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EN BANC

IN RE: ATTY. LORENZO G. A.C. No. 13521

GADON'S VIRAL VIDEO
AGAINST RAISSA ROBLES Present:

GESMUNDO, CJ ,*
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,
KHO, JR., and
SINGH, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 27, 2023

x-------------------------------------------------.2".: ~ ----x

DEC I SION

PERCURIAM:

This is an administrative case commenced by the Court, 1 pursuant to

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, against Atty. Lorenzo G . Gadon
(Atty. Gadon) after a video clip (subject video clip) of him lashing out and
uttering profanities against Raissa Robles (Robles), a journalist, surfaced
on!ine and went viral on various social media platforms.

• On official leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 1-6.
Decision 2 A.C. No. 13521

The Facts

Urged by the public, the Court issued a Resolution,2 dated January 4,

2022, taking cognizance of the subject video clip of Atty. Gadon, who was
speaking in front of a camera while inside a parked car, fuming and cursing at
Robles. He lashed out while jabbing his finger towards the camera:

Hoy. Raissa Robles, puki ng ina mo, hindot ka. Putang ina mo.
Ano 'ng pinagsasabi mong hindi nagbayad si BBM ng taxes? May
certification 'yan galing sa BIR.Puking ina mo! Hindot ka! Putang ina mo,
Raissa Robles! Magpakantot ka sa aso! Puking ina mo! Hindot ka! Putang
ina mo!3 _

[Hoy, Raissa Robles, your mother's vulva, fuck you. Your mother
is a whore. Why are you saying that BBM did not pay his taxes? There is a
certification from the BIR (that he did so). Your mother's vulva! Fuck you!
Your mother is a whore, RaissaRobles! Get yourself fucked by a dog! Your
mother's vulva! Fuck You! Your mother is a whore!]

The Court noted in the January 4, 2022 Resolution that this was not the
first time that Atty. Gadon has displayed similar behavior m public.
Specifically, the Court noted the following incidents:

I) Atty. Gadon "Vowed to pulverize Muslim communities if they

will not cooperate in the government's bid to address [the] insurgency and
rebellion problem in the region" and "expressed his readiness to exterminate
innocent children, women, men and old folks and bum down houses if they
ignore his plea to work together with the government."

2) He notoriously called former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes

Sereno' s supporters bobo and flashed them his middle finger outside the
Court's compound in Baguio City, and even declared, "I don't care if I am
disbarred. I will still eat delicious food and live comfortably. I don't depend
on income from lawyering alone, unlike some IBP officials."

3) He also stated that he had no regrets in cursing at former Chief

Justice Sereno' s supporters and would personally ask the Court to disbar
him by saying, "I was thinking off/ling a petition in the Supreme Court to
disbar me. If this bar thing is the only thing that will constrain me from
getting back at them, then I'd rather lose my license."

4) He allegedly committed acts of dishonesty, arrogance and

rudeness during the impeachment proceedings against [the] former Chief
Justice Sereno at the House of Representatives.

5) He maliciously imputed in a radio program that former President

Benigno C. Aquino III died ofHIV. 4

Id.
Id. at 1.
4
Id.atl-2.
Decision 3 A.C. No. 13521

The Court found that Atty. Gadon's language in the video recording
against Robles was violative of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), not to mention constitutive of prima facie gender-
based online sexual harassment under Sections 3(e) and 12 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 11313. 5 Thus, the Court ordered Atty. Gadon to show cause why·
he should not be meted the ultimate penalty of disbarment by filing a
Comment. The Court likewise placed him on preventive suspension from the
practice of law effective immediately.

In addition, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to respectively submit an
updated list and a status report of the pending administrative cases against
Atty. Gadon.

In his Comment, 6 Atty. Gadon averred that the immediate imposition

of a preventive suspension was without due process because it was imposed
even before the Court received his answer, or the expiration of the period to
file one, as provided in Section 15, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as
amended. He likewise argues that his preventive suspension was without any
basis in law. 7

Atty. Gadon further expressed that he felt singled out because his
perceived transgression in the video clip paled in comparison to Senator Leila
De Lima's (Senator De Lima) public admission of her affair with a_married
security aide and Atty. Jose Manuel "Che!" Diokno's (Atty. Diokno) filing
of a petition for the 1ssuance of a writ of kalikasan despite being later
disowned under oath by his supposed fisherfolk clients . 8

According to Atty. Gadon, these circumstances made him wonder if the

initiation of the present case was influenced by extraneous circumstances such
as his political and personal connection to the Marcoses, and his public
criticisms of Senior Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Senior
Associate Justice Leonen) and Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa (Justice Caguioa). Based on this notion, Atty . Gadon moved for the
inhibition of Justices Leonen and Caguioa from participating in the resolution
of the present case. 9

Atty. Gadon further elaborated in his Comment on the criminal

complaint 10 filed by Robles against him before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, charging him with the following:

5 Entitled "SAFE SPACES ACT," approved on April 17, 2019.

6
Rollo, pp. 15-50.
7
Id. at 18-22.
8
Id. at 22-23.
9
Id. at 23.
10 ld. at 52-61.
Decision 4 A.C. No. 13521

(a) one (1) count of qualified violation of the Safe Spaces Act, as defined
and penalized under Section 15(a) ofR.A. 11313, committed on or
about 13 December 2021 in Quezon City;
(b) one (I) count of cyber libel, as defined and penalized under Section
4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 committed on or about 21 December 2021 in
Quezon City; and
(c) one (1) count of!ibel, as defined and penalized under Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), committed on or about 21 December 2021
in Quezon City. 11

Atty. Gadon explained that his behavior in the video clip was provoked
by the following tweets and replies of Robles, under the Twitter handle
@raissawriter:

December 9, 2021, 6:56 PM:

Bongbong Marcos camp says, failure to file income taxes is NOT

tax evasion. So, since the BIR could not find A SINGLE COPY OF HIS
TAX DECLARATION FORMS as governor, how does he even prove that
he had paid. And isn't failure to pay taxes the very definition of "tax
evasion"? 12

December 9, 2021, 7:45 PM (in response to someone else's tweet):

But you see BIR has no record of payment at all. Either witholding
(sic) or final taxes. W (sic) BIR you are presumed not to have paid if your
earnings reach higher than minimum and there is no record of payment. 13

December 10, 2021, 11 :23 AM (in response to someone else's tweet):

True. We should all follow Bongbong Marcos' example of not filing

our income taxes. Anyway, it's not tax evasion @ 14

December 10, 2021, 7:43 PM:

IfBongbong Marcos wins, I'll do a Bongbong. \Vont file my taxes.

Sixyears. & Yehey! 15

December 12, 2011, 8:30 PM (in response to someone else's tweet):

What Bongbong Marcos is doing is fencing stolen goods on agrand

(sic) scale. There is already a Supreme Court decision that everything
beyond what Ferdinamd (sic) and Imelda Marcos declared as their assets

11
Id.at61.
12 Id. atn: Also available at <https://twitter.com/raissawriter/status/1468897361082535 938> (accessed
on April 20, 2023).
13 Id. at 77. Also available at <https://twitter.com/raissawriter/status/1468909569929736 192> (accessed
on April 20, 2023).
14 Id. at 78. Also available at <https://twitter.com/raissawriter/status/]469145817886130 180> (accessed
on April 20, 2023).
15 Id. at 78. Also available at <https://twitter.com/raissawriter/status/1469271586385821 700> (accessed
on April 20, 2023).
Decision 5 A.C. No. 13521

and earnings are stolen. Bongbong, Imelda, Imee and Irene continue to
block $$$$. 16

According to Atty. Gadon, Robles' tweets were false and libelous. 17

Enraged by these purported constant lies peddled by her, he recorded the
subject video clip to stop and rebuke her. 18 He claimed that he uttered those
words out of passion, in order to express his anger, disgust, and displeasure
against Robles. 19

Atty. Gadon, however, alleged that he did not post or upload the subject
video clip in any social media platform as he intended to directly send it to
Robles, and only for her. On the contrary, he argued that it was Robles who
uploaded the video on social media in order to gain sympathy from friends
and supporters and to besmirch his name considering that he had just
announced his intention to run for Senator. 20

As to the finding of the Court that Atty. Gadon's utterances in the

subject video clip could be considered as prima facie gender-based online
sexual harassment under Sections 3(e) and 12 ofR.A. 11313, he argued that
the said law was not applicable because his expletives were "an attack against
her as a journalist and not by virtue of her gender." 21 Moreover, he submitted
that there was no violation of Section 12 of R.A. 11313 because Robles had
apparently stated in an interview conducted on "After the Fact," a program of
the ABS-CBN News Channel, that she did not feel threatened by the subject
video clip, but was merely insulted. 22 He likewise advanced that his remarks
were neither misogynistic nor sexist because his utterances, "putang ina mo"
and "puki ng ina mo," were made to express anger, displeasure, and
disapproval, not because of any prejudice against Robles with respect to her
gender. 23 Citing Reyes v. People, 24 Atty. Gadon emphasized that the phrase
"putang ina mo" was "a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure." 25

Considering the foregoing, Atty. Gadon concluded that none of the

grounds enumerated under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court were
established in the present case. Thus, he argued that neither disbarment nor
suspension from the practice of law should be imposed against him. 26

16 ld. at 79. Also available at <https://twitter.com/raissawriter/status/1470008179585355 788> (accessed

on April 20, 2023).
17
ld. at 29-30.
18
Id. at 30.
19
Id.at31.
20 Id.at30-31.
21 Id. at 38.
22
Id. at 35~39.
23
Id. at 40.
24
137 Phil. I 12 (1969).
25
Rollo, p. 43.
26
Id. at 48.
 Decision 6 A.C. No. 13521

The Issue

Should Atty. Gadon be disbarred?

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds that Atty. Gadon has shown himself to be unfit to be
part of the legal profession. Thus, the Court imposes on him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment.

The Court has always maintained that the practice of law is a privilege
given to a few, and it is granted only to those of good moral character. 27 In
the recent case of Atty. Saludares v. Atty. Saludares, 28 the Court emphasized:

Possession of good moral character is a core qualification for

members of the bar. 29 "It is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of
the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community." 30 Time and again this Court
has reminded the members of the legal profession that "one of the
qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the
possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been
admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he[/she] does not
follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright
person, xx x it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society,
as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct,
to make use of its powers to deprive him[/her] of his professional attributes
which he[/she] so unworthily abused." 31

Here, the Court finds that Atty. Gadon has shown that he ~oes not
possess the good moral character required to remain a member of the Bar.

At this point, it must be noted that the CPR, under which Atty. Gadon
was charged with disbarment, has been expressly repealed by the new Code
of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA). 32 On April 11,
27
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. Consunji, A.C. No. 11439, January 4, 2022.
28
A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023.
29
Id., citing Domingo-Agaton v. Atty. Cruz, A.C. No. 11023, May 4, 2021.
30
Id., citing Villarente v. Atty. Villarente, Jr., A.C. No. 8866, September !5, 2020.
31
Domingo-Agaton v. Atty. Cruz, A.C. No. 11023, May 4, 2021.
32
Section 2 of the General Provisions of the CPRA provides:

SECTION 2. Repealing clause. - The Code of Professional Responsibility of I 988,

Sections 20 to 37 of Rule 138, and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are repealed.

The Lawyer's Oath, as found in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, is amended and superseded.

Any resolution, circular, bar matter, or administrative order issued by or pdnciples

established in the decisions of the Supreme Court inconsistent with the CPRA are dee~ed
modified or repealed.
Decision 7 A.C. No. 13521

2023, the Court unanimously approved the CPRA to make the code governing
lawyers' behavior more responsive to the needs of the times. After its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation on May 14, 2023, the
CPRA took effect 15 days thereafter, or on May 30, 2023. 33 Significantly, the
CPRA expressly provides that it shall have a retroactive application, that is, it
shall be applied to all pending cases, including this one. 34 Thus, although the
act for which Atty. Gadon was ordered to show cause why he should not be
disbarred was committed during the effectivity of the outdated CPR, the Court
shall evaluate his act using the provisions of the new CPRA.

There is no reason for Senior Associate

Justice Leanen and Justice Caguioa to
inhibit in the case

At the outset, it must be clarified that Atty. Gadon's prayer. to have

Senior Associate Justice Leanen and Justice Caguioa inhibit from this case
deserves scant consideration.

The grounds for disqualification of justices or judges are found m

Section l; Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Disqualification a/judges. -No judge or judicial officer

shall sit in any case in which he[ or she], or his [ or her] wife [or husband]
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he [or she] is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he [or she] has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he [or she]
has presided in any inferior court when his [or her] ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his [or her] sound discretion,

disqualify himself [ or herself] from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied)

Tan II v. People35 explains the two kinds of inhibitions referred to in

the above provision, and the considerations for which a judge or justice may
exercise the discretion to voluntarily inhibit from a case:
33 Section 3 of the General Provisions of CPRA reads:

SECTION 3. Effectivity clause. -The CPRA shall take effect fifteen (15) calendar days
after its publication in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation.
34 Section I of the General Provisions mandates:

SECTION I. Transitory provision. - The CPRA shall be applied to all pending and
future cases, except to the extent that ln the opinion of the Supreme Court, its retroactive
application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure
under which the cases were filed shall govern. (Underscoring supplied)
35 G.R. No. 242866, July 6, 2022.
Decision 8 A.C. No. 13521

Two kinds of inhibition are contemplated by the above provision.

The first paragraph refers to compulsory inhibition, while the second
paragraph refers to voluntary inhibition. The first paragraph effectively
disqualifies a judge from hearing a case where any of the instances
enumerated is present. On the other hand, the second paragraph explicitly
submits the disqnalification to the judge's exercise of his or her sound
discretion. In this case, considering that none of the grounds in the first
paragraph were alleged, the RTC judge in this case was being asked to
inhibit on the basis of the second paragraph.

Jurisprudence has established various guidelines in the evaluation of

a judge's exercise of discretion in deciding for or against voluntary
inhibition. One consideration is whether the party moving for a judge's
inhibition was deprived a fair and impartial trial. Another is whether the
judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case
in question. The Court also looks into whether the bias and prejudice were
shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source, the result of which
the judge's opinion on the merits was formed on the basis of something
outside of what the judge learned from participating in the case. In every
case, bias and prejudice, to be considered valid grounds for voluntary
inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence; bare allegations of partiality will not suffice. 36 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

Here, none of the above considerations, or even circumstances

analogous thereto, are present. There is no showing that Atty. Gadon was
deprived of a fair or impartial trial or proceeding. There is likewise no
evidence that Senior Associate Justice Leonen or Justice Caguioa has any
personal interest in the outcome of the case. There is also no proof that Senior·
Associate Justice Leanen and Justice Caguioa are actuated by bias or
prejudice against Atty. Gadon based on something that they learned outside
the present case. It is clear that the basis of the January 4, 2022 Resolution is
the subject video clip, together with the past behavior of Atty. Gadon, all of
which the Court has taken note of.

Even under the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC), there is
no ground to support Atty. Gadon's motion to have Senior Associate Justice
Leonen and Justice Caguioa inhibit from the resolution of the case. Rule 8
provides:

RULES
Inhibition and Substitution ofMembers of the Court

SECTION I. Grounds for Inhibition. ~ A Member of the Court shall

inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for
any of these and similar reasons:

(a) the Member of the Court was the ponente of the decision or
participated in the proceedings in the appellate or trial court;

36 Id.
Decision 9 A.C. No. 13521

(b) the Member of the Court was counsel, partner or member of a law
firm that is or was the counsel in the CftSe subject to Section 3(c) of
this rule;
'
(c) the Member of the Court or his or her spouse, parent or child is
pecuniarily interested in the case;

(d) the Member of the Court is related to either party in the case within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any
member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity;

(e) the Member of the Court was executor, administrator, guardian or

trustee in the case; and

(f) the Member of the Court was an official or is the spouse of an

official or former official of a government agency or private entity
that is a party to the case, and the Justice or his or her spouse has
reviewed or acted on any matter relating to the case.

A Member of the Court may in the ~xercise of his or her sound

discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than any
of those mentioned above.

The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the
'

inhibition.

Atty. Gadon did not allege any of the grounds under this provision, and
rightly so, as none of them are present in this case.

What is manifest in the allegations of Atty. Gadon with respect to

Senior Associate Justice Leonen and Justice Caguioa is the lack of clear and
convincing evidence of their purported bias ar1d prejudice:

This unusual treatment against [Atty. Oadon] made him wonder if

there are other extraneous circumstances or factors that contributed to the
same like his political and personal connection to the Marcoses, more
specifically to his idol, Ferdinand "Bong-Bo1tg" R. Marcos Jr., or BBM,
and to his public criticisms of two members of this Most Honorable Court,
namely, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and
Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice!Caguioa), for their previous
handling of the Election Protest filed by BBM before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). It is also of public knowledge that prior to the
instant case, respondent called for these Justices to refund the protest fees
deposited by BBM, and that he also filed an impeachment complaint against
Justice Leonen. Given the foregoing, (ilf Justices Leonen and Caguioa
had any hand in the issuance of A.M. No. ::p-12-05-SC [the January 4,
2022 Resolution] which placed [Atty. GadonJ on immediate suspension,
then he is constrained to respectfully move fo~ their voluntary inhibition in
this case as their continued participation might not satisfy the demands
Decision 10 A.C. No. 13521

of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' (sic) required as an

indispensable imperative of due process. 37 (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Gadon's allegations of partiality are clearly conjectural. There

was no showing that Senior Associate Justice Leonen or Justice Caguioa "had
any hand in the issuance of" the January 4, 2022 Resolution, other than their
perfonnance of their official adjudicative functions, which is presumed
regular, failing evidence to the contrary. The case of Republic v. Hachercl 8
instructs:

xxx In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duties which the records failed to
rebut. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Evezy reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt
as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in
favor of its lawfulness.

xxxx

In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that
an official duty has been regularly performed applies in favor of the
petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All things
are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was private
respondent's burden to overcome thisjuris tantum presumption. We are not
persuaded that it has been able to do so. 39 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Besides, the January 4, 2022 Resolution was an act of the entire Court
En Banc. Why is Atty. Gadon singling out Senior Associate Justice Leonen
and Justice Caguioa?

Atty. Gadon has obviously overlooked the nature of the Court. In the
recent case of Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo,40 the Court stressed that it acts as a
collegial body:

This Court is a collegial body. The Supreme Court acts on a pending

incident or resolves a case either en bane or in division. Decisions are not
rendered in a Justice's individual capacity, but are, instead, arrived at
through a majority vote of the Supreme Court's members. The Member-in-
Charge simply recommends the action to be taken. 41

37 Rollo, p. 23.
38 785 Phil. 784. (2016).
39 Id. at 794-795.
40 P.E.T. Case No. 005 (Resolution), November 17, 2020.
41 Id., citing Marcos v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005 (Resolution), August 28, 2018.
Decision 11 A.C. No. 13521

Thus, any Court decision or resolution, such as the January 4, 2022

Resolution, does not depend on the whim of any one Justice. Absent any
proof that the January 4, 2022 Resolution was instigated or facilitated by
either Senior Associate Justice Leonen or Justice Caguioa, there is no reason
for them to inhibit from participating in the resolution of the case. The
pernicious insinuation is that either or both Senior Associate Justice Leonen
and/or Justice Caguioa can impose their will on the rest of the Court. To
stress, the January 4, 2022 Resolution was issued by the Court En Banc, not
by any of the Justices in their individual capacity.

For imputing baseless accusations of partiality against Senior Associate

Justice Leonen and Justice Caguioa, the Court finds Atty. Gadon guilty of
direct contempt of court. The ruling of the Court in Tallada v. Racoma42
anchors this finding:

Indeed, unfounded criticisms against members of the Judiciary

degrade the judicial office and greatly interfere with the due
performance of their functions in the Judiciary. They not only
needlessly drain the resources of the Court in resolving them, they sow
the seeds of distrust of the public against members of the Judiciary. x
xx.

xxxx

In Bank of Commerce v. Borromeo, the Court reiterated that

contempt of court is willful disregard of public authority that tends to,
among others, impair the respect due such body:

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful

disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad
sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the
rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of, its proceedings by disorderly behavior or
insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different
acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need
not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration
of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have
the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of

42
A.M. No. RTJ-22-022, August 23, 2022.
 Decision 12 A.C. No. 13521

judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the
due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would
be resting on a very shak-y foundation. 43 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

In Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Distribution Management Association of

the Philippines, 44 the Court explained that unfounded accusations or
allegations, such as those made in this case, constitute direct contempt:

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass

the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed
by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code
ofProfessional Responsibility. 45

Baculi v. Belen 46 expounds:

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements

submitted before a court or judge where the proceedings are pending
constitutes direct contempt, because it is equivalent to misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.xx x. 47

It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity

and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of
justice and democracy. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation. "When confronted with actions and statements,
from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and
undermine public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to
wield its inherent power to cite any person in contempt. In so doing, it
preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the
legal profession." 48

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds Atty. Gadon guilty of direct
contempt of Court for making unfounded accusations against Senior
Associate Justice Leanen and Justice Caguioa in his Comment.

43
Id. at 14-16.
44
672 Phil. 1 (20 I I).
45
ld.atl7.
46
604 Phil. 1 (2009).
47
Id. at 9.
48
Roxas v. De Zv.zuarregui, Jr., 554 Phil. 323,327 (2007). Citations omitted.
Decision 13 A.C. No. 13521

Furthermore, as elucidated in Lorenzo, Atty. Gadon's act violated the

lawyer's oath and the CPR, now the CPRA. The second paragraph of Section
14, Canon II on Propriety is categorical:

SECTION 14. Remedy for grievances; insinuation of improper

motive. ~ A lawyer shall submit grievances against any officer of a court,
tribunal, or other government agency only through the appropriate remedy
and before the proper authorities.

Statements insinuating improper motive on the part of any such

officer, which are not supported by substantial evidence, shall be ground for
disciplinary action. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, in addition to the outburst of Atty. Gadon against Robles, the

Court finds additional ground to hold him administratively liable for
insinuating malicious accusations against Senior Associate Justice Leonen
and Justice Caguioa.

The immediate imposition of preventive

suspension was proper

Atty. Gadon laments that he was placed on preventive suspension even

before he formally received a copy of the January 4, 2022 Resolution. He
asserts that under Section 15 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, he could
only be suspended after the Court's receipt of his answer or the lapse of the
period to file one. He further insists that his suspension was without basis in
law, like the preventive suspension under R.A. No. 6770, 49 the 2017 Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 50

Atty. Gadon's submissions are without merit. The Court has

consistently held that disbarment cases are sui generis. In Dayos v. Buri, 51
the Court held:

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor

purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct
of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still
fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against
him despite numerous notices. 52 (Emphasis supplied)

49
Entitled "THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF l 989," approved on November l 7, l 989.
50
Rollo, pp. J8-20.
51
A.C. No. 13504, January 31, 2023.
51
Jd., citingBunagan-Bansigv. Atty. Ce/era, 724 Phil. 141 (2014).
Decision 14 A.C. No. 13521

The pronouncement in Saludares v. Saludares 53 likewise illumines:

Administrative cases against members of the legal profession are sui

generis, and are not affected by the result of any civil or criminal case. It
does not even depend on the existence of a complainant to allow the
continuation of the proceedings. The primary objective in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers is public interest. The fundamental
inquiry revolves around the finding as to whether the lawyer is still a
fit person to be allowed to practice law. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that an administrative case against a member of the Bar is

sui generis, preventive suspension as defined under R.A. No. 6770, the
RRACCS and the Labor Code, is different in nature from the preventive
suspension in disbannent proceedings. As clearly discussed in the above
rulings, the primary issue to be resolved in administrative cases is the fitness
of a person to be allowed to practice law.

Here, the expletives uttered by Atty. Gadon in the subject video clip are
so scandalous and downright offensive that the Court for itself can already say
"res ipsa loquitur," i.e., the thing speaks for itself, that there is no need to wait
for his answer before he could be placed on preventive suspension.
Considering that the video had already become viral on social media, the
Court had to act immediately; otherwise, its disciplinary power might be
rendered inefficacious by the unhampered spread of the video clip.

At any rate, as will be discussed below, Atty. Gadon does not deny that
he created the video. He only claims that he did not circulate it on social
media. Considering that the authenticity of the subject video clip is
undisputed, the immediate suspension of Atty. Gadon was proper. There was
no doubt as to the authorship from the outset.

With regard to his allegations regarding former Senator De Lima and

Atty. Diokno, suffice it to say that their circumstances have no bearing on this
case. Whether they committed misconduct does not affect the administrative
liability of Atty. Gadon, which is entirely distinct and independent. In other
words, their circumstances are irrelevant to this case.

Atty. Gadon has shown that he is ur,fzt to

continue as a member of the Bar

In the January 4, 2022 Resolution, the Court found that Atty. Gadon's
conduct violated Rule 7.03 of the CPR, which reads:

53 A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023.

54
Id.
Decision 15 A.C. No. 13521

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The said rule was incorporated in a similar and mnended rule under the
CPRA, and now forms part of Section 2 of Canon II on Propriety, thus:

SECTION 2. Dignified conduct.~ A lawyer shall respect the law,

the courts, tribunals, and other government agencies, their officials,
employees, and processes, and act with courtesy, civility. fairness, and
candor towards fellow members of the bar.

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's

fitness to practice law. nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in
public or private life. to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)

There is no question that Atty. Gadon's repeated use of the words "puki
ng ina mo," "hindot ka," and "putang ina mo," as well as his utterance of
"magpakantot ka sa aso," in the subject video clip are profane, to say the least,
and indisputably scandalous that they discredit the entire legal profession.

Atty. Gadon, however, justifies his use of these words by explaining

that they were uttered out of passion in order to express his anger, disgust and
displeasure against Robles.

The Court cannot accept these excuses. Granted that Atty. Gadon was
only defending President Marcos from the purported lies of Robles, he was
neither justified nor excused in using undignified, abusive and disrespectful
language considering his membership in the Bar. Spouses Nuezca v.
Villagarcia 55 illumines:

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it

should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions
has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. In this regard, all
lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts
who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Thus,
respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a
lawyer and an officer of the court. 56 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

55
792 Phil. 535 (2016).
56
Id. at 540.
Decision 16 A.C. No. 13521

Here, Atty. Gadon used highly offensive and obscene language to insult
Robles. Directed towards a woman, the language was misogynistic and sexist,
wholly gender inappropriate. His claimed defense of President Marcos was
lost in all the profanity. In fact, his words did less to defend President Marcos,
and more to degrade and denigrate the Bar.

Considering that Atty. Gadon believes that there are documents

contradicting Robles' assertion that President Marcos was a tax evader, he
could have remained in the realm of dignified legal discourse, using these
documents to make solid arguments, rather than hurling expletives against
her. This kind of behavior patently falls short of the expected conduct of a
lawyer. Sections 3 and 4 of Canon II of the CPRA provide:

SECTION 3. Safe environment; avoid all forms of abuse or

harassment. - A lawyer shall not create or promote an unsafe or hostile
environment. both in private and public settings, whether online, m
workplaces, educational or training institutions, or in recreational areas.

To this end, a lawyer shall not commit any form of physical. sexual,
psychological, or economic abuse or violence against another person. A
lawyer is also prohibited from engaging in any gender-based harassment or
discrimination.

SECTION 4. Use of dignified, gender-fair, and child- and

culturally-sensitive language. -A lawyer shall use only dignified, gender-
fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in all personal and professional
dealings.

To this end, a lawver shall not use language which is abusive,

intemperate. offensive or otherwise improper, oral or written, and whether
made through traditional or electronic means, including all forms or types
of mass or social media. (All underscoring supplied)

Atty. Gadon cannot take refuge in the case of Reyes v. People, 57 for the
simple reason that the petitioner in that case was not a lawyer, while Atty.
Gadon is. As earlier discussed, the expectations of a lawyer's conduct,
especially with respect to one's use of language, is significantly higher than
that of ordinary persons.

Atty. Gadon further submits that the subject video clip was made in
private, explaining that he did not upload the same on social media, as he
intended it exclusively for Robles:

38. As can be seen from the foregoing, [Robles] had been

slandering [Atty. Gadon's] idol, BBM, and branding him not only as a tax
evader but as a grand criminal. Like a true Marcos loyalist, [Atty. Gadon]
was enraged by the constant lies being peddled by [Robles] against the

57 Supra note 24.

 Decision 17 A.C. No. 13521

Marcoses, more specifically, against [Atty. Gadon's] idol, BBM, which in

tum caused him to record a private video clip with a view to stop and rebuke
complainant for telling lies against BBM, with the intention of sending
the same directlv to her-

39. Nevertheless, [Atty. Gadon] neither published nor posted

nor uploaded in any social media platform like Facebook, the subject [video
clip], which is unlike what respondent usually does in his Facebook page,
as the said video clip was intended solely for the eyes of the
complainant. xx x

40. As [Robles] herself noted, [the subject video clip] was

made privately inside [Atty. Gadon'sj car and the unsavory words like
"Putang-ina mo" and "Puking Ina mo" were uttered by him out of passion
and a result of emotional outburst directed solely and exclusively towards
[Robles] to express [Atty. Gadon's] anger, disgust and displeasure for [her]
spreading of malicious lies against [his] idol, BBM, as extensively
discussed above[.] 58 (Emphasis supplied)

What Atty. Gadon fails to realize is that lawyers, as Section 2 of Canon

II provides, are expected to avoid scandalous behavior, whether in public or
private life. This is reiterated in Sections 3 and 4 of the same Canon, which
respectively prohibit the creation or promotion of an unsafe or hostile
environment, both in private and public settings. and command the use of
dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in all personal
and professional dealings. The Court has consistently reminded lawyers that
they cannot segregate their public life from their private affairs. In Velasco v.
Causing, 59 the Court emphasized:

First, a lawyer is not allowed to divide his personality as an

attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Regardless of whether
a lawyer is representing his client in court, acting as a supposed
spokesperson outside ofit, or is merely practicing his right to press freedom
as a "journalist-blogger," his duties to the society and his ethical obligations
as a member of the bar remain unchanged. 60 (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)

In Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, 61 the Court stressed its ruling in Pobre v.

Defensor-Santiago, 62 that lawyers may be held administratively liable even
for their conduct supposedly committed in a private capacity:

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in

their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of

58
Rollo, pp. 30-3 l.
59
A.C. No. 12883, March 2, 2021.
,o Id.
61
801 Phil. 570 (2016).
62
613 Phil. 352 (2009).
Decision 18 A.C. No. 13521

Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to

one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which-
albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession - would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their
license and the law invest in them. 63 (Emphasis supplied)

That Atty. Gadon failed to see that he cannot set apart his professional
acts from his private life indicates that he does not fully understand the
responsibilities that come with the legal profession. His utterances alone,
even ifintended only for Robles, are reprehensible in themselves. That he did
not intend to release the subject video clip on social media does not make it
less abhorrent.

At any rate, Atty. Gadon's submission that he did not release the subject
video clip on social media is unavailing because he himself disclosed that he
intended Robles to see it. In other words, in one way or another, he intended
to share, upload, or otherwise disseminate the subject video clip to other
persons, although he claimed he only had Robles in mind. The fact that
Robles got a copy from someone other than Atty. Gadon could only mean that
he himself shared it with another person.

As early as 2014, the Court in Vivares v. St. Theresa's College64 already

warned about the risks that come with the use of social media:

[Online Social NetworkJusers should be aware of the risks that they

expose themselves to whenever they engage in cyberspace activities.
Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to
exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about
themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware
that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or inforn1ation online, they
are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and
more importantly, infonnation, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered
by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not
be allowed access to such. 65

Mindful of the both the benefits and dangers that come with the use of
social media, the CPRA introduced provisions which mandate its responsible
use. Section 36 of Canon II is most relevant to the present case:

SECTION 36. Responsible use. - A lawyer shall have the duty to

understand the benefits, risks, and ethical implications associated with the
use of social media.

63 Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, supra note 61, at 588.

64
744Phil.451 (2014).
65
Id. at 479.
Decision 19 A.C. No. 13521

Thus, Atty. Gadon cannot exculpate himself by claiming that he

"neither published nor posted nor uploaded" the subject video clip onto any
social media platform. As a lawyer, it was reasonable to expect that he
understood the consequences of recording the video, its benefits, if any, risks,
and ethical implications, including the likelihood of it spreading
indiscriminately, becoming available to anyone on social media, and the
influence that it could have on lawyers and non-lawyers alike, not to mention
the children who have been exposed, or have yet to be exposed, to the said
video clip. Atty. Gadon failed to take these implications and consequences
into account, and in doing so, he likewise failed in upholding the edict to
responsibly use social media.

In addition, the January 4, 2022 Resolution found that Atty. Gadon's

remarks against Robles could be considered prima facie proof of gender-
based online sexual harassment under Section 3(e) and 12 ofR.A. No. 11313.
They provide:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.~ As used in this Act: xx x

(e) Gender-based online sexual harassment refers to an online

conduct targeted at a particular person that causes or likely to cause another
mental, emotional or psychological distress, and fear of personal safety,
sexual harassment acts including unwanted sexual remarks and comments,
threats, uploading or sharing of one's photos without consent, video and
audio recordings, cyberstalking and online identity theft;

SECTION 12. Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment.

Gender-based online sexual harassment includes acts that use information
and communications technology in terrorizing and intimidating victims
through physical, psychological, and emotional threats, unwanted sexual
misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist remarks and comments
online whether publicly or through direct and private messages, invasion of
victim's privacy through cyberstalking and incessant messaging, uploading
and sharing without the consent of the victim, any form of media that
contains photos, voice, or video with sexual content, any unauthorized
recording and sharing of any of the victim's photos, videos, or any
information online, impersonating identities of victims online or posting lies
about victims to harm their reputation, or filing false abuse reports to online
platforms to silence victims. (Underscoring snpplied)

Atty. Gadon contends that the provisions ofR.A. No. 11313 cannot be
appreciated in this case considering that Robles admitted in the ANC
interview that she did not feel threatened, but only insulted, by Atty. Gadon. 66

The contention is untenable. The violation ofR.A. No. 11313 consists

m doing acts that cause or are likely to cause mental, emotional or

66
Rollo, pp. 35-39.
Decision 20 A.C. No. 13521

psychological distress, and fear of personal safety. In other words, the

violation pertains to the acts of the perpetrator, not to the reaction of the
recipient. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that Robles did not
feel threatened by Atty. Gadon's utterances in the subject video clip, such
reaction does not mean that his behavior did not terrorize or intimidate her, or
otherwise cause her mental, emotional or psychological distress, or fear for
her personal safety .

. The Court is mindful that Robles filed a criminal complaint which

includes one charge for violation of R.A. No. 11313 against Atty. Gadon.
Hence, it shall no longer dwell on the merits of the imputation of criminal
liability.

The penalties to be imposed on Atty.

Gadon

For the direct contempt committed against the Court, a fine of

P2,000.00 is imposed on Atty. Gadon, pursuant to Section 1,67 Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.

For his administrative liability, the pronouncement of the Court in

Advincula v. Macabata, 68 as reiterated in the recent case of Saludares v.
Saludares, 69 instructs:

[x x x] When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court

must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings
are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to
preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from
similar misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the
administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important
function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence. While it is discretionary upon the Court to
impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by person.al
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need
to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact
from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client,
to his brethren in the profession and to the public.

67 Section L Direct contempt punished summarily. -A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or
so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (I 0) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one ( 1) day, or both, if it
be a lower court. (Emphasis supplied)
68
546 Phil. 431 (2007).
69
A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023.
Decision 21 A.C. No. 13521

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the

preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only
for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Onlv those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify
a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice oflaw. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before
suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be
considered. 70 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In determining the penalty, the Court shall consider Atty. Gadon's

violation of the lawyer's oath and Section 14 of Canon II of the CPRA for
insinuating baseless accusations against Senior Associate Justice Leonen and
Justice Caguioa.

Moreover, the Court also takes judicial notice of the previous

administrative case of Atty. Gadon, Mendoza v. Atty. Gadon, 71 in which the
penalty of suspension was imposed on him for three months. In that case, he
was already warned to be more circumspect with his actions in times of
emotional outbursts:

Atty. Gadon should be more circumspect in his actions and should

control himself better in time of emotion outbursts. He should refrain from
using abusive and intemperate language which displays arrogance towards
the legal system and his colleagues. 72 (Underscoring supplied)

Section 38 of Canon VI on Accountability of the CPRA provides:

SECTION 38. Modifying circumstances. - In determining the

appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court may, in its discretion, .
appreciate the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:

xxxx

(a) Aggravating Circumstances:

(1) Finding of previous administrative liability where a penalty
is imposed, regardless of nature or gravity; xx x.

The Court likewise notes that numerous administrative cases have been
filed against Atty. Gadon. Before the OBC are the following cases:

,o Id.
71 A.C. No. 11810 (Resolution), June 26, 2019.
72
Id.
Decision 22 A.C. No. 13521

1. Admin. Case No. 11276, filed on April 08, 2016 by Sharief Agakan for
misconduct;
2. Admin. Case No. 11275 filed on April 08, 2016 by Atty. Algamar
Latiph for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath;
3. Admin. Case No. 11277 filed on April 08, 2016 by Atty. Mamarico
Sansarona, Jr. for misconduct; ,
4. Admin. Case No. 12427 filed on December 17, 2018 by Ambulatory
Healthcare Institute and Hernando Delizo (formerly CBD Case No. 15-
4649, where the IBP· Board of Governors recommended [Atty.
Gadon's] suspension for two years, and for him to return the amount of
Php700,000.00 to the Complainant); and
5. Admin Case No. 12464 filed on January 31, 2019 by Hernando Delizo
(formerly CBD Case No. 15-4695, where the IBP Board of Governors
recommended [Atty. Gadon's] suspension for six months to one year). 73

Likewise, these are the pending cases against him before the IBP:

I. Atty. Wilfredo Garrdio Jr. v. Atty. Lorenzo Gadon, filed on May 15,
2018 (for submission of report and recommendation by the
Investigating Commissioner);
2. CBD Case No. 18-5750, Zena Bernardo, et al. v. Atty. Lorenzo Gadon,
filed on April 20, 2018 (for submission of report and recommendation
by the Investigating Commissioner;
3. CBD Case No. 18-5751, Jover Lauria, et al. v. Atty. Lorenzo Gadon,
filed on April 24, 2018 (for submission by the parties of their respective
verified position papers); and
4. CBD Case No. 19-5977 (Adm Case No. 11275), Algamar Latiph et al,
v. Atty. Lorenzo Gadon, consolidated with CBD Case No. 19-5978
(Adm Case No. 11276) BNMPD Rep by Agakhan Sharief v. Atty.
Lorenzo Gadon, received from the Supreme Court on May 30, 2019
(for mandatory conference). 74

Although these cases have yet to be decided, the volume of

administrative complaints filed against Atty. Gadon indubitably speaks of his
character.

Considering all the foregoing, the Court finds that Atty. Gadon's
conduct merits the supreme penalty of disbarment.

This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and
professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law. 75 The privilege to
practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. 76 As such,

73
Rollo, p. 8.
74
Id. at 175.
75
In re: Facto/in, 686 Phil.351, 356(2012), citing Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360Phil.313, 315 (1998).
'' Id.
Decision A.C. No. 13521

lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with
their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. 77 There is no room in this noble profession for misogyny
and sexism. The Court will never tolerate abuse, in whatever form, especially
when perpetrated by an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Lorenzo G. Gadon GUILTY of

violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability. He is
DISBARRED from the practice of law. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
DIRECTED to remove the name of Lorenzo G. Gadon from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Furthermore, Lorenzo G. Gadon is found GUILTY of direct contempt

of court. He is FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00), to
be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the
Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the Court
Administrator, for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance; and the Department of Justice.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

(On official leave)

ALEXANDER G. GESMUND
Chief Justice

Acting Chief Justice

77
Id.
 •

Decision 24

/
HEN~~ING EDA
Associate ~ e

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Associate Justice

RICA~. ROSARIO JHOSE~JOPEZ

Asstciate Justice Associate Justice

J O ~ P. MARQUEZ
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Associate Justice / Associate Justice

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