Averroes and Hegel on

Philosophy and Religion

Comparing Averroes’ and Hegel’s positions on the relation between philosophy and
religion, this book explores the theme of the authorities of faith and reason, and the
origin of truth, in a medieval Islamic and a modern Christian context respectively.
Through an in-depth analysis of Averroes’ and Hegel’s parallel views on the
nature of philosophical and religious discourse, Belo presents new insights into
their perspectives on the relation between philosophical knowledge and religious
knowledge, and the differences between philosophy and religion. In addition, Belo
explores particular works which have not yet been studied by modern scholarship.
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 Averroes and Hegel on
Philosophy and Religion

Catarina Belo
The American University in Cairo, Egypt
First published 2013 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge

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Copyright © Catarina Belo 2013

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be identified as the author of this work.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

Belo, Catarina C. M. de M. (Catarina Carriço Marques de Moura), 1974–
Averroes and Hegel -on Philosophy and Religion / by Catarina Belo.
pages cm
Includes index.
ISBN 978-1-4094-3386-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Philosophy and religion. 2. Averroes,
1126–1198.
3. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831. I. Title.
BL51.B5135 2013
201’.61–dc23
2013004620
ISBN 9781409433866 (hbk)
ISBN 9781315568515 (ebk)
 Contents

Acknowledgements   vii

Introduction: Philosophy and Religion in Hegel and Averroes   1

1 The Decisive Treatise: A Project for the Harmony between

Philosophy and Religion   21

2 Demonstrative Discourse in Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s

Posterior Analytics   49

3 Dialectical and Rhetorical Discourse in Averroes’ Commentaries

on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric   75

4 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings   109

5 Hegel: Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the

Phenomenology of Spirit   125

6 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures   149

Conclusion   189

Bibliography   195
Index   213
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Acknowledgements

This book could not have been completed without the generous help of many
friends and colleagues. I first came across the idea for this book while reading
an article – mentioned in the introduction – by Josep Ignasi Saranyana, who
subsequently furnished further materials and advice for this project.
Moreover, in the course of researching for and writing this book, I received
much advice and materials from Averroes experts, namely Maroun Aouad, Charles
Butterworth, Rafael Ramón Guerrero, and Richard Taylor. I also received much
support and assistance from Hegel scholars, namely William Desmond, Manuel José
do Carmo Ferreira, Stephen Houlgate, Vincenzo Lomuscio, and Walter Jaeschke.
Colleagues from the American University in Cairo and other friends also provided
advice and relevant materials: Abraham Anderson, Alexandre Caeiro, Richard
Fincham, Eric Goodfield, William Melaney, Gavin Rae, and Alessandro Topa.
My home institution, The American University in Cairo, kindly supported this
project financially with various grants.
Last but not least, I am grateful to Johanna Baboukis and Laura Macy for the
careful and attentive proof-reading of the text.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Introduction
Philosophy and Religion in
Hegel and Averroes

In an article concerning the theological position of Averroes (Arabic Ibn Rushd,

1126–1198 CE), Spanish scholar J.I. Saranyana traces the history of scholarship
on Averroes to the present with a focus on a particular issue: the Andalusian
philosopher’s true position with regard to religion.1 Much ink has been spilt on this
controversial issue since the Middle Ages, when Averroism was often perceived
as conflicting with religion in general and in particular with Christianity. To
Averroes was ascribed the theory of the ‘double truth’, according to which there
is a religious truth and a philosophical truth which are often at variance, with the
hidden assumption that philosophical truth is preferable to religious truth. Among
the first modern interpreters of Averroes, Saranyana mentions Ernest Renan. On
Saranyana’s interpretation, Renan imputes to Averroes views similar to those held
by the German idealist philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831).
According to Saranyana, Hegel defended the idea that philosophy and religion
have the same content, but express themselves in different ways: religion through
imagination and representation, and philosophy in a conceptual and intellectual,
hence more rigorous, way. Saranyana considers that this view favours philosophy
over religion, inasmuch as the philosophical message is perceived to contain and
qualitatively to supersede the religious message.
The present study aims to examine the relationship between philosophy and
religion, based on the similarities and differences between philosophical language
or discourse and religious language, first in Averroes and then in Hegel, with a
view to shedding light on the relation between philosophy and religion, a theme
that preoccupied both philosophers throughout their lifetimes.
This study offers a thematic rather than a strictly historical comparison,
given that Hegel does not seem to have been directly influenced by Averroes and

1
Josep Ignasi Saranyana, ‘Los presupuestos teológicos de Averroes’, in Averroes
y los Averroismos: Actas del III Congreso Nacional de Filosofia Medieval (Zaragoza:
Sociedad de Filosofía Medieval, 1999), pp. 129–44, especially pp. 134–5. A connection
between Islamic philosophy and Hegel on this issue, as Saranyana points out, is also
made by Rafael Ramón Guerrero, ‘La filosofia árabe medieval’, in Actas del I Congreso
Nacional de Filosofía Medieval, ed. Jorge Ayala Martínez (Zaragoza: Sociedad de Filosofía
Medieval-Ibercaja, 1992), pp. 129–57, in particular pp. 147 and 152, focusing particularly
on al-Kindi and Alfarabi.
2 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

does not rate the medieval Muslim philosophers highly in his Lectures on the
History of Philosophy, considering them merely to repeat and convey, for the
most part, Aristotle’s views. He considers medieval Islamic philosophy to have
contributed nothing particular or special to the history of philosophy, but notes
its imaginativeness (probably having in mind the theology – kalām – tradition,
to which he devotes a much more detailed treatment than he does to philosophy
proper). He does not think of it as philosophy as such, and he follows Maimonides’
account of the development of Islamic philosophy and theology in the Guide of
the Perplexed, duly noting the rise of Aristotelianism in this period. The relation
between philosophy and religion is not seen as controversial; rather, Hegel states
that the philosophers (and theologians) developed their debates within a purely
religious context and were limited by dogma and Islamic revelation. Their aim
was thus to defend Islamic ideas – an emphasis on religion which is probably
explained by Hegel’s focus on the Islamic theologians. The main philosophers,
such as al-Kindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes he treats as merely Aristotelian
commentators.2 Thus his own thinking on philosophy and religion is not directly
influenced by medieval Islamic philosophy, which is not surprising, given that
scholarly research on medieval Islamic philosophy had hardly begun – it was in fact
truly inaugurated by Renan’s Averroès et l’averroïsme (1852). A possible impact
through medieval authors influenced by Averroist ideas is not to be excluded but
would require a separate study. Hegel had many words of praise for medieval
Scholastic philosophy, in particular for St Anselm of Canterbury, and he was fond
of other, controversial authors such as Meister Eckhart.
In spite of the many centuries separating Averroes and Hegel, and the widely
different social and cultural milieus in which they lived, there is a remarkable
similarity in their approaches, as we will see. The relationship between philosophy
and religion preoccupied many philosophers and thinkers, but it occupies the
absolute centre stage in the philosophies of Averroes and Hegel, due to their
personal interests and to the contemporary intellectual challenges facing them.
A comparison between these two philosophers should also shed further light on
their views, by comparing and contrasting them. Differences between these two
philosophers will also be noted towards the end of this study.
It must be borne in mind that many contemporary studies are available on
Averroes’ approach to religion, as well as on Hegel’s philosophy of religion. This
study will focus on the specificities of religious versus philosophical discourse
in Averroes and Hegel respectively, while taking into account previous scholarly
contributions to the discussion of this or related topics. In Averroes, this implies a
detailed study of the difference between the demonstrative method as opposed to
the dialectical and rhetorical methods, and in Hegel a discussion of the differences
between religious representation and conceptual (philosophical) thinking, in the
various works in which both philosophers treat these topics.

2
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II, ed. Eva Moldenhauer
and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), pp. 514–23.
 Introduction 3

In analysing these themes, I take into account two radically different historical
and cultural contexts, and the medieval versus the post-Enlightenment setting, as
well as the religious background of both philosophers, Sunni Islam in the case of
Averroes, and Christianity, more specifically Lutheranism, in the case of Hegel.
The stark historical and cultural contrast between Averroes and Hegel will only
help to bring their positions into sharper focus, especially as there is an evident
parallelism between them.
Averroes’ ‘agenda’ for reconciling philosophy and religion is explicitly laid
down in his work The Decisive Treatise (Faṣl al-maqāl), where Averroes seeks to
demonstrate that the message of the Qu’ran is identical with the pursuit of truth
undertaken by philosophy, which for Averroes is equivalent to Aristotle’s thought.
The Decisive Treatise states that the religious and the philosophical message
are at bottom one and the same. On this assumption, religion and philosophy
present the truth in different ways but share the same content. For him, the text
which contains religious truth is the Qur’an, rather than Aristotle, who addresses
primarily philosophers and draws a specific, limited audience. The Qur’an is
directed at everyone, including Muslim theologians and philosophers. Averroes
states that the Qur’an contains three ways of producing belief or faith in three
corresponding classes of people: demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical (or,
respectively, the philosophers, the speculative theologians of Islam, and the
majority of people). How convincing is his view that the same truth can be validly
expressed in these three ways without a change in content?
This project of harmonisation is implicitly pursued in other works, not
only his non-exegetical works, such as the The Incoherence of the Incoherence
(Tahāfut al-Tahāfut), in which Averroes speaks in his own name in defence of
the philosophical tradition, but also in his commentaries on Aristotle, in which
he introduces religious and theological topics and debates into his comments.
Dubbed the ‘Commentator’ of Aristotle’s works in medieval times, Averroes
presents remarkably original insights into several philosophical issues. One of the
topics in which he showed great resourcefulness and originality was the issue of
the relation between Islam and philosophy.
Religion is an abiding theme in Hegel’s writings. The young Hegel wrote a Life
of Jesus and various works on Christianity and Judaism, as well as on ancient Greek
religion. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807)
Hegel discusses religion and its relation to philosophy, including the difference
between representational thinking and conceptual thinking, employed respectively
in religion and philosophy; in fact, Hegel’s most elaborate single discussion of the
distinction between philosophy and religion is found in this work.
In Hegel, this question can be approached from at least two different, but
related, perspectives. An epistemological approach would take into account the
specificities of religious versus philosophical discourse. Which kind of intellectual
faculty or mode of apprehension is used in religious, as opposed to philosophical,
thought? On the other hand, the issue could be approached from a metaphysical
or ontological perspective, given that in Hegel the epistemological is never truly
4 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

separable from the ontological, if his dialectical scheme is taken into account. The
intertwining of the epistemological and the ontological is particularly evident in
the Phenomenology of the Spirit’s account of the process though which the Spirit
becomes what it truly is through self-knowledge, eventually attaining to absolute
knowledge. Thus knowing and being are united in Hegel’s Spirit, the axis of his
systematic philosophy. This study will focus on the epistemological aspects of the
relation between philosophy and religion without losing sight of the ontological
dimension of the question.
The Phenomenology of Spirit presents the unfolding of the Spirit as it proceeds
through various stages of development, from consciousness to absolute knowing
through self-consciousness, reason and Spirit. Hegel claims that philosophy and
religion represent the same substance but in different ways. Philosophy uses pure
concept or notion (Begriff), where the form is entirely adequate to the content
conveyed, while religion uses representation (Vorstellung), which appears to be a
lower stage of knowledge or consciousness. While it is clear that Hegel considered
Christianity to be the last stage of the unfolding of the Spirit in religious terms,
his position is not unambiguous if this consummate religion implies a degree of
‘picture-thinking’, as some translators have rendered his ‘Vorstellung’, which
seems to fall short of the accuracy of philosophical discourse.
In what follows, I will first present the problem in Averroes and Hegel and
analyse its reception among philosophers and scholars, proceeding to providing an
overview of the central chapters of this study. The questions surrounding the relation
between philosophy and religion in Averroes and Hegel are complex and have a
long history with regard to their impact on subsequent philosophical movements
and trends. If we consider the case of Averroes, we find an explicit attempt to show
the convergence between philosophy, more specifically the Aristotelian tradition as
developed in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and religion, particularly Islam. An
Arabic and Islamic tradition of philosophy developed in the wake of the reception
of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy into the Islamic Empire – once the Islamic
armies had entered geographical areas that were part of the Hellenistic world.
While its relation to Islamic religion was always in the background and shaped
that tradition, Averroes makes it an explicit theme in his writings. Therefore it is
worth noting that this Andalusian philosopher’s approach marks a watershed in the
understanding of the relation between philosophy (falsafa, from the Greek) and
Islam. Previously, Muslim philosophers such as al-Kindi (d. c.866), Alfarabi (d.
950) and Avicenna (d. 1037) had included Islamic elements in their philosophical
systems but in a rather less explicit manner. We find in al-Kindi the defence of a
universe created in time, contrary to Aristotle’s position in the Physics that the
world has existed from eternity and will not cease to exist. Al-Kindi also engaged
in the theological debates that were taking place in Baghdad in the ninth century.
In Alfarabi’s Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City, we
find a comprehensive system that encompasses all aspects of reality. The attentive
reader cannot fail to notice the similarities between Alfarabi’s description of the One
with its many attributes and the attributes traditionally ascribed to God in Islam.
 Introduction 5

The focus on God’s oneness, perfection, eternity, wisdom and splendour remind us
of the medieval Islamic debates over God’s attributes. Some aspects of Avicenna’s
philosophy also bear distinctive marks of an Islamic approach to religion and
God. Avicenna’s metaphysics, in particular, provides a proof of God’s existence
and stresses his oneness, raising the attributes of existence and oneness above all
others. These and other medieval Islamic philosophers integrate religious themes,
such as prophethood and revelation, into their works.
Notwithstanding this context, and in spite of noticeable elements of Islamic
doctrine and the influence of Islamic theology (kalām) in these philosophers, some
could argue that a more explicit attempt to show the congruence between philosophy
and Islamic religion, in particular with regard to the creation of the world and God’s
agency and nature, was lacking. Ibn Tufayl’s (c. 1110–1185) philosophical romance
Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, which attempts to show that religion teaches the same as natural
reason, can arguably still be considered an implicit endeavour to highlight the
harmony between philosophy and religion. Since Ibn Ṭufayl was a contemporary of
Averroes in al-Andalus, and introduced Averroes to the Almohad emir Abū Ya‘qūb
Yūsuf, his work may well have directly influenced Averroes.
Although influenced by kalām, a religious discipline seeking to unveil
God’s nature and attributes and the status of creatures and creation on the basis
of the Qur’an as a whole, falsafa nevertheless remained a separate discipline
which borrowed primarily from the Aristotelian tradition, through the Arabic
translation of the majority of works by Aristotle and his commentators, and from
the Neoplatonic school, known primarily through the Theology of (the Pseudo-)
Aristotle, which consisted in a translation of the last three books of Plotinus’
Enneads. Philosophy, as a foreign discipline, was viewed in many sectors of the
Islamic establishment with suspicion, and its orthodoxy was questioned.
It is worth recalling that, beginning in the eighth century, the Greek-into-
Arabic translation movement made available to Arabic readers a wealth of
scientific and philosophical works, paving the way for the further development of
various scientific fields by Arabs and Muslims across the Islamic Empire. While
some of these ‘discoveries’, such as mathematics, were welcomed and accepted
for their usefulness, other disciplines, such as philosophy, in particular physics and
metaphysics, were viewed as conflicting with religion in their unorthodox positions
on God and creation. Several philosophers in the Greek tradition accepted that the
world was eternal rather than created in time, and could not accept that God, who
was unmovable and unchangeable, would care for the particulars of his creation,
or could concern himself with individual human destinies. One may argue that
these philosophers, such as Avicenna and Alfarabi, were more engaged in working
out the implications of the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophical traditions,
conceiving systems based on Neoplatonic theories, than in attempting explicitly to
incorporate aspects of Islamic religion into their systems. A case in point is their
position on the soul, stating that not all souls survive after death, and also leaving
open the issue of bodily resurrection.
6 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

The issue of the compatibility of falsafa with Islam reaches a high point with
the accusations raised by al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) in his The Incoherence of the
Philosophers. Al-Ghazzali was a prominent Muslim theologian who had devoted
his life to the study of all forms of learning, until he experienced a religious
conversion which led him to examine the various disciplines of learning in the
light of their orthodoxy. He finds fault with the philosophers and their defence
of the eternity of the world, and of a purely intellectual God who has no basis in
the Qur’an, is neither omnipotent nor omniscient and appears to lack a will. In
addition, philosophers fail to prove, or even take an interest in, the resurrection
of the human body after death. These views, according to al-Ghazzali, contradict
explicit Qur’anic statements to the effect that God created the world in time by a
free decision, that he knows every detail in the universe and that human beings
will be resurrected, body and soul, after death.
Al-Ghazzali championed a particular school of theology, the Ash‘arite school,
named after its founder al-Ash‘ari (d. 935). This school is known for its more
literal reading of the Qur’an and a defence of the uncreatedness of the Qur’an,
which they viewed as the eternal speech of God, rather than as something created
by him. Moreover the Ash‘arites qualified the theory of human freedom and
responsibility, which was a moot point in medieval Islamic theology. Another
major, earlier school, the Mu‘tazilite school (founded in the mid-eighth century),
had defended the createdness of the Qur’an and human freedom and responsibility
(because God could not justly reward and punish human beings if they lacked true
freedom of action). The Mu‘tazilite view was closer to that of the philosophers –
indeed al-Kindi was synpathetic to their position – but it was the Ash‘arite school
which came to dominate in Sunni Islam.
Al-Ghazzali’s attack on philosophy did not go unnoticed. Averroes, noting
the influence and prevalence of al-Ghazzali’s writings and theology in his native
Andalusia, and seeing the threat posed to philosophy, made an eloquent and
systematic effort to rehabilitate this discipline and an explicit endeavour to defend
Islamic philosophy and the legitimacy of studying Aristotle and the Ancients. He
carried out this project in works such as The Incoherence of the Incoherence, a
point-for-point refutation of al-Ghazzali’s attacks on the philosophers, but most
pointedly in his Decisive Treatise on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy. In
this work, which will be the subject of the next chapter, he set himself the twofold
task of demonstrating that, according to Islamic law, it is permissible to study
philosophy, including the books of the Ancients, and to show that philosophy does
not contradict Islamic religion. Before detailing in the next chapter how he carried
out this project, it is worth noting his emphasis on the existence of only one truth.
According to Averroes, there is not a religious truth and a philosophical truth that
are at odds, but only one truth to be found in both philosophy and religion. In this
process, Averroes attempted to defend a more rationalist approach (which allowed
for a greater freedom in interpreting the Qur’an in the light of human reason) and
thus the freedom to philosophise; but he was unable to reverse the trend set by
al-Ghazzali.
 Introduction 7

So how did the theory of the double truth come to be associated with Averroes?
This controversy goes back to the Middle Ages and the transmission of Arabic
science and philosophy to the European Latin world. Parallel to the rise of the
universities, a renewed interest in the philosophy of Aristotle and his commentators
made itself felt. The medieval universities purported to teach all the subjects of
knowledge – this included philosophy (as well as law and medicine) with all its
branches, not excluding the natural sciences. One philosopher was known to have
written extensively on all subjects – Aristotle, whose works were considered dense
and difficult to grasp. Therefore, a need was felt for the use of commentaries,
ancient and medieval, on the work of the Stagirite. No commentaries were more
detailed than those produced by Averroes, and he came to be known as ‘the
Commentator’. He wrote different kinds of commentaries, some more detailed
than others, and his long, highly detailed commentaries were soon translated into
Latin and became widely read.
It took the best part of the thirteenth century for this science and philosophy
to be adapted by Christian philosophers and theologians and incorporated into
Christian theology. Some of the figures involved in this effort were St Albert
the Great and especially his student St Thomas Aquinas, the first having written
extensively on Aristotelian science and philosophy, and the latter incorporating
Aristotelian logic and ethics into a comprehensive system of Christian theology.
While an earlier period, the Patristic period, had seen the adoption of Neoplatonic
language and concepts into Christian theology, this new phase implied an
acceptance of Aristotelian language and substantial aspects of his philosophy as a
means of expressing Christian theology and dogma. However, in order to achieve
this, while ensuring adherence to correct doctrine, philosophy was made to serve
and be subsumed under theology (in the same way that reason was subordinated to
faith), the latter being the preferable, superior discipline of the two. Any doctrine
that was deemed to challenge church dogma would be rejected, in a smooth
adoption of Aristotelian philosophy.
With regard to Averroes’ role in this process, it should be noted that his works
dealt with a vast range of topics, from all branches of philosophy to medicine and
jurisprudence, and not all of these works were translated into Latin; thus a partial
and even distorted image of this philosopher was bound to emerge in the Latin
West. His works defending the harmony between faith and reason, and seeking
to articulate religion and philosophy, were not known to the likes of St Albert
the Great and St Thomas Aquinas, who opposed the philosophical school that
came to be known as Averroism. Morever, Averroes explicitly stated in his long
commentaries, written towards the end of his life, that Aristotle had founded the
main disciplines of knowledge, namely logic, physics and metaphysics, and had
committed no significant errors, wherefore nothing significant could be added to
his ideas and writings. This appeared to place Aristotle above other sources of
knowledge, specifically revelation; and this did not go unnoticed by his Latin readers.
In addition his interpretations of Aristotle were read with a critical eye and not
accepted wholesale. In particular, the eternity of the world, defended by Averroes
8 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

as it had been proved by Aristotle, was not acceptable to Christian theologians.

They also rejected Averroes’ particular interpretation of Aristotle on the soul, to the
effect that the human intellect does not survive individually after death but becomes
fused with a universal intellect, which is common to all human beings. While, for
instance, Avicenna, whose works were also translated into Latin, defended the
idea that the soul retains in the afterlife the individuality it had acquired by being
attached to a specific body, Averroes interpreted Aristotle’s text as stating that the
soul became totally separate from the material, bodily element, and could have no
individuality, an objectionable view in the eyes of Christian theologians because it
undermined the dogma of individual salvation and immortality.3
The process of adaptation of Aristotelian metaphysical principles and science
into the medieval Christian context was a collective effort, which unfolded under
the strict supervision of Church leaders, Aristotelian studies being banned at
several stages by concerned bishops. In particular, Christian theologians did not
feel bound to accept Aristotle’s argument for the eternity of the world, especially as
it contradicted the biblical account of creation in time. Therefore, notwithstanding
their admiration for the Stagirite, they did not support all of Aristotle’s positions.
The reception of Aristotelian studies was remarkably different in the Islamic
world than later in the Christian world. As Averroes states in his Decisive Treatise,
there is no consensus on matters of doctrine in the Islamic community, whereas
a consensus regarding matters of religious practice does exist. This allowed
theologians and philosophers a more or less free interpretation of the Qur’an and
great freedom in adopting and assimilating the works of the ancient philosophers.
Averroes uses this argument to make a case for incorporating Aristotelian science
into the Islamic sciences – although these arguments were not known, as we have
seen, to the medieval Latin theologians. This freedom of inquiry into theoretical
matters had also given rise to many disparate schools of theology in Islam, which
championed readings of the Qur’an which were more or less literal and a general
approach to religion which could be more rationalist or more traditional.
While several thirteenth-century Christian theologians took it upon themselves
gradually to integrate Aristotelian philosophy into Christianity, some reclaimed
the right to teach Aristotle independently of revelation. Thus, a school inspired by
Averroes’ interpretations of Aristotle thrived in Europe from the thirteenth century
onwards. This movement, known as Latin Averroism, had as its major exponent
Siger of Brabant (ca. 1240–1280s), who, contrary to the prevalent trend in Christian
theology, defended the idea that reason need not submit to revelation or scripture,
but should have free rein to inquire by itself. In connection with Siger of Brabant,
double truth consisted in affirming the independence of philosophical statements
from religious statements. Religion and philosophy could say different or even

3
Averroes came to be associated with materialism (thus denying any spiritual reality)
from the thirteenth century onwards; see Ernest Renan, Averroès et l’averroïsme: Essai
historique, 4th ed. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), p. 237.
 Introduction 9

opposite things concerning the same subject.4 While for some this divergence of
truths need not necessarily create problems for theology, some Latin Averroists
were considered to have followed philosophical, rather than theological, truth.5
The term Averroism had many meanings: it could refer to scholars who simply
used and admired Averroes’ commentaries, or it could be applied to those who
defended the ideas contained in those commentaries, upholding specifically

4
This particular theory of the double truth seeks to avoid a clash between religious
authority and philosophical theories. As Gilson states, while admitting that he had not
found any medieval philosopher openly admitting this theory of the double truth, ‘in
order to free themselves from those contradictions, some among the Masters of Arts of the
Parisian Faculty of Arts chose to declare that, having been appointed to teach philosophy,
and nothing else, they would stick to their own job, which was to state the conclusions of
philosophy such as necessarily follow from the principles of natural reason. True enough,
their conclusions did not always agree with those of theology, but such was philosophy and
they could not help it. Besides, it should be kept in mind that these professors would never
tell their students, nor even think among themselves, that the conclusions of philosophy
were true. They would say only this, that such conclusions were necessary from the point of
view of natural reason; but what is human reason as compared with the wisdom and power
of an infinite God? … The conclusions of philosophy are at variance with the teaching of
Revelation; let us therefore hold them as the necessary results of philosophical speculation,
but, as Christians, let us believe that what Revelation says on such matters is true; thus, no
contradiction will ever arise between philosophy and theology, or between Revelation and
reason’, Étienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1938), pp. 56–7.
5
Various scholars suggest that the theory of the double truth was not championed by
the medieval philosophers to which it was attributed, with the underlying assumption that
it was used as an accusation against them. According to Carlos Bazán, Alain de Libera, for
instance, attributes its invention to Étienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris who condemned
many Aristotelian theories that were being taught at the Faculty of Arts of the University
of Paris in the thirteenth century. ‘Four such doctrines appear to offer the best chances of
finding the defining features of radical Aristotelianism: unicity of the intellect, eternity of
the world, intellectual determinism, and the idea of happiness attained through philosophy
as the most perfect state of human life’, B. Carlos Bazán, ‘Radical Aristotelianism in the
Faculties of Arts: The Case of Siger of Brabant’, in Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der
Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de
Mayronis, ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer and Marc-Aeilko Aris
(Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2005), p. 590. For the association of the theory of the double
truth with Étienne Tempier, see also Zeinab El-Khodeiry, Athar Ibn Rushd fī Falsafat
al-‘Uṣūr al-Wusṭā (Beirut: Dār al-tanwīr, 2007), p. 138; and Massimo Campanini in his
Introduction to the Incoherence of the Incoherence: Averroè, L’incoerenza dell’incoerenza
dei filosofi, ed. Massimo Campanini (Turin: UTET Libreria, 2006), p. 52.
10 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Averroes’ brand of Aristotelianism.6 This could mean the defence, for instance, of
a single immaterial intellect for all humanity, or the eternity of the world.7
Averroist theories developed throughout the Middles Ages, as did local
Averroist schools in Italy (noticeably Padua) up to and beyond the Renaissance.
There were many admirers of Averroes, as well as many detractors, from among
both the Dominicans and the Franciscans. Given the threat posed by Averroism
to Church doctrine and authority, the Fifth Lateran Council particularly targeted
this school of philosophy. Its eighth session, held on 17 December 1513, forbade
schools of philosophy from teaching the mortality of the human soul and the
theory that there is one intellect for all humanity. Moreover, the theory of the
double truth (together with the assumption that there was a philosophical truth at
variance with scripture) was rejected.8
Averroism was also associated with the ‘blasphemy of the three impostors’,
which claimed that the founders of the three main religions, Judaism, Christianity
and Islam, were not divinely inspired but taught a natural doctrine.9 This theory

6
See Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘Averroica Secta: Notes on the Formation of Averroist
Movements in Fourteenth-Century Bologna and Renaissance Italy’, in Averroès et les
Averroïsmes juif et latin: Actes du Colloque international, Paris, 16–18 juin 2005, ed. J.-B.
Brenet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 307–31, especially pp. 315–16. Hasse furthermore
notes that certain scholars of Siger of Brabant, such as Van Steenberghen, do not consider
Siger of Brabant an Averroist. Hasse himself defends the idea that Averroism – as a school
of philosophy, with Averroes thought of as a philosopher in his own right rather than just a
commentator – only comes of age around 1500, and matures during the Renaissance (ibid.,
p. 324).
7
‘It has long been observed that the term “Averroista,” since its first occurrence in
Thomas Aquinas’ De unitate intellectus, was linked to a specific philosophical position:
Averroes’ unicity thesis. It is obvious, however, that “Averroists” were associated with more
theses, predominantly in psychology, physics and metaphysics: (such) as the (Aristotelian)
thesis of the eternity of the world, the denial of God’s infinite power, the denial of God’s
knowledge of particulars, the theory that first matter is characterized by an indeterminate
dimensionality, which is coeval with it, or the theory of the happiness as reached through
knowledge of the separate substances’, Hasse, ‘Averroica Secta’, pp. 316–17.
8
Karl Werner, ‘Der Averroismus in der christlich-peripatetischen Psychologie des
späteren Mittelalters’, Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historische Classe der Akademie
der Wissenschaften 98 (1881): pp. 175–320; repr. in Islamic Philosophy, vol. 69, Abu
l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), Texts and Studies I, Ibn Rushd in the Western
Tradition, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin in collaboration with Mazen Amawi, Carl
Ehrig-Eggert, Eckhard Neubauer (Frankfurt am Main: Publications of the Institute for the
History of Arabic-Islamic Science, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999), p. 125.
9
See Paul Alphandéry, ‘Y a-t-il eu un averroïsme populaire au XIIIe et au XIVe
siècle?’, Revue de l’histoire des religions 44 (1901): pp. 395–406; repr. in Islamic Philosophy,
vol. 69, Abu l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), Texts and Studies I, Ibn Rushd in
the Western Tradition, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, in collaboration with Mazen
Amawi, Carl Ehrig-Eggert, Eckhard Neubauer (Frankfurt am Main: Publications of the
Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University,
 Introduction 11

resurfaced during the Enlightenment and was used as an argument aimed at

undermining Church doctrine and authority.10 These ideas were to find fertile
ground in the minds of the Enlightenment thinkers, such as Diderot, La Mettrie
and D’Holbach.11 An influence of Averroism on the Enlightenment can thus be
discerned, but we must bear in mind that Averroism conveyed a truncated and
thus distorted view of Averroes’ philosophy, which defended the identity between
religious and philosophical truth.12
The first part of the present study, devoted to Averroes, examines the differences
between religious and philosophical language in Averroes’ works, in particular
those that directly deal with the relation between philosophy and Islam, and more
specifically those dealing with the various types of discourse, demonstrative,
dialectical and rhetorical. Since the positions defended in the commentaries can
differ somewhat from the ones held in his ‘original’ works, some scholars believe
to have found the true Averroes in one to the exclusion of the other genre. However,
given Averroes’ own cross-references between these works, I will not make that
distinction and will take both the commentaries and his more personal works as
expressions of his own view – without losing sight of the fact that he believed that
Aristotle’s works contained the truth and nothing significant (or dissonant) could
be added to them.
I shall begin with Averroes’ description of the different types of discourse in
the Decisive Treatise and proceed to analyse his detailed commentaries on these
issues as treated by Aristotle, respectively in Posterior Analytics, which deals with
demonstrative discourse, in Topics, which deals with dialectical discourse, and
finally Rhetoric, which deals with rhetorical discourse. Therefore the theme of the
three kinds of discourse will be dealt with in the Decisive Treatise and then in his

1999), pp. 197–209, p. 199. See also Renan, Averroès et l’averroïsme, pp. 252, 279, 292, 298,
for his reputed denial of the Eucharist. In his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, Pierre
Bayle (1647–1706) also associated Averroes with the theory of the three impostors; see
Abraham Anderson, The Treatise of the Three Impostors and the Problem of Enlightenment:
A New Translation of the Traité des Trois Imposteurs (1777 Edition) (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1997), p. 148.
10
Descartes also sought to prove the immortality of the soul against the Averroists,
in particular Pomponazzi (1462–1525); see Anderson, The Treatise of the Three Impostors,
pp. 149–50. Bernard de la Monnoye (1641–1728) explicitly stated that Averroes had
mocked the three religions (ibid., p. 44).
11
See Marcelino Menendez Pelayo, ‘La impiedad averroista. Fray Tomas Scoto: El
libro “De tribus impostoribus”’, Boletín Historico 1 (1880), pp. 17–23; repr. in Islamic
Philosophy, vol. 69, Abu l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), Texts and Studies I,
Ibn Rushd in the Western Tradition, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, in collaboration
with Mazen Amawi, Carl Ehrig-Eggert, Eckhard Neubauer (Frankfurt am Main:
Publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, Johann Wolfgang
Goethe University, 1999), pp. 147–54, p. 150.
12
See Charles Butterworth, “Averroës, Precursor of the Enlightenment?, Alif, Journal
of Comparative Poetics 16 (1996): pp. 6–18, p. 7.
12 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

commentaries on these works by Aristotle. Thus both the commentaries and the
original works will be studied in order to understand what Averroes means by the
demonstrative, the dialectical and the rhetorical methods of presenting the truth.
With regard to the development of Averroes’ philosophy, an increasing
admiration for Aristotle is observable in the way in which Averroes writes with
increasing detail on the Stagirite’s corpus, from the short to the long commentaries.
This tendency is also attested by his gradual abandonment of some Neoplatonic
theories, such as emanation as a creation model, and the espousal of a more
Aristotelian position, whereby both the celestial and the earthly worlds come to be
through final causality rather than efficient causality.
A parallel issue (the difference between religious and philosophical discourse)
is observable in the German idealist philosopher Georg Friedrich Wilhelm
Hegel, a self-confessed Lutheran. Writing at the turn of the nineteenth century,
his discussion of the relation between philosophy and religion is informed by
his social and religious setting and follows from previous developments in the
history of philosophy on the issue. Hegel was writing in a post-Enlightenment,
Romantic setting vastly different from that of Averroes, both religiously and
historically. While the medieval period had the issue of God at heart, intellectually
and philosophically, the Renaissance heralded a period in which man takes centre
stage. This shift in focus is observable in the history of philosophy, with the
emphasis of Descartes (1596–1650), commonly known as the father of modern
philosophy, on the human subject and the ability of the human intellect to know
external objects as well as God. This kind of inquiry into the human intellect, the
central theme of modern philosophy, would survive into the Romantic period, and
even into the contemporary period.
With respect to the relationship between philosophy and religion, the early
modern era saw philosophy cease to be a handmaiden of theology as a propaedeutic
discipline, paving the way for the study of theology, and regain its autonomy.
Within the medieval Islamic context, Islamic philosophy, developed by Muslim
philosophers, had not been subordinated to theology, which had a speculative
rather than dogmatic character, but neither was it considered as one of the Islamic
sciences, or required for their study, as we have seen.
By the eighteenth century, deistic and atheistic trends in European philosophy
had emerged and were being openly voiced. Challenges to the hegemony of
theology and central Christian dogmas were coming from various quarters,
including from non-Christian thinkers such as Spinoza (1632–1677), who was
considered a pantheist, due to his identification of God and nature. In the medieval
period, some Averroist principles, such as the union of the human intellect with
the active intellect, had been considered anathema in Christian circles. Now in the
modern period such challenges were becoming more widespread and notorious.
Overt clashes between the respective domains of religion and philosophy,
and accusations of impiety on the part of religious or civil authorities against
philosophers, which were common in the ancient and in the medieval period did not
vanish with the Enlightenment – one need only recall Spinoza’s excommunication,
 Introduction 13

which had been preceded by that of Uriel da Costa in the Portuguese Jewish
community of Amsterdam. However, a growing shift of focus from a God-centred
to a human-centred inquiry develops, with a rising confidence in human reason to
discover truth by itself independently of an external principle, culminating in the
Enlightenment’s stress on the ability of human reason to discover truth – natural
truth by itself, as opposed to religious truth, which relies on authority.
One of the signs of the growing autonomy accorded to human reason by
philosophers is the study of religion as an academic subject, with the foundation
of the discipline of philosophy of religion – a discipline which would have been
inconceivable in the medieval period, given that it presupposes that philosophy
judges religion.13 The treatment of religion, indeed the various religions, as an
academic subject rather than from the point of view of faith and the authority of
the Church, would be out of place in the medieval curricula. These developments
occured alongside a common criticism against established religion in Europe,
propounded by the various figures of the European Enlightenment. These attacks
were not directed only at the Catholic Church or other Christian churches and
their hierarchical structures or their relation with temporal powers, but also at
the core of Christian doctrine, such as the belief in a transcendent, benevolent
and personal God.
At the time of Hegel’s formative period, the winds of the French Revolution
were making themselves felt in Germany, as well as the influence of the
Enlightenment authors. Hegel read Rousseau, Kant and other Enlightenment
thinkers as a young man, while pursuing his theological studies in Tübingen. His
Protestant background also meant a stress on a personal relation with God rather
than relying on authority for matters of faith.
Thus when writing about Christianity and about religion, Hegel’s context was
quite different from that of Averroes, given that the religious authorities did not
have quite the weight accorded to them in the medieval period, whether it be the
experts in Islamic law and jurisprudence at the time of Averroes, or the Church
authorities in the medieval European period. Nevertheless, Hegel’s Lectures on
the Philosophy of Religion, delivered at Berlin, show that he had many detractors
and had to face charges of pantheism. In 1799, charges of atheism had forced
Fichte to leave his teaching post at Jena – which goes to show that the relations
between philosophers and the religious and political authorities of the day were
not entirely uncomplicated even in a post-Enlightenment setting.
It must nevertheless be emphasised that Hegel received a Lutheran education,
having studied theology as well as philosophy at the theological Stift in Tübingen.
Religion was a constant theme in his writings. Next to philosophy, he considered

13
See Georges Van Riet, ‘Le Problème de Dieu chez Hegel’, Revue philosophique de
Louvain 63 (1965): pp. 353–418, p. 374.
14 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

religion the highest form of access to the truth. For the young Hegel, in fact,
religion is even more important than philosophy.14
His first writings deal with theological, or rather religious, instead of
philosophical themes, and his study of Lutheran Christianity formed his
philosophical outlook. Even when discussing philosophy, he ascribed to it a
religious quality, speaking for instance of philosophers as a priestly caste.15
While religion is never far from Averroes’ concerns, in Hegel too the boundaries
between religion and philosophy are not always easy to discern, for instance in
his treatment of concepts such as the Spirit and reconciliation, concepts that play
a pivotal role in Hegel’s system. The conceptual framework of his writings is
charged with religious meanings.16
The first period of Hegel’s writings shows the influence of Kant, in particular
in Hegel’s Life of Jesus, which portrays Jesus as a teacher of morality in a Kantian
vein. Later his position with regard to religion changes under the influence of
Romanticism, and he defends the idea that religion is a matter of the heart and not
a question of dogmatics. Once he decides to devote himself to philosophy, around
1800, he seeks to develop his own system of philosophy, influenced by the two
main philosophers of the day, Fichte (1762–1814) and Schelling (1775–1854),
who had been his roommate in Tübingen. His first attempts at developing his own
system date from the period he spent in Jena in the early 1800s, culminating with
the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which served as an introduction to
his system and contained his main mature philosophical ideas.

14
De Nys quotes Hegel to the effect that ‘there may be religion without philosophy,
but there cannot be philosophy without religion’, Martin J. De Nys, Hegel and Theology
(London: T. & T. Clark, 2009), p. 2.
15
See Jacques D’Hondt, ‘La Philosophie de la Religion de Hegel’, in Hegel et la
Religion, ed. Guy Planty-Bonjour (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 16.
16
Many Hegel scholars, for example in the Marxist tradition, have refused to admit
the existence of a truly transcendent element in Hegel’s philosophy and in his concept
of Spirit, which they consider to be purely human. References to religion are interpreted
by these scholars as purely metaphorical and religion as a purely human phenomenon in
Hegel, lacking a transcendent foundation. In Averroes, a certain modern interpretation has
stressed the political dimension of his philosophy to the detriment of the purely religious in
its own right – in other words, Averroes and other medieval Muslim philosophers conceived
of religion as a means to structure the Islamic state, rather than as an end in itself. See Leo
Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 10.
However, in the Decisive Treatise, Averroes explicitly rejects this conception of religion.
Hegel also explicitly says that in discussing the Spirit, he means the Holy Spirit, as we shall
see. Although Averroes’ and Hegel’s approaches to Islam and Christianity respectively were
considered unorthodox, Hegel’s views for instance being seen as pantheistic, it is difficult
to discern a dichotomy between exoteric (to please the authorities) and esoteric (their true)
positions, a dichotomy that is explicitly laid out in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed and
used by Leo Strauss as a blueprint for interpreting the whole medieval Islamic and Jewish
philosophical tradition.
 Introduction 15

As we have seen, it is in the Phenomenology, which treats the various forms

of knowledge and consciousness, as well as philosophical and intellectual
movements thoughout history, that he compares in great detail religion and
philosophy and distinguishes between a religious mode of apprehension, which
relies on representation or picture-thinking, and a philosophical method, which
uses conceptual thinking. Hegel claims that philosophy and religion represent the
same substance but in different ways. Philosophy uses pure concept or notion
(Begriff), in which the form is entirely adequate to the content conveyed, while
religion uses representation (Vorstellung), which appears to be a lower stage of
knowledge or consciousness.
Representation is associated with several religions including Christianity,
which, although ranking as the highest form of religion, still contains pictorial
elements (such as the idea of ‘father’ and ‘son’, which need to be further
spiritualised by philosophy). This comparison between philosophy and religion
sets the tone for Hegel’s later approach to religion and constitutes the core of his
philosophy of religion.
His controversial approach did not go unnoticed. In spite of his tendency to
treat theological or religious issues, from his early studies to his mature career,
he was not considered an orthodox Lutheran theologian by all, and he clashed
with the leading Lutheran theologians of the day, especially with Friedrich
Schleiermacher, who stressed the emotional aspect of Christianity. On the one
hand, Hegel emphasised the intersection between philosophy and religion, and
the role of reason in explaining Christian doctrines, as attested by his admiration
for medieval Christian philosophy and theology, in particular that of St Anselm.
On the other hand, he believed that Christian dogmas could be better understood
as explained by philosophy than by theology, which meant that his position was
neither typically Lutheran nor Catholic, and indeed not conventionally Christian
by any measure. Therefore, the reception of his writings was polemical, with some
scholars defending his orthodoxy and others attacking him, to the point that Hegel
was plagued by accusations of atheism and pantheism throughout his tenure of the
chair of philosophy in Berlin in the 1820s and until his death in 1831.17
The debate was prolonged after his death by his followers, who held vastly
different views on the religious legacy of Hegel’s writings. Hegel’s immediate
admirers and interpreters were split into Right and Left Hegelians.18 The former

17
See Laurence Dickey, ‘Hegel on Religion and Philosophy’, in The Cambridge
Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), pp. 301–47, p. 313.
18
‘Broadly speaking the Right composed all who interpreted the Hegelian logic
theistically: Hegel himself, they claimed, had believed in a personal God and in immortality,
and indeed had regarded himself as a good Lutheran. ... Thus basically the Right and Left
wings of Hegelianism divide on the meaning of the Absolute. The former interpret the Idea
in terms of a transcendent divine Spirit, the God of Christian theism; whereas for the latter
it is simply an abstraction, a “principle” the existence of which is realised only in the order
16 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

defended his orthodoxy, and are usually identified with the Old Hegelians, while
the latter dismissed any religious element in Hegel, a position taken by the
most radical Left Hegelians. Left Hegelians such as Marx would divest Hegel’s
philosophical system of any supernatural element. This complex legacy attests to
the complexity and even ambiguity of Hegel’s treatment of religion.
A parallelism between Averroes and Hegel can thus be discerned, although the first
seeks to reconcile philosophy and Islam, and the latter philosophy and Christianity.
Both Averroes’ and Hegel’s approaches to religion in general and specifically Islam
and Christianity were controversial in their own times and afterwards.19
This similarity does not rely on historical proximity, as we have seen, or
transmission. Except for the purported influence of Averroism on the development
of humanism and the Enlightenment in its confidence in human reason, the
historical link between the two philosophers is tenuous, and a link between them
is loosened by their different religious allegiances, Averroes as a Sunni Muslim,
and Hegel as a Lutheran Christian. Yet a parallelism exists in their handling of
religion and their analyses of the relation between religion and philosophy. This
affinity can partly be explained by the fact that both were philosophers with a keen
interest in religion, trying to explicate the relation between the two disciplines in
such a way that philosophy did not come out the loser.
The medieval and modern period equated Averroism with a rationalism that
excluded religion. The question of his sincerity in religious matters is still fiercely
debated in modern Averroes scholarship. Some scholars believe that his true
views are encapsulated in the commentaries on Aristotle’s works, which they say
are not easily reconcilable with the Qur’anic worldview. Other scholars believe

of nature and which is apprehended as such by the human intelligence. In the case of the
extreme Left this implies a purely naturalistic or materialistic view of reality’, Bernard
M.G. Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 136–7.
19
The issue of Hegel’s position on philosophy and religion and the medieval
controversy over the double truth is commented on by one Hegel scholar as follows: ‘Thus
the question the student of Hegel’s religious philosophy is bound to ask himself is whether
he is not being invited to admit a double standard of truth whereby what is acceptable
enough in theology can and needs to be explained away in philosophy. The notion of such a
double standard was of course by no means novelty, having been taught – or so their critics
objected – by the Averroist Siger of Brabant and his followers in the thirteenth century. Yet
we may be sure that Hegel himself would have denied maintaining anything of the sort:
truth for him, as for any rational man, was and could only be one ... what Hegel repeatedly
says (or consistently implies) when he distinguishes the Begriff from the Vorstellung, the
idea “in and for itself” from the mere mental picture (or ideas which still retain a pictorial
element within them) – between what in fact can be readily grasped by all men and what
is comprehensible only to the understanding few – certainly leaves the reader with the
impression that the truth is capable of being presented in ways so diverse that one statement
of it can be virtually negatived by another. That Hegel himself regarded the conceptual
rendering as superior to the merely representational is of the very essence of his doctrine’,
Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, pp. 116–17.
 Introduction 17

that Averroes expressed his true views also or especially in his more personal or
original works, in which an attempt to reconcile Aristotle and Islam is at work.
Similarly, Hegel scholarship has debated Hegel’s position with regard to
religion. Some have looked to his work for a discriminatory comparison between
the two disciplines, philosophy and religion, debating whether, as a philosopher, he
prefers philosophy to the detriment of religion; in other words, whether he considers
religion as an inferior discipline, subordinate to philosophy, the more scientific and
accurate of the two.20 The issue of representation has been studied in detail, but
a study of religious representation contrasted with conceptual thinking, deserves a
detailed treatment and will be the focus of the chapters on Hegel in this study.
The relationship and articulation between the respective domains of philosophy
and religion can be studied in various philosophical traditions throughout history
as a recurring theme, and the works of Hegel and Averroes are particularly
illustrative of an attempt to articulate the two disciplines.
Chapter 1 of this book takes Averroes’ Decisive Treatise as its starting point.
In this work Averroes states that the religious and the philosophical message are at
bottom one and the same. On this assumption, religion and philosophy present the
truth in different ways but share the same content. For him, the text which contains
religious truth is the Qur’an, rather than Aristotle, who addresses primarily the
philosophers and draws a specific, limited audience. The Qur’an is directed at
everyone, including Muslim theologians and philosophers. Averroes states that
the Qur’an contains three ways of producing belief or faith in three corresponding
classes of people: demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical (or, respectively, the
philosophers, the speculative theologians of Islam, and the majority of people).
What is the exact difference between these three kinds of discourse? The answer
to this question will be sought in the commentaries on Aristotle’s works. This
chapter also studies the interpretation of religious texts by Averroes. When it
comes to his approach to the philosophical versus the religious sources and texts,
while the Qur’an is a much more comprehensive text than Aristotle’s works, the
philosopher decides how the Qur’an is to be interpreted. If no disagreement is to

20
The question of Hegel’s understanding of religion as relying primarily on
representation is a theme debated already by Hegel’s own students in Berlin, in particular
the Young Hegelians; see The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, Introduced and Edited
by Lawrence S. Stepelevich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 6–7.
For more recent interpretations of Hegel’s position as amounting to a subordination of
religion to philosophy, see, for instance, Chapter 2 of William Desmond, Hegel’s God: A
Counterfeit Double? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), in particular pp. 67­–70; Patricia Marie
Carlton, Hegel’s Metaphysics of God: The Ontological Proof as the Develoment of a
Trinitarian Divine Ontology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 112; or Jacques D’Hondt, ‘La
Philosophie de la Religion de Hegel’, p. 15. According to Jamros, ‘Philosophy ranks higher
than religion, claims Hegel, because it comprehends what religion merely believes’, Daniel
P. Jamros, S.J., The Human Shape of God: Religion in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
(New York: Paragon House, 1994), p. 1. We shall see, however, that religion is not merely
grounded in belief but entails a cognitive content.
18 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

be found between the Qur’an and Aristotle, the Qur’an is to be taken literally. If any
disagreement becomes apparent, then the Qur’anic verses in question ought to be
metaphorically interpreted. For the question of religious interpretation another work
will be studied, namely Kashf ‘an-manāhij al-adilla fi ‘aqā’id al-milla (Uncovering
the Methods of Proofs concerning the Beliefs of the religious Community). Averroes’
commitment to the defence of an Islamic point of view is further buttressed by his
defence of the superiority of Islam in relation to other religions.
Chapter 2 deals with Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics,
which treats of scientific discourse, laying out the conditions for the obtention of
irrefutable demonstration (the tool used by philosophers in their argumentation
and reasoning). These commentaries represent a wealth of materials hitherto little
explored, which will shed light on Averroes’ understanding of the various types
of assent or belief, in particular demonstrative assent. These works will help to
elucidate Averroes’ understanding of demonstration as a specifically philosophical
mode of assent in contrast to dialectic and rhetoric.
In Chapter 3 I will study Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and
Rhetoric, which deal respectively with dialectic and rhetoric, a discipline aiming
at persuading most people for the most part. As we shall see, Averroes understands
the disciplines of dialectic and rhetoric in a religious as well as a philosophical
sense, and identifies the dialectical class with the theologians of his time, the
mutakallimūn. Equally, while rhetoric has a certain political use in Aristotle, as it
was bound up with the various political systems of his day, Averroes understands
it in the context of Islamic law and courts and as a useful political and religious
weapon in bringing about assent to religious principles by the majority of people.
For him, religion is an individual matter when it comes to the acceptance of the
divine message, but it has a political significance for bringing about political
cohesion and stability.
Chapter 4 marks the begining of this study’s treatment of Hegel. In it the young
Hegel’s attitude towards religion is analysed. The young Hegel is sceptical of a
dogmatic understanding of Christianity and prefers to focus on Jesus as a model
of perfect morals. A second period within this early approach is marked by a
Romantic influence, whereby religion becomes an affair of the heart, and a means
of educating the majority of people in matters of morality. In this early period
Hegel had not yet developed his own philosophical system, nor had he developed
the distinction between representation and conceptual thinking as the respective
modes of apprehension in religion and in philosophy.
Chapter 5 studies the Phenomenology of Spirit, with a focus on its treatment
of religion as opposed to philosophy and the differences between representational
thinking and conceptual thinking. The question of representation is analysed in
connection with faith, and also with specific religions, in particular Christianity.
This chapter also deals with absolute knowledge as a symbol for philosophical
thinking, which uses concept rather than representation.
Chapter 6 analyses Hegel’s understanding of representation versus conceptual
thinking, in the Berlin lectures on the philosophy of religion and on the history of
 Introduction 19

philosophy. Religion, defined by Hegel in the Phenomenology as self-consciousness

of absolute being, is on a level with philosophy. Conversely, philosophy is
understood as God’s thinking of himself. Hegel went on to state unambiguously
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that the Spirit, the summit of his
philosophical system, is God, which lends a theological colour to his metaphysics
and epistemology. However, the assumption remains that philosophy represents
the height of human scientific achievement, rather than religion, which employs
representation, a mode of thinking which is more dependent on the historical, the
contingent and the material than conceptual thinking, which is purely spiritual
and universal. This chapter will also examine Hegel’s position on the central role
of Christianity within philosophy and his position on other religions, especially
Islam. One of the important points to be addressed is the absence of a specific
chapter on Islam in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, which, although
consisting of only a few pages, is extant in his Lectures on the Philosophy of
History. Hegel’s understanding of Christianity in the context of the debate over the
relation between philosophy and religion will also be highlighted in this chapter.
The later Hegel is much more theologically inclined and offers detailed reflections
on the Trinity and the Incarnation, the two main Christian dogmas. It remains to be
seen if an ambiguity towards religion and Christianity remains.
The focal point for the present study on Averroes and Hegel is the concept
of the different registers, discourses or methods used in philosophy and religion
respectively. Both Averroes and Hegel believed that philosophy and religion each
had its own specific domain and means of expression, although they conveyed the
same message.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Chapter 1
The Decisive Treatise: A Project for the
Harmony between Philosophy and Religion

The Decisive Treatise is arguably, in modern scholarship on Islamic philosophy,

Averroes’ most famous and most studied work. Since it considers specifically
the relation between philosophy and Islam, a theme which guided Averroes’
philosophical project, it will be the starting point of our analysis. This remains a
much-debated work, as regards both content and style. While some scholars have
stressed its intended aim of demonstrating the harmony between philosophy and
religion, in particular the compatibility between Aristotle’s philosophy and Islamic
religion and precepts, others have argued that this is a legal document in the form
of a fatwa (furnishing a legal opinion), advocating the permissibility of studying
philosophy (falsafa, originally a Greek discipline) and conducting philosophical
investigations within an Islamic framework.1 Arguments have been put forward in

1
Averroes, Le livre du discours décisif, Introduction par Alain de Libera. Traduction
inédite, notes et dossier par Marc Geoffroy (Paris: Flammarion, 1996), Introduction, p. 11.
Other scholars defend an alternative translation of this work. El Ghannouchi proposes –
instead of ‘The Decisive Treatise on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy’, which
he states was first proposed by Léon Gauthier – ‘Distinction of the Religious Discourse
from the Philosophical Discourse’, in A. El Ghannouchi, ‘Distinction et relation des
discours philosophique et religieux chez Ibn Rushd: Fasl al-maqal ou la double verite’, in
Averroes (1126–1198), oder, der Triumph des Rationalismus: internationales Symposium
anlässlich des 800. Todestages des islamischen Philosophen, Heidelberg, 7.–11. Oktober
1998, ed. Raif Georges Khoury (Heidelberg: Winter, 2002), pp. 139–45, p. 140. In this
article El Ghannouchi defends the idea that Averroes upheld a double truth theory (as a
precursor of the Enlightenment, by emphasising the power of human reason), and not a
harmony or reconciliation between religion and philosophy. Richard Taylor proposes,
after El Ghannouchi, that the title be translated as ‘The Book of the Distinction of Discourse
and the Establishment of the Connection between the Religious Law and Philosophy’, in
Richard C.Taylor, ‘Averroes on the Sharī‘ah of the Philosophers’, in The Judeo-Christian-
Muslim Heritage: Philosophical & Theological Perspectives, ed. Richard C. Taylor and Irfan
A. Omar (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2012), pp. 283–304, pp. 285–6. George F.
Hourani provides a literal translation of the title as ‘The Book of the Decision (or Distinction)
of the Discourse, and a Determination of What There is of Connection between Religion and
Philosophy’, in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy. A translation, with
introduction and notes, of Ibn Rushd’s Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl, with its appendix (Ḍamīma)
and an extract from Kitāb al-kashf ‘an manāhij al-adilla (London: Luzac, 1976), p. 1. In
turn, Butterworth translates the title as ‘The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the
Connection between the Law and Wisdom’, in Averroës, Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory,
22 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

favour of labelling this work either a philosophical or a legal document. The full
title of the work reads The Book of the Decisive Discourse/Treatise establishing
the Connection between Religious Law/Religion and Wisdom/Philosophy. This
connection, as one realises in reading the Decisive Treatise, addresses two
questions: What is the status of the study of philosophy according to Islamic law?
And what is the connection between the message of the Qur’an and Aristotelian
philosophy? These two aspects thus complement each other, and both characterise
Averroes’ intention in composing the book. The study of philosophy is set against
the background of Islamic law whereby each action is judged according to five
categories: obligatory, recommended, permissible, blameworthy or forbidden.
Averroes speaks here clearly as a jurist and draws from his vast legal erudition,
using a language which highlights the legal aspect of the work. This is not to say
that the question of a possible compatibility between philosophy and the literal
text of the Qur’an is not raised. For example, the issue of the creation of the
world is addressed. If most theologians have considered the Qur’an to state that
the world was created in time by God through his will and omnipotence, how is
this reconcilable with Aristotle’s explicit affirmation in the Physics that the world,
although spatially finite, has always existed and always will? Many studies have
been devoted to this work, so it would be superfluous to provide a full synopsis
here, but some of the main points made by Averroes are worth highlighting before
proceeding to the differences between religious and philosophical language.
Let us then examine the various ways in which philosophy and religion
converge, and whether Averroes’ exposition achieves its intended goal. After
analysing the Decisive Treatise, we will compare it to his commentaries to check
for congruence or any discrepancies.
First, it is important to address the similarities and differences between
philosophy and Islamic law, and, more broadly, Islamic religion. This work is
clearly addressed to a Muslim audience.2 Although the study of philosophy is
foremost in his mind, the author draws on the Qur’an for corroboration of his
statements, or the Sunna, the body of religious tradition in Islam, which includes
the sayings and deeds of Muhammad. The positions taken are thus verified
according to their consonance with the Qur’an or the Islamic tradition.
Subsequently the connection between philosophy and religion will be analysed
in terms of content and ideas, and checked against the positions of Greek and
Hellenistic philosophers and their Muslim followers on specific points such as

translation, with introduction and notes, by Charles E. Butterworth (Provo: Brigham

University Press, 2001). Hourani remarks that a Hebrew translation of this work was made
in the late thirteenth or the early fourteenth century, but a Latin translation was apparently
never made; Hourani, Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, p. 41.
2
Avital Wohlman argues that the work was specifically addressed to the political
leaders of al-Andalus, the Almohads, in Al-Ghazali, Averroës and the Interpretation of the
Qur’an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam, trans. David Burrell (London: Routledge,
2010), p. 50.
 The Decisive Treatise 23

the creation of the world and God’s nature. In this context, the charges of impiety
levelled by al-Ghazzali against the philosophers and philosophy as an un-Islamic
discipline must be also taken into account.
From a legal point of view, and with regard to the category into which the study
of philosophy falls, Averroes argues that a Muslim who is intellectually gifted for
philosophy and morally upright and religious not only is allowed, but has a duty,
to study the sciences of the Ancients, in particular philosophy, with its various
disciplines from logic to physics and metaphysics.3 Thus the study of philosophy is
not just useful and certainly not to be condemned, but is in fact binding on certain
Muslims. The obligation to study philosophy is drawn from Qur’anic verses to the
effect that God commands believers to reflect on Creation (88:17–20) insofar as
it reflects the Creator’s glory and omnipotence. According to Averroes, the study
of philosophy is binding on some precisely because philosophy consists in the
reflection on the world as made by God and so in the study of God’s attributes. The
significance of philosophy is based on our capacity as human beings to understand
the Creation and, to some extent, God’s nature. Studying philosophy, then, is not
merely a reflection on existence, but primarily a reflection on God and his works,
and hence a direct or indirect contemplation of God.
The Andalusian philosopher answers potential objections to the study of
philosophy. For instance, philosophy could be detrimental to those who study it.
In particular, this discipline stands accused of fostering irreligion and immorality,
leading its adherents astray. Averroes rebuts this charge by stressing that philosophy
is beneficial for most who study it, and only accidentally leads to their moral and
religious downfall. In this respect it is no different from jurisprudence (fiqh), an
indisputably Islamic discipline.4 In fact, not to engage in this kind of enquiry and
grasp God in a philosophical and spiritual (that is, non-anthropomorphic) way
may lead to irreligion and unbelief in this group of people. The three different
ways of believing in God are laid out by Averroes in the Decisive Treatise and
will be explained later when the distinction between the three different classes of
people is expounded.
Another objection against philosophy is that it did not exist when Islam
originated in the Arabian Peninsula, with the underlying assumption that it is a
foreign and un-Islamic discipline, unlike, for instance, jurisprudence and other
Islamic sciences that are directly anchored in the interpretation of the Qur’an and
the Sunna rather than the works of the ancient Greeks. Averroes replies to this
objection to the effect that neither did jurisprudence exist at the birth of Islam
but was developed later, with the implication that it would not have been known
to Muhammad and his companions. This, however, would not obviate the charge
that philosophy, born in ancient Greece, has its roots in the books of the Ancients
rather than the sources of Islamic religion. Averroes stresses that the main Islamic
disciplines did not exist at the time of Muhammad, including Qur’anic exegesis

3
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 6.
4
Ibid., p. 7.
24 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

and the occasions of revelation; therefore this constitutes no obstacle to the study
and practice of philosophy. Addressing the charge that the content of philosophical
works goes against the explicit text of the Qur’an, Averroes begins by replying that
one must read the Ancients’ books with a critical eye with a view to discerning if
it, and what in it is truly against religion. He will later explain the way in which
philosophy does not contradict the Qur’an.
The parallelism between philosophy and jurisprudence is worth considering. We
have seen that Averroes was both a philosopher and a noted jurist, having authored
his own manual of Islamic law under the title of Bidāyat al-mujtahid (translated
into English as The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer).5 He compares both disciplines
in various ways, and seeks to legitimise philosophy through their similarities. He
illustrates the commonalities between jurisprudence and philosophy by drawing
on a polysemic Arabic term, qiyās, which is used in both disciplines. In the context
of Islamic law, qiyās is translated as ‘analogy’ and consists in the method whereby
a judge decides on a new case on the basis of previous, similar cases. In the context
of philosophy, it translates as ‘syllogism’, the Aristotelian type of logical reasoning
which consists of two premisses and a conclusion, in which the premisses are
better known than, and lead to, the conclusion (for instance: ‘All humans are
mortal; all philosophers are human(s); therefore all philosophers are mortal’).
Thus in both cases, analogy or syllogism, one can draw the unknown from the
known, constituting an invaluable tool for the expansion of knowledge. In drawing
on these two meanings of qiyās, Averroes implicitly argues that philosophy is just
as legitimately Islamic as jurisprudence, given that legal analogy was developed
sometime after the birth of Islam. Averroes argues that since analogy was a later
development aimed at expanding our knowledge of jurisprudence, the use of
syllogistic logic to expand our knowledge of Creation and the Creator is all the
more appropriate.6 In this way is the study of philosophy legitimised as useful
and profitable, being in fact worthier than jurisprudence, for it does not just study
human action but all existents.
According to Averroes, religion teaches true knowledge and true practice. The
former comprises the theoretical sphere, such as the knowledge of God, Creation
and the afterlife, and could be said to overlap with philosophy in spite of being
arguably more comprehensive than philosophy, as we shall see. Religion also
comprises true practice, which leads to true happiness and includes the outward
actions, regulated by jurisprudence, and asceticism, which regards the actions of
the soul.7 Both are necessary for the achievement of eternal bliss, but Averroes’
preference for theory may stem from Aristotle’s appraisal of the theoretical
sciences as ranking above the practical ones. Man is a political animal, but he

5
Averroes/Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer: A Translation of Bidāyat al-
Mujtahid, trans. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, reviewed by Mohammad Abdul Rauf, Center for
Muslim Contribution to Civilization, 2 vols, New Edition (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2000).
6
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 3.
7
Ibid., p. 23.
 The Decisive Treatise 25

is more essentially a rational animal. The contemplative life is more valuable

still than the practical life, and contemplation is that which characterises divine
activity, as stated by the Stagirite.8
A striking point separating theory from practice is the existence of a consensus
(ijmā‘) of the learned community of Muslims, the ulema (‘ulamā’), which is
binding on practical matters, as opposed to the lack of consensus regarding matters
of theory. Averroes states that in order for any theoretical position to be condemned
(or approved) it must be submitted to the ulema for approval on the basis of a
consensus. While that consensus can be established regarding the specific aspects
of religious practice, no such consensus is available in matters of theory. For a
consensus to be formed, all the scholars involved in deciding on a given issue
at a particular time must be known, but that consensus cannot be traced back
with regard to theoretical issues.9 Therefore Averroes concludes that no specific
philosophical theory can be condemned as heretical by any Muslim with certainty,
as al-Ghazzali had misguidedly attempted. This point shows the greater emphasis
laid on orthopraxy than orthodoxy in Islam, and for Averroes allows the possibility
of philosophical debate and the acceptance of Aristotle’s theories concerning the
natural and the celestial world.10
Although any obstacles to the study of Greek philosophy by Muslims have thus
been removed, one must still be guided by religious principles in studying such
works. These must be studied discriminately and critically, and one should accept
only that which conforms to religion while rejecting that which is opposed to it.
Having proved that according to Islamic law the study of philosophy is
incumbent on some Muslims, Averroes goes on to discuss the particular issues
on which, according to al-Ghazzali, philosophy goes against religion. The main

8
  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, rev. J.O. Urmson, vol. 2 of The
Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1729–867, 1179a, p. 1863.
9
  Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 11. ‘Complete unanimity cannot be attained for it
would impossibly require (i) a limitation to a certain period of time, (ii) full and individual
knowledge of the opinion of each and every scholar, (iii) absolute assurance in the chain of
transmission of the opinion, (iv) certainty that it was never held that the text is incapable of
both literal and allegorical interpretations, (v) knowledge that no secret interpretations were
kept by any scholar, and (vi) full agreement by all on one and only one interpretation of the
text. Given these criteria, consensus adequate to contend with demonstrative certainty cannot
be reached’, in Richard C. Taylor, ‘Averroes on the Sharī‘ah of the Philosophers’, p. 289.
10
As Fakhry states, ‘Two circumstances in particular enabled Averroes to maintain
the difficult position which we have labelled the parity of philosophy and scripture, of
reason and revelation: first, the distinction, which the Koran itself (Koran, 3, 5) makes and
which the commentators from al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) down had recognized between ambiguous
(mutashābih) and unambiguous (muḥkam) scriptural passages; and second, the absence of
a teaching authority in (Sunnite) Islam upon which devolved the right to define doctrine’,
Majid Fakhry, ‘Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes’, Medieval Studies
30 (1968): pp. 78–89, p. 82.
26 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

work in which Averroes counters al-Ghazzali’s criticism point by point is the

Incoherence of the Incoherence, consisting of sixteen questions on metaphysics
and four questions on the natural sciences, for a total of twenty questions.11 In the
Decisive Treatise, a short, programmatic work, he does not discuss all these issues,
but stresses three that laid Islamic philosophers open to the charge of impiety
(kufr). These consist of the eternity of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars,
and bodily resurrection, in other words: the philosophers’ defence of the eternity
of the world, of God’s ignorance of individual things or persons, and of the theory
that only the soul, but not the body, survives death. Averroes’ exposition of these
issues in the Decisive Treatise illustrates his method of interpreting the Qur’an
with a view to showing the congruity between philosophy and religion.
As for the creation of the world, Averroes claims that the Qur’an explicitly
points to the existence of something together with God before the creation of the
world, such as God’s throne and the waters on which he stood before the start of
creation properly speaking. This indicates that there was never a point in time
when God was alone in existence. While Averroes takes pains not to contradict
the Qur’anic account of Creation, he argues that it is at bottom not incompatible
with Aristotle’s proof for the eternity of the world expounded in the Physics.
The Stagirite argues that the world must be eternal, never having come into
existence at a point in time and never ceasing to exist, on account of the activity
of the Prime Mover, which Averroes identifies with God. In Aristotle’s contention,
everything that is active or actual must be rendered actual, and drawn from a
state of potentiality to actuality, through something that is actual and possesses
the quality that it actualises in the other. For instance, something can only be
rendered white by something – its cause – which in some way possesses whiteness.
Aristotle further claims that actuality ultimately precedes potentiality, meaning
that the first principle of everything must be something which is permanently
actual. Therefore, the Prime Mover is the first cause of all motion, an action which
produces the passage from potentiality to actuality, and hence existence. The first
cause of the world can be said to create by setting in motion. Moreover, the Prime
Mover’s permanent actuality translates into a permanent activity and therefore
an eternal world, which, Averroes defends, is an eternal creation. Against the
Muslim theologians’ argument for a creation out of nothing at a specific moment,
Averroes defends an eternal, permanent creation. The Prime Mover’s setting in
motion constitutes the creation process, because nothing exists without being
drawn from potentiality to actuality. This must be done at one time, in an eternal
act. If God had been idle at any point in time, his omnipotence would have been
compromised. Although his arguments for the eternity of the world are provided in
the commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and the Incoherence of the Incoherence,
the Decisive Treatise explains why this position is compatible with a legitimate

11
Averroes, Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans.
from the Arabic with introduction and notes by Simon van den Bergh, Gibb Memorial
Trust, 2 vols (London: Luzac & Co., 1954).
 The Decisive Treatise 27

interpretation of the Qur’an. Before studying Averroes’ rules for the interpretation
(ta’wīl) of the Qur’an, let us mention briefly the other two issues that earned the
philosophers the accusation of impiety (takfīr).
Regarding God’s knowledge of particulars, Averroes purports to follow the
Qur’an, which expresses unambiguously that God knows every single existing
thing.12 This implies not just an awareness of ideas or universals, such as the
essence of ‘human being’, but a knowledge of individual human beings. Avicenna
had stated that God knows particulars, that is, individual things, insofar as he
knows universals. In other words, he knows, for instance, the individual horse in
so far as it bears the characteristics of any horse. However, al-Ghazzali argued that
this was tantamount to denying God’s knowledge of particulars, since one may
know the general idea of ‘horse’ without knowing any particular horse. Averroes
restates the problem by arguing that God’s knowledge cannot be described as
universal or particular, since these categories describe only the process of human
knowledge. Particular knowledge is obtained by us through sense experience, and
universal knowledge follows upon the previous through abstraction of the common
features of particulars. But one cannot claim that God knows through a process,
since everything is known to him immediately and with all certainty. Although
we cannot grasp the exact mode of God’s knowledge, we must assume that he
knows all particulars, although his knowledge is neither universal nor particular.
In his approach to this question, Averroes clearly acknowledges the ineffability of
the divine and distinguishes divine from human knowledge, which bears a pale
resemblance to the former. In this context, Averroes sets limits to the capabilities
of human reason, when it comes to knowing God’s nature.
The third issue concerning which al-Ghazzali accused the philosophers,
in particular Avicenna, of impiety, was bodily resurrection, which they had
failed clearly to uphold. The Qur’an describes heaven in explicit terms with the
underlying assumption of the resurrection of the body (56:28–33).
Among the essential tenets of Islam, according to Averroes, is the afterlife,
together with the existence of God and the prophets. A Muslim who departs
from these three tenets should indeed be charged with unbelief.13 In stating
this, he does not specify how happiness or wretchedness are to be understood
in the Hereafter, and he refers the reader to other works. The Qur’anic verses
dealing with the Hereafter are not to be taken in their apparent sense, that is to
say, literally. However, this does not mean that one should deny the Hereafter.
In the Incoherence of the Incoherence he returns to this issue and does not
explicitly advocate the resurrection of the body; he speaks of the different modes
of conceiving the Hereafter and human immortality, which he does not question,
since it remains an essential tenet of Islamic doctrine. He does praise, however,
the Islamic understanding of the afterlife as it features in the Qur’an, explicitly

12
For a detailed treatment of this issue in Averroes, see my ‘Averroes on God’s
Knowledge of Particulars’, Journal of Islamic Studies 17:2 (2006): pp. 177–99.
13
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 18.
28 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

and vividly illustrated. The implication is that this type of representation of the
Hereafter is much more conducive to the practice of religion in this world, than for
instance the immaterial depiction of Heaven in Christianity.14 The immortality of
the soul is upheld here, but Averroes seems to skirt the issue of bodily resurrection
in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. Later, in the Long Commentary on De
anima, he famously only admits the survival of the intellective part of the soul, to
the exclusion of the imagination and other parts of the soul that are attached to the
body. Moreover, the individual soul does not retain its individuality, since it is no
longer attached to the body, its individuating principle.15
The solution to all three questions is underpinned by an attempt to explain away
any anthropomorphic characteristics of God. His will is unlike the human will, and
consequently does not change; therefore, God could not have at one point decided
to create the world, having delayed his decision to create. And because there can
be no delay in God’s will between his decision and the coming to be of its desired
purpose, the world had to exist from all eternity. Equally, God’s knowledge is
unlike ours, insofar as it is infinite and is not universal or particular. Nor can it
be said that there is a process of God’s knowledge, for he knows everything at
once. Finally, the nature of the heavenly realm is in effect so completely devoid
of matter that no material element is admitted in it. In addition to the differences
in the interpretation of the Qur’an there were other points of friction between
Averroes and the Ash‘arite theologians and al-Ghazzali. For instance, the
philosophers denied the divine attributes of sight and hearing, because they were
too tied up with the material world we inhabit, since they are responsible for sense
perception, which includes material objects. Moreover, God does not need any
faculties in order to have absolute knowledge. The Qur’an was interpreted by the
philosophers in a metaphorical way, especially the passages where God assumes
human characteristics.

Philosophical Interpretation of the Religious Text

With regard to Qur’anic interpretation, Averroes first stipulates general principles,

to smooth over the discrepancies between philosophical and religious texts, and
later establishes the acceptable rules for the interpretation of the Qur’anic text.
If religion does not mention something already stated by philosophers, no
conflict ensues. If the religious text does mention it, it either agrees with philosophy
(or ‘demonstration’) or it does not. If it agrees, there is no contradiction. If it does
not agree, then the religious text must be metaphorically interpreted.16 It would

14
Averroes, Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut, vol. I, p. 361.
15
Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their
Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 335–8.
16
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 9.
 The Decisive Treatise 29

seem that the philosophical text, literally accepted, is the yardstick by which
religious discourse must be gauged, with the implication that philosophy would be
used to interpret the Qur’an, and the latter would have to conform to the explicit
sayings of the ancient philosophers, especially Aristotle. However, one should not
draw a strict analogy between the philosophical text and the religious text. While
the former may contain truth expressed in a rigorous way, the latter addresses
not just the philosophers but every single human being, and is therefore much
broader in scope and addresses a much wider audience. Some of its verses do not
require interpretation but can be taken in their apparent sense if in line with the
philosophical text. Before turning to the different types of assent to the religious
message, let us look into other aspects of religious exegesis. Averroes approaches
the issue of religious interpretation primarily in the Decisive Treatise and in
Uncovering the Methods, in ways that complement each other.17
It is important to stress that there had been a consensus among Muslim scholars,
to which Averroes alludes in the Decisive Treatise, that not all the Qur’anic verses
and religious literature were to be interpreted literally, especially when involving
a reference to God that was anthropomorphic. Among the four theological schools
that he mentions in Uncovering the Methods, two are primarily concerned with the
issue of interpretation of sacred texts, such as the esoteric (Batinis) and the literalist
(Zahiris). The latter, the literalists, accept only the apparent, literal meaning of the
Qur’an, and do not believe in the use of reason in order to believe in God’s existence.
For their part, the esoterics accept, as their name indicates, hidden meanings in the
Qur’an.18 The other two schools mentioned in this context, the Ash‘arites and the
Mu‘tazilites, are known to be at odds regarding the interpretation of the Qur’an,
with the Mu‘tazilites taking a more liberal approach. That is not to say that the
Ash‘arites rejected all forms of metaphorical interpretation. Ironically, Averroes
charges them with resorting to metaphorical interpretation when reading the
passages relating the creation of the world, ignoring the references to the throne
and the water which existed with God before his decision to create the world. This
indicates that the question of whether to interpret the Qur’an is not at stake; the
issue is which verses to interpret and how to interpret them:

Muslims have formed a consensus that it is not obligatory for all the utterances
of the Law to be taken in their apparent sense, nor for all of them to be drawn
out from their apparent sense by means of interpretation, though they disagree
about which ones are to be interpreted and which are not.19

17
Averroes/Ibn Rushd, Al-Kashf ‘an manāhij al-adilla fi aqā’id al-milla, edited with
an introduction and analysis by Muḥammad ‘A. al-Jābirī (Beirut: al-Ṭab‘at al-ūlā, 1998),
(Uncovering the Methods); translated into English in Averroes, Faith and Reason in Islam:
Averroes’ Exposition of Religious Arguments, translated with footnotes, index and bibliography
by Ibrahim I. Najjar, with an introduction by Majid Fakhry (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001).
18
Averroes, Faith and Reason in Islam, p. 17.
19
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 10.
30 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

In addition, certain rules must be observed in order to obtain a valid reading.

Averroes thus states that one must follow the rules of interpretation. He defines
interpretation thus:

The meaning of interpretation is: drawing out the figurative significance of an

utterance from its true significance without violating the custom of the Arabic
language with respect to figurative speech in doing so – such as calling a thing by
what resembles it, its cause, its consequence, what compares to it, or another of
the things enumerated in making the sorts of figurative discourse cognizable.20

This passage presents the precise rules for interpretation of a religious text,
including the Qur’an, but does in fact allow a great interpretative freedom, in
particular with regard to the metaphorical reading of the text. Instead of taking
references to God and the divine kingdom as literal, such as his hand, these guidelines
allow Muslim philosophers to do precisely what it takes in order to harmonise the
letter of the Islamic text with philosophical conceptions of God, such as the Prime
Mover or an infinite being that is pure thought thinking itself, or the absolute One
and indivisible, with all his attributes. To illustrate this point, one could take the
famous example of God’s hand to signify his power and omnipotence. Since the
hand is a limb which enables one to carry out an action, as the cause of that action
(according to the above stipulation mentioning a causal connection as warranting
figurative interpretation), then the link between the hand and power is established.
Since all attributes in God are infinite, such as knowledge, wisdom and power,
references to his hand can be taken to signify his omnipotence. The interpretation
of Islamic texts can thus be made to conform to philosophical ideas, in this case
Aristotle’s theory of causality. Averroes even admits the possibility of error in
interpreting religious texts. Since there is no consensus on theoretical matters,
unlike practical consensus, the effort of one judging such difficult issues should be
excused while one who produces a correct interpretation should receive a reward.
In fact, Averroes states that the effort itself, even if the result is erroneous, should
be rewarded, and the successful effort of a judge in interpreting these difficult texts
should receive a double reward, following a hadith quoted by Averroes. If a judge
in practical matters always receives a reward for his efforts, regardless of their
rectitude, the judge of theoretical matters, that is to say, the philosopher, should
a fortiori be rewarded for his efforts. One is here reminded of the different and
sometimes contradictory philosophical theories circulated even in Antiquity. For
example, Plato, unlike Aristotle in Averroes’ interpretation, held that the world had
a beginning in time. Averroes thus admits the diversity of philosophical opinions
although he eventually tends to side with Aristotle on all major issues. When a
literal interpretation of religious texts is impossible because it would involve a
contradiction with other passages and with what one holds the immaterial nature

20
Ibid., p. 9.
 The Decisive Treatise 31

of God to be, one can and should draw from philosophical literature, in order to fill
an existing interpretative gap.
Metaphorical interpretation of religious texts was not introduced by Muslim
philosophers, for the Mu‘tazilites had already advocated an open interpretation of
the Qur’an to maintain their spiritual rather than material understanding of God.
However, their task was not quite as complicated as that of the philosophers who
not only advocated a purely spiritual, incorporeal understanding of God, but had
set themselves the added task of integrating the Greek philosophical tradition into
Islamic doctrine, thus facing a more complex goal. While the Mu‘tazilites were
more obviously working within a purely Islamic framework, the philosophers
were accused of introducing and fostering what was essentially a pagan and
foreign discipline.
In addition to stipulating general rules for the interpretation of religious texts in
the Decisive Treatise, he expands on the same subject in Uncovering the Methods,
a work that aims at complementing the Decisive Treatise by providing the answers
to the central questions debated with differing outcomes by the various schools
of Islamic theology (kalām), such as the manner of proving God’s existence, and
God’s attributes and actions. He concludes this work by providing a method of
scriptural interpretation, more specifically the articulation between the apparent
and the real meaning of the Qur’an.
Before going on to discuss the rules of interpretation laid out by Averroes, it
is important to highlight his description of three different classes of people when
assenting to religious principles. As he had stressed in the Decisive Treatise, there
are three fundamental religious principles that a believer cannot dispute: (1) God’s
existence, (2) the prophetic missions together with the sacred books revealed to
them, and (3) happiness or misery in the Hereafter.21 His proposed distinction may
seem elitist in the sense that not every individual is deemed fit for a philosophical
understanding of these truths. In the Andalusian philosopher’s estimation, the more
intellectual and immaterial a conception of God and his creation one is able to
attain, the closer one is to the philosophical, scientifically adequate understanding
of God which is the one proposed by the philosophers. People are divided into
three classes according to the respective type of assent to religious truth. ‘Assent’
consists in an inner conviction and affirmation or denial of a given principle or
proposition.22 Assent is also defined by Averroes as the knowledge that something
exists or does not exist, whereas concept (or conception) implies knowledge of

21
Ibid., p. 18.
22
‘Assent is the firm assertion or denial of something, and it comes about in two
ways: (a) either absolutely, like our saying “does vacuum exist?” or (b) with qualification,
like our saying “is the world created?” Now this sort of seeking is always asked about by
the particle “does” [or “is” (hal)]’, in Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s
‘Topics’. ‘Rhetoric’, and ‘Poetics’, ed. and trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1977), p. 103, n. 1.
32 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

the meaning of a given term.23 In addition to the philosophers – who conceive

of God in purely abstract, spiritual terms – and the people – who do not have
such capacity and therefore picture God and the Hereafter with their imagination
or representation – there is a middle class, which Averroes identifies with the
theologians, whose arguments are not as stringent and compelling as those of the
philosophers, but who do not rely as heavily on imagination in order to grasp
religious truths, and thus they rise slightly above the general public.
Before delving into the details of the relation between the various classes, we
may note that Averroes proposes, at the end of the Decisive Treatise, to substitute
Islamic theology (kalām) with philosophy, as the yardstick by which the religious
books are to be interpreted, setting up the philosophers as the new guardians of true
belief and orthodoxy.24 For the theologians had not been able to form a consensus
regarding scriptural exegesis, and their interpretations could not rise to the level
of philosophy; therefore they did not represent significant progress in relation to
the more anthropomorphic representations that were used by Muslims at large.
When expounding his rules for interpretation in the Uncovering the Methods,
Averroes mentions the philosophers, who understand the metaphorical reading of
religious literature, which is the real meaning behind the figurative meaning, and
the majority of people, who only in certain cases are allowed access to the real
meaning behind the literal meaning. Philosophers should decide what most people
can and cannot access by way of metaphorical interpretation, and the manner in
which these texts should be presented, based on the assumption that not every
person has the same intellectual abilities and training. This position had already
been advocated in the Decisive Treatise, which established the philosophers as the
interpreters of religious texts. Averroes’ intended aim in setting up the philosophers
of the Greek tradition as guardians of orthodoxy is not to hide the philosophical
meaning of the Qur’an from the majority of Muslims, but to protect their faith,
since without a visual and more material understanding the majority of believers
cannot grasp God, given that their intellects are not so powerful that they can
relinquish the use of imagination in their beliefs about the divine.
In the Decisive Treatise, a text that predates Uncovering the Methods, Averroes
makes a threefold distinction of religious verses, which is loosely parallel to the
distinction between the first, apparent type, and the remaining types of religious
texts that admit of interpretation. Dividing interpretable verses into two categories,
he argues that some verses do not admit of interpretation by anyone, including

23
Charles E. Butterworth, ‘À propos du traité “al-Ḍarūrī fī l-manṭiq” d’Averroès et
les termes “taṣdīq” et “taṣawwur” qui y sont développés’, in Averroes and the Aristotelian
Tradition: Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126–1198):
Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum, Cologne, 1996, ed. Gerhard Endress and
Jan A. Aertsen, with the assistance of Klaus Braun (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 163–71, p. 167,
n. 5. Moreover, assent is effected through syllogism, induction or example (ibid).
24
See Idoia Maiza Ozcoidi, La concepción de la filosofía en Averroes: Análisis
crítico del Tahāfut al-tahāfut (Madrid: Trotta, 2001), pp. 17, 27.
 The Decisive Treatise 33

the philosophers. In that case, an interpretation would constitute innovation with

regard to accepted doctrine, and the persons in question would be legitimately
considered unbelievers, whether they are philosophers or not.
As for the remaining two types of verses, they admit of interpretation only
by the philosophers, who make up the demonstrative class. Some of the verses
that admit of interpretation are clear, and some are obscure, and a mistake in their
interpretation is excusable for those (i.e., philosophers) who are experts in the
matter. In addition to the apparent verses, those that should be interpreted include
both clear and ambiguous verses. The metaphorical meanings of some verses
may be accessible to all, or reserved for the philosophers. The latter may find the
literature whose true meaning is only accessible to them clear or ambiguous.25
The Decisive Treatise offers examples of legitimate interpretation of religious
texts. Among the verses that are to be interpreted but not divulged is one
describing God’s movement in space, towards heaven (Q. 2:29). This is a clear
example of a verse that must be interpreted by philosophers but not the majority of
believers. The philosophical tradition was consistent in stating that only material
substances can move, since movement implies traversing a distance and existing
in space. Space and corporeality are interconnected. Equally, substances bearing
these characteristics exist in time since movement presupposes time. Entities
that exist in space and time are temporal and must eventually perish, given that
any material being is subject to generation and corruption. Not having these
material characteristics, God could not possibly move, in the literal sense of
the term. Therefore, any movement that is predicated of God must be taken in a
metaphorical light, as indicating God’s power or ability to create. However, for
people who cannot think of God except through images and in some material way,
the interpretation of the verse in question is not permitted, nor is the fact that there
is a hidden meaning. This prohibition is meant to protect their belief in God. In
this sense, too, it is acceptable for most people to picture God in heaven, and this is
metaphorically, but not literally, true.26 However, not being a corporal or physical
substance, God does not have a material abode or a place.
Philosophers cannot accept the concept that God is in heaven or has a place.
This expression must be seen to indicate his majesty. The same verses are
understood differently by philosophers and other Muslims, with the same outcome
of reasserting faith in God.
It has become clear why philosophers need to interpret metaphorically verses
of the Qur’an which present God in an anthropomorphic way or ascribe to him
bodily or material attributes. Material beings are necessarily finite and perishable.
Why is it not possible to reveal the metaphorical interpretations of religious texts
to the majority of believers?

25
Hourani notes that according to Averroes any metaphorical meaning must be
confirmed by another passage of the Qur’an, as explicitly stated therein; Averroes on the
Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, Introduction, p. 25.
26
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 20.
34 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Averroes states in the Decisive Treatise that interpretation involves two steps.
The first one is to remove the allegorical meaning, or the image in question; for
instance, God’s material place, such as heaven. The second step is to provide
the true, inner meaning: God’s majesty or omnipotence. Given that most people
cannot grasp the spiritual meaning, once their representations of God are removed
they would cease to accept God’s existence. Equally, philosophers would find it
hard to believe in a God with physical attributes. Hence the importance of having
different registers of religious discourse.
Averroes illustrates this point eloquently with the example of the physician,
who stands to the health of the body – in a literal, not metaphorical, way – as the
philosopher stands to the health of the soul. The assumption is that not everyone
can be a physician, and one must rely on the advice of the physician and his
explanations and take the prescribed medicine in order to recover or stay healthy.
If someone comes along arguing that those explanations provided by the doctor
are not the true ones and sets about to explain the real reasons in a technical jargon
understood only by physicians, the majority of people, not understanding the
technical explanation, cease to follow the physician’s advice. They will no longer
believe in salvation and in the Hereafter, in other words, that ‘there is a health
that must be preserved or a sickness that must be removed’.27 Averroes adds that
the one inducing unbelief is himself an unbeliever, because he undermines the
foundations of belief. He specifically faults the Ash‘arites for playing just this
role – forcing a certain interpretation of the Qur’an on people and charging with
unbelief those who do not accept it. They are thus doubly misguided, because
they induce unbelief and because their methods are not even up to the standard
of philosophy. They spread false interpretations and oblige others to follow them.
In both works, the Decisive Treatise and the Uncovering the Methods, Averroes
presents a distinction between the literal and the apparent senses of religious
literature. The second work is an expansion on the first regarding this issue. The
issue of Qur’anic interpretation had been pivotal since the beginning of Islamic
theology. Theological positions were often defined by their approach to scripture.
Averroes is certainly a champion of this tradition of metaphorical reading of
scripture, favouring the Mu‘tazilites for providing a more spiritual exegesis. The
Ash‘arite approach is, according to him, neither philosophical nor accessible to the
vast majority of people.
Towards the end of the Decisive Treatise Averroes claims that the early followers
of Islam did not have recourse to interpretation and had a humbler attitude towards
the Qur’an. Averroes argues that this attitude was more legitimate. Does this mean
that interpretation was then absent and should therefore be totally excluded?
Obviously, Averroes does not go back on his defence of a metaphorical reading of
the Qur’an, but he reminds the reader that, in early Islam, if someone conceived of
an interpretation they would not divulge it: ‘For those in the earliest days came to
have perfect virtue and piety only by practicing these statements, without making

27
Ibid., p. 28.
 The Decisive Treatise 35

interpretations of them; and any one of them who grasped an interpretation did not
think fit to declare it’.28 The practice and spread of interpretations gave rise to the
different factions in Islam, who were often at odds with each other. Averroes does
not mean here to suppress metaphorical reading altogether, but he does consider
it reserved for a minority of believers, the philosophers trained in the Aristotelian
tradition. This leitmotiv is also present in Uncovering the Methods, although he
there offers a more detailed exposition of interpretation.
In Uncovering the Methods we find five ways of approaching the scriptural
text. First, the apparent meaning may coincide with the real meaning. In this case,
the apparent text should not be metaphorically interpreted, but rather presented
to everyone – both philosophers and the majority – as it is. The Decisive Treatise
also states that some verses are self-evident and do not require interpretation, and
they are to be read and understood by all, according to their apparent, literal sense.
The remaining four meanings imply some sort of interpretation, since the real
meaning differs from the apparent meaning. In these cases, the production of a
representation is called for, in the sense that a figurative expression stands for the
literal meaning intended.
In the first metaphorical type the meaning of the representation is difficult to
grasp and not widely known; therefore it should not be presented to untrained
people – to non-philosophers. That it is indeed a representation and the reason it is,
as well as the meaning of the representation, are difficult to establish; and this can
be accomplished only through lengthy syllogisms, which should not be divulged
to the general public.
In the second metaphorical type, both the real meaning and the fact of its
interpretability are known, so all should have access to the real, metaphorical
meaning. It is clear to all why and that the text in question is a representation.
The third metaphorical meaning implies a ready knowledge that the verse in
question requires interpretation, but the interpretation itself is obscure and difficult.
As an example, Averroes states:

This is similar to the saying of the [Prophet], peace be on him: ‘The Black Stone
is God’s right hand on earth’, to which may be added other similar sayings
which are either self-evident or readily known to be representations, but the
reasons why they are representations are known through an elaborate process.
The obligation in this case is not to be interpreted except by the elect among
the learned. Those who know that this is a representation, but do not belong to
the men of learning, will be told why it is a representation; either because it is
ambiguous ... or because the representation thereof is reduced to what is closer
to their understandings. Perhaps this is the proper course in order to dispel the
lingering ambiguity in their souls.29

28
Ibid., p. 31.
29
Averroes, Faith and Reason in Islam, p. 129 (slightly modified).
36 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Since all are aware that a representation is involved, an interpretation ought

in any case to be provided. Therefore, the interpretation should be geared to the
specific audience in question. Interestingly, Averroes invokes here a distinction
between existents employed by al-Ghazzali for such interpretations. The ‘proof
of Islam’, as the theologian was dubbed, stipulates five modes of existence or
meaning, ‘the essential, the sensible, the imaginary, the intelligible and the
ambiguous’.30 The essential conveys the real meaning, which is the apparent one.
The remaining four types of existence are related to essential existence but imply
a particular manner of apprehending, and should be made available to those who
cannot take the essential existence as the real meaning. Clearly, the sensible and
the intellectual existents are two different ways of approaching the same reality,
akin to the use of sense perception or the mind to grasp something. The imaginary
and the ambiguous are other ways of reading the religious text. Imagination is
for the philosophers a certain faculty of the human mind, which must be used
in certain contexts, and which involves a more material, sensible apprehension,
rather than a purely intellectual understanding.
Averroes holds that the aforementioned senses of existence should be present in
some approaches to the religious text, and that each type should be used according
to its persuasive force, its ability to bring about assent to the main religious truths.
He finally presents the fourth metaphorical type, which concerns statements
that are not readily known to be representational rather than literal, as it is not
widely known that they require interpretation; however, the reason behind the
representation, why they are metaphorical and what they mean, is easily known.
In other words, it is easily known why they are representations but not that they
are representations. Therefore they should not be interpreted, since it would open
the way to various readings, which might stray too far from the literal meaning
of the text; and in some cases it may lead to unbelief. Since at any rate the fact
of their interpretability is not divulged, it should not be advertised. There is no
reason to divulge their true meaning to any except those who are well grounded
in knowledge. If these know that the verses are interpretable, then they also know
why, but if they are not aware of their interpretability, they would not easily grasp
why or how.
What is the rationale behind this classification of four kinds of interpretative
approach to scripture? Averroes thinks of all possible combinations of whether the
fact of the interpretation can be known, on the one hand, and why it can be known,
on the other. Among the four types requiring interpretation, in the first case both
the fact and the reason why are easily known, with the assumption that it may
be divulged, because there is no difficulty involved. In the second case, both the
fact and the reason why the verse is to be interpreted are difficult to understand.
In the third case, the fact of the interpretation is known, but not the reason why.
Therefore, the interpretation should be provided, as it is likely to be understood

30
Averroes, Faith and Reason in Islam, p. 130. See also Averroës, Decisive Treatise,
p. 19.
 The Decisive Treatise 37

by the intended audience. In the last type, since the fact that the verse required
interpretation is not known, and its meaning is difficult to grasp, care should be
taken in its interpretation, which should not be divulged to the majority of people.
It emerges from the foregoing that, on the whole, some verses are to be read
literally and some can be interpreted, especially in the case of physical references
to God in the Qur’an or the traditions of Muhammad. We find a differentiation
between those verses that admit of interpretation and those which do not.
Uncovering the Methods makes a distinction between two related aspects, the
knowability of an interpretation and the reason for it, acknowledging that some
verses are clearly to be interpreted in the eyes of all Muslims. So it would not
make sense to hide the fact that an interpretation is required if most or all Muslims
acknowledge it. On the other hand, difficult interpretations should be kept from
the public, especially in the case of obscure verses.
Averroes’ approach does not involve a radical rationalism, for he does not
believe that the Qur’an can be interpreted in only one way, or that a verse can
be successfully and clearly deciphered by the philosophers, or that a unanimous
reading of all verses could be agreed upon. There can be disagreements as to the
reading of certain verses or texts, and even philosophers may never be able to
understand the ultimate meaning of a given passage, especially if it is ambiguous.
Here Averroes’ rationalism, with its trust in the ability of reason to understand the
ultimate realities, shows its limits, in the sense that not everything in religious
texts is clear, not everything pertaining to God can be fathomed by our minds.
In other ways, however, Averroes’ theory of exegesis emphasises the
preponderance and hegemony of philosophy in social and political terms; for
in Averroes’ vision it is up to the philosophers to determine how religious texts
should be read and presented – this task is taken away from religious authorities.
Both the Decisive Treatise and the Uncovering the Methods entrust the
philosophers with the task of interpreting the Qur’an correctly, for only they
possess the demonstrative, in other words, ‘scientific’ knowledge that is absent
from the other classes. The implications of substituting the religious with the
philosophical class are considered later in this study, when the different types of
assent are discussed.
In addition to interpretation, it is the task of philosophers to present religious texts
to all Muslims, in their role as preservers of the faith. Averroes here deems the efforts
of the theologians to have failed in their attempt to present a credible and profitable
reading of the Qur’an, hence the need for the intervention of the philosophers.
Averroes’ general criterion for interpretation, as seen in these works, is to bring
people to accept certain basic religious principles, which are to be believed for the
sake of the individual’s salvation and political stability. It is for the philosophers
to make the final decision on the meaning of religious texts and the way they
should be presented to the Muslim community at large. Of the texts that admit
of interpretation, some can be shared with the public, while others should be
read literally by the public, but not by the philosophers. The public may in some
cases access the same interpretation as the philosophers, or the philosophers may
38 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

prepare a special interpretation for them, according to their abilities and the four
non-literal types of existence listed by al-Ghazzali.
Uncovering the Methods was written after the Decisive Treatise, and it allows
more specifically for some interpretations to be publicly divulged. The core of
beliefs that is binding on all Muslims is also extended, in the former work, to
include: (1) the existence of God, (2) God’s unity, (3) God’s attributes of perfection,
(4) God’s freedom from imperfection, (5) the creation of the world, (6) the validity
of prophecy, (7) God’s justice and (8) the resurrection – although the exact manner
of belief in these items is not detailed by Averroes.31
It is now important to study the different types of assent with their corresponding
classes. Three classes are listed according to the type of assent, but they could also
be considered political classes, since religion inevitably plays an essential role
in Averroes’ society. The distinction between different philosophical and literary
methods had been made by Aristotle, but Averroes turns these into different types
of assent, furthermore assigning them to three different classes.
An examination of this issue as it is presented in the Decisive Treatise is called
for before proceeding to the more detailed treatment in the commentary literature.

The Different Types of Assent and Different Classes of People

We have seen that according to Averroes there is no significant difference between

the purpose of human existence in the Qur’an and in Aristotle. The former enjoins
us to know God and act in a manner that reflects knowledge of God and the
purpose of his creation. Aristotle, too, understood the human being as a rational
animal who can contemplate the divine and thus share in divine bliss (though
not necessarily in a Hereafter). Both the religious and the philosophical tradition
encourage a study of the divine. The goals of philosophy and religion coincide and
encourage the knowledge of the truth and the practice of virtue in order to obtain
the ultimate reward.
However, not every human being is equally intellectually gifted, and aptitudes
vary from individual to individual. Correspondingly, there are different types of
assent to religious or philosophical truth. Assent means the belief in and acceptance
of certain religious tenets. According to Averroes this intellectual attitude of
acceptance is closely bound up with conviction, for it is not possible to assent to
something in which one does not firmly believe. This belief is not merely external
assent, but true inner persuasion.32 There is an inner faith that must be fostered in
all people, which will ensure happiness in the Hereafter.
Averroes states that there are different approaches to the truth: one which is
more specifically philosophical, closely associated with the philosophers by virtue
of the method used, and others that lead to the same truth but by different means.

31
Fakhry, ‘Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes’, pp. 85–7.
32
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 17.
 The Decisive Treatise 39

The first method, which Averroes states is reserved for a minority of people,
is the demonstrative method. Those who aspire to this method must meet two
conditions: innate intelligence and religious virtue and justice. The implication,
moreover, is that philosophers must be trained in the ancient disciplines and know
logic, which is the art of sound reasoning, as well as the theories of the Ancients,
Aristotle in particular.
There are two other types of assent, each with its corresponding group or class.
The second, ranking just below the philosophical or demonstrative method, is the
dialectical method. In the Decisive Treatise, Averroes identifies it with kalām,
represented by such schools as the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites.
In what is the method of the theologians different from that of the philosophers?
The interpretations of the theologians are not consistent either in using syllogistic
logic or in providing a spiritual, rather than material, reading of scripture. Therefore,
both the method they use and the content they discern in scripture are flawed.
Their method, dialectical, is only tentative, and does not take full account of the
ancient sciences, which cannot be overlooked in reading religious texts. However,
given their rational attempt to understand scripture and provide a metaphorical
interpretation, this class is situated between the higher, demonstrative class, and
the lower, rhetorical class. The latter accepts the likenesses and literal meaning of
the religious text rather than employing any kind of reasoning. Their assent, as we
have seen, involves a more material or physical perception of the religious reality.
Averroes sets the demonstrative class apart from the other two:

Concerning the things that are known only by demonstration due to their being
hidden, God has been gracious to His servants for whom there is no path by
means of demonstration – either due to their innate dispositions, their habits,
or their lack of facilities for education – by coining for them likenesses and
similarities of these [hidden things] and calling them to assent by means of those
likenesses, since it is possible for assent to those likenesses to come about by
means of the indications shared by all – I mean, the dialectical and the rhetorical.
This is the reason for the Law being divided into an apparent sense and an inner
sense. For the apparent sense is those likenesses coined for those meanings, and
the inner sense is those meanings that reveal themselves only to those adept
in demonstration.33

Averroes draws a link between interpretation and the different classes. The
right interpretation is reserved to the philosophers, because it involves training
in the ancient sciences, which is lacking in the remaining two classes. For these
classes, here lumped together, the likeness or simile represents the true meaning
of a verse in a figurative way.
In each of the three classes, the final goal is to produce assent to religious
tenets, and the means should vary according to that intended end.

33
Ibid., p. 19.
40 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

In order to believe, the philosopher needs interpretation as much as the

common Muslim needs generally to follow the literal meaning, or an interpretation
especially crafted for him or her. Since the latter is more likely use to imagination
in understanding religious matters, the approach to the religious text must be
adjusted accordingly. The philosopher, who has a more spiritual understanding of
divine nature, might fall into unbelief if no such interpretation is provided, for he
or she cannot assent to material or anthropomorphic representations of God and
divine realities. Therefore, not to allow a philosophical reading of scripture would
leave out an important segment, albeit a minority, of the Muslim community. In
unravelling these interpretations, philosophers will also bring them in line with
Greek philosophy and science.
The establishment of three classes and modes of assent based on the formation
of concepts is made clear by Averroes. Religion teaches true science and true
practice in helping believers to form a concept and give assent. There are three
methods of inducing assent – demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical – through
the thing itself or its likeness. In view of the fact that not everyone understands
demonstrations or any kind of lengthy arguments, religion should comprise all
these three kinds of assent.34
As Averroes explains, each class has a specific form of assent, which is
either more material or more spiritual. Before assent occurs, it is necessary to
form a concept, which is presented in the guise of a proposition or affirmation. In
religious matters, this will refer to the ultimate reality, God, or a related issue such
as his attributes, his prophets and the Hereafter. Since one cannot understand or
truly assent to something one does not understand, the realities of religion must
be presented in a way such as to be accepted by all, in different ways to different
classes. If the meaning of the texts is plain for everyone, no interpretation is required.
Otherwise, an interpretation has to be produced; but it is usually the philosophers
who require such a metaphorical reading. The philosophers know both the ultimate
meaning and how to present it to the other classes, inducing assent by members
of the other classes. The Qur’an presents images of God, referring to his hand and
his sitting on a throne, which must be taken at face value by the rhetorical class.
The true meaning of these similes – that they indicate God’s power and majesty –
should not be openly revealed. In the case of ambiguous verses, the philosophers
should state the fact of their ambiguity, and not reveal their true meaning if they
think it jeopardises anyone’s faith. Averroes stresses that the Qur’an is such a

34
Ibid., p. 24. Marc Geoffroy places the three kinds of discourse in Averroes within
twelfth-century Almohad society. Thus the rhetorical class has a traditional, literalist,
religious discourse, represented for instance by the Hanbalite school. Dialectical discourse
employs common opinions and is defended by theologians such as the Mu‘tazilites and the
Ash‘arites. Finally, demonstrative discourse is practised by philosophers, who use physics
and metaphysics in their arguments; see Marc Geoffroy, ‘L’almohadisme théologique
d’Averroès (Ibn Rušd)’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 66
(1999): pp. 9–47, p. 19.
 The Decisive Treatise 41

rich text as to suit all manners of assent, from the philosophical to the rhetorical.
While one can claim that Averroes is measuring religious truth by a philosophical
standard, in this sense subordinating religion to philosophy, this is only partly
true. In reality he considers the Qur’an to be much richer than any philosophical
text, which would produce only one mode of assent, the philosophers being only
one of the three classes to which the Qur’an addresses itself. Philosophy is but
one of three valid ways in which to speak of God, although Averroes implies that
philosophy is a fundamental key for the understanding of the Qur’an and religious
texts. Philosophy may be pivotal for the interpretation of religious texts, but can in
no way claim to be richer than the Qur’an.
While dialectical and rhetorical assent is studied and systematised by
philosophers, such as Aristotle, the proper method used by philosophers is the
demonstrative method. Averroes goes on to state that religion aims at taking care of
the majority of people, who belong to the dialectical and the rhetorical classes, the
latter being more numerous than the former, without losing sight of the minority
constituted by the philosophers.
Averroes believes that the use of formal logic is not limited to the demonstrative
class, although the premisses that compose the demonstrative syllogism differ
from the ones making up the dialectical and the rhetorical syllogism, as we shall
see. A syllogism, as expounded by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics, consists of
two premisses, and a conclusion, which necessarily follows from the premisses.
If a valid inference is produced, by following valid rules for the deduction of a
conclusion from its premisses, and if these premisses are true, then the conclusion
is necessarily true. Any type of valid reasoning implies use of a syllogism, even
if one of the premisses is implicit. Alongside demonstrative syllogisms, there are
also rhetorical and dialectical syllogisms.
Regarding the rules of interpretation, Averroes expounds in the Decisive
Treatise the four types of methods or syllogisms in religion, that include all possible
combinations of premisses and conclusions. He shows which can be common,
certain or uncertain, and commonly accepted, and where interpretation may or may
not be allowed. In the first instance, where no interpretation is licit, the premisses
are certain, and generally accepted – though resulting from demonstration – and
the conclusion is the thing itself, not a likeness. This method or type of syllogism
is particular, not demonstrative – which deals primarily with universals – and the
method is rhetorical or dialectical.
In the second type, the premisses are certain (as in the demonstrative method)
as well as generally accepted, and the conclusion is not the matter in itself but its
likeness. Since the premisses are both certain and commonly accepted, that is to
say, satisfying both the demonstrative as well as the dialectical and the rhetorical
classes, they do not admit of interpretation; but the conclusion, which consists in
a likeness, not the thing in itself, does admit of interpretation.
The third type is the opposite of the second, since the conclusions are the things
in themselves, while the premisses are their likenesses, and are suppositional and
42 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

generally accepted, not certain. They therefore require interpretation on the part of
the philosophers. The conclusions, however, do not admit of interpretation.
In the fourth kind of interpretative syllogism the premisses are not certain but
are generally accepted and suppositional, that is, satisfying the dialectical and
rhetorical classes, but not the demonstrative class, and the conclusions are not
the things in themselves but likenesses of them. Therefore both premisses and
conclusion should be interpreted, but no part of the true meaning of premisses and
conclusion must be divulged by the philosophers.35
In these four types of interpretative syllogism we find premisses that may be
at once certain and commonly accepted, or premisses that are commonly accepted
but not certain. This means that all premisses must be accepted as they are by
the dialectical and the rhetorical classes. If they happen to be also certain, that is,
demonstratively certain, then they should be accepted as such by the philosophers.
If on the other hand the premisses are commonly accepted but not certain, the real
or hidden meaning must be sought by the philosophers. As for the conclusions
resulting from such premisses, they are either the thing in itself or a likeness – in
other words, a representation of the thing itself. If the former, they must be taken
as they are by all classes; if the latter, then their hidden, certain meaning must be
unveiled by the philosophers. We know from Aristotle’s logical writings – such as
the Prior Analytics, which treats the various types of syllogism – and Averroes’
commentaries on them, that in a valid syllogism the premisses are always better
known than the conclusion. In the same way, the conclusion of a legal analogy
also seeks to throw light on a matter previously unknown. The premisses are
always commonly accepted, but may not be certain, that is, demonstrative. The
conclusions are the intended outcome itself or a representation thereof. In both
premisses and conclusions there may be an interpretation required, but only for
the philosophers. It is in Uncovering the Methods that certain interpretations can
be provided for the general public, a view that may seem a new development
in Averroes’ conceptualisation of this issue. Unfortunately, Averroes does not
provide illustrations of these syllogisms.
Averroes upholds that the dialectical and the rhetorical should follow the
apparent sense of text, whereas later in Uncovering the Methods he states that some
interpretations are acceptable for non-philosophers. However, he does anticipate
that if the interpretation is more convincing than the apparent meaning, it should
be used, especially by someone who attains the level of the dialectical class.36 He
envisages interpretations for the dialectical class, like some interpretations of the
Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites.
How does Averroes define these three classes, a pivotal theme in the Decisive
Treatise? The rhetorical class is composed of people who are not at all versed in
interpretation, and they are the overwhelming majority. Others are versed in dialectical
interpretation, either by nature or by custom. Finally, there are those who are versed

35
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 24.
36
Ibid., pp. 25–6.
 The Decisive Treatise 43

in demonstrative interpretation by nature and art, in other words, philosophy, and

their interpretations should not be shared with the other two classes.37
Membership in the dialectical class is determined by nature or custom, that
is, by having the right disposition, a higher than average intellectual ability
and training in the Islamic sciences. As for the philosophers, they stand apart
through their superior intellectual ability and their training in ancient sciences
and philosophy. ‘Wisdom’ is used in this work of Averroes to signify philosophy
(falsafa). Each of these classes understands scripture in its own proper way.
The reason the interpretations of the philosophers should not be shared even
with the dialectical class is that, owing to their lack of training in philosophy, they
would misunderstand them; moreover, they would transmit them in a distorted
fashion to the rhetorical class, thus spreading unbelief. Averroes stresses that
one who spreads unbelief is himself an unbeliever. He mentions al-Ghazzali as a
glaring example of such a problem, charging him with having spread a distorted
version of the philosophers’ theories, in addition to inaccurate interpretations of
the religious texts.
What inspired Averroes to formulate his theory of three classes and three types
of assent? The concepts of demonstration, dialectic and rhetoric are to be found
in the writings of Aristotle, who devoted specific works to these subjects. In the
Posterior Analytics and the Prior Analytics (the latter laying the foundations of
syllogistic logic) he establishes the conditions for demonstration, which yields
certain knowledge, while his considerations on dialectic are to be found in his
Topics, which deals with the methodology and themes to be used in more informal
kinds of inference and questions that are not strictly demonstrative. His Rhetoric
deals with the art of public speaking and persuasion. Does Aristotle separate these
three methods into three classes as does Averroes? While the Stagirite admits that
a higher level of knowledge is obtained from demonstration, he links the three arts
more strongly than does Averroes. For Aristotle, they serve different purposes,
and can be complementary. Rhetoric has an obvious use in politics and dialectic
can be another way of pursuing philosophy, as is patent in Plato’s dialogues. The
same themes are often found in Aristotle’s logical works. His Topics complements
in many ways the introductory works on logic, such as On Interpretation and the
Categories, expanding on issues like definition, genus and species, differentia,
and their use in dialectical discourse. While Averroes generally follows the
main goals of Aristotle’s logical books, he uses them in a particular way, by
contextualising the themes for a Muslim audience. His stress on the need to keep
the philosophical interpretations hidden from the other classes is a case in point.
Whereas philosophers like Socrates and even Aristotle faced serious difficulties
with the political authorities of the day, the role of philosophy in medieval al-
Andalus was possibly even more fragile than it was in ancient Greece. The three
types of assent are rigidly associated with three classes of people by Averroes to

37
Ibid., p. 26.
44 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

shield philosophy from the accusation of impiety and to set the philosophical class
as a religious and consequently also as a political authority.
The division between the three classes, based on Aristotle’s distinction between
the three arts, finds confirmation, according to Averroes, in the Qur’an. He cleverly
draws on the similarity between Aristotelian terminology, as it had been translated
into Arabic, and scriptural terminology. As it is stated in a well-known Qur’anic
verse, which refers to the dialogue between Muhammad and the Jews: ‘Invite (all)
to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them
in ways that are best and most gracious’ (Q. 16:125).38
The terms referred to in this verse for addressing a specific audience are wisdom,
good admonition or preaching, and dispute. The first term in Arabic, ḥikma, stands
for philosophy. In fact, Averroes uses ḥikma instead of the Greek falsafa to refer
to philosophy throughout the Decisive Treatise, as a more Islamic term. The third
term in the verse comes from the root j-d-l, from which jadal, ‘dialectic’, derives.
The middle term, maw‘iẓa, which is also translated as ‘(religious) exhortation’,
can be identified with rhetoric.39 Averroes sees the distinction between the three
classes in the Qur’an, for, as he explains, scripture addresses all kinds of people,
the majority as well as the philosophers, together with those who attempt to provide
some interpretation of religious texts, namely the theologians. He thus imports
Aristotle’s various methods of inference and of addressing an interlocutor into
religious discussions. In the context of the Decisive Treatise these three methods
refer specifically to assent to religious truths, in a move that Islamises Aristotle’s
theory about different forms of speech and knowledge.
The philosophers are easily distinguishable from the multitude in any context.
The dialecticians, as we have seen, Averroes identifies with the theologians, a class
that was specifically Islamic and did not exist in Aristotle’s time. The method
of dialogue and debate, however, which for Aristotle could be a stepping-stone
to the study of philosophy, seems a fitting description of the theologians, in
Averroes’ estimation. He accuses them of creating factions with their inaccurate
interpretations, by divulging these to the general public, who do not understand
them and are thus led to unbelief. Other problems with these theological
interpretations fundamentally consist in the fact that they do not serve either the
philosophers or the multitude. They are too obscure for the multitude, but are not
truly demonstrative; indeed, some of their methods, such as those of the Ash‘arites,
are sophistical, because they do not accept necessary inference and causality, but

38
The Meaning of the Holy Qur’ān, New Edition with Qur’anic Text (Arabic),
Revised Translation, Commentary and Newly Compiled Comprehensive Index by Abdullah
Yūsuf ‘Alī (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1997), p. 669.
39
For a detailed discussion of this theme, see Averroès (Ibn Rušd), Commentaire
moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, introduction générale, édition critique du texte arabe,
traduction française, commentaire et tables par Maroun Aouad, vol. I, Introduction générale
et tables; vol. II, Édition et traduction; vol. III, Commentaire du Commentaire (Paris: Vrin,
2002), vol. III, pp. 115–18.
 The Decisive Treatise 45

rather accept God as the only and immediate cause of all that is. They thus deny the
necessary relation between cause and effect, such as, for instance, fire and burning.
Given that the methods and interpretations of the theologians are not clear
and scientific like those of the philosophers, nor apparent to the general public
regarding religious matters, they do not share in the qualities of the other two
classes. The Ash‘arites do not accept secondary causality. Averroes, like most
philosophers, defends the idea that God delegates power not only to humans but
to all sorts of living things, and establishes this as a condition of demonstrative
thinking. Secondary causality, according to him, in no way compromises God’s
omnipotence and indeed shows his wisdom. Averroes considers the denial
of secondary causality as unscientific and as disqualifying the Ash‘arites from
demonstration, as well as flying in the face of common sense.
Instead of following the theological schools, one should simply adhere to
the Qur’an, which contains all possible methods of alerting any individual to the
truth, and all methods of persuasion, namely the demonstrative and the rhetorical
methods.40 Averroes considers the text of the Qur’an to contain the best way of
teaching the multitude, as well as the ultimate message for the philosophers. The
Qur’an is a book that is addressed to all human beings, and suits any type of assent.
Due to the perfection of the Qur’an – and here Averroes’ allusion to the
uniqueness or the inimitability (i‘jāz) of the Qur’an is noteworthy – it is not
possible for any other type of text to come near its perfection.41 The Qur’an must
accordingly be treated with the greatest respect, for its interpretation must be
produced only when necessary. To undo the harm caused by the Ash‘arites, in
particular, one should read scripture in search of the things one ought to believe,
accept the literal meaning as much as possible, and go beyond it only if the
interpretation is apparent. The inimitability of the Qur’an consists precisely in
this, its being most perfectly persuasive and clear while alerting those adept in
interpretation to the hidden meanings, which can be demonstratively defended but
are not apparent to the multitude.
The Qur’an is inimitable in drawing assent from everyone, and vastly superior
to any other type of text. In addition, Averroes points to two additional virtues
of the Qur’an, the second being that its meanings can be defended – rationally –
up to a point, after which, if an interpretation is required, only the philosophers
understand it. In addition, and as the third strength, Averroes mentions the fact that
the Qur’an satisfies all the needs of the philosophers looking for a more immaterial
understanding of the religious truths. The signs indicating the fundamental aspects
of religious truths are all to be found in the Qur’an.
This is a text which does not make its hidden meanings apparent to anyone
except the philosophers, and that presents itself to each person according to his or
her intellectual capacities. In this sense, it obviously has a much wider audience
than Aristotle’s works.

40
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 31.
41
Ibid., p. 32.
46 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

As far as content is concerned, it is not the case that philosophers must believe
in something different from the general public or deny any of the fundamental
religious truths. The mode of belief is different, though. The demonstrative
approach, implicitly contained in the Qur’an, is only one of various ways leading
to belief, even if it is the most scientific and most spiritual one.
Averroes states in no uncertain terms that there is only one truth, and hence there
is no religious truth different from philosophical truth. The goals of philosophy
and religion coincide, however differently expressed. True philosophy does not
deny God’s existence, and neither does it deny the Hereafter, or the missions of
the prophets. As regards this third point, a fitting identification of the leader of
the Islamic community with Plato’s philosopher-king already had a precedent in
Alfarabi’s Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City.42 On this
interpretation, the prophets would also have been philosophers.
Therefore, Averroes believes that the philosophers should be the masters of
religious interpretation and its transmission to the multitude. He also proposes to
substitute the misleading interpretations of the theologians with a different type of
interpretation, which rises above a purely literal and traditionalist reading of the
sacred text, while steering clear of the confusing disputations of the dialecticians,
and keeping in mind the needs of the philosophers.43
The Andalusian philosopher does not provide an example of that middle way
for the multitude which would raise them somewhat above the rhetorical level
and would warrant the abolishing of traditional Islamic theology, maintaining
only two classes. It can be argued that the Decisive Treatise is a programmatic
work, a manifesto that does not flesh out all the issues debated by its author. A
deeper understanding of the distinction between demonstrative, dialectical and
rhetorical classes and modes of assent is thus to be sought in his other works. The
Decisive Treatise is, by virtue of the terminology used, a work accessible to all
educated classes, instead of only the philosophers. This work purports to address
a vast audience of anyone interested in religious matters and the interpretation
of the Qur’an – in other words, anyone with an interest in theology and the
Islamic creed, and in the question of the study and practice of philosophy in this
context. Instead of employing technical philosophical terms that one would find in
philosophical texts, Averroes uses Qur’anic terms to denote philosophical realities.
Strictly philosophical issues, he argues, should only be discussed in technical,
demonstrative books. And this can only be a reference to Aristotle’s works or
Averroes’ commentaries on them. Averroes states that he only allowed himself to
address these issues openly because al-Ghazzali had already divulged his views on
those issues for everyone to read in his works.

42
Alfarabi, Al-Fārābi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s Mabādī’ Arā’ Ahl
al-Madīnah al-Faḍīlah, ed. and trans. Richard Walzer (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), in particular Chapter 15, pp. 228–58.
43
Averroës, Decisive Treatise, p. 33.
 The Decisive Treatise 47

The Decisive Treatise is completed and complemented in many ways by later

works such as Uncovering the Methods and the Incoherence of the Incoherence,
as well as by the later commentaries. Two main issues contribute fundamentally to
the harmonisation between religion and philosophy: the interpretation of scripture
and the Islamic tradition, and the issue of the threefold form of assent with its three
corresponding classes. Correct interpretation is further expounded in Uncovering
the Methods, as we have seen, although unfortunately Averroes does not seem to
have applied his interpretative principles by composing a detailed commentary
on the Qur’an. Instead, he produced long, detailed commentaries on Aristotle’s
works. The tradition of commentaries on Aristotle goes back to the Hellenistic
period, but the long commentaries are a development introduced by Averroes.
As for the three forms of assent and respective classes, the debate is
not expanded upon in the Decisive Treatise. We must therefore study the
commentaries for further insight into what, exactly, Averroes means by the three
forms of assent, their nature and methods. This will take us to his commentaries on
Posterior Analytics, Topics and Rhetoric, which lay out respectively the rules for
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical discourse. We have seen how Averroes
points to the harmony between philosophy and religion through the use of Arabic
terminology that has at once religious and philosophical connotations, observable
in terms such as analogy/syllogism (qiyās) and religious or philosophical debate
or dispute (jadal). It can be argued that the articulation between philosophical and
religious discourse lies precisely on the relation between the different forms of
assent.
We will now study Averroes’ commentaries on Posterior Analytics, where
the demonstrative method is laid out, before proceeding to the commentaries on
Topics and Rhetoric, with the underlying assumption that Averroes understands the
three disciplines in much the same way in his various works, although they serve
different purposes and are addressed to different audiences. The commentaries do
not lose sight of contemporary twelfth-century theological and political debates,
and although the long commentaries were written after the Decisive Treatise,
Averroes had already studied and written on Aristotle’s works on demonstration,
dialectic and rhetoric when he composed it.
The Posterior Analytics was known in Arabic as Kitāb al-burhān (the book of
demonstration or proof), and Topics as Kitāb al-jadal (the book of disputation).
Finally, Aristotle’s Rhetoric was known as Kitāb al-khaṭāba (the book of rhetoric
or oratory). The next chapter analyses Averroes’ commentaries on Posterior
Analytics in order better to understand his conception of demonstrative, and thus
philosophical, discourse.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Chapter 2
Demonstrative Discourse in
Averroes’ Commentaries on
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

In the Decisive Treatise, Averroes distinguishes three kinds of classes of people,

and three methods of assenting to religious truth. One of these is the demonstrative
method, which is practised by the philosophical class. It is intellectually the most
demanding and rigorous, and it requires both an innate ability and training in
philosophy, in addition to upright morals, on the part of those aspiring to belong
to this class. In speaking of demonstration, Averroes seeks to adapt an Aristotelian
concept to an Islamic context. His understanding of demonstration is pivotal for the
articulation of philosophy and religion, from both a theoretical and political point
of view. In order to grasp more fully the several connotations of demonstration, we
must turn to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (also translated as Second Analytics,
since it follows the Prior or First Analytics, a work that lays down Aristotle’s rules
of formal syllogistic logic), which purports to describe the concept and valid use
of demonstration and demonstrative arguments.
The Posterior Analytics overlaps in content with other works of the Organon
(the collection of Aristotle’s logical writings), owing to its emphasis on the
process of producing accurate definitions and because it pursues the study of such
concepts as genus and species, which underpins much of Aristotelian science.
The works constituting the Organon were the Categories, De interpretatione (On
Interpretation), Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics (treating dialectic)
and On Sophistical Refutations, to which the Alexandrian commentators added
Rhetoric and Poetics.1
This chapter will look in broad strokes at Aristotle’s understanding of
demonstration in the Posterior Analytics, before turning to Averroes’ interpretation
of demonstration in his commentaries on this Aristotelian work, particularly the
middle and long commentaries. Finally, it will examine how Averroes’ idea of
demonstration informs his theory about the three forms of assent and in particular
the demonstrative, philosophical, form of assent and the class of its practitioners.
We have long commentaries written by Averroes on five of Aristotle’s works:
De anima, Metaphysics, Posterior Analytics, Physics and De caelo. These long
commentaries have been dated to the later part of his life and career, starting from

1
See Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, trans. Maroun Aouad,
vol. I, Introduction générale et tables (Paris: Vrin, 2002), p. 4, following Deborah Black.
50 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

around 1180. The Decisive Treatise, written roughly between 1165 and 1170, and
counted among the works of the middle period of Averroes’ career, is considered
to predate the Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics. However, in composing
the Decisive Treatise he would have known Aristotle’s work, given that he had by
then composed his short commentaries – including that on Posterior Analytics –
which are considered to be early works. It is therefore not unwarranted to use the
Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics in order retrospectively to throw light
on the concept of demonstration in the Decisive Treatise. For the first book of the
Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics I will refer to Badawi’s edition of the
Arabic text; given that the original Arabic version of the second book is not extant,
for that book I will refer to the 1562 Venice edition with its Latin translations by
Abram and Burana.
The Posterior Analytics is a work by Aristotle meant to complement the Prior
Analytics. Both form part of the Organon, meaning a tool or instrument, and cover
all fundamental aspects of logic and scientific reasoning. ‘Scientific’ here signifies
pertaining or leading to knowledge. In the Posterior Analytics demonstration
stands for scientific deduction, a process of obtaining new knowledge through
the linkage of universal notions.2 The valid forms of syllogism are detailed in the
Prior Analytics, whose conclusions are presupposed by the Posterior Analytics.
Thus syllogism, and generally speaking formal logic, is a fundamental part of
philosophy and defines demonstrative discourse for Averroes. The use of formal
logic is indispensible for philosophers practising their art.
With regard to the role of syllogism, Averroes states that demonstration
consists in a syllogism composed of proper premisses; therefore, one should
study syllogism as part of studying demonstration, which is why the Posterior
(or Second) Analytics builds upon the Prior (or First) Analytics and they share a
common name (Analytics). More specifically, to study demonstrations is to study
the matter of the demonstrative syllogism.3 Moreover, there is no science prior to
demonstration, in the sense that we do not know demonstration on the basis of
another science.4
Some theologians, such as al-Ghazzali, admit the legitimacy of using
Aristotelian logic, given that logic had a purely formal aspect and did not bind its
practitioner to any particular positions on the nature of God, the status of creation,
or the interpretation of the Qur’an. Therefore logic, and other disciplines developed
by the Ancients such as mathematics, could be used without detriment to Sunni

2
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 of The Complete Works
of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 71a, p. 114.
3
Averroes, Posteriorum Resolutoriorum Libro Duo. Expositio Magna, sive magna
commentaria, Averrois in eosdem libros, in Aristotelis Opera quae extant omnia, vol. 1,
part 2 (Venice: Giunta, 1562), 557C, Abram, henceforth Long Commentary on Posterior
Analytics, Book II.
4
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book II, 561A, Abram.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 51

doctrine. However, there were other aspects of the demonstrative discourse, as

we shall see, which were not purely formal, and that implied the acceptance of
certain basic principles of Aristotelian philosophy which al-Ghazzali considered
incompatible with religion.
Another important aspect involving demonstration and scientific deduction as
understood by Aristotle and Averroes was the notion of explanation, which in turn
was closely related to that of cause. In the syllogism, a process occurs whereby the
conclusion follows from the premisses in the same way that the effect proceeds
from its cause or causes. Al-Ghazzali famously attacked the theory of causality
in some of his most famous works, such as the Incoherence of the Philosophers –
concerned that a theory of natural causality detracted from God’s omnipotence in
the way it ascribed powers to human beings or natural substances, and precluded
the possibility of miracles.
The reason that the notions of causality and explanation are closely interwoven
(in Greek, the single term ‘aitia’ denotes both cause and explanation) is not far to
seek, for just as an effect issues from its own cause, the cause explains its effect –
and in logical or epistemological terms, understanding is produced in the intellect
by the explanation of a concept or argument. Averroes and previous Muslim
philosophers did not question natural causality – for instance, the power of fire to
burn certain substances – because they believed that God had created the universe
according to an intelligible plan, which humans beings could uncover, even if
they could not understand God’s essence and nature or attain to his understanding
of himself and Creation. They accepted the existence of an intrinsically rational
universe and our ability to decipher its mysteries by applying our reason to the
study of nature and the celestial world. Al-Ghazzali, however, was less confident
in the abilities of the human intellect to understand God’s design underlying events
in the world.
For Aristotle, there is a parallelism between causality in the natural world and
the way knowledge is produced in our minds. The natural and epistemological
dimensions of causation are grounded in the general metaphysical principle of
causality. Therefore, this principle is upheld by Averroes and his predecessors at
all levels and not just in logic.
In addition to logic, the Posterior Analytics also treats questions concerning
the possibility of human knowledge and the processes involved in this endeavour;
as we have seen, the logical and the epistemological are here intertwined. Aristotle
argues that the way things are first known to us, through sense experience, differs
from their intrinsic knowability – for universals in themselves are more readily
understood by the intellect than particulars. It is his work titled On the Soul (De
anima) that details the process of acquiring knowledge and the different faculties
of the soul.
Logic is also propaedeutic to sciences like physics and biology and even
metaphysics, which was considered to study being as being (ontology) and God
as the Supreme Being (theology). This made metaphysics the most encompassing
field of knowledge, whereas the other sciences were more specialised. While
52 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

metaphysics studied being qua being, physics, for instance, studied natural
phenomena, and biology studied living beings. Metaphysics has a stake in every
science, given that it treats being in general. However, various key logical concepts
occur in Aristotle’s metaphysics, for logic, with its focus on deduction and
methodology, came to be considered an indispensible tool that has to be mastered
before studying the other sciences. The Organon examines the various aspects of
logic, which stipulates what and how we can speak about things, and the method
to be used, such as syllogism, as well as the relation between the principles and the
hierarchy of the various sciences.
The Prior Analytics treats the various valid syllogisms. Invalid forms of
syllogism and fallacies are expounded in On Sophistical Refutations. The Posterior
Analytics, in turn, expands on the Prior Analytics to include what more generally
constitutes scientific language, and addresses questions of human knowledge –
such as whether knowledge comes from sense perception and how universals –
general concepts – are formed in the mind. It also discusses the kinds of issues
that form the syllogisms or demonstrations. Therefore, it has been argued that
while the Prior Analytics tackles the formal aspects of syllogism and scientific
discourse, Posterior Analytics studies the material aspects of language about
science and demonstrative knowledge.
A valid syllogism entails a necessary inference, one which cannot be otherwise.
Thus, necessary premisses lead to necessary, rather than possible or probable,
conclusions. Demonstrative knowledge depends on principles that are true, but
also immediately familiar and prior to the conclusions. This kind of knowledge
is thus ultimately based on first principles which cannot in turn be proved. One
such principle states that the whole is greater than the part. Aristotle insists on
the importance of avoiding circular arguments in demonstration, as well as those
involving an infinite regress.
Because premisses must be familiar and true, a demonstrative premiss cannot
assume something and its opposite at once, whereas dialectic can do this. In
addition, dialectic can use premisses that are refutable, and its inferences can be
implicit rather than self evident.
Deduction, for Aristotle, presupposes what is immediately true and always
the case, and therefore employs universals rather than particulars. There is no
demonstration of the accidental, in other words, of that which is not always or
necessarily attached to its subject. In this sense we can say, for instance, that there
is no demonstration regarding the colour of an individual human being, because
the specific colour is an accidental attribute, and varies among individuals.
Three elements that make up every demonstrative science are first, according
to Aristotle, what it posits to be (regarding a certain genus, which is the subject
matter of that science) – that concerning which the science proves; secondly, the
common axioms or the principles on which the demonstrative science rests – that
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 53

from which it proves; and finally the attributes belonging to that genus – that
which it proves.5
These three elements of demonstrative science are also listed in Averroes’
Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, namely (1) the subject posited together
with its essential accidents, then (2) the axioms (qaḍāyā), which are immediate
and self-evident, and in which the predicates inhere, and finally (3) the predicates
or attributes. Demonstration comprises thus the subject (mawḍū‘), the axioms, that
which is sought after (maṭlūb).6
These three elements are the principles of any given demonstrative science,
the conclusion and the genus regarding which demonstration is made. These three
elements appear here somewhat reformulated, as (1) predicate, which must be
essentially tied to the subject, (2) premisses showing the existence of predicates
to a subject, and (3) the nature, or genus, posited.7 He reiterates the prohibition of
crossing over from one genus to another in producing a demonstration within one
demonstrative science, although a lower-ranking science can prove the existence
of the subject matter of a higher science, such as having physics prove the existence
of God, which is the subject matter of metaphysics.8 Such a lower-ranking science
proves the existence of the subject matter of a higher science because it is more
specific and tied to matter and the particular, whereas the higher science furnishes
the reason why.9 If both proofs are compared, the cause of something is provided
by the higher science, and the existence by the lower science. In turn, dialectic
is not concerned with a particular genus in its deductions. Moreover, dialectic
may use opinions in its premisses, whereas demonstration does not, and entails no
element of chance.
Aristotle dwells on the relation between definition (e.g., ‘man is a rational
animal’) and demonstration, since a definition also renders explicit the attributes
of a genus (e.g., animal), and its relation to its species (e.g., human). The definition
does not itself demonstrate anything, but its close link with demonstration appears
from the fact that it can be a principle or a conclusion of demonstration. However,
there can be demonstration without definition.
There are different types of demonstration, including universal, particular,
affirmative and negative; however, Aristotle privileges a universal and affirmative
demonstration, for negation is only understood with reference to affirmation, and
the particular is comprised in the universal, whereas the universal exceeds the
particular. In addition, the particular is not as readily understood as the universal
by the intellect. For this reason, when it comes to the various syllogistic figures,

5
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 76b11–16, pp. 114–66, p. 124.
6
Averroes, Sharḥ al-burhān, ed. A. Badawi (Kuwait: al-majlis al-waṭanī li-l-thaqāfa
wa-l-funūn wa-l-ādāb, 1984) (henceforth Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book
I), pp. 311, 313.
7
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book I, p. 279.
8
Ibid., p. 285.
9
Ibid., p. 370.
54 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Aristotle associates demonstration primarily with the first figure, which is

universal and affirmative, whereas the second figure includes negation and the
third figure includes the particular. Aristotle highlights the fact that mathematics
and the various mathematical disciplines use the first figure. More specifically,
sciences should employ a demonstration as close as possible to the principle of
that science. A demonstration is more robust if it rests on fewer principles, given
that this ensures a lower margin of error. In the Long Commentary on Posterior
Analytics, Averroes expands on these issues and states that demonstrations in
the second figure do not produce definitions, given that they are not affirmative,
whereas the third figure is affirmative but demonstrates particulars rather than
universals. Only the first figure is autonomous, while the others depend on it.10
As we have already seen, there is a strong link between demonstration and the
notion of cause and explanation. Therefore, demonstration produces immediate
assent in the mind, although the issue of assent is not foremost in Aristotle’s mind.
A famous distinction made by Aristotle is that between demonstration of a fact/
existence and demonstration of cause. The first simply shows that something is
the case, the second also why it is the case. The link between demonstration and
causality is thus buttressed. A process is only understood if the causal relations
entailed in it can be grasped by the intellect.
Aristotle’s rules for demonstration are stringent. One must not leap from one
science to another, and one must remain within the same genus. Only universal
premisses ought to be employed to ensure a demonstratively perfect result, to avoid
any uncertain elements, and any particular elements should ideally not be part of
the premisses. Consequently, it should come as no surprise when Aristotle states
that not everything can be demonstrated.11 It seems, in fact, that demonstration is
only of a few select things, having limited applicability.
A major contribution to philosophy on the part of the Stagirite was the
foundation of formal logic to test the validity of arguments. Aristotle’s logic is
characterised by the use of syllogism. Since this constitutes correct scientific
procedure, does it mean that syllogism is only used in the demonstrative method?
We find syllogistic reasoning also in dialectic and in rhetorical discourse. The
difference lies, therefore, not primarily in the form of the syllogism, but in the
matter that constitutes the premisses, and, consequently, the conclusion. This
again attests to the formal correctness of dialectical and rhetorical language. A
parallelism of this acceptance of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms within an
Islamic setting on the part of Averroes is not far to seek. Averroes’ treatment of
interpretation allows the use of syllogism with literal or metaphorical premisses
and conclusion. Therefore, the fundamental distinction between these types of
syllogism is not the form of the syllogism but the subject matter that constitutes
the premisses.

10
Ibid., p. 375.
11
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 84a31.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 55

The Commentaries on Posterior Analytics

The centrality of the question of demonstration is evidenced by the fact that

Averroes wrote three commentaries on Posterior Analytics: a short commentary,
followed by his middle and long commentaries. The Short Commentary on
Posterior Analytics has been recently edited and translated into English by Charles
Butterworth, in a forthcoming edition of this work.

The Short Commentary on Posterior Analytics

This short commentary stresses the inextricable link between demonstration

and syllogism, whose premisses are essential, necessary, universal and certain.12
Averroes identifies this kind of reasoning with absolute (unqualified) certainty,
which implies a complete harmony between what we believe and the truth
of the thing conceived. And there can be no change in our belief and certainty
regarding it. Both the premisses and the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism
are unchanging. ‘Universal’ means here that each term of which something is
predicated is seen from a universal perspective, as belonging to a certain genus
or species, rather than to an individual. Essential means non-accidental. In
demonstrative premisses the predicate can be the subject, in the case of genera,
such as ‘animal’ as predicated of human being, or the other way around when
predicating essential accidents of a subject.
For a necessary demonstration/definition it is important to use (for definitions)
genera as predicated of species rather than accidents that are more general than
the genus (of the art) in question, such as equal and unequal in relation to number,
that is, predicates which do not serve to describe number adequately. The latter are
general demonstrations, which are not as essential as the former. In demonstrations,
it is important to use predicates that are closely related to the subject, such as
‘rational’ said of man, and which particularly characterise the subject.13 From
among the necessary premisses that constitute a syllogism, some are primary
intelligibles and others are obtained through syllogisms which employ primary
intelligibles as premisses. The latter constitute the demonstrative syllogism.
Ultimately all conclusions derive from primary intelligibles. The universals
present in these premisses can be obtained immediately and intuitively, such as
the principle that the whole is greater than the part, or could be obtained through
induction, that is, by comparing several particulars and discerning their common
characteristic(s). Averroes explains that in this syllogism we look for the cause of
something, or its existence, or both. This results in three species of demonstrative

12
Averroes, Averroes’ Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon, edited and
translated, with an introduction, by Charles E. Butterworth (Albany: State University of New
York Press, forthcoming), henceforth, Short Commentary on Posterior Analytics, p. 218. I am
grateful to Charles Butterworth for showing me this text in advance of publication.
13
Ibid., p. 223.
56 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

syllogism, the demonstration of cause and existence being the unqualified

demonstration. There follows the demonstration of the cause and finally the
demonstration of existence or by sign. Knowledge of existence may lead to
knowledge of cause, and knowledge of cause presupposes that we are aware of
the thing’s existence.14 Primary causes are the most important and appropriate
for demonstration. Strictly speaking, demonstration depicts the thing according
to what naturally characterises it and can potentially turn into its definition. In
addition, this kind of predication presupposes that causes should be predicated of
their effects and of the accident of the thing of which they are predicated.15
Averroes stipulates nine conditions for demonstration: (1) it must be certain
(2) it must be universal (3) it must be necessary (4) it must be predicated essentially
(5) its premisses must explain the existence of the conclusion as well as our
knowledge of the conclusion (6) it must be predicated in a natural way (7) the
premisses must exist and be known prior to the conclusion (8) the premisses must
be predicated in a primary way, and finally, (9) the premisses must be particularly
characteristic. This applies to self-evident premisses (in which predication must
be absolutely primary and not requiring further explanation, which is a tenth
stipulation for this kind of premisses) or to those that are conclusions of other
demonstrations. In these unqualified/absolute demonstrations, the middle term,
which is shared by the premisses, should be cause of the major or the minor or
both. (For instance: in ‘all humans are mortal; all philosophers are human(s);
therefore all philosophers are mortal’, the middle term is ‘humans’). The middle
term can be also a definition of both extremes, one of them or part of them.
Preferably, the middle term should define both extremes, otherwise the major (in
this case ‘mortal’), thirdly the minor (in this case, ‘philosophers’). Averroes relies
heavily on Alfarabi’s analysis for his exposition on demonstration in this short
commentary, although he is critical of some of Alfarabi’s positions in the Long
Commentary on Posterior Analytics, as we shall see. Among the predicables used
for defining something, we find for instance the genus (‘animal’ in ‘man is an
animal’) or the differentia (‘rational’ in ‘man is rational’), or also the particular
characteristic (proper), or an accident – this points to the relation between these five
predicables, as devised by Porphyry in his Isagoge. Averroes goes on to explain
the relations between unqualified demonstrations through the relations between
these predicables within the premisses. Negative and conditional demonstrations
can be converted into affirmative and assertoric ones.16
If something posterior (like ‘burning’) explains something prior (like ‘fire’),
it is a sign, but if the prior is taken to explain the posterior we have an absolute
demonstration (from cause to effect). But if the posterior does not always result
from the prior, we can only have a sign; for instance, if smoke is taken to denote
fire then this is a sign (because there can be fire without smoke). Thus we have four

14
Ibid., p. 225.
15
Ibid., p. 227.
16
Ibid., pp. 224–5.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 57

cases regarding the relation between prior and posterior: (1) the prior and posterior
indicate the existence of each other conversely, or (2) and (3) one indicates the
existence of the other, but not vice-versa; alternatively, (4) there is no causation
between them, in which case no sign or demonstration is possible.17
In the demonstration of existence we can find two characteristics of a subject
which can mutually imply each other – one being prior to the other – or not, and
thus expand our knowledge of the subject. Certain characteristics are accidental
rather than necessary, and the causal connection here pertains to the matter and the
agent, because what follows from the end and the form is necessary.
Averroes then goes on to explain the meaning of definitions, which as we can
see can constitute part of a demonstration. Definition differs from demonstration in
being a sentence with a specific composition – a demonstration, however, asserts
or denies. Averroes stresses the importance of using that which is prior to the thing
defined, such as to say that man is a rational animal. Some definitions exist for what
is defined and some of their parts exist for other parts, in which case they can be part
of a demonstration as primary premisses. Definitions whose connection to the thing
defined is not self-evident may be considered as conclusions of demonstrations.
Both the genus and the differentia, respectively – for instance, ‘animal’ and ‘rational’
– can constitute starting points of a demonstration or its conclusion.18
In the Short Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Averroes distinguishes three
kinds of arts, the theoretical arts, the practical arts, and those that are used in
both, such as logic. Each art, theoretical or practical, has its own specific set of
premisses, problems and subject matter. However, there is something common
to all demonstrative arts. Universal theoretical arts look into being in general,
whereas particular arts study being in a specific way, such as the natural sciences.
Within the theoretical arts, Averroes further distinguishes the universal arts,
which differ in the way of speculating: philosophy, dialectic and sophistry. These
three arts differ not only in the way of speculating, but also in the principles,
the end and the kind of knowledge provided. Philosophy, otherwise known as
metaphysics, studies being as being, and the conditions in which being is found.
It is built on certain principles and provides the highest possible knowledge of
something that one can conceive. Its goal is to conceive the ultimate causes of
beings, and in this human perfection is attained.
Dialectic aims at confirming or refuting the point at hand. It provides generally
accepted knowledge, and its principles are likewise commonly accepted. Sophistry,
in turn, is based on principles falsely assumed to be certain or commonly accepted.
It misrepresents the truth, and a sophist gives a false appearance of wisdom. It does
not provide knowledge as such. These here appear as separate from the practical
sciences. However, Averroes states that the universal sciences overlap with the
practical sciences, which are subordinated to the universal sciences with regard to

17
Ibid., pp. 247–8.
18
Ibid., p. 263.
58 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

their subject matter. Here Averroes does not mention rhetoric as such, focusing on
sophistry in its stead.
In this short commentary Averroes also focuses on demonstrative discourse
per se, dividing it into four kinds: for instruction and learning, for demonstrative
objection, for inference and for examination.19 Knowledge is divided into concept
and assent, and every actual knowledge derives from prior knowledge; such is also
the case with regard to instruction and learning.
That which paves the way to assent is restricting the issue to two poles of
the opposition (to which one can answer affirmatively or negatively), and what
paves the way to concept is understanding the meaning of the noun at hand. The
definitions bring about the concept. Instruction has three necessary principles:
‘order, expression, and principles’.20 Order implies starting with the simplest, by
nature, on the one hand, or with the more commonly accepted and easiest – not
unrelated to, and including, the analysis of a definition. Learning should be based
on essential, not metaphorical, principles, and should not appeal to the imagination
(which is out of place in demonstration). Substitution should not be used, except
for the substitution of the noun by its definition, or the explanation in place of the
thing being discussed. One can use a more common noun in order to make a point,
or its opposite, or an example, but just for guidance, or division.21 One should
avoid rhetorical or poetical discourse or an imitation of the term. An example of
this misleading practice of loose expression is to say that form is masculine and
matter feminine.
The principles of the arts include (1) self-evident, irrefutable premisses, such
as the principle that the whole is greater than the part (2) hypotheses (for the
untrained student), (3) postulates – those which take long to be understood and
those which are conclusions and principles, in the science which explains them
and the science which postulates them respectively – and (4) general descriptions
that explain a noun, which if evident must be taken as premisses, and if not evident
must be taken as hypotheses and postulates. Demonstrative objection is used by
the one who thinks the matter as the opposite of what it is, and does not accord
with the method of learning stipulated by demonstrative instruction and learning.
Error may occur in two ways in an art: where fundamental principles are
denied, such as denying nature or motion in physics, or where something such as
void is postulated. The things that can essentially lead to error are like denying an
essential attribute of a thing, or affirming of it something that does not belong to
it. Some are non-essential attributes, which may be true or false, and the false is
affirmed of it.
Averroes argues that error can also occur through syllogisms, in which case
both the syllogism and its conclusion ought to be rejected. Refuting simply the
syllogism and not the conclusion is a rhetorical device, for refuting the conclusion

19
Ibid., p. 276.
20
Ibid., p. 277.
21
Ibid., p. 278.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 59

does not invalidate the syllogism (according to its form). Error can occur if
the matter (information) contained in the syllogism is false. The demonstrative
syllogism and the syllogism of objection can both be refuted by means of the
contrary or contradiction.
Perfection in an art entails knowing its principles, being able to infer from
them what is necessary, and eliminating the essential things that lead to error. In
addition, one must be able to teach it.

The Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics

In order further to understand Averroes’ conception of Aristotle’s theory of

demonstration, the Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics (Talkhīṣ kitāb al-
burhān), which predates the long commentary on the same work, and which is
available in a modern edition of the original Arabic, requires our attention.
It is worth noting that the purpose of the short and middle commentaries was
not so much to examine the fine points of Aristotelian philosophy as to introduce
and give a solid grounding in the subject covered. It has been argued that Averroes
often departs from the less than perfect Arabic translation of the original Greek,
and produces a clearer text which seeks to elucidate the true meaning of Aristotle’s
words.22 The long commentaries are a more literal reading of Aristotle’s text,
whereas the middle (and short) commentaries were possibly intended not so
much for advanced philosophy students, but as introductory manuals not only
to Aristotle’s thought but to the various disciplines that he founded, such as
metaphysics or physics.
The Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics hence sets demonstration
within the wider context of other argumentative methods such as dialectic and
rhetoric, and even sophistical arguments. At the start of his Middle Commentary on
Posterior Analytics, Averroes explains knowledge in general. He expands on what
it means to know and argues that it always takes place through thought/reflection
(fikr) and syllogism or reasoning (qiyās). An argument should in principle admit
of formalisation by means of a syllogism.
Like Aristotle, Averroes asserts the chronological primacy of induction over
deduction, since knowledge starts with sense perception and only later proceeds
to deduction and abstract thought. The knowledge obtained prior to deduction
and thought can be of two kinds, either through assent – that something exists or
not – or knowledge ‘of that to which the name of the thing points’, which is called
imagination or representation (to oneself). We thus observe that for Averroes one
of the modalities of knowledge is tied up with imagination and the interpretation

22
For details and examples of the transformations introduced by Averroes, see
Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, vol. 1, pp. 14–16.
60 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of a term. Not surprisingly, assent and imagination both refer at least initially to
something actually existing and verifiable through sense perception.23
In Averroes’ overall interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of scientific
knowledge, we find the same intention to explain how this knowledge is produced.
In addition, a special concern for the production of assent in the mind is discernible.
The choice of means to produce assent obviously depends on the recipient of the
message. In the Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Averroes considers
assent alongside another mental process, imagination (taṣawwur), whereby
we represent in our minds that which the name of a thing denotes. Assent and
imagination approximately correspond to knowledge of something’s existence and
of what its name indicates. Awareness of a thing’s existence would seemingly
precede understanding of the meaning of its name, for someone who is aware of
the existence of something must needs know what the name indicates. Generally
speaking, one knows through thinking, or an idea (fikr) or syllogism (qiyās).24
In demonstration, which implies the use of inference through syllogism, every
proposition must be either true or false. To assume otherwise is sophistry,
which includes accidental knowledge – which is no true knowledge at all. False
information enters sophistical syllogisms, which need not be true or false.25
Sophists would argue that it is not possible to know through further principles, but
Averroes argues that the intellect knows the principles of demonstration as well
as the parts of the syllogism, which are known by themselves as self-evident. It is
therefore not necessary to show the reputability of these premisses, because their

23
The philosophers thus rely on the intellect rather than on the imagination for their
study of God and creation. The distinction between the philosophers and the other classes
has a justification in psychology, in the sense that the imagination is more tied to the body
and is more likely to visualise and anthropomorphise, as opposed to the intellect: ‘These
other faculties [other than the rational faculty] – the nutritive, sensory, and imaginative
faculties – are regarded as dependent upon and, to a degree, affected by physical, material
reality, which includes both that which is external to the person and that which is intrinsic
to the body in which the soul resides. These other faculties of the soul are thus implicated in
material and individual reality in a way which the intellect, beginning with its initial stage
of potentiality as the material intellect, is not’, Averroës Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s
De anima, critical ed., trans., notes and introduction Alfred L. Ivry (Provo: Brigham Young
University Press, 2002), p. xxi. The human intellect abstracts the universals from particulars
(ibid., p. xxi), while the practical intellect is connected to the imagination (ibid., p. 31).
Averroes further defends the idea that imagination should not be identified with knowledge
and intellect (ibid., p. 104). The imagination depends on the body, and processes sense data;
see Idoia Maiza Ozcoidi, La concepción de la filosofía en Averroes: Análisis crítico del
Tahāfut al-tahāfut (Madrid: Trotta, 2001), p. 302.
24
Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, critical ed.
Mahmoud M. Kassem, completed, revised, and annotated, Charles E. Butterworth and
Ahmad Abd al-Magid Haridi (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1982),
henceforth Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, p. 34.
25
Ibid., p. 43.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 61

self-evidence carries an immediate certainty. It is rather dialectic which employs

reputable or well-known premisses. In turn, demonstrative premisses, as Aristotle
had stated, must be necessary, and so eternal and unchangeable. The link between
necessity and causality is stressed, for Averroes argues that to know necessarily is
to know the cause, and if one does not know the cause one knows by accident.26
Hence the principle of causation is central for any kind of scientific knowledge,
and it is the philosophers who inquire into the causes of any event or process.
Averroes concurs with Aristotle that necessary knowledge comes with the
cause that necessitates existence. So the cause of existence, if and when known,
produces in the mind necessary knowledge, which cannot be otherwise. The
causation that is observable in the world of nature between cause and effect is
mirrored in the relation between premisses and conclusion, a leitmotiv that recurs
in Averroes’ theory of demonstration. Any valid inference or deduction mirrors
causation in nature.
In order to obtain necessary and true knowledge, Averroes states that the
premisses of a demonstrative syllogism must be true, primary, and not known
through a middle term, that is, must be self-evident and known by themselves.
There should be no middle term between the things affirmed and their opposites –
no half-truths; nor should any opposites be posited in the premisses. The premisses
should furthermore be better known than the conclusions – for the conclusion
purports to provide new, mediated knowledge. Better known to the intellect is the
simple and universal.27 However, because we first begin to learn through sense
perception, the sensible and sensory is in the first instance better known to us – or
rather to our senses – where the process of cognition starts. Demonstration is then
from primary principles that are not derived from any further principles. Averroes
adds that demonstration commands certain assent through syllogism. If the
principles themselves are immediate, they are not known through demonstration
but are self-evident.
Averroes distinguishes a demonstration by sign and absolute demonstration.
The latter indicates the proximate cause of something: for instance, one ought
to say that fire was the cause of burning, and not God.28 A further distinction is
made between a demonstration that indicates the existence, and one that indicates
the cause, the latter being considered more complete and thus preferable. Thus,
the former uses premisses that indicate a remote cause, and the latter uses the
proximate cause.
The premisses of a demonstration should be true to reality, and its terms should
be always true and necessary, hence the predicates are to be essential and primary,
and the premisses are necessary and essentially predicable of the universal.29
For, according to Averroes, all that is necessary is essential and vice versa.

26
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book II, 471F, Abram.
27
Averroes, Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, pp. 38–9.
28
Ibid., p. 69.
29
Ibid., p. 58.
62 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Demonstration yields certain, necessary and unchangeable knowledge, produced

by a valid deduction from true and necessary premisses. Other kinds of method
may yield true but not necessary conclusions. To reach the demonstrative level it
is certainly not sufficient that the information conveyed in the premisses be well
known or reputable, although this would be acceptable in the other methods of
bringing about assent.
Predication can refer to a single substance (such as the sun and the moon)
and as such constitute particular predication, or it can refer to a whole species or
genus and so constitute universal predication.30 Naturally, universal demonstration
is preferable, although particular demonstration cannot to be excluded. However,
with regard to the obtainment of knowledge, in its connection with demonstrative
knowledge, Averroes defends that inductive knowledge, the process of obtaining
universals, is not by itself sufficient for the attainment of demonstration. There is
no demonstration in the strict sense of perishable things, except accidentally, at a
given time. To illustrate this point, he states that an eclipse is a one-time event, but
a common universal nature underlies all eclipses – i.e., the same pattern/cause – so
demonstration is not of this eclipse in particular, but of the mechanism that produces
any and every eclipse.31 Demonstrations should occur within the same genus; thus,
something that is always the case for minerals does not necessarily apply to the
animal kingdom, and such a transfer would not constitute demonstration.
Averroes sums up the conditions for demonstration: it includes the issues that
are posited, the premisses that one must admit and the predicates of that which is
sought after. These conditions stipulate that we have essential predicates and that
things are known within that genus (i.e., premisses should indicate if the predicate
exists or not in that subject), and finally the posited nature should be the subject of
the art in which something is demonstrated. The prohibition to move across genera
in a demonstration had been established by Aristotle. Averroes goes on to state
that sciences must keep to the same genus and the same sought-after and subject
matter in order to share in the same demonstration. With regard to demonstration
of cause and existence, if one science comes under the other, the one treating the
higher genus shows the cause and the one in the lower genus proves the existence
of the subject matter.
The conditions for producing demonstrative knowledge are well defined
and limited, and therefore it is difficult to know in all cases if we have attained
demonstrative knowledge.32 The Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics
takes pains to distinguish demonstration from dialectic, which is a useful but
imperfect means of argumentation. Dialectic accepts affirming the opposite
of what is stated.33 The purpose of dialectic differs from that of demonstration,
because it does not aim at confirming a specific subject or substance. In addition,

30
Ibid., p. 53.
31
Ibid., p. 63.
32
Ibid., p. 69.
33
Ibid., p. 40.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 63

the conclusion of a dialectical inference may be drawn from essential or accidental

issues. Error may enter dialectical arguments, especially because their absolute
accuracy is not tested.
Averroes discusses other important aspects of the demonstrative argument, such
as the three specific figures found in it. The first figure of a syllogism is affirmative
and universal, and indeed the only one used by the mathematical sciences. Here
we must recall that the mathematical sciences were broadly construed as including
various disciplines and considering number under various aspects – for instance,
music considers number as it exists in time. Averroes praises the exactitude of
mathematical demonstrations, saying they are hardly matched by those of other
sciences. Mathematics is valued for being wholly abstract from matter. Averroes
states that the more remote from matter a science is, the more certain. Arithmetic
is therefore more certain than music, which involves time and is potentially linked
to matter, whereas arithmetic studies number per se. In addition, the simpler the
principles of a science, the more certain – for instance, he argues that arithmetic is
simpler than engineering.34
However, he adds that practically all the sciences that indicate the cause use
first figure syllogisms. Second figure syllogisms, which deny the predicate of a
subject, do not produce a necessitating consequence, and third figure syllogisms
yield particular rather than universal conclusions, which is a significant limitation,
for the terms and conclusions of demonstration proper should all be affirmative
and universal and not apply only to one individual. In addition, the first figure
seems to be independent of the others; hence, it is the first figure that produces par
excellence absolute demonstration.35 Averroes further defends the significance of
universality for demonstration and refutes those who defend the notion of particular
demonstration – he appears to follow a stricter line in this regard even than
Aristotle – for particulars are perishable and hence the knowledge thus obtained is
not essential and necessary. Like Aristotle before him, he equates necessity with
eternity as something that can never be otherwise. Therefore, particularity in an
argument leads to accidental knowledge. At any rate, the universal encompasses
particulars, so the demonstration involving universals also embraces all the
particulars classified under that universal, such as a genus or species. When
we know universals, we potentially know all the particulars coming under that
classification. Knowledge of particulars, however, does not imply an immediate
knowledge of universals. The example of a triangle is used, and explained also
in the long commentary. To say that a triangle is a three-sided figure with three
inward angles constitutes a demonstration, but to say the isosceles is a triangle is
a particular demonstration – if one only knows the latter one does not necessarily
know the nature of triangle in general. The universal is thus more apt to furnish the
cause. The more universal a demonstration, the stronger it is. It is also important

34
Ibid., p. 123.
35
Ibid., p. 87.
64 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

to have simplicity and affirmation, rather than complexity and negation, for the
former are more closely linked to the universal and eternal.
For Averroes it is important to employ immediate premisses, which are
essential. In them the predicates show the nature of the subject, and constitute
the definition or part of the definition; otherwise the subject of the predicate is
included in their definition.36 If there is a close link between subject and predicate,
it will be an essential rather than an accidental link, and the conclusion too will
be essential.
Simplicity is valued in concrete instances. Premisses are simple if they are
immediate, whereas non-immediate ones are composed. In turn, these primary,
immediate premisses must have finite predicates. If the relation of the premisses is
like the whole to the part, then we have an ostensive syllogism (qiyās mustaqīm),
which is a natural syllogism.
Given that true demonstration is universal, that which happens by chance does
not admit of demonstration, for those things do not happen always or for the most
part, and are not necessary, whereas demonstration is of the necessary or of that
which is possible for the most part, for instance something not falling outside
the laws of nature. A conclusion drawn from premisses indicating something
necessary is required. If it indicates something that occurs for the most part, then
the conclusion also applies for the most part. In addition, there is no demonstration
of information obtained by sense perception, given that the senses perceive
individuals, which exist at a specific time and place, not eternally, whereas
demonstration concerns the universal and that which belongs to individuals at all
times. Consequently, there can be a demonstration of the process of an eclipse,
and of human nature in general, but not of this particular eclipse or this particular
human being.37
In linking demonstration with the assumption of universality and foreseeable
outcomes if the same conditions or circumstances are in place, Averroes’ conception
of causation in the natural world points to a defence of a system of laws of nature.
Moreover, the senses do not perceive causality – rather, the intellect does. The
senses perceive only ‘this’ eclipse but do not grasp that the same process is at work
in other eclipses, even though it is by combining the different experiences of an
eclipse that the intellect comes to understand the mechanism at work during each
and every eclipse.38 Demonstration relies on causality and a purely intellectual
grasp, not on sense perception. The senses are an important starting point, as is
observation, and indeed all knowledge which comes from induction or deduction
starts from sense perception, but not in the final stage of producing an inference.
Averroes does note, however, that if one particular sense is lost, then the knowledge
linked to that sense is also lost.39

36
Ibid., pp. 111–12.
37
Ibid., p. 125.
38
Ibid., p. 126.
39
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book I, pp. 415–16.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 65

Demonstration, unlike the other methods, does not posit an opinion – even a true
one – as a working hypothesis, but only works from absolutely certain statements.
For even a true opinion does not carry absolute certainty, as its objects are possible
rather than necessary. In factual terms, necessary knowledge and opinion may
concur, but they do not carry the same level of certainty and conviction.40
The second book of the Middle Commmentary on Posterior Analytics does not
treat the general conditions for demonstrative knowledge, but rather details how
such knowledge is to be obtained. In particular it explains how one is to know the
existence as well as the cause of a given substance or event. The investigation
is broadened to mention other causes than the efficient cause – also the end or
purpose, and matter and form. In this domain, too, there cannot be demonstration
of the accidental and of that which happens by chance, for this is not intended
and does not have a definite cause. The causes investigated in the context of
demonstration must be well defined and not accidental. They must always lead
to the same effect, under the same circumstances. What happens by chance and
fortune is rare, and is not found among the causes mentioned in demonstrations. It
cannot serve as a middle term in a demonstration.41
Four things are discussed in this science of demonstration. Two are simple
and two are complex. The former examine whether something exists absolutely,
for instance whether the void exists, and also what it is that we know to exist.
The complex consist in the analysis of whether a predicate exists in a subject and
why, if this predicate exists for that subject (e.g., if the moon will be eclipsed
tomorrow).42 The middle term furnishes the cause of existence in addition to
indicating what something is. What is apt to be proved through demonstration
cannot be proved by any other method.

Universality and Definition

There is a close link between demonstration and definition, as stressed by Aristotle.

Averroes explains the difference between them, to the effect that a definition
indicates that which belongs to a substance and proves it, thus resembling
demonstration. The latter shows, moreover, things that are outside the substance.
The middle term, which is shared by both premisses, is more specific than the
major term, which is the predicate of the conclusion.
In addition, there can be no ambiguity in demonstration, wherefore no
polysemic terms ought to be used, although this is admissible in dialectic.43
Neither the conclusion nor the premisses should include any equivocal terms. The
terms, then, both in a syllogism and in a definition ought to be univocal, and as

40
Averroes, Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, p. 133.
41
Ibid., p. 160.
42
Ibid., pp. 137–8.
43
Ibid., p. 174.
66 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

clear as they can possibly be.44 Equivocal terms might lead one to think of many
things that they are one and the same. Examples of ambiguous language are to
say that the sea is the sweat or moisture (according to the Latin translators Burana
and Abram, respectively) of the earth, gathered in its deep end, or that the law
is the measure of acts and actions; for moisture does not give to understand the
substance of sea water, except in relation to earth, and the same applies to measure
in relation to the law.45 In this passage Averroes stresses that since the dialectician
avoids the use of ambiguous terms in definitions and demonstrations, this use is
even less appropriate in demonstration, on account of a certain similarity between
dialectical and demonstrative arguments. Terms and examples that are analogous
or transferable ought not to be used. If one responsible for demonstration and
definition is compelled to use these terms, the analogy should be a close one.46
This, however, applies to things that are not sensed and not corruptible. It helps
the intellect readily to understand the matter through the relation between those
definitions and the more universal ones. With regard to the relation between the
actual meaning and analogous expressions, Averroes offers a comparison to the
effect that the common sense (which coordinates the actions of the five external
senses) is like a centre to which the other senses, like the lines of a circle, converge.
Using peripheral expressions helps the intellect grasp the matter at hand, because
in spite of being peripheral, they lead to the centre. These definitions point to
the true definition, and it is easier for the intellect to become acquainted with the
analogy first, before encountering the true definition.

The Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics

Having expounded the concept of demonstration in the Middle Commentary on

Posterior Analytics, it is important to explain significant aspects of Averroes’
reading of Aristotle in his long commentary. As we have seen, the first book deals
with demonstration in general, comparing it, for instance, with the dialectical
method; while the second book looks more closely at the relation between
demonstration and definition given their many similarities. Its analysis is much
more detailed than that of the middle commentary, and we will focus on the ways
in which it builds upon or differs from it.
Averroes states that logic can be considered as a tool – this being its proper
use – but also as a science in its own right. What is expounded in it is used in
the other sciences.47 Moreover, what is known by demonstration is not the same
as what is known through definition, for the former is more universal. While a
definition indicates the essences of things, demonstration indicates the cause,

44
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book II, 526B, Abram.
45
Ibid., Book II, 527D–E.
46
Ibid., Book II, 527E–F, Abram.
47
Ibid., Book I, p. 461.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 67

being and accidents of a thing.48 Definition is only accidentally found together

with demonstration, in dialectic. However, demonstration and definition are
closely connected, for ‘when demonstrating what the triangle is, the geometer
defines it’.49 An absolute demonstration must additionally provide the cause.
Expanding on the causal relations obtaining in a syllogism, Averroes states that
the cause is the middle term, which is shared by both premisses, and the effect is
the major, which is the predicate of the conclusion.50 Demonstration through the
cause indicates why something is, otherwise it shows whether something is the
case. Demonstration proper involves indication of the cause, and the proximate
cause is more appropriately called the cause.
Perfect science involves knowledge of the cause. Averroes explains that ‘if an
eclipse is known by the interposition of earth, this constitutes perfect science, but
if the fact that the earth is interposed is known through an eclipse, this does not
constitute perfect science; if this is known so then by a science that deviates, or
falls short of perfect science’.51 A substance can have several causes if it has many
disparate attributes.
In underlining the stringency of demonstration, Averroes stresses its uniqueness,
whereas for Aristotle dialectic can be a good preparation for demonstration. For
Averroes, one does not need to know dialectic in order to learn demonstration.52
A perfect demonstration requires three aspects: (1) to know the existence of things
we are demonstrating by knowing its cause, (2) to know that it exists by virtue of
its cause, and know that this is its cause, and (3) that things cannot exist without
that cause. Here he distinguishes between indicating that something exists (quia)
and its cause (propter quid). To know the fact is to know existence before the
cause. The former proceeds from the particular to the universal and is therefore
not strictly demonstrative.53 It is more appropriate to proceed from the cause to the
effect than the other way around.
In the second book of the long commentary Averroes argues that the reply to
the question ‘what is it?’ yields the causes and forms, and the reply to the question
‘why?’ involves providing the external causes – the most important of which is the
final cause, but also the efficient cause. The two questions are interrelated. Each
of the four causes – form, matter, end and agent – can be found as middle term of
a demonstration.54
Absolute demonstration indicates both the cause and the existence. It produces
not just knowledge of the effect in the syllogism, but also how the effect is truly
produced by its cause outside the mind. It replicates what happens in nature. The

48
Ibid., Book II, 413A–D, Abram.
49
Ibid., Book II, 450F, Burana. My translation.
50
Ibid., Book II, 535B, Abram.
51
Ibid., Book II, 537C Abram. My translation.
52
Ibid., Book I, p. 170.
53
Ibid., Book I, pp. 180–81, 207.
54
Ibid., Book II, 477B Burana.
68 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

example provided states that we do not just know of fire because of smoke in a
certain place, we also know that smoke comes from fire.55 Necessary knowledge
implies knowing ‘why’ as well as ‘that’.56 A demonstration by sign (quia) is not
absolutely demonstrative, for signs are not demonstrations. Here Averroes remarks
that Avicenna had denied that demonstration through signs constitutes proper
demonstration or yields certainty, for one must know the effect through the cause
and not the other way around.57 Demonstrative inference would proceed from fire,
the cause, to smoke, the effect. The same applies within the syllogism, where the
middle term must have an essential link to the major and the minor. In a syllogism,
it is the middle term which effects the demonstration.
Only absolute demonstration brings about perfect assent, rather than recalling
an object to one’s mind through images. In this long commentary the question of
assent remains central, for demonstration implies not only an external utterance
(nuṭq) but also internal belief. This stress on the question of assent mirrors debates
on the status of faith, and the proclamation of faith, in the various medieval Islamic
theology schools.58
In the Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Averroes stipulates that
the premisses of a demonstrative syllogism must fulfil various conditions: they
must be true, self-evident, better known than the conclusion, and they must be
the cause of the conclusion and correspond with the thing explained.59 Some of
these characteristics can be shared with other types of syllogism, such as the
dialectical and the rhetorical, namely regarding the stipulation that the premisses
must be better known than the conclusion.60 The art of dialectic, in turn, is based
on commonly known premisses that are not demonstrative or proved as such, and
that yield no complete certainty.
If the principles of demonstration are not known by themselves, they must
be known through demonstration, so that ultimately the principles must be self-
evident, or known immediately by the intellect without recourse to demonstration.
A primary demonstration is one relying on first principles instead of on a previous
demonstration.
Demonstration only admits of one definition for each thing, whereas dialectic
admits more.61 Unlike the demonstrative syllogism, the dialectic and the rhetorical
syllogism do not yield absolute certainty. The certainty of a syllogism depends not
only on the certainty it produces, but also on the ability to furnish a definitive proof
of the knowledge in question. If the opposite of what is stated is false and rejected,

55
Ibid., Book I, pp. 182–3.
56
Ibid., Book I, p. 267.
57
Ibid., Book I, p. 275.
58
Robert Caspar, Islamic Theology, vol. II, Doctrines (Rome: Pontifical Institute for
Arabic and Islamic Studies, 2007), pp. 18–19.
59
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book I, p. 183.
60
Ibid., Book I, p. 198.
61
Ibid., Book II, 458A, Abram.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 69

we have a demonstration; if it is admitted in some way, this constitutes a different

kind of inference, dialectical or rhetorical.
In the Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics Averroes states that the
form (ṣūra) of the dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms is the same. In their
conclusion both assert something to the detriment of its opposite, although, as
we have seen, either of the opposites could be asserted in dialectic, given that its
statements are not strictly necessary, but possible.62
Distinguishing between the dialectical and the rhetorical syllogisms, Averroes
states that if an agreement on the opposite of what it states is rare, then we have a
dialectical syllogism; if it is equally possible, it is rhetorical or merely persuasive.
He further argues that in the dialectical syllogism we rarely find the false, whereas
in the rhetorical it can be equally found – in other words, there is a fifty per cent
chance of the conclusion being false. Dialectic employs a particular syllogism,
and both elements of the opposition are possible, although one is likelier than the
other. In addition, and unlike metaphysics (ḥikma, philosophy, or first philosophy),
which in this passage seems to be equated with demonstration, dialectic does not
focus on one single subject but treats several, and its goal is victory in an argument.
While metaphysics studies being qua being and the ultimate causes of existents,
dialectic studies beings in so far as they are known (mashhūra), and in so far as
they are handed down to us, or admitted by us.63 The identification of metaphysics
with demonstration in these passages appears from the comparison between
metaphysics and dialectic, where metaphysics takes the place of demonstration.
For dialectic, as well as demonstration, is a method rather than a discipline per se,
and the implication here is that metaphysics carries the certainty of demonstration.
Regarding the question of proving the subject matter of a certain science, a
contradiction could be seen to arise in the fact that, on the one hand, metaphysics
has the highest principles and its principles are common to all sciences,64 while,
on the other hand, its subject matter, God, is proved by physics. Averroes argues to
the effect that a particular science can indicate or signal its subject matter, but not
prove it in an absolute way, furnishing both the cause and existence.
How do sophistical statements differ from this? Averroes claims that these are
for the most part false, and only accidentally true.65 Does the admission of possible
falsehood in dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms contradict previous statements
to the effect that there is only one truth and that the rhetorical and dialectical
point to the same truth? One might argue on the basis of other works by Averroes
that dialectic and rhetorical statements may not be strictly true if taken literally,
but are always true if interpreted. Demonstrative knowledge or syllogisms, as
we have seen, are only to be read literally, as there is no further meaning to be
unveiled other than the explicit demonstrative statement. Demonstrative language

62
Ibid., Book I, p. 330.
63
Ibid., Book I, pp. 328–9.
64
Ibid., Book I, p. 298.
65
Ibid., Book I, pp. 199–200.
70 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

is in no way metaphorical, but direct. Moreover, there is no demonstration of the

accidental.66 But dialectical and rhetorical language and syllogisms, as we have
seen, are open to further interpretation, which means that even if the apparent
meaning is false, the hidden meaning is true. This is not explicitly stated in the
Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, but it can be gleaned in the light of his
statements in the Decisive Treatise.
Demonstration implies not only knowing with certainty that something is
true, but also being able to prove it, and to induce the same conviction in others.
For it is distinctive of demonstration to show the cause, given that knowledge is
knowledge of the cause as well as of existence. In the same way that the cause
produces the existence of its effect, so in a syllogism the premisses are the cause of
the conclusion. It is in perceiving the cause that we know the effect with certainty.
Therefore, demonstrative knowledge is necessary, which means that it is eternal
and cannot be otherwise.
How does demonstration stand with regard to the issue of mental assent?
Demonstrative syllogism always produces assent without fail, whereas dialectical
syllogism produces assent for the most part, and assent or lack of it are equally
possible with rhetoric. Nevertheless, false statements or outcomes may not feature
at all in dialectical and rhetorical utterances. They may all be true like demonstrative
conclusions; therefore, Averroes states that, regarding falsehood, the division into
demonstrative, dialectic and rhetorical is accidental, because falsehood is not
necessarily found in any of those categories.67 The Long Commentary on Posterior
Analytics stresses that demonstration is of the necessary. A cause necessarily
produces its effect, as the premisses necessarily produce the conclusion, in a valid
syllogism, thus leading to the mind’s assent – but only demonstration does so
necessarily and without fail.
If we read this information in the light of the Decisive Treatise, a demonstrative
argument never fails to produce certainty, unlike the dialectical and the rhetorical,
even if it is suitable for all people, and in spite of the fact that it does not fail
to produce assent if understood. For the majority of people, the best dialectical
or rhetorical arguments ought to be used, while the demonstrative class
requires demonstrative, certain proof, for assent. The demonstrative would fail
to bring about assent from the dialectical and rhetorical classes in virtue of its
incomprehensibility, which, as we have seen, is based on two factors: its content
is too spiritual for most people to grasp, and its method is too technical for most
people to follow, based as it is on syllogistic logic.
That is not to say that syllogisms are not used in dialectic or rhetoric, but as
Aristotle had explained and Averroes reiterates, rhetoric specialises in enthymemes,
a type of syllogistic reasoning which omits a premiss, while assuming it. It is
thus a simplified form of syllogism that can more readily be understood by the
majority of people. In stating that demonstration produces certain and unfailing

66
Ibid., Book II, 461D, Abram.
67
Ibid., Book I, p. 199.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 71

assent on the part of those who understand it, Averroes explains that this is because
what demonstration proves cannot be otherwise – it is eternal and does not change
or alter.68
Therefore, demonstration is more deserving of being called necessary science
(‘ilm) than anything else, since that which causes something of its kind is worthier
of receiving that appellation. In the same way that fire is hot insofar as it is the
foremost cause of heat, so is demonstration the cause of necessary science.69
Averroes held Aristotle’s work as containing the truth, and Aristotle himself as
the greatest philosophical and scientific authority of all times. However, this did
not stop Averroes from writing philosophical works – other than commentaries –
in his own name.
His discourse is clearly demonstrative in the commentaries, but in his personal
works he uses a more popular and accessible, non-Aristotelian vocabulary, while
referring to the same doctrines. If he points to his commentaries for corroboration
of his statements in the Decisive Treatise and the Incoherence of the Incoherence,
he implicitly shows the congruence between the two types of philosophical works.
The different language used purports to address a readership acquainted with
Aristotle’s works and philosophy – since the purpose of the commentaries was to
elucidate Aristotle’s texts, whose terse style was considered obscure – as well as
those unacquainted with philosophy.
Since demonstration strictly speaking goes hand in hand with universal
knowledge, which includes the attributes or qualities of the substances we claim to
know, predication is an essential element of demonstration. In some way or other,
the predicate must enter into the definition of a subject and so be inextricably
linked to it. Universal predication must be of everything in the subject, and must
be linked to it essentially and not just necessarily.70 Averroes berates Alfarabi for
countenancing the view that premisses need only be true, when in fact they must
also be essential, as must the middle term. In another criticism of Alfarabi, he
states that there are no special or particular premisses involved in demonstration,
as Alfarabi would have it. So the predicate must be essential and necessary (he
illustrates this with the fact that snow is necessarily but not essentially white), and
subject and predicate must imply one another.71
Naturally, conditional propositions are not part of the demonstrative method.
Accidental predication is only considered acceptable if the accident is essential to
the subject, and thus permanent. Conditional syllogisms are admissible in dialectic.72
With regard to predication in demonstrative syllogisms, the Middle Commentary
on Posterior Analytics had already confirmed these positions, namely that the
predicate must be essential to the subject and always found with it, as well as being

68
Ibid., Book I, pp. 256–7.
69
Ibid., Book I, p. 257.
70
Ibid., Book I, pp. 225, 229.
71
Ibid., Book I, pp. 245, 255.
72
Ibid., Book II, 433A–B, Abram.
72 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

an essential and primary attribute of the subject. Both the subject and the predicate
of premisses, and the conclusion in demonstrative syllogisms, must conform to
these rules. Unlike dialectical and rhetorical premisses, a demonstrative premiss
does not admit of questions; only affirmative premisses are permissible.73
In addition, as we have seen, no particular premisses are truly demonstrative.
This means that the premisses should not refer to an individual thing or event. The
example provided is that of an eclipse. Demonstration proper does not prove the
existence of an individual eclipse, but rather the process underlying any eclipse.74
Demonstration therefore proves the laws of nature, rather than explaining a
particular, one-time phenomenon, unless it obeys a general pattern. As a result of
the requirement of universality of the premisses, Averroes claims that there is no
demonstration of perishable, corruptible things.75
A demonstration implying individuals can only be found accidentally, not
essentially, given that demonstration has a universal nature. If we come across a
particular demonstration, or a demonstration of a particular event (or substance),
this does not constitute absolute demonstration. Therefore, the further one is from
matter and material objects, the more certain and demonstrative knowledge one
possesses. For matter is that which individualises something. Something becomes
individual by inhering in some matter. The particular, which is always composed
of matter and form, is complex. Consequently, the simple is preferable to the
complex when it comes to demonstration. Averroes also states that there is no
demonstration through sense perception since the senses perceive only that which
is particular, while the intellect apprehends the universal. Averroes, like Aristotle,
defends the idea that knowledge starts with the senses and sense perception, but
demonstration takes place when that knowledge becomes purified of the sensible
elements and reaches universality.
Demonstrative premisses, which formally have to be better known than the
conclusion they produce, as well as being true and self-evident, should also
be universal, essential and primary. This means that they are not particular, or
accidental, as we have seen, and should not derive from other propositions. If
they do derive from other propositions, they ought to result from them by
demonstration. This process cannot regress ad infinitum, but ultimately the
premisses on which demonstration is based must be self-evident and not proved
by any other propositions. Averroes further states that clearer knowledge results
from knowing the proximate cause, rather than a remote cause. In the same way,
primary premisses produce more evident knowledge than secondary ones, because
the link is then more clearly seen.76
It emerges from Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s views on demonstration
that it differs in various ways from the dialectical and rhetorical methods.

73
Ibid., pp. 52, 75.
74
Ibid., Book I, p. 291.
75
Ibid., Book I, p. 287.
76
Ibid., Book I, p. 301.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 73

Demonstration concerns the universal, eternal, unchanging. It would seem that

material individuals and any being under the law of generation and corruption
are excluded from demonstrative discourse. Thus demonstration would include
God, eternal laws of nature and the celestial world, any other celestial beings, and
mathematics. Particular or historical events that immediately affect humans would
not be considered as a fitting subject of demonstration. Averroes further argues,
drawing on the various figures of syllogism established in Prior Analytics, that the
first figure is the one that properly suits demonstration, for it is both affirmative and
universal. The second figure is not affirmative and the third figure is not universal.
There can be syllogisms regarding negative facts or particulars, but they do not
constitute absolute demonstration. The first figure is furthermore self-sufficient,
and stands alone without the other two, as shown in the Long Commentary on
Posterior Analytics.77
The model for demonstrative knowledge is clearly mathematics, by Averroes’
own admission – mathematical proofs use the first figure. As a result, mathematics
is the truest of sciences through demonstration.78 It provides absolute proofs, of
cause and of existence. These demonstrations are potentially definitions.
He argues that from definition no syllogism ensues. In relation to demonstration,
definitions are of three kinds: (1) as the conclusion of a demonstration, (2) as
principles of demonstrations, and finally as definitions, which are (3) demonstrations
of things that are not concurrently demonstrated by the syllogism but are known
by themselves.79
The premisses of demonstration constitute certain knowledge, whereas
dialectical syllogism may contain commonly known, rather than certain, premisses.
He further distinguishes the demonstrative syllogism from the rhetorical. A very
common form of rhetorical reasoning, as we have seen, is the enthymeme, which
omits one of the premisses (and so the middle term). Averroes explains that a
syllogism that lacks the middle term does not constitute demonstration.80
Demonstration, which unlike dialectic does not admit of questions in its
premisses, further differs from both dialectic and rhetoric in that it has a specific
subject matter, scientific or certain knowledge, and the means of attaining it, in
the same way that logic analyses the validity or invalidity of speech and language.
Dialectic, in turn, discusses any topic worthy of knowledge, and rhetoric seeks to
achieve persuasion of an audience regarding any topic. Both dialectic and rhetoric
do not specialise in a specific topic to the exclusion of others. Averroes reiterates
that nothing is more certain or better than knowledge by demonstration. He states
that something cannot be better known except through demonstration.81

77
Ibid., Book I, p. 376.
78
Ibid., Book I, p. 374.
79
Ibid., Book II, p. 473E–F, Abram.
80
Averroes, Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, p. 322.
81
Averroes, Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book I, p. 464.
74 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

To conclude, demonstration, as evidenced by Averroes’ commentaries on

Posterior Analytics, relies primarily on syllogistic logic with regard to its form,
and on necessary, certain, primary and essential knowledge with regard to its
content. In practice, it is the preserve of philosophers alone, who are trained in
the Aristotelian tradition and accept the laws of causality, in particular secondary
causality, in the natural world and in human discourse. If we compare the three
commentaries on this logical work by Aristotle, we find a growing stringency with
regard to the rules underlying demonstration, particularly in the way in which
Averroes insists on the universal character of the premisses and conclusions
involved in and derived from demonstration.
We now turn to the commentaries on Topics and Rhetoric for an analysis of
dialectical and rhetorical discourse in Averroes.
 Chapter 3
Dialectical and Rhetorical Discourse
in Averroes’ Commentaries on
Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric

The Commentaries on Topics

In his work entitled Topics (where topos means place or location but can also mean
procedure), Aristotle purports to describe a certain type of discourse that is parallel
to, but distinct from, demonstrative discourse, which, as we have seen, constitutes
valid deduction from indubitable principles. The work deals with the discipline of
dialectic, not unrelated to the concept of dialogue that is characteristic of Plato’s
works, the dialogical method of seeking the truth with an interlocutor.1 It consists
in reasoning from reputable opinions (rather than indisputable first principles,
as in demonstration), as stated by Aristotle at the opening of Topics. Like its
demonstrative counterpart, it admits of deduction while relying on reputable
premisses. Consequently, the conclusion of dialectical premisses is also reputable
– that is to say, accepted by the majority of people – rather than indisputable. The
premisses are considered contentious if they fail to be even reputable.
This formal discipline of discussion and argument has an important role, in
spite of falling short of the requirements for indisputable deduction. Reputable
signifies that they are acceptable to all or most people, or that they are accepted
by the wise, including propositions that contradict the opposite of what is taken to
be reputable. Opinions that accord with recognised arts are also within the domain
of dialectic, as well as propositions on which people hold no opinion, or most
people hold opinions that are contrary to those of the wise, or those held by the
wise against most people. A dialectical statement should appear to be true always
or for the most part.
In the second chapter of the Topics, and before proceeding, in the fifth chapter
of Book I, to establishing the conditions for the dialectical method, Aristotle
justifies devoting a study to the subject by listing the uses of this method, which

1
In connection with the use of the polysemic term ‘logos’ in ancient Greek and its
relation to dialectic, Frédérique Woerther remarks: ‘The first sense, that of dialectic, was
used for seeking and attaining the truth by means of Socratic argument (elenchos) and
dialogue; a second, sophistic sense sought to flatter the listener with no concern for his
welfare’, in Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic
Worlds, ed. Frédérique Woerther (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2009), p. 9.
76 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

can serve as part of an intellectual training, useful in casual encounters and in

the context of the philosophical sciences.2 The first use is connected to a ‘plan
of enquiry’, the second allows one to learn and test people’s opinions in their
presence, rather than simply other opinions heard, making it easier to examine
them. With regard to the philosophical sciences, Aristotle argues that its usefulness
lies in the fact that it allows us to ponder both sides of a question and thus to test
its respective strengths and weaknesses. A further usefulness lies in the possibility
of discussing the principles of each science. Aristotle famously stipulates in the
Posterior Analytics that the existence of the subject matter of a given science
cannot be proved from within that science, but rather must be proved by another
science. In this way, dialectic allows the discussion of those (primitive) principles
and reputable views about those sciences, before proceeding to their formal proof.
Dialectic is thus a preparatory discipline leading up to demonstrative discussions,
as Aristotle states. In particular, it prepares the criticism of the principles of every
enquiry. Like the other logical treatises, this work is very much about the use of
language, in this case specifically in the context of a dialogue or debate and its
linguistic components. It examines the arguments and the propositions employing
topics or (common)places as the parts of a premiss. Like the Prior Analytics and
the Posterior Analytics, this work builds on the conclusions of the Categories,
which analyses the components of a proposition such as subject and predicate, as
well as on the principles of On Interpretation, which analyses the various types
of propositions. Indeed, many issues already discussed in these previous works,
such as genus, property or accident or definition, resurface in the Topics, since
they are important elements of dialectical speech. Definitions have a role to play
in dialectical propositions.3 Other predicables, such as genus, and differentia are
in turn closely connected to definition.
What are the similarities and differences between demonstration and dialectic
according to Aristotle? Both use deduction, while dialectic also uses induction,
and both tackle ethical, natural or logical issues. Ethical enquiries appear to be
more properly discussed in dialectic than demonstration since the latter works
from universal premisses. Aristotle’s approach to the ethical virtues clearly departs
from Plato’s ethics, in that he does not seek definitions of the virtues and does not
link virtue to knowledge alone.
Moreover, Aristotle appears to distinguish the dialectician from the philosopher
when he states that the former is concerned with the order of the statements,
while the philosopher is instead concerned with the content of propositions.4
Although the two disciplines overlap, there is a clear distinction between them.
Like demonstration, dialectic can lead to the attainment of truth and knowledge,

2
Aristotle, Topics, translated into English by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, vol. 1 of
The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 167–277, 101a25–29, p. 168.
3
Ibid., 158b35–159a1.
4
Ibid., 155b4–10.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 77

but specifically it contributes to choice or avoidance of something. In this way it

appears to display a more practical aspect than does demonstrative knowledge.
Dialectic can lead directly to the solution of a problem or contribute in that
direction. In dialectic propositions may serve to find a universal by inductive
means, or they can strengthen an argument or clarify it. This method should take
into account the audience it addresses, such that deduction should be used among
dialecticians, while induction should be used in addressing the majority of people.5
One could establish a parallelism between Aristotle’s conception of necessity
and possibility in Physics II and Metaphysics V (Delta), and the difference
between the demonstrative and the dialectical methods: necessary is that which
always takes place and does not fail to occur, it is that which cannot be otherwise.
We find the necessary in the circular movements of the celestial spheres and,
generally speaking, in the heavenly processes that never deviate from a set
pattern. In turn, movements observed in the sublunary world of generation and
corruption are uncertain and do not follow a constant and undeviating pattern,
since they do not follow circular movement, which is more perfect than the other
types of motion. In the same way, demonstrative propositions always yield certain
and necessary conclusions and constitute certain knowledge. According to the
Metaphysics, ‘demonstration is a necessary thing, because the conclusion cannot
be otherwise, if there has been demonstration in the full sense; and the causes
of this necessity are the first premisses, i.e. the fact that the propositions from
which the deduction proceeds cannot be otherwise’.6 The certainty provided by a
complete demonstration relies on the certain content of the premisses as well as
the employment of a valid syllogism, thus producing certainty at the level of both
the content and the form of the process.
The possible is that which may or may not obtain, and sometimes happens,
sometimes not. Dialectical propositions are based on reputable, rather than certain,
knowledge. In this way does Aristotle define the art of dialectic with regard to
the demonstrative method. Equally, dialectic is not to be confused with rhetoric,
as we shall see. For Aristotle, the dialectical method is part of the philosophical
disciplines, ranking below demonstration with respect to the certainty of its
premisses and conclusions, but it is an important tool in the discovery of truth
and expansion of knowledge and can thus be of assistance as a supporting tool to
demonstrative knowledge. On its own it does not constitute scientific discourse.
It employs common aspects of logic, such as definition, genus and species and
differentia, and syllogism, though not absolute demonstration.
The somewhat different roles of dialectic in the Decisive Treatise and Aristotle’s
Topics are based on different emphases with regard to the subject of dialecticians
and their intended audience. Aristotle brings up the issue of the wise as opposed

5
Ibid., 155b20–24.
6
Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated into English by W.D. Ross, vol. 2 of The Complete
Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1552–1728, V, 1015b6–9, p. 1603.
78 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

to the majority of people, and dialectic certainly aims at providing a platform for
dialogue between these two groups. However, that which in Aristotle appears as
a distinction between the learned in philosophy and the unlearned becomes more
accentuated in Averroes, with his different classes displaying more rigid boundaries.
Furthermore, Averroes’ three classes are clearly set within an Islamic
context, namely his native twelfth-century al-Andalus. The demonstrative class
represents the philosophers. Al-Andalus had a strong and established tradition of
philosophical production such as to warrant setting the philosophers as a separate
class of scholars, constituted by those who studied the philosophical curriculum
and composed books of philosophy, such as Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl, both of whom
preceded Averroes in this field. The dialectical class does not seem to constitute
a separate class in Aristotle, or at least it is not so strictly defined. For Averroes,
this is the class of the Islamic theologians. In Aristotle, but not in Averroes, those
availing themselves of the dialectical method would include philosophers. In any
case, dialectic could build bridges between the philosophers and other people. In a
certain sense, Aristotle thought that dialectic could be used by any citizen, while in
Averroes’ estimation it was somewhat too specialised for the general public. And
while rhetoric appears to have a political dimension in Aristotle, particularly in a
democratic society where various and opposing ideas are defended, it functions
mainly as a religious education tool for Averroes.7 It is in this sense that it can
also have a political dimension, given that religion informs the social interactions
between the different classes as well as shaping the individual behaviour of citizens.
Let us now turn to Averroes’ commentaries on Topics to assess his understanding
of Aristotle, as well as his adaptation of this important work to his own context,
quite different from that of Aristotle’s fourth-century-bc Greece.
The title of the work Topics was translated into Arabic as ‘jadal’, which in
this context means ‘debate’ or ‘dispute’. This is an Arabic term, which, as we
have seen, occurs in the Qur’an, in reference to preaching the Islamic faith to
unbelievers (16:125). Averroes plays on the ambiguity of this term with its strong
religious as well as philosophical connotations, showing that this kind of method
is not unlike the debates with unbelievers described in the Qur’an.
Averroes wrote two commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, a short commentary
and a middle commentary. The Short Commentary on Topics has been translated
into English by Charles Butterworth.

7
Michael Blaustein succinctly makes this point: ‘Averroes, following the path of
his Aristotelian predecessors within the Islamic tradition sees rhetoric primarily as a mode
of discourse used by the philosophical elite in addressing the multitude about theoretical
and theological subjects. For Aristotle, on the other hand, rhetoric is above all the mode
of discourse used by political leaders with each other and with the multitude in public
deliberations about policy’, Michael Blaustein, ‘The Scope and Methods of Rhetoric in
Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric’, in The Political Aspects of Islamic
Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi, ed. Charles Butterworth (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 262–303, p. 262.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 79

As Butterworth notes in his introduction, other short commentaries, such as

those on Prior Analytics, Categories and De Interpretatione, pave the way for
the study of demonstrative reasoning, laid out in the Posterior Analytics. What
distinguishes these three treatises, the short commentaries on Topics, Rhetoric
and Poetics, the first two of which are examined in the present study, is their
relation to apodeictic (demonstrative) reasoning – they have a persuasive force
that is contextualised by Averroes. As he states, ‘while the other treatises are
recommended because they teach how to reason correctly, these three treatises
are presented as providing ways of imitating or abridging correct reasoning in
order to influence other human beings in any number of situations, but especially
with regard to political decisions and religious beliefs’.8 While following the
spirit of Aristotle’s treatises in their scientific context, Averroes here assesses and
highlights their relevance to his context, where Islam shaped society and politics,
and where politics and religion were inextricably linked.

The Short Commentary on Topics

The Short Commentary on Topics, which precedes the middle commentary,

presents similar arguments to those found in the middle commentary, but in a more
succinct fashion.9 In the middle and especially in the short commentary, Averroes’
particular contribution in expounding an Aristotelian discipline is apparent.
As in the middle commentary on the same work, he stresses the concepts
of concept/representation and assent, which acquire in the Decisive Treatise a
markedly religious as well as political tone. He distinguishes that type of assent
from demonstrative and rhetorical assent. In a certain way, demonstrative assent
differs from the other types because it occurs inevitably once a person understands
demonstrative syllogism. The kind of assent provided by demonstration is
unfailing, whereas the one provided by dialectic is suppositional. As Averroes
states, ‘in general, supposition is believing that something exists in a particular
kind of way, while it is possible for it to be different than it is believed to be.
Therefore, its peculiar characteristic is that it may be eliminated through
opposition; demonstration differs in that it has the peculiar characteristic of not
being eliminated through opposition’.10
The differences between demonstration and dialectic lie in the format of the
syllogism, as well as in the elements that constitute the premisses. The format

8
  Averroes, Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Topics,’ ‘Rhetoric’,
and ‘Poetics’, ed. and trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1977), p. 19.
9
  Butterworth states that ‘Averroës Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics was
not completed until 1168 C.E., whereas this Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics is
thought to have been completed prior to 1159 C.E.’, ibid., p. 116, n. 4.
10
Ibid., p. 47.
80 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of the syllogism must be sound, otherwise the syllogism will be sophistical.11

In fact, Averroes accepts more figures for the dialectical than for demonstrative
syllogisms.

Then if these syllogisms were enumerated in this manner, there would be twice
as many types of dialectical syllogisms as demonstrative syllogisms. That is
because with [dialectical syllogisms] no attention is paid to whether a predicate
is made naturally or essentially.12

Moreover, opinion plays here an important role, in contrast to the higher,

demonstrative method, for dialectical premisses are believed or assented to
because of the concurrence of most or all people, not because the matter at hand is
irrefutable. He goes on to state that ‘with demonstration, we arrive at assent which
is certain through our assenting to premisses because to our minds they appear just
as they are externally, not because they are someone else’s opinion’.13 It may be
thought that dialectical premisses are generally accepted because they are true or
bear some semblance to the truth, but the appearance of truth is the decisive aspect
in producing assent, whereas demonstrative truth is necessary in itself. This means
that through dialectic two opponents can legitimately defend opposing views, and
dialectical premisses may even be partially false, which does not happen with
demonstrative ones. It becomes apparent why dialectic involves more topics and
syllogisms than demonstration, because there may be many different opinions on
one issue, but only one essential truth. This can be seen as an advantage of dialectic,
as it accommodates more premisses than demonstration, which is a stricter logical
art. Not everything is a matter of demonstration, and on this account the range
of things that are demonstrable is much more limited than dialectical opinions,
especially because, as we have seen, the dialectical may countenance the defence
of an opinion as well as its opposite. In line with the Middle Commentary on
Topics, induction plays an important role in providing information that forms the
dialectical premisses. The universals are attained through particulars by induction.
The results obtained through induction are limited since it does not help if a
problem is entirely unknown.
The short commentary also distinguishes the different types of generally
accepted premisses, such as those accepted by everybody, including different
nations; the example given here is respect for one’s parents. This Averroes
considers to be the highest form of assent within dialectic. Furthermore, ‘some of
them are generally accepted by most people, without there being any disagreement
among the rest about that’.14 Some may be accepted by learned and wise men, or

11
Ibid., p. 48.
12
Ibid., p. 54.
13
Ibid., p. 47.
14
Ibid., p. 51.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 81

the practitioners of arts, or those skilled in them, or most of these without the rest
disagreeing with them. In dialectic a greater consensus is the desired end.

The Middle Commentary on Topics

The Middle Commentary is available in three Arabic editions, two of which were
published in Cairo by the General Egyptian Book Organization (the first by Charles
Butterworth, in 1979, and the second by Muḥammad Salīm Sālim, in 1980) while
the third, by Gérard Jéhamy, appeared in Beirut, published by the Publications de
l’Université Libanaise in 1982, under the title Averroès, Paraphrase de la logique
d’Aristote. In what follows, we will refer to the former two, complete, editions of
this commentary.
Averroes, as is his wont in this kind of work, offers a presentation of the subject
which is true to the subject as expounded by Aristotle, while interpreting it in a
way that resonates with his historical context.
Averroes opens this middle commentary by stating that the dialectical syllogism
is based on reputable or well-known (mashhūr), rather than certain, premisses.
Furthermore the uses of this art include practice and exercising (presumably for
demonstrative reasoning), discussing with the crowd/multitude (jumhūr), and
as preparation for the speculative sciences.15 Therefore, dialectic is useful for
philosophers and for the multitude, and in fact helps to bridge the gap between
the two groups.
In addition, the study of dialectic, which has it own specific rules, serves
to test ideas, to distinguish the true from the false in the context of a dialogue
or discussion. One striking characteristic which surfaces at this juncture is the
differentiation of dialectic from philosophy proper. Dialectic can be seen as part
of philosophy, in the sense that it prepares for the study of demonstration. On the
other hand, it falls short of the certainty and universality of demonstration, which
is the hallmark, measure and height of philosophical achievement.
Dialectic prepares for the speculative, truly philosophic sciences, but it appears
to be quite different from them, perhaps more so than in Aristotle. This comes as
no surprise, since the Decisive Treatise also clearly separates the practitioners of
these arts, namely the philosophers and the theologians. To that end, he states in
the Middle Commentary on Topics that dialectic only prepares for philosophy,
but is not part of it – thus excluding it from the philosophical sciences proper:
‘It is clear that the exercise intended by this art only prepares for philosophy,
in the same way as exercising by riding horses in contests is a preparation

15
Averroes, Talkhīṣ kitāb al-jadal, Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Medium in
Aristotelis Topica [Middle Commentary on Topics], edited, introduced and annotated by
Charles Butterworth, with the assistance of Ahmad Abd al-Magid Haridi (Cairo: General
Egyptian Book Organization, 1979), henceforth Middle Commentary on Topics, p. 31.
See also Averroes, Talkhīṣ kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fi-l-jadal, edited and annotated by Muḥammad
Salīm Sālim (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1980), p. 7.
82 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

for war’.16 For both Aristotle and Averroes dialectic can be a propaedeutic discipline
in preparation for demonstration, but while in Aristotle dialectic might still be
considered to belong in the domain of the philosophical disciplines, for Averroes
it appears to rank lower than philosophy (falsafa) strictly speaking. Bearing in
mind the description of dialectic and its practitioners in the Decisive Treatise,
we find that the theologians were not necessarily trained in the philosophical,
Greek, sciences. Furthermore, in the Decisive Treatise philosophy is associated
with demonstration, while the dialectical method and class are associated with
the theologians and their own principles. However, notwithstanding the fact that
philosophers studied the art of demonstration, with its own specific syllogisms,
they were also supposed to know the art of dialectic and the art of rhetoric in order
to be able to communicate with any kind of audience.
In spite of this, the Middle Commentary on Topics defends a close association
between dialectic and demonstration. It is useful for studying science, for it allows
one to test a proposition as well as its opposite, thus facilitating the discovery of
the truth, something impossible with demonstration, which only presents certain
truth and does not allow for exploration. As in the practical sciences, Averroes
argues, the premisses of a dialectical syllogism ‘are not wholly false or wholly
true’ – unlike the premisses of a demonstrative syllogism – adding that one could
find essential and accidental elements together in physics, metaphysics and
politics, but not in mathematics.17 Another indicator of the close link between the
two arts is that it is superfluous to debate profitably a question in dialectic if the
demonstration of the same topic is close at hand or far removed, or if no premisses
confirm or deny the issue discussed.18
In general, dialectic allows one to consider and discuss that which is reputable,
and its premisses should contain that which is neither obvious to everyone nor
wholly obscure.19 A known statement which admits of questioning can be included
in the premisses to become a part of the syllogism. Examples of this are issues
known to everyone, e.g., God’s existence (‘God exists’), or issues known by most
people and not disputed by others; one could add to this list issues known to the
wise (the ‘ulamā’, a term with religious connotations used to signify the class
of Islamic religious scholars) and philosophers, without the disagreement of the
majority or the rest of the people.20 An example of the latter would be the survival
of the soul after death.
The knowledge included in the premisses can be attained by experience in
either the speculative or the practical arts. That which is similar or opposite to
the well known is also well known. Here we find further indication that dialectic

16
Averroes, Middle Commentary on Topics, p. 31 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 8). All translations
of this work are mine.
17
Ibid., p. 32 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 11).
18
Ibid., p. 46 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 42–3).
19
Ibid., p. 42 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 31).
20
Ibid., p. 43 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 32).
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 83

ranks below demonstrative science, because what is known to all is better than
what is known to most people. Yet the demonstrative syllogism would draw the
immediate indisputable assent of all – if all classes were able to grasp it. In some
ways dialectic requires confirmation by the demonstrative art, such that it does
not stand on its own, as appears from Averroes’ claim to the effect that dialectic is
that ‘whose truth is not known by itself in relation to something reputable, while
doubt is attached to it with regard to the reputable’.21 Furthermore, just as Aristotle
envisages the use of this discipline as a means of communication and understanding
between various groups of people, namely the wise and the multitude, Averroes
also highlights this role of dialectic.
It is important to stress a concept that runs through the Decisive Treatise but
also appears in this middle commentary, namely ‘assent’. As Butterworth rightly
points out in his study, there is an emphasis on the concept of assent, which is
preceded by imagination (taṣawwur), the representation of the concept in one’s
mind. In order to accept a proposition or concept, one has first to form an idea, in
other words to grasp its meaning, and then assent to its truth. In fact, Butterworth
distinguishes four elements: (1) a preliminary stage aiding the formation of
a concept in the mind, (2) that which produces a given concept, (3) that which
prepares one for assenting, and finally (4) that which leads to assenting.22 This
term had a philosophical significance which was drawn from Stoic philosophy.23
However, it is also Qur’anic and thus firmly rooted in Islamic theology, as ‘an
act of intellectual adherence to the truths of the Qur’an’.24 Thus ‘assent’ in the
Islamic period is closely tied up with the question of faith as understanding and
acceptance of the Qur’anic revelation. It therefore takes on a predominantly
religious sense, which the purely philosophical term lacked, especially as closely
related to scripture and revelation in the Islamic tradition. For Averroes this is one
of those felicitous instances where the philosophical and the religious language
converge. This religious overtone is even more apparent in the Decisive Treatise,

21
Ibid., p. 44 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 36).
22
‘Averroes introduced a new ordering of the art of logic in these treatises. He first
identified concept (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) as fundamental terms, and then explained
that instruction about each had to proceed from that which prepares the way for it (al-
muwāṭṭi’ lah) and from that which brings it about (al-fā‘il lah). This meant that the art of
logic fell into four parts: (i) that which prepares the way for a concept, (ii) that which brings
a concept about, (iii) that which prepares the way for assent, and (iv) that which brings
assent about. Averroës’s discussion of words and of Porphyry’s account of the predicables
corresponded to the first part, while his commentary on the Categories corresponded to the
second part’; Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Topics’, ‘Rhetoric’, and
‘Poetics’, p. 12.
23
See Averroes, Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),
trans. Simon van den Bergh, 2 vols (London: Luzac & Co., 1954), vol. 2, p. 1. [note] 1.
24
Robert Caspar, Islamic Theology, vol. 2, Doctrines (Rome: Pontifical Institute for
Arabic and Islamic Studies, 2007), p. 9.
84 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

which states that the goal of all the three disciplines – demonstration, dialectic and
rhetoric – is to bring about assent to the fundamental truth of the Islamic faith,
such as God’s existence, the afterlife and the prophetic missions. This then is the
goal of dialectic, and it serves to link the various classes together, allowing them
to converge at the religious level.
Averroes claims that dialectic serves to mediate between the testimony
(shahāda) of the philosophers and those of the masses, and more specifically it can
be used between philosophers with differing opinions and members of the crowd
having divergent opinions among themselves, or in cases where the philosophers
happen not to go along with the majority opinion.25 An example of such possible
divergence of opinions is that philosophers believe that it is preferable to lead a
virtuous but difficult life without being influential, than a comfortable life filled
with public honours but no virtue.26 However, these opinions should constitute
‘right’ opinion rather than being mere falsehoods. Those opinions that are the
exception, or that are arbitrary or false, have no place in this art.27
Since dialectic deals with opinions rather than absolute certainty, which is the
domain of demonstration, there is much room for debate and dispute, even among
the philosophers. Averroes here cites the sophist Protagoras as representing an
extreme respect for opinions, and as favouring the view that things exist in so far
as they are believed. Philosophers should therefore be acquainted with dialectic
because it helps them to relate to other people. It also assists in bringing about
assent, this being the goal of the demonstrative and the other disciplines, and
specifically for Averroes inducing belief in the Islamic doctrines.
In spite of having different starting points – certain knowledge in
demonstration, right opinion in dialectic – these arts share a common goal. The
particular adaptation of Aristotle’s work to Averroes’ context is seen in the latter’s
emphasis on the question of persuasion and assent, especially in religious matters.
In addition to the stipulation that dialectic concerns reputable or well-known
matters, he places a limit on what is acceptable to discuss, alluded to in Aristotle,
but emphasised by Averroes: it would be wrong, for instance, to dispute whether
God is to be worshipped or not. Nothing that is harmful rather than useful finds
a place in this art. Thus, one should debate only what is useful within practical
philosophy, speculative philosophy or logic.28 In speculative philosophy – where,
just as in practical philosophy, the obligation of worshipping God is self-evident
– it is not useful to discuss whether sensibles may lead to truth or not, or whether
accidents are stable (a theory disputed by the theologians), or whether every
proposition admits of affirmation or negation. Here we find a recurring criticism
of the theologians, which was already to be found in the Decisive Treatise, in
particular Averroes’ point that one should not discuss issues that are not useful or

25
Averroes, Middle Commentary on Topics, pp. 44–5 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 36–7).
26
Ibid., p. 45 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 37–8).
27
Ibid., p. 45 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 39).
28
Ibid., p. 46 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 40–41).
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 85

are harmful for the majority of believers, or go against philosophic wisdom and
the first principles set by demonstration – in this latter case the logical principle
of the excluded middle (which stipulates that a proposition is either true or its
negation is true, but not both).
The basic rules of dialectic are reiterated later in this middle commentary,
when Averroes excludes from the dialectical method the discussion of what is
repugnant to a group, for instance to say that God does not exist, or that opposites
are one (as Heraclitus stated of good and evil).29 He further defends the use of
syllogism in this discipline, although it may render it difficult for the multitude to
understand the conclusion.
Averroes then proceeds to the technical aspects of the dialectical method. He
states that it admits of induction and syllogism, the two principles of dialectic.
Once attained through induction (comparing and realising the similarities between
similar particulars), the universal should be the reference, rather than continuing
to refer to a particular. Moreover, induction can be employed in two ways: to
verify the universal premiss in a syllogism, and to verify the sought-after (maṭlūb).
Averroes concedes that, in dialectic, induction (attaining a universal through the
particular) is more useful for the persuasion of the masses than is syllogism,
especially if one is relying on sensible data. On the other hand, while using
syllogistic logic, a legitimate part of the dialectical method, may prove difficult
in persuading the multitude, it is more difficult to refute. This middle commentary
insists that dialectic envisages two kinds of utterance, induction and syllogism,
and that induction confirms the premisses.30
Premisses used in dialectic are drawn from a variety of sources, including
examined opinions drawn from the multitude, different disciplines, and all the
philosophers, including the better known among them. Opinions debated in
dialectic should also be drawn from books, and all opinions should be compared
with their opposing views, in what appears to be a comprehensive method of
gathering all views. This should be done within each discipline, for example in
ethics, physics and logic.
Further details are provided regarding the means that lead to the dialectical
syllogism, one of which is obviously the ability to procure the premisses. In addition,
the nouns and grammar employed must be examined and distinguished. Also, it is
important to infer the differences, and to investigate any similarities.31 In analysing
the relation between the different terms and in finding a common noun, one obtains
clarity and agreement (between premisses) and avoids errors in the syllogism. The
meaning of the words used must have some relationship to the popular (jumhūrī)
meaning.32 This ensures that it will be understood by the multitude.

29
Ibid., pp. 222–4 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 428, 430–31).
30
Ibid., p. 216 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 415).
31
Ibid., p. 49 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 46).
32
Ibid., p. 63 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 77).
86 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

If the topics discussed are known and necessary, we have a demonstrative

syllogism; if reputable, we have a dialectical syllogism; and if they are plainly
false, this is a sophistical syllogism.33
Averroes limits the range of possible questions in dialectic. Appropriate are
questions that admit of a simple reply, ‘yes’ or ‘no’, such as the question ‘Is the
world created or not?’ or ‘Is man is a rational animal?’. Universal questions, such
as ‘What is man?’, or ‘In how many ways is something said?’, should not be
tackled dialectically. Dialectic can furnish the answer to questions pertaining to
the beautiful, or the useful or pleasant, such as in how many ways the good is said,
but always, as Averroes states, in seeking a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ reply, such as: ‘Is man
a rational animal or not?’ and ‘Is the good said in such and such a way?’. If such
a question is not available, it would be permissible to ask, for instance, ‘What
is the definition of man for such a person’? And there is no point in elongating
the question beyond what is required.34 Other limitations when asking questions
include the impossibility of disproving certain things: (1) the first principles of
knowledge in the arts; (2) terms that are very far removed from the first principles
(e.g., whether the soul survives); (3) things that are proximate to the principles;
or (4) things whose expression is equivocal (bi-ishtirāk al-ism) or borrowed
(musta‘āra). Asking whether the world is eternal would be in this latter category,
because ‘world’ is equivocal.35 In this way, Averroes indirectly states that this
question should not be addressed in this art but in the art of demonstration. This
is why dialectic remains in the domain of reputable, renowned opinions, because
other matters involve further premisses and studies.
Averroes stipulates the conditions for questioning and answering, here, for those
training for the art of demonstrations, not for those wishing to win an argument.36
The difference between this art and rhetoric then becomes apparent, in the sense
that dialectic is more closely assimilated to demonstration and has, as we have
seen, a propaedeutic role in relation to demonstration. Dispute for its own sake,
with the single aim of winning an argument or refuting the opponent’s argument,
regardless of the truth or reputability of the answer, is not the goal of dialectic.37
Those whose aim is to learn, on the other hand, deal with true premisses. Among
the things that are repugnant to all are the claims that God does not exist or is
not powerful.
Examples are used to elucidate in dialectic, while in the poetical art they are
used to bring about poetical assent.38
The classes that use the different types of premisses and syllogisms are
different. These are mentioned at the end of this middle commentary. Averroes

33
Ibid., p. 78 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 104).
34
Ibid., p. 218 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 419–20).
35
Ibid., p. 219–20 (ed. M. Sālim, pp. 421–3).
36
Ibid., p. 221 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 425).
37
Ibid., p. 222 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 426).
38
Ibid., p. 212 (ed. M. Sālim, p. 408).
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 87

considers here three classes. The sages, or wise men, or philosophers always
assent to what is good in itself, such as virtue, and the best of two opposites.
Then come the dialecticians, who choose the better of two opposites for the most
part, but sometimes choose the reproachable, and finally the sophists, who are not
looking for the truth but simply seeking to persuade and who choose the worse
of two opposites. This division differs from the one propounded in the Decisive
Treatise, where rhetoric is placed between dialectic and sophistry.
The Middle Commentary on Topics provides further details about the uses of
dialectic and its practitioners. In line with Aristotle, Averroes states that this art
does not attain to the certainty of demonstration, but it can be useful. For certain
questions, such as ethics, it can be used, whereas demonstration is inadequate
because it deals with universals and unchangeable, universal truths. In addition,
like Aristotle, Averroes defends the idea that dialectic allows for discussion and
debate about issues that are not certain but are well known and paves the way for
the practice of other questions. It has then a propaedeutic value, and it serves both
philosophers and other people. Non-philosophers can discuss non-demonstrative
questions in this way, and find some common ground with philosophers, while
it allows the latter to prepare for the study of demonstration. As regards his
own understanding of the relation between demonstration and dialectic, we see
that Averroes emphasises the significance of representation and assent in one’s
mind, a theme clearly evoking the religious significance of these concepts in the
Decisive Treatise.
If we further explore the connections between the two works, we notice that in
both works representation has a religious as well as a philosophical significance.
This makes the identification of the theologians with the dialectical class less
surprising in the Decisive Treatise, which is more critical towards dialectic than
the commentaries on Topics.
It is important to recall that there was no such discipline as demonstration
or philosophy as part of the Islamic sciences, although dialectic (in the sense
of kalām) did exist and was an important contributor to Islamic knowledge. In
relating and ranking demonstration and dialectic in relation to one another in the
Decisive Treatise, Averroes seeks to introduce this new science, demonstration or
philosophy, into the Islamic sciences. Moreover, theology or dialectic dealt with
issues that touched on metaphysics, as the study of reality and of God, such as his
nature and his attributes, his actions, and creation. However, dialectic, as affirmed
in the Decisive Treatise and the commentaries on Topics, remains at the level of
probability and possibility, whereas philosophy and demonstration proper are
certain. The subject matter of both disciplines may overlap. We know this from
the fact that dialectic may constitute a preparation for demonstration and rigorous
philosophic study, an aspect which is not treated in the Decisive Treatise. On the
other hand, certain issues may be specific to each method, something stressed
also in the Decisive Treatise. Some topics debated by the theologians might
perhaps admit of various opinions, while some issues might be more specific to
demonstrative proof.
88 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Certain issues could simply be discussed differently by both disciplines. For

instance, universal questions such as those about God’s nature should be handled
in demonstration, whereas questions regarding human action, namely the way in
which one should worship God through prayer, might be more properly treated
by dialecticians.
Dialectic and demonstration share certain common features in the way they
use syllogism and infer the unknown from the known. However, demonstration
uses demonstrative (necessary) knowledge and demonstrative proofs, whereas
dialectic uses possible and reputable topics, and the conclusions are in each case
either necessary or reputable.
The Middle Commentary on Topics further shows why demonstration is
superior to dialectic, for since dialectic does not provide us with certain knowledge
it cannot be accepted in the exact terms in which it is formulated, in other words,
as literally as demonstration. Dialectic produces a different form of assent to truth.
Some issues may not admit of demonstration and must be dealt with in dialectic;
other issues can be treated by both with different degrees of certainty.
The commentaries on Posterior Analytics and Topics, and the Decisive Treatise,
agree in the treatment of the merits of demonstration and dialectic, valuing the
former over and above the latter, although both play a necessary role within the
scheme of the various forms of assent. Dialectic represents a lower form of assent
than does its superior, more strictly philosophical, counterpart. The commentaries
do not appear to stipulate a specific class of dialecticians, except that these are
not yet philosophers, or may be philosophers in training. The Decisive Treatise,
instead, highlights the political and religious role of both philosophy and dialectic
with their respective classes, in clearly associating the theologians with the
dialectical class, and seeking to fashion a public, political and religious role for the
philosophers. Thus the political and religious aspects of the distinction between
demonstration and dialectic come to the fore in the Decisive Treatise.
Averroes identifies – particularly in the Decisive Treatise – the less positive
aspects of dialectic with the shortcomings of the theologians’ methods, particularly
the fact that dialectic does not yield certainty as does demonstration. On the other
hand, the issues dealt with by the theologians, such as the nature of God and his
attributes and actions, are unavoidable, indeed central.
While following closely in the steps of Aristotle in the commentaries on
Topics, there is a concurrent concern on Averroes’ part to address the issue of how
best to convey the truths of religion to the majority of people by using philosophy.
Criticism of the theologians surfaces here, as well as in the Decisive Treatise.39

39
‘Among all his writings, the Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, Rhetoric,
and Poetics are the best sources for acquiring an understanding of the relation Averroës
thought existed between politics, religion, and philosophy. In the first place, his thought
about this problem was based on specific ideas about the logical character of different
kinds of speech, their proximity to certain knowledge, and the investigative or practical
purposes to which each might be put. While these ideas are presupposed in his other works,
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 89

In these commentaries, dialectic is a tool to teach philosophers the way to convey

the truths of religion to the multitude, while allowing them to train for the higher
discipline of demonstration. It thus has a double function, to prepare for the study
of demonstration and as a means to communicate with non-philosophers, thus
serving as a bridge between the two classes.
We now turn to Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric while
comparing them with his understanding of this discipline in the Decisive Treatise.

The Commentaries on Rhetoric

Before analysing Averroes’ understanding of the nature and function of the

discipline of rhetoric it is important to bear in mind the main points made by
Aristotle in his influential work. Rhetoric plays an important role within
Aristotle’s corpus, and it came to be considered, as we have seen, as forming
part of the Organon. For Aristotle, rhetoric complements dialectic. They share
several common characteristics, among them the fact that they are accessible to
everyone, and have no single subject matter but deal with all subjects. Rhetoric
is about persuasion but also arguing for one’s views and attacking an opponent’s
arguments. It is a political and legal tool that can be used to defeat or win over
opponents in law courts, although there is a distinct usage in law and politics. An
orator can defend his own political interests by using rhetoric.
Rhetoric deals with the particular rather than the general, in the light of
Aristotle’s claim to the effect that a jury deals with the particular while the
lawgiver deals with the universal.40 Rhetoric is concerned with the modes of

including his larger commentaries on the logical arts, they are explained in these treatises.
Secondly, these treatises contain the fullest statement of the grounds for Averroës’s abiding
disagreement with those who considered themselves the defenders of the faith. In Averroës’s
view, these dialectical theologians and masters of religious tradition were responsible for
confusing the common people by using extraordinarily complex arguments to speak about
simple principles of faith and guilty of attacking philosophy under the pretext of saving
the faith they had garbled. Awareness of the reasons for his disagreement with them is
important, because it is the background against which he expressed his ideas concerning the
relation between political life and religious belief, as well as between religious belief and
philosophic investigation’, Butterworth, Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s
‘Topics’, ‘Rhetoric’, and ‘Poetics’, p. 21. In his introduction to the Middle Commentary
on Topics, Butterworth highlights in particular the connection made by Averroes between
dialectic and demonstration, and the dependence of dialectic on demonstration, as well
as the limits placed by Averroes on the usefulness of induction – see in particular pp. 25,
31–3, 35, 37 and 42. Butterworth further highlights the link between this commentary and
Averroes’ commentary on Plato’s Republic.
40
Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, vol. 2 of The Complete Works of
Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), pp. 2152–69, 1354b4–8, p. 2153.
90 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

persuasion and has its distinctive kind of argument, the enthymeme, which is
a syllogism lacking one of the premisses – for instance, to say that Socrates is
mortal because he is a man, omitting the major premisse to the effect that ‘all men
are mortal’. Aristotle believes that human beings have a natural tendency to seek
knowledge. Dialectic admits the use of commonly understood notions. Although
opposites can be defended in these two logical methods, Aristotle argues that the
truth will eventually prevail, for the truth is more persuasive. For people who
cannot be educated, one should use common notions, as in dialectic.41 Rhetoric
discusses persuasive facts and real and apparent means of persuasion (methods
and means of persuading) – while dialectic deals with real and apparent inference.
Dialectic stands between demonstration and rhetoric, using as it does complete
syllogisms, but considering opposites equally, whereas demonstration argues for
one of two opposites to the exclusion of the other. Rhetoric employs technical
and non-technical means of persuasion in any subject, and includes three kinds
of persuasion through the spoken word: the character of the speaker, the influence
on the audience’s frame of mind, and the proof itself (real or apparent). Both
dialectic and rhetoric deal with the truth and what is commonly known, and not
the false, like sophistry, but the proofs are not as stringent as in demonstration
proper. Aristotle mentions the example alongside the enthymeme as specific to
rhetorical arguments.42 However, while the example suits political oratory, the use
of enthymemes is better suited to forensic speech, which deals with past events
and their verification, and is based on the law and not the contingent, whereas
political oratory deals with the future. Both dialectic and rhetoric are addressed to
people who cannot understand a complex argument, and are not trained in logic.
And although rhetoric does not have its own subject matter, but deals with all
subjects, it is particularly useful in ethics and politics. In this sense, both rhetoric
and dialectic deal with the contingent (our actions) rather than necessary events,
in contrast to, for instance, physics or metaphysics. In this context, it is worth
mentioning that Aristotle distinguishes between particular laws, which apply
to the members of a given community, and universal laws, such as the laws of
nature.43 Rhetoric thus deals with that which is probable, for example voluntary
action, which is performed knowingly and without constraint.44
In speech-making, which is studied in rhetoric, three elements are considered:
the speaker, the audience addressed and the subject matter. Speeches divide
into deliberative, forensic and epideictic. In listing them, Aristotle states that
‘deliberative speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these
two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address
public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or
other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. Epideictic

41
Ibid., 1355a26–29.
42
Ibid., 1356b2–6.
43
Ibid., 1373b4–6.
44
Ibid., 1368b9–10.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 91

oratory either praises or censures somebody’.45 The propositions of rhetoric can be

composed of evidences, probabilities or signs.46 In a statement that we find echoed
in Averroes, Aristotle argues that advice is only offered on matters on which
one can deliberate. With regard to the relationship of rhetoric to other sciences,
Aristotle states that it combines logic and ethics, and stands between dialectic and
sophistical reasoning. In order to reach happiness, which is the general human
goal and cannot be achieved without excellence or virtue, deliberation is needed,
and consists of the ways and means, peace and war, national defence, food supply
and legislation. Aristotle’s Rhetoric thus builds a bridge between his ethics and his
politics, elucidating the use of the spoken word to promote favourable political
and ethical results. Aristotle also offers ethics maxims in this work, for instance
the principle, oft repeated by Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, that it is better ‘to suffer
wrong than to do wrong’, since this would be the choice of a virtuous person.47 But
rhetoric also deals with forms of government, a section of political theory.
Aristotle’s rhetoric tackles human emotions and emotional reactions in depth,
given their significance in inducing persuasion. Among the topics commonly used
in all oratory are those pertaining to the possible and the impossible. Among the
specific forms of oratorial argument he lists the example and the enthymeme,
which usually contains a maxim – a statement of a general kind concerning
questions of practical conduct. Maxims come in four different types, two requiring
a supplement and two not. If requiring a supplement they may be paradoxical or
part of an enthymeme. Alternatively, they can be known truths or immediately
understood.48 Example is based on induction and is divided into the employment of
past facts (which in turn can be found in the form of the ‘illustrative parallel’) and
the fable.49 The enthymeme, however, works on the basis of deduction, but differs
from the kind of deduction to be found in dialectic. Its simplicity is effective,
especially in addressing common people. Commonplaces can be integrated into
enthymemes, and these can be used to prove or to disprove something. Aristotle
accepts that fallacies and untruths may appear in rhetoric, as is shown in his
reference to Protagoras’ teaching how ‘to make the worse argument seem the
better’.50 Enthymemes can be based upon probabilities, examples, evidences
and signs. More specifically, ‘Enthymemes based upon probabilities are those
which argue from what is, or is supposed to be, usually true. Enthymemes based
upon example are those which proceed from one or more similar cases, arrive
at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference.
Enthymemes based upon evidences are those which argue from the inevitable
and the invariable. Enthymemes based upon signs are those which argue from

45
Ibid., 1358b8–14.
46
Ibid., 1359a7–8.
47
Ibid., 1364b21–23, p. 2171.
48
Ibid., 1394b7–12.
49
Ibid., 1393b4–10.
50
Ibid., 1402a24–28, p. 2235.
92 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

some universal or particular proposition, true or false’.51 Signs are not deductive.
Aristotle argues that because rhetoric is concerned with appearances, it is necessary
to take into account also the mode of delivery, such as the volume of sound, the
modulation of pitch, and the rhythm of speech.52 Metaphor – which should draw
on similarities between things, though not too obvious ones – is useful in rhetoric
and prose language, as is simile, which is equally a metaphor; whereas ambiguous
words belong in sophistical speech. Synonyms have their place in poetry, although
rhythm, as we have seen, is also part of prose speech. Proverbs and hyperboles are
also considered metaphors.53
The correctness of language and good style are important elements in rhetorical
speech. Appropriate language should express emotion and character, and the tone
used should correspond to its subject. In rhetoric, one may interrogate one’s
interlocutor, prompting him or her to agree or to contradict himself or herself if in
disagreement with one’s initial thesis. In rhetoric, Aristotle stresses, it is important
to arouse the emotions of the audience, such as pity, anger or hatred.
In Aristotle’s work, rhetoric appears as distinct from, but related to, dialectic.
It not only uses different methods but also has a different subject matter, and it is
less closely related to demonstration than dialectic. In relation to demonstrative
reasoning, it is clear that the methods as well as the object studied differ. While
demonstration studies metaphysics and physics for the most part, politics and ethics
seem to come under the dominion of rhetoric. In order to understand Averroes’
conception of rhetoric we will analyse his short and middle commentaries on
Aristotle’s work.

The Short Commentary on Rhetoric

Averroes’ Short Commentary on Rhetoric belongs to a set of short commentaries

written on Aristotle’s Organon at an early stage of his career as a philosopher and
Aristotelian commentator. One of the most striking features of this commentary is
arguably the way in which Averroes not only mentions the Islamic theologians in
the context of Aristotle’s exposition on rhetoric, but incorporates essential aspects
of the Islamic tradition, in this case hadith literature.
Averroes defines rhetoric as the art whereby one seeks to effect complete
persuasion on particular matters.54 For him, persuasion is a ‘kind of probable
supposition’.55 Among the things that produce persuasion are arguments (examples
and proofs) on the one hand and external things on the other. The latter include

51
Ibid., 1402b14–20, p. 2236.
52
Ibid., 1403ba30–31.
53
Ibid., 1413a17–22.
54
Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Topics’, ‘Rhetoric’, and ‘Poetics’,
p. 78.
55
Ibid., p. 63.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 93

oaths and testimonies. The proofs adduced in rhetoric contain the specific kind of
reasoning to be found in rhetoric, the enthymeme.
With regard to the matter of rhetorical speech, Averroes states that this is the
unexamined opinion of all or most people, which is trusted immediately, without a
previous examination, and so consists in probable suppositions which may happen
to be true or not. We are a step away from dialectic, whose matter is reputable
or well-known opinions, which are truly generally accepted.56 However, neither
dialectic nor rhetoric had a specific subject matter.
This kind of argument is persuasive because one of the premisses is omitted,
and it is not clear which premiss leads to the conclusion. Such unexamined
opinions can be based on received opinion or (immediately) sense-perceived
things. As regards the modality of the elements of these received opinions or
proofs, it includes that which is necessary, or possible for the most part, or equally
possible.57 However, the distinction between these categories within rhetoric is not
a hard and fast rule. Demonstration admits only of the necessary, to the exclusion
of the possible (for the most part) or the equally possible. With regard to the
equally possible, rhetoric accepts this kind of modality while assuming that one of
the opposites is preponderant over the other.
Examples used in rhetoric may consist of likenesses in a common matter or
by analogy. In an example, and in stark contrast to the rules of demonstration,
judgement about a particular is not made on the basis of the universal to which it
belongs; therefore the example is not conclusive. Moreover, sense perception does
nothing to yield certainty with regard to universals, and so no generalisations can
be based upon it. Averroes berates in particular the Islamic theologian al-Juwaynī
for extolling the use of examples as valid in itself for reaching certainty.58 Averroes
then says that in the same way that dialectic uses induction and syllogism, so
rhetoric correspondingly uses example and enthymeme.
Both the example and the enthymeme are considered to be persuasive
tools, as are another eleven external things that are not arguments: the virtue of
the speaker, using the passions to bring about assent, making moral speeches,
praising or belittling the matter at hand, consensus, testimonies, arousing desire or
apprehension, challenging and betting, oaths, the external qualities of the speech,
such as the inflection of the voice, and finally distorting speeches, a quality that is
more readily found in sophistry.
Among these persuasive elements, Averroes highlights testimony, a kind of
report which occurs either from sense perception, or by intellectual apprehension,
from one or more persons. Their persuasive power lies with the multitude rather
than the philosophers. Averroes goes on to explain what testimony or report means
within Islam, speaking of the testimony of Muhammad and the reports based on
his sayings (hadith). In this context he mentions the significance of the number

56
Ibid., p. 67.
57
Ibid., p. 68.
58
Ibid., p. 72.
94 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of reporters and the continuity of the tradition or oral reports. However, certainty
obtained from oral reports is rare if there is no conclusive syllogism accompanying
them.59 Consensus also belongs in rhetoric; thus, one should not accuse others of
infidelity if they depart from the consensus, since it does not afford absolute certainty.
A particular kind of persuasive challenge is effected by a miracle, but
Averroes endorses here al-Ghazzali’s claim to the effect that assent to matters of
religion through miracles is for the multitude rather than philosophers.60 Between
persuasive external things and proofs, namely enthymemes in the case of rhetoric,
Averroes favours the latter for bringing about assent.
Averroes’ Short Commentary on Rhetoric is a short but incisive work on the role
of rhetoric within the logical disciplines. Here as in other commentaries, his main
concern is the question of representation, and above all assent, which for him has
a strong religious connotation in addition to the generally epistemological context.

The Middle Commentary on Rhetoric

Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Rhetoric has benefitted from a detailed and

careful critical edition and study in three volumes by Maroun Aouad.61 A previous
Arabic edition of this middle commentary had been produced by A. Badawi
(Cairo, 1960), and another by M.S. Salem (Sālim) in 1967.62 Aouad’s edition is
the most complete, and therefore it will be my main reference. Aouad states that
the Middle Commentary on Rhetoric was written in 1175.63
According to Averroes, rhetoric shares some characteristics with dialectic, for
both address all or other people, rather than oneself, unlike demonstration, which
is used to address, persuade and converse with oneself. It is worth highlighting
that mastering all three sciences is a matter for the logician, for all these are parts
of logic. In addition, dialectic and rhetoric examine all things rather than being

59
According to Maroun Aouad, in Averroes’ estimation, oral reports only produce
opinions and are even inferior to enthymemes and examples; these ground oral reports, but
not the other way around. This position calls into question the epistemological value of the
historical sciences in Islam, which are essential for the constitution of Islamic theological
and juridical doctrines; see Maroun Aouad, ‘La critique radicale du témoignage, de la loi
positive et du consensus par Averroès’, in Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin: Actes du
Colloque international, Paris, 16–18 juin 2005, ed. J.-.Brenet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007),
pp. 161–81, pp. 180–81.
60
Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Topics’, ‘Rhetoric’, and
‘Poetics’, p. 77.
61
Averroès (Ibn Rušd), Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, Introduction
générale, édition critique du texte arabe, traduction française, commentaire et tables par
Maroun Aouad; vol. I, Introduction générale et tables; vol. II, Edition et traduction; vol. III,
Commentaire du Commentaire (Paris: Vrin, 2002), henceforth Averroès, Commentaire
moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote.
62
Ibid., vol. I, p. 216.
63
Ibid., p. 7.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 95

limited to just one subject matter or examining its object under a specific prism,
such as physics or metaphysics.64
Rhetoric is useful in disputes and for teaching and guidance, for accusation and
defence. Like the other parts of logic, it employs syllogism, as do demonstration
and dialectic. However, it has its own specific syllogism, which is the enthymeme
– a syllogism lacking one premiss, usually the major, that contains the universal
term, an important distinction given that too complex a syllogism would not be
understood by the multitude. An example of an enthymeme is, as we have seen, to
say that Socrates is a man, hence he is mortal, omitting the major premiss to the
effect that all men are mortal. Rhetoric studies everything that influences or brings
about persuasion, including the passions, although these are not the central focus
of rhetorical persuasion, since of themselves they prepare but do not bring about
persuasion.65
Rhetorical arguments can rely on external aspects, such as the passions, but
argumentation is its main characteristic, given that it is a part of logic.
For Averroes as for Aristotle, rhetoric has political as well as legal uses, and
again the Islamic influence in Averroes’ interpretation is not far to seek.
According to Averroes, it is the laws which determine what is right and wrong,
whereas judges determine what was or was not the case, in the circumstances at
hand. Therefore, controversy and confrontation before the judges belong to this
art. In advising, judges should refer to what is known to people – what is common
knowledge – regarding what is useful and harmful. Only legal scholars know what
is just or unjust, not the multitude.66 Therefore, one who speaks before the judges
must know what is just and unjust. This shows that rhetoric, while addressed to
most people, is mastered by a few. In fact, Averroes states that it is the logician who
masters this art. The goal is to produce persuasion and assent in one’s audience
or interlocutor. While both are part of this art, controversy demands a greater
persuasion effort than does deliberation. Rhetorical assent, according to Averroes,
is not due to that which is true but to that which resembles the true.67 Rather, true
rhetorical premisses must be praiseworthy, coming across as true. What kind of
assent does rhetoric aim at producing? Its goal is to induce the practice of virtuous
actions, and to do so in people who do not understand demonstration. Here the
significance of using enthymeme comes to the fore. It lacks one premiss, thus
offering a simplified argument which is particularly effective with people with no
syllogistic training.
Like dialectic, rhetoric considers two opposites at once. It does not produce
inevitable assent (that is the prerogative of demonstration) and it can be misused
– seeing that it can be employed to persuade of that which is not true or beneficial.
In addition, any person could potentially persuade (in the same way that a

64
Ibid., vol. II, p. 1.
65
Ibid., vol. II, p. 3.
66
Ibid., vol. II, p. 6.
67
Ibid., vol. II, p. 7.
96 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

non-physician can cure), but not always or for the most part.68 One becomes a
rhetorician through habit (or acquired practice).
A sophistical syllogism is not really a syllogism, unlike the enthymeme. Since
the sophist simply aims at persuading, he sometimes shares the rhetorician’s goal,
but sophistry shares nothing with dialectic. In explaining Aristotle’s definition
of rhetoric to the effect that it is a faculty or potentiality (quwwa) which seeks
to persuade on any aspect pertaining to individual things, Averroes claims that
faculty or potentiality signifies here that it acts on two opposites and may or may
not bring about the desired effect. It employs all efforts in examining thoroughly
how to bring about persuasion as far as possible, and in any of the individuals
falling under the Aristotelian ten categories.69 As we have seen, it does not seek to
persuade only regarding one subject, such as for instance medicine, which aims at
persuading with regard to health and the means to produce or restore health in the
human body. Rhetoric concerns persuasion regarding that which depends on our
free will and choice.
One of the three aspects effecting persuasion is the virtue of the speaker, who
should establish his own virtue, whereby his words become more persuasive, for
good men are more persuasive. The second aspect relates to the passions which
induce assent to that which is being discussed. Finally, it is important to use
persuasive words to establish that about which one speaks. Averroes, like Aristotle,
ties rhetoric to discussions about ethics and politics, and, for instance, deliberative
matters. In addition, neither rhetoric nor dialectic attains to certainty. Given that all
persuasive argumentation, by asserting or denying, is produced through syllogism
or something resembling a syllogism, both dialectic and rhetoric use syllogism:
dialectic uses induction or syllogism, and rhetoric uses induction, enthymeme and
example, the latter corresponding to induction in rhetoric.70 Both induction and
example start from an existing thing or fact. In dialectic the syllogism is more
trustworthy than induction, and in rhetoric example is more persuasive than the
enthymeme because the latter more often involves opposition.
With regard to the object of persuasion, it can be addressed to one or more
people; it can concern universals or particulars and can be effected through the
thing itself or something else. Like dialectic, rhetoric does not employ what is
admitted by one person only, but by the majority.71
A good syllogism in this art is composed of evident premisses, or of premisses
that are evident through other premisses. Averroes states that judges seek simplicity
in the proceedings of a case. In addition, the point at stake is to persuade that
something is the case or exists, and that it is praiseworthy or not. For the sake of
brevity, one premiss is omitted in enthymemes. Rhetorical premisses are usually
possible and rarely necessary. This is an important point in rhetoric, the fact that it

68
Ibid., vol. II, p. 11.
69
Ibid., vol. II, p. 14.
70
Ibid., vol. II, p. 17.
71
Ibid., vol. II, p. 19.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 97

deals with the possible rather than with the necessary. This stands in sharp contrast
to demonstrative method, which stipulates that its premisses are necessary and
always the case, an indication that demonstration suits sciences such as physics
and metaphysics, which deal not with particular cases but with what is always
the case, and the eternal, such as God and eternal laws of nature. Rhetoric deals
instead with human relations, either in principle, as in ethics, or within a human
community, as in politics. In relation to the content, Averroes further states that
truth in necessary things is more general than truth in particular (instances).72
Further making the distinction between possible and necessary in this context, he
states that necessary is, for instance, an attribute that always applies to the subject
of which it is predicated, whereas the possible sometimes applies to its subject and
sometimes does not. The first figure, which employs universal propositions in its
premisses, is the hallmark, as we have seen, of demonstrative discourse.
Example is related to induction because it derives from it, but it specifically
goes from one particular to another through the universal. Pursuing his discussion
of syllogistic logic within the realm of rhetoric, Averroes states that the enthymeme
is found in relation to the ten categories. The subject matter of rhetoric includes
kinds/species (anwā‘) and (common)places (mawāḍi‘, topics), as in dialectic.
They furnish the subject matter to be used in enthymemes. The kinds are universal
premisses which are used in each of the particular arts and the (common)places
are universal premisses whose particulars are used in each of the arts. Rhetorical
speech must include three elements, namely a speaker or orator, the subject being
handled and an audience, which can be (1) a judge or (2) a contradictor of what is
being proposed, or (3) the audience to be persuaded.
Here Averroes assimilates Aristotle’s purpose to his own Islamic purposes. The
Andalusian philosopher states that the judge judges according to (1) what is to be
(future cases) – and what is beneficial or detrimental (2) what has already taken
place, such as virtues or vices, developed by choice, or (3) the just or unjust. The
judge of future cases is the ruler (al-ra’īs) who elects the judge (qāḍī) in Islamic
states. He who contradicts uses rhetorical habitus, or practice. Therefore, we
find three kinds of rhetorical utterance: deliberation, controversy and verification
(tathbītī).
Deliberation is divided into permission and prohibition, controversy is divided
into accusation and acquittal, and verification is divided into praise and blame or
reproach. Deliberation concerns future time, whereas controversy concerns the
past. Praise and blame concern the present time. The goals of deliberative utterances
are to advise regarding the useful and the harmful, whereas controversy discusses
the just and unjust and verification addresses virtue and vice. However, each kind
of utterance may accidentally use the purpose or end of another kind of utterance.73
Among the kinds of premisses in rhetorical speech one finds praiseworthy ones,
indications (dalā’il) and signs (‘alāmāt). Praiseworthy premisses include those

72
Ibid., vol. II, p. 22.
73
Ibid., vol. II, p. 30.
98 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

which are not indications, for example, that one ought to favour one’s benefactor,
and the latter (indications) are things indicating that something, a certain quality,
belongs to something else. The distinction between indications and signs is that the
former are found in the first figure, which employs universal premisses, whereas
signs are found in the third (and also second) syllogistic figure.74 In addition, the
orator should use premisses indicating what is possible or impossible. Orators are
also required to show that something is good or evil, great or small.
As regards deliberation or advice, one should inquire into the good advised,
and not concerning necessary physical processes, or natural processes that do not
depend on us; for deliberation is not about what is necessary and already determined
but rather about the possible.75 Strictly speaking, deliberation addresses itself to
the possible scenarios that depend on one’s free will. In comparing philosophy
(here once again associated with demonstrative reasoning) and rhetoric, Averroes
states that philosophy is superior to the art of rhetoric in picturing (taṣwīr) and
assenting (the two main aspects of the cognitive process leading to religious belief,
as described in the Decisive Treatise), for the premisses used in philosophy are
truer and more correct than the ones used in rhetoric. In the latter, and concerning
our knowledge of the things under scrutiny, what matters is not the things in
themselves but whether they are reputable. Averroes makes a further specification,
to the effect that rhetoric is composed of logic and the science of political ethics
(al-siyāsa al-khalqiyya), and includes aspects of dialectic and sophistical discourse,
or aspects resembling these two arts.
Our main concern here is the method – in other words, the place – of rhetoric
as a part of logic, more than the ethical or political ramifications, which take centre
stage after the introductory part of the middle commentary on Rhetoric. Averroes,
however, makes the proviso that ethics only becomes integral to this art when the
issues at hand are suited to discussion and addressing other people. Politics is tied
to ethics for the sake of obtaining scientific knowledge of these things. Dialectic
and sophistry only become part of rhetoric when the subject matter is accessible
to all people. The difference between rhetoric and these other arts consists in the
extent of the examination (miqdār al-naẓar) – that is to say, rhetoric does not study
politics or ethics exhaustively and therefore is no substitute for these sciences.
The topics on which the orator advises all people of a city, a few or just one,
are five: the accumulation of wealth/reserves, advice on peace or war, advice on
protection of the city from foreign attacks, imports and obedience to the laws.76
Averroes goes on to describe these items in detail, including the significance of
good laws. He states that legislation pertains to the domain of politics, not rhetoric.
The orator should not allow the corruption of a good state or of any condition
which is based on the practice of virtues. This aspect of rhetoric also includes the
things which should be prohibited or disallowed. Rhetoric concerns persuasion

74
Ibid., vol. II, p. 23.
75
Ibid., vol. II, p. 31.
76
Ibid., vol. II, pp. 33–4.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 99

regarding the good, but seeking to show that a good is not a good belongs in the
domain of sophistry.
As part of rhetoric, Averroes examines the nature of the good as well as
questions pertaining to the law. In this context, he states that Islamic law does
not change and is thus eternal.77 After discussing matters pertaining to praise and
blame, Averroes proceeds to the issue of accusation and defence, which involve an
agent, an object and the act of accusing or defending.
With respect to the laws, he distinguishes between general and special laws.
The former are unwritten and what one might call natural law, such as the love
that binds children and parents. Written law varies according to nation and is
written and mastered by a few individuals, such as statesmen and judges, whereas
general laws are inscribed in everyone’s hearts. He goes on to examine the causes
of injustice, which is considered to happen by chance when the agent has no
knowledge of the act. Injustice can also occur by constraint, by choice or through
a passion such as anger.
Averroes stresses the importance of forgiveness, which is, however, not to be
considered when an offence takes place against God. He considers it a great injustice
to punish people for their virtues, citing the example of Jesus’ Apostles, or the gravity
of a crime that is committed for the first time, such as Cain’s murder of Abel.
Non-technical assent in rhetoric comes in five forms: laws, witnesses, contracts,
torture and oaths. With regard to torture he concurs with Aristotle in condemning
it, and he highlights its uselessness for obtaining truthful information, arguing that
one can never put one’s trust in it. Therefore, he claims, Islamic law disregards
any statements made under duress and any penalties associated with information
obtained in such a way. In discussing these matters, Averroes often compares
Greek law or custom with Islamic law, and reads Aristotle’s conclusions into his
own medieval Islamic milieu.
Averroes sums up the first book of rhetoric, which dealt with the various kinds
of utterance regarding permission and prohibition, praise and blame, accusation and
defence, and assent regarding these. He further argues that the judge may incline
towards one or the other of these propositions, given that they are not certain. It
is therefore important to study the role of emotions in bringing about assent in
the judge, which is the subject of the second book. This is because the judgement
proffered by the judge is influenced by the emotions he feels. Averroes adds that
someone persuades for the most part if he is knowledgeable, virtuous and known to
his audience, sharing similar characteristics such as language and birthplace.78
Proceeding to the description of the various emotions, Averroes studies, in
particular, anger (and its relation with vengeance), contempt, friendship and its
different kinds (and the kind of person one likes to befriend) and hatred. It is
important to establish if one is a friend or an enemy in order to find the motive

77
Ibid., vol. II, p. 70.
78
Ibid., vol. II, p. 139.
100 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

(or lack of it) for injustice if that is what is being investigated.79 He describes fear,
and its opposite, courage, shyness/timidity and shame, flattery, and the opposite
of shame, namely impudence. Preoccupation is also discussed by Averroes, also
in relation to indignation and envy. The significance of studying these passions
consists in the ability, for instance, to arouse indignation in the judge towards one’s
opponent, and in general to sway the judge in one’s favour. With regard to envy,
Averroes claims that we envy those who are similar to us, in terms of age, wealth,
and such attributes.80 In knowing the passions, one can build affective/emotive
syllogisms (al-maqāyīs al-infi‘āliyya). In doing this one must take into account,
according to Aristotle and Averroes, five states (aḥwāl) with their corresponding
dispositions: (1) the passions/emotions (such as anger or pity), (2) aspirations
(one’s preferences), (3) age (youth, maturity and old age), (4) one’s good fortunes
(for instance noble birth or health) and finally (5) the soul (with its different mental
dispositions and habits). He proceeds to analyse the characteristics of the different
age groups.
Having spoken about the syllogisms and the emotions that can sway those
involved in this kind of art, he goes on to distinguish three roles in this process,
the speaker, the opponent/interlocutor and the judge, who has the final word. In
order to maximise the potential for persuasion, one should have a judge and an
addressee in all kinds of rhetorical speech, such as deliberative speech. Averroes
affirms that the judge is superior to the speaker and the interlocutor and adds that
in Islam the judge has the final word. Only the judge’s utterances, such as oaths
and testimony, should be used to the exclusion of those of the speaker and the
interlocutor.81
The common issues raised in the three kinds of rhetorical speech are (1) if something
is possible or impossible, (2) if something will happen or not, (3) if something
happened in the past or not, and finally (4) how to aggrandise or lessen something.
When disputing, seeking to aggrandise or lessen is particularly appropriate.
Mentioning the past particularly suits litigious cases, and for deliberation one
should invoke what is possible – that is, what is possible to human agency, not in
nature, which is not controlled by human action.
Averroes then reverts to an earlier point regarding the two technical components
of rhetorical speech, namely the enthymeme, with a premiss and a conclusion, and
the example. Further explaining the example as it is used in rhetoric, he states that
it is based on past occurrences, or based on an invented example, which can be

79
Ibid., vol. II, p. 165. With regard to the differences between Averroes and Aristotle
in expounding the discipline of rhetoric, Aouad argues that Averroes is more insistent on
the connection of the accidental with rhetoric, as well as the lack of certainty in rhetorical
premisses and the role of the imagination in arousing emotions; see Averroès, Commentaire
moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, vol. I, pp. 104, 108, 114.
80
Ibid., vol. II, p. 199.
81
Ibid., vol. II, p. 216.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 101

fictitious – citing the stories in Kalila wa Dimna.82 Another characteristic of the

example is the use of repeated or common expressions such as idioms. Examples
look at similarities between the story and the case under discussion. They are
more convincing if they are based on the past, but an invented story can present a
closer similarity.
The next component of rhetoric analysed by Averroes is the maxim (ra’y),
which speaks of universal matters regarding what to choose or avoid. It is related
to the enthymeme in the sense that it constitutes a conclusion or a principle of
an enthymeme. The maxim does not have premisses or more than one sentence.
If premisses are added to a maxim we obtain an enthymeme. Alternatively, a
proposition that is used as a principle of an enthymeme whose second premiss
and conclusion are omitted is a maxim. There are four kinds of maxim, which
are divided into two groups. A maxim can be part of a premiss or a conclusion
of a demonstration, in which case it may be clear to everyone or to just a few.
In addition, it can be a hidden maxim, which requires a completing syllogism,
and this can be completed with a conclusion or with a premiss. Ultimately, the
meaning of a maxim should be intelligible to everyone.
When an ethical utterance is put in the form of a maxim, one should use that
which promotes the virtues and arouses a latent predisposition of the audience
to act in a virtuous way. Averroes sees maxims as a language understood by
most people who cannot abstract universals from particulars, and who can only
understand universals if they are related to particulars. These people thus benefit
from knowledge of universals, in the way that the universal contained in the
maxim suits them. In addition, indicating a universal which overlaps with what one
desires or shuns is a way of inducing acceptance of a universal ethical principle. It
produces persuasion regarding that which one did not wish and did not accept as
a mere particular. A maxim produces the impression of knowledge in people who
would not otherwise have it, whereby people feel that they have the reasoning and
syllogism which serves as basis for the maxim, leading to the acceptance of the
utterance. In proposing a universal in this way, the hearer is more likely to accept
it. In addition, the maxim renders the utterance ethical. The maxim proposes and
induces the adoption of a universal principle expressed. A person who adopts it in
this way has the disposition of one who adopts it – thus having the understanding
and the will to do it.83
After treating the nature of maxims, Averroes returns to the general
characteristics of rhetorical speech, stating that the premisses of enthymemes are
not as well known as those of dialectical syllogisms – for they are neither unknown
nor too well known. Moreover, the hearer accepts them upon hearing them, which
means that they were potentially in the hearers before they become actual once the
hearers understand those premisses.

82
Ibid., vol. II, pp. 225–6.
83
Ibid., vol. II, p. 235.
102 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

As for the issue surrounding the ones who master this art, Averroes emphasises
that untrained people should not address the masses, given their lack of experience
– in any case, the masters of rhetorical speech are logicians in one way or another.
Inexperienced people could confuse unknown premisses with known ones. They
may believe that well-known premisses are unknown or that what is clear to
them is clear to all – whereas what they say may need clarification. There is an
assumption that they may not be able to express themselves with clarity although
they understand what is proposed to them. An address to the masses must be well
crafted and clear.
The premisses of rhetorical speech must be evident, and produce immediate
assent, and they should come from judges or from persons acknowledged to be
virtuous, not from just anyone among the people. The premisses should be taken
from that which is necessary and possible, and from what is the case for the most
part, for a syllogism composed of that which is clear is superior. The speaker must
know that of which he speaks, whether in deliberation, controversy or boasting. In
other words, the premisses should state that which belongs to the thing discussed,
and must come from those who are well known in the community. Averroes claims
that the truer the premisses are, the more they belong to the matter at hand and the
more persuasive they are – for Aristotle this is complete wisdom.
Averroes then moves to topics, which are elements that go into the composition
of enthymemes and its premisses. There are two kinds of enthymemes, those used
to establish and those used to remonstrate. The topics are used in function of these
two kinds of enthymeme. For deliberation, one considers the harmful and the useful;
for boasting, one considers praise and blame; and for controversy, one considers that
which is just and unjust, regarding the passions and in ethical questions. Averroes
describes the places that allow the speaker to establish something.
Other topoi come from definitions, from induction or from opposition (taqābul)
and division of the predicate. One could reduce opposites to the same starting
point, such as to say that in considering whether philosophy is good or bad one
must philosophise – with the underlying assumption that it is necessary in any case
to philosophise.84
Premisses used in this context must conform to general opinion and be admitted
either immediately or easily over time. Averroes states that persuasion in this case
is of two kinds: either the premisses are admitted immediately, or they are admitted
because they are praised and known by all. Premisses in the art of rhetoric based
on opinion are twofold: they are admitted because they are well known, or they
are admitted/assented to because they are related to well-known things. There are
three kinds of assent, then: certain, truly well known or immediately well known.
Averroes goes on to analyse the topoi of reproach (tawbīkh), which often
involve the reputation of one’s opponent on the basis of his acts. Therefore, in
this case, one uses data that are external to the premisses – not so much what is
said but the reputation of the one who says it. This kind of topic highlights the

84
Ibid., vol. II, p. 246.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 103

contrary together with the thing mentioned. This topic uses fewer words that are
immediately clear, and reproach should be more self-evident than assertion.
The distinction between true and corrupted enthymemes is made, and Averroes
stresses that a syllogism valid in one art may not be valid in another; for example a
syllogism valid in dialectic may not be so in demonstration. Standards of certainty are
higher for demonstration than for dialectic, and higher for dialectic than for rhetoric.
Topics may be misleading on account of the use of words or their meanings,
for instance due to equivocal words. These misleading topics are common to
all three arts – demonstration, dialectic and rhetoric – arguably in the sense of
producing false or misleading conclusions. In rhetoric, for instance, one can render
the question confusing with the attending result that one believes in something
before it is proved. There are several ways of producing this kind of confusion,
such as, for instance, to indicate as cause something that is not a cause. To this
end, something is taken in a different state from the one in which it is. To induce
the interlocutor into error, in dialectic, one can mention possible false things; in
demonstration one brings up nonexistent things, which are false and impossible.
In rhetoric one mentions obligatory things, and presents something particular as
universal, by arguing that what is true particularly is true universally. In order to
show that such utterances are false, one must qualify them.85
Another topos consists in the objections that the audience may raise, and which
may consist in opposition to the premisses or conclusions. Averroes underlines the
fact that the premisses here consist of opinions. One may have a contrary opinion
regarding the point at hand. One can produce an enthymeme in support of a point
or of its opposite. This can be also done with well-known premisses in dialectic,
but not in demonstration.
One can oppose the premisses in four ways: by denying that the premiss leads
to the conclusion, by opposing the utterance itself, by opposing the questioner
or by prolonging the time of the dispute. Also, one can oppose the premisses
according to four topoi, based on the thing itself, universal or particular, or on
something external, contrary or similar.
The enthymemes that magnify or lessen are not part of those which annul or
establish.
At the start of the third book of the commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric,
Averroes recapitulates the three goals of rhetoric, namely, (1) it includes everything
which produces persuasion, whether with respect to the meanings or the things
themselves; (2) it purports to explain words expressing these meanings; and (3)
it analyses the parts of rhetorical utterance. The previous books dealt with the
meanings which produce persuasion, comprising three kinds. The first kind is the
affective or ethical meaning, which prepares the ground. The second kind consists
in establishing the virtue of the speaker. Finally, rhetorical meaning concerns the
utterances used first to persuade in so far as one seeks to persuade.86 Averroes

85
Ibid., vol. II, p. 256.
86
Ibid., vol. II, p. 263.
104 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

remarks that some topics are universal for the three kinds of rhetoric, while others
are specific to deliberation, controversy or praise.
The third book tackles the second and third sets of issues pertaining to the
study of rhetoric, namely the use of right words – which is a study of eloquence
and the most appropriate to convey the desired meaning, as well as of words that
are appealing to the understanding and words that signify something elevated or
base – and the parts of discourse. Explaining words pertains to logic, and some
aspects of eloquence are specific to each nation or language. According to Averroes
one should study the words that produce assent.
In rhetoric one may avail oneself also of external means of inducing persuasion.
This includes the use of gestures, sounds and intonation used in rhetorical speech
and with the spoken, not the written word. He provides an example from hadith
literature and the life of Muhammad. Much of what is said here by Aristotle,
Averroes acknowledges, has no use for Arabs. In contrasting rhetoric to poetry, he
states that rhetoric seeks the victory of one opinion, while poetry tries to arouse the
imagination. In addition, a made-up story belongs in poetry rather than rhetoric.87
Words used in rhetoric should be univocal, or if the words are equivocal,
the meanings should be clearly distinguished. Rhetoric and poetry require the
use of more persuasive words than does dialectic. Averroes proceeds to analyse
the various kinds of words, totalling eight kinds. We find altered words (by
substitution, exemplification or comparison), where the change can be simple or
composite, common words, strange words, and imported words. There are also
confusing words and made-up words. Explaining the usage of these various kinds
of words, he states that current words are the best for demonstration. On the other
hand, in rhetoric one should not use many imported, composite or strange words,
in order to convince most people rather than only the elite.
In altered words, the change should point to relation or another category, and
if a substitute is used it should be similar or related to the thing in question. If
the substitute is something related, it can precede (as a universal or cause) that
which it substitutes, it may come after it (such as its effects and particular) or be
its concomitant. The latter must coincide in matter of time or place or be a species
within the same genus. The concomitant may include a thing’s contraries.88 In
order to render something evident, one should use what is similar and evident
or contrary to it. Changes should be based on analogy, which serves to extol or
to revile.
Averroes states that there are four ‘cold nouns’ (al-asmā’ al-bārida) that should
be avoided, namely those with an unclear meaning, imported words, posited
(mawḍū‘) names, and changes that are not becoming. Evoking distant accidents of
something belongs in poetry.

87
Idem, vol. II, p. 283.
88
Ibid., vol. II, p. 279.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 105

The example, too, is a kind of alteration. A difference between the example and
alteration consists in the fact that the example must show a real similarity, whereas
alteration is used with regard to various things.
Averroes highlights the need to make good use of conjunction particles, as
already stressed by Alfarabi.89 Moreover, one should use familiar terms, rather
than too general ones. Ambiguous terms belong in sophistry. The singular, dual
and plural should be correctly applied. Written language should be clear, and oral
language should be easily explainable. Speech should evoke and promote ethical
behaviour in the audience, but it can only persuade if it sounds true to the mind.
A distinction is discernible between ethical and affective utterances, but the
latter can derive from the former. The orator should deliberate about the methods
of persuasion. He can use something novel to set the mind thinking. In order to
move the audience to do or avoid something, he should evoke the passion and
disposition that will lead one to do or avoid something according to the desired
outcome.
Raising the voice should not stand in the way of communicating the message.
Averroes provides various examples of correct language drawn from the Qur’an.
One should express oneself clearly in order to be understood and attain persuasion.
Equally, the enthymeme should not be too obvious, but only understood after the
hearer pays attention.90
Alteration should not be based on equivocal words, and should present the
thing as if it were before us, so one should use an appropriate alteration, for
instance, the opposite of something, as well as describing the actions that are to
be or are expected to be. The best kind of alteration is based on analogy and
correspondence. Alteration also includes portraying the animate as inanimate
and vice versa, which, Averroes states, is common in Arabic. As for alteration in
describing acts, one must be sure to use terms that are neither too well known nor
unknown. Leading into error can be achieved by using equivocal words or evoking
the unpleasant to denote the pleasant. To sum up, alteration is effected through an
opposite, an analogue, a similar term or an example.91
Resorting to hyperbole is more appropriate for oral speech. Written sentences
should be more accurate and verifiable because they are permanent.
In general, Averroes recommends greater clarity when addressing a crowd than
an individual or an elite, although inferior persuasion techniques, which would not
be suitable for an elite, are suitable for the multitude.92 In spite of the significance
of these rhetorical devices in public speech, Averroes claims that without such
external devices as metaphors and alteration of words before an assembly, one’s
style is more correct and the truth of the matter easier to discern.

89
Ibid., vol. II, p. 288.
90
Ibid., vol. II, p. 309.
91
Ibid., vol. II, p. 317.
92
Ibid., vol. II, p. 321.
106 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

In Chapter 13 of Book III of his Middle Commentary on Rhetoric, Averroes

details the essential parts of speech, the end or purpose, and assent, which confirms
or denies. Narration is a part of speech and is especially suited to litigious cases.
In addition we find narration, the exordium and the epilogue as components of
speech. Repetition is more commonly found in deliberative speech, the exordium
is not always needed in litigious speech, and in the epilogue we find assent and
verification. He sums up by saying that there are five parts of rhetorical speech,
namely the exordium, the goal, the narration, verification or assent and finally
the epilogue.
The exordium, which serves to introduce the subject matter, comes from praise
and reproach in the context of verification or assent, in deliberation it is used
for exhortation and non-exhortation and in litigious discourse it comes from the
accusation. The narrative should not be too long, and in it the narrator should
make sure to establish his own virtuousness. Ethical utterances are only used
in voluntary, practical matters, not for examining theoretical issues.93 Affective
utterances play an important role.
In deliberative speech, one should avoid narrative because it concerns the
past, whereas deliberation is about the future, and can only be used in passing
from praise to deliberation. The goal is to establish whether a thing exists or not,
and if it does, whether it is harmful or not. Thirdly, one should establish whether
something is just or not, and finally, if harmful and unjust, that it comes from the
adversary. Deliberation regards whether something will or will not take place,
and if it does, whether it is or is not just or profitable. For deliberation, the use
of examples is good, whereas litigious speech prefers enthymemes, if they are
not too technical. In ethical utterances, it is better to use maxims rather than
enthymemes and verification, but sometimes ethical utterances should be changed
into enthymemes.
Averroes gives suggestions for topoi that will win an argument, including making
the respondent contradict himself, and he also gives advice for the respondent.
Averroes concludes this middle commentary by listing the four parts of good
rhetorical speech: the speaker should establish his good reputation, he should
aggrandise and lessen things as required, he should use affective and ethical
utterances and finally he should speak to the point – these being four points
common to all the aspects of rhetorical speech. The example and its contrary
should be clearer than the thing exemplified or its contrary. Finally, the epilogue
should be clearly distinct from the main narrative.
To recapitulate, the commentaries on Topics and Rhetoric show that the
question of assent, in particular religious assent, is of paramount significance for
Averroes. Dialectic concerns the informal discussion of truths that are ultimately
religious. And, while in Aristotle rhetoric has a political and legal purpose, for
Averroes, and in the context of an Islamic society, assent is always of a religious
nature, for rhetoric is used either in Islamic law or within a political context that

93
Ibid., vol. II, p. 338.
 Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric 107

is shaped and underpinned by religious views, specifically Islam. It is one of the

duties of Muslim statesmen to transmit religious truth to the multitude.
The significance of rhetoric lies in its ability to transmit philosophical and
religious truths to the majority of people. While the philosophers discover truth
through demonstration, they communicate their findings through dialectic and
rhetoric, hence the significance of dialectic and rhetoric alongside demonstration.
Those who assent through rhetoric do not actually master this art, they only
understand its results.
Aristotle’s works on dialectic and rhetoric come to life again within a
medieval Islamic context in Averroes’ commentaries. While the spirit and most
theories to be found in Aristotle regarding dialectic and rhetoric are preserved,
they acquire a different purpose and meaning when adapted by the medieval
Andalusian philosopher. Having examined the differences between philosophical
and religious discourse in Averroes, we now turn to Hegel for this important aspect
of his philosophy of religion.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Chapter 4
Hegel’s Attitude to Religion
in the Early Writings

The Phenomenology of Spirit is arguably Hegel’s most complete and focused

discussion of the relation between representation and conceptual thought.
However, given that religion was a constant concern in his writings and teaching,
it is important to ascertain his position on these matters in his early writings, that
is, his writings before the Phenomenology of Spirit, which was published in 1807.
Some scholars argue that Hegel’s personal philosophy was not yet fully developed
before 1800, but the early writings on religion are an important part of his
philosophical output, and they cannot be ignored if one is seeking to understand
the way in which he views the relation between philosophy and religion in later
works. Even if Hegel’s philosophical system was not fully developed before the
Phenomenology – and although his attempts at building a philosophical system
were already patent in the early 1800s – some terms that are pivotal in the early
writings on Christianity, and religion in general, resurface again in his Berlin
writings. One such concept, for instance, is the concept of positivity, which in
connection with religion means a content imposed externally on the subject, on the
basis of authority, in particular a religious text – that is, scripture.
These writings – particularly those dating from the period he spent in Bern
and Frankfurt – warrant close scrutiny here also because they contain an early
interpretation of Christianity which Hegel would later revise in his lectures on
philosophy of religion delivered at Berlin throughout the 1820s. The question of
whether Hegel’s thought evolved over the several decades, from the 1790s to the
1820s, in which he reflected and wrote on religion, will be addressed later.
From the period Hegel spent in Bern, between 1793 and 1796, we have
fragments on folk religion and Christianity, as well as a Life of Jesus, evidencing
a stress on the promotion of morality and a strong influence of Kant, with its
emphasis on the inner laws of reason and obedience to the moral law. The Spirit
of Christianity and Its Fate dates from the Frankfurt period, between 1797 and
1800. Already in these early works we find positions that are echoed later, such
as the inability of the majority of people to relate in a rational or intellectual way
to religion. Other views are transformed, if not discarded, in the Lectures on
Philosophy of Religion.
Scholars have associated the different periods and phases of Hegel’s early
philosophical development with the places in which he lived as a young man. Thus
the period spent in Tübingen (1788–93), where he undertook philosophical and
110 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

theological studies, is associated with the concept of folk or popular religion.1 In

Bern, Hegel came under the influence of Kant, as evidenced by his interpretation
of the life of Jesus and the identification of Jesus’ message with a fundamental
moral teaching, the purpose of religion being the teaching and instilling of moral
behaviour.2 Finally, in the period spent in Frankfurt, Hegel comes closest to the
Romantic movement, and he stresses the inner, subjective aspect of religion
as a matter of the heart and feeling. This position is particularly evident in the
writings on religion and love, and especially in The Spirit of Christianity and Its
Fate (1798–1800). It is curious to note regarding this early period – especially in
the Frankfurt period where Hegel credits the heart, rather than cold reason, with
effecting unity and reconciliation between man and God – that he places religion
above philosophy, as truly reflecting reality and life.3
These early works contain a response to the various debates on religion that
characterised the eighteenth century. On the one hand, in this period a systematisation
of dogmatic theology was underway, championed by the likes of Christian Wolff
(1679–1754) and Alexander Baumgarten (1714–1762), which reflected upon the
nature of God and his attributes, the proofs of God’s existence and the immortality
of the soul. Another trend at work in the eighteenth century, with the flourishing
of the Enlightenment and its focus on the ability of human reason to fathom the
secrets of the universe, is the belief in the authority of reason to the detriment of
any supernatural or inaccessible authority. In this sense, the concept of natural
religion evolves, based on the principle of the human capability of discovering
the basic principles of religion and morals by itself without appealing to scripture.
In addition, these natural principles of religion were believed to exist innately in
every human being, so they transcended questions of creed or any particular faith
or religion.

1
For details of the curriculum of Hegel’s studies in Tübingen, see Carmelo Lacorte,
Il primo Hegel (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1959), pp. 122–7.
2
See, for instance, Raymond Keith Williamson, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy
of Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 22.
3
Ibid., pp. 61–2. It was during the Jena period that Hegel came to choose philosophy
of religion, precisely because of the latter’s association with representation, a limited kind
of apprehension, ibid., p. 84. Carmo Ferreira also stresses the fact that philosophy was not
yet a central concern for Hegel in the Frankfurt period, but was subordinated to religion.
Only later, in Jena, does Hegel show a preference for philosophy over religion; see Manuel
J. Carmo Ferreira, Hegel e a Justificação da Filosofia (Iena 1801–1807) (Lisbon: Imprensa
Nacional – Casa da Moeda, 1992), p. 19. Another contrast between the younger and the
mature Hegel lies in the attitude towards education. While the young Hegel was concerned
for popular education, in which religion would take a leading role, the later Hegel, in Berlin,
believes that philosophy is only for a minority of people, ibid., p. 192. In Frankfurt, his
dialectic logic is not yet developed, and religion assumes the role of reconciling differences,
uniting the finite (human) and the infinite (God); see Masakatsu Fujita, Philosophie und
Religion beim jungen Hegel (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1985), pp. 118, 150–51.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 111

With the rise of Romanticism in the wake of the Sturm und Drang movement,
however, some of the positions that characterised the Enlightenment were laid
aside and even criticised, with a much greater attention to the human subject and
the primacy of feeling and sentiment over reason.4 Hegel’s early writings take
stock of the philosophical developments of the eighteenth century, and he comes
to embrace for a while a certain Romantic position in his early writings. This entire
early period is critical of established religion, a criticism which does not spare
even Lutheran Christianity.

Religion and Morality

The first period of Hegel’s early writings displays the influence of the Enlightenment
and the moral purpose of religion, as defended by Kant. Thus in an early work
already mentioned, The Life of Jesus, a free translation and commentary on the
Gospels, Hegel puts into Jesus’ mouth several speeches that reflect Kant’s practical
philosophy and a religion which is conceived within the bounds of reason, urging
men to become ethically and morally better and dutiful. Thus we find Jesus stating
that one should not accept any teachings on the basis of authority, but only on
the basis of the judgement of universal reason.5 Moreover, the parables should be
interpreted in the light of the ethical laws. Hegel interprets these Gospel parables
in accordance with pure ethical principles, claiming that their purpose is to show
virtue to men. The kingdom of God he views as the kingdom of the good, reason
and law.6 A certain religious relativism is at work in his claim that one can find
grace from the judge of the world whether one worships Zeus or Brahma.7 And he
appears to replace the Holy Spirit with the spirit of virtue.8

4
Hegel’s ambivalence towards the Enlightenment is noted by H.S. Harris: ‘This
“bringing of Heaven to earth” in the sense of corrupting all sacred values into profane
ones, exchanging all divine promises for a mess of worldy pottage, is the direct outcome
of “the Enlightenment.” “The Enlightenment” was essentially a determination to make the
knowledge of this world, and the life of this world sufficient for man. It was a conscious
renunciation of any attempt to share in God’s life or God’s knowledge. This renunciation is
the “death” of speculative philosophy, and since the Enlightenment made this renunciation,
it could have no proper philosophy at all. It could produce only “imperfect” philosophies,
for which a sociological explanation can be given, but not a rational justification’, in G.W.F.
Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1977), Introduction, p. 8.
5
G.W.F. Hegel, Das Leben Jesu. Harmonie der Evangelien nach eigener Übersetzung,
ed. Paul Roques (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1906), p. 8.
6
Ibid., p. 30.
7
Ibid., p. 39.
8
Ibid., p. 61.
112 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Still during the Bern period, some of his writings spurn a concept of religion
strictly based on dogma and doctrine, religious institutions, customs and
ceremonials while avoiding also a purely intellectual or rational approach, which
he believes lacks life and sentiment. Instead, Hegel proposes a religion of the
heart that touches people deeply and helps them become better human beings by
guiding their actions.
For the young Hegel religion is a matter of the heart, and not so much the
science of God, his attributes and the immortality of the soul. In addition, religion
should have a positive and decisive impact on people’s active behaviour.
He distinguishes, moreover, between objective and subjective religion,
showing a clear preference for the latter.9 Objective religion he associates with
a codified, written form of religion, and with abstraction, a term which even in
the young Hegel bears negative connotations. Something is said to be abstract
which is separated or divorced from living reality – it is opposed to the organic
or, more specifically, the concrete. Objective religion is also associated with
Christian doctrine and dogmatic theology as developed by the Fathers of the
Church. In addition, it evokes the notions of tradition and customs. Objective
religion goes hand in hand with political power and the state, and relies on three
elements: concepts, customs and ceremonies.10 In contrast to objective religion
we find subjective religion, which belongs to the domain of feeling and influences
actions. It touches the heart instead of relying on the understanding, a faculty that
divides instead of finding common points or viewing an issue in its totality – this
conception of the faculty of the understanding would remain one of the hallmarks
of Hegel’s philosophy. This religion comes close to a natural religion in the sense
that its principles could underlie every single religion. Subjective religion could
be identified with folk religion, where doctrine is simpler and human happiness is
an integral part of the faith.
Hegel holds that various Christian doctrines formulated throughout the
history of the Church are not borne out by the life and sayings of Jesus; and some
fundamental doctrines, such as that of original sin, come under his criticism. The

 
9
G.W.F. Hegel, Frühe Schriften, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), p. 14.
10
Because of his criticism of established religion, the young Hegel is considered
to have much in common with a later movement, known as the Young Hegelians, who
drew inspiration from Hegel’s writings but departed from the mature Hegel on important,
especially political and religious, matters. See Lawrence S. Stepelevich, ed., The Young
Hegelians. An Anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Introduction, p.
3. Curiously, the Young Hegelians developed from a theological reflection on, and criticism
of, the theological views (which they considered dogmatism) of the mature Hegel. Ludwig
Feuerbach, a member of this group, went as far as to state that ‘Whoever fails to give up
the Hegelian philosophy, fails to give up theology’, L. Feuerbach, ‘Provisional Theses for
the Reformation of Philosophy’, in The Young Hegelians, p. 167. Another young Hegelian,
Bruno Bauer, considered Hegel’s philosophy as an exaltation of the human (not divine)
spirit, see The Young Hegelians, p. 176.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 113

later Hegel, during his Berlin period, would go back to the doctrine of original sin
and interpret it in a philosophical way, but he would show no such blatant criticism
of Church doctrines or of the person of Jesus himself.
The young Hegel offers an idiosyncratic reading of early church history,
stating that Jesus’ religion was one of love, and that his set of followers was only
turned into a sect by the twelve Apostles, bent on an institutionalised Church –
in a misunderstanding of Jesus’ vision. On the other hand, comparing Jesus to
Socrates, he remarks that the latter had not twelve but innumerable followers and
had a more universal message to convey.
There remains some ambivalence towards the figure of Jesus in the young
Hegel’s comparisons with Socrates. A tacit comparison between philosophy and
religion is observable here, Socrates representing philosophy and Jesus religion,
with the underlying message that philosophy is more universal than religion. Hegel
moreover remarks on most people’s inability to understand the purely rational.
This comparison can also be construed to mean that, in general terms, philosophy
might be more universal, but in practical terms religion touches most people more
directly than does philosophy. The majority of people become attached to the
more sensible, physical aspects of religion in preserving their faith. Later, in the
Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, Hegel would reject such comparison between
Socrates and Jesus as inadequate, for Jesus, sent by God and in his capacity as a
teacher, was more excellent because he was without sin.11 Moreover, Jesus was
not just human but the Son of God and God himself. If Jesus were merely viewed
as human, Hegel states, we would be employing a Qur’anic interpretation.12 This
point is repeated in the lectures on the philosophy of religion of 1827, to the
effect that if Christ is regarded as merely human, then he is seen as in Islam, as
a messenger of God – which according to Hegel is tantamount to rejecting the
religious standpoint. Not much later, however, he claims that both Socrates and
Christ died for the truth.13
It is significant that Hegel does not, as a Lutheran, simply criticise aspects
which could be taken as distinctive features of the Catholic Church, such as an
institutionalised and centralised Church, a strict insistence upon dogma, miracles,
rituals and ceremonies, or the sacraments, such as confession. Luther also comes

11
See also the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, where Hegel no longer sees
Jesus as a mere teacher, in G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,
ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 393.
12
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete
Religion, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984), p. 173; English
version in G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, The Consummate
Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson and J.M. Stewart with
the assistance of H. S. Harris (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1998), p. 244, n. 215.
13
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, pp. 240, 244–5
(pp. 316, 320–21, n. 196 of the English edition).
114 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

under attack, for being far removed from ‘the idea of the worship of God in spirit
and truth’ and for the focus on the doctrine of original sin.14 Hegel is also critical
of the Crusades and of Christianity’s acceptance of slavery.
In other fragments of the Bern period, the theory of original sin again comes
under attack, as Hegel claims to find no support for it in the Bible, considering it as a
doctrine that was read into the Bible but was not based on it.15 A fundamental problem
with original sin appears to be the way in which it is not conducive to an improvement
of human behaviour, since humanity is condemned to sin from the first.
Hegel argues that in a certain sense pagans can behave better than believers.16
However, in another work, he argues that Christians feel morally superior to
pagans because the latter have no notion of the forgiveness of sins.17 The general
thrust of his argument endorses a focus on morals and morality to the detriment of
doctrine and dogma. Here a clear influence by various Enlightenment approaches
to religion is to be discerned. For instance, there is a negative attitude towards
institutionalised religion, and the view that all religions are good if they promote
morality and harmonious coexistence among human beings. Thus Hegel mentions
Muhammad and Christ as well as ancient Greek religion as all promoting morality
and a moral lifestyle.18 Hegel shares with his contemporaries, in a trend that was
at work throughout the eighteenth century, an admiration for ancient Greece,
particularly its religion and political institutions. Ancient Greek religion formed a
whole with Greek culture and political principles.
Following a similar principle, Rousseau praises Islam in his On the Social
Contract (while criticising Christianity for having failed to achieve this harmony)
for its principle of the unity between religion and state, and for putting religion, as
he saw it, at the service of the state, a principle which he associates with his theory
of a civil religion.19
The goal of objective religion, according to Hegel, is to highlight the significant
aspects of subjective religion, that is, to further morality. It is not always clear
whether this morality has a supernatural dimension or serves only to promote
harmonious coexistence among human beings.
The highest goal of human existence, according to Hegel, is morality. While
religious doctrines were defined over the centuries, there seems to be an innate
capacity for virtue and morals in human beings. They can find them by thinking
for themselves, unlike the belief in Christian doctrines, which is not inborn and is
obtained only through grace.

14
Hegel, Frühe Schriften, p. 63.
15
Ibid., p. 91.
16
Ibid., p. 181.
17
Ibid., p. 202.
18
Ibid., p. 71.
19
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Book IV, Chapter VIII, in The
Basic Political Writings, trans. and ed. Donald A. Cress, intro. Peter Gay (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1987), p. 222.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 115

The early writings draw several comparisons between Greek and Christian
religion, pointing out, for instance, that Christ emphasised the significance of virtue
– as Plato had focused on the virtues. In addition, Hegel views some Christian
doctrines as merely legalistic rather than moral, whereas a moral conversion is in
his view the most important aspect of religion.20 Some dogmas even come under
question, such as the resurrection of the body, while Hegel prefers to highlight the
immortality and the spiritual nature of the soul, and to announce this important
view, presumably for the sake of morality.
Given these attacks on institutionalised religion, the Young Hegelians appear
to have much in common with the young Hegel (and not as much with the older
Hegel who lectured in Berlin), as remarked by Stepelevich.21
Catholicism is particularly criticised, namely the imposition of dogmas in
the Papal States and throughout the Catholic world, as well as the misuse of
indulgences.22 Hegel goes so far as to state that instead of consoling themselves
with their belief in God and his providence, the multitude should believe in
themselves, in order to acquire the virtues.23 Hegel stresses the crucial example of
Jesus as a practical model to be followed. On the whole, he believes that the most
important aspects of religion are beauty (as in ancient Greek religion) and love,
stressed in the Gospels. These elements alone would lead to morality, while faith,
with its ties to doctrine and theology, has a secondary role.24 An Enlightenment
influence is not far to seek.
On the one hand, we find in these early writings an emphasis on the practical
and societal role of religion. While Hegel defends the subjective role of religion in
order to foster morality, this would then be used for social purposes and enshrined
as a principle of the state. As already mentioned, Rousseau’s On the Social
Contract envisions a civil religion whose main goal is to maintain law and order
in human societies – highlighting the belief in God and the immortality of the soul
to this end.
In the furthering of morality all religions are equally useful; even ancient Greek
religion played an important role in this respect. On the other hand, established
religion stands in the way of human freedom and does not serve to promote
morality, given than the common folk are unable to understand the fine points

20
Hegel, Frühe Schriften, p. 78.
21
Stepelevich, The Young Hegelians, p. 3.
22
Hegel, Frühe Schriften, p. 76.
23
Ibid., p. 99.
24
Various scholars note that the young Hegel, although critical of positive religion
in the form of Judaism or Christianity, strongly defended a religion of love and life, later
becoming wary of philosophy, including Kant’s practical philosophy. Philosophy must cede
its place to religion, which solves any conflicts or contradictions, a role he would later
attribute specifically to philosophy and conceptual thinking; see Bernard Bourgeois, Hegel
à Francfort, ou Judaïsme – Christianisme – Hegelianisme (Paris: Vrin, 2000), p. 27. For the
young Hegel, love is a precursor of the Spirit, ibid., p. 64. Life is the truth of love, ibid., p. 82.
116 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of Christian doctrine. Therefore, a simpler religion must be found for them that is
effective in bringing about the desired results. These two aspects, the supremacy of
morality or virtue in religion, and the need for the political state to promote morality,
are two aspects of Enlightenment religion that form a civil or natural religion.
In addition, a Romantic influence can be seen at work in Hegel’s early positions,
which go beyond a mere rehearsal of Enlightenment approaches to religion. There
is a stress on the individual human subject and his or her need to interiorise these
principles of religion. Thus, religion does not merely serve as a means to bring
about morality in people who would otherwise not willingly coexist in a peaceful
manner. This Romantic aspect, as we have seen, is borne out by Hegel’s emphasis
on love and beauty, which must accompany each believer’s religious adherence.
Therefore, religion in us must be the result of an inner conviction rather than an
external imposition in the form of doctrines and rituals.
The Positivity of the Christian Religion, also dating from the period Hegel
spent in Bern, has much in common with the fragments on Christianity and folk
religion written earlier. The idea of positivity, which is also found in Hegel’s later
writings, indicates the objective, external, authoritative character of something
– religion in this case. More specifically, it points to something that is imposed
from without.25 In this work he again comments in great detail on several episodes
of Jesus’ life as narrated in the Gospels, explaining how Christianity became a
positive religion, displaying outward signs, and eventually becoming intertwined
with political power. His stress is once more on the notion of morality as the
intrinsic goal of religion, and of Christianity in particular.
In this context, he mentions the community of the Essenes, who construed
religion as a means to promote virtue and morality.26 Hegel seeks to uncover the
way in which Christianity became a positive religion through the person of Jesus,
and to determine which of its aspects were used for this purpose. He argues that
initially Christianity was not a positive religion, but rather a religion of virtue. It
was the spirit of the times that produced a positive religion, with the development
of doctrine. Hegel discerns three moments in this process: Christianity is first a
religion of virtue. It then became a sect – through the work of the Apostles. Finally
it became a positive religion – with a stress on doctrine and dogma where Jesus
had focused on virtue. This positivity is explained in the way in which morality
become codified as doctrine, through the agency of Jesus’ friends.
Hegel also highlights the significance of miracles in the development of
doctrine and in turning Christianity into a positive religion. The theme of miracles
and their status in religion is pervasive in Hegel’s writings and is taken up again
in the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion. He does not oppose the notion of
miracles as such, but rather their exploitation with a view to impose dogma and
the attempt to tie them to morality. Miracles draw people’s attention to the teacher

25
Roger Garaudy, Dieu est mort: étude sur Hegel (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1962), p. 83.
26
Hegel, Frühe Schriften, p. 106.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 117

who performs them, thus legitimising his moral authority.27 Later in life, Hegel
would also problematise miracles because of their externality – whereas in reality
faith is belief in something which is not seen. Therefore we should not rely on
the testimony of miracles in order to bring about faith. His criticism of the focus
on miracles in these early writings is prompted by their role in the advancement
of doctrine.
In addition, Hegel argues that the link between religion and politics was not
initially present, given that the disciples of Jesus did not have a political agenda
(whereas Socrates was interested in discussing politics), but it would become
central later in the history of the Church.
In The Positivity of Christian Religion, where he dissociates religion from
politics, he contrasts the notion of a state religion to Jesus’ intention of awakening
in his followers a sense of morality. For Hegel, the link between Church and state
and the state’s role in promoting morality was something that came later and went
hand in hand with the institutionalisation of the Church. He does not believe that
the state can impose morals, and he appears to prefer religion to be a personal
matter of morals, which would no doubt have an impact, albeit not direct, on
the state and the government. Moral citizens should constitute the nation, but the
moral law should not come from the state, because it should not be imposed from
outside. Even belief should not be imposed from outside – in spite of the close
link between Church and state found both in Catholic and Protestant countries,
and as something endorsed by both traditions. Hegel suggests that Jesus sought an
internalisation of the law rather than an external law imposed outwardly. This was
the goal of religion, in contrast to a religion imposed by the religious authorities,
as in ancient Israel. Hegel shuns legality as a means of forcing morality, in the
sense that morals should not be imposed by an external law. Hegel furthermore
believes in equality among the followers of Jesus, who were his friends without
distinction. The imposition of doctrine appears to Hegel to be an intolerance of
other opinions and an obstacle to a universal peace which Jesus wished to institute.
Hegel goes on to compare religion, in particular Christianity, with philosophy.
In the criticisms he levels at an institutionalised Church with its dogmas, he does
not attack Jesus himself, but rather his followers, who he says changed the nature of
Jesus’ intended message. The criticism levelled against Christianity does not touch
the person of Jesus, even though some of Hegel’s interpretations of the Gospels
are highly selective (such as his claim to the effect that the Last Supper was not
intended as a sacrament but became one at the hands of Christians). Hegel does not
spare the Catholic or the Protestant traditions from criticism – although he does
note the difference between them in this respect, given that the Protestant Church
is subordinate to the state while the Catholic Church is not. In this situation, for an
individual to be excluded from the Church implies also exclusion from the state,
while Hegel advocates a higher degree of separation between Church and state.
The sacraments in the Church, such as baptism, have become civil acts and the

27
Ibid., p. 117.
118 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Church a society within the state.28 Hegel proposes a looser link between Church
and state and religious tolerance on the part of the state. One thus ought to be
allowed to think freely and faith should not be imposed by state and Church.
Religious education does not promote freedom of thought, even though
Hegel believes that a certain freedom is allowed in the Protestant tradition, with
an attention to set positions, specifically when it comes to theological concepts.
Hegel believes that this freedom existed for people in the early Church and was
then restricted to a select few.
In turn, philosophy makes no distinctions among its practitioners and, as there
is no hierarchy, it accepts various opinions. The only judge in philosophy is reason,
whereas doctrine has the upper hand in Christianity.29 He opposes a philosophical
to a positive ‘sect’, whose positive character was imposed by its followers.
After providing his own personal interpretation of the Gospels, and of central
moments of the life Jesus such as the Last Supper, as well as the sacraments,
Hegel proceeds to attack both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, in spite of
remarking that in the Protestant Church, according to Luther, there is no attempt at
imposing a particular way of interpreting the faith; rather, each Protestant has his
or her own faith.30 In contrast, the Catholic Church defines and imposes her faith.
Moreover, there is no support for a dogma of infallibility in the Protestant Church,
which seeks to foster morals and virtue rather than highlighting symbols. This was
the original goal of the Protestant Church, fighting against authority. However,
this goal was betrayed as the Protestant Church developed and maintained strong
ties to the state: in the same way that Catholic states support the Catholic Church,
Protestant states support their churches. Hegel proposes a free exercise of religion
and religious freedom within the state, in which the state would not enforce any
kind of religious adherence. Furthermore, in the Protestant Church morality is not
based on freedom, as it ought to be.31 In his estimation, the Church represses free
will and reason when in fact the spirit is not fettered by rules and commandments
– the motivation to act morally should be inward. Therefore Jesus’ stated goal to
liberate from the slavery of the law has not been accomplished, according to the
young Hegel.32
The appendices to The Positivity of Christian Religion, stress the significance
of putting faith to the test of reason, while highlighting the difficulty that the
understanding has to come to terms with miracles as historical truths. This
is a theme that we also find in later writings, in particular the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, although these seem more accepting of miracles and of
the transcendent in general.

28
Ibid., p. 150.
29
Ibid., p. 124.
30
Ibid., p. 163.
31
Ibid., p. 179.
32
Ibid., p. 184.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 119

In this context, Hegel mentions the difference between understanding and

representation, a theme that features in the early writings but becomes much more
salient in the Phenomenology of Spirit, particularly, and also in the Lectures on
Philosophy of Religion. It is the representation but not the understanding which
accepts miracles and supernatural causes.
Hegel links the possibility of believing in miracles to the notion of positive
religion, an objective religion, and to an absolute idea of God. Miracles are
processed by the imagination and not the understanding. They are moreover
associated with a belief in the powerlessness of reason.33 It is the understanding,
not reason, which fights the notion of miracles by invoking the laws of nature.
Reason accepts another principle than itself at work in nature, such as God, and
hence accepts miracles.
Representation appears here linked to a specifically religious phenomenon, and
the faculties of understanding and representation (also potentially equated with
imagination) become polarised. The latter is linked to religion, while the former is
identified with philosophical thinking. Hegel argues that faith means not to know that
reason in itself is complete. Attempts to prove God’s existence through reason are
actually made for the sake of morality.34 Positive, objective religion (identified with
the religion of the Church, as we have seen) goes hand in hand with imagination,
and is used to sustain moral faith. The identification of positive religion with national
identity also limits its potential for more universal outreach.
The theme of Greek religion is very much in Hegel’s mind, as it would be
later in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It would be also revisited in the Lectures on
Philosophy of Religion. This interest follows in the wake of a renewed attention to
classical Antiquity during the Enlightenment, an interest which had been revived
in the Renaissance, promoting a new humanism.
This approach to Greek culture and religion is not without some ambivalence,
for although Hegel admires in Greek religion a lack of concern for set doctrines
(given that the Greeks had no fixed scriptural text as the Jews and the Christians
had) and the perceived joy of Greek religion, this religion was not without its
dark elements, as he states in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the early writings,
he claims that Greek and Roman religion are for free peoples, while Christianity
did not spread through reason.35 This admiring appraisal of Roman religion as
encouraging personal freedom would be qualified in the Berlin lectures.
Some shortcomings of Greek religion appear in its disregard for a closer
attention to the question of the immortality of the soul and the status of the
individual in the afterlife. The pagan gods, moreover, resemble human individuals
too closely. A political and religious individualism develops throughout the history
of Athens and Rome. During the Roman Republic, according to Montesquieu,
mentioned by Hegel, virtue is the underlying principle, and the soul is considered

33
Ibid., p. 214.
34
Ibid. p. 196.
35
Ibid., p. 204.
120 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

to be immortal – a view which has an impact on moral theories.36 Because of a

lack of freedom on earth (during the Roman Empire) people sought consolation
in the afterlife. Greek religion lacks a focus on the absolute (this could also be
seen as a weakness of polytheism) and lacks also the notions of sin and pity. This
absolute would be discovered within Christian religion, where the Christian God
is omnipresent.37 However, sentimentality and enthusiasm (Schwaermerei) is a
characteristic also of Christian religion, and arises in the faculty of representation.
At the same time, the Christian God is more aloof and abstract. More is demanded
of the individual believer, in its stress on personal holiness (which Hegel claims
to replace morality).38
In a new version of the opening of The Positivity of Christian Religion, dating
from 1800, Hegel again stresses the significance of feeling to the detriment of
understanding in religion – and also the fact that the various positive religions
differ from a natural religion of humankind, which is an innate phenomenon.39
While attacking the idea of doctrine as a remnant of the Middle Ages, Hegel asks
whether Christianity can be considered a positive religion. Everything that is good
in human beings is divine and comes from God. A religion becomes positive if it
involves the notion of an utterly overpowering and alien (fremd) God, although it
is part of human nature to acknowledge a higher being. Hegel concludes that Jesus’
doctrine became increasingly more positive at the hands of his followers, who
were still holding Jewish law as a guiding framework. Hegel favours a religion of
virtue over the mere adherence to set precepts.
In his sketches on Religion and Love (dating from Frankfurt, 1797–8), Hegel
still opposes the moral and the objective, and considers that actions such as
miracles, apparitions and revelation are positive. In addition, objective decrees do
not stem from the subject, and do not constitute its actions.40 In this work, some
dominant features of his philosophy that Hegel would later develop come to the
fore, such as the notion of reconciliation, in particular the reconciliation between
subject and object, alongside the claim that the deity is both subject and object,
and not just an object to be venerated – these are all views that would be reiterated
and developed in the Berlin lectures. In a passage that could have be written by
one of the Young Hegelians, he states that the deity is the love that becomes being
(Wesen) through the imagination (Einbildungskraft), which unites a human being
to his or her object.41 It is love rather than understanding which unites, while
understanding separates – a leitmotiv in Hegel.

36
Ibid., p. 206.
37
Ibid., p. 208.
38
Ibid., p. 210.
39
Ibid., p. 219.
40
Ibid., p. 241.
41
Ibid., p. 242.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 121

The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate

Another important early writing, The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, includes
reflections on Christianity and Judaism. Abraham is contrasted to the spirit of love
and embodies the opposition between Jews and the rest of the world, an attitude
which he compares negatively with that of Greece, which was all-inclusive – the
Greek mysteries were open to all.42 He argues that in Judaism there was a great
concern for physical preservation and survival rather than an idea of freedom or a
stress on the eternal truths, and God was wholly transcendent. Because morality for
Hegel is grounded in love, Judaism does not contemplate morality. It is Jesus who
proposes an inner law. Hegel identifies the true Jesus with the portrayal offered
by the Gospel of St John. Duty is replaced by love, and the laws are replaced by
justice. Love bridges the gap between subject and object. Love is the measure by
which everything is judged. Divorce is rejected by Jesus because it breaks the law
of love. Love brings equality and orders one not to kill. Love is the judge of every
action. This love is the opposite of an external law. In turn, life and love become
identified. Reconciliation is effected through love, and followers of Jesus are not
his servants, as he explicitly calls him friends. This love allows for a reconciliation
with fate and virtue. Love complements the virtues.43 This love represents a unity
not of concept but of spirit.
Hegel had already reflected on the Last Supper and its meaning, in the Positivity
of Christian Religion, where he argued that it was originally a farewell supper,
which Christians had turned into a commandment. In The Spirit of Christianity
and Its Fate the Last Supper is considered a union of love, which, as objectified
through imagination, can become the object of religious worship. Actions are
expressions of love, which is then still only feeling, not an image (Bild). This
action then becomes objectified, and ultimately it oscillates between a common
meal of friendship and a religious act.
In his interpretation the Last Supper is itself friendship, not just a sign of
friendship, and the union of the Apostles with Jesus is not just felt but objectively
seen, as a mystical action.44 All become one in the Spirit, as well as through the
shared bread and wine, which are more than bread and wine.45 In the Last Supper
Jesus becomes part of the Apostles, the disciples are one in the Spirit of Jesus.
Hegel holds that this meal signifies a return to the subjective, to the extent that the
experienced objects disappear as such. The material aspect comes to an end. The
corporeal gives way to the spiritual and to faith.46
Hegel reflects on the fact that the Logos is reason in commenting on the Gospel
of St John. He remarks that the world is not an emanation of divinity although it is

42
Ibid., p. 285.
43
Ibid., p. 362.
44
Ibid., p. 365.
45
Ibid., p. 366.
46
Ibid., p. 368.
122 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

caused by God. The divine, in particular form, appears as a human being. For him,
the union of infinite and finite is a mystery.
Jesus can be understood as Son of the Father through faith or cognition
(Erkenntnis), although the understanding tends to grasp the human and the divine
nature of God as separate, as held by the Jews. Thus it is important to go beyond
the understanding as a faculty.47
Qualifying the role of knowledge, Hegel asserts that the essence of Jesus as
relation of Son to Father can only be grasped through faith. It is the (human) spirit
which recognises divine Spirit. Something divine in him who believes allows
faith. Belief in the deity is made possible by the divinity of our own nature.
Hegel comments on the role of sin in recalling that, according to scripture, a
sin against the Spirit, as opposed to against an individual, cannot be forgiven. This
Spirit is identified with God and with life. Hegel goes on to refer to the scriptural
passage to the effect that John baptises with water, Jesus with the Holy Spirit
(Luke 3:16). The link between spirit, love and life is stressed as the true meaning
of religion. Love is the union of life, and the new commandment enjoined by
Jesus is to love one another. The communal aspect of religion also comes to the
foreground, as the kingdom of God is characterised by Jesus as harmony among
human beings and communion with God.48 At the same time, Hegel concedes that
God’s kingdom is quite different and separate from the political state. This goes
hand in hand with Jesus’ repudiation of the world. Hegel acknowledges that the
high point of the human spirit lies in an impulse towards religion, but the relation
to God does not exclude a communitarian dimension.49
In this work Hegel grapples with the idea of miracles and their role in religion,
particularly in Christianity, arguing that a miracle stipulates the existence of an
infinite cause for a finite effect. He adds that when God acts, it is from Spirit to
spirit, although a miracle implies an effect on a body, and in this sense seems to
represent something contrary to the divine and spiritual.50 The disciples, however,
did not distinguish between spirit and the corporeal like modern Europeans.51
The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate contains reflections on Christian theology
and dogmatics – now not simply attacked and rejected, but accepted and analysed
in their theoretical and theological meaning – which prefigure later discussions,
particularly in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Berlin lectures. Thus this work
marks the beginning of such theological reflections, which depart from the anti-
theological orientation of previous early writings.
To conclude, the early writings show that Hegel’s main inspiration was drawn
from the Bible and in particular the New Testament, which is not surprising in
view of his theological studies in Tübingen. He is critical of several aspects of

47
Ibid., p. 380.
48
Ibid., p. 394.
49
Ibid., p. 406.
50
Ibid., p. 413.
51
Ibid., p. 417.
 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings 123

organised religion and the concept of doctrine. He produces his own interpretation
of key scriptural passages, not adopting a literal or either a Catholic or a Protestant
reading. In other words, in spite of his Protestant upbringing, his criticism of
established religion does not spare the Protestant Church, in particular its alliance
with political states.
With regard to the differences between philosophy and religion, and religious
versus philosophical language, we see that in some writings he identifies Socrates
with philosophy and the philosopher by excellence, and Jesus with religion,
specifically Christianity. He also identifies the faculty of representation or
imagination with religion, but does not develop this connection to the extent found
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Although he is critical of organised religion, which
he states was first established by the followers of Jesus, in particular the Apostles,
he is seldom critical of Jesus himself and his life and example. Religion, for the
young Hegel, should come from the heart and be based on emotion. It also plays
an important role in promoting morality.
The contrast between philosophy, as based on reason, and religion, as based
on the imagination or representation, is present, but not consistently as a well-
defined theory in the young Hegel. Nor is his emphasis on reason with its
highest expression, the Spirit, absolute. One could argue that although a focus
on religion, approached with a critical eye, is an enduring theme in the young as
well as the mature Hegel, his whole systematic philosophy, underpinned by the
concept of Spirit, had not yet developed. And because the differentiation between
representation and religion on the one hand and philosophy and reason or spirit on
the other is a cornerstone of his systematic philosophy, he does not yet formulate
the comparison and contrast between representation and conceptual thinking
at this early stage of his philosophical career. The identification of religion
with representation and philosophy with conceptual thinking is instead clearly
formulated only in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Chapter 5
Hegel: Religion, Philosophy and
Consciousness in the Phenomenology
of Spirit1

The centrality of religion and religious themes is apparent in Hegel’s early

writings, as we have seen, and this continues into his mature career. His abiding
interest can be partly explained by his training as a theologian, but it is also due to
his conceptualisation of religion and philosophy as cognate disciplines, given their
common and shared content and aims.
A theme that recurs in his reflections on religion is indeed the relation and
comparison between philosophy and religion, how they resemble or differ from
each other and the way in which they overlap or complement each other. The early
so-called theological writings, which have religion as their central theme but are
strongly critical of Christian theology, do not yet present us with Hegel’s distinct
and full-fledged philosophical system; this begins taking shape only once Hegel
moves to Jena in the early 1800s. The writings that mediate between The Spirit
of Christianity and Its Fate and the Phenomenology of Spirit display a growing
interest in the pursuit of philosophy in its own right. Where religion had been
considered key for the reconciliation between human beings and the world or
even God, philosophy is now assigned that role, and it comes to be ranked above
religion with respect to this task. Thus these writings are less centred on religion
and show the direction that Hegel’s thought takes, leading up to the position of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, which identifies religious discourse with representation
and philosophy with conceptual or scientific thinking.
The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy
(1801), in which Hegel offers an appraisal of Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophical
systems in the light of the recent history of philosophy with particular attention

1
This chapter is an expanded version of a paper titled ‘Representation and Conceptual
Thought in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion’ which was delivered at the international
conference ‘Hegel and Religion’, hosted by the Religion and Post-Kantian Philosophy
Research Cluster at the University of Sydney, Australia, on 14–15 September 2010. I am
grateful to the other conference participants for their comments and suggestions regarding
my paper.
126 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

to Kant’s philosophy, defends the idea that it is the task of philosophy to think the
absolute – a task which had once been reserved to religion.2
Faith and Knowledge (1802–1803), while devoted to discussing aspects of
Kant’s, Jacobi’s and Fichte’s philosophy, introduces some important themes in
Hegel’s own philosophy, such as a preference for reason over the understanding,
since the former can reconcile oppositions which the latter establishes. In addition,
Hegel states that the idea of absolute freedom belongs to philosophy, and it is the
task of philosophy to treat religious matters. There is equally a suggestion of a
replacement of religion with philosophy, or at least of a speculative interpretation
of religious topics, when he recommends the establishment of ‘the speculative
Good Friday in place of the historic Good Friday’ and argues to the effect that
‘Good Friday must be speculatively re-established’.3
Other, later writings, dating from the Jena period, clearly prepare the ground for
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, such as his System of Ethical Life and his First
Philosophy of Spirit, dating from 1802–1804. A later Philosophy of Spirit dating
from 1805–1806 shows a preference for Christianity over other religions because
of its doctrine of the Incarnation of God, which bridges the gap between the human
and the divine. Moreover, the triad of art, religion and philosophy is presented,
in a process in which art finds its justification in religion, and religion finds its
justification in philosophy. Religion is here moreover identified with immediate
experience, while philosophy constitutes the absolute science or knowing and
embodies conceptual thinking.4
The articulation between philosophy and religion, already at work in his early
writings and in the first Jena writings, turns on Hegel’s differentiation between two
methods of approaching the same content, in particular the distinction between
representation (or picture-thinking, as Vorstellung is sometimes translated)
and concept or conceptual thinking (Begriff) – a distinction that becomes fully
developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. To put it broadly, the former might
involve the imagination or picturing through images, while, by contrast, conceptual
thinking is purely intellectual, and significantly, for Hegel, the highest form of
apprehension. This distinction was seminally present in the early writings, where
Hegel distinguishes between the imagination and the understanding, but these
do not yet correspond to the distinction between representation and conceptual

2
G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of
Philosophy, trans. intro. and notes Jere Paul Surber (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1978), p. 15.
3
G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 191.
4
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, translation of the Jena Lectures on the
Philosophy of Spirit (1805–1806) with commentary by Leo Rauch (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1983), p. 181. See also G.W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and
First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4), ed.
and trans. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979),
pp. 81–5.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 127

thinking, which are sharply defined and compared in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
In the early writings, Hegel is still tied to the various faculties mentioned by Kant,
such as imagination, understanding and reason, even though he was critical of
Kant’s conception of the remit and capabilities of these various human faculties.
The notion of conceptual thinking as underpinning philosophical speculation
and representing the highest form of knowing is characteristic of the later
Hegel and is developed in Jena. Various scholars argue that Hegel’s concept of
religion is complete in its broad features by 1805–1806, when he composed the
Phenomenology of Spirit.5
It appears, and certain scholars have certainly drawn the conclusion, that the
faculty, or process, in which religious thought is grounded is representation, while
conceptual thinking is reserved for philosophy and philosophers.6 Moreover, Hegel
states in several passages that in representation, the form or the mode of apprehending
the truth does not exactly match the content, while conceptual thinking does present
the content as it truly is. Some scholars have questioned the possibility of presenting
the same content in different ways.7 In addition, representation implies a greater
dependence on imagery and more material forms of apprehending the objects,
forms that are closer to sense perception, the five senses and in particular sight.
The assumed association between representation and religion on the one hand,
and philosophy and conceptual thinking on the other, seems to place religion in a
subordinate position vis-à-vis philosophy. If religion is associated with an inferior
level of apprehension, and philosophy with a more accurate, scientific, and higher
level of expression, then the latter is the worthier discipline. This position would run
counter to Hegel’s own claim to the effect that philosophy shares its content with
religion and both adequately represent God’s nature.

5
See Walter Jaeschke, ‘Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur
Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)’, Hegel-Studien 18 (1983): pp. 295–354, p. 315.
6
D’Hondt states that for Hegel art shares the same content as religion and philosophy;
Jacques D’Hondt, ‘La Philosophie de la Religion de Hegel’, in Hegel et la Religion, ed.
Guy Planty-Bonjour, (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 12. Art is even closer to sensibility than is
religion, and so it is a lower form of approach to the content. He further claims that Hegel
clearly distinguishes image (Bild) from representation (Vorstellung), associating the former
with religion in the form of art, and the latter with absolute religion, that is to say, Lutheran
Christianity, ibid., p. 21. In turn, Hodgson claims that ‘representation has two basic forms,
or configurations: sensible and nonsensible’, the first involving images (Bilder) and the
latter a spiritual content; see Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading
of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
p. 112. Hodgson further notes that thought differs from representation in that it uses dialectic,
adding that ‘immediacy is the principle of representation, while for thought mediation is
essential’, ibid., p. 114.
7
Falk Wagner, ‘Die Aufhebung der religiösen Vorstellung in den philosophischen
Begriff’, Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 18 (1976):
pp. 44–73, p. 46.
128 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Moreover, since Hegel insists on the organic nature of the Spirit and its
progressive development, all forms of knowledge are included in the Spirit’s gradual
process of coming to know itself, albeit in a hierarchical fashion. In this scheme,
representation ranks lower than conceptual thinking. In the Phenomenology’s
section devoted to religion, ‘representation’ (Vorstellung), precedes a more
conceptual way of understanding reality, which is ‘concept’ (Begriff), where the
Spirit finally comes to know itself as Spirit.
Understanding the nature of the two modes of apprehension and the
relationship between them is vital for uncovering the connection between religion
and philosophy, their similarities and differences. This examination moreover
aims to shed light on Hegel’s philosophy of religion, as well as other aspects of
his philosophy.
Does religion have a different and proper means of expression in relation to
philosophy, as well as a different content? Hegel affirms in several places that
the content of religion and that of philosophy is the same, with the proviso that
the mode of expression differs. An examination of Hegel’s understanding of
representation in connection with religious thought in the Phenomenology of
Spirit will help to clarify this matter.

Representation in the Phenomenology of Spirit

The articulation between representation and conceptual thinking is first

systematically laid out in the Phenomenology of Spirit, one of Hegel’s most
influential works, which addresses explicitly the question of the relationship
between philosophy and religion. It views them not just as static disciplines, but
as necessary moments in the life of the self-evolving Spirit. It lays out the organic
process of the Spirit, in its journey towards absolute knowing from the point of
view of the subject, proceeding from consciousness (where we find, for instance,
sense perception, the lowest level of perceptive awareness) to self-consciousness,
through to the highest realm, where reason, spirit and religion (which includes art)
are found, and finally, to absolute knowing. Each stage represents a higher form of
consciousness for the Spirit. While religion stands nearly at the peak of the system,
it does not represent the highest expression of the Spirit, this position is occupied
by absolute knowing, implicitly identified with philosophy. Another important
form of self-expression of the Spirit is art, although in the Phenomenology it is
associated with religion – in the subchapter on religion in the form of art. The
highest forms of expression which lead up to absolute knowing are thus art and
religion, with philosophy topping the process and completing the system.
In one way, religion is closely connected with representation, but representation
makes its appearance before the chapter devoted to the various forms of religion.
It is described there as a specific and somewhat autonomous faculty or way
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 129

of thinking.8 Is representation the sole mode of apprehension in religious thought?

And is it associated with religion as a whole or only with certain religions or aspects
of religion? It is worth recalling the various forms of cognition or consciousness
that make up this phenomenology of Spirit, which analyses, as the title indicates,
the various ways in which the Spirit appears to us and to itself. We thus first find
simply consciousness, which then develops into self-consciousness and reason,
corresponding to Hegel’s dialectic, which implies a triadic system. In the wake of
reason we find spirit, religion and absolute knowing. Within the chapter on reason,
Hegel pauses to take stock of the stages covered by consciousness. In the same
way that consciousness includes the moments of sense-certainty, perception and
understanding, reason will move from observing reason, which includes aspects
of scientific knowledge, to particular and, finally, universal reason, the latter stages
presupposing self-consciousness.9 Ethics and morality belong in the next, more
developed stage, Spirit. Art is treated as part of religion, which then becomes
absolute knowing, a final stage which can be identified with philosophy. Several
scholars note how Hegel favours religion and its educational potentialities over
art, at a time when art was considered a vehicle of and a means to teach the truth.10
There are references to representation or picture-thinking, as well as conceptual
thinking, well before the extensive treatment of religion and philosophy.
In the Preface, which advances many central themes of Hegel’s system, he
claims that truth is scientific, which amounts to saying that it is manifested in a
conceptual way, indeed that concept is the true element of truth. In this passage,
conceptual thinking entails the claim to the possibility of knowing the absolute,
and not in an intuitive or immediate way.11 It is the task of reason and conceptual
thinking to study and attain to the divine and the absolute, within the framework of
a philosophical inquiry. This early appearance of the notion of conceptual thinking
in the Phenomenology of Spirit follows from and is meant to buttress Hegel’s
claim for the possibility of reason to know the absolute in a philosophical, rather
than an immediate, intuitive or mystical way.
Another allusion to representation or picture-thinking in the Preface appears to
suggest its flexibility, pointing to its ability to move beyond the categories of subject
and predicate in a sentence, and not remain fixated in the opposition between them,
which is a tendency observable in the human faculty of the understanding.12 Hegel
asserts that the truth is not a ready-made object; it requires a cognitive process

8
Chapelle argues that representation is not, technically speaking, a ‘faculty’, but an
act of the spirit; see Albert Chapelle, Hegel et la Religion, vol. I: La problématique (Paris,
Editions universitaires, 1963), p. 120.
9
G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, analysis and foreword
by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 111, §348.
10
See, for instance, Walter A. Kaufmann, ‘Hegel’s Early Antitheological Phase’, The
Philosophical Review 63:1 (Jan. 1954): pp. 3–18, p. 8.
11
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 4, §6.
12
Ibid., p. 37, §60.
130 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

on our part and on the part of the Spirit that comes to know itself. That process
is dialectic, whereby the subject of knowledge is able to articulate and integrate
opposing principles and reach a complete knowledge of the whole.13 Conceptual
thinking is closely bound up with dialectic, as distinct from understanding, for
instance, whose task and remit lies in making and keeping distinctions between the
various objects known, rather than interrelating them. Representation, in turn, does
not include dialectical thinking/method.14 Moreover, notional/conceptual rational
thinking far surpasses the methods and results of common sense knowledge on
the one hand and intuition on the other, thereby producing true scientific, certain
knowledge.15 Already in the Preface, Hegel identifies conceptual thinking with
speculative philosophy, which yields absolute knowledge. In this Preface, which
can also be considered an introduction to his philosophical system and not just to
the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel lays out his plan for the whole work and also
his vision of what science, that is, true knowledge, should look like.
He endeavours to distinguish two common and contemporary approaches to
knowledge that he seeks to keep at bay. On the one hand, Hegel does not believe
in an attainment of the absolute that is immediate and intuitive and does not make
use of the negative and the dialectical movement between opposites. Hegel also
rejects the claim of empirical knowledge, based on sense perception, to the totality
of knowledge. Sense perception has a role to play in the process of attaining
knowledge, but it is a limited role that has to move on to the higher spheres of
reason and the spirit. Empirical knowledge and mystical experience both fail
to attain to the absolute as it is. According to Hegel it is a certain approach,
speculative reasoning employing conceptual thinking, that alone transcends the
empirical and grasps the absolute, which empirical knowledge cannot expect to
do. Representational thinking has the disadvantage of lying somewhere between

13
For Hegel, dialectic is the tool used by scientific, philosophical knowledge, and
its outcome is positive. He credits Plato with the invention of dialectic. See G.W.F. Hegel,
Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830),
trans. William Wallace, foreword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 112
(§78) and pp. 115–19 (§81).
14
See Martin J. De Nys, Hegel and Theology (London: T. & T. Clark, 2009), p. 56.
For Hegel, dialectic is the ultimate logical method, used by philosophy, since it permits the
reconciliation of contraries. As Gadamer points out, in the Phenomenology of Spirit the
dialectic method is the scientific method; see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five
Hermeneutical Studies, trans. and intro. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1976), p. 83. Gadamer further notes the finality of dialectic for Hegel: ‘The Ancients
... held that the working out of dialectical contradictions was only a study which prepared
one for actual knowing. Hegel, on the other hand converts this propaedeutic or negative
purpose of dialectic into a positive one. For Hegel the point of dialectic is that precisely
by pushing a position to the point of self-contradiction it makes possible the transition to a
higher truth which unites the sides of that contradiction: the power of spirit lies in synthesis
as the mediation of all contradictions’, ibid., p. 105.
15
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 40, §66, pp. 43–4, §§70–71.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 131

sense experience and an immediate knowledge and intuition of the object, and it
falls short of the concept. This placement of representation with regard to sense
perception and the intuition sets the tone for later exposition of what representation
or picture-thinking means.16
Later in the Phenomenology of Spirit, within the chapter devoted to self-
consciousness, in particular the freedom of self-consciousness, which emerged
from the master and slave relationship, the connection is established between
thinking and the notion or concept, in contrast to representation. The former
includes in itself its self-identity. Representation or picture-thinking still involves
the dichotomy between subject and object, which is other than consciousness.17
The object of the concept is purely notional and spiritual, a fact that generates
the identity, indeed the unity, between subject and object. In this movement away
from representation and into conceptual thinking, the subject is freed from the
otherness of the object and is in communion with itself.18 The sublation of the
otherness within itself, at once annulling and integrating it, leads to the next figure
of the spirit, Stoicism, in which self-consciousness remains hostile to the otherness
surrounding it. Stoicism turns into Scepticism and finally into the unhappy
consciousness, which some scholars have viewed as a veiled criticism of medieval
Christendom, in which consciousness knows the absolute or unchangeable as an
individual, and relates to it not as a thinking consciousness but in a devotional
way. The relationship itself to this absolute is not one of pure thinking, but a stage
towards thinking. Here the object remains something alien to the consciousness,
remaining alien and separated from it, as an unattainable beyond.19 The resolution
of this last stage of self-consciousness, represented by the unhappy consciousness,
ushers in the appearance of reason, or consciousness in the form of reason.

16
De Nys stresses the fact that representations can be drawn from sense perception
but they can be more conceptual than that; De Nys, Hegel and Theology, p. 34. According
to Clark, whose study examines ‘Hegel’s conception of the relation of language to thought:
that is, of the transition from “Vorstellung” to “Denken”’, from a linguistic perspective,
states that ‘Hegel speaks indiscriminately of “die Vorstellung” and “das Vorstellen”. In a
paragraph of the Encyclopedia [§20] where he compares it to thought, he points out that the
latter may be seen as an agent, an activity, and the product of this activity. So Vorstellung
is used for a faculty, an activity, and its product (assuming the position of common sense
which would distinguish the three). The translators of the Wissenschaft der Logik admit
that difficulty arose at each occurrence of this word. They have rendered it as sensuous
representation, image, imagination, presentation, ideia, general idea, ideation’, Malcolm
Clark, Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from “Vorstellung” to Thought in the
Philosophy of Hegel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 15 and pp. 26–7.
17
Representation expresses primarily the particular and is a moment of non-identity,
as opposed to speculative thinking, which effects the desired identity between subject and
object; see Albert Chapelle, Hegel et la religion, vol. II: La dialectique: Dieu et la Création
(Paris: Editions universitaires, 1967), p. 160.
18
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 120, §197.
19
Ibid., pp. 130–31, §216.
132 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Representation is also closely bound up with the imagination. These terms

are sometimes used interchangeably by Hegel. It implies the visualisation of a
particular object in the mind, and a dependence on sense perception, in particular
the sense of sight. In this regard, representation is closer to the material, or to
matter, than is conceptual thinking, which is the highest form of thinking, and has
dissociated itself from matter. Representation displays some of the shortcomings
of the faculty of the understanding, namely in not being able to see opposites as
part of a whole, and not attaining to the infinite, while conceptual thinking is able
to do both. Conceptual thinking is paired up with reason as a higher intellectual
faculty than understanding.20
Hegel deals with representation in the passages on the unhappy consciousness,
which depicts a kind of religious consciousness, while conceptual thinking,
identified with philosophical thinking, remains in the background, coming into
the fore towards the end of the work as Hegel expounds absolute knowing;
representational thinking surfaces again in the context of a discussion on faith.

Faith and the Enlightenment

Within the chapter devoted to spirit, which marks a higher stage of consciousness
than that of reason, Hegel mentions cultural and historical aspects in which we see
the spirit mirrored as it advances towards absolute knowing. Before embarking
upon the Enlightenment, Hegel discusses those pre-Enlightenment aspects against
which the Enlightenment launched a backlash, namely faith and pure insight.
In this context faith represents a flight from reality, but also the world of pure
consciousness: it dwells firmly within itself. For consciousness in the form of faith,
the underlying activity is not thought itself. It thinks an essence that is beyond
itself but that it considers as truly existing.21 This consideration of a transcendent
object constitutes religion in one of its forms, namely as faith within the context
of the world of culture.
Religion had already appeared in the form of the unhappy consciousness, and
also as faith in the underworld, within the context of ethics, more specifically
as the conviction of the existence of the departed spirits of family members in
Ancient Greece. This would not constitute faith in a transcendent being, however,
but rather in the family, so it is not, properly speaking, faith, as Hegel states. The

20
Ibid., p. 210, §346.
21
Ibid., p. 322, §528. Jamros points out that for Hegel, faith is not yet ‘the self-
consciousness of spirit’; Daniel P. Jamros, S.J., The Human Shape of God: Religion in
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Paragon House, 1994), p. 7. However, it
‘knows God by pure thinking rather than by sensory knowing’ and the ‘God of faith is
pure thinking in the form of an object “imagined”’, ibid., p. 65. Jamros also notes that
in the Phenomenology of Spirit religion comes after and subsumes reason, as well as
understanding, ibid., p. 135.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 133

unhappy consciousness could refer to medieval Christendom, and the faith in the
underworld appears to point to the distinction between divine and human law,
illustrated by the drama of Antigone.
This third approach to faith differs in that it now comes from the substance
(Substanz), that is, something external to the consciousness itself. In being thus
partly alienated from itself, it is still belief rather than faith, given that the union
with its object has not yet been achieved.22 At this stage, faith includes and
supersedes the former figure of consciousness as pure insight, which is a reflection
upon itself. Faith also includes the thought of an external being. Faith goes over and
above insight in that it has a content, whereas insight is pure self-consciousness.
A crucial aspect of faith, according to Hegel, is thought, which however is not yet
conceptual thinking.23 This thought bears the characteristics of immediacy and
simplicity. Because of these characteristics, there is an element of imagination in
faith, whose content lies in this super-sensible other. Faith first appears as a further
stage towards the development of the spirit, but once insight becomes part and
parcel of the Enlightenment movement, insight turns against faith as superstition,
because it does not recognise itself in belief, and does not recognise the object of
belief, considering it as the negative of the self-consciousness, and as a sensible
object, an idol. It considers the object of faith as representation.
Hegel condemns the Enlightenment for this ascription of faith to individual
whim which anthropomorphises absolute being. In this way, it is the Enlightenment
point of view that fails to attain to the absolute being. It fails to recognise the
absolute being that is indeed the object of faith, even if the latter, while knowing
its object, represents it in a non-conceptual way. Hegel denies that faith relies
on circumstantial historical evidence as claimed by the Enlightenment position;
rather, it is spirit bearing witness to itself, as a ‘particular personal conscience in the
absolute being’, against the Enlightenment’s accusation that its object is a product
of the consciousness of the believer.24 Hegel would later argue similarly against a
literalist approach to scripture and the literalist formulation of dogmatic truths in
his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. In turn, faith views the Supreme Being
(Être supreme) of the Enlightenment as a concept devoid of any reality. While
the Enlightenment accused faith of representing rather than conceptualising its
object, Hegel throws the very same accusation at the Enlightenment, which cannot
justify its own beliefs. Here representation bears the marks of sense experience
and sensible existence.
Hegel highlights the limits of both positions, the contingent knowledge of
faith, where absolute being comes in the form of a pictorial representation.25 He
adds that faith oscillates between two kinds of non-conceptual perceptions, a

22
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 322, §528.
23
De Nys states that ‘Hegel identifies essentially three components of religious
involvement: faith, representation, and the cultus’; De Nys, Hegel and Theology, p. 67.
24
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 338, §554, p. 345, §566.
25
Ibid., p. 346, §567.
134 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

‘slumbering’ one and a waking consciousness which lives in the world of sense
perception. For both faith and the Enlightenment, the absolute becomes unknown
and unknowable.
After treating the appearance of spirit through the Reign of Terror, which
was ushered in by the French Revolution, and the beautiful soul, which displays
many affinities with the Romantic movement, Hegel again returns to religion,
taking us back in human history for that purpose. In the following chapter of the
Phenomenology, devoted to religion, which takes the Spirit beyond the domain of
human reason, Hegel observes, for example, that the religion of the Enlightenment
does not seek to grasp a higher reality than reason. Summarising his criticism
of the Enlightenment, he states that the latter is its own religion. It uses the
understanding and sets up a super-sensible beyond that, however, goes over and
above the consciousness which remains satisfied with this world. It does not claim
to know that super-sensible reality, which remains for it void.26
Religion represents a higher stage in the development of the Spirit than does
(human) reason, but seemingly not the highest, for Hegel stresses that in the
kingdom of faith we are not yet in the domain of the notion or concept. Spirit in
religion is aware of itself as spirit, but the mode of perception is representational
thought, which falls short of a true portrayal of reality as it is in itself. Hegel
explains that this mode of thinking is not yet purely spiritual; it is a specific shape,
and does not portray the spirit as it sees itself, as purely spiritual and conceptual.27
In religion, the Spirit is not yet pure self-consciousness of itself, and its reality
transcends religion, in which Spirit represents or pictures itself to itself. Somehow,
religion and its characteristic mode of action, representation, are not purely
spiritual (presumably because representation depends on sense images) and do not
constitute a complete communion of the Spirit with itself.

Various Forms of Religion

Here Hegel not only treats religion in general, but also introduces the various
forms of religion, some of them representing more faithfully the essence and
the actuality of religion as such. Hegel reminds us that all the previous forms of
consciousness, such as consciousness itself, self-consciousness, reason and spirit,
are shapes of the Spirit as it comes to know itself. These shapes are then found
again in the various forms of religion analysed by Hegel.
Religion does not yet provide us with a true account of the ultimate reality, the
Spirit as it is, and the problem lies with the fact that religion constitutes a particular
shape (guise or garb: Kleid) whose method is representation, using symbolism or

26
Ibid., p. 411, §675.
27
Ibid., p. 412, §678.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 135

allegory for what it purports to represent or convey.28 But is this the case with all
forms of religion?
Hegel goes on to divide religion into three forms: natural religion, religion in the
form of art, and revealed religion, a division that respects the triadic nature of his
dialectic. Is it possible that in one of these forms of religion, in particular revealed
religion, which Hegel equates with Christianity, representation is no longer the main
or the only form of conveying the essence of the Spirit as it truly is?
One passage appears to indicate that even revealed religion is trapped in the
shape of representation, or picture-thinking:

If, in the first reality [Natural Religion], Spirit in general is in the form of
consciousness, and in the second [Religion of Art], in that of self-consciousness,
in the third it is in the form of the unity of both … this is the Revealed Religion.
But although in this, Spirit has indeed attained its true shape, yet the shape itself
and the picture-thought are still the unvanquished aspect from which Spirit must
pass over into the Notion (Begriff) … It is then that Spirit has grasped the Notion
of itself, just as we now have first grasped it; and its shape or the element of its
existence, being the Notion, is Spirit itself.29

Hegel’s position is partly justified by the dialectical movement that must take
account of philosophy as well as religion. If the latter were to prove the ultimate
form of expression of the Spirit, presenting it as it is in itself, there would be no
need to advance to an ulterior form of knowledge. Religion must present some
shortcoming, in order to provide an opening for philosophy. Given their obvious
differences, which Hegel details at length, philosophy and religion must constitute
two different ways of presenting the truth, although, as he stresses, their content
is the same.
Hegel considers that different religions represent the various shapes of the
Spirit, forming a dialectical process that progresses towards the revealed or
manifest religion, Christianity. They are different manifestations of the same
spirit, which means that they are contained in and superseded by Christianity.
Other world religions receive much greater attention in the Lectures on Philosophy

28
According to De Nys, ‘Representational thinking includes symbolic images,
narrative discourses that take up and elaborate those symbolic images, and conceptual
elements that are linked to but also different from symbolic images and their narrative
elaborations’; De Nys, Hegel and Theology, p. 11. For Hegel, as for Averroes, the symbolical
and the allegorical work at two levels, as the immediate symbol or allegory, and secondly as
its inner meaning; ibid., p. 71. He affirms that symbols ‘disclose and conceal’, ibid., p. 143.
Representation includes also historical narrative, ibid., p. 71. According to Fackenheim,
representation ‘refers to the Infinite in a finite way’; Emil L. Fackenheim, The Religious
Dimension in Hegel’s Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 155. With
representation, the divine remains other, unlike in philosophy, ibid., p. 185.
29
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 416, §683.
136 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of Religion, where they come under the designation ‘determinate religion’, since
they are considered determinate, specific, aspects of religion. It is important to
highlight that while Christianity constitutes the last stage in the succession of the
various religious forms, one should bear in mind that it stands apart, such as to
warrant a separate analysis of the role of ‘representation’ in this ultimate form
of religion.
Each religion has its own characteristics, but in a certain sense, they all represent
the same religion, which culminates in Christianity. These prove to be various
aspects of the same religion. They also share common representations. However,
the distinction between the various religions must be maintained. They resemble
each other but at the same time differ from each other, since they constitute various
shapes in which the spirit comes to know itself.30
Natural religion, the first section within religion, comprises three headings,
‘God as light’, ‘Plant and animal’ and ‘the Artificer’. These forms allow Hegel to
include reflections on such religions as those centred on the sun, on the worship
of animals and other natural objects. Religion from the first belongs to the domain
of the spiritual, rather than the material, and represents the world from the point
of view of the spiritual and of a spiritual principle, even if it is identified with
a visible natural object. The question of representation appears nuanced here. A
lower, previous stage of religion is representation or picture-thought, with regard
to its superior, successor shape. Given Hegel’s understanding of dialectic, the
more developed and spiritual shape of religion must supersede, that is, surpass
while including, the inferior shape from which it hailed.
A first form of natural or nature religion, the religion of light, already shows
the spirit as self-conscious of being all the truth. Hegel then discusses religion
in which particular animals are worshipped; and this is followed, finally, by a
discussion of the religion of the artificer (Werkmeister), or the Spirit as creator.
A more advanced form of religion is one that incorporates art, which comprises
ethical awareness. Religion in the form of art is divided into three headings, on
‘the abstract work of art’, ‘the living work of art’ and ‘the spiritual work of art’. In
religious art we find ‘nature transfigured by thought’, and a unity between nature
and self-conscious spirit.31 The individual self-consciousness finds its individual
voice in this form of religion which evokes the ancient Greek religious art, in
which the self becomes conscious of its unity with the divine being in its worship
and sacrifices. The driving force behind this process lies in the progressive
spiritualisation of the various forms of art. Some of the themes found in this section
of the Phenomenology will receive more detailed treatment in the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, such as the distinction between the old Greek religion of
the Titans and the new religion – embodied in a new generation of gods who come
under the aegis of Zeus – which is considered in ‘the spiritual work of art’. All
forms serve to usher in the revealed religion that is Christianity. In this context

30
Ibid., p. 417, §684.
31
Ibid., p. 428, §707.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 137

Hegel mentions the symbolism of the bread and wine in the rites pertaining to
Ceres and Bacchus. In a clear reference to the coming of Christianity, Hegel states,
‘Spirit has not yet sacrificed itself as self-conscious Spirit to self-consciousness,
and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood’.32 In
the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel notes how the Hindu religion,
for instance, presents a form of a Trinity, though it is not the perfect Trinitarian
model found in Christianity.
The passage from polytheism to monotheism is analysed. In the spiritual work
of art, where the various spirits coalesce into unity, a form of cult gives way to a
representation that does not yet attain to conceptual thinking but is embodied in
language, in particular the epic form. In it, the content and the form of consciousness
display the same universality. The link between self-consciousness and external
existence is expressed through language. Epic in particular is for Hegel the earliest
representational expression of the universal.33 This form of art is naturally literary.
Generally speaking, in religion, representation – or picture-thinking – takes
the form of art connected with the particular rather than the universal (a common
association in Hegel), and with blind necessity rather than freedom of the Spirit.
The world of the Greek gods is squarely equated with this element of the particular
and pictorial thought. This element of necessity is eloquently expressed in
Greek tragedy.
In addition, the tension between philosophy and representation already makes
itself felt here, and it is foreshadowed by Greek tragedy, with its focus on the
human fate of individuals.34 While imagination lends divine beings a contingent
nature and a superficial individuality, rational thinking frees divine beings precisely
from that contingent aspect.35 Later, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
Hegel speaks of the way in which philosophy emerges from Greek mythology, and
how this is particularly apparent in Plato’s philosophy.
Revealed religion presents a further step in the development of the Spirit, where
the form of substance assumes ‘that of subject’, a common theme highlighted by
Hegel in the Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit as an essential aspect of his
systematic philosophy. It means that we must take the object in its own right, and
from its own perspective, and consider it also in its relation to the subject and other
objects. At this juncture, this process involves God or the Spirit becoming for the
human subject what it is in and for itself. One could also interpret this assertion to
mean that in revealed religion the absolute Spirit as subject speaks to us, whereas
before religion was rather a product of human consciousness, and did not exactly
match its object. Before, the subject imposed its own imagination on the object;
now, the divine object reveals itself to the human subject as it is in and for itself,
and as a fully self-conscious spirit.

32
Ibid., p. 438, §724.
33
Ibid., p. 440, §729.
34
Ibid., p. 449, §741.
35
Ibid., p. 451, §746.
138 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Hegel states that through rational thinking, a possible reference to the ancient
Greek philosophers, the divine being is freed from its contingent shape, which is
produced by imagination. This may be a reference to Plato’s conception of the one
demiurge and Aristotle’s theory of the Prime Mover, both of which appear to run
counter to the polytheism prevalent in ancient Greek society. An allusion to the
concepts or ideas of the Beautiful and the Good confirms the reference to Plato’s
philosophy.

Representation and Christianity

This final stage of religion, the revealed religion, represents a stage where Spirit
ceases to be substance (conceived by human beings) and becomes subject – God
who reveals himself to us. Indeed, the substance becomes not just subject but
subject conscious of itself, a self-consciousness that is also for us. Moreover,
this self is absolute being. Hegel studies the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ,
who assumes a human nature in addition to his divine nature. The presence of the
two natures renders possible the reconciliation of human beings with God, thus
heralding the last phase of the dialectical process in which Spirit becomes in and
for itself. This stage is contrasted with that of the unhappy consciousness, where
the individual human subject aimed to know the absolute but failed to attain to
that absolute through knowledge. The stage of the revealed religion goes beyond
that of the unhappy consciousness, in which a loss of the substance and of the self
is observable and where the saying ‘God is dead’ belongs – revealing a partial
understanding of the divine.36
In this last section, devoted to religion, Hegel offers a philosophical description
of Christianity and the Incarnation of the Word, whereby the ‘Spirit is ... present
as a self-conscious being’, as a man, who can be immediately be seen, felt and
heard. Moreover, God is thus immediately perceived as a self, indeed as a self-
consciousness. Hegel states that ‘this incarnation of the divine Being, or the fact
that it essentially and directly has the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple
content of the absolute religion’, equating absolute religion with Christianity,
as he does later in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.37 This religion
is the revealed religion because in it we know and are conscious of the divine
being as Spirit. Here, in the religious domain, and specifically in Christianity, the
substance is truly subject and self, the divine being truly reveals himself to us. The
object of religious devotion is now the self who is not an ‘other’, and is also truly
the Creator.

36
Ibid., p. 455, §752. The unhappy consciousness has often been identified with
medieval Christendom. However, a yearning for the absolute and the beyond which
characterises this consciousness is specifically attributed to Protestantism in Hegel’s Faith
and Knowledge; see Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 148–9.
37
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 458–9, §§758–9.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 139

In Christianity God reveals himself truly and definitely to humankind, in

contrast to the chasm between human conceptions of God and his reality observable
in previous forms of religion. Hence the gods of the previous religions were not
adequate descriptions of God, nor did they portray the living, self-conscious God
revealed in Christianity. Hegel considers this to be the highest form of religion,
the absolute, true religion. Does this mean that Christianity is the highest form of
the Spirit, and ‘representation’ is relegated to previous, inferior forms of religious
thought? Some passages lead us to believe this, pointing to the true shape of
Spirit revealed in Christianity, which is conformed to the concept, a divine self-
consciousness that is revealed to the human self-consciousness.38
He further states that ‘God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge and is
only in that knowledge, and is only that knowledge itself, for He is Spirit; and this
speculative knowledge is the knowledge of the revealed religion’.39 This seems
to affirm that the revealed religion, Christianity, contains the speculative and
conceptual knowledge of God as he is, as Spirit and as thought. However, this self,
as this particular human being, is still the individual and not the universal concept.
A further stage appears to be required for the attainment of absolute knowing.
Representation, or picture-thinking, which is ‘the synthetic combination of
sensuous immediacy and its universality or Thought’,40 is still present in this
ultimate form of religion, particularly as the spirit becomes aware of itself in the
community.

This form of picture-thinking constitutes the specific mode in which Spirit,

in this community, becomes aware of itself. This form is not yet Spirit’s self-
consciousness that has advanced to its Notion qua Notion: the mediation is still
incomplete.41

This is partly due to a ‘split into a Here and a Beyond’ which still lingers. We
have the true content in revealed religion but the true form is still concealed. While
we have the true content in revealed religion, its various moments are linked only
externally and not organically. Therefore a ‘higher formative development of
consciousness is necessary’, so that the true content can ‘receive its true form for
consciousness’42
These shortcomings of representation are here attributed to the limitations
of the community which is identified with revealed religion, the Christian
community. In the revealed religion, representation or picture-thinking mediates
between pure thought and self-consciousness. Although representation is present
in religion, in revealed religion it is specifically identified with the middle term,

38
Ibid., p. 460, §759.
39
Ibid., p. 461, §761.
40
Ibid., p. 463, §764.
41
Ibid., p. 463, §765.
42
Ibid., p. 463, §765.
140 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

or middle part (the ‘antithesis’), of the dialectical form. Thought descends into
individuality, and passing into representation and otherness, it finally returns to
self-consciousness. 43 Nevertheless, the consciousness found in revealed religion
represents a higher form of consciousness than the one belonging to the unhappy
consciousness or the believing consciousness. It is important to stress that the
concept or conceptual thinking does not consider the particular but rather the
universal, whereas representation is still attached in some way to the particular,
especially in its connotation with pictorial thinking.
In addition, Hegel links representation with particular concern for historical
fact, while the concept (or notion) seemingly rises above history and chronology:
‘picture-thinking interprets and expresses as a happening what has just been
expressed as the necessity of the Notion’.44 Necessity here clearly points to the
universal, rather than the particular (event or substance). While a true dialectical
circle is effected, which implies an utterance of the Word that then returns to its
divine origin, this speculative thinking is not the way the religious community
understands this process.
Representation appears to lie in the beliefs of the religious community; in this
sense one could say that the representational form does not point to a fault of
religion itself, but to the inability of the community to grasp transcendent notions.
However, certain key elements of Christian dogma are placed by Hegel in the
realm of representation. One could argue that Hegel is simply criticising a literal
and even physical, rather than a metaphorical, interpretation of the relations among
the Persons of the Trinity. In particular, he berates the community for viewing the
relation between the Father and the Son from a natural or physical perspective.45
Representation again indicates in this context a certain relation to sense perception
and physical nature.
In addition to the Incarnation, Hegel comments on the concept of Creation as
a self-othering of God, where ‘creating’ is a representational way of describing
God’s becoming the other of itself; this is possibly a pantheistic reading of
creation, although Hegel would later, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
vehemently deny being a pantheist. Hegel conceives of the Spirit as a single entity,

43
Ibid., p. 464, §767.
44
Ibid., p. 465, §769. Clark states, ‘Hence, so far as we are to ascribe properties to
the stage of Vorstellung, we must say that it shares with sense a spatio-temporality and
a mere multiplicity of its elements, but is distinguished from sense by an interiority and
universality capable of giving expression to even the most elevated speculative thought.
It may be described as a picture-thinking, but as one in which the pictures are recognized
for such, as carrying a meaning not simply to be identified with them’; Clark, Logic and
System, p. 27. He further argues to the effect that ‘Vorstellung is the “other” of thought, and
yet is “interior” to it’, ibid., p. 40.
45
Ibid., p. 465, §771.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 141

a ‘simple oneness’ – evoking in the mind of the reader Aristotle’s understanding of

God as thought thinking itself.46
Hegel analyses various Christian doctrines in the light of the dichotomy
between representation and conceptual thinking. Doctrines that are speculatively
(conceptually) reinterpreted due to the potential for a representational reading
include the Trinity and its Persons, Creation, and Lucifer as a fallen angel. Hegel
considers the terms ‘Son’ and ‘fallen’ to belong to representation rather than
thought.47 Moreover, it is a shortcoming of representation that it cannot integrate
evil into the divine plan, and cannot reconcile opposites, whereas conceptual
thinking dictates precisely just such reconciliation – nothing is other to the
absolute being.48
However, in order to salvage core elements of Christian theology in Hegel’s
thought, one could argue that the shortcomings of the representational mode come
down to the difficulty of the Christian community – and, generally speaking,
of human nature – to think of God as he really is. A possible indication of this
interpretation is that representational thought, which is characteristic of religion,
in its immediacy ‘knows the human form of the divine Being at first only as a
particular, not yet as a universal, form.’49
At a later stage, the Spirit as self-consciousness, in its universality, no longer
thinks in images. This moment too is identified with the community. But here it is
unclear whether the reference is to the community of the faithful or the community
of Persons in God. With regard to the question of representation, an ambiguity
remains in the fact that ‘Spirit’ appears to refer alternatively to God’s Spirit and
the human spirit.50 German nouns are always capitalised, so the burden of the
interpretation falls on the reader.
The dialectical movement in this context is thought, which becomes
representation and finally self-consciousness, a movement mirrored in the
three stages represented by God, who then incarnates as a human being and
finally returns to the Spirit. The risen Christ is identified with the universal self-
consciousness and the community.51 The particular aspect of representation lies
with the imagination of the Spirit as an individual – indeed as particular, rather
than universal.52 The divine Spirit becomes universal through the resurrection,
which is a necessary moment in the Spirit’s becoming self-consciousness. The

46
See Walter Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), p. 103.
47
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 468, §776.
48
Ibid., p. 471, §780.
49
Ibid., p. 472, §780.
50
Houlgate’s interpretation suggests that the Spirit comes to the fore through human
consciousness and not independently. See his An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth
and History, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 179–80.
51
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 473, §781.
52
Ibid., p. 475, §785.
142 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

divine being ceases to be abstract through the Incarnation and the resurrection of
the Word. Once more, the substance has become subject, and actual Spirit. Hegel’s
approach to the Trinity tends to conflate or even confuse the three Persons of the
Trinity. Moreover, this triadic dialectic finds a conceptual formulation later in his
Science of Logic, where Hegel distinguishes three moments of his syllogistic logic,
consisting of the universal, the particular and the singular. His logic is furthermore
divided into logic of being, logic of essence and logic of concept – the last moment
representing the pinnacle of dialectical logic.53
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, all moments are necessary steps in the
development of the Spirit, and therefore representation as religious thought is a
necessary moment. However, it is possible to argue that representational thought
is the preserve of those human beings who are unable to think conceptually:

The mediation of picture-thought is necessary … For the self-consciousness

that does not think in terms of the Notion, this in-itself receives the form of
something that possesses immediate being and is imaginatively represented.54

It appears that representational thought does not allow human consciousness

adequate conceptual access to the divine reality, as the community cannot forsake
picture-thinking or its picture-thoughts, partly because it does not identify itself
with the divine itself, and thinks of its union with God as a distant beyond,
something in the future. A more complete form of reconciliation with the Spirit is
required, through the superseding (Aufhebung) of the representational mode and
the passing over into conceptual thinking. This process is described in the last
chapter of the Phenomenology, devoted to Absolute Knowing.
This last chapter recapitulates the different moments of the Phenomenology,
stating that in religion and representation the object is still an other to the
consciousness. This chapter presents the Spirit which has returned to itself as
concept or notion, acting within itself and fully reconciled with itself. Spirit
becomes ‘pure universality of knowing’.55 This is Spirit that knows itself as Spirit,
and not as something other, or something material, and which has absolute self-
certainty, whereas the content in religion is not yet ‘identical with its certainty’.56
The moment of science has finally been achieved, and both the chronological
process and history are superseded. Religion contains the true content, earlier
than science or absolute knowing (which obviously was unveiled in Hegel’s own
lifetime), but science presents the content conceptually, and only in it does the
Spirit truly know itself.57 The concept, or conceptual thinking, is the pure element
of the Spirit.

53
See also Hegel, Hegel’s Logic, pp. 254–5, §191.
54
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 475, §784, translation slightly modified.
55
Ibid., p. 485, §796.
56
Ibid., p. 485, §798.
57
Ibid., p. 488, §802.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 143

In the element of pure Spirit, any material, pictorial or even historical elements
are left behind, and Spirit is at one with itself. This is abundantly clear in a later
work, the Science of Logic, whose last moment, as we have seen, is precisely
Concept (Begriff), following the first two moments of Being (Sein) and Essence
(Wesen). In absolute knowing, the Spirit thinks only itself, and nothing extraneous.
This point is clearly stated by Houlgate:

I do not mean to deny that Hegel regards consciousness and thought – and,
indeed, philosophy itself – as mediated by history, language and culture.
What I wish to dispute is the claim that absolute knowing consists essentially
in the consciousness of such historical conditions. Absolute knowing, as the
Logic presents it, is not a relation of consciousness to anything, but is thought
thinking itself or ‘spirit thinking its own essential nature’ (WL, 1: 17; SL, 28).
Consciousness of the intersubjective community in which we are embedded is
to be found, in my view, in ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and religion, rather than
absolute knowing.58

In many ways, religious knowledge is our knowledge, and even the self-
knowledge of the Spirit. For example, Hegel stresses the need to move from the
Incarnation and death of Christ to the coming over of the Spirit – a reference to
Pentecost. In addition, while representation must be superseded, it constitutes a
necessary moment in the development of absolute Spirit, which cannot know itself
without that moment.
While the main doctrines of Christianity, namely the Trinity and the Incarnation,
play a pivotal role in his conception of the Spirit and its inner workings, Hegel’s
position appears to show some ambivalence, distancing himself at times from a
literal or any orthodox reading of these doctrines. An ambiguity remains in his
wish to proceed beyond historical revelation of Christianity to the necessity of the
Spirit in itself.
One should note, however, that as far as Christian dogmatics and theology
are concerned, Hegel takes a noticeably more careful, literal approach in the
Phenomenology of Spirit than in his earlier writings, where theological themes
are analysed. The early writings dismiss the dogmatic elements of the Gospels,
favouring instead a focus on morality and inner piety, whereas the Phenomenology

58
Stephen Houlgate, ‘Absolute Knowing Revisited’, The Owl of Minerva 30:1 (Fall
1998): pp. 51–67, pp. 55–6. Houlgate also claims that once absolute knowing is reached, the
object no longer stands against consciousness as something alien to it: ‘Absolute Knowing,
we recall, is the final form that consciousness takes in the PhG [Phenomenology of Spirit].
It is the form of consciousness that ceases to regard the real or the true as something over
against it to which it stands in “relation”, and that comes to regard the true as disclosed
within self-certainty itself. Absolute knowing is, in other words, the form of consciousness
that is liberated from the “opposition of consciousness” itself and so comes to be thought,
rather than consciousness itself – thought thinking itself (WL, 1: 43; SL, 49)’, ibid., p. 57.
144 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

takes these dogmas seriously. It could be argued that at that early stage Hegel
was influenced by both Enlightenment and Romantic attitudes towards religion,
whereas later, in the process of developing his own philosophy, he becomes
increasingly more confident in the role of speculative reason, eventually
abandoning an underlying and all-pervasive subjectivism.59
To recapitulate: is religion to be associated exclusively with picture-thinking
or representation in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit? It must be said that while
Hegel does downplay representation as a means that falls short of the Spirit which
has attained complete self-consciousness and absolute knowledge – a Spirit which
Hegel identifies with God – religion is the highest means of knowing absolute
Spirit after philosophy.
In the later writings, the representational mode of apprehension would be
compared with conceptual thinking as merely a different mode of expressing
reality. The view that representation constitutes a non-speculative approach where
the form does not yet truly match the content, and as such does not adequately
express or reflect it, is arguably somewhat qualified by the mature Hegel.
In the Phenomenology, one can argue that some of the limitations of this
level of knowledge lie with the religious community, rather than with religion
or Christianity as a whole. In accordance with this interpretation, Hegel seeks
to highlight the human limits in grasping the divine, as we fail to attain God’s
knowledge of himself. Interestingly, the chapter on Absolute Knowing in the
Phenomenology of Spirit seems only a sketch compared to the full-fledged
discussion of religion, in what possibly constitutes a tacit acknowledgement that
human reason cannot truly grasp the divine essence.60 However, some scholars
would argue that the discussion of God’s nature as thought thinking itself, as
absolute knowledge independently of creation and the world, is laid out in Hegel’s
Science of Logic.
As previously noted, Hegel’s academic and philosophical career spanned
several decades, and his interest in religion never faltered; but, as noted by some
Hegel scholars, an evolution in his religious thought is to be observed. While the
young Hegel, influenced by the Enlightenment’s attitude to religion, is sceptical
of organised religion and particularly dogma, stressing that Jesus was above
all a moral teacher, the later Hegel in Berlin takes a keen interest in Christian

59
See, for instance, Hegel’s comparisons between Socrates and Jesus, and his praise
of all religious leaders, Muhammad included, for the imposition of morality on the state;
G.W.F. Hegel, Frühe Schriften, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), pp. 52 and 71 respectively.
60
Hodgson notes the shortness of the chapter on Absolute Knowing, commenting
that ‘“absolute knowing” ... is more a goal than an achievement, and Hegel discusses it
only briefly in the concluding chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. For the most part
philosophy is “on the way”, not at the goal, which in religious terms could only be the
beatific vision and God’s self-knowing”; Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, p. 115.
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 145

theology, citing many medieval theologians and presenting his own Christology
and philosophy of the Spirit.61
Some ambiguity remains regarding what he deems to be the presence of certain
‘pictorial’ or representational aspects within Christianity, which could be read as
a metaphorical approach to essential Christian dogmas and doctrines, both in the
Phenomenology of Spirit and later in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
although this latter work appears even more willing to engage in theological
discussions and to accept theological dogmas. However, this is not to say that
the Christian elements are not crucially and deeply embedded in the Hegelian
philosophical system. The Christian influence in Hegel’s conception of dialectic
is not far to seek.
On the one hand, religion plays a crucial part in the unfolding of the Spirit, and on
the other, the history of religion mirrors the development of the Spirit. Furthermore,
it is curious to note that, for all the focus on Hegel’s conception of history as central
to his system, the Phenomenology of Spirit views the highest level of knowing,
conceptual thought, as entirely devoid of historical or chronological connotations.
At the conceptual level, the historical and chronological aspects are superseded.

Note on the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences

The theme of representation, as distinguished from thinking, appears again in a

work which was published before Hegel’s move to Berlin, and then revised in

61
According to Kaufmann, ‘Where he had previously condemned Christianity
for its irrationality, he later defended its essential rationality and came to celebrate
Christian dogmas as ultimate philosophic truths in religious form’, Kaufmann, ‘Hegel’s
Early Antitheological Phase’, p. 18. Some scholars argue that Hegel’s position regarding
religion did not substantially alter over time. Houlgate argues: ‘This difference between
philosophy and phenomenology is, I think, reflected in the treatment of religion in the two
disciplines. In his philosophy ... Hegel demonstrates that religion is absolutely necessary
to the full human experience of the truth. [...] In the Phenomenology, by contrast, Hegel
is not concerned to explain why religion must be preserved. His aim, instead, is to show
how religious experience undermines the very perspective of Vorstellung that defines it and
thereby points logically beyond itself to philosophy. [...] It is true, therefore, that Hegel’s
treatment of religion undergoes a subtle change between the Phenomenology and the Berlin
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. In the former, philosophy or absolute knowing
does, indeed, leave religion behind, whereas in the latter philosophy affirms and justifies
the religious point of view. The difference is, however, definitely not due to any growing
conservatism on Hegel’s part. It reflects the fundamental difference between the respective
methods and purposes of phenomenology and philosophy [...] Phenomenology ... does not
pretend to disclose the ultimate truth about religion, but contents itself with showing how
and why religion makes the philosophical understanding of truth necessary. [...] One should
not forget that [...] the Phenomenology is intended only to prepare us for, not to replace,
speculative philosophy’; Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, pp. 104–5. I am grateful to
my colleague Richard Fincham for pointing out this reference.
146 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Berlin: the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), in which Hegel

expounds his system as a whole. This work was meant as a textbook to be used in
the classroom, and its style is concise and succinct. Hegel’s own lectures notes, as
well as those of his students, were published alongside the main text, and are known
as Zusätze (additions). This work comprises a first part on logic ­a shorter version
of the Science of Logic – a second part on the philosophy of nature, and a third and
final part on the philosophy of mind or spirit, which includes the treatment of the
human spirit and religion. Within the section on psychology and spirit/mind, Hegel
treats the theoretical mind, divided into three sections, intuition, representation
(in turn divided into recollection, imagination and memory) and thinking. The
latter effects the unity of subject and object and rises above representation, which
is still occupied with a foreign object, rather than itself. In the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Spirit 1827–1828, Hegel expands on the difference between these
three moments, recollection, imagination and memory, within representation,
explaining the process in which these moments unfold:

We have to consider the representation in relation to its other, the intuition that
is its immediacy. The first relation is the immediate relation of a representation
to outer intuition. This is in a narrower sense a remembering; something appears
before me, and I know that I have already seen it.

Second, representation is posited as relation in itself. It is my representation,

and as [mine] it must be posited by me. This is the inner processing of the
representation by me. The representation thus processed by me, is posited as
a relation and more precisely, as totality. This is the reproductive imagination
[Einbildungskraft]. I bring the representation into a relation that I put into them.
This latter relation is the product of the productive imagination [Phantasie].

This representation as relation in itself, must also be brought to intuition; it must

be expressed, formal immediacy must be given to this representation of mine.
But this intuition is an essence given by me; it is not immediate as something
that has been discovered. This is the sign, the root of language. In the word, I
give my representation the capacity to be intuited. This form of immediacy is a
unity of a representation and an immediacy, an intuition that I have produced.

The third is that I make this intuition itself, the totality of my representation
and the intuition I have produced, into something inner. This is memory; in
myself I give myself this objectivity. In word and speech, the meaning, the
representation, and the intuition, the objectivity, are completely separated. [But]
in memory these become one. The intelligence, in the determination that its
 Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit 147

determination is at the same time both the content and the thing itself, is the
transition to thinking.62

In the Encyclopaedia Hegel reminds us that representation ultimately leads to

thinking:

Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or representation, is capable
of grasping the truth of things, and that the assertion of Epicurus that the true
is what is sensed, must be pronounced a complete perversion of the nature of
mind. Of course, thinking must not stop at abstract, formal thinking, for this
breaks up the content of truth, but must always develop into concrete thinking,
to a cognition that comprehends its object.63

In turn, thought is divided here into understanding, judgement and reason. Hegel
reiterates the position to the effect that it is at the level of thought that the concept
is known and reason is truly free, without a content that is imposed from outside.
After moving from the subjective mind/spirit, where representation and
thinking belong, and having treated the objective mind, Hegel places religion
and philosophy within the domain of absolute mind/spirit. Philosophy represents
the union of art and religion.64 The interconnection between form and content is
broached, and one particular passage points to the view that philosophy is not just
a form of expressing the truth, as is religion, but is completely identified with the
content itself, as the absolute form of the truth. Regarding philosophical thinking,
Hegel writes:

This cognition is thus the recognition of this content and its form; it is the
liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms, elevation of them into the

62
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827–1828, trans., intro. Robert
R. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 214–15.
63
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia
of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. by William Wallace, together with the ‘Zusätze’
in Boumann’s Text (1845), trans. A.V. Miller, foreword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2003), §465, Zusatz, p. 224.
64
Stephen Rocker writes: ‘The last section of part 3 of the Encyclopaedia of
the Philosophical Sciences, “Absolute Spirit,” describes the ascending stages of the
consciousness of the absolute idea in art, religion and philosophy. These stages of the
absolute idea parallel the stages of theoretical spirit – intuition, representation, and thought’;
Stephen Rocker, Hegel’s Rational Religion: The Validity of Hegel’s Argument for the Identity
in Content of Absolute Religion and Absolute Philosophy (London: Associated University
Presses, 1995), p. 77. Walter Jaschke argues that representation need not be limited to the
sensible realm in Hegel, but in connection with religion it bears a pictorial character, in
Hermann Drüe, et al., eds, Hegels ‘Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften’
(1830): Ein Kommentar zum Systemgrundriß (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000),
pp. 375–466, ‘Die geoffenbarte Religion’.
148 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

absolute form, which determines itself to content, remains identical with it, and
is in that the cognition of that essential and actual necessity.65

Some scholars, as we have seen, have questioned the feasibility, stressed by

Hegel, of presenting the same content in different formats – the content could
not possibly remain the selfsame if the form changes. The Berlin lectures on the
various philosophical subjects further contribute to the elucidation of this problem.

65
Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, §573, p. 302.
 Chapter 6
Representation and Christianity in the
Berlin Lectures

From the period when Hegel was chair of Philosophy at the University of
Berlin, the most prestigious such post in Germany, we have notes of his lectures
on various disciplines and issues, such as aesthetics, philosophy of history
and history of philosophy. Among these lectures are also the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion. Philosophy of religion was a discipline that had arisen
during the Enlightenment period as a dispassionate, academic reflection on
religion, independently of theology, which was specifically tied with Christianity.
Philosophy of religion, on the other hand, also reflected on other religious traditions
and compared them with Christianity. Although there had been reflections and
studies on other religions before this time, philosophy of religion as an independent
discipline was not taught before the late Enlightenment, and Hegel’s lectures may
well have contributed to its establishment as an academic discipline.1
In the medieval period, there was no philosophy of religion as such, since this
discipline implies a detached and essentially academic study of religion, whereas
the medieval perspective consisted in basing any philosophical inquiry on a
religious foundation. Averroes, however, in keeping with Islamic doctrine, viewed
Judaism and Christianity as abrogated by Islam, the last of the three religions
to be revealed. Averroes analysed other religions from the perspective of Islam;
and, especially in his Tahāfut al-tahāfut, he considered that Islam offered the best
conception of God and the afterlife as a means of promoting morality. Hegel,
too, studies other religions in their relation to Christianity, but he claims that they
have a role to play in religion as a whole and can be understood in the context of
Christianity, being likewise abrogated by it.2

1
See the introduction by W. Jaeschke in G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die
Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, Einleitung in die Philosophie der Religion: Der Begriff der
Religion, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993), p. xi. Oeing-Hanhoff
stresses that the concept of ‘philosophy of religion’ makes its appearance in the eighteenth
century and was unknown in the medieval period – Aquinas’ theological philosophy
(expounded as metaphysics) was not a philosophy of religion as such; see Ludger Oeing-
Hanhoff, ‘La nécessité historique du concept hégélien de Dieu’, in Hegel et la Religion,
ed. Guy Planty-Bonjour (Paris: PUF, 1982), pp. 77–99, p. 78.
2
Chapelle states that, for Hegel, non-Christian religions stand to Christianity as a
kind of prehistory, with the implication that they are not studied in their own right but as
150 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel returns to some of the

themes found in his early writings and in the Phenomenology of Spirit: that of the
relation between religion and philosophy as well as their respective methods. The
lectures were delivered several times, with significant modifications each time,
from 1821 to 1831, the year of Hegel’s death. They are divided into three parts.
The first part is devoted to the concept of religion in itself. The second part treats the
major world religions and the way they relate to the ultimate religion, Christianity.
Finally, the third and last part of these lectures contains Hegel’s interpretation of
Christianity, which is significantly different from the approach he had taken as a
young theologian and philosopher.
In his earlier thinking, other religions are considered as forms of the absolute
Spirit, which however only reveals itself fully in Christianity. In the lectures,
however, Christianity is treated in its own right, separately from the history of
religion; and while the Phenomenology of Spirit had linked religion and art, the
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion treat the two separately.3
Proposing to study God and his relation with the world as Spirit which
communicates itself to us in history and through religion, is a unique way
of addressing the issue of religion. God is not just studied as being and as an
object, which was the position of natural theology. Unlike several Enlightenment
philosophers, Hegel did not shy away from studying God, although he offered
a new approach in contradistinction to Scholastic and modern theology, such as
that of Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, much criticised by
Kant and other Enlightenment figures. Hegel scholar Walter Jaeschke claims that
Hegel’s philosophy of religion is really a philosophical theology, in which God is
the centre and the subject of the discipline in its relation to itself and to the finite.
It is the Spirit that relates itself to itself and to the other.4

The Concept of Religion and God

At the opening of this work, Hegel states that the object of philosophy of religion
coincides with that of natural theology (theologia naturalis), which is based on

prefiguring Christianity. See Albert Chapelle, Hegel et la Religion, vol. I: La problématique

(Paris: Editions universitaires, 1963), p. 148.
3
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, pp. xxxi–xxxii.
4
Ibid., p. xxviii. D’Hondt states that according to Hegel it is philosophy which
comprehends and explains religion. The latter does not explain itself, as it operates in
the domain of representation – and therefore it cannot conceptualise itself. See Jacques
D’Hondt, ‘La Philosophie de la Religion de Hegel’, in Hegel et la Religion, Guy Planty-
Bonjour (Paris: PUF, 1982), pp. 18–19. In addition, Jaeschke claims that Hegel’s philosophy
of religion is speculative theology (and replaces theology), in Hegel, Vorlesungen über die
Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. xxiii.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 151

what reason by itself can know about God.5 He also states that God is the object,
not just of religion, but of philosophy, and the beginning and end of everything,
including man.
In articulating the relation between philosophy and religion, he argues that
‘philosophy is theology, and preoccupation with it ... is in itself service of God
[Gottesdienst]’.6 A different approach from that of the Phenomenology of Spirit,
and especially that of the early writings, is at work, in the way in which not only
religion but also theology (as discourse about God) is analysed, the latter being
equated with philosophy. In contrast to the early writings, Hegel is no longer averse
to discussing theology as dogma, or to analysing Christian dogmas as significant
reference points, indeed as fundamental elements in religion and also philosophy,
as will become apparent from his study of Christianity. He explicitly seeks to
accommodate Christian theology within his philosophical system. Somewhat
differently from the Phenomenology of Spirit, these lectures stress that religion (as
philosophical theology) and philosophy study the same subject – given that God
is Spirit – and that religion, through religious representation and discourse, is not
merely a stepping stone on the way to the more accurate method (the philosophical
method) of comprehending reality, but the two – religion and philosophy – are
two sides of the same coin. The role of philosophy of religion consists precisely in
showing the congruence between the two disciplines. If so, in how do they differ?
If they are identical, what are then the specific tasks of philosophy on the one
hand, and religion on the other? The question of representation versus conceptual
thinking resurfaces in this context.
Hegel accepts certain aspects of Scholastic philosophy, describing God as
independent, free and unconditioned, a description which would not be out of
place in medieval treatises on God and his attributes. For Hegel it is pivotal to
stress that God can be known, that this is the goal of the Christian religion, and
that we are enjoined to know God’s nature and essence either by faith or reason,
authority or revelation.7 God’s nature is accessible both by faith and by reason,
a position that goes against two currents common in the eighteenth century: the
fundamentalist rationalism proclaimed by the Enlightenment, which argued that
faith is irrelevant in accessing the truth, and the opposing view, common in some
contemporary Protestant theology, that in order to know God and the truth one
should depend on faith rather than reason. Hegel does not wish to dissociate faith
and reason, religion and philosophy, as both have an epistemic value – although it
remains to be seen how they relate, and finally whether Hegel makes a comparative
value judgement regarding them.
The criticism of the Enlightenment’s ‘superstition’ against faith, and the pietist
reluctance against reason, informs Hegel’s position in other writings from this
period, in particular in his preface to Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs’ work

5
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 3.
6
Ibid., p. 4.
7
Ibid., p. 7.
152 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

on the philosophy of religion, dating from 1822. Defending Hinrichs’ approach to

the subject, in particular with regard to the intertwining of religion and scientific
knowing, Hegel argues for the harmony between faith and reason. Faith must not
remain without a cognitive content and reason should not renounce its activity in
relation to faith. Truth and spirit should not be only manifest in appearance and
feelings.8 Faith cannot remain purely subjective; it must go hand in hand with
reason. Moreover, it is the duty of the Church to educate human beings in the truth,
which is first presented to the representation, imagination and memory, a truth
which should be internalised. The dichotomy between spirit and nature presents
itself to consciousness, but the idea of God imposes itself.
As well as religion, another aspect which is contrasted to the natural element
in human beings is thought (Denken). In humans, understanding and finite reason
are contrasted to his divine thinking. In his preface to Hinrichs’ Religion im
innern Verhältniss zur Wissenschaft, Hegel equally compares understanding with
reason, which can grasp the infinite and eternal. Finite understanding, in spite of
its limitations, helps the development of doctrine, so it has a significant role, since
its content is equivalent to the eternal truth.9 In doing so, the understanding builds
on faith, which is related to but does not exclusively rely on feeling. The religious
proofs furnished by the understanding can produce faith.
This preface serves to renew the attack on the Enlightenment which proclaims
God to be unknowable because, like the pietist position, it separates reason
and faith. Hegel also dismisses the notion that feeling is the only true form of
religion. Rather, spirit requires that what exists in feeling should be available
for representation. Hegel further states that reflection (Reflexion) takes part in
representation – that is, representation and belief, or assent (Fürwahrhalten),
have a stake in reflection and rise above feeling.10 Philosophy is defined as the
‘science of thinking reason’, while religious faith is consciousness and absolute
belief corresponding to reason as available for the representation.11 Here reason
and representation appear intertwined rather than separated.
In his critique of both the Enlightenment’s formal rationalism and a subjective
approach to religion which severs all ties with reason, Hegel proposes the union
of faith and reason along the lines of medieval philosophers and theologians. This
study of religion consists in a science of religion, which philosophy purports to
be – a position also patent in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Religion
needs this support from philosophy. For its part, philosophy is given its content by
religion, which concerns God or Spirit. Hegel claims that this approach is found in
medieval Scholasticism, where reason thinks deeply about the dogmas of revealed

8
  G.W.F. Hegel, ‘Vorrede zu Hinrichs’ Religionsphilosophie [1822]’, in Berliner
Schriften 1818–1831, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 43.
9
  Ibid., p. 45.
10
Ibid., p. 50.
11
Ibid., p. 51.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 153

religion. Hegel’s admiration for medieval Scholasticism marks a departure from

the Lutheran response to this period of Church history.
Both an insistence on the exclusive use of the understanding and a mere
attachment to feeling are false approaches to religion. As a finite tool, the
understanding cannot truly comprehend the divine.12 This is the task of reason, or
spirit, which communicates with infinite Spirit, God. Since God is the truth, he is
eminently intelligible and the subject matter of philosophy. For Hegel, Christianity
is the revelation of what God is, and the Christian community is the community to
which the Spirit of God is sent.13
According to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the goal of the
philosophy of religion is to understand religion, which is a specifically human
endeavour not shared with animals, for these do not show evidence of religious
worship. Religion constitutes a different domain of human activity from others,
namely science and law.14 Hegel warns against the misconception that relegates
religion to a specific activity, stressing that it pervades all of human life. Through
the idea of God, to whom we owe every gift, our minds become conformed to that
higher domain of intellection.15 Religion should not be relegated to the private
realm as mere piety (Frommigkeit). Equally, it should not be seen merely through
the lens of cold reason (Räsonnement), which considers God simply as cause of
the universe. Science, however, requires the indication of the proximate cause.
Hegel concludes that religion has nothing to do with science in the purely natural
sense, for science in this sense prescinds from God.16 Instead, religion deals with
the absolute content. This means that religion views reality as a whole and from
the point of view of its origin, God, instead of researching specific, particular
aspects of (material) reality and the way they relate to us. This is an abstract,
partial approach that does not suit religion or philosophy of religion.

12
Ibid., p. 64.
13
Ibid., p. 65. In a book review supporting Karl Friedrich Göschel’s attempt to unify
philosophy and religion, particularly Christianity, Hegel claims that there is no difference
between Christianity and philosophical thinking, and he mentions the original unity (Einheit)
of Christianity and speculative reason. See G.W.F. Hegel, ‘Aphorismen über Nichtwissen
und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis: Von Karl
Friedrich Göschel [1829]’, in Berliner Schriften 1818–1831, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl
Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 354. He stresses that, according
this work he is reviewing, philosophical thinking is the highest product of Christianity.
Hegel criticises Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi for holding that God cannot be known (in his
theory of ‘unknowing’), ibid., p. 358. He points to Göschel’s concept that representation
can reach higher than knowing. Hegel thinks less highly of representation than the author,
but he praises the latter’s understanding of the harmony between faith and reason.
14
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 12.
15
Ibid., p. 13.
16
Ibid., p. 21.
154 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

The task of philosophy of religion is to perform a synthesis (rather than an

analysis) of opposites, finding an equilibrium; it involves seeking the infinite
in the finite and the finite in the infinite, reconciling feeling with cognition, and
religion with intelligence.17 In saying this, as we have seen, Hegel goes against
the prevailing academic current of his time, where religion and reflection are
separated. In his understanding, Christian religion accommodates knowledge
itself, and develops as the world of form.18 In this task of seeking to comprehend
the infinite and its relation to the finite, philosophy of religion employs reason,
conceptual thinking and cognition in order to grasp the absolute and omit nothing
that pertains to the content.19
Unlike pagan religion, which emerges already as a reconciliation between
subject and object, Christianity starts from a sundering of the human subject
from the infinite, absolute being (Wesen).20 While an absolute separation between
gods and humans is absent from pagan Greek religion, where they have much
in common, in Christianity the human subject finds himself face to face with an
absolutely infinite and transcendent God. But a reconciliation is possible through
unrestricted faith.
Hegel goes on to introduce the issue of representation into his understanding of
Christianity. In order to obtain the freedom which Christian religion sets as its goal,
one must acquire knowledge, and the path leading to knowledge passes through
imagination or representation (Vorstellung). In fact, knowing (Wissen) starts with
representation (Vorstellung). The obtainment of knowledge will strengthen our
relationship with God, who is knowing – in a classic identification of God and
thinking, already present in Aristotle with his definition of God as thought thinking
itself. With respect to doctrine, which was the subject of so much criticism in the
early writings, Hegel states that it offers representations and thoughts on God’s
nature and action. In introducing the theme of representation as associated with
religion, he links it specifically with Christianity.
Hegel’s personal understanding of religion is an attempt to reconcile faith and
reason, which had been dissociated from each other, and to overcome their isolation
from each other. In a certain way, this could be construed as a return to the medieval
theme of theology as ‘faith seeking understanding’, in Anselm’s formulation. This
constitutes a reaction against the Enlightenment’s banishment of religion and faith
from intellectual debates, at once isolating reason from religion and depriving
reason of an important source: the God of scripture on whom philosophers and
theologians alike had pondered and written. This synthesis is realised by the

17
Ibid., p. 22.
18
Ibid., p. 25.
19
Reardon states: ‘Hegel uses the word Begriff, “concept”, meaning literally a
“gripping together” into unity of the different components of a concrete idea’; Bernard
M.G. Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 33.
20
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 23.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 155

philosophy of religion, which is a new theology, and not entirely dissociated from
the project of the medieval Christian philosophers and theologians.
Hegel states that philosophy of religion is a conceptual cognisance of religion. In
it the absolute substantial content and the absolute form of cognisance are identical.21
His absolute and objective idealism – which implies that things only exist and are
known insofar as they are in the mind of God or the Spirit – means that he seeks to
reconcile here subject and object, as well as objective and subjective thinking.
In positing what is in the concept, and developing it, the latter is turned into
idea. The concept thus becomes known in all its determinateness, which constitutes
the true method towards knowledge.22
Other religions are determinate religions, while Christianity is the absolute or
consummate religion, the subject of which is the absolute idea, the Spirit or God
in truth. The reasons Hegel chooses Christianity as the absolute religion are varied
and complex, and the twin dogmas of the Christian Trinity – explicitly stating that
God is Spirit as well as Father and Son – and the Incarnation of God, which declares
that God was made man, are pivotal for understanding this choice. Christianity
afforded Hegel the perfect reasons to present a consummate religion where God
is Spirit and opposites can be reconciled. For instance, he draws on the doctrine
of the Trinity as the locus in which God becomes object to himself and loves
himself. Moreover, Hegel defends the idea that the theology of the Church rests
on the view of God as Spirit. However, he departs from official Christian dogma
in holding that the concept of Spirit as the relation between Father and Son is not
yet a matter of conceptual thinking but rather a question of ‘representation’.23 In
the introduction to the lectures of 1824, he claims that God, the subject of religion,
is unconditioned, free, boundless and the ultimate end.24 This ultimate end is not
isolated from us but affects the present time.25
He condemned Wolff’s affirmation that philosophy was preoccupied with
natural theology, which has God as subject, for this was a metaphysics of the
understanding – a faculty that can discern differences and categorise but cannot
reconcile extremes. For Hegel, philosophy of religion has as subject matter
not only God, but religion; it studies God and ponders religion in its various
dimensions. In contrast to Wolff’s philosophy, which studies being and thing

21
Ibid., p. 23.
22
Ibid., p. 28.
23
Ibid., p. 43.
24
Ibid., p. 31.
25
Various scholars note the differences in emphasis represented by the various
lecture courses. For instance, the polemic with Friedrich Schleiermacher reaches a peak
in the Lectures of 1824, and in the Lectures of 1827 Hegel is particularly concerned with
rebutting any charges of pantheism levelled against his philosophy. See Dale M. Schlitt,
Divine subjectivity: Understanding Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion (Scranton: University
of Scranton Press, 2009), pp. 38, 269.
156 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

(Ding) as abstractions, Hegel’s philosophy studies the absolute and the Idea.26 For
Hegel God is absolute Spirit which manifests itself.
God should be understood not just as object, by the understanding, but as
subject and Spirit. In addition, God is studied not simply in himself but also in
relation to his community. This aspect comes to the foreground in the analysis of
specific religions and of Christianity, and as reflection (Gegenbild) of the Christian
community.27 The doctrine of God is the doctrine of religion, and since the object
of philosophy is God, philosophy of religion and philosophy do not differ.
Philosophy, too, is knowledge of all that is eternal – what God is and what
his nature is.28 Philosophy shows the absolute in action, as producing itself. The
relation between philosophy of religion and the other parts of philosophy consists
in the idea of God being the result of the other parts of philosophy, in the same way
that the Spirit issues from the sum and process of its appearances. In this sense,
philosophy of religion sums up all the other philosophical sciences.
Tracing the history of philosophy and theology in order to set his own
approach against the backdrop of contemporary theories of religion, Hegel states
that theology consists in the study of God, the creed and dogmatics. On the other
hand, the Protestant Church is characterised by a close reading of the Bible. The
Enlightenment breaks new ground with the birth of rational theology, or a theology of
reason which does not simply comment on doctrine.29 His conception of philosophy
of religion, and philosophy tout court, is premissed on the knowability of God – a
position, he stresses, which runs counter to some modern currents of theology.
The reason for this inherent possibility is not far to seek, for Hegel argues that
divine reason and Spirit are not entirely different from human reason and spirit.30
However, Hegel flatly rejects any claim that religion might be a human production
or projection, explicitly arguing that religion is produced by the divine Spirit, and
not invented by humans; it is rather the work of God within humanity. Religion
is what first emerges as faith, as produced by the divine Spirit. On the other hand,
this also implies faith in reason as a product of the Spirit.31
Hegel adds that the Catholic Church did not separate philosophy from the
doctrine of the Church, for Scholasticism was the philosophy of the Church.32
He remarks that the Catholic Church fostered speculative philosophy, unlike
the Protestant Church, and that the separation between the two, doctrine and
philosophy, first took place in the latter. Faith and reason must be combined, and

26
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 34.
27
Ibid., p. 33.
28
Ibid., p. 34.
29
Ibid., p. 39.
30
Ibid., p. 46.
31
Ibid., p. 46.
32
Ibid., p. 47.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 157

one must therefore demonstrate that reason has the right to appropriate the doctrine
of religion as its proper field of enquiry.33
In order to distinguish his approach from the Enlightenment position which
prescinds from scripture, he argues that in this lecture series one studies not religion
in general, but positive religion, revealed by God.34 In mentioning revelation, he
implicitly accepts the role of the scripture in shaping religion as well as philosophy.
In denying that God can be known, through a certain kind of subjectivism, one
runs the danger of falling into atheism. For God is an objective, not a subjective,
reality, and he is not a particular possession of each individual. Moreover, if
religion were merely feeling, there could be no philosophy of religion.35
We find an interplay between finite spirit and infinite Spirit in Hegel’s
assertion to the effect that the characteristic of Spirit is to be for itself. In addition,
representation is here related to the positivity of religion, or of a given religion.
The Spirit is present in itself as object to the other, human or finite spirit, as a
given, and it is other for this other. The implication here appears to be that the
infinite Spirit presents itself in a manner, representative rather than conceptual,
that can be grasped by the finite spirit. Positive religion, which is revealed, bears
this representational aspect.36
While Spirit presents itself as other to the other, it may or may not present
itself as it is, as infinite, possibly because it could not thus be grasped by the finite
subject of the religious representation. The representative mode must be tailored
to the intellectual capabilities of the receiving subject. Moreover, the source of
representation and the representative method reside in the infinite Spirit itself. In
this way does God present himself to the particular, feeling subject.
Hegel lays out the three moments of his treatment of philosophy of religion. In
the first instance, he discusses (1) the concept of religion in general; the concept
of religion is not yet religion itself but a reflection upon it. The second moment is
constituted by (2) the necessary, determinate religion; determinate religion does
not yet correspond to the concept, as it is finite. In this second moment he treats
religions other than Christianity, which he considers finite, whereas Christianity
is the only infinite religion, and the only one which corresponds to the concept.
Finally he discusses (3) religion in its infinity, the absolute, existing religion,
which is the consummate religion.
In these three moments, the first constitutes the metaphysical concept; the
second is the distinction between subject and object, which is the standpoint of the
finite spirit in religion – infinite in itself but finite as relating to other (because they
are moments in the development of the Spirit); the third is the superseding of the
finite standpoint, the union of both, the cultus or worship (Kultus) or the concept
of religion.

33
Ibid., p. 50.
34
Ibid., p. 49.
35
Ibid., p. 52.
36
Ibid., p. 54.
158 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Always keeping the relation between philosophy and religion in mind, Hegel
argues that the concept of religion

taken in its speculative, absolute sense is the concept of the spirit, which is
conscious of its essence, of itself. The way ... in which consciousness ... is
for itself or is objective to itself is in general representation, and thus absolute
consciousness is religion. It is philosophy insofar as spirit is conscious of itself
not in the mode of representation but in the mode of thought. This is then the
speculative concept, spirit conscious of itself.37

The difference between philosophy and religion is here only the difference between
the spirit’s self-consciousness as thought or as representation, the two modes of
apprehension being equivalent.38
In keeping with Hegel’s triadic dialectic (within the concept of religion), the
first moment is the concept for us, which then appears as an external object, only
later to become cultus. We begin with the idea, then the process unfolds whereby
the realisation of the concept occurs, and finally the third moment is the identity
of both.39
For the Spirit to come to know itself it must go through the determinate, finite
religions. The determinate religions are only stages towards this ultimate goal, but
to pursue this itinerary is in the nature of the Spirit.

37
Ibid., p. 55, my translation.
38
With regard to the difference between religion or theology and philosophy, Patricia
Carlton states: ‘“philosophy is theology” ... However, Hegel distinguishes philosophy’s
method from that of theology by arguing that the philosophical study of God must be
based on the necessary connections among concepts. While religion or theology may
address questions about God, the proper philosophical method must be employed if we
are to comprehend conceptually the eternal truth of God. The unique role of philosophy,
therefore, is to develop a “scientific cognition” of this truth’, in Patricia Marie Carlton,
Hegel’s Metaphysics of God: The Ontological Proof as the Development of a Trinitarian
Divine Ontology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 2. She furthermore states that ‘this type
of conceptual knowledge of God is the proper project of philosophy’, ibid., p. 6. Rocker
stresses Hegel’s affirmation to the effect that representation sometimes also rises to general
thoughts; see Stephen Rocker, ‘The Integral Relation of Religion and Philosophy in Hegel’s
Philosophy’, in New Perspectives on Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, ed. David Kolb
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 29. Moreover, Clark emphasises
the close link between representation and thought: ‘Thus, rather than regard Vorstellung as
a stage simply below thought, it would perhaps be truer to see it as the “Beispiel” [example]
of the Notion which is formed by each level of thought in its attempt to understand the
whole in terms of itself’, Malcolm Clark, Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from
“Vorstellung” to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971),
p. 102.
39
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 56.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 159

While criticising previous proofs of God’s existence, which are prepared by

the understanding and thus have only a limited scope, Hegel proposes a different
path, now undertaken by reason, with regard to the determinate religions, offering
to give an account of the determinateness of God as well as of the finite and its
supersession, through which the representation of God will appear, taking into
account in this process each specific stage of the religious consciousness. A
second step involves the analysis of the particular representation or shape of a
certain determinacy. Religion implies a determinacy of consciousness which is
of a representational rather than a conceptual nature. The object of the religious
consciousness is represented rather than conceived. When it is conceived, we find
a philosophical rather than a religious consciousness. In order for Spirit to make
itself representable, it has to become a subjective consciousness of something that
is represented. It is assumed here that the spirit is behind the religious representation
of God in each religion, as the producer of its own representation. There are two
significant outcomes of this position, namely the fact that religion is not a mere
product of the human mind (if we take ‘spirit’ here to mean ‘God’) and that God
produces his own representation in the various religions – although Christianity
is presented as the consummate religion. The third step regards the particular
cultus, the church of such a religion, which unites doctrine and representation.
The issue of representation is present in the various determinate religions and also
in consummate religion.
In this introduction to the 1824 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel
makes a point which is reminiscent of a position taken by Averroes, stating
that religion is for the common, not the philosophical, consciousness. To the
religious consciousness in general the Spirit is present in a sensible way, through
representation, whereas it is only present as concept in philosophy.40 Averroes
had indicated that the rhetorical mode of assent, common to most people, is
underpinned by a more sensible way of apprehending God.
Hegel insists that his approach to philosophy of religion is not reducible to an
analysis of our own understanding as subject, of God as object, but intends to see
the Spirit as it is for itself, in its process of self-fulfilment and coming to know
itself. In this process, we find a theodicy, which portrays not an abstract Spirit
that lies beyond our grasp, but a living Spirit which is present and at work for
consciousness, appearing in order to be for itself.41
In the introduction to the lectures of 1827, where Hegel treats the relation
between philosophy and religion in general, he reiterates some of the themes
already introduced previously, namely God as the subject and goal of religion,
and religion as something that is specific to human beings and in which they are
truly free.
The relation between the two modes of knowing God, representative and
conceptual, religious and philosophical, is further strengthened. They share the

40
Ibid., pp. 59–60.
41
Ibid., p. 60.
160 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

same object, the eternal truth – that is God – and the explication of God. Hegel
goes on to claim that philosophy only explains itself in explaining religion, and
in explaining itself it explains religion. In the notes, he argues that philosophy is
not a wisdom of the world, but the cognisance (Erkenntnis) of the non-worldly:
‘not knowledge of the external mass, of empirical existence or life, but knowledge
of that which is eternal, which is God, and that which flows from his nature’. 42
Consequently, philosophy is the service of God (Gottesdienst, a term that is
commonly used in German to describe a religious, liturgical service), as we
have seen. Philosophy is thus religion and prescinds from subjective opinions in
occupying itself with God.
Commenting on the contemporary separation between philosophy and
religion, Hegel traces the history of a fruitful partnership between the two (not
always a peaceful partnership, for he notes the condemnation of Socrates on the
grounds of irreligiousness). This happy marriage was found in the Church Fathers,
who in turn were influenced by Neopythagorean, Neoplatonic and Neoaristotelian
philosophers. He traces the formation of Christian doctrine and dogmatics to
the Church Fathers, who were philosophically trained in these traditions.43 The
close connection between theology and philosophy, he argues, is also found in the
medieval period, when theology was philosophy and vice versa, citing Anselm
and Abelard as examples of great philosophers who built their theology on a
philosophical foundation.
Hegel believed that the criticism levelled at philosophy in the modern world
would also undermine the content of a revealed, positive religion, whereby
Christianity would be replaced by natural religion and natural theology. He stresses
the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity was developed against the background of
Neoplatonism and the Alexandrian school.44
He accuses contemporary thought of treating dogma, which is true and
necessary, in a purely historical way, rather than as living truth, and argues that
philosophy is truer to these dogmas than is modern theology. An approach to
religion which favours faith as an inner conviction over rational understanding
explains this indifference to dogmatic theology. While philosophy points to an
immediate certainty of God’s existence, it goes beyond this, seeking to know God
conceptually as well. It is important to say not simply that God exists, but also
what he is. Consequently philosophy (his own, in particular), retains more aspects
of dogmatics for Hegel than does contemporary theology.
With regard to philosophy of religion and the three moments in which it unfolds,
we first find the concept treated (as the main idea), then religion in its concrete
existence, and finally absolute religion, Christianity. Through this process, the
Spirit returns to itself. The three moments correspond to universality, particularity
and singularity (within concept of religion, although they feature in the Science

42
Ibid., p. 63, my translation.
43
Ibid., p. 65.
44
Ibid., pp. 66–7.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 161

of Logic), and integrate Hegel’s insistence on the reconciliation between subject

and object in philosophy.45 In this way, Hegel translates Christian themes such
as the Trinity and Creation in terms of his own formulation of syllogistic logic.46
The interrelation between God and consciousness had been mentioned. Hegel now
asserts that man is conscious of God, and God as Spirit is realised in (human)
consciousness. The proofs of God’s existence belong to the concept of religion,
but they are prepared by the understanding, not reason. Within the concept of
religion, we first find a substantial unity between subject and object, man and God,
under the aspect of feeling and faith. The second stage represents a split, in which
we find man’s relation to God, and religion as such, in the form of representation
and thought. Finally a reconciliation is effected, which sublates the opposition
between the subjective and God, and where we find a mystical union with God
through religious worship or cultus.47
He reiterates a point already made, especially with regard to the second
moment within the concept of religion, to the effect that religion addresses every
human being, while philosophy only addresses a few. In religion, all human beings
have access to the truth, by appealing to the specific mental modes such as feeling,
representation and thought by way of the understanding.48 The second moment,
following the concept, presents the different forms of religion as moment of the
Spirit, as finite religions and shapes in the history of religion.
Specific religions are not the Christian religion, but are related to it as
subordinate moments of, and contained in, Christianity. A related implication is
that the consideration of these religions is necessary for reaching the final moment
of Christianity. The notion of Incarnation (Menschenwerdung) pervades all
religions.49 Other religions offer various conceptions of God.

45
‘The logical truth of the self-movement of the Begriff has three distinguishable
“moments” which correspond to the “moments” of God’s own actuality as Spirit: the
moment of identity or universality, the moment of particularity or differentiation, and the
moment of individuality as the actual or fulfilled reconciliation of the other two moments’,
James Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1983), p. 98. Scholars further note the relation between Hegel’s triadic logic and the
Trinity, a connection which is explicitly acknowledged by Hegel; see Walter Jaeschke,
Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983),
pp. 133–4. This parallelism – which also means a syllogistic pattern for the forms of
representation, this syllogistic logic being explicit in philosophy – reflects the similarities
between religious and philosophical logic, ibid., pp. 134–5.
46
For the detailed description of the syllogism of absolute religion, which includes the
three moments of universality, particularity and singularity, see Claude Bruaire, Logique et
religion chrétienne dans la philosophie de Hegel (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964), pp. 60–61.
47
Schlitt argues that faith has subjective connotations, while representation is more
objective; it constitutes ‘the objective side, the content of this certitude (which faith is)’, in
Schlitt, Divine Subjectivity, p. 49.
48
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 88.
49
Ibid., p. 105, notes.
162 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

While the treatment of the concept of religion comprises religion in itself

and the understanding of God, it also touches on the remaining two parts of the
philosophy of religion, the determinate and the absolute or consummate religion.
As for the second part, on determinate religion, Hegel admits that he will not
follow a strictly historical approach – which goes some way towards explaining
the omission of Islamic religion, which does not feature in its own right within the
Lectures on Philosophy of Religion.
In expounding the concept of religion, Hegel rejects the view that religion is
merely useful for its practical purposes, for preserving societal units such as the
family and the political state.50 This point had already been made by Averroes
in his Decisive Treatise, which stated that the goal of religion is not merely a
sociological one, to preserve the physical existence of human beings in society.
For Hegel it is Spirit that uses religion for its own purposes, and not the human
mind that manipulates religion.
Finally, in the third moment of the philosophy of religion as a whole, Spirit is
for itself what it is in itself, and we have the consummate religion in Christianity.51
Nothing remains hidden with regard to God. With the completion of religion its
concept is attained. We find actual self-consciousness of religion in Christianity.
In the first part of the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, religion is the
consciousness of God in the form of feeling, representation or thought. In contrast
to the early writings, the significance of grasping God and religion is an objective
goal and not just for the purpose of instilling morals in the human subject. God is a
real substance and subject. Religious worship would be meaningless if subjective
feeling lacked an objective basis. The subjective aspect of religion, designated
‘faith’ by Luther, is important for Hegel, but incomplete. In addition, the subjective
and objective are interrelated rather than independent of each other.
Religion is consciousness of the absolutely true.52 Religion presents itself as
speculative thought in the consciousness, but also in its object, through concrete
forms of representation, which set God in relation to the religious community and
its worship. In the philosophy of religion God is represented as thinking himself
and determining himself. Hegel reflects on the religion of his day as a matter
of inner feeling, and on the way early worship took the form of devotion. The
speculative approach to religion involves the immediate relation of the I – the
subject – to the divine, as a relation of finite to infinite.53
At this stage, representation has an important role to play, and it is preceded
by feeling, then intuition. These are modes through which our consciousness
relates to the divine, as forms of religious consciousness. These forms follow in
necessary sequence towards the conceptual approach to religion. Hegel explains
how the content of perception, obtained from empirical experience, is internalised

50
Ibid., p. 109.
51
Ibid., p. 91.
52
Ibid., p. 114.
53
Ibid., p. 120.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 163

as feeling and finally becomes representation. Feeling necessarily turns into

representation. Religious feeling is characterised as an acknowledgement of the
other, and sensibility must become representation and theory, for religion is also
representation, knowing and thinking.54
While discussing sensibility and its becoming representation in the human
mind, Hegel also dwells on the seeming dichotomy between nature and Spirit as
mutually exclusive. In this context, he argues that nature and Spirit reflect one
another and are at bottom identical, since they have the same root, which is the
Idea: ultimately, nature reverts to Spirit in a necessary movement. He refers to
Spinoza’s one substance in this context, as superseding the dichotomy. Nature
is the idea but exists as something external, and its truth is consciousness. The
highest point in nature is sensation because it includes subjectivity. The spirit
animates nature. Hegel traces religious feeling from its origin in nature, or rather,
our perception of nature. Nature is appearance, but it is idea for us. Nature is
represented as a transfiguration of Spirit. This presentation of religion starting
from the subject reminds us of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and indeed Hegel
makes reference to this early work, connecting the lectures with the earlier work,
and showing the necessity of the religious standpoint.55
However, the idea of God goes beyond the mere union between finite and
infinite. He is ‘absolute being, the logical, universal being, substance, absolute
subject’.56 In relation to nature, God is the truth of the universe, not ‘an abstract
other’.
Recalling a theme that he had developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel
analyses the relation of religion to art and philosophy, where art corresponds to
immediate intuition, religion to representation, and philosophy to thought. These
are all different forms of conceiving the absolute truth.57
Hegel stresses that the content of all three is identical, and these forms are not
so different. In religion one also finds intuition and thought; thus, the three forms
are interrelated. Religion can be seen as bridging art and philosophy, for art is one-
sided without religion, that is, without representing a religious subject.58

54
Ibid., p. 128.
55
Ibid., p. 138.
56
Ibid., p. 139.
57
As noted by various scholars, representation can be seen as a progress towards
thought, pointing to thought; see Quentin Lauer, Hegel’s Concept of God (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1982), p. 10. In this sense, representation is not mere opinion,
ibid., p. 34 (in the same way that for Averroes dialectic rises above common opinion).
58
Thus Yerkes states that in representing God to oneself the content comes from
thought, but the form of the representation is sensuous; Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel,
p. 144. He further argues that, for all of Hegel’s admiration for Scholastic philosophy and
theology, it is still too closely attached to the historical and symbolic aspects of Christianity
and so is not a fully speculative reflection on Christian religion, ibid., p. 176. However, he
164 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

However, art comes closer to sensation, whereas religion rises above it. In that
regard, art involves the limitations of the sensible. Art reproduces certain objects
and is animated by the idea. Besides being limited by the circumstances of the
sensible, Hegel also points out that the work of art itself is lifeless and not self-
consciousness – whereas religion, in contrast, exists only in the thinking subject
and self-consciousness. In addition, art depends on religion, and here Hegel clearly
privileges religious art, which the Phenomenology of Spirit had already studied.
Absolute art, he claims, cannot be dissociated from religion. Religion shows its
superiority as the ‘subjective side in the element of self-consciousness, and for it
representation is more essential’, representation being understood here as distinct
from image (Bild).59 In addition, religion encompasses and subsumes art, adding
to it the notions of right and the ethical life. It has a content which is truth and
worship. The representations of religion have truth as subjectivity. Religion is
more universal than art in the way it portrays its object, the divine, as less tied to
the particular, or the sensible. Each stage is more universal than the preceding one.
As such, religion, and its mode of apprehension – representation – stand midway
between art and conceptual thought, as representation stands in between sense
perception and actual thought.
In addition, religion is more objective than art, and it can be taught; it has
a doctrine and a specific content (while the content of art would be the object
represented, which does not constitute a conceptual content as such). Religion
relies not merely on feeling but on mental representation through the word, which
can be imparted and has an objective value. Faith consists in the acceptance of this
objective content of religion, and it requires the subject to understand this truth
as one’s own.60 Hegel claims that Luther also understood faith as distinct from
sensibility, pointing to an objective content. As such, and to avoid a detrimental
subjectivity, religion as representation should steer clear of mere feeling and
argumentation (Räsonnement). Religion must also rely not merely on authority but
on personal assent to a real objective content. Religious proofs rely on authority
and on God’s revelation, a principle in which apologetics is grounded, but employs
the authority of those to whom revelation was made. This kind of reasoning must
pass over to the infinite.
Nevertheless, representation is still tied to the sensible, while philosophy
employs thought instead. The shape of religion is representation rather than
thought (Denken), and lacks the necessity of philosophy. Necessity in this context
appears to mean that the shape of religion could be otherwise – the representations
used could vary.61

notes Hegel’s affirmation that theology is the science of the Christian faith – a formulation
similar to Aquinas’ definition of theology in the Summa Theologica, ibid., p. 174.
59
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 147.
60
Ibid., p, 151.
61
Ibid., p. 156.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 165

Moreover, the content is not seen as necessary, because it is immediate rather

than mediated. On the one hand, representation is whole and concrete; on the other
hand, its content is immediate, positive, revealed. It is the truth, although it remains
external. It remains too general, such as the concept of God or Providence. Only
philosophy results from the process of obtaining necessary connections – through
dialectic, which is a mediating process. However, Hegel admits that the truth did
not first come in the form of conceptual thought, but through representation and
religion. Within philosophical thinking, one must distinguish conceptual knowledge
from the understanding, which deals with finite imagery and furthermore produces
dogmatics. The application of finite reasoning to the infinite and absolute (God)
proves inadequate. In this context, Hegel berates Jacobi and praises Spinozism,
for the former defends a reflection that goes from the finite to another finite thing,
whereas the latter proceeds to the infinite from the finite. Philosophy in its proper
form, conceptual knowledge, is contrary to sensibility, as it is to representation and
reflection (Reflexion), which is a limited kind of reasoning.62 Having discussed the
concept of religion in general, Hegel goes on to debate specific approaches to the
concept of religion.

The Lectures of 1824 on the Concept of Religion

In the lectures of 1824, discussing the concept of religion, Hegel specifically

distinguishes between an empirical and a speculative approach. The former
involves representation – it consists in observing religion in our world – thus an
external approach that does not start from the subject as such. However, God is
not empirically observable; God is known as object but also through feeling as
another to whom we become linked. Hegel further distinguishes between knowing
(Wissen) and cognition. The former is immediate, resembling Jabobi’s approach to
faith, whereas cognition (Erkenntnis) is a more complete kind of knowledge, more
concrete and universal. God must be seen as the highest personality, as singular
within absolute universality.63
Although feeling has a part to play in religion, it may involve contingency and
a negative sense of subjectivity, since it can express any content. Furthermore, it
is something that we share with animals. On the other hand, feeling can convey
God’s essentiality, as well as the sense of right and duty. However, it is the least
adequate form of presenting the content. It does not present God as he truly is.
Conviction is a higher form because it involves the will.
Representation marks a further level in the various approaches to the object
of religion, namely God. It carries with it subjectivity as something finite in
approaching the infinite. The finite reflects the infinite and they limit each other.
However, the finite comes to realise that it only exists in reference to the absolute,
the infinite. In fact, the finite has three moments: (1) as simple, (2) as reflection,

62
Ibid., p. 163.
63
Ibid., p. 170.
166 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

and (3) as infinite (union of both).64 Hegel explains that in religious, Christian,
terms this is understood as God who creates the world and sets a finite being
against himself. But for Hegel finite and infinite are interdependent.
The speculative approach, however, does not look at the object merely from
an empirical or observational point of view. It studies the concept of religion
from the point of view of the subject and consciousness, which, however, does
not lack objectivity.65 Here Hegel does not overlook the human subject, who is
the subject proper of religion, but also analyses the religious phenomenon from a
divine point of view. He asserts that religious experience is only obtained through
God. External observation remains external to the object, hence the need for the
speculative approach. In this instance, consciousness is related to truth as its object.
The necessity of the religious standpoint also becomes clear in this kind of study.
This section, which lays out the speculative approach, comprises three
moments: first, (1) the necessity of religion and its being determined by an external
content, (2) religion as coming from an other (external content) is superseded, and
(3) the determination of these forms within religion.66
In distinguishing the external and the internal approaches, and stressing the
need for a study from within (looking at the account religion gives of itself),
Hegel affirms that religion comes from God and not from man, and is not a
human invention. In religion, our spirit and consciousness is in contact with the
absolute Spirit, and religion is a consciousness of the absolutely universal object
and a relation of our spirit to the Absolute Spirit.67 Equally, religion is self-
consciousness of the absolute Spirit. The subjective spirit is not separate from the
object. Religion is the highest determination of the absolute Idea. Equally, we find
a mediation through the finite spirit, whereby the absolute Spirit posits itself as
finite spirit, such that the finite consciousness becomes a moment of the absolute
Spirit. Moreover, God becomes finite through man, and religion is the knowledge
divine Spirit has of itself through the mediation of the finite spirit.
In stressing the need to understand God from within, Hegel’s criticism of
the proofs of God’s existence becomes apparent – in religion one starts from the
absolute Spirit, not from the finite spirit, and not from proofs provided by the
latter. The starting point, rather, is God, since the determinations must come from
the concept itself or reality.
What is the role of philosophy in the process of disclosing the nature of God
to us and our relationship with him? Philosophy bears the methodical proof that
the content is true. It shows us, in a conceptual or intelligible way, the nature of
God from his own perspective in its truth.68 This role of philosophy or philosophy
of religion takes the place of theology in previous discourse about God. Rather

64
Ibid., p. 211.
65
Ibid., p. 216.
66
Ibid., p. 220.
67
Ibid., p. 221.
68
Ibid., p. 221.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 167

than having a theology, Hegel has a philosophy of religion which is equated with
philosophy itself. It shows us God’s activity within himself. Philosophy provides
an account of religion with the appearance of the Idea, of God, to us and to
the world.
In accordance with Hegel’s dialectic, this process is to be understood in three
moments. In a first instance, the idea is a self-identical affirmation; secondly,
we find a differentiation within the idea, being for one and for another, and the
appearance of God; and finally the difference is integrated within the absolute
affirmation.69
These first two aspects can be combined to some extent. The differentiation and
being for other (for the subject as an object) is essential, and contains the moment
of representation, the representation of God. This is understood as appearance, for
himself and for us. In a first instance, God is Spirit and is for us, and the reality
equals the idea. The second moment leads to the reconciliation of the difference
through worship and the religious community, and represents the practical side.
Within the first moment Hegel mentions other religions, which also consider
the idea of God, although they fail to represent him as he truly is; they fall short
of the authentic religion – a place reserved for Christianity, which understands
God as Spirit in its absolute content.70 While discussing the various religions and
their concept of God, Hegel offers some reflections on the difference between
philosophy and religion, the latter going hand in hand with representation (or
‘picture-thinking’): religion appears in many forms, which include positive
religion(s). Positivity in religion signifies that the content is imposed on the subject
externally, usually through scripture, a text which is considered authoritative and
from which dogma is elicited. In this sense, philosophy is at odds with religion as
positive religion, since the tendency for dogma and reification involves the use of
the finite understanding and goes over and above simple faith. Here the spirit has
gone out of religion, as a result of the stress on a particular form. Enlightenment
took it upon itself to critique these forms. Hegel goes on to say:

It is the distinctive task of philosophy to transmute the content that is in the

representation of religion into the form of thought; the content [itself] cannot be
distinguished. Religion is the self-consciousness of absolute spirit: there are not
two kinds of self-consciousness – not both a conceptualizing self-consciousness
and a representing self-consciousness, which could be distinguished according
to their content. There can only be a diversity in form, or a distinction between
representation and thought, and we can presuppose a more detailed acquaintance
with that.71

69
Ibid., p. 228.
70
Ibid., p. 234.
71
Ibid., p. 235, English translation in G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion, vol. 1, Introduction and the Concept of Religion, ed. Peter. C. Hodgson, trans.
168 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Representation has the form of externality and relies on sensation; it stands

midway between sense perception and thought. It is no longer pure sensation
because it has internalised sensation. What Hegel means here is that the imagery
associated with religion is still linked to the sensible and sensibility, in particular
the sense of sight. Proof of this sensibility is the figurative expressions used in
religion. In Christianity, specifically, the usage of terms such as ‘father’ and ‘son’
indicate the remnants of sensibility. Representation is the result of an internalisation
of sense data, which are subsequently translated into figurative expressions and
analogies. The notions of father and son as applied to God derive from the ‘natural
living state’, from the physical relation between father and son that we observe
in nature, while the concept of ‘creation’ loosely describes the relation of God
to the world. In addition, the chronological sequence insisted upon in religion
(the history of religious events succeeding in chronological order) goes against the
logic and necessity of the conceptual form. History and time stand opposite to the
logical and necessary. In a passage from the Lectures on the History of Philosophy,
which will be analysed below, Hegel explicitly opposes philosophy and history:

Philosophy is the science of necessary thoughts, of their essential connection

and system, the knowledge of what is true, hence eternal and everlasting. In
contrast, history in the usual view deals with what has taken place, thus with
something contingent, transitory, and past.72

Thus it is necessary to study history, and the history of philosophy, in a philosophical

perspective in order to discover in it the guiding principle(s).
In these passages from the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel sums
up his understanding of the relation of philosophy and religion, respectively based
on concept and representation. The content remains identical, but the form of
presentation differs. Indeed, it could be said that philosophy does not have a form
as such, but presents the content as it is, whereas religion uses figurative language,
based on everyday language, such as the concept of family relations. Hegel also
mentions the different approaches to religion – theological, pietist, sentimental – as
a sign that religion does not present the content in the most perfect way. Religion
is closer to sensibility than is philosophy, a point already made by Averroes. The
connection between religion and historical narrative also detracts from a perfect
expression of the true content.73

R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart with the assistance of H. S. Harris (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 333.
72
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–1826, vol. I, Introduction
and Oriental Philosophy, together with the Introductions from the other Series of these
Lectures, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart with the assistance of
H. S. Harris (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 167.
73
According to Jaeschke, the realm of representation is spatiality, temporality,
accidentality, and, generally speaking, particularity and finitude. It has a given content,
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 169

However, there is a conceptual way of reading history, which looks at the logical
necessity of the events as they unfold. It is this logical or speculative approach
which permits us to see Christianity as the culmination of religious tradition or
thought, and, in a parallel way, Hegel’s own philosophy as the culmination of the
history of philosophical thought, by his own admission. Summing up this first
point, and before proceeding to the second point, which pertains to the practical
aspect of religion and specifically worship, Hegel states that within the first point
God is seen in representation and this corresponds to the true idea of God. The
representation of God is the being of God.
Hegel proceeds to the second aspect, worship, which is grounded in faith,
defined as an inner testimony of the spirit which links us to the absolute Spirit.
While stating that faith cannot be solely based on miracles, Hegel argues that his
account of religion accords faithfully with the Christian faith, and is a philosophical
translation of Christian faith and theology. At this point he wards off charges of
pantheism, arguing that his union of the finite spirit with the infinite Spirit is seen as
a communication between the finite and the infinite, based on the notion that man
is made in God’s image. He adds that his account of absolute Spirit corresponds to
the Person of the Holy Spirit, who is God. He acknowledges that his appreciation

occurring in time, which is not immediately or physically present, unlike in intuition

(Anschauung), but is a recalled content, thus containing an element of memory. A representation
is something produced, or rather, reproduced. Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels,
p. 114. Representation constitutes just one aspect of religion, ibid., p. 115; it stands between
intuition and conceptual thinking, p. 116, and is also closely connected with feeling (Gefühl),
p. 117. Jaeschke asks how the content can possibly remain the same, absolute and infinite, if
presented in disparate forms (such as art and religion, as well as philosophy). The answer is
to be found in Christianity, the highest form of religion, and the passage to philosophy, ibid.,
pp. 118–19. For the connection between representation and memory, see also Chapelle, Hegel
et la Religion, vol. 1, p. 119. Hodgson highlights the richness of the concept of representation:
‘In the philosophy of religion lectures the discussion of language occurs principally as an
analysis of forms of the knowledge of God: immediate knowledge, feeling, representation,
thought. We have seen that for Hegel representation (Vorstellung) is not merely an
epistemological but an ontological category, pointing to a divine action, God’s setting-forth of
godself in the spatiotemporal world. God is both the subject and the object of representation.
Epistemologically speaking, representation has two forms, sensible and nonsensible. Sensible
representation expresses its contents in the form of historical narratives, either mythical or
factual. In narrative, elements exist alongside each other as independent entities, linked by
conjunctions. Representation is not yet able to hold its disparate elements together in the
form of a conceptual grasp of relations. The latter is the task of thought (Denken), which is
the highest form of language in its ideality and synchronicity. Nonetheless, it draws upon
materials furnished by representation, and if it cuts itself off from them it loses contact with
life experience and takes on the character of formal logic or mathematics. Hegel might have
been more explicit about this dependence of thought on representation. But it is clear that
an aspect of narrative is always present in thought, especially in religious thought’; Peter C.
Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 273–4.
170 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of theology, which seeks to understand faith in a rational way, brings him closer
to Catholic theology than to Protestant theology – and cites Meister Eckhart in
support of his view of the interrelation of God and man.74 This reconciliation is
achieved through worship, which comprises every aspect of human life. It implies
giving up subjectivity and particularity.

The Lectures of 1827 on the Concept of Religion

These lectures offer an approach to the concept of religion similar to the lectures
of 1824, and they deal more specifically with the three moments – concept of God
in itself, our knowledge of God and finally the cultus. Within the knowledge of
God, Hegel states that revelation is an integral part of Christian religion, and he
berates contemporary theology for speaking of religion rather than God, unlike
medieval theological practice.
We first conceive of God through representation, then as thought.
Representation can depict a fictitious content, whereas thought depicts God as
he is; it is not a merely subjective conception. Thought brings about certainty.75
However, representation is more objective than faith. Certainty of belief differs
from that of knowledge and is only a first stage towards knowledge. The agent of
faith is not an external fact or factor, such as miracles or historical confirmation,
but the testimony of the Spirit itself. At the same time, this faith cannot rely on
feeling alone, but must become more objective and universal. Representation
offers a more objective expression of the content than feeling, but it must progress
towards thought/concept. The content of representation and concept is the same
regarding the world spirit.
The characteristic of representation is that it entails images and sensible
forms which point to a more conceptual content. These images are to be taken
allegorically as symbols. Hegel cites the relation of Father begetting the Son in
religion as this kind of allegory – the allegorical aspect of which could be taken to
mean that this is not a physical begetting. The image stands for the real content but
must be distinguished from it, as an allegory.
For representation – it must be stressed that this term is taken in a subjective
sense, as the act of representing to oneself, and objectively, as the image
represented in the mind – history comes as appearance. Representation also has a
close link with history, and a time sequence, as Hegel had already mentioned, but
in a specific way, as narrative. The content of religion presents itself in a sensible
way especially to ordinary consciousness, that is to say, to ordinary people, who
are not philosophers. This sensible picturing involves events that take place in a
sequence, at a specific time and successively.76

74
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 248.
75
Ibid., p. 282.
76
Ibid., p. 295.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 171

God, the Spirit, and creation can also be seen as representations, although they
originally proceed from thought. Representation also has non-sensible forms.
Religion contains both feeling and representation, but representation is the first
objective form of the content. For its part, representation does not attain to the
unity itself but contains an element of contingency, and cannot bridge the gap
between God and the world.
With regard to thought, Hegel states that it is more universal than representation.
However, the common consciousness adheres to representation. Thought requires
mediation and necessity, a logical process – in short, Hegel’s dialectic logic. This
involves a process of unfolding causation, from cause to effect, where the effect is
subsumed in the cause and cannot exist without the causal process. Mediation in
religious knowledge takes the forms of teaching, education and revelation. Here
Hegel accepts that doctrine (Lehre) and revelation are essential. Even faith and
belief/conviction are mediated, rather than immediate.77
In a renewed criticism of the proofs of God’s existence, he claims that in them
the finite spirit gives testimony to the infinite Spirit, an inadequate process, since the
latter should testify for itself. At any rate, the truth of the finite is always the infinite.
With regard to the third moment, worship, Hegel states that it produces the
reconciliation of man to God, and it is an essential aspect of religion which cannot
be neglected. In this context, it must be said that the sacraments are an important
part of worship. Philosophy itself, in studying the absolute Spirit as object, is
a perpetual worship.78 A religion can be imposed by state authorities, but Hegel
claims that this flies in the face of the free nature of personal faith and belief.
In the excerpts of the lectures of 1831 (taken by student David Friedrich
Strauss), the year of Hegel’s death, three stages are delineated within religion:
feeling, representation and finally faith. Within representation, we do not yet possess
the truth of the content. Representation includes the figurative, which implies a
difference between the mode of representation and the object represented, calling
for the explanation of allegorical meaning. It also includes the indeterminate and
simple, which is not yet fully grasped. Finally, it includes the historical aspect, as
actual happenings and sequences of events.

The Determinate Religion

What is the role of representation in the second part of the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, devoted to determinate religions? The sequence of
religions presented leads to Christianity. These religions include pagan religions
such as ancient Greek religion, Judaism, and the oriental religions of China, India

77
Ibid., p. 306–7. However, representational thinking fails to make full use of
dialectic, Hegel’s own conception of logic, and specifically to grasp the object in its
dialectical unity. See Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel, p. 81.
78
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 334.
172 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

and Persia, for which Hegel had researched the latest sources in scholarship. 79 As
Jaeschke rightly points out, Hegel’s goal is not primarily to produce a history of
religions; in fact, the chronological relation of other religions to Christianity is
unimportant.80 His goal is rather to trace the role of the Spirit in historical religions,
as forms of the Spirit. Within determinate religion, he examines the being, essence
and concept of God. The treatment of world religions by Hegel is not exhaustive,
and Islam is omitted or at least not treated in its own right.
Having treated the religion of beauty, which is Greek religion, Hegel
discovers that the underlying principles in Judaism – the religion of the sublime
(Erhabenheit) – underlie Islam as well, namely, obedience as a fundamental
principle, together with unfreedom, and the concept of God as one and abstract.81
In these religions – as he will say later – God is not Spirit, in contrast to Christianity,
which is characterised by the dogma of the Trinity and where freedom is found. In
Judaism, people are considered servants, and Islam is characterised by fanaticism,
dependence and servitude along with strong ties to family and society.82 Islam,
however, is addressed to everyone and does not seek to convert just one people.
Fanaticism is also characteristic of Judaism, but only when religion is attacked, and
its goal is particular, unlike in Islam.83 Islam does not entail the kind of nationalism
found in Judaism, and the only distinction made is that between believers and
non-believers.84 He sees in Islamic doctrine the fear of God as the cornerstone,
and the veneration of God as one as foundational, and he deems this to be a
formal abstraction.85
He judges that Judaism does not envisage immortality or reconciliation,
and conceives realisation to be found only in the here and now; only a temporal
advantage is to be obtained by believers. As for Greek religion, he finds a union of
the spiritual and the natural, with beauty at the centre of worship. Greek religion
is also characterised by the absence of dogma; for the Greeks the immortality
of the soul is no dogma as such. This absence of dogma is also a characteristic
of Roman religion, the religion of expediency (Zweckmässigkeit, which can also
be translated as ‘usefulness’), which sees a decline in true religiosity. Here the
representation of the divine being is clearly not for thought but for representation

79
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, Die bestimmte
Religion, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994), p. xxi.
80
Ibid., p. xxix.
81
See also Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. Eva
Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 431, for
Hegel’s association of the ‘abstract’ with Islam.
82
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, pp. 62–4.
83
Ibid., p. 337.
84
Ibid., p. 577, notes.
85
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete
Religion, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984), p. 149.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 173

alone. The natural element suits the sensible and the external intuition, and the
human form is present and is an essential part of religion.
More generally, while dependency characterises the oriental religions, freedom
is found in the ancient Greek religion.86 On the whole, the various religions are
moments of the spirit.87
In the lectures of 1824 on the determinate religions, he offers a threefold
division, in which the first instance is natural or nature religion, followed by a
religion in which subjectivity plays an important role, including Judaism and
Greek religion, and finally the ancient Roman religion of expediency. In the
nature religions, Hegel incorporates the oriental religions. The second moment
of determinate religion embodies the religion of the spirit for itself, such as the
Greek and the Jewish religions. Finally, the Roman religion is the religion of the
external goal.88 In the nature religion (different from the Enlightenment’s rational
religion) a unity is observable between nature and spirit, and nature is worshipped
as something spiritual and for its divine powers.89 Here the representation of
the divine is still abstract rather than concrete. Within nature religion, one can
distinguish the metaphysical concept, the form or representation of God, and the
cultus. In nature religion, the infinite is present in the finite, God is present in
nature.90 Among the different nature religions, one finds the religion of magic,
which is not particularly spiritual, and is in fact not yet religion on that account.
The religion of fantasy (Hinduism) is the second form of nature religion, and in the
passage from nature religion to spiritual religion we find the religion of the enigma
(Rätsel), corresponding to ancient Egyptian religion.
In his analysis of determinate religions, Hegel often draws comparisons with
Christianity, which he sees as the culmination of a long process of development
of religious forms, each represented by a different religion. Thus, for instance, in
Greek religion the humanity of the gods is obvious, but not the principle of God
made man as such. While the Roman religion of expediency addresses all and
seeks the adherence of all peoples, together with the expansion of the empire, it
does not present an inner necessity, and its universality is not spiritual, unlike the
Christian and Islamic religions.91 The beginning of the process whereby Spirit is
for Spirit heralds the passage to Christian religion.

86
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, p. 115.
87
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, p. 91.
88
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, p. 142.
89
‘Natural religion, or rather the religion of nature, he [Hegel] defines as in essence
the unity of the spiritual and the natural. It is not to be confused however with what in his
day was usually designated by the term; the “natural religion” of the Enlightenment thinkers
he rejects as a figment of the “philosophical” imagination’, Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy
of Religion, p. 39.
90
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, p. 159.
91
Ibid., p. 401.
174 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

In the Lectures of 1827, Hegel again stresses that the various determinate
religions are moments of the (self-development of the) concept. Christianity is
the culmination of the process involving the series of the various religions. In
this lecture series he includes reflections on Taoism and Buddhism, using the
latest research by European scholars on the other (i.e., non-Christian) religions.
He notes the dualism (between finite and infinite) which characterises Oriental
religions, such as Manicheism.92 With regard to Egyptian religion, he remarks that
it is the first one to defend the immortality of the soul. Ancient Egyptian religion
represents a higher level of spirituality, in that it makes way for subjectivity in
the form of representation (i.e., the notion of gods in the shape of humans), in
which the human being is not represented immediately or simply objectively, but
as transformed by subjectivity and representation.93
Hegel explains why representation entails a higher level of spirituality, holding
that it contains an aspect of universality (rather than particularity). Representation
works at different levels, and has an element of thought. In the Phenomenology
of Spirit, representation at the highest level (within the chapter on religion) is
subsumed under Spirit, as is philosophy.94

The Consummate Religion

The consummate (or complete) religion, constituting the third part of the Lectures
on Philosophy of Religion, contains Hegel’s views on Christianity and its place
in his philosophical system. The title given to this final section of the lectures
indicates Hegel’s great esteem for Christianity, which represents the highest form
of religion, and the form in which the Spirit knows itself as such. Moreover,
Christianity does not have the incompleteness of other religions, hence it is the
consummate (vollendete) religion.
Hegel’s most explicit treatment of representation is found in the concept of
religion, his introduction to the theory of religion in these lectures. Representation
does not feature as prominently in the second part of the lectures as it does in the

92
Ibid., p. 507.
93
Ibid., p. 522.
94
As pointed out by Stephen Rocker, these are various levels of representation
(with the implicit affirmation of Christianity as containing the highest form of religious
representation): ‘We need to be clear that all religious representations are not on one level
and that doctrinal expressions of religion’s content more closely approach pure thought
as they manifest the effort to give rational expression to what is, or should be, believed.
Nonetheless doctrine as religiously expressed retains some degree of externality, and the
connection of the elements is not completely demonstrated. Yet, even here as Hegel notes,
we find “within religion philosophies directly expressed”’; Rocker, ‘The Integral Relation
of Religion and Philosophy in Hegel’s Philosophy’, p. 30.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 175

first part. We shall now examine his references to representation in the context
of Christianity.
Hegel’s manuscript describes Christianity as the most sublime (erhabenste)
religion.95 It shows the manifestation of God in spiritual self-consciousness. In
this sense, the Christian religion is the religion of revelation.96 In it God reveals
himself to humanity, which is possible first because man was made in God’s
image, as proclaimed in Genesis, and, secondly, because God became incarnate
and made himself man, as revealed in the New Testament. These appear to be
necessary conditions for a true communication between human beings and God.
In other religions, God is other than his manifestation, but not so in Christianity,
which is the religion of truth.97 In Christianity, God appears as Spirit and as truth,
in and for itself. As Hegel had mentioned before, the proofs of God’s existence are
an inadequate way of talking about God or even for understanding his existence,
because they proceed from the finite to the infinite (in the sense that man seeks to
prove God’s existence, rather than seeing God manifesting himself to humans),
whereas we should try to see God, insofar as possible, as he sees himself; in other
words, we should start from the concept.
In this context, Hegel contrasts subjectivity and representation with being and
objectivity. Representation signifies appearance to the subject in this context, which
need not have negative connotations. It can be something positive, for it implies
existence for the consciousness and for the spirit. In a sense, ‘the concept seems to
dispense with being in the same way that the soul dispenses with the body’.98 Even
so, one must proceed from the concept to being, as in Anselm’s proof, in which the
concept of God is proof of his existence: the concept not lacking any perfection
and thus not lacking existence. Representation bears, in this passage of Hegel’s
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, a more general meaning, signifying that
which the mind pictures to itself, without a contrast to concept or conceptual
thinking.99 In fact, representation is here equated with general content as opposed
to that which is limited and particular.
Among the ways of representing God, and after mentioning the Trinity, Hegel
also refers to certain ‘naive’ forms of representation in a Christian religious context.
These forms of representation are ‘Son, begetting’, a clear reference to Christian
theology and the Nicene Creed, which describes the mode of procession amongst
the Persons of the Trinity. In these lectures, Hegel offers a metaphorical reading
of Christian dogma. It is in this context that the discussion of ‘representation’
takes place in the treatment of the consummate form of religion, Christianity. In
addition, this religion represents for Hegel the full revelation of God. The fact
that certain aspects of Christianity, such as the Trinity, had featured in previous

95
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 1, notes.
96
Ibid., p. 2.
97
Ibid., p. 4.
98
Ibid., p. 8, my translation.
99
Ibid., pp. 14–15.
176 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

religions, albeit in an incomplete form, in no way detracts from the intrinsic truth
of the Trinity in Christianity – it is still a divine revelation rather than a human
construction. Any previous religious forms that were later found in the Christian
religion did not represent an absolute consciousness of the truth.100 He proceeds
to a philosophical analysis of the Trinity and its moral and spiritual implications.
God in himself is infinite power. Jesus is the Logos, that which manifests God; he
is wisdom and the paradigm for human beings. Finally, Spirit represents totality.
Hegel also stresses the interweaving between religious and philosophical
ideas, in particular in the intersection between Christianity and Neoplatonism, as
well as Gnosticism in Late Antiquity. He alludes to the existence of ‘philosophical
representations’ that were used from the time of Christ, and the way some of them
constituted philosophical systems, such as that of Philo of Alexandria and other
Alexandrian thinkers of Antiquity. This process involves a mixture of the Christian
religion with philosophical representations, with an admixture of figurative and
allegorical notions. He also claims that heresies rise from speculations on the
procession of that which is other from the One. It is interesting to find the use
of ‘representation’ applied to philosophy. The term could point at this passage
to a departure from Christian dogma as established by the Church councils. On
the other hand, it could mean a more fluid boundary between representation and
conceptual thinking, since the latter can also imply thought, and be closer to, or
further from, sensibility.
The second representation refers to Creation, and the world of finitude, after
the first representational sphere of God as Spirit, corresponding to the idea of God.
Hegel argues that representation sees these two spheres (God and Creation) as
quite separate, while they are at bottom one from the conceptual point of view.101
The world is seen as the region of contradiction, for instance between form and
matter, but some of these oppositions are produced by the understanding.102 The
third sphere is objectivity as finite spirit and, with redemption and reconciliation,
the completion or perfection (Vollendung also meaning consummation) of the
Spirit. The divine Idea should be realised in finite (human) self-consciousness.
Reverting to the concept of representation, Hegel distinguishes here
representation from concept or conceptual thinking. Something that is understood
conceptually is represented as different states (in time or place) of existence,
in a discrete form. As an illustration he refers to the principle of man’s being
made in God’s image – what this truly means is man’s spiritual vocation.
When speaking of ‘representation’ in the context of Christianity, Hegel links it
with a literal, materialistic or anthropomorphic reading of what he deems to be
metaphors present in scripture (a position which resembles Averroes’ theory of
metaphorical interpretation of the Qur’an if it depicts God in any corporeal way).
In this particular case, our being made in God’s image means that we share in

100
Ibid., p. 19.
101
Ibid., pp. 22–4.
102
Ibid., p. 26.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 177

God’s own intelligent and intelligible nature. Hegel believes that the speculative
content cannot be conveyed in images or representations – speculative meaning
conceptual in this context. Equally, the Fall of the first man is interpreted by him
metaphorically to mean that we become less similar to God, namely in becoming
mortal – although knowledge of good and evil is an intrinsic aspect of the spirit.103
He presents us with a philosophical explanation of the doctrine of original sin, and
man’s evil nature, in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right:

The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil is superior to the other
according to which he is good. Interpreted philosophically, this doctrine should
be understood as follows. As spirit, man is a free being [Wesen] who is in a
position not to let himself be determined by natural drives. When he exists in an
immediate and uncivilized [ungebildeten] condition he is therefore in a situation
in which he ought not to be, and from which he must liberate himself. This is the
meaning of the doctrine of original sin, without which Christianity would not be
the religion of freedom.104

Certain central biblical dogmas, however, are not to be taken metaphorically,

but as historical facts, namely the Incarnation. For Hegel Jesus is not merely a
divine teacher or a moral instructor, or even a philosopher. We possess an intuitive
and immediate certainty of his divinity, which is not a matter of representation
or persuasion.105 The consummation of reality in a single individual is the most
beautiful aspect of Christianity, by Hegel’s admission.
Other aspects of Christian teaching are analysed as they speak to the
representation and speculative thinking, such as the meaning of the kingdom of
God. This ‘metaphor’ could signify God’s own inner life but it is also is closely
related to Jesus, who embodies the kingdom of God. The representational aspect
appears to point to the fact of the Incarnation, but not because Hegel would deny
this dogma – God having become man. Instead, this is the way God reveals himself
and his kingdom to human beings, by making himself closer to them through the
Incarnation. God makes himself such as to be able to be grasped by human beings.

103
Ibid., p. 41.
104
G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B.
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51, §18, Addition H. According
to Reardon, ‘when the Bible speaks of the “wrath” of God, or of his “vengeance” or
“repentance” we at once realize that such terms are not to be taken in their primary meaning
but merely as suggestive of a resemblance or “likeness”’, Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy of
Religion, p. 34.
105
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 47. Reardon
states: ‘The gospel accounts of Jesus are not presented merely as a myth or allegory but as
a genuine record of actual occurrences, even though it is the divine signification and not the
bare happenings which furnish the inward and “rational” element in his history’, Reardon,
Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 34.
178 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

The three spheres here consider God first as thinking Spirit, secondly as his
realisation in nature (Creation) and finally as his realisation in a finite spirit, which
then returns to the eternal idea.106 Representation in these passages comes down to
the sensible and sensible imagining.
The manifestation of God, as Hegel states, is present in thinking, representation
and actuality. All these aspects are united in the figure of Jesus, who stands between
God the Father, as the pure concept of God, and the Spirit, which represents the
divine object becoming immanent.107
Representation also has a privileged link to faith. The substantial nature of Spirit
can be grasped through conceptual thinking, but in the community of believers this
is not the case – the community is conscious of the Spirit through faith. When Spirit
reveals itself for the spiritual consciousness as a whole it is called faith. This does not
require recourse to authority or reasoning, which for Hegel can be contingent and
accidental. The grounds for faith are the Spirit itself. He states that ‘the faith ... of the
community rests solely on reason itself, on the Spirit’.108
Since religion must rest on Spirit, an external element (such as authority) is not
sufficient to bring about faith; this must be achieved by inner persuasion. Neither
a merely rationalistic approach nor a subjectivist approach can be adequate. Spirit
transcends this dichotomy between subject and object. According to Hegel, this can
only be achieved through thought, that is, in philosophy: ‘Thinking is the only sphere
in which everything extraneous vanishes and spirit is absolutely free, is present to
itself. The interest of thinking, of philosophy, lies in reaching this goal’.109

The Lectures of 1824 on the Consummate Religion

The lectures of 1824 highlight the notion of Christianity as the consummate

religion.110 Hegel stresses again that religion represents the relation of Spirit to
spirit, and the communication between divine Spirit and human spirit. He rejects
the subjectivist notion that we cannot know God or the object in itself.
Representation appears especially linked to the Incarnation of God, who
in this process becomes something particular and conceivable by the human
consciousness/spirit.111 Here he also analyses the three moments of the consummate
religion, Christianity, as corresponding to the three Persons of the Trinity, not as

106
Ibid., pp. 68–9.
107
Ibid., pp. 77–8.
108
Ibid., p. 85. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 3, The
Consummate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson and J.M.
Stewart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 150.
109
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–1826, vol. I, p. 215.
110
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 24.
111
An echo from medieval Christian theology may be discerned here. According to
Aquinas, ‘just as the Blessed Virgin conceived Christ in her body, so every pious soul
conceives Him spiritually’; St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, complete English
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 179

they proceed from the Father, or in their internal timeless procession, but as they
reveal themselves to humanity. These moments consist in, first, the Father, who
is revealed to the Jewish people as announced in the Old Testament; secondly the
Son, whose life is narrated in the Gospels; and finally, the Holy Spirit, sent by
the Son after his ascension into Heaven, as narrated in the Acts of the Apostles,
which are part of the New Testament. It is philosophy, in particular philosophy of
religion, which conceptualises and reflects upon these moments in a concrete way.
The tripartition into these three moments, found in the third part of the Lectures
on Philosophy of Religion, is thus described by Hegel: spirit is considered in
three forms or elements. The first is eternal being, which is in the form of
universality, and is being for itself. Secondly comes the form or appearance, or
particularisation, being for others.112 Finally, we have the form of return to itself
from appearance, which is the form of absolute singularity. The second form is
specifically associated with representation, while the first is simply thought, and
the third is the form of subjectivity. In this process, which Hegel calls divine
history, the Spirit differentiates itself, separates itself and returns to itself. In terms
of location, the first form is outside space, the second is seen in the world, and the
third in the Christian community. This explication by Hegel is another example
of his philosophical interpretation of theological dogmas, his conceptualisation
of the Christian Trinity.113 The tripartition into universal, particular and singular
is already present, as we have seen, in his Science of Logic. The same idea is
available conceptually and for representation; indeed, the idea of God must be
universally accessible also to the representational mind.114
The second moment, heralding the coming of Christ, is studied in conjunction
with his teachings. Hegel notes something which could resemble points he had
already made in his early theological writings, to the effect that the teachings of
Christ cannot be equated with what went on to become the doctrine of the Church.
However, in this later context, this does not mean that the doctrine of the Church
is at variance with the teachings of Christ, but that it came to be conveyed in
a different way from the one in which Christ presented his teachings. A more
detailed note dating from 1831 states that these teachings are meant to arouse
sensibility, through representation, reaching the mind as intuition. They were only

edition in five volumes, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New
York: Benziger Bros., 1948), vol. 4, Part III, Q. 30, First Article, Obj. 3, p. 2173.
112
Jaeschke remarks that within the treatment of Christianity, Christology features as
the third moment in Hegel’s Encylopaedia [§569] (as singularity) whereas in the Lectures on
Philosophy of Religion it constitutes the second moment (as particularity): Walter Jaeschke,
Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels, pp. 93–4. The trinitarian structure of the exposition of
absolute religion is only introduced in the Lectures, not before, ibid., p. 95.
113
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, pp. 120–21.
114
Ibid., p. 122.
180 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

formulated as doctrine (conceptually and scientifically) at a later stage, according

to the needs of the Church.115
When the Spirit is given to the community, the representational mode turns
into a spiritual one, although the representational mode can always be recalled
and employed again. Representational apprehension derives from the sensible
and the use of imagery, although it can rise above it. This process becomes
particularly obvious with the coming of the Holy Spirit. The sensible presence of
the divine manifests itself in holy images, pictures and relics, which function as
mediation between the human community and God. For the spiritual community
the immediate presence has vanished, but it has already been incorporated into it,
and is to return with Christ’s second coming.116
In his endeavour to stress that the Spirit then resides in the community, Hegel
states that some forms of the religion – in this case Christianity – do not advance
beyond the second stage, which is the representation of the Son and those who
surrounded him. He mentions Catholicism as a case in point, where Mary, the
Mother of God, is venerated and the saints are exalted. He does not deny that the
Spirit is recognised as such, but states that it is considered in Catholicism to reside
in the Church and its decrees rather than its faithful. The second moment is thus
highlighted, and with it its sensible form which addresses sensible imagination to
the detriment of the third moment, of the Spirit; thus the second moment is not
spiritualised.117 Hegel adds that Mary and the saints become part of the reconciling
power of God in Catholicism, a clear reference to the views on intercession in
the Catholic Church. Moreover, the Spirit is considered to dwell in the Church
hierarchy rather than in the community.
Having described the Spirit as the union of the Father and the Son in the
Holy Trinity, he goes on to highlight modern challenges to the Church, based on
an abstract conception of God, that is antithetical to the Christian Church. This
abstract thinking can take on two forms. One of them is the Enlightenment, with
its general conception of God which does not take into account the Trinity and the
concrete God of the Bible. This view carries with it a certain subjectivism allied
with the conclusion that God cannot be known as he is.
The other challenge is Islam, which Hegel discusses here in the longest
passage devoted to Islam in the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion. In Islam,
and contrary to the Enlightenment position, the subject only exists for the One
and gives itself up. Its content resembles that of Judaism, but any particularity is
abolished, including the specificity of being addressed to a particular nation, one
of the hallmarks of Judaism. Islam is the antithesis of Christianity in its abstract
conception of God. It shares with Christianity only the fact of being addressed
to all peoples. Everyone is the same in the sight of God, and although slavery is
contemplated, all class distinctions are abolished. Hegel contrasts Islam to the

115
Ibid., pp. 240–41.
116
Ibid., p. 153.
117
Ibid., pp. 161–2.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 181

spirituality of Christianity, which is concretely grounded in the Trinity and its

historical revelation, a revelation that occurs in history, a concrete history.118 In
Islam the human individual should retain no private purpose, and nothing peculiar,
whereas in Christianity a self denial of the private or natural will aims at developing
one’s spiritual essence. This aspect of Islam, in Hegel’s understanding, explains
its fatalism and indifference to life. The similarity between the Enlightenment and
the Islamic position on the concept of God lies in an abstract approach.119 (The
editors of the English version of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion ascribe
the absence of Islam in Hegel’s treatment of determinate religions to the fact that
historically it is not subsumed under Christianity, and it represents a contemporary
rival.120 In various passages in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, he
stresses that the number of Muslims worldwide exceeds that of Christians).
The 1824 lectures on philosophy of religion seek to reconcile philosophy
and religion, or more specifically, philosophy and the Church. Philosophy was
considered to oppose religion and the Church because of its use of thought
and rejection of representational form. The opposition between them is a false
dichotomy because philosophy recognises the necessity of the representational
mode. Yet Hegel considers the concept to be a higher expression of the truth,
for while containing the forms of representation, its possesses its own content,
while representation points to a reality that remains outside the subject and is
not produced by itself.121 The purpose of philosophy is to know the truth and
thus to know God in a concrete way. Therefore, in its affirmation that we cannot
know God, the Enlightenment is opposed to philosophy, and opposes the fact that
philosophy shows the rational content of religion, and that the Spirit, who is the
Truth, is present in religion.
Within the realm of spirit, Hegel distinguishes three stages. The first is
immediate and naive religion, which is the stage of faith. Secondly comes the
understanding, and the type of reflection of the Enlightenment, and finally the
community of philosophers (of those who philosophise). This schema places

118
Scholars note the fact that Hegel incorporated more details about determinate
religions in the course of his various lectures, but his having read the Qur’an is not attested
and remains an unlikely possibility, given his denial of any historical aspect in Islam.
119
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, pp. 171–3.
120
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 242, n. 210.
121
Several scholars note that the opposition between subject and object, and human
and divine, is retained within representation. See, for instance, Raymond Keith Williamson,
Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion (Albany: State of New York Press, 1984), p.
266. In this sense, it bears some resemblance to the faculty of the understanding in the way
it proceeds, ibid., p. 274. Representation stays within the confines of the finite, ibid., p. 295.
Williamson aptly notes, however, that philosophy, as much as religion, is also a form of
conveying the truth (pace Hegel), therefore ‘[philosophical] language is also limited and has
a symbolic meaning that can be grasped only by those within the esoteric circle’, ibid., p. 300.
182 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

philosophy above faith, but the latter still represents a necessary part in the
development of the Spirit within human consciousness.122
Unlike some trends in Protestant theology, Hegel does not advocate a literal
reading of the Bible, but a reading that is guided by the Spirit, which he stresses
is the Holy Spirit. In his description of philosophy, he also highlights that true
philosophy is entirely consonant with Christian religion in its way of presenting
the content of religion, and so it is entirely orthodox. In this context, he stresses
the union between faith and reason, which had been sundered in different ways
by the Enlightenment, and more recently by a subjectivist approach to philosophy
and theology.
His theory of representation underpins his belief in the harmony between
philosophy and religion. While philosophy concerns only a few individuals,
religion is open to everyone, and therefore the content of both must be the same;
only the form of expression differs.

The Lectures of 1827 on the Consummate Religion

God is the content of thought and philosophy, but can also be conceived by the
faculty of representation, a point that is reiterated in the lectures of 1827. Hegel
buttresses this point by explaining the three moments of the consummate religion,
the first being the idea of God in itself, the second moment being constituted by
representation and appearance, and the third moment pertaining to the community
and the Spirit (a tripartition modelled on the three Persons of the Trinity, Father, Son
and Holy Spirit. These three moments, as we have seen, also embody respectively
the realms of universality, particularity and singularity).
Concerning the idea of God, he states that if the content is available for thought
it must also be available for representation, especially given that most people are
not familiar with philosophical thinking. The idea of God is first present to pure
thinking, and this ‘is the eternal idea of God for itself, what God is for himself, i.e.,
the eternal idea in the soil of thinking as such’.123
In the second place, the idea of God is available for representation, thus ‘not
for us in the mode of thinking, but rather for finite, external, empirical spirit,
for sensible intuition, for representation’.124 The idea of God as present for the
representation implies its manifestation in nature, and its apprehension by the
finite and empirical spirit. God is then present for ‘finite spirit as finite spirit’.125
The empirical and natural aspect of this manifestation emerges with the
Incarnation of the Son, and also with the creation of nature. We notice that in

122
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 176.
123
Ibid., p. 197. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 272.
124
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 197. Hegel,
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 272.
125
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 197. Hegel,
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 272.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 183

addition to mentioning the Son as characteristic of this second moment, which is

the moment of particularisation, the creation of nature also seems implied here.126
Conceptually, with regard to the idea of God, the Son is not distinguishable from the
Father. In a second instance, however, ‘the Son obtains the determination as other,
and thus we pass out of the pure ideality of thinking and into representation’.127
Hegel states that the first instance constitutes begetting while the second implies
the production of nature, or creation. However, the difference between begetting
and producing could simply mean the distinction between the procession of the
Son from the Father in all eternity (in the immanent Trinity) and the birth of the
Son (in a reference to the economic Trinity) in time. In this context, representation
appears to stand in between sense perception and understanding, but sometimes
representation and the understanding go hand in hand for Hegel – for instance,
when we conceive God through his attributes (involving both representation and
the understanding).128
In the second moment of the Christian religion, centred on representation,
the eternal idea emerges ‘out of universality and infinitude into the determinacy
of finitude’.129 Representation has its own forms, other than thinking, but their
content is identical. In its relation to doctrine, representation mediates between
intuition, faith and feeling on the one hand, and thinking on the other. Doctrine is
found first in the form of faith. It must subsequently pass over into representation,
and finally thinking – and this is how the historical process has unfolded. Hegel
claims that in this process Church doctrine used philosophy. The development of
doctrine is part of the Church’s teaching mission.
Hegel goes on to expound the inextricable link that binds philosophy and
religion, making philosophy out to be the rational consciousness of religion. He
states that ‘sustained by philosophy, religion receives its justification from thinking
consciousness’.130 He further remarks that philosophy is really the conveyor and
judge of the true content of faith as well as feeling and intuition. It is thinking that
is the absolute judge, which verifies and attests all forms of access to the truth.
Hegel concludes that philosophy (his in particular) is theology, in other
words a rational attempt to understand the divine. Here too, like Averroes,
he may have dreamt of supplanting the theology of his day, in particular in its
subjectivist approach, as defended by Schleiermacher among others, with his

126
A failure to distinguish adequately between the creation of the world and the
generation of the Son appears to have been a frequent accusation against Hegel’s theology;
see George S. Hendry, ‘Theological Evaluation of Hegel’, Scottish Journal of Theology
34:4 (1981): pp. 339–56.
127
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 199, notes. Hegel,
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 274, n. 67.
128
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 202.
129
Ibid., p. 215. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 290.
130
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 268. Hegel,
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. vol. III, p. 346.
184 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

own philosophy. The progress from feeling and representation is a natural and
necessary process, according to Hegel, given the fact that religion is grounded
in rationality. He argues to the effect that religion is a human activity, and is not
found in animals. Therefore, the rational aspect must be brought to the fore and
developed.131 However, intuition and representation are also forms of thinking,
broadly construed. The truth as revealed to human beings must be available not
only in the rational form but also as intuition and representation, insofar as they are
endowed with feeling and sensation. Representation is characteristic of religion in
itself, while thinking characterises philosophy. Philosophy thinks the content of
religion, as we have seen. In any case, the truth comes to human beings as thinking
beings. But forms other than thinking are finite and not the truth as a free form.
Philosophy is at home in conceptual thinking rather than representation.132
Religion (especially the non-revealed religions) is identified instead with
representation, while philosophy is equated with conceptual thinking.
These Lectures evidence a more elitist position in stating that religion is
for the general consciousness, or the common person, unlike philosophy.133
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which religion represents the highest form of
human consciousness, and religion and philosophy are identical in content, as both
have the truth as object.134
Some dogmas are once more analysed in the light of ‘imagery’ and the
representational mode, such as the procession of the Persons within the Trinity
and the manner in which the Father begets the Son.135 But the truths of the life
of Christ are analysed as facts. Yet again, negative aspects of representation that
are not convertible with conceptual thinking are mostly identified with forms of
religion that precede Christianity.
A growing appreciation for the role of speculative reason is to be observed in
Hegel’s philosophy, an evolution which has an impact on his analysis of religion.
His praise of Scholastic philosophy and theology is a testimony to this interest
in the rational understanding of faith. While the early writings are wont to skew
dogma and highlight the significance of morality, the Phenomenology engages
in a debate on the philosophical as well as theological implications of essential
aspects of Christian dogma. Hegel’s heightened interest in dogmatic theology,
and its incorporation into his own view that God is Spirit and reveals himself
as such to us, means that the identification of religion with representation as an
inferior form of apprehending the truth is downplayed in the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion. One could also discern two forms of representation in his

131
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, p. 276.
132
Ibid., p. 55.
133
Ibid., pp. 59, 88. ‘There is a sense that reason may be for a few, while the religion
of the many ... must necessarily speak to imagination and the senses’, William Desmond,
Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 33.
134
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, pp. 63, 79.
135
Ibid., p. 356.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 185

approach to religion, one clearly inferior, and one that is merely a translation of the
content of religion into a language that is accessible to everyone, but has a purely
philosophical meaning too. In addition, in these Lectures representation becomes
especially associated with nature religion or previous forms of religion that are not
revealed, a status that Hegel reserves to Christianity.

The Lectures on the History of Philosophy

Another important work dealing with the concept of philosophical and conceptual
thinking, as well as the relation between philosophy and religion, is the Lectures
on the History of Philosophy, in particular the introduction to the theme. Hegel
could have limited himself to explaining the concept of philosophy, but he also
compares it and contrasts it with the working principles of natural science – with
its reliance on empirical observation – and with religion, with its dependence on
representational thinking. Like science, ‘philosophy treats causes, the ultimate
grounds of things. So, where universal causes or grounds, the ultimate grounds of
things, get expressed, they share with philosophy precisely the feature that they
are universal and, more specifically, that propositions or grounds of this kind are
drawn from experience and inner sensibility’.136 The history of philosophy shows
the Spirit coming to know itself, and in this way it recalls the subject of religion or
the philosophy of religion which shows God as coming to know and determining
himself.137 Thus, philosophy has the same goal as religion. And because it has a
wide scope, philosophy in a sense deals with ‘everything that can be traced back
to general principles’.138
For Hegel, philosophy relies on the concept or the idea, which is concept
determining itself – whereas representation projects an alien object, but this
alienation from the object can be overcome in religion through cultus or worship:

In the case of religion we notice right away two definite features. The first is the
object for consciousness; God, as known as represented to us, thus as object,
is ‘over there’, is something other, and human beings stand ‘on this side’. The
second feature is devotion and the cultus, and they involve the transcending of
this opposition.139

Thus, the subject of the history of philosophy itself is thought determining

itself, occupied with itself.140 By contrast, in sense perception the subject is
preoccupied with something extraneous. Hence, in determining itself, philosophy

136
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–1826, vol. I, p. 71.
137
Ibid., p. 52.
138
Ibid., p. 74.
139
Ibid., p. 74.
140
Ibid., p. 54.
186 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

is free. Here we find at work the view that there is one sole reason behind the
historical development of philosophy and that this development is goal-directed,
culminating – not surprisingly – in Hegel’s own philosophy, whose system
supersedes previous philosophical systems. In this sense, there is at bottom only
one philosophy, which is the last and the richest. Hegel’s goal therefore is not to
describe and catalogue the different philosophies in historical succession, and to
offer a purely historical perspective, but to explain the necessary development
of the concept of philosophy throughout history. To illustrate how the history of
philosophy becomes enriched in the course of time, Hegel indicates how Plato’s
philosophy contains the Pre-Socratic philosophies, in particular the Eleatic, the
Pythagorean and the Heraclitean philosophies (with the underlying assumption
that his own philosophy will contain all that has gone before).141 Each philosophy
embodies the spirit of its age (in the same way that this spirit is carried over in any
historical epoch).
The proper faculty of philosophy is thinking, which is the activity of the
universal, and a specifically human activity. Introducing the theme of religion,
Hegel states that human beings are capable of religion on account of their
rationality, which points to the rational foundation of religion.142 However, as we
have seen, representation, in contrast to conceptual thinking, is more closely linked
to the particular than to the universal. The lines between universal and particular
can appear somewhat blurred: faith as a religious form of apprehension also grasps
the spirit ‘in a substantial, universal way’.143 Here the finite human spirit grasps the
infinite Spirit. Religious faith is an immediate apprehension of the Spirit.
If philosophy and religion have many points in common, some distinctions
have to be made. Thus in religion, spirit takes on a sensible aspect, as indeed in
art (religious art). In philosophy, on the other hand, the subject and the object
are ever united. Moreover, philosophy further ‘spiritualises’ Christian doctrine, a
process illustrated by Hegel in another instance of his philosophical exegesis of
Christian dogmas:

For instance, God is said from all eternity to have begotten, and to beget, his son.
The self-knowing on the part of divine spirit, its making itself into an object, is
here termed ‘begetting a son’; spirit knows itself in the ‘son’, for it is of the very
same nature [as the son]. This relationship of father and son, and of begetting,
is drawn from living nature, not even from spiritual relations but from what is
natural and living. This is how it is stated for purposes of representation, and one
says it is not to be taken literally. What, then, is the proper sense of this thought-
category? The proper sense is that it is to be taken in the form of thought. Thus
when mythology speaks of the wars of the gods, it is readily conceded that what

141
Ibid., p. 61.
142
Ibid., p. 56.
143
Ibid., p. 76.
 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures 187

is meant are various natural forces or spiritual forces, which were interactive
with, or even opposed to, one another.144

Hegel fuses together the doctrine of the Son’s procession from the Father with
Aristotle’s conception of God as thought thinking itself – for him these are two
different ways of saying exactly the same thing.
Referring to the history of religion, Hegel affirms that religious consciousness
progresses from a more immediate and sensible shape to a more spiritual one
(culminating in Christianity). In addition to this process, there is a general progress
from sensible representation to conceptual thinking – proof of this is the passage
from a conflation of philosophy and myth in Plato’s works, to a complete rejection
of the mythological in Aristotle, himself a pupil of Plato’s. But Hegel concedes
the existence of mythological or religious aspects later, such as in Neoplatonism.
At any rate, history shows the tendency of philosophy and conceptual thinking
to prevail over religion and representational thinking. One way in which this
‘superiority’ is obvious is the fact that philosophy appears to comprehend religion
and its object better than religion itself is able to do. Thus philosophy sees in
religion and its object something essential and substantial, indeed conceptual, and
not something accidental.145 While religion alone does not grasp philosophy, and
so cannot judge philosophy, philosophy grasps both itself and religion, the concept
and representational thinking. He states that ‘the last stage consists in justice being
done once again to the religious content by means of the speculative concept,
when the latter has perfected itself into the concrete concept of spirit’.146
Another illustration of the interaction between philosophy and religion,
and the use of the philosophical concept to explain religious ideas, is
medieval Scholasticism, which showed an effort to ‘grasp the church’s dogma
conceptually’.147 Thus while religion is the truth as it is apparent to all human
beings, philosophy is not for everyone. Religion has a rational element, but it is
philosophy which perfects what is rational, the truly speculative in human beings:

In other words, religion must be consciousness of what is true in and for

itself, and that is the general justification of the shape of religion. Speculative
consideration, however, is not the general form of thinking for everyone.148

In concluding his treatment of this subject, Hegel claims that ‘speculation

and religious representations are not as far removed from one another as they

144
Ibid., p. 79.
145
Ibid., p. 80.
146
Ibid., p. 81.
147
Ibid., p. 82.
148
Ibid., pp. 82–3.
188 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

are commonly believed to be’, so that his own approach to the subject is seen as
striking a golden mean.149
Representation is considered as one part of religion, alongside art and cultus,
and is the closest to philosophy, producing doctrines.150 While in other human
activities the spirit is expressed in a particular way, in philosophy it expresses
itself in a universal way:

In the other spheres we have determinations of spirit’s rationality in particular

forms. Art, religion, legal right, and so forth, do not make their appearance in
thought as such. Philosophy is the concept or substance of the entire shape of
spirit, of the whole of essential being, which the concept bring before itself in
it, the single focal point that draws together all the radiations of its vitality.151

Hegel insists on the articulation of form and content with regard to religion in its
relation to philosophy. If philosophy appears to criticise the concept of original sin,
or evil, it is only attacking the form in which this content is religiously expressed,
not the content itself, although sometimes, as he admits, the form goes into the
content – and can be mistaken for it. Hegel stresses that form and content must be
clearly distinguished when treating the relation between religion and philosophy.152
The Berlin lectures provide a wealth of information on Hegel’s perspective
on the relation between philosophy and religion and their specific domains
of conceptual thinking and representation. Whether his claim to the effect that
the content remains the same in spite of the different forms in which these two
disciplines present it is a question that remains controversial and is keenly debated.

149
Ibid., p. 96.
150
Ibid., p. 156.
151
Ibid., p. 272.
152
Ibid., p. 276.
 Conclusion

The relationship between philosophy and religion in Averroes and Hegel presents
remarkable similarities, especially with respect to the distinction they both
draw between religious and philosophical discourse, which is the subject of the
present study.
The similarities begin, perhaps, with the very prominence of this topic in their
works. The attempt to harmonise the two disciplines is particularly explicit in
Averroes and Hegel. Other philosophers set themselves the task of combining
philosophy and religion, but they did so by subordinating philosophy to theology,
as in the case of Saint Thomas Aquinas and other medieval Christian philosophers
who were also theologians. In Averroes and Hegel, we have a different perspective,
in that philosophy appears to gain the upperhand in this dialogue with religion,
albeit for different reasons. While Averroes was a professional jurist and judge
as well as a physician, he showed a keen interest in studying philosophy from an
early stage and devoted all his free time to philosophy. Hegel made a conscious
decision to become a professional philosopher around 1800, eventually becoming
a professional teacher of philosophy in Heidelberg and subsequently in Berlin.
Both philosophers believe that the same truth is expressed, albeit differently,
by religion and philosophy. This study has examined what it means to express the
truth religiously and philosophically and what this means for the status of religion
and philosophy.
In what follows, I will highlight the most salient similarities and differences
between Averroes’ and Hegel’s approach to this issue.
For Averroes there is no question of a double truth, or a different message
conveyed by religion and philosophy, as both express the same reality. This
legitimises the study of philosophy, which offers to those who have the appropriate
intellectual ability a privileged access to the truth.
The young Hegel is concerned for a popular education of mankind, but he
later believes that philosophy is only for a few, and that for most people, religion
provides access to the ultimate reality, God, or Spirit. For Averroes, those apt to
study philosophy are in fact obliged to do so because otherwise they may fall
into unbelief. The study of philosophy is furthermore acceptable and sometimes
binding in an Islamic society because it does not contradict, but supports, the
principles of Islam.
For Averroes there are three ways of believing in God, as well as in the
prophetic missions and the afterlife. There can be no compromise regarding
these three tenets, but the way of believing in them differs according to the
class to which one belongs. A philosopher cannot accept as literally true the
anthropomorphic descriptions contained in the Qur’an, but someone belonging
190 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

to the rhetorical class is allowed and indeed expected to do so. Any attempt to
harmonise the message of the Qur’an and the philosophy of Aristotle will require
a significant interpretative effort and method. Averroes lays out the rules for the
interpretation of scripture in the Decisive Treatise and also in other works, in
particular Uncovering the Methods. In a nutshell, if the literal meaning is clear
to every class, then no interpretation is needed; otherwise the philosophers will
interpret it according to the philosophy of Aristotle. This may seem a startling
principle, but Averroes painstakingly seeks to show that no incompatibility arises
between these two authorities: the religious and philosophical. Moreover, the lack
of consensus on theoretical matters in Islam means that various interpretations of
the Qur’an are possible, and that a philosophical interpretation is legitimate.
Averroes provides practical illustrations to show that this is the case.
Philosophical interpretations should never be given to people who are of the
rhetorical class, as this would cause unbelief in them. For interpretation, according
to Averroes implies removing the literal sense and producing the metaphorical
sense. The latter is a more spiritual or conceptual version of the former. For those
who cannot think except in terms of images, this means to take away all meaning
from the religious text in question, thus producing unbelief.
The possibility of interpreting a text in varying ways, and of producing
a philosophical interpretation of the Qur’an, rests on the lack of consensus on
theoretical matters in Islam, whereas a consensus on practice exists. Theoretical
speculation regarding the meaning of scripture is thus allowed.1 Therefore, no
philosopher can be labelled an unbeliever on account of his scriptural interpretation,
as al-Ghazzali had proposed, in particular regarding philosophers’ defence of
the eternity of the world, God’s ignorance of particulars and the denial of the
resurrection of the body. Averroes explains why Muslim philosophers are not
heretics in their views on God’s creation, God’s knowledge and the resurrection.
He also believes that every Muslim has a duty to believe in God’s existence, the
prophetic missions and reward and punishment in the afterlife. However, the
way of believing in these three principles varies according to the class of assent
to which one belongs. He distinguishes three classes, the demonstrative (the
philosophers), the dialectical (the theologians) and the rhetorical (the multitude).
The philosophers are masters of scientific, certain knowledge, and they know
things as they are. In turn, dialectic discourse offers a metaphorical reading of
the religious texts, but with no firm basis in Aristotle, which means that these

1
Massimo Campanini distinguishes between the Arabic tafsīr and ta’wīl, the
first corresponding to exegesis (with a focus on linguistic analysis) and the second to
hermeneutics (with a focus on the interpretation of the meaning of the text), Massimo
Campanini, ‘Averroes’ Hermeneutics of the Qur’ān’, in Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et
latin: Actes du Colloque international, Paris (16–18 juin 2005), ed. J.-B. Brenet (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2007), pp. 215–30, p. 219. When discussing the interpretation of the Qur’an,
Averroes speaks of ta’wīl, but in relation to Aristotle he employs tafsīr, clearly because the
philosophical text requires no allegorical interpretation.
 Conclusion 191

interpretations lack a scientific foundation. Rhetorical speech is used to convey

religious truths to the majority of people, who have no formal education. The
rhetorical method is a simpler art than demonstration and appeals to the feelings
and emotions of the audience as well as their intellect, and it seeks to arouse the
imagination. It deals with particulars rather than universals.
More specifically, demonstration teaches the art of inference and is based on
sound syllogisms. It rests on absolutely certain first principles, and its premisses
are essential, necessary, universal and certain. Demonstration is of the universal
for the most part. In turn, particulars, including specific historical events or
accidental happenings, are not truly part of demonstration. True demonstration
includes definitions; hence, the range of demonstrable knowledge is limited and
would include issues in mathematics and physics, as well as metaphysics, but not,
for instance, history or ethics. In demonstration, one should only use clear terms,
and not metaphors.
Dialectic includes the discussion of opinions and that which is known and
commonly accepted. It uses induction and does not provide absolute certainty. For
Averroes the dialecticians are the Islamic theologians who have sought to become
the authoritative interpreters of scripture.
Rhetoric deals with what is probable and serves to provide advice, ascertain
past events and praise or censure something or someone. It emphasises the role of
the emotions in obtaining assent and does not lose sight of the mode of delivery.
Rhetoric seeks to effect persuasion and treats probable suppositions and what
resembles the true. Its goal is to produce virtuous actions as it seeks to influence
free will in this direction. It uses examples, a simplified logic and induction
from particulars. Averroes thinks of rhetoric specifically in an Islamic context
with regard to Islamic law courts, although a political use is not to be excluded.
Rhetoric aims at producing immediate assent in the audience. Averroes states that
the truth is in any case always the same.
In Hegel, we find many similarities to Averroes’ approach. The young Hegel is
concerned with the education of the multitude, and religion for him is a means to
achieve this goal. Therefore, he thinks of religion first simply as the best vehicle
to promote morality. The mature Hegel will hold that religion conveys the truth
about reality, about God, for most people, while philosophers approach the truth
in a conceptual way.
Once Hegel’s philosophical system becomes more clearly defined, in the
period leading up to the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit, theological
doctrines start being addressed in their own right, rather than being dismissed,
as Hegel had done earlier. The early period is marked by an interest in religion,
but not necessarily theology in any orthodox way. In the period spent in Jena,
Hegel opts for philosophy and maintains an interest in religion and in particular
theology. Thus emerges the comparison between philosophy and religion with their
respective modes of looking at reality. Philosophy studies God from a conceptual
or speculative perspective, which is not intuitive and not apprehended immediately,
but involves the dialectical process and the power of the negative; in other words,
192 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

it involves a logical process, and the reconciliation of opposites. He develops his

own syllogistic logic which integrates this notion of dialectic. Representation,
the means used by religious consciousness to attain reality, God, lies somewhere
between sensible experience and the intuition of the object, which remains always
separate and beyond. This mode of apprehension is thus more closely linked to
sense perception and the material, the particular, the historical, and it does not truly
reconcile the subject to the object. Hegel’s own ‘biblical hermeneutics’ develops at
this stage, and he provides a rational, philosophical interpretation of fundamental
Christian dogmas such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, original sin and Creation.
Different religions are discussed in the Phenomenology of Spirit according
to their levels of spirituality and concreteness, culminating in Christianity. For
Hegel, all religions are manifestations of the Spirit, but only Christianity contains
God’s self-revelation to humankind, because it proclaims God made man in Christ.
These different world religions are later studied especially carefully in the Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion. Art appears also as a vehicle for expressing the
truth, although it is closer still to materiality than is religion; and Hegel affirms
in various passages that the role of art is to be understood in conjunction with
religion, as religion in the form of art, or religious art. In Christianity, there remain
representational elements, which are particularly evident with the Incarnation of
God, which will be subsumed under absolute knowing.
The Berlin lectures on philosophy of religion and the lectures on the history
of philosophy treat the relation between philosophy and religion through a similar
prism. Religion and philosophy share the same object, God, and philosophy is
at bottom theology, and service of God. In Berlin, Hegel approaches theology
as dogma. Moreover, God can be known through faith and revelation or through
reason. Religion pervades all of human life, but at the same time is not merely
a human production but comes from God. Even representation has its source in
God, even though it does not represent the infinite as infinite. Rather, it is tailored
to the receiving subject, when this is not a philosopher. Representation is related
to specific religions, and can be found in them. The Spirit can alternatively
present itself and its self-consciousness as thought or as representation, which
are both forms of the absolute Spirit; and in religion, the object is represented
rather than speculatively conceived. On the one hand, it is philosophy that
explains religion, while religion cannot really conceptualise itself. On the other
hand, philosophy only explains itself in explaining religion, meaning that the two
are interdependent.2 Faculties leading to representation are feeling and intuition,
or perception and feeling. While art goes hand in hand with intuition, religion
relies on representation, and philosophy is based on thought. The content of art
is not as conceptually translatable as is that of religion, but even representation
is related to the immediate and that which lacks proof and mediation. It is

2
Therefore Jaeschke argues that representation and conceptual thinking are
interdependent; see Walter Jaeschke, Hegel-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule (Stuttgart:
Metzler, 2003), p. 472.
 Conclusion 193

philosophy which changes the content of representation into the form of thought.
Moreover, representation employs figurative expressions, allegories, analogies
and indeterminate forms; but there are different levels of representation, some
being closer to thought, as in the case of Christianity, which affirms God as Spirit.
These lectures present in greater detail Hegel’s philosophical interpretation
of Christian dogmas, such as the Trinity. One such example is to view the Father
as infinite power, Jesus as Logos and wisdom, and the Holy Spirit as totality. For
Hegel, philosophy subsumes and is built on religion, but surpasses it in expression;
indeed, philosophy is the ‘spirit’s very own thinking and is, accordingly, its
specific substantial content’.3 The issue of representation as the specific form
in which religion is expressed was explored by various kinds of Hegelians to
defend or to discredit religion. The issue of representation was used by right-wing
Hegelians to stress unity of content between religion and philosophy, and by left-
wing Hegelians to stress the dissimilarity of content because of the different forms
of presentation.4
The similarities between these two philosophers’ approaches is not far to seek.
Religion, and religious language more particularly, employs imagery and deals
with the contingent and the historical. Philosophy and demonstrative or conceptual
thinking are universal, scientific, and employ logic, although Hegel defends
dialectic and Averroes demonstration as the most adequate logical discipline.
Both philosophers restrict the study and practice of philosophy to a minority of
people, while asserting that religion represents the truth for all. They both defend
a philosophical reading of scripture which does away with the particular and
contingent in religious texts.5 For Hegel, at least from a phenomenological aspect,
it is not possible to reach the philosophical standpoint without being immersed
in religion first. For Averroes, religion and philosophy are two expressions of the
same reality, and one must be acquainted with religion and the Qur’an before
studying philosophy. Philosophy and religion are thus inextricably bound together.

3
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–1826, vol. I, Introduction
and Oriental Philosophy, together with the Introductions from the other Series of these
Lectures, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. by R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart with the assistance
of H. S. Harris (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 188.
4
See Walter Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1983), p. 110, n. 1, citing Falk Wagner, ‘Die Aufhebung der religiösen
Vorstellung in den philosophischen Begriff’, Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie
und Religionsphilosophie 18 (1976): pp. 44–73, p. 45.
5
The notion that philosophical concept is a more adequate description of reality
has been challenged by various scholars. Reardon states ‘Might it not be objected that the
philosophical view is no more than a meagre aetiolated notion, whereas the religious image
yields truth in a shape both fuller and more colourful? Yet this would only reverse Hegel’s
position, since philosophy would thus become merely the stepping-stone to religion,
with the result that its whole status and function as the ultimate and completely adequate
expression of spirit would have been forfeited’. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy
of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 118.
194 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

However, they seem to show a preference for philosophy as the ultimate description
of reality. In both there is a tendency to downplay the value of religious language
in its own right as pointing to something unfathomable, even if neither Averroes
nor Hegel can be considered radical rationalists in the sense of defending the idea
that human reason can know everything and has no need for revelation.
Thus, neither Averroes nor Hegel believes in a double truth, but the format in
which the true content is expressed varies according to philosophy and religion, the
philosophical form of expression being superior to the religious. The role of Islam
in Averroes, and the role of Christianity in Hegel, is undeniable as an inspiration
to their own philosophies, and as a kind of measure or limit within which the
discussion of philosophical themes is set. However, unlike the predominant position
in the medieval Christian period, during which philosophy was considered as the
study of reality based solely on reason and leading up to the study of theology or
revelation, they place philosophy somewhat above religion as the more accurate
and less materialistic or anthropomorphic expression of the religious content. The
medieval Christian theologians and philosophers used philosophy in order to seek
to understand and express religious truths and the content of revelation. Averroes
and Hegel also use philosophy to explain religious language and expressions, but
in such a way as to render it universal and ahistorical, superseding the specificity
of religious language by means of philosophy.
For Hegel, as a post-Enlightenment philosopher, the metaphorical reading of
religious expressions is arguably even more blatant than it is for Averroes, whose
society made the radical rationalism of the Enlightenment next to impossible, in
spite of a certain freedom to study philosophy – although Hegel, too, constantly
had to ward off accusations of atheism or pantheism. Both philosophers show a
particular inclination for philosophy and are philosophers rather than theologians;
hence, when it comes to comparing philosophy and religion by way of analysing
religious and philosophical language, the latter comes out the victor.
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 Index

Abel 99 logic and ethics 7

Abelard 160 Neoaristotelian philosophers 160
Abraham 121 philosophy 7, 51, 59
Abram de Balmes 50, 66 science and philosophy 7–8, 22, 49, 60
Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf 5 studies 8
accident 53, 55–6, 61, 67, 71, 76, 82, 104 terminology 44
accidental 52, 57, 60, 63–5, 70–72, 82, tradition 4, 5, 35, 74
100, 178, 187, 191 Aristotelianism 2, 9n5, 10
accidentality 168n73 Aristotle 2–8, 11–12, 17–18, 21–2, 24–5,
afterlife 8, 24, 27, 84, 119, 120, 149, 189, 190 29, 30, 38, 39, 41–7, 49, 50–54, 59,
Albert the Great, Saint 7 61–3, 65–7, 70–72, 74–5, 78n7,
Alexandrian 49, 160, 176 79, 81–2, 84, 87–9, 95–7, 99, 100,
Alfarabi 1n1, 2, 4–5, 46, 56, 71, 105 100n79, 102–4, 106–7, 138, 141,
allegory 135, 170, 177n105 154, 190, 190n1
Amsterdam 13 argument for the eternity of the world
analogy 24, 29, 42, 47, 66, 93, 104–5, 168, 8, 10n7, 22, 26
193 Averroes’ admiration for 7, 12, 71
Ancients 6, 23–4, 39, 50, 130n14 conception of God 154, 187
al-Andalus 5, 22n2, 43, 78 and dialectic 75–8, 82, 83
Anderson, Abraham vii, 11n9, 11n10 logical works 43, 49
animal 24–5, 38, 53, 55–7, 62, 86, 136, and rhetoric 89–92
153, 165, 184 rules for demonstration 54, 59, 61
Anselm of Canterbury, Saint 2, 15, 154, and syllogistic logic 49, 55
160, 175 theory of causality 30, 51
anthropomorphic 28, 29, 32, 33, 40, 176, see also Stagirite
189, 194 arithmetic 63
Antigone 133 Art 39, 43, 50, 55, 57–9, 62, 68, 77, 80,
Antiquity 4, 30, 119, 176 81–4, 86–7, 92, 95–6, 98, 100,
Aouad, Maroun vii, 44n39, 49n1, 94, 102–3, 107, 126–9, 135–7, 147,
94n59, 94n61, 100n79 150, 163–4, 169, 186, 188, 191, 192
Apostles 99, 113, 116, 121, 123, 179 assent 18, 29, 31, 32n33, 36–47, 49, 54, 58,
Arabic 4–5, 7, 24, 30, 44, 47, 50, 59, 78, 59, 60–62, 68, 70, 71, 79, 80, 83–4,
81, 94, 105, 190n1 86–8, 93–6, 99, 102, 104, 106–7,
Translation movement 5 152, 159, 164, 190, 191
Arabs 5, 104 al-Ash‘ari 6
Aristotelian Ash‘arite 6, 28–9, 34, 39, 40n34, 42, 44–5
categories 96 atheism 13, 15, 157, 194
commentators 2–3, 5, 7, 49 atheistic 12
language 7 Athens 119
logic 50 attributes 53, 58, 67, 71, 100
214 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

of God 4–5, 23, 28, 30–34, 38, 40, 87, Berlin 13, 15, 17n20, 18, 109, 110n3, 113,
88, 110, 183 115, 119, 120, 122, 144–6, 148–9,
authority 9n4, 10–11, 13, 25n10, 44, 71, 188–9, 192
109–11, 117–18, 151, 164, 178 Bern 109, 110, 112, 114, 116
Averroes 1, 5–16, 21–47, 49–51, 54–75, Bible 114, 122, 156, 177n104, 180, 182
78–89, 91–107, 149, 159, 162–3n57, biblical 8, 177, 192
168, 176, 183, 189–94 Black, Deborah 49n1
as Aristotelian commentator 3, 7, 10n6, Blaustein, Michael 78n7
92 body 6, 8, 26–8, 34, 60n23, 96, 115, 122,
and double truth theory 1, 7–8, 9n4, 175, 178n111, 190
9n5, 10, 16n19, 21n1, 189, 194 Brahma 111
harmonisation of Aristotle and Islam Bread and Wine 121, 137
17, 21, 38, 97, 99 Buddhism 174
and Hegel 2–4, 16–18, 21–5, 135n28, Burana, I. Franciscus 50, 66
189, 191 Butterworth, Charles vii, 11n12, 21n1,
and rationalism 37 22n1, 31n22, 32n23, 55, 55n12,
and secondary causality 45 60n24, 78, 78n7, 79, 79n8, 79n9,
Averroism 1, 2, 7–11, 16 81, 81n15, 83, 89n39
Avicenna 2, 4–5, 8, 27, 68
axioms 52, 53 Cain 99
Cairo 81, 94
Baghdad 4 Carlton, Patricia M. 158n38
Ibn Bajja 78 Catholic 13, 15, 113, 115, 117–18, 123,
baptism 117 156, 170, 180
Bauer, Bruno 112n10 Catholicism 115, 180
Baumgarten, Alexander 110, 150 causality 12, 30, 44–5, 51, 54, 61, 64, 74
Bayle, Pierre 11n9 causation 51, 57, 61, 64, 171
Bazán, Carlos 9n5 cause 26, 30, 45, 51, 53–7, 61–3, 65–73,
beautiful 44, 134, 138, 177 77, 103–4, 119, 122, 153, 171, 185
beauty 115–16, 172 certainty 25, 27, 55, 61, 65, 68–9, 70, 77,
begetting 170, 175, 183, 186 81, 84, 87–8, 93–4, 96, 100, 103,
being 4, 51, 67, 143, 150, 154 129, 142, 143n58, 160, 170, 177, 191
absolute 19, 133, 138, 141, 163 chance 53, 64–5, 69, 99
divine 136, 138, 141–2, 172 Christ 113–5, 138, 141, 143, 176, 178n111,
finite 166 179, 180, 184, 192
human 27, 29, 38, 52, 55, 64, 110, 120, see also Jesus
122, 139, 141, 161, 174 Christianity 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 13, 14n16,
infinite 30 15–16, 18–19, 28, 109, 114–15,
material 33 115n24, 116–23, 125–6, 135–9,
metaphysics as study of 52, 57, 69 143–5, 149–88, 192–4
ontology as study of 51 Averroes on 28
Supreme 51, 133 Lutheran 14, 111, 127n6
transcendent 132 as positive religion 116
belief 3, 13, 17, 18, 32–4, 38, 46, 55, 68, christology 145, 179n112
79, 84, 89n39, 98, 110, 114–15, Church 7–8, 10, 11, 13, 112–13, 117–19,
117, 119, 122, 133, 140, 152, 170, 153, 155, 156, 159, 176, 179–81,
171, 182 183, 187
Catholic 13, 113, 117–18, 156, 180
 Index 215

Christian 13, 180 crusades 114

Fathers 112, 160 cult or cultus 137, 157–9, 161, 170, 173,
Protestant 117–18, 123, 156 185, 188
civil 12, 114–17
Clark, Malcolm 131n16, 140n44, 158n38 deduction 41, 50–53, 59, 61–2, 64, 75–7, 91
commandments 118, 121, 122n18 de Libera, Alain 9n5
commonplace 91 definition 43, 49, 53–8, 64–8, 71, 73, 76–7,
community 8, 13, 25, 37, 40, 46, 90, 97, 86, 96, 102, 154, 164, 191
102, 116, 139–44, 153, 156, 162, deliberation 91, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104,
167, 178–82 106
concept 4, 15, 18, 31, 40, 51, 58, 79, 83, deliberative 90, 96–7, 100, 106
83n22, 112, 118, 121, 126, 128–9, demonstrative
131, 134, 139, 140, 142–3, 147, arguments 49, 63, 66, 70
154n19, 155, 157–62, 166, 168, 170, arts 57, 83
173–6, 181, 185, 187, 188, 193n5 assent 18, 40, 49, 79
conceptual (thinking) 1–3, 14, 15, 16n19, books 46
17–9, 109, 115n24, 123, 125–34, certainty 25n9
137, 140–42, 144–5, 151, 154–5, class 33, 37, 39, 41–2, 46, 70, 78, 190
157, 159, 160, 162, 164–6, 168, conclusions 70
169, 169n73, 170, 175–8, 184–8, disciplines 84
191, 192n2, 193 discussions 76
concrete 112, 147, 160, 162, 169, 173, 179, inference 68
181, 187 instruction and learning 58
concreteness 192 interpretation 43
confession 113 knowledge 52, 62, 65, 69, 70, 72–3,
consciousness 4, 15, 125–48, 152, 158, 77, 88
159, 161–3, 166, 170, 171, 175–6, language 69
178, 182–5, 187, 192 method or discouse 2, 3, 11–12, 17, 39,
unhappy 131–3, 138, 140 40n34, 41, 45–74, 75, 77, 80, 97
self–consciousness 4, 19, 128–9, 131, objection 58
133–42, 144, 158, 162, 164, 166–7, premisses 42, 52, 55, 61, 68, 72
175–6, 192 proof 87, 88
consensus 8, 25, 29, 30, 32, 81, 93, 94, 190 propositions 77
content (of religion and/or philosophy) 1, reasoning 79, 81, 92, 98
3, 4, 15, 17, 22, 24, 46, 70, 97, 109, science 52–3, 83
125–8, 133, 135, 138–9, 142, 148, syllogism 41, 50, 55–6, 59, 61, 68,
152–5, 160, 163–71, 174n94, 175, 69–73, 79, 80, 82–3, 86
177, 180–88, 192–4 thinking 45, 193
controversy 7, 16n19, 95, 97, 102, 104 truth 80
conviction 31, 38, 65, 70, 116, 132, 160, Denys, Martin 14n14, 131n16, 133n23,
165, 171 135n28
Costa, Uriel da 13 Descartes 11n10, 12
Creation 5, 12, 22–4, 26, 29, 31, 38, 50, 51, Desmond, William vii, 17n20, 184n133
60n23, 87, 140–41, 144, 161, 168, determinism 9n5
171, 176, 178, 182, 183, 190, 192 devotion 138, 162, 185
in time 8 D’Holbach 11
creed 44, 110, 156 D’Hondt, Jacques 127n6, 150n4
Nicene 175 dialectical
216 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

arguments 63, 66, 70 emanation 12, 121

assent 40, 41, 46 empirical 130, 160, 162, 165–6, 182, 185
circle 140 engineering 63
class 3, 17, 18, 41–3, 46, 70, 78, 87–8 Enlightenment 11–12, 16, 110, 111, 111n4,
contraditions 130n14 114–15, 119, 132–4, 149, 151–2,
form 140 156–7, 167, 180–182, 194
inference 63, 69 and Islam 181
interpretation 42 approach to religion 114, 116
language 54, 70 Averroes as precursor of 21n1
logic 142 European 13
method or discourse 2, 11, 12, 39, Hegel’s ambivalence towards 111n4
40n34, 41–3, 47, 66, 72, 74, post- 3, 12, 13
75–107 religion of 116, 134
movement 135, 141 thinkers, philosophers or authors 11,
opinions 80 13, 150, 173n89
premisses 72, 75, 80 enthusiasm 120
process 135, 138, 191 Epic 137
propositions 76–7 Epicurus 147
scheme 4 Epideictic 90
speech 76 epistemological 3–4, 51, 94, 168n73
statement 75 and ontological 3–4
syllogism 41, 54, 68–70, 80, 82, 85–6, equivocal 65–6, 86, 103–5
101 essence 27, 51, 66, 122, 132, 134–5, 142,
theologians 89n39, 190 144, 146, 151, 158, 172–3, 181
unity 171n77 Essenes 116
utterance 70 ethics 7, 76, 85, 87, 90–92, 97–8, 101–3,
dialogue 43–4, 75–6, 78, 81, 91, 189 105–6, 111, 126, 129, 132, 143,
Diderot 11 164, 191
differentia 43, 56–7, 76–7 Eucharist 11n9
divine 15n18, 18, 25, 27–8, 30, 32, 38, 40, evil 85, 98, 141, 177, 188
111, 112n10, 120, 122, 126, 129, example 32n23, 58, 66, 86, 90–93, 94n59,
133, 135n28, 136–42, 144, 152–3, 96–7, 100–101, 105–6, 123,
162, 164, 166, 169n73, 172–3, 176, 158n38, 191
181, 183, 186 exegesis 23, 29, 32, 34, 37, 186, 190
divinity 121–2, 177 existence 23, 26, 29, 35–6, 38, 54, 55–7,
dogma 7–8, 12, 14–15, 18–19, 110, 112– 60–62, 65, 67, 69, 73, 137
18, 122, 133, 140, 143, 144–5, 151, as attribute 5
152, 155–6, 160, 165, 167, 172, of God 27, 29, 31, 34, 38, 46, 53, 82,
175–7, 179, 184, 186–7, 192–3 84, 110, 119, 159–61, 166, 171,
Dominicans 10 175, 190
explanation 34, 51, 54, 56, 58, 111n4, 171,
Eckhart, Meister 2, 170 177
eclipse 62, 64–5, 67, 72
education 13, 39, 78, 110n3, 118, 129, 171, Fackenheim, Emil L. 135n28
189, 191 faculty 3, 36, 60n23, 96, 112, 120, 122–3,
Egyptian, see religion 127–9, 131n16, 132, 155, 181n121,
Eleatic 186 182, 186
eloquence 104
 Index 217

faith 3, 7, 13, 17–18, 32–3, 37–8, 40, 68, God 4–6, 9n4, 12–13, 15n18, 19, 22–4,
78, 83–4, 89n39, 110, 112–13, 115, 26–34, 37–41, 45, 50, 51, 53,
117–19, 121–2, 132–4, 151–2, 60–61, 69, 73, 82, 84–8, 97, 99,
153n13, 154, 156, 160–62, 164–5, 110–15, 119–22, 125–6, 132, 136–
167, 169–71, 178, 181–4, 186, 192 42, 144, 149–63, 165–73, 175–87,
Fakhry, M. 25n10 189, 191–3
fallacy 52, 91 Good 85, 99, 102, 106, 111, 120, 138, 177
falsafa 4–6, 21, 43, 44, 82 Friday 126
falsehood 69–70, 84 Gospels 111, 115–18, 121, 143, 177, 179
Father 12, 15, 122, 140, 155, 160, 168, 170, Göschel, Karl F. 153n13
178–80, 182, 183–4, 186, 187, 193 Greece 23, 43, 78, 114, 121, 132
see also Trinity Greek 51, 59, 75n1, 99, 114, 135
feeling 110–12, 120–21, 147, 152–4, 157, mythology 137
161–5, 169n73, 170–71, 183–4, philosophers 22, 138
191–2 philosophy 21, 25, 31–2, 40, 44, 82
Ferreira, Manuel José do Carmo vii, 110n3 tragedy 137
Feuerbach, Ludwig 112n10
Fichte 13, 14, 125, 126 hadith 30, 92–3, 104
figurative 30, 32, 35, 39, 168, 171, 176, 193 Hanbalite 40n34
finite 22, 33, 64, 110n3, 122, 135n28, 150, happiness 9n5, 10n7, 24, 27, 31, 38, 91, 112
152–4, 157–9, 161–3, 165–7, 169, Hasse, Dag Nikolaus 10n6
171, 173–6, 178, 181n121, 182, heart 14, 18, 99, 110, 112, 123
184, 186 Heaven 27–8, 33–4, 77, 111, 179
fire 45, 51, 56, 61, 68, 71 Hegel, G.W.F 1–4, 12–19, 109–23, 125–
forensic 90 48, 149–94
form 4, 14–15, 29, 40, 44, 47, 49, 50, 52, as post-Enlightenment philosopher 194
54, 57–9, 65, 67, 70, 73–4, 77, 80, interpretation of Christianity
88, 91, 99, 101, 112, 115n24, 116, and Islam 180–81
122, 126–7, 127n6, 128–9, 131–48, Hegelian 15n18, 112n10, 145
150, 152, 154–5, 161–3, 165–76, Hegelianism 15n18
179–88, 192–4 Hegelians
Franciscans 10 Left 15, 16
Frankfurt 109, 110, 110n3, 120 Old 16
freedom 6, 8, 30, 38, 115, 118–21, 126, Right 15
131, 137, 154, 172–3, 177, 194 Young 17n20, 112n10, 115, 120
French Revolution 13, 134 Heidelberg 189
Hellenistic
Genesis 175 period 47
genus 43, 49, 52–7, 62–3, 76–7, 104 philosophers 22
Geoffroy, Marc 40n34 philosophy 4
German 1, 12, 141, 160 Heraclitean 186
Germany 13, 149 Heraclitus 85–7, 98
El Ghannouchi, A. 21n1 Hereafter 27–8, 31–2, 34, 38, 40, 46
al-Ghazzali 6, 23, 25–8, 36, 38, 43, 46, 50, hermeneutics 190n1, 192
51, 94, 190 Hinduism 173
Gilson, Étienne 9n4 Hinrichs, Hermann F.W. 151, 152
Gnosticism 176 historical 1, 3, 12, 16, 19, 73, 81, 94n59,
118, 132–3, 135n28, 140, 143, 145,
218 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

160, 162, 163n58, 168, 169n73, abilities 32, 43, 45, 157, 189
170–72, 177, 181, 181n118, 183, conception of God 31
186, 191–4 faculty 3, 132
history 1, 4, 15, 17, 18–19, 119, 134, 140, movements 15
142–3, 145, 149–50, 168–70, training 76
177n172, 179, 181, 186, 191 understanding 36, 64, 93, 112, 126
of the Church 112, 113, 117, 153 interpretation 1, 7–8, 14n16, 17–18, 23,
and philosophy 168 25n9, 27–47, 49, 50, 54, 60, 70,
of philosophy 2, 12, 125, 149, 156, 72, 95, 109, 110, 113, 117–18, 121,
168, 169, 185–8, 192 123, 126, 140, 141, 144, 150, 176,
of religion 145, 150, 161, 172, 187 179, 190–93
Hodgson, Peter C. 127n6, 144n60, 169n73 intuition 130, 131, 146, 147n64, 162–3,
holiness 120 169, 173, 179, 182–4, 192
Houlgate, Stephen vii, 141n50, 143, 143n58, intuitive 129, 130, 177, 191
145n61 Islam 3–6, 8, 10, 11, 14n16, 16–19, 21,
Hourani, George F., 21–2n1, 33n25 22–5, 25n10, 27, 34–6, 79, 93,
humanism 16, 119 94n59, 100, 107, 113–14, 149, 162,
humanity 10, 114, 156, 173, 175, 179 172, 172n81, 173, 180
Islamic
idea 2, 14–15n18, 16n19, 22, 27, 30, 60, armies 4
81, 83, 131n16, 147n64, 154n19, community 8, 46
155–6, 158, 160, 163–4, 167, 176, creed 46
178, 182–3, 185, 187 debates over God’s attributes 5
idealism 155 doctrine 5, 27, 31, 84, 94n 59, 149, 172
identity 11, 119n31, 158, 161n45 Empire 4, 5
image 7, 33–4, 40, 68, 121, 126, 127n6, faith 78, 84
131n16, 134, 135n28, 141, 164, ideas 2
169–70, 175–7, 180, 190, 193n5 law 6, 13, 18, 24–5, 99, 106, 191
imagery 127, 165, 168, 180, 184, 193 philosophers 5, 26
imagination 1, 28, 32, 36, 40, 58, 59, 60, philosophy 1, 2, 4, 6, 12, 14n16, 21, 22
60n23, 83, 100n79, 104, 119–21, religion, see Islam
123, 126–7, 131n16, 132–3, 137–8, religious scholars (ulema) 82
141, 146, 152, 154, 173n89, 180, revelation 2
184n133, 191 sciences 8, 12, 23, 43, 87
immediate 45, 53–4, 61, 63–4, 83, 102, society 106, 189
126, 129, 130–31, 135n28, 142, state 14n16, 97
146, 160, 162–3, 165, 169n73, 171, theologians 78, 92–3, 191
177, 180–81, 186–7, 191–2 theology 5, 6, 31, 32, 34, 46, 68, 83
impiety 12, 23, 26–7, 44 see also kalām
Incarnation 19, 126, 138, 140, 142–3, 155, tradition 22, 47, 78n7, 83, 92
161, 177, 178, 182, 192 world 8
infallibility 118 Israel 117
inference 41, 43–4, 52, 58, 60, 61, 63–4, Italy 10
68–9, 90, 91, 191
instruction 58, 83n22 Jacobi, Friedrich 126, 153n13, 165
intellect 8, 9n5, 10, 12, 32, 51, 53–4, 60, Jaeschke, Walter vii, 113n12, 127n5,
61, 64, 66, 68, 72, 191 141n46, 149n1, 150, 150n4,
intellectual 161n45, 168n73, 169n73, 172,
 Index 219

172n79, 172n85, 179n112, 192n2, La Mettrie 11

193n4 language 1, 7, 22, 30, 52, 54, 66, 69, 70–
Jamros, Daniel P. 17n20, 132n21 71, 73, 76, 83, 92, 99, 101, 104–5,
Jéhamy, Gérard 81 123, 131n16, 137, 143, 146, 168,
Jena 13, 14, 110n13, 125–7, 191 169n73, 181n121, 185, 193–4
Jesus 14, 18, 99, 109, 110, 111–18, 120, Last Supper 117, 118, 121
121, 123, 138, 144, 176–7, 178, 193 Latin 7–9, 22n1, 50, 66
see also Christ law 7, 29, 39, 66, 73–4, 89, 90, 95, 97–9,
Jewish 13, 14n16, 120, 173, 179 109, 111, 115, 117–18, 120, 121,
Jews 44, 119, 121, 122 133, 153
Judaism 3, 115n24, 121, 171–3, 180, 181, natural 64, 72, 73, 99
181n118, 189, 190, 194 learning 6, 35, 58
judge 24, 30, 95–7, 99, 100, 102, 111, 118, legal 21–4, 42, 89, 95, 106, 115, 117, 188
121, 183, 189 life 6–7, 9n5, 25, 49, 84, 89n39, 104, 110,
judgement 93, 99, 111, 147, 151 111n4, 112, 115n24, 116–23, 128,
jurisprudence 7, 13, 23–4 143, 153, 160, 164, 169n73, 170,
jurist 22, 24, 189 177, 179, 181, 184, 192
al–Juwaynī 93 literal 6, 8, 21n1, 22, 25n9, 29, 30, 32–40,
45–6, 54, 59, 123, 140, 143, 176,
kalām 2, 5, 31, 32, 39, 87 182, 190
see also Islamic theology literalist 29, 40, 133
Kant 13–14, 109–11, 115n24, 126–7, 150 logic 7, 15n18, 23–4, 39, 41–3, 49, 50–52,
Kantian 14 54, 57, 66, 70, 73–4, 76, 77, 83n22,
Kaufmann, Walter A. 145n61 84–5, 88, 89n39, 90–91, 94–5, 97,
Al-Kindi 1n1, 2, 4, 6 98, 102, 104, 110n3, 142–4, 146,
knowing 161, 163, 168–9, 171, 179, 191–3
absolute 4, 128–9, 132, 139, 142–3, Logos 75n1, 121, 176, 193
143n58, 144, 144n60, 145n61, 192 see also Jesus
knowledge love 99, 110, 113, 115, 115n24, 116, 120–22
absolute 4, 18, 28, 130, 144 Lucifer 141
certain 73, 77, 84, 88, 190 Luther 113, 118, 162, 164
as consciousness 15 Lutheran
demonstrative see demonstrative Hegel as 12–15, 15n18, 16, 113
divided into concept and assent 58 theologians 15
empirical 130 Lutheranism 3
of God 38 Hegel on 111, 127n6, 153
God’s knowledge 26–30, 111n4, 190
human 27, 51, 52 Maimonides 2, 14n16
necessary 61, 65, 68 Manicheism 174
particular 27 Marx 16
of particulars 10n7, 26, 27 Marxist 14n16
philosophical 139 Mary 180
religious 143, 171 material 8, 19, 28, 31–4, 36, 39, 40, 52,
scientific 60, 61, 98, 129 60n23, 72–3, 121, 127, 132, 136,
speculative 130, 139 142–3, 153, 192
universal 27, 71 mathematics 5, 50, 54, 63, 73, 82, 169n73,
of universals 63 191
220 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

matter 10n7, 28, 50, 52–4, 57–8, 63, 65, metaphysics 7, 10n7, 19, 23, 26, 40n34, 49,
67, 72, 80, 93–4, 132, 176 51–3, 57, 59, 69, 77, 82, 87, 90, 92,
maxim 91, 101, 106 95, 97, 149n1, 155, 191
mediation 127n6, 130n14, 139, 142, 166, Avicenna’s 5
171, 180, 192 mind 36–7, 51–2, 54, 60–61, 67–8, 70, 80,
medicine 7, 34, 96 83, 87, 105, 132, 146–7, 153, 155,
medieval 159, 162–3, 170, 175, 179
al-Andalus 43 miracle 51, 94, 113, 116–20, 122, 169, 170
authors 2 de la Monnoye, Bernard 11n10
curricula 13 Montesquieu 119
Christendom 131, 133, 138n36 moral 23, 93, 109, 110, 111, 114–15, 117,
Christian context (or period) 8, 194 119, 120, 144, 176, 177
Christian philosophers 189 morality 14, 18, 109, 111, 114–21, 123,
Christian philosophy and theology 15 129, 143, 144n59, 149, 184, 191
Christian theology 178n11 morals 18, 49, 114, 117–18, 162
commentaries 7 motion 26, 58, 77
controversy over double truth theory movement 4–5, 8, 10, 15, 33, 77, 110, 111,
16n19 112n10, 130, 131, 133–5, 141, 163
Islamic context or milieu 12, 99, 107 Muhammad 2–3, 37, 44, 93, 104, 114,
Islamic philosophers 5 144n59
Islamic and Jewish philosophical music 63
tradition 14n16 Muslim 5, 16, 22–3, 25–7, 29–33, 37, 38,
Islamic philosophy 2 40, 43, 51, 107, 181, 190
Islamic debates over God’s attributes 5 philosophers 2, 4, 12, 14n16, 17
Islamic theology 6 theologians 3, 6, 17
schools 68 mutakallimūn 18
Latin theologians 8 Mu‘tazilite 6, 29, 31, 34, 39, 40, 42
Muslim philosophers 2, 14n16 mystical 121, 129, 130, 161
perspective 149 myth 177n105, 187
philosophers 9n5, 152, 194 mythology 137, 186
Scholasticism 152, 153, 187
Scholastic philosophy 2 natural 7, 10, 13, 26, 51, 52, 57, 64, 71,
theologians 145, 152, 194 76, 90, 98, 136, 140, 150, 152,
theological practice 170 153, 155, 160, 168, 172, 173, 177,
theology 154 181–2, 184–7
treatises on God and his attributes 151 nature 12, 16n18, 42,–3, 51, 58, 61, 64,
universities 7 67, 72–3, 90, 97, 100, 119, 136–7,
times (or period) 3, 12, 13, 149, 149n1, 140, 146, 152, 163, 168, 173, 178,
160 182–3, 186
memory 146, 152, 169n73 necessary 61, 64, 70, 77, 80, 86, 88, 90, 93,
metaphor 92, 105, 176–7, 191 97–8, 128, 141–3, 157, 162–3, 182,
metaphorical 14n16, 18, 28–36, 39, 40, 54, 184, 186
58, 70, 140, 145, 175–7, 190, 194 conclusions 52, 62, 77
metaphysical demonstration 55, 70
concept 157, 173 inference 44–5, 52, 165
perspective 3 premisses 52, 55, 61–2, 102, 191
principles 8, 51 principles 58
science 71
 Index 221

see also knowledge of religion 13, 15, 19, 107, 109, 128,
Neoaristotelian 160 149, 149n1, 150, 151–7, 159, 160,
Neoplatonic 5, 7, 12, 160 162, 166–7, 169, 181, 185
Neoplatonism 160, 176, 187 Scholastic, 2, 151, 156, 184
Neopythagorean 160 physical 33–4, 37, 39, 60n23, 98, 113, 121,
notion 4, 15, 50, 90, 131, 134–5, 139, 140, 140, 162, 168, 170
142, 158n38, 176 physics 5, 7, 10n7, 23, 40n34, 51–3, 58–9,
69, 82, 85, 90, 92, 95, 97, 191
objectivity 146, 166, 175–6 pictorial 15, 16n19, 133, 137, 140, 143,
Oeing–Hanhoff, Ludger 149n1 145, 147n64
opinion 21, 25n9, 30, 40n34, 53, 65, 75–6, Pietist 151, 152, 168
80, 84–7, 93, 94n59, 102–4, 117– piety 34, 143, 153
18, 160, 163n57, 191 Plotinus 5
organic 112, 128, 139 political 13, 14n16, 18, 22n2, 24, 37–8, 43,
orthodoxy 5, 6, 15, 16, 25, 32 44, 47, 49, 78, 79, 88–91, 95, 98,
106, 112, 114, 116–17, 119, 122–3,
pagan 31, 114, 119, 154, 171 162, 191
pantheism 13, 15, 155, 169, 194 politics 43, 79, 82, 88n39, 89–92, 96, 97, 117
pantheist 12, 140 polytheism 120, 137, 138
pantheistic 14n16, 140 positivity 109, 116, 157, 167
particulars 5, 27, 51, 52, 54, 55, 60n23, 63, possibility 77, 87
73, 80, 85, 96–7, 101, 190, 191 possible 52, 65, 69, 70, 77, 88, 91, 93,
see also knowledge 96–8, 100, 102–3
passions 93, 95–6, 100, 102 practical 24, 25, 30, 57, 60n23, 63, 77, 82,
Patristic (period) 7 84, 88n39, 106, 111, 115, 162, 167,
Pentecost 163 169, 190
persuasion 38, 43, 45, 73, 84–5, 89, 90–92, predicate 53, 55, 61–5, 67, 71–2, 76, 80,
95, 96, 98, 100–105, 177–8, 191 102, 129
persuasive 36, 45, 69, 79, 90, 93, 94, 96, Pre-Socratic 186
102, 104 primary 55–7, 61, 64, 68, 72, 74, 177n104
Philo of Alexandria 176 Prime Mover 26, 30, 138
philosophy 1–19, 21–47, 49, 57, 69, 71, probability 87
78, 81–4, 86–9, 98, 102, 110–15, probable 52, 90, 92, 93, 191
117–18, 120, 123, 125–30, 135, procession 175–6, 179, 183–4, 187
137–8, 143–5, 147, 150–52, 156, proof 5, 26, 36, 47, 53, 68, 70, 73, 76, 87,
158, 160–67, 171, 174, 176, 178, 88, 90, 92–4, 110, 152, 159, 161,
179, 181–94 164, 166, 168, 171, 175, 187, 192
ancient, 4, 25, 40 prophetic 31, 84, 189, 190
Aristotelian, 7, 8, 22, 51, 59, 191 prophethood 5
history of, 2, 168, 169, 185–8 prophets 27, 40, 46
and history 168 Protagoras 84, 91
of history 149 Protestant 13, 117, 118, 123, 151, 156, 170,
and Islam 4, 5, 11, 16, 21, 22 182
Islamic 2, 6, 12, 43 Protestantism 138n36
modern 12 providence 115, 165
of nature, 146 psychology 10n7, 60n23, 146
Pythagorean 186
222 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Qur’an 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 18, 22–3, 26–8, 32, and morality 116, 117
40, 46, 176, 181n118, Islamic, see Islam
and Aristotelian philosophy 18, 22, 38, Jewish, see Judaism
190, 193 natural 112, 116, 120, 136, 160
Averroes on 41, 45 nature 173
inimitability of 45 philosophy of, see philosophy
interpretation of 28–9, 31, 33–4, 37 and politics 117
uncreatedness of 6 positive 116, 119, 157, 160, 167
Qur’anic 6, 16, 18, 23, 26–9, 34, 44, 46, oriental 173, 174
83, 113 China 171
India 171
rationalism 16, 37, 151–2, 194 Persia 172
rationalist 6, 8, 178, 194 revealed, 135, 137–40, 157, 175
Ramón Guerrero, Rafael vii, 1n1, 195 Roman, 119, 172, 173
Reardon, Bernard M. G. 154n19, 177n104, Renaissance 10, 10n6, 12, 119
177n105, 193n5 Renan, Ernest 1, 2, 8n3, 11n9
reason 4–8, 9n4, 13, 15–16, 21n1, 27, 29, representation 1–4, 15, 17, 17n20, 18–19,
37, 109–11, 118, 139, 121, 123, 28, 32, 34–6, 40, 42, 59, 79, 83, 87,
126–32, 132n21, 134, 144, 147, 94, 109, 110n3, 119, 120, 123, 125,
151–4, 156–7, 159, 161, 178, 182, 126–7, 127n6, 128–88, 192–3
184, 186, 192, 194 and faith, 178
natural 5, 9n4 resurrection 5, 6, 26–8, 38, 115, 141, 145,
and revelation 9n4, 25n2 190
reasoning 18, 24, 39, 41, 50, 54–5, 59, 70, revelation 2, 5, 7, 8, 9n4, 24, 25n10, 83,
73, 75, 79, 81, 91–3, 98, 101, 130, 120, 143, 151, 153, 157, 164, 170,
164–5, 178 171, 175–6, 181, 192, 194
recollection 146 rhetorical
reconciliation 14, 21n1, 110, 120, 121, 125, argument 70, 90, 95
130n14, 138, 141–2, 154, 161, 167, assent 40, 41, 79, 95, 159
170–72, 176, 192 class 3, 17, 39, 40, 40n34, 41–3, 46,
reflection 59, 133, 152, 154, 156–7, 70, 190
163n58, 165, 181 device 58, 105
religion 1–8, 10–19, 21–6, 28, 38, 40–41, inference 69
46–7, 51, 78–9, 88, 88n39, 89, 94, language 11, 54, 70
109–19, 122–3, 125–9, 132, 134–9, level 46
141–94 meaning 103
Christian, see Christianity method and discourse 2, 11, 12, 45, 47,
civil 114, 115 54, 58, 72, 74, 75–107, 191
consummate 155, 157, 159, 162, persuasion 95
174–85 practice 97
determinate, 136, 157–8, 159, 162, premisses 72, 95, 96, 100n79,
171–4, 181 reasoning 73
in the form of art 136 speech 92, 93, 97, 100–102, 104, 106,
Egyptian 173–5 191
Greek 114–15, 119, 120, 132, 136, 154, statement 69
171–3 syllogism 41, 54, 68, 69, 70, 73
Hindu 137 utterance 70, 97, 103
history of 145, 150, 161, 172, 187 ritual 113, 116
 Index 223

Rocker, Stephen 147n64, 158n38 Socrates 43, 90, 91, 95, 113, 117, 123, 144,
Roman 160
Empire 120 Son 15, 113, 122, 140, 141, 155, 168, 170,
Republic 119 175, 179, 180, 182–4, 186, 187
see also religion see also Trinity
Romantic 12, 18, 110, 111, 116, 134, 144 sophist 57, 60, 84, 87, 96
Romanticism 14, 111 sophistical 44, 59, 60, 69, 75n1, 80, 86, 91,
Rousseau 13, 114, 115 92, 96, 98
sophistry 57, 58, 60, 87, 90, 93, 96, 98,
sacraments 113, 117, 118, 171 99, 105
saints 180 soul 5, 6, 8, 10, 24, 26, 28, 34, 51, 60n23,
salvation 8, 34, 37 82, 86, 100, 110, 175
Saranyana, Josep Ignasi vii, 1, 1n1 beautiful 134
scepticism 131 immortality of 11, 110, 112, 115, 119,
Schelling 14, 125 172, 174, 178n111
Schleiermacher, Friedrich 15, 155, 183 species 43, 49, 53, 55, 62, 63, 77, 97, 104
Schlitt, Dale M. 161n47 speculative 3, 12, 17, 81–2, 84, 111n4, 126,
science 7–8, 12, 23–4, 26, 39, 40, 43, 130, 131n17, 139–40, 140n44, 141,
49–54, 57–8, 62–3, 65, 66–7, 69, 144, 145n61, 150, 153n13, 156,
71, 73, 76, 81–3, 87, 91, 94, 97–8, 158, 162, 162n58, 165–6, 169, 177,
112, 126, 130, 133, 142–6, 152–3, 184, 187, 191–2
156, 160, 164, 168, 179, 185 Spinoza 12, 163
scripture 8, 10, 25n10, 34, 36, 39–40, 43, Spinozism 165
44–5, 47, 83, 109, 110, 122, 133, Spirit 4, 14, 14n16, 15n18, 18–19, 112n10,
154, 157, 167, 176, 190, 191, 193 114, 115n24, 116, 118, 121, 123,
sect 113, 116, 118 128–9, 129n8, 130, 130n14, 131–2,
sense perception 28, 36, 52, 59, 60, 61, 64, 132n21, 133–140, 141n50, 142–7,
72, 93, 127, 128–131, 134, 140, 150–51, 156–63, 169–82, 185–8,
164, 168, 183, 185, 192 192, 193n5
senses 61, 64, 66, 72, 127 absolute 137, 143, 147n64, 150, 156,
sensibility 127n6, 163–5, 168, 176, 179, 185 166, 167, 169, 171, 192
sensible 36, 61, 72, 84, 85, 113, 127n6, and Christianity 139, 173
133, 147n64, 159, 164, 168, as creator 136
169n73, 170, 173, 178, 180, 182, as God 122, 138–9, 141, 144, 151–3,
186–7, 192 155–6, 159, 161, 167, 175–6, 182,
sentiment 111, 112, 189, 193
sentimental 168 as self–consciousness 141
sentimentality 120 as subject 138
Siger of Brabant 8, 9n5, 10n6, 16n19 development of 142, 145, 157, 182
sign 45, 56, 57, 61, 68, 91, 92, 97, 98, 116, divine 122, 141, 156, 166, 178, 186
121, 146 empirical 182
sin 114, 120, 122 finite 157, 166, 169, 171, 176, 178,
Original 112–114, 177, 188, 192 182, 186
singular 105, 142, 165, 179 Holy 14n16, 111, 122, 169, 179, 180,
singularity 160, 161n46, 179, 179n112, 182 182, 193
slavery 114, 118, 180 human 122, 141, 146, 156, 166, 177,
social 2, 12, 37, 78, 115 178, 186
sociological 111n4, 162 infinite 153, 157, 169, 171, 186
224 Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

and nature 163, 173 Terror

shapes of 134, 135, 136, 172, 188 Reign of 134
subjective 147, 166 Testament
theoretical 147n64 New 122, 175, 179
as truth 136, 181 Old 179
Stagirite 7, 8, 12, 25, 26, 43, 54 testimony 84, 93, 100, 117, 169, 170, 171,
see also Aristotle 184
state 14n16, 26, 97–8, 100, 103, 112, theodicy 159
114–18, 122–3, 144n59, 162, 168, theological 1, 3, 4, 9, 13–15, 19, 29, 34,
171, 176 44–5, 47, 78, 94n59, 110, 112n10,
Papal States 115 118, 122, 125, 143, 145, 149n1,
Van Steenberghen, F. 10n6 168, 170, 179, 184, 191
Stepelevich, Lawrence S. 115 theology
Stoicism 83, 131 Christian, 7, 15
Strauss, David F. 171 theoretical 8, 24, 25, 30, 49, 57, 78, 106,
Strauss, Leo 14n16 122, 146, 147, 190
Sturm und Drang 111 thinking 2–4, 15, 17–19, 30, 45, 60, 114–15,
subject 7, 9, 12–13, 31, 33, 43, 52–5, 57–9, 119, 123, 125–35, 137–47, 150–55,
62–5, 69, 71–3, 75–8, 81, 87, 89, 162–5, 167, 169n73, 171n77, 175,
90, 92–3, 95–9, 106, 109, 111, 116, 176–8, 180, 182–8, 192–3
120, 121, 128–131, 137–8, 142, Thomas Aquinas, Saint 7, 10n7, 149n1,
146–8, 150, 151–7, 159, 161–7, 164n58, 178n111, 189
169, 175, 178, 180, 181, 185–9, 192 thought 3, 59, 109, 118, 127, 127n6, 128–
subjective 110, 112, 114, 115, 121, 147, 9, 131n16, 132–7, 139–145, 147,
152, 157, 159–62, 164, 166, 170 152, 154, 158, 161–72, 174, 176,
subjectivism 144, 157, 180 178, 179, 181–2, 185–8, 192–3
subjectivist 178, 182, 183 time 4–6, 8, 22, 25–6, 30, 33, 62–4, 72, 97,
subjectivity 163–5, 170, 173–5, 179 99, 102–4, 129, 155, 168, 169n73,
substance 33, 62, 65–7, 72, 133, 138, 140, 170, 176, 183
142, 162, 163 topics 73, 76, 80, 82, 86–8, 91, 97–8, 102–4
Sunna 22, 23 topoi 102, 103, 106
Sunni 3, 6, 16, 25n10, 50–51 topos 75, 103
superstition 133, 151 traditional 8, 40, 46
superseding 142, 157, 163 traditionalist 46
syllogism 24, 32n23, 35, 41–2, 47, 50–52, tragedy 137
54–6, 58–61, 63–73, 77, 79–83, 85, transcendent 13–15n18, 118, 121, 132, 140,
86, 88, 90, 93–6, 100–103, 161n46, 154
191 transmission 7, 16, 25n9, 46
symbol 18, 118, 135n28, 170 triangle 63, 67
symbolic 135n28, 163n58, 181n121 Trinity 19, 137, 140–43, 155, 160–61, 172,
symbolism 134, 137 175–6, 178–84, 192–3
system 145, 146, 151, 168, 174, 176, 191 truth 1, 3, 6, 9, 11–14, 16n19, 17, 29, 38,
systematic 45–6, 55, 57, 69, 71, 75, 75n1,
philosophy 4, 123, 137 76–7, 80, 82–4, 86–91, 97, 105,
113–14, 115n24, 121, 127, 129,
Taoism 174 130n14, 133, 135–6, 145n61, 147,
Taylor, Richard vii, 21n1, 25n9 151, 152–3, 155, 158n38, 160–61,
Tempier, Étienne 9n5
 Index 225

163–6, 171, 175–6, 181, 181n21, Williamson, Raymond K. 181n21

183–4, 187, 189, 191–4 wisdom 5, 9n4, 30, 43, 44, 45, 57, 85, 102,
demonstrative 80 160, 176, 193
God as 153, 158n38, 160, 163, 175 Woerther, Frédérique 75n1
historical 118 Wohlman, Avital 22n2
philosophical 1, 6, 10, 11, 17, 38, 46, Wolff, Christian 110, 150, 155
145n61, 189 Word 138, 140, 142
religious 1, 6, 11, 13, 17, 31, 32, 36, 38, see also Jesus
41, 44–6, 49, 107, 189, 191, 194 world 4–6, 23, 28, 30, 31n22, 51, 86,
Tübingen 13, 14, 109, 110n1, 122 111, 121–2, 125, 132, 134, 136,
Ibn Tufayl 5, 78 144, 150, 160, 166–71, 176, 179,
183n126, 190
unbelief 23, 27, 34, 36, 40, 43, 44, 189, 190 celestial 25, 26, 51, 73
understanding 101, 104, 112, 118, 119, creation of 22, 23, 29, 38, 86
120, 122, 126–7, 129, 130, 132, eternal 26, 86
134, 147, 152–6, 159–62, 165, 167, eternity 7–9, 10, 26
176, 181, 183, 184 material 28
unity 38, 110, 114, 121, 131, 135–7, 146, natural 51, 61, 64, 74
153, 154n19, 161, 171, 173, 193 sublunary 77
universality 63–6, 72, 81, 137, 139, worship 114, 121, 136, 153, 157, 161–2,
140n44, 141–2, 160, 161n45, 164, 167, 169, 170–72, 185
161n46, 165, 173–4, 179, 182–3
universals 27, 41, 51, 52, 54, 55, 60, 62, Yerkes, James 163n58
63, 80, 87, 93, 96, 191
univocal 65, 104 Zeus 111, 136

virtue 34, 39, 45, 76, 84, 87, 91, 93, 96–9,
101, 103, 111, 114–16, 118–21