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Socio-logos
Revue de l'association française de sociologie

3 | 2008
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Articles

Tax Sociology
Sociopolitical Issues for a Dialogue with Economists

Marc Leroy
https://doi.org/10.4000/socio-logos.2073

Translation(s):
La sociologie fiscale [fr]

Abstract
Tax sociology investigates the fundamental relationship between taxation, State and society. This
article presents a literature review and issues on the sociopolitical side of tax sociology. Several
social representations are considered : “contribution-tax”, “exchange-tax” and
“obligation/constraint/tribute-tax”, but the elaboration of a typology of the tax State emphasizes
“contribution-tax” paid by possibly altruist citizen to finance public policies. In the framework of
fiscal democracy, the issue is to establish a tax social contract about social, political and
territorial/environmental functions of the interventionist tax State, in a critical dialogue with
economic analysis. The typology of tax deviance, inspired freely from the labelling theory, shows
that tax political legitimacy is essential, and that the cognitive rationality approach accounts for

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the taxpayer’s decision: indeed, the taxpayer does not (solely) react in accordance with the
utilitarian self-interest approach. The conclusion suggests a short debate on the effects of
economic globalization on the sociopolitical autonomy of State.
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Une version française de ce texte sera disponible dans le numéro 4 (2009) de Socio-logos.
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04/10/2023, 14:26 Tax Sociology

1 Introduction
1 Tax sociology investigates the fundamental relation between taxation, State and
society.1 Historically related to the construction of the European modern State, the
political dimension of taxation has remained essential since the crisis of the
interventionist State. Viewed as a political phenomenon, tax has been also an economic
field for a very long time, since for example La dîme royale of Vauban (1707) or the
maxims of Adam Smith (1776). It is also a social process, of which the sociologist
Tocqueville had an intuition. In L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, he maintains that in
the 18th century in England, it was the poor who had a tax ‘privilege’ (exemption),
whereas in France, it was the rich. He suggests that the tax State crisis (one of the
causes of the French Revolution) was rather a crisis of legitimation. Using the so-called
"relative frustration" theory, he explains that prosperity raises the hatred of old
institutions. When the economic situation gets better, tax inequalities are less well
endured, whereas the law is moderately applied. Yet the objective tax burden2 is not a
direct cause: the sociopolitical theory of “relative frustration” is more relevant than the
deterministic economic exchange theory; it anticipates the cognitive rationality
approach (Leroy, 2003) applied to the relation between the concrete context and the
feeling of tax fairness.
2 Fiscal sociology, founded in the 20th in relation to the impact of the World Wars on
the State and the economy has two tendancies: a sociopolitical “side” and an economic
“side”. Law, so often locked up in tax techniques, is not present enough, in spite of its
important contribution with regards to the rights and obligations of the taxpayer or the
constitutional principle of equality3. These two schools, where (at least) psychology,
social psychology, and history also intervene, must “dialogue” with each other in order
to build a unified (tax) social science subsuming the specialized points of view of every
discipline. After an overview (section 2), this article presents a review of the literature
and issues on the sociopolitical side of tax sociology with the analysis of: tax
representations and types of State (3), the sociological functional approach (4), tax
deviance (5) and tax globalization (conclusion: 6).

2 Sociopolitical and Economic Overview

3 After the First World War, Goldscheid (1917) and Schumpeter (1918), two Austrian
founders of fiscal sociology, i.e. the analysis of taxation and public finance, investigated
the crisis of the tax State. They lean to the sociopolitical side because of their historical
approach and the role of social classes or groups, as well as to the economic side as
analysts of capitalism. For them the formation of the tax State in Western Europe, tax
becoming the main resource, constituted a major historical change, whereas classical
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social scientists explain the modern State in Europe by refering to a rational-legal
bureaucratization (Weber), as to capitalism (Marx), or as a functional response to
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complexity duecookies and of labour (Durkheim). Attached to this tradition of fiscal
to the division
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sociology, over what
Mann (1943) proposes a functional analysis of tax: he mantains that taxation
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leaves the field of public finance, because of the First War, to enter into the field of
interventionist State sociology. “Its fiscal function has been combined with a function of
social control” (Mann, 1943, p. 225). Three forms of social control are exercised by
taxation (p.226): “correction of socially undesirable human behavior, readjustment of
economic power between social groups and classes, and combatting the social abuses of
capitalism and facilitating the transition to another economic order.” In another article,
Mann (1949, p. 119) uses the notion of the “social function of taxation” as part of social
reform.
4 Italian founders of fiscal sociology are considered to be rather on the economic side,
because of their interest in pure economics and marginalism, but they also pay special
attention to the nature of political power with the idea that “the concept of ruling class

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or élite is the appropriate theorical tool” (Boccacio, De Bonis, 2003, p. 76), according to
the classical approach of Machiavelli, Mosca and Pareto. Nevertheless, Panteloni (1967)
estimates that the attitude of Parliament is a (sociopolitical) factor to estimate the
tolerance of a country with regard to taxation. Disciples of Pareto4 work on the
sociopolitical side of tax, considered as nonlogical (sociological) action by the Master.
Pareto did not propose a whole theory of public finance but he encouraged his disciples
Borgatta, Griziotti, and Sensini to study the relation between taxation and economic
and social equilibrium. We return to this issue in the discussion of the taxpayer’s
decision : cognitive rationality is a suitable way to explain “nonlogical” actions and the
logic of “dérivations” (see: section 5). Of course, Puviani’s theory of “fiscal illusion”
(1903) can also be quoted here because this phenomenon is a widespread feature in
public finance, which is (wrongly) viewed as irrational. A little known French scholar
Laufenburger (1956) also has classic approach: he emphasizes the comparative
economics of the interventionist State, but also develops a psychology of public finance
concerning the taxpayer’s reactions. It is the functional classification of the economist
Musgrave (1959) which is however used today.
5 The founders insist on the importance of analyzing the interventionist State from
both the economic and sociopolitical sides. This balance changes with the
generalization of Keynesian policies and the Welfare State in Europe: a sociopolitical
consensus legitimates the tax State by the financing of its economic and social
interventions. Until the 1970s, the study of this legitimacy was of interest to fewer
scholars during the time of economic growth (Trente Glorieuses) and we see a decline
of tax sociology as a sociopolitical whole. Instead of the tax State, and because of the
increasing specialization of social sciences, the taxpayer’s behavior is investigated by
(social) psychology surveys.5 The goal is to improve citizens’ compliance to finance the
interventionist State. These studies of social attitudes are based on the sociopolitical
side, but they neglect tax policies and decisions-makers, and do not propose a
metatheory of the taxpayer. Nevertheless, they provide data for the discussion of the
influential utilitarian theses of Public Choice.
6 The Public Choice school develops a radical criticism of the interventionist State, on
the basis of the rational choice theory concerning democracy (Buchanan, Tullock,
1962). Its interdisciplinary impact cannot be ignored by fiscal sociology. The
(simplified) theory of public choice emphasizes a utilitarian notion of the public
decision where politicians, civil servants and voters maximize their self-interest on the
political market. Politicians seek to be reelected, which created an electoral expenditure
cycle. In democracy, the spending policies financed by taxes are those desired by the
median-voter, especially in the case of two great parties (Tullock, 1976). The bureaucrat
tends to maximize his budget (Brennan, Buchanan, 1980). The citizen has an aversion
for taxation (Downs, 1957). The success of Public Choice is to be related to the crisis
years of the 1970’s: as an interventionist tax State discipline, fiscal sociology was then
called into question. In answer to that, empirical studies show that the taxpayer is not
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always motivated by the rationality of self-interest: he is altruistic if the tax State is
legitimate (see: section 5).
7
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O' Connor’s analysis (1973) of the crisis of the tax State constitutes
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another sociopolitical answer to the question of the legitimacy of taxation. The role of
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the crisis of the two World Wars is studied by the economic theory of Peacock and
Wiseman (1967). But the conclusions from the historical construction of European
modern States centered on tax conceived as a dialectic between the obligation (the
King’s law based on a sovereignty right) and the legitimate contribution to policy are
neglected. The second element of the dialectic (“contribution-tax”) is definitively
established in the 19th century in the traditional finances of the industrialized countries
in the form of parliamentary authorization of levying tax (and spending). Initiated by
the founders of the discipline, historical tax sociology is developed, in particular by
Ardant and Wildavsky: comparing the explanation of tax changes, Wildavsky is on the
sociopolitical side with his “cultural theory of expenditure growth and (un)balanced

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budgets” (1964) and with his theory of the political incrementalism, and Ardant on the
economic side with his tax theory of liberal exchange.6
8 In the nineties fiscal sociology renews itself, whereas historical studies are carried out
as always(Witt, 1987; Daunton, 2001; Peukert, 2006; Piketty, 20017). On the
sociopolitical side, Campbell (1993) considers tax policy in response to crises, with
interest groups at the centre. In France empirical work on tax bureaucracy and taxpayer
rationality is followed up by more ambitious theorizations of data, in a dialogue with
economics and law (Leroy, 1993, 2007). The field for research is specified on the
economic (Backhaus, 2002) and the sociopolitical side (Campbell, 1993, Leroy, 2002);
classics are revisited (Boccacio, De Bonis, 2003; Backhaus, 2004; McLure, 2006,
2007). Futhermore, experimental economic psychology revives the critical debate of the
seventies about tax compliance, especially investigating individual values and the
relation with democracy (see: sections 4 and 5). Sociopolitical studies explore new
issues in relation with the collapse of the Soviet block (Hanousek, Palda, 2003; Appell,
2006, Gërxhani, 2007; Miller, 2007), the decentralization wave and federalism
(Garman et al., 2001; Roden, 2002), developing countries (Moore, 2004; Del Percio,
2008), and globalization (see: section 6) . Finally, tax sociology, on the sociopolitical
side, aims at studying the relation between the taxpaying citizen and the interventionist
tax State within the general framework of the sciences of the society, and by using its
own empirical data or those of other social sciences.

3 Contribution-Tax and the

Interventionist State
9 Except for the case where tax is “invisible”, for example some indirect taxes on
consumption where the taxpayer does not see the taxation included in prices, five social
representations of taxation exist in modern societies: within the framework of the
interventionist State, the issue is to institute a tax social contract.

3-1 Social representations tax

10 TABLE A: Sociological Representations of Tax
It is not a social representation (for example, but not always, indirect taxes:
Invisible-Tax
VAT…)

Tribute-Tax The felt tax burden is intolerable

Constraint-Tax The felt tax burden is too heavy

☝ 🍪Tax paid to public authorities (one of the two bases of the formation of the tax
Obligation-Tax
State in Europe): legal concept
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Exchange-Tax
overpaid
whatby the taxpayer for the benefit (services) which he receives from
the society: Economic concept
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Contribution- Taxpayer judges it legitimate to finance public institutions or policies: Political
Tax form of tax consent

11 The “exchange-tax” of economists dominates when the tax system does not justify its
interventions by the contribution to the community, solidarity with the poor, but only,
as the Public Choice school puts it, as the price for the benefit that each taxpayer (or
social group) receives from the State. A form of echange-tax was historically established
by the voting system based on tax, which conditioned the attribution of citizenship.
Today the price (fees) for the use of some services illustrates this utilitarian notion of
the tax consent. Exchange-tax is congruent with the theory of social groups who

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demand tax advantages. Self-interest theories are however not enough to explain the
decision of the taxpayer (see: section 5).
12 “Obligation-tax” is based on the definition of jurists : it is an unilateral act of a
sovereignty nature implying a financial levy of a public authority without counterpart.
Legitimate tax duty is not enough. “Constraint-tax” and “tribute-tax”, situations in
which the tax burden is regarded as intolerable, are of course to be proscribed because
they encourage tax evasion or revolt. If the perceived constraint is low, tax constitutes
an obligation, but if the constraint is too strong, tax is considered as an arbitrary
"tribute" (called thus in reference to Roman history). “Tribute-tax” can lead to anti-tax
reactions because of its objective financial weight, but also if it is perceiveid as unfair.
13 “Contribution-tax” (or citizen-tax) must be encouraged because it represents the
political form of tax consent, not only compliance but also altruistic tax behavior (see
below): the taxpayer judges it legitimate to finance public policies, even if they do not
benefit to himself.8 In French cities benefiting from a charter, the approval of the
accounts by the local taxpayer, according to written accounts (records), was common as
early as the 13th century. The “Etats Généraux” established the idea of obtaining tax
consent. In its fight against England, the American Revolution claims “contribution-
tax” (No taxation without representation). The socio-economic periods of crises and
wars are often used as cognitive arguments to make increase in the tax burden
acceptable (Leroy, 2002, p. 16; see: following section). The history of democratic
parliamentarism, according to the English model, is based on the power to authorize
and control the financing of public expenditure by tax. Experiments of direct local
democracy, with “participative budgets”, develop this sociopolitical representation. But
the political legitimacy of tax depends on the type of State.

3-2 Typology of the tax State

14 TABLE B : Tax State Typology
Tax Level
Intervention level  Low High


Low LIBERAL STATE TAX STATE CRISIS

High WASTEFUL STATE INTERVENTIONIST STATE

15 The “liberal State” with its low level of tax and public interventions is that of the
European economy of the nineteenth century. Liberal traditional finances express the
will to limit the role of the State for political and economic reasons. It is the apology for
the State limited to its sovereignty functions (diplomacy, defence, justice…): it is the
reign of economic competition and of the (supposed) invisible hand of market to ensure
prosperity. The tax State is limited by the prohibition of economic and social
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interventions, and it is also neutral with regards to economic decisions. In the English
tradition, following Smith and Ricardo, tax has a strictly financial role consisting in
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16 The “wasteful State” has a high level of tax and a low level of intervention, which can
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be explained by corruption, inefficiency, oppression… For example, in Boris Eltsine’s
Russia and the context of enrichment of oligarchs by privatizations, the lack of trust
expressed by citizens in the corrupt State explains the decline of tax morality.9 In every
country, reports of the financial courts or Parliament give examples of bad public
management and financial wasting. Even if some democracies have high levels of
corruption, the systematic organization by rulers of the waste of public money is
impossible in democratic countries with a big political control. A study, measuring State
legitimacy in 72 countries with indicators of “views of legality”10, “views of
justifications”11, and of acts of consent (including tax compliance), also shows that some
long-established democracies like New Zealand and France rank far down on the list
(Gilley, 2006, p. 517). But it is no surprise that in general Western Europe and Anglo-
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America followed by Asian countries rank high up. Although the relation between
corruption, democracy and the economy is complex12, it is clear that the wasteful or
corrupt State has neither the means (resources) nor the legitimacy to finance public
programs. Social interventionism is also difficult because of the low level of social trust.
17 The “Crisis State” has a low level of taxation with regards to its high level of
interventions (performance). According to Goldscheid (1967, p. 202), the capitalist
State has a structurally poor financial system and must extend the public sector to
escape a tax crisis. O' Connor (1973) tackles the question differently: the capitalist State
intervening more and more through public expenditure in order to support the
economy is based on budget deficits because it cannot legitimate higher taxes. The
interest of this thesis is to insist on the legitimation of the tax State. Indeed, its
structural fragility appears doubtful in developed countries, as Schumpeter underlines
it. Schumpeter (1918) argues that the collapse of modern State because of a tax crisis is
unrealistic in developed countries. He referes to the case of Austria, one of the worst
financial situations in Europe at the end of World War I, and concludes that “there is no
crisis of the tax state” because of the possibility either to raise a tax on consumption or
to levy a once and for all capital tax in order to reduce public debt and excess money
supply. He says there can be two different issues in a tax crisis: to find money to balance
the budget of the State13, and to manage the re-organization of the economy. Only the
first issue concerns public finance, while the second is to avoid threatening the market
economy because the need is for the “recapitalization” of the economy, and not, as it is
for Godscheid, for the “reappropriation” by the State. For Schumpeter the tax State and
the private market form together the modern social system and the limit of the taxable
capacity must hence be respected. Musgrave (1992, p. 101) argues however that this
prognosis about the economic limit of taxation “underestimated the flexibility and
resiliance of the system’s reponse to a rising public sector”. The tax State is thus
compatible with economic development.
18 The rise of tax revenues, the use of other means (borrowing, privatization, spending
cuts, fiscal innovations, request for subsidies) and the existence of unpopular financial
decisions (King, Gurr, 1988; Gold, 1995; Centeno, 1997) contradict the inexorability of
the tax crisis: the relation between taxation and expenditure is a political choice.
Finally, the tax cognitive theory shows that the crisis is used as an argument to justify
changes in modern tax policy. The cognitive approach (Leroy, 2002, p.16) is relevant to
discuss models which study the crisis as a decisive cause of the tax policy. For instance,
Peacock and Wiseman (1967) consider the two World Wars and explain that in a quiet
period public intervention is limited by the reluctance to be taxed, whereas war
increases tax tolerance. After the war period, tax revenues can satify social needs
(irreversibility of the public expenditure), in accordance with the increase in public
spending (see: the Wagner law). However, according to the neoliberal idea about State
retrenchment (see: section 6), the cut of public expenditure in some countries
contradicts the irreversibility theory. Campbell (1993), in an important article about
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fiscal sociology, regards tax reform as a response to an economic, geopolitical or tax
crisis. These theories are important, but they are too deterministic and postulate
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wrongly a general aversion of citizens for taxes (see below). Moreover, the positive link
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between war and the rise of taxes is not universal: “wars did not make states in Latin
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America” (Centeno, 1997, p. 1598).
19 The crisis is more a process than a causal datum. In line with cognitive rationality,
the crisis is employed as an argument to justify a rise of taxes. Using a combination of
surveys and content analysis of the quality of the information on the Social Security in
the United States during the debate of 1998-99 (Jerit, Barabas, 2006), an empirical
study indicates, after controlling for a set of variables, that misleading information
(from media) is associated with inaccurate perceptions: people exposed to information
composed entirely of misleading rhetoric, with words such ‘bankrupt’, ‘run short of
cash’... have a 47 % chance of incorrectly stating that the Social Security will run out of
money completely. The likehood of providing the correct response is only 10 %. This
effect is strengthened if people follow the debate. When the environnment
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(information) is composed of “benign” rhetoric with words such as ‘reform’, ‘protect’,

‘preserve’..., the likehood of giving the bankrupt (“run out of money”) response declines
to 32 %. These findings show the importance of debate on the crisis within the
framewok of political choices and not in the framework of constraints like the myth of
bankrupt. Indeed, the individual is rational (cognitive rationality) to follow the way the
media report on public policy debates and the citizen is rational to decide from this
point of view.14
20 The two cases of the Liberal and Wasteful State are not currently found in developed
democracies where there are mostly high levels of taxation and public interventions,
which defines the case of “Interventionist State” who avoids tax crises. This typological
analysis is also important showing the characteristics of developing countries, which
often only use a little taxes for their budget.15 In the opposite side, OECD developed
countries can maintain a significant tax State, but on one condition: politically
legitimating the interventions financed by tax.
21 The “Interventionist State” remains present in spite of the tax cut policies in
developed countries: tax revenues are still high, especially in Europe with 38,3 % of
GDP (OECD, 2006). Originally, the Welfare State represents a form of public
interventionism in accordance with the social justice theory developped in the 19th
century to remedy the effects of the industrial society. The golden age of Welfare State is
correlated with the growth of the post-war period characterized by the generalization of
Keynesian policies. Admittedly, the economic crisis of the 1970’s is also the crisis of the
financing of the Keynesian Welfare State. However, as seen with the tax crisis, several
solutions exist to finance the Welfare State politically desired. It is a democratic
question of choice, even if the political decision is related to the problem of good public
management. The issue is thus to institute a tax social contract of the interventionist
State accepted by citizens within a logic of fiscal democracy.

3-3 The tax social contract

22 As with the economic Leviathan Tax Theory (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), the
individuals’ consent is required. But the sociopolical approach of the tax social contract
emphasizes the taxpayer as a real decision-maker in the social context, and not (only)
behind a veil of ignorance. The first condition is the transparency of public finance, in
the framework of a democratic political choice concerning the level, structure, and
functions of taxes (see section 4), with the right comparative informations16. The
sociopolitical contract concerns the contribution-tax paid by citizen, possibly altruist,
who accepts the legitimacy of the functions of the interventionist tax State.17
23 There are several forms of compromise (trade-off) regarding the relationship between
the State, taxes and public services. The tax social contract is measured first through the
distribution of the tax burden between social groups and the level of social transfers,
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with a trade-off between low-income classes and rich classes, but it must also relate to
the general tax functions (see: section 4). Empirically, there is a strong relation between
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of revenus andthe nature of State output: according to Timmons (2005), in
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his study of 1975-1999 OECD countries, regressive taxes are associated with higher
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social spending and human development indicators, but not with property rights
protection. Cusack and Beramendi (2006) show that “Coordinate Market Economies”
governments tax labour more than capital in exchange for a generous Welfare State.
Scandinavian countries strongly tax taxpayers with income tax, including labour
incomes, and negotiate with firms remunerations of capital in exchange for social
protection. But in the Scandinavian social-democratic model, while capital owners
accept a large public insurance system and unions a moderation of the wage demand,
left-wing governments need to support the (universalist) Welfare State not only by
taxing labour, but also by using regressive indirect taxation (Beramendi, Rueda, 2007,
p. 627). Indeed, it appears that in Scandinanavian countries (and in France), indirect
taxation, measured as a percentage of GDP, is above the average, whereas in most

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countries tax rate cuts are financed with increases in consumption taxes (or social
insurance fees: Steinmo, 2003, p. 225). The so-called "flexicurity" approach, adopted in
Austria and Denmark, is also a kind of financial contract (for the creation of the Welfare
State: see note 15).
24 Thus the social protection level wanted by each country determines the form of
Welfare State18, but the issue is to decide explicitly the nature of the tax social contract
(tax democracy). The European Values Surveys indicate that, in spite of national
differences, people remain attached to the Welfare State. Across OECD countries, the
traditional institutions of the Welfare State remain popular, despite high tax rates (Bay,
Pedersen, 2006, p. 421). Even American public opinion supports specific welfare
programs associated with humanitarian sociopolitical ethos (Feldman, Steenbergen,
2001). A study of 14 OECD 1980-2000 democracies (Brooks, Manza, 2006) shows that
mass policy preferences are important for the maintenance of Welfare States, because
rulers must take public opinion into account, especially in the liberal Welfare State. But
the great tax functions are undermined by the the complexity of the tax system due to
the use of the tax tool (see below). In anycase, one can say, in opposition to the
neoliberal argument (Headey and al.., 2000; Steinmo, 2002), that a good level of social
protection is not contradictory with economic effectiveness. Moreover, the
Scandinavian model of the Welfare State resists economic globalization, in spite of high
tax rates. In the same way, social services provide social well-being and economic
growth (Sen 1999). The French model of redistribution is rather based on social tranfers
because of the weakness of the progressive income taxation (with regards to the VAT).
More generally, according to a study of 59 surveys (from 1980 to 2000) for 13
developed countries (Mahler, Jesuit, 2007, p. 493), a trade-off is found between the size
of transfers and the target of the social programms for the poor, in other words: the
more social policy is targeted, the less the size is developed and thus the less poverty
and inegality are reduced.
25 The contract to the contribution-tax, that I defend here, is a social trade-off accepted
in the public interest. In the absence of a contribution-tax contract, the tax is an
obligation based on the law, or a particular contract in exchange for services
individually received (utilitarian economists), or a insurance contract to guarantee
safety (or property: see Montesquieu). Since 1914, modern finances have been
intervening more and more in the economy and society, in spite of the neo-liberal
ideology in favour of the market following the crisis of the 1970’s (Robinson, 2007;
Leroy, 2008). In the global economic age, the social contract of interventionist
functions must be reconsidered.

4 Sociopolitical Functions
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The original nature of taxation both as object of public policy (tax policies) and as
26

instrument of the other public policies justifies a turn to a functional approach (as
Mann intuited it: see section 2). For dialoguing with economists, the traditional
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economic analysis of Musgrave (1959), centered on the financial, economic regulation
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and
youredistribution tax functions, is to be supplemented, on the sociopolitical side, by
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including the social, political and territorial functions. In sociology, the functional
approach has been traditional since Emile Durkheim. Durkheim (1895) emphasizes the
importance of functional explanation in Les règles de la méthode sociologique (chap.
5), but states that we must differentiate between cause and function to explain a social
phenomenon. These observations of the famous sociologist invite us to avoid the
hyperfunctionalism of the anthropological school (Malinowski) because every
institution does not have a function regarding the society as a whole. However, as
Merton in Social Theory and Social Structure explains it, the functional analysis is
relevant if the social units to which it applies are specified. That leads one to study,
according to Durkheim, "social types", and, for us, to propose a tax State typology.

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27 TABLE C : Sociopolitical Functional-Tax Approach
Financial Function
- Revenues from taxes to finance expenditure
Tax

Economic Regulation
- Economic action by taxes: priority sectors, exports, research…
Function Tax

- Redistribution by progressive income tax towards the poorest

Social Function Tax - Tax categorization of the society: family taxation, some social groups,
products, socially developed or discriminated sectors

- Legal territory of competence in tax law

- Territorial tax inequalities
Territorial Function
Tax - Territorial development: tax exemptions of certain "weak" rural zones,
urban districts, tax incitations for "competitiveness " zones
- Safeguarding of the environment: eco-taxes, expenditure taxes

- Citizen contribution-tax to general interest policies

- Political legitimacy
Political Function Tax
- Tax State compliance
- tax democracy with direct tax consent

4-1 The social function of taxes

28 Historically, the tax State appeared in Europe with a financial function, but it became
and remained interventionist (see above). The social function includes the
redistribution of incomes by the taxation because it modifies the social stratification,
but extends to the interventions for or against social groups, behaviours and values. In
spite of neoliberal tax cut policies, the tax social function remains significant.
29 Generally, a progressive income tax rate or the taxation of the fortune of the richest
leads to redistribution. It also depends on legal tax exemptions. Many countries
implement marginal rate cuts of income tax, which undermines the social
redistribution. Historically, the creation of income tax in European countries has had a
function of tax redistribution in relation to the creation of Welfare State, as a
complementary answer to the social issue of industrial capitalism. The purpose of taxes
is to reduce inequalities, to finance State interventions, and to protect weaker members
of society.19
30 In addition to redistribution, the tax social function relates to society issues. Indeed,
many sectors of society are subject to specific treatments by the use of tax expenditure.
In spite of the methodological difficulties of measurement (Burnam, 2003), we know

☝🍪
that tax expenditure is used in term of social aims in many OECD countries. For
example, in 2003, the social function of the tax expenditure (income tax, corporation or
company
This tax and
site uses VAT) and
cookies of Canada, France, and the United States represent around 35 %
and you
gives economic objectives
control over whataround 65 % (Godbout, 2006, p. 252). In these three countries,
corporation
you want tax is little used for social ends (93 % for economic goals), but income tax is
to activate
used differently as a social function (Canada: 34,6 %, U.S.: 38,5 %, France: 44,3 %).
According to the American Office of Management and Budget, about thirty cases are
aimed for by tax expenditure. An incentive tax for the creation of jobs is also a
widespread social tool (Faulk, 2002).
31 Thus, income tax has now less an objective of redistribution and evolves towards
social particularisms to treat specific issues of society. Traditionally, the family is
encouraged by this tax, in the form of tax cut or the application of lower tax payment, or
general marriage bonus as in France. Mann (1943, p. 226) noted that the Nazi Germany
or Fascist Italy surtaxed single people. Recently, the American marriage tax penality is
seen as a problem if the tax system does not meet the goal of marriage neutrality,

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namely the principles of equal treatment of married couples in every State, and the
equality of married and nonmarried couples (Berliant, Rothstein, 2003).
32 A guaranteed income policy based on tax refunding in favor of the unemployed who
find a job but lose the social security benefits, a so-called “negative tax”, is socially
interesting because it puts it into concrte form as a compromise between the neoliberal
idea of the struggle against the economic discouragement to work of the beneficiaries of
welfare transfers, and the social-democrat drive for redistribution towards the poorest.
In the case of poverty, the evolution of the cognitive rationality of rulers and citizens
changes, as with the American attempt creating a legal guaranteed income in the 1960-
70s (Steensland, 2006). Here, the social function distinguishes the "good poor"
deserving government aid and the others who should be encouraged to work.
33 Many countries encourage philanthropy, even if some have no tax-deductibility or
limit its deductibility. The social function sometimes also has a goal moral dissuasion
(Johnson, Meier, 1990; Paton and al., 2004), as with tobacco and alcohol taxation,
which also fulfills a financial purpose by generating additional revenues. In the U.S.,
taxation on gambling has a moral goal, whereas gambling is socially acceptable in the
U.K. Another example is the tax advantages granted to associations to support the civil
society. Let us also quote the cultural tax policy in France: tax incentives aim at
protecting cultural inheritance, in particular with the exemption of the wealth tax on
works of art, but culture is taxed when it becomes a profit-making activity (Leroy,
1997). The social function thus includes a general redistributive part which is an issue of
political debate issue, and particular measures of tax corporatism which harm the
transparency of the tax system.

4-2 The political function of taxes

34 The political function is at the core of the legitimacy of the tax State. Taxes are part of
the creation of the Western European State. Tax revolts occur as an opposition to the
legitimacy of taxation, considered as arbitrary. Taxation is an essential indicator of the
legitimacy of the State (Cheibub, 1998; Lieberman 2002; Leroy, 2003; Gilley 2006). To
take again an example from Schumpeter (1918), the crisis of the feudal society was due
to the process called by him the “patrimonialization of the personality” (right of
inheritance of the fiefs, opposition between the private and public spheres of interests,
independance of the nobility...); the old order and its fiscal foundation changed and the
institutionalization of the modern state took place. The reluctance to be taxed for the
needs of war, or in other words, the lack of legitimacy of the new tax demands from the
monarchy, explains this inalterable change. So, the monarchyt had to use mercenary
armies, an expenditure too heavy to balance the budget within the feudal system.
35 The problem is then to support the emergence of a contribution-tax in order to
finance public policies legitimately. The nondemocratic solution of the voting system,
☝🍪
based on taxes which give the voting rights to rich taxpayers, is not acceptable. The
solution of a parliamentary democracy (with taxes voted by the Parliament) is not
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enough cookies
in many and to fulfill the political function. Indeed, the complexity of
countries
gives you control over what
taxation, the reinforcement of the executive power to the detriment of the legislature,
you want to activate
and the influence of experts restrain the debate on taxes by the elected assemblies. A
new tax democracy must be imagined within the framework of the tax social contract
(see above), for example by local referenda or citizen debates. That implies the
acceptance of electoral accountability.20
36 A “citizen contribution-tax” is possible because self-interest (utilitarianism) does not
explain the totality of the taxpayer’s behaviour (see below). Tax thus sometimes
provides a support for rulers. For example, the French writer George Sand invites the
people to support the new Republican system of 1848 by the payment of taxes. A survey
in Israel in the Seventies (Dornstein, 1976) shows that tax compliance by recent
immigrants was weaker than of old inhabitants convinced of the legitimacy to finance a
modern Jewish State. The use of public money, trust in the government (Bergman,

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2002; Torgler, 2003), the tax system’s equity (Taylor, 2005, p. 84) constitute criteria
for the citizen of the political legitimacy of tax, whereas political disillusion towards the
authorities cause lower compliance.
37 It also appears that citizen is capable of acting as altruist.21 Contrary to the utilitarian
representation of values, data show that many people are ready to pay additional taxes
for programs which appear significant to them, and not egoistically useful (Mueller,
1963, p. 224, Beedle, Taylor-Gooby, 1983, p. 29; Welch, 1985, p.316; Brodsky,
Thompson, 1993; Taylor-Gooby et al, 1999, p. 192). Sometimes citizens support a tax on
gasoline for ethical reasons, even when they often use their vehicle (Brodsky,
Thompson, 1993). Public service users, while more opposed than others to taxation on
services, are nevertheless ready to pay fees for the services they use. Althrough users
generally support public spending more than non-users, they are willing to pay for
certain services (in the form of fees) out of their own pocket, whereas non-users are
willing to spend more on services that affect the welfare of their follow citizens (Winter,
Mouritzen, 2001, p.127). An altruistic consensus exists to admit the need for the basic
services for most underprivileged financing by general taxes of. We also know that the
financial crisis State (see section 3-2) cannot legitimatize new taxes to finance public
expenditure. The Liberal State, limiting revenues and interventions, is a historically
outmoded configuration, even if neoliberal ideology criticizes the interventions of the
State and the weight of taxes. The legitimate State is thus resolutely interventionist
because citizens generally support public services, in particular in the fields of health
and education (Kemp, 2002). The individual income level seems to produce a limited
effect on the demand for expenditure, and it does not have an effect in the case of
specific expenditures well targeting the beneficiaries (Schokkaert, 1987, p.179; Jacoby,
2000, p.761).
38 The political function of the contribution-tax contradicts the economic theory of fiscal
illusion (from Puviani, 1903 to Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) – according to which
irrational citizen demand more expenditure and less tax -, and refuses the aversion
theory – which states that tax is always abhorred because individual sees the money
then gives to the State but he hardly does not see the services (Downs, 1957). Some data
partly support the aversion theroy (Lewis, 1982, p. 314), but other tests refute it (Welch,
1985, p. 314; Kemp, 2002, p. 146). To account for the apparently contradictory results,
the solution of the puzzle consists in reconstituting the taxpayer’s reasoning with a
cognitive rational approach (Leroy, 2007). Citizen considers that his demand for public
services can be financed by various means: certainly tax, but also borrowing, reduction
of waste, reassignment of some appropriations and subsidies for other, user fees…
“More public services and less taxes” is thus not irrational when citizen proposes other
resources. Tax aversion is not general (Blount, 2000) and expresses the conviction that
the State can and must finance the desired expenditure differently. It depends on the
political justification of the function of tax in relation to expenditure. This rational
cognitive solution is empirically confirmed by Hadenius (1985) who shows that tax
☝🍪
aversion decreases when the link between tax and expenditure is indicated.
39 Furthermore, fiscal democracy, defined as the participation of people in the choices
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of public finance, has positive effects on tax compliance. Torgler (2004, p. 34) uses
gives you control over what
experiments to show that decision on the level of dissuasion (number of controls and
you want to activate
level of penalties) improves compliance. His study is confirmed by other experiments
(Alm et al., 1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002) on the relation between democratic decision
and compliance. National differences in tax morality depend on the legitimacy of public
institutions for citizen, and thus of the political function. From this point of view, (real)
direct democracy (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996) is more positive for
compliance. Tax transparency is also correlated with the erosion of electoral cycles in
fiscal balances (Alt and Dreher Lassen, 2006).

4-3 The territorial and environmental function

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40 The first legal use of the territorial function has is to define the geographical
sovereignty of the tax State. The second use aims at assessing territorial inequalities
which resulting from taxation, a form of the territorial social function. For example, in
the Belgian tax federalism (Cantillon et al, 2006, p. 1051), social security and personal
income taxes reduce income inequality between Flanders and Wallonia by about 75 %.
In France, local corporate tax is the first cause of inequalities between subnational
authorities. The third use is to determine the differences in the attractivity of territories,
in relation to the problem of tax competition (OECD, 1998) of regions and States. For
example, globalization leads to tax flight with the relocation of firms and wealthy
individuals by making use of offshore tax havens. Another example is the French policy
of regional planning that, for reasons of territorial equity, grants tax advantages to rural
zones with reduced economomic activity and to deprimed urban districts. The
attractivity of territorial taxes is part of the scattering of the objectives of taxation.
41 Environmental taxation is the fourth issue concerning the territorial funtion of taxes.
It aims to protect territorial natural resources within framework of sustainable
development frame. Inspired by ecological claims and recognized by several
international agreements, this issue leads to the use of the tax either to penalize
activities which destroy the environment (pollution), or to encourage actions to
preserve it. As for tax penalization, Stiglitz (2006) considers that American firms
should be subject to a specific taxation by other countries because the USA has always
refused the protocol of Kyoto, which favours them because it amounts to a as a subsidy
contrary to global economic competition. The principle of the pollutant-payer is
recognized by the OECD and by the Treaty of the European Union. The ecological tax
expenditure, it would be advisable to make the assessment in each country of tax
measurements, and to avoid contradictions between tax incentives that are for polluting
economic activities and those in favour of the environment.
42 Important tax functions are undermined by two factors of the scattering of tax
policies. Firstly, the use of the tax tool becomes too targeted to the detriment of the
logic of the important functions of the interventionist State. Secondly, in relation to the
first factor, the complexity of the tax system accentuates the dilution and the jamming
of the tax functions by concealing the whole logic of the tax system. The financial
function competes with the recourse to other budgetary resources like borrowing and
privatization. The economic division of the tax policy into sectors is carried out to the
detriment of the macro-regulation function. The redistribution function struggles to
become part of the program of public authorities. Too many particularisms and political
compromises to satisfy groups of voters lead to different tax schemes and even to tax
evasion.

5 Tax Deviance
☝🍪
5-1
This siteSociological
uses cookies and labelling of tax decision
gives you control over what
43 The want
you elaboration of a general typology of tax deviance (see: Table D), freely inspired by
to activate
the labelling theory of the sociologist Becker (1963), appears to dialogue with the law
and economics approach. The more complex law is, the more it leaves possibilities to
the interplay of the actors of tax deviance: privileged taxpayers build tax schemes up
which they defend as a category of (legal) tax avoidance, while the administration tends
to label the tax decisions in the category of tax evasion (fraud) of these actors. The
sociopolitical interplay makes the borders between legal and illegal categories move
both at the stage of voting the tax law and at the stage of the tax audit. Legal and illegal
decisions - avoidance, evasion, tax flight, cuts -, have similar economic effects, but
different sociological effects: tax evasion is perceived rather negatively, tax flight
neutrally, and tax avoidance positively (Kirchler and al., 2003).

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44 Concerning tax decision based on a scheme, taxpayer sometimes remains passive
facing taxes (Caroll, 1987; Webley et al., 1991, p.80), as long as the tax issue does not
appear openly during particular events, such as the period of income tax returns, the
mediatization of a reform or a social claim. The opportuneness of avoiding the tax is a
significant factor (Vogel, 1974, p.507; Lewis, 1982, p.158; Wärneryd, Walerud, 1982,
p.205; Webley et al., 1991, p.102), which depends on legal methods of taxation and
especially relates to independent workers. The presentation (and the vocabulary:
McBarnet, 1991, p. 341) of the tax scheme is chosen by the taxpayer, or his adviser, to
enter the legal category of avoidance.
45 TABLE D: Tax Decision Typology
Taxpayer Decision  Authority Decision  Legal Illegal

Scheme to avoid tax AVOIDANCE EVASION

No tax scheme COMPLIANCE ERROR

46 Classic labelling theory is used here as a dynamic model: taxpayers, especially firms
or people who can pay a tax lawyer, actively handle the woolly borders between
avoidance and evasion. An adviser has an interest to keep tax scheme secret in order to
avoid competition with other advisers, or because the tax advantage may be invalided
by law. The proof of evasion is difficult. An adviser does not request all the details from
his client. The answers to the requests of the tax administration only include selected
data: sometimes this tendency poses problems (see: Enron scandal). When there is no
tax scheme decision and an operation is then labelled as evasion (fraud), the error is
disastrous for tax legitimacy, because it increases the idea of administrative
arbitrariness. Tax interventionism of course encourages the interplay between the
administration and social groups concerning tax deviance labelling, especially when the
State does not respect the important functions of taxation when trying to satisfy each
particular request: tax optimization is opposed to the bureaucratic interpretation of law.
47 The detection of tax evasion depends on financial and human means and on
administrative tax co-operation between countries (international fraud). The essential
point concerning the sociopolitical approach of tax is to know how the bureaucracy
works. A sociological research thus shows that the French administrative decision is an
original model of bureaucracy (Leroy, 1993) different from the conception of economsts
or of lawyers: the audit decision of more negotiation between the tax inspector and the
taxpayer depends on hierarchical management. The law is adapted to every case;
administrative statistics do not distinguish between errors, small fraud, serious
cheating…; the inspector operates alone in a firm and is regarded as an expert.
Important comparative research thus needs to be done in order to know the regulatory
strategies of tax authorities. For example, American tax inspectors are evaluated
according to the adjustments they propose (Sakurai, 2002, p. 183). But, unfortunately
there are only a few studies comparing administrative regulatory styles in the context of
☝🍪
taxation. Some scholars criticize the strategy based on threat and legal coercion,
regardless of the circumstances, and support (Murphy, 2004) a regulation based on
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trust (instead of the “stick”) or on a “responsive regulation” (Braithwaite, 2007).
gives you control over what
Responsive
you want regulation,
to activateimplemented by the Australian tax administration, comes into
play at two levels: first, a cooperative approach encourages self-decision, and in the case
of mistakes, allows the taxpayer to persuade the tax office; second, in the case of non-
compliance and non-cooperative behaviour, a command and control approach deals the
conflict with appropriate sanctions. Another sociopolitical issue consists in
investigating the logics of “performance” using budgets of results, within the framework
of new management, and establishing its impact on the tax bureaucracy (Leroy, 2007).

5-2 The taxpayer decision

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48 Self-interest to avoid tax does not (solely) apply. This point is significant because the
interventionist tax system cannot survive if there is only antisocial tax behaviour. The
main economic models of tax evasion use the Expected Utility Theory (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972; Cowell, 1985, Yitzhaki, 1974), a framework based on utilitarian
rationality in the sense of the rational choice theory22: tax avoidance is seen as taking a
risk related to the methods of taxation and of auditing, as a criminal category, and as a
refusal to finance public goods. Refering to the theory of the risk, tax avoidance is a
function of the objectively expected profit, which is calculated compared to the tax rate,
the probability of being controlled and caught, and the amount of legal penalties. It is
often emphasized that high tax rates encourages evasion, and that the official economic
growth is thus undervalued. This approach leads to the economic theory of deterrence
by recommending a strong repression with frequent controls and high sanctions, which
appears difficult to realize in developed democratic States where the moral judgment of
evasion is weak. The second approach uses the economics of crime (Becker, 1968)
which measures the expected utility of fraud compared to that of other activities and
recommends deterrence. The third approach is based on the paradox of Olson (1966)
according to which “free-riders”, members of a latent group of the taxpayers, do not
find it beneficial to finance collective goods from which they will nevertheless profit.
49 These approaches raise several objections. Concerning the effects of the level of taxes,
and unlike Schumpeter’s idea about the limit of the taxable capacity (see: section 2), the
results remain inconclusive. At the macro-economic level, there is no relation
empirically affirmed between a high level of taxation and a low economic growth rate
(linked to evasion). For example, in spite of very high marginal rates of tax the United
States had a strong growth in the post-war period. At the micro-social level, it is not
empirically asserted that compliance by the richest taxpayers is weaker. Some find a
correlation between income and evasion, others contradict this result.23 On the
sociopolitical side, it is thus appropriate to take into account the socially tolerable tax
rate. In his study of 1970s Swedish social democracy, Vogel (1974, p.501) shows that
53,5 % consider reasonable the amount of taxes they pay, in spite of a particularly high
tax rate. In Germany, Schmölders, (1970) concludes that the opposition to tax is not a
direct function of the importance of the objective burden. In England, Lewis (1979, p.
255) supports this thesis. For the United States, Etzioni (1986, p.183) concludes that tax
evasion is linked to the feeling of tax unfairness in public opinion (1960-1980), even
when tax rates remain unchanged. A French survey (Dubergé, 1990) underlines that 60
% of the individuals consider “psychic costs” (for example: tax complexity) of tax
returns, and not the amount they must pay.
50 Concerning the risk of a tax audit, an important fact is that the average audit rate is
generally low, so that compliance should be lower than it apparently is: this observation
contradicts the utility-maximization approach. Experiments and surveys24 show that
the percentage of fraud is not related to the objective probability of a tax audit, except
when the audit information given to the individual is accurate. The heuristic logic of tax
☝🍪
duty distorts the representation of its self-interest by the taxpayer, including the well
informed. But the probability of a tax audit is over-estimated by taxpayers having
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already undergone a control of their declarations (Spicer, Hero, 1985, Maciejvosky et
gives you control over what
al., 2006; Mittone, 2006, p. 823). The tendency to evade depends on the number of
you want to activate
personally known evaders (Vogel, 1974, p. 505; Spicer, Lundstedt, 1976, p. 300;
Dubergé, 1990, p. 230). The perception of the proportion of individuals within the
reference group who engage in tax cheating is related to the evaluation of the sanction
risk (Welch et al., 2005, p. 24). According to the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), the objective factors of being caught in the event of evasion have a weak
influence on "the subjective probability" calculated by the taxpayer in order to decide:
the superiority of the Prospect Theory over the Expected Utility Theory is demonstrated
especially by Dhalmi and Al-Nowaihi (2007). For example, many people estimate that
the probability of being caught by the tax office is stronger when the amount of the tax
evasion is high. People are tempted by evasion in a situation of tax to be paid (perceived
as a loss), and less in a situation of a refunding of tax considered as a profit (about this
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“bias”: Kirchler, 2007, p. 133-142). There is thus no direct relation between the
objective calculation of the risk linked to evasion and the effective individual behaviour.
51 The taxpayer does not only react in an utilitarian way (self-interest), but also
appreciates taxes compared to moral attitudes (Weber: axiologic rationality) and their
representations (cognitive rationality25). Social norms are involved (Keenan and Dean,
1980; Reckers et al., 1994; Torgler, 2004; Wenzel, 2004; Alm and Torgler, 2006),
especially when the taxpayer is identified with the group which supports the same
norms. World Values Surveys and social science experiments show that while tax
morality varies from one country to another, moral attitudes influence compliance. For
instance, the impact of religiosity is a complex empirical puzzle26. Whereas Furnham
demonstrates by his British survey that people who strongly endorse the Prostestant
work ethic are more opposed to taxation, Grasmick et al. (1991), in their American
survey including Protestants, find that religiosity, measured as a frequency of church
attendance and (religious) identity salience, does reduce the inclination to cheat on
taxes. From a Dutch fiscal survey, Verboon and Van Dijke (2007) find that Protestants
are more compliant than Catholics and than people without religion (the least
compliant). Torgler (2003, p. 297), with data from World Values Surveys choosing
Canada, concludes by saying that church attendance is correlated with tax morale, but
that the coefficients of the confession variable (Catholics, Protestants, others) are not
signifiant. Lastly, Welch et al. (2005), in a study on American Catholic parishes, show
that personal religiosity has little impact on tax cheating when many individuals believe
that there are low levels of tax compliance within the community. Pride in his country
(Torgler, 2003, p. 295) and (see above) trust towards the government also have an
effect on tax compliance.
52 Nevertheless, if moral values are sometimes relevant, the moral judgment of evasion
is rather weak (Leroy, 2003, p. 232). According to the European and World Value
Surveys from 1981 to 2004, cheating on taxes is viewed as “never justifiable” by only
53% of the respondents (average rate of all countries). More than moral values, the
political legitimacy of the tax is essential. The feeling that the tax system is unfair
supports evasion (see above). The taxpayer’s cognitive rationality must be considered in
order to explain the subjective appreciation of risk. Other cases also support the
cognitive rationality theory (Leroy, 2003). Often, taxpayers do not see indirect taxes (in
particular VAT) as a fiscal burden because they "logically" see tax as a consumption cost
included in the price; the “relative frustration” theory of Tocqueville explains tax revolts
and the French Revolution (see: section 2). Tax history shows that, under the French
Monarchy, the myth of the end of tax was recurrent, in particular in the case of military
victory: because permanent taxes were recent, it is "logical" to think that tax was
exceptional (it was the case with feudal tax). Taxpayers see tax as a cause of
deterioration of their economic situation whereas, objectively, it is not the case: for
example, the French “Poujade” tax revolt (in 1950s) is explained by the economic
inefficiency of shopkeepers, and not by tax. But they think that the State is responsible
☝🍪
for their situation, because the State has an economic role: as tax is used to finance the
State, it is “rational” not to pay... Thus, the “living” relation of the individual to the tax
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authorities (Leroy, 2002; Kirchler, et al., 2006) influences compliance. About the
gives you control over what
relation between tax and expenditure, the citizen considers that his request for public
you want to activate
services can be financed by various other means than tax.

6 Conclusion: the Impact of

Globalization
53 The dialogue between the economic and the sociopolitical sides of tax sociology is
essential for the social science of taxation (and public finance). Indeed, in spite of
contributions of the other scholars, only these approaches are enough advanced to
theorize the tax system as a whole in conjunction with the legitimacy of public spending

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policies, and to investigate all the sociopolitical and economic aspects of the tax State.
Because it is a king of crisis, globalization opens a vast program. The impact of
globalization on taxes and social policies is the subject of a methodological and
theoretical debate (see Table E). According to the “efficiency of the market” theory,
economic globalization forces policy makers to compete for investment by cutting taxes.
On the other hand, the “compensation theory” insists on the resilience of the Welfare
State: institutional autonomy limits the negative effects of globalization. Although
empirical data about this issue give contrasting results, the efficiency of the market
theory is not confirmed.
54 In this debate, the tax social science has vocation to conceive the specific
sociopolitical contract for each type of tax State. For developing countries, the issue is to
develop a tax centered revenue State, politically legitimate and economically viable. For
developed countries, the new democratic tax contract must be based on the “citizen
contribution-tax” to finance the important economic and sociopolitical functions of the
State and to decide the mode of financial regulation. The general priority is to fight
against increasing inequalities due to globalization.27 The core of the tax contract
concerns the redistribution function wanted by citizen as well as economic efficiency to
create jobs. The strategic issue is to find a compromise between actors of the global
decision: State, citizen, firm. The task is difficult, but that already supposes to pose the
epistemological problem of the tax system as a fonctionnal economic and sociopolitical
whole.
55 TABLE E : The Effects of Economic Globalization

According to the conventional “market efficiency” theory (Tanzi, 1995), economic

globalization (EG) forces policy makers to compete for investment by cutting
taxes: the Welfare State is undermined by EG because of capital flight, tax
dumping and competition (relocation of businesses) and the reduction in the
power of political parties and trade unions. According to the critical compensation
theory of resilience of the State (Pierson, 1994; Garret, 1998; Scharf, 2000), the
tax State stuggles against the negative effects of EG (insecurities, inequalities) in
order to satisfy workers, acquired interests, “veto powers” or to continue the past
of institutional dependence.

Empirically, the effects of EG depend on the “reference indicators” (OECD, 2005).

The study of Garret and Mitchell (2001) of 18 countries in the OECD (1961-1993)
shows that: measured by the volume of the exchanges or the opening of the
financial market, EG does not decrease tax on capital, but it reduces the total
public expenditure, through only a little, (partly) according to the thesis of State
retrenchment (efficiency of the market). With the indicator of dependence on
countries with low wages, the effect is the opposite, namely public expenditure
increases, in accordance with the compensation theory of State resilience.

Measured by the indicator of foreign investment, globalization does not have

effects on social expenditures which increase in proportion to unemployment, in
accordance with the resilience Welfare State theory (compensation). Another
☝🍪
study of 15 countries from 1960 to 1996 (Crepaz, Moser, 2004) shows that EG,
measured by the exchange and deregulation of capital, is positively correlated with
This sitethe amount
uses of social
cookies andtransfers (compensation theory), but this effect depends on
the institutional
gives you control over what arrangement (competition between different public authorities
involving a tendency
you want to activate to blocking and a status quo).

Korpi and Palme (2003) discuss the use of the percentage of social expenditures in
the GDP as an indicator of the Welfare State. They defend the approach of "power
resources" to explain the retrenchment of the Welfare State in 18 countries within
the 1975-1995 period. Economic logic is less relevant than political factors related
to power resulting from the conflicts of classes on the labour market. The extent of
the retrenchment of Welfare State depends little on the EG, but much more on the
partisan variable which more or less slows down (with regard to the context) social
spending cuts: the leftist rulers tend to cut social spending when the public finance
situation is degraded, but significantly increase them when unemployment is
higher (compensation theory). Dreher (2006) confirms the importance of both EG
and political social integration. Rudra (2002) shows that there is a major decline
of the Welfare State in less-developed countries (LDCs) is more important,

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04/10/2023, 14:26 Tax Sociology
because State has less “power resources”, but, in another study (2007, p. 32), he
finds that LDCs still have distinct welfare regimes, demonstrating a capacity to
formulate different social policies.

Compared to the indicator of international economic openness, a study of 14

countries from1973 to 1999 (Kite, 2002) indicates that there is no clear relation
between economic openess and the level of Welfare State (expenditure on social
transfers and social public services). There are very open rich countries with a
generous Welfare State as well. The idea that a minimal Welfare State and
unorganized labour (weak trade unions, flexibility etc.) are an advantage in a
global economy is not supported, except for the United States and only in the
1990s. In advanced capitalist democracies, using the indicator of tax on capital,
Swank and Steinmo (2002, p. 643) show that, between 1981 and 1995, statutory
corporate tax rates (based on tax legislation), have decreased (on average) from 45
to 35% percent, but effective capital tax rates only from 38 to 36 (and the more
limited effective corporate and financial income tax from 26 to 24 percent). Tax
burdens on capital, labour and consumption as a percentage of the GDP remained
stable. Many countries have compensated tax rate cuts with a broadening of the
tax base: for example the general investment tax credit eliminated everuwhere by
1992 (Swank, 2006, p. 848).

Confirming the resilience of the Welfare State, the study of Mahler and Jesuit
(2006, p. 500) indicates that, whereas private sector income inequality before
taxation and social transfers has risen (the average Gini index increasing from
0.404 in 1980 to 0.441 in 2000), tax and transfer redistribution has with also
increased disposable income over the period.

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Notes
1 I thank Pierre Van Zyl (university of Reims) for his help in order to improve the English
language of this article.
2 England taxed more heavily than France, but more fairly (Mathias, O' Brien, 1976, p. 604).
3 For instance, in the American case, see: Barker, 2007.
4 About founders, see: Buchanan, 1960, p. 24-74; Musgrave, 1992; Backhaus, 2004; McLure,
2006.
5 In England (Lewis, 1982; Furnham, 1984), in France (Dubergé, 1961), in Germany (Schmölders,
1970), in Israel (Dornstein, 1976), in Sweden (Vogel, 1974), in the United States (Spicer,
Lundstedt, 1976; Keenan, Dean, 1980; Grasmick, Scott, 1982). The first essay on financial
psychology was published earlier by Schmölders (1932) in Germany and a short survey was
conducted by Raynaud (1947) in France.
6 See for: tax history: Webber, Wildavsky, 1986; incrementalism: Wildavsky, 1964; the cultural
theory of public budget: Wildavsky, 1985. According to Ardant (1971), if exchanges are
insufficiently developed, tax (payable cash) becomes more difficult to raise. For example, the
deceleration of exchanges in the 17th century of old Europe (downturn in the imports of precious
metals) explains tax revolts.
7 On the book of Piketty, see: Leroy, M. L’Année sociologique March 2006: 231-235.
8 This case is to be distinguished from the economic vertical equity.
9 Using data of the European and World Values Surveys (with a question on tax morality), Alm et
al. (2005) show that citizens’ lack of trust towards the State, seen as corrupt and incompetent in

☝🍪
fighting against tax evasion and the mafia, explains the decline of tax morality between 1991 and
1995. Thereafter, according to 1999 data, tax morality improves with the revival of trust in the
State. The study also shows that tax morality varies from one Russian state (“Oblast”) to another
This site uses
according to thecookies andtowards the federal State.
level of trust
gives you control
10 “Views over
of legality what
refers to the idea that the state has acquiered and exercices political power
you want to activate
in a way that accords with citizen views about laws, rules and customs (‘rules’, for short)” (Gilley,
2006, p. 502).
11 “The second sub-type of legitimacy is based on conformity to shared principles, ideas and
values – what I will call views of justifications” (Gilley, 2006, p. 502).
12 The majority of economic and sociopolitical scholars regard corruption as negative. Using data
from 100 countries (1982-97), Drury et al. (2006) show that corruption has no signifiant effect on
economic growth in democracies, but "democracy mitigates the negative impact of corruption on
economic growth" (p. 129), and “corruption has a deleterious effect on economic performance in
non-democracies » (p.131). Gerring et al. (2005), using long-term 20th century data, define
democracy as a political stock of capital: in accordance with the predominant view, democracy
has no statistically significant effect on economic growth if countries are compared to their levels
of democracy (it only has indirect effects by constituting an institutional environment of trust for
the investors). But "measured as a stock variable, democracy appears to have a strong positive

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04/10/2023, 14:26 Tax Sociology
relationship to growth performance" (p. 350). According to a study of Ugandan firms (Fisman,
Svensson, 2007), the negative effect of corruption is strong at the micro level of the firm: one
percent in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in growth of firms of more than three
percent points, an effect that is three times greater than that of taxation. Lastly Rothstein and
Uslaner (2005, p. 48) conclude : "inequality is a strong predictor of generalized trust, but trust
has no direct effect on inequality" (mesuread by the Gini index), whereas the virtuous cycle
associates "low inequality, high trust, honest governments, and universal social welfare policies"
(p. 67).
13 According to Schumpeter with a tax on consumption in an inflationary context.
14 Jerit and Barabas (2006, p. 293) show that after hearing a misleading rhetoric over 40 percent
of financial experts and highly educated individuals provide a wrong response, even if they are
less likely to say that the Social Security is going bankrupt.
15 They prefer customs duties, and, when it is possible, revenues drawn from the concession of
natural resources to companies (often located in foreign countries). Sometimes their strategic
position in the international relations with powerful countries confers on them strategic rents or
developement aid revenues; see: Moore, 2004, p. 299.
16 The tax lawyers may provide data on all legal tax system.
17 It is not relevant here to know wether the State is benevolent, revenue-maximiser, all-
powerfull, captured by social groups or dominating classes, but wether its interventions are
legitimate for the majority, i.e.: if the “contribution-tax” finances the social spending of the
interventionist State, even in an altruistic way.
18 The sociologist Esping-Andersen, (1990) uses the term “welfare-capitalist state” because all
Western countries tax and spend between 30% and 60% of GDP and spend more than half the
money on social policy or welfare. He distinguishes: a) the liberal Welfare State financed by tax
with interventions targeted on the poorest (American model), people rather using private
insurance. b) the Bismarck Welfare State financed by social security contributions from
employers and their employed (Germany, Italy). c) the universalist Welfare State (model of
Beveridge) where everyone has a good level of social protection financed by taxes (Scandinavian
countries). The recent reforms of social protection tend to implement mixed models.
19 Many scholars consider the Welfare State as the result of power relations or of the class
struggle, but this interpretation is only partly right because it neglects the importance of cognitive
rationality: the creation of the income tax (in Europe) is a compromise between the capitalist
class (Leroy, 1996), which thus avoids the (real) risk of a social revolution in the 19th century, and
the working class, supported by leftist parties, which regards these advantages for a stage of social
progress. The case of the creation of the English income tax by Conservative Peel in 1842 also
shows that conservatives accepted the creation of progressive income tax in exchange for customs
duties cuts in.
20 Lowry, Alt, Ferree (1998), studying the elections of governors and assemblies in 41 American
States from 1968 to 1992, show that electoral accountability occurs when it is clearly established
(example: when the same party controls the executive and the legislature), and when results
deviate compared to what people want. Voters do not sanction leftist rulers for increases of
taxation and expenditure (the left is supposed to promote public interventions); they sanction
conservative rulers if they increase expenditure, or if they do not use budget surpluses to decrease
taxes.
21 See recent studies in the “hard sciences”: Bowles (2006). “Groups Competition, Reproductive
Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism.” Science 314: 1569-1572, and Sciences
Humaines, December 2007, p. 34.
22 Refering to the utilitarian rationality, taxpaying is unrelated to a social contract on the
☝🍪
provision of public services, but is viewed as an exchange-tax (Price paid by the taxpayer for the
services reiceived for himself: see table A)
23 The
This sitecorrelation between
uses cookies income and evasion is defended by: Dornstein, 1976; Clotfelter, 1983;
and
Pommerehne, Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Hanousek, Palda, 2003; but not by: Mueller, 1963;
gives you control over what
Spicer, Lundstedt, 1976; Citrin, 1979; Grasmick, Scott, 1982; Wärneryd, Walerud 1982; Beedle,
you want to
Tayor-Gooby, activate
1983; Furnham, 1984, Gërxhani, 2007.
24 Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976, p.300; Spicer, Hero, 1985; Vogel, 1974, p.505; Dubergé, 1990,
p.230; Webley et al., 1991, p. 84; Reckers et al., 1994, p. 832; Scholz, Pinney, 1995, p.497.
25 Cf. the “broader notion of rationality” within the paradigm of the cognitivist theory of action of
R. Boudon (1989). “La théorie de l’action sociale de Parsons: la conserver, mais la dépasser.”
Sociologie et Sociétés 21 (1) : 55-67. (2003). “Beyond Rational Choice Theory.” Annual Review of
Sociology 29 (1): 1-21.
26 For an analysis of the relation between Christian thought and European Tax Systems, see: Bin,
2007.
27 On this topic, see: Sciences Humaines, n°191, March 2008. According to the OECD (2007),
inequalities increased in 18 out of 20 developed countries. In the United States, the 1% richest
gain 600 000 dollars more than in 1979 and the 80 % poorest only 7000 dollars. In France, see:

https://journals.openedition.org/socio-logos/2073?lang=en 25/26
04/10/2023, 14:26 Tax Sociology
Savidan, P, and L. Maurin. (2006). L’état des inégalités en France. Paris: Belin. The OECD report
praises the so-called « flexicurity » approach. According to the World Wealth Report 2007, the
High Net Worth Individuals (i.e. the richest) will be the richest in the near future.

References
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Marc Leroy, “Tax Sociology”, Socio-logos [Online], 3 | 2008, Online since 21 February 2016,
connection on 04 October 2023. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/socio-logos/2073; DOI:
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About the author

Marc Leroy
Professor of sociology at the University of Reims (Faculté de droit et de science politique, CRDT,
57 bis, rue Pierre Taittinger 51096 REIMS - FRANCE), [email protected] Marc Leroy is a
specialist on the sociology of taxation and public finance. He has notably published: Sociologie
de l’impôt. (2002). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Sociologie des finances publiques.
(2007). Paris: La Découverte. He ensured the scientific responsibility of a European Tempus
Program on taxation from 2003 to 2006.

By this author
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Déviance fiscale, anomie et régulation biaisée de la globalisation économique [Full text]
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