Educational Leadership's Moral Role
Educational Leadership's Moral Role
This essay intends to examine the moral character of learning and teaching and the concomitant
implications for educational leaders. With the academic curriculum in mind, I ask the basic
question: why should young people learn the standard academic curriculum that schools confront
them with? Although the expected answer might be, in the present policy context, to prepare them
for the increasingly complex and competitive world of work, I answer that it is to prepare them to
engage the cultural, the natural, and the historical worlds represented in the academic
curriculum*/to engage those worlds as members whose identities are shaped by those worlds,
whose futures require skillful and satisfying participation in those worlds, and whose membership
impose responsibilities to those worlds. The analysis presents a critique of the decontextualized,
abstract, depersonalized learning expected of learners, a learning of right answers to test questions,
without any clear understanding or justification of why these answers are ‘‘right’’*/a learning that is
inauthentic, posed, dishonest, and disrespectful, simply a response to the imposed playing of
school. I offer a virtuous approach to learning, an approach that seeks the good inherent in the
dialogue between the learner and the worlds he or she is studying, a goodness that creates both the
intelligibility of the knower as well as the intelligibility of the known found in their mutual
interdependence and relationality. The essay concludes with some implications for both teachers
and administrators in school that promote this moral, as well as, intellectual character of learning.
Introduction
This article will propose some perspectives that might guide educational leaders
(whether they be administrators or teachers) to address a neglected dimension of
their work, namely the cultivation of the moral character of learning and teaching. I
say this is a neglected dimension for two reasons: (a) the literature dealing with the
preparation and professional development of educators is, by and large, bereft of a
treatment of pupil learning as a moral activity, although we may find such treatments
of the moral character of learning in the more general literature on education (see, for
example, Dewey, 1916; Dunne, 1995; Hogan, 1995; Starratt, 2003); (b) this initial
effort is seen as starting a conversation among scholars in the field of education,
to these questions about the rationale behind the school curriculum is that these
studies have much to do with basic human concerns (Dewey, 1916; Broudy et al.,
1964; Dunne, 1995; Hogan, 1995; Carr & Steutel, 1999). These studies can
(thought not necessarily will) help us understand who we are: as natural beings
(situated in the world of ‘nature’ as represented by the natural sciences); as socio-
cultural beings (situated in the world of culture and society as described by the arts
and humanities, as well as the social and human sciences); as historical beings (as
belonging to communities whose traditions and journeys have a past, a present, and a
future, and whose members have built that past and are expected to build its future).
As human beings we are both embedded in and privileged by these worlds, bound
to and in partnership with these worlds. These studies bring to light the intelligibility
of these worlds and our own intelligibility as members of these worlds. These studies
illuminate our relationships to these worlds so that we may participate in them with
responsibility, integrity and purpose. Participation in these worlds obviously means
that the learning process involves not only an intellectual appreciation of the
architecture and grammar of these worlds (in the role of spectator, participant
observer or aesthetic critic) but also the gradual exercise of various practical skills to
negotiate and engage these worlds (as autonomous and intentional agents, as fully
functioning members of these worlds). These aspects of the learning process (both
understanding and personal engagement) constitute the ‘good’, the intrinsic value of
learning.
These studies can (but again, not automatically will) gradually and cumulatively
engage us in a conversation, both personal and public, with these worlds in which we
can ask: How do you work? How do you help me (us) understand how I (we) work?
How is my (our) immediate life world like your world? What do you teach me (us)
about my (our) possibilities, my (our) limitations, my (our) responsibilities? How are
you inside me and I inside you? With capable teachers these studies can develop into
ongoing conversations between the worlds expressed and interpreted through the
academic subjects that comprise the school curriculum, conversations where the
learners listen to the voices of those worlds talk back to them, where the learners can
become more fully present to those worlds and thus to the various relationships of the
learners to those worlds, relationships that gradually reveal increasing complexity
and responsibilities, relationships in response to which learners continue to shape
their self-understanding, both individually and communally.
Such a justification for engaging the school’s ‘subjects’ at this level of learning
seems to be lacking in the current articulation of the school’s learning agenda.
Instead, we hear other metaphors: the curriculum is ‘delivered’ by teachers to
students who, in turn, ‘master’ the curriculum, the mastery of which is revealed by
identifying or producing preordained ‘right answers’, which are then tallied as
numbers and percentages that reveal what the student has ‘achieved’.
Clearly, this understanding of learning refers to a one-way appropriation of a
prefixed menu of abstract right answers (no credit for left answers) that are presumed
to objectively correspond with the true and real state of affairs, uniformly and
universally agreed to by the adult world, if not the world of scholars (Shepard, 2002).
402 R. J. Starratt
There appears to be no concern in the process of preparing for these tests with either
the self-knowledge of one’s humanity in relationship to these worlds nor with one’s
responsibilities to these worlds. Achieving right answers seems an end in itself, a sign
of hard work and conformity to a dominant adult world that has constructed this
artificial obstacle course of puzzles, riddles, problems, abstract classifications,
formulae, definitions and technical vocabulary, the mastery of which is supposed
to predict a successful future.
The view of learning that is driven by mastery of right answers forces learning into
a uniform time-frame for all learners to learn a specific skill or understanding.
‘Mastery’ of such learning is equated with speed; how fast can one accumulate
sufficient information within the allotted class time in order to organize that
information into right answers to the test questions within the limited time-frame of
the test itself. The test questions, moreover, are assumed to represent a legitimate
sampling of the larger body of information delivered (though not necessarily learned)
during the circumscribed time of instruction and study.
This arrangement of curriculum units into limited, one size fits all time-frames
forces many, if not most, learners to hurry up, to scramble for some scrap of what it is
they perceive the teacher expects them to have learned, to parrot out a phrase or
definition just in time before the class or the test runs out of time, to guess at a right
answer without having any clue as to why this constitutes a right answer. More often
than not learners are forced to make believe that they know what they do not know.
Observe some students arguing with the teacher that they should get partial credit for
having a piece, however fragmentary, of the right answer. Within the game of ‘playing
school’ one might agree that they should indeed get the partial credit, for their
argument conforms to the simplistic logic of ‘getting the right answer’ as the
definition of academic achievement.
As I have argued elsewhere (Starratt, 2004), this test-fixated learning promotes an
unethical type of learning. This type of learning is inauthentic and irresponsible; it
promotes an attitude where the integrity of the worlds represented by the academic
subjects is of no importance outside of its instrumentality in providing decontextua-
lized right answers to someone else’s questions. This form of learning is posed
learning, phony, fake, superficial learning. Indeed, this learning is morally harmful
for it tends to programme students to approach their world in a thoroughgoing self-
referential and exploitative learning process that treats knowledge as the currency of
the school system, as a commodity to be traded in the free market of school
achievement. The learning process is thereby corrupted. Students are turned from an
authentic encounter with the physical, the cultural, the historical worlds to a pillaging
of texts in search for answers to the teacher’s or the test makers’ questions.
virtue of responsibility (Starratt, 2004). Virtues are ways of responding to the moral
demands and opportunities proffered within the varying circumstances and settings
of associated living (Flanagan & Jupp, 2001). Gouinlock (1993) suggested that
virtues are responses organically related to actual problematic situations. Thus, there
would be specific virtuous responses to problematic situations in the practice of
architecture, engineering or teaching. The virtuous response would not only seek to
avoid or prevent harm in those practices, but would seek to promote the good
organically embedded within practice. In other words, the integrity of the practice of
architecture, engineering or teaching would imply certain virtuous ways of practicing
those professions and certain ways that would violate the integrity of the practice.
The practice of learning has its own integrity, which calls for certain virtues.
I propose that learning involves the virtues of presence, authenticity and
responsibility. One has to be present, as fully present as possible to the material or
topic under study. Presence implies a dialogical relationship between the learner and
the material under study. As with two persons, their mutual presence to each other
make a relationship possible, a relationship bonded by telling and listening. Each
person listens to the other’s words, takes them in, and with the words takes the other
person inside as one interprets what the other’s words mean. The listener then
responds to the other, presenting in the response both the listener’s interpretation of
what the other has said and also how the listener responds to what the other has said
according to his or her perspective or feelings. Thus the dialogue goes back and forth,
with people disclosing more of themselves and taking in richer and fuller under-
standings of the other.
If one of the parties to the dialogue becomes distracted and fails to be fully
attentive to the other person then the mutuality of presence is diminished, if not
broken; the integrity of the dialogue and the relationship that was developing is put in
jeopardy. Frequently humans have ways of signalling the withdrawal of presence.
They look at their watch, throw up their hands and declare that they must rush off for
an appointment, but they hope the dialogue can be resumed tomorrow or on some
other occasion. Most of us, however, have experienced talking to another person who
was barely half present to us, who was obviously preoccupied with something other
than our fascinating story. We feel somewhat offended by the other’s feigned
responses of interest when it is obvious their mind is elsewhere.
The practice of the virtue of presence in the process of learning is something that
itself is learned. Some teachers will explicitly teach it under the guise of study skills or
creating a readiness set at the beginning of class. There are ways of getting the
learners’ attention, motivating them to focus and concentrate in anticipation of
learning something of personal value to them. As the lesson progresses, teachers
increase the learner’s attention by posing new questions, ‘If x is thus and so, what
does that imply for y?’ or ‘What does this situation suggest for its resolution?’ The
point behind the questions is to encourage the learner to listen to the intelligibility
embedded in the subject matter talking back to the learner. The teacher is suggesting
ways for the learner to be present to that intelligibility. Vygotsky (1984) suggested, in
his theory of learning, that teachers bring the learners into the ‘zone of proximal
404 R. J. Starratt
development, i.e. bring their presence close to, bring their attention to the threshold
of dialogue with the subject matter. In scaffolding the students’ attention with earlier
learnings, the teacher gives the potentiality of dialogue a running start, so to speak.
While there are many nuances to being present, three seem particularly apropos in
the activity of learning: (1) affirming presence; (2) enabling presence; (3) critical
presence. Affirming presence accepts the person or the event as it is; in its ambiguity,
its incompleteness, its particularity and its multidimensionality. Enabling presence is
open to the possibilities of the person or event to contain or reveal something special,
something of deep value and significance. Critical presence expects to find both
negative and positive features in persons and events. People and events and
circumstances reveal unequal relationships of power and reciprocity. Critical
presence brings to light what is tacit, assumed or presumed in situations that reflect
human constructions and beliefs, rather than something prefixed as necessary, as
natural, as essential. All of these ways of being present to what is being studied enable
the dialogue between learners and one or more of the worlds under consideration in
that unit of the curriculum. Those kinds of presence of the learner enable those
worlds to be similarly present as affirming who the learner is, as enabling the learner
to realize her or his possibilities more fully and as critiquing appropriate assumptions
and presumptions about their mutual relationships.
A second virtue that honors the integrity of learning is authenticity. The virtue of
authenticity involves human beings in their most basic moral challenge, namely the
challenge to be true to themselves, to be real. The opposite of that virtue is
inauthenticity, playing false, making believe one is someone other than who one is.
As with presence, the virtue of authenticity is a dialogical virtue. One cannot be
authentic alone locked in a closet. One is authentic in relationship to another.
Authenticity is revealed in our actions, in our acting out the various social and
cultural roles we play. Actions reveal the being behind the actions. Most basically,
one is authentic as a human being in response to one’s own humanity and the
humanity of the other. One is also authentic as a son or daughter, as a friend or lover,
a father or a mother. In all of these roles one strives to be real, not a fake or cardboard
character. However, the expression of our authenticity has to take into account the
similar effort of others to be true to themselves as well. Authenticity supposes a kind
of social contract, namely that if I expect to be granted a certain latitude to be myself,
to own my life and my choices, so too must I afford to others the latitude to chart the
courses of their own lives (Taylor, 1992).
The practice of learning asks of the learner that he or she acknowledge the world as
what it is. Sometimes the world under study reveals beauty and harmony, sometimes
it reveals complexity, conflict, arbitrary irrationality, seeming cruelty or malevolence.
The learner’s integrity is connected to the learner’s relationship to the various
physical, social cultural, historical and religious worlds he or she is studying. These
worlds invite the learner into membership. Membership, however, imposes a
recognition of both the benefits and privileges, as well as responsibilities, of
membership. In other worlds one’s authenticity as a member of these worlds requires
Cultivating the moral character 405
the many significant potential lessons offered in these focused learning experiences of
the physical, social, cultural and historical worlds. If learning does not implicate us in
those worlds, does not invite a response to these worlds, then why should we even
bother to study them in the first place? What purpose is served by accumulating an
encyclopaedic knowledge of the world if that knowledge provides no sense of who
one is, no sense of how to live one’s life, no sense of membership in the larger
communities that make up these worlds, no sense of moral purpose? Indeed, the
present insistence on accumulating this kind of encyclopaedic knowledge in both a
local and international competition for high test scores seems to ignore these
important questions and, thereby, eviscerates the moral character of learning (Carr &
Steutel, 1999).
extrinsic technical usefulness and intrinsic personal and civic moral purposes. I
believe most teachers would readily embrace such a modest effort to transform the
experience of learning from the tedious and exclusive emphasis on extrinsic and
technical knowledge into learning that can serve both extrinsic and intrinsic values in
learning.
Student
Teacher Curriculum
advantages and limitations, talents and interests the learner brings to the work of
learning. In the second dimension of the triangle the teacher re-encounters the
curriculum unit as revealing a world of significance and value to the teacher, a world
that illuminates and makes possible the teacher’s identity, sense of agency and
participation in that world. In the third dimension the teacher brings the learner and
the curriculum unit into mutual dialogue through the teacher’s careful construction
and scaffolding of a variety of learning experiences shaped by the teacher’s
knowledge of the learner and the teacher’s relationship to the world under study in
that particular curriculum unit. Through these learning activities the student
encounters the world revealed in that curriculum unit and is encouraged to
appreciate how this part of that world speaks to him or her about who he or she
is, about the possibilities for agency in that world, about the privileges and
obligations of membership in that world and about the unfinished agenda of that
world. In the process of learning these lessons the learner will, under the guidance of
the teacher, also learn to express the intelligibility of the subject matter in response to
expected types of questions on the state exam. Under the guidance of the teacher the
learners will also be encouraged to reflect on why these examination questions are
deemed to be important for public life.
By discussing the various dynamics of this model of the moral character of teaching
and learning, educators (whether teachers or administrators) can cooperatively
408 R. J. Starratt
reasonable assurances of such quality in their work. The practice of this kind of
self-assessment should gradually deepen their appreciation of how they come to
know themselves and their responsibilities to the worlds they are learning about,
as well as replace their exclusive reliance on the teacher’s judgement about the
quality of their learning. As students become increasingly adept at such self-
assessment they will be on the road to becoming more responsible for their
learning.
Conclusion
At the start of this essay, I asserted that the moral character of learning was a
neglected dimension in the theory and practice of school leadership. The burden of
most of the essay was to illuminate that moral character of learning through an
exposition of those moral virtues embedded in the very activity of authentic, integral
learning. These virtues, I argued, are not a kind of value-added, icing-on-the-cake
supplement to the more basic intellectual character of learning. On the contrary, they
are essential for the very intellectual quality of learning; without them what passes for
learning in schools is superficial, vacuous, artificial, make-believe, frivolous, and
possibly dishonest. If that argument is at all valid, then school leaders and all teachers
need to evaluate what they do in the light of the moral character of learning. The
argument suggests that they might need to develop the very virtues that support the
moral character of learning in their own roles as guides and facilitators of learning
(Starratt, 2004). Those who would lead in collaboration with teachers in cultivating
the many dialogical relationships implied in studying the worlds contained in the
academic curriculum, will need to nurture those virtues of presence, authenticity,
and responsibility in themselves, not only as adult models for the students, but in all
the organizational support activities they engage in to make learning come alive for
their young charges.
Notes on contributor
Robert J. Starratt, known to friends and colleagues as Jerry, began his work with
school administrators in 1973 at Fordham University, after earlier involvement
as a teacher and high school principal. He has served as chair of the Educational
Administration Departments at both Fordham University and at Boston
College, where he currently works. His books include: The drama of schooling/
the schooling of drama, The drama of leadership, Building an ethical school, Leaders
with vision, Centering educational administration, Transforming educational admin-
istration, Ethical leadership and seven editions of Supervision: a redefinition, co-
authored with Tom Sergiovanni. He and his wife, Ruth live in Newton,
Massachusetts, under the supervision of operatic birds, inquisitive squirrels and
cantankerous crows.
Cultivating the moral character 411
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