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Macroeconomics 2017 (Hubbard)
Chapter 2 Trade-offs, Comparative Advantage, and the Market System

2.1 Production Possibilities Frontiers and Opportunity Costs

1) exists because unlimited wants exceed the limited resources available to fulfill those wants.
A) Scarcity
B) Productive efficiency
C) The command economy
D) Economic growth
Answer: A
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Scarcity
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-1: Identify the basic principles of economics and explain how to think like an economist.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

2) To compete in the automobile market, Tesla must make many strategic decisions such as whether to
introduce a new car model, how to sell and service its cars, and where to advertise. At Tesla's Fremont,
California plant, managers must decide on the monthly production quantities of their S and X models. In
making this decision, the managers
A) face no trade-off because the Fremont plant only produces these two models of the many Tesla
models produced worldwide.
B) face a trade-off, because producing more of one model means producing less of the other.
C) will choose to only produce the quantity of S and X models where marginal cost equals zero.
D) will always decide on production quantities in which revenues are maximized.
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 41/41
Topic: Opportunity Cost
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking
Special Feature: Chapter Opener: Managers at Tesla Motors Face Trade-Offs

3) The principle of is that the economic cost of using a factor of production is the alternative
use of that factor that is given up.
A) marginal cost
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B) opportunity cost
C) normative economics
D) entrepreneurship
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Opportunity Cost
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

2
Copyright © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc.
4) The production possibilities frontier shows
A) the various products that can be produced now and in the future.
B) the maximum attainable combinations of two products that may be produced in a particular time
period with available resources.
C) what an equitable distribution of products among citizens would be.
D) what people want firms to produce in a particular time period.
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

5) shows that if all resources are fully and efficiently utilized, more of one good can be
produced only by producing less of another good.
A) Comparative advantage
B) Absolute advantage
C) The mixed market system
D) The production possibilities frontier model
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
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Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

6) The production possibilities frontier model assumes all of the following except
A) labor, capital, land and natural resources are fixed in quantity.
B) the economy produces only two products.
C) any level of the two products that the economy produces is currently possible.
D) the level of technology is fixed and unchanging.
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

7) The production points on a production possibilities frontier are the points along and inside
the production possibilities frontier.
A) attainable
B) unattainable
C) productively efficient
D) allocatively efficient
Answer: A
Diff: 1 Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

3
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8) The unattainable points in a production possibilities diagram are
A) the points within the production possibilities frontier.
B) the points along the production possibilities frontier.
C) the points of the horizontal and vertical intercepts.
D) the points outside the production possibilities frontier.
Answer: D
Diff: 1 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
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Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
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Figure 2-1

9) Refer to Figure 2-1. is (are) inefficient in that not all resources are being used.
A) Point A
B) Point B
C) Point C
D) Points A and C
Answer: A
Diff: 1 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-2: Interpret and analyze information presented in different types of graphs.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

4
Copyright © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc.
10) Refer to Figure 2-1. is (are) technically efficient.
A) Point A
B) Point B
C) Point C
D) Points B and C
Answer: B
Diff: 1 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-2: Interpret and analyze information presented in different types of graphs.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

11) Refer to Figure 2-1. is (are) unattainable with current resources.

A) Point A
B) Point B
C) Point C
D) Points A and C
Answer: C
Diff: 1 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-2: Interpret and analyze information presented in different types of graphs.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

12) In a production possibilities frontier model, a point inside the frontier is

A) allocatively efficient.
B) productively efficient.
C) productively and allocatively inefficient.
D) productively inefficient.
Answer: D
Diff: 1 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontiers
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

13) Carmelita can perform either a combination of 35 manicures and 70 pedicures or a combination of 50
manicures and 45 pedicures. If she now performs 35 manicures and 70 pedicures, what is the
opportunity cost of performing an additional 15 manicures?
A) 5 pedicures
B) 20 pedicures
C) 25 pedicures
D) 45 pedicures
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Opportunity Cost
*: Recurring
Learning Outcome: Micro-3: Discuss different types of market systems and the gains that can be made from trade.
AACSB: Analytical thinking

5
Copyright © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc.
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including the nostrils and the mouth; and likewise of the decrease or
increase of secretions (dryness of the mouth from fear, and “foaming”
from anger). These are among the well known physiological effects of
emotions.
Increase of sweat sometimes amounting to an outpour, and alterations
in the amount of the various glandular secretions (salivary, gastric, etc.),
and rigor are important phenomena.
The remarkable researches of Pawlow[202] and his co-workers in Russia
on the work of the digestive glands, and those of Cannon[203] in America
on the movements of the stomach and intestines have revealed that these
functions are influenced in an astonishing degree by psychical factors.
Although it has long been known that the sight of food under certain
conditions would call forth a secretion of gastric juice in a hungry dog
(Bidder and Smith, 1852), and common observation has told us that
emotion strongly affects the gastrointestinal functions, increasing or
diminishing the secretions of saliva and gastric juice, and even producing
dyspeptic disturbances and diarrhœa, it has remained for Pawlow and his
co-workers to demonstrate the important part which the “appetite,” as a
psychical state, plays in the process of digestion. In hungry dogs a large
quantity of gastric juice, rich in ferment, is poured out when food is
swallowed, and even at the sight of food, and it was proved that this
outpouring was due to psychical influences. Simply teasing and tempting
the animal with food cause secretions, and food associations in the
environment may have the same effect. “If the dog has not eaten for a
long time every movement, the going out of the room, the appearance of
the attendant who ordinarily feeds the animal—in a word, every triviality
—may give rise to excitation of the gastric glands.” (Pawlow, p. 73.)
This first secreted juice is called “appetite juice,” and is an important
factor in the complicated process of digestion. “The appetite is the first
and mightiest exciter of the secretory nerves of the stomach.” (Pawlow,
p. 75.) Pawlow’s results have been confirmed in man by Hornborg,
Umber, Bickel, and Cade and Latarjet. The mere chewing of appetizing
food, for instance, is followed by a copious discharge of gastric juice,
while chewing of rubber and distasteful substances has a negative result.
Depressing emotions inhibit the secretion of juice (Bickel). More than
this, Cannon,[204] in his very remarkable experiments on the movements
of the stomach and intestines, found that in animals (cat, rabbit, dog,
etc.), gastric peristalsis is stopped whenever the animal manifests signs
of rage, distress, or even anxiety. “Any signs of emotional disturbance,
even the restlessness and continual mewing which may be taken to
indicate uneasiness and discomfort, were accompanied in the cat by total
cessation of the segmentation movements of the small intestines, and of
antiperistalsis in the proximal colon.” Bickel and Sasaki have confirmed
in dogs these emotional effects obtained by Pawlow and Cannon.
The effect of the emotions on the digestive processes is so important
from the standpoint of clinical medicine that I quote the following
summary of published observations from Cannon: "Hornborg found that
when the boy whom he studied chewed agreeable food a more or less
active secretion of the gastric juice was started, whereas the chewing of
indifferent material was without influence.
"Not only is it true that normal secretion is favored by pleasurable
sensations during mastication, but also that unpleasant feelings, such as
vexation and some of the major emotions, are accompanied by a failure
of secretion. Thus Hornborg was unable to confirm in his patient the
observation of Pawlow that mere sight of food to a hungry subject causes
the flow of gastric juice. Hornborg explains the difference between his
and Pawlow’s results by the difference in the reaction of the subjects to
the situation. When food was shown, but withheld, Pawlow’s hungry
dogs were all eagerness to secure it, and the juice at once began to flow.
Hornborg’s little boy, on the contrary, became vexed when he could not
eat at once, and began to cry; then no secretion appeared. Bogen also
reports that his patient, a child, aged three and a half years, sometimes
fell into such a passion in consequence of vain hoping for food, that the
giving of the food, after calming the child, was not followed by any
secretion of the gastric juice.
"The observations of Bickel and Sasaki confirm and define more
precisely the inhibitory effects of violent emotion on gastric secretion.
They studied these effects on a dog with an œsophageal fistula, and with
a side pouch of the stomach which, according to Pawlow’s method,
opened only to the exterior. If the animal was permitted to eat while the
œsophageal fistula was open the food passed out through the fistula and
did not go to the stomach. Bickel and Sasaki confirmed the observation
of Pawlow that this sham feeding is attended by a copious flow of gastric
juice, a true ‘psychic secretion,’ resulting from the pleasurable taste of
the food. In a typical instance the sham feeding lasted five minutes, and
the secretion continued for twenty minutes, during which time 66.7 c. c.
of pure gastric juice was produced.
"On another day a cat was brought into the presence of the dog,
whereupon the dog flew into a great fury. The cat was soon removed,
and the dog pacified. Now the dog was again given the sham feeding for
five minutes. In spite of the fact that the animal was hungry and ate
eagerly, there was no secretion worthy of mention. During a period of
twenty minutes, corresponding to the previous observation, only 9 c. c.
of acid fluid was produced, and this was rich in mucus. It is evident that
in the dog, as in the boy observed by Bogen, strong emotions can so
profoundly disarrange the mechanisms of secretion that the natural
nervous excitation accompanying the taking of food cannot cause the
normal flow.
"On another occasion Bickel and Sasaki started gastric secretion in the
dog by sham feeding, and when the flow of gastric juice had reached a
certain height the dog was infuriated for five minutes by the presence of
the cat. During the next fifteen minutes there appeared only a few drops
of a very mucous secretion. Evidently in this instance a physiological
process, started as an accompaniment of a psychic state quietly
pleasurable in character, was almost entirely stopped by another psychic
state violent in character.
"It is noteworthy that in both the positive and negative results of the
emotional excitement illustrated in Bickel and Sasaki’s dog the effects
persisted long after the removal of the exciting condition. This fact
Bickel was able to confirm in a girl with œsophageal and gastric fistulas;
the gastric secretion long outlasted the period of eating, although no food
entered the stomach. The importance of these observations to personal
economics is too obvious to require elaboration.
“Not only are the secretory activities of the stomach unfavorably
affected by strong emotions; the movements of the stomach as well, and,
indeed, the movements of almost the entire alimentary canal, are wholly
stopped during excitement.”[205]
So you see that the proverb, “Better a dinner of herbs where love is
than a stalled ox and hatred therewith,” has a physiological as well as a
moral basis.
Nearly any sensory or psychical stimulus can be artificially made to
excite the secretion of saliva as determined by experimentation on
animals by Pawlow.
It is probable that all the ductless glands (thyroid, suprarenal, etc.), are
likewise under the influence of the emotions. The suprarenal glands
secrete a substance which in almost infinitesimal doses has a powerful
effect upon the heart and blood vessels, increasing the force of the
former and contracting the peripheral arterioles. The recent observations
of Cannon and de la Paz have demonstrated in the cat that under the
influence of fear or anger an increase of this substance is poured into the
circulation.[206] Cannon, Shohl and Wright have also demonstrated that
the glycosuria which was known to occur in animals experimented upon
in the laboratory is due (in cats) to the influence of the emotions, very
probably discharging through the sympathetic system on the adrenal
glands and increasing their secretion.[207] The glycosuria is undoubtedly
due to an increase of sugar in the blood. It is interesting to note, in this
connection, that there is considerable clinical evidence that indicates that
some cases of diabetes and glycosuria have an emotional origin. The
same is true of disease of the thyroid gland (exophthalmic goiter).
Most of the viscera are innervated by the sympathetic system, and the
visceral manifestations of emotion indicate the dominance of
sympathetic impulses. “When, for example, a cat becomes frightened,
the pupils dilate, the stomach and intestines are inhibited, the heart beats
rapidly, the hairs of the back and tail stand erect—all signs of nervous
discharge along sympathetic paths” (Cannon). Cannon and his co-
workers have further made the acute suggestion that, as adrenalin itself is
capable of working the effects evoked by sympathetic stimulation, “the
persistence of the emotional state, after the exciting object has
disappeared, can be explained” by the persistence of the adrenalin in the
blood. There is reason to believe that some of the adrenal secretion set
free by nervous stimulation returning in the blood stream to the glands
stimulates them to further activity, and this would tend to continue the
emotional effect after the emotion has subsided. “Indeed it was the
lasting effect of excitement in digestive processes which suggested” to
Cannon his investigations.[208]
According to Féré[209] the pupils may dilate under the influence of
asthenic emotions and contract with sthenic emotions. However that may
be, the dilatation of the pupils during states of fear may be demonstrated
in animals.
exert force of which he is ordinarily incapable. Or this energy, instead
of being discharged into the channels being made use of by the will, and
so augmenting its effects, may be so discharged as to inhibit the will, and
produce paralysis of the will and muscular action.
These muscular vasomotor and secretory changes need not surprise us,
as indeed they have a biological meaning. As Sherrington[210] has pointed
out, “there is a strong bond between emotion and muscular action.
Emotion ‘moves’ us, hence the word itself. If developed in intensity, it
impels toward vigorous movement. Every vigorous movement of the
body ... involves also the less noticeable co-operation of the viscera,
especially of the circulatory and respiratory [and, I would add, the
secretory glands of the skin]. The extra demand made upon the muscles
that move the frame involves a heightened action of the nutrient organs
which supply to the muscles the material for their energy”; and also
involves a heightened action of the sweat glands to maintain the thermic
equilibrium. “We should expect,” Sherrington remarks, “visceral action
to occur along with the muscular expression of emotion,” and we should
expect, it may be added, that through this mechanism emotion should
become integrated with vasomotor, secretory, and other visceral
functions.
Another physiological effect of emotion ought to be mentioned, as of
recent years it has been the object of much and intensive study by
numerous students and has been frequently made use of in the clinical
study of mental derangements and in the study of subconscious
phenomena. I refer to the so-called “psycho-galvanic reflex.” As an
outcome of all the investigations which have been made by numerous
students into this phenomenon, it now seems clear that there are two
types of galvanic reactions, distinct from each other, which can be
recognized. The one type first described by Féré[211] consists in an
increase, brought about by emotion, of a galvanic current made to pass
through the body from a galvanic cell. If a very sensitive galvanometer is
put in circuit with the body and such a cell, a certain deviation of the
needle of course may be noted varying in amplitude according to the
resistance of the body. Now, if an idea associated with emotion—i.e.,
possessing a sufficient amount of affective tone—is made to enter the
consciousness of the person experimented upon, there is observed an
increased deflection of the needle, showing an increase of current under
the influence of the emotion. The generally accepted interpretation of
this increase is that it is due to diminished resistance of the skin (with
which the electrodes are in contact) caused by an increase of the
secretions of the sweat glands. A similar increase of current follows
various sensory stimulations, such as the pricking of a pin, loud noises,
etc. It may be interesting for historical reasons to quote here Féré’s
statement of his observations, as they seem to be generally overlooked.
In his volume, “La Pathologie des Emotions,” in 1892, he thus sums up
his earlier and later observations: "I then produce various sensory
stimulations—visual (colored glasses), auditory (tuning fork), gustatory,
olfactory, etc. Whereupon there results a sudden deviation of the needle
of the galvanometer which, for the strongest stimulations, may travel
fifteen divisions (milliampères). The same deviation may also be
produced under the influence of sthenic emotions, that is to say, it is
produced under all the conditions where I have previously noticed an
augmentation of the size of the limbs, made evident through the
plethysmograph. Absence of stimulation, on the contrary, increases the
resistance; in one subject the deviation was reduced by simply closing
the eyes.
“Since these facts were first described at the Biological Society I have
been enabled to make more exact observations by using the process
recommended by A. Vigouroux (De la résistance électrique chez les
mélancoliques, Th. 1890, p. 17), and I have ascertained that under the
influence of painful emotions or tonic emotions the electrical resistance
may, in hystericals, instantaneously vary from 4,000 to 60,000 ohms.”
It will be noticed that Féré attributed the variations of the current to
variations of resistance of the body induced by sensations and emotions.
The method of obtaining the psycho-galvanic reaction may be varied
in many ways, the underlying principle being the same, namely, the
arousing of an emotion of some kind. This may be simply through
imagined ideas, or by expectant attention, sensory stimulation, suggested
thoughts, verbal stimuli, etc. According to Peterson and Jung,[212]
“excluding the effect of attention, we find that every stimulus
accompanied by an emotion causes a rise in the electric curve, and
directly in proportion to the liveliness and actuality of the emotion
aroused. The galvanometer is therefore a measurer of the amount of
emotional tone, and becomes a new instrument of precision in
psychological research.” This last statement can hardly be said to be
justified, as we have no means of measuring the “liveliness and
actuality” of an emotion and, therefore, of co-relating it with a galvanic
current, nor have we any grounds for assuming that the secretion of
sweat (upon which the diminished resistance of the body presumably
depends) is proportionate to the liveliness of the emotion, or, indeed,
even that it always occurs. It is enough to say that the galvanic current is
in general a means of detecting the presence of emotion.
The second type of galvanic reaction, as shown by Sidis and Kalmus,
[213]
does not depend upon the diminished resistance of the body to a
galvanic current passing from without through the body, but is a current
originating within the body under the influence of emotion. Sidis and
Kalmus concluded that “active psycho-physiological processes, sensory
and emotional processes, with the exception of purely ideational ones,
initiated in a living organism, bring about electromotive forces with
consequent galvanometric deflections.” In a later series of experiments
Sidis and Nelson[214] came to the conclusion that the origin of the
electromotive force causing the galvanic deflection was in the muscles.
[215]
Wells and Forbes,[216] on the other hand, conclude from their own
investigation that the origin of the galvanic current is to be found in the
sweat gland activity and believe the muscular origin improbable. From a
clinical standpoint the question is unimportant.

Sensory disturbances. On the sensory side the effect of emotions,

particularly unpleasant ones, in awakening “thrills” and all sorts of
sensations in different parts of the body is a matter of everyday
observation. Nausea, dizziness, headache, pains of different kinds are
common accompaniments. Such reactions, however, largely vary as
idiosyncrasies of the individual, and are obviously not open to
experimentation or measurement. Whether they should be spoken of as
physiological or aberrant reactions is a matter of terminology. They are,
however, of common occurrence. In pathological conditions disagreeable
sensations accompanying fear, grief, disgust, and other distressing forms
of emotion often play a prominent part, and as symptoms contribute to
the syndromes of the psychosis. The following quaintly described case
quoted by Cannon from Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy is as good as a
more modern illustration: “A gentlewoman of the same city saw a fat
hog cut up; when the entrails were opened, and a noisome savour
offended her nose, she much disliked, and would not longer abide; a
physician in presence told her, as that hog, so was she full of filthy
excrements, and aggravated the matter by some other loathsome
instances, insomuch this nice gentlewoman apprehended it so deeply that
she fell forthwith a vomiting; was so mightily distempered in mind and
body that, with all his art and persuasion, for some months after, he
could not restore her to herself again; she could not forget or remove the
object out of her sight.” Cannon remarks: “Truly, here was a moving
circle of causation, in which the physician himself probably played the
part of a recurrent augmenter of the trouble. The first disgust disturbed
the stomach, and the disturbance of the stomach, in turn, aroused in the
mind greater disgust, and thus between them the influences continued to
and fro until digestion was impaired and serious functional derangement
supervened. The stomach is ‘king of the belly,’ quotes Burton, ‘for if he
is affected all the rest suffer with him.’”
Such cases could be multiplied many fold from the records of every
psychopathologist. I happen by chance to be interrupted while writing
this page by a patient who presents herself suffering from a phobia of
fainting. When this fear (possibly with other emotions) is awakened she
is attacked by nausea and eructation of the gastric contents, and, if she
takes food, by vomiting of the meal. (Owing to a misunderstanding of
the true pathology by her physician, her stomach was washed out
constantly for a period of two years without relief!)

General psychopathology.—In the light of all these well-known

physiological effects of emotion it is apparent that when an idea
possessing a strong emotional tone, such as fear or its variants, enters
consciousness, it is accompanied by a complex of physiological
reactions. In other words, fear, as a biological reaction of the organism
to a stimulus, does not consist of the psychical element alone, but
includes a large syndrome of physiological processes. We can, indeed,
theoretically construct a schema which would represent the emotional
reaction. This schema would undoubtedly vary in detail in particular
cases, according to the excitability of the different visceral functions
involved in different individuals and to the mixture of the emotions
taking part (fear, disgust, shame, anger, etc.). As one type, for instance,
of a schema, taking only the most obtrusive phenomena which do not
require special technique for their detection, we would have:
Fear (or one of its variants, anxiety, apprehension, etc., or a compound
emotion that includes fear).
Inhibition of thought (confusion).
Pallor of the skin.
Increased perspiration.
Cardiac palpitation.
Respiratory disturbances.
Tremor.
Muscular weakness.
Gastric and intestinal disturbances.
(Blushing or congestion of the skin would replace pallor if the fear
was represented or accompanied by shame or bashfulness, etc. (self-
debasement and self-consciousness),[217] or if the affective state was
anger.)
On the sensory side we would have various paresthesiæ varying with
the idiosyncrasies of the individual, and apparently dependent upon the
paths through which the emotional energy is discharged:
“Thrills.”
Feeling of oppression in the chest.
Headache.
Nausea (with or without vomiting).
 Pains, fatigue, etc.
It is of practical importance to note that attacks of powerful emotions,
according to common experience, are apt to be followed by exhaustion;
consequently in morbid fears fatigue is a frequent sequela.
 Physiological Mimicry of Disease.

Now, theoretically, one or more of these physiological disturbances

might be so obtrusive as to be the predominant feature of the syndrome
and to mask the psychical element which might then be overlooked.
Gastric and intestinal disturbances, for instance, or cardiac distress,
might be so marked as not to be recognized as simply manifestations of
an emotion, but be mistaken for true gastric, intestinal, or heart disease.
Going one step further, if a person had a frequently recurring fear, as is
so common, and the physiological symptoms were obtrusively
predominant, these latter would necessarily recur in attacks and,
overshadowing the psychical element, might well have all the
appearance (both to the subject and the observer) of true disease of the
viscera.
Now, as a fact this theoretical possibility is just what happens. It is one
of the commonest of occurrences, although it is too frequently
misunderstood.[218] A person, we will say, has acquired—owing to no
matter what psychogenetic factor—a recurrent fear. This fear, or, in less
obtrusive form, anxiety, or apprehension, is, we will say, of disease—
heart disease or insanity or fainting or cancer or epilepsy or what not. It
recurs from time to time when awakened by some thought or stimulus
from the environment. At once there is an outburst of physiological, i.e.,
functional disturbances, in the form of an “attack.” There may be violent
cardiac and respiratory disease, tremor, flushing, perspiration, diarrhœa,
sensory disturbances, etc., followed by more or less lasting exhaustion.
On the principle of complex building, which we have discussed in a
previous lecture, the various physiological reactions embraced in such a
scheme as I have outlined tend to become welded into a complex (or
association psycho-neurosis), and this complex of reactions in
consequence recurs as a syndrome every time the fear is reëxcited. On
every occasion when the anxiety recurs, a group of symptoms recurs
which is made up of these physical manifestations of emotion which are
peculiar to the individual case. The symptoms, unless a searching inquiry
is made into their mode of onset, sequence, and associative relations, will
appear a chaotic mass of unrelated phenomena; or only certain obtrusive
ones, which in the mind of the patient point to disease of a particular
organ, are described by him. The remainder have to be specifically
sought for by the investigator. The latter, if experienced in such psycho-
neuroses, can often from his knowledge of the phenomena of emotion
anticipate the facts and in a large degree foretell to the patient the list of
symptoms from which he suffers. By those who lack familiarity with
these functional disturbances mistakes in diagnosis are frequently made.
Disease of the heart, or of the stomach, or of the nervous system is
frequently diagnosed when the symptoms are simply the product of
emotion. Quite commonly, when the symptoms are less related to
particular organs, but more conspicuously embrace vasomotor, sensory,
digestive disturbances (inhibition of function), and fatigue, the syndrome
is mistaken for so-called neurasthenia.[219] Thus it happens that in
recurrent morbid fears—known as the phobias or obsessions—a group of
symptoms are met with which at first sight appear to be unrelated bodily
disturbances, but which when analyzed are seen to be only a certain
number of physiological manifestations of emotion welded into a
complex. On every occasion that the fear recurs this complex is
reproduced.
It now remains to study the effect of the emotions on the psychical
side. This we shall do in the next lecture.

196. I use the word, not in the strict but in the popular and general
sense, to include feeling, indeed all affective states, excepting where the
context gives the strict meaning.
197. The James-Lange theory is disregarded here as untenable.
198. La Pathologie des Emotions, 1892.
199. Physiological Dilatation and the Mitral Sphincter as Factors in
Functional and Organic Disturbances of the Heart, The American
Journal of the Medical Sciences, February, 1901; also, The Occurrence
and Mechanism of Physiological Heart Murmurs (Endocardial) in
Healthy Individuals, The Medical Record, April 20, 1889.
200. The emotional factor is a source of possible fallacy in all
observations on arterial tension and must be guarded against.
201. Frederick Peterson and C. G. Jung: Psycho-Physical
Investigations with the Galvanometer and Pneumograph, Brain, Vol.
XXX, July, 1907, p. 153.
202. The Work of the Digestive Glands (English Translation), London,
02.
203. For a summary of Cannon’s work, see his article, Recent
Advances in the Physiology of the Digestive Organs Bearing on
Medicine and Surgery, The Medical Journal of Medical Sciences, 1906,
New Series, Vol. CXXXI, pp. 563-578.
 204. American Journal of Medical Sciences, 1906, p. 566. See also
“The Influence of Emotional States on the Functions of the Alimentary
Canal,” by the same writer (ibid., April, 1909) for an interesting résumé
of the subject.
205. American Journal of the Medical Sciences, April, 1909.
206. Cannon and de la Paz: American Journal of Physiology, April 1,
1911.
207. Cannon, Shohl, and Wright, Ibid., December 1, 1911.
208. These effects of adrenalin suggest that the secretion may take
some part in pathological anxiety states.
209. Pathologie des Emotions, 1892.
The influence of emotion on the muscular system need hardly be more
than referred to. Tremor, twitchings, particularly of the facial muscles,
and other involuntary movements, as well as modifications of the tonus
of the muscles, are common effects. All sorts of disturbances occur,
ranging from increase of excitability to paralysis. Everyone knows that
under the influence of powerful emotion, whether of joy, anger, or fear,
there is discharged an increase of energy to the muscles, sometimes of an
intensity which enables an individual to
210. The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, p. 266.
211. Note sur les modifications de la résistance électrique sous
l’influence des excitations sensorielles et des émotions, C. R. Soc. de
Biologie, 1888, p. 217.
212. Psycho-Physical Investigations with the Galvanometer and
Pneumograph in Normal and Insane Individuals, Brain, Vol. XXX, July,
1907.
213. Psychological Review, November, 1908, and January, 1909.
214. The Nature and Causation of the Galvanic Phenomena,
Psychological Review, March, 1910, Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
June-July, 1910.
215. Having demonstrated the development of electromotive force
within the body, these experimenters assumed that every psycho-
galvanic reaction was of this type. But plainly, their results do not
contradict the phenomenon of diminished resistance of the body to an
electric current brought about by emotion stimulating the sweat glands.
The evidence indicates, as I have said, two types of psycho-galvanic
phenomena.
216. On Certain Electrical Processes in the Human Body and Their
Relation to Emotional Reactions, Archives of Psychology, March, 1911.
 217. Morbid self-consciousness is commonly accompanied by fear
and other emotions. Nausea, although the specific manifestation of
disgust, not rarely is induced by fear.
218. A good example is that of an extreme “neurasthenic,” who had
been reduced to a condition of severe inanition from inability to take a
proper amount of food because of failure of digestion, nausea, and
vomiting. Examined by numerous and able physicians in this country
and Europe, none had been able to recognize any organic disease or the
true cause of the gastric difficulty which remained a puzzle. As a
therapeutic measure her stomach had been continuously and regularly
washed out. Yet it was not difficult to recognize, after analyzing the
symptoms and the conditions of their occurrence, that the disturbances of
the gastric functions were due to complex mental factors, the chief of
which, emotion, inhibited the gastric function, as in Cannon’s
experiments, and indirectly or directly, induced the nausea and vomiting.
The correctness of this diagnosis was recognized by the attending
physician and patient. Sometimes a phobia complicates a true organic
disease and produces symptoms which mimic the symptoms of the latter
—heart disease, for example. In this case it is often difficult to recognize
the purely phobic character of the symptoms. O. H. C. was such a case.
Though there was severe valvular disease of the heart, compensation was
good and there was little if any cardiac disability. The attacks of
dyspnœa and other symptoms were unmistakably the physical
manifestation of a phobia of the disease. The phobia had been artificially
created by overcautious physicians.
219. One has only to compare routine out-patient hospital records with
the actual state of patients to verify the truth of this statement. For
purposes of instruction I have frequently done this before the class. The
true nature of the psycho-neurosis and the irrelevancy of the routine
record and diagnosis have, I believe, been commonly made manifest.
Sometimes, however, of course, phobias complicate other diseases, and
we have a mixed symptomatology.
 LECTURE XV
INSTINCTS, SENTIMENTS, AND CONFLICTS

It is generally agreed that emotions proper (as distinguished from

other affective states) may be divided into those which are primary
(anger, fear, disgust, etc.), and those (jealousy, admiration, hatred, etc.),
which are compounded of two or more primary emotions. McDougall
has made a great contribution to our knowledge in having made clear
that a primary emotion is not only instinctive, but is the central or
psychical element in a reflex process consisting, besides, of an ingoing
stimulus and an outgoing impulse. The whole process is the instinct.[220]
It is of course innate, and depends on congenital prearrangements of the
nervous system. The central element, the emotion, provides the conative
or impulse force which carries the instinct to fulfilment. It is the motive
power, the dynamic agent that executes, that propels the response which
follows the stimulus. Though we speak of anger and fear, for example, as
instincts, McDougall is unquestionably right in insisting that more
correctly speaking the activated instinct is a process in which the
emotion is only one factor—the psychical. The instincts of anger and
fear should more precisely be termed respectively “pugnacity with the
emotion of anger” and “flight with the emotion of fear.” In the one case,
the emotion, as the central reaction to a stimulus, by its conative force
impels to pugnacity; in the other fear impels to flight; and so with the
other instincts and their emotions which I would suggest may be termed
arbitrarily the emotion-instincts, to distinguish them from the more
general instincts and innate dispositions with which animal psychology
chiefly deals, and in which the affective element is feebler or has less of
the specific psychical quality. For brevity’s sake, however, we may speak
of the instinct of anger, fear, tender feeling, etc. Of course they are
biological in their nature.
This formulation, by McDougall, of emotion as one factor in an
instinctive process must be regarded as one of the most important
contributions to our knowledge of the mechanism of emotion. It can
scarcely be traversed, as it is little more than a descriptive statement of
observed facts. It is strange that this conception of the process should
have been so long overlooked. Its value lies in replacing vagueness with
a precise conception of one of the most important of psychological
phenomena, and enables us to clearly understand the part played by
emotion in mental processes. It also shows clearly the inadequacy of the
objective methods of normal psychology when attempting to investigate
emotion by measuring the discharge of its impulsive force in one
direction only, namely, the disturbances of the functions of the viscera
(vasomotor, glandular, etc.). It discharges also along lines of mental
activity and conduct.
When studying the organization of complexes, and in other lectures,
we saw, as everyone knows in a general way, that affects may become
linked with ideas, and that the force derived from this association gives
to the ideas intensity and conative influence. Further, it was developed
that the linking of a strong affect tends to stronger registration and
conservation of experiences. This linking of an affect to an idea is one of
the foundation stones of the pathology of the psycho-neuroses. One
might say that upon it “hangs all the law and the prophets.”

Inasmuch as a sentiment, even in the connotations of popular

language, besides being an idea always involves an affective element, it
is obvious that a sentiment is an idea of an object with which one or
more emotions are organized. But, obvious as it is, it remained for Mr.
Shand, as McDougall reminds us, to make this precise definition. It is
hardly a discovery as the latter puts it, as the facts themselves have been
long known; but it is a valuable definition and its value lies in helping us
to think clearly. Nearly every idea, if not every idea, has an affective tone
of some kind, or is one of a complex of ideas endowed with such tone.
This tone may be weak so as to be hardly recognizable, or it may be
strong. Now, if emotion is one factor in an instinctive process, it is
evident that a sentiment more precisely is an idea of an object linked or
organized with one or more “emotion-instincts.” As McDougall has
precisely phrased it, “A sentiment is an organized system of emotional
dispositions centered about the idea of some object.” The impulsive
force of the emotional dispositions or linked instincts becomes the
conative force of the idea, and it is this factor which carries the idea to
fruition. This is one of the most important principles of functional
psychology. Its value can scarcely be exaggerated. Without the impulse
of a linked emotion ideas would be lifeless, dead, inert, incapable of
determining conduct. But when we say that an emotion becomes linked
to, i.e., organized with that composite called an idea, we really mean
(according to this theory of emotion) that it is the whole instinct, the
emotional innate disposition of which the emotion is only a part that is
so linked. The instinct has also afferent and efferent activities. The latter
is an impulsive or conative force discharged by the emotion. Thus the
affective element of an instinctive process—a process which is a
biological reaction—provides the driving force, makes the idea a
dynamic factor, moves us to carry the idea to fulfilment. As McDougall
has expressed it:
"We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human
activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from
some instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne
along toward its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive
impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental
activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly
developed mind is but a means toward these ends, is but the instrument by which these
impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their
choice of the means.
“Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism
would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a
wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed, or a steam engine whose fires had
been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of
individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and
mind and will.”[221]

Furthermore the organization of the emotions with ideas to form

sentiments is essential for self-control and regulation of conduct, and
becomes a safeguard against mental, physiological, and social chaos.
“The growth of the sentiments is of the utmost importance for the character and conduct of
individuals and of societies; it is the organization of the affective and conative life. In the
absence of sentiments our emotional life would be a mere chaos, without order, consistency, or
continuity of any kind; and all our social relations and conduct, being based on the emotions
and their impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic, unpredictable, and unstable. It is only
through the systematic organization of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the
volitional control of the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible. Again,
our judgments of value and of merit are rooted in our sentiments; and our moral principles
have the same source, for they are formed by our judgments of moral value.”[222]

Summing up, then, we may say one of the chief functions of emotion is
to provide the conative force which enables ideas to fulfill their aims,
and one of the chief functions of sentiments to control and regulate the
emotions.
Besides the instinctive dispositions proper there are other innate
dispositions which similarly provide conative force and determine
activities. For the practical purposes of the problems with which we are
concerned, the conative or impulsive forces of all such innate
dispositions and the sentiments which they help to form are here, it
should be understood, considered together and included under instincts.

The conative function of emotion.—I shall take up in a later

lecture[223] (in connection with the psychogenesis of multiple personality)
the instincts and sentiments for discussion in more detail. The point to
which I wish in this connection to call attention is that when a simple
emotion-instinct, or an idea linked with an instinct (a sentiment) is
awakened by any stimulus, its impulsive force is discharged in three
directions: the first is toward the excitation of those articulated
movements and ideas which guide and carry the instinct to fruition—to
fight in the case of anger, to flee in the case of fear, to cherish in the case
of love, etc. Second (accessory to the first) the excitation of many of the
various visceral functions which we have reviewed reinforces the
instinctive movements; e. g., for pugnacity or flight the increased
respiration and activity of the heart increase the supply of oxygen and
blood to the muscles; the secretion of sweat regulates the temperature
during increased activity, the increased secretion of adrenalin and the
increased secretion of sugar may, as Cannon suggests, respectively keep
up the emotional state (after the cause of the fear or anger has subsided)
and meet the demand of the muscles for an extra supply of food, etc.
Later experiments of Cannon seem to show that the adrenal secretion
removes the fatigue of muscles; and, further, that stimulation of the
splanchic nerves will largely recover fatigued muscles, increasing the
efficiency as much as 100 per cent.[224] As emotion discharges its
impulses along splanchic pathways to the adrenal glands, the inference
as to the function of emotion in overcoming fatigue is obvious.
As to the sensory accompaniments of emotion, it is quite reasonable to
suppose that their rôle is to supplement and reinforce in consciousness
the affect, thereby aiding in arousing the individual to a full appreciation
of the situation and to such voluntary effort (whether to guide and assist
the instinct to its fulfillment or to repress it) as, in the light of past
experiences, his judgment dictates. These sensory disturbances on this
theory act as additional warnings in consciousness where the affect
proper might be too weak.[225] Their function would be like that of pain in
the case of organic disease. Pain is a biological reaction and a warning to
the individual to rest the diseased part,[226] as well as a danger signal.
The third direction which the discharge of the impulsive force of the
emotion takes is toward the repression of the conflicting conative force
of such other emotions as would act in an antagonistic direction.[227] The
utility of the discharge in this direction is supplementary to that of the
excitation of the visceral functions: the former protects against the
invasion of counteracting forces, the latter strengthens the force of the
impulse in question.
Conflicts thus arise. When an emotion is aroused a conflict necessarily
occurs between its impulse and that of any other existing affective state,
the impulse of which is antagonistic to the aim of the former.
Consequently instincts and sentiments which, through the conative force
of their emotion, tend to drive the conduct of the individual in a course in
opposition to that of a newly aroused emotion (instinct) meet with
resistance. Whichever instinct or sentiment, meaning whichever impulse,
is the stronger necessarily downs the other; inhibits the central and
efferent parts of the process—ideas, emotions and impulses—though the
afferent part conveys the stimulus to the central factor. Thus processes of
thought to which the inhibited sentiment or instinct would normally give
rise, or with which it is systematized, are likewise inhibited and behavior
correspondingly modified. These statements are only descriptive of what
is common experience. If one recalls to mind the principal primary
emotions (instincts) such as the sexual, anger, fear, tender feeling,
hunger, self-abasement, self-assertion, curiosity, etc., this is seen to be an
obvious biological truth.[228] Fear is suppressed by anger, tender feeling,
or curiosity (wonder), and vice versa; hunger and the sexual instinct by
disgust.
What is true of the primitive instincts and their primary emotions is
also true of compound instincts (emotions) and of sentiments, i.e., ideas
about which one or several emotions are systematized. We may,
therefore, for brevity’s sake, speak of a conflict of ideas or sentiments or
emotions or instincts indiscriminately. In other words, any affective state
may be suppressed by conflict with another and stronger affective state.
A timid mother, impelled by the parental instinct, has no fear of danger
to herself when her child is threatened. The instinct of pugnacity (anger)
in this case not being antagonistic (in conflict) is not only not suppressed
but may be awakened as a reaction to aid in the expression of the
parental instinct. Per contra, when anger would conflict with this
instinct, as when the child does wrong, the anger is suppressed by the
parental instinct. Conversely, the sentiment of love for a particular
person may be completely suppressed by jealousy and anger. Hatred of a
person may expel from consciousness previous sentiments of sympathy,
justice, pity, respect, fear, etc. The animal under the influence of the
parental instinct may be incapable of fear in defense of its young,
particularly if anger is excited. Fear may be suppressed in an animal or
human being if either is impelled by great curiosity over a strange object.
Instead of taking to flight, the animal may stand still in wonder. Similarly
in man, curiosity to examine, for example, an explosive—an unexploded
shell or bomb—inhibits the fear of danger often, as we know, with
disastrous results. The suppression of the sexual instinct by conflict is
one of the most notorious of the experiences of this kind in everyday life.
This instinct cannot be excited during an attack of fear and anger, and
even during moments of its excitation, if there is an invasion of another
strong emotion the sexual instinct at once is repressed. Under these
conditions, as with other instincts, even habitual excitants can no longer
initiate the instinctive process. Chloe would appeal in vain to her lover if
he were suddenly seized with fright or she had inadvertently awakened
in him an intense jealousy or anger. Similarly the instinct may be
suppressed, particularly in men, as every psycho-pathologist has
observed, by the awakening of the instinct of self-subjection with its
emotion of self-abasement (McDougall) with fear, shown in the
sentiments of incapacity, shame, etc. The authors of “Vous n’avez rien à
declarer” makes this the principal theme in this laughable drama. Indeed
the principle of the suppression of one instinct by conflict with another
has been made use of by writers of fiction and drama in all times.
This principle of inhibition by conflict allows us to understand the
imperative persistence (if not the genesis) of certain sexual perversions
in otherwise healthy-minded and normal people who have a loathing for
such perversions in other people but can not overcome them in
themselves. H. O., for example, has such a perversion, and yet the idea
of this perversion in another person excites a lively emotion of disgust.
In other words, at bottom, as we say, she is right-minded. How then
account for the continuance of a self practice which she reprobates in
another, censures in herself, and desires to be free of, and why does not
the instinct of repulsion, and the sentiment of self respect, etc., act in
herself as a safeguard? Introspective examination shows that when the
sexual emotion is awakened, disgust and the sentiments of pride and self
respect are suppressed, and the momentarily activating instinct
determines all sorts of sophistical reasoning by which the perversion is
justified to herself. As soon as the instinct accomplishes its aim it
becomes exhausted, and at once intense disgust, meeting with no
opposition, becomes awakened and in turn determines once more her
right-minded ideas. Based upon this mechanism one therapeutic
procedure would be to organize artificially so intense sentiments of
disgust for the perversion and of self-respect that they would suppress
the sexual impulse.[229]
Likewise the intense religious emotions (awe, reverence, self-
abasement, divine love, etc.) may, if sufficiently strong, suppress the
opposing instincts of anger, fear, play, and self-assertion, and emotions
compounded of them. Examples might be cited from the lives of
religious martyrs and fanatics.
If it is true that “the instincts are the prime movers of all human
activity,” and that through their systematic organization with ideas into
sentiments they are so harnessed and brought under subjection that they
can be utilized for the well-being of the individual; and if through this
harnessing the immediate promptings of the emotions are brought under
volitional control, then all conduct, in the last analysis, is determined by
the conative force of instincts[230] (and other innate dispositions)
harnessed though they be to ideas. For though volition itself can control,
reinforce, and determine the particular sentiment and thus govern
conduct,—reinforce, for instance, a weaker abstract moral sentiment so
that it shall dominate any lower brutish instinct or sentiment with which
it conflicts, still, volition must be a more complex form of conation and
itself issue from sentiments.
We need not enter into this troublesome problem of the nature of the
will;[231] nor does it concern us. It is enough for our purpose to recognize
that volition can reinforce a sentiment and thus take part in conflicts. In
this way undesirable instincts and sentiments can he voluntarily
overcome and inhibited or repressed and mental processes and conduct
determined.
Nor are we concerned here with conduct which pertains more properly
to social psychology. Our task is much more limited and simple, namely
to inquire into the immediate conscious phenomena provoked by
emotion, just as we have studied the physiological phenomena. We have
seen that one such phenomenon is inhibition or repression of antagonistic
instincts and sentiments provoked by conflict. (We shall see later that a
conflict may arise between a conscious and an entirely subconscious
sentiment with similar resulting phenomena.)

Repression of individual instincts may be lasting.—The repressions

resulting from conflict which we have just been considering have been of
a temporary nature lasting only just so long as the conflict has lasted. It
is instructive to note that just as an instinct can be cultivated until it
becomes a ruling trait in the character, so it can be permanently
repressed, or so intensely repressed that it cannot be awakened excepting
by unusual excitants or under unusual conditions. Such a persisting
repression may be brought about either directly by volitional conflict or
indirectly through the cultivation of antagonistic sentiments. The
cultivation of an instinct is a common enough observation. Every one
can point to some one of his acquaintance who has so fostered his
instinct of anger or fear, has so cultivated the habit of one or the other
reaction that he has become the slave of his emotion. Conversely, by the
conative force of the will, and still more successfully by the cultivation
of appropriate moral and religious and other sentiments, and complexes
or “settings” systematized about those sentiments, a person can inhibit
any instinct or any sentiment organized with that instinct. A bad-
tempered person can thus, if he chooses, become good-tempered; a
coward, a brave person; a person governed by the instinct of self-
subjection can repress it by the cultivation of sentiments of self-
assertion, and so on. The complete repression of unchristian instincts and
sentiments is the acquired characteristic of the saintly character. The
cultivation and repression of character traits and tendencies along these
lines obviously belong to the domains of the psychology of character,
social psychology, and criminology. But the persisting repression of at
least one instinct—the sexual instinct—may take on pathological
significance[232] while that of sentiments may lead to pathological
dissociation and to the formation of disturbing subconscious states. To
this latter type of repression we shall presently return.

That the sexual instinct may be involuntarily and persistently

repressed by conflict is shown by the following case:
F. S. presented herself at the hospital clinic because of hysterical
epileptiform attacks of six months’ duration. The attacks, which had
been caused by an emotional trauma, were easily cured by suggestion.
After recovery she fell into lamentations over the fact that she was sterile
owing to both ovaries having been removed three years before because
of pelvic disease. Just before the operation she had also suffered from an
emotional trauma (fear). Although complete recovery from her
symptoms had followed the operation, the sexual instinct had been
abolished for three years. She was now much distressed over her
inability to have children, complaining it had led to domestic infelicity,
and apprehending divorce which had been threatened on the ground of
her sterility. Having confidence in the strength of certain fundamental
principles of human nature, and disbelieving the reasons alleged by the
husband for divorce, I was able to restore domestic felicity, as well as
demonstrate the psycho-physiological principle that the instinct was not
lost but only inhibited. A single suggestion in hypnosis, psychologically
constructed so as to bear a strong conative impulse that would overcome
any other conflicting affective impulses and carry itself to fruition,
restored not only the lost function[233] but conjugal happiness. That the
instinct had only been inhibited is obvious. Whether the repressing factor
had been fear or an involuntary auto-suggestion was not determined.
The following case is instructive not only because of the lasting
dissociation of this instinct as a result of a conflict, but because the
dissociation was volitionally and intentionally effected as a revenge.
Other interesting features are the transference of the repressing revenge
affect to an object (clothes which became an amulet or fetish to protect
from sexual approaches, and the building of a complex (“raw oyster”)
which became the bearer of the repressing force. X. Y. Z. received a deep
wound to her pride on the first night of her honeymoon when her
husband forgot his bride of a few hours who was awaiting him in the
nuptial chamber. Happening to meet in the hotel some political
acquaintances after the bride had retired, he became absorbed in a
political discussion and—forgot! When he appeared after a prolonged
absence and presented his excuses she was hurt in her pride and offended
to think that she was of so little importance to him that he could become
interested in talking politics.[234] There was anger too, and she vowed to
herself to show, or, to use her own words, she “would be hanged if” she
would show that she had any liking for or any interest in the marital
intimacy. (She had never hitherto experienced any sexual feelings and,
like most young girls, was entirely ignorant of the physical side.
Nevertheless, from what she had been told, she had idealized the
spiritual union of husband and wife and anticipated pleasurable
experiences.) So purposely she repressed any interest, made herself
absolutely indifferent to her spouse’s amorous attentions and experienced
absolutely no sexual feeling; and so it continued for some days. In view
of what later happened, and what we know of conflicts, we must believe
that the impulses which carried her volition to fruition came from the
emotions of anger, pride, and revenge.
Then one afternoon, just after she had finished dressing herself
preparatory to going out, her husband came into her room and made
advances to her. The idea appealed to her and she became emotionally
excited at the thought. But in the middle of the act when the libido began
to be aroused, suddenly she remembered that she had been snubbed at
the first and that her rôle was to show no liking or interest. There were
reawakened the emotions of pride, anger, and revenge, although not
malicious revenge. Impelled by these emotions she actually gave herself
suggestions to effect her purpose—a determination to get square with the
past. She said to herself, “I must not like it; I must put it away back in
my mind, I must become flabby as an oyster.” Thereupon she became
“perfectly limp and uninterested and the feelings of flabbiness came
over” her, and the beginning sexual feeling subsided at once. (That day
she had eaten some raw oysters and had been impressed by them as the
essence of flabbiness.) She admitted having continued during succeeding
years to cherish this revengeful feeling as to the sexual relation—to get
square with the past. She defended it, however, (although admitting the
childishness of the original episode) on the ground that the slight to her
pride must be viewed in connection with a long series of antecedent
experiences. These must therefore be viewed as the setting which gave
meaning to her idea of sexual relations with her husband. After this at the
sexual approach under conventional marital conditions she for a time
always volitionally induced this flabby “raw-oyster” sensation and
feeling. Later it would automatically arise at the first indication or
suggestion of the approach and counteract the libido. It was now no
longer necessary to be on guard, knowing she could not be taken
unawares. The consequence has been that the patient has never
consciously experienced any sexual feeling beyond those first beginnings
at the time of the experience when she was fully dressed. The patient can
produce the “raw-oyster” state at will and exhibited it voluntarily during
the examination. The state as then observed was one of lethargy or
extreme relaxation. There was no general anæsthesia; pinching and
pricking was felt perfectly, but, as she remarked, they carried no
sensation of discomfort. “I do not care at the moment,” she explained,
“what any one does to me; no sensation would cause pleasure or
discomfort.” To arouse the state she thinks of the sexual approach first,
and then the state comes. The sexual instinct has never been aroused by
reading, or associative ideas of any kind. “It does not exist,” to quote her
words.
Clothes became an amulet of protection in the following way: Ever
since that afternoon when she was taken unawares in her clothes (and
“almost liked it”) she realized and feared that sexual approaches when
she was fully clothed might arouse the sexual instinct. Consequently she
was more on her guard when fully clothed than at night for fear of being
taken unawares. The idea that she must be on her guard when clothed
became fixed, and, at first, when in this condition, she was always on her
guard ready to defend herself by pugnacity. Then any approach at such
times, if accompanied by physical contact, awakened an instinctive
reaction which became a defense; it aroused the instincts of fear and
anger. Any affectionate demonstration suggestive of the approach on the
part of her husband would arouse these defensive instincts. On the other
hand, when half dressed there has been no such ebullition of emotion;
she has in consequence always believed that having clothes on would
protect her against admirers. Indeed, as a fact, this is so, for any show of
affection from any one manifested by a touch, even the friendly pat of
the hand, will cause an unnecessary and unreasonable outburst of
uncontrollable anger, such as to astonish and startle the offender.
Clothes, becoming thus a sentiment in which the instincts of flight and
pugnacity are incorporated, have also become a protection in themselves
—an amulet to ward off danger.
What reason, it may be asked, is there for believing that the sexual
instinct really exists in this case, and is only repressed or dissociated? I
may not state all the reasons; it is sufficient to say that the evidence is to
be found in dreams. The large number of sexual dreams which the
subject has experienced, many of them accompanied by realistic sexual
manifestations and not symbolic only, leave no doubt of this fact.[235]

Conflicts with subconscious sentiments. Thus far we have been

considering conflicts between sentiments and emotional processes which
have been in the full light of consciousness. But in previous lectures we
have seen that ideas with strong emotional tones may be dissociated and
function below the threshold of consciousness as coconscious processes.
It is theoretically possible, therefore, that conflicts might arise between a
dissociated coconscious sentiment and one that is antagonistic to it in
consciousness. To appreciate this theoretical condition let me point out
that there is one important difference between the ultimate consequences
of the repression of an instinct and of a sentiment. If an instinct is
repressed (it being only an innate disposition) it ceases to be an active
factor in the functioning organism. It is inhibited. A stimulus that
ordinarily suffices to excite it fails to do so, and it may respond only to
an extraordinarily powerful stimulus, or perhaps none will awaken it.
Thus abstinence from food fails to awaken a sense of hunger in a person
who has lost this instinct for any reason, even though appetizing food be
placed before him.[236] Similarly anger, or fear, or tender emotion, or self-
assertion, or disgust, in certain persons cannot be awakened excepting by
very unusual stimuli. In other words, the psycho-physiological reflex is
completely or relatively in abeyance just as much so as is an organic
reflex (e. g., the knee-jerk) which has been inhibited. Normally, of
course, it is rare for an instinct to be absolutely inhibited excepting
temporarily, as has been explained, during a conflict with another
instinct. In certain pathological conditions (e. g., dissociated personality),
almost any instinct may be persistently inhibited. In normal conditions
there is, however, one exception, namely the sexual instinct, which, as
we have seen from instances cited, may be inhibited during long periods
of time. In women this inhibition is common and is effected, as I believe,
by the subtle and insensible influence of the environment of the child and
by social education, in other words, by the social taboo. Wherever
inhibition occurs observation would seem to show that the psycho-
physiological function has ceased to take part in the functioning
organism.
With sentiments, however, the case stands differently. A sentiment,
being an idea about which a system of emotional dispositions has been
organized, when repressed by conflict, or when simply out of mind,
whether capable of reproduction as memory or not, may, like all ideas,
still be conserved, as we have seen, as an unconscious neurogram. As we
have also seen, so long as it is conserved it is still a part of the
personality. Even though repressed it is not necessarily absolutely
inhibited but may be simply dissociated and then be able to take on
dissociated subconscious activity. As a subconscious process the idea
continues still organized with its emotional dispositions, and the conative
forces of these, under certain conditions, may continue striving to give
expression to the idea. We have already become familiar with one
phenomenon of this striving, namely, the emerging into consciousness of
the emotional element of the sentiment while the idea remains
subconscious, thus producing an unaccountable fear or joy, feelings of
pleasure or pain, etc. (p. 381).
1. This being so, it having been determined that under certain
conditions any conserved experience may become activated as a
dissociated subconscious process, it is theoretically quite possible that
the impulses of an activated subconscious sentiment might come into
conflict with the impulses of a conscious process—the two being
antagonistic. The resulting phenomena might be the same as when both
factors to the contest are in consciousness. In such a conflict if the
impulsive force of the subconscious sentiment is the stronger the
conscious ideas, sentiments, and feelings—in short, the conscious
process—would be repressed, and vice versa. Or if the subconscious
sentiment got the worst of the conflict and could not repress the
conscious process, the former, being dissociated and an independent
“automatic” process, might theoretically induce various other
phenomena in the effort to fulfil its aim. If it could not directly overcome
the impulses of the conscious process it might circumvent the latter by
inducing mental and physiological disturbances which would indirectly
prevent the conscious impulses from fulfilling their aim; e. g., inhibition
of the will, dissociation or total inhibition of consciousness, amnesia for
particular memories, motor phenomena interfering with normal activity,
etc. The subconscious sentiment engaging in such a conflict could be
excited to activity by any associative antagonistic idea in consciousness.
It should be noted that the subject being entirely unaware of the
subconscious process would not know the cause of the resulting
phenomena.
2. Now, in fact, such hypothetical conflicts and phenomena are
actually observed in very neat and precise form under experimental
conditions, particularly in pathological or quasi-pathological subjects.
These conditions are particularly instructive as they allow us to clearly
recognize the subconscious character of the conflicting process and
detect the exact sentiment concerned therein.

The following experiment illustrative of such a conflict between a

conscious and subconscious process I have repeated many times in one
subject with the same resulting phenomenon. It has been demonstrated
on several occasions to psychologists and others. On the first occasion
when the phenomenon was observed it was entirely spontaneous and
unexpected as also has since been frequently the case.
B. C. A. in one phase of alternating personality (B) was asked to
mention a certain complex of ideas which was known to have been
organized about a distressing “sentiment” in another phase (C) causing
considerable unhappiness. This sentiment included a strong emotion of
pride in consequence of which she had in the C phase intense objections
to revealing these ideas. As she herself said, she “would have gone to the
stake first.” Phase B has no such sentiment, but on the contrary the ideas
in question were only amusing to her.[237] In phase B, therefore, she not
only had no objection to revealing the sentiment distressing to C but
desired for therapeutic reasons to do so. In accordance with this
difference of sentiments the difference in the attitude of mind in the two
phases toward the same experience was quite striking. The impulse in the
one was to conceal the experiences and sentiment, in the other to divulge
them.
Now, in reply to an interrogatory as to what was distressing in the C
phase, B begins to mention the sentiment. At once, and to her
astonishment, her lips and tongue are tied by painful spasms involving,
also, the throat muscles. She becomes dumb, unable to overcome the
resistance. She struggles in vain to speak. When she gives up the struggle
to pronounce the forbidden words she speaks with ease on other subjects
saying “something prevented me from speaking.” Each time that she
endeavors to turn State’s evidence and to peach on herself, the same
struggle is repeated. When she persists in her effort, using all her will-
power, the effect of the conflicting force extends to consciousness. Her
thoughts become first confused, then obliterated, and she falls back in
her seat limp, paralyzed, and apparently unconscious. The thoughts to
which she strove to give expression have disappeared. She now cannot
even will to speak.
But she is not really unconscious, it is only another phase; there is
only a dissociation or inhibition of the consciousness comprising the
system of ideas making up the B phase and an awakening of another
restricted system. When automatic writing is tried, it is found that a
limited field of consciousness is present in which are to be found the
ideas which opposed the resistance. A precise statement of the opposing
factors (volition) which offered the resistance and brought about the
conflict, the spasm of the vocal apparatus, and finally inhibition or
dissociation of consciousness, is obtained from this dissociated restricted
field.[238]
This phenomenon carries its own interpretation on its face and cannot
be doubted. Certain sentiments, for the moment dormant and outside the
focus of awareness of the subject, are “struck” or stimulated by
memories within that focus. The conative force of the conscious wishes
to which the subject seeks to give expression meets with the resistance of
a similar and more powerful force from the previously dormant
sentiment. The latter carries itself to fulfilment and controls the vocal
apparatus at first, and then, finding itself likely to be overcome by the
will-power of the personality, annihilates the latter by the inhibition and
dissociation of consciousness.
Various forms of the same phenomenon of conflict with subconscious
processes I have experimentally demonstrated in Miss B. and O. N.
Spontaneous manifestations of the same have also been frequently
observed in all three subjects. In the published account of Miss B.[239]
numerous examples are given. I will merely refer to the attacks of
aboulia, the dissociations of consciousness and inhibition of thought, and
of speech resulting in stuttering and dumbness, the inhibition of motor
activity, the induction of systematized anesthesia and alexia, etc. In the
prolonged study of the case I was the witness, I was going to say, of
innumerable exhibitions of such manifestations, and the book is replete
with examples of conflicts between opposing mental processes. B. C. A.
in her account, “My Life as a Dissociated Personality,”[240] has described
similar spontaneous phenomena. It is worth noting in this connection that
the commonplace phenomena of systematized anesthesia (negative
hallucinations) may be induced by conflict with a subconscious process
motivated by strong emotion. Thus Miss B. in one of her phases could
not see the writing on a sheet of paper which appeared blank to her; on
another occasion she could not see the printing of the pages of a French
novel which she therefore took to be a blank book, nor could she see a
bookcase containing French books.[241] The subconscious conflicting
ideas were motivated by anger in the one case and jealousy in the other.
That the conflicting ideas in this case were elements synthesized in a
large dissociated system or subconscious self in no way affects the
principle, which is that of conflict between processes. The conflicting
process in such conditions is a more complex one, that is all.
Undoubtedly the systematized anesthesia, so easily induced by hypnotic
suggestion and which has been made the subject of much study, may be
explained on the same principle, although the affective elements are not
so obtrusive. The conflict is between the personal volition of the subject
to see the marked playing-card, if that is the test object used in the
experiment, and the suggested idea not to see it. The latter wins if the
experiment is successful and inhibits the perception of the card—i. e.,
dissociates it from the focus of awareness. (The emotional tones
involved are obscure; possibly they are curiosity on the one hand vs.
self-subjection on the other.)
The unconscious resistance to suggestion is probably of the same
nature. Every one knows that it is difficult to hypnotize a person who
resists the suggestion. This resistance may come from a counter auto-
suggestion which may be entirely involuntary, perhaps a conviction on
the part of the subject that she cannot be hypnotized, or an unwillingness
to be—i.e., desire not to be hypnotized or fear. The same is true of
waking a person from hypnosis. In other words, an antagonistic
preparedness of the mind blocks involuntarily the suggestion. A very
pretty illustration is the following: H. O. discovered that she could easily
and rapidly hypnotize herself by simply passing her own fingers over her
eyelids, but she could not wake herself out of hypnosis. She then
discovered that, if she first gave herself the suggestion that she would
wake when she desired, she could quickly do so. Likewise, if she
suggested to herself that she could not hypnotize herself the customary
procedure was without effect. Though this observation is a common
phenomenon the rapidity and ease with which the phenomenon was
demonstrated were as striking as it was amusing to watch her struggle to
awake when the preparatory anticipatory autosuggestion had not been
given.
In O. N. more complicated phenomena induced by conflicts with
subconscious complexes have been equally precise and striking. In this
subject I find, as the result of repeated observations, that, in order that a
suggestion, that is antagonistic to a preexisting attitude of mind
possessing a strong feeling tone, shall not be resisted in hypnosis, it must
be first formally accepted by the personality before hypnosis is induced.
If this viewpoint is not preformed, after hypnosis is induced the blocking
attitude cannot be altered. Practically this means that the subject shall
bring into consciousness and disclose ideas with which the intended
suggestion will conflict and shall modify them voluntarily. This she does
by first candidly accepting a new point of view, and then, secondly, by a
technical procedure of her own, namely, by preparing her mind not to
resist in hypnosis. This procedure, briefly stated and simplified, is as
follows: she first says to herself, “I will ‘take out’ that [resisting] idea.”
Then she arranges in her thoughts the ideas of acceptance which she will
substitute. Then she puts herself into a state of abstraction (hypnosis) and
suggests to herself that the resisting idea is taken out and that my
intended suggestion shall be her viewpoint. Even then, sometimes, when
the resisting idea is one harking back to a long past period of life and
belonging to a pathologically organized “mood,” known as the “b mood”
or state, the acceptance of the suggestion may be ineffectual. Under these
circumstances and when the hypnotic dissociation is carried too far, so
that the hypnotic state is reduced to the “b mood,” the previously auto-
suggested acceptance of the idea by the patient is thereby ostracized
from the hypnotic field and is unable to play its part and have effect. So
much by way of explanation. Now when the precaution has not been
taken to see that any resisting idea has been “taken out” and when the
intended suggestion has not been accepted, one of the following
phenomena is observed: (1) the hypnotic personality when the
suggestion is given becomes “automatically” and unconsciously restless,
endeavors, without knowing why, to avoid listening, and to push me
away, shifting her attitude and struggling to withdraw herself from
contact or proximity—all the time the face expressing hostility and
disapproval in its features; or (2) complete obnubilation of consciousness
supervenes so that the suggestions are not heard; or (3) the subject
suddenly wakes up. The last frequently happens as often as the
suggestion is repeated; and yet in hypnosis (and also, of course, when
awake), the subject is unaware of what causes the resistance and the
resulting phenomena. But if now the subject is warned of what has
occurred and accepts the suggestion by the procedure mentioned (unless
the “b mood” I have mentioned recurs), the resistance and other
phenomena at once cease and the suggestion takes effect. Thus in this
case the conflicting ideas can always be precisely determined and the
conditions of the experiment arranged at will and the results controlled.
It is obvious that all three phenomena are different modes by which the
subconscious idea resists the suggested idea and accomplishes its aim.

3. In entire accordance with the experimental results are certain

pathological disturbances which from time to time interrupt the course
of everyday life of this subject, O. N. These disturbances consist of one
or more of the following: a dissociative state in which the pathological
“b mood” is dominant; a lethargic state; twilight state; complete
repression of certain normal sentiments and instincts; complete alteration
of previously established points of view; morbid self-reproach;
nervousness, restlessness, agitation; anger at opposition; indecision of
thought, etc. Now, whenever such phenomena recur, with practical
certainty, they can always be traced by the use of technical methods to a
conflict with a turbulent sentiment (in which strong emotional tones are
incorporated) previously lying dormant in the unconscious. Sometimes
the turbulent sentiment can be definitely traced to childhood’s
experiences. Very often it has been intentionally formed and put into her
mind by the subject herself for the very purpose of inducing the
repression of other sentiments, to which for one reason or another for the
time being she objects, and of changing her habitual point of view. Her
method of artificially accomplishing this result is exceedingly
instructive. It is similar to the auto-suggestive process I have described in
connection with the hypnotic experiments. Having first prearranged her
psychological plan, she proceeds to put herself into abstraction and to
“take out”, as she calls it, her previous sentiment (or instinct) and