PARLIAMENT

IN I N D I A
TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER
and
TO MY MOTHER
 PARLIAMENT
IN INDIA
by

W. H. MORRIS-JONES
Professor of Political Theory and Institutions
in the University of Durham

PHILADELPHIA
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
 First American Edition, 1957
Published by
The University of Pennsylvania Press

Issued in co-operation with

the Institute of Pacific Relations

Made and printed in Great Britain by

William Clowes and Sons, Limited, London and Beccles
 PREFACE

HIS book is intended to serve more than one purpose, more than
one group of readers, both in India as well as outside. In Britain,
certainly, there is interest in what is sometimes called 'the Indian
experiment'. Can the institutions of parliamentary democracy take root
in Indian soil? When power was transferred in 1947, had something of
Britain's political experience been effectively communicated to India's
new rulers; and, if so, would that something be enough to meet the
exacting needs of the new republic? While Britain evidently has a
peculiar concern for the political development of India, the pattern of
world events in the last decade has imposed a similar curiosity on other
countries of the West. Is India able to present to Asia a way of avoiding
the uneasy 'choice' between the various forms of autocracy which
appear to offer themselves ? In particular, has she the political strength
and skill to afford capable resistance to the most dangerous of these
autocratic forms—that of Communist rule ?
These questions are asked also inside India; the same uncertainties
are felt there too. And with them are others with a slightly different em-
phasis. Can parliaments and politicians 'produce results'—in terms of
improved living standards for ourselves, the Indian people? Can we
fashion for ourselves honest government and upright administration?
Have we yet discovered our political selves or do we play purely
borrowed roles in our political behaviour ?
The student of politics has further questions of his own. What is the
exact mechanism whereby political institutions adapt themselves to new
environments ? What are the characteristics of this new attempt to com-
bine cabinet-parliamentary government with federal structure and to
add in an ambitious programme of state control and enterprise ? How
do national movements and their erstwhile allies adjust themselves to the
roles of government and critic within an accepted framework of rules
and conventions ? For the Indian student these enquiries are supple-
mented by others. In many Indian universities there is something
approaching a new awakening of political science. In the past the subject,
though recognised and taught, lacked coherence; for between the study
of modern European political philosophy on the one hand and the de-
tailed and frequently too textual learning of Indian constitutional
history on the other there fell the shadow of dependent status. Neither
teacher nor student was able to convince himself that there was anything
that could be called Indian political institutions; there were simply a
V
VI PREFACE

series of enactments and pronouncements emanating from the govern-

ing power, and the study of political institutions and behaviour meant,
if anything, the study of these things in so far as they could be observed
at work in far-away Britain. In consequence, the Indian student would
normally know much more of the working of Westminster and Downing
Street than of the Legislative Assembly in Delhi and the Viceroy's
Executive Council. It followed, too, that the observation of political
institutions often lacked the realism which more intimate contact might
have given, while it was at the same time frequently coloured by envy
(which made British politics too good to be true) or distrust (which
made them too bad to be believed). The achievement of independence
makes a balanced and rounded study of political science easier, and
there are indeed signs of a widely-felt desire for descriptions of what can
now be termed India's political institutions, for accounts at once more
lifelike than that which traditional academic exposition has provided
and more systematic and related to principles than could be obtained
from even the most perceptive press reports and comments.
Complete answers to these questions are not supplied in this book,
but an important part of the material required for such answers is here
set out, and on this basis I have felt justified in putting forward "conclu-
sions which at least suggest strongly the verdict which a more compre-
hensive study would reach. The limits of the present work may perhaps
be indicated at the outset. My study excludes, for the moment, the mani-
fold activities and the internal lives of the political parties—though I
have given an account of their organisation and behaviour in the legis-
latures. There is here no study of the civil services and the administrative
process at local, state and central levels; only in so far as legislatures
have to do with these matters—above all, through the operation of
parliamentary committees—have I touched upon them. I have also re-
garded much that is of interest in the working of cabinets as lying out-
side the scope of the present survey—though I have not been able to
avoid some comments on the role of Ministers in the assemblies of which
they are members. The omission of the courts and the judiciary was
more easily effected; even here, however, I have had to take note of in-
stances where the working of parliament has come before the courts—
as in cases, for example, involving the position of the Speaker or the
privileges of members. Most difficult of all was the decision, reluctantly
taken, to say little on the electoral process which is a necessary pre-
liminary to the very existence of legislatures. Yet to do that topic justice
would have entailed extensive first-hand observation or a co-operative
scheme of field studies; it would, in any case, have doubled the size of
the volume. For the most part, therefore, I took my legislators as I found
them, already past the hurdle of election; a study of their behaviour as
legislators throws some light on the stages by which they reached their
 PREFACE vii
positions, but a study of the general election would perhaps do even
more to explain their activities and characteristics in the legislatures.
One more disclaimer: this book is in no way a guide to Indian parlia-
mentary procedure; India's Erskine May will come later and must be
prepared by someone who is continuously immersed in the day-to-day
minutiae of parliamentary business.
The material used here is primarily the result of observations made
and data collected during nine months' stay in India in 1953-54. I have
made use of information relating to the whole period since 1947, but my
main concern has been with the period since the inauguration of the new
constitution in 1950 and the first general elections of 1951-52; it is above
all an account of a part of the working constitution as it had developed
by 1953-54. It is probable that many changes will take place even in the
near future, but I believe that the main pattern of relationships and be-
haviour has been established and that changes will be restricted to
modifications and developments of this established pattern.
The study devotes the greater part of its attention to the central
Parliament (and there mostly to the Lower House). A tour covering all
the 22 States possessing legislatures1 was neither possible nor necessary,
but 1 have made use of material gathered during visits to the assemblies
of Bombay (classified in the Constitution as a 'Part A ' State), Travan-
core-Cochin and Mysore ('Part B' States), and Delhi ('Part C ' State).
Since there is much uniformity between Centre and States in political
behaviour and procedural arrangements, I have devoted no separate
chapter to State legislatures.
Since Indian political institutions owe much to British experience, it
has been difficult wholly to avoid at least implicit comparisons with
British practice. Nevertheless, the attempt has been made, for it is cer-
tainly more important to measure political institutions and behaviour
against national character and national needs. At the same time, it must
be admitted that the two sets of tests are not unconnected. They are
closely linked by the fact that many of the principles and standards of
political philosophy which are embedded in British practice are widely
shared by many of those who operate political institutions in India; and
to that extent they constitute a part o f ' national character and national
needs.'

Many people have contributed to making this book possible and my

debts are several and considerable:
to the London School of Economics, who granted me the year's study
leave during which the work was prepared, and to my colleagues
there who provided much encouragement in many forms;
1 See pp. 100-101.
viii PREFACE

to the Rockefeller Foundation, whose generous travel grant made the

collection of material possible;
to the late G. V. Mavalankar, Speaker of the House of the People up
to his death in 1956, whose kind welcome ensured for me access to
much valuable information and whose wise guidance must now be
sorely missed ;
to M. N. Kaul, Secretary of the House of the People, and his staff (in
particular S. L. Shakdher, Joint Secretary), who placed every
facility at my disposal and displayed great patience in answering the
many questions I put to them;
to Ministers, members of legislatures and officials too numerous to
mention, who found time—and always gracefully—to share with me
their knowledge and judgment;
to friends in India (above all Sachin Chaudhury, Editor of The
Economic Weekly) who have helped to nourish my interest and
have shown me much that I might have missed;
to Dr. T. G. P. Spear, for reading most of the chapters and making
useful suggestions;
to research assistants: Mr. K. Eaton, B.Sc. (Econ.), for extracting
material, making sense of many statistics and making presentable
many of the tables and charts ; Sister Hedwige, Lecturer at Patna
Women's College, who also extracted certain information; Mr.
R. R. Setty, former Lecturer at Mysore University, who helped me
with some of the members' biographies ;
to typists: Miss Anderson and especially Miss E. Bond who de-
ciphered patiently and intelligently;
above all, to my wife for her encouragement and help at all stages.
The responsibility for the result remains mine.
Durham
May, 1956.
 CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I THE NATURE OF INDIAN POLITICS . . . 1
1. Introduction. 2. Unity. 3. Diversity. 4. Authority.
5. Levels of Politics. 6. The Place of Parliament.
II THE COMING OF PARLIAMENT . . . . 43
1. The Experience. 2. The Argument. 3. Parliament in the
Constitution. 4. The Election of Parliament.
III HOUSE A N D MEMBER 103
1. The Balance of Power. 2. The Members. 3. Times and
Places. 4. Behaviour and Attitudes.
IV PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT . .. . . .166
1. Party Organisation and the Parliamentary Party.
2. The Parliamentary Party.
V PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE . . . .200
1. The Evolution of Procedure. 2. The Parliamentary Day.
3. Financial Procedure. 4. Privilege. 5. Relations between
the two Houses.
VI OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES . . .264
1. The Speaker. 2. The Secretariat. 3. Financial Com-
mittees. 4. Other Committees.
VII THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARLIAMENT . .316
1. Ventilation of Grievances. 2. Legislation. 3. Control of
Executive. 4. Public Forum. 5. Conclusion.

Appendices
I The Constitution (extracts) . . . . . . 334
II The Changing Assembly (extracts) . . . . .371
III Dates of Sessions 400
IV Frequency of Divisions and Voting Figures . . . 402
V The Press (Objectionable Matter) Amendment Bill, 1953 . 404
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 407
INDEX 413
ix
 LIST OF TABLES
Page
I Development of Parliament: Seats and Franchise . .71-73

II 1951-52 Election Results .

(a) House of the People . 100
(b) Council of States . 101
(c) State Legislatures 100-101

III Age of Legislators . . 115

IV Education of Legislators . . 116

V Previous Experience of Legislators

(i) Legislative Experience . 117
118
(ii) Local Government Experience
120
VI Occupation of Legislators .
;—by
VII Age Composition of the House of the People 121
Parties . . . . . . . 121
VIII Education of the House of the People—by Parties
122
IX Experience of the House
(i) Legislative . .of the
. People—by
. . Parties
. . 122
(ii) Local Government . . . . . 123
X Occupation in the House of the People—by Parties 124
XI Madras: Age of Members 124
XII Madras Assembly—Age by Parties 125
XIII Madras: Education of Members 125
XIV Madras: Members' ' Livelihood Class' 126
XV Madras: Members''Social Group' 126
XVI Central Assembly 1944—Occupations 126
XVII Council of State 1944—Occupations
X
.
 L I S T OF T A B L E S Page
XVIII Average Daily Attendance . . . . . 139
XIX Length of Hindi Reporting per Day . . 145
XX Structure and Personnel of the Central Government 156-157
XXI Membership of some State Governments since 1947 159-165
XXII Questions in the House . . . . . . 318
XXIII Distribution of Parliamentary Time . . 321

xi
 NOTES
1. Abbreviations
C.A. Deb. Debates of the Constituent Assembly, 1946-49.
C.A. (Leg.) Deb. Debates of the Constituent Assembly (Legisla-
tive), 1947-49.
P.P. Deb. Debates of the Provisional Parliament, 1950-52.
H.P. Deb. Debates of the House of the People, 1952 on-
wards.
C.S. Deb. Debates of the Council of States, 1952 on-
wards.
Bombay (etc.) Debates of the Bombay (etc.) Legislative
Ass. Deb. Assembly.
Rules Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
in the House of the People.
Other abbreviations (e.g. P.E.P.S.U., D.V.C., P.S.P.) have been
employed only after their full title has been given.
2. Terms
(a) The use of the word parliament in the title of the book is inexact
but convenient ; it refers to the central Parliament and also to the State
legislatures. In the text, I have distinguished between Parliament (the
central legislature) and parliament (used to refer to legislative bodies
generally).
(b) Before 1950 the units of India were provinces and princely states;
since 1950 they have the uniform designation States.
(c) 'Centre' and 'Union' have been used interchangeably.
(d) During 1954, the desire to extend the use of Hindi led to the de-
cision that the House of the People should be known as Lok Sabha and
the Council of States as Rajya Sabha. Since these are simply Hindi
translations of the English originals which remain in the English version
of the Constitution, I have continued to use the latter.

xii
 CHAPTER ONE

T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

1. Introduction
HE dominating first impression of Indian politics which the foreign
observer obtains is one of great complexity. A kitten has played
with several threads, and since the ends seem to have disappeared
it is difficult to know where to begin the work of disentangling. It is, of
course, not only by her politics that India gives this impression; the en-
quirer whose interests are rather in religious mythology, or land tenures,
or caste structure, or musical composition will quickly discover that in-
tricacy is the key-note. The bewildering initial impact of an Indian
bazaar on the tourist is not misleading.
Much of this impression is no doubt to be explained in terms of the
strangeness and novelty of a different civilisation. The European senses
fully the unity and distinctness of his civilisation when he moves outside
it; just as, in a similar way, nothing causes an Indian to become more
readily forgetful of the variety and divisions within India than a journey
away from her shores. This strangeness of India to the Westerner is in-
dicated by a well-known feature of European life in that country—the
hated tendency for the whites to mix with their own kind; they seek the
reassurance of the familiar, above all the familiar world of ideas. Of
course, it is not to be denied that the exclusive clubs of the past owed
much to a sense of superiority—however misplaced—and, even more, to
a feeling that separateness was a political necessity, since only thus
could the self-conscious corporate spirit of the rulers and the awe and
respect of the ruled be safely preserved. 1 But even now when these corol-
laries of alien rule have disappeared, the search for the accustomed ways
in an environment never wholly understood remains usual; the fact that
the difficulty can be met by friendship with Westernised Indians serves
only to underline the point. The Indian visitor to Europe has generally
been in a stronger position, since his education in Western history and
literature often warned him what to expect and made the new world
more familiar. But it is true that the preparation was often misleading or
at least less adequate than anticipated, and then the need to find a circle
1
E. M . Forster's Passage to India still contains the last word on this particular subject,
even if it is open to criticism on other aspects. See N . C. Chaudhuri, 'Passage to and f r o m
I n d i a ' , in Encounter, June 1954.
1—P.I. 1
2 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

of one's own people became urgent; in any case, such advantage as there
may have been is fast disappearing as school and college syllabi adjust
themselves to national needs.
The degree of strangeness manifested by the various aspects of Indian
life naturally varies with the extent to which they have felt the impact of
Western influence. Most Westerners probably find a complete under-
standing of Indian music difficult, and it will take more than a little while
for the European to master the ways of family and home life. Even in
spheres where Western ways appear to have been all-conquering, the
European may still be surprised. The analytical economist no doubt
carries tools which will do their work with any kind of data, but his
colleague, the applied economist, may have a series of shocks when he
encounters, for example, the agricultural or even the industrial worker
who does not respond to the usual incentives in the usual way, the em-
ployer who displays a seemingly odd reluctance to introduce labour-
saving devices.
In the same way, the student of politics, too, is well advised to be on
his guard. He should not assume, for instance, that institutions with
familiar names are necessarily performing wholly familiar functions. He
should be ready to detect political trends and forces in what he will be
tempted to set aside as non-political movements. He should be prepared
to find the behaviour of those who hold apparently familiar political
positions conditioned by considerations which he would not normally
associate with such places. Thus, to take only an obvious example,
Gandhi was not primarily an individual eccentric and it was no accident
that his evening prayer meetings were in effect an important part of Con-
gress political machinery. N o r , as will be indicated more fully later, is it
odd in terms of Indian politics that the leader of the Socialist Party
should abandon 'politics' to dedicate his life to furthering and extending
the work of the saintly Vinoba Bhave and his Bhoodan or Land-Gifts
Mission.
The Western student of Indian politics who has at least reached the
stage of realising that things are not always quite as they seem has a
further temptation to overcome. Even after he has resisted the tourist's
delight in imagining that he has found something 'just like it is at home',
he may still seek to get his bearings in the strange world by establishing
a series of intermediate reference points. Thus the British student will
be inclined to say that he only needs to look across the Channel or over
to America or back a little way in the history of his own country to find
'parallels'. Is it strange to find vivid contrast between the ways of life
and the customs of the Punjab peasant and his counterpart in Travan-
core ? Then we have only to remember that the United States contains
within its boundaries the Californian fruit farmer of Italian origin, the
Southern plantation owner and the prairie farmer who came from
 INTRODUCTION 3
Sweden. Does the whole texture and atmosphere of family life appear
odd to one accustomed to the modern English home? But how the
strangeness wears off when we think of the family in Italy or remember
how our own grandparents spoke of the family in their day! Is it difficult
to get used to the idea of a close interpenetration of religious thought
and political behaviour? Surely not, if we stop for a moment and think
of Spain and Ireland today, Wales yesterday or England last week. This
method has its attractions (it may indeed be one of the ways we have to
use in order to learn), and the comparisons may have a certain limited
validity. But they are of necessity simplifications with a capacity to mis-
lead. India is not any part of modern Europe, nor even any part of
Europe in some chosen previous century; nor is it merely an unde-
veloped, primarily rural, agricultural country, nor merely a land where
religions have left their deep marks; despite and because of Western in-
fluences, it is itself—a complex and even confusing but certainly distinct
entity.
The sense of strangeness, then, is warranted. The complexity is not
simply attributed by the unpractised eye of the observer; it is really
present. It is the result, of course, of size and history. N o country of its
size and diversity of peoples could fail to be complex—unless, as is in-
deed by now conceivable, strong and ruthless power were able to impose
simplicity. N o country which has been subjected over a long period to
a variety of deep influences on all aspects of its life 1 could be expected to
remain simple. Our task here, however, is not to enquire into the causes
of the complexity but simply to describe those aspects of it which bear
on the character of Indian political life. This may be done by consider-
ing three topics: (a) the unity and diversity of India; (b) attitudes to-
wards authority; (c) 'levels' of politics. Each of these topics frequently
presents itself as a puzzling paradox to the student of Indian politics.
Some understanding of the forces at work is desirable before we proceed
to our study of a particular institution.

2. Unity
In formal political terms, the unity of India can be illustrated by refer-
ence to her constitution. 2 India is a Union of States, 3 and the indivi-
1 R e c o g n i t i o n of the i m p o r t a n c e of these o u t s i d e influences d o e s n o t imply e n d o r s e -
m e n t of the view t h a t ' w h a t e v e r civilisation o r social o r d e r flourished in I n d i a w a s the pro-
d u c t of e x t r a - I n d i a n historical c h a n g e s ' ( N . C h a u d h u r i , Autobiography of an Unknown
Indian, 1952. T h e strictly a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l p o r t i o n s of M r . C h a u d h u r i ' s b o o k are t h o r o u g h ,
v a l u a b l e a n d f a s c i n a t i n g ; his views o n I n d i a n h i s t o r y , t h o u g h sketchy a n d c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,
are always interesting.)
2
The Constitution of India ( G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , 1949). T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n c a m e i n t o
f o r c e in 1950 a n d w a s first a m e n d e d in 1951. C e r t a i n p o r t i o n s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of p a r -
ticular relevance t o t h e s u b j e c t of this b o o k are r e p r o d u c e d in A p p e n d i x I. See also
G l e d h i l l , Republic of India; J e n n i n g s , Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution and
The Commonwealth in Asia; Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India ( C a l c u t t a ,
1952). 3 A r t , 1 a n d t h e First S c h e d u l e .
4 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

dual constitutions of these States are set out as part of the Constitution
of India 1 and as such can only be altered by the amendment procedure
laid down in the Constitution. 2 The Parliament of India has exclusive
power to make laws on the 97 subjects which appear on the ' Union
List'—and these range from defence, foreign affairs and inter-state
commerce to railways, civil aviation, patents and film censorship. 3
It has also the exclusive power to legislate on any matter not enumer-
ated in the other two Lists of Concurrent and State Subjects—including
the power to impose a tax not mentioned in those lists.4 In case a State
law is repugnant to a Union law, the latter prevails, unless the President
gives special assent to the former. 5 Moreover, the Union Parliament is
entitled, under a Proclamation of Emergency or on a resolution passed
by a two-thirds majority of the Council of States, to invade the State
List. 6 There is also an important provision empowering the centre to
pass such legislation as may be required in order to give effect to inter-
national agreements. 7 Even more remarkable testimony to the constitu-
tional unity of India is to be found in Articles 256 and 257 (1): 'The
executive power of each State shall be so exercised as to ensure com-
pliance with the laws made by Parliament and . . . [so] as not to impede
or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union, and the
executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such direc-
tions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be neces-
sary for that purpose.' 8 The portions of the Constitution to which much
attention has been directed in India are those which set out the ' Emer-
gency Provisions'. 9 Of these the most noteworthy are not those which
envisage threats to security but rather those that provide for the failure
of constitutional machinery in the States and for a threat to the ' finan-
cial stability or credit of India or any part thereof'. If, for example, the
President is satisfied from a report of a State Governor (who is appointed
by him) that the constitutional machinery in the State has failed, he is
empowered to assume to himself all the functions of the State, the
powers of the State legislature may be exercised by the Union Parlia-
ment and any part of the constitutional machinery of the State may be

1 Parts VI-VIII. 2 Art. 368.

3 Art. 246 (1) and the Seventh Schedule. " Art. 248.
5 Art. 254.
6
Arts. 249 and 250. The Supply and Prices of G o o d s Act, 1950, is an example of an Act
passed in pursuance of a resolution under Art. 249. Since there was, in 1950, only one
House, the resolution ' t o make laws with respect to certain matters enumerated o n the
State List' was simply passed by a two-thirds majority of that House (P.P. Deb., 12 Aug.
1950).
1 Art. 253.
8
There is a further provision enabling Parliament to confer powers and impose duties
on States and States' officers. I am grateful to M r . G . R . Rajagopaul, Joint Secretary,
Ministry of Law, for pointing out instances of central Acts which 'give directions' and
'impose duties'.
9 Pitrt XVIII.
 UNITY 5
1
suspended. Further clear indication of this constitutional unity is given
by the absence of any dual system of courts (the judicial structure is an
integrated whole competent to enforce Union as well as State laws) and
the rejection of any kind of dual citizenship.2 The financial provisions
of the Constitution, even if no more than 'in accord with the general
trend in other federations', do also play an important unifying role;
'the States, in view of their limited resources, must always look to the
Centre for financial aid and thus will be following the dictation of the
Union in all important financial and political matters'. 3 Finally, it is
worth underlining 4 the fact that the Indian Union is far from being
'composed of indestructible States'; on the contrary, the States terri-
tories may be split up, reorganised, added to and reformed—and all this
not by amendment of the Constitution but by simple law passed by
Parliament. 5 In this way was the new State of Andhra created by the
partition of Madras in October 1953.
Such a marked central bias, such a powerfully unified federal con-
stitution, must clearly correspond to and flow from some firm and pro-
found experience of unity. To realise that this is indeed the case, we have
only to remember that India was, for about one hundred years, governed
under a unitary system, and, further, that this period coincided with the
rapid development of all means of communication. Centralisation,
which was in so many ways for so long resisted in Britain, was effected,
after a little hesitation, over the vast area of a sub-continent; the prin-
ciple of hierarchy which was at least somewhat disguised at home was
exported to India, there to shine in much glory. It is true that the princely
states were, within certain limits, left alone, and that their area and
population were considerable. Even there, however, it was on occasion
difficult to know whether it was in the Palace, with the ruler and his
ministers, or in the Residency nearby that the important decisions were
taken—and the British Resident, for all the attachment and affection
that he may have felt for the stately regime, was a member of the Indian
Political Service accountable to the Viceroy of India. It is true also that
towards the end of the period the process of transferring some respon-
sibility from British to Indian hands had taken the form of a measure
of provincial autonomy. 1919 already witnessed a partial delegation of
power in certain subjects to elected provincial legislatures; the Act of
1935 introduced (with certain safeguards) full provincial autonomy with

1 Punjab, P.E.P.S.U. (Patiala and Eastern Punjab States Union), Andhra and Travan-
core-Cochin have had periods of President's Rule, in 1951, 1953, 1954-55 and 1956
respectively.
2 Art. 5.
3 B. R. Misra, Economic Aspects of the Indian Constitution (Calcutta, 1952), p. 71.
4
As did Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Advocate-General of India, in his paper on ' T h e Indian
Federation' read to a conference on International Law held in Delhi in Dec. 1953.
5 Art, 4 (2).
6 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

cabinets responsible to popular assemblies. But these latter-day innova-

tions, most important as they were, could still scarcely efface or even
obscure the dominating political and administrative position of the
Indian Civil Service. Members of this corps d'élite occupied the leading
places from the district level—where they performed both administra-
tive and judicial functions—up to the centre, where they were at once
the (permanent) secretaries as well as the members (or political heads)
of departments. They might be stationed at Trichinopoly or Peshawar
or Delhi, but they belonged to one service. They generally felt a respon-
sibility for the welfare of the area placed in their charge, but they were
always accountable to a senior colleague placed a stage higher up 'the
steel frame'. They debated the pros and cons of centralisation and de-
centralisation, 1 but mainly from the viewpoint of administrative con-
venience.
Not all of the subjects of the Indian Empire, it is true, found it easy to
grasp the idea of an Indian nation. For the man in the village, even the
district town was still remote enough. But the politically relevant sec-
tions were naturally not so slow. It is noteworthy that the early stirrings
of modern political activity tended to be somewhat local in character :
witness the Bengal British Indian Society, the Servants of India Society
with its base in the intellectually lively centre of Maharashtra, Poona ;
and, among religious reform movements, there was a distinctly Bengali
flavour about the influential Brahmo Samaj. But the national platform
came as soon as could be expected; in 1885, less than thirty years after
the Mutiny, the Indian National Congress held its first session, and the
work of creating a nation, rendered possible by common experience of
British law and order, was begun in earnest. The early demands of the
national movement were not such as to rouse all classes of the com-
munity, but they made as much sense to the professional and business
classes in Bombay as to their counterparts in Calcutta. The leaders of
the movement, for all the special appeal that they had in their own re-
gions, were yet all-India figures. And when, with Gandhi, the roots of
the Congress were able to work downwards from the surface of society
to the different social soils below, the process was accomplished without
loss of national awareness; on the contrary, the fire of patriotism
burned more brightly than ever. There was a danger that in bringing
politics to the people, the leaders might find themselves prisoners of the
parochialism of the masses. If the demands had remained at the level of
the particular and the limited, this could indeed have happened. But the
cry of Swaraj captured the imagination of many levels of people, while
the interpretations given to it by district party workers enabled it to take
hold of many more. Above all, the symbolism of the spinning wheel and
the white cap, the disobedience march and the constructive programme
l As, for example, in the Report of the Decentralisation C o m m i s s i o n (1909).
 UNITY 7
—all largely the products of Gandhi's exceptional political imagination
—gave a well-nigh universal rallying-point, where all could feel one and
f r o m which it was possible for all to see a new world coming up over the
horizon. N e h r u entitled his book The Unity of India, and Tagore sang 1 :
Thou art the ruler of minds of all people,
Thou Dispenser of India's destiny,
Thy name rouses the heart of the Punjab, Sind,
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Dravida, Orissa and Bengal;
It echoes in the hills of the Vindhyas and Himalayas,
Mingles in the music of Jumna and Ganges,
And is chanted by the waves of the Indian Sea.
But if the framers of the Constitution had enjoyed the experiences of
unified rule and c o m m o n revolt in the past, equally they were sharers in
certain c o m m o n hopes and anxieties for the f u t u r e ; and the unitary
character of the Constitution flowed f r o m both sets of factors. M a n y of
the anxieties came f r o m a sense of uncertainty as to the strength of
centrifugal forces in the society—which we shall discuss presently; a
strong centre was in fact not only a reflection of an existing unity but
also a device designed to counter anticipated disunity.
One of the hopes of the constitution-makers was that with the 'surgi-
cal o p e r a t i o n ' of partition a source of weakness had been removed f r o m
the Indian body politic. It had been evident for a decade that the
national movement had after all failed to gain the confidence of the
bulk of the Muslim community. It followed that if the Muslims re-
mained as a political force in the state, it could only be at the cost of
radical concessions to their distrust, and a weak central government
would have been the first of such concessions. With the establishment of
Pakistan, Muslims would still be left in large numbers in India, but in a
politically deflated condition. The other potentially disintegrative forces
— ' d y n a s t i c ' , c o m m u n a l and regional—could be contained and kept
under control, and in time further c o m m o n experience of nationhood
and national reconstruction would reduce them to easily manageable
proportions. The policy of containment as well as that of national re-
construction demanded a strong centre.
So far as the threat to unity f r o m ' d y n a s t i c ' factors is concerned, it
can be said to have been completely overcome. The 562 princely states
have been securely integrated into the Indian Union. 2 N o d o u b t
1
This is now the Indian National Song. T h e verse given here (in Tagore's o w n transla-
tion) is still sung in its original form, including Sind, which is wholly Pakistan, and Punjab
and Bengal which have been divided.
2
This should not perhaps be said of Kashmir so long as its future remains in dispute
between India and Pakistan. But although India still stands by the principle of a reference
to the people of the State to determine their future, in the meantime and especially since
the arrest of Kashmir's Premier, Sheikh Abdullah, and his replacement by Bakshi G h u l a m
M o h a m m e d , integration on economic, political and other lines has proceeded apace. On
the integration of the princely states in general, see the Government of India White Paper
on Indian States (1950) and Lumby, The Transfer of Power (1954), Chapter VI; on Kashmir,
Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (1954).
8 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

Congress leaders were deeply anxious during the summer of 1947. Para-
mountry—the special relation of the rulers to the British Paramount
Power—was not to be transferred to the new political leaders of India
but was to lapse, so that the states were to become, as Lord Mount-
batten put it, 'technically and legally independent'. The Minister of
States, Sardar Patel, confessed in October 1949 that the situation in 1947
'was indeed fraught with immeasurable potentialities of disruption, for
some rulers did wish to exercise their technical right to declare inde-
pendence and others to join the neighbouring Dominion'. 1 The Butler
Committee in 1929 had said that 'politically there are . . . two Indias.
. . . The problem of statesmanship is to hold the two together.' But the
makers of the new India believed firmly that India was politically one
and that what was necessary was not a 'holding together' but a welding
together. 2 By a judicious combination of tactful and persuasive public
speeches on the one hand and a good deal of straight talking and shrewd
bargaining on the other, a momentous political revolution was achieved.
Kashmir presented (and continues to present) special difficulties, and the
employment of force proved necessary in the cases of Hyderabad and
Junagadh. But elsewhere the process suffered no serious check. From a
modest request for accession to the Union in respect of Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Communications and the conclusion of appropriate' Stand-
still Agreements' governing administrative matters, the new Govern-
ment moved steadily towards complete integration. A host of smaller
states were simply merged into neighbouring provinces; a few were, for
various special reasons, made into centrally-administered areas (or Part
' C ' States); the rest—whether formed into unions of States or simply
left as they were—became units of the new Republic, their constitu-
tions part of the Indian Constitution, their powers the same as those of
the former provinces, their status scarcely distinguishable except by the
presence of a former ruler as Rajpramukh or Head of the State in place
of a State Governor. 3 To consolidate the constitutional integration in
financial, political and administrative terms takes a little longer; the
backward condition of some of the states does not disappear overnight.
But the confidence of Indian leaders appears to have been amply justi-
fied. There are surely political differences between Rajasthan and Bom-
bay or between Punjab and P.E.P.S.U., but they are differences within a
common order of political behaviour, no longer contrasts of regimes and
political ways of life. It is not difficult to find in the former princely
states a little nostalgia for the past, in some a certain wistful pride in the
achievements of particular rulers or, more usually, their Ministers; and
these attitudes are often combined with something approaching scorn
1
Quoted in the White Paper, p. 123. 2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 Even this distinction disappeared in the recommendations of the States Reorganisa-
tion Commission and in the subsequent States Reorganisation Bill introduced in Parlia-
ment in 1956. (See below, p. 24, n.)
 UNITY 9
for the newcomers to the political scene. But these sentiments have little
independent political force 1 ; the ' two Indias' have become very nearly
one and the 'dynastic' threat is extinguished. The communal and re-
gional threats we shall refer to below.
Of all the aspirations which dominated the makers of the Constitu-
tion, none was more important than that which centred on economic
development. There might be very different ideas on the pace and
methods of development, but there was unanimity on the priority to be
given to raising the shockingly low living standards of the people. Every-
one felt not only the suffering but also the shame which attached to
India's poverty. 2 Some might see the solution in primarily Gandhian
terms: the restoration of the village economy, making it more' rounded'
and balanced by the development of cottage industries. Others, their
eyes glancing less at India's own past than at the world around them,
simply saw what was required to enable India to catch up with others in
the race for economic maturity: a ' normal' industrial revolution. What
is important in the present context is that for all schools of thought
alike, 3 the problem presented itself in all-India terms. The Indian eco-
nomy was a unity, whether thought of as 700,000 villages or as an ex-
panding pattern of steel works. Moreover, although different economic
policies would no doubt in practice lead to quite different political con-
sequences, there was very general agreement that Government direction
and even participation would be called for, and that for this a strong
centre was desirable. This did not entail too great a change of outlook
for either rulers or ruled. The British Governments of India had not been
noted for their economic enterprise, but at least whenever they felt that
public control or even ownership was necessary (as they did, for example,
with railways) they did not hesitate unduly on grounds of political pro-
priety. Certainly, so far as the people were concerned, nothing was more
natural than to 'look to Government'. The establishment of the Plan-
ning Commission in March 1950, charged among other things with the
tasks o f ' formulating a Plan for the most effective and balanced utilisa-
tion of the country's resources' and ' defining the stages in which the
Plan should be carried out and proposing the allocation of resources for
each stage', bore eloquent testimony to the new spirit. The pages of the
1
This is not to say that the sense of distinctness has no influence when combined with
other forces. It can, for example, reinforce anti-centre feelings; it can colour disputes and
rivalries within unions of former princely states, such as Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat;
it can affect the way in which some people approach the important question of the f u t u r e
reorganisation of states, supplying frequently a support for a conservative resistance
to change.
2
This in part explains the setting out of economic goals in the Constitution's Directive
Principles of State Policy.
3
I am not, of course, for a m o m e n t pretending to do justice to the rich variety of views
on economic policy which are held in India. The First Five Year Plan (Government of India,
Planning Commission, 1952) was at once a compromise between several of these and an
expression of one.
10 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

Plan itself also indicate that the inherited economic unity of India is to
be preserved and strengthened by unified political direction:
In promoting capital formation on the required scale, in facilitating and in
encouraging the introduction of new techniques, and in the overall re-align-
ment of the productive forces and class relationships within society, the
State will have to play a crucial role. This need not involve complete
nationalisation of the means of production or elimination of private agen-
cies in agriculture or business and industry. It does, however, mean a pro-
gressive widening of the public sector and a re-orientation of the private
sector to the needs of a planned economy.1
Again: 'The successful implementation of the Plan presupposes effective
power in the hands of the State for determining policy and directing
action along defined lines. . . ,' 2
This unified political direction, however, does not come easily; even
with its central bias, Indian federalism imposes the methods of con-
sultation and co-operation rather than those of dictation. ' In the field
of policy', says the Plan, 'the Central and State Governments have to
act in close co-operation with one another. . . . The implementation of
the Plan depends vitally on the Central and State Governments con-
forming as closely as possible to the pattern of finance outlined.' 3 The
Progress Report on the Plan for 1951-52 and 1952-534 makes the same
point: ' Many vital parts of the Plan lie in the sphere of the States. The
Centre can assist in many ways but, within the framework of the
National Plan, the main responsibility for . . . [many schemes] . . . rests
with the States. The Plan is a joint national enterprise in which the
Centre and the States are partners, united in a common purpose and
working with agreed policies in different fields of national development.'
The sentence which follows that statement gives a hint of one of the
difficulties: ' It is, therefore, important that both the Centre and State
Governments should place their obligations towards the fulfilment of
the Plan above all other claims.' This has to be read in conjunction with
passages later in the Report, such as: 'Within this broad picture [of
budgetary resources], there have been wide variations in performance
not only between the Centre and the States but also as between the
various States.' 5 Not only 'variations in performance' but even a certain
amount of tough bargaining in which the States attempt to get as much
Central aid for as little contribution to the whole—this is no more than
is expected of federal arrangements, and is even characteristic of rela-
tions between local authorities and the central government in unitary
1
The First Five- Year Plan: A Summary, p. 9.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3
Ibid., pp. viii and 17.
4
Government of India, Planning Commission, Five- Year Plan Progress Report (May
1953), p. ii.
5 Ibid., p. 7.
 UNITY 11
states. This kind of tension need not seriously impair the concept of
economic unity. At times, however, it may develop attitudes and argu-
ments which come very close to doing so. This may be illustrated by re-
ference to a paper by Professor K. V. Rao o n ' Centre-State Relations in
Theory and Practice'. 1 His thesis is that the Constitution is already being
operated in a manner and spirit contrary to the clear intentions of its
framers and that there is a growing 'centralisation of initiative' which
is reducing the States to mere 'administrative units'. He claims that the
Planning Commission in particular has in practice become much more
than a co-ordinating body, a veritable 'super-Cabinet'. Even the inde-
pendent Finance Commission charged with the allocation of central
grants is reduced, it is argued, to the position of a servant of the Plan-
ning Commission: 'instead of adopting an independent line of approach
of allocating grants on the inherent needs of the Units depending upon
their economic condition and need for funds for development, the
Finance Commission assessed the needs as decided by the projects in
hand and the immediate necessity for funds' 2 —as in effect already deter-
mined by the Planning Commission in its sanctioning of schemes. We
are not here concerned with the debate regarding the nature of the im-
pact of the Plan on government and administration 3 ; it is simply neces-
sary to point out that the concept of economic unity, firmly inherited
f r o m the British and enshrined in the Plan, is not free from attack.
The partition of India showed that an economic unity could be shat-
tered on rocks of political antagonism and distrust. The mere existence
of a centrally-biased Constitution and a National Plan might alone be
insufficient to avoid further difficulties. But the two inherited political
unities (which we have already indicated as important parts of the base
on which the Constitution was founded) have remained largely intact:
the unity of the higher administrative service and the unity of the
principal political party. The structural pattern of the old I.C.S. has
been repeated in the new Indian Administrative Service—the pattern,
that is, of an all-India service which is called upon to staff not only posts
at the Centre but also the more important positions at State and District
levels—and this pattern is also maintained in a number of specialist all-
India services. The members of these services continue to think much
1
Read to the Annual Conference of the Indian Political Sciencc Association in Dec.
1953 and published in part as an article in The Indian Journal of Political Science, O c t . -
Dec. 1953.
2
Italics in original.
3
The reply of the Planning Commission on the particular point would no doubt be that
it is a gross overstatement to speak of a loss of State initiative when the Plan is built up of
State Plans and the schemes sanctioned are framed and proposed by the States. A view
directly opposed to that of Professor R a o is expressed by Paul Appleby in Public Admini-
stration in India: a Report of a Survey (1953). See also the admirable Report on Public Ad-
ministration (1951) by A. D. Gorwala. A balanced review of the problems is provided by
M. V e n k a t a r a n g a i y a , ' The Pattern of Public Administration in the Five-Year P l a n i n The
Indian Journal of Political Science, July-Sept. 1953.
12 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

more in terms of the administrative unity of the country than would

State-recruited services. Moreover, although they may not be as proudly
aware of their distinctness and responsibility as were their British col-
leagues, yet it is remarkable how little the attitudes and frame of mind
have changed. The cast of mind of the higher civil servant is still
distinctive and he still tends, for reasons of taste and convenience, to
restrict his social intercourse to the circle of his fellows; his sense of re-
sponsibility has remained very little dimmed in spite of some discourage-
ment, especially at the State level, from unsympathetic or partial
Ministers. 1 It is to be noted, too, that the area of influence of the mem-
bers of this corps has increased rather than decreased. In spite of the
chagrin caused in business and specialist circles, it has been primarily
members of the I.C.S. who have been called upon to fill the top posts in
new public undertakings such as the Airways Corporation and the new
River Valley Corporations. In the same way, they hold places on the
boards of other enterprises in which the state, by ownership of a portion
of the shares, has taken control. Thus both in the traditional spheres of
civil service activity—the districts, the State capitals and Delhi 2 —and in
the new directions of governmental enterprise, as well as in any emer-
gency work of vital importance (the re-establishment and reorganisation
of government in Hyderabad and the reinforcement of administration
in States such as Rajasthan are but two examples), it is this exceptional
body of still exceptional men who are called upon. And their contribu-
tion is, by virtue of their training and outlook, a powerful unifying force.
It is too soon to say just how much of this inheritance they are now
passing on to the new recruits to the Indian Administrative Service.
At least as important as a force of unity is the party structure in
Indian politics. This topic is considered in some detail in Chapter IV; at
this point, a few preliminary observations will be sufficient. The party
structure acts as a unifying force in two ways. In the first place, the im-
portant political parties are all-India parties. Out of 689 seats in the two
1 Evidence is not easily set out, but frequent conversations with those concerned leave
this unmistakable impression. F o r the politician's attitude to civil servants, see below, p.
152.
2
They are traditional spheres, but there has been, of course, a very great increase in the
a m o u n t of work at all levels and in its complexity. M r . Paul Appleby (in his Public Ad-
ministration in India: a Report of a Survey (1953), p. 1) has put the point well: ' I n America
we properly hallow the memories of the great leaders who at the time of our national be-
ginnings coped with difficulties probably no greater than, if indeed equal to, those that
would have been faced in India even in 1900. Yet . . . the times now are much m o r e com-
plex. . . . N o t independence and self-government alone are the objectives, but such a
government dedicated to achievement of mass welfare at a tempo never attained anywhere
at the same stage of economic development. History provides no near precedent for w h a t
is being undertaken here.' Moreover, most of this additional burden seems to fall o n the
higher civil servants; it is only too easy to recruit a n u m b e r of extra clerks, but additional
personnel capable of exercising significant administrative discretion are scarce. This is in-
deed p a r t of a m o r e general impression that the outsider obtains in I n d i a : above a certain
level, too much is depending on too few; below it, too little depends on far too many.
 UNITY 13
Houses of the central Parliament, 595 were in 1952 held by all-India
parties. Even at the State level, of the 3,283 seats in all State assemblies
no less than 2,660 were held by all-India parties. 1 With a few exceptions
(for example, Jharkhand Party in Bihar, Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa,
Akalis in P.E.P.S.U.) local State parties did not prove attractive to the
electorate. Nor is this surprising. Indian federalism was born not of a
coming together of independent states but of a loosening of control and
power by a unified state, and the main political parties have their origins
in the period of unity. If there had been more than two years of pro-
vincial autonomy before the war, it might have made some difference ; it
is certainly possible that now with independence won, State politics may
be able to breed State parties, but the tendencies are not yet conclusively
clear. The party structure may be seen as a unifying force in a second
sense : not only are all important parties all-India parties but one all-
India party in particular has an overwhelmingly dominant position. The
Congress Party won 508 seats out of the 689 in the two Houses at the
centre, and 2,247 out of a total of 3,283 seats in the State legislatures.
Only in one State out of 22 with governments responsible to local legis-
latures has there been a non-Congress government in power; it was a
minority Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) government in Travancore-
Cochin dependent on Congress support. 2 The political scene is domin-
ated by a party which inherits the traditions of a united national
movement and reflects these in its rather centralised internal structure.
A nation often becomes aware of its unity less by introspection than
by looking at its neighbours. The greater the internal variety and ten-
sion, the more consolation is to be obtained by concentrating attention
on the contrast with outsiders ; doubt about having anything in common
with one's fellow citizens may be quickly set at rest by crossing a
frontier. 3 In the years before independence, Indian emphasis on the
unity of the country was primarily connected with a defence of the com-
prehensive character of the national movement against the supposed
attempts of the British to exploit differences ; since independence, unity
has been stressed mainly to counter centrifugal forces. But the position
of India vis-à-vis other nations also plays a part in the concept of unity.
In India's case this is less a negative matter of hiding internal differences
by accentuating external contrasts than a positive desire that a felt
1
The figures would be even m o r e conclusive if no account were taken of the large num-
ber of Independents. Election figures are set out below, Chapter II, Section 4.
2
In Dec. 1954 the Congress withdrew its support and the Government fell in Feb. 1955,
to be replaced by a Congress Government. N o t all Congress Governments, however, are
stable. See below, Chapter III, Section 1.
3
Pakistan furnishes perhaps an exceptional example of this process. T h e gap which in
almost every sense exists between Eastern and Western wings of the country explains much
of the anxious desire to keep in view the contrasts with India. But the Western Pakistani
appears to be more completely reassured by this method than his fellow citizen f r o m the
East.
14 THE NATURE OF I N D I A N POLITICS

national character should achieve international expression. One of the

many irritations which attached to British rule was that which resulted
from India's inability to show herself to the world as a distinct person-
ality on the international scene. It is not surprising, therefore, that one
of the first preoccupations of independent India has been the establish-
ment and pursuance of a distinctive foreign policy. She has become
aware of herself more than before as a part of Asia, and she is exploring
to discover common political ground in that region. At the same time,
she sees herself as a special part of Asia, peculiarly qualified, for ex-
ample, to act as interpreter between Asia and the West. But a foreign
policy may not only flow from a coherent national character; its pursuit
in turn reacts back on the internal political situation. 1 In this respect
nothing is clearer than that the foreign policies pursued by Pandit
Nehru have not simply received widespread approval in India but have
served to strengthen the sense of national unanimity and unity. Critics
of the right who suspect tenderness and weakness towards Pakistan and
critics of the left who distrust the Commonwealth and other links with
the West have alike failed to make any deep and lasting impression. 2
This success enhances the unity it expresses.
To point out political and economic factors making for the unity of
India is important, but is still not the whole story; it may be the less im-
portant part, even for a work concerned with political institutions. For
while it is true that religion was the ground on which the political move-
ment for the partition of the old India based itself, at the same time re-
ligion is also the ground on which much of the political coherence of the
new India rests. The casual visitor who encounters the young Wester-
nised Indian who is hazy about his gods and has even forgotten the more
vivid stories from Hindu mythology may be tempted to believe that
modern India is a post-Hindu civilisation in the sense in which modern
Europe has been described as a post-Christian civilisation, living on its
spiritual capital. But he would not need to go far to get his ideas cor-
rected. It would be enough to penetrate into the same young man's
home and meet his wife or, more convincing still, his mother. It would
be enough to keep one's eyes open, even in the large cosmopolitan city
of Bombay:
We enter a winding street, lined with little one- and two-storey houses, like
warped and tottering bird-cages, . . . and what look like garages or stables:
the temples. Deep in the shadows, an altar is illuminated. Red and gold
cloth behind the statuette, jewels, flowers, little glass trinkets, and in the
narrow space before the altar a woman standing, motionless. Sometimes
1
T w o extreme possibilities are fairly familiar: the foreign policy (usually aggressive in
t o n e if not in intent) which is designed to distract attention f r o m c o n t e n t i o u s h o m e
policies; and the foreign policy which results in aggravating internal difficulties.
2
I d o not wish to suggest that Indian foreign policy is framed solely in order to produce
these results.
 UNITY 15

the priest in a loin-cloth emerges from a dark corner to set two little sticks of
burning incense down beside a low fountain in the little courtyard. . . .
Little noise, and not a single smile. A temple bell rings, unmusically. One
hears the shuffling of bare feet, the swish of pink, violet, and pale-green
saris. . . . Here and there a man prays, squatting against a wall. . . . Every-
thing is delicate, feline, miserable, precious, all at once. . . . A little further
on, where the street turns and grows lighter, towards the black rocks and
lowlands along the seashore, a group of seated men are listening to a man
reading aloud. . . . It is part of the Mahabharata. Young and old, his
hearers listen motionlessly to the book from which Gandhi read passages to
his disciples every night. I do not know if I have ever seen anything more
touching, or a group of men more simple and dignified in the act of hearing
a poem. 1
T h a t is Bombay, but it could be any t o w n of any size in any p a r t of India.
In fact, religion—when once the outsider has learnt to recognise it—
is everywhere: in the small family pilgrimages to H i m a l a y a n shrines, in
the mass gatherings at holy places (the 1954 A l l a h a b a d K u m b h Mela was
attended by a b o u t f o u r a n d a half million people 2 ), in the family a n d
social celebrations of the festivals, in the cheap editions of sacred b o o k s
read in the trains a n d by the lift-boys, in the glossy, gaudy pictures of a
K r i s h n a h u n g in a million tea a n d coffee stalls. It is not always easy t o
k n o w what the impact of all this may be, for religion in India is not only
most public but also most private. Denis de R o u g e m o n t , in the article
j u s t quoted, has put t h e point w e l l : ' In this c o u n t r y where streets swarm
dizzyingly, where . . . there are t o o m a n y people everywhere; in this
c o u n t r y which does not believe in the individual as a n absolute, a n d
seems dedicated t o the collectivity, devotions a n d religion are individu-
alistic.' T h e H i n d u does not preach t o the outsider; rarely does he even
e x p o u n d — a n d then only to a private circle. T h e religion is almost as in-
accessible as it is obtrusive; but its impact certainly c a n n o t be negligible.
T o repeat that it is the g r o u n d on which rests m u c h of the political co-
herence of the c o u n t r y must not be t a k e n to m e a n t h a t India is a re-
ligious a n d n o t a secular state. Its influence is n o t so m u c h direct—the
openly c o m m u n a l political parties have not fared well—as indirect. I n
t h e first place, n o t only is religion everywhere but everywhere it is very
largely the same religion: the variety of languages does not prevent the
same sayings being recited, the same stories told f r o m A m r i t s a r to C a p e
C o m o r i n ; the regions m a y tend t o have favourites a m o n g the gods a n d
goddesses, but the p a n t h e o n is o p e n t o all. I n the second place, although
the religion does m u c h to divide by caste, it does something t o unite by
o c c u p a t i o n a n d even class; it will not be strange if a m o n g the m e n we
1 F r o m D e n i s de R o u g e m o n t , ' L o o k i n g for I n d i a ' , in Encounter, Vol. I, N o . 1. Re-
p r i n t e d by p e r m i s s i o n .
2 T h e K u m b h M e l a t a k e s p l a c e every twelve years. A g o o d d e s c r i p t i o n of the 1930
g a t h e r i n g is given in R o b e r t B y r o n , An Essay on India (1931), p p . 5 9 - 6 4 . T h i s o f t e n
perceptive little b o o k h a s received less a t t e n t i o n t h a n it deserves.
16 T H È N A T U R E OF I N D Ì A N POLITICS

find at Benares, dipping prayerfully in the Ganges at dawn, there is the

landlord, the teacher and the insurance agent. Religion in India, that is
to say, has more than a power to divide; it has also the power to unite—
by providing a common language across the different regions, by supply-
ing a common way of thought and behaviour across certain social gaps.

3. Diversity
The centrifugal character of political forces is the oldest and the
newest feature of Indian political life. The well-known failure of the
earlier empires to establish effective and lasting control over the whole
of the sub-continent was due in great part to the insufficiency of power
at their disposal and to various internal weaknesses. But 'insufficiency
of power ' is a relative matter, and it is clear that the failure owed some-
thing to the strength of resistance of the small local kingdoms and their
reluctance to be assimilated. Whatever the causes, the result of the
failure was certainly that regional distinctness was firmly maintained.
This distinctness was obscured during British rule and submerged in the
national movement. With the achievement of independence it asserts
itself once again.
British rule gave no precise recognition to the regions of India. In the
early days of the Company it simply encountered kingdoms—the
Moghul Empire, its provincial governors enjoying much independent
political power, and a number of separate kingdoms mainly in the south.
The Company extended its territories by treaties and conquests—at first
only when necessity demanded, later whenever opportunity arose or
could be created. When policy changed again and the remaining princes
were confirmed in the areas they held, the result was to ' freeze ' the map
of India in the familiar curious pattern of red and yellow patches, few of
which corresponded either to the ancient kingdoms or to the cultural
regions. The whole was firmly held together until it became desirable to
make concessions and yield some powers to nationalist discontent.1
When this happened, it seemed natural to start the process at levels
lower than the centre—by the introduction of local self-government and
by measures of provincial autonomy. 2 This policy, combined with the
desire to 'hold together' the princely states, led to the attempt in 1935 to
create a federal constitution. The attempt broke on the intransigence of
1 Or, as those concerned would have said, to give to certain groups of Indian subjects
opportunities for the exercise of some responsibility and the enjoyment of some measure o f
association with the processes o f government.
2
The important dates are 1861 (formation or restoration of Provincial Legislative
Councils), 1882 (Lord Ripon's Resolution on Local Self-Government), 1892 and 1909 (ex-
pansion o f Provincial Councils) and 1919 (a measure o f Provincial autonomy). Although
these measures were accompanied by expanded councils at the centre too, they did n o t
satisfy all sections o f nationalist opinion (see also Chap. II). It has been suggested recently
that the policy o f conceding first the local levels was unwise. (See T. G. P. Spear, in Asian
(then Asiatic) Review, April 1951.)
 DIVERSITY 17
the states, but it nevertheless dictated the terms in which India's con-
stitution-makers saw their problems in 1947.
It is worth while asking why the leaders of Indian nationalism, when
they came to power and found the Muslim urge for separation removed
by partition, still did not try to establish a unitary constitution. Did they
themselves after all not quite believe all they had claimed about 'the
unity of India' ? Part of the answer is no doubt that in most work of
constitutional construction, builders do not start from nothing; the
foundations have been laid already and are not easily upset. However
attractive might appear the constitutional experiments of other coun-
tries or the schemes of visionary political thinkers, they could not easily
compete in influence with the simple fact that an elaborate and carefully
worked out federal constitution for India already existed in the form of
the 1935 Act. Nor was it simply a matter of taking what lay to hand; the
problems which the 1935 constitution was designed to solve had not dis-
appeared with the transfer of power. However optimistic the leaders
might be with regard to the integration of the princely states, they would
clearly have invited difficulties if they had offered only a unitary con-
stitution; it was necessary at least to start with federalism, even if one
cherished the hope that it would become increasingly unitary in
character.
But it was not only the princes who had to be accommodated. The
Acts of 1919 and 1935 may have been fiercely criticised for being timid
and negligible concessions in relation to the demands made at the time,
but they effected an important change in Indian political life: they intro-
duced on to the stage the provincial politician. The provincial assem-
blies of the 1920s may not have been popular bodies and the fact that
the nationalist movement's attitude to them as institutions was generally
hostile no doubt robbed them of much value. But even at that stage they
served to introduce the idea of provincial affairs, even the beginnings of
a provincial platform. The provincial elections of 1936, fought on a
wider franchise and vigorously contested by the Congress, deepened this
experience to the point of transferring it from the margins of political
life to the centre. Congress governments were formed in seven out of
eleven provinces, and if they were in power for only two years it was
nevertheless long enough to communicate to those concerned a lively
sense of the value of provincial autonomy. Not only the holders of
ministerial office during 1937-39 but also the members of the provincial
legislatures during that period came to appreciate the scope and im-
portance of government at the provincial level. It was unlikely that these
men, when they came to form a significant proportion of the members
of the Constituent Assembly in 1948-49, would allow much talk of a
purely unitary constitution.
Yet it would be misleading to present India's federal constitution as
2—P.I.
18 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

a concession to the selfish political interests of princely states and of pro-

vinces which happened to be sufficiently strong at the time of constitu-
tion-making. 1 Rather, it was recognised that these interests corresponded
(or at least bore some relation) to actual differences and variations
between regions. There might be disagreement as to which areas really
deserved the distinction of region and there would certainly be dispute
about the regional boundaries. There might even be a feeling that to talk
too much about regions savoured of a lack of patriotic sentiment. Yet
no one could doubt that certain fairly well-defined regions with their
own marked characteristics existed.
One of the extraordinary gaps in the literature of sociology in India is
the absence of any study of these regional groups. Everyone knows they
exist, but they are nowhere comprehensively described. The probable
reason for this gap is significant; few people are sufficiently acquainted
with their neighbours across regional boundaries. It is true that some of
the big cities are cosmopolitan—in the sense that employment has
attracted men from all parts of India: Madras much less than Delhi,
Bombay or Calcutta. But it is striking to notice that, apart from the
exigencies of work or business, few things cause the regional groups to
mix. Outside office hours, the Bengali in business in Bombay, the Tamil
in a government job at Delhi will meet almost invariably fellow Ben-
galis, fellow Tamils. At all-India conferences and gatherings, delegates
when left to themselves quickly form regional groups—a little knot of
Malayalees, a compact circle from Bihar. And, indeed, what could be
more natural ? It is, firstly and above all, a matter of language: a lan-
guage other than one's own mother tongue has a dampening effect on
social intercourse; Hindi (except in the regions where it is itself a mother-
tongue—that is, in the north-central zone) is not yet widely used except
perhaps in the more ordinary transactions; English is still available to
many but, except for very few, it is not really fun. 2 With a language goes
a way of speaking, a way of making jokes, a whole common world of
1
It is true that they were what some would call 'vested interests'; vested interests cer-
tainly arise among political groups as well as from economic. It is the daily business of
governments to reconcile them. I would go further and argue that, while it is not normally
the business of governments to create them, even this can be a proper task. In any society,
there will be certain energies of a political character which seek outlets. Whether these
energies are considerable or insignificant varies from one period to another and from one
society to another in accordance with a host of factors, including, for example, the extent
and variety of ordinary employment opportunities. What is important for the political
health of society is that its institutions should be such as will conveniently and usefully
harness these energies and avoid their frustration. This is an important justification of
federal constitutions and even of local institutions in a unitary state.
2
It is instructive to see how a conversation often becomes either solemn or forced when
English is imposed. Conversely, so to speak, it is noticeable how often English is resorted
to when serious or technical subjects are discussed or when it is desired to convey an im-
pression of knowledge, experience or achievement. It is generally admitted, moreover, that
standards of English are falling quite rapidly; as a medium of instruction its place is shrink-
ing, as a subject of study it has become less popular.
 DIVERSITY 19
allusions and references so necessary to easy and enjoyable intercourse.
As in Europe, only a tiny few are ' at home' in a language other than
their own; a Gujarati girl married to a Punjabi will achieve this state—
but such marriages between regions are rare. It is also a matter of a
shared acquaintance with people and places and the possibility of com-
municating common memories of family and childhood. For the culti-
vated, it will be a matter of a common literary and musical heritage—
though admittedly this is less important for some regions (Punjab,
Gujarat perhaps) than for others. It is even a question of food—not un-
important where social intercourse is concerned. Even the European
quickly learns to distinguish between the dishes of Kashmir and those of
Madras, the cooking of Maharashtra and that of Bengal; the Indian's
preference for his own region's food will often amount to a great dis-
taste for that of others. Distinctive forms of dress (in part related to con-
trasting climates), festivals that have a peculiar regional significance,
different codes of family and social behaviour, special attachment to
regional heroes and episodes of the past—all this and much more goes
to make vivid and profound the contrasts that exist between one part of
India and another.
These regional differences have grown considerably in political im-
portance since the transfer of power. The vigour of their political expres-
sion through provincial autonomy under the 1935 Act was subdued by
a deeper loyalty to the struggle against alien rule. This check was re-
moved by independence, and no equivalent substitute has yet taken its
place. As we have seen, the federal Constitution is a centralised one,
there is a National Plan for the development of the whole country's re-
sources, there is a sense of India's place as a nation among the nations;
but as binding forces these are still not so powerful as the battle for free-
dom. Regional awareness in political terms expresses itself partly
through the tensions between the States and the Centre. We have already
indicated an example in the case of the operation of the Plan. A number
of other instances would be provided by a comprehensive administrative
history of Centre-State relations; the difficulties in the way of coherent
and effective policies with regard to food and refugees are only two of
the better-known cases.
There can be no doubt that friction would have been more frequent as
well as more serious if it were not for the all-India spirit of the leading
administrators. Without access to the departmental files it is not easy to
supply evidence of this influence, but one may be sure that their pre-
sence, for example at the frequent Centre-State departmental con-
ferences, 1 makes it easier for decisions to emerge—and subsequently to be
1 In answer to a question in Parliament on 2 Feb. 1949 the Minister of Agriculture paid
tribute to the value of such conferences to informal co-ordination between Centre and the
States. He stated that four such conferences had been held by his department during 1948.
Other departments concerned with State or concurrent subjects have similar meetings.
20 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

implemented. There can be even less doubt that Centre-State relations

have been facilitated by the political omnipresence of the Congress
Party. When the party in power at the Centre is different from that in
command of a State, Centre-State relations do not simply become
difficult; worse, they provide an important arena for the expression of
party rivalry. India has largely been spared that problem during the in-
fant years of its independence. The relations between Union and State
Ministers are at the same time relations between former colleagues of
the days of national struggle. Moreover, Nehru's position as President
of the Congress as well as Prime Minister helped greatly to smooth out
incipient quarrels.1 Not only the course of a State government's actions
but even its very life has sometimes been largely decided and determined
by organs of the party at the Centre. It is uncertain how strong these two
checks on Union-State frictions can remain. Certainly Congress, even if
it retains control at the Centre, cannot hope to have for long its rule in
all the States. Already, in 1954, a Praja Socialist Government was in-
stalled in Travancore-Cochin—though this is hardly a test case, since
its members were at least former Congressmen and the Government
rested on Congress support in the State Legislature.
But the picture of the political expression of regionalism cannot be
conveyed simply in terms of Union-State relations. As already men-
tioned, the pattern of provinces and princely states which emerged under
British rule bore little relation to the cultural regions—though the for-
mation in turn during the first half of the present century of the N.W.
Frontier Province, Assam, Bihar, Sind and Orissa was certainly a sig-
nificant move in this direction. Moreover, the establishment of units on
a linguistic basis had not only been approved by the Montagu-Chelms-
ford and Simon Reports 2 but had been for long a point in the Congress
programme. The party had expressed its support for the idea not only in
1
Nehru was Congress President from Sept. 1951 to Dec. 1954. In the manner of his
coming to the office and his leaving it, the strength of his position was revealed. In 1951,
Nehru had serious disagreements with the then President of the Congress, Purshottamdas
Tandon. Tandon was known to be conservative in social policies and insufficiently hostile
towards communal sentiments. When Nehru submitted to the All-India Congress Com-
mittee his resignation from the Working Committee, other members of the Working Com-
mittee quickly followed suit. When Tandon himself accepted defeat and resigned, Nehru
was at once chosen to take his place. In Oct. 1954, Nehru complained of an excessive bur-
den of work and announced his intention to give up at least the party office. This he did in
December. Nehru's Working Committee recommended U. N. Dhebar as his successor, and
he was the only person nominated.
The smoothing-out process could, from the viewpoint of Centre-State relations, work
in either direction. More usually, no doubt, the Prime Minister was able to use his Presi-
dential prestige and influence to secure State acceptance for Central proposals. But it was
on occasion suggested that certain Chief Ministers of States had been getting too much of
their own way, largely because Nehru, in his capacity as President of Congress, had been
uncomfortably aware of their value to the party in the State. On the whole question of
party-government relations, see below, Chapter IV.
2 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Cmd. 9109 of 1918), para. 246.
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (Cmd. 3569 of 1930), Vol. II, para. 38.
 DIVERSITY 21
resolutions but also by basing its own organisation at least to some ex-
tent on such units: its constitution (since 1921) included Pradesh (or
State) Committees for such areas as Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil-Nad and
Andhra. The ' N e h r u ' Report of 19281 strongly emphasised the desira-
bility of creating new units on these lines, the policy had been included
in the party manifesto, and in the Constitutent Assembly in November
1947 the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government accepted the
principle underlying the demand. Given these two facts—that some of
the peoples of India could be regarded as having already achieved a
measure of autonomy in their homelands (the Biharis, the Bengalis, the
Oriyas, etc.), and that linguistic units had been part of the national
movement's programme, it is not surprising that the Constituent
Assembly was faced at once with the demand that such units be created
for all parts of India and that this should be done before the new Con-
stitution was completed. Nor is it surprising that on the demand being
refused, the issue has disturbed Indian politics and consumed consider-
able political energy. Nowhere is the impact of India's diversity and in-
ternal divisions on her political life clearer than in the history of the
agitation among regional groups for their separate linguistic units. It
merits a slightly closer examination.
This question has been the subject of three recent investigations. It
was referred first by the Constituent Assembly to a Linguistic Provinces
Commission which reported in December 1948.2 Its conclusions were
firmly against the formation of new units. It recognised that the demand
had received important support in the past and that the subject had
gathered around it much 'heat and passion and controversy'. It under-
stood the case for the new units to rest on two alternative grounds: ' on
the theory that these linguistic groups are sub-nations and as such con-
tracting parties to the constitution . . . 'or on ' the unwieldy size of the
existing provinces, their heterogeneous composition and the adminis-
trative advantage which may result from bringing together people speak-
ing one language, in imparting education and in the working of courts,
legislatures, governmental machinery and democratic institutions'.
The Commission found, however, that the sub-nation theory took
1
Report of the Committee appointed by the All-Parties Conference, 1928. T h e Chairman
was Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal.
2
The Commission is known by the name of its Chairman, S. K . Dar, retired Judge of
the Allahabad High Court. Its report is published in Reports of Committees of the Consti-
tuent Assembly (Third Series), 1950, at pp. 180-239. The Commission was limited by its
terms of reference to the four possible Southern India units of Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala
and Maharashtra, but the analysis it made has a wider relevance. Within that geographical
scope, its terms of reference were wide: ' t o examine and report on the formation of [these]
new Provinces . . . and on the administrative, financial and other consequences of their
creation'. Moreover, the tone of the press communique issued at the time suggests that
the formation, of some at least of these new units, was expected: the Commission was ' t o
submit its report in time to enable the new States . . . to be mentioned in the First Schedule
to the D r a f t Constitution before the Constitution is finally a d o p t e d ' .
22 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

inadequate notice of the last two hundred years; the existing provinces
had 'taken root and are now living, vital organisms' and whatever sub-
nations might have once existed had now been assimilated with them.
Moreover, since in no area do linguistic groups form more than 80% of
the population, minorities cannot be avoided—and minorities in states
created on specifically linguistic grounds would find matters far from
pleasant. But above all, the Commission held, linguistic units will ob-
struct the spread of a national language and of national feeling—
'nationalism and sub-nationalism are two emotional experiences which
grow at each other's expense'—and Indian nationalism is too recent a
growth (and too recently relieved of its main stimulus) to be able to
stand such a strain. No doubt, in view of the intensity of feeling on the
subject, to refuse the demands would cause much frustration; it was ' a
grave risk', but one that had to be taken. Certainly there could be no
question of new units being formed immediately: India was just recover-
ing from partition, it was 'in the midst of an undeclared war with
Pakistan', it had food and refugee problems to solve, its administration
was 'depleted and over-strained'; and 'as if these anxieties were not
sufficient, India is about to experiment with a new Constitution with
autonomous States and adult franchise without the cementing force of
a national language to take the place of English'.
The Dar Commission expressed the view that, in view of the dangers,
it was not enough for India's political leadership merely to refrain from
further support of the agitation; it had to 'rise to the occasion and" guide
the country to its duty', and for this purpose it should regard the
changed circumstances as 'relieving it of all past commitments'. The
Congress did promptly appoint its own committee 1 to go into the
matter. It had the courage to accept the general view of the Dar report
and it expressed once more the dangers to national unity implied in the
encouragement of new loyalties. At the same time, it indicated the
measure of feeling for the agitation by making two significant conces-
sions: first, 'the case of Andhra can be isolated from others in that . . .
there appears to be a larger measure of consent behind it, and the largest
compact area likely to form part of this linguistic province is situated
within one (existing) province'; second, it conceded t h a t ' if public senti-
ment is insistent and overwhelming, the practicability of satisfying public
demand with its implications and consequences must be examined'.
These concessions were naturally soon interpreted by those concerned
as invitations to quicken the tempo of agitation. Congress ranks were
divided on the issue, while of the other parties the Communists did not
hesitate to make the demands an important part of their election cam-
paigning in the south. In Andhra, in particular, feelings intensified to a
i The members were Sardar Patel, Dr. Sitaramayya and Pandit Nehru. Appointed at the
Jaipur Congress session of Dec. 1948, it presented its report in April 1949 (Indian National
Congress, Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee, 1949).
 DIVERSITY 23
point where government in the State of Madras became dominated and
rendered difficult by the demands. The agitation approached a climax
when one of the ardent devotees of the campaign began a fast unto
death; the climax was reached when he died. Four days afterwards, on
19 December 1952, the Prime Minister announced to Parliament the
Government's decision to form a State of Andhra by the partition of
Madras. This was done and the new linguistic State of the Telugu
people was born in October 1953. But this step brought little peace. The
politics of Andhra since its formation have been stormy in the extreme;
sub-regional tensions (anticipated by the Dar Commission) have now
found scope for vigorous expression (on the question of the location of
the capital, for example) and, when combined with deep caste divisions
and a delicate balance among the political parties, produce an intricate
tangle in which the common purposes even of Andhra become easily
lost. Outside Andhra, of course, appetities—whether crude hunger for
office and opportunity or idealised longings for liberation—have been
considerably whetted. Party capital can still be made of all this by the
Communists, while ugly rifts appear in the State Congress parties and
even in their governments. The appointment of a fresh Commission in
19541 relieved the Union Government for a while of the necessity to take
any further decisions, but the campaign by no means abated. On the
contrary, protagonists and opponents of linguistic states alike marshalled
every line of argument and every ounce of strength in order to influence
the Commission in their direction. The result was a continued strain on
party solidarity and on the smooth working of State governments. The
Congress Working Committee considered the matter serious enough to
warrant the issue of a directive banning party members from joining any
agitation for linguistic states and permitting only the submission of
memoranda and representations to the Commission. But this did little
to lessen the strain. At most it kept up appearances—and not always
was it successful even in that. In Madhya Pradesh, for example, the de-
mand of the Marathi-speaking areas for a state of Maharashtra re-
mained strong; two senior officials of the State Congress Party went so
far as to prepare a memorandum alleging discrimination by the State
government in favour of the Hindi areas—a document at once de-
scribed by the Chief Minister of the State (also a Congressman, of
course) as 'misleading, baseless, mischievous and anti-national'. In
1
The announcement was actually on 22 Dec. 1953. It was made before an eagerly ex-
pectant House and was well received. The members were Saiyid Fazi Ali (former Judge and
lately Governor of Orissa), Sardar Panikkar (formerly Minister for a princely state and
lately Ambassador to China and Egypt) and Pandit K u n z r u (veteran independent parlia-
mentarian). It was expressly charged to bear in mind the preservation and strengthening of
the unity of India and the financial, economic and administrative problems affecting the
whole country. It should also be noted that its survey was not limited to the possibility of
linguistic states; it was free to consider any form of reorganisation, and its title was the
Central Commission for the Reorganisation of States,
24 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

Bombay, too, considerable difficulties were encountered. The President

of the State Party had to call for explanations from a large number of
party members who convened a conference to support the division
of Bombay State, the disintegration of Hyderabad and the inclusion of
Bombay City in Maharashtra. Nor was the Congress Party the only one
to be affected; similar rifts appeared in the Praja Socialist Party, especi-
ally on the question of the future of Bombay City.
The Commission reported in October 1955 and recommended radical
changes. The distinction between Part 'A', Part 'B' and Part 'C' States
was to disappear and the new pattern of units made big concessions to
linguistic divisions.1 These proposals, however, still fell short of the
demands of powerful political groups. Unrest, ministerial resignations
and even considerable violence followed. The Congress Working Com-
mittee and the Government felt obliged to make further concessions
which were embodied in the States Reorganisation Bill, 1956.2 It has
been said that India must indeed be strong' to be able to effect such re-
organisation; but it is clear that the Government has been quite unable
to resist the pressures of regional sentiment. These have operated some-
what independently of party and class divisions and have proved most
powerful. Their victory is unlikely to reduce their vigour; on the con-
trary, inter-State rivalries and jealousies may be expected to develop
further, unit selfishness vis-a-vis the Centre may well harden and the
position of linguistic minorities in the new units may be for some time
unenviable.3
1
Report of the States Reorganisation Commission (1955). With the exception of three
centrally-administered 'Territories' (Delhi and Manipur, already Part ' C ' States, and the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Part ' D ' State), India was to be divided into only
sixteen States. This number entailed the disappearance of many units formed from previous
princely states: Madhya Bharat, Saurashtra, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin, P.E.P.S.U.,
Ajmer, Bhopal, Coorg, Kutch, Himachal Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh and Tripura. At the
same time, three new linguistic States appeared: Kerala, Karnataka and Vidarbha.
2
The Bill introduced in Parliament in March 1956 envisages fifteen States: Andhra-
Telengana, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Madras, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal. This list corresponds closely to linguistic divisions. The Commission's Report
has thus been modified in several ways: (i) Karnataka is retained but the name of Mysore is
restored; (ii) Hyderabad is wholly absorbed by its neighbours; (iii) most important of all,
the attempt to hold together Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking peoples in the State of
Bombay is abandoned; and Maharashtra absorbs the previously proposed Vidarbha. As
a result of the disappearance of Bombay State, the future of Bombay City became doubt-
ful; despite Maharashtrian claims, the decision was taken to make Greater Bombay a
centrally-administered territory. It thus joins Delhi, Manipur and the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands as 'Union Territories'; the number of such units was brought up to
seven by the addition of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Maldive Islands, Himachal Pradesh
and Tripura.
3
That inter-State rivalry is anticipated is perhaps shown by the proposal, simultaneously
made in the Bill, to establish five 'Zonal Councils' of an advisory character, each compris-
ing a number of States. It may be added that 1956 also witnessed the publication of a sur-
prising scheme, put forward jointly by the Chief Ministers of West Bengal and Bihar, for
the merging of their States; at the time of writing, however, little further progress in this
direction could be reported and at least one of the Ministers concerned appeared to be
anxious to drop the notion.
 DIVERSITY 25
The regional feelings that gather around the question of language
might be thought to be balanced and counteracted by the campaign for
a national language. The Constitution has declared that Hindi is the
official language of the Indian Union, 1 and there are many who are
zealous in popularising and extending the use of the language. The
movement for Hindi, however, encounters more difficulties than simply
the resistance of the regional languages. In the first place, it comes into
conflict with English as the only existing national language of India, and
its progress in this struggle is not smooth. Correspondence on an all-
India basis must still be conducted in English, and so must the proceed-
ings of all-India conferences. Moreover, it will be some time before any
Hindi newspaper can achieve the status and quality of the leading news-
papers in English. Indian middle-class opinion is hardly firm in its views
as to how far the replacement of English by Hindi is to be encouraged;
when the Bombay Government recently attempted to debar children of
Indian parents from admission to schools where the medium of in-
struction is English, it was the parents who protested loudest. 2 In the
second place, there is not universal agreement as to the kind of Hindi
that is to be propagated. It is to be in the ' Devanagari', not the Persian
script, but how far words of Arabic and Persian origin are to be re-
placed by those derived or created from Sanskrit is a moot point; not
infrequently does one hear the complaint that the new Hindi of the
zealots is incomprehensible. And, finally, the conflict between Hindi and
English has itself a regional significance and divides the north from the
south; whereas Hindi is itself one of the languages of the north (and the
others are not wholly remote from it), the southern languages belong to
a quite distinct group. A few southerners have taken to Hindi, and no
doubt the number will increase. For the present, however, the middle
class in the south remains more at home in English.
Diversity has been discussed in terms of regional differences and
enough has been said to show that there is here a serious problem of re-
conciliation of loyalties: political behaviour and thinking in national
terms is not so firmly established that it can afford to allow unlimited
opportunities of political expression to regional loyalties, but its weak-
ness also means that it is unable easily to withstand the pressure. But
if this were all that was entailed in India's diversity it would be a
1
Art. 343. In pursuance of Article 344, the President of the Republic appointed on
7 June 1955 an Official Language Commission under the chairmanship of B. G. Kher,
former Chief Minister of Bombay and High Commissioner in L o n d o n . This Commission
had the task of making recommendations to the President ' a s to the progressive use of the
Hindi language'. (The relevant Chapter XVII of the Constitution is at Appendix I. Article
344 contains provision for a rather novel use of a joint committee of both Houses to ex-
amine the Commission's recommendations.) It was reported (Overseas Statesman, 11 June
1955) that the Commission was markedly p r o - H i n d i in composition, even in its Bengali and
M a d r a s members.
2 And the Supreme Court on 26 May 1954 upheld the protests and declared the orders
unconstitutional.
26 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

straightforward problem in one dimension. This, however, is far from

being the case. The divisions are in several dimensions at once. If
geographical diversity is given first place and most space, it is less on
account of its importance than because its effect on political life is more
easily understood, more obvious and more easily documented.
Of India's social diversities, that which stems from religion has been
the best known for its profound influence on politics. The independent
form eventually taken by Muslim political aspirations found its logical
conclusion in the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan. 1
Partition and the mass migrations which accompanied and followed it
still left a substantial Muslim community of perhaps 35 millions in
India, but it was difficult to see how it could resume independent com-
munal political activity. The highest stakes had already been played for
and won; moreover, the main leaders had moved to Pakistan, and in
any case it was clearly wiser to try to placate and reassure the majority
—already sad and angered by partition—by joining non-communal
parties or by withdrawing wholly from the political scene.
The Constituent Assembly's Advisory Committee on Minorities had
in August 1947 recommended that although separate electorates should
be abolished, seats in legislatur es should be reserved for Muslims (as also
for Scheduled Castes and Indian Christians) for a period of ten years.
But during the following year opinion—including Muslim opinion—had
changed, and in a further report in May 1949 the Committee noted that
' although the abolition of separate electorates had removed much of the
poison from the body politic, [even] the reservation of seats for religious
communities, it was felt, did lead to a certain degree of separation and
was to that extent contrary to the conception of a secular democratic
State'. 2 The Constitution, accordingly, includes no such safeguards for
religious minorities. But whether the Muslim citizen of India has already
learnt to think of politics in purely non-communal terms is uncertain.
There is, of course, that section which always adhered to the Congress;
it has many representatives in the legislatures and even in ministerial
position. The uncertainty is whether the allegiance of those who fol-
lowed the Muslim League (but were yet unable or unwilling to go to
Pakistan) has been effectively transferred so quickly, and, if so, which
parties have proved attractive. 3 On this, definite evidence is naturally
1
See W. Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India; Symonds, The Making of Pakistan; and,
for the details of the final negotiations, Lumby, The Transfer of Power.
2
The Report is published in Reports of Committees of the Constituent Assembly (Third
Series), 1950, at pp. 240-245. The institution of separate electorates is, of course, discussed
in the main constitutional reports on India since 1917, and in K. B. Krishna, The Problem
of Minorities. See also W. J. M. Mackenzie's 'Representation in Plural Societies' in
Political Studies, Feb. 1954, on the general problem.
3 The only State in which the Muslim League has remained as a political party is Madras,
where Hindu-Muslim tension has seldom been pronounced. There the party contested 12
seats, mainly in Malabar, for the State legislature and was successful in 5. It also contested
one seat from Madras for the House of the People and thus secured its one member of the
central Parliament.
 DIVERSITY 27
difficult to obtain. There are a few indications that the parties of the left
have not gained—or at least not as much as might have been expected.1
On the other hand, it is clear that Congress is concerned about its own
failure to rally the minorities, including the Muslims. 2 There was con-
siderable consternation when it became known that a conference of
Muslims had been held at Aligarh in November 1953 and that the senti-
ments expressed had been distinctly communal and displayed distrust of
the majority community. 3
The other principal religious minorities are the Parsis, the Christians
and the Sikhs. The Parsis, with their predominantly business and in-
dustrial interests largely centred on Bombay, have never been inclined
to translate their community sense into distinctive political terms. The
same is largely true of the Christians; the leaders of the community are
at present probably more concerned to protect their religious and cul-
tural institutions from the attacks of some extremist Hindus. 4 Only in
Travancore-Cochin, where they constitute a very substantial and power-
ful minority of nearly 40% do the Christians act at all significantly as a
political force. The Sikhs, on the other hand, while represented in all
1
M. Venkatarangaiya's study, The General Election in Bombay City (1953), states that
Congress secured the majority of Muslim votes in the City (p. 151), though of the 12
Muslim candidates who were put up (out of a total of 127 candidates), 6 stood for the
Socialists and 2 for the Communists.
2
In this connection, a party directive to Congress Legislature Parties in States issued in
June 1954 (reported in the press on 25 June) is of interest. It admits that there is a 'growing
feeling of uneasiness a m o n g minority communities', a sense of frustration, ' t h a t they are
not having a fair deal in the services and in the Congress organisation'. T h e directive there-
fore urges that ' a d e q u a t e representation should be given to minority communities in the
Congress organisation and other offices, which will . . . create a sense of security that their
association with the Congress will advance their interest. . . This would help to counter
' t h e state of resentment that is growing a p a c e ' .
3
Badarudduja, an ex-Mayor of Calcutta, presided over the convention and his address
was at once protesting and suppliant in tone. H e listed the oppressions of the minorities and
the attacks on Islam which had led to 'economic paralysis, cultural death or disintegration
and political helotage for Muslims'. H e offered the co-operation of his community to the
State, but begged for a ' s q u a r e deal as an integral part of the Indian N a t i o n ' . T h e conven-
tion decided to form a new Muslim Party. Angry questions were put in the Indian Parlia-
ment and nothing further was heard of the Party.
4
It has been reported that a volunteer movement was inaugurated in Delhi in July 1954
for the purpose of training Hindu religious workers to ' c o m b a t the menace of foreign mis-
sionaries'. Although the foreign missionaries provide a convenient pretext, the real in-
tentions were evident in the speeches made on the occasion: conversions are to be ' checked'
and efforts are to be m a d e to ' r e - c o n v e r t ' the converted. Such a movement, anti-Christian
in the guise of anti-foreign, has of course no official support. T h e Government of India,
however, has its own policy towards foreign missionaries. It has been at least very sceptical
about the value of missionary influence a m o n g tribal peoples (especially those of the N.E.
border areas) and it has been disturbed by reports of missionaries' antagonism towards
Indian culture. Its policy, reaffirmed in September 1955, is one of moderately discouraging
neutrality. Pandit Nehru in his letter to the Primate of Sweden in t953 stressed the view
that the Indian churches 'need not rely too much on external assistance'. Missionaries
already in India may continue to work 'unless they have come to adverse n o t i c e ' ; new
arrivals for existing missions will be allowed to enter India if they are qualified and if no
Indians are available; new missions will require special permission. {India News, 17 Sept.
1955.)
28 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

other parties (in the two states where they are numerous—P.E.P.S.U.
and Punjab), have also had their own party, the Akali Dal. The com-
munity has, however, so suffered from the partition upheaval and from
irresponsible political leadership that it has lost much political coherence
in recent years. 1
More important than the social diversity which flows from different
religions is that which comes from cleavages within the Hindu fold. The
political effects of some of these cleavages are to be seen on the surface of
political life. The extent to which Madras politics is still dominated by
the antagonism between Brahmin and non-Brahmin is well known, and
no account of voting behaviour, legislature proceedings or even minis-
terial appointments would be complete unless considerable attention
were given to this factor. Again, the lively tussles in the new State of
Andhra between the coastal and interior sub-regions owe much of their
vigour to the strong position of one particular caste in one of the areas.
Caste-community factors play an important part in the non-Christian
politics of Travancore-Cochin. All this is evident even to the spectator.
But caste loyalties do not always operate on the surface; indeed, the
bulk of their effect is, iceberg-like, below the surface. The outside ob-
server least of all is likely to notice their power; he can only guess at
their influence from their importance in social life as a whole. There is
little doubt that this is steadily decreasing under the impact of education
and industrialisation; there is as little doubt that it is still very great.
Most important of all the social-religious distinctions within Hindu
society is that between those sometimes called caste Hindus and the
others called untouchables, or Harijans (Gandhi's word for them, mean-
ing sons of God), or the Scheduled Castes. 2 The Constitution has pro-
visions for the reservation for a period of ten years of a number of seats
for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in Central and State Legislatures in
relation to their population. 3 Under this system the community is
assured of its due share of representatives in the legislatures, but they
are voted upon by the electorate at large. In this way, though an element
of communal distinctness is retained, there is a check on the pursuance
of narrowly sectional programmes. The party of the untouchables, the
All-India Scheduled Castes Federation, fared poorly in the General
Elections. It put up candidates only for the reserved seats, but even there
was rarely successful. This would appear to be not only due to the Hari-
jan's loss of confidence in 'their own party' but also to antagonism from
1
Both sections of the split Akalis were soundly defeated in the P.E.P.S.U. elections of
Feb. 1954 (see below, p. 107). The Sikhs conducted in 1955 a vigorous but untidy campaign
for a separate Punjabi-speaking (i.e. Sikh majority) State.
2 The last term is derived from Schedule I of the 1935 Act. Their normal official designa-
tion before 1935 was Depressed Classes.
3 Part XVI gives the ' special provisions relating to certain classes'. It includes a clause
(335) that 'the claims of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes shall be taken into consideration'
in government service. This is the subject of detailed departmental instructions.
 DIVERSITY 29
caste Hindu voters; it is said, for example, that the Socialists in Bombay
lost votes among middle-class Hindus because of their electoral alliance
with the S.C.F. 1 Also, it is unlikely that the almost complete absence of
Harijan members elected to unreserved seats 2 is to be explained simply
by there being no need to elect more than must in any case get elected to
reserved seats; it is very probable that many caste Hindus would still
find it difficult to bring themselves to vote for an untouchable.
But to understand this influence of caste on politics we have, as already
suggested, to consider the place of caste distinctions in everyday life. To
do this at all thoroughly would require a volume 3 ; here it may be enough
to refer to some striking facts given in the Report for 1952 of the Com-
missioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The number of people in
this status is immense: over 50 million in Scheduled Castes and nearly
20 million in Scheduled Tribes—with a further estimated 50 million
whose status is almost as low, though their castes have not been
'scheduled'. 4 'They live', says the Report, 'in ignorance, fear and cen-
turies-old traditions, leading an impoverished and difficult existence.' 5
The practice of untouchability, which accompanies and helps to per-
petuate the appalling economic conditions, is solemnly forbidden under
Article 17 of the Constitution, but the Report finds that it 'still persists
in the rural areas'. 6 The legislative measures taken in some States in
order to give effect to the constitutional ban 'have not proved very
effective'. Sometimes offences are not made cognisable, but 'even where
such offences are made cognisable, these laws have not been of any
material help to those for whom they were enacted. . . . Very few cases
have been reported to the police . . . [because] the Scheduled Caste
people have no courage to break the social barriers imposed on them.' 7
The Report gives instructive examples of the kind of social discrimina-
tion which is to be found. From a part of Punjab it is reported that in the
absence of separate wells for them, the Harijans 'have often to wait for
hours for caste Hindus to draw water for them and pour it into a pit
alongside—for direct pouring into the untouchables' vessels would be
1
M. Venkatarangaiya, op. cit., p. 152.
2
F o r the whole of India, ' o n e Scheduled Caste candidate and one Scheduled Tribe can-
didate were returned to the House of the People to unreserved seats'. Of all the State
Assemblies, ' t w o Scheduled Caste persons in W . Bengal and one in Travancore-Cochin
were returned to unreserved seats'. (Reports of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and
Tribes for the year 1952, pp. 49-50.)
3
The best short account is found in J. H. H u t t o n , Caste in India (1946).
In his Report for 1953, the Commissioner noted that 'every caste and community is
running a race for being included in the list of backward classes', so great is the hope of
gaining a few special privileges.
5 Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes for the year 1952, p. 141.
6 Ibid., p. 139.
1 Ibid., p. 41. The passing of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, by the Indian
Parliament is no doubt a further welcome indication of good intentions and even of deter-
mination to end the evils. T h e immediate effects of such legislation will, however, be
limited in practice.
30 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS
1
pollution'. In the villages of Madhya Bharat, it is said, 'there are no in-
stances of Harijans practising any other profession than those of their
forefathers', while in Rajasthan 'cases still occur where Scheduled
Caste people are not allowed to ride on horse- or camel-back within the
village limits'. 2 The combination of social discrimination with economic
backwardness is brought out pathetically in the passage which, after re-
cording that in Madras there are by this time ' no disabilities in regard
to the wearing of ornaments by Scheduled Caste women or in regard to
the eating of ghee [butter], sugar and the like', adds: ' but they cannot
afford all this due to their poverty'. 3 It is from Madras, too, that we get
the following comprehensive picture:
So far as access to shops, public restaurants and places of public entertain-
ment and the use of wells, tanks [large ponds], bathing places, roads, etc.,
are concerned, except for a few advanced and enlightened Harijans, the
majority are still afraid of making free use of public institutions. They fear
that any claim of right on their part would wound the feelings of the caste
Hindus on whom they are depending for their livelihood.4
That these fears are not wholly groundless is indicated by an account of
an incident which shows at the same time a link between social discri-
mination and political behaviour—though admittedly in an unusually
extreme form: it appears that the Rajput landlords of parts of Madhya
Bharat had been angered by the ending of the forced labour which they
previously extracted and by the refusal of some Harijans to perform
some of their traditional duties; the victory of untouchables at panch-
ayat (village council) elections proved the last straw, and promptly ' re-
sulted in firings on the Scheduled Caste people in two villages'. 5
These illustrations no doubt give but one side of the story. On the
other side should be put all the influences—from the exhortations of
leaders to the film and the motor bus—which work increasingly in an
egalitarian direction. Caste may be losing its hold, but it is not happen-
ing as quickly as Indian reformers would wish or as outside observers
often imagine. And so long as it remains, it has to be taken into account;
it can no longer be the job of either the Indian reformer or the foreign
observer to overlook it. On the contrary, for both, the changes already
effected must be less significant than the differences that remain. The
bearing of these differences on political thinking and behaviour has
three related aspects. They mean, in the first place, that political action
may be directly conditioned by caste factors; one votes, makes appoint-
ments, finds political association along caste lines, and also judges
political proposals in terms of their influence on the position of one's
caste. They mean, secondly, that even in the thinking of those who are
less actively concerned with politics there is always present an element
which is a competitor with national consciousness; that is to say, even
1
Ibid., p. 40. 2 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 3 ¡bid., p. 31. * Ibid.,?. 31. ¡Ibid., p. 39.
 DIVERSITY 31

where caste sentiment is not strong enough directly to affect behaviour,

it may still operate to hinder the emergence and then distort the shape
of a national endeavour. Finally, the importance of caste differences is
that they create their own deep gaps of social experience as well as con-
tributing to the widening of gaps caused by other differences. Nowhere
can the phrase that men who live differently think differently have a
more profound meaning than in India. Caste is a community, not self-
sufficient but rather connected and dependent on other similar com-
munities; yet possessing, at least in its ' p u r e ' form, its own distinctive
customs and values. 1
Religion and, within religion, caste are thus sources of social diversity
with a special importance in India and for the study of Indian politics.
But other sources of diversity, other differences with which the foreigner
is perhaps more familiar, are by no means absent. On the contrary, class
differences, for example, are unusually marked and they are also, as
already suggested, reinforced by the regional and communal-caste dif-
ferences. It will be hard to discover what there is in common between a
wealthy Sikh businessman from Punjab and the landless Harijan from
Tamil-Nad, between a Marwari financier and a Bengali Brahmin school
teacher. It is, of course, easy to think of very sharply contrasted types of
Englishman or Frenchman or American. But there are two points to
note: first, in the Western examples there will be several places at which
social experience has built substantial bridges across the gap, whereas in
India such bridges are normally few; second, the gap itself is very much
wider. Differences of class in India are not to be measured and grasped
simply by the use of statistics showing the incomes of the various social
groups; they would certainly demonstrate the existence of a large
majority who live in conditions of more or less abject poverty and a
small group enjoying exceptional wealth. But this is no more than even
the most casual visitor already notices. More important is a different
kind of dividing line which might not always correspond with money in-
comes. For example, if we think of our own society of somewhere
between fifty or a hundred years ago, we are surely impressed by the
importance, as a determinant of ways of thought and behaviour, of the
employment of domestic servants in the homes of the upper and middle
1
It seems possible that where it is perfectly accepted caste may continue to provide the
individual with a valuable sense of security in a rapidly-changing world. T h e difficulty is
that one of the things that is rapidly changing is precisely the extent to which it is perfectly
accepted. T h e result, on balance, appears to be an accentuation of social tensions which
harass the individual rather than a safe social harbour which shelters him. T h e question is
discussed in G. Murphy, In the Minds of Men: Study of Human Behaviour and Social Ten-
sions in India ( N e w York, 1953). In a stable society, caste furnishes a source of solidarity
and security and encourages a sense of dependence. In a period of marked social change—
e.g. a m o v e m e n t of population to the t o w n s — it can b e c o m e also an added source of ten-
sions, hostility and bitter despair. See also M. B. N a n a v a t i and C. N . Vakil, Group Pre-
judices in India (Bombay, 1953).
32 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

classes. It is surely the disappearance of this institution, as much as any

of the direct effects of social policy, which has brought about a striking
uniformity in patterns of life; Disraeli's 'two nations' became one, not
with Lloyd George's budget, nor even with the post-war welfare state,
but simply when 'the family stopped having a servant' and father
helped with the household work. In this sense, India is firmly' Victorian';
the household of an officer in the civil or military services, of a sub-
stantial shopkeeper or businessman, of a landowner or professional man
will include not one but several servants. Moreover, many whose in-
comes hardly permit this luxury will make other sacrifices to enable
them to live as their status or their traditions demand, to keep them-
selves above the crucial line of social demarcation. 1
To these more or less familiar economic class distinctions, we have to
add still further factors before we have even an approximate idea of the
diversities which bear on Indian politics. One of these is the contrast
between town and country. More precisely in India's case, it is a con-
trast, first, between the village and anything more than a village; and,
secondly, between small towns and big cities. It is true that much has
happened to break down these contrasts. The big cities and industrial
concentrations increasingly draw in from the rural areas workers whose
families remain in the villages; visits are then made in both directions
and two worlds meet. Again, the widespread development—above all,
in the post-war period—of the motor bus has brought the district town
within monthly or even weekly reach of the village—whereas it had
tended to be a place of only annual pilgrimage. Yet the differences re-
main immense. Both aspects—the beginning of contact and the distance
over which contact has to be established—can be illustrated by two
simple pictures which happen also to have a political importance. The
first is outside the imposing Parliament House in New Delhi: groups of
villagers, who have come in to the city by horse-cart or lorry, stand awed
and delighted by this marvel from a century so alien to their own.
Second, inside the Parliament House waiting in the lobbies are also men
from villages waiting to listen to their representatives or even to meet
them; for adult franchise has brought the village into the world of
politics, which was hitherto the preserve of the urbanised.
A mention must be made of two other distinctions. One is that be-
tween the Westernised Indian and others. This is, of course, very much
a matter of degree and the range is great: at one end the few who have
lived in the West and are as much at home in its customs as they are in
their 'own'—or even more so; at the other end, the clerk who has a
preference for American films or for wearing trousers in place of dhoti.
1
The more ardent members of the Communist Party naturally constitute an emphatic
exception to this rule; it is not unusual for middle-class party workers to donate their in-
comes (above a bare minimum) to party funds and make a point of doing everything for
themselves in an attempt to put themselves 'below the line'.
 DIVERSITY 33
But whatever the f o r m taken by Western influence, it has added its own
special contribution to India's lack of homogeneity. A final distinction
— b u t one by no means negligible—is that of age. In other words, there
are in different generations different way of thought, on all subjects, in-
cluding politics. There is nothing unusual in this. But, for politics in
particular, there is n o w becoming evident in India a dividing line of
special importance: 1947. T h a t is to say there is a world of difference
between the political attitudes of those w h o were old enough to be in-
terested or active in politics before independence and those whose m a i n
interest a n d activity came later. The difference could probably be ex-
pressed or conveyed in several ways: the younger m a n may appear m o r e
constructive, less idealistic, more aggressive a n d so on. But it is clear
that there is a contrast which is more marked t h a n is usual between age
groups.
The presence in Indian society of so m a n y kinds of diversity, each of
great importance, produces in political life a maze of cross-currents. The
position has been well summarised by a recent writer:
The absence of cultural homogeneity and the lack of social mobility . . . be-
come sources of social tension. . . . India may or may not be, as some
critics have maintained, many countries packed in a geographical receptacle,
but she undoubtedly is a place where many centuries jostle together. Side by
side in our country, especially among the Hindus, wide educational and cul-
tural differences exist—differences accentuated by the rigid caste barriers;
social life is cut up into many enclosures, and thought reared on such
foundations gets fractured into particularisms. 1
The clash of different social policies is, in all countries, seldom an exer-
cise in reason and logic alone; even in the peculiarly homogeneous
society of Britain we are accustomed to the pressures that sectional in-
terests and limited experiences exert on political attitudes and pro-
grammes. In India, the diversity of experiences a n d loyalties is so great
that it is sometimes a matter for wonder that coherent national policies
are able at all to emerge. T h a t they d o is a tribute to the power of the
forces making for unity which we noted earlier. But that the victory of
unity over diversity is not at all to be taken for granted is shown by the
continual appeals for a national view which are m a d e by political
leaders.
4. Authority
One of the manifestations of diversity which is an outstanding
characteristic of Indian politics is the prevalence of faction. 2 It is indeed
1
Asoka Mehta, Politics of Planned Economy, p. 31.
2 In a speech in Delhi on 15 May 1954, Pandit Nehru placed his usual emphasis on the
need for unity. He was explaining his retention of the position of Congress President along
with that of Prime Minister: ' I did so because I found there was no other way out. Several
weaknesses had crept into the Congress—dissensions, internecine quarrels, petty rivalries
and bickerings. . . . We must remain united and ward off the evils of parochialism and
casteism. . . . We must work hard to get things properly consolidated in India.'
3—P.I.
34 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

a natural consequence of the multitude of cross-currents we have already

described. Separate experiences and diverse loyalties make it difficult for
common efforts to be maintained ; cracks appear in the façade of unity
and splits take place.1 People find it easy to feel and believe that the
other fellow is really impossible to get on with.
If it were invariably possible to relate factions to the social diversities
we have mentioned, there would be no need to look further for an ex-
planation. But in fact this is not so. Inability to work with others in the
team often appears to be less the result of different loyalties than an in-
dependent characteristic with its own raison d'être. The suspicion that
this is the case is strengthened by a connected feature of Indian politics
which forcibly impresses the outside observer : a paradoxical or ambi-
valent attitude to authority. Authority in India appears to be subject at
once to much more abusive criticism and much more effusive adulation
than one is accustomed to elsewhere. Due respect combined with due
criticism is the exception rather than the rule. The position of Ministers
demonstrates this feature well. On the one hand, they are called upon to
grace an enormous number of functions of all kinds, they are received
with excited enthusiasm and heavy garlands of flowers, and their re-
marks are extensively reported in the following day's newspapers. On
the other hand, both in public and private they are criticised in un-
measured terms, some of the smaller newspapers indulge in violent
abuse, and scandal about them is always in demand. This is not the place
to attempt a careful analysis of these attitudes. But a review of some of
the factors that appear to be at work may throw further light on the
nature of Indian politics.
Profound respect for authority has its grounds in several features of
Indian life and history. To begin with the immediate past, it is clear that
much of the enthusiastic awe in which the present leaders are held is
derived from their prestige of yesterday, when they conducted the battle
for liberation from British rule. The selfless sacrifices endured during
that period are already losing much of their appeal—especially among
the younger generation who look more to present performance—but
they are still of some importance. But some of the respect is carried over
from the British rulers themselves. Their devotion to duty and their
pursuit of justice, their very remoteness and alien natures, helped to
establish a widespread and firmly-rooted respect for government which
was not damaged—was, indeed, even shared—by nationalist critics and
i I am not referring here to the kind of split which broke off the Socialists and later the
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party from the body of the National Movement. Clearly such splits
were not only unavoidable; they were necessary, for a national movement hardly con-
formed to the requirements of an independent parliamentary democracy, where the need
was for an opposition with an alternative policy. I refer rather to the kind of split which
has taken place in almost every State Congress party ; these have only rarely been prompted
by differences over policy—though sometimes such differences have later been paraded for
decency's sake. (In fact, even the K.M.P. split was not wholly free of this feature.)
 AUTHORITY 35
opponents. The British in their turn had been able to build on suitable
foundations; the pattern of Indian polity before the period of British
rule—a pattern still discernible in the princely states until very recently
—had as one of its clearest motifs an awe and devotion for the ruler.
Moreover, the very structure of Indian Hindu society inculcated—partly
but not exclusively through the caste system—a sense of status in all
members. To be of noble birth and high caste no doubt entailed certain
duties, but to be of lesser status certainly entailed the duty of respecting
those placed above. Finally, any explanation of the place of authority in
Indian society would have to take account of the family. In any society,
the family is probably of such importance that the relations and atti-
tudes which characterise it will find a place in the wider network of
social relations. The extraordinarily central position of the family in
Indian life makes it practically certain that the values it enshrines will
overflow outside it to society at large. There can be little doubt that
authority and status are the keynotes of Indian family life.1 The places
of elder brother, mother, mother-in-law and, above all, father are all
clearly defined by custom and characterised by the possession of appro-
priate authority which attaches to them.
India, however, is undergoing a social transformation—which began
before the political transformation and is yet far from completed. In
such a period it is perhaps to be expected that there should be some-
thing of a revolt against old values. There is thus, as just mentioned, an
impatience with the heroic leaders of yesterday unless they can show
themselves useful today. There is also a more general reluctance to
accept hitherto venerated authority. This attitude, when it encounters
the older deeper feelings, reacts with some violence. This accounts for
some of the abuse. But the matter is a good deal more complicated.
Some of the feelings of resentment and bitter frustration seem to be the
result of disappointed idealism. 2 The nationalist struggle had evoked
such efforts and inspired such hopes that this was unavoidable; for
some, that is to say, the post-independence Ministries are evident
failures simply because the millennium has not arrived. Moreover, the
nostalgia for the days of comradeship is all the stronger on account of
the undisguised scramble for office and power. The unduly harsh and
unsympathetic attitude towards authority also stems from the lack of
1
The bulk of the novels and short stories written in the Indian languages (above all, of
course, in Bengali) during the last half-century could bear witness to this. Some recently
published accounts in English of Indian childhood and family life confirm the impression.
See, for example, N . C. Chaudhuri, Autobiography of an Unknown Indian; N . Sircar, Indian
Boyhood; S. Ghose, And Gazelles Leaping.
2 This is not to say that there are not a m o n g certain sections—e.g. teachers—real
grievances. These do not, however, account for the whole mood of disillusionment. One
senior political leader with whom I discussed the question agreed; but he believed that
the frustration was not a recent development: 'Frustration has become a habit of mind
with our people.'
36 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

social cohesion. It is, in many ways, easier to respect authority exercised

by a complete alien than when it is in the hands of someone from a
neighbouring region or a different caste. Another consideration is the
smallness of the élite in India. In the West the 'governing classes' of
politicians and administrators are merged into and lost in the large body
of the upper and middle classes; whereas in India the top layers of
society are remarkably thin and the governing classes constitute an im-
portant proportion of them. The result is that M.P.s, Ministers, high
officials are within easy reach and are known personally to those in these
layers—a situation which makes contempt come easily and the retailing
of scandal a popular pastime.
The inability to 'get o n ' with the other man, the reluctance to accept
authority with due but not exaggerated respect, the preference among
politicians for splits rather than compromises, the tendency among the
educated classes to indulge in unconstructive and unreasonable criti-
cism—all these are closely connected, and they play an important part in
influencing, for example, the relations between governments and op-
positions. They help to explain the importance of personal followings
and personal incompatibilities in political groupings. In a country where
the multitude of cross-currents in politics is conducive to the growth of
faction, they reinforce that tendency. These characteristics may perhaps
be described without unfairness as signs of political irresponsibility. 1
Should such a description be proper, its explanation is not difficult. It is
a consequence, in the first place, of the long period of national struggle
for independence which in such a high degree encouraged irresponsible
utterance and behaviour; criticism could be careless because there was
never any danger of the critic being invited to perform better. Moreover,
in the countryside, the concentration of powers in the hands of the
district officer was so great and his sharing of these powers so rare and
minimal that it was scarcely surprising that he should have been called
the ' m a n - b a p ' (mother and father) of his area; and since for most
people 'government' meant the district officer, it was easy for a general
impression to develop that responsibility was the exclusive possession of
the rulers. But it seems also likely that irresponsibility may be related to
more permanent features of Indian social life. It is, for example, clearly
connected with the presence of so many strongly competing loyalties. A

1
Mr. Paul Appleby, in his study Public Administration in India (1953), discusses, in rela-
tion to the work of administrators, what seems to me a similar feature. He lists as one of
the factors making for disunity and incoherence in administration what he calls 'Lack of
action-mindedness' (p. 4). But he attempts to avoid making the charge of irresponsibility:
'This does not imply sloth, lack of social consciousness or irresponsibility; it refers to a
way of thinking about and addressing action problems. It may be related to the obverse
side of the shield which is one of India's distinct virtues—a bent toward and capacity for
speculative thought.' I find this not wholly convincing. Even Mr. Appleby goes on to say :
' I t is certainly related to a history that provided little opportunity for large-scale action
responsibility.'
 LEVELS OF POLITICS 37
man may be irresponsible in relation to State and Central politics simply
because he has a high sense of responsibility to his caste or district. 1 It is
also possible that the exercise by children of independent responsibility
is less encouraged in Indian family life than it is in the West, and this
may have its influence even on adult behaviour.

5. Levels of Politics
I have discussed a number of features, of Indian social life and indi-
cated the kind of influence they exert on Indian politics. Throughout this
discussion it has been rather assumed that there is only one pattern of
Indian political behaviour and that it is essentially the Western pattern
with certain special modifications imposed by peculiar features of his-
tory and social life. The analysis, that is, has been similar to the kind
one would expect to find in a book which set out to explain French or
American politics to English readers. It is appropriate at this stage to
introduce an element which appears to question this assumption, if not
to render it invalid. 2 1 refer to the presence in Indian politics of a manner
of political thought and behaviour which it is difficult to regard simply
as a local modification of some aspect of Western politics. It draws its
inspiration from religious teachings and represents a development of an
aspect of Gandhian politics. It leads its own life, alongside and not
wholly unconnected with the world of ' n o r m a l ' politics, but largely in-
dependent of it. It is possible to say that it is not politics at all; in that
case the Western pattern (of course, with its modifications) is left in sole
command as the only pattern of political conduct available. But it seems
more in keeping with the facts to allow that it is politics, even if it is of a
kind quite distinct from that of modern Europe. 3 It may not be mislead-
ing to say that Indian politics takes place at two different levels or in
two distinct modes, the one Western and secular, and other religious and
Indian. 4 At the same time, it must be confessed that it is difficult to see
the two levels as alternative ways of politics available to India as a
whole; ' spiritual politics' relies in many ways on the continuous prac-
tice o f ' Western politics', whereas the latter owes little to the former.
1
It is also a familiar point that nepotism often reflects a loyalty to family and clan in
excess of loyalty to the state.
2
T h e way in which I have expressed some of my reflections in this section owes some-
thing to a paper entitled ' T h e Idea of " C h a r a c t e r " in the Interpretation of M o d e r n
Polities', read by Professor Oakeshott to the 1954 conference of the Political Studies
Association of Great Britain.
3
It appears that Professor Oakeshott (see previous note) might not agree with this. His
view is that ' E u r o p e a n political dispositions have been diffused outside Europe to such an
extent that there is r o o m for doubt whether there is a second political " c h a r a c t e r " of any
significance now to be found in the world.'
t The word 'religious' is open to some misunderstanding. I should regard the activities
of bodies such as the H i n d u M a h a s a b h a as falling clearly within the sphere o f ' W e s t e r n '
politics; they compete with the use of similar methods for similar places. Perhaps
'spiritual' would be less ambiguous.
38 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

Yet it seems that the two ways can and do present themselves as alterna-
tives to individuals contemplating political activity.
The foremost exponent of this other level of politics is Vinoba Bhave,
and his entry into ' politics' was marked by his inauguration of Bhoodan
Yajna or the Land-Gifts Mission in 1951.1 The mission or movement
consists simply in requesting those who own land to give a portion to
those who have none. It appears to have started almost accidentally.
Bhave, walking through the disturbed and stricken areas of Hyderabad
in April 1951, was met at every point with the appeals of the landless for
land. In one village where this happened, Bhave turned to those in the
same village who had land and asked for donations of land. 'The people
acceded to my request and I received my first land-gift that day. This is
how the idea of Bhoodan came to me, and I tried it during my tour. It
gave encouraging results. Within a period of two months I receive-
about twelve thousand acres.' By April 1955, no less than 3,500,000
acres had been thus donated. And of that total, 120,000 acres had already
been distributed to those who had none or little land before. For the
work of collection and distribution he is aided by teams of voluntary
workers in the various States.
Every pronouncement of Vinoba Bhave shows the way in which the
movement combines spiritual and practical elements; the impulse is both
spiritual and social, the consequences also partake of both worlds. 'We
have accepted this work because we want to change and revolutionise
society; and also because it will alleviate the miseries of the poor; and,
further again, because we want to cleanse and purify our minds and
hearts.' He justifies his work on the three grounds that 'it is in tune with
the cultural traditions of India, it contains in it the seed of economic and
social revolution and it can help in the establishment of peace in the
world'. His teachings are full of references to Hindu mythology and are
based on doctrines (such as non-attachment) which are part of India's
spiritual heritage. He puts his creed in homely terms: ' If there are five
sons in the family, I want to be considered the sixth. I claim one-sixth
of the total cultivable land in the country.' At the same time, he relates
his movement to the existing social conditions and existing movements.2
' I do not beg alms. I ask for the land as a right of the poor. I refuse to
agree that my attempt . . . is contrary to the trends of history. New
things can happen. . . . My mission is not to stave off a revolution. I
want to prevent a violent revolution and create a non-violent revolu-
1
Vinoba Bhave was for over thirty years a silent and little-known but devoted follower
of G a n d h i . A portrait of the m a n and a description of his work are given i n ' L a n d T h r o u g h
L o v e ' , by Hallam Tennyson in Encounter, Dec. 1954, and the same a u t h o r ' s Saint on the
March (1955). A collection of his writings and speeches o n his L a n d - G i f t s Mission has
appeared under the title Bhoodan Yajna (Navajivan Press, A h m e d a b a d , 1953) and it is
f r o m that booklet that I have taken the quotations used below.
2
It is worth remembering that Bhoodan began precisely where the Communists had
been most active among the peasantry.
 LEVELS OF POLITICS 39
tion.' But 'when a revolution in the way of life is contemplated, it must
take place in the mind . . . and the present work is only the preparation
of a psychological atmosphere'. That the movement has aims much
wider than an approach to the land problem is made abundantly clear.
'This Bhoodan Yajna is an application of non-violence, an experiment
in the transformation of life itself.' ' I firmly believe that India should be
able to evolve, consistent with her ideals, a new type of revolution based
purely on love. . . . We do not aim at doing acts of kindness but at
creating a kingdom of kindness.'
It is worth while noting how Vinoba Bhave himself conceives the re-
lation of his 'level of politics' to politics as more usually understood. He
emphasises that his is a distinct sphere, though it contributes to 'normal'
politics. 'As to the economic side of the land problem, society itself can
look after it. . . . I have chosen as my work the creation of a moral
atmosphere so that the problem might be solved peacefully. . . . I do
not want to agitate for any legislative measure; mine is a moral move-
ment. Whatever success I get is on account of this difference.' But
though his mission may help the different activities of others, on a larger
view it also makes them unnecessary. ' A law which follows a change in
the moral principles of a people is just a formality of record. . . . In a
non-violent social order, law is like the formal " The E n d " put at the end
of a book. The end of the book does not depend on the affixing of that
seal. Hence I am indifferent about legislation.' Vinoba often speaks of
the importance of detachment from power, though he admits that
political power can be an instrument of service. In the sphere o f ' normal'
politics, he sees the value of a system of government and opposition, but
he would be happier if there could somehow be a basis and field of
united activity as well as the debate of alternative policies. But the
power in which he is mainly interested is a power that belongs to his
own ' level of politics' and is envisaged as rendering the other variety
obsolete. 'The power of the people is the opposite of the power of
violence. . . . There is an element of violence in the power of the state,
but inasmuch as this power has been entrusted to the state by the
people its character differs from that of naked violence. . . . We, how-
ever, intend to go further and create conditions which will do away with
the need to use even the power of the state.'
The success of the movement in the very short time it has been in
existence is evidence of its undoubted appeal to many people in the
country. One 'conversion' to Bhoodan which attracted special attention
was that of the Socialist Party leader, Jayaprakash Narayan. He has
abandoned the field of 'normal' politics and put his great mass appeal
at the service of Vinoba Bhave. In an article written shortly afterwards,
he has underlined the view of the connection between the two 'levels' of
politics which we have already detected in Bhave's own writings. Thus,
40 THE N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

to the ordinary politician, Bhoodan is simply a well-intentioned and no

doubt helpful movement of agrarian reform, which is at best preparing
the ground. But in reality, says Narayan, it is a mass movement of con-
version to a new climate of thought and new values of life. Since it aims
to revolutionise man and society, it is an intensely and deeply political
movement—but its politics are not those of parliaments and govern-
ments. It does not aim at capturing the state—the Communists do this,
and what results is not a ' withering away' of the state, but the total state.
The ultimate stateless society, in which people are able to manage their
affairs directly, will only come by a change of mind brought about
through the creation of conditions in which the people will rely more on
themselves and less on the state. Bhoodan is the beginning of this larger
movement.1
Many criticisms have, of course, been made of the Bhoodan move-
ment. It has been said that many of the gifts were of land of little value
or land which required much to be spent on it before it could yield re-
sults. It has been suggested that many landowners have been pleased to
donate land which they feared they would in any event soon have to part
with under legislative provisions, and that they were willing to forgo a
future compensation payment in return for a greatly enhanced local
prestige. Not always, it appears, has the machinery for the distribution
of the land-gifts worked as the founder intended. Whatever the validity
of these criticisms, it can certainly be admitted that in many cases neither
the donor nor the receiver of the gift has had in his mind only those con-
siderations which move Bhave himself. It would also be too much to
claim that the spirit of Bhoodan is perfectly understood even by those
who support it. In the parties of 'normal' politics, for instance, the em-
phasis is almost wholly on the value of Bhoodan as an auxiliary to the
state.2 None of this however, detracts from the fact that there is here an
activity which is important in its results, which is peculiarly Indian in
ethos, which is political but not in the accepted sense of the term. That
this form of politics can exist side by side with 'normal' politics is per-
haps a further sign of the strongly heterogeneous character of Indian
society.
6. The Place of Parliament
Against this outline of the nature of Indian politics we may proceed
to examine the particular institution of parliament in India. But before
1
The article in which these themes occurred was published in Bharat Jyoti, Bombay, on
28 June 1954.
2
Some of the truly Gandhian Congressmen may share Bhave's whole creed, but the
tone of the Party's officials is unmistakably practical. The main circular from the All-India
Congress Committee was issued in July 1953 and made support of the movement a duty of
Congressmen; as a further letter of 20 Aug. 1953 put it, ' W e should like to impress upon
you the desirability of giving your full support to the Bhoodan Movement because it is the
only practical way of solving the problem of land hunger in our country without having
to spend millions of rupees on paying compensation to the land holders.' (Congress
Bulletin, Aug.-Sept. 1953, p. 264.)
 THE P L A C E OF PARLIAMENT 41
we do so, it may be well to mention here two familiar general lines of
criticism to which the institution is often subject.
One of these appears at first sight to be related to the other 'level of
politics' which we have just described. It alleges that parliamentary de-
mocracy, by virtue of being a Western institution, cannot be suited to
India. Even after the winning of independence, there still remains to be
accomplished the establishment of genuinely Indian political institu-
tions. This view has nowhere been put forward with much skill or
subtlety, but it nevertheless influences the outlook of many in India. It
leads at least to the feeling that the political institutions of modern India
are unworthy of notice; at worst, it produces, with the aid of much loose
thinking, a sentiment of contempt and a series of ill-judged condemna-
tions. Some illustrations of the view may be given from the writing of
one of its more noteworthy exponents. 1
India has chosen [lie writes] to be a camp follower of the West and is taking
pride in its godless secularism and in the paraphernalia of parliamentary de-
mocracy which it has decided to adopt. . . . It is a matter of great sorrow
that the new Constitution does not breathe the principles of Truth and
Ahimsa . . . [for] we know that the institutions of parliamentary demo-
cracy have failed to give happiness and peace to large sections of the world
population who spend sleepless nights in fear of wars and party despot-
ism . . .
He then describes some of the weaknesses of this form of government:
the impossible task which it imposes on the elector; the sad elimination
of the independent candidate and the growing rigidity of party disci-
pline ; the farce of non-co-operation between government and opposi-
tion; and the baneful influence of politicians on administration. It
would have been better, the writer argues, if an attempt had been made
' t o present to the world of political science some true Indian principles
of political philosophy'. This could have been done by appointing a
committee of experts to study the Hindu scriptures and epics and ' our
vast history', with a view to discovering whether 'certain principles of
our indigenous administration and government could not be replanted
in our new Bharat [India]'. He concludes with five proposals which such
a committee could even now consider:
The Heads of the Union and the States to be effective heads 2 ; government
to consist of talent from all parties; elections to be so devised as to reduce
1
The passages are f r o m 'Reflections on Parliamentary Democracy in I n d i a ' , the Presi-
dential Address of Professor Bodh R a j Sharma to the Dec. 1953 conference of the Indian
Political Science Association. I believe that Professor Sharma would be the first to admit
that his views were shared by few of his colleagues.
2
It is interesting to note that this proposal was also popular in discussions on constitu-
tion-making in Pakistan; it was argued that the American system of strong one-man
executives was more Islamic than cabinet-parliamentary government. T h e committee
of religious experts he suggests was of course actually used in the case of Pakistan—with
somewhat unhappy consequences.
42 T H E N A T U R E OF I N D I A N POLITICS

the powers of the bosses and of wealth; religious education to be compul-

sory and books on religion to be prepared by a committee of leaders of all
religions with a view to the spiritual and moral regeneration of the com-
munity through self-control and the limitation of desires; nationalism to be
subordinated to internationalism.
Although this view bears certain resemblances to the distinct 'level of
politics' discussed earlier, it seems to owe most to a sense of resentment
that anything should be borrowed from outside the culture of India. 1 It
would perhaps scarcely be worthy of much attention were it not for the
extent to which it is commonly (though very vaguely) felt. The question
of the suitability of parliamentary democracy for India is no doubt a
serious one. But it is unlikely that it will be correctly answered on the
basis of hasty criticism of Western institutions and the inspection of
those of mediaeval India. Rather is it to be answered—as in fact it is
being answered—by experiment with readily available materials, by the
attempt to operate and adapt those institutions with which recent poli-
tical experience had made so many Indians familiar. The fact that
parliament is in origin a Western institution is less significant than the
fact that parliament in India has become an Indian institution.
The second line of criticism of parliamentary democracy—and one
less restricted to India than the first—is related to many of the observa-
tions made above in considering diversity in India. The critics of this
school believe that, while parliamentary institutions may work reason-
ably in homogeneous societies, they cannot do so in the absence of such
conditions. The point is not so much that divisions on religious lines
create permanent majorities and minorities instead of the fluidity of
power which democracy demands, 2 as that the multitude of cross-
currents of social loyalties will reduce parliament to a façade. The 'real'
power struggle will take place anywhere but on 'the floor of the House',
and parliament's proceedings will never be more than a formal record-
ing of the results of tussles between the various groups of forces which
have taken place privately outside. This criticism, like the first, tends to
produce a conviction that the institutions are unimportant.
This view seems both plausible and naive: plausible because, as we
have seen, India certainly does manifest a great degree of diversity and
it would seem likely that the various forces could only find accom-
modation by means of fragmented negotiations ; naive because in no
parliamentary system is there a complete absence of such cross-currents
and in no parliament are the party rooms and the lobbies less important
than the 'floor' itself. But this view cannot be so quickly disposed of;
it will in fact be a purpose of the following chapters to suggest an
answer.
1
In Bhave, on the other hand, there is no trace of resentment or contempt.
2
This was a familiar, and largely valid, criticism—before partition.
 CHAPTER TWO

THE COMING OF PARLIAMENT

1. The Experience

O
N the 13th May 1952 the first session of the Indian Parliament
opened in New Delhi. In the lives of the newly-elected members
the day was certainly of great importance; many of them were
taking their places in a representative assembly for the first time. 1 In the
history of parliamentary institutions in India, too, the day marked the
beginning of a new period. But with institutions, as also perhaps with
individuals, we do well to maintain a certain scepticism when con-
fronted with claims that they have begun wholly new lives. It is not easy
to find in the new Parliament features that have no earlier beginning.
The House of the People and the Council of States were new bodies, but
a bicameral central legislature was thirty years old. Adult franchise was
new, but the principle of election had been introduced over half a
century ago.
Even the name of Parliament had been in use for two years. When the
new republican Constitution of India was inaugurated on 26 January
1950 the existing legislature gave itself the title 'Provisional Parlia-
ment', and the adjective was forgotten in ordinary usage. To most of
her citizens, indeed, India acquired a parliament even before this. The
'appointed day' of the transfer of power, 15 August 1947, would be
chosen by many as the crucial birth-date. For on that day the Con-
stituent Assembly became, under the terms of the India Independence
Act, the legislature of the new Dominion. Yet the Constituent Assembly
itself was built on older foundations—and the story is soon firmly back
in the days of British rule.
It was a persistent complaint of India that Britain gave her conces-
sions to Indian national sentiment too late and that she passed on
always too little of her own constitutional heritage. The equally per-
sistent comment of the British was that India was in too great a hurry.
The Simon Commission, in the concluding pages of its first ('Survey')
volume, stated: 'Indian political thought finds it tempting to fore-
shorten history, and is unwilling to wait for the final stage of a

T h e legislative experience o f m e m b e r s is discussed in C h a p t e r III, Section 2.

43
44 THE C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

prolonged evolution. It is impatient of the doctrine of gradualness.' 1 In a

similar tone, the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform em-
phasised the desirability of an evolutionary development: 'If the long
collaboration of Englishmen and Indians is to result in the enactment of
a Constitution which will work successfully under Indian conditions, we
shall do well to discard theories and analogies and, instead, to base our
scheme on the government of India as it exists to-day.' India could and
should learn from the older D o m i n i o n s :

If the Constitutions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa

were framed on the British model, it was not because Parliament decided on
theoretical grounds to reproduce that model in those countries, but because
government in those countries had long been conducted on British principles
and had already grown into general conformity with British practice. If
these Constitutions, enacted over a period of more than forty years, differ
from one another in certain points, those differences are not to be attributed
to changes in British constitutional theory, so much as to variations in the
experience and practice of the particular communities themselves. In India,
too, there is already a system of government which, while possessing many
special characteristics, is no less based on British principles, and is no less a
living organism. . . . The safest hypothesis on which we can proceed is that
the future government of India will be successful in proportion as it re-
presents, not a new creation substituted for an old one, but the natural
evolution of an existing government and the natural extension of its past
tendencies. 2

The comparative success of parliamentary government in independent

1 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930 (Cd. 3568), I, 406. T h e Simon Com-
mission Report was, of course, one of the most comprehensive surveys of Indian politics in
the British period. It was also one of the most u n p o p u l a r in the eyes of Indian opinion.
N o w when many of the issues with which it dealt are closed, it may be possible to revalue
some of its general judgments. In this connection, the passage f r o m which the quotation is
taken is worth giving at greater length: ' D o w n to thirty or forty years ago India stood en-
tirely outside the influence of the course of political ideas which at length produced demo-
cratic self-government in some other parts of the world. But in the last generation she has
been swayed, at one and the same time, by the force of several conceptions which in
E u r o p e had followed a certain sequence. Thus, the struggle for power between rival re-
ligious communities, the rise of an intense national spirit, the spread of toleration, the
growth of democracy, and the controversies of socialism, m a r k fairly well-defined epochs
in European history. But in India, these various influences are contending side by side f o r
the allegiance of the politically-minded. T h e growth of national self-consciousness is
retarded by communal separation. T h e movement towards Western industrialism is coun-
tered by the return to the spinning wheel. T h e equality of Asiatic and European is pro-
claimed, while the clash of Brahmin and non-Brahmin, or caste and outcast, is intensified.
Ultra-democratic constitutions are propounded, although the long process which was a
necessary precedent to democracy in Europe, viz. the breaking down of class and com-
munal and occupational barriers, has only just begun. Indian political thought finds it
tempting to foreshorten history, and is unwilling to wait for the final stage of a prolonged
evolution. It is impatient of the doctrine of gradualness.' Few people would now quarrel
with this analysis and few would deny that the factors mentioned are still a m o n g the
decisive ones in modern Indian politics.
2
Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934 (H.L. 6/H.C. 5),
I, 8.
 THE EXPERIENCE 45
India can reasonably be attributed to the manner in which each stage in
the evolution of political institutions was firmly based on what had gone
before. On this method, there was at bottom less disagreement between
Britain and India than on occasion appeared. Although Indian leaders
sometimes framed their public demands in the form of absolute rights
and universal principles, much of their thinking was in fact guided by a
reliance on experience. Their estimates of the length of experience re-
quired were not the same as those of the British, and they were no doubt
more reluctant to admit the need to introduce modifications for India.
But their main quarrel with 'the doctrine of gradualness' came less from
a distrust of experience than from an impatience with time.
The unmistakably evolutionary character of Indian political develop-
ment as seen from the present day must not be allowed to obscure the
reality of the changes that were made at different stages. Certainly, for
the British administrators and statesmen concerned, each step ap-
peared a giant stride—and for the most part along a poorly-lit path.
Although few of them might have used Macaulay's well-known words,
many would have echoed his sentiments: ' The light of political science
and of history is withdrawn—we are walking in darkness—we do not
distinctly see whither we are going. It is the wisdom of man, so situated,
to feel his way, and not to plant his foot till he is well assured that the
ground before him is firm.'1 From the end of the nineteenth century,
however, the statesmen were less assured of the firmness of the ground;
they only knew that the risks of a step were less than the risks of standing
still.
The story of the development of legislative bodies in India is of course
only part of the constitutional history of British rule, and as such it is
interwoven with other strands, above all with the relations between the
home and Indian governments and with the interplay of unitary and
federal forces. It is sufficient here to sketch so much of the legislature
aspect as will indicate the experience which has been inherited by
modern India's parliamentarians. 2
Certain functions of government had been assumed by the East India
Company in India long before any necessity was felt to distinguish
between these functions. Authority rested with the Governor-General
and his Council of officials, and in the Governors of the Presidencies
(or Provinces) and their similar Councils. They made the laws and
executed them. The Charter Act of 1833, while it centralised the law-
making function in the Governor-General and Council, introduced the
first element of institutional specialisation: the law-making meetings of
the Council were differentiated from its executive meetings, and the
1
Quoted in Coupland, The Indian Problem, p. 20.
2
The student of Indian constitutional history is aided by the existence of excellent
official documents. In what follows, I have relied chiefly on these and, in particular, on the
Montagu-Chelmsford and Simon Reports.
46 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

Council in its legislative capacity was to be expanded by the addition of

a fourth member who was to assist in the work of drafting the laws. This
first move towards an Indian legislature was dictated not by political but
by technical considerations. Politics entered a little more twenty years
later: the legislative powers of the Presidency Councils had been taken
away but the central government found that it could not conveniently
possess the knowledge necessary to legislate for all parts of the country.
The Charter Act of 1853 further distinguished the executive and legisla-
tive aspects of the Council, and the size of the Council-as-legislature was
further increased by the addition of a representative of each Presidency,
along with two judges. Certain differences of procedure for legislative
purposes were also introduced; above all, the legislative meetings were
made public and the proceedings published.
The changes that followed the Mutiny were more radical and were
more evidently inspired by political rather than administrative con-
venience. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 was passed within three years
of the end of Company rule and its replacement by the direct responsi-
bility of the Crown. It is important, however, not to read too much into
the calculations and hopes of the time. The Mutiny had no doubt been
something of a shock.1 But no one imagined it to be anything very
different from what it was—an exasperated revolt of certain discon-
tented sections. Certainly no one at the time could have been so misled
as to believe that it represented an Indian national demand for partici-
pation in the business of government.2 It is true that even several de-
cades before the Mutiny a few British rulers of India had spoken of a day
when alien domination would cease. But these were private dreams; it
was not easy to see to whom power could be transferred nor how it
could be done. 3 The impulse behind the Act of 1861 was different. In
1860, Sir Bartle Frere had put the matter clearly: 'The addition of the
native element [to the Legislative Councils] has become necessary owing
to our diminished opportunities of learning through indirect channels
what the natives think of our measures and how the native community
1
But it is well to be reminded that its effects were acutely felt only in a few areas and that
for some it appeared simply a s ' the late disturbance in the plains' (Woodruff, The Guardians
(1954), p. 25).
2
Nationalists love history but make poor historians, and Indian nationalists who saw
in the Mutiny the first war of Indian independence were no exceptions. It is interesting in
this connection to note that the ' H i s t o r y of the F r e e d o m M o v e m e n t ' project begun in
India in 1953 ran into some difficulty precisely on this point. T h e historian-Director of the
scheme was reported in October, 1955 as resigning partly because he was unable to per-
suade the project Board that the events of 1857 were a sepoy mutiny and not a national
war of independence. (He was also u n p o p u l a r on account of discovering H i n d u - M u s l i m
c o m m u n a l sentiment before the creation of separate electorates by the British.) T h e whole
Board was disbanded in December, 1955. A noteworthy recent addition to Mutiny studies
is T. G . P. Spear's charming and scholarly Twilight of the Moghuls (1951).
3
Indeed, the visions of the early nineteenth century become even more obscured after
the Mutiny, the alternatives to British rule even less obvious. Three of the better k n o w n
statements of the earlier period are quoted in Coupland, op. cit., p. 18.
 THE EXPERIENCE 47
will be affected by them.' The Governor-General's Legislative Council
was enlarged by the inclusion of further 'additional members'. The
legislative powers of the Provinces were restored and five expanded Pro-
vincial Legislative Councils emerged. Moreover, although all the
additional members were to be nominated, half of them were to be non-
officials. Representation of the Indian public had begun, but the authors
of the scheme did not see it as a departure from autocracy, let alone as
a first step towards a different system of government. They saw it merely
as the sort of device that any sensible autocrat would employ. Frere
expressly compared the idea of the new Councils to that o f ' the durbar
of a native Prince . . . the channel from which the ruler learns how his
measures are likely to affect his subjects, and may hear of discontent be-
fore it becomes disaffection'. 1 N o t only was the majority of officials
firmly retained; the functions were strictly limited to advice in relation
to legislation. Lord MacDonnell explained that the Councils were
simply 'committees for the purpose of making laws—committees by
means of which the executive Government obtains advice and assistance
in their legislation, and the public derive the advantage of full publicity
being ensured at every stage of the law-making process. . . . The Coun-
cils are not deliberative bodies except with respect to the immediate
legislation before them.' 2
Thirty years later, in the Indian Councils Act of 1892, a further step
was taken. In 1861, it had hardly been necessary to point out explicitly
that the Councils were not envisaged as parliaments in embryo; by 1892,
the disclaimer was expressly made. ' I t is necessary', said Lord Dufferin,
' that there should be no mistake about our a i m s ' : the Act was not to be
regarded as ' a n approach to English Parliamentary Government'.
' I n d i a ' , he explained, 'is an integral portion of the mighty British
Empire' and the Government of India was responsible not to any local
legislatures but ' t o the Sovereign and to the British Parliament'. All the
same, a step was taken—and indeed the explanations would have been
unnecessary otherwise. The Councils were further enlarged and their
functions extended in such a way as to permit members to ask questions
and to discuss (but not to vote on) the Budget. Lord Dufferin's account
of the Government's intentions reveals a new kind of motive which has
in it elements of something more than merely intelligent autocracy: the
Councils are now designed ' t o give a still wider share in the administra-
tion of public affairs to such Indian gentlemen as by their influence,
their acquirements and the confidence they inspire in their fellow-
countrymen, are marked out as fitted to assist with their counsels the
responsible rulers of the country'. 3 More novel than this change of

1
Quoted in Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918 (Cd. 9109) (Montagu-
Chelmsford Report), p. 51.
2 Ibid., p. 53. 3 ¡bid., p. 57.
48 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

emphasis was a change in the method of selecting these non-official

members. They were to be nominated as in the past, but the nomina-
tions were to be made on the basis of recommendations put forward by
various groups. It was a good deal more natural in 1892 than it may be
now to think of representation in terms of classes and interests rather
than individuals in a territorial constituency. It was even more natural
to think in these terms in a country where social and other cleavages
were so marked. As a Government of India dispatch of 1892 put it,
Indian society was ' essentially a congeries of widely separated classes,
races and communities with divergencies of interest and hereditary
sentiment'. 1 The object of representation was that 'each important class
shall have the opportunity of making its views known in the Council by
the mouth of some member specially acquainted with them'.' Class' and
'interest' were intended in several senses. The instructions accompany-
ing the Act stated: 'Where corporations have been established . . . or
where associations have been formed upon a substantial community of
interests, professional, commercial or territorial', the Government might
entertain 'their recommendations with regard to the selection of mem-
bers in whose qualifications they might be disposed to confide'. 2 The
Muslim community was listed among those groups for whom repre-
sentation should be provided.3
Much that was implied in 1892 was made explicit in the Act of 1909
which embodied the Morley-Minto Reforms. The principle of election
was no longer hidden but given legal recognition. Since, however, the
new measure was still no more than an extension of an existing system,
the ' constituencies' for the new elections were the groups and classes of
1892—universities, municipalities, trade associations, landholders and
Muslims.4 The much enlarged Councils were given greater powers, in-
cluding the right to move resolutions and ask supplementary questions.
Above all, the process of expansion now reached a point where the
balance of forces in the Councils shifted appreciably: in the Provinces,
non-officials were now in a majority, while even at the Centre the official
majority was slender; in Bengal, the elected element alone constituted a
majority. These changes only made it seem to the statesmen concerned
all the more important to repeat and underline Lord Dufferin's dis-
claimer. Lord Morley assured thfe Viceroy of the British Government's
'cordial concurrence . . . [in] repudiating the intention or desire to
attempt the transplantation of any European form of representative
government to Indian soil'. 'The main standard and test' for any pro-
1
Quoted in Coupland, op. cit., p. 24. 2 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, p. 60.
3 ' N o t e on the History of Separate Mohammedan Representation' in Report of the
Indian Statutory Commission, 1930 (Cd. 3568) (Simon Report), I, 183.
4
The authors of the Reforms 'agreed that in the immense diversity of interests and
opinion in India, representation by classes and interests was the only practicable means of
embodying the elective principle' {Montagu-ChelmsfordReport, p. 64).
 THE EXPERIENCE 49
posal of reforms must be whether it gives ' new confidence and a wider
range of knowledge, ideas and sympathies to the holders of executive
power.' 1 This way of presenting the changes, as if they were intended to
meet the rulers' administrative convenience rather than the political de-
mands of the ruled, may not appear wholly convincing in the light of the
agitation which was conducted by Indian nationalism at the time. It
seems as if an attempt was being made to reassure those who feared that
too big a step was contemplated. The same is true of the famous de-
claration by Lord Morley in answer to criticisms in the House of Lords:
' If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or neces-
sarily to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I for one
would have nothing at all to do with it.' 2 A recent writer has confessed
that it is ' difficult to understand what Lord Morley visualised' when he
made this statement. 3 The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report,
too, felt 'constrained to say that despite his [Morley's] declaration the
features of his reforms . . . do constitute a decided step forward on a
road leading at no distant period to a stage at which the question of re-
sponsible government was bound to present itself'. 4 But that was written
already ten crowded years later. In 1909 it was still easier to look back-
ward than to see final goals. For one thing, although there might be
much agitation and 'unrest', it seemed more likely that this had par-
ticular and removable causes than that it heralded an irresistible
national movement. For another, it seemed as if there were insuperable
difficulties to the operation of parliamentary institutions in Indian con-
ditions. In a most revealing passage Lord Morley showed that he con-
ceived of pressure for that end coming from Britain itself, not from
India:

Not one whit more than you [he wrote to the Viceroy] do I think it desirable
or possible, or even conceivable, to adapt English political institutions to the
nations who inhabit India. Assuredly not in your day or mine. But the spirit
of English institutions is a different thing, and it is a thing that we cannot
escape even if we wished . . . because British constituencies are the masters,
and they will assuredly insist—all parties alike—on the spirit of their own
political system being applied to India. 5

The experience communicated and gained through these early Legis-

lative Councils was limited but far from negligible. The electorate in-
volved was still tiny, numbering little over 30,000 for all the Provincial
Councils. 6 Even after the successive expansions, the numbers of
1
Ibid., p. 64. 2 Quoted in Simon Report, I, 119.
3 Sir P. Griffiths, The British Impact on India (1952), p. 318.
4 5
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, p. 68. Quoted in Coupland, op. cit., p. 26.
6
Report of the Franchise (Southborough) Committee, 1919 (Cd. 141), p. 5. This figure has
limited meaning, since the system of elections was mainly indirect. Most of the electors
were already representatives—for example, members of municipal councils. The bulk of
the 30,000 were Muslim voters who chose their members directly.
4—p.i.
50 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

Provincial Council members totalled only 318, of whom only about half
were Indian non-officials; to this number must be added a mere 30 or so
members of the Indian Legislative Council.1 The powers and functions
of the Councils were also limited by law and by political realities. Some
of the limits were indications that the Councils were far from being
parliaments in their relations with their executives; others, in the case
of the Provinces, were reflections of the firmly unitary character of the
constitution. 2 Nevertheless the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was able
to conclude that the members had been given 'a real opportunity of
exercising some influence on questions of administration and finance'.3
The legislative record of 131 Acts passed by the Indian Legislative
Council between 1910 and 1917, 77 of them without discussion, appears
unimpressive. But these figures overlook significant committee discus-
sions and, even more important, they do not indicate that the govern-
ment had in fact cultivated the habit of consulting members informally
before introducing proposed measures. The newly-granted power to
move resolutions was used—and the fact that, out of 168, only 24 were
accepted obscures the general effect of the motions. A sure indication of
growing liveliness is given by the increasing use of questions: twice as
many were asked in 1917 as in 1911. Budget discussions, the voting divi-
sions and finally the introduction of an advisory finance committee
added to the transformation. And similar developments took place on
most of the Provincial Councils. The atmosphere may not have been
wholly parliamentary, but the change as compared with the pre-1909
period—when 'a handful of officials and two or three complaisant
Indian gentlemen sat round a table and read manuscript speeches in
turn' 4 —was marked enough. Lord Meston's summary of the achieve-
ment up to 1919 appears just: in spite o f ' much unreality in the business',
'futile disputation, growing impatience and irresponsible criticism',
nevertheless the Councils
familiarised an increasing number of intelligent Indians with administrative
questions; provided them, through the right of interpellation, with facts
which had previously been unavailable; enabled them by moving resolu-
tions to put the official world on its defence and to elicit principles and
motives for action which had previously been taken for granted; gave them
a considerable influence in the conduct of affairs.5
1 Ibid.
2
Examples of the latter limits were: the need for Provinces to submit all their legislative
proposals to the Governor-General for sanction and their inability to legislate on the large
range of subjects already dealt with by the central Council. The modification of such pro-
visions in later years belongs to the history of federation in India.
3
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, p. 6.
11lbert and Meston, The New Constitution of India (1923), p. 91.
5
Ibid., p. 93. It has been thought worth while to include (Appendix II) a selection from
Indian central legislature discussions on the financial statement or budget. These may in-
dicate something of the changing tones of the emerging Parliament.
 THE EXPERIENCE 51
' Putting the official world on its defence' and exercising ' considerable
influence' were, however, not enough for the post-war mood of political
India. Something more was wanted, and some British statesmen—in-
cluding even a few of those on the spot—did not fail to appreciate the
situation. The Secretary of State wrote at the time: ' My visit to India
means that we are going to do something, and something big. I cannot
go home and produce a little thing or nothing; it must be epoch-making
or it is a failure; it must be the keystone of the future history of India.' 1
The Declaration of 1917 had spoken not only of 'the increasing associa-
tion of Indians in every branch of the administration' but also of 'the
gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the
progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral
part of the British Empire'. Indian opinion expected much following
this and was mainly disappointed by what emerged in the form of the
Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the Act of 1919 based thereon. 2
Looking back at this distance of time, it can be seen that even i f ' epoch-
making' was too hopeful a term, the 1919 reforms did constitute the
'keystone' of subsequent constitutional development.
After 1917 it was not a question primarily of how to make the auto-
cracy work more smoothly; it was a question rather of finding a way to-
wards a transfer of power. That phrase was certainly nowhere used, but
its meaning was implicit in the way the Report contrasted its purpose
with that of previous reforms. There was now ' a new policy' and the
authors beheld 'the colossal nature of the enterprise'. 'Hitherto we have
ruled India by a system of absolute government, but have given her
people an increasing share in the administration of the country and in-
creasing opportunities of influencing and criticising the government' 3 ;
even the Morley-Minto Reforms were no more than 'the final outcome
of the old conception which made the Government of India a benevolent
despotism'. 4
If the need for 'something big' was clear and the difference of kind
between 1909 and 1919 quite evident, it was still not at all obvious which
was the safest way forward. Britain would be 'letting g o ' bit by bit, but
which bits first, and with what safeguards in case the new hands fumbled
dangerously? To learn responsibility in the exercise of power, it was

1
Edwin Montagu, An Indian Diary (1930), p. 8.
2
Much of the disappointment was caused not by the Act itself but by other political de-
velopments such as the Amritsar incident which seemed to indicate that nothing would
change after all. It must also be said that even if the reforms had ' g o n e f u r t h e r ' , as Mon-
tagu had hoped (op. cit., p. 5), and even if there had been no Rowlatt Acts and no Amritsar
slaughter, it is more likely than not that Gandhi's leadership would have taken the
nationalist movement away from the quasi-parliaments and towards the techniques of
non-co-operation.
3 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, pp. 5-6.
4 Ibid., p. 69.
52 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

necessary that power be given and, therefore, risks taken. 1 But where
and how ? By stages—in which Sir William Duke and Lionel Curtis took
prominent parts—it became clear that the great experiment would have
to be started at the provincial level; even then it would have to be limited
to a particular range of subjects. Provincial governments would be di-
vided into two compartments: one of Indian Ministers responsible to
elected legislatures for the 'transferred' subjects, the other of officials
responsible to the Governor for the 'reserved' subjects.2
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report presented this conclusion only after
its authors had given not only a brilliant historical review but had also
undertaken a penetrating analysis of the nature of the problem. First,
then, what was the goal? To all concerned, 'responsible government'
meant the British parliamentary pattern, 3 and the Report went to the
trouble of explaining what this implied: 'The electors send their men to
the Councils with power to act in their name, and the Councils commit
power to Ministers, over whom they reserve control in the form of the
power of removing them from office. The elector controls his government
because if his representative in Council supports Ministers of whom he
disapproves he can at the next election change his representative.'4
This account may be a classic statement of the liberal-radical theory of
the nineteenth-century British constitution. As such, it had, even in its
heyday, failed to win assent from non-liberal opinion. Moreover, by its
omission of any reference to political parties, it showed itself increasingly
in need of modification. In the context of its application to India, this
inattention to the transforming role of parties was perhaps pardonable,
since it was not easy in 1918 to discern an emerging pattern of political
groups. But even here it was a dangerous omission, because it could
(and to some extent did) lead to institutional arrangements which in-
hibited rather than encouraged the rise of parties. It can also be argued
that although Montagu was personally optimistic and certainly deter-
mined to press on towards the final goal of an Indian Parliament, this
1
Montagu, An Indian Diary, pp. 136, 134: 'The reasons which make self-government
impossible in this country now are not really distrust or unfitness or lack of ability or want
of character. . . . What we want is a growth of those conventions and customs and habits
of representative government without the acquisition of which democracy cannot stand.
. . . It is this use of power which they must be taught, which they must learn by experience.'
Montagu was of course ahead of British opinion in India; he had always to 'try and bring
the Government of India with me.' (Ibid., p. 55.)
2
On the emergence of the dyarchy idea, see (apart from the Report and Montagu's
Diary) L. Curtis, Papers relating to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy (1920). The
story is, of course, told in constitutional and political histories of modern India such as
A. B. Keith, Constitutional History of India, 1600-1935 (1936), and R. Coupland, The
Indian Problem, 1833-1935, being Volume I of A Report on the Constitutional Problem in
India (1942-43).
3 Perhaps the only exception was Curzon who, although the author of this passage of the
1917 Declaration, apparently thought it meant something much vaguer (Coupland, op. cit.,
p. 53).
4 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, p. 109.
 THE EXPERIENCE 53
theory tended to make the j o b seem even more difficult than it was. Be
that as it may, there must be less disagreement with what the Report
went on to say of responsible government:
The system pre-supposes in those who work it such a perception of, and
loyalty to, the common interests as enables the decisions of the majority to
be peaceably accepted. This means that majorities must practise toleration
and minorities patience. There must, in fact, be not merely a certain capa-
city for business, but, what is much more important, a real perception of the
public welfare as something apart from, and with superior claims to, the in-
dividual good. The basis of the whole system is a lively and effective sense
of the sanctity of the people's rights.1

As to the raw material that had to be worked upon in order that this
goal should be reached, the Report saw two sets of facts about India as
specially relevant. In the first place, in a land of great size and immense
population, among whom 'the curve of wealth descends steeply', the
vast majority live in poor villages in circumstances that limit vision
severely. The rural population had come to put their grievances before
their rulers, but it was still ' a revolution' from that to the new relation-
ship with an elected representative. Interest in politics was confined to
the urban minority—and even there it was necessary to distinguish be-
tween ' a core of earnest men who believe sincerely in and strive for
political progress', ' a ring of less educated people to whom a phrase or
a sentiment appeals' and 'an outside fringe "attracted by curiosity and
finding diversion" in attacks " o n a big and very solemn government, as
urchins might take a perilous joy in casting toy darts at an elephant" '. 2
In the second place, it had to be admitted that Indian society was di-
vided even more seriously than between town and country and rich and
poor. The Report quoted from Lord Dufferin writing in the 'nineties:
'This population is composed of a large number of distinct nationalities,
professing various religions, practising diverse rites, speaking different
languages, while many of them are still further separated from one an-
other by discordant prejudices, by conflicting source of usages and even
antagonistic material interests.' It hastened to say that the colours of the
Dufferin picture 'have since toned down' and to recognise that there was
' a new sense of unity'. Even so, however, India was still a country
' marching in uneven stages through all the centuries from the fifth to the
twentieth'. 3 Despite all this, the Report boldly proclaimed that the time
had come to disturb 'the placid, pathetic contentment of the masses'
and to 'call forth capacity and self-reliance in place of helplessness,
nationhood in place of caste or communal feeling'.
The reforms schemes and the Act of 1919, by envisaging a grant of re-
sponsible government in a certain field of government at the provincial
level, entailed a joining together of the two processes of the transformation
i Ibid. 2 Ibid. 3 jbid., pp. 117-118.
54 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

of devolution into federalism and the development of parliamentary

institutions. The Act and its rules contributed to the first process by
giving definition and legal form to separate lists of provincial and
central subjects and by an allocation of distinct sources of revenue.1
The second process (with which we are here mainly concerned) was
furthered in three main ways. First, representation was pushed further
in the Provincial Councils. All the Councils were enlarged, the propor-
tion of elected members was increased to not less than 70% and the pro-
perty qualifications for the franchise were lowered to bring the number
of provincial voters up to about millions.2 The authors of the Report
wrestled with the question of separate electorates—and lost. They ad-
mitted that the system of communal electorates only perpetuated divided
loyalties which hamper the development of a proper citizen spirit; they
conceded that it encouraged minorities to be dependent,3 and majorities
to be complacent; all things considered, they felt the system to be 'a
very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing prin-
ciple'. And yet, 'the hard facts' of distrust and lack of mutual confi-
dence had to be faced, and, for the Muslims at least, the system ' must
be maintained until conditions alter—even at the price of slower pro-
gress towards the realisation of a common citizenship'; it must even be
extended—to the Sikhs.4 In the second place, the list of provincial sub-
jects had to be divided in order to define the area of responsible govern-
ment. Law and order and land-revenue were subjects 'reserved' in the
charge of the Governor and his Executive Council (now generally com-
posed of two British and two Indian members) in accordance with the
previous system. The other subjects were 'transferred' to the Governor,
acting on the advice of Ministers in accordance with parliamentary
practice. This transfer of powers was, not unnaturally, hedged about
with safeguards: some of these provided for central intervention on, for
instance, civil service matters and imperial interests; others provided the
Governor with powers—of veto, certification, reservation, etc.—quite
different from those of a strictly' constitutional head'. Finally, although

1
The task, said the Report, was 'the very reverse of that which confronted Alexander
Hamilton and Sir John Macdonald', not, that is, the bringing together by means of a pact
hitherto separate units, but rather of 'drawing lines of demarcation, cutting long-standing
ties' (ibid., p. 101).
2
The Report had simply insisted that indirect elections, thought responsible for much
of the unreality in proceedings, should be 'swept away', and that any limitations on the
franchise 'should be determined rather with reference to practical difficulties than to any
a priori considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be
held to constitute a qualification' (ibid., p. 185). The details were worked out by the
Franchise (Southborough) Committee (1919, Cmd. 141), which rejected literacy tests but
stuck to property qualifications.
3 Montagu's Indian Diary is full of references which show how he was angered by the
passive attitude of minorities who leant on the government for protection, and how he was
determined at least not to extend the principle of separate electorates (e.g., pp. 114, 118).
4 Ibid., pp. 186-190.
 THE EXPERIENCE 55
the great experiment of responsibility was to be performed at the pro-
vincial level, it was agreed that representation should be taken further
even at the Centre. 1 In place of the small Legislative Council there was
set up a bicameral legislature consisting of a Legislative Assembly of
145 members, of whom 104 were elected (on a franchise higher in
property qualification than in the Provinces), and a Council of State of
60 members, 34 of whom were elected (on an extremely high property
franchise).
A beginning was thus made and, like most beginnings, it was not easy.
Under the most favourable conditions, dyarchy would have been ' a
high test of human nature' 2 on all sides. Each side of provincial govern-
ment would ' advise and assist' the other and neither would control or
impede the other. Great tact and forbearance were called for from the
participants and a fund of goodwill towards the enterprise on the part of
public opinion.
In point of fact, as already mentioned, 3 conditions became distinctly
unfavourable. Between early 1919 (when even the fiery Tilak was pre-
pared to stand for election and almost all sections thought in terms of
working the new scheme) and early 1920, 'the whole aspect of things had
altered'. 4 The unpopular Rowlatt Acts, the awful sequel of the shooting
in Jallianwalla Bagh at Amritsar, the Turkish Treaty which distressed
Muslim opinion, the introduction of new extra-parliamentary tech-
niques of political agitation and the increasingly evident nervousness and
hostility of many of the British civil servants—all these played their part
in spoiling the ground for the delicate seeds of partial responsible
government. Yet, although it must have appeared at the time to British
and Indian alike that dyarchy and the whole Montagu-Chelmsford
scheme were an unqualified failure, when assessed as a deliberately tem-
porary step towards an admittedly difficult goal they are seen as a
qualified success.5 Moreover there is not a great deal of disagreement
between British and Indian authorities on the main characteristics of
1
T h e Indian Legislative Council at the time had 68 members of whom 27 were elected.
M o n t a g u was biting in his comments: ' N o b o d y could have gone to the debate yesterday
without realising what a farce it all was—that these 27 creatures should claim to be a re-
presentative institution' {op. cit., p. 248). As we have already indicated, the Council had
not been useless, but it had been fashioned as an extended ' d u r b a r ' , not as an embryonic
parliament. Hence Montagu's further c o m m e n t : 'Their only chance, living at Delhi as they
do, is to be surrounded by a really representative collection of people from all over India.
This can only be done by enlarging and liberalising the Legislative Council. . . . Further,
the Legislative Council as it stands is not meant to develop; Morley said so. W e want to
sweep away this dead wood and make something that is intended to develop.' (Ibid., p. 117.)
2
Ilbert and Meston, op. cit., p. 138.
3 Above, p. 51.
4
'Kerala P u t r a ' , The Working of Dyarchy in India (Bombay, 1928), p. 29 (the author was
K. M. Panikkar).
5
This kind of revision of opinion had happened before (Canada) and was to happen
later (Ceylon, West Africa).
56 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

this period 1919-35, even if some aspects receive more emphasis from
some writers than others.1
What then was the contribution of dyarchy to the development of
parliamentary experience ? The negative or limiting factors may be de-
tected without difficulty. In the first place, experience went in not quite
the right directions. The non-co-operation movement' diverted the main
stream of political activity' and many of the more and increasingly im-
portant leaders of Indian opinion abstained from participation in the
reformed Councils.2 The major party, the Swarajists (who were Congress-
men), boycotted the first elections of 1923, and contested subsequent
elections only to obstruct the exercise of power, not to obtain it. This
had its effect on public attitudes towards the Councils: they were 'de-
prived of the interest and credit which they might have won from the
public under normal conditions'. Equally, it disturbed the morale of the
legislators who were ' kept in a state of nervous dread of the political
agitation outside'. 3
The idea of the reforms was to train men in responsibility—as
Ministers, as legislators, as voters. At each level, there were serious diffi-
culties in the way of realising this end. The responsibility of Ministers
was hindered by the absence behind them of firm and organised majori-
ties. Apart from the non-participating Swarajists, members belonged to
ill-defined groups: ' the various groupings, with kaleidoscopic changes
of nomenclature, composition and leadership, have not often been
on anything but communal lines, and their communal character has
tended to become more rather than less pronounced'. 4 Alongside this
factor was the powerful presence of the bloc of officials in the Councils.
They did not number more than 30%, but it soon became evident that
the Ministers of the transferred half of the governments badly needed
the support of these officials if the passing of their measures was to be
ensured. So the Ministers became decreasingly responsible to an in-
choate legislature and increasingly responsible to the compact and dis-
ciplined representatives of the reserved half of the governments.5 This
1
British official surveys are found in the Reports of the Reforms Enquiry (Muddiman)
Committee, 1925 (Cd. 2360), and Simon Commission, as well as more briefly in the books
of Keith and Coupland already mentioned. Indian studies include The Working of Dyarchy
in India, by 'Kerala Putra' (Bombay, 1928), and A. Appadorai, Dyarchy in Practice (1937).
2
Muddiman Report, p. 2.
3 Ibid.
4
Simon Report, I, 209. For this situation, incomplete responsibility and separate elec-
torates have both properly taken their share of the blame. It is nevertheless doubtful if
organised political parties could have been expected to develop so quickly even in the most
'ideal' conditions.
5
Ministerial responsibility to the legislatures, wrote 'Kerala Putra', 'has been a myth*
(op. cit., p. 52). The same author demonstrated that in view of the bloc of nominated and
official members, together with so many seats for special interests (Land, Industry, etc.),
a party would have had to obtain, for example, in the Madras Council, no less than 75%
of the 'general seats' (which were in turn subdivided according to community and in-
cluded Muslim and Christian seats) in order to secure a council majority.
 THE EXPERIENCE 57
tendency was reinforced by the character of relations between the
Ministers and provincial Governors. The intention of the reforms may
have been to make Governors mere constitutional heads in relation to
the transferred half, but in most cases this position was not established.
Governors treated Ministers as advisors whose advice need not be taken.
Moreover any hope of Ministers developing a system of joint respon-
sibility was discouraged by the evident preference of most Governors for
dealing with Ministers separately. Again, the division of subjects was
such that Ministers found it necessary tit several points to carry the re-
served half with them if they were to proceed with their schemes.1
Nor is it difficult to see respects in which the legislators' sense of re-
sponsibility was inhibited. Their powers were at once considerable and
inconclusive. They could pass legislation which might then be vetoed;
they could make cuts in the budget which could then be ' restored'; they
could reject government measures which would then be certified as
passed. Add to this the absence of defined parties and the ambiguity of
relations between the two halves of government and one has the
ingredients of irresponsible parliaments. Nor was there much hope of
responsibility being imposed on council members by their electors.
Constituencies were generally very large; in most cases, contact between
member and voters was slight and dependent on considerations other
than those of policy and programme; and in any case main political
interest centred elsewhere.
Yet, even if all this is true, it is not the whole story. During the period
of dyarchy, four general elections were held and the percentage of the
electors voting increased. No less than 93 public men had experience as
Ministers, no less than 121 as members of Governors' Executive Coun-
cils. The number who gained experience as legislators at central or pro-
vincial levels cannot be less than 1,000 and is probably twice that figure.2
Even the quality of the experience cannot be dismissed as negligible. It
is true that the tone of legislatures was generally hostile t o ' Government'
as a matter of principle and, in so far as they made any distinction
between reserved and transferred halves, more hostile to the former. In
spite of this much was learnt in the Provincial Councils—and even in the
Central Legislature. It was noted that the groupings in the Councils did
gradually improve their organisations. 3 Debates were generally well
attended, there was a high level of courtesy and genuine respect for the
Chair, and proceedings were conducted in an impartial manner. Above
1
One Minister, giving evidence before the M u d d i m a n Committee, complained: ' I was
Minister of Development—without the forests. I was Minister of Agriculture minus irriga-
tion. . . . I was Minister for Industry without factories, boilers, electricity and water
power, mines or labour, all of which are reserved subjects.' (Quoted in ' K e r a l a P u t r a ' ,
op. cit., p. 48.)
2
Appadorai, op. cit., p. 72.
3 Simon Report, I, 209: 'regular meetings of groups and the appointment of Whips have
become m o r e u s u a l ' .
58 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

all, perhaps, while it was no doubt frustrating to have to oppose without

prospect of power, at least the techniques of opposition were mastered,
and a good deal learnt in one way and another of the business of govern-
ment. The supplementary question, the resolution and the cut motion in
budget debates were all fully and not unskilfully exploited.1 Committees,
too, served a purpose: although government-dominated, Public
Accounts Committees, Standing Finance Committees, Standing Com-
mittees for other departments and Special Committees (set up in re-
sponse to questions or resolutions) made governments fully aware of
public reactions and encouraged members to study aspects of admini-
stration. 2
On the one side, therefore, governments, while not seriously threat-
ened (owing to their reserve powers), were continuously 'exposed to
challenge and comment' and were in fact considerably influenced in
many of their actions by Council opinion.3 On the side of the legisla-
tures, what is remarkable, in view of the temptations to irresponsibility,
is perhaps the extent to which the Councils (with one or two exceptions),
so far from bringing the quasi-parliamentary government to a halt, did
so far as possible play their roles constructively. A fair amount of useful
social legislation was passed and a sincere attempt was in many places
made to improve the conditions of the people. At the same time, the
legislatures on the whole acted responsibly in matters of finance and law
and order; if governments were reluctant to use their special powers,
legislatures were almost as reluctant to force them to do so; budget cuts
had fairly frequently to be restored, but in the provinces only once was
a bill 'certified', and only twice or thrice was the veto employed.4 Fin-
ally, even from the point of view of the electorate, the time of dyarchy
was not time wholly wasted. If it is true that electoral contests were
generally half-hearted affairs, at least in a few instances Ministers were
defeated and the voters began to have the sense of power in their hands.
And even if the centre of political gravity was in the non-co-operation
movement, the Councils were not without their place of importance in
public life: the public galleries were usually well filled, the debates
widely reported and read. Parliamentary life had begun in India. There
was, after all, some justification for the Simon Report's impatience with
1
Appadorai (op. cit., p. 82) gives these figures for one Province during the first nine
years of reformed Councils: 3,801 resolutions on topics in the reserved half, 1,346 on those
in the transferred half. The same author mentions 28 supplementaries on one occasion as
not wholly untypical. Similarly in the first four years in Madras, 3,393 cut motions were
admitted and 753 were discussed. ('Kerala Putra', op. cit., p. 62.)
2
'Kerala Putra', op. cit., pp. 67-69. See also Simon Report, I, 216 ff. See also below,
Chapter VI, Sections 3 and 4, passim.
3
In one Council, in three years, of 109 resolutions passed, no fewer than 80 led to some
government action ('Kerala Putra', op. cit., p. 62). Appadorai even suggests that govern-
ments paid so much attention to legislature opinion that they became timid and failed to
carry out measures that were needed (op. cit., p. 112).
Simon Report, I, 217.
 THE EXPERIENCE 59
nationalist impatience: 'Political ideas are so rapidly assimilated by In-
dian progressives and the sense of novelty so quickly wears off that it is
really necessary to pause and appreciate the extent of the transforma-
tion. Less then ten years ago there was not a province in India in which
parliamentary institutions existed.' 1
The process by which the next step (in the shape of the Act of 1935)
was prepared was even more elaborate and complex than had been the
case with the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme. Following the somewhat in-
sipid report of the Muddiman Committee in 1925, the Simon Commis-
sion was appointed in 1927 and made its first visit to India in the spring
of the following year. After exhaustive study, it published its Report in
1930. This was then commented upon in a Government of India De-
spatch of the same year. There followed the series of three Round Table
Conferences in London, the last one in December 1932. A Joint Select
Committee of both Houses in Westminster, appointed in 1933 to ex-
amine the Government's proposals which had been published in a White
Paper, worked for eighteen months, and the resulting Bill was introduced
into the Commons at the end of 1934. The Act was finally passed in
August 1935.
This examination of the problem, like that undertaken in 1917-19,
was naturally concerned with more than the development of legislatures.
It also took place against a background of political events as turbulent
as those that accompanied the earlier reforms. This is not the place to
discuss either the constitutional details or the political history. 2 For our
purpose, it is enough to summarise the main provisions and principal
events.
The Simon Commission met with hostility from nationalist opinion
from the moment when it was greeted at Bombay with black banners in-
scribed 'Simon, go back' to the final bitter condemnation of its Report.
The Commission's main recommendation was the abolition of dyarchy
in the Provinces and the complete transfer of all provincial subjects to
Ministers responsible to enlarged legislatures elected on a greatly ex-
tended franchise. Separate electorates for the communities could not be
abolished, for Hindu-Muslim tension had not decreased but increased
since 1919.3 So far as the Centre was concerned, the Report was more
cautious. If the Provinces were to be given such 'new and heavy respon-
sibilities ', strength and stability must be preserved at the Centre. This
1
Ibid., I, 132. T h e Report pointed out that by contrast the old Morley-Minto Councils
were presided over by the Governor-General and by Governors (whereas after 1921 there
were nominated and then elected presiding officers), were still in form the old Executive
Councils with some 'additional members' chosen to help in advice on legislation, and were
not directly elected.
2
See Keith, op. cit., and Coupland, op. cit.
3 T h e Report of the Indian Central Committee (1929, Cd. 3451) (a Committee of Indian
members of the Central Legislature) had recommended considerable replacement of
separate electorates by reserved seats.
60 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

was taken to mean that, until it was clear that the provincial experiment
was succeeding, there could be not even a partial transfer of responsi-
bility at the Centre. In the Commission's view, all that could be done at
once was to re-fashion the central legislature on explicitly federal lines:
both the Lower House, now to be called the Federal Assembly, and the
Council of State should be chosen indirectly by Provincial Councils.
The difficult but unavoidable problem of the relation between British
India and the Indian states could be tentatively approached by bringing
representatives of both together on a purely consultative Council for
Greater India. The Government of India 1 was doubtful on the federal
principle, feeling that with provincial self-government being developed
apace everything should be done to preserve the unifying factors. On the
other hand, it was prepared to go further than the Commission in the
direction of a gradual transfer of responsibility at the Centre: the cen-
tral government should be composed of officials and Ministers, and the
numbers and powers of the latter should be permitted by convention to
expand. Without the rigidity of dyarchy, a way of moving towards com-
plete responsible government could be found.
In the outcome—following the three Round Table Conferences and
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform 2
—something of both views prevailed. Part II of the Act of 1935 made
provision for the establishment o f ' The Federation of I n d i a i n c l u d i n g
British India and the princely states. This depended, however, on the
accession of a sufficient number of states to the Federation. As in fact
this never took place, the federal part of the Act remained inoperative.
It is, however, instructive in view of subsequent developments to see
what was envisaged. The Simon Commission's vision of a federal
Centre is realised—but with major 'centralist' modifications. The Upper
House, the Council of State, was to consist of Rulers' nominees in the
case of the states and of directly elected representatives for British India,
each unit having a number of seats in proportion to its population. The
Federal Assembly was to be similarly chosen, except that the British
Indian seats were to be filled by indirect elections in Provincial Assem-
blies. Federal, Concurrent and Provincial Lists of subjects were elabo-
rated and residuary powers were allocated by the Governor-General in
his discretion. A proclamation of emergency would enable the federal
legislature to legislate on any subject in the Provincial List. The federal
executive was envisaged on dyarchy lines. There was to be a Council of
Ministers, but certain subjects—notably defence and foreign affairs—
were 'reserved' to the Governor-General aided by 'counsellors', and
were not subject to vote. Moreover even in the 'transferred' field certain
safeguards were inserted in the form of provisions for the Governor-

1 Despatch (20 Sept. 1930, Cd. 3700).

2 Cd. 3778, Cd. 3997, Cd. 4238; H.C. 5 of 1933-34.
 THE EXPERIENCE 61
General to 'act in his discretion' and to 'exercise his individual judg-
ment'. 1 The former power extended from the 'reserved' subjects to con-
trol of the Reserve Bank, appointment of Ministers and summoning of
the legislature, and power to declare an emergency. The latter power was
mainly for exercise in relation to the Governor-General's eight' special
responsibilities': peace and tranquillity; minorities; civil servants;
British commercial interests; backward areas; princely states; the
financial stability and credit of the Federal Government; the effective
execution of all federal orders.
Although the federal part of the 1935 Act did not come into force, the
federal principle was established—in the sense that a division of powers
and resources between Centre and units was given elaborate statutory
form in the Federal, Provincial and Concurrent Lists, and also in that the
Provinces were ' invested for the first time with a separate legal personal-
ity'. 2 Moreover the Provinces were moved forward from dyarchy to
almost completely responsible parliamentary government. The 'almost'
qualification was what nationalist opinion distrusted and disliked 3 : for
although the whole range of provincial subjects was now transferred to
the popular, responsible, ministerial side of government, certain safe-
guards were built up and placed in the hands of the provincial Gover-
nors. These were powers of 'discretion' and 'individual judgment'
similar to those of the Governor-General at the Centre, not including
any distinct 'subjects' but covering a number of aspects which might or
might not in effect destroy the substance of provincial responsible auto-
nomy. The considerable expansion of the provincial legislatures and—
more important—of the provincial franchise which the Act provided
were scarcely noticed in the great discussions that took place on the
nature of the Act. 4 So opposed were the British and the Indian judg-
ments of the Act that it is not easy to realise that they refer to the same
document. The Indian view was shared by some moderate liberals and
all ardent Congressmen. Sir C. Y. Chintamani wrote: ' I venture to de-
scribe the Government of India Act of 1935 as the anti-India Act. We
are given a limp federation full of undesirable features, ill-balanced as
between the States and the Provinces and denied powers which are
vital to every government worth the name.' Congress leaders found it
hardly necessary to study provisions in detail to see that they amounted
to a 'slave constitution' and ' a new charter of bondage'. The British
1
T h e r e w a s a nice d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n these t w o p o w e r s . I n t h e first case, M i n i s t e r s
w e r e n o t entitled t o give a d v i c e — t h o u g h t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l m i g h t seek it if he w i s h e d .
' E x e r c i s i n g individual j u d g m e n t ' , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i m p l i e d t h a t ministerial advice w o u l d
be given, t h o u g h t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l c o u l d d i s r e g a r d it.
2
C o u p l a n d , op. cit., p . 133.
3
C o n g r e s s was, of c o u r s e , even m o r e d i s a p p o i n t e d at t h e f e d e r a l a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h
s e e m e d t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e r a t e of a d v a n c e w o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e speed of t h e slowest
e l e m e n t s — t h e princes.
4
T h e table at the e n d of this section sets o u t t h e g r o w t h o f assemblies a n d e l e c t o r a t e .
62 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

view was that the Act provided for 'the passing of the centre of
political gravity from British to Indian hands'—and this was the
view of those who favoured such a step as well as of those who de-
plored it.1
Like the Act of 1919, that of 1935 began its life in difficult circum-
stances. Quite apart from the hesitation of the Princes to surrender some
of their sovereignty through instruments of accession, so as to bring into
eifect the federal scheme, opposition to the ' safeguards' was such that
even the provincial part of the scheme was threatened. The first hurdle
was passed when all the parties decided to contest the elections to Pro-
vincial Assemblies which took place during the winter 1936-37. The
Muslim League was prepared to work the provincial constitution ' for
what it is worth'; the Congress wanted to win the elections only 'to
combat the Act and seek the end of it'. But at least both parties produced
documents that amounted to programmes, and at least the electoral
campaigns were conducted with vigour. Moreover it was held a good
omen for the future that the two main parties appeared to be on not un-
friendly terms, that their programmes were not widely different and
that they even established a common platform in some areas. And if
British observers were sceptical as to how much the voters understood
of the issues in detail, at least the appeal of Gandhi and the Congress
was evident and over 54% of the electorate went to the polls. Con-
gress won 711 of the 1,585 Provincial Assembly seats—and this in
spite of contesting only 58 of the 482 separate Muslim seats. It won
clear majorities in 5 of the 11 Provinces and was the largest party in a
further 3.
Far from certain, however, was the question whether Congress would
consider the conditions suitable for the acceptance of governmental re-
sponsibility. If the ' safeguards' were the decisive part of the Act, then
popular ministries would be in a false position of responsibility without
power and parliamentary experience was not worth buying at that price.
For some months a battle for 'assurances' took place. In March 1937
the All-India Congress Committee resolution on office acceptance was
passed. This was a compromise between two schools of Congress
thought—those of the 'Left' under Pandit Nehru who were inclined to
a non-co-operation policy of destroying the Act by causing its break-
down, those of the 'Right' who were eager to assume power and were
content to try to work the scheme 'for what it was worth'. The terms of
the resolution were that Congress ministries would be formed only in
those Provinces where the leader of the party in the legislature 'is satis-
fied and able to state publicly that so long as he and his Cabinet act with-
in the constitution the Governor will not use his powers of interference
i All quoted in N . Srinivasan, Democratic Government in India (Calcutta, 1954), pp. 6 2 -
64.
 THE EXPERIENCE 63
1
or set aside the advice of Ministers'. The Governors were unable to
give such assurances and minority ministries were formed. This position
was clearly not one that either side wished to continue. In June the
Viceroy issued a statement explaining the spirit in which the provincial
constitutions would be worked, and in the following m o n t h the Con-
gress Working Committee gave permission for Congress governments
to be formed. Such governments at once t o o k office in seven Provinces
and in a n eighth a year later; all these Congress ministries resigned in
O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r 1939. Non-Congress governments in three Pro-
vinces remained in power f r o m 1937 through the war, while similar
governments t o o k over f r o m Congress in three Provinces during the war
years. These years, then, f r o m 1937 to 1939 (or, in some cases, later)
were crucial years in India's experience of parliamentary government;
what conclusions were suggested by this experience ?
The record may be summarised under three headings: relations be-
tween Congress and other political parties; the performance of ministries;
and relations between Congress ministries and their party headquarters.
On the first of these, most British observers expressed some disappoint-
ment. Coupland, for example, impressed with the necessity for some
improvement in c o m m u n a l relations if political advance was to continue
within the f r a m e w o r k of a united India, came to a firmly despondent
conclusion:

All the provinces suffered more or less from the growth of communal an-
tagonism, but in several of the Congress provinces it overclouded the whole
picture. Owing . . . in particular to the high command's refusal to share
power with the Muslim League, Hindu-Muslim discord became so bitter
that, at the time the ministries resigned, it seemed, in the United Provinces
and Bihar at any rate, that, without a drastic change of policy, constitu-
tional government might soon become impossible. 2

By the time Coupland was writing (1943) there may have been
some Congressmen, too, who would in private have agreed that a
coalition offer to M r . Jinnah in 1937 might have saved a lot of
trouble, and perhaps partition, later. B. P. Singh R o y certainly agreed
that the Congress laid down impossible and fantastic terms for
Muslim League co-operation when it was offered in the United
1
B. P. Singh Roy, Parliamentary Government in India (Calcutta, 1943), p. 207. The
author of this work was a member of a provincial legislature from 1921 and had a decade's
experience as Minister. Other accounts from the Indian side of the working of the 1935 Act
are to be found in P. N . Masaldan, Evolution of Provincial Autonomy in India, 1858-1950
(Bombay, 1953) and in articles in the Indian Journal of Political Science (especially those of
P. N . Masaldan in Oct.-Dec. 1941, D . Verma in April-June 1940, S. V. Kokegar in J a n . -
March 1941 and B. N . Banerjee in July-Sept. 1941). The best account, however, remains
that of Professor Coupland: Indian Politics, 1936-42 (1943), being Volume II of his Report
on the Constitutional Problem in India.
2 Coupland, Indian Politics, 1936-42, p. 157.
64 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T
1
Provinces. Although events were to prove the Congress short-sighted,
their attitude can at least be understood. The League was still small
and it was not clear that Congress could not win away the Muslim
masses. Moreover even though the League's manifesto had a pro-
gressive appearance, the party's social composition was thought to
dictate a conservative legislative programme which would have con-
flicted with Congress radicalism. That these Congress calculations
were mistaken became too quickly evident. As early as April 1938
the League stated its view that Congress ministries had failed to
protect the minority, and it pointed to the riots in several Provinces.
Jinnah's presidential address to the League in October contained more
charges, and the bitterness of tone that marked later Indian history
was distinctly heard: Congress, he said, was getting into ' the hands of
those who are looking forward to the creation of a serious situation
which will break India horizontally and vertically'. 2 A Muslim League
'Committee of Enquiry' prepared a list of Muslim grievances; a
Congress offer to get the charges looked into by the Chief Justice (an
Englishman) was rejected; and when Congress ministries resigned in
1939 Jinnah declared a 'Deliverance Day'.
Also in its relations with groups other than the Muslim League,
Congress began to get a reputation for intolerance. Where it had clear
majorities it insisted on 'going it alone'; where it was in opposition it
was generally not content to be a purely parliamentary opposition. All
this, of course, was but a natural consequence of the character of the
party, of its aspiration to be an all-embracing national movement rather
than one party among many. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, Sir Cowasjee
Jehangir, Dr. Ambedkar and others in a statement in October 1939 said
that the record of Congress since 1937 'belies the hope that the present
Congress leaders want to establish real democracy in India. The Con-
gress governments resent any opposition and wish, like autocrats, that
no opposition should exist. . . . Minority opinion is ignored with callous
indifference. . . . Congress cannot bear rivals and cannot bear sharing
credit.' 3 This was an unduly harsh verdict, but it was certainly echoed in
British comments. Mr. Guy Wint, for example, noted not only the in-
clusion in Congress of all classes and its identification of itself with the
Indian nation but also the fact that the movement had developed ahead
of parliamentary institutions, whereas in the West, parties were gener-
ally more recent than parliaments; as a consequence, he wrote, ' Con-
1
B. P. Singh Roy, op. cit., p. 217. The terms apparently were, inter alia, that League
members should join Congress, the League group in the Assembly should cease to func-
tion as a separate group and its members should obey Congress orders, the League should
refrain from contesting by-elections and the League's Parliamentary Board should be dis-
banded.
2
Quoted in B. P. Singh Roy, op. cit., p. 242.
3 Ibid., p. 244.
 THE EXPERIENCE 65

gress's adoption of parliamentary ideas was to some extent fortuitous.

. . . So long as a parliamentary regime means a Congress Raj, Congress
is content with parliamentary institutions ; the test would come if Con-
gress faced the prospect of a prolonged exile from office.' 1 The point, of
course, is that it is not reasonable to expect a nationalist movement to
transform itself easily into a political party—and certainly not to expect
this to happen before the achievement of independence. So long as the
national struggle has not been won, ' exile from office ' can be seen only
as continued power in the hands of the alien oppressors or their agents. 2
In most other respects, the record of the new ministries—Congress
and non-Congress—was good. At the legislature level, the expanded
assemblies worked well: 'The capacity already shown by Indian poli-
ticians to make an orderly and effective use of the traditional delibera-
tive and legislative machinery of representative government has been
confirmed.' 3 Of course, even at this level, there were some departures
from British practice. The role of the new Speakers, for example, was
conceived in a more 'American' than British way: the U.P. Assembly in
particular passed a resolution that ' any member who is elected Speaker
would not be handicapped in his public activities in consequence . . .
and that he should be free to take part in political affairs outside the
House at his discretion'. 4 Again, opposition groups—generally Congress
—sometimes resorted not merely to obstructionist exploitation of pro-
cedure but also to 'walk-outs' of protest. 5 More important perhaps was
the comment of some observers that assembly debates seemed dull;
'they lacked the spirit of reality, there was too often an air of listlessness,
a feeling among members that the assembly did not count and that the
true centre of political animation was to be found in the Congress com-
mittee rooms.' 6
The legislative and administrative record of provincial governments
1
Schuster and Wint, India and Democracy (1941), p. 167.
2
B. P. Singh Roy (op. cit., p. 350) puts the Congress attitude neatly: 'Every party and
every group that stands aloof from the Congress tends knowingly or unknowingly to be-
come a source of weakness to the nation and a source of strength to the forces ranged
against it.' This is a part of the nationalist equipment which has to be disposed of after in-
dependence if democratic government is to succeed. The record of the Congress Party in
this respect since 1947 is—as will be indicated below—at least far better than that of, say,
the Egyptian Wafd or the Pakistan Muslim League.
3
Coupland, op. cit., p. 80.
4
Quoted in S. V. Kogekar, 'Indian Speakers and Party Politics' in Indian Journal of
Political Science, July-Sept. 1939. Professor Kogekar defended this resolution as in keep-
ing with Indian needs: to seek a non-party neutral—or even a member prepared to become
one—would be to seek an incompetent Speaker, and this position would remain ' s o long
as the Indian Constitution is not backed by the irresistible sanctions which come of
self-determination.' On the present position of Indian Speakers see below, Chapter VI,
Section 1.
5
D. Verma, 'Provisional Autonomy in the Punjab, 1937-39', in Indian Journal of Poli-
tical Science, April-June 1940. Since 1947, Congress has been at the receiving end of such
protests (see below, Chapter V).
6
Schuster and Wint, op. cit., p. 170.
5—P.T.
66 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

surprised most of the British observers. A good deal of valuable social

legislation was passed, financial policies were seldom reckless and more
often conservative, and governments were unexpectedly firm on matters
of law and order. Governments, that is to say, did take the lead and did
govern. Not all ministries were stable all the time, but most ministries
were able to rely on adequately disciplined followings in the assemblies.1
Relations between Governors and ministries were generally cordial, and
between 1937 and 1939 only on very rare occasions and very few issues
(such as the release of political prisoners) were disagreements so sharp
as to be brought to a head. Even the relations between Ministers and the
Services were better than had been feared. There may have been some
attempted interference on the part of members and Ministers with the
administration of justice, and also 'a tendency for Ministers to secure
information from, and to use as their executive instrument not the civil
service but the local party committees'. 2 Against this, on the other hand,
must be remembered the novelty of office for most of those concerned
and also the novelty for the Services of taking orders from men who
belonged to a developed political organisation. In any case, what Coup-
land calls the 'one outstanding fact' remains: 'The Congress had at last
become a constructive force in Indian politics.' The Viceroy himself re-
ferred at the time to 'a distinguished record of public achievement'. 3
One aspect of Congress rule during 1937-39 deserves special attention
—if only because several observers came to certain grave conclusions on
the matter: the relation between Congress ministries in the Provinces
and the Congress party machinery. There is no doubt that this relation
was important and peculiar. It arose from the position of a nationalist
movement in a situation of only partial transfer of power. As already
mentioned, the question of office-acceptance was one on which there was
disagreement within the party: was part of the prize to be taken or was
it to be rejected in favour of a continued struggle for the whole ? The
victory of those supporting office-acceptance forced a difficult com-
promise on the Congress movement: whatever they might, as pro-
vincial governments, do to serve the people directly and on immediate
issues could not be permitted to prejudice the larger aim of successful
agitation for complete independence. In these circumstances, it is not
1
Ibid., p. 154: 'At the time of the Round Table Conference the fear had been expressed
that Indians (whose experience of politics had been in the legislatures rather than in the
executive) would make the error of demanding that the assemblies should not only criticise
and control the cabinets but that they should (as in France) extend their power so far as
actually to share the responsibility of administration. But Congress cabinets once in office
.. . were inclined rather to limit the rights of the legislatures. . . .' This is not to say, how-
ever, that many legislators did not learn a great deal about the business of government and
administration through the various standing advisory committees of the assemblies.
2 ¡bid., p. 156.
3
Coupland, op. cit., p. 157. Another aspect of the same question is less kindly put in
Schuster and Wint (op. cit., p. 153): 'many observers felt that Congress had come to mock
but had stayed to bless'.
 THE EXPERIENCE 67
surprising that parliamentary democracy should have worked in ways
different from those of the books. None of the members of the Congress
Working Committee, the head of the party hierarchy, held ministerial
posts in the Provinces. The movement's top leaders reserved their ener-
gies for the nation-wide organisation of the continuing struggle for
independence. For them (as today for Communist parties) the parliamen-
tary front was only one of many on which the fight was in progress. It is
important to understand these attitudes, for failure to do so can suggest
conclusions about the nature of the Congress which while valid for that
period have only limited relevance to the present time.
The charges levelled against Congress behaviour and attitudes during
this period are clear. Coupland writes of the 'totalitarian policy of the
Congress high command' which weakened the application of the prin-
ciple of responsible government and practically negated the principle of
provincial autonomy; the provincial Ministers, that is to say, were re-
sponsible not to their legislatures, and through them to the electorate,
but instead to the Working Committee sitting in Wardha or Delhi. 1 The
same point is made by Schuster and Wint: ' of the assemblies Congress
is able to say that before they were, it w a s ' ; ' the loyalty of its supporters
is to party rather than to parliament' and 'thus the assemblies must serve
Congress, not Congress the assemblies'. 2 A more recent British verdict
echoes these.
Provincial autonomy [writes Sir Percival Griffiths] became distorted and
the system of responsible government lost much of its virtue. The attitude
of the Congress High Command protected the unity of the party and per-
haps of India, but it prevented the development of political parties in the
provinces. . . . The concentration of power at the centre bred an authori-
tarian approach to Indian politics. In the provinces, the necessary give and
take of parliamentary life might have developed tolerance and respect for
views of others, but these qualities were not likely to grow in the rarefied
atmosphere of a Congress Central Committee with no responsibility for the
government of the country.3

To these charges there is really no reply—except the adequate one

that it is not reasonable to expect nationalist movements to behave as
parliamentary parties. Only if Congress had possessed complete confi-
dence in the intentions of the British Government and in its servants in
India could they have allowed themselves to behave differently. And
this confidence was wholly absent. Certainly, statements from Congress
itself do not seek to hide their approach during this period. It is clear that
Pandit Nehru spoke for many when he outlined the order of priority as
he saw it in July 1937:
1
Coupland, op. cit., Chapter X.
2
Schuster and Wint, op. cit., p. 170.
3 Sir P. Griffiths, The British Impact on India (1952), p. 340.
68 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

The opinion of the majority of the Congress today [he said] is in favour of
acceptance of office, but it is even more strongly and unanimously in favour
of the basic Congress policy of fighting the new constitution and ending it.
. . . We are not going to be partners and co-operators in the imperialist
firm. . . . We go to the assemblies or accept office . . . to try to prevent the
Federation from materialising, to stultify the constitution and prepare the
ground for the Constituent Assembly and independence, . . . to strengthen
the masses, and, wherever possible in the narrow sphere of the constitution,
to give some relief to them.1

In the following month he was to put the matter even more bluntly. ' It
is manifest', he said in August, 'that the Congress is more important
than any ministry. Ministries may come and go, but the Congress goes
on till it fulfils its historic mission of achieving national independence
for India'. 2 If these statements make clear the justification for what ap-
peared to be 'totalitarian' ways, it must on the other hand be admitted
that on occasion Congress leaders went very far in the direction of
making a virtue out of what should have been no more than an unfor-
tunate necessity. One of the most strikingly violent expressions of what
amounted to anti-parliamentarianism came from Dr. Sitaramayya, a
member of the Congress Working Committee at the time. ' If there is
anyone', he told the All-India Congress Committee in 1938, 'who im-
agines that our [party] structure should be subordinated to the flimsy
notions of democratic and parliamentary conventions, let that person
remember that we are in a stage of transition. Those "goody-goody"
notions of constitutional propriety are not applicable to the Congress in
the present conditions.' 3 There is also the well-known statement of
Gandhi's at this time: ' Congress is democratic in its internal adminis-
tration but for the job of fighting the greatest imperialist power, . . . it
has to be likened to an army. As such, it ceases to be democratic. The
central authority has plenary powers enabling it to impose and enforce
discipline on the various units working under it.' 4 It is to be noted that

1 J. Nehru, The Unity of India (1942), p. 61. The Congress 1936 Election Manifesto had
already made it clear that the party would, as B. P. Singh Roy says, try to have it both
ways: Congress sought election both to end the constitution as well as to implement its
constructive social programme under the constitution (op. cit., p. 205).
2
Ibid., p. 75. It was on this occasion that he added a sentence which some people have
since remembered: 'When that achievement comes in full measure, the Congress might
well cease to exist.'
3 Quoted in B. N. Banerjee, 'Democratic Theory in its Application to Indian Polities',
in Indian Journal of Political Science, Oct.-Dec. 1943. Dr. Sitaramayya was justifying the
action of the Working Committee in 'the Khare case'. Dr. Khare, Congress Premier in
Central Provinces, resigned but was unable to persuade his colleagues to do so because,
they said, resignations had not been ordered by the Congress Parliamentary Board (a sub-
committee of the Working Committee responsible for supervision of the parliamentary
front). Dr. Khare formed a new cabinet, but the Parliamentary Board condemned this in-
dependent move and secured Khare's replacement as Congress leader in the C. P. assembly.
(See B. P. Singh Roy, op. cit., p. 233.)
4
Also quoted in B. N. Banerjee, loc. cit.
 THE EXPERIENCE 69
even these statements stress the peculiar and transitory nature of the
circumstances of the partial transfer of power. At the same time, it may
be admitted that habits of mind were formed and became somewhat set
in this period—habits which were not so easily changed when the ' stage
of transition' came to an end.
In view of the importance which at present attaches to relations be-
tween ministries and party committees, 1 it may be worth while outlining
the 1937-39 position in a little more detail. How did the party leaders
envisage the relation between ministries and various parts of the party
hierarchy ? The Congress theory in its most general terms is clear from
what has already been said. It was expressed well, if naively, by Pandit
Nehru. 'Ministers are responsible to their electorates, to their party in
the legislature, to the Provincial Congress Committee and its Executive,
to the Working Committee and to the All-India Congress Committee';
admitting that this might 'sound complicated and confusing', Nehru
went on to say that in simple fact, 'the Ministers and the Congress
parties in the legislatures are responsible to the Congress and only
through it to the electorate'. 2 But precisely how was ministerial re-
sponsibility to the party to be ensured and expressed? On this, the
leaders were not quite so clear. As Nehru explained, when on one
occasion the A.I.C.C. had met to review the work of ministries, it was
a difficult business because they had 'no rules or conventions for the
purpose'. 3 Gradually, however, conventions were in fact established. In
the first place, a line had to be drawn between principles and details:

It is clear that Congress Ministers have to follow Congress principles and

govern themselves by the general directions issued by the Congress or the
A.I.C.C. or the Working Committee. It is also clear that it is not possible or
desirable to interfere in the day-to-day work of the ministries, or to call for
explanations from them for administrative acts, unless some important
principle is involved. 4

Secondly, some Congress organs were more suited than others for the
work of supervising the ministries. The A.I.C.C. and the Provincial Con-
gress Committees were too large and too like mass meetings for the pur-
pose. Local (e.g., district) Congress committees, on the other hand,
covered too small an area and were too ignorant for the job; they could
offer suggestions and make complaints but they had better do so quietly
to the Provincial Executive Committee. 5 The key party organs were
evidently the provincial executives and the central Working Committee.
Finally, there were right and wrong ways of trying to supervise the
ministries. While there was certainly no need for party committees to be
2
i See below, C h a p t e r IV. J. N e h r u , op. cir., p. 81.
3 Ibid., p . 78. 4 Ibid., p. 78.
5 Ibid., p. 83.
70 THE C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

' silent and tongue-tied spectators' of ministerial performances, it was

not appropriate for the party to attack its ministries in a destructive
fashion. 'It is patent that for a Congress committee to condemn a Con-
gress ministry is both improper and absurd. It is as if one Congress
committee condemned another. The ministries, being the creation of
Congress, can be ended at any time by Congress.' What is required is
'friendly criticism' and the avoidance of any 'embarrassment'. 1 It be-
came obvious at a fairly early stage that the Working Committee and its
Parliamentary Board were doubtful if supervision could be decently
exercised by the provincial level committees, and that they preferred that
everyone simply reported their complaints up to the centre and left it to
the centre to do any controlling that might be necessary. In 1939 this
preference was expressed in a direction: the P.C.C.s were told they were
not to attempt to supervise ministries and they were prohibited from
public discussion of any disagreements between ministers and provin-
cial committees.2 To sum up, Congress ministries were, in the course of
their two years of office, rescued from the 'embarrassing' and often
wrongly motivated attacks of the party's provincial organs, while being
more firmly controlled in matters of general policy by the triumvirate
(Patel, Azad and Prasad) of the Parliamentary Board.
Whether ministries could have been able in time to extend their area
of autonomy is uncertain. In any event, the whole experiment of parlia-
mentary provincial government was suspended in the Congress provinces
with the resignations of all Congress ministries (on orders from the high
command), as a protest against the failure of the British Government to
consult Indian opinion before declaring her entry into the war. Congress
returned to its more usual role of opposition, and the parliamentary
front closed down. It is said that many Ministers were very sorry to have
to quit office. To add that this can well be believed is not to attribute
unduly selfish motives to the Ministers. The salaries they were permitted
to receive were in any case controlled by a Working Committee direc-
tive. It was rather that although parliaments were only one front, some
prestige did attach to ministerial rank; and that in two years there had
grown a real sense of having accomplished something tangible and
worth while in the way of public service. In this lies, of course, one of the
positive achievements of the experience of the 1935 Act. The 'slave'
constitution gave legislative experience to a very considerable number of
politicians in the provinces3; it installed what were in effect fully respon-
sible popular governments; it began to accustom all concerned to a

1 Ibid., p. 76. Also B. P. Singh Roy, op. cit., p. 221.

2 B. P. Singh Roy, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
3
Even the unchanged central assembly was no wasted institution. It forced an uneasy
government to give explanations; it trained a small group of politicians—but trained them
intensively—in the discussion of important and complex public issues; and, if it was not
the heart of the political scene, at least it was preparing quietly so to become.
 THE EXPERIENCE 71

transfer of power. Above all, it gave experience precisely where it was

needed; the men who began to learn governmental and parliamentary
politics during 1937-39 were to a great extent the men who took over the
total responsibility in 1947. Since there was in the post-war period no
time for a gradual transfer of power, it was indeed fortunate that at least
the two pre-war years had been well used. How much more difficult
would the 1947 assumption of power have been had there not been the
' charter of bondage'! And how much easier it would have been if there
had not intervened the wartime years of anger and frustration!

TABLE I . — D E V E L O P M E N T OF P A R L I A M E N T : SEATS A N D FRANCHISE

C E N T R E
1909-19
S E A T S I N LEGISLATIVE C O U N C I L
N o m i n a t e d a n d ex-officio . 41
Elected—General. . . 1 3
Land . . 7 or 6*
Muslim . 5 or 6*
Commerce . . 2

T o t a l elected . . 27
T o t a l Scats . . . . 68

(Electorate 4,818)
* A l t e r n a t e Elections
Southborough Report, 1919

LEGISLATIVE A S S E M B L Y C O U N C I L OP S T A T E
Nominated . . . 41 Nominated
Elected—Non-Muslim . 52 Elected—Non-Muslim 16
Muslim . . 30 Muslim 11
Sikh . . . 2 Sikh . 1
European . . 9 Non-Communal 2
Landholders . 7 European Commerce 3
Commerce . . 4
T o t a l elected 33
T o t a l elected . 104
T o t a l Seats 60
T o t a l Seats . . . 145
(Electorate 1,142,948») (Electorate 16,571+)
* I n 1931 t i n 1926
Simon Report, 1930 a n d Lothian Report, 1931

1935-47
LEGISLATIVE A S S E M B L Y C O U N C I L OF S T A T E
T h e c o m p o s i t i o n of b o t h C h a m b e r s
w a s similar t o t h a t of 1919-35.
A l t h o u g h t h e r e w a s a slightly i n -
creased electorate, this w a s d u e t o
p o p u l a t i o n increase rather than
franchise e x t e n s i o n .

1947-51
C O N S T I T U E N T ASSEMBLY
General . . 2 1 0
Muslim 78
Sikh . . 4

Total . . 292
(Electorate*)
* I n d i r e c t l y elected b y P r o v i n c i a l Assemblies
1
Banerjee: The Constituent Assembly'
72 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

TABLE I.—continued
1952-
H O U S E OF THE PEOPLE C O U N C I L OF STATES
Nominated—Non-scheduled . 8* Nominated . 16t
Scheduled tribes . 1 Indirectly Elected b y ' State
Elected—Non-scheduled . 390 Assemblies 200
Scheduled castes . 72
Scheduled tribes . 26 Total . 216
Total 497 t Includes Kashmir (4)
(Electorate 176 million)
* Includes Kashmir (6)
Report on the first General Elections in India, 1951-52 (Election Commission, 1955)

PROVINCES
1909-19
SEATS IN LEGISLATIVE C O U N C I L S ( 7 ) '
N o m i n a t e d and ex-officio - 159
Elected—General . . 69
Land . . . 2 3
Muslim . . 2 1
C o m m e r c e , etc . 17
T o t a l elected . 130
T o t a l Seats . . . 289
(Electorate 31,727)
Southborougk Report, 1919

1919-35
LEGISLATIVE C O U N C I L S ( 8 ) 2
Nominated . . . 183
Elected—Non-Muslim . 347
Muslim . .179
Sikhs . . . 12
Anglo-Indian . 3
Indian Christian . 5
European . . 1 1
Landholders. . 32
Universities . . 8
Commerce . . 43
T o t a l elected . 640
T o t a l Seats . . 823
(Electorate 6,375,000*)
* In 1 9 3 1
Simon Report, 1930 a n d Lothian Report, 1931

1935-47
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES ( 1 2 ) 3 LEGISLATIVE C O U N C I L S ( 6 ) 4
General . 817 Nominated . . . . 29 to 38
Muslim . 482 Filled b y Legislative Assembly . 39
Women . 40 Elected—General 118
Anglo-Indian 12 Muslim 56
European . 26 European . 9
Indian Christian . . 20 Indian-Christian 3
Backward Areas, etc. 12
Commerce, etc. . 56 T o t a l elected 186
Landholders . . 36
Labour . 38 T o t a l Seats . . . . 254 to 263
Universities . 8
Sikhs . . . . . 34 (Electorate 66,122)

Total (all seats are elected) . 1,581

(Electorate 41 million)
1946 Election Returns and 1935 India Act

1947-1951
Composition and Franchise as in 1919-35
 THE A R G U M E N T 73

TABLE I.—continued
1952
LEGISLATIVE A S S E M B L I E S ( 2 2 ) 3 LEGISLATIVE C O U N C I L S (7)'
Nominated U Nominated 69
Elected—Non-scheduled . . 2,603 Indirectly elected by Local Authorities . . 125
Scheduled castes . 477 Graduates . . . 33
Scheduled tribes . 192 Teachers . . . 3 1
Legislative Assemblies . 129
Total 3,283
Total 387
(Electorate 176 million)
ELECTORAL COLLEÇES ( 3 ) 6
90 seats
Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951-52 (Election Commission, 1955)

1 Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, Central Provinces, Assam.
2 As in (1) plus Punjab.
3 As in (2) plus Bihar, N . W . F . P . , Orissa, Sind.
4 Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Bihar, Assam.
s Assam, Bihar, liombay, Madyha Pradesh, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, U . P . , W . Bengal, Hyderabad,
Madyha Barat, Mysore, P . E . P . S . U . , Rajasthan, Saurashtra, Travancore-Cochin, Ajmer, Bhopal, C o o r g ,
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh.
6 Kutch, Manipur, Tripura.
? Bihar, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, U t t a r Pradesh, W . Bengal, Mysore.

2. The Argument
Whether or not the British Empire was won in a fit of absent-minded-
ness, such a mood seems to have had a good deal to do with the estab-
lishment of parliamentary institutions in India—at least in the sense
that there has hardly been a full-scale debate on the subject. Among
both the British and the Indians, views have varied at different times and
among different sections, but more remarkable has been the extent to
which the matter has been taken, one way or the other, for granted. We
have seen in the preceding section how in fact the ground was prepared
for parliamentary institutions. We must now review briefly the develop-
ment of British, and especially Indian, ideas on the suitability for India
of such institutions.
On the British side, as we have already noted, the initial assumption
was that parliament was not for India. Those among the British leaders
in India in the first half of the nineteenth century who thought in terms
of a future end of British dominion did not say clearly who or what in-
stitutions they saw as their successors. But it can be safely assumed that,
just as they saw themselves as inheritors of an autocracy, so it was to an
indigenous autocracy—albeit of a reformed and enlightened kind—that
they thought of bequeathing power. Even the radicals, whose whole faith
lay in the institutions of representative government, could not see how
it was possible to introduce them into India. James and John Stuart Mill
hardly permitted themselves the rash luxury of even a tentative hope;
only Macaulay went as far as that. 1 Even Macaulay and the other few
radicals who turned their attentions to India felt that the only way was
a 'strategy of indirect approach': the stumbling block was ignorance
i See Coupland, The Indian Problem, 1833-1935, pp. 18-22. Also Duncan Forbes 'James
Mill and India', in The Cambridge Journal, Oct. 1951.
74 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

and superstition; remove these by Western education (plus the Gospel,

added the Evangelicals) and then even India could march with the rest of
the world.
But the Indian Whig aristocracy did not in fact emerge according to
plan, and optimism about Indian political progress receded until the
last third of the century,1 when Gladstone's confident enunciation of
liberal principles found a response in a few men like Lord Ripon; and
by this time it was to the new middle professional classes that they
looked for torchbearers for liberty. Yet it was perhaps not until Edwin
Montagu that radical faith was consciously and carefully applied to the
study of Indian conditions. 'The primary purpose of the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report was to justify the assumption [that] the obstacles
which British statesmanship had hitherto regarded as prohibiting a par-
liamentary system in India could somehow or other be overcome.'2 At
the same time non-radical British statesmen and administrators began
to be somewhat more explicit than before as to what precisely these
obstacles were. Lord Balfour had already in 1909 made the point that
the British form of government was only suitable 'when you are dealing
with a population in the main homogeneous, in the main equal in every
substantial and essential sense, in a community where the minority are
prepared to accept the decisions of the majority, where they are all alike
in the traditions in which they are brought up, in their general outlook
upon the world and in their broad view of national aspirations'. 3 It
might be argued that this was an over-formidable list containing too
many question-begging terms, but it indicated the lines on which future
doubts would be expressed, and it supported an attitude of deep scepti-
cism towards the view that institutions could be easily imported 'as you
import a new locomotive'. 4 To assess the validity of this scepticism is
not easy. It is tempting to notice that the sceptics were to be found
among those who were opposed to any enthusiastic move towards a
transfer of power; and to suggest that they were seeking intellectually
respectable arguments to defend the status quo. It would be less crude
and probably more accurate to say simply that it happens that political
Conservatives are often philosophical conservatives; that is, those who
were attached to Empire were at the same time those whose political
philosophy was opposed to rationalist views of political institutions. An
English philosophical conservative habitually thinks of political in-
stitutions as part of a tradition of life, not as devices designed to solve
universal 'problems of government'; he would be sceptical about the
possibility of exporting institutions even if he were desirous on im-
mediate political grounds of doing so. Be that as it may, many British
observers found, as they looked upon the Indian scene, more difficulties

1
There were rare exceptions even in the darkest days; John Bright was one.
2 The Indian Problem, 1833-1935, p. 54. 3 Ibid., p. 26. 4 Ibid., p. 81.
 THE ARGUMENT 75
and more obstacles than the pessimists of the previous century had
troubled to notice.
In the first place, there was certainly still ample ignorance and super-
stition. The peasantry had been quite untouched by Western education,
and their vision was limited by grinding poverty and the remoteness of
their villages from modern life. The fact that a tiny élite had been res-
cued from such conditions, so far from being a hopeful move in the
direction of preparation for democracy, was, if anything, a further
difficulty. For it meant a division in society so deep that here indeed was
a tale of two nations. Could parliament fit such a situation without being
a mockery ? Moreover, added paternalists, could it be right to abandon
the simple peasant to the wiles of the city lawyers ? But, thirdly, this was
not the only division in Indian society; there were also 'nations' of re-
ligious communities and, within communities, of castes. In the former
case, the divisions were of an order that made majority rule the equiva-
lent of permanent domination by one people over another; in the latter
case, politics in the sense of reasoned debate on social and economic
measures would be impossible, because all decisions would be deter-
mined by loyalties imposed by the fortunes of birth and the status it
conferred. Parliamentary democracy was held to imply a discussion con-
ducted by well-informed men who would have somewhat different in-
terpretations of an essentially common good ; in India, there could only
be more or less clear and unanimous visions of several partial or sec-
tional goods. This tendency would be enhanced by the importance of
the family unit—yet another obstacle standing between the individual
and his ability to conceive a goal of public weal. Finally, there were in
the Indian temperament certain characteristics deposited by history and
confirmed by the social system which were inimical to parliamentary de-
mocracy : at one and the same time an undue reverence for established
authority and a stubborn uncompromising individualism.
This list has no claims to completeness, and each of the items merits
a great deal of elaboration. Nor does this summary treatment imply that
the points are without substance. Indeed, most of them have had already
to be mentioned (in Chapter I) as factors of continuing importance in
the nature of Indian political life. They serve here simply as an indica-
tion of the supports that were available for those disposed to be sceptical
about the possibility for parliaments in India. The authors of the liberal-
inspired Montagu-Chelmsford Report were aware of the points, but
were determined to do all they could to overcome them—or at least to
enable like-thinking Indians to overcome them. The authors of the
Simon Report saw the same features—and tended to despair. In their
' Survey' the difficulties are unhesitatingly set out. 1 None of these, as far
as they could see, would be easily changed. For example, ' any quickening
1
Simon Report, Vol. I, especially Chapters 1-4.
76 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

of general political judgment, any widening of rural horizons beyond

the traditional and engrossing interest of weather and water and crops
and cattle, with the round of festivals and fairs and family ceremonies,
and the dread of famine or flood—any such change from these imme-
morial preoccupations of the average Indian villager is bound to come
very slowly indeed.' 1 Or again, even if there are forces 'tending by de-
grees to sap the rigidity of the caste system', nevertheless 'the spiritual
and social sub-divisions of India, operating in a land where there is a
deep respect for religion, and supported by ancient tradition and the
canons of orthodoxy, are not likely to suffer very sudden or violent
alteration, and nothing is more clear than that whatever change may
come must come from the action of the people of India themselves'. 2
When the authors of the Simon Report reached their ' Recommenda-
tions', 3 the despair becomes in places most explicit. It was
a difficult and delicate operation to transplant to India forms of government
which are native to British soil. . . . The British parliamentary system has
developed in accordance with the day-to-day needs of the people, and has
been fitted like a well-worn garment to the figure of the wearer, but it does
not follow that it will suit everybody. . . . British parliamentarianism in
India is a translation, and in even the best translations the essential meaning
is apt to be lost. We have ourselves in attending debates in the Assembly and
provincial Councils been more impressed with their difference from than
their resemblance to the Parliament we know.4
From this starting point, still many routes presented themselves. It
would have been possible, for example, to preach the abandonment of
democratic institutions altogether and the resumption of some authori-
tarian form of rule patterned on Indian tradition—the extension to all
parts of India, for example, of the monarchies of the princely states. 5
The Simon Report did not take that way; India, it believed, was 'gradu-
ally moving from autocracy to democracy'. 6 On the other hand, the
Report did not feel able to say much about the form democracy could
take in India. It was content simply to explain a little further the grounds
for doubt and leave it for Indian opinion to find its own way to a solu-
tion. Thus the Report was at pains to show that at the provincial level,
while in effect what was proposed was the British system, this was to be
regarded by Indians as no more than a way of affording to them ' the
opportunity of judging by experiment' whether that system was 'fitted
to their needs and to the natural genius of the people'. No one should
2
1 Simon Report, l, p. 15. Ibid., I. p. 37. 3 ¡bid., Vol. II. 4 ¡bid., II, pp. 6-7.
5
This was not an unusual idea among British administrators in India. A fairly recent
example is provided in Goodbye, India (1946) by Sir Henry Sharp, in which the author
asserts that Western democracy is ill-suited to the traditions and institutions of India and
that a federation of oligarchies 'might prove the most durable solution'. In consequence of
this view, he believes, of course, that whatever forms are adopted, 'the real power will come
to be invested in some authority exercising a limited and benevolent despotism'.
6 Simonjteport, II, p. 14.
 THE ARGUMENT 77
imagine that a fixed course had been set for Westminster. For instance,
if in the Provinces something like the British party system fails to emerge
but instead there is ' a system of shifting g r o u p s t h e n that will imply a
constitutional position for provincial governments' quite different from
that of the Cabinet in the British system'. The main point was to realise
t h a t ' the British constitution is not a panacea which can be used at all
times and in all places'. 1 If the Report wished to leave the provincial
stage at least open for alternative ideas, it was, so to speak, even more
decisively doubtful so far as the Centre was concerned. 'It appears to
us', wrote the authors,' that there is a serious danger of development at
the Centre proceeding on wrong lines if the assumption is made that the
only form of responsible government which can ultimately emerge is one
which closely imitates the British system'. The only reason why that
system, whose main feature is 'that the Government is liable to be
brought to an end at any moment by the vote of the legislature', works
reasonably well in Britain is that it is there bound up with an organised
and stable party system' which ensures the cohesion of elected members
and their close contact with the electorate'. 2 Accordingly, 'the prece-
dent for the Central Government in India must be sought for else-
where ', but the Report was not very clear as to where. It appears to have
envisaged a very loose centre of an almost confederal type—'an associa-
tion of units formed mainly for the purpose of performing certain func-
tions on behalf of all'. 3
The reluctance of the Simon Report to propose solutions is perhaps
understandable. Indian politics was developing fast and its directions
may not have been clear. Moreover it may be regarded as appropriately
British to wish to see only the one immediate step ahead rather than to
plan the whole journey in the light of a vision of the end. Yet, whatever
the explanation, the fact remains striking: the Simon Commission, for
all its doubts on the export of parliament to India, declined effectively
to offer India any well-defined alternative; British statesmen were
prisoners of their own traditions. 4
1
Ibid., II, p. 147. It may be noted that while the Joint Committee of the British Parlia-
ment would not have disagreed with this statement, yet the tone of its Report is different in
emphasis. There is less inclination to look elsewhere and m o r e disposition to see the
positive aspects: ' W e cannot doubt that this apprenticeship in parliamentary methods has
profoundly affected the whole character of Indian public life' (Report of the Joint Committee
on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934 (H.C. 5).
2 Ibid., II, p. 146. 3 Ibid., II, p. 18.
4
Attention has been concentrated on the Simon Report, but it is fair to say that no
other British source went any nearer to defining alternative forms of democracy. The work
of Schuster and Wint (op. cit.), for example, was equally aware of the difficulties ( ' I n con-
cluding this survey it is impossible to suppose that the way is likely to be s m o o t h ' (p. 231));
in places, equally unhopeful about an Indian parliament ('Parliamentary democracy of the
Westminster pattern will not suit I n d i a ' (p. 439)); and equally reluctant to put forward any
other pattern. Optimistic teachers o f ' Comparative G o v e r n m e n t ' may like to think that the
growth of their subject in recent years makes such timid insularity impossible today, and
constitutional problems in colonial territories have certainly provided ample challenge t o
inventiveness.
78 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

If we turn to Indian views of this matter, we find that their eyes have
been almost equally fixed on the British model. For Indian nationalists
from the beginning, to attain political maturity would be to obtain
British political institutions. Their argument was straightforward and
would have delighted Macaulay's heart, as it no doubt did delight Lord
Ripon's. By education and imitation, they said, they had become as
Englishmen, and as Englishmen they yearned for English political forms.
' From our earliest schooldays', said C. Sankaran Nair, in his Presiden-
tial Address to the Indian National Congress in 1897, 'the great English
writers have been our classics. Englishmen have been our professors in
colleges. English history is taught in our schools. We live now the life of
the English'—except, of course, that the English governed themselves.
The speaker went on to make that point: 'To deny us the freedom of
the press; to deny us representative institutions, England will have to
ignore those very principles for which the noblest names in her history
toiled and bled.'1 The tone became more insistent as the years went by,
but the same point continued to be made. Another Congress Presiden-
tial Address, that of 1907 by Dr. Rashbehari Ghose, may be cited as an
example: 'What we do demand is that our rulers should introduce re-
forms as steps towards giving us that self-government which is now the
aspiration of a people educated for three generations in the political
ideals of the West. . . . We want in reality and not in name to be the
sons of the Empire.' 2 The fact that British political institutions were, in
the minds of Indian leaders, a corollary of English education in its widest
sense is nowhere made clearer than in the willingness, at least at the
beginning and at least of some leaders, to limit the enjoyment of such
institutions to those Indians who had received the benefits of such
education.

I was not aware [said Surendranath Banerjee] that any responsible Con-
gressman had ever asked for representative institutions for one woman or
for the masses of our people. We should be satisfied if we obtained repre-
sentative institutions of a modified character for the educated community,
who by reason of their culture and enlightenment, their assimilation of
English ideas, and their familiarity with English methods of government
might be presumed to be qualified for such a boon. 3

When Banerjee spoke of the 'modified character' of the institutions

which might be granted to India, he probably had in mind no more than
1
Quoted in Andrews and Muhherjee, Rise and Growth of the Congress, 1938, p. 193. As
that book states (p. 25), 'the authors of the Congress movement had great love for British
parliamentary institutions'. They quote the remark of the famous Dadabhai Naoroji on
his election in 1893 to the British Parliament as member for Finsbury: ' W e hope to enjoy
the same freedom, the same strong institutions which you in this country enjoy. We claim
them as our birthright as British subjects.'
2 Ibid., p. 217. 3 Ibid., p. 160.
 THF; ARGUMENT 79
that legislatures could not at that stage and all at once be made sove-
reign bodies on the lines of the British Parliament; the qualification was,
that is to say, principally one of timing. But already there were other
Indian voices that spoke of modifications in a different and more funda-
mental sense. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, founder of Aligarh (in 1877) as
an institution of higher education for Muslims, had already sounded
a note of distrust. In a speech delivered in the Legislative Council as
early as 1883 he had in effect explained the reasons for his doubts. He
said:

In borrowing the system of representative institutions from England, it is of

the greatest importance to remember those socio-political matters in which
India is distinguishable from England. . . . In a country like India, where
caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races,
where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern
sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all sections
of the population, I am convinced that . . . the system of election, pure and
simple, cannot be safely adopted. The larger community would totally over-
ride the interests of the smaller. . .

This voice, speaking as it did the same language as the British conser-
vatives, was never afterwards wholly silenced. At every stage, there were
some Muslim leaders who pressed for special safeguards for their posi-
tion as a minority community, and in moments of special exasperation
or despair they would pronounce upon the utter unsuitability of parlia-
mentary institutions of majority rule for a divided society. Mr. Fazlul
Huq's attack in 1924 on the whole idea of Western political institutions 2
and many of Mr. Jinnah's statements after 1938 are examples of this
view. At the same time, it must be admitted that Muslim spokesmen only
very rarely if at all expressed their anxieties in the form of a positive de-
mand for some different model of political institution. They—no less
than other Indians, and the British themselves—were limited in vision to
the British model. 3 The result was that Muslim political thinking may be
said to have moved almost in one j u m p from separate electorates to more
or less complete separation. 4 Such discussion as took place in India
before 1947 on, for example, fixed-term, composite executives on the

1 The whole speech is given in Coupland, The Indian Problem 1833-1935, as Appendix
II.
2
Given in the review of evidence in the Muddiman Report.
3
The British were perhaps the least blind. It appears (Coupland, The Indian Problem,
p. 116) that Lord Peel at the Round Table Conference did at least throw out the suggestion
of the Swiss and American models; no one else took up the matter.
4
There were, of course, intermediate stages in the shape of plans for great autonomy for
Muslim areas and a weak federal Centre. That was the attraction of the Cabinet Mission
Plan of 1946. The point, however, is that little thinking was done by Muslims along the
lines of finding (or devising) a form of institution that would safeguard minorities without
in effect separating them geographically.
80 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

Swiss model was the attempt of a few political science teachers to save
a situation.1
The Muslim doubts arose from the fears of a minority at the prospect
of majority rule, but other doubts, if anything still more fundamental,
came to be expressed in the course of the 1920s and are associated with
the influence of Gandhi. The liberal creed of Indian nationalism was in
some measure displaced by the new philosophy and new techniques of
a man who had absorbed English liberalism and then, in his South
African career, passed to some extent beyond it. Gandhi was, not un-
naturally, concerned more with moral principles and political techni-
ques than with patterns of political institutions. He said and wrote
enough, however, to make clear his general attitude on this question.
The state as such was evil, and the self-realisation and moral develop-
ment of the individual would be marked by its gradual disappearance
through a process of decentralisation. More important for our present
purpose was the fact that he did not share his liberal predecessors' en-
thusiasm for parliamentary institutions. In the first place this had been
too much part of the slavish imitation of all Western ways. India would
eventually have her own distinctive institutional path to tread. Gandhi's
phrase, 'parliament is a prostitute', indicates clearly enough his hope
that India's political forms would be such as would reflect and encourage
higher moral qualities than those of the West.2 Be that as it may,
Gandhi's view had the effect of causing a number of Indians to cease
waiting for an Indian replica of Westminster and instead to search for
indigenous models more suited to the traditions and genius of her
peoples. Of course, the influence of this line of thought must not be ex-
aggerated. It came into none of the serious constitutional proposals put
1
Several articles on the subject m a y be found in the Indian Journal of Political Science in
the year following the failure of the Cripps Mission. Advocacy of the Swiss model is ex-
pressed in 'Coalition or Composite Cabinets' by E. Ashirvatham (July-Sept. 1942), where
the author says that opinion had been ' hardening against the parliamentary type of govern-
m e n t ' ; ' T y p e of Executive suited to India's Constitutional Development' by N . S. Par-
dasani (July-Sept. 1942); ' W o r k a b l e Executives' by V. S. R a m and L. P. C h o u d h u r y
(July-Sept. 1943). A more sceptical view is put in ' C o m p o s i t e Executives' by V. K . N .
Menon (July-Sept. 1943), though he says that the idea had been widely current since the
1937-39 governments and adds that M r . C. Rajagopalachari had approved the notion.
Another article, ' M a k i n g Democracy Safe for I n d i a ' by D. G . Karve (Oct.-Dec. 1942),
urges instead a development of powerful parliamentary committees as a way of reassuring
minorities.
2
There is unfortunately no good study of G a n d h i ' s political philosophy. I have been
helped by reading the unpublished thesis, ' T h e Political Philosophy of G a n d h i in Relation
to the English Liberal T r a d i t i o n ' (University of L o n d o n , P h . D . , 1955), of Mr. B. S.
Sharma, but the view I have here taken is very different. Some of the contrasts between the
Westernised Indian nationalists of pre-1917 and G a n d h i are brought out vividly and em-
phatically in the last chapters of N . C. Chaudhuri, Autobiography of an Unknown Indian
(1951). It was an u n h a p p y fate that brought British optimism in the person of M r . M o n -
tagu to the fore at the moment when G a n d h i came to convert Indians away if not f r o m
liberalism (though that is M r . Chaudhuri's somewhat exaggerated view)—at least f r o m the
love of liberal political institutions.
 THE ARGUMENT 81
forward by Indians before independence. It was naturally not in evi-
dence in the 'Lucknow Pact' of 1916.1 It found no reflection in the
'Nehru' Report of 1928; in fact, that report expressly demanded for
India the straightforward British or Dominion model of ' a Parliament
. . . and an executive responsible to that Parliament'. 2 Anti-parliamen-
tarianism failed to obtain expression even at the Round Table Con-
ferences when Mr. Gandhi himself was present. Yet, throughout this
period, the idea that India would move through independence not to a
parliamentary regime but to an undefined but distinctly Indian 'Ram
Rajya' was permeating certain particularly Gandhian sections of the
Congress Party. It was sufficiently important to provoke the attacks of
non-Gandhian nationalists. One of these, writing in 1928, detected
'danger' in the new attitude and reasserted the orthodox liberal-
national view. The idea, he wrote,
that what India wants is a constitution suited to her own genius . . . in-
dicates either a reactionary mind which sees in democratic progress a chal-
lenge to interests, or a vague idealism generated by a faith in India's past
greatness. Both attitudes are dangerous to the peaceful political evolution of
India. What India wants, and what Britain has undertaken to give her, is
nothing less than 'Responsible Government'. The assimilated tradition of
England has become the basis of Indian thought. 3
In the first section of this chapter we have seen that, despite the doubts
of many, the British did afford to an increasing number of Indians ex-
perience of parliamentary forms. In 1947, when power was transferred,
the shape of India's future constitution remained to be determined. The
old Central Legislature disappeared and in its place was the Constituent
Assembly. Elected indirectly by members of Provincial Assemblies, it was
to be a temporary legislature as well as framer of the future. In England,
the discussion might continue as between liberals with faith and con-
servatives with doubts. But in India decisions had to be taken. In the de-
bates of the Constituent Assembly, therefore, we can find something
approaching a real argument about parliamentary government. 4 It will
be useful to examine some of these debates to see in particular how
the four elements we have already noticed expressed themselves: the
i This was a compromise which, however important in the history of H i n d u - M u s l i m
political relations, was entirely within the parliamentary model; Congress conceded to
Muslim fears not only separate electorates but also separate communal voting on certain
issues in the legislature. See Coupland, op. cit., p. 47.
1
Report of the All-Parties Conference (1928), pp. 101, 161. For the Muslim reaction to
this report, which proposed to drop the ' L u c k n o w ' safeguards, see Coupland, op. cit.,
p. 96.
3
' K e r a l a P u t r a ' , The Working of Dyarchy in India (Bombay, 1928), pp.v-vi; also
pp. 111-116.
4 This is not to say that this was (or appeared to the members to be) the most important
topic under discussion. Only a small proportion of the 165 days spent during 1946-49 on
constitution-making were devoted to the argument on parliamentary government as such.
W h a t follows does not purport to be an account of the framing of the Constitution; it is a
very selective description of certain themes.
6—P.I.
82 THE COMING OF P A R L I A M E N T

experience of quasi-parliaments, especially during 1937-39; the orthodox

liberal-nationalist desire for full 'responsible government', the long-
awaited genuine article of a British or Dominion parliamentary system;
the Muslim anxiety for constitutional safeguards and modifications for
minorities; the later fear of some nationalists that Western institutions
would not suit India.
The opening address on the first day (9 December 1946) of the Con-
stituent Assembly seemed to envisage that members would soon find
themselves looking to countries other than Britain for their inspiration.
The whole idea of a Constituent Assembly, said the Chairman, was un-
known to Britain; 'we have to look to countries other than Britain to be
able to form a correct estimate of the position of a Constituent As-
sembly'. He added: ' I have no doubt you will. . . pay greater attention
to the provisions of the American Constitution than to those of any
other.' 1 The Objectives Resolution moved by Pandit Nehru on 13 De-
cember was rather non-committal on models and forms of constitution,
stating simply t h a t ' all power and authority of the Sovereign Indepen-
dent India, its constituent parts and organs of government are derived
from the people'. Nehru's own speech made the point that 'whatever
system of government we may establish here must fit in with the temper
of our people and be acceptable to them', but he took care to leave the
matter as open as possible:' We stand for democracy [but] what form of
democracy, what shape it might take is another matter . . . for this
House to determine.'2
When the fourth session of the Assembly opened in July 1947, the
issue of partition had been settled and constitution-making could begin
in earnest. The main feeling of most members was that partition had
made the job easier; the terms of the Cabinet Mission scheme—with
'sections' of the Assembly free to set up 'group' constitutions and so
on—were left behind and a strong Centre became possible. Even forms
of government might be affected because, so it was felt, India was 'now
a homogeneous country'. 3 The first substantial indication of a lead in
1 C.A. Deb., I, 3-4. The Chairman was Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha, a senior member,
chosen to occupy the position pending the election of the Assembly's President a few days
later.
2
C.A. Deb., I, 57, 60. Attention at this time was of course on other questions—mainly
on how the Cabinet Mission's proposals were to be interpreted, whether they would imply
a weak Centre and whether the Assembly should go ahead in spite of the Muslim League's
boycott. It was noticeable, however, that members found it difficult to avoid thinking in
terms of a future parliament, as when Dr. S. P. Mukherjee said they were looking forward
to the day when they would be able 'to declare this Constituent Assembly as the first
Parliament of a Free and Sovereign Indian Republic' (C.A. Deb., I, 96).
3 N o speech captures the mood of release better than that of Mr. K. M. Munshi: 'I feel
—thank God—that we have got out of this bag at last. We have no sections and groups to
go into, no elaborate procedure as was envisaged, no double-majority clause, no more
provinces with residuary powers, no opting out, no revision after ten years and no longer
only four categories of powers for the centre. We feel free to form a federation of our own
choice. . . . We have now a homogeneous country' (C.A. Deb., IV, 544).
 THE ARGUMENT 83
the direction of parliamentary government came with the presentation
to the Assembly of the Reports of the two Committees set up (in April
1947) to determine the 'Principles of a Model Provincial Constitution'
and 'the Principles of the Union Constitution'. Sardar Vallabhai Patel,
introducing the former report, said that the two Committees had met
jointly for certain discussions, and he announced the decisions tersely:
' They came to the conclusion that it would suit the conditions of this
country better to adopt the parliamentary system of constitution, the
British type of constitution with which we are familiar. . . . The Pro-
vincial Constitution Committee has accordingly suggested that this con-
stitution shall be a parliamentary type of cabinet.' 1 Patel was in any case
a man of few words, but the fact that he could declare a vital principle
in a sentence depended in large part on the crucial phrase: ' with which
we are familiar'. Pandit Nehru a few days later introduced the report on
the principles of the Union Constitution with even less attention to this
particular aspect; it seemed that it could be taken for granted. In the
event, it was not quite so easy, for the Muslim League members 2 at this
stage came forward with criticisms. In the debate on Clause 12 of the
Report on the Provincial Constitution Committee ('The Governor's
ministers shall be chosen and summoned by him and shall hold office
during his pleasure'), Muslim members put the case for a fixed-term
executive, chosen by proportional representation election by the legis-
lature—a form of Swiss composite executive. 'The English system of de-
mocracy does not suit India. . . . It is absurd to think that no sooner the
constitution is framed, the religious groups will disappear and parties
will be formed on political and economic principles'; only a fixed-term
elected coalition would 'secure the confidence of every party in the
cabinets'. 3 An irremovable cabinet of Ministers 'co-ordinated' by an
effective provincial Governor would secure stable government, indepen-
dent of the ' whim of the party'; ' the Swiss system is the best via media
that can be accepted by us in this country'. 4 Although the motivation
was evidently communal, the argument was put so far as possible in terms
of governmental stability: 'you should protect the Ministers against
the shifting parties and predilections of groups in the legislatures'. 5

1 C.A. Deb., IV, 579-580.

2
Pakistan having been decided upon, the League boycott ceased and its members f r o m
constituencies in the new India attended the Assembly. The League acted as spokesman
for the 35 million Muslims left in India—until its effective disappearance from the Indian
political scene in 1948.
3 Speech of Aziz Ahmed K h a n (C.A. Deb., IV, 633).
t Speech of Begum Aizaz Rasul (C.A. Deb., IV, 635).
5
Speech of Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman (C.A. Deb., IV, 650). It is interesting to notice
that this theme, originated as a protection for a Muslim minority, seems to have become
popular among Muslims for its other merits; it was not infrequently advocated in discus-
sions of the proposed Pakistan Constitution during 1954-55, and always not as a protec-
tion for Pakistan's own minorities but as a protection for governments from the dangers of
unstable associations of irresponsible politicians in the legislatures.
84 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

The argument was repeated when the Report of the Union Consti-
tution Committee came before the Assembly a few days later.1 To
these criticisms, there were many different replies. The Muslim League
proposals would 'fragment political life' and produce disunited
ministries.2 Government would tend to become weak, timid and incon-
consistent. The only way to effective government was by party govern-
ment; 'if a party gets into power, it cannot implement its programme
unless it is charged with the full executive responsibility of the govern-
ment'. 3 Pandit Nehru forcefully endorsed this reply by saying that he
could 'think of nothing more conducive to creating a feeble ministry and
a feeble government than the business of electing them by proportional
representation'. 4 Apart from this answer, there was also the hope that
religious labels would now become less important and that' a new align-
ment' would emerge. In that event, government could be expected to
become in practice representative of all communities: 'there will be
Christians, Muslims, Parsees in our governments'. 5 But, finally and de-
cisively, there was the reply of experience of quasi-parliaments and the
historic longing for the real thing. 'We have been brought up in an at-
mosphere which has been conducive to the establishment of what we are
generally accustomed to term Parliamentary Responsible Govern-
ment.' 6 Towards the end of the debate on this topic, a Muslim member
confessed that theirs seemed a hopeless case: 'opinion in India is so
much in favour of the British model that it is not practical politics to try
to sing the praises' of other systems.7 The Reports were passed.
More important than the failure of the League attack on the British
parliamentary model was the gradual erosion, during the constitution-
making process, of their safeguards, those 'modifications' of the system
of representative government which the Muslims had enjoyed for so
long. The Report on Minority Rights placed before the Assembly in
August 1947 recommended the abolition of separate electorates and
weightage in the electoral system. These had 'sharpened communal
differences to a dangerous extent' and had 'proved one of the main
1
Thus Kazi Syed Karimuddin: there would be ' a plethora of parties' in independent
India and in such a situation, parliamentarianism would result in instability of the French
type (C.A. Deb., IV, 908). Mahboob Ali Beg argued that the British system was not really
democratic: 'Parliament does not choose the Ministers; the electorate cannot throw them
out'. But he also defended the idea of elected cabinets on the grounds that people did in
fact continue to do their political thinking in religious terms (C.A. Deb., IV, 919).
2 Speech of K. M. Munshi (C.A. Deb., IV, 651).
3 Speech of N . V. Gadgil (C.A. Deb., IV, 640).
4 C.A. Deb., IV, 915.
5 Speech of Dr. Sitaramayya (C.A. Deb., IV, 647).
« Speech of N . V. Gadgil (C.A. Deb., IV, 640). Also Seth Govind Das: 'We want re-
sponsible government. . . . The system of government in Britain must be followed here.'
That system could not be blamed for the strife in India; in fact, the trouble was that the
system had, properly speaking, 'not yet been put in operation' in India (C.A. Deb., IV,
637).
7 Speech of Hussain Imam (C.A. Deb., IV, 916).
 THE ARGUMENT 85
stumbling blocks to the development of a healthy national life'. 1 On the
other hand, reservation of seats was recommended for Muslims and
Scheduled Castes and for Christians in certain provinces, though a
suggestion that candidates for reserved seats should secure not a simple
majority but also a certain percentage of their own community's vote
was rejected. A minority attempt to introduce a constitutional provision
for reserved places in cabinets was firmly turned down in favour of a
general exhortation that minorities should be given opportunities in
ministries and in the services.2 Pakistan having been conceded, majority
opinion was inclined to be somewhat fierce against pressures for minority
safeguards. The tone was set by Sardar Patel's reply to one such plea:
' those who want that kind of thing have a place in Pakistan, not here',
and the report adds '(Applause)'. 3
At this stage, the Assembly in its constitution-making capacity ad-
journed—as Legislature, of course, it continued—while a Draft Con-
stitution was prepared on the basis of the various approved reports.
This document was then placed before the public for eight months. It
would seem that this process caused a fresh expression of opposition of
a new kind. The opposition during 1947 had been mainly communal and,
to a much smaller extent, 'radical' and 'socialist'. When the Assembly
came together to go through the Draft in November 1948, two new
lines of criticism were apparent, and both were at once mentioned by
Dr. Ambedkar, leading member of the Drafting Committee and in fact
chief draftsman of the Constitution. 4 It was noticeable, in the first place,
that he was at pains to distinguish the British from the American form
and to defend the former.
There is nothing in common [he said] between the form of government pre-
valent in America and that proposed under the Draft Constitution. . . .
1 C.A. Deb., V, 267. The Report is given as an Appendix to Vol. V of the C.A. Deb. It
was said to have been approved ' by an overwhelming m a j o r i t y ' of the Advisory Committee
on Minority Rights, but this would not have been inconsistent with Muslim opposition on
the Committee.
2
The Report, of course, made several other recommendations which do not immediately
concern us—including special nominations of Anglo-Indian members, the temporary pro-
tection of Anglo-Indians in certain employments and the appointment of 'minority
officers'.
3 C.A. Deb., V, 297. Much later, in 1949, the Minorities Committee found it necessary
to present a further report. Patel, introducing the new report, said that the previous report
of 1947 had been prepared 'when conditions were different and the effect of partition not
wholly comprehended'. By late 1948, ' t h e Muslim representatives, some of them, had
changed their opinions'. By waiting a little longer still, they found in mid-1949 ' a con-
siderable change in the attitude of the minorities'. When the majority proposed abolishing
even reserved seats for Muslims (though keeping them for Scheduled Castes and Tribes),
'there was only one solitary vote' against the proposal out of the 40 members of the Com-
mittee (C.A. Deb., VIII, 269). In the Assembly debate on this report, one or two Muslims
stuck to their traditional point, but the majority had concluded that this was no longer the
way (C.A. Deb., VIII, 275 ff.).
4 Criticisms of the balance between Centre and units, of the qualifications on f u n d a -
mental rights, etc., are not our concern here and are left out of account.
86 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

What the Draft Constitution proposes is the Parliamentary system. . . .

The President of the Indian Union will be generally bound by the advice of
his Ministers . . . and the Ministers are members of Parliament. . . . The
daily assessment of responsibility which is not available under the American
system is, it is felt, far more effective than the periodic assessment, and far
more necessary in a country like India. . . .

Secondly, Dr. Ambedkar revealed that there was discontent with the
'foreign' character of the Constitution, for he defended vigorously
Western forms of government and poured scorn on the only Indian
alternative of 'village republics'. There was, he believed, much false
sentimentality about the ancient Hindu village polity and about the
village of the present day. 'Village republics have been the ruination
of India.' 'What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance,
narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad that the Draft
Constitution has discarded the village and adopted the individual as its
unit.' 1
Dr. Ambedkar was not mistaken in paying attention to these two lines
of attack; they became very clear in the debate that followed. The first
line drew its strength from rather diverse sources.2 To some extent it
shared the attitude which the Muslims had expressed earlier and for
other reasons—and which, indeed, some of them again put forward. 'A
removable parliamentary executive is at the mercy of hostile groups in
their own party', living in fear of no-confidence motions and over-
anxious to satisfy the 'legitimate and illegitimate' demands of their
supporters.3 Or, again, there was the fear that parliamentary govern-
ment in India—with 'no conventions and no discipline'—would mean
the crushing of all opposition.4 More novel was the fear that the parlia-
mentary system calls for more honest men and would therefore be more
difficult for India: 'The parliamentary system must go. I have bitter ex-
perience of its working in the Provinces. In the Presidential system it is
easy to find one honest President, but it is not so easy to find an army of
honest Ministers and deputy Ministers and parliamentary secretaries
and so on.' 5 Novel, too, was the argument that a separation of powers,
of executive from legislative, would save the latter from corruption. The
parliamentary executive which is part of the legislature 'is in a position
to corrupt the House . . . to influence the votes of members by the

1 C.A. Deb., VII, 32-39. The bitterness of his remarks of course owes much to his posi-
tion as leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation and his conviction that rural India is the
stronghold of caste prejudice.
2
Its importance in the Assembly as a whole must not be exaggerated. Indeed one of its
spokesmen at one stage sighed—'I know that my voice almost appears as a voice in the
wilderness'. (Prof. K. T. Shah, C.A. Deb., VII, 961).
3 Speech of Mahboob Ali Beg (C.A. Deb., VII, 295).
* Speech of Kazi Syed Karimuddin (C.A. Deb., VII, 965).
5 Speech of Ram Narayan Singh (C.A. Deb., VII, 249).
 THE ARGUMENT 87
1
number of gifts or favours they have in their power to confer'. There
were also a tiny few who claimed that India needed a presidential strong
man government. One of these said t h a t ' power placed in the hands of
the electorate might prove disastrous. . . . Any attempt to foist parlia-
mentarianism on India will only spell our ruin and misery.' 2 The replies
to all this were fairly brief. Dr. Ambedkar pointed out that even the
Americans themselves had doubts about their own system, and urged
that the legislature was in need o f ' direct guidance and initiative from an
executive sitting in Parliament'. 3 Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar pointed
out that the princely rulers could not be so easily fitted in as constitu-
tional heads if the American pattern was followed. Moreover there was
hardly a need to imitate a system which was born of peculiar circum-
stances and special distrusts, and which was even more difficult to
operate: ' an infant democracy cannot afford to take the risk of a per-
petual cleavage, feud or conflict or threatened conflict between the legis-
lature and the executive'. 4 K. M. Munshi's reply was more elaborate.
He put the Assembly two questions. First, ' What would make for the
strongest executive consistent with a democratic constitutional struc-
ture?' On this, he thought that British experience was conclusive and
noted that 'the British model has been approved by everyone, including
leading American constitutional experts.' Second, 'What is the form
best suited to Indian conditions?' Here, too, he considered that there
could be little doubt; one had only to realise that experience with quasi-
parliamentary institutions had become an essential part of 'Indian
conditions'.

We must not forget a very important fact, that during the last one hundred
years Indian public life has largely drawn on the traditions of English
1 Speech of Prof. K . T. Shah (C.A. Deb., VII, 961). This point was felt by other mem-
bers to have some force. For example S. L. Saxena admitted that he was uneasy. It was all
very well but quite beside the point to look at England—'they have a tradition of 700
years'; more relevant was the fact that Indian experience of attempts on the part of
Ministers to bribe legislators in one way or another had not been encouraging. H e con-
cluded, however, by saying that it was ' n o w too late to change' and they would simply
' h a v e to be careful to develop traits' which would make the constitution work (C.A. Deb.,
VII, 963).
2
This was Brajeshwar Prasad (C.A. Deb., VII, 373). He wanted provincial governments
wholly abolished and all power vested in a President with four advisers—whose names he
suggested! Such an omnipotant rule was what suited I n d i a — ' w h a t Plato advocated in his
Republic has always been practised in India.' He also reviewed with admiration the achieve-
ments of Hitler, Mussolini, Kemal Ataturk and Stalin, and concluded w i t h : ' the rule of the
dictator is essentially democratic if he stands for the greatest good of the greatest number.'
It was he who later (C.A. Deb., XI, 875) still further shocked his listeners with the violence
of his views: ' I f the will of ignorant and hungry people were ever to become the basis of
government in India, it would mean the complete liquidation of all that is good and noble
in Indian life. . . . T h e essence of democracy is the representation of the real will of the
people as opposed to and distinct from the actual will. . . . I am opposed to federalism,
provincial autonomy, parliamentarianism, adult franchise and fundamental rights'!
3 C.A. Deb., VII, 968.
•» C.A. Deb., VII, 985.
88 THE C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

constitutional law. . . . For the last thirty or forty years some kind of
responsibility has been introduced in the governance of this country. Our
constitutional traditions have become parliamentary, and we have now
all our provinces functioning more or less on the British model. . . . After
this experience, why should we go back upon the tradition that has been
built for over a hundred years and try a novel experiment framed 150 years
ago and found wanting even in America 71

This defence of the British model and of political experience under

British rule only served to provoke further the second line of attack,
which had clearly been under preparation while the Draft Constitution
was before the country. At this stage (i.e., late 1948), however, the
attack was limited to few phrases in some of the speeches. Dr. Ambed-
kar's remarks on villages were held to be unfair, the Constitution was
quite lacking in Gandhian outlook, it had even little in it that was really
Indian, it was, as one member put i t , ' a slavish imitation of—nay, much
more—a slavish surrender to the West'. 2 This approach failed to result
in any positive constructive proposals—except perhaps the suggestion
that village panchayats should be used as an instrument for indirect
elections to the legislatures. Nevertheless, the complaints continued. In-
deed, they became loudest when it was too late to do anything, when all
amendments had been dealt with3 and the Constitution was finally about
to be passed. This was, however, not inappropriate; the complaints were,
after all, of the kind which lend themselves more to rhetoric than to
serious proposals. Where were the villages, where was the spinning
wheel, where the ban on cow-slaughter? Clearly, 'the ideals on which
this Draft Constitution is framed have no manifest relation to the funda-
mental spirit of India. . . . What is there in the Constitution to be proud
o f ? ' 4 ' W e wanted the music of Veena or Sitar, but here we have the
music of an English band.'5 ' I f you look into this Constitution' said an-
other speaker,' it would be difficult for you to find anything Indian. . . .
The British have departed but I regret to say that our countrymen have
not forsaken the ways of their former masters. We will experience much
more difficulty in bidding goodbye to the ways of the British than we
experienced in bidding goodbye to the British themselves.'6 T o one
member who protested that the Constitution contained no attempt to
solve the day-to-day problems of the people, it had to be explained that
1 C.A. Deb., V I I , 984. The Draft Constitution had provision for State Governors to be
elected by the voters, but this 'concession to the United States school of thought' was later
removed (C.A. Deb., V I I I , 426 ff.).
2 Speech of Lokanath Misra ( C . A . Deb., V I I , 242).
3 7,635 amendments were tabled and 2,473 of them were moved (figures given in Dr.
Ambedkar's final speech, C.A. Deb., X I , 972).
4 Speech of Lakshminarayan Sahu ( C . A . Deb., X I , 613-616).
5 Speech of K . Hanumanthaiya ( C . A . Deb., X I , 616).
6 Speech of Ramnarayan Singh (C.A. Deb., X I , 639-642). H e went on to add, a trifle
wildly, that 'our country and our society need no government'. Yet in a way this was an
authentic Gandhian voice.
 PARLIAMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION 89
the Constitution enabled them to do what they chose—and that that was
all a constitution could do. But, apart from that, the replies were along
lines already sufficiently indicated. The final reply to the debate was left
to the main author of the Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar pointed out that
it was 'futile to pass any judgment on the Constitution without reference
to the part which the people and their parties are likely to play'; ' how-
ever good a constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad if those who
are called upon to work it happen to be a bad lot'. The Constitution
made parliamentary democracy possible. Whether the possibility would
be realised and maintained would depend on India's 'holding fast to
constitutional methods', on transforming a political democracy into a
social democracy and on resisting the temptations of hero-worship. 1

3. Parliament in the Constitution

The previous section summarises some of the argument through the
years, and in the Constituent Assembly in particular, on the general
principle of parliament for India. But the Indian Constitution is one
which goes into details. 2 Those provisions which relate to parliament—
at Centre and State levels—have been given in full in Appendix I. A few
comments on some of these will therefore be sufficient here. 3
The Union Parliament consists not simply of one legislative body but
of the President together with two Houses. The Upper House is called
the Council of States, but its composition does not give equal weight to
the units. It consists of twelve members nominated by the President as
having 'special knowledge or practical experience in such matters as
1 C.A. Deb., XI, 972-981. Constitutional methods he took to exclude not only revolu-
tion but also civil disobedience, non-co-operation and satyagraha. Social democracy was
an urgent matter in a society based on inequality such as that of India—otherwise the con-
tradictions between political democracy and social conditions would imperil the former.
As for hero-worship, India was here in special d a n g e r , ' for in India Bhakti or what may be
called the path of devotion of hero-worship plays a part in politics unequalled in magni-
tude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world.' It was well to be
grateful to great men but there must be 'limits to gratefulness'. 'Bhakti in religion may be
a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to
degradation and eventual dictatorship.'
2
This was criticised at the time by many members of the Assembly and has since been
commented u p o n adversely by others (e.g., Sir Ivor Jennings, Some Characteristics of the
Indian Constitution (1952)). The explanation is in part that it contains the State constitutions,
in part that it is influenced by the 1935 Act and constitutes practically a h a n d b o o k of ad-
ministration. T h e general explanation of the latter feature offered by D r . A m b e d k a r was
that in India democracy was 'only a top dressing on soil which is essentially undemocratic'
and the 'constitutional morality' of which G r o t e spoke was not yet diffused through the
people; this deficiency required an elaborated constitution (C.A. Deb., VII, 38).
3 Line-by-line reference to the Articles of the Constitution has not been given but pages
of this section should be read along with Appendix I. Most of the topics are of course dis-
cussed at greater length in later chapters. T h e Appendix is taken f r o m The Constitution of
India (Delhi, 1949), with amendments incorporated. A brief summary of parliament in the
Constitution is given in A. Gledhill, The Indian Republic (1951), Chapter 7. More detailed
is D. D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India (Calcutta, 2nd Edition, 1952).
90 T H E C O M I N G OF P A R L I A M E N T

literature, science, art and social service'.1 The rest, up to a maximum of

238 (at present 207), are allocated by the Fourth Schedule among the
various States in rough proportion to populations. From Part A and
Part B States the members are chosen by State Assemblies by propor-
tional representation with single transferable vote.2 From Part C States
members were similarly chosen by State Assemblies or, where they did not
exist, by Electoral Colleges. The Council is not subject to dissolution
but one-third of its members retire every two years. The age-quali-
fication for members is placed at thirty years. During the early constitu-
tion-making debates, an amendment in favour of a single chamber was
moved but defeated after hardly any discussion. The government view
was put by Gopalaswami Ayyangar: 'The need has been felt practically
all over the world wherever there are federations of importance.' Yet, in
view of the Council's composition, he could hardly claim that it would
serve as a defence for smaller States or even for States' rights in general.
In fact, he restricted his argument to grounds which are independent of
federalism: 'the most that we expect the second chamber to do is per-
haps to hold dignified debates on important issues and to delay legisla-
tion which might be the outcome of passions of the moment'; it would
' also given an opportunity, perhaps, to seasoned people who may not be
in the thickest of the fray, but who might be willing to participate in the
debate with an amount of learning and importance which we do not
ordinarily associate with a House of the People'. 3
Whatever uncertainty there may have been on the purposes of an
Upper House, there was at no stage any doubt that the House of the
People would be the more powerful. Directly elected on the basis of
adult suffrage, the House consists of not more than 500 members, each
representing between 500,000 and 750,000 people,4 and is subject to
dissolution after not more than five years. The age qualification of twenty-
five years is lower than for the Council of States but higher than for vot-
ing rights. Among proposals which were brought forward at some stage
1
The original Draft Constitution showed more clearly the influence of the Irish Con-
stitution and gave a more elaborate list of relevant avenues of experience.
2
In the case of Jammu and Kashmir in 1951, representatives were chosen by the Presi-
dent in consultation with the State Government pending the establishment of a State
Assembly (Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950). Since Jammu
and Kashmir Legislative Assembly came into existence in 1954, this State too falls in line
with the general practice (Constitution Order, 1954) and the first elections took place in
Nov. 1954.
3 C.A. Deb., IV, 927. When, in the later debate on the Draft Constitution, an attempt
was again made to have only one House, Ananthasaynam Ayyangar defended an Upper
House as a way of using harmlessly some of the country's political energy: ' It is common
knowledge that in this country there is so much enthusiasm, and if for no other reason we
must find opportunity for various people to take part in politics' (C.A. Deb., VII, 1198).
"t Its strength at present is 499. Of these, 2 are Anglo-Indians nominated by the President.
In the 1951 elections, the 6 Kashmir seats and the 2 for Andaman and Nicobar Islands and
for certain Assam tribal areas were also filled by nomination. The remaining 489 were
elected. On the population limits, see below, p. 95, n. 1.
 PARLIAMENT IN T H E CONSTITUTION 91
of constitution-making but were fairly easily defeated were literacy tests
for members, the use of proportional representation for general elections
(rejected as being too complicated for the voter and tending to unstable
governments) and the introduction of arrangements for the recall of re-
presentatives and for the holding of referenda.
The Constitution provides for the appointment of presiding officers
(the Vice-President of the Union as ex-officio Chairman of the Council,
an elected Deputy Chairman of the Council, elected Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the House) and their powers. It also provides for a separate
secretariat for each House—this having been inserted as a consequence
of a recommendation from a Speakers' conference. It further lays down
certain general rules regarding the disqualification of members, though
these have been elaborated by ordinary legislation—such as the Parlia-
ment (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1950, which released the
appointments of Ministers and junior Ministers from the disqualifica-
tion attaching to holders of 'offices of profit under the government'. It
even goes so far as to establish certain general rules governing the con-
duct of business in Parliament, though Parliament has naturally been
permitted to frame its own rules for most matters of procedure. 1 Certain
' powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its Members' are
also stated in the Constitution. This topic was one of some difficulty.
The 1935 Act had given simply freedom of speech and protection of
members from proceedings arising out of the debates. Something more
was now required to fit the status of a sovereign Parliament, and the
Draft Constitution chose to copy the Australian Constitution: the
powers and privileges of Houses and members could be defined by law
but 'until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom'. This explicit reliance on the
British Constitution caused some doubts and misgivings, and several
members urged that the Indian Constitution should be self-contained
and that the powers and privileges should be defined and listed. It was
explained to members that definition had been considered and found
very difficult; that in any case 'the House of Commons is the assembly
which has the widest privileges of all the assemblies of the world'. 2 It
might have been (but was not) further explained that the peculiar and
wonderful position of the Commons rests on the fact that it has the
power of a court—the power to commit for contempt, that is to inflict
punishment, and that precisely so long as it does not define its privileges
and specify the offence, its action cannot be enquired into by the or-
dinary courts of law.
1
In this connection, the language of debate is laid down as Hindi or English. Presiding
officers are permitted by the Constitution to allow a member who cannot express himself
adequately in these languages to use his mother tongue. ' Unless Parliament by law other-
wise provides', the provision permitting English will be automatically deleted in 1965. N o
2
doubt several members will plead for an extension of its life. C.A. Deb., IV, 689.
92 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

In setting out the legislative procedure, the Constitution distinguishes

between Money Bills and others. Ordinary Bills may be introduced in
either House and must be passed by both Houses. The President's assent
completes the procedure. This assent may be withheld once; but if the
two Houses, after considering the President's recommendations, pass
the Bill again, the assent must be given.1 If an ordinary Bill is rejected by
one House or delayed more than six months, or if the two Houses can-
not agree on amendments, then the President may summon a Joint Sit-
ting. Since the voting at such a sitting is by simple majority, and since
the Lower House is twice as large as the Council, the Upper House has
in effect no more than a delaying power of six months and can after that
be overruled. Money Bills, on the other hand, may be introduced only
in the House of the People. The Council may make recommendations
within fourteen days, and these may or may not be accepted by the
Lower House. The Constitution states the categories of Bill that may be
considered Money Bills, but in cases of doubt the Speaker's decision is
final.2 The Constitution sets out the general procedure in financial
matters including the annual financial statement, appropriation bills,
grants and votes on account; it also lists those items which are charged
on the Consolidated Fund and as such not submitted to vote of Parlia-
ment. 3 Finally, the Constitution establishes firmly the position and status
of the Comptroller and Auditor-General as comparable to that of a
Judge, and the system of audit under his authority covers States as well
as Union Accounts.
The main provisions relating to the Union Parliament are reproduced,
mutatis mutandis, in the Parts of the Constitution which set out the State
constitutions. A few differences may, however, be noticed. The State
legislature consists of the Governor 4 together with one or two Houses.
In the Constitutent Assembly there was considerable disagreement on
the question of Upper Houses for States. In the event, those States with
second chambers were allowed to keep them while the others remained
unicameral; provision was at the same time inserted to enable second
chambers to be created or abolished on the initiative of a two-thirds
1
It may be added that Bills pending in Parliament do not lapse on prorogation.
2
The definition is along British lines, but it may be noted that the definition in India in-
cludes Bills dealing with 'the regulation of the borrowing of money or the giving of any
guarantee by the Government of India, or the amendment of the law with respect to any
financial obligations undertaken by the Government of India'.
3
Such items may, however, be discussed in either House.
4 The State Governors, unlike the Union President, are not elected—though this was
indeed the original intention and was abandoned in the face of some opposition. The
introduction of Governors nominated by the President smacked too much of old days of
bureaucratic centralisation; but the Government view was that an elected Governor
might conflict with the Chief Minister,and the safest way to a constitutional head at State
level was through nomination. Perhaps also the Government was not averse to a further
measure of central 'pull'. In the Part B or former princely states, the Governor is replaced
by the Rajpramukh or Ruler. But see above, p. 8, n.
 THE ELECTION OF PARLIAMENT 93
majority of the State Lower House. Upper Houses, or Legislative Coun-
cils, where they exist are constituted in a complex m a n n e r : one-third
elected by members of local authorities; one-third elected by members of
the State Legislative Assembly; one-twelfth elected by teachers; one-
sixth nominated by the Governor f r o m persons in the fields of literature,
science, art, co-operative movement and social service. Two i m p o r t a n t
differences between States a n d U n i o n are to be f o u n d in the legislative
procedure. In the first place, even where-there are two Houses of a State
Legislature, there is no provision for a joint sitting; the Councils may
delay for three months, but a second passing by the Lower House is
sufficient to enable the Bill to go forward for assent. Secondly, there is in
effect a central veto power on State legislation: the Governor may, like
the President in the U n i o n Parliament, withhold his own assent once
only, but he may also reserve a Bill for the consideration of the Presi-
dent ; in this case, it is possible for the President to continue indefinitely
to withhold his assent.

4. The Election of Parliament

The first General Election for the U n i o n a n d State Parliaments was

held in 1951-52. 1 In the constitution-making discussions there had been
some talk of proportional representation, and some hopes for a system
of indirect elections based on village panchayats. But the main aspira-
tion of the great majority was to see the introduction into Asia of free
direct elections on adult franchise. In his final speech to the Constituent
Assembly the President said that in making that decision they h a d in-
deed taken ' a very big step'. H e went o n :

I am not dismayed by it. . . . I know the village people who will constitute
the bulk of this vast electorate. In my opinion, our people possess intelli-
gence and common sense. They also have a culture which the sophisticated
may not appreciate but which is solid. . . . They are able to take measure
of their own interest and also of the interests of the country at large if things
are explained to them. 2
1
The excellent official account is the Election Commission's Report on the First General
Elections in India, 1951-52 (Delhi, 1955). Articles on the elections include W. H. Morris-
Jones, ' T h e Indian Elections' in Political Quarterly, July-Sept. 1952, and R. Park, ' I n d i a n
Election Results' in Far Eastern Survey, May 1952. Irene Tinker-Walker's ' Representation
and Representative Government in the Indian Republic', an unpublished Ph.D. Thesis
(University of London, 1954) contains a first-hand account of the elections, some of which
has been published in articles on the elections in Himachal Pradesh, Travancore-Cochin
and Rajasthan in the Summer 1953, Autumn 1953 and Spring 1954 issues (respectively) of
Parliamentary Affairs. An interesting pamphlet study of the elections is Asoka Mehta's
The Political Mind of India (Bombay, 1952). Other pamphlets or books include M. Venka-
tarangaiya's valuable The General Election in Bombay City (Bombay, 1953), B. R. Sharma's
Report on Elections in the Punjab (Jullundur, 1952) and S. P. Singh Sud's Elections and
Legislators (Ludhiana, 1952).
2 C.A. Deb., XI, 989.
94 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

In the last sentence the President certainly touched the heart of the
matter. Was the Indian electorate willing and capable to choose its re-
presentatives and was it presented with an understandable choice which
it could make in a free and secret fashion ?
The legal framework for the conduct of elections in India is in part
provided by the Constitution itself. The Constitution, for example, lays
down the manner in which the President of the Union shall be elected
and also the Vice-President (Articles 54-58 and 66-71 respectively). It
establishes certain general rules regarding the composition of and the
qualification of members for both Houses of the Union Parliament
(Articles 79-84 and 102-103) and for State legislatures (Articles 168-
173, 190-191, 238 and 240). Most important, it provides that the super-
intendence, direction and control of preparations for and the conduct of
all elections shall be vested in a permanent Election Commission inde-
pendent of the governments of the day (Article 324). Finally, it lays
down the principle of adult franchise (Article 326) and makes general
provision for the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Tribes
and for the nomination of Anglo-Indians (Articles 330-333). This still
left much to be done by ordinary legislation. Parliament filled the gaps
with the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951 (later
amended), while the Government under these Acts made two sets of
statutory rules for the preparation of rolls and the conduct of the elec-
tions. It is understood that this mass of somewhat dispersed law will be
codified before the second General Elections take place.1
The administrative framework began to take shape in 1950. Early in
that year, the offices of the Election Commission were set up and the
Chief Election Commissioner (Mr. Sukumar Sen) appointed. Over the
period of the elections themselves, two full-time Regional Commis-
sioners were also appointed. In all States, the governments appointed
Chief Electoral Officers and, below them, Electoral Registration Officers,
and these functions were performed as additional duties by existing
government officers. In the same way, judicial officers were chosen to act
as Revising Authorities to decide claims and objections to the draft rolls.
Returning Officers and their assistants were found from administrative
personnel. Presiding Officers and Polling Officers were supplied from a
lower section of government employees. This whole administrative
machinery was tested in polling rehearsals or mock elections held in
every State during the late summer of 1951.
Nearly two years elapsed between the passing of the Constitution and
the General Elections. But two years was not too long for the work that
had to be completed. The delimitation of constituencies was in itself
enormously difficult. The Constitution had set certain limits: not more
than one member of the House of the People for every 500,000 people,
1
Election Commission, op. cit., p. 6.
 THE ELECTION OF PARLIAMENT 95
not less than one for every 750,000'; not more than one member of a
State Assembly for more than 75,000 people. Upper and lower limits on
the number of seats in State Assemblies are also laid down, as well as an
upper limit of 500 for the House of the People. In addition, the Consti-
tution's provisions regarding the reservation of seats for Scheduled
Castes and Tribes had to be observed. The first task was the determina-
tion of population; the previous census of 1941 was considered too out
of date and the Census Commissioner was charged with the preparation
of estimates. On this basis, the Representation of the People Act, 1950,
allocated House of the People seats to the States and also established the
number of seats in State Assemblies. The latter was in every case an in-
tegral multiple of the former, so that a combination of State Assembly
constituencies would generally constitute one Union Parliament con-
stituency. Constituencies were normally single-member and were based
as far as possible on existing district or other administrative units. In
some areas the concentration of Scheduled Tribes permitted the reserva-
tion for them of single-member constitutencies, but for some tribal seats
and all Scheduled Caste seats it was necessary to create double-member
constituencies. 2 The proposals of the Election Commission were placed
before the public for objections, and Parliamentary Advisory Commit-
tees for each State (consisting of M.P.s representing the State in Parlia-
ment) were invited to make their comments and recommendations. The
final Delimitation Orders were subject to amendment by Parliament. 3
No less difficult was the preparation of Electoral Rolls. Some prelimi-
nary steps were taken during 1948-49, but the electoral legislation passed
in 1950 made the draft rolls largely unsuitable and work had to begin
practically afresh. The new draft rolls were published in the autumn of
1950 and claims and objections received up to the end of the year. The
chief difficulties arose with the large and somewhat floating population
of displaced persons, with women voters who would give not their own
names but only those of their male relatives, and with certain remote
islands off the south-western coasts. Moreover, the authorities were able
1
T h e latter l i m i t w a s deleted b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n (2nd A m e n d m e n t ) A c t , 1952, since t h e
p o p u l a t i o n increase revealed in t h e 1951 c e n s u s m a d e it u n w o r k a b l e . It h a d a l r e a d y p r o v e d
a n artificial h a n d i c a p t o t h e t a s k o f d e l i m i t a t i o n .
2
O f t h e 489 seats in t h e H o u s e o f t h e P e o p l e t o b e filled by election, 72 seats w e r e re-
served f o r S c h e d u l e d C a s t e c a n d i d a t e s , 27 f o r S c h e d u l e d T r i b e s ; they w e r e a r r a n g e d in
314 s i n g l e - m e m b e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , 86 d o u b l e - m e m b e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a n d 1 t h r e e - m e m b e r
c o n s t i t u e n c y (which h a d r e s e r v a t i o n f o r b o t h T r i b e s a n d Castes). O f t h e 3,373 S t a t e
A s s e m b l y seats, 477 w e r e reserved f o r S c h e d u l e d C a s t e s , 192 f o r S c h e d u l e d T r i b e s ; t h e s e
w e r e a r r a n g e d in 2,124 s i n g l e - m e m b e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , 578 d o u b l e - m e m b e r , a n d 1 three-
member.
3
T h i s p r o c e d u r e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n (op. cit., p . 57), ' d i d n o t w o r k o u t
s m o o t h l y o r s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ' . T h e D e l i m i t a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n A c t , 1952, sets u p i n s t e a d a n
i n d e p e n d e n t C o m m i s s i o n o f t h r e e (a r e t i r e d S u p r e m e C o u r t J u d g e , a r e t i r e d H i g h C o u r t
Chief J u s t i c e a n d t h e Chief E l e c t i o n C o m m i s s i o n e r ) , w i t h t w o t o seven a s s o c i a t e m e m b e r s
f r o m e a c h State d r a w n f r o m m e m b e r s of t h e H o u s e of t h e P e o p l e a n d S t a t e Legislative
Assemblies.
96 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

to receive little help from the political parties, which were inexperienced
in the work. All things considered, it was an achievement to enrol 49%
of the total population as against an eligible proportion of 50-55%.
It had been these formidable administrative problems rather than
doubts about the ability of the illiterate to vote which had seemed un-
surmountable in the past. The Indian Franchise (Lothian) Committee's
Report, 1 for instance, appeared more impressed with administrative
difficulties of vast numbers than with the problem of the illiterate voter
as such. They pointed out that even with the 1926 franchise, which con-
sisted of only 10% of the adult population, half the Muslim and one-
third of the Hindu voters of Bengal were illiterate. Nevertheless, with a
literacy percentage of about 16£, the system of voting to be adopted did
assume some importance. It was clearly impossible to ask the voter to
mark his paper without assistance—and such assistance would at once
have imperilled the secrecy of the ballot. The system adopted was one
which had already been used in India: separate ballot boxes, each
marked with the distinctive symbols of a candidate, are placed in the poll-
ing compartment; the voter is given a ballot paper which he does not
have to mark but which he simply places in the box of his choice. Parties
were invited to indicate their preferences in symbols and an allocation
was made by the Commission to fourteen parties recognised as all-India
parties. 2 Similar arrangements were made by State Chief Electoral
Officers for other parties operating only on a State basis and for inde-
pendents. 3 Since each voter was called upon to vote for his State As-
sembly as well as for the House of the People, each polling station
required two sets of boxes for the two sets of candidates. Two and a half
million boxes had to be made.
The elections certainly produced enthusiasm. In the first place, there
was no shortage of candidates. The number of seats to be filled was 489
at the Centre and 3,373 in the States. For these, nomination papers were
received for 2,833 and 23,287 candidates respectively. Even when some
nominations had been rejected and others withdrawn, 1,874 contested
the Centre seats and 15,361 the State seats. Only 93 candidates were re-
turned unopposed and 41 of these were for reserved seats. Of course, the
enthusiasm of many was misplaced; in spite of deposits (about £40 for
Central, £20 for State elections), a total of 9,198 candidates had to suffer
forfeiture—including 4,967 out of 6,520 optimistic Independents. In the

1 1932, Cd. 4086.

2
In Feb. 1953 the Election Commission withdrew recognition as all-India parties from
all parties which had failed to secure 3% of the total votes. This reduced the number to
four: Congress; Praja Socialist Party; Communist Party; Jan Sangh (H.P. Deb., 3rd
Session, 1953, Appendix II, Annexure I).
3
The number of State parties has also been reduced since the elections: 39 were re-
cognised in 1951; this has been reduced to 19, only 4 of which are recognised in more than
one State.
 T H E E L E C T I O N OF PARLIAMENT 97

second place, only considerable enthusiasm on the part of the adminis-

tration could have ensured the establishment and adequate staffing of
132,560 polling stations. In many areas polling had to be spread over
several days owing to shortage of personnel (the longest period was 25
days in one constituency), but at least every area, however inaccessible,
was catered for—even if camels, elephants, porters and fleets of jeeps
had to be used to transport the boxes and staff. Only in parts of one
Himalayan constituency were the arrangements mishandled; there delay
resulted in snow-bound conditions which made voting practically im-
possible. In addition, postal ballot papers were issued to nearly 300,000
voters—including armed forces, government personnel abroad and per-
sons under preventive detention. Thirdly, even among voters there was
more enthusiasm than had perhaps been generally anticipated.
105,944,495 persons—or 51-15% of the voters—cast their votes. The
maximum percentage was 92-6 in one constituency, the minimum 10-1.
Moreover, the process was orderly and peaceful in almost every polling
station. The figure of 1,250 electoral offences reported—including 817
cases of impersonation—is remarkably small. There was, on the other
hand, a spate of election petitions—338 in all, 314 of which were heard
by Election Tribunals. These bodies were constituted by the Election
Commission and were composed of a serving or retired High Court or
District Judge as Chairman, a serving or retired District Judge and an
advocate as members. Although 66 Tribunals were set up, the procedure
was slow, and at the beginning of 1955 there were still 7 petitions still
pending. Of the 307 dealt with, no less than 183 referred to improper
acceptance or rejection of nomination papers—mainly because of the
unnecessarily complex rules on the matter. In all, 156 petitions were dis-
missed, 128 allowed and 23 withdrawn.

The facts and figures of the electoral process are one thing; an assess-
ment and judgment on the meaning of the elections quite another. A
summary of the election results is given in Table I I (pp. 100-101).
Certain statements can be made on the strength of these figures. It can
be seen that while the Congress won an overwhelming majority of seats
both at the Centre and in most of the States, its performance in terms of
votes was less impressive. Neither in the elections for the House of the
People nor in those for the State legislatures—except one, Saurashtra—
did it succeed in securing an absolute majority of votes. In the absence
of multi-number constituencies this result is, of course, not surprising;
it was very easy for Congress to top the poll, but the total votes against
it, divided among several parties, were generally greater than those for it.
The discrepancy between seats and votes in the case of the Socialists and
Communists has a different explanation. The Socialists put up many can-
didates and in consequence gathered votes but few seats; the Com-
munists put up fewer candidates and concentrated on areas where they
7—p.i.
98 THE C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

were already strong. It can be seen, too, that a substantial proportion of

votes—rather more in State elections than in those for the Centre—
were dispersed over a number of small parties and independent candi-
dates. The election was an invitation to political adventure and no one
could be quite certain that it would not be worth while. Some consolida-
tion has already taken place since the election and more can be expected
as issues become clarified and experience is acquired. A map showing
how the parties fared in different parts of India 1 discloses readily the
Communist strength in the south and in west Bengal. It also shows, less
emphatically, the influence of the Socialists in the north-central States.
Analysis of statistics will not, however, tell us much about what the
election meant to 'the average voter'. Most observers seem to be agreed
that candidates were surprised to find such lively and intelligent interest
on the part of apparently uneducated people. There appears to be little
doubt, too, that the vote for Congress was not merely a vote of thanks
for past glories and not merely a vote of loving trust in Pandit Nehru
and the party of Gandhiji—though both these were important—but also
a vote for the only party that could look for a moment capable of form-
ing a reasonably stable and competent government. A t the same time,
this does not dispose of the doubt that votes may have been cast for
quite other reasons. N o r does the fact that the real challenge to the
Congress came evidently from the left rather than from the communal
parties rule out the possibility that caste and community played a big
part. One Indian political commentator went so far as to say that the
votes were quite meaningless because the popular mentality was still
authoritarian. This is clearly exaggerated, but how far and in what ways
did the loyalties that emerge from the social structure affect the voting?
The material for a thorough answer to this question simply does not
exist. It can be said without question that in certain areas votes went
where local landlords wanted them to g o ; this seems to have been par-
ticularly true of Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat. Again, certain regional
parties were openly based on caste lines; thus, the Tamilnad Toilers'
Party and Commonweal Party in Madras were based almost entirely on
non-Brahmin sentiment in that State,2 while the victory of the Jharkhand
Party in Bihar was acknowledged as a victory for the organised tribal
Adibasis. It appears too that not much sense can be made of the Con-
gress Party's own internal difficulties in, for instance, Bihar, unless
account is taken of caste factors. But caste is an iceberg; for the portion

1 Such a map is given in the Election Commission's R e p o r t (pp. cit.).

2 Even within the Congress Party in Madras, Brahmin and anti-Brahmin feelings
account f o r a very great deal o f internal disagreement. It is presumed that a gain in anti-
Brahmin strength within Congress during 1953-54 helped to persuade no fewer than 12 o f
the 19 Tamilnad Toilers' Party members in the Madras Assembly to cross over to the
Congress benches in December 1954.
 THE ELECTION OF PARLIAMENT 99
that is visible is much less than the part that is hidden. Two propositions
can fairly safely be put forward. First, in most constituencies there was
some voting which was decisively influenced by caste and communal
loyalties; a Muslim or a Christian or a Nair or a Brahmin would, that is
to say, attract votes by virtue of his community or caste alone. 1 Second,
in most areas there were 'group leaders' of one kind or another in a
position to command and offer the votes of their followers. Such group
leaders might be village headmen or membeis of a caste panchayat,
trade union officials or slum bosses.
Even when this has been said, the implications are not very clear. It
would be incorrect, for example, to suppose that all such caste or group
voting is blind or morally corrupting. In the best cases, it could in effect
be a kind of indirect election in which the responsibility of the repre-
sentative to interests in his constituency is more firmly ensured than
might otherwise be possible. A group leader may be able to represent to
a member of an Assembly the grievances and needs of his followers
more effectively than they could themselves. Such a position is no doubt
always open to corruption and is in any case far from the ideal of a
vision of the common good grasped alike by voter and representative.
On this, perhaps two comments suffice. One is that studies of elections
in politically advanced countries have in recent years destroyed some
illusions as to the extent to which such an ideal can be reached with adult
franchise. The second is that the range of a person's vision is limited by
general conditions of life and education as much as by sectional loyalties
and that an attack concentrated wholly on the latter is likely to be mis-
placed. In any event, the Indian electorate did not betray the 'act of
faith' of its leaders. No doubt there were the cases where superstitions
became entangled in politics and peasant women wanted to garland
ballot boxes as if they were idols. No doubt personalities and prejudices
played an enormous part in the making of decisions—and no doubt
'making a decision' is a euphemism for the process in many cases.
Nevertheless, the idea of a free choice penetrated downwards into layers
of society which were hitherto unfamiliar with the idea and the political
parties were educated in the politics of independence. The election was
influenced by the domination of sectional visions, but the very holding of
the elections may have been an important influence in the direction of
widening those visions.

1
Allegations that Congress 'exploited' caste loyaliies need not be taken too seriously.
All parties paid some attention to these factors in selecting candidates. In the A n d h r a
elections of 1954 it was reliably reported that even the Communist Party was careful t o
work among certain castes only by means of party members drawn from those castes. It
was further said that many who knew that their 'interests' pointed in one direction still
voted in another in obedience to caste sympathy.
 100 T H E C O M I N G OF PARLIAMENT

TABLE I I — 1 9 5 1 - 5 2 ELECTION RESULTS

(a) House of the People

Party No. of Candi- Seats Won Votes Polled % of Total

dates Votes
Congress 479 364 47,665,875 45
Communist 49 16 3,484,401 3-3
Socialist 256 12 11,216,779 10-6
K.M.P. 146 9 6,156,558 5-8
Jan Sangh . 93 3 3,246,288 31
Other Parties 327 44 17,395,845 16-4
Independents 524 41 16,778,749 15-8
1,874 489 105,944,495 100

( c ) STATE

Congress Socialists Communists K.M.P.

Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes
PART ' A ' STATES

Assam . 76 1,075,331 4 325,690 1 69,431 1 146,7921

Bihar . 240 3,951,148 23 1,737,466 — 108,671 1 273,911
Bombay 269 5,556,334 9 1,330,246 1 159,994 — . 559,492
Madhya Pradesh . 194 3,281,983 2 660,883 — 24,460 8 216,12Ì
Madras 152 6,998,667 13 1,312,703 62 2,591,341 35 1,793,629
Orissa . 67 1,428,414 10 432,731 7 206,757 — 16,948
Punjab . 96 1,830,601 — 224,608 4 251,713 — —

Uttar Pradesh 390 8,032,455 19 2,032,594 — 155,869 •1 954,196

Bengal . 150 2,897,881 215,385 28 800,951 15 667,445
PART ' B ' STATES

Hyderabad . 93 2,162,759 11 592,071 4,047

Madhya Bharat 75 938,919 4 145,843 — 39,600 — 6,510
Mysore 74 1,276,318 3 240,390 1 25,116 8 391,653
PEPSU. 26 376,297 .— 17,480 2 86,191 1 15,613
Rajasthan 82 1,286,953 1 136,464 — 17,181 1 16,411
Saurashtra 55 606,934 2 34,728 — 7,791 .— 30,907
Travancore-Cochin 44 1,204,364 11 485,194 — — — —

PART ' C ' STATES

Ajmer . 20 101,441 1,094 3,494 ,

Bhopal . 25 117,656 — 1,744 .— — — —

Coorg . 15 48,945 .— — — 1,386 — —

Delhi . 39 271,812 2 12,396 — 2,591 .— 13,646

Himachal Pradesh . 24 85,079 — 2,664 .—. — 3 26,471
Vindhya Pradesh . 40 272,255 11 128,787 — — 3 111,825
Kutch . 28 72,834 — 4,462 — . — . — —

Manipur 10 37,448 1 9,196 2 5,298 — —

Tripura 9 36,167 — — 12 55,603 — —

Total 2,293 43,928,995 126 10,084,869 162 4,613,438 77 5,306,219

F O R NOTES TO THIS TABLE SEE p. 102.

 THE ELECTION OF PARLIAMENT 101

(b) Council of State (indirectly from State Legislatures)

Party Seats Won

NOTES :
Congress 146
Communist . 9 (a) The size of the Council has
Socialist 6 been increased to 219 since the
K.M.P. 4 creation of Andhra in 1953.
Jan Sangh . 1 - (b) The figure of 216 here in-
Other Parties and cludes the 12 nominees of the
Independents 50 President and the 4 nominees
from Kashmir.
Total . 216

LEGISLATURES

Jan Sangh Others Independent Total

Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes
PART ' A ' STATES

7,191 9 161,963 14 662,492 105 2,448,890 Assam

— 113,234 53 1,500,749 13 1,863,661 330 9,548,840 Bihar
— 4,876 18 1,594,726 18 1,917,574 325 11,123,242 Bombay
— 249,899 5 660,188 23 1,852,452 232 7,006,588 Madhya Pradesh
— 8,216 51 2,543,516 62 4,749,184 375 19,997,256 Madras
— — 35 769,675 21 822,521 140 3,677,046 Orissa
— 277,616 22 1,211,643 4 1,182,408 126 4,978,589 Punjab
2 1,066,714 4 1,241,489 14 3,275,310 430 16,758,627 Uttar Pradesh
9 417,879 20 806,285 16 1,638,399 238 7,444,225 Bengal
PART ' B ' STATES

2,328 57 1,675,201 14 742,187 175 5,178,593 Hyderabad

4 193,627 13 404,755 3 258,156 99 1,987,410 Madhya Bharat
.— 62,118 2 61,606 11 696,667 99 2,753,868 Mysore
2 37,494 21 401,678 8 419,725 60 1,354,478 PEPSU
8 193,532 33 714,723 35 896,178 160 3,261,442 Rajasthan
•— 4,346 1 191,129 2 75,624 60 951,509 Saurashtra
— — 16 557,080 37 1,151,555 108 3,398,193 Travancore-Cochin

PART ' C ' STATES

3 28,612 3 15,781 4 84,366 30 234,788 Ajmer

— 11,135 1 43,939 4 51,746 30 226,220 Bhopal
.— — .— — 9 37,716 24 88,047 Coorg
5 114,207 1 24,142 1 82,922 48 521,766 Delhi
.— 6,212 1 11,924 8 47,433 36 179,783 Himachal-Pradesh
2 67,330 2 43,702 2 57,900 60 681,799 Vindhya Pradesh
— — — — 2 38,116 30 115,412 Kutch
— — 16 79,283 1 8,105 30 139,330 Manipur
— — 3 28,996 6 7,886 30 128,652 Tripura
35 2,866,566 345 14,744,173 332 22,620,333 3,370 104,184,593 Total
102 THE COMING OF PARLIAMENT

N O T E S TO T A B L E II.

(i) The Communists in Travancore-Cochin contested as Independents and combining

with other Left groups in a United Front of Leftists secured 32 seats. In Hydera-
bad, their label was Peoples' Democratic Front which won 42 seats.
(ii)The 30 member bodies in Kutch, Manipur and Tripura are not legislatures
but only electoral colleges chosen to select members for the central Parliament.
(iii)The number of seats in the Assam Assembly is 108, but in three constituencies
no nomination papers were filed and no members chosen.
 CHAPTER THREE

THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

1. The Balance of Power

N
OT the most interesting but certainly the first necessary question
to ask of a legislature is—who controls it ? This in turn must nor-
mally entail an account of the party allegiance of its members.
The position of the parties in the central Parliament following the elec-
tions of 1951-52 have already been set out above. 1 The outstanding
features of the party pattern of both Houses can be listed shortly: first,
the overwhelmingly dominant position of Congress; second, the very
divided character of the opposition groups; finally, the comparatively
large number of members returned as Independents and members of
local parties of one kind or another. Nothing has happened since 1952
to remove any of these features, but the latter two have in some measure
been modified.
By-elections account for little change. Of 19 by-elections which took
place up to the end of 1953, Congress retained 10 of the 14 seats it pre-
viously held and failed to capture any of the other 5. All its 4 losses
were gains to the Praja Socialist Party. This party also gained in terms of
votes—as did the Communist Party—and both did so at the expense of
parties other than Congress. 2
More important were the changes affected by movements of parties
and groups without reference to the electorate. Of these, the most note-
worthy was the coming together of the Socialist Party and Kripalani's
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, formed of dissident Congressmen in May
1951.3 The two parties had fought the election separately, but as soon as
the first session of the new Parliament began in May 1952 they decided
to establish a parliamentary alliance. The objects may at first have been
limited to securing parliamentary time and concerting lines of criticism in
1 Pp. 100-101.
2
As compared with the General Election, the percentage of total votes polled by the
different parties showed the following trends: the Congress proportion remained steady,
falling only f r o m 48-4% to 48-3%; that of the P.S.P. rose f r o m 16-4% to 24-6% and that of
the Communists from 1-9% to 7-3%; the communal parties (Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh
and R a m Rajya Parishad) lost ground f r o m 7-1% to 3%; so also did the other parties, f r o m
7-9% to 4%, and the Independents, f r o m 18-3% to 12-8% (figures taken f r o m Indian
National Congress, Report of the General Secretaries, Jan. 1953-Jan. 1954).
3 Kripalani, a former Congress President, had attempted to content himself and others
with a Democratic Front within the Congress, formed in 1950; by early 1951, it was clear
that this was not enough.
103
104 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

debate, but further negotiations soon led to a complete merger of the

two organisations on a nation-wide basis both inside the legislatures and
in the country as a whole; the Praja Socialist Party was set up in August
of the same year. The eifect was to give a markedly greater coherence to
the non-Communist opposition. This remains true in spite of the fact
that the merger added a further element to the already imperfectly
united Socialist Party leadership.1 In the House of the People, certainly,
the merger was an asset to the opposition and to the House itself. As
leader in Parliament, Kripalani brought with him considerable personal
prestige and status as well as capacity as a speaker—though admittedly
of platform rather than parliamentary style. Asoka Mehta's entry into
the House through a by-election in 1954 should have provided the P.S.P.
group with other qualities required in leadership.
At the time when the K.M.P. and Socialists effected their initial par-
liamentary alliance to the left of Congress, an attempt was also made to
bring about greater coherence of the right-wing elements. This attempt
not only failed to develop into a general merger in the country as a
whole; it has hardly been able to maintain itself in the House. The initia-
tor of the grouping was Dr. S. P. Mukherjee, leader of the Jan Sangh, a
new party hurriedly formed in 1951 following Dr. Mukherjee's resigna-
tion from the Cabinet and his dissatisfaction with the Hindu Mahasabha.
He formed a group in the House of the People called the National De-
mocratic Party. Its core was composed of the members of the Jan Sangh
and Hindu Mahasabha, but it was able to attract a number of right-
wing, primarily local parties such as Ram Rajya Parishad and some in-
dependents. At one time, in mid-1952, it may have numbered about 30.
Towards the end of that year, however, it partly disintegrated when
some of the independents found they could no longer follow Dr.
Mukherjee's policy of hostility towards Pakistan. Dr. Mukherjee's death
in 1953 not only removed an outstanding parliamentarian but seriously
prejudiced the chances of a coherent rightist group. Mr. N. C. Chatterjee,
an able Supreme Court advocate and member of the Hindu Mahasabha,
has to some extent taken his place, but has not been able to rally the
same measure of support.
1
The post-independence Socialist Party had a triumvirate leadership: Jaiprakash
Narayan, the principal personality and formerly undisputed leader of the Congress
Socialist Party days, but now, as we have seen above (p. 39), having abandoned Marxism
for the Bhoodan philosophy and politics; Asoka Mehta, intellectual but also organiser,
feeling his way towards an anti-Communist doctrine of 'constructive opposition'; Ram
Manohar Lohia, individualist and even eccentric, following a doggedly middle line of no
compromise with either Congress or Communists. The merger with the K.M.P. added the
fourth leader, Acharya Kripalani. His Gandhian radicalism has not proved wholly un-
digestible since the socialist leaders were already in search of a philosophic alternative to
Marxism. The divergencies in the leadership which manifest themselves sharply from time
to time (as at the Nagpur Convention of the party in Dec. 1954, when Kripalani rather
wearily resigned the Chairmanship in favour of the socialist' elder s t a t e s m a n N a r e n d r a
Dev) would have been hardly less marked in the absence of the merger.
 THE BALANCE OF POWER 105
Towards the end of 1954, an attempt was made to create a parlia-
mentary group of the left large enough to command recognition by the
Speaker as the Opposition Party. 1 The initiative appears to have come
from small non-Communist parties of the left, but the P.S.P. was natur-
ally the largest element and Kripalani was chosen leader of the group.
They gave themselves the name ' Union of Socialists and Progressives',
but the Speaker was not convinced that they constituted a sufficiently
homogeneous and stable organisation to merit recognition as a party.
The group has, however, effected a futher integration of the non-Com-
munist left and it has provided a useful parliamentary organisation for
the tiny leftist groups and for some independents; it has claimed as
many as 41 members.
These groupings, then, have modified two of the main features of the
House as elected in 1952: the opposition is not quite as weak and un-
divided, nor is the number of unrelated local parties and unattached in-
dependents quite as large as the election returns alone could indicate.
This, however, scarcely affects the dominating position of the Congress
Party. The Government party has had to meet opposition arguments
and has had to state its case, but it has not had to face a challenge of
numbers. The record of the divisions in Parliament and the voting
figures (given in Appendix I V ) show two facts: first, the frequency of di-
visions in the House of the People has increased in comparison with the
relatively placid days of the Constituent Assembly and Provisional Par-
liament; but, secondly, the numerical strength of the opposition to the
Government has only once reached 100 in a House of 499 members. 2 I f
the Government Whips have been busy, the reasons must be sought
elsewhere than in the threat of defeat. 3
The post-1952 developments in the Upper House, the Council of
States, have been similar. The composition in 1952 has already been
given 4 and its features were those of the Lower House. The changes in
the Council since 1952 have taken place partly through elections. These
elections were not only by-elections as in the House of the People but
also regular elections provided under the Constitution. The Council of
States is not subject to dissolution; instead, one-third of its members re-
tire every two years.5 Since all the members of the Council of States in
1952 were newly elected, the retirement roster was introduced by ballot;
members were divided into three groups to hold their seats for two, four
and six years. The first elections accordingly took place in 1954. Of the
74 retiring members (4 of the 12 members nominated by the President
also had to retire), only 43 were returned. The party positions, however,
1 See below, p. 155, on the important question o f recognition.
2 M o s t o f the largest opposition votes have been recorded in the course o f the passage o f
Preventive Detention Bills.
3 Their work is described in Chapter I V .
4 P. 101. 5 See above, p. 90.
106 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

changed less than the personnel. Congress recorded 10 gains and 1 loss,
the net improvement of 9 reflecting the changed position in the State
Assemblies which constitute the electorate for the Council. 1
The changes in the groupings of Council members have been along
lines similar to those in the House. The formation of groups has, if any-
thing, been somewhat easier than in the House, since the Chairman of
the Council has proved rather less exacting in his demands for certain
qualifications of stability before granting recognition to groups. On the
other hand, the pressure to combine is less in the Upper House, simply
because it is the less important of the two chambers. Outside the Con-
gress and Communist Parties, groups do exist for the purposes of de-
manding parliamentary time and selecting themes and speakers. But the
composition of these groups is not constant and their influence outside
the Council negligible.
Movements in the balance of power have been more evident in State
Assemblies than at the Centre. Not only have election changes been
more radical; the realignment of members once elected is also more im-
portant (at least in the politically less mature States) than it is in Delhi.
For these reasons a brief review of the developments in some States will
at the same time serve conveniently to illustrate the influence of some
of the factors we noted in the first chapter on the working of parlia-
mentary democracy. In three States, Assemblies elected in 1952 were
dissolved and General Elections held again within three years. In
P.E.P.S.U., stable government had been made difficult by the delicate
balance of parties: in an Assembly of 60, Congress had 26 members, the
Akali (Sikh) Party 22, Communists 3, K.M.P. 1, Jan Sangh 1 and there
were 7 Independents. This unhopeful situation was at once aggravated
by the baffling inconstancy and inconsequence of Sikh politics in an
area of former princely states unaccustomed to parliamentary demo-
cracy. 2 At first, six Independents joined the Congress Party and, thus
strengthened, the party formed a ministry. It was not long, however,
before the farce began. On the very day when the ministry was formed,
five members deserted. Within a month, they were followed by four
1
T h e March 1956 elections resulted in even less alteration in party strengths in the
Council, the only noteworthy change being an increase of Communist Party representa-
tion by 2.
2
The peculiar quality of Sikh politics has nowhere been exhaustively examined, but it
seems probable that the tendency to extreme factionalism may owe something to the highly
developed and military clan organisation of the Sikhs in the eighteenth century, and even
m o r e to the need of the community f r o m its very inception to define itself in relation to
more than one bigger power. On these historical factors, see Khushwant Singh, The Sikhs
(1953). T h e author explains lucidly the development of factions among the Akalis in the
1920s: a split first took place on the attitude to be taken to the Government and a further
division, which cut across the first, arose out of different attitudes towards Congress
(pp. 115, 139). Even the Communist Party in the P u n j a b has been influenced by Sikh
factionalism (p. 147). This factionalism is reflected in ' t h e fiery confusion of thought so
prevalent among Sikh politicians' (p. 143).
 T H E B A L A N C E OF POWER 107
more—including a Minister—and the ministry resigned. Its place was
taken by a coalition led by the Akalis and given the name of United De-
mocratic Front. It soon became evident that the Front had little sub-
stance behind it, and that it could remain united only by interpreting
democracy in eccentric ways. It showed, above all, a marked shyness in
meeting the Assembly. The Constitution (Article 174) compels a meet-
ing at least every six months, and the session that was summoned in
November 1952 was one that could not well have been avoided. The
next best thing was to adjourn it quickly. Only a few days after the open-
ing of the session a little note passed from the Chief Minister to the
Speaker—and a further respite was gained. A month later it was the
Speaker who took the initiative, calling the Assembly without consult-
ing the Minister. The Government was, however, equal to the occasion;
on the eve of the meeting two members of the opposition were sworn in
as Minister and Deputy Minister, a no-confidence motion was defeated
and the Assembly again adjourned and subsequently prorogued. Mean-
while, the Election Tribunal was examining the unusually heavy crop of
election petitions which had been filed in P.E.P.S.U. The seats of no less
than 23 of the 60 members were in question. Moreover, of 17 petitions
decided upon by early 1953, as many as 9 were upheld. The effect on
government stability was made all the greater, because out of the 6
members of the Council of Ministers 3 were among the unseated, while
a petition was still pending against another. It was in these circumstances
that a Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution
was issued in March 1953.1 Under this order (originally for six months
and later extended by Parliament for a further six months) the functions
of government in the State were assumed by the Centre, the State bud-
gets came before the Union Parliament and the administration in the
State was afforded an opportunity to recover. From the elections of
February 1954 an unambiguous pattern emerged. Congress won 37 of
the 60 seats, the Communists gained 1 to give them 4, the Independents
remained with a strength of 7, while the Jan Sangh and P.S.P. disap-
peared. The Akalis, who had enjoyed a lively series of internal disputes,
entered the fight in two halves, Right- and Left-wing; they split their
votes and secured only 12 seats between them. 2

1
A not unfair review of events was given by D r . K . N . Katju, Union H o m e Minister in
the debate on the Proclamation, House of the People, 12 March 1953.
2
In terms of votes, the increased support for Congress is clear, but it was at the expense
of parties other than the Akali:
1952 1954
Congress . 395,750 702,077
Akali . . 317,502 (Right) 324,699
(Left) 120,210
Independents . 369,294 336,485
Communists . 33,235 96,697
Others . . 238,674 33,737
108 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

General Elections were also held in Travancore-Cochin during

February 1954. The position after the elections of 1952 did not appear as
unstable as in P.E.P.S.U. In an Assembly of 109, Congress secured only
45 seats. To this number, however, it was thought reasonable to add for
all intents and purposes the 8 members of the Travancore Tamil-Nad
Congress and a sufficient number of Independents. Here, however, the
force of regional tension showed itself as powerful an unsettling factor
as Sikh communal politics in P.E.P.S.U. The T.T.N.C. is a section of
Congressmen whose only difference with the party arises from its sup-
port for the separation of the southern Tamil-speaking districts from
the Malayalam-speaking remainder of the State and their merger with
Madras. Their leader was given a place in the State Cabinet, but the
tussle within the party continued; while the T.T.N.C. insisted on its
own organisation outside the Assembly, other sections of the party
strove to absorb it into the main body. The problem was considered im-
portant enough to merit the attention of the Congress Working Com-
mittee, but the appeal of that body that the matter should be put into
cold storage until the whole problem of reorganisation of States came to
be examined was not seriously listened to. In September 1953 the
T.T.N.C. leader resigned from the Cabinet, and a few days later his
party voted with the (primarily Communist) opposition to defeat the
Government. The Chief Minister advised the Rajpramukh to dissolve
the Assembly, and he continued in office until the elections were held.1
The defeat of the Government, though caused by the intrusion of a re-
gional tension, was followed by open and angry discussions among
Congressmen.2 The Government was accused of clinging to office and
lowering the prestige of the party, and there were allegations of malad-
ministration. Whatever substance these charges had, behind them were
often different thoughts. On the part of some leading party persona-
lities, there was simple disappointment and annoyance that since 1952
there had been not even one Cabinet change—so that they had remained
excluded from office. The private resentment of a few, however, requires
for its support a more general dissatisfaction; this was to hand in the
shape of growing Hindu irritation at the increasing influence in the Tra-
vancore-Cochin Congress of the now prosperous Christian community.
If still more was required to furnish ground for dissension, there was
also the continuous difficulty of keeping the Cochin and Travancore
1
This course of events was violently criticised by the Left, which argued that a Govern-
ment could have been formed of the opposition groups and that the Rajpramukh should
therefore have sent for the Leader of the opposition. British precedents were freely quoted
on both sides and appeals were made across the straits to Ceylon, where Sir Ivor Jennings
was invited to pronounce a judgment. The composition of the opposition was in fact very
mixed, and it is unlikely that a stable government could have been formed.
2
One report (Times of India, 13 Oct.) spoke o f ' wild accusations flung through the news-
papers whose columns are filled with statements and counter-statements often of the nature
of personal attacks'.
 THE B A L A N C E OF POWER 109
wings of the State—and the Party—contented. 1 The Congress thus en-
tered the election contest in a weakened condition, and even the ener-
getic contribution of Pandit Nehru to the local campaign failed to
enable the party to improve its position. Its proportion of the votes
remained almost the same and it won 45 seats in an Assembly now of
118 members. Among the other parties, however, it had no likely allies.
The Government at once resigned and a period of busy negotiation and
active speculation followed. Apart from Congress's 45 seats, the Com-
munists emerged 2 with 23, the P.S.P. with 19, the T.T.N.C. with 12, the
Revolutionary Socialist Party with 9, and there were 9 Independents.
The general expectation was that a leftist government would be formed
with Congress in opposition. This belief was based on the election ar-
rangement made between the P.S.P. and the Communist-led United
Front of Leftists; both seemed to have made it clear that the Congress
was the main enemy. 3 Yet although the U.F.L. offered to serve under a
P.S.P. Chief Minister, and although there was much sentiment in the
P.S.P. which favoured such a Leftist government, the outcome of dis-
cussions between the local P.S.P. and the National Executive of the
party was different: the P.S.P. undertook, with its 19 members, to form
a government alone, and with Congress support was able to do so. This
Government proved stable; more, it showed itself to be capable, ener-
getic and honest. It courageously refused to think or act in communal
or regional terms and as a result won much respect in all regions and
communities. 4 At the same time, it must be admitted that if the Com-
munists, as the next largest single party after Congress, had been in-
vited to form a government they might well have been able to do so—
with the support of some P.S.P. members, who would thus have split
1 The two formerly separate princely states were merged in 1949, and centuries of inde-
pendent existence were not quickly forgotten. In Sept. 1951, 30 members of the Assembly
f r o m Cochin constituencies had resigned because the Cabinet contained no representatives
of that area.
2
The word is peculiarly appropriate; they had had to fight the 1952 elections under the
label of Independents.
3
It was later alleged by the Communists that the initiative for the alliance came wholly
f r o m the P.S.P., that the Communists stood down in favour of the P.S.P. and presented
them with several safe seats and that the alliance was clearly understood to be a prelude to
a Left Coalition Government.
4 This is not to say that it was able to keep the T.T.N.C. quiet. On the contrary, that body
became especially active in its attempts to impress the States Reorganisation Committee
with the justice of its demand for a merger of the Tamil districts of Travancore-Cochin
with Madras. In Aug. 1954, the P.S.P. Government was faced with a temporary but quite
serious law and order problem arising out of the violent f o r m taken by the agitation—said
to be the result of the Communist Party having taken over the direction f r o m the T . T . N . C .
who had stirred u p feelings they were unable to control. In any event, the police opened
fire in several areas and at least four persons were killed. T h a t a Socialist Government
should use the police to fire on the people caused grave heart-searchings in the P.S.P. At a
special party convention at N a g p u r in Dec. 1954, a resolution declaring it unnecessary for
the P.S.P. Government in Travancore-Cochin to resign on account of the firing was
carried only by 303 votes against 217; and this in spite of the finding of a judicial inquiry
that the firing was 'just and p r o p e r ' .
110 THE HOUSE A N D THE MEMBER

their party. In any case, the P.S.P. Government did not last long. The
Congress Party in the State became restive—partly because of proposed
measures of radical land reforms—and asked the Party's Parliamentary
Board in Delhi to permit them to withdraw support from the Govern-
ment. The Board in December 1954 gave them permission to oppose any
measure they thought undesirable, but warned them to consider care-
fully before taking steps which might lead to President's Rule. The local
Congress Party did 'consider carefully'; it refrained from challenging
the Government until the assembly members of the Tamil-Nad Travan-
core Congress imprisoned for their violent agitation1 were released. It
then secured 60 votes (out of the 118) for a motion of no confidence, and
promptly accepted an invitation to form a government in February
1955. This Government was no stronger than its 1952 predecessor: it
rested on 46 Congress votes, 12 of the unreliable T.T.N.C., and 2 or 3
former P.S.P. members (including the Speaker) who resigned from their
party. 2
The affairs of Madras also repay examination. The General Elections
had failed to give Congress an absolute majority, and the other seats
were divided among several parties and several Independents. In an
Assembly of 375, Congress had 152, Communists 62 and P.S.P. 48.
Other parties accounted for 51 and there were no less than 62 Indepen-
dents—both largely due to the importance of caste sentiments. In the
event, Congress was able to form a government; Mr. C. Rajagopala-
chariar, for whom no task was too difficult,3 was prevailed upon to
abandon once more any thought of retirement, was conveniently nomi-
nated by the Governor to the Upper House of the State and from that
position managed to secure the support of an adequate number of In-
dependents. With the formation of Andhra in October 1953, Madras was
partitioned, and with it its Legislative Assembly. 140 seats were trans-
ferred to form the new Andhra Assembly. In the new diminished Madras
Assembly, Congress still had no absolute majority, but its position was
certainly eased by the departure of the bulk of the Communists. At the
same time, this only gave greater freedom of movement to caste factions
and personal rivalries.4
These difficulties in Madras were, however, insignificant by compari-
son with those encountered over the new border in Andhra. In the
Assembly of 140, Congress had only 46 seats and were confronted by
1
See previous note.
2
It lasted just a year and fell in March 1956, apparently because of the defection of six
discontented members of the Congress Party.
3
He was the first Indian Governor-General following the departure of Lord Mount-
batten in 1948, and subsequently held the position of Union Home Minister during the
somewhat troubled pre-election years 1950-51.
i Their opportunities were further increased by the probably final retirement of 'C.R.'
in early 1954. See also above, p. 98, n. 2.
 THE B A L A N C E OF POWER 111

45 Communists. The P.S.P. numbered 16; while there was a K.M.P.

rump of 6 which had not been able to swallow the merger of the two
parties. 14 members belonged to the Krishikar Lok Party, a peasant
party formed in 1951 round the person of Professor Ranga, 2 repre-
sented the Scheduled Castes Federation and 11 were Independents. In-
tricate negotiations culminated in the formation of a Congress coalition
ministry. Its Chief Minister was the leader of the P.S.P., but he resigned
from the party on accepting the office. The P.S.P. group itself split, 10
supporting the ministry, 6 going into opposition with the blessing of the
party's national executive. When the Government met the Assembly in
November 1953, it appeared to have a voting strength of 80. On the
election of a Speaker, it won by the comfortable margin of 86 to 48. The
unpredictable character of party alignments did not, however, take long
to reveal itself; on the following day the ministerial candidate for the
Deputy Speakership secured 59 votes only against his opponent's 76.
The brief ten-day session produced a series of unusual events: the
K.M.P. rump of 6 dissolved itself, but one member opposed the decision
and remained independently K.M.P., while the others became simply
Independents; the crucial voting on the location of Andhra's capital got
lost in the sands of several amendments; the K.L.P. group though con-
sidered attached to the ministry by the holding of one portfolio in prac-
tice voted in a rather wayward manner, the Deputy Chief Minister being
constrained to remark that some of the legislators 'remain with the
opposition in the morning and with the Government in the evening'; on
the last day of the session the Government's dismay was completed by
a 'snap' division by which an amendment was passed halving the
Ministers' salaries. The Government was able to survive also the second
short session of the Assembly in January 1954—and this in spite of the
resignation from the Cabinet of the K.L.P. representative on the capital
question. Press comment consequently began to speak about stability
being assured. The 'wonderland' appearance of Andhra politics was,
however, made once more amply evident during the May 1954 session.
On the rousing Prohibition issue, on which Congress is committed, a
Communist amendment for its abolition was carried; although this was,
in the Andhra context, a matter of high policy and the defeat conse-
quently serious, the Government simply announced that it would 'treat
the resolution as recommendatory and not implement it'. On a number
of occasions initiative passed out of the Government's hands and the
Opposition was in effective control; a measure to establish a new uni-
versity was in its passage changed almost out of recognition, the
ministry being powerless to resist a long series of Communist amend-
ments and actually suffering defeat on the two occasions when it tested
its strength. The P.E.P.S.U. Government in 1952 avoided defeat by
avoiding the Assembly; the Andhra Government in 1954 accepted
112 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

defeat but ignored it. The state of bliss was brought to an end by the
Proclamation on 15 November 1954 of President's Rule, following
the defeat of the Government on a motion of censure by 69 votes to 68.
The Assembly was dissolved and fresh elections held in February 1955.
In these, Congress was successful and a stable government was formed. 1
Consideration of the three awkward cases of P.E.P.S.U., Travancore-
Cochin and Andhra serves to illustrate the unsettling power of person-
nel, caste and regional factions. It may also have shown how the
conventions of parliamentary government are on occasion imperfectly
understood, here by a government, there by its critics. Since, however,
the three States are admittedly far from typical, the examination of their
post-election politics fails to give a useful guide to general trends. For
these we may inspect by-election results of the 144 contests for State
Assembly seats between the General Elections and the end of 1953. 74
were Congress seats and of these 45 were retained and 29 lost. Of the
remaining 70 non-Congress seats, the party captured 29, its position re-
maining on balance the same. Of the 29 seats which Congress lost, no
less than 15 went to the P.S.P., only 2 to the Communists, 5 to com-
munal parties and 7 to Independents. This, taken alone, would suggest
a consolidation of P.S.P. as Opposition. Reference to the voting figures,
however, alters this impression considerably: only Congress and the
Communists were able to poll a greater percentage of total votes than
they had polled for their seats in the General Elections; moreover, only
the Communists were able actually to increase their total poll for these
seats.2 The only firm conclusions that may be drawn from by-election re-
sults appear to be the continued power of Congress, the increased sup-
port for the Communists and the steady reduction in the numbers of
Independents. Changes in party alignments in State Assemblies—other
than those caused by by-elections—are not especially marked, but they do
at least confirm the threat to the Independents. Its reality is appreciated

1
In the debate on the Presidential Proclamation in the House of the People (20 Nov.
1954), the Communists claimed that they could have formed a stable ministry and should
have been invited to do so. The P.S.P. also said that an attempt ought to have been made
to find alternative government. The Union Government spokesman defended the tem-
porary imposition of President's Rule on the ground that there was sufficient evidence
that no stable alternative government could be formed; he refused a request to publish
the State Governor's confidential report to the President on which action had been based;
he admitted that it would be normal parliamentary practice for a defeated ministry to
carry on until a new one was appointed, but said that this required a common under-
standing, as yet underdeveloped, between the political parties.
2
As for the elections to the Centre discussed already (p. 103), the figures are from Indian
National Congress, Report of the General Secretaries, Jan. 1953-Jan. 1954. The percentage
figures show the following trends between 1952 and 1954: Congress, rise from 37-7% to
45-3% and Communists from 6-6% to 12-6%; P.S.P., fall from 17% to 15-4%, communal
parties from 5-9% to 4-8% and Independents from 22-3% to 11-7%. The figures for the
number of votes show a Communist increase of nearly 150,000 whereas all others polled
less than for those seats in 1952—P.S.P. nearly 200,000 less, Congress over 50,000 less,
Communal parties 86,000 less and Independents over 500,000 less.
 THE MEMBERS 113
by many Independent members who have accepted membership of
the parties. Whether the motive has been hope for office and favour in
the present or for election support in future is not always clear, but the
trend is unmistakable. In Assam, for example, though there was only
one by-election, Congress members in 1954 numbered 89 compared with
76 in 1952, while the Independents had shrunk from 14 to 9 and other
parties lost 8. In Orissa, Congress gained two seats in by-elections but
its strength in the Assembly rose from 67 to 75, the Independents again
being reduced correspondingly.
The way in which parliamentary democracy works depends far more
than we may like to admit on the balance of power between political
parties. The inaugural period of parliamentary institutions in India has
been presided over by one overwhelmingly powerful party. Perhaps the
most important single fact about the elections of 1952—apart from the
achievement of holding them—was that they gave Congress an absolute
majority in both houses of the Union Parliament and in 18 out of 22
State Assemblies. It was well that it was thus. Nothing would have made
the future of democratic institutions in India more uncertain than an
initial period of unstable government. Even the few cases of unstable
regimes may have been useful if they underlined the main lesson. Such
trends as can be discerned do not lead to the supposition that this posi-
tion will quickly pass away. Of course, the personal influence of Pandit
Nehru is so great that if he were to withdraw his leadership from the
party, its continued unity would then indeed be uncertain. Even the
form of such a withdrawal would do much to determine the form of dis-
unity. A simple withdrawal from the political scene would probably lead
only to graver personal and other tensions in the party, whereas a de-
liberate attempt to move to the left would probably lead to a split in the
party very largely on policy lines.1 In the meantime, with stability
assured, attention is free to concentrate on the growth of a coherent and
responsible opposition. The weak and divided character of the opposi-
tion at the Centre and in most States has changed little and shows few
signs of changing more. The K.M.P.-Socialist merger has helped matters
somewhat, but the new P.S.P. is not yet a powerful magnet, and to see
in it an alternative government still requires faith rather than political
observation. The Communists are growing in strength but they can find
no allies. The communal parties have fallen further since their thorough
defeat in 1952, and the death in 1953 of Dr. S. P. Mukherjee, the creator
and leader of the Jan Sangh, removed the one man who might have been
able to transform these parties into a coherent nationalist conservative

1
The talks between N e h r u and P.S.P. leaders early in 1953 are supposed to have related
t o a possible coalition. The only terms acceptable to the P.S.P. were such as would prob-
ably have led to a split in Congress and perhaps the breaking away of a substantial con-
servative wing. Nehru was evidently not prepared at that time to risk so much.
8—P.i.
114 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

party. The only gain in opposition coherence has come and will continue
to come from the gradual disappearance of most of the small local
parties and Independents.

2. The Members
One of the first published comments on the social and occupational
composition of Indian legislatures was made by the authors of the
Montagu-Chelmsford Report. They had made a study of the Councils
under the Morley-Minto reforms and discovered that the legal profes-
sion was gaining ground, somewhat at the expense of the landowners.
In the Indian Legislative Councils of 1909, 1912 and 1916, lawyers con-
stituted 37%, 26% and 33% respectively of the total elected element. In
the Provincial Councils their proportion was found to be 38%, 46% and
48% for the same years. Moreover these figures did not tell the whole
story. So many of the ' constituencies' were ' special' ones restricted to
specific groups; if these were excluded, the proportion of lawyers reached
as much as 70%. The authors of the Report admitted that there was
nothing very surprising or unusual in this, but they nevertheless felt that
the political predominance of the lawyers was 'clearly not in the in-
terests of the general community'. 1 They concluded that steps should be
taken to ensure the election of other occupational groups. The separate
electorates and reserved seats which we have seen to be characteristic of
Indian legislatures in the British period were mainly the consequence of
regarding Indian society as peculiarly divided, but it owed a little also
to this particular desire to arrange deliberately for an even representa-
tion of all classes.
The present legislators of India are not only chosen to represent
general territorial constituencies; they have been elected on an adult
franchise which constituted a five-fold increase in the electorate over
that under the 1935 Act. What kind of men are these new parliamen-
tarians ? What has been the influence of the introduction of adult fran-
chise ? Is there any appreciable difference between the members of the
two Houses of the central Parliament ? Or between members of Centre
and State legislatures ? Or as between the representatives of the different
parties ? An attempt is made in the following pages to present informa-
tion about members of Indian legislatures under four main headings:
age; education; previous legislative and local government experience;
i Montagu-Chelmsford Report, p. 72. T h e Report appears, however, to have been mis-
taken in believing that the predominance of lawyers was marked only after 1909. T h e muni-
cipality constituencies f r o m the beginning provided the lawyers with opportunities. D r .
Tinker (The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma, 1954,
p. 58 n.) has noticed that it was not the traditional landed proprietors but the new Wester-
nised professional classes who entered the municipalities and through them went on to the
Provincial Councils: ' O f the 43 members elected by municipalities f r o m 1892 to 1909,
40 were lawyers.'
 THE MEMBERS 115
1
and occupation. The material relates to four bodies. The Provisional
Parliament of 1950-52 was the continuation of the Constituent Assembly
which, since 1947, had been the Dominion Legislature. Its members
had been chosen in several ways. The majority had been elected from
the Provinces in July 1946 according to the method laid down in the
Cabinet Mission Plan—that is, indirectly and on a communal basis by
the elected members of provincial legislatures. Others, representing the
princely states, had joined at various intervals later, and of these many
were simply nominated by the rulers. The House of the People is directly
elected by adult franchise. The Council of States, except for 12 nomin-
ated members, is elected indirectly from the State legislatures. Finally,
Bombay Legislative Assembly is a Lower House of one of the larger and
more advanced States.
We may begin with an account of the ages of the members. Table III
shows the age composition of the four bodies:

TABLE III—AGE

Bombay Legis-
Provisional House of the Council of
lative Assembly
Parliament People, 1952 States, 1952
Age Group 1952

No. % No. V
/o No. % No. %
20-29 . 6 2 24 5 1 16 5
30-39 . 54 17 110 22 35 16 49 16
40^19 . 96 31 144 29 58 27 80 25
50-59 . 76 24 135 27 60 28 51 16
60-69 . 50 16 39 8 38 18 13 4
70-79 . 8 3 1 11 5 1
Not known . 23 7 46 9 13 6 115 M

Total . 313 100 499 100 216 100 325 100

NOTE: Ages are given as at 1952. Percentages, in this a n d suceeding tables, are to the
nearest whole n u m b e r .
1
The conclusions drawn are most tentative, since no claim can be made as to the com-
pleteness or accuracy of the material presented. It is based on a number of published col-
lected biographies: Provisional Parliament Who's Who (1951); House of the People Who's
Who (1952); Council of States Who's Who (1952); Bombay Legislature Directory (1953).
The information given in these books was supplied by the members in response to requests
from the Parliament Secretariat (in the case of the Bombay Directory, from the Bombay
Legislature Congress Party). The data is not complete in all cases and some members
failed altogether to supply material. Moreover the members were not answering the par-
ticular questions which here concern us; they have stressed their service to the national
movement through various bodies and (though this is now less marked) through prison
sentences. It has often been necessary therefore to make guesses, especially where 'occupa-
tion' was concerned. 'Occupation' is indeed a source of special difficulty. It is very com-
mon in India for a man to be engaged in several occupations at different stages of his life
and even at the same time. A member may describe himself as a lawyer, a journalist and
social worker, while at the same time indicating that he owns land and has considerable
business interests. Private information has sometimes rendered guesses unnecessary, but
not always.
116 THE H O U S E A N D THE MEMBER

If the first and second columns are compared with a view to assessing the
influence of adult franchise, it will be seen that while the group 40-49 is
still the most common, there has been a shift in favour of the younger
men. The established politicians—venerable members of the nationalist
movement and nominees of princely rulers alike—who still had a signi-
ficant place in the Provisional Parliament are present in reduced numbers
in the new Lower House; the percentage over 60 has shrunk from 19 to
8. The age composition of the indirectly elected Upper House, however,
remains very similar. The Council of States is not entirely a body of
elderly statesmen, but the over-60's account for 23% of the members
and the 50-59 group occupy a slightly more prominent place than that
of 40-49. Comparison of the State Assembly with the central legislature
is made less easy by the large number of unknowns in the former. If it is
assumed that their inclusion would make no big difference in the rela-
tion between the age groups, it can be said that the average age of State
legislators is probably a little lower than that of those at the Centre.1 It
is also somewhat lower than in State Assemblies before the advent of
adult franchise.2
Table IV gives information on the education of legislators.
TABLE IV—EDUCATION

Bombay Legis-
Provisional House of the Council of
lative Assembly,
Parliament People, 1952 States, 1952
1952

No. % No. % No. % No. %

Graduated
Abroad^ 39 12 45 9 35 16 4 1
Graduated in
India . 171 55 246 49 105 49 103 33
College (Inter-
mediate) 35 11 66 13 31 14 17 5
High School . 23 7 60 12 16 7 35 11
Middle School 4 1 7 1 4 2 31 10
Primary School 8 3 8 1 3 1 29 9
Religious
Education 4 . 11 4 16 3 8 4 1 —

Private Educa-
tion 9 3 8 1 6 3 1 — .

N o t known . 13 4 43 9 8 4 94 30

Total 313 100 499 100 216 100 315 100

In all four Houses there is a striking proportion of graduates. As

1 See below, p. 124 for Madras and p. 128 for Bombay City data which confirm this view.
2 See below, p. 128, for Bombay before 1952.
3 A small number of members, although not graduates, nevertheless received some of
their education abroad. They have not been shown separately, but are included under
'College' or 'High School'.
* Religious education means education in Hindu or Muslim institutions.
 THE MEMBERS 117
between the three central legislative bodies there is indeed little contrast;
only the rather high percentage of the present Upper House with over-
seas qualifications may be noted. The State Assembly, however, does
appear to be significantly different. The contrast is again handicapped
by the large number of members who gave no information, but in this
case it seems probable that their inclusion would have the effect, if any-
thing, of increasing the proportions of the less educated. It seems likely
that while the number of central legislators who are equipped with no
more than school education is in the neighbourhood of 10-15%, in the
case of the States it may be as high as one-third. Madras statistics given
below confirm this.
Reference has been made in the previous chapter to India's pre-inde-
pendence experience of parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary institu-
tions. This experience was decisive in persuading the makers of the
Constitution to choose this form rather than others, and it may be con-
sidered that the success or failure of parliamentary government in India
will depend in part on the extent to which this experience is being utilised
and communicated. The previous legislative experience of the present
members thus takes on a special significance. Legislators' experience of
local government may conveniently be considered at the same time—
especially in view of the fact that one of the important reasons for the
stimulation of democratic local government in India was the rulers'
belief that it constituted a sound training for the higher political responsi-
bilities.1 Both forms of experience are shown in the separate parts of
the next table:
TABLE V—PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF LEGISLATORS
(i) Legislative Experience

Provisional House of the Council of Bombay Legis-

Parliament Peo pie States lative Assembly

No. % No. /0 No. % No. %

Old Central
Assembly,
pre-1947 39 13 18 4 15 7 0 •—•

Constituent
Assembly—
Provisional
Pari. (1947-
52) . 108 22 34 16 1 —

State Legisla-
ture 82 26 124 25 79 37 58 18
N o Legislative
Experience . 207 66 280 56 123 57 182 58
N o t known . 3 1 26 5 4 2 74 23

Total 313 — 499 — 216 — 315 —

1
See Tinker, op. cit., p. 45.
i 18 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

(ii) Local Government Experience

Provisional House of the Council of Bombay Legis-

Parliament People States lative Assembly

No. % No. % No. % No. %

Municipality . 56 18 79 16 42 19 62 20
District Board 46 15 65 13 27 12 68 22
Panchayat 2 1 2 — 2 1 4 1
None 213 68 339 68 158 73 114 36
Not known . 3 1 26 5 4 2 74 23

Total 313 — 499 — 216 — 315 —

NOTE: The figures in each of these tables overlap to some extent: several members
have experience of both Centre and State legislatures, of both municipality and
district board.

The first part of the table shows that between half and two-thirds of
the legislators had no previous parliamentary experience. Among the
central legislators there is a small but certainly invaluable group with
previous experience of the old central assembly. A much larger group,
amounting to between a quarter and a third, bring with them some use-
ful experience of legislative work at the State level. There is no appreci-
able difference between the Lower and Upper Houses; some of the
members of the latter have gathered much experience, but the propor-
tions with no previous experience are practically the same. The State
legislators are not so well equipped; while it is not surprising that their
central experience is practically nil, it is worth noting that even the num-
ber with previous experience at the same level is less than one-fifth. (It is
fairly safe to guess that few of the 'not known' group have previous ex-
perience.) In general, it may perhaps be said that adult franchise, despite
its experimental nature, has succeeded in producing a reasonable
balance between the retention of experience and the admission of new
blood into political life. Considering the small size of the elected element
in the former Central Assembly, it is important that as many as 33 of its
members still have places in the present Parliament. In this, as in so
many other respects, India has reason to be thankful that her expedition
into independence, while certainly not less exciting and adventurous
than others, is one that has been better planned and better equipped
than most.
The extent to which local government experience finds its way into
the legislatures is perhaps less important but still of interest. Men like
Lord Ripon were convinced of the value of local government as a train-
ing ground for politicians. They were no doubt gratified when it hap-
pened that local government experience found an important place in the
first Councils—and indeed this result was in large measure guaranteed
 THE MEMBERS 119
by establishing municipalities as constituencies for the provincial in-
direct elections. Even after 1909 many members of the Legislative
Councils 'were men who had made their name in local government'. 1
The maintenance of this feature was subsequently somewhat prejudiced
by the policies of boycott and non-co-operation followed by the nationa-
list movement. Just as these policies may be said to have limited the use
made of parliamentary opportunities at the Centre and Provincial levels,
so they also at times kept able men away from local affairs. By the 1920s,
' local leaders gave their allegiance to the District Congress Committee
. . . and local government, instead of serving as a school of political
education, became a mere annexe to the national political stadium'. 2
Even so, however, local government experience is not negligible among
modern legislators, and it is unlikely that this experience is even mainly
restricted to the post-independence period. Between a quarter and one-
third of the members of Parliament have served an apprenticeship on
municipalities or District Boards. The State legislators are much more
rooted in local government politics; perhaps over half their number
come to State affairs from a district or municipality background. It may
also be noted that whereas in the Centre municipality (i.e. medium-sized
town and city) experience is rather more usual than district (i.e. small
country town) experience, the opposite is true of the State. In all cases,
the village panchayat is out of the picture; its members evidently stay in
the village. The deliberations on rural affairs and the legislation for rural
reconstruction are in other hands. It is tempting to wonder if any very
different result would have followed if the attempts in the Constituent
Assembly to introduce indirect elections based on panchayats had been
successful.
Table VI gives the interests and occupations of members.
The categories available to us often fail to give an indication of a
member's social position, and the ambiguity attached to ' L a n d ' is par-
ticularly unfortunate. What is clear is that the professions are in all cases
important and account for over half the members of Parliament. Within
that group lawyers of course predominate. Also remarkable—and per-
haps especially characteristic of India—is the size of the group which
can only be described as engaged in social or political work. This feature
is related to the family system in India, and these mainly non-earning
persons are no doubt dependent on income from other members of the
family engaged in business or, even more likely, in agriculture. Further
comment on this table is unnecessary, except to point out that there is
no evident and certain contrast in occupational composition to be
found between the four bodies; as far as the evidence shows, the com-
position remains much the same whether it is State or Centre, before or
1 Tinker, op. cit., p. 89.
2 Ibid., p. 161.
120 THE HOUSE A N D THE MEMBER

TABLE VI—OCCUPATION OF LEGISLATORS

Provisional House of the Council of Bombay Legis-

Parliament People States lative Assembly
No. % No. % No. /o No. %
Land Interests 41 13 122 24 50 23 46 15
Business
Interests 43 14 70 14 45 21 44 14
Land 20 6 93 19 33 15 32 10
Business 25 8 49 10 28 13 38 12
Law 100 32 127 25 60 28 57 18
Press 33 11 38 8 20 9 8 3
Education 26 8 34 7 21 10 19 6
Services 16 5 10 2 11 5 6 2
Other Profes-
sions . 16 5 24 5 12 5 15 5
Public Work . 44 14 85 17 29 13 36 11
Not known . 33 11 39 8 2 1 104 33
Total 313 100 499 100 216 100 315 100

NOTES:
(1) The first two categories overlap with those that follow. They have been in-
cluded in an attempt to overcome the difficulties of ' double occupation'; the lawyer
who reveals that he owns land, the editor who evidently has certain business in-
terests find a place here as well as in their own professional categories. Even so, of
course, the figures in these two categories ought almost certainly to be much larger.
The great majority of members appear to be to some extent and in some way partici-
pating in business activity and/or dependent on the possession of a piece of land.
(2) The other categories also require explanation. 'Land' includes rent-receivers
as well as working farmers. 'Business' includes the industrialist, the shopkeeper and
the import-export agent. 'Law' covers the highly paid High Court advocate and also
the penurious district pleader. The university professor and the primary school
teacher find a place in 'Education'. Former army officers and civil servants account
for the 'Services'. Doctors are the most prominent of the 'Other Professions'. 'Pub-
lic Work' is perhaps the haziest of all: under this heading come most of the women
members who describe themselves as ' social workers', many of the whole-time Com-
munist Party workers, as well as a number of Gandhian followers engaged in political-
cum-social service; the category therefore gives little idea of the source of income, but
it is safe to say that in most of these cases (and, of course, in others too) membership
of the legislature has become the main source.

after the extension of the franchise, by direct or indirect election. A t the

same time, it must be said that, if general impressions have any validity,
certain contrasts can be f o u n d : first, the present members of Parliament
do include a m o n g their number some m e n of less sophistication, of a
lower social standing and lower income group than could be found in
the pre-1952 (and certainly pre-1947) Assembly; second, the same re-
mark could be made with even greater emphasis about the State legis-
latures. The relations between the categories 'land', ' l a w ' and the rest
may remain unchanged, but within each category there has been some
broadening, mainly downwards.
 THE MEMBERS 121

For the purpose of comparing the main political parties under these
headings, the members of the House of the People have been chosen.
Table VII gives the comparison in terms of age:

T A B L E V I I — A G E C O M P O S I T I O N OF T H E H O U S E OF T H E P E O P L E

(BY PARTIES)

Hindu Other Indepen-

Congress Communist Socialist Parties dent
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. °/o
20-29 . . . . 13 4 2 8 1 5 1 14 4 13 3 7
30-39 . . . . 75 23 12 50 7 33 7 23 9 21
40-49 . . . . 99 30 7 29 7 33 2 29 10 33 19 45
50-59 . . . . 111 34 3 12 3 14 3 43 5 17 10 24
60-69 . . . . 30 9 3 14 1 14 4 13 1 2
Over 70 1
Total giving information . 329 100 24 100 21 100 7 100 30 100 42 100

NOTE: Hindu means Hindu Mahasaba and Jan Sangh groups.

The main point to notice here is the striking, though not surprising,
difference between the members of the well-established Congress Party
and those of the newer parties. The Congress finds more of its members
from the 50-59 group than from any other and only 27% are under 40.
Among the Communists well over half are under 40, of the Socialists
38%.
No such marked differences are revealed in education:

T A B L E V I I I — E D U C A T I O N OF T H E H O U S E OF T H E P E O P L E

( B Y PARTIES)

Congress Communist Socialist Hindu Other Indepen-

Parties dent
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Graduated Abroad 28 8 3 13 1 5 3 43 2 7 8 20
Graduated in India 185 55 10 43 15 71 2 29 13 45 21 51
College (Intermediate) 49 15 4 17 2 10 I 14 6 21 4 10
High School 43 13 5 22 1 14 5 17 6 15
Middle School 7 2
Primary School 5 1 2 10 1 3
Religious Education 14 4 1 5 1 2
Private Education . 4 4 2 7 1 2

Total giving information . 335 100 23 100 21 100 7 100 29 100 41 100

The large numbers of the Congress Party permit them to have some
representatives of all kinds of education, while at the other extreme it is
122 THE HOUSE A N D THE MEMBER

perhaps the small numbers of the Hindu parties which enable them to
stand out prominently among the group with foreign degrees. But in
general the differences do not appear significant. The smaller parties
collected under the heading 'Other Parties' seem to have relied on
rather less educated members, but among the rest the proportion of
graduates varies only from the Congress's modest 63% to the Socialists'
impressive 76%. The Communist members are neither better nor worse
educated than the others.
Contrasts between the parties reappear when we turn to previous
legislative and local government experience.

TABLE IX—EXPERIENCE OF THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

(BY PARTIES)

(j) Legislative

Congress Communist Hindu Other Indepen-

Socialist Parties dents
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Old Central Assembly 16 4 1 14 2}
Constituent Assembly—
Provisional Parliament . 95 26 3 14 2 29 3 7 5 12}
State Legislatures . 106 29 4 2 10 2 29 3 7 10 25
No previous legislative
experience . 180 49 23 96 16 76 5 72 27 61 29 72}
Total . . . . 363 24 21 7 44 40

(ii) Local Government

Congress Communist Socialist Hindu Other Indepen-

Parties dents
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Municipality . 68 19 4 1 5 2 29 2 5 5 12}
District Board 58 16 4 2 10 3 7 2}
Panchayat 1 2}
No Local Government
Experience . 234 64 19 79 17 81 5 72 27 61 36 90
Total . . . . 363 24 21 7 44 40

NOTE : See Note to Table V.

The most vivid contrast is between Congress and the Communists;

whereas less than half the Congress members are new to work in legis-
latures, only one Communist has previous experience—and that is at
State level. The other parties occupy a position midway between these
extremes.
The contrast in legislative experience is hardly surprising given the
 THE MEMBERS 123
nature of politics before the General Elections. The contrast is, however,
hardly less marked in the case of local government experience. The large
majority of non-Congress members have a political experience which is
limited to party and other sectional or social organisations.
Finally we may set out the occupational composition of the House of
the People by parties:

T A B L E X — O C C U P A T I O N I N T H E H O U S E OF T H E P E O P L E

(BY PARTIES)

Hir du Other Inde pen-

Congress Communist Socialist Parties de nt s
No. % No. % No. 7. No. % No. % No. 7.
Land Interests 82 24 4 17 6 29 12 40 18 45
Business Interests 55 16 1 5 6 20 8 20
Land . . . . 62 21 4 17 5 24 9 30 13 32i
Business 37 11 1 5 5 17 6 15
Law . . . . 103 30 2 8 5 24 4 67 4 13 9 22i
Press . . . . 25 7 2 8 3 14 1 16 3 10 4 10
Education 22 6 4 17 2 10 3 10 3 7i
Services 8 2 2 7
Other Professions . 15 4 2 8 1 5 1 16 2 7 3 n
Public Work . 67 20 10 42 4 19 2 7 2 5
Total giving information . 339 100 24 100 21 100 6 100 30 100 40 100

Our hesitation in drawing very definite conclusions from data on

occupations has already been explained. Certain features nevertheless
seem clear. A large proportion of Independents are known to be landed
proprietors—and it was indeed primarily the influence which they de-
rived from this which enabled them to contest successfully; this seems to
be supported by our figures. Secondly, business interests, as one could
expect, find no representation among parties of the left. Thirdly, the
category of 'public work' has a special importance for the Communist
Party; nearly half its members have no apparent occupation other than
full-time party workers.
This material can be supplemented by data drawn from one of the
few official State election reports available at the time of writing. The
Madras Report contains much interesting information on age composi-
tion, educational qualifications and 'livelihood classes'. 1 The categories
used differ somewhat from those given above, but the main conclusions
seem to be confirmed. The following table gives the ages of the success-
ful candidates in the Madras elections to the two Houses of the Centre
and State legislatures:
1
Return showing the Results of the General Elections in Madras State, G o v e r n m e n t of
M a d r a s , 1953.
124 THE HOUSE A N D THE MEMBER

TABLE XI—MADRAS: AGE OF MEMBERS

House of the Council of Madras Legis- Madras Legis-

People States lative Assembly lative Council

No. /o No. % No. % No. %

25-34 . 16 21 5 18 106 28 6 10
35-44 . 28 37 9 33 155 41 19 32
45-54 . 18 24 9 33 85 23 20 33
55-64 . 12 16 2 7 27 7 13 22
65-74 . 1 1 2 7 2 1 1 2
Over 74 1 2

Total 75 100 27 100 375 100 60 100

For the two Lower Houses, the largest age-group is that of 35-44, but
for the Upper Houses the next group of 45-54 is equally prominent.
Table XII shows the age composition of the Madras Legislative
Assembly according to parties :

TABLE XII—MADRAS ASSEMBLY: AGE BY PARTIES

Socialist or Other
Congress Communist Independent
K.M.P. Parties

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %

25-34 . 30 20 37 60 13 21 11 23 15 29
35-44 . 65 43 23 37 26 42 21 44 20 39
45-54 . 39 26 2 3 18 29 14 29 12 24
55-64 . 16 11 5 8 2 4 4 8
65-74 . 2 1

Total. 152 100 62 100 62 100 48 100 51 100

A sharp contrast is revealed between the Communist Party and all

others. No party can be described as a party of old men, but the Com-
munist Party is distinctly a party of young men.
Table XIII compares the educational qualifications of the Madras
members of Centre and State legislatures.
From this it appears that the better-educated candidates favour (or are
favoured by) indirect election to Upper Houses. The contrast between
the qualifications of the members of the State Assembly and those of
members of the State Council is particularly marked. The most im-
portant feature, however, is the poor education which has been received
by the majority of State Assembly members; and Madras is most un-
likely to be inferior to other States in this respect. The majority of State
 THE MEMBERS 125

TABLE XIII—MADRAS : EDUCATION OF MEMBERS

House of the Council of Madras Legis- Madras Legis-

People States lative Assembly lative Council

No. % No. % No. % No. V

/0
Degrees and
Diplomas 45 60 17 63 107 29 34 57
Intermediate
(College) 4 5 4 2 26 7 4 7
Matriculation
(High School) 13 17 85 23 8 13
Middle School 5 7 4 15 60 16 4 7
Literate 8 11 2 7 97 26 10 17
Total 75 100 27 100 375 100 60 100

legislators are drawn from the meagrely educated sections and form a
contrast to the members of the central Parliament. They are, no doubt,
more like the people they represent. But the proportion o f ' passengers'
carried in State legislatures is for this reason high. The ministries are
much less supported by informed criticism than at Delhi, and the parties'
work of political training is heavy and difficult.
This impression could be checked by information relating to 'liveli-
hood classes' and 'social groups'. The following figures are given in the
Madras Return:

TABLE X I V — M A D R A S : MEMBERS' 'LIVELIHOOD CLASS'

House of the Council of Madras Legis- Madras Legis-

People States lative Assembly lative Council
No. /o No. % No. % No. %
I . 15 20 2 7 143 38 13 22
II . 3 4 1 4 6 2
Ill 1 0
IV 9 12 4 15 71 19 11 18
V . 3 4 15 4 1 2
VI 8 11 1 4 20 5 4 7
VII 2 3 8 2 I 2
VIII 35 47 19 70 111 30 30 50

Total . 75 100 27 100 375 100 60 100

NOTE: The eight categories used here are defined in the Madras Return as follows:
I: Cultivators (or their dependents) of land wholly or mainly owned; II: Cultivators
of land wholly or mainly unowned; III: Cultivating labourers; IV: Non-cultivat-
ing owners and agricultural rent-receivers; V: Principal means of livelihood from
Production; VI: from Commerce; VII: from Transport; VIII: from other sources
and miscellaneous sources.
126 T H E H O U S E A N D THE MEMBER

TABLE XV—MADRAS : MEMBERS' ' SOCIAL GROUP '

House of the Council of Madras Legis- Madras Legis-

People States lative Assembly lative Council

No. % No. % No. % No. V

/o
Non-backward
classes. 51 68 21 78 225 60 49 82
Unscheduled
backward
classes. 10 13 5 18 84 22 11 18
Scheduled
castes . 13 17 1 4 62 16
Scheduled
tribes . 1 1 4 1

Total 75 100 27 100 375 100 60 100

Although these categories are in several respects quite unsatisfactory,

at least the high proportion of cultivators in the Madras State Assembly
can be taken as bearing out to some extent the remarks made on educa-
tion. The State legislatures—and especially the Lower Houses—contain
a large number of members drawn from the class of small peasant culti-
vators, and a correspondingly smaller proportion from the professions.
The above sketch of the members of modern Indian legislatures
would be rendered more valuable if a comprehensive comparison with
the earlier legislatures were possible. Unfortunately, no published data
appears to be available. Some information, however, has been gathered1
and is presented in the following tables:
TABLE XVI—CENTRAL ASSEMBLY, 1 9 4 4 : OCCUPATIONS
Landowners . . . . 4 0
Lawyers, but mainly dependent on income
from land . . . . 2 1
Lawyers . . . . 1 1
Businessmen . . . 3 0
Other occupations . 1 7

1192

TABLE XVII—COUNCIL OF STATE, 1 9 4 4 : OCCUPATIONS

Landowners . . . . 1 6
Lawyers . . . . . . 7
Businessmen . 1 6
Other occupations . . . . 5
443
1
From private sources, based originally on official documents which seem to have
disappeared.
2 Including 18 nominated members.
3 Including 11 nominated members.
 THE MEMBERS 127
A comparison of these two tables with those on occupations in present
legislatures indicates some broadening of the social composition con-
sequent u p o n the increasing size of legislatures and the popularising of
politics which accompanied the advent of adult franchise. It is evident,
however, that the elected member changes less rapidly than the elec-
torate. Some of the traditional elements have no doubt suffered a set-
back in 'British India' areas, but this is somewhat obscured by their
continued hold in the districts which were formerly princely states.
There has been no massive invasion of Delhi by peasants and workers,
only a slight admixture. In the State Assemblies, however, the new
period has witnessed the arrival of large numbers belonging to the
'middle peasantry'.
NOTE: Although there is no comprehensive survey of the subject discussed in
this section, a reference may be made to a few partial studies:
1. The first is a brief article ('The House of the People—its Personnel', in
Modem Review, Calcutta, Jan. 1954) by Professor G. D. Srivastava. He, too,
has had to rely on the published Who's Whos, supplemented by some personal
enquiries. His figures do not agree in detail with those given here, but his
general conclusions are similar. He shows that the popular age group is 40-50
and that the parties of the Left are younger than Congress. The proportion of
members with previous experience of legislatures is higher among Congress-
men (nearly half) than among parties of the Left (about 10%). Over 60% of
the members are graduates and less than 7% have only elementary education;
the differences between the parties in this respect are not significant. Professor
Srivastava's occupation table is as follows:

Congress Parties of Others Total

the Left
Agriculture :
(a) Farmers . . . . 43 11 3 57
(b) Landlords 17 1 3 21
Business . . . . . 37 4 7 48
Professions:
(a) Law . . . . 110 11 11 132
(b) Education 22 5 5 32
(c) Journalism 25 4 4 33
Retired . . . . . 20 1 7 28
Whole-time Public Workers 60 22 2 84
Miscellaneous . . . . 16 6 7 29
Unknown . . . . . 35 — — 35

2. Professor Venkatarangaiya's survey of The General Election in Bombay

(Bombay, 1953) is a careful work but deals with Bombay City only. The data
he collected relates not only to the elected members but to candidates—to 98 of
the 127 City candidates for the State Assembly and to 15 of the 18 candidates
128 THE H O U S E A N D THE MEMBER

for the House of the People. He found that the age group 35-44 was the
most common among candidates of all parties for the State Assembly seats,
though in the case of Congress the next group, 45-54, was nearly as prominent.
By contrast, this latter group was for all parties the most popular among
candidates for the House of the People seats, indicating perhaps that parties
preferred to put up more experienced men for the Centre. He found a similar
difference in educational qualifications: although even for the State Assembly
more than half the candidates were graduates, the proportion for the seats at
the Centre was more than three-quarters. In education he found a difference
between the parties, the Communist candidates for the State Assembly
accounting for a proportionately large number of those with only primary or
secondary school education. With regard to occupations he found a large
number of professional and business people among the Congress candidates
and an equally marked number of trade union workers among those of the
Left parties. Congress candidates had more legislature as well as more local
government experience than those of all other parties. (Ibid., pp. 53-70.)
3. I am grateful to the Bombay University for permission to consult an
unpublished thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. in 1953: 'The Bombay
Legislature' by L. B. Wilson. The author collected by questionnaire a con-
siderable amount of information relating to the Assembly and Council of that
State before the 1952 General Elections. Some of his findings may be sum-
marised as follows:

A % of Total Education Z0°fhT°lf-

ge
Membership Membership

21-30 . . . 2 Degree and Diploma 69

31-40 . . . 22 College . . . 4
41-50 . . . 29 Secondary 22
51-60 . . . 31 Primary 5
61-70 . . . 11
Over 70 2

Occupation Income p.a. Membership

Law . . . . 41 Under £100 . . 18

Medicine . . . 3 £100-£200 . 24
Journalism . . . 3 £200-£400 21
Education . . . 3 £400-£700 6
Business 8 £700-£1,000 . 6
Agriculture 14 £1,000-£2,000 3
Social Work 17 Over £2,000 7
Services . . . 2
Miscellaneous . 5

A comparison of this information with that relating to the Bombay and

Madras Assemblies after 1952 suggests that State legislators are younger, less
highly educated and drawn to a smaller extent from the professional classes
than they were before adult franchise and the expansion of the assemblies.
 TIMES AND PLACES 129

3. Times and Places

The Constitution of India requires that 'Parliament shall be sum-
moned twice at least in every year' and that ' six months shall not in-
tervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for
its first sitting in the next session'. 1 The table in Appendix III shows the
opening and closing dates of the sessions, together with the number of
days on which Parliament actually sat. The earlier years have been in-
cluded for comparison, and it can be seen that the usual practice
formerly was to have two sessions a year: one from late January or early
February until the Budget was passed and the Delhi heat became diffi-
cult around the middle of April; and another after the rains had cooled
the air in August and September. Occasionally a third session in Novem-
ber-December was added. By now, however, a pattern of three sessions
has become normal; only the holding of the General Elections in 1952
prevents the table from showing this even more clearly. It is possible that
the arrangement of the sessions may change; it has been suggested, for
instance, that one session should be held during the monsoon rains of
June-July, when the M.P.s are in any case unable easily to tour their
mainly rural constituencies. Nevertheless, in whatever manner the ses-
sions may come to be arranged, it is clear that the number of days in a
year during which Parliament sits is unlikely to be reduced. As in other
countries, the work of the Indian legislature has steadily increased. From
1921 to 1930 the number of days' sittings in a year was never more than
68; during 1931-38, it was never less than that, and in 1933 reached 97.
The war years were naturally less active from this point of view, but the
post-war period has witnessed again a big increase. The years 1947-49
saw the legislators busy in constitution-making—the non-legislative ses-
sions are not included in the above figures—but from the inauguration
of the new constitution in 1950 the trend is clear: Parliament meets for
nearly 140 days a year. The Council of States commences its sessions at
the same time as the House of the People, but it generally meets less
often and may complete its work before the Lower House. The State
Legislatures, though also subject to a six months rule, 2 do not meet as
often as Parliament. Until very recently, a spring Budget session and a
shorter autumn session were sufficient. During the last few years, how-
ever, a third session later in the year has been added in some States.
Even so, the number of days' sittings annually is never very much more
than half that imposed by the pressure of work at the Centre. From the
point of view of work in the constituency and the pursuit of part-time
occupations, the member of a State legislature is doubly fortunate com-
pared with the M.P.: his presence is required in the State capital about
three months a year, and in any event his constituency and home cannot

i Art. 85 (1). 2 Art. 174.

9—.P.i
m T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

be more than about twelve hours away; the M.P.'s 140 days' sittings en-
tail his residence in Delhi for about six months and his constituency,
home and other occupations may be as much as two or three days'
journey from the Union capital.
Parliament is summoned and prorogued by the President of the
Union, 1 the actual decision being taken by the Leader of the House in
consultation with his colleagues, the Speaker and possibly leaders of
opposition groups, and the summons being issued by the Secretary. 2
The first business of each session is the joint gathering of the two Houses
to hear the President's Address, in which Parliament is informed of the
causes of its summons. 3 This is a new institution for India; the Governor-
General did not open the the sessions of the old Legislative Assembly.
The President's Address is, of course, modelled on the Queen's Speech
in the British Parliament, and its introduction is only one example of the
way in which modern Indian parliamentary procedure has found more
to suit its needs in British practice than in that of the former regime in
India itself. The need for the President's Address was felt mainly because
it underlines the responsibility of the Government to Parliament; for it
consists of the Government's review of the international and internal
situation and a statement of its general policy together with an indica-
tion of its legislative programme. 4 It was also felt appropriate that each
session should begin with a solemn, even if simple, ceremony. The Presi-
dent is conducted in a small procession, led by the Secretaries and Pre-
siding Officers of the two Houses, to the Central Hall of Parliament. The
Address is delivered first in Hindi and then in English and no further
business is done on that day. 5 Some days are then devoted to a debate
on the Address—as many as five days of the Budget session, only two
1
Art. 85 (2). The similar provision for the Governor or Rajpramakh's summoning of a
State Legislature is in Art. 174 (2).
2 Rules, Rule 3.
3 Art. 87. For States, Art. 176. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 re-
stricted the occasions on which there has to be a President's (and Governors') Address to
the first session after each election and the first session of each year. In practice, it was
usual to retain the Address for each session until 1956 when it was dropped except for the
first (or Budget) session.
4 This is a striking example of the way in which an old and local custom can achieve by
adaptation such a universal and modern meaning that it becomes suitable for imitation far
away from the time and place of its origin.
5
The Governors (in Part A States) or Rajpramukhs (in Part B States) deliver similar
Addresses. On some occasions in a few States, the event has been marred by the ostenta-
tious absence of members of the opposition and even by 'walk-out' demonstrations in the
course of the Address. This has posed a problem for Presiding Officers. Since the meeting
to hear the Address is not strictly a meeting of the House (or even a joint sitting where
there are two Houses) there is no one 'in the Chair' and therefore no one whose function
it can be to appeal for order. Some States seem to favour the provision of rules to deal with
these cases, but the majority, while deploring these breaches of decorum, hope that con-
ventions can be established and agreed upon between all parties. No serious incidents have
occurred at the Centre, but the Prime Minister has stressed the fact that the President and
Governors are symbols of the State and must be respected; dislike of Government policy
should be expressed in other ways and at other times. (See H.P. Deb., 22 Feb. 1954.)
 TIMES AND PLACES 131
days of a shorter session. A motion of thanks is moved and seconded by
two Government back-benchers and the debate takes place on a number
of amendments moved by the opposition groups. The movers of the
motions and other speakers have on occasion misunderstood the nature
of the Address. One mover, for example, determined to make the most
of this opportunity for oratory and anxious to underline the fact that the
Address was 'no mere formality', went so far as to thank the President
personally for his 'unerring guidance'. The Prime Minister later rose to
correct the impression: 'It is the Government's Address, although the
President delivers it. Some honourable members imagine that it is a
private address of the President. It is nothing of the kind.' 1 The scope of
amendments is wide and not strictly limited to the points actually dealt
with in the Address; attention may also be drawn to omissions from the
Address. 2 In view of the divided character of the opposition, it is not
surprising that a large number of amendments is normally received.
When they deal with important issues such as foreign policy and the
food situation, for which separate days are known to have been allotted
later in the session, their movers are usually persuaded to withdraw
them. Thus, of 88 amendments moved in November 1950 only 15 were
actually moved, and the discussion was thus concentrated on certain
topics. 3 This does not happen invariably: in February 1953, 74 amend-
ments were received; although the Deputy Speaker appealed for some
selection and grouping to be made—for they were on a wide variety of
subjects, as he put it, 'from China to Peru'—the House did not agree,
and all 74 were moved and put. 4
If the pressure of work has lengthened the sessions of Parliament, it
cannot yet be said to have had the same effect on the number of hours
the Houses sit during each day. At the inception of the Central Legisla-
ture, in 1921, the times were comparatively sedate and gentlemanly—
from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. with an ample luncheon interval from 1 p.m. to
2.30 p.m. These hours were maintained without change until the second
session of 1948 when the start was advanced to 10.45 a.m. From 1951,
the times have been more frequently changed. The decisions on this
matter are in the discretion of the Chair but are naturally made after
consulting the needs of Government business and the wishes of the
members. Thus, in 1951, when the first session extended into the hot
months of Delhi, the times were changed in the course of April and the
House met from 8.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. These timings have proved
popular with members and now tend to be the rule outside the winter
months. 5 On the other hand, the 'winter' timings too have changed and
1 P.P. Deb., 15 Nov. 1950.
2 E.g., the observation f r o m the Chair in H.P. Deb., 20 May 1952.
3 P.P. Deb., 15-17 N o v . 1950.
4
H.P. Deb., 13 Feb. 1953. Only one was pressed to a division.
5
The Chambers are well air-conditioned and cool, but members obviously like lo finish
the work as soon as possible and perhaps enjoy a siesta.
132 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

1.30-6.30 p.m. or 2-7 p.m. are now the general practice.1 It will be
noticed, however, that in any event the sittings do not last for more than
five hours. 2 It has sometimes been found necessary, towards the end of
a session with much business unfinished, to extend the sittings very
slightly. This always succeeds in causing a considerable outcry among
the majority of members, the more serious of whom plead the need for
time to study bills, reports and other papers, while others protest that
social engagements are properly an important part of an M.P.'s life and
should not be too much encroached upon. The Chair has agreed that
sittings should not, if possible, be lengthened, adding the further reason
that the quality of debate would tend thereby to suffer. It must be re-
membered, too, that Parliament normally meets on six days a week;
Sundays are observed as holidays, but there can be no question as in
England, of getting away on Friday evening for a week-end in the con-
stituency.3 The times of the sittings of State legislatures varies, but the
total number of hours per day is normally between four and five. The
Bombay Assembly, for instance, meets from 2-7 p.m. with a half-hour
tea break, and a sitting of 12 noon to 3 p.m. on Saturdays; Travancore-
Cochin generally observes the hours 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 2-5 p.m.
The Union Parliament meets in Parliament House in New Delhi.
This forms part of a group of buildings constituting the governmental
heart of the capital and planned by Sir Edwin Lutyens in 1919. Appro-
priately enough for that period, the Council Chamber (as it was then
called) does not occupy the centre of the group. The view up Kingsway,
the great central avenue, shows the Viceroy's House (now Rashtrapati
Bhavan or President's House) in the centre, flanked and supported by
the north and south blocks of the Secretariat, which housed the civil and
military officers of the Empire; the Council Chamber was placed a little
way to the right and off the crest of the hill. The building itself, however,
is impressive, at once elegant and massive. Designed by Sir Herbert
Baker and built in rose and cream-coloured stone, it is circular in shape,
covers an area of six acres and is one-third of a mile in circumference.
The plan of the ground floor is shown opposite;
It can been seen that the building houses three semicircular chambers,
at present occupied by the House of the People, the Council of States
and the Supreme Court. Between these chambers are three uncovered
garden courts, while the centre of the building is occupied by the
spacious Central Hall. This is used for the President's Address, as well
1
T h e House thus sits little after dark. W h e n it does so happen, it is indicated; until 1954,
the sign was a gay, revolving circle of lights with the colours of the Indian flag; this has
now been thought too frivolous and has been replaced by a sober single light.
2
In September 1954 a new practice was introduced of a sitting of six hours f r o m 11 a.m.
to 5 p.m. with no lunch break but with a convention that the H o u s e shall not be counted
between 1 p.m. and 2.30 p.m.
3
With the introduction of the six-hour daily sitting, Saturdays ceased in 1954-55 to be
ordinarily fixed for meetings.
 TIMES A N D PLACES 133
as for any talk to members by a distinguished visitor. Its main impor-
tance, however, lies in its ordinary use—as the M.P.s' lounge. Here the
day's papers can be read, tea and coffee are served, and here take place
ceaselessly those conversations which supplement and support the for-
mal debates in the Chambers. Surrounding all this are the office rooms—
of the Speaker of the House, the Chairman of the Council, the Secre-
tariats of both Houses and of the Ministers of the Government. Here,
too, are found the Parliamentary Notice Offices (which receive notices of
motions, amendments, etc., handed in by the M.P.s) and the offices of
the Congress Party in Parliament. On the first floor are the galleries to

the Chambers, the Parliament Library and the Committee Rooms,

while there are two further floors occupied by the junior officers and
clerical staff of the Parliamentary Secretariats. For the internal decora-
tion of the building, materials have come from many parts of India—the
black marble for the Chamber columns from Gaya, white and coloured
marble from Makrana and different kinds of wood from Assam and
Burma. The Central Hall has panels, in which it is proposed that por-
traits of leading Indians will be placed; one of Dadabhai Naoroji, a
founder of Indian nationalism, is already in position, while one of
Mahatma Gandhi is hung above the dais. It is also proposed to decorate
the walls of the outer corridor of the building with murals depicting
episodes of Indian history and features of Indian life.
The shape of the Chambers dictates the seating arrangement of both
Houses. It has often been held that two kinds of shape are connected
with two forms of parliamentary democracy. The rectangular British
pattern is associated with clearly-defined Government and Opposition
134 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

confronting each other on opposite sides of the House. The circular

Continental pattern on the other hand is associated with a parliamentary
situation in which the Government, a coalition occupying a not very
clearly demarcated central position, is flanked on both sides by its critics
of Left and Right. Yet, in India, although both Houses are semicircular
in shape and the seats follow the same pattern, the result is not at all the
Continental arrangement. The plan of the House of the People illustrates
the position:

The Speaker

The Government in India is in fact a 'centre' government, but it does

not sit on the centre benches; it sits, as does the Government in the
House of Commons, on the Speaker's right, and it is confronted by the
opposition groups whether of the Left or the Right.1 In the House
elected in 1952 the Congress Party normally occupied four of the six
blocks of seats, thus spreading round to an almost 'Opposition' posi-
tion. The Government itself, including the Deputy Ministers and Parlia-
mentary Secretaries, occupies (at least during Question Hour) the first
two benches of two or three blocks, its supporters behind and extending
beyond into the fourth block. Often it seems as though the more inde-
pendent members of the party prefer the third or fourth blocks where
they can enjoy the feeling of being somewhat less than wholly committed.
1
This leads to some apparently incongruous situations, as when, in the course of a de-
bate on unemployment, the Maharaja of Bikaner, an Independent M.P., after making'a
speech in which he blamed the merger of the princely states for throwing many out of work,
resumed his place next to the Communist group and began a most friendly conversation
with one of their leaders! One is reminded of the saying from France that there is more in
common between two Deputies, one of whom is a revolutionary and the other not, than
there is between two revolutionaries, one of whom is a Deputy and the other not.
 TIMES AND PLACES 135
Here they begin to merge into the Independents and into the right and
centre opposition groups who mainly occupy the fifth block. The Com-
munists and P.S.P. sit in the sixth block, on the Speaker's left and
directly facing the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues.
Equally important as a factor making the atmosphere of the Indian
Parliament approximate, in spite of the shape of the Chamber, to that
of the British rather than the Continental model is the absence of a
rostrum. The dais in the centre is occupied by the Speaker with his
Marshal at his side, while below him sits the Secretary. Each member
speaks from his own seat and addresses his remarks to the Chair. The
atmosphere of a genuine debate rather than a public meeting is thus re-
tained. And the Chamber, though in fact large, is sufficiently compact to
give a feeling of intimacy on all but the very poorly attended occasions.1
Also important in this respect is the absence of microphones for indivi-
dual speakers, for these would again tend to make speeches less in-
formal. Instead there is a 'sound reinforcement' system similar to that
of the new House of Commons. 2
Outside the Chamber are two wide semicircular corridors equipped
with comfortable seats and decorated with portraits of former Presiding
Officers. These are the Lobbies—an Inner Lobby for M.P.s only and an
Outer Lobby to which Press representatives with Lobby Passes can gain
admission. Here take place conversations of a less leisurely nature than
those that characterise the Central Hall, the hurried and urgent con-
sultations between colleagues, the final checking of points before an in-
tervention or a speech. Also on the ground floor and immediately to the
right of the Speaker is the Official Gallery, placed near the Government
front bench but technically outside the House. Here sit the officials of
the ministries, watching the passage of their departments' measures and
available for brief consultation if the Minister should desire it. In a
similar position on the other side is the seldom occupied Special Box, re-
served for visitors from abroad of ministerial or equivalent status. 3
Looking down on the Chamber are the galleries. The Press Gallery runs
above the Speaker's Chair and faces the House. Over the Government
1
There are not quite e n o u g h seats for all members. Formerly, the Chamber had o n l y
seats for 148; recent rearrangements n o w enable the a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f 461: 4 4 seats with
desks, 363 without desks and 54 removable seats for specially crowded days. T h e seats are
in the six blocks, each o f 10 rows. T h e fact that only a small proportion o f seats have desks
is intended, along with a clear c o n v e n t i o n against bringing into the Chamber any papers
or b o o k s other than those required for a contribution to the debate, to underline the nature
of the H o u s e as a place in which to speak and listen, n o t to read.
2
For members w h o still do not hear well, each seat has a concealed loud-speaker; when
a peculiarly inaudible member is speaking, his colleagues will often be seen leaning forward
in their seats with their ears close to these loud-speakers. Similar loud-speakers are pro-
vided in the Press Gallery and, on request, in the other galleries.
3 A m o n g those w h o were privileged spectators f r o m this position during 1953-54 were
Lord Swinton, British Secretary o f State for C o m m o n w e a l t h Relations, the lady Health
Minister from the Soviet U n i o n and two former members of the Government o f British
Guiana, Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham.
136 THE HOUSE A N D THE MEMBER

back benches are the Diplomatic and Distinguished Visitors' Galleries,

while opposite are the Speaker's Gallery and the Gallery for members of
the Council of State.
The rest of the semicircle is occupied by the Public Gallery with a
special section for ladies.1 The question of broadcasting the proceedings
of Parliament was at one time raised but opinion was firmly opposed to
it, less because of certain constitutional and legal doubts than on the
ground that it would encourage members to make speeches to the out-
side 'gallery'.
Most of these remarks apply equally to the Council of States. The
Chamber of the Upper House is, however, smaller; originally planned
to seat 86, it has now been expanded to accommodate 216, almost the
present number of its members. There is one slight difference in the
allocation of seats to members. As in the Lower House, the Government
is to the Chairman's right and the opposition to his left. In the Council,
however, the biggest opposition group was a Right-wing association of
members, and they have been given the extreme left block; the Com-
munists and P.S.P. have therefore to occupy a slightly more central
position. In the States, the accommodation of legislatures varies in style.
There are, in Bihar and Mysore for instance, magnificent new buildings
full of light and grace, whereas in other States solid grey Victorian
sobriety houses the Assemblies. In some States the Chambers are rect-
angular, in most semicircular; in some bare simplicity, in a few—as for
instance when a former ruler's palace has been 'converted' for the pur-
pose—stately luxury is the key note.
In some States, the sessions of the legislature are held alternatively in
the different towns. Formerly this was done mainly for reasons of com-
fort. Thus, summer sessions of the Central Assembly were usually held
in Simla, where the Government too moved to escape the impossible
Delhi heat. This kind of practice is continued by Bombay, which holds
a ' monsoon' session up the hill at Poona. But the practice in some States
has also as a motive the desire to placate regional jealousies. The Andhra
Assembly, for example, has already begun to hold sessions not only in the
temporary capital Kurnool but also in Waltair in the 'rival' coastal
zone of the State.2 In Madhya Bharat not only the legislature but the
whole machinery of government divides its time so as to keep both
Gwalior and Indore content. In this connection, it is interesting to note
that there is some suggestion that the Union Parliament itself should
1
All the galleries, when filled to capacity with additional seats installed, hold 450 per-
sons. Special passes are provided for each gallery. Admission to the Public Gallery is
obtained through M.P.s who are ordinarily allowed two applications for passes for any one
meeting.
2
Comfort is not wholly absent as a consideration even here; a less pleasant spot than
Kurnool is difficult to imagine. Lest I should be thought to be condemning the whole area
of which it is a centre, let me add that it is possible that, if chosen as a permanent capital,
it could be made habitable.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 137
hold one of its three annual sessions away from Delhi. In South India,
in particular, it is felt that the view of things as seen from the far north
is incomplete, and that it would do Ministers and other members alike
much good to have to spend a period in the south. Moreover, since
Bangalore with its perfect climate for twelve months of the year is the
site usually suggested, there is some sympathy for the idea even among
Northerners. The move would, of course, have to include most of the
Ministers and many officials and would be expensive in money and
effort; nevertheless, it may well be considered worth while as a contri-
bution to the unification of India.

4. Behaviour and Attitudes

'I, . . ., having been elected a member of the House of the People do

swear in the name of God (or solemnly affirm) that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and
that I will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter.'
This oath (or affirmation) has to be made by every member before he
takes his seat in Parliament. On his name being called by the Secretary,
he proceeds to the table below the Speaker, takes the oath, mounts the
dais to shake hands with the Speaker and signs his name on the Roll of
Members. He is then a member of the House. 1 What is the nature of the
duty he has undertaken and how is he expected to discharge it ? Before
answering this question in the subsequent chapters, we may take a
general view of the conduct and attitudes of the individuals and groups
that constitute a House. Although primarily descriptive of the House
of the People, most of the comments are equally applicable to the Upper
House and to State legislatures; some of the more striking differences
are noticed in the course of the section.
Politicians, perhaps even more than teachers and as much as writers
and artists, are men in love with their work. This is true of all countries,
and in this India is certainly no exception. For the politician, politics is
not an occupation so much as a way of living; not so much a task to be
performed as a natural expression of the personality. No doubt most
men are happy in the company of their colleagues and fellows, but no-
where is the enjoyment of professional community more marked than
among politicians. The Indian politician—at least at the Centre—is in
this respect in a peculiarly fortunate position; most members of Parlia-
ment not only work together but live together. In New Delhi, two large
hostels are available primarily for M.P.s and their families. Even of those
who live outside these hostels, a large proportion inhabit two streets of
1
There is no elaborate House procedure for the checking of members' credentials; the
Secretary relies on the information supplied by Returning Officers through the Election
Commission.
138 THE HOUSE A N D THE MEMBER

flats specially allotted to M.P.s. There is thus never a dull moment; even
when the House is not sitting, it is still possible and easy to drop in on
the fellow member who lives in the same block or in the apartment
across the road. The desire for professional talk, added to the love of
conversation and social intercourse which characterises Indian life in
general, is always easily satisfied. Most M.P.s are never left alone for a
moment, and few of them would be happy if they were.1
Yet although for the politician, politics is everywhere and has no fixed
hours, the sittings of the House naturally have a special importance. The
Indian M.P. has in any case other reasons for attending besides interest.
The pricking of conscience may play some part. The possibility of
awkward questions from the constituencies is, so far, rather remote.
More important by far is the force of party discipline; the members are
there to support or oppose a government, and the party Whips2 are
there to see that they do so. The Constitution has also a word to say on
attendance: ' If for a period of sixty days a member of either House of
Parliament is without permission of the House absent from all meetings
thereof, the House may declare his seat vacant.' 3 The House has there-
fore made arrangements for the scrutiny of applications for leave,
though these are in practice almost invariably granted without much
difficulty.4 Last but not least there is a financial incentive: M.P.s receive
a daily allowance 'for each day of residence at the place where Parlia-
ment meets'; and if one has taken the trouble to come to Delhi, it costs
little to put in an appearance in Parliament House. Members who come
to the House sign an attendance register in the lobby; at the same time
the staff at the table keep an hourly count of the members actually
present in the Chamber. The following table shows a contrast between
the two which is only to be expected:
1
This also means, unfortunately, that there is little time available for study or even for
reading. Even during session periods, the Parliament Library is comparatively little used,
except for the perusal of newspapers—and for still more conversation! It must be said that
there are a few noble exceptions. It must also be confessed that the M.P. is no better nor
worse than the middle class of India generally, among whom reading is still a largely un-
discovered art and pleasure. The nature of family and social life and the design of houses
have much to do with this; opportunity for silence and solitude is very rare. It is only fair
to add that these conditions keep alive skill and ease of conversation, great hospitability
and an absence of selfishness which the more private lives of the modern West have tended
to destroy.
2
See below, Chapter IV, Section 2.
3
Art. 101 (4). For States, Art. 190 (4); the period here is also sixty days and, in view of
the shorter sessions of State legislatures, the provision is therefore less important than at
the Centre.
4
Until 1954 the procedure was that the Speaker read out the application to the House
and, in the absence of dissent, declared permission granted (Rules, Rule 228). Absence of
even more than sixty days has been condoned. The large number of absentees during the
session of Aug.-Sept. 1953 prompted the feeling that a proper scrutiny was called for. By
a new rule introduced in Jan. 1954 the applications are first looked at by a Committee on
the Absence of Members, which then reports to the House. Some time of the House as a
whole has also been saved by this change.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 139

TABLE XVIII—AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE

Average Daily Average Daily

Attendance Attendance
(from Register) (from hourly
counts)

Provisional Parliament, 1950-52 (membership

rising from 285 in 1950 to 313 in 1951)
Second Session . . . . 252 132
Third Session . . . . 241 109
Fourth Session . . . . 198 49
Fifth Session 178 62

House of the People, 1952-53 (499 members)

First Session . . . . . 432 247
Second Session . . . . 389 163
Third Session . . . . 371 144

These figures seem to show that in spite of the incentives to attend, mem-
bers tend to become less active as the life of Parliament passes into
middle and old age—fewer sign the register regularly, and of those a de-
creasing proportion spend their time in the Chamber.
The figures do not, however, show the variations in attendance. It is
usual for attendance during Question Hour in the House of the People
to be in the neighbourhood of 250, while a closely fought debate or a
foreign policy statement will bring the numbers to over 400. At other
times, the attendance may be meagre and near the quorum mark of 50.1
In this respect, the galleries follow the House. The public gallery is
crowded and alert during Question Hour and during big debates ; the
Diplomatic Gallery also fills for the Budget speech and the Prime
Minister's speeches on the international scene. In the States, public
attendance is generally greater than in Delhi, partly perhaps because the
sessions are shorter. This is especially true of smaller States (though not
so much of Delhi State, whose citizens are made blasé by the presence
nearby of the Union Parliament). Travancore-Cochin is perhaps
exceptional on account of the high level of education and widespread in-
terest in politics ; certainly the brief sessions at Trivandrum are through-
out the day watched by a densely-packed crowd of mostly very young
and keenly-attentive spectators. Those legislatures which have more than
one place of meeting often find a significant difference in public interest ;
the Bombay legislature's Poona sessions are the delight of the student
community in particular, whereas Bombay City's inhabitants for the
most part seem to have other things to do.
It is, then, to a fairly crowded House and below fairly filled galleries
1
T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n prescribes the q u o r u m as o n e - t e n t h of t h e m e m b e r s h i p ( A r t . 100 (3))
140 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

that the Speaker makes his daily entrance at the start of the sitting.1 He
is preceded and announced by the Marshal:' Honourable Members, the
Honourable Speaker'—spoken in Hindi.2 The members rise in their
places, the Speaker bows to the centre and to the two sides and all then
resume their seats. The business of the day then begins. The scene which
the spectator witnesses is generally orderly and dignified. At the same
time it is a scene with some movement in it. The most colourful move-
ment is that in and out of the Chamber by the liveried messengers, who
bring notes and files to the Government front bench and to the Secre-
tary's table, crouching low as they move in order to avoid coming
between any speaker and the Chair. A more regular but less obtrusive
movement is that of the reporters who sit at an extension of the Secre-
taries' table and take down the proceedings in shorthand, entering and
leaving the Chamber in ten-minute shifts.3 A certain amount of move-
ment takes place among the members too. They enter and leave, rise to
speak and move across to have a whispered word with a fellow member.
A Minister may lean back to talk to a colleague or may even get up to
speak to one of his staff in the official gallery—though this is rare and
usually only during the discussion of amendments to Bills. Perhaps the
most significant movement is the least noticeable of all: that of the
Whips. The diplomatic work of these party managers is never finished;
there is always something that requires to be said to some member of
one's own flock or to a potentially friendly Independent or to the Whips
of the opposition groups.
The task of establishing a code of parliamentary behaviour has not
1
T h e Speaker has the power to order the ' withdrawal of strangers' (Rules, Rule 300) and
hold a sitting in private. This power does not appear to have been used. During the debate
on certain clauses of the Representation of the People (No. 2) Bill, however, the Speaker
said: ' I understand that it is the general desire of members that they meet informally and
discuss the amendments to the Bill with the Minister of Law. . . . I have no objection to
a d j o u r n n o w ' . T h e House then adjourned and continued its discussions in private. It is
interesting to note that on the following day it became evident that there had been a mis-
understanding and that some non-Congress members had thought that t h e ' private session'
was open only to Congress Party members! T h e procedure, however, was repeated, the
Deputy Speaker explaining: ' T h o u g h it is not a formal reference to a Committee of the
whole House, it is as good as that.' (There is no provision for a ' C o m m i t t e e of the whole
H o u s e ' in the Indian Parliament.) And the Minister of Law a d d e d : 'Everyone is invited.'
This was done a third time on the following day. T h e public was thus excluded f r o m much
of the discussion on this particular Bill. T h e procedure does not appear to have been used
since. (P.P. Deb., 22-24 May 1951.)
2
U p to late 1952, only the Speaker was ' h o n o u r a b l e ' . O n a member's protest, the De-
puty Speaker instructed the Marshal that all were ' h o n o u r a b l e ' and the f o r m was accord-
ingly amended. (H.P. Deb., 20 Dec. 1952.)
3
T h e shifts are shorter for the more difficult Question H o u r and also for the latter part
of the day's sitting. The reporters transcribe their own shorthand, and an effort is m a d e to
have cyclostyled copies of the proceedings available for the table and for members w h o
have spoken within l | - 2 hours of the end of the sitting. T h e reporters may co-operate in-
formally with the members of the press gallery. Hindi speeches are taken down in Hindi
shorthand. A large proportion of Hindi speeches—especially towards the end of the day—
§lows u p the preparing of the proceedings.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 141
been easy but, at the Centre at least, it has been achieved with some
success. No doubt the existence of quasi-parliamentary institutions dur-
ing the quarter-century before independence has been of decisive im-
portance. For although the new Parliament of 1952 contained many
members not merely new to Delhi but even without legislature ex-
perience of any kind, 1 it inherited very firmly a set of conventions estab-
lished during the earlier period. The late Speaker, Mr. Mavalankar,
who so ably guided the new parliaments from 1946 to 1956, has been
able to benefit from the sure foundations laid down by his predecessors. 2
The raw recruit to parliamentary politics has been provided with clear
guidance and has also been set a generally good example by his senior
fellows. He quickly learns that there are rules to be observed. On arrival
he is presented with a 'Handbook for Members' which supplies, among
much other information, an outline of procedure and a list of Dos and
Don'ts. Many of these have in fact been included as Rules of Procedure
and Conduct of Business.3 While the House is sitting, a member shall
not read any matter except in connection with the business of the House,
shall bow to the Chair when taking or leaving his seat, shall always ad-
dress the Chair, shall not obstruct the proceedings or interrupt, and so
on. These rules and conventions have usually been adopted in the States
too. In some States, of course, they are of as long standing as at the
Centre, and in a few cases, States have gone even further. Bombay, for
instance, has provided its members with a lengthy list of conventions
and a further list of expressions that have been held in Bombay to be un-
parliamentary, 4 and has referred its members to May's Parliamentary
Practice.
Breaches of the rules and conventions naturally occur from time to
time. Sometimes they arise from inexperience or oversight—as when the
new member tries to read out his speech and has to be discouraged.
Sometimes they follow from excitement or indignation, as when mem-
bers forget to refer to each other indirectly as 'the Honourable Mem-
ber', or when they fail at once to resume their seats when the Speaker
rises to speak. More serious are those breaches of order which are de-
liberately made by way of protest or demonstration. The Speaker is of
course equipped with powers to deal with such breaches. He can order
the withdrawal of a member (i.e. from that day's sitting) or his suspen-
sion (i.e. for the remainder of the session) and he can adjourn the House
or suspend a sitting for a period. 5 In case of a necessity to use force to
1
See above, p. 117.
2
For the position and function of the Speaker, see below, Chapter VI.
3 E.g. Rules 246-252.
The list makes amusing reading. It seems a little hard on members that they are for-
bidden the phrase 'throwing dust in the eyes of members' and the satirical use of 'divine
jewel'. The ban on ' t o n g u e diarrhoea' is more understandable; so also the exclamation
' T o hell with the G o v e r n m e n t ' and the description of the Commissioner of Police as the
5
'Chief G o o n d a (i.e. criminal, thug) of the S t a t e ' ! Rules 288-290.
142 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

implement his decisions, he can call upon his Marshal (called Sergeant-
at-Arms in some States) or even on the Watch and Ward Staff of the
House (who may be police deputed for the purpose). Although anger
may be at first directed at the other side of the House, the Speaker's
duty to preserve decorum quickly involves the Chair in the dispute and
most of the ugly scenes have in fact eventually taken the form of pro-
tests against the Chair. Even at the Centre, ' walk-outs' of indignant in-
dividuals and of groups have taken place on occasion, the Communists
being particularly attached to this method of drawing attention to them-
selves and giving emphasis to their view that the Chair is not impartial.1
In State legislatures, this particular behaviour has been very much used
—almost to the point of blunting its effectiveness; in many Assemblies it
must by now be unusual for a session to pass without at least one walk-
out. 2 So far as the use of force is concerned, occasions at the Centre have
fortunately been rare. Since the election of the new Parliament, the
Marshal of the House of the People has been called upon in this con-
nection only twice; once his movement towards the recalcitrant member
was sufficient to persuade him to promise to keep quiet, while on the
other occasion the member had to be handled and forced out of the
Chamber.3 Some of the State legislatures have been rowdy more fre-
quently. It appears, however, that only one incident perhaps deserves to
be described as a riot: that occurred in Rajasthan, where parliamentary
government if not a curiosity is at least a novelty. 4 Indeed, it is probably
safe to predict that the generally high standards already to be found in
Delhi and in the senior State capitals will spread elsewhere fairly
quickly. Against this, it is true, must be reckoned the Communists' will-
1
The House of the People has also witnessed what must be an unusual form of 'walk-
out'—one staged by a Minister! During the debate on the Press (Objectionable Matter)
Amendment Bill—on which there was considerable dispute—the 'walk-out' of the Com-
munists on one day was followed by that of the Home Minister on the next. A press report
of the incident (Times of India, 13 March 1954) reads: 'Two examples of scurrilous press
writing quoted by the Minister were described by Mr. Anthony (Anglo-Indian nominated
member) as harmless innuendoes whose import had been grossly magnified by Ministerial
hypersensitiveness and ego. An elaboration of these remarks generated some heat and the
Minister left the Chamber exclaiming " I can't sit here any m o r e " to the accompaniment
of derisive opposition laughter. He returned, however, a few minutes later.'
2
It must be confessed that although the walk-out is a deliberate technique of protest, its
use might not be so general if there was complete confidence in all Speakers. The Speakers'
retention of party links makes this more difficult than is necessary. (On this, see below,
Chapter VI, Section 1.)
3 The first member was a Hindu Mahasabhite who would not accept the Speaker's re-
fusal to admit his adjournment motion on the arrest of the Jan Sangh leader, Dr. Mukher-
jee; the other more stubborn M.P. was a Communist who created a scene during the debate
on the controversial Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Bill. (H.P. Deb., 18 July
1952 and 9 March 1953 respectively.)
4 'What happened on May 21 in the Rajasthan Assembly', said a press report (Times of
India, 1 June 1954), 'has no parallel in the country's legislative history. Rajasthan legis-
lators, on that evening, shook fists and screamed insults at the presiding officer, toppled
over the desks and kicked away the chairs.' The incident ended when the Sergeant-at-Arms
was ordered to remove a Communist member from the Chamber.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 143

ingness to abuse political institutions for their own ends; but even this
can be checked by the disapproval of public opinion.
The House, then, is generally well behaved, sober and serious. It is
even—by comparison with the House of Commons at least—rather
humourless. There are one or two members who are amusing and who
make it their business to amuse; there are a few situations which never
fail to raise a laugh—as when the Chief Whip makes one of his rare and
brief interventions or a Minister repeats too often the plea that he re-
quires notice to answer a question; and the wit of the Deputy Speaker 1 is
an enlivening influence. On the whole, however, life on the floor of the
House is rather earnest. There is a perceptible difference of atmosphere
between the House and the Council. The Upper House is smaller in
numbers and less pressed for time. It has to recognise that it is not the
more important House; its smaller galleries are very seldom as crowded
as those of the Lower House. The result is a less tense and more friendly
tone of debate—to which the urbane and good-humoured personality of
the Chairman contributes greatly. To listen to its deliberations is to
listen to a very private and intimate discussion among members of a
rather special club. This is not to say that the House of the People is ill-
tempered or unfriendly. It is simply that it is busy and has serious work
to do, and that it is the main arena of struggle. Seriousness, however,
does not make for dullness. In fact, the House is dull neither to look at
or to listen to. The gathering is a good deal more interesting to the eye
than the generally dark-suited assemblies of Europe. The lady members
naturally wear colourful saris, while the men's dress varies considerably.
Some wear European clothes, Nehru's style of the elegant traditional
North Indian long coat buttoned at the neck and tight trousers is fol-
lowed by most Ministers and many members, while others, especially
from the South, keep to the simple white shirt worn outside a white cloth
dhoti tied in various fashions. 2 The style of speeches also varies consider-
ably. N o speeches are read 3 but a few members still adopt the tone and
technique of the public meeting and declaim their phrases to the galleries,
and this is indeed very common in the smaller State legislatures where
the public attendance is large and the members unaccustomed to the
style of debate. Even among those who have learnt how to talk in the
House—in what is meant, after all, to be a discussion and not a series of
1
M r A n a n t h a s a y a n a m A y y a n g a r . O n the d e a t h of M r M a v a l a n k a r in F e b . 1956, he
was u n a n i m o u s l y elected to the C h a i r .
2
T h e latter is practically universal in S o u t h Indian assemblies a n d a p p e a r s as m u c h a
u n i f o r m as the d a r k suits of W e s t m i n s t e r . It m a y be of interest t o record, in passing, t h a t
the P r i m e Minister in 1954 issued guidance to G o v e r n m e n t officers on dress a n d f a v o u r e d
the b u t t o n e d tunic rather t h a n the E u r o p e a n open-necked coat a n d tie. (An enterprising
N e w Delhi tailor on t h e following day advertised that he would u n d e r t a k e the necessary
a d j u s t m e n t s to E u r o p e a n jackets!)
3 T h e r e is n o rule to this effect, but the practice h a s been effectively discouraged by the
C h a i r . C e r t a i n ministerial statements and the F i n a n c e Minister's Budget speech are, of
course, exceptions.
144 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

addresses—even here, there is room for much variation. It is a minority,

so far, who can speak in a manner that is at once ordered and logical as
well as graceful, and whose speeches have been given careful preparation
beforehand. The majority is fluent without being impressive in manner.
At the other extreme, there are some 1 whose style of delivery is so erratic
and incoherent that they appear to invite interruption—and, indeed,
sometimes appear to flourish on it to a point where it is difficult to see
what they would have said if they had been left to speak undisturbed.
These comments on the speeches prompt a mention of the question of
the language of debate. The Constitution provides that Hindi is the
official language of the Union, but that for fifteen years (from 1950)
English shall continue to be used for those official purposes for which
it was being used before 1950. It also enables any State legislature to
choose Hindi and/or a regional language as the official language of the
State, again with the same proviso regarding English. 2 The Constitution
further refers to the languages to be used in legislatures: in Parliament
Hindi or English are to be used, in State legislatures the official language
of the State or Hindi or English; in all cases, the presiding officers may
permit a member who cannot adequately express himself in these
languages to speak in his mother tongue. 3 In the Union Parliament,
there has been very little difficulty arising out of languages other than
Hindi and English. Shortly after the assembly of the new House a mem-
ber asked the Speaker if translations would be provided of speeches
made in a third language. The Speaker replied: 'Let us not raise im-
aginary difficulties'; genuine cases might arise and would be considered
then, but ordinarily, he supposed, members 'will try to speak in a man-
ner which is intelligible to other members'. 4 His hopes have been ful-
filled, but there has been a tough tussle between the ardent North India
advocates of Hindi and the non-Hindi-speaking members, especially
from the South. On one occasion the occupant of the Chair, a member
from Madras, asked a member who had begun in Hindi if he would
kindly speak in English so that the Chair could follow. 5 Only two days
later, the Railways Minister who replied in Hindi to the debate on the
Railway Budget was asked by the Speaker to give a short summary also
in English—' for the benefit of the large number of members from South
India particularly'. 6 The same Minister was on a similar occasion ad-
vised by the Deputy Speaker that Minister's speeches had a special im-
portance and should therefore be given in English. 7 On the other hand,
when a Madras member asked for an English translation of an answer

2 3
i Including, I fear, some Ministers. Arts. 343 and 345. Arts. 120 and 210.
4
H.P. Deb., 19 May 1952. During the first session, 496 members of the House of the
People took the oath or made the affirmation; 259 did so in English, 220 in Hindi, 9 in
Urdu, 4 in Malayalam, 2 in Telegu, 1 in Tamil and 1 in Oriya (Parliament Secretariat,
Brief Summary of Work, First Session, 1952).
6 7
5 H.P. Deb., 27 May 1952. H.P. Deb., 29 May 1952. H.P. Deb., 6 June 1952.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 145
given in Urdu by the Education Minister to a question put in English,
the Speaker remarked that members should really make efforts to learn
Urdu or Hindi; translations were available for members some time later
—admittedly too late from the point of view of putting supplementary
questions. 1 Govind Das, one of the foremost proponents of Hindi, has
been pressing that when questions are put in Hindi it should be made
compulsory to answer them in Hindi. On one occasion, the Deputy
Speaker replied that members must be given some time to learn Hindi;
even the Constitution had given English fifteen years' lease of life and
certainly 'point of bayonets' tactics would not help matters. 2 Classes in
Hindi for those M.P.s new to the language have in fact been started, and
some of the Congress Party members at least are enthusiastic. As a re-
ciprocal gesture, some Northerners are making efforts to learn one of the
Southern languages. Yet one may hazard the guess that it will not be
until some time after 1965 that all members will be able to speak at all
easily in Hindi.
U p to the present the proportion of speeches given in Hindi in the
Union Parliament remains comparatively small, in spite of the efforts to
increase its popularity. 3 There has, however, been some increase during
the period since 1947. The following figures show the average number of
minutes of Hindi speeches per day which the reporters of the House of
the People have recorded:
TABLE XIX—LENGTH OF HINDI REPORTING PER DAY
Average No. of
Session Minutes of Hindi
reporting per day

Before 1949 . Less than 10 minutes

Constituent Assembly (Legisla-
tive)
1949 Sixth Session 10
Provisional Parliament, 1950-52
First Session . 19
Second Session 13
Third Session 30
Fourth Session 46
Fifth Session . 38
House of the People, 1952-54
First Session . 36
Second Session 35
Third Session 58
Fourth Session 39
Fifth Session . 34
NOTE.—The length of the day's sitting has not been constant. Before 1951 they lasted
4£ hours; after that, 5 hours. But there were, of course, a few extended sittings.
1
H.P. Deb., 6 June 1952. The Education Minister, Maulana Azad, has always spoken in
Urdu—the form of Hindustani or Hindi which is written in the Persian script and which
2
contains a number of Arabic and Persian words. H.P. Deb., 30 March 1953.
3
The announcements in 1954 that the House of the People would henceforward be
known as the Lok Sabha and the Council of States as Rajya Sabha are illustrations of the
campaign.
10—P.I.
146 THE H O U S E A N D THE MEMBER

It would appear that, except when topics of special concern to Hindi

advocates are frequent (as in the Budget session of 1953), there is about
half an hour's Hindi spoken in a five-hour day. It may be added that so
far as the records of the House are concerned, speeches given in Hindi
are published in Hindi—and since 1952 no English translation is given.
At the same time a Hindi edition of the debates is being prepared along-
side the English version.
In the States, English has already lost importance. In the States in
Northern India such as Uttar Pradesh, the great majority of speeches
are in Hindi. In most other States, too, the regional languages have
come into their own. This is particularly evident where there is one main
regional language. In Travancore-Cochin, for example, almost all the
speeches are in Malayalam—which can be understood and spoken even
by those whose mother tongue is Tamil; the Speaker, however, con-
tinues to make his remarks on procedure in English.1 In Bombay, on the
other hand, there are three regional languages and the best way to be
understood by all is to speak in English. The cosmopolitan nature of the
big cities also has its influence in keeping English alive in those assem-
blies which meet in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.
It has already been noted that members of Parliament receive a daily
allowance for their attendance. This arrangement, rather than the pay-
ment of a salary, was general in central and provincial legislatures dur-
ing the period before 1947. Since the election of the new Parliament in
1952, this matter has been the subject of some thought and discussion;
we may, therefore, begin a brief review of some general attitudes of
M.P.s with an examination of their attitudes on this question of par-
ticular interest to them. The position on the eve of independence was
that members received a daily allowance of Rs.45/- 2 for each day of
parliamentary session or other parliamentary work. In addition mem-
bers were paid a travelling allowance: one and three-fifths of the first-
class fare to Delhi and back at the start and end of each session; one
first-class fare to and from Delhi for any other parliamentary journeys.
In 1949, the members greeted the approach of the new republic by
sacrificing some of their allowance; the daily amount was reduced to
Rs.40/-. Shortly after the elections of the new Parliament in 1952, a
Joint Committe of both Houses containing representatives of all main
parties was set up to consider whether it was desirable to change the
system to a salary basis or to a combination of salary and allowances.3
1
During the short ten-day session of the Travancore-Cochin Assembly in March 1954
there were, I believe, only two speeches in English, and one of these was by the nominated
Anglo-Indian member. Otherwise, apart from the Speaker's remarks, English only arose in
words and phrases here and there—such as ' o n a point of order', 'deficit financing', and,
every now and again in the course of a speech, 'Sir'.
2
1 Rupee = ls. (id.
3 The Speaker announced the appointment of the committee on 6 June 1952. It reported
a month later.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 147

The Committee called for suggestions from M.P.s and received over
two hundred proposals. It also considered foreign legislatures' practice.
There was some disagreement in the Committee, but the eventual re-
commendation was against the introduction of any salary and for a
further reduction in the allowance to Rs.35/- per day. The Communist
representatives were the outspoken advocates of a salary; they suggested
Rs.300/- per month plus a daily allowance of Rs.10/- per day. They
emphasised the need to reflect the fact that an M.P.'s j o b was not only
in Delhi but in his constituency too, and that it was an all-the-year j o b
and not an affair of sessions. The Committee as a whole agreed to leave
the travelling allowance unaltered and it rejected a proposal for free
railway passes.
When, however, the Government tabled a resolution seeking to give
effect to these proposals, there was something approaching a back-bench
revolt; the back rows were not prepared for a second grand gesture of
self-sacrifice. The Government took quick stock of the situation and de-
cided not to press the matter. The report was stored away for a while.
In the meantime, first-class accommodation on the railways was abol-
ished during 1953; this gave a reasonable opportunity to re-open the
whole question. In 1954, the House referred the problem back to the
Joint Committee, with instructions to recommend new travelling allow-
ances appropriate to the changed circumstances and also to re-examine
the salary question 'in view of the further experience gained since the
first report was presented.' 1 It was clear that a good deal of opinion had
moved round in favour of a salary scheme. The Report 2 outlines the two
opposing points of view. The salary school of thought stressed the need
for a fixed income throughout the year to meet family obligations and
to encourage political work in the constituencies. The allowances sec-
tion of opinion pointed out that for thirty-three years the system had
worked very adequately and also that a salary scheme would lead to
neglect of work in Parliament. They also indicated that salaries would
entail 'income-tax complications'. 3 The Committee felt that ' t h e argu-
ments are so balanced that it is not possible to recommend any one view
as applying universally to all members'. Members should therefore be
free to choose either (a) a salary of Rs.300/- per month plus Rs.20/- per
day, or (b) a daily allowance of Rs.40/- per day. The travelling allow-
ances were to be adjusted to equal two second-class and one third-class
fare for each journey. Once more, however, the back-benchers were not

1 H.P. Deb., 27 March 1954. The Chief Whip who had had the difficult task of organis-
ing the Government retreat before back-bench pressure summarised his experience simply
by saying that ' m u c h water had flowed' since 1952.
2
Parliament of India: Joint Committee on Payment of Salary and Allowances to Mem-
bers of Parliament, Second Report, April 1954.
3 W h a t 'complications' would be entailed is not clear; certainly salaries would 'entail
income tax'—and probably no more than that was meant.
148 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

satisfied. A meeting of the Congress Party in Parliament 1 was called to

discuss the question. The Prime Minister indicated that he had an open
mind on the subject and would leave it to the M.P.s themselves to de-
cide. In these circumstances, it was inevitable that the ' self-sacrificers '
would lose the day. The original proposal before the meeting was for
Rs.300/- per month plus Rs.20/- per day; this was dropped in favour of
Rs.400/- per month and Rs.21/- per day, ahd the option scheme was
abandoned. The Bill finally passed by Parliament embodies these results
of the Party meeting. It also included a free railway pass for the mem-
bers, in addition to the continuation (meant for his family and servant)
of travelling allowances in cash equal to one second- and one third-class
fare for the sessions. The Ministers abstained from voting on the Bill,
while the Communists attacked it as giving the M.P.s an income out of
all proportion even to that of the middle class in general 2 ; the great
majority of members simply felt relieved at the prospect of being better
able to withstand the pressure of Delhi's cost of living.
The salary question gave the ordinary M.P. a sense of his own power
vis-à-vis the leaders. It can hardly be a precedent for other issues, since
the Government in this case was not committed on a matter of high
national policy. It may, however, have given greater confidence to some
of the younger and more active back-benchers. Yet a great readiness to
question, to suggest, to disagree will, it must be recognised, be reflected
very little on the floor of the House; it will show itself largely within
party circles. For the Indian M.P. is a strong party member. Despite
regional attachments, despite class and caste affinities, party loyalty re-
mains strong. Divergent views on policy and particular local emphases
will, therefore, seek expression primarily within the councils of the
party. 3 Every member represents a constituency and many members
have particular ' interests ' in whose furtherance they are concerned, but
these loyalties have mainly to find their place within the loyalty to party.
Clearly, this does not prevent the M.P.s' questions from having a re-
gional or interest bias. A casual glance at one day's Question Hour is
enough to illustrate the point: a Delhi M.P. asks about central aid for
Delhi development schemes; a member from the Kangra tea-growing
district enquires about the constitution of the Tea Board and the mem-
ber from the coffee-growing State of Coorg wants to know about
Government plans for the export of coffee; the M.P. who is President of
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry asks
1 See below, Chapter IV, Section 2.
2 H.P. Deb., 14 May 1954, and C.S. Deb., 19 May 1954. The measure was 'piloted' by
the Government Chief Whip in his capacity as Minister for Parliamentary Affairs—or, as
he had described himself, as 'Minister for Members'; in this case, however, his task was
rather to gauge the strength of back-bench feeling and, having done so, to stand aside and
let it have its way.
3 This process at present takes place mainly within the Congress Party. The Party's
machinery of State Groups and specialised Standing Committees is described below,
Chapter IV, Section 2.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 149

whether, and if so how, the Government proposes to associate men with

experience of industry in the management of State Enterprises; and a
trade unionist questions the ministry on the wages paid to employees of
the Government Presses. 1 N o r does party loyalty mean the suppression
of these particular 'sectional' concerns in the course of debate; even
from a party point of view the best contribution a member can make
may often be of this kind; and, indeed, the Whips will choose their
parties' speakers mainly on these grounds. Thus if the debate is on the
Control of Shipping Bill, members from both sides of that particular in-
dustry will expect to be able to speak; a discussion on the Coir Industry
will naturally constitute an opportunity to members from Travancore-
Cochin, where that industry is largely concentrated. 2 'Pressure groups',
though not elaborately organised, certainly exist, and it would probably
be difficult to discover any significant 'interest' which was not directly
or indirectly represented in the House. The ' g r o u p ' will work unobstru-
sively but it will naturally use all legitimate means to press its case. One
clear example is provided by the Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and Industry. This body is directly represented in Parliament
in that both its President and Secretary are members, one Independent,
the other Congress. It will have its views expressed on the floor of the
House and through party channels. It will be called upon (or it will itself
ask to be allowed) to give evidence before Select Committees handling
Bills in which it is interested. It will also be consulted on a wide range of
subjects by the appropriate ministries of Government, the consulta-
tions taking place through departmental committees, deputations and
verbal representations, or correspondence. In the same way constituency
pressure also exists and seeks several ways of expressing itself. This pres-
sure is on the whole rather weak at the Centre. It is true that M.P.s re-
ceive letters and that on any day of the session there will be groups in the
corridors of Parliament House who have come in the hope of pressing
their member to some action or representation on their behalf. 3 The
1 H.P. Deb., 8 March 1954.
2
The Whip's choice of speakers is discussed also below, Chapter IV, Section 2. It some-
times happens that members not directly connected with the particular business feel that
they are unfairly excluded. On the Coir Industry Bill debate, for instance, a member was
prompted to ask the Chair whether there was any convention that only directly interested
M.P.s were able to 'catch the Speaker's eye'; he was assured that this was not the case
(H.P. Deb., 17 Nov. 1953). The Speaker is, however, much guided by the lists put in by the
Whips, and the complaint indicates that the Whips had given clear priority to members
f r o m coir districts.
3
The pressure, whether by correspondence or by interview, is difficult to assess and
appears in any case to vary a great deal from member to member. The pressure bears some
relation to the responsiveness of the M.P.: a few members have a heavy burden of corres-
pondence which they conscientiously tiy to deal with; others receive few letters and do not
reply even to those. The main opportunity for constituency pressure arises when the mem-
ber returns home at the end of the session. He then has to receive a fairly constant stream
of visitors. But many of their requests will be of a personal nature. The M.P., that is, will
be asked to use his influence to find suitable employment in Delhi for this man's son or
that man's cousin. A few matters that can be regarded as questions of policy may also be
raised, but it must be remembered that, above all in rural constituencies, the policies that
touch the people tend to be the responsibility of the State Governments.
150 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

main constituency pressure, however, is at the State level and is exerted

on and through the State member of the legislative assembly (M.L.A.);
in this case, too, it operates through questions, speeches, representation
on Select Committees on Bills and above all through party channels.
Perhaps the most searching questions that can be asked in order to re-
veal the character of a parliament and the attitudes of its members are
those that concern the relations between private member and the
Government and between Government and Opposition. Lord Campion
has recently made a brief but penetrating analysis of this matter so far as
Europe is concerned by pointing out some of the contrasts between the
British and French models of parliamentary organisation and be-
haviour. 1 The exploration of these questions in the Indian context will
show that parliament in India appears to have characteristics which be-
long to both models; in some respects it might even be said that there is
an Indian model which represents a position somewhere between the
two.
Lord Campion first enquires into the relations between the Govern-
ment and Parliament, or the Government and the private member.' The
British Cabinet', he writes, 'is not only responsible to Parliament, it is
part of Parliament, whereas elsewhere some hankering after the doctrine
of the separation of powers (which is strictly incompatible with parlia-
mentary government) tends to make the association . . . to be from out-
side, or half in and half outside.' In the Continental parliament the
situation of 'Ministry versus the Chamber' is normal and predominant,
and is reflected in several rules of procedure. Thus, in Norway, a member
who becomes a Minister hands over his duties as a member to a
substitute. It is often a rule that a Minister may speak in either House—
as if it were a courtesy granted to a stranger—whereas the British
Minister must 'belong' to one House and has rights only where he
belongs. 2 The French Minister is an alien in the House—unable to
serve on its committees, unable to move amendments in his own name,
and so on.
The position in the Indian Parliament is in this respect by no means
identical with that of Westminster. One important difference is that
Ministers are given by the Indian Constitution the right to speak in and
otherwise take part in the proceedings of either House. 3 This does help
to create a feeling of their being, if not strangers, at least somewhat less
than members—as well as somewhat more. For the constitutional pro-
vision is no formality; Ministers who are members of one House do in
1
Lord C a m p i o n , ' European Parliamentary Procedure', in Parliamentary Affairs (Spring,
1953). The procedural aspects in particular are set out in greater detail in Campion and
Lidderdale, European Parliamentary Procedure (1953). See also Lidderdale, The Parliament
of France (1951).
2
South Africa follows the Continental model in this.
3 Art. 88.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 151
1
fact have to spend a great deal of their time in the other. To some ex-
tent the need for a Cabinet Minister to operate in both Houses is les-
sened by entrusting some work to a junior colleague in the other House;
but, so far at least, this practice, though increasing, is by no means
general. The Minister who pilots a Bill through the House of the People
of which he is a member will, some weeks later, appear on the floor of
the Council of States to repeat his performance. In the same way, the
Minister who answers a batch of questions on production or legal mat-
ters in the Council of which he is a member will probably appear a few
days later to answer a similar series put by members of the Lower
House. 2 The Prime Minister and his senior colleagues certainly have to
be careful to divide their time between the two Houses and aid the
transaction of important business in both. These arrangements, while
they give a certain amount of flexibility and enable a shortage of mem-
bers of ministerial quality to be overcome, place a great burden on the
Ministers and result in their being more easily regarded by members of
both Houses as of very different and distinct status.
By itself, however, this constitutional provision would not have a very
pronounced effect on relations between members and government. More
important is an attitude of distrust of the Government inherited f r o m
the days of nationalist antagonism towards the alien government of the
British. Old habits of thought die hard, and it often appears as though
this particular old habit of distrust has been carried over into the new
period and transmitted into a variant of t h e ' hankering after the doctrine
of the separation of powers' which Lord Campion detects in France. An
excellent illustration of this feature is supplied by an exchange between
the Speaker and certain members which took place towards the end of
1950. The Speaker felt called upon to remark on the distrust displayed
even by members of the Government party.

Members should not jump to the conclusion that the Government want to
keep anything away from them. . . . That seems to me to be a remnant of
old memories, ignoring the character of the Government we have now. . . .
We must change our approach towards the Government. (An Hon. Mem-
ber : What about the Government changing its approach ?) Whatever may
be the mistakes of Government, we are now a sovereign House and the
Government is responsible to the House. (An Hon. Member: It is not.) If
they are not, I should say the House is weak not to drive them out. (An
Hon. Member: It is for you.) It is not for the Speaker. It is for the majority
to be strong and insistent, and I am sure that any government which claims
1 In the Ministry of 1952 after the General Elections, out of 15 Cabinet members, 5
were of the Council; of the 6 Ministers of Cabinet rank, none were f r o m the Council; of
the 14 Deputy Ministers, 3; of the 4 Parliamentary Secretaries, 1—making a total of 9
Council members out of a Ministry of 39.
2
Questions are grouped in each House so that certain departments are covered on cer-
tain days. Since Question H o u r is at the same time in both Houses, the Secretariats co-
ordinate this allotment of days for different departments to avoid overlapping.
152 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER

to be democratic and responsible to the House is bound to respond to what

the House says.1
This distrust is further aggravated by the lack of mutual respect between
politicians and civil servants. This, too, is a relic of the past when the
civil service was an arm of that foreign administration which put in
prison a large number of those who are now the leading politicians. The
result is that a member who becomes a Minister is still felt in some way
to have gone over, if not to 'the other side', at least to a position of
potential antagonism. The classic expression of this view was given by
the member who confessed: 'When I hear a word of praise from the
Ministers about their Secretaries and staff, I feel they are lost to the
country'. 2
One of the questions Lord Campion asks in order to demonstrate
the relations between Government and Parliament is—who chooses the
Government? On this point there is little difference, so far at least,
between India and Britain. The Government of India is chosen by the
electorate, which on the whole votes for a party; it is not chosen as the
result of negotiation between ill-defined and freely-deciding parlia-
mentary groups.3 The Nehru Government between 1947 and 1952 was
deliberately not a one-party government, since the Constituent Assembly
(Legislative) and the Provisional Parliament had not been chosen directly
by the people, and in any case it was felt desirable to start the post-
independence period with a broad leadership.4 By the time of the
General Elections, however, the non-Congress Ministers had resigned,
and after the elections there was no question of anything but a one-
party ministry.5 On another question—who controls the Government?
• i P.P. Deb., 20 Dec. 1950. At the same time, the Speaker and his staff have in a number
of ways had to assert the independence of Parliament and have thus done something to
accentuate the sense of cleavage and distinctness between Government and Parliament.
On this see also below, Chapter VI.
2
The M.P. concerned was one with a long record of service for the Congress Party from
1921 to 1946, and he had been imprisoned on no less than six occasions for participating in
Congress activity. Although the remark was made shortly after independence (C.A.
(Leg.) Deb., 17 March 1948), the attitude it reflects is still a force in the minds of members.
3
He would be too bold who would predict the party structure of India in a score of
years. But it seems to me that the trend towards the disappearance of small parties will con-
tinue. If this proves correct, it will also follow that the choice will tend to remain with the
electorate; it can be no more than a tendency—as the 1954 elections in Travancore-Cochin
showed. (See above, p. 109. Who 'chose' the P.S.P. Government?)
4
See the Prime Minister's statement in the House (C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 8 March 1948)
when he spoke of the consequences—'much argument in the Cabinet' but also 'extreme
friendliness and co-operation'.
5
The important resignations were: Dr. S. P. Mukherjee (later to found the Jan Sangh)
on 19 April 1950 on the issue of the 1950 Agreement with Pakistan, and with him K. C.
Neogy; Dr. Mathai on the relation between himself as Minister of Finance and the Planning
Commission; Dr. Ambedkar (who then resumed leadership of the Scheduled Castes
Federation) on 11 Oct. 1951 on the slow progress of the Hindu Code Bill, on foreign
policy, and other issues; Baldev Singh on 13 May 1952. A brief note on the changing struc-
ture and composition of the central ministry since 1948 is given in a Note at the end of this
chapter.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 153
—the Indian answer is not so clear. In Britain the Government is con-
trolled partly by its own supporters, but also, says Lord Campion, by a
homogeneous Opposition; in the Continental model, governments are
usually controlled by the two wings—Right and Left—of the Opposi-
tion ; also by the fact that even the parties supporting the government
have 'one foot in the Opposition'; and, finally, by a committee system
which is designed to produce a distinctive 'Chamber point of view'.
Here, again, India presents something of both worlds. The committee
system in India is considered later; at this point it is enough to say that in
the nature of the committees established as well as in the scope and tone
of their work, the system goes beyond that of Britain and in some re-
spects comes near to that of the Continent. 1
The relations between Government and opposition in India present
several special features. The most obvious is, of course, the predominant
strength of the Congress Government. This is a strength not of numbers
alone. It is a strength of relative unity compared with the disparate ele-
ments of the opposition. It is also a strength of experience; as we have
seen,2 the bulk of legislative—let alone executive—experience is to be
found in the Congress Party. This tends to make opposition criticism
often unrealistic and out of touch with administrative reality; it also
tends to predispose the Government to be scornful of the opposition's
contribution. An important consequence of this is that the Ministers
often feel that they bear a heavy burden in isolation; some feel that few
points of use are made from the opposition benches or even from their
own party, and the discussion that must precede policy is a discussion
restricted to a few colleagues in the ministry with the help of the senior
officials.
The relations between Government and opposition are also influ-
enced by the past of the Congress Party. This, too, contributes to feelings
of peculiar resentment on both sides. The Congress struggles to make the
psychological adjustment of climbing down from its position as a
national liberation movement, while the opposition is irritated by its in-
ability to change its mood overnight. The situation is complicated by the
fact that many of those on the opposition benches are former members
of Congress; this adds special tones to the attitudes on both sides. It
may be added that the presence of the Communist Party as a prominent
part of the opposition tends further to slow the transformation; con-
fronted with the Communists, the Congress feels more easily justified in
1
See below, Chapter VI. Lord Campion points out that just as the role of the Opposi-
tion in Britain ' m a y seem to us to go some way towards disproving the charge of auto-
cracy' which is often levelled against us on the Continent, so also ' t h e French system of
committees does at any rate do something to make good the Assembly's need of political
leadership' which is often felt in Britain to be the main defect of the Continental parlia-
ment. T h e Indian committee system may go beyond that of Britain, but not to this degree;
political leadership is still provided by a homogeneous government.
2 Above, p. 122.
154 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

its retention of the national mantle. To put the matter at its worst, all
this tends to make for unresponsiveness in the Government and irres-
ponsibility in the opposition. 1 The criticism should certainly not be ex-
aggerated ; there are on both sides of the House members who listen to
the opposite benches with attention and with minds open to the ideas of
others. Moreover, although it is indeed important that good habits be
cultivated in these formative years of Parliament, there are signs at the
Centre that the position is already improving; the impatient Minister is
disappearing and the irresponsible critic may follow him. 2 The process
will no doubt be a little slower in the States.
The Indian pattern, then, is not that of a government confronted and
controlled by a strong and homogeneous opposition. Nor can it really be
said that it is the French pattern of a government managing to exist by
keeping at bay two wings of opposition which threaten continuously to
engulf it; there are two wings of the Indian opposition but they make
no real threat as yet. 3 In the peculiar circumstances still prevailing in the
Indian party system, the Indian Government is not effectively control-
led ; it is simply influenced by the desire to retain its past popularity in
the country as a whole and by the need to take some account of move-
ments of opinion among its own rather varied supporters. 4 The latter in-
fluence is perhaps weaker now than it was before the General Elections;
certainly open criticism from within the party is less marked now than
in the Provisional Parliament. From this point of view, there was more
opposition when there were no opposition groups. 5

1
It is interesting that many M.P.s who were members of the old Central Assembly (as
well as some independent press observers of the old legislature) compare the present Parlia-
ment unfavourably with the old. Although the Government of those days was alien and
remote, they say, its members took very careful note of all criticism (as the files show),
replied minutely to the points of the Opposition and were conscientious in their attend-
ance and attentiveness alike.
2
A newspaper comment expressed the familiar complaint: ' I n a new Parliament, few
are m o r e unhelpful than the petulant Minister whose face puckers with irritation when
details are asked for, who rails at the opposition or silences the rank and file of his own
party, sinking back into his seat with a sense of achievement and conscious of the mechani-
cal majority behind h i m ' (Statesman, 26 Jan. 1954). Some Ministers have made the cari-
cature almost a portrait. The Prime Minister has normally set a good example. On one
occasion, for instance, the seriousness with which he treated opposition comment was
said (Hindustan Times, 23 Dec. 1954) to have 'created a p r o f o u n d impression': when
Communist members made certain allegations with regard to affairs in Pondicherry, he
left the House to put through a special trunk call and returned to communicate his in-
formation to the critics.
3 The P.S.P. Government in Travancore-Cochin was perhaps in this position, its move-
ments being influenced by the need neither to outrage its Congress' supporters' nor to give
too many opportunities for telling criticism f r o m the extreme Left.
4
Governments are, of course, also influenced by their own sense of mission and duty,
and this is particularly strong in the case of a former national movement.
5
The Aug. 1951 session of the Provisional Parliament, one M.P. remarked at the time,
would become famous for the number of occasions on which the Government bowed to
opinion expressed by Congress M.P.s on the floor of the House. Several bills were intro-
duced, subjected to heavy criticism in debate, held over for a while and finally considerably
amended from their original form (e.g. Part C States Bill, P.P. Deb., 25 Aug. 1951),
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 155
In this context it is worth noting the extent to which recognition and
rights are accorded to the opposition in Parliament. In the House of the
People the Speaker has maintained a distinction between Party and
Group which was made in the old Central Assembly. In a House of 140
a body of 12 qualified for recognition as a Party, while 9 was sufficient
to constitute a Group. In the new Parliament the Speaker has felt that
the tests, at least for Party status, should be stiffened, and in fact three
qualifications are now regarded as necessary before recognition as a
Parliamentary Party can be accorded: a number equal to the quorum of
the House (50)—for it must be able to ' keep the House'; a certain unity
of ideology and programme—so as to avoid encouraging mere associa-
tions of convenience; and the possession of an organisation outside the
House as well as inside. By these tests, only Congress has been able to
achieve recognition, even the P.S.P. and Communists being too small.
Groups are given recognition more easily and the Communist Party has
been accorded Group status. The position in the State Assemblies natur-
ally varies. In some cases, even where the Centre's tests have been ap-
plied, Party status is achieved by one or more group. In other cases,
State Speakers have waived the tests; in Uttar Pradesh the small P.S.P.
group has been given Party status and its leader recognised as Leader of
the opposition. Sometimes disagreement within the opposition ranks
prevents recognition even when the Speaker is ready to give it. In West
Bengal the opposition numbers 81 in a House of 158, but it is much di-
vided; the largest group is the Communists (30), but the rest of the
opposition (51) objects to any recognition being given to them.
In any event the difference in the privileges given to Parties and to
Groups appears on the surface to be not very marked. Groups as well as
Parties are consulted on the arrangement of the business of the House. 1
Both are equally considered from the point of view of opportunities to
speak, and both are allotted blocks of seats in the Chamber. The dif-
ferences remain two: first, only Parties (i.e. only the Congress Party at
present) are given office accommodation in Parliament House; second,
Groups have only an uncertain and limited right to be consulted on
important issues of policy. It is the latter point which has greater impor-
tance than at first sight appears. The Government may in practice con-
sult the opposition Groups, but this is a very different matter from being
continuously aware of the existence of a Leader of the Opposition who
is the head of an alternative government; and in fact the practice is that
there is little consultation. 2 Everyone in India is anxious to see a stronger
1 See below, pp. 217-219.
2
The spectator f r o m the gallery will often notice the Government Chief Whip moving
over to talk to leaders on the other side of the House (and there is also similar consultation
in the lobbies and offices), but the matters dealt with are mainly procedural, though the
Whip may also ' s o u n d ' some of those on the other side on some questions of policy. The
Prime Minister has set up a very informal foreign affairs group which contains members
f r o m the other side. It may be true that consultation would be freer and easier if the
Communists were not present.
 156 T H E H O U S E A N D T H E MEMBER
TABLE XX—STRUCTURE AND

1947-48 1948-49 1949-50

1. P R I M E MINISTER &
E X T E R N A L AFFAIRS
Minister of State for External Affairs
Deputy Minister for External Affairs Keskar (a) —
BALDEV S I N G H -
Minister of State
Deputy Minister . . . .
Deputy Minister . . . .
3. E D U C A T I O N . . . .
NATURAL RESOURCES &
SCIENTIFIC R E S E A R C H .
Minister of State for Natural
Resources
Deputy Minister of State for Natural
Resources & Scientific Research .
4. H O M E \ PATEL
STATES j-PATEL
INFORMATION AND BROAD-
CASTING . . . .
Minister of State for Information &
Broadcasting . . . . Diwakar
Deputy Minister for H o m e Affairs .
5. T R A N S P O R T . . . . }AYYANGAR AYYANGAR
RAILWAYS . . . .
Minister of State for Railways
Deputy Minister for Railways &
Transport

Deputy Minister . . . .
7. C O M M U N I C A T I O N S . 11 \
Deputy Minister . . . .

Minister of State . . . .
Deputy Minister . . . .
9. L A W
M I N O R I T Y AFFAIRS
Minister of State for Law
Minister of State for Minority Affairs Biswas
10. L A B O U R
Deputy Minister . . . .
11. F O O D & A G R I C U L T U R E .
Minister of State . . . .
Deputy Minister . . . .
12. R E H A B I L I T A T I O N .
Minister of State . . . . Saksena— (b) (b) • Iain (b)
Deputy Minister . . . .
13. I N D U S T R Y & SUPPLY MUKHERÏEE MAHTAB (see below)
W O R K S , MINES & P O W E R .
COMMERCE . . . . NEOGY PRAKASA (see 3)
WORKS, PRODUCTION &
SUPPLY
Deputy Minister for W.P.S.
W O R K S , H O U S I N G & SUPPLY .
Deputy Minister for W . H . S . .
COMMERCE & INDUSTRY .
Minister of State for C . & I. .
Deputy Minister for C. & I. .
PLANNING, IRRIGATION &
POWER
Deputy Minister for Planning
Deputy Minister for I. & P. .
PRODUCTION . . . .
14. M I N I S T E R WITHOUT PORT-
FOLIO RAJAGOPALACHARI
15. Minister of State for Parliamentary
Affairs Sinha

(a) Plus Commonwealth Relations. (b) Plus Relief. (c) Health & Communications combined,
(d) Transport & States combined. (e) Defence & External Relations combined.
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 157

PERSONNEL OF C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T

1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 29.1.55

Mahmud
v.. (

AYYANGAR NEHRU (e) (e) KATJU

Himatsinjhi
Chandra

PRAKASA
Mala vi ya

RA J AG OP AL ACH ARI (see 2) PANT

AYYANGAR (d)

jjatar
T>vMrF 3

1
1
~n A 1.1

KAUR (c)

t., una

Pataskar

DESAI

IAIN
Rao
IAIN (see 11)
T,. .
Khanna

GADGIL
Burgaohain (see below)

MAHTAB
Karmarkar
Mishra
I lathi

NOTE.—Members of the Cabinet are given in CAPITALS. Ministers of State (who are of Cabinet
rank but not actual members) and Deputy Ministers are in ordinary type.
158 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

and more coherent opposition; it is easy to see that it may become

stronger, but it is not easy to see it operating as one homogeneous force
under one leader. The recognition policy laid down by the Speaker is in-
tended to help the process, without encouraging alliances based on no
principle. Nevertheless, in the meantime, Government itself suffers by
the lack of contact with the opposite benches. It might be better—even
now, before the next elections bring their new configuration of parties—
to attempt to encourage the opposition Groups to agree upon one
Leader solely for the purpose of consultation on policy with the Govern-
ment. Such a Leader would not, of course, be able normally to express a
general and coherent opposition view, and the practical usefulness of
his comments might at first be very limited. This would matter less than
the fact that the Government would begin to learn the habit of consulta-
tion and the opposition would begin to feel a share of responsibility.

NOTE on the Structure and Composition of Governments (see p. 152, n. 5)

An attempt has been made in the table, pp. 156-7, to set out the
changes in the structure and personnel of the Central Government.
It will be seen that the arrangement of portfolios has changed con-
siderably from time to time, so much so that few of them have remained
unaltered throughout the period. Some of the changes have been
effected to meet the needs of the available personnel; the temporary
combination of Transport and States under Gopalaswamy Ayyangar in
1950-51 is an example of this kind. Others have resulted from special
temporary needs—such as a Minister for Minority Affairs, later com-
bined with the Law portfolio before it eventually disappeared. Others,
again, have arisen out of the developing nature of State activity; the
portfolios of Production and of Planning, Irrigation and Power are
obvious examples of this kind.
The structure of the Government has also undergone changes. The
first post-independence Government consisted of 14 members of the
Cabinet and 1 Minister of State. In the following years the number of
Ministers of State (of Cabinet rank but not members of the Cabinet)
was increased, and Deputy Ministers were introduced. On the eve of the
General Elections of 1952 the Cabinet numbered 13, Ministers of State 6
and Deputy Ministers 7. Subsequently while the numbers of the Cabinet
and Ministers of State have remained practically the same, the number
of Deputies has been doubled—an indication of both the pressure of
ministerial duties and the importance of creating an intermediate level
of Government leaders, many of whom are younger men with chances of
promotion. The same factors, it may be added, are also responsible for
an increase in the numbers of Parliamentary Secretaries.
The changes in the personnel of the Government have been in part
due to death or retirement—as with Patel, Ayyangar, Kidwai. Some-
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 159
times Ministers have left to become State Governors—as did Prakasa,
Munshi and Diwakar. Finally, there have been the resignations on
grounds of policy. These have been of two kinds. The first group
occurred during 1949-51 and meant the break-up of the post-indepen-
dence coalition cabinet: Mathai, S. P. Mukherjee, Neogy, Ambedkar
and Baldev Singh were all men whose previous political connections with
Congress were not strong. After the General Elections of 1951-52 the
Government was a Congress Government. Even so, however, there have
been resignations on grounds of policy: those of Giri and Krishna-
machari (the latter's subsequently withdrawn) are the important ex-
amples.
In the States' Governments, too, similar changes have taken place.
The rearrangements of portfolios have been very frequent and in most
cases the changes appear to have been determined by personal factors. 1
While it is unnecessary to set out this part of the story, it may be useful
to show the changes of personnel as a guide to the stability or otherwise
of State rule. The following table shows the membership of some State
Governments during each of the seven years since 1947:

TABLE XXI—MEMBERSHIP OF SOME STATE GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1 9 4 7

1. Assam
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
Bardoloi + +
Medhi . + + + + 4- 4- +
J. J. M. Roy . + 4- + + + 4- +
R. Das . + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4-
M. Mazumdar + + + + 4- + +
R. Brahma + + 4- 4- + -r 4-
O. K. Das + + 4- 4- 4- + 4-
M. M. Tayyebulla . + +
Bora 4- 4- + + +
Sarma . + + +
Chaudhury 4- + + +
B. Mookerjee + + +

2. Bihar
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
S. K. Sinha . + + 4- 4- + + +
A. N. Sinha . + + _L 4- 4- + +
S. Mahmud 4- + + 4-
J. Chaudhury 4- + 4- +
R. Singh + + 4- + +
B. Verma + + + + 4- + +
K. B. Sahey . 4- -r 4- 4- 4- + 4-
B.Jha . + + 4- 4-
A. Q. Ansari . + + + 4-

1
See C. Jha, ' G r o u p i n g of Portfolios in State Cabinet with Special Reference to Bihar',
in Problems of Public Administration, edited by B. B. M a j u m d a r . Professor Jha is able to
show that the arrangement of portfolios is certainly not based on any discernible principle.
160 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

2. Bihar—continued
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
D. N. Sinha . + + +
M. P. Sinha . + + +
S. P. Mandai . + + +
D. Singh + +
M. Shafi + + +
S. M. O. Munemi . + + +
B. Paswan + + +
H. Mishra + + +
R. C. Sinha . +

3. Bombay
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953
B. G. Kher . + + + +
M. Desai + + + + + + +
M. D. Gilder + + + +
D. N. Desai . + + + + + + +
U. L. Mehta . + + + +
L. M. Patii . + + + +
G. Nanda + +
M. P. Patii + + + + + + +
G. D. Vartak + + + +
G. D. Tapase + + + + + + +
J. N. Mehta . + + + + + +
Naik-Nimbalkar + + + + + +
B. S. Hirey . + + +
S. H. Shah . + + +
Y. B. Chavan + + +

4. Madhya Pradesh
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53
R. S. Shukla . + + + + + +
D. P. Mishra . + + + +
D. K. Mehta . + + + + + +
S. V. Gokhale + + + +
R. K. Patii . + +
W. S. Barlingay + + + +
R. Agnibhoj . + + + +
P. K. Deshmukh + + + + + +
A. M. Kakade + + + +
G. N. Kale . + + +
D. Gupta + +
B. A. Mandloi + +
N. C. Singh . + +
M. S. Kannamwar . + +
B. Biyani + +
S. Tiwari + +

5. Madras
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53
O. P. R. Reddiar . + +
T. S. S. Rajan + + + +
M. Bhaktavatsalam + + + +
B. G. Reddi . + + + +
Gurupadham +
H. S. Reddi . + + +
K. Chandramouli . + + + +
 iîEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 161
5. Madras—continued
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953
T. S. A. Chettiyar . 4-
K. M. Menon + + + +
K. V . R a o . +
A. B. Shetty . + + + + + +
V. Kurmayya
P. S. Kumuraswami Raja + + +
B. Parameswaram . + + + +
N. Sanjiva Reddi + +
C. P. Reddi . + +
J. L. P. R. Victoria + + +
Rajagopalachari + +
Subramaniam + + +
K. V. Naidu . + +
N. Ranga Reddi + +
V. C. Palaniswami Gounder + +
M. V. K. Rao + +
U. K. Rao + +
Nagana Goud -r +
N. Sankarra Reddi + +
Manickavelu Naicker + + +
K. P. K. Naii- + +
Raja R. Sethupathi + + +
S. P. B. Rao . + +
D. Sanjeevayya + +
K. K. Nadar . +
S. S. R.Padayachi . +

6. O rissa
1947—48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-
H. Mahtab + +
N. Kanungo . + + + +
L. Misra + + •r +
L. R. S. Bariha + + + +
S. Tripathi + + + + + + +
R. K. Bose + + + +
N. K. Choudhury + + + + +
P. M. Pradhan + ' +
R. Rath + + +
D.Sahu + +
S. Soren + + +
+ + +
K. C. Banhj Deo +
S. Mohanty .
K. P. Nanda .

7. E. Punjab
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
G. Bhargava . + + + +
Swaran Singh +
Partap Singh . +
Ranjit Singh . + + +
P. Singh Azad + + + +
G. Kartar Singh + + +
C. K. Gopal Dutt +
S. I. Singh Majhail + +
+
Lenha Singh Sethi
Bhim Sen Sachar + +
+
Ch. Lehri Singh
11—P.I.
162 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER
7. E. Punjab—continued
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953
G. Singh Bajwa + + + +
Ujjal Singh + + + +
Ram Sharma . +
Jagat Narain . + + +
Ch. Sundar Singh . + + +
Partap Singh Kairon + + +
J. Singh Mann +
N. Singh +
+
P. Chand

8. Uttar Pradesh
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-
G. P. Pant + + + + + + +
H. M. Ibrahim + + + + + + +
Sampurnanand + + + + + + +
Hukom Singh + + + + + + +
N. A. Sherwani + + +
G.Lai . + + + + + + +
A. G. Kher . + + +
C. P. Gupta . + + + + + + +
L. B. Sastri . + + + +
K. D. Malviya + + +
A. Zaheer + + + +
Hargovind Singh + + + +
Cheran Singh + + + +
M. L. Gautam + + +
K. Tripathi + + +
V. N. Sharma + + +
A. G. Kher .

9. W. Bengal
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953
B. C. Roy + + + + + + +
N. R. Sarkar . + + + +
K. S. Roy +
H. N. Choudhury . + + + +
P. C. Sen + + + + + + +
J. N. Panja . + + + + + + +
B. C. Sinha . + + + +
N. B. Maity . + + + +
N. D. Mazumdar + + + +
K. Mukherjee + + + + + + +
B. Mazumdar + + + +
H. C. Naskar + + + + + + +
Mohini Mohan Barman + +
Syama Prasad Barman + + + + +
R. Ahmed + + + + +
S. K. Basu + + +
K. N. D. Gupta + + +
R. Ray . + + +
P. Bose + + +
A. K. Mukherjee + + +
I. D. Jalan + + +
R. Roy . + + +
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 163
10. Hyderabad
1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
M. K. Vellodi + +
Nawab Bahadur + -U

M. Seshadri . +
C. V. S. Rao . + +
B. R. Rao + -r + + +
V. Koratkar . +
V. B. Raju + +
P. Gandhi + + +
D. G. Bindu . + + +
K. V. R. Reddy + + +
V. Vidyalankar + + + +
G. S. Melkote + + +
Nawab Jung . + + +
Chenna Reddy + + +
A. Rao Ganamukhi + +
J. R. Chandergi "T

S. Dev . + +
D. S. Chauhan + +
G. R. Ekbote +

11. Jammtt and Kashmir

1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-
Abdullah + + + + +
Ghu Mohammad Bakshi + + + + + +
M. A. Beg 4- + + + +
Budh Singh . + +
G. M. Sadiq . + + 4- +
S . L . Saraf . + + + + + +
G. L. Dogra . + + + +
P. M. Khan . H- +
M. Qasim 4-

D. P. Dhar . +

12. Madhya Bharat

1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-
G. K. Vijayavargiya +
L. Joshi +
J. L. Shriva stava . + +
S. Pandviya . + + + + +
K. Virulkar . +
Premsingh + + + -1-
S. H. Ali + -r
Sunnulal + +
M. Gangwal . + + + +
M. Mehta + + + +
V. V. Dravid . + + +
S. Tajoo -r + +
S. M. Jain + +
N. R. Dixit . + +
T. Jain . +
P. S. Rathov . +

13. Mysore
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
K. C. Reddy . . . + + +
H. C. Dasappa . . + + +
K. T. Bhashyam + + -i-
164 THE HOUSE AND THE MEMBER

13. Mysore—continued
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
H. Siddaiya . + + +
T. Mariappa . + + +
R. Chennigaramiah + + +
T. Siddhalingaiah . + +
Hanumanthaiya + + +
Siddaveerappa + + +
A. G. R. Rao + + +
T. Channiah . + + +
K. Manjappa + + +
R. N. Gowda +
J. M. Shariff . +
Chandresekharaiya +
P. S. Chetty . +

14. Rajasthan
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-
H. Shastri + +
S. Ram + +
P. N. Mathur + +
S. Dhadha + +
R. H. Singh . + +
B. Baya + +
N. Kachhwaha + +
P. Bafna + +
V. Tyagi + +
R. D. Goyal . + +
T. R. Paliwal + + +
M. L. Sukhadia + + + +
B. Nath + + +
B. L. Pandya . + + +
R. K. Vyas . +
N. R. Mirdha +
A.L.Yadav . 4- + + +
R. K. Joshi . + + +
J. N. Vyas . + + +
K. Arya + + +
J. K. Chaturvedi +
B. S. Mehta . +
M. D. Mathur +
B. S. Sharma . +
N. L. Joshi . +
J. Singh +

15. Saurashtra
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953
U. N. Dhebar + + + + + +
D. Dave + + + + +
R. U. Parikh . + + + + + +
G. Kotak + + + +
M. Shah + + + + + +
K. Modi + + +
G. C. Oza + + +
R. M. Adani . + + +
B. Mehta +
S. Gandhi +
}. Parikh +
 BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES 165
16. Travancore-Cochin
1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54
C. Keshavan . +
T. K. N. Pillai + + +
P. G. Menon . + + + +
A. J. John + + + + +
N. Kunjuruman + +
E. J. Philipose + + .
T. M. Varghese + +
Kalalhil +
V. Madhavan + +
K. Kochukuttan + +
+ +
A. C. Nadar . +
K. V. Nair
A. T. Pillai +
P . S . N . Pillai' +
+
A. Atchuthan +
P. K. Kunju .
E. E. Warrior +
K. Aiyappan . +
T. A. Abdulla +
A. Mascrene . +

It will be seen that in many States, Cabinet changes have been fre-
quent. Sometimes these are the results of changes in the party complexion
of the Government—as in Travancore-Cochin in 1953-54. Sometimes
the changes are signs of movements within the ruling Congress Party—
as in Rajasthan and Madras. Even in the stable States, such as Bombay
and Uttar Pradesh, the 1952 General Elections occasioned some
ministerial changes.
 CHAPTER FOUR

PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

PARLIAMENT of Independents, however improbable, is not wholly
inconceivable; what cannot be imagined is that they would for
long remain independent. An Independent member of the Indian
Parliament, questioned as to the way he worked in the House of the
People, replied without hesitation: 'The first thing you have to under-
stand is that a number of us Independents have formed a group.' The
great majority of members, however, do not have to create parties; they
are elected in a dual capacity as representing both a constituency and a
party, and they are part of a group before they reach Parliament House.
To describe the working of Parliament—even in strictly procedural
terms—without first analysing the life of each group which makes up the
whole would be certainly difficult and surely misleading.
Parliamentary groups vary in character according as they approximate
to one or other of two theoretical models: first, the group whose political
world is identical with or at least no greater than the world of Parlia-
ment itself, and whose activity is confined to the Chamber and its pre-
cincts; second, the group which is no more than a part of a larger
political organisation. The main groups in Indian legislatures are of the
second type, and we have therefore first to examine the relation of these
parliamentary groups to the parties to which they belong. The compara-
tive study of political institutions has already shown that there is room
for much variety even in this second type; the parliamentary group may
be anything from an obedient wing of the main body to its very heart.
Even the limited comparisons which can be made within British political
life point to some measure of contrast. 1 We should therefore not assume
that the pattern of each party in India is identical, nor that it is unchang-
ing.

1. Party Organisation and the Parliamentary Party

There are sufficient reasons for devoting first place and most of our
attention to the Congress Party. Its dominating parliamentary position
ensures that the internal rules and conventions it develops have a de-
cisive bearing on the working of parliament in India. Secondly, these
rules and conventions serve willy-nilly as models for many of the other
parties. Finally, as the senior and largest political party, it has left com-
1
At least in theory; actual behaviour varies less. See R . T . Mackenzie, British Political
Parties (1954), and Bulmer-Thomas, The Party Svstem in Britain (1953).
166
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 167

paratively little in its constitution to the mercy of ad hoc arrangements,

and the relations between its several parts are open to public scrutiny
and comment.
The Congress Party has, in the course of its seventy years' existence,
changed its character in radical fashion, and its constitution has had to
try to reflect this changing nature. 1 Although the movement was initiated
in 1885, it was not until 1899 that it gave itself a formal constitution. 2
The object of the Congress was ' t o promote by constitutional means the
interests and well-being of the people of the Indian Empire'. The or-
ganisation was in a rudimentary stage: the Congress itself was a body of
'delegates elected by political associations or other bodies, and by
public meetings', and it was to meet two or three times a year. There
was an Indian Congress Committee of 45 members chosen on the basis
of recommendations from the Provinces and consisting of a fixed num-
ber from each Province. Provincial Congress Committees were to be
organised ' f o r the purpose of carrying on the work of political educa-
tion, on lines of general appreciation of British rule and of constitutional
action for the removal of its defects'. There was also a 'British Congress
Committee' in England ' t o represent there the interests of the Indian
National Congress'.
Following the development of nationalist sentiments and the break-
away of the 'extremists' in 1907, the new constitution of 1908 restated
the objects of the Congress:
(i) the attainment by India of self-government similar to that enjoyed by the
self-governing members of the British Empire and participation by her in
the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on equal terms with those mem-
bers ; (ii) the advance towards this goal to be by strictly constitutional means
by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration
and promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and
organising the intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the
country.
At the same time, the movement's organisation was elaborated. The All-
India Congress Committee emerges at the top of a hierarchy which now
reaches down through Provincial to District and even Taluka Congress
Committees. The Congress itself is to meet annually, and the delegates
now have to pay a Rs.20/- fee (reduced to Rs.10/- in 1915), half the
1
See N. V. R a j k u m a r , Development of the Congress Constitution (Delhi, 1949).
2
There were, of course, resolutions before this date which set out various rules of pro-
cedure. One of these, N o . XIII of 1888, is of peculiar interest: it was 'resolved that no
subject shall be passed for discussion by the Subjects Committee or allowed to be discussed
at any Congress by the President thereof, to the introduction of which the Hindu or
M o h a m m e d a n Delegates as a body object unanimously or nearly unanimously'. The
popular tendency to attribute communal politics to the British—and in particular to the
introduction of separate electorates in 1909—would seem to overlook evidence of this kind
which shows that the national movement was very aware of the importance of communal
sentiments.
 168 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

proceeds of which were to be sent to London for the use of the British
Committee.
The transformation of the Congress at the end of the First World War
is reflected in the new constitution of 1920; a refined liberal pressure
group of middle-class gentlemen sets out to be a mass movement with a
single clear aim: 'the attainment of Swarajya (independence) by the
people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means '. The Provincial
Congress Committees, now organised on the basis of linguistic areas, are
delegate bodies chosen so that one member represents 50,000 inhabi-
tants. The A.I.C.C. expands to 350 members, and the daily direction of
the political struggle is entrusted to the new Working Committee ap-
pointed by it. The British Committee disappears and the funds are
divided between the A.I.C.C. and the P.C.C.s. The rather substantial
fees of the pre-war period give way to a simple 4-anna subscription.
Gandhi's influence was also evident in certain amendments of the 1920s.
An attempt was made in 1924 to replace the 4-anna path of entry by a
' yarn franchise ' : ' no one shall be a member of any Congress Committee
or organisation who does not wear hand-spun and hand-woven khaddar
at political and Congress functions and does not make a contribution of
24,000 yards of evenly-spun yarn per year of his or her own spinning'.
This harsh test was a year later allowed to be simply an alternative to the
money subscription. The last pre-independence Congress constitution,
that of 1934, made further attempts to increase the mass following while
retaining the more difficult qualifications for an élite within the organisa-
tion. Thus, Primary Committees were set up for enrolment purposes. At
the same time, those elected as delegates had to perform, for six months
prior to election, some manual labour 'equal in value to 500 yards per
month of well-spun yarn of over 10 counts and equal in time to 8 hours
per month'. The most interesting change in the higher levels of the or-
ganisation related to the Working Committee: this was to be no longer
chosen by the A.I.C.C., but instead to be appointed by the President of
the Congress. The debating society had become a disciplined political
power.
With the achievement of independence, the object of Congress had to
be restated. ' If the Congress had achieved all its objectives there would
be no purpose in its continuing,' Pandit Nehru remarked on one
occasion. 1 'But it has achieved only one objective—no doubt, a major
objective. The other major objective has been economic.. . .' Article 1 of
the new constitution of the party states that 'the object of the Indian
National Congress is the well-being and advancement of the people of
India and the establishment in India, by peaceful and legitimate means,
of a Co-operative Commonwealth based on equality of opportunity and
1
Speech at the Political Conference of Tamilnad Congress workers in Oct. 1954 (Con-
gress Bulletin, Oct.-Nov. 1953).
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 169

of political, economic and social rights and aiming at world peace and
fellowship'. It was, however, less the restated object than the conquest of
power which changed the character of the Congress after 1947. For one
thing, of course, the transformation of a national movement for inde-
pendence into a political party, at least potentially one among many, de-
manded radical adjustment of ideas on the part of the leaders—and
especially those whose work, in legislatures for example, brought them
in continuous contact with other parties. For the organisation as a
whole, however, this aspect was less important than another: even if
Congress were now ' o n l y ' a political party, it was—and much more
obviously—the political party, the only one that mattered as an instru-
ment of power. In consequence, the character of the party became
heterogeneous in a new way.
Already before 1947, Congress had under Gandhi's guidance de-
veloped two sides to its nature: it was a broad political movement with
the usual functions of agitation and education; it was, at the same time,
a social service organisation through which 'constructive w o r k ' could
be done to improve the lot of the downtrodden. It was Gandhi's idea
that after 1947 this second aspect alone should remain. Congress should
cast aside its political personality and blossom forth as a ' L o k Sewak
Sangh', a society for the service of the people. The political field should
be left to new and purely political organisations. This did not happen.
The Congress which had demanded the transfer of power had to accept
the power transferred. The two personalities had been welded into one
over the years and could not now be divorced. 1 To these two personali-
ties, the achievement of unquestioned power now added a third: the
party as government. It is no doubt a great over-simplification to say
t h a t ' in pre-Independence days it was those who were ready to suffer and
sacrifice who joined the Congress' 2 ; since Congress represented a moral
as well as a political ideal and offered a number of alternative forms of
action, it attracted a wide variety of idealists and rebels. It is certainly
true, however, t h a t ' since Independence, because of the lure of offices,
self-seeking people too entered the portals of this organisation'. 3 The
1
The possession of this social service aspect makes it difficult for the leaders to accept
the end of the national movement. Even Pandit Nehru, who understands and welcomes the
need for opposition, is reluctant to admit that the corollary must be the reduction of the
Congress to a ' m e r e ' political party. In a speech delivered in 1954 he said: ' T h e Congress
necessarily has to function as an electoral organisation, but that is not its only or its most
important task. It has been our proud privilege to be soldiers in a mighty national move-
ment which brought freedom to this country. We cannot allow Congress to shrink now in-
to just an electoral organisation. . . . Our party organisation must be something more than
a party. It must win confidence and respect by patient and self-sacrificing service, and thus
live in the hearts of our people.' (Report in The Statesman, 23 Jan. 1954.) This is, indeed, a
real problem: India has a great need for nation-wide social service organisations to under-
take social welfare work which the State cannot wholly cope with; yet the only substantial
body already experienced in the task is the leading political party.
2
Report of the General Secretaries of Congress, October 1951-January 1953, p. 25.
3 Ibid.
170 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

rush of this kind was all the greater because it was evident that Congress
had no real rivals. Moreover, in India employment opportunities are out
of gear with the demands created by the educational system; the political
world too thus becomes overcrowded. Many of the references to India
as a one-party state are grossly unfair and misleading, but at least in this
respect the phrase has a validity: Congress was widely understood to be
the high road to influence, office and power. The development of this
third facet of the Congress Party must be seen not only from the view-
point of the man seeking a career; it has another aspect as seen from the
position of the leaders. To a Congress Minister, the party organisation
appears as a support for the policies of the Government. This situation
is not, of course, peculiar to India; rather it is normal. Yet it had a
special importance in India. For one thing, it was a novel position for an
Indian political party. For another, the programme of national recon-
struction which had to be undertaken called for widespread public un-
derstanding and mass effort if it was to be successful.1 It seemed as if
Congress had not only to provide a road to power but also to constitute
itself an arm of the administration.
These developments have brought with them a number of difficulties
and problems of organisation. Some of the most troublesome of these
relate to membership of the party. The constitution of 1948 was in effect
a new one; yet it has had to be amended in 1950, 1952 and 1953—and
on each occasion the question of membership has been central. In 1948
the demand for entry to the Congress was heavy, and the leadership was
anxious to have a broad basis of support in the country for its measures.
The doors were thrown open and party workers vied with each other to
produce, in one way or another, impressive figures of numbers recruited.
The result was a mass intake so large that the organisation was barely
able to digest it. Nearly 30 million primary members were enrolled by
the end of 1949, and even the more exacting categories of qualified and
effective members numbered several hundred thousands. In these cir-
cumstances, not unnaturally, strange things happened. ' I n certain
cases', the official report admits, 2 'fraudulent enrolment was ap-
parent. One district made history by enrolling 400,000 effective
members. In certain villages enrolment exceeded the adult population
and in a few cases even exceeded the total population of the village.'
The management of the party's elections proved practically impos-
sible and serious abuses were quite common. The same official
report puts the matter very mildly when it remarks that 'indeed it
was a bold venture to make this attempt to hold elections on a
mass scale through non-official agencies and with inadequate re-

1
The relations between the British Labour Party and the trade union movement during
1945-51 may afford some basis of comparison.
2
Report of the General Secretaries, January 1949-September 1950, p. 78.
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 171
1
sources'. In 1950 a fee for primary membership was reintroduced and
fixed at the relatively high level of one rupee. At the same time, a quali-
fying period of two years as primary member was laid down as one of
the conditions of 'effective' membership. Two years later, the fee was
reduced to 4 annas and the two-year qualifying period removed.
Of greater interest to our present study is the impact of the changed
character of Congress on the relations between the different organs of
the party and on relations between these organs on the one hand and
those of the state on the other. The party institutions were set out in its
constitution 2 and must first be briefly described. Both primary and active
members of the party are organised in party constituencies of not less
than 500 primary members and corresponding so far as possible to
areas with a population of 100,000. Each constituency is entitled to elect
one delegate to the Annual Session of the Congress, but only active
members may be candidates in these elections. 3 This body of delegates
is the core of the party and numbered, in January 1953, for example,
3,561. The country is divided into twenty-six areas called Pradeshes,
which generally but not invariably correspond to the States created in
the Indian Constitution. 4 The delegates within the Pradesh area con-
stitute the Pradesh Congress Committee, while below the Pradesh there
1
Ibid., p. 82. The careful preparations and conduct of the General Elections two years
later may have owed something to the leaders' chastening experience of the party elections.
They owed much more, of course, to the work of the administration. The party's own
elections in 1952 were again not well conducted. The Report of the General Secretaries,
January 1953-January 1954 reveals that 'lots of complaints regarding the irregularities and
malpractices in the Congress elections poured into the All-India Congress Committee
office. . . . The office looked into these complaints and sent special representatives to in-
vestigate. . . . The investigation in Bihar showed that of a total of 2,100,000 primary mem-
bers there, no less than about 1,000,000 were irregularly enrolled.
2
Constitution of the Indian National Conference (as amended in July 1953) and Rules for
Various Articles of the Congress Constitution (1953).
3
The conditions for active membership are much more exacting than those for primary
membership and show the continuing importance of Gandhian tenets. Thus while a
primary member need only pay four annas and declare that he is over 18, accepts the
object of the party and belongs to no separate political party, an active member has to pay
one rupee and sign an eight-point declaration: ' I am of the age of 21 or over; I am a
habitual weaver of hand-spun and hand-woven Khadi; I am a teetotaller; I do not observe
or recognise untouchability in any shape or f o r m ; I believe in equality of opportunity and
status for all, irrespective of race, caste, creed or sex; I am a believer in inter-communal
unity and have respect for the faith of others; I devote part of my time regularly to some
form of national, community or social service otherwise than for personal profit, or to
some constructive activity [here 20 alternatives are listed, including the organisation of
peasants or labour or students, adult education, village sanitation and the uplift of
women] and will send periodical reports on my work . . . ; I shall collect ten rupees annually
and pay it towards the Congress Reserve F u n d . '
4 The Congress Pradesh has always taken more account of linguistic differences than the
administrative State has done; Andhra had its Pradesh in the party structure before it
gained its recognition as a State. The party structure may thus point the future pattern of
States in India; the present State of Bombay is divided for party purposes into no less than
four units—Maharashtra, Gujerat, Karnatak and Bombay City. On the other hand, some-
times the party structure has fallen in line with changing State divisions; the former
Pradesh of Kerala was in 1952 divided into two, one for Travancore-Cochin and one for
Malabar.
172 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

are similarly constituted District and Mandal (or Taluka) Congress

Committees. 1 The delegates in every Pradesh meet to elect from among
themselves one-eighth of their number as members of the All-India Con-
gress Committee. They also meet in this way to choose the President of
the Congress, whose term of office—and that of all the Congress com-
mittees—is two years. 'The highest executive authority of the Congress',
charged with the implementation of policy and responsible to the
A.I.C.C., is the Congress Working Committee. This body, often re-
ferred to as the 'Congress High Command', consists of the President
and twenty members nominated by him. These must include the
Treasurer and one or more General Secretaries, and will ordinarily be
drawn from members of the A.I.C.C. The Working Committee enjoys
wide powers by constitutional provision and by conventional practice.
Among its functions is the setting up of the Parliamentary Board con-
sisting of the President as Chairman and five other members. This Board
is to 'regulate and co-ordinate the parliamentary activities of the Con-
gress Legislature Parties'. For the purpose of conducting election cam-
paigns and selecting candidates for Centre and State legislatures, the
Board (with the addition of five members elected by the A.I.C.C.) con-
stitutes itself into the Central Election Committee.
It is with these organs then that we are concerned if we wish to en-
quire into the relations between Congress as government and Congress
as party. The story may begin before a government is actually chosen,
for certain features of the party as a candidate for power have a bearing
on its subsequent behaviour. The elections of 1952, the first to be held
on adult franchise and the first after independence, were not only a
headache to the administrator; they were, for all parties, an adventure
into the unknown. The Congress realised that a great deal depended on
how it chose its candidates. On the one hand, if its prestige and strength
were going to return it in overwhelming numbers to the legislatures, it
was important that its men should be of such a calibre as would make
them valuable members of such bodies, able to contribute to the debate
of policies and to furnish the personnel of governments. On the other
hand, if there was to be a serious challenge from the other parties, it
would be wise to choose men of influence in the constituencies. Again,
in the selection of candidates a due balance had to be maintained be-
tween the reward for services given and sacrifices made in the past and
the admission of fresh youthful zeal needed to rejuvenate the party.
' Candidates', said the Central Election Committee, ' should be chosen
with great care and should be men and women of integrity who, by their
past record and present professions, have shown that they believe in and
act up to the principles and objectives proclaimed on behalf of the Con-

1
In some of the areas of former princely states, District Committees had not yet been
established in early 1954.
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 173

gress. In particular, care should be taken that the choice of suitable

candidates is not affected by the predominance of any group or clique
in the area.' 1 The procedure for selection certainly demonstrated this in-
tention to choose with care. Applications were invited by the Pradesh
Congress Committees from candidates for both Centre and State legis-
latures. Applicants did not need to be members of the party—'The
test', Pandit Nehru said, 'must be "integrity first, integrity second and
integrity third", integrity and ability.' 2 The Pradesh Congress Com-
mittees set up Election Committees which consulted with district party
leaders, sometimes interviewed candidates and finally made recom-
mendations to the Central Election Committee. The list of candidates
thus recommended was made known and appeals and objections were
also to be sent to the Central Committee. This machinery, however, was
almost thrown out of gear by the pressure of work. For the 3,769 seats
in all legislatures, about 25,000 applications were received. What was
worse, they were quickly followed by over 100,000 appeals and objec-
tions. 'Thousands of letters and hundreds of telegrams poured into the
[Delhi] office every day' 3 —there to be scrutinised along with the re-
commendations. The volume of applications illustrates well the extent
to which Congress was generally accepted—in spite of the uncertainties
of adult franchise—as the way to importance. The fact that less than one
in six could be chosen meant inevitably a number of disappointed men.
Yet the procedure can perhaps also be blamed, since it presented un-
rivalled opportunities for that factionalism among Congressmen which
was above all to be avoided. 4 The broad avenues laid down for com-
plaints and objections did not greatly aid the selection, but they did
tend to ensure that disappointment should quickly become discontent.
Thus, before the perhaps unavoidable tension between government and
party could begin, the ground was prepared by an antagonism between
the chosen (most of whom were to be legislators, and many Ministers)
and the rejected (who would be expected to continue as party devotees).
In fact, of course, difficulties between the Congress Government and
the Congress Party had been encountered long before the election. To
1
Resolution of 14 July 1951, quoted in Report of the General Secretaries, October 1951-
January 1953, p. 13.
2
Quoted in M. Venkatarangaiya, The General Election in Bombay City, p. 33. One
chapter of the book is devoted to the selection of candidates.
3
Report of the General Secretaries, October 1951-January 1953, p. 15.
4 Rather more high-powered interviewing and rather less documentation and hearing of
'evidence' might have been better. One respected Congressman was reported to have ob-
served: 'Evidence, oral and documentary, is being piled u p ; at least some of it is reported
to be forged. Every attempt is being made to drag the reputation of one's rivals into the
mud. The ghastly part of it all is that such complaints are patiently heard and registered.
Nothing can be m o r e degrading. N o one's reputation is safe in such circumstances. And
such a habit grows. This game of mud-slinging will continue after the elections. T o me this
seems to lead to disintegration.' (Mr. Sampurnanand, quoted in Venkatarangaiya, op. cit.,
p. 39.) The prophetic sentences at least have proved true.
174 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

go no further back than the transfer of power and to speak first of the
position at the Centre, 1 it is only necessary to recall the protests made by
Acharya Kripalani during his period of office (1947-48) as Congress
President. Here, he complained, was a Congress Government which
took vital policy decisions without consultation with the elected head of
the party itself. When the Presidentship went, in 1949, to Dr. Sitara-
mayya, relations appeared to calm down considerably—probably less
on account of any increased consultation than because the clash of tem-
peraments was less marked, the Doctor's sphere of interests did not
overlap so much with those of the government and the stature of the
Prime Minister was growing apace. Nevertheless, there was held a
Secret Session of the A.I.C.C. in May 1949 for ' a frank discussion on
the activities of Congress Ministries and the possibilities of developing
intimate contact between the Ministry and the Congress Organisation'
—and there is no reason to suppose that attention was devoted to the
position in States to the exclusion of that at the Centre. In any event, it
is not clear that any great change was effected by the meeting: ' A n over-
all survey was made and the practical difficulties that were experienced
in working out the Congress programme through administrative and
legislative methods were placed before the Conference. There was a
genuine attempt to assess the situation and to make suggestions for
taking recourse to better constructive efforts.' 2 It may not be wrong to
suppose that the party's non-governmental leaders were told the facts of
ministerial life and went away, still sadder but at least also somewhat
wiser men. The period that followed—from September 1950 to October
1951—might be called without facetiousness the annus horribilis of the
Congress and without over-dramatisation its year of serious crisis. So
preoccupied, indeed, was the party with its internal strains and stresses 3
that it had little time to worry about relations between government and
party. The election of the orthodox Tandon as President of the Con-
gress, the closeness of the contest between him and the more radical

1
T h e Congress Provincial Governments of 1937-39 were notoriously subject to in-
structions f r o m the High C o m m a n d at Delhi. (See R. Coupland, The Indian Problem,
C h a p . X.) Their position, however, was quite special. They were influenced by the W o r k i n g
Committee partly because the m a i n party leaders were on that committee and not in the
governments, and partly because not even ministerial Congressmen could feel that the
conduct of government had any importance by the side of the national struggle for freedom.
See above, pp. 67-70.
2
Report of the General Secretaries, January 1949-September 1950, p. 30.
3
T h e Report of the General Secretaries, September 1950-0ctober 1951 is a significantly
brief document compared with others in the series. Yet it does not hide the situation. ' A
little over a year has passed since the Congress met at Nasik under the presidentship of
Shri P u r u s h o t t a m d a s T a n d o n . This period has been one of great stress and anxiety. . . .
T h e Congress has weathered many a storm. . . . Fissiparous tendencies developed within
the Organisation. Several prominent Congressmen f r o m time to time expressed dissatisfac-
tion at the manner in which the Organisation was functioning. Fears were also expressed
that undesirable elements were creeping into the Congress' (p. 1).
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y PARTY 175
1
Kripalani, the death (in December 1950) of Sardar Patel, who had done
so much to hold together the different forces—all this sharpened what
were perhaps inevitable clashes of political view. But the resolution of
the party's internal difficulties at the same time did much to ease party-
government tension. In May 1951, Kripalani, after an attempt to
create within Congress a Democratic Front, resigned to establish
his own Kisan Mazdoor Praja (K.M.P.) Party. Even more important
were the events of September of that year. Pandit Nehru determined
to bring matters to a head by submitting his own resignation f r o m
the Working Committee. This direct challenge to Tandon succeeded;
other resignations f r o m the Committee quickly followed and finally
Tandon himself resigned. The A.I.C.C. then elected Nehru President
without contest.
Only a few years ago, the possession by one person of the two posi-
tions of Prime Minister and Congress President would have been
thought both improper and impossible. Yet it has proved possible, has
been widely accepted as natural and has certainly made life easier for
both the Government and the party. 2 The success of the new arrange-
ment owes much to Pandit Nehru's ability and capacity for work, and
even more to his popularity in the party and in the country as a whole.
At the same time, it may indicate the reduced importance and influence
—as an independent body—of the Congress Party; it may be taken, in
other words, as a sign of the final transformation of a national move-
ment into a political party. Certainly it is not easy to see how the former
practice could return even should it be for some reason desired. The
world of the party by itself no longer holds the centre of the stage; a
glance at the list of members of the Working Committee reveals no
names of possible future Presidents—other than those of men who are
already Union or State Ministers. When a party is in power, the centre
of political gravity shifts from the party organs to the Cabinet. 3

1 There were three candidates. Of the 2,600 valid votes, T a n d o n got 1,306—only 6 more
than the 50% necessary for election on the first count. Kripalani secured 1,092 and
Shankarrao Deo 202, and it is likely that on a second count the votes of the latter would
have gone mainly to Kripalani. (Report of the General Secretaries, January 1949-September
1950, p. 83.)
2
There may be some critics of the arrangement. Pandit Nehru in his Presidential Address
to the Congress in Jan. 1953 said that ' h e agreed entirely with those friends and comrades
who objected to the high offices of Prime Minister and Congress President being held by
one and the same person . . .'. Yet one cannot help suspecting that this was more in the
nature of a tribute to a past idea. He indicated the bulk of Congress opinion when he went
on to s a y : ' but he could not say " N o " to so many of his valued colleagues.' (The Report of
the General Secretaries, January 1953-January 1954, p. 2.) He had been re-elected, again
without contest, at the end of 1952.
3
These lines were written before Pandit Nehru announced (in Oct. 1954) his desire to be
relieved of some of his several responsibilities and in particular of the party presidentship.
It does not seem, however, that they require revision. Pandit Nehru's chosen successor as
President is a sincere and devoted Congressman, but not a m a n who is likely to question the
boundaries laid down by the Prime Minister between party and Government.
176 P A R T I E S AND P A R L I A M E N T

The establishment of a link at the apex of government and party has

proved decisive. It is, however, by no means the only link. There had
from 1947 always been some Ministers who were members of the Work-
ing Committee, but the party had jealously insisted that the proportion
of Ministers (State as well as Centre) should never exceed one-third. In
September 1952 the limit was removed. The Working Committee for
1953, for example, contained among its 21 members no less than 10
Ministers—4 of the Union Cabinet, 6 Chief Ministers of States.1 More-
over, it is quite usual for one or two other members of the Union
Ministry to be invited to attend meetings where topics falling within the
sphere of their departments are to be discussed. The monthly meetings
of the Working Committee, held as they are at the Prime Minister's re-
sidence and under his chairmanship, are very far from being assemblies
of party bosses or political agitators out of touch with the responsi-
bilities of government. Of the items on the agenda, often as many as
half have no connection with internal party affairs—and in terms of
time taken, party matters are almost certainly more quickly disposed of.
The main attention is on matters of national policy and developments in
State politics, though the discussion is naturally in predominantly party
terms and thus differs from that which takes places on identical subjects
in the Cabinet.2
This overlapping of membership between party and governmental or
State organs is one of the ways in which tension can be most easily
lessened, and the system is to be found also below the level of Working
Committee. It is not always easy in a democracy to get party committee
members into the legislative or executive organs of government, but it is
always possible to keep those party members whose main sphere of
activity is governmental in touch with party life. To some extent this
would no doubt happen even in the absence of special arrangements.
During 1952-53, however, the Congress introduced in its constitution a
new category of associate membership which is designed specifically to
achieve this end. Under the new rules, all Congress members of the
Union Parliament are associate members of the Pradesh and District
1
This proportion becomes even more impressive if it is added to that of the remaining
11,3 were the General Secretaries (and these were M.P.s), 2 more were M.P.s, leaving only
6 who were party leaders pure and simple, in fact Presidents of Pradesh Congress Com-
mittees.
2
Cf. H. Morrison, Government and Parliament, p. 10: ' A t the formal Cabinet meetings
with the Cabinet Secretariat present, the cruder aspects of party electoral and parliamen-
tary tactics and the internal problems of the party in power are not discussed more than is
necessary.' Some examples of Working Committee agendas may be of interest. The Sept.
1953 meeting (in fact, three meetings lasting in all about seven hours over a weekend) heard
a review of the international situation by the Prime Minister and discussed, among other
topics, the political situation in Travancore-Cochin and in Andhra, the terms of reference
of the States Reorganisation Commission, an analysis of by-election results, legal and ad-
ministrative reforms contemplated by the Government and the abolition of Legislative
Councils in the States.
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 177
1
Congress Committees in their constituencies. Those of the M.P.s who
are on the Executive of the Congress Parliamentary Party 2 are further
awarded associate membership of the A.I.C.C. In a similar way, Con-
gress members of State Legislative Assemblies are associate members of
District Congress Committees, while those who are on the Executive of
a Congress Legislative Party in a State are in addition associate mem-
bers of the Pradesh Congress Committee. These arrangements are no
doubt useful, though time and space are surely limiting factors, especi-
ally for the member of the Union Parliament; the sessions get longer
rather than shorter, and his region can only be visited in the recess.3 On
the other hand, the Congress Party during 1953 began a campaign to
get its M.P.s more acquainted with their constituencies. Apart from its
value from the point of view of explaining party policy and gathering
public opinion and popular grievances, the campaign owes something
also to the desire to bring the party legislator closer to the party organs
in the States and Districts. 'We thought that such a programme would
create the necessary enthusiasm among the Congress Party workers in
the States.' 4
Relations between party and parliamentary groups at the Centre can
be understood by following further the extent of overlapping member-
ship. The Congress Party in Parliament has 11 office-bearers and an
Executive Committee of 20, and almost every one of these occupies a
place on some committee in the party hierarchy. More significant is the
extent to which the office-bearers of the party in Parliament are office-
bearers of the Congress organisation (see p. 178).5
In these circumstances it is not surprising that the party's Parliamentary
Board (which in 1953 consisted of 3 of the above, 2 Chief Ministers of
States and 1 other Union Minister) should have had to spend very little
of its energies on problems of liaison at the Centre. It needed in any case
all the time it could afford for the consideration of these problems in the
various States.
It will not be too much to say that, apart from the time of the troubles
in 1951 to which we have already referred, the most crippling defect of
1
There is a proviso that no M.P. can be an associate member unless he has been a
primary member for two years and is now an active member. Associate members of party
committees have no right to vote.
2 See below, p. 187.
3
Those with constituencies near Delhi are better placed. But it is also a matter of
personal temperament; M r . Kidwai, Union F o o d Minister until his death at the end of
1953, would no doubt have been active in the party politics of his State even if it had not
been U.P. and thus on the doorstep of Delhi. M r . Kidwai was a member of the Executive
Council of the U.P. Pradesh Congress Committee.
* Report of the Congress Party in Parliament for 1952-53, p. 14. It is not easy to judge
whether it has been wholly successful in this part of its object. Some local party officials
appeared pleased but others were less impressed by the visitors f r o m Delhi.
5
This was the position in 1953. There is no reason to suppose that the overlapping will
be much less marked in future.
12—p.I.
178 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

Office in the Congress Office in the Congress

Name Party in Parliament Party

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Leader President

Maulana Azad . Deputy Leader Senior Member of
Working Committee
Satyanarain Sinha Chief Whip —

Harekrushna Mahtab Secretary General —

Balwantray Mehta Secretary General Secretary

Shiva R a o Secretary —

Amarnath Aggarwal . Secretary —

R. R. Morarka . Treasurer —

U. S. Malliah . Deputy Chief Whip General Secretary

D . K. Borooah Deputy Chief Whip Member, Working
Committee
Amolak Chand Deputy Chief Whip —

the Congress since the transfer of power has been quarrelling within the
States and in particular between State Ministers on the one hand and
Pradesh Congress Committees on the other. Already by 1949, a number
of cases had arisen which were serious enough to damage State govern-
ment and necessitate the active intervention of the party's central organs.
Congress affairs in West Bengal had reached such a state in 1949 that the
Working Committee had to hear representations from sections of the
party in the State, and Pandit Nehru courageously visited Calcutta to
study and try to deal with the explosive situation. 1 In Madras, one
group of Congressmen levelled charges against the Congress Govern-
ment of the State—and did so in the public forum of the Madras Legis-
lative Assembly. The Working Committee ordered an enquiry but could
find no case worth further investigation. The critics were not so easily
silenced and again moved a motion in the Assembly; only a threat of
disciplinary action caused them to withdraw. 2 East Punjab, recovering
with difficulty from the chaos of partition and its accompaniment,
found stable government denied to it by party dissensions. Dr. Gopi-
chand Bhargava formed the first government after being unanimously
elected leader of the party. But within a fortnight a vote of no con-
fidence in him by the party was carried and he was replaced by Mr.
Bhim Sen Sachar. The Congress Parliamentary Board instructed the
new Premier on the composition of his Cabinet and for the sake of unity
insisted on the inclusion of Bhargava. Very soon, however, Bhargava
made complaints to the Board and secured signatures for a memoran-
dum condemning the Premier's actions. The Board then instructed the
1
'Explosive' is meant literally; this was the occasion when a bomb was thrown while
Nehru was addressing a crowd.
2
Even this proved temporary. The attacks began again in 1950 and Mr. Prakasam, the
leader of the group, eventually joined Kripalani's K.M.P. Party. It was he, however, who
in 1953 was persuaded to head the Congress Ministry in the new State of Andhra (see
p. 111 above). At the end of 1954, he rejoined the Congress.
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 179

Premier to seek a vote of confidence from the party. On his failing to

achieve this, he resigned and Bhargava returned. 1 During the same year,
similar troubles disturbed Uttar Pradesh and Travancore-Cochin, lead-
ing in the first case to the expulsion of a group by the Working Com-
mittee and in the second to a dissident bloc which eventually joined the
K.M.P.
The party's leaders tried to tackle the problem from both sides. On the
one hand, the Working Committee directed that Pradesh Congress
Committees were not to pass no-confidence motions against their Con-
gress Ministries; any complaints should be brought to the notice of the
Parliamentary Board. Similarly, party members in Assemblies who had
grievances against Ministers should refer in the first instance to the
Leader of the Party in the Assembly and if necessary to the Board. On
the other hand, attempts were made to persuade State Ministries to take
their parties into greater confidence. At a conference in 1949 of Presi-
dents and Secretaries of Pradesh Congress Committees, 'it was felt
necessary that the P.C.C.'s and legislative parties must have closer con-
tact established through a liaison office. Regular joint sittings might be
arranged', and important Bills could be discussed in this way before
they were introduced in the Legislatures. 2 The Congress President of the
day issued a directive to all P.C.C.s and Chief Ministers suggesting that
the State Governments should place before the P.C.C.s their legislative
programme and proposed administrative measures, and obtain recom-
mendations and co-operative assistance. He further thought that heads
of P.C.C.s might be made ex.-officio members of legislative parties and
that State Governments might open a complaints section for party
members. 3 It is not surprising that very little came of these suggestions,
some of which perhaps show little understanding of the nature of
ministerial responsibility.
The departures and the expulsions from the party, especially during
1951, removed only a few of the critics. Certainly the more recent period
has witnessed a continuation of similar difficulties. The dissensions may
be attributed to several causes. In an earlier chapter the divisions of
Indian society have been indicated as facilitating faction; the intense and
newly-released struggle for power within the party since independence
finds it easy to attach itself to these divisions. The instability of Congress
rule in Rajasthan, 4 for example, can be traced to a combination of at
1
Since the General Elections, Mr. Sachar has been Premier again.
2
Report of the General Secretaries, January 1949-September 1950, p. 60.
3 Ibid., p. 61.
4
In Nov. 1954 Rajasthan obtained its sixth Congress Cabinet since the State was formed
in 1949, its third since the General Elections of 1952. This time the change was supervised
by party headquarters. First, the central Parliamentary Board ' a d v i s e d ' the Chief Minister
to seek a vote of confidence f r o m the Congress Party in the State Assembly. Then one of
the party's General Secretaries went to Rajasthan and arranged the secret voting which
went against the Chief Minister.
 180 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

least four factors: a class tension due to the recent entry into the party
of several of the feudal landowners who have preferred to jump on the
wagon instead of obstructing it; a caste tension between Rajput and Jat
which to some extent coincides with the class tension; regional rivalries
between Congressmen from the different areas of Jaipur, Udaipur,
Jodhpur—formerly separate princely states; and personal antagonisms.
'The opposition to the jagirdars', i.e., landlords', entry into the Con-
gress', wrote an observer, 'is motivated by a strange amalgam of
factional and radical considerations. It is not easy to indicate where
radicalism shades off into caste feelings and considerations of factional
advantages.' 1 The variety of causes is paralleled only by the variety of
forms which the dissensions may take. Sometimes Cabinets have been
constituted so as to contain representatives of different groups; in these
cases, disputes occur within the Cabinet and lead to resignations or
threats of resignation. Punjab may be cited as one example. Following
disagreements in the Cabinet, the Chief Minister, Mr. Sachar, dropped
one of his colleagues, Mr. Sharma. The latter at once charged Mr.
Sachar with autocracy and the ministry as a whole with nepotism and
corruption, charges as promptly denied by the Chief Minister, who
accused Mr. Sharma of dishonesty. The battle took place on the floor of
the Assembly and presented, as one editorial comment put it, ' a spec-
tacle that must sadden those concerned to uphold parliamentary stan-
dards. . . . The public is left wondering whether all that Ministers do is
to fight among themselves.' 2 Under guidance from Delhi, the rebels
were expelled from the party. A similar incident in Bhopal a few months
later brought the Congress General Secretary to the spot and resulted in
suspensions from the party of an ex-Minister and his following. In other
States, the tussle takes place not in the Cabinet but between the Cabinet
and the Parliamentary or Assembly Party—probably because the
Cabinet has been composed of one group to the exclusion of others. Of
this variety, Madras and Delhi States supply good illustrations. In
Madras, one Congress member of the Assembly gathered the signatures
of a number of others to a document expressing want of confidence in
the Chief Minister. An attempt was made to enlist the support of the
President of the Pradesh Congress Committee, but this was not success-
ful. Instead, the matter was taken to the Parliamentary Board which
strongly backed the Chief Minister. In this case, a threat of disciplinary
action proved sufficient. In Delhi State, on the other hand, things went
further. Signs of discontent appeared in October 1953 when a meeting
of the Assembly Party was demanded and Ministers were severely criti-
cised for evasive answers to a number of questions such as the issue of
liquor licences and the presentation of purses to Ministers. In March

1
The Times of India, 12 June 1954.
2 The Times of India, 12 Oct. 1953.
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 181

1954, after a brief lull, fighting broke out again and the Party Leader in
the Assembly suspended one member. The Parliamentary Board under-
took an investigation and ordered that the suspension order should be
kept pending until Pandit Nehru had had an opportunity to hear both
Ministers and critics. In June 1954 the order was confirmed, and the
Congress President took advantage of the occasion to deliver some
general advice on behaviour and discipline. 1
The most bitter struggles, however, seem to be those that take the
form of conflict between the ministry on the one hand, with or without
the support of the Assembly Party, and the leaders of the Pradesh Con-
gress Committees on the other. Here the two classic cases of recent years
are furnished by Mysore and Hyderabad. In Hyderabad the conflict
between the political parties was, during 1953, quite overshadowed by
the battles that took place between the ministry and the leadership of
the Pradesh Congress Committee, battles that in this case—most un-
usually—owed something to an ideological cleavage between Right (in
the Government) and Left (in the party organisation). The main parti-
cipants were called to a meeting of the Parliamentary Board in Delhi in
October, and the P.C.C. President, Swami Ramanand Tirth, was invited
to state all his charges. The Board found that although these charges had
been given great publicity, in the press and in the public speeches of the
P.C.C. leaders, they lacked substance, and those concerned were re-
primanded for behaving with lack of discipline and decorum. 2 Yet, as
has happened not infrequently, it required even more pointed interven-
tion on the part of Pandit Nehru before the voices of dissent were
stilled. Only after he had visited the State and ordered a secret vote in
the Legislature Party and in the P.C.C. was a semblance of peace re-
stored. The troubles in Mysore have been of a similar character and have
proved if anything even more resistant to treatment. 3 As usual, the
Party's General Secretary visited the State and conferred with both
leaders, Mr. Hanumanthaiya, the Chief Minister, and Mr. Veeranna
Gowda, P.C.C. President, and as usual Pandit Nehru sent letters in-
dicating his displeasure at the public washing of the Mysore party's
dirty linen. The only perhaps novel feature of the Mysore wrangles was
that which occurred following one of the customary stormy scenes at a

1 Within two years, however, the critics had w o n ; the Chief Minister was deposed in
1956. An interesting feature of this sequel was that the Speaker of the Assembly was
chosen as Party Leader and accordingly stepped down f r o m the Chair to the f r o n t bench!
This perhaps illustrates the paucity of political talent in some smaller States. It certainly
shows that an Indian Speaker need not abandon all hope of a party political career (see
also below, p. 269 n.).
2
Congress Bulletin, Oct.-Nov. 1953, pp. 318-321.
3
By a nice coincidence, the first press cutting I made on arriving in India is one dated
7 Oct. 1953 and headlined ' M y s o r e Congress Chiefs' Conflict'; the last is dated 30 June
1954 and reads: 'Deep-rooted Differences among Mysore Congressmen; Mediation
Efforts Fail.'
182 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

party conference: one delegate rose and said that 'after hearing the
speeches it seemed to him that they were all power-mad, and that it
would be in the best interests of the country if both Mr. Hanumanthaiya
and Mr. Veeranna Gowda vacated their offices'. 1
That this unhappy impact of party disputes on the business of govern-
ment at the State level is not due to any indifference on the part of the
Congress leadership has already been made clear. If instructions and
advice were enough, the problem would long ago have been solved. A
circular letter from the A.I.C.C. office in September 1953 is only one
example: ' We have noticed with regret that even prominent Congress-
men indulge in mutual criticism and bickerings publicly through press
and platform.. . . Differences are quite likely to crop up among Con-
gressmen on important issues of public importance . . . but this should
not of itself give occasion to dissensions and personal vilifications. . . .
Public controversy should be avoided at all costs.' 2 On more than one
occasion, the leadership has set out in programme form the relations
which it considers should obtain between the ministry, the Assembly
Party and the Pradesh Committee, and has made suggestions to aid
smooth working. The Cabinet, it has been explained, must work as a
team; members should by all means—preferably by informal social con-
tacts and discussions—thrash out their differences, but they must co-
operate in action. The Chief Minister is Leader of the Party; he must
lead the whole party and not only a group, and in return must be treated
by all as the Leader. Contact between ministry and Assembly party must
be so close and continuous that government policies are understood and
backed by the members while they at the same time have ample oppor-
tunities—through party meetings and party specialist committees—to
express their views and those of their constituents. Members of the
Assembly party (and this applies to members of the Central Parliament
too) must visit their constituencies oftener so as to popularise Congress
policies and keep in touch with what the people are thinking; they should
be careful, however, not to interfere with the district administration or
attempt to exercise their influence on officials.3 Ministers should have
regular meetings with the leaders of Pradesh and District Congress
Committees, and, after a two-way exchange of ideas, the latter should
support the party government, remembering at the same time that the
Ministers are responsible not to the party alone but to the Assembly as

1 Report in The Hindu, 1 May 1954.

2
Congress Bulletin, Aug.-Sept. 1953, p. 269. The A.I.C.C. addresses letters not only to
P.C.C.s but to the Leaders of Assembly Parties.
3 It is interesting to note that this has recently been extended to the Congress members of
the Council of States and State Legislative Councils. These members, being indirectly
elected, have no territorial constituency; they have been asked by the A.I.C.C. to select an
area in which they will concentrate their activities as if it were their constituency (Report in
The Times of India, 29 June 1954).
 PARTY ORGANISATION AND THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y PARTY 183
1
a whole and to the people of the State. The formulae are agreed to and
applauded; and the practice changes little.
There is, then, a marked contrast between the smoothness which has
generally characterised the relations of party and government at the
Centre and the difficulties which are so general in the same relations at
the State level. Why should this be so ? A major part of the answer would
seem to be that smaller places have smaller men. The calibre of State
Chief Ministers in the former provinces is usually high, 2 but the same
cannot be said for those States which were formerly ruled by the
princes. The Congress leaders in the latter areas are for the most part
very new arrivals in the business of responsible government. They tend,
therefore, to be more susceptible to all the pressures of a divided and
factional society which we have already discussed. Although this may be
sufficient as an explanation, attention may be drawn to one vital dif-
ference between the arrangements at the Centre and those of the States.
We have already seen that a dominant unifying factor at the Centre was
Pandit Nehru's tenure of the top positions in both party and govern-
ment. The imitation of this pattern at the State level is expressly
forbidden by Pandit Nehru and the Working Committee. Even if it so
happens that one man should be elected Leader of the Assembly party
(and therefore Chief Minister) and also President of the Pradesh Com-
mittee, he must choose one and resign the other. This position arose in
Madras in 1954, when Mr. Kamaraj Nadar, P.C.C. President, was
chosen as Leader of the Congress Assembly party in place of Mr. Raja-
gopalachariar; he had to resign from the presidentship. A case in
Hyderabad was even more striking. There one of the members of the
Cabinet other than the Chief Minister was elected President of the
P.C.C.; even this joint tenure was not permitted. It may be true that in
some States there are not the men who can safely carry the two responsi-
bilities and be allowed to enjoy the two sets of powers. It may be, too,
that with some, even, there would be a danger of the party becoming too
much a slave of the government, or the government a tool of the party. 3
1
These points have been taken f r o m two sources: The Report of the General Secretaries,
Jan. 1953-Jan. 1954, pp. 120-122; and the press report (The Times of India, 17 June 19.54)
of Pandit N e h r u ' s note to Delhi Congress leaders.
2
Indeed, it is here, more than in the Union Cabinet, that one has to look for future
successors to the combined throne of Prime Minister and Party President.
3
The former situation is already alleged by some. Thus Mr. T a n d o n , former Congress
President, is reported to have declared: ' I do not feel the same joy in hoisting the Congress
Hag as I used to, because the Congress of today is not the same as it used to be. The Con-
gress Ministers have forgotten the people and are in love with palaces. The Congress Party
has become the slave of the G o v e r n m e n t ' (The Times of India, 10 June 1954). T o others,
especially outside the Congress Party, the opposite danger naturally seems greater. One of
the most frequently made allegations is that Congress Governments appear unable to dis-
tinguish between government and party and are willing to make the former work for the
latter. It seems always to be said, for instance, that Congress State Governments make
elaborate preparations to welcome the periodic grand sessions of the A.I.C.C.—prepara-
tions which are more suitably the responsibility of the P.C.C. (E.g., letter in The Statesman,
28 May 1955, on the A.I.C.C. meeting in Orissa.)
184 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

As a hard-and-fast general rule, however, it has little merit, while in

some cases its application may have encouraged a tension which other-
wise might not have existed and which has done more harm than good.1
The attitudes and practices of the other parties on this question can be
dealt with very briefly. To be out of power simplifies so many matters—
among them the relations of the party organisation to the party in the
legislature. The only party besides Congress which has had to do with
governing is the Praja Socialist Party. In the cases of both Andhra and
Travancore-Cochin, the National Executive of the P.S.P.2 had impor-
tant decisions to take, and these decisions influenced considerably the
outcome in these States. In Andhra, they refused to permit Mr. Praka-
sam, the local P.S.P. leader, to lead a coalition government with the
Congress; he had to leave the party to do so. In Travancore-Cochin,
the National Executive firmly discouraged a coalition with the Com-
munists and guided the local party towards assuming the sole responsi-
bility for government, though with the support of Congress in the
Assembly. There is as yet too little evidence available to say what influence
the National Executive has continued to exercise over the P.S.P. Govern-
ment in Travancore-Cochin, but it would appear that the latter has en-
joyed virtual autonomy. In the Union Parliament, the P.S.P. group is
small, numbering only 37. This fact, combined with a general tendency
among young parties of the Left to regard parliamentary activities as a
minor part of their work, meant that the centre of political gravity with-
in the party was at party H.Q., rather than in the Parliamentary Party.
Nevertheless, this situation has been changing. By the middle of 1954
not only the Chairman, Kripalani, but also the former Socialist party
leader, Asoka Mehta, were in the House of the People. With the de-
parture of Jai Prakash Narayan from party politics,3 this left only Dr.
Lohia of the well-known national leaders outside Parliament. The P.S.P.
headquarters remains in Bombay, the traditional base of the Indian
Socialists, but the initiative has passed to Delhi. The Parliamentary
Party may continue to receive policy directives, but its influence on these
directives is now important and its interpretation of them in any case in-
dependent. The protests that are heard against this tendency only under-
line its force. 4 The trend is, moreover, common to all the parties. It is,
1 It is to be noted that Pandit N e h r u ' s 1954 abdication f r o m the party throne was based
o n pressure of work, not on political or constitutional propriety.
2 The organisation of the P.S.P., though naturally less developed than that of the C o n -
gress and weak in party managers, is similar to that of the ' p a r e n t ' party. (The Socialists
were a distinct group in the Congress f r o m 1935 until 1948, when they became a distinct
party. T h e K . M . P . was formed of former Congressmen in 1951, merging with the Socialists
in 1952.) 3 See above, pp. 39, 104 n.
4 At the P.S.P. annual conference in Dec. 1953 it was alleged that ' t h e Parliamentary
section, instead of working as a limb of the Party, is working as if it were an independent
organisation. The Parliamentary section thus going its own way, the other sections . . .
very naturally tend to follow in its footsteps, with the result that the provincial offices,
bereft of all contacts, initiative and authority, are reduced to the status of mere post offices'
(Report in The Statesman, 1 J a n . 1954).
 THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y PARTY 185
for instance, no accident that the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha in the
House of the People, Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, was in 1954 elected Presi-
dent of that party. Only in the Communist Party is there some resistance
to the change; the parliamentary front is only one, and by no means the
most important, of the many fronts along which the party conducts its
struggle. The 'guidance' which the parliamentary representatives re-
ceive from the Politburo is no doubt 'the line', and not lightly disre-
garded. Yet even in the case of this party, it is noteworthy that its leader
in Parliament is an important member of the Politburo, while there are
half a dozen of the M.P.s who are on the Party's Central Committee.
Moreover, the Party H.Q. has been moved to Delhi, primarily to enable
easier consultation with the parliamentary group. Also, much of the
party's research work is now done under the control of the parliamen-
tary group, which thus serves the organisation as a whole. And one of
the notable sights of New Delhi is the large board which proudly in-
dicates 'The Office of the Communist Party in Parliament'.
This general trend has a wider significance and a meaning that is un-
mistakable: for the parties, for political life as a whole, Parliament has
become the focus of attention.

2. The Parliamentary Party

In considering the working of the party groups inside Parliament,
most attention can again properly be given to the Congress Party. Al-
though there were Congress representatives in the old Central Legisla-
ture, and although they were naturally well organised as a group, the
modern arrangements of the party date from the post-war establishment
of the Constituent Assembly, and above all from the transformation of
that body, in August 1947, into a Dominion Legislature. The title of
'Congress Party in Parliament' could come, of course, only after the in-
auguration in 1950 of the new Constitution and the consequent change
from Constituent Assembly (Legislative) to Provisional Parliament.
With the elections in 1952 and the setting up of the House of the People
and the Council of States, the present organisation of the party finally
took shape.1
The Congress Party in Parliament is a body of some 527 members of
the two Houses. It consists of M.P.s elected as Congress candidates
though there are also provisions for the admission of others such as In-
dependents. All members are pledged to follow the principles and policy
laid down by the Congress, as well as to conform to the rules, resolu-
tions and instructions of the Party in Parliament. They must also under-
take to resign their seats when called upon to do so by a competent
party authority, and they pay an annual subscription of Rs.175/- (about
1
These various constitutional stages have been described in Chapter II. The material
that follows is drawn from The Constitution of the Congress Party in Parliament, the
annual reports of the Party and from interviews.
186 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

£13) of which Rs.50/-is earmarked for the party library and research
work. The organisation has eleven office-bearers: Leader, Deputy
Leader, Chief Whip, three Deputy Chief Whips, Secretary-General,
three Secretaries and Treasurer. The Leader is elected by the Party in
Parliament for the full term of the Parliament. The Chief Whip is nomi-
nated by the Leader, and the Deputies are nominated by the Chief Whip
with the approval of the Leader. The others are elected annually. The
constitution also provides that one of the Deputy Chief Whips and one
of the Secretaries shall be a member of the Council of States.
General meetings of the party are held as often as necessary, and
according to the constitution at least once a month during sessions. At
the annual general meeting the office-bearers are elected and the
accounts presented. At the first meeting of each session the Leader
generally outlines the important work of the session. Of the other meet-
ings, some are held on the requisition of not less than 50 M.P.s. The
meetings of the general body are such large assemblies that discussion is
not easy; they tend to be used for three main purposes. They are, in the
first place, the occasions on which the Leader can deliver addresses on
general topics, such as the Five-Year Plan or the international situation,
or convey to every member directly some new emphasis which has to be
given to their work. They are also used when it is desired to give members
an opportunity to hear talks by distinguished visitors from abroad.
Finally, they serve an important morale purpose: whether requisitioned
by a group or advised by the Whips, they enable members to 'let off
steam' and Ministers to explain their policies on particular subjects.
The considerable increase in the size of the party following the elec-
tion of the new and expanded Parliament of 1952 led to the institution
of a new level between the general meeting and the executive committee.
By an amendment of 1952 there was introduced the General Council.
This is elected by the members sitting in State groups and choosing 20%
of their number; it consists of 108 members. According to the constitu-
tion it must meet at least once a week during sessions, but the Secretary-
General 1 revealed that it had actually met only four times during the
1952 Budget session, whereas the general body had met as many as
twelve times. For discussions of the party policy and the methods of its
implementation through the departments of government the General
Council is clearly better suited than the assembly of over 500. It would
seem, however, that the need for frequent meetings of the general body
continues to be felt; during the January-May session of 1954 it met
thirteen times—and more than half the meetings were devoted to
addresses by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs. It may be that the
General Council has not yet firmly established its place, but tends rather
to be squeezed out between Executive Committee and general body.
1
In an address at Indore in Sept. 1952.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 187
Ministers are often among those elected to the Council, but they can in
any case be invited to attend even if not members; no discussion of the
Five-Year Plan or the food situation would normally take place in the
absence of the Minister responsible for the subject. The Council is also a
convenient forum for the consideration of the broader features of the
party's organisation in the two Houses; it has, for instance, discussed
the committee structure of the Party in Parliament.
The direction of the party is in the hands of the Leader and the Execu-
tive Committee. This Committee consists of the 11 office-bearers, plus
21 elected members, 15 of whom are chosen by party members of the
House of the People and 6 by those in the Council. These may include a
few Ministers, but normally not more than a few. It is interesting that in
1952 the general meeting sought to dispense with elections by asking the
Leader to choose his own team. Pandit Nehru at first declined but later,
after inviting and receiving some suggestions for inclusion, did nominate
his Executive Committee. This Committee meets frequently. It prepares
the ground for the General Council and the general meetings of the
party and it considers matters of discipline and organisation. Above all,
it studies the progress of parliamentary business in some detail. The
constitution of the Party in Parliament lays down that, so far as possible,
all important government motions, Bills and resolutions should be
placed before the Executive Committee in advance of their considera-
tion by Parliament. There is even a sub-committee which considers the
amendments which have been suggested and advises the Executive Com-
mittee. Some of this examination of Bills and amendments may dupli-
cate discussions in departmental and government committees, but it is
designed for different ends. It is meant, for one thing, to ensure that
ministerial and party thinking do not diverge too much; measures will
be examined from the point of view of their conformity to the party's
policies and with an eye on the possible reactions of different elements
in the party. A further important function of this examination is to pre-
pare the party members for the reception of a particular measure and
ensure that their contributions, in debate and by way of amendments,
shall be constructive and not contrary to the purpose of the measure
concerned. It is, of course, this Committee which also considers non-
official resolutions and works out what the party attitude should be. In
all its work, the Committee owes much to the presence of the Whips and
the Secretaries and to the links that most members have with the Con-
gress organisation outside Parliament.
One of the most interesting recent developments has been the estab-
lishment of party Standing Committees. In part, they are a replacement
for the all-party Standing Advisory Committees of the old Central
Assembly which were abolished in 1952. 1 They are primarily study
1 See also below, pp. 308-311.
 188 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

groups. Each M.P. is asked to indicate his main fields of interest, and the
Executive Committee nominates the Standing Committees in the light
of this information. Most M.P.s appear to be on only one committee,
though some are members of two. The number of such committees is not
fixed, but they correspond more or less to the departments of govern-
ment, and in 1954 there were twenty-six. Their size varies greatly, in-
dicating partly the directions in which members are interested, partly
the judgment of the Executive Committee. It appears, for instance, that
not all those M.P.s who indicated Planning or Agriculture as their main
interests have been permitted to sit on those committees. Even so, while
the Planning Committee has 62 members and that on Agriculture 58, the
Transport Committee numbers only 13 and that on Natural Resources
and Scientific Research only 15. An attempt is also made to keep a due
balance in membership between the two Houses. The committee mem-
bers are expected to make a special study of their subject, to examine the
measures proposed in that field and to be ready to speak on them in the
House and to sit on the Select Committees 1 of the House when the Bills
are discussed. At the same time, the Standing Committees are sometimes
used by Ministers to try out ideas which they are in the process of for-
mulating and to prepare party opinion for adjustments of policy. On the
other hand, it would be misleading to present the committees simply as
aids to the party and government, a form of exploitation of the back-
bencher; they are at least as important as channels for complaints and
suggestions which the M.P.s themselves may want to make or which they
at least desire to pass on from others. Some examples of topics discussed
may be useful. Thus, the Commerce and Industries Committee discussed
textile control, handicrafts for foreign markets and Bills on the control
of royalties and the collection of commercial statistics. The Railways
Committee considered the Railway Budget and relevant portions of the
reports of the Public Accounts Committee, as well as the schemes for
the re-grouping of railways and the building of locomotives. Sometimes
committees have held meetings to hear talks by specialists. The External
Affairs Committee heard the Indian Ambassador to Egypt describe the
situation in that country, while the Defence Committee arranged talks
on the Indian Air Force and on the Japanese Army.
The effectiveness of the committees depends on the members, on the
Minister of the related department and especially on the committee con-
venor who is nominated by the Chief Whip. Frequency of meetings may
not tell the whole story of a committee's work, but they give some in-
dication: during the period from June 1952 to April 1953 (when Parlia-
ment was in session about six months in all), the Planning Committee
met 19 times, that on Education twice. Apathetic members, a weak con-
venor and an unco-operative or otherwise preoccupied Minister spell an
1 See below, pp. 230-232.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 189
ineffective committee. On the whole, however, the committees have
proved valuable. In the first place, from the party point of view, the com-
mittees strengthen and improve its parliamentary performance ; on any
subject there is a team of party M.P.s who can be expected to have given
some thought to the matter. The committees, that is, do something to
reduce the big gap in ability and knowledge between Minister and mem-
ber and perhaps a little to lessen the burden on Ministers of parliamen-
tary debate; as one party office-bearer put it, 'each member is able to
contribute his mite to the second line of parliamentary defence. It has
been our experience that members of the party reply to criticisms levelled
by the Opposition without the intervention of the Minister.' In their role
as a training ground for M.P.s the committees can do a great deal—and
there is certainly much to do. Up to the present, they have perhaps done
more to raise the level of the really backward M.P. rather than to pro-
duce teams of advanced specialists; there no doubt are certain specia-
lists in the party, but they have become so without the help of
'post-entry training'.
The achievement of the committees may be viewed, in the second
place, as an aid to the administrative process. It is here that so much de-
pends on the temperament of Ministers. The Minister who is receptive
to suggestions and sensitive to currents of thought and opinion can learn
much of value from a committee, and will encourage the convenor and
members in their work. It might be thought that the good Minister in
this respect will be the one whose background has been dominated by
life in party politics; though there is some tendency for this to be the
case, there are several exceptions—on the one hand, strong party men
who feel sure they know already all the ideas or complaints that could
possibly come through party channels; and on the other, former pro-
fessional men, whose connections with the party have been slighter, who
are happy to be able to check their own views and impressions with those
of the back-bencher. There is no doubt that ideally the committees are
especially important in India, where geography and social structure con-
spire so easily to place a gulf between the élite—ministerial and official
—and the mass. There is, moreover, no department whose subject is of
so technical a nature that the lay member has nothing at all to contri-
bute. In practice, however, performance has been very uneven. It will be
enough to describe how the good committees work; the ways of the bad
ones can then be easily imagined. In a good committee the convenor,
after informal discussion with several members, will select one or two
particular topics for consideration. He will then call for material or
guidance notes from the ministry, from the research section at the
A.I.C.C. office and from any other possibly helpful source. At a pre-
liminary meeting of the committee he will outline the task and, if pos-
sible, allocate the preparatory work among the members. At a further
190 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

meeting—after an interval during which the convenor has been in touch

with his colleagues and ensuring that they are working along the right
lines—the results of the study will be brought together and discussed.
Finally, the Minister will be invited to attend a meeting to hear the result
of the committee's deliberations and give his comments. This kind of
thing, it must be confessed, happens rarely, and the committees are
therefore less effective than they might be.1 At the same time, it would be
misleading to judge a committee's usefulness or influence simply by the
number of occasions on which its representations have led to a distinct
modification of policy—though there are a few such cases. Rather, the
committee's work and its influence should be more indirect and con-
tinuous, an influence—and only one among many—on the method of
approach to problems on the part of Ministers and their advisers. In
this connection, it is interesting that the opposition parties were quick
to detect possible dangers. During the debate on the Appropriation Bill
in 19522 one of the topics listed for discussion was expressed as follows:
'The recent steps taken to identify the administration with the Congress
Party; for example, the Planning Commission being present at Congress
Party meetings and Working Committee meetings, and the constitution
of special group committees of the Congress Parliamentary Party at
which officials are present to take advice.' The Prime Minister rejected
the charges: the Planning Commission met representatives of all parties,
not only the Congress; as for the study groups of the Party in Parlia-
ment, they were a useful institution which other parties would do well to
imitate, and he would gladly attend such committees as dealt with the
subjects for which he was particularly responsible; and it was untrue
that officials were present to take advice from the party. Nevertheless, in
the special circumstances of the Congress Party, the dangers are real,
and it is well that the opposition was alert. The attendance of officials at
meetings of the Standing Committees is in fact very rare, though it may
have happened on occasion that a Minister was accompanied by an
official adviser who could better answer some questions of detail which
members wished to put.
There is no doubt that the keen party M.P. appreciates the Standing
Committees. It gives him an important feeling of contributing to the
process of government, especially if the Minister appears to be grateful
for suggestions and conscientious in his replies to complaints. If the
M.P. makes use of the opportunities wisely, it enables him to gain a re-
putation for a command over a particular subject. If he is ambitious, he
will realise that it can be made into a route that leads to junior minis-

1
This is one reason why steps have been taken by some M.P.s (with the encouragement
of the Parliament Secretariat) to establish an Indian Parliamentary G r o u p which has
organised study circles on particular subjects.
2 H . P . Deb., 4 July 1952.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 191
terial posts. The committees show up the lazy and the stupid; they also
make it possible for the bright to shine.
The Congress Party in Parliament has organised its members not only
into Standing Committees for the study of particular subjects but also
into State Groups. These groups are used, as we have seen, for the elec-
tion of the General Council. Their real importance, however, is as a
channel for special local representations to departments. Thus the Tra-
vancore-Cochin State Group will discuss the slump in the coir industry
and attempt to suggest remedies. The convenor of the group will then
probably see the Minister concerned and press the urgency of the matter,
and put forward the group's proposals for consideration. The com-
plaints of the peasants in Himachal Pradesh will come to the ears of the
M.P.s from the State and will be passed on to the Ministry of Agri-
culture. Every group will put forward claims on behalf of its State for
new railway lines, fresh community projects and government-sponsored
industries, thus supplementing and reinforcing representations already
made by the State Governments. It may not always be possible for the
group to restrict itself to topics that are wholly the responsibility of the
Central Government, but even the discussion of State subjects is not
wasted since it increases the awareness at Delhi of the problems being
confronted at the various State capitals. When a Bill of special interest
to a particular State is before the Houses, the group will consider its
attitude and choose those it considers best fitted to speak on the subject.
The convenor will pass the names on to the Whips.
The State Groups are, of course, far more natural units than the
Standing Committees; they are groups in which M.P.s would in any
event tend to gather. They will contain former colleagues from State
politics, friends from neighbouring districts, above all people who speak
the same language. Indeed, so strong is the sense of regional community
that it is not unusual for a State G r o u p (or at least its convenor) to con-
sult with opposition M.P.s from the same area before submitting points
to the Ministers. The size of the group varies considerably: that from
U.P. numbers over 80, while there are at the other end several ones and
twos. Generally, however, they constitute a fairly compact and very in-
timate circle, in almost continuous social contact (in the Central Hall,
for example) and freely discussing not only points on which representa-
tions may be made but also politics in general and the more exciting
pieces of local gossip in particular. It is therefore not surprising that the
State Groups are an important link in the party's organisation and a
particular asset to the Whips; no one will know the mood of the mem-
bers better than the State Convenor, and no one is in a better position
than he to be able to assess the character of each member of his flock,
distinguishing the sycophant and the rebel, the zealot and the sleeping
partner.
192 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

The smooth working of the Congress Party in Parliament depends in

some measure on the effectiveness of the secretariat and office. The
general meetings, the General Council and above all the Executive Com-
mittee have to be adequately serviced with prepared agenda and syste-
matic records. The activities of the Standing Committees and State
Groups have to be watched and controlled. The office of the Party in
Parliament, however, goes beyond these routine secretarial functions in
three directions. In the first place, it has set up a Bureau of Parliamentary
Research with a staff of half a dozen research officers. This Bureau works
in co-operation with the research staff at the party headquarters or
A.I.C.C. office, but its role is rather different. It is designed to serve the
needs of members, and therefore concentrates on preparing 'talking
points', collecting material relevant to measures before Parliament and
in general on short-range, specific questions rather than on long-range,
more fundamental enquiries. It has, for instance, prepared a series of
small pamphlets outlining for each State the meaning for that area of
the Five-Year Plan, another series describing the policy of the Govern-
ment in relation to certain questions of Foreign Policy and a third on
such topics as Labour Policy, River Valley Schemes and the Food
position. On a smaller scale, and for a more immediate purpose, it pre-
pared for the 1954 Budget session a brief note on the nature of deficit
finance. A second direction in which the secretaries and staff have been
active concerns the campaign to develop constituency work among
members. Questionnaires have been prepared with the intention of mak-
ing the members establish closer acquaintance with local difficulties and
complaints, and in the hope that the channels of communication in both
directions between Parliament and the people can be cleared. It is worth
noting that the most important questionnaire was distributed not only
to M.P.s but also to members of State Legislative Assemblies (M.L.A.s),
in an effort to co-ordinate this aspect of the work of both. The party has
also experimented, not unsuccessfully, with sending teams of M.P.s on
talking tours of areas removed from their own; this assists, as one mem-
ber put it, in 'fostering a feeling that India itself is our constituency.'
Finally, the party secretariat has undertaken certain responsibilities as a
central co-ordinator of all State legislature parties. At the time when the
A.I.C.C. was meeting at Indore in September 1952 it was decided to
convene a meeting of Congress legislators from all the Assemblies, as
well as the Parliament. This proved a useful occasion for certain prac-
tices of the Centre—the Standing Committees, the roles of the Whips,
and so on—to be explained and advocated to the States. The conven-
tion also discussed work in the constituencies and relations with Pradesh
Congress Committees. One of the results of the meeting was the estab-
lishment in the offices of the Party in Parliament of a Legislative Co-
ordination Section. It is the duty of this section to arrange a continuous
 THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 193
exchange of information about the conduct of parties in legislatures—
both among the State Assembly parties and between Centre and States.
One of the steps so far taken has been the deputation by State legislature
parties of members of their staff for training at the secretariat of the
Party in Parliament.
The work of the Whips in relation to the House as a whole is men-
tioned elsewhere. 1 We have noticed, however, that they are at the same
time important office-bearers of the Party in Parliament. It would, in-
deed, not be incorrect to say that they serve the House mainly through
serving the Government and the party in power; for it is by organising
the Government's majority that they are able to perform their main
function of ensuring the smooth passage of business through Parlia-
ment. They are, no doubt, ' t h e usual channels' through which the
Government party negotiates with the opposition parties and with the
officers of the two Houses, but they would not be able to serve in this
capacity if they were not already important members of Government
and party.
The institution of the Whips is central to the working of the British
form of parliamentary cabinet government. It is an institution whose
working brings so close together the Executive, the Legislature and the
party that it is difficult to know where one ceases and the other begins;
its character is one of subtlety, its instruments persuasion and conven-
tions, its methods compromise and adjustment. It might be possible for
one country to copy without comprehending the electoral laws or the
legislature standing orders of another; no plausible imitation of the
British system of Whips would be possible, however, unless the spirit
had been thoroughly grasped. In India this has been achieved. The new
Parliament has perhaps been fortunate in its first Government Chief
Whip. Mr. Satya Narayan Sinha brings to his task a rich political ex-
perience. As a party member, he was President of a District Congress
Committee for seventeen years, Secretary of a Pradesh Committee for
five and a member of the A.I.C.C. since 1925. As a legislator he had ex-
perience at State level from 1926 and then at the Centre from 1934. It
was as early as 1937 when he first performed the functions of Whip. But
perhaps the qualifications of personality are more important, and it
appears to be generally agreed that he is both shrewd and persuasive,
both purposeful and humorous; it has been said that while every con-
versation with him hides a negotiation, at the same time every negotia-
tion becomes a conversation.
In India the Chief Whip is a Minister of Cabinet rank with the title of
Minister for Parliamentary Affairs. 2 Although not a member of the
1 Eg., pp. 218-219, below.
2 T h e Chief Whip w a s given explicit ministerial status during 1949 with the title' Minister
of State'. In 1950 he was ' Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs', while his present
title was introduced in 1952.
13—P.I.
194 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

Cabinet, he is the chairman of the Cabinet's Parliamentary Affairs Com-

mittee, which determines the measures to be brought before the legisla-
ture and the order in which they are to be introduced and considered.1
He is also a most important member of the Business Advisory Com-
mittee of the House of the People, as his Deputy in the Council of States
is of the similar Committee of the Upper House. These committees, on
which opposition groups are represented, decide the allocation of
available time among the various measures which the Government
proposes to introduce. The work of being 'stage manager' for the
Government is, however, by no means finished when these committees
have done their work. In the first place, the debate cannot be left to
chance; the party must have its speakers ready. The Chief Whip submits
his party's list of speakers to the Speaker of the House.2 To be able to
do this, he must know his members. This is one of the reasons for pro-
viding the Chief Whip with a number of assistants. In addition to the
three Deputies, one of whom is in the Council, there are nine Whips in
the House and four in the Council, and these Whips are responsible for
a 'bloc' of members from a particular 'zone' of the country. The Chief
Whip, when selecting the party's speakers, will be guided by the desire
to choose men who will be able to handle the particular subject and by
the anxiety to have various parts of the country fairly represented.
The Whips will therefore get in touch with the Convenors of the
Standing Committees and of the State Groups and will then make
their suggestions to the Chief Whip. A similar procedure takes place
when the party has to nominate some of its members to sit on the
Select or other Parliamentary Committees.3 The best known function
of the Whips, of course, arises when a division of the House takes
place, and the members vote for or against a motion. Although in
the central Parliament, Congress has majorities that are comfortable
to the point of luxury, the party has nevertheless thought it wise to
cultivate the habit of disciplined voting. The familiar system of
ordinary, one-, two- and three-line whips is used to indicate the extent
1
The Committee is a small one and is believed to include the Home and Law Ministers.
As in Britain, the whole structure of Cabinet Committees changes from time to time and is
not completely known to the public. Occasionally, however, information on particular
committees is divulged; the Prime Minister, for instance, told the Provisional Parliament
the composition, functions and work of the Economic Committee (P.P. Deb., 13 M a r .
1950,1, 1,799).
2
However, as the Speaker has had to explain to dissatisfied members on several occa-
sions, the Chair is in no way bound by the Whips' Lists; they are simply an aid to enable
the Speaker to keep u p the level of the debate and give a fair chance to all. (E.g., P.P. Deb.
7 Dec. 1950 and 27 Feb. 1951; H.P. Deb., 6 June 1952 and 20 Dec. 1952.)
3
In the case of Select Committees on Bills, it is usual for the Congress Members, once
elected, to meet as a group to discuss the party's attitude to the particular measure. Con-
gress M.P.s on other committees—e.g., Estimates Committee—neither meet separately nor
function as party members on the Committee; they are then simply members of Parliament
confronting the administration. (See below, Chapter VI.)
 THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 195
of urgency attaching to the vote. Specimens of whips issued are given
below. 1
CONGRESS PARTY IN PARLIAMENT
(House of the People)
24-25, Parliament House,
New Delhi.
Whip No. 10. 8 April 1953.
The Khadi and other Handloom Industries Development
(Additional Excise Duty on Cloth) Bill, 1953
Members of the Congress Party are requested not to move any amendment
to the above Bill, and if any amendment is moved by non-party members, it
should be opposed.
SATYA N A R A Y A N SINHA
(Chief Whip.)

CONGRESS PARTY IN PARLIAMENT

(House of the People)
24-25, Parliament House,
New Delhi.
Whip No. 9. 31 March 1953.
Members of the Congress Party are requested to be present in the House
this evening throughout the sitting, as there will be a Division on Demands
for Grants in respect of Ministry of Home Affairs & States.
S . N . SINHA
(Chief Whip)

CONGRESS PARTY IN PARLIAMENT

(House of the People)
24-25, Parliament House,
New Delhi.
Whip No. 13. 18 April 1953.
The Finance Bill
Members of the Congress Party are requested to be present throughout the
sitting this afternoon from 4 p.m. onwards, as there will be a division on the
Finance Bill.
for Deputy Chief Whip
The Whips are, of course, responsible for discipline in a much wider
sense than voting for the Government. The constitution of the Congress
Party in Parliament includes several rules for the party member: he must
send to the party office a copy of any motion, amendment or Bill which
he proposes to move or introduce, and can proceed only if the party
allows; he must not raise any important issue outside the scope of the
1
N o three-line w h i p is included and they have in fact been so far used only very rarely
up to the present.
196 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

Order Paper without permission; he is not to move a motion for the ad-
journment of business without Executive Committee approval; and con-
travention of these rules or the deliberate disregard of any whip renders
the member liable to expulsion from the party. The Whips are there to
see that these rules are obeyed. The member is also expected to obtain
the consent of the Whips for any absence from the House while it is in
session and for any departure from Delhi. Nevertheless, the imposition
of discipline is by no means the whole story. Perhaps the most important
function of the Whips is to communicate to the Leader the mood of the
party M.P.s and record the most minute and subtle changes of sentiment
and opinion. Here, again, the team of assistants is necessary. They must
be in continuous contact with members—on the floor of the House, in
the lobbies, in the Central Hall. The Chief Whip himself has tried to
describe this ceaseless work: 'The Whips are not only shock-absorbers,
but also indicators of the Party; they are not only advisers to the Leader,
but also the binding-force in the Party; they are not only barometers of
the different regions and opinions, but also the counsellors of members.' 1
It is not unusual to hear the charge that Congress in Parliament is a
sternly and rigidly disciplined party. Those who complain thus are
generally unable to recognise discipline as one of the necessary features
of coherent parliamentary conduct. Very often the protest is simply a
form of complaint against the large Congress majority; certainly it is
seldom made by Congressmen, most of whom suffer from no sense of
frustration. 2 Indeed, while voting behavour is admittedly closely con-
trolled, Congress M.P.s are in practice allowed to state a variety of dif-
ferent points of view on the floor of the House, provided naturally that
their speeches imply a general support for the Government and make no
serious challenge. Within the Congress Party in Parliament, members
have adequate opportunities for making suggestions and pressing their
points of view.3 In fact, the non-Congress M.P. who likes to portray the
1
A speech given at a conference of Congress Party Whips in Sept. 1952. In his capacity
as adviser to the Leader he will normally during session meet the Prime Minister not only
for one set interview daily but also several times in the course of the day for brief consulta-
tions. His advice may be on internal party matters (as Whip to Leader) or on the progress
of Government business (as Minister for Parliamentary Affairs to the Prime Minister). O n
his capacity as a 'shock-absorber', I must also add the story, said to be true, of a chat
between the Chief Whip and the Prime Minister. ' I have found out how to describe my
work, Panditji.' ' H o w is t h a t ? ' ' D o you know why the carpet in your office is always so
clean? Because there's a mat outside on which everyone wipes his shoes before entering. I
am the door mat which prevents the dirt f r o m reaching you.'
2
This is less true at the State level.
3
It is worth noting that the effort of the intelligent Whip is directed above all at the
training rather than merely the disciplining of the member. At the 1955 All-India Whips'
Conference (a new institution, at present mainly Congress), the Government Chief Whip
p u t the point thus: 'Congress Whips at the Centre and in most States have had on the
whole an easy time owing to preponderant m a j o r i t i e s . . . . But this is just the time when we
can afford to be less political and m o r e positive in our functions. We should devote o u r
energies to improving the quality of the legislators in our charge.' (India News, 29 J a n .
1955,)
 THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 197
Congress member as docile and helpless will on other occasions protest
that he has too many special opportunities for influencing Government
policy.
The organisation of the other parties in Parliament is based on similar
lines to that of the Congress. Since, however, they are so small and have
none of the problems of a Government party, their arrangements are
very much simpler and generally more informal, even in some cases to
the point of being ill-defined. The P.S.P. Parliamentary Group consists
of 37 members, of whom 10 are in the Council. The direction of the
group comes from the eight chosen office-bearers who form the Execu-
tive Committee: a Leader, Deputy Leader, Secretary and Whip in each
of the two Houses. The group is small enough to make meetings of the
whole body easy and frequent, and informal contact is naturally con-
tinuous among the members of each House. The question of forming
State Groups of course does not arise, but even the specialisation of
members on different subjects raises difficulties. Individual members
have been asked to concentrate on particular fields of interest, but it has
not been found possible yet to constitute formal study circles. Only when
this has been done will the party be in a position to attempt the same
kind of approach to ministries—for both information and discussion—
which the Congress Party Standing Committees have been able to make.
Up to the present, certainly, the P.S.P. group has felt that the absence of
any access to Government sources of information has been a handicap.
To understand the difficulty, it is necessary to bear in mind that in India
non-official research bodies, agencies, etc., are far less developed than,
say, in England, and information from sources other than the Govern-
ment unusually difficult to obtain. Also, the party itself cannot yet have
any large research organisation of its own—either in Bombay or in
Delhi. Moreover, it is not only small but also comparatively inex-
perienced; it is not in the position of a former government, now for a
while in opposition but equipped with the knowledge derived from
office. It is therefore not surprising that P.S.P.—and other opposition
groups too—should regret the passing of the Standing Advisory Com-
mittees of the old Assembly. As already mentioned, 1 the Prime Minister
has set up a purely informal Foreign Affairs group on a non-party basis,
but it is doubtful if the solution can lie in that direction without obscur-
ing ministerial responsibility. The best that opposition groups can do at
present is probably to make the most of their opportunities on the Par-
liamentary Committees, and attempt to build up their own Standing
Committees on special subjects. It is worth mentioning on the other hand
that one of the advantages of smallness is that individual opposition
members have greater opportunities for speaking on the floor of the
House than can be the case with the Congress back-bencher.

J Above, p. 155 n.
 198 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

The Communist Party in Parliament is a group of forty. One of the

peculiarities of its organisation is that of this number only about a
dozen comrades are instructed to work continuously in Parliament. The
remainder is organised so that, while they have periods in Delhi, they
spend also a great deal of their time outside—on the party's other
' fronts'. Such members of the group as are present in Delhi meet weekly
during the sessions, but the leading members are in more or less con-
tinuous consultation. The group has begun to devote more attention to
research than it did at first, and its members are instructed to specialise
in certain subjects and study in conjunction with the research staff,
which is also organised in several 'subject' sections. The other parties
and groups are even less elaborately organised; indeed, it is mainly for
particular issues and in order to be able effectively to command a share
of precious parliamentary time that they come together at all.
We have already seen that since 1952 the Congress Party in Parlia-
ment has attempted to act as a co-ordinator and adviser for the various
Congress parties in State legislatures. There is, in consequence, some
uniformity of practice at Union and State levels. The fact that some
States have very large Assemblies (and party groups) while others are
comparatively tiny results naturally in differences of scale and elabora-
tion. In Bombay the Congress Party in the legislature has a strength of
330, comprising 272 in the Assembly of 316 and 58 in the Council of 72.
The sessions in States are of course much shorter than at the Centre, but
so long as they last, the whole group meets weekly.1 So also does the 16-
member Executive, nominated annually by the Leader. The Leader has
also instituted a system of meeting the members from each district in
turn; this usually means a daily meeting during sessions. The party has
set up study groups on different subjects, but the short sessions made
serious work difficult. Discipline in the Bombay Party is very effective,
but appears to be achieved without much difficulty.2 It keeps together a
party in which regional tensions are always threatening (the Whips are
careful to keep a balance between regions in their choice of speakers and
nominees for committees—and the Chief Whip is, conveniently, from
no region of the State but from Andhra!) but it extends beyond voting
behaviour and leads to a certain uniformity of speeches on the floor of
the House. In Travancore-Cochin, the Congress group numbers forty-
five. This body may meet even more frequently than weekly during the
brief sessions. For instance, during a ten-day session in March 1954 it

1
In view of what was said in Section 1 of this chapter, it is interesting to note that in
Bombay not only are there the usual links between party and legislature party (e.g.,
Leader is member of Working Committee, m a n y M.L.A.s are members of P.C.C.) but the
Presidents and Secretaries of the four Pradesh Congress Committees covering the area of
the State (Maharashtra, G u j e r a t , K a r n a t a k and Bombay City) are invited to attend meet-
ings of the legislature party, though not entitled to vote.
2
It could not of course wholly withstand the States Reorganisation crisis of 1955-56.
 THF. P A R L I A M E N T A R Y PARTY 199
met three times. It has an Executive, but so far attempts to build up
study groups do not appear to have been successful. In those States
where the leading politicians lack experience of parliamentary demo-
cracy, the business of the legislature group is managed much more
informally, often more crudely and always in an atmosphere where per-
sonalities count for a great deal. There the whips are issued as whispers
in the corridors and lobbies, and the Whips who issue them at last look
less like polished diplomats and more like party bosses.
 CHAPTER FIVE

PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

HE procedure of a parliament is no doubt a reflection of political
traditions and of the disposition of political forces ; it is at the same
time capable of influencing political behaviour and thus moulding
the traditions and amending the dispositions. The procedure of the
British House of Commons is unintelligible except when read in the con-
text of the country's political history and in the light of particular con-
flicts and clashes; yet it has shaped the behaviour of generations of
politicians and done much to set the tone of public life. To those who
regard democracy as a particular social structure, parliamentary pro-
cedure cannot be of great interest. At most, they will try to judge it
efficient or not as a means to that end, and probably the procedure they
would approve i f ' the right people' were in office would not be the same
as that which they would favour if the balance of power were reversed.
As soon as we see democracy differently, as a particular way of reaching
political decisions rather than a possible way of reaching particular de-
cisions, then the significance of procedure is at once enhanced. It be-
comes a vivid—though no doubt complicated—expression of a pattern
of political ideals, and we can judge it as such. We ask whether it allows
scope for minority views and whether it encourages a full and frank ex-
change of opinions; we see if it helps to make rulers responsible and to
what extent it permits dominant intentions and aspirations to be clearly
expressed.
The procedural character of a legislature depends very much on the
constitutional context in which it is placed. A fundamental distinction is
drawn between legislatures of the 'American' Presidential-Congres-
sional type in which executive and legislature are separate and those of
the 'European' Cabinet-Parliamentary model in which the two powers
of government are integrated. This distinction cuts across that which is
also made between Federal and Unitary systems, and is, for a considera-
tion of procedure, the more important. The Indian Constitution is
federal—or at least has federal elements1; yet what matters more from
our present viewpoint is that she chose the Cabinet-Parliamentary in
preference to the Presidential-Congressional form. As we have already
seen, however, there is variety even within the range of parliamentary
legislatures, and a further distinction is drawn between those that follow
1
See pp. 3-5 above. Professor Wheare (Federal Government, p. 28) has used the term
'quasi-federal' to describe the Indian Constitution.
200
 THE EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURE 201
the British and those that approximate more closely to the Continental
model. 1 We saw that in some ways Parliament in India displays
' Continental' features, and we shall note others of a similar kind in the
following chapter. So far as procedure is concerned, however, Indian
legislatures belong, as one would expect, to the British rather than to the
French variety. The rules and conventions, that is to say, are designed to
enable the House as a whole to retain the initiative rather than rely on
the formulation of issues by committees. The process of general debate
is therefore carefully regulated and always takes place on a precisely de-
fined question. Also, the procedure encourages the gradual building up
of a case for and against the Government rather than a series of direct
challenges and decisions by way of votes of censure and confidence. 2
In what follows little attention is given to the detailed exemplification
of these general features of British parliamentary procedure. We shall in-
stead try to see the special Indian modifications of the general model and
note some of the innovations that have so far been devised. 3

1. The Evolution of Procedure

Although legislative bodies in India have a long history of gradual de-
velopment, 4 parliamentary procedure may be said to have begun at the
Centre and in the Provinces in 1921.
The 'Manual of Business and Procedure' of the first Indian Legisla-
tive Assembly reflects with some exactness the development then reached
by that institution. On the one hand, the rules were now more elaborate
than those which had served adequately the needs of the Morley-Minto
Councils. The Legislative Councils had continued to be regarded as no
more than enlarged versions of the Governor-General's Executive
Councils; the new Assembly was a distinct legislature with two houses. 5
On the other hand, a glance at the new Manual is sufficient to show that
the Assembly was still far short of the status of a sovereign parliament.
The sources of the new procedure were three. In the first place, the Act
of 1919 itself contained several provisions relating to the legislature. Its
composition, the duration of life of its two chambers, its general powers
1 Above, pp. 150-155.
2
See Campion, op. cit., and Campion and Lidderdale, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
3
A good account of British procedure is Eric Taylor's House of Commons at Work. I
should underline what I have already said in the Preface. First, this is not a h a n d b o o k o n
Indian parliamentary procedure. Second, I am not primarily concerned to make compari-
sons between India and Britain. At the same time in this chapter and the next, comparisons
have been particularly difficult to avoid; the two systems have so much in c o m m o n that it
has seemed worth while to avoid much detailed description by a brief reference to Com-
m o n s procedure which is already explained in other books.
* See Chapter II, Sec. 1.
5
The change was, of course, even more marked in the Provinces, where dyarchy had
transferred a portion of the provincial range of subjects to Ministers responsible to the
new legislatures.
202 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

and limitations were all set out in the Act. Moreover, the Act further
laid down certain rules more closely affecting matters of procedure.
Thus, the President of the Assembly was for four years to be appointed
by the Governor-General and thereafter to be elected by the Assembly
subject to the approval of the Governor-General; members of the Execu-
tive Council were to be ex-officio members of one of the two chambers
and to have the right to attend and speak in the other; certain measures
(including, for example, those affecting 'the public debt or public
revenues or imposing any charge on the revenues', 'religion or the reli-
gious rites and usages of any class of British subjects', 'the relations of
the Government with foreign Princes or States') could be introduced in
the legislature only with the Governor-General's sanction; budget pro-
cedure was to include certain non-votable items and the Governor-
General could authorise certain necessary expenditure if the legislature
refused demands; the Governor-General could withhold his assent to
Bills, disallow Acts passed and certify Bills which had been rejected;
members were to enjoy freedom of speech and were not liable to pro-
ceedings in the courts by reason of their speeches and votes. Although
much was in this way stated in the Act of 1919 itself, the Act provided
for the two other sources of procedure, the Rules and the Standing
Orders. The ' Draft Rules' of Business for Provincial Legislative Coun-
cils and the Indian Legislative Assembly as approved by the Joint Select
Committee 1 were made by the Governor-General in Council under
Article 67 (1) of the Act and with the sanction of the Secretary of State
in Council. These 'Indian Legislative Rules' were at once influenced by
those of the previous Councils and at the same time the basis for all sub-
sequent procedure. Numbering some fifty rules, they provided for legis-
lative and Budget procedure, questions, motions, quorum and so on.
Finally, a set of Standing Orders regulating more minutely the procedure
of the Assembly was made by the Governor-General under Article
67 (6) of the Act (and subsequently in minor respects amended by the
Assembly with the Governor-General's consent). 2
Since the federal portions of the 1935 Act never came into operation,
the changes in rules of procedure which followed the Act were relatively
unimportant. A comparison of the 1945 edition of the Manual with that
of 1926 reveals few significant alterations.
When the Constitutent Assembly (Legislative) began its work in 1947,
it took as its Rules ' the Indian Legislative Rules in force immediately
1
Cmd. 814 of 1920. The Provincial Rules were practically identical with those of the
Central Assembly (differing mainly because the provincial legislatures under the 1919 Act
were unicameral and required no rules for the transmission of Bills between chambers).
The pattern of uniform procedure throughout India was thus firmly established (see below,
Chapter VI, Sections 1 and 2). T h e only scope for procedural variety occurred in those
princely states which had representative institutions, such as Mysore and Travancore.
2
In the Provinces, Governors issued similar Standing Orders for the Councils.
 THE EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURE 203
before the establishment of the Dominion of India, as modified and
adapted by the President of the Constituent Assembly of India in exer-
cise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 38 of the
Government of India Act, 1935' and its Standing Orders were similarly
based. 1 The modifications and adaptations thus effected were substan-
tial. The most important arose out of the transformation of the Gover-
nor-General into a constitutional head of state. The former powers of
disallowance, certification and restoration (of grants refused by the legis-
lature) were simply removed. So also was the rule requiring the Gover-
nor-General's consent to the putting of questions or moving of motions
on such matters as tribal affairs and relations with the princes and
foreign countries. Certain powers in relation to the legislature which
had previously been exercised by the Governor-General were not re-
moved but transferred: that of arranging for the election of the presiding
officer to the President of the Constituent Assembly, that of alloting the
time of the legislature for non-official business to the Speaker. Apart
from these fundamental changes in the rules were other not less interest-
ing. The rules relating to Bill procedure largely disappeared since there
was now only one chamber, the Constituent Assembly (Legislative). A
new form of oath was introduced and the quorum provision omitted.
The language rule was modified: previously members of the Assembly
could speak in English or, by permission, in any Indian vernacular; now
they were entitled to speak in English or Hindi or, by permission, in
another Indian language. New provisions were introduced to permit
motions of no confidence and to allot days for the stages of the Finance
Bill. A previous rule limiting the power of the presiding officer to delay
procedure on Government Bills was removed. Finally, there were changes
of terminology: 'Member' (i.e. of the Executive Council) became
'Minister'; 'The Governor-General in Council' became 'The Govern-
ment of India'; the Assembly's 'President' becomes 'the Speaker'.
During the autumn session of 1948 the Speaker appointed a Com-
mittee of nine members under his Chairmanship to examine the Rules
and suggest further amendments. 2 He invited members to submit their
comments and suggestions, though it appears from his remarks made in
a statement to the House a year later that few responded. In any event
he and his staff as well as the Committee had been giving much thought
to the matter. The Speaker's statement of December 1949 revealed that
he had taken action in two directions. 3 In the first place, he had con-
sidered certain points to be of sufficient importance to merit inclusion in
the Constitution itself. He had therefore brought his proposals before
1
Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Rules of Procedure and Standing Orders, pp. 1 and
13. T h e powers under the Act of 1935 were of course conferred on the Governor-General
but, on the transfer of power, Orders gave these powers to the President of the Constituent
Assembly.
2 C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 3 Sept. 1948. 3 C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 20 Dec. 1949.
204 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

the Drafting Committee engaged in the preparation of the Constitution

and he was glad to say that 'the more important points now form part
of the Constitution of India'. Among these were the President's Address
to Parliament, the revised financial procedure including Votes on Ac-
count, Votes of Credit, Appropriation Bills and the Consolidated Fund,
and the important Article 105 which gave to Parliament the power to
define its own 'powers, privileges and immunities' and declared that
until so defined they should 'be those of the House of Commons of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom. 1 There were many other changes to
be made; his second line of action, therefore, had been to prepare, after
consultation with the Government, a further series of modifications and
adaptations to the existing Rules. On the inauguration of the new Con-
stitution in 1950 both the relevant Articles as well as the amended Rules
—now the ' Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Parliament '
—came into force.
The Rules of 1947 were the result primarily of the omission of now
repugnant provisions ; the Rules of 1950 were mainly marked by elabora-
tions of existing provisions or the introduction of wholly new elements. 2
Of the matters now worked out in greater detail, Question Hour pro-
cedure, the admissibility rules for Questions, the procedure of Select
Committees, the Divisions of the House and the General Rules for
speaking were foremost. The new elements in the Rules were partly the
result of the provisions of the new Constitution : the President's Address,
the new financial arrangements and a fresh chapter on privileges. Other
changes, unconnected with the new Constitution, were of no less im-
portance: the introduction of the Estimates Committee, the Short
Notice Question and the ' Half an Hour Discussion. ' 3 If these changes
appeared to be in the direction of strengthening the House vis-à-vis the
Government, some other alterations, smaller but of equal significance,
seemed to be designed for the same end : all Bills involving expenditure
to be accompanied by a Financial Memorandum; the Chairman of a
Select Committee to be any member of the Committee appointed by the
Speaker—not, as before, the Law Minister ex officio-, the reports of
Select Committees to be presented to the House not by the Minister in
charge of the Bill but by the Chairman of the Committee; the Finance
Minister to consider the suggestions of the Estimates Committee in de-
ciding the form in which the Budget is presented ; the Chairman of the
Public Accounts Committee to be no longer the Finance Minister ex
officio but any member of the Committee appointed by the Speaker.
A third transformation of the Rules took place with the election of the
1 See also below, pp. 245-255.
2
The Rules of 1950 incorporated both the 'Rules' and the 'Standing Orders', and the
distinction disappeared. It should be added that the arrangement and order of the new
Rules appear to have been a big improvement on the old.
3
All these matters are considered in greater detail in this chapter or in Chapter VI.
 THE EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURE 205
two new Houses of Parliament in 1952. The introduction of a bicameral
legislature necessitated several changes—in particular the inclusion of
provisions for joint committees and for an appropriate Bill procedure.
At the same time, the opportunity was utilised to bring in further changes
unconnected with the establishment of two Houses. The most important
of these concerned the development of the Lower House's committee
system: two new committees—the Business Advisory Committee and
that on Subordinate Legislation—appear; a third, the Rules Committee,
becomes formally recognised; while the procedures of the Public
Account Committee and of Select Committees are elaborated. This de-
velopment of committees represents—as we shall see more fully when we
consider the committee structure in detail 1 —a further reinforcement of
the House, very largely designed to enable it to stand up to the Executive
and exert more control over it. The removal in 1950 of the Law Minister
from chairmanship of Select Committees on Bills is in 1952 carried a
stage further: neither the Law Minister nor the Minister in charge of
a Bill is to be an ex-oflicio member of the Select Committee. Moreover, a
new set of rules defines the powers and conduct of Parliamentary Com-
mittees in general.
These changes have been the result almost entirely of the initiative of
the Speaker and his Secretariat. Before 1951 few members took much
interest in the development of procedure, and the informal Speaker's
committee was firmly guided by its chairman. Even after the formal
establishment of the Rules Committee in 1952, the proposals put for-
ward by the Speaker or Secretary have almost without exception been
agreed to. This represents a considerable achievement and bears witness
to the energy and devotion of those concerned. Although it is indeed
fitting that the establishment of procedure should be primarily the work
of those whose position enables them to make a continuous study of the
subject, Assemblies have yet in practice often insisted on exercising con-
siderable influence on the rules and orders; that this has not happened in
India (where Parliament is not exactly short of lawyers) shows the con-
fidence that most members have in the Speaker. The power to effect
these changes was given to the Speaker (and the Chairman of the Council
of States) by the Constitution. It is, however, in the nature of a tem-
porary power. The Constitution lays down that it is each House which
is to make its rules; it is only until such rules are made that the Speaker
is authorised to make 'modifications and adaptations' to the previously
existing rules. 2 While the power has lasted, it has given the Rules of Pro-
cedure great flexibility, and several changes—some of considerable im-
portance—have been made with great ease. Since 1952 alone, there have
been three occasions on which significant alterations have been made.
1 See below, Chapter VI.
2
I.e., to the Rules of 1947-50 which were in turn modifications and adaptations of the
pre-1947 rules. The Constitutional provision is Art. 118.
206 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

In April 1953 a definite period was set aside for Private Members' busi-
ness, Ministers were excluded from membership of the Public Accounts
and Estimates Committees and, most important, a new and extraordi-
nary Committee on Government Assurances was set up. In August of
the same year, a completely new procedure in connection with Private
Members' Bills was devised and a new Committee for the purpose intro-
duced. At the same time the powers and functions of the Estimates
Committee were very considerably expanded and a new procedure in-
troduced for the discussion of matters of urgent public importance.
Only a few months later, in January 1954, the scope of citizens' petitions
was much enlarged, 1 a further committee on the absence of members
established, the jurisdiction of the Committee on Private Members' Bills
extended to cover resolutions and provision made for secret sessions of
the House. The result of all this activity is, of course, that the present
Rules bear very little resemblance except in broadest outline to those
with which the Speaker began in 1947. The changes have in many cases
followed on informal experimentation and have been formalised only
when results were successful. In all cases, the amendments and additions
have arisen out of the work of the House and its needs as felt and for-
mulated by the Speaker and his staff. The House has thus been able
rather smoothly and very quickly to adjust its manner and methods of
work as new tasks and new attitudes have revealed themselves. At the
same time, this happy state of affairs is unlikely to last for long and soon
no doubt the House will assert its constitutional power to 'make its own
rules'; one consequence will probably be a certain rigidity and difficulty
of change as compared with the past. 2
Although the new Rules are largely the result of close daily observation
of procedure in the House and a certain amount of experiment, it should
not be concluded that the process has been haphazard or without guid-
ing principles. On the contrary, it has been perhaps peculiarly conscious
and deliberate, and its results reflect at every point the central ideas of
those who have been responsible for the changes. At the outset, inten-
tions were, as we have suggested, concentrated on the elimination of the
1
T h e Committee on Petitions will now have to examine and report on petitions con-
nected not only with Bills but (subject to certain restrictions) on any business before the
House or of general public interest. It remains to be seen what use will be made of this
provision.
2
Already in 1954 there were signs of a certain restiveness in some sections of the House
and especially among the opposition groups. In Feb. 1954, one opposition M.P., M r .
More (who was defeated in the contest for the Speakership in May 1952), petitioned the
President to move the Supreme Court (under Art. 143) and obtain its opinion on the
validity of the present Rules. Mr. More contended that the power exercised by the Speaker
was intended to be purely transitional and of a very limited character, and that the Speaker
has exceeded his authority in making completely new rules and continuing the amending
process for a long period. T h e fact that the Speaker is advised by a Rules Committee
nominated by him does not a m o u n t , Mr. More argued, to the Speaker performing a
function of the House under its delegated authority.
 THE EVOLUTION OF P R O C E D U R E 207
distasteful portions of the old Rules which gave special powers to the
Governor-General, limited the powers of the House and in general were
unsuited to a sovereign parliament. This simple negative attitude was
obviously of itself insufficient and the need for positive principles was
quickly felt. Such principles would no doubt gradually emerge from ex-
perience, but it was considered that examination of an existing model
could provide useful suggestions and probably save time. Since the com-
plaint before 1947 had been that the Delhi Assembly fell short of the
House of Commons and that India had been given an inferior article, it
was natural that Westminster should have been chosen for this purpose.
Visits to London and correspondence with the staff of the House of
Commons helped greatly in achieving a clearer idea of the line of ad-
vance. A cursory examination of the present Rules is, however, sufficient
to show that the use of the model has been discriminating. Such an ex-
amination will also show that the marked feeling of distinctness in India
between House and Government (whose general causes and character we
have already discussed1) has been given clear expression. At this point a
few examples will suffice.2
In many respects, then, the procedure and practice of the Indian Par-
liament is taken from that of the British. Some parts—and, indeed, the
general outline—came from Westminster via the old Central Assembly;
India, that is, began with British procedure, though it was severely
modified in accordance with the conceptions held by the British Govern-
ment as to what was suitable for Indian circumstances of non-responsible
government. It was not Commons' procedure, but it could be recognised
as derived from that model rather than from that of, say, the French
Chamber. There was a time for Questions, a similar Bill procedure,
similar general rules for making speeches. Other parts came from West-
minster directly and were taken soon after independence. These por-
tions were designed to demonstrate the characteristics of a sovereign
parliament and in particular to reduce the dominance of the Ministers
under the old regime. The introduction of the Consolidated Fund and
connected elements of financial procedure, the establishment of an
Estimates Committee and the release of the Public Accounts Committee
from government control are all examples of this second stage. Finally,
the House of Commons continues to be a guide in many matters of re-
finement. In a very large proportion of amendments, an important
argument for change has been that the new rule would incorporate
Commons' procedure. 3 Although this would be derided by some
xenophobic Indians as further evidence of the slavish imitation of the
1
Above, Chapter III, Section 4.
2
The contents of the rest of this chapter, as well as of Chapter VI, can be viewed simply
as further illustrations.
3
E.g., 'Secretary explained that the proposed rule was analogous to a rule of the House
of Commons'; 'It was explained to the Committee that it was an accepted convention in
208 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

West, it is in fact nothing more than the sober judgment of technical

experts that it is worth while relying in many ways on the experience of
similar technicians of procedure who happen to have been longer at the
job.
The makers of modern Indian parliamentary procedure have respect
for experience provided it is relevant experience. Their post-indepen-
dence examination of Commons' procedure persuaded them that in
some respects India's own quasi-parliamentary experience deserved to be
followed in preference to that of Westminster. Thus India has considered
but not accepted the institution of Standing Committees for Bills; she
continues to follow the system of ad hoc Select Committees chosen for
each Bill which is to be sent to committee. Again, she has no Committee
of the Whole House and, in particular, no Committees of Supply and
Ways and Means. It is recognised that many of the Commons' proce-
dures which owe their origin to peculiar historical circumstances have
been adapted to serve modern needs; others, however, are felt to have
been imperfectly adapted and to be more cumbersome than alternative
methods that can now be devised. Thus it has not been thought neces-
sary to take over the system of money resolutions. In other cases, again,
Commons' procedure is regarded as containing useful devices but doing
so in what would for India be an unnecessarily antiquated and indirect
form. At the end of the day's business in the Commons, when the motion
is moved that 'the House do now adjourn', what happens in practice is
that for half an hour a member is allowed to raise a matter of public
grievance or complaint and obtain the Minister's considered reply. In
India, the idea has been thought worth following, but the form is direct:
the Rules provide for 'Half an Hour Discussions'. Similarly, explicit
provision is made for ministerial statements.
Finally, there are ways in which Indian procedure has moved away
from both its own past and the Commons' present. The establishment of
a Business Advisory Committee and the strengthening of the Estimates
Committee are examples of wholly new developments of existing prac-
tices and institutions. The Committee on Government Assurances is an
example of an innovation.
The procedure of the Upper House is briefly referred to later. Its
rules, too, are the result of 'modifications and adaptations' made by the
Chairman of the Council. These were mainly effected for the new
Council of 1952—there being no Upper House during 1947-52—and
the House of Commons that . . .'; 'The proposed rule is designed to make our procedure
more elastic and in conformity with the practice in the House of Commons';' The Speaker
of the House of Commons had always ruled that. . .'. It is of some interest that on one
rule English practice was explicitly found irrelevant; in India the rules are framed under a
written Constitution interpreted by the Courts. Even in this case it was 'suggested that it
would be better to have a rule in conformity with the practice in England, leaving it to the
Courts, if ever occasion should arise, to pronounce upon the matter'.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 209
have not been developed subsequently to the same extent as those of the
House of the People. The evolution of State legislatures' procedure has
followed stages similar to those we have described. The process has, of
course, varied as the starting points of the different States varied. Those
States which were formerly Provinces with Legislative Assemblies and
Councils have followed an almost identical line of development from
the same starting date of 1921. They, too, of course, had representative
councils of a kind even before that time. 1 The position in the former
princely states showed no uniformity. In the politically undeveloped
areas, no popular representative institutions of any kind existed; they
had to be created when the accession and integration of states took place
in 1947-50. In others, such institutions had sometimes a long history. In
Travancore, for instance, a nominated Legislative Council set up in 1888
became partly elective in 1908 and mainly elective in 1921. In 1948 the
state introduced adult franchise ahead of the Indian Union. Mysore was
even more advanced. Its Representative Assembly dated from 1881 and
two 'Houses' were in existence from 1907.2 In all cases, however, im-
portant procedural changes were necessary corollaries of the advent of
responsible government. These changes have been very much modelled
on those at the Centre. The lead of the Parliament Secretariat in Delhi is
generally closely followed in the States, while the Conference of the
Speakers of all legislatures under the Chairmanship of the Speaker of
the House of the People is a further unifying force. 3

2. The Parliamentary Day

When the Speaker enters the House the order of business is already
settled. Each member has been given the List of Business for the day (or,
sometimes, covering two or more days). Portions of two such lists are
reproduced below:
HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE
LIST OF BUSINESS
November 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1953
[1-30 P.M.]

OATH OR AFFIRMATION
Members who have not already done so to make the pre-
scribed oath or affirmation of allegiance to the Constitution.
1
See above, Chapter I.
2
Government of Mysore, Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform in Mysore,
1939.
3
See below, Chapter VI, Sections 1 and 2. Most States like to show with pride how far
they have been able to walk in Delhi's procedural footsteps. A few, on the other hand,
show pride in their independence and point out directions in which Delhi's Rules have not
been imitated. Some have even entered into direct correspondence with Legislatures abroad
(in U . K . and the Dominions), but this has been discouraged.
14—p.i.
 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

QUESTIONS
Questions entered in the separate lists to be asked and
answers given.

EVIDENCE RELATING TO REPORT OF PUBLIC

ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
Shri B. Das to present Volume II—Evidence relating to the
Fifth Report of the Public Accounts Committee (1952-53)
on the Appropriation Accounts (Railways) and (Posts and
Telegraphs), 1949-50.

PAPERS TO BE LAID ON THE TABLE

*1. Secretary to lay on the table a copy of the statement
showing the Bills passed by the Houses of Parliament during
the Fourth Session, 1953, and assented to by the President.
**2. Shri Jagjivan Ram to lay on the table, under sub-
section (3) of section 5 of the Indian Aircraft Act, 1934, a
copy of the Ministry of Communications Notification No.
10-A/34-50, dated the 6th September, 1952, together with an
explanatory note.
***3. Shri C. C. Biswas to lay on the table, under sub-sec-
tion (2) of section 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act,
1952, a copy of the Delimitation Commission, India, Final
Order, No. 2, dated the 15th September, 1953.
***4. Shri Arun Chandra Guha to lay on the table a copy of
each of the following papers in accordance with sub-section
(3) of section 35 of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act,
1948:—
(i) Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the
Industrial Finance Corporation of India on the work-
ing of the Corporation during the year ended the 30th
June, 1953; and
(ii) statement showing the assets and liabilities of the Cor-
poration at the close of the year and the Profit and
Loss Account for the year.
***5. Shri Arun Chandra Guha to lay on the table a copy of
the Report of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration for
the half year ended the 30th June, 1953, in accordance with
sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Rehabilitation Finance
Administration Act, 1948.

* To be laid on Monday, the 16th November, 1953.

** To be laid on Tuesday, the 17th November, 1953.
*** To be laid on Wednesday, the 18th November, 1953.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 211
LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS
I he Rehabilitation 1. Shri C. D. Deshmukh to move that the Bill further to
l-'inance Administra-
tion (Amendment) amend the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, 1948,
Dili.
be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
(.Amendments printed on separate list to be moved)
T h e Sea Customs 2. Shri C. D. Deshmukh to move that the Bill further to
(Amendment) Bill.
amend the Sea Customs Act, 1878, be taken into considera-
tion.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
(.Amendments printed on separate list to be moved)
T h e Coir Industries
Hill.
3. Further consideration of the following motion moved
by Shri D. P. K a r m a r k a r on the 7th August, 1953, namely:—
" T h a t the Bill to provide for the control by the Union of
the Coir Industry and for that purpose to establish a
Coir Board and levy a customs duty on coir fibre, coir
yarn and coir products exported from India, be taken
into consideration."
Shri D. P. Karmarkar to move that the Bill be passed.
{Also further consideration of the amendment for reference of
the Bill to a Select Committee moved by Shri V. P. Nayar, on
the 7th August, 1953.)
The Ancient and
Historical M o n u -
4. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to move that the Bill to amend
ments and Archaeo- the Ancient and Historical Monuments and Archaeological
logical Sites and
Remains (Declara- Sites and Remains (Declaration of National Importance)
tion of National
Importance) Amend- Act, 1951, as passed by the Council of States, be taken into
ment Bill.
consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Calcutta High
C o u r t (Extension of 5. Dr. K. N. Katju to move that the Bill to extend the juris-
Jurisdiction) Bill. diction of the High Court at Calcutta to Chandernagore and
the A n d a m a n and Nicobar Islands, as passed by the Council
of States, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Travancore-
Cochin High Court 6. Dr. K. N. Katju to move that the Bill further to amend
(Amendment) Bill.
the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1952, as passed by
the Council of States, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Live-Stock
Importation 7. Shri P. S. Deshmukh to move that the Bill further to
(Amendment) Bill. amend the Live-stock Importation Act, 1898, as passed by
the Council of States, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Repealing and
Amending Bill. 8. Shri C. C. Biswas to move that the Bill to repeal certain
enactments and to amend certain other enactments, as passed
by the Council of States, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
212 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

The Cantonments 9. Shri Mahavir Tyagi to move that the Bill further to
(Amendment) Bill.
amend the Cantonments Act, 1924, as passed by the Council
of States be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
The Indian Railways
(Amendment) Bill.
10. Shri Lai Bahadur to move that the Bill further to
amend the Indian Railways Act, 1890, as passed by the
Council of States, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
The Special
Marriage Bill.
11. Shri C. C. Biswas to move the following:—
"That this House concurs in the recommendation of the
Council of States that the House do join in the Joint Com-
mittee of the Houses on the Bill to provide a special form
of marriage in certain cases, and for the registration of
such and certain other marriages and resolves that the
following members of the House of the People be nomi-
nated to serve on the said Joint Committee (names of per-
sons to be mentioned at the time of making the motion)."
N E W DELHI, M. N. KAUL,
The 11th November, 1953. Secretary.

HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

LIST OF BUSINESS
December 11, 1953.
PART I
GOVERNMENT BUSINESS
[From 1-30 P.M. to 4 P.M.]
A Supplementary List showing Government Business is
being issued separately.
PART I I
PRIVATE MEMBERS' BUSINESS
[From 4 P.M. to 6-30 P.M.]
Private Members' Bills to be introduced
T h e Universities
(Extension of Juris-
1. Shri Sivamurthi Swami to move for leave to introduce a
diction to other Bill to extend the jurisdiction of a university of any State in
State or States) Bill.
India to other State or States linguistically connected or for
any other purpose and to provide for matters connected
therewith.
Also to introduce the Bill.
The Indian Railways 2. Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move for leave to introduce
(Amendment) Bill.
(Omission of sections a Bill further to amend the Indian Railways Act, 1890.
TIA, TIB and amend-
ment of sections 71C, (iOmission of sections 1\A, 11B, and amendment of sections
7 ID, etc.)
11C, 1\D, etc.)
Also to introduce the Bill.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 213
T h e G o v e r n m e n t of
P a r t C States 3. Shri Dasaratha Deb to move for leave to introduce a
( A m e n d m e n t ) Bill.
(Amendment of
Bill further to amend the Government of Part C States Act,
sections 1, 3, etc., and
omission of section 23,
1951. (Amendment of sections 1, 3, etc., and omission of section
etc.) 23, etc.)
Also to introduce the Bill.
T h e G o v e r n m e n t of
P a r t C States Bill.
4. Shri Biren Dutt to move for leave to introduce a Bill
CAmendment of sec-
tions 1, 3, etc., and
further to amend the Government of Part C States Act,
omission of section 1951. (Amendment of sections 1, 3, etc. and omission of section
23, etc.)
23, etc.)
Also to introduce the Bill.
T h e G o v e r n m e n t of
P a r t C States 5. Shri V. P. Nayar to move for leave to introduce a Bill
(Amendment) Bill.
(Amendment of sec-
further to amend the Government of Part C States Act,
tions 1, 3, etc., and
omission of section 23,
1951. (Amendment of sections 1,3, etc., and omission of section
etc.) 23, etc.)
Also to introduce the Bill.
T h e Indian Trade
Unions (Amend- 6. Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move for leave to introduce
m e n t ) Bill. (Insertion
of new section 15A.)
a Bill further to amend the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926.
{Insertion of new section 15,4.)
Also to introduce the Bill.
T h e Training and
E m p l o y m e n t Bill.
7. Shri Diwan Chand Sharma to move for leave to intro-
duce a Bill to make provision for employment and training
for employment and to establish a comprehensive youth em-
ployment service.
Also to introduce the Bill.
The Unemployment
Relief Bill.
8. Shri A. K. Gopalan to move for leave to introduce a Bill
to provide relief to unemployed workers.
Also to introduce the Bill.
The Unemployment
R e l i e f Bill. 9. Shri V. P. Nayar to move for leave to introduce a Bill to
provide relief to unemployed workers.
Also to introduce the Bill.
T h e Chartered
Accountants (Am- 10. Shri C. R. Narasimhan to move for leave to introduce
e n d m e n t ) Bill.
(Amendment of sec-
a Bill further to amend the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.
tions 2, 4, etc.) (Amendment of sections 2, 4, etc.)
Also to introduce the Bill.

PRIVATE MEMBERS' LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS

T h e Indian Cattle
P r e s e r v a t i o n Bill. 11. *Further Consideration of the following motion moved
by Seth Govind Das on the 27th November, 1953:—
" T h a t the Bill to preserve the milch and draught cattle of
the country be taken into consideration."
Seth Govind Das to move that the Bill be passed.
The Monogamy
Enforcement Bill.
12. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava to move that the Bill to
enforce monogamy and to prohibit and penalise future biga-
mous marriages and to declare them illegal, be taken into
consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
* Seth Govind Das to continue his Speech.
214 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE
T h e Prevention of
Bigamous Marriages 13. Shri H. V. Pataskar to move that the Bill to provide
Bill. for the prevention of bigamous marriages, be taken into con-
sideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Hindu Divorce
Bill.
14. Shri H. V. Pataskar to move that the Bill to provide for
a right of divorce among all communities of Hindus in cer-
tain circumstances, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
The Dowry Re-
straint Bill. 15. Shri Fulsinhji B. Dabhi to move that the Bill to restrain
the custom of taking or giving of dowry in marriages, be
taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Control of E x -
port and Standardisa-
16. Shri S. V. Ramaswamy to move that the Bill to control
tion of Handloom the export and the standardisation of handloom cloth, be
Cloth Bill.
taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Punishment 17. Shri Banarsi Prasad Jhunjhunwala to move that the Bill
f o r Adulteration of
Foodstuffs Bill. to provide for punishment of those found guilty of adultera-
tion of foodstuffs, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Prevention of
Iuvenile Vagrancy
18. Shri M. L. Dwivedi to move that the Bill to make pro-
and Begging Bill. vision for prevention of juvenile vagrancy and begging, be
taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
The Dowry Re- 19. Shrimati Jayashri Raiji to move that the Bill to provide
straint Bill.
for restraining the taking or giving of dowry in connection
with marriages and for matters incidental thereto, be taken
into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Indian Penal
Code (Amendment)
20. Shri Syed Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi to move that the
Bill. (.Amendment of Bill further to amend the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Amend-
section 302.)
ment of Section 302), be circulated for the purpose of eliciting
opinion thereon by the end of February, 1954.
T h e Muslim Kazis
Bill.
21. Shri Syed Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi to move that the
Bill to provide for the appointment of persons to the office of
Kazi and for performing and keeping a record of marriages
and for the appointment of Tribunals for trying and deciding
cases of divorce and dissolution of marriage amongst Mus-
lims, be circulated for the purpose of eliciting opinion there-
on by the end of February, 1954.
T h e Indian Penal
Code (Amendment)
22. Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri to move that the Bill
Bill. (Amendment of further to amend the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Amendment
sections 53, 121, 132,
etc.) of Sections 53,121,132, etc.), be circulated for the purpose of
eliciting opinion thereon by the end of February, 1954.
T h e Parliament 23. Shri Diwan Chand Sharma to move that the Bill to pro-
Library Bill.
vide for building up an up-to-date and a comprehensive
Library for Parliament, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
 THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y DAY 215
T h e Military Pen-
sions BIU.
24. Dr. N. B. Khare to move that the Bill to regulate the
grant of ordinary pension, disability pension, family pension
and special pension to military personnel, be taken into con-
sideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e I n d i a n Penal
Code Amendment 25. Shri Nageshwar Prasad Sinha to move that the Bill
B i l l . (Insertion of new
section 29413.)
further to amend the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Insertion of
new section 294B), be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Indian Regis-
tration (Amendment)
26. Shri Satis Chandra Samanta to move that the Bill
Bill. (Insertion of new further to amend the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (Insertion
scction 2OA.)
of new section 20 A), be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Children's Pro-
t e c t i o n Bill.
27. Shrimati Sushama Sen to move that the Bill to provide
for protection, maintenance, custody, education and em-
ployment of children, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Indian Livestock
I m p r o v e m e n t Bill.
28. Shri Jhulan Sinha to move that the Bill to provide for
the improvement of livestock in India, be taken into con-
sideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Indian Registra-
tion (Amendment)
29. Shri S. V. Ramaswamy to move that the Bill further to
B i l l . (Amendment of amend the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (Amendment of
section 21.)
section 21), be taken into consideration.
{Amendment printed on separate list to be moved.)
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e P r e v e n t i o n of
C o w S l a u g h t e r Bill.
30. Shri Nandlal Sharma to move that the Bill to prevent
the slaughtering of cows in India, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Suppression of 31. Shrimati Maniben Vallabhbhai Patel to move that the
I m m o r a l Traffic and
B r o t h e l s Bill. Bill to provide for and consolidate the law relating to sup-
pression of immoral traffic in women and brothels, be taken
into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e C o d e of 32. Shri Khub Chand Sodhia to move that the Bill further
Criminal Procedure
( A m e n d m e n t ) Bill. to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Omission of
(Omission of sections
268, 284 and 309 and sections 268, 284, and 309 and amendment of section 286, etc.),
amendment of section
286, etc.) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e W o m e n ' s and
Children's Institu-
33. Shrimati Maniben Vallabhbhai Patel to move that the
tions Licensing Bill. Bill to regulate and licence institutions caring for women and
children, be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
216 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE
T h e Code of
Criminal Procedure
34. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava to move that the Bill
(Amendment) Bill.
(Amendment of sec-
further to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
tions 496 and 497.) (Amendment of sections 496 and497), be taken into considera-
tion.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
The Unemployment 35. Shri Hirendra Nath Mukerjee to move that the Bill to
Relief Bill.
provide relief to unemployed workers, be taken into con-
sideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Payment of 36. Dr. N. B. Khare to move that the Bill further to amend
Wages (Amend-
ment) Bill. (Amend-
ment of sections 2 and
the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Amendment of sections 2
17 and insertion of
new section 27.)
and 17 and insertion of new section 27), be taken into con-
sideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Code of 37. Shri Raghunath Singh to move that the Bill further to
Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Bill. amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Amendment of
(Amendment of
section 435.) section 435), be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Sri Kashi
Viswanath Mandlr
38. Shri Raghunath Singh to move that the Bill to provide
Bill. for the better administration and governance and for the
preservation of the Sri Kashi Viswanath Mandir known as
the Golden Temple of Banaras be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e W o m e n ' s and
Children's Institu-
39. Shrimati Uma Nehru to move that the Bill to regulate
tions Licensing Bill. and licence institutions caring for women and children be
taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Code of Civil 40. Shri H. V. Pataskar to move that the Bill further to
Procedure (Amend-
ment) Bill (Omission amend the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Omission of section
of section 87B.)
872?) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Child Marriage 41. Shri S. V. Ramaswamy to move that the Bill further to
Restraint (Amend-
ment) Bill. (Amend- amend the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (.Amendment
ment of sections 2 and
3.) of sections 2 and 3) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Indian Penal
Code (Amendment)
42. Shri S. V. Ramaswamy to move that the Bill further to
Bill. (Amendment amend the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Amendment of sections
of sections 312 and
314.) 312 and 314) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Prohibition of
Manufacture and
43. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava to move that the Bill to
I m p o r t of H y d r o - provide for the prohibition of manufacture and import of
genated Vegetable
Oils Bill. hydrogenated vegetable oils be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 217
T h e Titles and Gifts
f r o m F o r e i g n States 44. Shri C. R. Narasimhan to move that the Bill to provide
(Penalty for Accept-
ance) Bill.
for penalties for acceptance of titles and gifts from foreign
States be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Handloom In-
dustry (Improve- 45. Shri S. V. Ramaswamy to move that the Bill to provide
m e n t and P r o t e c t i o n ) for the improvement and protection of the handloom in-
Bill.
dustry be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Special M a r -
riage ( A m e n d m e n t ) 46. Shri S. V. Ramaswamy to move that the Bill further to
B i l l . (Amendment of
section 2.)
amend the Special Marriage Act, 1872 (Amendment of section
2) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Child Marriage
Restraint (Amend- 47. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava to move that the Bill
m e n t ) Bill. (.Amend-
ment of sections 2 and
further to amend the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929
4.) (.Amendment of sections 2 and 4) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Indian A r m s
( A m e n d m e n t ) Bill.
48. Shri Uma Charan Patnaik to move that the Bill further
(Amendment of sec-
tions 1 and 26 and
to amend the Indian Arms Act, 1878 (Amendment of sections
insertion of new sec- 1 and 26 and insertion of new sections \1A and 34) be taken
tions 1 7 A and 34.)
into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Essential S u p -
plies ( T e m p o r a r y
49. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava to move that the Bill
Powers) Amend-
m e n t Bill ( A m e n d -
further to amend the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
ment of section 1 and Act, 1946 (Amendment of section 1 and substitution of section
substitution of section
9.) 9) be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e P r o h i b i t i o n of
Manufacture and 50. Shri Jhulan Sinha to move that the Bill to provide for
Sale of Vanaspati
Bill.
the prohibition of manufacture and sale of vanaspati in India
be taken into consideration.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
T h e Suppression of
I m m o r a l Traffic and 51. Shrimati Uma Nehru to move that the Bill to provide
Brothels Bill. for and consolidate the law relating to suppression of im-
moral traffic in women and brothels be taken into considera-
tion.
Also to move that the Bill be passed.
N E W DELHI; M. N. KAUL,
The 8th December, 1953. Secretary.

In any Assembly the arrangement of business is a delicate and im-

portant matter. The bulk of the time of the House is required by the
Government, but some time must be set aside for Private Members; and
even in the time allotted to Government business the wishes of the op-
position groups have to be taken into account. Since 1953 the last two
and a half hours of the Friday sittings are normally allotted for the
transaction of Private Members' business. 1 Such business may consist of
i N e w R u l e 24.
218 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

Resolutions or Bills, and which of the two is to be dealt with on a par-

ticular Friday is left to the Speaker to decide. On days devoted to
Private Members' Bills, precedence is given according to the stage
already reached by the Bills, but among Bills at a similar stage of pro-
gress precedence is decided by ballot. 1 On Resolution days, precedence
is determined by ballot. Towards the end of 1953 it was decided that
there should be a Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolu-
tions. 2 The Committee, nominated by the Speaker, was primarily in-
tended to recommend time limits for the various Bills and Resolutions,
since it had been found that some M.P.s who were fortunate in the ballot
tended to hold the floor Friday after Friday. 3 This part of the work of
the Committee has gone smoothly. Bills have been classified in two cate-
gories, by tests of public importance and urgency and in the light of pos-
sible Government-sponsored legislation. As among the Bills given
priority, a fixed number of hours for the completion of all stages is laid
down. 4 The Committee was, however, also asked to examine in par-
ticular Private Members' Bills seeking to amend the Constitution. The
Committee took this matter very seriously and laid down certain general
principles. One of these stated that 'The Constitution should be con-
sidered as a sacred document—a document which should not be lightly
interfered with and should be amended only when it is found absolutely
necessary to do so.. . . Such amendments should normally be brought
by Government.' The Committee found that four Bills of which Private
Members had given notice sought to amend the Constitution; it ex-
amined them and recommended that none of the four should be allowed
to be even introduced in the House. 5 This report was accepted by the
House but only after some uneasiness had been felt by many members. 6
Apart from the half-day on Fridays, the rest of the time of the House
is allotted to Government business. The decision as to which Bills are to
be introduced and further proceeded with is determined by the Cabinet
and in particular by its Parliamentary Affairs Committee under the
Chairmanship of the Chief Whip or Minister for Parliamentary Affairs.
1
Rule 25, as amended in 1953. Bills to be introduced now have precedence over others
—a concession to members' pressure.
2
Rules, New Chapter VIA. The Committee was appointed on 1 Dec. 1953 and its
jurisdiction, at first restricted to Bills, was in Jan. 1954 extended to Resolutions. The
Deputy Speaker is Chairman.
3
Seth Govind Das and his Indian Cattle Preservation Bill proved particularly tenacious.
So also Mr. Gopalan's Resolution on Unemployment.
4
See Reports of the Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions. In the five
months of its existence up to May 1954 the Committee met 12 times and issued 8 Reports.
It examined and classified 56 Bills, placing 13 in 'Category A'. It decided to recommend
an upper time limit of four hours for any Bill or Resolution, and it fixed a particular num-
ber of hours for 15 Resolutions.
5 Ibid., First Report.
6 H.P. Deb., 11 Dec. 1953. The Communists found some support for their view that the
Committee appeared to be determined that only the Government should initiate Constitu-
tional changes.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 219
The further decision as to the order in which they are to be taken up is
a matter for consultation between the Leader of the House—in practice,
the Chief Whip will negotiate—and the Speaker, and the List of Business
is prepared accordingly by the Secretary. This decision, however, is de-
pendent to some extent on how much time is to be devoted to each stage
of each Bill. For the settlement of this problem a Business Advisory
Committee was established f r o m 1952. Consisting of fifteen members
from the main parties nominated by the Speaker and meeting under his
Chairmanship three or four times a session, the Committee allocates
time for the various Government Bills. The Chief Whip is, of course, an
important member of the Committee and he will state which Bills, in the
view of the Government, merit most attention. The agreed conclusions
of the Committee are then announced in the House by the Speaker. The
Committee has worked well and has reduced by a considerable amount
the discussion by the House as a whole of the allocation of time. This
achievement does not mean, however, that all difficulties in the arrange-
ment of business have been overcome. Trouble continues to arise in two
ways. In the first place, the order of business is not kept constant and
members who prepare themselves for one Bill complain that they find
another has been moved forward in its place. 1 These last-minute changes
are in part the fault of Ministers whose other engagements and tours
undertaken at short notice sometimes cause them to be absent when
their Bills come up for discussion. Most of the alterations, however, are
the consequence of the House itself not adhering to its programme; un-
finished business caused by some unexpected intervention today is
carried forward to upset the plans for tomorrow. Apart from the troubles
of day-to-day arrangements, there is usually also an end-of-the-session
rush. Members have, for example, pressed for a foreign affairs debate
towards the end of a session; yet they are often unwilling to accept the
consequences. They generally resist any curtailment of time agreed upon
for the other items, they are averse to any extension of the session and
they are usually most hostile to any suggestion that the House might sit
a little longer than its five-hour day. Somewhat surprisingly, they often
choose instead to do without the Question Hour for as many days as
may be necessary. 2
Normally, however, it is with Question Hour that the day's business
1
Before 1952, the complaints came f r o m all sides of the House; e.g. P.P. Deb., 28 April
1951. Since 1952, it is a frequent point of the opposition groups; e.g., 23 Nov. 1953.
2
E.g., H.P. Deb., 17 Dec. 1953, when the Prime Minister, as Leader of the House, put
the problem before the members: the session was due to end on 24 Dec., but he had agreed
to a debate on foreign affairs; it seemed to him that they would have to sit later or curtail
debate on other items. In the result, Question H o u r on 22-24 Dec. was used for ordinary
business in order to avoid sitting beyond the hours of 1.30-6.30. This marked hostility to
long hours is said by some to be a reaction against certain days of 1952 when the House,
after sitting its normal 8 a . m . - l p.m., met again in the evening from 4 - 7 p.m. Optimists
believe that the House will eventually be willing to accept a seven-hour day.
220 P R O C E D U R E AND PRIVILEGE

begins. This institution is as highly developed in India as it is in Britain,

and in this important respect the Indian Parliament is distinguished not
only from those of Continental countries but even from some of the
older Dominions. 1 It is generally the most interesting part of the day's
proceedings—less on account of the actual answers given (though these
may contain important statements) than because of the battle of wits
that can take place between the questioning members and the Minister.
This is the time when the lively M.P. can make his mark; it is, equally,
the time when Ministers can make or mar their reputations.
Questions for which an oral answer is wanted are 'starred' by the
questioner, and members are each allowed a ration of three such ques-
tions per day. 2 Any others are supplied with written answers only; the
same happens to questions intended for oral answer but not in fact
reached in the allotted time. Different days are set aside for the various
ministries, and members state the date on which they require an answer
from a particular Minister. 3 Ministries are in practice placed in three
groups so that each Minister's turn (in the House of the People 4 ) comes
twice a week. A typical week's allotment of days is given below:

ALLOTMENT OF DAYS FOR ANSWERING QUESTIONS DURING THE SIXTH

SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday

16 February 17 February 18 February 19 February

Prime Minister Communications Defence Prime Minister

External Affairs Food and Agricul- Education External Affairs
Commerce and In- ture Finance Commerce and In-
dustry Health Home Affairs dustry
Information and Labour Law Information and
Broadcasting Railways Natural Resources Broadcasting
Irrigation and Power Transport and Scientific Re- Irrigation and
Planning search Power
Production States Planning
Rehabilitation Production
Works, Housing Rehabilitation
and Supply Works, Housing
and Supply

1
Sir Anthony Eden, in his tour of the Commonwealth, is said to have felt more at home
in the Indian Parliament's Question Hour than he had in the Australian Parliament.
2
The rules relating to Questions are given in Chapter VII (i.e., Rules 38-58) of the Rules.
For the practice relating to Questions, I have consulted the appropriate sections of the two
series of volumes of ' Decisions' and 'Observations' from the Chair.
3
Members have been guided in the sometimes complicated matter of which Minister is
responsible for what; the Parliament Secretariat has published a 50-page pamphlet which
gives the answer in some detail.
4 See above, p. 151. His turn in the Council of States is arranged not to coincide.
 THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y DAY 221
ALLOTMENT OF DAYS FOR ANSWERING QUESTIONS—Continued

Monday 22 February Tuesday 23 February Wednesday 24 February

Communications Defence Prime Minister

F o o d and Agriculture Education External Affairs
Health Finance Commerce and Industry
Labour H o m e Affairs Information and Broad-
Railways Law casting
Transport Natural Resources and Irrigation and Power
Scientific Research Planning
States Production
Rehabilitation
Works, Housing and
Supply

A member wishing to question the Finance Minister thus knows the

days available, and he also knows that he must give ten days' notice for
his question.
The admissibility of questions is decided by the Speaker, and he is
guided by a list of twenty-two conditions which have been stated in the
Rules of Procedure. 1 Even so, the work is laborious—the Secretariat has
a special Questions Branch which helps to determine for example
whether a question should be disallowed on the ground that it has in
substance already been answered. It is also sometimes difficult; ques-
tions which relate to public corporations and universities and those
which touch on the sphere of State responsibilities have to be carefully
examined before being admitted. In cases of uncertainty, the Speaker
asks the department concerned for the relevant papers and then makes
his judgment. 2 Copies of all questions are in any case sent to the
ministries concerned as soon as they have been edited in the Parliament
Secretariat, and an opportunity is given to the ministries to point out,
for instance, that the question is a repetition of one already answered or
that the information it seeks is already available in a published docu-
ment. These comments are laid before the Speaker when he comes to
decide on admissibility. Ministries may not make any suggestions or
pleas to the Speaker on admission or disallowance; it is always open to
1
Rule 47. A question shall not, for example, ask for an expression of opinion, relate to a
matter which is not primarily the concern of the Government of India, make or imply a
charge of a personal character, etc. Two fairly recent additions to these conditions are that
a question may not refer discourteously to a friendly foreign country and may not seek
information regarding Cabinet discussions.
2
As a general rule, questions which refer to any of the following are admitted: action
taken on an All-India basis, even if done by each State; events of All-India importance,
even if occurring in the States; matters in respect of which the Government of India makes
grants or gives advice. The Speaker also exercises his discretion in deciding whether oral
or written replies are suitable and very many ' starred' questions are in fact transferred to
the list of 'unstarred'.
222 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

them to answer a question by a refusal to supply information on the

grounds that the expenditure of time and labour involved in collecting
the information will not be commensurate with the result or that it is not
in the public interest to disclose the information or simply that the in-
formation is not available. In a few cases, it may happen that a ministry
feels that it would be against public interest that a certain question
should even be asked—if it relates, for example, to delicate negotiations
still in progress ; the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs would then be
asked to approach the member concerned and try to persuade him to
withdraw the question.
Questions are asked in the order in which they appear in the List of
Questions—and that, in turn, is the order in which notice is received.1
The members put their questions by standing and calling out the ques-
tion number as given in the List. Part of a typical List of Questions in
the House of the People is reproduced below:

HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

'Questions for Oral Answers'

to be asked at a sitting of the House to be held on
Monday, the 8th March, 1954

SMUGGLING AND CATTLE LIFTING

*745. Sardar Hukam Singh: Will the Prime Minister be pleased to
state:
(a) whether there is any co-ordination and co-operation in checking
smuggling and cattle lifting at the border check posts of the two Punjabs:
and
(b) the number of cattle heads lifted from Indian territory by Pakis-
tanis during 1953-54 and the number returned?

U . S . - P A K I S T A N M I L I T A R Y ALLIANCE
*746. Th. Lakshman Singh Charak: Will the Prime Minister be pleased
to state whether there has been any difference in the normal movement
of people from Pakistan to India and vice versa since reports of the talks
on U.S.-Pakistan Military alliance appeared in Press?
1
Requests from Ministers that, within a day's List, questions should be grouped accord-
ing to the Ministers to whom they are addressed have not been granted. It was pointed out
that if the order according to ministries was kept constant, questions to certain Ministers
would never be reached by the end of Question Hour and the replies would invariably be
written. On the other hand, if Ministers took it in turn to be at the head of the List, there
would be a rush of questions to particular departments on particular days.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 223

CYCLE INDUSTRY

*747. Shri Bahadur Singh: Will the Minister of Commerce and Industry
be pleased to state:
(a) the annual production of cycles by the Punjab Cycle Manu-
facturers ;
(b) whether the Tariff Commission has received representations from
these manufacturers asking for protection to this industry;
(c) whether the Tariff Commission has considered those representa-
tions; and
(d) if so, what is the decision ?

CHANDERNAGORE

fSardar A. S. Saigal:
*748. <j Shri Tushar Chatterjea:
L Shri M. S. Gurupadaswamy:
Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:
(a) whether the Jha Commission has submitted its report on the future
Administration of Chandernagore;
(b) what are the recommendations in the report; and
(c) when these recommendations are likely to be implemented ?

M A N A G E R , TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, FARIDABAD

*749. Shri V. P. Nayar: (a) Will the Minister of Rehabilitation be

pleased to state whether it is a fact that the Manager, Technical In-
stitute, Faridabad, has applied for a monthly remuneration, over and
above the contract terms ?
(b) What has been decided regarding the salary to be paid to the
Manager ?

PALM Gur

*750. Shri Jhulan Sinha: Will the Minister of Commerce and Industry
be pleased to state:
(a) the total annual expenditure over the monthly publication Tad Gur
Khabar;
(b) the areas where it is distributed; and
(c) the expansion of the Palm gur Industry as a result of the super-
intendence of and direction given by the Palm Gur section of the
Ministry ?
224 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

U . N . COMMISSION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

*751. Shri S. N. Das: Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:
(a) whether there has been any widening of the terms and scope of the
U.N. Commission of Inquiry on the racial discrimination in South
Africa; and
(b) the nature of work that the Commission has decided to do since
the U.N. General Assembly passed the resolution to continue the Com-
mission ?
MAHATMA G A N D H I SAMADHI
*752. Shri Krishnacharya Joshi: Will the Minister of Works, Housing
and Supply be pleased to state:
(a) whether a new model of the Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi at Raj-
ghat has been prepared and completed by the C.P.W.D.; and
(b) if so, when the work of reconstruction of the Samadhi at Rajghat
will begin ?
DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES IN D E L H I
*753. Shri Radha Raman: Will the Minister of Planning be pleased to
state:
(a) the aggregate amount sanctioned by Government to the Delhi
State for various development schemes;
(b) the amount already drawn;
(c) the number of development schemes submitted against the sanc-
tioned amount;
(d) the number of schemes so far accepted; and
(e) how long it will take to accept the other schemes ?
HANDLOOM W E E K
*574. Dr. Ram Subhag Singh: Will the Minister of Commerce and In-
dustry be pleased to state:
(a) whether it is a fact that a Handloom Week was recently observed
throughout the country under the auspices of the All India Handloom
Board;
(b) whether it is also a fact that some grants were made to all the
States for observing this week; and
(c) whether some grants were also made to those co-operatives which
participated in observance of that week?
COAL PURCHASE BY PAKISTAN
*755. Shri M. R. Krishna: Will the Minister of Commerce and Industry
be pleased to state:
(a) whether it is a fact that the Pakistan Government are gradually
lessening the purchases of coal from India; and
(b) what reasons were given by the Pakistan Government for this
action ?
 THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y DAY 225
A R I D Z O N E RESEARCH
*756. Shri S. C. Samanta: Will the Minister of Irrigation and Power be
pleased to state:
(a) whether it is a fact that the Jaswant College at Jodhpur has been
associated with the arid zone programme of the U N E S C O ;
(b) if so, when; and
(c) what are the advantages derived by this college by such associa-
tion?

MANUFACTURE OF FOUNTAIN PENS AND I N K

*757. Shri K. P. Sinha: Will the Minister of Commerce and Industry be
pleased to state:
(a) whether it is a fact that a new plant for the manufacture of foun-
tain pens and ink is to be set up at Bangalore;
(b) what would be the total expenditure involved in setting up this
plant.

In spite of a number of disallowed questions and a number of transfers

f r o m Starred to Unstarred Lists, the number of questions admitted for
oral answer (usually 35-45) is always much greater than the number that
are actually answered within the Hour (normally 20-25). 1 The reply is read
out by the Minister; if it is lengthy or complicated, the answer will be
that ' a statement is laid on the Table of the H o u s e ' ; in that case an ex-
ception is made to the rule that answers are not available before the oral
reply is given, and the questioner is permitted to see the statement fifteen
minutes before Question Hour begins. 2 As soon as the reply is finished,
supplementary questions may begin, precedence being given to the
original questioner. The control of supplementaries is a delicate affair;
the tests that apply to questions apply equally to supplementaries, but to
apply these tests on the spur of the moment, and to do so without giving
undue protection to the Government or undue licence to the members,
calls for skill and quick judgment. In India, generally, the practice is to
allow six or even more supplementaries. 3 A harassed Minister can
1
The margin is sometimes useful if many members are absent, but the absentees often
exercise their right to authorise another member to put the question for them.
2
The intention, of course, is to give him a reasonable opportunity to prepare his supple-
mentary questions. In some States (e.g. Delhi State) the practice is carried much further:
in order to help members to frame their supplementaries, all answers are printed along
with the questions and shown to members one day beforehand. This is generally presumed
to be a transitional procedure which will disappear as members gain in experience. In all
cases, the answers are released to the press only when Question H o u r has finished.
3 The Council of State is even more liberal towards the members (or hard on the
Government) and supplementaries may often continue for about five minutes. The Council
is of course better able to afford the time, since its members and the questions they put are
fewer than in the House of the People. It is also worth noting that the Speaker's task of
controlling Question Hour is a good deal simpler now than it was in the inexperienced
first year of the new Parliament.
15—p.i.
226 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

always check the barrage by replying that he requires notice, but abuse
of this device gives as bad an impression as a vague or hesitant answer.
Usually it is at once evident which Ministers have a real grasp of their
subject—and which have not. 1
At the end of the Question Hour, the temperature of the House may
rise or fall according to the business that follows. Some possible pro-
cedures will almost certainly maintain interest and even excitment. There
may, for example, be a Short Notice Question. Although subject to the
same tests as ordinary questions, the Short Notice Question (i.e. a ques-
tion which has been allowed in spite of a notice of less than ten days)
will be of special interest because it will have fufilled the further con-
dition of referring to an urgent matter of public importance. Again,
there may be a Motion for the Adjournment of the business of the House
for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public impor-
tance. 2 Such motions were quite commonly allowed in the old Central
Assembly. The Government of those days recognised that there was a
fairly constant sense of frustrated opposition to many of its policies and
it was prepared to permit occasions for the expression of such feelings.
With the advent of fully responsible government, however, the Chair has
felt that acceptance of such motions should be rare. They amount to
proposals to depart from an agreed order of business, and this should be
accepted only in cases of genuine national emergency or by way of im-
plying practically a motion of censure on the Government. 3 In conse-
quence, the tests for admission have been applied with severity, and
motions have been disallowed because the matter was not sufficiently
important or not really urgent or more suitably ventilated by a Short
Notice Question or a Half an Hour Discussion. In fact, only one Ad-
journment Motion of this kind has been admitted in the House of the

1
The inexperienced Junior Minister can, of course, be excused his initial blunders. H e is
often rescued f r o m discomfort by his senior colleague. T h e Prime Minister himself some-
times joins in, and nothing does m o r e to raise the excitement of the House than to see the
P . M . spring to his feet in indignant support of a suffering friend.
2
The relevant part of the Rules is Chapter IX. The matter has also been the subject of
several Decisions and Observations f r o m the Chair.
3
The most important of several rulings is one of 1950 (P.P. Deb., 21 M a r c h 1950). T h e
Speaker outlined the development in the House of C o m m o n s and pointed out that f r o m
having at one time been frequently admitted, they were now severely restricted. ' T h e test
of urgency . . . is best expressed in the old dictum of Speaker Peel in the C o m m o n s . H e
said: " W h a t I think was contemplated was the occurrence of some sudden emergency
either in h o m e or foreign affairs. . . . " During the period 1921-39 the annual average of
such motions admitted by the Speaker was 1 -5.' He then reviewed Indian practice.' Succes-
sive Presidents of the Central Legislative Assembly including myself had considerably
relaxed the rule of admission. . . . T h e Government then was not responsible to the Legisla-
ture, nor were they amenable to its control. There was therefore good ground . . . to allow
opportunities of admission of all important questions. Since 15 Aug. 1947, the entire con-
stitutional and political set-up has changed. T h e Ministry is fully responsible to this House
and Members now have ample opportunities for discussing various matters. . . . W e can no
longer look u p o n an a d j o u r n m e n t motion as a normal device for raising discussion o n any
important matter.'
 THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y DAY 227
1
People since 1947. At the same time, while disallowing these motions,
the Speaker has often permitted Ministers, if they wish, to make state-
ments on the subject, in order briefly to set out the facts and indicate
government attitude or policy. N o questions or discussion are allowed
to follow such statements, though a member may, of course, give notice
for a later date of a question or request for discussion. 2 There is, finally,
one more item of business which may intervene between Question H o u r
and the main work of the day: the laying of papers on the Table of the
House. This procedure is required in respect of certain documents by the
Constitution itself, in other cases by the Rules and conventions of Par-
liament and in some cases by Acts of Parliament. 3 In all cases the
procedure is simple and brief: the papers have in fact already been for-
warded to the Parliament Secretariat; on the appointed day the item is
listed in the order of business and the Minister merely reads out the title
of the paper concerned. In this way, the documents are made public and
any M.P. or citizen who is interested is able to consult them.
Reference has already been made to special opportunities provided
for discussions. Although these periods of discussion do not take place
until the end of the main business, they arise out of the earlier part of the
proceedings and may therefore be considered here. The first kind of
opportunity is the Half an H o u r Discussion, a peculiarity of the Indian
Parliament introduced in 1950 and designed to perform a similar func-
tion to the half-hour at the end of each day in the Commons. It was felt
that while the attempts of the Chair to prevent supplementary questions
during Question Hour f r o m becoming a miniature debate were justified,
and while it was desirable that that period should be mainly utilised to
secure information, nevertheless there was a felt need for a short discus-
sion on some matters. A questioner who wishes to pursue a little further
an answer he has been given is therefore given the right to request a half-
hour discussion. 4 Three days' notice is normally required and the mem-
ber must have the signatures of two others to his request. He also states
1
H.P. Deb., 18 Feb. 1954. T h e mover was the Independent M.P. D r . L a n k a Sundaram.
The motion was to draw attention to an alleged inconsistency on the part of the Govern-
ment in allowing on the previous day a discussion in the Council of States on a subject
which on the same day had been ruled out in the House of the People. The intention, said
the mover, was to demonstrate that there was no co-ordination among Ministers, between
Government and Parliament or between Council and House. The motion was pressed to a
division and lost by 66 votes to 259. The incident reflected more than anything else the re-
sentment which is quickly felt by the Lower House of anything that seems like preferential
treatment of the Council. But on this aspect, see below, Section 5.
2
The same rule applies to all special ' S t a t e m e n t s ' which Ministers may make. Provision
for such Statements is made in a separate rule (No. 286) and they are generally called by
the Speaker at the end of Question H o u r .
3
E.g. Annual Financial Statement, Ordinances and Proclamations (under Arts. 112 (1),
123 (2), 352 (2), etc.); despatches and State Papers quoted by Ministers (under Rule 261).
On the provisions regarding subordinate legislation, see below, pp. 311-313.
4
See Chapter VIII of the Rules. The procedure was known to some Provinces earlier; it
has since been imitated by many States.
228 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

briefly why he considers the matter important. The Speaker then de-
cides whether he will allow the discussion. By a recent amendment, he
may not 'admit a notice which may, in his opinion, seek to revise the
policy of Government'. 1 The discussion, if admitted, can take place on
Wednesdays and Fridays at the end of the normal day's sitting. The
member who has given notice makes a brief speech setting out the
grounds of his dissatisfaction and the Minister concerned makes a brief
reply. The discussion is then thrown open to members who have given
notice of their wish to speak, and the Minister is allowed the final word.
These occasions prove of considerable general interest and are much
appreciated by the M.P.s.
A procedural peculiarity (by House of Commons standards) of the
Half an Hour Discussion is that there is no specific motion before the
House and there is no decision or vote to be taken at the end. The same
is also true of another form of Discussion recently introduced. The
strict refusal to admit adjournment motions and the limited nature of
the Half an Hour Discussion—from the viewpoint of time available and
the breadth of the issues allowed—left members still feeling that further
special opportunities were required. During the Budget session of 1953
many members were eager to discuss, at some length and in critical
spirit, the events in Jammu, where there was an agitation for the closer
union of Kashmir with India. The Deputy Speaker held a conference
with the leaders of various parties and groups and an agreed procedure
was arrived at for 'Discussions on matters of urgent public importance
for short duration'. 2 The procedure is similar to that for the Half an
Hour Discussions except that no notice is required, no particular day is
allotted and the time allowed may be up to two and a half hours. In
many ways, therefore, the new form of discussion has simply replaced
the old use of the Adjournment Motion. The difference that there is no
specific motion and no decision to be taken does, however, tend to free
the debate and remove the tenseness usually associated with Adjourn-
ment Motions. In any case, the latter remains still available for excep-
tional emergencies in which something approaching a vote of censure is
required.
These special procedures are naturally in addition to the more usual
provisions for Motions and Resolutions. 3 Ordinary motions and resolu-
tions have to some extent been replaced by the newer forms; in so far as
they remain, they are primarily used by the Government—except, of
1
The intention is to prevent or at least discourage the attempt to bring forward for this
brief discussion very large issues of policy. The wording of the amended rule is unhappy,
but the practice is in fact reasonable.
2
The Deputy Speaker announced the procedure in the House of the People (H.P. Deb.,
30 March 1953) and it was subsequently incorporated in the Rules as a separate Chapter
VIIlA.
3 Rules, Chapters XI and XII.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 229
course, in the case of resolutions appearing in Private Members' Busi-
ness. It may also be mentioned that there are special rules for Motions
of N o Confidence. 1 In particular, leave to make such a motion is only
granted if 50 members rise in their places to signify their support.
Although it is very unlikely that the most important function of Parlia-
ment is to pass laws, nevertheless the bulk of the time of a legislature is
spent on the consideration of Bills. 2 The life of a Bill, however, begins
long before it is introduced in Parliament. It begins, of course, in a
ministry and has the form of a proposal for legislation to implement a
policy. Even at this early stage, consultation takes place between the in-
itiating ministry and the Ministry of Law. The latter will give general
advice, in particular on the existing state of the law on the subject and
on any constitutional implications. The proposals are then prepared, to-
gether with the background facts of the subject, in a Summary which is
then submitted to the Cabinet (or one of its Committees) for approval.
Only after approval has been granted will the initiating ministry send
the proposals to the Ministry of Law with a memorandum indicating
precisely the lines of the legislation required and a request that a Bill be
drafted. The work of drafting involves its own skill, but it can certainly
be made easier if the initiating ministry has made its requirements clear.
In any event, however, several conferences between the draftsmen and
the officials of the initiating ministry will probably be needed and several
drafts may have to be prepared before all concerned are satisfied with the
legal form and administrative content of the Bill. The process deserves
not to be hurried, but in this it seldom gets what it deserves. Before the
Bill can be printed and made ready for Parliament it must be accom-
panied by several other documents: by a Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the Bill signed by the Minister responsible; by the sanction
or recommendation of the President wherever this is required by the
Constitution 3 ; by a financial memorandum where expenditure is in-
volved ; and by a further memorandum where powers of delegated legis-
lation are proposed. 4
The Constitution has laid down that Bills other than Money Bills may
originate in either House. 5 Money Bills must be introduced in the
Lower House and, although the Council may make recommendations
1
Rule 179. The first to be moved since 1947 was a motion of no confidence in the
Speaker moved in December 1954. See below, p. 269 n.
2
Statistics showing the actual distribution of time in the House of the People are given
in Table XXIII, p. 321.
3 Arts. 3, 117, 274, 349. These Articles refer to the boundaries of States, Money Bills and
the use of English for fifteen years for certain official purposes.
4
The memoranda are required by the Rules, 70 and 71 respectively. I a m grateful to
some of the officers concerned for a part of the information contained in this paragraph;
they are, however, in no way responsible for any of the statements made.
5
Art. 107 (1). Money Bills are defined in Art. 110 (1) and the matter is decided by the
Speaker (Art. 110 (3)). See Appendix I.
 230 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

(provided it does so within fourteen days), the House of the People may
reject them and the Bill may yet be considered passed. 1 In the case of
other Bills disagreement between the two Houses is resolved by a Joint
Sitting at which the Speaker of the House normally presides. 2 Since the
procedures of both Houses are practically identical, and since in fact the
majority of Bills are introduced in the Lower House, it will be enough
to describe Bill procedure in the House of the People. A joint sitting
can hardly be described; the party composition of the two Houses
is so similar that disagreements on Bills have not occurred and no
Joint Sitting has been held. An example of a Bill is reproduced in
Appendix V.
The first stage of a Bill in the House is its introduction. 3 What is im-
portant is that the proposed legislation is made available to members,
and study of the measure can begin. What happens in the House is simply
a Minister's formal motion for leave to introduce the Bill. By conven-
tion, no discussion takes place at this stage, though it has happened that
members have taken the opportunity to raise a point as to whether a
Bill is ultra vires of the Constitution. 4 Once the Bill is introduced (and
normally after an interval of at least two days), the subsequent stages
can follow at any time. The member in charge of the Bill makes one of
four motions: that it be taken into consideration, or that it be referred to
a Select Committee of the House, or that it be referred to a Joint Com-
mittee of the Houses with the concurrence of the Council, or that it be
circulated for the purpose of eliciting opinion on it. 5 The discussion on
any of these motions is of a general nature: 'the principle of the Bill and
its provisions may be discussed generally, but the details of the Bill shall
not be discussed further than is necessary to explain its principles.' 6 If
the motion for consideration is moved, an amendment proposing one of
the other three alternatives may be moved. If the member in charge
moves for reference to a Committee, an amendment proposing its cir-
culation may be moved. If a motion for circulation is carried and the
Bill is duly circulated, the member in charge must then normally move
its reference to a Committee. 7
i Art. 109. 2 Arts. 108 and 118 (3) and (4).
3
Chapter X is the part of the Rules covering legislation.
4
T h e convention not to oppose a Bill at this stage was broken for the first time on
23 Nov. 1954; a division was forced on the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Bill, its in-
troduction being carried by 146-36.
5
When sent to Committee or circulated, a time limit by which the Bill must be returned
to the House is usually stated.
« Rule 75 (1).
7
The Delimitation Commission Bill, for example, was originally to be taken at once
into consideration, but the Government accepted an amendment that it should be circulated
for a period (H.P. Deb., 9 July 1952). At the end of the period the member in charge then
moved its reference to a Select Committee (H.P. Deb., 12 Nov. 1952). Again, the same pro-
cedure occurred about the same time in connection with the Constitution (Second Amend-
ment) Bill (H.P. Deb., 8 July 1952 and 11 Nov. 1952).
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 231
The practice in the Indian Parliament is that only a few Bills are re-
ferred to Select Committees 1 (and even fewer to Joint Committees).
This procedure is used only with Bills of exceptional importance or un-
usual complexity. The size of Select Committees varies from 20 to 30,
but the Select Committee on the Estate Duty Bill, 1952, numbered 35.
The names of members are included in the motion itself. There is no
nucleus of members who generally sit on Select Committees; each Com-
mittee is freshly chosen for each occasion. The practice is that the
Minister for Parliamentary Affairs usually offers about one-quarter of
the places to the opposition groups and chooses the rest, after consulta-
tion with the party's convenors, 2 from among those of his own party
who are known to be interested in the subject. The Chairman is ap-
pointed by the Speaker from among the members and is usually a mem-
ber of the majority party. The conduct of the Committee is in his hands
subject to the Rules of the House and the more detailed directions which
the Speaker has issued to the Chairmen of Select Committees. The
principle of the Bill has already been settled and the attention of the
Committee is concentrated on the details and on any amendments that
may be moved in Committee. Select Committees may appoint sub-com-
mittees to investigate particular points; they also have the power to call
for the attendance of persons and the production of papers. In many
cases, of course, outside bodies take the initiative and ask to be called as
witnesses. The Committees' proceedings are confidential and press and
public are not allowed. 3 The reports are, of course, published (along
with any minutes of dissent) as soon as they have been presented to the
House 4 ; in some cases, the evidence and the proceedings during the
examination of witnesses may also be published.
When a Bill has been reported on by a Select Committee or a Joint
Committee, the House has to agree that it be taken into consideration
before the clause by clause consideration is taken up. Each clause is
considered in turn and put to the vote of the House. It is at this stage,
immediately after a clause is placed before the House, that amendments
to clauses may be moved. Amendments of which members have given
notice are duplicated in lists as they are received. Below is the seventh of
several lists of amendments to the Press (Objectionable Matter) Amend-
ment Bill, 1953. This particular list contains only two brief amendments,
but the lists are often lengthy:
1
The practice in States is sometimes the same; in other cases, reference to Select Com-
mittees appears almost usual.
2 See Chapter (IV), Section 2.
3
T h e proceedings may n o t be referred to in the House—e.g. an observation from the
Chair in the H o u s e on 12 May 1951.
4
T h e D r a f t s m a n of the Ministry of Law who has prepared the Bill attends all the meet-
ings of the Committee.
232 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

List No. 7.
HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

Notice of Amendments
The Press (Objectionable Matter) Amendment Bill, 1953
{To be moved at a sitting of the House)
17. By Shri Frank Anthony:—
That the Bill be circulated for the purpose of eliciting opinion thereon by the
15th April, 1954.
Clause 5
18. By Shri Khub Chand Sodhia:—
In page 2, line 9,—
(i) omit "The competent authority or"; and
(ii) omit "other".
NEW DELHI, M. N. KAUL,
The 27th February, 1954. Secretary.
Naturally, if the Bill has already been examined by Select Committee,
many of the amendments will have been already considered, but there
may still be many others to be moved—including those that may arise as
a result of disagreement with the Committee's recommendations. The
fact that a Bill has been sent to Committee does not, therefore, ensure a
short clause-by-clause stage; all that can be said is that it will normally
be shorter than if the Bill had been taken at once into consideration. 1
Amendments to the clauses are subject to conditions of admissibility—
they must in particular be relevant and within the scope of the Bill—and
the Speaker is given by the Rules the power to select amendments. In
practice, although a very large number of amendments is very often
moved, the Speaker has not exercised the power of selection. The num-
ber of amendments is large partly because of the fragmented character
of the opposition; the Speaker is unwilling to undertake the responsi-
bility of making selections partly because it is difficult to know in
advance which amendments are likely to be most important. 2 In conse-
quence, the clause-by-clause stage is often laborious. Each clause is
normally moved separately, and each amendment (except those that are
withdrawn) also must be put and agreed to or negatived. 3
1
The Estate Duty Bill, 1952, was a measure of extraordinary complexity and subject to
much controversy. It was sent to Select Committee and considerably amended during
the twenty-one meetings of the Committee. Nevertheless it was discussed on the floor of the
House for a total of 92i hours. (See H.P. Deb., 15 Sept. 1953.)
2
The confidential nature of the proceedings of the Select Committees adds to the
difficulty.
3
The Ajmer-Merwara Tenancy and Land Records Bill contained more than 200 clauses
and there were many amendments to almost every clause. In order to save the time of the
House, some members suggested that all the clauses and agreed amendments should be put
collectively. The Speaker observed: 'It would not only save time, but also the constant
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 233
The final or ' third reading' stage of any Bill is reached only after the
clauses (with amendments), the schedules if any, the enacting formula,
preamble if any, and the title of the Bill have all been put (in the form
that they 'stand part of the Bill') and agreed to by the House. The third
reading is the motion that the Bill (where necessary, 'as amended') be
passed. On this motion the discussion 'shall be confined to the submis-
sion of arguments either in support or rejection of the Bill. In making his
speech a member shall not refer to the details of the Bill further than is
necessary for the purpose of his arguments which shall be of a general
character.' 1 Since, however, it is also a decision of the House that there
shall be no repetition, it is in fact only rarely that there are speeches at
this final stage; the general principles have been discussed already and
the details have also been examined. 2 When a Bill is passed by the House,
it is transmitted to the Council for concurrence. It will there pass through
a similar procedure 3 before being presented to the President for his
assent. Up to 1954 the assent of the President has been refused only
once—and then on purely technical grounds and clearly on the advice of
the Ministry of Law. 4
This procedure for the discussion of Bills has not proved unsatis-
factory. The growing volume of legislation—coupled with the disin-
clination of members to sit longer hours—is, however, now beginning to
pose certain problems. If the House is to retain its opportunities for
questions and general discussions unrelated to Bills—and it would cer-
tainly be an incalculably serious loss if these were to be curtailed—it
would seem that one of two alternative courses must be taken: either
time in committee must be used to replace time in the House; or the de-
bate in the House must be limited by the imposition of rules of closure.
physical exertion on my part that it involves, namely to get u p and sit after every motion.
But I think the present procedure is necessary to check u p the amendments relating to each
clause—unless, of course, there are no amendments to certain clauses, which can then be
put collectively.' (P.P. Deb., 5 April 1950.) 1 Rule 114.
2
The only possibilities are, in the case of a Bill of some importance, that there might be
a case for a final general summing up on both sides, or, in the case of a Bill much amended
in the course of debate, general remarks on its new form. E.g. the following ruling of the
Speaker: ' I n the third reading, no speeches are allowed ordinarily. . . . The position is that
at the third reading, the discussion is restricted to such amendments or changes that have
been made during the clause-by-clause stage. T h a t is the general rule. The member's idea
is that he can make an extensive speech again as if he was speaking on the consideration
motion; but that is not permissible.' (P.P.Deb., 29 Feb. 1952.)
3
There appears to be one curious difference. The Rules of the House state that if a Bill
originating in the Council has been referred to a Select Committee of the Council it cannot
be referred to a Select Committee of the House. The Council, which had a similar rule for
some months, deleted it in Sept. 1952 with the result that a Bill which has already been
before a House Select Committee could be sent to a Committee of the Council (Rules of
Procedure in the Council of Stares, Rule 123).
* The House of the People (H.P. Deb., 5 April 1954) was told by the Speaker that the
President had refused assent to the P.E.P.S.U. Appropriation Bill passed by Parliament on
8 Mar. The ground for refusal was that the Proclamation, under which Parliament (during
the imposition of President's Rule in P.E.P.S.U.) had been empowered to legislate for that
State, had been revoked on 7 Mar.
234 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

The House seems reluctant at present to adopt either of these measures.

Yet the consequence is that Parliament tends to constitute a ' bottleneck'
so far as legislation is concerned. It not infrequently happens that each
session begins with a heavy load of Bills carried forward from previous
sessions, as well as those freshly introduced. For example, the last session
of 1953 was confronted not only with 19 new Bills but with 27 pending
from previous sessions, of which nearly half were Bills introduced in
1952.1
Proposals for a system of Standing Committees for Bills, which would
enable amendments to be more completely disposed of away from the
floor of the House, have often been put forward, and as often rejected as
unnecessary. It is understandable that members value the opportunity to
put forward their own amendments in public, and, so long as the Select
Committee system obtains, no limitation of the amending process on the
floor of the House will be easy. Large Standing Committees, in which
most of the interested members were able to take part and whose pro-
ceedings were public, would seem to go a long way towards a solution.
In the absence of this device, there is, in fact, a tendency towards the
limitation of the debate. Certain rules are, of course, of long standing.
The closure can always be moved at any stage 2 ; the Speaker, if he feels
that there has been reasonable debate, will then put the motion ' that the
question be now put', which, if carried, means that discussion ends and
the matter under discussion is at once put to the House. But the use of
the closure, if out of keeping with the conventions of the House, is natur-
ally most unpopular. Apart from the closure there have been special
rules for ensuring the conclusion by a definite date and time of the dis-
cussions on Demands for Grants, and, more recently, on the Finance
Bill.3 Until 1952, however, the Speaker's powers were otherwise limited. 4
In the new Rules of the House of the People a fresh power has been in-
cluded : ' Whenever the debate on any motion becomes unduly protract-
ed, the Speaker may, after taking the sense of the House, fix the hour at
which the debate shall conclude (and) the Speaker shall at such appointed
hour . . . proceed forthwith to put all such questions as may be neces-
sary to determine the decision of the House on the original question.' 5

1 Hindustan Times, 16 Nov. 1953.

2 Rule 256.
3
Rules 185 and 193. On financial procedure in general, see below Section 3.
4
'With respect to other Bills, I have no right to fix a time limit even for the Bill as a
whole. With this restriction, I feel very much embarrassed if any honourable member
thinks that I am allowing too much time. That is my position and the position of anybody
who may be in the Chair.' (P.P. Deb., 21 Sept. 1951.) Again: 'The procedure of the House
is that in a Bill I am bound to call every honourable member wishing to speak. If the House
thinks that there has been sufficient discussion, it is open to any honourable member to say
that the question may be put. Otherwise it is not competent for me to prevent members
from speaking.' (P.P. Deb., 11 April 1950.)
5
Rule 257. In Aug. 1953 the powers were further increased: the Rule was amended to
give the Speaker power to fix time limits for' any or all stages' of the Bill.
 THE PARLIAMENTARY DAY 235
1
As a matter of convention, this procedure was already in force ; even now
after the institution of the rule, it is very largely a matter of informal
negotiation and settlement between the leaders of the various groups.
It does, however, seem to happen with growing frequency. There is, that is
to say, a drift towards the limitation of debate rather than towards the use
of committees. This may indeed solve the problem of time, but it is diffi-
cult not to feel that it does so at greater cost than the system of Standing
Committees. In the first place, it means that Bills are in general less fully
considered. Secondly, it tends to result in a saving of time in the debate
on principles and not in the more mechanical consideration of amend-
ments. Finally, amendments that might be accepted by the Government
in committee tend to be rejected when moved on the floor of the House.
A word may be added on the actual system of reaching a decision
when the question—whether it is a motion in connection with a stage of
a Bill, any other kind of motion or a resolution—is put before the
House. 2 The Speaker puts the question—for example, that the Bill be
taken into consideration—and invites those in favour to say 'Aye' and
those against the motion to say ' N o ' . He then says: ' I think the Ayes
(or the Noes) have it.' If this opinion is not challenged, he repeats twice:
'The Ayes (or the Noes) have it', and the decision is taken. If his opinion
is challenged, he has two courses open to him. He may ask the Ayes and
the Noes to stand in turn in their places, and on a count being taken, he
declares the decision. This is the less usual form of voting, but it has been
used on some occasions. 3 The more usual—and lengthier—process is the
'Division' proper. The bells are rung for two minutes throughout the
building and members run from the Central Hall and other rooms to file
through the 'Division Lobbies' on either side of the Chamber. Their
names are marked off by the Division Clerks (members of the staff of
the secretariat), who then hand the lists to the Secretary; the totals are
presented to the Speaker and announced by him. 4
1
E.g. ' I concede that under the rules there can be no guillotine on any legislative pro-
gramme, but I had stated the decision (to close the debate) as representing the general will
of the House. It was a matter of agreement and I have been reminding lion, members every
now and then that they may please remember that the guillotine would be applied at six
o'clock. If the hon. member is very particular about stating the rule, I may tell him that I
a m going to accept closure at six o'clock.' (P.P.Deb., 22 Dec. 1950.)
2 Rule 287.
3 It can be used if the Speaker feels that the challenge is somewhat light-hearted and not
wholly serious. It was employed for example when the Communist Party forced a vote on
an unexpectedly minor issue. (H.P. Deb., 18 Nov. 1953. In this particular case, so the story
went, there was a tea party being given to a distinguished visitor from abroad in one of the
Parliament House refreshment rooms. A Minister was overheard to explain to the visitor
that the Government were in no way inconvenienced by the Opposition, which was so
weak. T h e remark was passed round without delay and some of the Opposition decided to
show that they could at least spoil a tea-party!) Normally, under this system, names are not
recorded, but in this case they were.
4 A division involving 400 voters will take about 20-25 minutes. There are rules permit-
ting the member who loses his way to correct his vote. A recent introduction is a rule per-
mitting the vote of a member to be challenged on the ground that he has a personal,
236 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

Divisions are naturally comparatively uncommon in the present Par-

liament. A record of divisions is given in Appendix IV. It will be seen
that, apart from two busy days in the Provisional Parliament in 1951 and
a few extra trials of strength at the beginning of the new Parliament of
1952, the frequency of divisions is about two in a month. An analysis of
the minority vote would show that the voting patterns among the oppo-
sition groups are far from constant.1 The largest musters of opposition
opinion occurred on 23 December 1953 (on Preventive Detention), when
the vote against the Government reached 91 and on 7 September 1954
with a total of 106.

3. Financial Procedure
The essentials of the Indian Parliament's financial procedure are laid
down in the Constitution. 2 The central principles are those that have
achieved classic expression in Britain:' The Crown demands money, the
Commons grant it, and the Lords assent to the grant. But the Commons
do not vote money unless it be required by the Crown; nor impose or
pecuniary or direct interest in the matter. The Speaker's decision on this is final. (These
rules, it may be added, also permit membership of Select Committees to be similarly
challenged and decided.) The system of division lobbies is usual in State Assemblies too.
It should perhaps be mentioned that press reports appearing some time ago said that an
electric push-button vote-recorder was on its way from Germany to Calcutta. If true, it is
to be hoped that the legislators for whose convenience it is intended, have heard how in
Finland the members found that, by the careful use of match sticks in the buttons, their
votes could be cast for them even in their absence!
1
One example of a splitting of the voting power of the opposition may be given. On
14 Dec. 1953 there was before the House a Government motion to accept the invitation of
the Council of States to join a Joint Committee to consider the Special Marriage Bill. Dr.
Lanka Sundaram moved an amendment intended to protest against the procedure—as
part of the quarrel between the two Houses (see below Section 5). The amendment was
supported by the Left and the Right, but the mover withdrew it after the subject had been
debated. A vote then took place on the original motion. The Right opposition was in no
difficulty, for it opposed both the procedure and the actual Bill itself. The Left, however,
was in a dilemma; they wished to support the measure, but they were severely critical of
the procedure. After hurried consultations, they decided that the withdrawal of the amend-
ment left them no opportunity to express their convictions; there took place, therefore, an
unusual event—the movement of the Communist M.P.s across the floor to join in the
'Ayes' lobby with the Government, thus isolating the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh and
some Independents. The vote was 181 to 27. (H.P. Deb., 14-17 Dec. 1953.)
2
Arts. 112-117 (see Appendix I). In this section I am concerned only with financial pro-
cedure in Parliament. The working of the Financial Committees of Parliament is con-
sidered below, Chapter VI, Section 3. The subject of financial control in general is treated
in P. K. Wattal, Parliamentary Financial Control in India (Simla, 1953). It includes, of
course, not only the preparation of the Budget and the work of the Audit Department but
also the difficult problem of relations between the Ministry of Finance and the other
ministries. This question received much public attention in India during 1954, largely be-
cause it was reported that the Finance Minister had threatened to resign on account of his
disagreement with his colleagues on this subject. The issue arose on the Prime Minister's
invitation to the Auditor-General designate to investigate the system of budgeting and
control, and on some of the reported findings of this officer—especially perhaps those
recommending that the Financial Advisers attached to ministries should no longer be
answerable to the Finance Ministry and that spending departments should be given wider
powers of internal financial discretion.
 FINANCIAL PROCEDURE 237

augment taxes, unless the taxation be necessary for the public service as
declared by the Crown through its constitutional advisors.' The execu-
tive, that is to say, can neither raise nor spend money without the
authority of Parliament; this authority rests with the Lower House; but
it is exercised only on the initiative of the executive. In the language of
the Constitution, 'The President shall in respect of every financial year
cause to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament a statement of the
estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India for that
year, referred to as the " annual financial statement"'—or more generally,
the Budget. This statement distinguishes between money required to
meet 'expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India' and
other expenditure; the former includes the salaries of the President,
Presiding Officers of Parliament, the Auditor-General and the judges,
and while open to discussion in Parliament is not voted upon 1 ; the other
estimated expenditures are submitted to the House of the People in the
form of Demands for Grants and may be passed, refused or reduced by
that House. When the Grants have been made, an Appropriation Bill is
introduced which provides for the appropriation out of the Consolidated
Fund of moneys needed for both kinds of expenditure. The Constitution
provides that similar procedures shall be employed for Supplementary
Grants (when the sum authorised proves insufficient), Additional Grants
(when a new service is undertaken) and Excess Grants (when more has
been spent than was authorised). Finally the Constitution gives powers
to the House of the People to pass Votes on Account pending the com-
pletion of the ordinary procedure and Votes of Credit to meet uncertain
needs, and to make Exceptional Grants.
It is to an unusally crowded House of the People with overflowing
galleries that the Finance Minister presents his Budget and makes (usu-
ally reads) his Budget speech. 2 The presentation takes place usually at
5 p.m. on the last day of February and, by a special rule, there can be no
discussion of the Budget on that day. The members go away to study the
Statement and speech whose contents have, of course, up to then re-
mained a closely guarded secret.3 The Budget itself is a fairly compact
1
Before 1947 the salaries of Ministers and certain civil servants as well as the whole ex-
penditure on Defence was non-votable.
2
The relevant part of the Rules is Chapter XIV. For elucidation of several points in this
section I am indebted to Mr. S. L. Shakdar, Joint Secretary, Parliament Secretariat. His
article, ' T w o Systems of Financial Procedure' (Parliamentary Affairs, Summer 1953)
draws attention to the main differences in this respect between the British and Indian
Parliaments.
3 T h e question of whether there had been a Budget 'leakage' was raised in the House of
the People in 1954 (H.P. Deb., 5 Mar. 1954). It appeared that some copies o f ' P a r t B ' of
the Budget speech—the part containing the tax proposals—had in fact been distributed in
error to a few press representatives about an hour before the speech was delivered. For-
tunately, the mistake was detected in a few seconds and the copies were promptly returned.
At the same time a similar question was being raised in the Delhi State Assembly. There a
Minister had, in an answer during Question H o u r on the day before the Budget was pre-
sented, disclosed certain figures f r o m the estimates; the Speaker ruled that the breach was
a technical one without any serious consequences and that no further action was necessary.
238 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

document of some twenty-five pages, but can hardly be understood with-

out simultaneous study of the Minister's speech (usually 1\ hours) and,
if possible, the 200-page Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget.
It may be as well at the outset to note certain general features of the
Indian Budget and budgetary procedure. It is, in the first place, a budget
in two parts: as in several Continental countries also, in India the Rail-
way Budget has for several years been separated from the General
Budget. The two Budgets are similar in form and are treated similarly by
Parliament. There are thus separate Demands for Grants for Railways
and a separate Appropriation Bill. In what follows there is no descrip-
tion of the process of passing the Railway Budget, but it has to be borne
in mind that a similar procedure to that of the General Budget is being
repeated with respect to Railways. 1 The Indian Budget, in the second
place, is not simply the taxation proposals of the Government but a
statement of estimated expenditure and estimated revenue. 2 Moreover,
it is not dealt with in separate 'Committees of the whole House' as in
England but in ordinary sittings with the Speaker continuing in the Chair.
Although the Budget is voted upon only by the Lower House, it is also
presented to the Council of States; no Budget speech is made in the
Council, but the papers are laid before it. A general discussion on the
Budget in the Council is also allowed, and is usually timed to precede
(and thus to contribute to) the main debate in the House of the People.
The general discussion that takes place on the Budget some days after
the Finance Minister has made his speech is a relic from times when the
Central Assembly could do little more to the Budget than discuss it
generally. The Houses discuss the Budget as a whole and any question of
principle involved in it. No motion is moved and members are dis-
couraged from raising matters of detail or specific grievances. 3 It is an
occasion on which each House is able to express its mood, and the
1
The Railway Budget is generally presented in the third week of February and is at each
stage one step ahead of the General Budget. In recent years a number of public corporations
have been created by Acts of Parliament and they have been permitted separate budgets.
The Budget of the Damodar Valley Corporation is presented to Parliament and the State
legislatures concerned (Bihar and Bengal), and the voting by Parliament and these legisla-
tures is confined only to the share of the respective Governments in the project. As the
Governments of Bihar and Bengal are financed by loans from the Centre for meeting their
share of expenditure of the project the provisions for loans in the Central Budget is also
voted by the Centre. The detailed Budget of the D.V.C. is not voted by either Parliament or
those State legislatures. On public corporations, see below, Chapter VII, Section 3. The
States have, of course, no Railway Budgets, but their General Budgets are subject to pro-
cedures in the Assemblies similar to those of the Central Parliament.
2
That is, the Indian Budget Day introduces the whole financial procedure, whereas in
England it is the day on which the Commons turn attention from 'the Estimates' to the
financial proposals, from expenditure to revenue. There are also several differences in the
actual preparation of the Budgets of England and India—such as the use and importance
of Revised Estimates in India. (See Wattal, op. cit., p. 67.)
3 E.g. rulings given on 26 May 1952 (H.P. Deb.: 'So far as specific points or grievances
are concerned, members will have an opportunity later. . . . A general survey of the ad-
ministration would be in order now.') and on 4 March 1953.
 FINANCIAL PROCEDURE 239
Government may learn how particular proposals will be received during
the subsequent stages. Ministers are expected to attend regularly and the
Chair has on occasion drawn attention to this convention. 1 It is also an
opportunity for discussing those items which are 'charged on the Con-
solidated F u n d ' and therefore non-votable.
When the general discussion is completed, the way is clear for the
business of voting the grants. The Demands for Grants are prepared by
the ministries in the same f o r m : Part I is a statement of the total esti-
mated expenditure requiring the vote of the House ('charged' or non-
votable expenditure being shown separately); Part II gives the sub-heads;
Part III the details under the sub-heads; and in respect of each, four
columns of figures showing, in the case of the 1954-55 Budget for in-
stance, the actuals from the accounts of 1952-53, the Budget Estimate
for 1953-54, the Revised Estimate for 1953-54 and the Budget Estimate
for 1954-55. The Demand is made in a motion 'that a sum not exceed-
ing Rs.x be granted to the President to defray the charge which will come
for payment during the year ending 31st March 1955 in respect of [the
subject of demand]'. To this motion three kinds of amendment, called
'cut motions', are possible. The most drastic is the refusal of supplies—
' t h a t the Demand be reduced to R s . l ' ; this has not been used in India
since independence. The second possibility is the economy cut—that the
Demand (as a whole or a particular item) be reduced by a specific sum.
This is also, if not unknown, at least very rare; in order to be able to
mention a specific sum by which the Demand should be reduced, more
knowledge and more appetite for detailed study are required than most
M.P.s possess. In practice the only form of amending motion used is the
'token c u t ' — ' T h a t the Demand be reduced by Rs.100'. On this any
grievance or request for information or suggested reforms may be
brought to the attention of the particular Minister concerned. The De-
mands of each ministry are taken up in turn and, in consultation with
both sides of the House, the Speaker allots a definite period for each.
The cut motions, though numbered serially as received in the Secretariat,
are grouped according to the Demands to which they refer. Usually, the
Speaker puts the Demands and the Cut Motions together before the
House and then the discussion begins. The Cut Motions are almost in-
variably moved only by opposition members, the Congress Party having
effectively discouraged Cut Motions from its own supporters. At the
same time, since this is an important opportunity for expressing local
grievances and requests, the Party makes full use of a special procedure
1
The Budget of March 1952 was a 'caretaker Budget' in the sense that a new Parliament
was being elected. Nevertheless, the Chair observed: ' I would like a larger number of
Ministers to be here. . . . Some of the Hon. Ministers are taking notes for others, but why
should not the others be here unless they are out of town ? . . . They should be here to hear
the Budget speeches' (P.P. Deb., 3 Mar. 1952). Some M.P.s who were also in the old
Central Assembly have remarked that the non-responsible members of the Government of
those days were never absent from their places during the Budget debate.
240 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGÊ

recently devised whereby M.P.s submit to the Ministers—usually, in the

case of Congress members, through their State Groups 1 —ten-line memo-
randa containing those local and particular pleas. In giving notice of a
Cut Motion the mover will state the subject to which he wishes to draw
attention. As in the case of amendments to Bills, 2 the divided nature of
the opposition leads to a very large number of Cut Motions, and the de-
sire of each opposition member to submit the complaints of his con-
stituency is a further factor making for lengthy lists of such motions. A
typical list of a few of the Cut Motions moved in connection with the
1954-55 Railway Budget is given to illustrate some of the topics raised:

HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS IN RESPECT OF RAILWAYS—1954-55

List of Motions of which notice has been received to be moved
under Rule 226 (3) of the Rules of Procedure at the sittings of the
House to be held on the 8th and 9th March, 1954.

MOTIONS
Demand No. 1
Shri V. Boovaraghasamy to move:—
443. That the demand under the head Railway Board (pages 1-2) be re-
duced by Rs.100. (Passenger's amenities.)

Demand No. 8
Shri N. D. Govindaswami Kachiroyar to move :—
444. That the demand under the head Ordinary Working Expenses—
Operation other than Staff and Fuel (pages 41-46) be reduced by Rs.100.
(Inadequacy of passenger amenities.)
Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move :—
445. That the demand under the head Ordinary Working Expenses—
Operation other than Staff and Fuel (pages 41—46) be reduced by Rs.100.
(Failure to abolish absentee-middleman-vendor-contractors on Railways.)

Demand No. 9
Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move :—
446. That the demand under the head Ordinary Working Expenses—Mis-
cellaneous Expenses (pages 47-55) be reduced by Rs. 100. (Refusal to pay
arrears of pay for suspended period in the cases of employees reinstated after
acquittal by courts disregarding the recent Bombay High Court judgment.)
1
See above, p. 194.
2
See above, p. 232.
 FINANCIAL PROCEDURE 241

Demand No. 9A
Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move:—
447. That the demand under the head Ordinary Working Expenses—
Labour Welfare (pages 57-62) be reduced by Rs.100. (Improvement of the
Railway Colony High School in Golden Rock to accommodate more
students.)

Demand No. 15
Shri V. Boovaraghasamy to move :—
448. That the demand under the head Construction of New Lines—Capital
and Depreciation Reserve Fund (pages 76-78) be reduced by Rs.100. (Open-
ing of new railway lines in Tiruchi and Tanjore Districts, Southern Railway.)

Demand No. 18
Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move :—
449. That the demand under the head Open Line Works—Development
Fund (pages 91-94) be reduced by Rs.100. (Opening of a road connecting the
Golden Rock Colony with Melekalkandar Kottai by constructing a passage
through the colony walls.)
Shri K. Ananda Nambiar to move :—
450. That the demand under the head Open Line Works—Development
Fund (pages 91-94) be reduced by Rs.100. (Construction of an over-bridge at
the Golden Rock Railway Station in order to facilitate the crossing railway
lines for people going to Senthannirpuram.)

NEW DELHI M. N. KAUL,

The 6th March, 1954. Secretary.

Each cut motion m a y refer to only one subject a n d not to the D e m a n d as

a whole. 1 T h e Chair has m a d e appeals to m e m b e r s to m a k e an agreed
selection of cut motions for discussion in order to give coherence t o the
attack, 2 and to some extent this is now being done. In any event, when
the end of the allotted time is reached, the Speaker puts all the D e m a n d s
regardless of whether they have in fact been discussed or not. Supple-
mentary D e m a n d s are subject to the same procedure, except that where
a new service is proposed the discussion may include the principles
1
E . g . ' Only o n e subject will be allowed u n d e r o n e c u t m o t i o n ' a n d ' W h e n a c u t m o t i o n
is m o v e d , all a r g u m e n t s m u s t only relate to t h e particular subject with which it d e a l s ' (P.P.
D e b . , 4 M a r . 1952). T h e s e a n d o t h e r restrictions, originally c o n v e n t i o n s expressed as
Decisions of t h e C h a i r , have subsequently ( N o v . 1954) been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Rules.
T h e refusal of supplies in t h e f o r m of the r e d u c t i o n t o Rs, 1 is now called the ' d i s a p p r o v a l
of p o l i c y ' cut.
2 E.g. P.P. Deb., 27 M a r . 1951.
16—p.i.
242 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

involved, since the House will not already have had an opportunity to
discuss them.1
A recent (1950) introduction into Indian financial procedure is the
Vote on Account. This device avoids the necessity to complete all
the Budget discussions before the new financial year begins on 1 April.
The House instead passes a Vote on Account which provides the Govern-
ment with the authority to draw funds for a period of two months. The
House is thus enabled to continue its examination of the Budget until to-
wards the end of April. The Vote on Account is not usually debated,
since its object is simply to permit the real debate to be carried on. 2
The final stage in the voting of supplies is the passing of the Appro-
priation Bill.3 This procedure, too, is new to India. It follows from the
introduction in the new Constitution of the Consolidated Fund. Before
1950, the passing of the Demands was formally completed by the laying
on the Table of the House a Schedule of authorised expenditure signed
by the Governor-General. The new procedure is more in keeping with a
sovereign Parliament, but its purpose is similar: to give legal effect to the
demands as voted and to authorise the issue of moneys for those pur-
poses from the Consolidated Fund. The attitude towards the debate on
the Appropriation Bill has undergone some change already and affords a
good illustration of the wise experimental flexibility of Indian Parlia-
mentary practice. In 1950 the Speaker said that the Bill was '.in a sense
formal legislation', but it gave another opportunity for suggestions and
comments.4 By 1951 an attempt was being made to establish a conven-
tion whereby the Bill was 'treated purely as a matter of form'. 5 In 1952
1
' T h e general principles followed in regard to cut motions on D e m a n d s for Supple-
mentary G r a n t s are as follows: T h a t cut motions must be restricted to the particulars con-
tained in the estimates on which supplementary grants are sought and to application of the
items which compose those grants; that a question of policy cannot be raised on demands
for supplementary grants in so far as such demands refer to schemes which have already
been sanctioned by the House; that with respect to a new service for which previously no
sanction has been obtained, questions of policy may be raised, though they must be con-
fined to the item on which the vote of the House is sought' (H.P. Deb., 8 Dec. 1952). Sup-
plementary D e m a n d s in India may arise more than once and the amounts involved have
often been very large.
2
Thus, on 12 M ' . 1951, the Speaker explained: ' I n this procedure, since full discussion
follows, the grant of supply for the interim period o n the Motion for Voting on Account
is always treated as a formal one just like a Motion for leave to introduce a Bill. . . . H o n .
Members will have a full opportunity to discuss the Demands for G r a n t s in a detailed m a n -
ner f r o m 26 Mar. to 10 April.' On that occasion, the Vote on Account was for one m o n t h
only. The Speaker added, by way of further explanation: ' I do not see what useful discus-
sion can be had on one m o n t h ' s supply, when eleven months' supply is going to be discussed
and when there had already been ample General Discussion for four days' (P.P. Deb.,
12 M a r . 1951).
3
More precisely, Bills; th^ Railway Appropriation Bill is passed separately first.
4 P.P. Deb., 24 Mar. 1950.
5
Thus, tue Speaker: ' I should invite the attentior of the hon. Members to a convention
that has been agreed to. I am not prepared to say that no observation is permissible on this
Bill-. . . But after a discussion i f fourteen days . . . I think it will hardly be fair to the
House as a whole to repeat the same arguments now. . . . I would not say that the hon.
Member has no right to speak, but I am shutting my eyes so that nobody is able to catch
them. I shall put the Motion straightaway to the House.' (P.P. Deb., 16 April 1951.)
 FINANCIAL PROCEDURE 243
the Speaker was firm to the point of severity: 'There is no debate on an
Appropriation Bill—not by rules but by convention of the House firmly
established. . . . The hon. Member can make use of some other
opportunity; not this one.' 1 With the newly-elected Parliament, some
concession to the opposition groups was thought desirable; the Speaker
therefore invited them to let him have a list of any points they wished to
raise at that stage. ' T h e whole idea is that there should not be any repeti-
tion of the debate on the Demands for Grants. . . . If there be any really
new points which require elucidation or consideration, certainly I will
consider them. ' 2 In the following year, the concession was so utilised as
almost to throw the machinery out of order; the Chair said:

When I made the suggestion, I naturally expected only particular subjects

to be submitted on behalf of particular groups. I now find that individual
Members also have sent in points, and apart from those which I received
yesterday . . . there is a very large number of further points here today. . . .
It was not my intention that so many points should be brought up. 3

The way out of the difficulty has been twofold. On the one hand, the
general position has been formulated in a Rule of the House:

The debate on the Appropriation Bill shall be restricted to matters of public

importance or administrative policy . . . which have not already been raised
while the relevant Demands for Grants were under consideration [and]
the Speaker may require members desiring to take part to give advance
intimation of the specific points they intend to raise, and he may withhold
permission for raising such of the points as in his opinion appear to be
repetitions. . . . 4

At the same time, the convention has been developed in a more organised
way. The Speaker suggested that ' t h e National Democratic Party, the
Communist Party, the Praja Socialist Party, and Independents may have
one subject each and the Unattached Members one subject, thus making
a total of five subjects for discussion'. 5 The debate on the Appropriation
Bill has thus become a short and well-organised discussion of about
three to four hours.
With the passing of the Appropriation Bill 6 the authorisation of ex-
penditure by Parliament is completed. There remains the approval that

1 P.P. Deb., 5 Mar. 1952.

2 H.P. Deb., 3 July 1952.
3 H.P. Deb., 8 April 1953.
4
The Rules Committee felt that ' t h e scope of discussion on Appropriation Bills had
become crystallised and it was thought proper that it be incorporated in the Rules'. The
intention was to facilitate the prior selection of fresh and important points.
5 H.P. Deb., 8 April 1953.
6
It is a Money Bill and goes through the Council of States subject to the same rules as
other Money Bills. See above, pp. 92, 229-230.
244 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

has to be given to the Government's proposals for raising the necessary

revenue. These proposals are embodied in the Finance Bill and this Bill
is introduced in the House of the People at the conclusion of the Finance
Minister's Budget speech. The Finance Bill follows the usual Bill pro-
cedure. After its early introduction, it is not taken further until the supply
work is finished. A motion is then usually made for its reference to a
Select Committee, and the debate on this is generally very wide. The
Select Committee examines the proposals in detail, and it is not unusual
that it recommends considerable reductions in taxation which are
accepted by the Government. The provisions of the Finance Bill, since
they describe tax changes, must come into operation not when the Bill is
finally passed but from the moment of its introduction; a declaration at
the end of the Bill states 'that it is expedient in the public interest' that
certain clauses of the Bill should 'have immediate effect under the Pro-
visional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931'. If, as a result of its passage
through Parliament, the Finance Bill becomes changed and the tax levels
reduced, the excess revenue collected in the meantime by the Government
has to be refunded. 1
There are, then, four main opportunities on the floor of the House for
the discussion of the finances of the Government. The General Discus-
sion on the Budget is intended for a review of financial policy and
questions of broad policy. When the Demands for Grants are made the
debate become narrower, being' limited to each head of the Demand and,
where cut motions are moved, still further limited to the particular sub-
ject on which the motion is made'. 2 The position as regards the Appro-
priation Bill has been adequately described. The discussions on the
Finance Bill are not restricted at all as to subject—on the' acknowledged
principle that any subject can be discussed and any grievance venti-
lated ', when authorising the taxation of citizens. In all these debates, the
Speaker has the power not only to fix time-limits for speeches but also
(in consultation with the Leader of the House) to allot time for the
various stages and put before the House whatever questions may be
necessary to conclude the particular business on time. In practice, the
distribution of time on the Budget in the two Houses is roughly as
follows:3

1 The Indian Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, authorises collection for only
sixty days in anticipation of the passing of the Finance Bill. Presidential assent must there-
fore be given to the Bill before the end of April. Parliament, in other words, has two months
in which to complete its whole financial procedure. The British procedure, which allows as
much as four months, is more leisurely and allows members to make a more thorough
study of the business. On the other hand, there is not much anxiety in India to imitate
Westminster on this point; Delhi's summer, unlike that of London, is only too punctual
and is well under way by the end of April.
2
The Speaker, in the course of a general explanation of the new procedure (P.P. Deb.,
24 Mar. 1950).
3 Figures taken from Shakdar, loc. cit.
 PRIVILEGE 245

House Council
Railway Budget: General Discussion . 3 days 2 days
Demands for Grants 3 days —
Appropriation Bill About 1 day
2 hours
General Budget : General Discussion . 4 days 3 days
Demands for Grants 15 days —
Appropriation Bill . 1 day 1 day
Finance Bill 4 days 1 day

4. Privilege

On no aspect of the life of Parliament has India since her indepen-

dence modelled her ways more carefully on those of Britain than in
regard to the privileges of the Houses and their members. The Constitu-
tion itself prefers not to attempt to describe t h o s e ' powers, privileges and
immunities' but instead says simply that until they are defined by law,
they 'shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom'. 1 They have remained undefined by Indian law, while
those of the House of Commons are, of course, nowhere codified but are
part of the Common Law of the land, and have to be pieced together
from a wealth of precedents.
The status of Indian legislative bodies from the viewpoint of privileges
and immunities had been a matter of concern to Indian legislators and
in particular to Indian Presiding Officers almost from the inception of
the 1921 Assemblies. The position up to 1935 was that, while the Assem-
blies tried to pretend that they had privileges analogous to those of the
House of Commons and persuade others to respect them as if they were
supported in law, whenever actual cases arose it was only too clear that
privilege was neither part of the 'law of the l a n d ' nor had it been statu-
torily conferred; if newspapers offended against supposed privileges,
there could be no question of calling the editors ' t o the Bar of the
House'. When the Joint Parliamentary Committee in London was con-
sidering in 1933 the next instalment of reforms for India, the Presiding
Officers of Indian legislative bodies sent a memorandum in which they
urged that since they were helpless to deal, for instance, with press abuse,
they should have conferred upon them the powers, privileges and im-
munities of the Commons. The 1935 Act fell short of their hopes in this
respect. It protected the freedom of speech in legislatures and empowered
the legislatures to make laws whereby the courts would be able to
punish persons refusing to give evidence before legislature committees.
1
Art. 105 (see Appendix I) and, for States, Art. 194. This reference to the British Parlia-
ment is not without precedent. Canada (British N o r t h America Act, 1867, Section 18),
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, Section 49) and Ceylon
(Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, para. 27) had already used Westminster as
a convenient reference point on this same matter; the Indian provision is indeed taken
directly f r o m the Australian Act.
246 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

Beyond that, it carefully left matters as they were. It did indeed em-
power legislatures to attempt the definition of their privileges by law, but
it expressly forbade the conferring on any legislature 'the status of a
court or any punitive or disciplinary power other than a power to re-
move or exclude persons infringing the rules'. 1 In Bengal, an attempt
was in fact commenced and a Bill defining privileges was drafted. In
some respects it simply elaborated the few powers bestowed by the 1935
Act; in others, however, it went clearly beyond them. It sought, for ex-
ample, to give the Speaker power to demand the attendance in the legis-
lature of members arrested on criminal charges. 2 The Bill had not been
proceeded with when the war suspended normal political life.
Following independence, the question of privileges again became open
to discussion. The fact that many M.P.s and M.L. A.s were being arrested
and detained under Preventive Detention orders lent even a certain
urgency to the matter. At the same time, legislatures could not very well
set about defining their privileges until it was settled what the Constitu-
tion itself would have to say. The terms of the Constitution have already
been stated; what was asked for in 1933 and refused in 1935 was taken
in 1950—a status equivalent to that of the House of Commons. 3 Never-
theless, there have been two schools of thought as to what should now
be done. One view is that the Indian Parliament (and State legislatures)
should still avail themselves of the now unrestricted power to define
their privileges by statute law. The other view holds strongly that such a
course is unnecessary and indeed would be unwise. The latter view,
which has strong support at the Centre and in some States, has up to now
prevailed. It concedes that to define the Indian Parliament's privileges as
' those of the House of Commons' permits some ambiguity, since the
privileges of the Commons are themselves undefined and only to be dis-
covered by the study of actual cases. 4 It argues, in the first place, that the
probable interpretation of the Constitution would be that as soon as a
legislature enacts a law defining its privileges, those of the House of
Commons at once cease to be available. An attempt to define would
therefore lead to a likely curtailment of powers and privileges. It is also
pointed out that the most important privilege is the right to punish for
contempt or a breach of privilege. This power has been firmly estab-
lished by the Speaker of the House of Commons, and he may issue a

1
Government of India Act, 1935, Sections 28 and, for Provinces, 71.
2
Bengal Assembly Powers and Privileges Bill, 1938, Clause 8.
3 When an international questionnaire was circulated in 1950 to ascertain the position of
different parliaments in relation to privileges, the reply f r o m India simply quoted Article
105 of the Constitution and added that the answers prepared by the House of C o m m o n s
should be regarded as the answers of the Indian Parliament.
4
A case which has had to be carefully studied in India in connection with preventive
detention of M.P.s is that of Captain Ramsay. See Report of the Committee of Privileges
of the House of Commons, 9 Oct. 1940; the M e m o r a n d u m prepared by Lord Campion for
that Committee illustrates well the uncertainty that can arise.
 PRIVILEGE 247
warrant on these grounds without further specifying the nature of the
breach committed. In India, so long as privileges remain 'those of the
House of Commons', the Supreme Court would probably uphold this
power and protect it against restriction even by the Fundamental Rights.
If the privileges were codified, however, if they were set out and defined
in an Act of Parliament, the courts would at once feel entitled to en-
quire into the constitutionality of such privileges. On balance, therefore,
it is far safer to rely on the article of the Constitution which refers to the
House of Commons.
Forecasts regarding political institutions in India are risky, but it is
fairly safe to say that parliamentary privilege is likely to cause some
difficulty in the future. For one thing, the whole question of privilege is
one which even in more settled parliamentary regimes is being sub-
jected to a certain amount of re-examination. It must be admitted that
the history of privilege in England is most intimately bound up with the
rather special story of the struggle of parliament to free itself from
the power of the executive; the fact that the institution began its life as
the High Court of Parliament is a further fact to be borne in mind—even
if this was more a convenient excuse than a direct cause of many privi-
leges. Countries like Australia inherited the historical memory as well
as the institution. But now in Australia and—though naturally to a
lesser extent—in England it is asked whether some of the privileges are
not out of date.
It is here that some attempt has to be made to distinguish between
those privileges which, whatever their origins, can still be seen as neces-
sary for the proper working of the institution and others whose justi-
fication in terms of the modern constitution is less obvious. Clearly the
immunity of members from civil and criminal proceedings arising out of
things said in parliament must be protected if there is to be free debate.
Again, each House must be able to exercise disciplinary powers over
its members. Doubts arise mainly in regard to the power of the House
to punish non-members for contempt of the House; for the consequence
of this power is that citizens may be sent to prison without a trial before
a judge in an ordinary court of law. One of the most striking cases of
the assertion of parliamentary power of this kind occurred in 1955
when the proprietor and the editor of the Bankstown Observer were
imprisoned on a warrant issued by the Speaker of the Australian House
of Representatives for breach of privilege of the House. The High Court
of Australia refused applications for writs of habeas corpus, holding
that since the constitution makes the privileges of parliament those of
the British House of Commons, 1 the courts were in no better position
1
At least 'until declared by the Parliament'. Some of the Australian State legislatures
have in fact broken away f r o m reliance on the House of C o m m o n s model and have en-
acted their own codes of privilege; only Victoria and South Australia have adopted the
wide privileges of the Commons.
248 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

than English courts would be to look behind the warrants issued by the
Speaker. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided that
the judgment by the High Court was 'unimpeachable' and refused to
grant leave to appeal. In the public discussion that took place in
Australia, it was felt by many that, leaving quite on one side the merits
of the particular case,1 it was doubtful if such powers ought to be
exercised wholly by a body like parliament without even the possibility
of appeal to the ordinary courts and an open trial. At least one English
authority has asked whether this Australian reconsideration would not
'aiford a convenient opportunity to review the matter in England also'. 2
If there are some doubts in England and Australia, it is not surprising
that there should be more in India. Resentment at having to follow
Westminster is the least valid and probably the least important of the
reasons. Nor is the mere fact that India's Constitution is written a
serious obstacle; the Australian judges have shown that they can and
do regard 'the unwritten custom of several centuries of English history
[as], so to speak, scheduled to the written constitution of Australia'. 3
The question concerns political wisdom more than technical ingenuity:
is there any longer the same need for parliamentary privilege? At whose
expense is parliamentary privilege asserted in the modern democratic
state? And, in the context of the Indian Constitution, is parliamentary
privilege more fundamental than the Fundamental Rights? These are
the important questions which lie behind the controversy as to whether
the privileges of Indian legislative bodies should now be defined by
law; for, once defined by law, the privileges become unambigiously
subject to the Constitution and it will be the duty of the Supreme Court
to determine cases where privilege and Fundamental Right conflict.4
The staunchest defence of the status quo whereby the Indian legisla-
tures enjoy the ample privileges of the British House of Commons comes
not unnaturally from the officers of the Parliament. The strongest
criticism of the status quo has been put forward in the Report of the
Press Commission.5 The former tend to think in terms of the defence
of the legislature against the executive and believe that the representa-
tive assemblies of the people require the support of the fullest historic
claims of the Commons. They hold the view that it is wise to imitate

1 The two men were found by the Committee of Privilege of the House to have sought to
intimidate and silence a member by publishing imputations of corrupt conduct.
2 Professor H. Street, 'Parliament and the Courts' in The Listener, 24 Nov. 1955.
3 The Times, 25 June 1955.
* This does not mean that the Supreme Court at present cannot find itself called upon
to do this, only that until the privileges are defined the Court has to try to reconcile legis-
lative supremacy of the British model with Fundamental Rights of the American model—•
an unenviable task. See below, p. 254, for an example of this kind of case.
5
Government of India, 1954. See also the chapter contributed by C. V. H. Rao, formerly
Editor of the 'Indian Nation', to The Indian Parliament, edited by A. B. Lai (Allahabad,
1956).
 PRIVILEGE 249
the modern Commons attitude of modest caution and disinclination to
'extend' their privileges, but they are equally insistent that it is a matter
of discretion resting with the Speaker and the legislature. The critics on
the other hand, while recognising that privileges and immunities are
essential if legislative bodies are to be able to function effectively, 1 have
concluded that limits should be set by law in order to avoid ambiguity
and to establish that privilege is not beyond inspection by the courts. 2
In a word, the critics may be said to prefer that the area of privilege be
determined by the courts in the context of citizen rights than by the
legislature in its discretion. It is difficult not to feel the force of this
view in the Indian context. For, in the first place, most modern privilege
cases seem to consist in conflict between legislature and the public
rather than between executive and legislature. In the second place, the
cabinet system implies that the executive can normally through party
allegiance control the legislature. F o r these reasons the old context of
privilege may be said to have given way to a new one. In these circum-
stances, excessive emphasis on privilege could even become a weapon
in the hands of an intolerant party cabinet in control of an obedient
legislature. 3 Even without that extreme danger, there is still the not
negligible fact that new legislatures may be too easily tempted to be
over-zealous in protection of their privileges and too prone to limit
narrowly the operation of legitimate criticism. Already the Report of
the Press Commission 4 has commented on 'the oversensitiveness of
some legislatures to even honest criticism'.
Some of the more interesting cases that have arisen since the inaugura-
tion of the new Constitution in 1950 may be briefly described. They show
that, generally speaking and certainly so far as the Centre is concerned,
Parliament through the Speaker has displayed a wise attitude of
caution; it has been reluctant to proclaim breaches of privilege except
in serious cases, and it has not attempted too quickly to assert and
exercise its powers. On several occasions in 1950, members tried to raise
supposed questions of privilege on the floor of the House; the Speaker
insisted on most occasions that members should first see him in his
chamber, since the questions were not really of privilege at all and only
wasted the time of the House. 5 The procedure to be followed if the
1
E.g., Report of the Press Commission (p. 430): ' N o one disputes that Parliament and
State legislatures must have certain privileges and the means of safeguarding them so that
they may discharge their functions properly'.
2 Ibid., p. 421.
3 See also Rao, loc. cit., p. 46.
4
The Commission naturally looked at the problem f r o m the point of view of its impact
on the Press—as the Speaker of the House of the People promptly pointed out in his
address to the Speakers' Conference on 3 Jan. 1955. But the Commission contained only
a small minority in any way connected with the Press and does not appear to have been
too biased in favour of the Press.
5 E.g., P.P. Deb., 10 Mar. 1950 and 30 Nov. 1950.
250 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

Speaker has been first persuaded that there may be a question of privi-
lege is laid down in the Rules of Procedure. 1 At the end of Question
Hour, the member wishing to raise the point makes a short statement of
the case and asks for leave to raise the matter. If there is any objection to
leave being granted, the Speaker asks those in favour to stand. If less
than twenty-five members rise, leave is refused. If leave is granted, then
the House may consider and decide the matter or a motion is moved
(usually by the Leader of the House) to refer it to a Committee of Privi-
leges nominated by the Speaker. This Committee reports to the House,
which then determines the action to be taken. 2 During 1950, three in-
cidents concerning privileges occurred but none was referred to Com-
mittee. On one occasion a member who was conducting a fast on the
banks of the Jumna in Delhi (in protest against the low wages of sugar
factory workers) was picked up by the local authorities and taken back
to his family. He was at the same time externed from Delhi. The extern-
ment order raised a question of privilege. The Prime Minister and Home
Minister admitted that the police authorities had not behaved correctly
and expressed the apologies of the executive. The House was divided in
its views and some members pressed for a Committee; after a useful
luncheon adjournment, however, a motion that the apologies be
accepted and the matter dropped was accepted. 3 The other two cases
concerned the press. One newspaper published some of the conclusions
of the Select Committee on the Finance Bill before thay had been re-
ported to the House, but its full apology was accepted. 4 Another pub-
lished certain remarks made in the House which the Chair had ordered
to be expunged and not to form part of the proceedings; the Chair
avoided declaring whether a breach had been committed, but said that
it was' highly regrettable', though not so serious as to be pursued beyond
a warning. 5
The first major case requiring reference to a Committee of the House
occurred in 1951 and concerned the conduct of a member. It was re-
ferred not to the Committee of Privileges but to a special Committee
on the Conduct of a Member. 6 The procedure throughout was in fact
closely modelled on that of the House of Commons in 'the Boothby
1 Chapter XV.
2
In April 1953 a new Rule was added setting out how judges and magistrates are to in-
form the Speaker whenever a member is arrested on a criminal charge or imprisoned or
detained.
3 P.P. Deb., 28 Feb. 1950 and 1 Mar. 1950.
* P.P. Deb., 27 M a r . 1950.
5 P.P. Deb., 12 Dec. 1950.
6 The Speaker remarked: ' T h e r e is a Committee of Privileges constituted under the
Rules. Yet it is within the powers of the House to constitute other special committees. . . .
It is a m o o t question to be considered as to whether any such conduct as alleged is really a
breach of privilege or something different. . . . T h e practice in the House of C o m m o n s has
been to constitute a special committee. . . . It is better to keep the Committee of Privileges
apart.' (P.P. Deb., 6 and 8 June 1951.)
 PRIVILEGE 251
1
Case'. The Prime Minister moved and the House passed a motion to
set up a Committee
(a) to investigate the conduct and activities of Shri H. G. Mudgal, M.P., in
connection with certain dealings with the Bombay Bullion Association
which include canvassing support and making propaganda in Parliament
on problems like option business, stamp duty, etc., and receipt of financial
and business advantages from the Bombay Bullion Association and (b) to
consider and report . . . whether the conduct of the hon. Member was de-
rogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with the standards
which Parliament is entitled to expect from its Members. 2

The Committee's procedure was that of a 'Court of Honour' rather

than a Court of Law. It was not, that is, bound by technical rules. It re-
ceived ' directives' from the Speaker and heard evidence; the Attorney-
General opened the case and attended many of the meetings; Mr.
Mudgal and his counsel were present except when the Committee delib-
erated. At the end of July, the report was submitted to the Speaker.
The Committee found that Mr. Mudgal had received, and expected to
continue to receive, sums of money for services rendered to the Bombay
Bullion Association in the way of putting certain questions, moving cer-
tain amendments, arranging interviews with Ministers, etc. 3 The mem-
bers of the Committee were unanimous in finding t h a t ' Shri Mudgal's
conduct is derogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with
the standards which Parliament is entitled to expect from its members.' 4
Some members felt that a code of conduct of M.P.s could and should be
formulated, and a draft of such a code prepared by one member was in
fact circulated on the Speaker's orders to all M.P.s. On 24 September
1951, the Prime Minister moved a resolution in the House to expel Mr.
Mudgal. After being allowed to speak and on being asked to withdraw
for a vote to be taken, Mr. Mudgal quickly wrote out his resignation
and handed it to the Chair. This, however, only led to an amended
1
See Owen Clough, ' T h e Boothby Case' in Journal of the Society of Clerks-at-the-Table
in Empire Parliaments, Vols. XI and XII, 1942-43, pp. 90-116. The Indian case is similarly
described in detail by S. L. Shakdher in ' T h e Mudgal Case' in the same Journal Vol. X X ,
1951. Mr. Shakdher points out some of the differences in procedure between the two cases,
in particular the greater powers conferred on the Speaker in India to regulate the work and
organisation of the Committee.
2 P.P. Deb., 6-8 June 1951.
3 It seems that the Bombay Bullion Association had hardly received their money's worth
when the arrangements were abruptly brought to an end. But this is of course no more
relevant to the questions of principle involved than the suspicion that Mr. Mudgal at first
saw little wrong in his behaviour. It is interesting in this connection—and perhaps not un-
illuminating—to refer to the entries after Mr. Mudgal's name in the Who's Who of the Pro-
visional Parliament: 'Educated New York College, New York and Columbia University.
. . . Editor and feature writer of The American Banker published in America, for three
years; Editor-in-Chief, The Negro World, published in America. Returned to India in 1937
after 17 years abroad.'
4
The Reports, Evidence and Proceedings are given in 'Committee on the Conduct of a
M e m b e r ' (Parliament Secretariat, 1951).
252 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

resolution which declared that he had 'deserved expulsion' and that

the language of his letter of resignation constituted a 'contempt of
the House which only aggravates his offence'. 1
The first occasion for a reference to the Committee of Privileges arose
on the arrest of Mr. Deshpande, Hindu Mahasabha M.P., in March
1952. The question raised was whether the arrest and detention of a
member while the House was in session constituted a breach of privi-
lege. The Committee found that privilege did not extend to arrests and
detentions under the Indian Preventive Detention Act, 1950. 'The Con-
stitution authorises preventive detention in the interests of the State, and
it is well settled that "the privilege of Parliament is granted in regard to
the service of the Commonwealth and is not to be used to the danger of
the Commonwealth"'—that is, for '"the protection of the community
as a whole"'. The arrest did not constitute a breach of the privileges of
the House, and the Speaker had been informed as quickly as possible.2
Another case, shortly afterwards, concerned the arrest of a Communist
M.P. who was at once released on bail. The only issue there was whether
there was a duty on the part of the magistrate to inform the House. The
Committee found no difficulty, after consulting Erskine May and some
British cases, in concluding that this duty only obtained when a member
has been committed to prison and detained without bail.3
An interesting case arose out of a debate in the House. One member,
Dr. Satyanarain Sinha,4 in the course of his speech alleged that a pre-
ceding speech by a Communist M.P. had been taken from an article by
a Russian Communist.5 He added certain further allegations and re-
ferred to other documents, whereupon the Deputy Speaker remarked:
'If any hon. Member refers to any document or reads any extracts from
it on the floor of the House, he must place it on the Table of the House.'
Dr. Sinha on the following day laid certain documents on the Table. A
few days later the Communist Party leader in the House wrote asking
the Speaker's consent to raise a question of privilege. The contention
was that Dr. Sinha's remarks were calculated to lower the prestige of the
particular Communist member and thereby that of the House in the eyes
of the public, and further that the documents laid were false, fabricated
and forged. The Speaker referred the case to the Committee of Privi-
leges. The Committee found no breach of privilege; Dr. Sinha's charges
1 P.P. Deb., 24 Sept. 1951.
2
Committee of Privileges, The Deshpande Case (Parliament Secretariat, July 1952).
Four members of the Committee (one Hindu Mahasabha, one Communist and two
Socialists) did not agree that preventive detention should be treated as if it were penal de-
tention; they held that immunity of arrest for M.P.s should extend to such cases; and they
held that there had been undue delay in informing the Speaker.
3 Committee of Privileges, The Dasaratha Deb Case (Parliament Secretariat, July 1952).
4 Not to be confused with his namesake, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs.
5
Dr. Sinha's charge was uncertainly stated:' I have compared the speech and found that
it was word for word—I would say the general line—from an article written by one
Lemin in February'.
 PRIVILEGE 253
were perhaps exaggerated but his documents were genuine. Both parties
to the dispute had been too hasty. 1 The Committee had at the same time
to decide a related question. Some days after the Sinha case had been re-
ferred to the Committee a press report appeared in which a Communist
M.P., Mr. Sundarayya, was said to have remarked at a meeting that 'the
Committee of Privileges had now almost completed its investigations
and Dr. Sinha was finding it difficult to get out of the situation'. Mr.
Sundarayya gave a different version of this speech; he had only said that
the Committee ' will be going into the whole matter and now it will be
for Dr. Sinha to prove his allegations, which will be a very hard job for
him to do'. The Committee declined to decide between the two conflict-
ing reports, but pointed out that, since in fact the Committee had at that
time not met, there was no case of inaccurate reporting of the proceed-
ings of a Committee but rather a purely incorrect statement. They
recommended no further action, but pointed out that 'it is highly desir-
able that no person including a member of Parliament or Press should
without proper verification make or publish a statement or comment
about any matter which is under consideration or investigation by a
Committee of Parliament'. 2
Similar cases have arisen also in the States. Two Bombay cases may be
mentioned as illustrations. One of these concerned the arrest of a mem-
ber without warrant during a session. Since, however, the arrest was
made under the ordinary law on charges involving offences for which,
under the Indian Penal Code, a person is liable to be arrested without
warrant, the Committee found no difficulty in saying that membership
of the House conferred no immunity. 2 The other case arose out of an
editorial comment in The Times of India. Questions had been allowed
and put in the House to the Minister of Finance and Prohibition on the
granting of liquor permits to magistrates and judges. The questioner
asked whether the Government was 'aware of the feeling in the public
that granting of liquor permits to Magistrates and Judges is likely to in-
fluence judicial decisions in prohibition cases'—to which the reply was
' N o ' . Supplementaries secured the names of the judges who were for-
tunate enough to get permits. The editorial comment followed two days
later—under the heading 'Contemptible'. The questions asked 'were
nothing short of a degrading design to lower their Lordships in public
esteem. . . . The singling out of magistrates and judges for public
1
Committee of Privileges, The Sinha Case (Parliament Secretariat, Dec. 1952).
2
Committee of Privileges, The Sundarayya Case (Parliament Secretariat, Dec. 1952).
M r . Sundarayya, though a member of the Council of States, gave evidence before the Com-
mittee of Privileges of the House of the People. See below, p. 261.
3
Bombay Legislature Department, Report of the Privileges Committee in the matter of
breach of privilege arising out of the arrest without warrant of Shri R. S. Patel, M.L.A.
(Dec. 1953). Two members of the Committee, while agreeing with the main finding, felt
that the arrest in this case was mala fide and that the House should protect its members in
such cases.
254 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

obloquy cannot but be part of a deliberate pattern.' The questions should

have been disallowed, since they violated the conditions laid down for
the admissibility of questions, and they were 'mean and petty'. 'The en-
tire performance in its malice and vituperation is unworthy of the Legis-
lature of what was once a premier State. But perhaps it is too much to
expect elementary good manners and good taste from those who know
no standards and observe none.' The Committee of Privileges, after
hearing the editor and his counsel, considered that the questions did not
amount to any contravention of the Constitution which bans 'discus-
sion' of the 'conduct of a Judge in the discharge of his duties'; further
that they were not contrary to the provisions of the rules regarding
questions; finally, that the criticism in the editorial 'exceeds the bounds
of decency, reason and fair comment' and 'is calculated to undermine
the prestige and authority of the House'. The editor and paper were held
guilty of contempt and therefore of breach of privilege of the House.
The House endorsed the findings and carried out the Committee's
recommendation to disapprove of the conduct of the editor and, in the
absence of a published unconditional apology, to withdraw the press
facilities given to the paper. 1
Only in one or two cases has any kind of conflict appeared between
the Speaker as defender of the privileges of the House and outside
authority. One instance worth mention—though indeed the matter did
not come to a head—occurred in West Bengal when the Speaker of the
Assembly granted temporary permission to two Communist M.L.A.s to
remain on the Assembly premises in order to avoid arrest under the Pre-
ventive Detention Act. It appears to be generally agreed, however, that
the desirability of allowing a member to continue to perform his duties
towards his constituency cannot be allowed to confer a general im-
munity from arrest. The only immunity permitted by established prac-
tice in Britain is that arrests cannot be effected within the precincts of the
Chamber while the House is actually sitting. Another instance of some
importance led to a case in the Allahabad High Court. The Speaker of
the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, in the exercise of his powers to maintain
order, had to instruct that the leader of the Opposition be removed from
the Chamber. He further suspended the member from the remainder
of the day's sitting and referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges.
The Committee agreed that the member had behaved in a disrespectful
manner and a resolution of the House then suspended him for the rest
of the session. The member thereupon brought an action in the High
Court against the Speaker, on the ground that double punishment had
been awarded in contravention of one of the Articles on Fundamental
1
Report of the Privileges Committee in the matter of Breach of Privilege by the Editor,
Printer and Publisher of The Times of India, Bombay (Bombay Legislature Department,
Mar. 1953). One M.L.A., an Independent, disagreed, finding the comments fair and
reasonable.
 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES 255

Rights in the Constitution. The Court dismissed the member's applica-

tion. It held, first, that disciplinary action for a breach of parliamentary
rules was n o t ' punishment' as intended by the chapter on Fundamental
Rights, and therefore the question of double punishment did not arise.
Secondly, the resolution passed by the House was an internal matter
which the Courts have no power to scrutinise. 1 Although the judges
were thus far agreed, there was not complete agreement in their com-
ments on the general position. One view was that in reconciling the
privileges of Parliament as set out in Articles 105 and 194 with the rest
of the Constitution it had to be taken that the framers had not intended
the privileges to be overruled by the Fundamental Rights; others were
of the contrary view that the Fundamental Rights were more funda-
mental. 2 One of the best known privilege cases arose out of action taken
by the Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly in referring
to the Committee of Privileges a criticism of his own conduct published
in the Bombay newspaper Blitz. The Committee held the author and the
editor guilty of breach of privilege and recommended the imprisonment
of the editor. The Assembly approved the report and a warrant for the
arrest of the editor was issued. He was arrested, flown from Bombay to
U.P. and detained. Within a week of his being arrested, a habeas corpus
application was presented to the Supreme Court raising inter alia the
point that the detention was contrary to Article 22 of the Constitution
which requires the production of the arrested person before a magistrate
within 24 hours of arrest. The Court upheld this contention and ordered
the release of the editor. 3 The Assembly took no further action.
This brief review of a few privilege cases serves to show the kind of
problem that has arisen in the period since independence. It also shows
that those responsible for the protection of Parliament's privileges have
on the whole proceeded cautiously.

5. Relations between the Two Houses

It is the habit of institutions to give birth to loyalties, and when two
institutions are placed side by side it is easy for clashes to occur and feel-
ings to run high. In a federal state, for example, no amount of skilful
vision of labour can prevent a sense of competition from arising between
the centre and the units; even if the jurisdictions of each are demarcated
with precision, there is always room for charges of unfair encroachment.
The same is true of relations between Legislature, Executive and Judi-
ciary—unless the three are highly integrated. This tension is often desir-
able, and indeed some institutions have been deliberately established
1
Art. 122 (2) cr, for States, (?.) (see Appendix I).
2
R a j N a r a y a n Singh v. The Tpeaker of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly (1953).
3 r c t i ' i o n No. 7 i of 1952.
256 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

with a view to creating a 'separation' and 'balance' of powers. The

existence of antagonism between two Houses of a Parliament should
occasion no more surprise, and is in fact encountered in the political
history of more than one country. Independent India has enjoyed the
operation of a bicameral legislature only since the General Elections of
1952. Nevertheless this short time has proved long enough to enable the
development of almost bitter rivalry between the two Houses. That this
has happened so quickly and in spite of the dominating position of one
party in both Houses bears striking witness to the power of institutions
to inspire fresh attachments of sympathy and devotion.1
The Council of States is an indirectly elected House with powers
similar to but in certain respects less than those of the House of the
People.2 The party composition of the two Houses is very similar3; in-
deed it would have required a very curious system of choosing the Coun-
cil to have produced a great contrast between the two in the present state
of political forces in India. Even the social compositions of the Council
and House resemble each other rather closely—or at least do not differ
in any way sufficiently to make them possess distinct characters.4 The
Council of States is neither significantly older nor significantly more ex-
perienced or more specialist than the Lower House. It contains some ex-
perienced parliamentarians, a few lawyers of high standing and a few
statesmen of wide experience; so does the House of the People. Some of
the Council members are quiet, elderly men of mature wisdom and
moderate views; the opposition benches, however, look if anything
slightly younger than those of the House of the People and would
certainly be unwilling to admit that they were less noisy.5 The Vice-
President of the Republic in his capacity as Chairman of the Council
succeeds wonderfully in conveying to the proceedings a tone of friendly
urbanity, but the realities of party strengths are little affected and party
organisation in the Council is no less developed than in thé House of
the People. The Upper House is a Council of States of the Union and
its members are elected by the State Assemblies. This, however, does
not seem to have made the floor of the Council a battleground between
Centre and States; a defence of'States-rights', an expression of regional
demands, is just as likely to be heard in the other House.
1
Lest this be thought too innocent a way of putting the matter, let it at once be admitted
that other factors play an important part. If a Lower House begins to agitate for the aboli-
tion of the other, the defence offered by the members of the latter is not unconnected with
the prospect for them of a loss of employment. It is also true that a quarrel between the
two Houses can be made to afford opportunities for some parties in the opposition to
embarrass the Government.
2 3
See Chapter II, Section 3 and Appendix I. See above, pp. 97-98.
4 See Chapter III, Section 2 . 1 have not been able to test the truth of the view that a large
number of members of the Council were campaign organisers during the General Election
who were subsequently rewarded by being nominated for the Upper House.
5 This is not to say that there are not, among the Socialists in particular, men of real
ability.
 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES 151
Nor is the procedure of the Upper House such as would appreciably
distinguish it from the House of the People. As we have already seen, it
has nothing to do with the Demands for Grants and only limited powers
over Money Bills.1 Since it is smaller and less worried by the pressure of
work on limited time, its debates are less frequently subject to strict con-
trol through time limits. It has less need to use Select Committees for the
same reasons—and also for the reason that important or difficult Bills
have usually been subjected to that treatment in the House. The Council
devotes not only two and a half hours weekly to Private Members' busi-
ness but the whole of each Friday—even doing without Question Hour
on that day. It has the same Half an Hour Discussion procedure as the
House but, instead of the longer Discussion period also provided in the
Lower House, the Council has adopted the House of Lords' procedure
of moving ' f o r papers'; the effect, however, is identical. The Council's
Question procedure did indeed begin as a somewhat distinctive institu-
tion; at its inception in 1952 it had the rules of the old Council of State
(not States), which permitted a total of three questions on only two days
—perhaps half an hour a week. The members, not unexpectedly, refused
to stand for this, and within two months a regular Question Hour with
a maximum of three per member had been conceded. 2
Composed of men similar to those who sit in the House of the People,
the Council has, not surprisingly, failed to evolve a distinct role for itself.
It might well be useful for what is discussed in one place to be discussed
further in the other, but the value is very limited when the same things
are discussed in the same way. The Council provides neither for tech-
nical revision nor for a wider and more leisurely debate. The following
table is of interest:

No. of Bills received No. of Amendments

from House of People passed by Council
and passed by Council to such Bills

First Session 25 1
Second Session . 16 —

T h i r d Session 26 1
F o u r t h Session . 5 —

F i f t h Session 15 13

1
At first, the Council's procedure provided only for 'the consideration and passing' of
Money Bills. By an amendment to the Rules in Sept. 1952 three stages were introduced:
consideration; clause by clause examination; and finally the motion—taken from Eire—
'that the Bill be returned'.
2
See Council of States Manual, Part I, Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business.
3
The three amendments were accepted by the Lower House. The complaint of the
Council is that the Government is always in such a hurry to get the Bills passed that there is
insufficient time for the minute examination which revision demands.
17—p.I.
258 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

Amendments, no doubt, do not tell the whole story; an examination of

the debates, however, fails to reveal any more subtle contribution on the
part of the Council. On the other hand, two points are to be noticed.
First, the Government has made an effort—and indeed has found it most
convenient and useful—to introduce first into the Council an increasing
number of its Bills:

No. of Bills first intro-

duced in Council
First Session 4
Second Session 3
Third Session 11
Fourth Session 11
Fifth Session 8

Second, there are a few recent signs that the Council may be beginning
to 'try its wings' as a forum for grand and soaring debate. Perhaps for
the first time, one of its discussions, on foreign affairs in late August of
1954, appears to have impressed observers considerably. 1 It is always
possible, therefore, that the Council will succeed in fashioning a dis-
tinctive role for itself. That, however, is rather a matter for speculation. 2
What is quite certain is that it has started its career as far as possible on
the same lines as the House of the People, that it feels consequently in-
ferior and somewhat frustrated, that it has striven for more equal status
and that it has provoked the most violent reactions among some mem-
bers of the Lower House. Some of the cases of dispute are worth
examination.
The first major public clash between the two Houses occurred during
the Budget session of 1953. The issue was in some ways small but pas-
sions were thoroughly roused on both sides. On the 29 April 1953 the
Council of States took up for consideration the Income Tax (Amend-
ment) Bill, 1952, as passed by the House of the People. The Bill had been
certified as a Money Bill by the Speaker, but in the course of the debate
1
I rely on the usually good judgment of the Statesman's political correspondent:
'There was a touch of greatness in the tone and content of the Rajya Sabha (Council of
States) debate last week on foreign affairs which may serve the other House as a useful
example. . . . For once it was a delight to sit in the Press Gallery.' The writer drew attention
to the valuable contributions of Dr. Ambedkar, Dr. Ramaswamy Mudaliar and Mr.
Krishna Menon. He also paid tribute to Dr. Radhakrishnan's 'directional skill'; 'he chose
the participants with extreme care . . . and, though outside the discussion, he seemed part
of it, alert but flexible, strong and at the same time forgiving' (Overseas Statesman, 4 Sept.
1954).
2
It may be of significance that out of the 31 new faces in the Council as a result of the
first elections of one-third of the members in March 1954, 5 were of persons with prominent
positions in States: 2 ex-Chief Ministers, 2 ex-Ministers and 1 Pradesh Congress Com-
mittee President. If there is anything like a trend to move up from State to Centre by way
of the Council, it could happen that 'States' rights' would be heard of more frequently in
the Upper House.
 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES 259
in the Council some members argued that it was not. The Law Minister,
Mr. Biswas, 1 who is not only a member but the Leader of the Council,
in replying to these doubts permitted himself to say that the Council
would be reassured if it were told categorically that the Speaker had
applied his mind to this question and issued the certificate after a full
and fair consideration of the matter. 2 On the following day, a member
of the House of the People sought to move a motion that the remarks of
the Law Minister were unjustifiable and inconsistent with the dignity of
the Speaker. The Chair observed that the Law Minister might be present
in the House on the following day when the motion could be brought up
for discussion. 3 The Council responded quickly to the situation and
passed a resolution 'that this Council is of the opinion that the Leader
of the Council be directed not to present himself in any capacity what-
soever in the House of the People' when the matter was brought up in
that House. 4 The Law Minister was present in the House of the People
when the Deputy Speaker read out a message from the Chairman of the
Council. The Chairman said that 'it was nobody's intention, least of all
that of the Leader of the Council, to cast aspersions on the integrity and
impartiality of the Speaker. It is our anxiety in this Council to do our
best to uphold the dignity of the Speaker and the privileges of the other
House as we expect the other House to protect our interestsand privi-
leges.' The Law Minister said he associated himself with those remarks,
and the Deputy Speaker said he thought that further discussion was not
called for. The members of the House had, however, heard of the re-
solution just passed by the Council and were not prepared to let the
matter drop. The Law Minister at this stage withdrew and the Deputy
Speaker eventually gave in to pressure and read out the resolution passed
by the Council. 5 Members angrily asserted that Ministers were respon-
sible to the House and doubted the propriety of the Council's resolution.
Subsequently, however, further apologies from the Law Minister and an
intervention by the Prime Minister appealing for an end to the hostilities,
persuaded members to drop the matter. 6
Meanwhile another dispute was gathering momentum off the floors of
the two Houses. It appears that some members of the Council had soon
formulated the idea that, in order effectively to carry out its general dis-
cussion of the Budget and its debate on the Appropriation Bill, it was
necessary that the Council should either have its own Estimates and
Public Accounts Committees 7 or that its members should be included in
1
T h e incident is s o m e t i m e s referred to as ' T h e Biswas B u s i n e s s ' .
^ C. S. D e b . , 29 A p r i l 1953. 3 H . P . D e b . , 30 A p r i l 1953.
1 C.S. D e b . , 1 M a y 1953. 5 H . P . D e b . , 1 M a y 1953.
6
H . P . D e b . , 6 a n d 7 M a y 1953. It is of incidental interest t o n o t e t h a t t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r
revealed t h a t t h e S p e a k e r h a s i n v a r i a b l y t a k e n advice f r o m the L a w M i n i s t r y b e f o r e certify-
ing Bills as M o n e y Bills. O p p o s i t i o n m e m b e r s w e r e n o t slow to p o i n t o u t t h a t it l o o k e d as
if s o m e Ministers did n o t k n o w e n o u g h a b o u t t h e w o r k d o n e in their d e p a r t m e n t .
1 T h e s e C o m m i t t e e s are discussed below, C h a p t e r VI, Section 3.
260 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

the existing two Committees of the House of the People. In January 1953
the proposals of the Council's Rules Committee with regard to the
Public Accounts Committee were sent to the House of the People; they
suggested a Joint Committee and added that since there were already 15
members on the House Committee, the simplest method would be to add
7 from the Council. The Rules Committee of the House met to consider
these proposals and had before them a resolution of the Public Accounts
Committee which stated its opinion that a Joint Committee or a separate
Council Committee on the subject would be 'against the principles un-
derlying the Constitution' and therefore unacceptable. 1 The Rules Com-
mittee agreed with this view: the House had special responsibilities in
financial matters; it cannot share these with anyone else; the responsi-
bilities of the Council in financial matters required no such measure;
and the particular rules suggested by the Council were objectionable. 2
The most that could be conceded was that the Council could, if it
wished, set up on its own not a Public Accounts Committee but an ad
hoc Committee to guide them in the discussion of financial matters. The
question was brought into the open when the Prime Minister moved in
the House a motion on the subject. This was not to establish a Joint
Committee, but to ' recommend to the Council of States that they nomi-
nate seven members to associate with the Public Accounts Committee of
this House'. 3 The Prime Minister found unaccustomed allies in the
Socialists and even the Communists. 4 Nevertheless there was much un-
easiness in the House and much support for the views of the Rules Com-
mittee. 5 Replying to the debate, the Prime Minister argued that the
financial powers of the House were in no way threatened as the
Public Accounts Committee imagined; that the British precedents which
had been quoted were not relevant; the Council of States was not the
House of Lords and the fears of some members were the result of
suspicions which ' flowed from some distant background knowledge of

1
T h a t Committee had further suggested that the Speaker be ' requested to take all neces-
sary steps to safeguard the privileges of the House and the Public Accounts Committee and
to make it quite clear to the Council of States that their suggestion is unconstitutional,
tending to interfere with the rights, privileges and prerogatives of the House of the People
in financial matters over which this authority is supreme'.
2
It had been suggested, for instance, that the Chairman of the Joint Committee should
be elected by the Committee (instead of nominated by the Speaker), that the q u o r u m
should contain a q u o r u m of Council m e m b e r s and that the C o m m i t t e e should be
a u t o n o m o u s (instead of working under the Speaker's guidance).
3 H.P. Deb., 12 and 13 May 1953.
* T h e Communist leader explained, not unreasonably, that while they were not in favour
of a second chamber, so long as it existed they were in favour of giving it work to do. It
was, however, probably unnecessary for him to confess that his party was ' n o t wedded to
constitutional p e d a n t r y ' .
5 One member expressed a part of the uneasiness when he said: ' T o d a y it is the Public
Accounts Committee; t o m o r r o w it may be the Estimates Committee.' Another alleged that
' w h a t the Constitution prevents the Council f r o m doing this motion enables it to do in an
indirect w a y ' .
 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES 261
English history'. Nevertheless he agreed further to postpone the ques-
tion. The motion was finally passed in December 1953 and the Council
members joined the new Committee in May 1954.1
Similar difficulties have occurred with regard to the problem of
Joint Committees. In this case, too, the Council suggested rules to which
the House took objection. Joint Committees have in fact been set up for
a few Bills, but when in December 1953 the proposal for a Joint Com-
mittee came from the Council the House again became indignant,
speakers referred to 'the subversion of the Constitution', 'acts of dis-
courtesy' and the Deputy Prime Minister promptly moved the adjourn-
ment of the debate. 2 Two days later the Prime Minister took part, and
once more appealed to members to be reasonable; the invitation came
from the Council simply because the Bill concerned originated there.
Somewhat sullenly, the House agreed. 3
Even greater excitement was caused by an incident in 1954. The Hindu
Mahasabha leader in the House of the People, Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, was
reported as saying in the course of a public speech that 'the Upper
House, which is supposed to be a body of elders, seems to be behaving
irresponsibly like a pack of urchins'. The question of privilege was raised
in the Council and the Chairman instructed the Secretary to ascertain
the facts. The Secretary's letter asking Mr. Chatterjee whether the re-
ports were correct was in turn raised in the House on the following day.
The Prime Minister argued that there could be no harm in the Secre-
tary's letter and pointed out that in Sundarayya's Case in 1952 a member
of the Council had helped an investigation of the House. The Speaker,
however, held that the letter was more 'in the nature of a writ' and
favoured the reference of the particular issue, as well as the general prob-
lem of procedure in such cases, to a joint meeting of the Privileges
Committees of the two Houses. This was agreed to by the Council of
States, the Chairman taking advantage of an opportunity to say that the
Council's action was in conformity with the practice of the British Par-
liament and that of India. 4 By the end of the year the two Privilege Com-
mittees, sitting together, had been able to work out an acceptable
procedure for cases where a member of one House commits a breach
of the privileges of the other.
In view of these disputes it is hardly surprising that there should be a
body of opinion in the House of the People which favours the early
abolition of the Council. The debate on the subject which took place in

1 H.P. Deb., 24 Dec. 1953. The House was reassured that the Committee remained a
Committee of the House under the Speaker's control (H.P. Deb., 10 May 1954), while
members of the Council, though somewhat disappointed with the compromise, were re-
lieved to be told that they were full members of the Committee (C.S. Deb., 13 May 1954).
2 H.P. Deb., 14 Dec. 1953.
3 H.P. Deb., 16 Dec. 1953.
4 H.P. Deb., 12 and 13 May 1954, and C. S, Deb., 11 and 14 May 1954.
262 PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGE

the House showed that there were some members of the Congress party
who were of this view—as well as the Leftists. 1 The arguments on both
sides were fairly familiar. Against the Council, it was urged that the
Council was a 'stronghold of reactionary elements' and ' a device to
flout the voice of the people'. There was more validity to the very dif-
ferent arguments that the Council performed no useful function. The
Government mainly contented itself with pointing out that two years
was hardly an adequate trial period. Other speakers were perhaps nearer
the possible lines of future development when they said that the Council
might be retained but differently chosen. On this point, however, there
has so far been little constructive thought. What is certain is that peace-
ful coexistence is difficult if the two Houses continue to desire to perform
the same functions. 2 Moreover, if their roles are not soon distinguished,
the tradition of rivalry will become established and the Council will con-
tinue to attract a large number of persons who would have even more
readily found themselves in the House of the People. The practice of
rivalry is a most wasteful exercise of political energies and one without
even by-products of value. It can only serve to lower Parliament as a
whole in public esteem.
The position of second chambers in the seven States which possess
hem is even less happy. 3 Although they are composed of members
chosen in five different ways, 4 they have not been more successful than
the Council of States in creating for themselves a distinctive role. Gener-
ally, however, the Councils aspire to no position of rivalry; they meet
very much less than the State Legislative Assemblies and achieve very
little. The Bombay Council may be given as an example. In 9 sessions
held between 1950 and 1954, only 2 Bills were first introduced in the
Council—and those were in 1950. In the same period the Council passed
219 Bills received from the Assembly and suggested amendments to 7 of
them. In some States the movement for the abolition of the Councils is
well advanced and the Congress Party Parliamentary Board has left the
question to local decision. The Constitution lays down that only the
Central Parliament can pass the law to abolish the Councils, and it may
do so only if the Legislative Assembly of the State passes a resolution to
that effect by a majority of its total membership and a two-thirds
majority of those present and voting. 5 These conditions have already
been fulfilled in some States. In Bombay, for instance, the resolution
1
H.P. Deb., 2 April 1954. The discussion was on a Private Member's Resolution moved
by a Socialist member.
2
One member spoke about 'the mad drive towards equalisation o f powers and func-
tions'.
3
There are Legislative Councils in six (of the nine) Part ' A ' States: Bihar, Bombay,
Madras, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal; and in one Part ' B ' State, Mysore.
4 Art. 171 (3) (Appendix I).
5 Art. 169 (see A p p e n d i x I).
 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES 263
was debated for two days and during that time no member spoke in
favour of retaining the Council. The Chief Minister simply put the case
for and against and left the decision to a free vote of the House; 213
members of the Assembly voted for the abolition of the Council, none
against, while 6 abstained. 1
1
Bombay Ass. Deb., 12 a n a 14 Dec. 1953.
 CHAPTER SIX

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

R
EFERENCE has already been made to an important feature of the
Indian Parliament—its self-consciousness as a Legislature, dis-
t i n c t from and even standing against the Executive. This attitude
is most clearly expressed through the officers of Parliament and through
the Parliamentary Committees. In an old and firmly established institu-
tion whose relations with neighbouring institutions are clearly defined
and unquestioned, the task of its officers is usually limited; problems of
internal order and external harmony are normally solved by appro-
priate adaptations of accepted codes. The case of the Indian Parliament
is different. Although its origins may be traced back several decades, the
changes since 1947 have been radical. In this situation, the influence of
the Speaker and his staff has been exceptional. The political leaders have
been preoccupied with policies; the institutions have been moulded by
their officers.
1. The Speaker
The institution of the Speaker in India is a good deal older than the
title; while the title was assumed only in 1947, the institution dates from
1921 and was established by two very different men during the 1920s.1
The first President of the Central Legislative Assembly was Sir (then
Mr.) Frederick Whyte. He was not elected by the House but nominated
by the Governor-General of the day for a period of four years; in these
first years the foundations of procedure and conduct were laid. Indian
opinion wanted nothing better than to be able to follow the ways of the
House of Commons; and, within the constitutional limits prescribed by
the Government of India Act, 1919, and under the guidance of Sir
Frederick Whyte, himself a former member of the House of Commons,
the members of the Assembly were enabled to do so. It may be that a
nominated Englishman as Speaker was inevitable and even suitable at
the time. Yet with the entry into the Assembly in the General Elections
of 1923 of the Swarajist Party (a group within the Congress), such a
situation would not have been easily tolerated for long. In fact, the
Government had in any case intended that an elected President should
be chosen when Sir Frederick Whyte's four-year term ended. Since the
1
For much of the historical information in this and the following sections, I am especi-
ally indebted to Shri M. N. Kaul, Secretary of the House of the People, and in particular to
his three articles, ' G r o w t h of the Position and Powers of the Speaker', 'Dignity and In-
dependence of the Chair' and 'Parliament under Mr. Mavalankar' (Hindustan Times, 24
and 31 Jan. and 7 Feb. 1954).
264
 THE SPEAKER 265
Swarajists did not command an absolute majority in the House, it was
perhaps with some surprise as well as with jubilation that they found
their candidate elected by 58 votes to 56, defeating the rival candidate
who enjoyed official support. President Vithalbhai Patel held office from
1925 to 1930 and did more than any of his successors before 1946 to
assert and consolidate the independence of the Chair.
On more than one issue President Patel came into conflict with the
Government, and on each occasion fought with tenacity for his indepen-
dent powers. One of his first battles was for a separate staff under his
control. Even Sir Frederick Whyte had favoured such a measure, though
he had not felt able to press his views with insistence. The Government,
too, conceded the principle, but resisted change on grounds of economy
and efficiency; the Assembly continued to be served by a staff which
formed part of the Legislative Department, a branch of the Government
under the Law Member of the Government. 1 President Patel raised the
issue soon after his election, but his position was much strengthened in
1927, when he was re-elected to the Chair with the unanimous support of
both official and non-official members—itself a tribute to the reputation
he had already established. In a famous statement to the House, he an-
nounced in effect his open campaign for independence: 'As President,
elected by the Assembly, I am responsible to the Assembly and to no
other authority.' In 1928 the House carried a motion for the formation
of a separate Legislative Assembly Department under the President, and
after reference to London the new regime was inaugurated in the follow-
ing January. 2 Another assertion of independence related to his power to
admit or disallow motions. Even at the commencement of his tenure of
office he refused to admit a Government motion to take into considera-
tion a Public Security Bill which had been reported upon by a Select
Committee. 3 He maintained his position in spite of a Viceroy's address
to the House on the subject, and even wrote to the Viceroy protesting
against his criticisms of the Chair. Towards the end of his period in
office, he succeeded in asserting the authority of the President over the
maintenance of order and security in the precincts of the House. The
Government at first held that it had to be the judge of what measures
were necessary, but Patel thereupon ordered the closing of the galleries.
After negotiations an agreement was reached: Government control of
1
It may be mentioned at this point that the old Council of State was also serviced by the
same department. Moreover, although a separate independent department was created for
the Assembly, the Council continued to employ the old arrangements until it came to an
end in 1947. When the new Council of States was established in 1952, it was given its own
separate secretariat distinct f r o m the Government departments—and distinct also f r o m
that of the House of the People.
2
The Department was legally in the portfolio of the Governor-General but the de facto
control rested unambiguously with the President.
3 He based his decision on the ground that discussion would not be possible without re-
ference to the Meerut Conspiracy Case, which was sub judice.
266 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

the outer precincts was unchanged but the inner precincts were placed in
charge of a Watch and Ward staff, some of whom were police officers
deputed by the Government, but all of whom were responsible to the
President. 1 Perhaps President Patel's most striking action was in defence
of respect for the Chair on the part of members. It appears that on one
occasion reports reached him that the official members (that is, of the
Government) freely commented in disparaging terms on some of his
decisions. He thereupon raised the matter in the House and requested
the Leader of the House to give members an explanation of the position.
On receiving an ample apology, he treated the matter as closed.
The resignation of President Patel in 1930 coincided with the with-
drawal also of most Congressmen from the Assembly, and the centre of
political gravity, which had in any case never very surely rested in the
Assembly, now certainly moved away from it. A succession of Presidents
during the 1930s and 1940s maintained the gains which Patel had made,
but the period of consolidation gave way to a new period of develop-
ment only in 1946 with the election of Mr. Mavalankar, the present
Speaker. 2 His election itself was an event of some excitement. He was
opposed by the Government, which decided, somewhat strangely, to put
up a nominated member to contest the election. The Government nomi-
nee was assured of Muslim League support, and the Government
appeared to be confident of the result. In fact, Mr. Mavalankar won by
66 votes to 63.3 In the recent development of the position of Speaker,
the personality of the man who held the position of Presiding Officer
from the last days of the Central Assembly of 1946, through the Con-
stituent Assembly (Legislative) of 1947-49 and the Provisional
Parliament of 1950-52, to the House of the People of 1956, has
naturally played an important part. 4 In the House he was stern and
1
The Speaker's control has more recently been extended to all security arrangements.
2
Following Patel's resignation, the Chair was occupied by Sir Muhammed Yakub
(1930-31), Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola (1931-33), Mr. Shanwukham Chetty (1933-34) and
finally for a long tenure by Sir Abdur Rahim (1935-45).
3
It has been recently revealed (in public statements by M. N. Kaul and Dr. Khare on
10 and 11 Jan. 1954 respectively) that a sufficient number of official members of the Govern-
ment were persuaded to vote for Mr. Mavalankar. It also appears (from the same sources)
that the Government was so anxious to discover which of its members had disobeyed the
Whip that they made efforts to secure the ballot papers; these had, however, been de-
stroyed by the Secretary in anticipation of such attempts.
4
Mr. Mavalankar began with the career of advocate but in the early 1920s became a
prominent worker in the Congress movement, for which he was on more than one occasion
imprisoned. He was active in local affairs and for some years President of Ahmedabad
Municipality. He was Speaker of the Bombay Assembly in the period 1937-39. The Chair
in the House of the People is also occupied from time to time by the (elected) Deputy
Speaker and by the (nominated) members of the Panel of Chairmen. Their impact on the
House has naturally been less than that of the Speaker, though the round and cheerful
figure of the Deputy Speaker presided over the House during the long absence through
illness of the Speaker in 1952-53. As already mentioned, on the death of Mr Mavalankar
in February 1956, Mr Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, previously Deputy Speaker, was
unanimously elected in his place.
 THE SPEAKER 267
conducted the proceedings with almost forbidding firmness, though
not without permitting himself from time to time the luxury of exer-
cising his sense of humour. He had a skilful lawyer's capacity for
disentangling procedural puzzles and stating the issues clearly and at
short notice; at the same time, he knew when and how to postpone
a decision to give time for more leisurely consideration. Above all,
he had the ability to catch the sense of the House and respond to the
movements of sentiment and emotion among the members.
The important functions of the Speaker in the House of the People
have already been indicated in the preceding pages. The maintenance of
order and decorum and the smooth conduct of business; the decisions on
the admissibility of questions and motions; the establishment of the
scope of different kinds of debate and their regulation 1 —all this and
more is already obvious from a few hours in the galleries or from a peru-
sal of a day's proceedings in the House. And if matters appear to pro-
ceed smoothly, it is usually because a difficulty has already been well
handled in the past. The influence of the Speaker in his own chamber is
no less significant. We have already noted that the present Rules of Pro-
cedure are practically the creation of the Speaker—usually tentatively
tried out in conventions, compared with those of the House of Com-
mons and, if found suitable in practice, incorporated in formal terms. 2
His chairmanship of the Business Advisory Committee is central to the
planning of the House's work and to the fostering of reasonably har-
monious relations between the Government and the opposition groups.
The emerging policy of the House on matters of privilege—the cautious
consolidation and resistance to ambitious extensions—is largely of the
Speaker's making. 3 The working of the whole range of Parliamentary
Committees (which we consider further below) is conducted under the
guidance of the Speaker, who in some cases has issued special directives
and who is on every occasion the person to whom a worried Committee
Chairman would go for advice.
The very constitutional framework within which the House operates
1
It has not been unusual in India for the Chair to interrupt speeches in order to get clear
the point which the members are making. This, however, is largely a matter of personal
temperament, and some occupants of the Chair are fonder of this form of participation in
the debate than others.
2
' W e freely refer to and follow British precedents in so far as they represent experience
about h u m a n affairs . . . and are the outcome of the evolution of democracy through cen-
turies' (Mavalankar, ' T h e Development of Parliamentary Procedure in India', Asian Re-
view, Jan. 1953). The Speaker added that there was no need to imitate ' o u t w a r d f o r m s ' ; in
fact, however, there is a good deal of discussion among the Speakers of various legislatures
o n the subject of the introduction (or, where it already exists, in some States, the retention)
of the Mace. The objections to it appear to be that it is un-Indian and that it is a symbol of
force; on the other hand, some Speakers claim to have found a similar symbol used in
ancient India and they say it stands not for force but authority.
3
It must be added that the Speaker, while no doubt checking the exaggerated anger of
the wilder members, has been zealous in the defence of the powers of the House in relation
to what are felt to be the encroachments of the Council.
268 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

owes much to the Speaker's influential advice. Many of the provisions

of the Constitution which relate to Parliament were indeed the direct
results of the Speaker's recommendations. This can be said, for
instance, of the inauguration of each budget session with a Presidential
Address and the radical transformation of financial procedure. More
important, the vital sections on privileges were the consequence of his
intervention. It may also be noted that the outcome of the fight of
President Patel for an independent secretariat is now, largely thanks to
the Speaker's insistence, included as a part of the Constitution. 1
Since the institution of the Speaker is in general so much modelled on
that of Britain, attention is naturally drawn to certain differences. Of
these, the position of the Speaker in relation to party politics is the most
interesting. In the early days, under the guidance of the first President,
the British model was accepted and generally followed; there was, that
is, a complete severance of the Speaker from party politics. Moreover
this position was more or less maintained during the whole period up to
independence. With the advent of popular governments in the Provinces
in 1937 the question became slightly more open, but on the whole there
was agreement that impartiality and the appearance of impartiality de-
manded sincere attempts to break previous political connections. 2 After
1947, however, the situation changed. 3 Now every Speaker almost with-
out exception was a Congress politician of some prominence. Among
their number there were some who did not simply fail to live up to the
standard of the agreed model, they declined to accept the model as
suitable for India. Such Speakers argued that the nature of the national
movement had been such that to sever relations from it on being chosen
Speaker was neither possible nor necessary; if it were rigidly enforced,
men of quality would not come forward for the position; and, in any
case, so it was said, impartiality in the Chair does not depend on the
nature of the Speaker's outside activities. Between this new school of
thought and the older orthodox view, the Speaker of the House of the
People has followed a middle course. He has held that Speakers must be
recruited from men of political experience, in order that democracy may
be consolidated. This certainly involved not imposing any drastic rule or
convention of abstinence and severance. On the other hand, he has stres-
sed the danger of Speakers developing an unconscious bias which im-
perils their impartiality, and of their losing the confidence of minority
parties. He has urged therefore that even if party membership is retained,
1
Art. 98 (see Appendix I). For this purpose, the Speaker summoned in 1949 a special
session of the Conference of Presiding Officers of all Indian legislatures to support his
efforts. (This institution is mentioned below, p. 270.)
2
See, however, p. 65 above.
3 Already in 1946 Mr. Mavalankar performed the symbolic act of discarding the
Speaker's wig which had been worn until then; he appeared—and continued to appear—
in the little white ' Gandhi' cap of the Congress.
 THE SPEAKER 269
participation in active politics of a kind that may be controversial—
especially if related to matters that could come before the legislature—
should be avoided. 'Though it is conceded that the Speaker in India
should stand apart from party strife, it is maintained that he should not
keep himself entirely aloof from politics as the British Speaker does.' As
a first step, he has evolved the formula that ' though the Speakers may
continue to be members of their parties, they should not attend party
meetings where various subjects are discussed nor should they actively
participate publicly in controversial matters that are likely to come up
for discussion before the House'. According to this view, the final aim is
unchanged: ' I n course of time, we shall be able to evolve from this a
sound convention on the lines of the British speaker.' 1 The Speaker has
been able to get his views accepted to a limited extent among the presid-
ing officers of State legislatures, but there are still many Speaker-poli-
ticians. 2 As memories and attachments to the national movement
gradually lose their former power, however, there is no doubt that non-
participation will become more general. Already there is a realisation
that the practice, held by all Speakers to be desirable, of not contesting
the Speaker's seat in the General Elections, can only develop along with
the convention of non-participation. 3
The lead given by the Speaker of the House of the People does not in
any way entail a silent or neutral attitude on certain general public
1
M a v a l a n k a r , loc. cit.
2
I n s o m e States there have b e e n o p p o s i t i o n a t t e m p t s to r e m o v e t h e S p e a k e r f r o m t h e
C h a i r . T h i s is usually a n expression of C o m m u n i s t o b s t r u c t i o n , b u t they a r e s o m e t i m e s
able to play o n a m o r e general s u s p i c i o n of partiality. T h e first m o t i o n of n o c o n f i d e n c e in
t h e S p e a k e r of t h e C e n t r a l P a r l i a m e n t w a s m o v e d o n 18 D e c . 1954. It w a s c o n d e m n e d by
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r as ' v i c i o u s ' , a n d h e described t h e o p p o s i t i o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r it as ' i n -
c o m p e t e n t a n d f r i v o l o u s ' . O v e r 50 m e m b e r s s t o o d to indicate their s u p p o r t t o t h e a d m i s -
s i o n of t h e m o t i o n f o r discussion, b u t t h e o p p o s i t i o n a c c e p t e d d e f e a t o n a voice v o t e
w i t h o u t pressing f o r a division. T h e m a i n grievance w a s t h e r e m a r k of t h e S p e a k e r t h a t he
w o u l d give m o r e credence t o f a c t s p u t f o r w a r d by t h e G o v e r n m e n t t h a n by o t h e r s . But t h e
b a c k g r o u n d a p p e a r s t o h a v e b e e n dissatisfaction w i t h the S p e a k e r ' s a l m o s t a b s o l u t e re-
f u s a l t o allow a d j o u r n m e n t m o t i o n s ; it w a s said t h a t he h a d a l l o w e d only 1 o u t of 89 in
t h r e e years. T h e incident w a s u n f o r t u n a t e , b u t it w a s h a r d l y a serious setback t o the in-
stitution of the C h a i r . T h e b e h a v i o u r of s o m e State A s s e m b l y S p e a k e r s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
h a s o n o c c a s i o n seemed p a r t i a l . A striking illustration n o t of p a r t i a l i t y b u t certainly o f
political S p e a k e r s h i p w a s p r o v i d e d by events in D e l h i State in F e b . 1956. D i s s e n s i o n s
a m o n g the C o n g r e s s P a r t y m e m b e r s of the S t a t e A s s e m b l y suggested t h e need f o r a new
l e a d e r as Chief M i n i s t e r ; t h e S p e a k e r a c c e p t e d n o m i n a t i o n , w a s duly elected a n d de-
scended f r o m the C h a i r to t a k e over t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e G o v e r n m e n t b e n c h e s !
3
T h e way the issue m o s t f r e q u e n t l y p r e s e n t s itself t o t h e S p e a k e r s is as f o l l o w s : If I a m
t o b e a s k e d t o give u p p a r t y politics, I m u s t be a s s u r e d of m y f u t u r e career as a S p e a k e r ;
this m e a n s (a) t h a t m y p a r t y m u s t h a v e a c o n v e n t i o n t h a t they will n o r m a l l y n o m i n a t e m e
again as a c a n d i d a t e for a c o n s t i t u e n c y a n d f o r re-election t o t h e S p e a k e r s h i p , a n d (b) t h a t
t h e r e m u s t be a c o n v e n t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s n o t t o c o n t e s t t h e S p e a k e r ' s s e a t ; u n t i l
these a s s u r a n c e s a r e established, I c a n n o t be expected to c o m m i t political suicide by losing
t o u c h w i t h m y p a r t y o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d m y electorate. (It m a y b e n o t e d t h a t at t h e C e n t r e at
least there is a firm c o n v e n t i o n t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e S p e a k e r m a y n o t e n t e r a d e b a t e o r p u t a
q u e s t i o n , he c a n represent his c o n s t i t u e n c y ' s needs by private c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h the
Government.)
270 OFFICERS A N D COMMITTEES

questions. The Speaker, for instance, has not hesitated to give his views
in public speeches on such burning issues as the formation of linguistic
states. Usually, however, he has restricted himself to remarks on the
broad features of the developing political life of the country. Thus he has
on occasion spoken of the importance of building up a strong but re-
sponsible opposition, of the meaning of secular democracy and the
value of social work in local areas. 1 Above all, he has played a promi-
nent part in the formulation and expression of a specifically' Legislature'
point of view. In this connection, the changing role of the Speakers' Con-
ference is significant. This institution is as old as the Legislative Assem-
blies but it has recently assumed a new meaning. In 1921 the Presiding
Officer of the Central Assembly carried out a tour of Provincial Assem-
blies, as a result of which a Conference of all Presiding Officers was called
in Delhi in the same year. The meeting was designed to discuss proce-
dural problems encountered in the different Assemblies, to exchange ex-
periences and ideas, and, where possible, to reach agreed conclusions
which would ensure the development of procedure throughout India on
more or less uniform lines. The Conference at once proved valuable and
met frequently though not at regular intervals. 2 The proceedings have
from the start been confidential, but the practice has developed of giving
the Opening Address and the gist of some of the discussions in the form
of statements to the press. The original function of the Conference has
been retained, and in the post-independence period the guidance which
the less experienced Speakers from some States have received has been of
exceptional worth. Most of the procedural difficulties discussed are sub-
mitted from the States; definite decisions on these are recorded in reso-
lutions only if there is complete agreement. The Chairman and guiding
spirit is the Speaker from Delhi, and the Conference Secretariat is sup-
plied also from Delhi. In this way procedural development is everywhere
kept on similar lines; Delhi in no way lays down orders or gives instruc-
tions, but the advice it offers on the basis of its experience is followed as
far as possible. It must be admitted, however, that the position of
Speaker in some States is hardly as strong as that at the Centre. In many
cases they have much more difficult Houses to control—with shifting
party alignments, unstable majorities, and so on. Not in all cases by any
means are the Speakers themselves sufficiently withdrawn from the
1
E.g. a speech reported in the press in Feb. 1954: 'In one-party rule there is a danger o f
democracy degenerating into autocracy. A strong opposition is most essential. Both the
party in power and the opposition should have the welfare of the country at heart, and by
means of discussion and compromise evolve what is best for the country. In a democracy,
all criticism should be inspired by a sense of responsibility and practicability of suggestions.'
(,Statesman 20 Feb. 1954.)
2 Conferences were in 1921, 1923 (two), 1925, 1926 (two), 1928, 1929, 1932, 1933, 1938,
1939. N o n e were held during the war years. The post-war series had been held in 1947,
1949 (two), 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955. The place o f meeting is n o w varied; the 1951
Conference was held in Trivandrum, that of 1953 in Gwalior, 1954 in Kashmir and 1955 at
Rajkot. The idea is t o extend the knowledge of various parts o f the country and also in
part perhaps to strengthen the morale of certain legislatures and their staff.
 THE SPEAKER 271
hurly-burly of stormy State politics to be able to c o m m a n d respect f r o m
all sides. Above all, not all Governments are as prepared as that of Pan-
dit N e h r u at the Centre to allow the Legislature to develop any f o r m of
independence of the Executive. 1 It is in this connection that the Con-
ference has begun to assume a new meaning—as a united expression of
specifically Legislature rights and interests. 2 It is, that is to say, not simply
procedural puzzles but deeper problems of the status and powers of the
Speakers, above all vis-à-vis governments, that now press for discussion;
the conference of technicians is developing, so to speak, a professional
esprit de corps.3
Behind this esprit de corps, as we have already suggested, there is
something like a distinctive political theory which emphasises not the
separation but certainly the distinctness of the powers of Legislature and
Executive. In the somewhat fluid state of political institutions in India,
the importance of such emerging attitudes is not to be under-estimated ;
even if the prevailing pattern of political power allows only a limited
scope for its expression, it may well come to be decisive at a later stage.
The opening address of the Speaker to the 1953 Conference gives one of
the clearest expressions to this view. 4 A central passage may be quoted in
full:
Unless Parliament is in a position to assert its independence as against the
executive, there can be no hope of real democracy or Parliamentary Govern-
ment; and it becomes more difficult where the members are organised as
parties. This question is both important and delicate in the present set-up,
when the political life of the country is not impersonal, is not wholly or-
ganised on the basis of programmes, and almost all the Legislatures have a
comfortable majority for only one party and the opposition is so much
divided in ideologies, parties and persons. Majorities are undoubtedly an ad-
vantage to push through a programme, but there are also dangers. . . .
Having very large majorities, the administration tends to become stiff, un-
compromising and sometimes unresponsive even to reasonable criticism.
. . . Political life has yet to be organised and based solely on programmes
1
In regard to some States, this way of putting it errs on the side of mildness; some Chief
Ministers, with monster majorities and well-managed followers, are not disposed to regard
the Legislature Officers as other than the staff of one more department of government: they
are to be firmly controlled. I am informed on good authority that such Ministers have tried
to put pressure on the Speakers—to disallow, for example, inconvenient amendments.
2
An attempt is naturally made to represent the Legislature's rights as bound u p with
those of the citizen body. On the occasion of the 1955 Speakers' Conference at R a j k o t ,
the Speaker of the Saurashtra Assembly called upon his fellows to realise that they were
not merely presiding officers but 'custodians of the democratic rights and privileges of the
people'. As already suggested in the discussion on privilege, this kind of claim, while no
doubt intended in good faith to be asserted as against the executive, may in practice come
to be more significant as a weapon against, for example, the press and the judiciary.
3 There have recently been proposals for the creation of an Inter-Legislature Association
of Indian parliamentarians. T h o u g h intended primarily for the discussion of policies, it
may also reinforce the tendency.
* E.g., as reported in The Times of India, 25 Oct. 1953. This was, of course, by no means
the only theme of the address.
212 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

and it will take a long time before conditions settle down. . . . The inde-
pendence of the Speaker and the Legislature Secretariat is therefore a matter
very vital and essential not only for a proper discussion, freedom of speech
and free expression of opinion, but for the very existence of legislatures as
really democratic bodies and not merely handmaids to the executive. . . .
[In relation to legislative control over finances,] I feel that no control by the
elected representatives of the people over the transactions of governments
can ever be too much. . . . [In general,] the Legislature is the head which
acts through the Government, and the Government has, therefore, to show
proper courtesy and consideration for the Legislature.
From one point of view, these opinions may be regarded as standing in
the traditions of President Patel confronted with an alien executive; they
are equally important as an expression of a present trend in political
thinking.

2. The Secretariat
The Secretariat serves the House and its Speaker. But, as in the case of
the Speaker, its importance is not only in its routine functions but in its
wider, 'political' significance in the present circumstances of the Indian
Parliament.
The establishment of a separate Central Legislative Assembly Depart-
ment was, as we have seen, effected after some difficulty in 1929.1 This
department continued to serve the Constituent Assembly (Legislative)
during 1947-49 and became, in 1950, the Parliament Secretariat, sub-
sequently the Lok Sabha (or House of the People) Secretariat. 2 Its staff,
formerly appointed by the Governor-General in consultation with the
President of the House, are now appointed by the Speaker and serve
under him. They are chosen from men already considered suitable by the
Public Service Commission, but the decision rests with the Speaker—or,
in the case of junior staff, with the Secretary. Indeed, when in 1948, a
special Selection Board of the Government Secretariat suggested that it
should extend its authority over Assembly Department appointments
the Speaker at once observed that his Secretariat' should not in any way
—in the matter of appointment, discipline, control or in any other matter
1
Constitutionally, the same is now the position of Secretariats of State legislatures (Art.
187, see Appendix I); in practice, many State legislature Secretariats are administratively
under the control rather of Ministers (usually the Finance Minister) than of the Speaker.
2
The title of Parliament Secretariat was actually retained even after the Council of State
came into existence in 1952; it would appear as if there was a reluctance to part with a de-
signation which underlined the greater importance of the Lower House. The change was
quietly effected without loss of dignity in 1954 when the Hindi titles were introduced. The
two Secretariats are now called Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Secretariats, even when re-
ferred to in English speech or correspondence. The Rajya Sabha Secretariat is similar in
organisation to that of the Lok Sabha. It is, however, naturally smaller (it has 15 gazetted
officers and a total administrative staff of 140); it has a less ambitious programme of re-
search and publications; and, while it shares its members' attitudes towards the House of
the People, it has not the same policy importance as the Lok Sabha Secretariat.
 THE SECRETARIAT 273
1
— b e subject to the jurisdiction of the executive', and this stand was
accepted. The salaries and conditions of service are settled by the Speaker
in consultation with the Finance Ministry. The convention is firmly estab-
lished that the budget of the secretariat, though subject to scrutiny by
the Finance Ministry, is not discussed in the House, though members
may m a k e suggestions and recommendations privately to the Speaker. 2
The staff of the Secretariat numbers over 250 and is organised in
several branches. Its routine work may be divided into those functions
which it performs in preparation for meetings and those which it carries
out by way of record and reference subsequently. In the preparation of
business, the Questions and Legislative Branches are the most important,
the former sifting the questions submitted and minuting each for the de-
cision of the Speaker, the latter preparing the a m e n d m e n t lists and the
general order of business. Two Committee Branches, one for the two
financial committees alone, perform similar preparatory functions for
the several committees of the House. The proceedings of the House (and
many committees) are taken down by the staif of the Reporters' Branch.
Stencilled copies are available within two hours of the end of the day's
debate and are sent for his corrections, if any, to each member who has
spoken. The work of preparing the Debates for press is done by a
separate Publications Branch; the Debates are published in two parts,
one giving the Questions and Answers of the first hour, the other the re-
mainder of the proceedings, while Appendices are also printed which
contain the lengthy statements laid on the Table of the House. Since
1949 a Hindi edition of the Debates has been prepared alongside the
English edition. The Debates are not, however, the only regular routine
publications. Each House has also its Bulletin. Part I is a daily publica-
tion and is a brief record of the proceedings. A specimen copy is given
below:

HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN—PART I
[Brief record of Proceedings]

December 15, 1953

No. 232
1. Oath or Affirmation
One member made affirmation in English.
1
K a u l , loc. cit.
2
I n 1948 t h e G o v e r n m e n t a p p o i n t e d a n E c o n o m y C o m m i t t e e t o e x a m i n e t h e staffing of
G o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t m e n t s . T h e C o m m i t t e e raised t h e q u e s t i o n of its being p e r m i t t e d to in-
vestigate t h e A s s e m b l y D e p a r t m e n t . T h e S p e a k e r a g r e e d , b u t o n t w o c o n d i t i o n s : the r e p o r t
w o u l d be a p r i v a t e o n e to t h e S p e a k e r a n d w o u l d n o t f o r m p a r t of the official r e p o r t ; it
w o u l d b e f o r t h e S p e a k e r a l o n e t o c o n s i d e r h o w f a r t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s c o u l d be imple-
m e n t e d . T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s were accepted. ( K a u l , loc. cit.)
18—p.I.
274 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

2. Starred Questions
Fifty-three starred questions (Nos. 940-947 and 949-993) were put down on
the order paper. Original notices of starred questions Nos. 975 and 982 were
received in Hindi.
Thirty-three starred questions (Nos. 940-942, 944-947, 949-961, 964-968,
971, 973, 975-978, 980 and 981) were orally answered and supplementary
questions were asked on all of them. Replies to the remaining questions (in-
cluding starred questions Nos. 943, 962, 963, 969, 970, 972, 974 and 979 of
which the questioners were absent) were laid on the Table.
3. Unstarred Questions
Twenty-three unstarred questions (Nos. 419 to 441) were put down on the
order paper. Original notices of unstarred questions Nos. 424, 426 and 440
were received in Hindi. Replies to unstarred questions were laid on the Table.
4. Message from the Council of States
Secretary reported a message from the Council of States that the Council, at
its sitting held on the 10th December, 1953, had agreed without any amend-
ment to the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 1953, passed by the House
on the 30th November, 1953.
5. Leave of Absence
Shri Chandikeshwar Sharan Singh Ju Deo was granted leave of absence
from all the meetings of the House for the current session.
6. Paper laid on the Table
The Deputy Minister of Finance laid on the table a copy of the Second
Annual Report of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan.
7. Statement by Minister of Home Affairs and States
The Minister of Home Affairs and States made a statement regarding the
elections in P.E.P.S.U. and Travancore-Cochin.
8. Government Bills introduced
(1) The Delivery of Books (Public Libraries) Bill, 1953.
(2) The Salt Cess Bill, 1953.
(3) The Press (Objectionable Matter) Amendment Bill, 1953.
(4) The Government of Part C States (Amendment) Bill, 1953.

9. Government Bills passed

(I) The Indian Tariff {Third Amendment) Bill, 1953
Shri D. P. Karmarkar concluded his speech in reply to the debate on the
motion for consideration of the Bill moved by him on the 14th December,
1953.
The motion for consideration of the Bill was adopted and the clause by
clause consideration was taken up.
Clauses 2 and 1, the Enacting Formula and the Long Title were adopted.
The motion that the Bill be passed was moved by Shri D. P. Karmarkar.
The motion was adopted and the Bill was passed.
 THE SECRETARIAT 275
(II) The Forward Contracts (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 195?
(as passed by the Council of States)
The motion for consideration of the Bill was moved by Shri D. P. Karmar-
kar. Shri Tulsidas Kilachand spoke on the motion.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari replied to the debate.
The motion for consideration of the Bill was adopted and the clause by
clause consideration was taken up.
Clauses 2, 3 and 1, the Enacting Formula and the Long Title were adopted.
On the motion moved by Shri D. P. Karmarkar, that the Bill be passed, the
following members took part in the debate:—
(1) Shri Radhelal Vyas
(2) Shri T. T. Krishnamachari
The motion was adopted and the Bill was passed.
10. Government Bill under consideration
The Minimum Wages (Amendment) Bill, 1953
On the motion for consideration of the Bill moved by Shri V. V. Giri, the
following members took part in the debate:—
(1) Shri M. S. Gurupadaswamy
(2) Shri Amarnath Vidyalankar
(3) Shri T. B. Vittal Rao
(4) Shri Kamakhya Prasad Tripathi
(5) Shri B. S. Murthy
(6) Dr. Virendra Kumar Satyawadi
(7) Shri K. A. Damodara Menon
(8) Shri Mangalagiri Nanadas
(9) Shri Debeswar Sarmah
(10) Shri Khub Chand Sodhia
(11) Pandit Suresh Chandra Mishra
(12) Shri Ahmed Mohiuddin
(13) Shri P. C. Bose
(14) Shri Pisupati Venkata Raghaviah (Speech unfinished).
The discussion was not concluded.
(The House adjourned till 1.30 P.M. on Wednesday, the 16th December,
1953.)
M. N. KAUL,
Secretary.

P a r t II is published almost as frequently; it contains general i n f o r m a -

tion likely t o be of interest to members. Here is a typical Council
Bulletin P a r t I I :
COUNCIL OF STATES

C O U N C I L BULLETIN—PART II
February 24, 1954

No. 787
Agreements entered into between the Governments of India and U.S.A.
Members are informed that copies of the following Agreements entered into
between the Government of India and the Government of the U.S.A. under
276 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

the Indo-U.S. Technical Co-operation Programme, 1953-54, received from the

Ministry of Finance, are available in the Library for reference purposes:—
1. Second Supplement to Operational Agreement No. 1—Project for
acquisition and distribution of fertilizers.
2. Provision of Engineering Services for Damodar Valley Corporation.

No. 788
Tea and Coffee Buffets near the Council Lobby, Parliament House
Buffets for serving tea, coffee and light refreshments to the Members are
functioning on either side of the passage leading from the central entrance of
the Council Lobby to the Central Hall.

No. 789
Opinions on the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill, 1953
Copies of "Paper No. II—Opinions on the Hindu Minority and Guardian-
ship Bill, 1953", as introduced in the Council of States, were circulated to
Members on the 22nd February 1954.

No. 790
The Air Corporations (Amendment) Bill, 1954
Copies of the Air Corporations (Amendment) Bill, 1954, as introduced in
the Council of States were circulated to Members on the 23rd February 1954.

No. 791
Bill passed by the House of the People
Copies of the Government of Part C States (Amendment) Bill, 1953, as
passed by the House of the People, are being circulated to Members today
separately.
S. N. MUKERJEE,
Secretary.

In addition, there is the Journal of the House, a sessional record and

practically, in effect, a collection of the Part I Bulletins of the session.
Among the special sessional records kept (mainly by the Table Office of
the Secretariat) are various sets of statistical information, 1 and the com-
pilations of Rulings and Observations from the Chair.
This routine work is no doubt exacting, for it demands always pre-
cision and often speed. 2 The Secretariat in Delhi, however, has gone far
1
E.g. statements showing time involved in various kinds of business; statistical informa-
tion relating to Questions; brief summaries of work relating to Legislation; time involved in
various stages of Bills (see Chapter VII and Bibliography).
2
I may be permitted to pay a personal tribute to the Secretariat Staff, w h o m I found in-
variably co-operative and efficient. They c o m p a r e very favourably with those o f G o v e r n -
ment departments—perhaps because they are a more c o m p a c t organisation, more easily
capable of feeling that they are a team with a worth-while j o b to do. A t the same time, it
m u s t be said that their officers set a g o o d example and, by such m e a n s as lectures to staff
o n the work of Parliament and its Secretariat, help to instil an unusual keenness.
 THE SECRETARIAT 277
beyond the performance of mere servicing. It has established in the first
place a Research and Reference Branch which is primarily intended,
along with the staff of the Parliament Library, to cater for the needs of
members. In the absence of developed party and non-official research
agencies, this is a potentially most valuable undertaking. U p to the
present, however, it is only a tiny minority of M.P.s who place their de-
mands for information. The Research section has, rather, had to take
the initiative itself; it prepares brochures on what it considers members
ought to want to know. In this connection it has been especially busy in
setting out information on parliamentary procedure in other countries,
especially Britain. 1 It prepares notes and bibliographies on important
Bills and it has started a record of important cases decided in the Sup-
reme and High Courts. 2
The senior officers of the Secretariat are, of course, the advisers as well
as the servants and teachers of the members. They are always available
for consultation on a wide variety of problems: why their questions have
not been admitted; how their amendments might best be formulated;
when would be the best opportunity to raise a discussion on a particular
subject; what were the implications of the afternoon's ruling, and so on.
The Secretariat has also done much to form the Indian Parliamentary
Group, which is a further means whereby the education of members and
their self-consciousness as a distinct body can be developed.
The Secretariat in Delhi is also the guide for all State legislature secre-
tariats. The custom has recently started of holding a Secretaries' Con-
ference at the same time as the Speakers' Conference, and here methods
of work are discussed. Apart from the annual Conferences, however,
Delhi is becoming a centre for training and reference. Secretariat staffs
from the States are sent to Delhi for several weeks to learn the system of
organisation, and there is from many States a constant series of re-
ferences on points of procedure which Delhi with its greater resources
and experience is better able to handle. Certain officers from the Delhi
Secretariat have on occasion been sent to State capitals to assist in
arranging the work of local departments on suitable lines. 3
Above all, the Secretary, with his staff, is the adviser to the Speaker.
1
E.g., 'Privileges of the House of C o m m o n s ' , 'Parliamentary Practice in C o m m o n -
wealth Countries', ' T h e U.S. Budget and Accounting Act, 1921', 'Question Time in the
House of C o m m o n s ' , and even compilations of 'Rulings of the Chair in the House of
Commons'.
2
It has even published—because no one else appeared likely to do so—a list of publica-
tions of all the Ministries of the Central Government.
3 Even Nepal has come within the orbit of the Delhi Secretariat; it received an adviser at
the time of the inauguration of its new Assembly in 1954. What may possibly be regarded
as the logical end of growing uniformity—viz., a single All-India Parliamentary Service—
has been mooted but by no means as yet generally accepted. Mr. Kaul, Lok Sabha Secre-
tary, in a public speech at the time of the 1953 Secretaries' Conference, said: ' We have to
see that there is uniformity of procedure, organisation and administration in the various
parts of The Grand Parliament of India'—i.e. in all the legislative bodies of India.
278 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

Although the Secretariat is strictly non-political—and must be so in

order to be able to serve all parties—it would be reasonable to assume
that the Secretary, while primarily a technical adviser and permanent
head of an administrative department, shares and supports the general
views about the position of the Legislature which we have seen are held
by the Speaker. In fact, since the Secretary of the House of the People
has on a few occasions given public expression to his opinions, we are
not obliged to rely on assumptions; there is sufficient evidence to show
that his influence is certainly exercised in the same direction. He has, for
example, commented on the system whereby the President of the Re-
public is elected by the votes of all the members of Central and State
legislatures:
The total strength of members of all our legislatures is 4,058—and this may
be increased when the constituencies have been freshly delimited. This body
is, in essence, what I call the Grand Parliament of India, and in my opinion
it was a mistake not to have actually summoned this body at the time of the
Presidential Election. The recording of votes at various centres and sending
them through the post does not emphasise the real unity of India through
its various legislatures. The old symbols are disappearing, and the im-
portance of new symbols of unity should be appreciated. The meeting of all
members in one place would have had a great psychological effect.1

Parliament, however, is no mere symbol. It is there that ' power in the

last analysis resides', and the task is to consolidate and develop the
power of Parliament. ' I have repeatedly asked myself the question:
Where does the line of future development lie, and in what way can Par-
liament become effective in the true sense of the term?' His answer
would no doubt include the jealous maintenance of the powers of the
Speaker and the independence of his Secretariat. But above all,
I have come to the conclusion that the most effective line of development in
the sphere of parliamentary activity is the formation of parliamentary com-
mittees. Parliament discusses policy, but unless there are committees which
can discuss details and where those who run the administration have to give
evidence, where matters can be thoroughly examined, Parliament's control
tends to become feeble. 2

Committees have the great advantage that they do not function in a

party-political atmosphere; rather, attention is concentrated on the con-
trol of the executive. If only the members of Parliament are organised
' to apply this time fully, what a potent force and influence our Parlia-
ment will become! ' 3 On the occasion of the celebration of the silver jubi-
lee of the independence of the Parliament Secretariat from Government
1
Speech at the Madras Press Club, reported in the press on 21 Oct. 1953.
2
Kaul, loc cit.
3 Ibid.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 279
control, the Secretary allowed himself to express a vision of the f u t u r e :
I feel confident that one day, when our country becomes richer and greater,
there will rise near Parliament House stately buildings in which will be
housed the Parliamentary Committees, not one or two but twenty. Each
will have its separate set of rooms, each will be assisted by its own secretarial
staff. Not only secretarial staff but, as in the United States, expert advisers
and research workers. Just imagine the vast vista that opens out: an expan-
sion of the parliamentary sphere of investigation and control over the
Government. 1
When institutions are in a state of rapid development, visions may
quickly become realities. A review of the committees of Parliament will
indicate how far this has already happened.

3. Financial Committees
If it is true that a legislature may be k n o w n by the committees it keeps,
it is reasonable to expect that financial committees in particular should
have a special importance. The H o u s e of the People is not as large as the
House of C o m m o n s (and, of course, the State Assemblies are much
smaller), but it is still too big and too inexpert a body to be able, as a
whole House, to exert any effective financial control over the Govern-
ment. That function is performed by the Public Accounts Committee and
the Estimates Committee. A n examination of their work to date will
show not only how financial control is exercised but also how far legis-
lature-consciousness or even the mentality of separation of powers has
developed.
The Public Accounts Committee is, in name at least, an institution of
some age. Although it t o o k the British Parliament a very long time to
create this particular device, it was transplanted quickly into the soil of
India's quasi-parliamentary institutions. Public Accounts Committees
were set u p b o t h at the Centre and in the Provinces under the M o n t a g u -
Chelmsford reforms, the first Committees being constituted in 1923.
They were generally small bodies of a b o u t 8 - 1 0 members a n d they met
invariably under the chairmanship of the Finance M e m b e r of the Execu-
tive Council. It was also always the rule that the Committees were serviced
by a secretariat drawn f r o m the Finance Departments. Although these
features indicate at once that the Indian Public Accounts Committee
was only in a very qualified sense a committee of the legislature, a n
attempt was m a d e to model it on British lines. The ' M e m o r a n d u m on
the work of Public Accounts Committees in I n d i a ' , prepared by the
Auditor-General in India during this period 2 and intended for the
purpose of explaining ' t o members of Public Accounts Committees
1
Speech to the Secretarial Staff at the Central Hall of Parliament House (Statesman,
11 Jan. 1954).
2 New Delhi, 1927. The Auditor-General was Sir Frcderic Gauntlctt.
280 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

throughout India the nature of the duties entrusted to them', devoted

much of its space to explaining how the Westminster Committee worked.
Indian Committees were invited to emulate the standard set by the British
Committee, which had helped to secure that the gap between estimated and
actual expenditure was reduced to as little as 1^%. At the same time the
author expressed the duty of the Committee as being 'to ascertain that
the money granted by the Legislature has been spent by the Executive
"within the scope of the demand"'. He added that this involved, for in-
stance, checking whether anything that could be described as ' a new
service not contemplated in the demand for grants' had been undertaken
by government; it involved also ensuring that moneys had been spent
with 'due regularity'—'that is, in accordance with those rules of sanc-
tion and appropriation which are laid down by superior authorities to
be followed by subordinate authorities'.' It is fairly evident from these
phrases that the British model was in fact modified for India. The 'terms
of reference' were more confined within a purely technical scope—as in-
deed one would have expected from a committee controlled by the
Finance Minister and staffed by his officers. Even the Auditor-General,
on whose reports the Committee has so much to rely, was, as the Simon
Report said, 'not in any sense a servant of the legislature' but 'an officer
appointed directly by the Secretary of State in Council and holding office
during His Majesty's pleasure'. 1 In the circumstances of the time, this
provision more easily implied his association with the executive than his
independence. Nevertheless, while it cannot be said that the Public Ac-
counts Committee worked in the same atmosphere and with the same
scope as its British counterpart, this does not mean that it performed no
useful function. It did act as some sort of check on financial propriety
and it certainly gave very valuable experience to its members. 2
No change in the nature of the Committee took place on the transfer
of power in 1947. The parts of the Indian Legislative Rules relating to
the Committee remained unchanged under the Constituent Assembly.
With the introduction of the new Constitution in 1950, however, a new
period began. Under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of
the Provisional Parliament (that is, the former Rules modified and ad-
apted by the Speaker), the Chairman was no longer the Finance Minister
but a member of the Committee appointed as such by the Speaker. At
the same time, the work of servicing the Committee was transferred from
1
Simon Report, I, 376.
2
The Simon Report seems to have overstressed the similarity of the Indian Committee to
that of Westminster and underestimated the differences. For instance, the crucial feature
of the Chairmanship of the Finance Minister is simply described as having 'sometimes em-
barrassing results'. The Report also accepts the Government of India's verdict that the
Committee was 'industrious and efficient' and its scrutiny of expenditure 'jealous, detailed
and enthusiastic' (I, 373-74). N o doubt the Committee did all it could but its context was
against it, and it is too much to claim that it was effective except within narrow limits. For
a study of the British Committee, see B. Chubb, Control of Public Expenditure (1952).
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 281

the Ministry of Finance to the Parliament Secretariat. The change of

control was emphasised by the inaugural meeting. The Committee for
the year 1950-51 was elected on 10 April 1950; on the same afternoon a
meeting was called, which the Finance Minister and Comptroller and
Auditor-General attended by invitation and which the Speaker addres-
sed. And when the Chairman a year later presented the first report of the
Committee to Parliament, he confirmed that the change had been real:
the Committee, now unambiguously a Committee of Parliament, was
able ' t o function in a freer atmosphere and to offer its criticism in an
unrestricted manner'. 1
The work of the Public Accounts Committee can be understood only
in connection with that of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The
Constitution devotes one chapter 2 to this office. It not only lays down the
provisions which ensure, as f o r j u d g e s of the Supreme Court, security of
tenure and independence; it also provides that the duties until prescribed
by Parliament shall be those already exercised under the 1935 Act. In
fact, there are certain peculiar features of the duties of the Indian Comp-
troller and Auditor-General which deserve special notice. In the first
place, although his title was changed by the Constitution from mere
Auditor-General, the alteration was one of name only; the Indian
Auditor-General is not in reality a Comptroller. That is, he is not in a
position effectively to control the issue of public money, The public re-
venues of India are lodged not in one central account but in some 300
local treasuries. Moreover, certain departments are authorised to draw
money without limit. Therefore, 'the responsibility for keeping within
the amount sanctioned in the budget is entirely that of the executive'. 3
As the Comptroller himself complained, 'it is impossible in the existing
circumstances to keep track of the up-to-date progress of expenditure'. 4
However, the importance of this defect should not be exaggerated. Con-
trol designed to prevent unauthorised issues in excess of grants is less
valuable than audit proper—the check after the event to ensure that such
issues have not taken place. An effective audit should suffice to impose
an adequate sense of responsibility on the spending authorities. The
second peculiarity of the Indian Auditor-General is that he is respon-
sible not only for audit but also for keeping the accounts. Economy was
the reason for the combination of these two distinct functions which
should properly be separated, and economy is the reason given for the
continuance of the system. This question has been the subject of a
special report of the Public Accounts Committee, 5 following frequent
1 Speech of Mr. B. Das, P.P. Deb., 29 Mar. 1951.
2 Chapter V of Part V, Articles 148-151.
3 Wattal, Parliamentary Financial Control in India (Simla, 1953), p. 167.
4
Quoted in Wattal, op. cit., p. 168.
5
Public Accounts Committee, 1952-53, Third Report ('Exchequer Control over Public
Expenditure'), Dec. 1952. This Report was based on that of a sub-committee which in-
vestigated the subject.
282 OFFICERS A N D COMMITTEES

protests by the Auditor-General himself. The Committee strongly en-

dorsed the Auditor-General's plea for a separation of accounting and
auditing functions and recommended accordingly that 'separate Ac-
counts Offices for the various Ministries and the major spending depart-
ments . . . should be set up as soon as possible'.1 Finally, it must be
noticed that the office of Comptroller and Auditor-General is one with
jurisdiction over States as well as Union. The audit of the accounts of
both Union and States is made, by the Constitution's Seventh Schedule,
one of the Union list of subjects. This centralised audit power is gener-
ally accepted as desirable. On the other hand, the keeping of State
accounts which is attached to it is a function which, it is felt, would be
more appropriately performed separately by the States. These special
features apart, the work of the Comptroller and Auditor-General is that
of auditing government accounts in order to assure Parliament that the
moneys it has voted have been spent as intended. The Constitution
(Article 151) provides that his report on Union accounts 'shall be sub-
mitted to the President who shall cause them to be laid on the table of
each House of Parliament', and that his report on State accounts should
similarly go to the Governor or Rajpramukh for laying before the State
legislature. These audit reports constitute the basis on which Public
Accounts Committees can function. 2
The detailed duties of the Public Accounts Committee are set out in
the Rules of Procedure of the House of the People.3 It is to examine
' accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by the House for
the expenditure of the Government of India, the annual Finance Ac-
counts of the Central Government and any other accounts laid before
the House as the Committee may think fit'.4It has to satisfy itself: '(a)
that the moneys shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were
legally available for and applicable to the service or purpose to which
they have been applied or charged; (b) that the expenditure conforms to
the authority which governs it; and (c) that every re-appropriation has
been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under
rules framed by competent authority'. Its functions have also been ex-
tended to include the examination of the accounts of ' State Corpora-
tions, Trading and Manufacturing Schemes and projects', as well as of
1
The Comptroller and Auditor-General subsequently announced (e.g. Statesman, 18
June 1955) that separation had been effected in three central departments and was being
done also in West Bengal.
2
In India no binding dates have been fixed for the submission of the audit reports and
delays have on occasion been considerable.
3 Rules of Procedure (Oct. 1952 edition), Rules 196-197. Similar rules govern the work-
ing of Public Accounts Committees in the States.
4 Finance Accounts set out receipts, disbursements and cash balances; Appropriation
Accounts give a comparision of the grants made by Parliament for particular purposes
with the actual expenditure on those purposes. Apart from the Appropriation Accounts
(Civil), there are separate Appropriation Accounts and Audit Reports for Defence, Posts
and Telegraphs and Railways.
 FINANCIAI. COMMITTEES 283
'autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of which may have
been conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor-General either under
the directions of the President or by a statute of Parliament'.
This statement of duties of the Committee should not give the impres-
sion that the scope of the Committee's work is unambiguous and not
open to dispute. There are in fact two problems of scope, neither of which
is capable of final solution but for both of which working understandings
at least are desirable. First is the problem of the area of govern-
mental activity to be covered by audit. In the case of public corpora-
tions, the position has so far been generally satisfactory from an audit
viewpoint, but parliamentary vigilance will perhaps always be required
to ensure that the statutes establishing corporations continue to include
proper safeguards. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, for instance,
provides that the Central Government appoints the auditor in consulta-
tion with the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and the rules framed
under the Act in fact stipulate that the auditor shall be an officer ap-
pointed by the Auditor-General. But it has been thought by some that it
would be safer not to leave it to the rules but to ensure that the parent
statute itself guarantees audit by the Auditor-General and the presenta-
tion of his reports to Parliament, 1 Even more delicate and difficult is
the case of private companies formed by the Government of India for
the management of Government industrial undertakings. This matter
was already briefly noted by the Committee in its first report following
its new constitutional status as a Parliamentary Committee: 'We attach
considerable importance to the necessity of safeguarding against any
whittling away of Parliamentary control by the participation of Govern-
ment in private companies.' 2 The Committee returned to the question
more thoroughly in their important Third Report (1952-53) already re-
ferred to above. They had before them an exceptionally strong statement
from the Comptroller and Auditor-General in which he went so far as to
describe the formation of private companies financed from the Consoli-
dated Fund a s ' a fraud on the Companies Act and also on the Constitu-
tion'. He pointed out that it was scarcely proper either to pretend that
the President or Secretary of a Department were ' persons' as intended
by the Companies Act or to take money from the Consolidated Fund
for such concerns. He feared that so far as audit was concerned his own

1
This was the view of the Committee itself. ' A s regards the audit of other Corporations
financed either entirely or partly by the Central Government, we share the views held by
the Comptroller and Auditor-General that his functions and responsibilities should be de-
fined in explicit terms in the Statute itself providing for the setting up of a Corporation. We
would also recommend that before statutory Corporations involving financial commit-
ments by Government are created, the Comptroller and Auditor-General should be
consulted in regard to the provisions for accounting and audit control.' (Public Account
Committee, 1950-51, Report on the Accounts of 1947-48 (Post-Partition) (Mar. 1951), p. 5.)
See also Wattal, op. cit., p. 163.
2 Report on the Account of 1947-48 (Post-Partition), p. 5.
284 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

control might be ousted, since he would certainly have no automatic

right to audit the accounts of such companies ; and even if he were in-
vited to do so, the invitation would come from the company instead
of from Parliament and, more important, his report would also be
submitted to the company, thus by-passing Parliament and the Public
Accounts Committee. The Committee endorsed this view in its Report. 1
The second problem of scope concerns not the area of audit and in-
quiry but rather its character and degree. The 'terms of reference' as
given in the Rules quoted above appear fairly narrow and technical. In
practice, however, Public Accounts Committees tend to range beyond
the technical. This is to some extent true of the British Committee ; it is
even more true of those in India. The interests of the members, the
knowledge that Parliament as a whole cannot effect any real probing of
the administrative machine, the politician's distrust of the bureaucrat,
even a hankering after the sensational disclosure of scandals—all these
factors prompt a desire to pass from technical irregularities into the
realm of'waste', 'extravagance', 'lack of adequate administrative con-
trols' and even 'unsuitable organisation'. The boundary lines between
the technical and the political are in the nature of the case ill-defined. So
long as the Public Accounts Committee was controlled by a Finance
Minister and serviced by his staff, the parliamentarians could be kept
safely—even too safely—away from the business of the executive
machinery. Once a non-official chairman is chosen and the staffing pro-
vided from the Parliament Secretariat, the barriers protecting the ad-
ministration are almost down ; at least the battlefield is extended and the
executive has to pursue ingenious manœuvres rather than rely on any
'Maginot Line'.
The Public Accounts Committee consists of 15 members elected annu-
ally by the House of the People by proportional representation with
single transferable vote, and the Chairman is appointed by the Speaker
from among the members. In a committee of this kind, much depends on
the calibre of the membership and in particular of the Chairman. Mem-
bers must be able and keen and there must be at least a nucleus of men
with some experience of the work. In Mr. B. Das, Parliament has found
a man with a long parliamentary life (he entered the Central Assembly
in 1923 and has been a member since), considerable experience of Public
Accounts Committee work and a keen interest in public finance. His
main assistant has been Mr. T. N. Singh, an enthusiastic and able former
journalist and teacher of economics. Other members include a few with
considerable business experience and training in economics. It is also
clear that an attempt has been made to maintain continuity of

1 Public Accounts Committee, 1952-53, Third Report (Exchequer Control over Public
Expenditure) (Dec. 1952), pp. 3-4. The Auditor-General's statement is published as
Appendix I to that Report.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 285
membership as a way of ensuring a pool of experience. If the membership
of the Committee since the new Constitution is examined, it can be seen
that of the 15 members elected in 1950-51, no fewer than 11 remained for
the following year. Even after the elections some continuity was secured:
the 1952-53 Committee included 7 of the 1951-52 Committee, and 6 of
these had been members of the 1950-51 Committee. This is a not unim-
portant achievement when it is remembered that there is some keenness
on the part of members to get on to committees and when the Congress
party is anxious to train as many people as possible in some aspect or
other of committee work. The calibre of the members may be indicated
by noting that two of the members of the 1952-53 Committee resigned to
take up ministerial office. The party complexion of the Committee is a
matter of little importance, but it may be recorded that the composition
of the 1952-53 Committee was Congress, 10; Independents, 3; Socialist,
1; Communist, 1. The whole troublesome issue of permitting members
of the Council of States to be chosen for the Public Accounts Committee
has already been discussed in Chapter V, Section 5.
The Committee's work is based on the audit reports of the Comptrol-
ler and Auditor-General and until these reports are before it, the Com-
mittee cannot begin to function. 1 When they are ready, a preliminary
discussion takes place between the Chairman and the Auditor-General
and copies of the reports are circulated to all Committee members. A
meeting of the Committee is then called—usually in July—in order to
settle the programme of work for the year. This may be preceded by an
inaugural meeting at which an address of a general nature is given. The
Speaker, for instance, delivered an address to the 1950-51 and 1951-52
Committees, the Auditor-General to the 1952-53 Committee. The pre-
paratory business done, the Secretariat notifies the ministries concerned
of the Committee's programme so that they may 'keep themselves in
readiness'. 2 Members peruse the Accounts and Reports and may frame
questions or requests for information, which are sent to the Secretariat.
Material furnished by the ministries in response to Secretariat requests is
circularised to the members and to the Auditor-General. The stage is
thus prepared for the examination by the Committee of witnesses from
the ministries and departments. 3

1
Delay in the preparation of the audit reports led the Committee to suggest in 1952 that
preliminary reports drawing attention to any grave irregularities might be given to the
Committee in advance of the full report.
2
See 'Rules of Procedure of the Public Accounts Committee' given in Financial Com-
mittees, 1952-53, prepared by the Parliament Secretariat. These Rules, prepared in 1952,
embody mainly long-standing practice. The present paragraph is largely based on these
Rules.
3
It should be mentioned that of course each ministry has had an opportunity at an
earlier stage of answering as to matters of fact and even offering explanations; relevant
portions of the audit report are sent to ministries in draft for their comments before the
report is finally prepared.
286 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

The meetings of the Committee are private. The examination of wit-

nesses is generally begun by the Chairman, other members being free to
put their own questions as the examination develops. The Comptroller
and Auditor-General is invariably present. The line of examination has
probably been discussed with him and he acts as an adviser to the Com-
mittee. His position is sometimes one of translator—explaining the
officials to the politicians and vice-versa. On occasion, he has felt it
necessary to protect official witnesses from over-aggressiveness on the part
of Committee members; at other times, he has joined in and reinforced
a criticism of a ministry made by members. A perusal of the proceedings
of the Committee reveals other points of interest. It is clear, for example,
that much time during the examination of witnesses is spent in members
obtaining information on the organisation of departments; they feel that
the inner ways of the administration have been for so long a closed book
that this is an opportunity not to be missed. Members are generally un-
inhibited and prepared to make comments on quite major questions of
organisation. The proceedings have been—in these first years of inde-
pendence—at times quite acrimonious, but already there is an improve-
ment as each 'side' becomes accustomed to the other, less distrustful and
more co-operative. It is also noticeable that the proceedings become
more economical in terms of time and more effective, as members ac-
quire experience and confidence; they can get to the point more quickly
and they are not so easily side-tracked by hares of prejudice and partisan-
ship. Yet although the Committee is changing, moving away from cer-
tain attitudes, it is by no means a complete change; the Public Accounts
Committee certainly remains very conscious of itself as Parliament's
watch-dog and guardian of the people against official negligence or cor-
ruption.
Some extracts from the proceedings will serve to illustrate most of
these points. The following, for example, taken from the examination of
the accounts of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, illustrates the Com-
mittee as an information room and the Auditor-General in the role of
restrainer over the members:
SHRI T. N . SINGH {Member): The Prime Minister is a public man. He has
got so many other public activities. In addition, he is the President of the
Congress. I do not think your Secretariat comes into the picture at all, so
far as his activities as the Congress President are concerned ?
SHRI B . N. K A U L (principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister): No.
SHRI M. L . DWIVEDI (Member): The Prime Minister enjoys a position
better than that of other Ministers, and so he has a general control over all
the Ministries. Is it not so ?
SHRI B. N . K A U L : I would not put it like that. He is the Prime Minister...

SHRI M. L . D W I V E D I : Has he got any supervisory functions over other

Ministries or not?
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 287
SHRI B . N . K A U L : The Minister-IN-charge of each Ministry is responsible
for the affairs of that Ministry. Under the Cabinet system of Government,
the Minister is the highest person in charge of a Ministry. He is directly re-
sponsible to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's Secretariat cannot
supervise the work of Ministries, each of which is in charge of a Minister.
SHRI V. P. NAYAR {Member): Cannot the Prime Minister sit in judgment
over the other Ministers?
SHRI B . N . K A U L : He can. Ultimately the Prime Minister is responsible.
SHRI V . P . NAYAR : Has he not got control over the various Ministries ?
SHRI B . N . K A U L : He exercises it through his Ministers. The Prime
Minister's Secretariat has no control over the other Ministries.
CHAIRMAN: This Secretariat is not similar to the other Secretariats.
SHRI B . N. K A U L : SO far as the work entrusted to any particular Ministry
is concerned, the Minister in charge has got complete control over that
Ministry. The Minister in charge is the final supervisory authority of that
Ministry. Nobody can interfere with that.
SHRI DATAR (Member)-. Can you as the head of the Prime Minister's
Secretariat call for Reports from the various Ministries ?
SHRI B. N . K A U L : I do not call for any Reports from anybody.
SHRI D A T A R : Does the Prime Minister receive Reports from anybody?
SHRI NARAHARI R A O (Controller and Auditor-General): May I say again
—as a senior official, formerly a Secretary to Government, and not as the
Auditor-General—a few things in this connection? The internal organisa-
tion and the way in which business is regulated between the Ministries con-
cerned and so on ar eordinarily regarded as a secret which is not to be
discussed at all. They are not allowed to be seen by anybody who is not con-
cerned with the Government itself. And here we are trying to go into details,
if I may say so with all respect, which really ought not to be discussed—
how the internal work is done as between the Ministers, to what extent
orders are issued by each Minister, what Reports the Prime Minister gets—
these are not matters for the Public Accounts Committee.
SHRI M . L . D W I V E D I : I raised the point because I had come to know that
in a certain Secretariat, clerks and officers go to sleep on chairs and there is
nobody to supervise them.
SHRI B. N . K A U L : The Superintendant of the Branch concerned is
supposed to supervise the clerks. 1
A n o t h e r extract will s h o w h o w f r o m financial m a t t e r s t o questions of
general o r g a n i s a t i o n generally seems a small step. I n this case, t h e
A u d i t o r - G e n e r a l in s o m e m e a s u r e s u p p o r t e d t h e m e m b e r s ' p r o b i n g :
SHRI T. N . SINGH (Member): I will raise the general question of the Tele-
phone Factory itself. That relates to the general working of the factory. You
1
Public Accounts Committee, 1952-53, Seventh Report on the Appropriation Accounts
(Civil) 1949-50, etc., Vol. 11—Evidence, pp. 20-21.
288 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

have got before you, I think, the balance sheet of the company, etc. For the
period 1949-50 you have shown a net profit on the total sales of Rs.19-21
lakhs, whereas the net profit on the total sales of Rs.84-5 lakhs for the period
1st February 1950 to 31st March 1951 was only Rs. 17,000. That means a
terrible reduction in the profits. What are the reasons for it ? Then the ques-
tion is also about the valuation of the assets taken over by the company
after the liquidation and the liquidation of the liabilities of the company to
the Government. What interest is being paid on the liability which the com-
pany owes to Government ? Also whether the liability has been liquidated
so far? Then we find that the cash in hand and at the bank was the very
heavy amount of Rs.73-87 lakhs in addition to the deposit of Rs.30 lakhs
which means over a crore. Is such a large amount of working capital justi-
fied ? Is it necessary at all, when the total turnover for a period of 14 months
does not exceed about Rs.84 or 85 lakhs?
SHRI NARAHARI RAO (Auditor-General): We have started a new method
of Government enterprise by nationalising Government industries. Sindri
has been converted into a private limited company but there is no private
capital. Money has been found from the Consolidated Funds and yet it is
termed as a private company. I am doubtful about the validity of it. Some
of the reasons are good. In running a business concern of that magnitude we
cannot run it as an ordinary Government Department or Office. It has to be
run as a business concern. Somebody must have responsibility and autho-
rity in the matter. But it is unnecessary to make it a private limited company
without having all other characteristics of a private company. Parliament
will itself lose control in respect of a concern which has been declared a
private limited company because it falls within the purview of the company
law. The proper course is to place the whole thing on a proper basis by an
Act for regulating such concerns. There is general agreement on the im-
portance for not whittling away Parliamentary control.
CHAIRMAN: I think he should reply question by question. Otherwise we
will get lost.
SHRI T. N. SINGH: All right, Sir. What were the reasons for the non-sur-
render of the amount ?
SHRI R . NARAYANASWAMI (Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance): The
matter had to go to the Standing Finance Committee and I think it went
very late and by the time details could be obtained it was too late for sur-
render.
SHRI T . N . SINGH: YOU could not get time even up to the 20th March to
surrender ?
SHRI A . V . PAI (Secretary, Ministry of Communications): The decision
was taken in January.
SHRI NARAHARI R A O : Surely when the change was made sometime in
February—1st February—the surrender should have been made by the end
of March. Somebody failed to do it. Let us leave it at that.
CHAIRMAN: That raises the general question I raised: whether Ministries
have got competent machinery to administer commercial concerns. The
 FINANCIAL COMMUTEES 289
Posts and Telegraphs are under you : it is a complete separate organisation.
Here about telephones, we have got a Production Ministry. We want to
know what is the proper method—whether the Production Ministry can
take up all manufacture. We do not know which Ministry controls a par-
ticular industry now—changes have been so quick. We want you to assist us
to come to a definite conclusion—whether every Ministry will deal with in-
dustrial concerns or they will be controlled by one Ministry. It is a general
question that we are going to investigate in this Session of the Public Ac-
counts Committee. But you assist us so far as the Telephone Factory is con-
cerned. Will it be under an individual Ministry?
SHRI A . V . PAI: It is under the Ministry of Communications.
CHAIRMAN: Will the Communications Ministry also specialise in indus-
trial manufacture and development, etc. ?
SHRI A . V . P A I : N O decision has been taken so far. It has not been trans-
ferred to Production.
CHAIRMAN: My point is whether an individual Ministry will deal with a
few schemes, e.g., the Health Ministry dealing with drugs like Penicillin,
etc., and the Communications Ministry dealing with the Telephone Factory
or whether all these will come under the control of the Ministry of Produc-
tion.
S H R I N A R A H A R I R A O : May I suggest that that question could be more
appropriate for the Production Ministry?
CHAIRMAN: But if my friends of the Communications Ministry can help
us by giving their opinion, then that Ministry can have the courage to say
that all industries should be concentrated under it.
S H R I A . V . P A I : We will find out what is the best course. In this particular
case, Telephones, it is entirely under the Posts and Telegraphs Department.
The experts are all of the Posts and Telegraphs Department. F o r co-ordina-
tion it is much better that it remains under the Communications Ministry—
both the Factory and the Posts and Telegraphs.
S H R I S . N . D A S (Member) : In view of the fact that the Production Ministry
is now set up, has the question of transferring this Department, i.e. the tele-
phones, been considered by Government ?
S H R I A . V . P A I : It has been considered to some extent, because the Pro-
duction Ministry asked us whether we would have any objection to this
being taken over by them. We gave them reasons why in the interest of co-
ordination we thought it better that it remained where it was.
SHRI S. N . D A S : Has it been considered at higher level?
SHRI A . V . PAI : It has not gone to the Cabinet.
SHRI U . C. PATNAIK {Member): How is it more convenient to have it
under the Communications Ministry ?
S H R I A . V . P A I : The main reason is—easier co-ordination. If it is under a
different Ministry, the co-ordination has to be at a higher level ; now the co-
ordination is within the Ministry, which is easier.
19—p.I.
m OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

SHRI NARAHARI R A O : I think there is a good deal to be said in favour of

leaving the Telephone Factory under the Communications Ministry be-
cause—this is my provisional view only—they know what they require.
They are the technical experts and they have to look after the telephones,
keep abreast of modern conditions and so they would be in a better position
to look after the Factory; they know precisely what they want. If it is put
under somebody else's control, I think the whole thing may go wrong. But
the Production Ministry might have a say in the matter of general condi-
tions of labour or other things like housing and so on which should be con-
formed to in all Government-sponsored industries. We do not want to have
different policies in regard to non-technical matters not solely concerning
your Ministry, but which are of common concern. That, I think, is probably
what you have in mind. That would be satisfactory.

PANDIT MUNISHWAR DATT UPADHYAY (Member): These remarks also

apply to the production of every article.
SHRI NARAHARI RAO : Quite so. For instance, if Railways want locomo-
tives to be manufactured, should the manufacture go to the Production
Ministry? It would lead to chaos. 1
The following extract on the subject of the Bhakra-Nangal D a m illus-
trates one of the fairly rare cases where the questioning (by the Com-
munist member) took on a clearly political character:
SHRI V . P . NAYAR (Member): I would like to know whether this idea of
consultation with the American engineers, and import of American experts
originated from the Department, or at the Ministerial level. Was it a Cabi-
net decision or was it something that originated in your Ministry?
SHRI S. D . KHUNGAR (Chief Engineer and Secretary to the Government
of Punjab, P.W.D., Irrigation Branch): The idea was that the Punjab
Government wanted specialists, and we asked for Americans of course with
guidance of the Centre. The idea first originated with the Punjab Govern-
ment, who approached the Control Board in the matter; and the negotia-
tions were done with the concurrence of the Centre.
SHRI V . P . NAYAR: My question has not been answered. I shall put the
question more specifically. Did you ask for American Engineers ?
SHRI S. D . KHUNGAR: Yes, we asked for them.
CHAIRMAN: The Punjab Government cannot take foreign experts without
the approval of the Central Government. So, everything was done with the
consent and sanction of the Secretary to the Ministry of Irrigation and
Power. In that case, the question will go over to Shri Khosla.
SHRI A . N . KHOSLA (Additional Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and
1
Public Accounts Committee, 1952-53, Seventh Report on the Appropriation Accounts
(Civil) 1949-50, etc., Vol. II—Evidence, pp. 26-28. A moment earlier, the Auditor-General
had ventured to comment to the witness: ' T h e point which has given rise to all this is that
you are not ready with an explanation, which shows that you did not examine the Audit
Report in time. . . . I hope it will not happen again' (ibid., p. 25).
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 291
Power): The memorandum came from the Punjab Government. We ex-
amined it and we put it on to the Central Cabinet, saying that we will re-
quire about 75 Americans for the purpose.
SHRI V. P. NAYAR : Probably you are aware that the maximum develop-
ment of hydro-power and irrigation has been in Russia for the last two de-
cades at any rate. For instance, the Volga D a m project and . . .
SHRI A. N . K H O S L A : The Dneiper Dam is a relatively small one, compared
with the American installations.
SHRI V. P. NAYAR : I am not referring to the Tennessee Valley System . . .
SHRI A . N . KHOSLA : I am referring to the other projects which are much
bigger.
SHRI V. P. NAYAR : You will find in the statistics of development of hydro-
power for the last twenty years in the world, and also of the enhancement of
irrigation facilities, that the maximum acreage has been irrigated under the
new canal systems in the Soviet Union and not in America. Likewise, the
maximum development of hydro-power may have been only 1 million kilo-
watts a few years ago, but during the ten years preceding this date, the
maximum development has been in Russia and under more or less Asian
conditions too. Did you for ever think that a study of the Soviet system was
necessary before you thought of importing Americans ?
CHAIRMAN : I think the technical data are not available in India without
consulting engineers and experts for study.
SHRI V . P . N A Y A R : It has been made clear that the idea of importing
Americans originated in the Department and not at the Ministerial level.
The Department specifically asked for American consultants. I would like
to ask: Have you made a study of the comparative development of hydro-
power in the world, before starting the work in India?
SHRI A . N . K H O S L A : Generally speaking yes, excepting the Soviet Union
of which we have very little information.
SHRI V . P. NAYAR: Did you ever try to get that information?
SHRI A . N . K H O S L A : I do not know where that information is available.
SHRI V. P. N A Y A R : It was categorically stated that an attempt was made
to study the whole procedure in all the countries, in Europe and America. I
should say that they have forgotten the maximum development of hydro-
power that has taken place in the world.
CHAIRMAN: The difficulty is because of our knowing very little about
Russia. As a student of political science, I can say that American aid was
taken by the Russians, besides German experts also. Technical details about
Russian development are not available with our engineers and technicians.
SHRI V. P. N A Y A R : He says that he does not know anything and at the
same time he does not give us the facts. When I asked him about the Volga
Dam he said that that is a very small project. He himself has admitted that
he knows very little about it. That being so, how can he say that it is a very
small one? Do you know the extent of the Tsimilin-Skaya sea?
292 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

SHRI A . N . KHOSLA: I d o n o t .
SHRI V . P . NAYAR : Do you know that it is the biggest artificial sea in the
world?
SHRI A . N . KHOSLA: I do not know that.
SHRI V . P . NAYAR: Then you please don't say that it is a small system that
obtains in Russia. When the question was put as to why other nationals
are not imported, the reply was given that right from the beginning, they are
following the American system. That is why they are denied the opportunity
now to get better technicians at cheaper rates. They cannot utilise English-
men or Frenchmen or others, because they are using the American system.
We were thinking that this importation of American experts was done at the
Ministerial level. But we find that the Ministry has been guided by the
experts in the matter. The Committee must note that.
CHAIRMAN: The Committee notes the fact that our technical experts are
not apprised fully with what has taken place in Russia.1
Finally, one extract which shows the sensitiveness of the Committee
in regard to its rights; it shows the Auditor-General as defender of the
officials in this case:

CHAIRMAN : Now, your Ministry has advised our Secretariat that certain
reports about Hirakud cannot be furnished to this Committee because they
have not been supplied to you. How is that ? These reports ought to have
reached you.
SHRI A. N. KHOSLA: The report is not yet final.
CHAIRMAN : That does not matter. If you have received a part of the re-
port, it ought to be submitted to this Committee. This is a Committee of
Parliament to look into the progress, and why should any Secretary with-
hold any report from us ?
SHRI A. N. KHOSLA: The Secretary has to obtain the advice of the
Minister. Because it is an interim report submitted to the Government of
India in the Irrigation and Power and Finance Ministries, and has not re-
ceived final consideration of Government it has not been made available.
But it can be supplied in its present form, if desired.
CHAIRMAN : Who withheld it, or decided that it should not be furnished to
us?
SHRI A . N . KHOSLA: It is between the two Ministers. But it can be sup-
plied, if required.
CHAIRMAN: We are not concerned with the Ministers. Your letter is
signed by an Under-Secretary and the reason given is that the final report
has not been received and so your Ministry is unable to supply it at present
to Parliament. Whether the report is final or interim matters little. The point
is, do you recognise this Committee as a Committee of Parliament ?
SHRI A. N. KHOSLA: We certainly do, Sir.
1
Public Accounts Committee, 1952-53, Seventh Report on the Appropriation Accounts
{Civii) 1949-50, etc., Vol. II—Evidence, pp. 120-21.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 293
CHAIRMAN : N o Minister of Government can interfere with the discharge
of its duties by this Committee. You stated just now that the Finance
Minister and the Irrigation Minister decided not to submit this report to the
Public Accounts Committee.
S H R I A. N . KHOSLA : It is not a decision that way. If a request comes from
the Public Accounts Committee that we have to supply that report, we will
certainly do it.
C H A I R M A N : N O Financial Adviser—not even the Finance Minister—has
ever till now said that a certain document should be withheld from a Com-
mittee of Parliament. Secretaries to Government have got this privilege:
they can say that a certain document is confidential. But when an Under-
Secretary to Government writes to us categorically in the strain of the letter
I read out just now, I feel rather insulted.
S H R I A . N . K H O S L A : What we meant to convey was that the report was
not final and therefore . . .
CHAIRMAN: Whether it is interim or final report, it has to be made avail-
able to a Committee of Parliament which looks into the working of the
Government of India Ministries. When I receive such a reply as this my
mind goes back to twenty-five years back when the Secretaries to the
Government of India used to refuse information sought by us.

S H R I N A R A H A R I R A O : Though I do not think it is entirely within my pro-

vince—I have been only assisting you generally—it seems to me that when
a report is received by Government and they have not yet considered it, or
the report is only an interim one, it is desirable to wait for their final action
and to ask the Government to let the Committee have the report as well as
the action taken by them. Otherwise, this Committee might make itself into
an executive body and usurp the functions of the Government itself. From
that point of view I do not see anything improper in what the Finance and
the Planning Ministers have decided. The only request that we might make
is that they should not delay this matter further and that we must have very
urgently a copy of the final report and action taken on it, or proposed to be
taken by Government. 1

W h e n the examination of witnesses is completed, the C o m m i t t e e m a y

discuss the lines of its report. Here, as in the initial stages of preparing
questions f o r witnesses, the skill a n d ability of the Secretariat, together
with the advice of the Auditor-General, are central t o the work. T h e re-
ports of the C o m m i t t e e are, in f o r m , r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o Parliament. In
practice, Parliament as a whole does not find time to devote a set period
to a d e b a t e on the reports. News of the c o n t e n t s — o r at least of the m o r e
sensational portions—does, however, reach t h e m e m b e r s quickly, a n d
occasions easily present themselves w h e n m e m b e r s can in questions a n d
1
P u b l i c A c c o u n t s C o m m i t t e e , 1952-53. Seventh Report on the Appropriation Accounts
(Civil) 1949-50, etc., Vol. I I — E v i d e n c e , pp. 151-152.
294 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

other ways make use of points taken from the reports. The press, too, is
quick to seize on any criticisms of the Government which have been
made by the Committee. The reports are, above all, addressed to the
ministries and departments.
A review of the work done by the Public Accounts Committee in the
first few years after the new constitution shows that the Committee has
settled down well and is becoming industrious. 1 In 1950-51, 13 meetings
were held lasting 29 hours; in 1951-52, 20 meetings lasted 59 hours; in
1952-53, 31 meetings lasted 81 hours. In the first year one, in the second
year two, while in the third seven reports were presented. The explana-
tion of the increased 'output' is partly that the Committee and its Secre-
tariat were doing more and better work. It is also in some measure due to
a new method employed in 1952-53, when five sub-committees were set
up for particular tasks. Three of the seven reports for that year are in
fact reports of sub-committees. The sub-committees number generally
three or four members and there is considerable keenness among those
selected. One of the sub-committees—that on the Hirakud Dam Project
—not only put in 102 hours of committee work but also spent some time
on a visit to the site itself.
It is easier to give this record of work done than to assess its impor-
tance and value. The Public Accounts Committee is in no way executive
and its usefulness has to be measured only in terms of its influence on
Government departments. There is no doubt that some of its reports
have been of high quality. The Third Report (on Exchequer Control)
has already been mentioned several times. The Sixth Report on the
Hirakud Dam Project was another very competent document. It brought
to light some serious cases of financial irregularity, and even if it is true
that the ministry was already in the process of making some changes, the
Committee's report administered a 'shock treatment' which certainly
speeded reforms. The report impressed observers with its sober and fac-
tual character, and its publication performed a valuable public service.
The total effect of the Committee on the departments is difficult to gauge
with any degree of accuracy. A perusal of the statements of action taken
on the recommendations of the Committee tells little, since the depart-
mental replies are of a somewhat set and uncommunicative character:
'recommendation noted', 'explanatory memorandum sent to the Com-
mittee ' , ' necessary instructions have been issued' and, of course,' matter
1
The Parliament Secretariat publishes each year a review of the work of the Financial
Committees. The Public Accounts Committee's Reports are published and the reports usu-
ally contain, as an Appendix, a statement of the recommendations and a further statement
showing the action taken by the Government on previous recommendations. The verbatim
record of evidence heard by the Committee was formerly published but suspended in 1942;
from 1952-53, publication has been resumed and some separate Volumes of Evidence have
appeared. Evidence given before sub-committees, however, is not printed. It may be added
that the Rules of the Committee provide that there shall be no Minutes of Dissent to the
Reports.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 295
under consideration'. It is certainly rare for a Committee recommenda-
tion to be rejected, 1 but it has been a fairly frequent complaint of Com-
mittee members that the Government, while saying it agrees, in fact does
nothing. For example Mr. T. N. Singh at one meeting protested: 'We
have been noticing that every year it is said that action has been taken,
meaning thereby that circulars have been issued . . . saying that in future
such and such rules should be observed, etc. And yet we come across the
same type of mistake every year. I would like to know if the Department
has done anything more than issuing a circular.' 2 Nevertheless, there is
some exaggeration in this, and it is the opinion of the Committee and of
officials alike that the administration does pay attention to recommenda-
tions. 3 The fair conclusion is that the Public Accounts Committee is suc-
ceeding in three main directions: first, it underlines and brings to public
notice defects which the administration is aware of but which it has not
yet wholly remedied; second, the mere existence of the Committee and
the Auditor-General serves to remind officials that their actions are sub-
ject to scrutiny on behalf of Parliament—and the fact that the scrutiny
is ex post facto makes no difference here; last, but in India by no means
least, the work of the Committee serves to bring official and politician
together and train both—the former in responsiveness to public opinion,
the latter in the task of constructive criticism. 4 The work of Public
Accounts Committees in the States is a good deal less effective. For one
thing, in most States the Committee is still dominated by the Finance
Minister and his officials; for another, it is not so easy to find able men
for the job. Even so, however, the achievements just listed for the Com-
mittee at the Centre can be held to apply to at least some extent in the
smaller sphere of State administration.
If Indian parliamentarians were happy by the change in the character
of the Public Accounts Committee in 1950, they rejoiced even more at
1
This happened, however, in the case of one of the rather broad and ambitious recom-
mendations of the Hirakud D a m Report which had stated that ' there should be a full-
fledged, high-level General Administrator in charge of the project as a whole.' The
ministry evidently felt it was really beyond the province of a Public Accounts Committee to
lay down the organisation of a project in that way. It was reported in the press (1 Jan. 1955)
that the Ninth Report of the Public Accounts Committee, which strongly criticised certain
Government of India purchases of jeeps in London, prompted an equally strong defence by
the Finance Minister of the officials concerned who did not, he said, deserve the condemna-
tion they had received f r o m the Committee.
1
Seventh Report, Vol. II (Evidence), p. 25.
3
In fact the administration cannot easily escape the Committee's persistence. In this
connection it is an important feature of the financial committees of the Indian Parliament
that they have already developed the habit of following u p certain cases. Thus the Public
Accounts Committee, having by its Sixth Report, 1952-53, on the H i r a k u d D a m Project
provoked certain Government action, returned in its Eleventh Report, 1953-54, to examine
the adequacy of that action. When, as mentioned in a previous note, the Government
replied to criticisms made in the Committee's Ninth Report, 1953-54, on the jeep con-
tracts, the Committee took u p the reply in their Fourteenth Report, 1954-55.
4
T h e importance of ceasing to be content with purely negative criticism has been one of
the constant themes of the Speaker in his addresses to the Committee.
296 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

the birth of a completely new financial committee in that same year: the
Estimates Committee of the House of the People. Previously, from the
time of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, there had been a committee
of the Assembly called the Standing Finance Committee, 1 and similar
committees in most of the Provinces. These committees were composed
of a majority of elected members, but they were invariably presided over
by the Finance Ministers and staffed by officials of the Finance depart-
ments. 2 The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was quite clear that these
committees would work under limitations; they would be purely ad-
visory and would serve mainly ' to familiarise elected members with the
process of administration and to make the relations between the Execu-
tive and the legislature more intimate'. 3 In the Provinces their influence
varied considerably according to the attitudes of the different govern-
ments. Their intended functions were to scrutinise proposals for new ex-
penditure, advise on supplementary estimates and consider and initiate
proposals for retrenchment. In most Provinces, however, their scope be-
came extended and there was always ' a distinct tendency to encroach on
the sphere of administrative policy'. At the Centre the committees' acti-
vities were, at least until after 1935, more confined. The point of view of
the governments appears to have been that, however great a nuisance the
committees were, they were worth while because they educated the mem-
bers and they enabled the executive to know in advance what lines of
criticism to expect in the Assembly. The claim of the Simon Report that
'the Executive has rarely, if ever, ignored its advice' 4 is worth noting—
even if the explanation in part is that the Government only brought be-
fore the Committee those items of expenditure on which it was prepared
to follow Assembly advice.
In any event, in the years following independence back-benchers ex-
pressed an anxiety to see a real Estimates Committee established, many
of them feeling that such a committee would be a sign of a sovereign
parliament. 5 The matter was debated in the Constituent Assembly
(Legislative) soon after the transfer of power. 6 The Finance Minister
reviewed the history of the Standing Finance Committee and explained
1
F r o m 1924, when railway finances were separated f r o m the general budget, there was a
separate Standing Finance Committee for Railways.
2
There were also Standing Advisory Committees for most departments. These are re-
ferred to briefly below, pp. 308-311.
3 Simon Report, I, 369. * Ibid., I, 371.
5
There had been talk of an Estimates Committee in 1938. But at that time what the
nationalist Opposition wanted was a 'retrenchment committee' that would cut the big
salaries, reduce expenditure and lower taxation. The suggestion of an Estimates Committee
came f r o m one of the European non-official members. T h e Finance Member of the Govern-
ment agreed to the idea and put forward a scheme for the consideration of all parties. T h e
Committee was to elect its own Chairman, but its Secretary was to be an official of the
Finance department and the estimates to be discussed by the Committee were to be selected
by the Finance department. The Opposition did not agree to this and nothing further was
done. 6 see C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 17 Nov. 1947.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 297
how its functions had developed by conventions. The Committee scru-
tinised recurring expenditure of Rs. 100,000 and over, non-recurring ex-
penditure of Rs.500,000 and over, all supplementary estimates and all
new items involving policy; in addition it assisted the Finance ministry
on any matters the Minister might refer to it. The Minister went on to
say that it seemed to him that the Standing Finance Committee was in
many ways a stronger committee than the House of Commons Esti-
mates Committee which has to take Government policy for granted, is
able to consider estimates only when expenditure has begun and has to
restrict itself to the examination of a few fields of Government spending.
But members were not satisfied. Some of them felt that what was good
enough for the House of Commons would be good enough for India; as
one member put it, ' N o w that we are free, we can have i t ! ' Some were
prepared to concede that the Estimates Committee could for a while be
presided over by the Finance Minister. Others drew attention to Britain's
wartime Select Committee on National Expenditure and pointed out
that it had done very well in a situation which had one significant
resemblance to that of independent India, namely, the absence of a real
Opposition in Parliament. Others again would be satisfied with the old
Standing Finance Committee, provided its powers were increased and
the ministry took the Committee fully into confidence. In the event, the
Estimates Committee suggestion was dropped for the time being and the
Standing Finance Committee was continued.
In 1950, with the inauguration of the new Constitution and the trans-
formation of the Public Accounts Committee, the matter was raised
more insistently, the Speaker and his Secretariat now acting as the spear-
head of the attack. It appears that official opinion in the Finance ministry
was opposed to the formation of an Estimates Committee, presumably
fearing that a too-powerful parliamentary committee might have a crip-
pling effect on Government departments. 1 But the parliamentary view
prevailed and the Finance Minister himself welcomed the setting up of
an Estimates Committee. He thought its suggestions and criticisms
would be useful to the Government and he felt that its very existence
would 'act as a deterrent on extravagance in public expenditure.' 2 The
first Estimates Committee was elected on 10 April 1950. At the same
time, the Standing Finance Committee was not abolished until all the
Standing Advisory Committees disappeared in 1952 after the General
Elections. 3 During the period of the Provisional Parliament (1950-52),

1
At the same time there seems to have been another school of official thought which, on
the basis of a study of the British pre-war Estimates Committee and on the strength of
British Treasury opinion, formed the view that an Estimates Committee would be a useless
body. Presumably, both views could be held together in a nightmare vision of a powerfully
troublesome committee that served no useful purpose.
2 P.P. Deb., 28 Feb. 1950.
3
See below, p. 310, for an account of the ending of the Standing Advisory Committees.
298 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

therefore, the House had three financial committees: Public Accounts,

Standing Finance, Estimates. It is not surprising that on occasion it was
felt that there was some confusion of duties; each committee, said the
chairman of the Estimates Committee in 1951, was 'beating the air in a
different direction'. 1
The work of the Public Accounts Committee has already been de-
scribed. The function of the Standing Finance Committee continued to
be, as before, simply to make available to the Government the view of
some representative members on certain specific proposals for fresh
expenditure; the Committee was set up on the initiative of the
Government, worked under the Finance ministry and was in effect a
Government committee. The Estimates Committee was in its status
clearly unlike the Standing Finance Committee. It was to be a Parlia-
mentary Committee like the Public Accounts Committee, working under
the direction of the Speaker, staffed by the Parliamentary Secretariat and
reporting to the House. The exact scope of its functions was, however,
not so easy to define. The general idea of an Estimates Committee was
explained by the Finance Minister in 1950. It would act as ' a con-
tinuous economy committee'. That is to say, it would not be concerned
with specific proposals but with' the question of economy over the whole
range of public administration'. They would examine the estimates of
the various departments not with a view to changing the expenditure
already undertaken for that year but to give guidance to the Government
as to the proposals to be made for the following year. The Estimates
Committee, the Finance Minister said, would not be concerned with
matters of policy, which were the responsibility of the Government;
rather, 'within the framework of policy', they would 'see that only the
minimum expenditure is incurred for fulfilling the objectives of Govern-
ment'. 2
As with the Public Accounts Committee, certain provisions concern-
ing the duties of the Estimates Committee are to be found in the Rules
of Procedure of the House of the People. 3 The Committee is to 'examine
such of the estimates as may seem fit to the Committee and to report
what, if any, economies consistent with the policy underlying those esti-
mates may be effected therein, and to suggest the form in which the
estimates shall be presented to Parliament'. But if in the case of the
Public Accounts Committee the line between'financial irregularity' and
'waste and extravagance' is difficult to maintain, certainly in the case of
the Estimates Committee it is easy to move from economy to efficiency,
from administration to policy. Apart from suggesting the form in which
estimates shall be presented to Parliament and recommending econo-
mies within a given policy framework, the Estimates Committee has

i P.P. Deb., 21 Mar. 1951. 2 P.P. Deb., 3 April 1950.

3
Rule 198 with fourteen sub-rules.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 299
regarded its scope as including the whole field of administrative
organisation and even proposals for adjustments and alterations of
policy designed to secure increased efficiency in administration. Even in
Britain, where relations between Government and Parliament are well
established by firm conventions, the operations of the wartime National
Expenditure Committee caused some doubts as to whether it was not
trespassing into policy matters and infringing the principle of ministerial
responsibility. 1 The Indian Committee is to a large extent inspired by
the example of the National Expenditure Committee and is guided by
men who wish to build up the legislature as a substantial counter to a
dominant executive. In the Estimates Committee, with its almost un-
avoidably flexible terms of reference, they have found a very suitable
instrument.
The Estimates Committee is larger than the Public Accounts Com-
mittee, being composed of up to 25 members. 2 They are elected by the
House of the People from its members by proportional representation
and the term of office is one year. The Committee works under the guid-
ance and control of the Speaker and is staffed by the Parliamentary
Secretariat; in addition, the Chairman of the Committee during the
important initial years 1950-54 was the Deputy Speaker. These arrange-
ments have provided a strong and purposeful direction of the Commit-
tee's work. 3 As with the Public Accounts Committee, an attempt has
been made to build up at least a nucleus of experience. No fewer than 20
of the 25 members for 1951-52 were members of the 1950-51 Commit-
tee, and even after the General Elections it was possible to secure that 9
of the 1952-53 Committee had served in the previous year, 6 of them for
two years; as many as 19 of the 1953-54 Committee had been members
of that of 1952-53. Seventeen of the 1952-53 Committee were Congress
Party representatives, and of the remaining 8, 2 were Independents, 1
Communist, 1 Socialist and 4 from small parties. The Committee has
been keen in attendance, the average number present being 18. One
somewhat curious feature of its composition deserves notice: there is no
overlapping of membership between this Committee and the Public
Accounts Committee. This is strange since it is admitted on all sides that
the work of the two Committees requires fairly careful co-ordination.
This point has been made by the Speaker himself in one of his addresses
to the Committees. It was made by the Chairman of the Public Accounts
Committee when he was invited to speak at a preliminary meeting of the
1
O n t h e British C o m m i t t e e , see C h u b b , op. cit., C h a p t e r 9.
2
T h e increased size o f t h e P u b l i c A c c o u n t s C o m m i t t e e f o l l o w i n g t h e a d d i t i o n o f m e m -
bers f r o m t h e C o u n c i l of States h a s since 1954 b r o u g h t t h e n u m b e r s o f t h e t w o C o m m i t t e e s
close t o g e t h e r .
3
T h e S p e a k e r h a s t a k e n c o n s i d e r a b l e interest in the C o m m i t t e e , s o m e t i m e s a t t e n d i n g its
p r e l i m i n a r y m e e t i n g s a n d always keeping in t o u c h with its w o r k t h r o u g h his a l m o s t daily
c o n t a c t with the C h a i r m a n and Secretariat.
300 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

Estimates Committee in 1952. It was also made by the Chairman of the

Estimates Committee in the course of a speech in the House when he
specifically suggested that the membership of the Committees should to
some extent overlap and the House should arrange to elect to one com-
mittee two or three members of the other. The suggestion was not carried
out, the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs (in his capacity as
Chief Whip of the Congress Party) intervening in the debate to say:' For
reasons which I shall try to explain to the Hon. Member outside the
House, it is not possible for us to accept that suggestion.' 1 It is believed
that the party's reasons for opposing overlapping membership included
its desire to satisfy the demand of back-benchers for committee posi-
tions and its anxiety to give training facilities and experience to as many
party members as possible. Co-ordination between the two Committees
therefore rests only on the fact that they share a common Secretariat. 2 It
may be added that Estimates Committees in the States have up to the
present been of a rather different character in that in most cases they
continue, as do the Public Accounts Committees, to be presided over by
the Finance Minister. 3 They are thus less than full Parliamentary Com-
mittees in the sense intended at the Centre, though they are serviced by
the legislature secretariats. In any case, it is probably wise that until
members of State committees acquire some experience they should be
guided by Finance Ministers, and so long as this arrangement continues
there is a further co-ordinating link between Estimates and Public
Accounts Committees. 4
The methods of work of the Estimates Committee were to some extent
provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the House. To a greater degree
they are to be found in the Committee's own rules, approved at its first
meeting in 1950 and subsequently elaborated. Even so, much remains
determined by conventions worked out by the Committee itself, or
rather by its Chairman and Secretariat with the approval of the Speaker.

1 P.P. Deb., 21 M a r . 1951.

2
T h e same arrangement exists in the House of Commons, but there a further connection
is established by the practice of making the Chairman of the Estimates Committee a member
of the Public Accounts Committee. It was this problem of co-ordination that prompted in
England Lord Campion's suggestion of a single Public Expenditure Committee. This idea
was considered in India also, but there too it failed to attract sufficient support.
3 One exception is the State of A n d h r a which went, so to speak, one better than the Centre
and chose the leader of the Opposition as Chairman of the Estimates Committee; this,
however, was in the nature of an ad hoc political concession. Travancore-Cochin is one of
the States which in late 1954 followed the lead of the Centre and passed new rules providing
for a non-ministerial chairman.
4 There is no doubt that in time—and in most States quite soon—the central pattern will
be reproduced everywhere. Already the Speakers' Conference has encouraged this develop-
ment. Moreover, the Speaker of the Indian Parliament has begun to organise all-India
conferences of Chairmen of Estimates and Public Accounts Committees. These are clearly
intended to become regular institutions parallel to the Speakers' Conference and will serve
to oring about greater uniformity of procedure in the conduct of parliamentary financial
committees throughout the country.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 301
The Committee, usually elected in June, begins its work in July and con-
tinues to meet as necessary—and so far as possible during off-session
periods—until the following May. Its first task is to make a plan of work
for the year. From its inception the Estimates Committee has followed
the advice given by the Speaker and the Finance Minister (and the prac-
tice of the British Committee), and has selected only a few ministries for
examination. In its first session, the Committee had not assessed the
magnitude of the task and it chose five ministries, of which it was able
during the year to examine only three. 1 The Committee quickly learnt
that if its examination was to be thorough, it was further necessary that
it should concentrate not merely on a few ministries but even on a few
subjects within a ministry or a group of ministries, and a rule to this
effect was agreed to in 1951. The approach of the Committee has subse-
quently become clearly one based either on projects within a ministry or
on topics and aspects common to several; there is no question of examin-
ing item by item the whole estimates of any ministry.
The Estimates Committee cannot proceed directly from a perusal of
the bare estimates to an examination of witnesses and, unlike the Public
Accounts Committee, it has no equivalent of a ready-made audit report
on which it can base its work. The second step it has to take, therefore, is
to procure from the ministry under examination certain further informa-
tion against the background of which it will be able more usefully to
consider the estimated expenditure of that ministry. The Rules of the
Estimates Committee in fact set out most elaborately the form in which
ministries are to 'furnish material in support of the Estimates'. In all
there are nine headings under which ministries are asked to give informa-
tion, and they include the organisation (with charts) and functions of the
ministry, detailed descriptions of schemes and projects undertaken, and
explanations for variations, if any, between actual expenditure in past
years and current estimates. 2 The volume of material submitted to the
Committee is very bulky, and probably the amount can be reduced as
officials get to understand better the kind of information the Committee
requires. 3 In addition to this routine information, the Committee pre-
pares questionnaires which indicate particular points on which further
information is needed. In the first year, the preparation of the question-
naires was somewhat casual, the Chairman and all members submitting
their questions and the whole list being forwarded to the ministries. In
the second year, a special sub-committee was charged with this task.

1
In the second year it chose only one, but was unable to complete a report o n that on
account of the arrears of work from the first year.
2
T h e Finance Minister was present at the Committee meeting when these headings were
formulated. H e pointed out the difficulties in the way of preparing so m u c h information,
but the Committee did not accept his objections.
3
The Parliament Secretariat began by publishing a volume of material supplied by one
ministry, but this practice was afterwards abandoned.
302 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

Finally, from 1953 onwards, a new procedure was devised which inte-
grated the initial formulation of questions with the subsequent investiga-
tions. Even in the first two years, the Committee had worked through
' study groups' for various topics. These groups had examined the writ-
ten material and prepared the way for the oral examination of official
witnesses. In the second year, these study groups had been used for the
further purpose of conducting on-the-site enquiries in relation to some
of the major river valley projects. Now, from 1953, the groups were
designated sub-committees and made responsible for all the work in rela-
tion to selected topics; that is, they framed the questions, studied the
material supplied by the ministries, examined witnesses and drafted re-
ports. This thorough organisation of sub-committees saved much time
of the full committee and enabled a much more effective investigation of
the estimates. In 1950-51, the Committee had 52 meetings lasting 167
hours; in 1951-52 activity was reduced—partly because of the preoccu-
pation of members with the elections, partly because of the heavy calls
on the Chairman's time as Deputy Speaker during the illness of the
Speaker—and 15 meetings lasting 41 hours were held. In 1952-53, with
the introduction of sub-committees, more and better work was done,
although the Committee itself met for only 55 hours in 21 meetings.
The examination of witnesses is on lines similar to those already de-
scribed above for the Public Accounts Committee. If anything, the wider
scope of the Estimates Committee, together with the absence of any 'in-
terpreter' such as the Auditor-General, has served to make relations
between the Committee and witnesses at times more difficult. Both sides
of the table are new to the job and time is needed before ways of putting
questions and ways of answering them are satisfactory. Already, how-
ever, there is more skill and less tension than was evident in the first
years. Also, as members become better informed through the work of the
sub-committees, questioning in full Committee is more to the point and
less time-wasting. 1 When the examination of material and witnesses has
been completed, the Committee considers its draft report. An interesting
feature of Indian procedure is that an advance copy of this document,
marked 'secret', is at once sent to the ministry concerned for verifica-
tion of factual details and for any action which the Minister may wish to
take in advance of the presentation of the final Report to Parliament;
copies of this draft report are also sent to the Ministry of Finance
and the Prime Minister, as well as to the Speaker. Corrections may
1
It is unfortunately not possible to give illustrations from the proceedings of the Esti-
mates Committee, since these are not published. It is intended eventually to do so, but it is
felt at present that publication—and consequent press publicity—would cramp the style of
both members and witnesses. It may be mentioned that the proceedings for the very first
meeting of 1950 were published and were numbered 'Volume I, No. 1 b u t perhaps this
particular issue was considered not the best advertisement for the Committee; in any event,
the series stopped at once. Apart from the Reports, the Committee publishes only its brief
minutes and a record of government action on its recommendations.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 303
then be made by the Chairman before the Report is presented to the
House.
Some interesting cases have come to light which illustrate the kind of
problem that may easily arise in relations between the Committee and
the Government. Early in 1951 a Minister asked to see the proceedings
of the Estimates Committee containing the evidence given by a chairman
of a public corporation working under the ministry. The Speaker de-
cided that the proceedings were confidential until and unless laid on the
Table of the House, and the request was refused. 1 On another occasion
a Minister, on receiving a report of the Committee, protested that it con-
tained inaccuracies and that if it was released to the press, he would have
to counter it publicly. The reply he was given was that the report had
been sent to his ministry for correction and that errors remaining were
not the fault of the Committee; that any report presented to Parliament
was public property and could be freely commented upon in the press;
that, on the other hand, it was undesirable for the Minister to comment
in advance of discussion in the House; that, finally, the opportunity for
ministerial comment would come when the House found time for a de-
bate on the report. Since that incident it has been the practice that, in the
event of major differences between Government and the Committee, in-
formal discussions are held. On at least one occasion the Prime Minister
considered it advisable to preside over the discussions. These incidents
seem to indicate that while the Estimates Committee has no more than a
power to make recommendations, a Government that wishes to main-
tain its popularity with the House will need to give good reasons for not
following the recommendations. On the other hand, if a rash or inex-
perienced Estimates Committee makes ill-considered suggestions, such
good reasons may not be so difficult to find.
The Estimates Committee in its first four years presented the following
reports:
1950-51 First Report Ministry of Industry and Supply.
1950-51 Second Report Reorganisation of the Secretariat and Departments of
the Government of India.
1950-51 Third Report Ministry of Commerce.
1950-51 F o u r t h Report Ministry of Works, Mines and Power.
1951-52 F i f t h Report The Central Water and Power Commission and Multi-
purpose River Valley Schemes.
1952-53 Sixth Report Ministry of F o o d and Agriculture.
1953-54 Seventh Report Ministry of F o o d and Agriculture.
1953-54 Eighth Report D a m o d a r Valley Corporation.
1953-54 Ninth Report Administrative, Financial and Other Reforms.
1953-54 Tenth Report Ministry of F o o d and Agriculture.
1953-54 Eleventh Report Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

1
This kind of difficulty may afford another reason (see previous footnote) for not wish-
ing to publish the proceedings. If, however, a decision is taken to publish in future, the
difficulty could be overcome, as it is in England, by permitting witnesses to give evidence
off the record.
304 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

While the Second Report is a slim document of 16 pages, most of the

others are substantial booklets of over 50 pages, while the Ninth has
84 pages. Clearly there is not here the space to analyse these reports in
detail nor to trace the exact extent to which their recommendations have
been implemented. 1 Some indication of the tone and attitude of a few re-
ports and a general idea of the Government response may, however, be
given.
The First Report contained three main types of recommendation. One
group of recommendations concerned improvements in the form of pre-
serting the estimates. These were favourably considered by the Govern-
ment and a number of improvements were fairly promptly introduced. 2
A second kind of recommendation was that aimed directly at securing
economies in administration and avoidance of losses through negligence.
This category included reductions of staff and salaries, curtailment of
expenditure on touring and telephones, and measures for the speedy dis-
posal of surplus stores to avoid deterioration. The Government replies
on these points tended to take the form of undertakings to investigate or
assurances that adequate measures had already been taken to prevent re-
currences of previous errors and losses. A third type of recommendation
went much further and proposed various changes of organisation. For
instance, the whole organisation for the purchase of stores abroad should
be overhauled and a State Purchase Corporation set up. Again, certain
directorates should be closed down and others merged. Most important
of all, a series of proposals were made to effect the better planning and
conduct of a number of State enterprises such as the Sindri Fertiliser
Factory, the Machine Tool Factory, and State Salt Factories. The
Government replies here either announced the appointment of investi-
gating committees or expressed the belief that certain Cabinet decisions
would secure what the Committee intended.

1
T h e latter is, in addition, no easy task. As already mentioned, the Committee's Secre-
tariat publishes separately booklets giving the action taken by the Government o n the
Committee's recommendations. Many of the Government's replies are in the nature of
promises to consider and investigate, and the final result of the recommendation is not im-
mediately obvious. The only attempt at an assessment of the Indian Estimates Committee
known to the present author is that made very early by Mrs. Hicks in the Economic Weekly
(Bombay, 21 July 1951) and in Public Finance Survey: India (United Nations, 1951). Mrs.
Hicks was full of praise for the work of the Committee, but in at least one respect she wrote
too s o o n : the Government may have appeared at first to accept the recommendation to
abolish the Enforcement Directorate, but it later changed its mind and rejected the sugges-
tion. There is also the difficulty of knowing to what extent government action is really the
result of a Committee recommendation, even if it appears to follow it; post hoc may not be
propter hoc, but it may be convenient to let it appear so.
2
This may have been because the suggestions were clearly reasonable or because the
executive felt that this kind of topic was obviously one on which the wishes of a legislature
committee ought to be followed. It was perhaps helped by the coincidence that the mem-
ber of the Committee most closely associated with this set of recommendations, M r .
Tyagi, was appointed Minister of State for Finance (under the Finance Minister) jtist when
the recommendation was being published by the Committee; he was in the position of being
asked to implement his own proposals.
 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 305
The Second Report was in some ways a less orthodox and more in-
teresting document. It concentrated attention not on one ministry but
on one aspect of governmental organisation—namely, the secretariat and
problems of overlap between several ministries—and it constitutes in
effect an organisation and methods report. The recommendations re-
garding amalgamation of ministries, departments and branches were of
a general character. They were followed by quick Government action to
regroup and reconstitute certain ministries, but it would be incorrect to
attribute this mainly to the Estimates Committee; schemes to this end
were in fact already under preparation by the Reorganisation Wing of
the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Committee formed a conclusion that
the establishment of several ministries included several unnecessary
senior appointments which were not justified, and it recommended the
abolition of the posts of Additional Secretary, Deputy Director-General
and, in some cases, Joint Secretary. Here the Government replied that
some of the posts had already been abolished and others were fully occu-
pied, but they undertook a further examination of establishments. The
Committee favoured a return to the pre-war system of ensuring that
officers deputed from States to the Centre returned to their States on
completing their tenure period. A scheme along these lines, the Govern-
ment replied, was about to be implemented. Other recommendations in-
cluded requesting officers earning high salaries to surrender all income
over Rs.3,000, more efficient systems for handling correspondence and
simplified systems of drafting, and economies through the pooling of
typists and messengers. The official replies again took the form of accept-
ing in principle subject to a closer investigation or explaining why a par-
ticular proposal would not prove desirable.
One of the most valuable reports of the Estimates Committee was that
on the River Valley Schemes in general. The Committee attacked a com-
plicated question with enthusiasm and skill and did so at the right time.
The Government was forced to appoint the high-level Rau Committee
to examine some of the criticisms and recommendations relating to the
Damodar Valley Corporation, and the improvement which subse-
quently took place in the administration of that scheme and others owes
a great deal to this Fifth Report. 1 It may not have been accurate in all
particulars—and for that, much of the blame belongs to the departments
who supplied the Committee with incorrect information—but it showed
a sound grasp of organisational principle and put the responsible
ministry and corporations under salutary critical fire. In the first place,
the Committee stated clearly the need for a three-tier organisation for
the Valley Schemes:
1
The Eighth Report on the Damodar Valley Corporation does little more than under-
line some of the conclusions of the earlier report and press for action. It also devotes atten-
tion to rebutting the Rau Committee's Report where it disagrees with that of the Estimates
Committee.
20—p.I.
306 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

The first tier should consist of the Cabinet, which on the advice of the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, the Planning Com-
mission and the Central Water and Power Commission will give policy de-
cisions. The functions of initiating and making plans should vest in the
C.W.P.C., which would act as fact-finding and initiating agency. They
would collect data, make plans and frame estimates. It should be the re-
sponsibility of the Ministry and the Planning Commission in consultation
with the C.W.P.C. and the Ministry of Finance to give these plans and
estimates final shape. The third tier is the creation (by Statute of Parliament)
of semi-autonomous organisations with well-defined functions and powers,
which would be charged with the responsibility of constructing the project
on the lines of approved plans and within the estimate framed.1

They went on to stress the importance of a properly integrated scheme

in which all aspects are co-ordinated. They advised three-men Boards for
the projects and suggested a procedure for deciding on modifications to
plans. They favoured a careful Government watch on the progress of
schemes and urged that Government directions to the Board should be
issued formally. Parliamentary control should be safeguarded by quar-
terly progress reports laid on the Table of the House. They put forward
recommendations as to the methods to be used for making appoint-
ments of different grades and contracts of different values. They even
went into the question of provision of training facilities for engineers
and of adequate repair workshops.
If anything, the Ninth Report was an even more remarkable survey.
At the conclusion of nearly five years' work, the Committee felt that
they should bring together in one document their views on a number of
administrative and financial questions which they had tentatively or im-
plicitly expressed in their other work. One of the most interesting
parts of the Report contains an analysis of financial procedure in the ad-
ministration, explains how methods appropriate to the pre-war govern-
ment are inappropriate in the new context of a welfare state and suggests
new procedures. The Committee were convinced that many losses were
incurred because schemes were approved and begun without adequate
preparation of technical blueprints and detailed estimates. With regard
to grants and loans to States, too, there was too haphazard a procedure,
leading only to delay, uncertainty and friction; State governments should
submit consolidated proposals well in advance and a Centre-State con-
ference should determine definite allocations for various schemes. The
Committee expressed itself as generally dissatisfied with the manage-
ment of State undertakings; instead of being run by civil servants who
conduct them as if they were mere extensions or branches of ministries,
they should be entrusted to men of experience in business and industry
who should be recruited into an all-India 'Commercial and Industrial

l Fifth Report, p. 69.

 FINANCIAL COMMITTEES 307
Service' for the purpose. The Committee added recommendations on
the establishment of an Institute of Cost and Works Accountancy, the
extension of Organisation and Methods Divisions, the separation of
accounts and audit, 1 effective action in disciplinary cases, decentralisa-
tion to State governments, delegation to junior officers, and methods of
inter-departmental consultation. Most of the Committee's remarks on
these points are at least usefully provocative even if they tend to over-
look difficulties and see only one side of the problem. A couple of recom-
mendations which show the Committee at its most ambitious and least
realistic are those which read: ' N o government servant who at the time
of r e t i r e m e n t . . . is in receipt of pay of Rs.500 per mensem and above
shall take employment in any private business which comes within the
sphere of responsibility of the Department in which he worked during
three years before retirement'; and 'early steps should be taken to ex-
amine the question of prescribing the ceilings on salaries in private em-
ployment consistent with the policies and principles adopted for the
public sector'.
These summaries of a few reports may be enough to indicate the
quality of work done by the Estimates Committee. It has of necessity
lacked experience and expertise, but it has found an effective way of
working and has tried, with some success, to produce reports of a con-
structive character. The reports are without doubt pieces of simple,
vigorous writing indicative of earnest and thoughtful purpose. If it is
clear that the Committee has a few hobby-horses which it loves to ride,
it is also clear that it is capable of hard and sober analysis coupled with
imaginative insight. It is not easy to be certain as to the extent to which
its reports are followed by the Government, but it is evident that the
Government recognises the Committee as a powerful force not to be
neglected. 2 There are even on record a few cases where spending
departments have submitted proposals for expenditure to the Estimates
Committee for their comment before making a final decision. The indirect
influence of the Committee—working through the House and the parties
as well as through public opinion generally—is probably even more im-
portant than its direct influence on the Government. Its development has
been rapid, and now that it is sensing its own power and becoming more
confident it is likely to increase still more in importance. To a very real
1
This is an example not so m u c h of wasteful overlap of effort by the Estimates and
Public A c c o u n t s Committees as of one Committee reinforcing a recommendation of the
other.
2
' A s s o o n as I took over the Revenue and Expenditure side of the Finance Ministry',
said Mr. Tyagi, 'I issued instructions to my Ministry and deputed one of the Joint Secre-
taries to take stock of the recommendations, tabulate them Ministry-wise, negotiate with
the Ministry concerned on every item and submit m e a fortnightly report. . . . My Ministry
will take all possible steps to implement the recommendations.' (P.P. D e b . , 29 Mar. 1951.)
Similarly, the Finance Minister himself: ' W e have every intention of treating the Estimates
Committee as an ally ' (P.P.Deb., 10 April 1951.)
308 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

extent, this type of committee, inspired as it is by the idea not simply of

economy nor even of efficiency alone but also of acting as a check against
an oppressive or arbitrary executive, achieves a special political signi-
ficance as a substitute for a real Opposition. Indeed, it may well be that in
an underdeveloped country—in which there is a wide measure of agree-
ment not only on goals but also on methods—this kind of arrangement
may be more suitable. In the immediate future, at any rate, it is if not
the only source of constructive opposition at least a most important
component of such an opposition. Finally, it must be noted that the
Estimates Committee, perhaps even more than the Public Accounts
Committee, performs two tasks of quite special importance in India. In
the first place, it is a most valuable training-ground for members of the
House. As a consequence, debates can become better informed and a
pool of experience is made available from which governments can re-
cruit fresh members.1 In the second place, the reports of the Committee
have a great educative value inside the House and also outside. They can
help greatly to build up that layer of informed public opinion which is so
urgently needed if the gap between rulers and ruled is to be closed.
Of the Estimates Committees in the States, it may suffice to say that
up to the present their stature has been much less than that of the Com-
mittee at the Centre. Nevertheless, as they develop men of calibre and
work themselves independent of their governments, they will no doubt
perform on the smaller State scale the functions already described as
being carried out at the Centre. Certainly they will continue to receive,
through the Speaker and his staff, every encouragement to follow the
model in New Delhi.

4. Other Committees
While the financial committees described in the previous section are
no doubt the most important part of the Indian Parliamentary Com-
mittee structure, an account of this structure cannot be concluded with-
out a mention of some others.
Reference has already been made to the distinctive system of Stand-
ing Advisory Committees in the Indian pre-war Assemblies, and the
character of the Standing Finance Committee in particular has already
been discussed. It was probably the most important and certainly the
most active of all these advisory committees, but at least committees of
some sort were in existence for each department or ministry.2 Most of
the committees numbered 10 members and the Chairman of each was
1
There have been several promotions from the Estimates Committee to ministerial rank,
of which those of Mr. Tyagi and Mr. Guha are only the most important.
2 In reply to questions in the House, information was given that most of the advisory
committees met 4-5 times in the course of 1948, whereas the Standing Finance Committee
met 11 times. There were in all seventeen Standing Committees for the various ministries
during 1948.
 OTHER COMMITTEES 309
the Minister concerned. Rules to regulate the constitution and pro-
cedure of these committees were passed when fresh elections to the com-
mittees took place after independence. Their pre-war character was
somewhat modified. The rules determining which matters were to be
brought before the committees left the initiative and discretion mainly in
the Minister's hands, but ' m a j o r questions of general policy' and 'legis-
lative proposals' were now to go to the committees, whereas in pre-in-
dependence days there had been added the qualification—' on which the
Minister desires the advice of the Committee'. However, it was expressly
stated that the functions of the committees were purely advisory. The
proceedings were to be strictly confidential and only brief reports in-
dicating subjects discussed and conclusions reached would be circulated
to members of the Assembly. Meetings were to be summoned by the
Secretary (an official of the ministry concerned) at such times as the
Minister might decide, but not less than twice a year. Pandit Nehru, in
moving the election of new committees, said that the 'standing com-
mittees of the past' had met only twice a year and had been rather formal
affairs; he hoped the new committees would meet oftener and that they
would survey the whole scene of a ministry's work; he promised the full
co-operation of the ministries. 1
These committees, then, continued their existence into independent
India, and it appeared as if the Indian Parliament might develop a
powerful system of committees parallel to the departments of Govern-
ment and, little by little, coming to exercise a control on ministerial
policy and even perhaps on the process of administration. Such a de-
velopment would, of course, have been in a different direction from that
of the British Parliament, a direction pointing more towards France or
the U.S.A. This has not happened. Each year, as the time arrived to elect
fresh committees, a short debate took place on their work. It became
clear that the views of Ministers and back-benchers were diverging. In
1948, members demanded wider powers for the committees—especially
the Standing Finance Committee—and called for a more co-operative
attitude on the part of Ministers. 2 In the following year, similar pleas
were heard again, and Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar (Deputy Speaker
and later Chairman of the Estimates Committee) pressed for several
changes that would have had the effect of strengthening all the commit-
tees and making the Finance Committee in particular something like an
Estimates Committee. 3 In the first year of the new Constitution, dif-
ferences of opinion became very clear. From the ministerial side, it was
pointed out that a system of powerful committees on departmental lines
belongs to a type of government quite different from that of the Com-
monwealth. India had adopted the British pattern in which ministerial

i C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 19 Nov. 1947. 2 C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 31 Mar. 1948.
3 C.A. (Leg.) Deb., 23 Mar. 1949.
310 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

responsibility was the crux of the matter; that responsibility must not be
confused or challenged by parallel committees of the legislature.1 Among
back-benchers views were divided. Some were disappointed with the
Standing Committees, revealing that they were often poorly attended
and that members could not really grasp adequately the points put
quickly before them by the officials. Others, however, felt that the com-
mittees were valuable. They argued that there was no sense in copying
Westminster where in any case a government was checked by an ex-
perienced Opposition. The defects in the committees could be put right
so that they would train and educate members and in time become a
strong and healthy check on government. In particular, the demand was
raised that the committees should be staffed by the Parliament Secre-
tariat instead of by the ministries.2
So long as there was no clear Opposition in the House, the Standing
Committees could manage to remain in existence—even if there was
some restiveness on the part of both Ministers and back-benchers. After
the General Elections, however, the situation changed. The House now
contained opposition groups, and among them the Communist Party.
In these circumstances, was there any sense in continuing to have ad-
visory committees with whom projects would be confidentially discus-
sed ? The Government decided firmly that there was not; the committees
should be abolished. The opposition and Independents criticised this
move as retrograde and undemocratic, but the Prime Minister was not
deterred. He explained that these committees had been formed in quite
different conditions and that they would now have 'no meaning'. They
belonged to a different system of institutions from those now in exis-
tence, and in any case they had proved of very little use in recent years.
He indicated that he was quite prepared to have informal conferences
with members of the opposition from time to time.3
The abolition of the Standing Advisory Committees has been a relief
to Ministers and a disappointment to members of the House outside
the Congress Party. 4 The view of the officers of Parliament is that the
change is for the better.5 They believe that a Cabinet type of government
1
This was not the unanimous view of Ministers. The Finance Minister of the day, Dr.
Matthai, spoke in defence of the Standing Finance Committee and said he found it useful.
2 P.P. Deb., 24 Mar. 1950.
3 H.P. Deb., 4 July 1952. It is not easy to obtain precise information as to the extent to
which such informal conferences have been held subsequently. It is believed, however, that
the Prime Minister has on a few occasions invited certain members of the House to private
discussions on foreign policy.
* Members of the Congress Party in Parliament may hardly notice the change, for the
party's own subject committees (see Chapter IV) serve the same purpose.
5
This was certainly the case in 1953-54. More recently, however, Mr Ananthasayanam
Ayyangar has confirmed that he at least remains in favour of the Standing Committees:
at the Seminar on Parliamentary Democracy held in New Delhi in February 1956, he
spoke of the desirability of reviving this institution and of the value of such committees for
the scrutiny of Government measures prior to their introduction in Parliament. In his new
position as Speaker he may be able to exert some pressure in this direction, but it is certain
that ministerial resistance will be strong.
 OTHER COMMITTEES 311
responsible to Parliament could never have permitted the Advisory Com-
mittees to become an effective force—regardless of whether Communists
were present or not. Moreover, so long as these committees were staffed
by the civil servants of the ministries, they would never have become
instruments of Parliament. With the removal of these committees, there-
fore, energies on the parliamentary side have been concentrated on build-
ing up a new structure of committees, not parallel to the departments of
government but cutting across them, not serving in an advisory capacity
to Ministers but working under the direction and control of the Speaker
and serviced by the Parliament Secretariat. The two financial commit-
tees are the centre of this new system; some of the other components
may now be mentioned.
During the session 1953-54 there were in existence eleven Parliamen-
tary Committees. These committees are now the subject of a special series
of Rules of the House. 1 They are committees chosen by the House or
nominated by the Speaker; the Chairman is appointed by the Speaker
from among the members; the Committee is staffed by the Parliament
Secretariat. They are in effect of two kinds. Some are committees con-
cerned purely with problems of internal management of the House. 2
Seven of the eleven committees are of this kind and the more important
have already been discussed in earlier chapters: Business Advisory Com-
mittee, Committee on Petitions, Committee of Privileges, Rules Com-
mittee, House Committee, Library Committee and Committee on
Private Members' Bills. The remaining four, on the other hand, are de-
signed to work as controls on the executive. Two of these are the
financial committees; the others are the Committee on Subordinate
Legislation and the Committee on Government Assurances.
The Committee on Subordinate Legislation was first nominated by
the Speaker on 1 December 1953. The idea of such a committee was dis-
cussed between the Speaker and the Minister of Law as early as mid-
1950, and a good deal of time was spent by the Secretariat in studying
(and making known to some members) British experience from the 1929
Committee on Ministers' Powers down to recent assessments of the
work of the Commons' Select Committee on Statutory Instruments. 3
1
Rules of P r o c e d u r e 2 6 3 - 2 8 5 . A t the S p e a k e r s ' C o n f e r e n c e in J a n . 1955, t h e S p e a k e r
of the U n i o n P a r l i a m e n t u r g e d u p o n the S p e a k e r s of S t a t e Assemblies t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f
c o n s o l i d a t i n g the s t r u c t u r e of P a r l i a m e n t a r y C o m m i t t e e s . Special R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e em-
p h a s i s i n g t h e i r distinctively p a r l i a m e n t a r y c h a r a c t e r c o u l d help, a n d State A s s e m b l y Rules
s h o u l d be b r o u g h t i n t o line w i t h t h o s e of t h e H o u s e of t h e P e o p l e . ' P a r l i a m e n t a r y C o m -
m i t t e e s ' d o n o t i n c l u d e several ' b o d i e s o n w h i c h m e m b e r s o f P a r l i a m e n t a r e r e p r e s e n t e d '
— s u c h as the C e n t r a l A d v i s o r y B o a r d of E d u c a t i o n , t h e C e n t r a l Silk B o a r d , the C o u r t o f
t h e U n i v e r s i t y of D e l h i a n d t h e C e n t r a l A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e of t h e N a t i o n a l C a d e t C o r p s .
T h e r e w e r e d u r i n g 1953-54 t h i r t y such b o d i e s .
2
T h e C o u n c i l of States h a s similar c o m m i t t e e s .
3
T h e P a r l i a m e n t S e c r e t a r i a t h a d c o m p i l e d b o o k l e t s of ' S e l e c t D o c u m e n t s ' of British
and I n d i a n m a t e r i a l f o r b o t h P u b l i c A c c o u n t s a n d E s t i m a t e s C o m m i t t e e s . T h e s e gave a n
a c c o u n t of the w o r k i n g of the British C o m m i t t e e s a n d d r e w a t t e n t i o n to s o m e of the
312 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

Provision for such a committee was laid down in the Rules of Procedure
in 1952.1 The general function of the Committee is to see and report to
the House 'whether the powers delegated by Parliament have been pro-
perly exercised within the framework of the statute delegating such
powers'. The Committee is nominated by the Speaker and consists of ten
members under a Chairman appointed by the Speaker. 2 It has powers
similar to the financial committees to appoint sub-committees having the
powers of the main Committee and to require the attendance of persons
and production of papers and records. 3
There is in fact a great deal of delegated legislation in India 4 and it is
of several varieties. N o t all delegated legislation has had to be laid on the
Table of the House, because Parliament, at the time of passing an Act
under which ministerial orders have been issued, was not sufficiently vigi-
lant to ensure this. In some cases, however, the parent Act has insisted
that the power it delegates to departments to issue elaborating legisla-
tion shall be subject to the provision that such rules must be laid on the
Table. Even so, there is no uniformity of procedure: some orders are
laid after they have come into effect, others come into effect after they
have been laid on the Table for a certain period, and so on. The Rules of
Procedure of the House already set down two important provisions in-
dependent of the establishment of the Committee. One rule (No. 71)
States that ' a Bill involving proposals for the delegation of legislative
power shall further be accompanied by a memorandum explaining such
proposals and drawing attention to their scope and stating also whether
they are of normal or exceptional character'. Another (No. 222) reads:

Each 'regulation', 'rule', 'sub-rule', 'bye-law', etc., framed in pursuance of

the legislative functions delegated by Parliament to a subordinate authority
and which is required to be laid before the House (hereinafter referred to as
'order') shall, subject to such rules as the Speaker may in consultation with
the Leader of the House prescribe, be numbered centrally and published in
the Gazette of India immediately after they are promulgated.

The exact terms of reference of the Committee on Subordinate Legisla-

tion follow these rules. The Committee is to examine the orders and con-
sider nine points 5 :
developments to date in India. The Secretariat now did the same for the Committee on
Subordinate Legislation, summarising the Donoughmore Report and subsequent develop-
ments and providing also a bibliography on the subject of delegated legislation.
1 Rules 215-226.
2 It has subsequently been expanded to fifteen.
3
The Government may decline to produce a document only on the ground that its dis-
closure would be prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State.
4 N o statistics indicating the volume are available.
5 It will be noted that this list differs from that in the case of the British Select Com-
mittee; the terms of reference of the Indian Committee are in effect wider, but they still
stop the Committee short of a consideration of the merit of an order.
 OTHER COMMITTEES 313
(i) whether it is in accord with the general objects of the Act pursuant to
which it is made; (ii) whether it contains matter which in the opinion of the
Committee should more properly be dealt with in an Act of Parliament;
(iii) whether it contains imposition of taxation; (iv) whether it directly or
indirectly bars the jurisdiction of the courts; (v) whether it gives retrospec-
tive effect to any of the provisions in respect of which the Act does not ex-
pressly give such power; (vi) whether it involves expenditure from the Con-
solidated Fund or the Public Revenues; (vii) whether it appears to make
some unusual or unexpected use of the'powers conferred by the Act pur-
suant to which it is made; (viii) whether there appears to have been un-
justifiable delay in the publication or laying it before Parliament; (ix)
whether for any reason its form or purport calls for any elucidation.
The Committee reports such matters as it thinks fit to the House.
The Committee's First Report was published in March 1954 and re-
vealed a most unsatisfactory position. Only one Bill introduced in the
House since 1952 complied with the Rule laying down that an explana-
tory memorandum should accompany proposals for delegated legisla-
tion—and even in that case the memorandum was quite insufficient and
inadequate. They recommended in strong terms proper adherence to the
Rule. In the second place, the Committee examined the bewildering
variety of provisions under which delegated legislation is issued, and was
disturbed at the high proportion of Acts which required no more than
that orders issued under the Act should be published in the official
Gazette before coming into effect. They recommended that uniformity
be secured by ensuring that Acts shall always lay down that orders be
laid on the Table of the House for thirty days before coming into force.
The Committee has been in existence for only a short time but it has
made an able and workmanlike start to its important task.
Having delivered its major attack in the general terms of the First
Report, the Committee has subsequently followed this up with a detailed
examination of statutory orders. It examined 90 orders in its Second
and 131 in its Third Report. It was found necessary to draw attention to
several features of orders deemed undesirable: curtailment of the juris-
diction of the courts; indefinite, complicated and ambiguous wording;
contravention of the provisions of the parent Act; undue delay between
the publication of an order and its being laid on the Table of the House.
The Speaker, congratulating the Committee on its first year's work,
told its members that they were 'the only protectors of the people
against the "new despotism" getting aggressive'; it was their job ' t o
direct the rule-making power in proper channels'. At the same time,
they were not to see themselves as necessarily hostile to the administra-
tion; they were rather its 'collaborators, co-operators and friends',
saving the civil servants, as it were, from their worst selves.1
1
The address of the Speaker is given as an Appendix to the Committee's Third Report
(May 1955).
314 OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

The Committee on Subordinate Legislation is modelled on a House of

Commons committee. The Committee on Government Assurances ap-
pears to be a wholly Indian invention—and perhaps one which would be
unlikely in Westminster. This remarkable Committee was first set up by
nomination of the Speaker on 1 December 1953.1 It is noteworthy for two
reasons. In the first place, it is the only Committee of the Indian Parlia-
ment which is presided over by a leading member (Mrs. Sucheta Kri-
palani) of the opposition. In the second place, the whole conception of
the Committee is novel. The terms of reference read boldly: 'The func-
tions of the Committee are to scrutinise the assurances, promises and un-
dertakings, etc,, given by Ministers from time to time on the floor of the
House and to report on (a) the extent to which such assurances have
been implemented; and (b) where implemented, whether such imple-
mentations have taken place in the minimum time necessary for the
purpose.'
The Committee originated in back-bench pressure in the first days
after independence. Members wanted to know whether there existed any
machinery to check up on the vast numbers of promises and undertak-
ings which Ministers were in the habit of making in reply to questions
and in debate. The office of the Government Chief Whip—later that of
the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs—accordingly undertook to make
statements to the House (based on data collected from all ministries)
showing 'action taken by Government on assurances, promises and un-
dertakings during the session'. It was in 1953 decided, mainly by the
Speaker and his Secretariat, that this function was more properly per-
formed by a Parliamentary Committee. In the nature of the work, it is
the Secretariat rather than the Committee that is busy. Each day's pro-
ceedings are examined for phrases that amount to assurances. Statements
and reports are then watched for 'implementations'. From time to time
the Committee reports on the gap between promise and fulfilment.
It is too soon to say a great deal about the effect of the Committee. In
its First Report, published in May 1954, it set out a list of 34 standard
forms of assurance, including everything from the firm ' I shall inform
the Hon'ble Member' to the vague ' I am reviewing the position'! It
fixed two months as the normal period for implementation and recom-
mended that when a ministry finds this period too short it should report
the particular difficulty to the Committee. Finally, it set out a table,
ministry-wise, of assurances given but not implemented, so that the
House and public might know thereby which were the biggest culprits!
The Second Report announced that out of 2,875 assurances given in the
eight sessions of the House, 1952-54, 760 remained unimplemented and
of these 61 had been outstanding for over two years. This may appear
naive, but it is a beginning of an institution which may become im-
1
At first 6 members were appointed; the numbers were brought u p to 15 in 1954.
 OTHER COMMITTEES 315
portant in itself and which certainly illustrates the atmosphere of
legislature-consciousness which has already been mentioned. The
whole structure of Parliamentary Committees reflects and at the same
time reinforces this mood of watchfulness over the Government. It pro-
vides the student of politics with an interesting if slight modification of
parliamentary government of the British type. More important, as al-
ready suggested, it saves the Indian Government with its large majority
from the worst temptations of autocracy.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARLIAMENT

{ account of parliament in India must have a somewhat un-
finished appearance, for it can be no more than an account o f ' the
end of the beginning'. Yet this is not to say that no conclusions
can be reached on developments to date. It should be evident from the
preceding chapters that a pattern of parliamentary politics has emerged
in India. This itself is a great deal. Recall the doubts and fears; con-
template the circumstances and environment of independent India in
post-war Asia; it can then be realised that a sufficient achievement of
parliament in India is that it exists. It is not an author's egocentricity that
prompts the remark that it is significant that a book of this kind can be
written; rather, the mere fact that there is an institution, working in a
regular manner and therefore susceptible of orderly description, is itself
noteworthy.
Nevertheless, the existence of parliament in India is no guarantee of
its continuance; for that, it is necessary that it should serve certain pur-
poses, that it should work, in the sense not merely of following a regular
pattern but of satisfying reasonable expectations. The qualification that
the expectations should be reasonable is perhaps particularly important
in India, for as we have seen1 it has not been uncommon for political
leaders there to expect, or seem to expect, more from political institu-
tions than they can ever give. This is probably a natural consequence of
a period of nationalist struggle against alien rule when everything ap-
pears to await the big political event, and men become victims of a ' deep
delusion' and
. . expect
All change from change of constituted power.'
The man who complained of the Indian Constitution that it did not
'solve the day-to-day problems of the people' 2 has to learn that neither
constitutions nor the political institutions they provide can of themselves
feed hungry mouths. It is equally important, of course, that in learning
that lesson he should not fall into the opposite error of imagining that
political institutions have no bearing at all on ' the day-to-day problems '.
Their role may be only that of help or hindrance, but even this can be
decisive.
What questions, then, may properly be put to test the success of par-
liamentary government in India ? The functions of a parliament can no
Above, pp. 88-89. 2 Ibid.
316
 VENTILATION OF GRIEVANCES 317
d o u b t be variously defined and listed, but perhaps the following f o u r
would be widely accepted as central. A parliament must in the first place
both sustain and control a leadership in such a way as to encourage ini-
tiative without permitting arbitrary governmental actions. Second, it
must furnish channels through which grievances and aspirations can be
heard by those in authority. Third, it must provide a platform on which
public policy can be debated so that alternative courses may be ade-
quately considered. Finally, it must afford opportunities not merely for
the expression of given public opinions but also for the education of
relevant sections 1 of the people so that they may have opinions worth ex-
pressing. H o w parliament in India answers to these tests may be fairly
clear f r o m what has gone before, but it may be useful if the conclusions
are drawn out more explicitly. 2

1. Ventilation of Grievances
The opportunities for the ventilation of grievances are several but there
is no d o u b t that the most i m p o r t a n t is Question Time, the liveliest part of
the parliamentary day. T h e figures (see following page) covering sessions
of the Provisional Parliament and the House of the People are of interest.
There is clearly a brisk business in questions. 3 N o t all the questions
put can be said to ventilate grievances and hopes; a large number, very
properly, are designed to evoke statements of general policy f r o m
Ministers. Nevertheless, the proportion o f ' ventilation questions' is quite
high. If, for example, we list the topics in any one session on which a
large n u m b e r of questions were put, we can see that they include several
topics which lend themselves to this kind of question. Thus, in the
A u t u m n Session of 1953 m o r e t h a n twenty questions were put on the
following: Cotton Textiles; H a n d l o o m and K h a d i Industry; Postal Em-
ployees; A r m y ; Sugar; All-India R a d i o ; Scientific Research; Coal and
Collieries; Railway Accidents; R o a d s ; and, t o p scorer of all and a good
example of a ventilation topic, Railway Lines and Links.
Question time is not the only opportunity. A d j o u r n m e n t Motions are
1
T h e use of this p h r a s e is m e a n t simply to indicate t h a t it is n o t necessary that parlia-
m e n t a r y democracy should develop political o p i n i o n s in all its citizens, but only that it
should try to secure that the opinions of those whose interests are in politics should be de-
veloped opinions. Grievances a n d aspirations (mentioned in the second function), o n the
o t h e r h a n d , m a y belong to all.
2
I n the following pages the statistical material is given w i t h o u t detailed references. It
has all been obtained f r o m records published by the Parliament Secretariat a n d listed in the
Bibliography.
3 T h e r e may even be something like a competitive spirit a m o n g a few m e m b e r s to see w h o
can p u t m o s t questions. T h e P a r l i a m e n t Secretariat seems to e n c o u r a g e this by publishing
f o r each session the n a m e s of those m e m b e r s w h o submitted the largest n u m b e r of ques-
tions (e.g. F o u r t h Session, 1953, 181 f r o m M r . R a g h u n a t h Singh), those w h o h a d t h e
largest n u m b e r admitted (75 f r o m M r . Dwivedi), a n d those w h o succeeded in putting the
largest n u m b e r of supplementaries (139 f r o m M r . Dwivedi). T h i s m a y assist keenness, but
it also p u t s a p r e m i u m o n questions f o r questions' sake.
318 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF P A R L I A M E N T

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 V E N T I L A T I O N OF GRIEVANCES 319
nowadays only very rarely admitted by the Speaker, but the giving of
notice of such a motion and the few minutes required to dispose of the
motion (e.g. by a ruling from the Chair with or without a ministerial
statement of explanation or policy) serve well enough to draw the atten-
tion of the House and the public to grievances which are considered by
those who raise them as both important and urgent. Many of the ad-
journment motions have a general political point but others refer to par-
ticular grievances. In the list of such motions for the Budget Session of
1953, examples of the former are: 'U.S. decision to neutralise F o r m o s a '
and perhaps also 'Strike by mail van workers in Calcutta'. Certainly,
however, examples of the latter type are more numerous and include:
' Minimum wage structure in tea p l a n t a t i o n s ' , ' Police firing on displaced
persons in Punjab', 'Issue of licences for import of dyes', 'Prohibitory
order banning processions in Delhi' and 'Stoppage of electric works in
six Andhra districts and consequent unemployment of 2,500 workers'.
The Half an Hour Discussions also afford opportunities for ventilating
grievances; in the session just quoted, such opportunities were taken
when topics like ' T h e bidi industry' and ' T h e International Wheat
Agreement' were put forward. In addition to these occasions which are
expressly provided for the purpose, other times by convention come to
be used in the same way. The most important occurs when the Demands
for Grants are before the House. As already mentioned, 1 this is the re-
cognised chance for local pressures to express themselves. Individual
members will put forward local district claims and complaints, while
groups of members from the different States will get together to frame
regional demands. Finally, it should not be forgotten that even in the de-
bates on Bills it is often possible to press home the interests of a section
of the population; the members from Assam do not lose their opportuni-
ties with a Bill like the Tea Bill, 1952, nor would members from Bengal
and Punjab allow the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment)
Bill, 1952, to pass through its stages without the benefit of their com-
ments.
Opportunities are thus not wanting and in fact are adequately em-
ployed. 2 Against this, two considerations may quite reasonably be urged.
First, it may be said that there is no strong Opposition able on the basis
of a grievance to create an effective stir in Government circles. Second,
it can be argued that relations between member and public are so weak
' Above, pp. 239-241.
2
For completeness sake mention must be made of petitions. The Rules of Procedure
provide for the submission of petitions relating to Bills; such petitions are examined by a
Committee on Petitions which can direct that they be circulated as papers along with the
Bills to which they refer. The arrangement has been little used to date and is one which is
obviously open to abuse. It may be worth recording that in 1952 the only Bill which pro-
voked petitions was the Preventive Detention Bill; 65 petitions with 388 signatures were
presented. In 1953, a few Bills prompted single petitions, in some cases with only one
signature.
320 T H E A C H I E V E M E N T OF PARLIAMENT

that it is only too easy on the one hand for real grievances and injuries
and legitimate pressing demands to go unheard, while on the other a
great deal of noise may be made out of ill-founded rumour or on behalf
of interests already able to look after themselves. These views contain a
little truth, but not enough. For one thing, the Opposition ready to take
up a grievance is a mixed blessing; it is not always the most worthy cause
that looks good for political 'investment'. Moreover, these criticisms
overlook the fact that the absence of a strong Opposition can be—and in
India is—associated with a lively internal organisation of the major
party through which many complaints and demands can find their way
upwards. The Congress Party's organisation for this purpose is improv-
ing and is likely to continue to improve. It is true that the member of
Parliament in Delhi is kept there by long sessions and is bound to become
somewhat isolated from his constituency. On the other hand, 'consti-
tuency contact campaigns' are conducted to overcome this tendency and
many if not most members are by some means or other kept in touch
with local affairs. 1 In any case it must be remembered that so far as ¡the
mass of the people are concerned, the member that matters is not the one
in Delhi but the one in the State parliament. 2 Contact in that case is
much easier because the State Assembly sessions are short and the mem-
ber is for most of the year at home. Moreover, complaints and hopes
may arise not only from localities and individuals but from 'interests'.
It is not easy to form a picture of the operation of 'pressure groups' in
the parliaments of India, 3 but it does appear that many of the significant
interests—sugar cultivators, railway unions, teachers, etc.—do in fact
have fairly recognised spokesmen among the members.

2. Legislation
Parliament is the legislature, and indeed the bulk of the Assembly's
time is spent on the discussion of Bills. The following table, while not an
exhaustive analysis of parliamentary time, 4 is sufficiently complete to
give a reliable picture of the dominating position of Government Bills:
1
The intense sociability of all Indians and of Indian politicians in particular is a great
asset here. So also is regional clannishness and family solidarity. The result of all these
factors is that the M.P.s' quarters in Constitution House, New Delhi, resemble busy wait-
ing rooms, bursting with friends and relations who have come up to town to stay for any-
thing from a day to a year. There is much talk and it is impossible that the member will not
learn a great deal about things back home.
z The complaint of many Delhi M.P.s is that they can't be quite as important to their
constituencies as the members of State Assemblies because they have so little to offer—
apart from railway lines. All the 'important' subjects are State, not Centre, responsibilities.
3 Some would say that inaccessibility of information is already a sign that such groups
are adequately organised.
4
Question Hour is not included. Private Members' Resolutions are included, but not
Private Members' Bills. The latter, however, account for very little of Parliament's time—
perhaps about four hours a session—and have all been unsuccessful. The times spent in dis-
cussing the Budgets of States (Punjab and P.E.P.S.U.) temporarily under President's Rule
are also excluded.
 L E G I S L A T I O N 321

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322 THE A C H I E V E M E N T OF PARLIAMENT

There would be no meaning in any figure giving the average amount of

time spent by the House on each Bill; some Bills occupy in all their stages
only a matter of minutes, 1 while others take hours. It can be said that
Parliament chooses wisely—it does, that is, spend time on those Bills
which deserve it. Some of the measures on which a great deal of time was
devoted on the floor of the House include the Estate Duty Bill, 1953
(92£ hours), the Preventive Detention Bill, 1952 (57^ hours), the Press
(Incitement to Crime) Bill, 1951 (52 hours), and the Representation of
the People (No. 2) Bill, 1950 (39 hours). In considering Bill procedure, 2
it was already noted that there was a pressure of Bills on available time
and that this seemed to demand greater use of a committee stage. Much
of the time of the House is taken with work which could better be done
in committee. Yet the tendency to refer Bills to Select Committees shows
little signs of developing. The volume of legislation passed by the pre-
independence Assembly amounted to about 25-30 Acts annually. This
figure fell somewhat in the war years, but since 1947 there has been some-
thing like a trebling of the pre-war output. Yet of the 70-80 Bills that are
passed through their various stages, only some 10-15 are referred to
Select Committees. 3
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Indian legislation is ill-considered.
To begin with, the work of the civil servants in the initiating ministry
and in the Ministry of Law is on the whole of a high quality. Once pre-
pared and introduced, a Bill does not normally change very greatly from
its introduction to its final stage; this might happen if committees were
more used. Of course, amendments are moved and some of them are
accepted by the Government. In this connection, it is interesting to note
two contrasts between the Provisional Parliament and the House of the
People. First, the number of amendments tabled in the Provisional Par-
liament was immense. In the one-party situation of that body, every
member was an individual anxious to make a mark for himself. Since the
General Elections introduced other parties, the framing of amendments
has become a more organised activity of party groups. Thus, in the 4th
Session of the Provisional Parliament 1,185 amendments were tabled to
32 Bills. In the first three Sessions of the House of the People the num-
bers of amendments tabled were 363, 232 and 695 (to 33, 21 and 30 Bills
respectively).4 In the second place, the proportion of amendments
accepted by the Government has also dropped since the advance of
opposition groups. In the 4th Session of the Provisional Parliament the
1
An irresistible (but, it goes without saying, wholly misleading) example is provided by
the 1950 Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill which was introduced, taken into
consideration, considered clause by clause, given a third reading and passed in a total of
four minutes.
2 Above, pp. 233-235.
3
The great Estate Duty Bill, however, was so referred; the Select Committee held 21
meetings.
4
In all cases, the number of amendments actually moved is much less.
 CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE 323

Government accepted 155 amendments and rejected 146. In the first

three Sessions of the House of the People the figures were: 1st Session:
accepted, 15, rejected, 120; 2nd Session: accepted, 22, rejected, 43; 3rd
Session: accepted, 44, rejected, 100. These figures should not be taken to
illustrate an unduly harsh and unresponsive Government attitude; the
explanation is, of course, rather that the majority of amendments now
come from the Opposition groups and are usually of a substantial
character. Nevertheless, the Government has on occasion shown an ex-
ceptionally open mind. T o refer once more to the Estate Duty Bill, the
Finance Minister in his final speech on that Bill drew attenton to the fact
that no less than 52 amendments had been accepted, 32 of them substan-
tive and at least 17 in the nature of real concessions. He said that the
progress of the Bill throughout its stages had indicated the ' interest of
the House and the energy, effort and consideration given' to the measure.
Statistics apart, any spectator or reader of the debates of the two
Houses of the Indian Parliament will be satisfied on most points. The
main issues of principle are brought out and debated. The parties are of
course (as in other countries) already committed to their various views,
but to an increasing extent they are learning that they must listen to
others if their own contributions are to be effective, that they must de-
bate, not merely address. Some members of Parliament who recall the
days of the old Central Assembly claim that members then worked much
harder and prepared their facts and arguments more carefully than is
now the case. This may well be true; many of the present members lack
the experience, education and intellectual capacity for intensive study of
the kind that is desirable; and there is certainly little anxiety to achieve
elegance and polish in speeches.1 Nevertheless, the parties are doing
their best to give opportunities to the able members and to shame even
the others into some efforts. In the meantime, no doubt, the valuable
ideas and the forceful, documented arguments must continue to come
from rather a small minority of the five hundred members. This has not,
however, prevented the Parliament from achieving a not unimpressive
record of legislation on a wide variety of social and economic matters;
and even if the bulk of the work behind such legislation has been done by
the civil service, the contribution of Parliament has not been negligible—
in getting the big issues stated, the details scrutinised and the interests of
affected parties heard.

3. Control of Executive
Parliament has the job, we have said, of sustaining and controlling a
leadership. It might be thought that in the situation of party strengths in
1 L a n g u a g e has a lot to d o w i t h this f e a t u r e : m o s t o f the m e m b e r s , e v e n i f at h o m e w i t h

c o n v e r s a t i o n a l E n g l i s h , d o n o t treat it w i t h the d e l i c a t e l o v e that the p r e v i o u s g e n e r a t i o n

f e l t . A p p e n d i x I I m a y serve t o s h o w this.
324 T H E A C H I E V E M E N T OF PARLIAMENT

the Indian Parliament (and in most of the State Assemblies) there was
no need to emphasise the sustaining role. This, however, is not quite the
case. A majority must be not only secure but also nourished. In this
sense, the Congress governments are not as well sustained as they might
be. That is to say, they are not strongly supported by the work and
thought of their followers. The experience and equipment of the majority
of members does not enable them to contribute a great deal, and one con-
sequence is that Ministers often feel somewhat lonely and isolated, de-
pendent for encouragement, stimulus, ideas and argument not on their
back-benchers but on their civil servants. This may be more true than
one likes to imagine of even England, but it is certainly too true of India.
Nevertheless, as has already been stressed, the new members are being
steadily trained by their parties and by the Parliament and State legisla-
ture secretariats, and there is every reason to expect an improvement in
this respect in the next parliaments.
In the next parliaments it is of course very possible that the Congress
Party will have a much less dominating position than at present. In that
event, the more usual sense in which the word' sustain' is used will come
to have significance: that is, it will become important that majorities of
a size adequate to secure stable government are produced by the elec-
tions. Such a result cannot easily be guaranteed by any electoral system,
but the chances in India are not unfavourable. For one thing, there is no
disposition to depart from the system of mainly single-member consti-
tuencies which tends to translate even small majorities in votes into ade-
quate majorities of seats. Moreover, there has been a tendency for some
integration of parties since the last General Elections. No doubt it would
be rash to predict the future party structure in India, and it would be
wise to expect at least some multiplication of parties for the election
struggle, but the general tendency towards coherence is fairly sure.1
In any event, the main emphasis at present and for some time to come
rests on the legislature as controller of the executive. On this point,
opinion in India and outside has expressed itself anxiously. In the ab-
sence of a proper Opposition, with adequate strength and enjoying due
recognition, there can be, it is said, no healthy parliamentary govern-
ment, for the government will be uncontrolled and unresponsive. On
this, little need be added to what has already been pointed out earlier. It
is an error, as we have seen, to imagine that the Government of India is
uncontrolled. From two directions—the party and the parliamentary
committees—come criticisms and suggestions which cannot too easily
be brushed aside; and there is every indication that both these channels
1
The role of prophet is risky and one hastens to add that the special position of Pandit
Nehru is such that a decision on his part to break the Congress into 'Right' and 'Left'
groups, the latter joining the Socialists, could transform the picture. Even in such an event,
however, it is not easy to see a very large number of parties as a permanent feature of
Indian politics.
 C O N T R O L OF E X E C U T I V E 325
of control are being steadily improved. There is much to be done at the
State level in both respects, but even here the movement is unmistak-
able. It is also worth mentioning that even though the opposition groups
in the House are weak, the Government to an appreciable extent is learn-
ing to behave as if they were strong.
There remains one aspect of parliamentary control which has not been
separately discussed in the preceding chapters: control of the public cor-
porations. This is a matter of some difficulty in India as elsewhere. A
résumé of an important discussion in the House of the People will serve
to introduce the problem. The discussion was raised by an Independent
member, Dr. Lanka Sundaram. 1 He claimed that the question was one
of importance and urgency, and his general argument was that the cor-
porations were in effect accountable to no one. Each had become a
monopoly which could forget the consumer with impunity, a veritable
imperituri in imperio. The Estimates and Public Accounts Committees
could do something, but not enough and usually only too late. The con-
trol by the Minister was ineffective, the control by Parliament virtually
non-existent. The remedy, he suggested, was to walk courageously along
the path that England seemed to be about to take—to set up a Parlia-
mentary Committee for the control and supervision of all public cor-
porations. The Finance Minister replied to this speech by saying that it
must be appreciated that the whole conception of public corporations
necessarily implied some degree of self-abnegation on the part of Parlia-
ment as well as of the Executive. So far as executive control was
concerned, they would with experience learn the best pattern of Minister-
Corporation relations. To improve forms of financial control charac-
teristic of the regular departments and ministries would clearly be wrong.
The Minister had power to issue directives, and the senior appointments
could be controlled. Parliamentary control was bound to be even more
limited. He thought that the very real influence of the Public Accounts
Committee was not realised. He believed that it would certainly be un-
wise to set up a special Parliamentary Committee which, whatever the
intentions might be, could only result in tying the corporations with red
tape.
There, for the present, the matter rests. Questions relating to public
corporations may be asked—but only if they are not on matters of day-
to-day administration. Debates are held on the annual reports and also,
of course, when the statutes setting up new corporations are before the
House. The discussions on Demands for Grants afford opportunities for
criticism and suggestion. For the rest, parliamentary control depends on
such probing as the financial committees may be able to carry out. As to
executive control, its extent is by no means clear, since it appears to be
mainly exercised in informal ways. One thing is certain: the protests of
1
It was raised under the Half-an-Hour Discussion Rule (H.P. Deb., 10 Dee. 1953),
326 T H E A C H I E V E M E N T OF PARLIAMENT

the Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee have made

Parliament vigilant to see that proper audit provisions are inserted in all
statutes constituting new boards and corporations.
Observers who have studied the administration of the Indian River
Valley Projects have concluded that, on the whole, such parliamentary
control as exists has been of definite value and might with advantage be
in some manner extended. 1 They point out, for example, that debates in
Parliament have often had a useful clarifying effect; the contrast between
the confusion of Centre and State roles in the case of Hirakud and the
firm division of labour in the case of the Damodar Scheme is said to be
in good part due to the debates which took place on the latter. Again,
the 5th Report of the Estimates Committee and 6th Report of the Public
Accounts Committee are held to have been helpful to all concerned. The
value of Question Time is less certain; the scope of questions is limited,
the questions are often based on ill-founded rumours, while the answers
given by Ministers are often deliberately or unintentionally vague and
evasive. Yet even this device is not without its worth, for at least the
Minister will be anxious to inform himself so that he cannot be com-
pletely surprised by a supplementary. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in
the case of many of the corporations is that which arises out of the shared
responsibility of States and Centre: both Central and State legislators
are liable to aim their criticisms in the wrong direction.

4. Public Forum
It has been noted earlier that, even in the days of the British when the
Assemblies and Councils were intended by nationalists to be far from
the centre of political gravity, these bodies attracted a good deal of pub-
lic attention. Once independence was gained, there was little to prevent
Parliament from stepping into its proper place at the centre of the stage.
Of course, Congress as the former nationalist movement still has a
special position. It is also natural that, as in every federal state, public
attention has to be in some measure divided between unit and central
legislatures. It is true, too, that when one speaks o f ' p u b l i c ' attention, it
must be remembered that the reference is to something much less than
the total adult population. Nevertheless, when all the qualifications have
been made, Parliament in India can still be properly described as a public
forum. During the 72-day Budget session of 1953, fifty thousand tickets
were issued for the visitors' galleries, and there is no sign of a falling off
of interest. A glance at the tightly packed, attentive crowds in the gal-
leries at Poona and Trivandrum will reassure the observer that interest in
State legislatures can be even more lively. An analysis of many different
1
Professor Henry Hart of the University of Wisconsin is in no way responsible for the
views here expressed, but many of the points made in this paragraph owe something to in-
structive conversations with him.
 CONCLUSION 327
kinds of newspapers would surely demonstrate that the press recognises
and encourages this interest; in India, a much greater proportion of news
space is generally devoted to parliamentary reporting than is the case
with most English newspapers.
The potential virtue of a public forum is two-fold. First, it can benefit
the spectators, who may by watching learn. Second, it can improve the
participants, who may have at least to find reasons with which to clothe
the interests they represent. These are ho more than possibilities—each
with corresponding vices. But, so far at least, the good in India out-weighs
the harm. A very wide range of views finds expression in parliament,
and parliament is accepted as the platform on which views are to be ex-
pressed and exchanged. As one comment put it, ' T h e Indian Parliament,
a mirror and educator of popular feeling, performing its duties in the
public eye, has proved that Britain's work in India lives on.' 1 Moreover,
there is a very real sense in which it can be said that the impact of parlia-
ment is more than political. The habit of orderly public discussion, once
established, helps to set the tone of public life in general. Parliamentary
behaviour can communicate as well as embody an understanding of how
leadership can be combined with fairness, adherence to principles with
toleration of different views. These ideas have already become part of
the outlook of many sections in India. Their expression in an institution
helps to ensure that they will be passed on to new generations.

5. Conclusion
The Manchester Guardian wrote recently in praise of the Indian Par-
liament: 'Parliamentary institutions have not had a very good time in
Asia. . . . All that is happening in Asia throws a spotlight on the Parlia-
ment in Delhi as the one institution of the kind which is working in an
exemplary way. . . . Pericles said that Athens was the school of Hellas.
Mr. Nehru without boasting may say that Delhi is the school of Asia.' 2
This is confident language, but is it not justified and supported by the
evidence brought together in the preceding chapters?
The three main charges that have been levelled against parliament in
India may be restated and briefly answered. First, parliament is un-Indian
and will therefore not last. To this, it must be admitted that in its origins
it certainly was alien to India. 'Except on the local level, democratic in-
stitutions have not been known in South-East Asia, where government
has been something embodied in and run by the few far above the heads
of the mass of the people'—and even village democracy probably ex-
pressed only ' the intimate ties of a small and old-established community
in which everyone has a fixed place'. 3 It can be further admitted that ' t o
1 2
Indian Express, 7 Mar. 1952. 5 June 1954.
3 R. Emerson, 'Problems of Representative Government in South-East Asia', in Pacific
Affairs, Dec. 1953.
328 THE A C H I E V E M E N T OF P A R L I A M E N T

extend democracy from the local face-to-face relation to the great

national scene of unknown masses of men may well prove to be not an
extension at all but the introduction of a new and quite different prin-
ciple'. 1 But, as we have seen, even if it is a new principle it is one which
has developed steadily and firmly, so that the 1952 Parliament elected on
adult franchise is only the latest of a long line. It is grounded in modern
Indian experience. Moreover, is there any other institutional pattern
which is similarly grounded and at the same time equally serviceable for
the purposes of the modern state ? The Bhoodan movement is of incal-
culable significance, but it is surely more likely to supplement than to
supplant the political institutions. Even the most sober view must con-
clude that parliamentary institutions have a better chance of success
than any other. 2 What is true, however, is that parliament's success as
an institution can be hindered by a failure wholeheartedly to accept it as
having by now become India's own. Publicists who continue to hanker
after a mythical 'institution of the soil' do disservice to the country's
political development.
Parliament in India has been described, in the second place, as a
façade which barely conceals an authoritarian dictatorship. This view
owes something, of course, to the peculiarly dominating position of the
Congress Party. But its plausibility is reinforced by other factors. It is
connected, for example, with the previous view, in that an a priori con-
viction that parliamentary democracy is unsuitable for India leads easily
to the conclusion that there is bound to be an element of illusion in any
appearance that it is working well. Again, the fact that in some respects
the quasi-parliamentary institutions of the pre-independence period did
constitute a façade has encouraged the habit of believing that parliament
in India must always have about it a quality of unreality. 3 Moreover, the
'façade' theory seems to fit in very well with the view that 'the Indian
mentality' is accustomed to and feels the need for unquestioning obed-
ience to authority. 4 This receives reinforcement, of course, from the
1 Ibid.
2
Compare A. Appadorai, Democracy in India (Oxford Pamphlet on Indian Affairs,
1942), p. 21 : 'The real question for India is not whether democracy will work successfully
—for she has no desirable alternative. What she must ask herself rather is how and how
quickly she can create those conditions under which democracy can start and continue to
work successfully.'
3 The 'façade' aspect of the Assemblies and Councils before 1947 refers to the fact that
the British Government of India was irremovable and, in the technical sense, non-respon-
sible; also to the fact that, during 1937-39, Congress ministries were not quite what they
seemed, since they were responsible in peculiar degree to the all-India party. Recognition
of these limitations in pre-war experience is by no means inconsistent with emphasis on the
vital value of that experience.
4
Compare, for example, Dr. Ambedkar's views of the dangers of the 'Bhakti' spirit of
devotion (as above, p. 89n.). It has similarly been alleged, as we noted, that the attitude of
the electors in 1951-52 was not one of genuine choice. R. Emerson (loc. cit.) for example
quotes the opinion that the elections merely showed ' the obedience by the mass of the
voters to commands or counsels which came to them authoritatively from above'. But this
both underestimates the educative effect of the Indian General Elections and by implication
overestimates the rational character of elections in the West.
 CONCLUSION 329
special position which Pandit Nehru has enjoyed since independence.
Parliament on this view is no more than Pandit Nehru's 'durbar'. Now
it must be admitted that the answer that can be given to all this is not a
complete one. It does need to be pointed out, however, that the charge
of cabinet dictatorship is a very familiar one even outside India; those
who were accustomed to think of independence as synonymous with the
removal of a strong direction of affairs have to learn that the British par-
liamentary system does encourage powerful governments. The question
of personal domination, too, requires to be seen more carefully. The
effective leader in a parliamentary system is often the man who is so
sensitive to currents of opinion that he never calls for obedience except
on those issues when he knows he will get it; and Pandit Nehru has this
quality of shrewdness. Moreover, British experience does not seem to
show that the unchallenged supremacy of one man need distort too
much the working of parliament. The institution's life is longer than the
man's, and even if Pandit Nehru's prestige and influence has been out-
standing during a crucial period of the development of parliament, it is
more likely than not that the institution is strong enough to assume in
time its more usual shape. The authority-loving character of the Indian
temperament is also a matter more complex than at first appears. 1 It is
combined—in modern India at least—with a usefully critical and scepti-
cal approach. It seems, too, that the 'oppositionist' tradition born of
nationalist struggle has a persistence in many ways fortunate. A durbar
without the prince is nonsense, but the Indian Parliament, for all the
valuable influence of the Prime Minister, will still make very adequate
sense when Pandit Nehru is no longer there.
The third charge against parliament in India is related to the first two.
It holds that the institution is unreal because it cannot operate properly
with the political categories that are relevant in India. That is to say,
parliament presumes a discussion of political principles, but the forces
that move people in India and which account for their views and actions
are the loyalties of caste and of locality. Here, again, it must be said that
this seems to attribute to parliamentary institutions greater limitations of
inflexibility than in fact they possess. The parliament in which nothing
takes place but the debate of principles has not yet existed, and every
parliament has to accommodate itself to the interests and passions of its
members. The interests and passions of Indian members are no doubt
different from those of the British M.P., and it may even be admitted
that the process of 'accommodation' is especially difficult. 2 It is
1
See discussion above, pp. 33-37.
2
In 1933, Sardar K. M. Panikkar wrote of the difficulty of marrying caste with demo-
cracy. Caste was, he said, still ' t h e dominating influence in Indian social life'. Yet it would
have to go if democracy was to be real and not simply 'another system of social t y r a n n y '
(Caste and Democracy (1933), pp. 8, 37). Whatever may be the present strength of caste, it
is certain that it is already less powerful now than it was even twenty years ago.
330 THE A C H I E V E M E N T OF PARLIAMENT

practically impossible to detect with certainty the influence of caste and

regional loyalties in the political process and therefore difficult to assess
their total importance. Yet the trend is surely clear: these loyalties have
to compete with other newer loyalties, and the working of parliamentary
institutions is one factor among many acting in the direction of weaken-
ing their hold. The partial submergence of caste and region in the course
of nationalist struggle was in a way unreal and unlasting; the present
gradual submergence of these factors in the business of facing the econo-
mic and social problems of independent India is more firm and certain. 1
If these charges can in the main be rebutted, this is not to say that par-
liamentary institutions in India are confronted with no problems. Some
of these may be mentioned again at this stage. Of the technical, institu-
tional problems, three are perhaps outstanding: the need for an
improved Bill procedure which takes up less time of the House while per-
mitting an adequate discussion of details; the discovery of an adequate
and distinct role for the Upper House; and the improvement of methods
of control over public corporations. Only the last of these is perhaps
sufficiently recognised at present. 2 More substantial and obvious are the
wider political problems. Foremost among these may be reckoned the
absence of an established and constitutional Opposition. The conclusion
reached here on this point has been that, while it is no doubt unfortunate
from many points of view that the Socialist movement appears to be un-
able to move beyond a promising beginning, the defect is far from fatal
to parliamentary government. It can be, and is, compensated for in large
measure by the development of an alert and vigorous parliamentary
committee system and by the growth of instruments of internal discus-
sion and criticism within the main party. Also, its worst effects can be,
and in large measure are, overcome by governments behaving as if they
were confronted with a formally established Opposition. 3 It is equally
unfortunate that the main opposition group in the parliamentary life of
India should be the essentially non-parliamentary Communist Party.
But here, too, the picture is not as black as the pessimists would have it
painted. It is far better that the Communists should be inside the par-
liaments than that they should be driven by frustration to their other
'fronts' of campaign. Moreover, it is not wholly unrealistic to hope that
1
T h e process will become even more rapid as the Congress Party ceases to enjoy such a
strong position; the absence of big political cleavage has permitted regional and caste
loyalties to have greater scope within the party than would have been the case if a sub-
stantial challenge existed.
2
For example, K. M. Panikkar in The Indian Journal of Political Science, J a n . - M a r .
1952: ' I n normal parliamentary democracies, the boundaries between political control and
service administration are fairly clear and well-defined. Today the boundaries are shifting.
We have to discover the nature and extent of popular authority over a u t o n o m o u s statutory
bodies set u p by the State to administer great enterprises started in the public interest b u t
run on commercial principles.'
3 It must be confessed that this is not yet true of all State legislatures. T h e result is a much
m o r e frustrated feeling among opposition groups at the State level than at the Centre.
 CONCLUSION 331
in the case of the Indian Communist Party, experience of Parliament
may have a mellowing effect. We have already quoted the French dis-
covery that 'there is more in common between two deputies, one of
whom is a revolutionary and the other who is not, than there is between
two revolutionaries, one of whom is a deputy and the other who is not';
the element of truth in this may come to be important in India. 1 For the
present, it is enough to note that the Communists, though so significant
a group in parliament in India, have so far been able to do little damage
to the working of the institution or to its reputation.
A less obvious but equally important problem is that of the relation
between government and administration when the government is a party
with the character of the Congress. A great deal of 'constructive work'
awaits voluntary labour, for there is more to be done than the admini-
stration can hope to do; at the same time, Congress has precisely the re-
quired tradition of social service; what more natural than that supply
should meet demand? But this forges links between party and admini-
stration to the prejudice of other political groups. The dilemma would
have been avoided if Congress had in 1948 become, as Gandhi suggested,
a social service organisation divorced from politics. That is hardly pos-
sible, but some similar divorce of functions will have to be shaped. 2
The importance of 'educating the new masters' of India is one to
which reference has already been made in several places above. At
present there is admittedly too great a gap, in range of experience and
degree of ability, between the front and back benches. The result is a
tendency for each to live in a separate world of ideas and categories, for
policy-making and policy-criticism to be insufficiently in touch with each
other, for the Minister to be lonely and overworked, the back-bencher
idle, frustrated and usually docile. The remedies already being put into
effect to close this gap as far as it is reasonably possible to do so are the
same remedies which help to overcome the absence of a recognised Op-
position : parliamentary committees and party committees. The change
wrought by these has been perceptible in half a lifetime of one parlia-
ment alone.
More difficult to locate—and certainly more difficult to remedy—is
another 'gap' which affects the working of parliamentary institutions:
the absence of an adequate body o f ' independent political thinking'. Mr.
Panikkar has well pointed out:
1
It must not, of course, be exaggerated. Mr. Masani is quite right to point out that the
basic Communist attitude to parliament is that they must 'use it to destroy i t ' and that
they must never forget that they are ' not legislators but agitators' (The Communist Party of
India (1954), p. 166). He is also right to show that even the party's parliamentary leaders
have not hesitated to talk o f ' n o t believing in the ballot as a way of changing governments'
and 'desiring to wreck the Indian Constitution' {ibid., p. 170).
2
The Bharat Sevak Sangh might have been such a device, but it has—almost inevitably
—become tarred with the Congress brush and is suspect to other parties. The Bhoodan
movement offers a possible alternative.
332 T H E A C H I E V E M E N T OF P A R L I A M E N T

Political leaders can hardly be expected to devote time to think out the com-
plex problems of the modern State. In every country where democracy
flourishes, this function is performed by voluntary associations of scholars,
public men and others interested in special subjects. The numerous societies
and associations which function in England . . . are in fact essential parts of
the democratic system of politics. It is they who, by unremitting research, by
constant public discussion, by innumerable publications do the thinking for
democracy.1
This is as yet very deficient in India. The Indian Council of World
Affairs, a few university departments of economic and social research, a
handful of serious journalists, perhaps the new Institute of Public Ad-
ministration—these are the only agents through which at present any
long-range non-partisan thinking outside the ministries themselves can
be done. Nevertheless this gap, however serious, is one that can be closed.
There is every possibility that, as a greater proportion of suitable talent
finds employment outside' government service', the amount of indepen-
dent thinking will increase.
Finally it must be said that almost every problem here mentioned is
more serious at the State level than at the Centre, and that this consti-
tutes a separate problem in itself. However, given the all-India character
of the political parties and the growing leadership of the central Parlia-
ment, it is a problem which will in time solve itself. Nevertheless, a survey
of parliamentary institutions which looked at the States alone would at
the moment present a less happy picture than the one given here.

India has received an inheritance from the period of British rule; she
has taken full possession of it and is adapting it to her own needs. The
'experiment' is working and parliamentary institutions are more firmly
established in the way of life ot the Indian people than they are in that of
many a country in Europe. One writer has referred to 'the totally novel
stresses which may develop when the existing generation of Indian poli-
ticians and officials, nurtured in British ways of thought and govern-
ment, has disappeared'. 2 There would be more to fear in this if it did not
seem much more likely that experience of both parliament and civil ser-
vice has been so continuous that the 'ways of thought and government'
are being passed on from one generation to the next—and passed on as
Indian, not British.
The British observer who sets out to describe and assess Indian de-
velopment in the period since independence has to beware of many con-
tradictory temptations. Britain and India have been and are too close
for the relationship to be devoid of emotion of one kind or another. The
former critic of India's nationalist aspirations must tend to look for
1
K. M. Panikkar in The Indian Journal of Political Science, Jan.-Mar. 1952.
2
Mr. Ian Stephens in a review in The Listener, 8 Oct. 1953.
 CONCLUSION 333
failures to support his earlier doubts; the former friend must with equal
force and for similar reasons find himself drawn to emphasise the good
points. And each, in attempting to correct for bias, may fall into the
other's error. The wise Indian will be disappointed with the Englishman
who has not changed at all, but he will be properly distrustful of one who
has changed too much. It will be primarily for the Indian reader to judge
whether the present author has kept a balance.
In any event, the story here told is unmistakably a story of success. A s
such, it is less exciting than a story of crisis and failure. But then, in
politics if nowhere else, excitement is not a virtue.
 APPENDIX I

Certain portions of the Constitution of India of special relevance to the

working of Parliament are here reproduced for reference. The principal
amendments up to May 1955 have been incorporated. Sections not repro-
duced are denoted by three stars, thus. * * *
Preamble.* * *
Part. I. The Union and its Territory.* * *
PartII. Citizenship.***
Part III. Fundamental Rights.* * *
Part IV. Directive Principles of State Policy.* * *
Part V. The Union.

Chapter I. The Executive * * *

Chapter II. Parliament

General
79.—There shall be a Parliament for the Union which shall consist of the
President and two Houses to be known respectively as the Council of States
and the House of the People.
80.—(1) The Council of States shall consist of:—
(a) twelve members to be nominated by the President in accordance with the
provisions of clause (3); and
(b) not more than two hundred and thirty-eight representatives of the States.
(2) The allocation of seats in the Council of States to be filled by representa-
tives of the States shall be in accordance with the provisions in that behalf con-
tained in the Fourth Schedule.
(3) The members to be nominated by the President under sub-clause (a) of
clause (1) shall consist of persons having special knowledge or practical ex-
perience in respect of such matters as the following, namely:—
Literature, science, art and social service.
(4) The representatives of each State specified in Part A or Part B of the
First Schedule in the Council of States shall be elected by the elected members
of the Legislative Assembly of the State in accordance with the system of pro-
portional representation by means of the single transferable vote.
(5) The representatives of the States specified in Part C of the First Schedule
in the Council of States shall be chosen in such manner as Parliament may by
law prescribe.
334
 THE CONSTITUTION 335
1
8L —(1) (a) Subject to the provisions of clause (2) and of articles 82 and 331,
the House of the People shall consist of not more than five hundred members
directly elected by the voters in the States.
(b) For the purpose of sub-clause (a), the States shall be divided, grouped or
formed into territorial constituencies and the number of members to be allot-
ted to each such constituency shall be so determined as to ensure that there
shall be 2 not more than one member for every 500,000 of the population.
(c) The ratio between the number of members allotted to each territorial
constituency and the population of that constituency as ascertained at the last
preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published shall, so
far as practicable, be the same throughout the territory of India.
(2) The representation in the House of the People of the territories com-
prised within the territory of India but not included within any State shall be
such as Parliament may by law provide.
(3) Upon the completion of each census, the representation of the several
territorial constituencies in the House of the People shall be readjusted by such
authority, in such manner and with effect from such date as Parliament may
by law determine;
Provided that such readjustment shall not affect representation in the House
of the People until the dissolution of the then existing House.
82.—Notwithstanding anything in clause (1) of article 81, Parliament may
by law provide for the representation in the House of the People of any
State specified in Part C of the First Schedule or of any territories comprised
within the territory of India but not included within any State on a basis or in
a manner other than that provided in that clause.
83.—(1) The Council of States shall not be subject to dissolution, but as
nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire as soon as may
be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the provisions
made in that behalf by Parliament by law.
(2) The House of the People, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five
years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the ex-
piration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the
House:—
Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exceeding one
year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months
after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
84.—A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament
unless he:—
(a) is a citizen of India;
1
Article 81 applies to the State of J a m m u and Kashmir subject to the modification that
the representatives of that State in the House of the People shall be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State. Paragraph 2 of the
Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order N o . VIII makes special provision for Tribal
Areas.
2 The words ' N o t less than one member for every 750,000 of the population a n d ' were
omitted by the Constitution (2nd Amendment) Act, 1952.
336 APPENDIX I

(b) is, in the case of a seat in the Council of States, not less than thirty years
of age and, in the case of a seat in the House of the People, not less than
twenty-five years of age; and
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by
or under any law made by Parliament.
85.1—(1) The President shall from time to time summon each House of
Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall
not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for
its first sitting in the next session.
(2) The President may from time to time:—
(a) prorogue the Houses or either House
(b) dissolve the House of the People.
86.—(1) The President may address either House of Parliament or both
Houses assembled together, and for that purpose require the attendance of
members.
(2) The President may send messages to either House of Parliament, whether
with respect to a Bill then pending in Parliament or otherwise, and a House to
which any message is so sent shall with all convenient despatch consider any
matter required by the message to be taken into consideration.
87.—(1) At the commencement of the first session after each general election
to the House of the People and at the commencement of the first session of
each year 2 the President shall address both Houses of Parliament assembled
together and inform Parliament of the causes of its summons.
(2) Provision shall be made by the rules regulating the procedure of either
House for the allotment of time for discussion of the matters referred to in
such address.3
88.—Every Minister and the Attorney-General of India shall have the right
to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, either House, any
joint sitting of the Houses, and any committee of Parliament of which he may
be named a member—but shall not by virtue of this article be entitled to vote.

Officers of Parliament

89.—(1) The Vice-President of India shall be ex-officio Chairman of the

Council of States.
(2) The Council of States shall, as soon as may be, choose a member of the
Council to be Deputy Chairman thereof and, so often as the office of Deputy
Chairman becomes vacant, the Council shall choose another member to
be Deputy Chairman thereof.
1
Substituted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, S.6, for the original
article.
2
This phrase was substituted for 'every session' by the Constitution (First Amendment)
Act, 1951, S.7.
3
The words 'and for the precedence of such discussion over other business of the
House' were omitted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, S.8.
 THE CONSTITUTION 337
90.—A member holding office as Deputy Chairman of the Council of
States:—
(a) shall vacate his office if he ceases to be a member of the Council;
(b) may at any time, by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman,
resign his office; and
(c) may be removed from his office by a resolution of Council passed by a
majority of all the then members of the Council:
Provided that no resolution for the purpose of clause (c) shall be moved un-
less at least fourteen days" notice has been given of the intention to move the
resolution.

91.—(1) While the office of Chairman is vacant, or during any period when
the Vice-President is acting as, or discharging the functions of, President, the
duties of the office shall be performed by the Deputy Chairman, or, if the
office of Deputy Chairman is also vacant, by such member of the Council of
States as the President may appoint for the purpose.
(2) During the absence of the Chairman from any sitting of the Council of
States the Deputy Chairman, or, if he is also absent, such person as may be
determined by the rules of procedure of the Council, or, if no such person is
present, such other person as may be determined by the Council, shall act as
Chairman.

92.—(1) At any sitting of the Council of States, while any resolution for the
removal of the Vice-President from his office is under consideration, the Chair-
man, or while any resolution for the removal of the Deputy Chairman from
his office is under consideration, the Deputy Chairman, shall not, though he is
present, preside, and the provisions of clause (2) of article 91 shall apply in re-
lation to every such sitting as they apply in relation to a sitting from which the
Chairman, or, as the case may be, the Deputy Chairman, is absent.
(2) The Chairman shall have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take
part in the proceedings of, the Council of States while any resolution for the
removal of the Vice-President from his office is under consideration in the
Council, but, notwithstanding anything in article 100, shall not be entitled to
vote at all on such resolution or on any other matter during such proceedings.

93.—The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two mem-
bers of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof and
so often as the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker becomes vacant, the House
shall choose another member to be Speaker or Deputy Speaker, as the case
may be.

94.—A member holding office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the House

of the People:—
(a) shall vacate his office if he ceases to be a member of the House of the
People;
(b) may at any time, by writing under his hand addressed, if such member is
the Speaker, to the Deputy Speaker, and if such member is the Deputy
Speaker, to the Speaker, resign his office; and
22—p.I.
338 APPENDIX I

(c) may be removed from his office by a resolution of the House of the
People passed by a majority of all the then members of the House:
Provided that no resolution for the purpose of clause (c) shall be moved un-
less at least fourteen days' notice has been given of the intention to move the
resolution:
Provided further that, whenever the House of the People is dissolved, the
Speaker shall not vacate his office until immediately before the first meeting of
the House of the People after the dissolution.
95.—(1) While the office of Speaker is vacant, the duties of the office shall be
performed by the Deputy Speaker or, if the office of Deputy Speaker is also
vacant, by such member of the House of the People as the President may
appoint for the purpose.
(2) During the absence of the Speaker from any sitting of the House of the
People the Deputy Speaker or, if he is also absent, such person as may be
determined by the rules of procedure of the House, or, if no such person is
present, such other person as may be determined by the House, shall act as
Speaker.

96.—(1) At any sitting of the House of the People, while any resolution for
the removal of the Speaker from his office is under consideration, the Speaker,
or while any resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker from his office
is under consideration, the Deputy Speaker, shall not, though he is present,
preside, and the provisions of clause (2) of article 95 shall apply in relation to
every such sitting as they apply in relation to a sitting from which the Speaker,
or, as the case may be, the Deputy Speaker, is absent.
(2) The Speaker shall have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part
in the proceedings of, the House of the People while any resolution for his re-
moval from office is under consideration in the House and shall, notwith-
standing anything in article 100, be entitled to vote only in the first instance on
such resolution or on any other matter during such proceedings but not in the
case of an equality of votes.

97.—There shall be paid to the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the
Council of States, and to the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the House of
the People, such salaries and allowances as may be respectively fixed by Par-
liament by law and, until provision in that behalf is so made, such salaries and
allowances as are specified in the Second Schedule.
98.—(1) Each House of Parliament shall have a separate secretarial staff:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed as preventing the
creation of posts common to both Houses of Parliament.
(2) Parliament may by law regulate the recruitment, and the conditions of
service of persons appointed, to the secretarial staff of either House of Parlia-
ment.
(3) Until provision is made by Parliament under clause (2) the President may,
after consultation with the Speaker of the House of the People or the Chair-
man of the Council of States, as the case may be, make rules regulating the re-
 THE CONSTITUTION 339
cruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to the secre-
tarial staff of the House of the People or the Council of States, and any rules
so m a d e shall have effect subject to the provisions of any law made under the
said clause.

Conduct of Business
99.—Every member of either House of Parliament shall, before taking his
seat, make and subscribe before the President, or some person appointed in
that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for
the purpose in the Third Schedule.
100.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions at
any sitting of either House or joint sitting of the Houses shall be determined
by a majority of votes of the members present and voting, other than the
Speaker or person acting as Chairman or Speaker.
The Chairman or Speaker, or person acting as such, shall not vote in the
first instance, but shall have and exercise a casting vote in the case of an
equality of votes.
(2) Either House of Parliament shall have power to act notwithstanding any
vacancy in the membership thereof, and any proceedings in Parliament shall
be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some person
who was not entitled so to do sat or voted or otherwise took part in the pro-
ceedings.
(3) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the quorum to constitute a
meeting of either House of Parliament shall be one-tenth of the total number
of members of the House.
(4) If at any time during a meeting of a House there is no quorum, it shall be
the duty of the Chairman or Speaker, or person acting as such, either to
adjourn the House or to suspend the meeting until there is a quorum.

Disqualifications of Members
101.—(1) N o person shall be a member of both Houses of Parliament and
provision shall be made by Parliament by law for the vacation by a person who
is chosen a member of both Houses of his seat in one House or the other.
(2) N o person shall be a member both of Parliament and of a House of the
Legislature of a State specified in Part A or Part B of the first Schedule, and if
a person is chosen a member both of Parliament and of a House of the Legis-
lature of such a State, then, at the expiration of such period as may be specified
in rules 1 made by the President, that person's seat in Parliament shall become
vacant, unless he has previously resigned his seat in the Legislature of the
State.
(3) If a member of either House of Parliament—
(a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1)
of article 102, or
1
See the 'Prohibition of Simultaneous Membership Rules, 1950', published with the
Ministry of Law Notification N o . F. 46/50-C dated 26 Jan. 1950, Gazette of India Extra-
ordinary, p. 678.
340 APPENDIX I

(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman or
the Speaker, as the case may be,
his seat shall thereupon become vacant.
(4) If for a period of sixty days a member of either House of Parliament is
without permission of the House absent from all meetings thereof, the House
may declare his seat vacant:
Provided that in computing the said period of sixty days no account shall be
taken of any period during which the House is prorogued or is adjourned for
more than four consecutive days.
102.—(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being,
a member of either House of Parliament—
(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the
Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by
law not to disqualify its holder;
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court;
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship
of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgment of allegiance or
adherence to a foreign State;
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.
(2) For the purposes of this article a person shall not be deemed to hold an
office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State
by reason only that he is a Minister, either for the Union or for such State.
103.—(1) If any question arises as to whether a member of either House of
Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in
clause (1) of article 102, the question shall be referred for the decision of the
President and his decision shall be final.
(2) Before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall
obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such
opinion.
104.—If a person sits or votes as a member of either House of Parliament
before he has complied with the requirements of article 99, or when he knows
that he is not qualified or that he is disqualified for membership thereof, or
that he is prohibited from so doing by the provisions of any law made by
Parliament, he shall be liable in respect of each day on which he so sits or votes
to a penalty of five hundred rupees to be recovered as a debt due to the Union.

Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members

105.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and
standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom
of speech in Parliament.
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any
court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any
 THE CONSTITUTION 341
committee thereof, and n o person shall be so liable in respect of the publica-
tion by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report,
paper, votes or proceedings.
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of
Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be
such as may f r o m time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so
defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement
of this Constitution.
(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to
persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and
otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament or any
committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of Parliament.
106.—Members of either House of Parliament shall be entitled to receive
such salaries and allowances as may f r o m time to time be determined by
Parliament by law and, until provision in that respect is so made, allowances
at such rates and u p o n such conditions as were immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution applicable in the case of members of the
Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India.

Legislative Procedure
107.—(1) Subject to the provisions of articles 109 and 117 with respect to
Money Bills and other financial Bills, a Bill may originate in either House of
Parliament.
(2) Subject to the provisions of articles 108 and 109 a Bill shall not be
deemed to have been passed by the Houses of Parliament unless it has been
agreed to by both Houses, either without amendment or with such amend-
ments only as are agreed to by both Houses.
(3) A Bill pending in Parliament shall not lapse by reason of the proroga-
tion of the Houses.
(4) A Bill pending in the Council of States which has not been passed by the
House of the People shall not lapse on a dissolution of the House of the
People.
(5) A Bill which is pending in the House of the People, or which having been
passed by the House of the People is pending in the Council of States, shall
subject to the provisions of article 108, lapse on a dissolution of the House of
the People.

108.—(1) If after a Bill has been passed by one House and transmitted to the
other House—
(a) the Bill is rejected by the other House ; or
(b) the Houses have finally disagreed as to the amendments to be made in
the Bill; or
(c) more than six months elapse f r o m the date of the reception of the Bill by
the other House without the Bill being passed by it,
342 APPENDIX I

the President may, unless the Bill has lapsed by reason of a dissolution of the
House of the People, notify to the Houses by message if they are sitting or by
public notification if they are not sitting, his intention to summon them to
meet in a joint sitting for the purpose of deliberating and voting on the Bill:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a Money Bill.
(2) In reckoning any such period of six months as is referred to in clause
(1), no account shall be taken of any period during which the House referred
to in sub-clause (c) of that clause is prorogued or adjourned for more than
four consecutive days.
(3) Where the President has under clause (1) notified his intention of sum-
moning the Houses to meet in a joint sitting, neither House shall proceed
further with the Bill, but the President may at any time after the date of his
notification summon the Houses to meet in a joint sitting for the purpose
specified in the notification and, if he does so, the Houses shall meet
accordingly.
(4) If at the joint sitting of the two Houses the Bill, with such amendments,
if any, as are agreed to in joint sitting, is passed by a majority of the total num-
ber of members of both Houses present and voting, it shall be deemed for the
purposes of this Constitution to have been passed by both Houses:
Provided that at a joint sitting—
(a) if the Bill, having been passed by one House, has not been passed by
the other House with amendments and returned to the House in
which it originated, no amendment shall be proposed to the Bill other
than such amendments (if any) as are made necessary by the delay in
the passage of the Bill;
(b) if the Bill has been so passed and returned, only such amendments as
aforesaid shall be proposed to the Bill and such other amendments as
are relevant to the matters with respect to which the Houses have not
agreed;
and the decision of the person presiding as to the amendments which are ad-
missible under this clause shall be final.
(5) A joint sitting may be held under this article and a Bill passed thereat,
notwithstanding that a dissolution of the House of the People has intervened
since the President notified his intention to summon the Houses to meet there-
in.

109.—(1) A Money Bill shall not be introduced in the Council of States.

(2) After a Money Bill has been passed by the House of the People it shall be
transmitted to the Council of States for its recommendations and the Council
of States shall within a period of fourteen days from the date of its receipt of
the Bill return the Bill to the House of the People with its recommendations
and the House of the People may thereupon either accept or reject all or any
of the recommendations of the Council of States.
(3) If the House of the People accepts any of the recommendations of the
Council of States, the Money Bill shall be deemed to have been passed by both
 THE CONSTITUTION 343
Houses with the amendments recommended by the Council of States and
accepted by the House of the People.
(4) If the House of the People does not accept any of the recommendations
of the Council of States, the Money Bill shall be deemed to have been passed
by both Houses in the form in which it was passed by the House of the People
without any of the amendments recommended by the Council of States.
(5) If a Money Bill passed by the House of the People and transmitted to the
Council of States for its recommendations is not returned to the House of the
People within the said period of fourteen days, it shall be deemed to have been
passed by both Houses at the expiration of the said period in the form in which
it was passed by the House of the People.

110.—(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, a Bill shall be deemed to be a

Money Bill if it contains only provisions dealing with all or any of the follow-
ing matters, namely—
(a) the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax;
(b) the regulation of the borrowing of money or the giving of any guarantee
by the Government of India, or the amendment of the law with respect
to any financial obligations undertaken or to be undertaken by the
Government of India;
(c) the custody of the Consolidated Fund or the Contingency Fund of India,
the payment of moneys into or the withdrawal of moneys from any such
Fund;
(d) the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India;
(e) the declaring of any expenditure to be expenditure charged on the Con-
solidated Fund of India or the increasing of the amount of any such
expenditure;
(f) the receipt of money on account of the Consolidated Fund of India or
the public account of India or the custody or issue of such money or the
audit of the accounts of the Union or of a State; or
(g) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to
(f).
(2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it pro-
vides for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the de-
mand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason
that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regula-
tion of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes.
(3) If any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not, the decision
of the Speaker of the House of the People thereon shall be final.
(4) There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when it is transmitted to the
Council of States under article 109, and when it is presented to the President
for assent under article 111, the certificate of the Speaker of the House of the
People signed by him that it is a Money Bill.
111.—When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of Parliament, it shall be
presented to the President and the President shall declare either that he assents
to the Bill, or that he withholds assent therefrom:
344 APPENDIX I

Provided that the President may, as soon as possible after the presentation
to him of a Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill to the Houses
with a message requesting that they will reconsider the Bill or any specified
provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introduc-
ing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and when a
Bill is so returned, the Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the
Bill is passed again by the Houses with or without amendment and presented
to the President for assent, the President shall not withhold assent therefrom.

Procedure in Financial Matters

112.—(1) The President shall in respect of every financial year cause to be

laid before both the Houses of Parliament a statement of the estimated receipts
and expenditure of the Government of India for that year, in this Part referred
to as the 'annual financial statement'.
(2) The estimates of expenditure embodied in the annual financial statement
shall show separately—
(a) the sums required to meet expenditure described by this Constitution as
expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India; and
(b) the sums required to meet other expenditure proposed to be made from
the Consolidated Fund of India,
and shall distinguish expenditure on revenue account from other expenditure.
(3) The following expenditure shall be expenditure charged on the Consoli-
dated Fund of India—
(a) the emoluments and allowances of the President and other expenditure
relating to his office;
(b) the salaries and allowances of the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman
of the Council of States and the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the
House of the People;
(c) debt charges for which the Government of India is liable including in-
terest, sinking fund charges and redemption charges, and other expendi-
ture relating to the raising of loans and the service and redemption of
debt;
(d) (i) the salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of
Judges of the Supreme Court;
(ii) the pensions payable to or in respect of Judges of the Federal
Court;
(iii) the pensions payable to or in respect of Judges of any High
Court which exercises jurisdiction in relation to any area included in
the territory of India or which at any time before the commencement
of this Constitution exercised jurisdiction in relation to any area in-
cluded in a Province corresponding to a State specified in Part A of the
First Schedule;
(e) the salary, allowances and pension payable to or in respect of the Comp-
troller and Auditor-General of India;
(f) any sums required to satisfy any judgment, decree or award of any court
or arbitral tribunal;
 THE CONSTITUTION 345
(g) any other expenditure declared by this Constitution or by Parliament by
law to be so charged.
113.—(1) So much of the estimates as relates to expenditure charged upon
the Consolidated Fund of India shall not be submitted to the vote of Parlia-
ment, but nothing in this clause shall be construed as preventing the discus-
sion in either House of Parliament of any of those estimates.
(2) So much of the said estimates as relates to other expenditure shall be
submitted in the form of demands for grants to the House of the People, and
the House of the People shall have power to assent, or to refuse to assent, to
any demand, or to assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the amount
specified therein.
(3) No demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of
the President.

114.—(1) As soon as may be after the grants under article 113 have been
made by the House of the People, there shall be introduced a Bill to provide
for the appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund of India of all moneys
required to meet—
(a) the grants so made by the House of the People; and
(b) the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India but not ex-
ceeding in any case the amount shown in the statement previously laid
before Parliament.
(2) No amendment shall be proposed to any such Bill in either House of
Parliament which will have the effect of varying the amount or altering the
destination of any grant so made or of varying the amount of any expenditure
charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, and the decision of the person
presiding as to whether an amendment is inadmissible under this clause shall
be final.
(3) Subject to the provisions of articles 115 and 116, no money shall be with-
drawn from the Consolidated Fund of India except under appropriation made
by law passed in accordance with the provisions of this article.
115.—(1) The President shall—
(a) if the amount authorised by any law made in accordance with the pro-
visions of article 114 to be expended for a particular service for the cur-
rent financial year is found to be insufficient for the purposes of that
year or when a need has arisen during the current financial year for sup-
plementary or additional expenditure upon some new service not con-
templated in the annual financial statement for that year, or
(b) if any money has been spent on any service during a financial year in
excess of the amount granted for that service and for that year,
cause to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament another statement show-
ing the estimated amount of that expenditure or cause to be presented to the
House of the People a demand for such excess, as the case may be.
(2) The provisions of articles 112,113 and 114 shall have effect in relation to
any such statement and expenditure or demand and also to any law to be made
346 APPENDIX I

authorising the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of

India to meet such expenditure or the grant in respect of such demand as they
have effect in relation to the annual financial statement and the expenditure
mentioned therein or to a demand for a grant and the law to be made for the
authorisation of appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of
India to meet such expenditure or grant.

116.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this

Chapter, the House of the People shall have power—
(a) to make any grant in advance in respect of the estimated expenditure for
a part of any financial year pending the completion of the procedure
prescribed in article 113 for the voting of such grant and the passing of
the law in accordance with the provisions of article 114 in relation to
that expenditure;
(b) to make a grant for meeting an unexpected demand upon the resources
of India when on account of the magnitude or the indefinite character of
the service the demand cannot be stated with the details ordinarily given
in an annual financial statement;
(c) to make an exceptional grant which forms no part of the current service
of any financial year;
and Parliament shall have power to authorise by law the withdrawal of moneys
from the Consolidated Fund of India for the purposes for which the said
grants are made.
(2) The provisions of articles 113 and 114 shall have effect in relation to the
making of any grant under clause (1) and to any law to be made under that
clause as they have effect in relation to the making of a grant with regard to
any expenditure mentioned in the annual financial statement and the law to be
made for the authorisation of appropriation of moneys out of the Consoli-
dated Fund of India to meet such expenditure.

117.—(1) A Bill or amendment making such provision for any of the matters
specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (1) of article 110 shall not be intro-
duced or moved except on the recommendation of the President and a Bill
making such provision shall not be introduced in the Council of States:
Provided that no recommendation shall be required under this clause for the
moving of an amendment making provision for the reduction or abolition of
any tax.
(2) A Bill or amendment shall not be deemed to make provision for any of
the matters aforesaid by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines
or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences
or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition,
abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority
or body for local purposes.
(3) A Bill which, if enacted and brought into operation, would involve ex-
penditure from the Consolidated Fund of India shall not be passed by either
House of Parliament unless the President has recommended to that House the
consideration of the Bill.
 THE CONSTITUTION 347
Procedure Generally
118.—(1) Each House of Parliament may make rules for regulating, subject
to the provisions of this Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its
business.
(2) Until rules are made under clause (1), the rules of procedure and stand-
ing orders in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution
with respect to the Legislature of the Dominion of India shall have effect in re-
lation to Parliament subject to such modifications and adaptations as may be
made therein by the Chairman of the Council of States or the Speaker of the
House of the People, as the case may be.
(3) The President, after consultation with the Chairman of the Council of
States and the Speaker of the House of the People, may make rules as to the
procedure with respect to joint sittings of, and communications between, the
two Houses.
(4) At a joint sitting of the two Houses the Speaker of the House of the
People, or in his absence such person as may be determined by rules of pro-
cedure made under clause (3), shall preside.
119.—Parliament may, for the purpose of the timely completion of financial
business, regulate by law the procedure of, and the conduct of business in,
each House of Parliament in relation to any financial matter or to any Bill for
the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India, and, if
and so far as any provision of any law so made is inconsistent with any rule
made by a House of Parliament under clause (1) of article 118 or with any rule
or standing order having effect in relation to Parliament under clause (2) of
that article, such provision shall prevail.
120.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Part XVII, but subject to the pro-
visions of article 348, business in Parliament shall be transacted in Hindi or in
English:
Provided that the Chairman of the Council of States or Speaker of the
House of the People, or person acting as such, as the case may be, may permit
any member who cannot adequately express himself in Hindi or in English to
address the House in his mother tongue.
(2) Unless Parliament by law otherwise provides this article shall, after the
expiration of a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Consti-
tution, have effect as if the words 'or in English' were omitted therefrom.
121.—Np discussion shall take place in Parliament with respect to the con-
duct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of
his duties except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President
praying for the removal of the Judge as hereinafter provided.
122.—(1) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called
in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.
(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or
under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business,
or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers.
348 APPENDIX I

Chapter III. Legislative Powers of the President

123.—(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in ses-
sion, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it neces-
sary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinances as
the circumstances appear to him to require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force
and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance—
(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate
at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament or, if
before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are
passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolu-
tions; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
Explanation—Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble
on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of
those dates for the purposes of this clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision
which Parliament would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it
shall be void.

Chapter IV. The Union Judiciary

* • *

Chapter V. Comptroller and Auditor-General of India

148.—(1) There shall be a Comptroller and Auditor-General of India who
shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal and
shall only be removed from office in like manner and on like grounds as a
Judge of the Supreme Court.
(2) Every person appointed to be the Comptroller and Auditor-General of
India shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the
President, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirma-
tion according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.
(3) The salary and other conditions of service of the Comptroller and
Auditor-General shall be such as may be determined by Parliament by law
and, until they are so determined, shall be as specified in the Second Schedule:
Provided that neither the salary of a Comptroller and Auditor-General nor
his rights in respect of leave of absence, pension or age of retirement shall be
varied to his disadvantage after his appointment.
(4) The Comptroller and Auditor-General shall not be eligible for further
office either under the Government of India or under the Government of any
State after he has ceased to hold his office.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Consitution and of any law made by
Parliament, the conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian Audit
and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the Comptroller
 THE CONSTITUTION 349
and Auditor-General shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the
President after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
(6) The administrative expenses of the office of the Comptroller and
Auditor-General, including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or
in respect of persons serving in that office, shall be charged upon the Consoli-
dated Fund of India.
149. 1 —The Comptroller and Auditor-General shall perform such duties and
exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the States
and of any other authority or body as may be prescribed by or under any law
made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, shall per-
form such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the
Union and of the States as were conferred on or exercisable by the Auditor-
General of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution
in relation to the accounts of the Dominion of India and of the Provinces
respectively.

150. 1 —The accounts of the Union and of the States shall be kept in such form
as the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India may, with the approval of
the President, prescribe.
151.—(1) The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India re-
lating to the accounts of the Union shall be submitted to the President, who
shall cause them to be laid before each House of Parliament.
(2)1 The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India relating to
the accounts of a State shall be submitted to the Governor or Rajpramukh of
the State, who shall cause them to be laid before the Legislature of the State.

Part VI. The States in Part A of the First Schedule

Chapter I. General. * * *
Chapter II. The Executive.***
Chapter III. The State Legislature.

168.—(1) For every State there shall be a Legislature which shall consist of
the Governor, and
(a) in the States of Bihar, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and
West Bengal, two Houses;
(b) in other States, one House.
(2) Where there are two Houses of the Legislature of a State, one shall be
known as the Legislative Council and the other as the Legislative Assembly,
and where there is only one House, it shall be known as the Legislative
Assembly.
169.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 168, Parliament may by law
provide for the abolition of the Legislative Council of a State having such a
Council or for the creation of such a Council in a State having no such Council,
1
In Articles 149 and 150 references to States shall be construed as not including the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, and in its application to that State clause (2) o f Article 151
shall be omitted.
350 APPENDIX I

if the Legislative Assembly of the State passes a resolution to that effect by a

majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not
less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting.
(2) Any law referred to in clause (1) shall contain such provisions for the
amendment of this Constitution as may be necessary to give effect to the pro-
visions of the law and may also contain such supplemental, incidental and
consequential provisions as Parliament may deem necessary.
(3) No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of this
Constitution for the purposes of article 368.
170.1—(1) Subject to the provisions of article 333, the Legislative Assembly
of each State shall be composed of members chosen by direct election.
(2) The representation of each territorial constituency in the Legislative
Assembly of a State shall be on the basis of the population of that constituency
as ascertained at the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have
been published and shall save in the case of the autonomous districts of Assam
and the constituency comprising the cantonment and municipality of Shillong
be on a scale of not more than one member for every seventy-five thousand of
the population:
Provided that the total number of members in the Legislative Assembly of
a State shall in no case be more than five hundred or less than sixty.
(3) The ratio between the number of members to be allotted to each terri-
torial constituency in a State and the population of that constituency as ascer-
tained at the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been
published shall, so far as practicable, be the same throughout the State.
(4) Upon the completion of each census, the representation of the several
territorial constituencies in the Legislative Assembly of each State shall be
re-adjusted by such authority, in such manner and with effect from such date
as Parliament may by law determine:
Provided that such readjustment shall not affect representation in the Legis-
lative Assembly until the dissolution of the then existing Assembly.
171.—(1) The total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State
having such a Council shall not exceed one-fourth of the total number of
members in the Legislative Assembly of that State:
Provided that the total number of members in the Legislative Council of a
State shall in no case be less than forty.
(2) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the composition of the
Legislative Council of a State shall be as provided in clause (3).
(3) Of the total number of members of the Legislative Council of a State—
(a) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by electorates consisting
of members of municipalities, district boards and such other local autho-
rities in the State as Parliament may by law specify;
(b) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates consisting
of persons residing in the State who have been for at least three years
i Paragraph 2 of the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order, N o . VIII provides for
the application of this article to tribal areas.
 THE CONSTITUTION 351
graduates of any university in the territory of India or have been for at
least three years in possession of qualifications prescribed by or under
any law made by Parliament as equivalent to that of a graduate of any
such university.
(c) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates consisting
of persons who have been for at least three years engaged in teaching in
such educational institutions within the State, not lower in standard
than that of a secondary school, as may be prescribed by or under any
law made by Parliament;
(d) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by the members of the
Legislative Assembly of the State from amongst persons who are not
members of the Assembly;
(e) the remainder shall be nominated by the Governor in accordance with
the provisions of clause (5).
(4) The members to be elected under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (3)
shall be chosen in such territorial constituencies as may be prescribed by or
under any law made by Parliament, and the elections under the said sub-
clauses and under sub-clause (d) of the said clause shall be held in accordance
with the system of proportional representation by means of the single trans-
ferable vote.
(5) The members to be nominated by the Governor under sub-clause (e) of
clause (3) shall consist of persons having special knowledge or practical ex-
perience in respect of such matters as the following, namely:
Literature, science, art, co-operative movement and social service.
172.—(1) Every Legislative Assembly of every State, unless sooner dis-
solved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meet-
ing and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall
operate as a dissolution of the Assembly:
Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exceeding one
year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months
after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
(2) The Legislative Council of a State shall not be subject to dissolution, but
as nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire as soon as
may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the pro-
visions made in that behalf by Parliament by law.
173.—A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legis-
lature of a State unless he—
(a) is a citizen of India;
(b) is, in the case of a seat in the Legislative Assembly, not less than twenty-
five years of age and, in the case of a seat in the Legislative Council, not
less than thirty years of age; and
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by
or under any law made by Parliament.
174.1—(1) The Governor shall from time to time summon the House or each
1 Amended as in Article 85.
352 APPENDIX I

House of the Legislature to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but
six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the
date appointed for its first sitting in the next session.
(2) The Governor may from time to time :—
(a) prorogue the House or either House
(b) dissolve the Legislative Assembly.
175.—(1) The Governor may address the Legislative Assembly or, in the
case of a State having a Legislative Council, either House of the Legislature of
the State, or both Houses assembled together, and may for that purpose re-
quire the attendance of members.
(2) The Governor may send messages to the House or Houses of the Legis-
lature of the State, whether with respect to a Bill then pending in the Legisla-
ture or otherwise, and a House to which any message is so sent shall with all
convenient despatch consider any matter required by the message to be taken
into consideration.
176.—(1) At the commencement of the first session after each general
election to the Legislative Assembly and at the commencement of the first
session of each year1, the Governor shall address the Legislative Assembly
or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, both Houses assembled
together and inform the Legislature of the causes of its summons.
(2) Provision shall be made by the rules regulating the procedure of the
House or either House for the allotment of time for discussion of the matters
referred to in such address.2
177.—Every Minister and the Advocate-General for a State shall have the
right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, the Legis-
lative Assembly of the State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative
Council, both Houses, and to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the pro-
ceedings of, any committee of the Legislature of which he may be named a
member, but shall not, by virtue of this article, be entitled to vote.

Officers of the State Legislature

[Articles 178-212 mainly repeat for the State Legislatures the provisions of
Articles 89-122 above. One important difference is contained in Article 197
which differs from Article 108:]
197.—(1) If after a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a
State having a Legislative Council and transmitted to the Legislative Council—
(a) the Bill is rejected by the Council; or
(b) more than three months elapse from the date on which the Bill is laid be-
fore the Council without the Bill being passed by it ; or
(c) the Bill is passed by the Council with amendments to which the Legisla-
tive Assembly does not agree,
the Legislative Assembly may, subject to the rules regulating its procedure,
pass the Bill again in the same or in any subsequent session with or without
1
This phrase was substituted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, S. 9
for 'every session'.
2
Amended as in Article 87(2) above.
 THE CONSTITUTION 353
such amendments, if any, as have been made, suggested or agreed to by the
Legislative Council and then transmit the Bill as so passed to the Legislative
Council.
(2) If after a Bill has been so passed for the second time by the Legislative
Assembly and transmitted to the Legislative Council—
(a) the Bill is rejected by the Council; or
(b) more than one month elapses from the date on which the Bill is laid be-
fore the Council without the Bill being passed by it; or
(c) the Bill is passed by the Council with amendments to which the Legisla-
tive Assembly does not agree,
the Bill shall be deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature
of the State in the form in which it was passed by the Legislative Assembly for
the second time with such amendments, if any, as have been made or suggested
by the Legislative Council and agreed to by the Legislative Assembly.
(3) Nothing in this article shall apply to a Money Bill.
[The provision equivalent to Article 111 is also somewhat different and is
contained in Articles 200 and 201.]
200.—When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State
or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both
Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor
and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he
withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of
the President:
Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation
to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together
with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or
any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desira-
bility of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his mes-
sage and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the
Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or
without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor
shall not withhold assent therefrom:—
Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for
the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the
Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High
Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution
designed to fill.

201.—When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the

President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that
he withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill the President may direct
the Governor to return the Bill to the House or, as the case may be, the Houses
of the Legislature of the State together with such a message as is mentioned in
the first proviso to article 200 and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or
Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the
date of receipt of such message and, if it is again passed by the House or
23—P.I.
354 APPENDIX I

Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to the Presi-

dent for his consideration.

Chapter IV. Legislative Power of the Governor

213.—(1) If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is
in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both
Houses of the Legislature are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circum-
stances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he
may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to
require :
Provided that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the
President, promulgate any such Ordinance i f —
(a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have
required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction
thereof into the Legislature; or
(b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same
provisions for the consideration of the President; or
(c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions
would under this Constitution have been invalid unless, having been re-
served for the consideration of the President, it had received the assent
of the President.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force
and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Gover-
nor, but every such Ordinance—
(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there
is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall
cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the
Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution dis-
approving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the
Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the
case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council ; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
Explanation : Where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legis-
lative Council are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of
six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of
this clause.
(3) I f and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision
which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State
assented to by the Governor, it shall be void :
Provided that for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relat-
ing to the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to
an Act of Parliament or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in
the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated under this article in pursuance
of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Legisla-
ture of the State which has been reserved for the consideration of the President
and assented to by him.
 THE CONSTITUTION 355

Chapter V. The High Courts in the States***

Chapter VI. Subordinate Courts***
1
PART V I I . T H E STATES IN P A R T B OF THE F I R S T S C H E D U L E
[This part applies the provisions of Part VI to Part B States. Relevant
clauses are:]
238.—(7) In article 168, for clause (1) the following clause shall be sub-
stituted, namely:—
' (I) For every State there shall be a Legislature which shall consist of the
Rajpramukh and
(a) in the State of Mysore, two Houses ;
(b) in other States, one House.'
(8) In article 186, for the words 'as are specified in the Second Schedule' the
words 'as the Rajpramukh may determine' shall be substituted.
(9) In article 195, for the words 'as were immediately before the commence-
ment of this Constitution applicable in the case of members of the Legislative
Assembly of the corresponding Province' the words 'as the Rajpramukh may
determine' shall be substituted.
(10) In clause (3) of article 202—
(i) for sub-clause (a) the following sub-clause shall be substituted,
namely :—
'(a) the allowances of the Rajpramukh and other expenditure relating to
his office as determined by the President by general or special order;'
(11) for sub-clause (f) the following sub-clauses shall be substituted,
namely :—
'(f) in the case of the State of Travancore-Cochin, a sum of fifty-one
lakhs of rupees required to be paid annually to the Devaswom fund
under the covenant entered into before the commencement of this Con-
stitution by the Rulers of the Indian States of Travancore and Cochin
for the formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin ;
(g) any other expenditure declared by this Constitution or by the Legis-
lature of the State by law, to be so charged.'
(11) In article 208, for clause (2), the following clause shall be substituted,
namely :—
'(2) Until rules are made under clause (1), the rules of procedure and stand-
ing orders in force immediately before the commencement of this Con-
stitution with respect to the Legislature for the State, or, where no
House of the Legislature for the State existed, the rules of procedure
and standing orders in force immediately before such commencement
with respect to the Legislative Assembly of such Province as may be
specified in that behalf by the Rajpramukh of the State, shall have effect
in relation to the Legislature of the State subject to such modifications
and adaptations as may be made therein by the Speaker of the Legisla-
tive Assembly or the Chairman of the Legislative Council, as the case
may be.'
1
N o t applicable to the State o f J a m m u and Kashmir.
356 APPENDIX I

PART V I I I . THE STATES IN PART C OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE

239.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a State specified in
Part C of the First Schedule shall be administered by the President acting, to
such extent as he thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant-
Governor to be appointed by him or through the Government of a neighbour-
ing State:
Provided that the President shall not act through the Government of a
neighbouring State save after—
(a) consulting the Government concerned; and
(b) ascertaining in such manner as the President considers most appropriate
the views of the people of the State to be so administered.
(2) In this article, references to a State shall include references to a part of a
State.
240.—(1) Parliament may by law create or continue for any State specified
in Part C of the First Schedule and administered through a Chief Commis-
sioner or Lieutenant-Governor:
(a) a body, whether nominated, elected or partly nominated and partly
elected, to function as a Legislature for the State; or
(b) a Council of Advisers or Ministers,
or both with such constitution, powers and functions, in each case, as may be
specified in the law.
(2) Any such law as is referred to in clause (1) shall not be deemed to be an
amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 368 notwithstand-
ing that it contains any provision which amends or has the effect of amending
the Constitution.
241.—(1) Parliament may by law constitute a High Court for a State
specified in Part C of the First Schedule or declare any court in any such State
to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of this Constitution.
(2) The provisions of Chapter V of Part VI shall apply in relation to every
High Court referred to in clause (1) as they apply in relation to a High Court
referred to in article 214 subject to such modifications or exceptions as Parlia-
ment may by law provide.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of
any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on
that Legislature by or under this Constitution, every High Court exercising
jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in re-
lation to any State specified in Part C of the First Schedule or any area in-
cluded therein shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction in relation to that
State or area after such commencement.
(4) Nothing in this article derogates from the power of Parliament to extend
or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court in any State specified in Part A or
Part B of the First Schedule to, or from, any State specified in Part C of that
Schedule or any area included within that State.

242.—(1) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the constitution,

 THE CONSTITUTION 357
powers and functions of the Coorg Legislative Council shall be the same as
they were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.
(2) The arrangements with respect to revenues collected in Coorg and ex-
penses in respect of Coorg shall, until other provision is made in that behalf by
the President by order, continue unchanged.

PART I X . TERRITORIES IN PART D OF THE FIRST S C H E D U L E . * * *

PART X . THE SCHEDULED AND TRIBAL A R E A S . * * *

PART X I . RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U N I O N AND THE STATES.

Chapter I. Legislative Relations

245.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may
make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legisla-
ture of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground
that it would have extra-territorial operation.
246.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has
exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ' Union
List').
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to
clause (1), the Legislature of any State specified in Part A or Part B of the First
Schedule also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred
to as the 'Concurrent List').
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State specified in
Part A or Part B of the First Schedule has exclusive power to make laws for
such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the 'State
List').
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any
part of the territory of India not included in Part A or Part B of the First
Schedule notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State
List.
247.—Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament may by law
provide for the establishment of any additional courts for the better adminis-
tration of laws made by Parliament or of any existing law with respect to a
matter enumerated in the Union List.
248. 1 —(1) Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to
any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.
(2) Such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax
not mentioned in either of those Lists.
J N o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e S t a t e of J a m m u a n d K a s h m i r ,
358 APPENDIX I

249. 1 —(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this

Chapter, if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not
less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or
expedient in the national interest that Parliament should make laws with re-
spect to any matter enumerated in the State List specified in the resolution, it
shall be lawful for Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the
territory of India with respect to that matter while the resolution remains in
force.
(2) A resolution passed under clause (1) shall remain in force for such period
not exceeding one year as may be specified therein:
Provided that, if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in
force of any such resolution is passed in the manner provided in clause (1),
such resolution shall continue in force for a further period of one year from
the date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to be in
force.
(3) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the pass-
ing of a resolution under clause (1) have been competent to make shall, to the
extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period
of six months after the resolution has ceased to be in force, except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.
250.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament shall, while
a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make laws for the
whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List.
(2) A Law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the issue
of a Proclamation of Emergency have been competent to make shall, to the
extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period
of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.
251.—Nothing in articles 249 and 250 shall restrict the power of the Legis-
lature of a State to make any law which under this Constitution it has power
to make, but if any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is re-
pugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament has
under either of the said articles power to make, the law made by Parliament,
whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State,
shall prevail, and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall to the ex-
tent of the repugnancy, but so long only as the law made by Parliament con-
tinues to have effect, be inoperative.
252.—(1) If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desir-
able that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to
make laws for the States except as provided in articles 249 and 250 should be
regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect
are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States it shall be law-
ful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and
any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which
it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or,
i N o t applicable to the State of J a m m u and Kashmir.
 THE CONSTITUTION 359
where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that
State.
(2) Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act
of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any
State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature
of that State.
253.'—Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter,
Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the terri-
tory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any
other country or countries or any decision made at any international con-
ference, association or other body.
254.—(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is re-
pugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is
competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one
of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the pro-
visions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or
after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the
existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State
shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State specified in Part A or
Part B of the First Schedule with respect to one of the matters enumerated in
the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an
earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter,
then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been re-
served for the consideration of the President and has received his assent,
prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting
at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to,
amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.
255. 2 —No Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State specified in
Part A or Part B of the First Schedule, and no provision in any such Act, shall
be invalid by reason only that some recommendation or previous sanction re-
quired by this Constitution was not given, if assent to that Act was given—
(a) where the recommendation required was that of the Governor, either by
the Governor or by the President;
(b) where the recommendation required was that of the Rajpramukh, either
by the Rajpramukh or by the President.
(c) where the recommendation or previous sanction required was that of the
President, by the President.

Chapter II. Administrative Relations

PART X I I . FINANCE, PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, S U I T S . * * *
1
Provided t h a t after the c o m m e n c e m e n t of the Constitution (Application to J a m m u
a n d Kashmir) Order, 1954, no decision affecting the disposition of the State of J a m m u a n d
Kashmir shall be m a d e by the G o v e r n m e n t of India without the consent of that State.
2
N o t applicable to the State of J a m m u a n d K a s h m i r .
360 APPENDIX I

PART X I I I . TRADE, COMMERCE AND INTERCOURSE WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF

INDIA.***

PART X I V . SERVICES UNDER THE UNION AND THE STATES.***

PART X V . ELECTIONS

324.1—(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of

the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to
the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of President and
Vice-President held under this Constitution, including the appointment of
election tribunals for the decision of doubts and disputes arising out of or in
connection with elections to Parliament and to the Legislatures of States shall
be vested in a Commission (referred to in this Constitution as the Election
Commission).
(2) The Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner and such number of other Election Commissioners if any, as the Presi-
dent may from time to time fix and the appointment of the Chief Election
Commissioner and other Election Commissioners shall, subject to the pro-
visions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament, be made by the President.
(3) When any other Election Commissioner is so appointed the Chief Elec-
tion Commissioner shall act as the Chairman of the Election Commission.
(4) Before each general election to the House of the People and to the Legis-
lative Assembly of each State, and before the first general election and there-
after before each biennial election to the Legislative Council of each State
having such Council, the President may also appoint after consultation with
the Election Commission such Regional Commissioners as he may consider
necessary to assist the Election Commission in the performance of the func-
tions conferred on the Commission by clause (1).
(5) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the conditions
of service and tenure of office of the Election Commissioners and the Regional
Commissioners shall be such as the President may by rule determine:
Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed from
his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the
Supreme Court and the conditions of service of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment:
Provided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Com-
missioner shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of
the Chief Election Commissioner.
(6) The President, or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, shall, when
so requested by the Election Commission, make available to the Election Com-
mission or to a Regional Commissioner such staff as may be necessary for the
discharge of the functions conferred on the Election Commission by clause
(1).
325.2—There shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial consti-
1
Applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir only in so far as it relates to elections
to Parliament and to the offices of President and Vice-President.
2 Not applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
 THE CONSTITUTION 361
tuency for election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either
House of the Legislature of a State and no person shall be ineligible for inclu-
sion in any such roll or claim to be included in any special electoral roll for
any such constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of
them.
326. 1 —The elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative
Assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage; that is to say,
every person who is a citizen of India and who is not less than twenty-one
years of age on such date as may be fixed in that behalf by or under any law
made by the appropriate Legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under
this Constitution or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the
ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal
practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election.
ill. 1 —Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may from
time to time by law make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or
in connection with, elections to either House of Parliament or to the House or
either House of the Legislature of a State including the preparation of elec-
toral rolls, the delimitation of constituencies and all other matters necessary
for securing the due constitution of such House or Houses.
328.1—Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and in so far as pro-
vision in that behalf is not made by Parliament, the Legislature of a State may
from time to time by law make provision with respect to all matters relating
to, or in connection with, the elections to the House or either House of the
Legislature of the State including the preparation of electoral rolls and all
other matters necessary for securing the due constitution of such House or
Houses.
329. 1 —Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution—
(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or
the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be
made under article 327 or article 328, shall not be called in question
in any court;
(b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either
House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except
by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner
as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate
Legislature.

PART X Y I . SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN CLASSES

330.—(1) Seats shall be reserved in the House of the People for—
(a) the Scheduled Castes;
(b) the Scheduled Tribes except the Scheduled Tribes in the tribal areas
of Assam; and
(c) the Scheduled Tribes in the autonomous districts of Assam.
(2) The number of seats reserved in any State for the Scheduled Castes or
the Scheduled Tribes under clause (1) shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same
1
N o t applicable to the State of J a m m u and K a s h m i r .
362 APPENDIX I

proportion to the total number of seats allotted to that State in the House of
the People as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or of the
Scheduled Tribes in the State or part of the State, as the case may be, in respect
of which seats are so reserved, bears to the total population of the State.
331.1—Notwithstanding anything in article 81, the President may, if he is of
opinion that the Anglo-Indian community is not adequately represented in the
House of the People, nominate not more than two members of that com-
munity to the House of the People.
332.1—(1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes, except the Scheduled Tribes in the tribal areas of Assam, in the Legis-
lative Assembly of every State specified in Part A or Part B of the First
Schedule.
(2) Seats shall be reserved also for the autonomous districts in the Legisla-
tive Assembly of the State of Assam.
(3) The number of seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of any State under clause (1) shall bear, as
nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats in the
Assembly as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or of the
Scheduled Tribes in the State or part of the State, as the case may be, in respect
of which seats are so reserved, bears to the total population of the State.
(4) The number of seats reserved for an autonomous district in the Legisla-
tive Assembly of the State of Assam shall bear to the total number of seats in
that Assembly a proportion not less than the population of the district bears
to the total population of the State.
(5) The constituencies for the seats reserved for any autonomous district of
Assam shall not comprise any area outside that district except in the case of
the constituency comprising the cantonment and municipality of Shillong.
(6) No person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe of any autono-
mous district of the State of Assam shall be eligible for election to the Legisla-
tive Assembly of the State from any constituency of that district except from
the constituency comprising the cantonment and municipality of Shillong.
333. 1 —Notwithstanding anything in article 170, the Governor or Rajpra-
mukh of a State may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community
needs representation in the Legislative Assembly of the State and is not ade-
quately represented therein, nominate such number of members of the com-
munity to the Assembly as he considers appropriate.
334.—Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part,
the provisions of this Constitution relating to—
(a) the reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes in the House of the People and in the Legislative Assemblies of
the States; and
(b) the representation of the Anglo-Indian community in the House of the
People and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States by nomination,
1
N o t applicable to the State o f Jammu and Kashmir.
 THE CONSTITUTION 363

shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of ten years from
the commencement of this Constitution:
Provided that nothing in this article shall affect any representation in the
House of the People or in the Legislative Assembly of a State until the dissolu-
tion of the then existing House or Assembly, as the case may be.
* * »

P A R T X V I I . OFFICIAL L A N G U A G E

Chapter I. Language of the Union

343.—(1) The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagari
script.
The form of numerals to be used for the official purposes of the Union shall
be the international form of Indian numerals.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1), for a period of fifteen years from
the commencement of this Constitution, the English language shall continue
to be used for all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used
immediately before such commencement:
Provided that the President may, during the said period, by order authorise
the use of the Hindi language in addition to the English language and of the
Devanagari form of numerals in addition to the international form of Indian
numerals for any of the official purposes of the Union.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, Parliament may by law provide
for the use, after the said period of fifteen years, of—
(a) the English language, or
(b) the Devanagari form of numerals,
for such purposes as may be specified in the law.
344.—(1) The President shall, at the expiration of five years from the com-
mencement of this Constitution and thereafter at the expiration of ten years
from such commencement, by order constitute a Commission which shall
consist of a Chairman and such other members representing the different
languages specified in the Eighth Schedule as the President may appoint, and
the order shall define the procedure to be followed by the Commission.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Commission to make recommendations to the
President as to—
(a) the progressive use of the Hindi language for the official purposes of the
Union ;
(b) restrictions on the use of the English language for all or any of the
official purposes of the Union ;
(c) the language to be used for all or any of the purposes mentioned in
article 348;
(d) the form of numerals to be used for any one or more specified purposes
of the Union ;
(e) any other matter referred to the Commission by the President as regards
the official language of the Union and the language for communication
364 APPENDIX I

between the Union and a State or between one State and another and
their use.
(3) In making their recommendations under clause (2), the Commission
shall have due regard to the industrial, cultural and scientific advancement of
India, and the just claims and the interests of persons belonging to the non-
Hindi speaking areas in regard to the public services.
(4) There shall be constituted a Committee consisting of thirty members, of
whom twenty shall be members of the House of the People and ten shall be
members of the Council of States to be elected respectively by the members of
the House of the People and the members of the Council of States in accor-
dance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.
(5) It shall be the duty of the Committee to examine the recommendations
of the Commission constituted under clause (1) and to report to the President
their opinion thereon.
(6) Notwithstanding anything in article 343, the President may, after con-
sideration of the report referred to in clause (5) issue directions in accordance
with the whole or any part of that report.

Chapter II. Regional Languages

345.—Subject to the provisions of articles 346 and 347, the Legislature of a
State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or
Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official
purposes of that State:
Provided that, until the Legislature of the State otherwise provides by law,
the English language shall continue to be used for those official purposes
within the State for which it was being used immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution.
346.—The language for the time being authorised for use in the Union for
official purposes shall be the official language for communication between one
State and another State and between a State and the Union:
Provided that if two or more States agree that the Hindi language should be
the official language for communication between such States, that language
may be used for such communication.
347.—On a demand being made in that behalf, the President may, if he is
satisfied that a substantial proportion of the population of a State desire the
use of any language spoken by them to be recognised by that State, direct that
such language shall also be officially recognised throughout that State or any
part thereof for such purpose as he may specify.

Chapter III. Language of the Supreme Court, High Courts, etc.

348.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part,
until Parliament by law otherwise provides—
(a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court,
 THE CONSTITUTION 365
(b) the authoritative texts—
(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in
either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legisla-
ture of a State,
(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all
Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor or Rajpramukh
of a State, and
(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Con-
stitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State,
shall be in the English language.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a) of clause (1), the Governor
or Rajpramukh of a State may, with the previous consent of the President,
authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any
official purposes of the State, in proceedings in the High Court having its
principal seat in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or
order passed or made by such High Court.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of clause (1), where the
Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English
language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of
the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor or Rajpramukh of
the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph
(iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language pub-
lished under the authority of the Governor or Rajpramukh of the State in the
Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text
thereof in the English language under this article.
349.—During the period of fifteen years from the commencement of this
Constitution, no Bill or amendment making provision for the language to be
used for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (1) of article 348 shall be
introduced or moved in either House of Parliament without the previous
sanction of the President, and the President shall not give his sanction to the
introduction of any such Bill or the moving of any such amendment except
after he has taken into consideration the recommendations of the Commission
constituted under clause (1) of article 344 and the report of the Committee
constituted under clause (4) of that article.

Chapter IV. Special Directives

350.—Every person shall be entitled to submit a representation for the re-
dress of any grievance to any officer or authority of the Union or a State in any
of the languages used in the Union or in the State, as the case may be.
351.—It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi
language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all
the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by
assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expres-
sions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the
366 APPENDIX I

Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its

vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.
PART X V I I I . EMERGENCY PROVISIONS.***

PART X I X . MISCELLANEOUS.***

PART X X . AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

368.1—An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the in-
troduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when
the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that
House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that
House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President for his assent
and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand
amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in—
(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI,
or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e) the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less
than one-half of the States specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule by
resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making
provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
PART X X I . TEMPORARY AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS.***

PART X X I I . SHORT TITLE, COMMENCEMENT AND REPEALS. * * *

First Schedule
PART A
Names of States Names of corresponding Provinces
Andhra 2
Assam Assam
Bihar Bihar
Bombay Bombay
Madhya Pradesh The Central Provinces and Berar
Madras Madras
Orissa Orissa
Punjab East Punjab
Uttar Pradesh The United Provinces
West Bengal West Bengal
1
In its application to the State of J a m m u and Kashmir the following proviso shall be
added: Provided further that no such amendment shall have effect in relation to the State
of Jammu and Kashmir unless applied by order of the President under clause (1) of Article
370.
2 The name of the new State of Andhra was added by the Andhra State Act, 1953.
 THE CONSTITUTION 367
Territories of States
The territory of the State of Andhra shall comprise the territories specified
in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Andhra State Act, 1953.
The territory of the State of Assam shall comprise the territories which im-
mediately before the commencement of this Constitution were comprised in
the Province of Assam, the Khasi States and the Assam Tribal Areas.
The territory of each of the other States in this Part shall comprise the ter-
ritories which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were
comprised in the corresponding Province and the territories which, by virtue
of an order made under section 290A of the Government of India Act, 1935,
were immediately before such commencement being administered as if they
formed part of that Province.
* * *
PART B

Names of States
Hyderabad
J a m m u and Kashmir
Madhya Bharat
Mysore
Patiala and East Punjab States Union
Rajasthan
Saurashtra
Travancore-Cochin.

Territories of States
The territory of each of the States in this Part shall comprise the territory
which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution was com-
prised in or administered by the Government of the corresponding Indian
State, and in the case of the State of Madhya Bharat, shall also comprise the
territory which immediately before such commencement was comprised in
the Chief Commissioner's Province of Panth Piploda.

PART c
Names of States
Ajmer
Bhopal
Coorg
Delhi
Himachal Pradesh
Kutch
Manipur
Tripura
Vindhya Pradesh
Territories of States
The territory of each of the States of Ajmer, Coorg and Delhi shall
comprise the territory which immediately before the commencement of this
368 APPENDIX I

Constitution was comprised in the Chief Commissioners' Provinces of

Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg and Delhi, respectively.
The territory of each of the other States in this Part shall comprise the terri-
tories which, by virtue of an order made under section 290a of the Government
of India Act, 1935, were immediately before the commencement of this Con-
stitution being administered as if they were a Chief Commissioner's Province
of the same name.
PART D

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Second Schedule
PART A***
PART B***
PART C
Provisions as to the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the House of the
People and the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of States and
the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of a State in
Part A of the First Schedule and the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the
Legislative Council of any such State.
7.—There shall be paid to the Speaker of the House of the People and the
Chairman of the Council of States such salaries and allowances as were pay-
able to the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India im-
mediately before the commencement of this Constitution, and there shall be
paid to the Deputy Speaker of the House of the People and to the Deputy
Chairman of the Council of States such salaries and allowances as were pay-
able to the Deputy Speaker of the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of
India immediately before such commencement.
8.—There shall be paid to the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legis-
lative Assembly of a State specified in Part A of the First Schedule and to the
Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council of such State
such salaries and allowances as were payable respectively to the Speaker and
the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and the President and the
Deputy President of the Legislative Council of the corresponding Province
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution and, where the
corresponding Province had no Legislative Council immediately before such
commencement, there shall be paid to the Chairman and the Deputy Chair-
man of the Legislative Council of the State such salaries and allowances as the
Governor of the State may determine.
PART D***
PART E
Provisions as to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India
12.—(1) There shall be paid to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of
India a salary at the rate of four thousand rupees per mensem.
 THE CONSTITUTION 369
(2) The person who was holding office immediately before the commence-
ment of this Constitution as Auditor-General of India and has become on such
commencement the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India under article
377 shall in addition to the salary specified in sub-paragraph (1) of this para-
graph be entitled to receive as special pay an amount equivalent to the dif-
ference between the salary so specified and the salary which he was drawing as
Auditor-General of India immediately before such commencement.
(3) The rights in respect of leave of absence and pension and the other con-
ditions of service of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India shall be
governed or shall continue to be governed, as the case may be, by the provi-
sions which were applicable to the Auditor-General of India immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution and all references in those
provisions to the Governor-General shall be construed as references to the
President.

Third Schedule***

Fourth Schedule

Allocation of Seats in the Council of States

To each State or group of States specified in the first column of the table of
seats appended to this Schedule there shall be allotted the number of seats
specified in the second column of the said table opposite to that State or group
of States, as the case may be.

The Council of States

Representatives of States specified in Part A of the First Schedule
1
States Total Seats
Andhra 1 12
Assam 6
Bihar 21
Bombay 17
Madhya Pradesh 12
Madras 18
Orissa 9
Punjab 8
Uttar Pradesh 31
West Bengal 14

148
1
Andhra was inserted by the Andhra State Act, 1953. The previous allocation for
Madras was 27 so that the new total of 148 represents an increase of 3.
24—p.I.
 APPENDIX I

Representatives of States specified in Part B of the First Schedule

1 2
States Total Seats
Hyderabad 11
Jammu and Kashmir . . . . 4
Madhya Bharat . 6
Mysore . . . . . . 6
Patiala and East Punjab States Union . 3
Rajasthan 9
Saurashtra . . . . . 4
Travancore-Cochin . . . . 6

49

Representatives of States specified in Part C of the First Schedule

1 2
States " Total Seats
Ajmer\ j
Coorg/
Bhopal 1
Himachal Pradesh . . . . 1
Delhi 1
Kutch 1
Manipur\ j
Tripura J
Vindhya Pradesh . . . . 4

10
Total of seats . . 207

Fifth Schedule***
Sixth Schedule***
Seventh Schedule***
Eighth Schedule***
Ninth Schedule***
 A P P E N D I X 11
T H E C H A N G I N G A S S E M B L Y (See p. 50 n.)
The following extracts from the proceedings of the Central Assemblies of
India may serve to illustrate the changing tone of discussion. Extracts have
been made from each of the main periods following the introduction of fresh
legislature reforms in 1861, 1892, 1909, 1919, 1952. The extracts are from
'Budget debates' :
1. Extract from 'Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-
General of India assembled for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations,
186?:-.
The Council met at Government House, on Wednesday, the 16th April
1862.
PRESENT :
His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Presiding.
His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.
The Hon'ble Cecil Beadon.
Major-General the Hon'ble Sir R. Napier, K.C.B.
The Hon'ble S. Laing.
The Hon'ble H. B. Harrington.
The Hon'ble H. Forbes.
The Hon'ble C. J. Erskine.
The Hon'ble W. S. Fitzwilliam.
The Hon'ble D. Cowie.
The Hon'ble Rajah Deo Narain Singh Bahadoor.
The Hon'ble Mr. Laing having ' brought forward the Budget of the Govern-
ment of India for 1862-63 ' in a fairly lengthy speech, the debate began :
'The Hon'ble Mr. Cowie said that, as an unofficial Member, he felt it to be
his duty to express the gratification with which he had listened to the State-
ment which had just been made, respecting the Surplus Revenue and the
objects to which it was to be devoted. To the high Duties on Imports he had
always objected as wholly indefensible, except upon the ground of necessity,
and he regarded their reduction as a simple act of justice, quite irrespectively
of any pressure from Manchester or any other quarter. He also cordially ap-
proved of the abolition of the 2 per cent Income Tax. At the time of the intro-
duction of the Tax by the late Mr. Wilson, he [Mr. Cowie] thought that the
limit had been fixed too low, and two years' experience as an Income Tax
Commissioner had convinced him that the greater part of the oppression of
which complaint was made in the collection of the Income Tax, was exercised
in respect of the 2 per cent levied on the smaller Incomes. With reference to the
continuance of the remainder of the Tax for three years more, he trusted that
the prosperity of the country would be so progressive that the Council might
be able to remove it altogether before the expiration of that period.
371
372 APPENDIX II

The Hon'ble Mr. Fitzwilliam said that he was happy to join in the con-
gratulations of his colleague on the Financial Statement which the Council
had just heard. He considered that the reduction of the Import Duties would
afford an important relief to the country, and especially to its commerce. He
fully concurred with Mr. Cowie in his views of the Income Tax, and could, in
like manner, speak from experience as a Commissioner for its collection. The
Tax had the effect of promoting both oppression and immorality, more par-
ticularly in its operation, on the large class who would now be relieved. As a
Member of that Council, he felt happy to give his cordial assent to the present
partial remission of the Tax, and he hoped that the time might soon arrive
when the Tax could be dispensed with altogether.
His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor said that, as his views on the Import
Duties had been alluded to by Mr. Laing, it might be necessary to explain
them for the satisfaction of those Members of the Council who were not
Members of the Executive Council, and therefore had not seen the papers on
the subject. N o Member of the Council objected more strongly than he did to
all Duties in the nature of protective Duties; and if he had thought that the
question of protection was involved in the difference between a 5 per cent, and
10 per cent. Duty, he should have considered that the additional 5 per cent,
should be the first to be remitted, or if the whole Tax partook of the character
of a protective Duty, he should have been in favor of its being taken off al-
together. But looking at the Tax merely as one for Revenue, in preference to
the License Tax which was then about to be imposed, he thought that it was
free from objection. The License Tax, however, had been given up, and there-
by a considerable burden of anxiety had been removed from his mind. His im-
pression was that the next Tax to be assailed, should be the Income Tax, in
preference to the Duties on Importations. But if practical men said that those
Duties acted as protective Duties, then no one more heartily approved of their
remission than himself.
The Motion was then put and agreed to.
The Hon'ble Mr. Laing then applied to His Excellency the President to sus-
pend Rules 15 and 16 for the conduct of business, in order that he might in-
troduce the Bill.
His Excellency the President declared the Rules in question suspended.
The Hon'ble Mr. Laing then introduced the Bill, and moved that it be re-
ferred to a Select Committee with instructions to report in a week.
The Motion was put and agreed to.'

At the next meeting of the Council, a week later,—

'The Hon'ble Mr. Laing presented the Report of the Select Committee on
the Bill to amend Act X of 1860 (to amend Act V I I of 1859, to alter the Duties
of Customs on foods imported or exported by Sea), and applied to His Ex-
cellency the President to suspend Rule 23 for the conduct of business. He said
that the alterations in the Bill were simply to add the words " Silk Chussum,"
after the words " R a w Silk", and to strike out words that were unnecessary.
His Excellency the President declared the Rule in question suspended.
The Hon'ble Mr. Laing then moved that the Report of the Select Com-
mittee be taken into consideration, and that the Bill, as settled by the Select
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 373
Committee, be passed. He said that it was desirable that the new Duties should
come into operation without delay.
The Hon'ble Rajah Deo Narain Singh said that he gladly availed himself
of this opportunity to express his warm admiration of the Financial Statement
submitted by the Hon'ble Mr. Laing at the last Meeting of the Council. In that
Statement it was shown that owing to the excellent management of the Hon'ble
Member, the expenditure had been considerably diminished, while the In-
come had at the same time improved, and a large increase of treasure had
accumulated in the Government Treasuries. This was no easy task, and its
accomplishment, while giving new strength to the Empire, had greatly bene-
fited the people by occasioning the repeal of the two per cent. Income Tax, the
License Tax, and the abolition or diminution of sundry Customs Duties. The
following advantages too, would on consideration, be found to have resulted
therefrom:
1st.—The two per cent. Duty bore most heavily on Incomes of not more
than 500 Rupees, and the relief occasioned by its repeal would be sensibly felt.
The License Tax was most oppressingly felt by Artizans, etc., and was a
source of daily annoyance to them, and its repeal would restore to them their
peace of mind and fill their hearts with gratitude to their Sovereign, for the
continuance of whose reign they would offer up hearty prayers.
2nd.—Although Act XXXII of 1860 imposed the Income Tax for a speci-
fied term of five years, people did not believe it would ever be taken off again;
many instancing that, though in England the Tax had been first imposed for a
limited period, it had since become permanent. The partial repeal of the Tax
within the period authorized by law would have the immediate effect of driving
such false surmises out of the heads of the people, and of convincing them that
the Tax would really be taken off on the expiry of the five years for which it
was imposed, and they would be ashamed of their former doubts.
3rd.—When Act XXXII was published, it was stated that Government was
forced to impose the Tax for the purpose of equalizing the Income and Ex-
penditure, and to make good losses incurred by the Mutiny. This statement
was by most people looked upon as a mere excuse for raising money, the fact
of Government having suffered any loss being denied. The falseness of these
doubts would now be proved by the fact of Government having taken off the
Tax as soon as the state of the finances would permit, and people would see
that its imposition was forced on the Government, and that the Government
was not actuated by a desire to screw money out of the people. The most im-
portant result, however, would be that the people would place entire con-
fidence in their Sovereign in whose service they would be ready to lay down
their lives.
Finally, too much could not be said in praise of Mr. Laing who, undeterred
by several serious attacks of illness, had labored unceasingly and to such good
purpose as in a short time to produce results quite unlooked for by the Natives
of this country, who could not but feel the heavy debt of gratitude they all
owed him. The Native Members of that Council were specially under obliga-
tion to him, for as these remissions of taxation had been made since they had
had the honor of occupying seats in the Council, they had risen high in the
estimation of their fellow subjects.
374 A P P E N D I X II

The Secretary read the Report of the Select Committee, and the Motion was
then put and agreed to.'
2. At the Council that 'met at Government House on Thursday, 21 March
1895\ twenty members were present to hear 'the Financial Statement of the
Hon'ble Sir James Westland'. Discussion of the Statement began on the
following Thursday. More Members took part than in 1862. One of them, Mr.
James, devoted his attention to the Post Office, urging that the main effort
should be to cheapen and improve the postal service rather than to produce
surpluses. Another, Sir Griffith Evans, concentrated on the importance of de-
veloping opium cultivation as a source of government revenue—in spite of the
'useless and improper agitation' of the 'opium faddists' in England—and on
the doubtful wisdom of the Chitral Expedition. Mr. Playfair advocated the
purchase of an increased proportion of Government stores from India instead
of England, partly for reasons of economy and partly 'injustice to the im-
portant industrial interests of India'. But the most noteworthy change from
1862 is to be found in the contributions of the Indian Members. The following
extracts are from the speech of Gangadhar Rao Madhar Chitnavis:

' I am aware, my Lord, that the view is urged in certain quarters that the
financial arrangements of the Government of India are, as a policy, so regu-
lated as to exhaust the very last resources of the tax-payer and to further
foreign interests in total disregard of the interests of the children of the soil.
My Lord, it is an opinion against which I would give the most emphatic pos-
sible protest, for with such a policy as a whole no Government in the world
could have more than a most ephemeral existence. Rightly or wrongly, India
is sometimes likened to the goose that used to lay golden eggs, but who would
be so foolish, my Lord, after the fable has grown pretty old in the world, as to
kill the goose for the sake of enriching one's self all in one day? The best in-
terests of England and the English Government can only be served by looking
first to the interests of the ruled and then to those of the ruling country, and if
any Government in power reverses this policy, or disregards it even for a
moment, future Governments have to pay the penalty, and I am not sure that
the present straits of the Government are not said to be to some extent the in-
evitable result of overlooking this far-sighted policy some time in the past.
The policy, however, which has mainly guided the English Government in
this country hitherto, and which will continue to guide it so long as England
can produce such far-sighted statesmen as we see at the present day, will, I
venture to hope, be that policy which was well defined some twenty years ago
by the late Prime Minister. " O u r title to be in India", said Mr. Gladstone,
"depends on a first condition, that our being there is profitable to the Indian
nations; and on a second condition that we can make them see and understand
it to be profitable"—a statement which calls to my mind the words of another
great statesman, a former Viceroy of India, I mean Lord Lawrence, who said
that "light taxation is the panacea for foreign rule in India".
When, therefore, my Lord, the Government is able to announce that it has
to impose no further burdens upon its subjects, I feel that the pleasure is
shared by both governed and governors alike.
At the same time, my Lord, I cannot but think that, despite the best wishes
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 375
of the Government, the Indian tax-payer is well nigh bent double with his
burden, and that any additional pressure could only break his back. The best
proof of this, I believe, is the imposition of the cotton-duties, a measure which
secured for the Secretary of State such strong opposition from a very influen-
tial section of the British public, and which, I believe, he would have held on
refusing to accede to, had there been open to him any further ways of taxing
the Indian people without a marked and glaring injustice.
I cannot but feel concerned at the gathering clouds in the North-West
horizon, which, I am afraid, bursting ere long, will bring back all his troubles
in an aggravated form and scatter his surplus of Rs.46,200 to the winds.
I am glad to observe from the Financial Statement that the Government of
India recognised the necessity of suspending the collections of land-revenue in
the Central Provinces during 1894-95 owing to failure of crops in parts of
those Provinces. Yet I read with no little concern that the whole revenue which
was thus postponed, re-appears not in instalments but all at once in the Budget
Estimate for the coming year, together with the entire revenue for that year.
So far as I am informed, and I have good opportunities of being well in-
formed, the state of crops this year has by no means improved, if it has not on
the contrary grown worse than last year. It was only the other day that a
deputation of the leading citizens of Saugor, on behalf of the people of the
Saugor District, waited upon the Chief Commissioner to represent to him the
state of the kharif crops in their district, which had been entirely ruined
through excessive rain. They showed that there was no hope of the outturn
being more than two annas in the rupee, and also that the prospects of the
rabi crop were not hopeful either. A considerable area of land has remained
unfilled for want of seed and funds for payment of labour. The linseed crop
and, in many cases, the wheat crop has already been damaged by rust. What
has been said about Saugor might be said with equal truth about Wardha,
Bhandara and some other districts of the province. The people, it is said in the
local paper just to hand, have a very gloomy future before them, and they are
likely to suffer another famine more terrible in its effects than the previous one.
Such being the prospects of crops in my Provinces, I am quite confident that
postponements of revenue will be still more urgently needed in this coming
year than in the one about to expire, and that the Budget Estimate of the land-
revenue in my Provinces has been fixed at rather an impossible figure. This
figure alone, if properly estimated, would, in my opinion, convert the surplus
into a deficit.
With this question of failure of crops is intimately connected the question of
the indebtedness of the agricultural population, which has of late years
attracted deserved attention from the Government. There has been continued
failure of crops for some years, and the Government considered it needful to
suspend the collection of revenue. This year the Government comes forward
to realize its past dues all in one year, and that a year of scarcity. The only
recourse open to the agricultural population to pay their dues is therefore to
borrow at high rates of interest and ruin themselves beyond recovery. Under
the circumstances such as these the idea occurs to me of going back to the old
Indian methods of remission of Government revenue in part and realization of
rent in kind. This, I think, is a very possible means of saving the agricultural
population from further indebtedness and improving their condition.
376 APPENDIX II

My Lord, I would not like to take up the time of the Council with any
further criticisms in reference to the Financial Statement presented this year:
so far as it goes, it is no doubt a very favourable one. It is perhaps very un-
kind for a non-official member to criticise the Budget Statements of such
critical years as we are passing through, for while he is almost by nature in-
clined to point out that there might be greater savings in every department of
expenditure, the Government perhaps thinks that it had already done its best
to effect it. A non-official member is perhaps too inclined to think that the
ever-increasing military expenditure of the country ought to be effectually re-
duced, and that the internal reforms of the country should be taken up in right
earnest, such questions as, for instance, the separation of the executive and the
judicial, which I believe would tend (though it may sound paradoxical) to
strengthen the executive, better prospects of pay and promotion to the police,
greater aids to education, longer periods of settlements, etc., etc. The impor-
tance of questions such as these, in a financial crisis like the present, are neces-
sarily lost upon the Government, and a non-official member thus performs a
somewhat thankless task. His views are resented by the Government as in-
opportune, and he is unable to secure any benefit for the people he represents.
But, whether or not the Government be in a position to accept the sugges-
tions of non-official members given out in this chamber from year to year, it is
easy to see that the position is this. Our expenditure is every year increasing,
and there seems to be no limit to the increase. On the other hand, the sources
of income as at present constituted seem to have reached very nearly their last
limit. India has been known through ages to be a very rich country, perhaps
the richest country in the world. But today she is hardly able to bear the costs
of government; for surely it means nothing else when year after year we find
ourselves face to face with liabilities greater than our assets and the Finance
Minister at his wit's end to make expenditure and income meet. What would a
private individual under such circumstances be driven to? Either he would
seek asylum in the Insolvency Court, or, if he had any hopes of solvency, he
would reduce his expenditure. One only hope there seems to be, namely, in
making the internal resources of the country ten times more productive that
she may be able to pay her expenses. The importation of machinery and capital,
the spread of commerce and improved methods of cultivation would seem to
have done a good deal in the right direction; but much more must yet be done,
and it would be idle to expect our financial situation to be based upon anything
like a permanent and natural foundation, so long as this has not been fully
effected by the Government.
In conclusion, my Lord, I would like to add that, in offering such criticisms
of the Financial Statement as I have been able to make, I have acted in no
carping spirit, but with an earnest desire to fulfil my duty to my people and to
effectuate the object of my presence here in Your Lordship's advisory Council.
I would not do Your Excellency's Government the injustice, my Lord, to be-
lieve that, in summoning to an enlarged Council natives of the country con-
versant with the feelings of particular provinces or classes of the population,
you do not earnestly wish for the real expression of their views, and I should in
fact be guilty of a want of confidence in the Government if I did not speak
plainly the thoughts that pass through our minds. Finance is so intimately
connected with taxation and taxation with good government and policy that I
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 377
have deemed the present the best moment to give my views. Evil we know is
done by want of thought as well as want of heart, and I and the people whom
I have the honour to represent feel that many, if not most, of the misunder-
standings which arise between the rulers and ruled in this country are the re-
sult rather of ignorance than want of sympathy and that such ignorance is
often a matter of the sincerest regret on the part of the Government. It is
therefore in the best spirit of loyalty that I have said what I had to say, a spirit
expressed so nobly in the words of Milton that I can scarcely end better than
by quoting them as an expression of my views:

" For he who freely magnifies what hath been nobly done and fears not to
declare as freely what might be done better, gives ye the best covenant of his
fidelity and that his loyalest affection and his hope waits on your proceed-
ings.'"

Even more striking was the speech of Mr. Mehta from which the following
passages are taken:
' I propose to offer a few observations on the Financial Statement that has
been explained to the Council with a clearness and ability for which we cannot
but be thankful. There can be do doubt that the right of discussing it, which
has been bestowed upon this Council by the Indian Councils Act, 1892, is a
most valuable privilege with large possibilities for the future. At the same time
it is difficult not to feel that there is an element of unreality about it, arising
from the peculiar position occupied by the Financial Member in Your Ex-
cellency's Executive Council. In a very recent debate in the House of Lords,
Lord Salisbury is reported to have borne testimony to the preponderating in-
fluence of the British Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the
counsels of the Ministry, and to have said that "when the Treasury lays its
hand upon any matter concerning the future development of the British Em-
pire, the chances of an Imperial policy are small." The position of the Indian
Finance Minister seems to be very nearly the reverse of that of the British
Chancellor of the Exchequer. The vulgar gaze is not allowed to penetrate be-
hind the thick curtains that enshroud the sanctuary, but the priests of the
tabernacle are sometimes human enough to disclose partial glimpses of the
mysteries within. In a valuable paper on " T h e Perilous Growth of Indian
State Expenditure", which may well be styled the Confessions of an Indian
Finance Minister, Sir Auckland Colvin says that " a Financial Member of
Council is not at liberty to express in his annual Financial Statement his per-
sonal point of view on the collective policy of the Government of which he is
a member". But, freed from official chains, both Sir David Barbour and Sir
Auckland Colvin, who between them represent the financial period between
1883-1892-3, have recently acknowledged that the constitution of the Govern-
ment of India is such that there is no efficient control over expenditure, and
that every Member of the Council, except the Financial Minister, is not only
irresponsible for financial equilibrium, but is directly interested in spending,
and as a matter of fact overpower all his appeals for economy and reduction.
These are not the views of clumsy and pretentious Native would-be poli-
ticians, who audaciously presume to think that they could govern the Empire
378 APPENDIX II

better, but those of distinguished men whose mature and tried knowledge and
experience must command respect, confirming in the most remarkable manner
the contention of the Association that it is the enormous increase of expendi-
ture since 1885-6 which is more responsible even than the depreciated rupee
for the embarrassed and critical state of Indian finance. But it has been argued
that, though it is perfectly true that the expenditure has increased, the increase
is justified by the needs of an expanding and progressive Empire.
But the real question is whether the items of military and civil expenditure
bear any just and reasonable proportion to the revenue that can be possibly
realized from the country without incurring peril and exhaustion. Altogether
something like seven crores of fresh taxation have been imposed since 1885.
What these figures mean is that military expenditure more than fully ab-
sorbs one-half of the whole net revenue of the country, or, to put it in another
way, if you leave out of account the opium revenue, which cannot be relied on
as stable owing to the competition of the home-grown drug in China, the mili-
tary expenditure absorbs the whole of what has been called taxation revenue
proper, derived from salt, stamps, excise, provincial rates, customs as now
fully revived, income and other assessed taxes, forest, registration and tributes
from Native States. Such a situation cannot but be regarded with serious
anxiety, but its gravity is immeasurably enhanced when we remember how the
land-revenue is raised to the amount at which it stands. I admit that there are
excellent rules laid down by Government for preventing undue severity in
settlement and revision proceedings. But the ingenuity of Revenue-officers is
wonderful, and in spite of limits against over-enhancement the individual cul-
tivator finds the settlement heavy beyond measure. Except in Bengal, four-
fifths of the agricultural population is steeped in debt and poverty. If the saukar
presses heavily against the raiyat, it is the Revenue-officer who has driven the
raiyat into the hands of the saukar. But the tale does not end here. Heavy as
the assessment mostly is, the rigidity and inelasticity of the system of collection
is more crushing still. The Commission appointed to enquire into the Dekkan
Agriculturists' Relief Act advocated a more liberal practice with regard to re-
missions and suspensions of revenue; but the Bombay Government actually
resented the recommendation as uncalled for and imprudent. The serious im-
port of this state of things arises from the consideration that grand military
preparations for protection against foreign invasion, or indeed anything else,
are nothing to the cultivator unless he has got something appreciable to pro-
tect. It has also been argued that the Indian raiyat is the most lightly taxed
subject in the whole world. But, apart from the circumstance that the assess-
ment he has to pay is both rent and tax combined, is it true that he pays no
other tax than the salt-tax? In debt all his life, does he not pay in stamps and
court-fees for every application he makes to a Revenue-officer, for every pro-
cess that is issued by or against him in the endless resort to Courts of one sort
or another, and does he not pay registration fees for his perpetual transactions
of bonds and mortgages and transfers ? Insufficiently fed all the year round,
does he not pay the excise-duty on liquor and opium, raising the abkari re-
venue by leaps and bounds ? In a recent discussion in the Belgian Chambers
Mons. Lejeune, former Minister of Justice, pointed out from statistics that the
consumption of spirits in Belgium had increased to an alarming extent, raising
the excise-revenue from four millions of francs in 1851 to thirty-three millions
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 379
in the present year, and that the principal reason for the increase was the in-
sufficiency of food procurable by the labouring classes. It is a well-known fact
that the cultivating labourer ekes out nourishment by the use of alcohol and
opium. If he does not pay the income-tax, does he not pay the road and other
cesses ? Has he not, since the new forest policy was introduced, contributed to
the forest-revenue by paying grazing and other fees and charges which he
never had to pay before ? As a matter of fact, the Indian raiyat goes through
life carrying a load of many burdens on his back. My object in referring to
these matters is to try to show that, if revenue can only be raised in this man-
ner, the expenditure for which this revenue is required to be raised, however
academically reasonable or incontrovertible in itself, is beyond the capacity
and resources of the country.
My Lord, I have spoken freely in the firm consciousness of a true and sin-
cere loyalty, for if by loyalty is meant a keen solicitude for the safety and per-
manence of the Indian Empire in which I am persuaded lie implanted the
roots of the welfare, prosperity and regeneration of this country, then I claim
to be more loyal than Englishmen and Anglo-Indians themselves, who are
sometimes led to subordinate the interests of that safety and that permanence
to the impetuous impulses of a singularly brave spirit, to the seductions of
conquest and imperial vain glory, or to the immediate gains and temptations
of commercial enterprise.
Sir James Westland was last year pleasantly sarcastic over " t h e united wis-
dom of the Native gentlemen interested in politics, who met at Christmas at
Lahore to show us how we ought to govern India", and enjoyed a hearty
laugh over their proposals to reduce revenue and increase expenditure at one
and the same time. Though of course they could not bear comparison with
members of the most distinguished service in the world, these gentlemen are
still not altogether devoid of logic and sense in their suggestions. It is not very
difficult to understand that, if you economise in the right directions, you can
reduce revenue and increase expenditure in others. If you could reduce your
military expenditure to reasonable proportions, if you could steady your " f o r -
w a r d " policy so as not to lead to incessant costly expeditions, if you could get
your inflated Army Home Estimates moderated, if you could devise ways by
which the huge burdens of salaries and pensions could be lightened, then it is
not chimerical to imagine that you could improve your judicial machinery,
strengthen your police, develop a sounder system of education, cover the
country with useful public works and railways, undertake larger sanitary
measures, cheapen the post and telegraph, and still be in a position to relieve
small incomes, to press less heavily on the land, to give the cultivators breath-
ing time and to reduce the salt-tax.'

This contribution drew replies not only from the Financial Member but also
from the Commander-in-Chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and from
the Governor-General himself.
3. The Financial Statement for 1913-14 was presented to the new enlarged
' Morley-Minto" Council in Delhi on 1 March 1913. The Viceroy, Lord Hard-
inge, presided and 47 members attended to hear Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson.
A week later, the discussion began and it now takes the form of a debate on a
380 APPENDIX II

series of resolutions moved by Members. 64 members were present and 24

spoke. A list of these resolutions indicates the scope of the discussion:
'That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that
the Provincial Settlement with the Government of Madras be revised so as to
increase the Provincial share of the excise revenue from one-half to three-
fourths.'
'That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that
the additional assignment for recurring expenditure on Education for the
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, announced in the Financial Statement,
be raised by Rs.1,200,000 a year.'
'That this Council recommends to His Excellency the Governor General in
Council that the amount allotted to Bihar and Orissa under the head of non-
recurring grants for education, sanitation and other beneficial purposes, be in-
creased by five lakhs of rupees.'
' That this Council recommends to His Excellency the Governor General in
Council that the amount allotted to Bihar and Orissa in the distribution of the
recurring grants for the promotion of education and the improvement of sani-
tation be increased by five lakhs of rupees.'
'That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that
the grant of 85 lakhs proposed to be distributed to the Major Provinces for re-
curring expenditure on Education and Sanitation in the Budget, be increased
by an additional sum of Rs.15 lakhs from the Imperial Revenue which should
be specially allotted for the development of Technical Education.'
'That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that an
additional grant of Rs.20 lakhs be given for Sanitation in Bengal.'
'That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that
the grants made to Local Governments be increased by such allotments as the
Government of India may think fit with a view to enable them to carry out the
experiment of the separation of judicial and executive functions in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in areas to be selected by them with the
approval of the Government of India.'

On this resolution sixteen members spoke and a division (25 Ayes, 37 Noes)
was taken.
' That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council the de-
sirablity, in view of the loss of opium revenue, of considering financial
measures for strengthening the resources of the Government, with special
reference to the possibility of increasing the revenue under a system of
preferential tariffs with the United Kingdom and the Colonies.'
'That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that
an additional customs duty of R.5 per cent, be levied on sugar imported into
India from foreign countries.'

The final budget debate took place on 24 March. The opening speech, that
of Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee, is fairly typical of the general tone:
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 381

' Sir, my first words on this occasion will be words of congratulation to the
Hon'ble Finance Minister on the Budget which he has presented to us. Our
feelings today, Sir, are of the mixed order. While we rejoice over the financial
prosperity of the country and grasp with gratitude the hand that has contri-
buted to it, so far as it lies in the power of a Finance Minister to do so, we are
filled with a sense of profound sorrow at his impending retirement and his
approaching departure f r o m this country. This feeling, I find is shared by Sir
Guy Fleetwood Wilson himself. H e says, in the speech with which he prefaced
the Financial Statement on the 1st March last, that he views the severance of
his connection with the Government of India with great sorrow. If he is sorry
to leave us, we are also deeply sorry to part with him. If at the present moment
India is prosperous and happy, the result is, in some degree at least, due to the
successful financial administration over which Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson pre-
sided with such conspicuous ability and such pre-eminent sympathy for the
people. For, Sir, the Department of Finance covers every other Department
and colours it with its hue. When Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson came out to this
country towards the end of 1908, the financial horizon was overcast with dark
and ominous clouds. The budget which was presented in the course of the next
three months disclosed a heavy deficit to the extent of nearly four millions. T o -
day, Sir, we have a surplus of seven millions. True, some new taxes have been
imposed to which nobody in India has seriously objected, but the public ex-
penditure has been well-maintained, the progressive requirements of the
country met, and the prospects of steady and continuous advancement
assured. In bidding Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson good-bye, we wish him long
life and prosperity in the old country, and may we couple this wish with the
hope that he may continue to feel an abiding interest in that country whose
prosperity and welfare he so sedulously tried to advance during the period of
his official connection with India ? H e will be remembered, Sir, as one of the
ablest and one of the most sympathetic of Finance Ministers whose outlook
extended beyond the range of his own particular department and whose sym-
pathies were co-extensive with the entire circle of our varied and multitudinous
interests.
Sir, there is one passage in the speech of Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson to
which I have already referred which will linger in our memories and will
appeal to our imagination long after he has left these shores. While dwelling
to the necessity of establishing a gold mint in this country, he made the obser-
vation that we are all united by the common bond, that we are fellow-citizens
of one great Empire. Sir, no nobler sentiment could have been uttered, for it
points to the essential equality of status on the part of His Majesty's Indian
subjects; and here may I be permitted to make an appeal, if I am allowed to
do so without impertinence or irreverence, to the Hon'ble Members who
occupy those benches and who constitute the Government of India, that they
may so discharge their exalted duties that this sentiment may be deepened and
accentuated and that we may all feel and realise, no matter whether we are
Englishmen or Scotchmen or Irishmen or Indians, that we are Britishers;
fellow-citizens, participating in the privileges and also in the obligations of a
common Empire, the greatest, perhaps the world has ever seen ?
Sir, sanitation and education are the watchwords of modern India. They
have been accepted by the Government with alacrity and enthusiasm. Sir Guy
382 APPENDIX II

Fleetwood Wilson, in the speech to which I have referred, says that they are
twins of phenomenal development. So they are. Sanitation is the first of our
needs. We must live before we can be educated, and we must be educated in
order that we may realise the commonest hygienic needs so indispensable for
the purposes of effective sanitation. The interdependence between sanitation
and education is recognised by the Government of India, which has made
them the concern of a common Department. You, Sir, as the head of the
Education and Sanitary Department are responsible for the health and the
education of the millions of our fellow-countrymen. I can conceive of no
higher duty or more exalted trust, and I may be permitted to add that educated
India is watching the operations of your Department with interest and ex-
pectancy. Sir, we are grateful to the Government of India for the grants which
it has made to the Local Governments in respect of sanitation, education and
other matters, and here perhaps, I may be permitted to utter a word of com-
plaint. There has been, perhaps, too great a disposition on the part of the
Government to earmark these grants, and the Local Governments, confronted
with resolutions and interpellations, often find themselves in the difficult posi-
tion that they have to refuse reasonable proposals put forward by non-official
members on the ground that they are handicapped by the instructions of the
Government of India. Sir, I do not for one moment dispute that the Govern-
ment of India, having made these grants, ought to have a voice in their dis-
posal ; but I beg to submit, Sir, that in accordance with the spirit of the great
Despatch of the 25th August, 1911, which holds out to us in prospect the
boon of provincial autonomy, a greater and larger measure of discretion
should be allowed to the Local Governments in the disposal of these funds.
Sir, if sanitation and education are the watchwords of the Government of
India, they are matters of absorbing interest to the Local Governments. Thus
for instance, the Government of Bengal has taken up the question of rural
sanitation and of village water-supply with a degree of earnestness and a
measure of practical sagacity which have won for that Government the un-
stinted gratitude of the people. In matters of sanitation and education the
policy of the Government of India is the policy of the Local Governments. I,
therefore, may be permitted in this Council Chamber to plead for the inde-
pendence of the Local Governments in these matters: they have to carry out
the instructions of the Government of India, varied by local conditions of
which they are best cognisant.
Sir, the release of the local cesses for local purposes has been an unspeak-
able boon to the people and is greatly appreciated by them. In Bengal, we get
25 lakhs a year, which, I understand, is to be devoted to village sanitation
and rural water-supply. Thousands and hundreds of thousands of lives are lost
every year through such preventible diseases as cholera and malarial fever.
Good water-supply, a good system of drainage will go far to protect the people
against the ravages of these diseases. The Government of Bengal has already
started anti-malarial operations, and with admirable results. I can bear my
personal testimony to the success of these operations in one particular area
with which I happen to be connected. Sir, if the 25 lakhs of rupees to which I
have referred be devoted to the digging and repairing of tanks, taking the
average cost of each tank to be Rs. 1,000, in the course of four years, we shall
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 383
have about 10,000 tanks in Bengal, an unspeakable boon to the people in the
rural areas.
Sir, the Hon'ble Finance Minister has been pleased to speak in terms of
sympathy with local self-government. He says the encouragement and develop-
ment of local self-government is an object about which all are agreed, and he
adds that these grants have been made with a view to strengthening their re-
sources. Sir, I am perfectly certain that these grants will enormously add to the
usefulness of local bodies. But, Sir, something more is needed for the en-
couragement and development of local self-government. With added funds
larger powers should be vested in them. I think their constitution ought to be
recast; they ought to be reorganised upon a more popular and liberal basis.
With greater independence, with larger powers of initiative, with less of
official control, these local bodies would be quickened into a new sense of
awakened responsibility. I rejoice, Sir, that the recommendations of the De-
centralisation Commission have been forwarded to the Secretary of State and
are under his consideration. I hope early orders will be passed, and I hope and
trust these orders will include the establishment of a Local Government Board
in each province. Sir, this is a proposal which was made in the time of Lord
Ripon. For some reason or another it was abandoned. I find, on reading
through the Report of the Decentralisation Commission, that Mr. Romesh
Chandra Dutt made this recommendation. I really hope, Sir, that this part of
the recommendations of Mr. Dutt will be accepted. At the present moment the
local bodies are supervised by hard-worked Magistrate-Collectors and Com-
missioners of Divisions. I think, Sir, the organisation of a central body super-
vising the self-governing institutions will have the effect of co-ordinating their
labours, and helping forward their development along normal and natural
lines.
Sir, we rejoice to find that the military expenditure is practically at a stand-
still, a sum of about £552,000 having been added in 1913-14 to the expenditure
side over the expenditure of the current year. Sir, it is further expected that as
the result of the labours of the Nicholson Committee there will be reductions.
But, Sir, there is an ominous note of warning in the speech of the Hon'ble the
Finance Minister. He says that a Committee has been appointed to inquire
into what he calls the Marine expenditure.
I should like to know what this marine expenditure is. I do hope that this
Committee will not make recommendations to add to the contribution which
we pay at the present moment to the British Navy. Hon'ble Members will re-
member the discussion which took place in the English newspapers regarding
the alleged inadequate grant which India makes in support of the British Navy.
We were reminded of the Dreadnoughts—of the gift of Dreadnoughts made
by the Colonies, and we were told that our contribution was below that of the
Colonies. That is so, so far as this particular matter is concerned; but in re-
gard to other matters, our contribution has been far in excess of that of the
Colonies—and I may add far in excess, in some cases at any rate, of the re-
quirements of justice and fair-play. The India Office—that magnificent pile of
buildings which attracts the gaze of the beholder in Whitehall—was built by
our money, and its establishment is maintained by us. The Colonial Office is
maintained by the Home Government. The Indian Army is maintained on a
footing so that it serves the purpose of an Imperial Reserve for which the
384 APPENDIX II

Imperial Government does not pay a farthing. In 1899, we sent 10,000 troops
to (South) Africa which saved the situation. In the Chinese War we sent an
Indian Contingent which did admirable service. Formerly the charges of
foreign expeditions in which Indian troops took part—both ordinary and
extraordinary—were paid out of the Indian revenues. Happily things have
altered for the better now. Lord Morley—then Mr. Morley—speaking in con-
nection with the Sudan War—described this policy as " a policy of melan-
choly meanness". But, as I have said, there has been an improvement in this
direction. The conscience of the British authorities has been stirred to a sense
of justice to the financial claims of India. In any case, Sir, I hope and trust, in
view of our contributions in the past, and in view of the poverty of our people
that no addition will be made in the shape of Marine charges.
The Hon'ble the Finance Minister refers to the improvements in communi-
cations as a source of revenue in which the Government of India is interested.
Probably those remarks apply to roads; but they might as well hold good in
respect of waterways. Sir, these waterways form an important branch of our
communications. In a country like ours with its long distances, with its fine
and magnificent rivers, the maintenance of waterways in a high state of effi-
ciency I conceive to be one of the greatest duties of Government. Sir, these
waterways provide facilities for cheap transport; they help the development of
inland trade; they constitute a perennial source of water-supply and thus
further the interests of sanitation. Sir, the German Government pays the
greatest possible attention to their canals and waterways, notwithstanding
their magnificent railways, for the purposes of industrial development. I hold
in my hand a book on Modern Germany written by Mr. Barker, who is an
authority on German affairs and with your permission, Sir, I will read a short
extract from it:

"Recognising the importance of a cheap transport system, which would

bring with it wholesome competition, Germany has steadily extended, en-
larged, and improved her natural and artificial waterways, and keeps on ex-
tending and improving them year by year, and if a man would devote some
years solely to the study of the German waterways, and make the necessary
but very extensive and exceedingly laborious calculations, he would prob-
ably be able to prove that Germany's industrial success is due chiefly to
cheap transport, and especially to the wise development of her waterways."

Well, Sir, we find in paragraph 187 of the Secretary's memorandum that

only a sum of 2 and two-thirds lakhs of rupees has been provided for the Mad-
aripurBheel in the Faridpur district. The provision is wholly inadequate. Many
of our rivers—I am speaking of Bengal, and I am sure what is true of Bengal is
true of the rest of India—many of our rivers are fast silting up and need
dredging. My Hon'ble friend on the left, Maharaja Ranajit Singh, has been
urging in the Local Council the need for dredging the Bhagirathi river. The
silting up of these rivers is a serious matter, even from the sanitary point of
view; as it obstructs drainage and constitutes a menace to the health of the
surrounding country. Therefore, Sir, from whatever point of view you choose
to view the matter—from the point of view of sanitation, of public con-
venience or of the development of inland trade—it seems to me that the
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 385
maintenance of our waterways in a state of the greatest possible efficiency is
an Imperial duty of the utmost importance and magnitude; and I desire to
press this consideration upon the attention of the Government of India with
all the emphasis that I can command.
Sir, we find that the Government of India have made grants of a non-recur-
ring character out of the surplus of this year. I hope, Sir—and I have reason to
believe—that that surplus will be recurring. An analysis of the situation forti-
fies me in this hope. Sir, the railway revenue has of recent years developed a
distinct tendency to grow and expand. F r o m 1909 up till now there has been
an increase in railway revenue year after year at the annual rate of from to
million pounds. I cannot help thinking that the Finance Minister has been
exceedingly cautious—I was going to say over-cautious—in his estimate. H e
has actually put the revenue of 1913-14 at 90 lakhs of rupees less than the re-
venue of this year. My countrymen do not share this pessimistic view. Railway
revenue depends upon trade conditions as well as upon social causes working
in the bosom of the community. So far as trade conditions are concerned, I am
not competent to speak, and I think very few are in a position to make a con-
fident forecast. But so far as these social causes are concerned, I may say this,
that the greater the facilities offered by the Railway Administrations the
greater the attention paid to the comfort and convenience of railway passengers
—especially of the third-class passengers, the greater will be the volume of
passenger traffic; and if passenger traffic goes on increasing, the goods traffic
is bound to increase too. The one will re-act on the other, and by their mutual
interaction strengthen each other. I am therefore optimistic in the view that
the railway receipts are likely to grow and expand year by year. And, Sir, if the
surplus is a recurring surplus, as I believe it will be, it seems to me that the best,
the wisest, the most economical thing for Government to do is, instead of
making these non-recurring grants, to revise the provincial settlements and to
give the Provincial Governments a larger share in the expanding revenues.
This is the view which was urged by Sir William D u k e on behalf of the Bengal
Government f r o m his place in the local Legislative Council.'

4. The atmosphere in the Central Legislative Assembly of 1928 can be illus-

trated by a few excerpts from the general discussion of the Budget on 8 March of
that year. In a large Assembly of over 100 members, the irremovable executive
now found itself confronted with a vigorous and hostile Opposition:
MR. R. K. SHANMUKHAM CHETTY (Salem and Coimbatore cum North Arcot:
Non-Muhammadan Rural)-. Mr. President, my Honourable friend Mr. Birla
made some very serious charges against the Honourable the Finance Member
in his speech yesterday. The substance of his charge is this, that the H o n o u r -
able the Finance Member in presenting to this House the nation's balance
sheet has presented it in such a way that if it were a company's balance sheet,
the person responsible for that balance sheet would be hauled up before a
court of law. My Honourable friend Mr. Birla gave some facts and figures in
support of his contention.
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL BLACKETT ( F i n a n c e Member): He mentioned
none.
MR R. K. SHANMUKHAM CHETTY: H e mentioned at least the accrued
25—p.I.
386 APPENDIX II

liability on the Post Office cash certificate bonus. At least that is substantially
accepted. Well, Sir, today, in the short time at my disposal, I propose to show
that in the Budget that the Honourable the Finance Member has presented he
had perpetrated two of the most serious fallacies known to logic, suppressio
veri and suggestio falsi.
SIR WALTER WILLSON (Associated Chambers of Commerce—Nominated
Non-Official): That is not fallacy.
M R . R. K. SHANMUKHAM CHETTY: I am afraid my Honourable friend has
not read logic. In support of my contention I will take into consideration the
analysis of the debt position of the Government of India as presented by the
Honourable the Finance Member. In the Explanatory Memorandum of
the Financial Secretary it is stated at page 14 that:
'in the five years ending the 31st March, 1929, the reduction (that is, in in-
terest charges) is fully 40% and is, among other things, an indication of the
extent of the replacement of unproductive by productive debt.'
In the speech of the Honourable the Finance Member, at page 31, he draws
attention to the fact that during the five years from the 31st March 1923, the
unproductive debt has been reduced by 76 crores. . . . What is the meaning of
reducing the unproductive debt ? There is no such thing as replacement of un-
productive debt by productive debt. (The HONOURABLE SIR BASIL BLACKETT:
Why not ?) When an unproductive debt has been incurred for certain pur-
poses, until that unproductive debt has been wiped off, it does remain as an
unproductive debt. It is absurd to say t h a t ' I have replaced my unproductive
debt by productive debt.' Such a statement has absolutely no meaning. My
Honourable friend is certainly entitled to utilise the resources in his hands in
investing them for productive purposes. I am not finding fault with him for
that, but to say that by this means he has reduced the unproductive debt is, to
say the least, absolutely misleading. The only way by which you can reduce
your unproductive debt is by setting apart a sinking fund for that purpose and
paying off that unproductive debt. That is the only way in which an unpro-
ductive debt can be reduced; and if that criterion is applied, the unproductive
debt during the last 5 years has been reduced to the extent of Rs.22-50 crores
and not to the extent of Rs.76 crores. (AN HON. MEMBER: Quite right.) . . .
If it is the intention of my Honourable friend, the Finance Member, to give an
accurate presentation of the debt position of the Government of India, then it
was his duty to show all the obligations of the Government of India on which
he has to pay interest. This figure he has given as Rs.107-21 crores on the 31st
March 1927, whereas on page 297 of the Finance and Revenue Accounts of the
Government of India for 1926-7 I find that this figure is Rs.133-05 crores.
Rs.133-05 crores represents the obligations of the Government of India bear-
ing interest. Therefore the total liability of the Government of India in the
matter of other obligations is Rs.133 crores and not Rs.107 crores. He has
omitted to show Rs.26 crores of the obligations of the Government of India
from the debt statement that he presented in his speech. I say that comes under
suppressio veri.
In paragraph 29 of his speech, speaking about surpluses he says that in
future also:
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 387
'Substantial savings may be expected to accrue in future, as they have done
in the past, under interest on deadweight debt.'
This statement, I submit is suggestio falsi, and it is for this reason. My Honour-
able friend says that there will be a surplus in future years because there will be
a substantial reduction in the interest on deadweight charges. I submit that if
there has been a substantial reduction in the interest on deadweight debt in the
last five years, it is because there have been surpluses, and it is because he has
utilised these surpluses in productive enterprises. Therefore, the reduction in
interest on deadweight debt was a result of the surpluses and the surpluses
were not the result of a reduction in the interest on deadweight debt. I suppose
it is too much for the Honourable the Finance Member to understand.
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : I have entirely failed to follow.
M R . R . K . SHANMUKHAM CHETTY : I can explain it to you once more because
it is a very serious point. My Honourable friend says in his speech that in
future he feels confident there will be a surplus and he gives as one of his
reasons for his belief the fact that there would be a substantial saving in the
interest on deadweight debt. My point is this. In the past there has been a
substantial saving in the interest on deadweight debt because there have been
surpluses and these surpluses he has utilised in increasing the productive
enterprises. Therefore the savings in interest were a result of the surpluses and
the surpluses were not a result of the savings in interest. I hope my Honour-
able friend the Finance Member has understood my point.
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : N o .
M R . R. K . SHANMUKHAM C H E T T Y : Then I pity him. I am afraid I cannot
make myself more intelligible than this.
M R . G A Y A PRASAD S I N G H ( M u z a j f a r p u r cum Champaran, Non-Muhamma-
dari): Give him one more chance.
M R . R . K . SHANMUKHAM C H E T T Y : This is suggestio falsi. It suggests as the
effect what is the cause. Surpluses are the cause of the reduction of interest and
not the effect.
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : What is the cause of the surplus?
Heavy taxation. I am going presently to
M R . R . K . SHANMUKHAM C H E T T Y :
prove how you got your surpluses. As I stated the only way by which you can
reduce your unproductive debt is to lay aside a sinking fund for the purpose
and pay off the unproductive debt.
M R . M . A . J I N N A H (Bombay City, Muhammadan Urban): It does not require
brains to produce a surplus. You have to tax.
M R . R. K . SHANMUKHAM C H E T T Y : In this connection I would just like to
make an observation on the way in which the accounts of the Government are
kept in this respect. So far as I have been able to understand the Finance and
Revenue Accounts, the Government of India do not keep a separate account
of their unproductive debt. They keep an account which shows the total
volume of their debt and they have got another account which shows the
various items of productive enterprise in which their debts are being utilised.
N o w from year to year they deduct from their total debt the amount of debt
388 APPENDIX II

they have invested in productive enterprise and whatever balance remains is

called unproductive debt. I submit that is not the proper way of maintaining
accounts.
THE HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : W h y ?
MR. R. K . SHANMUKHAM CHETTY; That does not enable this House to
appreciate the real position of the Government of India with regard to unpro-
ductive debt. What ought to be done is this. A separate account must be main-
tained for unproductive debt and the amount that you set apart for sinking
fund and the amount that you get by your realised surpluses must be utilised
in purchasing off securities and cancelling them. That is the only way of re-
ducing unproductive debt.
THE HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : W h y ?
Mr. R. K . SHANMUKHAM CHETTY: What is the other legitimate source that
you have got for reducing unproductive debt ? Y o u are not going to utilise the
railway depreciation fund to write off your unproductive debt. Y o u are not
going to utilise the reduction in cash balances to wipe off your unproductive
debt. Surely that does not mean wiping off unproductive debt. I therefore
maintain, Sir, that the way in which the debt position has been presented is, to
say the least, absolutely misleading.

A speech by H. E. the Commander-in-Chief was followed by the following

from Pandit Motilal Nehru:
PANDIT M O T I L A L N E H R U ( C i t i e s of the United Provinces, Non-Muhammadan
Urban): Sir, I have listened with great attention to the long expected an-
nouncement which has just been made by His Excellency the Commander-in-
Chief. I am sorry I have to confess that it leaves me cold. It is to my mind in
perfect keeping with the policy to which we owe the Statutory Commission
which is now doing wonders in the Madras Presidency. We know what those
wonders are. It has entered into an alliance with all the Government Publicity
Departments and also with that great new agency, whose worthy representa-
tive we have in my friend, Mr. K . C. Roy, in this House. That alliance is for
the purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of the world. Sir, I have not the re-
motest doubt in my own mind that the announcement made this morning is a
further step in the same direction. But I wish to tell all whom it may concern
that it will no more deceive the public than have the glowing accounts which
this mutual admiration society of seven has been issuing from the Madras side.
Throughout the very graphic description of the great concessions that have
been made to the public demand and especially to the recommendations of the
Skeen Committee, we find no real substance. The real thing which we wanted
is to be found nowhere. Now, Sir, so far as the recommendations of the Skeen
Committee are concerned, I must admit that I am one of those who found
little reason to enthuse over them. I had once the honour of being on that
Committee, and I may say, without meaning any disrespect and with due de-
ference to my friend Mr. Jinnah, that I felt a sense of relief at having had no
hand in those recommendations when I saw them in print after my having
retired from the Committee at an earlier stage.

MR. M. A . JINNAH: What do you feel now?

 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 389
P A N D I T M O T I L A L N E H R U : I have the same feeling now; the feeling is more
enhanced than it was, because even if everything suggested by the Skeen Com-
mittee had been given effect to, even if a Sandhurst had been founded in India,
we would have been where we were for some generations to come. But that
was not to be. The insatiable greed of the Government for domination would
not contemplate even at a remote date the contingency of India's standing on
her own feet. As far as I have been able to understand His Excellency the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the programme that he has laid before us, it is simply a
case of what is usually described as Indianization, at perhaps a brisker pace
than it has been in the past. Now, I may say-at once that the word 'Indianiza-
tion' is a word that I hate from the bottom of my heart. I cannot understand
that word. What do you mean by Indianizing India? I think His Excellency
himself was surprised at the use of the word. The Army is ours; we have to
officer our own Army; there is no question of Indianizing there. What we
want is to get rid of the Europeanization of the Army (Hear, hear, from the
Congress Party benches.) Now, what are the chances of our doing so. N o
Sandhurst is to be given to India, which means a great variety of propositions.
First of all, it will be said that without a Sandhurst of the precise type and of
the standard of the real Sandhurst, there can be no proper military education,
a proposition which I deny. The next argument is that even the ten cadets that
are required for the real Sandhurst are not available. The third ground is that
it must take a long time to have such an institution in India. Now, Sir, I sub-
mit that not one of these propositions is sound. So far as the dearth of men
and cadets in India is concerned, I have no difficulty in saying that it is a
calumny on the manhood of India to say that there is any such dearth. (Hear,
hear.) During the short period that I was on the Committee, I was convinced
that it was not the dearth of men but the want of inclination to get at the
proper men suitable for the purpose. What did we find ? There were men sent to
Sandhurst who were turned back because they could not even follow the
language in which the lectures were delivered. And what do we find in this
country? Thousands upon thousands of men who certainly are quite able to
follow the English language, whoever the professor and whatever the strange
tongue that pronounces it. But they were not to be taken. What was the
greatest recommendation for selection was whether the father, grandfather or
great-grandfather of the candidate had served in the Indian Army. (Laughter
from the Congress Party benches.) That was the chief recommendation. How-
ever, I think that part of the case will be dealt with by my friend Mr. Jinnah
who was on the Committee all through and has certainly superior knowledge
to my own from the material that was placed before the Committee. I base my
position upon the single circumstance that you have provided nothing for the
training of our men whom you can find in any numbers you like, provided you
have the inclination to find them. An Indian Sandhurst is not to come into ex-
istence! What is to happen? Well, there are some more places for cadets to be
thrown open at Woolwich, Cranwell and Sandhurst, and the process of what
is called 'Indianization' is to take its own course. Then the question formu-
lated by His Excellency was: ' Perhaps some Members would ask me—what
about the future?' He raised India to the position of gods when he said: 'The
future is on the lap of India; it lies with India.' What is poor, emasculated,
helpless India to do with its teeming millions, with its thousands and thousands
390 APPENDIX II

of capable, ablebodied and intelligent young men who are ready and willing
to join the Army if they were given the chance, unless there is some means of
training provided for them, unless they are admitted on their own merits and
not on the merits or demerits of their fathers and grandfathers ? Sir, the whole
thing is that there is no intention of putting India on her feet at an early date.
That is the whole truth of the matter. However sugar-coated the announce-
ment may be, however tempting the offer of admission into Woolwich, Cran-
well and Sandhurst, the fact remains that no substantive advance has been
made towards giving us a national army in the sense of its being officered by
Indians.
Now coming to the question of expense of founding training schools and
colleges, I say that if we can afford over 50 crores of rupees every year for the
normal expenses of keeping up this large army, it is sheer hypocrisy to say that
we cannot afford a quarter of that amount which I have no doubt will suffice
to provide military schools and colleges all over the country. In order to meet
our annual requirements we must find the 50 crores, but we can find no money
for these training colleges. I submit that, if His Excellency and Commander-in-
Chief were really to turn his attention to the military budget, he will find in
that very budget enough funds to devote to purposes of training. However, as
I have said elsewhere and here, I see no sign whatever in British statesmen of
a real desire to give India what by word of mouth they say they intend to give.
There is no real desire, and unless there is that real desire, India cannot
progress.
I was rather amused at certain parallels drawn by His Excellency. One of
them was that the Soviet Budget was much larger than the Indian Budget,
that it had increased by 50%. I have recently been in Soviet Russia, and I know
why they are increasing their military budget, at least the reason which they
gave me. They are living in perpetual danger of England provoking a war with
them. (Laughter from the Treasury Benches.) It is very easy to laugh, but I
think many of those who laugh have not been admitted into the confidence of
the War Office and know nothing about what the designs of the War Office
are. What a comparison this is. What is the army in Russia ? It is a national
army. It is the army of Russian peasants officered by Russians. Any amount
of expenditure in face of a common danger will not be grudged. What is our
army ? I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that our army is a mer-
cenary army employed by foreigners to put down their own countrymen, and to
keep them under foreign heels. Surely no self-respecting nation will without
compulsion contemplate such a contingency as having to pay for a mer-
cenary army in order to remain under control by an alien Government.
Then His Excellency said that some of the Indian soliders who were sent to
China made large remittances home. That again was a very interesting piece of
information to give. Where did these remittances come from ? Was it the sav-
ings from their salaries, or was it loot which they were allowed to make from
the poor Chinese? If it was . . .
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL BLACKETT: The savings of their salaries, Sir.
PANDIT MOTILAL N E H R U : What about their savings in India then? Why
should they be able to save money in China, in a foreign country and not in
India?
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 391
His EXCELLENCY THE C O M M A N D E R - I N - C H I E F : I do not know why; but I can
assure you they did save.
P A N D I T M O T I L A L N E H R U : I am sure they did; but probably they were let
loose upon the Chinese who . . . (Cries of: 'Withdraw' from the Government
Benches). I am not going to withdraw. I repeat a thousand times that our
soldiers were not used . . . (Cries of: 'Order' and 'Withdraw'.) You may
shout yourselves hoarse. I will not withdraw. I say that our soldiers were not
used for the honourable purposes for which a soldier should be used. (Cries
o f : ' Hear, hear' from the Congress Party benches.) They were used in order to
humiliate the nationals of another country who wanted to assert their indepen-
dence against . . .
MR. G . M . YOUNG: (Army Secretary): You said they looted.
You exacted from them a duty which, if they had
PANDIT MOTILAL N E H R U :
been independent, they would have refused to perform.
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : A l i e .
P A N D I T M O T I L A L N E H R U : Am I to substantiate what is human nature to my
learned friends over there ? I say it is human nature and I repeat it a thousand
times over in spite of all the noise that has been made on the other side.
T H E HONOURABLE SIR BASIL B L A C K E T T : I say it is a foul slander.
P A N D I T M O T I L A L N E H R U : Then you are so full of animal nature that you
have no idea of what human nature is or ought to be. It is nothing but animal
nature which prompted the sending of these troops there in spite of the protest
we made in India. However, Sir, leaving that alone, it is no consolation to any
Indian that his countrymen who were soldiers sent to China were able to make
remittances home from China.
Then His Excellency said that we will get advance in Indianization—that is
his word again—in proportion to the advance in responsible government.
Now, what are the steps that are being taken for any substantial advance in
responsible government? There is the Statutory Commission; as I said, it is
assiduously busy in circulating glowing accounts of its own proceedings and in
suppressing the real kind of reception that they are having. And what will they
do ? They have now given out the procedure which they mean to follow. That
is a procedure, Sir, which we of the Congress Party at any rate will not submit
to for a single moment. How is responsible government to be granted to India ?
The Army is kept apart. The Army is no part of responsible government. There
is a separate Committee to go into the question of the Indian States. They are
not in India. And yet any responsible government is to be granted by some
miracle by this Statutory Commission to India. It is not pretended that re-
sponsible government is to be given; it is only a progressive advance that is
going to be made; just as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has said
increasing responsibility in the Army, corresponding to progressive responsi-
bility in g o v e r n m e n t . . .
LALA L A J P A T R A I (Jullunder Divison; Non-Muhammadan): There is nothing
to prevent them saying that we should go back on the existing reforms.
P A N D I T M O T I L A L N E H R U : I thought you said going back without doing any-
thing; I am sure they will go back after doing some mischief. However, Sir,
392 APPENDIX II

this is an age-long affair. There have been Empires before this which have done
the same thing. They have ignored the lessons of history, and the British Em-
pire is doing the same. I will not say more on this occasion but sit down after
again repeating the warning that the day of reckoning is not very far.
5. An illustration may be taken from independent India. In the Provisional
Parliament on 5 March 1952 (just prior to the summoning of the newly elected
House of the People) the Finance Minister replied to the debate on the
Finance Bill. The following extract from the debates will perhaps show that
the House was lively without being hostile to the Government:
SHRI C. D . D E S H M U K H : The first point that I wish to deal with is that of
cotton prices, especially in Berar. From the speech made by Dr. Deshmukh,
the House might gather the impression that cotton prices were threatening to
tumble below the floor levels that have been fixed. That actually is not the case.
From time to time the ceiling has been raised during the last two years, accord-
ing to the classification and gradation of cottons, in order to encourage the
cultivation of cotton, and control was exercised not only for the purpose of
keeping down the price of cloth, but also for safeguarding the interests of the
cultivator, so that he could obtain the proper price for certain specific genuine
qualities of the cottons that he was encouraged to grow. It is true that there has
been a recession in the world prices of cotton, just as there has been a recession
in the prices of other raw materials and commodities, and in many cases the
spot market prices are below the ceiling. But the point that I wish to make is
that in no case have the prices fallen to or anywhere near the floor, and as I
shall show you, the current price is still well above the floor prices . . .
SHRI S O N D H I : Much below the ceiling.
SHRI C. D . D E S H M U K H : That is not the relevant consideration here for the
purposes of the debate. I cannot pretend to be sorry that they are below the
ceiling. The ceiling is the maximum.
SHRI S O N D H I : That is the point we raised.
SHRI C. D . D E S H M U K H : The point raised, as I understood it, was that they
were tumbling and that the time had come when Government should do some-
thing about it, which was a circumlocutory way of saying that there should be
a floor.
To return to the figures which I was proposing to give, Sir, for Jerila, the
ceiling is 820 and the floor is 495 and the latest available quotations will run
between 700 to 880. Then Vijay: the ceiling is 925, the floor is 565 and prices
are slightly below the ceilings in 920. Then C.P. Desi; here there is no floor.
Gaorani 990, floor is 625 and present price is around about 900 and so on. So
the ceilings and floor prices are fixed in terms of section 3 of the Cotton Con-
trol Order, 1950, and in terms of a Notification and a Press Note issued on
24 August 1946. Government have given an assurance in the following terms:
'When the prices are at the floor rates for any or all of the descriptions for
which such rates are specified in the Schedule annexed to the said general
permission, the Government of India undertake to buy such cotton of grade
and staples, specified for those rates in Bombay on terms set out in the notes
appended to the said Schedule and at equivalent prices elsewhere.'
 THE CHANGING ASSEMBLY 393
In terms of this undertaking Government have actually purchased cotton, as,
for instance, in 1943 and in 1945, and Government stand committed to this
undertaking and will be closely watching the situation.
Now, one reason why prices are falling, apart from a sympathetic fall to-
gether with other commodity prices is that the mills seem to be reluctant to lift
their quotas. This has been brought to our notice, but it is not so very easy to
think of a remedy. I f you were to say: 'Well, penalize the mills; they would
forfeit their quota in case they do not lift it within a stipulated time', the result
might be that the mills might cease to work for lack of cotton. That is not
going to help the cotton grower. It would certainly castigate the millowner but
does not improve the position. So instead of penalizing, we are considering
whether we should not try admonition and the Textile Commission has been
instructed to try and persuade the mills to lift their quotas within a stated
period, that is to say, in effect to stagger their purchases instead of waiting till
the end of the half-year and perhaps the prices might have gone down further.
All these developments are constantly being brought to the notice o f
Government by the interests concerned. One Dr. Deshmukh raised a point;
there is another Deshmukh who has written to the Commerce and Industry-
Ministry at Berar and a third Deshmukh is trying to explain the situation. So
you can see how alert and interested the Deshmukhs are to deal with this
problem.
M R . D E P U T Y SPEAKER:
Brahmarpanam Brahma havir
Brahmagnau Brahmna hutam.
Brahmaiva tena gantavyam
Brahma-Karma-samadhina.
[The offering-spoon is Brahma (the Omnipresent God), the oblation is
Brahma, it is offered to the fire that is Brahma; through all these deeds done
for Brahma, it is to reach the Brahma.]
SHRI K A M A T H : O M Shantih, Shantih, Shantih.
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH : From this incantation it is time for me to pass from
cotton to agriculturists about which Chaudhuri Ranbir Singh spoke. He raised
some fundamental issues, that is to say, justice and equality as between the
town dweller and the village dweller. Now, that is an issue on which one
could not hope to throw light in the course of an answer to a debate of this
kind. It is my impression that the denizen of the rural areas has not done so
badly during the last few years. Although I have no statistical evidence, I
should imagine that at least the producer is better off relatively than the
middle-class man in the urban areas.
SHRI ALEXANDER (Travancore-Cochin): What about the producer of food-
grains ?
SHRI C. D . D E S H M U K H : That is precisely the person I referred to. He has not
done so badly.
SHRI BHARATI (Madras): That is not correct.
SHRI C. D . D E S H M U K H : That can be proved. In 1947, for instance, in my
district, the grower was getting Rs.125 per kandy for his paddy. In six months'
time, he started getting Rs.185.
394 APPENDIX II

SHRI BHARATI: What about the cost of production?

SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH : In six months, there was no change in the cost of
production. It was just a windfall due to decontrol. Apart from the jute
grower, I cannot think of anyone else who has received that kind of accretion
to his profits. I think that by and large, till very recently, the grower of food
and cash crops has not been too badly off. The particular point of taxation to
which Ch. Ranbir Singh referred is a matter not within the field of the Central
Government. He referred to land revenue and the absence of any exempted
minimum of income. That again involves the question of agricultural income-
tax. I dare say that when land revenue is placed on a more uniform footing in
the country, that is to say, when it is replaced by an agricultural income-tax,
there might emerge some such minimum as is contemplated by the hon.
Member. But, in any case, as I said, so far as the Central Government is con-
cerned, there is nothing that one can do about it. Since most of the other taxes
are indirect taxes and since the purchases made by the rural population are
not so considerable as compared with the purchases made by the inhabitants
of urban areas, I do not think the average agriculturist bears a disproportion-
ately large share of the general taxation in the country.
I next come to the vexed question of subsidies. I can assure the hon. Mem-
ber that any tears that we may have shed were not crocodile tears. Nor was
there any intention to juggle with figures.
SHRI SONDHI: Were there any tears at all?
SHRI VENKATARAMAN : Y e s .

SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH: There were plenty of figures.

SHRI VENKATARAMAN: He was asking about tears.
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH : The point made by the hon. Member was that what
was said about the time-lag as between the curve of wholesale price indices and
the cost of living indices is not true. On the other hand, he seemed to imply
that the opposite was the case. That, I fail to understand. It is possible that
there is no parallelism after a time-lag; that is to say, that the other curve does
not follow the first one after an interval of three months. But, since some of the
items are common to both the indices to the extent to which the prices of those
articles are affected, the shape of the curve is bound to be affected. That was
the only point which it was my intention to make. The weightage that has been
given to food articles is not as high as 50 or 60, but is nearer 33. Food articles
include various other things besides cereals. If the hon. Member is interested,
I can show him the working of the Chief of the Economic Division in the
Planning Commission, on whose authority I quoted the figure the other day of
three per cent. I said three points. I am afraid it is wrong. It is three per cent
increase. So, we have these two figures that between 1948 and December 1951
there has been an increase of ten per cent in the cost of living indices.
Secondly, if the subsidies are taken away, the middle class representative
may have to pay three per cent more and his cost of living may go up by three
per cent. The hon. Member quoted certain figures to show what the cost of the
cereals would be if no subsidy were given. That brings out the point that I have
made, that even with the existing subsidy we cannot hold the situation because
 THE CHANGING ASSEMBLY 395
of the progressively increasing prices of imported foodgrains. That costs us
more and the freight on it is greater. Therefore, the work that was done by a
subsidy of say 35 crores one year would require 60 crores next year and per-
haps 90 crores: that was the maximum figure that we calculated. However
sympathetic one may be—and one is genuinely so to the middle classes—our
Budget just cannot bear the impact of a figure of that dimension when it is de-
voted just to subsidies, namely a figure of 90 crores. All that we could at one
time afford was 25 crores of which about 10 or 12 crores will be retained in any
case. The point that I made the other day was that the sum of 15 crores is not
going to make such a material difference to, the population affected.
On the other hand, there are certain indications which could be regarded as
hopeful by the middle classes, and that is, if we can find additional money for
our development projects, it will mean additional employment for the repre-
sentatives of what we recognise as the middle classes. It is not strictly true to
say that only one person in a middle class family works. Actually, I referred to
the figures and I find that 1 -68 person works.
SHRI VENKATARAMAN : Is that in the middle class family budget report pre-
pared by Mr. Subramaniam of the Government of India? A statistical en-
quiry has been conducted by the Government. A statistician went into the
middle class family budgets all over India and his figure was 1 -68 for the work-
ing classes and 1 or less for the middle classes.
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH: I am quoting from 'War on Middle Classes: An
Enquiry into the Effects of War-time Inflation on Middle Classes in Bombay
City,' by J. J. Anjaria.
SHRI VENKATARAMAN : Why not refer to your own statistician ?
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH : He is one of our statisticians.
SHRI VENKATARAMAN : The Government appointed a statistician to go into
the question and Government has conducted an enquiry into the cost of living
of the middle classes. The report is there before the Government.
PROF. K . T . SHAH {Bihar): May I ask what is the definition o f ' middle class' ?
SHRI T Y A G I : Unemployed.
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: That is trenching into the time that has been allot-
ted to me, but, I have no doubt that if one goes through this pamphlet he can
find out what the definition of 'middle class' is. Anyway, if we do not know
the definition, it is no use discussing the subject. If we understand something
in common by 'middle class' . . .
PROF. K . T . SHAH: It is not a question of not knowing the definition. It is
a question of knowing what you have adopted as the middle class.
M R . D E P U T Y SPEAKER: It is a question of categories. Anyhow, it will be
opening a new chapter.
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH: I do not lay any great stress on this point that it is
1 -68. It may be one and a half. All I am saying is that there is a tendency for
greater employment being available as a result of the development plans under-
taken by the Centre and the State Governments. And the condition of the
middle-classes would be very much worse if these development plans were not
396 APPENDIX II

to be there. F o r the rest they could only be helped by our general efforts to in-
crease production and to counter inflation by monetary and fiscal and other
means rather than by these somewhat artificial means of subsidising living.
Then there was another point made by the hon. Member and that is that it
might be practicable to give a subsidy to people whose income was Rs.300 per
mensem and below. Now, that means that the subsidy should be given to
90 per cent of the people instead of to 100 per cent. It does not really make any
difference in this country, in a country where incomes are so low. That really
is no solution of the problem. It is after giving anxious thought to all these
considerations that we came to the conclusion in issue. It is not as if the
middle-class has been forgotten entirely and throughout. After all, take the
history of the income-tax over the last few years. In 1947 the taxable minimum
was raised from Rs.2,000 to Rs.2,500. In 1948 it was raised to Rs.3,000 and in
1949 the minimum for a Hindu undivided family about which we might hear
a little more, was raised from Rs.3,000 to Rs.5,000.
PANDIT THAKUR D A S BHARGAVA: T h e i r m i n i m u m is a b o u t R s . 9 0 0 .
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH: The hon. Member will have an opportunity to say a
lot about the Hindu undivided family. Well then, in 1950, the taxable income
for a person within the Hindu divided family was raised from Rs.3,000 to
Rs.3,600 and for the Hindu undivided family to Rs.7,200. And then the rate
of income-tax on the slab between Rs.10,000 and Rs.15,000 was reduced from
five annas to four annas. Now, it may be said that these are small mercies: but
these are all that one could afford from time to time. I give this information in
order to prove that it is not out of neglect that a larger extent of relief is not
available to the middle-classes.
SHRI SONDHI : Does it compare favourably with the price index ?
SHRI C. D . DESHMUKH: W e have not tried to establish any correlation
between price indices and the income-tax relief; but I do believe, Sir, that if we
get the better of inflation, we shall have taken some effective step towards help-
ing the middle classes both in reducing the cost of living and in making more
money available for development expenditure.
Then there was the question of food self-sufficiency. An attractive scheme
was put forward by an hon. Member who at one time had a great deal to do
with food production, and I find tube-wells cannot be dug in all parts of the
country for they depend on subsoil water levels. Neither the machinery nor
the equipment nor the technical personnel is available for constructing 30,000
tube-wells in six months—or nine months—I forget which (an Hon. Member:
Six months). And, then, at present the experiment is being carried on for sink-
ing 1,000 tube-wells in the Punjab, U.P. and Bihar and it will take about two
years to complete these. Therefore, 30,000 tube-wells will take 30 times two,
that is, 60 years, and the cost will be about 100 crores. I am not referring to the
cost if the thing is worth doing. I f the money can be found and if some one
were to say you can complete this thing in six months and you have a million
tons waiting for you, well, I for my part, would take the risk, because it is the
quickest form of return to projects that anyone would turn to. But, alas, that
is not the case.
SHRI SONDHI: But he himself offered his services.
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 397
S H R I C . D . D E S H M U K H : That is not enough. One has to consider the
circumstances of the case. Actually the water table is not considered high
enough or plentiful enough to sustain 30,000 tube-wells. Anyway, it will
require a great deal of elaborate surveying before we can come to the con-
clusion that one could embark upon the construction of so many tube-wells.
Otherwise it might become one of those muddles about which we might
be asked to start an enquiry, if we give a contract for 30,000 tube-wells in our
excessive enthusiasm. I am told, however, that the estimated cost of one tube-
well including equipments is Rs.60,000. Therefore, 30,000 will cost Rs.180
crores or 378 million dollars and not 160 million dollars—I think that was the
figure that the hon. Member gave. And the average output per tube-well is
estimated at 60 tons per year and therefore, 30,000 tube-wells will give 1 -8
million tons and not four million tons. Therefore there is a great deal of dif-
ference when you examine it prosaically between the scheme put forward by
the hon. Member and the facts as they are. But taking his points in general, we
are prepared to agree that if one could concentrate within the limits of one's
resources, on minor works of irrigation and so on, one could get the quickest
return and both the Planning Commission and the State Governments as well
as the Ministry of Food and Agriculture are very well seized of the importance
of his point.
Then coming to the next few less important points like prohibition (SHRI
KAMATH: Less important? It is very important). I will not enter into an
elaborate defence of what is being done, but by and large, we are committed to
bringing about prohibition some time and the whole question is, what exactly
is the objective diagnosis on which our experiments are based, and I myself
would be inclined to agree with the hon. Member that if one finds as a result
of experience that one has taken a premature step, that certain very serious
sociological consequences have come about, then one ought to review the
situation and see if some other step could be taken or if propaganda could be
strengthened or if in the last resort, one should draw back. One cannot make
a general statement. Apart from stating these principles, each case would have
to be examined on its own merits. I understand—I have not seen the report,
but I am prepared to accept the hon. Member's statement—that in Madhya
Pradesh they seem to have come to the conclusion that they perhaps acted in
too much of a hurry. That in a sense touches me, because the first prohibition
experiment was in my time when I was Secretary in the separate Revenue De-
partment (SHRI KAMATH: Yes.) and I hope it is not there that the failure has
been made.

SHRI K A M A T H : May I know whether the other State Governments have been
advised to review and report to the Centre, following the example of Madhya
Pradesh?

SHRI C. D . D E S H M U K H : I think it is an important matter and the final draft

of the Planning Commission is getting ready. We have not yet finalised it. We
have had discussions with various people interested in the question and I am
not sure if we have heard the Chairman of the Committee which went into this
matter in Madhya Pradesh. We were trying to arrange an interview with him.
1 can assure the hon. Member that we are considering this point, though
398 A P P E N D I X II

categorically the reply to the question is that no directive has gone from
the Central Government so far.
DR. DESHMUKH: A r e there similar Committees in Bombay and Madras?
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: There is a Committee in Bombay but I would not
call it a similar Committee. Its terms of reference differ slightly.
MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: A Committee was appointed in Madras also.
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: That was many years ago. I do not know what the
findings and results of that Committee are.
Then there is the question of the election which crops up again and again.
I am informed that it is wrong to say that in U . P . and Madhya Pradesh the
Election Commissioner's instructions were not observed. N o ballot boxes used
by any State were unapproved by the Election Commission. A ballot box
which is not closed and sealed properly can of course be opened with a hair
pin or any other pin. But merely because a ballot box is tamperable one need
not necessarily draw the conclusion that in all cases over whole States the
boxes were tampered with.
SHRI KAMATH: N o b o d y says that.
SHRI SONDHI: That is not the allegation.
PANDIT KUNZRU: M a y I know whether the Election Commission has sent
for the Presiding Officers and asked them how they sealed their boxes as soon
as the voting was over?
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: I could not say what action the Election Commis-
sion has taken. This is the information that I have received from him.
SHRI KAMATH: In all the States other than U . P . and Madhya Pradesh the
ballot boxes used were manufactured by Godrej or Allwyn. In these two States
the boxes were manufactured locally.
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: I did not deny that, but that does not necessarily
mean that they were tamperable.
MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : Were they not steel boxes ? In Madras wooden boxes
or plywood ones were used and no such thing happened. I was myself a
candidate.
SHRI KAMATH: In Madhya Pradesh the boxes used were cottage industry
products.
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: I am sorry I shall not be able to throw any more
light.
T H E MINISTER OF W O R K S , PRODUCTION AND S U P P L Y (SHRI G A D G I L ) : V e r i t -
able Pandora's b o x !
SHRI KAMATH: Where is Pandora?
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH: There was the question of aerodromes. I had some
notes here, which I have lost, showing the provision made in the next year's
Budget. There is provision in accordance with a programme for the improve-
ment of aerodromes, especially in regard to lighting. That matter is receiving
attention.
Then there was some reference to smuggling of goods from Pondicherry,
 THE C H A N G I N G ASSEMBLY 399
Goa and so on. Questions have been frequently asked in the House and replies
given as to what precautions are taken from time to time, but if the conclusion
is that because there is smuggling we should reduce the import duties and
allow these goods in, I do not think that that conclusion is right. Even if you
remove all duties there are people who would be risking their lives or self-
respect for bringing the goods in, if there is money in it.
Lastly, there was reference to death-bed bequests, parting kicks, swan song
by an hon. Member who is not here.
SHRI NAZIRUDDIN AHMAD : I am here.
SHRI C . D . DESHMUKH : Those also are in very general terms, that one has
done nothing about corruption, blackmarketing or one has not solved the
question of controls, etc. These questions have been discussed very frequently
on the floor of this House and I am inclined to think that there is a far greater
awareness now and consequently a far greater degree of success in dealing
with both corruption and blackmarketing, and to the extent to which it
flourished in money supply, action has been taken to reduce money supply to
them. Today you will find that our money supply in contrast to many other
countries in the world is 100 crores down. I think gradually we are getting the
better of these problems.
Sir, I have tried to meet the criticisms made by hon. Members and would
now commend my motion to the House.
M R . D E P U T Y SPEAKER: The question is:
'That the Bill to continue for the financial year 1952-53 the existing rates of
income-tax and super-tax and additional duties of customs and excise, and
to provide for the discontinuance of the duty on salt for the said year, be
taken into consideration.'
The motion was adopted.
 A P P E N D I X III
DATES OF SESSIONS (See p. 129)

Actual No. of days on

Date of which House sat
Date of
Commence- Termination
ment Per Session Per Annum

First Legislative Assembly

First Session 3.2.1921 29.3.1921 28 \ 43
Second Session 1.9.1921 30.9.1921 15/
Third Session 10.1.1922 28.3.1922 44 \
26.9.1922 15/ 59
5.9.1922
15.1.1923 27.3.1923 51 \
17 / 68
2.7.1923 28.7.1923
Second Legislative
Assembly
First Session 30.1.1924 25.3.1924 381
27.5.1924 11.6.1924 8
h 60
3.9.1924 24.9.1924 14 J
Second Session 20.1.1925 24.3.1925 41 1 59
Third Session 20.8.1925 17.9.1925 18/
Fourth Session 20.1.1926 25.3.1926 391
12/ 51
Fifth Session 17.8.1926 2.9.1926
Third Legislative Assembly
First Session 19.1.1927 28.3.1927 451
20/ 65
18.8.1927 20.9.1927
Second Session 1.2.1928 27.3.1928 361
53
Third Session 4.9.1928 25.9.1928 17/
Fourth Session 28.1.1929 12.4.1929 451 62
Fifth Session 2.9.1929 26.9.1929 17
/
Sixth Session 20.1.1930 31.3.1930 46 \
56
Seventh Session 7.7.1930 18.7.1930 10/
Fourth Legislative Assembly
First Session
Second Session
14.1.1931
7.9.1931
4.11.1931
1.4.1931
3.10.1931
20.11.1931
51
20
13 J
y
1 84

Third Session 25.1.1932 6.4.1932 461

Fourth Session 5.9.1932 30.9.1932 19
r 88
7.11.1932 15.12.1932 23 J
Fifth Session 1.2.1933 12.4.1933 481
Sixth Session 22.8.1933 21.9.1933 23 [ 97
20.11.1933 22.12.1933 26 J
Seventh Session 24.1.1934 21.4.1934 611
Eighth Session 92
16.7.1934 31.8.1934 31/
Fifth Legislative Assembly
First Session 21.1.1935 9.4.1935 491
Second Session 19/ 68
2.9.1935 26.9.1935
Third Session 3.2.1936 23.4.1936 52\
Fourth Session 87
31.8.1936 16.10.1936 35/
Fifth Session 25.1.1937 3.4.1937 441
Sixth Session 79
23.8.1937 7.10.1937 35/

400
 A P P E N D I X III 401

Date of Actual No. of days on

Date of which House sat
Commence- Termination
ment
Per Session Per Annum

Fifth Legislative Assembly—

continued
Seventh Session 3 1 . 1 . 1 9 3 8 1 2 . 4 . 1 9 3 8 4 5 1

Eighth Session 8 . 8 . 1 9 3 8 2 0 . 9 . 1 9 3 8 3 0 y 9 6
1 0 . 1 1 . 1 9 3 8 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 9 3 8 2 1 J

Ninth Session 3 . 2 . 1 9 3 9 1 5 . 4 . 1 9 3 9 4 7 \
6 2
Tenth Session 3 0 . 8 . 1 9 3 9 2 2 . 9 . 1 9 3 9 1 5 /

Eleventh Session 6 . 2 . 1 9 4 0 6 . 4 . 1 9 4 0 3 7 1
5 3
Twelfth Session 5 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 0 2 7 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 0 1 6 /

Thirteenth Session 1 1 . 2 . 1 9 4 1 1 . 4 . 1 9 4 1 3 4 1
4 8
Fourteenth Session 2 7 . 1 0 . 1 9 4 1 1 8 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 1 1 4 /
Fifteenth Session . 1 1 . 2 . 1 9 4 2 2 . 4 . 1 9 4 2 3 2 \
41
Sixteenth Session . 1 4 . 9 . 1 9 4 2 2 4 . 9 . 1 9 4 2 9 /
Seventeenth Session 1 0 . 2 . 1 9 4 3 2 . 4 . 1 9 4 3 3 6 1
6 9
Eighteenth Session
f
2 6 . 7 . 1 9 4 3 2 5 . 8 . 1 9 4 3 2 3 y

Nineteenth Session 8 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 3 1 9 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 3 1 0
Twentieth Session . 7 . 2 . 1 9 4 4 5 . 4 . 1 9 4 4 3 7 \
5 2
Twenty-first Session 1 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 4 2 1 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 4 1 5 /
Twenty-second Session . 8 . 2 . 1 9 4 5 1 2 . 4 . 1 9 4 5 4 3 4 3
Sixth Legislative Assembly
First Session 2 1 . 1 . 1 9 4 6 1 8 . 4 . 1 9 4 6 6 0 1
7 6
Second Session 2 8 . 1 0 . 1 9 4 6 1 8 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 6 16 J
Third Session 3 . 2 . 1 9 4 7 1 2 . 4 . 1 9 4 7 4 7 1
Dominion Legislature— I
Constituent Assembly > 6 8
(Legislative)
First Session 1 7 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 7 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 9 4 7 2 1 J
Second Session 2 8 . 1 . 1 9 4 8 9 . 4 . 1 9 4 8 5 2 \
7 4
Third Session 9 . 8 . 1 9 4 8 7 . 9 . 1 9 4 8 22 f
Fourth Session 1 . 2 . 1 9 4 9 9 . 4 . 1 9 4 9 51
I
Fifth Session 5 . 1 0 . 1 9 4 9 6 . 1 0 . 1 9 4 9 7 5
Sixth Session 2 8 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 9 2 4 . 1 2 . 1 9 4 9 2 2 J
Provisional Parliament
First Session 2 8 . 1 . 1 9 5 0 2 0 . 4 . 1 9 5 0 6 0 1
Second Session 3 1 . 7 . 1 9 5 0 1 4 . 8 . 1 9 5 0 1 2 ^ 101
Third Session 1 4 . 1 1 . 1 9 5 0 2 2 . 1 2 . 1 9 5 0 2 9 J
5 . 2 . 1 9 5 1 9 . 6 . 1 9 5 1 9 9 \
1 5 0
Fourth Session 6 . 8 . 1 9 5 1 1 6 . 1 0 . 1 9 5 1 5 1 /
Fifth Session
L
5 . 2 . 1 9 5 2 5 . 3 . 1 9 5 2 2 3 1
House of the People
First Session 125
J
1 3 . 5 . 1 9 5 2 1 2 . 8 . 1 9 5 2 6 6 f

Second Session 5 . 1 1 . 1 9 5 2 2 0 . 1 2 . 1 9 5 2 3 6

Third Session 1 1 . 2 . 1 9 5 3 1 5 . 5 . 1 9 5 3 7 2 1

F o u r t h Session 3 . 8 . 1 9 5 3 1 8 . 9 . 1 9 5 3 3 5 > 137

Fifth Session 1 6 . 1 1 . 1 9 5 3 2 4 . 1 2 . 1 9 5 3 3 0 J
Sixth Session 1 5 . 2 . 1 9 5 4 2 1 . 5 . 1 9 5 4 7 4 1
Seventh Session 2 3 . 8 . 1 9 5 4 3 0 . 9 . 1 9 5 4 31 1 3 7
Eighth Session 1 5 . 1 1 . 1 9 5 4 2 4 . 1 2 . 1 9 5 4 32 J

y
Ninth Session 2 1 . 2 . 1 9 5 5 7 . 5 . 1 9 5 5 5 8 1

Tenth Session 2 5 . 7 . 1 9 5 5 1 . 1 0 . 1 9 5 5 54 1 3 7
Eleventh Session . 2 1 . 1 1 . 1 9 5 5 2 3 . 1 2 . 1 9 5 5 2 5 J

26—p.i.
 A P P E N D I X IV (See p. 105)
F R E Q U E N C Y OF D I V I S I O N S A N D VOTING F I G U R E S

Record of Divisions
Date

Constituent Assembly (Legislative)

Six Sessions (1947-49) . Nil

Provisional Parliament
1st Session, 28 Jan.-20 April 1950 Nil
2nd Session, 31 July-14 Aug. 1950 Nil
3rd Session, (1st part) 14 Nov.-22 Dec. 1950 Nil
15.3.51
1.5.51
31.5.51
1.6.51
1.6.51
1.6.51
1.6.51
1.6.51
2.6.51
3rd Session (2nd part), 5 Feb.-9 June 1951 2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51
2.6.51

22.8.51
29.8.51
4th Session, 6 Aug.-16 Oct. 1951 22.9.51
1.10.51
3.10.51
5th Session, 5 Feb.-5 Mar. 1952 Nil
House of the People
15.5.52
6.6.52
11.6.52
12.6.52
18.6.52
25.6.52
9.7.52
1st Session, 13 May-12 Aug. 1952 10.7.52
10.7.52
12.7.52
23.7.52
4.8.52
6.8.52
6.8.52
402
 APPENDIX IV 403

Record of Divisions

Dale Vote

House of the People—continued

-
15.11.52 216:59
27.11.52 149:41
3.12.52 156:51
4.12.52 152:42
2nd Session, 5 Nov.-20 Dec. 1952 15.12.52 366:26
15.12.52 364:24
15.12.52 351:23
19.12.52 286:62
18.2.53 284:64
27.2.53 255:74
12.3.53 208:60
13.3.53 129:55
3rd Session, 11 Feb.-15 May 1953 17.3.53 278:49
10.4.53 174:52
30.4.53 186:49
12.5.53 212:64
12.5.53 214:60
4th Session, 3 Aug.-18 Sept. 1953 . 26.8.53 246:54
3.9.53 195:51
18.11.53 118:12
30.11.53 186:45
5th Session, 16 N o v - 2 4 Dec. 1953 4.12.53 115:29
17.12.53 181:27
>
23.12.53 286:91
18.2.54 259:66
26.2.54 147:39
9.3.54 168:47
6th Session, 15 Feb.-21 May 1954. J 12.3.54 226:67
12.3.54 117:23
13.3.54 185:49
30.4.54 117:34
14.5.54 208:42
7.9.54 118:106
13.9.54 294:43
15.9.54 161:47
7th Session 23 Aug.-30 Sept. 1954 -- 23.9.54 283:33
23.9.54 288:35
23.9.54 286:33
24.9.54 68:37
19.11.54 154:35
22.11.54 141:38
23.11.54 146:36
8th Session 15 Nov.-24 Dec. 1954 - 30.11.54 172:28
7.12.54 132:39
8.12.54 133:31
13.12.54 135:38
15.3.55 322:9
2.4.55 95:12
12.4.55 280:16
12.4.55 297:8
9th Session 21 Feb.—7 May 1955 12.4.55 301:9
12.4.55 295:8
12.4.55 300:7
12.4.55 302:5
4.5.55 150:20
 A P P E N D I X V (See p. 230)

Bill No. 64 of 1953

THE PRESS (OBJECTIONABLE MATTER) A M E N D M E N T
BILL, 1953
( A S INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE)

A
BILL
to amend the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951.
BE it enacted by Parliament as follows:—
1. Short title.—This Act may be called the Press (Objectionable
Matter) Amendment Act, 1953.
2. Amendment of section 1, Act LYI of 1951.-—In section 1 of the
Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the
principal Act), in sub-section (3), for the words 'two years' the words
' four years' shall be substituted.
3. Amendment of section 2, Act LVI of 1951.—In section 2 of the
principal Act, in clause (k), the following words shall be inserted at the
end, namely:
' or any news-sheet which does not contain the name of the printer
and the publisher.'
4. Amendment of section 20, Act LVI of 1951.—In section 20 of the
principal Act,
(a) in sub-section (5), for the words ' a list of persons', the words
' a list for the entire State of persons' shall be substituted;
(b) after sub-section (4), the following sub-section shall be in-
serted, namely:
' (4A) In any inquiry under this section, it is the duty of the jury to
decide whether any newspaper," news-sheet, book or other document
placed before it contains any objectionable matter and it is the duty
of the Sessions Judge to decide whether there are sufficient grounds
for making an order for the demanding of security or for directing
any security which has been deposited or any part thereof to be
forfeited to the Government or for directing further security to be
deposited.'
5. Amendment of section 23, Act LVI of 1951.—In section 23 of the
principal Act, for the words and figures 'Any person against whom an
404
 APPENDIX V 405
order is passed by a Sessions Judge under section 4, section 5, section
7 or section 8 may, within sixty days of the date of such order, prefer
an appeal to the High Court,' the following shall be substituted, namely:
' T h e competent authority or any other person aggrieved by an
order passed by a Sessions Judge under section 4, section 5, section 7
or section 8 may, within sixty days of the date of such order, prefer
an appeal to the High Court,'.
6. Amendment of section 29, Act LVI of 1951.—In section 29 of the
principal Act, in sub-section (2), the words 'in the territories to which
this Act extends' shall be inserted at the end.

S T A T E M E N T O F OBJECTS A N D REASONS
The Press (Objectionable Matter) Act is due to expire on the 31st
January, 1954. In view of the fact that the Press Commission will,
among other things, examine the existing Press legislation and make
recommendations relating thereto, it is proposed to defer a detailed
examination of the issues involved until after the Press Commission's
recommendations have been received. At the same time, Government
feel that it would be undesirable to allow the Act to lapse. The Bill seeks
to extend the life of the Act by two years. Opportunity is being taken
to make certain minor amendments at the same time.
NEW DELHI; K. N. KATJU.
The 10th December, 1953.

ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM THE PRESS (OBJECTIONABLE M A T T E R ) A C T , 1 9 5 1
(LVI OF 1951).
* * * *

1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called

the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951.
* * * *

(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and shall remain
in force for a period of two years from the date of its commencement.
* * * *

2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

* * * *

(k)'unauthorised news-sheet' means any news-sheet in respect of

which security has been required under this Act but has not been
furnished as required;
# * * *
406 APPENDIX V

20. Jury.—(1) If in any inquiry before a Sessions Judge under this

Act, the respondent claims to have the matter determined with the aid
of a jury, the provisions hereinafter contained shall apply.
* * * *

(3) Such officer as may be appointed by the State Government in this

behalf shall prepare and make out in alphabetical order a list of persons
residing within the State who by reason of their journalistic experience
or of their connection with printing presses or newspapers or of their
experience in public affairs are qualified to serve as jurors.
* * * *

23. Appeal to High Court against orders of Sessions Judges.—Any

person against whom an order is passed by a Sessions Judge under
section 4, section 5, section 7, or section 8 may, within sixty days of the
date of such order, prefer an appeal to the High Court, and upon such
appeal, the High Court may pass such orders as it deems fit confirming,
varying or reversing the order appealed from and may pass such con-
sequential or incidental orders as may be necessary.
* * * *

29. Issue of search warrants in certain cases.—(1) Where any press is,
or any copies of any newspaper, news-sheet, book or other document
are, declared forfeited to Government under this Act, the State Govern-
ment may direct a Magistrate to issue a warrant empowering any
police officer, not below the rank of sub-inspector, to seize and detain
any property ordered to be forfeited and to enter upon and search for
such property in any premises—
# * * *

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1),

where any newspaper, news-sheet, book or other document is declared
forfeited to Government, it shall be lawful for any police officer to
seize the same wherever found.
* * * *

H O U S E O F T H E PEOPLE

A
BILL
to amend the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951

(Shri Kailas Nath Katju,

Minister for Home Affairs)
 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

A . OFFICIAL RECORDS AND REPORTS

(i) Before 1947
Legislative Council, Proceedings, 1862-1920.
Legislative Assembly, Debates, 1921-1947.
Council of State, Debates, 1921-1947.
Report of the Decentralisation Commission, 1909 (Cmd. 4360).
Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Montagu-Chelmsford), 1918 (Cmd.
9109).
East India Constitutional Reforms: Report of the Franchise Committee (South-
borough), 1919 (Cmd. 141).
Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee (Muddiman), 1925 (Cmd. 2360).
Report of the Indian Central Committee, 1929 (Cmd. 3451).
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (Simon), 1930 (Cmd. 3568-9).
Proceedings of the Round Table Conference (3 Sessions, 1931-32) (Cmd. 3778;
Cmd. 3997; Cmd. 4238).
Report of the Indian Franchise Committee (Lothian), 1932 (Cmd. 4086).
Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934 (H.C. 5).
Manual of Business and Procedure in the Legislative Assembly, 1945.

(ii) Since 1947—Government of India

Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946-49 (twelve volumes).
Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees (in three volumes).
Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, 1947-49.
NOTE: These cover six sessions. From the 3rd Session, the volumes are
in two 'Parts': Part I containing Questions and Answers; Part II the
rest of the proceedings.
Provisional Parliament Debates, 1950-52.
NOTE: From 1950, Statements laid on the Table of the House in ela-
boration of answers to Questions are published in separate Appendices.
House of the People Debates, 1952 onwards.
Council of States Debates, 1952 onwards.
State Legislative Assembly Debates.
The Constitution of India, 1949, and reprinted with amendments, 1955.
White Paper on Communist Violence in India, 1949.
White Paper on Indian States, 1950.
407
408 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reports of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(annual from 1951).
Report of the Finance Commission, 1953.
Report on Public Administration in India, by P. H. Appleby, 1953.
Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951-52 (1955).
Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission (3 volumes), 1955.
Report of the Press Commission, 1954.
Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, 1955.
Planning Commission:
Report on Public Administration, by A. D. Gorwala, 1951.
Report on the Efficient Conduct of State Enterprises, by A. D. Gorwala,
1951.
The First Five-Year Plan, 1953.
Progress Reports on the Plan, from 1953.
Community Projects Administration, Evaluation Reports.

(iii) Since 1947—Parliament Secretariat

NOTE: The following is only a part of the total list of publications pre-
pared and issued by the Parliament Secretariat. It does not include, for
example, several pamphlets, designed to give Indian M.P.s informa-
tion about the House of Commons. Certain other publications (e.g.
Rules, Committee Minutes, Speakers' Conference Minutes) are con-
fidential.

(a) General:
Journal of the House (sessional from 1950).
Parliament of India, Who's Who, 1950.
Parliament of India, Who's Who (2nd Edition), 1951.
House of the People, Who's Who, 1952.
Council of States, Who's Who, 1952.
A Guide to Parliament House.
A Guide to the Parliament Library.

(b) Procedure
Constituent Assembly (Legislative), Rules of Procedure and Standing Orders,
1947.
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Parliament, 1950.
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the House of the People, 1952.
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the House of the People (2nd
Edition), 1952.
Council of States Manual, 1952.
 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 409
Decisions from the Chair (House of the People) (irregular to 1949, sessional
from 1950).
Observations from the Chair (House of the People) (sessional from 1950).

(c) Statistical
Chart showing Hourly Count and Total Attendance of Members (sessional from
1950).
Statistical Information relating to Business (sessional from 1951).
Statement showing Time involved in Various Kinds of Business (sessional from
1950).
Brief Summary of Work relating to Legislation (sessional from 1950).
Statement showing Time involved in Various Stages of Bills (sessional from
1950).
Statistical Information relating to Questions (sessional from 1950).

(d) Committees
Financial Committees, A Review (annual).
Estimates Committee:
Select Documents on the Estimates Committee (3 series).
Minutes of the Estimates Committee (sessional).
Recommendations of the Estimates Committee and Action taken thereon by
Government (occasional).
First Report, 1950-51, Ministry of Industry and Supply.
Second Report, 1950-51, Reorganisation of the Secretariat and Departments
of Government.
Third Report, 1950-51, Ministry of Commerce.
Fourth Report, 1950-51, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power.
Fifth Report, 1951-52, Central Water and Power Commission and Multi-
purpose River Valley Schemes.
Sixth Report, 1952-53, Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
Seventh Report, 1953-54, Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
Eighth Report, 1953-54, Damodar Valley Corporation.
Ninth Report, 1953-54, Administrative, Financial and other Reforms.
Tenth Report, 1953-54, Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
Eleventh Report, 1953-54, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
Public Accounts Committee:
Select Documents on the Public Accounts Committee (2 series).
1950-51, First Report, Accounts of 1947-48 (post-partition).
1951-52, First Report, Accounts of 1948-49.
1951-52, Second Report, Accounts of 1948^49.
1952-53, Third Report, Exchequer Control over Public Expenditure.
1952-53, Fourth Report, Import and Sale of Japanese Cloth.
1952-53, Fifth Report, Appropriation Accounts (Railways) and (Posts and
Telegraphs), 1949-50.
1952-53, Sixth Report, Hirakud Dam Project.
1952-53, Seventh Report, Appropriation Accounts (Civil), 1949-50.
26*
410 SELECT B I B L I O G R A P H Y

1952-53, Eighth Report, Disposal of Tyres and Tubes.

1953-54, Ninth Report, Appropriation Accounts (Defence Services), 1949-50
and 1950-51.
1953-54, Tenth Report, Appropriation Accounts (Railways) and (Posts
and Telegraphs), 1950-51.
1953-54, Eleventh Report, Hirakud Dam Project.
1953-54, Twelfth Report, Fertilizer Deal and Pashabhai Patel Implements.
1954-55, Thirteenth Report, Appropriation Accounts (Posts and Telegraphs)
and {Railways), 1951-52 and 1952-53.
1954-55, Fourteenth Report, Appropriation Accounts (Defence Services)
1951-52 and 1952-53.
1954-55, Fifteenth Report, Appropriation Accounts (Civil), 1950-51 and
Audit Report (Civil), 1952.
Committee of Privileges:
The Deshpande Case, 1952.
The Dasartha Deb Case, 1952.
The Sinha Case, 1952.
The Sundarayya Case, 1952.
Committee on the Conduct of a Member:
The Mudgal Case, 1951.
Committee on Subordinate Legislation:
Select Documents on Delegated Legislation.
Reports.
Committee on Private Members' Bills:
Reports.
Committee on Government Assurances:
Reports.
Joint Committee on payment of salary:
Report (1953).

B . BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

NOTE: Place of publication, if not stated, is London
(i) Constitutional and Political Development
ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE, Report of a Committee to Determine Principles of
the Constitution for India (Allahabad, 1928).
APPADORAI, A., Dyarchy in Practice (1937).
BANJERJEE, A. C., Constituent Assembly of India (1947).
CHINTAMANI, SIR C. Y., and MASANI, M. R., India's Constitution at Work
(Bombay, 1940).
CHAMIER, D., Parliamentary Procedure in India (Bombay, 1925).
COUPLAND, SIR R., Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Vol. I, The
Indian Problem, 1833-1935 (1942); Vol. II, Indian Politics (1943); Vol.
ILL, The Future of India (1944).
CURTIS, L . , Dyarchy (1920).
EGGAR, A., The Government of India (Rangoon, 1924).
ILBERT, SIR C., The Government of India (3rd Edition, 1915).
 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 411

ILBERT, SIR C . , and L O R D MESTON, The New Constitution of India ( 1 9 2 3 ) .

K E I T H , A . B . , A Constitutional History of India (2nd Ed., 1 9 3 7 ) .
' K E R A L A P U T R A ' ( K . M. PANIKKAR), The Working of Dyarchy in India (Bom-
bay, 1928).
K R I S H N A , K . B . , The Problem of Minorities ( 1 9 3 9 ) .
LUMBY, E. W . R . , The Transfer of Power ( 1 9 5 4 ) .
MASALDAN, P . , The Evolution of Provincial Autonomy in India, 1858-1950
(Bombay, 1 9 5 3 ) .
M O N T A G U , E. S . , An Indian Diary ( 1 9 3 0 ) .
SCHUSTER, SIR G . , and W I N T , G . , India and Democracy ( 1 9 4 1 ) .
SINGH R O Y , B. P . , Parliamentary Government in India (Calcutta, 1 9 4 3 ) .
SYMONDS, R . , The Making of Pakistan ( 1 9 5 0 ) .

(ii) The Indian Constitution

BASU, D . D . , Commentary on the Constitution of India (2nd Ed., Calcutta,
1952).
GADGIL, D. R., Some Observations on the Draft Constitution (Poona, 1948).
GLEDHILL, A . , The Republic of India ( 1 9 5 1 ) .
, Fundamental Rights in India ( 1 9 5 5 ) .
JENNINGS, SIR W . I . , Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution (1952).
MISRA, B . R . , Economic Aspects of the Indian Constitution (Calcutta, 1952).
SRINIVASAN, N., Democratic Government in India (Calcutta, 1954).

(iii) Modern Indian Politics

APPADORAI, A . , Democracy in India (1942).
A N D R E W S , C . F., and M U K H E R J I , G., The Rise and Growth of Congress (1938).
BAILEY, S . D . , Parliamentary Government in South Asia (1953).
CHAUDHURI, N. C., The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian (1952).
C U R R A N , J . A . , Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics (1951).
D A R L I N G , SIR M . L . , At Freedom's Door (1949).
DESAI, A. R., The Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay, 1948).
DUBE, S. C., The Indian Village (1955).
G O R W A L A , A . D . , The Role of the Administrator (Gokhale Institute, Poona,
1952).
INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, Congress Bulletin (Delhi, Monthly).
, The Constitution of the Indian National Congress (Delhi, 1953).
, The Development of the Congress Constitution, by N. V. Rajkumar
(Delhi, 1949).
, Indian Political Parties, by N. V. Rajkumar (Delhi, 1948).
— •—, The Pilgrimage and After, Ed. N. V. Rajkumar (Delhi, 1952).
, Reports of the Congress Party in Parliament (Sessional).
, Reports of the General Secretaries (Annual).
, Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee ( 1 9 4 9 ) .
JENNINGS, SIR W . I . , The Commonwealth in Asia.
K H U S H W A N T S I N G H , The Sikhs (1953).
KRIPALANI, J . B., Towards Sarvodaya (New Delhi, 1951).
LAL, A. B. (Ed.), The Indian Parliament (Allahabad, 1956).
LOHIA, R. M., Aspects of Socialist Philosophy (Bombay, 1952).
412 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

MASANI, M . , The Communist Party of India (1954).

MEHTA, A., The Political Mind of India (Bombay, 1952).
MELLOR, A., India since Partition (1951).
MOON, P., Strangers in India (1943).
MURPHY, G . , In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human Behaviour and Social
Tensions in India (New York, 1953).
NANAVATI, SIR M . B., and VAKIL, C . N . , Group Prejudices in India (Bombay,
1951).
NARAYAN, J. P., Why Socialism? (Bombay, 1936).
NEHRU, J., Autobiography (1936).
, The Unity of India (1942).
, Speeches, 1949-53 (Delhi, 1954).
PANIKKAR, K. M., Caste and Democracy (1933).
SINGH SUD, S . P., Indian Elections and Legislators (Ludhiana, 1953).
SPEAR, T . G . P . , India, Pakistan and the West (1949).
TENNYSON, H., Saint on the March (1955).
TINKER, H . , The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and
Burma ( 1 9 5 4 ) .
VENKATARANGAIYA, M . , The General Election in Bombay City (Bombay, 1 9 5 3 ) .
WATTAL, P . K . , Parliamentary Financial Control in India (Simla, 1 9 5 3 ) .
W I N T , G . , The British in Asia ( 1 9 4 7 ) .
ZINKIN, M . , Asia and the West ( 1 9 5 1 ) .

C . JOURNALS
Asian Review.
Asian Recorder.
Eastern Economist.
Economic Weekly.
Far Eastern Survey.
Far Eastern Quarterly.
Indian Journal of Political Science.
India Quarterly.
Journal of the Society of Clerks-at-the-Table in Empire Parliaments.
Pacific Affairs.
Parliamentary Affairs.
 INDEX

Act, Indian Councils (1861), 16 n„ 46-7 295, 300, 308, 311 n.; control of
—, (1892), 16 n„ 47-8 public corporations, 326; general
—, (1909), 16 n„ 48-9. 114, 201 comment, 330 n., 332
—, Government of India (1919), 5, 17, Auditor-General. See Comptroller and
53-9, 201, 264 Auditor-General
(1935), 5, 16-17, 19, 59-71, 91,
114,202,245, 281
Adjournment Motion, 226-7, 228, 319, Balfour, Lord, 74
321 Bhave, Vinoba. See Bhoodan
Advisory Committees. See Committees, Bhoodan (Land-Gifts) Movement, 2,
Standing Advisory 37^10, 42 n., 328, 331 n.
Akali Party, 13, 28, 106-7 Bill, 92, 187, 191, 203, 204, 205, 207,
Ambedkar, Dr, 64, 85-9, 152 n., 156-7, 211-12, 218-19, 277, 319, 320-3;
159 Appropriation, 204, 237, 242-3;
Amendments. See Bill Procedure Finance, 244-5; Money, 92, 229,
Andhra State, 5, 21-3, 110-12, 136, 243, 258; Private Members', 206,
178 n., 184 212-18. See also Committee on
Appropriation Bill. See Bill, Appro- Private Members' Bills.
priation — procedure, 229-36, 257-8, 320-3, 330
Assembly, Central Legislative (1919-47), Blitz Case, The, 255
under 1919 Act, 55-9, 71, 201-2; Bombay State, 15, 24, 115-20, 127-8,
under 1935 Act, 59-60, 71, 117-18, 136, 139, 141, 146, 160, 165, 198,
126, 129-31, 154 n., 185, 226, 238, 253^1, 262-3
239 n., 245-6, 264-6, 270, 279-80, Budget, 143 n„ 237-9, 242, 245, 321.
296, 323, 328. See also Council, See also Demands; Votes; etc.
Central Legislative (1861-1919); Business, List of, 209-19. See also Com-
Council of State (1919-47) mittee, Business Advisory
—, Constituent (1946-49), 17, 21,43, 71, By-elections. See Elections
81-9,115, 152, 185, 202-4, 280,296,
309
Assemblies, Provincial Legislative (1935- Cabinet, 150-65. See Ministers
50), 5, 17, 59-72, 81, 245-6, 279- — Parliamentary Affairs Committee.
80, 296, 328 n. See also Councils, See Committee, Cabinet Parlia-
Provincial Legislative (1861-1935) mentary Affairs
—, State Legislative (1950 onwards), Campion, Lord, 150-53, 246 n.
constitutional status, 92-5; parties Caste, 28-31, 36-7, 75-6, 98-9, 110, 148,
in, 106; members of, 114-20, 123-8, 180, 183, 329-30. See also Com-
137; sessions, 129, 136; sittings, munalism; Scheduled Castes
132; languages of debate, 146; con- Central Hall, 130, 132-3
stituency pressures, 150, 320; Con- Chatterjee, N. C., 104, 185, 261
gress Party members of, 192,198-9; Christians, 26, 27, 72, 85
procedure, 209, 231 n., 236 n.; Civil Servants, 6, 11-12, 19, 135, 152,
privilege, 246, 253-5; Speaker, 269- 286-93, 295, 305-7, 313, 323, 324
271; Secretariat, 277; Committees, Closure, 233-5, 244
414 INDEX
Committee, Business Advisory, 194, Congress Party in Parliament, 133, 134,
205, 208, 219, 267, 311 148,172,176-8,185-99,320; Stand-
—, Cabinet Parliamentary Affairs, 194, ing Committees of, 187-90, 194,
218 310; State Groups of, 186,191, 194,
—, Estimates, 204, 206, 207, 208, 259- 240
260, 296-308, 315 , All-India Congress Committee,
—, House, 311 68-9, 167-8, 172, 174, 177, 182;
Joint, 146-7, 205, 230-1, 261 Central Election Committee, 172-3 ;
—, Library, 311 Parliamentary Board, 70, 110, 172,
—, 'Parliamentary', 205, 264, 267, 273, 177-83, 262; Pradesh Congress
278, 298, 308, 311, 330 Committees, 69, 167-8, 171, 173,
—, Public Accounts, 58, 204, 205, 206, 176, 178-83, 192; President, 20 n„
207, 259-61, 279-95, 299, 325 174-5, 178, 179; Working Com-
— Rules, 203-6, 260, 311 mittee, 67-70, 108, 168, 174-83
—, Select, 149-50, 188, 194, 204, 205, Consolidated Fund, 92, 204, 207, 237,
208, 230-2, 236 n„ 244, 250, 257, 239, 242
322 Constituent Assembly. See Assembly,
—, Standing Advisory, 58, 187, 197, Constituent
296-7, 308-11. Constitution, The Indian, 3-5, 7, 9-11,
—, Standing, for Bills, 208, 234 17, 19, 26, 28, 29, 43, 82-93, 94,
— on the absence of members, 138 n., 105, 107, 129-30, 138, 144,150,200,
206 203-4, 218, 229-30, 236-7, 245-8,
— on the conduct of a member, 250-2 262, 268, 281-2, 316
— on Government assurances, 206, 208, Council, Central Legislative (1861-
314-15 1919), 45-51, 71, 114. See also
— on Petitions, 206, 311, 319 n. Assembly, Central Legislative (1919-
— on Private Members' Bills, 206, 218, 1947)
311, 320 n. — of State (1919-47), 55, 60, 71, 126,
— of Privileges, 250-5, 261, 311 237
— on Subordinate Legislation, 205, 311- States (1952 onwards), constitu-
313 tion and powers, 72, 89-90, 92;
Commons, British House of, 91, 130, party composition, 101, 105-6;
134, 143, 150-3, 200, 201 n„ 204, members of, 115-20; Sessions, 129;
207-8, 226 n„ 228, 236-7, 238, chamber, 132-3, 136; atmosphere,
244 n„ 245-9, 250, 267, 269, 277, 143; Ministers in, 151; Congress
279-80, 297, 309-10, 311, 313 Party in, 185-6; procedure, 208-9,
Communalism, 7, 42, 53^1, 59, 6 3 ^ , 75, 225 n., 227 n„ 233, 238, 243 n„ 245;
79, 98-9, 106, 108. See also Caste; privilege, 253 n.; relations with
Christians; Muslims; Sikhs House of the People, 255-62, 330;
Communist Party, 32 n., 96 n., 98, 99 n., Secretariat, 272 n., 275-6
100-1, 103, 106-7, 109, 110-13, , Chairman of, 91, 106, 133,
121-4, 135, 142-3, 147-8, 153-5, 143, 205, 208, 256, 259, 261
185, 198, 243, 290, 310, 330-1 Councils, Provincial Legislative (1861-
Comptroller and Auditor-General, 92, 1935), 5, 16 n„ 17, 45-51, 54-9, 72,
236 n„ 237, 279-95 114, 201-2, 209. See also Assem-
Congress Party, 6,13,17, 20-1, 22-4, 26, blies, Provincial Legislative (1935-
27, 40 n., 62-70, 78, 80, 96 n„ 97- 1950)
101, 103, 105, 106-7, 108-10, 110- — State Legislative (1950 onwards)
114, 121-24, 127-8, 153-5, 264,268, 262-3. See also Assemblies, State
285, 324, 326, 328, 330, 331; con- Legislative
stitutional development of, 166-72; Courts, 132-3, 206 n., 208 n., 246-9,
in General Elections, 172-3; as 254-5
Government and Party, 174-83 Cut Motions, 239-42
 INDEX 415

Dasartha Deb Case, The, 252 Kidwai, R. A., 156-7, 177 n.

Decentralisation Commission (1909), 6 n. Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, 34 n., 100-
Delegated Legislation. See Committee 101, 103-4, 106, 111, 175. See also
on Subordinate Legislation Praja Socialist Party
Delhi State, 180-1, 225 n., 269 n. Kripalani, Acharya, 103-5, 174-5, 184
Demands for Grants, 237, 239-45, 319,
321 Leader of the House, 130, 219, 244, 250
Deputy Speaker. See Speaker See also Nehru; Prime Minister
Deshpande Case, The, 252 Legislation. See Bills
Discussion, Half-an-Hour, 204, 208, Legislatures. See Assemblies; Councils
226-8, 257, 319 Library, 133, 138 n, 311
Discussions 'for short duration', 228 Linguistic Provinces, Commission, 21-2;
Dufferin, Lord, 47-8, 53 Committee, 22-3. See also Regional-
ism; States Reorganisation Com-
Elections, 1936, 17, 62; constitutional mission
provisions for, 90-1, 94; General,
Local Government, 16 n., 114 n., 118-
1951-52, 13, 27, 28, 93-102, 114,
119, 122-3
172-3; since 1952, 106 ff.
Lothian Committee, 96
—, By-, 103, 112-13
Estimates Committee. See Committee,
Estimates Macaulay, Lord, 45, 73
MacDonnell, Lord, 47
Family, 3, 35, 37, 320 n. Madras State, 5, 23, 30, 110, 123-6, 146,
Federation, 3-5, 10-11, 13, 16-20, 60-1, 160-1, 165, 178, 180, 183
306, 326 Mavalankar, G. V., 141, 266, 267, 268 n.
Finance Bill, Financial Procedure. See See also Speaker
Bill, Finance; Procedure, Financial Mehta, A., 104, 184
Frere, Sir Bartle, 46-7 Members of Parliament, ages, 115-16,
121; education, 116-17, 121; ex-
Galleries, 135-6, 139, 140 n., 326 perience, 117-19, 122, 141, 331;
Ganatantra Parishad Party, 13 occupations, 119-20, 123, 127-8;
Gandhi, Mahatma, 2, 6, 7, 9, 15, 37-40, and constituencies, 129, 149, 177,
51 n., 68, 80, 81, 88, 168-9, 331 182, 192, 320; seating, 134-5; be-
Governor, State, 4, 8,92,93,108,130,282 haviour and attitudes, 137-55;
Hindi language, 18, 22, 25, 91 n., 130, attendance, 138-9; language of de-
140, 144-6, 203, 273 bate, 144-6; salaries, 146-8; party
House of the People. See various head- loyalties, 148-9; relation to Govern-
ings, e.g. those corresponding to the ment, 150-5; party training of, 189-
sub-headings under Council of 191, 323 ; discipline, 193-7. See also
States Committees; Private Members; etc.
Hyderabad, 8, 12, 24 n., 38, 181, 183 Minister for Parliamentary Affairs,
148 n , 156-7, 193, 196 n , 218, 231,
Independents, 96, 100-1, 103, 106, 108- 300, 314. See also Whips.
110, 110-14, 121-4, 135, 166, 243 Ministers, and public, 34-6; under Acts
of 1919 and 1935, 52-70pass.; and
Jan Sangh Party, 96 n., 100-1, 103 n., Parliament, 81-9, 91, 134-5, 150-5,
104, 106, 121-4 220, 227, 239, 303, 309-10, 314,
Jharkhand Party, 13, 98 324, 331; and Party organisation,
Jinnah, M. A., 63, 64, 79 173-85; and Party M.P.s, 185-99
Joint Committee. See Committee, Joint pass.; formation of State Mini-
Joint Sitting. See Sitting, Joint stries, 106-14; 159-65; of Central
Kashmir, 7 n., 8, 163 Government, 156-9. See also Prime
Kaul, M. N., 264 n., 266 n., 277 n. See Minister
also Secretary Montagu, Edwin, 51-2, 54 n., 55 n., 74
416 INDEX
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 20, 45 n., Prime Minister, 131, 134 n., 139, 174-6,
45-59, 74, 75, 114, 296 178, 186, 190, 226 n„ 250-1, 259,
Morley, Lord, 48-9 261, 286-7, 302, 303, 310. See also
Morley-Minto Reforms. See Act, Indian Congress President; Leader of the
Councils (1909) House; Nehru
Motion, 228-9, 321; of no confidence, Princely States, 5, 7-9, 16-17, 60-1,
229, 269 n. See also Adjournment 183, 209
Motion and Cut Motion Private Members' business, 206, 212-18;
Mudgal Case, The, 250-2 resolutions, 218, 229, 257, 321. For
Mukherjee, Dr. S. P., 82 n., 104,113-14, Private Members' Bills, see Bills,
152 n„ 156, 159 Private Members'
Munshi, K. M., 81 n., 87-8, 159 Privileges, 91, 204, 245-55, 261. See also
Muslims, 7, 17, 26-7,48, 54-5, 62-4, 71- Committee of Privileges
72, 79, 83-6. See also Communa- Procedure, Rules of, 141, 200-9, 220 n.,
lism 221, 250, 257, 267, 280, 282, 298,
Mysore State, 181-2, 209 311, 313; Financial, 236-45. See
also Bills; Questions; etc.
Narayan, Jayaprakash, 39, 104 n., 184 Provinces. See Assemblies; Councils
National Democratic Party, 104, 243 Provisional Parliament (1950-52), 43,
Nationalism, 6, 13-14, 35, 43. See also 115-20, 152, 154,185, 204,280, 297,
Caste; Communalism; Regionalism 317-18, 322
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 7,14,20, 22 n., 27 n., Punjab State, 5 n., 28, 161, 178-80
33 n„ 62, 67-70, 82, 83, 84,109,113, Public Accounts Committee. See Com-
156-7, 168, 169 n„ 173, 175, 178, mittee, Public Accounts
181, 183, 187, 309, 324 n., 327, 329. — Corporations, 12, 238 n., 282-4, 304-
See also Congress President; Leader 307, 325-6, 330
of the House; Prime Minister
—, Motilal, 21, 81
Questions, 134, 139, 140 n„ 148, 151 n.,
204, 207, 219-27, 257, 273, 317-18,
Opposition, 105, 113, 134, 153-5, 217, 326; short notice, 204, 226
236, 239, 270, 271, 297, 308, 310,
314, 319-20, 322, 324-5, 330, 331
Rajagopalachari, C., 110, 156, 183
Pakistan, 7, 13 n., 14, 26, 41 n. Rajasthan State, 9 n., 12, 30, 98, 142,
Party, 12-13, 96, 103-14, 155, 323^1. 164, 165, 179-80
See also Congress, Communist, Rajpramukh. See Governor, State
etc., Parties; Elections Regionalism, 2, 7, 16-25, 31, 36, 53, 75,
Patel, Vallabhai, 8, 22 n„ 70, 83, 85,156, 108, 148, 180, 183, 198, 320 n., 329-
175 330
—, Vithalbhai, 265-6, 272 Religion, Hindu, 3, 14-16, 37 n. See also
P.E.P.S.U., 5 n„ 28, 106-7 Caste; Communalism
Petitions. See Committee on Petitions Revolutionary Socialist Party, 109
Plan and Planning Commission, 9-11, Ripon, Lord, 16 n., 74, 118
19, 306
Praja Socialist Party, 2, 13, 20, 24, 96 n., Scheduled Castes, 26,28-31, 72-3, 85, 95
103-5, 109-10, 110-13, 121-4, 135, — Federation, 28-9
153-5, 184, 197, 243, 380. See also Secretary, Secretariat, of Parliament,
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party; Socia- 130, 133, 135, 205, 208, 219, 221,
list Party 272-9, 281, 284, 293, 299, 300, 311,
President of the Republic, 4, 89, 92, 93, 314
107, 112, 130-31, 204,233, 237, 278, Sessions, 129; secret, 140 n., 206
282; address to Parliament 130-31, Sharma, Prof. B. R., 41-2
204 Sikhs, 27-8, 71, 72,106-7
 INDEX 417
Simon Report, 20, 4 3 ^ , 45 n., 58-62, States, Reorganisation Commission, 8 n.,
75-8, 280, 296. 23-4. See also Linguistic Provinces;
Sinha, Satyanarain, 148 n., 178, 193, Regionalism
195, 196 n. See also Minister for Sundarayya Case, The, 253, 261
Parliamentary Affairs; Whips
Sinha Case, The, 252-3 Tandon, Purshottamdas, 20 n., 174-5,
Sitaramayya, Dr, 22 n., 68, 174 183 n.
Sittings, 129, 131-2; joint, 230
Times of India Case, The, 253-4
Socialist Party, 2, 34 n., 39, 97, 100-1,
Travancore-Cochin State, 5 n., 13, 20,
103—4. See also Praja Socialist
27, 28, 108-10, 139, 146, 152 n„ 165,
Party
184, 198-9, 209
Southborough Report, 49 n., 71 — Tamil-Nad Congress Party, 108-10
Speaker, general account, 264-72; con-
stitutional status, 91-2; recogni-
tion of parties, 105, 155; and Union of Socialists and Progressives, 105
Government, 107; control of pro- Uttar Pradesh, 254, 255
cedure, 130, 134, 137, 140-4, 194,
203-9, 209-44 pass., 259, 261; and
Vice-President, 91. See also Council of
privilege, 248-55 pass.; and Com-
States, Chairman
mittees, 280, 284,297, 299, 303, 308,
Vote on Account, 204, 237, 242
311, 313-14
— of Credit, 204, 237
— Deputy, 91, 131, 143, 144, 259,
266 n., 309
Speakers' Conference,209,270-71,300n. Whips, 105, 138, 140, 143, 147 n., 148 n.,
States. See Assemblies; Councils; Feder- 149, 155 n., 186-8, 192-6, 218, 219,
alism; Governor; Princely' states; 300. See also Minister for Parlia-
Andhra, Bombay, etc., States mentary Affairs