THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148788. November 23, 2007.]

SOLEDAD CAÑEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAÑEZO and

VICTORIANO CAÑEZO, petitioners, vs. CONCEPCION ROJAS,
respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision 1 of the

Court of Appeals, dated September 7, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 53236, and
Resolution dated May 9, 2001.
On January 29, 1997, petitioner Soledad Cañezo filed a Complaint 2 for
the recovery of real property plus damages with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Naval, Biliran, against her father's second wife, respondent
Concepcion Rojas. The subject property is an unregistered land with an area
of 4,169 square meters, situated at Higatangan, Naval, Biliran. Cañezo
attached to the complaint a Joint Affidavit 3 executed on May 10, 1979 by
Isidro Catandijan and Maximina Cañezo attesting to her acquisition of the
property.
In her complaint, the petitioner alleged that she bought the parcel of
land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although the transaction was not
reduced into writing. Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the
property. When she and her husband left for Mindanao in 1948, she
entrusted the said land to her father, Crispulo 4 Rojas, who took possession
of, and cultivated, the property. In 1980, she found out that the respondent,
her stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the
same. She also discovered that the tax declaration over the property was
already in the name of Crispulo Rojas. 5
In her Answer, the respondent asserted that, contrary to the
petitioner's claim, it was her husband, Crispulo Rojas, who bought the
property from Crisogono Limpiado in 1948, which accounts for the tax
declaration being in Crispulo's name. From then on, until his death in 1978,
Crispulo possessed and cultivated the property. Upon his death, the property
was included in his estate, which was administered by a special
administrator, Bienvenido Ricafort. The petitioner, as heir, even received her
share in the produce of the estate. The respondent further contended that
the petitioner ought to have impleaded all of the heirs as defendants. She
also argued that the fact that petitioner filed the complaint only in 1997
means that she had already abandoned her right over the property. 6 TaCEHA

On July 3, 1998, after hearing, the MTC rendered a Decision in favor of

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 the petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds a
preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiff Soledad Cañezo and
against defendant Concepcion Rojas by declaring plaintiff the true and
lawful owner of the land more particularly described under paragraph 5
of the complaint and hereby orders defendant Concepcion Rojas:

a) To vacate and surrender possession of the land to plaintiff;

b) To pay plaintiff the sum of P34,000.00 actual damages,

P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and
c) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 7

Despite the respondent's objection that the verbal sale cannot be

proven without infringing the Statute of Frauds, the MTC gave credence to
the testimony of the petitioners' two witnesses attesting to the fact that
Crisogono Limpiado sold the property to the petitioner in 1939. The MTC also
found no evidence to show that Crispulo Rojas bought the property from
Crisogono Limpiado in 1948. It held that the 1948 tax declaration in
Crispulo's name had little significance on respondent's claim, considering
that in 1948, the "country was then rehabilitating itself from the ravages of
the Second World War" and "the government was more interested in the
increase in tax collection than the observance of the niceties of law." 8
The respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naval, Biliran. On October 12, 1998, the RTC reversed the MTC decision on
the ground that the action had already prescribed and acquisitive
prescription had set in. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Naval, Biliran awarding ownership of the disputed land to
the plaintiff and further allowing recovery of damages is hereby
REVERSED in toto. There is no award of damages.

The said property remains as the legitime of the defendant

Concepcion Rojas and her children.
SO ORDERED. 9

However, acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the RTC

amended its original decision on December 14, 1998. 10 This time, it held
that the action had not yet prescribed considering that the petitioner merely
entrusted the property to her father. The ten-year prescriptive period for the
recovery of a property held in trust would commence to run only from the
time the trustee repudiates the trust. The RTC found no evidence on record
showing that Crispulo Rojas ever ousted the petitioner from the property.
The dispositive portion of the amended decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
decision of this Court dated October 12, 1998 is hereby set aside and
another is hereby entered modifying the decision of the Court a quo
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 and declaring Soledad Rojas Vda. De Cañezo as the true and lawful
owner of a parcel of land, more particularly described and bounded as
follows: DHESca

A parcel of land situated at Higatangan, Naval, Biliran,

bounded on the North by Policarpio Limpiado; on the South by
Fidel Limpiado; on the East by Seashore; and on the West by
Crispolo (sic ) Limpiado with an approximate area of 4,169 square
meters per Tax Declaration No. 2258, later under Tax Declaration
No. 4073 in the name of Crispolo Rojas and later in the name of
the Heirs of Crispolo Rojas.
Further, ordering defendant-appellant Concepcion Rojas and all
persons claiming rights or interest under her to vacate and surrender
possession of the land aforecited to the plaintiff or any of her
authorized representatives, Ordering the Provincial and/or Municipal
Assessor's Office to cancel the present existing Tax Declaration in the
name of Heirs of Crispolo Rojas referring to the above-described
property in favor of the name of Soledad Rojas Vda. De Cañezo,
Ordering the defendant-appellant Concepcion Rojas to pay the plaintiff-
appellee the sum of P34,000.00 in actual damages, and to pay for the
loss of her share in money value of the products of the coconuts of said
land from 1979 to 1997 and to pay further until the case is terminated
at the rate of P200.00 per quarter based on the regular remittances of
the late Crispolo Rojas to the plaintiff-appellee, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

The respondent filed a motion to reconsider the Amended Decision but

the RTC denied the same in an Order dated April 25, 1999.
She then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA),
which reversed the Amended Decision of the RTC on September 7, 2000,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the amended decision dated December 14, 1998
rendered in Civil Case No. B-1041 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint filed by Soledad Cañezo before the Municipal Trial Court
of Naval, Biliran is hereby DISMISSED on grounds of laches and
prescription and for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 12

The CA held that the petitioner's inaction for several years casts a
serious doubt on her claim of ownership over the parcel of land. It noted that
17 years lapsed since she discovered that respondent was in adverse
possession of the property before she instituted an action to recover the
same. And during the probate proceedings, the petitioner did not even
contest the inclusion of the property in the estate of Crispulo Rojas. 13
The CA was convinced that Crispulo Rojas owned the property, having
bought the same from Crisogono Limpiado in 1948. Supporting this
conclusion, the appellate court cited the following circumstances: (1) the
property was declared for taxation purposes in Crispulo's name and he had
been paying the taxes thereon from 1948 until his death in 1978; (2)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Crispulo adversely possessed the same property from 1948 until his death in
1978; and (3) upon his death in 1978, the property was included in his
estate, the proceeds of which were distributed among his heirs. 14
The CA further held that, assuming that there was an implied trust
between the petitioner and her father over the property, her right of action
to recover the same would still be barred by prescription since 49 years had
already lapsed since Crispulo adversely possessed the contested property in
1948. 15
On May 9, 2001, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 16 EATCcI

In this petition for review, the petitioner, substituted by her heirs,

assigns the following errors:
That the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
setting aside petitioner's contention that the Petition for Review filed
by respondent CONCEPCION ROJAS before the Court of Appeals was
FILED OUT OF TIME;

That the Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it decided
that the filing of the case by SOLEDAD CAÑEZO for Recovery of Real
Property was already barred by PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. 17

The petitioner insists that the respondent's petition for review before
the CA was filed out of time. The petitioner posits that the CA may not grant
an additional extension of time to file the petition except for the most
compelling reason. She contends that the fact that respondent's counsel
needed additional time to secure the certified copy of his annexes cannot be
considered as a compelling reason that would justify an additional period of
extension. She admits, though, that this issue was raised for the first time in
their motion for reconsideration, but insists that it can be raised at any time
since it concerns the jurisdiction of the CA over the petition.
The petitioner further posits that prescription and laches are unavailing
because there was an express trust relationship between the petitioner and
Crispulo Rojas and his heirs, and express trusts do not prescribe. Even
assuming that it was not an express trust, there was a resulting trust which
generally does not prescribe unless there is repudiation by the trustee.
For her part, the respondent argues that the petitioners are now
estopped from questioning the CA Resolution granting her second motion for
extension to file the petition for review. She notes that the petitioner did not
raise this issue in the comment that she filed in the CA. In any case, the
grant of the second extension of time was warranted considering that the
certified true copy of the assailed RTC orders did not arrive at the office of
respondent's counsel in Cebu City in time for the filing of the petition.
On the merits, the respondent asserts that the complaint is barred by
prescription, laches and estoppel. From 1948 until his death in 1978,
Crispulo cultivated the property and was in adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession thereof in the concept of owner. It took the petitioner 49 years
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 from 1948 before she filed the complaint for recovery of the property in
1997. Granting that it was only in 1980 that she found out that the
respondent adversely possessed the property, still petitioner allowed 17
years to elapse before she asserted her alleged right over the property.
Finally, the respondent maintains that the other co-owners are
indispensable parties to the case; and because they were not impleaded, the
case should be dismissed.
The petition has no merit.
On the procedural issue raised by the petitioner, we find no reversible
error in the grant by the CA of the second motion for extension of time to file
the respondent's petition. The grant or denial of a motion for extension of
time is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 18 The CA obviously
considered the difficulty in securing a certified true copy of the assailed
decision because of the distance between the office of respondent's counsel
and the trial court as a compelling reason for the request. In the absence of
any showing that the CA granted the motion for extension capriciously, such
exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by this Court.
On the second issue, the petitioner insists that her right of action to
recover the property cannot be barred by prescription or laches even with
the respondent's uninterrupted possession of the property for 49 years
because there existed between her and her father an express trust or a
resulting trust. Indeed, if no trust relations existed, the possession of the
property by the respondent, through her predecessor, which dates back to
1948, would already have given rise to acquisitive prescription in accordance
with Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure). 19 Under Section 40 of Act No.
190, an action for recovery of real property, or of an interest therein, can be
brought only within ten years after the cause of action accrues. This period
coincides with the ten-year period for acquisitive prescription provided under
Section 41 20 of the same Act. DcAEIS

Thus, the resolution of the second issue hinges on our determination of

the existence of a trust over the property — express or implied — between
the petitioner and her father.
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an
equitable ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to
such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
latter. 21 Trusts are either express or implied. 22 Express trusts are those
which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some
writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. 23
Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from
the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently, of the
particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the transaction
by operation of law basically by reason of equity. 24 An implied trust may
either be a resulting trust or a constructive trust.
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot
acquire by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 trust. 25 The following discussion is instructive:

There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the

ownership of property entrusted to him, or that an action to compel a
trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, or that the defense of
prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property held by a
person in trust for the benefit of another, or that property held in trust
can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time.

That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule
is that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse,
he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus,
Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not
apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust."
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property
held in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the
trustee has not repudiated the trust.
xxx xxx xxx
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary
against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property
held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. 26
As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on
the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and
satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. 27 The
presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor
who executes the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the
person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3) the trust res,
consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui
que trust, or beneficiaries whose identity must be clear. 28 Accordingly, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to prove the existence of the trust
relationship. And petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden. IDTHcA

The existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be

established by parol evidence. 29 It must be proven by some writing or deed.
In this case, the only evidence to support the claim that an express trust
existed between the petitioner and her father was the self-serving testimony
of the petitioner. Bare allegations do not constitute evidence adequate to
support a conclusion. They are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of
Court. 30
In one case, the Court allowed oral testimony to prove the existence of
a trust, which had been partially performed. It was stressed therein that
what is important is that there should be an intention to create a trust, thus:
What is crucial is the intention to create a trust. While oftentimes
the intention is manifested by the trustor in express or explicit
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 language, such intention may be manifested by inference from what
the trustor has said or done, from the nature of the transaction, or from
the circumstances surrounding the creation of the purported trust.
However, an inference of the intention to create a trust, made
from language, conduct or circumstances, must be made with
reasonable certainty. It cannot rest on vague, uncertain or indefinite
declarations. An inference of intention to create a trust, predicated only
on circumstances, can be made only where they admit of no other
interpretation. 31

Although no particular words are required for the creation of an

express trust, a clear intention to create a trust must be shown; and the
proof of fiduciary relationship must be clear and convincing. The creation of
an express trust must be manifested with reasonable certainty and cannot
be inferred from loose and vague declarations or from ambiguous
circumstances susceptible of other interpretations. 32
In the case at bench, an intention to create a trust cannot be inferred
from the petitioner's testimony and the attendant facts and circumstances.
The petitioner testified only to the effect that her agreement with her father
was that she will be given a share in the produce of the property, thus:
Q: What was your agreement with your father Crispulo Rojas when you
left this property to him?

A: Every time that they will make copra, they will give a share.
Q: In what particular part in Mindanao [did] you stay with your
husband?

A: Bansalan, Davao del Sur.

Q: And while you were in Bansalan, Davao del Sur, did Crispolo Rojas
comply with his obligation of giving your share the proceeds of
the land?

A: When he was still alive, he gave us every three months sometimes

P200.00 and sometimes P300.00. 33

This allegation, standing alone as it does, is inadequate to establish the

existence of a trust because profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily
translate to a trust relation. It could also be present in other relations, such
as in deposit.
What distinguishes a trust from other relations is the separation of the
legal title and equitable ownership of the property. In a trust relation, legal
title is vested in the fiduciary while equitable ownership is vested in a cestui
que trust. Such is not true in this case. The petitioner alleged in her
complaint that the tax declaration of the land was transferred to the name of
Crispulo without her consent. Had it been her intention to create a trust and
make Crispulo her trustee, she would not have made an issue out of this
because in a trust agreement, legal title is vested in the trustee. The trustee
would necessarily have the right to transfer the tax declaration in his name
and to pay the taxes on the property. These acts would be treated as
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 beneficial to the cestui que trust and would not amount to an adverse
possession. 34 cCSHET

Neither can it be deduced from the circumstances of the case that a

resulting trust was created. A resulting trust is a species of implied trust that
is presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention
as to which can be found in the nature of their transaction although not
expressed in a deed or instrument of conveyance. A resulting trust is based
on the equitable doctrine that it is the more valuable consideration than the
legal title that determines the equitable interest in property. 35
While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence
must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and
should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be
fabricated. 36 In order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol
evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to
the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. An implied trust,
in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof. 37 In the
present case, there was no evidence of any transaction between the
petitioner and her father from which it can be inferred that a resulting trust
was intended.
In light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no express trust or
resulting trust established between the petitioner and her father. Thus, in
the absence of a trust relation, we can only conclude that Crispulo's
uninterrupted possession of the subject property for 49 years, coupled with
the performance of acts of ownership, such as payment of real estate taxes,
ripened into ownership. The statutory period of prescription commences
when a person who has neither title nor good faith, secures a tax declaration
in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed
ownership of the lot. 38 While tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence
of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through
prescription. 39 Moreover, Section 41 of Act No. 190 allows adverse
possession in any character to ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten
years. There could be prescription under the said section even in the
absence of good faith and just title. 40
All the foregoing notwithstanding, even if we sustain petitioner's claim
that she was the owner of the property and that she constituted a trust over
the property with her father as the trustee, such a finding still would not
advance her case.
Assuming that such a relation existed, it terminated upon Crispulo's
death in 1978. A trust terminates upon the death of the trustee where the
trust is personal to the trustee in the sense that the trustor intended no
other person to administer it. 41 If Crispulo was indeed appointed as trustee
of the property, it cannot be said that such appointment was intended to be
conveyed to the respondent or any of Crispulo's other heirs. Hence, after
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Crispulo's death, the respondent had no right to retain possession of the
property. At such point, a constructive trust would be created over the
property by operation of law. Where one mistakenly retains property which
rightfully belongs to another, a constructive trust is the proper remedial
device to correct the situation. 42
A constructive trust is one created not by any word or phrase, either
expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one
which arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not come
about by agreement or intention but in the main by operation of law,
construed against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains
or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold. 43
As previously stated, the rule that a trustee cannot, by prescription,
acquire ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he
repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts.
However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if
the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of
the said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive
period. 44 A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate
from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a
beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a
constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to
speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends
holding the property for the beneficiary. 45 The relation of trustee and cestui
que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is for
the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. acCTIS

In addition, a number of other factors militate against the petitioner's

case. First, the petitioner is estopped from asserting ownership over the
subject property by her failure to protest its inclusion in the estate of
Crispulo. The CA, thus, correctly observed that:
Even in the probate proceedings instituted by the heirs of
Crispulo Rojas, which included her as a daughter of the first marriage,
Cañezo never contested the inclusion of the contested property in the
estate of her father. She even participated in the project of partition of
her father's estate which was approved by the probate court in 1984.
After personally receiving her share in the proceeds of the estate for 12
years, she suddenly claims ownership of part of her father's estate in
1997.

The principle of estoppel in pais applies when — by one's acts,

representations, admissions, or silence when there is a need to speak out —
one, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist; and the latter rightfully relies and acts on such belief,
so as to be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of
those facts. 46 Such a situation obtains in the instant case.
Second, the action is barred by laches. The petitioner allegedly
discovered that the property was being possessed by the respondent in
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 1980. 47 However, it was only in 1997 that she filed the action to recover the
property. Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to it has
either abandoned or declined to assert it. 48
Finally, the respondent asserts that the court a quo ought to have
dismissed the complaint for failure to implead the other heirs who are
indispensable parties. We agree. We note that the complaint filed by the
petitioner sought to recover ownership, not just possession of the property;
thus, the suit is in the nature of an action for reconveyance. It is axiomatic
that owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are
indispensable parties. Without them being impleaded, no relief is available,
for the court cannot render valid judgment. Being indispensable parties,
their absence in the suit renders all subsequent actions of the trial court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present. Thus, when indispensable parties are not before
the court, the action should be dismissed. 49 At any rate, a resolution of this
issue is now purely academic in light of our finding that the complaint is
already barred by prescription, estoppel and laches.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 7, 2000, and Resolution
dated May 9, 2001, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with Associate Justices Renato
C. Dacudao and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 21-33.
2. Rollo , p. 158.
3. Id. at 40.
4. Also spelled "Crispolo" in the pleadings.

5. Id. at 159.
6. Id. at 162-165.
7. Id. at 170-171.
8. Id. at 170.
9. Id. at 177-178.

10. Id. at 41-50.

11. Id. at 48-49.
12. Id at 32.
13. Id. at 31.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 14. Id.
15. Id. at 31-32.
16. Id. at 34.
17. Id. at 12-13.
18. Cosmo Entertainment Management, Inc. v. La Ville Commercial Corporation,
G.R. No. 152801, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 145, 150.
19. Article 1116 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:

ART. 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code
shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code
took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse,
the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws, a
longer period might be required.

20. Title to land by prescription . — Ten years actual adverse possession by any
person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or
continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full
and complete title, saving to the person under disabilities the rights secured
by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or
adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under
or through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all claimants . . .

21. Tigno v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 486, 497 (1997), citing Morales v. Court of
Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997).
22. Article 1441, Civil Code of the Philippines states:

ART. 1441. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by
the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being
by operation of law.

23. Buan Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 81, 89 (1996).

24. Id.
25. Id. at 92.

26. Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007, 514
SCRA 197, 214-215. (Citations omitted.)
27. Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14, at 300.

28. Ringor v. Ringor, G.R. No. 147863, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 484, 496.

29. Civil Code, Art. 1443.

30. Filipinas Port Services, Inc. v. Go, G.R. No. 161886, March 16, 2007.

31. Ringor v. Ringor, supra note 28, at 497-498.

32. Medina v. Court of Appeals, 196 Phil. 205, 213-214 (1981).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 33. TSN, September 11, 1997, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 148-149.

34. See Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 36, 56-57 (1995), where the Court
likened a co-owner's possession to that of a trustee. It was then held that a
mere silent possession, receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property,
the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and
the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it
is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that a co-owner (trustee)
exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners (cestui que trust).
35. Heirs of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 523, 531 (1999).

36. Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18.

37. Heirs of Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra.

38. Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon, G.R. No. 161720, November
22, 2005, 475 SCRA 731, 740.

39. Id. at 741.

40. Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No. 159571, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 627,
644.

41. Booth v. Krug, 368 III. 487, 14 N.E. 2d 645 (1938).

42. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Tri-City Motors and Sports, Inc., 171 Mich. App.
260, 429 N.W. 2d 871, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1190 (1988).

43. Heirs of Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35, at 531.

44. Buan Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23, at 92.

45. Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying, G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005, 458
SCRA 496, 508.

46. Cuenco v. Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra , G.R. No. 149844, October 13, 2004, 440
SCRA 252, 266.

47. The petitioner testified that she discovered that the property was in the
respondent's possession in 1978, when her father died. TSN, September 11,
1997, p. 10; rollo, p. 151.
48. Pahamotang v. Philippine National Bank , G.R. No. 156403, March 31, 2005, 454
SCRA 681, 699-700.

49. MWSS v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 966, 986-987 (1998).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com