Ojhri Camp Disaster: Tragedy and

Aftermath
On April 10, 1988, the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi agonized a
terrible shock early in the morning. This day would go down in history as one
of widespread sadness. A low-density explosion was followed by an
enormous one, and then various missiles, rockets, and projectiles started to
fall from the sky in all directions.

Mr. Khaqan Abbassi father of Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi martyred in this
disaster while a missile hit his car on Murree Road and his brother Mr. Zahid
Khaqan Abbasi had gone in coma with head injuries after missile shrapnel
had pierced his skull on April 10, 1988, Ojhri Camp disaster and died in 2005
after remaining on artificial respiration for 17 painful years.
Residents of nearby rescued people but it was very difficult. The situation
was very bad. Ojhari camp was a military storage center located in
Rawalpindi. It was used as an ammunition depot for Afghan Mujahideen who
were fighting against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Its name was camp
because was used to be a transit camp of the Pakistan Military. The capacity
of this camp to store the weapons was equivalent to the weapons carried by a
regiment on the move. But later it was used for the Afghan Jehad, therefore,
its storage capacity had to be increased. It was established in populated area
of the city on the instructions of Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rehman who was the main
player of Afghan Jehan. The new camp was under construction and it was
hoped that the Ojhri Camp would be shifted to the new place. But incident
took place before shifting. This was the reaction when these blasts took place
and people ran in different directions. It was not like only one family or one are
affected by it. The people of twin cities, Rawalpindi and Islamabad, were
affected.
This earthquake was comparable to the one that occurred in Lydia, Italy, more
than 2,000 years ago. It caused a great deal of terror and fear, and the capital
was engulfed in rumors of every description, from an Indian or Israeli attack to
a catastrophe at the Kahuta nuclear station.

No one who could explain what had transpired could be located for several
hours and even after couple of weeks some blasts also were heard.
The Ojhri camp was under the command of DG ISI, Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul
Rehman. After this tragedy, the then prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo
made two committees to investigate the disaster. The parliamentary
committee was headed by Mr. Aslam Khattak while military committee was
headed by Lt. Gen. Imranullah.
Gen. Zia ul Haq had to hurriedly return home because he was attending an
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Kuwait at the time. The
officials reassured the populace that there was no cause for alarm and that
the explosion at the guns and ammunition storage in Ojhri, which is halfway
between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, was simply an accident.

No one, however, accepted the official explanation due to the countless

mythological tales and untrue stories that had tortured the national mind.

But, no one accepted the official explanation since the public psyche had
been tortured by numerous mythological myths and untrue tales.

Nearly a hundred individuals died, while many more suffered injuries. Zia
wished to save his soldiers.

Brick barracks with thatched roofs made up the majority of Ojhri, an

antiquated World War II location for the storage of weapons and ammunition.
During the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan, the flow of guns expanded
significantly, and in 1979 the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate
selected the Ojhri Camp for temporary storage and disposal of weapons, as
and when required. Formerly used as temporary army units.

While not being crowded, the Camp needed administration. In his book
Working with Zia, Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif recounts that an accident
occurred on the fateful morning as some munitions was being moved about by
an untrained squad.

At around 9:30 am, as the men were attempting to slide a box housing a
122mm rocket down, it slipped from the top of the stack. It landed with a thud
and erupted upon impact, frightening the construction workers with a fire. It
had a built-in percussion fuse that, according to the experts, could be set off
by a powerful impact. This fuse had a point-detonating mechanism without an
integrated safety system, to put it another way, he wrote.
When he heard about the catastrophe while on a quick trip to Sindh, the prime
minister rushed to the capital. He issued special directives for the rescue and
rehabilitation of victims after making preliminary inquiries.

The most crucial issue was to determine the disaster’s cause and launch an
investigation. On April 12, Junejo created a five-member inquiry commission
and a five-member ministerial committee to investigate the disaster. The
commission is led by Gen. Imranullah, the corps commander of Rawalpindi.

This committee was tasked with conducting an investigation and submitting a

report to the prime minister, who would review the information and then
draught a report for the National Assembly. The committee’s members were
Malik Naeem Ahmad Khan, Mir Ibrahim Baloch, and Qazi Abdul Majid Abid,
with Mohammad Aslam Khattak serving as chairman.

As Junejo took all of these actions without informing Gen Zia, animosity arose
between the two, which resulted in the ouster of the Junejo administration and
the dissolution of the assemblies.

Gen. Zia wanted an investigation conducted by soldiers of his choosing since,

apparently, if “his men” were at fault, they would have to be spared.

Junejo was aware of it, which is possibly why he established the committees
before to Gen Zia’s arrival. According to reports, Gen. Imranullah held the
director general (DG) ISI accountable for the incident and recommended
necessary action.

It was intended to harm Gen. Zia. According to Aslam Khattak’s report,

accidents can happen when a country is in warlike conditions and should be
viewed as a sign of martyrdom in the service of a just cause. As a result, the
four junior employees should be punished in accordance with the law and the
others should be pardoned to put an end to the crisis.

The National Assembly asked that the parliamentary committee report be

made immediately public and that anyone found accountable be held
accountable as the inquiry dispute continued.

Rana Naeem Ahmed, the defence minister, wanted the report to be revised so
that it would be more widely agreed upon and accepted. After a heated
argument, Aslam Khattak reiterated that the report could not be changed
under any circumstances.
The defense minister got to work on a fresh study. When Gen. Imranullah was
questioned, he pointed the finger upon the ISI’s director general. Rana Naeem
wrote the paper after conducting additional research, in which he
unequivocally blamed the ISI.

He suggested taking action against the former DG ISI Gen Akhtar Abdur
Rahman and the current DG ISI Gen Hamid Gul because the Camp was
under the control of the DG ISI. The report underwent frantic scrutiny once
more, and in early May 1988, prime minister Junejo gave Gen. Zia these
reports with the signatures of the other members. Junejo told him he would
talk about it after he got back from the Philippines and South Korea.

The presidential residence was quite disorganized when the reports were
given, and the general tried to find a solution that would protect his close
friends. Gen Akhtar Abdu Rahman was the person in whom Gen Zia had the
most cause for concern.

There are many ambiguities and rumors regarding this disaster and tragedy:

o In 2012, two former Indian officer told me that it was their services that
sabotaged the facility to punish Pakistan for helping the Kashmiri and
Sikh rebels (Avoiding Armageddon by Bruce Riedel)
o In those days it was also thought that Russians are responsible for Ojhri
camp so that the supply of weapons and ammunition might not be
provided at the appropriately and within the stipulated period of time.
o It was also thought that US intended to get audit the weapon and
ammunition that was being given to Pakistan against Russian invasion
in Afghanistan and this audit may be avoided: “In Afghanistan the US
cash flow exceeds those for all others covert actions. Since 1979
commencing before the Soviet invasion at the end of the year, a billion
dollars were already imparted to the rebels secretly. Informed
observers say that 30 or more percent of the assistance were stolen on
the transportation routes which run through Pakistan.” (US News &
World Report, 16 June 1986)
o General Akhtar Abdul Rehman who was the Joint Chief of Army staff at
that time and also Chairman of All Armed Forces, visited the Ojhri camp
on 10th of April 1988 in the evening when fire was overcome and said
the army personnel their weapons and ammunition were durable and
apparently it’s a Sabotage and nothing such incident had happened for
the last six or seven years. (Afghan War & The STINGER SAGA by Lt.
Col. ( R) Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi)
 o It was Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rehman’s idea to construct the camp within
the inhabited area and the army personnel requested to the Gen. more
than once to shift the camp from here to any appropriate place who
used to shift and supply ammunition, but in vain.
o According to Col. Ghazi, some army officers declared this disaster an
accident while others declared it Sabotage.
o Another rumor or conspiracy tale is that Aghanis have sold out a great
number of weapons and ammunition to Iran.
Apparently, Ojhri camp disaster i.e. April 10, 1988 is a black day in the history
of Pakistan when the mishandling of lethal weapons during transportation
caused a major loss in which more than 100 innocent people passed away
and numberless wounded. It is still a mystery and whether it was an accident
or Sabotage nor report from both committees was publicized even after more
than three decades.

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