“Uncool and Incorrect” in Chile

“Uncool and Incorrect” in Chile

The Nixon Administration and the Downfall of
Salvador Allende
Stephen M. Streeter

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

Jefferson, North Carolina
 Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Names: Streeter, Stephen M., author.
Title: “Uncool and incorrect” in Chile : the Nixon administration and the downfall of Salvador
Allende / Stephen M. Streeter.
Description: Jefferson, North Carolina : McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2022 | Includes
bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022048325 | ISBN 9781476688831 (paperback : acid free paper) ♾

ISBN 9781476648286 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: United States—Foreign relations—Chile. | Chile—Foreign relations—United States. |
United States—Foreign relations—1969–1974. | United States—Politics and government—1969–1974.
| Chile—Foreign relations—1970–1973. | Chile—Politics and government—1970–1973. | Chile—
History—Coup d’état, 1973. | Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913–1994. | Allende Gossens,
Salvador, 1908–1973. | Cold War.
Classification: LCC E183.8.C4 S77 12022 | DDC 327.73083—dc23/eng/20221129
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022048325
British Library cataloguing data are available
ISBN (print) 978-1-4766-8883-1
ISBN (ebook) 978-1-4766-4828-6
© 2023 Stephen M. Streeter. All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Front cover: (top to bottom) U.S. President Richard Nixon (White House); Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger (U.S. Department of State); President of Chile Salvador Allende (Octubre Centre de Cultura
Contemporània)
Printed in the United States of America

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina 28640
www.mcfarlandpub.com
 Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
1
Origins of the Clash
2
The 1970 Presidential Election
3
The ­Face-Off
4
Nationalization
5
Making the Economy Scream: The “Invisible Blockade”
6
The Chilean Revolution
7
Destabilization
8
Creating a Coup Climate
9
Chile’s 9/11
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index of Terms
 Acknowledgments
Over the past decade, I have accumulated many debts in the writing
of this book. Many of the key questions investigated here were first
suggested to me by my colleague and friend Jim Siekmeier when he
was working in the State Department’s Historical Office as one of the
editors of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Jim kindly
tolerated my incessant inquiries about the status of the Chile volume
and steered me toward many important documents. A grant from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada paid for
research trips and enabled me to hire research assistants. Leonardo
Russomanno, Diana Cucuz, and Priti Murbah were instrumental in
getting me started by collating documents and summarizing the
secondary literature. Anyone who has visited a research facility knows
how valuable archivists can be. I am indebted to the staff of the
Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives; the Archivo José Toribo Merino,
Centro de Investigación y Documentación, Universidad Finis Terrae;
the Archivo Nacional de Chile; the National Archives of the United
Kingdom; and the U.S. National Archives. The McMaster ­Inter-
Library Loan staff, especially Kimberly Pickett, performed an
invaluable service by helping me to obtain the many hundreds of
publications that inform this book. I could not have written it without
them.
Many thanks are owed to Liz Delaney for editing the first draft and
helping me to refine my prose for a general audience. My department
chair, Pam Swett, graciously allowed me to rearrange my teaching
schedule several times to free up more writing time. Finally, I need to
apologize to my family for taking so long to complete this project.
Much as I would like to blame the delay on our cats, Solar, Sam, Rumi,
and Karma, who insisted that keyboard trays were made for napping, I
am afraid the true fault is my inclination toward procrastination. My
greatest debt is to Sal, who frequently encouraged me to keep going
when I was ready to give up. Her patience, love, and support truly
made this book possible.
 Abbreviations
AID Agency for International Development, U.S.
AFL–CIO American Federation of ­Labor–Congress of Industrial
Organizations
AFTAC Air Force Technical Applications Command
AIFLD American Institute for Free Labor Development
CCS Chilean Cooperative Society
CECLA Comisión Especial de Coordinación Latinoamericana (Special
Commission for Latin American Coordination)
CERA Centro de Reforma Agraria (Agrarian Reform Center)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.
CODE Confederación de la Democracia (Democratic Confederation)
CODELCO Corporación del Cobre (Copper Corporation of Chile)
CUT Central Única de Trabajadores (Chilean Labor Confederation)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)
ENU Escuela Nacional Unificada (National Unified Education)
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FRAP Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front)
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GAP Grupos de Amigos Personales (Group of Personal Friends)
IADB Inter-American Defense Board
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank)
ICA International Cooperation Administration, U.S.
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IPC International Petroleum Corporation
ITT International Telephone and Telegraph Company
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAPU Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (United Popular Action
Movement)
MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
MRII Movimiento Radical Izquierda Independiente (Independent Radical
Movement of the Left)
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NSC National Security Council
NSSM National Security Study Memorandum
OAS Organization of American States
OLAS Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (Organization of Latin
American Solidarity)
PCCh Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist Party)
PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)
PDR Partido Demócrata Radical (Radical Democratic Party)
PF Poder Feminino (Feminine Power)
PIR Partido Izquierda Radical (Radical Party of the Left)
PN Partido Nacional (National Party)
PR Partido Radical (Radical Party)
PS Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)
SOFOFA Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (National Industrial Society)
SRG Senior Review Group
TFP Tradición, Familia, y Propiedad (Tradition, Family, and Property)
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USP Union Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Union)
VOP Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (Organized Vanguard of the
People)
WSAG Washington Special Actions Group
 Introduction
Former Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs Charles
Meyer to Senator Frank Church: “The definition you used, my words, which
were the words of the administration, ‘cool and correct,’ I suppose from
where you sit, is both uncool and incorrect.”
Senator Church: “Those words, if those words have any meaning at all
—‘cool and correct and detached’; ‘letting Chileans handle their own
affairs’—these are not words that describe the facts that we have been told
today.”1
Johan Huizinga: “The historian must … constantly put himself at a point
in the past at which the known factors will seem to permit different
outcomes.”2
The 11 September 1973 military coup that toppled President Salvador
Allende of Chile remains one of the most mysterious chapters of the Cold
War. While military coups were relatively common in Latin America during
the twentieth century, Chile had long been considered a politically stable
democracy.3 In ending the first democratically elected socialist government
in Latin American history, the September coup raised serious questions
about Chilean exceptionalism. Those sympathetic to the “Chilean road to
socialism” wanted to know why the revolution, which began with such
enthusiasm and optimism, had ended so badly. The deaths of thousands of
Chileans during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, which lasted until 1990,
made it imperative to determine not only the fate of the disappeared but also
who was to blame for this human tragedy. Finally, the suspicion that the
Richard M. Nixon administration had waged a secret campaign against
Allende triggered a highly charged debate about the U.S. role in the military
coup.
It has taken such a long time to piece together what happened in Chile in
large part because of secrecy, ­cover-ups, and subterfuges. After U.S. covert
operations failed to prevent Allende from becoming president in 1970,
Nixon instructed his administration that U.S. policy toward the Unidad
Popular (UP) government was to be “cool but correct,” meaning no outward
signs of foul play.4 He publicly declared a year later that “we are prepared to
have the kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is
prepared to have with us.”5 One of the first major cracks in this facade
appeared in March 1972, when newspaper columnist Jack Anderson
published documents revealing that the International Telephone and
Telegraph Company (ITT), a multinational corporation with significant
investments in Chile, had approached the Nixon administration with a plot
to prevent Allende from becoming elected in 1970. When the U.S. Congress
held hearings on ITT in early 1973, the Nixon administration evaded
responsibility by claiming that ITT’s proposals had gone nowhere. Former
ambassador Edward Korry stonewalled Congress at critical points by
refusing to answer questions about whether he had received instructions to
stop Allende. Korry insisted that “no hard line toward Chile was carried out
at any time.”6
As Nixon’s credibility began to crumble in the face of the emerging
Watergate scandal and the secret bombings of Cambodia, the U.S. Congress
finally began questioning the Nixon administration’s claims about Chile. At
the outset of Henry Kissinger’s secretary of state confirmation hearings, held
just three days after the Chilean military seized power, U.S. Representative
Donald Fraser (D–Minnesota) declared that “the crisis of confidence is
presently so severe that doubts inevitably arise as to whether we can believe
the administration’s denial of involvement in the coup in Chile.” To convince
a skeptical Congress Kissinger testified that to the best of his knowledge, the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “had nothing to do with the coup.”
Of course, there was always the possibility, he added, that “some madman”
in the CIA had acted independently. (Had the legislators only known then of
Nixon’s “madman” strategy to intimidate North Vietnam, they might have
figured out that the madman, in this case, was none other than Nixon
himself.)7
The Nixon administration’s professed innocence in the affairs of Chile
came under further attack in December 1975, when a U.S. Senate
Intelligence Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho released
its report on the U.S. covert action program in Chile between 1963 and
1973. The Church Report, as it became known, revealed that the CIA had
long been involved in attempting to shape Chilean elections by
disseminating propaganda and supporting opposition political parties and
private sector organizations hostile to Allende and his coalition Unidad
Popular. After a variety of efforts, including the promotion of a military
coup, had failed to prevent Allende from being elected, the Nixon
administration adopted the “cool but correct” posture and applied economic
pressure to undermine the UP government. The report found no evidence
that the United States was directly responsible for the 1973 coup but
conceded that in keeping in touch with coup plotters the Nixon
administration had walked a “tightrope” between collecting information and
“exercising influence.”8
The Church Report demolished the idea that the Nixon administration
had followed a strictly “hands-off ” policy toward Allende, but it did not
answer the question of why Allende had fallen. The committee deliberately
steered away from the issue of the CIA’s efficacy and instead concluded with
a series of further questions about the coup. Was Allende really a threat to
U.S. national security that justified covert action? How responsible was the
United States for the unfolding horrors of the Pinochet regime?9 Instead of
ending the controversy over Chile, the Church Report only exacerbated a
deepening division between two schools of interpretation: one that blamed
Allende for trying to impose socialism on a recalcitrant population which
welcomed the coup as liberation and another that emphasized the Nixon
administration’s effort to destabilize Chile to the point where the military
felt compelled to seize power and destroy the left.
The Nixon administration told so many lies about Chile that it became an
obsession for some to prove, as one historian has complained, that “Nixon
and Kissinger’s skullduggery or CIA machinations” had caused Allende’s
downfall.10 The nearly exclusive focus on U.S. responsibility for the 1973
coup, while understandable given the times, did a disservice to the
complexity of the case. As U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry later bemoaned,
comprehending the literature on the coup is like “walking into the middle of
a bad mystery film. Lots of clues clutter the scenario, but the film ignores
them so it can end with ­simple-minded solutions.”11
Eventually, scholars began to widen their scope of inquiry. With
considerable foresight, Laurence R. Birns, a senior economic affairs officer
with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in
Santiago, told journalist William Buckley in 1977 that “there are maybe 10
different ingredients in the total mix of why Allende fell…. It takes a long
time to do a proper job in blending them.”12 The most obvious place to start
was with the Chilean side of the story. As the surviving members of the
Allende government began to reflect on their experiences in order to
determine the proper lessons to be drawn from Chile’s experiment with
democratic socialism, it became possible to put domestic affairs at the center
of the story. Ever haunted by the specter of U.S. imperialism, however, the
discussion over Chile inevitably returned to the issue of U.S. responsibility.
Even if Allende and his government had committed major errors and
mismanaged the economy, the question lingered: how should those mistakes
be weighed against the Nixon administration’s herculean efforts to bring
Allende down?
The debate over Chile did not advance much beyond these terms until
1998 when Spanish authorities detained Pinochet in London for alleged
human rights violations during his government. The controversy over the
Pinochet extradition case eventually prodded the William J. Clinton
administration into declassifying more than 24,000 U.S. government
documents related to Chile stretching from 1969 to 1991.13 At about the
same time, a lengthy lawsuit that had delayed the opening of the Nixon
Presidential Library was finally resolved, enabling the U.S. National Archives
to begin processing diplomatic records related to Chile. In 2004 the National
Archives released transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations,
which contained material on Chile. In 2014 and 2015, the State
Department’s Historical Office released special volumes on Chile as part of
its Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.
The release of these formerly classified documents has led to a rash of new
studies on the Nixon administration’s relationship with Chile. So why yet
another book on a topic that, according to some commentators, has been
overworked and focused too narrowly on the “blame game”?14 While some
American academics are bored with the topic, most Chileans still attribute
great historical significance to the 1973 coup (witness the ongoing memory
battles), and many still consider the United States to have been at least
partially responsible for it.15 Moreover, there are other good reasons for
delving deeper into the U.S. role in the 1973 Chilean coup.
First, the most recent studies vary so widely in their conclusions that it is
impossible to say that any sort of consensus has been reached. As one
scholar has emphasized, “questions as to how and why” Allende was
overthrown “stubbornly refuse to go away.”16 Divergent accounts of Allende’s
downfall, according to one survey of U.S.–Latin American relations, “test the
capacity of scholars to tolerate high levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, and
contradiction.”17 More specifically, debates continue to revolve around the
issues of “internal” versus “external” factors, key conjunctures or turning
points, and whether a coup was inevitable.18 Second, all of these studies were
published before the availability of the new FRUS volumes on Chile. This
collection of U.S. declassified documents provides valuable insight into the
Nixon administration’s approach to getting rid of Allende. Third, most of the
new scholarly studies of the Chilean coup have tended to focus on selected
dimensions of the story. For example, Peter Kornbluh and Kristian
Gustafson concentrate on the role of the CIA and mostly ignore other
instruments that the Nixon administration used against Allende. Tanya
Harmer’s widely praised study, Allende’s Chile and the ­Inter-American Cold
War, deliberately sidesteps the issue of responsibility for the coup to
concentrate on UP’s foreign policy in the broader Cold War context.
The goal of this book is to evaluate the Nixon administration’s efforts to
stop Allende within the context of Chilean history using the best
information available. Since the end of the Cold War and the near
worldwide failure of communist systems, it is tempting to view the Allende
revolution as doomed from the outset. Yet, there is a world of difference
between a social experiment that is terminated by electoral means and one
that succumbs to a bloody dictatorship that lasts 17 years. To highlight the
importance of contingency, I have employed counterfactuals at key points in
the narrative. While many scholars disapprove of counterfactual history, if
done properly it can highlight crucial turning points and provide insight
into missed opportunities.19
Evaluating U.S. responsibility for the 1973 Chilean coup invites
consideration of many important subsidiary questions. First, how did the
Nixon administration perceive the threat posed by Allende’s election, and
why did it take the administration so long to react to the threat? How much
support did Allende get from the communist bloc, especially Cuba and
Soviet Union? Was Chile really headed down the path of a communist
dictatorship as U.S. officials repeatedly charged?
Second, who was primarily responsible within the Nixon administration
for shaping and carrying out the covert action program against Allende?
How effective were U.S. tactics? Was there really an “invisible blockade,” as
Allende insisted? If so, what impact did it have on the Chilean economy?
How important was U.S. support for the opposition parties and private
sector organizations in creating the conditions that led to the coup?
Third, when, how, and why did U.S.-Chilean relations break down despite
both nations professing at the outset a desire for peaceful cooperation? Was
there another policy Allende could have followed that would have appeased
Washington? Could a coup have been avoided? Did Allende miss an
opportunity to find a political solution that would have saved Chile from
Pinochet?
To answer these questions required combing through thousands of
archival documents, books, journal articles, periodicals, newspapers, and
oral history interviews. The sheer size of the U.S. documentary record is so
staggering that it can lead to a “­world-according-to-Washington” bias if not
handled properly.20 While Chilean foreign ministry records provide a
valuable corrective to this imbalance, they are not comparable to the
impressive quantity and quality of documents originating from the Nixon
administration. Allende’s true intentions have proven difficult to uncover
because he did not keep a diary and his suicide leaves researchers with little
more than his public speeches and interviews to go on.21 Because many
Chilean government documents were destroyed at the time of the coup,
much of the story of Allende’s government has had to be cobbled together
from interviews, memoirs, and scraps of information smuggled out of
Dawson Island, where many UP leaders were held prisoner after the coup.22
With a few significant exceptions, the scholarly literature on Allende’s
domestic opposition is of relatively poor quality. There are obvious reasons
for this dearth. Given the memory battles in Chile over the 1973 coup,
Allende’s opponents still have good reason to remain silent about whatever
covert assistance they may have received from the Nixon administration. No
one wants to be remembered as a vendepatria (traitor).23
Interpreting the U.S. documentary record poses its own particular
challenges. Censors have removed significant portions of text from many
documents on the grounds of protecting national security.24 While it is
mostly guesswork to figure out what is being left out, it appears that the CIA
has removed the names of its assets and the cash amounts that went into
specific operations. These omissions hinder accurate assessments of the
CIA’s activities by obfuscating the money trail. As Ambassador Korry later
complained, the Church Report figures may have left an inflated impression
of the funds spent because the report equated appropriations with
expenditures. The censorship of documents also has exacerbated the danger
of imagining U.S. influence to be greater than it was.25
The chapters in this book are focused thematically and arranged in
roughly chronological order. Chapter 1 reviews the background of U.S.-
Chilean relations before 1970 and discusses how the Nixon administration
viewed the threat posed by Allende. This chapter also reviews the evolution
of Allende’s presidential bids and the formation of Unidad Popular. Chapter
2 centers on the Nixon administration’s attempts to influence the 1970
presidential election. Chapter 3 describes the initial friction that evolved
between Chile and the United States, despite foreign policies designed to
minimize conflict. Chapter 4 reviews the clash between the Nixon
administration and the Allende government over the nationalization of the
copper industry and ITT. Chapter 5 examines the contentious issue of
whether there was an “invisible blockade” against Chile, while Chapter 6
evaluates the impact of UP’s socialist programs on the economy. Chapter 7
describes the U.S. destabilization campaign, which included efforts to
influence the interim elections, prop up the private sector organizations, and
subsidize the opposition media. The Nixon administration’s attempt to
establish a coup climate is explained in Chapter 8, while Chapter 9 describes
the final events leading to the September coup and its aftermath. The
conclusion assesses the U.S. role in Allende’s downfall and explores
counterfactual scenarios.
A few days after the fall of the Allende government, Kissinger complained
to Nixon about the “bleeding” press, which had failed to celebrate the
Chilean coup. “In the Eisenhower period,” he grumbled, “we would have
been heroes.”26 Kissinger’s apparent indirect reference to the successful CIA
intervention in Guatemala is partly what drew me to undertake this
investigation more than a decade ago. As my study of the Eisenhower
administration’s intervention in Guatemala concluded, there appeared to be
some intriguing parallels to the Nixon administration’s intervention in
Chile. In both cases, the CIA launched covert operations against
democratically elected governments whose nationalist policies clashed with
U.S. corporate interests. The outcome was also generally the same in both
countries: brutal anticommunist dictatorships which implemented
neoliberal counterrevolutions that restored the local elite to power and
promoted foreign investment.27 The similarities struck Alfonso Bauer Paiz, a
former official in the Jacobo Arbenz administration. After personally
witnessing the coup in Chile, he understandably interpreted Allende’s defeat
as a replay of what had happened to Arbenz in 1954.28
A review of the literature on both coups, however, quickly reveals that this
kind of comparison has its limits. Despite some minor interpretive
variations, studies of the intervention in Guatemala seem to converge on a
relatively clear picture of what happened. Studies of the Chilean coup, by
contrast, appear to tell vastly different stories. The CIA’s covert operation to
topple Arbenz (PBSUCCESS) was worthy of its code name. The CIA’s covert
operation against Allende (FUBELT), however, proved to be a colossal flop.
Proud of its accomplishments in Guatemala, the CIA has since released
extensive records on PBSUCCESS, which has become the most widely
studied covert operation in the history of the agency. Could the secrecy
surrounding the CIA’s role in Chile explain the widely divergent accounts of
the 1973 coup?
While it is tempting to attribute the diversity of interpretations of
Allende’s downfall to the lack of access to the essential records, there are
more structural reasons for the differences between the two cases. The
Eisenhower administration’s intervention in Guatemala consisted of a single
tightly-knit operation, that concluded in a matter of months. The attempt to
bring down Allende involved multiple operations, often not well
coordinated, and took nearly three years.29 Based on the trend of documents
on Chile released so far, it seems highly unlikely that there is a “smoking
gun” somewhere lodged in the archives of Langley that will clear up the
entire mystery.30 A more useful approach is to determine how the Nixon
administration tried to influence the course of events in Chile without
exaggerating U.S. power.31 This study will show that the maximal goal of the
Nixon administration was to block Allende from the presidency by either
constitutional means or by promoting a military coup. When those efforts
failed, the minimal goal became punishing Chile so that no other Latin
American country would be tempted to imitate the Chilean road to
socialism. To accomplish this objective the Nixon administration
implemented a destabilization program aimed at creating a favorable coup
climate. Given the intrinsic impracticality of the UP’s economic policies and
the political impasse of late 1973, it seems likely that Allende’s government
would have failed, even without U.S. pressures. But the Nixon
administration’s efforts contributed significantly to Allende’s downfall by
polarizing the country and setting the stage for the long brutal reign of
Pinochet.

Abbreviations
AJTM — Archivo José Toribio Merino
Amembassy — American Embassy, Santiago
CAF — Classified Allende Files, RG 84
CDP — Chile Declassification Project
CIDOC — Centro de Investigación y Documentación, Universidad Finis Terrae, Santiago, Chile
CFPF — Central Foreign Policy Files
ch — chapter
CIAP — Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (­Inter-American Committee — on the
Alliance for Progress)
Cong — Congress
CREST — CIA Records Search Tool, FOIA Electronic Reading Room
DATT — Defense Attaché
deptel — department of state telegram to Santiago
DCI — Director of Central Intelligence
DIA — Defense Intelligence Agency
disp — dispatch
doc — document
DoD — Department of Defense
DoS — Department of State
DSB — Department of State Bulletin
embtel — embassy telegram from Santiago to Department of State
FAOHC — Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and —
Training
FOIA — Freedom of Information Act
FRUS — Foreign Relations of the United States
HAK — Henry A. Kissinger
HCFA — U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs
INR — Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
LAWR — Latin American Weekly Report
memcon — memorandum of conversation
MFF — Mary Ferrell Foundation
MINREL — Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Chilean Foreign Ministry)
MCUSFP — SCFR, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy
NACLA — North American Congress on Latin America
nd — no date
np — no publisher
NPMP — Nixon Presidential Materials Project
NSA — National Security Archive
NYT — New York Times
OLF — Orlando Letelier Fondo, Archivo Nacional de Chile
PPP — Public Papers of the President
pt — part
QERC — Quarterly Economic Review of Chile
RG — Record Group
SCFR — U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations
secstate — secretary of state
sess — session
SNIE — Special National Intelligence Estimate
tel — telegram
telcon — memorandum of telephone conversation
TNA — The National Archives, Kew, London
vol — volume
WP — Washington Post

1. Charles Meyer testimony, 4 December 1975, U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities, vol. 7, 37–38 (hereafter Intelligence Activities)
2. Quoted in Ferguson, Virtual History, 1.
3. Gray and Kirwin, “Presidential Succession in Chile.”
4. Kissinger, White House Years, 681.
5. Nixon, “Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” 25 February 1971,
PPP.
6. Korry testimony, 27 March 1973, MCUSFP, 301.
7. Henry Kissinger testimony, 17 September 1973, SCFR, Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger, 303. For
the CIA’s assurance that there had been no CIA madmen involved, see Santiago tel to CIA, 19 January
1974, CDP. On the madman theory with respect to Vietnam, see Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, ch. 4.
 8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973, 2, 6. (hereafter Church Report) Original
italics.
9. Church Report, 56.
10. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 7–8.
11. Korry, “­USA-In-Chile and ­Chile-In-USA,” 5–6.
12. "Looking Back on Allende," Firing Line transcript, 25 April 1977, 4.
13. Kornbluh, “Opening up the Files.”
14. For complaints about the literature on Allende being oversaturated, see Dustin Walcher and
Jeffrey F. Taffet comments in ­H-Diplo Roundtable Review 14:1 (September 2012). On the “blame
game,” see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 256.
15. See Manzi et al., “El pasado que nos pesa,” 194–95. On the general historical significance of the
coup both domestically and internationally, see Drake, “Cuarenta años después.”
16. Haslam, Nixon Administration, xiv. For one prominent scholar’s opinion that U.S. responsibility
for the coup remains “hotly contested,” see Gaddis, Cold War, 178. Additionally, the various truth
commissions established by the governments following Pinochet left many important questions
unanswered. See Loveman and Lira, “Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and Impunity as Historical
Themes,” 67–68.
17. Gilderhus et al., Third Century, 183.
18. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 20; Rositzke, CIA’s Secret Operations, 195. On the
importance of including the U.S. intervention against Allende in providing a full account of modern
Chilean history, see Corvalán Marquez, “La intervención de los Estados Unidos,” 69; and Joaquín
Brunner, “La reconciliación,” 163.
19. On the use of contingencies and counterfactuals, I have been guided by Costigliola, “Reading for
Meaning,” 286; Lebow, “Counterfactual Thought Experiments”; Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 5–6;
Roxborough, “Reversing the Revolution,” 19; and Gaddis, Landscape, 73–76, 103. For an assessment of
counterfactual issues explored in the early literature on Allende’s downfall, see Collier, “Allende’s
Chile.”
20. Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, xxxiv; Uliánova, “Los comunistas prefieren la subversión
pacífica,” 403.
21. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 147; Summ interview, 26, FAOHC. As discussed in
chapter 9, Allende’s personal papers were destroyed after the coup.
22. Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 10; Schnake, Schnake, 223. On the military’s destruction of UP records
and the lack of an archive for the Allende government, see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 279; and Haslam,
Nixon Administration, xiii.
23. For examples of Allende opponents who have denied collaborating with the United States, see
Zaldívar and Varas, Exilio en Madrid, 63–65; Everett G. Martin, “Spooky Cash: What Happened to
Funds CIA Aimed at Chile?” WSJ, 9 December 1974; and Tagle D., La crisis de la democracia en Chile,
273–74. The other difficulty is that some of Allende’s opponents may have been acting as CIA assets
without realizing it. See McSherry, Predatory States, 166.
24. Vernon Loeb, “Top C.I.A. Officials Won’t Declassify Some Chile Files,” WP, 11 August 2000.
25. Korry, “Embajador Edward M. Korry en CEP,” 19. Korry seems to have missed that the Church
Report did acknowledge that between March 1970 and October 1973 the CIA spent only $6.5 million
out of the $8.8 million that it had authorized for covert activities in Chile. Church Report, 42. After
the coup, Colby sent Kissinger a list of all 40 Committee actions on Chile but most of the amounts
authorized and spent on each operation are redacted. See Colby memo to Kissinger, 11 June 1974,
CDP.
26. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 923–24.
 27. Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, ch. 10. For an early comparison of the interventions in
Guatemala and Chile, see “Chile: The Story Behind the Coup,” NACLA’s Latin America & Empire
Report, 7 (October 1973), 13.
28. Alfonso Bauer Paiz, Memorias, 229–30.
29. Another important difference is that the CIA was able to maintain its cover in Guatemala far
longer than in Chile. See Immerman, “Brief History of the CIA,” 49. It also appears that Nixon was far
more obsessed with Allende than Eisenhower was with Arbenz. See Appy, “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan
Doodle,” 188.
30. For problems with relying on a “smoking gun” approach to assess U.S. responsibility for the coup,
see Alejandro Reuss, “U.S. in Chile,” Z Magazine, November 1999, 50; and Rogers and Maxwell,
“Mythmaking.”
31. Gaudichaud, Poder popular y cordones industriales, 15.
 1
Origins of the Clash
Understanding how the Nixon administration came to view the election
of Allende as one of the biggest threats to U.S. national security in the
history of the Western Hemisphere requires a review of U.S. relations with
Chile before 1970. The two countries may not have been destined to clash,
but there were many historical forces at work that predisposed the Nixon
administration to look unfavorably upon the presidency of Allende. After
reviewing U.S.-Chilean relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, this chapter describes Allende’s early political ambitions and the
origins of his coalition, Unidad Popular. The discussion then turns to
Nixon’s policies toward Latin America before concluding with an analysis of
U.S. perceptions of the Chilean threat.

The United States and Chile Before Allende

As nearly every historical survey of U.S.-Chilean relations observes, the
two countries got off on the wrong foot right from the start. Unwilling to
alienate Spain, the United States refused to assist Chile in gaining its
independence in 1810. After finally recognizing the new republic 22 years
later, the United States issued the Monroe Doctrine (1823), a lecture to the
world that Latin America belonged within the U.S. sphere of influence.
Chilean statesman Diego Portales cautioned his compatriots against “freeing
ourselves from one form of domination only to fall into another.”1 An
illuminating example of Portales’s warning appeared when the United States
attempted to mediate the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), an Andean contest
for control of the ­nitrate-producing region in the Atacama Desert. Although
Chile came out on top, the Chilean perception that the United States had
favored Peru and Bolivia deepened Chilean suspicions of America’s
motives.2 Relations then sank to their lowest point in the nineteenth century
with the Baltimore affair (1892), a bar brawl in the port of Valparaíso that
resulted in the death of several American sailors.3
Like most of Latin America, Chile fell under the sway of rising U.S.
economic dominance in the early twentieth century. By the First World War,
Chile received almost half of its imports from the United States, which
absorbed more than half of Chile’s exports. This increasing economic
dependency on the United States gave Washington considerable leverage
over Chile’s financial affairs.4 The origins of Chile’s modern debt crisis,
which became such a major headache for the Allende government, can be
traced back to the 1920s. Fiscal reforms recommended by the Princeton
economist Edwin Kemmerer in 1925, for example, enabled Chile to borrow
so heavily from U.S., British, and Swiss banks that Chile’s foreign debt
skyrocketed from $18 million to $257 million within five years.5
The boom in U.S. foreign investment in Chile, which climbed from $5
million to $200 million between 1900 and 1914, was concentrated largely in
nitrates and copper, the nation’s main source of foreign exchange.6 The U.S.
diplomat Spruille Braden, whose family owned one of the largest copper
mines in Chile, viewed his father’s entrepreneurial genius as having made a
“colossal” contribution to Chile’s ­well-being.7 In 1931, when the average
worker made only $80 a year, Braden declared that “in Chile there is much
less difference between the rich and the poor than in any country of the
world.”8 Most Chileans saw the matter differently. Because foreign
companies paid almost no tax and took most of their profits out of the
country, many citizens came to resent what they saw as the robbery of the
nation’s wealth.9
Increasing U.S. economic hegemony forced the Chilean government into
a precarious balancing act between trying to satisfy domestic constituencies
while accommodating foreign companies. As immigration and
industrialization in the early twentieth century began to alter Chile’s class
structure, the emergence of leftist parties to represent the working class and
peasantry introduced a new level of complexity into Chilean politics. Unlike
the dictators of Central America, who could suppress popular opposition to
U.S. economic interests, Chilean presidents of the twentieth century had to
operate in a more democratic climate. “Chile is not a ‘banana republic,’” one
U.S. intelligence report observed, “but a country with deeply ingrained
democratic traditions.”10
As Chile’s political system evolved, it became practically impossible to
rule without cutting deals with one’s opponents. This feature of the
parliamentary system gave the Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh, Chilean
Communist Party) and the Partido Socialista (PS, Socialist Party), which
took root in Chile during the 1920s and 1930s, a certain amount of leverage.
For example, to win the presidency in 1946, Gabriel González Videla, a
member of the centrist Radical Party, agreed to accept the support of the
Communists in exchange for granting them several cabinet posts. When the
PCCh began supporting a labor strike, however, the State Department came
to the rescue of the copper companies by red-baiting the unions. “If we do
not protect the legitimate interests of U.S. nationals in the face of such
Communist attacks,” Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden blustered,
“then God help defense of the hemisphere, solidarity, Good Neighborliness
and all of the policies and principles for which we stand.”11 Not long after
Braden threatened to withhold U.S. credits unless the strike was settled in
the copper industry’s favor, González Videla expunged the PCCh from his
government. The exact contribution of U.S. pressure to this outcome
remains unclear, but Chile did receive copious amounts of American aid
after the Chilean president outlawed the Communist Party.12
As the González Videla example suggests, the Cold War came to
dominate Chile’s relationship with the United States after the Second World
War. As a result, the U.S. intelligence services which had been stationed in
Chile to monitor Nazi activity turned their attention to the communist
threat.13 Given the historical strength of the left, Chile was clearly a country
that needed close supervision. After engineering the overthrow of the
nationalist Guatemalan government in 1954, the Eisenhower administration
worried that Chile would become the “next Guatemala.”14 CIA Director
Allen Dulles warned in 1958, “The situation in Chile is always a dangerous
one, because whenever the prices of copper and nitrates go down … the
Communists fatten on those economic crises.”15 Assistant Secretary of State
for ­Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom declared, “our political interests
will not permit us to stand by and watch Chile go down the drain.”16
Chile’s volatility was so unpredictable that many ­high-level diplomatic
visits were disrupted or had to be canceled. ­Vice President Nixon, who faced
angry demonstrators nearly everywhere he went on his 1958 tour of Latin
America, had to bypass Chile altogether because of public outrage over a
U.S. congressional decision to resume import taxes on copper. The backlash
became so intense that Chilean President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo had to
cancel his scheduled visit to Washington.17 When President Dwight D.
Eisenhower risked visiting Chile in 1960, he came away unsettled because of
an open letter he received from Chilean students accusing the United States
of being insensitive to the needs of the poor.18 Later in the decade,
demonstrators spat on U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy and showered him
with eggs and stones during his visit to several Chilean universities.19 When
Nelson Rockefeller toured Latin America in 1969 at Nixon’s request, he had
to cancel his visit to Chile because of the threat of violent demonstrations.20

Allende and the Origins of Unidad Popular

By the early 1960s, it was becoming increasingly clear to U.S. analysts that
the real threat in Chile was not armed revolution, but the democratic
election of a leftist leader such as Salvador Allende. Given the way that
Allende was later castigated by the Nixon administration, it is worth
remembering that U.S. officials at one time viewed Allende as an ally. Claude
Bowers, who served as U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1939 to 1953,
described Allende as “an able man of character and intelligence” who was
“an uncompromising foe of communism.”21 Who was Allende really, and
how did he come to be perceived as such a vital threat to U.S. national
security?
Born into a ­middle-class family in 1908, Salvador Allende threw himself
into politics after the death of his father in 1932, when he vowed to devote
his life to social struggle.22 Although Allende often claimed to have been
inspired by his reading of Lenin’s works, he was not particularly well versed
in Marxist theory. Allende’s heroes included not just Fidel Castro, but a wide
variety of visionaries such as independence leader Simón Bolívar and the
Nicaraguan rebel Augusto Sandino.23 Robert J. Alexander, an American
academic who interviewed Allende several times in the early 1950s,
concluded that Allende was never a “convinced ­Marxist-Leninist.”24
Allende’s passion for socialism appears to have been derived from a genuine
moral concern for the plight of the poor, which he came to know firsthand
as a physician.25 The filmmaker ­Costa-Gavras described Allende as a nice,
sweet, provincial doctor “who wanted to feed hungry children and bring
significant change to his country.”26 His critics frequently accused him of
hypocrisy because, while touting the need for greater equality, he had no
qualms about enjoying fine wines, dressing elegantly, and collecting
expensive artwork. For Allende, however, there was no contradiction: “I
would not be more revolutionary if my elbows were ragged or if I didn’t take
a bath every day,” he countered.27
Allende spent his formative political years participating in various
Popular Front coalitions of the 1930s. In 1945 he was elected Senator, an
office he retained until he became president. Allende was drawn to the
Socialist Party because of its emphasis on class analysis and advocacy of a
“third path” between communism and capitalism.28 Although he was an
outspoken critic of “foreign imperialism” and admired the Russian
Revolution, he did not think the Soviet model was applicable to Chile. “It is
silly to talk of proletarian revolution in the Russian manner,” Allende told an
interviewer in 1947. Rather, “the Socialists should be in favor of using the
government for an improvement of the conditions of the working class,
trying to get more independence for the country economically, and
generally bettering the position of the people.”29 Allende was also adamant
that the Chilean path to socialism would be democratic and include respect
for free speech and civil liberties.30
The U.S. embassy viewed Allende’s presidential candidacy in 1952
favorably in the belief that Allende was an anticommunist whose supporters
might help defeat Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, a former dictator who
threatened to impose authoritarian rule in the style of the Argentine leader
Juan Perón.31 But two years later, Allende’s reputation in Washington
plummeted because of his public criticism of the Caracas Resolution, which
the United States had introduced at the Organization of American States
(OAS) conference in Caracas to isolate Guatemala. Allende ridiculed the
idea that the small country of Guatemala posed a threat to the larger
“bourgeois” countries, and he took offense at U.S. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles’s exaggeration of the communist threat in Latin America.32 It
also did not help that Allende took a ­six-month tour in 1954 that included
stops in Soviet Union and China. While Washington may have missed an
opportunity to try and reorient Allende to the West by failing to offer
Allende a paid visit to the United States, it seems unlikely that exposure to
American culture would have made much difference. The U.S. excursions of
Cuban rebels José Martí and Fidel Castro, after all, had failed to dampen
their antipathy toward Yankee imperialism. In any case, Allende’s open
challenge to U.S. hegemony forever tainted him in the eyes of U.S. officials as
a communist sympathizer.33
By the next presidential election, Allende had formed a coalition of leftist
parties known as Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP, Popular Action Front)
that would greatly improve his chances. Unlike the election six years earlier,
when Allende barely scraped up 5 percent of the vote, in 1958 his share shot
up to nearly 29 percent. If not for the conservative female vote and a minor
leftist candidate who siphoned off a few percentage points, Allende might
have defeated the eventual winner, conservative Jorge Alessandri.34 Allende’s
near-miss reflected the rapidly changing composition of the Chilean
electorate. After the PCCh was reinstated in 1958, its rolls expanded
dramatically. Moreover, Chile’s growing population, female suffrage, and a
lowering of the voting age caused the size of the Chilean electorate to
quadruple between 1952 and 1970.35
Allende’s growing popularity frightened Washington. In 1962, the State
Department declared that it was “not prepared to risk a Socialist or FRAP
victory, for fear of nationalization of U.S. investments … and the possible
communist influence in a Socialist (or FRAP) government.”36 The prospect
that Allende might be elected seemed more worrisome than if he came to
power through force. President John F. Kennedy warned President
Alessandri about this danger when he pointed out that an Allende victory in
a democratic country like Chile would undermine the American claim that
communism had no appeal.37 A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
described Allende in late 1963 as “originally a moderate Socialist” who now
posed a severe risk to U.S. national security because he had “adopted a
strongly pro–Castro and pro–Soviet line.” A sign of Allende’s growing
strength was that his eloquent defense of Castro, during the October 1962
Cuban missile crisis, had prevented the Alessandri administration from
breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba for fear that such a rupture might
tilt the 1964 Chilean presidential election toward FRAP.38
Kennedy’s answer to the Allende threat was to transform Chile into the
showcase of the Alliance for Progress, a $20 billion development assistance
program designed to save Latin America from communism. As Kennedy
explained to Alessandri: “the problem is not ‘Castro,’ but rather difficult
domestic problems which provide a breeding ground for the extreme left.”39
According to the stages of growth model championed by Kennedy
administration economist Walt W. Rostow, as countries such as Chile went
through the strains of modernization, the impoverished masses became an
easy target for the communists, who offered the promise of a better life.40
The challenge in Chile, as in many Latin American countries ruled by
conservative leaders, was getting the cooperation of the elite classes.
President Alessandri was not especially interested in reforms, but Chile’s
economic needs were so great that he was induced to participate in the
Alliance for Progress by the prospect of obtaining economic aid to reduce
Chile’s growing balance of payments deficit.41
As the 1964 Chilean presidential election approached, U.S. officials began
to panic that the Alliance reforms would be insufficient to forestall an
Allende victory, an outcome that was looking more disastrous than ever.
Parts of FRAP’s platform included state welfare reforms that seemed
innocuous enough: free education, income redistribution through
progressive taxation, and the right to form unions. But the rest crossed the
line of acceptability: nationalization of Chile’s minerals, banks, and public
utilities; state protection for heavy industry; expropriation of the latifundios
(large farms); state controls on the distribution of consumer goods;
abrogation of military pacts with the United States; and an independent
foreign policy, including the establishment of relations with socialist
countries.42 Even though Allende himself was not a communist, noted one
U.S. embassy officer, the danger was that once Allende assumed the
presidency, communist control of several ministries could be achieved
within months. In this imagined scenario, as the economy tanked, Allende
would come to rely increasingly on the Communists for support.43 In short,
“an Allende victory would constitute a defeat for US policy.”44
Even though early polls put Eduardo Frei of the Partido Demócrata
Cristiana (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) in the lead, the trend appeared
to be going in the wrong direction. In mid–April 1964, U.S. Ambassador
Charles Cole calculated the odds to be “3 to 1 against Allende winning in
September,” but he also emphasized “that a year ago he would have placed
the odds at 10 to 1.” As one member of the U.S. National Security Council
(NSC) advised, we “must simply do what we can to get people to back
Frei.”45 Not taking any chances, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration
launched a covert action program to support Frei financially and frighten
the Chilean electorate away from Allende. Opening the coffers for Frei was
justified, according to one State Department official, because even though
there was no proof, “we have to assume the Commies are pouring in the
dough,” and “we can’t afford to lose this one.”46
In anticipation of the need to stop Allende, the CIA had laid the
groundwork for a covert operation in Chile in the early 1960s. The Kennedy
administration’s Special Group governing covert action operations
authorized miscellaneous payments to support Frei in 1962, but the major
program against Allende did not move forward until April 1964, after FRAP
demonstrated its potential by winning a congressional seat in a traditionally
conservative district.47 As the Church Report later revealed, the Johnson
administration spent almost $4 million on fifteen covert action projects to
ensure Frei’s victory. The CIA paid for more than half of the Christian
Democrats’ campaign costs and mounted a red scare campaign by saturating
the media with anticommunist propaganda. Using “radio, films, pamphlets,
posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall painting[s],” the
agency targeted women, students, labor unions, slum dwellers, and peasants.
The CIA established liaisons with the Chilean intelligence services to gather
information about the Chilean left.48 The plan involved “encouraging,
through covert ties and private U.S. organizations, effective anti–Allende
efforts by Chilean organizations including the Roman Catholic Church,
trade union groups, and other influential bodies.”49 There were limits to
these operations. As Secretary of State William P. Rogers later commented,
“we could have done a hell of a lot more.”50 For example, the CIA and the
embassy turned down several offers by the Chilean military to launch a coup
if Allende won.51 Also, the Special Group decided it was too risky for the
Johnson administration to partner with U.S. businesses in covert political
action, although the CIA would assure the private sector that every effort
was being made to prevent Allende’s election.52
The CIA did not have an exact contingency plan in case Allende won, but
a few U.S. officials pondered the alternatives. National Security Adviser
Robert Sayre advised: “We should proceed on the assumption that Allende is
bad medicine, but we should not slam the door because he might ­double-
cross his Communist friends. President Alessandri, Felipe Herrera, and
others, insist we can work with Allende.”53 While it is impossible to know
what the Johnson administration would have done if Frei had lost, the
willingness of some U.S. officials in 1964 to consider tolerating Allende
signaled the emergence of an accommodationist perspective that was to later
divide the Nixon administration.
After Allende lost the 1964 election, the CIA bragged that its covert
action program had been “indispensable” to Frei’s success. Part of the elation
can be attributed to relief that the election went better than expected. Frei
won by 17 percentage points, whereas the CIA had predicted a margin of
victory of just 12 points.54 Some U.S. State Department officials disputed the
CIA’s assessment of its contribution to Allende’s defeat, suggesting that Frei
would have won anyway.55 In any case, the CIA had at the very least helped
to polarize the electorate. One ­post-election analysis concluded that
anticommunist propaganda had been “drummed persistently into the
consciousness of the Chilean electorate.” Even though “the more blatant
propaganda was laughed off in typical Chilean fashion, one must believe
that even this left its mark.”56 Whatever the actual impact of the covert
action program, the CIA believed it had succeeded, and many Chileans,
including Allende, suspected that Frei had received some outside help.57
After his third defeat, Allende joked with reporters that the epitaph on his
gravestone would read: “Here lies Salvador Allende, future president of
Chile.”58 Despite his repeated failures, however, the leftward political trend of
the late 1960s favored Allende to make yet another presidential bid. During
his 1964 campaign, Frei had made bold promises at the very moment that
the Alliance for Progress had begun to falter. Allende, as a member of the
opposition, was ­well-positioned to condemn the program—the “Alliance for
Stagnation,” he spoofed—for not living up to its lofty promises.59 The
apparent close association of Frei with the U.S. embassy also tainted the
Christian Democrats at a time when revolutionary nationalism was
sweeping Latin America.60 Dissatisfied with the direction of the party, a
leftist faction of Christian Democrats broke away in May 1969 to form
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU, United Popular Action
Movement). Because of constitutional restrictions on consecutive terms, Frei
was not eligible to run again, so the PDC formally declared Radomiro Tomic
as its presidential candidate in August 1969. Then the conservative Partido
Nacional (PN, National Party), encouraged by gains it was making in
congressional elections, decided to nominate former president Jorge
Alessandri, thus foreclosing any possibility of the center and right joining
together to defeat Allende as had occurred in the 1964 election.61
While all these developments were propitious for Allende, his path to
becoming a presidential candidate again proved to be anything but smooth.
After the 1964 defeat, the Chilean left drifted. Some were convinced that
after three losses, Allende’s political career was finished, and it was time to
begin armed struggle. Allende himself had some doubts, but after touring
Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba, he became inspired to renew his effort to
bring revolutionary socialism to Chile through the democratic process.62
After a very close vote, the Socialist Party’s central committee settled on
Allende as its presidential candidate in late August 1969.63 Realizing that
they would all go down to defeat if they each ran separate candidates, the PS,
PCCh, MAPU, and three smaller parties, decided on 9 October to form a
new coalition called Unidad Popular (UP).64 By the end of the year, UP had
issued a platform (Programa Básico), which listed many sweeping reforms,
including the full nationalization of Chile’s copper industry.65 The only
remaining task was to select a candidate. Skeptics complained that Allende
was old news and would not attract the younger vote. Half in jest, Allende
defended himself by reminding everyone that he was like ­Coca-Cola, a
product known in every corner of Chile and the only one capable of
unifying the left.66 On 22 January 1970, after long heated discussions, UP
finally settled on Allende as its presidential candidate. His candidacy was
not exactly a triumph for the PS. As U.S. intelligence observed, “his relations
with the party hierarchy are poor.”67 The labored process by which Allende
entered the 1970 election foreshadowed the difficulties he would encounter
governing Chile when power struggles within UP began to emerge.68

The Nixon Administration and Latin America

As the political climate in Chile began to drift left in the late 1960s, the
U.S. government moved right. The election of Richard M. Nixon, a staunch
anticommunist republican, brought significant changes to U.S. foreign
policy owing to the Vietnam fiasco. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United
States would no longer automatically come to the rescue of countries by
directly intervening but would protect U.S. interests by providing military
aid.69 Although the Nixon Doctrine was intended to reduce the U.S.
commitment in Southeast Asia, the president also applied it to regions such
as Latin America. To devise a new policy for Latin America that would
replace the ailing Alliance for Progress, Nixon sent New York Governor
Nelson Rockefeller on a tour of Latin America in early 1969. The president
also ordered the interdepartmental group of the NSC to prepare a broad
study of U.S. policy toward Latin America that would examine such issues as
coups, military and economic aid, trade and investment, and the OAS.70
Both the Rockefeller Report and the NSC study warned that Latin
America was now suffering the strains of modernization and globalization,
as increasing population growth, urbanization, and rising expectations
brought about by improvements in communications and transportation
were triggering social unrest in Latin America. The danger, these reports
noted, was that the “uprooting” forces of change were turning Latin America
into a target for communist subversion.71 The Western Hemisphere was at a
“crossroads,” Rockefeller warned, because these developments threatened
“the very survival of our values and ourselves.”72 Given the urgency
expressed in these reports, it is easy to suppose that the authors were trying
to get Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to pay more
attention to Latin America. Students of the ­Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy
have frequently noted that neither official had much interest in affairs south
of the border. Nixon once instructed his aides that “people don’t give a damn
about Latin America.”73 Kissinger, who held a similar view, described Chile
in 1969 as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.”74 He also lectured
Chilean foreign minister Gabriel Valdés that “nothing important can come
from the South” because “the axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn,
crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo.”75
These anecdotes reveal a certain truth about the attitudes of Nixon and
Kissinger. The Vietnam War, the Middle East, and détente consumed the
energies of both men. But as the Chilean example would illustrate, Latin
America could not be ignored. Rockefeller emphasized that a successful
Latin American policy was crucial to maintaining U.S. hegemony: “If we
cannot maintain a constructive relationship in the Western Hemisphere, we
will hardly be able to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world.”76
U.S. Defense Attaché Vernon Walters put it more bluntly: “There is no
acceptable alternative to holding Latin America. We simply cannot afford to
lose it.”77
Nixon was not oblivious to these dangers; nor was he completely ignorant
about Latin America. At times, he seemed capable of grasping the
complexity of the region. Nixon’s notes from his 1967 trip to Latin America,
which included a stop in Chile, reveal that he thought it was “superficial” to
blame Castro for all the upheaval; the more dangerous threat was the New
Left, which he identified as anti–American nationalists who opposed private
enterprise and were fed up with the slow rate of progress.78 As he later
explained to the Bohemian Club, “even if Castro did not exist, Latin
America would have to be considered a major trouble spot…. As it
continues to fall further behind the rest of the world, it becomes a tinder box
for revolution.”79
Unfortunately, Nixon’s 1958 trip to Latin America, where he encountered
angry crowds, had left an indelible impression that reinforced his racist and
paternalistic prejudices about ­non-white peoples. Sounding like Theodore
Roosevelt, Nixon frequently ranted in private that Latin Americans were so
incapable of ruling themselves that they needed a strong hand.80 “You can’t
trust them,” he advised one of his newly appointed Latin American
ambassadors: “They’re all a bunch of kooks.”81 Although Nixon is notorious
for having held these views, he was not alone in imagining that Latin
America was so “uncivilized” that it needed dictatorships to maintain order
and keep communism under wraps. In a discussion of defense policy for
Latin America, Viron Vaky of the NSC Operations Staff referred to the
United States as the “mother hen” and Latin American nations as the
“chicks.”82 U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis once compared the plight of
American businessmen in Chile to the “Conestoga wagon days,” when the
pioneers were “surrounded in the desert by hostile Indians.”83 Kissinger sent
Nixon a report from an acquaintance, which argued that because “the Latin
temperament is rather volatile by nature” it would be dangerous to permit
Latin Americans to act “wildly and illegally without having to fear any
serious reaction on our part.” Nixon underlined this passage to indicate his
agreement and emphasized that he was going to include this point in his
upcoming speech to the ­Inter-American Press Associa-tion.84
Nixon’s speech to the press association on 31 October 1969 responded to
concerns that had been raised earlier in the year by the Comisión Especial
de Coordinación Latinoamericana (CECLA, Special Commission for Latin
American Coordination). In May members of the commission had gathered
in Viña del Mar, Chile to find common ground among the Latin American
nations on issues of development. The final agreement, known as the Viña
del Mar Consensus, declared that Latin American countries had a sovereign
right to control their natural resources. The organization also rejected the
common U.S. practice of making aid conditional on the acceptance of a
certain economic model. Finally, the agreement sought better terms of trade,
and for private investment not to be counted as “aid” in determining a
nation’s economic assistance needs. On 11 June 1969, Chilean Foreign
Minister Gabriel Valdés presented the consensus to Nixon on behalf of- ­
twenty-one Latin American governments, emphasizing that it was no longer
acceptable for the amount of capital repatriated from Latin America to
continue to exceed the amount invested many times over. Nixon politely
received these demands, but he also contested the implication that private
investment had not contributed to Latin America’s ­well-being.85
In his “Action for Progress” speech on 31 October, Nixon yielded to some
of CECLA’s demands by promising to lower trade barriers and eliminate aid
“tying,” which required aid recipients to purchase American goods to protect
the U.S. trade balance. But Nixon also cautioned that acting “in a way which
runs counter to commonly accepted norms of international law and
behavior” would discourage further investment. As reporters noted, this
part of Nixon’s speech was an indirect warning to countries such as Peru and
Bolivia, which were attempting to expropriate U.S. oil industries. Nixon also
asserted that any attempt to export revolution would be considered an
“intervention which our system cannot condone.”86
In some ways, Nixon’s “Action for Progress” policy bore a striking
resemblance to the “trade not aid” policy of the first Eisenhower
administration, which emphasized the importance of the private sector in
providing capital for developing countries. Whereas Eisenhower had
begrudgingly shifted the policy in his second administration to “trade and
aid,” Nixon appeared to be going in the reverse direction.87 One Venezuelan
politician complained that it was necessary to “look with a magnifying glass
to find something positive in the speech.”88 The Washington Post found the
“Action for Progress” slogan embarrassingly lame.89 Nixon also deliberately
left out of his address his intention to rely on military aid to keep Latin
America in line. As ­vice president, Nixon had considered Latin American
dictators to be a “great stabilizing force” against the communist threat.90
Even though such sentiments could no longer be expressed openly, Nixon
continued to admire dictators, who were, he confided to one associate, “the
only friends we got in Latin America.”91 In July 1969, Nixon ordered the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to identify key military leaders in every Latin
American country and to “maximize contact with them.”92

The Chilean Threat

Precisely why the Nixon administration decided to intervene in Chile has
divided scholars. According to a review of the literature by the historian
Mark Lawrence, one interpretation has emphasized the communist threat,
while another less popular version points to the perceived need to protect
U.S. investments.93 As some analysts have pointed out, trying to distinguish
between these two views can be considered artificial because
anticommunism and protecting U.S. commercial interests generally went
hand in hand.94 One way to tackle the causation question is to adopt a “levels
of analysis” approach. An examination of the Nixon administration’s view of
the threat in Chile at the international, regional, national, and individual
levels can help pinpoint the most important factors that led to the
intervention. This approach can also help explain why the Nixon
administration appears to have held such exaggerated views of the threat
posed by Allende’s election.95
At the international level, the Cold War contest between the United States
and the Soviet Union greatly elevated the stakes in Chile for many U.S.
officials. The Defense Department, for example, feared that Chile under
Allende would become a base for Soviet power. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt
insisted that the United States had a “vital strategic interest” in Chile because
it was a near certainty that a Marxist government in Chile would invite the
Soviets to establish military bases along the long Chilean coastline.96 As
Kissinger later recalled in his memoirs, Chile represented a “geopolitical
challenge” because eventually Allende would come to depend on “Soviet
forces and Soviet arms in the Southern Cone of the South American
continent.”97 Former CIA Director John McCone informed Kissinger that
Allende was a Marxist whose plans to nationalize industry “are dictated
from outside the country.”98 In March 1970, Ambassador Korry predicted a
“major Soviet commitment under an Allende government, with Chile
becoming a base for Soviet power and influence.”99 Because the PCCh was
“totally loyal to Moscow” the Allende regime would provide an
“extraordinary outlet for the universalist aspiration of the Soviet empire.”100
For many officials, Allende threatened to put American credibility on the
line, as a failure to prevent the establishment of a Marxist regime in a U.S.
sphere of influence could be interpreted by America’s enemies as a sign of
weakness.101 In line with this interpretation, U.S. officials frequently argued
that they were justified in supporting Allende’s opposition because the
Soviet Union and other communist countries were surely backing Allende.
Nixon, for example, explained in his memoirs that his policy was to ensure
that the “non–Communist parties have at least the same resources as the
lavishly financed pro–Allende forces.”102 In June 1970, U.S. intelligence
reported that the Soviets had decided to provide Allende with “massive
funding” because his chances of winning seemed to have improved.103 Korry
also later insisted that he had known for a fact that communist countries
such as East Germany were smuggling into Chile “substantial” amounts of
money to support UP.104 Korry, who had witnessed the Soviet takeover of
Czechoslovakia in 1948, seemed fixated on the idea that Chile would
inevitably become transformed into a Soviet satellite.105 The Eastern Europe
analogy appealed to many U.S. officials who claimed that the Soviets had
been subverting Chile through a “­long-range” strategy of penetrating
student organizations, labor unions, and political parties.106 “Allende’s
socialist state,” one NIE predicted, “would be a Chilean version of a Soviet
style East European Communist state.”107
Dissident voices in the Nixon administration tried in vain to qualify these
extreme judgments. “A South American Tito would be far worse than a Frei,
but he would be far better than a regime unrelievedly bitter and hostile
toward the United States and totally dependent on the USSR,” advised one
State Department policy memo. “Allende need not be a threat to our
national security … unless we make him one.”108 The U.S. Bureau of
Intelligence and Research observed that there was so much friction between
communists and socialists that the “rise of a ­Soviet-type regime in Chile
under the leadership of the Chilean Communist Party seems ­far-fetched.”109
There was no evidence to suggest that Allende was preparing to transform
Chile into a Soviet satellite. Right after Allende’s inauguration, Korry
reported that the new president had given “his unequivocal guaranty that
Chile would never—he repeated ‘never’ several times—be used to damage
the security interests to the hemisphere. There would never be any foreign
military bases here.”110 True, the Soviet Union had been subsidizing the
Chilean Communist Party with several hundred thousand dollars annually
through the 1960s. But the Soviets turned down Allende’s request for
$100,000 for his campaign in 1970, which forced the PCCh to draw on its
reserves.111 Moreover, it appears that Soviet funding, which went only to the
PCCh, not UP, was not comparable to the CIA’s covert operation against
Allende in either scale or scope.112 While the PCCh certainly maintained
close ties with the Soviet Union, Allende was perfectly capable of defying
communists, as he had in 1968 when he had criticized the Soviet Union for
invading Czechoslovakia.113 Even Pepsi Cola president Donald Kendall tried
to convince Nixon that the Soviet Union did not constitute a military threat
to countries such as Chile because the new Soviet strategy was to rely on
“political suasions,” much like the United States did when “we go around
trying to support people that are democracies.”114
At the regional level, U.S. officials feared that Chile would become a
communist dictatorship that would subvert the OAS, establish ties with
Cuba, and export its revolution to other Latin American countries. While
there was some disagreement among analysts over how rapidly this would
occur, the consensus held that it was only a matter of time before Allende
clamped down. On 5 March 1970, the group responsible for overseeing
covert action known as the 40 Committee learned that “an Allende victory
would mean the emergence of a ­Castro-type government in Chile.”115 In July,
an NIE concluded that while it might take a few years, Allende’s goal was to
establish a “Soviet-style East European Communist state.” There could be no
negotiating with Chile after that because “the hostility of Allende and his
allies towards the U.S. is too ­deeply-rooted to be easily changed.”116 The State
Department agreed that any attempt to reach a “modus vivendi” would be
impossible.117
CIA Director Richard Helms and Ambassador Korry thought Allende
was likely to establish a dictatorship much more rapidly than the NIE
suggested.118 Korry predicted that Allende would move “quickly” to
consolidate control of the country to preclude another presidential election.
To achieve this end, Allende would impose censorship; reject all military ties
to the United States; shift trade away from the United States; kick out the
Peace Corps; and transform Chile into a “training and staging ground for
subversive elements from all parts of South America.”119 An “Allende
takeover,” Kissinger explained, posed a “massive problem” for the United
States. “I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende
wins,” he announced during the electoral ­run-off stage, “there is likely to be
another free election in Chile.”120 Former CIA Director William Colby later
justified the agency’s intervention in Chile on similar grounds by arguing
that Allende, like Mussolini and Hitler, would never permit another
democratic election.121
The Cuban connection was especially worrisome to U.S. officials. Several
times in the 1960s Allende had visited Cuba where he became good friends
with Castro; his daughter Beatriz (Tati) had married a Cuban intelligence
officer.122 The CIA estimated that Cuba had provided $350,000 to Allende’s
campaign.123 An Allende victory would be especially catastrophic,
Ambassador Korry explained in August 1970, because the very political
forces that were capable of electing Allende did not require a charismatic
leader to transform Chile into another Cuba: “fidelismo without Fidel.”124 An
Italian businessman also warned Nixon that an Allende victory would
produce a “red sandwich” in Latin America, with Cuba at one end and Chile
at the other.125 Nixon later told television commentator David Frost that
“there wasn’t any question that Chile was being used by some of Castro’s
agents as a base to export terrorism into Argentina, to Bolivia, to Brazil.”
Allende was even more devious than Castro, according to Nixon, because
“he played it very clever” while his real intent was to “turn all the screws …
in the direction of making Chile a Marxist state.”126
In retrospect, these views are wildly off the mark, especially given that
there were alternative assessments that could have given rise to second
thoughts if they had been taken seriously. A State Department study sent to
Kissinger in mid–August 1970, for example, predicted that an Allende
government attempt to export revolution would be largely verbal, at least in
the first two or three years.127 Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Ralph
Dungan dismissed the idea that Allende’s election would cause a “chain
reaction” throughout the hemisphere as “­ill-informed nonsense.”128 In 1967
Allende had publicly subscribed to the views of the Organization for Latin
American Solidarity (OLAS), a ­Cuban-based organization that promoted
armed revolution in the region, but he never called for the use of violence in
Chile except as a last resort.129 Even though Allende’s participation in the
OLAS created a ruckus within Chile, U.S. officials in the late 1960s did not
seem to pay much attention to it. In fact, they ignored Allende between the
outcome of the 1964 election and the end of 1968.130 By 1970 the OLAS
proved to be no more than a paper tiger despite the great fear it had
generated among Latin American elites.131 A Nixon administration policy
paper on Latin America conceded in 1973 that “the Marxist experiment in
Chile” had not inspired Marxism to sweep the continent. Moreover, there
was “no inherent reason why the United States cannot have satisfactory and
fruitful relationships” with highly nationalistic regimes.132
Allende told the press in early September 1970 that Chile would not
follow Cuba’s path, but one that is “authentically ours according to Chile’s
reality, history, and idiosyncrasies.”133 OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza
tried to assure Korry: “Chile is not Cuba and Allende is not Fidel.”134 At least
one CIA analyst argued that “Allende is no blind follower of Castro,” who
allegedly kidded Allende that his “guerrilla suit should be made by Christian
Dior.”135 Former Chilean President Gabriel González Videla maintained that
Chile under Allende would not become another Cuba, but would be more
like Sweden or Norway.136 And, despite allegations of Cuban funding, the
Cubans deliberately kept their distance from Allende during the election to
avoid giving the opposition grounds for portraying him as a Castro
protégé.137
Turning to the national level of analysis, the perceived need to protect U.S.
corporations provided a strong inducement to stop Allende. As Kissinger
learned during the Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting of the NSC a few
weeks before the election, U.S. investments in Chile stood at $1 billion, and
more than a third of that amount was covered by U.S. investment
guarantees. At least half of Chile’s $3 billion foreign debt was owed to the
U.S. government and American banks.138 Because UP’s platform called for
the nationalization of the copper industry where most of U.S. capital in
Chile resided, the Nixon administration had good reason to worry about the
impact of an Allende victory on the private sector. In July 1970, an NIE
predicted that Allende “would move quickly to expropriate not only the
copper mines and other properties with foreign ownership, but also the
private banks and other important elements of the private sector with little,
if any, compensation.”139 As Nixon told Frost, “I knew” expropriation “was
coming … all you had to do was read his [Allende’s] campaign speeches.”140
 Corporate lobbyists repeatedly tried to alert the Nixon administration to
the dangers unfolding in Chile. In April 1970, representatives from the
Council for Latin America, a private organization of U.S. businessmen,
visited the State Department to warn of the damage that would be done to
the private sector if Allende were allowed to become president. In April
1970, Jay Parkinson, a representative from Anaconda Copper Company, told
Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer that
political contributions to the Alessandri campaign were in the “U.S. national
interest to help save major U.S. investors in Chile.”141 After Allende won the
first round of the election, Pepsi Cola president Donald Kendall; former CIA
Director John McCone, who sat on the board of ITT; and the Chilean
conservative newspaper publisher Agustín Edwards all appealed to the
White House to stop the “catastrophe” of Allende.142 McCone reminded
Kissinger that the United States had acted “very wisely in 1964,” implying
that it was time to step up to the plate once again.143 Nixon and Kissinger
met with these lobbyists on 14 September. One day later, Nixon ordered the
CIA to launch a second secret covert operation against Allende. Kissinger
later claimed that Nixon had been “triggered” into action by these lobbying
efforts, but no records of these meetings were kept so it is difficult to judge
their impact. The president may well have already made up his mind.144
Finally, moving to the individual level of analysis, there is the crucial
question of how personalities factored into the decision to intervene in
Chile.145 Many scholars have noted that Nixon’s insecurity and his obsession
with credibility greatly influenced his foreign policy. One psychobiography,
for example, described Nixon’s decision to overthrow Allende as
“contaminated with internal issues.”146 The historian Walter Hixson contends
that Nixon and Kissinger were “invested most heavily in credibility, a
pathological obsession with maintaining the nation’s masculine status as the
world’s preeminent superpower virtually no matter what the cost.”147 While
it is difficult to judge how important these traits were in the case of Chile,
they surely had some impact. In his memoirs, Nixon describes Chile as one
of a series of personal tests, which included the Vietnam War, the Middle
East, and the possible repeat of another missile crisis in Cuba (the
Cienfuegos crisis). He also feared that his failure to retaliate against North
Korea for shooting down a U.S. reconnaissance plane in 1969 might be
interpreted by communists as an encouragement to expand.148 When Helms
tried to explain to Nixon the risks involved in trying to stop Allende, he
found “it was like talking into a gale.”149 “Truman had lost China. Kennedy
had lost Cuba. Nixon was not about to lose Chile.”150 Kissinger, as well,
dreaded “the ‘­who-lost-Chile’ syndrome.”151
At every level of analysis, the Nixon administration judged the potential
election of Allende to be detrimental to U.S. interests, but officials disagreed
over the seriousness of the threat and how to respond to it. In early
September 1970, Vaky counseled restraint based on a CIA paper, which
concluded that even though Allende posed a serious problem, he was not a
“mortal threat” to the United States. A policy of containment was feasible
because it was unlikely that the Allende government will initiate a series of
“South American dominoes.”152 In questioning the applicability of the
domino theory to Latin America, one American journalist judged “the
prospect of Chilean Communists pouring through the Alamo” to be just as
hallucinogenic as “the specter of Vietnamese Communists storming Laguna
Beach.”153 Yet, Kissinger still described the election of Allende to Nixon as
“one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere.”154 Nixon
underlined italicized passages in Korry’s report on the 1970 election,
including his prediction that Allende’s victory represented a “grievous
defeat” for the United States that “will have the most profound effect on Latin
America and beyond.”155 How were such dissimilar assessments of Allende
reconciled?
That Nixon’s and Kissinger’s views prevailed over the judgments of the
State Department and the CIA suggests that bureaucratic politics played a
central role in the U.S. decision to intervene in Chile. Students of Nixon’s
foreign policy have often noted that Nixon and Kissinger were highly
contemptuous of the very institutions designed to help the president make
foreign policy decisions.156 Kissinger considered Assistant Secretary Meyer a
“weak man,” and Kissinger’s battles with Secretary of State William Rogers
were an open secret in Washington.157 Nixon had great difficulty trusting
anyone: “96 percent of the bureaucracy are against us,” he told his cabinet,
“they’re bastards who are here to screw us.”158 He especially distrusted the
CIA, a bunch of “Ivy League liberals” who had “always opposed him
politically.”159
Divisions in the foreign policy bureaucracy also help explain why Nixon
and Kissinger took so long to act against Allende. Although Helms had
pointed out to the 303 Committee (predecessor to the 40 Committee) in
April 1969 that an early start was needed if a covert action campaign was to
succeed, the Committee paid little attention to Chile for the rest of the
year.160 On 2 January 1970, Ambassador Korry disparaged Chile as a “­coffee-
house klatch,” insisting that there was “little that will endanger U.S. real
interests in the country or in the hemisphere.”161 Two weeks later, possibly in
response to the public announcement of Allende’s UP candidacy, Korry
warned the State Department that an Allende government could be worse
than Castro’s government.162 The 40 Committee finally authorized a
“spoiling” operation against Allende in March, but the second part of its
plan did not begin in earnest until August (see Chapter 2).
Nixon and Kissinger later complained that the State Department and CIA
had misled them about Allende’s chances of victory, implying that with
earlier warning the covert operation might have been successful.163 This
accusation, clearly an attempt to shift responsibility away from the White
House, is too convenient. As the leader of the 303 Committee, Kissinger was
privy to the same intelligence as everyone else, and he never questioned it at
the time. Early polls put Alessandri in the lead, but the election was too
close to call, and in any case, the 303 Committee understood even before UP
nominated Allende that a “popular front” style victory was possible. At any
point from March 1969 onwards, Kissinger could have escalated efforts to
stop Allende. State Department and CIA officials did not advocate measures
beyond a propaganda campaign because they did not think there was
anything more that could be done covertly without risking exposure of the
U.S. hand. In the end, the decision to bypass the State Department and
launch a separate secret plan to foster a coup was solely Nixon’s.164
Even if the decision to intervene in Chile came primarily from the White
House, there remains the question of why so many U.S. officials exaggerated
the Chilean threat.165 As Senator Frank Church later complained, “the only
plausible explanation for our intervention in Chile is the persistence of the
myth that communism is a single, ­hydra-headed serpent, and that it remains
our duty to cut off each ugly head, wherever and however it may appear.”166
The historian Robert Dallek attributes Nixon’s and Kissinger’s “apocalyptic
fears” about Allende to a “mistaken calculation.”167 Kissinger himself
reflected a little more than one year after the 1973 coup: “When we got
ourselves involved in Chile, it was perhaps because of an over estimation of
the importance of the problem and the effectiveness of our effort.”168 These
explanations fail to account for the anticommunist hyperbole that pervades
the U.S. documentary record, or why this kind of “error” was so common
during the Cold War.169
Determining why the Nixon administration initiated a covert war against
Chile requires distinguishing propaganda from the realist interests that had
long governed U.S. relations with Latin America. For example, we can
readily dismiss the idea that U.S. officials cared about the freedom of the
press or human rights in Chile, as those issues disappeared from
Washington’s sight once Pinochet seized power. At that point, Kissinger
implied that Allende had been part of a “network of sympathetic
organizations and groups that cover the globe, carrying out terrorist
outrages or financing them, transferring weapons, infiltrating the media,
seeking to sway political processes.” In truth, this description is better suited
to Operation Condor, a secret U.S.-backed intelligence program launched
after the 1973 Chilean military coup to persecute leftists throughout the
Southern Cone, than it is to Allende’s government.170 Former U.S.
Ambassador to the OAS Sol Linowitz had already pointed out the
contradiction nearly three years earlier when he asserted: “we should be no
more disturbed about Allende in Chile than about the military dictatorships
of Argentina and Brazil. What kind of a double standard do we have?”171
The real problem was not Chilean ties to the Soviet Union or even Cuba,
but that Allende promised to bring socialism to Chile in a way that would
legitimize other challenges to U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere and beyond.
Kissinger explained the threat to Nixon in the most dramatic terms possible:
“The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would
surely have an impact on … other parts of the world, especially in Italy; the
imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly
affect the world balance and our own position in it.”172 Allende posed a
greater threat than Castro precisely because he was so charming, flexible,
and reasonable.173 Nixon did not need to be convinced: If Allende set up a
successful “Marxist anti–American policy,” the president agreed, “others will
do the same thing.”174 Worse, as Nixon once explained to Mexican President
Luis Echeverría using the typical Cold War metaphors, “if the poison of
Communist dictatorship spreads through Latin America … it inevitably will
infect the United States…. You cannot separate one part of the body from
the rest.”175
Kissinger also demonstrated that he understood what has been called the
“threat of a good example” when he anticipated one ITT official’s advice to
reject the Tito analogy: “if Washington just sits there and does nothing to
thwart Allende, it will be inviting a sharper turn toward leftist nationalism—
which translates into more danger for foreign investments—among other
Latin American countries.”176 The fear that other countries might follow
Chile’s example conveys the real meaning of Kissinger’s famous quip: “I don’t
see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the
irresponsibility of its own people.”177 To not at least try and counter this
threat seemed unthinkable. Ambassador Korry posed the question in such a
way that the answer seemed obvious: If Allende “were to gain power, what
would be our response to those who asked, what did we do[?]”178
The history of U.S.-Chilean relations before 1970 did not predetermine
the Nixon administration’s effort to stop Allende. Frictions between the two
countries had been resolved diplomatically in the past, but during the Cold
War era, the Chilean left clashed with U.S. hegemony. The turning point
came in 1954 when U.S. officials decided that Salvador Allende was soft on
communism and was promoting a nationalist vision that endangered U.S.
commercial interests. Still, Washington, did not perceive Allende as much of
a serious threat until 1964, when the broadening of the Chilean electorate
and the leftist political climate put Allende into serious contention for the
presidency. The CIA’s contribution to the defeat of Allende in 1964 was
probably a case of overkill, as Eduardo Frei enjoyed the support of a broad
coalition that gave him a comfortable margin of victory. But the CIA’s covert
operations in Chile during the 1960s laid the groundwork for a repeated
attempt in 1970 when the presidential race was much closer.
Nixon administration officials were unanimous in regarding the election
of Allende as a problem for the United States. Commonly expressed
concerns were that Allende would transform Chile into a Soviet satellite,
which would collaborate with Cuba to export communist revolution
throughout Latin America; and that Allende would expropriate U.S.
businesses in Chile as part of his socialist agenda. But in visualizing these
worse case scenarios, the Nixon administration badly exaggerated the threat
and transformed Allende into a draconian monster, who had to be slain.
When minimal efforts to support Allende’s opposition failed, the State
Department counseled tolerating Allende’s 4 September 1970 electoral
victory because any further effort would be counterproductive. But as the
next chapter will show, Nixon and Kissinger overrode the skeptics and
launched a second covert operation that backfired badly and set the two
countries on a collision course.

1. Quoted in Muñoz and Portales, Elusive Friendship, 12.

2. Pike, Chile and the United States, 59; Sater, Chile and the War of the Pacific, 213.
3. See Goldberg, “Baltimore” Affair.
4. ­Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, 156.
5. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 161.
6. Mamalakis, Growth and Structure, 57. See also Monteón, Chile in the Nitrate Era.
7. Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 18.
8. Quoted in Pike, Chile and the United States, 271–72. Braden also ignored that many of its workers
were dying from silicosis because Indian labor was so cheap and plentiful that they could easily be
replaced. See Mathews, World in Revolution, 246.
9. Fermandois, Bustos, and Schneuer, Historia política del cobre en Chile, 6–9; Moran, Multinational
Corporations, 22; Klubock, “Nationalism.”
10. NIE 94–70, 30 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 126.
11. Braden memo, 22 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, 11: 615.
12. For an example of how Gonzalez Videla tried to appease U.S. officials, see Bowers letter to
Braden, 18 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, 11: 612. For acknowledgment of U.S. influence, see Barnard,
“Chilean Communists,” 373; Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 248; and Klubock, Contested
Communities, 261–71. On the aid that flowed after the anticommunist purge, see Sater, Chile and the
United States, 123.
13. Barnard, “Chilean Communists,” 362–63.
14. Hove, “Arbenz Factor,” 625.
15. SCFR, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vol. 10, 1958, 110.
16. Quoted in Hove, “Arbenz Factor,” 661.
17. Zahinser and Weis, “Diplomatic Pearl Harbor?” 164; editorial note, FRUS, 1958–1960 5: 800.
18. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 137.
19. Bowdler memo to LBJ, 17 November 1969, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 87.
20. SFRC, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Rockefeller Report on Latin America, 61
(hereafter Rockefeller Report).
21. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows, 39, 333. Allende later confirmed that he had enjoyed
excellent relations with Bower. See embtel 4687, 4 November 1970, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-70, box 2193,
RG 59.
22. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 69.
23. Debray, Chilean Revolution, 66–72; Witker Velásquez, Salvador Allende cercano, 164; Allende
interview with Ercilla, 4–10 February 1970, FCO 7/1516, TNA; Gabriel Valdés interview, 14 July 2002,
Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la historia, 31; Winn, “Salvador Allende,” 132.
24. Alexander, ABC Presidents, 173. On how Allende’s political views differed from the traditional
Chilean left, see Ribeiro, “Salvador Allende.”
25. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 69.
26. Toplin, History by Hollywood, 108.
 27. Quoted in Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 69. Even the CIA admitted that Allende’s
bourgeois tastes were not much of a political liablity. See SNIE 94–71, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 396.
28. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 93.
29. Allende interview, 15 January 1947, Alexander, ABC Presidents, 271.
30. Allende, Citas, 21, 121. On the evolution of Allende’s political views, which culminated in his
socialist convictions, see Quiroga Zamora, “Salvador Allende y la estrategia ­político-institucional.”
31. Hove, “Arbenz Factor,” 633–34.
32. For a description of Allende’s senate speeches criticizing the United States, see Sánchez Ibarra,
“La relación de Latinoamerica y los Estados Unidos.”
33. Hove, “Arbenz Factor,” 643–44, 647. For U.S. Ambassador Cecil B. Lyon’s impression of Allende
as a communist sympathizer, see Cecil B. Lyon interview, 15, FAOHC. For one CIA agent’s early
impression of Allende as a “brillant dialectician” at “expounding his Marxist theories,” see Phillips,
Night Watch, 28.
34. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 72–73; Pike, Chile and the United States, 264–65; Nunn,
“Chile’s Government in Perspective,” 76.
35. Hite, When the Romance Ended, 32; Taipa Videla, “Difficult Road to Socialism,” 23–25.
36. Quoted in Rabe, Most Dangerous Area in the World, 112.
37. Memcon (JFK, Alessandri), 11 December 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 12: doc 35.
38. NIE 94–63, 3 October 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 12: doc 45. Emphasis added. For Allende’s
defense of Cuba during the missile crisis, see Ortega Martínez, “Encuentros con Allende,” 284.
39. Memcon (JFK, Alessandri), 11 December 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 12: doc 35.
40. On the Kennedy administration, modernization, and globalization, see Streeter, “U.S.-Led
Globalization Project,” 198.
41. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 71–73.
42. Gil and Parrish, Chilean Presidential Election, 27–28. For Allende’s campaign strategy in the 1964
election, see Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 240; and Allende, Obras escogidas: período 1939–
1973, 202–51.
43. Embtel 939, 22 April 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 560.
44. Hurwitch letter to Bundy, 19 June 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 578.
45. Chase memo to Bundy, 19 April 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 553.
46. Jessup memo to Bundy, 23 July 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 31: 583. On the State Department’s
assumption that Castro had aided Allende’s 1964 election campaign, see memcon (Rusk, Tyler,
Shullaw, Walker, Harlech, Caccia), 27 October 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 32: 888.
47. Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 34–37.
48. Church Report, 14–19. On the special effort to target women, see Power, ­Right-Wing Women in
Chile, 85–86; and Power, “Engendering of Anticommunism.”
49. Mann memo to Rusk, 1 May 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 567. Some of the covert assistance went
to the Belgium Catholic Priest, Roger Vekemans, who helped support Frei’s 1964 presidential
campaign. See Lernoux, Cry of the People, 26–27, 290; and Korry, “Embajador Edward M. Korry en
CEP,” 11.
50. Quoted in Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 49.
51. Church Report, 16–17.
52. Special Group meeting minutes, 12 May 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 574–75.
53. Sayre memo to Bundy, 31 July 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 585.
54. CIA memo, 1 September 1964; and editorial note, FRUS, 1964–1968 31: 591–92.
55. Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 49. Korry thought the U.S. effort did not make a difference of more
than one percent to the outcome. See memo for the record, “Discussion of U.S. Government Activities
Leading Up to the Chilean Election in September 1970,” 19 January 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 71 n.
4.
56. Gil and Parish, Chilean Presidential Election, 49.
57. Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 49. On Allende’s suspicions of U.S. meddling, see “Allende Hints U.S.
Helped Defeat Him,” NYT, 16 November 1965; and Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 206. The
Chilean left’s indignation over U.S. interference in Chilean affairs swelled after the revelation of
Project Camelot, a U.S. Defense Department project to influence social science research in Third
World countries like Chile. See Horowitz, Rise and Fall of Project Camelot.
58. Jorquera, El Chicho Allende, 107.
59. Cáceres, La consecuencia de un líder, 66.
60. Taffet, “Making of an Economic Anti-American.”
61. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 77–85. On Alessandri’s motivations for running, see Glab,
“Christian Democracy,” 204–206.
62. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 207–216. On Allende’s decision to enter the presidential
race for a fourth time, see Hove, “Losing a Model Democracy,” 366–67.
63. Angell, “Christian Democracy in Chile,” 84.
64. Allende’s chief rival for the UP presidential nomination, Aniceto Rodríguez, claims that he
stepped aside to avoid dividing the party internally. Rodríguez, Entre el miedo, 312–13.
65. See Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 257–85.
66. Labarca Goddard, Chile al rojo, 217–52.
67. ­RAAS-8, 22 May 1970, POL 12 Chile, 1–­1-70, box 2194, RG 59; NIE 94–70, 17 July 1970, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 66.
68. Memo to the 40 Committee, 5 March 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 74.
69. Nixon Doctrine, 25 July 1969, PPP.
70. NSSM 173, 7 March 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976 ­E-11, pt. 1: 1–2.
71. NSC Interdepartmental Group for ­Inter-American Affairs, “U.S. Policy toward Latin America:
Response to NSSM 173,” n.d., FRUS, 1969–1976 ­E-11, pt. 1: 15.
72. Rockefeller Report, 202.
73. Quoted in Lawrence, “History from Below,” 269.
74. John Plank testimony, 23 July 1974, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Refugee
and Humanitarian Problems in Chile, pt. 2, 20.
75. Quoted in Hersh, Price of Power, 263. For more on Kissinger’s role in Latin American affairs, see
Rabe, Kissinger and Latin America. For similar comments from U.S. officials about the low priority of
Latin America in the Nixon administration’s foreign policy, see Mark L. Chadwin, “Foreign Policy
Report,” National Journal, 15 January 1972, 99–100; Petras and LaPorte, “U.S. Response to Economic
Nationalism in Chile,” 204 n. 26; and Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 147.
76. Rockefeller Report, 94.
77. Walters memo to Kissinger, 3 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 30
78. Michael, “Nixon, Chile and Shadows of the Cold War,” 98, 102.
79. Nixon address to the Bohemian Club, 19 July 1967, FRUS, 1969–1976, 1: 3. See also the Pope’s
warning to Nixon in early 1969 about the communist threat in Chile, recounted in Walters, Silent
Missions, 566.
80. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 39–43.
81. Quoted in Diederich, Somoza, 197.
82. NSC Review Group Meeting minutes, 3 July 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 3. Kissinger used
the same metaphor. See Kissinger, White House Years, 664.
83. Juan de Onís, “American Colony in Chile Declines,” NYT, 5 July 1972.
84. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 29 September 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976 1: 117–18. For examples of U.S.
paternalism toward Chile, see Cottam, Images and Intervention, 56; and Korry’s description of
Allende’s cabinet as a “child whose head, nerves, and muscles are controlled by communists and the
socialists,” in embtel 4630, 1 November 1970, POL 15–1 Chile, 11/1/70, box 2197, RG 59.
85. Valdés, “Americas in a Changing World,” 210–11; Benjamin Welles, “Latin Grievances against the
U.S. Handed to Nixon,” NYT, 12 June 1969; Uribe, Black Book, 31–33; Valdés, Sueños y memorias,
194–97.
86. Nixon, “Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Inter American Press Association,” 31 October
1969, PPP. For U.S. reporters’ reactions, see A.D. Horne, “Nixon Offers Latins a New Partnership,”
WP, 31 October 1969; Robert B. Semple, “President Urges Latins Take Lead to Spur Progress,” WP, 2
November 1969.
87. See Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 109.
88. “Latin Reaction to Nixon Speech Mixed,” NYT, 2 November 1969. For Valdés’s disappointment
over the failure of the United States to address the demands of the Viña del Mar Consensus, see
LAWR, 6 February 1970.
89. “Action Progress in the Americas,” WP, 2 November 1969.
90. Quoted in Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 108. For Rockefeller’s recommendation
concerning the military, see Rockefeller Report, 85–86.
91. Memcon (Nixon, Mitchell, Finch) 30 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 50.
92. NSSM 68, 12 July 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 7.
93. Lawrence, “Latin America and the Quest for Stability,” 470–71.
94. Zunes, “Decisions on Intervention,” 449–51; Morley, Imperial State and Revolution, 14–29.
95. Costigliola and Paterson, “Defining and Doing,” 14–19.
96. Zumwalt memo to Moorer, 15 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 251–52. See also Poole,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 159.
97. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 376.
98. McCone letter to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 249.
99. ­A-139, 29 March 1970, POL 1 Chile—U.S., 2–­3-70, box 2201, RG 59.
100. Embtel 971, 16 March 1970, POL 14 Chile, box 2195, RG 59.
101. Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, 188–89.
102. Nixon, RN, 490.
103. Intelligence note, 30 June 1970, CDP.
104. Korry, “Embajador Edward M. Korry en CEP,” 12.
105. Embtel 3741, 16 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 262–65. Korry’s histrionic prose in this
telegram has led one historian to compare him to Joseph de Maistre, a reactionary Catholic priest who
attacked the French Revolution. See Greg Grandin, “Plumping for Pinochet,” Nation, 21 January 2002.
106. HCFA, Cuba and the Caribbean, 36, 96.
107. NIE 94–70, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 121.
108. Open Forum Panel memo to secstate, 11 September 1970, POL Chile—U.S., 1/1/71, box 2201,
RG 59.
109. Research study memo ­RSGS-3, 1 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 136.
110. Embtel 4687, 4 November 1970, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-70, box 2193, RG 59.
111. Uliánova and Fediakova, “Aspects of Financial Aid to Chilean Communism,” Table No. 1 and
pp. 23–24; Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 108. For similar figures based on Russian archives, see
Haslam, Nixon Administration, 13–14. See also Gladys Marín oral history interview, 21 September
2003, CIDOC on the insignificance of Soviet funding. Wild exaggerations of Soviet contributions to
the Allende campaign (e.g., Silva Cabrera, Allende, 174) can be traced at least in part to the CIA’s
disinformation campaign known as the Kunakov Archives operation, which is discussed in chapter 2.
112. Fontaine Talavera, “United States and the Soviet Union in Chile,” 6. Former CIA Director John
McCone’s claim that Allende had received $1 million from the Soviets appears to be a wild
exaggeration designed to grab Kissinger’s attention. See McCone letter to Kissinger, 14 September
1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 249. The Soviets had a more targeted aid program because they did not
want to become economically burdened by another “Cuba.” See Andrew and Mitrokhin, World Was
Going Our Way, 71–72.
113. Salvador Allende speech to the Chilean senate, 21 August 1968, in Allende, Salvador Allende:
frente al mundo, 145–50. Allende was also quite critical of the Soviet occupation of Hungary. See
Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, 184. As one Chilean writer has observed,
Allende and his supporters failed to learn from the Czechoslovakia experience. See Ariel Dorfman,
“Death and Rebirth,” Nation, 8 October 1990.
114. Conversation no. 724–004 (Nixon, Kendall, Flanigan), 15 May 1972, Nixon Tapes. As one
former Soviet ambassador later recalled, the United States greatly exaggerated Soviet influence in the
Third World during the 1970s. See Dobrynin, In Confidence, 410.
115. Memo for the 40 Committee, 5 March 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 78.
116. NIE 94–70, 30 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 121.
117. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 140.
118. Helms, Look Over My Shoulder, 402. See also the CIA’s erroneous prediction that Allende would
purge the military within three years. CIA briefing paper, “Background on Military,” nd but probably
between 4 September and 4 November 1970, CDP.
119. Korry contingency paper, August 1970, in Korry, “The ­USA-In-Chile and ­Chile-In-USA,”
Estudios Públicos 72 (Spring 1998), 10–27. In early September, Korry cabled similar findings, which
Nixon praised as “an excellent perceptive job of analysis.” See embtel 3499, 5 September 1970, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 175–79
120. Deptel 154387, 19 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 119.
121. Oriana Fallaci, “The CIA’s Mr. Colby,” New Republic, 11 March 1976. See chapters 5 and 8 for
further examples of how U.S. officials invoked “Red Fascism” to justify intervention in Chile.
122. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 30–39.
123. Church Report, 20. This figure has never been verified. See Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 38.
124. Korry, Contingency Paper, August 1970, in “Chile in the Archives of the USA (1970),” Estudios
Públicos 72 (Spring 1998), 10.
125. Nixon, RN, 490.
126. Frost and Zelnick, Frost/Nixon, 278.
127. NSSM 97, attached to Meyer memo to Kissinger, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 80.
128. See “Chile: The Expanding Left,” Time, 19 October 1970.
129. Hove, “Losing a Model Democracy,” 353.
130. The U.S. embassy continued to track Allende’s activities, but their reports do not seem to have
had a significant impact in Washington. For example, after October 1964 Allende’s name barely
appears in FRUS, 1964–1968, 31. For assessments of Allende by U.S. officials in the 1960s that
downplayed the threat, see Hove, Losing a Model Democracy,” 356; and Martin, Kennedy and Latin
America, 462 n. 3.
131. For more on Allende’s involvement with OLAS, see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 36; Marchesi, Latin
America’s Radical Left, 71–72; and Hove, “Losing a Model Democracy,” 352–53.
132. NSC Interdepartmental Group for ­Inter-American Affairs, “U.S. Policy toward Latin America:
Response to NSSM 173,” n.d., FRUS, 1969–1976 ­E-11, pt. 1: 13.
133. FBIS, “Trends in Communist Propaganda,” 10 September 1970, CDP. For other examples of
Allende offering assurances that he was not going to establish a ­one-party state that would imitate the
Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, see de Onis, “Chile’s Leading Marxist,” NYT, 6 September 1970; Joseph
Novitski, “Allende Sees Chile Finding Her Own Way to Socialism,” NYT, 4 October 1970; and
“Chilean Leftist Sees No Red Coup,” NYT, 12 August 1962.
134. Embtel 3644, 12 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 223–27.
135. Chief, WH memo to Broe, 29 September 1970, CDP.
136. Alexander, ABC Presidents, 198. British Ambassador David Hildyard also counseled taking the
long view and accommodating Allende. See embtel 3585, 9 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
198.
137. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 38.
138. SRG meeting minutes, 17 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 385.
139. NIE 94–70, 30 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 125.
140. Frost and Zelnick, Frost/Nixon, 282.
141. Memcon (Meyer, Parkinson, de Cubas, Hobbing, Stedman), 10 April 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973,
21: 82.
142. Telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 12 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 228. David Rockefeller
assisted Edwards in getting in touch with Kissinger. See Rockefeller, Memoirs, 432.
143. McCone letter to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 249.
144. Kissinger, White House Years, 673. Helms also insinuates that these lobbying efforts had
prompted Nixon to start a second covert action, as discussed in chapter 2. See U.S. Congress, Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged
Assassination Plots (hereafter Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots), 228 n. 1; and Powers,
Man Who Kept the Secrets, 234. On the lack of records, see FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 228 n. 2. The Nixon
administration had already started planning this second operation before Nixon met with these
lobbyists. See Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 7.
145. For a general discussion of how the psychology and leadership style of leaders can shape their
decisionmaking, see Immerman and Gronich, “Psychology,” 336–37.
146. Volkan et al., Richard Nixon, 129.
147. Hixson, Myth of American Diplomacy, 222. On Nixon’s and Kissinger’s need to appear “tough”
on communism, see Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 130.
148. Nixon, RN, 490. On how some U.S. officials tried to link the Cienfuegos crisis to the Allende
threat, see Kissinger, White House Years, 593; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 366; and Siniver, “Nixon
Administration and the Cienfuegos Crisis of 1970,” 79.
149. Frost, “Interview with Richard Helms.”
150. Helms, Look Over My Shoulder, 404.
151. Quoted in Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 241.
152. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 239. See also Crimmins’s
assessment of NSSM 97 in Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 102.
153. Laurence Stern, “Chile: The Lesson,” Progressive (November 1973), 16.
154. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 5 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 439. Emphasis in the
original. According to one of Kissinger’s aides, Kissinger imagined Allende to be a greater threat than
Castro. Hersh, Price of Power, 270.
155. Kissinger, White House Years, 653.
156. See Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, ch. 4; Siniver, “Truth Is Out There,” 451–52; and Cline,
“Opinion.” On Nixon’s general propensity to bypass the NSC when it came to covert action, see ­Hoff-
Wilson, “Richard M. Nixon,” 186–87.
157. Telcon (Kissinger, Rockefeller), 19 September 1969, Kissinger Telcons, box 2, NPMP. For a vivid
example of the clash between Rogers and Kissinger over a press conference that included remarks
about Chile, see telcon (Kissinger, Rogers), 25 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, 2: 268. For one
White House insider’s recollection of Kissinger’s vendetta against Rogers, which included the Chilean
issue, see Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, 298–99.
 158. Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 309.
159. Kissinger, White House Years, 11. For further evidence of Nixon’s distrust of the CIA, see
Helgerson, Getting to Know the President, 73.
160. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 17 April 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 19; Helms, Look Over My
Shoulder, 399–400.
161. Embtel 10, 2 January 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 63–64.
162. Memo for the record, “Discussion of U.S. Government Activities Leading Up to the Chilean
Election in September 1970,” 19 January 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 70.
163. Frost and Zelnick, Frost/Nixon, 281; Kissinger, White House Years, 669.
164. See Streeter, “Review of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XXI,” 40–41.
165. The Church Committee later conceded that the Nixon administration had, in fact, wildly
exaggerated the communist threat in Chile, but it offered no explanation. See Intelligence Activities,
174–75.
166. Church Report, 10.
167. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 239.
168. memcon (Kissinger, Harrington, Cranston, Fraser, and others), 13 December 1974, FRUS,
1969–1976, ­E-3: doc 245.
169. On how America’s global commitments led U.S. officials to viewing all threats as
interconnected, see Johnson, Improbable Dangers, 143.
170. Kissinger, White House Years, 659. On Operation Condor see chapter 9.
171. Quoted in “The Fretful Neighbors,” Time, 19 October 1970.
172. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 5 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 440. The U.S. fear that
Chile might export its revolution is explored further in chapter 3.
173. For U.S. impressions of Allende supporting this view, see notes of a meeting in Valparaíso
(Zumwalt, Allende, and others), 19 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 570; and CIA memo,
“Background for Chilean Hearings,” 23 March 1972, 0005496321, CREST. Chilean leftists understood
that Allende appeared to U.S. officials as more of a threat than Castro because the Chilean experiment
had a more universal appeal. See Jaime Gazmuri oral history, CIDOC.
174. Kissinger telcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 9 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 453.
175. Conversation no. 735–001 (Nixon, Echevveria Alvarez, Haig, Barnes, Kissinger), 15 June 1972,
Nixon Tapes.
176. Berellez memo to Hendrix, 23 October 1970, MCUSFP, 679–80. The danger to private
enterprise posed by Allende was also noted in NSSM 97, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 86.
See also Chomsky, Turning the Tide, 114.
177. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 27 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 110. On fears that Nixon
and Kissinger had of the example that Chile was setting in Latin America, see conversation no. 517–
004, 11 June 1971, 9:37 a.m., Nixon Tapes.
178. Korry backchannel message to Crimmins, 22 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 101.
 2
The 1970 Presidential Election
The Nixon administration’s covert action program to prevent Allende’s
election in 1970 was not a single campaign that began and ended on specific
dates, but a series of continuing and overlapping operations that evolved in
response to changing conditions. Conflicts within the administration over
the best way to confront the Allende threat greatly complicated the U.S.- ­
decision-making process. In brief, the State Department balked at many
proposals as unnecessarily risky, while Nixon and Kissinger continually
pressed for more prompt and definitive action. As the U.S. ambassador and
the CIA station chief wrangled for operational control of what they
conceived to be the administration’s plan to prevent Allende from being
elected, both were unaware that Nixon had secretly ordered CIA Director
Richard Helms to launch a separate operation to promote a military coup.
According to the Chilean Constitution, if a presidential candidate won by
a plurality, rather than a majority, a joint session of Congress would hold a
separate vote to decide between the first- and ­second-place finishers. This
runoff vote was largely a formality, as tradition dictated that the candidate
with the highest number of votes be declared the winner. After Allende won
a plurality on 4 September 1970, the Chilean Congress was scheduled to
take the final vote on 24 October. Consequently, the Nixon administration
had only seven weeks to implement one or more schemes that would
prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. The Church Report
popularized the terms “Track I,” and “Track II” to describe these operations,
so they will be used in this study with the caveat that U.S. officials rarely
used these labels, if at all. Track I consisted of two phases: (1) a “spoiling
operation” to prevent Allende’s election by aiding his political opposition;
and (2) a ­post-election contingency plan to deny Allende the presidency by
influencing the congressional runoff vote.1 Phase 2 (not to be confused with
Track II), became known as the “­Frei reelection gambit,” a complicated ruse
to evade the constitutional restriction against consecutive terms in order to
return Frei to the presidency. Track II (­code-named FUBELT), known only
to Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA Director, was the secret effort initiated on
15 September 1970 to foment a military coup before 24 October to block
Allende’s inauguration. Before describing these operations and their
outcome it is necessary to review several events that shaped how the Nixon
administration would approach the 1970 presidential election.

The March 1969 Congressional Elections

Long before Allende became the UP candidate in the 1970 presidential
election, the U.S. embassy feared that his popular front coalition was gaining
ground on the Christian Democrats because of the sagging performance of
the Frei government. In late May 1968, Ambassador Korry recommended a
limited covert operation to provide direct financial support to selected
candidates in the March 1969 congressional elections, which “might hold
the key to 1970.”2 If successfully elected, this body of “moderates” would
bolster opposition to a popular front candidate, and “could act as a restraint
on the policies of any popular front president, should one be elected.”3 In
July the 303 Committee approved $350,000 for an operation that would
hopefully “break the leftward drift toward a popular front that threatens to
engulf Frei.”4
To initiate the operation, Korry proposed forming an election team that
with the CIA’s assistance would identify selected moderates in the Radical
Party (PR), Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and the National Party (PN)
where hard intelligence indicated that U.S. support might be decisive.5 By
channeling funds directly to leaders rather than their parties, Korry argued,
the United States could provide crucial help to potential winners while not
wasting resources on party nominations that the United States did not
support.6 The CIA assured Kissinger that even though the project had
potential security problems, the “risks have been accepted in consideration
of the U.S. stake in Chile.”7
In addition to passing money to selected congressional candidates, the
CIA employed many of the same scare tactics it had used in earlier Chilean
elections to create the proper “psychological climate.” These tactics included
circulating anticommunist posters predicting rampant inflation and high
unemployment if FRAP candidates were elected; saturating newspaper
outlets and radio stations with anticommunist, pro–American news items
and editorials; and the mobilization of farm, slum dweller, and women’s
organizations to vote for U.S. designated candidates. To split the Socialist
vote, the CIA also funded the Union Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist
Union, USP), which had split from the PS in August 1967 but was struggling
to survive.8
The final report to the 303 Committee on the attempt to influence the
March 1969 congressional elections judged the operation successful given
that 10 of 12 selected candidates receiving U.S. support had been elected.
Funding of USP, which received about half of its campaign expenditures
from the United States, had proven to be especially effective because USP
diverted enough votes from the Socialists to deprive the PS of seven
congressional seats. Moreover, the entire covert operation had been
conducted with no security leaks.9 Curiously, the report concluded that “the
moderates suffered a clear setback” because the electorate had become
polarized between the extreme right and left, “with the Marxist left coming
out the greatest beneficiaries.” Another dangerous trend was that the Radical
Party could no longer be counted on to oppose a popular front candidate in
the 1970 presidential election. Consequently, the CIA warned that the “-­
Communist-Socialist front would stand perhaps an even chance of victory
for the presidency.”10
The incongruity between the report’s optimistic presentation and
pessimistic conclusion illustrates a common problem that the Nixon
administration would face in evaluating the impact of its Chilean covert
action programs, which often became ­self-justifying once set in motion.
Final assessments tended to emphasize what was working while
downplaying shortcomings. For example, buried in the report is the fact that
the electoral team had hoped to identify up to 40 candidates but could only
find 12 worth funding. When one considers that there were 150 seats up for
grabs in the Chamber of Deputies and 30 seats in the Senate, the ability to
determine 12 seats seems far less significant. Even more important, it was
unclear whether U.S. funding was the determining factor in the victories of
the 10 selected moderates. The lack of a tracking mechanism meant that
there was no way to determine how individual candidates spent their
funds.11 The CIA station also cautioned that it lacked the “covert political
muscle to impose its will” on any political party’s selection of its
candidates.12 Despite all of these concerns, the agency may have lulled the
303 Committee into a false sense of complacency by suggesting that this
operation had boosted the PN’s chance of winning the next presidential
election.13

The Tacnazo
For most of the twentieth century, the Chilean military had quietly
succumbed to civilian rule, but signs of trouble emerged in May 1968, when
four hundred army officers threatened to resign over inadequate pay.14
President Frei’s attempt to contain the protest by bringing into his cabinet
retired Army General Tulio Marambio as defense minister did little to
overcome what the U.S embassy described as the “deeper problem of
festering discontent.”15 In early October 1969, U.S. intelligence reported that
General Roberto Viaux, the commander of the First Division in Antofagasta,
was plotting to depose Frei unless he agreed to fire Marambio, who was
planning to remove Viaux from his command.16 Viaux attempted to present
a letter to Frei in person complaining about obsolete equipment, declining
morale, lack of discipline, and dwindling military salaries. Frei refused to
meet with Viaux and sent him back to Antofagasta with an invitation to
retire. In response, Viaux’s supporters released the contents of the letter to- ­
right-wing newspapers, while Viaux flew back to Santiago to dramatize the
military’s plight by seizing control of the Tacna and Yungay regiments, as
well as the ­non-commissioned officer’s school.17
Viaux’s rebellion on 21 October 1969 became known as the Tacnazo
because it involved primarily soldiers from the Tacna regiment.18 The public,
the Catholic Church, and most political parties rallied behind Frei, who
closed Congress and declared martial law. In an act of solidarity, municipal
garbage trucks encircled La Moneda (presidential palace) to protect Frei
from a possible attack. The PCCh, fearing persecution if the military seized
power, denounced the revolt as a conspiracy against democracy and liberty,
while one of the nation’s largest unions organized a ­one-day strike in
support of the government.19 By contrast, many Socialists sympathized with
Viaux’s mutiny because the PS owed a historic debt to the Chilean military.
The party had been founded in 1933 with the support of the charismatic air
force colonel Marmaduke Grove, who had presided over a ­short-lived
socialist government the previous year.20 Nonetheless, Allende met with the
Christian Democrats, including Frei, to affirm his support for constitutional
government.21
The Tacnazo lasted only a day, as Viaux agreed to call off the rebellion and
accept retirement in exchange for the resignation of Defense Minister
Marambio and a promise to raise military salaries. While Viaux certainly
had the sympathy of many officers, the armed forces were not united behind
him, so if it was a coup attempt, then the Tacnazo must be considered a
failure.22 Afterward, Viaux told reporters that he had surrendered only
because Frei promised to grant his petitions, and his objective had never
been to overthrow the government.23 Possibly, Viaux was simply trying to
save face and was using the military’s dissatisfaction over salaries and
inadequate equipment as an opportunity to test the coup waters.24
In any case, the political significance of the Tacnazo appears to have
escaped the Nixon administration, which is ironic given how desperate U.S.
officials later became to provoke a military coup. Kissinger thought the
rebellion serious enough to bring to Nixon’s attention, but the revolt ended
so abruptly that there was no ­follow-up.25 Nearly thirty years later, Korry
claimed that he had suspected that the PS had provoked the military unrest,
but the embassy had paid very little attention to the affair because it “struck
us as very small.”26 As many analysts have since pointed out, the Tacnazo
represented a significant weakening of the Chilean military’s resolve to stay
out of politics.27 Afterward, the armed forces appeared to divide between
those who admired “the soldier with a soldier’s face,” as one journalist
dubbed Viaux, and those who were embarrassed by him and sought to
repair the military’s reputation.28 This division, according to one U.S.
intelligence assessment, demonstrated that the “glue which holds these
services together is fragile at best.”29
While the Nixon administration treated the Tacnazo with apparent
indifference, Frei was determined to squelch any future plotting. To assure
the military’s continued loyalty, he appointed René Schneider commander in
chief of the armed forces, and Carlos Prats Defense Minister. Both generals
had stalwart reputations as defenders of the constitution and the military’s
apolitical tradition. In early May 1970, as the presidential election campaign
was getting underway, Schneider explained in a newspaper interview that
the military would respect the constitutional process and support whomever
the Congress elected if a runoff was needed. The “Schneider Doctrine,” as it
was later called, would become one of the largest obstacles to the Nixon
administration’s attempt to block Allende from the presidency.30
One consequence of the Tacnazo that U.S. officials could not ignore, was
that it raised suspicions that the CIA had fomented the rebellion. On 22
October, the Washington Post cited a CIA source who claimed that the
agency had been aware of the plotting for six weeks. Furious, Vaky
complained to Kissinger that the Chilean Communists “will use this
statement to charge U.S. connivance with General Viaux.”31 The leak also put
the U.S. embassy on the defensive with the Frei government, as Korry was
repeatedly forced to deny rumors that the CIA had been involved.32 Allende,
as well, harbored similar suspicions. When discussing Viaux’s rebellion with
Frei government officials at the peak of the crisis, Allende worried that
“North American imperialism,” e.g., the CIA, the Pentagon, and Chilean
officers trained by the U.S. military in Panama, might divert the Chilean
military from its patriotic duty of defending the government.33
There is no evidence that any U.S. agency was involved in the Tacnazo,
and it is difficult to see what the motive could have been given all the
support that Washington had provided Frei over the years and that the 1970
presidential election was still a long way off. More important, Allende’s
perception of the Tacnazo illustrates a pervading belief among Chilean
leftists that a vast international conspiracy was attempting to thwart Chile’s
road to socialism. Of course, the real plot against UP was about to unfold,
but not quite in the way that Allende and many of his supporters imagined
it.

Track I (25 March to 29 September 1970)

In April 1969, Kissinger instructed the 303 Committee to turn its
attention to the 1970 Chilean presidential election, casually mentioning that
a Nixon acquaintance had recommended assisting Jorge Alessandri’s
campaign. While open to the suggestion, the committee saw no need for
urgency because the presidential candidates had not yet been formally
declared.34 Consequently, the matter did not come before the committee
again until early the following year, when all three major contenders were
known: Salvador Allende (UP), Radomiro Tomic (PDC), and Jorge
Alessandri (PN). By that time, the State Department and the CIA had begun
considering spoiling operations that would weaken FRAP (the forerunner of
UP) by removing one of its supporters, the PR. Ambassador Korry and CIA
Western Hemisphere Chief William Broe advocated this plan because even
though Alessandri was the front runner, 10 to 15 percent of the vote was still
undecided. Korry favored the spoiling operation over any attempt to provide
direct support to a candidate because in his opinion the United States simply
did not have the power necessary to get someone elected in that manner.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs John
Crimmins and Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs
Charles Meyer both questioned the need for any operation given the risks
involved, but Korry and Broe eventually convinced them to bring the
proposal to the 303 Committee because if Allende were elected it might be
difficult to answer questions later as to why nothing had been done.35
On 5 March 1970, the 40 Committee, which had replaced the 303
Committee the previous month, received a CIA memo presenting the case
for a spoiling operation that would lessen the chances of Allende being
elected president. The agency recommended against supporting either
Tomic or Alessandri. Tomic, who was not much better than Allende as far as
protecting U.S. interests was concerned, was running a distant third so
supporting his candidacy might not make much difference. Alessandri’s old
age and undistinguished political record, as well as widespread rumors of
CIA interference in Chile, ruled out the “mounting of a ­large-scale election
operation” on his behalf. Instead, the memo suggested expanding the
“propaganda mechanism” that had been tested and proven in the March
1969 congressional election, as well as supporting the Partido Demócrata
Radical (PDR, Radical Democratic Party). The PDR was a minor party
composed of former moderate PR members who defected in 1969 when the
PR decided to support the Socialists and Communists. By supporting the
PDR, the CIA hoped to reduce the number of votes that the PR could deliver
to UP. The U.S. ambassador and CIA station chief promised to monitor these
spoiling operations closely to ensure that they did not end up favoring
Alessandri instead of fulfilling their intended purpose as an “anti–UP
weapon.”36
Vaky did not think the spoiling operation went far enough and wondered
if it would not be “good insurance” to strengthen moderate Christian
Democrats as well.37 Korry and the CIA, however, continued to argue
against aiding either Tomic or Alessandri because of the security risks.38 In
his memoirs, Kissinger complains that the State Department had dragged its
feet on approving these operations by insisting that U.S. funds not be used to
support Alessandri.39 Yet at the 40 Committee meeting on 25 March 1970,
Kissinger did not advance Vaky’s suggestion about the Christian Democrats,
nor did he object to the decision to not aid Alessandri. With virtually no
discussion, the 40 Committee approved $125,000 for these spoiling
operations, noting that additional funds might be requested in the future to
support one candidate if polls indicated that Allende was gaining.40
Kissinger also did not object when the U.S. embassy and the CIA refused
to bend to corporate lobbyists who pressed the Nixon administration to
intervene in the Chilean election on behalf of Alessandri. For example,
Korry flatly rejected Anaconda Copper Company’s proposal to subsidize
Alessandri’s campaign, which was in “such disarray that any money would
be wasted” and the entire effort would be about “as discreet as a moon
launch.” Korry was not opposed to corporations donating to Alessandri, but
he warned the U.S. business community to be discreet; if Alessandri lost the
election, the winner might retaliate against Alessandri’s financiers.41 This
danger had been well illustrated in an incident involving the Chilean
Cooperative Society (CCS), a Chilean front created to enable private U.S.
businesses to secretly finance a “terror campaign” against Allende in the
1964 presidential election. In April 1970, executive Robert Haldeman of the
Kennecott Copper Company resurrected CCS to solicit contributions from
National City Bank, Dow Chemical, Bank of America, and other U.S.
corporations with financial interests in Chile. Anaconda’s contribution to
CCS leaked to the Communist Newspaper El Siglo, thus bolstering rumors
that U.S. copper corporations were behind a renewed “terror campaign” to
defeat Allende.42
The State Department’s resistance to supporting Alessandri was
reinforced in May 1970 by polling that suggested Allende was running third
and therefore no longer a “potent challenger.”43 By June, however, the tide
had begun to turn in Allende’s favor. To dispel rumors that he had been out
of public view because of a severe heart attack, Allende appeared on national
television explaining that he had merely been suffering from the flu.44 On 2
June, Allende attracted 60,000 to a rally, a “notable success,” the CIA
observed, which Frei and Alessandri would be ­hard-pressed to match.45 The
PCCh was helping Allende to gain momentum, the U.S. embassy explained,
by employing the “Vince Lombardi tactics of mastery of fundamentals,”
which included ­door-to-door campaigning to familiarize the electorate with
Allende’s “­bread-and-butter” promises such as free school lunches, an end to
inflation, and reduced cost of public housing and medicine.46
On 18 June 1970, Korry alerted the 40 Committee to the growing danger
that Allende would be elected president. The ambassador requested
$390,000 for attempts to weaken Allende’s support among women and to
supplement the ongoing effort to deprive Allende of votes from the PR and
$500,000 for the ­post-electoral period to buy congressional votes in the
event of a runoff.47 Korry’s proposal, which encompassed what would
become known as phase 1 and phase 2 of Track I, was sent formally to the 40
Committee on 22 June.48 In prepping Kissinger for the next 40 Committee
meeting, Vaky rejected the ­post-electoral phase of Korry’s proposal as too
risky.49 He also suggested that “Alessandri’s election might be the worst ‘anti–
Allende’ solution for us from a ­long-run point of view” because UP might cut
a deal with Alessandri to eliminate the PDC politically, thus placing Allende
in an ideal position to win the next election.50
At the 40 Committee meeting on 27 June, Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson conveyed the objections of Crimmins and
Meyer to Korry’s proposals while adding his own “philosophical
reservation” about the business of “election management.” Unsatisfied,
Kissinger wondered why it was not feasible to support Tomic to hurt
Allende. After learning that there were “ground rules” that prevented the
CIA from contacting the Christian Democrats, Kissinger overruled
everyone with the infamous reply: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and
watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”
The Committee approved phase 1 but decided that phase 2 would only be
implemented if Alessandri’s margin fell below five percent at the end of the
election.51
Kissinger later complained that he had been hampered by the State
Department’s objections to phase 1 and 2 of Track I. The “anti–Alessandri
bias of our bureaucracy,” he insisted in his memoirs, “ensured an Allende
victory.”52 Kissinger’s retrospective reasoning does not hold up. The question
of aiding Alessandri never came up at the meeting on 27 June, presumably
because that issue had already been decided on 25 March. Kissinger could
have raised it again, but that would have required challenging the arguments
that directly subsidizing Alessandri could have exposed the U.S. hand and
that there were few indications that his campaign would have been able to
put extra funds to any purposeful use. Nor did Kissinger have an answer to
Vaky’s concern about an Alessandri victory in 1970 setting the stage for an
Allende victory six years later. As chair of the 40 Committee, Kissinger
could have insisted on approving phase 2 (as he later did) or amending the
“rules” to aid Tomic. He did neither because his understanding of Chile was
extremely limited, and because he had to rely on the expertise of others who
understood the risks better than he did.53
A little less than a month after the 40 Committee met to discuss Chile,
Nixon ordered an interagency group of representatives from the
Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, JCS, and NSC to
consider U.S. policy options if Allende became president (National Security
Study Memorandum 97, or NSSM 97).54 It is not clear exactly what
prompted Nixon to issue NSSM 97, but presumably, Kissinger was keeping
the president apprised of events unfolding in Chile and Nixon did not like
the direction they were going. Given Nixon’s obsession with thwarting
Allende, he must have been disappointed with the interagency’s
recommendation to adopt a “restrained, deliberate posture” toward a future
Allende government instead of the “isolate and hamper” option, or the coup
option, which was dismissed as risky and unlikely to succeed.55
In any case, this contingency plan was temporarily shelved while officials
concentrated on how to prevent Allende from winning. At the SRG meeting
on 19 August 1970, the day after NSSM 97 was issued, Kissinger said he did
not want to discuss the study’s findings until after the election. Instead, he
ordered the CIA to prepare for the implementation of phase 2 of Track I.
When objections were raised (Meyer, for example, recalled that the 40
Committee had agreed to postpone phase 2), Kissinger insisted on
developing an action plan because Nixon wanted “maximum effort made to
keep Allende from winning in Congress,” and “the President may decide to
move even if we do not recommend it.”56
When Korry first introduced phase 2, he did not elaborate on where the
plan came from or how it would work. It appears that he got the idea from
the Chileans themselves. In March 1969, President Frei related to Korry that
several Chilean military leaders had told him they feared that the victory of
either the left or the right in the next presidential election could badly
polarize the country and lead to domestic violence. To avoid this scenario,
the military proposed seizing power, purging the left, and sending Frei to
Europe. After a brief period of military rule, Frei could return and resume
his mandate without having to worry about “extremists” anymore.57 This
fanciful scheme never went anywhere, but it strongly resembled a plot
described to Korry by Senate President Tomás Pablo of the PDC in early
August 1970. As Pablo explained, Alessandri had promised to accept the
winner of a first majority, so if he lost and there was a runoff and Congress
selected Alessandri, he would be bound by his pledge to refuse the
presidency. In that event, Pablo, as Senate President, would serve as the
nation’s interim president to preside over new elections. Frei would be
eligible to run again and would likely win. For this plan to work successfully,
Korry noted, would require the support of the Chilean military to control
“Marxist mob violence.”58
These schemes appear to have been the progenitors of phase 2, which
Korry originally presented as a contingency plan to bribe the Chilean
Congress in the event of a runoff so that Allende would be denied the
presidency.59 Broe pointed out to Kissinger at the 40 Committee meeting on
7 August 1970 that to determine if phase 2 was feasible would require asking
President Frei and Senator Julio Durán of the PDR to identify the
“persuadables.” Unfortunately, the very act of inquiring would blow the
operation’s cover.60 From the CIA’s perspective, phase 2 was a “security
nightmare.”61 Some State Department officials also strenuously objected to
proceeding with phase 2 because contacting Chilean assets before the
election was risky, premature, and unnecessary.62 As Meyer warned, “buying
Congressional votes … means interference with and corruption of a
principal institution of the Chilean Government and of a constitutional
function that lies at the heart of the Chilean political process.”63
The CIA did manage to produce a phase 2 plan just before the election,
but it was predicated on the assumption that Alessandri would finish ahead
of Allende. The plan called for continuing “political warfare” along the lines
of phase 1 and reserving $500,000 to buy congressional votes in the runoff.
The agency made no contingency plan for how phase 2 might be
implemented if Allende won, however, except to comment that “popular
forces rallying to his support may soon prove to be overpowering.”64 Because
Allende did not gain a majority on 4 September, a congressional runoff was
scheduled for 24 October. Allende’s narrow margin of victory over
Alessandri (36.2 percent to 34.9 percent) encouraged the Nixon
administration to continue pursuing phase 2 of Track I even though its
prospects were dimming.65 Ray Cline, the State Department’s intelligence
director, dismissed the “emotional” concerns of his colleagues about the
impropriety of bribing members of the Chilean Congress: “In the world of
realpolitik sensitivities are not so tender and people are more concerned
with who wins power rather than with morality.”66 After all, bribing
government officials was hardly unknown in American history. As one CIA
agent later explained: “You buy your votes in Boston, you buy your votes in
Santiago.”67
After Allende’s victory, Korry grew despondent. He realized that the
cooperation of Frei was crucial to the implementation of phase 2, but he
blamed Allende’s victory on the cowardice of the PDC. The ambassador was
disgusted with the Christian Democrats, “a disparate collection of politicians
covered by an umbrella with stripes of trompe l’oeil morality and genuine
populism,” who behaved like “Gadarene swine” in leading their followers to
the “Marxist ­slaughter-house.”68 On 7 September, Korry reported that
Alessandri had privately agreed not to concede yet, so phase 2 could
conceivably still go forward. But Korry was pessimistic about the chances of
success because Frei was preoccupied with feeling sorry for himself and
lacked “the guts to act to save his country, his name in history or even
himself.” One encouraging sign was a report from a U.S. military attaché of a
meeting among Chilean military commanders, who were discussing a plan
whereby the PDC and PN would elect Alessandri, who would form a
military cabinet and then resign. The Chilean military would maintain order
over the next sixty days until new elections could be held, which Frei would
easily win.69 The CIA account of this meeting, however, indicates that the
military was not united behind the plot.70 Korry became so discouraged
about the Frei ­reelection gambit that he began to refer to it as a “Rube
Goldberg contraption,” suggesting that the scheme had become overly
complicated.71
As the Frei ­reelection gambit looked ever more dubious, Helms warned
the 40 Committee at its 8 September meeting that if promoting a military
golpe (coup) was the goal, the committee needed to decide very soon
because once Allende was in power, he would quickly “neutralize” the
military and police. Johnson and Meyer predicted a civil war would break
out if Allende was denied a victory by the military; it made more sense to
tolerate Allende as “the lesser of two evils.” Once again, Kissinger overrode
the State Department and ordered the U.S. embassy to undertake a “­cold-
blooded assessment” of the prospects of assisting a military coup and
organizing Chilean opposition to Allende.72
Korry reported back that the chances for a golpe were “nonexistent”
because the Chilean military was too disorganized and inexperienced.73
Despite his earlier pessimism about the Frei ­reelection gambit, however, he
now thought that even though the Rube Goldberg contraption was a “long
shot” its “odds are improving by the hour.”74 The U.S. embassy country team
estimated that Allende currently had only a slight edge in congressional
votes over Alessandri (91 to 88) with 15 PDC members undecided.75 Korry’s
renewed interest in the Frei ­reelection gambit had been piqued by his recent
meetings with Christian Democrat representatives. Frei’s defense minister,
Sergio Ossa, told Korry on 12 September that Frei and most of his cabinet
supported the Frei ­reelection gambit but were worried about leftist
retaliation if it failed. Korry assured Ossa that in that case, the United States
would assist the conspirators and their families in securing commercial air
transportation out of the country.76
After reading Korry’s account, Nixon requested that the ambassador
determine the “feasible courses of action” open to the administration. Korry
began his reply by bragging about his efforts to prod phase 2 along. In
addition to badgering the Catholic Church into supporting Frei and warning
the Chilean armed forces that an Allende government would likely lead to a
ban on U.S. military equipment, he had told Frei, “to use blackmail to
counter blackmail, to take out every skeleton in the crowded Christian
Democrat closet to produce converts among his Congressmen, to be
prepared at the opportune moment to have the Carabineros [national
police] detain the leaderships of the Communist and Socialist Parties, to
frighten the hell out of his Armed Forces and to panic the country into more
dire economic circumstances.” Then came Korry’s recommendations for
action: plant stories in the press alleging that Communists would take over
Chilean universities, the mass media, and key elements of society; publicize
the Chilean army’s dependence on U.S. equipment; foment an atmosphere of
panic by having the White House request that commercial airlines prepare
for extra flights to accommodate a mass exodus if Allende assumes the
presidency; establish a special standby fund for bribing members of the
Chilean Congress; and cease disbursement of all U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) pipeline funds unless approved by the
ambassador.77
In the meantime, the CIA had prepared a separate assessment. The agency
agreed with Korry that the United States simply did not have a mechanism
that could precipitate a coup. The Frei ­reelection gambit was a “long shot”
(Korry gave it a 1 in 5 chance of succeeding), and if it backfired, the outcome
would be comparable to the Bay of Pigs disaster, the ­ill-fated effort to topple
Castro that had haunted President Kennedy. Failure would “wreck our
credibility, solidify anti–U.S. sentiment in Chile in a permanent way, create
an adverse reaction in the rest of Latin America and the world and perhaps
domestically.”78 Winston Lord of the NSC complained to Kissinger that
trying to thwart Allende’s election “could completely undercut our policy on
Vietnam.” It would be hypocritical to justify blocking Allende from the
presidency because he had won “only” 38 percent of the vote, Lord observed,
as this was about the same proportion of the vote that the U.S.-backed
candidate had just received in the South Vietnamese presidential election.79
Despite these warnings, the 40 Committee authorized Korry in mid–
September to determine if the Chilean military was going to back the Frei- ­
reelection gambit and to convey to Frei that he could expect covert U.S.
support.80 Korry explained that he could not directly contact Frei “without
creating a storm.” Instead, the ambassador used Chilean Defense Minister
Ossa to send a message designed to shame Frei into action: The United
States was prepared to support him, but if Frei stuck to his decision to play
the role of Hamlet, Korry would regard him “as a pathetic castrate unworthy
of either sympathy or sustenance … who had opted for a Communist Chile.”
In appraising the Chilean military, Korry was equally caustic. It was nothing
more than a “union of toy soldiers,” guilty of “moral cowardice,” who would
act only upon Frei’s orders.81
At this point, Vaky lost patience with Korry, who was becoming
increasingly unglued. Earlier, Vaky had alerted Kissinger that the
ambassador’s cables, known as “Korrygrams,” were becoming “rambling and
inconsistent,” at times almost “hysterical.”82 Secretary Rogers had also
warned Kissinger to be cautious of the ambassador, who had developed
“tender nerve ends” because of the stress. Korry’s messages were sounding
more and more “frenetic” and “irrational.”83 On 16 September, Vaky advised
Kissinger to put another expert in charge of phase 2 because Korry had
become an “unguided missile” who was “too exposed” and “too dangerous.”
If Korry “is not reigned in,” Vaky warned, “we are going to be in a mess.”84
Kissinger conveyed these concerns to Nixon, who approved the creation of
an action task force in Washington to oversee phase 2 of Track I.85
Vaky warned that Korry might not take kindly to having the Frei- ­
reelection gambit taken out of his hands. Fortunately for the White House,
however, phase 2 morphed into Track II before any confrontation could
erupt. On 19 September, the CIA reported to the 40 Committee that Frei
realized he did not have enough congressional votes to win and had
abandoned the constitutional solution. At the same time, it appeared that
Generals Camilo Valenzuela and Roberto Viaux were planning a coup to be
followed by new elections.86 One possible snafu was that Allende’s
supporters were predicted to react violently to any attempt to deny their
leader the presidency. As Chile braced for civil war, the 40 Committee
deliberated its next step. Again, Kissinger steered the committee away from
retreat. President Nixon, he admonished, would not approve of telling the
Chilean military to turn it off. Kissinger instructed Admiral Thomas Moorer
of the JCS to devise a plan for providing military assistance in case violence
broke out. Additionally, Vaky was to investigate possible outcomes and make
policy recommendations on how to respond.87 In his report the following
day, Vaky predicted that a military coup would collapse without external
assistance. The consequences of aiding the plotters, however, could be
catastrophic. Referring to the international backlashes that had resulted
from the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Vaky warned that if the Nixon
administration openly supported the coup, “we would also suffer in the
hemisphere and domestically by reawakening the Dominican Republic and
Czechoslovakia images.”88
The coup never materialized, but the 40 Committee ignored Vaky’s
warnings and tried to salvage the Frei ­reelection gambit by returning to its
1969 formulation. A military coup, if carried out before 24 October, would
eliminate the congressional runoff, which Allende was bound to win. The
military could send Frei away for a few months and then invite him back to
run in new elections, which he was likely to win.89 In his next
communication with Frei, Korry seems to have realized that this
reformulation of the Frei ­reelection gambit was the only option left.
Switching from Shakespearean to Russian metaphors, the ambassador
lectured Frei that if he “chooses to continue playing [a] ­self-pitying and
inactive role, history is bound to judge him harshly” as the “Kerensky of
Chile” for having turned the country over to the Communists. To drive
home the point, Korry also threatened that “not a nut or bolt will be allowed
to reach a Chile under Allende” and “we shall do all within our power to
condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty.”90
After reading Korry’s telegrams, the 40 Committee grew concerned that
the ambassador had become too exposed. Kissinger wanted Korry to convey
several messages to Frei, which would be hard to do if Korry was required to
keep a low profile. But because previous ambassadors had forbidden the CIA
to be in direct contact with Frei, Helms explained, the messenger had to be
Korry.91 To reduce the chances of exposure, the State Department instructed
Korry to use a trusted channel to assure Frei that if he were elected after a
coup, he could expect U.S. financial support.92 Korry was also to pass word
to the Chilean military that it could rely on continued U.S. military aid if it
carried out a coup.93
Korry refused to carry out these instructions, claiming that Frei did not
need assurances and the embassy had to keep a low profile.94 By 25
September, Korry had essentially given up on the effort to promote a coup
(why risk “another Bay of Pigs?”) and turned his attention to devising ways
to frustrate Allende once he assumed the presidency. These strategies
included suspending all U.S. economic and military aid; fomenting strikes
against U.S. companies such as Anaconda; persuading the National City
Bank to keep afloat the conservative newspaper El Mercurio; distributing
ominous economic forecasts predicting doomsday once Allende assumed
the presidency; spreading consumer panic; and freezing Chilean assets in
the United States.95 Kissinger was aghast that the ambassador had decided
on his own to abandon all attempts to block Allende from the presidency.
“Korry has flipped his lid!” Kissinger protested to Johnson.96
On 29 September, the 40 Committee concluded that all versions of the
Frei ­reelection gambit were dead. The last remaining option was for the
United States to act as a “catalyst” to instigate a coup. The committee
deadlocked at this point over the value on trying to keep Allende out of the
presidency. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard wanted immediate
action. Meyer, however, suggested that allowing Allende to assume the
presidency meant that “we could place the burden on Allende for all he did
—not ourselves, and after all, Allende would not be around forever.” Helms
retorted that he “had seen other ­take-overs where pronounced Marxists had
accomplished in far less than six years (Allende’s constitutional term) what
they had threatened to do and then there were no more elections.” In one
sense the debate was moot. Most members of the committee had no idea
that Nixon had already decided on the coup option two weeks earlier.97

Track II (15 September to 15 October 1970)

Kissinger had anticipated Track II on 9 September 1970 when he asked
the U.S. embassy for a “­cold-blooded assessment” of the coup prospects in
Chile.98 While Korry ruled out a military coup and continued to pursue the
Frei ­reelection gambit, Broe informed CIA Station Chief Henry Hecksher in
a separate cable that phase 2 “in any form is a ­non-starter.” Broe was resolute
that “the only prospect with any chance of success whatsoever is a military
golpe either before or immediately after Allende’s assumption of power.”
Consequently, Hecksher was instructed to begin establishing contacts with
the Chilean military who “could be used to stimulate a golpe if and when a
decision were made to do so.”99
At Kissinger’s request, Helms met with Pepsi Cola president Donald
Kendall, Chilean businessman Augstín Edwards, and an unnamed Chilean
informant on 14 September to discuss the prospects of stopping Allende.
After the participants rejected the Frei ­reelection gambit as unworkable, the
discussion centered on which military commanders could be counted on to
support a coup. The military did not appear united, and the fear was that
Roberto Viaux, or “some other nut” might try to stage a coup prematurely.
The informant claimed that “the key to a coup would be to get General
Carlos Prats, Chief of the National Defense Staff, to move, which would
involve neutralizing Schneider, the ­Commander-in-Chief of the Army.”100
Hecksher had already identified Schneider as a potential obstacle to the Frei
reelection gambit, so this meeting reinforced the notion that somehow
Schneider had to be removed if the military was going to prevent Allende
from becoming president.101
Nixon met with Kissinger, Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell on
15 September 1970 to issue the order for Track II. According to Helms’s
notes of the meeting, Nixon disregarded all risks even though the chance of
success was very low (only 1 in 10). The game plan was to “make the
economy scream” so the military would move against Allende. The CIA was
to prepare an action plan within 48 hours, but the U.S. embassy was not to
be involved. At least $10 million would be made available for this operation,
and the CIA was to use “the best men we have.” As Kissinger later
emphasized, the $10 million figure should not be taken literally; it was
simply Nixon’s way of emphasizing the importance of the project.102 Helms
later testified before the U.S. Congress, “If I ever carried a marshall’s baton in
my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day.”103
After receiving Nixon’s order, Helms immediately met with senior CIA
officials and assigned CIA Deputy Director for Plans Thomas Karamessines
to oversee the operation. Helms put David Atlee Phillips, a CIA agent with
ample covert action experience in Latin America, in charge of a special
Chilean task force whose mission was “to prevent Allende from coming to
power or unseat him.” Knowledge of Track II was to be kept from the
secretaries of state and defense, Ambassador Korry, and the CIA Chief in
Chile.104 The main strategy of Project FUBELT, the agency’s ­code name for
its operation, was to consider “every plot, however, bizarre” that would
create a “coup climate.”105 Wary of the pitfalls in attempting such a mission
but also mindful of the need to be creative, CIA headquarters emphasized to
the Santiago station the importance of keeping “our feet in the mud of
practicality and our eyes on the stars.”106
Without revealing the details of Track II, Kissinger told the 40 Committee
on 6 October that because time was running out, “some drastic action was
called for to shock the Chileans into action.” Nixon “wanted no stone left
unturned.”107 Fortunately, Korry had already been attempting to destabilize
the Chilean economy in his campaign to mobilize the military behind Frei.
For example, the ambassador’s efforts to spread consumer panic as the
runoff election approached, his enlistment of U.S. businesses to sabotage the
economy, and his threats to suspend U.S. economic and military aid, all
supported FUBELT’s objective of creating an “atmosphere of economic
doom” that would serve as a “flashpoint for action.”108
The only real problem with having Korry become an “unwitting agent in
implementing track two” was that if he decided that a coup was no longer
feasible, the Nixon administration would be in danger of sending mixed
signals to the Chilean military.109 Vaky detected this peril when he warned
Kissinger that the “very awkward and possibly dangerous gap” that was
opening up between the White House and the State Department in their
understanding of U.S. policy toward Chile could lead to crossed wires.110 For
example, in early October, the 40 Committee rejected Korry’s
recommendation to phase out the U.S. military advisory group in Chile.
Kissinger also revoked the ambassador’s order to the CIA station to stop
investigating coup plots. In mid–October, the U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) instructed U.S. Army Attaché Paul Wimert to work closely
with the CIA to send messages to the Chilean military, but not reveal them
to the U.S. ambassador.111 Consequently, Korry unwittingly alerted the
Chilean authorities to an army major who planned to assassinate Allende,
unaware that the officer was linked to CIA plotters.112
The “crossed wires” problem became more acute as Track II operatives
tried to cultivate potential coup leaders and reassure them of U.S. support.
Korry was so convinced that these activities could backfire and embarrass
the Nixon administration that he occasionally tried to interfere with them.
On 9 October, Korry complained to Washington of unauthorized attempts
to liaise with Patria y Libertad (Father and Liberty), a ­right-wing terrorist
group known to have been conspiring with Roberto Viaux to assassinate
Allende. Distraught that these efforts might reinvigorate charges in the
Chilean press of CIA interference, Korry leaked the plot to the Frei
government and threatened to publicize that many of Patria y Libertad’s
members were the sons of parents who worked for American
corporations.113 As Korry later explained in an interview, he did not care if
Allende died of assassination or a heart attack, “the point was to protect the
United States from the repercussions.”114
Korry’s antics proved to be the least of the CIA’s worries. A much bigger
problem was the Schneider Doctrine. To release the Chilean military from
its obligation to respect the constitution, the CIA decided it was necessary to
remove General Schneider. The idea of “neutralizing” Schneider had already
been raised several times, at the 14 September meeting between Helms and
U.S. corporate executives, and by Korry in a 21 September situation
report.115 Neutralization in CIA parlance could mean assassination, but the
agency settled instead on kidnapping, which was to be carried out by retired
General Roberto Viaux. The plan was risky from the outset. Most U.S.
officials held a very dim view of Viaux, a loose cannon who was not capable
of uniting the armed forces (a “General without an army” as he was known
in military circles).116 The CIA preferred the Frei reelection gambit over a-
Viaux-led military coup that could result in an “autocratic, nationalistic,
military government which may not be particularly pro–US.”117 With time
running out, increasing pressure from the White House, and the lack of
alternatives, however, the agency reluctantly began working with Viaux in
early October.118
While the CIA wanted to conduct a precise operation to maximize the
chances of success, controlling Viaux proved next to impossible. One danger
was that he would prematurely launch a coup that would fail and ruin the
chances for future attempts.119 Korry reported on 8 October that the army
would not support Viaux.120 A botched coup attempt could place “Allende
firmly in the saddle, as the Bay of Pigs did for Castro.”121 Karamessines
confessed to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alexander Haig that “the situation looked dimmer now than at any time
before” because all the senior Chilean military officers who had been
contacted directly remained pessimistic.122 A week later Karamessines
informed the 40 Committee that a “coup climate does not presently exist.”
The only viable coup leader was the “unpredictable Viaux,” and his chances
were “slight.”123 On 15 October, Karamessines broke the news to Kissinger
that Viaux had no more than a one in twenty chance at best of succeeding.
Kissinger decided to “defuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily,” but
he also instructed Karamessines to preserve the agency’s assets for possible
future use.124 Later, Kissinger told Nixon that he had “turned it off ” because
“nothing would be worse than an abortive coup.”125
CIA headquarters worded its instructions carefully to its agents in
Santiago. It was still “a firm and continuing policy that Allende be
overthrown in a coup,” but Viaux was to hold off until further notice.126 By
the time the CIA’s operatives could relay this information to Viaux, however,
it was too late. The “Viaux group” had already planned to kidnap Schneider
on 21 or 22 October. The plotters requested machine guns and ammunition,
which the CIA had supplied through the U.S. embassy diplomatic pouch.127
Meanwhile, the CIA learned of a second coup plot headed by General
Valenzuela, who was collaborating with Viaux. Valenzuela planned to
abduct Schneider and secretly fly him to Argentina while publicly blaming
Schneider’s disappearance on leftists. Frei would then resign and leave Chile
while the military assumed power.128 The CIA suddenly got its hopes up: “At
last, the military is pulling itself together in an effort to deny Allende the
presidency,” the station informed headquarters.129 The Track II operatives
even went so far as to meet Valenzuela’s demand of $50,000 for “expenses,”
while the station was asked to begin planning for the ­post-coup
environment.130
On 19 and 20 October, Valenzuela’s group made several attempts to
kidnap Schneider that had to be aborted for logistical reasons. Despite
obvious indications of amateurish bungling, the CIA encouraged Valenzuela
to keep trying.131 On the morning of 22 October, five men intercepted
Schneider’s car while he was on his way to work, and they shot him several
times. Surgeons were unable to save Schneider, who died three days later.132
The CIA was cautiously optimistic. The station boasted that the removal of
Schneider had afforded the armed forces “one last opportunity to prevent
Allende’s election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela’s scenario.”133
Headquarters agreed, praising its agents for having “done an excellent job of
guiding Chileans to the point where a military solution is at least an option
for them.”134 A “coup climate now prevails,” the CIA informed Kissinger on
23 October.135
As the euphoria wore off, however, U.S. officials began to worry about
exposure. Initial reports indicated that Schneider had been killed by
machine guns, which led the agency to suppose that the assassins came from
Valenzuela’s group, which had received machine guns via the U.S. diplomatic
pouch. But it then emerged that the attackers had used pistols, so it must
have been a different group. Although Valenzuela and Viaux were not
directly involved in the assassination, Chilean courts later determined that
both generals had conspired to generate the plot, which had been carried
out by their underlings. As the principal author of the kidnapping attempt,
Viaux received a ­twenty-year prison sentence, and Valenzuela was sentenced
to three years in exile.136
Cover-Ups and Conspiracies
To cover up its role, the CIA retrieved the machine guns and the $50,000
it had provided to the Valenzuela group and then instructed its agents to
deny any connection whatsoever to the assassination.137 To some, it might
seem the height of hypocrisy that Nixon sent Frei a message describing the
Schneider assassination as a “repugnant event” representing a “stain on the
pages of contemporary history.”138 But when the CIA’s role finally leaked out
in the mid–1970s, both Nixon and Kissinger denied any knowledge of the
plot to kidnap Schneider.139 In a technical sense, they were right. Both
officials could claim “plausible deniability,” an unofficial doctrine that
enables American leaders to evade responsibility for the unseemly
consequences of covert actions by keeping themselves apart from their
operational details.140 While it remains unclear if the group of Chileans that
killed Schneider were trying to kidnap him or assassinate him, Nixon and
Kissinger clearly did order the CIA to encourage ­coup plotting knowing that
there would be risks involved. The death of Schneider was treated internally
by the administration as simply an unfortunate ­by-product of an otherwise
successful operation.141 Most U.S. officials appear to have been more upset
that the assassination of Schneider did not lead to a coup than they were by
his death.
The Nixon administration had badly misjudged Chile. Most Chileans
were so appalled by this breach of their nation’s democratic tradition that
they rallied to Allende’s defense. One businessman wailed, “In all my life
there has never been anything like this, any assassination of a political leader
in Chile, it is shocking.”142 Chilean Senator Aniceto Rodríguez identified the
CIA as “the moral author of this crime, which is not in the Chilean
character.”143 In fact, the last comparable incident was the murder of Diego
Portales in 1837.144 The Schneider assassination, the CIA later bemoaned,
“was a demoralizing development for the military and effectively braked
whatever sentiment was developing for military action against Allende.”145 In
the end, Frei did not resign, the military did not follow through with
Valenzuela’s plan, and on 24 October 1970 Allende easily won the
congressional runoff, 153 to 35.146 To gain the votes of the Christian
Democrats, Allende was forced to sign a Statute of Democratic Guarantees,
in essence, a pledge to uphold the rights and freedoms that were stipulated
in the Constitution. The need for Allende to sign such an agreement
indicated just how much distrust had been sown by the terror campaign.147
After Allende assumed the presidency, Nixon administration officials
groped for explanations as to why they had failed. Nixon blamed the State
Department for putting its “chips” on the Christian Democrats.148 Kissinger
complained of an “entrenched bureaucracy” that had failed to support the
Alessandri candidacy, while Allende had received copious external
Communist funding.149 According to Haig, the U.S. intelligence community
had dropped the ball on Chile because it had failed to “sharply assess”
political trends in Chile, and because officials let their “policy
preconceptions” bias their covert action recommendations.150 A ­post-
mortem report emphasized bureaucratic explanations, such as divisions
among officials over their assessments of the threat and whether certain
covert action programs were worth undertaking given their high risks.151
Aside from pointing fingers at each other, U.S. officials came down
especially hard on the Chileans. After the Schneider assassination, Kissinger
complained to Nixon that there was supposed to be a popular uprising but
the Chileans are a “pretty incompetent bunch” because they did not prevent
their Congress from gathering to vote Allende into the presidency.152 In
addition to blaming Frei for being a weak leader, Korry chastised the
opponents of UP after the election “as bumbling, disorganized, naive, and
impotent as ever.”153 The Chilean right had “blindly and greedily pursued its
interests, wandering in a myopia of arrogant stupidity.”154 CIA Director
Helms attributed the lack of public fear about Allende to the Chilean people
having “been softened up and conditioned for six years to accept
revolutionary language, not only coming from the Communists and
Socialists, but generated by the ruling Christian Democrats themselves.”155
The underlying assumption in all these explanations, aside from their
hegemonic presumption that the United States had the right to intervene in
another nation’s affairs, is that somehow the Nixon administration got it
wrong on Chile when it could have gotten it right. The closest that U.S.
officials came to admitting that they simply did not have the power to
determine the outcome of the 1970 presidential election was the suggestion
appearing in a CIA report that the “extent to which an Allende victory might
have been avoided by a more positive, less circumscribed covert action
program is not certain—particularly given all the imponderables of voter
reactions, greater exposure, and increased risk.”156 Indeed, in hindsight, it is
difficult to see what more the Nixon administration could have done to
prevent Allende’s election short of direct military intervention.157 The option
of sending in the marines to Chile, as President Johnson had done to the
Dominican Republic in 1964 to prevent the leftist leader Juan Bosch from
returning to power, was never seriously contemplated by any Nixon
administration official. Such a move would have contradicted the Nixon
Doctrine and possibly triggered a civil war.158 Allende’s commitment to the
democratic process had its limits. “Our response to reactionary violence will
be revolutionary violence,” Allende told an interviewer after the Schneider
assassination. If “cornered” the way that Castro had been, there would be no
choice but to resort to “armed insurgency.”159
The full story of the Nixon administration’s effort to prevent Allende from
being elected did not emerge until the publication of the Church Report in
1975. But even though the CIA officially maintained most of its operational
cover for the duration of Allende’s presidency, UP anticipated that the U.S.
government would try to prevent Allende from being elected in 1970, just as
it had in 1964.160 Numerous Chilean leftists charged that the “terror
campaign” (campaña del terror) was the result of a conspiracy involving the
Chilean right, U.S. corporations, and the CIA.161 A Chilean government
commission established to investigate the terror campaign found some
circumstantial evidence that Anaconda was helping to fund the activities of
anticommunist organizations such as Chile Joven (Young Chile) and Acción
Mujeres de Chile (Women’s Action of Chile) on behalf of Alessandri. Much
to the U.S. embassy’s relief, however, the commission failed to uncover the
CIA’s spoiling operation. Korry was especially worried that the Kunakov
Archives operation, a CIA ploy to publicize alleged Soviet espionage in
Chile, was so clumsy that any “sophisticated reader” would readily see that
the archives “bear the imprint” of the U.S. government.162
The Chilean left originally coined the term “terror campaign” to denigrate
the right’s effort to portray Allende as an agent of the Soviet Union who
would impose communism on Chile by force. But as the bombings and
street violence escalated, Allende’s supporters began to argue that the agents
behind the terror campaign were also instigating a “climate of violence” as a
last resort because their propaganda was proving ineffective.163 Allende’s
opponents blamed the election violence on leftist extremists, but that seems
unlikely given that the largest group dedicated to armed struggle, the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), had promised Allende to
suspend all militant activity during the campaign.164 No use trying to
provoke the Marxists, complained Alessandri’s ­brother-in-law: “You can spit
in their face in the street … and they’ll say thank you.”165 In mid–October
1970, Allende blamed the spiraling violence on dozens of Cuban and Puerto
Rican mercenaries working for the CIA. These undercover agents had
managed to enter the country, Allende asserted, by infiltrating the group of
more than five thousand American tourists that the Frei government had
admitted over the previous three months.166 While there is no evidence to
substantiate Allende’s specific charges, the “terror campaign,” which formed
an integral part of the U.S. covert action program, appears to have received
CIA support, as the agency did fund some ­right-wing groups such as Patria
y Libertad, which did commit acts of terrorism.167 It remains unclear,
however, if the Nixon administration had a contingency plan to assassinate
Allende.168
Even though the CIA tried to hide its role in the terror campaign, Allende
came away from the election convinced that an international conspiracy had
tried to block him from gaining the presidency.169 Given the long history of
U.S. hegemony in Latin America and widespread suspicions about earlier
CIA interventions in Iran and Guatemala, it is understandable that Chilean
leftists would develop a conspiratorial view of the complex array of forces
attempting to undermine Allende’s electoral bid. During the 1970
presidential election campaign, Chilean newspapers and television stations
ran many sensational stories claiming to have uncovered plots against
Allende, which later turned out to have had no factual basis.170 For example,
after investigating widespread rumors that the U.S. citizen Paul Harthorn
was a CIA agent, the U.S. embassy uncovered that he was a management
consultant on good terms with the Chilean foreign minister, Gabriel
Valdés.171 The point is not that the Nixon administration was innocent of
interfering in the 1970 presidential election, but that previous American
misdeeds and the lack of transparency led the Chilean left to imagine
connections were there were none, and to exaggerate the power and
influence of the United States and its corporate allies to shape Chile’s
internal affairs.172
A good example of how an apparent conspiracy could obscure reality is
the ITT scandal, which helped perpetuate the widespread belief in Chile that
U.S. corporations were the main driving force behind the effort to deny
Allende the presidency.173 In 1972, the journalist Jack Anderson obtained
thirty secret memos generated by ITT describing the company’s efforts to
prevent Allende from becoming president.174 As will be discussed in Chapter
4, Anderson’s publication of the ITT documents in his news column, the “-­
Merry-Go-Round,” led to national outrage in Chile, just when the Nixon
administration and the Allende government were engaged in delicate
negotiations over the expropriations of U.S. businesses. Read in isolation,
the memos give the impression that U.S. corporations were attempting in
vain to goad a reluctant Nixon administration into blocking Allende from
the presidency.175 For example, the first document in the collection reveals
that the State Department rejected ITT President Harold Geneen’s offer of
financial assistance of “up to seven figures” to prevent Allende from
assuming the presidency.176 After Allende’s election, ITT did not believe it
could count on the Nixon administration “to move quickly to exert pressure
on Allende … because of our weak policy in the Hemisphere during the past
two years.”177
The ITT memos did reveal that the Nixon administration opposed
Allende’s election, but that was hardly a secret, and virtually no details of
subversive activities were provided. Even the ­so-called green light cable,
which described Korry as receiving approval by the State Department “to do
all possible—short of a Dominican Republic–type action—to keep Allende
from taking power,” failed to explain what the embassy did.178 Instead, the
memos give the impression that it was ITT, not the Nixon administration,
which was leading the terror campaign and pressing other corporations to
sabotage the Chilean economy to induce a coup.
When the ITT memos are placed alongside the U.S. declassified record, a
different story emerges. Anderson’s first document is dated 14 September
1970, ten days after Allende won the election. But ITT’s efforts to block
Allende from the presidency began much earlier. On 16 July, Geneen asked
Broe if the CIA would be willing to channel funds that ITT wanted to
donate to Alessandri’s campaign. Broe declined to involve the agency but
assured Geneen that the Nixon administration was “taking steps” to prevent
Allende from being elected.179 Kissinger turned down a similar offer from
two ITT officers in September.180 Former CIA Director John McCone, who
served on ITT’s board of directors, wrote Kissinger with an offer of $1
million (minimum) to help prevent Allende from assuming the presidency.
Kissinger evaded the proposal with a courtesy reply.181
Nixon and Kissinger could not have been more hostile to Allende and yet
they rejected ITT’s offers of financial assistance to thwart Allende’s election.
Why? Kissinger claims in his memoirs that he declined ITT’s financial help
in the Chilean election because he “considered this sort of activity
inappropriate for private enterprise.”182 A more plausible reason, however, is
that funding was not an issue, and involving ITT threatened to expose the
CIA’s covert action program. After Broe’s July conversation with Geneen, the
CIA noted that ITT’s operation threatened to implicate the Nixon
administration in the election, which “could tilt the outcome in favor of
Allende.”183 That ITT’s interference in the election was an insignificant
sideshow compared to the Nixon administration’s plotting does not mean
that U.S. officials disregarded corporate interests. On the contrary, defending
private enterprise was a core value that the administration frequently cited
when justifying the extraordinary measures that it took against Allende. To
put it another way, even if ITT had not lobbied the Nixon administration to
prevent Allende’s election, U.S. officials would likely have acted the same
way. There was no conspiracy between ITT and the Nixon administration
because one was not needed: U.S. corporate interests were being looked after
as part of the imperial state’s mission.184
The Nixon administration failed to prevent Allende from being elected
president in 1970 for many reasons, but certainly not for want of trying.
Previous successes in shaping the 1964 presidential election and the March
1969 congressional elections led U.S. officials to assume that they could stop
any popular front candidate by using the same techniques that had worked
so well in the past. Because UP did not select Allende as its presidential
candidate until early 1970, and because early projections gave Alessandri a
comfortable margin of victory, there appeared to be no urgency in devising a
plan to thwart Allende until June 1970, when polls began to reveal that
Allende was gaining on Alessandri. By then, Nixon and Kissinger contend, it
was too late. Both leaders blamed the CIA for not bringing the Allende
threat to their attention sooner, and the State Department for opposing any
viable action plan.185 Aside from appearing as suspicious efforts to shift the
blame onto others, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s complaints do not explain how
initiating the covert action programs earlier would have made any difference
to the outcome of the election. The State Department’s opposition to many
of the proposed actions was not based on sympathy for Allende, but on a
judgment that certain ventures were risky, unnecessary, and out of
proportion to the threat. Because Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee and
frequently overruled Meyer and Crimmins, the State Department can hardly
be held accountable for the decisions that it opposed. Furthermore, by
failing to inform Korry and the CIA station about Track II, Nixon hindered
the ability of his foreign policy team to work in unison.
Focusing on the issue of why the Nixon administration failed to prevent
Allende from becoming president should not obscure an equally important
question: Why did he win? Allende’s victory can best be explained as the
result of the split between Chile’s center and the right.186 Social scientists
who have closely scrutinized the 1970 election results have uncovered some
intriguing anomalies, but they all agree that the main factor in Allende’s
victory was the falling apart of the coalition that had elected Frei.187 In this
respect, it is frequently noted that Allende did not win because the electorate
shifted left and that his victory did not represent a mandate for socialism.188
It is revealing that Alessandri’s victory in 1958 by an even smaller margin
has failed to evoke similar commentary. The history of Chile’s presidential
contests suggests that very few presidents could ever claim to have a
mandate to implement their programs. Even Frei’s large majority in 1964
was misleading because conservatives did not endorse his reforms, which is
why they abandoned the Christian Democrats for Alessandri in 1970.189 That
UP continued to perform well in municipal elections also suggests that
Allende’s election was no fluke.190 The idealistic and enthusiastic group of
Chileans who embraced UP’s program hoped to demonstrate that socialism
could work in Chile. Many forces would impede that dream, including the
Nixon administration, which set out to destroy the revolution before it even
got started.

1. Technically, the spoiling operation predated phase 1, which did not receive official sanction until
June 1970. Nonetheless, following the Church Committee’s definition of Track I, the spoiling
operations can be included as part of phase 1, which is how Korry used the term. See memo to 40
Committee, 22 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 104–105; and Phillips, Night Watch, 220.
2. Memcon (Oliver, Sayre, Gardner, and others), 27 May 1968, CDP; memcon (Vaky, Broe), 6 August
1968, CDP.
 3. Truehart memo to Bohlen, 5 July 1968, CDP.
4. 303 Committee meeting minutes, 12 July 1968, CDP.
5. Memcon (Vaky, Broe), 6 August 1968, CDP.
6. Truehart memo to Bohlen, 5 July 1968, CDP.
7. CIA memo to Kissinger, 26 December 1968, CDP.
8. Memo to 303 Committee, 14 March 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 7.
9. Memo to 303 Committee, 14 March 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 9.
10. Memo to 303 Committee, 14 March 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 8, 10. On the polarization of the
electorate, see Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 73–76. While still the dominant party, the PDC share
of the vote fell by about 12 percent between the 1965 and 1969 congressional elections. Etchepare
Jensen, “Partidos y fuerzas políticas chilenas,” 5.
11. CIA memo to Broe, 17 September 1968, CDP.
12. Santiago to Helms, 8 August 1968, CDP.
13. CIA Office of National Estimates, 6 August 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 38.
14. For the government’s attempt to negotiate with the armed forces over a cost of living adjustment,
see Andrés Zaldívar oral history, CIDOC.
15. Embtel 4389, 18 October 1969, CDP. On the State Department’s earlier hope that Marambio
would negotiate pay increases to ease the tension, see Oliver memo to Rusk, 15 May 1968, FRUS,
1964–1968, 31: 666.
16. Intelligence note no. 707, 3 October 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 52–53.
17. John Goshko, “2 Units Revolt in Chile,” WP, 21 October 1969. Frei never received the original
letter, but according to Gazmuri et al., Eduardo Frei Montalva y su época, 710, a second letter signed
by Viaux’s supporters, including Roberto Souper and Nilo Floody, was published in La Segunda on 17
October 1969. For the original letter, see Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux, 55–67. Frustation over
poor resources can be traced in part to the training that many Chilean officers received in the United
States, where they became acquainted with more modern weaponry. See General Alejandro Medina
Lois interview in Marras, Palabra de soldado, 68.
18. For background on the Tacna regiment, see Nunn, “Latin American Militarylore,” 465–66.
19. Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 326–27. For the PCCh statement criticizing the Tacna
rebellion, see Corvalán, Camino de victoria, 288–90. For the Catholic Church’s condemnation, see
Moreno Beauchemin, Historia del movimiento sindical Chileno, 106.
20. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 85; research department memo 46/72, 20 November 1972, FCO
51/213, TNA.
21. Amorós, Allende, 252. On Allende’s confrontation with the PS Central Committee over Viaux’s
rebellion, see Garcés, Soberanos e intervenidos: estrategias, 150–51.
22. Embtel 4403, 21 October 1969, CDP. The Chilean Air Force was less motivated to support Viaux
because it had just received new aircraft from Great Britain. See Arancibia Clavel and de la Maza
Cave, Matthei, 142–43.
23. Embtel 4448, 22 October 1969, CDP; Miguel Herberg interview with General Roberto Viaux, 4
April 1973, Santiago Penitentiary.
24. Several Chilean military officials later insisted that the objective of the Tacnazo was not a coup
but to draw attention to the deteriorating condition of the armed forces. See González, Chile, la
conjura, 22; General Horacio Toro Iturra interview in Marras, Palabra de soldado, 104; Renán
Fuentealba Moena interview, 22 September 2002, in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la historia, 202; Prats
González, Memorias, 101–104; and Hansen, “Military Culture.” Some have argued that the Chilean
military was not really suffering as much as it claimed and that Viaux really was attempting a coup.
See Comentarios Editoriales, “1970”; Rojas Saavedra, Tiempos difíciles, 65–74; Prats González,
Memorias, 126–27; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 87; and Pérez Carrillo, “La Fronda Militar,” 53. Yet
another theory is that the rebellion was designed to get the government to act more strongly against
social unrest. See Angel, “Chile since 1958,” 338.
25. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 21 October 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 54–55. More than six months
later, U.S. intelligence did finally acknowledge that the Tacnazo had eroded Chilean exceptionalism.
NIE 94–70, 17 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 64–65. Oddly, the Chilean military never conducted
an internal investigation into the Tacnazo. See Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Conversando con el
General Julio Canessa Robert, 104–105.
26. Korry, “Embajador Edward M. Korry en CEP,” 20. For Korry’s downplaying of the coup threat,
see embtel 4178, 3 October 1969, CDP.
27. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 85; Varas et al., Chile, 174–75; Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Camino
al golpe, 39; Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 21; Moulián and Guerra, Eduardo Frei M.
(1911–1982), 208–209; Agüero, “La autonomía de las Fuerzas Armadas,” 168. Nearly two months
before the Tacnazo, the CIA observed: “The apolitical nature of the Chilean armed forces can no
longer be taken for granted.” CIA weekly review special report, 15 August 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-
16: 49.
28. Lira Massi, ¡Ahora le toca al golpe!, 73.
29. DIA intelligence report, 17 June 1970, CDP. For the prediction that military dissatisfaction would
continue after the Tacnazo, see Cline intelligence note to secstate, 4 November 1969, CDP. On Viaux’s
popularity and the military’s general support for his cause, see Joxe, “Chilean Armed Forces,” 259–60.
30. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 99. Korry later reported that the Schneider Doctrine was
“enunciated with the full knowledge and support if not prompting of Frei.” Embtel 3205, 14 August
1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign July—Sept 1970, box 1, CAF, RG 84. The Tacnazo reinforced the
idea among Allende’s supporters that the military needed to be incorporated into the revolution. See
Quiroga Zamora, Compañeros, 116–17; and comments of Senator Teitelboim Volosky in Molina
Johnson, Chile, 162–63.
31. John Goshko, “2 Units Revolt in Chile,” WP, 21 October 1969; Vaky memo to Kissinger, 22
October 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 55.
32. Embtel 4449, 23 October 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 56–57; embtel 4870, 20 November 1969,
FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 58–60; embtel 4905, 24 November 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 61–62. The
belief that the CIA instigated the Tacnazo remains strongly held in some quarters, especially the PDC.
See Hormazábal, La Democracia Cristiana y el gobierno de Allende, 40; Haslam, Nixon Administration,
44; and Labarca Goddard, Chile al rojo, 65.
33. Puccio, Cuarto de siglo, 185. While some suspect that the CIA was behind the Tacnazo (Moniz
Bandeira, Fórmula para el caos, 126), others have blamed the PS (Korry, “Embajador Edward M.
Korry en CEP,” 20) or the PN (González, Chile, la conjura, 48–49). For the theory that El Mercurio
publisher Augstín Edwards assisted the Tacnazo, see Uribe, Black Book, 34–35; and Pérez Carrillo, “La
Fronda Militar,” 58. For the theory that the rightwing Catholic organization Tradición, Familia, y
Propiedad (Tradition, Family, and Property, TFP) encouraged the Tacnazo, see Ruderer, “Cruzada
contra el comunismo,” 105 n. 14. None of these theories have been supported by hard evidence.
34. 303 Committee meeting minutes, 15 April 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 19. The notes of this
meeing reveal that Helms did advise getting an early start on any covert operation. But when he
pressed Kissinger on this point over the next few weeks, “Kissinger wouldn’t buy it . . . He wasn’t
interested.” Quoted in Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 370. Another deterrent was the threat of
Senator Fulbright, who was privy to the 1964 operation, to blow the whistle if the CIA made a similar
effort to influence the 1970 election. Helms, Look Over My Shoulder, 399.
35. Memcon (Chapin, Shankle, Broe, Korry), 19 September 1969, CDP; memcon (Crimmins,
Chapin, Coerr, Gardner, Korry, Broe), 19 January 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 69–72.
36. Memo to the 40 Committee, 5 March 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 73–78.
 37. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 25 March 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 78–79.
38. Coerr memo to Cline, 29 April 1970, CDP; CIA tel, 29 April 1970, CDP.
39. Kissinger, White House Years, 666–67.
40. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 25 March 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 80.
41. Santiago tel, 23 April 1970, CDP; embtel 1538, 28 April 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 86. For other
examples of corporate lobbyists, see deptel 18609, 6 February 1970, POL 7 Chile, 1–­2-70, box 2193,
RG 59; and Helms memo to Kissinger, 16 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 89–90. Korry’s warning
appears to have had some impact, as several U.S. commercial enterprises with investments in Chile
declined to assist ITT’s campaign to derail Allende’s election. See Merriam memo to Gerrity, 7
October 1970; and Merriam memo to McCone, 9 October 1970, in MCUSFP, 643–44.
42. Korry backchannel message to 40 Committee, 18 June 1970; and Korry backchannel message to
Crimmins, 22 June 1970, Latin America, Chile Wrap Up and Post Mortem [1971], The President [1 of
1], box 128, HAK Office Files, NPMP; embtel 2394, 26 June 1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign Jan—
Jun 1970, box 1, CAF. An American business lobby organization known as the Council of the
Americas (formerly the Business Group for Latin America) and ITT also contributed more than half a
million dollars to Alessandri’s campaign. See Schoenberg, Geneen, 292–93.
43. Embtel 1809, 15 May 1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign Jan—Jun 1970, box 1, CAF. Korry
predicted that Allende had little chance of winning because of his failure to attract a greater
proportion of the female vote. See ­A-212, 24 May 1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign Jan—Jun 1970,
box 1, CAF. Other factors included the lack of Soviet support, Allende’s ill health, and the belief that
he was “burned out.” See embtel 1869, May 1970, POL 1 Chile, 1–­8-70, box 2193, RG 59; and CIA
intelligence memo 0525/70, 6 July 1970, ­CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034–0, CREST.
44. CIA intelligence note, 19 May 1970, CDP. According to the British Embassy, one source of the
rumors about Allende’s illness was Chilean Foreign Minister Valdés. See Mason letter to Wiggin, 7
May 1970, FCO 7/1516, TNA.
45. Santiago tel, 3 June 1970, CDP.
46. Embtel 2210, 12 June 1970, POL 14 Chile, 6/1/70, box 2195, RG 59.
47. Korry backchannel message to 40 Committee, 18 June 1970.
48. Memo to 40 Committee, 22 June 1970.
49. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 23 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 107.
50. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 26 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 108. Emphasis in the original.
51. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 27 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 109–110. The policy that
prevented the CIA from directly contacting the PDC after 1964 was set forth by Ambassador Ralph
Dungan. See memo, “Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September
1970 Chilean Presidential Election,” 7 September 1970, CDP. Although Kissinger is famous for this
realpolitik assessment of the Allende threat in 1970, Undersecretary of State for ­Inter-American
Affairs Thomas Mann had already warned in 1964 that unless a covert action program was
undertaken against Allende, Chile might “become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose
an avowed Marxist as its elected president.” See Mann memo to Rusk, 1 May 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968
31: 565.
52. Kissinger, White House Years, 667.
53. Kissinger, White House Years, 663.
54. NSSM 97, 24 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 117–18.
55. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 140. For skepticism about the
coup option, see the Interdepartment Group for ­Inter-American Affairs’ assessment of Annex ­NSSM-
97, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 92–93; and Meyer memo to Johnson, 17 August 1970,
CDP.
56. Special Review Group meeting minutes, 19 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 142–44. Nixon
created the SRG to assist him in making decisions relating to national security affairs. The SRG was
composed of the Undersecretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, DCI, Chairman of the JCS,
and National Security Adviser (chair). See NSDM 85, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, 2: 264–
65.
57. Embtel 1171, 25 March 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 17–18.
58. Korry backchannel message to Crimmins, 11 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 133–38.
59. Because the ITT documents revealed that Alessandri’s forces were actively pursuing a similar
scheme in early September 1970, some accounts refer to this plan as the “Alessandri formula.” For
example, see Berrellez memo to Hendrix, 7 September 1970, MCUSFP, 583. Nixon administration
officials, however, never used that term. Well before Allende won the first round of the election, the
Christian Democrats had concocted the plot, which Korry then began to champion as phase 2 of
Track I.
60. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 7 August 1970, Latin America, Chile Wrap Up and Post Mortem
[1971], The President [1 of 1], box 128, HAK Office Files, NPMP.
61. Deptel 130820, 12 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 139. As one memo warned, “the slightest
revelation” of U.S. involvement in the bribing of the Chilean Congress would “mean almost certain
victory for Allende” and damage American credibility worldwide. Memo for the 40 Committee, 31
August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 101.
62. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 20 August, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 145–46.
63. Meyer memo to Johnson, 31 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 162.
64. Acting Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Operations, CIA memo, 23 August
1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 147–57.
65. As Korry noted, Allende did not perform as well as he had in 1964 when he won 39 percent.
Embtel 3499, 5 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 176.
66. Coerr memo to Meyer, 4 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 166 n. 1. David Phillips was also
among those officials who thought that bribery would not work in Chile and was too risky. See David
Atlee Phillips testimony before the Church Committee, 31 July 1975, 17, MFF Archive.
67. “Chile: A Case Study,” Time, 30 September 1974.
68. Embtel 3640, 11 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 213.
69. Korry backchannel message to NSC, 7 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 185–86.
70. CIA information cable, 8 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 193–94.
71. Embtel 3537, 8 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 196.
72. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 8 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 199–201.
73. Korry memo to 40 Committee, 11 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 216.
74. Embtel 3568, 10 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 210.
75. Embtel 3640, 11 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 214.
76. Korry backchannel message to 40 Committee, 12 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 219.
Ossa’s account suggests that the PDC did in fact consider adopting the ­reelection gambit, contrary to
what many former party leaders later claimed. See Andrés Zaldívar oral history, CIDOC; Renán
Fuentealba Moena interview, 22 September 2002, in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la historia, 207–208;
and Rojas Saavedra, Tiempos difíciles, 94.
77. Korry backchannel message 415 to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 229–33.
For Kissinger’s summary of this message for the president, see Kissinger memo to Nixon, 14
September 1970, ­LOC-HAK-460–­5-2–3, CREST.
78. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 236–40. Vaky’s summary
was based on CIA report, “Review of Political and Military Options in Chilean Electoral Situation,” 14
September 1970, CDP. Despite its pessimism about the Frei ­reelection gambit, the CIA persuaded
Italian and West German Christian Democrats to ask Frei to “save Chile.” CIA memo, “Report on CIA
Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970,” 18 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 214.
79. Lord memo to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 240–41. Senator Frank
Church made a similar observation during the ITT hearings. See Eileen Shanahan, “C.I.A. Aide Says
He Gave ­Anti-Allende Plan to I.T.T.,” NYT, 29 March 1973. Senator Edward Kennedy took the
comparison a step further when he told the Council on Foreign Relations that the 1970 Chilean
election was far more democratic than the sham election in South Vietnam. See no. 1202–798, 15
October 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
80. Johnson backchannel message to Korry, 15 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 252–53.
81. Korry backchannel message to Johnson, 16 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 258–60.
Korry continued his derogatory assessment of the Chilean military in embtel 3741, 16 September
1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 262–65. On Ossa’s apparent compliance in delivering Korry’s message, see
Korry backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 24 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16:
128; and Chronology, “­Washington-Santiago Exchanges Bearing on Role of Chilean Military in
Allende Election,” n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 751.
82. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 7 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 189; Vaky memo to Kissinger,
10 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 211.
83. Telcon (Kissinger, Rogers), 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 242.
84. Vaky memos to Kissinger, 16 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 256, 261.
85. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 17 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 266–67. The CIA had
already set up a task force to run Track II (see below), so now it had to create another one to direct the
constitutional route (Track I). A heavily redacted map of these two operations appears at the end of
CIA intelligence report, 17 September 1970, CDP.
86. CIA Station memo to 40 Committee, 19 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 275–77.
87. 40 Committee meeting memo, 19 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 273–75.
88. Vaky memo to 40 Committee, 20 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 278–82. Rogers also
warned Kissinger about the “backfire” potential. See telcon (Kissinger, Rogers), 14 September 1970,
FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 242.
89. Although the point is debatable, at least one American journalist in Chile during 1970 claimed
that even the Chilean left agreed that if Frei ran again, he would win. See “Chile and the Future of
South America,” Firing Line transcript, 8 October 1970, 2.
90. Korry backchannel message to Meyer and Kissinger, 21 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
285–87. Korry later claimed that he had deliberately planted the “not a nut or bolt” threat as a favor to
Ossa, who was attempting to goad the military into launching a coup. Korry, “Embajador Edward M.
Korry en CEP,” 27.
91. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 22 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 292–94.
92. Johnson backchannel message to Korry, 22 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 296.
93. Karamessines memo to the record, 22 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 295.
94. Korry backchannel to Johnson and Meyer, 22 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 297; Korry
backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 24 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 299.
95. Korry backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 25 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
304–308; Korry backchannel message to Johnson, 25 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 309–11.
96. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Johnson), 25 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 311–12.
97. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 29 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 317–19. Kissinger
did not attend this meeting, but Helms and Mitchell had been in on Track II from the beginning.
98. Backchannel message to Korry and Chief of Station, 9 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
201–202.
99. Broe telegram to Chile station, 9 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 203. On the CIA
station’s pessimism about Track II, see Devine, Good Hunting, 45–46.
100. Memcon (Helms, Kendall, Edwards, name not declassified), 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–
1973, 21: 246. The CIA’s record of this meeting does not support the implied suggestion by one author
that ITT was responsible for Nixon’s decision to launch Track II. See Trento, Secret History, 377.
101. CIA status report, 7 September 1970, CDP.
102. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 254. On the CIA’s efforts to comply with Nixon’s order, see
CIA memo, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 115–17. Helms later claimed that he had forgotten to
include in his notes that he had also warned Nixon that it was already too late to initiate a successful
covert action plan. See Woodward, Veil, 41.
103. Quoted in Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 227–28.
104. Broe memo for the record, 16 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 255; Helms, Look Over
My Shoulder, 403–405; Phillips, Night Watch, 220–21. Helms also kept the U.S. Congress completely in
the dark about Track II. See Hathaway and Smith, “Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence,”
90, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, CIA.
105. Phillips tel to Santiago, 28 September 1970, CDP.
106. CIA tel to Station, 21 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 284. Phillips, who later denied
having written the cable, told the Church Committee that the schemes to prevent Allende from being
elected were more like “pie in the sky.” David Atlee Phillips testimony before the Church Committee,
31 July 1975, 67, MFF Archive.
107. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 6 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 339. Kissinger claims
that Tracks I and II merged at this meeting. Kissinger, White House Years, 675.
108. Karamessines message to Kissinger, 20 September 1970, CDP; Phillips tel to Santiago, 28
September 1970, CDP.
109. CIA message to Station in Chile, 21 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 121.
110. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 22 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 288.
111. Editorial note, 14 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 368–70. Korry later claimed that he
knew the CIA “hid things from me.” Korry, “Embajador Edward M. Korry en CEP,” 25. Two days
earlier, Admiral Moorer had met with the DIA director to discuss “through whom pressure might be
exerted to prevent Allende from taking power.” Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 159–60.
112. Gregory Palast, “A Marxist threat to cola sales?” Guardian, 8 November 1998.
113. Korry backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 9 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
350.
114. Korry, “Embajador Edward M. Korry en CEP,” 26.
115. Memcon (Helms, Kendall, Edwards, name not declassified), 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–
1973, 21: 246; Korry backchannel message to Meyer and Kissinger, 21 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–
1973, 21: 287.
116. Quoted in Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 241.
117. CIA memo, 9 October 1970, CDP.
118. On the CIA’s reluctance to work with Viaux, see Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 122–26. On the
intense pressure to thwart Allende’s election, see Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 235.
On why the CIA decided to rely on Viaux despite the risk of provoking a civil war that would result in
“considerable and prolonged” carnage, see CIA tel, “Station Has Arrived At Viaux Solution” and CIA
tel, “HQS Agrees with Station that Viaux Solution Only Viable One,” 10 October 1970, CDP.
119. CIA tel, “Coup Plotting,” 19 October 1970, CDP.
120. Embtel 4177, 8 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 343–44
121. CIA memo, “Situation Report on [Sanitized] Activities,” 9 October 1970, CDP.
122. Broe memo for the record, 10 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 353.
123. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 14 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 359.
 124. Memcon (Karamessines, Haig, Kissinger), 15 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 371–72.
125. Kissinger telcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 15 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 372–73. According
to Davis, the CIA kept Track II on the back burner until at least November 1971. See Davis, Last Two
Years, 313–15.
126. CIA tel to Station, 16 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 373–74.
127. CIA report, “Viaux Undertaking Coup,” 19 October 1970, CDP.
128. CIA report, “Chronology of Events on October 12,” 19 October 1970, CDP; Church Committee,
Alleged Assassination Plots, 244.
129. CIA special situation report, 19 October 1970, CDP.
130. CIA memo, “Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970,”
18 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 217.
131. Phillips tel, “­Pro-Coup Message,” 20 October 1970, CDP.
132. For details, see Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 28–29.
133. CIA tel, “Long Range Consequences From General Schneider Events,” 22 October 1970, CDP.
134. CIA tel, “Maximum Effort in Circumstances Prevailing in Chile,” 23 October 1970, CDP.
135. CIA briefing notes, 23 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 408.
136. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 245 n. 2. To promote goodwill with the PDC
Allende agreed to exonerate Frei from the Schneider assassination. Also, according to one CIA source,
Allende sought to close the Schneider investigation quickly because he was afraid it might implicate- ­
high-ranking officers. See CIA information report, “President Salvador Allende,” 19 February 1971,
CDP. There is no evidence, however, to support Trento’s claim that Allende approved of light sentences
for the Schneider assassins in exchange for the full details of Track II. See Trento, Secret History, 386–
87.
137. Paul Wimert CNN interview, 21 February 1999, NSA; CIA memo, 9 March 1974, CDP; Hersh,
Price of Power, 289.
138. Eliot memo to Kissinger, 22 October 1970, CDP.
139. For Kissinger’s denial, see Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 252–53. For Nixon’s
denial, see “Excerpts From Nixon’s Responses to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” NYT,
26 March 1973.
140. On how the plausible deniability doctrine makes it difficult to judge the president’s complicity
in authorizing assassination plots, see Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, xxv; and
Immerman, “Brief History of the CIA,” 51.
141. See Colby’s comments in Strober and Strober, Nixon Presidency, 129; and Senator Frank
Church’s criticism that Schneider’s death “should have been seen as a foreseeable risk of the
kidnapping,” in Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, xvi. Vaky suggested that U.S. officials
were actually hoping that Schneider would be killed even though it was not part of the CIA’s plan. See
Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 135–36.
142. Joseph Novitski, “Chile Buries General as Martyr,” NYT, 27 October 1970.
143. Joseph Novitsky, “Military Leader Dies in Santiago,” NYT, 26 October 1970.
144. Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 329.
145. Memo for the 40 Committee, 28 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 541. On the Chilean
military’s indignation over the Schneider assassination, see Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 107.
146. Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 329. Frei later excused his inaction to Kissinger by claiming
that he had lacked the “moral authority” to sanction the violence required to block Allende’s election.
See Frei letter to Kissinger, 28 September 1978, quoted in ­Hurtado-Torres, “El golpe que no fue,” 136
n. 41. This justification is highly suspect given that Frei and most of his cabinet actively entertained
ways to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency (see Chapter 2). More plausibly, Frei
eventually decided against the ­reelection gambit because he simply did not believe it would succeed.
 147. Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 49. Allende later claimed he had agreed to the
guarantees statute as a “tactical necessity.” Debray, Chilean Revolution, 119–20. In return the PDC gave
up its demand for restrictions on Allende’s military appointments. Joseph Novitski, “Accord in Chile
Assures Allende of Winning Vote,” NYT, 10 October 1970. For documentation concerning the statute,
including Allende’s response, see Silva Sánchez, Primeras reformas constitucionales, 5–29.
148. Telcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 30 November 1970, 8:05 p.m., HAK telcons, NPMP. See also
Kissinger memo to Nixon, 30 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 218–20; and Kissinger telcon
(Kissinger, Nixon), 4 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 880.
149. Kissinger, White House Years, 669.
150. Haig memo to Kissinger, 3 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, 2: 473.
151. “Why Did the U.S. Government Not Take More Vigorous Political Action Measures to Prevent
the Election of the Marxist Candidate, Salvador Allende, as President of Chile?” 4 March 1971, Latin
America, Chile Wrap Up and Post Mortem [1971], The President [1 of 1], HAK Office Files, NPMP.
152. Telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 23 October 1970, 8:50 a.m., box 7, HAK telcons, NPMP.
153. Embtel 3537, 8 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 194.
154. Embtel 3499, 5 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 177.
155. Helms briefing, 5 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 184–85.
156. Helms memo to Nixon, 12 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 209. Phillips judged the
chance of successfully blocking Allende from the presidency to have been “at best, 2 out of 20.”
Intelligence Activities, 47.
157. William McAfee of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research later regretted
having missed a “lost chance” to defeat Allende by covertly assisting the Tomic campaign to draw
votes away from Allende in order to bolster the chance of an Alessandri victory. William McAfee
interview, 54, FAOHC. Vaky actually made this suggestion to Kissinger, who brought it up at the 40
Committee meeting on 27 June 1970, when it was dropped because of the standing rule not to provide
direct aid to the PDC. See Vaky memo to Kissinger, 25 March 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 79.
McAfee’s counterfactual scenario ignores that the NSC had determined that Tomic, whose political
platform mystified Chilean voters, was already well funded and yet was still failing to draw votes away
from Allende. See memo to 40 Committee, 22 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 103.
158. Probably to appease his rightwing critics, Nixon publicly implied that overt U.S. military
intervention in the 1970 election was not an option because it would have had “repercussions all over
Latin America.” See “A Conversation with the President,” 4 January 1971, PPP.
159. Allende’s comments were made in an interview with the Mexican newspaper Excelsior as
reported in embtel 4681, 3 November 1970, Transition Period October—early November 1970, box 1,
CAF. Right after the 1970 presidential election, the CIA also warned that any attempt to deny Allende
the presidency could result in an “upsurge of violent reaction by Allende supporters” that the armed
forces might not be able to contain. See intelligence memo, 7 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-
16: 110; and one Chilean military commander’s recollection that the military wanted to avoid a civil
war: José Toribio Merino interview, 27 September 1989, in Correa, Preguntas, 146–47. The Christian
Democrats also took the civil war threat very seriously. See Petras, “Transition to Socialism in Chile,”
46–47.
160. Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 52.
161. Embtel 2394, 26 June 1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign Jan—Jun 1970, box 1, CAF; Lewis H.
Diuguid, “Campaign in Chile Drifts Left,” WP, 19 July 1970; Orlando Millas informe to the PCCh
Central Committee, 14 September 1970, in Partido Comunista de Chile, 62.
162. Embtel 3333, 25 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 159. For Korry’s attempt at damage
control, see Korry backchannel message to Broe, 28 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 93–97. For
more on the Kunakov operation and its link to the ­CIA-funded Institute of General Studies, see Freed
and Landis, Death in Washington, 64.
163. Embtel 2454, 30 June 1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign Jan—Jun 1970, box 1, CAF. On the
campaign violence, which resulted in dozens of deaths, see Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 105.
Before the 1970 presidential election, U.S. officials generally judged the terror campaign as effective.
See embtel 2526, 6 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 115; Hecksher disp to Broe, 9 July 1970, CDP.
After the election, the CIA conceded that it had pretty much failed. See Santiago tel to CIA, “PDC
Junta Result Summary,” 6 October 1970, CDP.
164. CIA tel, “Agreement between the Socialist Party and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement for ­-
non-use of Violence during the Presidential Campaign,” 10 April 1970, CDP; Marambio, Las armas de
ayer, 84–85.
165. Hendrix and Berrellez memo to Gerrity, 17 September 1970, MCUSFP, 612.
166. Embtel 4232, 13 October 1970, POL 15 Chile, 1–14–70, box 2196, RG 59; embtel 4281, 15
October 1970, Transition Period October—early November 1970, box 1, CAF. After Allende
complained to Frei about the “extraordinary influx of Americans,” Frei suspended the granting of
American visas for one week. See embtel 3483, 4 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 172.
167. On the CIA’s funding of Patria y Libertad during the 1970 election, see Intelligence Activities,
178; and Church Report, 31. On Patria y Libertad’s possible ties to Viaux and the Schneider
assassination, see Santiago ­A-368, 21 December 1971, CDP. Michael Townley, a U.S. citizen, may have
assisted Patria y Libertad in its terrorist efforts, but it is a myth that he was working for the CIA, or the
U.S. embassy, which rejected his offer to serve as a liason to the Chilean right. See embtel 2496, 8 June
1973, CDP; Dinges, Condor Years, 73.
168. According the reporter Seymour Hersh, the option papers prepared for preventing Allende
from taking office included assassination schemes. See Hersh, Price of Power, 275. Nixon
administration officials, however, later insisted that there was never any discussion or plan to
assassinate Allende. For example, David Atlee Phillips, who helped implement the covert action
program against Allende, told the Church Committee that assassination was not among the options
U.S. officials discussed. See David Atlee Phillips testimony before the Church Committee, 31 July
1975, 12, MFF Archive. For Helms’s denial, see Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 228.
Nixon also denied that he had ordered any assassinations during his presidency. See United States
Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Final Report, book IV, 157–58. The CIA’s well-known attempts to assassinate Cuban leader
Fidel Castro as well as the doctrine of plausible deniability invited skepticism about these claims. For
example, the NSC had to assure the Church Committee that phrases such as “get rid of him” and
“downfall,” which appeared in the minutes of the NSC meeting on 6 November 1970, were not
euphemisms for assassination. A careful reading of these minutes reveals that Nixon administration
officials were in fact discussing a destabilization effort not assassination. See Jeanne Davis letter to
Wilderotter, 14 February 1976; and Jeanne Davis letter to Miller, 19 February, CDP; and memcon of
NSC meeting, 6 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 446–49. At the same time, the Nixon
administration made it clear to the CIA that it approved of any effort by the Chilean military to
remove Allende, even if that resulted in his assassination. See Summers, Arrogance of Power, 337.
Korry dismissed most Allende assassination plots as conspiracy theories spread by the Chilean left to
make Allende more pliable. See embtel 4735, 6 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 190. One
exception was an assassination plot by General Arturo Marshall that Korry reported to the Frei
government, which had Marshall arrested. Korry also reported without comment that a West
European diplomat had approached him with a request to arrange Allende’s assassination. See Hersh,
Price of Power, 29; Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, 230; and Korry backchannel message to
Johnson, Kissinger, and CIA Station Chief, 26 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 135.
169. Korry backchannel message to Kissinger, 18 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 272. For
Allende’s complaints about an “international conspiracy” to prevent his election, see 40 Committee
meeting minutes, 6 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 339. Allende also believed that “U.S.-directed
Cuban agents” were out to kill him. See embtel 4281, 15 October 1970, Transition Period October—
early November 1970, box 1, CAF.
170. Embtel 3647, 13 June 1970, Transition Period September 1970, box 1, CAF. According to one
Christian Democrat, CIA intervention in Latin American affairs was taken for granted by most
Chileans. See Victor Perera, “Law and Order in Chile,” NYT Magazine, 3 April 1975.
171. Embtel 3365, 27 August 1970, 1970 Presidential Campaign July—Sept 1970, box 1, CAF.
172. On how the Nixon administration’s efforts to cover up its own conspiracies has helped generate
a conspiracy culture, see Olmsted, Real Enemies, 150.
173. See Observador, “En Wall Street manejan el complot contra Chile,” Punto Final, 8 December
1970; Garcés et al., “World Equilibrium,” 83–87; and “Documentos de la ITT: reflexiones,” Mensaje,
May 1972.
174. Anderson, Anderson Papers, 69; Feldstein, Poisoning the Press, 268–69.
175. “ITT,” Newsweek, 3 April 1972. Broe misled the U.S. Congress in asserting that it was ITT rather
than the CIA that had initiated the idea of intervening in the election. See Broe testimony, 27 March
1973, MCUSFP, 259. The notion that corporate pressure determined Nixon’s decision to intervene in
Chile has become a staple of many popular interpretations of the coup. For an example, see
Christopher Hitchens, “The Case Against Henry Kissinger: Part One,” Harper’s, February 2001, 53.
176. Neal memo to Merriam, 14 September 1970, MCUSFP, 599–600.
177. Neal memo to Merriam, 30 September 1970, MCUSFP, 899.
178. Hendrix and Berrellez memo to Gerrity, 17 September 1970, MCUSFP, 608.
179. Broe memo, “Discussion with Mr. Harold S. Geneen,” 17 July 1970, CDP. Broe did offer to help
ITT find a reliable channel for its campaign contributions. See Broe memo, “Conversation with Mr.
Harold S. Geneen,” 3 August 1970, CDP.
180. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 389.
181. McCone letter to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 249. Kissinger later told
Nixon that he had never brought the ITT visit to his attention because the proposal “required no
action.” See Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 4 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 880.
182. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 389.
183. CIA tel to Station, 6 August 1970, CDP.
184. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution, 28; Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 311.
185. Kissinger, White House Years, 663; Frost, “Interview with Richard Helms.” For Helms’s view that
the CIA was serving as a scapegoat, see Hathaway and Smith, “Richard Helms as Director of Central
Intelligence,” 86.
186. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 106–110; Valenzuela, “Origins and Transformations,” 55.
187. Francis, Allende Victory, 68; Stone, “Social Modernization,” 361; Garretón, Chilean Political
Process, 34.
188. Prothro and Chaparro, “Public Opinion and the Movement of Chilean Government,” 43;
Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 39; Davis to DoS, ­A-180, 4 August 1972, box 3, CAF.
For challenges to this view, see Hellinger, “Electoral Change in the Chilean Countryside,” 271; and
Petras and Alexander, “Two Views,” 72–76; Magasich, Allende la UP y el golpe, 12.
189. Ayres, “Electoral Constraints,” 129–30; Urzúa Valenzuela, Historia política de Chile, 639;
Williamson, “Social Class,” 159.
190. See Navia and Osorio, “‘Make the Economy Scream’?” and chapter 7.
 3
The ­Face-Off
After the 1970 presidential election, the United States and Chile squared
off, as each side quietly prepared to do battle without revealing its true
intentions. The Nixon administration had failed to block Allende from the
presidency, so a new strategy was needed to prevent the Chilean revolution
from succeeding. Allende, well aware of Chile’s vulnerability, had to figure
out how to avoid provoking the United States while fulfilling his promise to
bring socialism to Chile. Both governments opted for an official policy of
friendliness toward each other to avoid any appearance of being an
aggressor. Before long, however, a series of relatively minor incidents created
frictions that foreshadowed the greater clash to come.

“Cool but Correct”

Because the Nixon administration was so focused on preventing Allende
from gaining the presidency, U.S. officials were slow to devise a policy for
dealing with Allende should he assume the presidency on 3 November 1970.
In mid–August, NSSM 97 laid out three options. The first was to try and
reach a “modus vivendi” with Allende; the second was to adopt a
“restrained, deliberate posture”; and the third was to “isolate and hamper”
the Allende government.1 Several of America’s allies, especially Great
Britain, advocated accommodation (the first option), but no official in the
Nixon administration took this position seriously.2 Korry recommended the
middle option (“roll with the punch”) because a harsh policy toward Chile,
he argued, would not be supported by most of Latin America, and Allende
had sufficient resources to survive a boycott: “copper is not sugar” and “1970
Chile is not a 1959 Cuba integrated into the US market.”3 Assistant Secretary
of State Meyer agreed with Korry in ruling out the third option. Trying to
isolate and hamper Allende’s government, he warned, would be
counterproductive because Allende could gain popularity in Chile and
throughout Latin America as a victim of U.S. imperialism.4
Gradually, U.S. officials began to converge on the phrase “cool but
correct” as a moniker for the Nixon administration’s policy toward the
Allende government. The “cool but correct” theme first appeared in Korry’s
1 October 1970 memo to Kissinger prescribing subtle ways to harass
Allende without drawing too much attention.5 A few days later, Vaky
recommended to Kissinger a “cold but correct” policy so that “we do not
give him [Allende] an excuse to escape our pressures.”6
The SRG held several meetings before the runoff election in early
November to determine the best course to follow if Allende should win. The
State Department favored a moderate policy because it feared that taking a
harsh line could backfire. Undersecretary of State John Irwin maintained
that the best path was to “conduct ourselves so that he [Allende] can’t blame
us for his failures. Let his own mistakes accumulate” so that Chile will
become a “bad example for the rest of Latin America.”7 Meyer pointed out
that Latin America was drifting left regardless of Allende, so “our policy
ought to be to maintain such communications as are possible with Allende
without making him into the hero of the Western Hemisphere.” Korry
warned that open hostility could drive the armed forces to support Allende
and bring in the Soviets. He proposed making a deal with Allende before his
inauguration: The United States would promise a policy of “­non-hostility” in
exchange for Allende’s promise to not allow Soviet military presence and to
not export revolution.8
The Defense Department led the charge for the more aggressive option.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs G. Warren
Nutter warned that failure to adopt a strong stance on Chile could leave
Americans wondering why “we stood by while Communists took over. The
reaction would be worse than with Cuba.” In a similar vein, Undersecretary
of Defense Packard argued that not trying actively to bring Allende down
would set a bad example for the rest of Latin America. The United States
would have had a better outcome, he ventured, had it taken a stronger stance
on Peru where a nationalist regime had expropriated a U.S.-owned oil
company. Kissinger suggested a compromise between these soft and hard
options, by trying to “isolate and hamper while following a restrained and
cool policy.”9
Kissinger kept Nixon apprised of these discussions, emphasizing that the
crux of the matter was how overt U.S. hostility should be.10 In line with
Kissinger’s recommendations, Nixon issued a series of instructions on 21
October that reflected his desire to move the policy discreetly in the
direction of hostility. Korry was not to pursue a deal before Allende assumed
the presidency; the White House would forgo sending the customary
message of congratulations; Secretary Meyer was to head a “small ­low-key
delegation” to attend Allende’s inauguration. Nixon also ordered the State
Department to begin contacting other Latin American governments to
outline U.S. “concerns” about Chile; U.S. military aid and training were to be
resumed; and the Air Force Technical Applications Command (AFTAC)
facilities on Easter Island were to be phased out, as Korry had
recommended.11
At the last SRG meeting in October, the group continued the debate along
the same lines, but with the input of two policy options papers prepared for
the upcoming NSC meeting in early November. In summarizing the first
paper, Vaky reiterated his earlier advice to Kissinger to craft a policy that fell
between restrained coolness and outright hostility. “The purpose is not to
try and fool him [Allende] into thinking we like him—he knows better; it is
to give him no excuse to retaliate and no political benefit from a publicly
hostile U.S. posture.”12 The annex to the second paper outlined a covert
action program “to aid and abet forces disillusioned with Allende to
recapture power politically, or, under certain circumstances, overthrow his
government.”13 These papers led the SRG to consider how covert action
might be employed to bring Allende down. Kissinger dismissed Meyer’s fear
that Allende would catch on to the CIA’s effort to undermine him: “Do we
care whether we are blamed if our action succeeds in getting rid of him?”
Certainly, if he goes, people will say, “Those damned Americans!”14 The
discussion deadlocked as before, with the State Department counseling
restraint and flexibility, and the Defense Department advocating open
hostility.
Kissinger presented these positions in a briefing memo to Nixon just
before the next NSC meeting. Because Nixon had come out publicly in
support of ­self-determination and ­non-intervention in the internal affairs of
Latin America, Kissinger warned, “it would therefore be very costly for us to
act in ways that appear to violate those principles.” Kissinger dubbed the
State Department view as the “modus vivendi” approach (i.e., the first
option in NSSM 97) and identified its weaknesses: Allende would gain the
strategic initiative and be able to consolidate his power at no cost. Kissinger
then offered the president two versions of the hostile approach: one that
would impose immediate punitive measures such as imposing an embargo;
and another that would exert “­non-overt pressure” following the “cold,
correct approach.” Kissinger’s advice was to “oppose Allende as strongly as
we can and do all we can to keep him from consolidating power, taking care
to package those efforts in a style that gives us the appearance of reacting to
his moves.”15 Nixon received similar advice from Vernon Walters, who
complained that South America was deteriorating owing to the “coddling of
leftists” in Chile. “If we move actively (not necessarily openly) against our
opponents,” Walters advised, “they will respect us for it.” Nixon underlined
this sentence with the comment, “This should be our line.”16
In essence, Nixon and Kissinger had already made up their minds about
how to handle President Allende before the NSC gathered on 6 November.
After Helms and Kissinger briefed the council on the threat and the options,
the discussion focused on the best way to bring Allende down. Nixon
jumped on the suggestion by Director of Emergency Preparedness George
A. Lincoln that reducing the U.S. copper stockpile could depress copper
prices which would severely damage Chile’s economy. Nixon ordered the
State and Defense Departments to draw up a proposal within a week on how
to sell from the stockpile because “it could be the most important thing we
do.” Nixon dismissed concerns about how the democratic forces in Latin
America might react to anti–Allende efforts. In his view, Latin American
intellectuals were a lost cause. More important was to increase aid to the
armed forces in Latin America, especially in Brazil and Argentina, because
“they are the power centers subject to our influence.” Nixon conceded that it
was essential to appear publicly “very cool and very correct,” but “[p]rivately
we must get the message to Allende and others that we oppose him.” Nixon
also rejected the Tito analogy, because unlike Eastern Europe, “Latin
America is not gone, and we want to keep it.” Employing a phrase that he
would become famous for by end of his presidency, Nixon insisted that it
was vital to send a message to the world that we “can’t be kicked around.”17
Nixon’s decisions at the NSC meeting were codified in National Security
Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93, which Kissinger issued on 9
November. While adopting a “cool but correct” public posture toward Chile,
the hidden goal of U.S. policy was “to maximize pressures on the Allende
government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement
policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests.”18 NSDM 93 called for
trying to isolate Chile diplomatically by pressing U.S. allies, especially Brazil
and Argentina, to oppose Allende; and to cultivate ties with friendly Latin
American military leaders. On the economic front, Chile was to receive no
more economic aid, financial guarantees for private investments in Chile
were to be terminated, and the United States was to use its leverage in
international financial institutions to restrict credit to Chile.19 Although
NSDM 93 did not specifically mention covert action, Nixon left the door
open for consideration of that tactic by establishing an Ad Hoc Interagency
Working Group, to be composed of Kissinger and representatives from the
CIA, and the State and Defense Departments, which would advise the SRG
on “specific courses of action.”20

“Ideological Pluralism”
Allende and his supporters expected to be challenged by the Nixon
administration, although they could only guess at the exact mechanisms. It
was not difficult to fathom that the UP platform, with its emphasis on
nationalization, financial independence, and solidarity with ­anti-imperialist
movements, was bound to raise hackles in Washington.21 Immediately after
Allende won the election, Cuban leader Fidel Castro telephoned Allende to
warn him not to make the same mistake he had made of alienating the
United States too rapidly.22 Allende concurred, having already been
convinced by his advisers that Chile should adopt a policy of
accommodation toward the United States that could help preserve the
objectives of the revolution. UP strategists figured that U.S. policy would be
guided more by a political conviction to protect American hegemony on a
global scale than by the defense of a particular economic interest, such as
the copper companies. Assuming this interpretation was correct, making
concessions on the copper issue would not be worthwhile because the
United States would simply find other issues to complain about, and UP
would have sacrificed one of its major goals for very little gain.23
Another scenario that Allende had to consider was the possibility that the
United States would invade Chile to remove him, just as it had invaded Cuba
in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs to try and topple Castro and had sent troops to the
Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent the reinstatement of the leftist Juan
Bosch. UP analysts dismissed the invasion threat as unlikely. They reasoned
that because Allende had been democratically elected, Washington would
find it difficult to invent a credible pretext to justify military intervention,
especially at a time when the Vietnam War was causing many Americans to
question U.S. military interventions in Third World countries.24 A much
more serious risk was that one of Chile’s neighbors, especially Brazil or
Argentina, which harbored historical grievances against Chile, could be
encouraged by the United States to provoke a violent conflict. On this point,
UP officials had correctly identified one of the thrusts of the Nixon
administration’s policy, which was to fortify the conservative regimes nearby
Chile to contain or roll back the Chilean revolution.25
To cope with these problems, the UP government established a foreign
policy called “ideological pluralism,” which preached ­self-determination and
non-intervention; compliance with international treaties; and peaceful
coexistence with all countries regardless of differing ideologies. This
pragmatic formula allowed Chile to establish diplomatic relations with
communist countries, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union while maintaining
friendly relationships with the United States and its Latin American allies. It
was a difficult balancing act that Allende barely managed to pull off in the
first year of his administration.26 When it came to implementing this policy
toward the United States, the UP government faced the especially difficult
challenge of trying to overcome the biases of the Nixon administration, the
U.S. Congress, and the American mass media.
UP officials had to work especially hard to convince Nixon
administration officials that Chile did not represent a security threat and
that Chile’s revolution would remain democratic and would not be exported.
On 4 November 1970, Allende presented his views to the visiting U.S.
delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer. Allende
stressed that the United States and Chile had longstanding historical ties
that would remain unbroken. Chile was a democracy with a free press and a
standing Congress that stretched back nearly 150 years with little
interruption. Chile was not going to be a socialist, Marxist, or communist
country, but would forge its own path based on popular participation and
Chilean tradition. Allende also emphasized that his government would not
permit foreign bases of any kind to be established on Chilean soil.27 Meyer,
who spent most of his time in Chile talking to the government’s opposition,
reported none of Allende’s views to the 40 Committee, except to express
incredulity that most Chileans believed their country would remain
democratic under his presidency.28 Chilean officials were equally
unimpressed with Meyer, except for his sense of humor. When his
motorcade passed in front of Chilean demonstrators yelling, “Chile, sí,
Yankees no,” he stuck his head out the window and yelled, “Chile sí, Yankees
sí,” then later with a smile muttered, “Yankees perhaps.”29
Meyer’s apparent disinterest in Allende’s views reflected two of the biggest
obstacles to Allende’s foreign policy: the Nixon administration’s sheer
ignorance of the Chilean political system; and the tendency to stereotype
Allende and his supporters. Because of these prejudices, many of which were
inflamed by the U.S. mass media, Chilean officials constantly found
themselves on the defensive when dealing with U.S. officials.30 Shortly after
the Chilean parliament ratified the UP victory, Allende complained to OAS
Secretary General Galo Plaza that despite his efforts to be friendly to the
United States, Ambassador Korry was “driving Chile to the verge of disaster
with his biased and distorted reports.” Although Allende admired Castro,
“Chile was not Cuba,” and “he was not a ­khaki-clad guerrilla coming down
from the mountains with rifle in hand.”31 Most U.S. officials ignored such
nuances. For example, in speaking with the British ambassador to the
United States, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs
Robert Hurwitch described officials in Allende’s government as “an alarming
bunch of thugs.” According to Hurwitch, Meyer’s trip had revealed that
Allende, who was practically a slave to the “­Moscow-oriented” Communist
Party, was determined to establish a Marxist authoritarian state.32 In a later
SRG meeting, Meyer described Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier as “a
bright, able, charming socialist” who is “also a hell of a liar.”33
U.S. assessments of Allende’s personality also undermined trust between
the two nations. Both ambassadors Edward Korry and Nathaniel Davis
depicted Allende in their dispatches as a playboy with an excessive drinking
problem, who lived in luxury and had ­extra-marital affairs.34 A man who
liked “fast women and slow horses” could never be taken seriously.35
Allende, Korry once declared, “plays the tune his visitors wish to hear.”36
Professions of friendship meant little, U.S. intelligence analyst Ray Cline
explained, because Allende possessed a “consistent and strong strain of anti–
Americanism.”37 Nixon and Kissinger frequently compared Allende to
Hitler, and the UP government to the Third Reich.38
Western journalists and newspapers portrayed Allende as a demagogue
who would either seize power himself or was too weak to control the
radicals in his coalition who would eventually seek to replace him. News
stories frequently assumed that because “the Marxist Allende” had won by
only a narrow margin, he would no longer permit free elections.39 Joseph
Kraft, of the Washington Post, warned that Allende was playing a “dangerous
game” in assuming he could absorb the left into the political system.40 The
Economist speculated that Allende could become the “Kerensky” of Chile,
once the “Stalinist” communist party seized power.41 The American
journalist William Buckley, who visited Chile for a few days in early 1971,
compared Allende’s followers to those who blindly supported Hitler and
Stalin. Buckley’s piece on Chile, which ran on the Associated Press wire, so
angered Ambassador Orlando Letelier that he accused Korry, who was
friendly with Buckley, of conspiring to wage “an anti–Chilean campaign.”42
Perhaps the biggest criticism made against Allende, especially in the early
days of his administration, was that the UP government censored the media.
“The freedom of the press issue,” states the Church Report, “was the single
most important theme in the international propaganda campaign against
Allende.”43 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the CIA did not restrict its
efforts to planting anti–Allende stories in the Chilean media. The agency
also served as one of the main sources of disinformation for American and
international reporters.44 These efforts may well have influenced the views of
Nixon and Kissinger, who repeatedly insisted that Allende had gained
complete control over the media and instituted a “fascist state.”45
The charge that UP engaged in censorship was closely connected to the
fear that Allende would never permit another free election. According to the
New York Times magnate C.L. Sulzberger, the UP government began using
“tough intimidation tactics against its opponents” in late September 1970 to
“gain control of Chile’s principal newspaper, television and radio stations”
before the next election. Sulzberger likened this move to the demagogic
methods of Argentine leader Juan Perón, who took over the media to
consolidate his power.46 Much of the censorship controversy concerned the
fate of El Mercurio, one of Chile’s oldest and most prestigious newspapers.
The government’s investigation of El Mercurio for back taxes was seen by
many critics as a ruse for taking the paper away from its owner, Agustín
Edwards, a ­well-known enemy of Allende.47 According to a New York Times
editorial, the ­Inter-American Press Association’s complaint against the UP
government for the use of this tactic suggested that Allende was bent on
“destroying freedom of the press in Chile.” That Allende was allegedly
controlling the media through “economic strangulation” became one of the
major rationales of the Nixon administration for covertly subsidizing the
opposition press.48
Armed with these kinds of reports, various members of the U.S. Congress
invoked standard Cold War tropes and clichés to alert the nation to the
alleged dangers unfolding in the southern hemisphere. No point in “being
nice” to Allende, argued Louis C. Wyman (R–New Hampshire), because “all
Marxist-Leninists everywhere are fanatically committed to the destruction
of the United States by any means possible.”49 Senator Gordon Allott (R–
Colorado) declared that Chile had become a “Communist police state,” so
“the question is how to isolate the disease that has infected that pathetic
nation.”50 John G. Schmitz (R–California) pointed to illegal land seizures and
the formation of people’s courts in Chile as evidence that “there is another
Iron Curtain descending in the Americas.”51
Faced with an onslaught of ­red-baiting, Allende and his foreign policy
team tried to counter these stereotypes and distortions without overreacting.
At nearly every opportunity, Chilean officials denied that the UP
government would permit Soviet bases to be established in Chile.52 The UP
government also took out a ­full-page advertisement in the New York Times,
which included excerpts from an interview with Chilean Foreign Minister
Clodomiro Almeyda about Chile’s relations with the United States. Almeyda
acknowledged that there were “potential areas of conflict” between the two
nations, but he hoped “to be able to approach and solve such problems
without damaging the friendship between these two peoples.” Under the
ideological pluralism guidelines, Almeyda emphasized the distinction
between ­anti-imperialism and anti–Americanism. Attacking the roots of
Chile’s dependency problem, he insisted, did not represent an attack on the
United States or any other country.53
In interviews and press conferences, Allende artfully dodged questions
designed to evoke antipathy toward the United States. “I shall have nothing
derogatory to say about Mr. Nixon,” Allende declared during an interview
with the French philosopher, Régis Debray.54 When speaking to leftist
filmmaker Saul Landau, Allende compared Chile’s expropriation of copper
to former President Kennedy’s attack on the steel trust: “Our struggle isn’t
against the people of the United States; it’s against a sector of the United
States.”55 On the censorship issue, Allende emphatically denied that his
government was harassing the press. In Chile, “there is no sector of political
opinion that is not able to make known its views,” he told the New York
Times.56 Allende also pointed out that when he served as health minister
under the 1938 progressive government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, “We never
beat up either conservative or liberal adversaries. We never jailed students or
journalists. We never used the repressive force of the carabineers [police] to
attack our adversaries.”57 He also informed U.S. Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) President Bradford Mills that under his administration,
“Chile enjoyed full liberties, … there was not a single political prisoner, nor
any interference with a press” that was even more hostile than the U.S.
media.58
The Chilean embassy in Washington kept close track of press coverage of
Chile and attempted to contact reporters who made factual errors or
misleading insinuations. In early 1971, Letelier reported to Santiago that
these lobbying efforts had finally begun to pay off, as news coverage of Chile
was becoming more objective and less sensational.59 For example, at a news
seminar Letelier befriended the reporter Jeremiah O’Leary, who had written
several articles in the Washington Star, denigrating Chile as a red menace to
the hemisphere. Letelier encouraged O’Leary, who was about to disembark
on a tour of Latin America, to visit Allende to find out for himself what the
president was really like. After interviewing Allende, O’Leary’s reports
notably softened, as he stopped referring to the Chilean president as
“Communist,” “Marxist,” “Castroist,” and “Maoist.”60 Letelier also wrote a
letter to the editor of the New York Times, explaining that the economic
difficulties experienced by the opposition newspapers were the result of a
drop in advertising revenue not “Government maneuvers.”61
To the degree that these efforts to counter the negative images of Allende’s
government succeeded it was because Chile was not headed down the path
of totalitarianism. Salvador Allende’s niece, Isabel Allende, who worked as a
journalist in Chile during the Allende era, remembers that “there had never
been as much freedom in all aspects of national life as when the government
of the Unidad Popular was in power.”62 Reports from the British embassy in
Santiago indicated that even though the UP did control the television
networks and had bought up several publishing houses, the opposition press
was flourishing as well.63 According to one study, the opposition controlled
about 80 percent of all means of communication during the Allende
presidency.64 Even the U.S. embassy, which had originally predicted the
reduction if not complete elimination of “political pluralism” in Chile’s
media, was eventually forced to offer a more qualified picture.65 In March
1971, Korry reported that “there have been no firing squads, no arbitrary
arrests, no obvious censorship, no barriers to free travel, no ­anti-religious
excesses.”66 The Chilean media, he acknowledged, is “still probably freer and
less inhibited than in most of Latin America.”67

Cracks in the Facade

The “cool but correct” and “ideological pluralism” policies had been
designed to avoid public friction between the UP government and the Nixon
administration. The assertions of friendliness that each side claimed to
profess for the other could only be maintained for so long given the
impending clash over UP’s expropriation plans. U.S.-Chilean relations began
to unravel with several minor disputes that were initially brushed off but
served to harden attitudes that eventually made differences over more
significant issues even harder to resolve.
The first incident resulted from the decision of the Nixon administration
to withdraw from Chile the AFTAC facilities, which included a weather
station on Easter Island. In his contingency paper of August 1970,
Ambassador Korry had predicted that Allende would make a great show of
ordering the removal of AFTAC because the foreign base might serve as a
vehicle for spying on Chile. Korry’s proposal to remove AFTAC was
included in several policy recommendations related to NSSM 97, and on 21
October 1970 Nixon ordered that the ­phase-out begin immediately.68
Three days after Allende’s ratification, Korry told Allende’s emissary,
Senator Hugo Miranda, that the decision to leave Easter Island had been
made “some time ago” under the Frei government for economic reasons.69
The Chilean foreign ministry, not placated by this deception, lodged a
formal protest with the American embassy, complaining that the withdrawal
of AFTAC without advance written notice amounted to a breach of
protocol.70 In Washington, Assistant Secretary Meyer offered a slightly
different excuse to Chilean Ambassador Domingo Santa María: the weather
stations were being pulled for “technical,” not “political” reasons.71 Still
unsatisfied, Allende complained privately to Korry and Meyer during his
inauguration that the termination of the weather station on Easter Island
had offended the Chilean Air Force, would damage the livelihood of locals
on the island who had come to depend economically on the Americans, and
was done in an unfriendly manner. Korry offered the weak excuse that he
had informed the Chileans by telephone instead of writing because of the
urgency of the evacuation.72
Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda finally ended the controversy on 10
November 1970 by assuring Korry that the UP government did not want to
unleash a minor scandal over this issue which might damage the good
relations that existed between the countries.73 Several weeks later, Almeyda
formally announced the end of UP’s investigation into the matter. “The
problem of Easter Island has been solved,” he told the press.74 Still, the
incident lingered in Allende’s mind. When the Chilean newspaper Clarín
reported that Allende considered the AFTAC withdrawal “violent
aggression” because it harmed the nation’s ability to forecast the weather,
Korry wrote him a long letter, repeating his earlier claim that the decision to
remove the stations had been made before his election, and insisting that the
air force had left behind all the equipment needed to make weather
forecasts.75 Allende did not reply, but he did not forget the incident either, as
he brought it up again with Ambassador to the United Nations George H.W.
Bush during his visit to New York in December 1972.76
The second incident to sow distrust between Allende and the Nixon
administration originated with a routine military mission led by U.S.
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in late February 1971 to consult with the Chilean
Navy at the port of Valparaíso. Allende invited Zumwalt to his summer
home, where the president did his best to convince the admiral that he
would never allow Chile to become “Sovietized.” Allende claimed that he
welcomed U.S. technical assistance, and to prove it, asked Zumwalt if the- ­
nuclear-powered USS Enterprise, which was in the vicinity, could make a
courtesy visit to Valparaíso. Zumwalt was inclined to accept the invitation
on the advice of Chilean Admiral Raúl Montero, who argued that it would
enhance the prestige of the Chilean military and help to keep Allende
“boxed in.” Korry initially favored the visit and forwarded the invitation to
Washington.77
By the time Zumwalt returned to Washington, however, Korry had
changed his mind. The ambassador worried that the Enterprise visit would
strengthen Allende’s image, possibly trigger anti–American protests, and
provide the pretext for the Soviets to send one of their vessels to Chile.78
Secretary of State Rogers telephoned Kissinger just before the SRG meeting
on 25 February to inform him that he opposed the visit because the United
States had not sent nuclear aircraft carriers to other Latin American
countries; having one visit Chile would send the message that you “get more
attention if you kick the U.S. in the teeth.”79 In his memoirs, Zumwalt claims
that he had the full backing of the Defense Department, but declassified
notes of the SRG meeting reveal that only Deputy Secretary of Defense
Armistead Selden favored accepting the invitation.80 Zumwalt maintained
that the visit would help the Chilean military to “keep the pressure on
Allende.” Withdrawing the invitation at this point, he warned, would enable
Allende to tell the military: “I took your advice and got slapped in the face.”
Nearly everyone else at the meeting, however, did not want to risk the
possibility that a visit by the Enterprise might help Allende. Clearly
frustrated, Kissinger wanted to know, “What is it we can’t do for Allende?”
He and Zumwalt then tussled over whether “putting the screws on Allende”
would be counterproductive. Kissinger finally agreed to bring the proposal
to Nixon, although he warned the group that the president “is not wild
about the idea.”81
Nixon vetoed the visit but because Allende had already televised the
invitation, the cancelation now required a public explanation.82 The Defense
Department offered the flimsy excuse that the Enterprise’s tight operating
schedule did not permit a stopover in Chile.83 For all of its prejudices against
Allende, not even the U.S. press took this justification seriously. The New
York Times scolded the Nixon administration for its “boorish rebuff to
Chile,” which undercut Nixon’s claim that “we are prepared to have the kind
of relationship with the Chilean Government that it is prepared to have with
us.”84 House Representative Robert Leggett (D–California) blasted the
cancellation as “an act of highest stupidity.” Leggett ridiculed the official
explanation as bogus, noting that just a few days ago the Enterprise was
visiting Brazil, a country ruled by a “vicious military dictatorship which is
becoming world famous for its liberal use of torture.”85
Unprepared for the backlash, the Nixon administration struggled to hide
the real reasons for the Enterprise cancellation. Kissinger angrily hung up on
Benjamin Welles of the Washington Post who called seeking clarification
about which branch of the administration had nixed the visit.86 In his
testimony before Congress, Korry repeatedly evaded questions about the
affair. According to the ambassador, the Enterprise incident would have
barely been noticed in Chile had it not been for all the attention given to it
by the U.S. press.87 In the Washington Post, former U.S. Ambassador to Chile
Ralph Dungan charged the Nixon administration with “ideological bias,
ineptness, lack of coordination, political naiveté, and worse.”88
The negative media coverage given to the cancelation certainly made it
impossible for Chilean officials to ignore. Washington Post reporter Jeremy
O’Leary, for example, told Ambassador Letelier that according to his sources
the visit had been canceled for political, not operational reasons.89 But
independently of the U.S. news media, Chilean officials continued to have
their suspicions about the cancelation.90 When presenting President Nixon
with his diplomatic credentials, Letelier briefly mentioned that Allende was
deeply disappointed that the Enterprise was not coming. Nixon just changed
the subject.91 Many Chileans interpreted the cancellation of the visit as an
insult to Allende, a U.S. intelligence report noted, a sign of Chilean
“oversensitivity” which “appears to have become almost obsessive.”92
As with the AFTAC withdrawal, Chilean officials did not want to make a
big deal out of the canceled Enterprise visit, but they found it difficult to
contain their resentment. According to Time magazine, Allende viewed the
decision to cancel the visit as a “slight” against his administration, and he
pleaded for the United States to refrain from setting up “roadblocks” in front
of the Chilean revolution.93 When the ­right-wing magazine Qué Pasa alleged
that Allende had complained to the Chilean military about the canceled
Enterprise visit, UP officials immediately called the U.S. embassy to deny the
story and promised to refute it publicly.94 Foreign Minister Almeyda also
assured Secretary of State Rogers that the UP government’s “calm reaction”
to the cancelation of the Enterprise visit demonstrated that Chile would not
inflame anti–American sentiments “or do or say things that would lead to a
deterioration in relations.”95 To cast aside all further doubt, Allende finally
told Life magazine that he did not consider the cancellation a “snub.”96
A third incident that helped erode U.S.-Chilean relations concerned
Felipe Herrera’s bid to become ­Secretary General of the United Nations.
Herrera was a Chilean economist who gained a prominent international
reputation while serving as the first president of the ­Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB). Ambassador Letelier first floated the idea of
Herrera’s candidacy to Assistant Secretary Meyer in late September 1971.
Meyer feigned neutrality, but the State Department immediately devised a
plan to thwart his candidacy.97 Aside from what NSC staffers perceived to be
Herrera’s managerial incompetence, the Nixon administration opposed
Herrera mainly because he was a Chilean whose election would heighten the
international respectability of the Allende government.98 In early October,
Bush alerted the State Department that momentum was starting to build in
Latin America around Herrera’s candidacy, so the United States needed to
act quickly to oppose him.99 Rogers directed Bush to contact representatives
from Argentina, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica first so that Herrera would get
the word on the grapevine before Bush personally confronted him.100
Meanwhile, the State Department asked its ambassadors throughout Latin
America to convey “in deep confidence” to their respective foreign ministers
U.S. opposition to Herrera and to solicit other candidates who might usurp
him.101
When Bush finally informed Herrera on 6 November that the United
States could not support his candidacy, Herrera blamed the lack of
endorsement on the Nixon administration’s opposition to Chile’s
expropriation policies. Bush admitted that the damage to U.S. investments in
Chile had had an “adverse” effect on U.S. public opinion, which the U.S.
government as a democracy could not ignore. The American people were
not anti–Chilean, he insisted, but were the Chilean people now anti–
American? Herrera replied that Chileans held Americans in “high regard,”
but he lamented the U.S. government’s tendency to “characterize everything
Chile was doing as unfriendly, and anti–American, because of the
understandable discontent of the copper companies, their stockholders, and
taxpayers who faced [the] possibility of having to make up the losses.” Bush
tried to shift ground, implying that anti–American statements by Chileans at
the UN demonstrated that issues which divided the countries transcended
the copper expropriation cases. When Herrera insisted that Chileans would
still view U.S. opposition to his candidacy as a “political sanction against a
country which believed it was only exercising its rights,” Bush responded, in
essence, that this was a Chilean interpretation and not his problem.102
Despite this clear rebuke from the United States, the Allende
administration did not give up on Herrera’s candidacy. Almeyda and Letelier
told Ambassador Nathaniel Davis on 16 November that they found it
“strange” and “abnormal” that the United States would inform Latin
American members of the UN Security Council of its opposition to Herrera
before speaking to Chilean officials.103 A few days later, at a special meeting
of the Latin American group in New York, Herrera blasted the United States
for discriminating against him.104 In an interview on Chilean national
television, Herrera attributed U.S. opposition to his candidacy to
“deteriorating” relations between the countries.105 The Chilean representative
to the UN, Humberto Díaz Casanueva, also publicly chastised the U.S.
government for its “‘preemptive veto’ of Herrera’s candidacy and Bush’s
undiplomatic behavior.” On 19 November, Bush met briefly with Díaz
Casanueva to explain that he had been forced into reacting because of press
rumors; in any case, differences between the two countries over copper
mines had no bearing on the matter. Bush had to leave the meeting early, but
Chilean officials made it clear to Bush’s Latin American adviser who
remained, that the “general public in Chile and elsewhere were not gullible,”
and would interpret the U.S. veto of Herrera’s candidacy “as retaliation pure
and simple.”106
Undeterred by Chilean protests, the State Department continued to
maneuver behind the scenes to block Herrera’s candidacy. As Kissinger was
pointing out to Letelier that other Latin American countries, not just the
United States, opposed Herrera, Rogers was instructing the UN mission to
“head off ” any attempt to include Herrera in the ­Five-Power deliberations
and to enjoin Britain in the effort to exclude him.107 Chile meanwhile added
to the pool of candidates, Gabriel Valdés, to increase the odds that a Chilean
might be elected.108 After a long series of negotiations, the council chose
Kurt Waldheim. The Soviet representative, who had been partial to Herrera,
later claimed that one of the Chilean candidates would have been elected if
not for the opposition of the United States.109
The fourth incident to mar U.S.-Chilean relations originated with
President Nixon’s decision to send a diplomatic mission to Latin America. In
a long rambling conversation with White House Counselor Robert Finch on
30 September 1971, Nixon declared that “it was too goddam dangerous” to
go to Latin America himself, so he was sending Finch as his emissary. It
would be like his 1958 trip, the president joked, “except without the rocks.”
After running through a list of potential countries to visit (excluding Chile),
Nixon advised Finch not to shy away from meeting with the dictators
because “they’re the only friends we’ve got.”110 In early December after the
mission returned, White House Communications Director Herbert Klein,
who had accompanied Finch, told reporters that after conversing with the
leaders of six Latin American countries, he and Finch had gotten the feeling
that the Allende government “won’t last long.”111
When the Klein statement reached Santiago, Foreign Minister Almeyda
immediately telephoned the U.S. embassy to complain that “episodes of this
kind every week or two” were highly damaging to U.S.-Chilean relations.112
Ambassador Davis met with Almeyda the next day to explain that the Klein
statement did not represent official U.S. policy. Almeyda emphasized that
Allende was extremely upset by the statement as he did not want problems
with the United States.113 The damage was done, however, as the U.S.
embassy reported that UP was now linking the Klein statement to an
“orchestrated campaign against Chile carried out by ‘international reaction
and its agents.’”114 In Washington, Kissinger assured Ambassador Letelier
that Klein’s statement was unfortunate but did not represent the
administration’s policy. Letelier remained skeptical. The timing of Klein’s
comments had raised suspicions about U.S. intentions, he told Kissinger, and
even though he did not want to believe it, the facts suggested that the Nixon
administration had adopted an aggressive policy toward Chile.115 Worried
that the façade of the “cool but correct” policy was beginning to crumble,
Ambassador Davis met with Allende on 11 December to try and smooth
UP’s ruffled feathers. Davis claimed that Klein had been misquoted, and in
any case, the State Department had issued “clarifications,” which should put
the matter to rest. Davis left the meeting believing he had mollified Allende,
but the president clearly did not forget the statement, as he frequently
referred to it in speeches and correspondence with U.S. officials when he
wanted to make the point that there seemed to be an international campaign
being waged against him.116
Exporting Revolution
Throughout all these incidents, both Chile and the United States managed
to observe the proprieties of normal diplomatic relations. But as the UP
began to implement the rest of its foreign policy agenda, and as the Nixon
administration schemed to isolate Chile, it became increasingly difficult for
either country to maintain the pretense of friendliness toward the other.
Chile’s involvement with Cuba was especially irksome to the Nixon
administration, as was Chile’s attempt to transform the OAS into an
organization capable of challenging U.S. hegemony.
Nixon claimed in his memoirs that the prophecy of an Italian
businessman, that Chile would become a bleeding “red sandwich” after
Allende’s election, came true as “Cuban intelligence agents began operating
from a base in Chile, exporting revolution to Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay.”117 Nixon and Kissinger had received several intelligence reports in
the first month of Allende’s presidency suggesting that Chile was going to
become the training center for Latin American revolutionaries. According to
one source, Allende had informed the Bolivian revolutionaries of the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army) that they
could expect from the UP government secret financial support and refuge.118
Finch’s report to Nixon advocated improving the quality of U.S. intelligence
and security liaison activities in Latin America to meet the anticipated move
by the “Marxist Government of Chile … to support subversion abroad.”119
Other independent sources seemed to confirm that Chile under Allende
was rapidly becoming a haven for Latin American revolutionaries. Time
magazine reported in January 1971 that “terrorists, revolutionaries and
other troublemakers on the lam have gravitated to Socialist President
Salvador Allende’s capital from Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay.”120 In August
1971, ­ex-president Eduardo Frei alerted the U.S. embassy to the increasing
number of Cuban, Czech, and leftist exiles working with Chilean
intelligence organizations.121 Brazilian President Emílio Garrastazu Médici
told U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally in June 1972 that Chile was
supporting subversives from Bolivia.122 The ­right-wing press also inflamed
perceptions of Chile’s role as an exporter of revolution. One report alleged:
“Students organized by Communist parties and Castro sympathizers in
seven Latin American countries are now streaming into Santiago and
Valparaíso.”123
Allende denied it all. In his victory speech, he had pledged to respect the
principles of non-intervention and ­self-determination, but “this does not
mean that we will be silent about our support for those people who struggle
for their economic independence.”124 Consequently, the UP government was
not shy about expressing its solidarity with Third World revolutionary
movements. “What we are doing is authentically Chilean,” Allende told his
enthused campaign workers, but it will also “have repercussions throughout
Latin America. Chile will be shaken like a football kicked by Pelé [the
Brazilian soccer star].”125
Exactly where “solidarity” ended and “intervention” began, however,
remained murky. Allende and his supporters repeatedly tried to assure
everyone that the Chilean revolution was a homegrown affair. Immediately
after Allende’s electoral victory, Chilean foreign minister Armando Uribe
promised U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, Joseph J. Jova that the Chilean
Communist Party “would lean over backwards to give an Allende
Government a bourgeois cast,” which included keeping down “any initiatives
towards subversion abroad.”126 Our goal is to export copper, not revolution,
PR Senator Hugo Miranda explained to Ambassador Korry.127 In his
interview with Washington Star reporter Jeremiah O’Leary in 1971, Allende
asserted that UP was not trying to export its revolution. The government
had even restricted the stay of Tupamaros refugees because they lacked
passports or visas. “We have no problems with the United States,” Allende
insisted. “The North Americans see communists under every rock. Some
Marxist countries see gringos under every rock.”128 Allende openly lectured
his own party that the Chilean revolution could not be exported elsewhere
because the popular forces in each country had to find their own way based
on their own country’s reality.129 In August 1971 Allende visited various
neighboring Latin American countries to assure their leaders that Chile did
not represent a security threat.130 That effort paid off. Even though Chile was
harboring a small number of “­would-be revolutionaries” from other
countries, one U.S. intelligence report noted, “Allende’s good neighbor
policy has not suffered serious damage.”131
On balance, it appears that Allende was being somewhat deceptive about
his government’s relationship with revolutionaries in other countries.
Allende’s ideological and personal ties to Cuba have been described
extensively by the historian Tanya Harmer. Allende’s daughter, Beatriz, was a
leader in the Chilean branch of the Bolivian ELN and married to a Cuban
intelligence officer. The president himself had a Cuban mistress and was
known to host the Tupamaros at his weekend retreat. When the Tupamaros
kidnapped the British Ambassador to Uruguay in mid–1971, Allende played
a key role in securing his release.132 Allende’s bodyguard, known as the
Grupos de Amigos Personales (GAP, Group of Personal Friends) was staffed
initially with MIR extremists with close ties to Cuban intelligence. It appears
that Allende tended to look the other way when extremists in his coalition
decided to assist revolutionary exiles.133
Yet as suggestive as these facts may appear, they do not add up to a master
conspiracy to foment revolution in the hemisphere. Chile presented “not a
threat,” one prominent Chilean economic historian pleaded, “but a hope;
not a model to be imitated, but an experience to be reflected upon.”134 Nixon
and Kissinger nonetheless seized on sections of intelligence reports that
presented ­worst-case scenarios because an inflated threat helped justify the
covert action program in Chile.135 Eduardo Frei was not an especially
reliable source given the many fanciful predictions he made during the
election campaign.136 Nor could Latin American dictators be expected to
provide reliable estimates of threats emanating outside their borders.
Eventually, U.S. officials were forced to realize that their initial predictions
about Allende exporting revolution had been inaccurate. The U.S. embassy,
for example, could find “no real evidence of an established link” between
MIR and the Tupamaros.137 In December 1970, Crimmins sent Kissinger a
report that “there are no clear signs” that Allende’s “government is engaged
in subversive activities in other countries.”138 The CIA agreed although it
noted that safe havens in embassies, access to arms, and medical care, “have
improved prospects for subversive activity in nearby countries.”139 Chile
certainly did attract a wide variety of leftists during UP’s reign, but it is
unclear how many of them were using Chile as a staging ground for
revolutionary activities as the CIA implied.140 After the 1973 coup, some
10,000 to 13,000 foreigners sought refuge in foreign embassies. Many of
these individuals were simply unofficial refugees who originally came to
Chile to escape political persecution from repressive regimes in their home
countries.141 As one diplomat commented, “Of course they’re probably
gabbing day and night about what they’d do if they ever get back home.
Political refugees everywhere spend their waking hours plotting in their
beer, but it rarely comes to much.”142 Kissinger finally admitted to Nixon in
January 1971 that Allende was unlikely to facilitate insurgency in
neighboring countries.143
Whatever assistance revolutionary exiles did receive from Chile during
the Allende years pales in comparison to the amount of equipment and
training that the United States provided to repressive regimes in Latin
America.144 The hypocrisy of U.S. government officials fretting over the
revolutionary potential of exiles residing in Chile not long after the Kennedy
administration had sent 1,400 Cuban exiles to depose the Castro regime in
the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion would have been hard for UP officials to miss.
It was precisely how the United States preached ­non-intervention to other
Latin American countries while not observing the principle itself that so
rankled Chilean leftists about the U.S. dominance of the OAS. Not
surprisingly, the UP platform had denounced the OAS as a “tool of North
American imperialism,” and during his campaign, Allende indicated that he
would abandon it. Just before his inauguration, however, Allende told the
OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza that he planned to work constructively
from within the organization to try and transform it.145
Meanwhile, the Nixon administration debated how to best influence the
OAS to isolate Chile, especially after the UP government established
diplomatic relations with Cuba. On 19 November 1970, the SRG assigned
the Ad Interagency Hoc Working Group the task of coming up with a
“factual rationale” that could be used to discourage OAS members from
following Chile’s lead in recognizing Cuba, and which could serve as a
platform for condemning Chile in the OAS.146 When the report came back,
Kissinger was disappointed to learn that trying to exclude Chile from the
OAS or impose sanctions were not viable options. The SRG concluded that
the best approach “was to concentrate on building a case against Chile on
the basis of Chilean policies and tactics.” Any disruptions that Chile might
attempt in the OAS “should be dealt with on a ­case-by-case basis, with US
reaction increasing in proportion to Chilean actions.”147
Nixon was undoubtedly disappointed to learn from Kissinger that there is
“no prospect for any serious action against Chile by the OAS.”148 In his 1971
annual review of foreign policy, Nixon spoke glowingly of “our commitment
to equal partnership” in the OAS, despite Chile’s lamentable decision to
establish ties with Cuba. Still, Nixon insisted that “we will not be the ones to
upset traditional relations.” In a sentence that became the signal formula for
the “cool but correct” policy, Nixon declared that “we are prepared to have
the kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared to
have with us.”149 One could read almost anything into this vacuous
statement, but it allowed Allende to reciprocate with the ideological
pluralism formula by asserting that the UP government wanted “amicable
relations with the most powerful country in the hemisphere, providing we
are allowed the freedom to express differences, to dissent and to negotiate
from different points of view.”150
Allende wanted to appear friendly to the United States, but he took issue
with Nixon’s equation of U.S. interests with those of the other OAS
members.151 This criticism, which Chilean officials repeated frequently in
speeches and international forums, justified structural changes to the OAS
that would correct the power imbalance. In January 1972 Chilean
Ambassador to the OAS Luis Herrera ridiculed the concept of “juridical
equality” and described the relationship between Latin America and the
United States as one of “serfdom.”152 Herrera castigated the special OAS
security committee established in 1962 to monitor communist subversion as
a manifestation of U.S. imperialism and called for its termination.153 In his
April 1973 speech to the OAS, Foreign Minister Almeyda claimed that the
organization had reached a “profound crisis.” Measures proposed by
Almeyda included normalization of relations with Cuba, ­re-examination of- ­
inter–American defense treaties, and a more even balance of power within
international lending organizations such as the ­Inter-American
Development Bank.154
Some have asserted that UP’s rhetorical flourishes against the United
States yielded few concrete results and merely served to alienate the
conservative members of the OAS.155 But UP’s criticisms of North American
hegemony undoubtedly resonated with many Latin Americans, given the
many times that the U.S. government had manipulated or used the OAS to
achieve its own agenda. As even the NSC admitted to itself, Washington had
frequently used the OAS as a “political ­fig-leaf ” to support U.S.
interventions in countries such as the Dominican Republic.156 Of course,
Chile could not hope to convince anticommunist dictatorships, such as
Brazil’s, to endorse its proposals to restructure the OAS. But Chile could
articulate widespread felt grievances that some countries would be reluctant
to publicize lest they risk losing the economic and military aid that they so
heavily depended upon. In this respect, Chile was much freer to challenge
the United States within the OAS because there was little that Washington
could do to punish Chile that it was not already doing.157 Chile’s criticisms of
the OAS also put U.S. officials on the defensive, to the point where they
made claims of innocence that appeared ludicrous. For example, not long
after the ITT revelations, Secretary Meyer denied before the OAS that the
United States had in any way interfered in the 1970 Chilean presidential
election.158
The honeymoon period after Allende’s election did not last long. Despite
professions of friendship and a desire by the United States and Chile to
appear ­non-confrontational, subtle indications of the battles to come
appeared rapidly in the first year of Allende’s presidency. Taken in isolation,
most of these incidents did not amount to much. The closing of the weather
station on Easter Island, the cancelation of the Enterprise visit, and the
efforts to thwart UP’s attempt to get a Chilean elected UN ­Secretary General
were minor scrapes that could have been glossed over had there not been
more fundamental issues that divided the two nations. Even the clashes
between the United States and Chile over Cuba and the OAS were not so
serious as to cause either country to abandon diplomatic efforts designed to
foster friendly relations.159 What finally brought the two nations to blows, as
the next chapter will show, was UP’s decision to carry out its program of
nationalization, which ultimately led to the expropriation of major U.S.
investments in Chile.

1. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 140.

2. Embtel 3585, 9 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 197–99; Hildyard letter to Wiggin, 9
September 1970, FCO 7/1516, TNA. Kissinger later falsely claimed that “we were open to
accommodation should Allende, against all expectations, be prepared for one.” Kissinger, White House
Years, 683.
3. Korry tel to DoS, 10–11 August 1970, “Chile in the Archives of the USA (1970),” Estudios Públicos
72 (Spring 1998), 7.
4. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 141.
5. Korry backchannel message to Kissinger, 1 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 325.
6. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 5 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 331.
7. SRG meeting minutes, 17 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 395.
8. SRG meeting minutes, 14 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 363, 366–67.
9. SRG meeting minutes, 14 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 364–365, 368.
 10. Kissinger memo to Nixon, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 399
11. Kissinger memo to Laird, 21 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 403–404. A recommendation
to remove AFTAC facilities on Easter Island, Punta Arenas, and Quintero was also made in DoS,
“Action in Support of U.S. Posture Towards Chile,” 16 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 377.
12. Vaky, “Analytical Summary of an Options Paper,” 28 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 421.
13. Annex to Chapin Options Paper for NSC, 27 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 415.
14. SRG meeting minutes, 29 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 429.
15. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 5 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 444–45. Emphasis added.
16. Walters memo to Kissinger, 3 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 435.
17. Memcon of NSC meeting, 6 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 446–49. Kissinger also
rejected the Tito analogy. See SRG meeting minutes, 17 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 393. On
the outcome of the stockpile suggestion, see chapter 4.
18. NSDM 93, 9 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 451.
19. Option C of “Options Paper for NSC: Chile,” 3 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 163–75.
20. NSDM 93, 9 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21, 452.
21. Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 77–78.
22. CIA information cable, 25 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 490. Zhou Enlai also
encouraged Allende not to rush the revolution. See Summaries of China Talks, Feb. 1972—Oct. 1975:
Latin America, November 1973, ­LOC-HAK-460–­6-7–7, CREST.
23. Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government,” in Sideri, ed. Chile 1970–73, 116–
17.
24. Graham Greene, “Chile: The Dangerous Edge,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1972, 34; Labarca
Goddard, Corvalán, 168.
25. Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government,” in Sideri, ed. Chile 1970–73, 105–
107.
26. “Pluralismo ideológico,” 1971, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE. As Allende’s personal adviser has
emphasized, it was deemed especially important not to antagonize the United States before the
revolution could be consolidated. See Garcés, Allende y la experiencia chilena, 169. On the roots of the
Chilean Socialist Party’s anti–imperialist foreign policy, see Muñoz, “International Policy of the
Socialist Party.”
27. Memcon (Allende, Almeyda, Huidobro, Meyer, Korry, Uribe), 4 November 1970, Memorandos
Políticos MINREL 1961–1990, AMRE.
28. Meyer briefing memo, 13 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 456.
29. Memo, 6 November 1970, Memorandos Políticos MINREL 1961–1990, AMRE.
30. See Pearson, “Coverage of Chile”; and John Pollock, “Reporting on Chile,” Nation, 29 January
1973. Chilean Ambassador Letelier observed that the U.S. officials who sat on the House
Subcommittee on ­Inter-American Affairs had only a “superficial” knowledge of Chile. Letelier, no.
332–108, 7 March 1973, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
31. Memcon (Allende, Galo Plaza), 2 November 1970, POL 15 Chile, 11–10–70, box 2196, RG 59.
32. Millard letter to Wiggin, 18 November 1970, FCO 7/1527, TNA.
33. SRG meeting minutes, 7 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 495. For McNamara’s dislike of
Letelier, see World Bank Group Oral History Program, Robert S. McNamara oral history transcript,
89. For a contrary view of Letelier, see John Hugh Crimmins interview, 33, FAOHC.
34. Embtel 4529, 26 October 1970, POL 6 Chile, box 2193, RG 59; Davis, Last Two Years, 48–50.
Korry has also allegedly asserted that Allende took bribes from ITT, although there is no evidence to
support this accusation. See Trento, Secret History, 390.
35. Samuel F. Hart interview, 72, FAOHC.
36. Embtel 2256, 28 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 317–18.
 37. Cline letter to Lodge, 15 December 1970, CDP.
38. For examples, see SRG meeting minutes, 3 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 366; and memcon
(Nixon, Kissinger), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10, doc 42.
39. “Chile: The Expanding Left,” Time, 19 October 1970. On how this article exaggerated the
communist threat posed by Allende’s election, see José Antonio ­Viera-Gallo, “Allende, Chile y el
Time,” Mensaje, December 1970. On the long history of ­anti-Allende bias in the U.S. mass media prior
to the 1970 presidential election, see Greenfield, “Creating a Climate of Opinion?”
40. Joseph Kraft, “The Allende Game,” WP, 10 December 1970.
41. “Down the Kerensky Road,” Economist, 26 December 1971. Even the British embassy could see
through this exaggeration. See Hildyard letter to Wiggin, 4 January 1971, FCO 7/1903, TNA.
42. William Buckley, “Toward a Dark Age in Chile?” Minneapolis Tribune, 4 February 1971, enclosed
with ­Menanteau-Horta letter to Chilean Foreign Ministry, 7 February 1971, Verbales, Embajada de
Chile en EEUU, AMRE. For a heated discussion between Letelier and Korry over Buckley, see embtel
876, 17 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 277–78. For a quantitative assessment of U.S. press
reporting on Allende and the extraordinary attention given to Chile versus other Latin American
nations, see ­Hurtado-Torres, “U.S. Press and Chile,” 51–53.
43. Church Report, 29.
44. Carl Bernstein, “CIA and the Media,” Rolling Stone, 20 October 1977; Intelligence Activities, 171–
72. On the agency’s use of the media to disparage Allende, see John Jacobs, “Halperin Alleges 4
Instances of CIA Exploiting the Media,” WP, 5 January 1978; and Montealegre Iturra, Carne de
estatua, ch. 4. For an example of how the U.S. Information Agency depicted censorship under
Allende, see report ­R-3–71, 29 March 1971, Research Reports, Miscellaneous 1961–1983, box 3, RG
306.
45. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 245–6 (Nixon, Kissinger), 6 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 301;
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 381; Frost and Zelnick, Frost/Nixon, 278–79.
46. C.L. Sulzberger, “Ugly Clouds in the South,” NYT, 25 September 1970.
47. See Rep. John G. Schmitz (­R-California) comments in CR, 17 February 1971, 117: 2935–6.
48. Editorial, “Threat to Chile’s Freedom,” NYT, 29 May 1971. See also chapter 7, where the CIA’s
role in supporting the opposition media is discussed more fully.
49. CR, 8 November 1970, 116: 38006.
50. CR, 27 January 1971, 117: 783. Ambassador Letelier dismissed these comments as coming from
an unimportant member of Congress who said little that was newsworthy. Letelier no. 1453–990, 17
December 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
51. CR, 4 March 1971, 117: 5160.
52. For examples, see memcon (Jarpa, Kissinger, Hewitt, Nachmanoff), 7 December 1970, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 506; notes of a meeting in Valparaiso, 19 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 569–
77; and C.L. Sulzberger, “Allende, in Interview, Bars Any Base Imperiling U.S.,” NYT, 28 March 1971.
53. “Chile’s Foreign Policy,” NYT, 25 January 1971.
54. Debray, Chilean Revolution, 126.
55. NACLA, New Chile, 18.
56. Juan de Onís, “Allende Sharply Denies Charges Chile’s Press Is Being Harassed,” NYT, 31 January
1971.
57. Joseph Novitski, “Allende Sees Chile Finding Her Own Way to Socialism,” NYT, 4 October 1970.
58. Embtel 2819, 27 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 628.
59. Letelier no. 290–20, 1 March 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; no. 447–36, 9
April 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU.
60. Letelier no. 1029–80, 24 August 1971, and Letelier no. 650–54, 8 June 1971, both in Oficios,
Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. In retrospect, these assessments appear to have been overly
optimistic. For O’Leary’s recollection of Allende as a “­country-club Marxist,” see Jeremiah O’Leary,
“Belated Requiem for Allende,” Washington Times, 28 September 1990. On O’Leary’s questionable
relationship with the CIA, see Bernstein, “CIA and the Media.” After interviewing Allende, Joseph
Kraft depicted the Chilean president as paranoid. See “Letter from Santiago,” New Yorker, 30 January
1971. Even if some of the mainstream American press moderated its views of Allende, it reverted to its
earlier stereotypes of the UP government after the September 1973 coup. See Vergara, “El reportaje a
Chile,” 41–44.
61. Orlando Letelier letter to the editor, “No Sanctions against Chilean Press,” NYT, 15 June 1971.
62. Allende, Conversations with Isabel Allende, 59. For one British observer’s claim that Chile under
Allende was not headed toward a communist dictatorship, see Angell, “Chile: From Christian
Democracy to Marxism?” 117.
63. Hildyard letter to Wiggin, 4 January 1971, FCO 7/1903, TNA; Hildyard letter to Hunter, 25
March 1971, FCO 7/1903, TNA; Hurwitch letter to ­Douglas-Home, 22 April 1971, FCO 7/1903, TNA.
During Allende’s government Santiago opposition newspapers had nearly twice the circulation as ­pro-
government newspapers. Athey, “Government and Opposition in Chile,” 553–54.
64. Knudson, Chilean Press during the Allende Years, 7. For the observations of several North
Americans observers who found the Chilean press to be relatively uncensored during the Allende
presidency, see Thomas G. Sanders, “Allende’s First Months,” American Universities Field Staff Reports,
28:2 (April 1971), 8; Gordon Young, “Chile: Republic on a Shoestring,” National Geographic, October
1973, 477; Morris, We Must Make Haste, 143–44. See also Knudson, “Allende to Pinochet,” 46–47; and
Dooner, Periodismo y política.
65. ­A-376, 1 November 1970, TEL Chile, 1/1/70, box 1579, RG 59.
66. Embtel 43, 5 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 240.
67. Embtel 1344, 10 March 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. Ambassador Davis remembered Chile as a
“open society” before the coup, especially in comparison to the Eastern bloc nations where he had
served. See Nathaniel Davis CNN interview, 21 February 1999, NSA. Whatever censorship did exist
under Allende, paled in comparison to the curtailment of free speech that followed under Pinochet.
See Knudson, “Chilean Press since Allende”; Fagen, “Media in Allende’s Chile,” 69; and Human Rights
Watch, Limits of Tolerance.
68. Korry, “Contingency Paper,” August 1970, “Chile in the Archives of the USA (1970),” Estudios
Públicos 72 (Spring 1998), 18; Meyer memo to Kissinger, 18 August 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 79–
80.
69. Embtel 4583, 27 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 412.
70. Telex 272, 30 October 1970, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
71. Santa María telex 848, 31 October 1970, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. For Henry
Kissinger’s evasive answers to questions from the Washington Post about the AFTAC withdrawal, see
telcon (Kissinger, Berger), 3 November 1970, Kissinger Telcons, NPMP.
72. Memcon (Allende, Almeyda, Huidobro, Meyer, Korry, Uribe), 4 November 1970, Memorandos
Políticos MINREL 1961–1990, AMRE. For the negative reaction of the Chilean Armed Forces to the
AFTAC phase out, see embtel 4735, 6 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 190. On the facilities
and the views of the Easter Island residents, see Juan de Onís, “U.S. Spurs Closing of 3 Posts in Chile,”
NYT, 3 November 1970; and Joseph Novitski, “Closing of U.S. Base Stirs Easter Island,” NYT, 9
November 1970.
73. Memcon (Almeyda, Korry), 10 November 1970, Memorandos Políticos, AMRE.
74. Joseph Novitski, “Chile Ends Study of a U.S. Pullout,” NYT, 30 November 1970.
75. Embtels 1694 and 1679, 29 March 1971, POL Chile—U.S., 1/1/71, box 2201, RG 59.
76. Bush tel 5269 to secstate, 5 December 1972, POL 7 Chile, 11–15–72, box 2193, RG 59.
77. Zumwalt, On Watch, 325–27; memcon (Kissinger, Zumwalt), 24 February 1971, Kissinger
Telcons, NPMP.
78. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 24 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 579–81. Korry waffled
again when he later told the U.S. Congress that canceling the Enterprise visit “may have been a
mistake.” Korry testimony, 1 July 1971, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 5.
Korry’s ­flip-flop on the Enterprise visit contributed to Kissinger and Laird’s perception that the
“nutty” ambassador had become unreliable. See telcon (Kissinger, Laird), 11 March 1971, Kissinger
Telcons, NPMP.
79. Telcon (Kissinger, Rogers), 25 February 1971, Kissinger Telcons, NPMP. Kissinger corrected
Rogers by noting that the United States had sent a carrier to Rio.
80. Zumwalt, On Watch, 326. Zumwalt appears to have overestimated his colleagues’ profession of
support. Admiral Moore, for example, informed Kissinger’s aide that although he favored the
Enterprise visit, he “would not fall on my sword if it did not come to pass.” Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
161.
81. SRG meeting minutes, 25 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 584–86. Nixon had complained
to Kissinger earlier in the month that he was afraid that Allende would use the visit for the “worst
damn propaganda purposes.” Conversation no. 460–027 (Nixon, Kissinger), 6 February 1971, Nixon
Tapes.
82. On Allende’s televised announcement of the invitation and the image problem that the
cancelation raised, see Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 24 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 579
n. 1.
83. “Carrier’s Visit to Chile Is Off,” WP, 28 February 1971.
84. Editorial, “Boorish Rebuff to Chile,” NYT, 2 March 1971.
85. CR, 4 March 1971, 117: 5156–57.
86. Telcon (Kissinger, Welles), 18 March 1971, Kissinger Telcons, NPMP.
87. Korry testimony, 1 July 1971, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 25–28.
88. Ralph Dungan, “Foray by the Enterprise into Diplomatic Affairs: Carrier’s Visit to Chile
Cancelled,” WP, 27 March 1971.
89. Letelier telex 159, 10 March 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
90. Juan de Onís, “U.S. Cancellation of Visit by Enterprise Stirs Chile,” NYT, 7 March 1973.
91. Letelier telex 145, 2 March 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
92. Joint intelligence memo, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 289.
93. “Mandate for Allende,” Time, 19 April 1971.
94. Embtel 2462, 10 May 1971, POL 15–1 Chile, 1/1/71, box 2197, RG 59.
95. Memcon (Rogers, Meyer, Almeyda), 16 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 307–308.
96. Peter Young, “Allende,” Life, 16 July 1971. Nonetheless, Allende’s letter to President Nixon
concerning copper negotiations presented the canceled Enterprise visit and the Easter Island incident
as slights against his administration. See Allende letter to Nixon, 20 August 1971, Selser, Salvador
Allende y Estados Unidos, 157.
97. DoS telegram 173993 to UN Mission, 22 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 399–400.
98. Wright and Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 2 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 404–405.
Korry also opposed Herrera but warned against making U.S. opposition public. See embtel 5077, 3
October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 696–67.
99. Bush tel 3132 to DoS, 5 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 400–401.
100. Bush tel 3999 to DoS, 3 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 405–406; Rogers tel 20225 to
Bush, 5 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 407–408.
101. DoS tel 198753, 20 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 402–403.
102. Bush tel 4079 to DoS, 6 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 410–11.
103. Embtel 5708, 16 November 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF,
RG 84.
104. Circ. no. 208, 18 November 1971, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE.
105. Embtel 5737, 18 November 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF,
RG 84.
106. Bush tel 4349 to DoS, 19 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 413 n. 2, 415.
107. Letelier telex 789, 7 December 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; Rogers tel
226040 to UN Mission, 16 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 434.
108. Valdés, Sueños y memorias, 222–23.
109. Bush tel 5191 to DoS, 22 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 5: 445.
110. Memcon (Nixon, Mitchell, Finch) 30 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 50.
111. Tad Szulc, “2 Nixon Aides See Allende in Peril,” NYT, 1 December 1971.
112. Embtel 5910, 1 December 1971, POL Chile—U.S., 6/1/71, box 2200, RG 59. For the official
Chilean protest, see Minrelaciones telex 346 to Embachile, n.d., Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU,
AMRE; and “Chile Protests Klein Statement,” NYT, 2 December 1971.
113. Memcon (Davis, Almeyda), 2 December 1971, Memorandos Políticos, Memorandos Políticos
MINREL 1961–1990, AMRE; embtel 5950, 3 December 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—
Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
114. Embtel 5960, 3 December 1971, box 3, CAF, RG 84.
115. The conversation between Kissinger and Letelier took place at the home of journalist Joseph
Alsop. Kissinger denied it, but Letelier’s account of the meeting in his original report to Santiago
proves that the meeting did in fact take place. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chile Cites ’71 Kissinger
Assurances,” WP, 3 February 1975; Letelier telex 789, 7 December 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en
EEUU, AMRE. The meeting is also described in Dinges and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row,
50.
116. Embtel 6056, 11 December 1971, POL Chile—U.S., 6/1/71, box 2200, RG 59. For examples, see
Allende’s speech at Castro’s farewell on 4 December 1971 in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 141;
Allende speech to CUT, 8 December 1971, Punto Final, 4 January 1972; and Allende’s meeting with
Bush in New York in 1972, described in DoS to Irwin, todep 3/219389, 4 December 1972, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 834. The Chilean foreign ministry also complained to the U.S. embassy that Chile’s
attempt to build a positive relationship with the United States had not been reciprocated. MRE telex ­-
N-391, 14 October 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. Ironically, it was not long before
the Soviets silently concurred with Klein’s statement. See chapter 5.
117. Nixon, RN, 490.
118. CIA intelligence information cable, 30 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 159–61;
Kissinger memo to Nixon, 3 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 450; Kissinger memo to Nixon,
25 November 1970, NSC ­H-Files, Policy Papers, ­NSDM-93 [2 of 2], box ­H-220, NSC Institutional
Files, NPMP.
119. Finch memo to Nixon, 2 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 52.
120. “In with the Outs,” Time, 25 January 1971.
121. Embtel 3840, 19 August 1972, POL 2 Chile, 3–18–70, box 2193, RG 59.
122. Haig memo to Nixon, 23 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 55.
123. Paul Bethel, “Remember those Defenders of Chile’s Allende?” Human Events, 6 March 1971.
124. Allende victory speech, 5 September 1970, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 49.
125. Norman Gall, “The Chileans Have Elected a Revolution,” NYT, 1 November 1970.
126. Memcon (Uribe, Jova), 14 September 1970, POL 15 Chile, 1–14–70, box 2196, RG 59.
127. Embtel 4538, 27 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 414.
128. The interview, which appeared in the Washington Star on 20 May 1971, was reproduced in
deptel 88567, 20 May 1971, POL 15–1 Chile, 1/1/71, box 2197, RG 59.
 129. “Allende en el Congreso del Partido Socialista,” 28 January 1971 in Allende, Salvador Allende:
Su pensamiento político, 71–72. In bringing up this point, Allende was reacting to C.L. Sulzberger’s
insinuation that the Chilean model of revolution might be exported to Italy, thus threatening NATO.
On 21 February 1971, Allende emphasized that even though he did not advocate exporting Chile’s
revolution, he hoped that popular front movements in Europe would be inspired by UP’s electoral
victory. See C.L. Sulzberger, “Spaghetti with Chile Sauce,” NYT, 13 January 1971; and joint intelligence
memo, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 296.
130. The visits to Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Argentina are discussed in Harmer, Allende’s Chile.
131. SNIE 94–72, 29 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 606.
132. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 97.
133. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 37, 52, 185; Kissinger memo to Nixon, 2 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–
1973, 21: 551; CIA Weekly Summary, Special Report, “The Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary
Left under Allende,” 26 February 1971, ­CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030008–1, CREST.
134. Véliz, “Chilean Experiment,” 453.
135. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 93.
136. As the U.S. embassy noted, the former president had a “certain gift for dark drama.” Embtel
1244, March 1972, POL 2 Chile, 3–18–70, box 2193, RG 59.
137. Embtel 2238, 15 June 1970, CDP.
138. Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 4 December 1970, CDP.
139. CIA memo, “Chilean Facilitation of Subversive Activities in Latin America,” 18 December 1970,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 224. The State Department’s Intelligence Research Bureau criticized this
report for failing to distinguish aid given by the Allende government from aid given by “unauthorized
extremists groups.” Summ memo to Cline, 14 January 1971, CDP.
140. The Chilean military clearly viewed these foreigners as an internal threat, as revealed in its July
1973 memorandum which called for the removal of 15,000 “foreign extremists.” CIA intelligence
report, 9 July 1973, CDP.
141. According to the military junta, the foreigners allegedly included 4,000 Bolivians, 2,300
Argentines, 1,200 Brazilians, 1,200 Uruguayans, and 700 Peruvians. Robert D. Ohman, “Foreign
‘Extremists’ Face Chile Trials,” WP, 18 September 1973. This estimate appears to have been taken from
the number of foreigners who entered the country legally. See Secretaría General de Gobierno, Libro
blanco, 69; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos, 125; and Huneeus, Pinochet Regime, 63 n. 38.
On the refugee status of these foreigners, see the written statement of Adam and Pat ­Garrett-Schesch,
28 September 1973, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Refugee and Humanitarian
Problems in Chile, pt. 1, 22.
142. David F. Belnap, “Chile Is Haven for Leftists,” WP, 8 October 1972. On how Chile under Allende
did help foster a transnational network of Latin American leftists committed to armed struggle, see
Marchesi, Latin America’s Radical Left, 135.
143. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 25 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 3.
144. See Huggins, Political Policing.
145. Memcon (Allende, Galo Plaza), 2 November 1970, POL 15 Chile, 11–10–70, box 2196, RG 59.
For Allende’s explanation of why he decided to keep Chile in the OAS, see Debray, Chilean Revolution,
123–25.
146. SRG meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 470.
147. SRG meeting minutes, 7 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 493.
148. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 25 November 1970, NSC ­H-Files, Policy Papers, ­NSDM-93 [2 of 2],
box ­H-220, NSC Institutional Files, NPMP.
149. Nixon, “Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” 25 February 1971,
PPP.
 150. Allende speech in Punta Arenas, 27 February 1971, in Allende, Chile’s Road to Socialism, 108.
151. Kissinger conveyed Allende’s complaint to Nixon in Kissinger memo to Nixon, 29 March 1971,
FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 598.
152. Terri Shaw, “Chilean Takes Helm at OAS, Blasts U.S.,” WP, 4 January 1972.
153. Deptel 53460, 23 March 1973, 1973STATE 053460, CFPF, RG 59.
154. Almeyda speech to OAS, April 1973, Vera Castillo, La política exterior chilena, 457–60.
155. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 213; Boye, “Chile y el interamericanismo,” 84–85.
156. Study prepared in response to NSSM 15, 5 July 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 4. Allende’s
foreign policy also had considerable domestic support within Chile. See Zylberberg and
Monterichard, “An Abortive Attempt,” 193.
157. Several studies have suggested that the OAS was at its nadir in the 1970s owing to growing
dissatisfaction among Latin American countries over U.S. domination. See Child, Unequal Alliance;
Meek, “U.S. Influence in the Organization of American States”; Penny Lernoux, “OAS: Death by
Malign Neglect,” Nation, 28 May 1973; and ­Connell-Smith, United States and Latin America. On the
legacy of UP’s foreign policy, see Magasich, “La política internacional chilena.” See also Almeyda’s
assessment that at least UP did not become isolated from the rest of Latin America. Almeyda
interview in Varas and González, Chile entre el sí y el no, 55.
158. Meyer statement to OAS, 15 April 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84. Connally once recommended to
Nixon abandoning the OAS so that the United States would be free to selectively “put the screws” on
Latin American countries such as Chile that carried out expropriations. Nixon liked the idea, but the
proposal was never pursued. See conversation no. 262–005 (Nixon, Connally), 19 July 1971, Nixon
Tapes.
159. As late as 1973, both countries were still open, at least in principle, to discussing changes in the
OAS. See embtel 1604, 12 April 1973, 1973SANTIA01604, CFPF, RG 59; deptel 91946, 14 May 1973,
1973STATE091946, CFPF, RG 59; and embtel 3031, 10 July 1973, 1973SANTIA03031, CFPF, RG 59.
 4
Nationalization
As part of its 1970 campaign platform, Unidad Popular promised to
divide the Chilean economy into three areas: the social sector, the private
sector, and the mixed sector. The primary goal was to nationalize the ­large-
scale businesses while permitting most of the small private firms to continue
operating normally. Unlike Cuba, which had expropriated all private
enterprises after its 1959 revolution, nationalization in Chile began
gradually and legally, starting with monopolies, which according to the UP
platform made up just 150 out of the more than 30,000 firms operating in
Chile. The industries targeted for complete takeover by the state included
the copper, nitrate, iron, and coal mines; banks and insurance companies;
and transportation and communication industries that comprised the bulk
of Chile’s infrastructure. The nationalization plank was an ambitious and
unprecedented venture that in many ways stood at the heart of UP’s
program to transform Chile into a socialist nation.1
Allende began the nationalization program by expropriating the large
monopolies, which were mostly ­foreign-owned and therefore easy targets
given the rising tide of nationalism sweeping Latin America in the 1970s.
According to dependency theory, which was highly influential in that era,
Latin America’s underdevelopment could be traced in part to the
exploitation of its natural resources by foreign powers, initially Spain and
Portugal during the colonial period, then by Great Britain and the United
States after Independence. Nationalization of foreign companies was one of
the ways that nations like Chile could recover their natural wealth and
become less dependent on hegemonic powers like the United States.2
When Allende assumed the presidency, U.S. private assets in Chile stood
at more than $1 billion. The U.S. government’s historical commitment to the
free enterprise system, and the fact that nearly a third of these investments
were covered by U.S. government guarantees, inevitably drew the Nixon
administration into conflict with the UP government, especially when
private companies disputed the terms of expropriation.3 This chapter
discusses the two largest expropriation cases, one involving the copper
industry and the other concerning the International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation. These two businesses accounted for a significant
share of U.S. private investment in Chile, and the failure of the Allende
government to provide them with adequate compensation strongly
accelerated the deterioration in U.S.-Chilean relations. The nationalization
issue ultimately became intertwined with how much foreign aid the United
States was willing to provide Chile, a topic discussed more fully in Chapter
5.

Copper: “Be a Patriot, Stick a Yankee”

Shortly after Allende’s inauguration, a sign outside the Chilean National
Library invited patrons to “Be a Patriot, Stick a Yankee.” For a few cents,
Chileans could pitch darts at an image of Uncle Sam running away with- ­
money-laden suitcases tagged “Chilean copper.”4 Chile’s largest export by far
and a major source of foreign exchange was copper, an industry that was
dominated almost entirely by foreigners. Just two privately owned U.S.
mining companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, owned close to 90 percent of
Chile’s copper production until Frei’s “Chileanization” program began to
challenge their monopoly in the late 1960s. Under the Copper Agreement
(Convenio) reached in 1967, Anaconda retained full ownership of its
existing properties in exchange for investing $109 million in increasing
production by constructing a new mine that would be ­one-quarter owned
by the Chilean state. Kennecott chose to sell 51 percent of its existing
properties to the Chilean state to form a jointly owned new company (El
Teniente) that would receive an infusion of $230 million. In return for
agreeing to raise copper production levels from several hundred million to
more than a billion pounds, both companies received guaranteed tax
reductions for 20 years. Most of the deal was financed by loans from the U.S.
Export-Import Bank, and the copper companies insured their investments
through a program sponsored by AID that was eventually absorbed by
OPIC.5
The Chileanization program was the outcome of a compromise between
the Frei government and the copper companies in an arrangement brokered
by the U.S. embassy. By avoiding ­full-scale expropriation, Chileanization
had the advantage of not alienating Washington. Consequently, Chile
became one of the largest recipients of U.S. economic aid under the Alliance
for Progress.6 In accommodating Anaconda and Kennecott, the Convenio
also kept copper production flowing by avoiding an awkward transition at a
time of soaring copper prices. Finally, the agreement provided Chileans with
an opportunity to master the necessary technical expertise to operate the
mines, which they would need in the future if the mine were ever to be fully
expropriated.
Unfortunately for the Christian Democrats, Frei’s program proved an easy
target for Chilean nationalists, who charged that the government had agreed
to an inflated price for Kennecott’s share of the mines by allowing the
company to use the “replacement value” rather than the book value in
assessing its worth. Even worse, the tax reduction provisions for both
companies led to spectacular windfall profits that many Chileans deeply
resented.7 One critic disparaged the government’s arrangements with the
copper companies as “masterworks of subterfuge.”8 In early 1969, U.S.
intelligence regarded the nationalization of Chile’s copper holdings as
“inevitable.”9 Public opinion polls taken during the 1970 presidential
campaign indicated an overwhelming majority of Chileans supported the
nationalization of copper.10 Copper was an issue that cut across all party
lines in Chile. “Even if Allende were to drop dead today,” Korry informed
the State Department in 1971, “the nationalization of copper would proceed
inexorably because the PDC is firmly for it.”11
As discussed in Chapter 1, the threat of UP’s expropriation program
counted as one of the primary reasons that the Nixon administration sought
to block Allende from office. But U.S. officials expended so much energy on
Tracks I and II that they failed to devise a contingency plan for how to cope
with the nationalization plans of Allende once he assumed the presidency.
“Chilean expropriatory acts and our response,” the Ad Hoc Interagency
Working Group on Chile advised Kissinger on 19 December 1970, “will be
the single greatest determinant of the course of U.S.-Chilean relations.”12 The
expropriation of U.S. private businesses in Chile meant not only the
potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars under the U.S. government
investment guarantee program, but Allende’s method of expropriation could
also set a dangerous precedent. As one State Department official explained,
“action against one of the companies causing a payment under the A.I.D.
guarantee agreement would have a very serious adverse effect on the
President’s whole program for investment guarantees and promotion of
private American investment abroad.”13
And yet, as determined as Nixon was to protect U.S. private investments
in the Third World, his obsession with stopping Allende from assuming the
presidency outweighed his concern for individual corporations such as
Anaconda and Kennecott. In October 1970, when the 40 Committee was
considering ways to create enough economic turmoil to “nudge the military
into a ­take-over,” someone speculated that tipping the U.S. hand could create
so much hostility that Allende might retaliate by carrying out ­full-scale
expropriations in the future. Kissinger explained bluntly that Nixon had
given strict instructions that if there was a “choice of risking expropriation
or Allende accession, he would risk the dangers of expropriation.”14 In fact,
some of the suggested strategies for undermining Allende were potentially
damaging to the interests of U.S. companies. For example, the proposal that
Nixon seized on at the NSC meeting on 6 November 1970 of unloading the
U.S. copper stockpile in order to drive down the world price of copper and
deprive the UP government of external revenue would also have damaged
the profits of copper companies worldwide. Kissinger pointed this out to
Nixon in an early 1971 memo which argued that unloading the U.S.
stockpile was unfeasible. Such a move would require the approval of the U.S.
Congress, and because the American share of the annual world production
of copper was only 3 percent, selling off the U.S. stockpile would not have a- ­
long-term impact on market prices.15
The Nixon administration reacted slowly to Allende’s plan to nationalize
the copper industry in part because U.S. officials were unsure whether it
would succeed. On the one hand, the Chilean copper industry had become
so dependent on U.S. technical expertise and spare parts that once these
were cut off, Chile would face enormous bureaucratic obstacles running the
industry on its own. For Chile “to shake its uncomfortable Yankee friend
from its back,” Che Guevara had noted while traveling through Chile’s rich
mining areas in early 1952, would be a “herculean” task “given the quantity
of dollars the United States has invested here and the ease with which it
flexes its economic muscle whenever its interests seem threatened.”16
On the other hand, Chile might eventually make the transition and
expand its foreign markets. A U.S. boycott would be ineffective because
Europe would not cooperate given that it received 50 percent of its copper
from Chile.17 Allende also astutely adopted a gradual legal approach, which
seemed to indicate that there might be room for negotiation. He assured
Chilean business leaders at the beginning of his presidency that 98 percent
of them would not be adversely affected by UP’s nationalization program.18
The government was not singling out American corporations, Allende
explained to Korry and Meyer, and UP would proceed legally on a case-by-
case basis, much the way that the U.S. government enforced its own antitrust
legislation.19 In announcing his plan on 21 December 1970 to nationalize the
copper industry, Allende emphasized that expropriation did not constitute
an “attack on the North American people, nor on the North American
government.”20 When reporters solicited Allende’s views on foreign
investment, he replied, “We do not have anything against the people of the
United States, but we do have a good deal against the United States
capitalists that have deformed our economy.”21 Allende’s reasonableness, the
U.S. embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission Harry Shlaudeman commented,
helped create the appearance of a “revolution without undue fuss.”22
Ambassador Letelier, “a reasonable, mature democrat,” in Korry’s
assessment, insisted that UP would negotiate “fairly” with the copper
companies in the interim while the Chilean Congress deliberated the
proposed nationalization legislation.23 Allende was following a “moderate”
approach to nationalization, the New York Times reported at the end of 1970,
as evidenced by the president’s rejection of his radical flank’s demands to
implement “sweeping” changes to the Constitution.24
On 25 January 1971, Chile’s national copper company, Corporación del
Cobre (CODELCO, Copper Corporation of Chile), took out a ­full-page
advertisement in the New York Times to explain to an American audience
why there was near unanimity in Chile about the urgency of nationalizing
the nation’s most precious resource. The foreign copper companies,
CODELCO argued, had “a truly colonial hold” on Chile, as pricing decisions
about Chile’s copper were made in New York, not Santiago. The copper firms
had a strong incentive to sell copper cheap to their own processing
companies, whereas Chile’s interests lay in higher copper prices and gaining
control over industrial processing within the country. U.S. companies had
taken $10.8 billion out of Chile over the past 69 years, CODELCO alleged,
greater than the Gross National Product of Chile over its entire history.25
Allende originally proposed calculating compensation for the copper
companies as a function of the original cost of the investment minus
depreciation, “excess profits,” and “mine depletion,” all payable over 30 years
at 3 percent interest.26 Anticipating the worst, Anaconda executives pressed
Nixon to make a “tough public statement” about the “plunder” of U.S.
private interests in Chile.27 One Anaconda lawyer allegedly griped, “We used
to be the fuckor, now we’re the fuckee!”28 The administration sympathized
with Anaconda’s plight, but U.S. officials chose not to react rashly.29 Instead,
the State Department decided to “apply quiet pressure along economic lines”
by “encouraging other countries not to invest in Chile.”30 Korry warned
Chilean officials that the Nixon administration was concerned that UP’s
expropriation plans, which appeared to violate international law, could
create problems with the U.S. Congress because of the investment guarantee
contracts.31 Indeed, the alarming prospect of Chile’s nationalization program
draining OPIC’s reserves had already come to the attention of U.S. Senator
Jacob K. Javits (R–New York), who worried that the Chilean nationalization
threat could kill the OPIC program just as it was getting off the ground.32
Chilean officials acknowledged these warnings politely but continued to
plow ahead with the plans to nationalize the copper industry.33 Allende told
a meeting of copper miners in early 1971 that he wanted to avoid reprisals
that could hurt Chile’s access to U.S. credit, but he would not “pay the price
of national dignity.”34 It was a theme that he would return to both on an
individual and national level when faced with pressures to back down.
Allende also continued to hold out the promise of compensation as a way to
maintain positive relations with the Nixon administration. We will “recover
our basic resources from the hands of foreign capital,” he told a rally of
40,000, “but that does not mean taking what is not ours, or not paying
indemnification.”35 Ambassador Letelier explained to Korry that Allende
was seeking a copper bill that would represent a compromise between the
initial position of the UP and the traditional U.S. insistence on “effective,
adequate, and prompt” compensation. Allende would have “total control of
the eventual negotiations” and “could choose from zero to 100 on each of
the many variables involved”; no matter what, UP would honor all of Chile’s
outstanding debts including the one to the ­Export-Import Bank.36 Letelier
also assured Kissinger that copper compensation would be paid in
convertible currency.37
Faced with Allende’s irresolute determination to nationalize the copper
industry, the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile agreed with
Korry’s recommendation in early 1971 to avoid a confrontation with Chile
over copper (now was “not the time to wave the big stick”), but instead to
serve as an informal broker for the negotiations between UP and the copper
companies.38 This option meant keeping Korry on as ambassador for several
more months even though Nixon and Kissinger were anxious to move him
out of Chile.39 The issue of whether the Nixon administration should get
involved in the copper dispute was hotly debated at the SRG meeting on 17
February 1971. Kissinger opposed having Korry participate in the copper
negotiations because the U.S. government could get drawn in as an
adversary of UP, thereby affording Allende an excuse for “castrating” his
parliamentary opposition. Korry certainly had a proven knack for grasping
the technical details of the copper negotiations, but his inflated ego and
pedantic style posed risks that Kissinger was reluctant to take.40 Other
officials at the SRG meeting, however, pointed out that the U.S. government
would inevitably be drawn into the negotiations because of the OPIC
guarantees. The compromise was to have the State Department provide
Korry with strict guidelines so that the United States did not become a party
to the negotiations.41 Consequently, the State Department instructed Korry
to determine whether there was any possibility of a “reasonable” negotiated
settlement. If so, then the ambassador was to encourage Allende to use the
flexibility built into Chile’s constitutional amendment to promote a
satisfactory agreement. Korry was free to indicate provisions of Chilean law
that did not meet international standards, but, as Kissinger emphasized in
initialing his approval to these instructions, he was to start at the ministerial
level and not approach Allende directly or to indicate to the Chileans that
the U.S. government was willing to become directly involved in the
negotiations.42
Korry began his mission by focusing on UP’s plan to nationalize
Bethlehem Steel, a U.S. corporation whose investments in Chile were
insured by OPIC. The U.S. embassy hoped to use Bethlehem as a kind of test
case to learn what might or might not work in negotiating the much larger
copper expropriations.43 Korry managed to bring the two sides together by
persuading Bethlehem not to resort immediately to OPIC, and by helping
“to convert ­contentiously-worded ultimata” from the Chilean government
into contracts.44 Afterward, OPIC President Bradford Mills praised the
ambassador for playing a “skillful and effective ­behind-the-scenes role in
these negotiations,” which “contributed substantially to the attainment of
[the] agreement.”45
Next Korry attempted to assist negotiations over the new Cerro mine,
Andina, which he described to Washington as “an important building block
in the construction of a solid structure, the apex of which is formed by
Kennecott, Anaconda and ITT.”46 Korry remained optimistic after Allende
told him that he “had laid the facts on the line with the Chilean public, that
if they did not produce they would pay the price.” Chile would sell the
United States as much copper as it wanted; his government “did not wish to
be punitive” or “provoke problems with any US company.”47 A few weeks
later, however, Allende began to waver, as he told Korry that “he had been
having a little trouble ‘in his own chicken coop’ but it was ’99 percent
settled.’”48 By June, Korry had lost patience and confronted Allende directly.
The president insisted that the proposed Cerro legislation was inconsistent
with the copper law before Congress, so if he signed it now, he would be
criticized by the opposition. The plan was to wait for Congress to pass the
copper amendment, then sign the Cerro agreement with slightly amended
terms. Korry did not believe this explanation but said nothing while
privately concluding that the real forces holding back the deal was not
Allende’s opposition on the right but the left, i.e., MIR, the Socialists, and
MAPU. Korry then scolded Allende for misleading him and warned that
“such delays opened the path to all sorts of byways.”49
The stalled negotiations over Cerro marked a turning point in U.S.-
Chilean relations, as it became clear that Allende was going to take a
hardline on copper. He told OPIC President Mills that “he intended to fulfill
his revolution under Chilean law and his interpretation of justice (social as
well as legal), and that the US would simply have to come to terms with
these Chilean realities.”50 On 11 July, Allende informed the Chilean
Congress: “We will pay if it is just, and we will not pay what is not just,”
citing Soviet and French reports showing that Anaconda had exploited the
mines for ­high-grade ore, leaving behind slag and obsolete equipment.51
When the Chilean Congress approved the copper amendment five days later
(16 July), it retained the controversial provision that would permit Allende
to deduct “excess profits” that the copper companies had earned since 1955
from the book value of the companies as determined by the Contraloría
General (Controller General). Companies could go before a Special Copper
Tribunal to appeal the Controller General’s assessment of value, but not
Allende’s “excess profits” determination.52
In reaction to the new Chilean copper amendment, Kennecott
immediately requested that the State Department “officially intervene” to
ensure that the company receive “just compensation.”53 Anaconda officials
also contacted the department to demand that it do more to obtain just
compensation, such as offering the Allende government more international
credit so that it could afford to pay off its claims. Because Korry might
become a “lame duck,” they recommended sending a special ­high-level
envoy to speed up the negotiations.54 U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally
agreed with the idea to send an emissary who would take a hard line. He
reminded Nixon that the United States was almost entirely dependent on
foreign sources for certain strategic raw materials, such as chromium,
platinum, tin, nickel, manganese, bauxite, and zinc. The stakes were high:
“the United States cannot permit ­high-handed, disguised, confiscatory
procedures by Chile to become a blueprint for action by others.”55 Sounding
a lot like Nixon, Connally told Business Week that it was high time to get
tough with expropriation cases in Latin America because “we don’t have any
friends there anyway.”56
When the compensation issue came before the SRG in August 1971, the
Treasury Department argued for threatening to cut off all aid to Chile as an
impetus to settle the copper cases. The State Department, by contrast,
worried that cutting aid would be premature because it could trigger a
confrontation even before the Allende government had made its final
determination on compensation. One important question was whether it
was worth trying to influence the Contraloría General, the Chilean body
responsible for determining the book value of the companies. If, on the one
hand, that body was really under the control of UP, then U.S. officials could
attempt to persuade the Allende government to direct the Contraloría to
support any agreement that might be negotiated with the companies. If, on
the other hand, the Contraloría was independent, such an approach could
be counterproductive.57
The issue remained unresolved for months, and in the meantime, Korry’s
optimism began to fade. The ambassador considered the copper bill a “farce”
because it eliminated book value, and because three out of the five members
who sat on the “spurious” appeals court were appointed by UP.58 U.S.
intelligence predicted in early August 1971 that “there is virtually no chance
that the government’s compensation offers will come close to satisfying the
companies; each case is likely to be carefully calculated to exact maximum
benefits for Chile.”59 Secretary Rogers thus authorized Korry to present to
the Chilean government an official note of protest concerning certain
provisions of the copper bill. The note complained that book value was not a
fair measure of compensation and that the deductions from book value
(“excess profits”) were “punitive and confiscatory.” The communication also
suggested that Allende could use his discretionary powers to remedy these
deficiencies in the law.60 Allende replied in an open letter to Nixon to
remind him that Chile’s decision to nationalize the copper industry had
been made democratically and that it was up to the comptroller’s office to
determine the appropriate financial compensation.61
On 9 September 1971, the SRG discussed whether economic aid should
be given to Chile as an inducement to settle the copper compensation issue.
U.S. officials were uncertain how to proceed. Providing economic aid
(carrots) might lure Allende into being “reasonable,” but it might also
strengthen his program, which was contrary to the president’s instructions
to “maximize pressures” on the UP government. At Kissinger’s suggestion,
the group decided to obtain Nixon’s approval before lifting credit
restrictions.62 Before Nixon could rule on the matter, Allende announced his
finding on 28 September that Kennecott and Anaconda had earned $744
million in “excess profits,” which technically resulted in the companies
owing the government of Chile rather than the other way around.63 Just
before issuing the “Allende Doctrine,” as his decision became known,
Allende led Korry to believe that “sticks of retaliation” would not have
swayed his calculations.64 Undeterred, Korry met with Allende and Foreign
Minister Almeyda on 30 September to dangle “carrots” of international
assistance for copper expansion. In return, the Chilean government would
pay compensation to the copper companies over 20 years at reasonable rates
of interest.65 Korry’s scheme was predicated on the presumption that there
was sufficient wiggle room in the legislation for Allende to recalculate the
value of the expropriated properties to suit the companies. Allende,
however, insisted that the new law did not give him that kind of latitude. The
two men wrangled back and forth in the masculine discourse of diplomacy,
with Allende wanting to know how much it would cost to settle, “­man-to-
man.” Korry reiterated his scheme, emphasizing it would “doubtless ease
Chile’s credit problems.” Allende said he would consider Korry’s proposal,
but the ambassador interpreted the president’s parting cordiality as
equivalent to saying, “nothing personal, old boy, in this declaration of war.”66
Although Allende promised to inform Korry of his decision by the following
day, Korry did not learn of Allende’s decision to decline the proposal until
his farewell meeting with Allende on 8 October 1971.67
The Allende Doctrine, U.S. intelligence estimated, could cost the U.S.
government as much as $368 million in potential OPIC claims.68 Even more
disturbing, however, was that Allende’s “excess profit” scheme could spread,
thus endangering U.S. private investment throughout the Third World.69
Nixon was furious. Allende “is really screwing us now,” he complained to
Connally and Kissinger on 5 October 1971. “I’m going to kick him.” Giving
Allende “the hook,” he joked with one of his aides, would please the ­right-
wing in the United States.70 In a ­follow-up conversation with Kissinger a
week later, Nixon fumed, “it’s time to kick Chile in the ass” because “they
have confiscated American property and we won’t allow it.” Enlarging upon
his anatomical metaphors, Nixon directed Kissinger to “really blast their
butts” by having Connally prepare a “strong statement knocking their brains
out.”71
Despite Nixon’s hyperbole, Kissinger did not rush to provoke a
confrontation with Allende. When Kissinger met with Almeyda and Letelier
in early October, he complained that Allende could have salvaged relations
between the two nations by using his discretionary power to provide
compensation to the copper companies. Almeyda replied that it would have
been political suicide for Allende to have considered a higher level of
acceptable profits, but he also emphasized that Chile was not looking for an
“apocalyptic” confrontation with the United States.72 One press account of
this meeting alleged that some sort of accommodation had been reached
because Kissinger allegedly said there was little point in a “get tough” policy
with Chile when he was just about to fly to Peking to negotiate with the
Chinese Communists.73 Kissinger later assured Connally that the news
report was “complete nonsense.” What he had actually said, Kissinger
insisted, was that the United States would be “watching” to see that Chile
would provide a “satisfactory” level of compensation.74 Nathaniel Davis, who
had just replaced Ambassador Korry, later portrayed this meeting as
inconsequential: the two sides merely “probed” each other in a “bland”
manner.75
Rogers eventually agreed to carry out Nixon’s wish for a “tough”
statement, but he warned Kissinger that because of their debt the Chileans
“have all the muscle on this one.”76 The ­Inter-Agency Expropriations Group
recommended that the U.S. government condemn Chile’s expropriations,
but stop short of halting economic and military aid. Consequently, Rogers’s
statement added little to what was already publicly known about
Washington’s disapproval of Allende’s nationalization program. The only
important addition was the threat, added to the statement draft by Nixon,
that Chile’s failure to pay compensation could “erode the base of foreign
assistance with possible adverse effect on other developing countries.”77 As
reporter Marilyn Berger of the Washington Post observed, Rogers’ statement
constituted a warning to other Third World countries not to follow the
“Allende route.”78
While most of America’s allies gave at best mixed support to the Nixon
administration’s policy on expropriations, Rogers’ statement alerted the U.S.
Congress to the dangers unfolding in Chile.79 Representative Mario Biaggi
(D–New York), for example, called for swift retaliation against Chile for
nationalizing the copper industry.80 Some U.S. legislators, such as Senator
Harry F. Byrd (I–Virginia), worried that the domino effect could bankrupt
OPIC, as other countries sought to emulate the Allende Doctrine.81
Fortunately for Allende, the Chilean embassy had cultivated a few contacts
in the U.S. Congress, who helped prevent an overreaction. Senator Javits
predicted that the Allende government would eventually come around
because of its need for foreign aid, and he reminded his colleagues that “we
probably could not have carried on World War II without Chilean copper.”82
Senator Edward Kennedy (D–Massachusetts) assured Letelier that he
understood why Latin American countries had to nationalize their basic
resources. Nixon’s “brusque and frigid” response to Allende’s election,
Kennedy told the New York Council on Foreign Relations, means that “we
can never know whether a more sensitive policy toward Chile might have
helped avoid the expropriation decision.”83
 Nixon may have wanted to “kick” Allende, but Rogers’s statement on
expropriation ended up rallying Chileans behind the copper amendment.
Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, Chile’s prestigious Catholic primate, as well
as most members of Allende’s opposition, defended the government’s
expropriation decision.84 When Kennecott officials tried to present a letter
demanding “prompt, adequate and effective compensation,” Allende gave a
“masterful presentation” about why the copper judgment was fair, returned
their letter, and dismissed them.85 UP officials also tried to explain Chile’s
copper expropriation using historical analogies that Americans could
understand. “When Lincoln freed the slaves in the United States,” Allende’s
chief legal adviser explained to a press conference, “there was no
compensation paid to the planters.”86 On NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Allende
detailed the constitutional process that had been followed in deciding to
expropriate the copper industry. Then he drove the point home with a
rhetorical question: “Would the average American tolerate foreigners
owning the oil in Texas? I think not.”87
The standoff between Chile and the United States over copper
temporarily eased at the end of 1971, as each side came to realize that an
overly rigid posture was not in its interest. U.S. intelligence concluded that
any harsh reaction by the United States over the copper issue would simply
enable Allende to present himself as a “national martyr.”88 Reprisals against
Chile at this stage could easily boomerang: “By posing as a Chilean David
manfully facing an avaricious Yankee Goliath,” the CIA ventured, “Allende
effectively could equate his own interests with that of the nation as a whole.”
Even worse, an attack on Chile would likely rally the rest of Latin America to
its side, thus further isolating the United States within the OAS.89 The only
positive sign was that Allende appeared to be taking personal control of the
copper negotiations without guidance from UP, which at least opened up the
possibility that a settlement could be achieved since Allende would not have
to cater to the left side of his coalition.90 Moreover, there were some
indications, Ambassador Davis noted, that Allende was having “a few
second thoughts” about his doctrine.91
As the Nixon administration deliberated its next move, the Chilean
government struggled to control the damage that the copper amendment
had done to Chile’s relations with the United States. In early November
1971, Letelier observed that the Nixon administration was under pressure by
conservatives for being too soft on countries that nationalized their
industries without providing adequate and prompt compensation. “If we
don’t formulate a new policy,” the ambassador warned his colleagues, “we
run the risk of losing control of events which will then control us.”92 Foreign
Minister Almeyda assured Ambassador Davis that the Chilean government
fully understood the scale of U.S. objections to the copper amendment.
Allende had been deliberately vague during his “Meet the Press” interview
because he did not wish to cause a “downward spiral” in relations between
the two countries when there was still room to follow a “more constructive
course.”93
By 1972, there were still two avenues available that might have led to a
resolution of the copper dispute between Chile and the United States. One
was that the copper companies still had the opportunity to appeal their case
before the Special Copper Tribunal. The other was to take the dispute to a
third party using the 1914 arbitration treaty between the United States and
Chile. Allende had first raised the idea of using an international court in
October 1971, when he proposed it to Korry as one way around the excess
profits determination.94 It would be nearly a year before these avenues could
be fully explored, and in the meantime, several events renewed tensions that
disrupted the process.
In early 1972 Nixon made several public statements which implied that
Chile was going to be punished for the way it was handling the copper
expropriations. Countries that expropriated the property of U.S. citizens,
Nixon announced, would cease to receive aid until it appeared that
“reasonable” steps were being taken to provide compensation.95 He was even
more explicit in his 1972 annual report to Congress: Chile’s “application ex
post facto of unprecedented legal rules which effectively nullify
compensation is, in our view, inconsistent with international law.”96 Allende
immediately held a press conference to repudiate “any attitude that would
imply a trampling of our independence.” Chile is a “small dependent”
country, he declared, that “can dictate its own laws with dignity.”97
Allende was in a defensive position because Chile had decided to suspend
payments on the Anaconda and Braden Copper Company (a Kennecott
subsidiary) notes for the 51 percent shares it had purchased in the late
1960s.98 The State Department protested Chile’s failure to honor the debt,
and wondered whether this default signaled that UP was moving away from
a “reasonable settlement.”99 An added pressure was that Kennecott filed suit
against CODELCO in New York, which froze millions of dollars of Chilean
assets in the United States.100 Given that Chile also risked losing loans from
U.S. and European creditors that were needed to serve its foreign debt,
Allende agreed to make the next payment on the $92.7 million it owed to
Braden, minus $8.1 million that had allegedly not been “usefully invested.”
Anaconda, however, could not expect similar treatment until the Special
Copper Tribunal had made its ruling.101
The agreement to pay Braden bought the Allende government some
breathing room, but Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Crimmins kept up
the pressure by warning Letelier that the United States and many of Chile’s
other creditors would in principle not accept repudiation of $8.1 million of
the debt to Braden.102 Sensing the noose tightening, Chilean officials
proposed using the 1914 bilateral treaty to arbitrate the dispute.103 That
treaty established a ­five-member international commission, with each
country getting to select two members, only one of which could be a
national citizen. The fifth member, who would chair the commission, was to
be selected by both countries but could not be of the same nationality as any
of the other members. The commission would investigate for a year, and if
an agreeable settlement could not be reached within six months after that,
the case would be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Hague.104
 There were several positive reasons for considering the use of the 1914
bilateral treaty to arbitrate the copper dispute. Undersecretary of State John
Irwin, who met with Allende during the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meetings in April 1972, reported that
because of Chile’s sinking economy, Allende was inclined to seek a
negotiated settlement of the copper compensation issue.105 Unlike the 1929
arbitration treaty, which was also under consideration, any settlement
reached using the 1914 treaty would not require the approval of ­two-thirds
of the U.S. Senate. Yet the 1914 treaty also had many strikes against it. First,
this particular treaty had never been used before so there was no precedent
as to how it might work. Second, Chile could use arbitration procedures to
delay a settlement. Third, by opening the door to considering “all disputes,”
the treaty could raise “potentially embarrassing questions such as the ITT
affair.”106 Fourth, the treaty contained a problematic clause that seemed to
rule out its use in cases that “may affect the independence, honor or vital
interests” of either country or “their respective constitutions.” Given that the
copper legislation had become part of the Chilean Constitution, U.S. officials
feared that Allende’s left opposition would seize on this clause to block any
settlement.107
From the Nixon administration’s perspective, the problem of how to find
the right international mechanism that would settle the copper
compensation issue was intertwined with Chile’s foreign debt relief
agreement, up for renewal at the Paris Club meetings in April 1972. The
Paris Club was composed of 14 creditor nations that negotiated the
repayment schedules of debtor nations. The Ad Hoc Interagency Working
Group on Chile warned the SRG that Paris Club creditors might not support
the United States in its pursuit of a “tough compensation position” on the
Chilean copper cases.108 At the SRG meeting on 11 April 1972, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Development Finance John Hennessy worried
that arbitration might become a “­face-saving device for Allende, which will
permit him to go out and solicit new loans.” While SRG members all agreed
that some sort of statement that established the principle of compensation
was desirable, the State Department maintained that it would be “the worst
of all possible worlds” if Allende managed to obtain an agreement with the
other Paris Club members that did not include the United States. The
compromise was to have the U.S. negotiator in Paris check with Treasury
Secretary Connally before breaking with the rest of the Club.109
As it turned out, the SRG contingency plan was never needed in Paris
because in return for debt rescheduling Chile accepted “the principles of
payment of a just compensation for all the nationalizations in conformity
with Chilean law and international law.” This clause was introduced into the
final agreement at the insistence of the United States.110 Afterward, Almeyda
declared that the Chilean state still had the right to determine the amount of
compensation, but he also allowed that Allende could introduce legislation
that would modify the “excess profits” determination.111 The Paris agreement
was a “major step forward,” Kissinger reported to Nixon, noting that when
the ITT scandal threatened to disrupt the talks, Allende and Almeyda had
assured Ambassador Davis that Chile was treating the copper cases as
distinct from ITT.112
The agreement reached in Paris only delayed payment of the portion of
Chile’s foreign debt to the United States for 14 months (retroactive to
November 1971), instead of the three years that UP officials had sought.
That stipulation meant the Allende government had only until the end of
December 1972 to come up with a new payment agreement.113 The only
other remaining avenue for resolving the copper issue closed in August
when the Special Copper Tribunal ruled that Allende’s “excess profits”
determination was a “political act” that fell outside its judicial purview. The
U.S. embassy objected to the tribunal’s “artificial” distinction between
indemnization (damages) and excess profits but found some solace in the
tribunal’s ruling that the failure to provide compensation to the companies
lay “solely with the President, and not with the Chilean constitution or
Congress.”114
As time was running out, the State Department directed Ambassador
Davis to remind the Allende government of its obligation under the Paris
agreement to provide compensation and to suggest direct negotiations with
the companies. Davis was not to suggest arbitration using the 1914 Treaty
mechanism, however, because of the danger that Chilean officials could use
such proceedings as evidence in Paris that Chile was making a good faith
effort at achieving a settlement.115 When Davis met directly with Allende on
15 September 1972 to deliver this démarche, Allende lamented that the
tribunal had not provided compensation as he had hoped. While not ruling
out direct negotiations with the companies, he said he preferred
government-to-government negotiations, and suggested using an
“international tribunal” as a possible solution.116
As the State Department well understood, the Chilean government was
highly unlikely to agree to negotiate directly with the copper companies, but
U.S. officials hoped to use that refusal as “another negative act for the
record.”117 Negotiating directly with the companies became virtually
impossible once they abandoned all hope of obtaining compensation from
the Chilean courts, and moved to seizing Chilean shipments of copper
headed to various European destinations.118 For example, on 5 October
1972, Kennecott secured a court action in Paris blocking payments to
CODELCO for a shipment of Chilean copper due in Le Havre. This
maneuver was immediately denounced by the Chilean Ambassador to
France and the Chilean representative to UNCTAD. Even the Christian
Democrats, who rarely if ever came to Allende’s defense, castigated
Kennecott’s action as an “open robbery attempt.”119 Chilean copper
representatives overseas also urged the Intergovernmental Council of
Copper Exporting Countries, a body of Third World copper exporting
nations, to band together against such tactics.120
In addition to fueling popular resentment against the copper companies,
Kennecott’s European litigation raised suspicions among Chilean officials
that the Nixon administration may have been involved in instigating it. As
one State Department official explained to Kissinger, even though U.S.
officials denied having any connection to Kennecott’s lawsuit, Allende was
still using it as a “pretext for shifting blame for Chile’s economic problems
and a basis for rallying sympathy and support.”121 Normally Allende showed
great restraint when it came to dealing with his adversaries, but these
attempts to prevent Chile from selling its copper overseas caused his anger
to boil over. “Kennecott for years squeezed Chile like a lemon,” he fumed,
“and then had the audacity to ask for compensation.”122 In December 1972,
the president even went so far as to hint that the European lawsuits were
deliberately timed to coincide with ­antigovernment protests as part of a
master plan to overthrow his government.123
Chile eventually managed to defeat some of Kennecott’s suits, but the
mere threat of legal action was starting to scare copper purchasers into
demanding new contracts that forced CODELCO to assume all the risks.
The delay in obtaining revenue from copper exports caused by lengthy court
proceedings also greatly impeded Chile’s attempt to keep up with payments
on its foreign debts.124 Given this poisonous atmosphere, it is not surprising
that the Chilean foreign ministry responded to the State Department’s 15
September démarche with a note that Ambassador Davis frowned upon for
its “polemical and abusive tone.”125 The note insisted that the compensation
issue was a Chilean internal matter as justified by UN Resolution 1803
(XVII), which asserted the rights of nations to permanent sovereignty over
their national wealth and resources. If the U.S. government was going to
identify so strongly with U.S. private companies, then it had to be held
responsible as well for their aggressive acts.126
Despite its strident tone, the “nota dura” (harsh note), as Almeyda later
referred to the 23 October communique, left open the possibility of holding
bilateral talks with the United States to resolve the expropriation issue.127 A
month later the State Department agreed. Both sides had good reason to
continue negotiating. Almeyda and Letelier assured Davis that Allende was
seriously dedicated to resolving the copper issue while observing that
“Kennecott’s assault was doing Chile great damage.”128 On the U.S. side, the
stakes were much higher than just their particular claim, Meyer explained to
Kennecott officials, as “the possibility of some form of arbitration in this
dispute … could have [a] major impact on Latin America’s traditional
adherence to the Calvo doctrine.”129 The Calvo doctrine, which held that
local law should prevail over international law in expropriation disputes, had
long been a bone of contention between the United States and Latin
America.130 U.S. insistence that Chile’s copper expropriation be accompanied
by “payment of fair compensation in a prompt, adequate, and effective
manner” can be traced to a principle endorsed by the United States at the
founding conference of the OAS in 1948. Many Latin American nations had
objected to this clause based on the Calvo doctrine but few if any of them
had been able to test it. Chile’s handling of its copper expropriation was thus
dangerous from the Nixon administration’s perspective because the Allende
Doctrine threatened to set an example that others might be encouraged to
emulate.131
To jumpstart the copper negotiations, the Chilean embassy in
Washington sought to arrange a meeting between Allende and Nixon during
Allende’s December visit to New York to deliver a speech to the United
Nations.132 Letelier emphasized repeatedly to Davis that Allende’s trip
provided a “historic opportunity” for the two countries to repair relations.
Davis concurred, recalling the “lost opportunity” of Castro’s visit to the
United States in April 1959, when President Eisenhower refused to meet
with the leader of the Cuban revolution.133 U.S. Secretary of State Rogers
scotched the proposed meeting between Allende and Nixon, however,
because he feared that it would elevate Allende’s “prestige at home and
abroad, thereby strengthening his government and weakening his domestic
opposition.” Allende was deeply offended that his offer had been rejected.
President Nixon was receiving enemies of the Western world, he complained
to Peruvian President Juan Velasco Alvarado, yet he refused to meet with a
Latin American chief of state.134
Consequently, bilateral negotiations over copper did not begin until late
December 1972 at the embassy level. The first round achieved little because
the two sides remained far apart. The State Department’s goal was to
“maximize pressure on the Allende government” by demanding full
compensation for all the expropriations.135 Allende, although seeking to
maintain positive relations with the U.S. government, faced considerable
opposition within UP to providing the copper companies any
compensation.136 Given the Nixon administration’s hardline, the Chilean
strategy was to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States, thereby
gaining time for the consolidation of the Chilean revolution.137
As the discussions commenced in late December it became immediately
apparent that the “rock in the road” was the U.S. insistence on linking Chile’s
foreign debt refinancing to the copper compensation issue.138 Chilean
officials had long insisted that those issues be kept separate. Moreover,
Letelier explained that the “excess profits” determination was ­off-limits
because Kennecott’s lawsuit had so incensed the Chilean public that UP had
little room to maneuver.139 “Yankees go home,” read many a poster in
Santiago, but “without paying them.”140 Given the deadlock, the two sides
were inexorably drawn into a discussion of the 1914 treaty as an arbitration
mechanism.141 The willingness to even entertain the use of an international
treaty to settle the copper compensation issue was a major concession for
Allende. As Letelier had explained to Davis, when the idea was first formally
proposed in December 1972, “it had cost dearly to get it through the Chilean
government and UP parties.”142 State Department officials disfavored the
1914 treaty because it was nonbinding, but they also realized that rejecting it
outright would be difficult to justify legally. ­Stiff-arming the Chilean
proposal would also give Allende an opportunity to blame the Nixon
administration for blocking a settlement, so Rogers agreed to pursue the
treaty procedure but with modifications to “make it expeditious and
binding.”143
By the time the bilateral talks resumed on 22 March 1973, the prospect
that the 1914 treaty might yield compensation for the copper companies had
begun to draw attention in the Chilean press, much of it negative.144 The
public controversy surrounding the treaty meant that the longer the copper
negotiations went on, the further out on a limb Allende found himself.
Another factor contributing to Chilean hostility was that the scandal
surrounding ITT’s attempts to prevent Allende from being elected surfaced
just as the bilateral talks were getting underway. When the Chilean
delegation once again proposed the 1914 treaty as a mechanism for
arbitration, U.S. officials replied sardonically that they were not interested in
“cosmetic devices.” Chile’s problem was that it was not willing to face the
“hard question of eventual payment.” Letelier then flipped the issue around
by asking what the U.S. government would do if an international
commission decided in Chile’s favor. What assurances could the United
States give that it would abide by the decision and normalize relations?
Emboldened by the outcome of the March congressional elections as well as
the ITT scandal, the Chilean negotiators stood their ground. The talks thus
ended with no real movement forward, except that both sides maintained a
willingness to try again in the future.145
Many Chilean journalists interpreted the breakdown of the bilateral
negotiations as primarily the fault of the United States. Letelier came away
so discouraged by the outcome of the talks which hit the Chilean
government “like a bombshell” that he considered resigning. The Chilean
delegation felt threatened by the United States, he confided to Ambassador
Davis, and it now believed that Washington had made a “180 degree turn in
policy” from last December.146 The Chilean newspaper Ultima Hora declared
that the Nixon administration was not interested in an arbitration
mechanism that could take more than a year because it wants to “nip in the
bud” the Allende Doctrine before it spreads.147 José Cayuela of Chile Hoy
called the excess profits formula the “cornerstone” of Allende’s program.
Asking now for a new constitutional amendment, he charged, would be a
repudiation of an experiment that has been lauded worldwide.148 Allende,
himself, had become somewhat indignant. In explaining the copper impasse
to an Italian journalist, he asserted that “we have never stooped to the level
of insult and will certainly not do so from now on. But neither can we be
expected to surrender, even in part, our independence and sovereignty.”149
Despite the many roadblocks to a settlement of the copper issue, the
Allende government was not willing to give up.150 Almeyda and Letelier met
with Secretary Rogers and Acting Secretary of State for ­Inter-American
Affairs John Crimmins in early April to discuss the possibility of renewing
the bilateral talks. Because the two Chilean diplomats appeared to be
“somewhat more flexible” than the last Chilean delegation, the State
Department began to explore new approaches to the copper compensation
issue that would not require Chile to amend its constitution.151 On 25 May,
Rogers met briefly with Allende in Argentina, where both were attending
the inauguration of President Héctor Cámpora. Allende defended his
“excess profits” doctrine at length. “The copper companies had garnered
fabulous, almost incredible profits in proportion to their initial investments,”
the president declared, but “had never developed manufacturing or
processing industries in Chile.” When Rogers insisted that corporations had
to be guaranteed that their profits would not be jeopardized by changes in
government, Allende claimed that he was not talking about all profits, but
“excessive ones,” the kind that was causing a “welling up of feeling”
throughout Latin America.152 Although the meeting accomplished nothing
of substance, Allende informed the press afterward that the two now
“understand one another a bit more,” and he promised further
discussions.153
The OAS meetings in Peru in June 1973 afforded just such an
opportunity, as Almeyda led a delegation to meet secretly with Assistant
Secretary Hennessy and Jack Kubisch, who had just replaced Meyer as
Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs. After reviewing the
state of the negotiations, Kubisch formally proposed submitting the copper
dispute to an “impartial third party,” emphasizing the great risk it carried for
the United States because of the ­open-ended nature of the terms at this
stage.154 After U.S. officials clarified questions raised by the Chilean
delegation, Almeyda replied that the U.S. proposal in its present form was
“unviable” because of the jurisdictional issue, which would require Chilean
congressional approval. In short, the U.S. proposal did not represent a step
forward because it simply amounted to an arbitration procedure that
Letelier had already rejected. Almeyda continued to press the 1914 treaty as
a mechanism, but he also promised to bring the U.S. proposal to the
“highest level” in Chile (presumably Allende).155
The last formal set of bilateral talks on the copper issue took place in
mid–August 1973, this time with ­ex-defense minister José Tohá heading up
the Chilean delegation, and Kubisch and Hennessy representing the United
States. Tohá opened the talks by reiterating that the last U.S. proposal could
not be accepted in good faith knowing that it would not lead to an effective
solution. Instead, he suggested modifying the 1914 treaty mechanism by
restricting the scope of the commission’s investigation to determining
whether the Special Copper Tribunal’s refusal to review Allende’s “excess
profits” determination constituted a “denial of justice.” This procedure had
the advantage of potentially opening the door for an executive decision on
compensation without having to obtain approval from the Chilean
Congress, which would be “political suicide.” U.S. officials replied that they
strongly preferred that the Allende government negotiate directly with the
copper companies, but they did not reject the new proposal outright.156
Kubisch praised the Chilean proposal for suggesting a ­third-party
procedure, but he objected to the lack of any guarantee of a “concrete,
definite and final result.” After two days of negotiating the two sides
adjourned only agreeing to meet again soon.157
The 11 September coup abruptly ended all copper negotiations with the
UP government, which raises the question of whether an agreement was
obtainable had Allende survived to the end of his term. Shortly before the
last round of negotiations, Letelier, who had replaced Almeyda as foreign
minister in a cabinet shuffle, tried to convince Ambassador Davis that it was
in Washington’s best interest to settle with Allende because any successor
government “would find its hands tied much tighter by national pride and
the powerful opposition of the left.”158 The closest that the reverse case (i.e.,
that Chile would be better off settling sooner rather than later when the
State Department might not be so flexible) came to being acknowledged was
the Chilean embassy’s observation at the end of August 1973 that the
replacement of Rogers with Kissinger as secretary of state did not bode well
for the UP government given Kissinger’s hardline reputation on the
compensation issue.159
Did the Nixon administration drag out the copper negotiations
anticipating that a military coup was coming, and imagining a better deal
might be obtainable from a dictatorship? The CIA had considered this
possibility and concluded that the Chilean copper expropriation was
irreversible. The Chilean military would try to find “some ­face-saving
device” but it would be a “symbolic settlement, intended to produce a
political reconciliation, because Chile would still lack funds for any
meaningful payment.”160 It also appears that the U.S. embassy took Letelier’s
warning seriously because it contacted prominent Chilean lawyers in July
1973 to see if a legal way could be found for Allende to compensate the
copper companies without having to involve the Chilean Congress. One
possibility was for Allende to agree to the establishment of an arbitration
commission on the grounds that one of the provisions of the 1914 treaty
(Article IV) gave the government the authority to resolve disputes before
submitting them to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
Another idea was to submit the case to the International Court of Justice. If
the judgment went against Chile, Allende might find a way to pay the
copper companies through a formula involving shipping and processing
costs, which fell outside the jurisdiction of Congress. Although Davis still
preferred that Chile negotiate directly with the copper companies, he
acknowledged that there technically might be a way for Allende to
circumvent Congress, even though the “mechanism might tread close to the
margin of legality.”161 Several U.S. embassy analysts also recommended
offering Chile financial aid in exchange for binding arbitration, which would
reduce the appeal of the “foreign devil” argument and strengthen moderates
in UP.162 These considerations demonstrate that the Nixon administration, at
least at the embassy level, was not intentionally delaying a copper agreement
with Allende.
What no one could predict was that Pinochet’s ferocious repression would
cripple the left, thereby paving the way for a lucrative settlement for the
copper companies. In 1974 Pinochet agreed to pay $376 million in
compensation to the three major copper companies, which also received
cash payments under the OPIC agreement. Compared to the settlements
achieved in Peru, the Chilean agreements appeared, in the word of one
analyst, “generous.”163 Given that Pinochet eventually managed to appease
both the copper companies and the U.S. government, why could not Allende
have done the same?164 For one, as a dictator committed to a ­free-market
economy, Pinochet did not have to worry about Congress, the left, or any of
the complications of the Chilean constitution. Allende, by contrast, was a
democratically elected president who was a stickler for proceeding legally in
the implementation of socialism in Chile. Allende had also been elected on a
platform that promised to end the historical exploitation of Chile’s natural
resources by foreign companies.165
While there may well have been some presidential discretion in providing
compensation to the copper companies, it is difficult to imagine that Allende
could have agreed to a settlement like the one Pinochet achieved without
obtaining a great deal in return, such as foreign debt relief and copious
amounts of economic aid. Korry had dangled “carrots” of financial
assistance as an incentive to settle the copper cases amicably. But because
Nixon had ordered the State Department to maximize economic pressures
against the UP government, it seems unlikely that senior administrators
such as Kissinger would have authorized the amount of aid Allende would
need to offset the criticism he would surely draw if he were to retract his
doctrine.166 Korry claims that Allende rejected his aid offer for “ideological
reasons” because if he accepted the deal “there would be no Chilean
revolution.”167
The failure of Nixon to meet with Allende in December 1972 was no
more a lost opportunity than Eisenhower’s rebuff of Castro in 1959. Nixon’s
determination to eradicate Allende and the tone of Allende’s UN speech
suggest that the two were unlikely to have come to terms, just as Eisenhower
and Castro probably could not have achieved a rapprochement given
Castro’s revolutionary fervor and Ike’s attempted use of the CIA to
undermine him.168 Perhaps UP officials were naive to think that they could
negotiate a copper settlement at the same time as they hoped to avoid a
confrontation with the Nixon administration, but their policy of “ideological
pluralism” led them to believe that it was possible because of the distinction
they made between the U.S. government and the private sector. The ITT
scandal eventually disabused them of that notion.

ITT: “Imperialists go home!”

 As discussed in Chapter 2, ITT had secretly approached the Nixon
administration in 1970 with a proposal to block Allende from the
presidency. UP officials remained unaware of this plot until it was uncovered
by newspaper columnist Jack Anderson in March 1972. Up to that point, the
UP government had approached the nationalization of ITT much the way it
did the other large corporations operating in Chile. As the Anderson
documents revealed, ITT did not end its lobbying activities once Allende
won the election. In late October 1970, ITT Vice President William Merriam
wrote Kissinger asking the Nixon administration to halt all loans to the
Allende government if it did not provide “speedy compensation” for the
expropriation of American property. Kissinger politely acknowledged the
request, promising to take ITT’s recommendations into account.169 Just as
ITT was unaware of the extent of Nixon’s attempt to thwart Allende in the
1970 presidential election, so too it remained mostly in the dark about
Nixon’s order (NSDM 93) to undermine Allende’s government after Tracks I
and II had failed. The most that U.S. officials would reveal was that the
administration was applying “quiet pressure along economic lines” and
“encouraging other countries not to invest in Chile.”170
ITT had good reason to be worried about the Allende nationalization
program, as the company had investments in Chile worth $150 million,
which could all be lost if Allende applied his doctrine of “excess profits.”171
The first major meeting between ITT and the UP government took place on
10 March 1971, when company officials met with Allende to discuss the fate
of Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile, or Chiltelco, as ITT’s subsidiary in Chile
was known.172 Allende explained that he did not wish to expropriate the
company at the moment, but he was possibly interested in forming a
partnership. The two sides bantered about the possible financial
arrangements for a while, before the ITT officials mentioned that they badly
needed a rate increase because of an impending cash shortfall. “A telephone
company was like a woman,” one company representative joked, “always
coming back after money.” Sexualized humor was invoked commonly in
government and corporate circles to help broker deals, but it seems to have
failed in this instance. Allende politely laughed, but he also said that this was
not the case in Chile. Possibly the analogy offended Allende’s pride, even if
only subconsciously, by its implication that if there were to be a partnership
ITT would be in the dominant male position over Chiltelco, the subordinate
female, begging for money. In any case, Allende merely promised to appoint
a commission to investigate what would be a “fair price” for Chiltelco.173
Although Korry relayed the substance of this meeting to Washington as a
“very friendly talk,” ITT had misread Allende’s joviality.174 On 26 May 1971,
Allende informed the company that Chile was going to nationalize ITT’s
share of Chiltelco (70 percent) and would pay compensation in an amount
to be determined by a commission headed by the minister of the interior. In
the negotiations that followed the two remained far apart. ITT demanded
$153 million, allegedly “full book value,” whereas the Allende government
said it was only willing to pay $24 million.175 The only real surprise is that
the Allende government offered any compensation at all. ITT had such an
unsavory reputation in Chile for mismanagement, bad labor relations, and
poor service that many Chileans were demanding that the government
confiscate the company. At the same time, ITT had little incentive to
negotiate with the Chilean government because it could always fall back on
its OPIC insurance, which amounted to about $100 million.176 Letelier was
stunned to learn from Korry that because ITT’s holdings were insured by a
U.S. government agency, if the Chilean government did not pay the
company sufficient compensation, the U.S. government as subrogees would
“seek the full amount and perhaps more.”177
In August 1971, UP said it would accept an independent audit of
Chiltelco, but ITT also had to provide access to its OPIC insurance policy
before negotiations could continue. ITT refused and instead pressed
Secretary Rogers to take the “necessary” action to force the Allende
government to provide adequate and fair compensation.178 After Allende
announced the next month that he was going to allow Chiltelco workers to
take over the operation of the company, ITT sought to prod the Nixon
administration into doing everything possible “to see that Allende does not
get through the crucial next six months.”179 ITT President Harold Geneen
met with Nixon administration officials to convey this message, and he later
forwarded an ­18-point action plan to bring down Allende, which included
loan restrictions, CIA assistance for the “squeeze,” and other forms of
economic warfare.180 The administration ignored ITT’s proposal. As Rogers
explained to ITT’s vice president for Latin American operations, the
sanctions that ITT sought could divide the OAS, and the United States did
not control international lending sources such as the IDB.181 Frustrated that
the Nixon administration was not doing enough on its behalf, ITT filed a
$92 million claim with OPIC.182
As discussed earlier, the documents released by Jack Anderson created
the impression that the Nixon administration had to be pushed into
protecting American commercial interests in Chile from communist
encroachment. Nothing could be further from the truth, but ITT’s meetings
with CIA officials threaten to expose U.S. covert operations in Chile, thus
making a mockery out of Nixon’s “cool but correct” policy.183 After the ITT
memos became public, the U.S. State Department proclaimed that “any ideas
thwarting Chilean constitutional processes were firmly rejected by the
administration” both during and after the 1970 election. The Anderson
documents did show that for the most part, the Nixon administration
resisted ITT’s proposals, except for a troublesome memo which uncovered a
“green light” cable from Nixon authorizing Korry “to do all possible—short
of a Dominican Republic–type action—to keep Allende from taking power.”
The State Department dodged reporters’ queries about the “green light”
cable, thus leaving hanging what exactly Korry did.184 When Nixon learned
of the leak, he became indignant. Korry was instructed to stop Allende, he
complained to his press secretary, “but he just failed, the son of a bitch.”185
The publication of the ITT memos deepened Chilean fears that the Nixon
administration might be conspiring against Allende. Undersecretary of State
Irwin met with Letelier to assure him that the U.S. government had not
interfered in the internal affairs of Chile. Letelier acknowledged that the U.S.
government could not be held accountable for a private company’s actions,
but he also pointed out that the Anderson revelations helped foster “strong
feelings in the Chilean public” that the United States was waging “economic
warfare against Chile.” Irwin denied that there was any such policy and
blamed Chile’s economic troubles on UP’s expropriation policies. Letelier
rejoined that UP had repeatedly stated its willingness to find a mechanism
for negotiating compensation of expropriated properties, but in the case of
ITT, its refusal to permit an international appraisal, along with the recent
Anderson revelations, might force the government to reconsider its original
offer.186
Because the ITT documents revealed by Anderson told only a very small
part of a much larger but hidden story, they led to wild speculation in both
the United States and Chile about the exact nature of the Nixon
administration’s involvement with the plot to thwart Allende’s election. For
example, Letelier cabled Santiago that the ITT documents supported a
theory that Kissinger had encouraged prominent businessmen to create
economic chaos in Chile, but Senator J. William Fulbright had uncovered
the plot and had asked CIA Director Helms to halt it.187 Another bizarre
interpretation, spread by conservative publications such as El Mercurio and
La Verdad, alleged that Letelier had paid Anderson $70,000 to create the
ITT hoax so that Allende would have a foreign target to blame for his
domestic troubles.188 To dispel these outlandish fantasies, the Chilean
embassy verified the authenticity of the ITT documents before dispatching
them to Santiago to be translated into Spanish. The Allende government
then published them in a book, which became a best seller.189 Not to be left
out of the fray, the Chilean Congress announced that it was launching its
own investigation into the ITT affair, although Allende’s opposition insisted
that its scope include the activities of all foreigners, as well as a recent
mysterious cargo shipment from Cuba (see Chapter 8).190
Initially, the UP government tried to downplay the ITT scandal to avoid
provoking the Nixon administration.191 As was pointed out in an SRG
meeting, however, the ITT scandal was a “net plus” for Allende, who would
invoke the “foreign devil” theme at every opportunity, such as at the OAS
and UNCTAD meetings.192 The Anderson revelations were being “played to
… the hilt by the leftist press and elsewhere in the hemisphere,” one of
Kissinger’s aides reported.193 The newspaper La Nación suggested that ITT
stood for “Imperialism, Treason, and Terror.”194 On Chilean national
television, a visiting Cuban quartet sang, “They are up to mischief every day,
look out, Chileans, for the C.I.A.”195 The public backlash against ITT
eventually grew so large that Allende could not afford to ignore it.196 On 18
April 1972, he informed a crowd of more than half a million cheering
supporters that he was going to expropriate ITT.197 Just before this
announcement, he explained to Ambassador Davis that after the Anderson
revelations he could no longer negotiate with ITT—it had become a matter
of “national dignity” and “­self-respect.” But Allende also emphasized that he
had refrained from making public accusations about the U.S. government’s
role in the ITT machinations, and he assured the ambassador that
compensation would be paid as determined by Congress.198
Whether Allende believed in the Nixon administration’s innocence in the
ITT affair is unclear, but his maneuver appears to have been designed to
reassure Washington and the Paris creditors that the expropriation of ITT
would not create the same problems as the copper expropriations.199 In mid–
May 1972 Allende informed Davis that he was going to submit a
constitutional amendment to establish a special tribunal that would oversee
the nationalization of ITT. There would be no “excess profits calculation,”
but the original provision that had allowed ITT to make 10 percent profit
was now changed to “up to 10 percent.”200 Davis found this provision
troubling. So did Assistant Treasury Secretary Hennessy, who told Letelier
that the Chileans had misled everyone in Paris now that the proposed
procedure for expropriating ITT had “all the undesirable features employed
in the copper nationalization.” Letelier pointed out that the Paris agreement
stipulated that just compensation would be provided under Chilean and
international law. In any case, the ambassador emphasized, “given the things
that ITT had done, the Chilean Government could not go on negotiating
with them as it had before.”201
Allende was caught in a bind. As he explained to Ambassador Davis, he
faced enormous pressure to confiscate ITT’s assets. The company had
behaved in an “improper and inadmissible” way toward Chile. At the same
time, he was keen to prevent the ITT scandal from ruining U.S.-Chilean
relations. He had asked the press not to attack the U.S. government,
including Ambassador Korry, and he was open to the idea of settling the
compensation issue through an international commission.202 In attempting
to straddle the controversy, Allende encountered several difficulties. For one,
to draw attention away from the Nixon administration, he relentlessly
attacked ITT, which only increased the popular pressure for its
confiscation.203 Another problem was that the president risked losing
credibility among his supporters in trying to keep the Nixon administration
out of the scandal because anyone who closely scrutinized the ITT memos
could easily see that U.S. officials were entertaining ways to stop Allende.204
As Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister Anibal Palma explained to the OAS,
ITT’s “maneuvers” in Chile appeared to have had at minimum “the
toleration of United States officials.”205
The ITT scandal might have died down had the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee not decided to investigate ITT’s misdeeds in Chile and
elsewhere. The ITT hearings, held in late March through a Senate
subcommittee chaired by Senator Frank Church in 1973, sparked renewed
interest in the ITT scandal by throwing a spotlight on the characters
appearing in the Anderson memos. The Nixon administration scrambled to
devise a strategy that would keep its secrets from probing legislators. As
Meyer explained to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William
Porter, “Our primary interests with respect to the hearings on this issue are
to avoid or minimize disclosures that could severely compromise opposition
forces in Chile and embarrass the Administration.”206 The CIA was especially
worried that because it had facilitated ITT’s campaign contributions to
Alessandri, company officials might expose the CIA’s spoiling operation.207
The question of whether ITT deserved to receive compensation from its
OPIC insurance policy also threatened to expose the Nixon administration’s
attempted interference in the 1970 Chilean presidential election. If OPIC
could prove that ITT had “provoked” its nationalization through illicit
activities, then the company’s claim could be denied.208 A Washington Post
investigation revealed that ITT had purposely delayed negotiations with the
Chilean government and exaggerated returns on its investment to obtain a
speedier and more lucrative payout from OPIC.209 U.S. officials also feared
that ITT might seek to defend its insurance claim on the grounds that the
company’s plotting against Allende in the 1970 presidential election had
been sanctioned by Washington. Given that Ambassador Korry had
encouraged U.S. businesses to sabotage the Chilean economy during the
election, the Nixon administration would be under pressure in an OPIC
investigation to reveal certain dimensions of its covert operations against
Allende.210
The ITT hearings, which required the testimony of various prominent
State Department, CIA, and ITT officials, terrified the Nixon administration,
as there was no telling what witnesses might say under pressure. In late
January 1972, Nixon and White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman had
discussed their fears that Korry, if not given gainful employment, might start
writing publicly about “how we screwed up Chile.”211 At the time, they
imagined it was only necessary to contain Korry until after the U.S.
presidential election. A year later, however, one memo warned that Korry
had become uncontrollable because he feels that the State Department “is
prepared to sell him down the river.”212 The Nixon administration
contemplated invoking executive privilege to block its officials from
testifying, but since that restriction would only enhance suspicions that the
administration had something to hide, it opted instead to prep witnesses to
obfuscate the investigation.213 For example, ITT’s public relations director
Hal Hendrix agreed to shield the CIA by claiming that he had obtained the
Korry “green light” cable from a Chilean Christian Democrat, instead of
CIA Station Chief Henry Hecksher.214 Briefing memoranda suggested ways
for officials to dodge questions that might expose the 40 Committee’s
deliberations, and if necessary to deny that there was any attempt to block
Allende’s election.215
Given that this orchestrated testimony would contradict the classified
documentary record, the State Department refused Senator Church’s request
for all cable traffic between Washington and Santiago from 1 August 1970 to
31 January 1971.216 The problem of perjury became especially acute in the
case of former CIA Director Richard Helms, who assured the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 7 February 1973 that the CIA did not try to
overthrow the Allende government or pass money to Allende’s opponents.217
Then on 6 March in an executive session of the Church subcommittee,
Helms insisted that the CIA had not attempted to influence the vote in the
1970 Chilean presidential election.218 Helms would not be convicted of
perjury until long after Allende was gone, but his false testimony highlighted
the need of the Nixon administration to control the scope of the ITT
hearings. Consequently, the CIA arranged to hold a private briefing session
with Senator Church and his subcommittee staff just before the onset of the
public hearings.219 Because CIA officials were not under oath, they were free
to forge a narrative that would keep the attention focused on ITT and steer
the committee away from probing into the agency’s Track II activities. This
tactic was partially successful because officials could truthfully deny the
existence of a “­Government-corporate conspiracy,” which the committee
seemed bent on uncovering.220
As a result of these machinations, the ITT hearings in late March 1973
produced little new information beyond what the Anderson documents had
already revealed. Such contradictory statements about the purpose of ITT’s
$1 million slush fund, however, led Senator Church to conclude that
“somebody is lying.”221 Church was right that witnesses had lied, but not just
about ITT’s intentions. CIA Western Hemisphere Division Director William
Broe asserted that the Nixon administration did not have a policy to
interfere in the 1970 Chilean presidential election.222 Korry insisted that the
“United States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member
of the Chilean Congress.”223 Assistant Secretary Meyer declared that the
policy of the administration was “that there would be no intervention in the
political affairs of Chile … we bought no votes, we funded no candidates, we
promoted no coups.”224
Until the Church Report appeared in 1975, no one could prove that these
statements were false, and the deception enabled Nixon to maintain the
pretense that his administration bore no ill will toward Allende.225 Even
leftwing Chilean newspapers conceded that the U.S. government had largely
rejected ITT’s proposals to stop Allende.226 That the CIA had been willing to
meet repeatedly with ITT officials to entertain schemes to block Allende,
however, was hardly reassuring.227 The publicity emanating from the ITT
hearings fueled conspiracy theories in Chile, which generally lumped the
CIA with multinational corporations under the umbrella of “imperialism.”
El Siglo charged ITT and the CIA with committing “blackmail and economic
gangsterism against Chile.”228 Chilean television aired a play, based loosely
on the ITT documents, with a cast of characters that included Kissinger,
Geneen, Korry, Frei, and others related to the scandal.229
After the ITT hearings, UP’s practiced distinction between the U.S.
government and U.S. corporations began to dissolve. Almeyda’s OAS speech
in April 1973, for example, charged that U.S. government and ITT officials
had “colluded” to interfere in the internal political affairs of Chile.230 Chilean
diplomat Hernán Santa Cruz used similar phrasing in referring to the ITT
scandal at an UNCTAD meeting held around the same time.231 In the
Chilean Congress, PCCh Deputy Tomás Solis warned that the same forces
(ITT and CIA) that had aided Frei in 1964, “are now instigating economic
chaos, provocations and a coup d’état to destroy the democratic process in
this country.”232
Allende, who had not wanted to make premature judgments, finally came
down hard on the company. On 7 April, Allende told NBC reporter Tom
Streithorst that he had no information that the Nixon administration was
involved in the ITT affair.233 A few days later, however, he announced at a
World Labor Assembly gathering that he had drawn up legislation to
expropriate ITT, and he hoped that the Chilean Congress would punish the
corporation for its insolence. “No one can dream that we are going to pay
even half a cent to this multinational company, which was on the verge of
plunging Chile into civil war,” he thundered. Allende noted that the ITT
hearings had revealed CIA “participation” in the plot to block his election.
Still, Chile’s dispute was not with ordinary Americans, but with the U.S.
government and international corporations: “Here in Chile, we do not use
the term ‘Yankee go home.’ We say, ‘Imperialists go home.’”234 When Allende
met with Rogers in Argentina the next month, he slightly transposed this
analysis, insisting that he had always been mindful to distinguish between
the people and the U.S. government on the one hand, and “other elements,”
such as ITT on the other.235 By grouping the “U.S. government” with the
American “people,” Allende was hoping to avoid embarrassing the Nixon
administration. When a journalist tried to get Allende to clarify the issue,
Allende continued to insist that he had made no accusations about a
conspiracy, and his reference to the CIA at the labor conference had been
based solely on the declarations of witnesses before the Senate
subcommittee.236
The final blow which ended any possibility that Allende would negotiate a
deal with ITT was the investigation into the mysterious ­break-in of the
Chilean embassy in Washington, D.C., on the weekend of 13–14 May 1972.
The Chilean embassy suspected that the crime was politically motivated
because valuables had been left untouched.237 Jack Blum, the associate
counsel for Church’s multinational subcommittee, confided to a Chilean
embassy officer his suspicions that the culprits were the same individuals
who had committed the Watergate ­break-in. Blum’s theory was that the
burglars were acting in the interest of ITT, which was thought to be planting
secret microphones in the offices of various senators, as well as the Chilean
embassy, to monitor the ITT investigation.238 Although Church’s
subcommittee could find “no hard evidence” of ITT involvement in the
Chilean embassy ­break-in, Blum’s theory appeared in a newspaper article by
Jack Anderson, who speculated that ITT had hired Watergate burglar E.
Howard Hunt to obtain information about Chile’s plans to confiscate
Chiltelco.239 The Nixon tapes, as well as the report of the Watergate Assistant
Special Prosecutor, have since established that Nixon’s infamous Plumbers
unit was indeed responsible for breaking into the Chilean embassy.240 More
important, however, is that Blum and Anderson had raised suspicions
among Chileans that ITT was involved, which was not hard to imagine
given the corporation’s other proven transgressions against Allende. As
Letelier explained to Davis in mid–May 1973, he was besieged with queries
from the press about the ­break-in, which was helping to create “popular
pressure to expropriate ITT.”241
During the last set of bilateral talks in August 1973, Tohá informed the
American delegation that UP was drafting new legislation that would
expropriate ITT’s holdings in Chile; the company’s “­wrong-doings” were so
grave that it had to be treated differently from copper. Tohá indicated that
the legislation would be ready in about two weeks, and “there was no way to
predict what action the Chilean Congress might take.”242 The September
coup rescued ITT from the precipice, as the company went from possibly
losing everything to getting most of what it wanted. In 1974, the Pinochet
government paid ITT $125 million for Chiltelco, and a year later ITT
received a settlement of nearly $35 million from OPIC.243 This ending
should not surprise. The ITT hearings, as Letelier astutely observed, were
more about the U.S. Congress flexing its muscles in the foreign policy arena
and protecting the reputation of American businesses, than they were about
exposing wrongdoings in Chile.244 The intervention of ITT in Chile is not a
typical case, argued Senator Gale W. McGee (D–Wyoming), and should not
“blind us” to the legitimate contributions of multinational corporations to
the developing world.245 Church’s subcommittee emphasized that it firmly
opposed Allende’s expropriation of private American businesses, but
corporations such as ITT should not be allowed to set policy. The danger in
this instance, the committee’s final report noted, was that ITT’s interference
in the 1970 presidential election could have started a civil war that would
have ended up converting Allende, a “­soft-lining Marxist,” into an “anti–
American demagogue.”246
 While the expropriation of the copper industry and ITT may have been
inevitable under Allende, as Ambassador Davis later emphasized, the terms
of compensation for either were not ­pre-determined.247 In this respect, it is
worth noting that the UP government did provide compensation for many
of the firms it nationalized, so theoretically the same could have been done
for Kennecott, Anaconda, and ITT.248 Whatever negotiating room existed,
however, dissipated rapidly as the copper companies imposed shipping
embargos and the ITT hearings whipped Chilean nationalism into a frenzy.
The Nixon administration’s rejection of the 1914 Treaty as a possible
arbitration mechanism for these disputes also made it more difficult for
Allende to moderate the demands of extremists who wanted full
expropriation without compensation. “Because there is a close relationship
between the interests of the multinational corporations and the policies
followed by the State Department,” Allende told U.S. National Public Radio
in June 1973, “we run the risk of provoking anti–Americanism in Chile. And
that, of course, is not good.”249
The conflicts over compensation for expropriated U.S. businesses also
severely strained UP’s policy of ideological pluralism, as the distinction
between “economic imperialism” and the U.S. government became much
harder to sustain in the face of evidence that Nixon administration officials
were siding with the copper companies and ITT, which had both conspired
to prevent Allende from becoming elected. The ­near-breaking point would
be reached, as the next chapter will show, when Nixon’s order to make the
Chilean economy scream forced Allende to acknowledge that there was an
“invisible blockade” to sabotage the Chilean revolution.

1. UP Program, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 268–69.

2. Moran, Multinational Corporations, ch. 5; Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 6. On the influence of
dependency theory on Allende and other Latin American leaders, see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 33–34,
44.
3. ­RARS-13, 28 September 1970, FN ­Chile-A, 1/1/70, box 867, RG 59. For a list of U.S. investments
in Chile, see “United States Investments in Chile,” NYT, 21 September 1970. For a list of foreign firms
operating in Chile, see NACLA, New Chile, 149–67. For a list of U.S. investments covered by OPIC,
see attachment, Letelier no. 979–648, 10 August 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
4. “Projecting the Common Touch,” Time, 16 November 1970.
5. Embtel 1767, 2 May 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 20.
6. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 67.
7. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 133–34.
8. “American Firms Face Total Expropriation of Mines Under New Chilean Amendment,” WSJ, 23
December 1970.
9. NIE 94–69, 28 January 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 2.
10. Friedman memo to Shlaudeman, 11 December 1969, 1970 Presidential Campaign 1968–1969,
box 1, CAF, RG 84.
11. Embtel 1000, 22 February 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
12. Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 19 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 232.
13. Memcon (Samuels, Korry, Crimmins, Weintraub, Szabo, Salzman, Katz, Chapin, Baker), 7 May
1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 32. Despite these fears, the impact of the Chilean copper cases on U.S.
investment in Latin America was negligible. See Hobbing, “Effects of the Copper Cases,” 221.
14. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 6 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 339. Kissinger also told
the SRG that Nixon did not care about compensation and was willing to let OPIC absorb the $350
million debt if Allende could be brought down. See SRG meeting minutes, 17 October 1970, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 390. According to a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, it was Kissinger who
convinced Nixon that “U.S. private interests must not be permitted to assume an overriding priority.”
See Petras and LaPorte, “U.S. Response to Economic Nationalism in Chile,” 225 n. 84. See also
Kissinger’s alleged rebuff to a corporate executive that “we have the larger national interest to think
of.” Quoted in Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 241–42.
15. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 2 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 535–36.
16. Guevara, Motorcycle Diaries, 89.
17. ­A-364, 23 October 1970, United States/Chile Relations, Sept—October 1970, box 6, CAF, RG 84;
SRG meeting minutes, 23 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 524.
18. Juan de Onis, “Allende Assures Business Leaders,” NYT, 19 October 1970.
19. Embtel 4687, 4 November 1970, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-70, box 2193, RG 59. See also Allende press
conference, 22 March 1971, circ. no. 50, 22 March 1971, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE.
20. Allende, Chile’s Road to Socialism, 81.
21. Juan de Onís, “Allende, Chilean Marxist, Wins Vote for Presidency,” NYT, 6 September 1970.
22. Embtel 5323, 9 December 1970, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
23. Embtel 5649, 29 December 1970, INCO 15–2 Chile, 1/1/70, box 1147, RG 59.
24. Joseph Novitski, “Allende Moderation Seen in Copper Nationalizing,” NYT, 30 December 1970.
25. CODELCO, “The Recovery of Basic Resources Is a Sovereign Decision Reflecting the Feelings of
All Chilean People,” NYT, 25 January 1971.
26. Feldman memo to Crimmins, 4 January 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 1/1/71, box 1147, RG 59; ­A-
310, Amembassy to DoS, 1 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 463–73.
27. Embtel 550, 29 January 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 1/1/71, box 1147, RG 59.
28. Quoted in Moran, Multinational Corporations, 153.
29. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 2 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 552–54.
30. Raddatz (Bank of America) memo to James, 9 February 1971, MCUSFP, 44–45.
31. Embtel 494, 27 January 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 1/1/71, box 1147, RG 59.
32. Brendan Jones, “Chile’s ­Take-Over Plans Hit by Javits,” NYT, 2 February 1971. On the likelihood
that successful claims on the Chilean expropriations would shrink OPIC’s reserves, see HFCA,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 74–75. Senator Church also voted against the 1972 foreign
aid authorization bill in part because he opposed having the taxpayer pick up the bill for expropriated
American copper companies in Chile. See Frank Church, “Why I Voted No on Aid,” New Republic, 13
November 1971.
33. Letelier no. 153–128, 2 February 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; embtel 636,
3 February 1971, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-71, box 2193, RG 59.
34. “Allende Expresses Caution on Seizures,” NYT, 8 February 1971.
35. Juan de Onís, “Allende Affirms Desire for Amity,” NYT, 31 March 1971.
 36. Embtel 876, 16 February 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 2/1/71, box 1147, RG 59.
37. Memcon (Kissinger, Letelier, Nachmanoff), 23 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 594.
38. Embtel 875, 12 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 268.
39. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 16 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 544–48.
40. Kissinger acknowledged that in helping to facilitate Frei’s Chileanization agreement, Korry had
“played a brilliant, imaginative and essential role throughout as a ­behind-the-scenes go between.”
Kissinger memo to Nixon, 11 July 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 49.
41. SRG meeting minutes, 17 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 559–67.
42. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 5 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 586–89.
43. Embtel 875, 12 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 268.
44. Embtel 5020, 29 September 1971, in Intelligence Activities, 129.
45. Bergsten memo to Kissinger, 30 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 600.
46. Embtel 1953, 12 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 305.
47. Embtel 2394, 5 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 320.
48. Embtel 2819, 27 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 627.
49. Embtel 3249, 18 June 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 6/1/71, box 1148, RG 59. Korry later blamed PS
leader Carlos Altamirano for thwarting the deal. See Korry, “­USA-In-Chile and ­Chile-In-USA,” 45.
According to one of Allende’s confidants, an agreement on the nationalization of the copper industry
could not be reached because of general opposition within UP to providing any compensation. See
Amorós, Allende, 362–63.
50. Embtel 2819, 27 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 627.
51. Allende speech, 11 July 1971 in Allende, Obras escogidas (1970–1973), 112.
52. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 150–51; ­A-310, Amembassy to DoS, 1 November
1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 463–73. On how the Chilean Congress decided to leave the
compensation issue up to Allende in order to force him to take the heat, no matter what he did, see
Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 71. UP tried to justify the excess profits calculation by
distinguishing between “expropriation,” which required equitable monetary compensation under
international law, and “nationalization,” the recovery of national resources in the public interest,
which released the Chilean government from having to pay private companies a specific amount. See
Fermandois, “La larga marcha,” 309–310.
53. Crimmins briefing memo to Samuels, 28 July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 646–47.
54. Draft memcon (Irwin, Meyer, Anaconda Company officials, and others), 11 August 1971, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 413–17.
55. Connally memo to Nixon, 10 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 655–66.
56. Benjamin Welles, “We Don’t Have Any Friends Anyway,” NYT, 15 August 1971.
57. Deptel 139331, 31 July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 648–49.
58. Embtel 4369, 23 August 1971, and embtel 3348, 24 August 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
59. SNIE 94–71, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 402.
60. Deptel 152097, 18 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 667.
61. Allende letter to Nixon, 20 August 1971, in Selser, Salvador Allende y Estados Unidos, 158.
62. SRG minutes, 9 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 683–89. Nachmanoff advised Kissinger
before the meeting to use a third party to assist the copper negotiations, which “would keep the carrot
somewhat fuzzy.” Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 8 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 682.
63. Hewitt memo to Kissinger, 29 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 694–95. Although Allende
never gave any indication he was going to try and collect it, the Contraloría ruled that Anaconda and
Kennecott owed Chile $378 million. CIA memo, 15 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 475 n. 2.
For the Contraloría’s final calculations on compensation, see table 6.3 in Fortin, “Nationalization of
Copper,” 219. The Contraloría is equivalent to the Comptroller of the U.S. General Accounting Office,
except that its rulings can be rejected by unanimous consent of the cabinet. U.S. officials claimed that
Allende often used the cabinet to impede the Contraloría, but he clearly did not do so when it came to
the nationalization of the copper industry. See Santiago, “talking points concerning situation in Chile,”
5 October 1973, CDP. For a legal justification of the expropriation of private property, see Novoa
Monreal, Los resquicios legales. For a defense of the company’s position on book value, see Lillich,
“Valuation of the Copper Companies.”
64. Embtel 4987, 27 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 694.
65. Korry first proposed this plan on his “own authority” to Felipe Herrera, Carlos Matus, and Jorge
Arrate, who agreed to arrange a meeting with Allende and Almeyda to discuss it. Embtel 5020, 29
September 1971, in Intelligence Activities, 130–33.
66. Embtel 5034, 30 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 436–39. Korry claims to have warned
Allende that rejecting his plan could lead “powerful groups” to retaliate against him. See Peter Kihss,
“U.S. Took Extraordinarily ‘Soft Line,’” NYT, 16 September 1974.
67. Embtel 5184, 8 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 705.
68. CIA intelligence memo ER IM 71–201, October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 444.
69. Arzac memo to Korry, 4 October 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—Dec. 1971, box 6,
CAF, RG 84. See also comments by U.S. Representative Dante Fascell (­D-Florida) in CR, 16 December
1971, 117: 47503–504.
70. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 584–3 (Nixon, Haldeman, Connally, Kissinger), 5 October 1971,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 440–42.
71. Kissinger telcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 12 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 710–11.
72. Memcon (Almeyda, Letelier, Kissinger, Davis, Nachmanoff), 6 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973,
21: 700–703. Allende was under pressure from one sector of UP which argued that the United States
was going to enact a blockade against Chile no matter what the government did, so reserves should go
toward adjusting the balance of payments rather than compensating the copper companies. See Bitar,
Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 71.
73. Benjamin Welles, “Chilean Hints Cut in Levy on Mines,” NYT, 8 October 1971.
74. Telcon (Kissinger, Connally), 8 October 1971, Kissinger Telcons, NPMP.
75. Davis, Last Two Years, 31, 417 n. 77.
76. Telcon (Kissinger, Rogers), 12 October 1971, Kissinger Telcons, NPMP.
77. Samuels memo to Nixon, 12 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 707–708. For the publicized
text of Roger’s statement as well as Meyer’s comments to the Subcommittee on ­Inter-American Affairs
of the HFCA, see DSB 65 (1 November 1971), 478, 498–500.
78. Marilyn Berger, “Chile’s Refusal to Pay Firms Hit by Rogers,” WP, 13 October 1971. Rogers also
allegedly promised representatives of U.S. firms with investments in Chile that the United States
would invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment if the Chilean government failed to provide full
compensation for the copper properties it nationalized. See “U.S. Will Stop All Aid to Chile Unless
Decision to Seize Copper Companies Is Changed,” Times, 23 October 1971.
79. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1976, 4: doc 174.
80. CR, 13 October 1971, 117: 35997.
81. CR, 15 October 1971, 117: 36379.
82. CR, 21 October 1971, 117: 37272–73.
83. Letelier telex 584, 6 October 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; no. 1202–798, 15
October 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. For more on the U.S. congressional
reaction to the Chilean copper nationalization case, see Petras and LaPorte, “U.S. Response to
Economic Nationalism in Chile,” 209–17.
84. Juan de Onís, “Chile is Aroused by U.S. Warning,” NYT, 24 October 1971. For other negative
Chilean reactions, see Richard Wigg, “Chile Rejects U.S. Warning on Copper Takeover,” Times, 15
October 1971; and Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chileans Fear Clash with Chileans Over Copper,” WP, 17
October 1971.
85. Embtel 5346, 21 October 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 10/15/71, box 1149, RG 59.
86. Juan de Onís, “Rogers Stand on Chile Spurs Unity Drive,” NYT, 15 October 1971.
87. Enclosure, circ. no. 195, 31 October 1971, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE.
88. Intelligence note ­RARN-31, 14 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 452–54.
89. CIA memo, 15 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 477–78.
90. CIA information cable TDCS–314/11716–71, 3 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 473.
91. Embtel 6082, 14 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 738.
92. Letelier memo, 3 November 1971, doc 6, folder 16, box 2, OLF.
93. Embtel 5714, 16 November 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 11/1/71, box 1149, RG 59.
94. Embtel 5184, 8 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 706.
95. Nixon, “Statement Announcing United States Policy on Economic Assistance and Investment
Security in Developing Nations,” 19 January 1972, PPP.
96. Nixon, “Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” 9 February 1972,
PPP.
97. “Allende, Criticizing Nixon, Says Chile Can Dictate Her Own Laws,” NYT, 20 January 1972.
98. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 154–55.
99. Deptel 4069, 6 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 749.
100. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 155.
101. Juan de Onís, “Chile Says She Will Pay $84.6—Million to Kennecott,” NYT, 26 February 1971.
102. Deptel 41406, 10 March 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
103. Embtel 1274, 18 March 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 1/1/72, box 1149, RG 59.
104. Gantz memo to Feldman, 30 November 1971, POL Chile—U.S., 6/1/71, box 2200, RG 59.
105. Irwin memo to Secretary, 17 April 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 1–­1-72, box 2200, RG 59.
106. Kozak memo to Feldman, 14 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 565.
107. Meyer memo to Irwin, 8 April 1972, POL ­Chile-U.S., 1/1/72, box 2200, RG 59.
108. Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, “Next Steps Options on Chile,” 4 April 1972,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 551.
109. SRG minutes, 11 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 791–93.
110. For Ambassador Davis’s description of this clause as a “fig leaf,” see Davis, Last Two Years, 76.
111. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chile Finds Settlement Satisfactory,” WP, 21 April 1972. Allende told
Ambassador Davis he was optimistic that the courts would allow the excess profits determination to
be appealed. See embtel 2361, 12 May 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 5/1/72, box 1150, RG 59.
112. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 28 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 796–97.
113. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chile Predicts Deficit in Balance of Payments,” WP, 24 July 1972.
114. Embtel 3810, 18 August 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
115. Deptel 15092, 18 August 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
116. Embtel 4021, 30 August 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
117. Deptel 15092, 18 August 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
118. Memcon (Kennecott Copper Corporation officials, Meyer, others), 4 October 1972, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 628.
119. “Chile Scores France on Copper Decision,” WP, 7 October 1972. James J. Nagle, “Kennecott
Acts on Chile Copper,” NYT, 5 October 1972; “Chile Envoy Says U.S. Firm Waging ‘Economic War,’”
Times, 6 October 1972.
120. Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Chile, assailed by Kennecott, Seeks Support,” NYT, 17 October 1972.
121. Eliot memo to Kissinger, 12 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 631.
122. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Allende Denounces Kennecott,” WP, 20 October 1972.
 123. Terri Shaw, “Allende Suggests Kennecott Linked to Chile Protests,” WP, 4 December 1972.
124. Embtel 5217, 17 November 1972, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-71, box 2193, RG 59; “Paris Court Bars
Payment for Chile Copper at Kennecott’s Behest,” WSJ, 5 October 1972. On the failure of Kennecott’s
European lawsuits, see “Freeze Lifted on Chile Copper Payments,” NYT, 30 November 1972; and
“Kennecott Loses Round as West German Court Frees Chilean Copper,” WSJ, 23 January 1973.
125. Embtel 4702, 18 October 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 10/1/72, box 1150, RG 59. For the initial
draft, see MRE telex ­N-391, 14 October 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
126. MRE telex ­N-401, 23 October 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. On UN
Resolution 1803, see Crimmins memo to Rogers, 25 July 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 804 n. 3.
127. Almeyda memo, 23 November 1972, doc 7, folder 16, box 2, OLF.
128. Embtel 5649, 19 December 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
129. Memcon (Kennecott Copper Corporation officials, Meyer, others), 4 October 1972, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 629.
130. Rogers, “Of Missionaries,” 2–3.
131. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 20–23.
132. Letelier telex 843, 10 November 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; Phillips tel
4486 to secstate, 9 November 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
133. Embtel 5291, 23 November 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 655–56; Davis, Last Two Years, 124.
On the “lost opportunity” thesis and the hostile reception that Castro received during his 1959 visit,
see Azicri, “Could the War Have Been Avoided?”; and Nathaniel Davis CNN interview, 21 February
1999, NSA.
134. Rogers memo to Nixon, 15 November 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 833; Bletcher to secstate, tel
7336, 1 December 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
135. Meyer memo to Secretary, 19 December 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
136. Embtel 5649, 19 December 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59; embtel 5652, 20
December 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
137. Minuta, 26 December 1972, Memorandos Políticos, AMRE.
138. Minutas de conversaciones sostenidas entre delegaciones de Chile y Los Estados Unidos, 20–22
December 1972, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
139. Deptel 230071, 21 December 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
140. Robert Kuttner, “Chile Is Not Cuba, or Is It?,” Commonweal, 6 August 1971, 407.
141. Deptel 231561, 23 December 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
142. Embtel 1138, 19 March 1973, 1973SANTIA01138, CFPF, RG 59.
143. Armstrong and Meyer memo to Rogers, 28 February 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 845–47.
144. Embtel 313, 22 January 1973, POL Chile—U.S., 1–­1-72, box 2200, RG 59; embtel 982, 12 March
1973, 1973SANTIA00982, CFPF, RG 59
145. For the U.S. summary of the talks, see deptel 55858, 27 March 1973, FN 14 Chile, 6/1/72, box
867, RG 59. For the Chilean summary, see Minutos de Conversaciones Sostenidas Entre Delegaciones
de Chile y los Estados Unidos, 22–23 March 1973, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
146. Embtel 1341, 31 March 1973, 1973SANTIA01341, CFPF, RG 59.
147. Embtel 1391, 3 April 1973, 1973SANTIA01391, CFPF, RG 59.
148. Embtel 1479, 6 April 1973, 1973SANTIAO01479, CFPF, RG 59.
149. Allende interview with L’Unità, 4 April 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
150. Allende threatened to invoke the 1914 Treaty unilaterally so that even if it fails, it “will not be
our fault.” Embtel 1734, 19 April 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84.
151. Deptel 69790, 13 April 1973, 1973STATE 069790, CFPF, RG 59; deptel 72125, 17 April 1973,
POL Chile—U.S., 4–­5-73, box 2200, RG 59.
152. Deptel 102367, 29 May 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 862–63.
 153. Embtel 67, 5 June 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
154. Amembassy Peru tel 4355 to DoS, 25 June 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 875.
155. Belcher (Lima) tel 4425 to secstate, 26 June 1973, POL Chile—U.S., 5–30–73, box 2200, RG 59;
Belcher tel 4406 to secstate, 26 June 1973, POL Chile—U.S., 5–30–73, box 2200, RG 59.
156. Deptel 163581, 17 August 1973, 1973 STATE163581, CFPF, RG 59.
157. Deptel 164697, 18 August 1973, 1973 STATE164697, CFPF, RG 59. For the Chilean account of
these discussions, see memcon (Kubisch, Hennessy, Tohá, Soto, Urrutia), 16–17 August 1973, box 33,
no. 33074, AJTM.
158. Embtel 2918, 4 July 1973, 1973SANTIA02918, CFPF, RG 59.
159. Rodríguez, no. 1205–433, 31 August 1973, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
160. CIA intelligence memo, 1 August 1973, CDP.
161. Embtel 3295, 25 July 1973, 1973SANTIA 03295, CFPF, RG 59.
162. Robert P. Coe, “U.S. Policy Recommendations on U.S.-Chile Economic Problems,” enclosure,
Amembassy ­A-152 to DoS, 27 July 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84; Davis ­A-120 to DoS, 13 June 1973, POL 1
Chile—5–­9-73, box 2201, RG 59.
163. Baklanoff, Copper in Chile, 12–13. For the details of the final settlement, see Sigmund,
Multinationals in Latin America, 171–72.
164. Altamirano has insisted that he, Almeyda, and Allende all agreed that the compensation issue
had to be settled to end the U.S. economic blockade. See Politzer, Altamirano, 53.
165. On the impact of neoliberalism on Chile’s copper industry, see Caputo and Galarce, “Chile’s
Neoliberal Reversion of Salvador Allende’s Copper Nationalization.” By 1980, nearly all of the five ­-
hundred-plus industries nationalized under Allende had been transferred to the private sector. Petras
et al., Democracy and Poverty in Chile, 23.
166. There is no documentary evidence to sustain Korry’s claim that he had Kissinger’s backing to
make the aid offer of $11.7 million. The letter Rogers sent to Almeyda authorizing Korry to negotiate
on behalf of Nixon says nothing about economic aid. About as far as Kissinger was willing to go in
compromising was to consider splitting the excess profits between the Chilean government (51
percent) and the companies (49 percent), an arrangement that probably would have been
unacceptable to Allende. See Seymour Hersh, “Kissinger Called Chile Strategist,” NYT, 15 September
1974; Korry letter to the editor, WP, 29 September 1974; Rogers letter to Almeyda, 16 August 1971,
FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 665–66; and conversation no. 287–007 (Nixon, Kissinger), 11 October 1971,
Nixon Tapes.
167. Adolph G. Merino, “Ex U.S. Envoy Tells of ‘70 Offer to Chile,” WP, 19 September 1974.
168. Nixon’s extreme hostility to Castro and Allende (reinforced by Helms) undermines the “lost
opportunity” thesis. See LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, 122–23.
169. Merriam letter to Kissinger, 23 October 1970; and Kissinger letter to Merriam, 9 November
1970, MCUSFP, 720–21, 730.
170. Raddatz (Bank of America) memo to James, 9 February 1971, MCUSFP, 44–45.
171. Neal memo to Merriam, 17 February 1971, MCUSFP, 807.
172. Chilean Economic Minister Pedro Vuskovic met with ITT briefly before the meeting with
Allende, mostly to explain Allende’s nationalization policy. Berrellez memo to Hendrix, 25 February
1971, MCUSFP, 816–17.
173. Hendrix memo to Perkins, 12 March 1973, MCUSFP, 824–28. On how one UP comic book
mocked ITT through sexual stereotyping, see Kunzle, “Chile’s La Firme versus ITT.”
174. Embtel 1368, 11 March 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 3/1/71, box 1147, RG 59; Schoenberg, Geneen,
287.
175. SCFR, International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 14.
176. Embtel 2911, 2 June 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 6/1/71, box 1148, RG 59; embtel 2998, 7 June
1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 6/1/71, box 1148, RG 59. Just before he was elected, Allende openly
complained about ITT’s practice of prioritizing the installation of telephones in “affluent sectors” of
Santiago. See Holmes memo to Stimson, 2 September 1970, MCUSFP, 570.
177. Embtel 3939, 26 July 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84. Korry also reported that Letelier had “misled”
the UP government on OPIC. See embtel 4369, 23 August 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—
Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
178. Chile background memo, 27 August 1973, MCUSFP, 900–915; Guilfoyle letter to Rogers, 3
September 1971, MCUSFP, 926–29.
179. ITT memo, “Chile Nearing Crucial Period,” 28 September 1971, MCUSFP, 939–42; deptel 4787,
15 September 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 9/1/71, box 1148, RG 59.
180. SCFR, International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 15. On the role of Harold
Geneen in pursuing this strategy, see Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 304–305.
181. Guilfoyle memo for the record, 28 September 1971; and ITT memo for the files, n.d., MCUSFP,
964, 975–79.
182. OPIC tel 189045 to DoS, 14 October 1971, INCO 15–2 Chile, 10/1/71, box 1149, RG 59.
183. For a partially sanitized summary of the CIA’s meetings with ITT, see CIA memo, 21 March
1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 536.
184. Deptel 50484, 24 March 1972, CDP; Tad Szulc, “State Department Denies Any Move to Block
Allende,” NYT, 24 March 1972.
185. Conversation no. 022–006 (Nixon, Ziegler), 23 March 1972, Nixon Tapes.
186. Deptel 50417, 24 March 1972, POL 14 Chile, 1–10–72, box 2195, RG 59; Letelier telex 248, 24
March 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
187. Letelier telex 235, 21 March 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
188. CR, 10 April 1972, 118: 12009; circ. no. 6, 30 March 1972, Circulares Confidenciales, AMRE.
189. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chile Puts ITT Documents on Sale,” WP, 5 April 1972; Lewis H. Diuguid,
“Chile Moves to Seize ITT Holdings,” WP, 18 April 1972. On the authentication issue, see no. 367–34,
24 March 1972, doc 1, folder 15, box 6, OLF; and Letelier telex 352, 2 May 1972, Telex, Embajada de
Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
190. Embtel 1523, 30 March 1971, United States/Chile Relations, January—June 1972, box 6, CAF,
RG 84.
191. Almeyda telex 112, 21 March 1972; and Letelier telex 258, 27 March 1972, Telex, Embajada de
Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
192. SRG minutes, 11 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 788.
193. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 777.
194. This description of ITT appeared in La Nación, the official government newspaper. See Lewis H.
Diuguid, “Chile Puts ITT Documents on Sale,” WP, 5 April 1972. For speculation that the release of
the ITT papers would increase suspicions among Allende supporters that the CIA had meddled in the
1970 presidential election, see “ITT Papers to be Sent to Allende,” 24 March 1972, WP, 24 March
1972.
195. Juan de Onís, “‘Look Out, Chileans, for C.I.A.,’” NYT, 2 April 1972.
196. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 28 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 796; embtel 1660, 16 April
1973, 1973SANTIA01660, CFPF, RG 59.
197. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chile Moves to Seize ITT Holdings,” WP, 18 April 1972. For the text of
Allende’s speech, see Punto Final, 25 April 1972.
198. Embtel 1829, 18 April 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 4/1/72, box 1149, RG 59.
199. Embtel 18, 19 April 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 4/1/72, box 1149, RG 59.
200. Embtel 2362, 12 May 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 5/1/72, box 2362, RG 59.
201. Deptel 96050, 30 May 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 5/1/72, box 1150, RG 59. Emphasis added. For
Letelier’s version of this conversation, see Letelier telex 427, 27 May 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en
EEUU, AMRE.
202. Embtel 2902, 12 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 581–82.
203. For examples, see FBIS Daily Report, 11 July 1972; embtel 3259, 11 July 1972, box 3, CAF, RG
84; and Allende address to the UN General Assembly, 4 December 1972, in Cockcroft, Salvador
Allende Reader, 208.
204. For Allende’s attempt to defend his policy of not attacking Nixon, see Allende interview with
Chile Hoy, no. 3, 30 June—6 July 1972.
205. Quoted in Benjamin Welles, “Chile Accuses Washington,” NYT, 15 April 1972.
206. Meyer memo to Porter, 23 February 1973, CDP.
207. CIA memo, 5 February 1973, CDP.
208. Cape letter to Hunter, 2 November 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
209. Marilyn Berger, “ITT Refused Chile Offer for Holdings,” WP, 10 April 1972; and “Future of
OPIC Seen at Stake in ITT Insurance Inquiry,” WP, 9 October 1972.
210. Editorial, “Why Pay ITT a Cent?” WP, 10 October 1972.
211. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 654–1 (Nixon, Flanigan, Haldeman), 24 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 527.
212. Memo, “Chile,” 17 January 1973, CDP. In early 1971, Kissinger had advised Nixon to repost
Korry so as to avoid “sending back to private life an excessively embittered, articulate, and
knowledgeable potential critic.” Kissinger memo to Nixon, 26 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 615.
213. Eliot memo to Kissinger, 16 March 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 850.
214. Corn, Blond Ghost, 245–46.
215. Briefing memo, 17 January 1973, CDP; CIA memo, 21 March 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16:
536.
216. The Nixon administration was prepared to invoke executive privilege to block Church’s request,
but the senator backed down. See Eliot letter to Dean, 12 April 1973, POL Chile—U.S., 5–30–73, box
2200, RG 59; and Anderson memo to Porter, 23 April 1973, POL Chile—U.S., 4–­5-73, box 2200, RG
59.
217. SFRC, Nomination of Richard Helms to Be Ambassador to Iran, 47.
218. SFRC, CIA Foreign and Domestic Activities, 13.
219. Ford, William E. Colby, 112–14.
220. Gardner memo to McAfee, 19 March 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 673–78. Brent Scowcroft
assured Kissinger that in reviewing potentially embarrassing cables between Korry and the White
House there were no references to ITT. Scowcroft memo to Kissinger, 28 March 1973, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 680.
221. MCUSFP, 427.
222. William Broe testimony, 27 March 1973, MCUSFP, 259.
223. Edward Korry testimony, 27 March 1973, MCUSFP, 301.
224. Charles A. Meyer testimony, 29 March 1973, MCUSFP, 402, 406.
225. Remarkably, none of these officials were convicted of perjury. The Justice Department did begin
proceedings against several ITT officials, but the Jimmy Carter administration dropped all the charges
when the accused threatened to reveal CIA secrets. Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 515 n. 34. Helms
eventually settled out of court for a suspended ­two-year jail sentence and a $2,000 fine. See Helms,
Look Over My Shoulder, 445.
226. Embtel 1321, 30 March 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84.
227. This point was noted by the Church subcommittee in its concluding report. See SCFR,
International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 19.
228. “Chilean Paper Sees ‘Gangsterism’ By ITT,” WP, 23 March 1973. For further examples of
Chilean leftist commentary on the ITT affair, see embtel 1245, 26 March 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84; and
embtel 1257, 27 March 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84.
229. Embtel 1460, 6 April 1973, box 6, CAF, RG 84. For one Chilean writer’s description of the play,
“Pissing in the Wind,” see Délano, Diario de Estocolmo.
230. Almeyda speech to OAS, 5 April 1973, Vera Castillo, La política exterior chilena, 460.
231. Geneva tel 1878 to secstate, 25 April 1973, 1973GENEVA01878, CFPF, RG 59.
232. FBIS Daily Report, 12 April 1973.
233. Deptel 65552, 9 April 1973, 1973STATE 065552, CFPF, RG 59. The Department of State
speculated that Allende appeared to be downplaying the ITT scandal to protect the Paris negotiations.
See Eliot memo to Kissinger, 9 April 1973, POL 15–1 Chile, 1/1/72, box 2197, RG 59.
234. “Allende Scoffs at Funds for I.T.T.,” NYT, 11 April 1973.
235. Deptel 102367, 29 May 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 859.
236. Wallach interview with Allende.
237. Embtel 2450, 15 May 1972, POL 17 Chile—U.S., box 2201, RG 59.
238. Telex 52, 16 January 1973, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
239. Jack Anderson, “Chilean ­Break-ins Reflect Watergate,” WP, 8 March 1973. The CIA discounted
the story, claiming that there was no connection between E. Howard Hunt and ITT. See CIA memo, 8
March 1972, 0005507466, CIA Electronic Reading Room.
240. The exact motive for the ­break-in has never been established. One theory is that the burglars
were after the “Cuban Dossier,” an alleged list of the many CIA attempts to kill Castro. Waldron,
Watergate, 629. The supposed dossier, however, does not appear either in Chilean embassy records or
Letelier’s personal papers. Nixon suggested to an aide that possibly John Dean had ordered the ­break-
in as a CIA cover-up. Dean has denied it and suggested that the operation was organized by John
McCord, a former CIA agent, to eavesdrop on the Allende government. See editorial note, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 797–99; Wise, American Police State, 181; Tim Weiner, “In Tapes, Nixon Muses About
Break-Ins at Foreign Embassies,” NYT, 26 February 1999; and “Nixon Tape Makes References to 1972
Embassy Burglary,” Journal Times, 26 February 1999.
241. Deptel 95646, 18 May 1973, 1973STATE 095646, CFPF, RG 59.
242. Deptel 164695, 18 August 1973, 1973STATE 164695, CFPF, RG 59.
243. Eliot memo to Kissinger, 16 March 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 850 n. 3.
244. Letelier, no. 548–27, 17 April 1973, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
245. CR, 16 April 1973, 119: 12458.
246. SCFR, International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 17.
247. Davis, Last Two Years, 71. For one study suggesting that international law was evolving to
support the right of a host nation to determine just compensation for nationalized foreign property,
see Fleming, “Nationalization of Chile’s Large Copper Communities,” 646.
248. For a list of U.S. firms seized during the Allende presidency, see ­A-187, 28 September 1973, box
4, CAF, RG 84. Some of these firms either received adequate compensation or agreed to form a joint
enterprise with the Chilean state. See the testimony of a General Tire International Company official,
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Summary of the Hearings before the Group of
Eminent Persons, 185; Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 299–302; comments of a First National
City Bank official, in Meyers et al., Chile, 112; and Theberge, Understanding the Allende Revolution, 5–
6.
249. Allende statement on National Public Radio, 26 June 1973, in Allende, El pensamiento de
Salvador Allende, 170.
 5
Making the Economy Scream
The “Invisible Blockade”

The Nixon administration’s effort to undermine the Allende government

through economic warfare began with Track II, the CIA’s covert operation to
destabilize the Chilean economy to foment a military coup that would
preclude Allende’s probable election by Congress. On 15 September 1970,
Nixon asked the CIA to “make the economy scream.” When that effort failed
to prevent Allende from becoming president, Nixon ordered his
administration to “bring maximum feasible influence to bear in
international financial institutions to limit credit or other financing
assistance to Chile” (NSDM 93). Other Latin American countries, as well as
U.S. private businesses, were to be enlisted in this campaign to prevent the
Chilean revolution from succeeding.1 As Nixon confided to U.S. Treasury
Secretary John Connally, “We can’t send men now anymore” so “the major
thing we can do is squeeze them economically,” which “can have one hell of
an effect.”2 The CIA allegedly viewed this effort as a “laboratory experiment,
to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in efforts to discredit
and bring down a government.”3
The UP government was not oblivious to the threat of U.S. economic
warfare. After all, Ambassador Korry had warned Chileans: “Once Allende
comes to power, we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile … to
utmost deprivation and poverty … for a long time to come.” Allende’s
supporters were also aware that the “campaign of terror” during the 1970
election campaign had been waged at least partly on the premise that
economic chaos would precipitate a coup. But UP strategists were hoping
that once Allende established friendly relations with the United States and
made it clear that the new Chilean government did not pose a security
threat, Chile would still be able to access international sources of credit.4 As
U.S. officials carried out NSDM 93, however, Chilean officials gradually
began to suspect that the United States and multinational corporations were
blocking Chile’s efforts to obtain loans from various international financial
institutions and private banks. By early 1971, UP officials charged that an
“invisible blockade” was being imposed on Chile to sabotage the revolution.
After the 1973 coup, a controversy immediately erupted about whether an
“invisible blockade” had brought down Allende. One body of interpretation
maintained that there had indeed been an “invisible blockade,” which had
severely hampered the Chilean economy as part of a broad conspiracy
against Allende. The scholars James Petras and Morris Morley, for example,
traced the blockade to an “international power bloc,” of U.S. corporations,
government agencies, and international banks, which “sharply diminished
the marketing, trade, investment and credit opportunities of Chile
throughout the world.”5 The most fervent advocates of this view described
the blockade as the “key factor” in triggering the 1973 coup.6 Another group,
mostly Nixon administration officials and their defenders, discounted the
“invisible blockade” thesis as a myth invented by the Allende government
and its supporters to shift attention away from UP’s ruinous economic
policies. As one NSC official explained to Kissinger a few days after the
coup: “Thus the answer to the question: did the U.S. cut off their credit in
international agencies is [a] demonstrable NO. Where new credit flows
ceased, it was due to the rules and policies of the institutions themselves and
to Chile’s own economic action.”7
The debate over the “invisible blockade” was partly semantic. Even while
U.S. officials were attempting to curtail loans to Chile, they repeatedly
denied that there was any “blockade.” In their minds, that term was reserved
for the ­full-scale economic sanctions of the sort imposed on Cuba after its
1959 revolution. Because Chilean officials could see only the effects of
Nixon’s secret orders, and because the ITT hearings had unveiled corporate
intrigue, it is understandable that Allende and his supporters came to
imagine that “economic imperialism” was conspiring against the Chilean
revolution by blocking sources of credit. The war of words that unfolded
between the Allende government and the Nixon administration over these
suspicions undoubtedly created a great deal of confusion that spilled over
into later debates about why the UP government had failed. This chapter will
try to set the record straight, as documents are now available that can show
us exactly how the Nixon administration went about trying to undermine
Allende’s government economically.
Although U.S. officials never used the term “economic blockade” in their
internal discussions of how to implement NSDM 93, they did consider
imposing trade sanctions against Chile in retaliation for its expropriation of
the copper industry. The idea was quickly dismissed, however, as the United
States lacked a suitable pretext. In the absence of hostile illegal actions by
Chile against the United States, one legal adviser warned, any attempt to
impose trade controls or block Chilean assets would constitute a violation of
international law, specifically Article 19 of the OAS Charter, which
prohibited coercive economic measures.8 A more serious problem was that
sanctions were judged unlikely to be effective. The United States only
received 17 percent of Chile’s exports, so cutting them off would simply
drive Chilean trade toward Western Europe and Japan without seriously
damaging Chile’s economy.9
Whereas overt economic sanctions would have immediately provoked a
confrontation with Allende, the surreptitious curtailing of Chile’s access to
credit offered the advantage of keeping up the pretense of a “cool but
correct” attitude toward the UP government. The policy worked, at least in
the short term. Allende told a journalist in early 1971 that he did not expect
the United States to conduct an economic warfare campaign against Chile.
He had been elected democratically, so “their hands are tied.”10 Allende also
apparently believed he would be able to find alternative sources of credit,
even as the United States withdrew its aid program.11 Foreign Minister
Almeyda seems to have been under a similar illusion. For example, at a press
conference in early 1971, he brushed off a journalist who pointed out that
Nixon had openly stated that the continuation of certain U.S. aid programs
in Chile would depend upon the direction of Chile’s foreign policy.12
UP’s hopeful optimism diminished rapidly. In early February 1971, U.S.
Senator Javits told the American Management Association that Chile’s
copper amendment “may serve to isolate Chile from the ­inter-American
system and weaken decisively Chile’s close links with the economic system
of the Western Hemisphere.”13 Chilean journalists immediately seized on the
phrase, “isolate Chile,” as an indication that “U.S. imperialism” was about to
initiate an economic blockade against Chile, just as it had against Cuba.14
Chilean journalist Luis Hernández Parker claimed that Allende had
confronted Meyer with written evidence of Nixon’s orders to induce Latin
American countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and others, to
institute a “blockade” against Chile. The Nixon administration and UP
officials immediately denied the story as a complete fabrication, but
“blockade” rumors continued to circulate in the Chilean media.15 Although
Allende publicly denounced the Hernández Parker story as fiction, he
clearly still had doubts. During his meeting with ITT officials on 10 March
1971, Allende complained that he had been “­double-crossed” by American
private banks, which were refusing to extend further credit even though
Chile had just paid off its latest installment.16
Although Chilean journalists had gotten the details wrong, there was in
fact a plot to deny the UP government economic aid and multilateral credit.
When Allende assumed the presidency in 1970, Chile was already in a
precarious financial position. Chile had the highest foreign debt in Latin
America, about $2.2 billion, more than half of which was owed to the United
States. Since the Second World War, most of Chile’s loans had come from
AID, IDB the ­Export-Import Bank, and the World Bank. During the
Alliance for Progress decade, Chile had been the recipient of $2.1 billion in
foreign assistance, second only to Brazil for all U.S. aid given to Latin
America. More than ­three-quarters of Chile’s ­short-term credit came from
U.S. private banks. Chile was also heavily dependent on the United States for
imported capital goods, including spare parts.17 To convey Chile’s burden in
dramatic terms, Allende once observed that “every child born in Chile
comes into this world with a debt of $400!”18
Chilean officials understood that this extreme economic dependence on
the United States gave the Nixon administration immense leverage over the
Chilean economy right from the beginning of Allende’s presidency.19 To
grasp how the “invisible blockade” worked requires a review of the U.S.
economic aid program (AID and ­Export-Import Bank), multilateral sources
of credit (IDB and World Bank), Chile’s attempt to reschedule its foreign
debt, and alternative sources of credit from communist countries.

U.S. Economic Aid: Dancing a Jig for Henry Kearns

The easiest place for the Nixon administration to initiate economic
warfare against Chile was to curtail its aid program. Phasing out U.S.
economic assistance to Chile would not draw much attention, because AID
commitments were already slated for dramatic reductions well before
Allende won the presidency.20 Consequently, Meyer informed Allende
during his inauguration, “not to expect anything from AID.”21 The State
Department decided to delay rather than cancel funds already in the AID
pipeline, however, as some of them were supporting “­people-to-people”
programs, which Nixon had gone on record as supporting. For example, ­PL-
480 funds for school milk were retained, as were ­small-scale AID loans for
cooperative development and training.22 The Peace Corps program was kept
on for the same reason, despite attempts by certain U.S. congressional
legislators to defund it.23 The State Department had originally predicted that
the UP government would kick out the Peace Corps Volunteers, but instead,
Allende welcomed them as “fine, idealistic young men.”24
Cutting off ­Export-Import Bank loans to Chile required delicate
maneuvering if a political backlash were to be avoided. As Meyer explained
to the SRG in November 1970, Chile was receiving $2 million per month in
credits from the ­Export-Import Bank. Abruptly halting these funds would
send a “dramatic” signal to Chile by effectively severing its access to the
entire commercial banking network in the United States, as private banks
would follow the ­Export-Import Bank’s lead. The State Department thus
convinced ­Export-Import Bank President Henry Kearns to deny Chile new
credit and export guarantees based on “banking risk” rather than political
considerations.25
The ploy of rejecting loans for “economic” instead of “political” reasons
failed to appease Chilean officials when it came to their application for a
loan of $26 million for the purchase of three Boeing aircraft for the Chilean
national airline known as ­LAN-Chile.26 In mid–May 1971, the Chilean
embassy contacted Kissinger’s office to convey Allende’s displeasure at the
delay in the processing of the ­Export-Import Bank loan for the Boeing
aircraft. Letelier warned Korry that the bank’s decision on this loan was of
“critical” importance to U.S.-Chilean relations, as a rejection would be
interpreted by Allende as an act of “hostility” based on political
motivations.27
The question of whether to grant the ­Export-Import Bank loan to Chile
for the Boeing aircraft divided the Nixon administration. Ambassador Korry
favored approving the loan unconditionally because refusing it would
trigger Chilean hostility and induce the UP government to buy the aircraft
elsewhere, possibly from Britain. Demanding that the planes not be used to
fly to and from Cuba, as the Defense Department recommended, would be
considered “political blackmail” by the UP government and could lead to a
hardening of its attitude toward the copper compensation issue.28 Treasury
Secretary Connally, by contrast, advised Nixon to turn down the loan, which
he did not think would affect the copper negotiations one way or the other.29
The ­Export-Import Bank sought to make any new loan to Chile conditional
upon UP honoring all debts to U.S. companies that it had expropriated. The
bank also insisted on clarification from the UP government about its balance
of payments position, foreign debt, and foreign exchange reserves. Imposing
all these conditions on Chile was unprecedented, the bank admitted, but
necessary given its view of ­LAN-Chile as “a losing proposition.”30
When the issue came before the SRG on 3 June 1971, Kissinger argued
that the group should not waste its time trying to decide “every bloody
Chilean loan.” Better to seek a judgment from Nixon, and then use the
Boeing case as a precedent that would establish a general policy on
extending credit to Chile.31 Kissinger presented the issue to Nixon a few days
later with the personal observation that “the time has not yet arrived for us
to confront Allende directly by openly drawing the line on economic
credits.” Instead, Kissinger recommended proceeding with the loan
gradually by allowing Kearns to insist on “bankable conditions,” which
would delay approval until after the copper negotiations were concluded.
Nixon agreed with the proviso that he would cut off the loan if a satisfactory
copper settlement was not achieved.32
Because the conditions laid down by the ­Export-Import Bank all but
doomed the Boeing loan, U.S. officials tried to delay conveying this bad
news to the UP government for as long as possible. They found an excuse
when a former Frei cabinet minister, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, was
mysteriously assassinated on 8 June 1971. Conflicting reports about who
might have killed Pérez Zujovic initially led to wild speculation in the
Chilean mass media that the CIA was involved. One popular story suggested
that the CIA had killed Pérez Zujovic to foster a coup. Another claimed that
the assassin came from the same group that had killed General René
Schneider during the 1970 presidential election.33 Nixon was astonished that
the Chileans thought the CIA had killed Pérez Zujovic. “Why the hell would
we assassinate him?” he asked Kissinger. The CIA was too incompetent to
have pulled it off, Kissinger replied, pointing out that the agency had
bungled the Schneider assassination—it took them three attempts.34 Nixon
later kidded with Connally, “If we had attempted it, we’d have done it….
We’re poor at the CIA, but not that poor.”35
Immediately after the assassination Allende declared a state of emergency
and established a commission composed of various Chilean intelligence
agencies to investigate the murder.36 Within a few days, authorities identified
the culprits as two members of the ­ultra-left extremist organization,
Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (VOP, Organized Vanguard of the
People). Both suspects subsequently died in a ­shoot-out with the police.37
Allende was despondent over the Pérez Zujovic assassination, which he
viewed as a crime against Chilean society. It also did not help that at least
one of the VOP assassins was among those leftists that he had released from
prison at the start of his presidency.38 But Allende was also guilty of
spreading rumors about the assassination, such as his nationally televised
speech suggesting that the death of Pérez Zujovic bore a “suspicious
similarity” to the Schneider assassination.39 Nixon was incensed at the
implication because it was obvious that the “Communists” were to blame.
Kissinger fueled his boss’s rage by suggesting that the UP government was
“playing this like the Nazis played the Reichstag” fire.40 On 11 June, Letelier
conceded that the CIA allegations were damaging U.S.-Chilean relations,
and he promised U.S. officials that Allende would convene UP leaders
shortly to issue a clarification.41 A few days later, Allende publicly urged
Chilean journalists to be more responsible in offering their judgments about
the assassination.42 Still, rumors of CIA intrigue continued to fly, partially
stoked by Allende’s fiery speech to a labor confederation on 16 June. In what
Korry described as a highly emotional performance, Allende blamed the
assassination on a vast international conspiracy, which included local
fascists and mysterious efforts to isolate Chile by cutting off bank credits
from traditional sources and preventing Chile from hosting the UNCTAD
conference.43
The distraction of the Pérez Zujovic assassination bought the Nixon
administration only a few weeks of temporary relief, as the Chilean embassy
continued to press U.S. officials for a decision on the Boeing loan.44 In mid–
June 1971, Kissinger’s aide warned him that delaying much longer on the- ­
Export-Import Bank loan could potentially cause the Chileans to take a
harder line on the copper compensation issue, which would increase the risk
of OPIC having to pay $400 million in guarantees.45 After several
unproductive meetings with ­Export-Import Bank officials, Letelier
reminded them that Chile could always go to the Soviets for the planes. The
threat was essentially a bluff, for LAN much preferred American Boeings to
Soviet Ilyushins, but Letelier correctly suspected that the bank’s obstinacy
was “backed at a high political level.”46 To expose the Nixon administration’s
use of the bank as leverage to protect the copper companies, Letelier issued a
press release stating that Chile’s application for a loan to purchase the
Boeing aircraft had been rejected.47 Allende immediately took his cue. After
explaining to a group of copper miners that the Boeing loan was being held
up by the copper companies even though the Chilean government was
following constitutional procedures in expropriating the copper industry, he
appealed to their national pride. We may be a small country, he proclaimed,
but we will not submit to this insult to our “dignity.”48
Once again, UP officials seem to have stumbled onto the truth of U.S.
economic aggression but for the wrong reasons. The copper companies were
at that very moment privately pressing the Nixon administration to cut off
all aid to Chile until a fair deal was reached on compensation.49 Because
Allende and his supporters were in the dark, they could not be expected to
grasp that the copper companies were not the driving force behind the
rejection of the ­Export-Import Bank loan application. Although Kissinger
wanted to take a “tough course on Chile,” he remained somewhat skeptical
about the copper companies’ schemes. Anaconda’s proposal to reward Chile
with credits as an incentive to settle the compensation issue, he noted in an
SRG meeting, is “really asking us to pay the Chileans to pay them
[Anaconda] off.”50 Even if the copper companies had not lobbied the Nixon
administration to defend their interests, U.S. officials would have found
another pretext to block the loan. Nixon was anxious to punish Chile
economically as much as possible to set an example. As he explained to
Kissinger and Connally, “everything we do with the Chilean Government
will be watched by other governments and revolutionary groups in Latin
America as a signal as to what they can do and get away with. Therefore, I
tend to be against doing anything for them.”51 When Kissinger reported in a
memo that the ­Export-Import Bank and IDB loans and guarantees had been
cut off, the president highlighted both and indicated that he wanted the
policy of aid reduction to continue.52
Heaping the blame on the copper companies, enabled both the Nixon
administration and the UP government to evade an overt clash. “Chile does
not want to see in this lamentable development a negative alteration in the
attitude of the Government of the United States with us,” the Chilean foreign
ministry announced in August 1971.53 A Chilean embassy official assured
U.S. legislator William Anderson (D–Tennessee) that Chile wanted to
believe that the ­Export-Import Bank’s rejection of the loan for the Boeings
did not signal an “aggressive” U.S. posture, but was simply the result of a
banking decision.54 Most Chileans were far less understanding. In reviewing
Chilean press coverage about the Boeing loan rejection, the U.S. embassy
reported: “all shades of Chilean political opinion are in fundamental public
agreement” that linking the loan to the copper compensation issue
constitutes an “infringement of sovereignty and therefore deserves
repudiation by all Chileans.”55 U.S. reporter Marilyn Berger noted: “There is
a sense that the United States is holding an economic bludgeon, and the
immediate reaction is to refuse to knuckle under to pressure.”56
The announcement that the Nixon administration was making the loan
for the Boeing aircraft conditional on the outcome of the copper
negotiations drew widespread fire not only in Chile but also from some
surprising quarters in the United States. A research associate at the
Brookings Institution, a U.S. ­right-wing think tank, complained that linking
the loan to the copper cases could force “President Allende to take a more
anti–U.S. stand on all fronts in spite of his ­oft-stated desire to maintain
cordial relations with this country.”57 Herman Badillo (D–New York)
chastised Nixon: The ­Export-Import Bank’s refusal to negotiate the Boeing
loan, he wrote, “is nothing more than a callous rebuff to Chile” that will
strain U.S. relations with Allende.58 The Washington Post regarded the- ­
Export-Import Bank’s conditions for the loan to Chile “as a classic case of- ­
big-stick diplomacy” because “no ­self-respecting government, Marxist or
otherwise, can be expected to dance a jig” for ­Export-Import Bank President
Henry Kearns.59
Despite these isolated pleas for leniency in Chile’s case, the U.S. Congress
wanted to adopt a much harsher policy toward countries that expropriated
U.S. businesses. The Hickenlooper Amendment, for example, required the
president to suspend assistance to any country that did not take “appropriate
steps” to provide “speedy compensation” to U.S. citizens whose property had
been expropriated. The suspension of aid was mandatory, although the
president could evade this restriction if he determined that continuing aid to
a particular country was “important to the national interests of the United
States.”60 The Nixon administration had used this loophole in the case of the
Juan Velasco Alvarado military regime in Peru, which had nationalized the
International Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1968. The Nixon administration
decided to accommodate Velasco for many reasons. According to the NSC,
the Velasco regime represented a new kind of “strongly nationalist, middle
class, military group” which “cannot be neatly characterized as ‘Nasserist’ or
‘Peronist,’ and certainly not as ‘Castroist,’ although it exhibits some elements
of each.”61 Invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment against such a regime
would stir up anti–Americanism in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America.62
U.S. officials considered dumping Velasco, but because the entire Peruvian
military shared Velasco’s anti–American views, there was no guarantee that
Velasco’s replacement would confer any advantage.63 At least Velasco was
anticommunist and could be counted on to cooperate in the effort to isolate
Chile.64 As Kissinger explained in an SRG meeting in late October 1970,
“One reason we could go along with the ­non-application of the
Hickenlooper Amendment in the IPC case was that we judged that Velasco
was a nationalist but not unreasonable and that we could keep some lines
open to him.”65
Many of the same considerations that led the Nixon administration to
delay invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment in Peru also applied to Chile.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Crimmins warned Kissinger on 19
December 1970 that a strong application of the Hickenlooper Amendment
in Chile could raise sympathy for the Allende regime throughout Latin
America, as many believed that the amendment violated Article 19 of the
OAS Charter, which prohibited member states from using economic
coercion against each another.66 Hickenlooper “is an emotional name” in
Latin America, Irwin warned the SRG, so it would be better to find other
means to accomplish the same ends in Chile.67 Invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment against Chile, one U.S. journalist predicted, would “send shock
waves throughout Latin America.”68
Although the threat of an unwanted confrontation led the Nixon
administration away from invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment in Chile,
Nixon and Kissinger were keen to explore other ways to restrict aid to
countries that dared to expropriate U.S. private investments. “Should we just
simply lie back and let them expropriate things around the world?” Nixon
asked Kissinger. “Unless we become too dangerous to tackle,” Kissinger
answered, “there’s going to be a constant erosion of our international
position.”69 On 23 June 1971, Nixon ordered a suspension of loans to all
countries in the process of expropriating property owned by U.S. citizens
until a study could be conducted to assess U.S. options.70 Consequently, the
Boeing loan to Chile was held up another four months while the Nixon
administration deliberated a new policy guideline on expropriations. Charls
Walker of the Treasury Department wanted expropriations of any kind
(compensated or not) to trigger an immediate cessation of aid, which would
shift the blame for a confrontation to the expropriating country rather than
the United States.71 Crimmins, however, worried that Treasury’s hardline,
“whether naked or flimsily veiled … will give our policy a distinct, coercive,
repressive cast.”72 The compromise appeared in NSDM 136, which
automatically suspended aid to countries that expropriated a “significant
U.S. interest” until it could be determined that “the country is taking
reasonable steps to provide compensation.”73 When Nixon announced the
new policy in January 1972, he failed to mention that it did not apply to
humanitarian aid and ­Export-Import Bank operations.74 In a ­follow-up press
conference, however, one of Nixon’s assistants implied that the new policy
would be applied to Chile’s pending ­Export-Import Bank loan application.75
To make matters worse for Chile, in early 1972 the U.S. Congress began to
consider further restrictions on loans to Third World countries that carried
out expropriations. The result was the Gonzalez Amendment, which
mandated U.S. representatives in multilateral institutions to vote against
loans to countries that had expropriated U.S. investments without providing
compensation.76
Chileans took great offense at these legislative restrictions on the
disbursement of foreign aid, which seemed to be aimed at them. The
paternalistic way U.S. officials delivered these new edicts only heightened
Chilean bitterness. For example, Secretary Rogers admitted that halting aid
to Third World countries that carried out expropriations without providing
prompt fair compensation could appear as a “slap in the face” to Chile and
other Latin American nations, but such measures might be the “only
language they understand.”77 Ambassador Letelier interpreted these aid
restrictions as attempts to neutralize Chile’s promotion of Latin American
solidarity, as demonstrated in the recent agreements that Allende had signed
with the presidents of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Argentina.78 Letelier
also correctly ascertained that Treasury Secretary Connally was behind the
hardline policy on expropriation, and had greater influence over Nixon than
the State Department.79 The main purpose of Connally’s Latin American
tour in mid–June 1972, Letelier surmised, was to lay down the “rules of the
game” when it came to U.S. overseas private investment.80
Given that the United States held the purse strings, Chile had little
recourse to the new aid restrictions. By early 1972 the ­Export-Import Bank
had multiple grounds for denying Chile further credit; it chose to cease all
loans pending clarification of Chile’s debt issues.81 After Chile fell more than
six months behind in repayment of AID loans, Secretary Rogers had to issue
a “national interest waiver” to the Hickenlooper Amendment in order to
permit humanitarian aid to continue flowing while the foreign debt and
copper compensation negotiations continued.82 In March 1973 the Chilean
foreign ministry drafted a complaint that the United States had violated the
OAS Charter by intervening economically in Chile. The ministry gave as
evidence the new U.S. legislation that tied aid to the expropriation issue. The
premise of the argument was weak. Decisions by the United States over how
to disburse its foreign aid hardly constituted “economic aggression.” The
Chileans were on much stronger ground, however, when it came to U.S.
attempts to deny Chile credit from multilateral banks.83

The ­Inter-American Development Bank and World

Bank: Kicking an Elephant
To compensate for the decline in aid from the U.S. government, UP
officials hoped to obtain more credit from the IDB and the World Bank,
both multilateral lending agencies that theoretically would provide a more
neutral forum for judging Chile’s loan applications. This solution failed to
take into account that the United States, because of its greater financial
contributions to the reserves of both banks, exerted a disproportionate
amount of voting power that could be used to block loans to any country
that violated the rules of expropriation as defined by the United States.84
Even before the passage of Gonzalez Amendment, U.S. bank representatives
were legally required to veto loans from countries that carried out
expropriations without providing adequate compensation.85
In the case of the IDB, the Nixon administration was especially concerned
that the bank’s founder and president, Felipe Herrera, a Chilean, could not
be trusted. Meyer complained to the SRG on 17 October 1970 that Herrera
had ­double-crossed the United States by advancing loan applications from
Chile after promising he would wait until after 4 November. Consequently,
Meyer directed the U.S. representative to IDB to abstain from voting on loan
applications to Chile (effectively blocking them) by claiming that he was
without instructions from Washington.86 A Defense Department official also
warned that Letelier, one of Felipe Herrera’s “protégés,” was so familiar with
how the IDB operated that he would be difficult to outmaneuver. While
there was no getting rid of Letelier, who stayed on in Washington as the
Chilean ambassador to the United States, Herrera was forced out of the IDB
by the White House, no small irony given that he was then free to make a
bid to become the next UN ­Secretary General.87
When Allende assumed the presidency in 1970 several IDB loans were
pending for two private Chilean Catholic universities. On 19 November, the
SRG debated the meaning of Nixon’s order to cease all new loans to Chile “to
the extent possible.” According to Kissinger, Nixon meant by this phrase that
no new loans should be made unless there are “overwhelming reasons to do
so.” Undersecretary of State John Irwin counseled delaying a decision
because the university loans were just the kind of case where an exception
ought to be made. Turning them down now, he warned, would be seen by
Allende as a hostile move. Kissinger eventually conceded, but groused that
“if we don’t do something significant somewhere along the line, we will be
lending support to his [Allende’s] line that there is no penalty for going
against the United States.”88 When the issue came up again at the SRG
meeting on 23 December, U.S. Information Agency Director Frank
Shakespeare argued for approving the loans, which were not for very much
money and would be the “wrong issue to make a case on.”89 Nixon approved
the loans, but with Kissinger’s assurance that U.S. representatives would
make it clear to the bank that there would be no more credits for Chile.90
The decision to grant the university loans proved farsighted. When
Letelier expressed his concern about rumors that the White House was
waging an economic blockade against Chile, Kissinger was able to point to
the U.S. approval of the two IDB loans for Chilean universities to support
his contention that such accusations were complete “nonsense.”91 Letelier
told Rogers in April 1971 that UP had become so worried about U.S.
congressional opposition to loans to Chile that it was delaying further IDB
proposals to avoid a confrontation.92 The two university loans did draw fire
from conservative critics in the U.S. Congress, such as H.R. Gross (R–Iowa),
who became incensed that the United States was assisting an “avowed
communist government.”93 The corporate sector also pressed the Nixon
administration to cease supporting multilateral credit to Chile as a means to
induce the UP government to provide satisfactory compensation for the
properties it had nationalized.94
When it came to curtailing multilateral credit to Chile, the Nixon
administration hardly needed to be pushed. As Irwin advised Kissinger at
the end of 1971, the best way to carry out NSDM 93 was “to obstruct and
delay Chilean loan applications before the IBRD [World Bank] and IDB
using technical and procedural reasons to the maximum feasible extent.”
Hiding behind the facade of “­credit worthiness” would delay an unnecessary
confrontation with both the UP government and the multilateral institutions
over charges of political bias in rejecting Chile’s loan applications.95 This
strategy proved highly effective as Chile found its access to IDB credit
blocked at every turn. So transparent were these obstructions that Canada
accused the United States of using the bank as a “lever and a whip” to punish
counties such as Chile that were embroiled in nationalization disputes.
Chilean loan applications were rejected so often on technicalities that one
Chilean official jested: “The IDB is behaving like an umbrella that’s up only
when it’s not raining.”96
Denying Chile access to credit from the World Bank proved even easier
than from the IDB because the head of the World Bank, former U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert S. McNamara, could be counted on to support the
administration. Instead of contacting McNamara directly, however, the State
Department decided it would be less conspicuous if it first attempted “-­
working-level consultations” to persuade bank officials to restrict loans to
Chile.97 When Allende assumed the presidency the World Bank had
approved several ­hundred-million-dollar projects in Chile, most of which
were beyond recall. A World Bank survey team was scheduled to visit Chile
in December to consider new projects, which included a power plant,
livestock improvement, and fruit processing. The U.S. Executive Director of
the World Bank agreed to convey “discretely” to the survey team a set of
questions prepared by the State Department whose probable answers would
prevent Chile from receiving further credit “without the hand of the U.S.
Government showing in the process.”98
The Nixon administration’s subtle attempt to turn the World Bank against
Chile was highly successful, although it is conceivable that the bank would
have declined Chile’s projects anyway.99 McNamara initially assured Chilean
officials that the World Bank would not discriminate against the UP
government on ideological grounds, but bank representatives also warned
Chilean officials in February 1971 that Chile’s recent “structural and
institutional changes” had introduced an “element of uncertainty in the- ­
short-run economic outlook.”100 Just as the Nixon administration desired,
the bank delayed processing Chile’s proposed new loans. The electric power
project stalled, for example, because Chile rejected the bank’s demand to
increase power rates, which UP officials viewed as a violation of Chilean
sovereignty.101 Another obstacle was the copper expropriation issue. At its
annual meeting in September 1971, World Bank officials informed Chile’s
National Bank Governor Alfonso Inostroza that there had to be “reasonable
progress toward a suitable settlement” on copper compensation before Chile
would be eligible for new credits.102
At the 1972 UNCTAD meeting in Santiago, Allende complained to
McNamara that the CIA and the Nixon administration were holding back
World Bank loans. McNamara denied the charge and insisted that there
were only two ways to industrialize: Chile could either rely on external
capital resources or follow the Russian and Chinese model of “carving
capital resources out of domestic welfare and consumption.” When Allende
adamantly rejected the second path, McNamara hinted that an
“accommodation” might be possible. The two finally agreed that Allende
would make policy changes in exchange for McNamara’s willingness to bring
a development loan project before the board.103
This rapprochement did not last long. Nixon, furious that McNamara was
even considering approving a Chilean loan, instructed his administration in
June 1972 to “oppose loans to any country,” including Chile, “that has kicked
us around.”104 Tensions between the Allende government and the World
Bank exploded at the bank’s next annual meeting in late September.
Inostroza complained that Chile had not received a single loan from the
bank, which had acted in a “manifestly precipitate and prejudiced manner
… not as an independent multinational body at the service of the economic
development of all of its members, but in fact as a spokesman or instrument
of private interests of one of its member countries.”105 Bank officials, clearly
embarrassed at this outburst, denied the accusation and insisted that Chile
did not qualify for new loans because of its unresolved foreign debt and lack
of credit worthiness.106 Now that the lines had been drawn, the dispute
continued to play out in similar terms over the next twelve months. For
example, at the 1972 UN Economic and Social Council meeting Chilean
representative Hugo Cubillos charged that the World Bank was granting
credits based more on “political ideology than on the content of the
projects.” McNamara denied Cubillos’ assertion that the bank had
suspended loans to Chile because of its nationalization policy. The problem,
he insisted, was that the government of Chile had not taken suitable steps to
restore its ­credit worthiness.107
By early 1973, the UP government had concluded that the World Bank
was not going to grant further credit to Chile because of the bank’s general
policy to punish Third World countries that carried out nationalizations.108
Consequently, Chile suspended payments on its outstanding loans to the
World Bank. Allende strenuously objected to Chile being classified as “not- ­
credit worthy,” especially given that it had always honored its international
debts. In June, Inostroza and World Bank Senior Vice President J. Burke
Knapp agreed that if the bank would adjust interest on outstanding loans,
Chile would resume payments and make good on arrears by the end of
1973.109 This agreement paved the way for Chile to make another attempt at
applying for a World Bank loan. To help ensure a better outcome, Chilean
embassy officer Pablo Valdés pleaded with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for ­Inter-American Affairs John Kubisch on 26 July 1973 not to interfere
with the loan, thereby causing an “adverse reaction” in Chile that might
disrupt the bilateral talks. Kubisch said he would keep an open mind, but he
also warned Valdés that the Gonzalez Amendment had tied the
administration’s hands. An additional obstacle, he added, was that the Paris
creditors were afraid that approving Chile’s World Bank loan request would
undermine any incentive for Chile to undertake a stabilization program.110
The very same day, Secretary Rogers requested that U.S. embassies in the
countries with prominent voting power in the World Bank explain to their
respective host governments that the United States opposed Chile’s loan
application. The State Department also asked McNamara to keep the
Chilean proposal off the World Bank agenda.111 These tactics proved to be
overkill. McNamara later recalled that “I didn’t need any instruction from
the U.S. government … to stop me from loaning to Chile” because “the
whole damn economy was being destroyed.”112 The danger a Chilean default
might damage the bank’s credit rating eventually led McNamara to
reconsider loans to Chile provided Allende agreed to a rescheduling plan.
World Bank lending to Chile did not resume, however, until after Pinochet
seized power.113
Renegotiating Chile’s Foreign Debt: Shooting an
Albatross
Allende may have made a mess of Chile’s economy, as his critics have
charged, but it also must be acknowledged that he inherited an exorbitant
foreign debt when he assumed the presidency. By 1970, Chile owed $3.1
billion, forcing the country to divert 30 percent of its exports toward
servicing the foreign debt. Chile was already trapped in an early
manifestation of what would eventually be called the “debt crisis,” a cycle of-
never-ending borrowing just to keep up with interest payments.114 During
his 1964 presidential campaign, Allende had explained that his proposal to
renegotiate Chile’s foreign debt did not constitute an act of hostility toward
the United States: “Any country in the world would understand that you
cannot keep servicing the debt when it amounts to half the total value of
exports.”115 By the time Allende became president, Chileans had tired of the
traditional medicine of the “money doctors,” who recommended
stabilization programs that kept Chile impoverished. The challenge for the
UP government thus became how to honor its external debt without
sacrificing the goals of the revolution.
Allende understood that tackling the foreign debt issue meant having to
negotiate with Washington. Chilean economist Ricardo Lagos prophetically
observed after Allende’s electoral victory: “The success of Allende’s program
may depend on the United States” because of Chile’s large foreign debt.116
Allende viewed the debt crisis as one of the main reasons that Latin America
remained underdeveloped. The “foreign debt of our continent reaches
astronomical figures,” he told the annual meeting of the UN Economic
Commission for Latin America in early 1971, so that “day by day the
distance between the industrialized and the developing countries grows
greater and greater.”117 Given the urgency of the issue, it is surprising that
Allende did not announce the renegotiation of Chile’s debt until a year after
his inauguration. By then Chile’s foreign reserves had fallen by nearly ­one-
half. He announced on 9 November 1971 that “unless there is a
restructuring of the accumulated debt, the country will face serious ­balance
of payments problems, which cannot be corrected through partial internal
measures in exchange policy or in foreign trade.”118
In determining how to respond to Allende’s announcement, the Nixon
administration pondered whether to openly take the lead in seeking
“maximum stringency in the terms of any debt ­re-negotiation.”119 The
Treasury Department favored a strategy of “maximum economic denial”
because “it could start a dangerous trend if Chile, after just expropriating
foreign investment is then permitted to declare a moratorium on its own
debt and, without any visible economic stabilization program, obtain a
generous rescheduling.”120 Ambassador Davis, by contrast, advocated a
policy of “quiet restraint,” so as not to give Allende an opportunity to rally
the nation against the “foreign devil.” In his view, the Europeans should take
the lead in debt renegotiation.121 On 11 January 1972, State Department
official Sidney Weintraub summarized these views for the SRG. The U.S.
goal in the negotiations would be “to see that Chile receives the least
possible debt relief; that its creditworthiness be an accurate reflection of its
own seriously deteriorated economy; and that the Allende regime continue
to bear the full responsibility for its own failures without shifting it to us.”
With Kissinger’s approval, Weintraub had agreed to U.S. participation in the
Paris Club’s creditors’ meeting, scheduled for early February.122 The U.S.
delegation, to be headed by Weintraub, would “vigorously press” the
Chileans to acknowledge its debt to U.S. official and private creditors,
including the copper companies.123
Weintraub’s decision to head the delegation to Paris and renegotiate
Chile’s foreign debt enraged Connally, who wrote to Nixon complaining that
he had been operating under the assumption that “our principal purpose is
to get broad creditor support to isolate Chile.” Nixon underlined this
sentence and wrote next to it, “This is our policy.”124 Connally brought up
Weintraub’s decision a few days later in a telephone conversation with the
president. That “­son-of-a-bitch” was “not supposed to do that,” the president
fumed. Kissinger had been instructed that Allende was to get “absolutely
nothing,” he added.125 Nixon was incredulous that the State Department
wanted to “go over and help make another loan to Chile—when Allende’s in
trouble!”126 The next day, Nixon put Connally in charge of the Paris
delegation with the instruction that “we just drag our feet” in the
negotiations.127 Nixon and Connally revisited the issue in early February. Let
the Soviets rescue Chile, the president argued. Chile will end up like Cuba,
which “sucks from Russia a million dollars a day.” No need to worry about
Allende, Connally promised, “just hold his feet to the fire and he’ll be in
trouble…. We’re going to do to Chile what we did to Argentina 25 years ago.
We let the Perons run high, wide, and handsome there, and they destroyed
Argentina for a quarter of a century.”128
Although the Treasury Department appeared to have reasserted control
by taking charge of the U.S. delegation to Paris, the State Department ended
up having the last word. Several obstacles derailed the Treasury’s plan to
pursue the hardline against Chile. Although Letelier tried to assure Connally
that Chile did not want a confrontation in Paris, Almeyda informed
Ambassador Davis that Chile would not accept an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) standby agreement as a condition for obtaining debt relief. “It is
simply not in the cards,” he warned, to expect the “Chilean government to
lie down and surrender its program, its aspirations, and its leadership.”129
Consultations with some of the Paris creditors also revealed that few of them
were willing to take a hard line against Chile at this stage. One Spanish
official wondered, would it not be better to sign a bad deal than risk pushing
Chile into becoming a “second Cuba?”130 France, which chaired the meeting,
also proved uncooperative by trying to speed up the negotiations and
downplay the IMF standby requirement.131 The U.S. embassy continued to
recommend working together with the European creditors toward the
“toughest debt renegotiation deal we can achieve.” Otherwise, Chile might
sign a separate agreement with the European creditors and use nationalist
resentment over the ITT case to gain support for repudiating the U.S.
portion of the debt. The first instruction in NSDM 93 was “to avoid giving
the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international
support for consolidation of the regime.” Adopting a hard line in Paris could
potentially violate Nixon’s instructions by undermining the “cool but
correct” posture.132
The Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile and the NSC agreed
with the State Department because they feared that Treasury’s hardline
approach could end up strengthening Allende’s hold on Chile. But they also
recommended that U.S. negotiators and the other creditors make debt relief
contingent upon settlement of the copper expropriation cases.133 The SRG
finally settled the matter on 11 April 1972, by agreeing to ask the Paris Club
members to issue a statement on expropriation that the U.S. negotiator
(Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Development Finance John
Hennessey) could sign after clearing it with Connally. The United States
would not propose arbitration of the copper issue but would accept
arbitration if the Chileans and other creditors agreed.134
Chilean officials entered into the negotiations in Paris fairly confident of
obtaining a debt relief agreement, but they faced an uphill struggle. By early
1972, the Chilean economy was already in serious trouble. Allende had been
forced to suspend the servicing of short- and ­medium-term debts, which
made it difficult to obtain new lines of credit from European banks.135
Ricardo Lagos predicted a rough road in Paris for Chilean negotiators, as the
creditors might force a devaluation that could exacerbate inflation.136 The
IMF report, which came out in the middle of the negotiations, revealed that
Chile’s balance of payments had fallen from a surplus of $70 million to a
deficit of $400 million since Allende assumed the presidency.137 These
economic indicators supported the U.S. Treasury Department’s contention
that “time is on our side,” especially as external assistance dried up and
copper prices plunged.138
In between the four formal negotiating sessions that took place in Paris
from February to April 1972, U.S. and Chilean officials met privately to
discuss the impediments to a settlement.139 On 10 March, for example,
Letelier and Crimmins sparred over the IMF standby agreement, Chile’s
debts, and the copper compensation issues. Crimmins emphasized that the
creditors wanted Chile to agree to an IMF standby agreement as the “firm
norm.” Letelier declared that an IMF standby agreement was a violation of
Chilean sovereignty and would not be accepted, although Chile was working
with the IMF team in Chile to prepare an acceptable alternative.140
Crimmins asserted that the Braden debt and copper compensation cases
(see Chapter 4) were pertinent to the Paris Club members because of their
impact on the balance of payments. Letelier insisted that the Paris Club
meetings were the wrong forum for these issues, but he also hinted that they
might be handled bilaterally via the 1914 Treaty.141
The final agreement reached on 20 April 1972 reflected compromises on
both sides. Allende’s announcement the day before that he was going to
nationalize ITT brought the compensation issue to the attention of the Paris
creditors, so Chile had to pledge that it would provide “just compensation
for all the nationalizations in conformity with Chilean law and international
law, as reflected in the principles of resolution 1803 of the United Nations.”142
Chile had sought a ­three-year grace period on its foreign debt but had to
settle for agreeing to pay 30 percent of all debt and interest payments from
November 1971 to the end of 1972, with six years to pay the remainder. UP’s
sole victory was that creditors dropped the IMF standby requirement in
exchange for Chile’s agreeing to report regularly on its balance of
payments.143 Kissinger wrote to Nixon afterward that the Chilean agreement
represented a “major step forward” that will “probably be acceptable to us.”
The president scribbled in the margin, “not to me,” and asked Kissinger to
check back with him for final approval.144
If Nixon did not like the 1972 Chilean debt agreement, the Chileans were
not happy either. Allende explained to workers in a May Day speech that the
agreement did not solve Chile’s foreign debt problem, and Chile would have
to fight to defend its constitutional amendment on copper compensation.145
Pablo Neruda, the Chilean ambassador to France, told a literary association
in New York City that the way that U.S. officials behaved during the Paris
negotiations reminded him of the famous Samuel Coleridge Taylor poem,
The Ancient Mariner, in which a sailor kills an albatross, thus bringing bad
luck to his ship. To Neruda, the sailor “looked to me as though it was
perhaps the representative of the United States [Hennessy] who concealed
an arrow underneath his business papers—ready to aim it at the albatross’s
[Chile’s] heart!”146
Almeyda and Letelier determined that there was no way out of the foreign
debt problem without resolving the compensation issue.147 Chile’s balance of
payments position was highly precarious, Almeyda noted in late November
1972, and to default on the foreign debt would paralyze Chile’s relations with
its remaining creditors, push European countries into siding with the United
States against Chile, and damage Chile’s relations with the IMF, the World
Bank, and other Latin American countries. Christian Democrat President
Renán Fuentealba also warned that if UP walked away from the talks and
began relying on Soviet aid, the opposition could then accuse Allende of
seeking to “exchange one imperialism for another.”148 Consequently,
Almeyda advocated maintaining positive relations with the United States to
gain more time to find a solution to the compensation issue, which would
then open the way for more productive negotiations over the debt crisis.149
The difficulty with this strategy, as discussed in the previous chapter, was
that the Nixon administration rejected the 1914 Treaty as a mechanism for
arbitration of the copper dispute. At the same time, the Chilean negotiators
in Paris had come under attack in the Chilean press for having “signed
away” part of the Chilean constitution.150 Allende also faced dissension from
within the UP ranks. MAPU ­Secretary General Óscar Guillermo Garretón,
for example, advised the president that trying to negotiate with the United
States over the foreign debt and the copper compensation issues was
pointless because Chile had nothing to offer and nothing it could demand. It
was better, he argued, to focus on seeking support from socialist countries
and the Third World.151 Even Allende’s own party (PS) called for repudiating
the foreign debt “if North American imperialism continues economic and
diplomatic aggression” against Chile.152
Not privy to these debates raging inside UP, the State Department
continued to challenge Treasury’s hard line out of fear that Allende would
gain politically if the United States became isolated from the rest of the Paris
creditors. If Chile were to repudiate the U.S. portion of the debt, Irwin
warned Kissinger, the “rupture would close the door to future movement
toward settlement of debt and compensation claims, would cause severe
immediate losses to U.S. agencies, and could deprive us of an important
opportunity for major creditors collectively to enunciate expressions of
principle on international economic policy.”153 Instead, the State Department
recommended signing a bilateral debt rescheduling agreement for the
November 1971–December 1972 period before the next Paris round in
order to increase economic pressure on the UP government. Allende’s
probable failure to pay would contribute toward the goal of seeking
“maximum international criticism of Chile’s economic policies.”154
In late January 1973, the Paris creditors met again to consider Chile’s
progress. The United States helped defeat various proposals to extend
Chilean debt relief. The Club decided to defer all action until late April or
early May, by which time an IMF study of the Chilean economy was
supposed to be completed.155 Letelier was relieved that the United States did
not try to introduce in this session bilateral issues related to copper
compensation, but he also warned Santiago that U.S. officials would not
necessarily be so understanding at the next Paris Club meeting.156 Letelier
pointed out that because the United States had demonstrated “flexibility” in
the April 1972 Paris session, it expected “substantial reciprocity from
Chile.”157 Nonetheless, he pleaded with the Nixon administration to separate
the debt renegotiation from the nationalization question. Ambassador Davis
indicated that although the U.S. government was not going to back down on
this point, it was open to using a ­third-party mechanism to arbitrate
compensation.158
At the next Paris Club meeting in mid–July 1973, Chile requested
rescheduling of the new installments due in 1973 owing to the poor balance
of payments outlook. The creditors insisted, however, that Chile implement
stabilization policies instead of a formal IMF standby agreement. The Club
would resume negotiations no later than 31 October 1973 when the report
of another IMF team would be available.159 Like the copper compensation
issue, the negotiations over Chile’s foreign debt were disrupted by the
September coup. Pinochet accepted an IMF standby agreement in January
1974 and immediately received $95 million, as Chile returned to the
compliant group of Third World dictatorships, which were content to
appease international lending institutions, even if that meant imposing
austerity plans that caused their populations to suffer.160

U.S. Military Aid: Red Fascism?

While Nixon insisted that economic aid should be reduced to Chile as
much as possible, he left unclear if that policy should be extended to
military assistance. In 1970, the United States had a small military mission
of 17 men stationed in Chile, so one of the first decisions to be made after
Allende’s election was whether to keep the mission or withdraw it. On the
one hand, continuing the U.S. military mission under existing defense
agreements would strengthen U.S. ties with the Chilean military and keep it
dependent on U.S. spare parts and equipment. On the other hand, keeping
the mission and supporting the Chilean military could end up strengthening
Allende’s forces, confusing U.S. allies, and triggering a Latin American arms
race.161
Just before Allende assumed the presidency, the Chilean government had
contracted for but not yet received some twenty ­M-41 tanks from the U.S.
government. Chile was also scheduled to receive $2.5 million from the U.S.
Military Assistance Program (MAP), and just over $4 million in Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) for military equipment.162 Additionally, the Chilean Air
Force was seeking to purchase ­C-47, ­C-130, and ­F-5 aircraft, which would
require export licensing approval. Uncertain about Allende’s attitude toward
the military, U.S. officials initially suspended these programs in order to
determine if it was even possible to continue them given the change in
government.163 The State Department recommended that before contacting
the Allende government the U.S. military mission first determine if Chilean
military leaders wished to honor the existing defense treaty agreements.164
At the 19 November 1970 SRG meeting, Kissinger decided to keep the
U.S. military mission in Chile without contacting the Chilean government in
advance because it would “give us a channel of communication and some
normal means of contact with the one element in Chile that has the best
chance to move against Allende.”165 Kissinger’s ruling was consistent with
Nixon’s instructions to foster closer relations with the military in Latin
America while keeping a low profile. We should keep close contact between
“our military and theirs,” Nixon had told the NSC in 1969, “but not appear
to be doing it.”166 Such contradictory instructions would be hard enough to
carry out under normal circumstances, but in the case of Chile there were
added difficulties. Potentially embarrassing questions were likely to arise in
the U.S. Congress and elsewhere about why the Nixon administration was
continuing to support the Chilean military when it was cutting off nearly all
economic aid to the Allende government.167
Although Kissinger declared that “our strategy is to try and be as close to
the military as we can,” he was at the same time unsure whether the Chilean
military could be trusted.168 For example, he asked the Defense Department
to investigate whether Chile’s presence on the ­Inter-American Defense
Board (IADB), a body created during the Second World War to protect the
hemisphere, posed any dangers because the board handled classified
intelligence. Cuba had been excluded from IADB in 1962 because of its ties
to the Soviet Union, so by the same logic perhaps Chile should be kicked
out.169 Even after the Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Chile determined that
Chile’s participation on the board did not represent a serious security risk
and that trying to oust Chile from it would be embarrassing and
counterproductive, both Kissinger and Nixon remained skeptical about
supporting the Chilean military. The apparent willingness of senior Chilean
military officers to work with Allende caused Nixon and Kissinger to
question their reliability.170
 At the SRG meeting in mid–February 1971, U.S. officials debated how
much military assistance to provide Chile. The State Department argued that
because the Chilean military was “constitutionally minded” it was better to
lower FMS credit to $4–5 million from the proposed $7 million to signal the
military that there was a cost to their complacency. Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard acknowledged that the Chilean military was
“unwilling to take a stand,” but he still recommended granting the full
amount because “by continuing our assistance, we may at least keep the
Russians from coming in.”171 The group decided to release the ­M-41 tanks in
the pipeline but left it to Kissinger to decide on the appropriate FMS level.
Kissinger ended up siding with the State Department by awarding Chile $5
million in FMS credits on the grounds that an extra $2 million would not
buy extra influence with the Chilean military.172
Even though the FMS level appeared settled, in May 1971 the Chilean
ministry of defense requested $19.4 million in FMS credits to purchase a
variety of aircraft and paratrooper equipment.173 The issue was “whether to
restrict the Chileans to $5 million previously approved by SRG, or to allow
them to use the $5 million to guarantee up to $10 million in commercial
credits.”174 The State and Defense Departments advocated leniency. To deny
the request, they argued, would ostracize the Chilean military, which would
simply purchase the equivalent aircraft from either France or the Soviet
Union.175 NSC staffer Arnold Nachmanoff, however, doubted that the
aircraft sale was needed to maintain lines of communication with the
Chilean military, and it risked alienating other Latin American countries
such as Argentina and Peru, which could interpret the sale as favoritism
toward Chile.176
At the SRG meeting in early June, Kissinger took on the advocates of
more military aid to Chile. Was equipping the Chilean military not
depriving it of an incentive to turn against Allende? he asked. Deputy
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Armistead Selden
replied that “our only hope is the military. We must remain in touch with
them until we know that all possibility that they might oppose Allende is
gone.” Kissinger rejoined by comparing Allende’s treatment of the Chilean
armed forces to Hitler’s courting of the German military in 1933–1935:
“Allende gives them a few things here and there, treats them nicely, and just
keeps suckering them along…. As a historian I would be amazed if Allende
were not to build a popular base and a police force so that in one year it will
be impossible to overthrow him and the military will be totally impotent.”
State and Defense Department officials did not object to Kissinger’s
invocation of “Red Fascism.” Instead, they pointed out that Brazil and
Argentina were being offered comparable amounts of military aid, and Chile
would just go elsewhere to purchase the planes if the United States turned
down its request. Refusing to concede, Kissinger grumbled that “while
Allende establishes a hostile government, the military get funds but never
move against him. All we get is psychic satisfaction.”177
In the end, Kissinger simply referred the matter to Nixon to decide, which
essentially gave Kissinger control over the decision, since Nixon was likely to
accept whatever his national security adviser recommended. In presenting
the issue to the president, Kissinger recommended keeping the limit on FMS
credits to Chile to $5 million. Awarding an extra $5 million would not buy
additional influence over the Chilean military, he argued. Ignoring the
evidence presented at the SRG meeting which indicated that several other
Latin American countries were receiving comparable military aid and had
no cause for complaint, he warned Nixon that adding another $5 million
could provoke criticism from Latin American allies and the U.S. Congress.
Nixon approved the recommendation on 9 June 1971, and Kissinger
reinforced the decision a few days later in a conversation with the
president.178 Allende “is heading for a ­one-party government as fast as he
effectively can,” Kissinger asserted. He is treating the military “just like
Hitler … building them up while neutralizing them.” Nixon did not need
convincing. “I haven’t seen the military in Chile do anything for us. I’m
inclined not to help them militarily.”179
As it turned out, even granting just the $5 million to the Chilean military
incurred the wrath of several anticommunist U.S. legislators. For example,
representative John Rarick (D–Louisiana) blasted the Nixon administration
for helping Allende to arm himself against neighboring countries and to
“defend himself against his own people.” Likewise, representative Jack
Edwards (R–Alabama) found it incomprehensible that the State Department
was awarding $5 million in military credits to the “Marxist regime of Chile,”
a “­well-oiled cog” in the “Communist plan for world conquest.”180
The Chilean embassy correctly noted that ornery critics such as Rarick
did not carry much influence in the U.S. Congress, which ultimately did
approve the Nixon administration’s 1971 request for military aid to Chile.181
But considerations of congressional approval shaped the administration’s
approach to military aid to Chile the following year. Ambassador Davis
worried that the Hickenlooper Amendment might endanger the military
assistance program in Chile, which was essential to keep, he argued, because
the Chilean military’s “fear of ‘abandonment’ continues to be a critical
psychological factor here.”182 Consequently, Crimmins explained to
Kissinger at the SRG meeting on 11 April 1972 that the State and Defense
Departments had already agreed on a figure of $10 million, but were
uncertain that the U.S. Congress would approve such a request given Chile’s
expropriation of U.S. companies. The Soviets were offering Chile $300
million, but as CIA Director Helms correctly observed, Chilean military
leaders “don’t like dealing with the Russians and don’t want to become
dependent on them for their military supplies and equipment.” The Treasury
Department objected to the aid going forward before the results of the Paris
talks were known. Kissinger, who was furious for not having been consulted
earlier on these deliberations, finally agreed that $10 million in FMS credits
would be released to the Chilean military after the Paris Club meetings
yielded an acceptable agreement.183 Since the Allende government had been
forced in Paris to sign a compensation agreement, Treasury eventually
dropped its objections to the military aid. “With the growing opposition to
Allende, the contact with the Chilean military,” the NSC advised Kissinger,
“becomes doubly important.”184
The Paris Club deliberations illuminated the danger that military aid
could be swept up into the thorny issues of Chile’s foreign debt. In 1972 U.S.
officials did not want to discuss the FMS credits, but when the UP
government insisted on including them in the foreign debt negotiations, the
U.S. delegation reluctantly agreed to reschedule the military portion of the
debt over a ­ten-year repayment period.185 The following year, the State
Department argued that it was essential to reschedule the military debt
separately from the foreign debt in order to maintain good relations with the
Chilean military and deter it from accepting Soviet military aid.186
Negotiating the military debt bilaterally also enabled the Pentagon to insist
that the “1973 FMS servicing would be paid in full and not renegotiated.”
Chilean negotiators were devastated by this “180 degree turn” in policy.
Even though the military debt was small, Letelier complained to Davis,
Chile could not go to Paris again having agreed to terms with the United
States that could not be extended to other creditors, who were owed
hundreds of millions of dollars.187
The Nixon administration’s pressure on Chile to keep up its service
payments on the military debt figured into the economic warfare campaign
to undermine Allende. By taking a hard line on the repayment schedule,
U.S. officials could squeeze the UP government economically while
continuing to support the Chilean military. In May 1973, the Chilean Air
Force decided to resurrect its ambition to obtain ­F-5 aircraft. Allende had
stated earlier that he was prepared to buy the ­F-5 wherever Chile could get
the best deal.188 Under the threat that Chile might purchase the aircraft from
either Britain or France, Nixon authorized the sale of the ­F-5 to Chile as
“important to the national security of the United States.”189
The dichotomy in Washington’s foreign aid policy toward Chile did not go
unnoticed. In March 1972, a member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs
Committee pressed Secretary Rogers as to why a “dictatorial regime” such as
Chile’s was receiving U.S. military aid. Rogers tried to wriggle out of the
dilemma by claiming there was an important distinction to be made
between “dictatorial” and “repressive” regimes. In the case of Chile, “we
think it would be better not to have a complete break with them.”190 Six
months later, however, the New York Times foreign correspondent Tad Szulc
reported that Nixon administration officials “strongly denied suggestions in
some diplomatic quarters here that the military aid was designed to court
the Chilean armed forces in the hope that they might overthrow the Allende
government.” According to the administration, the policy that called for
cutting off aid to countries that expropriated U.S. private property without
providing proper compensation did not apply to military aid.191 Senator
Daniel Inouye (D–Hawaii), who headed a subcommittee on appropriations,
clearly did not agree. In June 1973, Inouye grilled Undersecretary of State
for Security Assistance Curtis Tarr about the proposed FMS credit sales of- ­
F5-E aircraft to Chile. Inouye pointed out that Chile had already fallen
behind on other credit obligations, and such funds would be better spent on
development.192
If others could easily see that the Nixon administration employed a
double standard when it came to economic and military aid to Chile, then
why did Allende not draw attention to this discrepancy? It may appear
puzzling that Allende was willing to accept U.S. assistance to the very forces
that would eventually overthrow him. But as he told the writer Graham
Greene in 1972, he did not anticipate a U.S. invasion like the Dominican
Republic; he was more afraid that turning down U.S. military aid might
provoke the U.S. government.193 Even more important, Allende ardently
believed in Chilean exceptionalism. Kissinger was correct in suggesting that
Allende was courting senior military commanders, but not to institute a
fascist state. Allende believed that by incorporating the Chilean armed
forces into the revolution, he could deter extremists such as Viaux from
conspiring against him. He was also confident that even if “economic
imperialism” was erecting an economic blockade against his government,
Chile would find alternative sources of credit, especially from the Soviet
Union.

Patching a ­Worn-Out Tire

The Chilean Communist Party, which had strong historic ties to the
USSR, had initially been encouraged by the Soviets to support the Chilean
road to socialism. But the Soviets remained very cautious about Allende’s
prospects, even after he had won the election. At his inauguration, the
pessimistic Soviet delegation had predicted, “this is not going to end well.”194
Given the uncertainty of Chile’s revolutionary direction, the Soviets
provided minimal economic support, mostly for ­small-scale projects, which
included a lubricant factory, chemical plant, technical assistance to the
fishing industry, and various machinery and equipment, as well as
foodstuffs, such as wheat, milk, and meat.195
During the 1970 Chilean presidential campaign, U.S. officials had
exaggerated the Soviet threat to such an extent that they had difficulty
gauging what the Soviet Union would do once Allende was in power. As late
as April 1972, U.S. analysts were still imagining that Communist countries,
especially the USSR, might try to save Allende as the Chilean economy
plunged into chaos.196 Gradually, however, they began to concede that the
Soviets were not coming to his rescue. Chilean businessmen told
Ambassador Davis in July that they believed that the new minister of
finance, Orlando Millas, was practical enough to realize that Chile still had
to get most of its finances from the West, as the Russians were unlikely to
fund another Cuba.197 British sources also reported that the Soviets did not
want to make a heavy financial commitment to another country in Latin
America.198
UP officials made several trips to communist countries, including the
Soviet Union, to secure economic assistance, but these ventures yielded
mostly ­non-transferable bilateral credits, which could not be used against
Chile’s exploding balance of payments deficit.199 In early December 1972,
Allende decided to visit the Soviet Union personally hat in hand to request
hundreds of millions of dollars in ­short-term credits. In his attempt to
appeal to Chile’s “elder brother,” Allende drew on Pablo Neruda’s analogy of
Chile as a country ravaged by a “silent Vietnam, without the roar of planes
and the bursts of grenades, but with the same feelings, as millions of
Chileans experience an overt concealed encirclement of their country.”200
Soviet officials were content to exchange rhetorical flourishes with Chilean
leaders about socialist solidarity, but they had already made up their minds
not to make a significant financial commitment to Chile.201 Consequently,
Allende only managed to secure about $20 million in ­short-term credits and
$50 million for military equipment that was never used due to the
opposition of the Chilean military.202 He was deeply embarrassed and
disappointed at the lack of support from the Soviets. “Never have I felt so
humiliated,” he confided to Ricardo Lagos afterward.203
In June 1971, several U.S. Soviet experts had predicted that despite Chile’s
“bleak” economic future, the Kremlin “would find it hard to say ‘no’” to any
request by Allende for more aid. Ambassador Davis informed the State
Department in December 1971 that “with Russian and East European help,
some debt relief imposed by the debtor’s inability and unwillingness to pay,
and with some breaks, Chile just might be able to rock along for some time
to come.”204 Why were these forecasts and those of U.S. officials (at least
initially), so far off base?205 Several factors governed the Soviet Union’s
decision not to bail out Allende.
First, aside from Cuba, the Soviet Union tended to view Latin America as
a U.S. sphere of influence. In October 1970, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin told Chilean Ambassador Santa María that while Moscow
welcomed Allende’s electoral victory, it would not significantly alter the
balance of world power, as the Soviets were not interested in competing with
the United States for control of the Third World.206 Although the PCCh
enjoyed ongoing financial support from the Soviet Union, the amounts, as
General Nikolai Leonov later observed, were relatively minor—“not Moscow
gold.”207 Chile, which never counted as a very high priority for the Soviets,
fell even lower on its list of supported revolutionary causes owing to Nixon’s
policy of détente.208
Second, the Soviet Union had almost no material interests in Chile worth
defending given that the economies of the two countries were not very
compatible. For example, the Soviet Union did not need copper and had
little grain to spare for export. Because of Chile’s historical dependency on
U.S. technology, switching to Soviet equipment and machinery also posed
logistical challenges, as exemplified by the Chilean military’s rejection of
Soviet military aid.209
Third, the Soviets were not about to let Chile bleed them economically as
Nixon had hoped. NSC staffer William J. Jorden informed Kissinger in April
1972 that “Moscow certainly does not want another Cuban ­rat-hole.”210
Korry had warned Soviet Ambassador Alexander Basov that “to keep the
Chilean economy afloat in 1972, it would cost approximately 250 to 350
million dollars in hard currency or the equivalent in consumer supply
items.”211 Even if the Kremlin had wanted to support the UP government
financially, it surely would have strained the Soviet Union’s resources to
provide hard currency in the amounts that Allende needed to reverse the
downward trend of the Chilean economy.212 According to Korry, the Soviet
Union advised Chile in early 1973 that it should “come to terms with Nixon
rather than plunge recklessly toward certain economic and political
disaster.”213
Fourth, Chile’s revolutionary “peculiarities” troubled Soviet officials, who
were unsure where Allende was headed. Soviet observers in Chile reported
to Moscow in 1972 that the UP government did not appear to have a ­well-
planned strategy for completing the transition to socialism. Because of the
possibility that Allende would be ousted either by a coup or by the
opposition in the next election, the Soviets sought to restrict their assistance
to programs that could be continued even if there were a change in
government.214 After a lengthy debate, Soviet officials rejected a $30 million
loan request from Chile because “it would be like putting a patch on a ­worn-
out tire.”215
The UP government did not fare much better in building economic
relations with other communist countries. In 1972, Chile’s trade with nine
communist countries amounted to only about 9 percent of Chile’s total
commerce.216 Most of the credits extended to Chile by Eastern Europe and
China were for the same sorts of items offered by the Soviet Union:
machinery, equipment, industrial plants, and technical assistance. These
loans also had the same drawback as the Russian ones, in that they were
bilateral credits that could not be transferred to other markets.217 Not only
did communist countries such as Poland and Romania have little to offer
Chile because of the limitations of their own economies, but some of their
leaders also shared Soviet doubts about the direction of the Chilean road to
socialism and the viability of the Allende regime.218
Chile’s last resort for credit was Western Europe, but even here the Nixon
administration had interfered by leaning on European creditors to not make
any loans to Chile.219 As part of Track II, the Nixon administration had
persuaded Britain in mid–October 1970 to defer two loans to Chile’s
national development corporation, Corporación de Fomento de la
Producción (Production Development Corporation).220 After Allende
assumed the presidency, U.S. officials kept up the pressure. Deputy Assistant
Secretary Hurwitch explained to British Ambassador Guy E. Millard that
“there were both good economic and political reasons for being cautious
with loans to Chile.”221 Whether this kind of intimidation was necessary
remains less certain because the state of Chile’s economy as well as the
copper dispute may have caused Western creditors to hesitate before making
further loans to the Allende government.222

The Rhetoric of the Blockade

As credit sources began to dry up and Chile’s balance of payments
worsened, UP officials increasingly relied on the “invisible blockade” thesis
to explain Chile’s economic woes. In early 1971, U.S. officials had
vehemently denied the existence of any blockade, and Allende had publicly
refuted such rumors.223 But as U.S.-Chilean relations soured over the copper
compensation issue and the ITT scandal, UP officials began to suspect that
there was some sort of conspiracy being waged against Chile. Beginning in
early 1972, Chilean officials began to drop hints in their conversations with
their U.S. counterparts that external forces were conspiring to prevent Chile
from obtaining international credits. For example, Letelier told Irwin in
March that while he certainly could distinguish between private companies
and U.S. government actions, the Chilean public, perhaps with some
“exaggeration,” was developing “strong feelings” that the United States was
guilty of “waging economic warfare” against Chile.224
Allende’s first serious public reference to the blockade thesis appeared in
his farewell speech to Castro, who had been visiting Chile for three weeks at
the end of 1972. In an angry reaction to the Klein statement (see Chapter 3),
Allende drew a parallel between threats to Chile and Cuba, which had
suffered “blockade, invasion, and acts of aggression.” He continued defiantly,
“They are mistaken if they think that by denying credits or blocking debt
renegotiation they can deter us from our destiny to control our own
resources.” In this speech, as in many others, “they” served as a convenient
placeholder that evaded having to identify the exact identity of Chile’s
oppressor.225 Given that Chilean officials could not prove there was a
blockade, it is understandable that they were not more precise in describing
its perpetrator other than to blame “imperialism,” which implied some sort
of conspiracy involving U.S. multinational corporations and the U.S.
government.
In order to preserve his foreign policy of ideological pluralism, Allende
initially tried to keep attention focused on multinational corporations and
international lending institutions, but this evasion became increasingly
awkward as circumstantial evidence of Washington’s intrigue mounted. At
the UNCTAD conference in April, Allende complained that multinational
corporations, such as the copper companies, had exerted “pressure” on “one
of the biggest contributors” to the World Bank and IDB to deprive Chile of
credits.226 In June, Allende privately told Ambassador Davis that he
considered U.S. economic policies that were depriving Chile of spare parts
as more damaging than sending in the marines.227 The following month,
Allende gave a speech tracing Chile’s economic difficulties to a “virtual
economic blockade.”228 When Chilean journalists finally forced Allende in
September to concede that the “virtual blockade” had now become an
“actual blockade,” Allende relied on the passive voice: “An international
campaign has been waged saying that Chile will not be able to make its
commitments.” This blockade was “invisible,” he added, because unlike the
obvious use of force in the invasion of the Dominican Republic, most
Chileans were unaware of “this concealed, veiled way of acting.”229
While Allende usually refrained from insinuating that the Nixon
administration was behind the blockade, his colleagues tended to be less
diplomatic. Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister Anibal Palma, for example,
went before the OAS General Assembly and boldly accused the United
States of violating Article 19 of the OAS Charter, which prohibited members
from employing “coercive” measures against each other.230 In October 1972,
Chile’s ambassador to the UN Humberto ­Díaz Casanueva charged the
United States with using its “powerful influence” in the World Bank to deny
Chile loans.231 Likewise, Chilean representative to UNCTAD Hernán Santa
Cruz accused the “most powerful country in the world” of conspiring to
establish an “economic boycott of Chile, which is no longer invisible.”232
Pablo Neruda, never at a loss for words, accused Nixon of erecting an
economic blockade “to isolate and destroy the Chilean revolution” by “using
different executioners, some of them already unmasked, such as the
venomous network of ITT spies.”233
The idea that the United States was conducting an economic blockade
against Chile also became a popular theme among U.S. academics and
journalists who were fascinated by the Chilean experiment with socialism.
The Latin American discussion group of the Brookings Institution, for
example, held a forum in 1971 on whether the Nixon administration was
trying to sabotage the Allende government by blocking access to credit.234 In
1972, several North American scholars published an essay in the journal
Foreign Policy comparing U.S. economic measures being taken against Chile
with the blockade against Cuba.235 Citing Chile as a case in point, Senator
George McGovern’s Task Force on Latin America criticized the Nixon
administration for its “obsessive identification of the United States national
interest with that of individual corporations.”236 In early 1973, the North
American Congress on Latin America published a highly influential essay
that expounded the blockade thesis.237
Chilean accusations of a blockade reached their pinnacle with Allende’s
appearance at the United Nations in New York City on 4 December 1972,
where he gave the most important speech of his entire political career. From
the beginning of my election, he declared, “an attempt has been made to cut
us off from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyze trade in our
principal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of
international financing.” The depth of such a conspiracy could be hard to
fathom: “it is an oblique, underhand, indirect form of aggression,” composed
of “forces that operate in the ­half-light, that fight with powerful weapons,
but that fly no identifying flags and are entrenched in the most varied
centers of influence.”238 Through such colorful but opaque phrasing, Allende
managed to avoid mentioning the Nixon administration by name and to
keep the focus on multinational corporations, such as ITT and Kennecott.239
Afterward, one journalist wrote, the overflow crowd in the Assembly Hall
began shouting “Viva Allende” for having dared to express the “deeply felt
resentments of the poor nations toward the rich nations and in particular
Uncle Sam.”240
That evening, Allende met with UN Ambassador George Bush at the
Waldorf Astoria. Allende appeared in a “­quasi-Mao” jacket, and the two
spoke “frankly” while sipping scotch. The Chilean president reminded Bush
of several unfriendly acts by the United States, such as the removal of the
weather station at Easter Island, and the Klein statement that his
administration would “not last.” Bush immediately became defensive and
insisted that Americans were not “imperialists.” Free enterprise did not
“bleed” other people, he continued, while allowing that “there may have
been excesses from time to time.” The main stumbling block in U.S.-Chilean
relations, Bush emphasized, was the expropriation issue. Allende attempted
to put Bush at ease by explaining that it was important to differentiate
between government, citizens, and corporations. Bush refused to accept this
olive branch. All these entities were “interlocked” and could not be
separated, he pronounced, because “our system is right for us.”241 The issue
of the blockade, so vigorously highlighted in Allende’s speech, never came
up, but Bush later told reporters that there was no blockade. Chile’s inability
to obtain credits from international banks, he suggested, stemmed from
Chile’s poor creditworthiness.242
After his UN speech, Allende left the energizing atmosphere of New York
for the sobering reality of Moscow, where he was disappointed to learn that
Soviet aid would not be forthcoming in the amounts he had imagined. From
this point forward, Chilean criticisms of the United States over the blockade
became more strident. During the bilateral talks of December 1972, Letelier
complained that the U.S. government had used its influence to block loans
from international institutions, and that Chile was being deprived of credits
for political rather than financial considerations.243 In a radio interview,
Almeyda accused the United States of influencing international financial
institutions to punish countries like Chile, which had nationalized their
natural resources.244 Nixon administration officials continued to deny these
accusations, but the ITT hearings in March led to renewed charges in the
Chilean press of a conspiratorial blockade.245 The leftist magazine Clarín, for
example, accused ITT of waging a “dirty war of aggression” against Chile by
cutting off credit, obstructing foreign debt renegotiations, and depriving the
country of machinery, food, and spare parts.246 Chile now faces a “dark
threat” and “total war,” the magazine warned, as the Nixon administration
threatens to dump copper, zinc, and lead onto the world market to lower
prices as a way of punishing Latin American countries that have spoken out
against “imperialist preponderance.”247 Even Allende finally began to point
the finger at Washington. In his last presidential message to the Chilean
Congress, Allende accused the Nixon administration of dumping to lower
the price of copper, and he attributed the major cause of the financial
blockade to institutions under the control of the United States.248
How important was the blockade to the Chilean economy and to what
degree does it explain Allende’s downfall? Three schools of interpretation
have emerged on this question. One view is that the “blockade” was
inconsequential because Allende replaced the credit he lost from traditional
sources with credit from communist countries. According to this
assessment, most of Chile’s economic problems were due to UP’s
mismanagement of the economy, not the ­so-called blockade.249 A second
view acknowledges that the blockade aggravated Chile’s balance of payment
difficulties and contributed to inflation, but maintains that it was not the
primary cause of Chile’s economic difficulties.250 A third interpretation
places great emphasis on the blockade as crippling the Chilean economy,
thereby undermining the popularity of the UP government.251
Whether one calls the economic provision of NSDM 93 a “blockade” or a
“credit squeeze,” it did succeed in reducing international credit available to
the UP government.252 The Chilean economy had been propped up by
hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid in the 1960s, so when the
Nixon administration dropped that aid to a trickle and pressed the ­Export-
Import Bank, IDB, and World Bank to curtail new loans, Chile lacked the- ­
short-term credits needed to service its outstanding debts.253 Whether U.S.
pressure was the essential factor in denying Chile those credits is difficult to
judge, but there does seem to have been a double standard at work, as these
institutions also made loans to countries with as bad or worse credit ratings
than Allende’s Chile.254 The UP government did manage to compensate
somewhat for this shortfall by obtaining credits elsewhere—about $450
million from communist sources alone.255 But most of that aid, which
arrived late in Allende’s presidency, was tied to purchases of goods from the
donor countries and did little to solve the spare parts shortage.256 The
blockade also had a psychological component that contributed to the
undermining of Chile’s international image. By propagating the message that
Chile was not creditworthy, the Nixon administration managed to depict
Chile as an “insolvent” country whose socialist experiment had failed and
therefore not worthy of emulation.257
The blockade certainly created enormous headaches for the UP
government, but its impact should not be exaggerated. The severe trade
imbalance, declining copper prices, and the lack of foreign investment
contributed more to the balance of payments disequilibrium than the credit
shortage.258 The blockade did not especially harm the military, and for all the
anti-imperialist rhetoric appearing in the leftist press, Chile remained a
society heavily penetrated by American culture, as millions of Chileans
continued to embrace American comics, movies, and television shows.259 As
U.S. economic aid dwindled in 1971, the American embassy considered it
vital to continue funding U.S. cultural programs, such as the Duke Ellington
concert, because they helped the U.S. government to “maintain constructive
contact” with the Chilean population.260 Such efforts did not go unnoticed
by the critics of cultural imperialism. When several Chilean leftists
published a Marxist analysis of Disney comics, a U.S. legislator denounced
this attempt to “discredit the United States and our free enterprise system.”261
Shortly after the September 1973 coup, a Washington Post reporter noted
that “people have had to cluster anxiously around television sets showing
over and over again scenes of air and ground assaults on the presidential
palace, alternated by film programs of American tapdancers or Mickey
Mouse cartoons.”262
Allende sympathizers frequently implied that U.S. corporations were
behind the “invisible blockade.” Anaconda and Kennecott certainly did
attempt to embargo Chilean copper shipments, and ITT schemed to bring
Allende down. But Chilean leftists and their supporters often failed to grasp
that the U.S. government and the private sector each waged their own wars
against the UP government largely independently of each other. The copper
companies had no direct influence over the IDB and the World Bank
decisions regarding loans to Chile. The State Department did not encourage
the copper companies to embargo Chilean copper shipments. The
multinational corporations that had been nationalized by the UP
government did not have to prod the Nixon administration into taking a
hardline on Chile’s foreign debt, as Nixon and Connally were already in
favor of that strategy from the outset. In short, there was no master plan of
collusion, just the normal functioning of a capitalist hegemonic power in
which private and public sectors attempted to defend their perceived
interests, most of which were compatible.263
 Even allowing that the invisible blockade devastated Chile’s international
finances, whether it was “decisive” to the downfall of Allende is much harder
to determine. Chilean officials themselves had difficulty understanding how
the blockade was affecting the Chilean economy and what steps should be
taken to combat it. A UP forum held in early 1972 could not reach a
satisfactory consensus on how to react to Chile’s growing fiscal crisis. Some
wanted to curtail imports, while others called for repudiating the foreign
debt.264 Even after the coup, former UP officials still could not agree on the
importance of the blockade. Inostroza claimed that the Chilean Central
Bank had succeeded in temporarily breaking the blockade by obtaining $600
million in ­short-term financing from European banks, the Eastern Bloc,
other Latin American countries, Japan, and Australia.265 Sergio Bitar, a UP
economic planner, however, insisted that while these alternative credits
helped alleviate the crisis, the blockade still “had a critical affect [sic] on the
final phases of the Allende period.”266
When considering all the factors operating against Allende, the blockade
cannot be considered the sole or even primary cause of his downfall. But
Nixon’s plan to attack the Chilean revolution was multifaceted and included
components designed to strengthen Allende’s opposition and promote a
coup climate. So, the real issue is whether the economic blockade
contributed significantly to the destabilization of the country to the point
where the Chilean military felt compelled to intervene. To answer that
question necessitates a discussion of the impact of UP’s socialist program on
the nation’s economy. Then it will be possible to assess the importance of the
Nixon administration’s efforts to create a coup climate.

1. NSDM 93, 9 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 452.

2. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 469–1 (Nixon, Connally, Haldeman), 17 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 519.
3. Michael Harrington testimony, 25 September 1974, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, Inquiry into Matters Regarding Classified Testimony
Taken on April 22, 1974, Concerning the CIA and Chile, 33.
4. Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government,” in Gil et al., ed. Chile at the
Turning Point, 116–17.
5. Petras and Morley, How Allende Fell, 76.
6. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 192. For other examples, see “Chile: The Story Behind the
Coup,” 6; statement by former UP members, “The Phoenix and the Albatross,” in MacEoin, Chile:
Under Military Rule, 149; and Schesch and Garrett, “The Case of Chile,” 41.
7. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 773. See also James D.
Theberge testimony, 18 September 1974, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 314;
Kissinger, White House Years, 682.
8. Feldman memo to Crimmins, 4 December 1970, FT ­Chile-Cuba, 1/1/70, box 1058, RG 59.
9. CIA intelligence memo ER IM 71–30, February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 258–66.
10. Debray, Chilean Revolution, 126.
11. Hildyard letter to Hunter, 18 October 1971, FCO 7/1904, TNA.
12. See memo attachment no. 1 to circ. no. 18, 5 January 1971, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE. For
Nixon’s statement, see “A Conversation with the President,” 4 January 1971, PPP.
13. CR, 25 February 1971, 117: 3961.
14. Embtel 636, 3 February 1971, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-71, box 2193, RG 59.
15. Embtel 811, 10 February 1971, United States/Chile Relations, Nov. 1970—June 1971, box 6, CAF,
RG 84. For U.S. rejections of the story, see deptel 45390, 18 March 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84; memcon
(Kissinger, Letelier, Nachmanoff), 23 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 595. For UP rejections of the
story, see embtel 1413, 15 March 1971, United States/Chile Relations, Nov. 1970—June 1971, box 6,
CAF, RG 84.
16. Hendrix memo to Perkins, 12 March 1973, MCUSFP, 827; embtel 1368, 11 March 1971, INCO
15–2 Chile, 3/1/71, box 1147, RG 59.
17. Amembassy ­A-292 to DoS, 28 September 1971, FN 14 Chile, 1/1/70, box 866, RG 59; Kissinger
memo to Nixon, 14 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 234; Farnsworth et al., “Invisible
Blockade,” 349.
18. Galina, El sueño no fué ametrallado, 107.
19. Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 49; Chilean Minister for Economic Affairs Pedro Vuskovic remarks in ­-
Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Excerpts from the CIAP Meeting on Chile, 4–
5.
20. Santa María no. 416–313, 25 March 1970, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
21. SRG minutes, 7 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 494–503.
22. “Feasible Reductions, Delays or Terminations of AID Commitments to Chile,” enclosure to
Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 19 December 1970, box ­H-050, NSC Institutional Files, NPMP. By the
end of 1971, the U.S. embassy had retained projects worth less than $4 million out of the $17 million
in the pipeline. See embtel 6082, 14 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 739.
23. CR, 8 December 1971, 117: 45502–503.
24. Enclosure to ­A-60, 22 February 1970, CDP; Embtel 6056, 11 December 1971, POL Chile—U.S.,
6/1/71, box 2200, RG 59.
25. SRG meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 482. On the collapse of lending
by private banks, see Allende Address to Nation, FBIS Daily Report, 21 May 1972; and embtel 1666, 26
March 1973, FN 6–1 Chile, 1/1/71, box 865, RG 59.
26. Fisher memo to Meyer and Crimmins, 14 May 1971, DEF 12–5 Chile, 1/1/71, box 1697, RG 59.
The aircraft requested included two 707 and one 727 Boeing jets.
27. Embtel 2592, 17 May 1971, FN 6–1 Chile, 1/1/71, box 865, RG 59; Nachmanoff memo to
Kissinger, 17 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 622–24.
28. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 1 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 632.
29. Connally memo to Nixon, 9 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 635–3.
30. SRG, “­Ex-Im Bank Position on Loan to ­LAN-Chile,” 7 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 369–
71.
31. SRG meeting minutes, 3 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 365. In the meantime, Crimmins
was forced to stonewall Senator Fulbright, who wanted to know why the loan to Chile was being
delayed. See SCFR, ­Inter-American Development Bank Funds for Special Operations, 48–49.
32. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 9 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 637–40.
 33. Embtel 3055, 9 June 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. For suspicions that the United States was behind
the Pérez Zujovic assassination, see Schnake, Schnake, 186; and Juan de Onís, “Hunt Chilean Leftist in
Slaying of Opposition Chief,” NYT, 10 June 1971.
34. Memcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10, doc 42.
35. Memcon (Nixon, Kissinger, Connally), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 43.
36. Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, “Chile: ¿un país de ‘excepción?,’” 217.
37. Embtel 3159, 14 June 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84.
38. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 271–72; Sigmund, “Allende in Retrospect,” 49. Although
the precise motive remains unknown, one theory is that the VOP assassins were seeking revenge for
Pérez Zujovic’s alleged role in the Puerto Montt massacre of 1969. See Vergara, “Revisiting Pampa
Irigoin,” 51. For the contorted argument that the Chilean left was to blame for the assassination
because Chilean folk singer Víctor Jara demonized Pérez Zujovic in one of his protest songs, see Vial,
“Algunas condiciones para una democracia estable en Chile,” 113–15.
39. Embtel 3035, 8 June 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84.
40. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 517–20 (Nixon, Kissinger, Connally), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 376.
41. Deptel 103819, 11 June 1971, United States/Chile Relations, Nov. 1970—June 1971, box 6, CAF,
RG 84.
42. MRE telex 150, 14 June 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
43. Embtel 3232, 16 June 1971, POL 15–1 Chile, 1/1/71, box 2197, RG 59. For the text of the speech,
see Allende, Salvador Allende: Su pensamiento político, 139–64. For examples of Chilean news stories
alleging CIA involvement, see embtel 3398, 24 June 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. On how the
assassination strengthened the conservative side of the PDC, see Sigmund, “Allende in Retrospect,” 49;
José Antonio ­Viera-Gallo Quesney interview, 7 September 2003, in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la
historia, 342–43; Corvalán Marquéz, Los partidos políticos y el golpe del 11 de septiembre, 85–86; and
Winn, “Furies of the Andes,” 254.
44. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 14 June 1971; deptel 116431, 29 June 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
45. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 16 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 385–86.
46. Letelier telex 428, 5 August 1971, and Letelier telex 441, 11 August 1971 Telex, Embajada de
Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
47. Letelier telex 445, 12–13 August 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
48. Embtel 4251, 14 August 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF, RG
84.
49. Draft memcon (Irwin, Meyer, Anaconda Company officials, and others), 11 August 1971, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 413–17; Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 14 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
663–64.
50. SRG minutes, 17 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 48. The Treasury Department, on the
other hand, favored bailing out Anaconda directly. See Charls Walker’s comments in SRG minutes, 9
September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 686.
51. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 517–20 (Nixon, Kissinger, Connally), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 372.
52. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 18 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 510.
53. Juan de Onís, “Allende Assails U.S. Jet Sale Ban,” NYT, 15 August 1971. For Allende’s attempt to
defuse the conflict further, see his comments in LAWR, 20 August 1971.
54. MRE no. 118, 25 August 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. For the ­Export-
Import Bank’s insistence that the aircraft sale was not being held up for “political reasons,” see the
testimony of J.E. Corette, General Counsel for the ­Export-Import Bank, 27 July 1971, HCFA,
Subcommittee on ­Inter-American Affairs, New Directions for the 1970’s, 225. On Kissinger’s advice to ­-
Export-Import Bank President Henry Kearns to use “banking conditions” to justify denying the loan,
see memcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10, doc 42.
55. Embtel 4283, 17 August 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF, RG
84. For an example of the kind of criticism evoked by the Boeing loan controversy, see Luis Corvalán
speech at the Caupolicán Theater, 22 October 1971, in Farías, La izquierda chilena, 1038–39.
56. Marilyn Berger, “­Head-On Economic Clash with Chile May Be Developing,” WP, 24 August
1971.
57. Peter T. Knight letter to the editor, NYT, 2 September 1971.
58. CR, 8 September 1971, 117: 31091. Badillo did not find convincing the Nixon administration’s
reply that “normal banking and financial criteria, and not political considerations, underline the
Bank’s position.” CR, 15 September 1971, 117: 32040.
59. Editorial, “Bullying Chile,” WP, 14 September 1971.
60. Quoted in Kuhn, “Hickenlooper Amendment,” 71.
61. NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin America study, “Peru and IPC: Review of U.S. Strategy,”
24 May 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 600.
62. NSC Interdepartmental Group for ­Inter-American Affairs study, 25 March 1969, FRUS, 1969–
1976, ­E-10: doc 585.
63. Vaky memo to Kissinger, 26 May 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 601; Kissinger memo to
Nixon, 2 July 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 605.
64. Brands, “United States and the Peruvian Challenge,” 480; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 259–60;
Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 175.
65. SRG meeting minutes, 29 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 428.
66. Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 19 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 235–36.
67. SRG meeting minutes, 23 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 525.
68. Jeremiah O’Leary, “Copper Issue May Shut Off Aid to Chile,” Washington Star, 22 October 1971.
69. Conversation no. 517–022 (Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger), 11 June 1971, 2:40 p.m., Nixon Tapes.
70. NSSM 131, 23 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 4: doc 155.
71. SRG minutes, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 45.
72. See Crimmins memo to Irwin, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 4: doc 159.
73. NSDM 136, 8 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, 4: doc 169.
74. Nixon, “Statement Announcing United States Policy on Economic Assistance and Investment
Security in Developing Nations,” PPP, 19 January 1972.
75. DSB, 66 (19 January 1972): 157.
76. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1976, 4: doc 148; Shackley memo for the record, 17 October 1972,
FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 829.
77. Benjamin Welles, “Rogers Threatens Chilean Aid Cutoff in Expropriations,” NYT, 23 October
1971.
78. Letelier telex 615, 15 October 1971, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
79. Letelier no. 846–561, 16 July 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. Edward
Boorstein, who facilitated purchases in the United States for the UP government also noted that
Connally was pressing the ­Export-Import Bank and multilateral lending institutions to reject all of
Chile’s loan requests. See Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 99–100.
80. Circ. no. 7, 29 June 1972, Circulares Confidenciales, AMRE.
81. “Eximbank Curtails Credits for Chile,” NYT, 19 February 1972.
82. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1976, 4: doc 149.
83. Memorandum confidencial, 16 March 1973, Memorandos Políticos MINREL 1961–1990,
AMRE. Letelier presented this complaint in bilateral talks to no avail. See deptel 55858, 27 March
1973, FN 14 Chile, 6/1/72, box 867, RG 59.
 84. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, 234–35; Schoultz, Human Rights, 270–
71.
85. “Feasible Reductions, Delays or Terminations of AID Commitments to Chile,” enclosure to
Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 19 December 1970, box ­H-050, NSC Institutional Files, NPMP.
86. SRG meeting minutes, 17 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 397.
87. Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 83.
88. SRG meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 471.
89. SRG meeting minutes, 23 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 516.
90. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 28 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 533–34.
91. Memcon (Kissinger, Letelier, Nachmanoff), 23 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 596.
92. Deptel 59089, 8 April 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
93. HCFA, Subcommittee on ­Inter-American Affairs, New Directions for the 1970’s, 17.
94. Draft memcon (Irwin, Meyer, Anaconda Company officials, and others), 11 August 1971, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 413–17.
95. Irwin memo to Kissinger, 22 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 744.
96. Quoted in Farnsworth et al., “Invisible Blockade,” 353. For comments by a Chilean administrator
about the difficulties in processing IDB loans, see Thayer Arteaga, Segunda fila, 129–31.
97. SRG meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 471.
98. Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 4 December 1970, CDP.
99. Sharma, “United States,” 589–92. For example, the Bank’s operating principles did provide for the
consideration of nationalization disputes as part of the criteria for extending a loan. See ­Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Domestic Efforts, 150. Also telling is that the U.S.
Treasury Department counted the suspension of World Bank lending to the Allende government as a
successful example of U.S. clout over the bank. See Gwin, “U.S. Relations with the World Bank,” 256–
57.
100. Santa María telex 1038, 21 December 1970, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; World
Bank, “Chile and the World Bank,” 82.
101. Farnsworth et al., “Invisible Blockade,” 354. The State Department also influenced the bank to
cancel its planned mission to evaluate the fruit plant project. See Laurence Stern, “Aid Used as Choke
on Allende,” WP, 16 September 1973.
102. World Bank, “Chile and the World Bank,” 84.
103. Embtel 1781, 14 April 1972, INCO 15–2 Chile, 4/1/72, box 1149, RG 59; McNamara oral
history transcript, 89–90. McNamara later claimed that the bank had only withheld credit because it
had received no applications from the UP government. Shapely, Promise and Power, 496. According to
one of Allende’s former ministers who attended the meeting, McNamara ignored Allende’s plea that
the United States cease its economic obstructionism and instead align itself with a popular Latin
American regime. See Varas Morel, Don Américo, 49.
104. Conversation no. 026–008 (Nixon, Shultz), 26 June 1972, Nixon Tapes.
105. Hobart Rowen, “Chile Blasts World Bank,” WP, 28 September 1972.
106. “Chile Criticizes World Bank Policy,” NYT, 29 September 1972. For the full text of Inostroza’s
speech, see his press release, 28 September 1972, doc 1, folder 16, box 6, OLF.
107. Sanford, “Multilateral Development Banks,” 125–26; World Bank, “Chile and the World Bank,”
86.
108. Negri, telex 65, 9 February 1973, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
109. World Bank, “Chile and the World Bank,” 87; Kapur et al., World Bank, vol. 1, 1008.
110. Deptel 147174, 26 July 1973, 1973STATE 147174, CFPF, RG 59.
111. Deptel 147739, 26 July 1973, 1973STATE 147739, CFPF, RG 59.
112. McNamara oral history transcript, 58. For the point that World Bank officials evaluating Chile’s
loan applications were largely U.S. economists who were unlikely to challenge McNamara, see Kedar,
“World Bank–United States–Latin American Triangle,” 683–84. For the view that both economic and
political factors influenced the Bank in rejecting Chile’s loan applications, especially the unresolved
nationalization dispute, see HCFA, United States and the Multilateral Development Banks, 51–52.
113. Sharma, “United States,” 591–92.
114. On the origins of Chile’s foreign debt, see Kofas, Sword of Damocles, 181; and Taffet, Foreign Aid
as Foreign Policy, 80.
115. Allende speech at the 4th plenary session of the central planning office of Allende’s presidential
campaign, 2 August 1964, in Allende, Obras escogidas: período 1939–1973, 223.
116. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chilean Voters Pick Marxist President,” WP, 6 September 1970.
117. Allende, Chile’s Road to Socialism, 126.
118. Juan de Onís, “Chile, Reserves Low, Will Seek Renegotiation of Payments on Her $­3-Billion
Foreign Debt,” NYT, 10 November 1971. By late 1971 net foreign reserves had fallen from $350
million to $130 million since Allende assumed the presidency. See CIA intelligence memo ER IM 71–
201, October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 449. Inostroza later admitted that the government should
have addressed the foreign debt issue sooner. See Inostroza, “Nationalization of the Banking System in
Chile,” 307.
119. Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, “Chile: Next Steps,” 23 November 1971, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 483–85.
120. Petty memo to Connally, 10 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 735.
121. Embtel 6082, 14 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 737. Frei also advised the U.S.
government not to become isolated from the other creditor nations. See embtel 1244, March 1972,
POL 2 Chile, 3–18–70, box 2193, RG 59.
122. The Paris Club creditors who met to consider the Chilean request for debt rescheduling
included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The IMF, World Bank, and IDB attended as
observers. France chaired the meeting. Watson tel 2327 to secstate, 4 February 1972, FN 14 Chile,
2/1/72, box 866, RG 59.
123. Weintraub memo to SRG, 12 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 755–56.
124. Connally memo to Nixon, 15 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 757–58.
125. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 469–1 (Nixon, Connally, Haldeman), 17 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 518.
126. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 652–17 (Nixon, Kissinger), 20 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-
16: 521.
127. Nixon Tapes, Conversation no. 650–012 (Nixon, Ehrlichman, Shultz).
128. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 320–28 (Nixon, Connally), 8 February 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-
16: 533.
129. Embtel 412, 26 January 1972, FN 14 Chile, 12/1/72, box 866, RG 59. On Letelier’s appeal to
Connally and Hennessy, see Letelier no. 97–11, 1 February 1972, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en
EEUU, AMRE; and deptel 41405, 10 March 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
130. Amembassy Madrid tel 655 to secstate, 14 February 1972, FN 14 Chile, 2/1/72, box 866, RG 59.
For a discussion of the pressure that the head of the U.S. Paris delegation exerted on Spain to change
its “­pro-Chile” position, see Henríquez Uzal, ¡Viva la verdadera amistad!, 178.
131. Amembassy Paris tel 2942 to DoS, 15 February 1972, FN 14 Chile, 2/1/72, box 866, RG 59.
132. Embtel 1536, 31 March 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84; Davis, Last Two Years, 74–75.
133. Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, “Next Steps Options on Chile,” 4 April 1972,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 543–52.
134. SRG minutes, 11 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 787; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 390–91.
On the Treasury Department’s agreement to drop its opposition to the multilateral debt rescheduling
agreement, see editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 786. For Connally’s suspicions that Kissinger had
conspired against him, see Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 439.
135. Inostroza, “Nationalization of the Banking System in Chile,” 306. On the role of the copper
company lawsuits in dissuading European nations from lending to Allende’s government, see
Feinberg, “Dependency and the Defeat of Allende,” 35.
136. Embtel 569, 4 February 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
137. IMF report, “Chile—Survey of Economic Development and Prospects,” attached to circ. no. 42,
24 February 1972, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE (hereafter IMF report).
138. Petty memo to Connally, 3 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 727.
139. The 1972 Paris Club meetings on Chile’s debt rescheduling took place on 2–3 February, 16–17
February, 29–30 March, and 19 April. Pickering memo to Scowcroft, 15 September 1973, POL 15
Chile, 2–­5-73, box 2196, RG 59.
140. The “40 Measures” of the UP platform included a provision calling for an end to commitments
with the IMF. See Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 280.
141. Deptel 41406, 10 March 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
142. Amembassy Paris tel 7620 to secstate, 20 April 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84. For the official text of
the agreement, see the enclosure to Amembassy Paris ­A-396 to DoS, 20 April 1972, FN 14 Chile,
4/1/72, box 866, RG 59.
143. John L. Hess, “U.S. Joins in Credit Accord with Chile,” NYT, 20 April 1972. The U.S. share of
Chile’s debt, nearly ­one-half of the total, amounted to $69 million, mostly to the ­Export-Import Bank.
See DoS, “Chile Strategy,” 1 December 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 661.
144. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 28 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 796–97. There is no record of
Kissinger officially securing Nixon’s approval for the 1972 Chilean debt agreement, so it appears to
have stood by default.
145. Allende’s May Day speech, 1 May 1972 in Allende, Salvador Allende: Su pensamiento político,
353–55.
146. Henry Raymont, “Neruda Opens Visit Here with a Plea for Chile’s Revolution,” NYT, 11 April
1973; “Pablo Neruda Speaks on Chile’s Debt Renegotiation,” in Johnson, ed., Chilean Road to
Socialism, 143.
147. Letelier notes on the situation with the United States, 11 August 1972, doc 9, folder 16, box 2,
OLF.
148. Embtel 5698, 22 December 1973, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
149. Almeyda memo, 23 November 1972, doc 7, folder 16, box 2, OLF. Letelier also alluded to
“gaining time” in minuta, 26 December 1972, Memorandos Políticos, AMRE.
150. Embtel 5652, 20 December 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84; embtel 5649, 19 December 1972, POL
Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
151. Óscar Guillermo Garretón letter to Allende, 26 December 1972, doc 8, folder 18, box 2, OLF.
152. Juan de Onís, “Defaults by Chile Urged in Appraisal,” NYT, 19 December 1971.
153. Irwin memo to Kissinger, 6 November 1972, FN 14 Chile, 6/1/72, box 867, RG 59.
154. DoS, “Chile Strategy,” 1 December 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 663.
155. Amembassy Paris tel 2056 to secstate, 27 January 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84.
156. Letelier telex 91, 30 January 1973, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE. Kedar ignores
this issue in arguing that the Allende administration had managed to collaborate successfully with the
IMF to its advantage. Kedar, “Salvador Allende and the International Monetary Fund,” 746.
157. Embtel 1341, 31 March 1973, 1973SANTIA01341, CFPF, RG 59.
158. Embtel 2918, 4 July 1973, 1973SANTIA02918, CFPF, RG 59.
159. Amembassy, Paris tel 19356 to DoS, 13 July 1973, 1973PARIS19356, CFPF, RG 59.
 160. World Bank, “Chile and the World Bank,” 91.
161. Kennedy and Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 17 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 467–
68. Annual U.S. military expenditures on the Chilean armed forces had grown from $49 million to
$203 million between 1940 and 1970. DoS, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditures, 35.
162. Meyer memo to Rogers, 14 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 358.
163. CIA memo, “Suspension Temporarily Imposed on MAP and FMS Has Been Rescinded,” n.d.,
CDP.
164. Meyer report to SRG, 17 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 463; Kennedy and Nachmanoff
memo to Kissinger, 17 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 467. The treaties included the Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement of 1952 and a Military Mission Agreement of 1964. According to
NSDM 93, continuation of the MAP program “on a minimum basis” depended on Allende’s
willingness to reaffirm these treaties. See Options Paper for NSC: Chile, 3 November 1970, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 171.
165. SRG meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 477. Immediately after
Allende’s inauguration, the head of the U.S. Southern Command personally visited Chile in order to
“keep open lines of communication” with the heads of the Chilean armed services. See General
George R. Mather testimony, 20 May 1971, HCFA, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, 420.
166. NSC meeting minutes, 15 October 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 4.
167. Meyer memo to Kissinger, 12 January 1971, NSC Misc/Memos—January 1971, box 7, RG 59.
168. SRG meeting minutes, 17 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 568.
169. SRG meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 475.
170. Crimmins memo to Kissinger, 4 December 1970, CDP; Kissinger memo to Nixon, 18 December
1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 510; memcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10,
doc 42. On the JCS’s objections to attempting to oust Chile from the IADB, see Poole, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 160–61.
171. SRG meeting minutes, 17 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 568.
172. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 16 February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 558 n. 7; Kissinger
memo to undersecretary of state et al., 25 February 1971, SRG Meeting—Chile 2/17/71, box ­H-052,
NSC Institutional Files, NPMP.
173. DoD, “Chilean Ministry of Defense Request for FMS Credit Assistance in Procuring Army and
Air Force Equipment,” n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 349–55.
174. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 1 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 632.
175. Embtel 1968, 13 April 1971, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
176. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 1 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 630–33.
177. SRG meeting minutes, 3 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 366–69. On “Red Fascism,” see
Adler and Paterson, “Red Fascism.”
178. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 9 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 640.
179. Memcon (Nixon, Kissinger), 11 June 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10, doc 42.
180. CR, 6 July 1971, 117: 23637; CR, 13 July 1971, 117: 24768.
181. Letelier no. 815–541, 13 July 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE; Letelier no.
967–599, 27 July 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
182. Embtel 6082, 14 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 737.
183. SRG minutes, 11 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 787–95.
184. Jorden and Kennedy memo to Kissinger, 8 May 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 580.
185. Crimmins memo to Undersecretary, 26 July 1972, DEF 12–5 Chile, 1/1/70, box 1696, RG 59.
186. Deptel 167289, 14 September 1972, box 6, CAF, RG 84. On fears that a reduction in U.S.
military aid might induce the Chilean military to accept Soviet military aid, see “Status of Military
Relationship (tab),” n.d., U.S./Chile Background Papers April 1971, U—Mr. Williams, box 15, General
Files on NSC Matters, 1969–1972, RG 59.
187. Embtel 1341, 31 March 1973, 1973SANTIA01341, CFPF.
188. See Allende’s comment to the Washington Star, as reported in embtel 2641, 19 May 1971, POL
15–1 Chile, 1/1/71, box 2197, RG 59.
189. DSB 69 (16 July 1973): 90. For a complete list of military equipment provided by the United
States to the Chilean military during the Allende government, see Kubisch briefing memo to
Kissinger, 1 October 1973, DEF U.S.-Chile, 1/1/70, box 1855, RG 59. The purchase of the ­F-5 aircraft
by the Chilean Air Force was held up by the uncertainty surrounding U.S. congressional funding, and
then the September coup intervened so the sale never went through. See Santiago memo to file, 17
December 1973, CDP and chapter 9.
190. Secretary William P. Rogers testimony, 14 March 1972, HCFA, Foreign Assistance Act of 1972,
39.
191. Tad Szulc, “U.S. Is Continuing Aid to the Chilean Armed Forces,” NYT, 9 December 1972.
192. Deptel 123344, 23 June 1973, DEF 12–5 Chile, 6–­1-72, box 1697, RG 59.
193. Graham Greene, “Chile: The Dangerous Edge,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1972, 34.
194. Quoted in Uliánova, “Soviet Perceptions,” 8.
195. Leonov, “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America,” 24–25; Amembassy to DoS, ­A-142, 9 June 1972,
FT 13–2 Chile, 4/1/70, box 1058, RG 59.
196. Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, “Next Steps Options on Chile,” 4 April 1972,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 545–46.
197. Memcon (Davis, various Chilean businessmen), 26 July 1972, POL 15–1 Chile, 1/1/72, box
2197, RG 59. See also Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 178–79.
198. Reeve letter to Fall, 13 November 1972; and Robson letter to ­Gordon-Lennox, 29 November
1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
199. Davis to DoS, ­A-341, 26 November 1971, box 3, CAF, RG 84; Coe to Dos, ­A-212, AGR Chile,
6/1/70, box 467, RG 59. On UP visits to communist countries to establish commercial relations and
obtain economic assistance, see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 116; and Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin
America, 139–41.
200. Theodore Shabad, “Allende Arrives in Soviet, Seeks New Aid for Chile,” NYT, 7 December 1972.
For the “elder brother” analogy, see Arancibia Clavel, “Los origenes de la violencia,” 12.
201. Joint ­Soviet-Chilean communique, 11 December 1972, FCO 7/2208, TNA.
202. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 194. The Soviets offered Chile military aid again in May 1973,
but legal and technical obstacles, as well as the opposition of the Chilean military high command,
prevented the aid from going forward. See Davis, Last Two Years, 132.
203. Lagos, Mi vida, 246.
204. Embtel 6008, 7 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 732.
205. Gouré et al., “Whither Chile?” 58.
206. Santa María telex 761, 9 October 1970, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
207. Leonov, “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America,” 9.
208. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 92.
209. Undated attachments to Weintraub memo to SRG, 12 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16:
507. For a fuller discussion of the Chilean military’s reluctance to accept Soviet weaponry, see chapter
8. On the lack of Soviet need for Chilean copper, see Rupprecht, Soviet Internationalism, 269.
210. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 779.
211. Embtel 5020, 29 September 1971, in Intelligence Activities, 134.
212. Helwege, “Three Socialist Experiences in Latin America,” 212, 222.
213. SCFR, Vance Nomination, 71.
214. Uliánova, “Soviet Perceptions,” 17–18; Andrew and Mitrokhin, World Was Going Our Way, 77–
79. According to Chilean diplomat Gabriel Valdés, Soviet officials believed that the UP government, a
“romantic project, impossible to support and economically disastrous,” would eventually be
overthrown by the military. Valdés, Sueños y memorias, 238. The Soviets may have also received
pessimistic reports about Chile from Cuban sources. See Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America,
142–43.
215. Quoted in Leonov, “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America,” 25. Because of bureaucratic divisions,
the Soviet Defense Ministry continued to sell weapons to Chile in 1973 even though Soviet
intelligence predicted that Allende was likely to be deposed in a military coup. See “General Nikolai
Leonov at the CEP,” 8–9.
216. Amembassy ­A-110 to DoS, 6 June 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
217. Guardia, “Structural Transformations in Chile’s Economy,” 82–83. For examples of the kinds of
agricultural items obtained from communist countries, see Coe to Dos, ­A-212, AGR Chile, 6/1/70,
box 467, RG 59.
218. Haslam, Nixon Administration, 157. As Zhou explained to Allende, China was too strapped by
its efforts to support the Vietnamese Revolution to offer Chile much economic assistance. Joseph,
“China’s Relations with Chile under Allende,” 139.
219. Meyer memo to SRG, 9 April 1971, POL 1 Chile—U.S., 10–28–70, box 2201, RG 59.
220. Wiggin letter to Daunt, 16 October 1970, FCO 7/1517, TNA.
221. Memcon (Millard, Hurwitch), 17 November 1970, FN 6–1 Chile, 1/1/70, box 865, ­Subject-
Numeric File, 1970–1973, RG 59.
222. Kennecott’s copper embargo also may have scared off West European creditors. See Feinberg,
“Dependency and the Defeat of Allende,” 35.
223. Embtel 1413, 15 March 1971, United States/Chile Relations, Nov. 1970—June 1971, box 6, CAF,
RG 84; embtel 2394, 5 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 321; Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 10
May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 618.
224. Deptel 50417, 24 March 1972, POL 14 Chile, 1–10–72, box 2195, RG 59; Letelier telex 248, 24
March 1972, Telex, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
225. Embtel 5950, 3 December 1971, POL Chile—U.S., 6/1/71, box 2200, RG 59.
226. Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 171.
227. Embtel 2902, 12 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 583.
228. Allende Addresses Nation on Economic Situation, FBIS Daily Report, 25 July 1972.
229. Allende interview with Chilean journalists, 10 September 1972, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende
Reader, 179.
230. Benjamin Welles, “Chile Accuses Washington,” NYT, 15 April 1972.
231. Diaz Casanueva speech to the UN, 3 October 1972, in Vera Castillo, La política exterior chilena,
387–89.
232. “Chile Accuses U.S. of Boycott Move,” NYT, 7 October 1972.
233. Neruda, Call for the Destruction of Nixon.
234. Letelier no. 651–431, 8 June 1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
235. Petras and Laporte, “Can We Do Business with Radical Nationalists?” 137.
236. Tad Szulc, “McGovern Group Scores Nixon on Latin America,” NYT, 31 October 1972.
237. Elizabeth Farnsworth, “Chile: Facing the Blockade,” NACLA’s Latin America & Empire Report 7,
no. 1 (January 1973), 2.
238. Allende address to the UN General Assembly, 4 December 1972, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende
Reader, 205.
239. Muñoz, “International Policy of the Socialist Party,” 154.
240. Marquis Childs, “George Bush at the U.N.: His Finger in the Dike,” WP, 8 December 1972.
241. DoS to Irwin, todep 3/219389, 4 December 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 834–37.
 242. Terri Shaw, “Allende at U.N. Charges ‘Economic Aggression,’” WP, 5 December 1972.
243. Deptel 230942, 22 December 1972, POL Chile—U.S., 9–14–72, box 2200, RG 59.
244. Draft embtel, “FonMin on U.S. Expropriation Policy,” 26 January 1973, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
245. John J. Crimmins testimony, 6 March 1973, HCFA, United ­States-Chilean Relations, 12;
Kimberly King, “Treasury Official Denies U.S. Has ­Anti-Chilean Lending Policy,” 28 March 1973, box
7, CAF, RG 84.
246. Embtel 1460, 6 April 1973, box 6, CAF, RG 84.
247. Embtel 1758, 24 April 1973, box 7, CAF, RG 84.
248. Extracto del 3d Informe de Gestion Presidencial realizado ante el Congreso Pleno el 21 de
Mayo de 1973, in Allende, Obras escogidas (1970–1973), 201.
249. Falcoff, Modern Chile, 76–77; Roxborough et al., Chile, 154–56; Sigmund, “‘Invisible Blockade,’”
337; Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 219–26
250. Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government,” in Sideri, ed. Chile 1970–73,
127; Steenland, “Two Years of Popular Unity in Chile,” 13–16; Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes, 58; de Vylder, Allende’s Chile, 105–106, 129.
251. “Chile: The Story Behind the Coup,” 6; Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 127; Farnsworth
et al., “Invisible Blockade,” 364–65; Stavenhagen, “The Future of Latin America,” 143.
252. Davis, “In the Years of Salvador Allende,” 120.
253. Church Report, 34.
254. Payer, World Bank, 44. Jack Anderson claimed to have uncovered “secret World Bank minutes”
showing that McNamara was criticized by other bank delegates for refusing loans to Chile. See Jack
Anderson, “The Economic War Against Allende,” Washington Post, 3 November 1974. By contrast
McNamara fought extremely hard to get the Pinochet regime a World Bank loan for a copper project
despite the opposition of six bank directors. See telcon (McNamara, Kissinger), 1 April 1975,
Kissinger Telcons, DoS, FOIA. The bank granted these loans despite Chile’s “horrendous” economic
performance in the early years of the Pinochet regime. See Ayres, Banking on the Poor, 71–72.
255. Gouré and Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration, 140–41; and Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin
America, 128. Kissinger’s claim that the Allende government had received $600 million in communist
aid appears to be greatly exaggerated. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 391.
256. Farnsworth et al., “Invisible Blockade,” 364–65; Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 127.
Most of the economic aid that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe committed to the Allende
government was not actually delivered due to resistance by Chilean industrialists to the adoption of
Communist equipment and technology. See “U.S./USSR Economic and Military Assistance to Chile
1963–1973,” n.d., ­LOC-HAK-110–­2-8–8, CREST.
257. Guardia, “Structural Transformations in Chile’s Economy,” 70; Fajnzylber, “External Sector and
the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government,” 167; Farnsworth, “Chile: What Was the U.S. Role?,”
133–34.
258. See chapter 6.
259. By the early 1970s, half or more of all televisions shows and movies shown in Chile were of U.S.
origin. Smith, Geopolitics of Information, 42. On U.S. cultural penetration of Chile, see Rinke,
Encuentros con el Yanqui; NACLA, New Chile, 59–65; Zylberberg and Monterichard, “An Abortive
Attempt,” 175–76; and Ayres, “Political History,” 16. According to Letelier, Chileans admired the U.S.
people but not their big corporations. See memcon (Kissinger, Letelier, Nachmanoff), 23 March 1971,
FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 596; and Letelier notes, n.d., doc 1, folder 16, box 6, OLF.
260. Embtel 6082, 14 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 739–40. Even some Chilean leftists
could not resist certain dimensions of American culture. Paul Good interview, 63, FAOHC. Heraldo
Muñoz, who served in the Allende administration, never forgave himself for missing a Duke Ellington
concert. Muñoz, Dictator’s Shadow, 33. On how Chilean youth embraced some elements of the U.S.
counterculture during the Allende years, see ­Barr-Melej, Psychedelic Chile.
261. CR, 8 March 1972, 118: 7605; Dorfman and Mattelart, How to Read Donald Duck. For the
challenges that Chilean leftists faced in trying forge a national cultural identity, see Rinke, Encuentros
con el Yanqui, 310; Woll, “Comic Book in a Socialist Society”; Herbert Schiller and Dallas Smythe,
“Chile: An End to Cultural Colonialism,” Society, March 1972; Flora, “Roasting Donald Duck,” 168;
and Mattelart, “Cultural Imperialism,” 76–77.
262. Marlise Simons, “Santiago: A Battle-Scarred Capital,” WP, 14 September 1973. On how U.S.
cultural influences in Chile increased after the coup, see Sigmund, “Chile: Successful Intervention?”
37.
263. For examples, see Gedicks, “Nationalization of Copper in Chile,” 20; NACLA, “U.S.
Counterrevolutionary Apparatus,” 26; John M. Swomley, Jr., “The Political Power of Multinational
Corporations: Chile, A Case in Point,” Christian Century, 25 September 1974, 881; Hortensia Allende’s
comments reported in Ottawa tel 2270, 3 December 1973, 1973MONTRE02270, CFPF, RG 59; and
“Allende Widow Says U.S. Promoted Inflation,” WP, 26 September 1973.
264. Zammit, Chilean Road, ch. 4.
265. Inostroza, “Nationalization of the Banking System in Chile,” 300.
266. Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 127.
 6
The Chilean Revolution
The Chilean revolution began with a strong sense of utopian idealism that
reflected the lingering spirit of the sixties. Allende’s supporters filled the
streets after his victory, one Chilean writer remembered, greeting each other
as “comrades,” who wished to promote “peace, solidarity, and the possibility
of a new life.”1 According to the French revolutionary Régis Debray, “anyone
who did not experience the southern summer in that first year of the
Popular Front has not known the sweetness of life…. There was something
gay and ­light-hearted in the atmosphere.”2 Many of the first “forty measures”
that UP had pledged to take, such as the establishment of social security,
breakfast programs for children, and a public health care system, sounded
innocuous enough. But even some of the more radical provisions of the UP
platform, such as the nationalization of the copper industry, enjoyed
widespread support among the Chilean population.3
The Allende government ran into strong opposition, however, when it
attempted to eradicate the latifundia (large estates) and divide the economy
into social, private, and mixed sectors (“three areas”).4 Allende’s narrow
margin of victory meant that the effort to implement the UP program
through democratic means was bound to meet resistance from political
parties that represented the more privileged sectors of Chilean society. Not
surprisingly most wealthy Chileans were horrified by Allende’s victory, but
the opposition to the UP government eventually grew to include broad
sectors of the population, including the professional middle class, women,
peasants, and even some members of the working class. As this chapter will
show, the failure of UP to carry out a viable economic policy set the stage for
the U.S. covert action program that would significantly contribute to
Allende’s downfall.

Agrarian Reform
 UP’s program for agrarian reform, which appeared in a special section of
its platform, represented a continuation of efforts by the previous
administration to redistribute land to the peasants, but at a much faster
rate.5 In early 1970, Jacques Chonchol, who would later direct the UP
agrarian reform program, told an interviewer that Frei’s attempt to establish
agrarian reform cooperatives (asentamientos) had benefited only 20,000 out
of the original target of 200,000 peasants.6 To broaden the reform, UP
proposed increasing credit and technical assistance to the poorest strata of
farmers. An added objective, in keeping with the social goals of the
revolution, was the establishment of peasant cooperatives and ­self-governing
councils. The UP government hoped to institute its agrarian program in an
orderly fashion, but the pressure for land was so great that peasants began
seizing farms illegally, sometimes with the encouragement of MIR militants.
These land seizures, or tomas, as Chileans called them, became a source of
political embarrassment for Allende, as the opposition portrayed UP as
having deliberately generated chaos in the countryside in order to carry out
its political objective of eliminating private property.7
Compared to the Frei administration, the pace of land distribution during
the first year of Allende’s government did accelerate dramatically, as all
farms larger than 80 hectares became subject to expropriation. Although UP
had promised to give peasants individual land titles, it opted instead for
replacing asentamientos with the Centro de Reforma Agraria (CERA,
Agrarian Reform Center), a large cooperative composed of expropriated
farms.8 This rapid dismantling of the hacienda system raised questions about
whether the new regulations of land ownership would disrupt the ability of
Chile to feed itself. Chonchol argued that a new system of production was
needed to address the country’s glaring economic inequality. Capitalism had
failed most Chileans, as the wealthiest 5 percent owned more than 27
percent of the national income, while the majority lived in poverty.9
To U.S. officials the introduction of the CERA indicated that Allende’s
agrarian reform program was endangering production incentives, which
could lead to food shortages.10 The AID mission in Santiago invoked a
common Cold War analogy of communism as a disease when it described
the land seizures as “somewhat analogous to a boil on the body of a person.
It affects directly only a very small portion of the body, yet the whole body is
aware of pain and is apprehensive about it spreading to other areas.”11
Allende’s agrarian reform also drew the wrath of Chilean conservatives,
especially wealthy landowners who comprised the National Agricultural
Society.12 According to one prominent study of Chile’s agrarian system, rural
employers’ associations “offered a more militant resistance to the incumbent
[Allende] government than at any other time in Chilean history.” Their
tactics included producer strikes, vigilante actions to recover occupied
farms, and mass media campaigns to publicize the government’s
mismanagement of its agricultural program.13 Many peasants distrusted
CERA and continued to demand land titles. Some UP bureaucrats reacted
paternalistically, dubbing peasants who resisted the agrarian reform as
“kulaks,” and “agents of the CIA.”14
These developments led some analysts to predict early on that Chile
would soon begin to experience significant food shortages.15 In August 1971,
Kissinger was told by an aide that “disruption from agrarian reform and
peasant takeovers” had become so severe that Chile would have to import
more food the following year.16 In late 1971, an El Mercurio editorial
disparaged the government for failing to control the tomas, which had
produced “anarchy” in the countryside.17 Time magazine asserted that
“agricultural production has plummeted” because “the Allende regime has
not moved forcefully enough against illegal seizures of farms by armed
extremists.”18 In April 1972, Ambassador Davis reported that “growing rural
unrest in Chile has already had a significant negative impact on private farm
investment and over all agricultural production.”19 Crimmins subsequently
informed Rogers that Allende’s agrarian reform program “has sowed
uncertainty and confusion in the rural sector, with adverse effect on
agricultural production.”20
The UP government was aware of the impending crisis, one U.S. report
alleged, but “has proved unwilling to modify its radical agrarian reform
program in order to reduce the costs in terms of lost production.”21 Most UP
officials did their best to minimize such criticisms but to little effect. Allende
repeatedly stated that the government did not support land seizures. He
begged the Mapuche Indian population, which resided in southern Chile, to
cease engaging in tomas.22 The government also pointed out that the
problem of illegal land seizures was actually quite small, affecting less than
one percent of all the land that had been expropriated.23 UP and its
supporters tried to shift the blame for food shortages to problems inherited
from the Frei administration, earthquakes, and the “U.S. boycott.”24 Few
were convinced. U.S. intelligence reported in October 1971 that “allegations
that the full blame should be laid on the doorstep of [UP] government
policy appear to be gaining more credence.”25
Food shortages did arise in 1972 and worsened in 1973, leading to
hoarding and the growth of a black market. Chilean farming, the New York
Times declared in late August 1972, “was thrown out of kilter by President
Allende’s sweeping agrarian reform program,” thus causing farmers to
abandon the spring planting.26 In what has been dubbed the “chaos
hypothesis,” many analysts have identified the agrarian reform program as a
prime example of the incompetency and mismanagement of the Chilean
economy that led to the increasing unpopularity of the UP government.27
Some of these critics have painted a draconian picture of Allende’s agrarian
reform as a deliberate attempt to create hunger in order to push through a
Marxist agenda aimed at destroying the hacienda system.28
While the UP agrarian reform certainly had many faults, its contribution
to the downfall of Allende was far less significant than has been suggested.
UP officials were correct that the opposition had exaggerated the impact of
the tomas, which had started before Allende was elected.29 One farmworker
who had helped organize the land seizures asked a journalist to disseminate
photos of the peasants “so that Nixon will see” that “we are not
revolutionaries who want to kill anybody. We are just workers who want our
rights respected.”30 The UP government managed to complete the
expropriation of the latifundia in just 18 months, an achievement that one
study has described as “the most profound land reform in history without a
violent revolution.” Remarkably, this historic feat was “accomplished without
the social dislocation and decline in production which had accompanied
comparable land reforms elsewhere.”31 Even Ambassador Davis conceded
that rural violence in Chile under Allende paled in comparison to the
thousands killed in the land reforms of Colombia and Vietnam.32
Experimentation with ­self-governing peasant organizations certainly met
resistance, but government officials did not try to imitate the ­state-
controlled farms of Cuba or the Soviet Union. Chonchol rejected ­import
substitution as a viable model for Chilean agriculture. He advocated
increasing exports of Chilean wine, fruit, and vegetable products that would
bring in more foreign exchange.33
 Agricultural statistics do not support the charge that the food shortages
during Allende’s government were caused primarily by a severe decline in
agricultural production.34 It also needs to be emphasized that shortages of
meat, milk, and coffee were not uncommon in the Frei era when Chile had
to import as much as ­one-fifth of its food supply.35 Wealthy farmers did
attempt to sabotage the UP government by slaughtering cattle and refusing
to plant crops after Allende became president, but agricultural output
actually increased between 1969 and 1972 owing to higher productivity and
increased land area under cultivation.36 Field crop production fell off by
about 30 percent in 1973, but this decline appears to have been caused more
by the rise of a black market, which decreased incentives to participate in
cooperative farming, than by illegal land seizures. The truckers’ strikes of
October 1972 and July 1973 also compounded the distribution problem, as
did the September 1973 coup.37

The Social Sector

The problems of food shortages, hoarding, and the black market, which
became so acute in the months leading up to the 1973 coup, have strongly
colored both popular memory and historical accounts of the entire Allende
period.38 Because the UP government ended abruptly as it was failing, it is
tempting to interpret its economic policies as all heading in a linear line
toward disaster. The mass media contributed to this image in its search for
easy explanations for the coup.39 U.S. reports on the Chilean economy also
generally presented a highly pessimistic picture, which indicated that failure
was inevitable. Kissinger informed Nixon in early 1971: “The Chilean
economy has performed poorly in recent years, and little or no growth is in
prospect for 1971.”40 One U.S. economist who arrived at the American
embassy in Santiago about this time later complained about the boredom of
his post: “You could have trained Cheetah the Chimp to do the economic
analysis of the Allende policies, because it was all straight downhill.”41
Such crude assessments obscure important variability in performance and
do injustice to the complexity of Chile’s economic ills. Most Chileans,
especially the poorer sectors, enjoyed an increase in living standards during
the first year of Allende’s presidency. The World Bank described 1971 as “a
year of spectacular progress” toward UP’s objectives, including higher wages,
lower unemployment, and relatively low inflation.42 Allende’s first five
months, declared one ­long standing Communist supporter, were “the most
brilliantly played in Chilean history.” The historian Peter Winn insists that
Allende’s “extraordinary achievements,” which included a “massive
redistribution of income; the diminution of both inflation and
unemployment; the expanded housing, health, and education programs; the
extension of social security; and the reform of the legal system,” was
“unequaled by any previous Chilean president, let alone in his very first year
of office.”43 Even Ambassador Korry marveled that the “enormous boost in
real purchasing power has materially benefited perhaps 90 percent of all
Chileans,” effectively achieving the social goals of the Alliance for Progress.44
This early prosperity proved highly misleading, as many have since
observed, because the momentum could not be sustained. To understand
why requires a short review of UP’s economic policies and the obstacles that
Allende faced in trying to legislate a socialist revolution. UP started out
intending to redistribute income, reduce unemployment, and expand
production so that the economy would remain strong during the transition
from capitalism to socialism. Construction of the “new economy” called for
nationalizing the large industrial monopolies in the social sector (utilities,
banks, mines, etc.) while providing state assistance to the vast majority of
firms in the private sector that guaranteed workers’ rights.45 The policy was
designed to divide the bourgeoisie so that the revolution would retain the
support of the middle class.46 As economic minister Pedro Vuskovic
explained in an interview, the whole point of the nationalizations was to “get
at the oligarchy” and “rid Chile of a monopolistic industrial situation that
was breaking economic development.”47
The creation of the social sector was supposed to proceed in an orderly
legal fashion like the agrarian reform, but it too soon spun out of control as
workers viewed Allende’s election as an opportunity to seize factories on
their own. This “revolution from below” forced Allende into accelerating the
pace of nationalization, which fostered lengthy disputes with the opposition
over the “three areas” legislation.48 Enlarging the social sector meant having
to provide higher wages and benefits, which were paid for through deficit
spending. Once wages had been increased it became nearly impossible
politically for the government to impose austerity measures, so it granted
wage adjustments to compensate for inflation.49 Instead of UP generating its
own surplus, “the social area became a leaking bucket,” one analyst has
commented, which enhanced “the galloping rate of inflation.”50
As discussed in Chapter 5, international finance also contributed to UP’s
economic difficulties. Chile’s balance of payments deficit was already
suffering by late 1971 as the U.S. blockade reduced the supply of credits on
capital account. An added drain on the capital account was the
disinvestment by the large copper companies as well as capital flight.
Because UP’s “programs awakened more desires than could be satisfied,”
U.S. intelligence noted, Chile also began to suffer a trade imbalance.51 With
their higher wages, Chileans, historically accustomed to a high consumption
of consumer goods, went on a spending spree that led to a rise in imported
goods that was not matched by a concomitant increase in exports.52 Allende
did gain some relief by rescheduling payments on Chile’s foreign debt, but
the ­hoped-for gains from increased industrial production and copper sales
never materialized. Copper prices fell from 64 to 49 cents per pound
between 1970 and 1971, a loss of about $140 million in anticipated income
according to the World Bank.53 The double blow to capital and current
accounts caused Chile’s balance of payments to plunge from a surplus of $70
million to a deficit of $401 million over the first year of Allende’s
presidency.54 The balance of payments crisis subsequently began draining
Chile’s foreign reserves, which plunged by several hundred million dollars in
1971.55
Allende frequently complained that economic growth was being
hampered by capital flight and brain drain.56 To stem the outward flow of
capital after the 1970 election, Allende had asked the Frei administration to
halt bank withdrawals.57 Finance minister Andrés Zaldívar Larraín ignored
the request and instead issued an alarming report claiming that Allende’s
victory had provoked a credit and banking crisis, as domestic private
investment and the inflow of capital from abroad had come to an abrupt
halt.58 Ambassador Korry recommended circulating “the bleak Zaldivar
analysis” as widely as possible, as part of a campaign to frighten foreign
businesses into withdrawing their technicians. “The fewer the brains,” he
boasted, “the more difficult the management problem for Allende.”59 The
State Department’s recommendations for implementing phase 2 of Track I
thus included taking “political action to encourage the flight of key Chilean
technicians and managers so as to hamper the operation of the economy and
to augment the political tensions.”60
As discussed in Chapter 2, these early efforts to derail the economy failed
to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency, but the effects of the
terror campaign surely lingered. Capital flight is notoriously difficult to
measure given the strenuous efforts that are often made to hide it. For
example, after Allende’s victory, wealthy Chilean ranchers allegedly began
marching some 160,000 cattle across the border into Argentina.61 One study
has described the outflow of capital from Chile as “drastic,” amounting to
$103 million in 1971.62 Another study, however, has suggested that capital
flight from Chile during the 1970s was insignificant in comparison to its
external debt.63 The World Bank and IMF, while including capital flight
among the reasons for the declining balance of payments, did not elevate it
above other factors such as the drop in private investment on capital
account.64 Reports of tens of thousands of wealthy Chileans who fled
immediately after Allende’s election appear exaggerated or misleading given
that many of them returned to fight socialism.65
Far more important than capital flight or the brain drain was inflation.
One prominent economic historian has asserted that the “failure to curb
inflationary pressures was perhaps the single most important factor in the
fall of Allende.”66 Although the inflation rate in Chile remained under
control in 1971, it climbed rapidly to more than 100 percent in 1972 and
reached unprecedented levels of 1,000 percent in 1973, among the highest in
the world.67 In early 1972, Communist Party leader Orlando Millas
acknowledged that preventing inflation had become “a matter of life and
death” for the UP government.68 Polls indicated that most Chileans
identified economic issues, especially inflation, among the main problems
facing the nation.69 The cause of hyperinflation under Allende has been the
subject of much investigation. The main variables include the “wage trap”
(i.e., deficit spending to subsidize an enlarged social sector), price controls,
the high cost of imported goods, an expanded money supply, capital flight,
economic blockade, falling copper prices, the balance of payments deficit,
currency devaluation, and lack of tax revenue. Sorting out cause and effect,
as well as trying to determine which factors were most important, can be
daunting. It seems safe to say that some factors, such as the large fiscal
deficits and the expanded money supply, were more proximate, while others
such as the blockade were more indirect. Regardless of its exact cause,
inflation contributed to the rise of shortages, the black market, and
hoarding.70
Allende had often complained about inflation under Frei, so why did he
not do more to address inflation when it began to increase under his own
administration? Many UP supporters were lured into a false sense of
optimism by the prosperity of the first year, even though there were plenty
of warning signs.71 According to the PDC, by early 1971 Allende had
become “drunk with success.”72 Economist Ricardo Lagos cautioned the
government in its first year that it could not keep “goosing the economy”
without depleting Chile’s foreign reserves and causing runaway inflation.73
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai counseled the UP government to be “less
doctrinaire” and slow down the pace of the revolution.74 One Chilean school
administrator prophetically warned in 1971: “if Allende can’t overcome the
economic troubles, there will be a great reaction, perhaps a military coup.”75
Allende’s need to appear upbeat in public may have caused him to take
warnings about the economy less seriously than he should have. On NBC’s
Meet the Press in late October 1971, Allende downplayed inflation while
expressing optimism about the future despite current difficulties.76 UP also
responded slowly to the economic crisis because it was divided internally
about how to correct it.77 Some UP economists were nonchalant about
economic problems either because they assumed that economic growth
would eventually compensate for current difficulties, or because they saw
the crisis as a way to “sharpen class conflict.”78 Others were simply in denial.
Minister of Planning Gonzalo Martner claimed in early 1972 that Chile was
already over the hump, as inflation had been cut in half, and “our balance
sheet is largely positive.”79 Allende’s first economic minister, Pedro Vuskovic,
told friends that he did not care if his economic policies were successful so
long as he “contributed to a truly revolutionary change in Chile’s structure.”80
Vuskovic also appeared unconcerned about inflation, which he blamed on
“imperialism” and “internal enemies.”81 Chilean officials who predicted
disaster if the government did not find a way to steer the economy in a more
sustainable direction had little impact. Gabriel Valdés who took up a UN
post after Allende’s victory became so worried about Chile’s economy at the
end of 1971 that he made a special trip to Santiago to convince Allende to
fire Vuskovic.82 Unfortunately, Vuskovic’s replacement, Carlos Matus,
propounded a similar philosophy. Chile was only in a crisis by conventional
economic criteria, Matus told a German magazine, since there was now an
opportunity to accelerate the revolution.83
Allende did not learn of the pending storm until August 1971, when
according to a CIA informant, Allende “has at last become aware of the
enormity of the country’s economic problems and the degree to which they
have been aggravated by the policies of his UP ministers.”84 The president
warned his followers that “we cannot continue to spend and spend the
reserves of the state … we may have difficult hours ahead.”85 If they did not
show a greater sense of responsibility in public management, Allende
lectured his department heads in late 1971, “we are headed for an
irremediable failure.”86 In mid–1973, an Argentine economist explained to
Allende and several cabinet ministers that inflation was only going to get
worse. In exasperation, Allende complained, “Why didn’t anybody tell me
this earlier?”87
There were in fact officials who had advocated policies to check inflation,
but Allende was unsure how to proceed because he received such conflicting
advice. As one of Allende’s economic advisers later explained, “Some UP
economists didn’t see the danger, and held that concern with such things as
money supply reflected a narrow technical and bourgeois point of view.”
These advisers predicted that once the state gained control of the strategic
parts of the economy inflation could be brought under control.88 Others,
such as Communist Party leader Orlando Millas, rejected the view that
somehow inflation was not “real.” They advocated restricting the money
supply, reducing spending, and improving tax collection.89 In April 1973, UP
economic adviser Edward Boorstein warned that inflation was threatening
to deprive the government of popular support. He recommended reducing
the foreign debt, increasing taxes on the wealthy, and lowering the debt of
state enterprises.90 Implementing ­anti-inflation policies, however, proved
difficult because of opposition on both sides of the political spectrum. UP
Economic Minister José Cademartori, later complained that “we could not
carry out any tax reform because the opposition dominated Congress and it
rejected all our proposals.”91 Resistance also came from government officials
who objected to ­IMF-like austerity measures, which might hurt ­working-
class support for UP in the midterm elections (see Chapter 7).92 After the
coup, one of Allende’s principal economic advisers allegedly confessed to a
U.S. legislator that it had been politically impossible to combat inflation.93
Allende, himself, had little understanding of the problem. He acknowledged
at the end of July 1973 that his government had made “mistakes,” but he still
blamed the high inflation rate on the economic blockade and transportation
bottlenecks.94
Instead of attempting to lower the inflation rate, UP instead tackled the
problem of food shortages and the black market through voluntary
measures and government regulation. Allende repeatedly exhorted
managers and workers to increase production while consuming less.95 “The
Marines are not going to impose their will here,” Allende told a crowd of
supporters in late 1971. “If they restrict our credits, we will have to tighten
our belts, but for each notch that the workers have to take in, the
reactionaries here will have to take in 10.”96 Allende warned the leaders of
the UP coalition that “if we don’t increase production and export more, our
problems are going to get worse, which will strengthen the opposition.”97
The president also frequently appealed to the population to make sacrifices
for the good of the revolution. “If we were truly a revolutionary people,” he
told a rally in Antofagasta in February 1972, nobody would eat beef for a
year.98 “Winning the battle of production” went the popular UP slogan, “is
crucial for lifting the imperialist siege.”99 By early 1973, Allende was asking
workers not to expect wage increases because “we must all make a great
effort to halt the inflationary spiral.”100 Allende also pleaded with women to
understand that the food shortages were not the fault of the government,
because Chile had always been forced to rely on millions of dollars of food
imports.101
Allende’s appeals to increase production and make sacrifices appear to
have had limited impact, as many workers used their newfound freedoms
under socialism to slack off. The problems of declining worker discipline are
well illustrated by the copper industry. Fidel Castro had counseled Allende
after his election to persuade foreign technicians to stay in the country as
long as possible to avoid a massive brain drain like the one that had hurt
Cuba.102 But once Allende nationalized the copper industry there was no
stopping the exodus of experienced managers and technicians. Not
surprisingly, the mines experienced a production lag during the transition
period owing to administrative confusion, worker indiscipline, labor
disputes, and a lack of spare parts.103 In early 1973, Allende chastised the
Chuquicamata copper workers for not demonstrating a “revolutionary
spirit” and instead “acting like true monopolistic bankers, asking for more
money for their pockets without considering the situation of the country.”104
According to one U.S. intelligence report, absenteeism in the copper
industry and other industrial sectors was disrupting production, as nearly
half the labor force failed to show up for work after the weekend.105
Although the copper mines failed to achieve the government’s projected
target in 1971, the difficulties of industry owing to nationalization should
not be overstated. One Anaconda official admitted that “the problems might
exist even if the American companies were still here in full force.”106 Even
though copper revenue did not reach the levels that Allende had hoped for,
the industry eventually got back on its feet and annual output improved
during each year of his presidency.107
To keep speculators and hoarders in check, UP instituted price controls
and began organizing Juntas de Abastecimiento y Precios (JAPs, Supply and
Price Committees) in April 1972.108 The JAPs were neighborhood
organizations that reported hoarders and ­black-market merchants to the
authorities. JAPs could only advise and had no legal powers, yet Chilean
commercial associations spread propaganda suggesting that they were really
incipient ­Cuban-style organizations that the Chilean Communist Party was
using to gain control of the population.109 Despite the spread of more than
1,500 JAPs across the country, food prices continued to rise and the black
market thrived as the government controlled only about 30 percent of the
distribution.110 “Current shortages of meats, dairy products, eggs, rice,
potatoes, onions, sugar,” the U.S. embassy reported in September 1972, “are a
source of considerable embarrassment for the UP government.”111 Frei, after
returning from his trip to Europe in August 1972, described Chile as a
“volcano” owing to “sharp deteriorations in economic conditions.”112
Allende was highly reluctant to introduce rationing, but he broached the
possibility in late 1972 when he compared Chile’s current economic plight to
wartime conditions.113 As the lines lengthened and food shortages worsened,
UP’s supporters pressed authorities to institute some form of rationing. In
January 1973, Finance Minister Fernando Flores publicly proposed the
rationing of 30 essential foodstuffs for those in the ­lower-income brackets.
The announcement led to a frenzied purchasing of items anticipated soon to
be in even shorter supply. Because wealthier consumers would have to pay
more for the same goods, the opposition bitterly denounced UP’s rationing
plan as a thinly disguised instrument of class warfare.114 In the face of this
counterattack, officials dropped the formal rationing plan and instead
created a national distribution agency, which used the JAPs to ensure that
each family received an adequate basket of food staples at fixed prices.115
Allende and his critics quibbled over whether the new distribution system
constituted true rationing, but whatever the new program was called, it had
managed to provide food for an estimated 180,000 families by mid–1973.116
These attempts to alleviate hardship were not insignificant. Allende’s most
loyal supporters demonstrated a remarkable spirit of sacrifice in keeping
with the times when ­self-imposed austerity was considered a virtue. As
Isabel Allende recalled, “One Peruvian artist who arrived for a visit during
that period asked, amazed, why Chilean women dressed like lepers, lived in
doghouses, and ate like fakirs.”117 The rationing system, which helped level
income inequality, was welcomed by many ­working-class Chileans
accustomed to living on the edge since a guaranteed basket of staples
provided a newfound sense of security.118 Well into 1973, when the economy
was obviously sinking, Allende’s loyal supporters remained steadfast. “It’s a
shitty government,” they proclaimed half in jest, “but it’s ours.”119
For most Chileans, however, the food shortages, long lines, and the
rationing system proved to be a nightmare.120 Flores had publicly announced
the food program without consulting the public works minister, General
Ismael Huerta Díaz. After Huerta resigned in protest, the government put
the program under the control of Air Force General Alberto Bachelet, where
it floundered due to clashes with MIR extremists over administration.121
Several UP officials complained that the rationing system was overly divisive
and impractical.122 Corrupt shopkeepers subverted the food distribution
program by taking control of the JAPs to buy at wholesale prices goods that
they then sold on the black market.123 The speculation by some analysts that
the rationing system might have worked had it been implemented sooner
overlooks UP’s desire to avoid alienating the middle class.124 Allende himself
had declared in 1971 that “Chile is not used to rationing and we don’t want
it.”125

Explanations
It was obvious by 1973 that the Chilean economy was in deep trouble. But
was it really on the verge of collapse, as so many commentators have
claimed? The idea that UP’s policies had destroyed Chile’s economy is a
common theme in the scholarly literature on the Allende government.126
That Chile’s experiment with socialism had to fail because it challenged
conventional economic wisdom now seems ­pre-ordained. Korry once
reported to the State Department that the great “mass of Chileans know
nothing of economics and a great deal about purchasing power.”127 In 1971 a
Chilean economist confided to American conservative William Buckley that
if the Allende plan worked, “we’ll have to tear up every economics textbook
ever written.”128 Two years later, Eduardo Frei claimed that Chile was
descending into a “carnival of madness.”129
These assessments are understandable given the dramatic decline in many
of Chile’s macroeconomic indicators as well as the visible rise in food
shortages, rationing, and the black market. Still, the detrimental impact of
the UP economic program needs to be put into historical context. During
Allende’s presidency, agricultural and industrial production, while certainly
not stellar, fell more or less within expected historic norms. The problems of
capital flight and labor discipline, though real, were not high enough to
seriously hamper the economy. Inflation skyrocketed to unprecedented
levels, but Chile had suffered inflation many times in its history.130 Food
shortages and long lines no doubt caused hardship, but the rationing system
prevented serious hunger.131 More food was available in Santiago from 1972
to 1973 than during the last year of the Frei government.132 As Ambassador
Davis noted, the food shortages were “more psychological fact than real
inability of [the] Chilean middle class to go on living reasonably well.”133
Many of the problems with the Chilean economy under Allende
worsened under Pinochet, with direr consequences. Inflation persisted for
years, while unemployment soared into double digits, and the poorest
segments of the population began to starve.134 Under Pinochet, Chile quickly
returned to an era, as Allende had once described it, when “the shops were
full but the stomachs were empty.”135 Although life became markedly worse
for the average Chilean after 1973, descriptions abound of the “Chilean
miracle” under the neoliberal policies of the Chicago Boys, a group of
economists hired by Pinochet to reconfigure Chile’s economy along the lines
of ­free-market principles. Because Pinochet eventually brought inflation
under control and slashed the deficit by privatizing the public sector, his
regime received high praise from mainstream economists. Like the bitter
medicine prescribed by the money doctors of the early twentieth century,
neoliberal policies allegedly became the only way forward for Chile after the
disaster of Allende. As one State Department Chilean desk officer of the late
1970s later explained: “Chile’s economy was recovering very, very beautifully
under the military.” Of course, “the impact on the lower classes in Chile, on
the working people, was horrendous,” but “that’s one of the necessary steps
that has to be taken to build a new economy.”136
The question of who was to blame for the deterioration of the Chilean
economy was a debate that raged throughout the Allende presidency and
continued long afterward. As the economy took a turn for the worse in 1972,
Allende began castigating the previous government for leaving him an
“anemic and twisted system.”137 He also started to attribute the economic
downturn to the “invisible blockade,” the truckers’ strike (see Chapter 7),
and the lack of revenue because of opposition to his tax proposals.138 When
visiting Mexico, Allende drew parallels between Chile’s current dilemma and
the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution, insinuating that both countries
had been punished for expropriating their natural resources. In Chile, he
asserted, inflation was being exacerbated by the falling price of copper and
the copper company embargos, as well as the lack of access to international
credit.139 After the coup, many former UP officials expanded on this excuse.
Orlando Letelier, for example, blamed Allende’s downfall on the “most
destructive and sophisticated conspiracy in Latin American history,” waged
by “reactionary forces, supported feverishly by their friends abroad.”
Strategies to undermine Allende, he alleged, included the economic
blockade, hoarding by the rich, industrial sabotage, and the creation of a
“vast black market.”140 The implied suggestion according to this
interpretation is that the UP government might have succeeded had it been
given more time and not faced such vicious opposition.141
By contrast, Allende’s critics generally discounted the role of the United
States and the domestic opposition in explaining Chile’s economic crisis.
Frei told an industrial rally that “1971 will be remembered as the year of the
orgy, millions were squandered recklessly, land given away unthinkingly.”
The government blames the crisis on “foreign aggression,” he charged, but
“we cannot agree that this is the cause of the country’s ruin.”142 According to
this view, UP’s impractical policies alone were to blame for wrecking the
economy, and Allende was doomed from the outset. Deterministic scenarios
described by this school of thought nearly always follow the same sequence:
economic decline, chaos, and a coup.143 Even if the UP government had
garnered sufficient revenue through higher copper prices and increased
taxes to provide compensation for nationalized businesses, these critics
argue, UP’s socialist agenda still would have led to inflation because of the
massive deficits and exploding money supply.144 One prominent survey of
Chilean history has concluded that external factors such as the CIA made no
difference to the outcome: “the real ‘destabilization’ of Chile was the work of
Chileans” themselves.145
The debate over Chile’s economic ills contributed to the sense of doom
that pervaded the latter part of the Allende presidency. As the historian
Steve Stern has commented, “By Allende’s last year of rule, the presentiment
of disaster had become a stronger political and cultural force: a discourse
repeatedly projected into the public domain, a political tool used actively by
all sides, a common sense nourished by the reality of a government unable
to contain disorder spiraling out of control.”146 In retrospect, it is possible to
transcend this polarized dichotomy by acknowledging that both sides had
valid points. Surely the Nixon administration’s economic warfare campaign
against Allende had some impact, otherwise, U.S. officials would have
abandoned it. At the same time, the UP government bears responsibility for
failing to carry out a sustainable economic policy that would address such
critical issues as inflation and food shortages. Assistant Secretary Meyer’s
memo to Kissinger of 8 September 1971 captures both views succinctly.
Chile’s economic troubles are not due “exclusively to our efforts,” he
reported, but “are visibly of its own making.”147 The CIA made a similar
assessment in March 1972: “In the end, we were counting on the fact that
the economic results of his [Allende’s] actions (raising wages,
nationalizations, inflation, flight of capital, etc.) would eventually take their
economic toll and catch up with him, and this is pretty much what has
happened in the last year and a half.”148
Nixon administration officials assumed that poor economic performance
under Allende would automatically induce the opposition to create so much
chaos that the military would have to intervene. A U.S. embassy officer later
recalled: “Chileans revolted against Allende because they couldn’t get toilet
paper.”149 The missing step in this equation was the need to publicize and
exaggerate, if necessary, Chile’s economic ills. Whether or not the economy
was “going to the dogs,” as one commentator put it, mattered less than the
perception that it was, and that the only solution was to overthrow the
government.150 U.S. officials running the covert action campaign against
Allende finally came to understand this point in late 1971, when one of the
CIA’s informants in the PDC explained that “however disastrous the
economic situation might become it alone would not create enough despair
to bring about Allende’s ouster.”151 The way to solve this dilemma, an
intelligence report observed, was to exploit rising expectations: “Chileans
are accustomed to high rates of inflation and sporadic shortages of goods,
and the poorer classes are almost certainly consuming more in 1972 than in
1970. What is new is the frustration caused by shortages coming in the
immediate aftermath of a consumer boom fostered and acclaimed by the
government.”152 As the next chapter will show, the Nixon administration did
its best to transform discontent over the economy into political action that
would eventually bring Allende down.

1. Agosín, Of Earth and Sea, 73–74.

2. Debray, Praised Be Our Lords, 119–20. Along with the euphoria was a premonition among some
of Allende’s supporters that the military would eventually remove him. See Ariel Dorfman, “Death
and Rebirth,” Nation, 8 October 1990.
3. UP Program, 1970, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 278–81. Many elements of the UP and
PDC platforms were actually not all that different. See Sideri, “Process of Transformation and the Role
of International Cooperation,” 364–66.
4. For a summary of the intellectual basis of UP’s economic policies, see Arriagada Herrera, De la
“vía chilena,” 102–116.
5. UP Program, 1970, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 280.
6. Yglesias, “Report from Chile,” NYT, 11 January 1970. Probably to emphasize the Frei
government’s failures, Chonchol vastly overstated the scope of its land reform, which targeted no
more than 100,000 peasant proprietors, as he himself later wrote. See Chonchol, “La reforma agraria
en Chile,” 606; and Roxborough et al., Chile, 55.
7. Amembassy to DoS, ­A-61, 24 February 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84.
8. Garrido et al., Historia de la reforma agraria en Chile, 174. For a detailed description of Allende’s
agrarian reform, see Barraclough and Fernández, Diagnóstico de la reforma agraria chilena.
9. Jacques Chonchol, “Bringing About the Revolutionary Process,” NYT, 25 January 1971.
10. Intelligence memo ER IM 71–138, July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 392.
11. TOAID ­A-75, 25 February 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84.
12. Embtel 1173, 13 March 1972, CDP
13. Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside, 324. For a ­first-hand description of the “White Guard,” a
vigilante group of small farmers that attempted to recover their land, see Moss, “Allende’s Chile,” 80–
82. For the view that the tomas were mostly ­non-violent and that skirmishes were exaggerated by the ­-
right-wing media, see Winn, “Furies of the Andes,” 246–50. Friedman, “Revolution and ­Counter-
Revolution in Southern Chile” maintains that the landowners in the southern province of Cautín were
too divided to put up much resistance.
14. Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside, 331–32. For Corvalán’s admission that many peasants
disliked the CERA, see Davidow to DoS, ­A-208, 30 August 1971, AGR Chile, 6/1/70, box 467, RG 59.
For more on peasant grievances about land titles, see Jose Yglesias, “The Chilean Experiment:
Revolution in the Countryside?” Ramparts, June 1973. For problems of bureaucracy and paternalism
in Allende’s agrarian reform, see Morris, We Must Make Haste, 189–211; and Loveman, “Unidad
Popular in the Countryside.”
15. Korry reported consumer goods shortages as early as July 1971. See embtel 3927, 23 July 1971,
box 3, CAF, RG 84.
16. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 12 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 659.
17. Brunton ­A-337 to DoS, 12 November 1971, AGR Chile, 6/1/70, box 467, RG 59.
18. “Empty Pots and Yankee Plots” and “Allende’s Troubles,” Time, 13 December 1971 and 24 January
1972.
19. Davis ­A-99 to DoS, 26 April 1972, LAB 11 Chile, 1/1/70, box 1395, RG 59.
20. Crimmins memo to Rogers, 25 July 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 804.
21. Hewitt memo to Kissinger, 15 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 712.
22. Allende press conference, FBIS Daily Report, 27 May 1971; Allende’s speech at Concepción
University, FBIS Daily Report, 31 May 1971; Allende speech in the Plaza de la Constitución, Santiago,
21 December 1970, in Allende, Chile’s Road to Socialism, 74–75. In early 1972, Allende began to crack
down on MIR for its role in promoting the land invasions. CIA memo, 5 January 1972, CDP.
23. Yon ­A-61 to DoS, 24 February 1971, AGR Chile, 6/1/70, box 467, RG 59.
24. Elizabeth Farnsworth et al., “Inside Chile,” New York Review of Books, 9 March 1972.
25. CIA intelligence memo ER IM 71–201, October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 447.
26. Joseph Novitski, “Allende’s Economics Runs Afoul of Household Budget,” NYT, 29 August 1972.
27. Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside, 301; Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 170; Moss, Chile’s Marxist
Experiment, 81–97.
28. Susan L.M. Huck, “Freeing Chile,” American Opinion 17 (November 1974), 18.
29. Malcolm W. Browne, “Poor in Chile Seize Land for Marxist Communities,” NYT, 31 August
1970; Garcés, “Chile 1971,” 292; Brown, “Radical Reformism in Chile,” 237.
30. Juan de Onís, “Defiant Peasants Are Seizing More Farms,” NYT, 18 February 1971.
31. Winn and Kay, “Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution in Allende’s Chile,” 156. See also
Martner, El gobierno del presidente Salvador Allende, 536; and IDB, Economic and Social Progress in
Latin America: Annual Report 1973, 165–66.
32. Davis, Last Two Years, 121.
33. Jacques Chonchol, “The Agrarian Policy of the Popular Government,” in Zammit, Chilean Road,
113–14.
34. CIAP, El esfuerzo interno, ­II-14.
35. Elizabeth Farnsworth et al., “Inside Chile,” New York Review of Books, 9 March 1972; Steenland,
Agrarian Reform under Allende, 4.
36. World Bank, Chile: An Economy in Transition, 173; Steenland, Agrarian Reform under Allende,
15.
37. Solon Lovett Barraclough, “The State of Chilean Agriculture before the Coup,” Wisconsin Land
Tenure Center Newsletter, 43 (­January-March 1974), 11–13; IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin
America: Annual Report 1973, 160; Jarvis, “Unraveling of Chile’s Agrarian Reform,” 265–67; Brown,
“Radical Reformism in Chile,” 236–37; Sigmund, “Allende in Retrospect,” 53. On the problem of
fertilizer and machinery shortages, see Duman, “Agrarian Reform,” 48. Transportation issues also
contributed to the food shortages. See CIA report, 6 October 1972, CDP; and Carlos Matus interview,
Chile Hoy, no. 7, 28 July—3 August 1972.
38. For studies that emphasize UP’s irresponsible economic policies, see Alexander, Tragedy of Chile,
173; Whelan, Out of the Ashes, 340–45; Escuela de Negocios de Valparaíso, Chilean Economy.
39. For examples in the U.S. media, see Jonathan Kandell, “Allende’s Undoing,” NYT, 15 September
1973; Paul N. ­Rosenstein-Rodan, “Allende’s Big Failing: Incompetence,” NYT, 15 June 1973; and
“Righting a Leftist Mess,” Time, 12 November 1973. For the Chilean media, see Bardón Muñoz, Una
experiencia económica fallida; and Donoso Loero, Breve historia de la Unidad Popular.
40. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 20 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 592.
41. Samuel F. Hart interview, 54, FAOHC. Hart seems to have forgotten that he had once described
UP’s economic policies has having “had some notable successes.” See draft of embtel (unnumbered),
29 October 1971, box 3, CAF, RG 84.
42. World Bank, Chile: An Economy in Transition, 73.
43. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 75, 228. For a more tempered assessment of Allende’s early
economic successes, see Thomas G. Sanders, “Allende’s First Months,” American Universities Field Staff
Reports, 28:2 (April 1971), 4–7.
44. Embtel 3038, 8 June 1971, POL 2–2 Chile, box 2193, RG 59. The CIA made a similar assessment.
See CIA intelligence memo ER IM 72–70, April 1972, ­CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070–0, CREST.
45. UP Program, 1970, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 268–69.
46. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 140–41; Stallings, Class Conflict, 135–36.
47. Joseph Novitski, “Marxist Chile after One Year,” NYT, 10 October 1971.
48. The classic case study of this process is Winn, Weavers of Revolution, which describes the
unauthorized seizure of a textile factory by workers who then presented Allende with a fait accompli.
See also, Morris, We Must Make Haste, ch. 5; and Raptis, Revolution.
49. Nove, “Political Economy,” 59–60.
50. de Vylder, Allende’s Chile, 154. According to the World Bank, Chile’s Central Bank doubled the
money supply in 1971 to finance the growing deficit. World Bank, Chile: An Economy in Transition,
64.
51. CIA intelligence memo ER IM 71–30, February 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 259.
52. SNIE 94–71, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 403, 409; “Chile: A Variegated, Elitist and
Consumption Oriented Society,” 22 July 1971, box 3, CAF, RG 84.
53. World Bank, Chile: An Economy in Transition, 72. See also CIA intelligence memo ER IM 72–14,
January 1972, ­CIA-RDP85T00875 R001700030014–2, CREST.
54. IMF report, 3.
55. Hewitt memo to Kissinger, 15 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 711–12.
56. Allende speech at Concepción University, FBIS Daily Report, 31 May 1971. For a general
description of capital flight after Allende’s election, see Yañez, “Chile on the Road to Socialism,” 5.
57. Joseph Novitski, “Election Affects Chile’s Economy,” NYT, 8 September 1970.
58. Joseph Novitski, “Chilean Official Reports an Economic Crisis in Wake of Election,” NYT, 25
September 1970. For the text of Zaldívar’s report and UP’s response, see Summary of a Radio and TV
Address by Minister of Finance Andres Zaldívar, 29 September 1970, CDP; and LAWR, 2 October
1970. Capital flight after Allende’s election is described somewhat vaguely in Alauf, “La coyuntura
económica,” 7.
59. Korry backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 25 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
307.
60. DoS, “Action in Support of U.S. Posture Towards Chile,” 16 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
376. On the “outflow of resources and experts,” see Sideri, “Process of Transformation and the Role of
International Cooperation,” 379.
61. de Vylder, Allende’s Chile, 180; ­Rosenstein-Rodan, Chile under Allende, 8.
 62. Farnsworth, “Facing the Blockade,” 16, 26. In her assessment of the balance of payments,
Farnsworth attributes the entire $103 million under “net autonomous capital movements,” to capital
flight. For other accounts that describe capital flight as damaging the Chilean economy, see Lindow,
Basic Data on the Economy of Chile, 25; O’Brien, Allende’s Chile, 200; and LAWR, 16 July 1971.
63. Arellano and Ramos, “Fuga de capitales en Chile,” 63. Unfortunately, this study does not provide
specific data for the 1970–1973 period.
64. World Bank, Chile: An Economy in Transition, 238; IMF report, 3.
65. Jonathan Kandell, “In Marxist Chile, the Wealthy Who Remained Still Find Beef and Scotch,”
NYT, 21 February 1973; memcon (Frei, Meyer), 23 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 714; Joseph
Kraft, “Chile’s Political Spring,” WP, 6 December 1970; Korry backchannel message to NSC, 7
September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 184; and CIA report, 25 February 1971, CDP.
66. ­Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, 325.
67. CIA study on Latin America, November 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-10: doc 58; World Bank,
Chile: An Economy in Transition, 74; Falcoff, Modern Chile, 59.
68. Juan de Onís, “2 Chilean Parties Take a Hard Line,” NYT, 19 February 1972.
69. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 176–77 n. 23.
70. Opinions vary widely on why inflation ran so high under Allende. In prioritizing its causes, I
have drawn upon IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: Annual Report 1973, 164;
Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America 1973, 168; Ramos,
Inflation in Chile, 353; Nove, “Political Economy,” 63; de Vylder, Allende’s Chile, 90–94; Whitehead,
“Inflation and Stabilisation in Chile 1970–7,” 81; Barandiaran, Inflación; Escuela de Negocios de
Valparaíso, Chilean Economy, 8–9. Many of the factors that led to inflation in the early 1970s had long
been a problem in the Chilean economy. See Mamalakis and Reynolds, Essays on the Chilean
Economy.
71. On the unwarranted optimism of the UP government, see Chilean National Planning Office,
“Analysis of the Economy in 1971,” in Zammit, Chilean Road, 319–41. Warnings about the money
supply, balance of payments deficits, and inflation were available as early as April 1971. See ­Griffith-
Jones, Role of Finance, 135; and Haslam, Nixon Administration, 104–107. UP also failed to heed the
lessons from leftist governments in Argentina and Brazil that had led succumbed to military coups in
part because of inflation. See Skidmore, “Politics of Economic Stabilization,” 181.
72. Embtel 46, 6 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 245.
73. Lagos, Southern Tiger, 26. For an elaboration of Lagos’s concerns, see “Cuatro opiniones sobre el
primer año de gestión económico del gobierno de Allende,” 25–28.
74. Larry Rohter, “Letter from the Americas,” NYT, 10 September 2003; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval,
405.
75. Sara Davidson, “Living through the Allende Revolution,” NYT, 17 October 1971.
76. Transcript of Allende’s conversation on NBC Meet the Press, enclosed with circ. no. 195, 31
October 1971, Circulares Ordinarias, AMRE. As late as February 1972, Allende was still denying the
need for rationing. See Graham Greene, “Chile: The Dangerous Edge,” Harper’s Magazine, March
1972, 32.
77. Nove, “Political Economy,” 65.
78. Embtel 4813, 26 October 1972, box 4, CAF, RG 84. For an example of this kind of analysis, see
Esteban Lederman, “El mito de las reservas nacionales,” Chile Hoy, no. 22, 10–16 November 1972.
79. Kalfon, Allende, 98.
80. Embtel 3039, 9 June 1971, POL 2–2 Chile, box 2193, RG 59.
81. Vuskovic interview, Chile Hoy, no. 2, 23–29 June 1972.
82. Subercaseaux, Gabriel Valdés, 164–65.
83. Moss, Chile’s Marxist Experiment, 57. On the failed economic policies of Millas and Matus, see
Stallings and Zimbalist, “Political Economy of the Unidad Popular,” 79.
84. Memo, “Meeting on Possible Economic Crunch in Chile,” 17 August 1971, CDP.
85. Embtel 4372, 23 August 1971, United States/Chile Relations, July—Dec. 1971, box 6, CAF, RG
84.
86. Juan de Onís, “Economic Crisis in Chile Eroding Allende Support,” NYT, 29 October 1971. For
Allende’s complaints about “featherbedding” and the lack of “revolutionary spirit” among UP’s
supporters and government officials, see LAWR, 26 January 1973.
87. Frenkel, “En las condiciones actuales estamos sentados sobre un volcán.” At least one economic
adviser claims that Allende in fact had been warned. See Everett G. Martin, “The Crucial Year for
Chile’s Allende,” WSJ, 6 July 1973.
88. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 118–19. Millas, Memorias, 432.
89. Millas, Memorias, 432. See also Labarca Goddard, Corvalán, 27; and Cademártori, “Some
Political and Economic Problems,” 90–91.
90. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 195–200.
91. Quoted in Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 30.
92. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 200; Bitar, Transición, 137–42.
93. See Jack B. Kubisch testimony, 25 September 1973, HCFA, United States and Chile during the
Allende Years, 131–32.
94. Allende speech to CUT, 25 July 1973, in Allende, Las grandes alamedas, 161.
95. Allende Addresses Predeparture Rally, FBIS Daily Report, 28 November 1972.
96. Juan de Onís, “Allende Imposes Control by State on Sales of Food,” NYT, 9 December 1971.
97. Cartas a los jefes de los partidos de la Unidad Popular, July 1972, in Allende, Discursos, 413.
98. Sobel, Chile & Allende, 73. Allende also reminded his supporters of the sacrifices that the Cubans
had made on behalf of their revolution. Allende speech to CUT, 25 July 1973, in Allende, Las grandes
alamedas, 162. On UP’s attempt to combat the meat shortage though a campaign to get Chileans to eat
more fish, see Espinosa Muñoz, “‘La batalla de la merluza.’”
99. Sandri, “Chile,” 200,
100. Allende Marks Arrival of Sugar from Cuba, FBIS Daily Report, 11 April 1973.
101. Allende Speaks to Women Rallying in Support of UP, FBIS Daily Report, 21 August 1973. On
Chile’s history of dependence on food imports, see NACLA, New Chile, 89.
102. CIA report, “Castro Sent the Following Advice to Allende,” 6 October 1970, CDP.
103. Embtel 6253, 28 December 1971, INCO Copper Chile, 9/1/71, box 1200, RG 59; Mikesell,
“Copper: Recent Developments in the Chilean and Peruvian Industries,” 1 November 1971, INCO
Copper Chile, 1/1/72, box 1200, RG 59; Norman Gall, “Chile: The Struggle in the Copper Mines,”
Dissent (Winter 1973), 102–105; Economic Intelligence Unit, QERC, 1973, no. 1, 6; Finn, Tracing the
Veins, 66.
104. “Chile Says All of ‘73 Copper Output Is Sold Despite New Kennecott Bid to Halt Sales,” WSJ, 26
February 1973.
105. CIA intelligence memo ER IM 71–138, July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 389. On the
problems of time lost in endless meetings, see Fernando Quiroga interview, 1 December 2001, in
Gaudichaud, Poder popular y cordones industriales, 359; and James Theberge, “Chile after Allende,”
Economist (13 October 1973), 44. Allende reportedly grew so frustrated over absenteeism and
inefficiency that he threatened several times to resign. See “Chile’s Course under Allende,” Times, 4
April 1973.
106. “Chile, Hampered by Mishaps in Its Mines,” WSJ, 15 March 1971. A U.S. copper executive also
admitted that the Chileans were quite capable of running the mines on their own. See “Chile: The
Expanding Left,” Time, 19 October 1970. On the possibilities of other countries helping Chile with its
technical difficulties, see LAWR, 17 December 1971.
 107. World Bank, Chile: An Economy in Transition, 106; Martner, “Los problemas de la producción,”
723. One investigator found that the rate of absenteeism was highest immediately after expropriation,
but then fell after workers began to impose ­self-discipline. See Zimbalist, “Worker Management,” 484.
108. About half of the JAPs were situated in Santiago. See Larraín and Meller, “­Socialist-Populist
Chilean Experience,” 205 n. 16. On how the JAPs were administered, see Giusti, “Participación
popular en Chile.”
109. Davis ­A-156 to DoS, 30 June 1972, box 3, CAF, RG 84. Mears ­A-166 to DoS, 14 July 1972, AGR
Chile, 6/1/70, box 467, RG 59. For portrayals of the JAPs as instruments of communism domination,
see Everett G. Martin, “In Chile, a ‘Cola’ Isn’t Something You Drink,” WSJ, 2 March 1973; Moss, Chile’s
Marxist Experiment, 170–71. For the view that the JAPs helped facilitate community activism, see
Bruey, Bread, 36.
110. Mears ­A-166 to DoS, 14 July 1972, AGR Chile, 6/1/70, box 467, RG 59; Zimbalist and Stallings,
“Showdown in Chile,” 6. On the operation of the black market in Northern Chile, see Frazier, Salt in
the Sand, 40.
111. Amembassy ­A-234 to DoS, 27 September 1972, AGR 15 Chile, 1/1/70, RG 59.
112. Embtel 3840, 19 August 1972, POL 2 Chile, 3–18–70, box 2193, RG 59.
113. Interview with Chilean Journalists on the radio show, “The Great Inquiry,” 10 September 1972,
in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 189–90; Discurso en la conmemoración del segundo
aniversario del gobierno popular, 3 November 1972, in Allende, Discursos, 503.
114. Meller, Unidad Popular and the Pinochet Dictatorship, 43–45.
115. For a description of the basket’s contents, see report no. 252, 6 March 1973, in Embassy of
Chile, Chile: A Summary of Recent Events, 4.
116. Threfall, “Shantytown Dwellers,” 177.
117. Allende, My Invented Country, 155.
118. Zimbalist and Stallings, “Showdown in Chile,” 9; Fermandois, Revolución inconclusa, 592;
Raptis, Revolution, 114.
119. Many versions of this joke appear in the literature. I have used the most common phrasing. For
examples, see Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 153 n. 10; González, Chile, la conjura, 279; and
Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 351. The meme became so popular that MAPU adopted it as a
campaign slogan. See Davis ­A-61 to DoS, 30 March 1973, POL 12 Chile, 1–­3-73, box 2194, RG 59.
120. For descriptions of the hardships caused by the food shortages, see Power, “Class and Gender,”
303–304; and Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, 27. For the detrimental effect of the
shortages on the psyche of the Chilean middle class, see Fermandois, Revolución inconclusa, 584–87.
On how the JAPs became a target of Allende’s political opposition, see ­Frens-String, “Communists.”
121. Huerta Díaz, Volvería, vol. 1, 478–93; Moss, Chile’s Marxist Experiment, 170–71; Marshner,
Chile First Hand, 31–32. On administrative problems encountered by Bachelet and the military’s fear
that the rationing system could become a political tool, see embtel 3187, 18 July 1973,
1973SANTIA03187, CFPF, RG 59; Chancery memo to Latin American Department, 26 January 1973,
FCO 7/2410, TNA; and Hector Suarez Bastidas, “La distribución: ¿Tarea de masas o de las FF.AA.?”
Punto Final, 24 April 1973. On the difficulty of implementing a distribution system in the face of the
U.S. economic blockade, see Schatan, “El desabastecimiento.” Another obstacle was created by the
Mothers’ Centers, which attempted to disrupt the rationing programs as a form of protest. See
Supplee, “Women and the Counterrevolution,” 405.
122. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 197; Almeyda, Reencuentro, 24.
123. O’Brien, Allende’s Chile, 176–77. For other examples of corruption and hoarding, see Economic
Intelligence Unit, QERC, 1973 no. 2, 12–13; and Pierre Kaflon, “Chile’s Ailing Revolution,” in Birns,
End of Chilean Democracy, 15–17.
124. Roxborough et al., Chile, 87–88.
 125. Allende address to International Workers Day Rally, 1 May 1971, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende
Reader, 84. In early 1973, Allende was still promising he would not introduce rationing because
Chileans had bad memories of the practice, but he did not offer a concrete alternative. See Allende
speech, 27 January 1973, in Allende, El gobierno popular, 219. For the view that the rationing system
would have worked had it been given more time, see Barraclough, “State of Chilean Agriculture before
the Coup,” 13; and Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 196.
126. For examples, see Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 346; Millás, Anatomía de un fracaso, 5–6;
and Frei and Fuentealba, Para comprender a Chile, 31–52.
127. Embtel 1843, 15 April 1971, POL 17 Chile, box 2198, RG 59.
128. William F. Buckley, “Closing the Curtain,” National Review, 9 March 1971, 278.
129. Whelan, Out of the Ashes, 401.
130. On inflation during the 1960s, see Reichman, Inflación y la economía chilena. It has been noted
that other Latin American countries have experienced worse inflation than Chile, yet their
democracies did not break down. See Muñoz Goma, “Antecedentes,” 18–19. On the danger of an
overly economistic interpretation of the 1973 coup, see “Angell, “Some Problems,” 101–103.
131. Paul Sigmund, “Seeing Allende Through the Myths,” Worldview, 17:4 (April 1974), 18. In ­mid-
1973, the CIA noted that emergency food shipments from Mexico, Argentina, and Western Europe
were helping to alleviate the crisis. CIA, Economic Intelligence Weekly (annex), 31 May 1973, ­CIA-
RDP85T00875R001500160002–3, CREST. For how pots and pans protestors exaggerated when they
claimed to be on the edge of starvation, see Chavkin, Storm over Chile, 206.
132. MacEoin, Chile: The Struggle for Dignity, 202. On how the opposition exaggerated the food
shortage problem, see Juan de Onís, “Chile Is Enjoying Summer’s Bounty,” NYT, 25 December 1972;
and Letelier notes, n.d., doc 1, folder 16, box 6, OLF.
133. Embtel 6008, 7 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 729. The CIA noted at the end of 1972
that “people with extra money in their pockets for the first time probably have not yet begun to worry
much about the lack of things to buy.” CIA intelligence memo ER IM 72–175, December 1972, ­CIA-
RDP85T00875R001700040058–3, CREST. On how Chileans adjusted to hardship, see Marvine Howe,
“Allende Looks for a Solution for Chile,” NYT, 5 August 1973; and David Holden, “Chile,” Sunday
Times, 3 December 1972.
134. Frei interview in Alexander, ABC Presidents, 255. For descriptions of economic hardship,
including starvation, after the coup, see Kubisch briefing memo to Kissinger, 16 November 1973,
FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 409–410; and James Pringle, “Year of the Generals,” Newsweek, 16
September 1974.
135. Quoted in Shragin, Chile, 72.
136. Robert Steven interview, FAOHC. Ambassador David Popper made the same argument. See
embtel 5561, 11 September 1974, CDP. For examples of studies praising Chilean neoliberalism, see
Richards, “Political Economy.” The CIA acknowledged that “rehabilitation of the economy” and
preserving workers’ gains were “incompatible.” See CIA intelligence report, 25 September 1973, CDP.
137. Allende Address to Nation, FBIS Daily Report, 21 May 1972.
138. Allende Addresses Predeparture Rally, FBIS Daily Report, 28 November 1972; embtel 2191, 22
May 1973, POL 15 Chile, 2–­5-73, box 2196, RG 59.
139. Salvador Allende interview on Mexican television, n.d., in Allende, Chile: historia de una
ilusión, 172–73. See also Salvador Allende speech to the Mexican National Congress, 1 December
1972, in Allende, Discursos, 511–30.
140. Orlando Letelier, “‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile,” Nation, 28 August 1976, 138. For another example,
see Gonzalo Martner’s comments in Chavkin, Storm over Chile, 62.
141. Stallings, Class Conflict, 238; Frederic Langer, “Conditions Were Ripe for Economic Recovery,”
Le Monde diplomatique, October 1973, in Academics for Chile, Chile: A Diary of Recent Events, 74–76;
Pat Garrett and Adam Schesch, “Chile: The Dream Bides Time,” Progressive, February 1974, 37.
142. Frei speech at the Caupolicán Theater in Santiago, FBIS Daily Report, 20 December 1972.
143. Moss, Chile’s Marxist Experiment, 58; Silva Cabrera, Allende; Edwards and Edwards, “The
Economy,” 145–49; Diamond, Upheaval, 152. On the problem of determinism in historical accounts of
the UP period, see Schlotterbeck, Beyond the Vanguard, 3.
144. Meller, Unidad Popular and the Pinochet Dictatorship, 42, 60; World Bank, Chile: An Economy in
Transition, 92; Whitehead, “Inflation and Stabilisation in Chile 1970–7,” 77.
145. Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 355.
146. Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 15.
147. Meyer memo to Kissinger, 8 September 1971, SRG Meeting—Chile 9/9/71, box ­H-059, NSC
Institutional Files, NPMP.
148. CIA memo, 21 March 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 537.
149. Tomas D. Boyatt interview, 33, FAOHC. Isabel Allende remembers receiving two rolls of toilet
paper for her birthday. See Allende, Paula, 169.
150. Emmanuel de Kadt, “Allende’s Chile,” Listener, 6 December 1973. As one study of
destabilization has pointed out, “Economic suffering does not necessarily imply social and political
disintegration.” Merom, “Democracy,” 82.
151. CIA memo to the record, 1 November 1971, CDP. That the agency accepted this analysis can be
seen in CIA intelligence memo ER IM 72–14, 13. For an explanation as to why Allende’s popular
support did not sag despite the economic crisis, see Navia and Osorio, “‘Make the Economy Scream’?”
796.
152. SNIE 94–72, 29 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 603.
 7
Destabilization
One of the most popular theories about the 1973 Chilean coup is that the
Nixon administration “destabilized” the Allende government to bring about
its downfall. The origins of the destabilization thesis can be traced to a letter
from Michael Harrington (D–Massachusetts) to Senator Fulbright on 18
July 1974, calling for a congressional investigation into American activities
in Chile. Citing classified testimony by CIA Director William Colby,
Harrington accused the agency of acting as a “spoiler” by attempting “to
politically destabilize the country and discredit Allende to improve the
likelihood that an opposition candidate would win.” After Allende won the
election, Harrington charged, the 40 Committee authorized $5 million “for
more destabilization efforts during the period from 1971 to 1973.”
Harrington’s letter leaked to New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh, who
then began to refer to “destabilization” in his investigative reports on Chile.
After the 1973 coup, the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House
Armed Services Committee chastised Harrington for having invented the
term, but the congressman insisted that he remembered seeing it in the
transcript of Colby’s testimony.1 Colby repeatedly denied Harrington’s
assertion, and every Nixon administration official questioned about the
issue insisted that there was no “destabilization” policy.2
The U.S. declassified record confirms that Nixon administration officials
did not use the term “destabilization” when discussing Chile. But like the
debate over the “invisible blockade,” the controversy over “destabilization” is
largely semantic. Even if Ambassador Davis was correct in his suspicion that
Harrington coined the term as a result of the “prism of his own beliefs,”
Davis missed the crucial point that “destabilization,” if defined carefully,
does provide a succinct shorthand for describing how the Nixon
administration attempted to undermine Allende.3 The covert action goal in
Chile, recommended an options paper for the NSC in October 1970, should
be to “allow the U.S. to aid and abet forces disillusioned with Allende to
recapture power politically, or, under certain circumstances, overthrow his
government.” Recommended steps to achieve this objective included: foment
splits within Allende’s UP coalition; encourage a “brain drain” from the
country; launch a local and international propaganda campaign to promote
Chile’s image as a censored nation penetrated by Cuban and Soviet
intelligence; provide direct financial subsidies to key military figures and
Allende’s political opposition; and promote a climate of fear and uncertainty
in Chile.4 Although NSDM 93 did not specifically include these
recommendations, the creation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group
“to prepare options for specific courses of action” enabled their
consideration. At Kissinger’s request, the CIA broadened its covert action
program to include the October paper’s suggestions.5 Nixon was well aware
of this destabilization strategy. At the end of 1971, the president hinted as
much when he told British Prime Minister Edward Heath that in Chile, “the
left is in trouble. There are forces at work which we are not discouraging.”6
The covert action program that was undertaken to fulfill the objectives of
NSDM 93 indicates that the Nixon administration engaged not only in
“hostile intent” toward Chile, as one author has put it, but also in hostile
actions designed to remove Allende from the presidency.7
This destabilization policy did not foresee a clear chain of events that
would lead to Allende’s demise, but was designed to tackle the problem from
multiple angles using a variety of tactics. Putting the economic squeeze on
Chile while subsidizing Allende’s political opposition and keeping tabs on
the military could lead to the same outcome but through different avenues.
Defeating Allende through normal electoral channels was one possibility
(favored by the State Department); establishing a “coup climate” (favored by
Nixon and Kissinger) was another. Finally, even assuming that the
destabilization strategy failed to remove Allende, it could potentially create
so much damage as to dissuade other Latin American countries from
becoming inspired by the Chilean experiment with socialism. This chapter
explores the CIA’s covert action program devoted to undermining the UP
government by supporting Allende’s domestic opposition.

Assisting Allende’s Opposition: “Why set limits to the

grace of God?”
 Given the many attempts to portray the Chilean coup as a CIA
conspiracy, it needs to be emphasized that most of the opposition to Allende
arose independently of U.S. efforts to assist it. Allende’s opponents, who
came largely from the middle and upper class, can be divided into three
main categories. The first group included all the formal political forces
outside the UP coalition. The two most prominent opposition parties were
the Christian Democrats (PDC) and the National Party (PN). Two minor
opposition parties of lesser importance were the Radical Democratic Party
(PDR) and the Radical Party of the Left (Partido Izquierda Radical, PIR).
The second group to oppose Allende was composed of the “private sector
organizations,” as U.S. officials called them, which included a wide variety of
business and trade associations such as Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
(SOFOFA, National Industrial Society); the right-wing terrorist group Patria
y Libertad; the independent gremialista movement; and women’s
organizations, such as Poder Femenino (PF, Feminine Power), which led the
“pots and pans” protests. A third category of opposition to Allende was the
media, which included ­right-wing newspapers such as El Mercurio;
opposition radio and television stations; and conservative think tanks and
research foundations.
While all these groups wanted to get rid of Allende, they differed in their
tactics. In general, the political opposition sought to obstruct UP’s socialist
agenda by impeaching government ministers, blocking legislation, and
challenging government candidates in municipal and congressional
elections. Although the PDC was sympathetic to some of UP’s goals, the
party initially sought to work within legal channels to restrict Allende’s
powers until he could be defeated in the next presidential election. The PN
also participated in the legislative and electoral process, but as it became
clearer that Allende could not be stopped through legal means the PN began
to devote more of its energies to promoting a coup climate.8 The private
sector organizations concentrated on making the country ungovernable
through demonstrations, strikes, sabotage, and street violence.9 The ­right-
wing press helped the opposition political parties to win local elections by
exaggerating the communist threat; it also tried to goad the military into
action by portraying Allende as a ­Marxist-Leninist demagogue who was
allowing Cuban revolutionaries to threaten Chile’s sovereignty.10 Most of
these groups initially worked independently of each other, but as the
political system came to an impasse in mid–1973 they gradually joined
together to support Allende’s ouster by force. In this respect, the Nixon
administration worked hard to tilt the balance toward the opposition, no
matter what the cost, so that if a coup did not materialize before the end of
Allende’s term, the next UP presidential candidate would be soundly
defeated.
After Allende won the presidency in 1970, Kissinger was eager to begin
assisting the opposition.11 However, Assistant Secretary Meyer, who
returned from Chile in mid–November, cautioned that it was too early to
start “pushing” on Allende because the PDC and the PN remained so
divided. This delay was unwelcome news to Kissinger. “We were told to lie
low” in September and October so as not to upset the ratification process, he
grumbled, and “now we find ourselves with no opposition.” At this point,
anything was worth trying. “A good definition of a miracle,” he mused, “is a
situation where there is no rational expectation of something happening and
it happens. I have no feeling of any group or policy likely to challenge
Allende. However, we can’t prevent a miracle. Why set limits to the grace of
God?”12
Kissinger’s hopes for divine intervention soon received a boost from the
CIA. At the 40 Committee meeting on 19 November 1970, the CIA’s Western
Hemisphere Chief, William Broe, presented the agency’s covert action
program “to divide and weaken the Allende government.” Although censors
have removed many of the details of this meeting, it is still possible to
describe the broad outline of the plan.13 One major tactic was to subsidize
the opposition press and to spread news stories in Chile and internationally
that would damage Allende’s image as a moderate social democrat. Another
scheme involved financing dissidents within the government who would
split the UP coalition and weaken the Communist Party’s influence.
Stimulating the departure of “key technicians and professionals” from Chile
was also being explored by the agency as a method to undermine the
government’s effectiveness. Finally, the CIA was attempting to identify
potential leaders in the political opposition who could be supported
financially in the interim elections.14
The committee approved the plan, although Irwin questioned the
effectiveness of the “brain drain” tactic, and Broe had to assure Kissinger
that supporting moderates rather than extremists was justified because the
main objective was to “sow dissension” within Allende’s ranks regardless of
which faction needed support.15 At the next 40 Committee meeting to
discuss Chile, Kissinger continued to question the need to have a united
Center-Left coalition as long as they are all opposing Allende.” Broe and
Meyer emphasized that it was essential to keep the opposition elements from
“fighting one another” if they were to be effective.16 Kissinger had touched
on one of the biggest obstacles to the covert action plan, which was the
animosity that existed between the PDC and the PN. Trying to get these two
parties to cooperate was one of the most difficult tasks U.S. officials faced in
trying to influence the five major interim elections that took place during
Allende’s presidency: (1) April 1971 municipal elections; (2) July 1971
Valparaíso ­by-election; (3) January 1972 ­by-election; (4) July 1972
Coquimbo ­by-election; and (5) March 1973 Congressional elections.17

The Interim Elections

1. The April 1971 Municipal Elections: A “litmus test”
The CIA’s program to assist the political opposition began with the
municipal elections scheduled for 4 April 1971. These elections, which were
held in 250 districts, involved more than fifteen hundred candidates.18 At the
SRG meeting on 14 October 1970, Korry had proposed building up
Allende’s political opponents “so that they will have a maximum impact” on
the spring 1971 elections. “Economic problems for Chile may be at a peak”
by then, the ambassador speculated. Making it “difficult” for the new
president would impress other Latin American countries “by showing that
we can extract concessions from the Allende regime.”19 As the elections
approached, however, Korry abandoned his earlier assessment. “The speed
and skill with which Allende is realizing the Chilean revolution,” he reported
in early 1971, “has thus far robbed his natural opposition of any field where
they could give battle.”20 Korry questioned the effectiveness at this point of
subsidizing the PDC, but he did encourage Frei’s ­ex-finance minister,
Andrés Zaldívar Larraín, to run for Allende’s vacant Senate seat.21
At the 40 Committee meeting on 28 January 1971, the CIA proposed
spending $1.24 million on the April 1971 municipal elections, mostly for
opposition radio stations and newspapers, as well as the opposition parties
in the hope of getting them to cooperate. The agency also sought to fund the
PDR, a small splinter group that could potentially draw votes away from the
PR, which formed part of UP’s coalition.22 The Committee approved the
plan, even though Kissinger was disappointed with the prospects and
worried about leaks to the Cuban security service that was assisting the
Allende government with intelligence. Broe offered assurances that “funding
arrangements have been worked out very carefully,” but the risks still
bothered the State Department.23 While approving the operation, Meyer
warned that “exposure of our involvement in these actions would seriously
worsen the situation of our general interests in Chile and would have
significantly adverse repercussions in Latin America and else-where.”24
In Ambassador Korry’s view, the April 1971 municipal elections
represented a kind of “litmus test” to determine if Senator Luis Bossay (“the
grand old man of radicalism”) could lead the PR out of UP to form a new
alliance with the PDC. If the PR performed poorly, Korry predicted, Bossay
would have a greater chance of persuading the party to leave the
government for the opposition.25 UP officials were also treating the elections
as a kind of test but in the other direction. If UP could obtain 50 percent or
more of the vote, PCCh leader Luis Corvalán told the party’s central
committee then the government would have a mandate to accelerate the
revolution.26 A sweeping victory could even set the stage for holding a
plebiscite to transform the Chilean Congress into a unicameral legislature, a
tactic made possible by a recent constitutional amendment that could be
invoked whenever there was an executive branch impasse with Congress.27
In November 1970, Allende had repeatedly threatened to hold a plebiscite if
the Chilean Congress continued to block new forms of legislation.28 Several
UP officials favored holding a plebiscite, so the 1971 municipal election
stood as a kind of referendum whose outcome could encourage Allende to
move in that direction.29
About one month before the April elections, a scandal known as the
“copper plot” erupted, which each side used to attack the other. The
controversy began on 7 March 1971 when UP’s mining minister, Orlando
Cantuarias, claimed to have uncovered a secret plot involving the CIA and a
Swiss brokerage firm to purchase millions of tons of copper in order to drive
down the international market price of Chile’s most valuable export.30 The
government arrested seven conspirators, including one alleged CIA agent
named Howard Edwards. When it turned out that Edwards was nothing
more than a con artist, the PDC accused Cantuarias of inventing the CIA
story to cover up his own involvement in copper profiteering schemes.31
Ambassador Korry hoped that the PDC investigation into the copper plot
would damage the UP’s performance in the April election, but the affair
eventually faded as neither side could produce sufficient evidence for a
conviction.32
In mid–March, U.S. projections indicated that UP would win half the vote
or more because it was successfully registering so many younger voters.
While trying to remain optimistic about the campaign, the CIA reported
that the PDC was suffering from internal feuding between the Tomic and
Frei factions.33 To make matters worse, unifying the opposition was proving
difficult because “distrust, competition and even hatred” among the three
opposition parties (PDC, PN, PDR) “continues to be a basic problem.”34
Although the agency reported no security leaks, Allende came
uncomfortably close to unearthing the CIA’s propaganda campaign when he
publicly denounced the “March Plan,” an alleged conspiracy involving a
variety of ­right-wing groups who were waging “a furious press campaign—
both national and international—designed to convey an impression of
chaos, disorganization, repression and totalitarianism.”35
As the U.S. embassy had predicted, UP polled just under half the vote in
the 4 April 1971 elections. The Socialist candidate Sepúlveda Acuña easily
won Allende’s vacant senate seat because the opposition vote was split
between the PDC candidate (Zaldívar), and a ­third-party candidate
supported by the PDR. Kissinger reported to Nixon that UP’s share of the
vote (49.7 percent) indicated “a significant gain over the 36% it won in last
September’s presidential election,” thus giving Allende “an increased
mandate for pursuing his programs.”36 The Socialists also became the leading
force within UP by winning 5 percent more of the vote than the
Communists, which strengthened the hand of militants who wanted to
accelerate the pace of the revolution. Even though the PR had performed
poorly, the anticipated Bossay revolt did not occur, at least in part because of
Allende’s continued support for PR ministers. Splitting Radicals away from
the UP in the future, the CIA admitted, “will be difficult to achieve.”37
Although Nixon and Kissinger assumed that the election was rigged, the
New York Times reporter Juan de Onís observed that the election campaign
“has taken place without any restriction on freedom of assembly or on press
and radio information.” The opposition had been allowed to attack the
government on a wide range of issues, de Onís noted, including
unemployment and the copper plot.38
The CIA and the U.S. embassy tried to spin the election as a “success”
since the opposition had won half the vote. Assistance to the opposition had
proved effective, the CIA claimed, by depriving Allende of the majority he
needed to call for a national plebiscite. The covert action campaign was also
successful in establishing “media capabilities, which will be of great and
continuing value in opposing UP.”39 Crucially, the CIA assisted the
opposition “without arousing the suspicion of the Allende government.”40
U.S. officials apparently did not care if Allende raved about conspiracies, so
long as he could provide no direct evidence that could implicate the CIA.
Although Korry cautioned that Zaldívar’s loss demonstrated that “we should
restrain our meddling to the minimum and the basics,” he was thrilled that
the PDC, now the largest single party, had adopted an anti–Marxist
platform. U.S. assistance proved helpful in strengthening Frei’s influence in
the party at the expense of another party faction that sought to work with
the Communists.41 The 40 Committee was so impressed by these results that
it agreed to pick up the tab for the PDC’s election cost overruns.42

2. The July 1971 Valparaíso ­By-Election: “A ray of hope for the

future of Chile”
Many commentators have suggested that Allende missed several
opportunities after the April 1971 municipal elections to take the revolution
in a direction that might have saved his presidency. The first missed
opportunity was the chance to form an alliance with the leftist faction of the
PDC. Both Allende and the Tomic faction of the PDC were open to such a
possibility, but UP’s superior performance in the April 1971 elections made
it harder for Allende to argue for compromises.43
The second mistake Allende allegedly made was his failure to move
forward decisively with a plebiscite.44 On 21 May 1971, Allende told the
Chilean Congress that he was considering introducing a new constitution
with a single chamber “People’s Assembly.”45 Before implementing this plan,
however, Allende decided to wait until after the 18 July ­by-election in
Valparaíso, where a congressional seat became vacant after the sudden death
of a PDC congresswoman. Although Allende originally considered
supporting a PDC candidate, he deferred to his colleagues’ preference for
Hernán del Canto, a Socialist labor leader from Santiago.46 The PDC and the
PN agreed to back an independent local candidate, Dr. Óscar Marín, a
former member of the Radical Party who had worked on the PDC campaign
in the 1970 presidential election. On 2 July 1971, the CIA sent an urgent
request to the 40 Committee for funds to support Marín’s candidacy. The
Valparaíso ­by-election, the agency explained, has become “a critical
bellwether factor in Allende’s judgment on whether or not to call a national
plebiscite to establish a unicameral legislature.”47 Within a few days, the 40
Committee approved Korry’s request for $150,000 for “propaganda (radio,
press, posters, leaflets, wall paintings); for voter transportation to the polls;
and for all other possible efforts to ensure a maximum ­turn-out of pro–
Marin votes.”48
The July 1971 ­by-election, which some viewed as another test of UP’s
mandate, was too close to call.49 Even though Valparaíso was Allende’s
hometown, it was also a known Christian Democratic stronghold. Marín
displayed more personal charm than del Canto, a poor speaker who was
easily cast by the opposition as an outsider.50 On 18 July, Marín won the
election by 1.5 percentage points. It is impossible to determine with
precision how important U.S. covert assistance was to Marín’s election but
given the small margin of victory, it could well have tipped the balance. Of
greater significance, however, was that women had favored Marín by 17,000
votes, thus illustrating one of UP’s biggest electoral weaknesses.51
Although the results were not much different from the outcome of the
April 1971 municipal elections, many observers interpreted the July 1971- ­
by-election in Valparaíso as a setback for Allende.52 The defeat of the UP
candidate, proclaimed PDC President Narciso Irureta, “is a clear warning
that the electorate does not want Marxism.”53 Former president Eduardo Frei
sighed in relief, “For the first time, I can see a ray of hope for the future of
Chile.”54 Allende, however, tried to downplay the outcome by claiming that
UP never really had great expectations: “We said if we won it would be like
breaking the sound barrier,” he told a journalist afterward.55 But holding a
plebiscite now appeared to be a much riskier prospect, as Allende indicated
that UP would wait patiently until the next election to see if one was
necessary.56 The CIA was pleased that its funds had helped turn the tide
against UP, but the agency also noted that there were no guarantees that the
cooperation exhibited in this election among the opposition parties would
continue.57 Indeed, shortly after the Valparaíso election, the Christian
Democratic youth group along with seven members of the PDC left the
party because it refused to rule out future alliances with the PN.58
3. January 1972 ­By-Election: “A strong tremor … but short of an
earthquake”
Fearful that Allende might speed up his plan to hold a plebiscite before
the deteriorating economy further eroded UP’s electoral base, the CIA asked
the 40 Committee at the end of October 1971 for more funding to support
the PDC, PN, PDR, and the newly formed Movimiento Radical Izquierda
Independiente (MRII, Independent Radical Movement of the Left), a group
of five senators and seven deputies who left the PR in August 1971.59 These
opposition parties remained structurally and organizationally weak, the CIA
observed, so they needed funding to be better prepared for the March 1973
Congressional elections. The requested funds were to be spent on salaries,
intelligence and research, office equipment, propaganda, political surveys,
the Catholic University’s television channel, and “political action”
(professionals such as lawyers, student organizations, and women’s groups).
This last category, primarily associated with the PN, appears to have been
the start of the agency’s venture into support for the private sector
organizations. Concerning support for the MRII, the hope was to encourage
the new splinter group “to adopt a spoiler role within the UP coalition.”60
When this proposal came before the 40 Committee on 5 November 1971,
Kissinger worried about U.S. exposure. “Doesn’t Allende wonder where the
money continues to come from when he knows it’s drying up? He’s not
stupid. How do they account for their funds?” Broe explained that the
finances, which could reach as high as $4.5 million, were easily hidden
because “in Chile, they are not required to account for it; they indulge in
double bookkeeping and anonymous gifts, and there has been no seizure of
opposition party books as yet.” The only member of the 40 Committee to
raise serious objections was Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, who
questioned the vast amount of assistance that appeared to be needed to keep
the opposition going. Kissinger snapped: “This is not a normal situation
here…. This will keep the opposition viable.”61 Johnson should have known
better. A few days earlier, Meyer had forwarded him the CIA’s proposal, with
the comment: “This is essentially ordered by the White House, which says
no delay for lack of money.”62
Just as the 40 Committee was approving the CIA’s massive covert
assistance to the opposition, Allende announced that he was going to draft a
bill that would replace the current ­two-chamber Congress with a “People’s
Assembly.” If Congress rejected the measure, as was likely, Allende could
then call for a plebiscite to let the public decide the matter. As the U.S.
embassy commented, the proposed legislation included a “grab bag” of UP
objectives, such as term limits on Supreme Court judges, equal rights for
women, social security for all Chileans, and the enactment of the
government’s economic program.63 Narciso Irureta denounced the proposal
as a desperate attempt by Allende to seize “total power at any cost.”64 Allende
rallied his supporters: “We do not seek a confrontation, but if they want it,
we are ready to go to a national plebiscite, and we will win.”65 The CIA
predicted that if Allende called for a plebiscite and sensed “that he is in
danger of losing political control, pressures for focusing attention on a
foreign scapegoat by provoking a crisis with the US would mount.”66
The CIA misread Allende’s intentions when it came to his tactics in
bringing about a plebiscite. At this stage, the Chilean president did not seek
an open confrontation with the United States, despite controversies over the
expropriation of the copper industry and ITT. Allende was far more
interested in testing the electoral waters in a ­by-election scheduled for 16
January 1972.67 The two congressional seats up for grabs in Chile’s southern
provinces pitted ­UP-backed candidates against a unified opposition. Even
though UP’s popularity appeared to be sinking along with the economy, the
CIA was taking no chances because polls indicated a close race and the
outcome of the contest could have a serious impact on Allende’s decision to
proceed with a plebiscite. On 10 December 1971, the agency requested
special funding to support Rafael Moreno Rojas (PDC) who was running
against Héctor Olivares (UP); and to support Sergio Diez (PN) who was
running against María Eliana Mery (Independent, but backed by UP).68 The
40 Committee, realizing that time was short, approved the proposal by
telephone on 15 December.69 Although the details of the operation
(including its total cost) remain censored, CIA funding may have helped
broker the informal agreement whereby the PDC and PN “agreed to support
covertly the other’s candidate.”70
In a close contest marred by minor street violence but cleanly held, Diez
and Moreno defeated their ­UP-backed rivals by 2 and 7 percentage points
respectively. Once again, women voted disproportionately against the UP
candidates.71 Factors that turned the electorate against UP include
antigovernment attitudes among copper workers, fear among peasants that
they would be deprived of land titles under the UP agrarian reform
program, rural disorder fomented by the MIR; rising inflation and food
shortages, and active campaigning on behalf of the opposition candidates by
ex-president Eduardo Frei.72 Kissinger reported the outcome of the election
to Nixon as a “stunning defeat” for Allende. “While internal factors were the
chief ones in determining the results,” he informed the president, CIA funds
“made it possible for the opposition to bring its message to the voters and
offset to some extent the very determined campaign being carried out by the
Government.”73 The CIA assessed the U.S. contribution to the outcome of
the election in even more glowing terms. UP’s heavy commitment to the
election, the agency reported to the 40 Committee, “necessitated an
opposition effort which would have been impossible without U.S. support.”
Even the PN and the PDC have admitted that U.S. assistance was “absolutely
indispensable” to the victory of their candidates. “There can be no doubt,”
the agency concluded, “that the opposition’s success was made possible
largely because of the financial aid provided by the U.S. Government, which
significantly built up the confidence and capabilities of the parties.”74
Publicly, UP tried to downplay its defeat. Minister of Interior Alejandro
Ríos Valdivia compared the election to “a strong tremor, Grade 4, but short
of an earthquake.”75 Allende discounted the outcome as not representative of
UP’s true strength because the election had taken place in the “oligarchy’s
corner.”76 In truth, the ­by-election had not altered the balance of power
much in the Congress, and UP had only slipped a few percentage points
from its performance in the April 1971 municipal elections—“53–47 is
hardly [a] ­flood-tide toward the opposition,” Ambassador Davis conceded.77
But some analysts consider the January 1972 ­by-election to have been a sign
of UP’s declining political fortunes.78 Because there had been such strong
expectations that UP would win, especially in the rural areas where land
reform should have bolstered support for the government candidates, the
loss appeared especially embarrassing.79 The U.S. embassy explained that
while UP could be expected to treat this ­by-election as an isolated exception,
the “psychological blow is serious and statistics hold implications that will
be difficult to ignore.”80 The election not only emboldened the opposition,
but also deepened divisions among Allende’s supporters, as the PS, the
PCCh, and MIR began quarreling over who was to blame for UP’s defeat.81
The issue of the government’s sagging electoral support was thoroughly
discussed at UP’s national convention in El Arrayán. After listening to
widely differing opinions on the significance of the ­by-elections, UP leaders
decided not to proceed with a plebiscite on a unicameral legislature.82
 4. July 1972 Coquimbo ­By-Election: “A hollow win for Allende”
As pleased as U.S. officials were over the outcome of the January 1972 ­by-
election, they also understood that the newfound unity among the
opposition remained extremely fragile.83 Buried in the CIA report was a
warning that “the PDC left wing remains vulnerable to UP pressures.”84
Allende made several overtures to the Christian Democrats after the 1970
presidential election to gain support for his nationalization legislation.85
Although these ventures did not pan out, U.S. officials feared that the
opposition would splinter if the CIA did not hold it together in a time of
diminishing resources. After detailing the many ways in which the Chilean
economy was failing, Ambassador Davis warned Washington in early
February 1972 that according to Marxists, this “grim economic scenario
need not be decisive” if the UP government “can consolidate its control over
the economy.” For example, Allende was threatening to obtain a legal ruling
on whether a ­two-thirds or a simple majority was required to override his
veto of a constitutional amendment passed by the opposition to block
further nationalization of private businesses. If his veto was ruled valid,
Allende could bleed the opposition. “In some ways we are witnessing a race
between the deteriorating Chilean economic situation as a whole,” Davis
cabled Washington, “and the deteriorating economic situation of opposition
forces.”86
Alarmed by Davis’s report, U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird urged
the 40 Committee to “take every available means to ensure the survivability
and mobility of Chilean democratic forces opposing the Marxist socialist
programs.”87 Laird’s request did not require any special action by the 40
Committee, because the CIA was already engaged in a ­full-scale covert
action program to assist the opposition. But his recommendation to
Kissinger highlights the considerable anxiety that Nixon administration
officials experienced over the viability of Allende’s political opposition. The
PDC, for example, came into dire financial straits because of accumulated
campaign debts from the 1970 presidential and April 1971 municipal
elections.88 In its status report to the 40 Committee on 6 April 1972, the CIA
warned that the $340,000 Tomic debt represented a “considerable financial
strain for the party,” just as it was preparing to challenge UP candidates in
key elections at the University of Chile and the Central Única de
Trabajadores (CUT, Chilean Labor Confederation).89
The 40 Committee authorized payment of at least part of the PDC debt,
although precisely how much cannot yet be determined because the dollar
amounts have been redacted from the CIA’s reports.90 In any case, the flow of
U.S. funds to Allende’s opposition grew so high by early 1972 that Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs John Crimmins
worried that the CIA might be risking exposure by “overploughing the
ground.” The agency assured him that its cover was solid. After the success
of the January ­by-election, everyone would assume that the opposition’s
money was coming from stockpiles “kept in mattresses.”91 As it turned out,
the Tomic debt did not interfere with the Christian Democrats’ performance
in the April 1972 contest for university rector because the PDC candidate
Edgardo Boeninger easily defeated the UP candidate by more than 8
percentage points. Boeninger’s victory was highly significant, the CIA noted,
because university elections are “widely regarded in Chile as an important
weathervane of national political opinion.”92 In the CUT election, which UP
candidates were expected to dominate, the PDC finished a respectable third,
fewer than a thousand votes behind the PS.93
In much worse shape than the PDC was the PIR (formerly MRII), a small
splinter group of two senators and seven deputies that left the PR after the
breakdown in talks between UP and the PDC over legislation designed to
slow down the nationalization of private businesses.94 On 19 April 1972, the
CIA asked the 40 Committee to approve the use of its funds to support the
PIR. “Without financial resources,” the CIA warned, “the PIR will either
wither away or will be forced to sue for readmission to the UP.” Even though
the party represented less than 5 percent of the electorate, it could have an
“important psychological impact” in elections where a few percentage points
divided the contestants.95
The 40 Committee approved the funds within a week, which proved
fortuitous because a ­by-election soon opened up in Coquimbo to fill the seat
of a recently deceased Communist Deputy. The CIA acknowledged that the
Coquimbo province was a longtime UP stronghold but suggested that the
government’s replacement candidate could be defeated if voters belonging to
the PR before the PIR split could be persuaded to vote for the opposition.96
The agency had some grounds for optimism. The last two ­by-elections had
been won by the opposition, and U.S. intelligence reported at the end of June
1972 that the Allende regime was at a “point of crisis” owing to factional
disputes, “unrelenting economic problems,” and political violence.97 But the
CIA’s ­hoped-for scenario proved to be wishful thinking. In what the head of
the 40 Committee described as “another of those ‘­good-guys-versus-bad-
guys’ ­by-elections,” the PCCh candidate defeated the PIR candidate by 8
percentage points.98 Although the contest had not been very close, the New
York Times described the election as a “hollow win for Allende” because UP’s
margin of victory in the Coquimbo election fell by nearly threefold
compared to the municipal elections of the previous year.99 Yes, the “bad
guy” won, the CIA informed the 40 Committee, but the Coquimbo outcome
also “indicated a further slow but steady erosion of popular support for the
government.”100

5. The March 1973 Congressional Elections: “They voted with

their heads against their own stomachs”
The Nixon administration approached the March 1973 Congressional
elections with guarded optimism.101 Coup prospects were on the rise, the
economy was in a slump, and after the turbulent truckers’ strike of October
1972 (see below) many observers were comparing Chile’s current state to the
Great Depression era when social unrest had forced President Carlos Ibáñez
del Campo to flee into exile.102 The CIA judged the optimum goal of winning
two-thirds of the vote in the Congressional elections to be “out of reach,” but
all the opposition had to do was win 55 percent or more of the vote to be
considered victorious. The agency proposed additional funding for the
opposition parties, which had banded together to form the Confederación de
la Democracia (CODE, Democratic Confederation); and for the private
sector organizations, which could be mobilized to maximize voter
turnout.103 “The Allende government has been so successful in undermining
the economic base of individuals and organizations which support the
opposition,” an internal CIA memo explained, “that the PDC would be
unable to operate or campaign successfully without this support.”104 A
properly organized “­get-out-the-vote campaign” could result in a significant
shift of power within Congress, given that half the seats in the Senate and all
the seats in the Chamber of Deputies were up for grabs.105
 The 40 Committee approved the CIA’s proposal with no discussion, as was
becoming routine with these sorts of requests.106 The CIA asked for even
more funds in early February 1973 because of unforeseen rising campaign
costs.107 In giving his approval, Crimmins noted: “It is of course not possible
to state with precision the extent to which our aid to the opposition has
contributed to its viability and to its excellent prospects in the present
campaign,” but “as far as we can tell, the money has been used wisely, with a
minimum of waste and perceived corruption, and with no security
compromise.”108
Nearly every political observer considered the stakes in the March 1973
congressional elections to be monumental in determining Chile’s future. Frei
considered the contest to be a “morally binding plebiscite” that was Chile’s
most important election in the twentieth century.109 The Christian
Democrats had decided a year earlier that the March 1973 ballot would
serve as a test of popular support for Frei’s candidacy in the next presidential
election, scheduled for 1976. Some were even hoping that the opposition
would gain a ­two-thirds majority, which would enable Congress to impeach
Allende.110 The PN also sought to remove Allende, as indicated by its
campaign slogan: “Not just a new Congress, but a new government.”111 UP
officials were equally vocal about the historic importance of the election.
Communist Party Senator Volodia Teitelboim was not exaggerating,
asserted the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when Teitelboim stated, “we
are talking about the fate of the revolution.”112 Luis Corvalán, the PCCh- ­
secretary general, emphasized that the March elections were significant not
only because they could alter the composition of the Congress, but also
because they were taking place “at a decisive and difficult moment of our
national history,” when “one sector of the oligarchy coexisting with U.S.
imperialism is determined to overthrow our government.”113
Predictions of the election’s outcome were couched in similarly dramatic
terms, although political leaders had to be careful not to mobilize their
supporters by setting overly high expectations which might then be dashed.
Frei, for example, acknowledged that the opposition was highly unlikely to
secure a ­two-thirds majority, but he still spoke of an “overwhelming
victory.”114 Allende predicted UP would gain 40 percent of the vote, which
would count as a victory because that would be 4 percent more than UP
obtained in the 1970 presidential election.115 Allende also pointed out that
Frei had remained in office despite the Christian Democrats winning less
than 30 percent in the last legislative election of Frei’s presidency.116 But
Allende also was careful not to pin the future of the revolution on the
outcome of the March elections. Possibly to hedge a potential loss, Allende
assured a rally of 80,000 in the National Stadium on 6 February: “Nothing is
going to halt Chile on its march to socialism.”117 One day before the election,
he told a press conference: “We will never change our program whether we
get a million votes or one.”118
Not surprisingly, campaign tactics matched the hyperbole of the
candidates. As one prominent Chilean scholar has written: “For several long
months the electorate was bombarded by a flurry of speeches, declarations,
rallies, charges, and ­counter-charges of an intensity rarely seen in Chilean
politics. Personal vilification became the order of the day, as the ­ever-present
broadcast and print media sought to tarnish the images of leaders and
contenders.”119 According to one study of the Chilean media, the number of
political advertisements run in the March 1973 congressional election was
three times greater than in the 1970 presidential election. CODE’s
advertisements, which comprised ­two-thirds of the total, drew attention to
the hardships on nuclear families because of the declining economy.120 The
rise of inflation, the black market, long lines, food shortages, and street
violence—all issues easily exploited by the opposition—strongly suggested
that UP would lose. In this respect, U.S. officials appear to have fallen victim
to the same propaganda that they helped fund. Between late 1972 and early
1973, the CIA had changed its estimate of the opposition winning a ­two-
thirds majority from “out of reach” to a “valid, although difficult,
objective.”121 This goal might be achieved if the PN could increase the
number of Senate seats from 5 to 8 or 9, which it could do by increasing its
share of the national vote to 24 percent.122 Just four days before the election,
the CIA predicted that the opposition would win 62 percent of the vote, with
a 2 percent range of error.123 Most other predictions of the election were
equally gloomy for UP.124 The Argentine foreign ministry gave an estimate
identical to the CIA’s, while the Soviet Foreign Ministry thought that
whatever the margin of victory for the opposition, a “political storm” would
ensue in a matter of days.125
Given this dire outlook for the Allende government, the outcome of the
March 1973 congressional elections surprised nearly everyone. The
opposition won 54.7 percent of the vote, much lower than expected, while
UP obtained 43.4 percent, much higher than expected. Although the
opposition still controlled Congress, UP picked up two seats in the Senate
and six seats in the Chamber of Deputies.126 The question of who really
“won” or “lost” the election depended on the benchmark being used for
comparison. The opposition claimed victory because even though UP had
gained a few congressional seats, CODE still had enough voting power to
thwart Allende’s legislative agenda. The PDC remained the largest political
party in the nation, and Frei was now ­well-positioned to win the next
presidential election. The PN increased its share of the vote from 18 to 21
percent compared to the April 1971 municipal elections, and it gained four
new congressional seats. To cast Allende as the loser, CODE officials pointed
out that UP had lost 6 percentage points compared to its performance in the
April 1971 municipal elections.127
Allende and his supporters, on the other hand, also declared victory
because the government’s share of the vote had increased more than 6
percent since the 1970 presidential election and because the opposition had
failed in its bid to gain the ­two-thirds majority necessary to impeach
Allende.128 In his annual message to Congress, Allende declared that “the
government’s policies have been vindicated by the massive support received
by the political parties that sustain it, the highest that any government has
received in the last 20 years after 27 months in office.”129 Even the CIA
conceded that because CODE had underperformed, “the elections are
regarded by most Chileans as a government victory.”130
One could argue endlessly about who won the March 1973 congressional
elections. Most observers called it a draw that failed to resolve the
constitutional impasse between the executive and legislative branches.131 But
there could be no doubt, as the CIA put it, that Allende had received a
“psychological boost” from the election, which legitimized his regime.132
Such results were intolerable to CODE, which made the excuse that the
election had been rigged. Allende immediately denied the charge. General
Carlos Prats, who was in charge of overseeing the elections, would never
have allowed himself to become implicated in fraud, Allende told an
American journalist, “because in Chile you cannot get away with it.”133
Despite some ­pre-election violence, the election itself appeared to have
taken place in an orderly manner.134 After investigating election anomalies, a
law school dean at the Catholic University of Santiago issued a preliminary
report suggesting that there might have been more than 300,000 false votes,
about 8 percent of the total.135 Allende denounced the allegations as a
“whirlwind” aimed at undermining constitutional government.136 The head
of the electoral registry, Juan Ignacio García, also repudiated the charge,
asserting that the March contest had been “one of the cleanest elections in
the history of Chile.” The law school report was not credible, García told a
U.S. embassy officer, as it “produced no document, statistical studies, or
procedural appendices.” After conducting his own investigation, García
found that 90 percent of the discrepancies could be attributed to human
error.137 Even if there had been some fraud, the CIA conceded, “it is doubtful
whether a recount could make a substantive difference of more than one or
two percentage points in the electoral results, with no assurance that CODE
would benefit from all readjustments.”138
Given that fraud could not account for the outcome of the election, the
CIA station and U.S. embassy scrambled to explain to Washington what had
gone wrong. After all, they had overestimated the opposition’s victory by 7
percent, a serious miscalculation, well beyond the range of statistical error.
One problem was that the opposition failed to anticipate the impact of
nearly one million newly enfranchised illiterates and eighteen- to ­twenty-
one-year-olds (nearly 20 percent of the electorate), “who are apparently
convinced that Allende will eventually improve their lot.”139 Another issue
was that the moderate splinter parties, especially the PIR and PDR, did very
poorly, as the electorate gravitated toward one end of the political spectrum
or the other.140 The PDC overestimated its popularity in the countryside,
where it expected to improve given the upheavals created by Allende’s
agrarian reform. Ambassador Davis also speculated that many Chileans
were frightened into voting for the government because of UP propaganda
equating a vote for CODE with a vote for civil war.141
But the best explanation by far that accounted for UP’s startling
performance was that Allende remained very popular with the working class
and the poor. Ambassador Davis conceded that the “lower half of [the]
population is still materially better off than under previous governments and
may have a greater sense of ­well-being, even though workers are not able to
purchase all goods higher money wages should permit.”142 As Teitelboim put
it, “they voted with their heads against their own stomachs.”143 What did it
matter if the government rationed beef if you never could afford it in the
first place?144
This class consciousness explanation, which has since been adopted by
many analysts, runs the risk of oversimplifying what was probably a more
complex calculation by the voters.145 If the economy had been as bad as the
opposition insisted, Allende’s supporters would likely have abandoned the
cause. Surely there are limits to revolutionary consciousness if you are
starving. As Frei later commented, “inflation and the shortages had not
reached their desperate situation, and had not yet affected the popular
sectors.”146 Allende gained 8 percentage points among women in the March
1973 election compared to the 1970 presidential election, an extraordinary
achievement given the opposition’s effort to exploit the negative impact that
the food shortages were having on women’s lives. But as the historian
Margaret Power has emphasized, gender still trumps class in explaining the
pattern of the female vote.147
Despite the disappointing outcome of the March 1973 congressional
elections, CIA headquarters consoled its station for having done “an
outstanding job.” Broe assured Station Chief Henry Hecksher that “no
amount of additional funds or of extra effort would have changed the
electoral outcome to any significant extent.”148 The CIA also tried to assure
the 40 Committee that the $1.6 million spent on the election had been put to
good use. For example, CIA financing enabled the PDC to organize voter
information into a computerized database, conduct ­door-to-door
campaigning, and assist voters in getting to the polls on election day. The
private sector organizations used their funds to wage a propaganda
campaign aimed at getting out the vote. They also helped reduce friction
between opposition candidates, assisted with fundraising, and provided
babysitters to free up women to vote. While the CIA patted itself on the back
for having been effective at reaching the middle classes, the agency also
conceded that “the private sector as a whole is mistrusted by the ­lower-
income groups which form the basis of the UP’s political power.”149
In transmitting the CIA’s report on the election to the 40 Committee,
Crimmins did not challenge the idea that “our help was effectively used” in
making “organizational improvements” that “have ­long-range value.” Given
the poor outcome, one might wonder why the Nixon administration
appeared to be so nonchalant in evaluating the effectiveness of its covert
assistance to Allende’s political opposition. The explanation lies in
Crimmins’ justification for continuing the operation: “We believe that on the
whole our help has put the opposition in a substantially better position than
it otherwise would be.” According to this logic, there was practically no limit
to the amount of support to be given to the opposition, provided it could be
done securely because it was easy to imagine a worse outcome if such
support was not provided. Given the urgency of Nixon’s orders to bring
down Allende, the CIA was under tremendous pressure to produce results;
when the agency came up against roadblocks as it had in the 1973
congressional elections, it could always fall back on the excuse that it was
better to keep trying than to do nothing.150
The March 1973 congressional elections, as many commentators have
suggested, marked a critical turning point in the history of Allende’s
presidency. The historian Peter Winn, for example, has called the election a
“Pyrrhic victory” for Allende because the possibility of some sort of
accommodation between the government and the opposition quickly
evaporated.151 The appearance of success in the election emboldened UP
militants to press forward with the revolution, and Allende became
overconfident that the population would continue to support him in
pursuing the socialist agenda. At the same time, once the opposition realized
that Allende could not be stopped through legal channels, it began to turn
toward a military solution out of desperation.152 Coup plotters in the
military concluded from the high vote received by UP that “no politician
could run the country,” thus it was necessary to continue with their schemes
to oust Allende by force.153 The outcome of the election also demonstrated
the limits to the Nixon administration’s destabilization strategy of inflaming
popular anger over the economy. Despite all the money that the CIA poured
into the opposition propaganda campaign, it could not transform
dissatisfaction over the economy into a large enough electoral mass that
would vote Allende out. Consequently, assistance to the private sector
organizations became the crucial lynchpin in the destabilization strategy.

The Private Sector Organizations

While the CIA and the State Department generally saw eye to eye on
assisting Allende’s political opposition, tactical differences arose between the
two bodies over the funding of the private sector organizations. Insofar as
funds were used for electoral activity, the State Department had no
objection. But when it came to assisting the private sector’s other activities,
namely promoting strikes and street violence, Ambassador Davis worried
that they could trigger a premature coup that would expose the U.S.
connection. To reduce this risk, Davis tried to place restrictions on which
private sector organizations could receive U.S. funds. The difficulty with this
approach, as the Church Report later pointed out, was that the political
opposition and the private sector organizations were so intricately linked
that money passed to one group could easily make its way to another.154
Although censors have redacted the names of these organizations and the
amounts they received, it is still possible to describe in general terms the
activities of some of the groups known to be instrumental in creating a coup
climate.

Pots and Pans

A good example of the challenge in following the money trail is the case
of women who opposed Allende. The scene of angry housewives banging
their pots and pans in protest against the UP government because of rising
inflation and food shortages is deeply embedded in popular memories of the
Allende era.155 After the 1973 coup, the military regime did its best to
cultivate the notion that these women had requested the military to act,
while critics disparaged the protestors as spoiled housewives (“merry ladies
of the bourgeoisie,” as the Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez called
them) on the CIA payroll.156 Such portraits badly distort a much more
complex reality. As discussed previously, Allende was making great strides
among women toward the end of his presidency, but most women still
opposed him. Scholarly accounts of these women and their organizations
belie the charge that they were simply a fascist mob propped up by
imperialism, as UP officials and their supporters insisted.157
While the CIA does not appear to have created a specific program
devoted to supporting Allende’s female opposition, the agency’s clandestine
activities in Chile dating from the 1960s included several attempts to exploit
gender divisions against the Chilean left. The CIA specifically included
women under the category of “special interest groups” that it funded
clandestinely in the 1969 congressional elections.158 During the 1970
presidential election, the CIA helped fund the terror campaign, which aimed
at frightening women into voting against Allende.159 Between Allende’s
election and his ratification, Ambassador Korry recommended targeting
women, “who as a group remain least responsive to Allende and most
sensitive to the implications of a Leninist state.”160 The CIA also helped fund
the PDC Women Against Allende organization, which pressed Christian
Democrats not to vote for Allende in the final runoff election.161
The first major protest by women against President Allende was the
March of the Empty Pots and Pans, held in early December 1971, which
coincided with the visit of Fidel Castro. In addition to demanding that
Castro go home, the protestors used the occasion to protest food shortages,
which not only made home life difficult but also in their view constituted an
attack on womanhood. The demonstrations, attended by thousands of
women, eventually led to clashes with counterdemonstrators, forcing the
security forces to intervene. To prevent further spectacles of the police ­tear-
gassing female marchers, Allende imposed a ­week-long curfew.162 General
Augusto Pinochet, who was in charge of restoring order, warned ominously,
“I hope the army does not have to come out … because if they do it will be
to kill.”163 One U.S. legislator interpreted the government’s reaction to these
disturbances as a sign that Allende was “moving with new speed through the
last steps toward a solidified Communist dictatorship.”164
Whether the March of the Empty Pots and Pans had international help
has been the subject of much speculation. In his farewell address to Castro,
Allende charged that a “fascist germ” was using Chilean women in protest
demonstrations, much the way that Brazilian women had been used in the
rightist campaign against João Goulart, the leftist Brazilian president who
was deposed in a military coup in 1964.165 Allende insinuated that “fascist”
protests against his government had a “foreign mentality” about them and
were “alien” to the normal Chilean political discourse.166 After the infamous
Klein statement that “Chile won’t last long,” UP officials claimed that the
pots and pans protests formed part of an orchestrated campaign against
Chile carried out by “international reactions” and their “agents.”167 In early
1972, the French revolutionary Régis Debray observed: “The CIA has been
very subtle, very intelligent … replacing the landing of mercenaries or
marines with demonstrations of elegant ladies is much more effective isn’t
it?”168
Evidence for these allegations is largely circumstantial. Trying to discredit
Chilean female protestors by labeling them stooges of imperialism enabled
the UP government to avoid taking responsibility for mismanaging the
economy and failing to address adequately women’s issues.169 It is
conceivable that ­right-wing Chilean women were inspired by the Brazilian
model; they may have even received organizational assistance from think
tanks funded by conservative Chilean businessmen and foreign Christian
Democrats.170 But there is no evidence that the CIA orchestrated these
activities.171 The Klein statement was an inadvertent slip by an inexperienced
Nixon emissary who did not belong to the administration’s inner diplomatic
circle; it was not a ­pre-meditated slur designed to intimidate Allende as part
of a master conspiracy timed to coincide with the March of the Empty Pots
and Pans.172
Ambassador Davis later denied that the CIA had instigated the December
1971 protests, and he even suggested that the agency had been caught off
guard by them.173 CIA field reports suggest that the agency did know that the
protests were going to take place, but then so did Castro, who advised UP to
confront the female demonstrators regardless of the potential for violence.174
In their reports to Washington, both the U.S. embassy and the CIA
described the demonstrations in dry factual terms, without indicating that
the United States was in any way responsible for them. Given that the CIA
was keen to show the 40 Committee that its covert action plan in Chile was
succeeding, one would expect to see the agency taking credit for the
demonstrations if it could have.175 It seems that U.S. officials did not see the
need at this stage for directly sponsoring organizations such as PF, which
received support from the opposition parties that the CIA was already
subsidizing.176 Given the apparent robustness of the women’s movement
against Allende, the CIA concentrated on assisting other private sector
organizations that appeared to be in greater need.

The Truckers’ Strikes

An important group of private sector organizations that garnered much of
the CIA’s attention emerged in reaction to UP’s nationalization scheme. UP
strategists had hoped to divide the bourgeoisie through the “three areas”
legislation, which allowed for small private businesses to remain intact. The
scheme went awry, however, when the wave of enthusiasm over Allende’s
victory led workers to seize factories and businesses that were not
necessarily on the ­government-sanctioned expropriation lists. This
revolution from below made it difficult for authorities to regulate the pace of
the takeovers, which at times appeared out of control. Although the
opposition greatly exaggerated the appearance of chaos in the industrial
sector, just as it did with the land reform, many small business owners came
to fear that their livelihood was under attack. Consequently, Allende’s
nationalization legislation became a legal bone of contention that consumed
the political energies of the government and drove the smaller merchants
into an alliance with the more powerful businesses.177
U.S. officials were initially quite hopeful that the private sector
organizations would flourish to become a major obstacle to the
government’s socialist agenda. In early December 1971, Ambassador Davis
informed the State Department of a “growing conviction in opposition
parties, private sector and others that opposition is possible,” which has
replaced the “earlier mood of resignation with which [the] business
community reacted to ­buy-outs, or politicians despaired of ‘saving’ Chile.”178
Nearly a year later, the CIA gave a much more pessimistic view: the private
sector was under attack by the state, which now controlled about half of all
manufacturing and farmland. “The survival of the private sector is crucial to
the opposition,” the agency declared, “because this sector represents a
sizable segment of Chilean society not yet under government control as well
as an important source of funds for opposition political parties.”
Consequently, the 40 Committee approved the CIA’s request to fund this
“complex array of organizations representing private enterprise among large
and small businessmen, industrialists, farmers, workers and peasants.”179
Davis approved the funding of the private sector organizations “in
principle,” but he grew concerned when several of them became involved in
premature coup plotting.180 In early 1972, the CIA reported that General
Alfredo Canales was looking for a suitable pretext for a coup. Canales, who
claimed to have 80 percent of the armed forces behind him, planned to
launch the coup in May or June, presumably after Allende had vetoed the
constitutional amendment passed by the opposition to prevent further
nationalization of private enterprise.181 Theodore Shackley, who replaced
Broe as the head of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division in May 1972,
was so convinced that a coup was forthcoming that he ordered the agency to
begin compiling arrest lists for possible use after the coup to thwart possible
armed resistance.182
Although the Canales coup never materialized, CIA officers remained in
“close contact” with the Chilean military. Shackley also reported in
September 1972 that the private sector groups were “seeking to escalate
political tensions in order to encourage a coup.” He recommended funding
these groups, even though it might be better to allow the “Marxist
experiment” to “run its natural course at least through the March 1973
elections, so that Chileans and others will be convinced that the Allende
government was given a fair chance and that his brand of socialism is not
the road to true social progress.”183 Davis, however, insisted that aid “not be
used to encourage maladroit adventurist elements into rash and indiscreet
efforts at a coup.” The compromise was that the CIA agreed to delay
assistance to two of the private sector organizations until mid–October, at
which time further funding would require the approval of the ambassador,
the State Department, the CIA Chief of Station, and CIA headquarters.184
By mid–October 1972, the opposition’s campaign to defeat UP in the
upcoming congressional elections was in full swing. As discussed above, the
Nixon administration considered assistance to the private sector
organizations as vital to getting out the opposition vote. But funding for two
questionable private sector organizations (Patria y Libertad most likely one
of them) remained in limbo when a national strike led by the trucking
industry nearly paralyzed the country.185 On 10 October 1972, the Chilean- ­
Truck-Owners Association, headed by León Vilarín, authorized a strike in
the southern province of Aysén. The strike was triggered by the
government’s announcement that it intended to establish a state trucking
agency in the province, which appeared to threaten the livelihood of the
independent truckers. Other issues included regulations over cargo rates
and the lack of spare parts.186
The truckers were the ideal organization to lead a national strike against
the government. As independent entrepreneurs, they naturally mobilized
around nationalization threats and had the tactical advantage of having to
do little other than park their trucks to bring the country’s transportation
system to a halt. The truckers also easily gained opposition support because
of their connection to the gremialista movement, which the U.S. embassy
described as a “conglomerate of ­loosely-linked trade and professional
associations” representing doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers, housewives, airline
pilots, small business owners, and other ­middle-class professionals.187 As the
strike mushroomed from 50,000 truckers to more than half a million
supporters, its demands expanded to include protection from
nationalization of the last private wholesale food distributor and the nation’s
only newsprint factory (Papelera).188 The opposition also circulated a
national petition (Pliego de Chile) with these demands and others, which
Allende’s supporters viewed as an attempt to get the government to
surrender.189
After UP leaders met to discuss the crisis, one of them reported: “We all
agreed that this is an escalation of sedition, a coup d’état in the making.”190
The PN and Patria y Libertad certainly saw the strike as an opportunity to
oust the government, but some of the Christian Democrats and many others
were less certain about the strike’s objectives.191 One opposition politician
insisted: “It would be absurd to think of overthrowing Allende now. It would
be all out of proportion with the causes of the crisis, and an attempt might
put the army on his side once and for all.” The goal of the strike was not to
overthrow Allende, one PDC official asserted, but “to put him back in his
place: within the Constitution and only using laws to carry out the
program.”192
Allende was not so sure. When the strike erupted, he allegedly thought he
might be assassinated, and his government overthrown.193 If the story is true,
it explains why he arrested the “fascist” strike leaders, impounded thousands
of trucks, seized opposition radio stations, and declared a state of
emergency.194 Allende may have been overreacting, but his draconian
response is understandable. The government was “extremely jumpy,” the
British embassy noted, owing to perpetual coup rumors and the tendency of
UP leaders to believe in conspiracy theories.195 Fortunately for Allende, his
supporters quickly came to the rescue. Just as the strike seemed to forge
greater unity among the opposition, it also emboldened the revolution’s
champions. Volunteer brigades unloaded trains and trucks to relieve the
shortages of goods caused by the “bosses’ strike.” Labor organizations in the
cordones industriales (industrial zones) seized factories that had been shut
down by their owners in support of the strike.196 UP supporters circulated
their own petition (Pliego de Pueblo), which called for greater
nationalization of industrial and commercial firms, expropriation of U.S.
investments, and the end of payment on Chile’s foreign debt.197
As the country became more and more polarized, rival political factions
took to street fighting. One week into the strike, Allende warned that Chile
was “on the verge of a civil war.”198 The media greatly inflamed tensions, as
the two sides presented dramatically different accounts of the same events.199
As one Chilean commentator noted, “A foreigner who comes to this country
and reads all the newspapers would think he had arrived in a schizophrenic
world.”200 El Mercurio, for example, cast the strike as a contest between
“democratic forces” and the “oppressive Marxist state.”201 Newspapers
sympathetic to the government generally called the truckers’ action a “paro”
(stoppage) rather than a “huelga” (strike), a term they believed was best
reserved for true labor disputes.202 The Chilean Foreign Ministry, upset at
the “international campaign” to denigrate Chile’s image, instructed its
embassies to emphasize that Chile had not fallen into chaos. The armed
forces remained loyal and were helping to keep the production system
functioning.203
On 16 October, the State Department described the crisis to Kissinger as
“a ­three-way test of nerves, with the government and the opposition
respectively seeking to engage the military institution’s preference for
accommodation in such a way as to produce the appearance of a victory for
itself.” Although the chances for a compromise were estimated to be about
60–40, U.S. officials began contingency planning in case a coup transpired.204
Davis raised the alarm when he closed one of his reports with a
melodramatic flourish: “Nikita Khrushchev once said that revolution is like
a pregnant woman—when she is ready to have a child she will have it where
she pleases. Chile’s pains are coming faster, with shorter quiet interludes. In
one of these crises a child will be born, either living or ­still-born. If it is
dead, we may not know it right away, but Chile will not be the same.”205 The
outcome of the strike was difficult to project because the opposition kept
enlarging its demands, thus disrupting the negotiations.206 On 21 October,
Allende offered a major concession by agreeing not to nationalize the
trucking industry. A little more than a week later, however, he broke off talks
because the opposition insisted that the issue of the radio stations and the
fate of Papelera be included in the final settlement.207
 Allende was in a tight spot. On the one hand, the cost of the strike had
reached more than $100 million in just two weeks.208 As the British embassy
observed, “the strikes came at a very bad moment for the Chilean economy,
and the consequences will be far reaching.”209 On the other hand, many of
Allende’s supporters were urging him not to sacrifice the goals of the
revolution. Allende, ever the masterful political juggler, used his famed
muñeca (sleight of hand) to find a solution that would allow his government
to survive nearly another year. On 4 November, Allende appointed three
new military officials to his cabinet, including General Carlos Prats as
interior minister. Prats pledged to settle the strike within a few days. To get
the truckers back to work, Prats agreed to set up a government commission
to investigate their complaints, and he promised to protect those who
supported the strike from retaliation by leftist extremists.210
Why would the opposition settle just when it appeared to have the
government at its mercy? As the State Department explained to Kissinger,
“the opposition is not, and probably cannot quickly become, organized in
any systematic way to seize power from the government on its own, but can
only hope that its manifestations of massive protest will oblige the military
to take over and dictate a ­turn-around in the government’s ­political-
economic program.”211 When the coup failed to materialize, the opposition
settled on the next best solution, which was to hope that once the military
entered Allende’s cabinet, it would be in a position to check the revolution.212
Although Allende’s solution displeased UP militants, such as Carlos
Altamirano who did not trust the military and wanted to punish the strikers,
it ended the financial drain on the economy and stabilized the country,
which enabled UP to regain its footing before the March 1973 congressional
elections.213
Many scholars and observers have described the October 1972 truckers’
strike as pivotal in the downfall of Allende. Even more significant than the
economic damage done by the strike was the deep divisions it sowed
throughout the entire country.214 The opposition learned that if it worked
together it could bring the government to its knees, given that the
distinction between economically and politically motivated strikes had
finally collapsed.215 At the same time, Allende came away unscathed and
overconfident, believing he had outmaneuvered the opposition, and that the
workers could be counted on to protect the government.216 What he failed to
grasp, as the Chilean scholar Arturo Valenzuela has emphasized, was that
the truckers’ movement “marked a change from ­party-directed and ­party-
manipulated mobilization to direct mobilization by both big and small
businessmen seeking to protect their stakes in the system.”217
Whether the United States assisted the truckers’ strike has been highly
controversial. Allende asked how 15,000 truckers could survive for 20 days
without work if they did not have some great stash.218 To many, the answer
was obvious. One Chilean senator declared: “I can state with certainty that
the El Teniente copper strike and the truckers’ strike were funded by the
CIA.”219 According to some observers, there was so much American
currency flowing in to support the striking truckers that the U.S. dollar fell
in value against the escudo.220 The Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman recalls once
encountering a group of feasting truck drivers who taunted him by waving
American dollar bills in the air.221 A similar story appeared in Time
magazine, whose correspondent asked some truckers who were enjoying a
lavish meal where they had obtained the money for their food: “From the
CIA,” they laughed.222 Such stories hardened the belief among many Chilean
leftists that the revolution faced an assault from the domestic bourgeoisie in
cahoots with imperialism.223 A line from one of Pablo Neruda’s poems said it
all: “­get-rich-quick truckers, Societies of Presum[p]tuous Lawyers, … with
Nixon as main backer they launched the bosses’ strike.”224
The difficulty with these stories is that they are either inconclusive or
open to different interpretations. That the U.S. embassy had several
undercover CIA agents among its staff, as some analysts have observed,
hardly constituted evidence that they were funding the strike.225 Asserting
that León Vilarín was “probably on the CIA payroll,” as one scholar claimed,
sounds plausible to those who are inclined to believe that anyone in
Allende’s opposition could be on the take.226 Striking truckers who joked
about the CIA by flaunting U.S. dollars could just as easily have been making
fun of the Chilean left, which was constantly droning on about Yankee
imperialism.227 The only hard evidence that the truckers were receiving cash
directly from the CIA appears to be a ­one-time modest sum of $2,800 that
was passed directly to the strikers in violation of the agency’s ground
rules.228 One angry Christian Democratic senator who denied that the strike
had been funded by the CIA, later calculated that the agency would have to
have spent the lavish amount of $16 million just to cover the cost of the
striking truckers.229
Those seeking to connect the CIA to the truckers’ strike too readily
dismiss contrary evidence. PN chief Sergio Onofre Jarpa, for example,
claimed that he had visited many truckers during the strike and never saw
the CIA anywhere.230 After the coup, U.S. officials unanimously denied that
the truckers’ had received any CIA funding, either in October 1972 or in
July 1973, when the truckers went on strike again.231 On 16 September 1973,
Colby informed Kissinger that “no support was provided to the private
sector, whose initiative in launching and maintaining a series of crippling
strikes was instrumental in provoking the military coup.”232 A few days later,
the State Department issued a press statement that “the United States played
no part, financial or otherwise, in that strike or in the other stoppages and
protests mounted by the opposition to Allende.”233 CIA Directors Helms and
Colby, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American Affairs John
Kubisch later testified before the U.S. Congress that the Nixon
administration did not fund the truckers or any other group that wanted to
overthrow the government. Kissinger, too, in his memoirs denied that the
CIA was in any way involved with the strike leaders.234
Nixon administration officials lied about so many dimensions of the U.S.
intervention in Chile that such claims could reasonably be questioned. Still,
the available declassified record suggests that the CIA was not the main
source of funding for the October 1972 strike.235 What U.S. officials
conveniently left out of their testimony, however, was that after the March
1973 congressional elections, CIA and State Department officials debated
whether to continue funding private sector organizations that were seeking
to foster a coup climate.236 The CIA Station maintained that it would be a
“grave mistake not to attempt to strengthen this force as an effective
instrument of the opposition.”237 Most State Department officials were more
cautious, as they pointed out the risks of exposure, especially given that the
Church hearings were already probing into the agency’s activities in Chile.238
In a meeting with CIA officials on 14 June 1973, Assistant Secretary Kubisch
complained that the United States had been meddling in the “Chilean
electoral process for so long that it would take a long clean period before
there would be general belief that we were not involved.” In his view, there
were no “vital U.S. interests” at stake, so the risk of aiding the private sector
organizations was not worth it.239 Despite Kubisch’s objections, the CIA
approached the 40 Committee in mid–July with a proposal for supporting
the private sector organizations as part of a general plan to provide $1
million to the opposition.240 Davis and Kubisch were reluctant to endorse the
proposal. “Chile has to save itself,” Kubisch insisted. The proposed amount
to be passed to the private sector was too small to be effective given the risk
of exposure.241
The second truckers’ strike, which began on 26 July 1973 and lasted until
the September coup, provided the CIA with an opportunity to press its case.
The strikers’ grievances were the same as before, but there was more talk of
bringing down the government.242 An internal CIA memo argued that aid to
the private sector organizations “could greatly hasten economic
disintegration and frustrate government plans to obtain more complete
control of the economy before implementing drastic and unpopular
reforms.”243 The executive secretary of the 40 Committee advised Kissinger
to approve the CIA proposal to assist the opposition because “it is unlikely
that it could survive without additional funding.”244 Kissinger favored
sending funds to private sector organizations such as the striking truckers to
provoke a coup, but Kubisch threatened to resign if he was overruled.245 In a
concession to the State Department, Kissinger and the 40 Committee
approved the $1 million for the opposition, but with the stipulation that all
expenditures allocated to the private sector had to be approved by
Ambassador Davis.246 This condition greatly reduced the chance of U.S. aid
reaching the truckers directly. Davis refused to approve the CIA’s proposal to
assist the private sector organizations, but he left an opening for Colby by
agreeing that “soundings should be made in Washington on this matter.”247
On 29 August 1973, Kissinger’s aide recommended telling Santiago, “Not
now. But let’s keep the option open.” Kissinger left the matter hanging until
the coup intervened nearly two weeks later.248
Technically speaking, U.S. officials could claim truthfully that they had
not passed money directly to the striking truckers. But as many
commentators have since pointed out, funds could have easily made their
way to the truckers from private sector organizations and the political
opposition that the CIA was supporting.249 The Chilean private sector was
also helping to support the truckers’ strike. For example, one CIA informant
was pleading for more U.S. assistance because “he and his colleagues in the
Private Sector were supporting the truckers in what he termed a last ditch,- ­
do-or-die effort against Allende.”250 The question of responsibility is difficult
to untangle. As one U.S. intelligence official queried, “If we give it to A, and
then A gives it to B and C and D, in a sense it’s true that D got it. But the
question is: Did we give it to A knowing D would get it?”251 Until the CIA
declassifies the names of the organizations that it funded it will be
impossible to answer this question.252
The most that can be said at present is that U.S. officials flooded the
opposition with millions of dollars knowing that it was highly likely that
some of the funds would be diverted from their intended purposes.
Assistant Secretary Meyer acknowledged this problem in discussing his
reservations about the CIA’s proposal to fund the private sector
organizations: “We do not expect [less than 1 line not declassified] if aid is
later given to them, to act simply as conduits to the political parties. At the
same time, we would expect the money to be used for purposes directly
oriented toward energizing these parties, and not for the organizations’ own
institutional objectives, which might have only an indirect relationship with
our political aims in Chile.” The CIA tried to assuage Meyer’s trepidation
over these “­by-products” by insisting that funding could always be
withdrawn if necessary. Meyer was skeptical, but not enough to block the
proposal.253
If the CIA was not the main source of funds for the truckers’ strikes, then
where did the money come from?254 One possibility was the American
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the international arm of the
American Federation of ­Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (­AFL–
CIO), known for its attempts to infiltrate foreign labor movements during
the Cold War.255 Shortly after Allende’s election, the State Department
briefed George Meany and other ­AFL–CIO leaders on the Allende threat.256
Under an AID grant of $125,000 in 1971, AIFLD sought to “maintain a ­toe-
hold” in the Chilean labor movement, which was notoriously difficult to
penetrate given the strong influence of the Chilean Communist Party.257
AIFLD aimed to train dozens of Chilean labor leaders who could contest the
communists for control of CUT, Chile’s largest labor confederation, which
represented at least ­one-fifth of the labor force.258 From 1962 to 1971, AIFLD
trained nearly 9,000 Chileans, although U.S. officials regarded most of
AIFLD’s projects in Chile in the 1960s as ineffective.259 According to one
report, senior ­AFL–CIO officials had advance knowledge of the truckers’
strikes.260 The exact contribution of AIFLD to the destabilization campaign
in Chile, however, remains uncertain. Chilean labor leaders trained by
AIFLD certainly were working with the gremios to oppose Allende but there
is very little evidence to suggest that the organization was subsidizing strikes
in Chile in any substantial way.261
The most likely source of funds for the striking truckers were wealthy
Chileans living in Argentina and Brazil, and foreign companies located in
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.262 When the second strike began the CIA
station reported that an “unspecified source” had sent funds through
intermediaries.263 One of the intermediaries was possibly the private sector
organization SOFOFA, which the CIA described in September 1971 as
“engaged in a ­rear-guard effort to defend the interests of the private business
community.”264
The Media
A major objective of the destabilization program against Allende was to
undermine popular support for the Allende government and tarnish its
international reputation. This task was to be accomplished, Broe explained
to the 40 Committee on 19 November 1970, by “placing tailored articles in
selected newspapers outside of Chile,” and purchasing a printing press and
local radio station. The CIA also planned to target “selected military and
civilian ­policy-makers in Latin America, Europe and Asia with periodic …
briefings detailing specific Chilean Government actions to subvert
democracy and institute a Marxist state.”265 Other techniques eventually
adopted by the CIA included “efforts to exacerbate tensions and embarrass
Allende by placing propaganda in the European and Latin American press,
underscoring friction within the Unidad Popular (UP), and focusing on
Allende’s poor health, heavy drinking, promiscuity, and expensive tastes.”266
The CIA also hired a research firm to produce an “economic study on Chile,
factual but emphasizing unfavorable developments,” which was circulated to
“international news services such as UPI and Reuters.”267
According to the Church Report, the CIA spent $4.3 million on
propaganda and supporting the opposition media during the Allende
presidency. Given the agency’s long history of covert action in Chile, it had- ­
well-groomed ­ready-made assets in the media capable of quickly churning
out propaganda to divide UP and sow panic in the general population.268 For
example, a widespread rumor among wealthy Chileans was that Allende had
plans to transport the poor to upscale neighborhoods and move all the rich
into the slums.269 Propaganda projects included efforts to wrest control of
university and labor organizations from the communists, and supporting a
“civic action front group to combat communist influence within cultural and
intellectual circles.”270 As described above, a special effort was made to
disseminate propaganda during the interim elections in order to scare voters
away from supporting UP candidates, and during the truckers’ strike to
galvanize the opposition.271
The CIA made the same justification for funding the opposition media as
it did for supporting Allende’s political opposition and the private sector
organizations: without U.S. subsidies, the media would not survive. “The
outlook for non–Marxist Chilean media is bleak,” a CIA report stated in
mid–December 1970, as “a sizable portion of the industry could be wiped
out if advertising revenue falls below operating costs.” UP intended to use its
control over “patronage positions in the ministries concerned with labor,
taxation and social security,” the agency warned, to squeeze out opposition
newspapers and publishers “without resorting to drastic measures or openly
repressive action.”272
The idea that the opposition media was in danger of going extinct because
of government economic pressure was an exaggeration partly driven by the
CIA’s need to justify its funding requests, but also by Chilean opportunists
seeking to exploit U.S. fears. For example, one conservative Chilean senator
approached Kissinger’s office several times begging for assistance, warning
that “if the government is effective in emasculating the opposition media, all
hope of eventually replacing the Allende Government by peaceful and
democratic means vanishes.”273 U.S. officials were generally sympathetic to
such requests, even when couched in alarmist terms. According to one CIA
report in early October 1972, government critics were raising a “hue and
cry” over its closure of two radio stations and Allende’s veto of funds for
financially strapped radio and television outlets. The report acknowledged
that “some opposition media court martyrdom by their excesses.” But such
behavior is understandable, the authors insinuated, because “many of
Allende’s supporters see an urgent need to muzzle the opposition
spokesmen.”274
In addition to supplying funding for opposition parties to buy radio
stations and newspapers, the CIA also provided subsidies to existing media
outlets that appeared to be in danger for either political or economic
reasons. The largest recipient of funding by far in this category was the
conservative newspaper El Mercurio, which obtained about $1.5 million
from the CIA during the Allende presidency.275 As the most respected and
influential newspaper in Chile and much of Latin America, it made sense to
U.S. officials to ensure its survival. There was also a natural inclination to
support the paper given that El Mercurio’s owner, Agustín Edwards, had
conspired in the plot to prevent Allende’s election (see Chapter 2).
Efforts to assist El Mercurio began even before Allende’s inauguration. On
16 September 1970, Ambassador Korry requested that the State Department
find some way to persuade National City Bank not to call in its loans to the
newspaper. That El Mercurio was already in dire financial straits before
Allende assumed the presidency casts doubt on later claims that the
newspaper was suffering solely from economic attacks by UP.276 Nearly a
year later, the CIA informed the 40 Committee that El Mercurio needed $1
million if it was to survive over the next few years. A 60 percent drop in
advertising revenue and UP’s refusal to grant loans was squeezing the paper
to the point where it was going to have to shut down before the end of
September 1971 if it did not receive an immediate infusion of $0.7 million.277
Kissinger’s aide recommended granting the request, provided the newspaper
promised to “launch an intensive public attack on the Allende government’s
efforts to force them out of business—e.g., public editorials, letters to the- ­
Inter-American Press Association and leading newspapers, requests for
moral and financial support from the free press, spelling out of some of the
blackmail tactics which the Allende government has been using.”278 At the
next 40 Committee meeting, CIA Director Helms described Allende’s
crushing of the newspaper as only slightly more sophisticated than a “­Nazi-
type seizure of the plant by storm troopers.” Despite this provocative
analogy, the committee members were divided about whether to grant the
request. Admiral Moorer “felt we were gambling with a loser and the
expenditure of funds was extravagant.” Helms agreed. Meyer acknowledged
the “­rat-hole aspects of the subsidy but thought we should still make a
fight.”279 Kissinger decided to take the matter to Nixon, who approved the
funds on the condition that “El Mercurio launch an intensive propaganda
campaign on the freedom of the press issue.”280
That the Nixon administration agreed to place this condition on
subsidizing El Mercurio may appear curious, because the newspaper had
long dedicated itself to attacking Allende. Part of the fear was that Edwards
might take the funds and use them for other enterprises. Another issue was
whether subsidizing the paper with such large amounts of cash might pose a
security risk. When the newspaper came up for renewed funding at a State
Department meeting in early 1972, one official wondered whether it was
time to let El Mercurio go with a “big bang” that would “dramatize the
Allende regime’s hostile attitude toward a free and critical press.” CIA
representatives rushed to insist that the paper was “invaluable as the
principal press voice against Allende.”281
On 10 April 1972, the agency appealed directly to the 40 Committee for
additional funding to enable the paper to pay back taxes and foreign
creditors, which would carry it through the March 1973 congressional
elections. In making the case for continued subsidies to El Mercurio, the
agency noted that proof of its effectiveness was that Allende spent a great
deal of energy attacking the newspaper in his speeches and letters to the
press.282 The paper also provided “spiritual leadership” to rally the
opposition around issues such as the ­three-areas bill and UP’s plan to
establish a unicameral legislature. El Mercurio had been instrumental in
highlighting “the economic chaos brought on by Allende’s policies, stressing
such aspects as the scarcity of food and consumer items, lack of production,
worker dissatisfaction, and credit difficulties.” Finally, the newspaper had
proven useful in shaping military attitudes as evidenced by a recent series of
articles that exposed the Communist Party’s attempt to infiltrate the ranks of
the armed forces.283
In forwarding the CIA’s proposal to the 40 Committee, Kissinger aide
William Jorden reluctantly recommended granting the $965,000 request
because the newspaper “is a thorn in Allende’s side” that “does help give
heart to the opposition forces. Without it, the Allende government would
have much clearer sailing. And if it goes down the drain because of
government pressure—as opposed to financial failure—we have an excellent
‘freedom of the press’ issue to use there and in the Hemisphere.” The 40
Committee approved the CIA’s request for a second tranche of funding,
which carried the paper through the March 1973 elections and up to the
September coup.284
The CIA’s effort to bolster the opposition media also included a
component to fund economic research that not only criticized UP’s
performance but also established the foundation for a new economy once
Allende was overthrown. According to the Church Report, “Project files
record that CIA collaborators were involved in preparing an initial overall
economic plan which has served as the basis for the Junta’s most important
economic decisions.”285 The “Chicago Boys,” as these collaborators became
known, were the product of the longstanding “Chile Project,” established in
the 1950s by the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA, AID’s
predecessor) to sponsor the training of several dozen Chilean economists at
the University of Chicago.286
After imbibing the neoconservative philosophies of Milton Friedman and
Arnold Harberger, these economists returned to Chile, where they formed a
hub at the Catholic University.287 In mid–1971, SOFOFA head Orlando
Sáenz asked the Chicago Boys to join the “Monday Club,” a group of
powerful Chilean businessmen who met weekly at El Mercurio headquarters
to begin formulating an economic plan that could guide any future
government that replaced UP. By early 1973, the group had produced a thick
document known as El Ladrillo (the Brick). This document eventually
leaked to the armed forces where it allegedly encouraged the coup plotters to
move ahead on the assurance that there would be some sort of plan to help
the Chilean economy recover from the chaos created by the Allende
government.288
The CIA’s contribution to the formation of the economic plan that
eventually undergirded the Pinochet regime remains murky. Documents
that might pinpoint which individuals and organizations received CIA
funding have been sanitized, leaving researchers to speculate on the exact
connection.289 According to one scholar who has conducted interviews with
the Chicago Boys, funding came from “international” sources, and the
assumption was that the CIA could be counted among the donors.290 But so
far, no U.S. documents suggest that the Nixon administration had a master
plan to impose neoliberalism on Chile.291 A more useful way of interpreting
the available evidence is to acknowledge that the “Chile Project” had openly
received funds from ICA and AID, as well as the Rockefeller and Ford
Foundations, so neoliberalism evolved in Chile as the natural outcome of
economic policies that the U.S. government and private ­non-government
organizations had been advocating for decades.292
The impact of the Nixon administration’s destabilization program on
Chile poses several interpretive challenges. In appealing to the 40
Committee for funds, the CIA repeatedly insinuated that the opposition
would wither away if it was not propped up.293 CIA requests, however, must
be read with great caution because of the agency’s tendency to exaggerate
the opposition’s needs in order to justify the covert action program. Clearly,
the opposition to Allende grew out of frustration with the UP government
over many issues—inflation, food shortages, strikes, street violence, and
more. It is impossible to know if the opposition would have survived
without CIA subsidies, but given the depth of hostility to the UP
government by early 1973, it seems likely that it would have struggled on in
some form or other, just as the opposition to Pinochet would survive under
much more onerous circumstances.294 More critically, the question is
whether the CIA helped to tip the balance against Allende by helping to
establish a coup climate.
When it came to bolstering the formal political opposition, the CIA’s
contributions were substantial, ongoing, and partially successful. Although
the exact amount of money that the CIA spent on various opposition groups
remains largely unknown, it needs to be emphasized that U.S. dollars went a
long way in Chile given the escudo’s poor exchange rate.295 The performance
of the opposition in the interim elections helped dissuade Allende from
holding a plebiscite to establish a unicameral legislature. Attempts to get
dissidents in UP to abandon the government were less successful, but by
working to unify Allende’s enemies, the CIA managed to prevent the UP
government from exploiting divisions in the opposition, especially within
the PDC. The outcome of the March 1973 congressional election was
certainly disappointing to the Nixon administration, but the electoral
impasse merely emboldened opposition elements that favored a coup. In this
respect, CIA assistance to the private sector organizations and the mass
media contributed significantly to the destabilization of the Allende
government.296 Granted, striking truckers and ­middle-class housewives did
not depend fully on U.S. funding to carry out their activities, but CIA
assistance helped increase the widespread support that these protests
received. By early 1973, a coup climate had been firmly established. The final
challenge was how to encourage the Chilean armed forces to take the
decisive step in launching a coup.

1. For Harrington’s letter and his attribution of “destabilization” to Colby, see Michael Harrington (­-
D-Massachusetts) testimony, 25 September 1974, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, Inquiry into Matters Regarding Classified Testimony
Taken on April 22, 1974, Concerning the CIA and Chile, 36. For Seymour Hersh’s report, see “C.I.A.
Chief Tells House of $­8-Million Campaign against Allende in ‘70–73,” NYT, 8 September 1974. One
year after the coup, Harrington continued to insist that Colby had used the term. See transcript of
William Colby prepared speech, 13 September 1974, ­CIA-RDP88–01315R000200010008–7, CREST.
The transcript of Colby’s classified testimony has never been released, even though Harrington
publicly challenged Colby to release it to settle the debate. See Michael J. Harrington letter to the
editor, NYT, 25 September 1974.
2. William Colby letter to the NYT, 18 September 1974; Colby, Honorable Men, 382; Davis, Last Two
Years, 327; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 382; Edward M. Korry testimony, 4 December 1975,
Intelligence Activities, 32; Richard Helms testimony, 22 January 1975, SFRC, CIA Foreign and Domestic
Activities, 24; Phillips, Night Watch, 252–54; Harry W. Shlaudeman testimony, 12 June 1974, HCFA,
Human Rights in Chile, 136.
3. Davis, Last Two Years, 320.
4. Annex to Chapin Options Paper for NSC, 27 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 415–17.
Emphasis added.
5. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 13 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 460.
6. Kissinger memo for the file, 20 December 1971, NSA,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/doc15.pdf.
7. See Gustafson, Hostile Intent.
8. Embtel 3493, 27 February 1972, box 3, CAF, RG 84.
9. Shackley memo for the record, 17 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 827.
10. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 154.
11. See, for example, Vaky’s advice to Kissinger in early October 1970 that a ­long-range “­game-plan”
should include covert assistance to the “­anti-Allende Christian Democrats.” Vaky memo to Kissinger,
7 October 1970, ­LOC-HAK-108–­5-2–4, CREST.
12. Meyer briefing memo, 13 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 458.
13. Memo, “Covert Action Program for Chile,” 17 November 1970, CDP.
14. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 486–87.
15. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 489.
16. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 7 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 504.
17. As one U.S. embassy officer later noted, although the embassy had little contact with the Allende
government, “there was a great deal of contact with the ­anti-Allende parties.” See Jeffrey Davidow
history interview, 40, FAOHC.
18. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 28 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 545.
19. SRG meeting minutes, 14 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 365.
20. Embtel 43, 5 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 239–40.
21. Korry backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 21 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
537–38.
22. Memo to the 40 Committee, 28 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 540–45.
23. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 28 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 545–47. Note that FRUS
editors have incorrectly transcribed the date of this document as 1970.
24. Meyer memo to Irwin, 28 January 1971, CDP.
25. ­A-26, 22 January 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. For background on Bossay, see Torres Dujisin, La
crisis del sistema democrático, 83.
26. Juan de Onís, “Leftists View Chilean Election as Test,” NYT, 9 March 1971.
27. Joseph Novitski, “Allende, Facing Pressure to Act, Insists on Playing by the Rules,” NYT, 6
December 1970. For a history of the legislation regarding the holding of a plebiscite, see Piedrabuena,
La reforma constitucional.
28. Tad Szulc, “Allende Plans Plebiscites If Congress Balks Moves,” NYT, 4 November 1970.
29. Embtel 1421, 15 March 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. Allende was much more cautious about
treating the elections as a mandate to hold a plebiscite, although U.S. officials did not believe him. See
Salazar, Chile 1970–1973, 101; memo for the 40 Committee, 2 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16:
298.
30. Sobel, Chile & Allende, 51–52. For Allende’s commentary on the affair, see “Allende informa al
pueblo,” Puro Chile, 31 March 1971, in González Pino et al., Los mil días de Allende, vol. 1, 80.
31. The exposé on Edwards appeared in William Montalbano and James Savage, “Chile Jails Miami
Probe Figure,” Miami Herald, 11 March 1971, attachment to embtel 1387, 12 March 1971, box 2, CAF,
RG 84. For an example of sensational Chilean news coverage of the affair, see Luis Hernández Parker,
“El Complot del Cobre,” Ercilla, in Chile: El diálogo o las armas, pt. 1, 239–44.
32. Embtel 1451, 17 March 1971, POL 17 Chile, box 2198, RG 59; embtel 1558, 22 March 1971, box
2, CAF, RG 84. For Allende’s insistence that no UP official was involved in the copper plot, see embtel
1497, 18 March 1971; and embtel 1762, 31 March 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. Korry asked Washington
to supply missing telexes between Santiago and Zurich that could help discredit UP, but the CIA
claimed it was unable to recover them. See Korry backchannel message to Kissinger and Johnson, 7
April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 602–604; and Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 14 April 1971, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 612–13.
33. Memo for the 40 Committee, 15 March 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 283–87.
34. Memo for the 40 Committee, 2 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 298.
35. Allende speech in the Plaza de la Constitución, 30 March 1971, in Allende, Chile’s Road to
Socialism, 119–23.
36. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 9 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 605. Emphasis in the original.
37. Memo for the 40 Committee, 21 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 311. On the impact of the
increased power of the Socialists, see Korry ­A-140 to DoS, 4 May 1971, POL 17 Chile, box 2198, RG
59. The election results also suggested that Allende was increasing his support among women. See
Kyle and Francis, “Women at the Polls,” 306.
38. Nixon Tapes, Conversation 245–6 (Nixon, Kissinger), 6 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 300–
301; Juan de Onís, “Orderly Chilean Election Drive Ends,” NYT, 4 April 1971.
39. Memo for the 40 Committee, 21 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 309–313. On how the
election hampered the prospects of a plebiscite, see Juan de Onís, “Allende is Given Mandate by Vote,”
NYT, 6 April 1971. Most of the key opposition leaders, such as Sergio Onofre Jarpa, managed to hold
on to their seats, and most women supported the opposition. See Etchepare Jensen, “Partidos y
fuerzas políticas chilenas,” 16. For how the election divided the Chilean electorate into two major
blocs, with the PDC shifting to the right, see Silva Solar, “Errors of the Unidad Popular,” 324.
40. Nachmanoff memo to Nixon, 11 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 621. On how Kissinger
deceived Letelier into thinking Chile did not have to fear U.S. interference in the election, see Dinges
and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, 44–45.
41. Korry backchannel message to Kissinger and Johnson, 7 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 602.
42. Nachmanoff, “Talking Points for 40 Committee Meeting, Wednesday, May 26, 1971,” n.d., FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 625–26.
43. Winn, “Salvador Allende,” 147; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 146. Several UP leaders later
claimed that the prospects of an alliance between UP and PDC were greatly harmed by the Pérez
Zujovic assassination and UP sectarianism. See Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 170–72; and
Arrate, “Protagonistas,” 154. Rightists in the PDC also opposed any deal with Allende because they
did not think UP could win a plebiscite and they were hoping to defeat Allende in the March 1973
elections. Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 75–76.
44. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution, 145; Collier and Sater, History of Chile,
331; MAPU, El primer año del gobierno popular 34 popular, vol. 2, 63–64; Israel Zipper, Politics and
Ideology, 48–49; Silva, Los cordones industriales, 120; Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 168. For skepticism
about UP’s chances of winning a plebiscite, see Bitar, Transición, 126–27.
45. Embtel 2700, 23 May 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84.
46. Israel Zipper, Politics and Ideology, 65–66.
47. Memo for the 40 Committee, 2 July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 641.
48. Memo for the 40 Committee, 2 July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 642; 40 Committee meeting
minutes, 6 July 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 643–44.
49. Juan de Onís, “Election Poses New Test for Allende,” NYT, 18 July 1971.
50. Feinberg, Triumph of Allende, 222.
 51. Intelligence note ­RARN-25, 22 July 1971, POL 14 Chile, 1/1/71, box 2195, RG 59; Power, ­Right-
Wing Women in Chile, 28.
52. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 149.
53. Juan de Onís, “Chilean Leftist Loses Key Election for a Deputy,” NYT, 19 July 1971.
54. Sigmund, “Two Years,” 45.
55. Suárez, Entre el fusil y la palabra, 259.
56. SNIE 94–71, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 409–11; Juan de Onís, “Allende Affirms
Policy after Vote Defeat,” NYT, 21 July 1971; Biehl del Río and Gonzalo, “Political ­Pre-requisites,” 323.
57. CIA memo to 40 Committee, 4 August 1971, CDP.
58. Feinberg, Triumph of Allende, 222; Etchepare Jensen, “Partidos y fuerzas políticas chilenas,” 19.
59. For an explanation of the origins of this dissent group, which included Bossay, see Myhr, Chile’s
Path to Socialism, 28–29; and LAWR, 6 August 1971.
60. Memo for the 40 Committee, 29 October 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 455–62.
61. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 5 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 719–21.
62. Nachmanoff in a memo to Kissinger, 3 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 715–17.
63. Juan de Onís, “Allende to Seek One Legislature,” NYT, 5 November 1971; embtel 5679, 12
November 1971, POL 1 Chile, 1–­8-70, box 2193, RG 59; Juan de Onís, “Allende Pushes ‘People’s
Assembly’ Plan and Talks with Castro,” NYT, 12 November 1971.
64. Juan de Onís, “Chilean Opposition Denounces Plan to Alter the Legislature,” NYT, 23 November
1971.
65. Juan de Onís, “Allende’s Rally Smaller than Planned,” NYT, 21 December 1971.
66. CIA memo, 15 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 476. Sergio Ossa warned that Allende
would use the copper nationalization controversy to gain support for the plebiscite. See Nachmanoff
memo to Kissinger, 15 November 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 721–23.
67. For conflicting pressures on the plebiscite issue after the Valparaíso setback, see “Crucial Test for
Dr. Allende,” NYT, 2 August 1971; and LAWR, 17 September 1971. Tomic argued at the PDC plenary
in March 1972 that UP was afraid to hold a plebiscite because it knew it would lose. See Tomic, El
camino chileno al socialismo, 13.
68. Memo for the 40 Committee, 10 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 489–94. On the idea
that the January 1972 ­by-election represented a test of support for a plebiscite, see Juan de Onís,
“Allende Program Faces Test in Two Elections Sunday,” NYT, 13 January 1972.
69. Jessup memo to Kissinger, 13 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 736; memo for the 40
Committee, 10 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 489.
70. Meyer memo to Johnson, 10 December 1971, CDP.
71. Lewis Diuguid, “Allende’s Coalition Defeated in Two Chilean ­By-Elections,” WP, 17 January
1972; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 165. On minor ­pre-election violence, see “6 Reported Injured in
Chilean Election Violence,” NYT, 15 January 1972.
72. Lewis Diuguid, “Allende Aide Probes Vote Loss,” WP, 18 January 1972; Norman Gall, “Agrarian
Revolt in Cautín: Part II,” American Universities Field Staff Report, 19:5 (September 1972): 13; Morris,
We Must Make Haste, 285–86; Horne, Small Earthquake, 335.
73. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 20 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 761–62.
74. Memo for the 40 Committee, 21 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 523–26.
75. Juan de Onís, “Election Cheers Foes of Allende,” NYT, 18 January 1972.
76. Etchepare Jensen, “Partidos y fuerzas políticas chilenas,” 23.
77. Embtel 953, 28 February 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 766. For a similar analysis, see Kaufman,
Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 185.
78. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 165–66; Fontaine Aldunate, Todos querían la revolución, 12.
79. Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 136; Haslam, Nixon Administration, 118; LAWR, 21 January
1972.
80. Embtel 226, 17 January 1971, POL 14 Chile, 1–10–72, box 2195, RG 59.
81. Juan de Onís, “Reverses Split Chile’s Leftists,” NYT, 5 February 1972.
82. Zammit, Chilean Road, 33–34, 245–46; Haslam, Nixon Administration, 120. Allende had spoken
favorably about a plebiscite several times early in his presidency. By 1972, however, he firmly rejected
calls to establish an informal People’s Assembly in Concepción that might challenge UP’s legal
authority. See Allende letter to UP leaders, 31 July 1972, in Allende, Discursos, 408–11; and Allende
interview with Argentine journalist Pablo Piacentini, 6 August 1972, in Allende, De cara a la verdad,
87–88.
83. Athey, “Government and Opposition in Chile During the Allende Years,” 501.
84. Memo for the 40 Committee, 21 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 525.
85. Joint intelligence memo, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 291. These ventures eventually failed
because of disagreements over the issue of bank nationalizations. See Moss, Chile’s Marxist
Experiment, 129–30.
86. Embtel 953, 28 February 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 771. For background on the proposed
Constitutional amendment, see memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16:
553–55; and chapter 8.
87. Laird memo to Kissinger, 8 March 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 772–73.
88. Embtel 383, 25 January 1972, box 3, CAF, RG 84.
89. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1972, CDP.
90. The 40 Committee approved Korry’s request to cover the PDC’s ­short-term debt from the April
1971 municipal elections campaign, but the amounts are redacted. See memo for the 40 Committee,
20 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 324. The CIA was still emphasizing the PDC debt burden in
late 1972. See Santiago tel to CIA, 15 September 1972, CDP.
91. McAfee memo to Cline, 3 February 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 531. For further concerns
about security leaks, see McAfee memo to Undersecretary, 16 February 1972, CDP.
92. Memo for the 40 Committee, 11 May 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 577. On the role of the PDC
in assisting Boeninger’s campaign, see memo for the 40 Committee, 12 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­-
E-16: 587.
93. Memo for the 40 Committee, 15 August 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 619. For detailed results
of the CUT election, see Zapata S., “Chilean Labor Movement,” 93.
94. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 April 1972, CDP; Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 69.
95. Memo for the 40 Committee, 19 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 574.
96. Memo for the 40 Committee, 12 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 586.
97. SNIE 94–72, 29 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 592.
98. Ratliff memo to Kissinger, 16 June 1972, CDP.
99. UP won by just 8.8 percent in 1972 versus 25.8 percent in 1971. See Juan de Onís, “Chilean
Communist Wins a ­By-election for Federal Seat,” NYT, 17 July 1972; and “Hollow Win for Allende,”
NYT, 19 July 1972.
100. Memo for the 40 Committee, 15 August 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 617.
101. Crimmins memo to Rogers, 25 July 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 802.
102. Embtel 3870, 22 August 1972, box 3, CAF, RG 84. On how economic decline was hurting
support for the government, see intelligence note ­RSGN-13, 29 June 1972, LAB Chile, 1/1/70, box
1394, RG 59.
103. Meyer memo to Johnson, 13 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 635–37.
104. Broe memo to Meyer, 18 November 1972, CDP.
105. CIA memo to Davis, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 664–65.
106. Memo, 11 January 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 840–41. On the increasing use of telephone
votes to reduce the need for ­face-to-face meetings, see note on U.S. Covert Actions, FRUS, 1969–1973,
21: xlii.
107. Memo for the 40 Committee, 8 February 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 667–72.
108. Crimmins memo to Porter, 9 February 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 844.
109. Jonathan Kandell, “Change in Policy for Chile Asked,” NYT, 1 March 1973; Eduardo Frei
interview, 24 January 1973, in Correa, Preguntas, 40.
110. Athey, “Government and Opposition in Chile During the Allende Years,” 502.
111. Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 81. See also Jarpa, Creo en Chile, 263–64.
112. Quoted in O. Grek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, “The Situation in Chile,” 21
February 1973, in Uliánova, “Soviet Perceptions,” 55–56.
113. Corvalán speech to the nation, 1 March 1973, FBIS Daily Report, 1 March 1973.
114. Haslam, Nixon Administration, 161.
115. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 197.
116. Jonathan Kandell, “The Chilean Military Sets Forth Its Position on March Elections,” NYT, 24
February 1973.
117. “Unified Legislature and a New Charter Proposed by Allende,” NYT, 6 February 1973.
118. Jonathan Kandell, “Allende Belittles the Election Chances of His Foes,” NYT, 3 March 1973.
119. Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 83.
120. Thomas, Contesting Legitimacy in Chile, 113–31.
121. Santiago tel to DCI, 8 February 1973, CDP.
122. Hecksher tel to Broe, 13 February 1973, CDP.
123. CIA report, 28 February 1973, CDP.
124. Moss, Chile’s Marxist Experiment, 177.
125. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 201; Yofre, Misión Argentina en Chile, 314–315.
126. USP, a small socialist splinter group that did not belong to CODE or UP, earned 0.27 percent. If
null or blank ballots, are eliminated, then CODE beat UP 55.6 to 44.1 percent. CIA memo for the 40
Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 683.
127. Knudson, Chilean Press during the Allende Years, 62–65.
128. Knudson, Chilean Press during the Allende Years, 66–67.
129. Allende’s Third Annual Message to the National Congress, 21 March 1973, in Cockcroft,
Salvador Allende Reader, 223.
130. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 685.
131. Urzúa Valenzuela, Historia política de Chile, 672; Garretón and Moulian, Análisis coyuntural y
proceso político, 95; Nunn, “New Thoughts,” 276–77; ­RAAS-4, 27 February 1972, POL 14 Chile, 12–­5-
72, box 2196, RG 59.
132. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 682. The idea that Allende
had won a “psychological” victory also appears in the observations of foreign diplomats. See Harmer,
Allende’s Chile, 205.
133. Wallach interview with Allende.
134. Richard Fagen, “Letter from Chile,” New York Review of Books, 17 May 1973. After the results
came in, even Eduardo Frei conceded to an American observer that the election was valid. See Kling
and Birns, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Chile,” 6.
135. “Electoral Fraud at the Parliamentary Election, March 1973,” report telecast on Channel 13 of
the Catholic University in June 1973, in Pinochet Ugarte, Crucial Day, 179. See also Boetsch G. H.,
Recordando con Alessandri, 148–49.
136. Embtel 3420, 20 July 1973, 1973SANTIA03240, CFPF, RG 59.
137. Memcon (Garcia, Tipton), 23 July 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84. The large number of alleged
fraudulent votes can also be explained by the swelling of the voter registration rolls by individuals
between the ages of 21 and 24. Paul Sigmund, “Seeing Allende Through the Myths,” Worldview, 17:4
(April 1974), 18. Nonetheless, the PDC clung to the fraud allegation and launched a formal
congressional investigation that was still in process at the time of the September coup. See memcon
(Gonzalez, Tipton), 25 July 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84; and Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 186–87.
138. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 684. The U.S. embassy held
the same opinion. See embtel 1238, 23 March 1973, POL 14 Chile, 12–­5-72, box 2196, RG 59.
139. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 682; Jonathan Kandell,
“Foes of Allende,” NYT, 5 March 1973.
140. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 686.
141. Embtel 1238, 23 March 1973, POL 14 Chile, 12–­5-72, box 2196, RG 59.
142. Embtel 1238, 23 March 1973, POL 14 Chile, 12–­5-72, box 2196, RG 59.
143. Quoted in Haslam, Nixon Administration, 162.
144. Angell, “Congressional Elections in Chile,” 137.
145. For accounts emphasizing class as the key factor in the election, see Smith and Rodríguez,
“Comparative ­Working-Class Political Behavior,” 88; CIA Station Chief summary, 29 March 1973,
CDP; Santiago tel to DCI, 17 April 1973, CDP; and Everett G. Martin, “Allende Foes Fail to Get ­Two-
Thirds Rein On Chile Government, Leaving Nation Split,” WSJ, 6 March 1973.
146. Alexander, ABC Presidents, 250.
147. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 218.
148. Broe memo to Hecksher, 14 March 1973, CDP.
149. Memo for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 687.
150. Crimmins memo to Porter, 4 May 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 856.
151. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 240. On the extreme polarization of the electorate, possibly the
worst in Chilean history, see Valenzuela, “Origins and Transformations,” 55.
152. Santiago tel to DCI, 17 April 1973, CDP; Martínez Corbalá, Instantes de decisión, 78–79;
Senator Francisco Bulnes interview, 2 November 1973, in IDOC International, Chile: The Allende
Years, 43; Tomic, “Christian Democracy,” 234–35.
153. Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November,”
NYT, 27 September 1973.
154. Church Report, 31. Some opposition groups may well have been receiving CIA assistance
without knowing whose interests they were serving. See Theotonio Dos Santos, “Las condiciones
políticas del golpe de estado,” Chile Hoy, no. 16, 29 September—5 October 1972.
155. According to one study, a “consumer psychosis” motivated many Chilean women to protest,
even those who were formerly apolitical. See Winn, Americas, 338.
156. Gabriel García Márquez, “The Death of Salvador Allende,” Harper’s, March 1974, 49. For similar
portraits, see Cooper, Pinochet and Me, 14–15; Chavkin, Storm over Chile, 205–206; and Corvalán, De
lo vivido y lo peleado, 137–38.
157. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 156–60; Thomas, “Legacies of Patrimonial Patriarcalism”;
Tinsman, Partners in Conflict, 252–53.
158. Memo to 303 Committee, 14 March 1969, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 9.
159. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 126–43.
160. Korry backchannel message to 40 Committee, 18 June 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 92.
161. CIA paper, “Talking Paper on TRACK I,” 17 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 383; Power, ­-
Right-Wing Women in Chile, 141–42.
162. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 151–56.
163. Juan de Onís, “Allende Decrees Emergency Rule as Riots Continue,” NYT, 3 December 1971.
164. Gordon Allot (­R-Colorado), CR, 11 December 1971, 117: 46420.
165. Allende’s Farewell Address to Castro, 4 December 1971, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader,
140.
166. Allende Interview with Chilean Journalists, 10 September 1972, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende
Reader, 188.
167. Embtel 5960, 3 December 1971, box 3, CAF, RG 84.
168. Henry Raymont, “Debray Shifts toward Allende View,” NYT, 9 February 1972.
169. On Allende’s failure to address adequately women’s issues, see Townsend, “Refusing to Travel”;
and Chaney, Supermadre, 46–47.
170. On possible Brazilian influences, see Power, “Who but a Woman,” 95; Cusack, Revolution and
Reaction, 115–16; and Marlise Simons, “The Brazilian Connection,” WP, 6 January 1974.
171. For example, senior CIA officials assured Ambassador Davis that the agency “did not use
Brazilians or Brazil to conduct programs in Chile.” See Davis, Last Two Years, 332.
172. Klein later claimed that he was unaware of CIA meddling in Chile and was “merely passing on ­-
third-hand information from knowledgeable sources.” Klein, Making it Perfectly Clear, 275.
173. Davis, Last Two Years, 323. See also Kubisch’s denial in Excerpts from Testimony Before
Congress by Kubisch and Shlaudeman, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 728.
174. CIA report, 1 December 1971, CDP; CIA tel, 2 December 1971, CDP. On how the CIA paid at
least one informant to gain intelligence on PF, see Devine, Good Hunting, 58–59.
175. Embtel 6008, 7 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 730. The redacted line in the memo for
the 40 Committee, 10 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 491 suggests that the CIA did
infiltrate the marchers.
176. Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 69.
177. On the clash between the UP government and militant workers, see Winn, Weavers of
Revolution. For other factors, such as the JAP program and UP socialist rhetoric, which helped unite
the business community against the government, see Silva, State and Capital in Chile, 47; and Angel,
“Chile since 1958,” 356–57.
178. Embtel 6008, 7 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 730–31.
179. Memo for the 40 Committee, 24 August 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 624–26.
180. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 810–11.
181. CIA information cable TDCS DB–315/02051–72, 10 March 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 773–
76; CIA intelligence information cable TDCS DB–315/00374–72, 15 January 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973,
E-16: 514–17.
182. Corn, Blond Ghost, 251.
183. Shackley memo to Helms, 13 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 812–14.
184. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 819–21. When this
proposal reached Kissinger, the NSC had been added to the authorization list, which the CIA
interpreted as requiring Kissinger’s approval as well. See Ratliff memo to Kissinger, 20 September
1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 823–24; and Meyer memo to Johnson, 13 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 632.
185. Patria y Libertad leaders denied that they had received CIA funding. See Moulian Jara,
“Bipolaridad en Chile,” 49; Pablo Rodríguez interview in Varas and González, Chile entre el sí y el no,
147–48. For the possibility that the CIA sent funds to Patria y Libertad through organizations such as
SOFOFA. See Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Nacionales y gremialistas, 357.
186. “Chile Emergency Called in Strike,” NYT, 12 October 1972; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende,
184–85; Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 104–105, 209; Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 108 n. 116 and
117. Despite its historic importance, there are few scholarly accounts of the October 1972 truckers’
strike. The only ­book-length treatment is Orrego Vicuña, El paro nacional, an undocumented
polemical tract by a strike partisan, published immediately after the strike ended.
187. Amembassy ­A-298 to DoS, POL 12 Chile, 12–15–70, box 2194, RG 59; Cusack, Revolution and
Reaction, 52. For background on the gremios, see Drake, “Corporatism and Functionalism”; García F.,
Los gremios patronales.
188. Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 349; Santiago tel 598, 30 October 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
On the spare parts issue, see Church Report, 33. On the role of PF in aiding the strike, see Power, ­-
Right-Wing Women in Chile, 172, 174. The strike also attracted the support of private rural estates and
peasant cooperatives. See Tinsman, Partners in Conflict, 264; and Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 186.
189. Davis, Last Two Years, 109; Nove, “Political Economy,” 70.
190. Joseph Novitski, “Protest Strikes Spread in Chile,” NYT, 18 October 1972. For Allende’s belief
that the strike was aimed at overthrowing his government, see CIA report, 18 October 1972, CDP.
191. CIA report, 16 October 1972, CDP. According to Edgar Boeninger, the PDC was forced into
supporting the strike by its grassroots. Sigmund, Chile 1973–1998, 8. See also Larraín, “Orientaciones
y actividades.”
192. Joseph Novitski, “Mounting Unrest in Chile Indicates Confrontation Is Along Class Lines,” and
“Chile; Heading for the Real Crunch,” NYT, 21 and 22 October 1972. For further evidence that the
PDC did not view the strike as a way to overthrow the government, see Jonathan Kandell, “Foreign
Companies Aided ­Anti-Allende Strikers,” NYT, 16 October 1974; and Thayer Arteaga, Segunda fila,
137–38.
193. Haslam, Nixon Administration, 142–43; CIA tel, 18 October 1972, 0000365954, CREST.
194. “Chile Takes Over Radio Broadcasts,” NYT, 14 October 1972.
195. Report no. 515/72, 28 November 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
196. Castillo Soto, Cordones industriales, 159–83; “Carnival Crisis,” Time, 13 November 1972; Fleet,
“Chile’s Democratic Road to Socialism,” 779. On how Allende’s supporters used the telex network to
coordinate their responses to the strike, see Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries, ch. 5. For a
description of a film portraying heroic popular responses to the truckers’ strike, see Guzmán and
Burton, “Politics and the Documentary,” 52.
197. Stallings, Class Conflict, 142–43. For the text of the Pliego del Pueblo, see Naranjo et al., ed.,
Miguel Enríquez y el proyecto revolucionario en Chile, 171–88. For UP’s mobilization efforts, see
MAPU, Octubre 1972.
198. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Allende Warns of Civil War Possibility,” WP, 17 October 1972.
199. For examples, see Fagen, “Media in Allende’s Chile,” 66–67; John Pollock and Torry Dickinson,
“Apologists for Terror,” Worldview, 17:3 (March 1974), 29; Mattelart, Mass Media, 171–78; and Reyes
Matta, “Mass Media.”
200. Marta Harnecker, “Plan septiembre en octubre,” Chile Hoy, no. 19, 20–26 October 1972.
201. Landis, “Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in Chile,” 79.
202. Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 89 n. 27.
203. MRE circ. no. 160, nd but probably 20 October 1972, Circulares Confidenciales, AMRE.
204. Eliot memo to Kissinger, 16 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 825–26; Jorden memo to
Haig, 17 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 830–31.
205. Embtel 4681, 17 October 1972, LAB 6–1 Chile, 1/1/70, box 1395, RG 59.
206. “Allende Breaks Off Talks with Strikers,” NYT, 28 October 1972.
207. Santiago tel 587, 21 October 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
208. “Agreement in Chile Is Reported on Settlement of Truck Strike,” NYT, 26 October 1972.
According to a former UP minister, the October 1972 strike ultimately cost the nation about $300
million. See Tapia Videla, “Difficult Road to Socialism,” 52.
209. Santiago tel 610, 6 November 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
210. “Allende Names 3 Military Men to Cabinet in a Move for Order,” NYT, 3 November 1972; “New
Interior Minister of Chile Vows to End Strikes by Monday,” NYT, 4 November 1972; “Strike Leaders in
Chile Call End to the Stoppage,” NYT, 6 November 1972.
 211. Eliot memo to Kissinger, 16 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 825.
212. The CIA reported that the protest leaders had agreed to accept Allende’s terms only because
strike funds were running out and Prats served as a guarantor. CIA weekly summary, 10 November
1972, ­CIA-RDP79–00927A009900020001–3, CREST.
213. Santiago tel 606, 3 November 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA; INR, ­RAAN-49, 6 November 1972,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 653–54.
214. Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 355; Bitar, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, 114–15.
215. Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 15–16.
216. Allende, Chile: historia de una ilusión, 175–76, 182–83; Haslam, Nixon Administration, 150–51.
217. Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 78.
218. Quoted in Suárez, Entre el fusil y la palabra, 281.
219. Vitale, “El gobierno de Salvador Allende,” 22.
220. Prats González, Memorias, 313–14; Edwards, Persona Non Grata, 261; de Vylder, Allende’s Chile,
234 n. 35; Alberto Santana, “La CIA vinculada al paro de transportes,” in La tragedia chilena:
testimonios, 149.
221. Dorfman, Heading South, 32–33.
222. “The Bloody End of a Marxist Dream,” Time, 24 September 1973.
223. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 295–96 n. 23. For examples, see J.C.M., “El sordido mundo del
fascismo,” Punto Final, 24 October 1972; Scherer García, Pinochet, 36; and Politzer, Altamirano, 131.
The charge that the CIA had financed the trucker’s strikes continued after the coup. For examples, see
Garcés, Allende y la experiencia chilena, 306–307; Stockholm tel 3552, 5 October 1973,
1973STOCKH03552, CFPF, RG 59; and Bertrand Russell Tribunal II Provisional Verdict, April 1974,
in MacEoin, Chile: Under Military Rule, 118–19.
224. Neruda, Call for the Destruction of Nixon.
225. Zimbalist and Stallings, “Showdown in Chile,” 5; “Chile: The Story Behind the Coup,” 14;
Marvine Howe, “Allende Cabinet Orders Strong Steps To Curb Violence and End Truck Strike,” NYT,
15 August 1973.
226. Stallings, Class Conflict, 142. For similar unsupported allegations about Vilarín, see Carlos
Altamirano speech, 9 September 1973, in González Pino et al., Los mil días de Allende, vol. 2, 1276;
Prats, Una vida por la legalidad, 65–66; Bartsch et al., Chile: libro negro, 74; and Moniz Bandeira,
Fórmula para el caos, 464–65. After the coup, Vilarín “vigorously” denied receiving any CIA funds.
See Everett G. Martin, “Spooky Cash: What Happened to Funds CIA Aimed at Chile?” WSJ, 9
December 1974.
227. According to several U.S. embassy informants from the PDC, the government had lost
credibility with the public by overplaying its accusations of CIA interference. See memcon (Pareto,
Monares, Arzac, Isaacs), 22 March 1972, box 3, CAF. For the suggestion that the truckers were
probably not joking, see Ralph P. Davidson, “A Letter from the Publisher,” Time, 30 September 1974.
228. Church Report, 31. See also Karl F. Inderfurth testimony, 4 December 1975, Intelligence
Activities, 22.
229. Musalem S., “El paro nacional,” 40.
230. Arancibia et al., Jarpa, 175.
231. “U.S. Denies Aiding Strikers in Chile,” NYT, 21 September 1973. Nearly a year later, Seymour
Hersh cited an interview with CIA official Ray Cline to substantiate the claim that the CIA had
directly subsidized the truckers. The New York Times later printed a correction in which Cline insisted
that what he had actually said was that the striking truckers had “benefited from CIA financial aid to
political parties.” See Seymour Hersh, “C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes in Chile That Beset Allende,” NYT,
20 September 1974; “Correction to Ray Cline Statement,” NYT, 22 October 1974; and Davis, Last Two
Years, 325–26.
 232. Colby memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 743.
233. News briefing transcript, Thursday, 20 September 1973, deptel 187854, 21 September 1973,
FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 790.
234. Richard Helms testimony, 22 January 1975, SFRC, CIA Foreign and Domestic Activities, 12; Tad
Szulc, “The View from Langley,” WP, 21 October 1973; Kubisch testimony, 25 September 1973, HCFA,
United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 148. See also Phillips, Night Watch, 237; and
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 393.
235. CIA, “Agency Covert Action Operations in Chile Since 1962,” 14 July 1975, CDP; CIA tel to
Santiago, 10 January 1973, CDP.
236. CIA memo to file, 31 March 1973, CDP.
237. CIA station message, 25 June 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 877.
238. Gardner memcon (Kubisch, Crimmins, Fisher, Gardner, CIA names not declassified) to
McAfee, 31 May 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 690–93.
239. Gardner memcon (Kubisch, Hurwitch, Shlaudeman, CIA names not declassified) to McAfee, 14
June 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 868–69. Kubisch replaced Meyer as Assistant Secretary of State for ­-
Inter-American Affairs at the end of May 1973.
240. Memo for the 40 Committee, 13 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 704–709.
241. Kubisch memo to Porter, 25 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 883–84.
242. Marvine Howe, “Truck Striker in Chile Says Issue Is Freedom,” NYT, 6 August 1973; “Truckers
in Revolt,” Time, 27 August 1973; “Contingency Paper for Chile Ad Hoc Working Group,” 24 August
1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 715.
243. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 886.
244. Ratliff memo to Kissinger, 10 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 887. The private sector
organizations may well have deliberately exaggerated their plight in order to convince the CIA of the
need for funding. For examples, see the CIA sources cited in Phillips memo to Karamessines, 13
August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 888. Whether the agency really believed these sources or was just
using them to serve their own agenda is impossible to tell, but it did include them in making its
appeal to Kissinger to approve the funds.
245. Jack Kubisch interview, 172–73, FAOHC. The CIA was in contact with the truckers and eager to
support them. See Devine, Good Hunting, 60.
246. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 886.
247. Colby memo to Kissinger and Kubisch, 25 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 891; Colby
memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 742–43; Davis, Last Two Years, 324;
Church Report, 31. On 24 August, Davis did agree to fund a covert operation that appears to have
involved the private sector organizations. Unfortunately, the amount and destination of the funds have
been censored. See editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 886.
248. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 29 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 893. Harmer’s claim that the
Nixon administration’s support for Allende’s opposition “waned” in 1973 needs qualification. Nixon
and Kissinger were determined to keep up the pressure on Allende. The CIA argued that because
“heightened political tensions could lead to a dramatic breakdown in public order which would
prompt the military to act . . . we should be prepared to assist the private sector.” See Harmer, Allende’s
Chile, 206; memo to Shackley, 30 June 1973, CDP.
249. Agee, Inside the Company, 600; Cusack, Revolution and Reaction, 117; Church Report, 31.
250. Phillips memo to Karamessines, 13 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 888.
251. “Chile: A Case Study,” Time, 30 September 1974. See also Michael J. Harrington, “The CIA in
Chile: A Question of Responsibility,” NYT, 2 January 1976. For Colby’s admission that money was
passed through intermediaries, see Oriana Fallaci, “The CIA’s Mr. Colby,” New Republic, 11 March
1976, 17.
 252. For example, the speculation that TFP received CIA funding cannot yet be ruled out. See
Lernoux, Cry of the People, 297; and Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 121–22. Another example is
the allegation that the CIA established a front organization in Chile called the Institute of General
Studies, which supported counterrevolutionary activities designed to undermine Allende. See Petras
and Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende,” 26; Garcés, Soberanos e intervenidos: Chile,
74; Landis, “Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in Chile,” 120; and Fred Landis, “How 20
Chileans Overthrew Allende for the CIA,” Inquiry, 19 February 1979. I could find no mention of this
institute in the U.S. declassified record, but it is possible that CIA censors have redacted its name,
especially when it came to the Kunakov operation, which was allegedly one of the institute’s
productions. See chapter 2.
253. Meyer memo to Johnson, 18 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 820. Crimmins echoed
Meyer’s concerns when he drew attention to a CIA report stating that funds intended for the ­getting-
out-the-vote campaign had been used to protect private enterprise. Gardner memo to McAfee, 27
February 1973, CDP. On how CIA funds could have been “filtered” to the strikers, see Seymour Hersh,
“C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes in Chile that Beset Allende,” NYT, 20 September 1974.
254. Neither of the two strikes could have been sustained on union funds alone. See Church Report,
31. According to Chilean businessman Orlando Sáenz, the striking truckers had access to five bank
accounts. Verdugo, Allende, 117. Another strike leader later claimed that the CIA had funneled funds
to the truckers through foreign organizations. Joseph Novitski, “CIA News Causes No Stir in Chile,”
WP, 9 September 1974. Ambassador Davis, however, claims that CIA officials assured him that the
agency was not using Brazil as a conduit to fund the truckers’ strike. See Davis, Last Two Years, 332–
33.
255. For example, one Chilean labor leader has claimed that toward the end of the truckers’ strike,
an ­AIFLD-sponsored labor federation was mysteriously “flooded” with funds of an unknown origin.
Hirsch, “Analysis of Our ­AFL-CIO role in Latin America,” 36. For a claim that “­AIFLD-allied groups”
assisted the truckers’ strike, see Sidney Lens, “Partners: Labor and the CIA,” Progressive, February
1975, 39.
256. Meyer report to SRG, 17 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 462. NSDM 93 had
recommended that U.S. officials “encourage U.S. labor organizations to take [an] active role in [the]
effort to prevent Communist control of Chilean labor movement and the Chilean government, and to
oppose them if this eventuates.” Options Paper for NSC: Chile, 3 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­-
E-16: 170.
257. Meyer memo to Working Group, 27 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 529–30;. On the
difficulty of penetrating the Chilean labor movement, see Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in
Chile, 264–70; Hirsch, CIA and the Labour Movement, 18–19; Sidney Lens, “American Labor Abroad:
Lovestone Diplomacy,” Nation, 5 July 1965, 27; Henry Landsberger testimony, 17 September 1974,
HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 239; Kofas, Struggle for Legitimacy, 108; and
Jim Mellen, “Leaders for Labor,” in NACLA, New Chile, 54–58.
258. O’Neill memo to Friedman, 6 June 1972, 5/16 Chile, 1972, box 5, 18–010, George Meany
Memorial Archives; Davis ­A-69 to DoS, 6 April 1973, LAB Chile, 1/1/70, box 1394, RG 59; “Chile: The
Story Behind the Coup,” 11.
259. For descriptions of AIFLD’s activities in Chile, see AIFLD, Decade of Worker to Worker
Cooperation, 26; Scott, Yankee Unions Go Home!, 245–48; Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy, 289–90;
Spalding, U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America, 270, 272; SCFR, Subcommittee on American
Republics Affairs, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 640–43; and Alvaro Catalán, “Imperialist
Penetration in the Chilean Trade Union Movement,” August 1974, doc 29, folder 3, box 5, OLF.
260. Tim Shorrock, “Labor’s Cold War,” Nation, 19 May 2003.
261. For accounts emphasizing AIFLD’s influence in the Chilean labor movement, see Haslam,
Nixon Administration, 192–94; Ruth Needleman, “The ­AFL-CIO Abroad: Behind the Chile Coup,”
Guardian, Labor Supplement (Fall 1974); Harding and Spalding, “Struggle Sharpens,” 6; and Freed
and Landis, Death in Washington, 82–83. For accounts that downplay CIA and AIFLD contributions
to labor strife during the Allende presidency, see Landsberger testimony, 17 September 1974, HCFA,
United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 241; and Cox, “Labor and Hegemony: A Reply,” 174.
The UP government investigated but could not find evidence of foreign influence in the truckers’
strike. See CIA information report, 31 October 1972, CDP.
262. Agee, Inside the Company, 600; Jonathan Kandell, “Foreign Companies Aided ­Anti-Allende
Strikers,” NYT, 16 October 1974; Seymour Hersh, “C.I.A. Chief Tells House of $­8-Million Campaign
Against Allende in ‘70–73,” NYT, 8 September 1974; Baily, United States and the Development of South
America, 157–58; Petras, “Chile and Latin America,” 19. UP officials interviewed by Simons three
weeks before the coup claimed to have evidence of foreign financing of the strike but could not
disclose the details without interfering with foreign debt negotiations. If these officials really had solid
documentary evidence then why did they not release it after the coup, when the debt was no longer an
issue? See Marlise Simons, “The Brazilian Connection,” WP, 6 January 1974.
263. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 886.
264. CIA memo attached to Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 21 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973,
E-16: 433. SOFOFA was most likely the “powerful businessmen’s organization” referred to in the
Church Report as having received “emergency support” in September 1972. If so, then the CIA could
be said to have indirectly channeled funds to the truckers’ strike, although there is no evidence that
the CIA passed this money with advance knowledge of the strike. See Church Report, 30. SOFOFA
denied that it received outside funds, but New York Times reporter Jonathan Kandell insisted that the
sources for his story came from SOFOFA itself. “A Report in Times Denied by Chileans,” NYT, 24
November 1974. SOFOA may have also been helping to finance Patria y Libertad, which supported
the truckers’ strikes. See Marlise Simons, “­Neo-Fascists Close to Chile Military Junta,” WP, 5 October
1973.
265. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 19 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 487. The CIA also
circulated publications “carefully tailored to contain a subtle antigovernment slant.” See memo for the
40 Committee, 2 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 300.
266. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 511.
267. Memo for the 40 Committee, 2 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 300.
268. Church Report, 7; “Covert Action in Chile: 1963–1973,” Intelligence Activities, 170. See also
David Phillips’s description of CIA media assets in Chile as including “people who might be described
as Bernard Baruch [a wealthy financier] sitting on a park bench.” Transcript of David Atlee Phillips
testimony before the Church Committee, 31 July 1975, 70, MFF Archive.
269. William M. Carley, “Chilean Question,” WSJ, 12 March 1971.
270. Church Report, 9.
271. For examples, see Bernedo and Porath, “A tres décadas del golpe.”
272. CIA memo for the 40 Committee, “Chilean Media Under a Marxist Regime,” 18 December
1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 223.
273. Memcon (Ibanez, Nachmanoff, Hewitt), 1 and 9 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 494–
95. The senator was referred to the American embassy.
274. CIA report, 6 October 1972, CDP.
275. Church Report, 8, 28.
276. Korry backchannel message to Johnson, 16 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 260. For
Korry’s attempt to intimidate National City Bank, see Korry backchannel message to Johnson, 25
September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 310–11.
277. Memo for the 40 Committee, 8 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 429–31. For the
importance that the CIA placed on El Mercurio and other ­anti-Allende news agencies, see Devine,
Good Hunting, 52–53.
278. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 8 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 680. Emphasis in
original.
279. 40 Committee meeting minutes, 9 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 690–91.
280. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 13 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 693.
281. McAfee memcon (Meyer, Crimmins, Hurwitch, Fisher, Little, Gardner, CIA unnamed) to Cline,
23 February 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 764.
282. El Mercurio was the first newspaper that Allende read every morning, according to Knudson,
“Allende to Pinochet,” 43.
283. CIA memo for the 40 Committee, 10 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 562. For other
examples of how the ­right-wing press attempted to undermine the UP government, see Dooner, La
prensa de derecha en Chile; Sunkel, El Mercurio, 78–97; and Durán and Rockman, “Análisis ­psico-
histórico.”
284. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 784.
285. Church Report, 30, 40.
286. Friedman and Friedman, Two Lucky People, 397. The 1955–57 Klein and Saks mission headed
by a Wall Street firm also helped prepare the ground for neoliberalism in Chile by recommending free
market policies to combat inflation. See Correa, “Algunos antecedentes”; Glaser, “Chile’s Monetarist
Money Doctors,” 177–81; and Biglaiser, “Internationalization of Chicago’s Economics,” 274.
287. Silva, “Technocrats and Politics in Chile,” 390–91; Délano and Traslavina, La herencia de los
Chicago Boys, 13–16. The Chicago Boys also shaped Alessandri’s campaign platform in the 1970
presidential election. See Remmer, Military Rule in Latin America, 136–37.
288. O’Brien and Roddick, Chile, 34–35; Silva, State and Capital in Chile, 74–75. For the text of the
Brick, see de Castro, “El Ladrillo.” On the military’s role in the origins of the plan, see Arancibia
Clavel, Conversando con Roberto Kelly V., 138–42; Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el Presidente
Pinochet, 18–38; Sergio de Castro interview, 14 September 2003, in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la
historia, 355; and Delano and Traslavina, La herencia de los Chicago Boys, 23–25. In July 1973, the U.S.
embassy organized a seminar that featured neoliberal ideas. See “The Economic Counterrevolution,”
NACLA’s Latin America & Empire Report 8 (October 1974), 6.
289. The plan that Broe presented to the 40 Committee on 19 November 1970 alludes to funding for
“research activity” but the details are censored. See 40 Committee meeting minutes, 19 November
1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 487–88. Ambassador Davis has admitted that the CIA did fund economic
research organizations during the Allende presidency. Nathaniel Davis, “Chile: No, the Ambassador
Has Not Forgotten,” WP, 22 October 1983. Citing the Church Report, the social critic Naomi Klein
claims that the Chilean Chicago Boys received more than ­three-quarters of their funding from the
CIA. While this is certainly plausible, the Church Report does not identify by name any organization
that allegedly received these funds. See Klein, Shock Doctrine, 70; and Church Report, 30. For the
admission of the head of SOFOFA that the team of economists who produced the Brick received
assistance from abroad, possibly including the CIA, see Orlando Sáenz interview, 29 September 2002,
in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la historia, 224–26. For the allegation that one of the Brick’s authors,
Hernán Cubillos, was working for the CIA, see Rouquié, Military and the State in Latin America, 420
n. 61.
290. Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists, 321 n. 20. See also O’Brien, “New Leviathan,” 39.
291. For example, one U.S. official has claimed that AID did not foresee that Chilean economists
who had received AID scholarships for attending the University of Chicago would be “handed the
reins of power” after the coup. Judd Kessler interview, 33, FAOHC. On the other hand, it does appear
highly suspicious that neoliberals such as Saénz played a key role as a mediator between the Nixon
administration and the junta immediately following the coup, especially regarding the copper dispute.
See embtel 4307, 16 September 1973; and embtel 4322, 17 September 1973, CDP.
292. See Parmar, Foundations of the American Century, 180–205 for the efforts of various U.S.
philanthropic organizations to shape economic research in Chile before the 1973 military coup. See
also Gardner, Legal Imperialism, ch. 7; and Dezalay and Garth, Internationalization of Palace Wars,
115–18 on how the Ford Foundation’s Chile Law Program attempted to Americanize Chile’s legal
system. For one Christian Democrat’s view that it was the Chilean right, under the influence of the
Chicago Boys, that orchestrated the coup as part of a master plan to impose neoliberalism on Chile,
see Jaime Hales interview in Verdugo, Chile 1973, 228. On the strong legacy of the Chicago school of
economics in Chile, see Biglaiser, “Internationalization of Chicago’s Economics,” 281–82. Tinsman,
Buying into the Regime, ch. 1 attempts to trace the roots of neoliberalism in Chile to the influence of
agronomists from the University of California rather than economists trained at the University of
Chicago. For a description of how neoliberalism evolved in Chile prior to the 1973 coup, see Fischer,
“Influence of Neoliberals in Chile,” 308–317.
293. Right after Allende’s election the CIA estimated that Allende’s opposition was unlikely to unify
either in the short term or the long run. See Weekly Summary Special Report, 4 December 1970, ­CIA-
RDP85T00875R001500020058–7, CREST.
294. The CIA presented Allende’s political opposition as “dependent on external (and U.S.
Government) financial support.” See memo for the 40 Committee, 10 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–
1973, ­E-16: 490. Yet some have questioned the importance of CIA subsidies to El Mercurio. See Everett
G. Martin, “Did the Chilean Press Need CIA Help?” WSJ, 18 September 1974; and John Strasma
testimony, 17 September 1974, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 287.
295. Marvine Howe, “Chile Finds Crisis to be Normal Now,” NYT, 28 August 1973. For one estimate
that the CIA’s expenditures on covert action in Chile amounted to $40 million locally, see Seymour
Hersh, “C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes In Chile That Beset Allende,” NYT, 20 September 1974.
296. The CIA emphasized the importance of the private sector organizations in helping to create
“conflict and confrontation which will lead to some sort of military intervention.” See Santiago tel to
DCI, 2 May 1973, CDP.
 8
Creating a Coup Climate
Although the initial U.S. effort to promote a military coup (Track II) had
been formally abandoned by November 1971, the idea never really died
because around the same time, CIA Station Chief Henry Hecksher promised
headquarters to “work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a
coup” by identifying the key Chilean military units that could pull it off
successfully.1 The CIA’s Western Hemisphere division chief, William Broe,
agreed that case agents should continue to gather intelligence, but they were
not to engage in “frank” talk about coup mechanics with key commanders
because of the need to protect the doctrine of plausible deniability. Of
course, it was up to the “discretion and good judgment of the individual case
officer” when it came to making the “rather fine dividing line” between
“merely ‘listening’ and ‘talking frankly about the mechanics of a coup.’”2 As
CIA Director Helms later admitted, it was almost impossible to have contact
with the Chilean military plotters without them interpreting it as a sign of
U.S. support.3 Because the CIA could not take direct control of the coup
operation as it had once done in Guatemala, the most the agency could do
was to signal the Chilean military that it would have the full support of the
Nixon administration once a promising coup attempt was underway.4
As this chapter will demonstrate, the Nixon administration’s indirect
approach to promoting a coup in Chile faced numerous obstacles. The
Chilean military, U.S. intelligence noted in 1971 with apparent regret, “are
among the least inclined of any in Latin America to intervene in politics.”5
Although General Schneider had been removed through assassination in
1970, his doctrine lingered long afterward. So long as Allende appeared to
be remaining within constitutional bounds, the Chilean military was
reluctant to intervene in political affairs, especially if it did not sense that it
had the support of Allende’s opposition.6 As discussed previously, it took a
long time for Allende’s opposition to unify and for the economy to
deteriorate to a point that triggered social unrest. Fostering a coup climate
was also a bit of a slippery slope, U.S. officials noted. On the one hand, if
anti–Allende protests became too unruly, the Chilean military might strike
against the opposition rather than the government.7 On the other hand, if
Allende maintained his popular support, the military would be forced to
launch massive repression of nearly half the civilian population without a
proper ­follow-up plan.8

Coup Prospects
To lessen the inducements for a coup, Allende insisted from the outset on
operating democratically and respecting Chilean political traditions. Relying
on the myth of Chilean exceptionalism, he repeatedly praised the armed
forces for their professionalism while insisting that they had an important
role to play in contributing to the nation’s economic development.9 Any
attempt to goad the military into a coup was hindered by Allende’s
numerous allies within the armed forces, such as Generals Alberto Bachelet
and Carlos Prats.10 Moreover, the Chilean military was highly
compartmentalized, with little communication between the three
branches.11 In November 1971, U.S. officials bemoaned the “lack of cohesion
in armed forces leadership” and noted with regret that “no charismatic
leader has emerged with sufficient stature to give the Chilean military a
sense of purpose or will to act decisively.”12 The lack of coordination
increased the odds that an ­ill-conceived coup attempt would fail, thus
discouraging further attempts. The assessment five months later was no
better. In March 1972, the CIA reported that coup prospects were “poor”
because Allende has flattered the military, “defended them against critics,
raised their pay, and dealt deftly with their reluctance to be drawn into many
aspects of his administration.”13
The Nixon administration had no simple solution to these problems,
other than to continue with the destabilization program in the hopes that a
coup climate would eventually evolve. After Allende’s inauguration, U.S.
officials monitored events in Chile very closely, continually looking for signs
that the military’s resolve was strengthening. Both the CIA station and the
U.S. embassy in Santiago developed close contacts with the Chilean military,
which was to be kept “U.S.-oriented.”14 These liaisons were generally kept
secret, as Kissinger ordered the Pentagon to cease ­high-level public visits
after Nachmanoff warned that they were “not necessarily the most effective
way to maintain contact and influence with the Chilean military, and may
create unnecessary problems.”15 Even with this clandestine penetration of
the Chilean military, predicting precisely when a coup might occur was a
“futile task,” one analyst noted, because it was unclear how much chaos was
needed before the military would feel compelled to intervene.16 Given the
economic prosperity of Allende’s first year in office, Ambassador Korry
explained in mid–1971, there were “no conceivable circumstances in which
the military would attempt to thwart [the] consolidation of Allende’s
Marxist and ­anti-imperialist revolution.”17
To help turn the Chilean military against the UP government, the CIA
passed false information to officers in the Chilean military high command
that Allende was using Cuban intelligence to spy on them.18 The
effectiveness of this tactic is difficult to judge, for many anticommunist
Chilean officers were already worried about growing Cuban influence in the
UP government.19 That Allende was so friendly with Castro, and that many
members of Allende’s family and his bodyguard had close ties to Cubans
undoubtedly raised eyebrows among the more conservative Chilean military
officers.20 A commonly touted justification for the 1973 coup was that
Allende was turning Chile into a Cuban satellite as evidenced by his
attempts to smuggle into Chile Cuban arms camouflaged as artwork.21 In
1974, Chilean Ambassador to the OAS Manuel Trucco alleged that the UP
government had smuggled sufficient weapons from Cuba, the Soviet Union,
and Czechoslovakia to equip a division of more than 15,000 men.22
While Allende and many of his supporters were certainly enamored with
Cuba, and the UP government did receive assistance from Cuba in the form
of intelligence training and arms, the idea that Allende was serving some
sort of international communist conspiracy seeking an armed revolution in
Chile is inaccurate.23 Notwithstanding his frequent use of Marxist rhetoric,
Allende eschewed violence and emphasized the uniqueness of the Chilean
road to socialism.24 One of Allende’s most treasured memorabilia was a copy
of Che Guevara’s tract The Guerrilla War because Che had written inside the
book, “To Salvador Allende, who is trying to obtain the same result by other
means.”25 Despite pressure from both Cuba and some Chilean leftists to arm
the revolution, Allende adamantly rejected such pleas because he feared the
consequences of a civil war. He was remarkably consistent on this point,
even toward the end of his presidency when the threat of a military coup
was obvious to everyone.26
Far more bothersome to the Chilean military than the Cuban threat was
the increasingly strident conflict between the UP government and its
opposition. In April 1972, the CIA noted that although the Chilean tradition
of compromise and negotiation (“political transactionalism”) had not yet
vanished, the Chilean military was becoming restless over growing “political
polarization” that could lead to a breakdown in the public order.27 The NSC
informed Kissinger that “economic and political unrest have caused the
military to grow … uneasy,” even though there is yet “no sign that they are
prepared to unseat Allende.”28 An NIE added that most members of the
Chilean military would prefer that Allende moderate his policies rather than
risk an attempt at overthrowing him while a “popular consensus” for a coup
was still lacking.29

The September Plan: “Pastel del Choclo”

The difficulty U.S. officials faced trying to predict a coup is well illustrated
by the plotting of Alfredo Canales, a general well known to U.S. officials
because of his previous association with Track II.30 According to CIA
reports, Canales began coup preparations in early 1972. U.S. officials initially
thought that Canales might be able to launch a successful coup, given that he
was highly popular in military circles and allegedly had 80 percent of the
armed forces behind him.31 The general also had the support of the business
community and the ­far-right opposition group, Patria y Libertad.32
According to British officials, Brazilians had been in touch with Canales in
early 1972 to provide “logistical support for a subversive movement from
bases in Bolivia.”33 On 14 September 1972, the CIA was so convinced that
Canales had a “fair to good chance to succeed” that it began preparing
blacklists of leftists to be arrested after the coup.34 The DIA, however, was
more cautious. The prospects of a military coup in Chile were improving “to
at least an even chance,” one report noted, while warning that Canales would
not be able to pull it off by himself.35 The State Department was even less
enthusiastic. A failed attempt to overthrow Allende at this stage, Assistant
Secretary Charles Meyer and his deputy John Crimmins cautioned, could
backfire by either strengthening Allende or triggering a civil war. It would be
better if the effort to remove Allende through force could be delayed until
after the opposition made a good showing in the March 1973 congressional
elections, they argued, when a “clean” coup could be justified by a popular
mandate.36
Meyer and Crimmins got their wish because before the plot could unfold,
the UP government caught wind of the “September Plan.”37 Canales, a
braggart whom Ambassador Davis once described as “notoriously
indiscreet,” became so drunk one night that he leaked the plot to a fellow
officer, who immediately reported it to his superiors.38 By the time Canales
had contacted the CIA to gain approval and assistance for his coup attempt,
his plot had become so well known that Ambassador Davis advised making
no response. The NSC agreed and pointed out in a memo sent on 19
September to Kissinger through Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Alexander Haig that “Canales may soon be in jail
and might, if pressed, disclose that he was in touch with the U.S.” Kissinger,
however, doubted the embassy’s judgment. He wrote on the top of the
memo: “Davis is an idiot” and indicated that he wanted to discuss the matter
as soon as possible. Haig, who was away, asked CIA Deputy Director Vernon
Walters to prepare a “plan,” but time ran out before these deliberations could
proceed.39
On 21 September, Chile’s army ­commander in chief, Carlos Prats, forced
Canales into retirement for insubordination.40 Canales insisted publicly that
he had been dismissed unfairly. This allegation encouraged the opposition to
attack Prats and ridicule the origins of the September Plan, dubbed by the
government “Pastel del Choclo,” after a popular Chilean casserole that the
conspirators had supposedly dined on while concocting their plot.41 Prats
eventually replied in a public letter that Canales had been asked to retire, not
because of personal rivalry or poor health, but for “institutional” reasons.42
In support of Prats, Allende blamed the September Plan on foreign
imperialism and the CIA.43
While the Nixon administration was not behind the plot, as Allende
insinuated, the CIA was actively considering supporting it and was
disappointed that the Chilean military had accepted Canales’s dismissal
without protest. U.S. officials had reported the technical details of the
Canales affair accurately while failing to grasp its significance. The CIA
acknowledged that General Pinochet appeared to be involved with Canales,
but the agency dismissed Pinochet’s importance because he preferred to
“close eyes to events.”44 In his memoirs, Pinochet claims that he had learned
from Canales’s fate the importance of restricting coup plotting to a “very
closed circle.”45 The forced retirement of Canales may have been successful
in deterring coup plotting in the short term, but it widened the gap between
Prats and the rest of the military leaders, who began to distrust him for
appearing too friendly with Allende.46 Perhaps most important, Canales had
openly challenged the Schneider Doctrine by arguing that the Chilean
military had a national duty to remove any government that violated the
constitution.47 Canales thus helped shift the traditional Chilean military’s
concept of national security from combating external threats to focusing on
internal threats under the counterinsurgency doctrine that many Chilean
officers had been taught in U.S. military and police training programs.48
Canales’ efforts to gain U.S. assistance for his coup attempt raised the
question of how the Nixon administration should respond to similar
requests from future plotters. Pinochet had already been given assurances by
previous School of the Americas classmates that the United States would
support him in a coup against Allende “with whatever means necessary.”49
But as the Canales episode illustrated, it was important to back a reliable
leader who had a good chance of succeeding, because a failed coup attempt
might expose the U.S. hand. In mid–October 1972, the State Department
and CIA discussed what to do should an opposition figure approach the U.S.
embassy or the CIA station seeking support for a coup and its aftermath.
The CIA claimed to have looked at the coup prospects from every
conceivable angle and concluded that there was no decisive course of action
at present that could be undertaken to remove Allende. Everyone at the
meeting agreed that the “Chilean military were the key to any coup that
might develop now or in the future,” but whenever the military decided to
move it would not need U.S. government assistance, so at this stage, it was
best not to offer it.50
The State Department disagreed with the CIA and the White House,
however, over how to respond if a coup succeeded. Crimmins rejected
Theodore Shackley’s suggestion of providing any new military government
with “the names and addresses of MIR and radical wing PS members in
order to assist them in rolling up these elements as quickly and thoroughly
as possible.” The State Department, however, worried that aiding the new
regime promptly might create the appearance that the U.S. government was
somehow complicit in the coup. CIA and White House officials argued that
U.S. support was already being given to the domestic opposition, so the issue
of collusion was moot. Shackley also emphasized that Chilean military
officials will “want to know in advance that they are operating with a sure
thing.” The State Department eventually conceded that a de facto argument
could be used to recognize, and possibly assist, any military regime that
superseded the Allende government. But the group postponed discussion of
how much aid could be promised to the Chilean military in the ­post-coup
era.51
At the end of October 1972, the working group decided that it would be
better not to give assurances to coup plotters because Allende was already
on a “downhill slide.” There seemed to be no point in risking exposure while
there was still a chance that Allende might be defeated in the March 1973
congressional elections.52 It was also important not to appear overly eager to
embrace the coup leaders. Any indication by Washington that it welcomed a
change of government, the group warned, would lend credence to the
inevitable charge that “the US masterminded Allende’s demise and moved
with unseemly haste to support another military regime in Latin America.”53
Despite these cautions, the CIA did not give up on Nixon’s order to foster
a coup climate. In early 1973, the agency proposed supporting a general
strike after the March elections. Ambassador Davis condemned the scheme
as an “extremely high risk venture,” but the failure of the opposition to
achieve the ­two-thirds majority needed to impeach Allende forced the
Nixon administration into reconsidering the best method for engineering a
military coup.54 While the CIA was not entirely convinced by Davis’s
assessment, it conceded that until the Chilean military’s attitudes could be
determined, it might be counterproductive to promote a strike that could
provoke the military into repressing the opposition.55 The CIA Station thus
proposed widening its “contacts, knowledge, and capability” in order to
foster a military coup. The key was to find a “single, secure channel” to the
coup plotters so that the agency could play an “expanded” role in creating a
“renewed atmosphere of political unrest and controlled crisis.”56 To some
CIA hardliners, even this recommendation did not go far enough. A
complete military takeover, according to one analyst’s judgment, could be
achieved by providing large-scale support to militant PN members and
other extremist organizations to “promote economic chaos, escalate political
tensions, and induce a climate of desperation in which the PDC and the
people generally come to desire military intervention.”57
This destabilization strategy became more effective after the March
elections because there were increasing signs that some members of the
PDC had decided that a military coup was now the only solution to the
constitutional impasse over the social area of the economy. As one
prominent PDC leader recalled, after the March 1973 elections the party
adopted the slogan: “We must give it to the Marxists with our hatchets and
clubs.”58 At the same time, militant socialists within the UP coalition were
arguing that it was time to start fighting back against the opposition in the
streets.59 Another factor contributing to a coup climate was UP’s proposal to
restructure the nation’s education system through a program known as
Escuela Nacional Unificada (ENU, National Unified School). The military,
the middle sectors, and the Catholic Church all condemned ENU as a
communist plot to indoctrinate the population in Marxism. Opposition to
ENU became so fierce that UP was forced to abandon it, especially given
that the controversy was helping to forge greater unity among Allende’s
opposition.60
As encouraging as these developments were, U.S. officials remained
ambivalent about the prospects of a coup. Even though the Chilean military
is largely anti–Marxist, the CIA station noted in April 1973, “it would take
an aggregate of very compelling reasons and pressures” to get the armed
forces to depart from the Schneider Doctrine.61 The DIA also noted that
“continued violence is the necessary catalyst” for a coup, which at present
was only a “remote possibility.”62 Field reports could also be unreliable. In
early May, one of the CIA’s sources reported that a majority of the generals,
including Pinochet, were ready to intervene. The report was forwarded with
the comment that while coup discussions were certainly underway, the
agency still believed that most generals did not want to risk a coup and
would prefer to see Allende moderate his policies.63
CIA Director James Schlesinger so doubted the Chilean military’s
readiness to act that in early May 1973, he scotched a CIA station proposal
to provoke an intervention. The agency continued to request funds to help
“better monitor any coup plotting and to bring our influence to bear on key
military commanders that they might play a decisive role on the side of the
coup forces when and if the Chilean military decides on its own to act
against Allende.”64 But the White House continued to oppose direct contact
with coup plotters because of the risk of failure. NSC staffer William Jorden
discounted rumors that an air force coup was underway at the end of May
when Prats was out of the country. “Above all,” he advised Kissinger, “there
should be no effort to involve the U.S. in these developments in any way.”65
Jorden’s caution proved prudent, for the CIA reported a few days later that
the plotters still had a “long way to go before they will be ready to move.”66

The Tanquetazo: “I think that Chilean guy may have

some problems”
The first major military uprising against Allende proved to be exactly the
kind of ­ill-conceived venture that U.S. officials feared. In late June 1973, the- ­
right-wing terrorist organization Patria y Libertad and several ­lower-
ranking Chilean military officials from the Second Armoured Regiment
conspired to kidnap Allende and attack the presidential palace (La
Moneda).67 On 26 June, Chilean military intelligence uncovered the plot,
arrested the conspirators, and ordered the head of the regiment, Colonel
Roberto Souper, to relinquish his command.68 Instead of stepping down,
however, early in the morning on June 29, Souper led eighty supporters out
of his regiment in two tank convoys in a rebellion that subsequently became
known as the “Tanquetazo.”69 One of Souper’s convoys headed toward the
Defense Ministry to liberate a popular captain who had been imprisoned for
his participation in the original conspiracy. The other convoy headed to
attack La Moneda, not realizing that Allende was still at his residence in
Tomás Moro.70
When Allende learned of the attack on La Moneda, he wanted to bomb
the rebels, but the air force declined, claiming it was not technologically
feasible.71 The Chilean president also gave a radio address, calling on the
people to occupy the factories but not the streets, where they might be
gunned down. Allende promised to provide arms if necessary, but he did not
explain how the arms would be distributed or where they would come
from.72 Meanwhile, Commander in Chief of the Army Carlos Prats
contacted several generals, including Pinochet, to confront the rebels.
Pinochet took charge of the Tacna regiment, which marched south toward
La Moneda, while Prats headed up a contingent of troops headed north.
Getting the rank and file to support this ­counter-offensive proved somewhat
troublesome, as several soldiers did not want to take up arms against their
comrades. Prats shamed them into compliance by daring them to shoot him
if they did not want to take his orders. After Prats and Pinochet converged
on the street in front of La Moneda, the two generals embraced, sending a
strong signal to the rebels that the top commanders in the armed forces were
not supporting the revolt. Prats risked his own life by walking right up to the
tanks to demand that the rebels give themselves up.73
Souper surrendered by noon, by which time sporadic gunfire had
wounded dozens and killed 22, including a ­Swedish-Argentine journalist,
who famously filmed his own death.74 That evening Allende held a rally at
the Constitution Plaza and stood on the Moneda balcony with the generals
who had helped suppress the rebellion. The president heaped praise on the
armed forces for their heroic defense of the government, but the generals
remained sober, as they resented being used by Allende.75 In truth, many
officers sympathized with the Tanquetazo rebels, but they failed to join the
revolt because their superiors showed no interest in getting involved.76
Given the bungling nature of the rebellion and the speed at which it
fizzled, some analysts have questioned whether the Tanquetazo represented
an honest coup attempt. That Souper’s tank regiment stopped at red lights
and had to refuel at gas stations has led some to treat the affair as a comic
farce of minor historical significance.77 As one creative writer put it, the
Tanquetazo was “scarcely a puff of smoke from a dragon running out of
diesel fuel.”78 Another common interpretation is that Souper’s rebellion was
aimed more at liberating fellow officers from prison than at toppling the
government.79 Because many generals later claimed that they learned
important military lessons from the revolt, such as how UP might respond
to a military threat, other commentators have described the Tanquetazo as a
“dress rehearsal” for the real coup that would take place on 11 September
1973.80 This view is closely connected to the belief among some of Allende’s
supporters that the 29 June revolt was a CIA plot to test the coup waters.81
The Church Report later implied that U.S. intelligence officials would
have known about the 29 June revolt beforehand because they were
monitoring Chile so closely.82 Actually, the Nixon administration was baffled
by the Tanquetazo. In mid–June 1973, the U.S. embassy did report that the
coup prospects were at the highest level since Allende took office, and that
conspiracy was “reaching further into the ranks of the Generals and
Admirals” and “spreading more openly to lower officers.”83 But U.S. officials
had no inkling that a coup attempt was going forward on 29 June, probably
because their contacts in the military were also taken by surprise. Chilean
military intelligence had detected the original plot but imagined that it had
taken care of the problem by arresting the main conspirators and ordering
Souper to be replaced.84
After Nixon had been briefed on the revolt, his first comment was, “I
think that Chilean guy may have some problems.” Kissinger assured the
president that Allende indeed had “massive problems,” but the United States
had nothing to do with the coup attempt.85 When the rebellion began,
Ambassador Davis was skiing in the Andes and had to rush back to
Santiago.86 A CIA briefing paper that provided answers to possible questions
that might arise about its role in the coup attempt indicated that the agency
had declined a request from one of the plotters for U.S. assistance.87
Retrospective assessments of the Tanquetazo by Nixon administration
officials suggest that they remained puzzled about its origins and
significance long afterward. U.S. defense intelligence first reported the event
as “either an attempted coup or a protest of the arrest of one of its officers,
the exact nature of the move has never been clear.” The revolt’s failure, the
report observed, had left many navy and air force officers with a “deep sense
of frustration and disappointment.”88 One U.S. embassy officer was so
impressed by Allende’s ability to weather yet another crisis that he wanted to
cable Washington that there could be no coup in Chile because the generals
were behind Allende.89 The CIA described the revolt as a “futile gesture” and
a “wild gamble” that could potentially strengthen Allende if he decided to
purge the plotters from the army and bring the military back into his cabinet
on his own terms. The agency also noted that the military had now lost the
element of surprise and seemed disorganized.90 Even if another coup
attempt were successful, the CIA warned Kissinger, the subsequent regime
might lack the leadership needed to maintain public order.91
But Allende did not purge the military, the generals declined to join his
cabinet, and the serious coup plotters began to realize that they needed a
coordinated effort with strong leadership to remove Allende.92 Soon after the
Tanquetazo, leading commanders from all three branches of the military
formed a “Committee of 15,” ostensibly to discuss security issues, but also to
devise means to weaken the revolution.93 In this respect, the Tanquetazo can
be seen as a major turning point that sealed the fate of the government
because Allende became overconfident about the military and failed to
prepare his popular base for the next coup attempt.94
It is certainly possible to build a case, as several have, that Allende
seriously erred by failing to take measures after the Tanquetazo that might
have saved the government.95 Afterward, Ricardo Lagos’s uncle predicted
that a “real coup” would take place within a few months because Allende
had failed to punish the conspirators.96 The Communist Party strongly
advised Allende on the day of the rebellion to take the offensive by purging
the military and making an example of the Souper regiment.97 Allende
rejected this advice and continued to insist that the military could be
counted on to respect the constitution.98 When a Spanish journalist who had
infiltrated ­right-wing circles tried to warn Allende that a coup was
imminent, the president brushed him off with the comment: “We are not in
Spain, here the army follows a democratic tradition.”99 According to former
UP economic minister Orlando Millas, Allende believed that his repeated
public offer to sacrifice his life for the revolution would deter his
opponents.100 Allende may have also gained an inflated sense of his success
given the large domestic and international support he received after
defeating the rebellion.101 Fidel Castro, for example, compared Allende’s
“great triumph” in suppressing the June 1973 revolt to the Cuban defeat of
the CIA’s Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961.102
Allende was not alone in holding these views, as many others appear to
have been lured into a sense of complacency about the military.103 After the
Tanquetazo, Pinochet impressed Ambassador Orlando Letelier with his
loyalty by retorting that he was so angry that he wanted to line up the rebels
and shoot them.104 Defense Minister Tohá publicly showered the military
with praise for its “professionalism” in suppressing the 29 June rebellion.105
The Soviets interpreted the outcome of the Tanquetazo as a sign that Allende
still had the support of the Chilean military.106 The New York Times misread
the Tanquetazo as a sign of Allende’s robustness: “It seems clear by now that
the army will not seize power in the absence of flagrant constitutional
violations or a total economic collapse.”107 Even the CIA interpreted the
affair as an indication that the Chilean military was not prepared to violate
the Constitution and launch a coup.108
Another sign that Allende perhaps erred is that many of his supporters
became disenchanted after the Tanquetazo because of the apparent
unwillingness of the government to take more drastic measures to defend
the revolution.109 During Allende’s speech on the evening of 29 June, the
demonstrators demanded arms and kept yelling “close the Congress.”
Allende finally silenced the crowd and promised merely to hold a plebiscite
if necessary.110 As one MAPU trade unionist bitterly recalled, most of
Allende’s supporters at the rally were demanding “radical measures,” but the
president “made a fatal mistake” by appeasing the military.111 “Allende was a
coward,” one worker later charged. “He should have given us weapons.”112
After the Tanquetazo, the military began to use the Arms Control Law,
which Allende had failed to veto in October 1972, in order to seize what few
weapons the popular organizations had stashed. These arms raids, which
terrorized the workers, caused great disillusionment, especially in the
cordones industriales.113
The refusal to prepare an armed defense did alienate some of the
revolution’s most militant supporters, but what choice did Allende have? The
Chilean road to socialism was predicated on the premise that it would be
peaceful, and that the Schneider Doctrine would prevent the military from
intervening, assumptions which many of Allende’s supporters shared.114
Shifting suddenly in mid–1973 to a military strategy could well have
accelerated the coup plans of generals who were already extremely disturbed
by the loose talk on the extreme left of “democratizing” the existing army, or
establishing a “parallel army.”115 Those who condemn Allende for failing to
arm the workers have not explained where the weapons could have come
from, nor how they would have been kept hidden given the frequent
military raids.116 Nor is it clear that UP could have built up a sufficient
supply of arms given that the popular organizations frequently complained
about not having enough weapons to defend themselves.117 According to one
news account, thousands of Allende’s supporters showed up at the 29 June
rally armed only with pitchforks.118 One former GAP member recalled that
Patria y Libertad was better equipped than the presidential bodyguard,
which had to throw stones to protect government buildings.119 Trying to
obtain weapons secretly from the Soviet Union to arm the popular
movement would have been extremely risky, as it would have been very
difficult to hide the shipments from the Chilean military, and if discovered
could have provided the opposition with grounds for Allende’s
impeachment.120 Allende did eventually succumb to pressures to import
Cuban arms, but by the time they arrived in late 1973 the Socialist and
Communist parties were unprepared to absorb them.121 As one of Allende’s
former economic advisers later complained, “Some critics of the UP talk as
though all that one had to do to arm the people was to drive some trucks
through the streets and distribute weapons like Good Humor ice cream.”122
Even if UP had somehow managed to find a way to arm the workers, what
were the chances of a popular army defeating a highly trained professional
army supported by the opposition? The notion that the popular
organizations could have put up effective resistance if only they had been
appropriately armed seems dubious.123 One prominent scholar of the
Chilean revolution has concluded, “it is unlikely that even an armed and
united working class could have successfully resisted an undivided armed
forces willing to use its superior firepower against its own civilian
population.”124 Prats later told Ricardo Lagos, all the paramilitary
organizations in Chile had the firepower of about ­two-and-a-half minutes,
whereas the military had the firepower of ­two-and-a-half hours.125 When the
militant socialist Carlos Altamirano insisted that the masses be mobilized to
save the revolution, Allende waxed skeptical, retorting: “How many ‘masses’
equals one tank?”126 Cardinal Silva Henríquez repeatedly warned UP
leaders: “You are nuts if you think the soldiers are going to let you point a
gun at them.”127 Prats told his diary on 1 July 1973: “the Socialist Party, the
MIR, and other groups continue to insist that the moment has arrived for
armed struggle … if they think they can successfully defeat the military and
the police they are crazy!”128
The president was not as naive as many have suggested. After the ­near-
miss of the Tanquetazo, Allende knew that he stood on the “edge of a
volcano,” and that he had achieved a mere Pyrrhic victory.129 On the evening
of 30 June, Allende fretted, “Even though the act of insubordination has
been controlled, I am worried about its aftermath in the next few hours.”130
He sent Congress a proposal for a ­six-month state of siege, thinking that he
had secured the support of PDC leader Patricio Aylwin. Unfortunately for
Allende, Congress voted it down, leaving him with few options to curtail the
escalating violence.131 Three days after the Tanquetazo, Allende met with his
cabinet members at La Moneda and implored them “to find a political
solution,” because “at my age, I will not be a president in exile … the only
way I leave here is to the graveyard.”132 Allende understood that if the policy
of incorporating the military into the revolution was going to have any
success, he had to assure the generals that he respected their professionalism
and did not seek to challenge their power.133 Hence, he told a workers’ rally
on 25 July that “so long as I am president there will be no parallel army.”134
Allende was not alone in believing that the military could be kept at bay. His
intelligence chief, Mario Sepúlveda, later recalled that he had been aware of
the pressures for a coup, but he did not feel alone because there were still
many generals who supported the constitution.135
The Tanquetazo was not a comic opera, or a botched effort by some
hungover soldiers to liberate several of their comrades. Nor was it a “dress
rehearsal” for the 11 September coup, or a CIA plot. The 29 June 1973
rebellion was a desperate attempt by some ­lower-level officers and a ­right-
wing terrorist group to trigger a coup. As one general later explained, if the
rebels “had wanted to drag UP leaders through the streets it would have
been easy and produced great carnage,” but it was clear from the outset that
the rebellion was more about trying to induce the armed forces into putting
an end to the Marxist experiment that was allegedly oppressing the
country.136 Unfortunately for Souper, the high command was not quite
ready.137
The 9/11 Plot Unfolds: “The last card that Chile had to
play”
Trying to pinpoint the precise date that the Chilean military decided to
overthrow Allende is futile because the plot evolved gradually and erratically
in response to the chaotic conditions in Chile during the final year of the
Allende presidency. Although the Chilean military, like most Latin
American militaries, was a conservative body by nature, and many officers
disliked Allende from the outset, the threshold for abandoning the
Schneider Doctrine proved much higher than anyone expected. One
explanation for the delay is that motives for undertaking the coup varied so
widely among the plotters that it took a long time before they could
converge on a viable plan. One military instructor who supported the coup
later recalled, “I could have pulled my hair out for teaching my students for
all those years that the armed forces must never rebel against the
constitutional government … it took a long time to convince officers that
there was no other way out.”138
In some ways, the Chilean military was ideologically predisposed against
Allende even before he was elected. According to Air Force Commander
Gustavo Leigh, anti–Marxist sentiments took root in the Chilean military as
far back as the Popular Front era, when the PCCh began following a Soviet
line.139 The military did not panic after Allende was elected, however,
because it assumed that he would be forced to rule from the center.140 Some
Chilean military officers were willing to let the Marxist experiment unfold
in the hope that it would be discredited.141 It is also possible that some
Chilean military officers tolerated Allende’s election because the socialists
had supported the Tacnazo of October 1969.142 The military’s discontent
with Allende thus began gradually and then accelerated in late 1972 as
Allende stubbornly clung to his promise to bring socialism to Chile despite
increasing domestic opposition.
For much of the early Cold War, the Chilean military had depended on
the United States for military equipment and training, which helped
reinforce anticommunism among its ranks.143 The majority of the leaders of
the 11 September coup had been trained at the U.S. Army School of the
Americas, which prodded Latin American militaries to concentrate more on
the internal security threats in their countries.144 The CIA’s intense
anticommunist propaganda campaigns of the 1960s, also undoubtedly
contributed to the military’s foreboding about Allende. Finally, the
government’s attempt to reform the education system rankled senior
officers, not only because many were devout Catholics, but also because they
viewed ENU as a form of Marxist indoctrination that would undermine
military discipline.145 In mid–1973, generals became increasingly upset
about the potential formation of a “parallel army” and attempts by MIR to
incite disobedience in the armed forces.146
In addition to concerns about increasing Cuban influence and “foreign
extremists” in Chile, many Chilean military officials resented pressure from
Allende to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union.147 As Admiral Patricio
Carvajal later recalled, “every time we asked for funds to pay off debts
incurred from previous arms purchases from the United States, we always
got the same answer: ‘accept the Russian offer.’”148 The Chilean military
refused Soviet weaponry, however, because of the formidable logistical
problems related to maintenance and training. The generals preferred to
stick with their traditional U.S. suppliers given their familiarity with
American technology and the greater availability of spare parts. An added
concern was that the Soviet technicians who would be required to travel to
Chile to assist the transition might attempt to indoctrinate the Chilean
military in communism.149 General Prats, who reluctantly explored the
possibility of purchasing Soviet arms, confessed to a Chilean diplomat after
his trip to the Soviet Union in 1973 that even though he had secured an offer
of Soviet tanks, the Chilean military would revolt rather than accept them.150
Fear of losing resources from their Pentagon benefactor the longer they
appeared tolerant of the UP government undoubtedly weighed on the
generals’ minds. In mid–1973, they demanded that Allende repair relations
with the United States as a matter of national security.151
Of course, there were some members of the Chilean military who either
supported Allende or simply wanted to respect the Schneider Doctrine.152
Thus, an even more important factor in uniting the military against Allende
than the Cold War was the threat of a civil war. Surely it would have been
difficult for any Chilean officer, no matter what his political persuasion, to
stand by while the nation descended into violence and chaos.153 So great was
the military’s fear of social unrest, that officers conjured up fantastical
scenarios in which Chile in its weakened state was invaded by Peru or
Bolivia to retake land lost in the War of the Pacific.154 Civilian violence
challenged the military’s sense of its professional obligation to maintain law
and order. Pinochet’s claim that he opposed a civil war because of the
“destruction and death” that would result is difficult to swallow given the
thousands of Chileans who later perished under his deadly reign.155 Yet there
is some truth to the notion that the Chilean military felt obliged to save the
country from ruin because of the perception that Chile’s democracy had
broken down and could not be saved. As General Sergio Arellano explained
six months after the September coup: “We all wanted a democratic way out.
There wasn’t … we were the army that wielded the sword. We were the last
card Chile had to play.”156
That the Chilean military felt it had a moral duty to act as the last resort
to save the country figures into the final reason for toppling Allende, which
was pressure from the opposition. Immediately after seizing power on 11
September 1973, the military junta justified the coup as necessary because
the UP government had allegedly violated free speech, destroyed national
unity, introduced “alien ideas,” violated laws, ruined the economy, and
stifled civil liberties. “There being no other reasonable method holding out
promise of success … the armed forces have taken upon themselves the
moral duty, which the country imposes on them, of deposing the
government” and “counting on the support of the vast majority, all of which,
before God and history, justifies our action.”157 Notably, the Pinochet
dictatorship would commit almost every one of these alleged sins, but the
military still felt obliged to insist that the September 1973 coup was for the
good of God and country. One of the reasons it took so long to organize the
coup is that the key military leaders had to feel confident that the nation was
behind them. As one Chilean officer explained in October 1972, “there
would have to be some clear violation of the constitution before we would
act—or we would have to be certain that we had massive support.”158 Foreign
Affairs Minister Ismael Huerta Díaz explained to the UN after the coup: “We
acted in concordance with the immense majority of our countrymen, who,
in fear and desperation, saw how an ideology alien to our history was taking
advantage cleverly of our judicial structure in order to impose upon us a
totalitarian regime.”159
 Given that the military had by far greater firepower than any organization
in the country and could depose the government at any time, why did so
many coup leaders need to feel vindicated by a show of popular support?
The reason, at least in part, was the military’s patriarchal sense of honor and
machismo, which left it vulnerable to the tactics of shaming and ­red-
baiting.160 Many of the ­middle-class women who opposed Allende taunted
military officers by throwing corn at them and shouting, “chicken,
chicken!”161 Later, these women contended that their protests had been
critical in getting the military to act.162 As Gustavo Leigh acknowledged,
“We felt vilified and cornered; the people were calling us cowards.”163
According to Ambassador Davis, many Chilean military officers found it
“galling” that their wives appeared braver than they were.164 In joshing with
U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz after the coup, Pinochet invoked an
old Chilean proverb that “women always have the superior rank…. Chilean
mothers realized that unless they acted, their children would lose their
liberty.”165
The Chilean armed forces, U.S. intelligence observed in October 1971,
had begun to resent “Allende’s attempt to create the impression that the
military favors his policies.”166 ­Right-wing newspapers accused the army of
having been bought off with a “car and a house.”167 Allende’s efforts to court
the military became so transparent that one socialist grumbled: “there’s not a
rowboat left in the Navy that he has not climbed aboard,” and “he never
appears at a meeting without some general with him.”168 Patria y Libertad
leaders chastised the military for defending the government during the
Tanquetazo, a grievous offense in their eyes, tantamount to supporting
“international ­Marxist-Leninism.”169 Their leaflets fused anticommunism
with machismo in appealing to Chilean men to overthrow the government:
“Stop being a slave of communism. Be a man, be a patriot, sacrifice
yourselves, rebel.”170
Given that the Chilean military and the opposition both encouraged each
other to oppose Allende it is difficult to sort out who or what exactly was
responsible for the 11 September coup.171 One possible interpretation that
encompasses most of these motives is to describe the movement that
overthrew Allende as “fascist.”172 From 1970 to 1973, Allende and his
supporters frequently denigrated members of the opposition as “fascist,”
usually with the insinuation that they were being aided by U.S.
imperialism.173 For example, the leftist press extended the fascist label to- ­
right-wing women protestors and even to certain members of the PDC.174
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev later described the Chilean coup as “fascist,”
as did the former Chilean ambassador to Italy, who told the Russell Tribunal
in April 1974 that the coup leaders were now establishing in Chile a “new
form of fascism, more modern, more scientific, and more brutal than ever
before.”175 Orlando Letelier denounced the coup leaders as “fascist traitors”
who had “sold the country to foreign interests.”176 Given the widespread use
of the term during the Allende era, it is understandable that resistance
organizations would attempt to rally around the theme of antifascism after
the coup.177
Whether one subscribes to this theory of the Chilean coup depends
heavily on how fascism is defined.178 Pinochet’s seizure of power, scenes of
the Chilean military burning books, the junta’s anti–Marxist rhetoric, and
the construction of dozens of detention centers after the coup certainly
suggest fascist analogs.179 Fascism also had a certain historical appeal to the
Chilean military given the rise of fascist movements in Chile during the
1920s and 1930s.180 But as many critics have since pointed out, there were
also important differences between the Pinochet regime and the classical
fascist regimes of the European variety.181 For example, historians generally
consider fascism to be a ­mass-based movement, yet after the coup Pinochet
was quick to shut down organizations such as Poder Femenino and Patria y
Libertad.182 Pinochet’s embrace of neoliberalism also seems incongruous
with the economic policies of previous fascist governments, which usually
attempted to exert some state control over the economy.183
Regardless of what label should be used to describe the Pinochet regime,
the charge that the Chilean military was moved to oust Allende as a result of
a fascist plot backed by the United States and multinational corporations is
highly misleading.184 The Nixon administration certainly did its best to
undermine Allende, and Nixon and Kissinger would later embrace Pinochet,
but U.S. officials most likely would have tolerated a less draconian leader had
the coup turned out differently.185 Nor should the Chilean military be treated
as a monolith. At least some of the generals that joined the coup rejected the
“fascist label.” Air Force Commander Gustavo Leigh insisted afterward, “We
are not fascists…. We are not Nazis.”186 Admirals Patricio Carvajal, Ismael
Huerta Díaz, and José Toribio Merino were moved to join the coup, not out
of any deeply held fascist beliefs, but because of their fear that the country
was descending into anarchy and that the left was attempting to infiltrate the
armed forces.187 Even Pinochet’s beliefs before the coup do not suggest a
budding fascist. In September 1972, the CIA described Pinochet as
“previously the strict constitutionalist.”188
Tracing the history of the military’s plotting will help identify the key
turning points in the path to the final coup in September. Pinochet later
claimed that he had first begun thinking about participating in a coup after
the assassination of Pérez Zujovic in 1971, but he did not start actual
planning until April 1972, when he received an intelligence report warning
about the dangers posed by extreme leftist organizations such as MIR.189
Pinochet’s version of coup planning is suspiciously ­self-serving and is not
corroborated by other sources.190 In June 1971, the CIA judged Pinochet to
be a “highly efficient subordinate officer who carries out orders explicitly”
and “is unlikely to undertake action on his own accord.”191 A few months
later, a CIA informant described Pinochet as a “mild, friendly, ­narrow-
gauged military man … who would not lead [a] coup.”192 To the U.S.
embassy, Pinochet “was seen as somebody of not great influence.”193 Long
after the coup, Kissinger recalled that “we did not know Pinochet” until he
became head of the army, at which point “we thought he might be someone
favorable to Allende.”194
Pinochet, like many other generals, claimed that he deliberately restricted
coup planning to a narrow circle, so secrecy could explain why U.S. officials
misread his intentions.195 But other independent sources suggest that
Pinochet was more an opportunist than a key instigator of the September
coup.196 For example, Pinochet claims that plotting began in late May 1973
on his own initiative, when he transformed an internal security plan
designed to protect the UP government into a plan to overthrow Allende.197
This story distorts the complexity of the coup effort, as many events brought
different officers into the plot at different times depending on their
perception of the crisis.
For some, such as Admiral Merino, the truckers’ strike of October 1972
became the pivotal moment when they began to consider a coup.198 For
others, the outcome of the March 1973 congressional elections indicated
that Allende had to be removed by force.199 And for still other officers, it was
the Tanquetazo on 29 June 1973 that prompted them to contemplate serious
coup planning.200 According to Air Force General Nicanor Díaz Estrada, the
armed forces finally agreed to overthrow Allende in mid–July 1973 at a
meeting of the Committee of 15 that did not include Pinochet. In fact, most
of the meeting participants were unsure if Pinochet could be trusted.201
Yet another major incident that helped turn military officers against
Allende was the assassination of Allende’s naval aide, Captain Arturo Araya,
outside his home on the evening of 27 July 1973. Araya, who had just
returned from guarding Allende during a celebration at the Cuban embassy,
was shot down after he went outside his house to investigate a mysterious
explosion. Chilean military intelligence pointed the finger at three Cubans,
MIR, and a member of Allende’s bodyguard.202 A separate police
investigation, however, uncovered that confessions of the accused had been
extracted by torture and that the real culprits were members of Patria y
Libertad. The murder devastated Allende, who blamed fascism.203 Luis
Corvalán and Carlos Altamirano accused the opposition of engineering the
crime because of Araya’s ­well-known loyalty to Allende.204 Patria y Libertad
leader Roberto Thieme denied that his organization was involved and
declared that “this new attack corresponds to the most ­cold-blooded and
Machiavellian decision by ­Marxism-Leninism.”205
Many theories have since been put forth about the death of Araya. One is
that it was a ­by-product of Patria y Libertad’s terrorist campaign aimed at
disrupting Allende’s dialogue with the PDC and securing Merino’s
command over the navy.206 Another interpretation is that U.S. intelligence
services orchestrated the assassination to remove a loyal naval commander
who might have interfered with a coup attempt.207 In his last speech to the
Chilean people, Allende suggested that Araya’s death, along with
Schneider’s, was the result of a climate created by “foreign capital and
imperialism united with reactionary elements.”208 Yet another possibility is
that Araya had just been unlucky for having been caught in a crossfire
between left and right extremists.209 The courts eventually convicted several
members of Patria y Libertad for the crime, but it remains unclear if the
assassins had ties to naval coup plotters, or were just “troubled” youth, as the
judge ruled in letting them off with a ­three-year sentence that was never
carried out because of a presidential pardon.210
We may never know the exact story of Araya’s assassination, but no
documents have yet surfaced that implicate the CIA. Far more important
than who was truly guilty was that the Chilean military viewed Araya’s death
as a consequence of Allende’s permissive policy toward leftist groups which
were arming themselves.211 As a U.S. defense intelligence report later
concluded: “The incident and the presumed fact that it [Araya’s
assassination] was committed by extreme leftists agitated the entire officer
corps of the Navy and left them feeling that they may be next.”212 Admiral
Merino and General Prats both noted that Araya’s death had provoked
widespread indignation throughout the armed forces, especially the navy.213
One scholar has asserted, perhaps with some exaggeration, that Araya’s
murder was “probably the single most decisive event clearing the way for the
subsequent military seizure of power.”214
Although Araya’s death certainly accelerated the momentum for a coup,
there remained one formidable obstacle: General Prats. In late 1972, U.S.
intelligence began to lose faith in Prats after he felt compelled to defend his
decision to force Canales into retirement. Prats gave a television address in
November 1972 that, according to one British official “made the opposition’s
flesh creep by saying that Allende had been elected on the basis of the UP
programme and that it was only democratic that he should carry this out.”215
By March 1973, the CIA was describing Prats as a major obstacle to its
efforts to foster a coup.216 The Chilean military had originally hoped that
Prats would “put a brake on Allende.”217 But after Prats removed Canales and
attempted to defend UP’s educational reform program, ENU, many officers
came to regard him as an apologist for the Allende government. Prats’
efforts to purchase Soviet arms also earned him disfavor among many
officers.218
The final blow to Prats’ command came not from the CIA or the military,
however, but from an unexpected corner. On 27 June 1973, Prats fired a gun
from his car in downtown Santiago at a woman in another car who had
stuck out her tongue at him. Both cars pulled over and no one was hurt, but
a mob soon gathered and threatened to lynch Prats, who was forced to
depart from the angry scene in a taxi. The female driver who had stuck out
her tongue, Alejandrina Cox, became an instant hero among the opposition,
which capitalized on the incident to demand Prats’ resignation. Prats did
apologize to Cox and offered to resign, but Allende refused to accept the
departure of his last loyal military commander.219 The pressure continued to
build in the military against Prats, but as one CIA report noted, the general
could not easily be forced out: “The only other way to remove Prats …
would appear to be by abduction or assassination.” The bad memory of the
Schneider assassination ruled out this option, the report concluded, so the
timing of the coup had to be left in limbo.220 On 10 July, Jorden informed
Kissinger that U.S. intelligence estimated the chances of Allende
consolidating power to be about ­fifty-fifty while lamenting that the “US
lacks powerful or reliable levers for influencing the final outcome.”221
At this point, U.S. officials had grown so frustrated that they began to
entertain serious doubts about whether a coup in Chile was feasible or even
desirable. On 1 August 1973, a CIA intelligence memo provided a balance
sheet on the pros and cons of a coup. On the plus side, a coup would provide
a “psychological setback to the cause of doctrinaire socialism in the
hemisphere”; eliminate Cuban influence in Chile; reduce Chile’s subversive
activities against its neighbors; lead to a favorable settlement of the copper
dispute, thus opening the door for private investment; and establish political
and social stability. On the negative side, it was unclear what the military
might do once in power, given that many officers favored some of the
policies of the Christian Democrats. There was also the danger of a civil war
erupting, or that the Chilean military would be unable to establish a stable
government.222 A few weeks later, the agency’s Western Hemisphere chief,
David Phillips, reported with dismay the weak coup prospects in Chile. The
U.S. Defense Attaché estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the army officer
corps was opposed to Allende, but a coup was highly unlikely “so long as the
top leadership such as Generals Prats, Pinochet, Sepúlveda, Urbina,
Pickering, and Brady remained in firm support of the constitutional regime.”
Ambassador Davis, who did not favor promoting a coup, had already
resigned himself to the likelihood that Allende was going to serve out his
term.223
No one expected that the Cox incident would end Prats’ military career.
But on 22 August 1973, hundreds of ­right-wing women mobbed Prats’ home
demanding his resignation. Prats failed to convince the rest of the military to
support him, so he resigned the next day.224 A UP intelligence officer later
suggested that Prats’ exit from the military was the consequence of an
elaborate plot involving the CIA and Patria y Libertad.225 The opposition
certainly mobilized to get rid of Prats, but there was no conspiracy.
Alejandrina Cox did not belong to any opposition group, and the women
who went to protest at Prats’ house were operating on their own initiative.226
Prats’ removal from the UP government initially buoyed U.S. spirits. The- ­
Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group noted that Prats’ departure from the
army reduced the chances that the armed forces would divide in a coup
attempt.227 But when Allende appointed Augusto Pinochet to replace Prats,
the Nixon administration barely noticed, except to observe that Pinochet
“lacks prestige and influence” and “is unlikely to wield the authority and
control” that Prats did.228 The most that could be said for the new
commander, who was not the military’s first pick, is that he “will likely be
much firmer in [the] handling of the army,” and will “try to keep army
personnel out of the cabinet and away from politics.”229 In retrospect, Prats’
resignation may have represented one of the last opportunities to avoid a
coup, for military leaders later claimed that they had informed Allende in
late August that if he settled the trucker’s strike and compromised with the
opposition they would not act.230

UP’s Response: “By Reason or by Force?”

While the military plotted behind Allende’s back, UP struggled to figure
out how it could stave off a coup without sacrificing the revolution. As street
violence spiraled out of control and the coup threat loomed, Allende’s
coalition strained nearly to the breaking point over how to respond to the
growing crisis. Should the government arm the population in defense of the
inevitable coup attempt, or should UP officials search for a political
settlement that would involve compromising with both the military and the
PDC? Allende firmly rejected the first option because it could unleash a
devastating civil war. Allende’s widow later observed that when it came to
Chile’s coat of arms—“by Reason or by Force”—Allende unequivocally
preferred the former because of his previous contact with refugees from the
Spanish Civil War.231 “Millions of people in the world want socialism,” he
once told a U.S. scholar, “but don’t want to have to pay the terrible price of
civil war in order to obtain it.”232
The Communist Party agreed with Allende on the need to avoid a civil
war, but the Socialist Party argued that the popular movement needed to be
prepared for the possibility that it would have to defend the revolution with
arms if necessary. This split between the communists and socialists impeded
Allende’s effort to pursue a negotiated solution with the PDC, which itself
was unsure how it should respond to the crisis.233 The CIA deliberately
attempted to exploit divisions among Allende’s supporters by publicizing the
friction within UP and disseminating intelligence to sow distrust among the
coalition’s members. But the growing rifts in Allende’s government cannot
be attributed solely to U.S. meddling.234 For example, many of Allende’s
supporters opposed his efforts to appease the military by appointing various
generals to his cabinet.235
Probably the biggest issue threatening Allende’s presidency was the
controversy over the government’s use of an outdated decree to implement
its ­three-areas program. In February 1972, the opposition passed an
amendment to the Chilean Constitution (the ­Hamilton-Fuentealba bill, also
known as the Three Areas Amendment), which aimed to halt further
nationalization of private firms. When Allende vetoed various sections of
the amendment, the Senate voted by a simple majority to override the
president’s veto. Allende contended that Congress lacked the necessary ­two-
thirds to override his veto, so he asked the Constitutional Tribunal to rule
on the matter. Impatient at having to wait for a decision, the opposition
began to demand that Allende either promulgate the amendment or call a
plebiscite.236
Before risking what amounted to a vote of confidence in his government,
Allende preferred to try and reach a compromise.237 Talks between the
government and the PDC held in the second half of 1972, however, failed to
produce a settlement because neither side trusted their negotiators.238 On 25
April 1973, the Chamber of Deputies voted to override Allende’s veto. A
month later, the Constitutional Tribunal recused itself from the dispute,
leaving Allende little choice but to return to the negotiating table. Allende
secured a meeting with Eduardo Frei through Cardinal Silva Henríquez only
to have it called off after embarrassing public revelations that Frei’s party had
colluded with the CIA in the 1964 presidential election.239 The election in
May 1973 of Patricio Aylwin to replace Renán Fuentealba as PDC president
also seemed to indicate that the Christian Democratic party was shifting to
the right and was unlikely to compromise.240 Employing a soccer analogy,
Aylwin declared that the PDC’s new objective was to “not let Allende score a
single goal.”241
As the opposition hardened, Allende came under pressure from some
members of his cabinet to abandon the Constitution.242 When he refused,
many leftists stepped up their efforts to bolster the popular organizations in
anticipation of a civil war.243 The PS was opposed to any concessions, as it
began to advocate “forward without compromise.”244 To make matters worse,
Allende began to clash with the judicial branch of government over many of
its policies. When the Chilean Supreme Court openly scolded Allende for
not enforcing its orders, the UP government replied by threatening to
impeach the entire court, which one communist newspaper scorned as a
bunch of “old shits.”245 By mid–1973, it was clear to the U.S. embassy that the
“psychological climate” in Chile had deteriorated because of “growing
weariness with politicians and some feeling that current problems are
insoluble if left in their hands.”246 Prats recorded in his diary after the
Tanquetazo that Chile was as close to civil war as it had been since 1891.247
Legal battles over the Three Areas Amendment came to a head in early
June 1973, when the Comptroller General ruled that Allende either had to
obey Congress’s veto or call a plebiscite by 7 June. Allende ignored the
deadline, choosing instead to continue negotiating with the opposition.248
Prats offered to broker an agreement between UP and the PDC, but Frei
declared that his party was unwilling to negotiate so long as its adversary
kept a machine gun on the table.249 After much public posturing, Allende
and Aylwin met several times from late July to early August 1973. Allende
agreed to appoint interior minister, Carlos Briones, a moderate socialist, to
work out the details of an agreement that would disarm the population, end
the second truckers’ strike, and solve the constitutional impasse over the
Three Areas Amendment.250 The negotiations collapsed, however, essentially
because neither leader could hold back the obstructionists among their
supporters. Allende had to battle Carlos Altamirano to get Briones
appointed, which signaled to the opposition that UP was divided and could
not be trusted.251 Then Aylwin retreated after the Chamber of Deputies
approved a resolution crafted by the PDC that condemned Allende for
violating the Constitution, interfering with the Supreme Court, and
violating civil liberties.252 Allende complained in an open letter to the nation
that the opposition was attempting to provoke a coup, but he did not
abandon negotiations with the PDC.253 When Briones attempted to reopen
the dialogue, Aylwin declared publicly that it was “impossible” to continue
until the government ­re-established constitutional law, reinstated the
striking El Teniente miners, and respected judicial decisions regarding the
control of a university television station.254
Even after negotiations with the PDC collapsed, Allende continued to
delay implementing his one last option. Prats commented in his diary entry
for 26 August: “Allende does not appear to understand that the only way to
solve the crisis is to hold a plebiscite, even if it means transferring power to
another group.”255 On 4 September, Allende held a massive rally in front of
La Moneda to celebrate the third anniversary of his election. Allende fumed
about the “fascist” threat, but he did not mention the issue of a plebiscite,
except to caution his supporters that even though “we are facing a serious
conspiracy we must not lose our composure.”256 Nearby, thousands of
women held a counterdemonstration against the government, demanding
Allende’s resignation.257 Afterward, Allende confided that he felt like he had
attended “the funeral of the country” and that “the only solution to the crisis
is a political one.”258
Not until early September 1973 did Allende consult with some of his
closest aides to propose a solution to the constitutional crisis. He told them
he was thinking of inviting the PDC to ­co-govern by holding a plebiscite on
his presidency. After much debate, it appeared that the president had already
made up his mind. “There is no other way!” he declared.259 Allende then met
with former PDC ­Secretary General Belisario Velasco to sound out the
progressive wing of the PDC on the plebiscite issue. Velasco doubted that
Allende could control extremists in his coalition and warned him that the
crisis had reached the point of “life or death,” as the PDC had recently
learned that the CIA and the right were plotting a coup while the Navy was
already in rebellion.260 The UP government also received a warning from
Prats, who informed Defense Minister Letelier on 7 September that if
Allende did not remove certain generals from the cabinet there would be a
coup within a week. Prats named several conspirators, such as General
Arellano Stark, but he still expressed confidence in Pinochet.261 The next day,
Allende told Prats that he was going to hold a plebiscite that he would
probably lose but was necessary to avoid a civil war. Prats was incredulous. It
will take two to three months to organize a plebiscite, he warned the
president, whereas a coup is likely to transpire within the next ten days.
Allende bristled at Prats’ suggestion that he go into exile for a year. “Never!”
he retorted.262
 On 7 and 8 September, Allende discussed the proposed plebiscite with the
leaders of the UP coalition. The PCCh and a few minor parties supported
the plebiscite, while the PS opposed it, claiming that Allende was
exaggerating the coup threat.263 On the morning of 9 September, Allende
met one last time with several Communist leaders to explore a political
solution to the crisis. During the meeting, Allende received news that
Altamirano had just given a speech defending his meeting with rebellious
sailors in Valparaíso.264 The speech was bound to inflame the navy, which
was already on edge because of rumors that leftist extremists were
attempting to infiltrate the armed forces.265 “That madman [Altamirano] is
sabotaging me,” Allende groaned.266 After exploring various options, none of
them deemed viable, Allende finally agreed to announce the plebiscite on 11
September. He informed Generals Pinochet and Urbina that afternoon of
this decision.267
For a president who faced one of the worst political crises in Chilean
history, Allende seemed surprisingly unruffled on 10 September. To Foreign
Minister Almeyda, who had just returned from the non-aligned conference
in Algiers, Allende appeared “calm and relaxed,” as if a great weight had
been lifted from his shoulders. The president said he was confident that the
announcement of the plebiscite would ease the tension.268 “If we get through
this week,” he promised his mining minister, “the crisis will diminish.”269
That afternoon Allende met with his cabinet ministers and several generals
to inform them of his decision to hold a plebiscite. He made sure the
generals understood that he would not resign, purportedly brandishing a
rifle given to him by Fidel Castro that he would use to commit suicide if
necessary.270 In the evening, Allende became animated after receiving a letter
from the UP coalition supporting the plebiscite.271 Even if he lost the
plebiscite, he was still optimistic about the future because, he insisted, “this
country is impossible to govern without the left.”272 Unfortunately for
Allende, time had run out, as the coup that began on the morning of 11
September precluded any further consideration of a peaceful solution to the
crisis.

Was There a Way to Keep the Ship from Sinking?

Allende surely waited too long to announce the plebiscite, but if he had
done it earlier could he have saved Chile from a coup? Those who believe
that Allende was doomed, have often dismissed the plebiscite as moot. Yet,
this counterfactual scenario is worth considering insofar as it helps in
determining whether a coup was inevitable. Regarding this issue there are
three essential questions to consider: First, was a plebiscite even feasible;
second, what caused the breakdown in negotiations between Allende and
the PDC; and third, if a plebiscite could be arranged, who was likely to win?
On the first question, some have maintained that holding a plebiscite to
restructure the government was both desirable and feasible.273 In July 1973,
the U.S. scholar Laurence Birns described several scenarios, including a
plebiscite, which could lead to some sort of ­power-sharing agreement with
the opposition.274 After the coup, University Rector Edgar Boeninger
speculated that the same procedure that was used to settle the power
struggle at the University of Chile in 1972 could have been applied to the
1973 constitutional crisis.275 Communist Party leader Volodia Teitelboim
insisted that UP and the opposition had been close to an agreement that
would have allowed the Christian Democrats to lead an emergency
government.276 PDC leader Bernardo Leighton later claimed that he would
have trusted the president to hold an honest plebiscite because Allende had
always demonstrated an unshakable commitment to democratic
procedures.277 U.S. intelligence reports, which painted a picture of a highly
cautious, hesitant, and divided military well into 1973, suggest that if the
plebiscite had been announced early enough, the military might have
continued to honor the Schneider Doctrine.278 On 22 August, a senior
Chilean military commander confided to a reporter that even though the
military was prepared to “act once the politicians have run out of solutions
… we do not wish to proceed until the ship is sinking.”279
While these solutions might seem reasonable under normal
circumstances, Chile had become so polarized by mid–1973 that any lasting
agreement would have been difficult to achieve.280 Pinochet thought a
plebiscite would have only prolonged Chile’s agony of a civil war.281 The
leader of the truckers’ strikes, León Vilarín, was so convinced that Allende
had cheated in the March congressional elections that he did not believe the
UP government could be trusted again.282 Some have blamed UP’s
widespread use of Marxist rhetoric, such as “dictatorship of the proletariat,”
for frightening the opposition into thinking that Allende was going to
establish a totalitarian government.283 Allende repeatedly said he would
resign if he lost the plebiscite, but his followers might not have been so
compliant.284 French sociologist Alain Touraine’s interviews with Chilean
leftists suggest that civil war could have erupted had Allende lost the
plebiscite.285 The Chilean diplomat Gabriel Valdés judged any ­last-minute
accommodation between UP and the opposition to be impossible because
the PDC had become too alienated from the government and extremist
groups such as MIR were out of control.286
Trust was also lacking on the other side. Many of Allende’s supporters did
not believe that the military or the opposition would allow a plebiscite, let
alone respect its outcome. Socialist Party leader Altamirano viewed the
negotiations with the PDC as an abdication of power because of that party’s
shift to the right.287 A disenchanted communist student leader later surmised
that if the left had won the plebiscite, “the military would still have
intervened, arguing fraud.”288 As discussed previously, many of the key
leaders who led the coup had turned against Allende as early as the trucker’s
strike of October 1972. Exactly when the momentum for a coup became
unstoppable is difficult to judge, but it appears that U.S. intelligence was
overly cautious in suggesting that Allende still might find a way out in early
September 1973. By then most PDC provincial chiefs were demanding
Allende’s resignation.289 The Chilean scholar Joaquín Fermandois has
suggested that the most the plebiscite announcement could have
accomplished at that point was to cause the military to hesitate in launching
the coup.290
On the second question, both sides were clearly to blame for the
negotiations breaking down, but was one side more culpable? Allende’s
sincerity has been the subject of considerable speculation because of his
renowned muñeca (slipperiness).291 To Aylwin, Allende appeared to be
playing for time in order to wear down the opposition. Likewise, Briones
came under suspicion by the PDC for allegedly playing a “double game.”292
Allende was aware of the imminent coup threat, yet he continued to imagine
he could salvage the revolution by stretching out the negotiations. According
to Allende’s personal adviser, Juan Garcés, the president planned to
announce on 11 September that he would introduce reform legislation over
the next week, during which time he would invoke martial law if necessary.
If there was no agreement with the PDC by 20 September, then he would
call for a plebiscite.293 Possibly, if Allende had offered this solution before the
Tanquetazo there might have been a slim chance of it proceeding, but by
early September the military and the opposition were highly unlikely to
accept these conditions. Congress had already rejected a state of siege after
the Tanquetazo, so why would it suddenly agree to one more than two
months later? True, ­extra-judicial violence, including bomb threats against
U.S. embassy officials, appeared to be escalating so it was possible to make a
strong case for imposing martial law. But the opposition was still likely to
block such a measure because increased anarchy worked in favor of those
seeking to establish a coup climate.294
The longer UP factions argued openly about how to respond to the crisis,
the more the PDC had reason to doubt Allende’s ability to make an
agreement that would be honored. The PS undermined Allende’s negotiating
power by threatening to leave the government if he made too many
concessions to the PDC.295 Aylwin explained his party’s fears in late August
1973: “Allende has said that as long as he is in power, he will respect our
democratic institutions, but his supporters openly advocate dictatorship.”296
Notwithstanding this misleading caricature of Allende’s supporters, MIR’s
revolutionary rhetoric and Altamirano’s inflammatory speeches did stoke
fears in the opposition that Allende would not be able to control the
extremists in his coalition.297 One Chilean historian has suggested that
Allende was hesitant to agree to Aylwin’s proposals because he did not want
to betray his daughter, Tati, who opposed them.298
One faction of the PDC, led by Radomiro Tomic and Bernardo Leighton,
did attempt to reach an agreement with Allende that might have prevented a
coup.299 When Aylwin was arguing with party leaders about whether to
negotiate with Allende, he allegedly pounded the table and declared that
even if there was only a 1 in 20,000 chance of saving democracy, they had to
take it.300 Aylwin later insisted that the 22 August resolution was not aimed
at promoting a coup, but at empowering the military members of Allende’s
cabinet to end UP’s violations of the Constitution.301 Renán Fuentealba also
contended that the PDC was united as a party in opposing a coup.302 Even
Frei, who was highly pessimistic about Chile’s future under the UP
government, allowed that Allende could stay in office if he got rid of the
ministers who kept pushing for a socialist agenda through illegal means.303
Allende was overconfident and may well have been playing for time, but
the Christian Democrats did not negotiate in good faith.304 In July 1973, U.S.
defense intelligence reported that the PDC’s strategy was to talk but never
concede anything.305 Aylwin’s demands were so unreasonable, Prats noted in
his diary, that they appeared to be designed to get Allende to refuse them.306
The plebiscite never really had much of a chance because most Christian
Democrats were dead set against it. As early as January 1973, Frei and
several of his former ministers were advocating a military coup.307 The tide
turned after the March congressional elections when the PDC realized it
could not legally remove Allende, so it abandoned democracy and began to
look for ways to goad the military into launching a coup.308 Additionally, the
Christian Democrats prematurely endorsed the false interpretation of the
Araya assassination as a leftist plot, which contributed to the military’s
perception that it was under direct attack.309 The PDC was also guilty of ­fear-
mongering by warning that the country had fallen into such “grave peril”
that Bolivian troops were gathering on Chile’s northern border.310
The Christian Democrats, along with several other opposition groups,
had direct contact with the military officers who were contemplating a
coup.311 According to a CIA informant, PDC officials, including Aylwin,
were practically “on their knees begging the military to overthrow
Allende.”312 In early May 1973, PDC leaders told certain military officers that
they were planning on impeaching the entire Allende cabinet in order “to
get the military to move.”313 By early July, Frei had become so discouraged
that he allegedly told opposition senators that nothing more could be done:
the only way to solve the crisis was with rifles.314 On 8 September 1973, the
CIA reported that several PDC leaders were demanding that the party
endorse a coup in order to be in position to “guide and influence the
intervention along ‘institutional’ lines.”315
Aylwin’s later insistence that the PDC did not design the 22 August
resolution to promote a coup was disingenuous. When asked about his
apparent endorsement of the coup, Aylwin evaded the question by blaming
the coup on practically everyone—Allende, the Chilean right and left, the
Pentagon, and the Chilean military—except himself or the PDC.316
According to a leading PDC official, the party intended for the resolution to
serve as a “green light” for the military to take power.317 Bernardo Leighton
later confessed that the PDC had erred in passing the resolution, which the
Chilean military and U.S. officials later used to justify the coup.318 Aylwin
once commented that if forced to choose, he preferred a Chilean military
dictatorship to a Marxist one.319 Immediately after the generals seized power,
he issued a statement justifying the coup as necessary to prevent Allende
from carrying out a “­self-coup,” meaning that Allende had intended to lead a
coup against his own government in order to become a dictator.320 The PDC
did not approve the coup, he told an Italian news service, but military
repression afterward was understandable because the army confronted a
“parallel army with groups of snipers and commandos of guerrilla type.”321
Concerning the third question, even if Allende had somehow managed to
pull off a plebiscite, what were his chances of winning? To the degree that
optimism prevailed among Allende’s supporters, there was at least a chance
that a plebiscite could be held honestly without disruption.322 The president
also boasted to PDC ­Secretary General Velasco during their meeting on 6
September that the March 1973 congressional elections had demonstrated
that he had the support of more than 60 percent of the ­working class.323 The
British ambassador to Chile thought that UP’s performance in the March
elections meant that Allende’s government would survive and might even
obtain a majority.324
 Many skeptics, however, have argued that Allende failed to hold a
plebiscite because he knew he would lose.325 Certainly fear of failure was a
factor from 1971 to 1972 when uneven UP performance in the municipal
elections kept Allende from risking a plebiscite. By 1973, Allende privately
conceded that he was likely to lose a plebiscite, but he was willing to accept
that risk to avoid a civil war.326 More important than perceptions of the
plebiscite’s outcome was its timing. Early September was far too late, but
even the previous month was dubious.327 A former adviser to the Frei
government later estimated that if a plebiscite had been held in August 1973,
at least 60 percent would have voted for a new government.328 Allende’s best
chances of holding and winning a plebiscite, if not in early 1971 when the
economy was still booming, were probably sometime between the truckers’
strike of October 1972 and the Tanquetazo of late June 1973 because the
military was less likely to interfere in this period given its lack of
organization.
Regardless of whether a plebiscite could have kept “the ship from
sinking,” the suspiciously close timing of the coup with the planned
announcement of the plebiscite has led to speculation that the military
decided to depose Allende on 11 September 1973 in order to prevent him
from gaining time to save his government. To consider this question
requires reviewing the final two weeks of coup plotting by the Chilean
military.329

1. Hecksher disp to Broe, 12 November 1971, CDP. Although Kissinger, Colby, and Phillips later
claimed to have been unaware that Track II lingered, Hecksher testified before a Senate intelligence
committee that he had in fact been instructed to keep Track II alive. The discrepancy can be explained
by confusion over the different terms that U.S. officials used when discussing U.S. efforts to promote a
coup. See Davis, Last Two Years, 313–15; and Karamessines’ comments in Church Committee, Alleged
Assassination Plots, 254–55.
2. Broe disp to Hecksher, 1 December 1971, CDP. On this gray area between monitoring and
encouraging a coup, see Church Report, 6; Marchetti and Marks, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 386;
Treverton, Covert Action, 31; and Richard Bissell’s comments quoted in Richard J. Barnett, “The CIA’s
New Cover,” New York Review of Books, 30 December 1971.
3. Helms, Look Over My Shoulder, 407–408. For similar comments, see the testimony of former NSC
staffer Morton H. Halperin, 5 December 1975, Intelligence Activities, 61.
4. Shackley memo to Schlesinger, 8 May 1973, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 2, doc 12; Summers,
Arrogance of Power, 337.
5. SNIE 94–71, 4 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 400.
6. Memo for the 40 Committee, 28 January 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 541; Nachmanoff memo to
Kissinger, 21 September 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 432.
 7. CIA tel to Santiago, 6 March 1973, CDP.
8. Embtel 1238, 23 March 1973, POL 14 Chile, 12–­5-72, box 2196, RG 59; Arancibia Clavel,
Conversando con Roberto Kelly V., 138.
9. SNIE 94–72, 29 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 600.
10. Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 108; embtel 262, 15 January 1971, box 2, CAF, RG 84. Allende had
a Masonic connection with some of the military officers, including Pinochet. See research department
memo 46/72, 20 November 1972, FCO 51/213, TNA; and Rocha, Allende, 17–18.
11. Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 117–18. The considerable size of the national police (about
40,000), which operated independently from the military, further divided the security forces. Neff,
“Politics of Repression,” 67.
12. Annex A to “Chile: Options Paper on Next Steps,” 26 November 1971, SRG Meeting—Chile
4/11/72 [1 of 2], box ­H-064, NSC Institutional Files, NPMP.
13. Central Intelligence Bulletin, 16 March 1972, ­CIA-RDP79T00975A021400090002–3, CREST.
14. Embtel 5459, 16 December 1970, DEF U.S.-Chile, 1/1/70, box 1855, RG 59; 40 Committee
meeting minutes, 19 November 1970 and 7 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 487, 503
15. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 10 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 619.
16. Draft contribution to SNIE 94–71, 23 July 1971, box 3, CAF, RG 84. The analysis drew heavily on
Hansen, “Military Culture”; Joxe, Las Fuerzas Armadas; and Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920–1931.
17. Nachmanoff memo to Kissinger, 10 May 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 619.
18. Church Report, 37–38; editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 511.
19. Marras, Confesiones, 126–27; Nunn, “Latin American Militarylore,” 472.
20. Davis, Last Two Years, 46; “Chile with Allende,” Economist, 11 March 1972, 29.
21. Cuba did send arms to Chile, but not via the art exhibit. See Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 320 n. 23.
On how the Cuban threat was used to justify the coup, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 383, 392; and
Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 93; Hermogenes Perez de Arce testimony, 7 March 1974, U.S. Congress,
House, Committee on Internal Security, Theory and Practice of Communism, pt. 5, 2554–55; and the
junta’s White Book, as discussed in chapter 9.
22. Trucco, “Foreign Armed Intervention in Chile,” 101. See also chapter 9 for discussion of Plan Z,
which alleged that a coup was necessary to prevent a Cuban conspiracy.
23. For Cuban efforts to aid the UP government, see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 230–39.
24. Allende, First Annual Message to the National Congress, 21 May 1971, in Cockcroft, Salvador
Allende Reader, 99–100.
25. Debray, Chilean Revolution, 74.
26. For examples of Allende’s statements opposing a civil war, see Allende speech to university
students, 4 May 1972, in Allende, Obras escogidas (1970–1973), 272; 100; and Wallach interview with
Allende; Varas and Vergara, Coup! Allende’s Last Day, 78.
27. CIA Office of National Estimates memo, 4 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 539–42.
28. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 777, original emphasis.
29. SNIE 94–72, 29 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 601–602.
30. CIA tel to Station, 16 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 374.
31. CIA information cable TDCS DB–315/02051–72, 10 March 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 773–76.
Frei regarded Canales as “the most popular officer in the army.” Embtel 1244, March 1972, POL 2
Chile, 3–18–70, box 2193, RG 59.
32. CIA information cable TDCS DB 315/07314–72, 29 August 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 805–
808.
33. Clissold to Hunter, 13 April 1973, FCO 7/2410.
34. CIA information cable TDCS DB–315/07701–72, 14 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 818;
Corn, Blond Ghost, 251.
 35. DIA memo, 15 September 1972, CDP.
36. Meyer message to Davis, 30 August 1972, CDP. The NSC concurred that the time was not right
for a coup. See editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 811.
37. CIA information cable TDCS DB–315/07701–72, 14 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 817.
38. Embtel 953, 28 February 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 767; Rojas, Murder of Allende, 114–15.
39. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 19 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 821. On Kissinger’s
contempt for Davis, see Roger Morris, “Rare Resignation in Protest,” Washington Monthly, 7:12
(1976).
40. DATT 699, 21 September 1972, box 3, CAF, RG 84; Prats González, Memorias, 289–90, 294.
Allende had earlier expressed his desire to see Canales retired, so the discovery of Plan September
may have provided the perfect pretext. See Nunn, Military in Chilean History, 328 n. 45.
41. DATT 705, September 1972, box 3, CAF, RG 84; Marta Harnecker, “Plan septiembre en octubre,”
Chile Hoy, no. 19, 20–26 October 1972; Selser, Los días del presidente Allende, 125; Víctor Vaccaro,
“Muchos nombres para un solo plan,” Chile Hoy, no. 20. 27 October—2 November 1973.
42. Prats’ public letter concerning the retirement of General Canales appeared in Punto Final, 10
October 1972. See Farías, La izquierda chilena, 3134; and CIA weekly summary, 6 October 1972, ­CIA-
RDP79–00927A009800050001–1, CREST.
43. Meyer memo to Johnson, 13 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 634. On the claim that the
September Plan received foreign financing, see UP National Executive Committee, “Al pueblo de
Santiago, al pueblo de Chile,” 1 September 1972 in Selser, Los días del presidente Allende, 123.
44. CIA tel, 31 August 1971, CDP; CIA message, “Pinochet, August,” 27 June 1972, CDP. Altamirano
later insisted that Pinochet had never been involved with Canales’s efforts to topple the government.
Politzer, Altamirano, 41.
45. Pinochet Ugarte, Journey through Life, 277.
46. Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 112; Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Conversando con el General
Julio Canessa Robert, 118. U.S. intelligence appears to have engaged in wishful thinking about Prats, as
several reports suggested that he might join the Canales coup plot. CIA information cable TDCS DB–
315/07701–72, 14 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 816–17; DIA memo, 15 September 1972,
CDP.
47. Research department memo 46/72, 20 November 1972, FCO 51/213, TNA; Michaels,
“Background to a Coup,” 298; Quiroga Zamora, Compañeros, 82–83; Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, El golpe
después del golpe, 81–82; and Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, “Del ‘ibañismo’ al ‘pinochetismo,’” 184–85.
48. Huggins, Political Policing, 85–86; Varas and Agüero, El proyecto político militar, 148–49. For a ­-
first-hand description of the ­anti-Marxist training of Chilean military officials at Fort Gulick, Panama,
see Eugenio Rivera Desgroux interview in Verdugo, Chile 1973, 65.
49. CIA cable, 27 September 1972, Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 2, doc 10.
50. Shackley memo for the record, 17 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 827–29.
51. Shackley memo for the record, 17 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 828–29.
52. Gardner memo to file, 30 October 1972, CDP.
53. Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile contingency paper: “Possible Military
Intervention,” 30 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 648.
54. Broe memo to Hecksher, 12 January 1973, CDP.
55. CIA tel to Santiago, 6 March 1973, CDP.
56. Warren tel to DCI, 14 March 1973, CDP.
57. Memo to Broe, 17 April 1973, CDP.
58. Tomic, “PDC During the Allende Years,” 334.
59. CIA report, 2 May 1973.
60. Farrell, National Unified School, 212–14; Huerta, Volvería, vol. 2, 16; Prats, Una vida por la
legalidad, 50–51; CIA intelligence report, 11 April 1973, CDP; Harry W. Shlaudeman interview, 15,
FAOHC; embtel 1771, 24 April 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
61. Santiago tel to DCI, 17 April 1973, CDP.
62. DIA intelligence summary, 28 April 1973, CDP.
63. CIA report, 2 May 1973, CDP.
64. DCI message to Santiago, 2 May 1973, CDP; Shackley memo to Schlesinger, 8 May 1973,
Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 2, doc. 12.
65. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 24 May 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 857.
66. Santiago tel to DCI, 26 May 1973, CDP.
67. On the role of Patria y Libertad in instigating the revolt, see embtel 2850, 29 June 1973 and
embtel 2877, 2 July 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84; DIA intelligence summary, 2 July 1973, CDP; Díaz
Nieva, “Patria y Libertad y el nacionalismo chileno,” 177–78; Pérez Carrillo, “La Fronda Militar,” 117–
20; and Haslam, Nixon Administration, 179.
68. Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Conversando con el General Julio Canessa Robert, 124–25; Prats
González, Memorias, 414; Huidobro Justiniano, Decisión naval, 124; Vidales, Contrarrevolución, 367–
68.
69. Both “Tancazo” and “Tanquetazo” have been used to describe the 29 June 1973 military uprising.
I have adopted the latter usage to avoid confusion with the Tacnazo rebellion of October 1969 (see
chapter 2).
70. Quiroga Zamora, Compañeros, 93. The Soviets had also uncovered the plot and warned Allende.
Andrew and Mitrokhin, World Was Going Our Way, 84.
71. Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 120; Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, “Cómo llegaron las Fuerzas
Armadas a la acción del 11 de Septiembre de 1973,” El Mercurio, 11 September 1974, 8. One CIA
report attributed the lack of air force participation in the Tanquetazo to a lack of communication. CIA
intelligence report, 9 July 1973, CDP. According to one general, the Hawker Hunter aircraft lacked
bombs with the right specification, a deficiency that was obviously corrected by the time the coup was
attempted in September. See Arancibia Clavel and de la Maza Cave, Matthei, 168–69.
72. Fontaine Aldunate, “Cómo llegaron,” 9; Davis, Last Two Years, 171.
73. Prats González, Memorias, 417–23; Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Conversando con el General
Julio Canessa Robert, 129–30; Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 254. Quiroga Zamora, Compañeros,
94 insists that generals Mario Sepúlveda and Guillermo Pickering played the more “decisive role” in
quelling the rebellion.
74. The scene appears in Patricia Guzmán’s epic film, Battle of Chile. For a ­first-hand description of
the chaotic atmosphere, see Victor Niemeyer interview, 23, FAOHC. On the casualties, see Donoso
Loero, Breve historia de la Unidad Popular, 369.
75. CIA intelligence report, 9 July 1973, CDP; Prats González, Memorias, 423; Pinochet Ugarte,
Crucial Day, 95. For the text of Allende’s speech, see Soto, El último día, 210–18.
76. Magasich, Los que dijeron “No,” vol. 1, 425–28; Prats González, Memorias, 432–34; Merino
Castro, Bitácora, 206; General Alejandro Medina Lois interview in Marras, Palabra de soldado, 69.
77. Gustafson, “­Double-Blind,” 80; Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 354.
78. Alegría, Allende, 257.
79. Willoughby, La guerra, 148–49; Vega, La caída de Allende, 241. According to one CIA agent,
Souper’s supporters were emboldened to act after a night of heavy drinking. Devine, Good Hunting,
61–62.
80. For what the military learned from the Tanquetazo, see Arturo Yovane, “Desde el Edificio
Norambuena,” Qué Pasa, 8–14 September 1977, 34; Pinochet Ugarte, Journey through Life, 292–97;
and Huidobro Justiniano, Decisión naval, 139–41; Huerta, Volvería, vol. 2, 50. On the “dress rehearsal”
metaphor, see Athey, “Government and Opposition in Chile During the Allende Years,” 509; and
Tomic, “Christian Democracy and the Government of the Unidad Popular,” 234.
81. Embtel 3098, 12 July 1973, CDP; Altamirano speech, FBIS Daily Report, 12 July 1973; Víctor
Vaccaro, “Itinerario de un golpe frustrado,” Chile Hoy, no. 56, 6–12 July 1973; Bussi de Allende, “The
Facts About Chile,” 63; Vidales, Contrarrevolución, 207; Verdugo, Allende, 145. Haslam claims that the
White House ran a secret operation through William Colby and Vernon Walters to promote the
Tanquetazo without the knowledge of the 40 Committee, the U.S. Ambassador, or the CIA station
chief. This conspiracy theory, based on one anonymous source, is conspicuously similar to the
dubious theory that Walters helped engineer the September 1973 coup. See Haslam, Nixon
Administration, 182; and chapter 9.
82. Church Report, 39.
83. Embtel 2569, 13 June 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
84. “Chilean Army Announces Barracks Revolt is Crushed,” NYT, 29 June 1973. U.S. officials may
have also been misled by the opposition press, which discounted the threat, some even going so far as
to suggest it was a ploy by Allende to set up an autocoup. García F., El tancazo, 24–25. Ambassador
Davis cabled Washington one day before the rebellion that despite rumours of an impending coup, the
military’s “­built-in inhibitions are deeply embedded.” See Amembassy ­A-117 to DoS, 28 June 1973,
POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-71, box 2193, RG 59.
85. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 4 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 880.
86. Davis, Last Two Years, 172.
87. CIA briefing paper, “Questions which may be raised concerning Chile,” 1 July 1973, CDP.
88. DoD intelligence information report, “Events Leading Up To The 11 September Military Coup in
Chile, and other Related Matters,” 29 October 1973, CDP.
89. Jeffrey Davidow history interview, 43, FAOHC.
90. CIA intelligence memo, 1 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 710; CIA intelligence report 7
July 1973, CDP.
91. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 879.
92. Merino Castro, Bitácora, 206; DIA intelligence summary, 5 July 1973; CIA intelligence report, 9
July 1973, CDP; embtel 2940, 6 July 1973, 1973SANTIA02940, CFPF, RG 59.
93. CIA information report, 25 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 884–85; Marras, Confesiones, 129–
30; Arriagada Herrera, Pinochet, 90–91. For an example of the committee’s main planning document,
see González, Chile, la conjura, 184–87, 501–507.
94. According to General Nicano Díaz Estrada, serious coup plotting began after the Tanquetazo.
Marras, Confesiones, 103–105.
95. Tótoro Taulis, La cofradía blindada, 190–91; Zimbalist and Stallings, “Showdown in Chile,” 23.
96. Lagos, Mi vida, 41.
97. Labarca Goddard, Vida y lucha de Luis Corvalán, 107; Millas, De O’Higgins a Allende, 320–21.
Castro had previously warned Allende not to trust the military. See Jack Anderson, “Washington ­-
Merry-Go-Round,” WP, 8 September 1972.
98. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 138. For the suggestion that Allende may have imagined
he could gain the military’s loyalty because he was the grandson of a great military surgeon who
served in the War of the Pacific, see Subercaseaux, Gabriel Valdés, 157–58.
99. Herberg, Chile 73, 52.
100. Millas, Memorias, 355.
101. Embtel 2851, 30 June 1973, POL 23–9 Chile, 3–25–70, box 2198, RG 59; Galina, El sueño no fué
ametrallado, 83–84.
102. Castro, “Salvador Allende: His Example Lives On”; Jonathan Kandell, “Allende’s Position
Appears Stronger in Aftermath of Chile’s Abortive Revolt,” NYT, 1 July 1973.
103. Mottet, “Chilean Drama,” 60; Fuente de Información Norteamericana, Class Struggle Sharpens
in Chile, 17; Yanez, “Chile: Continuing Confrontation,” 99. One exception was the British embassy,
which viewed the Tanquetazo as a sign of trouble to come. See Secondé tel 187, 1 July 1973; and
diplomatic report no. 348/73, 9 July 1973, FCO 7/2410/TNA.
104. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 296 n. 29; Letelier, Orlando Letelier, 20; Muñoz, Dictator’s Shadow,
37. For further attempts by Pinochet to avoid suspicion by flattering Letelier, see Dinges and Landau,
Assassination on Embassy Row, 57–59.
105. José Tohá interview, Chile Hoy, no. 55, 29 June—5 July, 1973. This complacency about the
military following the Tanquetazo even extended to some members of the far left. See MIR leader
Andrés Pascal’s comment in Aedo, “Somos de los mesmos,” 93.
106. Turrent, La Unión Soviética en América Latina, 194–95; Gouré and Rothenberg, Soviet
Penetration, 105.
107. Norman Gall, “Chile Hard Times,” NYT, 1 July 1973.
108. Jack Devine interview, La Tercera, 6 January 2014.
109. Israel Zipper, Politics and Ideology, 259.
110. Italics added. For the text of Allende’s address, see Allende report to the nation on the military
uprising of June 29, 1973, 29 June 1973, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 232–38. The scene is
well described in Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 19–20; and Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Revolt
Crushed as Army Backs Allende,” NYT, 30 June 1973. On the disillusionment some Allende
supporters experienced because Allende did not close Congress, see White, Chile’s Days of Terror, 81.
111. Henfrey and Sorj, Chilean Voices, 55.
112. Gerry Foley, “Pools of Blood on the Sidewalks of Santiago,” 15 October 1973, in Evans, Disaster,
239.
113. Blanco, Coup in Chile, 6; Quiroga Zamora, Compañeros, 97–98; White, Chile’s Days of Terror,
62–63; Mallon, Courage Tastes of Blood, 137–47.
114. On the importance of preventing violence, see Allende, First Annual Message to the National
Congress, 21 May 1971, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 96. For examples of Allende
supporters who endorsed this view, see Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 243; Paiva, Rastros de mi pueblo,
29; and Henfrey and Sorj, Chilean Voices, 37. Even the MIR, which had a reputation for invoking
revolutionary rhetoric, generally refrained from escalating the violence. See Bruey, Bread, 47.
115. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 238; LAWR, 21 September 1973; Valenzuela, “Political Constraints,” 4;
Kay, “Chilean Road to Socialism,” 224–25.
116. Prieto, Chile, 42; Strange Defeat, 11; Enríquez Frödden, Edgardo Enríquez Frödden: testimonio,
78–81
117. Carmen Silva interview, 20 November 2001, in Gaudichaud, Poder popular y cordones
industriales, 345, 379–80; Alberto Jerez oral history interview, CIDOC.
118. Paul L. Montgomery, “For Allende, 31 Months of Crises—and Survival,” NYT, 30 June 1973.
119. Arce, Inferno, 10.
120. For example, Chilean naval intelligence kept a ­Russian-built factory in Chile under constant
surveillance. Theberge, Soviet Presence in Latin America, 78–79. The Soviets did dispatch weapons to
UP in the summer of 1973 but aborted the shipment once they learned that the September coup plot
was under way. Leonov, “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America,” 24.
121. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 221–22.
122. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 238.
123. For the view that Allende erred in not arming the popular organizations, see Kay, “Chile: The
Making of a Coup D’Etat,” 25; Maira, “Strategy and Tactics,” in Gil et al., ed. Chile at the Turning Point,
271; and Pérez, “Salvador Allende—Notes on his Security Team,” 32 n. 123. For studies that question
the ability of the cordones to mount an adequate defense, see Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes, 101, 131 n. 58 and n. 59; and Garretón and Moulian, Análisis coyuntural y proceso político,
101–102. According to the U.S. embassy, UP feared that “extreme leftists” were using the popular
movement as “tools of ideological indoctrination and mass mobilization.” See Davis ­A-94 to DoS, 31
May 1973, POL 12 Chile, 1–­3-73, box 2194, RG 59.
124. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 243.
125. Lagos, Mi vida, 254.
126. Quoted in Winn, “Furies of the Andes,” 257.
127. Silva Henríquez, Memorias, 258.
128. Prats, Una vida por la legalidad, 61.
129. Fermandois, Revolución inconclusa, 667; Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile, 251–52, 275 n. 1.
130. Garcés, Allende y la experiencia chilena, 304.
131. The siege motion in the House lost 81 to 52. “Allende’s Bid for Siege Powers Rejected,” NYT, 2
July 1973. For why the PDC failed to support Allende’s request, see “Declaración del PDC frente al
proyecto de estado de sitio pedido por el gobierno,” 19 June 1973, in Echeverría B. and Frei, 1970–
1973, vol. 3, 123–25; and Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 95. According to one
firsthand observer, some PDC officials believed that Allende had staged the rebellion to confuse the
opposition. See Whitehead, “Why Allende Fell,” 470–71 n. 15.
132. Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 365–66.
133. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 245.
134. Allende speech to CUT, 25 July 1973, in Allende, Las grandes alamedas, 155.
135. González, Chile, la conjura, 247. For other examples of unwarranted optimism about the
military’s loyalty, see Victor Perera, “Law and Order in Chile,” NYT Magazine, 3 April 1975; and
Santiago tel to DCI, 17 April 1973, CDP. As late as August 1973, the PCCh maintained that nearly half
the army and most of the national police were still loyal. DIA intelligence summary, 2 August 1973,
CDP.
136. Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Conversando con el General Julio Canessa Robert, 137–38
137. For the view that the coup attempt failed because Souper failed to respect the military hierarchy,
see Boetsch G. H., Recordando con Alessandri, 152.
138. Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November,”
NYT, 27 September 1973. In early 1973, the Chilean military began drawing on the red fascism
analogy to justify action against Allende. See Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 115–16.
139. The Chilean military’s ­anti-Communist sentiments can be traced in part to early ­twentieth-
century Prussian influences. See Arriagada Herrera, El pensamiento político de los militares, 71–107;
and Joxe, “Chilean Armed Forces,” 247.
140. Gustavo Leigh Guzmán interview in Marras, Confesiones, 127. The military was also assured by
Allende’s promise at the outset of his presidency that he would abide by the constitution and not allow
Chile to become a Soviet outpost. See Schnake, Schnake, 167–68; and Sigmund, “Chilean Military.”
141. Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 107.
142. Nunn, Military in Chilean History, 260, 266. Admiral Merino later conceded that Allende did
have considerable support among the troops at the outset of his presidency. See José Toribio Merino
interview, 27 September 1989, in Correa, Preguntas, 147; and Hove, “Losing a Model Democracy,”
441.
143. Between 1950 and 1964, Chile was the second highest recipient of U.S. military aid in Latin
America, just behind Brazil. Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, 62.
144. Gill, School of the Americas, 2; Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Conversando con el General
Julio Canessa Robert, 75. For a description of the historical ties that many coup leaders had with the
United States, see embtel 4906, 9 October 1973, CDP. For descriptions of the School of the Americas’
counterinsurgency program, see “Training Chile’s Terrorists,” NACLA’s Latin America & Empire
Report, 10:1 (January 1976), 14.
 145. Farrell, National Unified School, 212–14.
146. González, Chile, la conjura, 203–205; Prats González, Memorias, 440–41; BBC transcript of
Panorama television program, 10 December 1973, TNA.
147. On the military’s perception of the threat posed by foreign exiles, see CIA intelligence report, 9
July 1973, CDP; Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 102.
148. Carvajal Prado, Téngase presente, 184.
149. CIA Office of Economic Research memo to Van Batenburg, 9 March 1972, 0000307810, CREST;
Nunn, Military in Chilean History, 328 n. 36; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos, 120–22.
150. Davis, Last Two Years, 132; Arancibia Clavel et al., Jarpa, 185; Edwards, Persona Non Grata,
269–70.
151. DIA intelligence summary, 16 March 1973, CDP.
152. Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 133.
153. CIA Director Colby later asserted that the Chilean coup was caused by “nothing in particular”
except that the country was descending into chaos. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–
1973, 21: 913–14. On the military’s professional sense of obligation to restore order, see Nordlinger,
Soldiers in Politics, 54–55. On the military’s natural inclination to side with the right because of its
own class composition, see Thomas G. Sanders, “Military Government in Chile, Part I,” American
Universities Field Staff Reports, 22:1 (December 1975), 2.
154. CIA tel, 6 September 1973, CDP; embtel 2461, 7 June 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84. The CIA seems
to have been unaware that Merino had already investigated this possibility the previous month and
discovered that Peru, at least, had no such plans. See Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 125–26.
155. Pinochet Ugarte, Journey through Life, 283.
156. Quoted in Garcés et al., “World Equilibrium,” 93 n. 8. See also Varas, Gustavo Leigh, 125–28;
and Huerta, Volvería, vol. 2, 31.
157. “The Reasons of the Junta,” 11 September 1973, Loveman and Davies, Politics of Antipolitics,
238–40. Afterwards, Pinochet repeatedly invoked “divine providence” in explaining the success of the
coup. For an example, see Pinochet, A seis meses de la liberación nacional, 33. For an analysis of this
religious discourse, see Muñoz León, “Competing Narratives about Sacrifice,” 515–19.
158. Everett G. Martin, “Class Warfare,” WSJ, 24 October 1972.
159. Ismael Huerta statement to the UN, 9 October 1973, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Internal Security, Theory and Practice of Communism, pt. 5, 2727. See also Gustavo Leigh’s comments
in Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 144.
160. Mattelart, “Chile: The Feminine Side of the Coup,” 22.
161. Thomas G. Sanders, “Military Government in Chile, Part II,” American Universities Field Staff
Reports 22:1 (December 1975), 2; “Inflation of Violence,” Time, 9 October 1972.
162. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 242; Winn, Americas, 339.
163. Quoted in Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, 28.
164. Embtel 6008, 7 December 1971, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 731.
165. Embtel 1687, 3 April 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 447.
166. Intelligence note, 14 October 1971, CDP.
167. Zammit, Chilean Road, 233; Everett G. Martin, “The Crucial Year for Chile’s Allende,” WSJ, 6
July 1973.
168. Jose Yglesias, “1909–1973 Salvador Allende: A Personal Remembrance,” Ramparts, November
1973, 25.
169. Patria y Libertad account of the Tanquetazo, 19 July 1973, La Tercera de la Hora, Silva Bijit et al.,
Historia, 113.
170. “Allende to Bring Military Men into the Cabinet to Ease Unrest,” NYT, 9 August 1973.
171. For examples of the military encouraging the opposition, see CIA intelligence report, 1
September 1973; and CIA tel, 7 September 1973, CDP. For evidence of the opposition’s pressure on the
military to intervene, see comments by Federico Willoughby in Marras, Confesiones, 13–14; Gustavo
Leigh in Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 133; and “Chile: The Story Behind the Coup,” 6. A CIA
informant later claimed that the special coup “teams” included “carefully selected civilians.” See CIA
to Files, 16 September 1973, CDP.
172. Rodríguez Elizondo, Introducción al fascismo chileno; Rojas Mix, El dios de Pinochet, 16–20;
Grugel, “Nationalist Movements”
173. Vuskovic, Acusación al imperialismo.
174. For examples, see Ruis, Ya te vimos, Pinochet!; and Uribe, Carta abierta a Patricio Aylwin, 106.
175. Uliánova, “Soviet Perceptions,” 30; Vassallos, “Accusations against Chile,” 101.
176. Letelier, Speeches and Writings, 4.
177. See “Harmer, “View from Havana,” 118–19.
178. The terminology used to describe the Pinochet regime is seemingly endless. See Garretón,
Chilean Political Process, 46; and Joignant and Navia, “El golpe a la cátedra,” 17–18.
179. Angell, “Chilean Road to Militarism,” 407; Frazier, Salt in the Sand, 42; journalist José Miguel
Varas comments in Verdugo, Chile 1973, 168; Sanders, “Book Burning.”
180. Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors; Klein, “New Voices”; Farías, Los nazis en Chile; Etchpare
and Stewart, “Nazism in Chile”; Deutsch, Las Derechas, 191; Sznajder, “Case of ­Non-European
Fascism.”
181. Steenland, “Coup in Chile,” 28; Kaufman, Transitions to Stable ­Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes,
60.
182. Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, “Were Women and Young People,” 554–55; Power, ­Right-Wing Women
in Chile, 244–46.
183. For further criticisms of the fascist analogy, see Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 343–44; Touraine,
Vida y muerte, 97–99; Paxton, Anatomy of Fascism, 201; Cardoso, “On the Characterization of
Authoritarian Regimes,” 36–37; and Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Military Rule in Chile, 3–4.
184. For examples, see Jonathan Kandell, “Reds Lay Coup to U.S.,” NYT, 25 October 1973; Cohen,
“U.S. Imperialism and Chilean Fascism”; Bussi de Allende, “The Facts About Chile,” 66; Marini,
“Economía política de un golpe militar,” 282–83; Boorstein, “Chile”; and Millas, “From Economic
Subversion to Fascist Putsch,” 102.
185. Colby, for example, tolerated Pinochet but would have preferred the election of a Christian
Democrat such as Frei. See Woods, Shadow Warrior, 369.
186. “The General Explains,” Time, 29 October 1973.
187. Fontaine Aldunate, Todos querían la revolución, 211; González, Chile, la conjura, 221–22; zone 1
military officials’ letter to Merino, 5 September 1973, no. 28677, box 25, AJTM, CIDOC.
188. CIA cable, 27 September 1972, Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 2, doc 10. Well after the 1973 coup,
U.S. intelligence continued to describe Pinochet as reluctant participant in the coup because he
preferred that the armed forces remain apolitical. DIA biographic data on Pinochet, January 1975,
CDP.
189. Pinochet Ugarte, Crucial Day, 70–75.
190. Several of the key 9–11 coup plotters later claimed that Pinochet’s account of his role is
inaccurate. See Leigh’s and Merino’s comments, summarized in CIA intelligence report, 20 August
1974, CDP; Arellano’s comments in González, Chile, la conjura, 228; and Leigh’s comments in Marras,
Confesiones, 129–30.
191. CIA report, 9 June 1971, CDP.
192. CIA tel, “Pinochet Actions at Dinner August 5,” 6 August 1971, CDP. A year later, Pinochet did
begin to have “second thoughts” about participating in a coup against Allende. See CIA cable, 27
September 1972, Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 2, doc 10. But there is no evidence to support the claim
(e.g., Trento, Secret History, 393) that the CIA decided to back Pinochet as leader of the coup. See also
Jack Devine’s insistence that the CIA’s “number two” man badly misjudged Pinochet. Jack Devine
interview, La Tercera, 6 January 2014.
193. Jeffrey Davidow history interview, 45, FAOHC.
194. Quoted in Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 214. Eleven days after the coup, Kissinger was still
requesting that the U.S. embassy clarify whether Pinochet had been involved in plotting to overthrow
Allende. See Kissinger ­A-8173 to Amembassy, 27 September 1973, POL 6 Chile, box 2193, RG 59.
195. Embtel 4154, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 908; Pinochet Ugarte, Crucial Day, 75–
76.
196. Some of the key plotters resented Pinochet’s later bid for power given that he was a “­late-comer”
to the coup effort. See CIA memo, 21 March 1974, CDP; and Schnake, Schnake, 211.
197. “Chile Coup Was Planned for More than Year,” Times, 29 December 1973; Pinochet Ugarte,
Journey through Life, 271. In early May 1973, one CIA source indicated that Pinochet would “not be a
stumbling block to the coup plans,” which suggests that he was not a part of the initial planning. See
Santiago tel to DCI, 2 May 1973, CDP.
198. Arancibia Clavel, Conversando con Roberto Kelly V., 147; Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Officers
Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November,” NYT, 27 September 1973. One report on
events leading up to the Chilean military’s decision to overthrow Allende puts the turning point at the
end of November 1972, when Prats served as ­vice president while Allende was travelling overseas. See
“Estudio de la situación actual del país y actitud de las FF.AA. ante los hechos que deriven en
transgresión de la legalidad, el orden público y la normalidad de las actividades fundamentales de la
nación,” n.d., no. 33068, box 33, AJTM, CIDOC.
199. Pérez Carrillo, “La Fronda Militar,” 136–38; Vidales, Contrarrevolución, 202–203.
200. Canessa Robert and Balart Páez, Pinochet y la restauración, 196–98.
201. González, Chile, la conjura, 187; Verdugo, Chile, Pinochet, and the Caravan of Death, 2–3.
202. Embtel 3359, 30 July 1973, 1973SANTIA03359; and embtel 3515, 7 August 1973,
1973SANTIA03515, CFPF, RG 59.
203. Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “Salvador Allende,” 135, 285.
204. Davis, Last Two Years, 183; Pérez, Salvador Allende—Notes on his Security Team, 35–38;
Huidobro Justiniano, Decisión naval, 166–68.
205. “Gunman Murder Aide to Allende,” NYT, 28 July 1973.
206. Quiroga Zamora, Compañeros, 99. See also Patricio Guzmán’s film, The Battle of Chile.
207. Vega, La caída de Allende, 207; Silva Bijit et al., Historia, 62; Marín, Una historia fantástica y
calculada, 180; Mario Díaz B., “La CIA y la derecha en el asesinato del Edecán,” Punto Final, 19 June
1973; Steenland, “Coup in Chile,” 22; Frida Modak commentary, Radio Portales, no. 28400, 31 July
1973, AJTM, CIDOC.
208. Allende’s last words transmitted by Radio Magallanes, 11 September 1973, in Cockcroft,
Salvador Allende Reader, 240.
209. DoD intelligence information report, “Events Leading Up To The 11 September Military Coup
in Chile,” 29 October 1973, CDP; Martínez Corbalá, Instantes de decisión, 260–61.
210. González, Chile, la conjura, 215.
211. Pinochet Ugarte, Journey through Life, 297–98.
212. DoD intelligence information report, “Events Leading Up To The 11 September Military Coup
in Chile,” 29 October 1973, CDP.
213. Merino Castro, Bitácora, 197; Prats, Una vida por la legalidad, 67; González, Chile, la conjura,
216–17.
214. Whitehead, “Linowitz,” 336.
215. Chancery letter to Latin American Department, 10 November 1972, FCO 7/2209, TNA.
 216. Warren tel to DCI, 14 March 1973, CDP.
217. Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November,”
NYT, 27 September 1973.
218. Embtel 1771, 24 April 1973, DEF Chile, 1/1/70, box 1696, RG 59; Santiago tel to DIA, 24 April
1973, CDP; CIA tel, 18 May 1973, CDP.
219. Prats González, Memorias, 415–17; embtel 2805, 27 June 1973, 1973SANTIA02805, CFPF, RG
59; “Chilean Army Announces Barracks Revolt Is Crushed,” NYT, 4 September 1973.
220. CIA tel, 23 July 1973, CDP.
221. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 10 July 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 882.
222. CIA intelligence memo, 1 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 709–14.
223. Phillips memo to Karamessines, 13 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 888.
224. Prats González, Memorias, 478–82. Pinochet allegedly feigned support for Prats by threatening
the female demonstrators and their military husbands but then deferred to the generals’ decision not
to issue a public statement defending Prats. Muñoz, Dictator’s Shadow, 39.
225. Vega, La caída de Allende, 241–42.
226. Power, ­Right-Wing Women in Chile, 226–28.
227. “Contingency Paper for Chile Ad Hoc Working Group,” 24 August 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-
16: 719.
228. DIA report to file, 24 August 1973, CDP; DoD tel IR 6 817 0132 73, 27 August 1973, CDP.
229. DoD tel IR 6 817 0132 73, 27 August 1973, CDP.
230. Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November,”
NYT, 27 September 1973. On the speculation that a coup might have been avoided had Prats been
able to hold on to his command, see Schnake, Schnake, 210.
231. Witker Velásquez, Salvador Allende cercano, 270; Allende inaugural address at the national
stadium, 5 November 1970, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 54.
232. Winn, “Furies of the Andes,” 240.
233. On divisions within UP, see Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 84; and Almeyda,
Reencuentro, 189–193.
234. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 510–11.
235. DIA intelligence summary, 14 August 1973, CDP; González, Chile, la conjura, 231–32;
Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 172–74; Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 212–15.
236. Hudson, “Role of the Constitutional Conflict,” 68; Falcoff, Modern Chile, 145–50; CIA
information cable TDCS DB–315/02051–72, 10 March 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 774–75; Brunn,
Chile, 47–57.
237. Winn, Weavers of Revolution, 233–34. Allende insisted that he was not afraid to hold a
plebiscite, but it was his prerogative to set the terms. See Allende speech, 18 March 1972 in Allende, El
gobierno popular, 114.
238. Memo for the 40 Committee, 15 August 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 620–21; Juan Garcés
statement in Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz, El imperativo de la memoria, 25–29. For more
on the difficulty of achieving a lasting agreement, see Garretón and Moulian, La Unidad Popular y el
conflicto político en Chile, 129.
239. Silva Henríquez, Memorias, 250–54; embtel 1692, 17 May 1973, POL 12 Chile, 1–­3-73, box
2194, RG 59. The exposé appeared in Laurence Stern, “U.S. Helped Beat Allende in 1964,” WP, 6 April
1973.
240. LAWR, 18 May 1973; Hecksher tel to Broe, 9 July 1973, CDP; Athey, “Government and
Opposition in Chile During the Allende Years,” 503–504. Although the party was already shifting
right for many reasons, Tomic later attributed Alywin’s triumph to the Socialist Party’s personal
attacks on Christian Democratic leftists such as Bernardo Leighton and Renán Fuentealba. See Tomic,
“PDC During the Allende Years,” 336–37.
241. Quoted in Israel Zipper, Politics and Ideology, 80.
242. CIA intelligence report, 8 June 1973, CDP.
243. Davis ­A-94 to DoS, 31 May 1973, POL 12 Chile, 1–­3-73, box 2194, RG 59; CIA intelligence
report, 25 June 1973, CDP; CIA intelligence bulletin, 9 July 1973, ­CIA-
RDP79T00975A024800070002–8, CREST.
244. Florencia Varas, “Last Feverish Hours of Allende Regime,” Times, 6 November 1973.
245. Embtel 2569, 13 June 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
246. Amembassy ­A-117 to DoS, 28 June 1973, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-71, box 2193, RG 59.
247. Prats, Una vida por la legalidad, 58. For parallels between the state of affairs in Chile in 1891
and 1973, see Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 150–57.
248. Whelan, Out of the Ashes, 394–95.
249. Prats González, Memorias, 430–31.
250. Silva Henríquez, Memorias, 262–63.
251. Silva Henríquez, Memorias, 276. For the Socialist Party’s distrust of negotiations with the
Christian Democrats, see Marvine Howe, “Dozen Chilean Professional Groups Form Front to Oust
Allende,” NYT, 2 August 1973.
252. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 232–33. For the text of the resolution, see Para una paz estable,
125–32. Opinions vary widely on whether Allende violated the constitution as the opposition charged.
For accounts contending that he did, see Velasco, “Allende Regime in Chile,” 723; and Hudson, “Role
of the Constitutional Conflict.” For the view that he did not, see Fleet, “Chile’s Democratic Road to
Socialism,” 775–76; and Valenzuela and Valenzuela, “Visions of Chile,” 174 n. 62. For the legal
documentation on the constitutional crisis, see Editorial Jurídica de Chile, Antecedentes ­histórico-
jurídicos, años 1972–1973. Novoa Monreal,¿Vía legal hacia el socialismo? defends UP’s legal position,
while Faúndez, Democratization, 225 blames the Comptroller’s office for allowing itself to become
politicized. Whatever Allende’s constitutional transgressions may have been, they were not the main
cause of the coup. See Markos Mamalakis testimony, 18 September 1974, HCFA, United States and
Chile During the Allende Years, 344; and Dieter Kroner, “The Downfall of Salvador Allende,” Neue
Zürcher Zeitung reprinted in CR, 22 December 1973, 119: 43409.
253. Marlise Simons, “Allende Accuses Opposition of Seeking to Spur Armed Coup,” WP, 26 August
1973.
254. “Imposible el diálogo,” La Prensa, 1 September 1973, in González Pino et al., Los mil días de
Allende, vol. 2, 818.
255. Prats, Una vida por la legalidad, 84–85.
256. FBIS Daily Report, 5 September 1973.
257. Embtel 4015, 6 September 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
258. CIA tel, 6 September 1973.
259. González, Chile, la conjura, 273–74.
260. González Camus, El día en que murió Allende, 113–17. The head of the Carabineros, Arturo
Yovane, claims to have leaked the coup plot to the PDC in late August 1973. See Pérez Carrillo, “La
Fronda Militar,” 142.
261. Letelier, Orlando Letelier, 23–24.
262. Prats González, Memorias, 509–10.
263. Accounts of these meetings vary, but most agree that UP was split and the Christian Democrats
backed out. See Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 367–68; Millas, Memorias, 359–66; Steenland, “Coup in
Chile,” 12; Hormazábal, La Democracia Cristiana y el gobierno de Allende, 163–64; Witker Velásquez,
Salvador Allende cercano, 225; Walker, Del populismo al leninismo, 108; and “Carolina Rossetti
entrevista a Rafael Agustín Gumucio.”
 264. Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 153–54.
265. Altamirano speech at the National Stadium, 9 September 1973, in Farías, La izquierda chilena,
1276–81. On the Navy’s purging of leftist sailors, see tel IR 6 817 0053 73, 13 April 1973, CDP. On the
role of CIA propaganda in stoking fears about communist plots to infiltrate the military and
assassinate its leaders, see Landis, “CIA Makes Headlines,” 30–31.
266. Quoted in Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 241. For Allende’s disgust with Altamirano’s
revolutionary romanticism, see Timerman, Death in the South, 126.
267. Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 155–56; Garcés, Allende y la experiencia chilena, 352–53.
Briones claims that Allende had planned to announce the plebiscite on 10 September but because the
speech was not ready in time, he delayed it for one day. Florencia Varas, “Last Feverish Hours of
Allende Regime,” Times, 6 November 1973. Several UP ministers, including Orlando Letelier,
allegedly helped edit Allende’s planned announcement of the plebiscite. See Enríquez, “La obra del
gobierno de Allende,” 226–27. Allende’s press secretary Carlos Jorquera later claimed that Allende
delayed the plebiscite announcement until 12 September at the request of Chilean military officials
whom he met on 9 September. This story has not been corroborated by anyone else. See Jorquera,
Chicho Allende, 113.
268. Almeyda, Reencuentro, 240.
269. Bitar, Chile 1970–1973, 368. For a similar account of Allende’s remarks on this point, see
Letelier, Orlando Letelier, 15.
270. Canessa Robert, Quiebre y recuperación, 169–70. For Letelier’s recollection of Allende’s resolve
at this meeting, see Letelier testimony, 18–21 February 1975, International Commission of Enquiry
into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, in Chile: Denuncia y Testimonio, 17.
271. Corvalán, De lo vivido y lo peleado, 154.
272. González, Chile, la conjura, 325.
273. Farrell, National Unified School, 240–41. See also Almeyda’s opinion that Allende had found an
“appropriate solution” in his plan to announce a plebiscite. Almeyda, “Salvador Allende y las
Relaciones Exteriores de Chile,” 158.
274. Laurence R. Birns, “Chile: The Frying Pan Awaits the Fire,” American Report, 3 (30 July 1973)
reprinted in HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 507. Part of the challenge in
determining the feasibility of a plebiscite is that its exact formulation remains unknown. In 1993,
Eduardo Novoa discovered parts of a working draft of UP’s proposal to establish a Chamber of
Workers on par with the Chamber of Deputies. This document is far from being in a form that
Allende could have delivered as a speech, let alone one that the public could readily vote upon. See
Allende, Un estado democrático y soberano, 8.
275. Boeninger, Democracia en Chile, 215. Aylwin appears to have been following Boeninger’s model
when he asked the legislators on 8 September 1973 to resign in order to force a new election.
Mendoza, Todos confesos, 95–96; Serrano, La igual libertad, 58.
276. Volodia Teitelboim interview, 26 November 1989, in Correa, Preguntas, 139. For indications
that the PCCh was more than willing to reach a deal, see memcon (Huepe, Isaacs), 10 May 1973, box
4, CAF, RG 84. As late as ­mid-August 1973, U.S. intelligence reported that the PDC was still divided
whether to pursue a hardline against Allende. DIA intelligence summary, 17 August 1973, CDP. For a
potential solution in which the president and the Congress would resign in order to clear the way for
new elections, see Tomic, “Some Clarification,” 189–90; and Núñez Muñoz, El gran desencuentro, 211–
12.
277. Bernardo Leighton interview, 14 November 1985, in Correa, Preguntas, 112–13. For evidence
that the gremios preferred a plebiscite to a coup, see Verdugo, Chile 1973, 72, 108. Catholic Jesuits also
promoted dialogue to avert a civil war. See Thomas G. Sanders and Brian H. Smith, “Chilean Catholic
Church during the Allende and Pinochet Regimes,” American Universities Field Staff Reports 23:1
(March 1975), 6. In early September 1973, the British embassy suggested that a compromise between
the government and the PDC still might be possible. See diplomatic report no. 415/73, 3 September
1973, FCO 7/2425, TNA.
278. Gardner memcon (Kubisch, Hurwitch, Shlaudeman, CIA names not declassified) to McAfee, 14
June 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 868; DIA intelligence summary, 25 August 1973, CDP.
279. Florencia Varas, “Chile at a Standstill, Waiting for a coup?” Times, 20 August 1973.
280. As Lagos later surmised, if the two groups had only known what was coming over the next
fifteen years, they would have reached a compromise. See Ricardos Lagos interview, Varas and
González in Chile entre el sí y el no, 110–11.
281. Correa and Subercaseaux, Ego Sum Pinochet, 61–62.
282. “Se constituyo comando multigremial de Santiago,” El Mercurio, 11 September 1973, in
González Pino et al., Los mil días de Allende, vol. 2, 939.
283. Falcoff, Modern Chile, 316–18; Amembassy ­A-259 to DoS, 14 November 1972, POL 2 Chile, 1–­-
1-71, box 2193, RG 59. For Allende’s dramatic but ultimately futile attempt to convince Aylwin that he
would never establish a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” see Silva Henríquez, Memorias, 267.
284. Jorquera, Chicho Allende, 113; Martner, El gobierno del presidente Salvador Allende, 540–41;
Schnake, Schnake, 223.
285. Touraine, Vida y muerte, 179. For a similar judgment, Paul Sigmund, “Seeing Allende Through
the Myths,” Worldview, 17:4 (April 1974), 18.
286. Subercaseaux, Gabriel Valdés, 176–77.
287. Altamirano, Dialéctica de una derrota, 193. For harsh criticisms of the PCCh for agreeing to the
plebiscite, see Palacios, Chile, 116–27. In early August 1973, MIR’s leader announced that no
compromise was possible. See Haslam, Nixon Administration, 208.
288. Henfrey and Sorj, Chilean Voices, 170.
289. Embtel 4072, 10 September 1973, 1973 SANTIA04072, CFPF, RG 59.
290. Fermandois, Revolución inconclusa, 756–58.
291. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 177 n. 23.
292. Silva Henríquez, Memorias, 279. On Allende’s notorious tactic of holding long discussions but
delaying any agreement, see interview with former President Eduardo Frei, 28 March 1980, in Falcoff,
Modern Chile, 316. For Aylwin’s conclusion that Allende was not serious in his negotiations, see
Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 313 n. 31.
293. Garcés, Allende y la experiencia chilena, 369.
294. On the bomb threats, which UP officials blamed on “fascists,” see embtel 3627, 15 August 1973,
CDP; and embtel 3624, 15 August 1973, 1973SANTIA03624, CFPF, RG 59.
295. Fermandois, Revolución inconclusa, 760; Andrés Zaldívar oral history, CIDOC; embtel 3426, 1
August 1973, 1973SANTIA03426, CFPF, RG 59.
296. Marvine Howe, “Allende’s Ouster Not Aim,” NYT, 27 August 1973. For Aylwin’s assessment that
Allende was a “prisoner of his own party, which did not want a democratic solution,” see Retamal
Avila, Aylwin, 290.
297. Judd Kessler interview, 24, FAOHC. See also, one PDC negotiator’s recollection that Allende did
not seem to understand that Altamirano and the young militants would not support an agreement.
Thayer Arteaga, Segunda fila, 151.
298. Véliz, Continuities, 23. By contrast, Carlos Altamirano claims that Allende was his own man and
not overly influenced by either his wife or his daughter. Politzer, Altamirano, 66–67. See also one study
claiming that Tati supported Allende’s decision to hold a plebiscite. Álvarez Vergara, Tati Allende, 158.
299. CIA information cable TDCS DB–315/07701–72, 14 September 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
817.
300. Mendoza, Todos confesos, 97.
 301. Serrano and Cavallo, El poder de la paradoja, 246–47; Aylwin Azócar, El reencuentro de los
demócratas, 28–29.
302. Fuentealba interview, Chile Hoy, no. 62, 17–23 August 1973.
303. Editorial, “Frei Offers a Way,” NYT, 31 August 1973.
304. After the coup, the junta claimed that a letter sent from Castro to Allende indicated that
Allende’s negotiations with the PDC had been designed solely to gain time to make military
preparations to halt a coup. A close reading of the letter, however, indicates that Allende’s first choice
was a peaceful solution. See Castro letter to Allende, 29 July 1973, in Timossi, Grandes alamedas, 196–
97; embtel 3515, 7 August 1973, 1973SANTIA03515, CFPF, RG 59; and embtel 4573, 25 September
1973, 1973SANTIA04573, CFPF, RG 59. On Allende’s ploy of asking for more time as a stalling tactic,
see Renán Fuentealba Moena interview, 22 September 2002, in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la historia,
208–209. On the PDC’s waffling and outright sabotage of the talks, see Israel Zipper, Politics and
Ideology, 83; and Gumucio, Apuntes, 209–13.
305. DIA intelligence summary, 17 July 1973, CDP.
306. Prats González, Memorias, 450.
307. Birns testimony, 18 September 1974, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years,
358. Some PDC leaders were hinting at the advantage of a coup in early 1972. See memcon (Pareto,
Monares, Arzac, Isaacs), 22 March 1972, box 3, CAF.
308. Santiago tel to DCI, 17 April 1973, CDP. Even as late as August, the opposition lacked the ­two-
thirds votes in the Senate needed to impeach Allende. “Chile’s Labor Federation Bids Members
Defend Government,” NYT, 23 August 1973.
309. Embtel 3359, 30 July 1973, 1973SANTIA03359, CFPF, RG 59.
310. Embtel 3768, 23 August 1973, 1973SANTIA03768, CFPF, RG 59.
311. Ahumada, Chile: La memoria prohibid.a, vol. 1, 128 n. 23.
312. Pérez Carrillo, “La Fronda Militar,” 125. PDC leader Luis Pareto also allegedly conspired with
Chilean naval leaders to promote the coup. See Schnake, Schnake, 178–79.
313. Santiago tel to DCI, 7 May 1973, CDP.
314. Quoted in Canessa Robert and Balart Páez, Pinochet y la restauración, 207.
315. CIA tel, 8 September 1973, CDP.
316. Serrano and Cavallo, El poder de la paradoja, 248.
317. González, Chile, la conjura, 250. See also Schnake, Schnake, 190–91.
318. Boye, Hermano Bernardo, 201–202. For the importance of the 22 August resolution in justifying
the military intervention, see Amorós, Allende, 476–77; Valenzuela, “Military in Power,” 27; and Colby
letter to Scowcroft, 17 September 1974, CDP.
319. Marlise Simons, “Allende Accuses Opposition of Seeking to Spur Armed Coup,” WP, 26 August
1973.
320. Embtel 4424, 20 September 1973, 1973 SANTIA04424.
321. Rome tel 10281, 26 September 1973, 1973ROME10281, CFPF, RG 59. Several PDC officials did
sign a manifesto opposing the coup, but the statement was not published until a year later. Ahumada,
Chile: La memoria prohibid.a, vol. 1, 195. As discussed in chapter 9, Allende had no plans for a ­self-
coup.
322. For examples of those who believed that Allende could win a plebiscite, see Coronel Araneda,
Memorias de un sepulturero, 60–61; Hernán Ortega interview, 6 November 2001, in Gaudichaud,
Poder popular y cordones industriales, 206; and Carlos Altamirano interview, Chile Hoy, no. 39, 9–15
March 1973.
323. González Camus, El día en que murió Allende, 115.
324. See diplomatic report no. 217/73, 13 March 1973, FCO 7/2410.
325. Willoughby, La guerra, 150; Therberge testimony, 18 September 1974, HCFA, United States and
Chile during the Allende Years, 310–11.
326. Hernán Santa Cruz interview, in Witker Velásquez, Salvador Allende cercano, 171; Muñoz,
Dictator’s Shadow, 6.
327. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, 37; Jaime Hales interview in Verdugo, Chile 1973, 228; Marshner,
Chile First Hand, 59.
328. ­Rosenstein-Rodan, “Why Allende Failed,” 12–13.
329. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 177 n. 23.
 9
Chile’s 9/11
Given the mountain of insurmountable obstacles that Allende was facing
during the final days of his presidency, few observers were surprised when
the military coup finally unfolded early in the morning on 11 September
1973. Nearly all accounts of that period describe a society at the breaking
point because of hyperinflation, food shortages, strikes, and street violence.
After the coup, a great deal of soul-searching went into what had gone
wrong and whether there had been an opportunity missed to avert the coup.
The role of the United States in the downfall of Allende also became the
subject of much speculation, especially because of the widespread publicity
that the ITT scandal had received as a result of the Church hearings held
just a few months earlier. Recounting how the coup came about is necessary
for exploring these issues—then it will be possible to assess U.S. efforts at
damage control, as the Nixon administration went about trying to convince
the world that it had been just a neutral bystander.

The Chilean Military Hesitates: An ­Alphonse-Gaston

Routine
In late August 1973, the DIA estimated that most Chilean senior military
officers were still hoping to extract concessions from Allende without having
to launch a coup.1 The opposition continued to press Allende to remilitarize
his cabinet in the hopes that the military officers would keep the UP
government in check. Sensing an opening, the CIA station requested that
“maximum support” be given to the opposition, with the understanding that
“events may carry the armed forces beyond this point to that of a full
military takeover.”2 As discussed previously, Ambassador Davis objected that
such assistance might implicate the United States in a coup, but he agreed to
consult Washington, which suspended a decision. When it came to the issue
of Allende’s cabinet composition, however, no amount of assistance to the
opposition would have mattered because military officers had already begun
to defect from the government.3
One of the most publicized departures was air force commander César
Ruiz Danyau, who resigned his post as transportation minister on 17 August
after a disagreement with Allende about how to settle the second trucker’s
strike.4 Ruiz Danyau’s departure angered the air force commanders, nearly
triggering another premature coup. Ambassador Davis later described the
scene as a “­tragi-comic ‘Alphonse and Gaston’ act”—referring to a popular
cartoon that satirized two overly polite bumbling Frenchmen—“with the
Navy waiting for the Air Force to move and the Air Force hoping the Navy
would start, while the Army gave private assurances that it would not act
against any such move.”5 The only significant outcome was that General
Gustavo Leigh agreed to replace Ruiz Danyau as head of the air force on the
condition that another general assume the transportation post. Now there
were two branches of the military headed by commanders (Pinochet and
Leigh) who were hostile to Allende.6
After this ­near-fiasco, the military realized it had to achieve better
coordination among the three branches to pull off a successful coup.7 At the
end of August, the key military plotters met and decided that September
would be the “decisive” month to get rid of Allende.8
Getting all three branches of the military lined up against the UP
government, however, required the removal of Admiral Raúl Montero, the
head of the navy, who appeared to be loyal to Allende. Montero, a weak
figure who knew that he had lost the respect of most naval officers, offered
to resign. Allende begged Montero to stay on, however, because the
alternative was to promote the next in command, Admiral José Toribio
Merino, a suspected coup plotter.9 The delay over Merino’s appointment so
roiled the Chilean Navy that it threatened to withdraw from the annual U.S.-
South American naval exercise (Unitas). In solidarity, the armed forces
considered canceling their participation in the traditional Independence
Day celebrations (18–19 September).10 Fearing a repeat of the Tanquetazo
debacle, Assistant Secretary Kubisch asked the CIA to devise a plan for
assisting any coup attempt that appeared to be in danger of failing.11
On 6 September, as Ambassador Davis departed for Washington to meet
with Kissinger, the DIA reported that “military officers are now looking
more toward easing into power” in order to avoid the necessity of “drastic
tactics and possible confrontations.”12 But two days later, the U.S. embassy,
the DIA, and the CIA all agreed that Chilean military plotters had fixed a
coup date for 10 September.13 The CIA cautioned that the coup might be
delayed, either to allow for better “tactical coordination,” or because Merino
wanted to wait for his appointment as head of the navy. Either way, the
agency warned, Allende “still has time to maneuver,” which he could use to
accommodate the demands of the PDC or the military, thereby throwing off
the timing of the plotters or averting a coup altogether.14 Meanwhile, back in
Washington Davis predicted that if the armed forces took over, Chile’s new
government was likely to be similar to the military regimes of Brazil and
Peru insofar as it would be “very pro–American. We have good contacts
with the Chilean military,” he reassured Kissinger.15
On 9 September, Leigh and Merino managed to goad a hesitant Pinochet
into signing a pact setting the coup date on 11 September.16 The new date,
which the CIA detected through its naval sources, raised U.S. apprehensions
that the delay could provide Allende “with additional time to work his way
out of the present crisis.”17 The DIA also surmised that Allende might yet
pull a rabbit out of his hat: The previous day the Communist Party had
contacted the opposition, which could open “the way for Allende to form a
more moderate government and appease the military.”18 The Chilean
military apparently had similar concerns, for on 10 September it contacted a
CIA officer with a request for assistance in case the coup attempt
encountered difficulties. The U.S. officer who received this entreaty sent the
request on to Washington. The CIA’s Western Hemisphere Chief, David
Phillips, then forwarded this appeal to Kissinger and Kubisch, who had
already ordered that a plan be drawn up to meet just such an emergency.
Before Washington could respond, however, the Chilean military launched
the coup early the next day right on schedule.19

The Coup
Just as many Americans can remember where they were and what they
were doing on 11 September 2001 when they first heard the news that
terrorists had attacked the World Trade Center, most Chileans who lived
through the Allende era have enduring memories of 11 September 1973,
when the armed forces attacked La Moneda and deposed the UP
government.20 The day of the coup has been described countless times by
eyewitnesses and analyzed thoroughly by a wide variety of participants,
journalists, and scholars. While nearly everyone can agree that the coup
represented a dramatic turning point in Chilean history, some controversies
remain, including the degree of civilian and military resistance, Allende’s
suicide, and the coup’s timing.21
Once the Chilean military command united against the UP government
the Chilean revolution was doomed. Allende, however, refused to yield.
After learning that the navy was in rebellion on the morning of September
11, he raced to La Moneda to defend the government. His first radio
message tried to appeal to the rest of the military’s sense of professionalism
in the hope that soldiers would defend the government.22 Resistance within
the military was extremely limited. A handful of UP sympathizers at the
National Academy for ­Non-Commissioned Police Officers managed to hold
out for three days.23 But the bulk of the armed forces closed ranks once the
coup was underway. Those who did not paid a heavy price during the
counterrevolution. According to some accounts, the military took the
precaution just before launching the coup of shooting or imprisoning
known Allende supporters within their ranks.24 As U.S. Senator Fulbright
speculated, “what we have seen in Chile may not be one coup, but two—the
first within the armed forces themselves when moderates were replaced by
hard liners, and the second when the hard liners overthrew the civilian
government.”25
Once Allende realized he could no longer count on the military, he gave
what would be his last radio message, which concluded: “The people must
defend themselves, but not sacrifice themselves” by being “leveled or mowed
down.”26 These parting instructions to his followers illustrated the glaring
flaw in Chilean exceptionalism. With no concrete backup plan to protect the
revolution once it came under armed attack, Allende left his supporters in
the lurch. Although practically everyone knew a coup attempt was coming,
many imagined that a compromise was still possible.27 Allende told a
Spanish journalist in early 1973 that he believed the military would remain
loyal, but in any case, his supporters would meet counterrevolutionary
violence with revolutionary force.28 Yet how were “the people,” mostly
civilians untrained in the use of arms, supposed to defend themselves
against the likes of the Chilean armed forces? Civil disobedience was not an
option against bombs, tanks, and guns. Whatever weapons Chilean leftists
had tried to stash for defensive purposes had mostly been seized by the
military under the Arms Control Law. As one Socialist remembered, on the
day of the coup “all we had was a pistol and a plastic bag with bullets.” Most
did not even know how to use a gun.29
Deposing Allende through a coup proved easier than either the Nixon
administration or the Chilean military had imagined. The naval takeover of
Valparaíso early in the morning had met no opposition, Kissinger later
reported to Nixon.30 The airstrikes on La Moneda that opened the rebellion
proved to be overkill, as most Carabineros had abandoned the building well
before noon.31 Allende sent a truce message to the coup leaders asking that
the ­low-income residential neighborhoods be spared while the two sides
negotiated.32 The military refused and insisted on the president’s
unconditional surrender, offering to fly him out of the country. Allende
declined.33 Realizing that his government was about to fall, the president
sent most of his staff out of the building, and around 2 p.m. shot himself
with the ­AK-47 given to him by Fidel Castro.34
Shortly after Allende’s suicide, the military announced that except for a
few snipers in Santiago, the entire country was under its control.35
Unexpectedly, the coup elicited only scattered civilian resistance, as pro–
Allende workers failed to take to the streets in defense of the government as
many authorities had anticipated.36 General Arellano Stark later recalled
how surprised he was that the industrial belts, which were Allende
strongholds, were so easily subdued.37 Some have tried to explain the
military’s easy victory as an indication of just how unpopular Allende’s
government had become. The U.S. director of the Binational Center in
Santiago, for example, later described jubilant cheering in downtown
Santiago offices once news of the coup began to spread.38 Undoubtedly, a
sizable portion of the population, probably the majority, was relieved that
the crisis was over.39 But a better explanation about why there was so little
resistance is that most supporters of Allende’s government were either
unwilling or unprepared to initiate a civil war.40
Allende’s death had left the resistance leaderless. Pinochet’s refusal to
allow Allende’s body to be photographed and the lack of an official
investigation into his death led to decades of wild speculation about how the
president had died.41 For all its inside knowledge of the Chilean military,
even the Nixon administration was initially unsure. At 5 p.m. on the day of
the coup, Kissinger informed Nixon that an unconfirmed report indicated
that Allende had committed suicide. A day later, the Washington Special
Action Group (WSAG, a crisis management team comparable to the 40
Committee) pondered the issue. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush
suggested that Allende had deliberately committed suicide in order to
become a martyr. When Kissinger contended that “losers don’t become
martyrs in Latin America,” a Defense Department official rapidly countered
with the example of Che Guevara.42 A few days later, Kissinger pressed
WSAG on whether Allende’s death was a suicide. CIA Director William
Colby was evasive but implied that the president had taken his own life. “I
wished he had asked our permission,” Colby joked, implying that Allende’s
judgment had been impaired: “We know he had about ten drinks in the
morning and was loaded by noon.”43

Conspiracies
The suicide explanation, which served as the Chilean military’s official
version of Allende’s death, drew considerable skepticism among Allende’s
supporters, who did not find it difficult to imagine that either the military or
the CIA or both had done in their great leader. Further doubts about
Allende’s death were encouraged by the claim of one of Allende’s bodyguards
that the military had shot the president six times.44 For those who believed
that the United States was ultimately responsible for the coup, it was then a
short step to connecting Allende’s death to the United States, even if
indirectly. Gabriel García Márquez, for example, blamed Allende’s death on
junta members “in the hire of North American imperialism.”45 Pablo Neruda
explained Allende’s death as a murder committed by the Chilean military
(“bloodhounds”) on behalf of the Chilean oligarchy and the copper interests
in a scheme that had been instigated and financed by the North
Americans.46 The Berkeley Barb, a radical U.S. student newspaper, alleged
that Green Berets (U.S. Army Special Forces) under the guidance of the CIA
had stormed the presidential palace and shot Allende.47
The theory that Allende must have been murdered has enjoyed
remarkable longevity despite overwhelming evidence pointing toward
suicide.48 Allende spoke publicly and privately many times about his
willingness to die for the revolution by committing suicide.49 Although
Allende often denied that he had a martyr complex, he seemed obsessed
with former President José Manuel Balmaceda, who committed suicide
during the political strife of 1891 rather than concede to the Chilean
Congress.50 In late August 1973, Allende told the Chilean military that he
would never surrender and if necessary, he would die in La Moneda.51
Allende did not just fantasize about suicide, he was also very explicit that he
would kill himself with the ­AK-47 that he had received from Castro as a gift.
Shortly before the coup, he arranged to have his private papers shipped to
Cuba or destroyed in the event of his death.52
Given these repeated warnings, Allende’s decision not to accept the
military’s offer to go into exile should not have been surprising to anyone.
One day before the coup, Allende told his wife that he was not going to
surrender and be flown out of the country in an airplane.53 As several of his
close associates later commented, Allende was not the kind of leader who
would have been comfortable in exile knowing that he had abandoned his
loyal followers.54 Whether Allende should have even tried to leave is
debatable. Air force general Gustavo Leigh later admitted that if Allende had
chosen exile over suicide, he would have created many headaches for the
junta.55 But for that very reason, it seems unlikely that the military would
have let him go. Hortensia Allende barely managed to escape from their
home, which suffered bomb attacks. During the coup, Pinochet joked with
Carvajal that if Allende did accept their offer to fly him out of the country it
could be arranged to have the plane crash.56 In the opinion of Isabel Allende,
her uncle had made the right choice given Pinochet’s rationale for his joke:
“Kill the bitch and you eliminate the litter.”57
Even though the balance of the evidence strongly suggests that Allende
committed suicide, many Allende supporters continue to question it because
they seem to be afraid that such an admission would cast aspersions on
Allende’s character.58 Opponents of the UP government certainly tried to use
the suicide to denigrate the Chilean president.59 After the coup, Isabel
Allende recalled, the generals claimed that a “drunken Allende had
committed suicide not only out of shame for his own failure as leader but
particularly because the valiant armed forces had uncovered his deposits of
Russian armaments, his pantry full of chickens, his corruption, his thievery,
and his bacchanals.”60 Allende’s death should not be compared to
Balmaceda’s, one critic insisted, because Allende was a weakling who could
not face his failures.61 Other detractors alleged that Allende committed
suicide to evade being put on trial for treason.62 One journalist has
embraced these assumptions in attempting to argue that Allende’s suicide
was staged by the military to make the president appear weak.63
Several analysts have blamed communist propaganda for spreading
doubts about Allende’s suicide.64 Castro told Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi that Allende would not have committed suicide because he had once
pledged to fight to his last breath.65 The Soviets also assumed that Allende
did not kill himself because true revolutionaries could only fall “by being
assassinated by the enemy.”66 The widespread belief that Allende died
fighting, however, is not the consequence of communist indoctrination but a
desire to remember Allende as a hero who resisted to the end.67 After the
coup, U.S. intelligence reported rumors circulating in Chile that Allende had
been assassinated by his bodyguard to ensure that he became a
revolutionary martyr.68 As Ariel Dorfman has so eloquently explained:
“Because Allende’s death was the first death of the dictatorship, the
preeminent death with which the terror had been inaugurated, we needed it
to be an archetypal death, one from which all the other deaths would flow,
we needed this to be an epic tale, tragic only in its simplicity, the good king
assassinated by the generals who had sworn allegiance to him.”69 For some
Allende supporters, this psychic need for a hero was so powerful that no
amount of contrary evidence seemed to matter. After the coup, one of
Allende’s security staff insisted that he would never believe that Allende
committed suicide, nor would Allende’s supporters.70
The strong desire to see Allende as a masterful leader who had devised a
plan to solve the crisis but was then betrayed by the military has also figured
into the debate over the timing of the coup. For example, several former UP
officials maintain that the military advanced the coup date to preempt a
plebiscite.71 Pinochet later claimed that Allende had boasted to him that he
would win the plebiscite, a “threat” that the general discounted as a bluff.
Pinochet also asserted that the plot had been advanced to appease a restless
navy.72 Yet the date of the coup was not finally fixed until 9 September, when
Merino and Leigh sent a pact to force a wavering Pinochet to commit to the
coup.73 Altamirano’s speech at the Teatro Caupolicán that day certainly
infuriated the navy, but the plot had already been formulated and would
have gone forward in any case.74 Perhaps most important, many military
officers either did not hear about the plebiscite or doubted that Allende
would ever hold one.75 One officer declared afterward, “We would have
acted even if Allende had called a plebiscite or reached a compromise with
the political opposition.”76
Another way to explain Allende’s failure was to depict him as a victim of
U.S. imperialism. Relations between the United States and Chile had
deteriorated so badly by 1973 that it is not surprising that so many former
UP officials and their sympathizers readily grasped onto conspiracy theories
about how the Nixon administration had orchestrated Allende’s downfall.
For example, many accounts have suggested that U.S. naval ships were
directing the coup under the cover of Unitas.77 What actually happened is
that Admiral Merino dispatched a Chilean fleet from Valparaíso headed
north on Monday, 10 September, allegedly to participate in the Unitas
exercises but with secret orders to turn around early the next day.78 As
Ambassador Davis later correctly surmised, “This Navy feint may have
served its purpose of lulling and misleading President Allende and his
supporters on Monday.”79 Three U.S. destroyers and a submarine stationed in
Peruvian waters were heading south early on the morning of 11 September
to participate in the Unitas exercises. When Assistant Secretary Kubisch
learned that a coup attempt was underway, however, he ordered the Defense
Department to turn the U.S. naval craft around and cancel the exercises.80
Two days after the coup, WSAG discussed how to handle potential
questions from the press about why U.S. naval vessels were headed toward
Chile when the coup transpired. Kubisch warned that an “allegation that
American ships were in Chilean waters can do considerable damage for
years to come.” Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush advocated sending
the vessels, which were currently just south of the Peruvian border and on
their way to Cape Horn, back north to avoid any suspicion. Several admirals
objected because they wanted to station the ships 200 miles off the Chilean
coast out of sight in order to keep U.S. options open. Kissinger could not
conceive of a circumstance in which the ships would be needed, however, so
he promised to consult Nixon, whom he predicted would turn them around.
Kissinger argued that since there was nothing to hide, why not just say that
“this was a regular exercise; that our ships were supposed to meet Chilean
ships, but when we heard about the coup we cancelled their orders.”81 This
discussion, which took place behind closed doors where U.S. officials could
have freely contemplated how to cover up the U.S. role had there been one,
demonstrates that the U.S. Navy was not directing the coup.
Another conspiracy theory was prompted by the timing of Ambassador
Davis’s meeting with Kissinger on 8 September, which appeared to suggest
that the ambassador had gone to Washington seeking approval to initiate the
coup, perhaps even advancing the date.82 As Kissinger explained to WSAG
after the coup, however, he had asked Davis to come to Washington during a
“quiet period.”83 Davis, who was free to choose the meeting date, picked 8
September because he wanted to be back in Santiago “as soon as possible,”
presumably because he anticipated the Allende government falling in the
near future.84 Assistant Secretary Kubisch later pointed out that if the actual
coup date had been known with certainty, the State Department would have
ordered Davis to stay at his post.85 Kissinger’s and Davis’s recollections of
their meeting differ only in minor details. Neither of their accounts suggests
that they were conspiring to launch a coup in Chile on 11 September. An
exasperated Kissinger later complained to Rush that “it’s an absurd situation
where we have to apologize for the overthrow … of a government hostile to
us…. I didn’t know that a coup was coming at any particular date. We’d been
hearing coup rumors for a year.”86
Long after the coup, Nixon administration officials repeatedly denied that
they had anything to do with the coup. CIA Director William Colby, for
example, wrote in his memoirs that the Chilean coup was “carried out with
no participation by CIA—in fact, CIA sent instructions to its station in
Santiago in May and June 1973 to separate itself from any contact with the
Chilean military.”87 The Chilean military also denied both privately and
publicly that it had received any assistance from the United States. One day
after the coup, Ambassador Davis reported that according to Pinochet, “he
and his colleagues had not even hinted to us beforehand of their developing
resolve to act” because “it had been better that way.”88 Kubisch informed
WSAG: “The leaders of the coup were very cagey, they refrained from
tipping us off. The leadership did not tell us when it would happen.”89
Pinochet swore to Time magazine: “We received help from nobody…. We
did this ourselves, the true Chileans and the armed forces, with no help
from the inside or the outside.”90 The retrospective accounts of the coup by
its leaders tell more or less the same story, and they are notably consistent in
not mentioning guidance or assistance from the United States.91
Skeptics might reasonably reject such disclaimers because both groups
had good reasons to lie about their collusion. After the coup, U.S. officials
repeatedly insisted that they were not responsible for Allende’s downfall,
even though the White House had in fact issued secret instructions to bring
him down. The Chilean generals, as proud nationalists, might also be
expected to lie since to admit that they had received any assistance from the
Nixon administration would make them appear as tools of U.S. imperialism.
For example, the claim that there was no contact between the CIA and the
Chilean military is false, because ­lower-level Chilean officers leaked the plot
to the U.S. embassy, and at least one Chilean military figure approached the
CIA seeking assistance if the coup went badly.92
But just because Nixon administration officials were deceptive about
some of their actions does not mean that they lied about all of them. As
Senator Fulbright once observed: “if you are caught in enough lies, nobody
is going to believe you even if you are telling the truth.”93 Up until practically
the last hour before the actual coup began, U.S. officials remained uncertain
about whether a coup would take place or whether it would succeed.94 Since
the available evidence does not point to the United States having a direct
hand in the Chilean coup, some analysts have attempted to weave elaborate
stories about U.S. officials who were pulling the strings behind the scenes.
One conspiracy theory that emerged several days after the coup maintained
that in 1971 the CIA had hatched a plot ­code-named Centaur to overthrow
the Allende government through psychological warfare, currency
manipulation, and crop destruction. The origins of this hoax can be traced
to former Chilean Ambassador to Mexico Hugo Vigorena Ramírez, who
declared shortly after the coup that he had seen documents proving the
existence of Centaur. U.S. intelligence quickly refuted the claim, insisting
that documents had been forged by an American parole violator who had
fled to Mexico.95
More recently, the historian Jonathan Haslam has raised the possibility
that CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters was directing the coup from a
hotel on Constitution Plaza in Santiago with the assistance of General
William Westmoreland’s ­brother-in-law Hernández Westmoreland.96
Walters, a dashing diplomat known for his skilled troubleshooting and
expertise in many languages, would appear in many ways to be the ideal
instrument for undertaking such an assignment. Walters had already proved
his usefulness in the campaign to undermine Allende by serving as a
translator for Nixon when he offered “money or other discreet aid” to
Brazilian President Emílio Garrastazu Médici in late 1971 for encouraging
the Chilean armed forces to overthrow Allende.97 At the time of the coup,
Walters was also allegedly supervising CIA liaisons with Chilean intelligence
services.98 As one Chilean journalist has speculated, “Who better than the
brilliant and experienced Walters to direct the final offensive against
Allende?”99
This interpretation is tempting given that Nixon had kept both the U.S.
ambassador and the CIA station out of the loop when he established Track II
to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency in 1970. If Nixon kept a
covert operation tightly held once, why not again? After all, Walters had
played a suspiciously similar role in the 1964 coup in Brazil.100 The evidence
put forth so far, however, is based on hearsay, unattributed sources, and
disputable facts. For example, there is no evidence that Nixon or Colby
directed Walters to undertake such a mission. Even more damning is that
Walter’s diary shows that he was not even present in Chile in September.101
Of course, it could be that Nixon never kept track of his secret order and
Walters fudged his diary entry. But then why did Nixon leave a paper trail
for Track II and not this final operation? Haslam suggests that Walters sent
orders to the coup leaders through Captain Ariel González Cornejo.
Although González was present when Pinochet agreed to join the coup, he
was a minor character who did not figure into the ­coup plotting, except as a
messenger delivering the pact to Pinochet from Leigh and Merino, both of
whom had already committed to a coup on their own initiative. The
contradictions and unanswered questions that pile up if one were to follow
the logic of this interpretation strongly point to its improbability.
To reject these conspiracy theories is not to absolve the Nixon
administration of its responsibility for the downfall of Allende. Trying to
uncover a smoking gun in the form of direct U.S. control over the coup is
the wrong way to look at the question of complicity because it defines
intervention so narrowly that U.S. officials could truthfully deny it. As one
CIA officer later admitted, the agency may not have been directly involved
in planning the coup, “but our contacts with the military let them know
where we stood … the understanding was that they would do it when they
were ready and at the final moment tell us it was going to happen.”102 Even
more important, the Nixon administration had helped foster a coup climate.
General Gustavo Leigh acknowledged that the United States “was pushing
us and clearly trying to destabilize Mr. Allende’s government…. We knew
that Washington wasn’t going to pose any obstacles to our seizing power.”103
A few days after the coup, Nixon sought Kissinger’s assurance that “our hand
doesn’t show on this one.” Kissinger responded in a way that confirms that
the Nixon administration had at least some responsibility for Allende’s
downfall: “We didn’t do it. I mean we helped them” to create “the conditions
as great as possible.”104 Assistant Secretary Kubisch heartily agreed: “Our
policy on Allende worked very well,” he told Kissinger, who replied
grumpily, “we’ll get the credit for this anyway.”105
The ­Cover-Up
The behavior of Nixon administration officials after the coup reveals
much about their role, as they strove to defend their innocence, not only to
the press and the U.S. Congress but also to themselves. In order to stabilize
Chile, the State Department was anxious to begin assisting the junta, but it
faced an uphill battle in trying to convince the world that the United States
had nothing whatsoever to do with the coup. Achieving this objective
required an extensive public relations campaign because the ITT scandal
and Allende’s longstanding complaints about an invisible blockade had
preconditioned much of the world to believe that the Nixon administration
had conspired with multinational corporations to topple the UP
government.
Indeed, just as Kissinger warned, the immediate world reaction to the
1973 Chilean coup was overwhelmingly negative and included widespread
accusations of U.S. collusion with the coup leaders.106 In Latin America, the
response was especially unfavorable. As one U.S. reporter observed, “the
Chilean coup pumped a lot of new anti–U.S. venom into the hemisphere.”107
The recurring charge in these protests was that “foreign imperialism,”
embodied by an alleged conspiracy between ITT and the CIA, was
responsible for the Chilean coup and the death of Allende.108 In Paris, 30,000
marched past the Chilean embassy shouting: “Down with the murderers in
the CIA.” In Italy and Spain, demonstrators attacked ITT facilities; dozens of
protestors in Panama set on fire an American flag that they had seized from
a United States Information Service exhibit.109 Leftists in Guatemala,
Guyana, and Bolivia drew parallels between previous CIA interventions in
their own countries and the coup in Chile.110 According to U.S. Ambassador
to India Patrick Moynihan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi thought that the
United States had become such a “profoundly selfish and cynical ­counter-
revolutionary power” that she was wondering “whether India might be
next.”111 As discussed in the previous chapter, protestors also frequently
condemned the Chilean coup as “fascist.” In Frankfurt, West Germany, for
example, the American Counsel reported that nearly 3,000 demonstrators
denounced “CIA and big business support for [the] ‘fascist plot’ to destroy
democracy in Chile and elsewhere.”112 Costa Rican students alleged that the
“fascist golpe was planned and controlled by the Pentagon through the
Chilean Army.”113
Some of the strongest criticisms of the Nixon administration for having
engineered the coup in Chile came from countries that had also been highly
critical of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Especially in Europe, the CIA
noted, “Chile replaced Vietnam as the burning issue for leftist idealists and
propagandists.” For example, the U.S. embassy in Stockholm compared
Swedish sympathy for Allende to the “­not-too-long-past emotional
involvement of Swedes in the Vietnam issue, and like Vietnam the ­anti-
imperialists have monopolized the stage.”114 Swedish Prime Minister Olof
Palme, who had clashed repeatedly with Washington over Vietnam,
reasoned that “when a people demands its rights, then the multinational
corporations extend their fingers, then the big powers stand ready with their
tank brigades or ­B-52’s.”115 Even Canada, one of America’s closest allies,
could not restrain its ­anti-coup protestors, who, the U.S. embassy in Ottawa
noted, came largely from the ranks of those who had organized Vietnam
antiwar demonstrations.116
Political leaders in some of the countries where these protests erupted
tried to moderate the outrage by pointing out the Chilean revolution’s
shortcomings. Costa Rican President José Figueres, for example, described
Allende’s failure as “inevitable,” and he praised the Chilean military as a
professional body that he hoped would soon return Chile to constitutional
rule.117 In Argentina, where 10,000 demonstrators burned an American flag
to the cries of “It was the Yankees,” President Juan Perón blamed Allende’s
downfall on his “sectarianism and his tendency toward political excess.”118
The United States could also count on ­right-wing dictatorships in Latin
America, such as Haiti, Brazil, Bolivia, and Guatemala, to remain mostly
silent about the Chilean coup, and to be among the first countries to
recognize Chile’s new military government.119
Strangely, the initial Soviet reaction to the Chilean coup was restrained
insofar as U.S. responsibility was concerned. Soviet Premier Leonid
Brezhnev did blame the Chilean coup on “reaction … encouraged and
supported by imperialist forces abroad,” but he also “refrained from any
charges of U.S. involvement in or foreknowledge of [the] coup,” the U.S.
embassy in Moscow reported.120 According to British sources, just before the
coup, the Soviet Communist Party had refused Chilean Senator Teitelboim’s
request for a statement of support for Allende.121 The most likely explanation
for Soviet reluctance to blame the Nixon administration for the Chilean
coup is that Moscow had already decided to abandon Allende as a lost cause
so there was no need to defend him in a way that could threaten détente.122
China and most Eastern Bloc countries also blamed “imperialism” for the
coup, but they too were reticent to identify the Nixon administration as the
culprit.123 This tactic of using “imperialism” to avoid implicating the U.S.
government in Allende’s downfall, strongly resembles the distinction that
Allende had often made between the U.S. government and American
corporations as a way to avoid a direct clash with the Nixon administration.
The one major communist country that did not hesitate to blame the
United States for the military coup in Chile was Cuba. During the coup, the
Chilean military had attacked the Cuban embassy as well as a Cuban
freighter, Playa Larga, which had departed from Valparaíso with 8,000 tons
of sugar on board.124 The incident provided Cuba with a pretext for bringing
an official complaint to the UN Security Council. The Nixon administration
became so worried that the new Chilean regime would not be able to defend
itself that it instructed the junta to replace its current UN representative
with a “­first-class orator.”125 As U.S. officials anticipated, Cuba used the
international forum to castigate the U.S. government for its role in toppling
Allende. At the 17 September 1973 Security Council meeting, Cuban
representative to the UN Ricardo Alarcón accused President Nixon of being
the “conspirator and intellectual author” of the Chilean coup. “The trail of
blood spilled in Chile,” he charged, “leads directly to dark dens of [the] CIA
and Pentagon.”126
In response, Chilean representative Raoul Bazan tried to excuse the
military’s attack on the Cuban ship because it had left the port without
authorization to abscond with sugar that Chilean merchants had already
paid for. The attack on the Cuban embassy was also justified, he argued,
because the Cubans, who allegedly fired first, had interfered with Chile’s
domestic affairs by arming paramilitary groups with Soviet and Czech
rocket launchers.127 U.S. Ambassador to the UN John A. Scali mocked the
Cuban representative for trying to resurrect “the hoary old accusation that,
of course, the CIA, the United States or some secret American mastermind
is at the root of all this. It is playing the same old record with the same old
result: ‘The CIA, the CIA …’ Next it will be blamed for creating the traffic
problem in New York, arranging the results of football games, or, even worse
for his government, having secretly written the bible.”128
In the end, most members of the Security Council decided that the- ­
Chilean-Cuban incident was best handled through bilateral channels.129
Scali boasted to Washington that “those who wished to hear evidence of US
guilt were entirely disappointed.” Hopefully, the more “­fair-minded” in the
Security Council chamber were “a little less convinced that Chile is [the]
scene of ­latter-day US imperialism.” But Scali also cautioned that the new
Chilean regime was likely to become the target of the ­non-aligned nations,
which admired Allende as a “‘civilized’ democratic Marxist,” who had been
“brought to power constitutionally.”130
As Scali’s warning indicated, the need for a ­cover-up could not be
ignored, especially as the Nixon administration was anxious to resume
diplomatic relations with Chile in order to assist the military junta. Even
before the coup had succeeded, U.S. Defense intelligence noted that any new
government that formed would be dependent on the United States for
emergency economic assistance in the form of flour, medicines, and spare
parts.131 The problem was that early diplomatic recognition of the junta
could imply that the Nixon administration was somehow involved in the
coup. At the WSAG meeting on 12 September, Rush cautioned against
repeating the mistake made in Brazil in 1964, when immediate
congratulations to the new military regime gave the appearance that the
United States was somehow behind the coup against President João Goulart.
Kubisch likewise warned that “the biggest errors we have made in Latin
America in recent years have involved too hasty recognition of military
regimes.” He advised: “privately, we should be forthcoming and cooperative
and do what we can to help stabilize their economy and give them the
assistance they need. Publicly, we should avoid a too quick, affectionate
embrace and any impression that we had any involvement in the change.”132
WSAG’s final instruction, which Nixon approved, was for Ambassador
Davis to assure the junta that Washington was “­well-disposed” toward the
new regime but for now it was necessary to take a “­low-key public
posture.”133
The question of when to officially recognize the new Chilean government
called for subtle maneuvering. At the next WSAG meeting, both Kissinger
and Kubisch rejected Treasury Secretary William Simon’s suggestion to use
“the coup as a bargaining point to settle the expropriation and debt
resettlement issue.” Better to let the dust settle and find a “­face-saving
formula.” It was especially important, Rush added, to avoid giving the
impression that the United States had supported the coup on behalf of
multinational corporations.134 As one Nixon administration official
explained to the press, the goal was to “glide in … so that no one can infer a
special meaning.”135 The point was later reinforced by Mexican Foreign
Minister Emilio O. Rabasa who advised Kissinger to “play it very cool” when
it came to aiding the new military regime in Chile because so many Latin
Americans believed that the U.S. government had overthrown Allende.136
Delaying diplomatic recognition, however, did not solve the problem of
what Nixon administration officials should tell the media, or how they
should testify to the U.S. Congress without perjuring themselves. An NSC
staffer warned Kissinger that discussing U.S. covert activities in Chile, even
in executive session, “will open a Pandora’s box.” It was imperative to
provide a credible story that omitted the finer details of the destabilization
effort to avoid triggering suspicions.137 Ensuring that the details of the covert
action program in Chile did not leak out proved to be a more complicated
task than the Nixon administration had anticipated. Because no one could
predict in late 1973 that two years later the sordid details of the CIA’s covert
action programs in Chile would be revealed by the Church Committee,
there was a real danger that some officials, especially those not privy to
Track II, could overstate the case.138
Another problem was that Kissinger, who was likely to be grilled about
the Chilean coup during his nomination hearings to become secretary of
state, had been so distracted by other foreign policy issues that he had not
kept up with developments in Chile. At the 14 September WSAG meeting,
Kissinger asked for a briefing paper on the nature of the Allende
government: “I have the impression that it was rather anti–US wasn’t it?”
Kubisch patiently explained that Allende had not been that hostile to the
United States, at least bilaterally.139 Kissinger either forgot this point or was
simply appeasing Nixon, when he agreed enthusiastically with the
president’s assessment a few days later that the Allende regime had been “an
anti–American government all the way.”140
The Nixon administration’s foreknowledge of the September 1973 coup in
Chile threatened to raise awkward questions about U.S. intelligence sources.
If Kissinger did not get his story straight, he might be caught in a
contradiction. When Kissinger asked WSAG what he was supposed to tell
Congress about why Washington had not warned Allende that a coup was
coming, he received varying advice. Colby recommended saying that “we
had a series of warnings, but didn’t know until Monday that they were going
ahead.” Admiral Moorer disagreed: “You could say we had indications, but
no warnings.”141 Kubisch, who later provided Kissinger with guidelines to
handle tricky questions, suspected that Kissinger would not want to mention
that the Chilean military had informed the U.S. embassy afterward that it
had deliberately decided to keep the exact timing of the coup secret. Such an
admission would obviously “reveal our close contact” with the coup
leaders.142 NSC staffer William Jorden, however, recommended that
Kissinger could safely testify that the United States did nothing to oppose
Allende’s election in 1970. Because Jorden did not join the NSC until May
1972, he probably was unaware of the CIA’s earlier efforts to prevent Allende
from becoming president. But even CIA Director Colby, who had access to
all the details of Tracks I and II, failed to remind Kissinger that the CIA had
tried to block Allende’s election in a bungled covert operation that ended
with the death of General Schneider.143 Fortunately for Kissinger, the U.S.
Congress did not probe deeply into the Chilean coup during his nomination
hearings, so he was able to get away with the feeble claim that to the “best of
my knowledge and belief,” the CIA “had nothing to do with the coup.”144
To stave off further suspicions of U.S. meddling in Chile, Nixon
administration officials emphasized repeatedly that the UP government fell
because its incompetence had forced the Chilean military “reluctantly” to
intervene to save the country.145 Kubisch insisted to the U.S. Congress on 20
September, “it is untrue to say that the U.S. Government was responsible
either directly or indirectly for the overthrow of the Allende regime.”146
Kubisch later confided to a joint State Department CIA meeting, however,
that he had been “extremely lucky” that no one had asked him whether the
administration had helped Allende’s political opposition.147 When the
hearings resumed five days later, Kubisch asserted that he could not think of
any operative NSC decisions “giving tacit or covert encouragement or
support to opposition groups in Chile” during 1973. “We have taken no step
to try and bring about his downfall and overthrow,” he insisted. “Not the
State Department, not the Pentagon, not [the] CIA, not anybody else.”148
Kubisch, who did not become Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-
American Affairs until June 1973, was possibly unaware of the October 1970
NSC options paper proposing to overthrow Allende by assisting the
opposition. But he failed to inform the committee of his own participation
in the administration’s deliberations over covert assistance to the private
sector organizations in 1973.149
Another way to divert attention from the U.S. role in toppling Allende
was to justify the coup on the grounds that the UP government had planned
to wage a campaign of terror against the opposition and the Chilean
military, including mass executions, in order to impose a communist
dictatorship on Chile. This conspiracy theory, known as “Plan Z,” appeared
in the White Book, the junta’s propaganda tract purporting to detail the
crimes of the UP government. The exact origins of Plan Z have been the
source of much conjecture. Although the White Book does not identify
precisely the author of Plan Z, it does claim that UP’s “intellectual adviser,”
Joan Garcés (Allende’s closest aide), had come up with the plan to conduct
executions.150 To sensationalize the alleged plot, Chilean military officials
announced shortly after the coup that they had discovered Plan Z
documents in the safe of Allende’s undersecretary of the interior. Lest
someone notice that the safe was situated in an office that had burned in the
bombing of La Moneda, the junta later claimed to have discovered the full
plan in the Chilean Central Bank.151
The White Book has since been thoroughly discredited as a ruse. The
director of El Mercurio, Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, who helped orchestrate a
media blitz around Plan Z in 1973, confessed two decades later: “I have no
proof that Plan Z existed.” The junta’s publicity director, Federico
Willoughby, has admitted that Plan Z functioned for the regime as an
instrument of “psychological warfare.”152 Even Pinochet, who insisted that
Plan Z was real, acknowledged a little over a year after the coup that it had
not been the “decisive factor” in the military’s decision to seize power.153
Like most propaganda tracts, the White Book began with a partial truth
and then distorted the facts to forge a massive conspiracy that simply did
not exist. For example, Allende did request Cuban assistance in defending
La Moneda, and Cuban weapons were smuggled into the country. But the
arms available to those who wanted to resist the coup amounted to a
pittance compared to the supplies of the ­well-stocked Chilean armed forces.
Moreover, as established in the previous chapter, neither the ­ultra-left nor
the UP government had any coherent plan to distribute weapons to the
masses, most of whom had no military training. In truth, these were ­ill-
conceived defensive measures aimed at resisting an imminent military coup,
not a ­Moscow-Havana conspiracy to take over Chile.154 Every member of the
UP coalition who has been interviewed on the subject denies the existence
of Plan Z.155 In fact, on the morning of the coup, Allende was still making
appeals to the armed forces to respect the Schneider Doctrine.156 In 1990, a
Chilean human rights lawyer declared that Plan Z “has been widely
discredited in Chile except by a fanatical minority of Gen. Augusto
Pinochet’s supporters.”157
But if the author of Plan Z did not come from the UP government, then
who committed the forgery? One theory is that the main author was army
lieutenant colonel Manuel Contreras (one of the architects of Pinochet’s
secret police), who was assisted by various military officials and civilians.158
Another view is that Chilean historian Gonzalo Vial wrote the White Book
under the supervision of Admiral Patricio Carvajal.159 Still others have
ventured that the CIA manufactured the plan.160 Jack Devine, who served on
the agency’s Chile Task Force, claims that he had devised the idea of planting
fake evidence that would justify the military intervention. The CIA Station
Chief vetoed Devine’s proposal, but one of Devine’s sources promised to
forward it to the Chilean Foreign Minister Ismael Huerta Díaz, who was
preparing a UN speech to defend the new government.161 Jack Devine’s
harebrained scheme may have been part of the inspiration for Plan Z, but
the idea that the CIA was directly its sole author is difficult to sustain based
on the currently available declassified evidence. According to the Church
Report, only “two CIA collaborators” (not agents) assisted the junta in
preparing the White Book, which appeared publicly on 10 October 1973.162
U.S. intelligence and embassy officials had been tracking the details of Plan
Z well before then, but they were extremely slow to question their accuracy.
Their correspondence suggests that the vast majority of U.S. officials were
unaware that CIA assets had assisted in the production of the White Book.
Some of these officials held such an exaggerated view of UP’s strength that
they were prone to conspiracy theories, especially given the loose talk on the
Chilean left of armed struggle and class warfare. The junta exploited this
vulnerability by leaking the details of Plan Z to U.S. defense attachés, who
then reported them to Washington verbatim.163
Only very gradually did most U.S. officials begin to realize that Plan Z was
a ploy. In late October 1973, one CIA report discounted a source’s
contention that the Allende government had provided a staging ground for
the Soviets: “This seems to be another attempt by the junta to make
propaganda points abroad.”164 Around the same time, U.S. defense
intelligence reported that Chilean naval intelligence had seen no evidence of
Plan Z.165 U.S. military attachés observed that the homemade hand grenades
that had allegedly been captured from Allende’s supporters had such
primitive fuse mechanisms that they were “more dangerous to the user than
the intended victim.”166 The U.S. embassy also ridiculed the junta for
“displaying the sweeping of closets and attics including relics of the War of
the Pacific in an effort to support its claim that UP was heavily armed.”167
Ambassador David H. Popper, who replaced Davis in early November 1973,
found “ludicrous” the attempt of the ­right-wing press to use Allende’s
request for small arms as evidence of UP arms smuggling.168
Any doubts that Nixon administration officials entertained about Plan Z,
however, were not aired publicly because it seemed better to leave the
impression that a military coup had been the only solution to Chile’s
political crisis. “Whatever the truth of the matter,” Ambassador Davis cabled
the State Department, “it is clear that the military had good reason to
suspect that the left would resort to force if it felt it had any hope of
success.”169 Plan Z also proved useful in justifying the repression of the
remnants of the UP government, which Washington feared might return to
power if they were not eliminated. The NSC was especially worried that in
order to assuage world opinion “the new government may move too fast to
ease up on its effective actions against terrorists and extremists.”170 In
October 1973, CIA Director Colby testified in a classified hearing that the
junta killings were doing “some good” in “rooting out Marxist influence”
thus averting the potential danger of a civil war.171 This rationalization
became a routine defense mechanism for former Nixon administration
officials who bent over backward to excuse human rights violations in Chile
following the coup. As Kissinger explained in a 2001 interview, “we did not
want to weaken Pinochet to a point where the Allende people would come
back.”172 According to one former U.S. ambassador to Chile, Allende and
Castro had become too “­palsy-walsy,” so it was necessary “to have sort of a
cleaning up after Allende … or it would have gone totally leftist—I mean
totally Communist.”173 U.S. officials did not shy away from helping Latin
American dictatorships eliminate suspected subversives, as U.S. intelligence
services played an instrumental role in Operation Condor.174
While Plan Z helped rationalize the repression needed to eliminate the
“Marxist cancer” that had spread through Chilean society, one might
question why the Chilean military felt the need to resort to such a
transparent hoax given that it had a monopoly on power after 11 September
1973. The generals not only needed the powerful story of an alien threat to
convince themselves of the justice of their cause, but they also needed to
convince their subordinates to carry out the dirty work of repression
without questioning orders.175 According to one eyewitness, Chilean officers
had told the rank and file that Allende was planning to kill 100,000 people
including the entire armed forces.176 Torturing and eliminating suspects
could not have been an easy task, especially in a country like Chile where
extreme levels of brutality were uncommon. Imagining revenge and
believing that one was in the right likely helped the executioners to carry out
their grim orders.177
Plan Z also helped turn Chileans against each other. Relentless repetition
of the junta’s sensational accusations by the mass media helped to establish a
police state where everyone was suspect.178 According to Isabel Allende,
right after the coup, the junta inundated the citizenry with the fiction of Plan
Z, “which involved an interminable blacklist containing the names of
thousands of persons they had planned to massacre within the next few
days, an unprecedented genocide.”179 In this ­panic-stricken atmosphere, the
junta managed to convince many Chilean citizens to denounce and turn in
foreign “extremists,” thereby “cleansing your homeland of undesirables.”180
As Carlos Altamirano and others have suggested, Plan Z represented
Pinochet’s “Reichstag fire.”181
Yet another purpose of Plan Z was to convince the international
community, especially the United States, that the new regime should be
excused for certain violent excesses given the vital necessity of extirpating a
Communist threat of hyperbolic proportions. “If the left extremists had their
way, and had carried out their own autogolpe plan,” Pinochet told
Ambassador Davis, “there would have been a million dead.”182 As growing
human rights violations after the coup caused the U.S. Congress to question
the wisdom in granting economic and military aid to Chile, Pinochet and
other military officers, as well as U.S. officials, invoked Plan Z as a defense of
the coup. The Chilean regime needs to defend its actions, Ambassador
Popper advised Washington in early 1974, by explaining “how the extremist
elements were preparing to establish by violence a totalitarianism of the left;
how the country had collapsed into economic chaos; how the military had
thereupon intervened as a civic duty acclaimed by [the] bulk of the
country.”183 It was vital, Pinochet’s defense minister warned nearly a year
after the coup, to “combat Marxist conspiracy, internal and external,” which
was threatening to force the country back onto the “socialist path.”184
Plan Z appears to have been most effective with those who were already
ideologically opposed to the Chilean experiment with socialism. Rep. John
B. Conlan (R–Arizona), for example, declared that the bulk of Chileans
welcomed the coup because “They knew that Allende was the puppet of the
Communist leaders in Moscow and Havana. They believed revolution was
inevitable, and welcomed it when it came as the only remaining chance to
stop the Soviet Union and Cuba from seizing power entirely.”185 Jesse Helms,
the archconservative Republican senator from North Carolina, avowed that
Chilean women had demanded the overthrow of Allende, a “dictator” for
having “taken over their schools and taken over all of their institutions.”186
Peace Corps Volunteers stationed in Chile urged Americans to sympathize
with the coup because of the threats contained in Plan Z.187 Even the
Catholic Church in Rome felt compelled to defend the new Chilean military
regime because of the White Book. Vatican Deputy Secretary of State
Giovanni Benelli told U.S. and British officials that human rights abuses in
Chile needed to be put into context. After all, Allende had been planning a
“pro–Communist coup” with illegal arms smuggled into the country.188
There were, of course, limits to Plan Z’s effectiveness as a propaganda tool.
Although most of the Chilean mass media faithfully conveyed the junta’s
messages, a few foreign reporters did initially express some skepticism about
Plan Z.189 The Washington Post, for example, reported from London that
most observers did not take seriously Frei’s claim that Allende had been
planning a “­pre-emptive coup.”190 Likewise, New York Times reporter
Jonathan Kandell found the documentary support for Plan Z to be
“surprisingly deficient” in details.191 Plan Z, one U.S. commentator declared,
is about as “well authenticated as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.”192 Even
inside Chile, doubts began to emerge. Despite the PDC’s initial endorsement
of the coup, by 1974 most party leaders regarded as “ludicrous” the idea that
Allende had planned an “­auto-golpe.”193 Interviews with Chilean military
coup leaders after 11 September 1973 revealed that they had been unaware
of the alleged assassination plots described in Plan Z.194
The White Book also failed to deter the U.S. Congress from probing
deeper into the Nixon administration’s intervention in Chile.195 Immediately
after the coup, Rep. Michael Harrington announced his intention to ask both
houses to investigate the role of the United States in Allende’s downfall. His
request was eventually endorsed by other democratic liberals, such as Rep.
Edward Koch of New York, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, and
Senator Frank Church of Idaho. The repeated attempts of Nixon
administration officials to derail questions about the U.S. role in aiding
Allende’s opposition only heightened the intrigue.196 For example, the State
Department brushed off Senator Kennedy’s questions about meetings of the
40 Committee on the grounds that its proceedings were classified. The
department also evaded Kennedy’s request for the names of U.S. embassy
contacts with Chilean personnel by claiming that no records had been
kept.197
The Watergate scandal, which reached its peak in mid–1974, added even
more pressure to investigate the U.S. role in the Chilean coup.198 Nixon’s
resignation did little to appease the U.S. Congress’s curiosity about Chile
because Kissinger, a highly controversial figure, remained secretary of state
under President Gerald Ford. On 8 September 1974, New York Times
reporter Seymour Hersh broke the story that the CIA had spent more than
$8 million trying to bring down Allende.199 This revelation forced Kissinger
to explain to Ford the history of U.S. covert operations in Chile. In denying
that the Nixon administration had tried to topple Allende, Kissinger had to
explain Track II. “There was no attempt at a coup,” he told the president,
“though there could have been in ’70 if we hadn’t failed.” Kissinger reassured
Ford that even though Hersh’s story was “embarrassing … we can ride it
out.”200 To discredit Hersh’s revelations, Kissinger told the reporter Ted
Koppel that the story was “all total nonsense.”201
Unfortunately for Kissinger, President Ford reignited the controversy at a
press conference a week later by contending that the CIA’s assistance to the
opposition newspapers and political parties had been “in the best interest of
the people in Chile.”202 In an impassioned rejoinder, Allende’s wife protested:
“To say that $8 million … were spent to guarantee the survival of the
opposition parties and press—which were never threatened—is outrageous,”
especially given that the Ford administration was ignoring the junta’s
crackdown on civil liberties and destruction of the opposition.203 This
presidential statement, judged one American journalist, certainly fell under
“the tradition of kingly Hubris.”204 Senator Walter F. Mondale (D–
Minnesota) chastised the administration for its “unbelievable” double
standard: “If we are so concerned about the existence of opposition elements
and preservation of democracy in Chile, do we now have a program to help
support the democratic politicians and journalists who have now been
muzzled, banned and jailed?” Senator Frank Church went one step further:
“Our policy in Chile was unsavory and unprincipled. It can’t possibly be
justified unless we take the view that our methods and objectives are the
same as those in the Soviet Union.”205
By late 1974, the effort by the executive branch to cover up the U.S. role in
the downfall of Allende had largely failed, at least with most American
audiences. For example, when Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft tried to convince a skeptical
Georgetown University audience that covert assistance to Allende’s
opposition had been a practical matter to defend democracy, students
pummeled Scowcroft with questions about U.S. support for dictatorships in
Chile and Greece.206 Like the Watergate scandal, attempts by U.S. officials to
cover their tracks in Chile only led to further scrutiny. The Ford
administration had to dodge a request from the ­Inter-American Press
Association for the names of newspapers that had received U.S. financial
assistance during the Allende government.207 The final straw was probably
former CIA Director Helms’s admission to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in early 1975 that he had made a “mistake” in his earlier
testimony by evading questions about U.S. involvement in Chile.208
“Destabilizing a nation is like dropping a stone in a pond,” one American
political scientist observed. “The impact is greatest among the vanquished,
who will harbor deep resentments and fears. Eventually, however, ripples
will reach distant observers, who will also draw conclusions about the nature
of U.S. foreign policy.”209
When the U.S. Congress finally decided in 1975 to conduct formal
investigations into past U.S. covert operations in Latin America, the State
Department began to panic. Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-American
Affairs William D. Rogers warned Kissinger that such investigations would
have the “gravest of consequences” for U.S. policy in the region, with Chile
serving as “the most colorful copy.” The Ford administration decided that
the best way to protect U.S. intelligence operations was to advocate holding
executive rather than open sessions. Just before Congress’s reports on ­inter-
American relations were released in late 1975, Rogers predicted disaster:
“Latin American nations would respond, ‘What kind of country is this? How
can you do business with people like this who spill their guts all over the
place.’” Kissinger disparaged the reports as a “national disgrace.”210
The Church Committee revelations shocked many Americans, but Rogers
and Kissinger need not have worried. Former Nixon administration officials
continued to profess their innocence in the 1973 Chilean coup. For example,
both Kissinger and Colby repeatedly told the press that the administration
had nothing to do with the assassination of General Schneider.211 During his
nomination hearings to become Assistant Secretary of State for ­Inter-
American Affairs, former embassy officer Harry Shlaudeman denied any
responsibility for the Chilean coup, which he blamed on “historical factors
that go back to the end of the last century.”212 In 1977, a leader of the U.S.
delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission expressed regret for the
U.S. subversion of the Allende government. The State Department
immediately disavowed the apology, claiming that a U.S. congressional
committee had absolved the Nixon administration of responsibility for the
coup.213 In 2003, former Kissinger aide William D. Rogers criticized
Secretary of State Colin Powell for having “bought the myth” that the United
States was somehow “morally responsible for what happened in Chile.”214
Powell had failed to grasp that one of the great benefits of empire is never
having to say you are sorry.215 With the sole exception of Richard Helms,
who was only tapped on the wrist, there were no serious consequences for
any of the U.S. officials who lied to the press and the U.S. Congress about
Chile.216 After all, Chile was simply not a high priority for U.S. politicians
like Hubert Humphrey, who abandoned a CIA hearing in 1975 with the
announcement that getting “jobs for 400 people in Minnesota today … is a
great deal more important to me right now than Chile.”217
A World Turned Upside Down
The significance of the Nixon and Ford administrations’ attempt to
absolve the United States from any wrongdoing in Chile goes far beyond the
issue of accountability. The U.S. declassified record indicates that many
Nixon administration officials believed in their own innocence. Jorden
reassured Kissinger five days after the coup, “no one can assert that this
Government—the Administration of President Nixon—did anything
directly or indirectly to bring down the Allende regime. Quite to the
contrary, I believe we bent over backward to show patience and restraint in
word and deed in the face of their economic and public attacks.”218 The
conviction of U.S. officials that they had nothing to apologize for only grew
stronger over time. When Chilean economist Ricardo Lagos encountered
Kissinger at a Berlin conference many years after the coup, Kissinger burst
out that he “had nothing to do with the coup d’etat.”219 In 1977, Nixon
denied that he had contemplated a coup in 1970.220 In 1989, former Acting
Assistant Secretary of State John Crimmins explained to an interviewer: “I
am satisfied in my own mind that the coup itself was homegrown.”221 In
2001, Kissinger again denied that Nixon’s policy had been aimed at
promoting a coup.222
That U.S. government officials came to believe their own lies is hardly
surprising, but in this case, Washington’s ­self-deception over Chile helped
deepen the “credibility gap,” the ­Vietnam-era phrase for the American
population’s growing distrust of the government.223 A year before the 1975
Church Report appeared, poll data suggested that more than half the
American population believed that not only had the United States
intervened in Chile but also that it had been wrong to do so.224 One set of
lies soon beget another. To prop up Pinochet, the Nixon administration had
to downplay a growing body of irrefutable evidence that Chile under
Pinochet was becoming a police state.225 In 1974, Ambassador Popper
attempted to excuse the junta’s repression by emphasizing that Allende had
left the country in shambles, so “some form of violent change was imminent
—from the extreme left if not from the right.”226 Because the Chilean
military leaders succeeded in freeing Chile of a Marxist regime, the
ambassador explained to Washington, they had become “indignant at [the]
international Marxist campaign against them involving patent untruths and
distortions.”227 Likewise, Assistant Secretary Kubisch tried to get his
colleagues to sympathize with the Chilean generals who were facing
widespread international condemnation for their authoritarian methods:
“They say, in effect, ‘Look…. We got rid of all these bandits and these
criminals, and these dirty, ­no-good commies … why in the hell can’t you all
understand that?’ And we say it is not that simple.”228
After professing innocence with regard to Allende’s downfall, U.S. officials
strained to defend Pinochet, even if that meant stretching the truth once
again. In prepping Kissinger for his nomination hearing, the State
Department recommended that if he was asked about human rights
violations in Chile, he should deny “that the junta has adopted systematic
repression as a deliberate, ­long-term policy.”229 Kissinger hardly needed
coaching. As he later explained to his staff: “however unpleasant they act,
the Government is better for us than Allende was…. So we shouldn’t
support moves against them.”230 One week after the coup, U.S. legislators
asked the State Department to request that the new Chilean government
respect human rights.231 The department responded that it lacked “firm
information” to substantiate the charges of repression in Chile.232 However,
when Kissinger learned that the junta had conducted hundreds of
executions in its “puritanical crusading spirit—a determination to cleanse
and rejuvenate Chile,” he said nothing.233 In March 1974, long after ­non-
government organizations had amply documented human rights violations
in Chile, the CIA insisted that “the junta has not been bloodthirsty.” Chile’s
poor human rights record, the agency contended, can be traced to “a ­world-
wide ­Communist-orchestrated campaign to discredit the junta.”234 After
learning that Ambassador Popper had raised human rights issues with the
Chilean defense minister, Kissinger reprimanded the ambassador to “cut out
the political science lectures.”235
By fostering a climate of unreality about the origins and consequences of
the 1973 coup in Chile, the Nixon administration helped to hasten Chile’s
transition from the “politics of inevitability” to the “politics of eternity.”
These concepts, as developed by the Yale historian Timothy Snyder, help
explain how longstanding democracies like Chile’s can fall so rapidly to
totalitarianism.236 According to Snyder, the politics of inevitability projects a
utopian future based on economic philosophies that promise progress no
matter what the obstacles. Because of the myth of Chilean exceptionalism,
most Chileans were unprepared for the breakdown of their democracy in
1973. As one observer recalled: “To many Chileans, it was as if their world
had suddenly turned upside down.”237 Allende’s followers were especially
guilty of utopianism. According to one UP supporter, “people believed
paradise was around the corner.”238 One Chilean lawyer later reflected: “We
thought the road to socialism was inevitable. We had this naive belief that
because the winds of history were blowing in our direction somehow we
would be taken to a safe harbour.”239
 After the shock of the September coup wore off, many demoralized
Chileans subscribed to the politics of eternity, which teaches that there is no
future, there is no truth, democracy is a sham, and the government’s main
task is to defend certain segments of the population against perceived
external enemies. As Pinochet seized power and outlawed all political
parties, Chile appeared to fall into a dream state in which all sense of civic
responsibility vanished and Marxism became the enemy. As one Chilean
scholar has observed, “One of the most highly mobilized societies in the
world became one of the most demobilized.”240 On the left, disenchantment
took the form of conspiracy theories about how U.S. multinational
corporations and the Nixon administration had colluded to destroy the
Chilean revolution and murder Allende.241 On the right, many of Allende’s
enemies justified the coup and the repression that followed on the basis of
the fictitious Plan Z.242 Either way, the rational processes needed for
democracies to function were seriously undermined.243 In a 1998 survey,
nearly ­one-half of the Chileans polled no longer believed that democracy
was the best form of government.244 As Ariel Dorfman has commented on
the Pinochet era: “fear, once it begins to eat away at a nation, once it is
manipulated by an ­all-powerful government, is not easily eradicated by
reason. To someone who feels vulnerable, who imagines himself as a
perpetual victim, who detects enemies everywhere, no punishment to the
potential perpetrators is too light and no measure to ensure safety too
extreme.”245
It took nearly two decades before Chile would awaken from this surreal
nightmare, right about the same time that America’s own democracy began
its decline, culminating in the 2016 election of President Donald Trump.
Americans, in believing that they had won the Cold War, grasped onto the
politics of inevitability by concluding that there were now no more
alternatives to neoliberalism and globalization, which would eventually
spread democracy everywhere.246 Chile’s experience should have been a
warning that history was not over, and that neoliberalism could coexist
perfectly well with dictatorship.247 One small step toward helping to prevent
the United States from tumbling further into the politics of eternity where
facts do not matter would be an honest assessment of the Nixon
administration’s contribution to Allende’s downfall.248
 1. DIA intelligence summary, 25 August 1973, CDP.
2. CIA tel, 24 August 1973, CDP.
3. Ambassador Davis did authorize some private sector funds on 24 August, but the recipients’
names are censored. See editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 886.
4. Embtel 3743, 22 August 1973, box 4, CAF, RG 84.
5. Davis airgram ­A-195 to DoS, 12 October 1973.
6. CIA information report, “Comments on Coup and Plans of Military Government,” 21 September
1973, CDP.
7. After the coup, a CIA source reported that preparations had begun in ­mid-August with the
creation of a “special coordination team,” which included three branches of the military and “carefully
selected civilians.” CIA report, “source comments on preparations for a coup,” 16 September 1973,
CDP.
8. CIA tel, 1 September 1973, CDP.
9. Embtel 3950, 4 September 1973, CDP. For a description of the angry clash on 29 August between
Allende and the admirals, see Merino Castro, Bitácora, 218–19. On the military’s perception of
Montero as weak, see Arancibia Clavel, Conversando con Roberto Kelly V., 136.
10. Embtel 4058, 8 September 1973, 1973SANTIA04058, CFPF, RG 59; JCS message, 7 September
1973, CDP.
11. McAfee memo to Gardner, 7 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 894.
12. DIA intelligence summary, 6 September 1973, CDP.
13. Embtel 4058, 8 September 1973, 1973SANTIA04058, CFPF, RG 59; DIA report, 8 September
1973, CDP.
14. CIA information report, 8 September 1973, CDP. After the coup, a CIA source explained that
Chilean armed forces had moved the coup launch date from the tenth to the eleventh of September
because of organizational and communication problems. See CIA report, “source comments on
preparations for a coup,” 16 September 1973, CDP. There is no mention of the military having
changed the date of the coup to ­pre-empt Allende’s planned announcement of a plebiscite, as several
former UP officials have claimed. See Letelier testimony, 18–21 February 1975, in International
Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, Chile: Denuncia y Testimonio,
17; and Jorquera, Chicho Allende, 113.
15. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1245 n. 14.
16. Merino Castro, Bitácora, 229; Varas, Gustavo Leigh, 129–30; Verduga, Interferencia secreta, 23–
24; Arellano Iturriaga, Más allá del abismo, 47–48. For the text of the pact, see Huidobro Justiniano,
Decisión naval, 233–34.
17. CIA information report, 9 September 1973, CDP.
18. DIA report, 11 September 1973, CDP.
19. Phillips memo to Kissinger, 11 September 1973, CDP. Kubisch later testified before a closed U.S.
senate foreign relations subcommittee that the ­tip-off came “not more than 14 to 16 hours before—
maybe as little as 10.” Dan Morgan, “‘­Hands-Off’ Policy Set,” WP, 13 September 1973. As late as 10
September, some Chilean military commanders still expected that Allende would find a political
solution. See Eugenio Rivera Desgroux interview in Verdugo, Chile 1973, 68.
20. See Ariel Dorfman’s comments, quoted in Keeton, “Reevaluating the ‘Old’ Cold War,” 115.
21. General descriptions of the coup include Verduga, Interferencia secreta; Silva Bijit et al., Historia;
Boldáz Aguirre, La caída de Allende; Soto, El último día; Varas and Vergara, Coup!; González Camus,
El día en que murió Allende; Cavallo and Serrano, Golpe. Especially good on the Cuban exodus is
Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 239–46. For personal accounts, see Testimonios Chile; Merino and Rivas, ¿Qué
hacía yo el 11 de septiembre de 1973?; White, Chile’s Days of Terror; Verdugo, Chile 1973; Peter Winn,
“Diary of a Coup” in Hutchinson et al., Chile Reader, 443–49; and Ariel Dorfman interview, 8
September 2013, Democracy Now!
22. Silva Bijit et al., Historia, 159; embtel 4081, 11 September 1973, 1973SANTIA04081, CFPF, RG
59. According to one eyewitness, until the bombing and tank attacks Allende hoped that the coup
attempt might end like the Tanquetazo. See Florencia Varas, “General Fills in the Pieces to Allende
Death Puzzle,” Times, 11 September 1973.
23. Bandeira, “Ideological Struggle in Chile,” 58; Garrett and Schesch, “Chile: The Dream Bides
Time,” 35; LAWR, 9 November 1973.
24. LAWR, 9 November 1973; Magasich, Los que dijeron “No,” vol. 2, 270–73; Testimonios Chile, 17–
18.
25. CR, 27 September 1974, 119: 31776.
26. Allende’s last words transmitted by Radio Magallanes, 11 September 1973, in Cockcroft, Salvador
Allende Reader, 241.
27. Schnake, Schnake, 212.; Fernando Alegría, “The Fall of Santiago,” Ramparts, December 1973, 32.
On the lack of a civilian defense of La Moneda, see Garcés and Levia, El golpe en La Legua, 111–17.
On UP’s failure to foresee the severity of the repression that would follow a coup, see Sergio Bitar, “We
Never Imagined Such Brutality Could Happen in Chile,” Progressive, August 1990, 37. U.S. intelligence
believed that Allende had advance warning of the coup but erred in thinking he could out maneuver
the military. Paul F. Wallner testimony, 31 October 1973, HCFA, Subcommittee on ­Inter-American
Affairs, Soviet Activities in Cuba, pt. 4, 7.
28. Gurriarán, ¿Caerá Allende?, 157–58.
29. Hite, When the Romance Ended, 27; Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 48. GAP officials
realized that they would be massacred if they tried to defend the government alone. See Silva Bijit et
al., Historia, 158. Carlos Altamirano estimated that UP had at most 1,500 supporters with sufficient
military training to defend the government, no match for the armed forces, which numbered at least
200,000. See Carlos Altamirano Orrego interview, 8 September 2002, in Arancibia Clavel, Cita con la
historia, 173; and Muñoz, Dictator’s Shadow, 3. For a description of the lack of mobilization and
breakdown in communications among UP’s parties, see Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 243–44. On how
some UP militants were waiting for weapons that never arrived, see Franck Gaudichaud, “Voices from
a Revolution,” Le Monde diplomatique, September 2003.
30. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 11 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 896–97.
31. CIA information report, “Withdrawal of Carabinero Forces from the Moneda,” 11 September
1973, CDP. Admiral Patricio Carvajal’s tried to justify the bombing of La Moneda as an act of
“purification” needed to shock the population into obedience, but Air Force General Fernando
Matthei later claimed that the bombing was “unnecessary” and “counterproductive.” See Florencia
Varas, “Chilean Admiral Explains Technical Points of the Military Coup that Overthrew President
Allende,” Times, 8 November 1973; and Silva Bijit et al., Historia, 182, 184.
32. Florencia Varas, “Last Feverish Hours of Allende Regime,” Times, 6 November 1973; Silva Bijit et
al., Historia, 164.
33. Varas, Gustavo Leigh, 131; CIA information report, “Comments on Coup and Plans of Military
Government,” 21 September 1973, CDP.
34. Alexei Barrionuevo and Pascale Bonnefoy, “Allende’s Death Was a Suicide,” NYT, 19 July 2011.
35. Embtel 4116, 11 September 1973, CDP.
36. Embtel 4106, 11 September 1973, 1973SANTIA04106, CFPF, RG 59; CIA bulletin, 18 September
1973, CDP; Huidobro Justiniano, Decisión naval, 269; Silva Bijit et al., Historia, 138.
37. Ahumada, Chile: La memoria prohibida, vol. 1, 87. See also Dan Morgan, “Army Battles Allende
Backers,” WP, 13 September 1973.
 38. Victor Niemeyer interview, FAOHC. Many viewed the coup as divine justice. See Silva Bijit et al.,
Historia, 157; Verdugo, Chile 1973, 136; and Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 112.
39. Ernest W. Lafever testimony, 5 August 1974, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende
Years, 184. Many imagined that after a brief period of military rule, Chile would return to democracy.
See Diamond, Upheaval, 154; HCFA, U.S. Policy, 9–10; Verdugo, Chile 1973, 72–73; Power, ­Right-Wing
Women in Chile, 241; Subercaseaux, Gabriel Valdés, 170; Volk, “Lessons and Legacy,” 2. On the fallacy
of equating support for a coup with support for a military dictatorship, see Prothro and Chaparro,
“Public Opinion and the Movement of Chilean Government,” 43; and Bermeo, Ordinary People, 166–
67.
40. Loveman, “Political Left in Chile,” 25; Politzer, Altamirano, 47; Silva Bijit et al., Historia, 176.
41. Pinochet Ugarte, Journey through Life, 339.
42. WSAG minutes, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 901.
43. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 918.
44. Luis Renato González Córdoba, “The Scene from Within the Moneda,” in Birns, End of Chilean
Democracy, 40.
45. Bogota tel 7537, 11 September 1973, 1973BOGOTA07537, CFPF, RG 59.
46. Neruda, Memoirs, 348.
47. Steve Long and Arn Passman, “Green Berets Shot Allende,” Berkeley Barb, 27 September—3
October 1974. For a similar charge, see Oglesby, Yankee and Cowboy War, 52.
48. For interviews and surveys suggesting that a substantial proportion of the Chilean population
continues to believe that Allende was murdered, see Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, “‘¡Se siente,,’”154–55 n. 38;
and Manzi et al., “El pasado que nos pesa,” 188. For examples of those who question or discount the
suicide theory, see Barros, Chile, 210–19; Steenland, “Coup in Chile,” 15–16; Galina, El sueño no fué
ametrallado, 37; Rojas, Murder of Allende; Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, 65; Vega, La caída de
Allende, 283–91; Benítez, Las muertes de Salvador Allende; Politzer, Altamirano, 52; and Millas,
Memorias, 403.
49. Mendoza, Todos confesos, 121–22; Subercaseaux, Gabriel Valdés, 165–66; Allende, Conversations
with Isabel Allende, 249; Juan de Onís, “Socialist Says Allende Once Spoke of Suicide,” NYT, 12
September 1973.
50. CIA Office of National Estimates memo, 4 April 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 540; Salazar,
Conversaciones con Carlos Altamirano, 232; Falcoff, Modern Chile, 316; Collier and Sater, History of
Chile, 150–57; Everett G. Martin, “The Last Hours of Salvador Allende,” WSJ, 25 September 1973.
51. Varas, Gustavo Leigh, 122.
52. The papers were eventually burned by a Cuban intelligence officer. Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 237–
38, 243.
53. González, Chile, la conjura, 324–25.
54. Max Marambio in Silva Bijit et al., Historia, 194; Politzer, El libro de Lagos, 119; Régis Debray
commentary on Allende’s death in Castro et. al, Fidel Castro, Salvador Allende, 35.
55. Varas, Gustavo Leigh, 121–22.
56. For the attacks on Allende’s home, see “Junta: Chile Is ‘Normal,’” WP, 14 September 1973.
Pinochet’s joke seems especially ominous given that the military regime would later end up throwing
more than a hundred prisoners out of helicopters into the ocean, lakes, and rivers. See Verduga,
Interferencia secreta, 112.
57. Isabel Allende, “Pinochet without Hatred,” NYT Magazine, 17 January 1999.
58. The evidence that Allende did commit suicide is overwhelming. For the eyewitness testimony of
Allende’s physician, Patricio Guijón, see Witker Velásquez, Salvador Allende cercano, 189–93. The
description of the suicide by one of Allende’s bodyguards, Pablo Zepeda, appears in the documentary
film, Betrayal in Chile: Who Shot Salvador Allende? On the forensic evidence, which disproves that
Allende was shot six or more times, see Alexei Barrionuevo and Pascale Bonnefoy, “Allende’s Death
Was a Suicide,” NYT, 19 July 2011. See also the conclusions in Chile Comisión Nacional de Verdad y
Reconciliación, Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (hereafter
Rettig Report), 7; and CIA, Hinchey Report.
59. del Pozo Artigas, Allende, 19–23.
60. Allende, Paula, 198.
61. Silva Cabrera, Allende, 370.
62. Ibañez, “Chilean Crisis,” 70; “Chile Junta Cites ‘Corruption,’” WP, 20 September 1973.
63. Brescia, Salvador Allende, 12–13.
64. Whelan, Out of the Ashes, 572; Shirley Christian, “Leftist Journal Concludes Allende Killed
Himself,” NYT, 16 September 1990.
65. New Delhi tel 10481, 16 September 1973, 1973NEWDE10841, CFPF, RG 59.
66. Uliánova, “Soviet Perceptions,” 29.
67. Patricio Zamorano, “Hubo seis testigos del suicidio de Allende,” La Nación, 12 September 2003;
Shirley Christian, “Santiago Journal,” NYT, 5 June 1990; Timossi, Grandes alamedas, 136–38.
68. United States Defense Attaché Office Caracas intelligence report, 13 September 1973, CDP; CIA
information report, 28 September 1973, CDP. Another version of this conspiracy theory is that Castro
ordered Cubans in Chile to kill Allende if necessary to prevent him from going into exile. See Ammar,
Cuba nostra, 162; Vivés, El Magnífico, 240.
69. Dorfman, Heading South, 52. For a similar analysis, see Dunkerley, Political Suicide, 19–20;
Oxhorn, “From Allende to Lula,” 10, 42 n. 1.
70. Reimann Weigert and Rivas Sánchez, Chile, 79. For the claim that the CIA was “behind” the
assassination of Allende, see Barcia, “Locking Horns,” 108–209, 215 n. 5.
71. Soto, El último día, 51; Arancibia Valenzuela, Agenda de un intendente, 73; Garcés, Allende y la
experiencia chilena, 354–55; Testimonio de Orlando Letelier, Mexico City, 1975; Corvalán, De lo
vivido y lo peleado, 155–56.
72. Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos, 131–32; Pinochet Ugarte, Crucial Day, 114–15; 315;
Pinochet Ugarte, Journey through Life, 315–16.
73. Davis ­A-192 to DoS, 5 October 1973, POL 15–1 Chile, 10–24–70, box 2197, RG 59; González,
Chile, la conjura, 310–11; and Marras, Confesiones, 106–108; Devine, Good Hunting, 63.
74. For accounts emphasizing the Valparaíso rebellion as a trigger to the 11 September coup, see
Davis airgram ­A-195 to DoS, 12 October 1973; Ahumada, Chile: La memoria prohibid.a, vol. 1, 127 n.
11; Marras, Confesiones, 127–28; and Correa and Subercaseaux, Ego Sum Pinochet, 92–94. For
accounts downplaying the importance of Altamirano’s speech, see Schnake, Schnake, 224; Sigmund,
Overthrow of Allende, 240; and Soto, El último día, 50; Vial Correa, Pinochet, 213.
75. Marras, Confesiones, 110; Canessa Robert and Balart Páez, Pinochet y la restauración, 230.
76. Jonathan Kandell, “Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November,”
NYT, 27 September 1973.
77. Bussi de Allende, “The Facts About Chile,” 64; Uribe, Black Book, 126–33; García Márquez,
“Death of Salvador Allende,” 46; Steenland, “Coup in Chile,” 22; “MIR Analyzes the Coup,” in Birns,
End of Chilean Democracy, 104; Teitelboim, “Chile,” 39–40; Soto, El último día, 48, 52; Fuentes
Wendling, Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad, 343; Haslam, Nixon Administration, 170.
78. Huidobro Justiniano, Decisión naval, 246–47; Whelan, Allende, 24–25, 76.
79. Davis airgram ­A-195 to DoS, 12 October 1973.
80. Phillips, Night Watch, 246; Jack Kubisch testimony, 20 September 1973, HCFA, United States and
Chile during the Allende Years, 119; Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Rush), 13 September 1973, FRUS,
1969–1973, 21: 911. There is no documentary evidence to support the allegation in Prados, Presidents’
Secret Wars, 320–21, that a U.S. Navy SEAL commando team landed in Chile under the cover of the
Unitas exercises.
81. WSAG minutes, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 900–903. WSAG discussed the issue
two days later and came to the same conclusion: the Chilean Navy may have taken advantage of the
scheduled exercises to launch the coup, but Rush assured Kissinger: “We had nothing to do with it.”
See WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 916.
82. Moniz Bandeira, Fórmula para el caos, 523–24; Teitelboim, La lucha continúa, 42. See also
Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam’s comments on Davis’s suspicious movements just before the
coup as reported in Stockholm tel 468, 4 February 1974, 1974STOCKH00468, CFPF, RG 59.
83. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 916.
84. Davis, Last Two Years, 358.
85. Jack Kubisch testimony, 20 September 1973, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende
Years, 119. Davis also pointed out that Kissinger was too smart to have left such an obvious trail by
recalling his ambassador to Chile just a few days before initiating the coup. See Nathaniel Davis CNN
interview, 21 February 1999, NSA. See also Pickering briefing memo to Scowcroft, 14 September
1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 766 for the State Department’s advice to Kissinger on how to handle
this question should it come up during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
86. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Rush), 13 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 912.
87. Colby, Honorable Men, 305.
88. Embtel 4154, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 908.
89. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 917.
90. “The Generals Consolidate their Coup,” Time, 1 October 1973.
91. Marras, Confesiones, 130; Correa and Subercaseaux, Ego Sum Pinochet, 100–101; Merino Castro,
Bitácora, 233.
92. David Binder, “Chile’s Junta Says It Kept U.S. In Dark,” NYT, 15 September 1973.
93. CR, 27 September 1974, 119: 31775.
94. Colby later told WSAG that the CIA “didn’t know until Monday that they were going ahead.”
WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 917.
95. “Chile to Try 5,200 by ­Court-Martial,” WP, 18 September 1973; Phillips, Night Watch, 240;
Laurence Stern, “‘Centaur Plan’ to Oust Allende Called Hoax,” WP, 20 September 1973; “The Generals
Consolidate their Coup,” Time, 1 October 1973; excerpts from testimony before Congress by Kubisch
and Shlaudeman, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 729; Davis, Last Two Years, 454 n. 59. Another bizarre
conspiracy theory suggested that the planes that had bombed La Moneda were piloted by Americans.
See Villanueva, Modelo contrarrevolucionario chileno, 138–39; García Márquez, “Death of Salvador
Allende,” 52–53.
96. Haslam, Nixon Administration, 219.
97. Memcon (Nixon, Médici, Walters), 9 December 1971, National Security Archives; Ray and
Schaap, “Vernon Walters,” 5.
98. Jeff Stein, “Mystery Man of American Diplomacy,” Boston Globe Magazine, 29 August 1982.
Walters also later played an important role in coordinating Operation Condor. See Kornbluh, Pinochet
File, ch. 6.
99. Verdugo, Allende, 143.
100. Rabe, Killing Zone, 107–108; Freed and Landis, Death in Washington, 184.
101. Lockhart, “(W)Archives: He Rode a Tank”; Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 7.
102. Vernon Loeb, “Spook Story,” WP, 17 September 2000.
103. Roger Cohen, “Shift in U.S. Policy on Latin America Decreases Likelihood of Military Coups,”
WSJ, 4 May 1989.
104. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 924. In 1993,
Shlaudeman conceded that “our activities . . . probably did contribute to the atmosphere in which the
military moved.” Harry W. Shlaudeman interview, 14, FAOHC.
105. WSAG minutes, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 905.
106. CIA intelligence memo no. 1165/73, 14 September 1973, CIA-RDP85T00875R00 1100160049–
6, CREST. For a list of international reaction to the coup, see Riesch and Strharsky, Bibliographical
Notes. On why the Chilean coup drew so much world attention, see Kelly, “1973 Chilean Coup,” 171;
Vergara, “El reportaje a Chile”; and Eckel, “Allende’s Shadow,” 67.
107. Carl T. Rowan, “Chile Is Our Tragedy as Well,” Washington Star, 19 September 1973. On the
damage the coup caused to U.S.-Latin American relations, see CIA, national intelligence daily, 27
September 1974, CDP.
108. Pickering briefing memo to Scowcroft, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 768–69.
109. Editorial, “Thousands in Europe March in Protest,” WP, 12 September 1973; Panama tel 5223,
26 September 1973, 1973PANAMA05223, CFPF, RG 59. For a ­first-hand description of protest in
Italy, see Nena Ossa, “Letter from Rome,” National Review, 21 December 1973.
110. Jagan, “Reflection on Dramatic Events”; Tadeo, “Formulas for ­Counter-Revolutionary Coups,”
105; Guatemala tel 4557, 19 September 1973, 1973GUATEM04557, CFPF, RG 59.
111. Seymour Hersh, “Concern by India on CIA Related,” NYT, 13 September 1974; Frank Merrick,
“The CIA: Time to Come in From the Cold,” Time, 30 September 1974.
112. Frankfurt tel 6008, 17 September 1973, 1973FRANKF06008, CFPF, RG 59.
113. San Jose tel 3261 to DoS, 12 September 1973, 1973SANJO03261, CFPF, RG 59.
114. Stockholm tel 3454, 27 September 1973, 1973STOCKH03454, CFPF, RG 59; Bern tel 3868, 17
September 1973, 1973BERN03868, CFPF, RG 59.
115. Stockholm tel 3259, 14 September 1973, 1973STOCKH03259, CFPF, RG 59.
116. Ottawa tel 2291, 21 September 1973, 1973OTTAWA02291, CFPF, RG 59. For an even harsher ­-
anti-American reaction in Quebec, see Montreal tel 1836, 14 September 1973, 1973MONTRE01836,
CFPF, RG 59.
117. San José tel 3302, 15 September 1973, 1973SANJO03302, CFPF, RG 59. On Figueres’s dismal
opinion of Allende generally, see ­Hurtado-Torres, “Gathering Storm,” 251.
118. Buenos Aires tel 7118, 27 September 1973, 1973BUENOS07118, CFPF, RG 59. At the same
time, Perón did have strong suspicions that the United States was behind the coup. See Carl T. Rowan,
“Chile Is Our Tragedy as Well,” Washington Star, 19 September 1973.
119. DCI briefing, 14 September 1973, CDP; ­Port-au-Prince tel 1658, 24 September 1973,
1973PORTA01658, CFPF, RG 59.
120. Moscow tel 11439, 20 September 1973, 1973MOSCOW11439, CFPF, RG 59. On the
acquiescence of the Soviet press in this regard, see Moscow tel 11976, 1 October 1973,
1973MOSCOW11976, CFPF, RG 59.
121. Moscow tel 11235, 17 September 1973, 1973MOSCOW11235, CFPF, RG 59; deptel 18499, 18
September 1973, 1973STATE184999, CFPF, RG 59.
122. Moscow tel 11620, 25 September 1973, 1973MOSCOW11620, CFPF, RG 59; Westad, Global
Cold War, 283; Dahl, “Soviet Bloc Response,” 34; Prizel, Latin America through Soviet Eyes, 164–65.
123. Hong Kong tel 9277, 17 September 1973, 1973HONGK09277, CFPF, RG 59; Joseph, “China’s
Relations with Chile under Allende,” 143–44. Notably, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai did not
challenge Kissinger’s lies about the U.S. role in the Chilean coup. Memcon (Kissinger, Zou Enlai,
others), 12 November 1973, in Burr, Kissinger Transcripts, 200. For Eastern European reactions, see
Sofia tel 1241, 18 September 1973, 1973SOFIA01241, CFPF, RG 59; and Warsaw tel 4795, 14
September 1973, 1973WARSAW04795, CFPF, RG 59.
124. WSAG minutes, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 899; Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 244–
45.
125. USUN tel 3202, 14 September 1973, CDP.
 126. USUN tel 3261, 18 September 1973, 1973USUNN03284; and “The Generals Consolidate their
Coup,” Time, 1 October 1973.
127. USUN tel 3262, 18 September 1973, 1973USUNN03262, CFPF, RG 59; “Complaint by Cuba,” in
UN, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security
Council, 188.
128. USUN tel 3263, 18 September 1973, 1973USUNN03263, CFPF, RG 59. For the State
Department’s instructions to Scali to deny any U.S. government involvement in the coup, see deptel
184215, 17 September 1973, 1973STATE184215, CFPF, RG 59.
129. Only the Soviet Union, Panama, Guinea, Algeria, Yugoslavia, and Yemen sided with Cuba. See
“Complaint by Cuba,” in United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs,
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 189. The Chilean military government eventually
seized a Cuban ship in the Panama Canal in retaliation for the sugar and port equipment taken by
Playa Larga. See Amembassy Panama tel 5431 to secstate, 5 October 1973, 1973PANAMA05431,
CFPF, RG 59.
130. USUN tel 3282, 19 September 1973, 1973USUNN03282; and USUN tel 3308, 19 September
1973, 1973USUNN03308, CFPF, RG 59.
131. DIA message, “Military Coup Plotting for Morning of 11 Sep,” 10 September 1973, CDP. The Ad
Hoc Interagency Working Group recommended that in the meantime, the junta should rely on
military aid from Brazil and other friendly Latin American countries. “Summary of Chile
Contingency Paper,” 12 September 1973, NSC Institutional Files, box ­H-094, folder WSAG Meeting
Chile 9/12/73, NPMP.
132. WSAG minutes, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 900.
133. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 12 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 906–907.
134. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 914–15; Kissinger, Years of
Upheaval, 408.
135. David Binder, “Chile’s Junta Says It Kept U.S. In Dark,” NYT, 15 September 1973.
136. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Rabasa), 18 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 927–28.
137. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 922.
138. U.S. officials had already witnessed an example of this kind of problem in early 1973, when
Ambassador Davis had to restrain Frei’s supporters from openly challenging U.S. news stories alleging
that the CIA had intervened in the 1964 Chilean presidential election. See Laurence Stern, “U.S.
Helped Beat Allende in 1964,” WP, 6 April 1973; and Davis, Last Two Years, 146–47.
139. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 917–18. See also the CIA’s desperate
attempt to answer sixty of “Kissinger’s arcane economic questions” within a few days. Phillips, Night
Watch, 249. For the State Department’s suggestions on how Kissinger should respond to potential
questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Pickering briefing memo to Scowcroft,
14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 763.
140. Kissinger telcon (Kissinger, Nixon), 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 924.
141. WSAG minutes, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 917. David Phillips, head of CIA
operations for the Western Hemisphere, later recalled that no one proposed warning Allende because
of the prevailing assumption that Nixon would oppose it. Phillips, Night Watch, 248. How much
Nixon knew about the impending coup cannot yet be determined because the portions of the
president’s daily briefs on 8 and 11 September that relate to Chile have been censored in their entirety.
See Kornbluh, “CIA ­Cover-Up on Chile.”
142. McAfee memo to Gardner, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 919.
143. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 922–23. Determining
exactly what Jorden knew is difficult to establish, but the CIA did note in early 1973 that State
Department officials were still in the dark about Track II. See “Overview Statements on CIA
Involvement in Chile in 1970,” 20 February 1973, 0000096947, CREST. Colby and Phillips, who were
no longer involved with Chilean affairs by 1971, later told Ambassador Davis that they did not know
that “Track II had lingered beyond 1970.” See Davis, Last Two Years, 318.
144. Henry Kissinger testimony, 17 September 1973, SCFR, Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger, 303.
145. Pickering briefing memo to Scowcroft, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 763–66;
memcon (Chou ­En-lai, Kissinger, and others), 13 November 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, 18: doc 59 n. 1.
146. Kubisch statement, 20 September 1973, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years,
96.
147. Gardner memo to McAfee, 20 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 937.
148. Kubisch testimony, 25 September 1973, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende Years,
135, 148. By this point, the CIA had already reminded Kissinger that the administration had given
covert assistance to Allende’s opposition. See Colby memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS,
1969–1973, ­E-16: 742–43.
149. Kubisch had been serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. embassy in Mexico City when
the NSC options paper was issued. See FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: xxxi. On his role in the destabilization
effort, see chapter 7.
150. Secretaría General de Gobierno, Libro blanco, 25, 94; Silva Cabrera, Allende, 295.
151. Taufic, Chile en la hoguera, 210. PDC Senator Alberto Jerez, who was imprisoned with Daniel
Vergara on Dawson Island for two years, claims that Vergara was never interrogated about Plan Z. See
Witker Velásquez, Salvador Allende: Una vida por la democracia y el socialismo, 267.
152. Magasich, Los que dijeron “No,” vol. 2, 27.
153. Whelan, Out of the Ashes, 632 n. 54.
154. Marín, Vida es hoy, 178; Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 232–33.
155. For examples, see Politzer, Altamirano, 31; Lagos, Southern Tiger, 161; and Coronel Araneda,
Memorias de un sepulturero, 57. Orlando Letelier later pointed out that when he was imprisoned after
the coup his interrogators never asked him about Plan Z. See testimony of Orlando Letelier, Mexico
City, 1975. A former GAP member who later collaborated with Pinochet’s secret police recalled that
the UP had a defense plan, but it did not include assassination. See Arce, Inferno, 11–12.
156. “Junta in Charge,” NYT, 12 September 1973.
157. Thomas Andrew O’Keefe, “Most Chileans Know Military Invented Plot,” NYT, 29 July 1990.
158. Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 53–54;
159. Bastián Fernández, “Plan Z,” El Mostrador, 14 August 2014; Huneeus, Pinochet Regime, 62 n. 23;
Arancibia Clavel, Conversando con Roberto Kelly V., 171–72. Vial insisted down to his death in 2009
that Plan Z was authentic. For Altamirano’s rebuttal, see “Carlos Altamirano responde a Gonzalo
Vial.”
160. Agee, Inside the Company, 600–601; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 724; Freed and Landis, Death in
Washington, 38, 103, 119.
161. Devine, Good Hunting, 66–67.
162. Church Report, 40. See also CIA, Hinchey Report; Davis, Last Two Years, 460 n. 18.
163. For examples of U.S. intelligence cables, see DATT 624, 16 September 1973; DIA tel 625, 25
September 1973; and DIA summary, 18 September 1973, all in CDP. For U.S. embassy reporting, see
embtel 4323, 17 September 1973, CDP; embtel 4904, 9 October 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2:
393–95; and Amembassy ­A-215 to DoS, 9 November 1973, POL 2 Chile, 1–­1-71, box 2193, RG 59.
164. CIA intelligence report, 26 October 1973, CDP. For the admission by one CIA field agent that
his source had a “vested interest in promoting the existence of ‘Plan Z,’” see CIA intelligence report, 25
October 1973, CDP. For similar doubts about the “alleged countercoup,” see CIA information report,
28 September 1973, CDP.
165. DoD intelligence information report, “Events Leading Up to The 11 September Military Coup
in Chile,” 29 October 1973, CDP. See also Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 240.
166. DoD intelligence report, 26 November 1973, CDP.
167. Embtel 5153, 9 November 1973, CDP.
168. Embtel 1693, 3 April 1974, 1974SANTIA01693, CFPF, RG 59. See also Pinochet’s claim that the
discovery of small arms in Allende’s house constituted evidence of a conspiracy. “The Generals
Consolidate their Coup,” Time, 1 October 1973.
169. Davis airgram ­A-195 to DoS, 12 October 1973. Uncertainty about the authenticity of Plan Z did
not stop the State Department’s Soviet and Eastern Europe division from producing a propaganda
pamphlet featuring Plan Z as an international communist conspiracy. See Klosson, Técnica soviética.
170. Kennedy and Jorden memo to Kissinger, 19 September 1973, WSAG Meeting Chile 9/20/73,
box ­H-094, NSC Institutional Files, NPMP.
171. Tad Szulc, “The View from Langley,” WP, 21 October 1973.
172. Transcript of Elizabeth Farnsworth interview with Henry Kissinger, Online News Hour, PBS.
173. Cecil B. Lyon interview, 16, FAOHC.
174. McSherry, Predatory States; Dinges, Condor Years; Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 6.
175. Bawden, Pinochet Generation, 142.
176. White, Chile’s Days of Terror, 31.
177. Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 41–56; Passmore, Wars Inside Chile’s Barracks, 13;
Amnesty International, Chile, 60; Magasich, Los que dijeron “No,” vol. 2, 295; Landis, “CIA Makes
Headlines,” 31–32.
178. Knudson, Chilean Press during the Allende Years, 80; John Pollock and Torry Dickinson,
“Apologists for Terror,” Worldview, 17:3 (March 1974).
179. Allende, Paula, 198.
180. Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, 152–53. See also the Rettig Report, 163; Leggett
et. al, Allende, 48.
181. Altamirano, Dialéctica de una derrota, 192. For other accounts using the same analogy, see
Carmona, “Fascismo chileno,” 104; and Krippendorff, “Chile,” 97.
182. Embtel 4992, 12 October 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 399.
183. Embtel 846, 22 February 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 425.
184. Embtel 4315, 23 July 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 458.
185. CR, 22 December 1973, 119: 43463.
186. SFRC, Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, pt. 1, 46.
187. “Liberal Senators Shill for Chilean Marxists,” Human Events, 30 March 1974, 293.
188. Rome tel 11385, 18 October 1973, 1973ROME11385, CFPF, RG 59; Crawley memo to Hunter,
14 November 1973, FCO 7/2416, TNA.
189. Winn, “Furies of the Andes,” 267; Chavkin, Storm over Chile, 106.
190. Christopher Roper, “Chile ­Ex-President Supports Junta,” WP, 14 September 1973.
191. Jonathan Kandell, “Chile’s Junta Tells,” NYT, 31 October 1973.
192. Laurence R. Birns, “Chile in the Wall Street Journal,” Nation, 3 December 1973, 583.
193. Valenzuela and Valenzuela, “Visions of Chile,” 173 n. 50.
194. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 240; Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land, 89.
195. Senator Barry Goldwater (­R-Arizona) was the sole member of the Church Committee to take
Plan Z seriously. See his dissent in Church Committee, Foreign and Military Intelligence, 583.
196. CR, 12 September 1973, 119: 29390; CR, 18 June 1974, 120: 19776.
197. CR, 5 February 1974, 120: 2152. For similar evasions, see Shlaudeman testimony, 12 June 1974,
HCFA, Human Rights in Chile, 124–25; and Holton letter to Kennedy, 19 August 1974, CDP.
198. Chalmers M. Roberts, “The U.S. Integrity Gap,” WP, 19 September 1973.
199. Seymour Hersh, “C.I.A. Chief Tells House of $­8-Million Campaign Against Allende in ‘70–73,”
NYT, 8 September 1974.
200. Memcon (Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller, Scowcroft), 6 September 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11,
pt. 2: 461–62.
201. Telcon (Ted Koppel, Kissinger), 9 September 1974, Kissinger Telcons, DoS, FOIA.
202. The President’s News Conference, 16 September 1974, PPP.
203. Hortensia B. de Allende letter to the editor, NYT, 25 September 1974. See also Tom Wicker,
“Was Ford Conned on Chile?” NYT, 20 September 1974.
204. Laurence Stern, “What’s Good for America,” New Statesman, 27 September 1974.
205. Seymour Hersh, “Senators Order Inquiry on Chile,” NYT, 18 September 1974. On the
international condemnation of Ford’s comments, see McGarr, “Unquiet Americans,” 197–98.
206. Memcon (Scowcroft, 25 Georgetown University undergraduates, and others), 29 October 1974,
CDP.
207. Springstein memo to Scowcroft, 7 November 1974, folder Chile (1), box 3, Presidential Country
Files for Latin America, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
208. Richard Helms testimony, 22 January 1975, SFRC, CIA Foreign and Domestic Activities, 6. See
chapter 7 for a discussion of his perjury conviction.
209. Feinberg, Intemperate Zone, 204. For the U.S. domestic impact of the coup, see Hoeffel and
Kornbluh, “War at Home.”
210. Editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 574–75.
211. Telcon (Elkin, Kissinger), 24 November 1975, Kissinger Telcons, DoS, FOIA; Fallaci, “CIA’s Mr.
Colby,” 17. The coverup effort continued into the ­twenty-first century, as Kissinger and former
Undersecretary of State William D. Rogers allegedly influenced the journal Foreign Affairs to suppress
a letter from the journal’s book review editor, Kenneth Maxwell, defending his review of Kornbluh’s
book, The Pinochet File. See Maxwell, “Case of the Missing Letter.”
212. Michael J. Harrington statement, 25 May 1976, SCFR, Shlaudeman Nomination, 7.
213. Dan Griffin, “Envoy Apologizes for U.S. Role in Chile, Draws Disavowal,” WP, 9 March 1977.
President Jimmy Carter called the apology “inappropriate.” Edward Walsh, “‘Plain Speaking’ More
Difficult Now,” WP, 14 March 1977.
214. William D. Rogers obituary, WP, 27 September 2007. Powell’s boss, President George W. Bush,
notably ignored the issue during his brief visit to Chile in late 2004. See Ariel Dorfman, “What Bush
Missed in Chile,” Los Angeles Times, 23 November 2004. In an earlier White House press conference
with President Lagos, Bush had promised to investigate charges of Pinochet’s corruption. Yet the issue
of U.S. responsibility for human rights violations in Chile never came up, even though at this same
press conference Bush condemned Iran for violating human rights and funding terrorist
organizations. See George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions with President Ricardo Lagos of
Chile and an Exchange With Reporters,” 19 July 2004, PPP.
215. So far, no U.S. president has been willing to acknowledge the U.S. role in fomenting the Chilean
coup. Carter evaded the issue by citing the Church Report. Jimmy Carter, “The President’s News
Conference,” 3 March 1977, PPP. President William Clinton once lectured the Chilean Congress on
freedom and democracy without once mentioning U.S. support for Pinochet. See Marc Cooper,
“Remembering Allende,” Nation, 28 September 1998; and William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the
National Congress of Chile in Valparaiso,” 17 April 1998, PPP. In dodging the issue of U.S.
responsibility for the 1973 coup in Chile, President Barack Obama said he thought it was important to
“know our history” but “not be trapped by it.” Apparently, we can “know” that the emperor has no
clothes, but it would not do to say so out loud. See Barack Obama, “The President’s News Conference
with President Sebastián Piñera of Chile in Santiago, Chile,” 21 March 2011, PPP; Kevin Gostola,
“Ghosts of Allende & Pinochet Haunt Obama during Visit to Chile,” OpEdNews, 23 March 2011; and
Castro, “My Shoes Are Too Tight.”
 216. Laurence Birns, “How to Lie in Washington,” New York Review of Books, 17 July 1975. Another
example of deception that carried no consequence was Alexander Haig’s repeated insistence that he
had not been significantly involved in the Nixon administration’s policymaking decisions with respect
to Chile. See SFRC, Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, pt. 1, 45, 66. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis also
remained unscathed, as he became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Ford
Administration, despite numerous objections by legislators seeking to connect him to the 1973 coup
in Chile. See SFRC, Nomination of Nathaniel Davis.
217. SFRC, CIA Foreign and Domestic Activities, 11.
218. Jorden memo to Kissinger, 16 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 773.
219. Lagos, Southern Tiger, 32.
220. Frost and Zelnick, Frost/Nixon, 271–72.
221. John Hugh Crimmins interview, FAOHC.
222. When asked about the CIA document stating that it was a “firm and continuing policy that
Allende be overthrow by a coup,” Kissinger dodged responsibility by claiming he would never see such
a document because it would be confined to the lower operational level. See Elizabeth Farnsworth
interview with Henry Kissinger, 6 February 2001, Online News Hour, PBS.
223. For a discussion of Kissinger’s “denial mechanism,” see Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow, 13–14; and
Gaddis, “Rescuing Choice from Circumstance,” 580–83. On the contribution of the CIA intervention
in Chile to the “credibility gap” or its equivalent, “the confidence gap,” see Olmsted, Challenging the
Secret Government, 17; and Scott, Reining in the State, 138–45. Nearly three years after the coup, State
Department officials deluded themselves in imagining that fewer Latin Americans now spoke of
“destabilization plots” because we have “succeeded in demonstrating our commitment to mutual
accommodation rather than unilateral intervention.” Lord briefing memo to Kissinger, 1 September
1976, FRUS, 1969–1976, 38, pt. 1: 466. For the suggestion that U.S. leaders lie about certain policies
because they understand that the public would not support them, see Pessen, “Appraising American
Cold War Policy,” 461.
224. “Poll Finds 60% Are Critical of U.S. Intervention in Chile,” NYT, 29 October 1974. On how
disenchantment over the Vietnam War contributed to this criticism, see Gosse, “Unpacking the
Vietnam Syndrome.”
225. In the six weeks following the Chilean coup, the White House was besieged with thousands of
communications of protest over the junta’s human rights violations. See Keys, “Congress,” 826 n. 13;
editorial note, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 943–46; and Fagen, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights,”
115–16.
226. Embtel 5559, 11 September 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 463.
227. Embtel 2046, 18 April 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 448.
228. Transcript of acting secretary of state’s principals’ and regionals’ staff meeting, 10 June 1974,
FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 453–54.
229. Pickering briefing memo to Scowcroft, 14 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 766.
230. Transcript of secretary of state’s staff meeting, 1 October 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2:
391. See also former CIA Director Colby’s comment that Pinochet was the lesser of two evils (the
other being Allende) because “nobody is worried about Pinochet” conquering the world. Fallaci,
“CIA’s Mr. Colby,” 16–17.
231. CR, 20 September 1973, 119: 30722–23, 30785.
232. News briefing transcript, Thursday, September 20, 21 September 1973, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16:
786.
233. Kubisch briefing memo to Kissinger, 16 November 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 409.
234. CIA memo 1030/74, 21 March 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 432–35.
235. Seymour Hersh, “Kissinger Said to Rebuke U.S. Ambassador to Chile,” NYT, 27 September
1974. For more on Kissinger’s role in propping up Pinochet, see Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow, 148–49.
236. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 8–9.
237. Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 119. For a ­first-hand description of how shocked Chilean were at
the repression that followed the coup, see “Novelist Isabel Allende,” Democracy Now, 28 November
2014; and Bruey, Bread, 64.
238. Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, 25.
239. Duncan Campbell and Jonathan Franklin, “Last Chance to Clear the Slate of the Pinochet Era,”
Guardian, 1 September 2003. For examples of utopianism, determinism, and arrogance in the Chilean
left, see Marchak, Reigns of Terror, 83; Vargas Puch, Utopía y realidad en Chile, 190–92; Marc Cooper,
“The Other September 11,” Times, 11 September 2003; Genaro Arriagada Herrera, “La doble crisis,”
Mensaje, ­January-February 1978; and Timerman, Death in the South, 104.
240. Valenzuela, “Chile,” 188. On the crippling of Chilean democracy after the coup, see Richard
Gott, “Legacy of Terror,” New Statesman, 15 September 2003; and Remmer, “Political Demobilization
in Chile”; and Hite and Morlino, “Problematizing the Links,” 52. On how Pinochet’s rhetoric
contributed to the politics of eternity by redefining Allende’s supporters as “­non-Chilean,” see
Munizaga, El discurso público de Pinochet.
241. Teitelboim, “Prelude to Future Victories,” 84–85; Cantero, “Role and Character of External
Factors,” 122–23.
242. Collins et al., eds., Politics of Memory in Chile, xi; Beckett, Pinochet in Piccadilly, 178; Stern,
Reckoning with Pinochet, 448–49 n. 3; Winn, “Salvador Allende,” 156–57. PDC leader Patricio Aylwin,
who became president in 1990, tried to rewrite history by avowing that he had never believed in Plan
Z. In truth, he had repeatedly invoked Plan Z right after the coup as a justification for removing
Allende. See Aylwin Azócar, El reencuentro de los demócratas, 30; and “Chile Junta Cites ‘Corruption,’”
WP, 20 September 1973. The Chilean journalist Hernán Millas declared in 1999 that Plan Z was a
hoax, even though he himself had treated the plan as sensational revelation immediately after the
coup. See Millas, La familia militar, 23–30; and Millas, Anatomía de un fracaso, 149–53.
243. The coup also helped deepen Chilean fatalism about U.S. hegemony. See Collier and Sater,
History of Chile, 359 n. 1; and Timerman, Death in the South, 36.
244. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 20. On how the Pinochet dictatorship contributed
to the depoliticization of Chilean society, see Schuster Pineda, “La desafección de los chilenos con los
partidos políticos”; Waugh, “Depoliticization in ­Post-Pinochet Chile”; and Silva, “Politics of ­Neo-
Liberalism in Latin America.”
245. Dorfman, “Lessons of a Catastrophe,” Nation, 29 September 1973.
246. Lichtenstein, “Market Triumphalism.” On the irony that Chile’s experiment with neoliberalism
eventually led to its implementation in the United States, see Barder, “American Hegemony Comes
Home”; and Volk, “Chile and the United States Thirty Years Later.”
247. Salazar, Daño transgeneracional, 31; Klein, Shock Doctrine, 70; Caldwell and Montes, “Friedrich
Hayek,” 283; Herman, Real Terror Network, 191.
248. On the danger that the United States might lose its democracy like Chile did, see Diamond,
Upheaval, 176.
 Conclusion
The Church Committee concluded its 1975 report on U.S. covert action in
Chile with several provocative questions: “In 1970, the U.S. sought to foster
a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende’s accession to power; yet after
1970 the government—according to the testimony of its officials—did not
engage in coup plotting. Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration? Or was the
threat posed to the national security interests of the United States so grave
that the government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly during
1970–73?”1 The committee seemed to be implying that the United States
normally only intervenes in countries where its national security interests
are at stake, and that possibly the Nixon administration had not done
enough to take down Allende after it failed to prevent his election.
This study has argued that Nixon administration officials wildly
exaggerated the communist threat in Chile by obsessing over the imagined
possibility that Allende might transform the country into a ­Soviet-Cuban
outpost that would spread communism to other Latin American countries.
In truth, Allende’s Chile was never a security threat to the United States or
any country in the Western Hemisphere.2 After the coup, Kissinger had to
concede to U.S. Congressman Donald Fraser’s point that Chile, which was
“further away than Moscow,” would not be “landing in any time in the future
on the beaches of California.”3 Allende kept his vow to never allow a foreign
power to establish a military base in Chile. As shown in Chapter 5, the
Soviets consciously chose not to provide the Unidad Popular government
with the amount of aid needed to rescue Chile’s sagging economy. Chile
under Allende did serve as a kind of haven for revolutionary exiles, but most
of them remained inactive. Despite the friendly ties between the Allende
and Castro governments, there is no hard evidence that Chile conspired
with Cuba to export revolution to the hemisphere by force. In rejecting
national security as a motive for Nixon’s orders to bring down Allende,
Senator Frank Church of Idaho likened the American president to “Caesar
peering into the colonies.”4
Whatever his flaws, Allende did not transform Chile into a police state, as
Augusto Pinochet did when he censored the media and incarcerated
thousands of political prisoners in detention camps.5 Some of the most
impressive features of Allende’s government included free speech, religious
tolerance, and respect for the rule of law.6 The UP government also made
significant progress toward many of its goals during its short reign of a little
more than a thousand days: the nationalization of the copper industry;
enactment of the most significant agrarian reform in the nation’s history;
promotion of indigenous rights; challenging of U.S. domination of the ­inter-
American system; establishment of social and cultural programs to alleviate
poverty, improve health care, and promote literacy; and the enhancement of
participatory democracy in a country long ruled by a tiny elite.7 These
accomplishments, Pablo Neruda argued, were collectively the “most
important achievement in the history of Chile.”8 Shortly after the coup, one
of Allende’s comrades predicted that within a decade, “people will begin to
remember Allende for the process of social change he started and not for the
problems he caused. They will put up a statue of him—a really big one—
right out in the middle of the city, and no one will complain about it.”
Although this prophecy badly underestimated the duration of Pinochet’s
dictatorship, a monument to Allende finally appeared in Santiago’s
Constitution Plaza in 2000.9
Given that U.S. officials were so far off the mark in treating Allende’s
election as a national security risk, some analysts have described the Nixon
administration’s harsh policies toward Chile as a “mistake.”10 After all, why
go to such lengths to undermine a presidential candidate who embraced
ideological pluralism and went out of his way to assure the Nixon
administration that he was not anti–American? As many U.S. advisers
pointed out at the time, there was no need to panic over Allende, a moderate
socialist who faced formidable opposition. After Assistant Secretary of State
for ­Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer returned from Allende’s
inauguration, he informed U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger
that “every Chilean or Latin American that I talked to said that if the US did
anything to draw strong or adverse attention to Allende, the 36% of the
popular vote which he got would be 70% within 24 hours…. They all begged
us not to put an anti–US stamp on Allende.”11
Adopting a hardline strategy against Allende also risked severely
damaging America’s reputation throughout the Third World. Right after
Allende’s election in 1970, Senator John O. Pastore (D–Rhode Island) tried
in vain to caution CIA Director Richard Helms of “the danger that we might
fail to recognize truly popular revolutions and label them ­Communist-
inspired.”12 Such warnings about potential blowback proved justified. After
the coup, House Speaker Jim Wright (D–Texas) began to observe on his
trips to Latin America “a growing paranoia toward the CIA and a tendency
to excuse failures of one kind or another by blaming the U.S. agency.”13
Senator Hugh Scott (R–Pennsylvania) was troubled that “what happened in
this coup d’etat and what may happen in some future coup d’etat is that
somebody may say we were involved, and then we go to the Alice in
Wonderland tactic of verdict first and trial afterward.”14 Senator Richard
Schweiker (R–Pennsylvania) of the Church Committee chastised one CIA
operative that “throwing a duly elected government out the window is just
inviting all kinds of anti–American, ugly American reactions.”15
Just because Allende’s government did not pose a military threat to the
United States, however, does not mean that it did not potentially endanger
other U.S. interests.16 Well before the Cold War, Washington, routinely
linked capitalist features of the American free enterprise system to U.S.
national security. The specific multinational corporations such as Kennecott
and International Telephone and Telegraph, which were threatened by the
nationalization provisions of the UP platform, did not direct the Nixon
administration’s campaign to undermine Allende. But the desire to preserve
a liberal capitalist world order that would protect corporate interests did
figure into Washington’s calculation of the threat posed by Allende’s election,
which came at a time when U.S. hegemony had begun to suffer from
imperial overstretch.17 The Nixon Doctrine, which facilitated the withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Vietnam, represented an attempt to hold on to empire
but at a reduced cost, as the United States pulled back from ­large-scale
military commitments to shift the burden of defense to its client states.
Applying the doctrine to Chile meant adopting the public “cool but correct”
posture while continuing secretly to undermine Allende’s government.
When Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier presented his diplomatic
credentials in early March 1971, Nixon assured him: “We do not … seek to
impose our beliefs on others, recognizing that perhaps the most important
freedom of all is that of selecting one’s own path, of determining one’s own
destiny. The path chosen by the program of your country is not the path
chosen by the people of this country, but we recognize the right of any
country to order its own internal affairs.”18
Nixon’s bombast encouraged Letelier’s hope that a socialist government
such as Chile’s might coexist peacefully with the United States. In August
1971, Letelier offered his colleagues many good reasons to suggest that there
had been a shift in the political winds. First, Nixon’s détente policy and
rapprochement with China seemed to be lessening Cold War tensions
globally. Second, the worldwide political upheavals of 1968 had encouraged
Latin Americans to become more aware of their rights. Third, American
domestic politics had become so roiled over the Vietnam War that it was
politically difficult if not impossible for Washington to dispatch the marines
into Latin America as it had in 1965 when the Lyndon B. Johnson
administration invaded the Dominican Republic. Fourth, the Nixon
Doctrine appeared to signal that the United States was going to disengage
from military intervention and acknowledge that other countries have the
sovereign right to devise their own policies.19
Given the historical context, it is understandable that Chilean officials
initially failed to detect that the “cool but correct” policy was designed to
conceal a covert action program aiming at halting the rise of a socialist
power in the Southern Cone. The depth of the CIA’s interference in the 1964
election was still unknown in 1970, and the degree of Nixon’s hostility to
Allende would have been hard to detect given Nixon’s public statements and
willingness to entertain détente with the large communist powers. American
leaders could choose how to respond to perceived threats and there was
nothing written in stone that the United States had to go to war against
Chile in 1970. According to the historian Paul Sigmund, there was not “any
inevitability or necessity about U.S. policy toward Allende that would have
compelled a different President or National Security Adviser to follow the
same policy.”20 One American journalist declared after the coup that “it takes
no great leap of imagination” to suggest that Washington might have
adopted a different strategy against Allende.21 As discussed in Chapter 1,
Nixon and Kissinger were clearly responsible for the administration taking a
harder line against Chile, as the State Department and, to some extent, the
CIA were much less keen to undertake risky operations that might
backfire.22 Kissinger so dominated the various committees governing policy
toward the Allende government that he became known in the State
Department as the “Chilean desk officer.”23
The most commonly suggested alternative to Nixon and Kissinger’s policy
was to adopt a ­hands-off approach that would allow Allende to complete his
presidential term on the assumption that the UP government would become
so unpopular it would lose the next election. It was not an implausible
scenario.24 Shortly after becoming president, Allende pledged that if the
opposition won the 1976 elections, “we will retire to our corner” even if it
meant, he later reaffirmed, that “the country would live in hell.”25 Before
British Ambassador David Hildyard left his Santiago post in mid–March
1973, he predicted that Allende would complete his term and that there
would be free elections in 1976.26 Christian Democrat Renán Fuentealba
advised Ambassador Nathaniel Davis that instead of promoting a coup it
would be better to let the Allende government fall on “the weight of its
moral bankruptcy.”27 After the September 1973 coup, several U.S. officials
lamented that the UP government went out by force instead of being
defeated at the polls. Former Ambassador to Chile Ralph Dungan, for
example, suggested that “nothing would have served our interests better
than if [Allende] had completed his term in office and then been repudiated
by the Chilean people in constitutional elections.”28Assistant Secretary of
State for ­Inter-American Affairs John Kubisch agreed. The “best outcome,”
he told Congress two weeks after the coup, “would have been for him to go
on and complete his mandate and be defeated.”29
The problem with the hardline approach, according to these critics, was
that it let Allende off the hook. The French ambassador to Chile thought it
unfortunate that the Chilean experiment with socialism had not been
allowed to fail on its own: “Now, the Left will claim it was cheated and that
no proof exists to demonstrate that [a] Marxist system cannot function in
the West.”30 Even worse, predicted Mexico’s foreign minister, Allende will go
down in history as a martyr whose death vindicated Fidel Castro’s insistence
that significant social change could only be achieved through armed
struggle.31 During the Church Committee hearings, Senator Schweiker
received a round of applause from the gallery for scolding former
Ambassador Edward Korry that he and his associates had “proved Castro
and the Communists right by our inept and stupid blundering in Chile.”32 To
former U.S. diplomat William Bundy, the Track II operation was especially
indefensible because “its aura and that of earlier scandals contributed to a
historical myth that it was Americans, and not the Chileans themselves, who
overthrew Allende in 1973.”33 The problem in Chile, Bundy complained, was
that “we went far enough to be blamed, [but] not far enough to affect the
outcome.”34 Had the Nixon administration not tried to make the Chilean
economy scream, complained Senator Paul Tsongas (D–Massachusetts) in
1981, “the true failure of Allende in Socialist theory would have been clearer
to Latin Americans today.”35
Even allowing for the possibility that a different American president
might have chosen a less harsh strategy against Allende, however, Nixon’s
decision to initiate a covert action program in Chile was hardly out of
character. Nixon’s predecessors, both democratic and republican, had
employed covert action with mixed success in attempts to overturn
nationalist regimes in Third World countries such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba,
British Guiana, and Brazil.36 Hence Nixon’s claim to be instituting a new
policy of greater tolerance toward countries with different political systems
is hard to take seriously given Washington’s long history of intervening in
countries where revolutionary movements appeared to threaten U.S.
economic interests. To allow nationalist or socialist regimes to flourish in
America’s own “backyard” was unthinkable because inaction could be
interpreted as a sign of weakness, thus undermining U.S. credibility. The
issue went beyond communism.37 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara once highlighted the danger to President Lyndon Johnson: “Our
ends cannot be achieved and our leadership role cannot be played if some
powerful and virulent nation—whether Germany, Japan, Russia or China—
is allowed to organize their part of the world according to a philosophy
contrary to ours.”38 As the social critic Naomi Klein and others have
observed, it was necessary to destroy socialist experiments like Chile’s to
demonstrate that there was no alternative to neoliberalism.39 From this
perspective, Nixon’s attempt to bring Allende down was not a “mistake” or
an “aberration,” but a gamble that ultimately paid off.40 The cost of 3,000
human lives to bring about neoliberalism in Chile, one U.S. diplomat later
declared, “was probably cheap at twice the price.”41 Finally, to those U.S.
officials who were fixated on Allende as a demagogue, allowing the Chilean
president to fulfill his term carried unacceptable risks. Former U.S.
Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon warned in April 1973 that in 1976
Chile could move toward “a totalitarian Marxist form of socialism with the
loss of political democracy and civil liberties.”42
Whatever one makes of the motives of the Nixon administration in its
attempts to thwart Allende, there remains the central question of how
effective those efforts were. The historian Stephen Rabe has commented that
it is not difficult to “imagine Chile heading toward the political abyss,
without foreign actors—Brazil, Cuba, the United States—encouraging
violent responses.”43 In considering this issue, analysts often divide the
possible causes of Allende’s downfall into “internal” and “external” factors.
The most commonly identified internal factors include Allende’s leadership,
the policies of the UP government, the domestic opposition, and the armed
forces. The external factors to consider include the Cold War atmosphere,
the ­inter-American system, Cuban influence, multinational corporations,
the Nixon administration’s economic blockade, and the CIA’s destabilization
efforts.
In an effort to help the country heal after the 1988 plebiscite that ended
the Pinochet dictatorship, Chilean political leaders have generally tried to
avoid the controversy over the 1973 coup.44 For example, when Christian
Democrat Patricio Aylwin assumed the presidency in 1989, he kept it
simple: “We were all responsible.”45 Michelle Bachelet, who would later
become Chile’s first female president, pointed out in 2000 that nobody wants
to take responsibility for what happened and instead seeks to blame their
opponents.46 On the fortieth anniversary of the Chilean coup, President
Sebastián Piñera cautioned Chileans on how they should remember this
“very dark part of our history” without reproducing the same anger:
“Everybody has some lessons to learn.”47
An explanation that casts blame everywhere is supported by the widely
shared observation that Chile became so politically polarized during the
Allende years that the country’s venerable tradition of convivencia finally
collapsed. A U.S. intelligence ­post-mortem noted, for example, that
“Chileans of all persuasions were in some part responsible for the
breakdown of a system whose hallmark for 40 years had been
accommodation and compromise.”48 The notion that Chile was a tranquil
paradise until Allende came along forms part of the myth of Chilean
exceptionalism, yet there can be no denying that by almost any standard the
UP years were extremely stormy.49 In early September 1973, the British
ambassador to Chile appeared incredulous over how politically divided the
nation had become: “Never before have I seen such torrents of inaccurate
reporting in such bitter and abusive language as is fed daily to the Chilean
public by the Press and radio of both Left and Right … this adds much to
the spiraling tension.”50 By the end of Allende’s presidency, political discord
had penetrated nearly all facets of daily life. One citizen recalled, “when you
visited friends, you couldn’t start a conversation without it turning into
politics,” and then “they would go like cat and dog, one against the other if
your ideas were different.”51
That Chile was severely polarized in the early 1970s has become
practically a truism; the controversy is over why a country with a relatively
robust democratic tradition fell to dictatorship so rapidly. Numerous
explanations have been offered: political party factionalism, the growing
dominance of the executive branch, rural upheavals caused by the
government’s agrarian reform, class divisions, threat misperceptions, Cold
War dogmatism, Cuban intrigue, media propaganda, street violence, and a
growing atmosphere of fear.52 For the most part, studies offering these
explanations emphasize internal factors and mostly ignore the role of the
Nixon administration. Analysts also sometimes confuse the causes of
polarization with its consequences. For example, did Chile become more
violent because of polarization, or the other way around?53 Finally, to point
out that everyone was responsible for the coup will not satisfy most
historians because such a conclusion is so vague as to be almost
meaningless.54 Obviously, there were numerous factors that led to Allende’s
downfall, but were some more important than others? What about the role
of contingency? Was U.S. assistance to the opposition vital to tipping the
balance against Allende, or would the government have fallen on its own
anyway?
Naturally, former Nixon administration officials and their supporters
firmly rejected the idea that the United States had anything to do with
Allende’s demise. From their perspective, the blame for the coup lies with
Allende and his supporters for attempting to carry out a revolution that
most Chileans did not want. “It was not U.S. ‘interference,’” U.S. Senator
Barry Goldwater declared in his dissent from the Church Report, “but rather
a minority’s attempt to impose doctrinaire Marxism on a democratic
framework, which led to the establishment of the present military
government.”55 Allende’s failures “owed nothing to American intervention,”
Kissinger insisted in his memoirs, but were the consequence of his “own
incompetence and intransigence.”56 Allende fell “not because of anything
that was done from the outside,” Nixon told an interviewer in 1977, “but
because his system didn’t work in Chile … and Chile decided to throw it
out.”57 Because of the widespread international backlash against the Chilean
coup, many U.S. officials appeared overly defensive in their attempts to
counter charges of American complicity. “We were not responsible for what
happened,” former embassy officer Samuel Hart complained in 1998. “But
when history was being written, that’s not the way it came out. The U.S.
became the key element, the crucial element, the catalyst in what happened
in Chile. Chileans know that’s not true, but the rest of the world doesn’t
think so.”58
Hart appears to have been reacting to the claims of Allende’s supporters,
largely in the communist party, who immediately after the coup tried to shift
the blame for Allende’s downfall onto the shoulders of the Nixon
administration. Such explanations frequently consisted of crude caricatures
of U.S. imperialism that promoted conspiratorial interpretations of the coup.
For example, the Chilean Communist Party declared that the plot against
Allende had been “hatched in the office of the CIA in collaboration with
ITT.”59 Communist leader Volodia Teitelboim was even more blunt: “The
September coup in Chile carries the trademark: ‘Made in USA.’”60 The
former UP public works minister, Orlando Millas, discounted as a “lie that
the Popular Unity government failed in its efforts.” Kissinger, he insisted,
“masterminded” the coup.61 In 1975, General Secretary of the Chilean
Communist Party Carlos Altamirano instructed his comrades not to forget
that “U.S. imperialism and its executive branch, the CIA, facilitated and
directed what happened on September 11, 1973.”62 One leftist journalist
identified nearly a dozen institutions that comprised the “bricks and mortar”
of the “house of treason” that brought down Allende: ITT, Kennecott,
Anaconda, DOW, Ford, Department of State, Pentagon, CIA, NSC, World
Bank, ­Export-Import Bank, and the ­Inter-American Bank for
Development.63
In declaring that “the world” had subscribed to this conspiratorial view,
however, Hart himself was guilty of exaggeration. Many commentators and
scholars across the political spectrum have minimized the role of the United
States in causing Allende’s downfall. About a week after the coup, former
president of the Latin American Studies Association Henry Landsberger
acknowledged that “U.S. efforts may have simply added more than sufficient
fuel to a fire which was already consuming the structure of his [Allende’s]
government.”64 A New York Times editorial asserted that “the ingredients for
the Chilean tragedy were homegrown, not imported; here, as elsewhere,
United States influence, for better or worse, was marginal.”65 Just after the
Church Committee had released its findings, the historian Arthur Whitaker
declared that “it is as certain as anything in human affairs,” that the Chilean
military “would have ousted” Allende “without the slightest encouragement
from the United States.”66
Allende’s failings have also been widely recognized, not only by his critics
but also by many of his supporters. The faults include the lack of a clear
revolutionary strategy, poor administrative abilities, unrealistic expectations
about Soviet assistance, failure to control the extreme left, unjustified faith in
the Schneider Doctrine, mishandling of the negotiations with the Christian
Democrats, overconfidence in his ability to manipulate the opposition, and
underestimating the coup threat. Additionally, UP and its supporters have
been found guilty of factionalism, revolutionary romanticism, blocking
compromises with the opposition, exaggerating the government’s popular
support, smearing the entire opposition with the “fascist” label, failing to
gain the support of ­middle-class women, sexism within the revolutionary
movement, attempting to infiltrate the military, frightening the public with
incendiary talk about a potential civil war, and perhaps worst of all, ruining
the economy through mismanagement and incompetence.67
That Allende lacked enough popular support to carry out a socialist
program has been extensively noted not just by conservatives, but also by a
wide variety of commentators, including those who were sympathetic to
Allende’s goals. In reflecting on the era, the Chilean social democrat Ricardo
Lagos conceded: “To desire to introduce profound changes in Chilean
society obligates one to have broad political and social support, perhaps
broader than President Allende had.”68 According to one former Soviet
official, Moscow discounted the CIA’s role in triggering the coup: “The main
reason was that Allende lost support with the majority of the population,
probably never had it, and the Chileans were not used to suffer[ing]
economic deprivations and hardships.”69 Christian Democrat Radomiro
Tomic went so far as to suggest that CIA meddling may have actually
prolonged the life of Allende’s government because allegations of U.S.
interference, whether true or not, enabled UP officials to rally the nation
against Yankee imperialism.70
These two extreme positions on the origins of Chile’s 1973 military coup
—it was solely the fault of the UP government or U.S imperialism—overlook
more nuanced possibilities. For example, even if we grant that the Chilean
road to socialism was inherently flawed and that the Nixon administration
was not directly involved in the actual coup, it is still necessary to determine
how important the U.S. destabilization effort was to fostering a coup climate.
Many have argued that it was the combination of domestic opposition and
U.S. intrigue that doomed Allende’s government. Isabel Allende, for
example, has blamed the failure of the socialist revolution in Chile on both
U.S. international policies and Allende’s internal enemies: “the bourgeois,
the oligarchy, the ­right-wing business and investment groups.”71 Cladomiro
Almeyda, a leading member of the Chilean Socialist Party, contended that
the U.S. destabilization effort did not create the factors leading to the
downfall of the UP government, but did “increase and intensify their
efficacy.”72
Determining whether U.S. influence was sufficient to “tip the balance of
power in favor of the insurrection’s success,” as Almeyda put it, lies at the
heart of the issue.73 When confronted with the fact that the United States did
intervene in Chilean political affairs through its covert action programs,
many of those who insist that the 1973 coup was exclusively an internal
affair maintain that Washington failed to put sufficient resources into these
programs to make any difference. The journalist Joseph Kraft, for example,
found it unthinkable “that so small a sum—for $8 million is virtually
nothing in the modern intelligence game—could have caused the fall of the
Chilean government.”74 Soon after reporter Seymour Hersh broke the story
of the Nixon administration’s destabilization effort, former Chilean
President Eduardo Frei scorned the idea that the UP government, which
allegedly had billions of dollars at its disposal, could be brought down by
just $8 million.75 When CIA Director Richard Helms finally admitted to the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early 1975 that the Nixon
administration did seek to overthrow the Allende government, he described
the CIA’s efforts as “pretty pitiful.”76
Aside from the galling assumption that the United States had the right to
attempt the overthrow a democratically elected president, this explanation
suffers from many defects. First, the cost of a covert action program is not
necessarily a good predictor of its outcome. The CIA spent more than five
times as much on the 1961 Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion, which failed
miserably, than it did on the 1954 Guatemalan operation, which succeeded
splendidly.77 Second, the CIA was never strapped for funds in its efforts to
destabilize Chile. Nixon had authorized $10 million to initiate Track II, and
he most surely would have allocated more if the CIA had requested it. The
problem was not a lack of funds, but how and when to spend them most
efficiently without exposing the U.S. hand.78 Third, U.S. officials frequently
defended the covert operations in Chile as necessary to sustain Allende’s
opposition. Ambassador Korry testified before the U.S. Congress that
“without our assistance the free press would have collapsed. There’s no
question about it.”79
Another way that Nixon administration officials tried to evade
responsibility for the coup was to claim that because all the actions they
authorized were done in the name of democracy, nothing that the United
States did in Chile could be construed as illegitimate. For example, CIA
Western Hemisphere Chief David Phillips recommended that the
administration respond to press queries about the agency’s role in the
Chilean coup by explaining that the CIA did no more than assist political
parties and the media in the hope that the UP candidate who followed
Allende would be defeated in the next presidential election.80 Phillips
disregarded that providing secret assistance to an opposition party could
rightfully be considered a form of interference in another country’s internal
affairs.81 Harry Shlaudeman, the main “hardliner” in the U.S. embassy
during the Allende presidency, assured the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on ­Inter-American Affairs that “we provided no direct
assistance to any political party” during the 1970 election. But when asked if
channeling money to opposition parties after Allende’s election would
constitute a violation of the State Department’s ­non-intervention policy,
Shlaudeman waffled. Shlaudeman may have been feigning confusion, but
many other Nixon administration officials did not shy away from asserting
publicly that any U.S. assistance the opposition may have received was
inconsequential to the coup.82 According to George W. Landau, who served
as U.S. ambassador to Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship, when it came
to Allende’s downfall, “we got much more credit than we deserved; we did
not have much to do with it.” When Track II failed, some Chilean
“hotheads” killed General René Schneider, and “after that we were minor
operators, it was the Chilean people who got rid of Allende.”83
The argument that the Nixon administration did not violate Chilean
sovereignty because its efforts to bring down Allende were minimal and
ineffective is preposterous.84 Senator Frank Church lashed out in frustration
at this argument during a U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on
covert action: “When we talk about a benign intervention in Chile involving
a contribution by our Government to El Mercurio, one of the most
important newspapers in Chile and suggest what’s wrong with that, what
would we think if the Government or Brazil were subsidizing the New York
Times? … Do we live by a double standard and do we have certain rights
against other people that we would not tolerate for a moment for them to
assert against us?”85
And yet, to acknowledge that the Nixon administration grossly violated
Chilean sovereignty still does not answer the question of how important the
U.S. intervention in Chile was to the coup. Many Allende supporters have
recognized that U.S. efforts to subvert Chile’s revolution were made easier by
the fact that the UP government lacked a mandate. Isabel Allende, for
example, has acknowledged that “it would have been impossible for the CIA
to overthrow Allende without the help of a strong opposition in Chile.”86
After a lengthy discussion with a former CIA agent, the Colombian writer
Gabriel García Márquez concluded that “with all of its power and money,
the CIA could not have accomplished a thing without the connivance of the
governing classes of Latin America, without the venality of our civil
servants, and without the almost limitless possibilities for corruption that
are open to our politicians.”87
That a covert action requires a strong domestic opposition to succeed can
be readily conceded and could even be considered a practical necessity for
nearly any secret operation to successfully take down a foreign leader.
“Covert action is most successful,” CIA Director William Colby told the
Church Committee, “when you want to help someone who wants the help
and doesn’t have the means to succeed without it.”88 But whether the Chilean
opposition could have succeeded in toppling Allende without the support of
the Nixon administration is the more perplexing counterfactual question. As
one former UP official has pointed out, when countries become polarized,
the outcome can depend to a “very decisive extent” on external influences.89
Despite the Church Committee’s unwillingness to take a clear stand on
this issue, its report came very close to suggesting that at the very least
Washington’s permission was required for the coup to go forward.90 In
raising the issue of contingency, the Church Committee created an opening
for many former UP government officials and their sympathizers to make
the case that U.S. intervention played a decisive role in bringing about the
1973 coup.91 Gonzalo Martner, former head of national planning under
Allende, for example, has traced the overthrow of Allende to “external forces
tied to internal social sectors.”92 Edward Boorstein, a UP economic adviser,
later declared that “with its power and experience, its worldwide
organization, its network of secret agents, and its broad influence in Chile,
the U.S. government was crucial to the elaboration and execution of a
scientific strategy for keeping the UP government from succeeding.”93 To the
former ­vice-dean of Santiago’s Polytechnic Institute, Claudio Durán, it was
obvious “that the government of the U.S., the CIA and the multinational
companies played essential roles with the armed forces of Chile, through
increased loans for equipment, special training for Chilean officers, etc.,
while Nixon was denying Allende’s demands for loans to solve the most
acute problems of the country.”94 One year after the coup, the political
scientist Richard Fagen suggested to the U.S. House Subcommittee on ­Inter-
American Affairs that “the opposition of the U.S. Government was a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the fall” of Allende.95
Such pronouncements might be expected from Allende sympathizers, but
several CIA officials appear to agree. Former CIA Director William Colby,
for example, confessed in his memoirs that the CIA’s assistance to Allende’s
opponents was vital to producing tensions between the opposition and the
government. Even after Track II failed, Colby conceded, the “CIA was
responsible to some degree for the final outcome.”96 CIA Deputy Director for
Plans Thomas H. Karamessines told the Church Committee that there was
no question in his mind that “the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970
had their impact in 1973.”97 Former CIA operations officer Jack Devine has
bragged that after the coup the CIA station “bathed in the glow of success”
for having “helped create the climate for the coup without taking actions
that might taint the effort.” The operation was considered so successful that
he and his fellow case officers became known around Langley as “the Chile
Mafia.”98
Several objections might be raised against this interpretation. For one, the
CIA can hardly be trusted to give an objective accounting of its own
programs. As discussed in Chapter 7, the CIA station in Santiago tended to
exaggerate the success of its operations to justify their continuation. Agency
pride would have made it very difficult to admit the shortcomings of its
efforts to undermine Allende.99 Second, the proposition that Allende’s
opposition would have withered away if not for U.S. assistance often relies
on the dubious assumption that Allende was about to establish a communist
dictatorship as described in the fictional Plan Z. Third, the opposition to
Pinochet’s dictatorship had comparatively less U.S. help than did Allende’s
opposition, and yet it survived long enough to oust Pinochet.100 Fourth,
many analysts continue to insist that some sort of military coup was
inevitable no matter what the Nixon administration did. Indeed, it is hard to
review the economic and social trends between 1972 and 1973 and not come
to the conclusion, as one author has put it, that Chile was moving
“inexorably toward some kind of violent resolution of the political crisis.”101
The Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic wrote General Carlos Prats in late
August 1973: “all of us are pushing Chilean democracy towards the
slaughterhouse. As in the tragedies of classical Greek theater, everyone
knows what is going to happen, everyone hopes that it does not happen, but
each person does exactly what is needed for the tragedy to occur, even as he
tries to prevent it.”102
After the coup, many of the historical actors portrayed the Chilean coup
as a foregone conclusion.103 Kissinger described Allende as uninterested in
dialogue with the opposition because he was so determined to march
“inexorably toward a fate that he both dreaded and invited.”104 Christian
Democrat Patricio Aylwin claimed that the coup was “fatally determined”
because ideological dogmatism and desperation had become so widespread
in the population.105 Partido Nacional Senator Francisco Bulnes, who helped
draft the 22 August resolution encouraging the military to intervene,
insisted: “We had no choice. We were heading into either a military or a
Marxist dictatorship.”106 To one prominent communist leader, there was no
“peaceful way” to end the crisis because the UP government was under
attack from the day it entered into office.107
 Unfortunately, the Greek tragedy analogy absolves too many of these
individuals from examining the choices that they made by suggesting that
the outcome was structurally determined in advance. To avoid “the illusions
of retrospective determinism,” as the French sociologist Henri Bergson once
put it, requires identifying the plausible steps that might have been taken to
avert a coup.108 In the final months of Allende’s presidency, some observers
suggested that there was a peaceful way out. The New York Times, for
example, surmised in June 1973 that Allende still had an opportunity to
“isolate and disarm” the extreme right if he disregarded the left extremists
and began a dialogue with the Christian Democrats.109 Newsweek
emphasized that the opposition also had important choices to make:
“Everything is up to the Christian Democrats, who have to grasp that they
cannot continue to immobilize a country, lay siege to a government, deny
the basic laws. For they, too, must be responsible for what happens. Do they
want a rightist coup? A Fascist Chile?”110 The tragedy is that the Christian
Democrats who lobbied the military to intervene on the grounds that the
UP government presented an existential threat to Chilean democracy ended
up empowering one of the most authoritarian governments in Latin
American history. As discussed in Chapter 8, an accord between the
Christian Democrats and UP on the Three Areas Amendment, if arranged
early enough, might well have preempted a coup.111 General Prats promised
Allende that if he could break the political impasse with the opposition, he
could rest assured of the patriotic support of the armed forces.112 Even
though Allende took too long to announce the plebiscite there was no
particular reason why the military had to launch a coup on 11 September.
The military could have waited for the plebiscite announcement, which
Allende had divulged to Pinochet, and then offered to oversee the
referendum, just as it had helped ensure the fairness of the March 1973
congressional election. In this respect, to attribute the coup to the failed
policies of the UP government would be to blame the victim. As the
historian Eric Hobsbawm quipped to Allende’s opponents who asked what
else they could have done except support a coup: “the simple answer is: not
to make a coup.”113
As with most counterfactual speculations, the key issue is their
plausibility. Some scenarios can be readily dismissed because they are based
on false premises. For example, Allende’s former aide, Joan Garcés, has
speculated that if the Soviets had shared with the UP government in June
1973 their intelligence that the U.S. Southern Command had planned the
Unitas exercises for early September, then Allende could have taken the
necessary precautions to prevent a coup. As reviewed in Chapter 9, these
naval exercises were not timed to coincide with the coup because U.S.
officials did not know exactly when a coup might transpire.114 Moreover,
Allende was well aware in June that he was up against the threat of a coup at
any moment and yet he continued to delay finding a workable solution.
Ambassador Davis also engaged in faulty speculation when he contended in
his memoirs that had the Nixon administration warned the UP government
of the impending coup in September 1973, Allende would have transformed
Chile into a “leftist totalitarian regime.” This allegation, frequently made by
apologists for the coup, formed the main basis of Plan Z, a transparent
fabrication to justify the counterrevolution.115
Another category of unlikely scenarios has originated from some Allende
supporters who engaged in wishful thinking after the coup. They imagined,
for example, that if only Allende and the UP government had developed a
revolutionary strategy and armed the workers, then the coup attempt could
have been defeated.116 Most of these revolutionary fantasies, such as the
proposal to form a “parallel army,” were not only infeasible but were also to
some degree responsible for triggering the coup. All the talk about a
potential civil war was seriously misguided. For a civil war to take place a
country must be divided into factions with roughly the same firepower.
Otherwise, the conflict just becomes a slaughter.117 Even though Allende did
have some supporters in the Chilean military, it is hard to imagine that half
of the armed forces were willing to defend him and the UP government.118
The idea that a popular revolutionary vanguard could have waged a
successful civil war against the military and the opposition also seems
extremely ­far-fetched. Allende pointed out the futility of this strategy to
socialist Carlos Altamirano when he asked sarcastically: How many
“masses” equals one tank?119
To uncover the more useful counterfactual scenarios, consider the various
turning points that historians have identified in the Allende presidency. In
1971, there were three important conjunctures: first, the April municipal
elections, when UP’s superior performance convinced the Christian
Democrats to align with conservative forces and Allende decided to forgo
holding a plebiscite to form a unicameral legislature; second, the July
Valparaíso ­by-election, because against Allende’s wishes the Socialists
rejected an alliance with the Christian Democrats, leading the party to move
even further to the right; and third, the December “pots and pans”
demonstrations led by Chilean housewives, which signaled the rise of
hyperinflation. In 1972, the two major turning points were: June, when
negotiations collapsed between the government and the Christian
Democrats over expropriation legislation leading the opposition to consider
promoting a military coup; and October, when the truckers’ strike nearly
brought down the government. In 1973, the three most critical moments
were: the March 1973 congressional elections, whose outcome emboldened
leftists in UP to resist any compromise with the opposition and convinced
many Christian Democrats that a coup was the only way to remove Allende;
June, when the Tanquetazo revolt came close to toppling the government;
and finally, the 22 August congressional resolution, which gave the military
a green light to seize power.
Determining which of these turning points were the most important ones
can help determine when the coup did become inevitable and whether it
could have been avoided. The events of 1971 seem to have been the least
significant because there was little reason for anyone to compromise so early
in Allende’s presidency. Allende might have held a plebiscite after the April
municipal elections, but opinions remain divided as to how well that might
have turned out. Allende understandably chose not to take the risk. By mid–
1972, when signs were unmistakable that the government’s development
strategy and the economy were beginning to flounder, an agreement
between UP and the PDC might well have preempted the truckers’ strike,
although it is much easier to see this possibility in hindsight. After the
March 1973 congressional elections, when the opposition failed to gain the
majority it needed to oust Allende legally, the momentum for a coup appears
to have become unstoppable except, perhaps, through some sort of
compromise. The failed Tanquetazo rebellion of 29 June 1973 was probably
Allende’s last realistic chance to come up with a solution, but he waited too
long to announce the plebiscite.120 Gabriel Valdés, Frei’s former foreign
minister, claims that a coup could have been avoided if Allende had
accepted his advice at the end of July 1973 to use his presidential powers to
form a team of “collaborators” to pacify the country. The problem with this
proposal, aside from its vagueness, is that the Araya assassination had
already unleashed strong momentum within the military to initiate a
coup.121
As these turning points suggest, there were several plausible opportunities
to bring Chile back from the brink, but extremists on both sides of the
political spectrum made compromise nearly impossible. The 11 September
1973 coup was not inevitable, but it also did not come as a surprise given
Chile’s deteriorating social and economic trends. The Nixon administration
did everything it could within its limited power to hasten this decline and
therefore bears at least some responsibility for creating a coup climate. Even
though the covert operation to remove the head of the Chilean armed forces
did not prevent Allende from being elected as the Nixon administration had
hoped, Schneider’s assassination helped erode the tradition that the Chilean
military’s role was to protect the political system and not seek power for
itself. The U.S. economic blockade certainly damaged Chile’s international
financial position, but most of the problems plaguing the Chilean economy
were of the government’s own making. The CIA’s destabilization programs
certainly did help the opposition to maintain a stronger electoral presence,
and by providing subsidies to the private sector organizations and the ­right-
wing media. Nixon administration officials indirectly hinted to the Chilean
military that they would look favorably upon a coup; they also entertained a
rescue plan in case the coup attempt went astray. Partly why the junta and
the ­far-right became so indignant over U.S. aid restrictions after the coup
was the expectation of praise and assistance for having carried out
Washington’s dirty work.122 Kissinger tried to acknowledge this debt when
he told Pinochet afterward, “You did a great service to the West in
overthrowing Allende.”123
Despite these substantial contributions to creating a coup climate, the
Nixon administration cannot be held entirely responsible for orchestrating
Allende’s downfall. Most likely Allende would not have seen the end of his
term even in the absence of U.S. assistance to the opposition.124 And yet
Eduardo Frei’s conclusion that “the miracle … is not that the coup came at
all, but that the military resisted civilian pressure as long as it did” rests on
the faulty assumption that a coup was the only way out.125 In truth, a
peaceful transition of power was possible had Chileans not lost faith in their
democratic institutions. Chile was not a banana republic, as U.S. officials
frequently acknowledged, and it is hard to see how anything the United
States did would have prevented Chileans from resolving the crisis had they
really wanted to.126 Unfortunately, Chile’s democracy proved to be far more
fragile than anyone expected. The Nixon administration may not have
directly overthrown Allende, but its destabilization program did succeed in
accelerating Chile’s transition from socialism to neoliberalism, and in
warning Latin American countries away from experiments like Chile’s, lest
they were prepared to face Washington’s hostility.127

1. Church Report, 56.

2. On the fallacy that the west coast of South America was of great strategic importance to the
United States after 1945, see Schoultz, National Security, 184–85.
3. Memcon (Kissinger, Fraser, et al.), 17 December 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, 38, pt. 1: 261.
4. Quoted in Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, 491.
5. Laurence R. Birns, “Allende’s Fall, Washington’s Push,” NYT, 15 September 1974; Allende, My
Invented Country, 171; Meyers et al., Chile, 62. Despite its dire predictions about the fate of Chile
under Allende, U.S. intelligence reported in 1972 that the country had not become a police state. See
SNIE 94–72, 29 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1973, ­E-16: 595.
6. On free speech and respect for the rule of law, see Silva Solar, “¿Era viable el proyecto de la Unidad
Popular?,” 104; and chapter 4. On religious toleration, see report of the Chilean delegation for the
Latin American Convention of Christians for Socialism, 23–24 April 1973, in Eagleson, Christians
and Socialism, 75–76. Allende insisted throughout his presidency that his government would respect
the rule of law and the Constitution. For examples, see Allende, First Annual Message to the National
Congress, 21 May 1971, in Cockcroft, Salvador Allende Reader, 97; and Allende interview, 4 April
1972, in Witker Velásquez, Salvador Allende 1908–1973, 221.
7. The nationalization of the copper industry was so popular that not even Pinochet dared to reverse
it, although he did abandon the “excess profits” formula in calculating final compensation for the
expropriated businesses. See chapter 4. On the achievements of Allende’s agrarian reform, see
Bellaisario, “Chilean Agrarian Transformation,” 175–77; and chapter 6. On Allende’s efforts to
improve the lot of the indigenous population, see Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle, 59–60;
Albizú Labbé, “El indigenismo.”; Crow, “Debates about Ethnicity”; and Correa et al., La reforma
agraria y las tierras Mapuches. On Allende’s challenges to U.S. hegemony in the ­inter-American
system, see Almeyda, “Salvador Allende y las Relaciones Exteriores de Chile,” 149–50; Harmer,
Allende’s Chile; and chapter 3. On the economic, social, and cultural accomplishments of the UP
government, see Murphy, For a Proper Home, ch. 4; Andreas, “Chilean Woman”; Tasgian, Income
Redistribution, 140; Amorós, Allende, 308–310; Woodford Bray, “Making”; Modell and Waitzkin,
“Medicine and Socialism in Chile”; and Domínguez, “Violence,” 162. On the broadening of electoral
suffrage and enhancement of direct democracy, see Winn, “Pinochet Era,” 19; Guardia et al., “General
Considerations,” 29; Victor Perera, “Law and Order in Chile,” NYT Magazine, 3 April 1975; and
Lernoux, Cry of the People, 406–407. On UP’s effort to increase the political participation of women
even at its own expense, see Neuse, “Voting in Chile.” On the role of UP in promoting a more
democratic workplace and society, see Schlotterbeck, Beyond the Vanguard; Espinosa and Zimbalist,
Economic Democracy, 186; Barrera, Worker Participation, 4; Petras, “Chile: Nationalization,”; Vergara,
Copper Workers, 160–67; and Silva, “State,” 436–38.
 8. Neruda, Memoirs, 349. Because many of these achievements fell short of UP’s revolutionary goals,
cynics poked fun at Allende as the best president of the nineteenth century. Miguel Donoso Pareja
interview, in Comité 4 de Septiembre, Chile presente histórico, 99. In any case, Allende did possess a
unique ability to combine the struggle for greater democracy with the fight for greater economic and
social justice. See Dorfman, “Time for Creative Suffering.”
9. Everett G. Martin, “The Last Hours of Salvador Allende,” WSJ, 25 September 1973; Montealegre
Iturra, Carne de estatua, 189–90; Hite, “Resurrecting Allende.”
10. I am referring here not to tactical mistakes (e.g., Senator Frank Church considered assassination
plots, including the one against Schneider, as “aberrations” (Church Committee, Alleged Assassination
Plots, xix)) but to errors of judgment in policymaking. See chapter 1.
11. Meyer briefing memo, 13 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 457.
12. CIA memo for the record, 23 November 1970, 0005493022, CREST.
13. Wright, Worth it All, 38.
14. CR, 21 September 1973, 119: 30809.
15. Transcript of David Atlee Phillips testimony before the Church Committee, 31 July 1975, 51,
MFF Archive. For the concept of “blowback,” see Johnson, Blowback, 8.
16. On the slipperiness of “national security” as a concept, See Rosenberg, “Commentary,” 283.
17. Schmitz, United States and ­Right-Wing Dictatorships, 100–101; Kolko, Confronting the Third
World, 219. For a concise overview of the relationship between U.S. economic interests and national
security, see Simpson, “Explaining Political Economy.” For evidence that CIA interventions in
countries such as Chile did in fact lead to greater commercial opportunities for American exporters,
see Berger et al., “Commercial Imperialism?”
18. Nixon statement at presentation of Letelier’s credentials, 2 March 1972, doc 1, folder 15, box 6,
OLF; Amorós, Allende, 353–54.
19. Letelier no. 976–76, “¿Ha cambiado Estados Unidos su actitud hacia América Latina?, 10 August
1971, Oficios, Embajada de Chile en EEUU, AMRE.
20. Sigmund and Fagen, “Correspondence,” 376.
21. Stern, “Chile: The Lesson,” 18.
22. For example, former Secretary of State William Rogers pointed out the risks “if you get caught”
intervening in foreign elections. See ­Hoff-Wilson, Nixon Reconsidered, 251. On the CIA’s skepticism
about Track II, see transcript of David Atlee Phillips testimony before the Church Committee, 31 July
1975, 16–17, MFF Archive; and Ranelagh, CIA: A History, 176. Nixon’s decision to intervene in Chile
can be compared to President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in Vietnam. Neither
choice was predetermined since there were viable alternatives. See Logevall, Choosing War, xvi.
23. Seymour Hersh, “Kissinger Called Chile Strategist,” NYT, 15 September 1974. On Kissinger’s role
as Nixon’s “point man” when it came to Chile, see Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 235.
24. Nathaniel Davis CNN interview, 21 February 1999, NSA; Wright, Worth it All, 37–38.
25. Thomas G. Sanders, “Chile: The Elections and After,” American Universities Field Staff Reports,
17:10 (September 1970), 11; Wallach interview with Allende. For other examples, see Salvador
Allende interview, 17 September 1970, in Correa, Preguntas, 18.
26. Diplomatic report no. 217/73, 13 March 1973, FCO 7/2410.
27. Embtel 1764, 24 April 1973, POL 12 Chile, 1–­3-73, box 2194, RG 59.
28. “Was the U.S. Involved?” Time, 1 October 1973.
29. Jack B. Kubisch testimony, 25 September 1973, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende
Years, 131–32.
30. Paris tel 24131, 13 September 1973, 1973PARIS24131, CFPF, RG 59.
31. Mexico City tel 7260, 26 September 1973, 1973MEXICO07260, CFPF, RG 59.
32. Edward Korry testimony, 4 December 1975, Intelligence Activities, 45.
 33. Bundy, “National Security Process,” 103.
34. Bundy, “International Security Today,” 35.
35. SFRC, Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, pt. 2, 62. For a variant on this theme, see one American
editorialist’s lament that the CIA’s meddling in Chile tragically tainted U.S. efforts to do good in the
Third World. William V. Shannon, “This Dream Not for Export,” NYT, 28 September 1974.
36. See McCoy, In the Shadows, 55; Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 246–48; and Herman,
Real Terror Network, 122.
37. As one commentator has argued, the United States frequently presented interventions in
countries like Chile as “part of the ­East-West conflict” when they were really “­West-South conflicts.”
Kaldor, Imaginary War, 107.
38. McNamara draft memo to Johnson, 3 November 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 3: doc 189. On the role
that identity played in shaping Cold War conflicts like the one in Chile, see Jervis, “Identity,” 33.
39. Klein, Shock Doctrine; O’Brien, Century of U.S. Capitalism in Latin America, 168–69; ­García-
Hurtado, “Political Economy,” 1–8.
40. Kissinger later pointed out that the United States had intervened previously in Chile to thwart
Allende’s election ambitions hence the decision in 1970 to try and stop Allende, “was not an aberrant
judgment of one American administration.” Transcript of Elizabeth Farnsworth interview with Henry
Kissinger, Online News Hour, PBS.
41. Michael W. Cotter interview, 44, FAOHC. As the historian Steve Stern has suggested, the death
toll was probably much higher than 3,000. Even a conservative estimate would be in the range of 3,500
to 4,500. Cotter also neglected to mention the hundreds of thousands of individuals who were
tortured, or the nearly half a million Chileans forced into exile. See Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s
Chile, xxi.
42. Orrego Vicuña and Lincoln, “Economic Development,” 218.
43. Stephen Rabe comment, ­H-Diplo Roundtable Review 14:1 (2012).
44. Read and Wyndham, Narrow but Endlessly Deep, 4–5.
45. Quoted in Collier and Sater, History of Chile, 355.
46. Michele Bachelet, inauguration of the Museum of Memory, 11 January 2000, in Silva Bijit et al.,
Historia, 213.
47. Nathan Thornburgh, “Chile’s 9/11,” Time, 9 September 2013.
48. INR, intelligence note ­RAAN-29, 15 October 1973, CDP. The classic study on polarization
during the Allende government is Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. For comparative
perspectives, see Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die.
49. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Chile’s Past Had Been Peaceful,” WP, 12 September 1973.
50. Diplomatic report no. 415/73, 3 September 1973, FCO 7/2425, TNA.
51. BBC transcript of Panorama television program, 10 December 1973, 14, TNA. See also Muñoz,
Dictator’s Shadow, 35.
52. For a list of the causes of polarization with no attempt to prioritize them, see the Rettig Report,
64–74. For a largely theoretical attempt to explain Chile’s polarization, see Garretón, Chilean Political
Process. For an attempt to include Cuba and the Soviet Union in the cast of actors causing Chile’s
democratic breakdown, see Gustafson, “Other Hidden Hand,” 417.
53. The issues of just how bad the violence became and who was mainly responsible for it remain
highly contested issues. For accounts that tend to dramatize the violence and blame UP extremists, see
Arancibia Clavel et al., Los hechos de violencia en Chile; and Theberge, Soviet Presence in Latin
America, 41. For accounts downplaying the violence as a factor leading to the coup, see Paul Sigmund,
“Seeing Allende Through the Myths,” Worldview, 17:4 (April 1974), 17; Winn, “Furies of the Andes,”
261, 273–74 n. 19; and Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 176–77 n. 23.
54. For criticisms of the “everyone was responsible” thesis, see Greg Grandin, “Don’t Do What
Allende Did,” London Review of Books, 9 July 2012; Grandin, “Instruction of Great Catastrophe,” 57;
and the comments of Chilean sociologist Oscar Azócar and PCCh leader Lautaro Carmona, in
Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz, Allende vive, 103.
55. Church Committee, Foreign and Military Intelligence, 581.
56. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 393; Kissinger, White House Years, 677–78.
57. Frost and Zelnick, Frost/Nixon, 291.
58. Samuel F. Hart interview, 67, FAOHC. Emphasis in the original.
59. “Declaración del Partido Comunista de Chile,” October 1973, in Cerda, Chile, 73.
60. Teitelboim, “For a Victorious Revolution,” 10.
61. Millas, “Salvador Allende,” 125.
62. Carlos Altamirano speech, 19 April 1975, in Suárez Salazar, ed., Che Guevara, 126.
63. Selser, Una empresa multinacional, 145.
64. Henry Landsberger testimony, 17 September 1974, HCFA, United States and Chile during the
Allende Years, 224.
65. Graham Hovey, “Agony of the Americas,” NYT, 18 September 1973.
66. Whitaker, United States and the Southern Cone, 415.
67. Corruption, which frequently drew the wrath of Allende’s opponents, might be added to this list.
See Korry backchannel message to Johnson and Kissinger, 25 September 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21:
305; embtel 4904, 9 October 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 395; and Trento, Secret History, 390.
Corruption probably existed within the UP government, however, Allende’s critics appear to have
greatly exaggerated the problem. See Brown, “Radical Reformism in Chile,” 237; Verdugo, Allende, 97;
and Timerman, Death in the South, 96. As part of its smear campaign against Allende, the Nixon
administration strove to find evidence of drug trafficking but came up short. See Nachmanoff memo
to Kissinger, 12 November 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 454; Cushman paper to Kissinger, 21
December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1973, 21: 513–15; and John Crimmins testimony, 6 March 1973, HCFA,
United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 77, 81–83. Whatever corruption did exist in the
Allende government, pales in comparison to the vast corruption that permeated the Pinochet regime
and was ignored by Washington practically until Pinochet’s death. See Winn, “Economic
Consequences,” 103; United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption, 129; and Passmore, Wars
Inside Chile’s Barracks, 61.
68. Larry Rohter, “Letter from the Americas,” NYT, 10 September 2003.
69. Yuri Pavlov CNN interview, 21 February 1999, NSA.
70. Tomic, “Christian Democracy,” 238.
71. Allende, Conversations with Isabel Allende, 59–60. For similar views, see Borovik, Tragedy of
Chile, 15; James Petras and Betty Petras, “Ballots into Bullets,” Ramparts, November 1973, 28; and
Cantero, “Role and Character of External Factors,” 122.
72. Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government,” in Gil et al., ed. Chile at the
Turning Point, 100.
73. Ibid. On the importance of external actors providing adequate resources to the domestic
opposition. see Mainwaring and ­Pérez-Liñán, Democracies and Dictatorships, 46 n. 4.
74. Joseph Kraft, “Chile, the CIA and National Security,” WP, 19 September 1974.
75. Alexander, ABC Presidents, 264.
76. Seymour Hersh, “Helms Said Nixon Sought Chile Coup,” NYT, 10 February 1975.
77. O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change, 50.
78. About a year after Allende became president, Nixon suggested to CIA Director Helms that “we
could have won” the Chilean election if the agency had received all of the funds that Helms had
recommended. Helms agreed even there is no evidence that the CIA was hampered in Chile by a lack
of resources. As argued in chapter 2, it remains unclear how increased funding would have helped to
defeat Allende. See conversation no. 587–007 (Nixon, Ehrlichman, Helms), 8 October 1971, Nixon
Tapes. As a Church Committee staff member pointed out, on a per voter basis the CIA spent twice as
much on the 1964 Chilean election as both U.S. presidential candidates did on the 1964 U.S.
presidential election. Treverton, Covert Action, 18.
79. Edward Korry testimony, 4 December 1975, Intelligence Activities, 44.
80. Phillips memo to Deputy Director for Operations, 3 October 1973, CDP. Kissinger gave this
same excuse to a government commission in 1975. ­Hoff-Wilson, Nixon Reconsidered, 250.
81. Likewise, former CIA operative Jack Devine has insisted that the agency’s assistance to the
opposition was not intended to produce a coup. See Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago,” 173.
82. Fagen letter to Fulbright, 8 October 1973, CDP; Shlaudeman testimony, 12 June 1974, HCFA,
Human Rights in Chile, 123.
83. George W. Landau interview, 8, FAOCH.
84. For a similar historical analogy, see Chomsky’s comparison of the terrorist attack on the United
States of 11 September 2001 with the Chilean coup of 11 September 1973. Chomsky, What We Say
Goes, 76–77. For a critique along these lines of Kissinger’s claim of innocence, see Forsythe,
“Democracy,” 390.
85. Morton H. Halperin testimony, 4 December 1975, Intelligence Activities, 82.
86. Allende, Conversations with Isabel Allende, 66.
87. Gabriel García Márquez, “CIA in Latin America,” New York Review of Books, 7 August 1975.
88. Quoted in Johnson, Season of Inquiry, 103.
89. Quoted in Qureshi, Nixon, 133.
90. Church Report, 6.
91. Lagos, Mi vida, 261; Corvalán Marquéz, La secreta obscenidad, 229; Gladys Marín speech, 21 July
1995, in Marín, Vuela lejos tu pensamiento, 124; Gabriel Valdés interview in Varas and González, Chile
entre el sí y el no, 214.
92. Martner, El gobierno del presidente Salvador Allende, 524.
93. Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, 257. Emphasis added.
94. Durán, “Chile,” 358. Emphasis added.
95. Richard Fagen testimony, 17 September 1974, HCFA, United States and Chile during the Allende
Years, 286. Emphasis added. For other examples of this interpretation, see Ruth Needleman, “CIA
Role in Chile Exposed,” National Guardian, 18 September 1974; Herman, Real Terror Network, 195;
and Spence, “Class Mobilization,” 162.
96. Colby, Honorable Men, 305.
97. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 254.
98. Devine, Good Hunting, 65, 68–69.
99. On how the tendency of the CIA to live in its own world interferes with its sense of reality, see
Rositzke, CIA’s Secret Operations, xvii.
100. Angell, “International Support for the Chilean Opposition,” 176.
101. Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 67.
102. Radomiro Tomic letter to Carlos Prats, 29 August 1973, in Hutchinson et al., Chile Reader, 427.
103. For other examples of accounts that employ the Greek tragedy analogy, see Chavkin, Storm over
Chile, 224; Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 172 n. 15; Whelan, Out of the Ashes, 379; and Tomas
Moulián, Allende, “Allende, the Final Victor,” Le Monde diplomatique, September 2003.
104. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 400.
105. Mendoza, Todos confesos, 92.
106. Constable and Valenzuela, Nation of Enemies, 29.
107. Teitelboim, “Reflections,” 15.
 108. Quoted in Logevall, “Presidential Address,” 3.
109. Editorial, “Chile Near the Brink,” NYT, 25 June 1973. Kissinger cites this editorial as proof of
Allende’s intransigence, ignoring Allende’s repeated efforts to negotiate with the PDC. See Kissinger,
Years of Upheaval, 400.
110. “Allende of Chile: On the Rocky Road to Socialism,” Newsweek, 2 July 1973.
111. Athey, “Government and Opposition in Chile During the Allende Years,” 175. On the role of the
Frei faction in blocking such an agreement, see Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz, El
imperativo de la memoria, 25–29.
112. Prats, Una vida por la legalidad, 42.
113. Eric Hobsbawm, “Murder of Chile,” New Society, 20 September 1973.
114. Garcés, Soberanos e intervenidos: Chile, 82.
115. Davis, Last Two Years, 20.
116. Enríquez Frödden, Edgardo Enríquez Frödden: testimonio, 78–81; Foley and Miah, Tragedy in
Chile, 20–23; Brahm García, “Retórica violentista a de izquierda.”
117. On the absurdity of the UP slogan “no to civil war” while undertaking preparations for one, see
Gaudichaud, Chile 1970–1973, 259.
118. Kay, “Chilean Road to Socialism,” 225–26.
119. Quoted in Winn, “Furies of the Andes,” 257.
120. For the view that in April 1973 Allende still had time to find a solution to the growing crisis, see
Moulian, La forja de ilusiones, 283–83; and Inostroza Fernández, Derrota de la vía pacífica, 51.
121. Gabriel Valdés interview in Varas and González, Chile entre el sí y el no, 213.
122. Oppenheim, “Quest for Unity on the Left,” 385.
123. Memcon (Pinochet, Kissinger, others), 8 June 1976, FRUS, 1969–1976, ­E-11, pt. 2: 624.
124. For a similar conclusion by a former Church Committee member, see Treverton, “Covert
Action and Open Society,” 1000.
125. Falcoff, Modern Chile, 317.
126. As one prominent Chilean journalist pointed out, the country had passed safely through a
similar crisis in 1954, when the government of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo faced rising inflation, a
copper strike, and a strident opposition, yet managed to avoid a coup. See Hernández Parker, Senores
auditores, 296–97.
127. In 1978, for example, Ronald Reagan identified Chile as one of several Latin American nations
that “have learned the cost of Socialist experimentation” by suffering “economic catastrophe.” See
Ronald Reagan, “Foreign Affairs: The Need for Leadership,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 May 1978,
424. On how the Chilean coup strengthened ­right-wing Latin American regimes, see Wright, State
Terrorism in Latin America, 29.
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Oral Histories and Published Interviews

Alexander, Robert Jackson. The ABC Presidents: Conversations and Correspondence with the Presidents
of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992.
Allende, Isabel. Conversations with Isabel Allende. Edited by John Rodden. Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1999.
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Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2005.
_____. Cita con la historia. Santiago: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2006.
Arancibia Clavel, Patricia, and Francisco Balart Páez. Conversando con el General Julio Canessa
Robert. Santiago: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2006.
“Carolina Rossetti entrevista a Rafael Agustín Gumucio.” Plural: Revista del Instituto para el Nuevo
 Chile 2 (1983). https://piensachile.com/2015/03/11/­entrevista-rafael-agustin-gumucio-en-el-ano-
1983-sobre-salvador-allende-gossens/.
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http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/script.html.
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2010.
Correa, Raquel, and Elizabeth Subercaseaux. Ego Sum Pinochet. Santiago: ­Zig-Zag, 1989.
Debray, Régis. The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende. New York: Pantheon, 1971.
Enríquez Frödden, Edgardo. Edgardo Enríquez Frödden: testimonio de un destierro. Santiago:
Mosquito Editores, 1992.
Farnsworth, Elizabeth. Interview with Henry Kissinger, 6 February 2001, Online News Hour, PBS
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/bb/latin_america/chile/documents/­kissinger_02-06-01.html.
The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training.
https://adst.org/­oral-history/­oral-history-interviews/#gsc.tab=0.
Frost, David. “An Interview with Richard Helms.” Studies in Intelligence 44, no. 4 (1981).
Frost, David, and Bob Zelnick. Frost/Nixon. New York: Macmillan, 2007.
“General Nikolai Leonov at the CEP.” Estudios Públicos 73 (1999): 1–37.
González, Mónica. Chile, la conjura: Los mil y un días del golpe. Santiago: Ediciones B, 2000.
Guzmán, Patricio, and Julianne Burton. “Politics and the Documentary in The Battle of Chile: An
Interview with Patricio Guzmán.” Socialist Revolution (San Francisco) 7 (1977): 36–68.
Henfrey, Colin, and Bernardo Sorj, eds. Chilean Voices: Activists Describe their Experiences of the
Popular Unity Period. Hassocks, UK: Harvester Press, 1977.
Korry, Edward M. “El Embajador Edward M. Korry en CEP.” Estudios Públicos 72 (1998): 5–44.
Marras, Sergio. Confesiones. Santiago: Onitorrinco, 1988.
Mattelart, Armand. “Cultural Imperialism, Mass Media and Class Struggle.” Insurgent Sociologist 9,
no. 4 (1980): 69–79.
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revolucionario en Chile: discursos y documentos del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria.
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_____. El libro de Lagos. Santiago: Ediciones Grupo Zeta, 1998.
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Serrano, Margarita. La igual libertad de Edgardo Boeninger. 2d ed. Santiago: Uqbar Editores, 2009.
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Patricio Aylwin. Santiago: Grupo Editorial, 2006.
Strober, Deborah H., and Gerald S. Strober. The Nixon Presidency: An Oral History of the Era. 2nd ed.
Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003.
Varas, Florencia. Conversaciones con Viaux. Santiago: Varas, 1972.
_____. Gustavo Leigh: El general disidente. Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1979.
Varas Morel, José Miguel. Don Américo: Un chileno comunista. Santiago: np, 1992.
Verdugo, Patricia, ed. Chile 1973: Así lo viví yo. Santiago: Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello, 1994.
Wallach, John. Salvador Allende: An Interview with Chile’s Marxist President, May 29, 1973. North
Hollywood, CA: Center for Cassette Studies, Voices of Latin America, 1973.
White, Judy, ed. Chile’s Days of Terror: Eyewitness Accounts of the Military Coup. New York: Pathfinder
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Internet
Centro de Investigación y Documentación Digital Archive
Democracy Now! https://www.democracynow.org/.
Dorfman, Ariel. “A Time for Creative Suffering.” TomDispatch, 2013,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175741/tomgram%3A_ariel_dorfman%2C_martin_luther_king_
and_the_two_9_11s.
Castro, Fidel. “Salvador Allende: His Example Lives On.” Monthly Review, 26 June 2018.
https://monthlyreview.org/castro/­salvador-allende-his-example-lives-on/.
Firing Line transcripts. https://www.hoover.org/news/­firing-line-transcripts-hoover-website.
Frenkel, Robert. “En las condiciones actuales estamos sentados sobre un volcán.” Apuntes Urbanos, 5
June 2013. http://­apuntes-urbanos.blogspot.com.ar/2013/06/­roberto-frenkel-en-las-
condiciones.html.
Hathaway, Robert, and Russell Jack Smith. “Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence.”
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005307558.
H-Diplo Roundtable Review 14:1 (September 2012). http://www.­h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/-­
Roundtable-XIV-2.pdf.
Mary Ferrell Foundation. https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Documents.html.
Miguel Herberg interview with General Roberto Viaux, 4 April 1973, Santiago Penitentiary.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfJ8W8YX5Vw.
World Bank Group Oral History Program. https://oralhistory.worldbank.org/.
McNamara oral history transcript

Newspapers and Periodicals

American Opinion
American Universities Field Staff Reports
Berkeley Barb
Boston Globe Magazine
Chile Hoy
Christian Century
Dissent
Economist
El Mercurio
El Mostrador
Guardian (London)
Harper’s Magazine
Human Events
Inquiry
Journal Times
La Tercera
Latin American Weekly Report
Le Monde diplomatique (English edition)
Life
Listener
London Review of Books
Los Angeles Times
Mensaje
Miami Herald
NACLA’s Latin America & Empire Report
Nation
National Journal
National Geographic
National Guardian
National Review
New Republic
New Society
New Statesman
New York Review of Books
New York Times
New York Times Magazine
Newsweek
OpEdNews
Progressive
Punto Final
Quarterly Economic Review of Chile
Qué Pasa
Ramparts
Rolling Stone
Society
Sunday Times (London)
Time
Times (London)
Vital Speeches of the Day
Wall Street Journal
Washington Monthly
Washington Post
Washington Star
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center Newsletter
Worldview
Z Magazine

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World Bank. “Chile and the World Bank.” ­Inter-American Economic Affairs 30, no. 2 (Autumn 1976):
81–91.
Wright, Thomas C. Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution. 2d ed. New York: Praeger, 2001.
_____. State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
Yañez, Ivan. “Chile on the Road to Socialism.” Interplay 4 (March 1971): 5–9.
Zahinser, Marvin R., and W. Michael Weis. “A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon’s Goodwill
Mission to Latin America in 1958.” Diplomatic History 13, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 163–90.
Zapata S., Francisco. “The Chilean Labor Movement under Salvador Allende: 1970–1973.” Latin
American Perspectives 3, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 85–97.
Zimbalist, Andrew. “Worker Management by Chilean Industry, 1970–1973: An Empirical
Investigation.” Journal of Economic Issues 10, no. 2 (June 1976): 476–88.
Zimbalist, Andy, and Barbara Stallings. “Showdown in Chile.” Monthly Review 25, no. 5 (October
1973): 1–24.
Zylberberg, Jacques, and Miguel Monterichard. “An Abortive Attempt to Change Foreign Policy: Chile
1970–3.” In Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, edited by K. J.
Holsti. London: Allen & Unwin, 1982.

Dissertations, Theses
Athey, Lois Edwards. “Government and Opposition in Chile During the Allende Years: 1970–1973.”
PhD diss., Columbia University, 1978.
Friedman, Kenneth Charles. “Revolution and ­Counter-Revolution in Southern Chile: A Study of
Agrarian Elites.” PhD diss., City University of New York, 1979.
Glab, Edward. “Christian Democracy, Marxism and Revolution in Chile: The Election and Overthrow
of Salvador Allende.” PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1975.
Hansen, Roy. “Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army.” PhD diss.,
University of California Los Angeles, 1966.
Hove, Mark T. “Losing a Model Democracy: Salvador Allende and U.S.-Chilean relations, 1945–1970.”
PhD diss., University of Florida, 2009.
Hurtado-Torres, Sebastian. “The Gathering Storm: The United States, Eduardo Frei’s Revolution in
Liberty and the Polarization of Chilean Politics, 1964–1970.” PhD diss., Ohio University, 2016.
Landis, Fred Simon. “Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in Chile, 1970–1973.” PhD diss.,
University of Illinois at ­Urbana-Champaign, 1975.
Michael, Daniel L. “Nixon, Chile and Shadows of the Cold War: U.S.-Chilean Relations During the
Government of Salvador Allende, 1970–1973.” PhD diss., George Washington University, 2005.
Oppenheim, Lois Susan. “The Quest for Unity on the Left: Allende’s Chile and the Socialization of the
Economy.” PhD diss., Washington University, 1980.
Pérez Carrillo, David. “La Fronda Militar: el 11 de septiembre.” MA thesis, University of Chile, 2000.
Veneros ­Ruiz-Tagle, Diana. “Salvador Allende: Anatomy of a Leadership.” PhD diss., Brandeis
University, 1998.
Waugh, Michael. “Depoliticization in Post-Pinochet Chile: Evidence and Implications for Democratic
Consolidation.” MA thesis, University of North Carolina, 1992.
Zunes, J. Stephen. “Decisions on Intervention: United States Response to Third World Nationalist
Governments, 1950–1957.” PhD diss., Cornell University, 1990.

Unpublished Materials
Etchepare Jensen, Jaime. “Partidos y fuerzas políticas chilenas en el gobierno de Salvador Allende,
1970–1973.” Universidad de Concepción, 1989.
Ford, Harold P. “William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence.” CIA, 1993.
https://archive.org/details/WilliamColbyAsDirectorOfCentralIntelligence19731976
Hirsch, Fred. “An Analysis of Our ­AFL-CIO role in Latin America.” San Jose, CA, 1974.
Reyes Matta, Fernando. “Mass Media, Polarization and Social Change: The Chilean Case during the
Allende Government.” 1974.
 Index of Terms
Acción Mujeres de Chile
Action for Progress
Acuña, Sepúlveda
Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group
agrarian reform
Aguirre Cerda, Pedro
Air Force Technical Applications Command (AFTAC); see also Easter Island
Alarcón, Ricardo
Alessandri, Jorge
Alexander, Robert J.
Algeria
Allende, Hortensia Bussi de
Allende, Isabel
Allende, Salvador: achievements of; AFTAC; agrarian reform; Alliance for Progress; Altamirano; April
municipal elections; Araya assassination; armed struggle; Arms Control Law; assassination plots;
Aylwin; balance of payments deficit; Balmaceda; Boeing aircraft loan; Bowers; brain drain; British
view of; Bush; capital flight; Castro; censorship allegations; Chilean Constitution; Chilean foreign
debt; Chilean military; CIA view of; civil war threat; copper nationalization; copper plot; corruption
allegations; coup; Cuba; economic policies of; USS Enterprise; exiles; export of revolution; failures of;
Frei; health of; IDB; impeachment threat; “invisible blockade”; ITT; January By-Election; July
Valparaiso By-Election; July Coquimbo By-Election; lifestyle of; March congressional elections;
Masonic membership; McNamara; El Mercurio; muñeca; nationalization; Nixon; Nixon
administration view of; OAS; OLAS; PDC negotiations; Peace Corps; Pérez Zujovic assassination;
Pinochet; plebiscite; political views of; rationing; Schneider assassination; Schneider Doctrine; “self-
coup” accusation; September Plan; Soviet Union; Statute of Democratic Guarantees; suicide of;
Tacnazo; Tanquetazo; Three Areas Amendment; truckers’ strikes; Tupamaros; United Nations; U.S.
military aid; U.S press view of; women; World Bank; Zhou Enlai
Allende Doctrine; see also copper
Alliance for Progress
Allott, Gordon
Almeyda, Clodomiro
Alsop, Joseph
Altamirano, Carlos
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO)
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)
American Management Association
Anaconda Copper Company; see also copper
Anderson, Jack
Anderson, William
Andina
Araya, Arturo
Arbenz, Jacobo
Arellano, Sergio
Argentina
Arms Control Law
asentamientos; see also agrarian reform
Aylwin, Patricio
Bachelet, Alberto
Bachelet, Michele
Badillo, Herman
Balmaceda, José Manuel
Baltimore affair
Bank of America
Basov, Alexander
Bauer Paiz, Alfonso
Bay of Pigs
Bazan, Raoul
Benelli, Giovanni
Berger, Marilyn
Bergson, Henri
Bethlehem Steel
Biaggi, Mario
Birns, Laurence
Bitar, Sergio
black market
blacklists
Blum, Jack
Boeing aircraft loan; see also LAN-Chile
Boeninger, Edgardo
Bolívar, Simón
Bolivia
Boorstein, Edward
Bosch, Juan
Bossay, Luis
Bowers, Claude
Braden, Spruille
Braden Copper Company
Brady, Herman
brain drain
Brazil
Brezhnev, Leonid
Briones, Carlos
British Guiana
Broe, William
Brookings Institution
Buckley, William
Bulnes, Francisco
Bundy, William
Bush, George H.W.
Bush, George W.
Business Week
Byrd, Harry F.
Cademartori, José
Calvo doctrine
Cambodia
Cámpora, Héctor
Canada
Canales, Alfredo; see also September Plan
Cantuarias, Orlando
capital flight
Carabineros
Caracas Resolution
Carter, Jimmy
Carvajal, Patricio
Castro, Fidel
Catholic Church
Catholic University
Cayuela, José
Centaur
Central Única de Trabajadores (CUT)
Centro de Reforma Agraria (CERA); see also agrarian reform
Cerro
Chamber of Deputies
Che Guevara
Chicago Boys; see also neoliberalism
Chile Hoy
Chile Joven
Chile Project; see also Chicago Boys
Chilean Air Force; see also Chilean military
Chilean Armed Forces see Chilean military
Chilean Army; see also Chilean military
Chilean Central Bank
Chilean Communist Party see Partido Comunista de Chile
Chilean Congress
Chilean Constitution
Chilean Cooperative Society (CCS)
Chilean courts
Chilean economy: balance of payments deficit; dependency; exports; foreign debt; trade
Chilean elections: April municipal; January by-election; July Valparaiso by-election; July Coquimbo
by-election; March congressional; presidential; presidential; presidential; March congressional;
presidential
Chilean embassy break-in
Chilean exceptionalism
Chilean military
Chilean Navy; see also Chilean military
Chilean Truck-Owners Association
Chiltelco (Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile)
China
Chonchol, Jacques
Christian Democrats see Partido Democráta Cristiano
Chuquicamata
Church, Frank
Church Committee; see also U.S. Congress
Church Report
Cienfuegos crisis
civil war threat; see also polarization
Clarín
Cline, Ray
Clinton, William J.
Colby, William
Cole, Charles
Coleridge Taylor, Samuel
Colombia
Comisión Especial de Coordinación Latinoamericana (CECLA)
“Committee of 15”
communist threat
Condor see Operation Condor
Confederación de la Democracia (CODE)
Conlan, John B.
Connally, John
Constitutional Tribunal
Contreras, Manuel
Contraloría General
Convenio (Copper Agreement)
“cool but correct” policy
copper: “copper plot”; Corporación del Cobre (CODELCO); embargo of; export of; industry;
nationalization of; prices; El Teniente; see also Anaconda Copper Company; Kennecott Copper
Company
cordones industriales
Corette, J.E.
Corporación de Fomento de la Producción
Corporación del Cobre (CODELCO) see copper
corporate lobbyists
Corvalán, Luis
Costa Rica
Council for Latin America
Council of the Americas (Business Group for Latin America)
Council on Foreign Relations (New York)
coup (11 September 1973); Chilean domestic reaction to; food shortages following; impact on Chilean
democracy; impact on Chilean foreign debt; impact on copper nationalization; impact on ITT
nationalization; impact on Latin America; impact on U.S. military aid; Nixon administration
foreknowledge of; Pinochet’s role in; repression following; timing of; U.S. domestic reaction to; U.S.
responsibility for; world reaction to
“coup climate”
Cox, Alejandrina
credibility gap
Crimmins, John
Cuba
Cuban missile crisis
Cubillos, Hugo
Czechoslovakia
Dallek, Robert
Davis, Nathaniel: agrarian reform; April municipal elections; assistance to Allende’s opposition;
Chilean foreign debt; Chilean military; CIA funding of research organizations; copper expropriation;
coup; destabilization; food shortages; Herrera; “invisible blockade”; ITT expropriation; July
Coquimbo By-Election; Kissinger view of; Klein statement; March congressional elections;
presidential election; Plan Z; private sector organizations; September Plan; Soviet aid; Tanquetazo;
Track II; truckers’ strikes; U.S. military aid; view of Allende; view of Chile; women
Dawson Island
Debray, Règis
del Canto, Hernán
de Onís, Juan
destabilization
détente
Devine, Jack
Díaz Casanueva, Humberto
Díaz Estrada, Nicanor
Diez, Sergio
Dobrynin, Anatoly
Dominican Republic
domino theory
Dorfman, Ariel
Dow Chemical
Dulles, Allen
Dulles, John Foster
Dungan, Ralph
Durán, Claudio
Durán, Julio
Easter Island; see also AFTAC
Eastern Europe
Echeverría, Luis
Economist
Ecuador
Edwards, Agustín
Edwards, Howard
Edwards, Jack
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Ejército de Liberación Nacional
Eliana Mery, María
USS Enterprise
Escuela Nacional Unificada (ENU)
exiles
Export-Import Bank
Fagen, Richard
fascism
Fermandois, Joaquín
Figueres, José
Finch, Robert
Floody, Nilo
Flores, Fernando
Fontaine Aldunate, Arturo
food shortages
Ford, Gerald
Ford Foundation
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Foreign Policy
40 Committee
France
Fraser, Donald
Frei, Eduardo: agrarian reform of; Canales; capital flight; Chilean foreign debt; Chileanization; coup;
Easter Island; exiles; food shortages; inflation; ITT; January By-Election; July Valparaiso By-Election;
March congressional elections; presidential election; presidential election; opposition to UP
government; PDC negotiations with Allende; Plan Z; Schneider assassination; Schneider Doctrine;
Tacnazo
Frei reelection gambit
Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP)
Friedman, Milton
Frost, David
FUBELT; see also Track II
Fuentealba, Renán
Fulbright, J. William
Gandhi, Indira
Garcés, Juan
García Márquez, Gabriel
Garrastazu Médici, Emílio
Geneen, Harold
Goldwater, Barry
González, Cornejo Ariel
Gonzalez Amendment
González Videla, Gabriel
Gordon, Lincoln
Goulart, João
Great Britain
Greece
Green Berets (U.S. Special Forces)
Greene, Graham
gremialista movement
Gross, H.R.
Grove, Marmaduke
Grupos de Amigos Personales (GAP)
Guatemala
Guevera, Che
Guillermo Garretón, Óscar
Guinea
Gustafson, Kristian
Guyana
The Hague
Haig, Alexander
Haiti
Haldeman, H.R.
Halderman, Robert
Hamilton-Fuentealba bill see Three Areas Amendment
Harberger, Arnold
Harmer, Tanya
Harrington, Michael
Hart, Samuel
Harthorn, Paul
Haslam, Jonathan
Heath, Edward
Hecksher, Henry
Helms, Jesse
Helms, Richard
Hendrix, Hal
Hennessy, John
Hernández Parker, Luis
Herrera, Felipe
Hersh, Seymour
Hickenlooper Amendment
Hildyard, David
Hixson, Walter
Hobsbawm, Eric
Huerta Díaz, Ismael
human rights
Humphrey, Hubert
Hunt, E. Howard
Hurwitch, Robert
Ibáñez del Campo, Carlos
“ideological pluralism”
Ignacio García, Juan
imperialism
inflation
Inostroza, Alfonso
Inouye, Daniel
Inter-Agency Expropriations Group
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
Inter-American Press Association
Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
International Court of Justice
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Petroleum Company (IPC)
International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT): bribery allegations; Chilean embassy break-
in; coup; “invisible blockade”; nationalization; presidential election; U.S. congressional hearings on
“invisible blockade”; see also IDB; U.S. economic aid; World Bank
Iran
Irureta, Narciso
Irwin, John
Italy
Japan
Jara, Víctor
Jarpa, Sergio Onofre
Javits, Jacob
Jerez, Alberto
Johnson, Lyndon B.
Johnson, U. Alexis
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jorden, William J.
Jova, Joseph J.
Juntas de Abastecimiento y Precios (JAPs)
Kandell, Jonathan
Karamessines, Thomas
Kearns, Henry
Kemmerer, Edwin
Kendall, Donald
Kennecott Copper Company; see also copper
Kennedy, Edward
Kennedy, John F.
Kennedy, Robert F.
Khrushchev, Nikita
Kissinger, Henry
Klein, Herbert
Klein, Naomi
Klein and Saks mission
Knapp, J. Burke
Koch, Edward
Koppel, Ted
Kornbluh, Peter
Korry, Edward: AFTAC; Allende assassination plots; Allende view of; April municipal elections;
Boeing aircraft loan; Buckley; Chilean economy; Chilean military; Church Report; “cool but correct”
policy; copper nationalization; copper plot; corporate lobbying; coup; coup prospects; Easter Island;
USS Enterprise; exiles; Frei reelection gambit; Herrera; “invisible blockade”; ITT; July Valparaiso By-
 Election; Kissinger view of; Kunakov Archives Operation; Letelier view of; El Mercurio; presidential
election; presidential election; Nixon view of; OPIC; Patria y Libertad; Pérez Zujovic assassination;
Schneider assassination; Schneider Doctrine; Soviet and East German aid; Tacnazo; Track I; Track II;
U.S. congressional testimony of; U.S. economic aid; UP censorship allegations; view of Allende; view
of Chile; view of Christian Democrats; view of Letelier; women
Kraft, Joseph
Kubisch, John B. (Jack)
Kunakov Archives operation
El Ladrillo (The Brick)
Lagos, Ricardo
Laird, Melvin
LAN-Chile; see also Boeing aircraft loan
Landau, George W.
Landau, Saul
Landsberger, Henry
Lawrence, Mark
Leggett, Robert
Leigh, Gustavo
Leighton, Bernardo
Leonov, Nikolai
Letelier, Orlando: Allende’s suicide; April municipal elections; Boeing aircraft loan; Buckley; Chilean
embassy break-in; Chilean foreign debt; Chilean military; copper nationalization; coup; USS
Enterprise; Herrera; IDB; IMF; “invisible blockade”; ITT; Klein statement; media campaign; Nixon
administration view of; Pérez Zujovic assassination; Pinochet; Plan Z; plebiscite; Tanquetazo; U.S.
cultural imperialism; U.S. economic aid; view of the Nixon administration; view of the U.S. Congress
Lincoln, George A.
Linowitz, Sol
Lord, Winston
Lyon, Cecil B.
Mann, Thomas
Mapuches
Marambio, Tulio
March of the Empty Pots and Pans; see also women
“March Plan”
Marín, Óscar
Marshall, Arturo
Martí, José
Martner, Gonzalo
Matus, Carlos
McAfee, William
McCone, John
McGee, Gale W.
McGovern, George
McNamara, Robert S.
Meany, George
Médici, Emílio Garrastazú
El Mercurio
Merino, José Toribio
Merriam, William
Mexico
Meyer, Charles
Millard, Guy E.
Millas, Hernán
Millas, Orlando
Mills, Bradford
Miranda, Hugo
Mitchell, John
Mondale, Walter F.
“Monday Club”
La Moneda (presidential palace)
Monroe Doctrine
Montero, Raúl
Moorer, Thomas
Moreno Rojas, Rafael
Morley, Morris
Mothers’ Centers
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU)
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)
Movimiento Radical Izquierda Independiente (MRII)
Moynihan, Patrick
Muñoz, Heraldo
Nachmanoff, Arnold
La Nación
National Academy for Non-Commissioned Officers
National Agricultural Society
National City Bank
National Party see Partido Nacional
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 136
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 97
NBC
neoliberalism; see also Chicago Boys
Neruda, Pablo
New York Council on Foreign Relations
New York Times
Newsweek
Nicaragua
1914 arbitration treaty
1929 arbitration treaty
Nixon, Richard
Nixon Doctrine
North American Congress on Latin America
North Korea
Norway
Nutter, G. Warren
Obama, Barack
O’Leary, Jeremiah
Olivares, Héctor
Operation Condor
Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS)
Organization of American States (OAS)
Ossa, Sergio
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Pablo, Tomás
Packard, David
Palma, Aniba
Palme, Olof
Panama
Papelera
“parallel army”
Paris Club; see also Chilean foreign debt
Parkinson, Jay
Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh)
Partido Democráta Cristiano (PDC): April municipal elections; Araya assassination; Boeninger;
Chilean economy; Chilean military; CIA assistance to; copper nationalization; copper plot; coup;
coup promotion; fascism; Fre reelection gambit; January By-Election; July Valparaiso By-Election;
July Coquimbo By-Election; Korry view of; MAPU; March congressional elections; March
congressional elections; negotiations with Allende; presidential election: presidential election; Pérez
Zujovic assassination; Plan Z; plebiscite; Schneider assassination; Tacnazo; Tanquetazo; Three Areas
Amendment; truckers’ strikes; August resolution; women
Partido Democráta Radical (PDR)
Partido Izquierda Radical (PIR)
Partido Nacional (PN)
Partido Radical (PR)
Partido Socialista (PS)
“Pastel del Choclo” plot; see September Plan
Pastore, John O.
Patria y Libertad
PBSUCCESS
PDC Women Against Allende
Peace Corps
Pentagon
Pepsi Cola
Pérez Zujovic assassination
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague
Perón, Juan
Peru
Petras, James
Phillips, David Atlee
Pickering, Guillermo
Piñera, Sebastian
Pinochet, Augusto: civil war threat; Clinton; Committee of; copper nationalization; corruption; coup;
dictatorship; fascism; human rights violations; IMF; ITT; Kissinger; March of the Empty Pots and
Pans; Masonic membership; neoliberalism; Nixon administration view of; opposition to; Plan Z;
plebiscite; Prats; School of the Americas; September Plan; Tanquetazo; women; World Bank
PL-480; see also Agency for International Development
Plan Z
plausible deniability
Plaza, Galo
Playa Larga
plebiscite ,
Pliego de Chile
Pliego de Pueblo
Poder Feminino (PF)
Poland
polarization; see also civil war threat
“political transactionalism”
“politics of eternity”
“politics of inevitability”
Popper, David H.
Portales, Diego
Porter, William
Portugal
Powell, Colin
Power, Margaret
Prats, Carlos
private sector organizations
Project Camelot
Puerto Rico
Qué Pasa
Rabasa, Emilio O.
Rabe, Stephen
Radical Party see Partido Radical
Rarick, John
rationing
Reagan, Ronald
“Red Fascism”
Ríos Valdivia, Alejandro
Rockefeller, David
Rockefeller, Nelson
Rockefeller Foundation
Rodríguez, Aniceto
Rogers, William D. (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs)
Rogers, William P. (U.S. Secretary of State)
Romania
Roosevelt, Theodore
Rostow, Walt W.
Rubottom, Roy
Ruiz Danyau, César
Rush, Kenneth
Russell Tribunal
Saenz, Orlando
Sandino, Augusto
Santa Cruz, Hernán
Santa María, Domingo
Sayre, Robert
Scali, John A.
Schlesinger, James
Schmitz, John G.
Schneider, René: assassination of; Doctrine of
School of the Americas
Schultz, George
Schweiker, Richard
Scott, Hugh
Scowcroft, Brent
Selden, Armistead
Senior Review Group (SRG)
September Plan (“Pastel del Choclo plot”); see also Canales, Alfredo
Sepúlveda, Mario
Shackley, Theodore
Shakespeare, Frank
Shlaudeman, Harry
El Siglo
Sigmund, Paul
Silva Henríquez, Raúl
Simon, William
Snyder, Timothy
Sociedad de Fomento Gabril (SOFOFA)
Solis, Tomás
Souper, Roberto
Soviet Union: Allende view of; copper; coup; economic aid; Herrera; Kunakov Archives operation;
March congressional elections; military aid; presidential election; PCCh; Plan Z; Tanquetazo; threat
of; view of Allende and UP
Spain
Special Copper Tribunal
Special Group
Stark, Arellano
Statute of Democratic Guarantees
Stern, Steve
Streithorst, Tom
Sulzberger, C.L.
Sweden
Szulc, Tad
Tacna regiment
Tacnazo
Tanquetazo
Tarr, Curtis
Task Force on Latin America
Teitelboim, Volodia
El Teniente see copper
terror campaign
Thieme, Roberto
Third World (developing countries)
Three Areas Amendment (Hamilton-Fuentealba bill)
303 Committee
Time magazine
Tito, Josip Broz
Tohá, José
tomas
Tomic, Radomiro
Touraine, Alain
Townley, Michael
Track I
Track II; see also FUBELT
Tradición, Familia, y Propiedad (TFP)
Trucco, Manuel
truckers’ strikes: July; October
Trump, Donald
Tsongas, Paul
Tupamaros
Ultima Hora
Unidad Popular (UP): achievements of; AFTAC; agrarian reform; April municipal elections; armed
struggle; Boeing aircraft loan; censorship allegations; Chilean foreign debt; Chilean military; Chilean
Supreme Court; Christian Democrats (PDC); copper nationalization; copper plot; coup; Cuba;
divisions within; economic policies of; USS Enterprise; ENU; exiles; failures of; food shortages;
foreign policy of (see also ideological pluralism); Herrera; IDB; IMF; inflation; “invisible blockade”;
ITT; January By-Election; July Valparaiso By-Election; July Coquimbo By-Election; Klein statement;
March congressional elections; media views of; nationalization policy of; presidential election; Nixon
administration policy toward; OAS; opposition to; origins of; Peace Corps; Pérez Zujovic
assassination; Plan Z; platform of (Programa Básico); plebiscite; September Plan; Soviet and other
Communist aid; Tacnazo; Tanquetazo; truckers’ strikes; utopianism of; women; World Bank
Union Socialista Popular (USP)
Unitas
United Nations
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
UN Economic and Social Council
UN Economic Commission for Latin America
UN Human Rights Commission
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group; Allende assassination
plots; Allende’s suicide; April municipal elections; Araya assassination; assistance to Allende’s
opposition; blowback problem; Brazil; British Guiana; Chicago Boys; Chilean economy; Chilean
 embassy break-in; Chilean military; Chilean views of; Christian Democrats (PDC); Church
Committee; civil war threat; communist threat; copper nationalization; copper plot; corporate
lobbying of; coup; “coup climate”; coup prospects; covert operation expenditures; Cuba;
destabilization; exiles; FUBELT; Guatemala; human rights violations; Institute of General Studies;
Iran; ITT; January By-Election; July Valparaíso By-Election; July Coquimbo By-Election; Kissinger;
Kunakov Archives operation; El Ladrillo (the Brick); March Congressional elections; March
congressional elections; March of the Empty Pots and Pans; El Mercurio; neoliberalism; presidential
election; presidential election Nixon; operational bias; Patria y Libertad; PBSUCCESS; Pérez Zujovic
assassination; phase; Pinochet; Plan Z; Prats; private sector organizations; propaganda; protests
against; Schneider assassination; September Plan; Soviet aid; Tacnazo; Tanquetazo; terror campaign;
TFP; Third World; Track I; Track II; truckers’ strikes; U.S. economic aid; view of Allende; women
U.S. Congress; see also Church Committee
U.S. Defense Department
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
U.S. economic aid
U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. Information Agency
U.S. Information Service
U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
U.S. military aid
U.S. Military Assistance Program
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
U.S. National Security Council
U.S. private investment
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
U.S. State Department: Allende view of; Allende’s suicide; April municipal elections; blowback
problem; Chilean economy; Chilean foreign debt; Chilean military; communist threat; “cool but
correct” policy; copper; corporate lobbying of; coup; destabilization; USS Enterprise; exiles; Herrera;
human rights; IDB; ITT; Kissinger; El Mercurio; presidential election presidential election; phase;
Plan Z; private sector organizations; September Plan; Soviet Aid; SRG; Tacnazo; Track I; Track II;
truckers’ strikes; U.S. Congress; U.S. economic aid; U.S. military aid; view of Allende; World Bank
U.S. Treasury Department
University of Chile
Urbina, Javier
Uruguay
Vaky, Viron
Valdés, Gabriel
Valdés, Pablo
Valenzuela, Arturo
Valenzuela, Camilo
Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (VOP)
Vekemans, Roger
Velasco, Belisario
Velasco Alvarado, Juan
Venezuela
La Verdad
Vial, Gonzalo
Viaux, Roberto
Vietnam
Vigorena Ramírez, Hugo
Vilarín, León
Viña del Mar Consensus
violence
Vuskovic, Pedro
Waldheim, Kurt
Walker, Chars
Walters, Vernon
War of the Pacific
Washington Post
Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)
Washington Star
Watergate; see also Chilean embassy break-in
Weintraub, Sidney
Welles, Benjamin
West Germany
Western Europe
Westmoreland, Hernández
White Book (Libro Blanco)
White Guard
Willoughby, Federico
Wimert, Paul
Winn, Peter
Women; see also March of the Empty Pots and Pans
World Bank
World Labor Assembly
Wright, Jim
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zaldívar Larraín, Andrés
Zhou Enlai
Zumwalt, Elmo