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G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.*

LITO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

Criminal Law; Estafa; The gravamen of the crime of estafa under

Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong
date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective.—The CA

_______________

* EN BANC.

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did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of
the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in
the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Same; Same; Estafa With Abuse of Confidence; Elements of.—The
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender
or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or

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conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a

demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Same; Same; Demand; No specific type of proof is required to show
that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.
—No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.
Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
“demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon
the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Settled is the rule that in
assessing the credibility of witnesses, the Supreme Court gives great respect
to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.—Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s sole witness,
which is questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the
rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity
to observe the

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demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an

opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of
the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.
Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of
their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence,
the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; There seems to be a perceived
injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However,
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation.—There seems to be a perceived injustice
brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on
crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage
measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this
Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied
through this Court’s decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power
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of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that
the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by
including Article 5, which reads: ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection
with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report
to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement
as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive

penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
Same; Penalties; For acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable
by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the reasons why the same act should be the
subject of penal legislation.—For acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to
render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be
the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is
present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is
tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable
by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first
except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy
therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court
considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed.
Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the
need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
Same; Courts; The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the
law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.—Verily, the
primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise
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legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,

distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that
would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as
to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal

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branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable

breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial
legislation.
Same; Civil Indemnity; In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded
to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to
the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the
accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.—In our jurisdiction,
civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that
was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil
aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies,
in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the
accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution.
Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could
not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken
which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes.
Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in
some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption
of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law
only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is
P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount
awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article
2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish
or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages
can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed
the award of civil indemnity.
Same; Penalties; Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel
punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which
the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.—Even
if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
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unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,

considering that the

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State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment
on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot
be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded
directly and not collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the
issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishment; It has long been held
that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping
post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like.—It has long been held that the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of
the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory,
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.
Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. It takes
more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community.” Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the
Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.
Same; Same; The Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks
sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code (RPC).—
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely
adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money
based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables
that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon
before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects
on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact,

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and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to
arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our
existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and
lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies
and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.
Same; Same; It is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate
laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should
refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.—With due respect to the
opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues,
all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the
powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to
Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.
With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil
liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said
on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the
value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent
as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Sereno, CJ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that I concur with the ponencia
in affirming the conviction of petitioner but vote to apply the penalty for
estafa adjusted to the present value of the thing subject of the offense.—I
concur with the ponencia in affirming the conviction of petitioner but vote
to apply the penalty for estafa adjusted to the present value of the thing
subject of the offense. Considering that the penalty has remained untouched
for eighty-three years, the Court cannot adhere to its literal imposition
without first revisiting the assigned values on which such penalty was
based. The Legislature of 1930 pegged the penalties at the prevailing value
of money at the time of the enactment of the Revised Penal Code. Apart
from its representation as a basket of goods or as a means of exchange,

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money has no independent value by itself, and that is how the law has
always seen it. Even this outlook must then necessarily affect our views
regarding the liberty of persons and how money affects it.
Same; Same; Same; View that the legislative intent behind provisions
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is to create prison terms dependent upon
the value of the property subject of the crime.—The legislative intent behind
provisions of the Revised Penal Code is to create prison terms dependent
upon the value of the property subject of the crime. A prison term is
virtually monetized, while an individual’s life and well-being hang in the
balance. It is incumbent upon the Court to preserve the intent of Congress
while crucially ensuring that the individual’s liberty is not impinged upon
any longer than necessary. This is distinct from the situation contemplated
under Article 5, par. 2 of the Penal Code, in which the Court would need to
delve into the wisdom of the law, i.e., the appropriateness of the penalty
taking into account the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense. Thus, the crux of the present case is simple judicial application of
the doctrines that in cases of doubt: 1) the law must be construed in favor of
the accused; 2) it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This duty of judicial construction is understood to
permeate every corner where the Court exercises its adjudicative function,
specifically in how it expounds on criminal rules. To assume that the Court
would be changing the penalty imprudently leads to a misplaced
apprehension that it dabbles in judicial legislation, when it is merely
exercising its constitutional role of interpretation.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is axiomatic that laws, customs, public
policy and practice evolve with the passage of time; so too, does monetary
valuation.—It is axiomatic that laws, customs, public policy and practice
evolve with the passage of time; so too, does monetary valuation. Money
has no value in and of itself except that which we assign, making it
susceptible to construction and interpretation. Money is not real in the sense
that it is capable of being indexed. Viewed in this way, human lives and
liberty cannot be made dependent on a mere index of almost a century ago. I
submit that in the present case, the Court is not even delving into questions
of validity of the substance of the statute. This is no different from the
Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons or the
determination of valuation in expropriation cases. We have

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continually checked penalties in criminal cases, adjusted the amounts of

damages and indemnities according to the appropriateness thereof in light of
current times. We have done so with eyes open, knowing that the
adjustments reflect a realization that the value of the peso has changed over
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time. If the purchasing power of the peso was accepted as a “judicially

manageable standard” in those cases, there is no reason for the Court not to
apply it in favor of the accused herein, especially because it is mandated to
do so.
Same; Same; Same; View that I agree with the view of Justice Roberto
A. Abad that while Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only a minimum
amount, the Court since then has regularly increased amounts awarded by
the lower courts; Pantoja’s recognition of inflation as a reality — among
other instances when the Court has acknowledged “changed conditions” —
only shows that criminal rules, especially the implementation of penalties,
must also evolve.—I agree with the view of Justice Roberto A. Abad that
while Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only a minimum amount, the
Court since then has regularly increased amounts awarded by the lower
courts. Tellingly, these decisions and resolutions are not mere suggestions or
guidelines for the trial courts’ exercise of discretion, but are actual findings
of error. Pantoja’s recognition of inflation as a reality — among other
instances when the Court has acknowledged “changed conditions” — only
shows that criminal rules, especially the implementation of penalties, must
also evolve. As societies develop, become more enlightened, new truths are
disclosed. The Court as an institution cannot ignore these truths to the
detriment of basic rights. The reality is that property-related crimes are
affected by external economic forces, rendering the penalties vulnerable to
these forces.
Same; Same; Same; Pro Reo Rule; View that the rationale behind the
pro reo rule and other rules that favor the accused is anchored on the
rehabilitative philosophy of our penal system.—The rationale behind the pro
reo rule and other rules that favor the accused is anchored on the
rehabilitative philosophy of our penal system. In People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil.
109 (1933), the Court explained that it is “necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This
opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the
duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with
the end in

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view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to
the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the
social order.”
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Power; View that
establishing a policy or a rule of preference towards the unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness has always been
within the scope of judicial power.—The imposition of a policy on penalties
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is not far removed from the judicial construction exercised in the present
case. Establishing a policy or a rule of preference towards the unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness has always been
within the scope of judicial power.
Statutory Construction; View that in case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.—Article 10 of the Civil Code states: “In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.” The Code
Commission found it necessary to include this provision to “strengthen the
determination of the Court to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized in some way of interpreting the law.”
Constitutional Law; Due Process; View that fear of clogged dockets
and the inconvenience of a perceived distortion are operational concerns
that are not sufficient justification to re-tilt the scales to the prejudice of the
accused.—Fear of clogged dockets and the inconvenience of a perceived
distortion are operational concerns that are not sufficient justification to re-
tilt the scales to the prejudice of the accused. It does not impact on the fact
that by adjusting the questioned amounts to the present value of money, the
Court would merely be following the mandate of Article 10 and fulfilling its
proper constitutional role.

Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Cruel Punishment Clause; Penalties; View that the

Filipino people who ratified the present Constitution could not have
intended to limit the reach of the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover torture
and other forms of odious punishments only because

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nearly four decades before the present Constitution took effect, the
Philippine government joined the community of nations in approving the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 which bans
“torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”—
Indeed, the Filipino people who ratified the present Constitution could not
have intended to limit the reach of the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover
torture and other forms of odious punishments only because nearly four
decades before the present Constitution took effect, the Philippine
government joined the community of nations in approving the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 which bans “torture or x x x
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” In 1986, shortly
before the Constitution took effect, the Philippines ratified the International

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Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) containing an identically

worded prohibition. These international norms formed part of Philippine
law as generally accepted principles of international law and binding treaty
obligation, respectively.
Same; Same; Same; View that impermissible disproportionality is
better gauged by testing punishments against the following alternative
parameters: (1) whether more serious crimes are equally or less severely
punished; or (2) whether the punishment reasonably advances the state
interest behind the penalty.—Impermissible disproportionality is better
gauged by testing punishments against the following alternative parameters:
(1) whether more serious crimes are equally or less severely punished; or (2)
whether the punishment reasonably advances the state interest behind the
penalty. These parameters strike the proper balance of providing practical
tools of adjudication to weigh claims of cruel punishment while at the same
time affording Congress discretionary leeway to craft penal statutes
addressing societal evils.
Same; Same; Same; View that by imposing a level of punishment for
estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide and kidnapping,
Article 315’s system of calibrating the maximum penalty based on the
amount of fraud is plainly arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of
the crime punished.—Article 315 of the Code calibrates the maximum
penalty for estafa on an escalated basis once a threshold amount of fraud is
crossed (P22,000). The penalty escalates on a ratio of one year
imprisonment for every P10,000 fraud, with 20 years as ceiling.
Accordingly, for a fraud of P98,000, the trial

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court sentenced petitioner to a maximum term of 15 years. This punishment,

however, is within the range of the penalty imposable on petitioner under
the Code had he “killed the [private complainant] jeweler in an angry
confrontation.” The same penalty would also be within the range prescribed
by the Code had petitioner kidnapped the private complainant and kept him
detained for three days. By any objective standard of comparison, crimes
resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty are unquestionably more serious
than crimes resulting in the deprivation of property. By imposing a level of
punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide and
kidnapping, Article 315’s system of calibrating the maximum penalty based
on the amount of fraud is plainly arbitrary and disproportionate to the
severity of the crime punished.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Cruel Punishment Clause ensures
that the state interest is advanced without sacrificing proportionality
between the crime and punishment. In short, the Clause acts as
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constitutional brake whenever Congress enacts punishment whose severity

is gratuitous, wholly unconnected to the purpose of the law.—The penalties
of imprisonment and/or fine attached to each crime are meant to deter and
incapacitate criminals from infringing such right. The Cruel Punishment
Clause ensures that the state interest is advanced without sacrificing
proportionality between the crime and punishment. In short, the Clause acts
as constitutional brake whenever Congress enacts punishment whose
severity is gratuitous, wholly unconnected to the purpose of the law.
Same; Same; Same; View that the breach of the Cruel Punishment
Clause by Article 315’s system of calculating the maximum penalty for
estafa in excess of P22,000 means that only the minimum term of
imprisonment provided under Article 315 for such crime can be imposed on
petitioner, namely, prisión correccional in its maximum period.—The
breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause by Article 315’s system of
calculating the maximum penalty for estafa in excess of P22,000 means that
only the minimum term of imprisonment provided under Article 315 for
such crime can be imposed on petitioner, namely, prisión correccional in its
maximum period. This level of penalty is covered by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which renders the next lower penalty, namely, prisión
correccional in its medium period, as the minimum of the sentence. The
entirety of the sentence will be anywhere within the range of these
maximum and

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minimum penalties. Hence, petitioner’s term of imprisonment should be

modified to three (3) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days of prisión correccional, as maximum.
Same; Same; Same; Syndicated Estafa (P.D. No. 1689); View that the
penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1689 is an altogether different matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) by adding a new mode of committing estafa
and imposing the penalty of “life imprisonment to death” or “reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds
P100,000.”—The penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under
Presidential Decree No. 1689 (PD 1689) is, however, an altogether different
matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of the Code by adding a new mode of
committing estafa and imposing the penalty of “life imprisonment to death”
or “reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud
exceeds P100,000.” Unlike Article 315, PD 1689 does not calibrate the
duration of the maximum range of imprisonment on a fixed time-to-peso
ratio (1 year for every P10,000 in excess of P22,000), but rather provides a
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straight maximum penalty of death or reclusion perpetua. This places PD

1689 outside of the ambit of the proscription of the Cruel Punishment
Clause on the imposition of prison terms calibrated based on the value of the
money or property swindled, unadjusted to inflation.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Cruel Punishment Clause, on the
other hand, is the constitutional yardstick against which penal statutes are
measured using relevant standards unrelated to questions of criminal malice
and injury.—Testing Article 315 against the Cruel Punishment Clause under
the standards espoused in this opinion does not make a dead letter law of the
second paragraph of Article 5 of the Code. Such provision, mandating
courts to recommend executive clemency — when a strict enforcement of
the provisions of th[e] Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense. (Emphasis supplied) operates within the realm
of criminal law, requiring fact-based judicial evaluation on the degree of
malice of the accused and the injury sustained by the victim or his heirs. The
Cruel Punishment Clause, on the other hand, is the constitutional yardstick
against which penal statutes are meas-

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ured using relevant standards unrelated to questions of criminal malice and

injury. Far from overlapping, the conclusions yielded by analyses under
these two rules are distinct — a penal statute may well avoid the taint of
unconstitutionality under the Clause but, applying such statute under
peculiar set of facts, may justify a recommendation for the grant of
clemency.
Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional infirmity not only of
Article 315 but also of related provisions in the Code calls for a
comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.—The
constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but also of related provisions
in the Code calls for a comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year
old legislation. Pending such congressional review, this Court should
decline to enforce the incremental penalty in Article 315 because such
continued enforcement of the incremental penalty violates the Cruel
Punishment Clause.

Brion, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; View that what they propose to do

involves an undue and unwarranted invocation of the Supreme Court’s
judicial power — an act that cannot be done without violating the due
process rights of the Republic.—In my view, what they propose to do

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involves an undue and unwarranted invocation of the Court’s judicial power

— an act that cannot be done without violating the due process rights of the
Republic. Notably, the Republic focused solely and was heard only on the
matter of estafa. In fact, the present case is only about estafa, not any other
crime. To touch these other crimes in the present case likewise involves acts
of policy determination on the substance of the law by the Judiciary — a
violation of the highest order of the limits imposed on us by the
Constitution.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; View that in reviewing
criminal cases, we recognize our duty to correct errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed raised by the parties as errors, regardless of whether
they had been made the subject of assignments of error or not.—I am not
unaware that an appeal in criminal cases throws the case wide open for
review, and allows the reviewing tribunal the power to correct errors or to
reverse the trial court’s decisions on the grounds other than those raised by
the parties as

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errors. In reviewing criminal cases, we recognize our duty to correct

errors as may be found in the judgment appealed regardless of whether they
had been made the subject of assignments of error or not. This discretion,
however, is limited to situations where the Court intends to correct the
trial court’s errors in applying the law and appreciating the facts. A
quick survey of jurisprudence shows that this includes reevaluating factual
questions presented before the trial court, weighing the credibility of
witnesses and other pieces of evidence presented before the trial court, or
applying the proper penalty.
Same; Same; Same; View that at most, the Supreme Court’s wide
discretion in reviewing criminal cases allows it to motu proprio provide a
proper interpretation of the penal law being applied.—At most, the
Supreme Court’s wide discretion in reviewing criminal cases allows it to
motu proprio provide a proper interpretation of the penal law being applied.
This discretion, however, does not extend to the power to adjust the penalty
defined in the law, based on the monetary value of the property involved in
the crime of estafa. More than this, the Court’s discretion does not allow it
to similarly adjust the penalties defined in other crimes, similarly based on
the monetary values of the property involved in these other crimes, as
these other crimes are not involved in the present case. These crimes and
their penalties have neither been adjudicated upon by the trial court nor by
the CA; neither is the “judicial interpretation” of their penalties necessary to
determine whether Corpuz committed the crime of estafa in the present
case.
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Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; View that within their

respective spheres of influence, each department is supreme and the exercise
of its powers to the full extent cannot be questioned by another department.
—Underlying the doctrine of separation of powers is the general proposition
that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the same
hands that possess the whole power of the other departments. Within their
respective spheres of influence, each department is supreme and the exercise
of its powers to the full extent cannot be questioned by another department.
Outside of their defined spheres of action, none of the great governmental
departments has any power, and nor may any of them validly exercise the
powers conferred upon the others.

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Same; Same; Judicial Power; View that Section 1, paragraph 2, Article

VIII of the Constitution states that judicial power “includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,” as well as to “determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” as well as to “determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Traditionally, judicial
power has been defined as “the right to determine actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction.” It is “the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the
courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights.”
Same; Same; Same; View that no court can exercise judicial power
unless real parties come before it for the settlement of actual controversy
and unless the controversy is of the nature that can be settled in a manner
that binds the parties through the application of existing laws.—No court
can exercise judicial power unless real parties come before it for the
settlement of actual controversy and unless the controversy is of the nature
that can be settled in a manner that binds the parties through the application
of existing laws. This traditional concept of judicial power, as the
application of law to actual controversies, reflects the constitutional
imperative of upholding the principle of separation of powers, such that the
Judiciary has no power to entertain litigations involving the legality,
wisdom, or the propriety of the conduct of the Executive; neither has it
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the power to enlarge, alter or repeal laws or to question the wisdom,

propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy or expediency of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; View that judicial interpretation of penal laws
should be aligned with the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily
in the language of the law as it defines the crime.—On the legislature’s
exclusive domain, through lawmaking, lies the

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authority to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It

is the legislature, as representative of the sovereign people, that determines
which acts or combination of acts is criminal and what the ordained
punishments shall be. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned
with the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of
the law as it defines the crime.
Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; View that the cardinal canon in
statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis — requires
that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”—The cardinal
canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis —
requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought
in the language in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” In interpreting
any statute in the exercise of its judicial power of applying the law, the
Court should always turn to this cardinal canon before all others. “Courts
should always presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there,” and that the legislature knows “the
meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.” Thus, when the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, and does not yield absurd
and unworkable results, the duty of interpretation, more so of construction,
does not arise; the Court should resort to the canons of statutory
construction only when the statute is ambiguous.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that as the words of Article 315
are clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or alter them to
accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the law or from
legislative history.—The language of the penalty clauses of Article 315 of
the RPC is plain and clear; no reservation, condition or qualification,
particularly on the need for adjustment for inflation, can be read from the
law, whether by express provision or by implication. The clear legislative
intention to penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as
enumerated in the law, therefore, should be deemed complete — Article 315
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embodies all that the legislature intended when the law was crafted. As the
words of Article 315 are

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clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or alter them to
accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the law or
from legislative history, i.e., to remedy the perceived grossly unfair
practice of continuing to impose on persons found guilty of estafa the
penalties that the RPC Commission pegged on the value of money and
property in 1930.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; View that the equal
protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place in like circumstances; The equal protection, however, does
not demand absolute equality under all circumstances.—Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides: “nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection clause means
that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. It demands that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The equal protection, however, does not demand absolute equality
under all circumstances. The protection recognizes that persons are not born
equal and have varying handicaps that society has no power to abolish.
Thus, the equal protection clause permits reasonable classifications provided
that the classification: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
applies equally to all members of the same class.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that that there has been no
change in the way the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines fraud and, hence,
there should be no reason for a change in the way a fraudulent act is
penalized; A fraud committed in the 1930s should be punished in the same
manner as a fraud committed in the present day.—The key element in estafa
is the fraudulent act committed that has caused harm to others. Estafa
penalizes the fraudulent act. I submit that there has been no change in
the way the RPC defines fraud and, hence, there should be no reason for
a change in the way a fraudulent act is penalized. A fraud committed in
the 1930s should be punished in the same manner as a fraud committed in
the present day. That the consequences of the fraudulent act constituted the
basis for determining the gradation of penalties

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was a policy decision that Congress had the prerogative to make. This
included the value behind each threshold and its corresponding penalty.
What was true then is still true today. Thus, the disparity between the
monetary values of things and property in the 1930s and the prevailing
monetary values of like things and property do not amount to distinctions so
substantial that they would require this Court to treat and classify Corpuz
differently from persons who committed estafa in 1930.
Statutory Construction; View that resorting to judicial legislation by
construction encroaches into the exclusive domain of the legislature — a
course that clearly violated the constitutional separation of powers
principle.—Even granting arguendo that the penalty the CA imposed on
Corpuz is “grossly unfair” from the economic and pragmatic point of view
(as Justice Abad has carefully crafted), the solution to this “gross
unfairness” is not for this Court, by itself, to provide. Article 315 of the RPC
is plain and unambiguous and Corpuz’s case falls clearly within its
provisions. Hence, under the circumstances and within the context of this
case, the Court’s duty is simply to apply the law. Resorting to judicial
legislation by construction encroaches into the exclusive domain of the
legislature — a course that clearly violated the constitutional separation of
powers principle.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; Cruel and Unusual Punishment;
View that in determining whether a penalty is cruel or unusual, we have
considered not just the amount taken from the private injured party, but also
considered the crime’s impact on national policy and order.—In this case,
the Solicitor General has adequately provided the reason for the penalties
behind the estafa, i.e., to protect and encourage the growth of commerce in
the country and to protect the public from fraud. This reason, to my mind, is
sufficient to justify the penalties for estafa. That the amount taken from the
private injured party has grown negligible through inflation does not ipso
facto make the penalty wholly disproportional. In determining whether a
penalty is cruel or unusual, we have considered not just the amount taken
from the private injured party, but also considered the crime’s impact on
national policy and order. It cannot be gainsaid that the perpetuation of fraud
adversely impacts on the public’s confidence in our financial system and
hinders as well the growth of commerce.

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Abad, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Penalties; View that as a general principle, crimes

found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) carry with them the same penalties
whatever year the accused commits them.—As a general principle, crimes
found in the Revised Penal Code carry with them the same penalties
whatever year the accused commits them. For example, one who mutilates a
Philippine coin in 1932, when the code took effect, would go to jail for 2
years and 4 months maximum, exactly the same penalty that another who
mutilates a coin in 2014 would get. The correspondence between the gravity
of the offense and the severity of the penalty does not change with the
passage of time. But, unwittingly, the penalties for crimes involving
property under the Revised Penal Code are in breach of that principle.
Although these penalties are meant to be proportionate to the harm caused,
they are not described in specific and constant terms like the number of days
of incapacity for work of the offended party in physical injuries cases.
Same; Same; Incremental Penalties; View that it is not only the
incremental penalty that violates the accused’s right against cruel, unusual,
and degrading punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the board
touching all property-related crimes. This injustice and inhumanity will go
on as it has gone on for decades unless the Court acts to rein it in.—It is not
only the incremental penalty that violates the accused’s right against cruel,
unusual, and degrading punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the
board touching all property-related crimes. This injustice and inhumanity
will go on as it has gone on for decades unless the Court acts to rein it in.
Same; Same; Same; View that it may be assumed that those who
enacted the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in 1930 did not foresee the
onslaught of inflation in the second half of the century.—It may be assumed
that those who enacted the Revised Penal Code in 1930 did not foresee the
onslaught of inflation in the second half of the century. They had an
agricultural economy and, presumably, the purchasing power of the peso at
that time had not changed perceptibly in the years that they had known. It
would be imprudent to believe that, if those legislators had an inkling of the
shape and value of money and things would take down the years to 2014,
they would have still pegged those penalties to their 1930 economy. But
they

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did. Clearly, they were uninformed and, therefore, their intent must have
been to match the penalties written in the law to the values of money and
property as they understood it at that time.

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Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) need not rewrite
the penalties that the law provides. Rather, the clear intent of the law can be
given by “harmonizing” the law or “aligning the numerical figures” to the
economic realities of the present.—The Court need not rewrite the penalties
that the law provides. Rather, the clear intent of the law can be given by, to
borrow a phrase from Atty. Mario L. Bautista, counsel for Corpuz,
“harmonizing” the law or “aligning the numerical figures” to the economic
realities of the present. To put it another way, ascertaining the facts of the
case in order to faithfully apply to it the law as the legislature intended it is a
judicial function. Dean Candelaria of Ateneo shares this position.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Civil Code stands on the same
footing as the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in terms of force and effect. One is
not superior to the other.—Some would say that Article 2206 of the Civil
Code merely governs civil indemnity whereas Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code on penalties for estafa governs criminal liability, implying that
the latter is quite different. But the Civil Code stands on the same footing as
the Revised Penal Code in terms of force and effect. One is not superior to
the other. The point is that prudent judicial construction works equally on
both codes.
Same; Same; Same; View that in any event, the rule is that in case of
doubt the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are to be construed
in favor of the accused.—In any event, the rule is that in case of doubt the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are to be construed in favor of the
accused. What has happened, however, is that the Court has beginning in
1964 construed the minimum amount set in Article 2206 as subject to
adjustment to cope with inflation although this worked against the accused
in murder and homicide cases. The Court has not come around to give the
same construction to the inflation-affected penalty provisions of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code which would be favorable to him.

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Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Statutory Construction; View that our duty is to interpret the law. It is a

duty reposed on us by the Constitution. We provide meaning to law’s
language and make laws written in a different historical context relevant to
present reality.—I concur with the ponencia of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
in affirming the conviction of Lito Corpuz. However, I dissent on the
penalty imposed by the majority. I do not agree that it is judicial legislation
for us to reconsider the range of penalties created by Congress in 1932. The
range of penalties for the crime of estafa should be recomputed based on
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present value. Our duty is to interpret the law. It is a duty reposed on us by

the Constitution. We provide meaning to law’s language and make laws
written in a different historical context relevant to present reality.
Criminal Law; Penalties; View that the purchasing power of the peso
has significantly changed after eight decades, and it is time that we interpret
the law the way it should be: to reflect the relative range of values it had
when it was promulgated. In doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just
construing what it actually means.—Viewed in this way, I must dissent in
the penalty imposed upon the accused. The pecuniary values that provided
the basis for the range of penalties for the crime of estafa (swindling) were
the values in 1932. It is clear that the gravity of a crime where someone was
defrauded of fifty pesos (P50.00) of property in 1932 is not the same as the
gravity of the same offense for property worth fifty pesos (P50.00) in 2014.
The purchasing power of the peso has significantly changed after eight
decades, and it is time that we interpret the law the way it should be: to
reflect the relative range of values it had when it was promulgated. In doing
so, we are not rewriting the law, just construing what it actually means.
Same; Same; View that an interpretation of a legal provision more
beneficial to an accused or a person who is convicted will have a retroactive
effect.—Definitely, an interpretation of a legal provision more beneficial to
an accused or a person who is convicted will have a retroactive effect. This
should be because such interpretation is corrective in nature. This should not
present extremely debilitating difficulties, and we do not have to have
special rules. The convicted prisoner could simply file habeas corpus as a
post-conviction remedy whenever he or she would have served more than
what would be

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required based on our new interpretations. It is also possible for the

Department of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections and Parole and Probation
Administration to adopt its own guidelines on the release of prisoners. This
difficulty is not insurmountable.
Same; Same; View that I am not convinced that a ruling that will affect
penalties in other crimes where the gravity is measured in pesos will present
difficulties too debilitating so as to amount to being unimplementable.—
Law has never been a discipline too autonomous from the other disciplines.
The points of view of those that inhabit the world of economics and finance
are not strange to lawyers. The eyes through which the law views reality
should not be too parochial and too narrow. Our understanding should
instead be open enough to allow us to see more by borrowing from other
disciplines. Doing so enhances rather than weakens judicial rigor. I am not
convinced that a ruling that will affect penalties in other crimes where the
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gravity is measured in pesos will present difficulties too debilitating so as to

amount to being unimplementable. I do not see why courts of law cannot
simply adopt the universally acceptable formula for present value.
Same; Same; View that an interpretative methodology for penalties is
proposed because of the extraordinary lapse of time from the date of
promulgation of the law (1932) to the present.—An interpretative
methodology for penalties is proposed because of the extraordinary lapse of
time from the date of promulgation of the law (1932) to the present.
Definitely, we will not be recomputing the penalties for all statutes. I am of
the view that the approach for computing the penalties in this case will only
be applicable to statutes that have been promulgated and have not been
amended for no less than the past eight decades. The world was very
different then. A world war intervened. Four different Constitutions with
their corresponding amendments were promulgated and took effect. There
are now more types of property than could have been imagined at that time.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nini D. Cruz and Mario Luza Bautista for petitioner.

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The Solicitor General for respondent.

PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of
petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private
complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an
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18k diamond ring for men; a woman’s bracelet; one (1) men’s
necklace and another men’s bracelet, with an aggregate value of
P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The
period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale

_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of the
Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin
(now a member of the Supreme Court), concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2 Rollo, p. 43.
3 Id., at pp. 48-52.

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or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was

able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of
estafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy,
one (1) men’s diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
men’s bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies’ bracelet,
22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand
Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the
part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to
return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said
items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused
failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety-
Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and
prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his

counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

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The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the

lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the

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defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be

summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of
Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of
extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they
earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business
with private complainant. However, he admitted obtaining a loan
from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a
blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May
2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed
agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not
even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one
(1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prisión
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy
the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the
appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

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WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment

dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term,
such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prisión
mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total
of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration,

filed with this Court the present petition stating the following
grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE
LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS
VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT —
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE
RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF
SOLD;

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Corpuz vs. People

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED

IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO
RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR
REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD — AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE — WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION’S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT ALTHOUGH —
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;

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2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER — ACCUSED IS MORE

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND
APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to

object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established
the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.

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Corpuz vs. People

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime

charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are
conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the
findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of
the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the
trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and
substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of
the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991
marked as Exhibit “A” and its submarkings, although the same was
merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However,
the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility
of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also
correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection
in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established
doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection
shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the
formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that

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the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of
jewelry were supposed to be returned and

_______________
4 Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599; 469 SCRA 610, 618 (2005).

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