Class Notes for Philosophy 251: Fall 1996

Notes for Class Two (Sept. 4)

Freedom and Determinism

Metaphysics is the study of the nature of reality. It investigates what it means to say
that something is real or exists. It reveals the differences between how things appear
and how they "really" are.

One of the major issues raised in metaphysics is the question of human freedom. It is
a major issue because it brings together most of the central questions of metaphysics.
It suggests that the experience of freedom might not reflect the reality of the human
situation; it raises the prospect that human beings might be radically different from
other things in reality; and it opens up the possibility that freedom (and even "reality")
might not be an either-or kind of thing. That is, the freedom-determinism issue might
be the kind of issue that allows us to talk about something's being "more or less" real.

It is obvious that we often feel that we are free to do what we do and to make the
choices we make. Those who defend the view that we are free point to the fact that we
can reflect on our options and can decide to act one way or another. Determinists, on
the other hand, point out that this is a classic case of the difference between
appearance and reality: we appear to be free, when we are really caused to think and
act in certain ways based on past experiences, social conditioning, and even genetic
predispositions. These forces not only affect our choices and actions (often without
our aware of them); they create them. Freedom is thus an illusion.

In order to make sense of this debate, we have to get clear about what we mean by
freedom. Proponents of freedom admit that there are ways in which people are not
free: for example, you are not free to violate the law of gravity by flying around the
room. And external threats to your safety or social pressure are sometimes so strong
that it seems odd to say that your freedom has not been limited. Some would even say
that character or personality can create conditions that prevent a person from doing
certain actions. In like manner, guilt, shame, or conscience can be constraints on one's
freedom. So external forces (such as threats or genetic make-up) cannot be the only
influences we need to take into account in discussing freedom.

Determinists often differ in their explanations about how we are constrained to act.
But they generally agree that, like everything else in the universe, human choices and
actions have causes that determine them to be exactly what they are. Even so-called
random or whimsical decisions or actions are caused by something (though we may
not be able to say exactly what). To imagine an uncaused act or thought is to imagine
something that is unlike anything else in nature. It would be to think of human beings
as somehow inexplicable.

Determinism is different from predestination and fatalism, in that the latter two refer
to causes outside of nature. According to predestination, God knows at the moment of
creation who will be saved and who will be condemned for all eternity, and in this
sense has determined beforehand who are the elect and who are the damned. Our
destinies have already been determined in God's creation of the world because he
knows who will do good and who will do evil in the world he creates. This might
seem unfair to the damned and not the act of a loving Father; but at least the damned
get a chance to live.

According to the fatalist, whatever we choose or do is determined by fate. Unlike the

laws of nature (which describe the regularities of things interacting in nature), fate
governs all things in nature by being the external force determining nature itself.
Determinism is a theory that specifically refers to human choices and actions, but
fatalism encompasses all events, including those involving inanimate objects. [A
typical objection raised against fatalism is that, if people really did believe that fate
determined their lives, there would be little reason for them to do anything. Fatalism
seems to invite resignation and to encourage a sense in which no one takes
responsibility for anything.]

Our study of the freedom-determinism question will focus on five viewpoints:

 1. Hard Determinism (Skinner and Freud)

 2. Soft-Determinism, Compatibilism (Aristotle, Augustine, Spinoza, Hume)
 3. Pragmatism/Indeterminism (William James)
 4. Existentialism (Sartre)
 5. Rational-Agent or Person Theory (Stoics, Albert Ellis)

I. Hard Determinism: Since every event in nature has a cause or causes that account
for its occurance, and since human beings exist in nature, human acts and choices are
as determined as anything else in the world. Behavior may be determined by many
things (e.g., heredity, environment), but it certainly is due to such causal factors.
There is no real freedom, only the illusion of freedom (which is due to an ignorance of
the true causes of actions). Since people are not morally responsible for their actions
and cannot do other than what they do, thinking that they are responsible is
unjustified. However, we are justified in holding people responsible for their actions--
that is, in providing further influences and causes in their lives--in order to get them to
act in socially desirable ways in the future.
Note: do not confuse being responsible for one's free actions with being held
responsible for one's actions. Though someone might not be free to act, that does not
automatically mean that the person cannot justifiably be held responsible for the act--
for example, to fulfill some social or political purpose. Punishment or reward might
still be used even if there is no real freedom as further causal determinants of
behavior.

B. F. Skinner: the predictability of human behavior indicates that human beings are
determined to act in certain law-like ways based on being conditioned. Positive
reinforcement makes us happy, negative reinforcement makes us sad. Because we
seek happiness, positive reinforcement is more effective than negative reinforcement.
If an environment is bad enough, we will react against it.

This way of thinking treats human actions as events described or explained in terms of
causes rather than reasons, intentions, or purposes. Depending on what kind of
explanation we give, we get a different account of what makes behavior intelligible.
To use concepts like freedom and moral worth (or dignity) is to rely on an account in
which intention is something over which we have control. And we hold people
responsible (morally and legally) for what we think could have been done differently
or not at all. But once we think that actions are determined by causes, we move (in
Skinner's phrase) "beyond freedom and dignity."

Objections: (1) Though deterministic behaviorism can make predictions about

unreflective (un-thought-out) responses to stimuli, it cannot predict how people will
choose or act when they have had a chance to think through their decision.
Furthermore, it cannot account for our ability to challenge and change the attitudes
and desires that we have learned.

(2) Though many things we do are explainable in terms of causes, some things we do
can be explained only by appealing to reasons: that is, our decisions are often
intelligible only by knowing what purposes or goals we had in mind when acting.
Determinism assumes that there is only one way to explain behavior (viz., causes),
when in fact there is another way of explaining behavior (viz., reasons) which is just
as good.