The Psychoanalytic Model

of the Mind
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The Psychoanalytic Model
of the Mind
By

Elizabeth L. Auchincloss, M.D.

Washington, DC
London, England
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Auchincloss, Elizabeth L., 1951– , author.
The psychoanalytic model of the mind / by Elizabeth L. Auchincloss.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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For my students
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Contents
About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Otto F. Kernberg, M.D.
Preface and Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii

Part I
Foundations
1 Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind . . . . . . 3
2 Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model
of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious . . . . . . . 35
4 Core Dimensions of
Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . 57

Part II
The Topographic Model
5 The Mind’s Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6 The World of Dreams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7 The Oedipus Complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
 Part III
The Structural Model
8 A New Configuration and a New Concept:
The Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
9 The Id and the Superego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
10 Conflict and Compromise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Part IV
Object Relations Theory
and Self Psychology
11 Object Relations Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
12 Self Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Part V
Integration and Application
13 Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic
Model of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Part VI
Appendixes
Appendix A: Libido Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Appendix B: Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Appendix C: Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
About the Author

Elizabeth L. Auchincloss, M.D., is Vice-Chair for Educa-

tion, Director of the Institute for Psychodynamic Medicine, DeWitt Wal-
lace Senior Scholar, and Professor of Clinical Psychiatry in the
Department of Psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical College in New York
City. She is also Senior Associate Director, and Training and Supervising
Analyst, at the Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training
and Research.

ix
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Foreword

Otto F. Kernberg, M.D.

To carry out a clear, comprehensive, in-depth overview of contem-

porary psychoanalytic theory, including its ramifications into divergent
ideological approaches to its major components, and, at the same time,
to do justice to psychoanalysis’ relationships with its boundary sci-
ences, is a major challenge. Elizabeth Auchincloss has achieved it with
the present volume. This book permits psychiatrists, psychologists, and
mental health professionals to acquire a sophisticated knowledge of the
psychoanalytic model of the mind, and to relate it to corresponding sci-
entific developments in the neurosciences and other fields of psycho-
logical investigation. For the trained psychoanalyst, this volume
presents an original, erudite organizing frame of reference that clarifies
the questions and controversies actually being explored and debated by
the psychoanalytic community. It also constitutes a natural companion
to the impressive Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts published by Sam-
berg and Auchincloss in 2012, in which the entire body of psychoana-
lytic concepts and terminology so comprehensively synthesized in
Auchincloss’ present volume is defined in clear and precise terms. This
volume may be considered an updated version of—albeit a more so-
phisticated and comprehensive overview than—Charles Brenner’s An
Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis of many years ago.
The basic frame of psychoanalytic theory proposed in this work in-
cludes five dimensions: topography, motivation, structure, develop-
ment, and psychopathology/treatment. These dimensions follow
Freud’s fundamental discovery of the dynamic unconscious and his
theory of unconscious motivational forces—the dual-drive theory of li-
bido and aggression—and their dynamic expression in terms of their
conflicts with the demands of reality, represented by defensive opera-
tions directed against them. The vicissitudes of the corresponding con-

xi
xii The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

flicts, at various unconscious and conscious levels, are expressed in the

topographic model; the organization of defensive operations, in the
structural model, and particular characteristics in early and later stages
of the life span, in the developmental model. The psychoanalytic explo-
ration of psychopathology reveals pathological consequences of those
conflicts: in physical and psychological symptoms, in characterological
rigidities, and, particularly, in constellations of self-defeating and
potentially dangerous limitations in psychosocial functioning. Psycho-
analytic psychotherapies facilitate the development of specific
approaches to this pathology.
Auchincloss places contemporary developments in psychodynamic
theory and treatments within the broad field of general psychoanalytic
theory comprehensively explored along those dimensions, combining a
historical approach to the evolving formulations with a specific orien-
tation to four currently competing alternative psychoanalytic schools:
the early, classical, “Id”-inspired model reflecting mostly the Topo-
graphic dimension; the ego psychological school developed mostly
within the Structural Model; the revolutionary contemporary Object
Relations approaches that center on the structural vicissitudes of devel-
opment of self and internalized relations with others: and Self Psychol-
ogy as a particular approach to the vicissitudes of the self.
Auchincloss comes from the background of American Ego Psychol-
ogy, the prevalent psychoanalytic approach in this country in the sec-
ond half of the past century, but she pays careful attention to the newer
approaches of alternative models, particularly the contemporary Object
Relations model represented by the Kleinian school, the Relational
approach, and (to some extent) Self Psychology. She also explores the
French psychoanalytic approach, quite prevalent in Latin language
countries, that stresses Freud’s Topographic Model, strongly empha-
sizes Freud’s dual-drive theory, and highlights the dominance of
archaic oedipal conflicts. Less well known in the United States than the
Relational and the Kleinian approaches, the French psychoanalytic
approach has contributed important analyses of the vicissitudes and
pathological consequences of infantile sexuality and its relationship to
aggression and perversion. French analysts stress the dynamics of syn-
chronic as well as diachronic aspects of psychic functioning, and, within
their structural concerns, have highlighted the functions of language as
a specific expression of unconscious dynamics.
Throughout the careful description of the multiple aspects of con-
temporary psychoanalytic theory, Auchincloss stresses the relationship
between scientific developments in fields at the boundaries of psycho-
analytic observations, particularly the neurosciences, and the sociocul-
Foreword xiii

tural influences in the early developmental stages of infantile psychic

experience. Neurocognitive findings related to or commensurate with
psychoanalytic models, and empirical evidence linking them, illustrate
Auchincloss’ consistent placement of the psychoanalytic view of the
mind within present-day scientific progression in related fields.
In agreement with this approach, I would add, as one more impor-
tant parallel development, the field of affective neuroscience—the con-
temporary affect theory that considers affect systems as the basic
motivational systems of the mind. Neurobiological research of affect
activation, expression, and registration involving limbic and related
cortical brain structures has provided evidence that early object rela-
tions take place in the context of powerful positive and negative affect
activation. In fact, affective neuroscience and psychoanalytic object
relations theory may turn out to constitute the most important link
between neurobiological and psychodynamic development, reflected
in current explorations of the relations between affect and drive theory.
Are early internalized dynamic relations between self and others the
building blocks of the “tripartite” psychic structure? Or are the affective
links between self and others the basic components of the psychic
drives?
Here we are entering a central territory of contemporary controver-
sies and concerns of psychoanalytic scholars and researchers. The Psy-
choanalytic Model of the Mind provides the reader with a clearly focused
orienting frame showing where psychoanalytic theory stands today
that illuminates these issues. At the same time, it is a unique introduc-
tion to the general psychoanalytic model that should be helpful to all
mental health professionals involved in psychotherapeutic treatments,
as well as a must for any therapist carrying out psychodynamic psycho-
therapy.
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Preface
and Introduction

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind has been written for

everyone who wants or needs a way to think about the mind in depth.
The model of the mind presented in this book is based on psychoana-
lytic thinking over the past 120 years. The goal of this book is to explain
how the psychoanalytic model of the mind works and how it contrib-
utes to the care of people with mental suffering. The psychoanalytic
model of the mind attempts to describe mental experiences such as feel-
ings, thoughts, wishes, fears, memories, attitudes, and values. It at-
tempts to understand how these mental experiences interact with and
influence each other, how they arise from earlier experiences, and how
they are transformed in the course of development. The psychoanalytic
model of the mind looks at mental life along parameters such as levels
of self-awareness, motivation, structure, and development. It seeks to
understand the contribution made by mental experiences to both nor-
mal and pathological behavior.
The psychoanalytic account of how the mind works is the most com-
plex model of mental functioning ever invented for clinical purposes. It
looks at the mind along parameters such as topography, motivation,
structure, and development. It looks at individual symptoms and char-
acter traits as well as at the whole person and his or her life. In addition
to providing the theoretical scaffolding for psychodynamic psychother-
apy, the psychoanalytic model of the mind forms the basis of almost all
psychological treatments, or “talking cures,” for emotional suffering.
Psychological assessment is an important part of the evaluation and
treatment of every patient, not just patients treated in psychotherapy.
Even in patients whose mental illness has a predominantly biological
basis, psychological factors contribute to onset of the illness, improve-
ments in or worsening of the patient’s condition, and expression of the
illness. Research shows that treatments that focus on symptoms alone,
to the exclusion of emotional and interpersonal patterns, are not effec-
tive in sustaining change (Westen et al. 2004). Indeed, the outcome of

xv
xvi The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

almost every treatment depends on understanding every patient as a

psychological being (Lister et al. 1995). Psychological factors also influ-
ence the manner in which every patient engages in treatment. Studies
show that quality of the therapeutic alliance is the strongest predictor of
outcome for all mental illness in all treatment modalities (Krupnick et
al. 1996; Zetzel 1956). A strong treatment alliance depends on precise
knowledge of the patient as a human being. It also depends on under-
standing the transference and countertransference reactions that either
disrupt or strengthen the clinician–patient bond.
Despite the widespread influence of psychoanalysis in the field of
mental health, there is no single book that explains the psychoanalytic
model of the mind to the many students and practitioners who want to
understand it. Everyone recognizes the face of Sigmund Freud and the
symbol of the couch. However, few know what lies behind these icons
in the way of either intellectual substance or useful practice. Every stu-
dent knows that psychoanalysis is at once adored and reviled, eulo-
gized and lampooned. However, few have any idea what the fuss is all
about or why the psychoanalytic model of the mind is important. The
Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind is committed to demonstrating how this
model is useful in treating all patients, all of the time.
Although the field of mental health is officially committed to the
biopsychosocial model (Engel 1977), we do not often see this model at
work. For too many years, our field has been weakened by a polariza-
tion of choices to be made along several familiar axes: mental health
practitioners are asked to choose between a mind-based and a brain-
based point of view; mental health practitioners are asked to choose
between either of these points of view and a culturally informed point
of view; mental health practitioners are asked to choose between a
humanistic and a scientific point of view; mental health practitioners
are asked to choose between clinical evidence and empirical evidence;
and mental health practitioners are asked to choose between cognitive
and psychoanalytic approaches to the mind.
At the same time, the field of psychoanalysis has been beset with its
own problems, which interfere with our students’ efforts to understand
the contributions of psychoanalysis to the understanding of the
patient’s suffering. These overlapping problems include the isolation of
much psychoanalytic thought from ideas emerging from neighboring
disciplines; the use of too many terms that are hard to understand, so
that students often feel excluded by private, seemingly impenetrable
language; the eschewing by some psychoanalysts of the importance of
empirical study; the excessive hero-worship felt by many psychoana-
lysts about Freud the founder; and controversies among psychoana-
Preface and Introduction xvii

lysts over which is the best model of the mind among competing
models, to mention only a few areas of dissent.
The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind seeks to transcend these many
problems with a new approach. This book will be committed to demon-
strating that

• The psychoanalytic model of the mind is consistent with a brain-

based approach and should never be used separately from such an
approach.
• The psychoanalytic model of the mind is consistent with cultural
psychiatry.
• The psychoanalytic model of the mind is consistent with other well-
known models of the mind, including the cognitive model.
• The psychoanalytic model of the mind can be presented in a way that
allows clinicians to use the best aspects of several competing models.
• The basic tenets of the psychoanalytic model of the mind are sup-
ported by empirical evidence.

Every chapter of The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind will address

these points, avoiding destructive polarization and embracing com-
plexity. In addition, when we talk about Freud, we do so with respect
but not with reverence. In other words, when we write that “Freud
said...,” we do not envision him speaking ex cathedra, but rather as
speaking with an inquiring mind that seeks to build the best model of
the mind using all the evidence. Finally, every effort has been made to
explain complicated ideas and concepts in simple language, avoiding
jargon whenever possible. However, important terms will be used so
that readers can learn what they mean and thereby gain access to what
is, and has been, a language-based enterprise. A Glossary has been pro-
vided in Appendix C at the end of the book (see Part VI).
This book is divided into six parts. Part I, “Foundations” includes
four chapters. Chapter 1 (“Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind”)
explores basic questions such as “What is the mind?” “What is psycho-
analysis?” and “What is a model?” It also addresses the question “Why
do we need a model of the mind in an era of the brain?” Chapter 2 (“Or-
igins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind”) tells the back story of
how the first psychoanalytic model of the mind was formulated, begin-
ning with a lightning tour of the history of scientific psychology and
moving on to the work of Freud himself. Chapter 3 (“Evolution of the
Dynamic Unconscious”) explores the concept of the dynamic uncon-
scious, which forms the basis of the psychoanalytic model of the mind.
xviii The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

It reviews the history of the concept of the unconscious in Western phi-

losophy and psychology and contrasts the dynamic unconscious with a
related but different concept—the cognitive unconscious, developed in
the neighboring field of cognitive neuroscience. Chapter 4 (“Core Di-
mensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind”) defines five core di-
mensions shared by all psychoanalytic models of the mind: topography,
motivation, structure/process, development, and theory of psychopa-
thology/treatment (therapeutic action). Each of these dimensions is dis-
cussed in relation to similar concepts from neighboring disciplines. This
chapter also includes another lightning tour of four foundational psy-
choanalytic models of the mind: the Topographic Model, the Structural
Model, Object Relations Theory, and Self Psychology. These models are
presented in the order in which they were developed historically so that
readers can see how the psychoanalytic model evolved in response to
improvements in clinical understanding and new evidence from other
disciplines. As the reader will also see, each of these four psychoana-
lytic models of the mind has much to say about the core dimensions of
mental functioning and psychopathology/treatment. Throughout the
book, these four models will be explained in relation to each other and
ultimately will be integrated into a single usable and contemporary
model of the mind. Finally, Chapter 4 introduces the reader to a chart
that will serve as a unifying template for the book’s content. In this
chart, the core dimensions of mental functioning and psychopathol-
ogy/treatment are plotted for each of the four foundational psychoan-
alytic models of the mind. As readers progress through the book, they
will see how each successive model conceptualizes each of these key di-
mensions of mental life and mental illness/treatment. When they reach
Part V and the last chapter, the task of understanding the various mod-
els will have become much easier.
Parts II through IV are devoted to exploring the four main psycho-
analytic models of the mind in depth. Part II, “The Topographic
Model,” includes three chapters. Chapter 5 (“The Mind’s Topography,”
begins with an overview of the Topographic Model, which postulated
conscious, preconscious, and unconscious domains separated by a bar-
rier of repression. Although this model contained rudimentary ideas
about motivation, structure, development, and psychopathology/treat-
ment, its main focus was the mind’s topography. This chapter high-
lights the tremendous explanatory value of Freud’s Topographic
Model, including the important concept of neurosis. Indeed, all psycho-
dynamic psychotherapies include the aim of bringing unconscious
wishes, fears, and fantasies into awareness. Chapter 6 (“The World of
Preface and Introduction xix

Dreams”) explains how a contemporary psychoanalytic model of

dreams works and how dreams are used in psychotherapy. At the same
time, it explores theories and empirical evidence from cognitive neuro-
science, integrating these theories and findings with the psychoanalytic
approach to dreams. Chapter 7 (“The Oedipus Complex”) surveys this
first important example of unconscious fantasy, developing in child-
hood and persisting in adult mental life. Although contemporary psy-
chodynamic clinicians no longer believe that the oedipus complex is the
cause of all psychopathology, this chapter explores the ways in which
oedipal conflict is still important and why it is considered universal.
Part III, “The Structural Model,” includes three chapters. Chapter 8
(“A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego”) provides an
overview of the Structural Model with its well-known components:
ego, id, and superego. In examining how Freud revised his own model
of the mind, the reader will absorb the empowering message that the
psychoanalytic model of the mind is “man made” and open to revision.
Chapter 8 also describes the concept of the ego in greater detail, exam-
ining ideas such as self-regulation/homeostasis and adaptation. Chap-
ter 9 (“The Id and the Superego”) considers the concept of the id, as well
as the concepts of drive, libido, psychosexuality, and aggression. (In
Part VI of this book, Appendix A, “Libido Theory,” illustrates how li-
bidinous drives become transformed through defenses into adult sex-
ual behavior, character traits, and neurosis.) Although everyone knows
that Freud said, “Everything we do is because of sex,” his actual views
are poorly understood. Chapter 9 also considers the concept of the su-
perego, examining the important role this structure plays in the experi-
ence of moral imperatives. Chapter 10 (“Conflict and Compromise”)
explains how ego, id, and superego work together in the formation of
compromise, forged from the mediation of conflict among their com-
peting aims. The chapter also explores the concept of defense in greater
detail. (In Appendix B, “Defenses,” common defense mechanisms are
classified according to their costs in terms of ego functioning.) Finally,
Chapter 10 updates the psychodynamic approach to psychopathology
and treatment.
Part IV, “Object Relations Theory and Self Psychology,” includes
two chapters. Chapter 11 (“Object Relations Theory”) explains what
Object Relations Theory is and how it developed. The story of how and
why this theory was formulated will again remind students that no the-
ory is set in stone. Readers will also learn how Object Relations Theory
expands our understanding of clinical problems, making it possible to
better understand problems such as borderline psychopathology and
xx The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

problems with intimacy. Chapter 12 (“Self Psychology”) traces how

Heinz Kohut developed Self Psychology in his work with patients with
narcissistic disturbances. This model is based on the observation that
certain individuals experience trauma during childhood in the form of
a failure of parental empathy. Chapter 12 also explains how Self Psy-
chology can be integrated with other psychoanalytic models of the
mind.
Part V (“Integration and Application”) consists of a single chapter
(Chapter 13, “Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the
Mind”) that explores how the four foundational psychoanalytic models
can be integrated into a single approach, while also being used sepa-
rately. At this point, readers will be able to see a completed version of
the chart that has been steadily growing as each model of the mind is
introduced. The chart shows the contribution of each of the four models
to the core dimensions of mental functioning and psychopathology/
treatment. This chapter will also explore areas of controversy surround-
ing attempts at integration. Finally, Chapter 13 will show how the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind coalesces into a complex psychiatry that
integrates mind, brain, and culture.
The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind has been written for students at
every level of training, including psychiatry residents, psychology
graduate students, social work students, and medical students. It is
designed to serve as a resource for undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, literature, and all aca-
demic disciplines outside of the mental health professions who may
want to learn more about what psychoanalysts have to say about the
mind. Readers will come away with an appreciation of how psychoan-
alytic thinking about the mind is useful in understanding patients. At
the same time, readers will come away with a deeper understanding of
all minds, not just those of patients, but of everyone, including his or
her own. Work with patients should be a deep and rewarding experi-
ence that affords opportunities for growth, not only for the patients
themselves but also for mental health practitioners. These opportunities
for growth are most easily found and used by those equipped with the
best model of the mind.
Preface and Introduction xxi

References
Engel GL: The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine. Sci-
ence 196:129–136, 1977
Krupnick JL, Sotsky SM, Elkin I, et al: Therapeutic alliance in psychotherapy
and pharmacotherapy outcome: findings in the National Institute of Men-
tal Health treatment of depression collaborative research program. J Con-
sult Clin Psychol 64:532–539, 1996
Lister EG, Auchincloss EL, Cooper AM: The psychodynamic formulation, in
Psychodynamic Concepts in General Psychiatry. Edited by Schwartz H,
Bleiberg E, Weissman SH. Arlington, VA, American Psychiatric Publishing,
1995, pp 13–26
Westen D, Novotny CM, Thompson-Brenner H: The empirical status of empir-
ically supported psychotherapies: assumptions, finding and reporting in
controlled clinical trials. Psychol Bull 130:631–663, 2004
Zetzel E: Current concepts of transference. International Journal of Psychoanal-
ysis 37:369–375, 1956
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Acknowledgments

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind is the result of a course

by the same name that I have taught to students in the Department of
Psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical School since 1987. I am very grate-
ful to these students for creating wonderful discussions, through which
I have learned much.
At Cornell, I also owe special gratitude to Dr. Jack Barchas, Chair of
the Department of Psychiatry, whose vision of a world of mental health
that includes many points of view has been an inspiration to me. His
support, encouragement, and wisdom have been a source of daily sus-
tenance.
I have also been fortunate throughout my career to have worked
with fantastic co-teachers in many settings, including Nathan Kravis,
George Makari, Helen Meyers, Robert Michels, and especially Arnold
Cooper. I have also been lucky to have worked on other projects with
extraordinary people, especially Robert Glick and Eslee Samberg, with
whom I spent many hours discussing topics related to psychoanalysis.
I am also grateful to many students, teachers, and colleagues in the
psychoanalytic world, especially those at the Columbia University Cen-
ter for Psychoanalytic Training and Research.
Finally, I am grateful to Richard Weiss, who has been my constant in-
tellectual companion.

xxiii
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 PART I

Foundations
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER 1

Overview:
Modeling the Life of the Mind

This chapter addresses questions such as the following: “What is

the mind?” “What is psychoanalysis?” and “What is a model?” It goes
on to explore the question “Why do we need a model of the mind in an
era of the brain?” Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes the
following: computational model of the mind, embodiment, emergent property,
mind, mirror neurons, psychoanalysis, psychodynamic, and theory of mind.
This book is based on the premise that each of us behaves and has
experiences, makes plans and choices, and lives a life in ways that re-
flect the operations of something called the mind. It begins with the as-
sumption that the experience of having a mind is a special aspect of
human existence and that mental events are important determinants of
who we are and how we behave in everyday life and in clinical situa-
tions. It also begins with the assumption that mental events cannot be
reduced to the terms of any other discipline from which psychiatry and
psychology draw, but must be described in their own terms.
Merriam-Webster defines the word mind as “the complex of elements in
an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons.”
The word includes “the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive

3
4 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

mental activity of an organism.”1 The concept of mind can be explored in

many different directions. For centuries philosophers of mind such as
Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Heidegger, Searle, and Dennett, to mention
only a few, have debated questions such as “Is there a mind?” “Can mind
be reduced to brain?” “What are the properties of mind?” “Do animals or
machines have minds?” “Does the mind have causal properties, or is it a
mere epiphenomenon of brain processes?” and “What is the relationship
between mind and body?” Intellectual historians explore and disagree
about how the concept of mind enters discourse about human behavior.
Theologians weigh in on the question of the relationship between the mind
and God. Of course, psychologists of all stripes offer theories about what
kind of mind humans have, and what can be said about this mind.
Mental health professionals may be more or less interested in all of
these directions in which the study of mind can lead, most having read
enough to know that the philosophy and history of mind is complex
(Kendler 2001; Makari 2008). However, we also know that we need a
concept of mind to understand our patients. Most clinicians think of
mind as an emergent property of brain, meaning that it is dependent on
the brain but cannot be described in terms or concepts appropriate to the
brain (Frith 2007). Indeed, most clinicians function practically as what
philosophers call property dualists, meaning that even if we understand
that mind emerges from brain, we know that we must separate mind
and brain for clinical purposes. In other words, we treat the patient’s
mind and the patient’s brain as though they have separate properties,
each of which demands a unique kind of thinking and a separate kind of
intervention. This way of conceptualizing patients is firmly established
in our tradition. It has been written about most clearly in classics such as
George Engel’s (1977) biopsychosocial model or Paul McHugh and Phil-
lip Slavney’s The Perspectives of Psychiatry (McHugh and Slavney 1998),
both of which assert that mental health professionals need and use sev-
eral ways of thinking about patients, one of which focuses on psychol-
ogy, or the study of the mind.

What Is Psychoanalysis?
Psychoanalysis is the branch of psychology that deals most thoroughly
and profoundly with understanding human behavior as the result of

1See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mind (accessed April 7,

2013).
Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind 5

the mind. In contrast to neurobiology, which studies behavior and men-

tal experiences from the point of view of brain activity, or to social learn-
ing theory and some types of social psychology, which search for the
environmental and cultural factors that influence experience and be-
havior, the psychoanalytic model of the mind attempts to organize our
understanding of how mental phenomena such as feelings, thoughts,
memories, wishes, and fantasies affect what we experience and do. Tra-
ditionally, psychoanalysis has been variously defined as a theory of the
mind, as a theory of some aspects of psychopathology, as a treatment,
and as a method of investigating the mind (Freud 1923/1962). Through-
out this book, the word psychodynamic, which literally means “mental
forces” (or motivations), will be used interchangeably with psychoana-
lytic, because there are few psychodynamic approaches that are distinct
from the psychoanalytic approach.

What Is a Model?
The most common strategy used by psychoanalytic theory makers to
organize and explain the mind is the building of what we call the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind. As with all models used in the natural and
social sciences, the psychoanalytic model of the mind is an imaginary
construction designed to represent a complex system—in this case, the
human mind—that cannot be observed directly in its entirety. The pur-
pose of any model is to represent a system in such a way that it is easier
to talk about and easier to study. Some scientific models are very ab-
stract, based on the language of mathematics or logical principles.
Other models take a more plastic form, constructed by analogy with ob-
jects in the physical world that are already well understood. Scientific
models are judged by how well they explain the available evidence,
predict new findings, and are consistent with other knowledge. Exam-
ples of scientific models with which we are all familiar include the Co-
pernican model of the solar system, the Rutherford–Bohr model of the
atom, and the “Standard Model” of particle physics (which describes
the interactions among the elementary particles that make up all mat-
ter). Each of these models attempts to organize available evidence into
a representation of some aspect of the natural world.
The psychoanalytic model of the mind attempts to organize the data
of the clinical situation—including the patient’s life story, the patient’s
report of his or her inner experience, and the patient’s interactions in the
treatment setting—into a representation of the human mind as a coher-
ent psychological system. The model describes how psychological phe-
6 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

nomena such as feelings, thoughts, wishes, fears, fantasies, memories,

attitudes, and values interact in the system and influence each other. It
describes the motivations that animate the patient, the structures that
organize the patient’s mind, and the functions and processes by which
the patient’s mind works. It also describes how the mind develops. The
psychoanalytic model of the mind represents the mind of all human be-
ings in general, as well as the mind of any specific individual, with its
unique characteristics. It can be used to describe how mental life is ex-
pressed in pathological as well as normal behavior and how treatment
is used to influence the mind. The psychoanalytic model is not the first
model of the mind. For thousands of years, mankind has been using
analogies to represent the mind, drawing upon images such as a theater,
an iceberg, a hydraulic system, and (more recently) a computer
(McGinn 2013).
The earliest psychoanalytic model of the mind was constructed by
Sigmund Freud in his attempt to make sense of his experience with his
own patients. In his book The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1962),
Freud introduced his first fully developed model of the mind, or what
he called the psychic apparatus, based on analogies with the science and
technology of his day, which included a hodgepodge of neurobiology,
reflex arcs, and optical instruments. Freud also borrowed heavily from
other fields such as literature and archeology.
Some aspects of Freud’s first model, often referred to as the Topo-
graphic Model of the mind, survive in the contemporary psychoana-
lytic model of the mind. Other aspects have been abandoned. Indeed,
an important part of Freud’s legacy is the reminder that successful
model making should always be flexible and open ended. No scientific
model is ever complete. For example, we were all taught in childhood
that Christopher Columbus’ spherical model of the Earth was a brilliant
and dramatic improvement over other models popular in his day,
which represented the planet as a flat disc, sometimes balanced on the
back of a turtle! Columbus’ model provided him with the theoretical ra-
tionale for his bold plan to sail West in search of “The East.” However,
Columbus’ own failure to properly estimate the size of our planet
caused him to be confused about where he was at his journey’s end.
Later map makers worked with the discoveries of Columbus (and oth-
ers) to improve on the model of our planet Earth, with its oceans and
land masses. Indeed, map makers are still at work charting the unseen
depths of the ocean floor. As with our map of the world, the psychoan-
alytic model of the mind has continued to develop since Freud’s first
efforts to map the workings of the inner world. Although the contem-
Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind 7

porary psychoanalytic model of the mind borrows heavily from Freud’s

first models, it has undergone profound changes in the 100-plus years
since the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1900/1962),
becoming ever more complex in response to new data from clinical ex-
ploration and from other sources.
Today, no single psychoanalytic model of the mind is able to account
for all data from within and outside of the clinical situation. The con-
temporary psychoanalytic model of the mind is best described as plu-
ralistic, consisting of not one but several models of the mind,
overlapping but distinct, each taking a somewhat different perspective
on human mental functioning and each emphasizing a different set of
phenomena. Roughly speaking, each contemporary psychoanalytic
model of the mind corresponds to a different psychoanalytic “school of
thought.” Readers have heard of major schools of thought such as Ego
Psychology, Object Relations Theory, Attachment Theory, Self Psychol-
ogy, and Relational Psychoanalysis, to mention a few. These models of
the mind (or schools of thought) vary with respect to how they repre-
sent the mind, how they understand the patient’s suffering, and how
they explain the therapeutic action of psychotherapy.
A goal of this book is to combine the major psychoanalytic models
of the mind into a single usable contemporary psychoanalytic model of
the mind. In the process of integrating these models, we will trace the
evolution of efforts to conceptualize the nature of mental life in the
work of Freud and of many others. We will describe how the processes
of clinical discovery and theoretical formulation interact in the task of
model making. We will delineate those elements that are shared by all
psychoanalytic models of the mind as well as the important distinctions
among competing models. Throughout, we will emphasize the fact that
psychoanalytic model making is an ongoing process. Clinicians still
face the same questions that challenged Freud: How can we understand
patients, and how can we help them change? Our models of the mind
are important and useful to the extent that they help us to answer those
questions.

Why Do We Need a Model of the Mind?

In the late 1970s, attempts to model the workings of the mind became
more interesting with the introduction of a fascinating idea, emerging
from cognitive neuroscience, called theory of mind. According to this no-
tion, all humans are hardwired with the capacity to develop a theory
about how minds work—both our own minds and the minds of other
8 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

people. If this notion is correct, the question of whether mental health

professionals need a model of the mind is moot: As human beings, we
already have one, whether we like it or not.
In their groundbreaking paper “Does the chimpanzee have a theory
of mind?,” cognitive scientists David Premack and Guy Woodruff
(1978) used the phrase theory of mind for the first time to describe what
cognitive psychologists had for a number of years been discussing as a
specific capacity possessed by all human beings (and maybe other ani-
mals as well). This capacity enables us to 1) understand that others have
beliefs, desires, and intentions; 2) realize that others’ beliefs, desires,
and intentions might be different from our own; and 3) form opera-
tional hypotheses, theories, or mental models of what others’ beliefs,
desires, and intentions might be (Malle 2005). Theory of mind (or ToM,
as it is often called) is an innate endowment that equips us to get by in
a world where complex interactions with others are part of everyday
life. As an evolutionary biologist might put it, ToM is essential to sur-
vival in our evolutionary niche. In the psychoanalytic model of the
mind, theory of mind is referred to as mentalization (see Chapter 12,
“Self Psychology,” and Appendix C, “Glossary”).
Researchers suggest that theory of mind begins as an innate poten-
tial in infancy and develops in a facilitating matrix of normal matura-
tion, social interactions, and other experiences. Under normal
circumstances, ToM can be shown to be present in children by about the
age of 4 years (Bartsch and Wellman 1995; Gopnik and Aslington 1988;
Mayes and Cohen 1996). In adults, ToM exists on a continuum ranging
from the elaborate, complex, and reasonably accurate to the rudimen-
tary, barely functional, and virtually nonexistent. The ability of each of
us to accurately represent what others are feeling or are trying to do pre-
dicts how well we perform in a variety of interpersonal tasks. At one
end of the spectrum, individuals with autism, who have specific defects
in the ToM module, have a very hard time functioning in the social
world (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). At the other end of the spectrum, peo-
ple with highly developed capacities for ToM can negotiate a range of
social and interpersonal transactions, ranging from parenting, friend-
ship, and romantic intimacy to business, teaching, politics, and, of
course, working in the field of mental health! Obviously people vary in
how well they function in each of these domains.
Cognitive psychologists have developed an array of ingenious ex-
periments to test whether adults, children, or nonhuman primates have
a functioning theory of mind. It is very difficult to discern whether pre-
verbal children and animals can imagine the minds of other creatures,
and scientists continue to debate this question. The experiments in sup-
Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind 9

port of each side of these arguments make for interesting reading (Sper-
ber and Premack 1995). Through use of functional neuroimaging (i.e.,
functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) techniques, scientists
have been able to illuminate particular brain regions that may play a
role in the brain systems responsible for ToM (Frith and Frith 1999).
Neuroscientists have demonstrated the existence of mirror neurons,
widely distributed throughout the primate brain, that fire both when
we perform an action and when we see someone else perform the same
action (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). Scientists believe that these mir-
ror neurons may be a crucial part of the neural substrate for our capac-
ity to envision what others are thinking, feeling, and planning to do.
Mirror neurons may allow us to understand the intentions behind oth-
ers’ actions by creating a template for those actions inside our own
minds. In fact, some scientists argue that mirror neurons allow us to
grasp the minds of other people not through conceptual reasoning at
all, but through direct simulation of the other’s experience.2
The theory of mind hypothesis proposes that most human beings
are born with the potential to know and make sense of what goes on in
the minds of other people. In other words, our attempts to construct
and refine a psychoanalytic model of the mind are not altogether differ-
ent from mental activities people perform every day. We all use our in-
nate capacity for understanding minds to explain ourselves to
ourselves and to understand the behavior of others. In other words,
when things go as planned, we are all psychologists.

Modeling the Mind in the Era of the Brain

How does one think about the mind in an era dominated by discoveries
about the brain? What role does a model of the mind play in this age of
neuroscience? Whereas popular belief often holds that advances in neu-
roscience and psychopharmacology render thinking about the mind
and related “talking cures” obsolete, clinicians know that the opposite
is true. Never before has the world of mind science been so lively! As
we explore this issue further, recall that Freud’s formal education was
not in psychology, or even in psychiatry, but almost entirely in the field

2See also National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria,

domain “Social Processes,” construct “Perception and Understanding of Oth-
ers,” subconstruct “understanding mental states” (nimh.nih.gov/research-pri-
orities/rdoc/index.shtml; accessed January 12, 2014).
10 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

of neuroscience. Before beginning his work with patients suffering from

mental illness, he had a long and successful career as a neuropatholo-
gist. Even after Freud became immersed in the study of mental life, his
goal was to create a science of the mind that would be based on an un-
derstanding of the brain. One of his earliest manuscripts, The Project for
a Scientific Psychology (Freud 1895/1962), which dates from 1895 (but
was not published in his lifetime), records Freud’s efforts to create a
model for what the brain circuitry of the mind might look like. He aban-
doned this “Project” only when it became clear to him that the neuro-
science of his day was not sophisticated enough to support his plan, so
that he found himself engaged in highly speculative “theory making”
about neural functioning.
Today, our knowledge of the brain is infinitely more advanced than
it was in Freud’s time. Although mind science is still far from realizing
the dream of a brain-based psychology, we have reached a point where
intelligible conversation across the mind–brain barrier is at least possi-
ble. In fact, we find ourselves in the early stages of a rapprochement
between psychology and neuroscience that sheds new light on the
importance of psychology as a basic science and promises a deeper
understanding of psychotherapy. Important aspects of our model of the
mind that had long been thought to be beyond the scope of systematic
inquiry are suddenly of renewed interest. Let me give some examples
of what I mean.

The Unconscious
At the turn of the twentieth century, Freud first presented his revolu-
tionary “new psychology” based on the proposition that most of what
goes on in the mind occurs outside of awareness (Freud 1896/1962). At
the turn of the twenty-first century, it is no longer revolutionary to de-
mand that we take the unconscious into account in our study of psy-
chology. In the exploding world of mind science, nonconscious mental
processes are now taken for granted as a basic feature of the mind. The
new challenge is to account for consciousness and to explain the pur-
pose it serves (Chalmers 1996; Crick 1994; Damasio 1984, 1999; Dennett
1991; Edelman and Tononi 2000; Gazzaniga et al. 1998; Levine 2001;
Thau 2001).

Mind and Body

A second feature of the psychoanalytic model of the mind of new inter-
est to the rest of mind science is its emphasis on embodiment. This con-
cept of embodiment includes the idea that the mind is intrinsically
Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind 11

shaped by its connection to the body, or that the “hardware” from

which the mind emerges—the body—is an essential determinant of the
nature of mind. For example, research from the laboratory of University
of Southern California neuroscientist Antonio Damasio demonstrates
what psychoanalysts have long recognized—that how humans reason
cannot be separated from how they feel. In other words, cognition can-
not be studied independently from affects, the complex emotional/
physical states produced by and in the body as part of its system of eval-
uating the self in relationship to the environment for the purpose of sur-
vival (Damasio 1984, 1999). At the same time, from a somewhat
different angle, philosophers George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, and University of Oregon) argue that the
whole of the reasoning mind is indelibly shaped by metaphors derived
from the experience of the body (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). As we
will see, the psychoanalytic model of the mind has long emphasized the
centrality of both affects and bodily determined metaphors as organiz-
ers of mental life, introducing ideas about the impact of bodily experi-
ence on the organization of mental life very similar to those of Damasio
and of Lakoff and Johnson. Concepts of the embodied mind present a
major challenge to what has been called the computational model of the
mind, which asserts that the best model of the mind is offered by the dis-
embodied modern computer. The computational model of the mind has
held wide influence in mind science for the past 60 years.

Self and Other

In recent years, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have demon-
strated that mother–baby interactions in earliest infancy help shape the
cognitive (and neuronal) structures underlying the infant’s capacity to
tolerate distress. We are in the early stages of a new biology in which
human relationships are recognized as regulating both mind and brain
beginning in infancy (Eisenberg 1995; Hofer 1984; Schore 1994). Al-
though Freud did not invent psychotherapy, he did launch the first
modern exploration of the psychoactive, behavior-modifying, and ulti-
mately brain-altering power of human relationships. The psychoana-
lytic model of the mind takes into account how relationships are
internalized in the course of development to create lasting mental rep-
resentations of self and other that shape experience and are reactivated
in everyday encounters and in all treatments. The focus of psychody-
namic psychotherapy always includes the question of how to bring
about change by mobilizing these representations in the context of a
new relationship.
12 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

The Narrative Self

A final point in the convergence between the psychoanalytic model of
the mind and cognitive neuroscience is a shared interest in a particular
feature of the mind—its innate capacity for narrative expression. Again,
Damasio has taken the lead in arguing that consciousness provides an
ongoing story about our self-state that serves our need for self-
regulation and adaptation to the environment (Damasio 1984; Farber
and Churchland 1995). In other words, contemporary brain scientists
are beginning to take an interest in the fact that each of us, in the privacy
of our own minds, is continually inventing and reinventing a life story
as part of an ongoing effort to situate ourselves in the world and to
maintain a coherent sense of self. Cognitive psychologists, too, have a
strong interest in the narrative structure of the mind, increasingly using
the word script in their work (Tomkins 1986). In his first book, Studies on
Hysteria, Freud remarked almost apologetically that he found it
“strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories”
(Breuer and Freud 1893/1895, p. 160). As we will see, the mind’s narra-
tive structure is one of the fundamental aspects of the psychoanalytic
model of the mind.

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

in the Clinical Setting
A look at developments in contemporary mind science shows that the
psychoanalytic model of the mind is ideally suited to help us observe and
reveal fundamental aspects of mental life. In the clinical setting, the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind provides the clinician with a way of mak-
ing sense of his or her interaction with the patient. It allows the clinician
to organize the clinical details—the patient’s communication, behavior,
modes of relating, and history—so as to construct a picture of the pa-
tient’s “inner workings” that can be used to understand the current situ-
ation, predict responses, and plan interventions. Without such a model,
the clinician would quickly become lost in a sea of experiential data. By
contrast, the clinician equipped with a sophisticated model of the mind is
able to find his or her bearings in the doctor–patient interaction, organize
clinical material, and chart a course for potential change.
Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind 13

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 CHAPTER 2

Origins of the Psychoanalytic

Model of the Mind

This chapter tells the back story of how the first psychoanalytic
model of the mind was formulated, beginning with a lightning tour of
the history of scientific psychology, moving from Mesmer, Charcot, and
Bernheim, and arriving finally at the case of Anna O., treated by Freud’s
mentor, Breuer. It will turn to the work of Freud himself, examining
how, in the process of abandoning hypnosis, he arrived at the concept of
the dynamic unconscious, which forms the basis for the psychoanalytic
model of the mind. Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes the
following: cathartic method, defense, empiricism, free association, fundamen-
tal rule, hypnosis, hysteria, materialism, mesmerism, physical determinism,
positivism, psychic determinism, psychology, psychotherapy, repression, resis-
tance, suggestion, and talking cure.
Although mental experience has been a subject of fascination since
the dawn of consciousness, the history of scientific study of the mind is
only about 150 years old. When Freud introduced his first psychoana-
lytic model of the mind, the term psychologist did not even really exist.
The word psychology—which combines the Greek words psyche
(“mind/soul”) and –ology (“the study of”)—was introduced into intel-
lectual discourse by a Serbo-Croatian poet (also known as the founder
of Serbo-Croatian literature) around 1520 (Krstic 1964), but it did not
catch on right away. Poets and philosophers have mused about the
nature of the human mind at least since the days of the ancient Greeks.
However, psychological reflection did not become organized into a dis-
15
16 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

tinct academic or university-based scientific discipline until the end of

the nineteenth century, with the birth of two major branches of scientific
psychology: the field of experimental psychology (founded by Wundt
in Germany in the late 1870s) and the field of psychoanalysis (founded
by Freud in Austria in the 1890s).

Birth of Scientific Psychology: The Rise of

Psychic Determinism
Modern scientific psychology is the result of the convergence of two
major trends in the history of ideas: the Enlightenment (a philosophical
movement born in seventeenth-century Europe) and the romantic
movement (a trend in culture and the arts beginning in late eighteenth-
century Europe). The Enlightenment was characterized by a belief in
the power of human reason to triumph over ignorance and superstition.
Enlightenment philosophers held to the doctrine of physical determinism,
which asserts that all events in the natural world obey laws. This atti-
tude led to an explosion of knowledge in the fields of physics and chem-
istry and in the basic sciences of medicine. In contrast to the
Enlightenment, which idealized man’s capacity for reason, the romantic
movement idealized man’s capacity for imagination and feeling. For
the romantics, irrationality was not to be overcome, but to be explored
as a vital source of creativity. As a result of this idealization, subjectivity
became a phenomenon worthy of attention, and introspection became
an important route to knowledge about man.
As a result of the combined influence of the Enlightenment and the
romantic movement, enthusiasm for successes in the natural sciences
had begun to spread to the study of human behavior, so that by the
beginning of the nineteenth century in Europe, we see the development
of what we now call the social sciences, including anthropology, sociol-
ogy, economics, political science, and psychology. Much of psychology
is based on the principle of psychic determinism (analogous to physical
determinism), which asserts that psychological life—like physics, biol-
ogy, physiology, and all other systems in the natural world—is lawfully
determined. In other words, psychological events are determined by
antecedent psychological events, transformed according to natural
laws. Adherence to the principle of psychic determinism does not
require abandonment of the idea that mental events result from brain
activity; it simply establishes the field of mental activity itself as an
appropriate subject for natural science by asserting that mental events
obey laws of their own and are not the meaningless epiphenomena of
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 17

brain processes. The word psychology was in use early in the nineteenth
century among philosophers, who did much to pave the way for the
emergence of psychology as an academic discipline (see Chapter 3,
“Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious”); educators and developmen-
talists, who studied the best ways to train the minds of children; sexol-
ogists, who studied human sexual behavior (e.g., Richard Freiherr von
Krafft-Ebing [Krafft-Ebing 1886/1998] and Havelock Ellis [Grosskurth
1985]); proto-psychometricians, who found ways to measure individual
differences, such as intelligence (e.g., Alfred Binet [Binet and Simon
1908] and Francis Galton [1869]); neuroanatomists, who discovered
areas of the brain responsible for behaviors such as language and motor
behavior (e.g., Paul Pierre Broca [1824–1880], Carl Wernicke [1948–
1905], and John Hughlings Jackson [1835–1911]) (Stevens 1971); and
psychopathologists and psychotherapists, who sought to understand
and treat mental illness (e.g., Jean-Martin Charcot, Hippolyte Bern-
heim, and Josef Breuer) (Ellenberger 1970). Alongside of these scholarly
endeavors were dozens of other less intellectually legitimate forays into
areas such as phrenology, parapsychology, and even the psychic life of
plants (Fancher 1979; Hunt 1993; Robinson 1995).

Franz Anton Mesmer: Early Attempts to Apply Scientific

Principles to the Practice of Medicine
The medical historian Henri Ellenberger (1970) has argued that we can
trace the origins of scientific psychotherapy to the end of the eighteenth
century, when we see a shift in the healing arts from the domain of reli-
gion to the domain of science, as doctors and men of science, rather than
priests and exorcists, began to dominate the study and treatment of
mental suffering. Ellenberger focused on the character of Franz Anton
Mesmer (1734–1815), a Viennese physician working more than
100 years before Freud, who was deeply immersed in many aspects of
Enlightenment philosophy, particularly the application of science to the
practice of medicine. Mesmer believed that he had discovered the exis-
tence of a universal, physical fluid, analogous to the forces of gravita-
tion or of electricity. He argued that disturbances of equilibrium in this
fluid explain health and disease. Mesmer’s theory of cure proposed that
the therapist, or “magnetizer,” induce in the patient a trance-like state,
transmitting his own stronger and better fluid to the patient through the
channel of the rapport. Although he initially became famous throughout
Europe, Mesmer was ultimately discredited by the French Academy of
Science (after an investigation carried out by a panel that included
America’s own Benjamin Franklin). Today, Mesmer’s theories of mag-
18 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

netic fluid seem silly to us. His name, while preserved in the English
language, is not part of vocabulary of modern medical practice but is
memorialized in the word mesmerize, which means “to fascinate or
enthrall.” However, Mesmer’s work represents the efforts of a man of
science to wrest control of the study of mind from the domain of reli-
gion and religious practice (Ellenberger 1970).
By the middle of the nineteenth century, mesmerism had all but dis-
appeared in European medical circles, eclipsed by steady refinements
in the techniques of experimental science. However, by the second half
of the nineteenth century, we find a new wave of medicalization of the
illnesses and the treatments that had been the concern of Mesmer and
his followers. This medicalization was fueled by three developments:
the widespread prevalence of hysteria, a fascination with hypnosis, and
the development of the field of neuroscience.

From Magnetic Illness to Hysteria

Patients with hysteria were most often young to middle-aged women
who suffered from an odd assortment of sensory and motor symptoms,
as well as disorders of thought, emotion, and consciousness, frequently
neurological in appearance, that did not fit the pattern of any known
neurological condition. Hysteria was a relatively common illness in
nineteenth century Europe and the United States, its victims including
many famous people (e.g., Alice James, the sister of William and Henry
James). However, hysteria was not an illness that was new to the age.
The term hysteria was coined by the Greek physician Hippocrates (460–
370 B.C.E.), who believed that it was caused by irregular movement of
blood from the uterus (hysteros) to the brain. In the Middle Ages and
well into the eighteenth century, people manifesting hysteria were often
thought to be suffering from demonic possession and were treated with
exorcism. By the middle of the nineteenth century, hysteria had become
the focus of healers previously interested in the “magnetic diseases.”
The illness also drew the attention of the earliest practitioners of our
modern field of neurology, who began to offer ideas about disordered
functioning within the mind/brain system.1

1 These new ideas about the causes of hysteria were presented most systemati-
cally in the work of Paul Briquet (1796–1881), a French physician who argued
that the ailment was a “neurosis of the brain” caused by the effect of violent
emotions on individuals predisposed by heredity factors. For an introduction to
the concept of neurosis, see Chapter 5, “The Mind’s Topography.”
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 19

From Mesmerism to Hypnosis

As interest in magnetic illnesses was replaced by the study of hysteria,
mesmerism was in turn replaced by the practice of hypnosis. Like hyste-
ria, hypnotism was an ancient phenomenon that can be traced back to
ancient Egypt. However, the term was coined in 1843 by James Braid
(1795–1860), a Scottish-born surgeon practicing in Manchester, who
named the practice after the Greek word hypnos, the god of sleep. Al-
though Braid ultimately recognized that hypnosis and sleep were unre-
lated, the name nonetheless persisted. Intrigued by the demonstrations
of a Swiss mesmerist, Braid began to experiment with inducing trance
states in his servants, his friends, and even his own wife. To explain the
phenomenon, Braid rejected Mesmer’s theory of magnetic fluid and re-
placed it with his own (somewhat vague) theory of altered brain phys-
iology. His new term hypnosis was quickly adopted throughout Europe
as the official and newly medicalized name for the practice of inducing
a trance for the purpose of treatment.

Emergence of the Fields of Neuroscience,

Neurology, and Psychiatry
Both hysteria and hypnotism were of great interest to men whose train-
ing was in the new fields of neuroscience and neurology. Whereas the
brain had long been understood to be the organ of the mind, described
as such in the teaching of both Hippocrates and Galen (129–210 C.E.),
human understanding of the specific relationship between the brain
and various behaviors, experiences, and symptoms underwent a great
leap forward in the second half of the nineteenth century, as scientists
began to unlock the secrets of brain structure and function. Scientist-
physicians Camillo Golgi (1843–1926) and Santiago Ramon y Cajal
(1852–1934) (at the Universities of Pavia and Madrid, respectively)
made advances in the microscopic study of brain tissue that led to the
development of the neurone doctrine, which posits that the basic unit of
brain structure is a specialized cell called the neuron. In 1906, Golgi and
y Cajal shared the Nobel Prize for Medicine for the development of this
doctrine, now accepted as the basis for modern neuroscience. Also dur-
ing the second half of the nineteenth century, the physiologist-physi-
cians Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896) and Hermann von Helmholtz
(1821–1894) at the University of Berlin began to elucidate the electro-
chemical function of the neuron, and neuropathologist-physicians in-
cluding Paul Pierre Broca (1824–1880), Carl Wernicke (1948–1905), and
20 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911) (at the University of Paris, the Uni-
versity of Breslau, and London Hospital, respectively) began to map the
correlations between specific areas of the brain and functions such as
speech and language (Broca and Wernicke) and motor function (Hugh-
lings Jackson) (Stevens 1971). Meanwhile, as basic neuroscience is tak-
ing off in laboratories throughout Europe, we also see the rise of
university-based psychiatry. The neurologist-psychiatrist Wilhelm
Griesinger (1817–1869), first director of the university-based Burghölzli
mental hospital in Zurich and often called the father of modern aca-
demic psychiatry, was famous for having declared that “mental dis-
eases are brain diseases” (Ellenberger 1970, p. 241).
By the end of the nineteenth century, throughout Europe but espe-
cially in France, we see an integration between a new fascination with
hysteria, the practice of hypnotism, and the new science of the mind/
brain system. This integration was brought about largely through the
work of two men who, while intensely competitive with each other, did
work that made possible the development of modern psychotherapy.
These two men were Jean-Martin Charcot, practicing at L’Hôpital
Salpêtrière in Paris, and Hippolyte Bernheim, practicing 240 miles
away in the city of Nancy. Both of these men exerted a powerful and di-
rect influence on one of their students, the young Sigmund Freud.

Jean-Martin Charcot: Hysteria and Pathogenic Ideas

Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) was one of the most luminous charac-
ters in all of nineteenth-century medicine. The son of a middle-class car-
riage maker, he rose to become one of the most distinguished
neurologists of all time, considered by many to be the father of modern
neurology. Charcot earned fame through his work at the L’Hôpital
Salpêtrière where, in 1862, he was appointed chief physician of one of
the hospital’s major sections. At the time of his appointment, the
Salpêtrière was a vast but decaying complex of 45 buildings that served
mainly as a medical poorhouse for thousands of old women and pros-
titutes. Although famous as the site where Philippe Pinel made medical
history by liberating the “insane” from their chains, the mid-nine-
teenth-century Salpêtrière was not a place where young men of ambi-
tion sought appointment. However, Charcot recognized that the
Salpêtrière sheltered patients with rare or unknown neurological dis-
eases who could serve as the subjects for clinical research. Within a
decade, he had transformed this warehouse for the forgotten into a
modern academic medical center with new consulting rooms for treat-
ment, laboratories for research, and a large auditorium. Medical stu-
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 21

dents and scientists from all over the world flocked to the Salpêtrière to
hear Charcot’s dramatic lectures and to witness his spectacular clinical
demonstrations.
Charcot adopted the idea that hysteria was a brain illness that left
constitutionally predisposed individuals susceptible to disturbance in
the psyche. His work on hysteria began with his effort to distinguish pa-
tients with epileptic seizures from those who were having hysterical
convulsions. He was also interested in the similarities between hysteri-
cal paralyses and traumatic paralyses for which there was no evident
organic cause. Traumatic injury had become increasingly common in
this era of the railroad, where accidents were frequent and litigation
over who could legitimately claim to be paralyzed focused attention on
the etiology of syndromes associated with trauma. Charcot and his col-
laborators developed an elaborate classification system for hysteria, in-
cluding what he called traumatic hysteria.
At the end of the 1870s, Charcot’s interest began to include hypno-
sis, which had gained some acceptance in European medical circles. His
experiments quickly revealed that hysterical patients were easy to hyp-
notize. Using hypnosis, Charcot demonstrated that he could reproduce
the same symptoms in patients suffering from hysteria as could be
found in those suffering from traumatic paralyses. He also demon-
strated that with hypnosis, he was able to remove the same symptoms
of paralysis from both groups of patients. On the basis of this work,
Charcot concluded that hypnotic, hysterical, and traumatic paralyses
were all identical to each another, all the result of suggestion (see section
“Hippolyte Bernheim and the Nancy School”), and all consisting of
lawful, ordered phenomena. He argued that in susceptible individuals
with a hereditary predisposition who were exposed to suggestion (ei-
ther therapist-induced, self-induced, or spontaneous, as in the case of
trauma), “a coherent group of associated ideas settle themselves in the
mind in the fashion of parasites, remaining isolated from the rest of the
mind and expressing themselves outwardly through corresponding
motor phenomena” (Ellenberger 1970, p. 149). Charcot introduced the
concept that small, sequestered fragments of the mind could follow a
course of development separate from the rest of the personality, mani-
festing themselves through bodily symptoms. These sequestered bits of
psychic life became known as subconscious fixed ideas, the term given
them by Charcot’s student Pierre Janet. Charcot’s concept marked the
first time that ideas were seen as having causal properties in the physi-
cal world. His revolutionary concept that ideas outside of awareness
can be pathogenic, or have the power to cause hysterical and other kinds
22 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

of neurotic symptoms, would soon be seized upon and modified by

another of Charcot’s students—the young Sigmund Freud.
Whereas the impressionable young Freud became more than a little
enthralled with Charcot, other visitors to the Salpêtrière were more
skeptical. Despite his prestige in French medical circles and the excite-
ment created by his dramatic clinical demonstrations, Charcot ulti-
mately ran afoul of the scientific establishment. In the last years of his
life, his work in the areas of hypnosis and hysteria fell into disrepute fol-
lowing allegations made by students and patients that many of his
famous demonstrations were “faked” by subjects eager to please the
master. Charcot’s work on hysteria was repudiated by his successors. In
1925, at a celebration of the centennial of Charcot’s birth held at the
Salpêtrière, the period of Charcot’s life devoted to hysteria and hypno-
sis was dismissed as an unfortunate chapter in an otherwise brilliant
career. Only the French surrealists, in their passion for all things at the
margins of the acceptable, gave Charcot a posthumous award for his
“discovery of hysteria” (Ellenberger 1970, p. 101).

Hippolyte Bernheim and the Nancy School:

The Origins of Psychotherapy
Meanwhile, across France in the city of Nancy, Hippolyte Bernheim
(1840–1919) was also using hypnosis to treat patients suffering from
hysteria. Like Charcot, Bernheim understood hysteria to be a patho-
genic effect of subconscious fixed ideas. Although decidedly less colorful
than Charcot, Bernheim was a distinguished professor of internal med-
icine at a university hospital in the Alsatian city of Strasbourg. When
this province was annexed by Germany in 1871 during the Franco-Prus-
sian War, Bernheim, a fervent French patriot, relocated to Nancy, the old
capital of Lorraine, where he rose rapidly in the ranks of the new uni-
versity hospital.
In Nancy, Bernheim came into contact with Ambroise-Auguste Lié-
beault (1823–1904), a country physician whom many considered a
quack because of his practice of using hypnosis to treat the poor. Bern-
heim was convinced by Liébeault’s assertion (now known to be incor-
rect) that hypnotic sleep is identical to natural sleep, the sole difference
being that the former is induced by the suggestion. In fact, it was Lié-
beault who made famous the use of the word suggestion and Bernheim
who defined suggestibility (both terms later taken up by Charcot) as “the
aptitude to transform an idea into an act” (Garrabé 1999).
In contrast to Charcot, Bernheim and the Nancy School argued that
hypnosis was not a pathological brain state that can be induced only in
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 23

people predisposed through heredity but was itself the result of sugges-
tion, reproducible in everyone to varying degrees. The Nancy School is
credited with placing hypnosis (and, by association, hysterical ill-
nesses) on a continuum with normal states of mind, anticipating
Freud’s assertion that people with hysteria and “normal” people have
essentially the same psychological makeup. Finally, and again in con-
trast with Charcot, Bernheim was interested in developing hypnosis as
a therapeutic intervention. In the course of their long collaboration, Lié-
beault and Bernheim used hypnosis to treat over 30,000 patients suffer-
ing from “nervous ailments” including hysteria, but also rheumatism,
gastrointestinal diseases, and menstrual disorders. Their method con-
sisted of the use of suggestion to induce hypnosis accompanied by the
use of imperative suggestion to remove symptoms. Over time, Bern-
heim began to dispense with hypnosis altogether, using suggestion
alone to influence the expression of the patient’s pathogenic ideas. This
use of suggestion in the waking state was a treatment procedure that
the Nancy School now named psychotherapy, the first use of what is now
a very common word.
Bernheim introduced his ideas to the medical world in 1882. The
same year, Charcot presented a paper on hypnosis and hysteria at the
Académie des Sciences. Immediately these two men became bitter
rivals, borrowing from and elaborating on each other’s ideas. Despite
the differences between these two men, their shared insights led to the
consolidation of a new theory of hysteria based on a disordered brain/
mind system. This new theory explained the bizarre symptoms of hys-
teria as the result of separate systems of awareness, or consciousness,
and/or split fragments of mental life, which in susceptible individuals
functioned autonomously. It paved the way for new approaches to
treatment based on the goal of reintegrating split-off ideas into ordinary
conscious mental life. This new theory and its associated “psychother-
apeutics” were disseminated throughout Central Europe by 1885, when
we encounter the young neurologist Sigmund Freud on his way to Paris
to study with the great Charcot.

Sigmund Freud
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was born on May 6, 1856, in Freiburg, a
small town in Moravia at the edge of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He
was the oldest son of a wool merchant, Jacob Freud, and Jacob’s much
younger, third wife, Amalia Nathanson. When Sigmund was 4 years
old, the Freud family moved to Leopoldstadt, the predominantly Jew-
24 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ish quarter of Vienna. As was the trend among newly urbanized Jews
toward assimilation, Jacob and Amalie Freud raised their children in a
German-speaking home with the goals and ideals of the Viennese mid-
dle class. It is not known how Jacob Freud supported his family in Vi-
enna, and his financial situation was quite precarious. Nevertheless, he
appears to have been able to provide his 10 children with education,
music lessons, and even summer vacations at a resort in Moravia. By all
accounts, family life revolved around the needs and wishes of the cou-
ple’s oldest son, whose intelligence inspired awe in his gentle and gen-
erous father, and pride in his beautiful and doting mother, who referred
to him as “mein guldener Sigi” (Jones 1953/1961, p. 4).
The picture of Freud that emerges from many sources is one of con-
tradiction. By temperament, he was an intense and passionate man who
modulated his feelings with hard work, introspection, and a knack for
irony. As a suitor, he was affectionate, even ardent, if also possessive,
jealous, and self-absorbed. As a friend, he was given to intense, almost
desperate and dependent attachments to other men, which were inevi-
tably broken off with hard feelings, mostly on his side. He was at once
optimistic, wildly ambitious, and preoccupied with finding a way to be-
come great, even as he was often paralyzed by agonizing self-doubt.
Early in his career, he was plagued with neurotic symptoms including
palpitations, shortness of breath, indigestion, and extreme moodiness.
He saw himself as a loner, isolated in a hostile world, although he
greatly exaggerated the extent to which he and his early work were
scorned. Although he was thoroughly identified with his Jewishness,
through which he claimed to have inherited his comfort with being “in
the Opposition” (Freud 1925/1962, p. 9), he had no use for the deity,
whom he dismissed as “an illusion” (Freud 1927/1962). His boyhood
heroes were not famous philosophers and intellectuals, but “conquista-
dors” and rebellious heroes of antiquity. The sources from which he
drew inspiration were as likely to be great poets as they were to be men
of science. However, his own lifestyle was modest, fastidious, and even
somewhat ascetic, with long hours spent seeing patients and evenings
engaged in writing. Free time was devoted to domestic life or evenings
spent playing cards with friends. All of Freud’s children described him
as an affectionate and devoted father. In other words, his entire appetite
for grandeur was given over to the development and promotion of his
ideas (Freud 1925/1962; Gay 1988; Jones 1953/1961; Makari 2008).
In his official autobiography, Freud asserts that he was the best stu-
dent in his class at the gymnasium, and school records support this
claim. From the first, he read voraciously in politics, history, literature,
art, and the natural sciences. When he entered the University of Vienna
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 25

at the age of 17, he was already competent in Greek, Latin, Hebrew,

English, French, Spanish, and Italian, and thoroughly familiar with the
Western canon ranging from the works of Darwin to the classics of
Western literature. In a bit of foreshadowing, records from his gymna-
sium days show that on his final exam, he was asked to translate a pas-
sage from Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex (Freud 1925/1962; Jones 1953/1961).
Freud began at University of Vienna with the plan to study medi-
cine. At first he was in no hurry to make himself independent of his fa-
ther’s financial support. His studies at the university were prolonged
by his wide-ranging curiosity and his interest in research. Freud spent
most of the first year in the study of the humanities, reading Ludwig
Feuerbach, a Hegelian philosopher who argued that man’s invention of
God leaves him “alienated from himself,” and studying with Franz
Brentano, the philosopher-priest who proposed a view of the mind as
defined by its quality of intentionality (or the quality of always “being
about” or representing something outside itself). He also found time to
translate a volume of the works of British philosopher John Stuart Mill,
who viewed mental processes as consisting of the association of related
ideas.
After a year of research in comparative anatomy under Carl Claus,
Freud published his first paper, on the gonadal structure of the eel. In
1875, he took a position as a research scholar in Ernst Brucke’s Institute
of Physiology. Brucke was to exert a major influence on the develop-
ment of Freud’s intellectual and professional life.

Freud the Neuropathologist

Brucke’s Institute was run according to the principles of a scientific
movement called the Helmholtz School of Medicine, which grew out the
friendship of four men who worked together at the University of Berlin
in the 1840s: Ernst Brucke (1819–1892), Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–
1896), Carl Ludwig (1816–1895), and Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–
1894). These four scientists were influenced by the positivist revolution
sweeping the German intellectual world in the mid-nineteenth century.
Positivism was a program for systematizing all knowledge of the world
based on “undeniable truths.” Since its introduction by Auguste Comte
more than 200 years ago,2 the term positivism has come to be used more
widely (and more vaguely) to describe any account of the world using

2 Comte introduced the word positivism in his multivolume book The Course in
Positive Philosophy (1830–1842); see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comte/
(accessed November 15, 2013).
26 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

the language and methods of science. By the middle of the nineteenth

century, positivism had become strongly associated with two other im-
portant attitudes: empiricism (the belief that the only source of true knowl-
edge about the universe comes from the evidence of the senses) and
materialism (the belief that everything in the universe can be understood
in terms of the properties of matter and energy). This triad of positivism,
empiricism, and materialism allied itself in opposition to all speculation
about the universe based on the power of unseen spiritual forces (Koch
1985, p. 16). In the biological sciences, the positivist revolution fueled the
rise of the science of physiology, which attempted to explain organisms
in accord with the principles of chemistry and physics. This new physiol-
ogy played a large role in the development of psychology as an ordered
and lawful system that can be studied within the framework of the natu-
ral sciences. Both Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, and Wilhelm
Wundt (1832–1902), the father of university-based academic/experimen-
tal psychology (see Chapter 3), were direct descendants of the Helmholtz
School, each having studied under one of its founders (Bernfeld 1944).
Freud’s successes as a laboratory scientist were substantial. His
investigations of the microscopic neuroanatomy of the lamprey and the
crayfish contributed to the revolutionary “neurone doctrine.” His train-
ing at the Institute of Physiology prepared him for later work on the mi-
croanatomy of the human brain stem and the cranial nerves, and in
anatomo-clinical neurology in the areas of cerebral palsy and aphasia.
His work on the pharmacological effects of cocaine brought him some
renown and even some early notoriety. He was appointed to the cov-
eted position of Privatdozent at the University of Vienna in 1885 on the
basis of his recognized expertise in neuropathology.
Brucke also gave Freud important professional and personal guid-
ance, persuading him that despite his success in research, his future at the
Institute was not bright, because pathways for academic advancement
were blocked by the presence of talented colleagues several years his
senior. Furthermore, the relative penury associated with laboratory life
would never be able to provide Freud with the means to marry his fian-
cée, 21-year-old Martha Bernays (1861–1951), a young woman from a
socially prominent German-Jewish family with whom he was passion-
ately in love. In 1882, a year after receiving his medical degree, Freud left
Brucke’s laboratory and took a position as a house physician at the Vien-
nese Hospital in preparation for beginning the more financially secure
life of a clinician. In the next 3 years, he studied internal medicine, sur-
gery, ophthalmology, and dermatology, with the bulk of his time spent in
the study of nervous diseases. Finally, it was Brucke who obtained for
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 27

Freud the coveted University Jubilee Travel Scholarship, which in 1885

took him to Paris for his life-altering encounter with Charcot.

Freud and Charcot: New Investigations of Psychopathology

At the Salpêtrière, Freud began to think about psychopathology in a
new way. His brief 6-month study of psychiatry under Theodor
Meynert at the University of Vienna had focused on the study of phe-
nomenology and classification, with no emphasis on the meaning of
symptoms. Thrilled by the personal dynamism of Charcot and by the
boldness of his ideas about hysteria and hypnosis, Freud returned to
Vienna, committed to the study of psychopathology. He quickly de-
voted himself to the task of translating Charcot’s works into German.
Freud began clinical practice in 1896, and 6 months later he was earning
enough money to marry Martha Bernays. As one of the few specialists
in nervous diseases in Vienna at the time, his practice quickly grew,
made up largely of women suffering from hysteria whom few wanted
to treat. Freud’s therapeutic arsenal for the treatment of hysteria
included electrotherapy accompanied by deep and whole-body mas-
sage, baths for relaxation, and variations on the “rest cure” developed
by American physician Silas Weir Mitchell (1829–1914), all of which he
used well into the 1890s. He also began to experiment with hypnosis.
Because Freud’s hero Charcot was not especially enthusiastic about the
use of hypnosis for treatment, Freud was most influenced in his tech-
nique by Bernheim, whom he visited in Nancy for 2 months in 1889 and
whose book on hypnosis he had committed to translate. At the time of
this second visit to France, Freud also attended the First International
Congress on Hypnotism in Paris (timed to coincide with the opening of
the Eifel Tower).
Freud’s early technique for the treatment of hysteria included the
induction of a hypnotic trance (as described by Bernheim) followed by
the use of imperative suggestion for the removal of symptoms. Never-
theless, despite his enthusiastic endorsement of Bernheim’s method,
Freud quickly became frustrated with the use of suggestion to remove
symptoms, complaining of the contrast between the “rosy coloring” of
the physician’s suggestions and the “cheerless truth” of the patient’s
suffering (Freud 1891/1962, p. 113). Freud modified Bernheim’s tech-
nique to include the use of hypnosis not only for therapy but also for
“investigation” of the illness. The most immediate influence on this
development in his practice came from a Viennese colleague, Josef
Breuer, who showed Freud a way by which he might combine clinical
work with his passion for a deeper understanding.
28 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Freud and Breuer: Studies on Hysteria

Josef Breuer (1842–1925) was a well-known Viennese family physician
with an excellent reputation as both a clinician and a researcher. Among
other things, he is known today for his description of the Hering-Breuer
reflexes governing respiration. Breuer was the leader of a group of
prominent Jewish physicians who worked together and helped each
other in anti-Semitic Vienna. The older man quickly became Freud’s
mentor, offering encouragement, friendship, and even financial sup-
port. Not only did Breuer send Freud patients for his fledgling practice,
but he also shared with Freud his ideas about the treatment of hysteria.
It was Breuer with whom Freud co-authored his first full-length
treatise on psychology, Studies on Hysteria, published in 1895. This book
consists of five case studies (one treated by Breuer and four treated by
Freud) and two theoretical chapters—one on the pathogenesis of hyste-
ria (written by Breuer) and one on psychotherapy (written by Freud).
The book describes how Breuer and Freud understood the psychopa-
thology of hysteria and how they used what they both referred to as
“the cathartic method” to treat patients suffering from this disorder. It
also contains several subplots embedded in the text that enliven the
story, including the story of how Freud and Breuer broke with each
other over their understanding of hysteria; the story of how Freud
moved from a trauma theory of hysteria to a theory based on the impact
of forbidden, unconscious wishes; and—most relevant here—the story
of how Freud gradually moved away from the use of hypnosis, a move
that led him to develop a new model of the mind. Studies on Hysteria
was not a wild success in medical circles, netting its authors about 425
gulden ($85.00) each. However, it launched Freud once and for all on
the path of writing about the psychological life of the mind that would
ultimately lead him to fill 37 volumes of his collected works (Jones
1953/1961; Makari 2008).

Breuer’s Cathartic Method: The Story of Anna O.

As early as 1883, Breuer had shared with Freud the story of his treatment
of a woman suffering from hysteria, made famous in the first case report
in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud 1893/1895/1962) as “Anna O.”
Anna O. (whose real name was Bertha Pappenheim) was “a young girl
of unusual education and gifts who had fallen ill while nursing her
father of whom she was devotedly fond” (Freud 1925/1962, p. 20).
When Breuer took over her case in 1882, her symptoms included paral-
yses of her limbs, paresthesias, disturbances of vision and speech, and
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 29

states of mental confusion. She had two alternating personalities—one

that was normal and the other that she called “naughty” (Breuer and
Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 24). The transition from one to the other was
marked by a phase of autohypnosis. Breuer observed that Anna O. could
be relieved of her symptoms if, during these self-induced trance states,
she were allowed to “express in words the affective phantasy by which
she was at the moment dominated” (Freud 1925/1962, p. 20). From this
observation, Breuer developed a treatment method in which Anna O.
was encouraged to tell stories about her symptoms under the influence
of hypnosis. He observed that her stories invariably led to a recounting
of her state of mind and her feelings at the time when her symptoms first
developed. Careful attention to the details of her stories demonstrated
that her symptoms represented symbolic expressions of experiences and
memories of which she was not aware in her “normal” state. When she
was brought in contact with the emotions connected to these “lost”
experiences through storytelling, “the procedure...succeeded, after long
and painful efforts, in relieving her...of all her symptoms” (Freud 1925/
1962, p. 20).
It is clear that Breuer’s claim, in Studies on Hysteria, to have cured
Anna O. of her symptoms was exaggerated. Historians have shown that
after her treatment ended, she spent at least a year in a sanatorium be-
fore going on to become a prominent social worker whose work with
wayward young women earned her commemoration on a German
postage stamp in 1954. Nevertheless, Anna O. is generally accepted as
the co-inventor with Breuer of a new treatment characterized by intro-
spective investigation, shared narrative, and the expression of feelings.
Anna O. called this new procedure “chimney sweeping”; speaking se-
riously, she named it “the talking cure” (Breuer and Freud 1893/1895,
p. 30). Breuer called it “the cathartic method” (Breuer and Freud 1893/
1895/1962, p. xxix; Freud 1925/1962, p. 22).
At first Freud was enthusiastic about the new treatment, which he
referred to as “Breuer’s method,” applying it to his own patients begin-
ning in 1889. Between 1889 and 1896, Freud hypnotized his patients us-
ing the cathartic method with the aim of uncovering dissociated
pathogenic ideas and tracing them back through a chain of associations
to the point of origin, which was inevitably a traumatic event. In this
early phase of his work, traumatic memories (and later, forbidden
wishes) were effaced through suggestion (in the manner of Bernheim)
or were discharged through words, affective expression, and/or correc-
tive association with the rest of conscious mental life (in the manner of
Breuer).
30 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Freud’s Abandonment of Hypnosis and

Discovery of the Dynamic Unconscious
We now arrive at a crucial episode in our history: the story of how Freud
made the transition from the use of Breuer’s cathartic method to a new
treatment method that led him to develop a new model of the mind.
The crucial step in this invention was Freud’s abandonment of the use
of hypnosis and his substitution of new ways to engage the patient in
treatment. Despite his initial enthusiasm for treatments based on hyp-
nosis, Freud gradually became frustrated with the technique, discour-
aged by the fact that many of his patients were not hypnotizable, or by
the fact that their cures often seemed short-lived. Casting about for a
treatment method that did not depend on hypnosis, Freud recalled a re-
mark made by Bernheim to the effect that events experienced by pa-
tients under hypnosis are only apparently forgotten and can be brought
to consciousness if the therapist insists that the patient can remember.
Freud concluded that this fact might also be true of forgotten ideas in
hysteria, and he began to conduct his therapeutic investigations in the
waking state. In a technique that he later called free association, Freud in-
vited his patients to let thoughts flow freely, with as little conscious con-
trol as possible. He also insisted that his patient report to him
everything that passed through the mind with as little censorship as
possible (Breuer and Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 56). Freud’s insistence
that the patient report to the analyst everything in his or her mind with
as little censorship as possible would later come to be known as the fun-
damental rule of psychoanalysis (Freud 1901/1962, p. 39). Fortified by
the principle of psychic determinism, Freud was confident that every
thought or feeling that came to the patient’s mind would be a link in a
determined chain of associations, leading back ultimately to the origi-
nal pathogenic idea or memory. In other words, while relatively free of
conscious censorship, the patient’s thoughts would not be guided by
chance at all, but would lead the investigation in the right direction. The
net effect of the modifications Freud made in Breuer’s method was that
his patients were now fully “awake” and as a result were more actively
engaged in the treatment process. His own role, by contrast, became
less intrusive and controlling.
With these changes, Freud had inadvertently discovered a treatment
method that afforded him a view of the patient’s mind at work that had
not been apparent before. When Freud encouraged his patients to be-
come active participants in the treatment investigation, he was rewarded
with his first glimpse of a world of psychological activity that lay behind
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 31

the patient’s symptoms, a world more vast than previously imagined.

His first observation was that despite his patients’ best attempts to ad-
here to the demands of the new treatment, they were not always able to
bring themselves to report all of their thoughts and feelings or even to
allow themselves to be fully aware of their own mental activity. The pa-
tients’ efforts at free association inevitably produced gaps and disconti-
nuities in the train of thought and incoherence in the story. Freud used
the word resistance to describe discontinuity in the flow of association.
His next observation was that he and his patients had to work hard to
overcome this resistance. He had to admonish his patients repeatedly to
say whatever came to mind, and they, in turn, had to struggle to cooper-
ate with his demand. Freud concluded that his patients’ conscious moti-
vation to adhere to the technique of free association was opposed by
another, less conscious motivation to conceal aspects of mental life, not
only from the doctor but also from the patient him- or herself. Finally,
Freud observed that all of the bits of mental life that his patients were re-
luctant to reveal turned out to be of a “distressing nature, calculated to
arouse the affects of shame and of self-reproach...they were all of a kind
that one would prefer not to have experienced, that one would rather
forget” (Breuer and Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 269; Makari 2008).
By combining all of these observations, Freud concluded that his pa-
tients wanted to keep certain ideas, feelings, memories, and wishes out
of consciousness because they needed to defend themselves from asso-
ciated feelings of shame and self-reproach. Freud used the word repres-
sion to refer to the defensive process of removing unacceptable thoughts
and feelings from consciousness. In other words, for the first time,
Freud was able to see a psychological battle going on in his patient’s
mind that had previously been obscured by the use of hypnosis.
It was around these observations of resistance to self-awareness,
and of the work needed to overcome it, that Freud organized his new
theory of hysteria. Whereas Breuer, Charcot, Bernheim, Janet (Charcot’s
student), and others understood that hysteria was the result of patho-
genic ideas becoming walled off from ordinary conscious mental life,
they all believed that these splits in consciousness were the result of
pathological brain processes, such as “hypnoid states” (Breuer), innate
weaknesses in the capacity for synthesis (Janet), or familial “mental de-
generation” (Charcot). Freud introduced the revolutionary idea that in
hysteria, thoughts and feelings are separated from consciousness not
because of diseased brain processes but rather because of the emotional
needs of the patient—or from “the motive of defense” (Breuer and
Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 285). In contrast to Charcot’s “traumatic hys-
32 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

teria” or Breuer’s “hypnoid hysteria,” Freud described what he called

“defense hysteria,” asserting that individuals with hysteria do not suf-
fer from brain disease, but are essentially normal people struggling
with thoughts and feelings that they find unacceptable (Breuer and
Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 285). In his view, hysteria is the result of a
battle over unacceptable thoughts, memories, and wishes that are
barred from consciousness but that continue to seek expression in the
form of symptoms. Initially, Freud saw what he called resistance as a
barrier to exploration of inner life. However, over time, he learned to be
as curious about the patient’s reasons for keeping secrets as he was
about the secrets themselves. In other words, Freud became increas-
ingly interested in observing resistance as the most important clue to ar-
eas of conflict in the patient’s emotional life. When his patients were
able to overcome their resistance and to accept these warded-off aspects
of psychological lives, their symptoms disappeared.

A “New Psychology” of the Unconscious:

Psychoanalysis
By 1896, Freud had given up use of hypnosis almost entirely as a
method for the treatment of hysteria and had devoted himself fully to
the practice of what he initially called “psychical analysis” but by the
end of the year had named psychoanalysis (Freud 1896b/1962, p. 151).
As his practice grew, Freud applied his new treatment method to many
new patients and even to himself. The years between 1895 and 1900
were exciting as Freud mined the possibilities afforded him by his novel
treatment method. However, although his concept of defense hysteria
was a revolution in thinking about the cause of hysteria, the greatest
revolution was yet to come. Not content with the clinician’s job of un-
derstanding and treating patients, Freud was a highly ambitious man
who sought to leave a lasting mark in the world. He was drawn to large
questions, the answers to which might shed light on the “nature of
man” (Jones 1953/1961, p. 175). Even while engaging in the treatment
of his growing caseload of patients, collaborating with Breuer to write
Studies on Hysteria, and working to extend his theory of defense hysteria
to include other illnesses, Freud was already beginning to explore how
the processes of defense and repression operate not just in psychopa-
thology but in psychological health as well.
In the years between the publication of Studies on Hysteria in 1895
and the turn of the century in 1900, Freud worked feverishly to expand
his theory of hysteria into a general theory of mind. As early as 1896, in
Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 33

a letter to a friend, Freud remarked that he was well on his way to in-
venting a “new psychology” that would apply not just to people suffer-
ing from neuroses but to everyone (Freud 1896a/1962, 1901/1962,
1933/1962). From the first, Freud’s new psychology, known now as psy-
choanalysis, was founded on his ideas about parts of the mind that in
everyone are unconscious. As we will see in Chapter 3, the concept of
the unconscious is at the core of all psychoanalytic models of the mind.

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the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 2. Translated
and edited by Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1962, pp 1–335
Ellenberger H: The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of
Dynamic Psychiatry. New York, Basic Books, 1970
Fancher RE: Pioneers of Psychology. New York, WW Norton, 1979
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pects of the institutionalization of the “new psychology,” in A Century of
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 CHAPTER 3

Evolution of the
Dynamic Unconscious

This chapter explores the concept of the unconscious in greater

depth. It explains what it means when we say that the psychoanalytic
unconscious is dynamic. It will review the history of the concept of the un-
conscious in Western philosophy and compare the concept of the psycho-
analytic unconscious to related concepts from neighboring disciplines. In
the face of overwhelming evidence, why do so many people deny the ex-
istence of the unconscious? Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes
the following: automatic thoughts, behaviorism, cognitive psychology, cogni-
tive unconscious, dynamic, dynamic unconscious, functionalism, introspec-
tionism, mind–body dualism, structuralism, and unconscious.
The unconscious is a core feature of every psychoanalytic model of the
mind. Although psychoanalytic models of the mind may vary, the idea that
feelings, thoughts, memories, wishes, fears, fantasies, and patterns of per-
sonal meaning outside of our awareness influence experience and behav-
ior is a core feature of all of them. The theory that symptoms, troublesome
personality traits, or problems in living represent efforts to solve uncon-
scious conflict is central to the psychodynamic understanding of human
suffering. The observation that shared investigation into unconscious men-
tal life can lead to relief from suffering is one of the cornerstones of psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy. Although ideas about unconscious mental life
have been modified continuously since their introduction more than a cen-
tury ago, the basic idea that unconscious factors influence mental life

35
36 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

remains the most important shared feature of the psychoanalytic model of

the mind. The goal of this chapter is to explain more about the psychoana-
lytic view of the unconscious and to explore how this view differs from
other approaches.

The Unconscious
in the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
As we have seen in Chapter 2, Freud invented the psychoanalytic model
of the mind when he applied the principle of psychic determinism to data
derived from waking therapy, arriving at the concept of a dynamic uncon-
scious. At the moment when he abandoned the use of hypnosis in favor of
a new treatment strategy based on the use of free association, Freud was
able to observe forces at work in the mind that no one had ever seen
before. He observed that his patients struggled with conflict between
revealing what was on their minds and concealing it from themselves and
from the doctor. Freud’s exploration of this conflict led to the first descrip-
tion of how the mind is divided by inner strife. From the concept of
defense hysteria, it was a short step to a view that all minds are divided by
a struggle between conscious acceptable thoughts/feelings and uncon-
scious unacceptable thoughts/feelings. In contrast to other theoreticians
working at the time, Freud saw the mind as split not because of brain dis-
ease or degeneration but because of motivations, or dynamic forces. For
this reason, in the psychoanalytic model of the mind, we often refer to the
unconscious as the dynamic unconscious to distinguish it from other kinds
of nonconscious aspects of mind. Let’s explain what we mean.

What Does the Word Dynamic Mean in the Context

of the Unconscious?
The word dynamic, familiar to readers as part of the word psychodynamic, is
an old word in the language of psychoanalysis, borrowed from the lan-
guage of physics, where it describes a state of continuous interplay of mul-
tiple forces. In psychoanalysis, because we are talking about the mind,
dynamic refers to psychological forces—or, more precisely, to motivational
forces. In other words, as described by psychoanalysts, the unconscious
consists of a world of hidden motivational forces—including wishes, needs,
hopes, and fears—that influence all aspects of mental life and behavior.
In the psychoanalytic model of the mind, unconscious mental life is
dynamic in two senses. First, it is dynamic in the sense that it makes its
influence felt in everything we do, not just in some states of mind some
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 37

of the time. Second, the unconscious is dynamic in the sense that its con-
tents are actively denied access to consciousness by a psychological
force called repression. Repression, as we already know, is the term
Freud used to describe a purposeful—or, again, motivated—uncon-
scious process in which thoughts or feelings judged to be irrational, im-
moral, distressing, or otherwise unacceptable are excluded from
awareness. In other words, thoughts and feelings become part of the
dynamic unconscious when they are kept out of awareness by other dy-
namic mental forces, which oppose our efforts to know our minds.

What Can We Learn From Ordinary Introspection?

What can ordinary introspection tell us about our mental life outside of
consciousness? The fact is, all human beings, even those with no knowl-
edge of the details of any psychological theory, operate with some notion
of an unconscious. Everyday experiences point to the idea that the mind is
at work outside of awareness. For example, we all have the experience of
suddenly remembering something we had forgotten, which must have
been stored somewhere in the mind in the meantime. Most of us have had
the experience of waking up in the morning to discover that we have found
the answer to a lingering problem we were not aware of working on while
asleep. It is easy to demonstrate that responses to subliminal stimulation
occur daily. For example, we find images in our dreams that we have bor-
rowed from waking experience, but which we did not register consciously
during the day. In addition, we know that our minds can process informa-
tion in ways that make it possible for us to do all kinds of things—from
reading a book to hitting a golf ball to driving a car—even though we are
not able to describe exactly what it is that we know or what we are doing.
Ordinary experience prepares us, at least somewhat, for the idea that the
mind is at work outside of awareness.
The psychoanalytic model of the mind, with its particular concept of
the unconscious, includes the idea that the mind can store information,
work on intellectual problems, and register stimuli outside of conscious-
ness. It also includes the idea that lots of information processing occurs
outside of awareness. However, the real significance of the psychoanalytic
concept of the unconscious lies not in its storage function, its capacity for
subliminal perception, or its capacity for information processing. The idea
specific to the psychoanalytic view of the mind is that thoughts and feel-
ings outside of awareness are not just stored in some unseen compartment
in the mind waiting to be noticed or called upon but are alive, powerful,
and ever-present, influencing all of our experiences and life choices, both
large and small. Also, in contrast to mental activity kept from awareness
38 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

in the interest of speed and efficiency (as in information processing that

allows for judging distance while walking upstairs or for decoding letters
and words while reading), the contents of the dynamic unconscious are
kept from awareness because we do not want to know about them.
Even the fact that we do not want to know all of our own thoughts is
not entirely beyond our capacity for ordinary introspection. We all know
that from time to time we react to situations in ways that do not make
sense, or do things for reasons that we cannot explain. We are certainly
able to spot these moments in other people, often with the conviction
that we know the “real” motives behind what others do. We fear, often
correctly, that others can see things about us that we do not see about
ourselves (Vazire and Mehl 2008). Even the implication of self-decep-
tion, embedded in the concept of repression, is not entirely beyond the
reach of self-reflection. From time to time we have all had to admit, of-
ten in the face of vehement protest to the contrary, that we have not
been honest with ourselves about our reasons for a response or an action,
or that we did something for reasons of which we are not particularly
proud—a bit of self-interest, a competitive or vengeful impulse, or a se-
cret longing? Again, such instances of self-deception are easy to spot in
other people. As it turns out, the capacity to understand how and why
people hide their real feelings and motives from themselves is part of the
psychological equipment of every normal child. Research shows that
children as young as 6 or 7 years old are aware that people often go to
elaborate lengths to obscure their true motives and/or feelings from
themselves, so as to avoid feelings of shame and guilt (Chandler et al.
1978). In other words, there is a lot that introspection can tell us about the
unconscious, even the dynamic unconscious.

Early Investigations of the Conscious Mind

Although many people imagine that Freud was the first person to write
about unconscious mental life, or even that he somehow “discovered”
it, he was not the first to argue for the possibility of mental life outside
of awareness.1 However, it is true that when Freud began explicating
his “new psychology,” he was at odds with the rest of the new field of

1Fritz Perls, the founder of Gestalt Psychology in America, referred to Freud as

the “Livingstone of the unconscious,” thus comparing the father of psycho-

analysis with the British explorer who “discovered” the source of the Nile
(Perls 1947/1969, p. 86). See also Charles Van Doren (1992), A History of Knowl-
edge: Past, Present, and Future.
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 39

academic/experimental psychology, which took as its aim “an exact

description of consciousness.”2

The Theories of Wilhelm Wundt and His Followers:

Introspectionism and Functionalism
The founder of this new field was the physician Wilhelm Wundt (1832–
1902). In contrast to Freud, Wundt was the son of a Lutheran pastor in
southwest Germany and came from a long line of scholars and university
presidents. In 1857, a year after Freud’s birth, Wundt took a position as a
research assistant in the newly established Berlin Physiological Institute
under the direction of Freud’s hero, Hermann von Helmholtz. In 1879, just
as Freud was hitting his stride as a neuropathologist in Ernst Brucke’s In-
stitute in Vienna, Wundt took possession of an abandoned storage closet at
the University of Leipzig to set up his first laboratory at what he called the
“Institute of Psychology.” Wundt’s research program was based on an in-
vestigative technique called introspection, which involved controlled atten-
tion to minute bits of conscious experience such as sound, light, and color.
Indeed, in later years, the psychology with which Wundt is associated
came to be called introspectionism. Wundt’s mission was to elucidate the ba-
sic elements of conscious psychic life (which he identified as sensation and
feeling), and to discover how these basic elements interact to form con-
scious experience. Therefore, when we compare psychoanalysis with the
official discipline of university-based psychology, we find considerable
overlap in their origins in the Helmholtzian tradition. However, we also
find that Freud was at odds with this growing branch of “the establish-
ment” in his interest in unconscious mental states.
Wundt’s student Edward Bradford Titchener (1867–1927), the Eng-
lish-born psychologist who founded the psychology laboratories at
Cornell University in 1892, continued the tradition of equating mind
with consciousness. Titchener developed a branch of psychology
known as structuralism, which carried on Wundt’s project of delineating
the structures of the conscious mind. William James (1842–1910), the
physician-philosopher-turned-psychologist who offered the first uni-
versity-based instruction on physiological psychology at Harvard Uni-
versity in 1875, was the chief proponent of a school of psychology
known as functionalism. In contrast to the introspectionism and/or
structuralism of Wundt and Titchener, James’ functionalism argued that

2 Seehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wilhelm-wundt/ (accessed November

25, 2013).
40 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

the goal of psychology was to elucidate the function, or purpose, of

mental life. Wundt and Titchener’s structuralism and James’ function-
alism vied for supremacy in American psychology for three decades
between 1890 and 1920, together dominating the field of psychology
until the rise of behaviorism (about which we will have more to say in a
moment). In spite of their rivalry, these men had in common the view
that mental life can be equated with consciousness. James, like most
psychologists of his day, understood that mental events are connected
to brain processes; however, in contrast to Freud, he argued that
“consciousness...‘corresponds’ to the entire activity of the brain...at
the moment” (James 1890, p. 177; see also Edwards and Jacobs 2003,
p. 25; Fancher 1979; Hunt 1993; Reiber 1980; Robinson 1995).

The Legacy of René Descartes: Mind as Consciousness

Wundt, Titchener, James, and many others in the early years of aca-
demic psychology took for granted the idea that mind and conscious-
ness can be equated. In one way or another, all were intellectual
descendants of the French mathematician and philosopher René Des-
cartes (1596–1650). A giant in Western intellectual history, Descartes
was a major force in the movement from medieval science and philoso-
phy to the modern era and has been heralded as the father of modern
psychology. In 1639, he began work on his most famous work, Medita-
tions,3 which consists of a series of reflections concerning the possibility
of knowledge (scientia). Rejecting the authority of Church-sanctioned
scholasticism (the integration of the works of Aristotle and the teach-
ings of the church offered by Thomas Aquinas), Descartes began his re-
flections from a position of radical doubt, wondering what, if anything,
one could be certain of. As Descartes famously argued, the only thing
that cannot be doubted is doubt itself—or more to the point, one’s own
experience of doubt. This is the essence of his famous sentence cogito,
ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”). We would be going far afield were
we to fully examine how Descartes used this first “truth” to arrive at
certainty as to the existence of a nondeceiving God, and then, at cer-
tainty with regard to the existence of an external world that can be in-
vestigated using the methods of mathematics. What is important for
our purpose is to understand how, in the process of developing his epis-

3 The full title of Descartes’ book was Meditations on the First Philosophy: In
Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Mind and Body Are Demon-
strated.
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 41

temology, Descartes arrived at both a novel foundation for seeking

knowledge and a view of the mind itself.4
Some historians of psychology venerate Descartes as an important
ancestor of the field of cognitive psychology (more about this in a moment),
reminding us that he posited a thinking mind (referred to often as his cogito)
at the center of knowledge (Gardner 1985). However, there are other fea-
tures of Descartes’ view of the mind that are less admired today. The first
of these—and perhaps the best known to students of mind science—is what
has been called Cartesian mind–body dualism, or the view that the mind and
the body are two entirely and essentially different things. For Descartes, the
essential feature of physical reality (including the body) is that it occupies
space or is extended (res extensa). This means that everything in physical
reality is susceptible to mathematical measurement and description. In
contrast to physical reality, the essence of mind is to think (res cogitans). As
mind does not occupy space, it is not susceptible to mathematical descrip-
tion. In Descartes’ view, the mind is equivalent to the soul and belongs not
to the domain of science but to that of religion. Although Descartes did con-
sider the question of how mind and body interact, his basic mind–body
dualism influenced all subsequent discourse on the nature of mind.
A second feature of Descartes’ view of the mind was his equation of
mental life with thinking. Descartes considered feelings and emotions to be
generated by the body, and he considered ideas and thoughts to be gener-
ated by the mind, which could therefore be understood as distinct from
emotion. As we explore the psychoanalytic model of the mind in greater
depth, we will consider the shortcomings of this view (see also Damasio
1984).
A final feature of Descartes’ view of the mind, and the one most rele-
vant to the subject of the unconscious, was his view that the mind and con-
sciousness are the same thing. Because Descartes’ epistemology depends
on the idea that thinking is the only thing of which we can be certain, it also
requires a denial of the possibility that thinking can take place without
one’s being aware of it (Rosenzweig 1985, p. 29). Descartes’ view that the
mind is transparent to itself—that we have “clear and direct,” privileged,
automatic, and accurate access to our minds (a viewpoint referred to by
contemporary philosophers of mind as “the concept of first-person knowl-
edge” [Gopnik 1993])—was part of the legacy of Cartesian psychology in-
herited by many of Descartes’ followers, including Wundt and other early
university-based students of psychology (Fancher 1979; Hunt 1993).

4 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes/ (accessed October 12, 2012).

42 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

The Unconscious From Descartes to Freud

Outside of university-based academic psychology, however, there were
many who felt that important mental events do occur outside of aware-
ness (Edwards and Jacobs 2003, p. 16). Indeed, it would be easy to fill a
book full of pithy aphorisms dating all the way back to ancient times
about the mind’s hidden aspects. For example, Plato’s (428–348 B.C.E.)
view that knowledge is the rediscovery of forgotten ideas points to the
possibility of unconscious mental life. The Christian philosopher
Augustine (354–430 C.E.), influenced by Plato, wrote that his own mind
was hard to grasp in that much of it was beyond awareness. St. Thomas
Aquinas, the father of medieval scholasticism, proposed a theory of
mind that emphasized mind–body unity and the importance of uncon-
scious factors (Whyte 1962, p. 80). Although Descartes profoundly
influenced the founders of formal academic psychology, there are other
traditions in modern European thought that did not assume that mental
life is the same as consciousness (Ellenberger 1970; Klein 1997; Tallis
2002; Talvitie 2009; Whyte 1962).

Enlightenment Philosophy and the Unconscious

For example, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), the German poly-
math whose works included treatises on law, philosophy, mathematics
(calculus and binary systems), logic, mechanics, and physics, has often
been cited as the first post-Cartesian European scientist to argue for the
idea of unconscious mental activity (Whyte 1962, p. 99). In his 1704 book
New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Leibniz asserted that there
are many small perceptions (petites perceptions) below the threshold of what
he called “apperception” that have a profound impact on conscious expe-
rience. In contrast to Descartes, who had confidence in his “clear and
direct” experience, Leibniz asserted that these “clear concepts are like
islands which arise above the ocean of obscure ones” (Whyte 1962, p. 99).5
Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), a German philosopher, psy-
chologist, and educator, expanded the idea of unconscious mental pro-
cesses into a complete theory of mind. Building on Leibniz’s idea of a
threshold of perception, Herbart added a dynamic component, conceiv-
ing of ideas as forces. Herbart borrowed the term dynamic from Leibniz,
who first used it (in opposition to the word static) in discussions of me-
chanics (Ellenberger 1970, p. 289). Indeed, Herbart defined psychology
as “the mechanics of the mind” (Jahoda 2009). He argued that all mental
phenomena result from the interaction of multiple perceptions, repre-
sentations, and ideas that compete with each other at the threshold of
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 43

consciousness. In Herbart’s view, stronger ideas push weaker ideas

below this threshold in a process that he called verdrängt—the same
word Freud used for his concept of repression. In Herbart’s view,
“repressed” ideas strive to reemerge, reinforcing themselves through
association with other ideas (Ellenberger 1970, p. 312; Edwards and
Jacobs 2003; Whyte 1962, pp. 143–144).
Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), a professor of physics, philoso-
phy, and medicine at the University of Leipzig, introduced an experimental
approach to the study of the unconscious. Fechner is probably best known
today for his metaphor (borrowed by Freud, and perhaps itself borrowed
from Leibniz’s “islands in the ocean”) comparing the mind to an iceberg
floating on the sea (Jones 1953/1961, p. 374). Less well known to us but
more important historically was the fact that in 1850, Fechner began a se-
ries of experiments testing the relationship between the intensities of stim-
ulation and perception (Ellenberger 1970, p. 217) that are considered by
many to be the starting point of experimental psychology and were influ-
ential on Wilhelm Wundt (Ellenberger 1970, p. 217).6

The German Romantic Movement and the Unconscious

In contrast to the philosophers of the Enlightenment, with their “cult of
reason,” philosophers of the German romantic movement were fasci-
nated by the irrational and the individual. Prominent in the first third
of the nineteenth century, German romantic philosophers took a special
interest in phenomena such as creativity, genius, dreams, and mental ill-
ness, all of which were seen as having sources in the unconscious. How-
ever, in contrast to the Leibnizian “cognitivists,” romantic philosophers
were interested in unconscious motivation. They were all influenced by
one the first romantic philosophers, the Swiss-born Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau (1712–1778), who left an account of his life in the form of Confes-
sions (1782), arguably the first autobiography based on the author’s

5Leibniz’s views had widespread influence on many fields and many writers.
Scottish judge and philosopher Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1781), influ-
enced by Leibniz, was the first person who used the English word unconscious
(in 1751) to refer to a particular mental function—again, the function of percep-
tion. Twenty-five years later, the German philosopher and physician Ernst
Platner (1744–1818) was the first person to use the German word Unbewusstsein
(unconsciousness)—the same word used by Freud—in 1776 to describe ideas
outside of consciousness. Thus, by the end off the eighteenth century, the con-
cept and the word unconscious had developed a strong foothold in discussion
about the mind. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/ (accessed Sep-
tember 24, 2012).
44 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

personal feelings. Rousseau’s reflections on his actions and motives,

including those “not so clear to me as I have for a long time imagined,”
rival the Meditations of Descartes in their influence on subsequent Euro-
pean thought. Romantic poets including Goethe (1749–1832), Schiller
(1759–1851), and Coleridge (1772–1834) argued that the unconscious
was the storehouse of hidden treasures of the mind and the source of all
creativity (Ellenberger 1970, pp. 200–202; Whyte 1962, pp. 126–129).
A particular brand of German romanticism that had a profound
influence on all aspects of German culture, including the development
of psychology, was the Philosophy of Nature (Naturphilosophie), founded
by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) at the University
of Munich. In Schelling’s philosophy, the visible world emerged from a
common spiritual principle, the “world soul” (Weltseele), which over
successive generations produced matter, nature, and consciousness
(Ellenberger 1970, pp. 203–205). The unconscious was rooted in the

6 While Fechner was hard at work on his experiments on Leipzig, another

group of thinkers interested in psychology—including the psychology of
unconscious mental processes—was forming across the sea in England. The
founder of this group was Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856), a Scottish-born
professor of medicine, law, and metaphysics at the Royal Institute who was
one of the first British philosophers to take note of the important developments
in German philosophy and science in the mid-nineteenth century. Hamilton
began to include German ideas in his own lectures at the University of Edin-
burgh. In his view of the mind, Hamilton argued that “the sphere of our con-
scious modifications [by which he meant mental activities] is only a small circle
in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, of which we are only
conscious through its effects” (Hamilton 1860, p. 242).
Hamilton’s most important students in the world of psychology were
other British physicians, including Thomas Laycock (1812–1876), a British-
born, German-educated physiologist at the University of London who first
posited “the reflex action of the brain,” by which he meant “an unconsciously
acting principle of organization” (Whyte 1962, p. 162), and William Benjamin
Carpenter (1813–1885), an English physician and naturalist who in 1853 coined
the term unconscious cerebration, which soon became widely used in the Eng-
lish-speaking world (Jones 1953/1961, p. 378). Carpenter’s Principles of Mental
Physiology (1874) was devoted to a discussion of the evidence for this uncon-
scious cerebration gleaned from its downstream effects on consciousness and
behavior (Whyte 1962, p.155). For Laycock, Carpenter, and the other medically
oriented students of Hamilton, it mattered little whether the concept of uncon-
scious cerebration was formulated in terms of metaphysics or of brain physiol-
ogy. Their goal was to understand the patient as part of a body-mind unit
(Whyte 1962, p. 162). In contrast to Descartes, their assumption was that brain
and mind are not different at all but are made of exactly the same stuff (Whyte
1962).
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 45

invisible life of the universe, forming the link between man and nature.
Although this philosophy sounds odd and mystical to our modern ears,
it was highly influential among European philosophers and writers of
the time.7
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), born in Poland but educated in
Germany, worked largely outside of the German university. His work The
World as Will and Representation was first published in 1819 but did not
become widely read until the second half of the nineteenth century, when
Schopenhauer became fashionable as part of a neo-romantic revival in
Europe. Although Schopenhauer’s philosophy is impossible to classify,
his ideas are important to our story because of his emphasis on the con-
cept of “will to live” (Wille zum Leben), a blind, unconscious force driving
the entire universe, including the mind of man. In Schopenhauer’s view,
man in a self-deceiving, irrational creature motivated by internal instincts
serving the larger universal will (Ellenberger 1970, p. 208).
The work of Schopenhauer profoundly influenced Friedrich Niet-
zsche (1844–1900), another giant in Western philosophy. Endowed with
a brooding and stormy temperament, the young Nietzsche quickly
became disillusioned with religion, finding inspiration instead in the
works of Schopenhauer and the music of Richard Wagner. Preoccupied
with man’s capacity for self-deception, Nietzsche tried to demonstrate
that every emotion, attitude, opinion, behavior, and apparent virtue is
rooted in an unconscious lie (Ellenberger 1970, p. 273). In Nietzsche’s
view, the unconscious is the essential part of every individual and con-
sists of a turbulent cauldron of thoughts, emotions, and instincts, in-
cluding needs for pleasure and struggle, sexual and herd instincts,
instincts for knowledge and truth, and ultimately the one basic instinct,
the “will to power” (Ellenberger 1970, p. 274). Nietzsche’s work de-
scribes the vicissitudes of these instincts, their inhibitions, and their
multiple disguises. The most shocking of Nietzsche’s ideas, presented
in his book On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), was his view that profes-
sions of Christian morality are nothing more than a disguised form of

7 Gustav Theodor Fechner reenters our story at this point, for although we have

noted his role in the founding of experimental psychology, Fechner was also a
midlife convert to the school of Naturphilosophie (Ellenberger 1970, p. 216). In
our previous discussion of Fechner, we neglected to mention that the tens of
thousands of experiments published in his multivolume Psychophysics were
largely an effort to provide proof for his highly speculative universal principles
of nature, which included the principle of tending to stability (or constancy),
the pleasure/unpleasure principle (especially as it related to the principle of
constancy), the principle of repetition, and the concept of psychic energy.
46 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

inhibited, unconscious “resentment.” Unsparing even of himself,

Nietzsche argued, in a dark refrain of Rousseau, that every religion and
every philosophy (presumably including his own) is no more than a
disguised confession.
Late-nineteenth-century speculation about unconscious mental life
culminated in the work of Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842–
1906), whose book The Philosophy of the Unconscious was first published
in 1869. In this massive 1,200-page treatise, von Hartmann discussed
the subject of the unconscious in relation to 26 topics, including neural
physiology, movements, reflexes, will, instinct, idea, curative processes,
energy, sexual love, feeling, morality, language, history, and ultimate
principles, to mention a few (Whyte 1962, p. 164). Claiming to present
the unconscious as a systematic philosophy, von Hartmann’s work is
largely unread and forgotten today, dismissed by most historians as
“neither good philosophy nor good science” (Whyte 1962, p.165). How-
ever, The Philosophy of the Unconscious was wildly popular in its day,
printed nine times between 1869 and 1881 and translated into both
French and English.
The popularity of von Hartmann’s book belies any notion that the
idea of unconscious mental life was not considered before Freud.
Although Freud acknowledged only “the great Fechner” as having
been important to him (Freud 1900/1962, p. 536; Freud 1925/1962,
p. 59), there is plenty of evidence that Freud was familiar with all of the
major psychological treatises of his day. For example, although Freud
never cited Herbart, we know that he was familiar with Herbart’s work
through its central place in Gustav Adolf Lindner’s (1828–1887) text-
book of psychology, which he read in his gymnasium days (Ellenberger
1970, p. 536; Jones 1953/1961, p. 372). Most interesting, perhaps, are
Freud’s attitudes toward Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, whose ideas are
strikingly similar to his own. Freud denied having been influenced by
either man, claiming that he avoided the works of both Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche until later life “with the deliberate object of not being
hampered in working out the impressions received in psychoanalysis
by any anticipatory ideas” (Freud 1914/1962, pp. 15–16; Freud 1925/
1962, pp. 59–60). Clearly, Freud had a special interest in protecting the
originality of his theory of repression, which he saw as the cornerstone
of psychoanalysis, arguing that it “quite certainly came to me indepen-
dently of any sources” (Freud 1914/1962, p. 15). As Ellenberger points
out, regardless of whether Freud had read Schopenhauer or Nietzsche
while he was at work on his own ideas, he was certainly part of a tradi-
tion that Ellenberger (following Klages) likes to call “the great unmask-
ing trend” in the literature and philosophy of mid- to late-nineteenth-
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 47

century Europe, which consisted of a “systematic search for deception

and self-deception and the uncovering of truth” (Ellenberger 1970,
p. 537). The unmasking trend included not only Schopenhauer and Ni-
etzsche but also Karl Marx and writers such as Henrik Ibsen, whose
plays exposing life’s lies were cited by Freud with great admiration (see
also Ricoeur [1977] on “the hermeneutics of suspicion”).

Unconscious Mental Processes and

Contemporary Academic Psychology
We have learned how Freud proposed the concept of a dynamic uncon-
scious. We have also learned that the concept of the unconscious was
not new in Western philosophy. However, it was at odds with prevail-
ing ideas in Wundt’s new academic psychology. Much has changed in
academic psychology since its founding in 1879, so that psychoanalysts
are no longer alone among psychologists in their efforts to chart uncon-
scious mental life. However, this change did not happen right away.
Although various forms of Wundt’s introspectionism dominated
American psychology for the three decades between 1890 and 1920, the
1930s and 1940s saw the rise of behaviorism as the dominant paradigm
in the field of academic psychology.

The Emergence of Behaviorism

Behaviorism is a branch of psychology that seeks to explain human (and
animal) activity as a chain of stimulus-response connections linked
together by reinforcement. The founding members of this new psychol-
ogy included Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), who invented the concept of
conditioned reflexes; Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1947), who invented
the concept of reinforcement; and James B. Watson (1878–1958), who
coined the term behaviorism itself. Strict behaviorists argued that the
data of introspection are not only unreliable but unnecessary for the
study of human activity, which can best be explained as a series of con-
ditioned reflexes. In pursuit of scientific objectivity, behaviorism argued
that it should restrict itself exclusively to the study of overt actions,
turning away not only from the idea of the unconscious but also from
the idea of the mind itself. In this view, the mind is an illusion created
by brain activity, a meaningless by-product of the nervous system with
no causal role in human behavior. While behaviorism argued that
human behavior is based on “nonconscious” activity, it rejected the idea
of unconscious mind. Behaviorism created the image of psychology as
the study of rats scurrying through mazes and across electric grids in
48 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

pursuit of rewards or of cheerful children (from B.F. Skinner’s [1948]

best-selling novel Walden Two) behaviorally engineered to create a per-
fect society. Despite the heroic efforts of Dollard and Miller (1950) in the
1950s to link social learning theory to psychoanalysis, for the most part
these fields remained far apart (Fancher 1979; Hunt 1993; Watson 1924).

The Rise of Cognitive Psychology

Around the middle of the twentieth century, however, the field of aca-
demic psychology began to move away from behaviorism toward the
study of cognition (Gardner 1985, p. 6). This new psychology is referred
to as cognitive psychology, cognitive science, or cognitive neuroscience. Each
name includes the word cognitive, which refers to the question of how
human beings know things. Cognitive science is a multidisciplinary
approach to psychology that grew out of the fields of computer science,
artificial intelligence, psycholinguistics, ethology, anthropology, neuro-
science, and philosophy of mind.
Beginning in the 1940s, theorists from these disciplines became
increasingly dissatisfied with explanations of behavior as sequences of
conditioned reflexes. They argued that many human capacities—such
as language, problem solving, planning, remembering, creating, and
imagining (as well as some complex animal behaviors such as nest
building and mating)—cannot be explained on the basis of reflex
chains, however elaborate. These theorists began to posit the existence
of stable, autonomous cognitive structures, or representations, operating
within the organism (and analogous to the software programs in a com-
puter) that account for its behavior (or output). Depending on the field
of inquiry, these representational structures included symbols, rules,
images, programs, schema, mental maps, expectations, plans, and
goals, to name a few. Linguists posited the existence of deep structures of
language that matured without having been learned; computer scien-
tists programmed machines capable of computation based on algo-
rithms; personality theorists described stable and patterned traits, some
of which appeared to be innate; and mathematicians established a new
discipline, information theory, all replacing chains of conditioned
reflexes. In other words, cognitive scientists argued that it is impossible
to understand the human organism without speaking about a mind
(Gardner 1985; Hunt 1993).
In the second half of the twentieth century, cognitive science had
become so popular that it became common to speak of “the cognitive
revolution” (Baars 1986; Neisser 1967). As we noted in Chapter 1, cog-
nitive psychology has created a parallel track for the study of uncon-
scious mental processes, exploring capacities related to information
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 49

processing. The cognitive unconscious (Kihlstrom 1987, 1995) includes

implicit knowledge, tacit knowledge, procedural knowledge, implicit learning,
implicit memory, nondeclarative memory, nonconscious construals, the adap-
tive unconscious, subliminal perception, and pre-attentive processing, to
mention only a few important concepts (Bargh and Barndollar 1996; Ed-
wards and Jacobs 2003; Gazzaniga 1967, 1992; Greenwald 1992; Hassin
et al. 2005; Kahneman 2011; Kihlstrom 1987, 1995; Schacter et al. 2011;
Stein 1997; Weinberger and Weiss 1997; Westen 1998; Wilson 2002; Zell-
ner 2012a). In the world of cognitive-behavioral therapy, which is based
somewhat on cognitive psychology, unconscious mental processes are
referred to as automatic thoughts (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Beck 1976;
Edwards and Jacobs 2003; Hassin et al. 2009; Weinberger and Weiss
1997). The term nonconscious processing can be confusing because it has
been used to refer both to aspects of the cognitive unconscious and to
aspects of the neural underpinnings of all mental functioning. Indeed,
the neural underpinnings of nonconscious processing have been
explored in areas such as split-brain experiments (Gazzaniga 1967,
1992), pathways by which the brain processes anxiety (LeDoux 1996),
and the phenomenon of “blindsight” (Weiskrantz 1997; Weiskrantz et
al. 1974), to mention only a few.
There is some overlap between these aspects of the cognitive uncon-
scious and Freud’s descriptive unconscious (see Chapter 5, “The Mind’s
Topography”). There is also much overlap between the cognitive
unconscious and ideas posited 300 years ago by Leibniz and his follow-
ers. However, the types of unconscious mental functioning of interest to
cognitive scientists are different from those of most interest to psycho-
analysts. The cognitive unconscious mostly includes phenomena
related to information processing outside of awareness. This uncon-
scious processing is thought to be necessary because it affords greater
efficiency and speed. The writer Malcolm Gladwell (2005), in his book
Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, intrigued readers of pop-
ular science with descriptions of phenomena related to unconscious
information processing. Gladwell’s Blink pays special attention to our
capacity to process complex information from many sources quickly—
or “in the blink of an eye”—at a subliminal level. Most of this uncon-
scious information processing cannot become conscious, even with
close attention.
However, the dynamic unconscious of interest to psychoanalysts in-
cludes unconscious motivations and/or feelings that are kept from
awareness not for greater efficiency but because they have been judged
to be unacceptable. More recently, we have seen increasing overlap
between the psychoanalytic dynamic unconscious and the cognitive
50 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

unconscious in the emergence of new ideas from cognitive psychology,

including unconscious affect, nonconscious goal pursuit, and unconscious
motivation (Bargh and Barndollar 1996). Conflict mediation is made pos-
sible by unconscious scanning operations, or metacognition—terms by
which cognitive psychologists describe the capacity to monitor one’s
own mind so that compromises can be forged among priorities. As we
will see, the psychoanalytic model of the mind has much to say about
how the mind forges compromise in the midst of conflict (Bargh and
Barndollar 1996; Metcalfe and Shimamura 1994).
When approaching the literature about unconscious mental process-
ing, it is important to remember that efforts to correlate aspects of the
psychoanalytic unconscious with concepts derived from cognitive psy-
chology are complicated by the “discourse politics” that have prevailed
in the world of mind science, because war between points of view has
ensured that no common language has been adopted by the scientific
community to describe any aspect of mind (Edwards and Jacobs 2003).
Important comparisons between the cognitive unconscious and the dy-
namic unconscious, as well as much empirical evidence for both, can be
found in the work of Erdelyi (1995), Hassin et al. (2005), Wakefield
(1992), Weinberger and Weiss (1997), Westen (1998), and many others.
Evidence of the neuronal pathways that might be involved is summa-
rized in the work of Panksepp (1998), Solms and Turnbull (2002), and
Zellner (2012b). To make matters even more interesting, we find con-
cepts pertaining to unconscious mental functioning emerging from
fields such as in economics (Ariely 2008; Kahneman 2011), evolutionary
psychology (Smith 2004), political science (Covington 2002; Jameson
1982), and cultural theory (Saul 1997), among others.

Controversy Surrounding the Unconscious:

Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception
It is a paradox that although the concept of unconscious mental func-
tioning is accepted by most people as a matter of common sense, its
existence is highly controversial. Despite the fact that the concept of
mental life outside of awareness has a long history and is recognized by
most contemporary psychologists and philosophers of mind, it is still
widespread, even common, to hear educated, otherwise knowledge-
able people assert that they “do not believe in the unconscious.” How
can we understand this widespread skepticism with regard to the con-
cept of mental life outside of awareness?
Evolution of the Dynamic Unconscious 51

The fact is, human beings are powerfully attached to the idea that
we have immediate, privileged, and complete access to our own psy-
chological life—or, in other words, to the idea that through the act of
introspection, we can know our own minds. When Descartes argued
that he had “clear and direct” access to his own inner life, this confi-
dence formed the basis of his philosophy. Although we know that Des-
cartes had many critics, his claim to what philosophers of mind call
“first-person knowledge” has powerful resonance with what we would
like to believe—that we do indeed know what we are thinking (Gopnik
1993). Some historians have argued that Western philosophy in partic-
ular has a long history of valorizing man’s capacity for self-awareness,
beginning in the Renaissance, when words for “awareness” and “self-
consciousness” first began to enter philosophical discourse, and peak-
ing during the European Enlightenment with its “cult of reason”
(Whyte 1962). In this view, Descartes was only the strongest voice in a
philosophical tradition that venerated conscious awareness, rationality,
and self-determination.
Some have also argued that our conviction that we have “first-per-
son knowledge” is not just a cultural value but also an innate, or “hard-
wired,” feature of the human species (Carruthers and Smith 1996; Weg-
ner 2002, 2005). Indeed, the annals of neuroscience and psychology are
full of observations of our human tendency to claim understanding of
our behavior in ways that are clearly at odds with the facts. For exam-
ple, subjects who do strange things under the influence of posthypnotic
suggestion—such as crawling under the table to “look for a chicken”—
are compelled to offer all kinds of post hoc explanations for their behav-
ior, all the while unaware that they are acting out the command of the
hypnotist. In the split-brain experiments referred to earlier (see section
“The Rise of Cognitive Psychology”), patients who have undergone a
surgical procedure to disconnect the hemispheres of the brain from each
other (a rarely used treatment for intractable epilepsy) respond with
complex behavior to stimuli presented to the nonconscious/nonverbal
half of the brain even though they have no conscious awareness of those
stimuli. When asked what they are doing and why (e.g., laughing in re-
sponse to a cartoon presented to the nonconscious/nonverbal half of
the brain), subjects will invariably give an explanation that bears no
relationship to the stimulus presented (Gazzaniga 1967, 1992).8 It is
astonishing how rarely these patients express puzzlement or astonish-

8 Seealso New York Times, November 6, 2007, on “rationalization” (Tierney

2007).
52 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ment at their own behavior. It seems that it is almost impossible for hu-
man beings to admit, or probably more accurately even to recognize,
that when it comes to understanding our own minds, we often simply
do not know what we are thinking.
When Freud was in an especially devilish mood, he enjoyed provok-
ing his readers by reflecting on just how disturbing his idea about the
unconscious might be. Never modest, he declared his ideas to be as
shocking as those of Copernicus and Darwin, asserting that along with
those two great pioneers of Western science, he shared the honor of hav-
ing caused one of the three great “narcissistic injuries” to mankind. It
was Copernicus who, in a “cosmological blow” to our self-love, first
proposed that the Earth is not the center of the universe. It was Darwin
who, in a “biological blow,” first suggested that man is not the special
creation of a divine being. In the most wounding blow of all, Freud as-
serted that the concept of the unconscious demands that we accept that
we do not even know what we are thinking (Freud 1917/1962, pp. 140–
141). Despite our best efforts to heed the ancient maxim “Know thy-
self,” it seems that we are fated to be unable—indeed, unwilling—to
fully know even our own selves.

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 CHAPTER 4

Core Dimensions of
Psychoanalytic Models
of the Mind

This chapter defines five core dimensions emphasized in all psy-

choanalytic models of the mind: topography, motivation, structure/
process, development, and psychopathology/treatment. It also pro-
vides a quick tour of four leading psychoanalytic models of mental
functioning: the Topographic Model, the Structural Model, Object Rela-
tions Theory, and Self Psychology. The reader is introduced to the basic
outline of the book, which is organized around a chart showing how
each psychoanalytic model conceptualizes each of the core dimensions
of mental functioning and psychopathology/treatment. The goal of the
book is to work toward a unified psychoanalytic model of the mind. Vo-
cabulary introduced in this chapter includes the following: adaptational
perspective, developmental lines, developmental point of view, epigenesis,
genetic perspective, hedonic principle, motivational/dynamic point of view,
nature and nurture, pleasure/unpleasure principle, reality principle, struc-
tural point of view, and topographic point of view.
In Chapter 2, we described how Freud arrived at the concept of the
dynamic unconscious, the foundation for the psychoanalytic model of
the mind. In Chapter 3, we discussed the concept of the unconscious in
greater depth, exploring how we experience aspects of unconscious
mental functioning in moments of ordinary introspection, how philos-

57
58 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ophers and psychologist throughout history thought about the uncon-

scious, how contemporary psychologists think about it, and finally
why, in the face of so much evidence, many continue to deny the possi-
bility of unconscious mental functioning. The idea that hidden motiva-
tional forces—feelings, thoughts, memories, wishes, fears, fantasies,
and patterns of personal meaning that are kept out of awareness be-
cause they are unacceptable—continuously influence our experience
and behavior is a basic feature of the psychoanalytic model of the mind
that, as we will see, is central to the topographic point of view. At the
same time, there are four other basic features of all psychoanalytic at-
tempts to model the mind, bringing the total to five. We begin this chap-
ter by delineating these five key domains of the mind.

Key Domains of Mental Functioning

All psychoanalytic models of the mind will have much to say about the
domains of topography, motivation, structure/process, development,
and psychopathology/treatment. The first four of these are fundamen-
tal dimensions that any model of the mind must take into account. The
last is a dual category that each model must formulate in depth in order
to be useful to patients. On some occasions, these basic aspects of men-
tal life are referred to as points of view (Rapaport and Gill 1959). By pro-
viding a strategy for reframing observations about mental life in terms
of general principles, these five key domains allow the clinician to turn
information about the patient into knowledge about the patient’s mind
and, ultimately, about his or her suffering. Delineating the core dimen-
sions of the mind makes the psychoanalytic model of the mind easier to
understand, easier to integrate, and easier to use in the task of helping
patients.

Topography
The notion that the mind, whether normal or pathological, is always di-
vided into conscious and unconscious parts is often called the topo-
graphic point of view. Descriptions of the mind’s topography—or what is
conscious and what is unconscious—are part of every psychoanalytic
model of the mind. Because the topographic point of view is so funda-
mental, we list it first among the basic features of the psychoanalytic
model of the mind. As we will see, the earliest psychoanalytic model of
the mind was itself called the Topographic Model (Freud 1900/1962).
This early model relied heavily on the topographic point of view of
mental functioning but included the other four points of view as well.
Core Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind 59

Motivation
Motivation is the second feature shared by all psychoanalytic models of
the mind. Motivation is another word for the impetus for mental and/or
physical activity. It may take the form of needs, fears, wishes, purposes,
and intentions. In the psychoanalytic model of the mind, the search to
understand motivation is called the dynamic or motivational point of view.
Put simply, the motivational point of view addresses the question “Why
do people do what they do?” or “What makes people tick?” The moti-
vational point of view is almost as important as the topographic point
of view in the evolution of the psychoanalytic model of the mind. As we
have seen, inherent in the concept of dynamic unconscious is the idea
that behavior results from an interaction of two motivational forces—a
wish to express unconscious mental content and a wish to keep this
content hidden. In other words, mental content can be unconscious be-
cause we do not want to know about it, or “from the motive of defense”
(Breuer and Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 285).
There is ongoing debate within psychoanalysis about the basic nature
of human motivation. We will explore this debate further in each succes-
sive chapter of the book. Nevertheless, despite differences, there are sev-
eral aspects of the theory of motivation about which most psychoanalysts
agree. First, in contrast to the case in behaviorism or social learning the-
ory, in the psychoanalytic model, experience and action are understood
as being motivated from within the mind. In other words, behavior is
not simply a collection of responses to stimuli from the external world.
The mind is viewed as capable of spontaneous activity and is not merely
reactive to the environment. Indeed, as we shall see, when Freud aban-
doned his seduction hypothesis in favor of a view of motivation as arising
from within the mind of the child, psychoanalysis became increasingly
committed to the study of internal mental life (see Chapter 7, “The Oedi-
pus Complex”). In any case, whether motivation is seen as originating
from biological imperatives or from the internalization of cultural man-
dates, in the psychoanalytic model, motivation always has a mental com-
ponent that plays a causal role in determining behavior.
Second, in addition to seeing motivation as originating in the mind,
the psychoanalytic model sees motivation as guided by the pleasure/
unpleasure principle. This principle asserts that behavior and mental
activity always seek to maximize feelings of pleasure and to escape
from feelings of unpleasure or pain. In general psychology, this princi-
ple is known as the hedonic principle (Schacter et al. 2011, p. 326). The his-
tory of psychoanalysis can be told as a long argument about the nature
of the basic pleasures that guide human mental life. For example, Freud
60 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

emphasized the pleasure that accompanies the satisfaction of sexual

and aggressive drives, and he saw all other pleasures as transforma-
tions of these more basic pleasures (see Chapter 9, “The Id and the Su-
perego,” for an exploration of drive theory). Other theorists have
pointed to the pleasures inherent in attachment, dependency, and feel-
ings of safety, arguing that these satisfactions cannot be reduced to
those already mentioned (see Chapter 11, “Object Relations Theory”).
Still other theorists have emphasized the pleasures that accompany au-
tonomy, mastery, and self-actualization (see Chapter 12, “Self Psychol-
ogy”). Despite this ongoing debate, most psychodynamic psychiatrists
agree that the pleasure/unpleasure principle provides the basic com-
pass that guides human behavior. The pleasure principle is not unique
to the psychoanalytic model; it forms the basis of many kinds of psy-
chology. However, by keeping this principle in awareness, clinicians
can understand even the most painful behavior as serving a hidden
pleasure, or as defending against even worse pain.
Third, the psychoanalytic model of the mind takes into account
the fact that motivation develops in an interaction between the mind
and the external environment. In other words, the mind operates ac-
cording to the reality principle in addition to the pleasure principle. The
search within the psychoanalytic model to understand those aspects of
individual human behavior and mental life that represent efforts to
cope with the reality of the external world is called the adaptational per-
spective. Because the psychoanalytic model of the mind understands
motivation as both originating within the organism and adapted to the
environment, it is able to consider both internal and external factors in
the development of human desire. Much debate within psychoanalysis
focuses on the relative emphasis placed on internal versus external con-
tributors to motivation. For example, Freud conceptualized basic moti-
vations as derivatives of biologically rooted drives that unfold in a
largely predetermined maturational sequence. Other theorists have
emphasized wishes, fears, and desires that are socially and culturally
determined. Most contemporary psychodynamic psychiatrists see mo-
tivation as resulting from a complex interplay of nature and nurture,
wherein inborn preferences are shaped by interactions with the envi-
ronment, especially by the social matrix.
Finally, the psychoanalytic model of the mind includes the idea
that the mind is always working to reconcile conflicting motivations.
It is impossible for any given behavior or mental experience to satisfy
both the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Indeed, there are
even many competing imperatives for various kinds of pleasure, not to
mention many competing imperatives created by fears and moral con-
Core Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind 61

straints. As a result, the psychoanalytic model of the mind includes the

concept of conflict (also called psychic conflict). In this view, the mind
seeks to reconcile its conflicting wishes, fears, and moral constraints
with the demands imposed by reality through compromise formation. Ev-
ery conscious experience and/or behavior represents a compromise
among competing demands. In psychodynamic psychotherapy, the cli-
nician seeks to explore the wide variety of compromises made by peo-
ple as they seek to reconcile these competing demands. Psychological
health can be assessed by evaluating compromises in terms of adapta-
tion to reality and yield of pleasure. Psychodynamic psychotherapy
seeks to expand the range of compromises available to the patient.

Structure and/or Process

Structure is the third feature of the psychoanalytic model of the mind.
A mental structure can be defined as a relatively stable mental configu-
ration with a slow rate of change (Rapaport and Gill 1959). The struc-
tural point of view arises from the observation that the motivational
forces controlling mental life, along with the processes by which they
are modulated, are not fleeting or erratic, but instead represent endur-
ing patterns that are stable over time. Although, again, there is consid-
erable argument about the best description of psychic structure, all
psychoanalytic models of the mind draw on this important concept,
with different schools of thought defined in part by what each sees as
the basic structure of the mind. The term structure has been used to refer
to mental events and processes at varying levels of abstraction, ranging
from fantasies, memories, ideals, moral standards, character traits, and
representations of self and other to more abstract and/or complex con-
cepts such as mental agency or modes of function such as defense.
Freud’s well-known tripartite model of the mind, which divides mental
life into id, ego, and superego, is only one example of how the broader
concept of psychic structure has been used to create a model of the mind
(Freud 1923/1962).
An important aspect of the concept of structure is its built-in histor-
ical component. For example, whereas the concept of wish can be con-
ceived of as existing only in the present, the concept of structure allows
us to talk more easily about the history and development of the inner
world. By talking about development, we can talk about the possibility
of change. If we can understand how stable configurations in the mind
are formed, how they are threatened, and what makes them change, we
can build a theory that encompasses both psychopathology and psy-
chological change. This needed theory of change provides a rational ba-
sis for all approaches to psychotherapy.
62 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Another important aspect of the concept of structure is that every

structure has certain capacities, or processes. It is often hard to separate
these processes—for example, primary process, secondary process, de-
fense, reality testing, and so forth—from the structure itself. Indeed, some-
times we see a process that is itself defined as a structure. For this reason,
we include process with structure and discuss both concepts together.

Development
The developmental point of view is the fourth important feature of the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind. It seeks to understand behavior and
mental life as part of a meaningful progression from infancy to adult-
hood. It assumes that an adult can be understood as a psychological be-
ing only by exploring his or her history. The developmental point of
view seeks to understand the origins of the patient’s wishes, fears, ide-
als, values, attitudes, and adaptive strategies. It also explores how all of
these change over time. The developmental aspects of the psychoana-
lytic model of the mind borrow extensively from developmental psy-
chology, given that these overlapping fields share an interest in the
mental life of the child (Gilmore and Meersand 2013).
Unique to psychoanalysis, the genetic perspective takes as its focus the
patient’s subjective story of his or her past as told to the therapist in
treatment. The word genetic here refers not to the molecular basis of he-
redity but rather to the idea of genesis, or “the story of origins” (Hart-
mann and Kris 1945). By contrast, the developmental point of view is
not unique to psychoanalysis. The developmental dimension seeks to
understand the history of psychological life from the point of view of an
objective observer, often through use of empirical methodology.
Initially Freud’s developmental theory focused on describing
wishes, which are organized into drives and which emerge according to
an inborn, biologically determined plan consisting of oral, anal, phallic,
and oedipal/genital phases (see Chapter 9, “The Id and the Superego”).
However, most contemporary psychodynamic psychiatrists prefer the
notion of developmental lines along which one can trace the history of any
number of aspects of mental life, including wishes, fears, morality, the
self, the quality of object relatedness, and all dimensions of ego func-
tioning, to mention only a few (A. Freud 1981).
In addition, for the most part, psychodynamic psychiatrists adopt
an epigenetic perspective of development. The concept of epigenesis
views the formation of structure as the result of successive transactions
between the individual and the environment. The outcome of each
phase depends on the outcomes of all previous phases, as each new
Core Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind 63

phase integrates previous phases and each has a new level of organiza-
tion. The concept of epigenesis allows for a tension between the fact that
wishes, fears, and conflicts from earlier years are preserved in the mind
and that they are also, to some extent, transformed and superseded. The
concept of epigenesis also allows for regression, by which certain phe-
nomena represent a return to earlier states of development. Indeed,
many aspects of psychopathology can be understood as representing a
regression to strategies that were adaptive at earlier stages of develop-
ment but now appear inappropriate.
The developmental point of view adds depth to the adaptational
perspective by asserting that what may be been adaptive for a child at
one phase of development may be maladaptive in the same person as
an older child or as an adult. Finally, the developmental point of view
allows us to understand how the mind of a child may be preserved in
the mind of an adult, so that we are forever influenced by our childhood
wishes, fears, and ways of thinking.

Theory of Psychopathology and Treatment

(Therapeutic Action)
Every psychoanalytic model of the mind includes both a theory of psy-
chopathology and an associated theory of therapeutic action. The the-
ory of psychopathology attempts to account for how and why the mind
of the patient causes suffering. The theory of treatment attempts to ex-
plain how psychodynamic psychotherapy might help the patient find
relief. Freud’s famous statements that psychodynamic psychotherapy
seeks to “make conscious everything that is pathogenically uncon-
scious” (Freud 1901/1962, p. 238; Freud 1916–1917/1962, p. 282) and
that “where id was, there ego shall be” (Freud 1923/1962, p. 56; Freud
1933/1962, p. 80) are examples of how he conceptualized psychopa-
thology and treatment within the model of the mind he was using at the
time. Although theories of psychopathology and treatment have grown
vastly more complex than they were in Freud’s day, all clinicians must
use these theories in their work in order for their aims and strategies to
be coherent.
For a detailed review of the psychoanalytic approach to psychopa-
thology, readers are referred to Psychodynamic Psychiatry in Clinical Prac-
tice, 4th Edition (Gabbard 2005), and Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual
(Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual Task Force 2006). There are also
several good textbooks about psychodynamic psychotherapy (Caban-
iss et al. 2011; Caligor et al. 2007; Dewald 1964; Gabbard 2004; Summers
and Barber 2009).
64 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Four Foundational Psychoanalytic

Models of the Mind
The four psychoanalytic models of the mind examined in this book are
the Topographic Model, the Structural Model, Object Relations Theory,
and Self Psychology. These four models have emerged over the past 120
years of psychoanalytic thought and represent major ways of thinking
about mental functioning. Soon after Freud elaborated his first model of
the mind, he became dissatisfied with it; he subjected both this early
model and all subsequent models to continuous revision. In doing so,
he established a tradition in which models of the mind are questioned
and changed in response to new data (Arlow and Brenner 1964). Evolv-
ing clinical experience demands modification of each existing model,
leading to the development of new models. As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, the result is that the contemporary psychoanalytic model of
the mind is a composite of several models, each of which attempts to
address the insufficiencies of the others. As we will see, each of the four
psychoanalytic models of the mind has much to say about the five core
dimensions of mental functioning. Each of these models looks at the
core dimensions slightly differently, and each emphasizes different
aspects. Throughout this book, these four models will be explained in
relation to each other, with the ultimate goal of integrating them into a
single contemporary model of the mind.

Topographic Model
The Topographic Model was Freud’s first model of the mind, intro-
duced in 1900. It posited a basic structure of conscious, preconscious, and
unconscious domains separated by a barrier of defense, or repression.
Although this model contained rudimentary ideas about motivation,
structure, development, and psychopathology/treatment, its main
focus was the topography of the mind. The basic features of the Topo-
graphic Model, as well as its lasting impact on theories of psychopathol-
ogy and treatment, will be explored in Part II (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) of
this book.

Structural Model
Increasingly dissatisfied with his Topographic Model, Freud intro-
duced his Structural Model in 1923. In this model, the mind is divided
into three parts, ego, id, and superego, each differing in structure and
motivational aims and each having unconscious features. As Freud and
his followers became increasingly interested in the functioning of the
Core Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind 65

ego, the Structural Model came to be known as Ego Psychology. The

basic features of the Structural Model, in addition to the work of well-
known ego psychology theorists such as Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann,
and Erik Erikson, will be explored in Part III (Chapters 8, 9, and 10) of
this book.

Object Relations Theory

Object Relations Theory was developed in the 1940s, after the death of
Freud. In contrast to previous models, Object Relations Theory views the
mind as organized by internal object relations—self and object represen-
tations linked by an interaction between self and object. Object Relations
Theory seeks to understand basic motivations such as attachment and
separation, positing that infants are object seeking from the beginning of
life. It explores how object relations develop over time under the influ-
ence of various pressures and how different configurations in these
object relations can lead to psychopathology and can suggest associated
treatment strategies. The basic features of Object Relations Theory, in
addition to the work of well-known object relations theorists such as
Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion, D.W. Winnicott, Margaret Mahler, John
Bowlby, and Otto Kernberg, will be explored in Part IV (Chapter 11) of
this book.

Self Psychology
Introduced by Heinz Kohut in the 1960s, Self Psychology looks at men-
tal functioning as representing the functioning of a basic structure
called the self. Kohut explored basic inborn narcissistic needs in all of us,
positing that we all seek recognition and encouragement from caregiv-
ers, whom he described as selfobjects. Self Psychology proposes that
during childhood, in interactions with empathic caregivers, each of us
developed a self that was more or less robust in terms of agency, energy,
and ability to form ideals. It also describes a treatment strategy based
on an understanding of the selfobject function of the therapist. The
basic features of Self Psychology, in addition to the work of well-known
self psychology theorists such as Kohut and his followers, will be
explored in Part IV (Chapter 12) of this book.

Core Dimensions Across the Four Models

In Part II (“The Topographic Model”) of this book, readers will be intro-
duced to a chart that will help them with the task of understanding the
psychoanalytic models of the mind. In this chart, the core dimensions
66 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

emphasized by all psychoanalytic models of mental functioning—

Topography, Motivation, Structure/Process, Development, and Psy-
chopathology/Treatment—are plotted for each of the four foundational
models of the mind examined in this book—the Topographic Model,
the Structural Model, Object Relations Theory, and Self Psychology.
Table 4–1 shows the form that the master chart will take.
As each model of the mind is introduced, the chart will become
filled in. In the process of watching the chart grow, the reader will learn
how concepts that are familiar but may be difficult to grasp or to inte-
grate—for example, libido or separation-individuation—can be under-
stood as an approach to motivation, structure/process, development,
and/or psychopathology/treatment. In addition, aspects of the four
component models of the mind can be understood in relation to one
other, pointing the way to useful integration. The ultimate goal is for the
reader to arrive at a usable composite psychoanalytic model of the
mind. How to do this will be discussed in Chapter 13, “Toward an Inte-
grated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind.”

References
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Breuer J, Freud S: Studies on hysteria (1893/1895), in The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 2. Translated
and edited by Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1962, pp 1–335
Cabaniss D, Cherry S, Douglas CJ, et al: Psychodynamic Psychotherapy: A Clin-
ical Manual. Oxford, UK, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011
Caligor E, Kernberg OF, Yeomans FE: Handbook for Dynamic Psychotherapy
for Higher Level Personality Pathology, Washington, DC, American Psy-
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Dewald P: Psychotherapy: A Dynamic Approach. New York, Basic Books, 1964
Freud A: The concept of developmental lines–their diagnostic significance. Psy-
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edited by Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1962, pp 1–626
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of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 6. Translated
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Freud S: Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis (1916–1917), in The Standard
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463
 Core Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind
TABLE 4–1. Core Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Models of the Mind

Structure/
Topography Motivation Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Topographic Model
Addressed in Part II
(Chapters 5, 6, and 7)

Structural Model
Addressed in Part III
(Chapters 8, 9, and 10)

Object Relations Theory

Addressed in Part IV
(Chapter 11)

Self Psychology
Addressed in Part IV
(Chapter 12)

67
68 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Freud S: The ego and the id (1923), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 19. Translated and edited by
Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1962, pp 1–66
Freud S: New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis (1933), in The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 22.
Translated and edited by Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1962, pp 1–182
Gabbard GO: Long-Term Psychodynamic Psychotherapy: A Basic Text. Wash-
ington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2004
Gabbard GO: Psychodynamic Psychiatry in Clinical Practice, 4th Edition. Wash-
ington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005
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chodynamic Primer. Arlington, VA, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013
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Study Child 1:11–30, 1945
Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual Task Force: Psychodynamic Diagnostic
Manual. Silver Spring, MD, Alliance of Psychoanalytic Organizations, 2006
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J Psychoanal 40:153–162, 1959
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Summers RF, Barber JP: Psychodynamic Psychotherapy: A Guide to Evidence-
Based Practice. New York, Guilford, 2009
 PART II

The Topographic
Model
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 CHAPTER 5

The Mind’s Topography

This chapter describes the Topographic Model of the mind. In this

model, the mind consists of conscious, preconscious, and unconscious
domains separated by a barrier of repression. All psychodynamic ap-
proaches to psychopathology and treatment draw upon aspects of the
Topographic Model, with the aim of bringing pathogenic unconscious
wishes, fears, and feelings into awareness. Vocabulary introduced in this
chapter includes the following: censor, condensation, conscious, descriptive
unconscious, displacement, insight, interpretation, neurosis, overdetermina-
tion, parapraxis, preconscious, primary process, psychic reality, reconstruction,
repetition compulsion, resistance, return of the repressed, secondary process,
symbolization, transference, and wish.
The Topographic Model was Freud’s first fully developed psycho-
analytic model of the normal mind. As discussed earlier, after introduc-
ing the concept of the dynamic unconscious in his work on hysteria,
Freud immediately began work on a model of the mind that would ap-
ply to everyone, not just those suffering from psychopathology. Intro-
duced more than 100 years ago, the Topographic Model of the mind
seems primitive or antiquated to us when judged by the standards of
contemporary psychology. Nevertheless, it continues to exert a pro-
found influence on the contemporary psychoanalytic model of mind
and treatment.
Freud first introduced this Topographic Model of the mind in Chap-
ter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1900/1962), but he did not

71
72 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

formally designate it as reflecting a topographic point of view until 15

years later (Freud 1915/1962). The word topographic is derived from the
Greek word topo, meaning “place.” The choice of this word represents
Freud’s conception of the mind as consisting of structures, each of
which occupies a particular psychical locality and functions in a partic-
ular spatial relation to the others (Freud 1900/1962, p. 536). Having
abandoned his earlier efforts to establish a brain-based psychology,
Freud made it clear that he did not intend for these “places” in the mind
to refer to any existing brain anatomy. The idea of a psychic locality was
intended to serve as a metaphor for an imaginary mapping of the men-
tal terrain in which the unconscious is conceived of as lying “beneath”
the domain of consciousness as a kind of psychic underworld.
As we can see by its name and by our brief introductory description,
the Topographic Model of the mind looks at the mind largely from the
topographic point of view, emphasizing which mental contents are
allowed access to consciousness. However, the Topographic Model also
includes a description of the ongoing motivational (or dynamic) interac-
tions among the three regions of the mind, which work both together
and in conflict, each influencing the others. In addition, the Topo-
graphic Model also includes a description of the structural properties of
each part of the mind, including the characteristics and modes of func-
tioning of each. Finally, the Topographic Model of the mind is tied to a
developmental point of view that accounts for how the psychological life
of the child lives on in the adult.

Mental Topography: The Mind’s Three Layers

In the Topographic Model, the mind is divided into three regions, con-
ceptualized on a vertical axis from the surface of the mind to its depth,
differentiated from one another by their relationship to consciousness.
These three regions of the mind are the conscious mind, the preconscious
mind, and the unconscious mind. Consciousness lies on the surface of
the mind and includes mental experience that is within awareness at
any given moment. Just beneath consciousness is the preconscious,
which includes mental contents that are in the descriptive unconscious,
meaning that although they are not within awareness at any given mo-
ment, they can easily be brought to awareness if attention is applied to
them. Beneath the preconscious lies the unconscious, buried in the
deepest region of the mind. In contrast to the preconscious, which is
only descriptively unconscious, the unconscious is dynamically uncon-
scious, meaning that its contents cannot be brought to awareness by a
The Mind’s Topography 73

simple act of attention but are actively denied access to consciousness

by the force of repression.

Motivation
The most significant feature of the Topographic Model of the mind is
the dynamic interaction among the unconscious, preconscious, and
conscious regions of the mind. Indeed, as we explored in Part I of this
book, the Topographic Model of the mind grew directly out of the con-
cept of the dynamic unconscious, which is made up of wishes. A wish is
defined by Merriam-Webster as an act of desire.1 In the psychoanalytic
model of the mind, a wish is a striving to experience some kind of sat-
isfaction. According to the Topographic Model, the most important
interaction in the mind is the ongoing struggle between the precon-
scious and the unconscious, which are separated by a censor with the
authority to decide which wishes are socially or morally acceptable.
During this early period, Freud became increasingly convinced that
wishes of a sexual nature are the most important wishes in the mind. He
also believed that sexual wishes are the most unacceptable. In Chapter
9, when we explore the Structural Model of the mind and the concept of
the id, we will see how Freud organized wishes into libidinal and
aggressive drives, developing drive theory to explain how these differ-
ent types of motivations worked.
As we discussed in our description of the dynamic unconscious, in
this model, the unconscious is dynamic in two senses. First, it is
dynamic in that unconscious wishes seek to express themselves all of
the time, affecting all that we experience and do. Second, it is dynamic
in that unconscious wishes are repressed, or held outside of awareness,
because we do not want to know about them, having judged them to be
unacceptable. An example of unacceptable content might be a young
woman’s wish to have the love, sexual attention, and admiration of
everyone, and/or her wish to do away with all rivals. The censor may
judge these wishes to be unacceptable in terms of social norms. Such a
judgment may lead this young woman to repress these unacceptable
wishes or to banish them from consciousness. However, repressed
wishes are not destroyed; instead, they are preserved in the uncon-
scious and continue to exert an active effect on all of mental life and

1 See
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wish (accessed January 9,
2012).
74 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

behavior. In other words, this young woman may have repressed her
unacceptable wishes, but these wishes are still active in that she feels
extremely anxious to the point of panic whenever the unacceptable
wishes are stirred up. Furthermore, she avoids all efforts to make her-
self more attractive, such as dressing up or getting her hair and nails
done. Despite being decidedly dowdy, she is preoccupied with how
other women express their femininity. In the sections below, we will
learn more about how a therapist, by bringing her patient’s unaccept-
able wishes into awareness, can help relieve this young woman of suf-
fering.
In the Topographic Model, there is little dynamic interaction be-
tween consciousness and the preconscious. Indeed, as we mentioned
earlier, the contents of the preconscious are not within awareness at the
moment but can easily be brought to consciousness if attention is paid
to them. For example, the preconscious might include the answers to
questions such as the following: “How many windows are in your bed-
room?” or, more relevant here, “Where is your local nail salon or beauty
parlor?” If the young woman mentioned above attends to these ques-
tions, she can access the information to answer them correctly, by turn-
ing attention to what had been preconscious. However, she does not
know the answer to the question of why she is so anxious when she
thinks about having a manicure. The thoughts, feelings, and/or wishes
associated with her anxiety are unconscious, or repressed.

Structure/Process
In the Topographic Model of the mind, the unconscious, preconscious,
and conscious regions of the mind each have a characteristic structure,
and each operates in a characteristic way. As we have seen, the uncon-
scious consists exclusively of unacceptable wishes that have been sepa-
rated from the rest of the mind by repression. In addition, according to
the Topographic Model, the unconscious operates according to what
has been called primary process, in which wishes strive for immediate
expression or satisfaction through whatever means possible, obeying
the pleasure principle without regard for consequences. As a result, the
unconscious is incapable of social judgment or moral concern. Freud
believed at this point that primary process also accounts for the peculiar
form that thoughts take in the unconscious, which is unperturbed by
logical contradictions and operates without a sense of time. Primary
process is also responsible for the fact that unconscious ideas are often
represented by highly personal and idiosyncratic concrete symbols
The Mind’s Topography 75

rather than words (symbolization). Visual symbolism is especially pro-

nounced in dreams, which reflect the predominance of the primary pro-
cess. The specific organizing mechanisms of primary process include
condensation (wherein a single idea is capable of representing many re-
lated ideas, linked by private, idiosyncratic associations) and displace-
ment (wherein an idea is capable of representing another idea, again
linked by personal, often symbolic association). An example of unac-
ceptable wishes represented in primary process form might be a dream
image recounted by our same young woman (dreamer) in which, as she
is getting a manicure, “the bottle of nail polish is suddenly filled with
blood.” Through exploration of this young woman’s associations, the
nail polish and the manicure appear to represent both a wish to be “the
most glamorous of all women” and a wish to “polish off” all rivals in a
bloody attack (see Chapter 6, “The World of Dreams,” for a more in-
depth discussion of dreaming and dream theory). As we can see here,
primary process is responsible for the phenomenon of overdetermina-
tion, often seen in dreams and symptoms, in which a single idea or sym-
bol may represent many ideas.
The preconscious is the seat of reason. In other words, the precon-
scious operates according to secondary process, which obeys the reality
principle. It includes the capacity to judge mental contents and censor
those judged to be unacceptable according to conventional mores. It
includes the capacities for assessment of external reality, delayed grati-
fication, and planned action for the purpose of solving problems. Pre-
conscious thoughts, organized by the secondary process, are logical,
goal directed, and language based. They rely on the stable, conven-
tional, or culturally shared meaning of words, as opposed to the highly
personal and idiosyncratic symbolic language of primary process.
Freud theorized that primary process was the original, or earliest
mode of mental functioning, with secondary process developing only
after the child learns through experience that wishing alone does not
bring satisfaction and that more advanced forms of thought and action
are necessary for gratification. Indeed, the word primary here refers to
what comes first in the development of the mind. However, contempo-
rary psychodynamic theorists no longer adhere to this view, arguing
instead that both kinds of mental organization develop simultaneously
in the mind and that primary process should not be confused with
immature cognition. Contemporary theorists also understand that
there are probably multiple ways of encoding experience, which are
best studied by cognitive psychologists (Bucci 1997).
The conscious mind is the same as the preconscious mind in terms
of structure. Consciousness also functions according to secondary pro-
76 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

cess, using the logical processes with which we are all familiar. Indeed,
most of the time we are aware only of secondary process, and we are
used to conscious, purposeful thought. However, under conditions in
which censorship is relaxed, or when mental life is especially domi-
nated by unconscious wishes, feelings, and thoughts (as in dreams,
daydreams, slips of the tongue, the play of children, art, poetry, neurotic
symptoms, or any highly emotional state), it becomes possible to
observe the penetration of primary process into conscious mental life.
For example, we see this in the dream recounted above by the young
woman with extreme anxiety who avoids going to a nail salon. When
awake, this young woman had no realization of her unacceptable
wishes but was aware only of her own anxiety at the thought of doing
anything to improve her appearance, including getting a manicure,
going shopping, or fixing her hair.

Development
Finally, the Topographic Model of the mind is attached to a view of
development. We have seen how the unconscious consists of unaccept-
able wishes. We have seen how Freud came to believe that the most im-
portant of these wishes were sexual. He also came to understand that
many of them date from infancy and childhood. Again, we will explore
what is called infantile sexuality more thoroughly in Chapter 7 (“The
Oedipus Complex”) and Chapter 9 (“The Id and the Superego”). In any
case, as the child grows older, his or her childhood wishes become
increasingly unacceptable in terms of conventional morality and the
surrounding society, and these wishes are repressed. Indeed, the self-
centered and competitive wishes of our young woman are appropriate
for a very little girl but not for a young adult. However, despite repres-
sion, this young woman’s childhood wishes have not gone away but
continue to be active in her mind.
At the same time as the censoring capacities of the child develop,
other mental processes develop as well (see Chapter 7, “The Oedipus
Complex,” and Chapter 8, “A New Configuration and a New Concept:
The Ego”). However, contemporary psychodynamic practitioners know
that everyone possesses an unconscious mind, ruled in part by primary
process, which continues to be active even in adulthood. In other words,
the Topographic Model describes a mind that is divided, from the earli-
est days of life, forever and permanently into two domains of psycholog-
ical life—one layered on top of the other—that are separated by a censor.
The upper layer of the mind constitutes a reality oriented, rational, and
The Mind’s Topography 77

morally constrained domain of reason, responsive to the constraints of

society. The lower layer is in part a pleasure-seeking, illogical, and
amoral domain of childhood wishes, subject to highly idiosyncratic
forms of symbolic representation. The upper layer partially obscures the
lower layer but is not able to control it completely. Indeed, the two do-
mains of the psyche coexist in dynamic relationship with one other, each
making its own unique contribution to psychological life.2

What Can the Topographic Model

Help Us to Understand?
Psychic Reality and Subjective Experience
Although the Topographic Model of the mind is flawed in ways (see
Chapter 8, “A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego”), it is
useful in understanding many aspects of human mental life and behav-
ior, both normal and pathological. According to this model, all experi-
ence is the result of the continuous interaction of unconscious and
preconscious/conscious regions of the mind, as our experience of inner
wishes and fears interacts with our experience of external social reality.
Indeed, Freud described the unconscious as a psychic reality with impor-
tance equal to—if not greater than—external reality in terms of influ-
ence on our experience (Freud 1916, p. 444). The Topographic Model of
the mind helps us to understand the idiosyncratic, personal, and often
not-so-rational private world of personal meaning that constitutes each

2 Inthe early days of the Topographic Model of the mind, Freud was uncertain
about what was included in the unconscious. He talked about repressed mem-
ories (reminiscences), unacceptable thoughts/feelings, and wishes (Breuer and
Freud 1893/1895/1962; Freud 1900/1962). Over time, he came to see that
repressed wishes are forged in childhood and often involve an element of sex-
uality. The oedipus complex, one of the most famous scenarios imagined by
Freud, which many readers may have already detected in the clinical material
mentioned above, involves Freud’s ideas about the oedipus complex. Indeed,
the oedipus complex is so well known that we will devote the whole of Chap-
ter 7 to exploring this idea, both how it developed alongside the early Topo-
graphic Model of the mind and how it is used by psychodynamic clinicians
today. In later chapters of this book, we will also see how elements other than
wishfulness are included in unconscious mental functioning. We will explore
these elements, examining what contemporary psychodynamic practitioners
think about how the mind functions, with particular attention to what we now
think might be included in the unconscious.
78 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

individual’s ongoing subjective experience. As each of us develops, in-

ner experience interacts with the experience of external reality, and un-
conscious interacts with conscious, in a matrix of subjectivity, as past
and present desires, feelings, fears, hopes, expectations, prejudices, and
attitudes shape every new experience, even as they are in turn being
shaped by new experience. Some aspects of subjective experience are
universal, in that we are all human beings who have many things in
common. Other aspects of subjective experience are highly idiosyn-
cratic, as each of us develops in a unique way, under unique circum-
stances.

Transference
In the formation of subjective experience, unconscious wishes, hopes,
and fears evade the censor by assuming many forms of disguise, so that
every aspect of mental life represents a mixture of unconscious wish
and disguise. In describing how this mixture of wish and disguise
comes about, Freud proposed the concept of transference, first intro-
duced as part of the Topographic Model. In any mental state, an uncon-
scious wish may transfer, or displace, some of its intensity to an
unobjectionable preconscious thought with which it might have some
symbolic or associative connection (Freud 1900/1962). Returning again
to the young woman described earlier, we find an example of this phe-
nomenon in her intense interest in helping her best friend “look great”
whenever she goes to a party. In this instance, the young woman’s
interest in “looking glamorous” is displaced onto her investment in her
friend’s appearance, which is more acceptable to her than interest in her
own. This transference of intensity is the mechanism behind the well-
known clinical phenomenon in which a patient transfers strong feelings
from a person of emotional importance (often from the patient’s child-
hood) to the therapist (Freud 1905a/1962). For example, in psychother-
apy, this same young woman monitors her female therapist carefully
for evidence that the therapist is trying to look beautiful. Throughout
this book, we will see how transference phenomena are useful in all
kinds of psychodynamic psychotherapy as a way to understand the
unconscious mind of the patient. For now, we see that in the Topo-
graphic Model of the mind, transference is an ongoing process connect-
ing the wishes of the unconscious system to the language-based
thoughts of the preconscious/conscious system, explaining how all
experience comes to represent a blend of unconscious and conscious
influences.
The Mind’s Topography 79

Slips of the Tongue, Jokes, and Dreams

As noted earlier in our discussion of primary and secondary process, in
any situation in which censorship is relatively relaxed, we can see the
influence of the unconscious on aspects of mental life. Indeed, excited
by the possibilities presented by his new theories, Freud enjoyed enter-
taining himself and his readers by demonstrating the contribution of his
Topographic Model to our understanding of all kinds of phenomena. In
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Freud 1901/1962), he wrote about
how slips of the tongue and bungled actions, or parapraxes, reveal
unconscious life when the mind is relatively relaxed by intense feeling
or fatigue. For example, when a committee chairman announces at a
public meeting that Mr. X will make a “stupor” (rather than “super”)
new member of the committee, he is revealing a hidden and forbidden
opinion that the man in question is both boring and stupid. In the same
vein, when a political candidate declares himself to be “on the side of
anti-bias, anti-hatred, and anti-Semitism,” he cannot expect to win the
endorsement of the Anti-Defamation League (Motley and Baars 1979).
In addition, we can see the contribution of the dynamic unconscious
when a young woman heading out for dinner in a flashy, revealing
dress mishears her doorman yelling “Sexy! Sexy!” as he hails her a taxi
cab. In another example, a young man, angry in the aftermath of an
argument with his boss, misreads a street sign as saying murder when it
really says Maeder (Arlow 1969, p. 9).
A collector of humorous puns and jokes, Freud also enjoyed demon-
strating that jokes achieve their desired effect by introducing forbidden,
unconscious ideation into previously innocuous situations. For exam-
ple, to quote from one of Freud’s favorites, “A wife is like an umbrella;
sooner or later one takes a cab.” Freud analyzed this joke as drawing a
laugh because we all know, but do not “venture to declare aloud and
openly, that marriage is not an arrangement calculated to satisfy a
man’s sexuality” (Freud 1905b/1962, p. 77).
Finally, as we have seen earlier, in the world of dreams we are also
able to observe the interactions of the unconscious and preconscious
mind under circumstances in which the censor is a bit more relaxed, or
“asleep at the switch.” Dreams are so central to the development of the
Topographic Model and so important to the work of psychodynamic
psychotherapy that we will devote the whole of Chapter 6 to exploring
the purpose and meaning of these phenomena.
80 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Theory of Psychopathology in the

Topographic Model: The Concept of Neurosis
The Topographic Model of the mind has made a lasting contribution to
the study of psychopathology. As discussed above, the Topographic
Model posits that all experience is the result of a mixture of unconscious
and preconscious elements, as inner unconscious experience combines
with the experience of external and social reality to form subjectivity.
This formula applies to pathological as well as normal mental phenom-
ena. Indeed, it is important to remember that the concept of the dy-
namic unconscious was first invented for the purpose of understanding
human mental suffering, allowing Freud and his followers to talk about
the role of unconscious mental forces in the formation of the symptoms
of hysteria, and soon, of other kinds of psychopathology.
Pathological phenomena best accounted for by the psychoanalytic
model of the mind are described with the concept of neurosis. Neurosis is
defined as any inflexible, maladaptive behavior that represents a solution
to unconscious conflict. In all human experience there is ongoing conflict
between efforts to satisfy unconscious wishes and efforts to repress these
same wishes when they are judged to be unacceptable. Therefore, in neu-
rosis also, wishes are always both partially expressed and partially hid-
den. However, in neurosis, unlike more ordinary experience, there is a
cost to the solution in terms of the suffering that accompanies symptoms.
In the field of psychiatry, the term neurosis has been decried as being
vague, overinclusive, and impossible to verify empirically, and in 1980 it
was dropped from the official psychiatric nomenclature in favor of the
word disorder, a term more easily defined with the purely descriptive ap-
proach favored by the DSM system (American Psychiatric Association
1984). However, despite its relative disuse as a formal nosological cate-
gory in psychiatry, neurosis remains one of the most important concepts
in psychodynamic psychiatry, because all psychodynamic treatment
seeks to help patients gain freedom from neurotic suffering. As we prog-
ress through this book, we will see how our developing model of the
mind adds to the theory of psychopathology and/or neurosis.
The word neurosis did not originate with psychoanalysis or with
Freud. It was coined by the Scottish physician William Cullen in the
1770s to designate functional disturbances of the nervous system for
which there was no demonstrable structural lesion in the afflicted or-
gan. In the nineteenth century, the neuroses included a wide variety of
diverse ailments, including many that are now considered neurological,
such as epilepsy and Parkinson’s disease. The term also included hys-
The Mind’s Topography 81

teria. Writing extensively as he did about hysteria, Freud co-opted the

word neurosis so that nowadays this word has little meaning outside the
context of psychodynamic psychiatry. Although Freud first used the
term as a purely nosological category, he soon expanded and redefined
the concept in his discussion of what he called the neuropsychoses of de-
fense (which included hysteria, obsessional neurosis, phobias, and some
kinds of paranoia) (Freud 1894/1962). Freud explained these ailments
as representing the return of the repressed—that is, the reappearance of
unacceptable ideas, disguised in the form of symptoms (Freud 1896/
1962, p. 161). In other words, in a view that was radical at the time, neu-
rotic symptoms do not differ from aspects of ordinary experience, in
that both represent the mixed impact of unconscious wishes and social
reality. However, in neurosis we find unacceptable wishes “returning”
disguised as symptoms, whereas in nonpathological experience, the
mixture causes less distress.
Let us turn to some examples of how the Topographic Model helps
us to understand various kinds of neurotic psychopathology. A young
woman with hysterical conversion disorder may suffer from the symp-
tom of a paralyzed arm, evincing no neurological disorder upon exam.
We will say that her symptoms comprise a neurosis if they represent her
fear of the emergence of forbidden unconscious wishes to strike out at
her mother, or to masturbate to satisfy forbidden sexual wishes. In this
young woman’s case, the symptom of the paralyzed arm represents the
solution to a conflict between wishing to attack her mother, or to mas-
turbate, and feeling that this wish is unacceptable.
Unconscious conflict may be expressed not only in the form of neu-
rotic symptoms but also in the form of troubling neurotic personality
traits, such as difficulties in work, troubles in love relationships, crip-
pling life patterns, or disturbances in mood and/or self-esteem. For ex-
ample, a self-effacing young man may exhibit the character traits of
timidity and deference. In his case, these character traits may be under-
stood to represent the young man’s fear of his own unconscious wish to
strike out at authority figures, so that he always “pulls his punches.” We
will return to this same young man to learn a great deal about the ex-
pression of conflict in character when we explore the Structural Model
(see Chapter 10, “Conflict and Compromise”). In the young woman
who felt anxious, especially whenever she thought of a nail salon, we
see both symptoms (anxiety and avoidance) and character traits (exces-
sive goodness and asexuality) caused by disguised unacceptable un-
conscious wishes.
The Topographic Model of the mind enables us to understand not
only the content but also the peculiar form in which symptoms often
82 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

appear. All symptoms are symbolic communications that, like dreams,

make use of primary process mechanisms such as condensation, dis-
placement, and symbolization to represent personal and idiosyncratic
hidden thoughts and feelings. Indeed, the similarity between the orga-
nization of symptoms and the organization of dreams was one of
Freud’s first brilliant observations. His contribution included the ability
to read symptoms and character traits as texts in which we can see the
partial expression of a patient’s forbidden unconscious wishes and his
or her fears. In the example of the young woman with the paralyzed
arm, we see how some patients make use of body parts to express more
complex thoughts. Even the strange and fragmented thoughts of many
psychotic patients can be better understood if we understand the
“logic” of primary process. Although psychotic symptoms are caused
mainly by disordered brain processes, we see in them the exposure of
primary processes in a situation where secondary processes are de-
stroyed or severely fragmented. For example, a psychotically depressed
young man who is struggling with unacceptable anger may feel that his
body is filled with “poison” or that his brain is being taken over by “ma-
lignancy.” Another psychotic schizophrenic young woman may spend
hours collecting and eating “teeny pieces of tin” so as to feel closer to
her mother, whose name is Christina.
Finally, a last important contribution made by the concept of the
dynamic unconscious to the understanding of neurotic psychopathol-
ogy is that it allows us to understand not only the hidden content and
complex form of symptoms, character traits, and problematic patterns
but also their striking inflexibility. Indeed, neurosis is characterized, and
even defined, by its failure to respond to the demands of common sense
or current reality. For the person suffering from neurotic problems, the
advice of friends and family, the reading of self-help books, and even the
most determined efforts of willpower fail to provide relief or bring about
change. Our understanding of the nature of the dynamic unconscious
helps us to understand this rigidity by suggesting that repressed ideas
are not just hidden but take on new qualities by virtue of having been
repressed. In other words, repressed ideas, feelings, and motivation
have become sequestered from the rest of the personality. As we have
seen, in describing this sequestered aspect of the repressed unconscious,
Freud was fond of using metaphors from archeology. He suggested that
when unconscious ideas/wishes/feelings become separated from the
rest of the mind by repression, they are not “worn away” by exposure to
the reality of new experience. Instead, they continue to exist, timeless
and unchangeable, maintaining their childish, timeless, and irrational
qualities in the same way the artifacts from ancient civilizations are pre-
The Mind’s Topography 83

served from erosion by their burial in the depths of the earth (Freud
1909b/1962).
In contrast to ancient artifacts, however, repressed wishes and fan-
tasies do not remain inert but continue to be active in mental life. They
contribute to the repetition compulsion of neurotic patients, who repeat-
edly enact specific scenarios during the course of their lives without
ever recognizing the relationship of these scenarios to unconscious
memories or wishes. For example, a young woman whose sister died
from traumatic brain injury during their childhood came to treatment
with a chief complaint of feeling “brain dead.” Despite unusually high
intelligence, she had long been unable to fully use her mind. She also
proved to be highly accident prone, especially with regard to accidents
endangering the cranium. In treatment, this young woman endangered
herself by failing to follow the low-tyramine diet appropriate for those
on monoamine oxidase inhibitors. Although none of her neurotic pat-
terns was connected consciously with memories or feelings about her
sister’s death, the exposure of this link led ultimately to a resolution of
her self-destructive feelings and behaviors.

Theory of Therapeutic Action

in the Topographic Model:
Psychodynamic Psychotherapy
The Topographic Model of the mind is central to our understanding not
only of how people develop symptoms or fixed ways of feeling/acting
that lead to suffering but also of how psychodynamic psychotherapy
can bring about relief. Although modern conceptions of the therapeutic
action of psychodynamic psychotherapy no longer view exploration of
the unconscious as the only aim of treatment, the goal of making the un-
conscious conscious is part of most treatments (Freud 1901/1962,
p. 238; Freud 1916–1917/1962, p. 282). Many of the clinical techniques
used in psychodynamic psychotherapy were developed with the aim of
bringing unconscious mental contents into conscious awareness. As we
have seen, Freud developed free association in the hope that if the pa-
tient abandons conscious control of his or her thought processes, it will
be easier to observe the unconscious determinants of his or her subjec-
tive experience. In psychodynamic psychotherapy, the patient is still
asked to “say whatever comes to mind,” speaking as candidly as possi-
ble. The patient and the therapist work together to infer the nature of
unconscious determinants in the sequencing, patterning, and content of
the patient’s flow of ideas and feelings, the nature of his or her avoid-
84 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ance of engaging in exploration, and the transferences he or she

experiences or enacts in the process. Resistance is the word that psycho-
dynamic psychiatrists use to describe the clinical phenomenon of a pa-
tient’s active but unconsciously motivated avoidance of knowing his or
her own mind. Exploration of resistance leads patient and therapist di-
rectly to the heart of the patient’s most intense struggles between the
unconscious wishes and feelings seeking expression and the effort to
avoid awareness of these unconscious wishes and feelings. As we have
also seen, transference is the word Freud used to describe the automatic,
unconsciously determined repetition within the therapist-patient rela-
tionship of unconscious feelings/thoughts involving other people, of-
ten important caretakers from childhood. Exploration of transference
allows for examination of emotionally intense feelings about the pa-
tient’s experience in relation to important others. Exploration of both
resistance and transference takes place in the controlled setting of psy-
chotherapy, where both phenomena are emotionally alive, yet subject to
a degree of detached observation on the part of both the patient and the
therapist.
In the language of psychodynamic psychotherapy, an explicit infer-
ence about the working of the dynamic unconscious is called an inter-
pretation. An interpretation that makes inferences about the forgotten or
repressed past is called a reconstruction. Knowledge about the uncon-
scious gained through interpretation is called insight. The Topographic
Model of the mind proposes that insight is useful to patients because
when wishes, feelings, thoughts, and memories are made conscious,
they become subject to secondary process thinking rather than to pri-
mary process thinking. In other works, when conscious, they become
subject to rational assessment and judgment. Patients become more
able to choose how to act in the face of inner demands and less at the
mercy of a rigid, stereotyped tendency to act out unconscious scenarios.
Although psychodynamic psychiatrists no longer see insight as the
only—or even at times the most important—element in treatment, it is
still a central part of all psychodynamic psychotherapy, as the patient
gains increased awareness of and mastery over the unconscious factors
that affect his experiences or his choices, or about unconscious barriers
to becoming the person he wants to be. (We provide a more extensive
discussion of the value of consciousness in the next section, “The Na-
ture and Function of Consciousness.”)
In the case of the young woman whose sister died from traumatic
brain injury, exploration of her complaints of not being able to use her
brain, her communications during her session, her dreams, and her var-
ious moments of avoidance all contributed to understanding her un-
The Mind’s Topography 85

conscious memories and feelings about her sister’s death. Originally,

although the patient had recounted the fact of her sister’s illness and
death, her feelings about these events were not within her awareness.
She complained about feeling “brain dead” herself but did not connect
these feelings with the facts of her sister’s brain injury. At the same time,
she talked often about both angry and guilty feelings in reaction to
friends who sought or needed help. Her dreams contained images of
someone who was injured and/or dying. Exploration of all of these
feelings, memories, and dreams led to deepening understanding. How-
ever, in this young woman’s psychotherapy, the most important insight
came from the exploration of transference. Patient and therapist were
able to understand frightening interactions in which the patient mis-
used medication in ways that might damage her brain, as a powerful
window into her unconscious feeling of connection with her dead sister
and her unconscious feelings of guilt and anger about her sister’s injury
and death. When her feelings were brought into awareness, she no lon-
ger needed to express them in the form of self-destructive symptoms
and character traits.
In the same way, the anxious young woman who avoided the nail
salon and who was anxious to the point of panic at the thought of any
efforts to make herself beautiful, learned in her psychodynamic psycho-
therapy that her anxiety was connected to her repressed and unaccept-
able wishes to attack other beautiful women, beginning with her
mother. When this young woman was able to consciously reflect on her
wishes and fears and to integrate them with the rest of her mental life,
she no longer felt severe anxiety in the face of her wishes to look more
attractive.

The Nature and Function of Consciousness

Although neuroscientists and psychologists do not agree about the pre-
cise definition of consciousness, most include a quality of mental
awareness in their definition (Hirst 1995). As used by neurologists, def-
initions of consciousness emphasize levels of arousal of brain centers. In
contrast, as used by psychodynamic psychiatrists, definitions of con-
sciousness emphasize the subjective aspect of experience, or self-aware-
ness. In contemporary psychodynamic psychotherapy, we continue to
use the technique of bringing unconscious mental contents into aware-
ness, with the aim of increasing the patient’s ability to choose a course
of action in the face of conflicting imperatives. According to this prac-
tice, when patients are conscious or aware of their inner life, they are
better able to regulate and control themselves and to make choices and
86 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

judgments about how to feel and act. How does this idea fit with what
is going on in the rest of mind science?
As noted earlier, in contrast to earlier branches of psychology that
equated mind with consciousness, the field of cognitive neuroscience is
rapidly charting the unseen realms of unconscious mental life. This
map-making endeavor began with exploration of information process-
ing that takes place in the cognitive unconscious (Kihlstrom 1987, 1995)
and has moved on to include processes of motivation and intention.
Most recently, it has included processes of self-regulation such as atten-
tion, metacognition (self-monitoring), working memory, and other pro-
cesses previously thought to be under conscious control (Uleman 2005).
Indeed, this rapidly expanding map of unconscious mental function
has left many wondering what the role of consciousness is. This ques-
tion has plagued thoughtful scientists for many years, including Freud
himself, who referred to “the long-looked-for evidence that conscious-
ness has a biological function” (Freud 1909a/1962, p. 145).
Freud saw consciousness as part of “the superiority of humans over
animals” (Freud 1900/1962, p. 617), strongly rejecting any idea that
consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon or only “a superfluous re-
flected picture of the completed psychical process” (Freud 1900/1962,
p. 616). He suggested that consciousness makes higher-order mental
processes possible, contributing to self-regulation by playing a role in
the capacity for reality testing, judgment, and “temperate and purpose-
ful control” (Freud 1900/1962; Freud 1909a/1962, p. 145; Freud 1911/
1962). In Freud’s view, the reason for making the unconscious conscious
is so that repression can be replaced by “condemning judgment carried
out along the best lines” (Freud 1910/1962).
In contemporary psychodynamic psychiatry, questions about the re-
lationship between consciousness, attention, language, integration, and
higher-order mental functions such as self-reflection, self-monitoring,
judgment, self-control, and volition are the subject of ongoing investi-
gation (Klein 1959, 1970). For example, Shevrin (Shevrin et al. 1996),
supported by Brakel (1997), argued that the role of consciousness is to
categorize experience, deciding whether a mental event should be clas-
sified as perception, sensation, dream, thought, or memory. Conscious-
ness thereby distinguishes experiences from one another and helps to
organize the mind. Olds (1992) emphasized the feedback functions of
consciousness, in which sense data are re-represented symbolically and
thereby made independent of their sources. According to Olds, in self-
reflective consciousness, the self and its interactions can be represented,
making introspection possible. Levin (1997) and Rosenblatt and Thick-
stun (1977) also emphasized similar “re-entrant mechanisms” of con-
The Mind’s Topography 87

sciousness that make possible many complex functions, such as

empathy, insight, object relatedness, and psychological mindedness, al-
lowing for flexibility in the ways human beings conceptualize them-
selves and make decisions (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 43–45).
As noted, in the rest of cognitive neuroscience we also see expand-
ing research into the function of consciousness. In recent years, Posner
and Rothbart (1998) have argued that aspects of self-regulation, such as
volition, are dependent on elements of consciousness, including aware-
ness, self-monitoring, and executive attention. Bargh (2005, p. 53), who
otherwise argued for the recognition of unconscious self-regulation, as-
serted that consciousness serves the purpose of greater integration and
coordination through its “assemblage” of various kinds of experience.
Other aspects of consciousness emphasized by researchers include self-
control offered by language (Bucci 1997), reconsolidation of memory
(Nader and Hardt 2009; Sara 2000), modulation of emotion (Phelps
2005), access to a common narrative (Damasio 1984; Farber and Church-
land 1996), and many other aspects of self-control (Hirst 1995; Pally
2000; Pally and Olds 1998; Payne et al. 2005).
In short, we see that psychodynamic psychiatry holds a view of the im-
portance of conscious awareness that is in accord with what is going on in
the rest of mind science. When clinicians discovered ways to enhance the
self-regulation of patients by increasing their self-awareness, they discov-
ered what many researchers are finding in the laboratory—that enhanced
consciousness does indeed improve one’s ability to choose how to live,
even if unconscious factors are also seen to be increasingly powerful.

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 5–1 introduces our Topographic Model chart of core dimensions,
in which we have placed the following key concepts:

• Topographic point of view: The mind is divided into conscious, pre-

conscious, and unconscious domains. The preconscious mind can be
made conscious when attention is paid to its contents; the uncon-
scious mind cannot by made conscious by the simple act of attention,
but is denied consciousness by the forces of repression.
• Motivational point of view: The unconscious mind consists of
wishes that continually strive for expression. The conscious/precon-
scious mind has the capacity for repression of these wishes when
they are judged to be unacceptable.
88 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

• Structural point of view: The unconscious mind is characterized by

primary process; the conscious/preconscious mind is characterized by
secondary process. The unconscious mind and the conscious/precon-
scious mind are separated by a censor that has the task of judging
wishes to be either acceptable or unacceptable.
• Developmental point of view: Primary process develops before sec-
ondary process. Wishes come from childhood and form the basis of
infantile sexuality. Over time, they are judged to be increasingly unac-
ceptable. Meanwhile, the capacity for repression (i.e., the censoring
capacity) grows. The end result is an adult mind that is forever split
between conscious/preconscious and unconscious domains.
• Theory of psychopathology: Neurosis—inflexible, maladaptive pat-
terns of thought, emotion, or behavior—results from unconscious
conflict between the conscious/preconscious domains and the un-
conscious domain. Neurosis is characterized by the return of the re-
pressed (in which unacceptable wishes that have been repressed
reappear in the form of symptoms) and often by the repetition compul-
sion (a tendency to reenact specific scenarios without awareness of
their relationship to early repressed wishes or fantasies).
• Theory of therapeutic action: The goal of psychodynamic psycho-
therapy is for the patient to acquire more insight into the unconscious
mind—to “make the unconscious conscious.” Through the technique
of free association (which operates according to the fundamental rule
that the patient will say whatever comes to mind as candidly as pos-
sible to the therapist), the unconscious determinants of the patient’s
subjective experience gradually come to light. The therapist and pa-
tient then observe transference and resistance, using both to piece to-
gether a picture of the unconscious mind. The therapist also makes
use of interpretation, defined as a statement about the unconscious
mind. Interpretations about childhood are called reconstructions.
 The Mind’s Topography
TABLE 5–1. Topographic Model Part 1: The Mind’s Topography

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

The mind is The unconscious mind The unconscious Primary process is the Neurosis arises from Free association
divided into consists of wishes operates earliest mode of conflict between (“fundamental
three regions: always striving for according to mental functioning; the conscious/ rule”)
Conscious expression primary process; secondary process preconscious
Preconscious the preconscious/ develops later domains and the Examination of
Unconscious Unacceptable wishes are conscious operates unconscious domain transference and
kept in check by according to Wishes come from Return of the repressed resistance
forces of repression secondary process childhood and form Repetition compulsion
from the the basis of infantile Therapeutic
preconscious/ A censor separates the sexuality interpretation and
conscious mind unconscious and reconstruction
the conscious/ Wishes become
preconscious increasingly Insight (“Make the
mind unacceptable unconscious
conscious”)
Censoring capacity grows

89
90 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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 CHAPTER 6

The World of Dreams

This chapter explains how dreams are understood and used in

contemporary psychodynamic psychiatry. It also examines how dream
theory has been updated and discusses dream theory from neighboring
disciplines. Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes the follow-
ing: activation-synthesis hypothesis, day residue, dream, dream work, latent
dream thoughts, manifest dream, and self-state dreams.
A dream is defined as a mental experience that occurs when the
dreamer is asleep. It includes images, thoughts, and feelings that the
dreamer remembers when he or she awakens. Dreams are reported by
people living in every corner of the world. Since the beginning of time,
people have wondered about the meaning of dreams, often using them
to foretell the future or for religious ritual. Literature and poetry from
all parts of history and all parts of the world are replete with stories
about the importance of dreams. More recently, scientists have used em-
pirical methods to understand how dreams are created and what they
might mean.
Meanwhile, many patients in psychotherapy, and certainly many
patients in psychodynamic psychotherapy, report their dreams to their
therapists. Psychodynamic psychotherapists work with patients to ex-
plore their dreams as part of a shared search for better understanding
of the patient’s psychological life. There are many approaches to under-
standing dreams, including approaches from anthropology, sociology,
and other branches of psychology. For example, we know that dream

93
94 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

states are produced by the brain, primarily during rapid eye movement
(REM) sleep but also during other stages of sleep (Dement and Wolpert
1958). In their work with patients, psychodynamic psychotherapists
may use many models from many disciplines to understand dreams,
but when doing therapy, they call upon the psychoanalytic model of the
mind to help them understand what the patient’s dreams mean and
how those dreams can help them to learn about the patient’s inner life.

The Topographic Model,

the Dynamic Unconscious, and
the Psychoanalytic Theory of Dreams
Freud introduced the Topographic Model of the mind in 1900 at the
same time that he offered the first psychoanalytic theory of dreams. We
have seen how Freud turned from exploration of hysteria to develop-
ment of the first model of the normal mind. In the process of doing this,
he also turned from exploration of neurotic symptoms to the study of
the normal phenomenon of dreaming. In The Interpretation of Dreams,
Freud related how he became interested in dreams after observing that
his patients invariably inserted dreams into their free associations
(Freud 1900/1962). As he became increasingly immersed in dream in-
terpretation (exploring his own dreams as well as those of his patients,
children, family, friends, and colleagues), Freud found support for his
concept of the dynamic unconscious. Indeed, Freud is well known for
having written that “The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to
knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind” (Freud 1900/
1962, p. 608). Although aspects of psychoanalytic dream theory have
changed since it was first introduced in The Interpretation of Dreams in
1900, much of the theory, vocabulary, and practice of dream interpreta-
tion remains similar to Freud’s first efforts.
Freud’s theory of dreams addresses two issues: the purpose of
dreams and the meaning of dreams. The second of these issues is most
important to contemporary practitioners. Freud argued that the pur-
pose of dreams is to protect sleep in the face of disturbing sensations,
such as noise and thirst, or from mental preoccupations, including both
current concerns (such as getting to work on time) and unacceptable
unconscious wishes. Freud proposed that dreams manage these dis-
turbing stimuli in ways that protect sleep. For example, a person who is
late to work may dream that he is already at his desk, or a thirsty person
may dream of drinking water. Freud also argued that both mental pre-
The World of Dreams 95

occupations and unconscious wishes are represented as being fulfilled

in the dream, albeit in a disguised form. He went on to say that if un-
conscious wishes are not sufficiently disguised, they will arouse anxi-
ety, so that the dream fails to protect sleep, and the dreamer awakens.
Nowadays, psychodynamic psychiatrists do not attempt to account for
the purpose of dreams, understanding that data from the clinical situa-
tion does not lend itself to the exploration of this important question. In
fact, debate rages throughout mind science about how best to under-
stand the purpose served by dreaming and dream states for human be-
ings and other animals (Crick and Mitchison 1983).
In contrast to his ideas about the purpose of dreams, Freud’s efforts
to understand the meaning of dreams have persisted and are still in use
today. Here’s how the psychoanalytic theory explaining the meaning of
dreams works. Freud used the term manifest dream to describe the
dream as recalled and narrated by the dreamer on awakening. He un-
derstood that the manifest content of dreams often changes, because we
remember different versions of the dream at different times. Freud dis-
tinguished the manifest dream from what he called latent dream
thoughts, or underlying thoughts expressed by the dream. Finally, he
used the term dream work to describe the process (within the dreamer)
of transforming the latent dream thoughts into the manifest dream.
According to Freud, in the process of making a dream, the latent
dream thoughts attach themselves through association to unconscious
wishes from childhood. The latent thoughts and the childhood wishes,
both of which are unacceptable to the censor, then attach themselves,
again by association, to a bit of day residue, or an innocuous image and/
or event from current experience, which then appears in the manifest
dream. In other words, the power of forbidden unconscious wishes is
transferred to unobjectionable day residues, or bits of conscious experi-
ences from everyday life that serve as symbols for the formation of the
dream. In this way, latent dream thoughts are altered or disguised for
the purpose of evading the censor, which is charged with the task of
keeping unacceptable thoughts out of awareness. As we can see, Freud
argued that the structure of dreams resembles the structure of neurotic
symptoms, which he understood as resulting from a struggle between
the unacceptable thoughts seeking expression in consciousness and the
forces of repression.
Dreams can be interpreted by the therapist by breaking them down
into component parts, images, or phrases and asking the patient to as-
sociate to each component. As with exploration of a symptom, the pa-
tient’s associations to parts of a dream provide both therapist and
patient with a method for unraveling the dream work and finding the
96 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

latent dream thoughts hidden beneath the manifest content. In this pro-
cess (or in some variant of this process), therapist and patient uncover
unacceptable thoughts from present life, as well as thoughts from many
stages of childhood. Indeed, if they work long enough on any dream,
patient and therapist will discover very early childhood wishes.
In the example introduced in Chapter 5 (“The MInd’s Topogra-
phy”), the young woman with panic attacks who avoided the nail salon
reported a manifest dream in which she was getting a manicure when
the bottle of nail polish suddenly filled with blood. Through explora-
tion of her associations to images in the dream, she and her therapist
found latent dream thoughts of murdering other women. In another ex-
ample, an unmarried young woman in psychotherapy reported a man-
ifest dream that included the image of a plastic doll sitting on the
uppermost shelf of a bookcase, which she “could not reach.” The pa-
tient’s associations to the dream led to her recounting that she had been
“playing dolls” with her niece on the previous day and had wondered
to herself what had become of the dolls of her own childhood. Further
associations led to concerns that her need to feel “above it all” (on the
uppermost shelf) would lead to her remaining unmarried. Her deepest
concern, not previously conscious during the first telling of the dream,
was that she too might be “left on the shelf” and, unlike her sister, never
get married or have children of her own. There was also resonance be-
tween the image of the plastic doll and the patient’s feelings about how
her father had treated her during childhood. Finally, there was reso-
nance between the patient’s feeling that the doll was “out of reach” and
her feeling that she could not recapture feelings from childhood that
dated from before her mother’s death when she was 4 years old. In
Chapter 7 (“The Oedipus Complex”), we will see how this dream might
reveal aspects of early childhood wishes and conflicts.
As we see in this example, this patient’s dream of the plastic doll on
the shelf involved harmless material, or day residue, from her everyday
life (her bookshelves and her niece’s dolls), which symbolized many
layers of experience and thought from various stages of her life. When
the patient (and her censor!) was awake, inhibitory and defensive
mechanisms prevented unacceptable thoughts from gaining access to
consciousness, in this case because they were too painful. When the pa-
tient was asleep, the censor relaxed a bit, and we see greater penetration
of these painful (latent dream) thoughts into consciousness, albeit still
disguised in the form of a dream.
We can also see that when the logical processes of mental life are rel-
atively inactive during dream sleep, primary processes can be more eas-
ily observed in the unusual thought processes that characterize dreams.
The World of Dreams 97

As we have seen in Chapter 5, primary process includes condensation,

displacement, and symbolism. For example, in the dream about the nail
polish, we see the wish to be glamorous and the wish to “polish off” ri-
vals represented in the symbol of the bottle of polish. In the dream of
the doll on the shelf, we can also see many thoughts and wishes repre-
sented in just a few images (condensation). We see the patient’s fear of
not getting married represented in a doll “left on the shelf” (displace-
ment), and we see the feeling of being superior or being “above it all”
also represented by the doll on the shelf. In both cases, the representa-
tion makes use of the concrete, pictorial image of a doll (symbolization).

The Use of Dreams in Contemporary

Psychodynamic Psychiatry
Most psychodynamic psychiatrists since Freud continue to see dreams as
an important source of information about unconscious mental life. How-
ever, our focus on dreams is based on a newer understanding of the
mind. Freud’s early theory of dreams was based on the Topographic
Model and was never updated when he improved on this model. For ex-
ample, the idea of a censor that sits between the unconscious and the pre-
conscious/conscious is an idea that has been discarded (see Part III). In
addition, much of early dream theory is based on Freud’s ideas about
“psychic energy,” which most contemporary psychodynamic psychia-
trists think of as highly flawed. For example, in Freud’s energy-based the-
ory, only wishes have enough “energy” to cause a dream to be created, so
that latent dream thoughts must attach themselves to wishes to gain
enough energy to create a dream—hence Freud’s famous assertion that
“dreams are the fulfillment of a wish” (Freud 1900/1962, p. 121). Con-
temporary work with dreams has broadened to include exploration not
only of unacceptable latent thoughts but also of the defensive modes of
functioning that are revealed in dreams (see also Part III). Contemporary
clinicians also use dreams to gather information about the state of the
transference. Finally, as we will see when we examine Self Psychology in
Chapter 12, Heinz Kohut (1977) proposed that certain self-state dreams are
not founded on unconscious infantile wishes but rather are attempts to
master threats to the self. However, diverse points of view share an un-
derstanding that sleeping patients are less vigilant about preventing
themselves from becoming aware of aspects of psychological life. For that
reason, dreams can be very useful in psychodynamic psychotherapy.
An example of another patient dream illustrates how a dream can
be useful in psychodynamic psychotherapy. A young woman came to
98 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

therapy for help with “excessive sexual restraint” and trouble finding a
romantic partner. She was very successful as a high-level administrator
in her life at work, but she had never had a boyfriend. She reported
having had a very traumatic childhood, filled with physical abuse at
the hands of her father and brother. In the second session of psychody-
namic psychotherapy, this young woman reported the following
dream: “A huge grizzly bear, a ferocious tiger, and many snakes”
threatened to come into the patient’s house while she was “stirring her
dinner on the stove.” She had been “trying to relax,” and yet she awoke
in “terrible fear.” Over time, as the patient and her therapist explored
this dream, they understood that the wild animals who interrupt and
threaten the patient represented her frightening memories and feelings,
her father and brother who abused her when she was a child, and her
therapist who threatened to “stir up trouble” by exploring these feel-
ings. The dream, to which patient and therapist referred throughout the
therapy, helped them both to better understand these important issues.

Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams:

Why Is It Important?
Let us pause for a moment to explore a question that many readers have
asked: Why is Freud’s book The Interpretation of Dreams considered one
of the most important works of the modern age? Most students have
been told that it is, but few know why. The Interpretation of Dreams was
written between 1895 and 1899 and was published in 1900. In Freud’s
estimation, it was his greatest book. Indeed, writing about this book
many years later, Freud said, “Insight such as this falls to one’s lot but
once in a lifetime” (Freud 1900/1962, p. xx). What is The Interpretation of
Dreams about, and what are the insights of which Freud was so proud?
The Interpretation of Dreams, as the title suggests and as we have ex-
plored in this chapter, is a treatise on the subject of dreams—their struc-
ture, function, and meaning. But it is also much more. From its very first
page, Freud engages his readers with the promise of something both in-
triguing and potentially shocking. In his selection of a title, the German
word Traumdeutung, meaning “dream interpretation,” Freud chose a
word familiar to readers that referred to the dream interpretations of-
fered by Gypsy fortune tellers living at the fringes of society. In other
words, Freud’s choice of the title Traumdeutung was guaranteed to chal-
The World of Dreams 99

lenge, even provoke, a scientific audience and intrigue others (Ellen-

berger 1970, p. 452). Then, in his choice of a verse for his epigraph,
Freud borrowed the lines from Virgil’s Aeneid (Book VII, 312), again fa-
miliar to his readers and again guaranteed to ignite their curiosity:

Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo.

(“If I cannot sway the Higher Powers, I will move the Underworld.”)

These words are the battle cry of the goddess Juno, who, frustrated
by her failure to enlist the help of Jupiter in her plan to destroy the Tro-
jan warrior Aeneas, summons the Furia Alecto and her band of enraged
women from Hades to assist in her attack on the young hero as he
makes his way to found the city of Rome. At the end of The Interpretation
of Dreams, Freud elegantly weaves these famous lines of ancient poetry
into the intellectual plot of the book to represent the “fate of repressed
ideas,” which even when banished to the underworld by the “Higher
Powers” of consciousness, are far from vanquished but instead find re-
newed power to influence—and, by implication, even to destroy—our
lives (Freud 1900/1962, p. 608). By using these words, Freud offers his
readers a dramatic and stirring bit of foreshadowing of the story he
plans to tell. He promises his readers that he will in fact “raise hell.”
The plot of The Interpretation of Dreams unfolds through the interplay
of at least three subplots, which interact with and inform each other
throughout the course of the book’s seven chapters. As we have seen,
the first subplot of the book is Freud’s theory of dreams—what dreams
mean, what they are for, and how they work. The second subplot is the
presentation of Freud’s first fully developed theory of the unconscious
in the workings of the normal human mind—the Topographic Model of
the mind. The third subplot is the story of Freud’s own coming of age
and his struggles with insecurity, self-doubt, and competition on the
way to becoming a man, told through the recounting of his own
dreams. The genius of The Interpretation of Dreams lies in the way Freud
moves back and forth from one subplot to the others, developing each
in relation to the others in a brilliant fugue, at once highly personal and
vast in scope. The style of the book is both literary and scientific, the
subject matter is both highly intimate and universal, and the preoccu-
pations of the author are both mundane and existential, predicting the
great tensions that enliven psychodynamic psychiatry to this day. It is
no wonder that The Interpretation of Dreams is considered Freud’s mas-
terpiece.
100 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Psychodynamic Dream Theory

and Neuroscience
For a long time, Charles Fisher (1954, 1965; Fisher and Paul 1959) was
one of the few psychoanalysts who applied empirical techniques from
neuroscience to investigate the psychoanalytic approach to dreams.
However, several important critiques of psychoanalytic dream theory
have emerged from neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience. Among
the most important of these is the work of John Allan Hobson and Rob-
ert W. McCarley, Harvard University sleep researchers who published a
series of articles about dreaming (Hobson 1988; Hobson and McCarley
1977). Hobson and McCarley posited that REM sleep is instigated by the
periodic firing of pontine reticular neurons, especially gigantocellular
tegmental field cells. Discharges from these cells provide sensorimotor
information, which activates the forebrain. The forebrain then constructs
a dream by synthesizing random sensorimotor information from the
pons with information stored in memory. Hobson and McCarley called
their theory the activation-synthesis hypothesis of dream formation.
In many of his writings, Hobson points out that the activation-syn-
thesis theory accounts for the instigation and the formal properties of
dreams but has few, if any, implications for understanding the meaning
of dreams. However, in other statements, Hobson has challenged theo-
ries about what dreams might mean, especially those derived from psy-
choanalysis (Hobson 1988; Hock 2009). At the same time, Hobson and
McCarley have critiqued other aspects of dream theory, including the
idea that dreams may be “forgotten” by patients because they reveal
feelings that are upsetting, thereby instigating motivated forgetting, or
repression. In contrast to this view, Hobson and McCarley argue that
the forgetting of dreams results from changes in the ratio of neurotrans-
mitters during REM sleep that affect forebrain neurons involved in
memory. These changes impair long-term memory while leaving short-
term memory intact. Therefore, a subject is more likely to have good re-
call—even of affectively charged dream material—on awakening from
REM sleep in a laboratory than on awakening at home the following
morning. In other words, Hobson and McCarley (1977; McCarley 1981)
view the poor recall of dreams as being due to neuronal changes rather
than to repression.
Some neuroscience research findings contradict Hobson’s conclu-
sions by suggesting that dreaming is generated by forebrain structures
and/or that forebrain structures are involved with motivational cir-
cuitry, offering support to Freud’s views of dreaming as connected to
The World of Dreams 101

wish fulfillment (Braun 1999; Solms 1997, 2000). Other researchers re-
view empirical evidence about dreams from both neuroscience and cog-
nitive psychology, as well as from the clinical situation, discussing the
many complex implications for Freudian and other psychoanalytic the-
ories, exploring issues such as the dreams of different kinds of patients,
including those with trauma, and how dreams are used in—and change
with—treatment (Ellman 1992; Fonagy et al. 2012).
Many authors who support Hobson’s findings have also pointed out
that there need be no contradiction between his findings and those of
psychoanalysis with regard to understanding the meaning of dreams.
These authors argue that Hobson’s theory and the theories of psycho-
analysis represent two separate sets of findings that originate from dif-
ferent methods of study and emphasize different aspects of dream
states, dreaming, and dreams. Hobson’s theory explores the neural cor-
relates of the dream state, and psychoanalytic theory explores the mean-
ing of dreams. Findings in one theory should strive to be consistent with
the other, but neither theory can be translated into the terms of the other.
In other words, although Hobson’s neuroscientific findings are very im-
portant to the project of developing a complete theory of dreaming, they
shed no light on the question of whether meaning is present in dreams,
or what that meaning might be. And likewise, although Hobson and
McCarley’s understanding of how memory functions in relation to
dreams is very important, this understanding sheds no light on aspects
of memory that are influenced by psychological factors. As many have
argued, until we have a framework that connects brain and mind, we
must be careful about making explanatory or causal statements that link
these two realms. For now, brain and mind must be treated “as two dis-
tinct orders, each having its own peculiar language, conceptualizations,
and levels of abstraction” (Labruzza 1978, p. 1537; Mancia 1999; Wasser-
man 1984).
As an example of how to usefully integrate findings from very differ-
ent fields, we can link theories from neuroscience to those from psycho-
analysis by understanding that the neurophysiological processes that
occur during dreaming, such as motor paralysis or penile erection, are
sometimes utilized by the dreamer as symbolic elements that can assist
in representing important thoughts. As one theorist has written in an ef-
fort to link theories from neuroscience to those from psychoanalysis,

a loose analogy can be made with the relatively random inkblots of a

Rorschach test. The patient projects onto these the meanings that reflect
his particular psychology. Since the pontine discharges would presum-
ably be even more random than the inkblots of the Rorschach, there
102 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

would be even more room within the frame for the dreamer to project
his psychological conflicts. (Wasserman 1984, p. 842)

Exploring the Meaning of Dreams

Exploration of the meaning of dreams and/or of motivated forgetting
requires use of the correct methods. These methods must be in the do-
main of psychology, not neuroscience. Data from the clinical situation is
an important source of such psychological data. Other psychological
methods appropriate for the study of the meanings of dreams include
those using computers and “data mining” techniques. For example, ac-
cording to Kelly Bulkeley of the International Association for the Study
of Dreams (of which Hobson is also a member), researchers have been
using quantitative methods of analysis for many years to study the con-
tent of dreams. In collaboration with psychologist G. William Domhoff
at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Bulkeley describes a tech-
nique he calls “blind analysis,” which exploits advances in digital tech-
nology to explore recurring patterns in dreams. As Bulkeley writes, the
findings from several studies “provide compelling evidence that
dreaming is not meaningless ‘noise’ but rather a coherent and sophisti-
cated mode of psychological functioning” (Bulkeley 2013, p. SR 14).
Bulkeley and others publish often in the journal Dreaming. This jour-
nal explores dreams from many points of view, including the neurosci-
ence of dream states, the meaning of dreams and nightmares, and the
relationship of dreams to trauma, coping, and stress, to mention a few
important topics.1 Indeed, as Bulkeley goes on to write, “From the
American Indian ritual of the vision quest to the Muslim prayer and
dream-incubation practice of istikhara, there have been cultural tradi-
tions of enhancing people’s awareness of their dreams and deriving
insights from them. Modern researchers can learn from such practices
and combine them with today’s technologies, using new tools to fulfill
an ancient pursuit” (Bulkeley 2013, p. SR 14). Bulkeley’s techniques,
and those of many others, support the understanding of psychody-
namic psychiatry that dreams have meaning and that investigation of
this meaning can be very useful in the exploration of psychological life.

1For an index of topics, see the website of the International Association for the
Study of Dreams (http://www.asdreams.org) and the journal Dreaming, pub-
lished by the American Psychological Association (http://www.apa.org/
pubs/journals/drm/index.aspx).
The World of Dreams 103

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 6–1 shows our Topographic Model chart of core dimensions with
the addition of key concepts for Structure/Process and Treatment.

• Topographic point of view: Dreams are both conscious/precon-

scious and unconscious. The manifest dream is conscious; the latent
dream thoughts are unconscious.
• Motivational point of view: In dream sleep, latent dream thoughts
combine with wishes from childhood to seek expression. The forces
of repression are at work even during sleep.
• Structural point of view: In the dream-making process, latent dream
thoughts linked with wishes from childhood attach themselves, by
association, to day residue (an innocuous image and/or event from
current experience), which then appears in the manifest dream. In
this way, latent dream thoughts are altered or disguised for the pur-
pose of evading the censor, which is charged with the task of keeping
unacceptable thoughts out of awareness.
• Theory of therapeutic action: The exploration of dreams is part of al-
most all psychodynamic psychotherapies.
 104
TABLE 6–1. Topographic Model Part 2: The World of Dreams

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

The mind is The unconscious mind The unconscious Primary process is the Neurosis arises from Free association
divided into consists of wishes operates earliest mode of conflict between (“fundamental
three regions: always striving for according to mental functioning; the conscious/ rule”)
Conscious expression primary process; secondary process preconscious
Preconscious the preconscious/ develops later domains and the Examination of
Unconscious Unacceptable wishes are conscious operates unconscious domain transference and
kept in check by according to Wishes come from Return of the repressed resistance
forces of repression secondary process childhood and form Repetition compulsion
from the the basis of infantile Therapeutic
preconscious/ A censor separates the sexuality interpretation and
conscious mind unconscious and reconstruction

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

the conscious/ Wishes become
preconscious increasingly Insight (“Make the
mind unacceptable unconscious
conscious”)
Dreams Censoring capacity grows
Dream exploration
The World of Dreams 105

References
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(Bethesda, MD). Neuropsychoanalysis 1(2):196–201, 1999
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Dement W, Wolpert E: The relation of eye movements, bodily motility, and exter-
nal stimuli to dream content. Journal of Experimental Psychology 55:543–
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Ellenberger H: The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of
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Ellman SJ: Psychoanalytic theory, dream formation, and REM sleep, in The In-
terface of Psychoanalysis and Psychology. Edited by Barron JW, Eagle MN,
Wolitzky DL. Washington, DC, American Psychological Association, 1992,
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of perception in dream formation. J Am Psychoanal Assoc 2:389–445, 1954
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dreams: a validation study. J Am Psychoanal Assoc 7:35–83, 1959
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edited by Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1962, pp 1–626
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thesis hypothesis of the dream process. Am J Psychiatry 134:1335–1348, 1977
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tory of Psychological Research, 6th Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ, Pren-
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 CHAPTER 7

The Oedipus Complex

This chapter explains what is meant by the oedipus complex. It ex-

plores concepts related to the oedipus complex, both historically and in
contemporary theory. Finally, it delineates research in support of the
concept from developmental psychology and other neighboring disci-
plines. Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes the following:
castration anxiety, complex, fantasy, internalized homophobia, narrative
structure of the mind, negative oedipus complex, oedipal victor, oedipus com-
plex, penis envy, positive oedipus complex, preoedipal stage, primal scene, pri-
mary femininity, and seduction hypothesis.
The oedipus complex consists of a set of feelings and thoughts that we
all have about our role in a three-way relationship between ourselves
and our parents. The oedipus complex emerges when we are children
between the ages of 3 and 6 years. It includes the wish for romantic
union with one parent, along with a wish to be rid of the other, compet-
ing parent. The oedipal child wishes to be the primary recipient of the
love from the desired parent, and fears retaliation from the rival parent.
The result is a complex network of feelings, including love and hate, de-
sire and jealousy, disappointment and hope, and competition and fear.
This network of feelings forms a template in the mind that lasts for the
rest of our lives and influences everything we do. Because the oedipus
complex is founded in childhood experience, it is affected by the cogni-
tive immaturity of the child. In other words, it contains many illogical
and fantastical thoughts and feelings. As the child grows older and re-

107
108 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

pression sets in, the oedipus complex becomes increasingly uncon-

scious. However, it is universal and has a lasting effect on the psycho-
logical life of all of us, whether male or female, young or old.
Freud first formulated the oedipus complex as he was developing
his earliest theories on hysteria and the Topographic Model of the mind.
He discovered the oedipus complex in his own self-analysis, inspired
by the death of his father (in 1896), and in his work with patients. His
first published account of the importance of this set of feelings ap-
peared in the book The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1900/1962).
The oedipus complex represents Freud’s foray into several impor-
tant areas in the development of the psychoanalytic model of the mind.
In Chapter 1 (“Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind”), we men-
tioned several of these areas as being very important also in contempo-
rary mind science:

1. The oedipus complex represents Freud’s first fully developed idea

about the contents of the unconscious. We discussed the concept of
the dynamic unconscious at length in Chapter 3, exploring its con-
ceptual origins and its role in the mind and in the formation of
symptoms and dreams. However, aside from some general ideas
about “unacceptable sexual wishes, often from childhood,” we have
not discussed much about unconscious wishes, thoughts, and feel-
ings.
2. The oedipus complex represents a change in Freud’s theory from
one that emphasized external causes of mental events to one that
emphasized internal psychological motivation. For example, as
mentioned in Chapter 4 (“Core Dimensions of Mental Function-
ing”), Freud’s initial theory of hysteria was based on his seduction hy-
pothesis, which posited that experiences of sexual seduction (or
abuse) perpetrated on children by caretakers led to overstimulation
and later illness (Freud 1894/1962, 1896/1962). One of the seminal
events in the birth of psychoanalysis was Freud’s abandonment of
the seduction hypothesis in favor of a new theory emphasizing the
inner psychological life of the normal child as a source of stimula-
tion (in normal development) or overstimulation (in cases of hyste-
ria) (Freud 1897/1962). The oedipus complex took the place of the
seduction hypothesis in the developing psychoanalytic model of the
mind.
3. The oedipus complex represents Freud’s first effort to describe in de-
tail how the psychological life of the child lives on in the adult. Aside
from his having asserted that it does, we know little about it. The
oedipus complex is the first of several universal problems that we
The Oedipus Complex 109

face as children and that affect our psychological life forever (see
section “The Universality of the Oedipus Complex” later in this
chapter).
4. The oedipus complex includes some of Freud’s first ideas about the
importance of the body and of sexuality, leading to his later descrip-
tions of the oral and anal phases of psychosexual development,
drives, and libido (see Chapter 9, “The Id and the Superego”).
5. The oedipus complex includes some of Freud’s first ideas about the
importance of early caretakers in the development of psychological
life.
6. The oedipus complex represents Freud’s first complete account of
the mind’s storytelling capacity. The importance of this aspect of the
psychoanalytic model of the mind will be discussed later in this
chapter (see section “The Oedipus Complex and the Importance of
Narrative and Fantasy”).

Freud’s Theory: Terms and Concepts

Let us begin our discussion of the oedipus complex with a more de-
tailed description of some terms and concepts developed by Freud. Be-
cause so many of Freud’s ideas are closely connected with his ideas
about the oedipus complex, it will be easiest if we address these terms
and concepts as a group. We can then move on to discuss which ideas
continue to be important and which have been updated.
Freud named the oedipus complex after the myth of Oedipus, as
told in the play Oedipus Rex, by Sophocles. He explained the dramatic
impact of this play as resulting from the empathy that we all feel with
Oedipus’ tragic fate, in which, despite his best efforts, he accidentally
marries his mother and kills his father. In Freud’s view, this fate is ines-
capable because Oedipus is acting out what we all wish for, by virtue of
having once been children. Despite the term’s having been named after
a mythical male hero, Freud used oedipus complex to refer to both men
and women.
Freud borrowed the word complex from his friend and colleague
Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), who used the term to mean any set of un-
conscious associated feelings and ideas that form a network or template
in the mind (Jung 1934/1960). Jung made use of the word complex in
word-association experiments in which subjects were asked to say what
words came to mind in response to a stimulus word, thereby revealing
the organization of complexes (Jung 1906/1919). When Freud broke
with Jung around 1910, he also ceased to use the word complex. How-
110 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ever, the term oedipus complex has persisted as the name by which the
concept became famous. Because the oedipus complex contains many
thoughts and feelings that contradict one another, such as wishes and
fears, we often refer to oedipal conflict when talking about its influence
on mental life.
Although Freud asserted that the oedipus complex is universal, ap-
pearing in both male and female children, he had many ideas about the
difference between the genders, some of which have to do with how
each gender negotiates the oedipal period. In Freud’s view, preoedipal
children of both genders are most always involved with and attached to
the mother. For the little boy, this attachment becomes more romantic
and sexual as he enters the oedipal stage, and he develops a full-blown
oedipal complex. Then the oedipal boy, in the grip of what Freud called
castration anxiety (see below) regarding actual or imagined threats to his
penis, relinquishes his sexual/romantic longings for his mother. In the
process, he develops a conscience that thereafter tells him how to be-
have (Freud 1924/1962).
For the little girl, who also enters the oedipal phase attached to her
mother, things are quite different. Her recognition of the genital differ-
ence between males and females leads to her feeling disappointed, as
she develops what Freud famously called penis envy. In his view, the lit-
tle girl blames her mother for her lack of a penis and turns to her father,
who has the desired and admired organ. In this way, the little girl
changes her love object from her mother to her father, and in turn, goes
on to develop a full-blown oedipus complex. However, in Freud’s view,
the impetus for the girl’s renunciation of oedipal strivings is not so com-
plete as is the boy’s, as she feels that she has already been castrated and
therefore has less to fear. Her oedipal wishes are never fully repressed,
and her conscience is never fully formed (Freud 1925/1962). We find
here a first presentation of Freud’s notorious views of women, which
immediately got him (and, through association, much of psychoanaly-
sis) into trouble with those who felt that his views of women were seri-
ously wrong.
Freud’s ideas about the oedipus complex also overlap with his ideas
about the development of sexual orientation, particularly about the de-
velopment of homosexuality. He used the term positive oedipus complex
when he wanted to talk about sexual wishes for the opposite-sex parent,
accompanied by hatred and fear of the same-sex parent. He used the
term negative oedipus complex when talking about sexual longings for the
parent of the same sex, accompanied by hatred and fear of the opposite-
sex parent. In Freud’s view, the child’s sexual and romantic longings de-
velop under the influence of what he called innate bisexuality. Because of
The Oedipus Complex 111

this innate bisexuality, the positive oedipal complex and the negative
oedipal complex invariably coexist, and the child experiences ambiva-
lence toward each parent. However, most of the time, either the positive
or the negative oedipus complex prevails, with the child preferring one
parent or the other. The prevailing complex corresponds to sexual ori-
entation in the adult. In Freud view, sexual orientation was immutable.
It resulted from a fixation (see Chapter 9, “The Id and the Superego”) at
an early phase of development, but it is not pathological.
Although we know that the oedipus complex is universal, leaving a
lasting imprint on the psyche of all of us, we find few adults who are
consciously aware of having romantic and sexual feelings toward a par-
ent, however beloved that parent may be. This is because the oedipus
complex becomes increasingly unconscious as repression sets in. Oedi-
pal feelings are driven from awareness by several factors: fears of retal-
iation by the rival parent, experienced as a threat of bodily harm, which
(for both sexes) Freud termed castration anxiety; fear of the loss of love
of the parent(s) and/or of abandonment by them; and fear of the feeling
of guilt. The fear of guilt becomes increasingly important as the child
grows older.
In the course of repression, the oedipus complex leaves behind both
unconscious wishes and unconscious fears. It also leaves behind a new
psychic structure, which Freud eventually named the superego, formed
as the child internalizes parental prohibitions against oedipal strivings
(see Chapter 9, “The Id and the Superego”). It is this newly formed su-
perego, or conscience, that generates the feeling of guilt. Finally, the
oedipus complex also leaves behind important modifications in self-
image, or identifications, formed as the child begins to copy his or her
parents instead of pursuing his or her wishes for romantic attachment
to them (see Parts III and IV).

Contribution of the Oedipus Complex

to Theory of Psychopathology and
Therapeutic Action in the Topographic Model
In classical psychoanalytic thinking, the oedipus complex was seen as
the major cause of all neurosis. Nowadays this view is no longer com-
mon, because contemporary psychodynamic clinicians understand that
many conflicts stemming from various stages of early life leave a lasting
imprint on the mind of the adult. However, the oedipus complex is still
very important in the genesis of much of the psychological suffering
seen in adulthood. In other words, many neurotic struggles and inhibi-
112 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

tions of adult patients can be traced to lingering conflicts over oedipal

fears and wishes.
For example, a middle-aged man presents to treatment with trou-
bles in many areas of initiative, repeatedly failing at work and in other
activities. In his marriage, he is excessively submissive to his wife, with
whom he has sexual intimacy only rarely. In treatment it emerges that
as a little boy, the patient feared retaliation from an aggressive and bul-
lying father. The boy imagined (probably somewhat correctly) that this
bullying was punishment for his romantic strivings directed toward his
mother. Because this boy needed to appease his father, he came to fear
and avoid any kind of pleasurable activity, resigning himself to a
dreary, dull life. In this way he not only placated his father (and all per-
sons in authority) but also made himself less attractive to his mother
(and all desirable women).
In another example, a woman in her late 30s presents to treatment,
anxious about whether she will ever find a husband. She has a history
of repeated love affairs with married men but has had trouble finding a
man of her own. In treatment it emerges that as a little girl, she felt
(probably accurately) that her distant and cold father could not return
her love. As a result, she learned to squander her romantic attentions on
unavailable men, in a vain effort to get what she never was able to get
from her father. A final example is the young woman with panic attacks
described in Chapter 5 (“The Mind’s Topography”), who avoided all ef-
forts to make herself more attractive because these efforts reminded her
of oedipal strivings to outdo her mother (and all other women).
In contemporary psychodynamic psychotherapy, exploration and
management of oedipal conflict is almost always important, and thera-
pists continue to look for its lasting effects. They search for these lasting
effects in the patient’s choice of whom to love; in his or her attitudes to-
ward sexuality and pleasure of all kinds; in all aspects of the patient’s
self-image, especially those related to gender; in the patient’s attitudes
toward morality (whether overly strict or too lenient); in the patient’s
capacities for initiative, curiosity, and strivings for success; in his or her
attitudes toward competition; and in fears of all kinds, especially those
related to bodily injury.
Throughout the life cycle, many events trigger oedipal feelings and
conflicts, which must be worked out again and again. As an example,
let us look at the young woman whose dream of the doll on the shelf
was described in Chapter 6 (“The World of Dreams”). Early in her adult
life, this young woman was content to focus on her career, seemingly
uninterested in men. However, when her married older sister gave birth
to a child, this event stirred up envy and a wish to have a husband and
The Oedipus Complex 113

a baby of her own. She began treatment, worried that these wishes
would never come true. As her psychodynamic psychotherapy deep-
ened, it became clear that an early version of her wish for romantic love
had been driven from awareness in response to the sudden death of her
mother when the patient was 4 years old, at the height of the oedipal pe-
riod. She responded to her mother’s death with a profound sense of loss
and grief, which she tried to control with efforts to “rise above it all.” To
make matters worse, however, she imagined that her mother’s death
from a rapidly growing cancer was caused by her own competitive oe-
dipal feelings. In other words, at the time of her mother’s death, this lit-
tle girl experienced herself as having triumphed over her mother (or, as
it is often called, as an oedipal victor). She felt that she deserved punish-
ment for her competitive transgression, and she doled out this punish-
ment to herself in the form of a loss of pleasure in all “female pursuits.”
She focused on becoming a good, studious girl who would cause no fur-
ther trouble to anyone, and who paid attention only to her career. Her
feelings about the plastic doll turned out to have many sources, includ-
ing her repressed wishes to have a baby of her own, her thoughts about
her mother’s dying body, her own grief characterized by feelings of life-
lessness and being unreal, and her distant, lifeless relationship with her
father, heightened by their shared need to retreat from each other after
her mother’s death. In other words, exploration of her grief at the time
of her mother’s death was complicated by oedipal feelings. We will re-
turn to this patient later in this book, when we discuss how conflicts
other than oedipal ones also affect the psyche in lasting ways.

The Oedipus Complex Updated

The Mind of the Developing Child
Let us now have a look at the many ways in which the oedipus complex
and related ideas have changed in contemporary psychodynamic the-
ory. Many of these changes point to important developments in theory
and practice. To begin with, contemporary developmental psychologists
have a vastly broader view of the oedipal period in children, taking into
account many aspects of development in addition to the development of
new desires and fears. These aspects include many related to the cogni-
tive maturation of the child, emphasizing the child’s increased capacity
for self-regulation, problem solving, reality testing, theory of mind, lan-
guage, episodic memory, symbolization, private speech, and narrative
and fantasy (Gilmore and Meersand 2013). When we explore the concept
of the ego introduced in the Structural Model of the mind (see Chapter 8,
114 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

“A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego”), we will see that
many of these functions are called ego functions.
All of these developing capacities can be drawn into and affected by
oedipal conflict, so that psychodynamic psychotherapists will often un-
derstand inhibitions and/or difficulties in any of these capacities as be-
ing related to lingering oedipal conflict. For example, a young woman
suffering from oedipal conflicts may act very flustered, confused, and
downright ignorant about many things that appear obvious to every-
one around her, and that are not consistent with her high level of intel-
ligence. Upon exploration, her confusion may turn out to be related to
a fear of knowing too much about the “facts of life” for fear of the oedi-
pal feelings that this knowledge would arouse.
Nevertheless, as developmental psychologists have shown us, the
oedipal child will confront the challenge of new wishes and fears about
the body and relationships, morality, gender, love, and hate with new
capacities for dealing with these challenges. For example, we see that
oedipal boys and girls love to tell stories, which are often related to their
struggles to come to terms with a new situation. Their conversation be-
comes more complex, they become more curious, they engage with oth-
ers in imaginative play, and they are beginning to love fairy tales. As we
shall see at the end of this chapter, perhaps this is why Freud named the
oedipus complex after one of the most famous stories of all time.
Finally, it is important to remember that although the mind of the
oedipal child is becoming more mature, it is still very undeveloped and
naïve. The thinking of oedipal children is characterized by cognition
that is concrete, with a poorly developed capacity for differentiating
fantasy from reality. Freud himself was aware that oedipal thoughts
and feelings were influenced by the mind of the child. He wrote about
the many daydreams that children have about sex between the parents
(or the primal scene, as he called it). Primal-scene daydreams are univer-
sal scenarios, both real and imagined, about what takes place in the par-
ents’ bedroom. An example of a primal-scene daydream is the idea,
common among children, that the parents are involved in some kind of
violent activity. He also described children’s ideas about “where babies
come from” (Freud 1908b/1962). Common examples of such ideas are
that pregnancy results from having eaten something, and that birth
takes place through the anus. Finally, Freud emphasized that castration
anxiety need not be the result of real threats to the child’s genitals, but
is most often the result of the child’s primitive psychological life, in
which he or she imagines that frightening things could happen, often in
response to “bad deeds.” In addition, penis envy results from the little
girl’s childish reaction to the awareness of gender difference, in which
The Oedipus Complex 115

she might imagine that she lacks something important, or that she has
been “castrated” for some misdeed.
As noted earlier, the oedipus complex in adults bears the mark of
this cognitive immaturity of the child. In other words, oedipal wishes
not only maintain the intensity of wishes left over from childhood but
also are arranged in a way that reflects the mind of a child. For example,
the young man described earlier with persistent oedipal conflict has in-
tense fears of retaliation for any sign of initiative. These fears vastly ex-
ceed the real dangers of his current situation. One explanation for the
intensity of his fears is that they reflect the terrors that torment even the
average child. In the same vein, the young woman who dreamt of the
doll on the shelf imagined, even as an adult, that her mother would dis-
approve of her or punish her, even though her mother had been dead
for many years. Another young woman came to treatment because she
was unusually interested in dangerous and/or violent sex with men. In
her treatment, she discovered that as a child, she confused her parents’
frequent fights with their lovemaking, which she had already imagined
might include violence. Feeling intensely left out, she wanted to “get
into the act,” which she imagined as brutal and dangerous.

Other Events That Affect the Oedipal Situation

In addition to placing a greater emphasis on the cognitive development
of children, contemporary theorists are also more aware of many other
issues that are likely to be on the mind of adult patients, contributing to
suffering and complicating the experience of the oedipal complex. First
of all, contemporary theorists are acutely aware of the impact of prior
stages of life on how each patient has negotiated oedipal challenges. Ev-
ery child enters the oedipal period having already had important expe-
riences that affect feelings of attachment to his or her parents, feelings
about him- or herself, and attitudes toward bodily experience. He or she
will have already had considerable experience with pleasure, pain, fear,
and anxiety. The period of development from birth to the onset of the
oedipal period is called the preoedipal stage of development. (We will
discuss the preoedipal period in greater depth in Chapter 11, “Object
Relations Theory.”) Second, contemporary psychodynamic psychother-
apists are more likely to be aware of the impact of the parents’ reactions
to the child’s oedipal wishes (Anthony 1970). For example, an adult
whose parents accepted and were amused by his or her competitive
strivings during the oedipal period will look very different from an
adult whose parents became angry and vindictive when challenged
(Britton 1989). Finally, contemporary practitioners are aware of the im-
portance of other factors such as adoption, same-sex parenting, single
116 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

parenting, the death of a parent, divorce, and any other atypical situa-
tion. For example, a young man who was adopted may grow into an
adult with intense fears of abandonment in response to any transgres-
sion, including any stemming from the oedipal period. Contemporary
psychodynamic therapists are also aware of the impact of cultural atti-
tudes toward romance and sexuality, morality, gender roles, and a host
of other important issues.

Gender Development and Homosexuality Reconsidered

Contemporary theorists and practitioners have very different ideas
than did Freud about gender development and homosexuality. Al-
though a full discussion of these important issues would take us far
afield, we will discuss them briefly here, because, as noted above, we
cannot easily separate Freud’s well-known views on these topics from
his views on the oedipus complex. Also, theories about gender devel-
opment and about homosexuality are among the most important errors
made by psychoanalytic theory makers. During the several decades
when these theories were widely believed and applied, they caused
great pain to many women and gay people in psychodynamic psycho-
therapy.
In Freud’s views of the oedipus complex, we find the seeds of his
view that the average woman 1) is plagued with residual penis envy
(i.e., is narcissistic), 2) constitutes her femininity in response to a feeling
of inferiority (i.e., is masochistic), and 3) never really relinquishes her
oedipal strivings and has a poorly formed conscience (i.e., is immature
and easily led astray). Indeed, as is well known, Freud understood little
girls to be an inferior, or “castrated,” version of little boys. The applica-
tion of these ideas had disastrous consequences for many women in
treatment. Indeed, many women in treatment were made to feel as if
their ambitious strivings were “unfeminine.” Pathological masochism
and narcissism were seen as “normal” and were not treated as vigor-
ously as they should have been. The guilty feelings from which many
women suffer were poorly understood.
Although Freud’s ideas were challenged immediately by some of
his followers (Horney 1924, 1926), it was not until the 1960s and 1970s
that the field of psychoanalysis fully reviewed and revised his theories
of female gender development (Blum 1976; Mitchell 1974; Schuker and
Levinson 1991). Since then, contemporary theorists have offered impor-
tant new versions of female development that emphasize primary femi-
ninity, in contrast to Freud’s view that femininity develops in reaction
to a feeling of being castrated (Stoller 1976). They also posit normal, al-
beit somewhat different, moral development (Gilligan 1982). The expe-
The Oedipus Complex 117

rience of penis envy is no longer seen as universally important for the

development of little girls, and its importance can be influenced by a
host of factors, such as the experience of power distribution among the
genders in a given family, or prior experiences of loss and bodily dam-
age that affect self-esteem (Grossman and Stewart 1976). At the same
time, awareness that little boys feel envy in reaction to the attributes of
their mother and sisters offers contemporary practitioners a more bal-
anced view (Jaffe 1977). In contemporary theory, both genders must
face the experience of envy in response to the feeling of loss that accom-
panies awareness that one cannot have everything (Klein 1957/1975).
These and many other advances in the psychoanalytic theory of gender
development are now widely accepted.
Views about homosexuality have also been challenged, especially in
the 1970s and 1980s, as the entire field of mental health revised its views
on homosexuality. As almost everyone knows, in response to new data
from many neighboring fields, and to political activism, the American
Psychiatric Association removed all references to homosexuality as a
disorder from the Third Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders in 1973, and the fields of psychiatry, psychology, and
social work revised their theory and practice. In what was one of the
most unfortunate episodes in its history, psychoanalysis was among the
last holdouts in the field of mental health, with many theorists asserting
ideas such as the following: 1) homosexuality represents a defense
against oedipal (or other) fears; 2) homosexuality is always accompa-
nied by narcissistic personality; and 3) homosexuality can be changed
in treatment that addresses the motivations and defenses that underlie
the psychological choice of same-sex attraction, to mention just a few.
Many of these views were vastly more extreme in their antihomosexual
bias then were those of Freud himself. Indeed, Freud’s own views on
the subject were varied and included the following: 1) everyone has in-
nate bisexuality, 2) homosexuality cannot be changed, 3) homosexuality
does not represent psychopathology, 4) the negative oedipus complex
is a defense against the positive oedipus complex, and 5) homosexuality
represents a fixation at an early stage of development, among others.
When applied to homosexual men and women in treatment, these
views had many disastrous consequences as homosexual people in
treatment tried to change their orientation, deepened their self-hatred,
and were denied the many opportunities that come with greater self-
understanding (Bayer 1981; Lewes 1988).
Today, psychodynamic psychotherapists understand that same-sex
romance and sexual attraction is not pathology and is mostly immuta-
ble. They also understand that clinical data alone cannot lead to a com-
118 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

plete theory of the development of sexual orientation (Auchincloss and

Vaughan 2001; Downey and Friedman 1998; Friedman 1988; Isay 1989).
Contemporary psychodynamic psychotherapists are interested in how
all patients, whatever their primary orientation may be, face the chal-
lenges presented by intimacy and sexuality. Aware that some problems
are specific to those with same-sex orientation, psychodynamic psycho-
therapists are alert to how patients with same-sex orientation consoli-
date identity (or not); manage the problem of being different from
(most) parents; deal with homophobia, either from the surrounding cul-
ture or in the form of internalized homophobia (Friedman 1998); and/or
raise children under atypical circumstances, to mention a few issues. As
with the psychoanalytic theory of gender development, human sexual-
ity of all kinds is now understood in vastly more inclusive terms, with
developmental theorists considering findings from behavioral genetics,
psychoneuroendocrinology, and many other neighboring disciplines in
addition to data from the clinical situation (Britton et al. 1989; Friedman
and Downey 1995).

The Universality of the Oedipus Complex

Contemporary psychodynamic practitioners have a complex view of
oedipal-phase issues that includes an appreciation of innate factors and
the influence of the environment. However, despite the fact that many
concepts related to the oedipus complex have changed in the face of
new information, psychodynamic psychiatrists continue to feel that the
oedipus complex describes an important and universal set of thoughts
and feelings that have lasting effects on everyone. To begin with, psy-
chodynamic psychotherapists retain much of the terminology associ-
ated with the oedipus complex, adhering to a long tradition beginning
with Freud. For example, although the complex was named for a male
hero, the term is used when talking about both genders. Although at-
tempts to correct this male-centered bias in terminology have been
made (for example, the suggestion of analogous concepts such as the
Electra complex), these efforts did not catch on. Some theorists have
proposed that the myth of Persephone offers a better story to describe
the conflicts of a little girl (Kulish and Holtzman 1998).
In the face of the many changes and developments in oedipal theory,
the best way to explain the universality of the complex is to understand
that in every culture, and in every mind, there are always at least three
problems that must be addressed by every individual. First, everyone
in every culture must deal with the problem that other people with
The Oedipus Complex 119

whom we are emotionally involved may have a relationship with each

other that excludes us. Second, everyone in every culture must deal
with the problem that certain strivings are forbidden. Finally, everyone
in every culture must deal with the fact of having once been a child and
with the many lasting feelings that accompany that fact. Understood in
this way, although the oedipal configuration may differ among cultures
and individuals, no human being escapes the psychic effects of these
universal problems. Everyone must find a way to manage the chal-
lenges presented by these problems, and as a result, everyone must con-
tend with feelings of competition and exclusion; desire, fear, and guilt;
and helplessness and powerlessness. In Western culture, the oedipus
complex (as described by psychoanalytic theory) is the most common
way that this scenario presents itself in childhood. Although variations
in this configuration are common, the oedipal scenario and its accom-
panying emotional challenges are universal.
Evidence for the universality and continued relevance of the oedi-
pus complex continues to come from the growing field of developmen-
tal psychology (Gilmore and Meersand 2013). In addition, cognitive
psychologists have devised ingenious experiments to explore the influ-
ence of oedipal fantasies on performance of a variety of tasks (Britton
1989; Eagle 1959; Palumbo and Gillman 1984). However, the most com-
pelling evidence for the ongoing significance of this concept comes
from clinical experience with individuals in psychodynamic psycho-
therapy who struggle with the persistent effects of oedipal conflict as
evinced by neurotic suffering.

The Oedipus Complex and

the Importance of Narrative and Fantasy
Freud’s interest expanded from the study of hysteria and psychopathol-
ogy to the study of dreams and of normal psychology. His attention also
moved from a focus on external events (seduction hypothesis) to a focus
on the internal workings of the mind. In the process, Freud developed
the Topographic Model. He began to write about art and literature, in
which he found many examples of stories illustrating how this model
of the mind works. Freud came to see that neurotic suffering and
dreams are linked to art and literature through the shared structure of
the story. His explication of the oedipus complex was the first (and per-
haps most famous) example of how to understand that a dramatic story
appears in both the work of poets and playwrights and in the ordinary
human mind. Moving back and forth from the exploration of neurotic
120 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

and normal human psychology to the study of literature, art, and art-
ists, Freud used his new theory of mind to reveal the ordinary psychol-
ogy hidden in artistic creation and the dramatic scenarios expressed in
everyday life. In his writings about literature, Freud suggested that cre-
ative writers are individuals who have special access to an innate story-
telling capacity of the mind (Freud 1908a/1962).
This innate storytelling aspect of mental life is reflected in the grow-
ing importance of the concept of fantasy as children approach the oedipal
period. In the human mind, all experience is organized in the form of
fantasies—scenarios in narrative form that usually feature the fantasizer
in a major role. With regard to the narrative framework of experience,
the psychoanalytic model of the mind posits the following process: ex-
perience begins as a feeling; a feeling develops into a wish and/or fear;
wishes and fears are grouped into complexes; and complexes are orga-
nized into networks of fantasy. Again, the oedipus complex is the first of
these networks of fantasy to be described. Throughout this book, we will
describe many more. This aspect of the mind’s shaping of experience is
called the narrative structure of the mind. The emphasis placed by the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind on the mind’s storytelling capacity brings
it into closer contact with neighboring mind science, which has become
increasingly interested in the narrative structure of mind and brain.
The most obvious examples of fantasy in mental life include the
phenomenon of daydreaming and the fantasies that accompany mas-
turbation and sexual activity. Also, earlier in this chapter we saw that
oedipal-stage children become increasingly interested in storytelling.
However, the creation of fantasy is a more or less continuous process,
most of which goes on outside of awareness, so that we often refer to
unconscious fantasy. The most elaborate of our fantasies is the life story
(or stories) by which each of us lives. Much of psychoanalytic psycho-
therapy is devoted to the tasks of exposing and exploring the uncon-
scious fantasy life of the mind and organizing this fantasy life into a life
story. Indeed, in the autobiographical subplot of The Interpretation of
Dreams, we find the first full-length exposition of how the workings of
the unconscious mind are connected not just to the creation of symp-
toms, or even of dreams, but also to the narration of personal details of
the entire life story of a single striving individual—in this case the life
story of Sigmund Freud himself.
The Oedipus Complex 121

Revision of the Topographic Model:

Freud’s Structural Model of the Mind
Part of Freud’s genius was to see the similarities between apparently
disparate human activities such as symptoms, jokes, bungled actions,
dreams, and daydreams, finding in these seemingly unimportant bits of
human mental activity the key to understanding some of the deepest of
human concerns. It is part of the lasting appeal of Freud’s work that he
was able to link the ordinary to the extraordinary, discovering the com-
mon humanity between the suffering neurotic and the creative artist,
alike in their struggle to reconcile the demands of the unconscious with
the constraints imposed by everyday reality. The Topographic Model of
the mind, initially presented in The Interpretation of Dreams and devel-
oped over the subsequent 20-odd years, represents Freud’s first attempt
to build a theoretical model that would organize and account for his ex-
traordinary observations. This model opened the door to ways of think-
ing about what human mental life is like—and about how it expresses
itself in many diverse ways—that had never been considered before.
However, in this description of the Topographic Model of the mind
we find many contradictions. The alert reader may have already no-
ticed these many contradictions. Although Freud struggled for more
than two decades to fit his many observations about human mental life
into the Topographic Model, he was finally forced to offer a radical re-
vision of this model, known as the Structural Model. In Part III, we will
begin with an exploration of the many contradictions in the Topo-
graphic Model that led to its being revised. As we will see, one of these
contradictions is the structure of fantasy itself, which according to the
Topographic Model of the mind should not exist in the unconscious-
ness. Nevertheless, let us end Part II with a reminder that much of the
Topographic Model remains useful, especially the understanding of the
power of the dynamic unconscious to affect everything that we do. Cli-
nicians must remember that unacceptable thoughts and feelings
pushed from awareness are often the cause of neurosis, and that bring-
ing these thoughts and feelings to light can assist their patients in com-
bating mental suffering.
122 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 7–1 shows our Topographic Model chart of core dimensions with
the addition of key concepts for Motivation, Structure/Process, and De-
velopment.

• Topographic point of view: The oedipus complex is almost entirely

unconscious.
• Motivational point of view: Oedipal strivings (the wish to be the pri-
mary recipient of the desired parent’s love, along with the wish to be
rid of the other, competing parent) are part of what motivates each of
us all the time. Oedipal fears (including fear of abandonment or loss
of love, fear of retaliation [i.e., castration anxiety], and fear of guilt
feelings) are also important to each of us.
• Structural point of view: The oedipus complex creates a structure in
the mind that influences all later experience. (The term complex refers
to any set of unconscious associated feelings and ideas that form a
network, or template, in the mind.) The oedipus complex illustrates
the innate storytelling capacity of the human mind. In his writings,
Freud vividly described how the mind organizes its experience by
means of fantasy scenarios in narrative form. Finally, the oedipal com-
plex leads to some important changes in the mind. As the child grad-
ually internalizes parental prohibitions against oedipal strivings, a
new structure—the superego (or conscience)—emerges that generates
the feeling of guilt. Important modifications in self-image, or identifi-
cations, also form as the child begins to emulate the parents instead
of pursuing wishes for romantic attachment to them.
• Developmental point of view: The oedipal phase—between the
ages of 3 and 6 years old—is the time when oedipal strivings and fears
predominate. However, these strivings and fears last forever, persist-
ing into adolescence and adulthood. In other words, the life of the
child lives on the adult mind.
• Theory of psychopathology: Oedipal conflicts stemming from early
life leave a lasting imprint and contribute to psychological suffering
(neurosis) in adulthood.
• Theory of therapeutic action: Exploration of the oedipus complex is
part of almost all psychodynamic psychotherapies.
 The Oedipus Complex
TABLE 7–1. Topographic Model Part 3: The Oedipus Complex

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

The mind is The unconscious mind The unconscious Primary process is the Neurosis arises from Free association
divided into consists of wishes operates earliest mode of conflict between (“fundamental
three regions: always striving for according to mental functioning; the conscious/ rule”)
Conscious expression primary process; secondary process preconscious
Preconscious the preconscious/ develops later domains and the Examination of
Unconscious Unacceptable wishes are conscious operates unconscious domain transference and
kept in check by according to Wishes come from Return of the repressed resistance
forces of repression secondary process childhood and form Repetition compulsion
from the the basis of infantile Therapeutic
preconscious/ A censor separates the sexuality interpretation and
conscious mind unconscious and reconstruction
the conscious/ Oedipal strivings and fears
Oedipal strivings preconscious persist into adolescence Insight (“Make the
Oedipal fears mind and adulthood unconscious
conscious”)
Dreams Wishes become
increasingly Dream exploration
Complex unacceptable
Fantasy
Narrative Censoring capacity grows

Conscience
Identifications

123
124 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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lytic Bibliography. Hillsdale, NJ, Analytic Press, 1991
Stoller R: Primary femininity. J Am Psychoanal Assoc 24 (suppl):59–78, 1976
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 PART III

The Structural
Model
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER 8

A New Configuration and a

New Concept: The Ego

This chapter introduces readers to the Structural Model of the

mind, briefly defining the concepts id, ego, and superego. It reviews the
reasons why the psychoanalytic model of the mind needed to be
changed. It explores the concept of ego in greater depth. Vocabulary
introduced in this chapter includes the following: adaptation, autono-
mous ego functions, average expectable environment, ego, ego functions, ego
identity/identity, ego psychology, ego strength, ego weakness, homeostasis, id,
identification, internalization, reality testing, superego, and tripartite model.
The Structural Model of the mind was the second version of the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind. Freud introduced the Structural Model
in 1923, in his book The Ego and the Id (Freud 1923/1962). As we will see,
Freud offered his revised model of the mind in response to his growing
awareness that the Topographic Model of the mind had many theoreti-
cal inconsistencies, and most important, that it failed to help him
explain the ever-wider range of clinical problems with which he was
confronted. As a result of this awareness, Freud began to question
whether the best way to understand the psychological struggles of his
patients was to explore them along topographic lines. He proposed that
mental life might be best understood not as the result of a struggle
between unconscious and preconscious/conscious domains of the
mind but instead as the result of the interaction between three struc-
tures of the mind, which he called ego, id, and superego. These structures

129
130 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

are distinguished from one another by their different motivations,

structural properties, modes of operation, and development. To sum-
marize briefly, ego is the name for the executive function of the mind
responsible for maintenance of homeostasis and adaptation; id is the
name for the motivational forces in human psychic life, called the drives;
and superego is the name for the moral imperatives and ideals that we
commonly call the conscience.
In the 1950s, especially in the United States, the Structural Model of
the mind became the dominant model of mental functioning used by
psychodynamic clinicians. Over time, it became synonymous with the
term ego psychology, the branch of psychoanalysis that emphasizes the ego
and its role in psychological functioning. In addition, the Structural
Model of the mind is considered to be synonymous with the term tripar-
tite model of the mind and also often with the term conflict theory, which em-
phasizes how the ego manages the competing aims of the id and the
superego in accord with external reality by forging compromises that af-
fect all of mental life. Finally, the Structural Model of the mind (and/or
Ego Psychology/Conflict Theory) has often been considered to be synon-
ymous with what has been called classical psychoanalysis or even simply
Freudian psychoanalysis. Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the
present, the Structural Model of the mind (and Ego Psychology) has often
been in competition with Object Relations Theory and/or Self Psychol-
ogy (and, more recently, with Relational Psychoanalysis) for dominance
in the world of psychodynamic psychiatry (see Part IV). Among the aims
of this book is to show that these models can be combined (along with the
Topographic Model) into an integrated point of view.

Problems Leading to Revision

of the Topographic Model
What problems led Freud to revise his theory in the form of the Struc-
tural Model of the mind? Although we have seen that the Topographic
Model is useful in many ways, Freud soon discovered that his division
of the mind into unconscious and preconscious/conscious s was not
adequate to describe all of the complexities of mental life. To review
briefly, in the Topographic Model, conflict occurs between unconscious
wishes seeking expression and preconscious/conscious forces of
repression, which respond to the demands of reality, society, and moral-
ity. The unconscious is entirely wishful and uninhibited, and the pre-
conscious/conscious includes all capacities for organization, appraisal,
planning, and delay. This model presents several problems.
A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego 131

First of all, the model was challenged by Freud’s observation, perhaps

already obvious to the astute reader, that both the defenses against the
emergence of unconscious wishes and the censor at whose behest these
defenses operate are themselves unconscious. They cannot be brought to
consciousness simply by attending to them, as we can with the precon-
scious. For the most part (with some exceptions), we are not aware of de-
liberately excluding thoughts from consciousness or of censoring them.
Indeed, if we were, the whole purpose of a defense intended to produce
“not knowing” would be defeated. In the clinical situation, the patient
shows evidence of resistance, but this resistance is not mounted con-
sciously. In other words, the psychoanalytic model of the mind must in-
clude an unconscious that is capable of appraisal and defense.
Second, Freud began to observe that in more than a few instances,
the thoughts and feelings defended against are not wishes at all; rather,
they are moral concerns. Freud’s work with patients suffering from mel-
ancholia (the term that he used for depression), obsessional symptoms,
and masochism led to his understanding that moral imperatives and
self-punitive tendencies can also operate unconsciously. These moral
imperatives may include ideals, taboos, punishments, and rewards. In
other words, the psychoanalytic model of the mind must include an
unconscious that contains moral imperatives in addition to wishes.
Finally, as we have seen in Chapter 7 in our exploration of the oedi-
pus complex, the unconscious is replete with stories organized in nar-
rative form. When Freud first began clinical work, he did not worry
much about the structure or organization of psychological experience.
However, as his theory developed, he began to recognize that certain
mental contents are organized in ways that, in themselves, influence the
nature of experience. As we have seen, Freud recognized early on that
thoughts in the form of wishes had a special place in mental life. Soon,
with the help of ideas borrowed from colleagues (including Carl Jung
and others), Freud began to understand that these wishes are organized
into complexes—groups of associated ideas, feelings, and wishes—that
are stored together in the mind. He went on to develop the idea that
mental experience, especially emotionally charged experience, is orga-
nized in the form of fantasies, or imaginative story-like narratives fea-
turing the imagining subject in a major role. The concept of unconscious
fantasy began to take on major importance in the psychoanalytic
approach to understanding subjective experience (see Chapter 7, “The
Oedipus Complex”). However, the idea that unconscious mental life is
organized as a story contradicts the Topographic Model of the mind,
which asserts that unconscious mental life can only be wishful, orga-
nized by primary process. In other words, the psychoanalytic model of
132 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

the mind must include an unconscious that can be organized in narra-

tive form. Ultimately, for these three reasons, the Topographic Model
had to be revised (Arlow and Brenner 1964).

As the Topographic Model Collapses,

the Unconscious Expands
Another way to look at the transition from the Topographic Model to
the Structural Model of the mind is to recognize that the important con-
cept of the unconscious has itself changed dramatically. Contemporary
psychodynamic psychiatrists no longer refer to the original idea, central
to the Topographic Model, of a unified unconscious domain of the mind
characterized by a single type of childish, wishful content or a single
kind of mental processing. We can see from our earlier look at the Top-
ographic Model how the Freudian unconscious got its widespread and
false reputation as a “cauldron full of seething excitations” (Freud
1933/1962, p. 73; Park and Auchincloss 2006). However, when Freud
formulated the Structural Model of the mind, he dismantled the Topo-
graphic Model, with its “seething cauldron” view of the unconscious.
This dismantling was largely in response to his own growing awareness
that unconscious mental life includes not only peremptory wishes but
also moral, strategic, and reality-oriented strivings, many organized in
ways that are logical and goal directed. In other words, with the intro-
duction of the Structural Model, the idea of the unconscious as an un-
derworld full of primitive, irrational, and wishful strivings, hell-bent on
seeking expression at all costs, was no longer viable. In the new model,
the dynamic unconscious was envisioned as including strivings for self-
preservation, capacities for appraisal and choice, and moral impera-
tives, as well as childish, pleasure-seeking wishes (see Chapter 3, “Evo-
lution of the Dynamic Unconscious”).

The Ego
This brings us to the new and important concept of the ego, or the execu-
tive agency of the mind. Among the most important novel features of the
Structural Model of the mind is its greater emphasis on our psychological
capacities for self-regulation (sometimes called homeostasis) and for adapta-
tion. Although these capacities are implied in the Topographic Model,
with a censor capable of judgment and delay, they are given vastly
greater attention in the new Structural Model—all posited to be capaci-
ties of this new structure called the ego. The word ego was coined by
A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego 133

James Strachey in his translation of Freud’s das Ich or “the I.” Strachey
was the editor in chief of the English language edition of Freud’s writ-
ings, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, published between 1956 and 1974. Strachey and his team of editors
are responsible for coining familiar words such as ego, id, parapraxis, ca-
thexis, and others. Prior to 1923, Freud had used the term ego in variety of
ways, but mostly to designate the whole mind or the whole person. He
did not formally assert that the ego is the executive function of the
mind—or, as he put it, “a coherent organization of mental processes”—
until his introduction of the Structural Model (Freud 1923/1962, p. 9).
When Freud developed this formal concept of the ego, he launched
the beginning of an enormous interest in the processes of homeostasis
and adaptation and in the ego functions that comprise these important
processes. These ego functions include capacities previously attributed
to the conscious/preconscious mind in the Topographic Model, such as
censorship and defense, as well as characteristics assigned to secondary
process in the Topographic Model, such as reason, logic, and judgment.
The ego functions also include cognition, perception, memory, motility,
affect, thinking, language, symbolization, reality testing, evaluation,
impulse control, and affect tolerance, to mention an important few. Ego
functions include the vital tasks of mediating conflict and forging com-
promise (see Chapter 10). They also include the key tasks of forming
and maintaining mental representations, including representations of
self and object (see Chapters 11 and 12). The ego has conscious, precon-
scious, and unconscious aspects; however, for the most part, ego func-
tions operate outside of awareness. Only a few ego functions operate
preconsciously and consciously (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 69).
Let us explore the processes of self-regulation/homeostasis and
adaptation in greater detail. To begin with, homeostasis is a concept bor-
rowed by psychoanalysis from general biology, which explores this im-
portant function in every organism. Recently, the field of cognitive
science has contributed a great deal to our understanding of how this
function works (see section “The Rise of Cognitive Psychology” in
Chapter 3). We also mentioned some aspects of this function in Chapter
7 when we discussed contemporary views of the oedipus complex. As
we saw then, the psychoanalytic model of the mind helps us under-
stand the capacity to regulate conflicting motives by appraising them,
deciding on priorities, and forging compromises among them.
The Structural Model of the mind marks a vast improvement over
the Topographic Model in terms of delineating conflicting motivations,
explaining how we at arrive at compromises, and explicating the ego
functions necessary for forging these compromises. For example, in the
134 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Structural Model, defense is defined as both a capacity of the ego and one
of the most important elements of compromise. In the new model, the
range of possible defenses expands beyond repression to include an al-
most infinite array of strategies by which the mind can manage conflict.
Managing the subjective experience of psychic conflict requires addi-
tional ego functions, such as impulse control and affect tolerance. As
noted previously, we will discuss conflict, defense, and compromise in
greater detail in Chapter 10.
In addition to having the function of self-regulation, the ego is de-
fined as the mental structure with the capacity for adaptation to exter-
nal reality. Adaptation is another concept borrowed by psychoanalysis
from general biology and refers to the survival needs of every organism
and how these survival needs are met in interaction with the environ-
ment. Adaptation includes the fit between an individual and the envi-
ronment and the psychological processes that enhance this fit by
changing, controlling, and/or accommodating to the environment
(Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 6). When applied to psychoanalytic
psychology, the concept of adaptation emphasizes the fact that human
psychology is shaped not only by conflicting internal motivations but
also by interactions with the relevant environment. For the most part,
psychoanalysis stresses the caregiving environment, the family, and
sometimes the surrounding culture. As we will see in Chapter 10, adap-
tation to external reality plays an important role in mediation of conflict
and forging of compromise. As we will see in Part IV, in both Object Re-
lations Theory and Self Psychology, exploration of how the growing
child develops psychological structures in interaction with the care tak-
ing environment becomes ever more important as the psychoanalytic
model of the mind develops.
The earlier Topographic Model of the mind does include some aware-
ness of the importance of adaptation to external reality in psychological
life. For example, the Topographic Model posited that unconscious
wishes are in conflict with the demands of external reality or society as
perceived by the preconscious/conscious. Furthermore, Freud argued
that the secondary processes of the preconscious/conscious regions of
the mind develop in response to the infant’s growing awareness that the
primary processes are not enough to achieve satisfaction in the real
world. Finally, arguing within the Topographic Model of the mind, Freud
also argued that motives for self-preservation (an early version of what
would soon become the ego) were in conflict with unconscious wishes.
However, the Topographic Model of the mind places strongest emphasis
on the unconscious wishes themselves. Indeed, most of the writing of
Freud consisted of his attempts to characterize the nature of the uncon-
A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego 135

scious. In other words, although the Topographic Model of the mind did
acknowledge the impact of the external world, as delineated above, this
impact was poorly conceptualized.
The new Structural Model of the mind marked a vast improvement
over the Topographic Model in terms of understanding the mind’s ca-
pacity to adapt to external reality. For example, the capacity for reality
testing, defined as an ego function, can now be studied in greater depth.
In addition, we find a growing interest in processes of internalization,
also an ego function, which can also be studied in greater depth. Inter-
nalization is another concept borrowed from general biology, defined
(often in opposition to externalization) as an organism’s tendency to take
in aspects of the external world. Indeed, Freud first described the ego
itself as developing under the impact of perceptual stimuli, or aware-
ness of external reality. Later he described how the ego gains strength
and character from the internalization of interpersonal relationships (see
Chapters 9 and 10 for an introduction to the concept of character). For ex-
ample, identification is defined as a modification of the self-image that
results from internalizing the traits of others. We have seen how oedipal
strivings are managed through the development of identifications with
parents who have previously been experienced as rivals. Understand-
ing the many aspects of internalization (including identification) will
become increasingly important as the psychoanalytic model of the
mind develops, and as we explore Object Relations Theory and Self
Psychology in Part IV (Vaillant 1977, 1983).

Contribution of the Ego to

Theory of Psychopathology and
Therapeutic Action in the Structural Model
The Structural Model of the mind, and the concept of the ego in partic-
ular, has had a profound effect on how psychodynamic psychiatrists
think about mental health, psychopathology, and treatment. Delinea-
tion of the various ego functions allowed clinicians to evaluate them in-
dividually and to thereby give a richer description of mental health
expressed as ego strengths, and psychopathology expressed as ego weak-
nesses. Although these concepts have been refined over time, they are in
widespread use in the contemporary mental health professions to de-
scribe the level at which our patients function.
In the Topographic Model of the mind, neurotic psychopathology
was understood as resulting from the inflexible, stereotyped influence
of unconscious wishes in situations where repression was too rigid or
136 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

wishes too strong. The goal of treatment was the search for hidden but
pathogenic unconscious striving with the aim of “mak[ing] conscious
everything that is pathogenically unconscious” (Freud 1901/1962,
p. 238; Freud 1916–1917/1962, p. 282). What Freud meant by this state-
ment was that by subjecting unconscious wishes to conscious judgment
rather than to repression, the patient would have greater control over
his or her mind (Freud 1905/1962). With the introduction of the Struc-
tural Model, neurotic psychopathology came to be understood as the
result of inflexible or maladaptive efforts on the part of the ego to forge
compromise among competing aims. Under the new model, the goal of
treatment was to understand how the ego manages (or fails to manage)
conflict, with the aim of strengthening the ego’s adaptive capacity. With
this in mind, we can better understand Freud’s famous statement,
“Where id was, there ego shall be” (Freud 1923/1962, p. 56; Freud
1933/1962, p. 80). These new ways of thinking about psychopathology
and treatment will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 10 (“Conflict
and Compromise”).

The Work of Well-Known Ego Psychologists

Anna Freud
The Topographic Model of the mind was largely the creation of one
man, Sigmund Freud. However, although introduced by Freud, the
Structural Model of the mind was elaborated by many others. For ex-
ample, Freud’s youngest daughter, Anna Freud (1895–1982), explored
the defensive capacities of the ego in her book The Ego and the Mecha-
nisms of Defense (A. Freud 1936/1974). Anna Freud is probably best
known as a major proponent of the field of psychodynamic child psy-
chiatry and psychotherapy, but in this role, she also made many contri-
butions to the study of normal and pathological ego development (A.
Freud 1965/1975). We will not explore the field of psychodynamic child
psychiatry in depth, or even the vast field of ego development, as such
an exploration would take us far afield. However, it is useful to notice
that Ego Psychology developed alongside the growth of psychoanalytic
developmental theory and child observation and that the two are
closely related (Gilmore and Meersand 2013).

Heinz Hartmann
Another important contributor to the field of Ego Psychology was
Heinz Hartmann (1894–1970), whose book Ego Psychology and the Prob-
A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego 137

lem of Adaptation (1939/1958) made explicit the importance of the

mind’s capacity for adaptation to external reality. In Hartmann’s view,
the ego develops in the course of interactions between the mind’s in-
born potential and what he called the average expectable environment. The
average expectable environment includes aspects of the usual caregiv-
ing environment, such as love, nurturing, and safety. Hartmann was
also important for having described autonomous ego functions—inborn
capacities of the mind that develop independently, or autonomously,
from conflict and that include thought, memory, perception, cognition,
and motility. As we have seen in some of the examples in Chapter 7 on
the oedipus complex, autonomous ego functions can be drawn into
conflict and become distorted. As we will see below, the delineation of
autonomous ego functions, and the concept of the ego in general, al-
lows psychoanalytic psychology to develop in close contact with the
rest of psychology, including cognitive neuroscience.

Erik Erikson
A final ego psychologist familiar to most of our readers is Erik Erikson
(1902–1994), who after Sigmund Freud is possibly the best known psy-
choanalyst in the United States (Park and Auchincloss 2006). Erikson is
famous for his eight-stage theory of human development throughout
the life cycle, which includes the stages trust/mistrust, autonomy/shame
and doubt, initiative/guilt, industry/inferiority, identity/role confusion (or dif-
fusion), intimacy/isolation, generativity/stagnation, and ego integrity/despair.
In the successful negotiation of each of these stages, the developing in-
dividual acquires the psychological capacity for which each stage is
named (e.g., trust); if this capacity is not attained, a pathological state of
mind ensues (e.g., mistrust). Capacities result from interactions among
inborn capacities, external reality, interpersonal relationships, and the
surrounding culture. One of Erikson’s most important contributions
was the concept of ego identity, later shortened to identity, which is de-
fined as the consolidation of a stable sense of oneself as a unique indi-
vidual in society (Erikson 1950, 1956, 1959; see also Auchincloss and
Samberg 2012, p. 70). Erikson’s argument that ego development can
only be understood in the context of the surrounding culture has al-
lowed psychoanalytic psychology to develop in close contact with the
rest of the social sciences, including sociology, anthropology, and others.
In addition, Erikson’s interest in the importance of the object in each
stage and the importance of developing a healthy sense of identity pres-
ages the development of Object Relations Theory and Self Psychology
(see Chapters 11 and 12).
138 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Points of Convergence Between

the Structural Model and General Psychology
As we have seen, the Structural Model of the mind and Ego Psychology
brought with them an interest in a wide array of mental processes and
capacities. Some of these capacities—such as many related to the man-
agement of conflict (see Chapter 10)—operate outside of awareness be-
cause they are repressed. However, the ego also includes many
processes and capacities that operate outside of awareness not because
they are repressed but because they are designed to operate this way.
These capacities are part of what Freud called the descriptive uncon-
scious (see Chapters 3 and 5). Indeed, with the emphasis of the Struc-
tural Model on the mind’s capacities for homeostasis and adaptation,
Ego Psychology brings the psychoanalytic model of the mind into
closer contact with the rest of general psychology (Kagan 1983; Mischel
et al. 1989; Piaget and Inhelder 1969; White 1959). The Structural Model
of the mind also brings the psychoanalytic model of the mind into con-
tact with aspects of neuroscience (Casey et al. 2011; Ochsner and Gross
2005; Ochsner et al. 2002). The National Institute of Mental Health,
which aims to arrive at a new way of classifying psychopathology
based on dimensions of observable behavior and neurobiological mea-
sures, has introduced Research Domain Criteria that include the do-
main “Cognitive Systems,” which in the psychoanalytic model of the
mind are defined as ego functions (Cuthbert and Insel 2013).1
During a period in the development of the psychoanalytic model of
the mind in the 1950s and 1960s, proponents of Ego Psychology, includ-
ing Hartmann and others, went so far as to argue that psychoanalysis
was on its way to becoming a “general psychology” (Hartmann 1964).
These ego psychologists understood that a complete psychology should
include many things, including findings from the clinical situation, ex-
perimental psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive neurosci-
ence, and the social sciences. They argued that the Structural Model of
the mind, especially the concept of the ego with its autonomous func-
tions, brought psychoanalysis closer to developing such a general psy-
chology, or a complete understanding of the mind. For those readers
interested in history, this view of psychoanalysis coincides with a period
of relative hegemony of psychoanalysis in American psychiatry. How-

1See nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml (accessed January 12,

2014).
A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego 139

ever, this broad, expansive view of the possibilities of the psychoanalytic

model of the mind has fallen out of favor. Most contemporary psycho-
analysts (the author included) feel that psychology is a composite field
that includes many kinds of knowledge, from experimental psychology,
developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial
intelligence, philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and others. This book
seeks not to delineate a complete theory of mind, but rather to delineate
the special contributions of the psychoanalytic model of the mind to a
theory of mind. It also seeks to outline a psychoanalytic model of the
mind that is consistent with information from neighboring disciplines,
especially from the cognitive neurosciences. At the same time, as we saw
in Part I, the rest of general psychology is slowly but surely inching its
way toward the psychoanalytic model of the mind, in a quiet process
that continues to this day. In the next chapter we will discuss the other
components of the Structural Model of the mind: the id and the super-
ego, emphasizing how in these structures, also, we can find links to
neighboring disciplines.

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 8–1 introduces our Structural Model chart of core dimensions, in
which we have placed the following key concepts:

• Topographic point of view: The ego and superego have both con-
scious/preconscious and unconscious aspects. The id is defined as
entirely unconscious.
• Motivational point of view: The ego seeks both homeostasis (self-reg-
ulation) and adaptation. The id is the seat of our basic pleasure-seek-
ing motives, called drives. The superego is concerned with moral
imperatives. These motivations are always in conflict; as a result, com-
promise among them must be forged.
• Structural point of view: The mind is divided into three structures:
ego, id, and superego. The ego has capacities—termed ego func-
tions—that include faculties previously attributed to primary process
in the Topographic Model, such as censorship and defense, as well as
characteristics associated with secondary process, such as cognition,
140 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

perception, memory, evaluation (encompassing reality testing), af-

fect and impulse tolerance, and the ability to form mental represen-
tations. The ego also has capacities for internalization (an organism’s
tendency to take in aspects of the external world), identification (mod-
ification of the self-image that results from internalizing the traits of
others), and the formation of ego identity (the consolidation of a stable
sense of oneself as a unique individual in society).
• Developmental point of view: The ego develops throughout the life
cycle, especially during childhood. In Erikson’s eight-stage theory of
human development, each stage represents a specific psychological
capacity that must be acquired for the ego to develop successfully:
trust/mistrust, autonomy/shame and doubt, initiative/guilt, industry/infe-
riority, identity/role confusion (or diffusion), intimacy/isolation, generativ-
ity/stagnation, and ego integrity/despair.
• Theory of psychopathology: In the Structural Model, mental health
is assessed in terms of ego strength, and psychopathology in terms
of ego weakness.
• Theory of therapeutic action: Exploration of the strategies by which
the ego maintains homeostasis and adaptation in the face of conflict
is part of every psychodynamic psychotherapy—hence the phrase
“Where id was, there ego shall be.”
 A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego
TABLE 8–1. Structural Model Part 1: A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

The ego and the The ego, superego, The mind is divided into Ego development Ego strength/ego Strengthening the ego
superego and id each have three structures: Erikson’s stages weakness serves as “Where id was, there
have both separate aims: ego, superego, an index of mental ego shall be”
conscious/ The ego— and id health/illness
preconscious homeostasis
and and adaptation The ego
unconscious The superego— Ego functions
aspects moral Defense
imperatives Internalization
The id is entirely The id—drives Identification
unconscious Ego identity
Conflict is always
present because
of competing aims

141
142 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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 CHAPTER 9

The Id and the Superego

This chapter describes the concepts of id and superego in greater

detail. It also explains drive theory, libido theory, and psychosexuality.
The advantages and disadvantages of a drive view of motivation are ex-
plored. Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes the following:
aggression, aggressive drive, anal stage, autoerotic, drive, drive theory, ego
ideal, erotogenic zone, fixation, genital stage, guilt, infantile sexuality, in-
stinct, latency, libido, libido theory, object seeking, oedipal period, oral stage,
phallic stage, preoedipal period, psychic energy, psychosexual stages, psycho-
sexuality, reaction formation, regression, separation anxiety, sexuality, shame,
stranger anxiety, and sublimation.
To understand how the Structural Model of the mind helps us to un-
derstand normal and pathological mental functioning, we must move on
to explore the id and the superego. As noted in Chapter 8 (“A New Con-
figuration and a New Concept: The Ego”), the ego has the job not only of
self-regulation/homeostasis and adaptation but also of mediating con-
flict and forging compromise between the demands of id and superego,
in accord with external reality. What are the id and the superego? How do
they function, and what do they help us to understand about the mind?

The Id
In the Structural Model of the mind, the id is the part of the mind that con-
tains our basic pleasure-seeking motives. In the Structural Model, the

145
146 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

forces of the id are called drives. These drives consist of the drive for psy-
chosexual satisfaction and the drive for aggression. Drive theory was the
first fully developed theory of motivation in the psychoanalytic model of
the mind. In this chapter, we explain what drive theory is, along with its
well-known corollary libido theory. We also explain what the aggressive
drive is. We explain which aspects of drive theory are important and how
this theory has been updated in contemporary psychoanalysis.
The word id (like the word ego) was coined by James Strachey in his
translation of Freud’s term das Es (literally “the It”1). The id is the struc-
ture of the mind most closely associated with biological needs of the
human organism, including sexual and aggressive urges. The id is
defined as entirely unconscious. It is made up of inborn needs and
acquired passions, both of which can be repressed.
In the Structural Model of the mind, the concept of the id inherits al-
most all of the properties of the unconscious as described in the Topo-
graphic Model of the mind. For example, the id includes the quality of
wishfulness, it is often unacceptable to consciousness, and it is kept
from awareness by the force of repression. It operates according to the
primary process mode of functioning, seeking satisfaction and pleasure
without concern for the consequences. Finally, it seeks always to escape
repression and to influence thought and behavior. In the service of this
escape from repression, the id assumes many disguises. We will explore
all of these features in greater detail here and also in Chapter 10, where
we discuss how the id contributes to conflict and compromise.
The id is always in close contact with the ego, with which it func-
tions in a tight symbiosis. Each structure is dependent on the other. The
id lacks the organizational and rational capacities of the ego, and unlike
the ego, it cannot recognize the world outside the mind. Therefore, the
id can express itself only through the activities of the ego. The ego lacks
the motivational power of the id. Therefore, in order to accomplish any-
thing, the ego must borrow this power from the id. Freud represented
the tight relationship between ego and id in his famous metaphor of the
rider (ego) and the horse (id). In the functioning of this team, most of
the power is provided by the horse, and most of the planning is pro-

1Here Freud acknowledged his adaptation of the term from the German psy-

chiatrist Georg Groddeck (1923/1949), who employed das Es to describe the

way that man is “lived by” unknown and uncontrollable forces. Freud also
linked this use with Friedrich Nietzsche, who used das Es to refer to the com-
ponent of human nature that is under the control of natural law (Auchincloss
and Samberg 2012).
The Id and the Superego 147

vided by the rider. However, the uneasiness of their relationship is also

represented in the metaphor. Imagine what happens when the rider is
unable to direct the horse to go where he wants it to go. If the rider fails,
the team runs into trouble. In other words, if the ego fails, the person de-
velops psychopathology (Freud 1923/1962). Again, we will explore the
contributions of the id (and of the ego and the superego) to psychopa-
thology in both this chapter and Chapter 10.
For several reasons, most contemporary psychoanalytic practitio-
ners do not use the word id very much anymore. First of all, the id is
defined as consisting of wishful desires alone, without any organization
beyond that of the primary process. Therefore, we cannot experience
the contents of the id directly; we can only infer its existence from its
contribution to compromises forged by the ego. In addition, the id and
the drives are associated with the language of psychic energy in which
these concepts were first described by Freud. This language has been
much criticized both within and outside of psychoanalysis (Brenner
1982; Holt 1976; Klein 1976; Rosenblatt and Thickstun 1970; Schafer
1976). In other words, in the Structural Model of the mind, the id is con-
ceived of as a place in the mind made up of purely wishful drive energy.
For these reasons, even theorists who use the word drive rarely invoke
the term id. However, work in the neurosciences has provided some
support for the concept of a deep level of motivation and reward that
seems to correspond to aspects of the concept of id (LeDoux 1996; Olds
and Forbes 1981; Panksepp 1998). There are also links between the con-
cept of id and the domain “Positive Valence Systems” of the National
Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria.2 The concept of id
(and drive) is also still useful as a way of conceptualizing important
aspects of motivation. We will say more about these below.

Freud’s Drive Theory

Let us turn now to the concept of drive, without which we cannot un-
derstand the id. As we have said above, the id consists of the sexual and
aggressive drives. A drive is defined as a psychological representation
of a motivational force that emerges from the body as a result of an
individual’s biological needs. Indeed, we cannot improve on Freud’s
own definition of drive as “a concept on the frontier between the mental
and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originat-

2See nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml (accessed January 12,

2014).
148 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ing from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of
the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its con-
nection with the body” (Freud 1915/1962, p. 122). A drive exerts a con-
stant pressure on the psychological system, continuously stimulating
mental activity. It serves as the motivating force behind all human psy-
chological experience and activity (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012,
pp. 65–67). The term instinct, with which drive is often confused, is
defined in general biology as a species-specific, inherited pattern of
behavior that does not have to be learned, rather than as an inborn mo-
tivational force (Lorenz 1937, 1949/1979; Tinbergen 1951).
Where does the concept of drive come from? At first, in the Topo-
graphic Model of the mind, the psyche is forced into action by wishes,
many of which are unacceptable to the censor. In the Structural Model,
these same wishes are unacceptable to the ego. In 1905, in his book Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud (1905/1962) organized his obser-
vations about wishes into his new and more elaborate drive theory. Drive
theory includes discussion of the role of drive in development, in normal
functioning, and in psychopathology. Because Freud formulated drive
theory in 1905, when the Topographic Model of the mind was still new
and the Structural Model of the mind had not yet been developed, the
concept of drive spans both models and is important to both. Originally,
in the Topographic Model of the mind, Freud conceptualized only one
drive, which he called libido. Later, with the introduction of the Structural
Model, he added a second drive, aggression (Freud 1920/1962). As we
will see, the concept of drive was modified in later versions of the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind. For example, we will see some of these
modifications when we study Object Relations Theory in Chapter 11. The
concept of drive is not used at all in Self Psychology (discussed in Chap-
ter 12). Certainly the concept of motivation has moved beyond sexuality
and aggression as the only two forces active in the human mind. Never-
theless, an aim of this book is to show how the concept of drive continues
to be useful, even if our view of motivation has expanded.

The Sexual Drive

Libido and Psychosexuality. Libido is the name that Freud gave to the
drive for sexual pleasure. The word libido is derived from the Latin for
“wish” or “desire.” Sometimes Freud used the word libido in much the
same way we do today, to mean sexual desire or sexual appetite. How-
ever, the term also has a more specific use in the psychoanalytic model
of the mind, where it is synonymous with the drive for sexual satisfac-
The Id and the Superego 149

tion. Ideas about the origins, transformations, and effects of libido have
been collectively referred to as libido theory. When we discuss libido
theory, it might be helpful to refer to Appendix A. Almost everyone
associates Freud with the idea that “Everything we do is because of
sex.” In other words, by explaining what libido is, we can explain why
Freud has the reputation for thinking so much about sex, and, more im-
portant, what his ideas actually were.
In order to understand what is meant by libido, we need to under-
stand what Freud meant by sexuality (or what he often called psychosex-
uality). In Freud’s view, sexuality meant much more than the sexual
coupling of adults during intercourse. Freud equated psychosexuality
with the human search for sensual bodily pleasure in all its forms. In his
view, this search begins immediately at birth and reflects an inborn ten-
dency to seek bodily pleasure. Bodily pleasure is attached to the survival
needs of the organism, which vary with each stage of development. For
example, in the infant’s earliest days, the search for bodily pleasure is
centered in the mouth or oral cavity, thus ensuring that the infant will
find nourishment; next, the search becomes centered in the anus (and
urethra), ensuring that the child will defecate and urinate; and finally the
search becomes centered in the genitals, ensuring that the child (or ado-
lescent) will become interested in his or her genitals, ultimately using
them to have sexual intercourse and thereby procreate. In other words,
throughout development, the search for bodily pleasure takes different
forms, depending on what is most important at each stage of life.
We will discuss the oral, anal, and genital stages in greater detail
later in this chapter. However, according to libido theory, the quest for
pleasure at every stage is always fueled by the same drive, called libido.
In other words, when Freud talked about sexuality, he meant a great
deal more than just adults engaging in sexual liaisons. We are correct
when we say that Freud asserted that everything we do is caused by our
interest in sex. However, we are not correct when we say that Freud as-
serted that everything we do is the result of our interest in sexual inter-
course. In Freud’s view, sexual intercourse is merely one manifestation
of the workings of libido and is far too narrow a term to capture all that
is meant by the concept of psychosexuality. As we will see, in this early
period Freud did use the concept of libido to explain just about every-
thing, from adult sexual behavior, to neurosis and character, to culture.
Indeed, libido theory is Freud’s early “theory of everything,” which has
led to most people’s associating Freud with sex (Freud 1915/1962) (see
Appendix A, “Libido Theory”).
150 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Psychosexual Phases of Development. Let us go on to explain more

about how libido develops. According to libido theory, libido has its
source in any one of a number of erotogenic zones, which develop accord-
ing to a predetermined maturational sequence. These erotogenic zones
are the oral zone, the anal zone, the phallic zone, and the genital zone. In re-
sponse to the continuous demand for pleasure created in each of these
zones, the mind creates wishes, fantasizes about how these wishes will
be satisfied, and ultimately plans for how satisfactions will be achieved.
These plans are called libidinal aims. Libidinal aims reflect the influence
of each zone on a series of psychosexual phases—also named oral, anal,
phallic, and oedipal/genital—that each child must transverse. By the
way, when Freud delineated a stage/zone that he called phallic, he
named it that way because he believed that both sexes conceived of only
one type of (male) genitalia; in response to revisions in theory, this
phase was renamed the early genital phase. (For further discussion of the
problems in Freud’s views of female development, see Chapter 7, “The
Oedipus Complex”.) Libidinal aims may be directed toward the child’s
own body (autoerotic) or toward another person (object seeking). Because
stimulation of the erotogenic zones by parents or other caretakers oc-
curs in the course of normal childhood, caretakers always become the
first libidinal objects of the child’s libidinal aims.
The first evidence of the libido at work is the infant’s obvious plea-
sure and satisfaction while sucking either his mother’s breast or his
own thumb (in what is known as the oral phase). Pleasurable pursuit of
anal and genital satisfactions is also easily observed in the activities of
young children, who often play games with their own feces (during the
anal phase) and who love to show off their genitals (during the early
genital [phallic] phase). The early genital/phallic phase is followed by
the genital/oedipal phase, which (as we have seen in Chapter 7) reflects
the child’s erotic/romantic interest in his or her caretakers. Indeed, as
we can see, the oedipus complex has the distinction of being the first
scenario about infantile sexuality to be invented by Freud, but it is not
the first in terms of the development of the child. The oral, anal, and
early genital (phallic) phases are often referred to collectively as the pre-
oedipal stage of development. The preoedipal and oedipal stages of de-
velopment are often referred to collectively as infantile sexuality. The
oedipal period is followed by the stage of latency, a period of relative
quiescence during which the force of repression holds the sexual drive
in check until the hormonal changes of adolescence bring it to the fore
again. The many aspects or components of libido finally come together
in the service of reproduction at a relatively late stage of development,
adolescence and/or adulthood.
The Id and the Superego 151

Although originally attached to the survival needs of the species,

libidinal aims quickly become independent of these needs. Through
complex transformations, they become a powerful source of motivation
in their own right, serving as a constant source of stimulation to which
the mind must respond. In other words, as with the oedipus complex
(see Chapter 7), libidinal aims from all stages of development do not go
away, but continue to act in the mind of the adult, influencing later psy-
chological experience and activity. First of all, we detect clear evidence
of the influence of libidinal aims from the oral, anal, and early genital
(phallic) zones during adult sexual activity and foreplay. If infantile sex-
uality is totally repressed, we see sexual inhibition (see Appendix A).
However, most often we see the influence of early psychosexual stages
in more disguised forms. Indeed, among the most intriguing aspect of
libido theory is that it alerts us to the existence of sexual pleasure hid-
den in behavior that is apparently nonsexual. Many neurotic symptoms
represent forbidden sexual fantasies in a disguised form. For example,
hysterical difficulties swallowing or eating may reflect fellatio fantasies;
obsessional rituals involving touching may reflect conflicts over mas-
turbation (see Appendix A, “Libido Theory”).
Infantile sexuality is transformed not just into neurotic symptoms but
also into character traits through the processes of sublimation and reac-
tion formation, new defenses that Freud described for the first time in re-
lation to the development of character (Freud 1908/1962). In sublimation,
a forbidden wish is deflected from its original aim to one with a higher
social value. For example, a “voracious reader” may satisfy an oral wish
to devour food through a love of reading. In reaction formation, a forbid-
den wish is transformed into its opposite. For example, the anal pleasure
that accompanies playing with feces may be transformed into character
traits such as fastidious cleanliness and compulsive orderliness. If a per-
son evinces symptoms or character traits that reflect the overwhelming
influence of a particular stage, he or she is often said to have a fixation on
that stage. Fixation may be caused by either overstimulation or depriva-
tion during a particular stage. If a person substitutes pleasures from an
earlier stage for those at a later stage that are either frightening or forbid-
den, he or she is said to be showing evidence of regression. For example, a
woman who always picks a fight with her husband on Friday night be-
cause “he isn’t helping her clean the bathroom” may be regressing to a
preoccupation with anal concerns in order to avoid the possibility of a
sexual encounter at the genital/oedipal level. We find here the basis for
Karl Abraham’s (1877–1925) oral, anal, early genital/phallic, and genital
character types to which we still refer today (Abraham 1921/1948, 1924/
1948, 1925/1948). We often describe people with oral character as those
152 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

who appear fixated on finding satisfaction or pleasure in being cared for

or fed, or in eating and/or drinking too much. We describe people with
anal character in much the same way as Freud did, as characterized by
“parsimony, orderliness, and obstinacy” (Freud 1908/1962). Finally, we
often encounter people who seem to have an excessive interest in exag-
gerated displays of genital prowess without being much interested in re-
lationships; we are likely to refer to these people with the later term phallic
narcissistic character (Reich 1933/1945). In Chapter 10 (“Conflict and Com-
promise”), we will explore the concept of character in greater depth, dis-
cussing how Ego Psychology improved upon this early theory. Later, in
Chapters 11 and 12, we will see how the concept of character is improved
upon even more by the advances of Object Relations Theory and Self Psy-
chology. Later in this chapter we will see how Freud goes on with libido
theory to explain aspects of culture itself (again, see Appendix A, “Libido
Theory”).

The Aggressive Drive

Whereas Freud originally attempted to describe aggressive thoughts and
actions as expressions of the libidinal drive, eventually he modified this
theory of motivation by adding a separate aggressive drive (Freud 1920/
1962). Freud was moved to make this change by his clinical observations
of patients in whom aggressive motives appeared to predominate, as well
as by his observations of the fighting that engulfed Europe during World
War I. By the time that Freud introduced the Structural Model, he argued
that the aggressive drive is of equal importance to libido as a motivational
force in human psychology. Although theorists disagree about the extent
to which the aggressive drive is innate (as opposed to being a response to
frustration), all agree that aggression is a ubiquitous force in mental life.
Aggression can be expressed in many forms, both normal and patho-
logical. These expressions vary in intensity, ranging from self-assertion
and mastery through irritation, anger, and resentment and on to extreme
fury, overt sadism, combat, and murderous rage. As with libido, aggres-
sive “aims” can be expressed in oral, anal, or genital/phallic form. As with
libido, aggressive objects are most often caretakers from the child’s early
life. For example, during the oral phase, aggression may be expressed as
biting and/or spitting; during the anal phase, aggression may be ex-
pressed in power struggles over control; during the early genital/phallic
phase, aggression may be expressed as wishes to dominate others with
displays of genital prowess. We find remnants of preoedipal aggression in
our language: aggression is often described in such phrases as “biting sar-
casm,” treating someone “like shit,” “pissing” on someone, or “fucking
[someone] over.” Many developmental psychologists have explored how
The Id and the Superego 153

aggression is expressed during childhood (Parens 1979). Many have also

explored the factors contributing to the intensity of aggression, including
early experiences of intense pain, deprivation, loss, abuse, enforced pas-
sivity, overstimulation, and/or sexual abuse (Furst 1998).
Like libido, aggression is subject to repression and is often expressed
in disguised form. Examples of common disguises are jokes or seem-
ingly harmless pranks. Another example is passive aggressive behavior,
which often includes procrastination that interferes with the aims of
other people. Aggression can be turned against the self, as in self-hatred
(see Appendix B, “Defenses”). Extreme forms of self-hatred may appear
as self-mutilation or suicide. Like libido, aggression also makes a con-
tribution to character style. For example, aggression can be sublimated
in the form of initiative and ambition and/or intense demands for mo-
rality and justice. It can be observed in activities such as some kinds of
organized sports, military service, police work, and of course medical
practice. In an example from psychopathology, the paranoid personal-
ity is organized around the projection onto others of one’s own aggres-
sion. Finally, aggression plays a prominent role in many kinds of severe
psychopathology, such as borderline personality disorder, perversions,
and violence (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, pp. 11–13).

Contribution of the Drives (the Id)

to Theory of Psychopathology and Therapeutic Action
in the Structural Model
Understanding every individual’s relationship to the search for bodily
pleasure and/or the expression of aggression plays an important role in
psychodynamic psychotherapy. As id demands make a contribution to
every kind of psychopathology, all psychodynamic psychotherapy
must include an exploration of how each patient experiences and man-
ages his or her most primitive urges. The fantasies through which urges
are expressed should be explored, as should any points of fixation and/
or regression. Fantasies about sexual and aggressive urges are often a
source of resistance, or not knowing about oneself. In addition, the
patient often turns to the therapist in his or her quest to express these
urges. In other words, exploration of transference wishes for the grati-
fication of libidinal wishes or for the expression of aggressive impulses
constitutes an important part of every psychodynamic psychotherapy.
In Chapter 10, when we explore the concepts of conflict and compro-
mise, we will learn more about the contributions of libido and aggres-
sion to both normal mental life and psychopathology, as well as how
these forces are expressed in the clinical situation.
154 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Role of the Drives in Human Motivation

There are many problems with the drive theory of motivation as
expressed in the Structural Model. The most obvious problem is that we
no longer think of human beings as struggling with only two motiva-
tional forces—sexuality and aggression. Indeed, explaining all of human
activity as representing the vicissitudes of these two urges is difficult. In
Part IV, we will consider additional motives, such as needs for attach-
ment, separation, and all varieties of self-enhancement. We will see how
these motives are described in Object Relations Theory and Self Psychol-
ogy in Chapters 11 and 12. In addition, contemporary psychodynamic
theorists know that even with this greater complexity in our understand-
ing of motivation, a compete theory of motivation requires a broad inter-
disciplinary dialogue among all kinds of psychologists, neuroscientists,
evolutionary biologists, as well as social and political scientists.
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of this conceptualization, there is
much to be gained from the idea of motivation conceptualized as a drive.
This conceptualization allows us to talk about three important observa-
tions that clinicians have made about human motivation: 1) human
beings appear to be under continuous pressure from certain kinds of
desire; 2) human beings express desire in many forms, which can often be
substituted for each other; and 3) human beings have desires that seem to
derive from the body. Let us talk about these three observations one by one.
First, the concept of drive captures what appears to be a continuous
and demanding force in the human mind to achieve its aims. In other
words, human motivation does not appear to be a sporadic or intermit-
tent force; instead, it seems to be ongoing. In addition, human motivation
often seems imperative, demanding satisfaction at every turn. The drive
concept captures this aspect of human desire, stressing the ongoing
peremptory nature of the pressure for mental activity created by some
motivational forces. Efforts to meet this demand can be seen in character
traits and life patterns that are enduring, repetitive, and stable. Indeed,
the ongoing quest for pleasure underlies some of the most basic aspects
of personality, such as a sense of “aliveness,” vivacity, or enjoyment and
appreciation of the “spice of life.” Too much dampening of this quest can
lead to inertia, inhibition, or feelings of “deadness.” The ongoing wish to
express aggression underlies such basic aspects of personality as initia-
tive, assertiveness, and activity. Again, too much dampening of this wish
can lead to excessive meekness or passivity. (In Chapter 10, we will see an
example of how this passivity might be expressed in a man who suffers
from a marked inhibition of aggression.)
The Id and the Superego 155

Second, the concept of drive captures the fact that human strivings
appear in many forms and can be substituted for one another. Indeed,
Freud’s expansion of the concept of sexuality beyond sexual intercourse
in adults was one of his most revolutionary contributions to the under-
standing of human psychology. By postulating that a single drive—
libido—lies behind such disparate phenomena as sucking, defecating,
and genital interest, Freud asserted that pleasure-seeking behaviors in
children are on a continuum. Pleasure-seeking behaviors in children are
also on a continuum with pleasure-seeking behaviors in adults, includ-
ing sexual activity such as foreplay, sexual intercourse, and atypical sex-
ual activities (which are often called “perversions”). When we assert that
these diverse behaviors result from a single motivational force, it follows
that they can be substituted for one another. Such substitutions take
place when one form of pleasure seeking (or aggression) is deemed to be
unacceptable. Pleasure seeking and aggression may also disguise them-
selves in the form of apparently nonsexual or nonaggressive behavior,
including symptoms (in neurotic people) and character traits (in all peo-
ple). Finally, pleasure seeking and aggression can disguise themselves in
the form of culturally acceptable activities such as art, science, or reli-
gion. In other words, widely diverse phenomena such as sexuality and
aggression in children, sexuality and aggression in adults, perverse sex-
uality, neurotic symptoms, character traits, and cultural activities, which
appear to be dissimilar, are all related to each other, in that each repre-
sents a disguised form of libido or aggression, or more usually, a combi-
nation of the two. The fact that Freud pointed to the similarities among
these widely disparate phenomena is responsible for the fact that his
ideas are considered so revolutionary. This fact is also responsible for
much of why Freud’s ideas have been so controversial. People still have
trouble accepting that children have sexual wishes, that the division be-
tween “normal” and “perverse” sexuality is arbitrary, and that character
traits and cultural activities might have sexual and/or aggressive ori-
gins (see Appendix A, “Libido Theory”).
Finally, the concept of drive allows us to talk about aspects of the im-
portant connection between the mind and the body. Indeed, as noted in
Chapter 1 (“Overview: Modeling the Life of the Mind”), a feature of the
psychoanalytic model of the mind important to the rest of mind science
is its emphasis on embodiment. The concept of embodiment includes the
idea that the mind is intrinsically shaped by its connection to the body,
or that the body is an essential determinant of the nature of mind. The
drive theory of motivation asserts that all motivational forces in the
mind derive from bodily needs. In other words, the id emerges from
and is shaped by the experience of the body, as in the experience of the
156 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

erotogenic zones. Indeed, the Structural Model asserts that the ego also
is shaped by its contact with the body. For example, as we have already
seen in our description of bodily expressions of aggression, metaphor is
a powerful way that we organize thought and language; in metaphor,
the body literally provides us with “food for thought” (Lakoff and John-
son 1980, 1999; Melnick 1997). Finally, as we will see in our next discus-
sion, even the superego is shaped by its relationship to the body.

The Superego
In the Structural Model of the mind, the superego is the part of the mind
that is commonly known as the conscience. In stark contrast to the id,
which represents the pleasure-seeking aspect of mental life, the super-
ego represents those aspects of mental life that are concerned with
morality. The superego consists of a set of values and ideals by which
we measure ourselves, called the ego ideal. It also includes a set of pro-
hibitions and commands that guide our behavior. For the most part, the
superego operates unconsciously, although many of its derivatives can
be observed easily with simple introspection. Indeed, almost all of us
are aware of a large part of our experience that deals with our ideas and
feelings about right and wrong.
When we measure up to the ideals held by our superego, we have a
sense of well-being and self-esteem. In other words, we feel good about
ourselves. When we fail to meet our ideals or violate a superego prohi-
bition, we feel a painful sense of inferiority, shame (the feeling that “I am
judged to be bad by other people”), or guilt (the feeling that “I judge
myself to be bad”) (Lansky 1994). The superego also prescribes punish-
ment for bad thoughts or behaviors. Some of these punishments are
overt, as in acts of appeasement or reparation. Many are disguised, par-
ticipating in the formation of symptoms, character traits, and other
activities. Feelings of shame, guilt, and self-punishing behavior are a
unique aspect of self-regulation. Indeed, Freud argued often that the
superego is the aspect of psychic functioning that most clearly differen-
tiates human beings from other animals (Auchincloss and Samberg
2012, pp. 252–255; Freud 1900/1962).
The concept of morality played an important role in the Topo-
graphic Model, long before the Structural Model (and the concept of the
superego) was invented. In this earlier model of the mind, we see
morality at work in the fact that unconscious wishes are often judged to
be “unacceptable” by the censor. However, in the Topographic Model,
morality was only vaguely defined, as roughly equivalent to the injunc-
The Id and the Superego 157

tions imposed by society, transmitted from generation to generation by

parental authority. In the Structural Model, this vague description gives
way to a more sophisticated view of morality. Superego development is
understood to be a complex process involving several aspects of expe-
rience, including the internalization of parental ideals, demands, and
threats; the structuring of the child’s primitive fantasies about these pa-
rental ideals, demands, and threats; and the harnessing of the child’s
own aggressive wishes, all in the service of policing the self.
Originally, the superego was thought to emerge at the end of the
oedipal stage and to represent an admixture of the child’s internaliza-
tion of parental prohibitions and the child’s own aggression toward the
rival parent. As Freud said, the superego is “the heir to the Oedipus
complex” (Freud 1923/1962, p. 48) (see Chapter 7). However, it is more
common for contemporary psychodynamic practitioners to see the
oedipal stage not as marking the first appearance of the superego, but
rather as marking an important consolidation of many earlier experi-
ences and feelings, both positive and negative, that play a role in the de-
velopment of thinking about morality. Contemporary psychodynamic
theory draws from the observations of developmental psychologists,
who trace superego development back to infant–caregiver affective
communications beginning immediately at birth. Children between 18
and 36 months of age have already internalized some superego func-
tions, as demonstrated by empathy for others, affective reactions to
wrongdoing, prosocial behaviors and attitudes, and the capacity to
struggle with moral dilemmas (Blum and Blum 1990; Decety and Ickes
2009; Emde and Buchsbaum 1990; Gilmore and Meersand 2013). Other
theorists stress the development and change of the superego through-
out the rest of the life cycle (Blos 1979; Bornstein 1951, 1953; A. Freud
1936/1974; Gilmore and Meersand 2013; Sarnoff 1976). In any case,
because the superego so obviously results, in part, from the internaliza-
tion of the relationship with caregivers, it points the way to the next
model of the mind, Object Relations Theory (described in Chapter 11),
in which the process of internalization of relationships plays a central
role in the establishment of all psychological structures.

The Superego and the Mind of the Child

Because the superego develops during childhood, it bears the imprint
of the child’s immature mind. For example, because it develops in the
course of our interactions with our parents, the superego never com-
pletely loses its personal quality. We tend to experience our conscience
as an inner “voice” or “eye” that monitors and judges our behavior. We
158 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

also tend to experience our conscience as omnipresent and omniscient,

like we do our parents. Indeed, we often treat our conscience as we
would a parent whom we can make deals with, hide from, or seduce.
The superego also includes archaic irrational elements that correspond
to the fantasy life of the child. For example, our ideals often lie far
beyond what is realistic for us to achieve. This fact reflects both our nos-
talgia for feelings of omnipotence from infancy and our wish to hang
onto an idealized view of our parents from childhood.
Fears of judgment and punishment are also archaic and irrational.
They include fears of castration, mutilation, or abandonment, which cor-
respond to the greatest fears of children. Usually these threats are consid-
erably more savage than the behavior of the average parent, a fact that
reflects the input into the superego of the child’s own untamed aggres-
sive fantasies (Freud 1923/1962). The superego judges thoughts and ac-
tions as though they are the same, reflecting the fact that young children
cannot easily distinguish between thoughts and deeds. Indeed, this is a
major reason why Freud felt that human beings are usually “discontent”
(Freud 1930/1962). Superego imperatives are often contradictory, and are
therefore impossible to meet. For example, as a lingering effect of the oe-
dipus complex, many men struggle with conflicting demands, both ema-
nating from the superego: the demand to live up to the image of the father
as a successful male, and, at the same time, the threatening injunction that
being too much like the father will lead to punishment. In other words,
the superego has qualities that make it difficult to feel 100% good about
oneself, no matter what one does!
Because we recognize these archaic and primitive aspects of the
superego, we often speak about the conscience as if it were an animal,
or in metaphors that refer to animals. Think of the book Pinocchio, with
the puppet’s conscience incarnated as “Jiminy Cricket!” Thus, a person
might complain that his conscience is “buzzing like a mosquito” in the
back of his mind, or she may experience her conscience as “gnawing”
or “nipping” at her. We remember that Freud depicted the id as a horse
in the famous metaphor of the horse and rider by which he represented
the relationship between id and ego, and we are not surprised to find
him representing the id as our “animal nature.” We may be more sur-
prised to realize that we also represent the superego as an animal. The
fact that we often compare both the id and the superego to an animal
makes us understand more clearly what Freud meant when he argued
that id and superego are closely related to each other (Freud 1923/1962).
He meant that they share primitive origins in childhood and that the su-
perego is fueled by aggression from the id. Indeed, Freud’s argument
that we use our own aggression, turned against the self, to police and
The Id and the Superego 159

control ourselves in the form of morality was another one of his most
useful contributions to the study of psychology.

Contribution of the Superego

to Theory of Psychopathology in the Structural Model
Under normal circumstances, over the course of development, the su-
perego becomes more impersonal, more temperate, and more realistic,
resulting in a coherent and manageable set of ideals. These ideals can be
met well enough with a reasonable degree of self-monitoring and self-
control. Under pathological circumstances, the superego may be poorly
structured and weak, resulting in psychopathic and criminal behavior.
The superego may also be overly harsh and sadistic, resulting in exces-
sive self-punishment or moralistic rigidity. Self-punishment is easily ob-
served in the form of self-mutilation or suicidal behaviors, inhibition of
pleasure, depression, and masochism of all kinds (Brenner 1959). Super-
ego pathology is seen in almost every character style, including several
famous “types” described by Freud, such as “Those Wrecked by Suc-
cess” (people with intense unconscious guilt who punish themselves by
stumbling on the threshold of accomplishment), “The Exceptions” (peo-
ple who feel that because they have had an unfair life and have suffered
so much already, they need not adhere to the usual moral standards),
and “Criminals Out of a Sense of Guilt” (people with intense uncon-
scious guilt who commit crimes so that they will be caught and pun-
ished) (Freud 1916/1962). In Chapter 10, we will explore the concepts of
conflict and compromise, learning more about how the superego (and
the id) contributes to normal mental life and to psychopathology.
However, again, it is important to notice that most of the examples
cited here emphasize the effects of the harsh, punitive aspects of the
superego. Indeed, Freud himself was most aware of this negative, pun-
ishing side of the conscience, writing rarely about the positive side
(Freud 1927/1962). He has often been criticized for failure to theorize
much about other, more loving aspects of the superego, which are
equally important. Other, more recent theorists, including many from
Object Relations Theory, have emphasized the importance of the loving
superego (Schafer 1960) or (as we will see in Chapter 11) an internalized
good object that makes us feel good about ourselves when we do the
right thing, which, arguably, is most of the time. Indeed, when we dis-
cuss the impact of Object Relations Theory on our theories of psychopa-
thology and psychodynamic technique, we will learn more about the
importance of the ability to maintain a good internal object in the face
of negative feelings. When we discuss Self Psychology (in Chapter 12),
160 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

we will see how the concept of the ego ideal is amplified, as we learn
how positive feelings between mother and child lead to the develop-
ment of goals and ideals that are central to a healthy self.

Contribution of the Superego

to Theory of Therapeutic Action in the Structural Model
Psychodynamic psychotherapists spend a lot of time trying to under-
stand the workings of the patient’s superego. The superego makes a
contribution to almost every thought, feeling, and behavior, big or
small, in everyone. Irrational superego demands as well as irrational
and contradictory ideals make a contribution to almost every kind of
psychopathology. Sometimes, as we have seen, superego pathology
dominates the presentation of psychopathology, as in masochism, de-
pression, and many kinds of inhibitions.
Therefore, all psychodynamic psychotherapy must include an ex-
ploration of the patient’s attitudes toward morality, the patient’s ideals,
and the circumstances that lead to feeling guilt or shame, or to feeling
good about the self. The circumstances leading to self-punishment must
also be understood. The complex consequences of shame, guilt, and
self-punishment must be explored. Because the superego so obviously
develops in the context of relationships with caregivers, it is prone to
being externalized onto authority figures, including the therapist. This
fact is of particular clinical significance in understanding the transfer-
ence because the therapist is frequently experienced as the arbiter of
right and wrong, or as someone who is likely to disapprove, forgive,
and/or otherwise judge the patient. Indeed, one of the most influential
early views of the therapeutic action in psychodynamic psychotherapy
argues that over time, the patient’s superego is modified through inter-
nalization of interactions with the therapist, whose attitudes toward the
patient’s wishes are often less harsh and moralistic (Strachey 1934).
When we move on to Chapter 10, we will learn more about how the su-
perego (and the id) is expressed in the clinical situation and how psy-
chodynamic psychotherapy works by helping the patient find better
ways to regulate morality in the forging of compromise.

Understanding Moral Development: Contributions From

General Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Contemporary psychodynamic practitioners recognize that a complete
theory of morality (or of any important aspect of mental life) requires
input from many disciplines, including social psychology (Appiah
2008; Blasi 1980; Haidt 2008), anthropology (Gilmore 1991), and devel-
The Id and the Superego 161

opmental psychology (Eisenberg 2000; Emde et al. 1991; Gilligan and

Wiggins 1988; Kohlberg 1963, 1976; Turiel 1998; Zahn-Waxler et al.
1992). Indeed, the famous thought experiment called the “trolley prob-
lem,” introduced by philosopher Philippa Foot, which asked subjects
whether, under a variety of circumstances, they would act to save peo-
ple endangered by a runaway trolley, has spawned a whole generation
of “trolleyologists” who are interested in using empirical methods to
study how we handle issues of right and wrong (Grimes 2010). For ex-
ample, in studies related to the concept of the superego, social psychol-
ogists have found that individuals who are encouraged to imagine that
authority figures are “watching you from the back of your mind” have
lower self-esteem (Baldwin et al. 1989); in studies related to the concept
of the ego ideal, social psychologists have found that individuals’ self-
worth is highly contingent and varied (Crocker and Wolfe 2001) and
that whether or not people behave according to their ego ideal affects
their self-esteem (Higgins 1987). Neuroscientists, too, are interested in
the study of morality, offering strong evidence for the biological basis of
the sense of right and wrong, or the lack of it, in studies of brain func-
tion and genetics (Delgado et al. 2005; Greene et al. 2001; Grigsby and
Stevens 2000; Koenigs et al. 2007; Weston and Gabbard 2002). (For an in-
teresting review of evidence from both general psychology and neuro-
science on the development and functioning of morality, see Paul
Bloom’s book Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil [2013].)

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 9–1 shows our Structural Model chart of core dimensions with the
addition of key concepts for Motivation, Structure/Process, and Devel-
opment.

• Topographic point of view: The id is defined as entirely uncon-

scious. The superego has both conscious/preconscious and uncon-
scious aspects.
• Motivational point of view: The id is the seat of the drives—libido
and aggression. A drive is the mental representation of a bodily need
or urge; it exerts a continuous demand on the mind for satisfaction.
Drive aims can appear in disguised forms and can be substituted for
one another. Superego aims include all motivations concerned with
morality.
162 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

• Structural point of view: The id is the structure of the mind most

closely associated with biological needs of the human organism. It
operates according to the primary process mode of functioning,
seeking satisfaction and pleasure without concern for the conse-
quences. The superego—the part of the mind commonly known as
the conscience—consists of prohibitions and commands that guide
our behavior; it also contains a set of values and ideals by which we
measure ourselves, called the ego ideal.
• Developmental point of view: Libido develops according to a hard-
wired set of psychosexual phases: the oral, anal, and early genital
(phallic) phases (comprising the preoedipal period); the genital/oe-
dipal phase (i.e., the oedipal period); the latency phase; and adoles-
cence. The preoedipal and oedipal stages of development are often
referred to collectively as infantile sexuality. Infantile sexuality can
sometimes manifest as symptoms or character traits, especially when
transformed by defenses such as sublimation or reaction formation.
Both symptoms and character traits can show evidence of fixation
(the overwhelming influence of a particular stage) or of regression
(the substitution of pleasures from an earlier stage for those of a later
stage). Aggression also undergoes stages of development.
Whereas the superego was originally considered to emerge at the
end of the oedipal stage, contemporary theorists commonly view su-
perego development as beginning considerably earlier, with the oe-
dipal stage marking not the first appearance of the superego, but
rather a period of important consolidation of earlier experiences and
feelings that play a role in the development of thinking about moral-
ity. Other theorists believe that the superego undergoes development
and change throughout the life cycle.
• Theory of psychopathology: The primitive urges of the id—both the
search for bodily pleasure and the expression of aggression—make a
contribution to every kind of psychopathology. Under pathological
circumstances, the superego may be poorly structured and weak, re-
sulting in psychopathic and criminal behavior, or may be overly
harsh and sadistic, resulting in excessive self-punishment or moral-
istic rigidity.
• Theory of therapeutic action: All psychodynamic psychotherapies
include exploration of the id (e.g., transference wishes for gratifica-
tion of libidinal wishes or for expression of aggressive impulses) and
the superego (e.g., attitudes toward morality, ideals, and circum-
stances leading to feeling guilt or shame).
 The Id and the Superego
TABLE 9–1. Structural Model Part 2: The Id and the Superego

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

The ego and the The ego, superego, The mind is divided into Ego development Ego strength/ego Strengthening the ego
superego and id each have three structures: Erikson’s stages weakness serves as “Where id was, there
have both separate aims: ego, superego, an index of mental ego shall be”
conscious/ The ego— and id Superego development health/illness
preconscious homeostasis
and and adaptation The ego Development of the drives
unconscious The superego— Ego functions (Id)
aspects moral Defense Psychosexual phases
imperatives Internalization (oral, anal, early
The id is entirely The id—drives Identification genital [phallic],
unconscious Libido Ego identity genital/oedipal,
Aggression latency,
The superego adolescence)
Conflict is always Ego ideal Fixation
present because Regression
of competing aims The id

163
164 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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 CHAPTER 10

Conflict and Compromise

This chapter introduces readers to the concepts of conflict and

compromise. It explores the concept of defense. It also surveys impor-
tant concepts related to appraisal and defense from neighboring mind
sciences. Vocabulary introduced in this chapter includes the following:
affect, character, character disorder, compromise/compromise formation, con-
flict, danger situations, defense, defense mechanism, defensive style, deficit, ego
dystonic, ego syntonic, intersystemic conflict, intrasystemic conflict, mental-
ization, metacognition, observing ego, reflective function, signal affect/signal
anxiety, and somatic marker hypothesis.
In Chapters 8 (“A New Configuration and a New Concept: The
Ego”) and 9 (“The Id and the Superego”), readers were introduced to
the three components of the Structural Model of the mind: the ego, the
id, and the superego. We looked at each component from the topographic
point of view, learning that each has an unconscious aspect. We saw
how these three components differ from each other in terms of motiva-
tion and structure. Finally, we also learned a bit about their develop-
ment. Because the Structural Model was derived from the Topographic
Model of the mind, all three components have inherited aspects of the
previous model. The id is conceptually close to the unconscious of the
Topographic Model. The ego and the superego both include aspects of
the conscious/preconscious, especially if we include the censor and the
concept of defense.

167
168 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

In this chapter, we explore how id, superego, and ego work together.
Although these structures have competing aims, their competition is
worked out through compromise forged by the ego. Compromise takes
many forms, including symptoms, inhibitions, and a wide variety of
character traits, both pathological and adaptive. This chapter examines
the concepts of conflict and compromise and what the Structural Model
has to say about how psychodynamic psychotherapy works.

The Mind in Conflict

From the beginning, as we have seen, the psychoanalytic model of the
mind posits that everyone is struggling with conflict over competing
thoughts and feelings. In the Topographic Model of the mind, conflict
can be detected in the formation of symptoms. Even when there is no ap-
parent psychopathology, conflict can be detected in parapraxes, slips of
the tongue, dreams, and/or character traits. However, whereas the Top-
ographic Model describes conflict between the unconscious and the con-
scious/preconscious mind, the Structural Model of the mind describes
conflict between the id and the superego, both operating within the con-
straints imposed by external reality. In the Structural Model, the ego has
responsibility for mediating conflict. In Chapter 8 (“A New Configura-
tion and a New Concept: The Ego”), we defined the ego as the part of the
mind responsible for homeostasis and adaptation. Both of these respon-
sibilities are carried out during the process of conflict mediation, which
includes both the ability to modulate inner tension (homeostasis) and
the ability to assess and deal with external reality (adaptation).
The ego must mediate many different conflicts. There is conflict
between the id and the superego (intersystemic conflict)—for example, a
man may wish to be sexually powerful like his father (id), but this wish
may compete with feelings of guilt (superego). There is conflict within
the id or within the superego (intrasystemic conflict)—for example, a
man’s wish to replace his father (id) may compete with his wish to love
and be loved by his father (id). Or a man’s feeling that he should be
highly successful at work (superego/ego ideal) may compete with his
feeling that he should be perfectly available to his children (superego/
ego ideal). Finally, either the id, the superego, or both may be in conflict
with the demands of external reality—for example, a man’s wish to
replace his father (id) may compete with the awareness that his father
is the source of knowledge important for success (external reality).
Although the Structural Model divides the mind into only three parts,
we can see that motivational forces are many, maybe even infinite, and
Conflict and Compromise 169

that the convolutions of conflict are complex. To make matters even

more difficult, motivational forces are at work in the mind all of the
time, and external reality never goes away. Therefore, the mind is in
conflict all of the time.

Conflict Mediation and

Compromise Formation
In Chapter 8 (“A New Configuration and a New Concept: The Ego”),
we delineated many functions available to the ego. In this chapter, we
examine how these functions are used in the mediation of conflict. The
Structural Model posits the following sequence of events: 1) wishes and
moral prohibitions are aroused; 2) the ego appraises the situation, send-
ing information to itself; 3) defenses are mobilized; and 4) compromises
are formed. This process goes on continuously and unconsciously.
In the process of conflict mediation described above, we find at least
two important ego capacities: appraisal and defense.

Appraisal: Signal Affect/Signal Anxiety

If the ego is to mediate between competing demands, it must be able to
appraise the situation, or to understand what is going on. In other
words, the ego must be able to figure out what is likely to happen in
various scenarios, or the consequences of acting on various motiva-
tions. For example, what will happen to the boy/man mentioned above
if he expresses his wish to replace his father? On the other hand, what
will happen to him if expresses his need to be loved by his father?
The appraisal system of the mind is complicated, and much of gen-
eral psychology is devoted to understanding how we know what is
going on inside ourselves and in the outside world. In the psychody-
namic approach, we use terms such as reality testing to describe an indi-
vidual’s ability to understand external reality. We use terms such as
psychological mindedness, observing ego, mentalization (Fonagy et al. 2002),
and reflective function (Levy et al. 2006) to talk about an individual’s abil-
ity to understand internal psychological processes. When we use these
terms, we are talking about ego functions, or appraisal processes, im-
portant in the mediation of conflict. In Chapter 3 (“Evolution of the Dy-
namic Unconscious”), we mentioned how cognitive psychologists in
general psychology are investigating what they call unconscious scan-
ning operations, or metacognition, appraisal processes by which we can
monitor our own minds and thereby choose among priorities (Metcalfe
170 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

and Shimamura 1994; Roseman and Smith 2001; Scherer 2001; Uleman
2005).
However, the ego uses not just cognitive capacities but also emo-
tional capacities to evaluate and manage situations both inside the
mind and between the mind and the outside world. This process makes
use of affects, or feelings—our basic, inborn ability to experience variet-
ies of pleasure and pain (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, pp. 8–10).
Here’s how the affective, or emotional, aspect of the appraisal system
works.
During the course of development, the child learns that sometimes
the expression of wishes leads to satisfaction and pleasure. For exam-
ple, much of the time, a hungry child with the wish to suck or eat has
the experience of being fed, accompanied by an experience of satisfac-
tion and pleasure. At other times, this same child learns that the expres-
sion of wishes leads to pain, in the form of disappointment and
suffering. For example, a hungry child with the wish to suck or eat may,
for various reasons, be met with frustration and/or pain. Throughout
the life cycle, affective experiences of pleasure or pain accompany every
wish or aim, in increasingly complex and nuanced forms.
Over time, the child learns to remember the experiences of pleasure
or pain that accompany his or her wishes and to use these memories in
decisions about how to manage wishes. Beginning in childhood, the ego
subjects all wishes to a process of evaluation in which the amount of
pleasure that will likely result from pursuit of a wish is compared with
the amount of pain that will likely result. In this process of evaluation,
the ego uses a signal affect—an attenuated version of the experience of an
affect (either pleasure or pain) remembered from the past (Auchincloss
and Samberg 2012, p. 9). The ego makes use of all kinds of pleasurable
affects (e.g., happiness, satisfaction, pride) to signal that pleasure will
ensue if a wish is pursued. It makes use of all kinds of negative affects
(e.g., anxiety, shame, guilt) to signal that pain will ensue if a wish is pur-
sued. If the ego receives a signal that pleasure will result from the expres-
sion of a wish, it gives the wish a green light. If it receives a signal that
pain will result, it gives a red light. Because there is almost invariably
conflict among competing wishes, the ego will need to find a compro-
mise. This compromise must be made quickly, as from moment to
moment, the ego makes split-second decisions about the situation. Fur-
thermore, if we remember that motivations are many and emanate from
many parts of the mind, we realize that the process of appraisal is com-
plex. Affects work well as components of the appraisal system because
they transmit a lot of information quickly and forcefully. Affects also
work well because they are able to mobilize defense.
Conflict and Compromise 171

When he first described this system of appraisal, Freud focused on

painful experience in the form of anxiety, suggesting that the ego uses
signal anxiety to evaluate various outcomes and make decisions. Freud
described a universal developmental sequence of danger situations that
trigger anxiety in all human beings. These danger situations include loss
of an important object, loss of an object’s love, castration anxiety (the
name given to the fear of physical punishment), and ultimately super-
ego disapproval, or the feeling of guilt (Freud 1926/1962). As the psy-
choanalytic model of the mind developed, others contributed to the list
of typical anxieties, adding separation anxiety (Bowlby 1960), stranger
anxiety (Spitz 1950), and persecutory and depressive anxiety (Klein
1940; see Chapter 11, “Object Relations Theory”). Freud was arguably
somewhat pessimistic, and this may have played a role in his emphasis
on anxiety and unpleasure. Indeed, we have seen in our discussion of
the superego that Freud rarely emphasized the positive. However, there
is research suggesting that we remember negative experience more in-
tensely than we do pleasurable experience, so perhaps Freud’s negative
emphasis was appropriate (Christianson and Loftus 1987; Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Ochsner 2000). However, whereas Freud emphasized
painful affects in the system of appraisal, other theorists have empha-
sized the positive feelings used by the ego to signal that we are on the
right track. For example, the ego uses the good feelings that come from
knowing that we are “doing the right thing” or a feeling that we will be
“safe” if we pursue our wishes (Sandler 1960; Schafer 1960; Stern 2003).
Developmental psychoanalysts have also emphasized the important
role of positive feelings such as interest, curiosity, pleasure, and pride in
the formation of the appraisal system used by adults (Emde 1983, 1991).
Many have pointed to similarities between the concept of signal anx-
iety from the psychoanalytic model and the concept of learned expecta-
tions from learning theory in general psychology (Bandura 1977). In
addition, there is much evidence from cognitive neuroscience about the
importance of different parts of the brain in the formation of the reward
systems that determine much of our behavior (Olds and Forbes 1981).1
There is also much evidence from cognitive neuroscience about the role
of brain structures such as the amygdala in creating fear, and the impor-
tance of fear signals in determining behavior (Aggleton 1992; Armony

1See also National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria,

domains “Positive Valence Systems,” “Negative Valence Systems,” and “Cogni-
tive Systems” (nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml; accessed
January 12, 2014).
172 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

and LeDoux 2000; LeDoux 1996; Phelps 2006; Phelps and LeDoux 2005).
For a system of appraisal that uses both positive and negative signal af-
fects, see Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis, in which attenuated affec-
tive experiences generated by the body play a central role in the
regulation of mental life. The somatic marker hypothesis is very similar
to the signal affect hypothesis from the Structural Model of the mind. In
the somatic marker hypothesis, we also see an important example of
how cognitive neuroscience (and psychoanalysis) argues that the mind
is embodied in important ways (see Chapter 1, “Overview: Modeling
the Life of the Mind”) (Damasio 1984).

Defense
In almost every situation, the ego must deal with conflict among com-
peting motivations, with each motivation leading to different imagined
consequences, often involving fear of an unpleasant feeling. Here is
where defense, one of the most important ideas in the psychoanalytic
model of the mind, comes in. The concept of defense is not new to us.
From the beginning, Freud differed from his predecessors in his
approach to patients suffering from hysteria, when he asserted that hys-
terical symptoms result not from a diseased brain (or a neurodegenera-
tive disorder) but rather from “the motive of defense” (Breuer and
Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 285). As he moved from the study of hysteria
to the study of all people, Freud based his new Topographic Model on
conflict between regions of the mind separated from each other by
repression. The Topographic Model emphasized the defense of repres-
sion; indeed, in this model, defense and repression are often inter-
changeable. In the Structural Model of the mind, we see the concept of
defense becoming increasingly complex and increasingly central to how
the mind works. Let us back up and explain what we mean by defense.
Defense is defined as any unconscious psychological maneuver used
to avoid the experience of a painful feeling (Auchincloss and Samberg
2012, pp. 51–52). The mind is capable of an infinite variety of such ma-
neuvers, and any thought, feeling, or behavior can be used in the ser-
vice of defense. Furthermore, defense can be directed not only against
wishes but also against any mental activity that might give rise to un-
pleasurable feelings, including thoughts, memories, actions, and feel-
ings themselves. Defensive operations are always mixed together. They
begin early in childhood and continue to operate throughout the life
cycle. Developmental psychologists have tried to describe the chrono-
logical development of defenses (Gilmore and Meersand 2013). Every-
one uses defenses, and defenses play an important role in both normal
functioning and psychopathology (see Appendix B, “Defenses”).
Conflict and Compromise 173

Some defenses are fleeting, called into action when a short-lived sit-
uation threatens to stir up pain. For example, a defense called denial is
commonly used by otherwise realistic people who have recently been
diagnosed with a fatal illness. Other defenses form long-standing pat-
terns that may be enacted over extended periods of time. For example,
in a defense called identification with the aggressor, a person adopts the
behavior of a former tormenter so as to turn passive into active and
thereby avoid the pain evoked by feelings of weakness, pain, and help-
lessness. Another defense that can be enacted over a long period of time
is altruistic surrender, exemplified by the behavior of a shy teenager who
devotes all her energies to furthering the love interest of her best friend,
with the aim of avoiding awareness of her own dangerous competitive
feelings. Every individual develops patterns of defense that are rela-
tively stable over time.
Although any psychological experience may serve a defensive func-
tion, there are many specific and commonly used defense mechanisms. De-
fense mechanisms with which readers may be familiar include repression,
reaction formation, sublimation, conversion, displacement, projection, isolation,
undoing, denial/disavowal, splitting, negation, and turning against the self, all
described first by Sigmund Freud. Anna Freud added the defenses intro-
jection, idealization, asceticism, intellectualization, altruistic surrender, and
identification with the aggressor, to mention a few (A. Freud 1936/1974).
Melanie Klein added primitive idealization, projective identification, and rep-
aration (Klein 1932, 1945, 1975a, 1975b). Another well-known defense
mechanism is called regression in the service of the ego (Kris 1950). Defini-
tions and examples of these and other defense mechanisms are provided
in Appendix B.
General psychology is converging on psychoanalytic concepts of
defense when it posits analogous concepts such as motivated forgetting,
coping mechanisms, biased attribution, defensive nonattending, compensatory
mechanisms/processes, and safeguarding tendencies (Bornstein 1996; Park
and Auchincloss 2006). Many investigators have applied empirical
methods to the study of defense, both within psychoanalysis and in cog-
nitive and social psychology. For example, some investigators have
developed research instruments that can objectively and reliably mea-
sure the use of specific defenses (Cooper 1992; Perry and Lanni 2008).
Other investigators have studied how defenses operate in a variety of
contexts (Westen 1999). For example, studies demonstrate that the con-
cept of defense can be applied across cultures (Tori and Bilmes 2002), can
differ according to gender (Bullitt and Farber 2002), and can change in
treatment (Roy et al. 2009). Cramer (2006) has reviewed what we know
about how defenses develop, function, and change, as well as research
174 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

methods for their assessment. Finally, cognitive psychologists have used

empirical methods to study defense (Adams et al. 1996; Anderson et al.
2004; Newman and Stone 1996; Newman et al. 1995; Rotton 1992; Simons
and Chabris 1999; Singer 1990; Stein and Young 1997; Weinberger et al.
1979), and neuroscientists have turned their attention to understanding
the biological underpinnings of defense (Anderson et al. 2004; Aybek et
al. 2014; Moscarello and LeDoux 2013; Northoff et al. 2007).

Conflict and Compromise in Operation:

An Example
According to the Structural Model of the mind, every experience, how-
ever big or small, represents a compromise between competing
demands of id, superego, and external reality. The ego has the task of
forging compromise after appraising the situation and mobilizing
defenses to make the situation manageable. Having said this, and
explained a bit about how the system of conflict mediation and compro-
mise formation works, it is time for an example:

Dr. A, a 28-year-old unmarried physician, is seeing Dr. B two times a

week in psychodynamic psychotherapy. He came to treatment with a
chief complaint of intense anxiety that threatens to overwhelm him
whenever he becomes romantically interested in a woman. In addition,
Dr. A’s personality is marked by diffidence bordering on obsequious-
ness, which is especially pronounced with “authority figures.” Although
he is highly intelligent and skilled, he is not advancing professionally.
One day, several years into treatment, as Dr. A is walking to his psy-
chotherapy session, he spies Dr. B on the other side of the street ap-
proaching her office. Dr. A arrives at the office door just before his
therapist. While he is waiting, he suddenly imagines himself hurling in-
sults at Dr. B for being late. In his mind, these insults are accompanied by
angry and derisive thoughts. As they meet at the door, Dr. A quickly
“forgets” his earlier thoughts of anger and derision. In a markedly sub-
servient manner, he bows slightly to Dr. B and offers to carry her bags. In
the process, he drops and breaks his mobile phone.

How does the Structural Model help us to understand this scenario?

The ego has the task of mediating the competing demands of the id, the
superego, and external reality, forging compromise among them. In
other words, Dr. A’s behavior must serve to satisfy his wishes, gratify
the imperatives of his superego, and meet the demands of external real-
ity. Having instantaneously and unconsciously evaluated his angry
Conflict and Compromise 175

thoughts as potentially damaging to his relationship with Dr. B, Dr. A

defends against this danger through repression and reaction formation.
In addition, he turns his aggression against himself in a submissive ges-
ture of appeasement. In his behavior at the door, we can see Dr. A’s fear
of his own aggressive thoughts, his defense against them, and his need
for self-punishment. The satisfaction of aggressive wishes is also pro-
vided by his obsequious behavior. In addition, we can see a glimpse of
Dr. A’s forbidden wishes for romantic intimacy with Dr. B—wishes that
are partially satisfied by the closeness he feels with her in the act of car-
rying her bags. In fact, when Dr. A later “confesses” to Dr. B, with great
anxiety, that he had imagined saying “Fuck you” to her, we see that ag-
gression may itself defend against sexual wishes, as both are expressed
in this highly ambiguous phrase. As it turned out, Dr. A was afraid that
he would suffer punishment more severe than a broken mobile phone if
he were to openly express his sexual and romantic thoughts about Dr. B.
Drs. A and B still had much work to do in exploring Dr. A’s feelings
and thoughts. They needed to understand them, Dr. A’s fears about
them, his defenses against them, their interactions, and their origins.
However, this brief vignette provides a first glimpse of how conflict
leads to compromise. Later in this chapter, when we examine the Struc-
tural Model’s contribution to our understanding of how psychody-
namic psychotherapy works, we will return to the case of Dr. A.

Contribution of Conflict and Compromise

to Theory of Psychopathology in
the Structural Model
The Structural Model teaches us that all behavior and experience repre-
sents compromise, which may take many forms, including some kinds
of psychopathology. The Structural Model makes a major contribution
to the study of psychopathology, representing an advance over the Top-
ographic Model. In Chapter 8, when we discussed the ego, we learned
that, using the Structural Model, we can examine neurotic symptoms
for the ego weaknesses that are in evidence. In this chapter, we discover
that we can also examine such symptoms for what they reveal about the
adaptiveness or maladaptiveness of the compromises forged by the in-
dividual. Furthermore, we also see how the Structural Model expands
the concept of neurosis to encompass psychopathology without overt
symptoms—in other words, psychopathology in the form of character.
176 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

The Concept of Character

Character is defined as an individual’s stable and enduring behaviors,
attitudes, cognitive styles, and moods. It also includes the individual’s
typical modes of self-regulation, adaptation, and relating to others. In
contrast to the popular usage of the term, character in the psychoanalytic
model places no special emphasis on moral values (although traits
involving thoughts about right and wrong are an aspect of every indi-
vidual’s character). In short, everyone has a character or a character
style (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 32). Indeed, because Dr. A is
submissive not just occasionally but much of the time, we describe him
as having a character marked by extreme diffidence even to the point of
passivity.
The concept of character is roughly analogous to what psychologists
and psychiatrists (especially when using the DSM system) usually call
personality, the major difference being that character, as a psychoanalytic
concept, links external manifestations of an individual’s functioning to
the psychoanalytic model of the mind (Baudry 1984). When we define
the concept of character, we quickly find ourselves using terms that are
closely associated with the Structural Model, such as self-regulation, ad-
aptation, and ego. Indeed, most of the best definitions of character define
it as representing the ego’s stable and preferred solution to conflict
among the id, the superego, and external reality (Fenichel 1954; Reich
1933/1945).
In Chapter 9 (“The Id and the Superego”) we had a brief look at the
first concept of character (developed by Sigmund Freud and Karl Abra-
ham) as reflecting the predominance of one or another of the erotogenic
zones—oral, anal, or early genital (phallic). However, when we define
character in terms of ego, we are using a much more successful strategy.
Indeed, the study of character became something of a growth industry
in the Ego Psychology of the 1950s, as psychoanalysts generated many
theories about character functioning, classification, and development.
Contemporary theories emphasize the many factors leading to charac-
ter formation, including interactions with caregivers, parental character
traits and ideals, family style, culture or society, biological endowment,
temperament, cognitive style, mood, and early loss or trauma. How-
ever, the concept itself continues to focus on the functioning of the ego.
An individual’s stable defensive style is an important feature of his or
her character. A rigid defensive style contributes to character pathology,
with specific defensive maneuvers associated with specific character
types. For example, we typically think of hysterical/histrionic character
as marked by use of the defenses of repression and somatization. We think
Conflict and Compromise 177

of obsessional character as marked by the use of reaction formation, isola-

tion, intellectualization, and undoing. We think of paranoid character as
marked by the use of projection (Shapiro 1965, 1984). In Chapter 11 when
we talk about Object Relations Theory, we will see how theorists have
linked use of certain defenses with psychopathology, including neu-
rotic, borderline, and psychotic psychopathology (Kernberg 1970; see
also Appendix B, “Defenses”). When we reach Chapter 12 on Self Psy-
chology, we will see how the concept of self influences the formation of
character (Kohut and Wolf 1978).

Character Disorders
Whereas the term character itself implies neither health nor pathology,
to the extent that someone’s character is inflexible and maladaptive, he
or she may be diagnosed with a character disorder. Traditionally, patho-
logical character traits are distinguished from symptoms by the fact that
they are experienced as part of the self (ego-syntonic), whereas symp-
toms are experienced as alien to the self (ego-dystonic).
Character is considered pathological if it involves weaknesses in the
areas of reality testing and social judgment, abstract thinking, affect tol-
erance (Kernberg 1970; Krystal 1975; Zetzel 1949), or impulse control
(Kernberg 1970). It is also considered pathological if it involves too
much disturbance in the capacity for pleasure. Certain defensive strat-
egies are seen as healthier or more adaptive than others because they
come with less “cost” in terms of ego functioning. For example, altru-
ism and humor are considered higher-level defenses because they do
not include narrowed reality testing, whereas projection and denial are
considered lower-level defenses because they do include distortions in
the experience of reality (see Appendix B, “Defenses”).

Theories of Ego Weakness: Defense Versus Deficit

There are two major theories that explain ego weakness. The first of these
theories describes ego weakness as the result of a maladaptive use of de-
fense. For example, an individual who is afraid that the expression of oe-
dipal strivings will lead to retaliation and/or punishment may defend
against them by limiting all forms of initiative, developing severe inhibi-
tions in many areas of ego functioning. The second of these theories de-
scribes ego weakness as the result of a deficit caused either by innate
biological factors or by environmental factors such as deprivation. For
example, a patient may be low on initiative because he or she has a pas-
sive temperament. Another patient may have trouble experiencing plea-
sure because he or she experienced so many deprivations as a child that
178 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

he or she simply does not recognize positive feelings. Indeed, clinicians

will often argue among themselves about whether a specific ego weak-
ness is caused by defense or by deficit. For example, does a patient feel
confused because she creates confusion in her mind as a defense against
painful awareness? Or is she confused because her lack of experience
means that she simply does not understand what is going on? Is another
patient inattentive as a way to defend against painful awareness, or is he
inattentive because of some form of attention-deficit disorder?
In Chapter 11, we will see a famous example of the defense/deficit
argument in debates over the etiology of borderline psychopathology.
We will see another famous example in Chapter 12 when we explore
differences in how Kernberg and Kohut conceptualized narcissistic
problems. For the most part, however, contemporary psychodynamic
practitioners do not take an either/or point of view in the debate over
defense versus deficit as the cause of ego weakness, but instead recog-
nize that psychopathology must be understood from multiple perspec-
tives and that combined treatment approaches are often required.

Contribution of Conflict and Compromise

to Theory of Therapeutic Action in
the Structural Model
Having explored how the Structural Model helps us to understand psy-
chopathology, we can see that this new model also makes an important
contribution to the theory of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The Struc-
tural Model adds complexity to our therapeutic goals. In the Topo-
graphic Model, successful psychotherapy aimed at increasing self-
awareness by making the unconscious conscious, with the goal of in-
creasing our ability to use rational judgment in regard to our wishes. In
the Structural Model, successful psychotherapy aims not only at bring-
ing unconscious mental life into awareness but also at increasing ego
strength. If we understand this aim better, we can better understand
Freud’s famous statement, “Where id was, there ego shall be” (Freud
1923/1962, p. 56; Freud 1933/1962, p. 80).
In the course of psychodynamic psychotherapy, the therapist and
the patient use the therapeutic setting to explore compromises forged
by the ego in the process of mediating conflict. Exploration of the ego’s
ways of forging compromise is called defense analysis. Compromises are
expressed not only in the form of symptoms and character traits but
also in the patient’s way of behaving in the psychotherapeutic situation.
Conflict and Compromise 179

Exploration of the patient’s habitual modes of resistance as he or she de-

fends against the emergence of wishes, impulses, feelings, fears, and
fantasies within the treatment setting provides important clues as to the
ego’s habitual modes of defense and conflict resolution in everyday life.
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of treatment using the Structural Model is
the therapist’s greater emphasis on the methods of and reasons for re-
sistance, rather than on simply what is being warded off. Many of the
patient’s habitual modes of conflict resolution are also expressed in the
transference, or in the patient’s way of experiencing the therapist. For
example, a woman who becomes childlike, helpless, and forgetful in
her psychotherapy sessions whenever she is threatened with the emer-
gence of sexual fantasies directed toward her therapist is demonstrating
the use of repression and regression typical of the hysterical histrionic
character style. As we have seen with Dr. A, a man who becomes overly
polite and deferential to his therapist when threatened with the emer-
gence of aggressive or sexual fantasies is showing the reaction forma-
tion and isolation of affect typical of the obsessive character style.
Many of these habitual modes of defense represent the persistence
into adult life of strategies for conflict resolution that were used by the
ego during childhood that are no longer adaptive in the adult. In psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy, patient and therapist explore these outdated
strategies. In the course of such exploration, the growth of new ego capac-
ities for affect tolerance and reality testing allows the patient to make new
attempts at conflict resolution, using defenses that are more adaptive. For
example, a chronically self-defeating woman may learn in therapy that
she has destroyed her successes out of unconscious guilt for hidden ag-
gressive fantasies toward an overbearing mother and out of fear of retal-
iation from parental “authority figures.” A greater tolerance for feelings
of fear, guilt, and anger, as well as a more realistic view of the actual na-
ture of both her imagined “crimes” and the danger she faces, will enable
this woman to tolerate greater success in life. Although conflict and de-
fense can never be eliminated, psychotherapy helps the patient find new
compromises among competing wishes, fears, and environmental con-
straints that are less self-punishing, have a higher yield of pleasure, and
are better adapted to the realities of present-day life. To illustrate:

After treatment in psychotherapy, Dr. A learned to accept his hostile feel-

ings toward women and his fears of assertive sexuality. As a result of this
greater acceptance, he was able enjoy a mutually satisfying relationship
with his new wife. He was also able to find greater success at work. Re-
sidual aggression and unconscious sadism were expressed in a success-
ful career as a plastic surgeon whose patients were largely women.
180 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 10–1 shows our Structural Model chart of core dimensions with
the addition of key concepts for Motivation, Structure/Process, Psycho-
pathology, and Treatment.

• Topographic point of view: Conflict and compromise are, for the

most part, unconscious.
• Motivational point of view: All motivations are in conflict. The
sources of conflict are many, including the differing aims of the ego,
id, and superego. Conflict also includes attempts to avoid danger sit-
uations—specific scenarios that trigger anxiety in all human beings.
• Structural point of view: Compromise formation is the result of the
ego’s mediation of conflict among the id, the superego, and external
reality. To forge compromise, the ego uses its many capacities for ap-
praisal and defense. (Defense is defined as any unconscious psycho-
logical maneuver used to avoid the experience of a painful feeling.)
Appraisal through use of a signal affect (also called signal anxiety)—an
attenuated version of the experience of an affect (either pleasure or
pain) remembered from the past—as an information system is an im-
portant part of compromise formation. Character has been defined as
an individual’s stable and enduring behaviors, attitudes, cognitive
styles, and moods. Importantly, the concept of character also in-
cludes the individual’s typical mode of mediating conflict.
• Developmental point of view: Like many aspects of the mind, com-
promise has a developmental history. What may have been adaptive
for one phase of life may no longer be adaptive for a later phase. Dan-
ger situations also have a developmental history, as does character.
• Theory of psychopathology: Certain defensive strategies are seen as
healthier or more adaptive than others because they come with less
“cost” in terms of ego functioning. Maladaptive compromise can lead to
symptoms and/or character disorders. There is disagreement regard-
ing whether ego weakness is best conceptualized as resulting from a
maladaptive use of defense or from a deficit due to innate biological or
environmental factors. For the most part, however, contemporary
psychodynamic practitioners do not take an either/or stance in the
debate over defense versus deficit, but instead recognize that psychopa-
thology must be understood from multiple perspectives.
• Theory of therapeutic action: The exploration of compromise (in-
cluding the nature of conflict and defense) is an important part of all
psychodynamic psychotherapies.
 Conflict and Compromise
TABLE 10–1. Structural Model Part 3: Conflict and Compromise

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

The ego and the The ego, superego, The mind is divided into Ego development Ego strength/ego Strengthening the ego
superego and id each have three structures: Erikson’s stages weakness serves as
have both separate aims: ego, superego, an index of mental Exploring conflict,
conscious/ The ego— and id Superego development health/illness defense, and
preconscious homeostasis compromise
and and adaptation The ego Development of the drives Maladaptive compromise
unconscious The superego— Ego functions (Id) may lead to character “Where id was, there
aspects moral Defense Psychosexual phases disorders ego shall be”
imperatives Internalization (oral, anal, early
The id is entirely The id—drives Identification genital [phallic], Defense versus deficit
theories of
unconscious Libido Signal affect genital/oedipal,
psychopathology
Aggression Compromise latency,
formation adolescence)
Avoidance of danger Ego identity Fixation
situations Character Regression

Conflict is always The superego

present because Ego ideal
of competing aims
The id

181
182 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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 PART IV

Object Relations
Theory and
Self Psychology
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 CHAPTER 11

Object Relations Theory

This chapter introduces readers to Object Relations Theory. It out-

lines the basic assertions of this model of the mind, comparing it with pre-
vious models. It discusses some famous object relations theories, pointing
to similarities and areas of overlap with neighboring disciplines and fields
of research. Finally, it explores the contributions of Object Relations The-
ory to our understanding of psychopathology and treatment. Vocabulary
introduced in this chapter includes the following: Adult Attachment Inter-
view, attachment, attachment behavioral system, attachment theory, borderline
personality organization, co-created experience, container/contained, corrective
emotional experience, countertransference, depressive anxiety, depressive posi-
tion, differentiation, envy, good-enough mother, holding environment, identity
diffusion, individuation, internal working models of attachment, interpersonal,
Mentalization-Based Treatment, midlife crisis, need-satisfying object, object, ob-
ject permanence, object relations, on the way to object constancy, paranoid posi-
tion, part object, persecutory anxiety, position, practicing, rapprochement,
rapprochement crisis, representation, schema, schizophrenogenic mothering, self
constancy, separation, separation-individuation, Strange Situation, therapeutic
alliance, Transference-Focused Psychotherapy, and whole object.
After its introduction in the early 1920s, the Structural Model, along
with Ego Psychology, dominated thinking about the psychodynamic
approach to mental heath in America for almost half a century. How-
ever, in the 1960s and 1970s, it gradually became clear to many theorists
that some behavior and many states of mind are best described not in
terms of conflict among the structures of ego, id, and superego but

189
190 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

rather in terms of internal representations of self and other. It also be-

came increasingly clear to developmental psychologists that many
mental capacities previously attributed to the ego could be better un-
derstood as developing in the infant–caregiver matrix. In the midst of
these two developments, Object Relations Theory was invented.

Object Relations Theory:

Terms and Concepts
Object Relations Theory models the mind in terms of internal representa-
tions of self and other. Object is the word that psychoanalytic theorists use
mainly to describe another person. An object relation is defined as a psy-
chological configuration consisting of three parts: a self representation,
an object representation, and a representation of an affectively charged
interaction between the two. The word representation as used in psycho-
analysis is roughly analogous to the word schema as used in cognitive
psychology; both mean “an organized and persistent pattern of thought”
(Weinberger and Weiss 1997). When we use the term object relations, we
are referring to psychological representations. In other words, object rela-
tions must be distinguished from interpersonal relationships, a term that
refers to the interactions between an individual and another person in the
outside world. The term object relations is often erroneously assumed to be
synonymous with interpersonal relationships.
Object Relations Theory attempts to understand how self and object
representations develop in childhood, how they are maintained through-
out life, how they influence and are influenced by other structures and
motivations, and how they affect psychic functioning and behavior. The
basic tenets of Object Relations Theory may be summarized as follows:

• Object relations are largely unconscious.

• Human beings are object seeking from birth; object seeking is not re-
ducible to any other motivation.
• All psychological phenomena, from the most fleeting experience to
the most stable structure, are organized by object relations.
• Object relations evolve through internalization of the infant’s inter-
actions with the object world, developing from an admixture of in-
nate factors (including affect dispositions and cognitive capacities)
and interactions with caregivers.
• Interpersonal relationships reflect internalized object relations; psy-
chopathology, especially serious psychopathology, is best conceptu-
alized in terms of disturbances in object relations.
Object Relations Theory 191

In placing object relations at the center of psychological life, Object

Relations Theory emphasizes the fact that psychic life develops in the
context of the social or interpersonal environment and is adapted to that
environment.

Comparison of Object Relations Theory With

the Topographic and Structural Models
Sigmund Freud used the term object throughout his writing life. In fact,
there is no aspect of either the Topographic Model or the Structural
Model—including those related to motivation, structure, development,
and psychopathology/treatment—that does not include understand-
ing of the role of the object. For example, in our discussion of oedipal
conflict (see Chapter 7, “The Oedipus Complex”), we saw how early ob-
jects, including father and mother, are important in the developing
mind of the child. When drive theory was introduced (see Chapter 9,
“The Id and the Superego”), we explored how almost all forms of libido
and aggression (except those that are autoerotic) require an object for
the attainment of satisfaction. Throughout our discussion of the Struc-
tural Model, we saw how both the ego and the superego develop in in-
teraction with caregivers. In addition, in the developmental sequence of
danger situations important in the mediation of conflict, loss of the ob-
ject—or of the love of the object—is an important fear (see Chapter 10,
“Conflict and Compromise”). Finally, in all models of the mind, theories
of therapeutic action emphasize the role of the transference as revealing
important aspects of the mind. It should not be surprising to us then
that there is considerable overlap between the earlier models of the
mind and Object Relations Theory. Indeed, it is important to remember
that maintenance of stable and realistic self and object representations
is defined as an ego function. In other words, one way of conceptualiz-
ing Object Relations Theory is to think of it as a model of the mind that
specifically focuses on the ego functions responsible for developing and
maintaining object relations.
A brief comparison of several of the basic tenets of Object Relations
Theory with those of the Structural Model of the mind may be useful in
clarifying how the Object Relations model of the mind differs from the
earlier model:

• Topographic point of view—In Object Relations Theory, object rela-

tions are conceptualized as being largely unconscious. By contrast, in
the Structural Model, the id was defined as unconscious, and the ego
192 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

and superego were conceptualized as having both unconscious and

conscious/preconscious aspects.
• Motivational point of view—According to Object Relations Theory,
the pursuit of objects is not reducible to the pursuit of bodily and/or
aggressive pleasure (as is asserted in the Structural Model). In other
words, we do not seek attachment to our mother because she is a
source of pleasure; rather, we seek the attachment for its own sake.
Wish and drive may be important motivators in psychic life, but they
must always be as embedded in self and object representations.
• Structural point of view—In Object Relations Theory, the basic unit
of experience is a package consisting of a self representation, an ob-
ject representation, and the interaction between the two—an object
relation—rather than a package consisting of a conflict between a
wish and a prohibition (as in the Structural Model). All psychic struc-
tures—not just the superego—are made up of object relations.
• Developmental point of view—In Object Relations Theory, infant–
caregiver interactions are central to all aspects of the developing
mind, not just the superego (as is posited in the Structural Model);
preoedipal interactions involving the infant–mother relationship are
just as important to the development of the mind as are oedipal in-
teractions; and the establishment of stable object relations during the
preoedipal period of development is a necessary forerunner to devel-
opment of the oedipal phase. In other words, Object Relations The-
ory places more emphasis on the preoedipal period than does the
Structural Model.
• Theory of psychopathology and theory of therapeutic action—In
Object Relations Theory, psychopathology is conceptualized primar-
ily in terms of disturbances in object relations, rather than in terms of
oedipal conflict (neurosis) (as in the Structural Model). In regard to
the mechanism of therapeutic action, Object Relations Theory posits
that it is the patient–therapist relationship itself that brings about
change, as opposed to insight derived from interpretation (per the
Structural Model). Contributions of the Object Relations model to
psychoanalytic theories of psychopathology and therapeutic action
are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter (see sections
“Object Relations Theory and Adult Psychopathology” and “Object
Relations Theory and Psychodynamic Treatment”).
Object Relations Theory 193

The Birth of Object Relations Theory

The most important object relations theorists are Klein, Mahler, Bowlby,
and Kernberg. Bion and Winnicott are discussed briefly in this chapter
and will be mentioned again in Chapter 12 when we talk about Self Psy-
chology. Each of these theorists emphasized a different aspect of Object
Relations Theory.

Anna Freud: The Need-Satisfying Object

After Sigmund Freud's death in 1939, the psychoanalytic model of the
mind developed in several directions, in large measure differentiated
from the Freudian model by the place given to the role of the object and
object relations in psychological life. Anna Freud (1895–1982), Freud’s
youngest child, remained loyal to her father’s Structural Model of the
mind, broadening this model (later called Ego Psychology) through her
work with children and the study of defense. However, her interest in
development led her to study object relations in childhood, although she
did not use that term. In her work, Anna Freud described a natural pro-
gression from object dependency to self-reliance. She posited a series of
predictable stages through which normal children pass: an early stage of
undifferentiated self and object representations; a stage in which the ob-
ject is experienced as need-satisfying; a stage marked by the attainment of
object constancy, in which stable object representations are maintained
even in the face of feelings of anger; an oedipal stage marked by conflicts
over rivalry and possessiveness; and a stage marked by the adolescent
struggle to find new, nonincestuous objects (A. Freud 1963). We will dis-
cuss the important concepts of need-satisfying object and object constancy
in greater depth in a moment.

Melanie Klein: The Paranoid and Depressive Positions

At roughly the same time that Anna Freud was doing her work, Mela-
nie Klein (1882–1960) proposed a very different theory, which has had a
lasting effect on the psychoanalytic model of the mind. Klein’s theory is
considered the first real Object Relations Theory.1 Building on ideas
about the development of the superego, understood as resulting from
internalization of interactions between child and caregiver, Klein pro-
posed that the entire mind is built out of similar internalizations, which

1Although the term itself—object relations theory—was invented by Ronald Fair-

bairn (1954), who was a student of Klein’s.

194 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

lead to the formation of representations of both self and object. Let us

explain a bit more about how Klein’s theory works.
In her theory, Klein described the feelings and thoughts of young
children that influence the development of object relations. For exam-
ple, if the young child experiences the object as “bad,” this experience
of “badness” is as much the result of projection of the child’s angry
thoughts and feelings onto the representation of the object as it is the re-
sult of any actual bad qualities of the object. By the same token, if the
young child experiences the object as “good,” this “goodness” is the re-
sult of an admixture of the projection of the child’s experience of happy
satisfaction onto the object and the object’s own good qualities. Accord-
ing to Klein’s Object Relations Theory, the child’s efforts to manage the
good and bad aspects of experience lead to the development of his or
her inner world. As we can see, Klein adhered to Sigmund Freud’s con-
cept of drive (libido and aggression); however, in Klein’s theory, drive
is always experienced in the context of relationships with others.
In the process of managing these good and bad experiences, every
child must progress through what Klein called positions, analogous to
Sigmund Freud’s and Anna Freud’s developmental stages. These posi-
tions—the paranoid position (also known as the paranoid-schizoid position)
and the depressive position—are defined as stable configurations of self
and object representations built from the combined influence of wishes,
thoughts, and feelings; and interactions with caregivers. In Klein’s
view, successful development is defined as the capacity to tolerate con-
flicting feelings of love and hate toward the same object, as expressed in
movement from the paranoid to the depressive position.
The paranoid position is the earliest organization of the psyche. It is
characterized by the splitting apart of good (satisfying and loving) from
bad (frustrating and aggressive) aspects of experience, accompanied by
the use of projection and projective identification of bad aspects of expe-
rience onto the object. Splitting and projection/projective identification serve
to protect the good self and good object from angry, hostile feelings. (We
will say more about splitting and projective identification in a moment
when we talk about patients with borderline psychopathology.) In the
paranoid position, the child fears that he or she is in danger of being de-
stroyed by the bad object, who has become the repository for all of the
child’s own projected aggression. The child is also threatened by his or
her own experience of envy, which is also projected onto the object. In
other words, the paranoid position is marked by persecutory anxiety.
During the course of normal development, in the context of support-
ive maternal care and the absence of too much frustration, the child be-
gins to move into the depressive position. This movement progresses as
Object Relations Theory 195

the child develops the capacity to tolerate conflicting feelings of love

and hate toward the same object, so that he or she does not have to re-
sort to splitting and projective identification to manage bad experience.
In the depressive position, a child fears that his or her own angry feel-
ings may threaten the object, now experienced as loved and needed. In
other words, the depressive position is marked by depressive anxiety.
However, the child’s new capacity for gratitude toward the object,
along with growing confidence that envy can be overcome and damage
to the relationship can be repaired, reassures him or her that love will
prevail over hate and that loving relationships can be maintained (Klein
1932, 1975a, 1975b; Segal 1946).

Two Views of the Major Developmental Challenge of

Childhood: Anna Freud Versus Melanie Klein
If we pause for a moment to compare the views of Melanie Klein with
those of Anna Freud, we see that for Klein, the major developmental chal-
lenge facing children is the integration of contradictory feelings about the
object, whereas for Freud, the major developmental challenge facing chil-
dren is the achievement of relative independence from the object with the
internalization of regulation in the form of a strong ego. These two theo-
rists had other disagreements as well. Indeed, the struggle between Anna
Freud and Melanie Klein and their followers for dominance and influ-
ence in psychoanalysis in the aftermath of Sigmund Freud’s death is leg-
endary in the history of psychoanalysis in Great Britain, where they both
lived and worked (King and Steiner 1991). Nowadays, however, we do
not have to be caught up in their conflict but can draw upon the best from
both these theories in our view of the mind.

Wilfred Bion and D.W. Winnicott: The Container/Contained,

the Good-Enough Mother, and the Holding Environment
Among the students of Melanie Klein were two other British psychoan-
alysts, Wilfred Bion (1897–1979) and D.W. Winnicott (1896–1971). Bion
is known for his concept of the container and the contained. In this view,
the mother must help the child manage intolerable and painful experi-
ence. Through the mother’s caretaking acts, which include soothing
and verbalizing (or what Bion called reverie), the infant’s chaotic, un-
bearable experience is transformed into something more tolerable, so
that the child can successfully move from the paranoid to the depres-
sive position. In Bion’s terms, the mother acts as a container for the in-
fant’s chaotic experience, which must be contained. Bion’s theory has
obvious implications for the theory of therapeutic action (Bion 1962,
196 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

1963, 1967, 1970), which we will touch on later in this chapter (see sec-
tion “Object Relations Theory and Psychodynamic Treatment”). In
Chapter 12 (“Self Psychology”), we will revisit Bion’s theories about the
role of the containing mother in helping the child to develop affect tol-
erance and other key capacities.
Winnicott proposed a theory of object relations that also describes
the infant’s capacity to relate to others, which develops in interaction
with the mother. Winnicott is famous for his concepts of the good-enough
mother (who provides the infant with the optimal amount of comfort
and frustration) and the holding environment (created by a caregiver who
is “good enough”). This holding environment is necessary for develop-
ment of the child’s capacity to experience concern for the object instead of
merely using the object as a repository for the projection of bad experi-
ence (Winnicott 1954/1958, 1958, 1965, 1971). Like Klein, Winnicott saw
successful development as representing the ability to integrate feelings
of love and hate toward the object. Unlike Klein, Winnicott placed em-
phasis (as did Bion) on the role of the mother in providing the environ-
ment where this can happen.
Later in this chapter we will examine the contribution of the concept
of the holding environment to the theory of therapeutic action in psy-
chodynamic psychotherapy (see section “Object Relations Theory and
Psychodynamic Treatment”). We will also discuss Winnicott’s ideas in
greater detail in Chapter 12 (“Self Psychology”), when we look at his
theories about how the interactions between infant and mother are im-
portant for the development of an authentic sense of self in the child, as
well as for the development of the child’s capacity for play, fantasy, and
a rich inner life.2

Margaret Mahler: Separation-Individuation

Meanwhile, in America, a psychoanalyst named Margaret Mahler
(1897–1985) was doing important work based on her observations of
young children and their mothers. Although Mahler saw herself as
writing within the tradition of Ego Psychology and the Structural
Model, her ideas drew from those of both Anna Freud and Melanie
Klein and have contributed a great deal to our understanding of the

2Winnicott was heavily influenced by his studies with Klein. Working in the
United Kingdom at the time of the Freud–Klein controversies, Winnicott
helped to found the British Middle School, later known as the Independent
Group (King and Steiner 1991).
Object Relations Theory 197

child’s interaction with caregivers. Mahler is best known for her most
important idea, the process of separation-individuation.
In Mahler’s theory, separation is a psychological process by which
the child forms a representation of the self that is distinct or separate
from the representation of the object. Individuation is a psychological
process by which the child develops specific characteristics, so that the
self becomes not only distinct from the object but also unique and au-
tonomous (Mahler et al. 1975). In Mahler’s view, the process of separa-
tion-individuation occurs between the ages of 9 months and 4 years.
Mahler delineated four subphases of the separation-individuation pro-
cess: differentiation, practicing, rapprochement, and on the way to object con-
stancy. She proposed two other, earlier phases: the autistic phase (birth
to 2 months), in which the infant is unresponsive to external stimuli,
and the symbiotic phase (2–9 months), in which the infant is attached to
the mother but imagines him- or herself to be merged with the mother.
The autistic phase and the symbiotic phase have been largely discred-
ited by studies indicating that even the youngest infants have highly
developed capacities that allow for both contact with the outside world
and differentiation between self and object (Stern 1985).3 However,
Mahler’s views about separation-individuation have stood the test of
time.
According to Mahler, the separation-individuation process begins
with the differentiation subphase (6–9 months). In this subphase, the in-
fant begins to take more interest in his or her surroundings and starts to

3Mahler’s autistic and symbiotic stages of development, now no longer in use,

represent a common and serious problem in some psychodynamic theory

making in which adult psychopathology is seen as reflecting difficulty at an
early stage of development. In this case, Mahler posited that “autistic schizo-
phrenia” was the result of difficulties in the autistic stage of development and
that “symbiotic schizophrenia” was the result of difficulties in the symbiotic
stage of development. Mahler’s work in this area is related to some of the most
damaging errors in psychodynamic theory making, in which the difficulties of
psychotic patients were blamed on problematic or “schizophrenogenic” moth-
ering (Fromm-Reichmann 1950). Nowadays, schizophrenia is no longer con-
ceptualized as reflecting difficulties in mother–infant interactions (Willick
2001). (In addition, as we have seen, infants are no longer thought to be either
“autistic” or “symbiotic” in the first months of life.) Reexamination of these
and other errors highlights the need for theory makers to avoid the “genetic
fallacy” in which present-day functioning is conceptualized as reflecting diffi-
culties in development, often in parent–child interactions (Willick 1983) (see
also Chapter 7 [“The Oedipus Complex”] for a discussion of errors made in
thinking about female development and about homosexuality).
198 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

interact more and more with the environment. The relationship to the
mother is firmly established, as indicated by the frequent use of the so-
cial smile and the appearance of stranger anxiety (Mahler 1972; Mahler
et al. 1975).
In the practicing subphase (10–15 months), the child experiments
with distance by moving away from the mother, enjoying his or her
newly developed capacities for crawling and walking. In this subphase,
the child explores his or her expanding world at increasingly greater
distances but still requires the mother to be available for emotional refu-
eling, especially when the child is tired or upset. The practicing sub-
phase is characterized by feelings of omnipotence and elation, because
the child seems to be in a “love affair with the world” (Mahler 1972;
Mahler et al. 1975).
The practicing subphase is followed by the rapprochement subphase
(15–24 months). During rapprochement, the child experiences conflict-
ing feelings brought on by a new awareness of him- or herself as a sep-
arate individual. In this subphase, the child begins to feel increasingly
vulnerable, often showing intense separation anxiety. In the face of feel-
ing more vulnerable and anxious, the child returns to the mother, often
in a demanding and controlling way. At the same time, the child’s
clingy behavior arouses the fear that his or her newfound separateness
and independence will be lost. The conflict between the wish to depend
on the mother and the wish for autonomy from her creates a rapproche-
ment crisis. This crisis is accompanied by feelings of anger and hostility;
it is also accompanied by wide fluctuations in mood, as feelings of om-
nipotence alternate with feelings of vulnerability (Mahler 1972; Mahler
et al. 1975). Indeed, anyone who has spent time with a young child in
the rapprochement stage of development knows why this stage has
been called “the terrible twos.”

The Importance of Object Constancy

Mahler called the final subphase of separation-individuation by the
term on the way to object constancy. Object constancy is one the most im-
portant concepts in the psychoanalytic model of the mind. It is defined
as the ability to maintain a positively tinged feeling toward the mother
(or anyone else) in the face of feelings of frustration, anger, and/or dis-
appointment. A related concept is self constancy, defined as the ability to
maintain a positive self representation in the face of failure or threats to
self-esteem. Object constancy depends on the achievement of object per-
manence (usually by 6 months), defined as the ability to maintain a rep-
resentation of an object (animate or inanimate) even when it is not
within perceptual awareness (Piaget 1954/1990; Schacter et al. 2011,
Object Relations Theory 199

p. 477). Object constancy, an emotional capacity, is often confused with

object permanence, a purely cognitive capacity. Mahler borrowed the
term object constancy from fellow ego psychologists Anna Freud and
Heinz Hartmann, the latter of whom coined the term to describe object
representations that remain stable and permanent “independent of the
state of needs” (Hartmann 1953, p. 180). In other words, as we have
seen, prior to the achievement of object constancy, the object is experi-
enced as need-satisfying, or as existing only to meet the infant’s needs
(Hartmann 1952, 1953). In Klein’s terms, the need-satisfying object is a
part object, meaning that only one aspect of the relationship is experi-
enced (and represented) by the child, as opposed to a whole object, which
is experienced as complete, or integrated with respect to all its qualities,
both good and bad. Mahler, like Klein, believed that the capacity for ob-
ject constancy is achieved when the child is able to integrate bad repre-
sentations of the mother with good representations of the mother, so
that the object can retain its identity as a “good person” even when the
mother does something that the child finds frustrating. In other words,
Mahler’s final stage of separation-individuation is roughly equivalent
to the depressive position as described by Klein.
While Mahler argued that object constancy is fairly firmly established
in the normal 3-year-old child, she called this final stage in the separation-
individuation process on the way to object constancy, reflecting her feeling
that the attainment of object constancy is a lifelong process. Klein also un-
derstood that the attainment of object constancy waxes and wanes
throughout life. Although in her view, maturity is reflected in the move-
ment from the paranoid to the depressive position, the two positions fluc-
tuate in everyone. Indeed, in Klein’s view, retreat to the paranoid position
is often a defense against unbearable depressive anxiety, or the fear that
one’s own aggression will destroy the object.
Indeed, throughout the life cycle we face continual threats to object
constancy posed by any event that causes separation from loved ones or
feelings of vulnerability and anger. Actually, object constancy can be
threatened by just about any strong feeling. Obvious examples of such
threats include adolescence (often called “the second separation-individ-
uation”), when we face the challenges of leaving home and finding new
people with whom to identify (Blos 1967); parenthood, when we face the
many feelings that come with having a baby (Anthony and Benedek
1970); the midlife crisis, when we face the fact that life does not go on for-
ever (Jacques 1965); and many others (Akhtar 1994). When we discuss
the contributions of the Object Relations model to psychoanalytic theo-
ries of psychopathology and therapeutic action (see sections “Object Re-
lations Theory and Adult Psychopathology” and “Object Relations
200 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Theory and Psychodynamic Treatment” later in this chapter), we will see

that the concept of object constancy—including failures of object con-
stancy (and of self constancy)—is at the root of all kinds of severe person-
ality disorders.

John Bowlby: Attachment Theory

While Anna Freud and Melanie Klein were locked in struggles over Sig-
mund Freud’s legacy and Margaret Mahler was studying babies and
their mothers in New York City, the British psychoanalyst John Bowlby
(1907–1990) was developing a different kind of object relations–based
theory called attachment theory (Bowlby 1969/1982, 1973, 1980). Attach-
ment theory is another theory of early development based on the study
of interactions between infant and caregiver. Bowlby defined attachment
as “lasting psychological connectedness between human beings”
(Bowlby 1969/1982, p. 194). The central premise of attachment theory is
that the infant’s motivation to develop an attachment with the caregiver
is an innate feature of the human mind dictated by evolutionary pres-
sure, or by the survival needs of the species. The quest for attachment
precedes—and is not reducible to—the quest for libidinal gratification
(Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, pp. 20–22).
Bowlby argued that the motivation for attachment is realized
through an inborn attachment behavioral system operating between infant
and mother. He identified five components of the attachment behav-
ioral system that regulate distance between infant and mother: sucking,
smiling, clinging, crying, and following. When the infant becomes dis-
tressed (either by an internal stimulus, such as feeling hungry, or by an
external stimulus, such as distraction in the mother), the attachment
system is activated and the infant seeks physical contact with the
mother. In return, the mother responds to the infant’s signals with be-
haviors that increase closeness and nurturing. By contrast, when the in-
fant feels secure, the attachment system is deactivated; attachment
behaviors in both infant and mother cease.
For Bowlby, the nature of the child’s earliest tie to the mother estab-
lishes the child’s basic attitude toward others and the child’s basic sense
of self. The bond with the mother is represented in what Bowlby called
internal working models of attachment, which are established by 1 year of
age. Internal working models of attachment are analogous to the object
relations that we have seen in the theories of Klein and Mahler in that
they include a self representation, an object representation, and a repre-
sentation of the interaction between the two. As with object relations,
these internal models serve as a template for all future interactions with
Object Relations Theory 201

others. Internal working models of attachment also play a role in the de-
velopment of cognitive capacities, affect regulation, impulse control,
and other ego functions that we explored in the Structural Model. How-
ever, internal working models of attachment differ from object relations
in that theories about their development place less emphasis on the
emotional state of the child and more emphasis on the interactions be-
tween child and caregiver. As we have seen, Klein and Mahler both em-
phasized the influence of the young child’s inner experiences of love
and hate in the development of his or her object relations. In contrast,
Bowlby placed greater emphasis on the nature of the interaction with
the actual mother (Fonagy 2001; Johnson et al. 2007).
In the development of his theories, Bowlby was heavily influenced
by work from a variety of neighboring disciplines, including biology,
evolution, and ethology. He was influenced by Darwin’s theory of evo-
lution, understanding that the attachment behavior that links the de-
pendent infant to the caretaking mother improves survival. Bowlby
was also inspired by Konrad Lorenz’s (1903–1989) research on imprint-
ing in geese (Lorenz 1949/1979) and by Harlow’s research on maternal
deprivation in primates (Harlow and Zimmermann 1958), as both of
these investigators explored aspects of inborn needs for a relationship.
Indeed, because Bowlby’s theory emphasized the importance of inborn
behavioral patterns and of real relationships, he was often at odds with
other psychoanalysts of the time, who tended to emphasize the internal
workings of the mind rather than external behaviors (Coates 2004).

Mary Ainsworth and Mary Main:

The Strange Situation and the Adult Attachment Interview
In any case, attachment theory did not enter the psychoanalytic main-
stream until the 1970s and 1980s, with the important research of Mary
Ainsworth (1913–1999) and Mary Main (1943–) (Fonagy 2001). Ains-
worth developed a research procedure called the Strange Situation,
which she used to assess individual differences in attachment organiza-
tion. In the Strange Situation, the child is observed playing while care-
givers and strangers enter and leave the room. An independent observer
rates the child’s behavior on several factors, including the following: the
amount of exploration engaged in by the child, the child’s reaction to the
departure of the caregiver, the amount of stranger anxiety shown by the
child when alone with the stranger, and the child’s reunion behavior
with the caregiver. Ainsworth described distinct patterns of attachment
that she called secure attachment, anxious-avoidant attachment, and anxious-
resistant attachment (Ainsworth et al. 1978). A fourth pattern, disorga-
202 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

nized/disoriented attachment, was added by Mary Main (Main and Solo-

mon 1986). Main developed what she called the Adult Attachment
Interview, used to investigate patterns in adult recollections of early
childhood experience related to attachment. She described similar pat-
terns, including the following: secure-autonomous, dismissing, preoc-
cupied, and unresolved/disorganized (Main et al. 1985). The Adult
Attachment Interview has been used by dozens of investigators to study
the many complex effects of patterns of attachment.

Object Relations Theory and

Adult Psychopathology
All psychodynamic clinicians agree that the quality of object relations,
including a secure internal working model of attachment, is an impor-
tant parameter along which to evaluate mental health. In general, object
relations are assessed as mature when an individual is able to sustain
loving attachments. This ability requires recognition that the object is
distinct from the self and that one’s own needs may sometimes conflict
with those of the object. It also requires the capacity to accept some de-
gree of dependence on the object, as well as some separation from the
object. Mature object relations additionally require the acknowledge-
ment, acceptance, and tolerance of ambivalence toward the object. Fi-
nally, mature object relations are marked by self and object constancy,
allowing for the feeling that the self and the object are “good enough.”
Using empirical research techniques, investigators have shown that
disruptions in infant–caregiver relationships correlate with psychopa-
thology both in early life and later on (Beebe and Lachmann 2003; Beebe
and Stern 1977; Beebe et al. 1992, 2008; Bowlby 1944; Cassidy 2008;
Deklyen and Greenberg 2008; Lyons-Ruth and Jacobvitz 2008; Spitz
1945; Spitz and Wolf 1946; Tronick 1989). In addition, investigators have
explored the complex correlates in many mind/brain systems of these
disruptions. For example, Allan Schore (1994) has summarized work in-
vestigating the development of affect regulation in the context of infant–
caregiver relationships, integrating this work with findings from neuro-
biology (Eisenberg 1995; Hofer 1984, 1995). Schore (1994) posited that
the function of emotion regulation, which develops in interaction with
the parents, is eventually taken over by mental representations—inter-
nalized aspects of the caretaking environment that enable the child to in-
dependently regulate affect states. Drew Westen and others have
attempted to integrate Object Relations Theory with aspects of attach-
Object Relations Theory 203

ment theory, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience (Bandura

1986; Blatt and Lerner 1983; Calabrese et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2013; Weg-
ner and Vallacher 1977; Westen 1990, 1991). More recently, in studies that
promise to revolutionize our understanding of mental health, Avshalom
Caspi and colleagues have reported that the experience of early depriva-
tion and loss may interact with genetic vulnerability to produce psycho-
pathology in later life (Uher et al. 2011; Zimmerman et al. 2011). Finally,
Barbara Milrod and colleagues have suggested that “separation anxiety
and its treatment could provide an important window to neural circuits
and other biological processes associated with internalization of social
supports” (Milrod et al. 2014, p. 40). Object Relations Theory interfaces
with the National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria
domain “Social Processes” and with the construct “Affiliation and At-
tachment” (Cuthbert and Insel 2013).4 (Readers interested in a recent
summary of correlations between neurobiology and Object Relations
Theory are referred to Kernberg 2014.)
In the clinical situation we see disturbances in object relations in
many kinds of adult psychopathology (Nigg et al. 1992). In healthier pa-
tients, establishment of mature object relations during the preoedipal
period of development is a necessary forerunner to successful naviga-
tion of the oedipal stage (Klein 1945). For example, the young woman
who was “afraid to be left on the shelf,” whom we discussed in Chap-
ters 6 (“The World of Dreams”) and 7 (“The Oedipus Complex”), suf-
fered terrible loss at the time of her mother’s death, leaving her even
more afraid than usual that strong feelings of competition aroused in
the oedipal stage would lead to abandonment. As we have seen, this
young woman treated most romantic opportunities with a feeling of be-
ing “above it all.” The young doctor who was obsequious in the pres-
ence of authority, whom we discussed in Chapter 10 (“Conflict and
Compromise”), was also raised in difficult circumstances by parents
whose own struggles with illness led them to demand that their son be
a “good boy” who showed little aggression. As a result, he came into
the oedipal stage already afraid of confrontation and competition.
In more seriously ill patients, failure to successfully differentiate self
from object is reflected in psychotic experiences of all kinds, including
those resulting from severe mental illness (e.g., schizophrenia, affective
disorder) or from organic conditions, toxic states, or trauma. Although
it is possible to describe psychotic experience in terms of ego weakness

4See nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml (accessed January 12,

2014).
204 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

(such as disturbances in reality testing and/or the use of denial), many

aspects of psychosis are best described in terms of self and object repre-
sentations. For example, in the case of hallucinations or delusions, the
patient may be unable to tell whether thoughts or voices originate in his
or her own mind or the minds of other people.
Inability to tolerate ambivalence, or to maintain object constancy, is
reflected in severe personality disorders, including borderline, para-
noid, and some narcissistic conditions. Again, although it is possible to
describe serious personality disorders in terms of ego weakness (such
as impulse dyscontrol and affect intolerance), a better way of under-
standing these disorders may be to conceptualize them as reflecting an
inability to maintain loving relationships in the face of frustration.
Many patients with severe personality pathology do not form attach-
ments at all because they are afraid of the intense feelings that will be
stirred up by an intimate attachment; others are unable to tolerate sep-
aration and loss. Many suffer from problems with both attachment and
separation.

Otto Kernberg:
Integration of Object Relations Theory
With the Structural Model
The American psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg has done important work
integrating many of the best aspects of Object Relations Theory with the
best aspects of the Structural Model. For example, although Kernberg
adheres to a concept of drive, which he uses to describe the peremptory,
superordinate search for pleasure (or impulse for aggression) guiding
all behavior, he conceptualizes drive somewhat differently than do
many who adhere more fully to the Structural Model. In Kernberg’s
view, the experience of drive results not from the body’s innate demand
for pleasure but rather from an innate disposition to experience plea-
sure in the context of relationships, which leads people to seek similar
pleasurable relationships in an ongoing way. In other words, pleasur-
able (or good) experiences in the context of relationships become orga-
nized as drives.
Kernberg developed an important system for classifying personality
organization (Kernberg 1970) and a theory for understanding border-
line personality disorder (Kernberg 1975). These theories reflect his
efforts to integrate Ego Psychology with Object Relations Theory (Kern-
berg 1976) and have been highly influential in the field of mental health.
Object Relations Theory 205

Kernberg’s Classification of Personality Disorders

According to Kernberg, in the development of healthy object relations,
every individual must succeed at two basic tasks. The first task is the
ability to differentiate self from object, or to construct self and object
representations with clear boundaries. The second task is the ability to
integrate self and object representations with respect to their good
(pleasurable) and bad (frustrating) aspects. Kernberg saw the success-
ful development of object relations as the attainment of object con-
stancy, or the ability to maintain a positive attachment to an object even
in the face of frustration or anger. Included in Kernberg’s concept of ob-
ject constancy is the concept of self constancy.
The twin tasks of separating self from object and of integrating good
and bad aspects of self and object are closely related. This relationship
is seen in many instances of psychological stress. For example, in the
common experiences that involve separation from loved ones, we all
face difficulty managing feelings, which often include frustration and
anger. We must be able to withstand these feelings without losing either
the capacity for self and object differentiation (task 1) or the capacity for
object constancy (task 2). According to Kernberg’s classification of per-
sonality disorders, patients who frequently fail at the task of differenti-
ating self from object (task 1) are prone to psychotic pathology; patients
who frequently fail at the task of integrating good and bad experience
(task 2) but who mainly succeed at the task of differentiating self from
object (task 1) are prone to borderline psychopathology; and patients
who usually succeed at tasks 1 and 2 are prone to neurotic psychopa-
thology (Kernberg 1970). Kernberg is most famous for his descriptions
of the second group, or those with borderline personality organization
(Kernberg 1975).

Kernberg’s Conceptualization of
Borderline Personality Organization
Kernberg’s borderline personality organization (BPO) is a psychoana-
lytic diagnosis marked by nonspecific ego weaknesses (such as poor im-
pulse control and affect intolerance) and by disturbances in object
relations. In Kernberg’s view, BPO is characterized by object relations in
which there are poorly integrated good and bad self and object represen-
tations. BPO is also characterized by the use of defense mechanisms
based on splitting, such as projective identification and omnipotent control.
These defenses are based on a need to separate positive from negative
experience, get rid of negative experience through projection onto the
206 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

object, and control the object, who is now experienced as bad and poten-
tially dangerous. In other words, the defenses characteristic of BPO re-
flect the underlying disturbances in object relations. As described by
Kernberg, BPO corresponds to Klein’s concept of the paranoid position,
which (as we recall) is characterized by the splitting off and projection of
all-bad experiences onto the object, in contrast to Klein’s depressive po-
sition, where love and hate are integrated.
In BPO, a failure to integrate good and bad aspects of experience un-
derlies the inability to experience a coherent picture of oneself and/or
of others. Patients with BPO often manifest wide fluctuations in mood,
which represent the activation of self and object representations that are
split apart or experienced as all-good or all-bad. The patient’s mood
fluctuates according to which part of this poorly integrated representa-
tion is activated. An incoherent picture of the self, which Kernberg (bor-
rowing from Erikson 1956) called identity diffusion, leaves patients with
BPO at risk for extreme swings in self-experience and self-esteem. An
incoherent picture of others leaves patients with BPO at risk for misin-
terpretation of the actions of others and interpersonal chaos. BPO is
found in borderline personality disorder as defined by DSM-5 (Ameri-
can Psychiatry Association 2013), as well as in other severe personality
disorders, such as paranoid personality disorder, schizoid personality
disorder, and some types of narcissistic personality disorder.

Other Perspectives on the Etiology

of Borderline Psychopathology
As we saw in Chapter 10 when we discussed differing ways of under-
standing ego weakness (see section “Theories of Ego Weakness: Defense
Versus Deficit”), a key debate among psychoanalytic theorists focuses
on whether psychopathology is best explained as resulting from de-
fenses against intrapsychic conflicts (i.e., the defense/conflict model) or
as resulting from deficits due to failure of the early environment to pro-
vide the necessary ingredients for optimal psychological development
(i.e., the deficit/developmental failure model). Kernberg’s view of BPO
emphasizes the role of aggression in distorting internalized object rela-
tions, as “all good” and “all bad” self and object representations are
actively kept apart by defenses based on splitting. In other words, Kern-
berg’s theory of BPO is a defense/conflict model. In contrast to Kernberg’s
emphasis on defense as the cause of BPO, other theorists argue that fail-
ures in infant–caregiver interactions during childhood are the major
cause of deficits in the psychic structure of patients with borderline per-
sonality disorder. In other words, these theorists hold to a deficit/develop-
Object Relations Theory 207

mental failure model of psychopathology. For example, some have argued

that experiences of abandonment by parents lead to the borderline indi-
vidual’s inability to tolerate aloneness (Adler and Buie 1979; Masterson
1981) or failure to achieve object constancy (Akhtar 1992, 1994). More
recently, Peter Fonagy and Mary Target (1996) have proposed that bor-
derline psychopathology results from deficits in the capacity for self-
reflection and/or mentalization, which in turn result from impaired in-
fant–caregiver interactions (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 28; Fon-
agy and Target 1996; Fonagy et al. 1993b, 2002). We will see another
example of the defense/conflict versus the deficit/developmental fail-
ure debate in Chapter 12 when we explore differences in how Kernberg
and Kohut conceptualized narcissistic problems.
Contemporary understanding of borderline psychopathology is in-
formed by research from many fields, including social cognitive psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience (Depue and Lenzenweger 2001/
2005; Donegan et al. 2003; Fertuck et al. 2006; Graham and Clark 2006;
Lenzenweger et al. 2004; Minzenberg et al. 2006; Posner et al. 2002). This
research supports a view of borderline psychopathology as resulting
from the interaction of temperament and environmental risk factors, in-
cluding abuse or neglect, which leads to an incoherent sense of self and
other, insecure working models of attachment, deficits in mentalization,
and poor systems of self-control.

Object Relations Theory and

Psychodynamic Treatment
Object Relations Theory has made major contributions to our under-
standing of how psychodynamic psychotherapy works. We see these
contributions most obviously in the specific psychodynamic psycho-
therapies developed for the treatment of borderline personality disor-
der. For example, Kernberg’s own treatment for borderline personality
disorder, called Transference-Focused Psychotherapy (TFP) (Clarkin et
al. 2006), is based on his Object Relations Theory of borderline person-
ality disorder. TFP is based on the premise that underlying object rela-
tions are activated in patient–therapist interactions. Therefore, it
emphasizes work in the transference as offering the most effective
means of addressing these underlying object relations. A primary task
of the TFP therapist is to observe and interpret pathological object rela-
tions as they are activated in the patient–therapist relationship (Clarkin
et al. 2006). In contrast to Kernberg’s TFP, Anthony Bateman and Peter
Fonagy have developed Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT) for psy-
208 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

chotherapy with patients with borderline personality disorders, which

focuses on developing mentalizing capacity in these patients (Bateman
and Fonagy 2004, 2006).
However, we see the influence of Object Relations Theory in all psy-
chodynamic psychotherapies, not just those designed for severe per-
sonality disorders (Caligor et al. 2007). The most obvious influence is a
change in the goals of therapy to include not just the aim of understand-
ing wishes, prohibitions, and ideals and the habitual modes of manag-
ing conflict (Structural Model) but also the aim of building strong
relationships with other people. Therapists using Object Relations The-
ory are very interested in how each patient finds attachments and inti-
mate connections that are sustaining and how each patient maintains a
sense of separateness. They are also interested in how each patient does
(or does not) have internal structures marked by self and object con-
stancy, which support a sense of being “good enough.”
In addition, we see the influence of Object Relations Theory on how
psychotherapy is conducted. For example, we see this influence in the
strong emphasis on use of countertransference (defined as the therapist’s
feelings about the patient) as a primary source of information about the
patient’s inner life (Heimann 1950, 1956). We also see the influence of
Object Relations Theory on theories of therapeutic action (Blatt et al.
1994; Fonagy et al. 1993a; Mayes and Spence 1994). For example, over
time, theories have begun to emphasize the importance of the patient–
therapist relationship not just as a source of information but also as a
force for change. In general, over the years, we have seen a shift from
early theories of therapeutic action emphasizing change resulting from
insight derived from interpretation to more recent theories emphasizing
change resulting from the relationship with the therapist. Various theo-
rists have emphasized different aspects of the therapeutic relationship
using different terminology, including the following: corrective emotional
experience (Alexander and French 1946), new object (Loewald 1960); real
relationship (Greenson and Wexler 1969), therapeutic alliance (Zetzel
1956), holding environment (Modell 1976), and container/contained (Bion
1963, 1970). Indeed, in our Preface and Introduction to this book, we
mentioned the importance of the therapeutic alliance in all psychoana-
lytic treatments, a concept that has been increasingly well understood
as a result of Object Relations Theory (Krupnick et al. 1996; Zetzel 1956).
A relatively recent school of psychoanalysis called Relational Psy-
choanalysis emphasizes that the meaning of the patient–therapist inter-
action is “co-created” and urges exploration of this co-creation process
as a major emphasis of the work (Greenberg and Mitchell 1985). We will
not discuss Relational Psychoanalysis in this book, as it consists mainly
Object Relations Theory 209

of theories about the clinical situation and how best to understand what
goes on between patient and therapist. Many relational theorists have
so stressed the phenomenon of co-created meaning that the concept of
a model of the mind unique to the patient rather than co-created in the
clinical situation is difficult to grasp.
The debate continues over which aspect of psychotherapy—the ther-
apist’s interpretations or the relationship between patient and thera-
pist—is more important to therapeutic change. However, according to
Glen Gabbard and Drew Westen (2003), this debate is of less relevance to-
day than it was in the past. Nowadays, we must integrate many theories
of therapeutic action, including the role of interpretation and the role of
the relationship, which work together. Nevertheless, readers should keep
this debate in mind as we move on to Chapter 12 (“Self Psychology”),
where we will explore yet another model of the mind with a somewhat
different view on how the therapeutic relationship helps the patient.

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 11–1 introduces our Object Relations Theory chart of core dimen-
sions, in which we have placed the following key concepts:

• Topographic point of view: Object relations are largely unconscious.

• Motivational point of view: People are object seeking from birth; ob-
ject seeking is not secondary to other motivations. Wishes for separa-
tion from the object and for autonomy (individuation) are also inborn.
There is inevitable conflict between wishes for affiliation and wishes
for separation, accompanied by ambivalent feelings of love and hate
for the object. If successful compromises are forged between these
wishes and feelings, the individual acquires the ability to experience
gratitude toward the object, along with growing confidence that envy
can be overcome and damage to the relationship can be repaired.
• Structural point of view: The basic unit of experience is the object re-
lation—an intrapsychic structure consisting of a self representation,
an object representation, and the representation of an affectively
charged interaction between self and object. Object relations can be
either fleeting or enduring. Enduring object relations serve as tem-
plates for all psychic structures (such as ego, id, and superego) and
for all future relationships. Related concepts include need-satisfying
object, object constancy, self constancy, attachment behavioral sys-
tem, internal working models of attachment, and mentalization.
210 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

• Developmental point of view: Object relations are largely formed in

interaction with caregivers during childhood. Anna Freud, Klein,
Bion, Winnicott, Bowlby, Mahler, Fonagy, and Kernberg have offered
overlapping developmental models for object relations. Each of these
developmental models ends in attainment of the capacity for object
constancy, or the ability to maintain strong, positive ties to an object
even in the face of separation, frustration, or anger.
• Theory of psychopathology: The quality of object relations serves as
an index of mental health/illness. Strong, realistic object relations
marked by object constancy are the hallmark of mental health. In
contrast, disturbed object relations manifested by an inability to
maintain object constancy are seen in many kinds of adult psychopa-
thology, including severe personality disorders such as borderline,
paranoid, and some narcissistic conditions, or any disorder charac-
terized by borderline personality organization.
• Theory of therapeutic action: In psychodynamic psychotherapy, ob-
ject relations are activated in the therapist–patient relationship, which
is then used to understand them. As a result, Object Relations Theory
leads to therapies that emphasize the transference, and especially the
countertransference. It also leads to theories of therapeutic action that
emphasize the role of the therapist as a new object (as opposed to theo-
ries that emphasize insight). Two well-known psychodynamic psy-
chotherapies developed specifically for the treatment of borderline
personality disorder are Kernberg’s Transference-Focused Psycho-
therapy and Bateman and Fonagy’s Mentalization-Based Treatment.
 Object Relations Theory
TABLE 11–1. Object Relations Theory

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Object relations Conflicting wishes for Object relation Attachment The quality of object Activation of object
are largely affiliation and for Self representation relations serves as relations in the
unconscious separation- Object representation Separation of self from an index of mental therapist–patient
individuation Representation of other health/illness relationship
interaction
Love/hate/ambivalence between the two Paranoid position and Borderline personality Countertransference
Envy/gratitude/repair depressive position organization (BPO) The therapist as a new
Need-satisfying object object
Container/contained
Object constancy Good-enough mother Transference-Focused
Self constancy Holding environment Psychotherapy

Attachment behavioral Separation-individuation Mentalization-Based

system Differentiation Treatment
Practicing
Internal working models Rapprochement
of attachment On the way to object
constancy
Mentalization Parenthood
Midlife crisis

Development of
mentalization

211
212 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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 CHAPTER 12

Self Psychology

This chapter introduces Self Psychology. It explains how this

model of the mind works and what it contributes to our understanding
of psychopathology and treatment. Vocabulary introduced in this chap-
ter includes the following: affect mirroring, alien self, core sense of self, dis-
order of the self, emergent sense of self, empathy, false self, grandiose self,
idealized parental imago, idealized selfobject, idealizing transference, identity
diffusion, mirror transference, mirroring selfobject, narcissism, narcissistic
rage, narrative sense of self, pathological grandiose self, pathological narcis-
sism, self, selfobject, selfobject transference, self–selfobject matrix, subjective
sense of self, transitional object, transitional phenomena, true self, twinship
transference, and verbal or categorical sense of self.
As with the Topographic Model and the early Structural Model, Self
Psychology was largely the work of one man—Heinz Kohut (1913–
1981) developed this model in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In common
with Melanie Klein and others who developed Object Relations Theory,
Kohut was initially schooled in the Structural Model (or Ego Psychol-
ogy) but came to feel that that model was insufficient to describe or treat
the patients and problems that he saw. However, Kohut did not work
with object relations theorists but instead proposed his own model of
the mind.

219
220 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

The Self and Its Development

Self Psychology is a theory of the mind based on a structure at the core
of the personality—the self. In this theory, the self is a mostly uncon-
scious structure that is defined as the center of initiative and a source of
the coherent experience of sameness. The self is made up of an individ-
ual’s ambitions, ideals, and talents. The self is healthy if it is character-
ized by feelings of cohesion and continuity; feelings of energy and
initiative; mature self-assertion, self-esteem, and pride; and investment
in a stable set of ideals and goals. The self is also considered healthy if
it is characterized by the ability to regulate affects and to make use of
interactions with selfobjects. When an individual has psychopathology,
or a disorder of the self, the self feels weak, incoherent, ineffective, and
bad, or it cannot find meaning in goals or ideals (Auchincloss and Sam-
berg 2012, pp. 234–238).
Developmental theory describes the growth of the self in detail and
is very important in Self Psychology. Self Psychology asserts that the in-
dividual is born with an innate set of narcissistic strivings that serve as the
major force for motivation in the personality. Narcissism is defined as an
investment in the self. These innate narcissistic strivings include needs
for aliveness, authenticity, coherence, mastery, safety, autonomy, unique-
ness, creativity, a sense of agency and purpose, and self-esteem. The self
develops from an admixture of innate factors and interactions with care-
givers. Among the inborn needs of the infant is a need for recognition
from caregivers, who must respond with empathy to infant’s growing
self. Empathy is defined as the capacity to feel or to understand the sub-
jective experience of another person. Empathic responsiveness in care-
givers, usually the mother and the father, is vital to the development of
the self. These empathic caregivers are the child’s first selfobjects. A self-
object is defined as another person who is experienced as part of the self
and who fulfills the needs of the self. Indeed, in Self Psychology, the self
cannot be conceptualized outside of the self-selfobject matrix.
According to Self Psychology, there are two major narcissistic lines
of development, or components of the self that develop in the child in
interaction with caregivers. One component is the grandiose self, which
expresses innate strivings for power and recognition. The grandiose self
develops in interaction with a mirroring selfobject who validates and
takes pleasure in the child’s exhibitionism and accomplishments. The
other component of the self is the idealized parental imago, which results
from the child’s attributions of omnipotence and perfection to caregiv-
ers. The idealized parental imago develops in interaction with an ideal-
Self Psychology 221

ized selfobject who provides the strength and calm needed for the child
to feel safe and to develop affect regulation.
In the course of development, both of these components of the self
grow stronger through gradual internalization of empathic selfobject
experiences. In other words, internalization occurs in the context of the
caregiver’s empathic responsiveness to the child’s selfobject strivings.
Over time, the grandiose self matures into stable self-esteem, assertion,
and realistic ambition. The idealized parental imago matures into en-
during ideals. The mature and healthy self then is able to pursue ideals
with assertion and energy.
In Self Psychology, dreams often reflect the state of the self, in what
Kohut and his followers have called self-state dreams (Kohut 1971, 1977,
1984) (see Chapter 6, “The World of Dreams”). We can also see here that
Kohut has elaborated on Freud’s concept of the ego ideal (see Chapter 9,
“The Id and the Superego”) in his theory of the development of the self
and its ideals or goals.

Kohut’s Theory of Adult Psychopathology:

Disorders of the Self
According to Kohut’s theory, disorders of the self result when a care-
giver does not mirror the child’s grandiosity—or reflect back to the
child the needed recognition, validation, and joyful acceptance of this
grandiosity. Disorders of the self also result when a caregiver does not
help the child to modulate his or her grandiosity. In both of these cases,
the grandiose self is repressed or disavowed, or is poorly integrated
within the adult personality. It retains its childish quality and fails to
mature into healthy self-esteem and self-assertion. In serious cases or
under severe stress, individuals with disorders of the self may have
trouble managing aspects of reality, as in borderline conditions or ad-
dictions. Disorders of the self also result when a caregiver does not al-
low the child to develop and/or modulate the idealized parental imago.
Failures such as this occur when the caregiver either seriously disap-
points the child or fails consistently to meet the child’s expectations. In
such cases, wishes for an idealized parent may persist in their childish
form, or the child may give up on such wishes. In either case, the child
is not able to develop lasting ideals and goals.
In other words, in disorders of the self, clinicians may see a weaken-
ing of either the grandiose self or the idealized parental imago. The cli-
nician may also see compensatory structures developed to make up for
a weak self, such as aloofness, addiction, or perversion, to mention a
222 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

few. Disorders of the self include what is called narcissistic personality

disorder in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Disorders
of the self may also be accompanied by narcissistic rage (Kohut 1972/
1978). Narcissistic rage is understood as a consequence of a perceived
threat to the self and is triggered and accompanied by experiences of
shame, humiliation, and/or disappointment. Narcissistic rage can
range from trivial irritation to fanatical fury and is characterized by the
need for revenge and justice. Easy susceptibility to narcissistic rage
makes for relationships with others that are volatile and unstable (Ko-
hut and Wolf 1978).

Kohut’s Theory of Therapeutic Action:

Mobilization of Selfobject Transferences
In Self Psychology, treatment consists of guiding patients with disor-
ders of the self as they experience a reactivation of the original needs of
the self in the form of a variety of selfobject transferences. In fact, Kohut
first began to sketch out his model of Self Psychology because he felt
that the Structural Model of the mind did not help him to understand
the transferences of his patients, which he called narcissistic transfer-
ences. With mobilization of a mirror transference, the patient’s archaic
grandiose self is revived. In these transferences, the patient wants the
therapist to behave in ways that validate or recognize the self. With mo-
bilization of an idealizing transference, the patient’s idealized parental
imago is revived. In these transferences, the patient wants the therapist
to behave in ways that are experienced as perfect. The patient may also
develop a twinship transference, in which he or she assumes or demands
that the patient and the therapist are exactly the same. This transference
serves to make a weak self stronger.
Mobilization of these selfobject transferences serves as an opportu-
nity for renewed development of the self. Indeed, in Self Psychology,
psychodynamic therapy is approached from a developmental point of
view. The therapist focuses on the selfobject function of the transfer-
ence, linking the transference to selfobject functions that the patient ex-
periences as having been missing during his or her childhood. In this
way, the transference is seen as expressing a longing for these selfobject
functions to be taken over by the therapist, so that a weakened self can
be repaired. In other words, the therapist emphasizes the patient’s felt
need rather than the patient’s feelings of having unacceptable wishes.
In Self Psychology, examination of moments of disruption between
patient and therapist is central for therapeutic action. These moments,
Self Psychology 223

in which the therapist fails to understand the patient’s need, are inevi-
table. They provide an opportunity for patient and therapist to better
understand what is felt to be missing in the present and in the past and
to better understand what is felt to be required for repair.
Although Kohut argued that the therapist’s empathy is not in itself
part of the therapeutic action, he considered empathic communication
and interpretation to be a requisite ingredient for psychological change
(Kohut 1984). Furthermore, the therapist’s ongoing effort to be em-
pathic plays an important role in treatment by diminishing the patient’s
need for defenses and expanding the patient’s capacity for introspec-
tion, promoting the emergence of warded-off feelings and memories,
which can then be explored.

Comparison of Self Psychology With the

Structural Model and Object Relations Theory
A brief comparison of several of the basic tenets of Self Psychology with
those of the Structural Model and Object Relations Theory may be use-
ful in clarifying how Self Psychology differs from those earlier models:

• Topographic point of view—Self Psychology does not differ signifi-

cantly from the Structural Model or from Object Relations Theory in
that the self has both conscious and unconscious aspects.
• Motivational point of view—In Self Psychology, the strivings of the
self, or narcissistic needs, are the driving force in the personality, in
contrast to unacceptable wishes for bodily pleasure (Structural
Model) (Ornstein 1993) or needs for attachment/separation (Object
Relations Theory). Indeed, if other wishes are too evident, in Self
Psychology they are conceptualized as the result of threats to the self.
Narcissistic strivings have their own line of development and cannot
be reduced to other needs (Structural Model); in Self Psychology, ag-
gression, or narcissistic rage, is a consequence of a perceived threat to
the self rather than an inborn striving (Structural Model and some
kinds of Object Relations Theory).
• Structural point of view—In Self Psychology, the self is the superor-
dinate of structure in the mind, as opposed to ego, id, and superego
(Structural Model) or object relations (Object Relations Theory).
When evident, other structures (such as the id or superego) are con-
ceptualized as the result of threats to the self.
• Developmental point of view—Whereas all models affirm that em-
pathic responses from caregivers serve an important selfobject func-
224 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

tion that is crucial to development, in Self Psychology it is the actual

behavior of the caregiver, especially empathic behavior, that is spot-
lighted as the major contributor to the child’s experience of self, as
opposed to the thoughts, feelings, and fantasies within the child’s
own mind (Structural Model and Object Relations Theory). Selfob-
ject needs persists throughout the life cycle; narcissistic strivings are
never outgrown but instead develop into mature forms, such as cre-
ativity, humor, and wisdom.
• Theory of psychopathology and theory of therapeutic action—In
Self Psychology, psychopathology is the result of arrested develop-
ment, or selfobject failures on the part of caregivers, rather than the
result of conflict (Structural Model and most kinds of Object Rela-
tions Theory). In Self Psychology, the oedipus complex is not the pre-
dominant conflict in psychopathology (Structural Model) (Terman
1984/1985); instead, disorder of the self is the most important diagnos-
tic concept in psychopathology, replacing neurosis (Structural Model)
and/or borderline personality organization (Object Relations Theory).
In Self Psychology, the reactivation of selfobject needs in the transfer-
ence is conceptualized as the expression of frustrated needs from
childhood, as opposed to being conceptualized as representing con-
flict, defense, and compromise (Structural Model and most kinds of
Object Relations Theory). Finally, the empathic understanding of-
fered by the therapist is crucial to therapeutic action, as opposed to
insight gained through interpretation (Structural Model and some
kinds of Object Relations Theory).

Narcissistic Personality Disorder:

Kohut Versus Kernberg
A good way to deepen one’s understanding of Self Psychology is to
consider the controversy between Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg
about how best to conceptualize narcissistic personality disorder. These
thinkers agree on the description of a certain kind of individual who is
preoccupied with fantasies of success and power, who expects to be
seen as special or superior, who is demanding of constant attention,
who is envious of others who have more than he or she does, who is in-
tent on being seen as powerful and perfect, who is arrogant and prone
to rage and depression, and who is lacking in empathy for others. Such
people are described as having narcissistic personality disorder (NPD)
(American Psychiatric Association 2013).
Self Psychology 225

Kohut’s View
In Kohut’s view, patients with NPD show the persistence of a grandiose
self left over from childhood in situations in which caregivers failed to
meet selfobject needs during the childhood. In cases such as these, the
child’s grandiose self has failed to mature and still seeks selfobject rec-
ognition from others in an intense form. When selfobject recognition
cannot be found, narcissistic rage ensues because the self feels threat-
ened.
According to Kohut’s treatment model, the therapist must allow the
patient’s thwarted selfobject needs to emerge in the transference. The
therapist must then handle this selfobject transference with empathic
understanding. Finally, inevitable empathic failures in the treatment
must be explored so as to promote growth. Ultimately, the remobilized
grandiose self can resume maturation and be integrated into the pa-
tient’s personality.

Kernberg’s View
In Kernberg’s view (see Chapter 11, “Object Relations Theory”), the pa-
tient with NPD does not show the persistence of a normal grandiose self
left over from childhood; instead, this individual shows a new patho-
logical structure that Kernberg calls the pathological grandiose self, which
forms the center of what Kernberg terms pathological narcissism. This
pathological grandiose self serves to ward off dependency on another
person, who is experienced as important only when giving praise.
Rather than having any other needs, the individual with NPD prefers
to see him- or herself as self-sufficient. In other words, for Kernberg, the
pathological grandiose self is a defense against dependency. If an indi-
vidual with NPD were to experience true dependency, that individual
would immediately experience him- or herself to be in the paranoid po-
sition (see Chapter 11) and would feel persecutory anxiety (see Chapter
11). This is because underneath, the individual with NPD is unable to
integrate bad and good experiences of the object (see Chapter 11), be-
cause his or her angry feelings at this object feel too strong.
According to Kernberg’s treatment model, the therapist must allow
the patient’s pathological grandiose self to emerge in the transference.
The therapist must then interpret the patient’s defenses against depen-
dency (and the paranoid position). Finally, the therapist must help the
patient to understand that his or her paranoid fears are a reflection of
the patient’s own aggression toward the object (and the therapist).
When this aggression becomes more manageable, the patient will de-
226 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

velop the ability to integrate good and bad experiences toward the ther-
apist, thereby overcoming the paranoid position (Kernberg 1975, 1976).

Discussion
Although this comparison is highly oversimplified, it does serve to
highlight some of the differences between Self Psychology (Kohut) and
the Structural Model/Object Relations Theory (Kernberg) toward NPD.
The differences lie in 1) the extent to which the grandiose self is seen as
either a normal vestige of childhood (Kohut) or a pathological structure
(Kernberg); 2) the extent to which the grandiose self is conceptualized
as either a deficit due to empathic failures in caregivers during child-
hood (Kohut) or a defense against dependency (Kernberg); and 3) the ex-
tent to which aggression is seen as either the result of threats to the self
(Kohut) or the underlying cause of the whole problem, making integra-
tion of experience impossible (Kernberg). Many clinicians use both
models (see Chapter 13, “Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model
of the Mind”), emphasizing Self Psychology with some kinds of pa-
tients and Kernberg’s model with other kinds of patients. Many also use
both models with the same patient at different times, employing a more
empathic stance at some times and a stance that includes confrontation
of the patient’s aggressive feelings at other times. Many use a more em-
pathic stance early in the treatment, when the patient feels more vulner-
able to criticism and less trusting of the therapist.

Influence of Self Psychology on

Psychodynamic Psychotherapy
Self Psychology has influenced psychodynamic treatment in several
important ways, even if the clinician does not adhere to the whole of
Self Psychology in every situation. First of all, Self Psychology empha-
sizes the empathic immersion of the therapist in the patient’s experi-
ence as being important for all psychodynamic treatment. In addition,
Self Psychology provides a developmental rationale for why empathic
immersion is crucial to the patient, and Self Psychology alerts the ther-
apist to watch for the consequences of empathic failure. Self Psychology
also alerts the therapist to watch for specific selfobject transferences in
all patients and to manage these transferences properly. In addition, Self
Psychology alerts the therapist to look for a history of empathic failures
on the part of caregivers and other significant objects and to look for
ways in which patients manage ongoing selfobject needs. Finally, Self
Self Psychology 227

Psychology reminds the therapist that narcissistic strivings are inborn

and natural and pursue their own line of development and that patients
may be highly self-critical and/or ashamed of these strivings. We see
the influence of Self Psychology when the clinician works with the pa-
tient to help the patient become the center of his or her own life story,
lived with meaning, and to develop goals that are invested with interest
and pursued with energy and creativity.

Other Conceptions of the Self:

Contributions From Ego Psychology
and Object Relations Theorists
We have seen that although both the Structural Model and Object Rela-
tions Theory include a concept of self, the conception of self in these mod-
els is very different from the conception of self in Self Psychology. For
example, in Chapter 8 (“A New Configuration and a New Concept: The
Ego”) we explored Erikson’s theories on ego identity (Erikson 1950, 1956),
and in Chapter 11 (“Object Relations Theory”) we examined Mahler’s
theories on individuation and her concept of practicing (Mahler et al. 1975).
Certainly both of these theorists were aware of the need for individuals
to develop a coherent and strong self, defined in various ways. Also in
Chapter 11, we saw that Kernberg’s theory includes the concept of iden-
tity diffusion (borrowed from Erikson), an incoherent experience of the
self evinced in patients with borderline personality organization (but not
in those with NPD; Kernberg argues that patients with NPD are pro-
tected against identity diffusion by the organization provided by the
pathological grandiose self). However, Kernberg contends that identity
diffusion is caused by the individual’s failure to integrate good and bad
experiences of the self (i.e., self inconstancy) rather than by empathic fail-
ures of the original selfobjects. Nevertheless, Self Psychology and other
models of the mind, especially Object Relations Theory, overlap in that
most models are interested in how interactions with caregivers promote
the growth or dysfunction of the self. Let us look some more at several
important theorists from other models to see better what we mean.
Winnicott, whose ideas were explored a bit in Chapter 11, was also
very interested in the role of the mother in promoting aspects of the in-
fant’s self. For example, he wrote extensively about the good-enough
mother, the holding environment, and the mirroring function of the
mother’s face. He also wrote about the transitional object, defined as a
teddy bear, blanket, or some other important object that the child expe-
228 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

riences as both “me” and “not me” simultaneously, and about transi-
tional phenomena in general as being important in the development of
the child’s capacity for play, fantasy, and a complex inner life. Finally,
Winnicott wrote about how children who were deprived of a facilitating
maternal environment develop a false self that is displayed in response
to the caregiver’s expectations and demands while the true self lies bur-
ied deep within (Winnicott 1953, 1965, 1971).
Winnicott’s ideas were very influential on the development of Self
Psychology and also on the work of two other psychoanalytic “baby
watchers”: Daniel Stern and Peter Fonagy. Stern wrote about develop-
ment of the self in interaction in the first relationship with the mother,
describing the stages of self development as emergent sense of self (birth
to 2 months), core sense of self (2–6 months), subjective sense of self (begin-
ning around 9 months), verbal or categorical sense of self (beginning
around 18 months), and narrative sense of self (beginning in the third or
fourth year) (Stern 1985, 1989). By placing the narrative sense of self as
the final stage of development, Stern is putting the capacity to tell a
story about the self at the center of his concept of full development.
Here Stern is in agreement with cognitive psychologists, who increas-
ingly use what they call scripts as probes for investigation (Tomkins
1986). He is also in agreement with Damasio (see Chapter 1, “Overview:
Modeling the Life of the Mind”) and others from the field of neurosci-
ence, who stress the importance of narrative, arguing that the self is a
story that the mind tells itself in a high level of self-monitoring (Dama-
sio 1984, 1999). Finally, Stern is in agreement with clinicians who em-
phasize the self as being at the center of storytelling in the treatment
situation.
Fonagy likewise has written extensively about the development of
the self in terms of the capacity for mentalization (see Chapter 1 and Ap-
pendix C, “Glossary”), which always develops in interaction with the
mother (see Chapter 11). Fonagy describes in detail how the mother’s
affect mirroring of the child lays the groundwork for the child’s develop-
ment of mentalization, as she helps the child become confident that he
or she can manage intense feeling states and can tell the difference be-
tween self and other, and between reality and fantasy. If the mother’s af-
fect mirroring is mistuned, insensitive, or otherwise defective, the child
may go on to develop an alien self, which is similar to Winnicott’s false
self (Fonagy et al. 2002). We have already seen in Chapter 11 how these
children may also go on to develop borderline personality disorder.
In Fonagy’s work, we find that the development of affect tolerance,
mentalization, and the self are closely related. We also hear echoes of
Bion (see Chapter 11), who stressed the mother’s important role in help-
Self Psychology 229

ing the child to develop affect tolerance (Bion 1962, 1963, 1967, 1970). In-
deed, many self psychologists have argued for a reworking of the view
of therapeutic action posited by Self Psychology to include not only the
therapist’s empathic mirroring of the patient (per Kohut’s views) but
also the therapist’s additional function of taking on the role of the con-
taining mother (per Bion’s views) in helping the patient to manage in-
tense feelings that may otherwise be difficult for the patient to handle
and may lead to continued psychopathology (Newman 2007; Socarides
and Stolorow 1984). We can see here that clinicians in the office often
draw from several models of the mind in their work with patients. As we
move on to Chapter 13 (“Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of
the Mind”), where we consider how to develop a psychoanalytic model
that incorporates the best features of all models, readers should keep in
mind the idea that in this case, clinicians are melding the views of Kohut
and Bion.

The Study of the Self:

Contributions From General Psychology
and Neuroscience
Meanwhile, as psychodynamic psychotherapists are working out how
to use Self Psychology in their work with patients, investigators from
many branches of general psychology, including personality theory, de-
velopmental psychology, and social psychology, are studying concepts
of the self, using methodologies appropriate to these fields. Areas of
study include the following: self-concept (an individual’s explicit
knowledge of his or her own behaviors, traits, or characteristics) (Bau-
meister 1998); self-narrative (the stories that individuals tell about
themselves) (McAdams 1993; McLean 2008); self-schema (traits used by
individuals to define themselves) (Markus 1977); self-relevance (an in-
dividual’s enhanced awareness of phenomena relating to him- or her-
self) (Rogers et al. 1977); self-concept and memory (Kihlstrom et al.
2002); self-verification (an individual’s tendency to seek evidence to
confirm his or her self-concept) (Swann et al. 2003); the feeling of agency
(an individual’s sense of initiative) (Haggard and Tsakiris 2009); locus
of control (an individual’s habitual tendency to locate the cause of
events either within or outside of him- or herself) (Rotter 1966); self-
consistency (the need for and extent of feelings of coherence) (Lecky
1945); self-esteem (the extent to which an individual likes, values, or ac-
cepts him- or herself) (Baumeister et al. 2003; Brown 1993); self-discrep-
230 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

ancy (the extent to which an individual’s self-schema matches his or her

preferred self-schema) (Higgins 1987); the relationship between self-
esteem and status (Barkow 1980); the relationship between self-esteem
and a sense of belonging (Leary and Baumeister 2000); self-efficacy (the
extent to which an individual feels effective) (Bandura 1977); and self-
serving bias (the tendency for individuals to take credit for their suc-
cesses but to downplay responsibility for their failures) (Miller and Ross
1975; Shepperd et al. 2008). Efforts are also being made to integrate find-
ings from general psychology with psychoanalysis (Andersen et al.
2005; Westen 1992). Neuroscientists, too, are investigating the neural
structures that underlie the self (Damasio 1984, 1999; Feinberg 2001;
LeDoux 2002; Macrae et al. 2004; Mitchell et al. 2002; Morin 2002). Em-
pathy is receiving a great deal of attention from both psychologists and
neuroscientists (Carr et al. 2003; Decety and Ickes 2009). In addition, the
concept of self interfaces with the National Institute of Mental Health
Research Domain Criteria, domain “Social Processes”; construct “Per-
ception and Understanding of Self”; and subconstructs “agency” and
“self-knowledge” (Cuthbert and Insel 2013).1

The Self
in the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
The self is so important in the study of psychology that it may seem odd
that Self Psychology, the last of the psychoanalytic models of the mind
to be presented here, was not fully developed until late in the twentieth
century. In fact, some theorists, like Kohut himself, have argued that
Freud ignored the self, or perhaps took the self for granted, in the devel-
opment of his models. In any case, we need not take a position on this
debate, because we have the advantage of psychoanalytic models of the
mind that include both those developed by Freud and those that came
after. If we can integrate these models into a single model of the mind,
we need not decide which we prefer. The challenge of Chapter 13 will
be to propose an approach to using all of the models of the mind to-
gether as an integrated whole.

1See nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rod/index.shtml (accessed January 12,

2014).
Self Psychology 231

Chapter Summary and

Chart of Core Dimensions
Table 12–1 introduces our Self Psychology chart of core dimensions, in
which we have placed the following key concepts:

• Topographic point of view: The self and the selfobject are largely un-
conscious.
• Motivational point of view: The individual is born with an innate
set of narcissistic strivings that serve as the major force for motivation
in the personality. These strivings include needs for aliveness, au-
thenticity, coherence, mastery, safety, autonomy, uniqueness, creativ-
ity, a sense of agency, and self-esteem. Narcissistic strivings develop
in interaction with selfobjects, and so are often called selfobject striv-
ings. These strivings are never outgrown; instead, they develop into
mature forms.
• Structural point of view: The self is the superordinate structure in the
mind at the core of the personality. It is the center of initiative and the
source of the coherent experience of sameness. A selfobject is the in-
ternal experience of another person who is part of the self and who
serves the needs of the self. Dreams may reflect the self-state of the
dreamer.
• Developmental point of view: The self develops from an admixture
of innate factors and interactions with caregivers, who must respond
with empathy to the infant’s growing self. These empathic caregivers
are the child’s first selfobjects, and development occurs in the context
of this self-selfobject matrix. There are two major components of the
developing self: 1) the grandiose self, which forms in interaction with
the mirroring selfobject, and 2) the idealized parental imago, which forms
in interaction with the idealized selfobject. Over time, the grandiose
self matures into stable self-esteem, and the idealized parental imago
matures into enduring ideals.
Stern wrote about development of the self in interaction in the first
relationship with the mother, describing five stages of self develop-
ment: emergent sense of self (birth to 2 months), core sense of self (2–6
months), subjective sense of self (beginning around 9 months), verbal or
categorical sense of self (beginning around 18 months), and narrative
sense of self (beginning in the third or fourth year).
232 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

• Theory of psychopathology: The health of the self—in terms of co-

hesion and continuity, feelings of energy and initiative, mature self-
assertion, self-esteem, and investment in a stable set of ideals—
serves as an index of mental health. Psychopathology is conceptual-
ized as a disorder of the self—as reflected by an experienced lack of
strength, cohesion, effectiveness, or goodness and/or an inability to
find meaning in goals and ideals. Disorders of the self result from
selfobject failures on the part of caregivers, such as when a caregiver
does not mirror the child’s grandiosity or does not let the child de-
velop an idealized parental imago. Compensatory structures de-
velop to make up for a weak self.
Narcissistic personality disorder, as defined by DSM-5, has been con-
ceptualized by Kohut as reflecting the persistence of infantile narcissism
in cases where there has been a failure of empathy in caregivers, and
by Kernberg as expressing a pathological grandiose self (in the form of
pathological narcissism) that serves as a defense against dependency.
Winnicott wrote about how children who were deprived of a facil-
itating maternal environment develop a false self that is displayed in
response to the caregiver’s expectations and demands while the true
self lies buried deep within. Fonagy wrote about how the mother’s
affect mirroring of the child lays the groundwork for the child’s de-
velopment of mentalization. If the mother’s affect mirroring is mis-
tuned, insensitive, or otherwise defective, the child may go on to
develop an alien self, which is similar to Winnicott’s false self.
• Theory of therapeutic action: In psychodynamic psychotherapy,
disorders of the self are treated through mobilization of narcissistic
transferences, creating an opportunity for renewed development of
the self. Exploration of inevitable empathic failures—moments of disrup-
tion between patient and therapist—is also central to the therapeutic
action.
 Self Psychology
TABLE 12–1. Self Psychology

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Self and selfobject Narcissistic or selfobject Self Development of the self The health/maturity of Mobilization of
are largely strivings Selfobject Self-selfobject matrix the self serves as an narcissistic
unconscious Empathic caregivers index of mental health transferences
Self-state dreams
Grandiose self forms Psychopathology is Exploration of
in interaction with conceptualized as a inevitable
mirroring selfobject disorder of the self empathic failures
Idealized parental imago
forms in interaction Narcissistic personality
with idealized disorder (NPD)
selfobject Persistence of infantile
narcissism (Kohut)
Emergent sense of self Defense against
Core sense of self dependency
Subjective sense of self (Kernberg)
Verbal/categorical sense
of self Pathological grandiose self
Narrative sense of self Pathological narcissism

False self (vs. true self)

Alien self

233
234 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

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 PART V

Integration
and Application
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER 13

Toward an Integrated
Psychoanalytic Model
of the Mind

This book has traced the evolution of efforts to conceptualize the na-
ture of mental life, first in the work of Freud and then in the work of
many other people. It has described four foundational psychanalytic
models of the mind, looking at how each model thinks about the mind
and about psychopathology and treatment. Our task for this final chap-
ter is to discover how these four models of the mind can best be used to
understand and help our patients.
To begin this task, let us refer to our composite chart (Table 13–1),
which has grown throughout this book as each model has been intro-
duced and its most important features discussed. We see that the chart
is divided into six columns—labeled Topography, Motivation, Struc-
ture/Process, Development, Psychopathology, and Treatment—and
has four rows, one for each model of the mind explored in this book. For
each of these four models, many terms and concepts appear under the
different column headings. There are lots of entries, and the sheer vol-
ume of these entries threatens to overwhelm us. How can we begin to
make sense of so many separate terms and concepts, much less discover
a way to use such a large number of ideas in an integrated way?

239
 240
TABLE 13–1. Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Topographic Model
The mind is The unconscious mind The unconscious Primary process is the Neurosis arises from Free association
divided consists of wishes operates according earliest mode of conflict between (“fundamental
into three always striving for to primary process; mental functioning; the conscious/ rule”)
regions: expression the preconscious/ secondary process preconscious
Conscious conscious operates develops later domains and the Examination of
Preconscious Unacceptable wishes according to unconscious domain transference and
Unconscious are kept in check secondary process Wishes come from Return of the repressed resistance
by forces of childhood and form Repetition compulsion
repression from A censor separates the the basis of infantile Therapeutic

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

the preconscious/ unconscious and the sexuality interpretation and
conscious mind conscious/ reconstruction
preconscious mind Oedipal strivings and
Oedipal strivings fears persist into Insight (“Make the
Oedipal fears Dreams adolescence and unconscious
adulthood conscious”)
Complex
Fantasy Wishes become Dream exploration
Narrative increasingly
unacceptable
Conscience
Identifications Censoring capacity grows
 Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
TABLE 13–1. Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Structural Model
The ego and the The ego, superego, The mind is divided into Ego development Ego strength/ego Strengthening the ego
superego and id each have three structures: Erikson’s stages weakness serves as
have both separate aims: ego, superego, an index of mental Exploring conflict,
conscious/ The ego— and id Superego development health/illness defense, and
preconscious homeostasis compromise
and and adaptation The ego Development of the drives Maladaptive compromise
unconscious The superego— Ego functions (id) may lead to character “Where id was, there
aspects moral Defense disorders ego shall be”
imperatives Internalization Psychosexual phases
The id is entirely The id—drives Identification (oral, anal, early Defense versus deficit
unconscious Libido Signal affect genital [phallic], theories of
Aggression Compromise genital/oedipal, psychopathology
formation latency, adolescence)
Avoidance of danger Ego identity Fixation
situations Character Regression

Conflict is always The superego

present because of Ego ideal
competing aims
The id

241
 242
TABLE 13–1. Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Object Relations Theory

Object relations Conflicting wishes for Object relation Attachment The quality of object Activation of object
are largely affiliation and for Self representation relations serves as an relations in the
unconscious separation- Object representation Separation of self from index of mental therapist–patient
individuation Representation of other health/illness relationship
interaction
Love/hate/ between the two Paranoid position and Borderline personality Countertransference
ambivalence depressive position organization (BPO) The therapist as a new
Envy/gratitude/ Need-satisfying object object
repair Container/contained

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Object constancy Good-enough mother Transference-Focused
Self constancy Holding environment Psychotherapy

Attachment behavioral Separation-individuation Mentalization-Based

system Differentiation Treatment
Practicing
Internal working models Rapprochement
of attachment On the way to object
constancy
Mentalization Parenthood
Midlife crisis

Development of
mentalization
 Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
TABLE 13–1. Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)

Topography Motivation Structure/Process Development Psychopathology Treatment

Self Psychology
Self and Narcissistic or Self Development of the self The health/maturity of Mobilization of
selfobject selfobject strivings Selfobject Self-selfobject matrix the self serves as an narcissistic
are largely Empathic caregivers index of mental health transferences
unconscious Self-state dreams
Grandiose self forms Psychopathology is Exploration of
in interaction with conceptualized as a inevitable
mirroring selfobject disorder of the self empathic failures
Idealized parental imago
forms in interaction Narcissistic personality
with idealized disorder (NPD)
selfobject Persistence of infantile
narcissism (Kohut)
Emergent sense of self Defense against
Core sense of self dependency
Subjective sense of self (Kernberg)
Verbal/categorical sense
of self Pathological grandiose self
Narrative sense of self Pathological narcissism

False self
Alien self

243
244 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

We believe that the best approach to using the different psychoana-

lytic models of the mind is two-pronged: 1) in some circumstances, treat
all four models of the mind as a single model; and 2) when called for,
use each model separately. How would this process work?
Let us reverse the axes of the chart, so that the rows become columns
(Topographic Model, Structural Model, Object Relations Theory, and Self
Psychology) and the columns become rows (Topography, Motivation,
Structure/Process, Development, Psychopathology, and Treatment). With
this new orientation of our chart (Table 13–2), we can begin to see how the
four models might be used together, even while remaining distinct.

Can There Be a Unified Psychoanalytic Model

of the Mind?
In Table 13–2, we can see at a glance what each model has to say about
each of the core dimensions of mental functioning and mental illness/
treatment. For example, if we look at the Motivation row, we see that the
motivations emphasized in the Structural Model are those related to the
body’s quest for pleasure, whereas the motivations emphasized in Ob-
ject Relations Theory are those related to needs for attachment and/or
separation. These impelling forces for mental and/or physical activity
are very different from each other, but they are not mutually exclusive.
The same holds true for much of the content of the other core dimen-
sions—Topography, Structure/Process, Development, Psychopathol-
ogy, and Treatment—when compared across models. Writers who have
attempted to delineate the common features of the various psychoana-
lytic views of the mind have used very similar dimensions (Cooper
1985a; Gedo and Goldberg 1973; Klein 1976; Michels 2005; Rothstein
1985; Wallerstein 2000). Let us take these dimensions one by one, in a
search for common features among our four models.

Topography
When we look at the integrated psychoanalytic model of the mind
along the dimension of Topography (see first row of Table 13–2), it is rel-
atively simple to see a common theme: almost every component of the
mind has a conscious and unconscious component, with a few excep-
tions (e.g., the concept of the id, which is rarely used in contemporary
psychodynamic work). In other words, clinicians working from a uni-
fied psychoanalytic point of view must remember that there is always
more to the story than what the patient is aware of and that patients do
Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 245

not want to know much of what is hidden. In fact, the most important
feature of a unified psychoanalytic model of the mind is the concept of
the dynamic unconscious.

Motivation
We have just been reminded that concerns about which contents of the
mind should be allowed access to consciousness cannot be neatly sepa-
rated from motivational concerns. Indeed, the dynamic unconscious is
defined as the aspect of the mind that we avoid through the “motive of
defense” (Breuer and Freud 1893/1895/1962, p. 285). Clinicians work-
ing with a unified model of the mind must remember that part of every
patient wants to hide awareness of aspects of him- or herself, whatever
else that patient may wish or fear. In fact, as they listen to a patient’s
story, clinicians will always ask what the patient does not want to know
at any given moment. In addition, psychodynamic clinicians will work
from a very strong motivational point of view with regard to many
other phenomena, examining every behavior and experience with the
aim of understanding what motivations this behavior/experience
serves. In all models of the mind, when we talk about motivation, the
pleasure principle and the reality principle are always in operation. In
addition, a unified psychoanalytic model of the mind pays attention to
many different motivations, including the search for bodily pleasure (li-
bido), aggressive impulses, wishes for attachment to other people and
for separation from them, and wishes for self-actualization (along with
threats to all four), no matter what point of view predominates in either
therapist or patient. We will explain more about how to think about dif-
ferences in a moment.

Structure/Process
A unified psychoanalytic model has a structural view of the mind. In
other words, psychodynamic clinicians always see the patient’s mind as
being organized in a stable way over time. The mind does not just con-
sist of fleeting motivations, many of them outside of awareness, but also
includes consistent configurations or patterns, along with the processes
by which these configurations are modulated. In a unified psychoana-
lytic model of the mind, structures and processes are understood to be
concerned with self-regulation (or homeostasis), adaptation, and de-
fense. Psychodynamic clinicians also look at the importance of narra-
tive structure, or of stories, in the organization of experience. Finally,
psychodynamic clinicians always look at the structure of the whole per-
son, or his or her character. Again, differences will be discussed below.
 246
TABLE 13–2. Reverse Axis—Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
Topographic Model Structural Model Object Relations Theory Self Psychology

The mind is divided into three The ego and the superego Object relations are largely Self and selfobject are largely
Topography

regions: have both conscious/ unconscious unconscious

Conscious preconscious and
Preconscious unconscious aspects
Unconscious
The id is entirely unconscious

The unconscious mind consists The ego, superego, and id each Conflicting wishes for affiliation Narcissistic or selfobject
of wishes always striving for have separate aims: and for separation- strivings

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

expression The ego—homeostasis and individuation
adaptation
Unacceptable wishes are kept in The superego—moral Love/hate/ambivalence
Motivation

check by forces of repression imperatives Envy/gratitude/repair

from the preconscious/ The id—drives
conscious mind Libido
Aggression
Oedipal strivings
Oedipal fears Avoidance of danger situations

Conflict is always present

because of competing aims
 Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
TABLE 13–2. Reverse Axis—Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)
Topographic Model Structural Model Object Relations Theory Self Psychology

The unconscious operates The mind is divided into three Object relation Self
according to primary structures: ego, superego, Self representation Selfobject
process; the preconscious/ and id Object representation
conscious operates Representation of interaction Self-state dreams
according to secondary The ego between the two
process Ego functions
Structure/Process

Defense Need-satisfying object

A censor separates the Internalization
unconscious and the Identification Object constancy
conscious/preconscious Signal affect Self constancy
mind Compromise formation
Ego identity Attachment behavioral system
Dreams Character
Internal working models of
Complex The superego attachment
Fantasy Ego ideal
Narrative Mentalization
The id
Conscience
Identifications

247
 248
TABLE 13–2. Reverse Axis—Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)
Topographic Model Structural Model Object Relations Theory Self Psychology

Primary process is the earliest Ego development Attachment Development of the self
mode of mental functioning; Erikson’s stages Self-selfobject matrix
secondary process develops Separation of self from other Empathic caregivers
later Superego development
Paranoid position and Grandiose self forms in
Wishes come from childhood Development of the drives (id) depressive position interaction with mirroring
and form the basis of selfobject
infantile sexuality Psychosexual phases (oral, anal, Container/contained Idealized parental imago forms
Development

early genital [phallic], Good-enough mother in interaction with idealized

Oedipal strivings and fears genital/oedipal, latency, Holding environment selfobject

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

persist into adolescence adolescence)
and adulthood Fixation Separation-individuation Emergent sense of self
Regression Differentiation Core sense of self
Wishes become increasingly Practicing Subjective sense of self
unacceptable Rapprochement Verbal/categorical sense of self
On the way to object Narrative sense of self
Censoring capacity grows constancy
Parenthood
Midlife crisis

Development of mentalization
 Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind
TABLE 13–2. Reverse Axis—Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)
Topographic Model Structural Model Object Relations Theory Self Psychology

Neurosis arises from conflict Ego strength/ego weakness The quality of object relations The health/maturity of the self
between the conscious/ serves as an index of mental serves as an index of mental serves as an index of mental
preconscious domains and health/illness health/illness health
the unconscious domain
Return of the repressed Maladaptive compromise may Borderline personality Psychopathology is
Repetition compulsion lead to character disorders organization (BPO) conceptualized as a disorder
Psychopathology

of the self
Defense versus deficit theories
of psychopathology Narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD)
Persistence of infantile
narcissism (Kohut)
Defense against dependency
(Kernberg)

Pathological grandiose self

Pathological narcissism

False self
Alien self

249
 250
TABLE 13–2. Reverse Axis—Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (continued)
Topographic Model Structural Model Object Relations Theory Self Psychology

Free association (“fundamental Strengthening the ego Activation of object relations in Mobilization of narcissistic
rule”) the therapist–patient transferences
Exploring conflict, defense, and relationship
Examination of transference and compromise Exploration of inevitable
resistance Countertransference empathic failures
Treatment

“Where id was, there ego shall The therapist as a new object

Therapeutic interpretation and be”
reconstruction Transference-Focused
Psychotherapy
Insight (“Make the unconscious Mentalization-Based Treatment

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

conscious”)

Dream exploration
Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 251

Development
A unified psychoanalytic model of the mind has a developmental point
of view, because no part of the mind can be understood apart from its
history. This history will always include the story of childhood and will
feature caretakers and family members, as well as sentinel events, both
happy and sad. Clinicians working with a unified psychoanalytic
model understand that the mind of the child lives on in the adult.

Theory of Psychopathology and Therapeutic Action

(Treatment)
Clinicians working with a unified psychoanalytic model of the mind ex-
amine every patient from each of the above points of view, with an eye
to understanding his or her psychopathology. Although this is not a
book about psychopathology and/or psychodynamic treatment, psy-
chodynamic clinicians working with different models of the mind have
much in common. Psychodynamic treatment strategies may differ, but
they share a commitment to understanding the patient’s story, told to
the therapist with as much candor as possible. Exploration of how the
story is told will always be part of the therapeutic work, and explora-
tion of the transference experience is always part of the process. Every
treatment seeks to understand the patient’s way of finding pleasure,
managing aggression, negotiating attachments and separations, and ex-
pressing the self. Every treatment seeks to understand the feelings and
fears associated with all of these aspects of the patient’s mental life and
the compromises forged among competing aims. This understanding
will be shared with the patient so that he or she can find better ways to
handle the challenges of being human.

Why Is Having Different Models

Useful and Important?
Although models of the mind have much in common, they also have
important differences. Indeed, a major aim of this book has been to
make readers aware of the major differences among models. Which
model is best? It is not clear. This is true partly because we lack methods
good enough to answer the question empirically. It is also true because
the mind is an immensely complex system, with many moving parts.
Therefore, it should not be surprising that there are many ways to think
about it and many ways to intervene. In other words, if we know that
252 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

there is a dynamic interaction between many aspects of the mind, then

we should expect the entire system to change in response to several dif-
ferent kinds of interventions.
For example, a stronger self might make a brash young man less an-
noying to others, who resent his constant demands for attention. At the
same time, a stronger self might make this young man less likely to give
in to his sadistic superego, which feels to him like a source of power.
However, having a less sadistic superego might allow this man to dis-
play less passive aggression because of a reduced need to be defiantly
rebellious against all authority. Less rebellion against authority might
enable this same man to allow himself more kinds of pleasure, thereby
becoming less resentful of those who are having fun, with less need to
upstage them. Less rebellion might also make him more admiring of his
father and therefore more comfortable with being idealistic himself. If
this man is able to experience more feelings of real idealism instead of
just cravings for attention, he might like himself better—and so on.
Sometimes it will be best to conceptualize this young man as dealing
with forbidden oedipal strivings by making himself into an “annoying
boy”; at other times, it will be best to imagine him as needing to stay
close to those he loves, even while struggling with aggression toward
them; at still other times, it will be best to imagine him struggling with
a self that feels weak and unrecognized, turning to aggression to help
himself feel stronger. We can imagine many interventions at many
points.
In a second example, let us return to the young woman with panic
attacks, one of which was triggered by the suggestion that she visit a
nail salon (see Chapters 5 and 6). Clearly this young woman becomes
anxious whenever she is tempted to pursue embellishments to make
herself more feminine or beautiful. Is she afraid of competitive oedipal
wishes? Does she feel closer and more attached to her mother if she
stays somewhat dowdy like her mother was? Maybe becoming more
beautiful would represent a painful and terrifying separation from her
mother. On the other hand, maybe this young woman cannot allow her-
self to express strivings to be noticed as beautiful because her mother,
who was often depressed during the patient’s childhood, failed to
acknowledge and enjoy these strivings. Each of these ideas is true about
the patient, and each represents a different model of the mind.
In this book we have seen how each model of the mind tries to cor-
rect shortcomings of previous models. However, each model also cre-
ates new problems and new blind spots. In fact, clinicians who use only
one model of the mind to the exclusion of all others run the risk of
ignoring important aspects of the patient’s mind. For this reason, it is
Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 253

wise to use all four models, each of which emphasizes a different aspect
of the mind and each of which has different strengths. Many theorists
have written about how each model might be applied to different phe-
nomena, different stages of life, and different kinds of patients (Gedo
and Goldberg 1973; Pine 1988, 1989). We have also seen how models of
the mind borrow from each other, as in the example of many so-called
Self Psychology theorists who borrow the idea of the containing mother
from Object Relations Theory (see Chapter 12).
Let us look at some more examples. In trying to help the young
woman who dreamt about the doll on the shelf (see Chapters 6 and 7),
would it be best to help her to talk about sexual and competitive wishes
that have been driven underground because they are too frightening?
Or would it be best to talk about her fear of loss, or her fear that her own
angry feelings might have led to her mother’s death? Maybe it is impor-
tant to help this young woman deal with her feeling of superiority (feel-
ing “above it all”) as being a search for the praise she did not get as a
child. Or are the patient’s feelings of superiority a defense against feel-
ings of vulnerability and dependency? Maybe it is best to help her deal
with her envy of her sister so that she is less likely to punish herself for
this envy and can allow herself to pursue her own deepest wishes. The
best answer is that it is important to talk with the patient about all of
these issues.
How can we best understand the timid young doctor who dropped
his mobile phone in an obsequious rush to be helpful (see Chapter 10)?
Should we help him to be more aware of his aggressive feelings toward
his therapist? Or should we talk about his feeling that he needs to be
compliant in order to be loved by others? His abject need for love only
makes him hate himself more; perhaps we should talk about this feeling
of self-hatred. Or perhaps we should talk about his related feeling of
weakness and his warded-off wishes to be seen as smart and accom-
plished, which were never recognized by his busy, unhappy parents.
Again, the best answer is that we should talk about all of these issues.
Choosing the most important issues to talk about at the right time
requires experience. Patients differ on which model of the mind best
suits the problem with which they are struggling. Patients also differ
with respect to which model of the mind best describes their problems
at any given moment. However, without our four models of the mind,
we would not even be alert to the presence of many issues. Having all
models in one’s psychodynamic toolbox allows one to listen to each
patient, making sense of his or her suffering and finding ways to help.
In other words, the best way to help each patient is to borrow from all
four models. Every patient needs to feel more comfortable with his or
254 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

her bodily strivings, his or her wishes for affiliation and separation, and
his or her wishes for self-expression and meaningfulness. Every patient
needs to deal with fears associated with all of these. Finally, every pa-
tient must deal with the constraints of reality, which include conflict,
limitation, and loss. Which of these issues predominates at any given
time will vary. However, clinicians need all four models of the mind to
listen for each of them.

Importance of the Biological Model

of the Mind
A good clinician always uses many perspectives other than the psycho-
dynamic perspective with each patient. Even the best psychodynamic
clinician always uses a neurobiological understanding of mental illness,
employing interventions that take this understanding into account. In-
deed, the young woman with panic attacks may need biological treat-
ment for her anxiety or a course of cognitive-behavioral treatment. Less
anxiety will itself have a positive dynamic effect. For example, the pa-
tient may feel better about herself, have less need to cling to her mother,
and be less afraid of autonomy.
As noted in the Preface/Introduction to this book, there need be no
conflict between the psychoanalytic model of the mind and other im-
portant points of view, including neurobiological, cognitive, and cul-
tural approaches to understanding mental illness. Clinical work should
be informed by empirical study from all disciplines and be consistent
with these disciplines. For example, we know from the work of devel-
opmental psychologists that the superego does not develop suddenly at
the end of the oedipal period, as Freud taught, but instead develops
slowly over time (Emde et al. 1988). This fact influences our listening in
that it will help us to be alert to a patient’s guilt and shame surrounding
events that predate the oedipal period. We also know that rhesus mon-
keys raised by “supermoms” can have a normal outcome even when
they carry a genetic liability for anxious or aggressive temperament
(Suomi 2004a, 2004b). This fact likewise influences our work, making us
think harder about the importance of the selfobject function in psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy.
Throughout this book, we have tried to highlight areas of research
linking the psychoanalytic model of the mind with both neuroscience
and general psychology. We should all be partners in our quest to better
understand patients. There have been many good efforts on all sides to
build this partnership (Bucci 1997; Cooper 1985b; Gabbard 1992; Kandel
Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 255

1998, 1999, 2005; Kihlstrom 1994; LeDoux 1999; Levin 1991; Mayes et al.
2007; Olds and Cooper 1997; Shapiro and Emde 1995; Solms and Turn-
bull 2002; Westen 1998).

Dangers of Integration:
A Note for Psychoanalysts
Not everyone agrees that integration of the various psychoanalytic
models of the mind is either possible or wise. Indeed, as we mentioned
briefly in the Preface/Introduction to this book, the field of psychoanal-
ysis has been beset by arguments over which model of the mind is the
best or the most useful. A summary of these arguments would take us
far afield. For now, it is enough to say that we live in an era of psycho-
analytic pluralism and that efforts at integration can be seen as efforts
to undo this pluralism with a proposed synthesis that is experienced as
“too prescriptive.”
Indeed, in the Introduction to our book Psychoanalytic Terms and Con-
cepts, Eslee Samberg and I wrote about the problems and the dangers of
writing a psychoanalytic dictionary in an era of pluralism and in a field
marked by efforts to model what cannot be seen—the mind—and the
unseen part of the unseen—the unconscious mind. In our Introduction,
we tried to describe how we arrived at a way to handle these problems
so that we could proceed with the work of editing a dictionary, which
requires admitting that one has a point of view (Samberg and Auchin-
closs 2010). Arguably, the problem here is even more challenging, be-
cause the task of integrating the various psychoanalytic models of the
mind requires even more condensation than does the writing of a dic-
tionary; condensation, perforce, requires that complexity—and many
points of view—be eliminated. In other words, many will be aware that
important points of view have been given short shrift in this book’s
chapters.
Nevertheless, attempts at integration are important because every
clinician needs to have a robust and workable psychoanalytic model of
the mind, usable with every patient in every situation. Most students of
mental health will not become psychoanalysts, daily immersed in the
complexity of psychoanalytic theory, fascinated by the ways different
theorists use different words, or intrigued by differences of opinion. For
these reasons, integration is important, even at the risk of oversimplifi-
cation. Future clinicians must be able to use our models of the mind to
help patients. The aim of this book is to provide a starting point for
those interested in understanding the complexity of theory either
256 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

through further reading or through education. In a previous commen-

tary, I argued that the clinical work of doing psychodynamic psycho-
therapy offers the best exposure to the psychoanalytic model of the
mind (Auchincloss 2002). Here we are arguing that we need a psycho-
analytic model of the mind to do good clinical work. Both of these state-
ments are true.

Conclusion
Throughout this book we have tried to emphasize the fact that psycho-
analytic model making should be an ongoing process. For example,
readers must understand that the word superego is simply the name
Freud gave to his observation that most people are strongly influenced
by thoughts about right and wrong. Object relations gained traction
when clinicians realized that it is difficult to talk about how some peo-
ple function without thinking about how they organize their experience
of self, other, and the interaction between the two. Self Psychology
would not have survived if thinking in greater detail about the compo-
nents of the self were not useful. Clinicians always face the same ques-
tions that challenged Freud and his followers: How can we understand
patients, and how can we help them change? Our models of the mind
are important and useful only to the extent that they help us to answer
these questions.

Further Reading
Auchincloss EL, Samberg E: Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts. New
Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2012
Gabbard GO, Litowitz BE, Williams P (eds): Textbook of Psychoanaly-
sis, 2nd Edition. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Publish-
ing, 2012
Gilmore KJ, Meersand P: Normal Child and Adolescent Development:
A Psychodynamic Primer. Arlington, VA, American Psychiatric
Publishing, 2013

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Toward an Integrated Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind 257

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Menninger Foundation, 1954–1982. New York, Other Press, 2000
Westen D: The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: toward a psychodynamically
informed psychological science. Psychol Bull 124:333–371, 1998
 PART VI

Appendixes
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 Appendix A

Libido Theory

Libido is the name that Freud gave to the drive for sexual pleasure.
The word libido is derived from the Latin for “wish” or “desire.” Ideas
about the origins, transformations, and effects of libido have been col-
lectively referred to as libido theory. For a full discussion of the illustra-
tion in this appendix, readers are referred to the section “Freud’s Drive
Theory” in Chapter 9 (“The Id and the Superego”).

261
 262
APPENDIX A. Libido Theory
Libido ➜ Transformation via defense ➜ Outcome

➜ Repression of ideation but with excitement remaining ➜ “Normal” sexuality and foreplay

➜ Repression of ideation and excitement ➜ Sexual inhibition

➜ Direct expression of a component of libido ➜ Atypical sexuality (“perversion”)

➜ Repression with “the return of the repressed” ➜ Neurosis

Infantile sexuality from the Repression with partial “return” ➜ Neurosis: anxiety disorder
erotogenic zones
Conversion ➜ Neurosis: conversion disorder
Oral

The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Reaction formation ➜ Neurosis: obsessive-compulsive disorder
Anal
Phallic Projection ➜ Neurosis: paranoid disorder
Genital/oedipal Displacement ➜ Neurosis: phobia

➜ Repression, sublimation, and reaction formation ➜ Character

Fixation at the oral phase ➜ Oral character
Fixation at the anal phase ➜ Anal character
Fixation at the phallic phase ➜ Phallic narcissistic character

➜ Repression and sublimation ➜ Culture

Art
Science
Religion
Law
 Appendix B

Defenses

Many theorists have made efforts to classify and organize the de-
fenses. For example, Otto Kernberg (1970) has offered the most com-
monly used system for classifying psychopathology according to level
of functioning, including psychotic, borderline, and neurotic levels. In
addition, George Vaillant (1977, 1992; Vaillant et al. 1986) attempted to
correlate defensive style with level of mental health, using data gath-
ered from his longitudinal study of a large group of men. In this appen-
dix, we will draw upon both of their systems. (See also Auchincloss and
Samberg 2012; Dickerman and Auchincloss, in press; and Gabbard et al.
2012.)

Mature Defenses With Little Cost

in Terms of Ego Functioning
Altruism: A defense in which an individual shows concern for the well-
being of others in order to avoid painful feelings such as anxiety about
his or her own well-being.

Example: A wealthy woman satisfies her need to feel important and

avoids unacceptable feelings of selfishness by donating large amounts
of time and money to “worthy” causes.

263
264 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Humor: A defense in which an individual treats a painful subject

with a comic attitude, thereby diminishing the pain.

Example: A woman who is getting old and approaching her death puts
everyone at ease by making humorous statements about her disabilities.

Reparation: A defense in which an individual attempts to relieve

guilt or anxiety experienced for having had aggressive wishes toward a
loved and needed object by making efforts to repair the imagined dam-
age or harm done by those aggressive impulses.

Example: A young man shows his little brother how to play baseball, be-
cause he feels badly that he has often made fun of him.

Sublimation: A defense in which the individual deflects a wish

from its original aim to one with a higher social value.

Example: A young man expresses his unacceptable aggressive impulses

by engaging in competitive sports while expressing easy amiability in
everyday life.

Suppression: A defense in which an individual consciously places

unpleasant thoughts or feelings out of awareness.

Example: A middle-aged man in the cardiac intensive care unit main-

tains a positive attitude toward his prognosis and intentionally avoids
thinking about his precarious condition.

Neurotic Defenses With Mild or Moderate Cost

in Terms of Ego Functioning
Displacement: A defense in which an individual redirects interest or
intensity attached to one idea toward another more acceptable idea.

Example: A young man who is angry at his boss for criticizing him be-
comes angry with his own son and shouts at the child with little provo-
cation.

Idealization: A defense in which an individual sees another indi-

vidual in an exaggeratedly positive light, so as to ward off disappoint-
ment or to enhance his or her own experience of self.

Example: A young man sees his father as good at everything, avoiding

the painful awareness that his father let him down many times during
his childhood.
Appendix B: Defenses 265

Introjection: A defense in which an individual internalizes an as-

pect of the external world, usually an object, so as to avoid a painful
feeling, such as loss or disappointment.

Example: A young woman whose mother has died develops an intense

interest in cooking, in identification with an important aspect of her
mother.

Isolation of affect: A defense in which an individual separates the

affective meaning of an event or thought from his or her awareness of
the event/thought in order to lessen the emotional impact. Intellectual-
ization is a form of isolation of affect characterized by the use of exces-
sive cognitive activity to control and ward off unacceptable feelings.

Example: A mother becomes an expert in the science behind her daugh-

ter’s attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder while being emotionally
distant from her daughter and appearing to have no emotional response
to her daughter’s disability.

Projection: A defense in which an individual attributes an unaccept-

able or intolerable idea, impulse, or feeling to another individual.

Example: An aggressive, competitive young woman perceives others as

“having it in for her.”

Rationalization: A defense in which an individual resorts to seem-

ingly reasonable explanations to account for feelings or actions, thereby
avoiding recognition of more painful feelings and/or motivations.1

Example: A young man blames “time constraints at work” for often ar-
riving late to sessions with his therapist, thereby avoiding feelings of an-
ger toward his therapist.

Reaction formation: A defense in which an individual transforms a

forbidden wish into its opposite.

Example: A young man expresses extreme homophobia in order to avoid

awareness of his own homosexual interests.

1See
also Tierney J: Go ahead, rationalize. Monkeys do it, too. New York Times,
November 6, 2007.
266 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Repression: A defense in which an individual excludes unaccept-

able thoughts and feelings from consciousness.

Example: A young woman is unaware that she feels sexually interested

in her next-door neighbor but is anxious in his presence.

Undoing: A defense in which an individual negates unacceptable

sexual, aggressive, or shameful feelings associated with a previous be-
havior by doing or saying the opposite.

Example: A young man who often makes hostile jokes about colleagues
usually follows these interactions by saying, “I was just kidding!”

Primitive Defenses With Significant Cost

in Terms of Ego Functioning
Denial/disavowal: A defense by which an individual repudiates as-
pects of external reality, thereby diminishing painful feelings.

Example: In the face of much evidence to the contrary, a middle-aged man

in the cardiac intensive care unit asserts that his health is improving.

Dissociation: A disruption in the continuity of mental experience

for the purpose of defense. Splitting is an example in which dissociation
is applied to mutually contradictory conscious experiences.

Example: A young woman is outraged by the idea that she might be sex-
ually interested in her best friend’s husband, ignoring the fact of having
flirted with him intensely the night before.

Primitive Idealization: A defense in which an individual splits

apart exalted and devalued aspects of another individual, experiencing
only the exalted aspect, so as to ward off feelings associated with the de-
valued aspect, or to enhance his or her own experience of self.

Example: Early in the treatment, a young woman who is afraid of her

rage at those in authority sees her current therapist as “perfect,” while
recounting stories in which all the other therapists whom she knows or
has seen are highly flawed.

Projective Identification: An interpersonal defense in which an in-

dividual transfers parts of the self onto an object in order to rid him- or
herself of those parts and to control the object from inside. When using
Appendix B: Defenses 267

projective identification, the individual often behaves in a way that in-

fluences the other individual’s behavior and experience to be consistent
with the projection.

Example: A young woman who vehemently denies that she is aggressive

and intrusive resists her boyfriend’s efforts to discuss emotionally trou-
blesome issues, causing him to lose patience with her and make angry,
intrusive efforts to engage her in a discussion of their interaction.

Somatization: A defense in which an individual expresses unac-

ceptable feelings in the form of physical symptoms, so as to lessen their
painful impact. Conversion, the symbolic transformation of unaccept-
able wishes into physical symptoms, represents the classic example of
somatization.

Example: A young man who does not “want to see” painful truths about
his father’s infidelity complains to his doctor about his own “intermit-
tent blurred vision.”

Splitting: A defense in which an individual separates contradictory,

conflicting conscious experiences, thereby preventing their integration,
so as to prevent the emotional impact of integration.

Example: A young woman, who previously had nothing bad to say

about her “perfect” therapist, states after a minor disappointment that
her therapist is “a heartless person.”

Other Defense Mechanisms

Altruistic surrender: A defense in which an individual can only
achieve gratification of unacceptable wishes vicariously through ex-
treme, selfless devotion to a proxy.

Example: A teenage girl who finds her own interest in boys to be unac-
ceptable works tirelessly to make her best friend more attractive.

Identification with the aggressor: A defense in which an individual

takes on the characteristics or role of someone who had formerly tor-
mented or abused him or her, so as to avoid painful feelings of passivity
and shame.

Example: A young gay man who has been teased by family members for
being “too effeminate” treats himself with contempt.
268 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Regression in the service of the ego: A form of regression that, al-

though it may be originally instituted for defensive purposes, leads to
a more innovative and adaptive mental function and organization (as in
artistic creation).

Example: A successful female author is able to evoke the voice of a child

in her writing.

Turning against the self: A defense in which an individual directs

an unacceptable wish, usually aggressive, from another individual to-
ward him- or herself.

Example: A man who finds his anger at his wife to be unacceptable often
blames himself excessively for their altercations.

Turning passive into active: A defense in which an individual acts

out an experience of having been a passive participant in an interaction
by assuming the active role, thereby avoiding feelings and/or memo-
ries of being out of control or helpless.

Example: A middle-aged man who was physically abused by his own fa-
ther during childhood enjoys a job in which he exercises control over
others who work for him but avoids situations in which he feels power-
less, as in seeking treatment for illness.

References
Auchincloss EL, Samberg E: Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts. New Haven,
CT, Yale University Press, 2012
Dickerman AL, Auchincloss EL: Psychodynamic psychotherapy, in Contempo-
rary Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy. Edited by Tin-
sley HEA, Lease SL, Wiersma NSG. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage (in press)
Gabbard GO, Litowitz BE, Williams P (eds): Textbook of Psychoanalysis, 2nd
Edition. Arlington, VA, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012
Kernberg OF: A psychoanalytic classification of character pathology. J Am Psy-
choanal Assoc 18:800–822, 1970
Vaillant GE: Adaptation to Life. Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1977
Vaillant GE (ed): Ego Mechanisms of Defense: A Guide for Clinicians and Re-
searchers. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 1992
Vaillant GE, Bond M, Vaillant CO: An empirically validated hierarchy of de-
fense mechanisms. Arch Gen Psychiatry 73:786–794, 1986
 Appendix C

Glossary

Activation-synthesis hypothesis A theory of DREAM formation in-

troduced by Hobson and McCarley (see Chapter 6) in which the
brain constructs a dream by synthesizing random sensorimotor in-
formation from the pons with information stored in memory.

Adaptation The individual’s ability to make changes and/or com-

promises so as to become better suited to his or her external environ-
ment.

Adaptational perspective In the psychoanalytic model of the mind,

the effort to understand aspects of behavior and mental life that
serve the purpose of coping with the external world.

Adult Attachment Interview An instrument developed by Main

(see Chapter 11) to investigate patterns in adult recollections of early
childhood experience related to attachment.

SMALL CAPS type indicates terms defined as main entries elsewhere in this
glossary.

The reader is referred to Auchincloss and Samberg (2012) for more a more
extensive exploration of terms and concepts.

269
270 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Affect(s) The complex emotional/physical states—both pleasurable

and painful—produced by and in the body as part of its system of
evaluating the self in relationship to the environment for the purpose
of survival. Commonly called feelings.

Affect mirroring The process by which the mother empathically

reads and reflects back to the child his or her feeling states, thereby
helping the child gain confidence in managing intense AFFECTS and
learn to differentiate between self and other, and reality and FANTASY.
The mother’s affect mirroring of the child lays the groundwork for
the child’s development of MENTALIZATION.

Affect tolerance The ability to experience AFFECT states without hav-

ing to ward them off through DEFENSE.

Aggression The WISH to subjugate, prevail over, harm, or destroy oth-

ers, and the expression of such a WISH in thought, action, words, or
FANTASY.

Aggressive drive In Freud’s TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL, the source of PSY-

CHIC ENERGY deriving from the organism’s aggressive WISHES.

Alien self In Fonagy’s theory (see Chapter 12), an inauthentic sense

of self that can develop when the mother’s AFFECT MIRRORING is mis-
tuned, insensitive, or otherwise defective. Similar to Winnicott’s
FALSE SELF.

Altruism A DEFENSE in which an individual shows concern for the

well-being of others in order to avoid painful feelings such as ANXIETY
about his or her own well-being.

Altruistic surrender A DEFENSE in which an individual can only

achieve gratification of unacceptable WISHES vicariously through ex-
treme, selfless devotion to a proxy.

Ambivalence The simultaneous existence of opposite feelings, atti-

tudes, or tendencies toward another person, thing, or situation.

Anal character A personality style characterized by marked orderli-

ness, stubbornness, and obstinacy, thought to be related to the pre-
dominant influence of LIBIDO arising from the anal EROTOGENIC ZONE.

Anal phase The second phase of psychosexual development (extend-

ing from 18 months to 3 years), during which LIBIDO deriving from the
anal EROTOGENIC ZONE dominates the organization of psychic life.
Appendix C: Glossary 271

Anxiety An AFFECT characterized by a painful experience of apprehen-

sion and anticipation of danger.

Attachment The biologically based bond between infant and care-

giver.

Attachment behavioral system A component of ATTACHMENT THEORY

that includes inborn features of behavior in infant and caregivers
that ensure the establishment of attachment.

Attachment theory A view of ATTACHMENT proposed by Bowlby (see

Chapter 11) that includes development, patterns in children and
adults, and sequelae over the course of the life cycle.

Autoerotic Libidinal aims directed toward the child’s own body, as

opposed to those directed toward another person.

Automatic thoughts Unconscious mentation in COGNITIVE PSYCHOL-

OGY or in cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Autonomous ego functions Inborn capacities of the MIND that de-

velop independently (or autonomously) from CONFLICT and that in-
clude thought, memory, perception, cognition, and motility.

Average expectable environment The caregiving situation within

which an infant’s capacities can develop in a predictable and pro-
gressive manner.

Behaviorism A branch of PSYCHOLOGY that seeks to explain human

(and animal) activity as a chain of stimulus-response connections,
linked together by reinforcement.

Borderline personality organization A psychoanalytic diagnosis

introduced by Kernberg (see Chapter 11), marked by EGO WEAKNESSES
and disturbances in OBJECT RELATIONS, including poorly integrated SELF
and OBJECT REPRESENTATIONS.

Castration anxiety The fear that unacceptable WISHES will lead to

punishment in the form of loss of or injury to one’s genitals or one’s
body.

Cathartic method Breuer’s technique (see Chapter 2) of treating pa-

tients with HYSTERIA, consisting of HYPNOSIS and the expression of AF-
FECTS associated with sequestered ideas.
272 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Censor In Freud’s TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL, an agent of REPRESSION whose

function is to keep from CONSCIOUSNESS mental content judged to be
unacceptable.

Censorship In Freud’s TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL, the system by which

WISHES are appraised as unacceptable to CONSCIOUSNESS and then re-
pressed.

Character An individual’s stable and enduring traits, attitudes, cog-

nitive styles, and moods.

Character disorder A disturbance in the structure of an individual’s

personality in which there are rigidly held patterns of behavior that
get the individual in trouble or lead to the defeat of his or her own
aims but that cause him or her little subjective distress.

Co-created experience A process that integrates the subjective ex-

periences of two people in a relationship into a single experience.

Cognitive psychology A branch of PSYCHOLOGY that focuses on the

study of how people know things. Cognitive psychology posits the
existence of stable, autonomous cognitive STRUCTURES, or REPRESENTA-
TIONS, operating within an organism (and analogous to the software
programs in a computer) that account for its behavior (or output).

Cognitive unconscious Mentation that is not within awareness that

mostly includes phenomena related to information processing.

Complex A set of UNCONSCIOUS associated feelings and ideas that form

a network or template in the MIND.

Compromise/compromise formation A mental product that re-

flects the EGO’S solution to a problem presented by the competing de-
mands of ID, SUPEREGO, and external reality.

Computational model of the mind The view that the human mind
or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system (in
the sense of a symbol manipulator that follows step-by-step func-
tions to compute input and form output).

Condensation A mental process by which a single idea is capable of

representing many related ideas, linked by private associations.

Conflict A struggle within the MIND between thoughts, feelings, or

structures with opposing aims.
Appendix C: Glossary 273

Conflict theory A theory about how the EGO manages the competing
aims of ID, SUPEREGO, and external reality by forging COMPROMISE.

Confrontation A therapeutic intervention that directs attention to

aspects of CONSCIOUS experience that are observable but that are
avoided or disavowed.

Conscious In Freud’s TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL, that part of the MIND that is

accessible to awareness.

Consciousness A mental state characterized by awareness and self-

awareness.

Container/contained In Bion’s theory (see Chapter 11), caretaking

acts, including soothing and verbalizing, that serve to transform the
infant’s chaotic experience into something more tolerable.

Conversion The symbolic transformation of unacceptable WISHES into

physical symptoms.

Core sense of self The second stage in the development of the SELF—
from 2 to 6 months—in Stern’s theory (see Chapter 12) about how the
sense of self develops in interaction with the mother/caregiver.

Corrective emotional experience In the theory of Alexander and

French (see Chapter 11), therapeutic change that results from the
therapist’s specific efforts to be different from the patient’s parents.

Countertransference The therapist’s responses to the patient, CON-

SCIOUS and UNCONSCIOUS, including responses that are mainly a reac-
tion to the therapist’s own inner life and those that are mainly a
reaction to the patient.

Danger situations Circumstances that trigger ANXIETY in all human

beings, including loss of an important OBJECT, loss of an object’s love,
CASTRATION ANXIETY, and SUPEREGO disapproval (or GUILT).

Day residue An event from the waking life in the day before the
dream that appears in the DREAM as a symbol.

Defense Any UNCONSCIOUS psychological maneuver used to avoid the

experience of a painful state of mind.

Defense mechanism A specific and well-delineated act of DEFENSE,

such as REPRESSION, REACTION FORMATION, or SUBLIMATION.
274 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Defensive style An individual’s characteristic mode of DEFENSE, a

major constituent of CHARACTER.

Deficit A weakness in psychic STRUCTURE caused by early deprivation.

Denial A DEFENSE by which an individual repudiates aspects of exter-

nal reality, thereby diminishing painful feelings. Also called dis-
avowal.

Depressive anxiety A fear that one’s own angry feelings may

threaten or harm a needed and loved OBJECT.

Depressive position In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), a stage of de-

velopment marked by attainment of the ability to integrate good and
bad aspects of the experience with an OBJECT.

Descriptive unconscious Mentation that is not within awareness at

any given moment but can easily be brought to awareness if atten-
tion is applied to it.

Developmental lines Distinct developmental sequences of function

and behavior, including WISHES, fears, self-regulation, morality, SELF
and OBJECT REPRESENTATIONS, and narcissistic strivings.

Developmental point of view An approach to understanding be-

havior and mental life as part of a meaningful progression from in-
fancy to adulthood.

Differentiation In Mahler’s theory (see Chapter 11), a subphase of

the SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION process in which the infant begins to
show interest in the external world.

Disavowal See DENIAL.

Disorder of the self In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a type of psychopathology

that is characterized by weakness in the self.

Displacement A process whereby the interest or intensity attached to

one idea is redirected onto another associated idea; often used as a
DEFENSE.

Dissociation A disruption in the continuity of mental experience for

the purpose of DEFENSE.

Dream A mental event occurring during sleep that consists of a col-

lection of images, ideas, and emotions.
Appendix C: Glossary 275

Dream work The process of transforming the LATENT DREAM THOUGHTS

into the MANIFEST DREAM.

Drive A psychological REPRESENTATION of a motivational force that

emerges from the body as a result of an individual’s biological needs.

Drive theory A theory about the role of DRIVE in development, nor-

mal functioning, and psychopathology.

Dynamic A state of continuous interplay of multiple psychological

forces or motivations.

Dynamic unconscious Mentation that is actively denied access to

CONSCIOUSNESS by the force of REPRESSION.

Ego In Freud’s STRUCTURAL MODEL, the executive agency of the MIND,

responsible for mediating among the demands of the DRIVES (the ID),
the external world, and the SUPEREGO.

Ego dystonic Behaviors that are experienced by the individual as in-

compatible with the dominant view of the self.

Ego function(s) Specific capacities of the EGO employed in the service

of self-regulation and/or ADAPTATION, such as cognition, perception,
memory, motility, AFFECT, thinking, language, SYMBOLIZATION, REALITY
TESTING, evaluation, judgment, CENSORSHIP, impulse control, AFFECT
TOLERANCE, DEFENSE, and CONFLICT mediation.

Ego ideal A repository of standards, values, and images of perfection

by which an individual measures him- or herself.

Ego identity In Erikson’s theory (see Chapter 8), the consolidation of

a stable sense of oneself as a unique individual in society.

Ego psychology The branch of PSYCHOANALYSIS, roughly equivalent to

the STRUCTURAL MODEL, that emphasizes the concept of the EGO and its
role in the psychological functioning.

Ego strength In the STRUCTURAL MODEL, a state of psychological

health characterized by the ability to efficiently fulfill EGO FUNCTIONS
required for self-regulation and/or ADAPTATION, including REALITY
TESTING and social judgment, abstract thinking, AFFECT TOLERANCE, im-
pulse control, and the flexible utilization of appropriate DEFENSE
MECHANISMS.

Ego syntonic Behaviors that are experienced by the individual as

compatible with his or her dominant view of the self.
276 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Ego weakness In the STRUCTURAL MODEL, a state of psychopathology

characterized by the inability to fulfill EGO FUNCTIONS required for self-
regulation and/or ADAPTATION.

Embodiment The idea that the MIND is intrinsically shaped by its con-
nection to the body.

Emergent property A property of any system that is dependent on

another system (as MIND is to brain) but that cannot be described in
terms appropriate to that system, so that the new (or emergent) prop-
erty must be described in new terms.

Emergent sense of self The first stage in the development of the

self—from birth to 2 months—in Stern’s theory (see Chapter 12)
about how the sense of self develops in interaction with the mother/
caregiver.

Empathy The capacity to feel, imagine, or sense the experience of an-

other person.

Empiricism The belief that the only source of true knowledge about
the universe comes from the evidence of the senses.

Envy A feeling of wishing to have something that another person has,

often accompanied by destructive feelings toward that person.

Epigenesis The view that development proceeds in a series of succes-

sive transactions between the individual and the environment, with
the outcome of each phase dependent upon the outcomes of all pre-
vious phases.

Erotogenic zone A body part that serves a source of libidinous ex-

citement or gratification. Sigmund Freud postulated a developmen-
tal series of erotogenic zones: oral, anal, phallic, and genital.

False self In Winnicott’s theory (see Chapter 12), the self experience
that emerges in response to another person’s needs, expectations,
and demands (as opposed to the TRUE SELF that emerges in response
to one’s own needs, expectations, and demands).

Fantasy An imagined scenario in narrative form in which the imag-

ining person is featured in a major role and often in an emotionally
charged situation.

Fixation The persistent and overwhelming influence of a particular

stage of development on adult functioning.
Appendix C: Glossary 277

Free association A technique of PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY in

which a patient suspends CONSCIOUS control over his or her thought
processes, thereby revealing UNCONSCIOUS influences on the patient’s
subjective experience.

Functionalism A branch of PSYCHOLOGY that explores the function, or

purpose, of mental life.

Fundamental rule A request made by therapist to patient to report

whatever comes to mind, speaking with as little CENSORSHIP as possi-
ble.

Genetic perspective In the psychoanalytic model of the mind, the

effort to understand the adult patient’s report of his or her develop-
ment as an important determinant of experience.

Genital phase The fourth phase of psychosexual development, fol-

lowing the oral, anal, and phallic phases. The genital phase is some-
times combined with the OEDIPAL STAGE and called the genital/oedipal
phase.

Good-enough mother In Winnicott’s theory (see Chapter 11), a

mother who provides nurturing, optimal responsiveness, and safety
so that the infant can thrive.

Grandiose self In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a component of the self that rep-

resents the earliest expression of inborn narcissistic strivings to be
omnipotent and special.

Guilt A feeling of badness and ANXIETY linked to thoughts of moral

transgression.

Hedonic principle A principle from general psychology that asserts

that behavior and mental activity seek always to maximize feelings
of pleasure and minimize feelings of pain.

Holding environment In Winnicott’s theory (see Chapter 11), a situ-

ation created by a GOOD-ENOUGH MOTHER (or caregiver).

Homeostasis A state of stable intrapsychic equilibrium or self-regu-

lation.

Humor A DEFENSE in which an individual treats a painful subject with

a comic attitude, thereby diminishing the pain.
278 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Hypnosis A state of altered CONSCIOUSNESS (accompanied by changes

in brain waves) induced by special techniques and often used for the
purpose of treatment.

Hysteria A type of psychopathology characterized by somatic symp-

toms that are unrelated to demonstrable anatomical or physiological
pathology.

Id In Sigmund Freud’s STRUCTURAL MODEL, the seat of the DRIVES, in-

cluding sexual and aggressive urges. The content of the id is always
UNCONSCIOUS.

Idealization The attribution of exalted qualities to someone or some-

thing. A DEFENSE in which one individual sees another individual in
an exaggeratedly positive light, so as to ward off disappointment or
to enhance his or her own experience of self.

Idealized parental imago In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a component of the

self that represents the inborn need for perfection in the primary
caregivers.

Idealized selfobject In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a caregiver who can be ex-

perienced as perfect, thus allowing for healthy development of the
IDEALIZED PARENTAL IMAGO.

Idealizing transference In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a patient’s exalted view

of the therapist, which represents a revival of the IDEALIZED PARENTAL
IMAGO in the person of the therapist.

Identification A process in which the individual’s SELF REPRESENTA-

TION is modified to resemble an OBJECT REPRESENTATION.

Identification with the aggressor A DEFENSE in which an individual

takes on the characteristics or role of someone who had formerly tor-
mented or abused him or her so as to avoid painful feelings of pas-
sivity and SHAME.

Identity The stable sense of oneself as a unique individual in society.

Identity diffusion Lack of coherence in SELF REPRESENTATION, resulting

from failure to integrate all aspects of the SELF.

Imprinting According to Lorenz’s theory (see Chapter 11), the act by

which a newborn animal recognizes another animal as a parent.
Appendix C: Glossary 279

Individuation In Mahler’s theory of SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION (see

Chapter 11), the process by which children develop the feeling of au-
tonomy and uniqueness.

Infantile sexuality Sexual and/or romantic feelings in children, es-

pecially as expressed in the psychosexual phases.

Insight Knowledge about the UNCONSCIOUS, often gained through IN-

TERPRETATION.

Instinct In general biology, a species-specific, inherited pattern of be-

havior that does not have to be learned.

Intellectualization A defensive process in which an individual uses

excessive cognitive activity to control and ward off unacceptable
feelings.

Internalization A group of processes whereby an individual takes

aspects of the external world into the psyche.

Internalized homophobia A process whereby a homosexual indi-

vidual responds to homophobia in the surrounding culture by treat-
ing him- or herself in a homophobic way or by identifying with the
aggressor.

Internal working models of attachment In Bowlby’s theory (see

Chapter 11) theory, psychological REPRESENTATIONS that include a REP-
RESENTATION of SELF, OBJECT, and the interaction between them, pertain-
ing to ATTACHMENT.

Interpersonal Between two or more individuals in the external

world.

Interpretation An explicit inference made by the therapist to the pa-

tient about the workings or the contents of the UNCONSCIOUS MIND.

Intersystemic conflict Struggle in the mind between opposing

WISHES, thoughts, or feelings in different regions of the MIND, as be-
tween ID and SUPEREGO.

Intrasystemic conflict Struggle in the mind between opposing

WISHES, thoughts, or feelings in the same system, as within the ID.

Introjection A DEFENSE in which an individual internalizes an aspect

of the external world, usually an OBJECT, so as to avoid a painful feel-
ing, such as loss or disappointment.
280 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Introspection The process of examining one’s inner psychological

experience.

Introspectionism A branch of PSYCHOLOGY associated with Wundt

(see Chapter 3) and characterized by the close examination of subjec-
tive experience in order to understand its most fundamental ele-
ments.

Isolation A DEFENSE in which an individual separates events,

thoughts, or parts of mental experience from one another in order to
lessen their emotional impact.

Isolation of affect The most commonly used form of ISOLATION, in

which an individual separates an idea, experience, or memory from
the feelings connected with it in order to lessen its emotional impact.

Latency A developmental phase of childhood (roughly between 5

and 12 years of age), originally identified by Sigmund Freud as the
period between the OEDIPAL STAGE and puberty, that is characterized
by a lull in active libidinal and aggressive DRIVES and an apparent rel-
ative reduction in sexual interest.

Latent dream thoughts The underlying content of the DREAM, made

up of unacceptable thoughts and feelings.

Libido The source of PSYCHIC ENERGY deriving from the organism’s sex-
ual WISHES, drawn from all levels of psychosexual development.

Libido theory Sigmund Freud’s theory about the origins, transfor-

mations, and effects of LIBIDO in the psychology of the individual and
of culture (see Chapter 9 and Appendix A).

Manifest dream The DREAM as recalled and narrated by the dreamer

upon awakening.

Materialism The belief that everything in the universe can be under-

stood in terms of the properties of matter and energy, and reduced to
descriptions expressed in measurements.

Mentalization The ability to understand the behavior of others in

terms of mental states such as beliefs, desires, feelings, and memo-
ries; the ability to reflect upon one’s own mental states; and, the abil-
ity to understand that one’s own states of mind may influence the
behavior of others. Also called reflective function.
Appendix C: Glossary 281

Mentalization-Based Treatment A therapy developed by Bateman

and Fonagy (see Chapter 11) that aims to treat severe personality dis-
orders through efforts to increase MENTALIZATION.

Mesmerism A theory and practice developed by Franz Anton Mes-

mer (see Chapter 2) based on his belief that disease was caused by
disturbances in the free flow of hypothesized invisible fluids in the
body and that the blocked flow could be corrected through magnetic
force (“animal magnetism”). Mesmer’s theory of cure proposed that
the therapist, or “magnetizer,” induce in the patient a trance-like
state and then transmit his own stronger and better fluid to the pa-
tient through the channel of the rapport.

Metacognition The process of thinking about one’s own thinking.

Midlife crisis A turning point in an individual’s life, occurring in

middle age, accompanied by emotional turmoil.

Mind An individual’s experience, CONSCIOUS or UNCONSCIOUS, of per-

ceiving, feeling, thinking, willing, and reasoning.

Mind–body dualism The view that the MIND and the body are two
entirely and essentially different things.

Mirroring selfobject In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a caregiver who offers rec-

ognition, validation, and enjoyment of the child’s GRANDIOSE SELF, so
that it can develop and mature properly.

Mirror neurons Neurons that fire when an individual performs an

action and when he or she sees someone else perform the same ac-
tion.

Mirror transference In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a situation in PSYCHOTHERAPY

in which the GRANDIOSE SELF is revived, so that the patient needs the
therapist to respond to him or her with recognition and validation.

Model An imaginary construction that represents a complex system

that cannot be observed directly in its entirety.

Motivational point of view In the psychoanalytic model of the

mind, the effort to understand the interplay of psychological forces,
or aims and strivings.

Narcissism An individual’s investment in him- or herself or an as-

pect of the self.
282 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Narcissistic rage In Kohut’s theory regarding DISORDERS OF THE SELF

(see Chapter 12), an extreme affective state—ranging from irritability
to fury and accompanied by feelings of SHAME, humiliation, and/or
disappointment—triggered by a perceived threat to the self.

Narrative sense of self The fifth stage in the development of the

self—beginning in the third or fourth year—in Stern’s theory (see
Chapter 12) about how the sense of self develops in interaction with
the mother/caregiver.

Narrative structure of the mind In the psychoanalytic model of the

mind, the understanding that mental life is shaped by stories.

Nature versus nurture The ongoing controversy about whether a

given phenomenon results from qualities that are intrinsic to the in-
dividual (nature) or from the effects of the external caregiving envi-
ronment (nurture).

Need-satisfying object The infant’s initial experience of the mater-

nal OBJECT, in which the OBJECT is experienced as existing only to meet
the infant’s needs.

Negative oedipus complex An oedipal interaction between child

and parents in which the child takes the same-sex parent as the love
object and the opposite-sex parent as the rival.

Neurosis A type of psychopathology characterized by inflexible,

maladaptive behavior that represents a solution to UNCONSCIOUS CON-
FLICT.

Object A person who is the focus of one’s WISHES and needs.

Object constancy The ability to maintain a positively tinged feeling

toward the mother (or anyone else) in the face of feelings of frustra-
tion, anger, and/or disappointment.

Object permanence The cognitive ability to know that an OBJECT (an-

imate or inanimate) exists even when it cannot be perceived.

Object relations A psychological configuration consisting of three

parts: a SELF REPRESENTATION, an OBJECT REPRESENTATION, and a REPRESEN-
TATION of an affectively charged interaction between the two.

Object Relations Theory A model of the mind characterized by ef-

forts to understand how OBJECT RELATIONS develop in childhood, how
they are maintained throughout life, how they interact with other
Appendix C: Glossary 283

STRUCTURES and motivations, and how they influence psychic func-

tioning and behavior.

Object representation The individual’s mental image of an OBJECT in

his or her life. The REPRESENTATION contains aspects of the actual exter-
nal OBJECT but is also colored by the individual’s FANTASIES about the
OBJECT.

Object seeking Libidinal aims that are directed toward another per-
son, as opposed to those directed toward the child’s own body (AU-
TOEROTIC).

Observing ego The part of the CONSCIOUS MIND that is capable of self-
reflection and is activated in treatment.

Oedipal period/stage The period (between the ages of 3 and 6 years)

during which the OEDIPUS COMPLEX emerges.

Oedipal victor A boy’s experience of having triumphed over his fa-

ther in obtaining his mother’s special affection, or a girl's experience
of having triumphed over her mother in obtaining her father's spe-
cial affection.

Oedipus complex A set of feelings and thoughts about the role of the
individual as a child in relation to his or her two parents, which in-
cludes the WISH for romantic union with one parent, along with a WISH
to be rid of the other, competing parent.

On the way to object constancy In Mahler’s theory (see Chapter

11), the final stage of SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION in which the child
learns to integrate positive and negative feelings/thoughts about the
mother.

Oral character A personality style characterized by greed, depen-

dency, demandingness, and impatience, thought to be related to the
predominant influence of LIBIDO arising from the oral EROTOGENIC
ZONE.

Oral phase The first phase of psychosexual development (consisting

of approximately the first 18 months of life), during which LIBIDO de-
riving from the oral EROTOGENIC ZONE dominates the organization of
psychic life.

Overdetermination The observations that any given manifestation

of mental life can be given multiple psychological explanations.
284 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Paranoid position In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), the earliest or-
ganization of the psyche, characterized by active SPLITTING of good
and bad aspects of experience, accompanied by PROJECTION (later, PRO-
JECTIVE IDENTIFICATION) of the bad aspects of experience onto the OBJECT.

Parapraxis A symptomatic act, is one of a number of cognitive or

functional errors such as slips of the tongue, forgetting of names or
words, slips of the pen, or bungled actions.

Part object In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), the experience of only
one aspect or attribute of an OBJECT, such as an all-good object or an
all-bad object.

Pathological grandiose self In Kernberg’s theory of narcissistic per-

sonality disorder (see Chapter 12), an organization of the SELF that
serves the defensive need to avoid dependency.

Pathological narcissism In Kernberg’s conceptualization (see

Chapter 12), the name given to narcissistic psychopathology, the core
feature of which is a structure called the PATHOLOGICAL GRANDIOSE SELF.

Penis envy According to Sigmund Freud, a girl’s or woman’s feeling

of discontent with her genitals, accompanied by a longing to have
the genitals of a male.

Persecutory anxiety In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), an individ-

ual’s fear that he or she is in danger of being destroyed by the bad
OBJECT, who has become the repository for all of his or her own pro-
jected AGGRESSION.

Phallic narcissistic character A personality style characterized by

exhibitionism and extreme gender role behavior, thought to be re-
lated to the predominant influence of LIBIDO arising from the phallic
EROTOGENIC ZONE.

Phallic phase The third phase of psychosexual development (begin-

ning at about 2 years of age and culminating in the OEDIPAL STAGE),
during which LIBIDO deriving from the phallus (penis or clitoris)
dominates the organization of psychic life. The phallic phase is often
called the early genital phase.

Physical determinism The belief that events in the material world

are caused by other events in the material world.

Pleasure/unpleasure principle A principle that asserts that behav-

ior and mental activity seek always to maximize feelings of pleasure
and minimize feelings of unpleasure or pain.
Appendix C: Glossary 285

Position In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), a stable configuration of

SELF and OBJECT REPRESENTATIONS resulting from the combined influence
of WISHES, thoughts, and feelings as well as interactions with caregiv-
ers.

Positive oedipus complex An oedipal interaction between child

and parents in which the child takes the opposite-sex parent as the
love object and the same-sex parent as the rival.

Positivism A program for systematizing all knowledge of the world

based on undeniable truths and often empirical methods as well.

Practicing In Mahler’s theory (see Chapter 11), a subphase of the SEP-

ARATION-INDIVIDUATION process in which the child experiments with
distance by moving away from the mother, enjoying his or her newly
developed capacities for crawling and walking.

Preconscious In Freud’s TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL, one of the three compo-

nents (with CONSCIOUS and UNCONSCIOUS) of the mental apparatus. El-
ements of the preconscious are not conscious but are easily brought
into conscious awareness through focusing attention on them.

Preoedipal period/stage The period of development from birth to

the onset of the OEDIPAL PERIOD (between the ages of 3 and 6 years).

Primal scene The childhood perception of parental sexual inter-

course, whether actually observed, actually overheard, or only imag-
ined, and the meaning the child attaches to it.

Primary femininity A view of female development that asserts that

the earliest sense of being female is not based on CONFLICT or is not a
response to feeling inferior.

Primary process A primitive form of thinking linked with the PLEA-

SURE PRINCIPLE and characterized by reliance on SYMBOLIZATION, DIS-
PLACEMENT, and CONDENSATION, as well as by a disregard for logical
connections, for contradictions, and for the realities of time. The con-
tent of primary process is dominated by WISHES, AFFECTS, CONFLICT,
and/or UNCONSCIOUS FANTASY. In Freud’s TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL, primary
process is associated with the UNCONSCIOUS domain of the MIND.

Primitive idealization A DEFENSE in which an individual splits apart

exalted and devalued aspects of another individual, experiencing
only the exalted aspect, so as to ward off feelings associated with the
devalued aspect, or to enhance his or her own experience of self.
286 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Projection A DEFENSE in which an individual attributes an unaccept-

able or intolerable idea, impulse, or feeling to another individual.

Projective identification An INTERPERSONAL DEFENSE in which an indi-

vidual transfers parts of the SELF onto the OBJECT in order to rid him-
or herself of those parts and to control the OBJECT from inside.

Psychic determinism The belief that psychological events are

caused by other psychological events, transformed according to nat-
ural laws, or that psychological life is lawfully determined.

Psychic energy In Sigmund Freud's theory, the force behind all men-
tal activity.

Psychic reality Subjective psychological experience, understood as

the result of the continuous interaction between inner WISHES and
fears and the external world.

Psychoanalysis A branch of PSYCHOLOGY, introduced by Sigmund

Freud, which includes a MODEL of the MIND, a treatment, and a method
for exploring inner life. The psychoanalytic model of the mind ex-
plores mental life along topographic, motivational, structural, and
developmental parameters, and examines the contributions of this
model to the understanding of psychopathology and treatment.

Psychodynamic Pertaining to mental forces or motivations.

Psychology The study of MIND and behavior.

Psychosexual phases The phases of development introduced as

part of LIBIDO THEORY, which posits a series of sequential, overlapping
phases in the developing infant and child—oral, anal, phallic, and
genital—each representing predominant sensual investment in a dif-
ferent EROTOGENIC ZONE.

Psychotherapy The treatment of mental disorder by psychological

rather than medical means.

Rapprochement In Mahler’s theory of SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION (see

Chapter 11), a subphase marked by conflicting feelings of depen-
dence and outrage, brought on by new awareness of SEPARATION from
the mother.

Rapprochement crisis In Mahler’s theory of SEPARATION-INDIVIDUA-

TION (see Chapter 11), the CONFLICT felt by the child during the sub-
phase of RAPPROCHEMENT between WISHES to depend upon the mother
Appendix C: Glossary 287

and WISHES for autonomy, often accompanied by feelings of anger and

wide fluctuations in mood.

Rationalization A DEFENSE in which an individual resorts to seem-

ingly reasonable explanations to account for feelings or actions,
thereby avoiding recognition of more painful feelings and/or moti-
vations.

Reaction formation A DEFENSE in which an individual transforms a

forbidden WISH into its opposite.

Reality principle A principle that asserts that behavior and mental

activity will take the constraints of the external world into account,
even when seeking pleasure.

Reality testing The capacity to understand aspects of external real-

ity, beginning with the capacity to differentiate between reality and
FANTASY.

Reconstruction In INTERPRETATION made by the therapist that makes

an inference about a forgotten or repressed aspect of the past.

Reflective function See MENTALIZATION.

Regression A change in psychological phenomena in a direction that

is the reverse of its usual, progressive direction. For example, an in-
dividual may substitute a pleasure from an earlier stage of develop-
ment for one from a later stage, as a DEFENSE against the danger felt to
be part of the later stage.

Regression in the service of the ego A form of REGRESSION that, al-

though it may be originally instituted for defensive purposes, leads
to a more innovative and adaptive mental function and organization
(as in artistic creation).

Reparation In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), an individual’s at-

tempts to relieve GUILT or ANXIETY experienced for having had aggres-
sive WISHES toward a loved and needed OBJECT by making efforts to
repair the imagined damage or harm done by those aggressive im-
pulses.

Repetition compulsion A tendency to repeat patterns of behavior or

to re-create situations that may be painful or self-destructive without
recognizing the relationship of these behaviors/scenarios to early re-
pressed WISHES or FANTASIES.
288 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Representation A stable psychological structure inside the mind

that stands for something that is or was outside of the mind. In the
psychoanalytic model of the mind, the term usually refers to inter-
nalized images of SELF, OBJECT, and interactions between self and ob-
ject.

Repression A DEFENSE in which an individual excludes unacceptable

thoughts and feelings from CONSCIOUSNESS.

Resistance A phenomenon in PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY in which

the patient evinces a noticeable discontinuity in the flow of associa-
tion.

Return of the repressed A phenomenon, thought to underlie NEU-

ROSIS, in which unacceptable ideas that have been repressed reemerge
in the form of symptoms.

Schema In general PSYCHOLOGY, a word referring to a structure, or a

relatively stable psychological configuration.

Schizophrenogenic mothering In now-discredited theories, a qual-

ity of mothering thought to be the cause of schizophrenia.

Secondary process A type of thinking linked with the REALITY PRINCI-

PLE and characterized by rationality, order, and logic. In Freud’s TOP-
OGRAPHIC MODEL, secondary process is associated with the
PRECONSCIOUS and CONSCIOUS domains of the MIND.

Seduction hypothesis Sigmund Freud’s early theory of HYSTERIA (see

Chapter 7), which posited that symptoms are caused by sexual acts
perpetrated on the child by caretakers.

Self A psychic STRUCTURE, or REPRESENTATION, consisting of the individ-

ual’s subjective sense of “I.” In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, the superordinate
STRUCTURE of the MIND.

Self constancy The ability to maintain a positive SELF REPRESENTATION

even in the face of failure or other threats to self-esteem.

Selfobject In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, another person who serves the pur-

pose of maintaining or supporting the SELF.

Selfobject transference In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, any one of a number of

TRANSFERENCES activated in PSYCHOTHERAPY in which SELFOBJECT needs
are reactivated in relation to the therapist.
Appendix C: Glossary 289

Self Psychology A model of the mind based on the development and

functioning of the self.

Self representation The individual’s mental image of himself or

herself. This REPRESENTATION is made up of experiences of internal
stimuli, FANTASIES about the SELF that are elaborated in relation to OB-
JECTS, and internalized perceptions of the way in which others expe-
rience the individual.

Self–selfobject matrix In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, the combination of an in-

dividual and another person who serves the purpose of maintaining
or supporting the SELF, originally the infant and the primary care-
giver.

Self-state dreams In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, DREAMS that represent the state

of the self of the dreamer.

Separation In Mahler’s theory of SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION (see Chap-

ter 11), the process by which children form a mental REPRESENTATION of
the SELF as distinct from the mental REPRESENTATION of the OBJECT.

Separation anxiety A type of ANXIETY that appears in infants of about

6 months of age in response to being too far away from the mother or
the primary caregiver.

Separation-individuation A developmental process proposed by

Mahler (see Chapter 11) in which the child must form a mental REPRE-
SENTATION of the SELF as distinct from the mental REPRESENTATION of the
OBJECT (SEPARATION) and must develop specific characteristics so that
the SELF not only becomes distinct from the OBJECT but also becomes
unique and autonomous (INDIVIDUATION).

Sexuality/psychosexuality The search for sensual bodily pleasure

in all its forms.

Shame A feeling of badness or ANXIETY linked to an individual’s

awareness that others may see him or her to be bad or inferior.

Signal affect An attenuated version of the experience of an AFFECT (ei-

ther pleasure or pain) remembered from the past that is used by the
EGO in appraisal of the current potential for danger. Also called signal
anxiety.

Signal anxiety See SIGNAL AFFECT.

290 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Somatic marker hypothesis A hypothesis formulated by Damasio

(see Chapter 10) that explains how emotional processes guide hu-
man behavior, choices, and decision making.

Somatization A DEFENSE in which an individual expresses unaccept-

able feelings in the form of physical symptoms, so as to lessen their
painful impact.

Splitting A DEFENSE in which an individual separates contradictory,

conflicting CONSCIOUS experiences, thereby preventing their integra-
tion, so as to prevent the emotional impact of integration.

Stranger anxiety A type of ANXIETY that appears in infants of about

6 months of age in response to the presence of persons who are not
the mother or the primary caretaker.

Strange Situation An experimental situation designed by Ains-

worth (see Chapter 11) in which the child is observed playing while
caregivers and strangers who enter and leave the room, thus reveal-
ing his or her ATTACHMENT pattern.

Structuralism A branch on PSYCHOLOGY that attempts to delineate the

structures of the CONSCIOUS MIND.

Structural Model Sigmund Freud’s second psychoanalytic model of

the mind (see Chapter 8), based on the division of the psyche into
three parts: EGO, ID, and SUPEREGO.

Structural point of view In the psychoanalytic model of the mind,

the effort to understand aspects of behavior and mental life by ex-
ploring the influence of three STRUCTURES: EGO, ID, and SUPEREGO.

Structure A relatively stable psychological configuration with a slow

rate of change.

Subjective sense of self The third stage in the development of the

self—beginning around 9 months—in Stern’s theory (see Chapter 12)
about how the sense of self develops in interaction with the mother/
caregiver.

Sublimation A DEFENSE in which the individual deflects a WISH from

its original aim to one with a higher social value.

Suggestion The phenomenon by which an idea proposed from out-

side the mind (or by one part of the mind) is taken up inside the mind
(or by another part of the mind) and often then transformed into an
action.
Appendix C: Glossary 291

Superego In Sigmund Freud’s STRUCTURAL MODEL, one of three major

agencies of the MIND and the seat of the individual’s system of ideals
and values, moral principles, and moral injunctions. Commonly
called the conscience.

Suppression A DEFENSE in which an individual consciously places un-

pleasant thoughts or feelings out of awareness.

Symbolization A phenomenon in which an OBJECT or idea is repre-

sented by an image or something equally concrete.

Talking cure A slang name for any type of therapeutic intervention,

usually PSYCHOTHERAPY, that emphasizes shared narrative in an inter-
action.

Theory of mind The capacity to understand that 1) others have be-

liefs, desires, and intentions, which constitute a “mind”; 2) this mind
may be different from one’s own; and 3) this mind causes others’ ac-
tions.

Therapeutic alliance The aspect of the relationship between patient

and therapist that reflects the patient’s capacity to sustain coopera-
tive effort, independent of state of the TRANSFERENCE or RESISTANCE.

Topographic Model Sigmund Freud’s first psychoanalytic model of

the mind (see Chapter 5), based on a division of the psyche into three
parts: CONSCIOUS, PRECONSCIOUS, and UNCONSCIOUS.

Topographic point of view In the psychoanalytic model of the

mind, the effort to understand aspects of behavior and mental life by
examining whether those aspects have access to CONSCIOUSNESS.

Transference A phenomenon in which an UNCONSCIOUS WISH “trans-

fers” some of its intensity to an unobjectionable PRECONSCIOUS thought
so as to avoid CENSORSHIP. More commonly, the clinical phenomenon
in which a patient transfers strong feelings from someone of emo-
tional importance (often from childhood) to the therapist.

Transference-Focused Psychotherapy A type of PSYCHOTHERAPY de-

signed to treat BORDERLINE PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION, based on Kern-
berg’s theory (see Chapter 11).

Transitional object In Winnicott’s theory (see Chapter 12), a trea-

sured possession such as a teddy bear or a blanket that the child ex-
periences as both “me” and “not me” simultaneously.
292 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Tripartite Model Another name for Sigmund Freud’s STRUCTURAL

MODEL, emphasizing the fact that there are three structures: EGO, ID,
and SUPEREGO.

True self In Winnicott’s theory (see Chapter 12), the self experience—
incorporating one’s own needs, expectations, and demands—that
emerges in the context of a facilitating maternal environment.

Turning against the self A DEFENSE in which an individual directs an

unacceptable WISH, usually aggressive, from another individual to-
ward him- or herself.

Turning passive into active A DEFENSE in which an individual acts

out an experience of having been a passive participant in an interac-
tion by assuming the active role, thereby avoiding feelings and/or
memories of being out of control or helpless.

Twinship transference In SELF PSYCHOLOGY, a situation in PSYCHOTHER-

APY in which the patient demands or expects that he or she and the
therapist are exactly the same, thereby attempting to strengthen the
self.

Unconscious That part of the MIND that is outside of awareness.

Undoing A DEFENSE in which an individual negates unacceptable sex-

ual, aggressive, or shameful feelings associated with a previous be-
havior by doing or saying the opposite.

Verbal/categorical sense of self The fourth stage in the develop-

ment of the self—beginning around 18 months—in Stern’s theory
(see Chapter 12) about how the sense of self develops in interaction
with the mother/caregiver.

Whole object In Klein’s theory (see Chapter 11), the experience of an-
other person as complete and/or integrated, especially in terms of
his or her good and bad aspects.

Wish An act of desire or a motivational aim.

Bibliography
Auchincloss EL, Samberg E: Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts. New Haven,
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Gabbard GO, Litowitz BE, Williams P (eds): Textbook of Psychoanalysis, 2nd
Edition. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012
Index
Page numbers printed in boldface type refer to tables;
page numbers followed by “n” indicate note numbers.

Abraham, Karl, 151–152 Alien self (Fonagy), and failure of

Activation-synthesis hypothesis, of affect mirroring, 228, 232, 233,
dream formation (Hobson and 270
McCarley), 100, 269 Anal character, 152, 262, 270
Adaptation, as ego capacity, Anal phase, 150, 262, 270
132–135, 138, 269 Anal zone, 150, 262
Adaptational perspective, in Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim), 28–29
psychoanalytic model of the Anxiety, 271
mind, 60, 63, 269 castration, 110, 111, 271
Adolescence depressive, 171, 195, 199, 274
in Anna Freud’s developmental persecutory, 194, 225, 284
stages, 193 separation, 171, 198, 203, 289
in psychosexual phases of signal, 171, 180, 289
development, 150, 162, 163 stranger, 171, 198, 201, 290
as “second separation- Appraisal, in conflict mediation,
individuation,” 199 169–172
Adult Attachment Interview (Main), Aristotle, 40
201–202, 269 Attachment, 270
Affects, 170, 269–270 behavioral system (Bowlby), 200,
cognition and, 11 271
isolation of, 265 definition of (Bowlby), 200
signal, in appraisal, 170, 172, 180, patterns of (Ainsworth and Main)
289 anxious-avoidant, 201
Affect mirroring, in development of anxious-resistant, 201
the self, 228, 270 disorganized/disoriented, 202
Affect tolerance, 270 secure, 201
as ego function, 133, 134, 177, 179, theory (Bowlby), 200–201
196, 274, 275 working models of (Bowlby),
in development of mentalization, 200–201
228, 229 Attachment behavioral system
Aggression, 148, 153, 161, 270 (Bowlby), 200, 271
Aggressive drive, 146, 152–153, 270 Attachment theory (Bowlby),
Ainsworth, Mary, 201–202. 200–201, 271
See also Object relations theory Augustine, 42

293
294 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Autistic phase, in Mahler’s theory of Carpenter, William Benjamin, 44n6

separation-individuation, 197, Case example, of conflict mediation
197n3 and compromise formation,
Autonomous ego functions 174–175, 176, 179
(Hartmann), 137, 138, 271 Caspi, Avshalom, 203
Average expectable environment Castration anxiety, 110, 111, 271
(Hartmann), 137, 271 Cathartic method (Breuer), 28–29, 271
Censor/censorship, in topographic
Behaviorism, 271 model, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 88, 89,
emergence of, 47–48, 59 95, 97, 103, 131, 132, 133, 139,
Bernays, Martha, 27 148, 156, 167, 272. See also
Bernheim, Hippolyte, 17, 20, 22–23 Repression; Transference
Binet, Alfred, 17 evasion of, through disguise, 78,
Biological model of the mind, 95, 97
254–255 override of, in free association, 30
Bion, Wilfred, 65, 195–196, 210, relaxation of, in dreams and
228–229. See also Ego parapraxes, 79, 95
psychology; Structural model Character, 135, 175, 262, 272.
Biopsychosocial model (Engel), 4 See also Personality
Bisexuality, innate. concept of, 176–177
See Innate bisexuality disorders of, 175, 177–178, 272
Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Charcot, Jean-Martin, 17, 20–22
Thinking (Gladwell), 49 Sigmund Freud and, 27
Bloom, Paul, 161 Child. See also Oedipus complex
Body, inseparability from mind, 10–11 fear of judgment/punishment, 158
Borderline personality disorder, 153, libido and, 150
204, 206, 207–208, 210, 228 mind of developing, 113–115
Borderline personality organization in preoedipal period of
(BPO), 205–206, 224, 271 development, 115, 150, 162,
Bowlby, John, 65, 193, 200–201, 210. 192, 203, 285
See also Attachment; Object superego and, 157–159
relations theory Claus, Carl, 25
BPO. See Borderline personality Co-created experience, in relational
organization theory, 208–209, 272
Braid, James, 19 Cognitive-behavioral therapy, 49
Brain, psychoanalytic models and, Cognitive neuroscience, areas of
9–12 parallel development and points
Breuer, Josef, 15, 17, 27 of convergence with
cathartic method of (Anna O.), psychoanalytic model of the
28–29 mind
Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and autonomous ego functions and
S. Freud) 28 cognitive systems, 138
theories on hysteria, 31–32 dream theory, 100–102
Briquet, Paul, 18n1 narrative structure of the mind,
British Middle School (Independent 12
Group), 196n2 nature and function of
Broca, Paul Pierre, 17, 19–20 consciousness, 87
Brucke, Ernst, 25 reward/appraisal systems and
Bulkeley, Kelly, 102 fear signals, 147, 169, 171–172
Index 295

study of the self, 229–230 Container/contained (Bion), 195–196,

theory of mind (ToM), 7–9 208, 211, 229, 253, 273
theory of moral development, Conversion, as defense mechanism,
160, 161 173, 267, 273.
unconscious mental functioning, See also Somatization
50–52 Conversion disorder, 81, 262
Cognitive unconscious, 49, 50, 86, Core dimensions, of psychoanalytic
272 models of the mind, 57–66, 67
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 44 integrated chart of, 240–243
Compromise/compromise reverse-axis chart of, 246–249
formation, 61, 167–185, 272. Countertransference, in object
See also Structural model relations theory, 208, 210, 211, 273
conflict mediation and, 169–174 The Course in Positive Philosophy
appraisal (signal affect/signal (Comte), 25n2
anxiety) 169–172 Cullen, William, 80
defense, 172–174 Culture
contribution to theory of in ego development, 137
psychopathology and in libido theory, 149, 262
therapeutic action in
structural model, 175–180 Damasio, Antonio, 11, 12, 228
case example of, 174–175, 176, 179 somatic marker hypothesis of,
maladaptive, as source of 172, 290
neurotic psychopathology Danger situations, 171, 180, 181, 191,
and character disorders, 136, 273
175, 177, 180, 181 Darwin, Charles, 52
Comte, Auguste, 25–26, 25n2 Daydreams
Condensation, 272. as example of narrative quality of
See Primary process fantasy in mental life, 120
Conflict, 272. See also Compromise/ as example of unconscious
compromise formation; penetrating into conscious
Structural model life, 76, 121
intersystemic/intrasystemic, 168, of primal scene, 114
279 Day residue, in psychoanalytic
mediation of, 50, 134, 169–174, dream theory, 95, 96, 103, 273
180, 191 Defense/Defenses, 205–206, 263–268,
case example illustrating, 273. See also Defense versus deficit
174–175, 176, 179 theories of psychopathology
mind in, 168–169 analysis, 178
psychic, 60–61, 134, 206 concepts from general
Conflict theory, 130, 273. psychology, 173
See also Structural model definition of, 134, 172–173
Conscience, 110, 111, 116, 122, 123, ego and, 172–174
130, 156, 157–158, 159, 162. habitual modes of, 179–180
See also Superego Kernberg’s classification of, 263
Conscious, in topographic model, 64, mechanisms, 173, 263–268, 273
72, 273 mature, 263–264
Consciousness, 273 neurotic, 264–266
as mind, 40–41 primitive, 266–267
nature and function of, 85–87 Vaillant’s classification of, 263
296 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Defense/conflict model of borderline Disorders of the self, 220, 224, 232,

personality organization 233, 274. See also Self psychology
(Kernberg), 206–207 Kohut’s theory of, 221–222
Defense mechanisms, 173, 263–268, Displacement, 75, 97, 173, 264, 262, 274
273. See also Defense/Defenses Domhoff, G. William, 102
Defense versus deficit theories of Dreams, 79, 85, 93–105, 121, 231, 274.
psychopathology See also Topographic model
about borderline personality definition of, 93
organization, 206–207, 226 exploration of, in psychodynamic
about ego weakness, 177–178, 180 psychiatry, 97–98
about narcissistic personality The Interpretation of Dreams and,
disorder, 226 98–99
Defensive style, 176–177, 180, 263, manifest, 95, 279
274 meaning of, 102
Deficit, 274 psychoanalytic theory of, 94–97
models/theories of psychodynamic dream theory
psychopathology, 177–178, and neuroscience, 100–102
180, 181, 206–207, 226 self-state, 97, 221, 231, 289
Deficit/developmental failure model Dream work, in psychoanalytic
of borderline personality dream theory, 95, 275
organization, 206–207 Drives, 62, 73, 130, 146, 147–153, 275.
Depressive anxiety, in object See also Id; Libido;
relations theory (Klein), 171, Psychosexuality
195, 199, 274 aggressive, 146, 152–153
Depressive position, in object role in human motivation, 154–156
relations theory (Klein), 194, sexual, 148–152
195, 199, 206, 211, 274 Drive theory, 147–153, 275.
Descartes, René, 40–41, 51 See also Id; Structural model
Sigmund Freud and, 42–47 DSM system (American Psychiatric
Descriptive unconscious, 49, 72, 138, Association), 80, 176
274. See also Preconscious DSM-5, 206, 222, 232
Developmental point of view, 62–63, du Bois-Reymond, Emil, 19, 25
274 Dynamic unconscious, 275.
in object relations theory, 210, 211 See also Unconscious;
compared with topographic Topographic model
and structural models, 192 evolution of, 35–55
in self psychology, 231, 233 Sigmund Freud’s discovery of, 15,
compared with structural 30–32, 59
model and object relations in topographic model, 71, 73–74,
theory, 223–224 79, 80, 82, 84, 94, 108, 121, 132
in structural model, 140, 141, 162, in unified psychoanalytic model
163 of the mind, 245
in topographic model, 72, 76–77,
88, 89, 122, 123 Ego, 129–130, 132–135, 275.
in unified psychoanalytic model See also Ego psychology; Freud,
of the mind, 248, 251 Sigmund; Structural model
Differentiation subphase, of functions of, 113–114, 133–135, 275
separation-individuation autonomous (Hartmann), 137,
(Mahler), 197–198, 274 138, 271
Index 297

relationship with id, 146–147 Experimental psychology, 16, 26, 39,

strengths, 135, 140, 141, 275 43, 45n7, 138, 139
weaknesses, 135, 140, 141, Externalization, versus
175–178, 276 internalization, 135
The Ego and the Id (S. Freud), 129
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense Fairbairn, Ronald, 193n1
(A. Freud), 136 False self (Winnicott), and lack of
Ego functions. See Ego facilitating maternal
Ego ideal, 156, 160, 161, 162, 163, 221, environment, 228, 232, 233, 276
275. See also Superego Fantasy, 119–120, 153, 276
Ego identity (Erikson), 137, 140, 141, Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 43, 45n7
227, 275 Feelings. See Affects
Ego psychology, 7, 64–65, 130, 275. Fisher, Charles, 100
See also Structural model Fixation, 111, 117, 151, 262, 276
and birth of object relations fMRI. See functional magnetic
theory, 189, 193, 196, 199, 204, resonance imaging
219 Fonagy, Peter, 206–207, 210, 228–229,
and theories of well-known ego 232. See also Object relations
psychologists, 136–137, 138 theory
Anna Freud, 137 Foot, Philippa, and “trolley problem,”
Erik Erikson, 137, 140, 141, 206, 161
227 Free association, 30, 31, 36, 83, 89, 277
Heinz Hartmann, 136–137 Freud, Anna, 65, 136, 173, 193, 195,
Ego Psychology and the Problem of 199, 210. See also Ego psychology;
Adaptation (Hartmann), 136–137 Object relations theory
Electra complex, as alternative to versus Melanie Klein, 195
oedipus complex, 118 Freud, Sigmund, 10, 23–32, 71–72,
Ellenberger, Henri, 17, 46–47 77n2. See also Id; Oedipus
Ellis, Havelock, 17 complex; Structural model;
Embodiment, 10–11, 155–156, 276 Topographic model
Empathy, 224, 230, 231, 232, 233, 276 abandonment of hypnosis and
from caregiver, 65, 220–221, discovery of the dynamic
223–224, 226, 227 unconscious, 30–32
from therapist, 223, 224, 225, 225, biography of, 23–25
226, 227 descriptive unconscious, 49
lack of, in narcissistic personality drive theory, 147–153
disorder, 224 early theory of hysteria, 286
as superego function, 157 The Ego and the Id, 129
Engel, George, 4 The Interpretation of Dreams, 94,
Envy, 112, 117, 194, 195, 209, 253, 276 98–99, 120
Epigenesis, 62–63, 276 Josef Breuer’s cathartic method,
Erikson, Erik, 67, 137, 206, 227. 28–29
See also Ego psychology; Jean-Martin Charcot and, 27
Structural model René Descartes and, 42–47
concept of ego identity, 137, 140, as neuropathologist, 25–27
141, 227 psychoanalytic model
eight-stage theory of human construction by, 6
development, 137 Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and
Erotogenic zones, 150, 262, 276 S. Freud), 28
298 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Functionalism, 39–40, 277. Hedonic principle, 59–60, 277

See also James, William Helmholtz, Hermann von, 19, 25, 39
Functional magnetic resonance Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 42–43
imaging (fMRI), in studies of Hippocrates, 19
theory of mind (ToM, 9 Hobson, John Allan, 100
“Fundamental rule,” 30, 88, 277 Holding environment (Winnicott),
196, 208, 211, 227, 277
Gabbard, Glen, 209 Home, Henry (Lord Kanes), 43n5
Galen, 19 Homeostasis, as ego function, 130,
Galton, Francis, 17 132–133, 138, 139, 140, 141, 168,
Gender development and 245, 277
homosexuality, 116–118. Homosexuality, gender
See also Oedipus complex development and, 116–118.
Genetic perspective, 62, 277 See also Oedipus complex
Genital phase, 150, 152, 262, 277 Hughlings Jackson, John, 17, 20
Genital zone, 150 Hypnosis, 278
Gestalt psychology, 38n1 Sigmund Freud’s abandonment
Gladwell, Malcolm, 49 of, 30–32
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 44 historic origins, 19–23, 27, 29
Golgi, Camillo, 19 Hysteria, 18, 18n1, 19–23, 27–32,
Good-enough mother (Winnicott), 278
196, 197–198, 211, 227, 277 Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and
Grandiose self, 277 S. Freud), 28
in disorders of the self (Kohut),
221–223 Id, 64–65, 130, 145–156, 146n1, 278.
Kohut versus Kernberg on See also Freud, Sigmund;
narcissistic personality Structural model
disorder, 224–226 contribution of the drives to
in normal narcissistic line of theory of psychopathology
development, 220, 221, 231, 233 and therapeutic action in the
pathological (Kernberg), 225, 272, structural model, 153
232, 233, 284 Sigmund Freud’s drive theory,
Griesinger, Wilhelm, 20 147–153
Groddeck, Georg, 146n1 aggressive drive, 152–153
Guilt, 277 sexual drive, 148–152
associated with oedipus complex, libido and psychosexuality,
111, 119, 122 148–149
exploration in psychodynamic psychosexual stages of
psychotherapy, 160 development, 150–152
from superego disapproval, 156, relationship with ego, 146–147
171 role of the drives in human
in superego psychopathology, motivation, 154–156
159 Idealized parental imago, in
development of self, 220, 221,
Hamilton, Sir William, 44n6 222, 231, 232, 233, 278
Hartmann, Heinz, 136–137, 138, 199. Identification(s), as ego function,
See also Ego psychology; 111, 122, 123, 135, 140, 278
Structural model Identification with the aggressor,
Hartmann, Karl Robert Eduard von, 46 173, 267, 278
Index 299

Identity diffusion, in borderline Just Babies: The Origins of Good and

personality organization, 206, Evil (Bloom), 161
227, 278
Imprinting, 201, 278 Kames, Henry Home, Lord, 43n5
Infantile sexuality, 76, 88, 150–151, Kernberg, Otto, 65, 204–207, 263.
162, 262, 279. See also Object relations theory
See also Oedipal stage; classification of personality
Preoedipal stage disorders, 205
Innate bisexuality (S. Freud), and conceptualization of borderline
development of gender personality organization,
orientation, 110–111, 117 205–206, 227
Insight, and psychodynamic conceptualization of narcissistic
psychotherapy, 84, 88, 89, 192, personality disorder, 225–226,
208, 210, 224, 279 227, 232, 233
Internalization, 279 versus Kohut, 225, 226, 232,
in object relations theory, 190, 233
193–194, 195 Klein, Melanie, 65, 173, 193–195,
in self psychology, 221 196n2, 199, 206.
in structural model See also Object relations theory
as ego function, 135, 140, 141 versus Anna Freud, 195
in superego development, 157, Kohut, Heinz, 65, 97, 219–223.
160 See also Self psychology
versus externalization, 135 theory of adult psychopathology,
Internal working models of 221–222
attachment, 200, 207, 209, 279 versus Kernberg on
International Association for the narcissistic personality
Study of Dreams, 102 disorder, 224–226, 232, 233
Interpretation, as therapeutic theory of therapeutic action,
technique in psychodynamic 222–223, 229
psychotherapy, 84, 88, 89, 192, Krafft-Ebing, Richard Freiherr von, 17
208–209, 223, 224, 287
The Interpretation of Dreams Lakoff, George, 11
(S. Freud), 6, 71, 94, 98–99, 108, Latency, 150, 162, 163, 280
120, 121 Layrock, Thomas, 44n6
Introspection, 16, 24, 37–38, 39, 47, Learned expectations, concept of, 171
51, 57, 86. 156, 223, 280 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 42, 43n5
Introspectionism, 39–40, 47, 280. Libido, 145–152, 161, 280.
See also Wundt, Wilhelm See also Drives; Id; Libido theory
Isolation, as defense, 173, 177, 280 Libido theory, 146, 149, 261, 262, 280
Isolation of affect, as defense Liébeault, Ambroise-Auguste, 22
mechanism, 179, 265, 280 Lindner, Gustav Adolf, 46
Lorenz, Konrad, 201, 277
James, William, 39 Ludwig, Carl, 25
Janet, Pierre, 21, 31
Johnson, Mark, 11 Mahler, Margaret, 65, 196–199,
Jokes 197n3, 227.
as disguised aggression, 153 See also Object relations theory
as parapraxes, 76, 121 Main, Mary, 201–202.
Jung, Carl Gustav, 109–110, 131 See also Object relations theory
300 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Manifest dream, in psychoanalytic in attachment theory (Bowlby),

dream theory, 95, 103, 280 200–201
MBT. See Mentalization-based as container for infant’s chaotic
treatment experience (Bion), 195–196
McCarley, Robert W., 100 as creator of holding environment
McHugh, Paul, 4 (Winnicott), 196
Mentalization (Fonagy), 169, 207, in development of affect tolerance,
280 228–229
capacity for, 228 in development of mentalization
Mentalization-based treatment (Fonagy), 228
(MBT), 207, 281 in development of object
Mesmer, Franz Anton, 17–18 constancy (Mahler), 199
Mesmerism, 18, 19, 281 empathic responsiveness of, 220
Metacognition, 50, 86, 169–170, 281 good-enough (Winnicott), 196, 276
Meynert, Theodor, 27 in oedipus complex, 110
Midlife crisis, as threat to object schizophrenogenic, 95, 197n3, 285
constancy, 199, 279 in separation-individuation
Milrod, Barbara, 203 (Mahler), 198
Mind, 10–11, 281. in Stern’s stages of self
See also Psychoanalytic models development, 228
of the mind Motivated forgetting, 100, 102, 173.
appraisal system of, 169–170 See also Repression
as consciousness, 40–41 Motivational point of view, 59–61,
definition of, 3–4 148, 281
embodiment of, 10–11 in object relations theory, 209, 211
as emergent property of brain, 4 compared with topographic
modeling and models of, 3–12 and structural models, 192
theory of (ToM), 7–9, 291 in self psychology, 231, 233
Mind–body dualism, 41, 281 compared with structural
Model, 5–7, 281. model and object relations
See also Psychoanalytic model of theory, 223
the mind in structural model, 139, 141, 161,
Morality, 156–157 163, 180, 181
attitudes toward, exploration in in topographic model, 73–74, 87,
psychodynamic 89, 103, 89, 104, 122, 123
psychotherapy, 112, 160 in unified psychoanalytic model
developmental lines of, 62, 162 of the mind, 245, 246
Nietzsche’s ideas about, 45–46 “Motive of defense,” 31, 59, 172, 245
and superego development,
156–159, 161, 162 Nancy School, 22–23.
theories from general psychology See also Psychotherapy
and cognitive neuroscience, Narcissism, 65, 220, 281
160–161 Narcissistic needs, 65, 223, 224
in topographic model vs. in Narcissistic personality disorder
structural model, 156–157 (NPD).
Mother. See also Attachment; See also Disorders of the self
Attachment theory in DSM-5, 222, 232
and affect mirroring, 227, 228, Kohut versus Kernberg on,
232, 270 224–226, 232, 233
Index 301

Narcissistic rage (Kohut), 222, 223, comparison with topographic

225, 282 and structural models,
Narcissistic strivings, 220, 223, 224, 191–192
227, 231, 232. See also Selfobject contributions of object relations
Narcissistic transference, 222. theorists to self psychology,
See also Selfobject 227–229
mobilization of, 232, 233 history of, 193–202
Narrative structure of the mind, 12, Mary Ainsworth, 201–202
119–120, 122, 131–132, 282 Wilfred Bion, 195–196
National Institute of Mental Health John Bowlby, 200–201
Research Domain Criteria, 9n2, Anna Freud, 193
138, 147, 171n1, 203, 230 versus Melanie Klein, 195
Need-satisfying object (A. Freud), Otto Kernberg, 204–207
193, 199, 211, 282 classification of personality
Neurone doctrine, 19, 26 disorders, 205
Neurosis, 80–83, 224, 262, 282 conceptualization of
New Essays Concerning Human borderline personality
Understanding (Leibniz), 42
organization, 205–206
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 45–46
defense/conflict model of
NPD. See Narcissistic personality
disorder borderline
psychopathology,
Object constancy, 198–200, 210, 211, 206–207
282 Melanie Klein, 193–195
in Anna Freud’s developmental versus Anna Freud, 193
stages, 193 Margaret Mahler, 196–198
attainment of, as index of mature Mary Main, 201–202
object relations, 202, 205 D.W. Winnicott, 195–196
inability to attain/maintain, as importance of object constancy in,
root of severe personality 198–200
disorders, 200, 204, 205, 207 overview of, 189–190
“on the way to object constancy” points of view in
subphase of separation- developmental, 192, 210, 211
individuation (Mahler), 197, motivational, 192, 209, 211
198, 199, 283 structural, 192, 209, 211
role of mother in development of, topographic, 191–192, 209,
199 211
Object permanence, and object terms and concepts in, 190–191
constancy, 198–199, 282 theory of psychopathology in,
Object relations. See Object relations 192, 202–204, 210, 211
theory theory of therapeutic action in,
Object relations theory, 64, 65, 192, 207–209, 210, 211
189–217, 193n1, 282 Object representation, 190, 192, 198,
chart of core dimensions for, 65, 200, 209, 283
66, 67, 209–210, 211, 242, Oedipal fears, 122, 123.
246–250 See also Castration anxiety
comparison with self psychology, Oedipal period/stage, 150, 157, 162,
223–224 283
302 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Oedipus complex, 107–125, 283. Pathological grandiose self, 225, 232,

See also Freud, Sigmund; 233, 284
Topographic model Pathological narcissism, 225, 232,
in adults, 115 233, 284
contribution to theory of Pavlov, Ivan, 47
psychopathology and Penis envy, 110, 114–115, 116–117,
therapeutic action in 284
topographic model, 111–113 Perls, Fritz, 38n1
Freud’s structural model of the Persecutory anxiety, in object
mind, 121 relations theory (Klein), 194,
importance of narrative and 225, 284
fantasy in, 119–120 Persephone, myth of, as alternative
management of oedipal conflict, to oedipus complex, 118
112 The Perspectives of Psychiatry
negative complex, 110, 111, 117, 282 (McHugh and Slavney), 4
positive complex, 110, 111, 117, 285 Personality, contrasted with
revision of the topographic character, 176
model, 121 Personality disorders.
terms and concepts, 109–111 See also Borderline personality
universality of, 118–119 organization (BPO); Narcissistic
updates to, 113–118 personality disorder (NPD)
gender development and differing theoretical perspectives
homosexuality on, 206–207
reconsidered, 116–118 Kernberg’s classification/
mind of the developing child, conceptions of, 205–206,
113–115 225–226, 227, 232, 233
other events that affect the Kohut’s classification/conceptions
oedipal situation, 115–116 of, 205–206, 225–226
Omnipotent control, as defense in psychodynamic treatments for,
borderline personality 207–209
organization, 205 role of aggression in, 153
On the Genealogy of Morality role of failed attainment of object
(Nietzsche), 45–46 constancy in, 200, 204
On the way to object constancy Phallic narcissistic character, 152,
subphase, of separation- 262, 284
individuation (Mahler), 197, Phallic phase, 150, 262, 284
198, 199, 283 Phallic zone, 150, 262
Oral character, 151–152, 262, 283 The Philosophy of the Unconscious
Oral phase, 150, 262, 283 (von Hartmann), 46
Oral zone, 150, 262 Physical determinism, 16, 284
Pinel, Philippe, 20
Pappenheim, Bertha (Anna O.), 28–29 Platner, Ernst, 43n5
Paranoid position, in object relations Plato, 42
theory (Klein), 194, 199, 206, 211, Pleasure/unpleasure principle, 45n7,
225–226, 284 59–60, 284.
paranoid-schizoid position, 194 See also Hedonic principle
Parapraxis, 79, 168, 284 Practicing subphase, of separation-
Part object, in object relations theory individuation (Mahler), 197,
(Klein), 199, 284 198, 227, 285
Index 303

Preconscious, in topographic model, dynamic unconscious in, 35–55

64, 72, 75, 285 foundational models in, 64–65
Premack, David, 8 object relations theory, 189–217
Preoedipal period/stage, 115, 150, self psychology, 219–236
162, 192, 203, 285. structural model, 129–185
See also Infantile sexuality topographic model, 71–125
Primal scene, 114, 285 integration of models, 239–258
Primary femininity, 116–117, 285 dangers of, 255–256
Primary process, 285 importance of neurobiological
in dreams, 96, 97 approaches, 254–255
in the id (structural model), 146, 162 usefulness of and need for
mechanisms in different models, 251–254
condensation, 75, 82, 97, 272 historical origins of, 15–34, 35–55.
displacement, 75, 82, 97, 173, See also Freud, Sigmund
264, 262, 274 Hippolyte Bernheim, 22–23
symbolization, 75, 82, 97, 113, Jean-Martin Charcot, 20–22
133, 291 René Descartes, 42–47
in neurotic and psychotic Sigmund Freud, 23–32
symptoms, 82 Franz Anton Mesmer, 17–18
in the unconscious (topographic Wilhelm Wundt, 39–40
model), 74–76, 84, 88, 89 overview: modeling the mind,
Primitive idealization, 173, 266, 285 3–14
Principles of Mental Physiology unified model, 244–251, 246–250
(Carpenter), 44n6 Psychodynamic psychotherapy, 4–5,
The Project for a Scientific Psychology 35, 61, 63.
(S. Freud), 10 See also Psychoanalysis;
Projection, 173, 194, 262, 265, 286 Psychoanalytic models of the
Projective identification, 173, 194, mind
195, 266–267, 286 basic clinical techniques in, 83–85,
as defense in borderline 88
personality organization, 205 case example of, 174–175, 179
Psychic conflict, 60–61, 134, 206 defense analysis in, 178–179
Psychic determinism, 16, 30, 36, 286 exploration of dreams in, 79,
Psychic energy, 45n7, 97, 147, 286 97–98
Psychoanalysis, 286. exploration of drives (id) in, 153
See also Psychotherapy; exploration of ideals and
Psychodynamic psychotherapy attitudes toward morality
classical, 130 (superego) in, 160
definition of, 4–5 exploration of oedipal conflict in,
Freudian, 130 112–113, 119
neuroscience and, 101–102 exploration of unconscious
as a “new psychology” of the fantasies in, 120
unconscious, 32–33 foundations in theory of
relational, 7, 130, 208–209 therapeutic action from
Psychoanalytic models of the mind. topographic model, 83–85
See also separate models goal of, 88
core dimensions of, 57–68 historical origins of, 22–23
integrated chart of, 240–243 in object relations theory,
reverse-axis chart of, 246–249 207–209, 210
304 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Psychodynamic psychotherapy Ramon y Cajal, Santiago, 19

(continued) Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep,
power of human relationships in, 94, 100
11 Rapprochement subphase, of
in self psychology, 226–227, 232 separation-individuation
transference phenomena in, 78 (Mahler), 197, 198, 286
Psychology (cognitive/general), Reaction formation, 151, 173, 262,
areas of parallel development 265, 287
and points of convergence with Reality principle, in psychoanalytic
psychoanalytic model of the model of the mind, 60, 75, 245, 287
mind Reality testing, as ego function/
autonomous ego functions and capacity, 62, 86, 113, 133, 135,
cognitive systems, 138 140, 169, 179, 287
reward/appraisal systems and disturbances of, in character
fear signals, 169, disorders or psychosis, 177,
171–172 203–204
study of the self, 229–230 Reconstruction, as therapeutic
theory of moral development, technique in psychodynamic
160, 161 psychotherapy, 84, 88, 89, 287
Psychopathology, theories of. Reflective function, 169.
See Theory of psychopathology See also Mentalization
in psychoanalytic models of the Regression, 63, 151, 153, 162, 163,
mind 179, 287
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life in service of the ego, 173, 268, 287
(S. Freud), 79 Relational psychoanalysis, 7, 130,
Psychosexuality 208–209
libido and, 148–149, 162 REM. See Rapid eye movement sleep
phases of development, Repetition compulsion, 83, 88, 89, 287
150–152 Representations, 48, 190, 288
Psychosexual phases, 150, 151, 162, Repression, 288
163, 262, 286. as defense mechanism, 173, 266
See also Libido theory in dynamic unconscious, 37
anal, 150, 262, 270 forces of, within id, 146, 150, 153
genital, 150, 152, 262, 277 Sigmund Freud’s concept of, 31, 37,
oral, 150, 262, 283 38, 46, 64
phallic, 150, 262, 284 Johann Friedrich Herbart’s
Psychotherapy, 7, 10, 11. concept of, 43
See also Psychodynamic in libido theory, 262
psychotherapy; Theory of in topographic model, 64, 71, 73,
therapeutic action/treatment in 74, 82, 86, 87, 95, 172
psychoanalytic models of the Research Domain Criteria.
mind See National Institute of Mental
definition of, 286 Health Research Domain Criteria
historical origins of Resistance, 288
Hippolyte Bernheim, 22–23 exploration of in defense analysis,
Jean-Martin Charcot, 20–22 179
Franz Anton Mesmer, 17–18 fantasies about sexual and
Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and aggressive urges as source of,
S. Freud), 28 153
Index 305

Freud’s concept of, 31–32 comparison with structural

in topographic model, 84, 88, 89 model and object relations
Return of the repressed, 81, 88, 89, theory, 223–224
262, 288 contributions from ego
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 43–44 psychology and object
relations theorists, 227–229
St. Thomas Aquinas, 40 contributions from general
Samberg, Eslee, 255 psychology and
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph neuroscience, 229–230
von, 44 influence on psychodynamic
Schiller, Friedrich, 44 psychotherapy, 226–227
Schizophrenogenic mothering, 195, overview, 219
197n3, 288 points of view in
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 45 developmental, 223–224, 231,
Secondary process, 288 233
in the preconscious/conscious motivational, 223, 231, 233
(topographic model), 75–76, structural, 223, 231, 233
84, 88, 89 topographic, 223, 231, 233
Seduction hypothesis, 59, 108, 119, 288 theories of
Self, 11, 288 psychopathology, 221–222,
conceptions of 224, 232, 233
from self psychology, 220–222, Kohut versus Kernberg on
223 narcissistic personality
from ego psychology and disorder, 224–226
object relations theorists, therapeutic action, 222–223,
227–229 224, 226–227, 232, 233
from general psychology and Self-punishment, as superego
neuroscience, 229–230 psychopathology, 159, 162
development of, 220–221 Self-regulation, 86–87, 132, 133–134,
disorders of, 220, 221–222, 224, 139, 156, 245.
232, 274 See also Homeostasis
Self constancy, 198, 200, 205, 209, Self representation, 190, 192, 198,
211, 227, 288 200, 209, 289
Selfobject, 65, 220–221, 231, 288. Self–selfobject matrix, 220, 231, 233,
See also Self psychology 289
failures, by caregivers, 224, 232 Separation anxiety, 171, 198, 203, 289
function, of caregiver/therapist, and adult psychopathology, 203
65, 222, 254 and danger situations, 171
idealized, 220–221, 231, 278 in rapprochement subphase of
mirroring, 220, 231, 233, 281 separation-individuation,
needs, 224, 225, 226 198
strivings, 221, 231, 233 Separation-individuation, Mahler’s
transference, 222, 225, 226, 232, theory of, 196–199, 289
233, 288 Sexual drive. See Libido
Self psychology, 219–236, 289. Sexual inhibition, in libido theory,
See also Kohut, Heinz; Self 151, 262
chart of core dimensions for, Sexuality/psychosexuality, 149,
65, 66, 67, 231–232, 233, 243, 154–155, 289
246–250 atypical (“perversion”), 262
306 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Sexuality/psychosexuality comparison with object relations

(continued) theory, 191–192
infantile, 76, 150–151, 162, 262, 279 comparison with self psychology,
influence of oedipus complex on, 223–224
112 integration with object relations
Shame, 289 theory (Kernberg), 204
in narcissistic rage, 222 points of convergence with
as signal affect, 170 general psychology, 138–139
and the superego, 156 points of view in
Signal affect, 170, 172, 180, 181, 289 developmental, 140, 141, 162,
and somatic marker hypothesis, 172 163
Signal anxiety, 171, 180, 289 motivational, 139, 141, 161,
Skinner, B. F., 48 163, 180, 181
Slavney, Phillip, 4 structural, 139–140, 141,
Slips of the tongue, 79 161–162, 163, 180, 181
Somatic marker hypothesis topographic, 139, 141
(Damasio), 172, 290 theory of psychopathology in,
Somatization, 176, 267, 290 140, 141, 180, 181
Splitting, 173, 194, 195, 267, 290 theory of therapeutic action in,
in borderline personality 140, 141, 180, 181
organization, 205–206 work of well-known ego
The Standard Edition of the Complete psychology theorists,
Psychological Works of Sigmund 136–137
Freud (Strachey), 133 Structural point of view, 61–62, 290
Stern, Daniel in object relations theory, 209, 211
as “baby watcher,” 228 compared with topographic
stages of self development, 228, and structural models,
231, 233, 192
Strachey, James, 133, 146 in self psychology, 231, 233
Stranger anxiety, 171, 198, 201, 290 compared with structural
Strange Situation, 201–202, 290 model and object relations
Strivings theory, 223
narcissistic (selfobject), 220, 221, in structural model, 139–140, 141,
223, 224, 227, 231, 233 161–162, 163, 180, 181
oedipal, 110, 111, 112, 116, 122, in topographic model, 74–76, 88,
123, 135, 177 103, 89, 104, 122, 123
Structuralism, 39, 40, 290. in unified psychoanalytic model
See also Titchener, Edward of the mind, 245, 247
Bradford Structure, in psychoanalytic model
Structural model, 64–65, 66, 67, 121, of the mind, 61–62, 64, 65, 290.
129–143, 145–166, 167–185, 290. See also Narrative structure of
See also Compromise/ the mind; Structural point of
compromise formation; view
Conflict; Ego; Ego psychology; Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and
Id; Superego S. Freud), 12, 28, 29, 32
chart of core dimensions for, Sublimation
64–65, 66, 67, 139–140, 141, as defense mechanism, 173, 264,
161–162, 163, 180, 181, 241, 290
246–250 in libido theory, 151, 162, 262
Index 307

Superego, 64–65, 111, 130, 156–161, in self psychology, 222–223,

291. 226–227, 232, 233
See also Structural model compared with structural
contributions from general model and object relations
psychology and cognitive theory, 224
neuroscience, 160–161 in structural model, 140, 141, 180
contribution to theory of in topographic model, 83–85, 88,
psychopathology and 89, 103, 104
therapeutic action in in unified psychoanalytic model
structural model, 159–160 of the mind, 246–250, 251
mind of the child and, 157–159 Therapist as new object, in object
Symbiotic phase, in Mahler’s theory relations theory, 208, 210, 211
of separation-individuation, Thorndike, Edward Lee, 47
197, 197n3 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
Symbolization, 75, 82, 97, 113, 133, (S. Freud), 148
291 Titchener, Edward Bradford, 39, 40
ToM. See Theory of mind
“Talking cure,” 9, 29, 291 Topographic model, 6, 58, 64, 67,
Target, Mary, 206–207. 71–92, 93–105, 107–125, 291.
See also Object relations theory See also Dreams; Freud,
TFP. See Transference-focused Sigmund; Oedipus complex
psychotherapy chart of core dimensions for, 64,
Theory of mind (ToM), 7–8, 291 66, 67, 87–88, 89, 103, 104,
hypothesis of, 9 122, 123, 240, 246–250
Theory of psychopathology in comparison with object relations
psychoanalytic models of the theory, 191–192
mind, 63 and development, 76–77
in object relations theory, dream theory in, 93–104
202–204, 205–207, 210, 211 and mental topography, 72–73
compared with topographic and motivation, 73–74
and structural model, 192 and nature and function of
in self psychology, 221–222, consciousness, 85–87
225–226, 232, 233 oedipus complex in, 107–141
compared with structural overview, 71–72
model and object relations psychic reality and subjective
theory, 224 experience, 77–78
in structural model, 135–136, 140, slips of the tongue, jokes, and
141, 153, 159–160, 162, dreams, 79
175–178, 180, 181 and structure/process, 74–76
in topographic model, 80–83, 88, and transference, 78
89, 111–113 points of view in
in unified psychoanalytic model developmental, 72, 76–77, 88,
of the mind, 246–250, 251 89, 122, 123
Theory of therapeutic action/ motivational, 73–74, 87, 89,
treatment in psychoanalytic 103, 89, 104, 122, 123
models of the mind, 7, 10, 11 structural, 74–76, 88, 103, 89,
in object relations theory, 210, 211 104, 122, 123
compared with topographic topographic, 72–73, 87, 89, 103,
and structural model, 192 104
308 The Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind

Topographic model (continued) Unconscious, 10, 35–55, 43n5, 64, 72,

revision of, 121, 130–132 81, 292.
theory of psychopathology in, See also Dynamic unconscious
80–83, 88, 89 evolution of, 35–55
theory of therapeutic action in, Sigmund Freud’s discovery of,
83–85, 88, 89, 103, 104 30–32
Topographic point of view, 291 psychoanalysis as a “new
in object relations theory, 209, 211 psychology” of, 32–33
compared with topographic in unified psychoanalytic model
and structural model, of the mind, 245, 251
191–192 Unconscious scanning operations, in
in self psychology, 231, 233 appraisal, 50, 169
compared with structural Unified psychoanalytic model of the
model and object relations mind, 244–251, 246–250
theory, 223
in structural model, 139, 141 Vaillant, George, 263
in topographic model, 72–73, 87, Virgil, 99
89, 103, 104 Visual symbolism, in dreams, 75
in unified psychoanalytic model
of the mind, 244–245, 246 Wagner, Richard, 45
Transference, 291 Watson, James B., 47
idealizing, 222, 278 Weir Mitchell, Silas, 27
mirror, 222, 281 Wernicke, Carl, 17, 19–20
narcissistic, 222, 232, 233 Westen, Drew, 209
in psychodynamic Whole object, in object relations
psychotherapy, 84 theory (Klein), 199, 292
selfobject, 222, 225, 226, 288 Winnicott, D.W., 65, 195–196, 196n2,
topographic model and, 78 232, 276, 288.
twinship, 222, 292 See also Object relations theory
Transference-focused psychotherapy Wish, 75, 76, 292
(TFP), for borderline personality definition of, 73
organization (Kernberg), 207, 291 repressed, 77n2
Tripartite model of the mind, 61, 130, Woodruff, Guy, 8
292. See also Structural model The World as Will and Representation
“Trolley problem” (Philippa Foot), 161 (Schopenhauer), 45
True self (Winnicott), 228, 232, 233, 292 Wundt, Wilhelm, 39–40