The US-​Thai Alliance and Asian

International Relations

Thailand, a long-​standing defence partner of the United States and ASEAN’s

second largest economy, occupies a geostrategically important position as a
land bridge between China and maritime Southeast Asia. This book, based
on extensive original research, explores the current state of US-​Thai relations,
paying particular attention to how the United States is perceived by a wide
range of people in the Thai defence establishment and highlighting the
importance of historical memory. The book outlines how the US-​Thai rela-
tionship has been complicated and at times turbulent, discusses how Thailand
is deeply embedded in multi-​faceted relationships with many Asian states, not
just China, and examines how far the United States is blind to the complexities
of Asian international relations by focusing too much on China. The book
concludes by assessing how US-​Thai relations are likely to develop going for-
ward. Additionally, the work contributes to alliance theory by showing how
domestic politics shapes memory, which in turn affects perceptions of other
states.

Gregory Raymond is a lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,

Australian National University, Canberra.

John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies,

in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University,
Canberra.
Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series
Series Editors
Leszek Buszynski, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian
National University, and William Tow, Australian National University.

Security issues have become more prominent in the Asia Pacific region
because of the presence of global players, rising great powers and confident
middle powers, which intersect in complicated ways. This series puts forward
important new work on key security issues in the region. It embraces the roles
of the major actors, their defense policies and postures and their security inter-
action over the key issues of the region. It covers the United States, China,
Japan, Russia, the Koreas, as well as the middle powers of ASEAN and South
Asia. It also addresses issues relating to environmental and economic security
as well as transnational actors and regional groupings.

32 Japan’s Search for Strategic Security Partnerships

Edited by Gauri Khandekar and Bart Gaens

33 Geopolitics and the Western Pacific

China, Japan and the US
Leszek Busznski

34 The South China Sea

From a Regional Maritime Dispute to Geo-​Strategic Competition
Edited by Leszek Buszynski and Do Thanh Hai

35 China in Japan’s National Security: Domestic Credibility

Toshiya Takahashi

36 Cambodia’s China Strategy

Security Dilemmas of Embracing the Dragon
Chanborey Cheunboran

37 The US-​Thai Alliance and Asian International Relations

History, Memory and Current Developments
Gregory Raymond and John Blaxland
The US-​Thai Alliance and
Asian International Relations
History, Memory and Current
Developments

Gregory Raymond and John Blaxland

First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Gregory Raymond and John Blaxland
The right of Gregory Raymond and John Blaxland to be identified as authors
of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks,
and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​14644-​3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-​1-​032-​01006-​9 (pbk)
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Typeset in Times New Roman
by Newgen Publishing UK
Contents

About the authors  vi

Acknowledgements  viii

1 Introduction: history, memory and the US-​Thai alliance  1

2 Thailand and the Great Powers  29

3 Historical memory and the US-​Thai alliance  67

4 Rediscovering China  101

5 Thailand at the centre I: pan-​Asianism and ASEAN  135

6 Thailand at the centre II: neighbours  154

Conclusion: an alliance in trouble  178

Bibliography  196
Glossary  212
Annexure  213
Index  235
About the authors

Gregory Raymond is a lecturer in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs
researching Southeast Asian politics and foreign relations. He is the author
of Thai Military Power: A Culture of Strategic Accommodation (NIAS Press,
2018). His work has been published in journals including Contemporary
Southeast Asia, South East Asia Research and the Journal of Cold War
Studies. As well as convening the ASEAN-Australia Defence Postgraduate
Scholarship Program, he is ANU Press editor for the Asia-Pacific Security
series. He holds a PhD in political science from La Trobe University and an
MA in Asian Studies from Monash University. Before joining the Australian
National University, Raymond was a policy advisor in the Australian gov-
ernment, as well as in the strategic and international policy areas of the
Department of Defence and the Australian Embassy in Bangkok.
Dr Raymond’s research is at the intersection of area studies and inter-
national relations, and aims to add depth to understanding of the dynamics
of the Asia Pacific region by highlighting the importance of state preference
and national identity. His work on strategic culture, collective memory and
institutions focuses on the importance of culture, memory and the construc-
tion of history in Southeast Asia, and assessing its role in Southeast Asian
defence planning and relations with Great Powers. As a Thai studies scholar,
he also researches the politics of Thailand and its relations with its neighbours.
An emerging research area is the integration of the Mekong sub-region with
southern China, which he is exploring through multiple lenses including phys-
ical connectivity, geo-economics and sub-regional community.
John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence
Studies at the Australian National University (ANU) and the first Australian
recipient of a US Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative grant.
He is a Senior Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, a Fellow of the
Royal Society of New South Wales and a member of the editorial board for
the Australian Army Journal. He is also a former military intelligence officer, a
former Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU, and occa-
sional media commentator.
At ANU, he researches, writes and teaches about intelligence, cyber
security; Australian military history, strategy and operations; defence studies;
 About the authors vii
and, International relations on Asia Pacific security affairs, notably Southeast
Asia.
His publications include Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq,
2001–2014 (2020); In from the Cold: Reflections on Australia’s Korean War,
1950–53 (2020); A Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia (2019); The
Secret Cold War (2016); East Timor Intervention (2015); The Protest Years
(2015); The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard (2014); Strategic
Cousins (2006); Revisiting Counterinsurgency (2006); Information-era
Manoeuvre (2003); Signals: Swift and Sure (1998); and Organising an Army
(1989).
Acknowledgements

This book is the result of a research grant initially awarded in 2015 by the
Minerva Research Initiative from within the United States Department of
Defense. The project involved us, as academics employed by the Australian
National University (ANU) in Canberra, undertaking research in Thailand
on a topic that reflected an interest in understanding the implications of
the US so-called “pivot to Asia.” The project’s initial title was “Thailand’s
Military, the USA and China: The Influence of Great Powers on the Strategic
Choices of the Thai Armed Forces.” In receiving the grant, we became the first
recipients of a Minerva Research Initiative grant outside of North America.
That grant led us to undertake a project spanning several years, from 2015
onwards, and involving a survey of students from Thailand’s armed service
academies, staff colleges, war colleges, joint staff college and national defence
college, as well as students at a government postgraduate program known as
the King Prajadiphok Institute in Bangkok.
In all, 1800 respondents completed our survey over the course of three
years of in-country surveying. This involved us soliciting their views on how
Thais perceive themselves and the world around them in terms of inter-
national relations and great power dynamics, in a historical context. The
surveys were complemented by interviews with more than two dozen senior
serving or retired government officials, mostly from the Ministry of Defense
or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Along the way we also conducted a number
of workshops in order to validate and explore the implications of some of the
quantitative data we were collecting. For this we were ably supported over
three years by the successive heads of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTArF)
Strategic Studies Center. This project involved an outstanding degree of
collaboration and support from elements of the RTArF including the Thai
Ministry of Defense, RTArF Headquarters, the Royal Thai Army (RTA),
Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).
This could not have been possible without a remarkable level of support
and assistance from a range of friends and colleagues as well as many who
did not personally know us but who could see the utility and purpose of the
project and were willing to lend a hand. This included officials working in
the U.S. Department of Defense Army Research office and Navy Research
 Acknowledgements ix
Office including Dr Cung Vu, Dr Lisa Troyer, Dr David Montgomery, Dr
Erin Fitzgerald, Dr Andrew Higier, and Dr Ivy Estabrooke.
We received outstanding support from a succession of Australian
ambassadors and other diplomats including Bill Paterson, Paul Robilliard
and James Wise, as well as Ms. Savitree Jongsuwat and colonel Andrew
Duft in the Defence section of the Australian Embassy in Bangkok. We owe
thanks also to the Australian Consul General in Hawaii, Jeff Robinson, and a
member of his staff, Damien Donavan, who went out of their way to facilitate
workshops and engagement opportunities for us with interlocutors in Hawaii.
The ANU staff at the Australian Embassy in Washington DC, Martha Evans
and John Wellard, followed by Paul Harris were also a great help facilitating
engagement with interlocutors across the city, as was Dr Sheridan Kearnan.
Others were also very helpful including in the East West Centre in
Washington D.C., where Dr Satu Limaye facilitated a workshop, as well as
Ralph A. Cossa and Kerry Gershaneck at Pacific Forum in Hawaii, and at the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, where Dr Amy Searight, along
with my ANU colleague, (and Centre of Gravity series editor) Dr Andrew
Carr, facilitated a joint CSIS and ANU publication in November 2017 with
our interim findings entitled Tipping the Balance in Southeast Asia? Thailand,
the United States and China.
The most important assistance came from members of the Royal
Thai Armed Forces who offered ongoing support, assistance, advice and
introductions, facilitating engagement and helping to overcome challenges
along the way. Chief amongst them was General Surapong Suwanna-adth,
a now retired former Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) of the RTArF, former
senior instructor at the RTA Command and General Staff College (where
John first met him as an Australian exchange student). General Surapong
is also an old graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. Equally as helpful
was his predecessor as CDF, General Boonsrang Niumpradit, himself a West
Point graduate and one of a select few Thais to command Australians and
other international contingents as part of the United Nations peacekeeping
operation in East Timor. Others who were very helpful, from the RTA
included Lieutenant Generals Jont Kraprayoon, Thitinant Uttamang, Niphat
Thonglek, Surasit Thanadtang, Chaianan Chantakananuruk and Werachon
Sukhondapatipak, as well as Major Generals Thunlathorn Nawapid, Jumphon
Chalertoy, Terdsak Dumkhum, Kittiphong Wongskhaluang, Werachart
Palakawong Na Ayutthaya, Paiboon Vorrawanpreecha, Pipattana Nilkaew,
Nantawong Choktaworn, Ruchaglaw Kongkeo and Wandee Tosuwan.
Colonels Banchachit Saensunon and Nonthawat Pakdipongpitchaya were
also instrumental in making this happen. From the RTN, Admiral Graivut
Vattanatham, Pongthep Nhuthep, Vice Admiral Wittanarat Gajaseni, Rear
Admiral Apichai Sompolgrunk and Nawee Luthaivathunyou. From the
RTAF, Air Vice Marshal Adisorn Unhalekhaka, Pongpoomet Nhoonil,
Poomjai Leksuntarakorn Group Captain Verachon Pensri. From the Royal
Thai Police, Police Superintendent Dr. Jessada Burinsuchat.
newgenprepdf

x Acknowledgements
Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak and Dr Panitan Wattanayakorn as well as
Dr Preyanuch Leuhatong and Natchapat Ountrongchit from Chulalongkorn
University were particularly helpful as well.
From the US Embassy in Bangkok, Colonel Larry Redmon and
Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) Jeremiah (Lumpy) Lumbaca deserve a “mention
in dispatches.”
We are particularly grateful to those senior former officials who agreed to
be interviewed for the project. These include former Prime Minister, Anand
Panyarachun and former Foreign Minister Tej Bunnag, and a number of
other senior foreign ministry leaders including Prajuab Chaiyasan, Professor
Dr Surakiart Sathirathai, Kobsak Chutikul, Dr Kantathi Suphamongkhon
and several others who have asked not to have attention drawn to their
contribution.
At the ANU we received outstanding support from the College of Asia
and the Pacific Research office, particularly Sean Downes as well as others
including Karen Warne. In our own School, the Coral Bell School of Asia
Pacific Affairs, Professor Brendan Taylor, then head of the Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre of which both of us are members, deserves special
mention, as does Professor Joan Beaumont, Dr Iain Henry, and the school
manager, Deanne Drummond and finance manager, Tim Robbins. On
research design, we are indebted to assistance from Judith Steiner who helped
design the questionnaire and Chris Lonergan and Catherine Smithers who
managed the input and correlation of the data. Nyree Mason was particularly
helpful with statistical analysis, ensuring the formulations were rigorous and
the results were fully analysed from as many angles as possible. The Routledge
Series Editor, Dr Leszek Buszynski has been a great source of encouragement
as well. In the end, however, we are the ones to blame for any outstanding
errors or omissions the reader may identify.

Dr Greg Raymond and Professor John Blaxland

22 April 2021
1 
Introduction
History, memory and the US-​Thai
alliance

With one singular exception, time’s arrow is straight. Unidirectionality of

time is one of nature’s most fundamental laws. It has relentlessly governed all
happenings in the universe –​cosmic, geological, physical, biological, psycho-
logical –​as long as the universe has existed. Galaxies and stars are born and
they die, living creatures are young before they grow old, causes always precede
effects, there is no return to yesterday, and so on and on. Time’s flow is irre-
versible. The singular exception is provided by the human ability to remember
past happenings.1

Thailand remains important for the United States. A long-​standing defence

partner and ASEAN’s (Association of South East Asian Nations) second lar-
gest economy, Thailand occupies a geostrategically important position as a
land bridge between China and maritime Southeast Asia, straddling critical
sea lanes. It hosts Asia’s largest multilateral military exercise, Cobra Gold,
and its Utapao airport provides an important staging post for US forces
transiting to the Middle East. Historically, Thailand has been something of
a bellwether state. It ended its tributary relationship with imperial China in
1853 and entered trade and diplomatic relationships with the rising West.
Thailand today is a country far more secure than when the United States
and Thailand began their strategic partnership, in the midst of the Second
World War.2 It is a security that has produced not only greater prosperity, but
also a stronger national identity. These attributes, as well as some startling
findings from our empirical research, prompted us to examine the Thai-​US
alliance through the lens of collective memory and national identity. Looking
backwards through the lens of contemporary Thai memory, this book explains
how Thais view their long and turbulent alliance relationship with the United
States, against their broader set of international relationships, and against the
more complex backdrop of international politics in the twenty-​first century.
We believe this approach breaks new ground in the study of alliances, and is
one that has applicability elsewhere in the Indo-​Pacific region, especially for
other Southeast Asian states who are partners of the United States.
2 Introduction

An approach based on memory

Alliances are special. They indicate a binding commitment to another state’s
security that encompasses joint military operations. At the same time, alliances
are constrained by fundamental dynamics found in any bilateral relationship.
Do the actors perceive their identity, values and their interests to be compat-
ible, or inimical, with those of their alliance partner? These factors matter
because nested within the security bargain of an alliance is a deeper relation-
ship between two countries that may engender genuine warmth and trust, or
alternatively, perfunctory and superficial display. Alliances in the latter cat-
egory have in the past, and will again in the future, dwindle away. Some of
these failures may be put down to the inherent weaknesses of ‘alliances of
convenience,’ where states of fundamentally different governing ideologies
put aside temporarily their differences because of a shared threat perception.3
The brief alliance between the United States and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is
an example. Other hollow alliances die for more subtle reasons. China’s Cold
War alliance with the Soviet Union soured as sensitivity over hierarchy, status
and identity eroded trust.4
Identity is a fundamental variable of international relations and can be, as
suggested earlier, as important to the success of alliances as the material elem-
ents of the security bargain. While identity is a subject that has been exten-
sively addressed in constructivist international relations (IR) research, there
is little consensus on what precisely the concept means and how it is formed.5
In one of constructivism’s most influential essays, Alexander Wendt argued
that state identities form as states interact with one another.6 Cooperative
encounters could lead to perception of the world as benign, while conflictual
episodes could foster a perception of a ‘self-​help world’ (a core tenet of neo-​
realist IR theory). Some see the designation of a hostile and inimical ‘Other’
as inherent to defining the ‘Self.’7 Others point out that states can find iden-
tity through group membership.8 Friendship is yet another kind of Self-​Other
encounter, a special type in which the Self feels able to be authentic, and yet
still accorded recognition by the Other.9 Regardless of how identity forms, it
is fair to say that the sum of ‘Self-​Other’ perceptions will lead to a designation
of the ‘Other’ as friend, enemy or something else.
Self-​Other perceptions are for states, in our view, inevitably shaped by
collective memory. In this book we examine Thai collective memory and its
implications for both its own national identity, its perception of its alliance
partner the United States, other Great Powers, neighbouring countries and
ASEAN. So how exactly are identity and memory linked?
It is well established that the reputation of allies can shape alliance decision-​
making.10 Clearly the notion of reputation has built into it, actions from the
past, and so memory is certainly critical to the notion of reputation. However,
how the internal processes by which states form and promulgate memory of
allies tends not to be a focus of this alliance literature. Neither has construct-
ivist IR theory, to our knowledge, dealt explicitly with the question of the
 Introduction 3
relationship between memory and identity (although Berenskotter does point
out that “individuals are not empty shells waiting to be filled with meaning
but historical beings grounded in unique experiences and visions of a desirable
future,” a point which we suggest is equally relevant to states11). So here we
might turn to the English philosopher John Locke. Locke wrote that for indi-
vidual human beings, memory and identity were deeply interlinked:

in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational

Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any
past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is
the same self now it was then; and ’tis by the same self with this present
one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.12

Locke was concerned with how the fundamental identity of individuals

remains the same despite physical and mental growth over the course of their
lifetimes. Our concern here is somewhat different; it is the relationship between
collective memory and national identity in the population of a nation state.
And here, we contend that national identity is linked to collective memory in
a way analogous but also different to individual identity and memory. While
what is collectively remembered shapes national identity, the formation of
collective memory is subject to factors different to the unique physiological
and psychological traits that might influence how a particular individual
remembers their life.
Collective memory, according to sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, is different
from personal autobiographical memory, because it is reinforced by the inter-
action of the individual with society.13 This means it comes from written
records, photographs, commemorations, rituals and festivals. Accordingly,
this book examines the writing of history as well as other practices, such
as art and ceremony, that embody collective remembering. In doing so we
are deeply cognisant of how political and social power structures, especially
domestic but also international, surround and shape these practices. Memory
studies research now speaks of the existence of mnemonic hegemonies, in
which tensions exist between official master narratives and community-​based
counter-​narratives.14 In the case of Thailand, we are deeply interested in how
Thailand’s national identity as a Buddhist constitutional monarchy survived
but was deeply shaped by the colonial period, despite Thailand having
remained formally uncolonised. These attributes have shaped its practice of
writing national history, thereby influencing its collective memory of self and
others, including its alliance partner the United States.
We will shortly set out the specific methodological approach taken in this
book, built on this framework of memory, identity and alliances, and also
foreshadow some of the key findings and concepts. But before we do, let us
articulate firstly the puzzle we wish to solve, and secondly, the justification for
why we think our approach is worthwhile adding to the existing approaches
to understanding alliances.
4 Introduction

The puzzle
Why does Thailand, on the doorstep of a rising and more assertive China, not
draw closer to its treaty ally the United States? In our surveys of Thai military
officers undertaken between 2015 and 2017, two results stood out. First was
the readiness of Thai officers to identify the United States, Thailand’s treaty
ally, as a more likely military threat than China, Russia, India or Japan.15
Admittedly this result took place against a backdrop in which the sampled
group of approximately 1,800 officers generally saw state-​based threats as less
serious than non-​state-​based threats.16 Simultaneously, these officers believed
that Thailand was reliant on the United States for security.17 But even taking
these factors into account, the preparedness to believe that the United States,
a treaty ally, might itself be a country that would harm Thailand was start-
ling and demands further exploration and explanation. Certainly American
talk of sanctions after the 2014 coup coloured perceptions of the United
States. But in this book we will argue that the unease on the Thai side has
deeper roots.
The second result was the finding that over almost 40 percent of the
surveyed officers had not heard of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO), despite the 1954 Manila Treaty forming the primary legal basis
of the US-​Thai alliance. In our surveys we asked all waves, Do you know
about the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) once
headquartered in Bangkok?18 SEATO had been formed as a response to the
communist Vietminh driving French forces from northern Vietnam, in par-
ticular through their 1954 victory at Dien Bien Phu. This had spurred the
United States to seek to deter further communist aggression. The result
was the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), signed in
Manila on 8 September 1954 by the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand.
Thailand was one of the most eager proponents and the first to ratify the
treaty, on 2 December 1954.19 Under Prime Minister Phibun Songkram, the
Thai government had sought a bilateral security guarantee from the United
States against the possibility of Chinese or Vietminh advances into Thai ter-
ritory via Laos, and saw the Pact primarily in those terms. Phibun also had
an additional motive, to strengthen his domestic political position against
rivals such as police chief Phao Siyanon and army commander Sarit Thanarat,
by obtaining more military assistance for the Thai military and economic
aid for Thailand. SEATO accomplished this goal, when inter alia, SEATO
decided to establish a headquarters in Bangkok.20
Given that it is Thailand that relies on the protection of the United States
rather than vice versa, one would expect greater awareness of SEATO on the
Thai side. But Thailand has released at least two defence white papers which
make no mention of Thailand having a military alliance with the United
States, let alone SEATO.21 If scholarship on America’s Asian alliances is
any indication, Thailand seems the poor cousin of the United States’ Asian
 Introduction 5
alliances. Some works neglect to mention the United States –​Thailand
alliance.22 Indeed, some texts argue that the US-​Thai alliance is defunct.23
It might be argued that Thailand’s Janus-​faced attitude towards the United
States is an outlook consistent with the Southeast Asian geopolitical pos-
ture commonly known as hedging. “Hedging” has been applied to the states
that have retained the United States as their primary security partners, but
have steadily expanded their trade as well as their security ties with China.
Lim and Cooper suggest that hedging is an umbrella term to distinguish
between seemingly contradictory forms of behaviour towards China, such
as trying to socialise China within multilateral institutions concurrent with
strengthening defence capability and alliances with the United States.24 Kuik
suggests that hedging behaviours –​pursuing multiple seemingly contradictory
policies towards Great Powers –​reflects the current post–​Cold War environ-
ment where “elites do not perceive any imminent and unambiguous threat”
and instead “view the embodiments of risks to be more versatile, multifaceted
and uncertain.”25
Unlike many analyses of hedging, this book, prompted by our survey
results and interviews, looks backwards rather than forwards, and more
at emotion and identity, than assets and bargaining. One additional result
which suggests the utility of this response was data in response to a survey
question about metaphors for the US-​Thai relationship in Thai eyes. We
asked respondent to rate the accuracy of four descriptions of the US-​Thai
relationship. Though none received high ratings of fidelity, the description
of ‘patron-​client’ (phu uppatham kap phurapkanuptham) was rated as more
accurate than ‘friend’ (phuean).26 Familial relationships were not seen as good
analogies. If the United States is more a patron than a friend, we need to try
to understand what has led to this perception.
This book, therefore, seeks to explain the hedging stance of one Southeast
Asia state, Thailand, through the lens of collective memory. It takes as its
starting premise that Thailand’s current alliance with the United States, no
less than its growing relationship with China, hangs in an uneasy balance
that combines memory of the past relations with these giants as well as
expectations about the future path of both. Like many other East Asian
states, Thailand is retaining security ties with the United States while pur-
suing strong economic relations with China. But perhaps more like the United
States’ other Southeast Asian ally, the Philippines, and unlike its southern
anchor, Australia, Thailand’s memory of the United States is both comforting
and troubling, in part because Thailand’s relationship with the West writ large
has been both comforting and troubling.

Memory and the theory of alliances

Alliances are agreements between independent states to cooperate militarily
in the event of war or violent conflict with others.27 Most of the theorisation
of alliances and the growth of an alliance literature was undertaken against
6 Introduction
the backdrop of the Cold War, as part of a broader study of war and con-
flict in the United States. The dominant analytical framework was bargaining
and rational utility maximisation and the primary motive for states entering
alliances was capability aggregation: a bigger force bringing higher chances
of victory. Studies predominantly used case studies from nineteenth-​century
and twentieth-​century Europe; references to Middle East, African, or Asian
alliances were a minority of cases and always considered with respect to the
contemporary Cold War context in which the studies were written.28 Some
attention was paid to alliances with ‘Third World’ states. Here George Liska
noted that in small power and large power alliances, there tended to be consid-
erable asymmetry in the motives of their respective partners.29 Large powers
wished to gain physical access for their militaries (and preclude it to their
rivals) and control any excessive aggression from their junior partner. Small
powers sought protection from threats, but also status, and contributions to
political stability.30 These observations are clearly pertinent to the bargain
struck between Thailand and the United States during the Cold War.
Nonetheless, this book does not use bargaining as its prism for viewing
the US-​Thai alliance. It instead employs collective memory and identity.
Why have we chosen this approach? There are principally four reasons,
namely: (1) decline in frequency of military conflict; (2) new research on
how decisions are made; (3) the importance of domestic politics and (4) non-​
Western modes of international relations. Let us unpack each of these.
To begin, we contend that the decline in frequency of military conflict is
reducing the applicability of models developed during the Cold War. When
Diesing and Snyder first compiled their classic Conflict Among Nations in
1977, the Cold War was in full swing.31 They based their analysis of inter-
national behaviour on the concept of crisis bargaining, in which coercion
has a high degree of prominence. They tested three models of crisis decision-​
making –​utility maximisation, bounded rationality and bureaucratic politics
and studied 13 cases, from the Fashoda crisis of 1898 to the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962.32 Seven of these crises were in the post–​Second World War
period, an era with two large drivers of conflict, colonialism and the bipolar
Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the post–​Cold War period both these drivers have disappeared. Interstate
warfare has become rare. In fact, the post–​Cold War period coincides with
what some scholars have called the East Asian Peace.33 This is a somewhat
controversial notion, because many see the current period as dangerous. But
the facts are that the last major military conflict in East Asia was over four
decades ago, when in 1979 China decided to teach Vietnam a lesson and
attacked it, following Vietnam’s own invasion of Cambodia in 1978. This
bloody conflict may have claimed as many as 56,000 lives.34 But it was also
a harbinger of the final decade of the Cold War, after which Southeast Asia
no less than other part of East Asia, sought energetically to turn battlefields
into marketplaces. The reasons for this peace are not agreed. Realists like
Hugh White credit US primacy.35 Others credit Japan as important to this
 Introduction 7
Pax Mercator, as it provides a model of a state focused above all on industri-
alisation, trade and technological modernisation, with the converse rejection
of nationalism and expansionism.36 Others view the absorption, and indi-
genisation of Western political concepts of norms such as sovereignty, and
the development of localised forms of shared identity and modes of diplo-
matic practice, most prominently displayed in ‘the ASEAN way’ as equally
important.37
Our surveys found that Thai military officers see the post–​Cold War era as
one in which the likelihood of states using military force has diminished sig-
nificantly. When asked if they felt very secure or very insecure from external
military threats, we found that over 60% of our respondents (n=1781) gave
ratings ranging from 7 to 10, on a scale in which 10 indicated the most secure.38
The most common response was 8, from about 26% of respondents. In our
surveys, undertaken between 2015 and 2017, we found that there was greater
concern about non-​state threats, such as climate change, crime and refugees.
In our interviews with Thai military officers, officials and former politicians
we found that the domestic concerns of political reconciliation and monar-
chical transition, the unrest in the southern border provinces and terrorism
more broadly were uppermost in their minds. Some went as far as to state
that “Official threats like in war, forces from other countries coming to invade
Thailand, there really aren’t any” and that “Today is an era of new types of
threats.”
Overall, if the current era is one of relative peace, this reduces the import-
ance of military conflict for understanding international politics.39 If states
are rarely confronted with a military crisis with a potential for serious military
conflict, then the habits of thought employed for military crises, and alliance
management might, if they ever existed, atrophy. Moreover, if alliance
bargaining, which as Diesing and Snyder point out, is mainly a matter of
each ally’s military power, the power of the adversary, and alternatives for
alignment, what happens to the analytical efficacy of this model when there is
no clear adversary?40 In fact one of our US discussants hit on this very point,
when they described the US-​Thai alliance as a “threat-​deprived alliance.”
A second problem of alliance theory is its tendency to view decision-​making
as primarily a matter of rational utility maximisation. This no longer reflects
what modern research tells us about human decision-​making. In writing
about the prospects for Australia and Britain to reach a happy post-​Brexit
trade deal commentators wrote that “[S]‌entiment and history will not count
for much when vested interests dig trenches across the negotiating table.”41
That may be true, but sentiment and history were exactly what drove British
citizens to vote for Brexit, despite the predicted economic costs.
Economists, accordingly, are beginning to expand their understanding of
how decision-​making occurs, to encompass more than a rational process of
value-​maximising within constraints. Informed by neuroscience, economists
state that for individuals, “emotions and rational decision-​making are not
orthogonal” and in fact emotional engagement during risk-​taking is part of
8 Introduction
‘reasoned’ decision-​making.42 Psychologists also strenuously argue against
restricting analysis to rational factors. Psychologist of international relations
Vamik Volkan, for example, contends that the rational components of the
Turkish-​ Greek relationship –​the economic, legal, military and political
factors –​were highly

contaminated with shared perceptions, thoughts, fantasies and emotions

(both conscious and unconscious) pertaining to past historical glories
and traumas: losses, humiliations, mourning difficulties, feelings of
entitlement to revenge, and resistance to accepting changed realities.43

This research has not gone unnoticed by international relations scholars,

and some, like Neta Crawford, argue that emotion is undertheorised in inter-
national relations.44
Decision-​making is not, in fact, an activity which is exclusively evidence-​
based. Many decisions are made by combining evidence with pre-​existing
beliefs. Where there is less evidence, pre-​ existing beliefs become more
important and vice versa.45 Prior beliefs will often call on episodic memory,
memory obtained through personal experience, or semantic memory, memory
of information obtained through verbal or written information. Richard
E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May studied how US decision-​makers drew on
history to inform their decisions during crises. They showed that decision-​
makers all carry in their heads not only their own memories of direct or vic-
arious experiences, but also beliefs about persistent or recurrent patterns.46
For many scholars and policymakers, alliances can be analysed as an
accounting exercise, in which costs, risks, benefits and assurances can all
be measured.47 Thomas Wilkins, in assessing the ANZUS alliance between
Australia and the United States, extended this approach to identifying tan-
gible and intangible assets such as loyalty, military contributions, purchase
of arms, capacity to further US goals with third countries, and congruent
threat perceptions.48 It is certainly the case that accounting approaches can
be applied to the Thai-​US alliance, and have been. The United States values
Thailand’s location and bases for its logistics resupply operations to the
Middle East, while Thailand values US military doctrine and training. But
if what contemporary economists and psychologists tell us about decision-​
making is accurate, the practice of analysing alliances in terms of bargaining,
and assessments of ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ offered by each alliance partner,
may not be enough to assess the health or underlying strength or weakness
of an alliance.
The third key reason for traditional bargaining approaches to understanding
alliances is that these models do not sufficiently incorporate domestic politics.
As a product of the Cold War period, most of the alliance literature is squarely
within the realist paradigm. Realism, as a paradigmatic school of inter-
national relations, is inclined to view states as unitary, security-​maximising
actors and discount domestic politics as important in international politics.
 Introduction 9
But is it realistic to ignore domestic politics as a factor impinging on alliance
politics in Thailand? Significant studies of the Thai-​US alliance during the
Cold War saw internal patterns of Thai political behaviour as the dominant
factor shaping Thai approaches to the alliance, where Thai politicians such
as Phibun Songkram sought to strengthen their internal position through
access to US aid and assistance.49 In the post–​Cold War era, in an environ-
ment of low frequency of interstate conflict, domestic politics in Thailand
has continued to loom large as a factor in the Thai-​US alliance. This has been
particularly true since 2006, when Thailand ended 14 years of democratic rule
to return to military rule. Thailand and the United States experienced con-
siderable political turbulence in their bilateral relationship for the first three
years after the 22 May coup in 2014, when the Obama administration decided
to strongly oppose the coup in its public statements.
The pace and degree to which anti-​Americanism arose in the wake of
the 2014 coup is linked to past memory of the United States interfering in
Thailand’s domestic politics. We found a statistically significant correlation
between threat ratings for Great Powers and the belief that Great Powers can
influence Thailand’s domestic politics, demonstrating that at least some of the
high threat rating for the United States stemmed from perceptions that the
United States interferes in Thailand’s domestic politics.50 In our view, events
in Thai history beyond the strong US condemnation of the 2014 coup con-
tribute to a readiness to believe in US interference. One of the most seminal
events in twentieth-​century Thai history is the 1973 revolution. This book will
argue that this critical event, which saw people’s power demonstration depose
a ten-​year dictatorship, is fused with a less fond memory of the US presence
during the Vietnam War, that became increasingly unwanted in the final years
and months before the fall of Saigon in 1975.
Thailand’s domestic politics and foreign policy have been entangled before.
Before the renaissance of Sino-Thai identity from the mid-​1980s, Sino-​Thais
experienced periods of persecution and repression. One instance followed a
strike of the Chinese labouring community in Bangkok in 1910. The strike
paralysed the city and prompted the then Thai monarch Rama VI to later pen
anonymously an essay titled “The Jews of the East,” one of the most overtly
racist attacks on Chinese in Thai history.51 Rama VI’s goals were threefold.52
Firstly, he sought a way in which to communicate to Chinese in Thailand
that they could be vulnerable without royal protection. Secondly, he was keen
to draw a distinction between China, which had removed its monarch only
shortly before the strike, and Thailand, to ensure that Thais did not think that
a similar revolution was warranted at home. Thirdly, he wished to demonstrate
to European audiences that Thailand was not the same as China and should
be treated differently. As Kevin Hewison notes, a great deal “of the domestic
politics that involved China and the Chinese in Thailand in the first half of
the 20th Century had to do with events in China.”53 In fact Thailand may well
have avoided establishing diplomatic relations with the Republic of China –​
despite China’s overtures –​because Thailand was afraid that establishment of
10 Introduction
such relations would provide China an opportunity to interfere in its internal
affairs through the Chinese community within the country.54
The fourth key reason why we should consider an identity-​and memory-​
based approach to the US-​Thai alliance is the absence of a strong alliance
tradition in pre-​colonial mainland Southeast Asia. War was frequent in the
pre-​colonial era and the Siamese city state of Ayutthaya fought 70 wars in
417 years, about one every six years.55 These wars, however, took place within
the mandala system of interstate relations, which drew on both China’s
tribute system and the Indian theory of mandala.56 Although opportunistic
and transient alliances did occur, these were in a context not of relations
between legal equals but in a system where each mandala (a centre of power
without defined boundaries) “contained several tributary rulers, some
of whom would repudiate their vassal status when the opportunity arose
and try to build up their own networks of vassals.”57 There was little that
approximated Europe’s nineteenth-​century system of states, led by profes-
sional diplomats and military officers, each practising raison d’état.58 Thus
the arrival of the Westphalian system of international relations in mainland
Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century was a significant rupture to what
had existed previously. Some international relations scholars increasingly
wonder if the post–​Cold War era is seeing an East Asia that exhibits aspects
of pre-​colonial international relations that is “dressed up in Westphalian
costume, but is not performing a Westphalian play.”59 We are intrigued in
this respect, that Thailand has released at least two defence white papers
which make no mention of Thailand having a military alliance with the
United States.60 To conclude this section then, we see four factors –​the
implications of a reduced frequency of military conflict, a greater recogni-
tion of the role of emotion and memory in decision-​making, the importance
of domestic politics and the possibility of a non-​Western mode of inter-
national relations –​justifying our choice to employ memory and identity in
studying the US-​Thai alliance.
Finally, realist approaches to alliances do not fundamentally preclude
alternative modes of understanding alliances. A careful reading of realist
alliance theory suggests that it permits perspectives from the constructivist
school of international relations. One of the foremost writers on alliances,
Stephen Walt, sought to understand alliances with respect to balancing.
He argued that states form alliances to balance against threat, challen-
ging Kenneth Waltz’s position that states form alliances to balance against
power.61 In substituting threat for power, Walt implicitly introduced the
question of how states determine threat. States must decide which states
pose a threat based on a reading of the “Other’s” actions and intentions.
Given that these are fundamentally unknowable, states bring prior belief to
the question of intent, illuminated by the state’s own history, culture, values
and identity.
The question of how states decide who a threat is, and indeed, who a
friend is, therefore opens the door to a constructivist reading of alliances.
 Introduction 11
Constructivists posit that factors such as national identity shape interests,
and additionally, factors such as culture and memory, shape policy. In
constructing who is a friend and who is a threat, states take memory of past
behaviour into account. In constructing who is a friend, and indeed who
is an ally, states take formal legal statements such as treaties into account,
but they also consider the present circumstances, and the track record of
that friend. Instrumentally, they may also consider their possible future
need, acting to maintain the appearance of shared interests, in the event that
circumstances change, and an alliance becomes necessary. In considering the
past actions of that friend, states draw on collective memory, and at times,
narrative truth rather than literal truth. They may also construct their official
memory in the light of present power distributions and political incentives,
both domestic and international. In this book we argue that where the char-
acter of threat is unclear, as it is in the post–​Cold War era, and where the
future source of threat is also unclear, the role of memory may increase as a
factor shaping perceptions of friends and allies.

History, identity and memory

Memory impacts international relationships, including alliances. This is
of course not a new observation. The role of memory, in impeding closer
relations between South Korea and Japan –​despite shared status as US allies
and common concerns about China’s growing military power –​has been well
documented.62 More recently, evidence has emerged suggesting memory has
played a part in President Duterte’s efforts to distance the Philippines from
the United States.63 Cambodia too continues to struggle with the legacy of its
entanglement in proxy wars as well as its own civil conflicts, and continues
to debate the responsibility of major powers such as China and the United
States.64
Examination of the relationships between history, memory and identity
has founded an entirely new discipline, memory studies. One of the most sig-
nificant works in memory studies, certainly in terms of scale as well as in
terms of conceptual innovation and subsequent influence, was Pierre Nora’s
Realms of Memory project on France’s national identity.
An interest in the relationship between history and memory spurred his-
torian Pierre Nora’s project, described as “one of the key intellectual projects
of the Mitterrand era.”65 The undertaking sought to capture French “national
feeling” through a systematic analysis of the places of collective memory.66
Nora’s idea of “memory places” –​lieux de memoire or sites of memory –​
supposed the existence of building blocks out of which traditional images
of France had been constructed. His project sought both to identify these
“symbolic fragments” of the “symbolic whole” and to “shed light on the con-
struction of representations, the formation of historical objects over time.”67
The material result was a three-​volume series consisting of 132 articles exam-
ining the construction of key components of French national identity. These
12 Introduction
covered sites of memory as diverse as real people (such as Joan of Arc), events
(such as the French Revolution and the Tour de France) and geographic
concepts (such as France’s territorial boundaries, the “hexagon”). Nora
stated that lieux de memoire could be material (like an archive), functional (a
textbook) or symbolic (a ritual like a minute’s silence).68
Scholars subsequently applied Nora’s method in an international relations
setting. Hampton and Peifer assessed Germany’s sites of memory in rela-
tion to foreign policy. They posited three memory sites, the “trans-​Atlantic
German-​ American,” “German-​ centric” and “Central European” memory
sites. They argued that in the years since the end of the Cold War, Germany’s
Trans-​Atlantic site had stagnated while the German-​centric site had been
revitalised.69
This book applies Nora’s idea of “sites of memory” to the question of
Thailand’s collective memory and identity of self, others and the US alliance.
It draws inspiration from Nora’s project in the broad sense of recognising
that collective memory has structure. Collective memory does not attribute
equal weight to all events, figures and all periods; it is lumpy –​there are
periods and phenomena of which there are high levels of collective recollec-
tion, while others are forgotten or live only in obscure texts. In particular, the
social memory of other nation states is not simply a matter of recalling the
most recent events to do with that nation. This is worth noting because some
research on memory emphasises recency. All things being equal, recency –​the
elapsed time between an event and its recollection –​does appear to apply
to human memory of world history. When psychologists assessed social
representations of world history amongst university students in 12 countries,
asking them to nominate the most important events and figures in history,
they found a significant recency effect. Two-​thirds of the events and people
nominated were within the past 100 years.70
But collective memory –​and sense of time –​for a particular society of
people is far from neutral as to when something objectively happened.
Holbwachs emphasised this when he wrote that “Time is real only insofar as it
has content, insofar as it offers events as material for thought.”71 Psychologist
Vamik Volkan noted that for traumatic events, the phenomenon of groups
feeling a particular event to be proximate, despite being chronologically dis-
tant, was very powerful. So powerful, in fact, that after observing the way in
which Serbs conducting ethnic cleansing in Bosnia 1992–​1995 referenced the
events of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, he coined the term “time collapse.”72
Time collapse, which Volkan described as where “people may intellectually
separate the past event from the present one, but emotionally the two events
are merged,” is a universal phenomenon. Arguably it is occurring today in
the case of the persecution of Muslims and especially the Rohingya in con-
temporary Myanmar, where Baman Burmese invoke their historic sense of
victimhood from British colonialism to justify violence against innocents.73
Where and why does this phenomenon of time shrinkage or time collapse
arise? In this book, as we assemble the sites of Thai memory for the United
 Introduction 13
States, China, other Great Powers and neighbours, we will observe that the
construction of memory is not a neutral process, and as Ross King writes,
“its production is inevitably linked to power.”74 As such it is often, but not
always, state-​sponsored collective memory that we focus on. That is not to
say the state is always an agent in the formation of collective memory. In the
case of Thailand, it is not the state that fostered the remembering of the use
of the so-​called tang daing, or red petrol tanks, that were used to immolate
hundreds and possibly thousands of alleged communist sympathisers or
communists in southern Thailand prior to 1973.75 Official silence surrounds
these events, but they live on in collective memory, for example, in the rela-
tion to the incidents above, with the building of a local monument. But in
the case of the memory of foreigners and other countries, it is often the
power and goals of the state we are concerned with, if for no other reason
than the defining of ‘self ’ and ‘other’ is to an extent, core business for a
nation state.
In this book we recognise that both international and domestic power
structures shape memorialisation. Awareness of contemporary relative power
shifts is almost certainly changing the way that Thais remember their his-
tory with China and the United States. In 2012 Boonlert Supadhiloke under-
took content analysis of Thailand’s two English-​language newspapers, the
Bangkok Post and the Nation, in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis.76
He found that “the US was portrayed as the old power waning in hegemony
while China an emerging power with a fast growing economy.” Our surveys
too found that Thai military officers feel that the current era is one of historic
transition. China’s influence, they believe, has caught up with and passed that
of the United States.77 They expect China’s influence to continue to grow in
future, and to surpass the influence of the United States.78 Is this affecting
memorialisation of the past?
China’s greater importance to Thailand is almost certainly shaping memory
and culture, ranging from the increased enthusiasm for celebrating the Chinese
New Year, or the deliberate recollection of the ethnically Chinese King Taksin
(1767–1782) in association with the opening of a new luxury shopping mall
(both phenomena covered in Chapter 4). Moreover in 2015 Thailand and
China marked 40 years of diplomatic relations with lavish functions. Official
statements spoke of a “close and cordial relationship, based on the solid foun-
dation and deep bonds of affinity and cultural ties rooted since time imme-
morial.”79 Airbrushed from this picture were the hostile Sino-​Thai relations
of the Cold War, when Thailand saw itself as “no exception to Peking’s grand
design for conquest and expanding influence.”80 Was this no more than simple
diplomatic finesse, putting an unpleasant episode aside for the sake of rela-
tionship building? In this book we place such instances of benign perception
of China in a larger context, as we trace how the construction of China as
a benign northern neighbour has occurred over a period of decades, dating
from the meeting of Chou En Lai with Thailand’s Foreign Minister Prince
Wan at the 1955 Asia Africa Conference in 1955.
14 Introduction
Power relations causing a recasting of recollections has happened pre-
viously. Thailand revised its view of its participation in the tribute system,
to accommodate King Mongkut’s (Rama IV, 1851–​1868) view that the pro-
viding of tribute was shameful.81 (A table of Chakri monarchs and their
prime ministers is included as Annexure.) Prior to Mongkut, Thai rulers were
willing participants in the rituals and modalities of the system.82 For example,
all of the early Chakri monarchs sought and received imperial letters of inves-
titure from the Chinese emperor, and when these were translated into Siamese,
the titles of Rama III and Rama IV contained a transliteration of the Chinese
name for king of Siam (Siam-​lo-​kok-​ong).83 But after Mongkut, the view
became that Thailand had pragmatically engaged in the tribute system,
mainly for material gain, and that participation had been no more than “just
one form of commercial investment.”84
While shifts in the global balance of power are important for how the
United States is seen, we would tend to argue that it is the way that Thailand’s
domestic political power structures have developed, which has the more signifi-
cant implications for the Thai alliance with the United States. To understand
why this is the case requires that we understand that Thailand’s conception
of itself as a nation state is integrally entwined with its nationalist history,
the strongest characteristic of which is a focus on the lives and deeds of great
kings. How did this focus come about?
The widening availability of printing in Thailand and the development
of a mass education system, both from the 1880s, strengthened the possi-
bility of an imagined community based on traditional Brahmanic concepts
of kingship and Buddhism. As Thailand’s first Western-​style historian, King
Chulalongkorn’s (Rama V, 1868–1910) half-​brother Damrong Rajanuphab
was a key figure. Damrong wrote seminal tracts of Thai nationalist his-
tory and oversaw the transition from a view of the past as dynastic history
(phongsawadan) to a view of the past as national history (prawatisart).85 For
example, in his account of Thailand’s wars with Burma, Damrong projects
the notion of Thailand as a modern nation state with defined territory back-
wards in time, allowing one of Siam’s better known kings, Naresuan, to be
recast as a “mixture of Thomas Jefferson and Giuseppe Garibaldi.”86 Further
contributions to the development of a Thai nationalism revolving around
monarchs came from King Vajiravudh (Rama VI, 1910–1925), who devised
the notion of the Thai nation state being constituted by the three pillars of
nation, religion and king (chat, satsana, phramahakasat).
Over the course of the twentieth century there were challenges to this
monarchical-​centred nationalism, most vigorously after the 1932 revolution
ended the absolute monarchy. The proponents of the revolution, however, laid
the groundwork for an even stronger royalist nationalism by promulgating
stories of lost territory and wounds to the nation as Thai kings struggled with
colonialism.87 From 1957 onwards, the reign of King Bhumibol (Rama IX,
1946–2016) saw a form of royalist nationalism, loosely integrated with demo-
cratic practice, achieve such dominance that the current era has been termed
 Introduction 15
one of ‘hyper-​royalism.’88 Such omnipresence, including in books, public dis-
play and film

renders the past more glorious, which in return amplifies the brightness
of the present. For this reason, glorifications of the past Chakri kings are
quite common under hyper-​royalism.89

Now several years into the reign of King Vajiralongkorn (Rama X, 2016– ),
efforts to erase the memory of Thailand’s two-​and-​a-​half-​decade excursion
into a less royally centred nationalism and politics (after the 1932 revolution
until 1957) are amplifying. One example is the case of the disappearance
of the plaque associated with the Khana Rasadorn, the People’s Party that
overthrew the absolute monarchy in 1932.90 Then there is the removal of a
memorial that commemorated the victory over royalist forces that followed
the 1932 revolution.91
The dominance of royalist nationalist history has implications for
Thailand’s international relations and its alliance with the United States.
Firstly, the focus on Thailand’s heroic kings in colonial and pre-​colonial times
renders the history of the twentieth century, including the Cold War, compara-
tively faint in Thai collective memory. Consequently, the history of the Thai-​
US alliance similarly occupies a diminished and marginal status in collective
imaginings of the past. Secondly, the rise of narratives of trauma and injury
around the events of the colonial era, personified in the trials and triumphs
of Rama V King Chulalongkorn, as well as narratives defining a Thai identity
partly in opposition to the dominant West, have engendered a complex love-​
hate psychology towards the West that some have termed Occidentalism.92
This mindset colours Thai relations with the West, including the United
States, until today. Thirdly, defining a Thai identity around the heroic actions
of past kings has troubled Thailand’s goals of regional leadership and inte-
gration. While in the post–​Cold War era Thai elites have promoted a liberal
economic pan-​Asian Suvarnabhumi (Golden Land) vision, this is in tension
with a national identity that, when not glorifying or demonising Thailand’s
conflicts with its neighbours, has tended to look down on neighbouring states
as colonised and less developed.
Of course, all states are built on doctored histories. The French historian
Ernest Renan noted in 1882 that forgetting was integral to the invention of a
nation. Niccolò Machiavelli noted that all just enterprises are built on a crime.93
The United States itself has tended to ignore the history of its colonial empire.94
The Thai state, it might be argued, is one accustomed to achieving amnesia
through official silence on its internal conflicts, even if they are remembered by
communities. Incidents of state-​or state-​sponsored violence, such as the violence
employed in the 1973 revolution, the 1976 massacres at Thammasat University
and the suppression of the 1992 protests, and most recently, the killing of some
100 Red Shirt protestors in 2010 have either not been investigated, or have been
investigated with no officials held accountable. The use of violence by the state
16 Introduction
in Thailand’s Southern border provinces, which in the 2004 Tak Bai incident
claimed the lives of some 70 young men without the dismissal or demotion
of a single military officer amongst those responsible, is another example of
this impunity. Thongchai Winichakul, in examining these large memory gaps in
Thailand, suggests that “Silence is … mostly self-​imposed, either out of fear or
out of concern for the unthinkable consequences to the country.”95
Thailand’s memory silences can be shown to have impacted on its inter-
national relations in quite specific ways. For example, despite its humiliating
experience of four years of Japanese occupation, there is little commemor-
ation of the Seri Thai anti-​Japanese resistance movement founded by Thai
expatriates supported by Britain and the United States during the Second
World War. In 2015 Thai national leaders attended a major commemor-
ation of the end of the Second World War, but newspapers covering their
attendance omitted to mention the event, and described the visit only in
terms of other objectives (trade and defence purchases).96 Nor were there
any significant public ceremonies in Thailand. The reason for this silence is
not embarrassment at having collaborated with Japan even if under duress,
but reflects unwillingness to publicly commemorate the Seri Thai.97 This is a
puzzle, given that Thailand’s own history books acknowledge that without
the role of the Seri Thai, Western countries might have dealt with Thailand
much more harshly after the defeat of Japan. Thai historians are aware that
placing parts of Thai territory under the control of the United Kingdom
was a real possibility at that time. But Seri Thai’s bitter post–​Second World
War rivalry with the Thai army, its importance as a domestic political
movement, and its role as a power base for one of Thailand’s most contro-
versial politicians, Pridi Phanomyong, has limited the capacity of the Thai
state to afford its prominent recognition. As a result, there is virtually no
public commemoration of one of the earliest and most important examples
of Thai-​US military cooperation.

The methodology of this book

As stated earlier, this book is inspired by Nora’s concept of sites of memory.
It conceives of sites of memory in two forms. The overall site of memory for a
relationship with a foreign actor is the first form. Then there are specific sites
or fragments of memory connected with particular themes or events. For the
Unites States, an example might be memory of Cold War cooperation, or for
China, memory of Chinese immigration. We can conceive of these memory
fragments as being positive, negative or neutral in the degree of warmth or
antipathy that they generate towards the foreign actor.
We also conceive of the memory fragments as being additive. An over-
abundance of negative events and themes will produce a negative overall site
of memory. This aggregation allows us to conduct a ‘balance of identity’
approach to understanding alliance strength. What do we mean by this? It is
an approach which looks at the extent to which accumulated memories and
 Introduction 17
narratives belonging to Country A deliver to the present a positive, less posi-
tive or negative identity of the putative ally, Country B.
To construct the sites of memory this book triangulates, drawing on a var-
iety of sources. The book’s large evidence base, and the statistical analysis this
has afforded, strengthen our claims and arguments. Between 2015 and 2017 we
undertook extensive surveys of almost 1,800 Thai military officers, achieved
through our unparalleled access to senior commanders. The data reveals in
detail the thinking and attitudes of the Thai military, still the most potent
force in Thai politics and Thai foreign policy. Our surveys and interviews pro-
vide cues for deeper investigation. Historiography is clearly important. We
need to understand the biases in Thai history-​writing. A significant array
of Thai and foreign historians have dealt extensively with how and what is
remembered in Thai history, whose work we have already acknowledged in
this chapter and whose work we continue to refer to throughout this book.
Their interpretations help us to detect where Thai sites of memory for Great
Powers have been influenced by pivotal moments in Thai domestic politics.
We are also interested in the physical manifestations of memory. Thailand
has pursued statue-​building more vigorously than other mainland Southeast
Asian countries.98
In this book we will investigate many of the Thai physical sites which speak
to the collective memory of the foreign “other.” Shrines to the late eighteenth-​
century monarch Taksin, for example, summon images of China and the
Chinese as protectors of Thailand against the evil Burmese. The statue of Ya
Mo in Nakhon Ratchasima speaks to the collective memory of Thailand as
overlord to Laos in the early nineteenth century.
Film is also important as is current media. Films such as Bangrajan (2000),
Suriyothai (2001) and the series of six films about King Naresuan (2007–​2015)
are amongst the films that have not only contributed to nationalist projects
but have also been “massively successful in doing so.”99 In our empirical
investigations we make extensive use of current Thai language media to inves-
tigate how the past is being interpreted and remembered. We are particularly
interested in the evidence of the phenomenon of time collapse, where mem-
ories of past or distant events are far more vivid than the recent past.
It might be asked why we assess the broader components of national
memory embodied in popular culture and public monuments. After all, it
might be thought that the conduct of foreign policy is an elite endeavour,
undertaken by specialists who are educated in international relations and pol-
itics who can be assumed to pursue diplomacy according to an objective public
interest. There are several reasons. Firstly, Thailand’s royalist nationalist con-
ception of history is not just a project aimed at inculcating a national identity
amongst the masses (although it is this as well). It is on the contrary widely
shared at all levels of Thai society; indeed, amongst its strongest exponents
are the military. The royalism of the Thai military is both fervent (embodied
in practices like daily pledges before statues of Rama V and statements in
defence white papers attributing Thai independence to the diplomacy of wise
18 Introduction
kings) and self-​interested, in that the continued political role of the military is
legitimised by its self-​proclaimed status as the guardian of the monarchy (and
the conception of a “constitutional monarchy” which lays more weight on the
monarchy than the constitution).100 Moreover although military officers tend
not to study history, politics or international relations as part of their formal
military training, it remains the military that is the most powerful force in
determining Thailand’s foreign policy.101
Secondly, whilst Thailand does teach a modest number of international
relations courses at its universities, the connection between academia and the
Thai policy world is not strong.102 The only international relations scholar to
have moved into Thai politics is Democrat Sukhumbhand Paribatra. At the
same time, Thai academic Kitti Prasirtsuk concedes that in the past, teaching
Thai students about Southeast Asia meant that lecturers had to struggle to
“overcome the nationalist discourse nurtured by the official hostility towards
neighbouring countries.”103
Thirdly, the sheer power of nationalist discourse in Thailand has enabled it
in the past to be weaponised in the service of Thai sectional domestic political
actors. This was very evident in Thailand’s 2008–​2011 crisis with Cambodia over
what Thais call the Phra Viharn and Cambodians, the Preah Vihear, temple. As
Thailand’s then Foreign Minister Nopphadon Patthama later reflected,

one mob and group of political players … had the same political object-
ives, to bring down the government using the issue of Phra Viharn to
foment madness and attack other people who did not agree as being
unpatriotic or treasonous. These people distorted information and
created chaos. Apart from creating a split between Thais, they created
enmity between Thailand and Cambodia.104

What this book is and is not

To recapitulate, our interest in this book is the question of how collective
memory, history and the reading of history contribute to identity and thereby
to perceptions of threat, and “the Other” as friend, adversary, business
opportunity or some other. That said, the book is biased towards Thailand’s
relations with Great Powers, particularly but not exclusively the United States
and China.
Accordingly, our first substantive chapter is on memory in Thailand’s
relations with European Great Powers. We also consider Thailand’s memory
of India, Russia and Japan, and also present a genealogy of the concept of
‘Great Powers’ (maha amnat) in Thai discourse. The memory of relations with
Europe is crucial to understanding the US-​Thai alliance, both because it is an
era of royal heroism which has remained a template for Thai foreign relations
in the multipolar world of today, and because it is the era in which the com-
plex syndrome of ‘Occidentalism’ develops. Chapter 2 takes us to a treatment
of memory in the US-​Thai relationship, followed by a similar treatment
 Introduction 19
for the Thai-​China relationship. Then, because our interviews, surveys and
broader research revealed Thai focus on its neighbours and ASEAN to be of
such importance to both Thai identity and its foreign policy, we have included
two whole chapters on memory in relations with neighbours and pan-​Asian
institutions. Our conclusion seeks to place insights from these chapters into a
cogent and coherent statement.
This book, then, is not a chronological history of the Thai-​US alliance,
although it does draw deeply on history and historiography. It is also, as
already explained, not purely concerned with the Thai-​US bilateral relation-
ship, nor even the Thailand, China and United States triangle.105 It starts
from the premise that understanding the foreign policy of a Thailand that
has “grown richer, more sophisticated, and more economically and culturally
enmeshed with the rest of the world,” and the place of the alliance with the
United States within that policy, cannot be achieved through a narrow his-
toric or geographic lens.106 Finally, this book does not attempt an assets-​and-​
liabilities stocktake of the US-​Thai alliance, in any material or ordinary sense,
for reasons already stated.

Conclusion
The former Australian senior defence official Dennis Richardson was well
known for pithy summations. In encapsulating Australia’s relations with
China and the United States, Richardson would say that Australia had “two
friends, one ally.” This statement was powerful, but not because it represented
a forensic accounting of what the United States brought to Australia’s
security. It was powerful because it invoked the identity the United States has
for Australia, including both through the special military relationship and
through Australia’s long-​standing inclination to seek the protection of an
Anglophone Great Power. It was redolent with memory of Australia’s long
history of fighting alongside the United States in almost every significant
global conflict since the Second World War.
In this book we argue that memory has played a significant part in shaping
Thai views of its alliance with the United States. In this setting, where no
clear threat exists, memory matters, alongside other factors such as beliefs
about future trends, and institutionalisation of the relationship. The alliance,
as we have argued elsewhere, possesses considerable institutional resilience at
its core. The institutional resilience derives firstly from the doctrinal and lan-
guage investment of the Thai military-​to-​military relationship, and secondly
from Thailand’s own strategic culture, which emphasises the maintenance of
equidistant relationships with multiple Great Powers.107 But thereafter, at the
broader level of the Thai nation state, the strength of the relationship wavers
and even dissipates.
In what follows, we argue that Thai collective memory has eroded the
overall vigour of the US-​ Thai strategic alliance. A bilateral relationship
that was once infused with charitable impulses, relief at the avoidance of
20 Introduction
near-​disaster, mutual fascination, exoticism, which flattered Thai sensibilities
and desire for status, has passed away, and in its place has emerged a more
transactional relationship in which the Thais are conscious of US fading
power, but also suspicious and somewhat disillusioned by the US propensity
for use of force, for disrupting local societies, and for unilateral pursuit of US
economic interests. Thais are also disappointed by their fall from the centre
of US foreign policy attentions. We make this argument by cataloguing key
memory fragments in the Thai collective memory that concern the United
States, in the process considering how their construction has affected their
potency.
Because this book is about a Southeast Asian alliance in the post–​Cold
War period, it is deeply marked by two characteristics of this era: power shifts
and reduced frequency of military conflict. That the current period is one of
great strategic change in terms of redistribution of global power, with a shift
of global economic and strategic weight back to Asia, is widely accepted and
has been for some time. In 2007, Coral Bell wrote that “the next landscape of
world politics is just beginning to be visible through the lingering twilight of
the unipolar world.”108 More recently, Gideon Rachman wrote that “there is
little doubt that a widespread process of Easternization is under way, as Asian
nations reassert their own histories and heritages, and scrape away some of
the accumulations of Westernization.”109 Australia’s 2017 intelligence review
found that the “geopolitical consequences of economic globalisation are cre-
ating new centres of power.”110 Thai military officers are also convinced that
the power relativities between the United States and China are changing.
A key and striking finding of our surveys was that many Thai military officers
perceive China’s power and influence to be growing, equal to the United
States and likely exceeding the United States in future.
But the shift in thinking about Asia is not just about China. A central
argument of this book is that Thailand’s perception of itself as an actor and
leader has changed significantly since the Cold War ended. Even before the
post–​Cold War era, Thailand glimpsed an opportunity to lead the develop-
ment of the Mekong sub-​region. In the years that have passed, variants of
this Suvarnabhumi or Golden Land vision, in which Thailand leverages its
geographical centrality, both as a bridge between China and Southeast Asia
and as a hub flanked by poor neighbours who offer markets and targets for
investment, have persisted. They fuse with Thailand’s increasingly high valu-
ation of ASEAN for Thai interests. At the same time, we will demonstrate
that Thailand has a hard time operationalising its greater focus on ASEAN,
because its base level views of its neighbours Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam are still deeply coloured by its nationalist-​infused histories and offi-
cial memory.
Though Thai identity has changed, it is still greatly concerned with the
memory of what occurred in its formative years. This was a struggle to retain
independence, and despite its formally uncolonised status, remains an aspect
of Thailand that it has in common, as Chong and Hamilton-​Hart comment,
 Introduction 21
with virtually all other Southeast Asian states.111 This then is our point of
departure for the next chapter, on Thailand’s memory of Europe, as well as
two other contemporary Asian Great Powers, Japan and India.

Notes
1 Endel Tulving, ‘Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain’, Annual Review of
Psychology 53, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1–​2.
2 After cooperating in planning resistance against the occupying Japanese during
the Second World War, the two countries became treaty allies under the 1954
Manila Pact, an arrangement subsequently strengthened by the 1962 Rusk-​Thanat
Communiqué. The communique committed the United States to act without
waiting for SEATO agreement, but did not include automatic commitments in the
event of a contingency. Les Buszynski, ‘Thailand and the Manila Pact’, The World
Today 36, no. 2 (February 1980). pp. 45–​51.
3 Evan N. Resnick, ‘Strange Bedfellows: U.S. Bargaining Behaviour with Allies of
Convenience’, International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/​11), pp. 144–​184.
4 Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Sino-​Soviet Relations, 1945–​1966’, in Francis A. Beer (ed.),
Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 291.
5 See, for example, Maja Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous
Liaison’, European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 3 (2001), pp. 315–​348;
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity” ’, Theory and Society
29, no. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 1–​47.
6 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction
of Power Politics’, International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–​425.
7 Jonathan Mercer, ‘Anarchy and Identity’, International Organization 49, no. 2
(Spring 1995), pp. 229–​252.
8 Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of
the International’, Millennium 35, no. 3 (2007), p. 660.
9 Ibid., pp. 663–​666.
10 See, for example, Gregory D. Miller, The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and
Military Alliances before the First World War (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2011).
11 Italics added. Ibid., p. 663.
12 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II: Ideas II.xxvii.
9: 335 quoted in Gideon Yaffe, ‘Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, in
L. Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human
Understanding’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), doi:10.1017/​
CCOL0521834333, p. 215.
13 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992), p. 38.
14 Berthold Molden, ‘Resistant Pasts versus Mnemonic Hegemony: On the Power
Relations of Collective Memory’, Memory Studies 9, no. 2 (2016), pp. 125–​142.
15 We asked the following question (in Thai) to four waves of respondents between
2015 and 2017 (Wave 1, n=667; Wave 2, n=115; Wave 3, n=494; Wave 4,
n=507): thinking about the Great Powers, how significant or not significant is the
level of (Waves 1 & 2: threat) (Waves 3 & 4: military threat) from the following
22 Introduction
countries? In all waves, the mean (Likert scale) rating for the United States was
higher than that of China (and Russia, Japan and India). These rankings were
found to be statistically significant, except for in the case of Russia and Japan
where no significant difference in ranking was found. For verifying the statis-
tical significance of ranking the United States ahead of China, we used Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks Test, Asymp. Sig. (2-​tailed), p<0.001. For survey results see Tables
A.1 and A.2 and Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Annexure.
16 We asked respondents (in the four waves above) the following question: Thinking
about the current defence environment in Thailand, how significant or not signifi-
cant are the external threats from the following? To see if there were significant
differences overall between the mean ranks for the different threat categories of
neighbouring countries, Great Powers and non-​state threats, the Friedman test
was conducted. The mean ranks suggested that non-​state threats were perceived
as greater than the threat of the Great Powers, which in turn was seen as a greater
threat than neighbouring countries. Overall there was a significant difference
(χ2(2) = 272.780, p < 0.001). For survey results, see Table A.3, Annexure.
17 We asked Waves 3 and 4: to what extent does Thailand still depend on the United
States for protection against external military threats? Mean ratings were 6.9 and
7.0 respectively (Likert scale, with 10 maximum reliance and 0 no reliance). For
survey results, see Table A.4, Annexure.
18 For detailed survey results, see Table A.6 and Figure A.5, Annexure.
19 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact); 8 September 1954,
accessed at Yale Laws School website https://​avalon.law.yale.edu/​20th_​century/​
usmu003.asp on 24 August 2020.
20 Leszek Buszynski, S.E.A.T.O. The Failure of An Alliance Strategy
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. 1–​ 44; Chatri Ritharom,
‘The Making of the Thai-​ US Military Alliance on the SEATO Treaty of
1954: A Study in Thai Decision-​Making’, PhD thesis, Claremont Graduate
School, 1976; Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and
Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i
Press, 1997), pp. 109–​209.
21 Ministry of Defence, The Defence of Thailand 1994 (Bangkok: Ministry of Defence,
1994); Ministry of Defence, Defence of Thailand 2005 (Bangkok: Ministry of
Defence, 2005).
22 See, for example, Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American
Alliance System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Carnes Lord
and Andrew S. Erickson (eds.), Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward
Presence in the Asia-​Pacific (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014); Andrew
T. H. Tan, Handbook on the United States in Asia: Managing Hegemonic Decline,
Retaining Influence in the Trump Era (Cheltenham, UK; Edward Elgar, 2018);
Iain Henry, ‘Reliability and Alliance Politics: Interdependence and America’s
Asian Alliance System’, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2017. All
of these omit any mention and certainly any detailed treatment of the US-​Thai
alliance.
23 Brad Glosserman, ‘Can the United States Share Power’, in Joanne Wallis
and Andrew Carr (eds.), Asia Pacific Security: An Introduction (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016).
24 Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, ‘Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Realignment
in East Asia’, Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015), pp. 696–​727.
 Introduction 23
25 Kuik Cheng-​Chwee, ‘The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response
to a Rising China’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (August 2008), pp. 159–​
185, p. 164.
26 Other descriptions were ‘siblings’ and ‘parents and child’. Likert scale mean
ratings for Wave 3 (n=491) were 6.6 (patron and client), 5.6 (friends), 4.8 (siblings)
and 4.2 (parent and child). A similar rank order was obtained for Wave 4 (n=501).
For detailed results see Tables A.7–​A.9 and Figures A.6 and A.7 in Annexure.
27 The International Encyclopaedia of Political Science defines an alliance as “a formal
agreement among independent states in the international system to cooperate
militarily in the event of militarized conflict with outside parties.” Bertrand Badie,
Dirk Berg-​Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino (eds.), International Encyclopaedia of
Political Science (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2011), pp. 61–​62.
28 See, for example, Helge Granfelt, Alliances and Ententes as Political Weapons: From
Bismarck’s Alliance System to Present Time (Uddevalla, Sweden: Fahlbeck
Foundation, Lund, 1970); Francis A. Beer, Alliances: Latent War Communities in
the Contemporary World (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Robert
L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Colombia University Press,
1968) and George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).
29 George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1968).
30 Ibid., pp. 27–​28.
31 Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision
Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977).
32 Ibid., pp. xii–​28.
33 Stein Tonnesson, Explaining the East Asian Peace: A Research Story
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2017).
34 King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications
(California: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 105, 114.
35 Hugh White, The China Choice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 11.
36 Tonnesson, Stein, ‘The East Asian Peace: How Did It Happen? How Deep Is It?’,
Global Asia 10, no. 4 (Winter 2015/​16) accessed at www.globalasia.org/​v10no4/​
cover/​the-​east-​asian-​peace-​how-​did-​it-​happen-​how-​deep-​is-​it_​stein-​t%C3%B8,
accessed 12 February 2021.
37 Amitav Acharya, ‘Culture, Security, Multilateralism: The “ASEAN way” and
Regional Order’, Contemporary Security Policy 19, no. 1 (1998), pp. 55–​ 84,
doi:10.1080/​13523269808404179, accessed 12 February 2021.
38 For survey results see Tables A.10 and A.11 and Figure A.8 in Annexure.
39 This was the view of most scholars in a survey of literature addressing the
implications of the end of the Cold War. David A. Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and
the End of the Cold War’, World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995), pp. 117–​141,
p. 118.
40 Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, p. 430.
41 Editorial Board, East Asia Forum, ‘Little Britain Post-​Brexit’, East Asia Forum,
24 February 2020, accessed at www.eastasiaforum.org/​2020/​02/​24/​little-​britain-​
post-​brexit/​ on 27 February 2020.
42 Peter Bossaerts and Carsten Murawski, ‘From Behavioural Economics to
Neuroeconomics to Decision Neuroscience: The Ascent of Biology in Research
24 Introduction
on Human Decision Making’, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 5 (2015),
pp. 37–​42, p. 40.
43 Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 117.
44 Neta C. Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and
Emotional Relationships’, International Security 24, no. 4, (Spring 2000), pp. 116–​
156, p. 116.
45 Mathieu d’Acremont and Peter Bossaerts, ‘Decision Making: How the Brain Weighs
the Evidence’, Current Biology 22, no. 18 (September 2012), pp. R808–​R810.
46 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History
for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 203.
47 Michael Wesley, ‘Global Allies in a Changing World’, in Michael Wesley (ed.), Global
Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century (Acton: ANU Press, 2017), p. 10.
48 Thomas Wilkins, ‘Re-​assessing Australia’s Intra-​alliance Bargaining Power in the
Age of Trump’, Security Challenges 15, no. 1 (2019), pp. 9–​32.
49 See, for example, Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship, and Chatri Ritharom,
‘The Making of the Thai-​US Military Alliance on the SEATO Treaty of 1954: A
Study in Thai Decision-​Making’, PhD thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1976.
50 We tested for correlation between threat ratings for Great Powers and belief
that Great Powers can influence Thailand’s domestic politics. We found low-​to-​
moderate significant correlations that were, however, strongest in the case of the
United States (Pearson Correlation 2-​tailed r=0.365, p<0.001). See Table A.12
and A.13 and Figure A.9 in the Annexure for survey results.
51 Vajiravudh, Phuak yiew haeng buraphathit lae muang thai chong tunthet (The Jews
of the East and Wake Up Thailand) (Bangkok: Vajiravudh Memorial Hall, 1985).
52 Kasian Tejapira, ‘The Misbehaving Jeks: The Evolving Regime of Thainess and
Sino-​Thai Challenges’, Asian Ethnicity 10, no. 3 (2009), pp. 263–​283, doi:10.1080/​
14631360903189658; Wasana Wongsurawat, ‘Beyond Jews of the Orient: A New
Interpretation of the Problematic Relationship between the Thai State and Its
Ethnic Chinese Community’, Positions 24, no. 2 (2016), pp. 555–​582, doi 10.1215/​
10679847-​3458721 accessed 12 February 2021.
53 Kevin Hewison, ‘Thailand: An Old Relationship Renewed’, The Pacific Review 31,
no. 1 (2018), pp. 116–​130, doi:10.1080/​09512748.2017.1357653, p. 118.
54 Rajendra Kumar Jain, China and Thailand 1949–​1983 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1984),
p. xxxix.
55 Noel Alfred Battye, ‘The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–​
1910: Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn’,
PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974, p. 1.
56 Recalling that Fairbank (1968) documented the existence of a tribute system
in which non-​Chinese rulers took part in the Chinese world order by partici-
pating in the appropriate forms and ceremonies, Chandler (1972) argued that
these patterns of relations were then replicated between the city-​states of main-
land Southeast Asia. D. Chandler, ‘Cambodia’s Relations with Siam in the Early
Bangkok Period: The Politics of a Tributary State’, Journal of the Siam Society
60, no. 1 (1972), pp. 155, 168; J. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional
China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). The
Indian system of mandala was described in the Arthasastra of Kautilya. Sunait
Chutintaranond, ‘Cakravartin: The Ideology of Traditional Warfare in Siam and
Burma, 1548–​1605’, PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1990, p. 235.
 Introduction 25
57 O. W. History Wolters, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 17, quoted in Sunait,
‘Cakravartin’, p. 235.
58 Jurgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the
Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 394–​395.
59 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why Is There No Non-​Western International
Relations Theory?’ in A. Acharya and B. Buzan (eds.), Non-​Western International
Relations Theory (London: Routledge, 2010), accessed at https://​doi-​org.vir-
tual.anu.edu.au/​10.4324/​9780203861431 on 12 February 2021, p. 5. For other
accounts of the influence of Southeast Asian history on current dynamics, see
A. Milner, ‘Culture and the International Relations of Asia’, The Pacific Review
30, no. 6 (2017), pp. 857–​869; M. Stuart-​Fox, ‘Southeast Asia and China: The Role
of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations’, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 26, no. 1 (April 2004), pp. 116–​139; D. Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong: The Need
for New Analytical Frameworks’, International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003).
60 Ministry of Defence’s The Defence of Thailand 1994 and Defence of Thailand 2005.
61 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
62 For example, in 2012 Japan and Korea were ready to sign an agreement on infor-
mation sharing, and another one on mutual logistics resupply. Domestic oppos-
ition in South Korea caused the abandonment of the proposed agreements.
Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia
(New York: Hatchette Book Group, 2016), p. 214. See also Brad Glosserman
and Scott A. Snyder, The Japan-​South Korea Divide: East Asian Security and the
United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
63 See, for example, Trefor Moss, ‘Behind Duterte’s Break with the U.S., a Lifetime
of Resentment’, Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2016, accessed on www.wsj.com/​
articles/​behind-​philippine-​leaders-​break-​with-​the-​u-​s-​a-​lifetime-​of-​resentment-​
1477061118 accessed on 6 June 2018; Tweet Aaron Connelly @ConnellyAL 17
August 2017. ‘At the East Asia Summit Last Year, Duterte Passed around Photos
of the 1906 Bud Dajo Massacre of Moros on Jolo’; Stella A. Estremera, ‘Duterte
Reminds US of Bud Dajo Massacre’, SunStar Davao, 6 September 2016. www.
sunstar.com.ph/ ​ d avao/ ​ l ocal- ​ n ews/ ​ 2 016/ ​ 0 9/ ​ 0 6/​ d uterte-​ reminds-​ u s-​ bud-​ d ajo-​
massacre-​495916 accessed on 6 June 2018.
64 ‘US, China Face Off over Legacy in Cambodia’, VOA News, 9 February 2019,
accessed at www.voanews.com/​a/​us-​china-​face-​off-​over-​legacy-​in-​cambodia/​
4780344.html accessed on 14 February 2019.
65 Mary N. Hampton and Douglas C. Peifer, ‘Reordering German Identity: Memory
Sites and Foreign Policy’, German Studies Review 30, no. 2 (May 2007), p. 374.
66 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past Volume
1: Conflicts and Divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. xv.
67 Ibid., p. xxi.
68 Ibid., p. 14.
69 Hampton and Peifer, ‘Reordering German Identity’, p. 372.
70 James Liu, Dario Paez, Patrycja Slawuta, Rosa Cabecinhas, Elza Techio, Dogan
Kokdemir, Ragini Sen, Orsolya Vincze, Hamdi Muluk, Feixue Wang and Anya
Zlobina, ‘Representing World History in the 21st Century: The Impact of 9/​11,
the Iraq War, and the Nation-​State on Dynamics of Collective Remembering’,
Journal of Cross-​Cultural Psychology 40, no. 4 (July 2009), pp. 667–​692.
71 Halbwachs, ‘On Collective Memory’, pp. 8, 38.
26 Introduction
72 Volkan, Bloodlines, p. 35.
73 See, for example, D. Herath, ‘Constructing Buddhists in Sri Lanka and
Myanmar: Imaginary of a Historically Victimised Community’, Asian Studies
Review (2020), 44, Issue 2, doi:10.1080/​10357823.2020.1717441 accessed on 12
February 2021.
74 Ross King, Heritage and Identity in Contemporary Thailand: Memory, Place and
Power (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), p. 3.
75 Jularat Damrongviteetham, ‘Narratives of the “Red Barrel” Incident: Collective
and Individual Memories in Lamsin, Southern Thailand’ in K. Loh, S. Dobbs and
E. Koh (eds.), Oral History in Southeast Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, New York,
2013), pp. 101–​107.
76 Boonlert Supadhiloke, ‘Framing Sino-​ US-​Thai Relations in the Post-​ Global
Economic Crisis’, Public Relations Review 38, Issue 5 (December 2012),
pp. 665–​675.
77 When asked to rank influence (construed broadly) on a Likert scale from 1 (least
influence) to 10 (maximum influence), the median results across all waves for the
present period put China at 9 and the United States at 8. We tested if the larger
mean rating for China’s current influence in Thailand compared that of the United
States was statistically significant. The results of the Wilcoxon-​signed ranks test of
the difference between the mean ranks confirmed respondents rated China’s influ-
ence higher (Z=-​4.418, p<0.001). For survey results see Tables A.14 and A.16 in
the Annexure.
78 We tested if the larger mean rating for China’s expected influence in Thailand
in ten years’ time (8.49) compared to that of the United States in ten years’ time
(6.78) was statistically significant. The results of the Wilcoxon-​signed ranks test of
the difference between the mean ranks confirmed it was (Z=-​17.034, p<0.001). For
survey results see Tables A.17 and A.18 in the Annexure.
79 Congratulatory messages on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People’s Republic
of China. Accessed at www.mfa.go.th/​main/​en/​media-​center/​1457905-​Congra
tulatory-​Messages-​on-​the-​40th-​Anniversary -​of.html on 11 August 2017.
80 Statement by Thai representative Sukich Nimmanhaeminda in the UN General
Assembly on Chinese representation in the UN, 24 November 1966, in Jain, China
and Thailand 1949–​1983, p. 123.
81 Masuda Erika, ‘The Last Siamese Tributary Missions to China, 1851–​1854 and
the “Rejected” Value of Chim Kong’, in Geoff Wade (ed.), China and Southeast
Asia Volume IV: Interactions from the End of the Nineteenth Century to 1911
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 186.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., pp. 181–​190.
84 Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-​Siamese Trade 1562–​1853 (Bangkok:
Silkworm, 2014), p. 2.
85 Charnvit Kasetsiri, Studies in Thai and Southeast Asian Histories (Bangkok:
Foundation for the Promotion of Social Science and Humanities Textbook Project,
2015), pp. 225–​227. Mongkut (Rama V) too was a practitioner of history-​writing,
and pioneered the application of the title “the Great” to previous kings such as
Ramathibodi, Naresuan and Narai. Andreas Sturm, ‘The King’s Nation: A Study
of the Emergence and Development of Nation and Nationalism in Thailand’,
PhD thesis, University of London, 2006, p. 97.
 Introduction 27
86 Chris Baker, ‘Editor’s Preface’, in Prince Damrong Rajanuphap, Our Wars with
the Burmese (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2001), p. xxvi.
87 Shane Strate, The Lost Territories: Thailand’s History of National Humiliation
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015).
88 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘Thailand’s Hyper-​ Royalism: Its Past Success and
Present Predicament’, Trends in Southeast Asia no. 7 (Singapore: ISEAS-​Yusof
Ishak Institute).
89 Ibid., p. 15.
90 Jonathan Head, ‘The Mystery of the Missing Brass Plaque’, BBC News, 20 April
2017, accessed at www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​asia-​39650310 on 1 August 2019.
91 Monument marking defeat of royalist rebels removed in dead of night, Khaosod
English, 28 December 2018, accessed at www.khaosodenglish.com/​politics/​2018/​
12/​28/​monument-​marking-​defeat-​of-​royalist-​rebels-​removed-​in-​dead-​of-​night/​
on 29 December 2018.
92 Pattana Kitiarsa, ‘Farang as Siamese Occidentalism’, Working Paper Series
No. 49, September 2005, Asia Research Institute, National University of
Singapore.
93 Ernest Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?’ text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne
on 11 March 1882, in Ernest Renan, Qu’est-​ce qu’une nation? (Paris: Presses-​
Pocket, 1992) (translated by Ethan Rundell), accessed at http://​ucparis.fr/​files/​
9313/​6549/​9943/​What_​is_​a_​Nation.pdf on 31 July 2019; Niccolo Machiavelli
quoted in Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the
Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrer,
Strauss and Girouix, 2014), p. 197.
94 A. G. Hopkins writes that “major syntheses of U.S. history, authoritative studies
of foreign affairs, and college textbooks all adhere to the rule of silence.” American
Empire: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 496.
95 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘Remembering/​ Silencing the Traumatic Past: The
Ambivalent Memories of the October 1976 Massacre in Bangkok’, in Tanabe S.
and C. Keyes (eds.), Cultural Crisis and Social Memory: Modernity and Identity
in Thailand and Laos (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 243–​283.
96 Gregory V. Raymond, ‘Mnemonic Hegemony, Spatial Hierarchy and Thailand’s
Official Commemoration of the Second World War’, South East Asia Research
26, no. 2 (2018), pp. 176–​193.
97 Ibid.
98 Grant Evans, ‘Immobile Memories: Statues in Thailand and Laos’, in Tanabe
and Keyes (eds.), ‘Cultural Crisis and Social Memory’, p. 155.
99 Glen Lewis, ‘The Thai Movie Revival and Thai National Identity’,
Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 17, no. 1 (2003), p. 69.
100 Gregory Vincent Raymond, Thai Military Power: A Culture of Strategic
Accommodation (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2018), pp. 52, 90–​91.
101 According to John Funston’s study of Thai foreign policymaking, the Thai mili-
tary dominated foreign policymaking until the early 1970s and remained influ-
ential thereafter. John Funston, ‘The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Thailand: Some Preliminary Observations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia
9, no. 3 (December 1987), pp. 229–​243. Our surveys found that Thai military
officers nominated the internet and social media as their most important source
of knowledge about the Cold War, followed by books, tertiary education, movies,
television programs and secondary school education in descending order.
28 Introduction
102 Kitti Prasirtsuk, ‘Teaching International Relations in Thailand: Status and
Prospects’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific 9, no. 1 (2009), pp. 83–​105,
doi:10.1093/​irap/​lcn018, p. 92.
103 Ibid., p. 98.
104 Nopphadon Patthama, ผมไม่ได้ขายชาติ, I Did Not Sell My Nation
(Bangkok: Chatchamnai doi Khlet Thailand, 2008), p. 61.
105 There is a substantial literature, beginning with Benjamin Zawacki’s recent book
Thailand: Shifting Ground between the US and a Rising China (London: Zedbooks,
2017). Other useful treatments include Ann Marie Murphy, ‘Beyond Balancing
and Bandwagoning: Thailand’s Response to China’s Rise’, Asian Security
6, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 1–​ 27; Fineman, Special Relationship; Robert
J. Muscat, Thailand and the United States: Development, Security and Foreign
Aid (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Clark D. Neher and Wiwat
Mungkandi, U.S.-​Thailand Relations in a New International Era (Berkey: Institute
of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1990); R. Sean Randolph, The
United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950–​1985 (Berkely: Institute
of Asian Studies University of California, 1986); George K. Tanham, Trial in
Thailand (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974).
106 Chris Baker, ‘Thailand Is Not Lost’, The New York Review of Books, 24 May
2018, accessed at www.nybooks.com/​articles/​2018/​05/​24/​thailand-​is-​not-​lost/​ on
25 November 2019.
107 See John Blaxland and Greg Raymond, ‘Tipping the Balance? Thailand, the
United States and China’, Centre of Gravity Series, ANU College of the Asia and
the Pacific, November 2017. Note that this book is about Thai perceptions and
attitudes towards the alliance, rather than a holistic appreciation, which would
encompass investigation of shifts in US policies and approaches to Thailand.
This book will focus on the view from Thailand, even while recognising that the
two are not entire separable, because changes in US policy may prompt changes
in Thai attitudes.
108 Coral Bell, ‘The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World
Politics’, Lowy Institute Paper 21, Lowy Institute for International Policy,
2007, p. 1.
109 Gideon Rachman, Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline: From
Obama to Trump and Beyond (New York: Other Press, 2016), p. 31.
110 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), p. 23.
111 Alan Chong and Natasha Hamilton-​Hart, ‘Teaching International Relations
in Southeast Asia: Historical Memory, Academic Context, and Politics –​An
Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific 9, Issue 1, (2009), pp. 1–​
18, doi:10.1093/​irap/​lcn024; advance access published on 6 November 2008, p. 14.
2 
Thailand and the Great Powers

A little lamb lived by a flowing stream. A great temptation, when the heat was
torrid, To thirsty souls that water’s limpid gleam. At least so thought a “Wolf,
of aspect horrid, Who, having for some time abstained and fasted, Desired to
learn how lamb and water tasted. He felt with pinching want his paunch was
pining, Early he’d lunched, so longed the more for dining. A Cochin China
rooster, lank and thin, Or something indigestible from Tonquin, For a big,
sharp-​set Wolf, are snacks, not meals; So down the sparkling river Lupus
steals, Quite uninvited, but intent on forage, Fronting the fleecy flocks with
wondrous courage; For whether in the Southdowns, or Siam, By the near
Medway, or the far Menam, Your Wolf is most courageous with your Lamb.1

In 2017 Thailand and France celebrated 160 years of diplomatic ties. On the
lawns of the French ambassador’s riverside residence in Bangkok, guests ate
brie cheese and fois gras baguettes. The French ambassador proclaimed that
the Thai and French people shared “sophistication in living.”2 In the same
year, some 300 km away Thailand also celebrated “Trat Memorial Day” (Trat
ramluek festival). This festival recalls the eastern province of Trat gaining
its freedom (itsaraphap) from France on 23 March 1907.3 Trat was under
French control for 2 years, 6 months and 7 days, as part of a deal in which
France exchanged the adjoining province of Chantaburi for Trat. France
had obtained Chanthaburi in the aftermath of the traumatic events of 1893,
which we will shortly describe. The festival saw shops and parading soldiers
carrying the red flag with the white elephant, Siam’s flag until replaced with
the tricolour by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI 1910–​1925). The portrait of
Thailand’s revered King Chulalongkorn (Rama V 1868–​1910) appears fre-
quently in the branding for the festival. Local citizen Mr Chian Chinotkanon
was quoted as saying that “when France seized Trat we were forced to lower
the elephant flag. The local people cried.”4
The early twentieth century was the high tide of Western colonialism, a
period of intense manoeuvring between Siam, France and Britain. The heroic
diplomacy of Chulalongkorn is the lens through which many Thais recall this
era. A former Thai foreign minister told us that for this period:
30 Thailand and the Great Powers
This is diplomacy. Flexibility means stability. You cannot gain all. When
the superpower from the West comes like a hungry tiger, you must give
a piece. Some territory, some ground. Siam did this 14 times, each time
different, to the French and the British. That’s our loss. But we gained our
independence. And to play the game, King Rama V was very impressive.
He played a very good game.

Europe still wields influence in Thailand. The European Union can use its
market access to compel reforms, as it did in recent years to push Thailand
to crack down on slavery in its fishing industry. In human rights, its voice is
heard.5 But in defence and security terms our interviews suggested that Europe
is no longer considered a significant player. Its influence is seen as minor,
especially compared with a century before and especially compared with the
United States and China, or even Australia currently. In this chapter we argue
that despite this decline, the image of Europe as a threat to Thailand is a
deeply embedded and a powerful historical memory that frames Thailand’s
broader view of the West, as well as its view of the current strategic environ-
ment. And within that remembered past, it is the memory of France which
burns the most.
Much of this chapter probes the site of memory for France. It is, as
stated earlier, a site of memory laced very strongly with the personal trials
and tribulations of one individual, Chulalongkorn. The strong emphasis on
Thailand’s royals in its histography means that the personal impact of the
French threat on Chulalongkorn is known to many Thais. When contem-
porary Thai popular culture covers history, vignettes of the royal personages
and their experiences are often recounted, reflecting the ubiquity of Thailand’s
royals, and especially Rama V and Rama IX in Thai modern popular cul-
ture.6 That they are so often referenced also reflects a profoundly important
aspect of Thai collective memory relevant to its international relations, that
Thailand’s central concern has been, as noted by Shane Strate, a “search for
its place within the new global order created by the West.”7 In this chapter we
explain why Thailand’s European site of memory is of such importance to its
broader international outlook.
Before starting that examination, we first ask, “how has Thailand thought
about Great Powers?” To answer this question, we must first consider when
and where the idea of a Great Power first emerged, and then consider how
it may have arisen or been transferred into a Thai context. We then move
to discussing the first site of memory, that of Europe, by unravelling the
legacy of Thailand’s brush with colonial France. We argue that the person-
alisation around the figure of Chulalongkorn has enabled it to become what
psychologists call an intergenerational trauma. We then move to considering
the European countries which Thais considered benign, if unreliable, Britain
and Russia. In the latter part of this chapter we consider the memorialisation
of two non-​European major powers, India and Japan, which are assuming
 Thailand and the Great Powers 31
larger roles in Thai foreign policy in the twenty-​first century, but in the case
of India particularly, are still unfamiliar and strange for many Thai people.

The idea and experience of Great Powers

For Thailand, the idea of Great Powers as threats is coming back. This was
the message from our surveys conducted between 2015 and 2017, where
Thai military officers rated the likelihood of threats from Great Powers as
higher than threats from neighbouring countries. More broadly, they also see
threats from non-​state sources as more important than threats from states.8
This is a shift from the Cold War, when Thailand was very concerned about
state threats, especially from its neighbours. In the 1980s, a Chulalongkorn
University study found that three quarters of political, military, bureaucratic,
business, intellectual and labour respondents viewed Vietnam (74.3%) as by
far the biggest threat for direct military aggression or causing loss of terri-
tory.9 Laos (23.7) and Cambodia (37.4) were also rated as significant threats,
although by about half as many compared with Vietnam.
The return of Great Powers to prominence in Thai thinking takes us back
to the early twentieth and nineteenth centuries. But what is a Great Power and
what is the Thai understanding of a Great Power? What are the experiences
which shaped the development of the concept in the Thai world view?
The Western notion of a Great Power has a very distinctive meaning and
lineage. Great Powers were states which, in the words of Hedley Bull, “assert
the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that
affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole.”10 The
description emerged by the middle of the eighteenth century, with some attrib-
uting the invention of the concept to German historian Leopold von Ranke.11
The notion of Great Powers really became firmly settled in European diplo-
matic discourse by the time of the Concert of Europe in 1815.12 At this time,
the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia convened
in Vienna to discuss the future of Europe and the treatment of France, which
had laid waste to Europe in the wars led by Napoleon from the time of the
French Revolution in 1789 until his defeat at Waterloo in 1815.
No specific Thai language equivalent for a Great Power existed until well
into the twentieth century. Thailand’s polymath foreign minister and author
Prince Wan Waithayakon, who worked with Thailand’s Royal Institute, the gov-
ernment body responsible for the Thai language, then invented the term prathet
maha amnat following the First World War.13 As Wan returned from Europe in
1919, word-​coining was on the rise due to the need to establish a Thai version
of the Civil and Commercial Code. While Wan was the inventor of maha amnat
(along with many other words used frequently in contemporary Thai such as
“government” (ratthaban), industry (utsahakam), and influence (itthiphon), he
later sought to replace it, arguing that it was inaccurate, since the word amnat in
Thai equates to “authority” rather than “power.” As he explained,
32 Thailand and the Great Powers
states are equal in international law and have no amnat or power to order
other states. So I submitted phuwah, which was rejected because it did not
sound smooth.14

Today Thailand’s Royal Institute, the office responsible or the preservation

and custodianship of the Thai language, defines maha amnat as a “country
which has great power in either the economic or military domains.”15
The idea of European Great Powers grew slowly in Thai perceptions,
though Europeans were well known visitors to the court of Ayutthaya.
Siam completed equal treaties of friendship and commerce with Portugal
(1516), Spain (1598), the Netherlands (1617) and France (1687).16 In the
latter two, Siam was able to send or exchange diplomatic missions.17 From
1612 the British East India Company made furtive attempts to insert
itself into regional trade networks, especially during the era of the court
of King Narai (1656–​1688), and especially the Siam-​Japan commercial
networks. But the commercial incentives were low and political intrigues
were complex.18 In the absence of a concerted effort from the company
itself, lone traders, either former employees or employees acting more on
behalf of their own interest than the companies, were more likely to be
represented at the court in Ayutthaya. Ayutthaya itself was well integrated
into Southeast Asian trading networks with the Malay archipelagos and
the South China Sea. During this period the kings of Ayutthaya were
the principal traders. During the reign of Narai in the second capital of
Ayutthaya, contact with Europeans ended badly with the expulsion of
French diplomats at court, and Siam was in a period of isolation there-
after until the reign of Rama III.
Caution began in the eighteenth century. Rama II (1809–​1824) was
told by his Chinese interlocutors to be wary, that the British would begin
by asking for increased trade and would finish by seizing the country.19
A throwaway line from the British diplomat Sir John Crawfurd, to the
effect that the British could acquire a country like Siam with two or three
warships, exacerbated these concerns. The biggest impact on Siamese
thinking was, however, the British defeat of the previously thought-​to-​be-​
invincible Burmese in the war between 1824 and 1826. Soon after, Rama II
signed Siam’s first commercial agreement with British envoy Henry Burney
on 20 June 1826, Siam’s first treaty with a Western nation.20 Additional
equal treaties were signed with Great Britain in 1826 and the United States
in 1834.
Thereafter Siam’s contact increased steadily. How did the Thais think
about these countries? Some ideas can be gained from the speeches and letters
of the nineteenth-​ century Thai monarchs Mongkut and Chulalongkorn.
When Rama IV corresponded in English with British officials, he referred
to “marine powers” and “western powerful nations.”21 In a letter of 1868 he
wrote, regarding the European Great Powers, that:
 Thailand and the Great Powers 33
The only weapons that will be of real use to us in the future will be our
mouths and our hearts, constituted so as to be full of sense and wisdom
for the better protection of ourselves.22

Chulalongkorn for his part, towards the end of his life in 1908, referred to Siam
as having the company of ‘nations with much power’ (nana prathet thi mi amnat
yaiyai).23 Hence his policy over his reign had been to “govern with security to
maintain the independence of our country.”24 It was under Chulalongkorn’s
reign that Siam began to establish its overseas diplomatic network, launching
its first permanent mission to Britain in 1880.25 Chulalongkorn and other
royals also began to send their sons for schooling in England, who on return,
provided a pool of experts for dealings with the Europeans.
By the time of Vajiravudh, Thai global awareness was more comprehen-
sive and sophisticated. Vajiravudh was schooled in a Western country, the
first Chakri monarch to do so. He attended Oxford University between 1889
and 1891 as well as Sandhurst Royal Military College. Consequently, he
spoke and wrote English with native fluency. While his father Chulalongkorn
Rama V and grandfather Mongkut Rama IV had both been adept English
speakers, their direct contact with the West was much less. Mongkut never
visited, and Chulalongkorn did not visit Europe until almost 30 years into
his reign, in his famed trip of 1897. Also, through profound technological
change that shortened distances and increased ease of communication, the
world globalised transformatively in the nineteenth century. In the 1830s com-
munication times between Britain and India were six months, via sailing ship.
Rail and steamship shorted this to one month by the 1850s, and to the same
day by the 1870s when the telegraph was introduced.26
As a result, Vajiravudh and his ministers were deeply immersed and entirely
fluent in the affairs of continental Europe by the early twentieth century. From
the outbreak of war in 1914 they followed events closely, seeking to judge the
eventual victor. This led to Vajiravudh’s decision to end Siam’s neutrality in
1917, siding with Allies and ultimately sending a small force to France just
prior to the cessation of hostilities in November 1918. In making the decision,
he was extremely conscious of the impact that this might have on the thinking
of the “Great Powers,” who he termed mahaprathet. For example, in a speech
to the departing troops Vajiravudh noted that Thailand had never before sent
troops to fight in a conflict abroad and that this was an opportunity to show
the world that the Great Powers accepted Siam as an equal (mahaprathet khao
rap rao thao prathet khong khao laeo).27
While technology brought the world closer to Thailand, European Great
Powers were developing a view of themselves and the non-​European world
that increased their danger to Asian societies. Prior to the nineteenth cen-
tury, European nations applied Grotian concepts of natural law in which all
states were presumed equal and sovereign. By the late nineteenth century,
international law had entered a new a phase in which the universal law of
34 Thailand and the Great Powers
nations was replaced by a positivist European international law. This shift
saw non-​European states that previously possessed full legal status reduced
to being candidates for admission into the ‘family of nations.’28 As such, they
were liable to be subject to unequal treaties. These treaties all contained fixed
duty schedules, restricted import tariffs and extraterritorial provisions giving
foreigners rights, if charged with crimes committed in Thailand, to be tried
for crimes in courts staffed by their own citizens. This was because Britons
could not be expected to be subjected to Siamese law when “Siam was still
an uncivilized nation.”29 As they had done in China, Japan and other Asian
countries, the European treaty powers soon used their extraterritorial and
trade privileges to establish autonomous enclaves in Siam and even to embed
themselves in the administration of the country. This they did with an eye to
preserving and even enlarging their interests in the face of competition from
other Great Powers. As Gerrit Gong writes, while “Siam preserved its nom-
inal independence, it lost its judicial and fiscal autonomy outright, and had
its political autonomy compromised.”30 In the last decade of the nineteenth
century even this was threatened. How a memory of this danger to national
sovereignty was constructed and amplified over the course of the twentieth
century is the subject to which this chapter now turns.

French wolf and Siamese lamb

In 2018 web-​based Thai language publication The Cloud published an art-
icle titled “La Tour Eiffel,” about Chulalongkorn’s famous 1897 trip to
Europe. The Cloud is written for young urban professionals, describing itself
as a magazine about “local, creative culture, better living.”31 The description
of Chulalongkorn’s travel starts brightly, with Chulalongkorn stating that
“Paris is always a good idea.” The piece continues, pointing out the novelty
of Chulalongkorn’s visit, as the first leader of an Eastern country (prathet
tawanok) to visit ten countries of Europe. Then the tone darkens. We read
about the Pak Nam Crisis, which had taken place four years before, in 1893:

Thailand’s independence was entwined with the volatile state of politics

in the era of colonialism. With its lesser power, Thailand had to submit
to paying a massive fine and conceding 140,000 square kilometers. King
Chulalongkorn was severely depressed to the point that he fell gravely ill.
He refused to eat or receive medications and even wrote a poem with the
implication of farewelling his family, because he could not stand the pain
and anguish.32

The piece is a good indication of the way in which events of Chulalongkorn’s

life are frequently reprised in Thai collective memory in the twenty-​first
century.
The events of 1893 took place at the mouth of the Chao Phraya river, just
outside of Bangkok in the province of Samut Prakan where today can be found
 Thailand and the Great Powers 35
Fort Phra Chulachomklao, or as is commonly known in Thai, pomphrachun,
on a Royal Thai Navy base. Fort Chulachomklao is a site inscribed with the
memory of the Pak Nam Crisis. Preserved alongside a warship permanently
moored for visitors are seven five-​ton Armstrong guns, installed in 1886.
These were fired in a vain attempt to sink the French gunships that entered
the Chao Phraya in 1893 in an act of coercion and intimidation. On the day of
the author’s visit each of the pits was draped with a sign displaying the words
“Remembering 124 years since 1893” (ramluek 124 pi ror sor 112).
In 1992 the site underwent significant renovations linking it even more
closely to the Thai monarchy. A committee headed by Mom Luang (ML)
Thawisan Ladawang, principal private secretary to King Bhumibol, and
comprising former senior military and public servants led the development
of a new royal monument. When finally opened by Princess Sirindhorn in
1993, the monument comprised a 4.2 metre statue of Chulalongkorn in the
guise of a navy admiral, standing astride a 937 square metre base, inside of
which is a museum recounting the events of 1893. The museum displays a
series of paintings, in which we can see the French ships Comete, Inconstance,
Jean Baptise Say and Lutin arrive at the mouth of Chao Phraya. We see the
events of 13 July 1893, in which an exchange of fire between the guns and the
French ships leaves four Thai and three French soldiers dead. We read of the
subsequent concessions of territory (sia dindaen) in 1903 and 1906 to secure
the return of Drat province and Thailand’s independence (laek kap ekkarat
khong thai).33
The museum is an important site of a complex and powerful collective
memory. One dimension of the collective memory of Chulalongkorn is cere-
bral and strategic. His humiliation in the 1893 crisis but subsequent triumph in
his tour of Europe today constitute, in the form of a phoenix-​from-​ashes-​type
parable, a template for successful Thai foreign and strategic policy. Indeed,
contemporary accounts of his deeds constitute a narrative, which elsewhere
Raymond has termed a “Deeds of Chulalongkorn” narrative. This narrative
imparts lessons about the place of military force in Thai politico-​military
thinking.34 It also sets out a model for successful diplomacy, in which military
force provides a deterrent but foreign policy is largely conducted through the
management of the Great Powers.
A perfect example of the influence and propagation of this narrative
was given in 2010, when Thailand’s former Foreign Minister Dr Surakiert
Sathirathai gave a speech for the Phra Chulachomklao Fort Rama V
Monument Foundation (munnithi phrabonmarachanusaori ratkanthiha
pomphrachunchomklao).35 Parts of the speech are worth quoting at length:

The thing that we should know and apply currently, the most important
thing for me, is the royal foreign policy, when amidst the colonialist
trends of the Great Powers in that period, [we pursued a policy of]
building a balance of the great powers or a policy of building close
ties with one Great Power to balance other Great Powers (Balance of
36 Thailand and the Great Powers
power and influence). [At this point in the printed text we see a picture of
Chulalongkorn in Denmark with King Christian IX on 23 July 1897.]
His Majesty King Rama V saw that he had to speedily gain support
from other Great Powers, for example, Russia, Germany (which at that
time had just been consolidated by Prussia), the United States and Japan,
to enter and have benefits and influence in Thailand concurrently, in
order to balance the power (khon lae khan amnat) of England and France.
Many times, the King employed these nationalities in his service and gave
concessions for trade. For example, Germany was given a railway con-
cession instead of England, the Directors of the Railways were three
Germans, allowing Germany to manage ship transport between Thailand
and Singapore.
The King saw that there were three nations, Germany, Russia and Japan,
in conflict with England and France in competing for benefits in Asia and
Africa. You probably remember that with Russia Rama V invited Tsar
Nicholas II to visit Thailand from the time that he was the prince. When
Nicholas became Emperor, he was already close with him and he invited
Rama V to Russia officially. There were then photos of [Rama V with]
Tsar Nicholas II broadcast over Europe which had the effect of limiting
the role of England and France. It was seen that Thailand was close
friends with Russia. This had the effect of Russia helping to negotiate
with France to reduce the aggression with Thailand and accept Thailand
as a sovereign state and reduce the harassment. It was a result of the
first 1897 visit. This caused England and France to welcome His Majesty
as the head of a sovereign state. This was the brilliant royal foreign
policy.36

Even before the 1897 visit Chulalongkorn had pursued a norms-​ based
approach to foreign policy, in effect seeking admission to the so-​ called
Family of Nations, the countries Europeans deemed civilised.37 His cultiva-
tion of English dress and manners amongst himself, other senior royals and
his diplomats gave Siam direct access to London, something denied to other
colonised neighbours such as Burma, which were ruled by the India Office.38
The policy also underpinned his son and successor, Vajiravudh Rama VI’s
decision to send troops to France, which was in part to demonstrate that Siam
was a civilised nation cognisant of the laws and customs of European war-​
making. The reward was a much stronger platform, in the post–​First World
War settlement, from which to seek the revision of the unequal treaties levied
on Thailand from the mid-​nineteenth century.39
The second dimension of the memory of the Pak Nam crisis is visceral
and emotional. Historians of Thailand agree that this collective memory is
profoundly important to Thailand’s view of the past and its national psyche
generally. Thongchai Winichakul calls it a “master plot” for a version of his-
tory that focuses on Thailand’s past of sacrifice and ‘tragic wounds.’ Charnvit
 Thailand and the Great Powers 37
Kasetsiri calls it Thailand’s “wounded history.” Shane Strate terms it a
“National Humiliation discourse.”40 The emotion that this memory could
evoke was first seen in the propaganda efforts of the nationalist Phibun
regime, especially as it sought to galvanise public support for an irredentist
war against France in Indochina in 1940. It was later seen in Thai parlia-
mentary debate, following the Second World War, over whether to return the
Indochinese provinces gained by the 1940 military operations. It was also
seen in Thai public anger at the outcomes of the 1962 international court
case between Thailand and Cambodia over the Phra Viharn/​Preah Vihear
temple, in which the court deemed the temple to be on territory belonging
to Cambodia, and then again in the second eruption of the temple dispute
between 2008 and 2011. Although anger arises in relation to a broader
memory of territories lost as a result of colonialism, the most sensitive touch
point remains the 1893 crisis.
The power of the National Humiliation discourse is an example of what
Vamik Volkan, a psychologist who has focused on the part that group iden-
tity plays in international relations, might call a Chosen Trauma.41 A “Chosen
Trauma” is where groups empathise and feel solidarity with the experiences
of an ancestor. They do so to the point that there is a phenomenon of “time
collapse,” in which perceptions of events of the present are mentally and emo-
tionally conflated with episodes from the past. Volkan formed his concepts
based on observation of the ethno-​ nationalist conflicts unleashed in the
breakup of Yugoslavia, and the way in which Serbs summoned the memory
of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo to justify their attacks on Bosnian Muslims.42
The ways in which India and China’s historical experiences of colonisation
and subordinate status in relation to the West became post-​imperial ideolo-
gies that continue to shape their foreign policy throughout the Cold War and
after are further examples.43 In the case of Thailand, in 2012 a senior Thai
military officer told Raymond that this part of Thailand’s history showed why
Thailand needed strong armed forces, to make sure that this history was not
repeated.
It was not inevitable that the events of 1893 would become a Chosen
Trauma. For several decades after 1893, public discussion of the incident was
suppressed. Thai leaders worried about inflaming Thai-​Franco relations given
France was still a threat. In 1925 Prince Damrong, for example, suppressed
publication of an account of the French occupation of Chantaburi.44
Moreover, during the First World War Thailand sent a military deployment to
France to support the Allies. After the war the Thai soldiers were feted and
praised, two received recommendations for the French Croix de Guerre, and
many took part in gala victory parades in Paris in July 1919.45 By 1940, how-
ever, Thailand’s political climate had changed considerably. The Thai abso-
lute monarchy had been overthrown and the nationalist regime of Phibun
Songkram was fomenting the idea of an anti-​colonial, pan-​Asian and irre-
dentist war against France. Phibun and his chief ideologue Luang Vichit
38 Thailand and the Great Powers
Wathakan decided the time had come to revive the memory of 1893, in order
to stir public sentiment and support for an Indochina war. Vichit set out
Thailand’s case, claiming a loss of territory to the French:

Had France not taken a considerable part of her territories, Thailand

would have possessed at the present time a vast Kingdom of nearly one
million square kilometres … Can any honoured nation tolerate such a
loss forever? Moreover, the loss was not confined only to land and popu-
lation. The French also committed a piratical act in 1893 by sending two
warships to Bangkok and took away a sum of money equivalent to three
million francs … . [O]‌ne must also bear in mind that our territories lost
to France are neither colony nor foreign land, but they are own flesh and
blood, as the population of those territories are of Thai race.46

Consequently Thailand launched military operations across the eastern

border on 26 November 1940.47 Some 43,000 of the 300,000 square miles lost
to France at the turn of the century were regained.48 In the aftermath of the
Second World War, the United States and France demanded that all colonial
possessions occupied by Japan be returned unconditionally. In response Thai
parliamentarians passionately condemned French imperialism, lamented the
prospect of the return of Thai citizens to suffer under French administration
if the territory was ceded, and recalled the glory and honour of the 1940
victory.49
The memory of the French wolf and the Siamese lamb was henceforth
Thailand’s Chosen Trauma. It was this Chosen Trauma that was activated when
the now independent state of Cambodia took Thailand to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962, charging Thailand with wrongful and illegal
occupation of the Phra Viharn temple site on the Thai-​Cambodian border.
Thailand in its counter-​memorial in the 1962 court case made clear that the
origins of the dispute lay in France’s encroachment:

About 1860 the French established themselves in Cochin China and

began trying to extend their influence into Cambodia. Cambodia at that
time was a tributary state of Siam …
About 1892, agitation began in France for the acquisition of the
Siamese territory on the left bank of the Mekong. This is described
in a memorandum drawn up on the 21st March, 1893 by M. Rolin-​
Jacqueyns, Minister Plenipotentiary and General Adviser to the Siamese
Government.50

The Court, asked to determine whether the temple was in Thai or Cambodian
territory, considered the “watershed as border” principle, contained in Articles
1 and 2 of the 1904 Franco-​Siamese Treaty. This principle stipulated that the
Dangrek Mountain watershed between the respective basins of the Mun river
in Thailand, and the Mekong river in Cambodia, would be the border. But in
 Thailand and the Great Powers 39
the end, it placed more weight on the Thai authorities not protesting a 1907
French map’s depiction of the border in the vicinity of Preah Vihear/​Phra
Vihear.51 Despite the map clearly showing the border lying to the north of
the temple, thereby leaving it and the watershed in Cambodian territory, the
Thai government did not protest when it was given copies of the map. Instead
it distributed copies to its embassies overseas and ordered more copies for
distribution to other ministries and provincial governors. The Court also
considered that Siam’s former minister of the interior and education, Prince
Damrong Rajanuphab, visited the temple in his private capacity. The prince
was met by a French official wearing a uniform and flying a French flag at the
site. Prince Damrong made no protest then or later.
The court’s verdict is still discussed today in popular magazines. In 2012 the
Thailand Tatler, a glossy magazine reporting on the doings and fashions of
the Thai ultra-​rich, ran a special on Prince Damrong Rajanuphab to mark the
150th anniversary of his birth. The article cited Mom Rajawong Damrongdej,
Damrong’s grandson. Damrongdej vehemently denied the accuracy of the
court’s judgment that Damrong had acquiesced in France’s acquisition of the
temple:

When my grandfather visited Preah Vihear, it was 15 years after he had

resigned from the Ministry of the Interior and he went there purely as a
private person … Prince Damrong’s secretary clearly notes that the prince
was very angry with the French for putting up the French flag. If it was
Cambodian territory how could Thais visit there without a visa or pass-
port? He was scheduled to visit another site, and on learning that it was
on Cambodian soil he refused to go. My grandfather dedicated his entire
life to Thailand. How could anyone think he would tacitly accept the
Cambodian claim of sovereignty over Preah Vihear?52

The ICJ’s awarding of sovereignty of the temple to Cambodia came as a

shock to the Thai government, then headed by military leader Field Marshal
Sarit Thanarat. After Sarit’s emotional speech announcing the loss of the case
was broadcast throughout the nation via radio and television, demonstrations
broke out across Thailand protesting the decision.53 According to historian
Charnvit Kasetsiri, the demonstrations went for 15 days and spread to 50
provinces across Thailand.54
The issue of the temple resurfaced in 2008, when Cambodia, ignoring Thai
objections, applied for UNESCO world heritage status for the site. Whilst the
matter of sovereignty over the temple had been settled, disagreement remained
on the question of the 4.6 square km surrounding the temple. The trauma was
again reawakened. Nationalist demonstrators flocked to the border, some, like
activist Veera Songkwamkit, to be imprisoned by a Cambodian government
equally seized by the opportunity to stir up nationalism. A Thai historian
Suwit Thirasasawat published a book titled The Background of the Loss of
Territory and Problem of Prasart Phra Viharn from “Ror Sor 112” [Pak Nam
40 Thailand and the Great Powers
Incident]55 Until the Present.56 Thai royal Princess Sirindhorn requested the
book be reprinted, suggesting that it had the imprimatur of the Thai royal
family. A newspaper article stated that:

the chaos and tumult that exists between Thailand and Cambodia which
the World Heritage registering of Prasart Phra Viharn should not have
been caused at all. More than one hundred years a Great Power of Europe
with the name of France came and disturbed and tyrannized Siam and
Cambodia. It caused resentment to the point that Pra Chao … Udomsak,
the father of the navy though only thirteen years old, so perceived the
resentment etched into the heart of King Chulalongkorn that he had
tattooed … Trat Ror Sor 112 .57

The strength of Thai and Cambodian feelings, drawing on nationalist-​

constructed memory and manipulated for domestic political gain, spawned a
four-​year border conflict. Troops from both states were mobilised and small
arms and artillery fire exchanged during periods of peak tension. Cambodian
and Thai soldiers died and were injured. ASEAN was unable to adjudicate
effectively, and the armed conflict did not cease until the ICJ issued an injunc-
tion ordering the withdrawal of troops from the area in July 2011.58
The memory of 1893 hovers over relations with Cambodia and arguably
colours Thailand’s perceptions of the West, especially in times of crisis. Part
of the reason for this is linguistic. The generic word for a European white
Western foreigner, as many know, is farang. Etymological investigation
suggests that the farang probably derived from Persian or Indian words for
Westerners such parangi or frenghi.59 Because farang is like the Thai word
for France, farangset, it is commonly believed that the word farang is derived
from the word for France. This conflation, given what we have seen about
Thai collective memory regarding France, inevitably would lead us to expect
to some collateral damage to the image of the West in general.
What is certainly true is that, even regardless of the equating of farang
and farangset, the relationship of Thailand to the West in general is highly
ambivalent and conflicted, driven by both admiration and resentment. This
is not always visible at first glance. Thailand’s diplomats and high-​ranking
statesmen have often propounded an historiography in which Thailand
adapted with ease to the West, selecting those aspects of the West which it
preferred and ignoring the remainder.60 Thai kings such as Chulalongkorn
often drew on Western scholarship but chose not to acknowledge that fact,
in developing their own ideas about how to propagate a form of Buddhism
suitable for Thailand’s national survival.61
But tracing Thailand’s internal modernisation discourse, including through
the neologisms for civilised or modern (such as siwilai, ariya, charoen and
the most recent than samay) and the debates, as well as to the desirability
or not of core components of the West such as Christianity or democracy,
reveals insecurities and pathologies. Thongchai perceives a Siamese elite
 Thailand and the Great Powers 41
adopting siwilai to maintain relative superiority over rural and provincial
others. Thailand’s elites, he says, have often been anxious to assert “they were
civilized like the West but that they were also unique and exceptional.”62 Pavin
argues that farang, like Burma, has provided an oppositional identity against
which to define Thainess (khwampenthai).63 Pattana Kitiarsa sees a Siamese
Occidentalism, a complex psychological balancing act in which Thais produce
a “Thai-​ized version of the West as the superior but suspicious other, based
on specific historical and cultural encounters against them.”64 Pattana argues
convincingly that the enduring potency of this outlook is epitomised in the
Thai movie Thaweephop, in which a young Thai woman criticises Thai people
for an unthinking adoption of Western manners and lifestyles.
This is hardly a distinctively Thai syndrome. Intellectuals all over Asia
and the Middle East struggled to formulate coherent, authentic responses
to Western dominance over several decades in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Islamic intellectual Jamal al-​Din al-​Afghani felt that it
was necessary to emulate Western science, education and military power but
feared that blind mimicry of the West would expose the Muslim world to
“being content with their domination over us.”65 Mohandas Gandhi feared
that Hindu nationalists would simply institute “English rule without the
Englishman.”66 Debates between different factions were intense. Chinese
intellectuals such as Sun Yat Sen, Liang Qichao and Liang Shuming argued
for the preservation of traditional Chinese virtues and against Western materi-
alism, only to be mocked by the ‘New Culture’ radicals such as Hu Shi and the
Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chen Duxiu for
their naivete.67 These ambivalent attitudes continue to inform Asian outlooks
for a very long time, as Kishore Mahbubani argued in his 2004 book, Can
Asians Think?68
In our next chapter, on the US-​Thai alliance, we argue that reverberations
of the Thai memory of 1893 and the larger psychological complex of ‘Siamese
Occidentalism’ can play a part in Thai reactions to the West. They were pre-
sent in Thai reactions to the West during the Asian Financial Crisis and in
the rancorous relations after the military coups of 2006 and 2014. But for
the moment we turn to look at how Thailand has recalled some more benign
aspects of contact with Europe in the late nineteenth century and subsequent
decades.

Perfidious Albion and Mueang Phudi: Britain in Thai memory

Ripples of nostalgia spread through Thai elite circles when the British
Embassy on Witayu Road Bangkok was demolished in 2019. The British had
sold the embassy and residence to a consortium including Central World,
one of Thailand’s largest shopping mall developers. It was reported that after
being sold for 420 million British pounds, making it the largest land sale in
Thai history, the proceeds would go towards development of 30–​40 other
British diplomatic facilities elsewhere around the world.69 The theme of Thai
42 Thailand and the Great Powers
social media comment was “it’s a pity” (sia dai) while the headline for Sannok
news emblazoned over pictured of the wrecked building was “nothing left but
memories” (luea khae khwamotrongcham). There was also consternation, as
Association of Siamese Architects wrote to the British ambassador advising
that they would recall their award for outstanding conservation of architec-
tural arts.70
Britain has occupied a special place in the minds of Thai elites, and as with
France, it is a place frequently mediated through the figure of Chulalongkorn
and enabled through education. As Chulalongkorn modernised the monarchy
in the later nineteenth century, he initiated the tradition of sending his sons
to British boarding schools. His example was then emulated by Thailand’s
other nobles and aristocrats, and later by Thailand’s expanding middle class.71
Chulalongkorn himself was an Anglophile, whose genuine affection led him
to describe the first day of his visit to Britain in 1897 as equivalent to that
of a Muslim achieving a pilgrimage to Mecca.72 His successors Vajiravudh
and Prajadhipok were also notably British in manner and bearing –​“the
former in the eccentric variant and the latter the conservative one,” according
to Peleggi.73 Many of Thailand’s leading politicians have been educated in
England. Anand Panyarachun (prime minister, 1991–​1992) followed in his
father’s footsteps with a British public school education. Schooling in England
at age 16 in 1948 brought with it a tough first year of “unrelenting cultural
immersion.” But by the time he graduated from Cambridge in 1955, after
spending seven continuous and formative years in England, he had become
in his own words, “practically bicultural.”74 Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008–​2011) was
educated at Eton and Oxford University.
The reverence accorded to England and the English language grew slowly
and was far from universal. In the mid-​nineteenth century, just a select few
shared the belief of Mongkut’s brother Phra Phin Klao that “one who comes
into the world and cannot speak English is as one born here and cannot speak
Siamese.”75 These few men, though, had an increasingly important place in
Thailand as the second half of the nineteenth century progressed. When
the British governor of Singapore Sir Andrew Clark was invited in 1875 to
mediate an internal political crisis in 1875, he was assisted first by the son of
the foreign minister, who had studied at Oxford, and then by the ex-​regent’s
grandson, who had studied at the Royal Horse Artillery at Woolwich.76
Over time the perception of England and the English as special grew, leaving
a linguistic legacy: the enduring designation of the English as phudi, meaning
“good people” and England as mueang phudi meaning “country of good
people.” Phudi is today the convenient short designation of Britain for Thai
newspaper headlines. According to Kru Lilly, a Thai language teacher writing
for the popular daily newspaper Thai Rath, this appellation arose because:

England was a country that was old and had been wealthy a long time.
It was advanced in many areas, leading civilisation all over the world.
If you don’t count the administration of a monarchy and upper classes,
 Thailand and the Great Powers 43
England had customs and traditions that Thais adopted. Such that Thais
in ancient eras adopted the culture of the English in dress, speech and
eating. If you did this it looked good, looked like you had good manners.
This turned into calling each other phudi angkrit.77

Kru Lilly then records that upper class and royal Thais attending Cambridge
and Oxford, the world’s oldest universities, returned exhibiting the traits of
phudi, adding to the meaning of the term.
In the late nineteenth century, Britain became deeply embedded in the
political and economic affairs of the kingdom. Beginning in 1897, British
officials served as Siam’s financial advisers producing financial reports.78
British nationals were also deeply involved in the staffing of other parts
of the Siamese bureaucracy, including the courts, the police force and the
railways. As of 1907, a British defence attaché could write with regard to
Siam’s administration that “nearly all departments have the assistance of
European advisers, whose power and authority vary with the nature of the
work to be done.”79 In 1907 a Dane, Colonel Schau, led the provincial gen-
darmerie, and an Italian, Colonel Gerini, was principal of the Royal Military
College.80 Britain, however, saw its position as the “premier power” and saw
this reflected in its numerical dominance of the foreign adviser category. As
of 1907, its representative in Siam Ralph Paget could cite that it had “125
British in the Siamese service, as against 5 French, about 40 Germans, 11
Dutch &c.”81 This position was jealously guarded, with Paget noting that it
“would be no pleasant experience to find French or possibly Germans in pre-
ponderant numbers in a country where our interests are so great.” The extent
to which foreigners were integral parts of the early Siamese bureaucracy is
perhaps less well appreciated in Thailand today, as the narrative of a Thailand
that escaped colonisation tends to obscure this aspect of Siamese-​European
relations.
Over time less positive recollections of Britain accumulated. The British
under John Bowring forced the kingdom to open to trade in 1855. While
this was welcomed by factions in the Siamese elite who saw opportunities,
it was also true that Bowring’s mission had a coercive aspect: as he hinted
at the time, while he had many ships at sea, he planned to bring just a small
portion to Bangkok.82 Thai disappointment at British aloofness in the 1893
crisis further cooled Anglophilia. When under threat from the French, British
Foreign Secretary Lord Rosebery told Thais that “Great Britain had nothing
to do with the affair.” Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office Sir
Thomas Sanderson further told them to “not irritate the French government
by petty acts of hostility.”83 Rosebery reportedly later regretted the failure
to stop France acquiring large swathes of Siamese territory but believed
that because Britain had “no treaty rights what-​ever to interfere in behalf
of Siam,” he could not have “induced the English nation to go to war” over
Siam.84 Privately, he was scathing, describing Chulalongkorn as a “moribund
lecher” and his Foreign Minister Devawongse as a “childish debauche.”85
44 Thailand and the Great Powers
As with the overall memory of Pak Nam, the memory of British indiffer-
ence was revived after the 1932 revolution. This was especially pungent after
the 1942 decision to side with the Japanese. At that time Phibun Songkram,
well aware of the traditional affinity for all things British amongst Thai elites,
launched a propaganda war in which the British failure to assist during the
1893 crisis was amongst his most powerful ammunition.86 His state-​sponsored
radio program featuring Mr Nai and Mr Man mocked Britain’s efforts “to
fight to the very last Indian” in defending their Southeast Asian possessions.87
Hence it was to be expected that one of our interviewees stated that in
Thailand’s struggle against France “the British were supposed to be discreetly
helping us but not much.”88 Phibun’s cooperation with the occupying forces,
allowing Japanese forces access to Thai transport facilities and use of Thai
fuel and ammunition, left the British incandescent with rage.89 The British
government later described Phibun’s regime as a “quisling government” who
had committed an act of betrayal.90
As Britain’s power rapidly waned in the mid-​twentieth century, American
officials noted that there remained evidence, “perhaps reminiscent of by-​
gone days, of the British desire to play a dominating role” in Thailand.91
Former British Ambassador Josiah Crosby, probably like many in Britain,
seemed unable to appreciate to which the Second World War would come
to be a watershed in the decline of colonialism. As the war progressed, he
advocated that Britain be allowed to keep its “system of Advisers” in post-​
war Siam.92 That system, he said, had enabled British prosperity to reach its
greatest height. Then there were the harsh reparations Britain was seeking
in early 1945, which included putting Thai territory on the Isthmus of Kra
under a protectorate, and which left a sour taste for many Thais.93 The US
Department of State, however, emphasised that it viewed the Free Thai
movement favourably, and this influenced its preference for the “restoration
to Thailand of complete freedom as a sovereign state.”94 That the United
States was able to impose its preferences in the debate over what post-​war
reparations ought to be imposed on Thailand was one marker of the shift in
global power in the wake of the Second World War.

Memory of Europe: the triumphant 1897 tour

A critically influential fragment of memory for Thailand’s collective European
lieu de memoire is Chulalongkorn’s 1897 tour of Europe, the prapart euro.
In this memory space, Chulalongkorn’s mastery of British dress and cus-
toms places him on a similar status as other European royalty, supported
by the abundance of images of Chulalongkorn and his sons in top hat and
tails that are frequently encountered in modern Thailand. It is widely under-
stood that at this critical period, only four years after the Pak Nam incident
in which France had threatened Thailand with its gunships, extorting land
and payment, Thailand’s future as an independent state was precarious.
Chulalongkorn’s visit to Europe, and his cultivation of relations with his royal
 Thailand and the Great Powers 45
counterparts, most of all displayed Thailand’s “civilised” nature and helped
deter annexation.
The memorialisation of Chulalongkorn’s 1897 trip has strengthened
over time. Ahead of the 100th anniversary of the trip in 1997, the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai organised a committee to oversee
celebrations. The Thai Treasury Department issued a special bronze coin with
Chulalongkorn’s profile and the message “To remember the royal tour of
Europe from 7 April to 16 December in year 116 of the Rattanakosin era.”95
A two-​volume set of Chulalongkorn’s correspondence over the course of the
trip was issued. For the introduction to volume 1 Chuan wrote:

the fact that Rama V travelled to Europe in 1897 was significant because
it was the first official trip by a Thai monarch. He visited Italy, Austria,
France, Belgium, Holland, England, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Spain
and Portugal. All visits were received with honour and were successful.
Three monarchs paid return visits including Russia, Germany, and Italy
and alliances were strengthened.96

Collective memory of the tour is strengthened by a healthy genre of books

and articles chronicling the 1897 trip and explaining its importance. Some
seek to interpret its significance. For example, Krairoek Nana’s Behind
Chulalongkorn’s Travel to Europe: The Politics “Beyond Dynastic History” of
Rama V dissects the background to Chulalongkorn’s trip and aims to ensure
readers understand its political implications.97 Krairoek’s book stresses the
importance of the visit to Russia as reflecting Chulalongkorn’s view that
“if he persuaded Russia to be an ally, Russia as an ally with France could
be a mediator (khon klang) in solving various problems that Siam had with
France.”98 Public relations academic Dr Napawan Tantivejakul, in her article
‘National Image Construction for the First Royal Visit to Europe of King
Rama V Chulalongkorn,’ argued that the visit “helped build the good impres-
sion about Siam in the eyes of European stakeholders and led to the nation’s
sovereignty.”99 Cremations volumes, issued for those attending the crema-
tion rites of an eminent person, are another form of memorialisation. These,
sometimes contain Chulalongkorn’s prapart euro correspondence, as was the
case for the cremation volume of Thai professor Dusit Phanitphat.100
Physical memorials to the prapart euro can be found in Europe itself.
During the 1897 tour, Chulalongkorn had, at the suggestion of his host
Sweden’s King Oscar II, travelled to various parts of Sweden outside the cap-
ital. Fifty years later a dusty road on which Chulalongkorn’s entourage had
travelled was renamed King Chulalongkorn’s Road (Kung Chulalongkorns
väg) in his honour. In 1992 a Thai dance group visiting a remote town Sweden
discovered the road. They initiated the building of a memorial in the shape of
a traditional Thai pavilion (sala). A committee of Swedish and Thai members
raised funds and opened the building on 19 July 1998, the 101st anniversary
of Chulalongkorn’s visit.101
46 Thailand and the Great Powers

Russia: sentimental friends

The post–​Cold War era has seen a significant rehabilitation of Russia’s image
for Thais. Vladimir Putin visited Thailand in 2003, and Queen Sirikit sub-
sequently returned the favour with a visit to Russia in 2007. Russian Prime
Minister Medvedev visited Thailand in 2015.
This is in sharp contrast to the final phase of the Cold War when Thais felt
very apprehensive about the Soviet Union, and its sponsorship of Vietnam.
At that time, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila warned that

For the first time since the tsarist fleet met with defeat at the hands of the
Japanese fleet during the Russo-​Japanese war, Russian naval ships have
re-​established their presence in the South China Sea posing challenges to
the US bases in the Philippines and threats to the supply lines through the
Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai/​Wetar straits.102

After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, Thais were concerned about

the USD$1 billion Vietnam was receiving from the Soviet Union annually,
and that the Soviet Union would provide advanced fighters and SAM 7-​B
ground to air missiles to the Vietnamese.103 In his 1983 survey of Thai elite
national security perspectives, Kramol Tongdhammachart found that the
USSR, alongside China and Vietnam, was rated the highest threat for polit-
ical subversion.104
With the end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
Thailand rapidly reassessed its posture towards Russia. Foreign Minister
Prasong of the first Chuan administration noted the ascendancy of liberal
economics and democracy following the dissolution of communism and
the Soviet Union, calling “ideological and military conflict” a thing of the
past.105
The door was left open for a reconstruction of the memory of Russia. And
this was undertaken vigorously, drawing strongly on royalist-​nationalism and
the memory of Chulalongkorn’s 1897 visit to Europe and his meeting with
Tsar Nicholas II. In 2012 Raymond interviewed a mid-​level officer of the Thai
armed forces who said that “When France and England came and tried to use
their force … we have our allies just like Russia in that day Tsar Nicholas. Our
princes graduated from Russian military colleges. So that’s why Russia sent
troops to help us.” This statement implies a conviction that Russia helped
Thailand in a time of need, although exactly how is unclear. There is no evi-
dence that Russia provided troops.
There is, however, a prima facie case that the personal relationship of
Chulalongkorn and Tsar Nicholas may have helped Siam gain greater
acceptance as a member of the global community and helped in managing
its relationship with France. This question and others were addressed in some
detail in 2007, when the Royal Thai Embassy in Russia published a volume in
English titled From Your Friend: 110 Years of Relations between Thailand and
 Thailand and the Great Powers 47
Russia. The phrase “From Your Friend” in the title of the book was taken from
the phrase written on the cigarette case given by Nicholas to Chulalongkorn
as a token of friendship. Accordingly, the theme of the collection of essays is
the value of sentiment in international relations. The epilogue closes with the
conclusion that:

The emergence of Imperial Russia as a “protector” of Siam apparently

caught both Britain and France by surprise. The two superpowers clearly
miscalculated the diplomatic skill of king Chulalongkorn in his effort
to secure the support of Imperial Russia. By basing their calculations
solely on real terms, the two superpowers apparently neglected the “sen-
timental” value which both Imperial Russia and Siam evidently attached
considerable importance to.106

Noranit Setabutr’s essay in the volume answers the self-​posed question, “Is
it true that the visit to Russia by Chulalongkorn in 1897 was highly signifi-
cant for Thai security?”107 It provides a detailed account of the Russia-​Siam
diplomacy that has been subsequently mythologised and which now forms a
large part of the Russian site of memory. From the Thai perspective, three
clear advantages accrued from the Chulalongkorn visit. First, it is thought
that Tsar Nicholas exerted some influence in inducing the French govern-
ment to accept a visit from Chulalongkorn in 1897, allowing him to present
his case directly on several of the border issues that continued to plague
Franco-​ Siamese relations. Secondly, it established diplomatic relations,
allowing Russian official representation in Thailand. With Russia seeking to
play the Great Game in the Far East, it may have been beneficial to have
Russia seeking to reduce French and British influence. Thirdly, the visit
allowed Chulalongkorn to dispel the view common in the European press,
according to Chulalongkorn’s adviser Rolin-​Jacquemyns, that Thailand was a
“[b]ackward and uncivilised nation that is being governed by a tyrannic eastern
head of state.”108 Nonetheless, from an objective perspective, it remains the
case that the factor most favourable to Thai security and sovereignty was the
1896 Anglo-​French Treaty, negotiated bilaterally between France and Britain
with no Thais present.
Perhaps just as importantly, the volume, composed in the last decade
of the reign of King Bhumibol, as Thailand’s royalism reached a fevered
pitch, was also a fervent tribute to the role of the Chakri dynasty in ensuring
Thailand’s security. In his foreword, Ambassador Sorayouth Prompoj’
wrote that although the book was not intended to be a eulogy to King
Chulalongkorn, it was

really most fortunate for the Thai people to have been born in the realm
of the Chakri kings whose immense benevolence and ability steered the
country clear of the turmoil of colonialism while its independence has
been continuously preserved right to the present.109
48 Thailand and the Great Powers
Written just a year after the 2006 coup, with contributions from Privy
Councillor MR Thep Devakul and junta-​appointed chair of the Constitution
Drafting Assembly Noranit Setabutr, the book’s assessment of Russia’s place
in Thai foreign policy can be read as a royalist polemic against the dangers of
democracy. This is suggested in Sorayouth’s comment that:

The threat toward the independence of and sovereignty of small countries

nowadays no longer has to do with defending territory such as during the
age of imperialism. Rather, the threat comes in the form of political, eco-
nomic and social exploitation in the name of globalization. Western-​style
democracy which fuels ideological struggle and economic competition as
well as the race for economic supremacy represents real challenges and tests
whether Thailand can withstand the force of changes in the globalized world
with pride and dignity in the same impressive way that past Thai monarchs
[have] pursued shrewd foreign polices during the era of colonialism. (italics
added)110

In recent years, interest in Russia and Thai royals has intensified with the
publication of several books, recalling not only Chulalongkorn’s relations
with his counterpart Tsar Nicholas, but also the time of his son Prince
Chakrabongse at the Tsar’s court. That Chulalongkorn’s son was sent to
the Russian court was recalled by several of our interviewees. While there,
Prince Chakrabongse, much to the disappointment of his father, had eloped
to marry Russian woman Ekaterina Desnitskaya. In 2017 the granddaughter
of Prince Chakrabongse and his Russian bride published the letters between
Chulalongkorn and his son.111 The book shed more light on a favourite sub-
ject, Chulalongkorn’s visit to Russia in 1897. Today’s nostalgia binge is seen
as a useful legitimation of Thailand’s policy of strengthening relations with
an authoritarian major power. Thai relations with Russia help Thailand defy
criticism of its coups and military regime.112

India: a very distant source of culture

The relationship between India and Thailand is both obvious and obscure.
On the one hand, elements of Indian culture are omnipresent in Thailand: in
the garuda mythical bird symbol adorning Thai passports and government
crests (known as the krut in Thai), the Ramayana story (Ramakien) in clas-
sical Thai theatre and dance, temple architecture and royal court ritual. The
modern Thai language is replete with neologisms which use Pali or Sanskrit
roots. At the same time, the Thai site of memory for the modern nation
state India is thinly populated and even tainted by overtones of racism.
Understanding this paradox takes us into the construction of Thainess
and Siam’s nineteenth-​century transition from a diffuse eastern geocultural
space overlaid with both Indic and Sinic influences, to a Westernised
geocultural space.
 Thailand and the Great Powers 49
Current geopolitical and liberal economic imaginings of India reveal little
of this puzzle. For contemporary Thai security planners, India is a new pole in
the multipolar distribution of global power, placing it in a category of Great
Power requiring special handling.113 Anand Panyarachun advised that “Peace
and stability in Asia can be underwritten by three major powers. China, Japan
and India.”114 For Thai economists, India is, as a low-​cost labour country of
huge market potential, both a threat and an opportunity.115 But lofty strategic
goals can be realised only through flesh and blood contacts –​and building
a special relationship, especially in the security domain, has not been easy.
In fact, Thailand notably lags other Southeast Asian countries in developing
closer relations with India. Seven of ten ASEAN countries signed a defence
cooperation memorandum of understanding with India before Thailand did
in 2012.116 Singapore and Malaysia have comprehensive economic agreements
with India, but Thailand only has its agreement to pursue a free trade
agreement, a document signed in 2004.117 While India seeing Thailand as part
of China’s sphere of influence may have posed an obstacle, Thailand’s site of
memory for India is also problematic.
The Cold War did not help relations. In 1997, while trying to understand
India and Thailand’s insubstantial links after 50 years of diplomatic relations,
a columnist noted that Thailand and India occupied different camps during
the Cold War, Thailand as a US ally, India as a friend of the Soviet Union.118
In the same year another noted that India’s recognition of the Vietnam-​
installed Heng Samrin government in Cambodia after Vietnam’s invasion
incurred Thailand’s displeasure.119 They cited Prime Minister Chatchai, the
first Thai prime minister to visit India (in 1989), as admitting that the Indian
and Thai people had little knowledge and understanding of each other. The
writer concluded with exhortations for India and Thailand to do more to
grow their economic relationship, building on the “Look East” policy of
India and the “Look West” policy of Thailand.
But this twentieth-​ century geopolitical discourse does not explain
the cultural paradox of simultaneous distance and proximity. There is a
vague memory that India and Thailand share some cultural roots. Our
interviewees recognised that India was the birthplace of Buddhism, that
there was a religious connection. But this cultural connection does not
produce much sense of fraternity. A National Security Council official,
who meets regularly with his Indian counterparts to discuss terrorism and
transnational crime, downplayed the importance of cultural links between
India and Thailand.120 A former senior diplomat was less generous, and
indeed, verging on racist:

Thais don’t want to open their hotels to Indians, it’s not worth it, once
the Indians leave, they must redo the rooms again. Its commonly said, it
costs us too much. So that’s that cultural thing, although we took almost
everything from India, culture, religion, names, but it’s the old India not
the new India.121
50 Thailand and the Great Powers
The cultural relationship between India and Thailand is thought to have
originated via the Mon and Khmer kingdoms, and via South Asians moving
along the Indian Ocean trade routes from as early as the sixth century. Thai
kings gained their Brahmanic rituals, court uniforms and dress from Indian
culture while the planning of the city of Ayutthaya was modelled on Indian
cosmology.122 Western cultural historians, later describing the process of cul-
tural diffusion, differed in the extent to which they saw Southeast Asian soci-
eties as mere ciphers of their more powerful neighbours, or whether they saw
Southeast Asians exercising significant agency in adapting Indian art, ritual
and architecture.123 There is more agreement amongst scholars of Thailand
that the construction of Thainess in the early twentieth century, pioneered
especially by historian Damrong Rajanuphab, fostered a widespread view that
Thais, as well as loving independence and being peaceful, were gifted in their
capacity to assimilate from others.124
A journey away from a positive view of Indian culture began with Siam’s
move into the European geocultural world, and like Thailand’s memory of
Europe, was greatly influenced by Chulalongkorn’s travels abroad. As Patmon
Panchawinin wrote in 2017, Chulalongkorn’s 1872 trip to India showed that
Siam was in the “process of changing, via a plan of advancement, from
eastern to western” (sayam yu nai krabuankan plian phan baep phaen khwam
charoen chak tawanok ma pen tawan tok).125
Chulalongkorn spent three months travelling in India with a large ret-
inue. India, especially Calcutta, was for Siam in the late nineteenth century,
like Singapore, a window into the modern world. Siamese elites saw, for the
first time, aspects of what ‘being civilised’ meant from a Western perspec-
tive: museums, libraries, botanical gardens and so on.126 While the 1897
Europe trip is better known, Chulalongkorn may have learnt more about
administration and government from his 1872 visit to India, Burma and
Singapore. According to Charnvit Kasetsiri, even his idea of a Council of
State or Privy Council may have come from the Indian trip.127 The Council of
State was a key administrative reform which strengthened the absolute mon-
archy, paving the way for further modernisation and strengthening of Siam as
a nation state.128
India was also a place where Thailand, through Chulalongkorn, could
emphasise its difference, rather than its similarity to India. These trips were
amongst the first in which a Thai king distributed images of himself to the
public. The photographs from the trip to India showed Chulalongkorn in
Western dress.129 As a consequence the English-​language newspapers in India
described Chulalongkorn as wearing clothes ‘very like an English gentlemen’s
morning dress.’ The English official, Edward Bosc Sladen, who accompanied
Chulalongkorn on his trip, later wrote that:

the King and all the Siamese Officers with him, dressed and otherwise
deported themselves very much in the European style. It was easy there-
fore to provide for their entertainment throughout the tour of India, by
 Thailand and the Great Powers 51
means which brought them into more intimate domestic relationship
with us, than would otherwise have been possible, had they been in the
slightest degree trammeled by native caste prejudices, or the restrictions
imposed by an enforced regard for oriental observances.130

Indeed, when meeting Indians princes, Chulalongkorn reportedly “could not

help viewing with something akin to pity and ridicule, the conservatism of
native dependent states which aped to preserve the magnificence of bye-​gone
days without regarding the progress of western civilization.”131
Today neither country makes mention of the complex relations of the
colonial period in their official bilateral relations, preferring to draw a
straight line from an ancient time of shared religious and cultural ties to
the establishing of diplomatic relations after India’s independence in 1947.132
This is likely because there are aspects uncomfortable for both in the colonial
period. After Chulalongkorn’s reign, Vajiravudh placed relations with British
authorities well ahead of the interests of Indians. After the First World War
the British ambassador in Bangkok praised the cooperation of the Thai king
in taking measures to suppress “Indian sedition in Siam” including through
the “arrest and deportation of the principal Indian malefactors.”133 After the
1932 revolution and especially during the Second World War, the govern-
ment of Phibun Songkram reversed this policy and instead sought to support
Indian revolutionary movements.134 Many Indians resident in Thailand were
encouraged to join the Indian National Army (INA). Thai soil was used to
train and supply the INA. Indian nationalists invoked Thai-​and-​Indian-​
shared Hindu-​Buddhist heritage. Today Thai scholars mention the cooper-
ation as being significant but imply it was conducted under duress.135
Today the India-​Thailand relationship is strongly forward looking, pro-
pelled by convergent geostrategic and economic incentives, and in its post–​
Cold War reorientation Thailand sees India as part of its plan for turning
‘battlefields into marketplaces.’ Though India’s markets so far remain difficult
to prise open, there is a shared interest in establishing east-​west transport
connectivity through Myanmar. Thailand naturally sees these as important
to balance the strong push from China to open north-​south connectivity.
Intersecting policy initiatives (Look East, Look West) and new multilat-
eral groupings (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation [BIMSTEC], India-​Mekong) provide momentum and
a sense of anticipation. Shared maritime borders and some commonalities in
countering insurgency foster maritime and counterterrorism cooperation.
With all this evident desire for closer relations, there has been some sig-
nificant effort to promote the relationship, including through royal visits.
Princess Sirindhorn has visited India some extraordinary 19 times while
other princesses have also visited. The current Thai king visited in 2010,
when crown prince, flying a Thai airlines flight carrying his immediate
family members and 120 Thai Buddhists to Bodh Gaya, the site of Buddha’s
enlightenment.136
52 Thailand and the Great Powers
But India-​Thai relations still lack a firm bedrock of shared memory,
especially at community levels. Shared anti-​colonialism is difficult to invoke
for Thailand because it is associated with the now unacceptable Phibun
Songkram government, as well as all the complication of the collaboration
with Japan in the Second World War. Thai memory of India is therefore prone
to suffer from the prejudices of Thailand’s royalist-​nationalist history that
tends to place its neighbours, especially Burma, Cambodia and Laos, in a cat-
egory of less developed, unfortunate, and colonised nations. There is evidence
that mentally, the memorialisation of Chulalongkorn’s trip achieved a similar
result, placing India in a similar category, from which it has been hard to
break out. Thailand has wanted less rather than more cultural indebtedness
to India. It sought in the early twentieth century to overhaul the notions of
law that it inherited from India, in order to modernise and adapt to Western
demands.137 At the community levels of Thai society, the distance between
India and Thailand finds expression in the racism that Thais of Indian des-
cent sometimes experience.138

Japan: a manicured site of happy amnesia

Thawi Bunyaket, secretary to the Council of Ministers of the Phibun gov-
ernment, once said that 8 December 1941, the day Thailand acquiesced to
Japan’s invasion, “was one of the most important days in our history. It was
a day that every Thai had cause to regret, for it was the day on which the
independence and sovereignty of our nation was tarnished.”139 Thawi could
scarcely have been more wrong. Far from being remembered as an important
day, in today’s Thailand it is barely remembered at all. On the 70th anniver-
sary of the Second World War, former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun
said that the war “did not have much impact on Thailand.”140 When Raymond
presented a paper on Thai memory of the Second World War, one Thai audi-
ence member said that the reason for the muted remembrance was that “we
don’t give a shit.”
The reasons for this amnesia are complex. The narratives of Thai royalist-​
nationalist history, including its celebration of bamboo diplomacy, portray
the episode as flexibility winning the day.141 The clouded past of the resistance
movement, the Seri Thai, as pro-​democracy movement and nemesis of the
Thai army, prevents more than token celebration of their accomplishments.
This is in spite of Thai history books, which concede that their deeds prevented
harsh war reparations from the Allies, that might have even encompassed loss
of territory.142 Finally, there is the astute diplomacy of Japan itself, which
moved swiftly to pay reparations, offer aid and engineer a new memory scape
focusing on Thailand’s relations with Japan during the Ayutthaya period.
Consequently, Thailand’s Japan lieux de memoire is manicured and benign.
One interviewee described the Japanese as “tidy and polite,” “not chaotic”
and people who “have never tried to convert their economic influence into
political influence.”143 The site of memory is similarly unthreatening. The two
 Thailand and the Great Powers 53
most powerful components are the Ayutthaya site, marking the presence of
the Japanese as an important community in the ancient city in Ayutthaya, and
the Second World War site, the memory of Japan’s occupation of Thailand
from 1941 to 1945.
These two sites of memory are in fact deeply linked. In the wake of the
Second World War, the Japanese government embarked on a program of rec-
onciliation and reparation across Southeast Asia. The first step was resolution
of war reparations, which Japanese leaders saw as “an economic stepping
stone back into Southeast Asia” and a means of healing.144 An agreement
was signed in Tokyo in January 1962 awarding an outstanding 9.6 billion
yen.145 The fulfillment of reparations opened the door for expanding eco-
nomic relations in the form of credit loans, joint investments and the export
of Japanese capital goods and services to Thailand. From the mid-​1980s,
Japan provided as much as two-​thirds of Thailand’s overseas development
assistance.146
Part of the assistance aimed at celebrating the long shared history, espe-
cially in Ayutthaya. Japanese traders first settled in Ayutthaya during the reign
of King Naresuan (1590–1605), and commenced a rich history that included
a community of as many as 1,500 Japanese at its peak.147 An example of
Japanese efforts to preserve that historical memory is the founding of the
Ayutthaya Historical Study Centre. Proposed by the Bangkok Japanese
Chamber of Commerce, the Thai-​Japanese Association and Ayutthaya prov-
ince, the first idea was to celebrate the area where Japanese had settled by
establishing a Japanese Settlement Museum. Academics from both Japan and
Thailand adapted that idea and came up with Ayutthaya Historical Study
Centre. The Japanese government contributed 999 million Japanese yen.148
The project was completed in time to commemorate the 600th anniversary of
Thai-​Japanese relations in 1987 as well as King Bhumibol’s 60th birthday.149
The Thai-​ Japanese Association and Japanese Chamber of Commerce
remain active in promoting another feature of Ayutthaya’s history, the
Japanese village. In 2018 they funded the opening of a new Virtual Reality
Street Museum, which uses sophisticated graphics and movie technology
to depict the maritime trade that existed between Japan and Ayutthaya.150
This includes the role of Yamada Nagamasa, a Japanese merchant who rose
to fame in the seventeenth century during the reign of King Song Tham
(1610–1628), and who actively promoted Japanese Thai relations.151 Yamada
Nagamasa gained a great deal of attention in Thailand and Japan during the
period preceding the Second World War, when Japan began to be of greater
interest to Thailand. Thai-​ Japanese relations had dwindled after Japan
adopted a policy of isolation in 1633, but the new stronger Japan that had
emerged after the Meiji Restoration attracted Thailand’s attention, especially
after their victory over Russian naval forces in 1904. Yamada was then revived
in the 1930s and 1940s efforts to establish a history of cordial Japanese-​Thai
relations. It should also be noted that the seventeenth century saw conflict
between significant groups of Japanese resident in Siam and local forces.
54 Thailand and the Great Powers
In 1630 King Prasatthong (1629–1656) assembled a force of 4,000 Thais to
attack a powerful group of Japanese in Ayutthaya. They fled by boat to the
sea, killing 500 Thai soldiers in a bloody exit.152
Our interview cohort understood and appreciated these older connections
with Japan. We heard that “Sukhothai absorbed influence from China and
Japan, then Ayutthaya absorbed influence from Portugal, then Holland,
France.” The same interviewee commented on the respect from Japan,
“Japan and China and Korea from the past, they think of Thailand as a good
country as an advanced country, a civilised country.”153 Another recalled that
“Since the Ayutthaya period we had a Japanese regiment. Attached to the
Thai army.”
Much of the Thai Second World War Japan memory site has been
papered over. Unlike memorialisation of the First World War, there is no
Second World War memorial in Bangkok’s historic core where other key
religious and royal buildings are located. No traces have been left of the
presence of the occupying Japanese high command in Bangkok, who were
housed at the northeast corner of the royal square, Sanam Luang.154 There is
Victory Monument, but it celebrates Thailand’s seizure of Indochinese terri-
tory before the Japanese occupation, and has now become a site of memory
for all Thai military conflicts.155 Outside central Bangkok there are various
memorials which tell of the occupation, as well as the brief resistance that the
invading Japanese met in southern Thailand. The Seri Thai museum, which
doubles as a community library and opens only on special occasions, is to the
east. To the west there is a modest historical marker in Samut Prakan. Small
statues of defending soldiers, erected during the Phibun era, can be found at
the southern provinces of Prachuap Khiri Khan and Nakorn Sri Thammarat.
Both are sites of local annual commemorative ceremonies. There are some
Seri Thai sites of memorial in northeastern Thailand. In northern Thailand
there is a Japanese war memorial in Mae Hong Son province.156 In sum, these
sites are located in out of the way places and are not always well maintained.
The absence of a Second World War national day or a Second World War
monument associated with the Thai monarchy leaves the Second World War
detached from Thai nationalism, and the Japanese largely untarnished as his-
toric adversaries. Into that void have come a range of common rationalisations
of what happened, including why Japan is not seen as an enemy, why Phibun
Songkram chose to collaborate, and why the war left little impact. Our
interviewees mentioned some of these, including that Thailand was treated
better than other occupied countries, that there was no point in fighting
against the stronger Japanese, and that the Japanese were only on their way
to Burma. Most fascinatingly, they reiterated that Thais have popularly seen
the Second World War occupation through the lens of romance novels and
especially Khu Kam (Destiny Couple). This novel describes the Japanese sol-
dier hero Kobori helping his Thai lover find shelter from the Allied air raids.157
One interviewee told us that despite the invasion “Thai people didn’t hate the
 Thailand and the Great Powers 55
Japanese people at all, it ended up as a lovely story, with an affair with a Thai
lady.” Another stated that:

even though the Japanese invaded Thailand, and at that time we were
not happy to have Japanese troops on Thai soil, we forget it. Let bygones
be bygones. We’re still thinking about the Thai drama, the love story, the
Japanese soldier and the Thai lady, in the village, it’s still like a soap opera
during that period like “The King and I.”158

In sum, the Japanese, unlike the Burmese or French, have not been demonised
through nationalist history. For their part the Japanese have not squandered
the opportunity of Thai forgiveness. On the contrary, Japan has been adept in
its diplomacy to build good relations. Japan became a major aid donor in the
1980s and Thailand benefited from this aid, using the funds for critical infra-
structure development. Japan was also Thailand’s biggest foreign investor.
Officials meet regularly and Japanese officials play advisery roles with Thai
economic agencies.159 The Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand and
its website is one contemporary example of public relations excellence. Its
YouTube video tells us of a 600-​year-​old relationship between Thailand and
Japan spanning respective monarchies, diplomacy, culture and business (mai
wa ja pen khwamsampan an diao ratchawang khwamsampan thangkanthut
watthanatham settha kit lae kan kha).160 It also advises the startling statistic
that 60% of foreign businesses in Thailand are Japanese. Tej Bunnag, when
asked, stated that:

We have had very close relations with Japan. We admired them, and they
were our model in Asia. The Thai Red Cross society is the second oldest
Red Cross Society in Asia, after Japan. Much of our set up was modelled
after the Japanese Red Cross, after Prince Vajiravudh’s visit to Japan in
1902. That’s why we have our own hospital, that’s why we have our own
College of Nursing, the same as the Japanese Red Cross. The Royal fam-
ilies are very close, the Japanese Red Cross is run by Prince Konoe, whose
father was the Prime Minister before the war. He’s considered as an inner
member of the royal family of Japan. Whenever he’s here he calls on our
patrons, our executive, our Vice President.

This untroubled site of memory, and the years of largely healthy economic
ties, will provide scope for building the security relationship in future years.
Our interviewees expressed strong interest in this, mentioning that limitations
in building cooperation has been largely from the Japanese side. They are
aware of Japan’s reinterpretation of its constitution, and have noted that
Japan’s presence in Thai defence trade shows has become more prominent
and energised. They are expecting future cooperation to build in areas such as
maritime security and technology.
56 Thailand and the Great Powers

Conclusion
In the wake of the 2014 coup, the French Ambassador Thierry Viteau was
departing. He held a function at his Embassy inviting Thais from across the
political spectrum, from the Privy Council to members of the nitirat group of
pro-​democracy activists. The event was an opportunity for France to commu-
nicate its dissatisfaction at the turn of events. In the middle of the room the
ambassador organised for an ice feature displaying Voltaire’s statement on
the Rights of Man and Citizens passed by the French parliament in 1789. The
ambassador’s speech referred to France’s belief, since the Revolution, that
democracy and human rights belong to all humankind. The article describing
the event concluded drily that “the coup critics who attended the party on
Monday may have to wait until another foreign-​organised function is held to
find an excuse to ‘whine’ and dine away from the watchful eyes of the military
power holders.”161
The idea of Great Powers in Thai imagination began with nineteenth-​
century Thai kings managing relations with the European states who
could defeat Burma and China. The construction of the dramatic reign of
Chulalongkorn, ironically rendered most powerfully through the nationalism
of the revolutionaries who ended absolute monarchy, continues to provide
the substance for the European sites of memory. Chulalongkorn’s personal
anguish during the Pak Nam Crisis recalls the French wolf and the Siamese
lamb, while his tour of Europe displayed his overcoming of doubt to prevail
in a display of morals and manners. His preservation of Thailand’s sover-
eignty leaves an emotional scar as well as a strategic legacy. This is the view
that Thai security is best guaranteed by maintaining relations with multiple
Great Powers, encouraging them to compete amongst themselves and to
balance each other’s influence.
Today memory of Europe provides a resource for Thailand’s regime to
combat intrusive or uncomfortable demands for democratisation. This is
because Thailand’s sites of memory and narratives for Europe bring together
themes of past colonial coercion and current political discord in a way that
subtly maintains the image of Western Europe as an oppressor and the phe-
nomenon of Occidentalism as a continuing dynamic in Thai-​Western relations.
As Thailand has experienced democratic regression since 2006, so has the
Occidentalist impulse to reject criticism from Western countries strengthened.
The exception has been Russia, where more happily, Thailand has found a
convenient synergy between its current warming ties with an authoritarian
Great Power, and its nostalgia for the friendship between Chulalongkorn and
Nicholas II. There is also nostalgia for Britain, its manners and its language,
but also contentment that it no longer commands respect or obedience.
In the case of Thailand’s regional neighbours, memory is more neutral
with respect to domestic political dynamics, but it is still an active factor,
constraining in the case of India, facilitating in the case of Japan. As Thailand’s
strategic environment is now populated by Asian giants, Thailand seeks to
 Thailand and the Great Powers 57
apply Chulalongkorn’s strategic logic locally, by building stronger relations
with India and Japan. The respective sites of memory and identity for each
suggest that this will be more easily achieved with Japan than India. Despite
the shared ancient cultural and religious heritage, India is less familiar. The
recollection of the colonial period is not conducive to relations, as the shared
anti-​colonialism too is associated with Phibun, while Chulalongkorn’s visit to
India was an exercise in ingratiating himself with the government of British
India, including by differentiating himself from the local Indian leaders.
Then the Cold War froze contact. Now, while the will for greater cooper-
ation exists on both sides, the path is not comfortable, even with the efforts
of Princess Sirindhorn to change the place of India in the Thai imagination.
Japan, through both the amnesiac sleight of hand of Thai nationalist history
and domestic politics, and its own well-​crafted post–​Second World War aid
policy, has largely escaped any lingering bitterness from its invasion and occu-
pation. Realising the importance of history and memory as a critical adjunct
to investment and industry, Japan has invested in Ayutthaya as an historic
site demonstrating long-​standing ties. The future is open for strengthening
security cooperation, at a pace that is comfortable for Japan.
Strengthened relations with India and Japan would help realise the vision
of future Asian security expounded by Anand Panyarachun (see Chapter 2),
as the United States continues to decline in relative material power. This
decline in relative importance is at the same time accompanied by turbulence
at the level of identity and values. This is the backdrop to the next chapter,
which explores the Thai memory of its alliance with the greatest Great Power
of the twentieth century, the United States.

Notes
1 ‘The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb’ was a poem published in Punch,
lampooning France’s coercive designs on Siam. Punch or the London Charivale, 5
August 1893. p. 54.
2 ‘Thai-​France Diplomatic Ties Reach 160 Years’, The Nation, 3 March 2017,
accessed at www.nationthailand.com/​national/​30307901 on 16 March 2020.
3 Dr Sompong Chumark, ‘Thailand’s Policy Concerning Border-​Line Problems
with Neighbouring States’, นโยบายของไทยต่อปัญหาพรมแดนกับประเทศเพื่อนบ้าน, Research
Report, Chulalongkorn University, 1989.
4 ‘Visit the Trat Remembers Festival Commemorating 111 Years since the Province
of Trat Declared Its Independence’, เที่ยวงาน “ตราดรำ�ลึก” ครบรอบ ๑๑๑ ปี หวนรำ�ลึก …
วันประกาศอิสรภาพจังหวัดตราด, Designated Areas for Sustainable Tourism, accessed at
https://​tis.dasta.or.th/​dastatravel/​trat-​memorial-​day111/​ on 16 March 2020.
5 ‘EU under Fire after Lifting Threat to Ban Thai Seafood Imports over Illegal
Fishing’, The Guardian, 10 January 2019 accessed at www.theguardian.com/​
environment/​2019/​jan/​10/​eu-​under-​fire-​after-​lifting-​threat-​to-​ban-​thai-​seafood-​
imports-​over-​illegal-​fishing on 30 June 2020.
6 For discussion of the prevalence of anecdotes and representations of Rama V
and Rama IX in contemporary Thailand see Irene Stengs, Worshipping the
58 Thailand and the Great Powers
Great Moderniser: King Chulalongkorn, Patron Saint of the Thai Middle Class
(Singapore and Seattle: NUS Press with University of Washington Press, 2009);
Thongchai Winichakul, ‘Thailand’s Hyper-​Royalism: Its Past Success and Present
Predicament’, Trends in Southeast Asia no. 7 2016, ISEAS.
7 Strate, The Lost Territories, p. 16.
8 Out of the total sample of over 1,784 respondents, the median value for external
threats from Great Powers was placed at 8.00 compared with 6.00 for neighbouring
countries (where 10 was a rating of maximum significance and 1 a rating of least
significance). As previously stated, these results were statistically significant. For
mean and median results see Table A.3, Annexure.
9 Kramol Tongdhammachart, Kusuma Snitwongse, Sarasin Viraphol, Arong
Suthasasna, Wiwat Mungkandi and Sukhumband Paribatra., ‘Thai Elite’s National
Security Perspectives: Implications for Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn
University, 1983), p. 19.
10 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th ed.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 196.
11 Torbjorn Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 3rd ed.
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 232.
12 Benjamin Zala, ‘Great Power Management and Ambiguous Order in Nineteenth-​
Century International Society’, Review of International Studies 43, no. 2 (2017),
p. 372, doi:10.1017/​S0260210516000292.
13 Narathippraphanphong-​Wonwan Foundation, วิทยทัศน์พระองค์วรรณฯ ครบ ๑๑๐ ปี
วันประสูติ ๒๕ สิงหาคม ๒๕๔๔, The Vision of Prince Wan: 110 Year Anniversary of His
Birth (Bangkok: Text and Journal, 2001), p. 312.
14 Ibid., p. 117.
15 เรียกประเทศที่มีพลังทางด้านเศรษฐกิจหรือทางทหารสูง ว่า ประเทศมหาอำ�นาจ. Royal Institute
Online Dictionary, accessed at www.royin.go.th/​dictionary/​index.php on 15
January 2019.
16 Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘Asian Perspectives of the Evolution of International
Law: Thailand’s Experience at the Threshold of the Third Millennium’, Chinese
Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (2002), pp. 527–​554.
17 Ibid., pp. 527–​554.
18 Anthony Farrington and Dhirawat na Pombejra, The English Factory in Siam
1612–​1685 (London: British Library, 2007), p. 1.
19 Walter F. Vella, Siam under Rama III: 1824–​1851 (Locust Valley, NY: J.J. Augustin
Incorporated, 1960), p. 116.
20 Ibid., p. 120.
21 Winai Pongsripian and Theera Nuchpiam (eds.), Writings of King Mongkut to
Sir John Bowring (AD 1855–​ 1868) (Bangkok: Khana Kammakan Chamra
Prawattisat Thai lae Chatphim Ekkasan thang Prawattisat lae Borannakhadi,
1994), pp. 43, 69.
22 Battye, ‘Military, Government and Society’, p. 260.
23 ระราชดำ�รัสในพระบาทสมเด็จพระจุลจอมเกล้าเจ้าอยู่หัว (ตั้งแต่ พ.ศ.๒๔๑๗ถึงพ.ศ. ๒๔๕๓) Speech
On the Occasion of the Presentation of Equine Statue, 11 November, 1908
in Speeches of King Chulalongkorn 1874–​ 1910, Cremation Volume, Wat
Thepsirinsrawart, Bangkok, 25 June 1988, pp. 52, 227–​228.
24 Ibid., 227–​228.
 Thailand and the Great Powers 59
25 Neil A. Englehart, ‘Representing Civilization: Solidarism, Ornamentalism,
and Siam’s Entry into International Society’, European Journal of International
Relations 16, no. 3, March 2010, p. 425.
26 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, ‘The Global Transformation: The Nineteenth
Century and the Making of Modern International Relations’, International
Studies Quarterly , 57, Issue 3, (September 2013), pp. 57, 628.
27 NA, R6, T, 15.3/​1, Phraratcha damrat notra thinang anantotmakhom, 26 April 1918.
28 Lydia H. Liu, ‘The Desire for the Sovereign and the Logic of Reciprocity in the
Family of Nations’, Diacritics 29, no. 4 (Winter 1999/​2000), p. 169.
29 British Library, India Office, L/​PS/​10/​97, memorandum by Mr Paget respecting
Anglo-​Siamese Treaty negotiations, 13 April.
30 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilisation in International Society
(Offord: Clarendon Press, 1984).
31 The Cloud accessed at https://​readthecloud.co/​about/​ on 11 March 2020.
32 ‘La Tour Eiffel’, The Cloud, 16 July 2018 accessed at https://​readthecloud.co/​
notenation-​la-​tour-​eiffel/​ on 13 March 2020.
33 Raymond visits on 11 February 2018. Tips puts the fatalities of the 13 July skirmish
considerably higher, at six French and 61 Siamese casualties, including 31 dead.
Walter E. J. Tips, Siam’s Struggle for Survival: The Gunboat Incident at Paknam and
the Franco-​Siamese Treaty of October 1893 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996), p. 84.
The consequent Franco-​Siamese Treaty and Convention of October 1893 resulted
in the loss of territory on the east side of the Mekong, a 25 km demilitarised zone
along the west side of the Mekong stretching from Luang Prabang to Cambodia,
a fine and French occupation of the port town of Chantabun.
34 Raymond, Thai Military Power, pp. 43–​61.
35 Special Address by Dr Surakiart Sathirathai, รำ�ลึก ๑๐๐ ปี ปิยมหาราชานุสรณ์ บทเรีย
นความอยู่รอดของชาติท่ามกลามความขัดแย้ง, Ramluek roipi piyomharachanuson botrian
khwamyurot khong chati thamklang khwamkhatyaeng, ‘Remembering 100 Years
of Commemorating the Lessons of National Survival Amidst Conflict’, sem-
inar report from seminar held by the Royal Thai Navy, Department of Fine
Arts, Matichon Limited and the มูลนิธิพระบรมราชานุสาวรีย์รัชกาลที่๕ป้อมพระจุลจอมเกล้า,
Phra Chulachomklao Fort Rama V Monument Foundation Seminar held on 19
October 2010 at Royal Thai Navy Headquarters.
36 Ibid., pp. 18–​19.
37 Gong, Standard of Civilisation.
38 Englehart, ‘Representing Civilization’, p. 426.
39 Gregory V. Raymond, ‘War as Membership: International Society and Thailand’s
Participation in the First World War’, Asian Studies Review, 2019, doi:10.1080/​
10357823.2018.1548570, p. 9.
40 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1995),
p. 160. Charnvit Kasetsiri, ลัทธิชาตินียมไทย: สยามกับกัมพูชาและกรณีปราสาทเขา พระวิหาร,
Siamese/​Thai Nationalism and Cambodia: A Case Study of the Preah Vihear
Temple (Bangkok: Toyota Thailand Foundation/​Foundation for the Promotion
of Social Science and Humanities Textbook Project), p. 10; Strate, The Lost
Territories, p. 122.
41 Volkan, Bloodlines.
42 Yanara Schmacks, ‘Vamik’s Room by Molly Castelloe’ (2019; 59 minutes),
doi:10.3366/​pah.2019.0318, Psychoanalysis and History 21, no. 3 (2019),
pp. 389–​391.
60 Thailand and the Great Powers
43 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-​Imperial Ideology and Foreign
Policy in India and China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
44 Strate, The Lost Territories, p. 42.
45 Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism
(Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 117–​119.
46 Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, Thailand’s Case (Bangkok: Thai Commercial Press
1941), 2–​3.
47 Directorate of Education and Research, ประวัติกองทับไทยในรอบ๒๐๐ปี พ.ศ.๒๓๒๕–​
๒๕๒๕, Royal Thai Armed Forces, History of the Thai Armed Forces in 200 Years
B.E. 2325–​2525 [AD 1782–​1982] (Bangkok:Supreme Command Headquarters,
1982), p. 264.
48 Kenneth Perry Landon, ‘Thailand’s Quarrel with France in Perspective’, The Far
Eastern Quarterly 1, no. 1 (November 1941), p. 25.
49 Strate, The Lost Territories, pp. 136–​146.
50 Counter-​ Memorial of the Royal Government of Thailand, 29 September
1961, Written Proceedings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
International Court of Justice, accessed at www.icj-​cij.org/​public/​files/​case-​related/​
45/​9253.pdf on 15 February 2021, p. 170.
51 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits,
Judgment of 15 June 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962.
52 ‘Prince Damrong: An Illustrious Life’, Thailand Tatler, June 2012, p. 145.
53 ปัญหาปราสาทพระวีหาร.., ‘The Prasart Pra Phra Viharn Problem …’, Kom Chat Luek,
7 August 2010, p. 4.
54 ‘Preah Vihear: Shrine to Nationalism’, Bangkok Post, 26 June 2010, pp. 6–​7.
55 Ror Sor 112 translates as the 112th year of the Rattanakosin era, the year in which
the Pak Nam crisis occurred.
56 Suwit Thirasasawat, เบื้องลึกการเสียดินแดนและปัญหาปราสาทพระวิหารจากร.ศ.112ถึงปัจจุบัน,
The Background of the Loss of Territory and Problem of Prasart Pra Phra Viharn
from Ror Sor 112 until the Present (Bangkok: Historical Society, 2010); เบื้องลึก
‘Deep Background’, Matichon, 6 June, 2010.
57 เอาปราสาทพระวิหารคืนไปเอาปัจจันตขิรเี ขตรคืนมา, ‘Take back Prasart Phra Viharn, Take
Back Bajjankirikhet’, Kom Chat Luek, 1 August 2010. According to historian Strate,
the practice of tattooing the word ‘Trat’, the name of the eastern Thai province that
was occupied by France under the terms of the 1893 Pak Nam conflict settlement, is
an entirely “fabricated legacy” from the pen of Luang Vichit Wathakan.
58 Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011, p. 555 .
For detailed accounts of the conflict see Chapter 7, Raymond, Thai Military Power,
pp. 184–​221; Puangthong R. Pawakapan, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand
at the Temple of Preah Vihear (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2013). Martin Wagener, ‘Lessons from Preah Vihear: Thailand, Cambodia, and
the Nature of Low-​Intensity Border Conflicts’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian
Affairs 30, no. 3 (2011), pp. 27–​59; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘Diplomacy under
Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy’, Contemporary
Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (December 2009), pp. 447–​467.
59 Kitiarsa, ‘Farang as Siamese Occidentalism’, pp. 10–​12.
60 See, for example, Surin Pitsuwan, ‘The Relative Importance of External and
Internal Factors’, in Cavan Hogue (ed.), The Development of Thai Democracy
 Thailand and the Great Powers 61
since 1973: Proceedings of the Thai Update 2003 (Canberra: Australian National
University, 2003), 29–​30 April 2003.
61 Patrick Jory, Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy: The Vessantara Jataka and the Idea
of the Perfect Man (New York: State University of New York Press, 2016), p. 129.
62 Thongchai Winichikul, ‘Conceptualizing Thai-​Self under Royalist Provincialism’,
Opening Keynote Address, at the 12th International Conference of Thai Studies,
University of Sydney, Australia, 22 April 2014.
63 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘The Quest for “Siwilai”: A Geographical Discourse of
Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-​ Century
Siam’, The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (August 2000), pp. 528–​549; Pavin
Chachavalpongpun, Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-​ Burmese
Relations (Maryland: University Press of America, 2005).
64 Pattana, ‘Farang as Siamese Occidentalism’, p. 5.
65 Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the
Remaking of Asia (London: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 113.
66 Ibid., p. 226.
67 Ibid., pp. 213–​215.
68 Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians Think? (Singapore: Marshall Cavandish, 2004).
69 บันทึกความทรงจำ�สถานทูตอังกฤษก่อนย้ายสู่สถานที่ใหม่, New TV undated www.newtv.co.th/​
news/​12658 accessed 18 March 2020; www.standard.co.uk/​news/​world/​britains-​
historic-​bangkok-​embassy-​bulldozed-​to-​make-​way-​for-​mall-​a4211991.html.
70 ‘Thai Architect Association Wants Its Award Back after Demolition of Former
Embassy Building’, The Thaiger, 26 August 2019, accessed at https://​thethaiger.
com/ ​ n ews/ ​ b angkok/​ t hai-​ a rchitect-​ a ssociation-​ wants-​ i ts-​ award-​ b ack-​ a fter-​
demolition-​of-​former-​embassy-​building on 18 March 2020.
71 ‘International Education in Thailand –​30 Years On’, Bangkok Post, 28 January
2020, accessed at www.bangkokpost.com/​business/​1845489/​international-​
education-​in-​thailand-​%E2%80%93-​30-​years-​on on 18 March 2020.
72 Englehart, ‘Representing Civilization’, pp. 417–​439, p. 431.
73 Maurizio Peleggi, Thailand: The Worldly Kingdom (London: Reaktion Books,
2007), p. 94.
74 Dominic Faulder, Anand Panyarachun and the Making of Modern Thailand
(Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2018), p. 45.
75 Battye, ‘The Military, Government and Society in Siam’, p. 80. The ‘second king’
at this time was Mongkut’s half-​brother Phra Phin Klao.
76 Andrew Clarke, ‘My First Visit to Siam’, The Contemporary Review, 1 January
1902, pp. 225, 227.
77 ทำ�ไม ‘อังกฤษ’ ถึงเป็น ‘เมืองผู้ดี’, Thai Rath, 22 March 2013 accessed at www.thairath.
co.th/​content/​334020 on 19 March 2020.
78 Mr Mitchell Innes served as financial adviser in 1897 and 1898, until replaced by
Mr Rivett Carnac. Rivett Carnac allowed the Siamese government to issue its first
Budget Report in 1902. ‘General Report on Siam for the Year 1906’, TNA FO 628/​
28/​314.
79 ‘Military Report on Siam’, Intelligence Branch, Government of India, 1907, L/​
BS/​20/​D160/​1, p. 110.
80 Ibid., p. 132.
81 ‘Memorandum on Draft Treaty with Siam’, Ralph Paget, 31 August 1908, India
Office L/​PS/​10/​97, p. 11.
62 Thailand and the Great Powers
82 Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 31.
83 ‘France and Siam: From Our Correspondent’, Melbourne Argus, 28 August 1893,
p. 7 accessed at Trove NLA on 18 March 2020; Ira Klein, ‘Salisbury, Rosebery,
and the Survival of Siam’, Journal of British Studies 8, no. 1 (November 1968),
p. 127.
84 Klein, ‘Salisbury, Rosebery, and the Survival of Siam’, p. 119.
85 Ibid., p. 131.
86 Strate, The Lost Territories, pp. 97–​106.
87 Ibid., p. 100.
88 Interview, Tej Bunnag, Bangkok, 2016.
89 Benjamin Batson, ‘Siam and Japan: The Perils of Independence’, in
Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980), p. 277. E. Bruce Reynolds,
Thailand’s Secret War: The Free Thai, OSS, and SOE during World War II
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 108.
90 ‘Proposed Declaration by the British Government in regard to Thailand’,
Document 892.01/​53 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1944,
Volume V, p. 1312.
91 Letter from Thailand Ambassador Edwin Stanton to Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, 1 September 1949, Declassified 760050NND File 1945-​49 Box 3398
General Records of the Department of State.
92 Letter from Mr Bridges to Mr Blake, dated 8 January 1943, TNA BW 54/​1.
93 Foreign Records of the United States (FRUS) (1945) Report by the State-​War-​
Navy Coordinating Committee, Washington, Volume VI, 9 February.
94 Ibid.
95 เหรียญที่ระลึกเสด็จประพาสยุโรป ครั้งที่ 1 (ร.ศ.116) ชนิดทองแดง, The Treasury Department
website, accessed at www.treasury.go.th/​th/​k5traveltoeurope/​ on 19 March 2020.
96 Committee to Facilitate Celebration of 100 Year Anniversary of the Prapart
Europe 2540 การเสด็จประพาสยุโรป ของ Chulalongkorn รศ 116, Volume 1
(Bangkok: Srimuang).
97 Krairoek Nana, Behind Chulalongkorn’s Travel to Europe: The Politics
‘Beyond Dynastic History’ of Rama 5 เบื้องหลังพระบาทสมเด็จพระจุลจอมเกล้าเจ้าอยู่หัว
เสด็จประพาสยุโรป การเมือง นอกพงศวดาร รัชกาลที่๕ (Bangkok: Matichon, 2006).
98 Ibid., p. 13.
99 Napawan Tantivejakul, ‘National Image Construction for the First Royal Visit
to Europe of King Rama V’, การกาหนดสร้างภาพลักษณ์สยามประเทศในการเสด็จประพา
สยุโรปครั้งที่ 1 ของพระบาทสมเด็จพระจุลจอมเกล้าเจ้าอยู่หัว, Journal of Public Relations and
Advertising 12, no. 2 (2019), p. 64.
100 Funeral volume of Professor Dusit Phanitphat, 19 July 2541, Bangkok.
Possession of National Library of Australia Asian Collection.
101 ‘A Royal Visitor Remembered: The Thai Pavilion in the Swedish Countryside’,
Real Scandinavia, 21 September 2018, accessed at http://​realscandinavia.com/​
a-​royal-​visitor-​remembered-​the-​thai-​pavilion-​in-​the-​swedish-​countryside/​ on 18
March 2020.
102 Quoted in Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lessons
from Thailand (Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1987), p. 88.
103 Ibid., p. 113; Jim Wolf, ‘Thailand’s Security and Armed Forces’, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 2 November 1985, p. 979.
 Thailand and the Great Powers 63
104 Kramol et al., Thai Elite’s National Security Perspectives, p. 19
105 Michael Connors, ‘Thailand and the United States: Beyond Hegemony?’, in
M. Beeson (ed.), Bush and Asia: America’s Evolving Relations with East Asia
(London: Routledge, 2006), p. 132.
106 Royal Thai Embassy, From Your Friend: 110 Years of Relations between Thailand
and Russia (Moscow: Project of the Royal Thai Embassy, 2007), p. 154.
107 Noranit Setabutr, ‘Is It True that the Visit to Russia by Chulalongkorn in 1897
Was Highly Significant for Thai Security?’, in Royal Thai Embassy, From Your
Friend, pp. 76–​93.
108 Ibid., p. 88.
109 Ibid., p. i.
110 Ibid., p. v.
111 Narisa Chkarabongse (ed.), Letters from St. Petersburg: A Siamese Prince at the
Court of the Last Tsar (Bangkok: River Books, 2017).
112 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‘Thailand’s Delicate Dance with the Major Powers’,
East Asia Forum, 18 May 2015, accessed at www.eastasiaforum.org/​2015/​05/​18/​
thailands-​delicate-​dance-​with-​the-​major-​powers/​ on 20 March 2020.
113 ความมั่นคงแห่งชาติ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๘ –​ ๒๕๖๔, National Security Policy 2015–​2021, National
Security Council of Thailand, pp. 3–​4.
114 Interview, Anand Panyarachun, Bangkok, 2016.
115 For example, the National Economic and Social Development Board writes that

there is growing competitiveness of international trade, and Thailand is

pushed in between light industry countries with an advantage of low labor
cost (e.g., China, India and Vietnam) and countries that have their own brands
of production and upper markets for automobiles, electronics, electrical
appliances, financial services, education, and public health (e.g., Republic of
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan).

The Sufficiency Economy Philosophy and the Context of National Development,

p. 67.
116 Sasiwan Chingchit, ‘From Looks to Action: Thailand-​ India Strategic
Convergence and Defence Cooperation’, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 40I,
Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, May 2015, p. 28.
117 ‘Thailand Keen to Work with India on FTA’, The Economic Times, 16 February
2017, accessed at https://​economictimes.indiatimes.com/​news/​economy/​foreign-​
trade/​thailand-​keen-​to-​work-​with-​india-​on-​fta/​articleshow/​57181786.cms?utm_​
source=contentofinterest&utm_​medium=text&utm_​campaign=cppst on 31
March 2020.
118 5 ทศวรรษสำ�พันธ์ไทยขอินเดีย จากวัฒนธรรมมาถึงเศรษฐกิจ, ‘5 Decades of Thai-​ India
Relations: From Culture to Economy’, Khao Sot, 4 August 1997.
119 เอินเดียเพลียใจในอาเซียน, ‘India Is Dejected in ASEAN’, Khao Sot, 2 August 1997,
p. 8.
120 Interview, official National Security Council, Bangkok, 2016.
121 Interview, former official Ministry Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 2017.
122 Eksuda Singhalampong, ‘From Commissions to Commemoration: The Re-​
Creation of King Chulalongkorn and His Court, and the Thai Monarchy
Through Westernised Art and Western Art Collection’, PhD thesis, University of
Sussex, 2016.
64 Thailand and the Great Powers
123 George Coedes was an exponent of the former perspective and O. W. Wolters the
latter. Peleggi, Thailand: The Worldly Kingdom, p. 11.
124 See, for example, F. Ferrara, ‘The Birth of “Thainess”,’ in The Political Development
of Modern Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 39–​74,
p. 72, doi:10.1017/​CBO9781107449367.004; Chaiwat Satha-​Anand, ‘Thailand: The
Layers of a Strategic Culture’, Chapter 7 in Ken Booth and Russell Trood, Strategic
Cultures in the Asia-​Pacific Region (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 59.
125 ‘The India that Rama 5 Touched, อินเดียที่รัชกาลที่5 ทรงสัมผัส, ‘The Cloud’, 23
October 2017 accessed at https://​readthecloud.co/​scoop-​18/​ on 1 April 2020.
126 สโมสรศิลปวัฒนธรรมเสวนา “อินเดียโมเดลกับสยามใหม่สมัยรัชกาลที่ 5”(ตอน2) accessed at
www.youtube.com/​watch?v=CMvsTTTVhKY on 30 March 2020.
127 ‘The India that Rama 5 Touched’.
128 Mead, Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism, pp. 54–​60. Mead, however, speculates
that Rama V may have taken the idea from the French Conseil D’Etat.
129 Eksuda, ‘From Commissions to Commemoration’.
130 British Library, India Office Records (hereafter IOR) Mss Eur E290/​14, 20
August 1885 quoted in Englehart, ‘Representing Civilization’, pp. 417–​439.
131 Ibid.
132 As of 2020, neither embassy website mentioned Thai-​ Indian anti-​ colonial
cooperation in their history briefs.
133 Letter from Dering to the secretary of the Government of India, dated 17 January
1919, TNA FO 371 4093.
134 Strate, The Lost Territories, pp. 114–​117.
135 Sawitree Charoenpong states that

The relations between Thailand and India during the Second World War were
also remarkable at the governmental level, that is, between the Thai govern-
ment and the Provisional Government of Free India, or “Azad Hind,” under
the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose, who collaborated with Japan …
Since Thailand sided with Japan during the Second World War, the Thai gov-
ernment cooperated with the Indian Independence League, whether willingly
or unwillingly. (italics added)

Sawitree Charoenpong วารสารอักษรศาสตร์ ปีที่ 41 ฉบับที่ 2 (2555), pp. 97–​153, Journal

of Letters 41, no. 2 (2012), pp. 97–​153.
136 Website of the Royal Thai Embassy, New Delhi, accessed at http://​newdelhi.
thaiembassy.org/ ​ t h/ ​ t hailand- ​ i ndia- ​ r elations- ​ t h/ ​ p olitical- ​ a nd- ​ s ecurity-​
cooperation-​th/​ on 9 April 2020.
137 ‘Foreign Benefactors towards Thai Law’, Daily News, 2 December 2015, ชาวต่าง
ประเทศผู้มีคุณแก่วงการกฎหมายไทย (๑), accessed at www.dailynews.co.th/​article/​364315
on 16 April 2020.
138 ‘Owner of Clip Is Thai of Indian Ethnicity: At that Time It Wasn’t Funny’, เจ้า
ของคลิปชีวิตคนไทยเชื้อสายอินเดีย: “ตอนนั้นมันก็ไม่ตลกนะ, accessed at www.bbc.com/​thai/​
thailand-​40627947 on 1 April 2020.
139 Direk Jayanama, Thailand and the Second World War (Chiang Mai: Silkworm
Books, 1967), p. 141.
140 ‘How Asians See the Second World War, 70 Years On’, Nikkei Asian Review,
13 August 2015, accessed at https://​asia.nikkei.com/​Politics/​How-​Asians-​see-​
World-​War-​II-​70-​years-​on, on 2 May 2018.
141 Strate, The Lost Territories, pp. 5–​6.
 Thailand and the Great Powers 65
142 At the small Seri Thai museum, located on Bangkok’s outskirts, a sign tells visitors
that because of Seri Thai’s actions, “Thailand did not lose the war, the Thai gov-
ernment did not have to capitulate, the Thai military did not have to disarm,
and Thai territory was not seized.” Prathet thai mai pen phu-​phae songkram;
ratthaban thai mai tong yom chamnon; khong-​thap thai mai tong wang awut; din-​
daen thai mai tong thuk yuet khrong (Raymond visit to Seri Thai museum, Seri
Thai Park, Bueng Kum, Bangkok on 5 November 2015).
143 Interview, retired senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
144 Chaiwat Khamchoo, ‘Japan’s Politico-​ Security Relations with Thailand in
the Post-​Vietnam Era’, in Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds, Thai–​
Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective (Bangkok: Innomedia Press, 1988),
p. 240.
145 Ichikawa Kenjiro, ‘Japan’s Repayment of the the Second World War Special
Yen Account to Thailand’, in Chaiwat and Reynolds, Thai-​Japanese Relations,
p. 208.
146 David M. Potter, Japan’s Foreign Aid to Thailand and the Philippines
(New York: St. Martin’s Press 1996), 23. Over time the burgeoning relationship
opened up its own problems, particularly as a result of Thailand’s tendency to
accumulate large trade deficits. The deficit, as well as general perception of Japan
as willing to exploit investment opportunities but less interested in genuine tech-
nology transfer and host country development, led to street protests in the 1970s.
Pasuk Phongpaichit, Busaba Kunasirin and Buddhagarn Rutchatorn (eds.), The
Lion and the Mouse? Japan, Asia and Thailand: Proceedings of an International
Conference on Thai-​Japan Relations (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1986),
p. 360; Khamchoo, ‘Japan’s Politico-​Security Relations’, p. 242.
147 Charnvit Kasetsiri and Michael Wright, Discovering Ayutthaya (Bangkok: Social
Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Foundation, 2007), pp. 151, 153.
148 Ibid., p. 122.
149 Ibid., pp. 222–​223.
150 ‘Authentic Ayutthaya Comes to Life at Japanese Village’s Virtual Reality Street
Museum’, TAT News, 20 February 2018, accessed at www.tatnews.org/​2018/​02/​
authentic-​ayutthaya-​comes-​life-j​ apanese-​villages-​virtual-​reality-​street-​museum/​
on 22 August 2019.
151 Charnvit and Wright, Discovering Ayutthaya, p. 122.
152 Benjamin A. Batson, ‘The Perils of Independence’, in Alfred W. McCoy,
Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Southeast Asia Studies, 1980).
153 Interview, retired senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2015.
154 King, Heritage and Identity, p. 23.
155 The Indochina War 1940–​ 1941 (phipat indochin farangset) was Thailand’s
revanchist attack on French-​controlled Indochina. Thailand started the conflict
unilaterally a year before Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and invaded Southeast
Asia. Phibun authorised military operations on 26 November 1940 after a break-
down in Thailand’s border negotiations with Vichy France, and as Germany
challenged in Western Europe. Some 43,000 of the 300,000 square miles lost to
France at the turn of the century were regained. Thai success was formalised by
Japanese mediation in Tokyo on 9 May 1941. Siamese administrative officials
and police were posted to the new provinces and for the next five years the ter-
ritory was Thai. But Thailand was compelled to return the territories under
66 Thailand and the Great Powers
the post-​war Franco-​Siamese Agreement of Settlement and Protocol signed in
Washington on 17 November 1946.
156 General Saiyud Kherdphol, Japan and Thailand during the Second World War
(Bangkok: Thai Shimizu, 2014), p. 246.
157 Thommayanti, คู่กรรม, Destiny Couple (Bangkok: Akson Phetkasem, 1972),
pp. 2–​9.
158 Interview, mid-​ranking Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
159 Danny Unger, ‘From Domino to Dominant: Thailand’s Security Policies in the
Twenty-​First Century’, East Asia In Transition: Towards a New Regional Order
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), p. 247.
160 Website of the Japan Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, accessed at www.jcc.
or.th/​en/​site/​index, on 16 December 2015.
161 ‘Hoping to Ease the Pain’, Bangkok Post, 19 July 2014, accessed at www.
bangkokpost.com/​thailand/​politics/​421284/​hoping-​to-​ease-​the-​pain on 14
April 2020.
3 
Historical memory and the
US-​Thai alliance

In the end Thailand and the US will have more of a partnership than an
alliance.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, 20161

Once overt formalized alliances between unequal states fail visibly to foster
military security and stability … their intangible effects assume inordinate
importance.
George Liska, 19682

Soldiers develop extraordinarily close bonds. The personal connections

that endure between American soldiers and Thailand’s Border Police are an
example. A Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) colonel described to
us how the family of a deceased US colonel brought his remains to PARU
headquarters at Hua Hin.3 In a special ceremony, the PARU released the
remains of “George” from a plane over the Gulf of Thailand. It is difficult to
imagine a greater testament to the closeness that soldiers even from cultures
as different as Thailand and the United States can develop. These bonds of
trust are replicated in other unit-​to-​unit relationships between the Thai and
US military establishments, such as those between the marines and air forces.
The trust and comfort between Thai and US combat aircraft pilots on exer-
cise are other examples.4
But personal relations between soldiers are not the determinants of
alliances and, in any case, these pockets of amity are not representative. While
military-​to-​military relations at the heart of the US-​Thailand alliance remain
strong and active in the contemporary era, they are paradoxically accom-
panied by significant distrust.5 Making this most clear was our survey of
1,800 Thai military officers, which found that the United States was seen as
a more likely military threat to Thailand than China or Russia.6 When asked
about the significance of military threats from Great Powers, the mean rating
for the United States was the highest followed by China, Russia, Japan and
India in this order. These rankings were found to be statistically significant,
except for in the case of Russia and Japan where no significant difference in
68 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
ranking was found. At the same time, the United States, while seen as a patron
more than a friend, is also believed to provide an important security guar-
antee for Thailand.7 How do we explain this significant ambivalence to the
United States? How do we explain the puzzle of growing distance in the rela-
tionship when a former shared adversary, China, is becoming more powerful
and more assertive?
The acrimonious US-​Thai exchanges in the post-​2014 coup period par-
tially explain these startling results. There is, however, in our view a need for
a longer historical perspective incorporating memory and identity to com-
prehend these results, and to answer the broader questions. A report by the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, based on survey data taken
from before the 2014 coup, provides compelling evidence of this. The CSIS
report found that of eleven Asia Pacific states (United States, Japan, South
Korea, China, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Australia, Singapore, Myanmar
and Taiwan), Thailand was “least enthusiastic about U.S. Leadership” despite
its formal treaty alliance with the United States.8 The authors of the report
concluded on a sombre note:

Thailand’s domestic instability is a continuing challenge, but equally

concerning from the perspective of the U.S.-​ Thai alliance are Thai
elites’ remarkably negative view of the United States. Shared interests,
objectives, and expectations are the foundation of a strong alliance, but
Thailand is a consistent outlier in its assessment of the U.S. role in the
region. Without an improved political climate … the U.S. alliance will not
be sustainable. (italics added)

In this chapter we examine the US-​Thailand site of memory, and draw on our
findings to offer a new means of explaining this fractured view of the United
States. Partly because of an accumulation of negative memory, we argue that
identity dissonance has grown; that is to say, the net balance of US identity
for Thais has become negative. This identity dissonance is now framing con-
temporary events. As Neta Crawford argued in her exploration of the role of
emotion in international politics,

A pre-​ existing feeling that a relationship is warm, or one that is

characterized by empathetic understanding with the other, may help
actors frame ambiguous behaviour as neutral, positive, or motivated by
circumstances rather than hostile intentions. Conversely, fear and antip-
athy may promote negative evaluations and make a neutral or positive
reception of ambiguous behaviours and events less likely.9

A significant part of Thailand’s negative framing of the United States is

Thailand’s approach to war memory. It means the remembrance of US and
Thai comrades in arms does not filter through into broader public imaginings.
Instead, the memory scape of the US-​Thai Cold War enmeshment is of
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 69
political interference, dictatorship, social problems and a legacy of difficult
relations with neighbours. A broader factor contributing to the negative
balance of identity is Thailand’s Occidentalism, its complex and ambivalent
psychology towards the West and farang generally. In turn, Thailand’s anti-​
democratic political dynamics and royalist-​nationalism underpin both of
these memory factors.
We begin our memory analysis with our survey results. In addition to the
abovementioned findings, the periodisation which our respondents attributed
to Thailand’s history with the United States was intriguing. We had asked our
respondents to rate the influence of the United States across six time periods
based on world history rather than Thai history.10 It is natural to expect that
people might remember the past in different chunks of time. And so it turned
out to be. When we used a statistical technique known as factor analysis,
we found our Thai survey respondents saw Thailand’s relationship with the
United States as comprising three chunks.11 The first chunk was the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries together. The second was the mid-​twentieth cen-
tury and the Cold War together. The third was the post–​Cold War era.
This periodisation prompted our arguments about key fragments of Thai-​
US collective memory. We argue that the most positive memory of the United
States is associated with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is
a period associated with a memory of gratitude. It is also remembered as a
period in which US influence was less than subsequent periods. The second
period is a period where the memory is less positive. It is in fact dominated by
memories of interference and difficult social and political legacies. The third
and final period is less negative than the second period but still not positive.
It is a memory of drift and disregard. This is a period in which the United
States and Thailand have less interaction, and where such interaction has
occurred, it has been somewhat prickly. It is also a period in which the growth
of a stronger Thai nationalism, strongly associated with the monarchy and
its accompanying strains of Occidentalism, is fostering amongst conservative
elites and more broadly, a righteous indignation against external criticism.

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: memory of gratitude

In 2015 the Thai Ambassador to the United States Pisan Manawapat wrote
an op-​ed celebrating the US-​Thailand security partnership, praising what he
cited as a 182-​year-​old alliance.12 Thai and US diplomats regularly cite the
treaty of 20 March 1833 as the commencement of ties between the United
States and Thailand. In our interviews, however, there was little indication
that this early nineteenth century contact is a memory of significance amongst
Thai officials. That is not to say that the agreement is not without substantive
or symbolic importance. The 1833 treaty, an exact analogue of that which the
Siamese had signed only seven years earlier with the British, may have been
one of the first examples of Thailand’s practice of counterbalancing the influ-
ence of one Great Power by strengthening ties with another.13 Certainly the
70 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
treaty was drafted much faster –​within a month –​than the British version,
reflecting perhaps that Siam at this time knew little of the United States and
so feared it less than the British. Its main impact was, somewhat paradoxic-
ally, the bringing of both arms and missionaries.14 Historians suggest that by
the end of the nineteenth century, there were just 125 Americans in Thailand,
half of whom were missionaries.15 The missionaries are important, for they
represent the benevolence of the United States seen by Thais in their remem-
brance of this period.
The memory of gratitude for US benevolence in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries coalesces around US humanitarian and diplomatic
contributions. Thailand’s older generation of diplomats remember well the
educational and medical work of American missionaries. The good works
of Dr Dan Beech Bradley, who brought the printing press, schools and
modern medicine to Thailand, were cited by former Prime Minister Anand
Panyarachun:

Thais of my generation do recall the good deeds of the US, starting with
the missionaries who set up hospitals, nursing colleges and schools such
as the Bangkok Christian College. The first missionary to Thailand,
Dr. Dan Beach Bradley, also established the first Thai printing press.
These were important contributions to the health and educational devel-
opment of our country.16

There is also recollection of American advisers to Thai kings. Seeking to ele-

vate the quality of decision-​making, Thailand employed a succession of these
between 1903 and 1940. Chulalongkorn had begun the hiring of General
Advisers in 1892, with the Belgian Rolin-​ Jacquemyns.17 Thereafter, the
advisers were American, beginning with Edward H. Strobel in 1903, followed
by Jens Westengard from 1908 to 1915, and then Wolcott Pitkin from 1915
until 1917. Part of the reasons Americans were chosen was to not offend the
French or the British by appointing one of their countrymen.
One of the later advisers, Francis B. Sayre, adviser from 1923 to 1930,
inspired lasting gratitude for his role in the revision of the unequal treaties
granting foreigners special legal rights in Thailand. To understand the signifi-
cance of this treaty revision, we must appreciate the degree to which Thais
continue to remember the system of sitthi saphap nok anakhet, or foreign
extraterritorial rights. In 2015, the high-​profile Thai constitutional lawyer and
drafter Bowornsak Uwanno wrote a series of four newspaper columns titled
“Foreign Benefactors towards Thai Law.” In the first column he set out the
conditions under which Thailand had adapted its legal system:

In the past our ancient Asian law began to be seen as outdated and unciv-
ilised [la lang lae pa thuean], especially by Westerners [chao tawantok] who
were starting to take a bigger role in various regions through means of
both trade and war.
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 71
When the threat of colonialism of the West came to our region, our
neighbours who either could not accept or who accepted too late the need
to modernise, and who opposed without good foreign policy, were over-
come by the superior military force of the West and lost their sovereignty.
When the British emissary Sir John Bowring came Mongkut Rama IV
signed a trade treaty which infringed Thai interests, because he realised
that he could not defeat Western military power and that the best policy
was to develop the country.
One part of the Bowring Treaty that disadvantaged Thailand were the
extraterritorial rights [sitthi saphap nok anakhet] of the English, which
meant that if the English and people under their control had legal cases,
these were outside the power of Siamese courts and were considered
in English consular courts, which tended to favour citizens of its own
nationality.
The reason that Westerners didn’t accept the Thai courts and justice
system was because in the eyes of the West, Thai law was considered
obsolete and barbaric.18

In the remaining articles Bowornsak described first how the system of extra-
territorial rights was extended to other nation states, and then with the
help of foreign advisers, rolled back so that Thais were able to administer
their own justice system. Bowornsak names three foreigners who especially
helped Thailand in its legal development and the dismantling of the unequal
treaties and their provisions for extraterritoriality. These were: the Japanese
Tokichi Masao who edited the Criminal Code of Siam; the Belgian M. Rolin-​
Jaequemyns, general adviser to Chulalongkorn; and the American, Francis
B. Sayre, who was given the title phrayakanyanmaitri.
Thai legal reform and attainment of full sovereignty occurred over many
years. The entire transformation of the Thai legal system, from the traditional
pattern based on the Law of the Three Seals to a modern system of civil
law resembling a European court system, took over two generations, from
1895 to 1935.19 During this time a plethora of foreign advisers served in the
Thai Ministry of Justice, including from France, Britain, Japan, Ceylon, the
United States and Belgium.20 It was a process in which Thais attempting to
increase their control were liable to encounter foreign scepticism if not out-
right opposition. In his annual report to the British foreign minister in 1911,
the British minister to Thailand, Arthur Peel, recounts his annoyance at one
such upstart. After first praising Prince Rabi, who had “had attached great
importance to the presence and counsel of European advisers to the Ministry
of Justice” and had even said that “he could not foresee the day when the
Ministry of Justice would be able to dispense with them,” he dimly noted that:

this opinion is not shared by Prince Charoon, who is strongly imbued with
national ideas and anxious, like many inexperienced youths of Siam, to
see their country emancipated from all foreign control, and it was under
72 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
the influence of these impressions that he has hitherto done all within his
power to see that the employment of foreigners in his department should
be as limited as possible …21

In the aftermath of the First World War, in which Thailand had made a
small contribution to the Allied forces, a Siamese delegation sought revi-
sion of the unequal treaties at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.22 They were
met with unflinching British rejection. At the root of their unwillingness to
budge was the British view that there was an “insurmountable disparity of
the contracting parties.” In his critique of the Siamese proposal, the British
minister to Siam Lyle expanded on this notion:

The disparity is not one of territorial dimensions, of military power, or of

comparative commercial production, but is one of political development
and of national education, growth and mental capacity. Siam wishes
to negotiate on a plane of absolute, and not even relative, equality, and
ignores the dissimilarity of our respective positions.

He then drew a comparison with Burma, displaying the notions of racial hier-
archy common for the times:

Perhaps the supreme test of all the Siamese fitness is to be found in a com-
parison of this country and its people with neighbouring Burma and the
Burmese. The Burmese as a people are racially, mentally, and politically
superior to the Siamese, and have during the past thirty years had the
advantage of a much closer European contact, example, and education.
Is His Majesty’s Government prepared to concede forthwith to Burma
political and judicial autonomy over all interests within that State? If the
answer is in the negative, much more so must the negative apply to Siam.23

Francis Sayre was crucial in overcoming British intransigence and moving

the matter forward. Sayre introduced Thai delegates at the Paris Peace
Conference to US President Woodrow Wilson, who became convinced of
Thailand’s case, such that “America would be prepared to give Siam a new
treaty and would as a matter of justice renounce without compensation
her rights of extraterritoriality.”24 The United States became the first Great
Power to cede its rights of extraterritoriality under the Siamese American
Treaty of 1920. According to Francis B. Sayre, this was a treaty of “epoch-​
making importance for Siam” and it set a precedent that other European
nations and Japan later followed.25
Sayre’s actions have contributed to the view that, as Thai historian
Thamsook Numnonda wrote, “Americans were less condescending towards
the Siamese than Europeans.”26 Certainly, this history has been taught in
Thai schools. Writing in a 1970s Thai history text book, Dr Narong Sinsawat
wrote that:
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 73
Dr Francis B. Sayre an American lawyer became an important brain for
Thailand in seeking revision of the treaties by Europe and the US and
received a royal award.27

This memory is further embodied in a street, near the Ministries of Foreign

Affairs and Defence in Bangkok, named in honour of Sayre, using the Thai
rank Kanyanmaitri that was bestowed on him by Rama VI.28
Former Thai Foreign Minister Tej Bunnag, an historian himself, also
recalled the enlightened US policy at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
Recalling King Rama VI’s decision to enter the First World War on behalf
of the Allies, he said:

That earned us a place at the conference at Versailles. That was the begin-
ning of modern Thai foreign policy. And of course we were fully behind
and expected much from President Wilson’s self-​determination and we
put our views down at the Congress of Versailles. That the unequal
treaties should be negotiated, and the US was with us all along the way.
As you know, our first advisor was a Belgian, Rollin-​Jacquemins. But
from Rollin-​Jacquemins the adviser to the Thai government on every-
thing, including foreign affairs, was always an American. Usually a
retired Harvard Law Professor starting off with Westengard and we had
American advisers to the Thai government until after the Second World
War. One of the most famous was Francis B. Sayre. He was ennobled as
Phraya Kalayanamaitri, meaning Good Friend.29

Just as, if not more, significant as the memory of US support in ending the
unequal treaties is the memory of US forbearance and protection at the end
of the Second World War. Thai scholars looking at the alliance today count
this development as having created “the pretext for trust between the two
nations.”30 Their understandings match the historical record.
After the Second World War Britain, the Great Power with the most
significant influence and commercial interests in Thailand, was enraged.
Describing Phibun’s regime as a “quisling government” for having aligned
with Japan and declared war on it and the United States, Britain sought harsh
reparations that might have included some or all of the country being treated
as a protectorate.31 Thailand would need to “work their passage home” and
only then Britain would “support the emergence of a free and independent
Thailand.”32 The United States did not agree, stating that this would increase
distrust of the United States and Britain. It argued strenuously, telling the
British Embassy that “it would be better that the British Government make
no declaration rather than the proposed one under consideration.”33 But if
it insisted, then “it would be advisable that it include at least an unequivocal
commitment that Great Britain has no territorial ambitions in Thailand.”34
Later the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull increased the pressure on the
British:
74 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
You may say to Mr Eden that this Government would view with extreme
regret the inability of the United States and the United Kingdom to take
an identical position with regard to problems which would involve the
long-​term objectives for which this war is being fought.35

The US government’s position was not pure philanthropy. The United States
was convinced that its interests would be better served by treating Thailand as
an “enemy-​occupied country” rather than simply as an “enemy.” In May 1945
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) assessed that restoring colonial rule in
Asia would increase the risk that “Asiatics may turn to communist or other
political ideology if American democracy does not give them the encourage-
ment they seek.”36 The OSS further warned that “British, French, and Chinese
intentions will result in a reduction of the sovereignty of Thailand.”37 In the
end, the United States took a strong public position, with the Undersecretary
of State expressing that it had an interest in British-​Siamese peace terms. This
persuaded Thai elites of the United States’ goodwill. At a dinner in December
1945, the Thai King Ananda Mahidol and Thai cabinet ministers “expressed
gratitude for the United States interest in British peace terms with Siam which
had led to the softening of those terms.”38
Thai history books recall the United States’ crucial intervention.
Dr Narong’s 1970s history textbook states that:

When the Second World War subsided Thailand announced that the dec-
laration of war had been invalid. The United States accepted this. Because
of that, even though Britain wanted to squash Thailand, they couldn’t
because the United States took Thailand’s side [khao khang thai].39

Similarly, the 2010 New Era Thai History noted the role of United States at
the end of the Second World War when Britain proposed a treaty that would
have impacted Thai sovereignty. It stated that “Thailand asked the United
States for a policy that would give Thailand its sovereignty and independ-
ence” (kho hai ratbal omerikan mi nyobai thi cha hai prathet thai mi ekkarat
lae amnatathippatai).40 Other histories omit the US role. A 1965 textbook
for Thailand’s Triam Udom Suksa School summed up the outcomes of the
Second World War as simply that the Allies won, with Thailand forced to
join the United Nations and to give up territory to France and England.41
More recently a 2015 history textbook left out the role of the United States
altogether, instead emphasising the role of Seri Thai, Thailand’s Free Thai
independence force, in negotiating with the Allies and taking Thailand into
the United Nations.42 This patchy coverage in Thai history books may explain
why only two of our interviewees, both diplomats, mentioned the importance
of the United States in the context of Thailand’s lucky escape from its Second
World War alignment with Japan. Unfortunately, this generation of diplomats
is moving on figuratively and literally, and these more positive memories of the
United States are not as powerful as the others that we will shortly come to.
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 75
The domestic politics surrounding the official commemoration of the
Second World War, and especially the place of the Seri Thai (Free Thai)
movement, is a significant obstacle to greater remembrance and recogni-
tion of the US contribution to its post-​World War status. Washington had
sponsored and trained the Seri Thai resistance movement, and indeed this is
one of the reasons that the US administration decided to overlook Thai col-
laboration with Japan. Seri Thai, an underground resistance to Japan’s occu-
pation, commenced activities late in the war. The then-​Thai ambassador to
the United States, Seni Pramoj, had called for the formation of a Free Thai
movement immediately after Japan’s invasion, but British and US authorities
were sceptical. Eventually, the US OSS sponsored and trained overseas Thai
students for infiltration operations. Some Seri Thai members parachuted into
rural regions to gather intelligence and prepare for a possible uprising. With
regent Pridi Phanomyong still resident in Thailand and royalist Seni working
from overseas, they led a movement which by the end of the war had achieved
Thailand-​wide membership of between 50,000 and 90,000. While Seri Thai
had not engaged in any major military operation or uprising by the time it was
formally disbanded on 25 September 1945, it had contributed to intelligence
gathering and logistics support for US forces. The United States later awarded
medals of bravery to Seri Thai members, like Lieutenant Bunmag Desaputra
who received a citation for the medal of freedom for “heroic services in action
against an enemy of the United States in enemy occupied territory during the
period September 1944 to September 1945.”43
Although Thailand’s official history books state the facts about the role
of the Seri Thai, there is no prominent official commemoration, prominent
permanent site, or regular ceremonial events, recognising the contribution of
Seri Thai in keeping Thailand independent. If these existed, they may well
have lifted the profile of the United States in a positive way. The reasons for
these lacunae in the murky and bitter domestic politics of the post–​World
War era. This was a three-cornered contest for power between a Seri Thai
faction headed by revolutionary and one-​time regent Pridi Phanomyong, the
Thai army, and the monarchists. It was high stakes; many lost their lives. The
outcome was Pridi’s exile and a pall of silence over the Seri Thai, mentioned
in books but with minimal place in Thailand’s public consciousness. The Seri
Thai museum in Bueng Kum, east of Bangkok, is concrete testimony. It is
little known, and rarely opens.

The Cold War: memories of interference and difficult social and

political legacies
The most poisonous residues of Thai Cold War memory of the United
States were on display in the run-​up to the 2019 Thai general election. Chat
Nawavichit, a retired Thai navy admiral, posted a video on Facebook.44
Chat, a former head of the Institute of Advanced Naval Studies, first
introduced himself as a strategist who had studied strategy “for over sixty
76 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
years.” He then expounded his theory. The United States, he said, was intent
on remaining the world’s sole Great Power (mahaamnat pu diow). To achieve
this end, it wished Thailand, occupying a strategic point in Southeast Asia,
to accept the basing of US soldiers and nuclear weapons, in case of war with
China. To gain Thai acceptance of these objectives, the United States was
conducting a shadow war (songkhram ngao) via deniable covert operations.
The operations were of two types, economic and democratic. An example
of the economic type was the Asian Financial Crisis, (wikrittomyamkung) in
which Thailand almost lost its sovereignty (sunsiaekrat) but “we survived.”
The crisis was followed with elections. This was an example of colonists
(naklaananikhom) attacking the economy almost to the point of that country
becoming a “failed state” (prathet lom lala) with all activities within their con-
trol, and then appointing a “nominee” to govern the nation, in the way that
they require. Therefore:

Thailand was attacked as well, in the election of 2001, 2008, and 2011.
They seized the administration of Thailand. But they couldn’t make it
permanent because Thai people rose up and fought. And the soldiers,
who are a main force, had to intervene and seize power, not accepting
Thai people be slaves all their lives [penthat tlot chiwit].

Admiral Chat’s theory is outlandish but nonetheless a powerful data point

suggesting the utility of approaching the US-​Thai alliance from the stand-
point of memory and identity, as well as rational bargaining. His denunciation
contains many of the elements of memory, identity politics and domestic pol-
itics that this book argues have fused with Thailand’s international outlook,
including its view of its US alliance partner. There are Occidentalist references
to colonialism and sovereignty. There is also the imprint of the intense dis-
cord over Thailand’s identity, as a state both monarchic, authoritarian and
democratic, that has roiled the country since 2006. All these aspects of the
current alliance dynamic make rationalist approaches to alliance theory less
applicable here.
It would be easy to dismiss Chat’s tirade as the unrepresentative views of
one extremist. But in the age of the internet, extreme views can gain wide
exposure and exert real influence. Certainly, the growth of the internet has
contributed to the circulation of rumours in Thailand. In 2013, Thailand had
about 29 internet users per hundred citizens.45 After the 2014 coup, Facebook
was abuzz with rumours that not only did the United States oppose the coup,
it supported one side of Thai politics. It was believed that the United States
had submarines in the Gulf of Thailand, ready to land troops to help this
group.46
While extreme conspiracy theories are likely not viewed as credible in Thai
government and elite circles, the belief that Thailand has been and is subject
to foreign interference remains strong. Statistical evidence from our surveys
found that respondents rated the capacity of Great Powers to interfere in Thai
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 77
politics as high. Over 65% of respondents rated the capacity of Great Powers
to interfere in Thailand’s domestic politics as either 8, 9 or 10 on a Likert
scale. At least some of the high threat rating for the United States stems from
perceptions that the United States influences, or interferes in, Thailand’s
domestic politics. As we noted in the Introduction, this was shown statistically
through a correlation between threat ratings for Great Powers and the belief
that Great Powers can influence Thailand’s domestic politics. The correlation
was strongest in the case of the United States (compared with China, India,
Japan and Russia).
In what follows, we will argue that a substantial amount of this belief
stems from memory of the Cold War, in which the United States had consid-
erable influence over the stability of Thai political actors. This is not to deny
the importance of more recent history, and in particular more recent Thai
observations of US unilateralism in the post–​Cold War era. The US use of
military force for democracy promotion in the post–​Cold War era, as well as
the emergence of the internet, may have strengthened the perceptions that
rhetoric may be accompanied by interference, either covert or military. As one
Thai newspaper columnist explained in 2018, since the Iraq invasion of 2003,
tough US public rhetoric is seen as potentially heralding military attack:

Before the United States destroys any country, it lays a Rolling Plan, the
first phase of which is destroying the credibility of the leaders of that
country systematically …47

Here, however, we argue that reaction to the United States’ vigorous con-
demnation of Thailand’s 20 May 2014 coup should also be understood in a
longer historical context and collective remembering. This view is supported
by our interviews. A senior diplomat summarised the Cold War period as
one in which “sometimes the US got carried away a bit, because they could
call up anybody, anytime, prime minister or whoever, and tell them what to
do.” Whether factual or not, American covert interference has remained a
trope in Thai history writing. A Thai history of the 1947 coup published in
2015 alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the coup
because it was suspicious that Pridi Phanomyong and Seri Thai were a front
of the Thai communist party.48 Writing in the 1980s, a Thai policeman argued
that a CIA-​trained policeman firing a CIA-​supplied mortar had sunk a ship
during the Manhattan rebellion.49 It is certainly the case that the presence of
the CIA, as we will set out below, was large and that there were mis-steps. In
January 1974 a CIA agent based in Nakhon Phanom sent a false letter to Thai
newspapers purporting to be from a Thai communist. The letter offered a
cease-​fire in return for recognition of “liberated areas.” The true source of the
letter, which may have been intended to strengthen Thai government resolve
against communism, was traced and a public uproar resulted.50
This memory of interference overshadows the fact that Thailand was
a huge beneficiary of US largesse during the Cold War. About $USD 1
78 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
billion was spent on economic and military aid between 1946 and 1966.51
Designed to give Thailand greater logistics capacity to respond to threats
from China or North Vietnam, US military construction included 563 km
of asphalt road, airfields and development of Sattahip port.52 The support
also included education and training. By 1987, over 11,000 academics and
civil servants had trained in the United States under the US aid program.53
The military aid budget was also generous.54 This support, together with
Japanese investment, helped Thailand emerge from the Cold War as a tiger
economy. Thailand’s per capita GDP by 2015 was 42 times what it had been
in 1965.55 This stands in stark contrast to the plight of its predominantly
Theravada Buddhist mainland Southeast Asian neighbours Myanmar, Laos
and Cambodia.
But the memory of interference, and two other negative sites of memory
that we might term ‘social problems’ and ‘geopolitical quandary,’ in toto
diminish positive memory of the United States during the Cold War. By
memory of ‘social problems’ we mean the popular belief that the US presence
contributed to social problems such as prostitution and illegitimate Amerasian
children, and to political problems such as dictatorship.56 By ‘memory of geo-
political quandary’ we mean the view that the US defeat in Vietnam and sub-
sequent withdrawal left Thailand isolated, with no geopolitical choice but to
seek security within its own neighbourhood, most especially by forging good
relations with China and later Vietnam.
As we noted from the outset, Thai social memory of the Cold War is not
as strong or detailed as memory of the colonial period. Official secrecy may
be one reason, especially about Thai forces serving alongside US soldiers in
fighting communist forces in Laos. Even as reports of Thai ‘mercenaries’ or
‘volunteers’ appeared in English language newspapers during the 1960s, little
awareness formed in the broader community.57 But overall what remains,
when framed within the broader Occidentalism and royalist-​nationalist his-
tory, subtracts from the positive perception of the United States that formed
in the early and mid-​twentieth century. In what follows we trace how this
important historical period gave rise to these sites of memory, making the
Cold War memory of the United States one burdened by memory of interfer-
ence and difficult social and political legacies.

Aid and entanglement

The debt of friendship incurred from the US good works at the end of the
Second World War led Thailand into the Korean War in 1950 and an increasing
Cold war embrace. Although hard geopolitics underpinned the increasing
closeness, there was a sugary almost romantic tone in the bilateral relationship
of the 1950s and 1960s. As the numbers in the US Embassy swelled from 20 in
1946 to 200 in 1951, US Ambassador Edwin Stanton praised Thai people for
their bravery, claiming that this “little country is our best friend in Southeast
Asia.”58 Many Americans were charmed by the grace and manners of the
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 79
Thais, just as many travellers have been before and since. The year 1965 was a
highpoint in relations. A successful royal visit to the United States left a reposi-
tory of powerful images; King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit with Elvis Presley
and jazz musician Benny Goodman conveyed an image of easy friendship and
cultural affinity.59 Thai beauty queen Apsara Hongsakula’s winning of the
Miss Universe beauty pageant was also tremendously important. Thais were
keen to be held in high esteem, and the opinion of the US public mattered.
But behind this infatuation, the United States and its military aid had become
entangled in Thailand’s domestic political rivalries.
There were many of these rivalries and, somewhat like today, the rules
for their management were largely unwritten. Following the revolution in
1932, Thai politics had become fluid and volatile. The revolutionaries of
1932 had left King Prajadhipok (Rama VII, 1925–​1935) as a constitutional
monarch. He and his royalist supporters were unhappy with subsequent
developments and plotted their return to power. Their first attempt, the 1933
Boworadej rebellion, was only narrowly defeated by the army, after which
Prajadhipok abdicated to live abroad in England. The royalists continued to
plot. Concerning the 1932 revolution and its aftermath, British Ambassador
Josiah Crosby later commented:

It is a significant fact that their first revolution, their subsequent coup

d’etat, which took the premiership out of the hands of Phya Mano, and
the rising engineered later on by Prince Boworadej, have all of them
been virtually bloodless. The average self-​respecting revolutionary in any
South American republic would certainly laugh at these anaemic efforts
with scorn and, without condoning the ferocious methods of domestic
warfare practised in more turbulent lands, it is permissible to argue that,
had a little more blood been split in the early stages of political upheaval
in Siam, there would be a greater degree of security and order in the
country today.60

But while blood was occasionally spilt, no side was ever vanquished a la the
Russian revolution. This enabled continuing rivalry between the revolution-
aries and the royalists, later compounded by splits between the leaders of the
revolution. The struggle for power between Pridi Phanomyong and Phibun
Songkram emerged in the late 1930s after Phibun gained power in 1938.61
Their competition intensified in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of
Thailand in 1942–​1945. Pridi, who had led the domestic forces of the Seri
Thai movement while Phibun led the collaborationist government, was made
prime minister while Phibun was investigated for war crimes. Pridi’s down-
fall, engineered by the royalists, allowed Phibun a path back to power. Their
struggle reached outright warfare following the 1947 coup and Pridi’s flight
into exile. The army was Phibun’s power base and the navy Pridi’s, leading to
internecine warfare during the failed Palace and Manhattan rebellions in 1949
and 1951 respectively.
80 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
Against this febrile political landscape, diplomats of external powers
continued to seek influence. The victory of communist forces in China in
1949 spurred the view that Thailand’s large population of unassimilated
Chinese might become subject to increasing pressure from communist China.
The CIA viewed Thailand as being “committed to the West in the present
world struggle” more than any other Southeast Asian state, except perhaps
the Philippines.62 But it thought that in the event of serious encroachments
from Chinese and Vietminh communists Thailand would fall.63 The US
Ambassador to Thailand between 1947 and 1953 Edwin Stanton advocated
that military aid be given to Thailand.64 He wrote later in his memoirs that he
was well aware that offering military aid might mean entanglement with the
domestic political intrigues of the armed forces:

An additional complicating factor was the degree to which the country’s

armed forces had become enmeshed in domestic politics … On balance,
however, it seemed to me that Communist efforts to engulf all of Southeast
Asia were of such gravity that the extension of military aid, which the
Government had requested, was a step we must take in the hope that
it would unite the armed forces and create the will and determination to
defend King, country and Buddhist faith, as the Thai people had done in the
past. (italics added)65

Unfortunately, the extension of military aid, far from uniting the Thai armed
forces, further deepened its divisions.
Aid was meant to strengthen Thailand’s capacity to resist communism.
Certainly, in the wake of the North Korean attack on South Korea, communism
loomed larger in the minds of Thai leaders as a serious threat. Stanton, pre-
sent in Thailand when the invasion occurred, dated the fear of communism in
Thailand from the North Korean attack on South Korea, writing that people
began to say that “A small country like Thailand must have strong friends like
the United States and the United Nations.”66 Thailand’s commitment of 4,000
troops to the conflict was publicly construed and internally communicated as
support for the United Nations. In an interview with the Thammathipat on 30
June 1950, Prime Minister Phibun Songkram said that:

Thailand is a member of the United Nations, I’m confident this organ-

isation will be the permanent guarantor of peace in the world [lak prakan
santiphap an thawon khong lok] and a true supporter for all small nations
[penthiphueng khong prathet lek lek thang lai].67

Phibun may well have been thinking of the benefits for Thai security that
Thailand’s participation in the First World War had achieved some 32 years
earlier, including membership of the League of Nations and the renegotiation
of unequal treaties.68
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 81
The precedent of Thailand’s first coalition operation, however, with the
United States also opened the door to significant material support and with it,
impact on domestic political dynamics.69 Indeed getting military aid flowing
from the United States may well have been more important than any national
security benefit flowing from supporting the United Nations. In Fineman’s
estimation:

What brought Phibun over to the American side was the prospect of mili-
tary aid. Of all the things the Thais wanted from the United States –​eco-
nomic assistance, trade concessions, a security commitment –​none shone
with the glitter of new arms.70

In this sense, the Thai case matches Vu Tuong’s argument that local political
groups engaged in domestic political contestation manipulated Great Powers
throughout the Cold War in Asia.71 Phibun wanted military aid less for
reasons of national security than for reasons of personal security. He sought
military aid because in the fractious and unstable political environment it was
the quickest way to shore up support from the army.72
Phibun certainly faced threats from political rivals. Barely a year after the
start of the Korean war deployment, diplomats assembled to observe the US
Charge d’Affairs handing over a dredge to the Thai armed forces. Suddenly
Phibun was being kidnapped by a party of Thai Marines. The kidnapping,
later known as the Manhattan incident after the name of the ship, precipitated
a conflict in which the Thai airforce bombed the Thai naval dockyard, killing
civilians, while the Thai army shelled the Thai Navy signals department.
The rebellion, ultimately suppressed, took place over 36 hours, killing 1,200,
mostly civilians, and injuring 1800.73 During the conflict a “great deal of
ammunition had been expended by both the police and the Army” leading
the British to consider that they might be approached for supplies.74 American
observers meanwhile wondered “how much of the new stuff supplied by them
had been used by either side during the show.”75
Alongside the military aid was active CIA involvement in establishing and
shaping Thai security agencies. Drawing on the close personal links that had
developed between members of the American-​sponsored wing of the Seri
Thai and the OSS during the Second World War, the CIA established whole
new Thai security units, including the Border Patrol Police (BPP), the PARU
and an intelligence organisation during the 1950s.76 These links inevitably
drew the United States into the quagmire of Thai domestic politics.
CIA involvement was on a scale sufficient to fundamentally shift Thailand’s
domestic balance of power for almost a decade. A case in point was the rise
of army colonel Phao Siyanon. The strong links between the CIA’s Bangkok
expatriate Willie Bird and the ambitious Phao allowed him to use the police as
his route of ascent. After becoming police deputy secretary general, Phao took
the side of Phibun in the Pridi-​Phibun struggle, murdering four former Seri Thai
members of parliament following the 1951 Palace Rebellion. His reputation for
82 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
effectiveness endeared him to the British authorities, who used him along the
Malayan border. He also impressed the US officials, who saw him as capable,
albeit ruthless. Willie Bird’s company, in the meantime, became the agent for the
CIA’s front company, Sea Supply, in Bangkok. Sea Supply opened a paratrooper
training facility in Lopburi north of Bangkok in early 1951 and began training
police in airborne and guerrilla warfare. In 1953, there were 200 CIA advisers
stationed at the camp. Phao’s intimate links with the CIA encompassed the use
of his police to support Operation Paper, an operation intended to wrest control
of Yunnan province in Southern China from the communists.
Although the operation failed, Phao’s power base nonetheless continued
to grow. CIA aid expanded the police to 48,000 between 1956 and 1957, 3,000
more than the army in this period.77 The police acquired tanks, armoured
cars, helicopters, boats and modern weapons.
Ultimately the rivalry between Phibun and Pridi was replaced by a three-​
way rivalry between Phibun, Phao and Sarit Thanarat, the Thai army com-
mander. Phao’s power grew as the new US Ambassador Bill Donovan, agreed
to support new units within the police such as the BPP and the PARU in 1953.
Phibun began to fear that the United States was going to work with Phao to
remove him from power. These fears increased when Donovan was replaced
as US ambassador by John Peurifoy, who already had been involved in the
overthrow of a government in Guatamala.78 By 1955 Phao indeed felt suf-
ficiently emboldened as to approach Peurifoy, seeking his approval to move
against Sarit, approval which Peurifoy declined to offer:

I made it perfectly clear to Phao … JUSMAG is not (repeat not) encour-

aging any movement against Sarit.79

The Phao-​Sarit rivalry reached a crescendo in 1957. Sarit, by this time in

near total control of the military, attacked Phibun and Phao following their
bungled attempt at rigging the 1957 election. Sarit claimed the pair had been
aided and abetted by the United States. His newspaper, San Seri, began to
attack Sea Supply while praising Joint United States Military Assistance
Group (JUSMAG): “We are pleased to have you [JUSMAG] here because
you come to work openly, not like another unit [the CIA] that works under-
ground.”80 On 15 September Sarit seized power and both Phibun and Phao
fled. The following day Thai soldiers and supporters attacked the Sea Supply
office, causing CIA agents to begin burning documents in a situation that
could easily have turned lethal. This was a mere three years after Thailand
and the United States had become treaty allies through SEATO.

The parting of ways amidst social revolution: the US exit and

the geopolitical turn
The circumstances of the withdrawal of US forces from Thailand were
marred by dispute during the renegotiations of US basing, and were difficult
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 83
enough on their own to have left a negative legacy. But just as, if not more
important, are the domestic social and political upheavals which accom-
panied US withdrawal during the 1970s, especially the political violence and
unrest that erupted in 1973 and 1976. These have become linked in Thai col-
lective memory. The Mayaguez incident of 1975 brought to a head issues
surrounding sovereignty and basing together with issues of social justice, in a
particularly potent cocktail of emotions.
After 1957, Thai-​ US enmeshment had deepened. Thailand became
involved in US wars in Laos and Vietnam, hosted US airforce bombing
missions from bases in Northeast Thailand and took US advice on defeating
its own communist insurgency. But the looming defeat of the US in Vietnam
signalled that change was approaching. From Nixon’s announcement of the
Guam Doctrine in 1969, Thai security elites understood the United States was
leaving. When this finally occurred, with defeat in the Vietnam War, middle-​
class frustration at more than a decade of dictatorship was a firestorm waiting
to be ignited.
The events of 1973, which saw the overthrow of dictatorship, and 1976,
which saw the massacre of student protesters, profoundly changed Thai pol-
itics. They inhabit important places in Thai collective memory. Their respective
dates, sipsee dula (14 October) and hok dula (6 October 1976), evoke powerful
memories and feelings, despite the absence of official government commem-
oration. Thailand’s 1973 revolution brought the end of an era of unchal-
lenged absolutist dictatorship commenced by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat
in 1957. Students and the middle class protested in large numbers against the
continued rule of the government of army general Thanom Kittakachorn.
After several days of stand-​off and after the tragic shooting of a student,
the government lost its moral authority. The dictators fled into exile and a
period of democratic experimentation commenced. The events of 1973 exert
a great hold in Thai collective memory. David Wyatt wrote that the 1973 revo-
lution, together with the three years of democratic government that followed
and the 1976 anti-​leftist massacres, “imprinted the minds of virtually all Thai
with vivid memories and impressions.” Charnvit Kasetsiri called the event
“one of the most significant in Thai history.”81 Thongchai Winichakul argues
that the 1973 uprising was significant not only for the political upending, but
also because it triggered an intellectual revolution with new schools of history
revising how Thais saw their past.82
In the course of the 1973 revolution the bilateral relationship with the
United States suffered serious collateral damage. The leftist element of the
protests viewed the US-​Thai alliance through the prism of dictatorship, since
the dictators were associated with a fawning and overly dependent relation-
ship with the United States.83 Students questioned the threat posed by com-
munism and the use of Thai territory for the prosecution of the air wars on
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.84
The 1975 Mayaguez incident, in which US Marines used the Thai airbase
at Utapao for an attempt at rescue of Americans kidnapped at sea by the
84 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
Khmer Rouge, came at a particularly bad time. Matters were made worse
by clumsy diplomacy, with the US ambassador of the time, McMaster, not
informed ahead of the Marine operation. McMaster wrote in dispatches at
the time that he:

had absolutely no advance word that military action was to be taken by

U.S. aircraft based in Thailand to obtain the release of the Mayaguez
… I have now learned that U.S. aircraft were launched from bases in
Thailand at about 1330 hours Bangkok time. This is an hour and a half
before I met the Prime Minister at his request to discuss the matter.85

He continued on, stating that he could not “stress to [sic] strongly the damage
to U.S.-​Thai interests which [would] likely result from this unilateral action.”
He rightly suspected that the Thais would believe that his failure to mention
the operation was deliberate rather than “an unbelievable lack of coordin-
ation and foresight in failing to keep [him] informed.” While US Secretary of
State Kissinger’s initial response was to downplay the Thai indignation, asking
“can we send a few tranquilizers to Masters?” there was serious damage.86
Masters was in hindsight correct in assessing the incident would “likely to be
very costly for U.S.-​Thai relations at a time when the Thai are already moving
rapidly to reassess their foreign policy.”
The Kukrit government submitted a letter of protest and outrage at the
infringement of Thai sovereignty spread. On 17 May 1975 an angry mob
marched from Thammasat University to the residence of the US ambassador
calling for the United States to ask for forgiveness from the Thai people. The
incident included the burning of an American flag, triggering anger in the
United States.87 One of the protestors urging students to fight against US
imperialism was Thirayuth Boonmee, a key protagonist in the 1973 revolu-
tion.88 The Thai press expressed fury, with the Thai Rath stating that “what
we want is the U.S. assurance that it will not commit any acts that may violate
Thailand’s sovereignty and cause us difficulties in future.”89
The Mayaguez incident complicated the negotiation of the future terms
of the US-​Thai alliance. Anand Panyarachun, Thailand’s ambassador to the
United States, was recalled to conduct a review of all agreements with the
United States. His review, which found two agreements that had been signed
without the knowledge of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, raised fur-
ther concerns in the Kukrit government.90 Of particular sensitivity were
agreements which sanctioned the presence of US technicians and staff at the
Ramasoon intelligence facility in Northeastern Thailand. The agreements
gave US personnel exemption from Thai jurisdiction, and had no time limit.
Anand drove his review of the agreements with characteristic forthrightness,
believing that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should lead on foreign policy.
He took a hard line on negotiating the terms of the exit of US forces from
Thailand under the then Foreign Minister Chatchai Choonhavan. This won
him few friends in the US security establishment and made him enemies in the
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 85
Thai military, who sought his downfall following the 1976 violence. Anand,
then permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, investigated as
a communist sympathiser. Stood down from his position, Anand spent weeks
in limbo before being exonerated.91 Nonetheless it would be a mistake to think
that the view of the United States was changing only amongst diplomats,
students and leftists.
The view that Thailand needed to end the presence of US troops to protect
its geopolitical future was shared across the military and politicians. During
the Kukrit period, some 22 out of 29 influential decision-​makers, including
members of Cabinet, the House of Representatives, Foreign Ministry, and
the National Security Council believed that the withdrawal of US combat
forces and airbases from Thailand would be good for Thai national security.92
They believed that Thailand could not establish friendly relations with its
neighbours, in particular Vietnam, without the exit of the Americans.
Consequently, after the two years of an appointed government under
Sanya Dharmasakti (1973–1975), elections were held and the newly elected
Prime Minister Seni Pramoj promised the end of US troop presence within
18 months. Seni’s brother Kukrit, elected following a vote of no confidence,
ended Seni’s brief reign, one-​upped him, promising the exit of all troops
within 12 months. The effect of the US defeat was likely powerful. British
failure to defend Singapore in the Second World War left an indelible imprint
on the minds of many native Singaporeans, to the point where the legitimacy
for Britain to continue its colonial rule was in question. It appears that US
defeat in the Vietnam War and subsequent disavowal of interests in Southeast
Asia did similar damage to Thai faith in the utility of the alliance.93
In a forthcoming book, Thai scholar Jittipat Poonkham argues that the
1970s and the departure of United States catalysed a fundamental rupture
in Thai foreign policy thinking and discourse that has been insufficiently
acknowledged or documented.94 The need to invent a foreign policy stance
less tied to alignment with the United States led ultimately to the invention of
the “bending with the wind” metaphor for Thailand’s “bamboo” diplomacy.
This meant that not only did Thailand commence relationships of détente
with previous foes such as the Soviet Union and communist China during
the 1970s, they recast the history of modern Thai foreign policy to mirror the
exigencies of the present. Thailand’s survival through the Second World War
and the colonial period were thus attributed to an immemorial “bamboo dip-
lomacy,” a powerful metaphor for Thai foreign policy that has held sway not
only in Thailand but also globally.95
Over subsequent years the legacy of the US bases and troops in Thai
collective memory appeared to worsen, amongst both the Thai community
and elites. In February 1986 political developments in the Philippines led to
some cause for speculation that the United States might seek new military
bases outside the Philippines. It prompted speculation amongst Thai gov-
ernment figures, parliamentarians and the media over what Thailand ought
to do if the United States sought to reopen bases in Thailand. While some
86 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
canvassed the possibility of economic benefit, the preponderant reaction was
negative. Sentiments expressed included that the bases would “touch off a
regional arms race and hinder Thailand’s foreign relations.” There was also
reflection on earlier experiences, with the Thai Rath newspaper arguing that
the previous US presence had created “social problems like illegitimate chil-
dren” and had been responsible for the “emergence of tyrants.”96 Whether
accurate or not, the trope that “United States imperialism” was responsible
for Thailand’s military rule remains very much part of contemporary Thai
collective memory.97
As time passed, Thai popular culture associated the Cold War alliance
of the United States with “social problems.” It is estimated that up to 7,000
Amerasian children were born from the stationing of US troops in Thailand
between 1962 and 1975.98 The 1973 book and film Khao Nok Na traced
the story of two Amerasian children, born out of wedlock because of GIs
stationed in Thailand. The book became a television serial shown in 1990–​
1991.99 Our military interviewees mentioned this book as indicative of their
memory of the Cold War. This association with social problems appears to be
stronger than, for example, gratitude to the United States for its contributions
to Thai nation-​building in the form of both soft and hard infrastructure
contributions.
Some Thais we interviewed questioned whether the US Cold War diag-
nosis of the communist threat and especially the Chinese was accurate. Even
today, debate continues about the accuracy of assessments of the Cold War
communist threat in Southeast Asia. Leaving aside this vexed question, US
intelligence did make two significant errors with respect to Thailand during
the Cold War. One was interpreting China’s establishment of the Thai
autonomous zone in southern Yunnan as a threat to Thai stability intended
to encourage a communist rebellion amongst ethnic Tais in Thailand, Laos
and Burma. It is more likely that this reflected Chinese government adminis-
trative policy towards its ethnic minorities.100 The second was seeing the exiled
former Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong’s presence in China and Yunnan as
a sign that Pridi was communist and actively seeking to foster a communist
uprising from China. Pridi welcomed Beijing’s sanctuary, but he remained lib-
eral and a supporter of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy.
Today, Thailand’s contributions to American-​led wars against communist
forces are little recognised or commemorated. Some may be surprised at
this. Yet in general, twentieth-​century war memorials are of less importance
in Thailand than memorials associated with past kings such as Naresuan
or Taksin. They occupy less public space, and the space they do inhabit
is less prominent. Some are found collocated with military bases, like the
Monument to the Bravery and Sacrifice of the Thai Soldiers on the Vietnam
Battlefield, at the Royal Thai Army’s base at Lat Ya, Kanchanaburi. They
certainly do not inhabit the metaphysical space between religion and history
in the way that shrines dedicated to Taksin, Naresuan or Chulalongkorn
in their warrior guises do.101 Moreover, as we have seen in the case of the
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 87
Vietnam War, there has been both revisionism as to the wisdom of Thailand’s
involvement and, as we will see in the next chapters, a strong drive to set
aside commemorations which might irritate international relations. In the
case of the Korean War though, the Thai veterans do periodically organise
some commemorative activity as they did in 2015, but this has relatively
little public profile.102
Looking to the future, there is potential for the ascent of Rama X, who
saw active service in the Cold War against Thailand’s communist insur-
gency, to start to bring greater attention to the Cold War. For example,
in October 2019 Army Chief General Apirat Kongsompol gave a public
speech in which he described the king’s actions during that deployment,
saying it showed that the “the monarchy, the military and the people
cannot be separated.”103 This remains, however, highly uncertain given the
monarch’s relative remoteness and unpopularity compared to his father,
and uncertainty as to how the United States would figure in any greater
Cold War memorialisation. Reversing the current collective memory would
be neither rapid, nor easy.

Post–​Cold War: memory of drift and disregard

The memory of the post–​Cold War era in Thai-​US relations is of increasing
distance, declining intimacy and disappointment at lack of assistance.
To an extent this was inevitable, as the imperative which had brought the
United States to Southeast Asia vanished as regional battlefields became
marketplaces. Thais felt acutely, however, their fall from US focus, especially
in episodes such as the Asian Financial Crisis. This, and greater US public
criticism of Thailand’s coups, saw the reassertion of an Occidentalist view of
the United States.
After Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia fell to communism in 1975, American
interest in Southeast Asia dropped abruptly. For example, after spending
some $3.1 billion per year on the secret war, Presidents Ford and Carter
paid no more attention to Laos.104 While the US and Thailand military rela-
tionship experienced an uptick after the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia
in late 1978, with the establishing of the annual Cobra Gold multilateral
exercise and an arrangement for supply of munitions, the larger bilateral
relationship began to drift. Points of friction emerged during Thai-​US
interactions on trade, such as violation of intellectual property rights and
labour rights.
Our interviewees remembered the fall in Thailand’s importance for the
United States. One former senior diplomat commented that since the end of
the Cold War:

we see less of the American interest in Thailand. There was Alexis

Johnston, Martin, that kind of Ambassador who would come to
Thailand … they would send the very very senior level of ambassador to
88 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
this country … now we get deputy assistant secretary, which we all know,
is a very low level … that shows the American interest in Thailand is no
longer there.

Writing even before the United States had departed Southeast Asia, George
Liska anticipated that the degree of enmeshment achieved in the extreme
circumstances of the height of the Cold War threat might later haunt US
alliances. The US efforts to compensate for differences in material wealth,
he wrote, “prematurely narrowed the political gap between states of unequal
power by raising the less developed countries to an artificially high level of
apparent importance and influence.”105
Thai elites have an abiding recollection of US disinterest in Thailand
during the 1997 Financial Crisis. One of the first significant events of the
post–​Cold War era, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis saw the Thai economy
shrink by 11% in 1997.106 For 40 years annual Thai economic growth had
never gone below 4% and had averaged 7%. Suddenly it plummeted. The
crisis destroyed businesses and engendered a nationalist backlash and a dis-
trust of globalisation that has remained, including in the form of the late
King Bhumibol’s Sufficiency Economy philosophy. The unfavourable rec-
ollection of the United States is sustained by anecdote such as that of
Dr Veerapong Ramangkura, then Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs. In late 1997, Veerapong met Stanley Fischer, of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) managing director, and asked Fischer to work together
with him on the IMF-​Thai deal then in train. Fischer declined, saying he had
too many countries to look after. When Veerapong argued that a single for-
mula should not be applied to every country given their different economic
and political cultures, Fischer reportedly replied “Don’t worry. The single for-
mula can be applied all over.”107 The memory remains, one of our interviewees
said, “there was still a feeling that the US could have done more to help ease
the financial crisis.”108 Until today, senior Thai officials express weariness at
the West’s “suffocating hold” on key global organisations such as the IMF.109
The 9/​11 attacks produced another stressful encounter. Because of its
Malay Muslim South, Thailand was initially unwilling to contribute militarily
to US military operations in Iraq, but eventually did so under pressure. One
former foreign minister told us:

the feeling then was that we wanted to help the US and to be in good terms
with the US, we didn’t want to turn the US down by refusing to send fresh
troops to help the US in Iraq after the first group of Thai soldiers returned
to Thailand. Now there was sensitivity there. As you know, we’ve had this
long ongoing Muslim unrest in the South of Thailand. And so there was
a fear in Thailand that sending troops to Iraq to help the US occupa-
tion there would aggravate the situation in the south. When US Secretary
of State Codoleezza Rice brought to my attention US request for fresh
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 89
Thai troops to be sent to Iraq, I explained to her how this could become
problematic for Thailand because of our Muslim population. Instead,
I suggested that Thailand could help in other ways, such as sending med-
ical teams to Iraq instead of soldiers.110

US pressure was also felt in relation to implementing sanctions on Myanmar,

another area where the Thais differed from the United States.
As bilateral relations were cooling Thai politics became turbulent, begin-
ning with the coup against Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The
US response to the 2006 coup was mild, but the 2014 coup elicited strong
rhetoric.111 The “coup and post-​coup repression” made it impossible for the
United States to go on with “business as usual.”112 Senior US officials drove the
message home in public speeches on Thai soil. Senior US State Department
official Danny Russell criticised the coup in a speech at Chulalongkorn
University, saying that:

I’ll be blunt here: When an elected leader is deposed, impeached by the

authorities that implemented the coup, and then targeted with criminal
charges while basic democratic processes and institutions are interrupted,
the international community is left with the impression that these steps
could be politically driven.113

Conservative Thais and swathes of the Thai mainstream media reacted

strongly to the criticism. There was a perception of US hypocrisy.
Commentators noted Thailand was not getting the same treatment as other
countries which had conducted coups; they doubted whether “the US would
apply the same standards of engagement to all allies, such as Egypt or
Israel.”114 The Thai language press complained that the “US really wasn’t
interested in democracy or human rights very much. It has supported coups
in Egypt, Ukraine, Iraq, Iran, Algeria and other countries all over the world
that help its national interests.”115 Numerous interviewees cited the com-
parison with the US treatment of the Egyptian’s military. Suspension of aid
money was not at issue, it was the principle.
The state of Thailand’s democracy lurked beneath the surface of the
Thai-​US relationship throughout the Cold War, so the Thai public acrimony
between Thailand in the wake of the 2014 coup was inevitable. But from the
US perspective in 2014, how could the United States, a country that believed
it was created to fulfil God’s will of spreading “liberty and democracy across
the world,” forever remains silent as its military partner overthrew yet
another democratically elected government?116 US governments had thrust
aside misgivings concerning military involvement in politics throughout the
Cold War, because of the strong belief that the threat from communism was
paramount. Edwin Stanton, the US ambassador to Thailand between 1947
and 1953, conceded that “[A]‌n additional complicating factor was the degree
90 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
to which the country’s armed forces had become enmeshed in domestic pol-
itics.” But he considered that support to the armed forces should continue
because

… it seemed to me that Communist efforts to engulf all of Southeast

Asia were of such gravity that the extension of military aid, which the
Government had requested, was a step we must take in the hope that it
would unite the armed forces and create the will and determination to
defend King, country and Buddhist faith, as the Thai people had done
in the past.117

In the post–​Cold War era Thais remembered US interference in Thai pol-

itics, including through complicity in previous Thai coups. But exacerbating
the irritation for many Thais was the United States’ repeated willingness to
use military force in the post–​Cold War ‘unipolar moment.’ In 2018 US pol-
itical scientist Larry Diamond pinpointed 2005 as the beginning of a global
democracy recession and suggested that the 2003 Iraq invasion may have
contributed to this because it linked democracy promotion with the use of
military force.118 Apropos of this observation, Thai academic Kien Theervit
opined in 2017 that:

The United States is believed to be the champion of democracy but there

isn’t any other country that has done more harm to innocent people
around the world. Who was the leader that deposed Saddam Hussein in
Iraq, who toppled the government of Ghaddafi in Libya? Causing both
these countries to fall into civil war until today. There is still Afghanistan,
Syria and others.119

In part the levels of “ideational hegemony” between the United States and
Thailand achieved during the 1990s, with shared liberalising democratic and
economic policies, began to diminish in the twenty-​first century.120 We found
this in our interviews, even leaving aside the rancour over the 2014 coup. One
senior Thai scholar and government adviser put it this way:

Cooperation works best on a whole understanding, that the use of Utapao

or airbases in Thailand are quite free and open for the US, because of nat-
ural national interests. But when there are remarks about our institutions
like monarchy, our politics, our military and Thailand in general, in terms
of trade, and other conflicting issues, it raises a lot of doubt that, do we
still share these interests. And popular sentiments are also everywhere in
Thailand against the American hegemony in general.

Part of the decline also reflects the continued strength of Thai royalist nation-
alism, and the accompanying Occidentalism, which means that even as the
West is admired, it is resented as an irresistible force that threatened Thai
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 91
sovereignty and traumatised Thai monarchs in the colonial era. Part of the
decline in shared outlook parallels a greater Thai investment in ASEAN, both
as a vehicle for Thailand’s own grand strategy and as an institution with whose
norms Thailand has increasingly identified. As Linda Quale noted, ASEAN
countries have strongly supported the delegitimising of the use of military
force that has occurred since 1945, and this has contributed to declining idea-
tional congruence in both the Thai and Philippines alliances with the United
States.121 In the next two chapters we will examine how Thailand’s journey in
its memory and perception of its neighbours is still evolving, and explore the
implications for the US-​Thai alliance.
To identity drift must be added the lack of positive memory of the alliance
in the Cold War era, which might otherwise have provided a bedrock for the
relationship. Analysis of the survey results also suggested that any gratitude
to the United States could diminish over time, with the tendency for younger
officers, compared with their older colleagues, to have less favourable views of
the United States during the Cold War. In particular, on the degree of wel-
come or unwelcome for United States’ influence in Thailand, there was some
correlation between age and positive perception of the United States for the
Cold War and post–​Cold War years, with older respondents tending to see US
influence as more welcome than younger respondents.122

Conclusion
In the 1950s the CIA developed a sophisticated Cold War strategy for
Southeastern Asian countries. The agency thought it essential that non-​
communist governments fighting communist insurgencies establish an
image of benevolence for rural populations. Accordingly, they proposed
“using military resources in rural civic action programs designed to popu-
larize the government and its army.”123 As a consequence, Thailand’s BPP
was founded in 1950. From early on in its history the BPP taught school-​
age ethnic minorities in Thailand’s highlands and border area the Thai lan-
guage. From the mid-​1950s this effort encompassed the building of schools,
with the first school opened in Chiang Khong in Thailand’s Chiang Rai
province in January 1956.124 The BPP education programs have been very
successful in Thailand’s state-​building, and they continue in Thailand’s
border provinces. But how many Thais today know or feel gratitude for the
US role in establishing these programs? Like Japanese using kanji script
borrowed from China or Westerners using the Indian numeral zero in
their arithmetic, Thai memory of the origins of these programs are rarely
triggered, let alone their architects commemorated. Instead, the origins of
these programs are subsumed into the overall narrative of the benevolence
of the Thai monarchy.
In this chapter we argued that three sites of memory exist for the Thai-​
US alliance, a memory of gratitude for the generosity, benevolence and pro-
tection of the United States from the early and mid-​twentieth century; a
92 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
memory of interference, social problems and negative geopolitical legacies
from the Cold War period and a memory of drift and mutual disregard from
the post–​Cold War era. Cumulatively, and in terms of the balance of com-
patible identity for the Thai-​US alliance, this site of memory constitutes a
liability rather than an asset. Unfortunately, from the US perspective, aspects
of Thai domestic politics and Thai foreign policy have prevented greater
commemoration of Cold War and World War cooperation, in respectively
the Vietnam and Korean Wars and the struggle of the Seri Thai against the
Japanese occupation. Also, unfortunately for the image of the United States,
Thai royalist-​nationalist sentiment inclines Thais, especially in times of crisis,
to see the United States through the memory of the West’s encroachments
during the colonial era.125
Does US officer education for Thai military officers ameliorate the effects
of these sites of memory and resultant identity dissonance for the Thai mili-
tary? By the twenty-​first century, over 21,000 officers had studied in the
United States under International Military Education and Training (IMET)
programs.126 Some interviewees suggested this was the contributing factor to
US influence:

when you give a scholarship to a Thai officer to attend some school or

courses in the US they will get better understanding about the US culture.
Once they come back to Thailand the idea is still with them throughout
his life, his military career.127

But our survey results cast doubt on the net benefit of the extensive US
IMET program in terms of a more positive view of the United States.
We tested whether study in the United States had any statistical effect on
responses to perceptions of the level of threat from all Great Powers and
perceptions of the level of threat from the United States. The test showed no
statistically significant difference between respondents who had studied in
the United States and those who had studied overseas in other countries.128
Similar results were contained in relation to views of the US rebalance and
degrees of US influence in various periods of history: no statistically dis-
cernible effect.129 Our findings align with those of Paul Chambers in relation
to the effectiveness of IMET in promoting democratic governance. After
listing the number of US-​trained officers who have participated in Thai
coups, these training programs are as far as inculcating democratic values,
he concludes, “useless.”130
To be sure, we are not arguing that the balance of identity and negative
memory deficit to be fatal to the alliance. From the Thai perspective, there
are indeed assets to be prized. Firstly, the institutionalising of English lan-
guage usage and US military doctrine in the Thai military keeps the United
States an attractive partner purely at the military level. Language and doc-
trine favour the US alliance. The second language of Thai military officers is
overwhelmingly English. Although there is a small and increasing number of
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 93
Thai officers studying Mandarin Chinese, it is not widely taught or spoken
in Thailand (ethnic Sino-​Thais generally speak Teoh Chiou) and the officers
returning from language study struggle to maintain their skills. Doctrinally,
the Thai military is very close to the United States, having adopted US mili-
tary doctrine since the 1950s. As one officer told us, procurement from coun-
tries other than the United States has not changed this:

For example, even though we have the [Swedish] Grippen combat air-
craft, we still use the US doctrine. We use the Chinese tank but still use
US doctrine. We study it in the Command and General Staff College. The
organization of our units is also still based on the US.131

Secondly and more importantly, Thailand’s strategic culture promotes the

maintenance of multiple relationships with Great Powers. As we stated in
Chapter 2 regarding the memory of Chulalongkorn’s example, Thailand’s
renowned preference for an omnidirectional foreign policy remains strong
amongst both Thailand’s military and diplomats. We frequently heard
interviewees stress the importance of balance in foreign relations. Former
foreign ministers, academics, junior military officers and senior military
officers were unanimous in expressing this view. Some explicitly referenced
the example of nineteenth-​century monarch Chulalongkorn, who fam-
ously preserved Thailand’s independence despite the close attention of
predatory European powers, France and England. This principle suggests
that Thailand will aspire to “balance” its relations with major powers
to ensure that none gain disproportionate influence, giving Thailand a
degree of freedom in its posture. It suggests that even as China’s influ-
ence grows, Thailand will seek strong relationships with other powers,
particularly the United States, as well as with regional powers India and
Japan. It will also seek to strengthen its relations with ASEAN, and its
leadership role in relation to its neighbouring countries. These factors
make the Thailand alliance viable, at least from the Thai perspective, into
the future. The alliance will, however, be more a ‘partnership’ than an
alliance with the exclusivity that the term implies, and much unlike other
US alliances such as with Australia or Japan. We will explore the role of
memory in constraining Thailand’s efforts to build relations with ASEAN
in later chapters, but for now we turn to examining the effect of memory
in Thailand’s relationship with its principal alternative Great Power suitor,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Notes
1 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‘Thai-​US Treaty Alliance Needs Realigning’, Bangkok
Post, 15 January 2016.
2 Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 37.
3 PARU is an elite unit within the Border Patrol Police (BPP).
94 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
4 A senior Thai military officer interviewed in Bangkok in 2016 said that
“Interoperability with the Chinese is still a long way off ” because “it’s very dan-
gerous, flying the Chinese and American airplanes together and you can’t speak
the same languages.” He clarified the Thai-​China “Falcon Strike” air exercise
as more like “we fly, they fly” and “not the joint training as such as we do with
Australia or the US.”
5 In addition to the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold, Thailand and the United
States conduct over 50 smaller bilateral military exercises each year. Joshua
Kurlantzick, ‘A New Approach to Thailand’s Insurgency’, Discussion Paper,
Council of Foreign Relations, October 2016, p. 11.
6 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, see introduction for more detail. This result was
found in three consecutive years of surveying, and after reformulation of the Thai
language version of the question. See Tables A.1 and A.2 and Figures A.1 and A.2
in Annexure for survey results.
7 Perceptions of Thailand being dependent on the United States for protection
against external military threats were evident, with 4 out of 10 officials believing
Thailand is highly dependent, while 5 out of 10 saw a medium reliance (n=944).
Four out of ten considered the US-​Thai relationship to be that of a patron and
client, almost twice the number who perceived the relationship to be that of friends
(n=994). See Tables A.4, A.5, A.7, A.8 and A.9, and Figures A.4, A.6 and A.7 in
the Annexure for survey results.
8 Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, ‘Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of
Regional Expectations’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 2014.
9 Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics’, pp. 134–​135.
10 The first was the nineteenth century. The second was the early twentieth century
from 1900 to 1918, a period corresponding from the turn of the century until the
end of the First World War. The third was the mid-​twentieth century from 1919 to
1945, corresponding with the period between the end of the the First World War
and going up to the end of the Second World War. The fourth was the Cold War,
which we dated from 1947 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The
fifth was the post–​Cold War era, which we dated from 1992 to 2008. The sixth and
last was the period from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 until the present.
11 We undertook a factor analysis for the degree of significance for US influence on
military and security matters over various time periods. Bartlett’s test of spher-
icity was significant (χ2(15) = 2026.759, p<.001) suggesting the variables were
sufficiently correlated to make factor analysis possible. A principal components
analysis was conducted which initially suggested two discrete factors; however, a
three-​factor solution fit the data better (the scree plot suggested three factors, and
the results were three factors made more sense in the rotated component matrix).
A Varimax rotation was applied to the factor solution in order to make the
variables which loaded on these three factors more distinct. The analysis suggests
that respondents generally thought about the United States’ influence as having
three distinct periods: (1) nineteenth and early twentieth century (which explained
44.69% of variance); (2) mid-​twentieth century and Cold War (which explained
28.74% of the variance) and (3) post–​Cold War and after (12.33% of the vari-
ance). See Table A.14 in Annexure for survey results.
12 ‘Thai-​US Ties Nourish Global Sstability’, Bangkok Post, 25 September 2015,
accessed at www.bangkokpost.com/​print/​706816/​ on 25 September 2015.
13 Vella, Siam under Rama III, p. 122.
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 95
14 Ibid., pp. 116, 122.
15 Jim Algie, Denis Gray, Nicholas Grossman, Jeff Hodson, Robert Horn and Wesley
Hu, Americans in Thailand (Bangkok: Editions Didier Millet, 2014), p. 125.
16 Interview, Anand Panyarachun, Bangkok, 2016.
17 Thamsook Numnonda, ‘The First American Advisers in Thai History’, Journal of
the Siam Society 62, no. 2 (1974), p. 125.
18 ‘Foreign Benefactors towards Thai Law’, Daily News, 2 December 2015, ชาวต่างปร
ะเทศผู้มีคุณแก่วงการกฎหมายไทย (๑), accessed at www.dailynews.co.th/​article/​364315 on
16 April 2020.
19 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A
Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p. 9.
20 Tamara Loos, Subject Siam: Family, Law and Colonial Modernity in Thailand
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 4.
21 Mr Peel to Mr Grey, Siam Annual Report, 1910, 1 March 1911, TNA FO371/​
1221.
22 In 1917 Thailand decided to side with the Allies in the First World War and to
send a deployment of 1,100 airmen and ambulance drivers to France in July 1918.
Raymond, ‘War as Membership’, 43, no. 1, p. 8.
23 Mr Lyle to Earl Curzon, Bangkok 20 August 1919, review of Memorandum put
forward by the Siamese government respecting the revision of existing Treaties
and Tariffs. TNA FO 371/​4091 p. 402, p. 408.
24 F. B. Sayre, ‘The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam’, American Journal of
International Law 22, no. 1 (1928), p. 88.
25 Ibid., p. 81.
26 Thamsook Numnonda, ‘The First American Advisers in Thai History’, Journal of
the Siam Society 62, no. 2 (1974), p. 126.
27 Narong Sinsawat, Sonbang Yikhan and Chutharat Bangyi, Baep-​rian sangkhom-​
sueksa panha rawang prathet chan matayom-​sueksa ton-​plai, Senior High School
Social Studies Textbook: International Problems (Bangkok: Thai Watthana
Phanit, 1976), p. 130.
28 ‘Foreign Benefactors towards Thai Law’, Daily News, 23 December 2015, ชาวต่างปร
ะเทศผู้มีคุณแก่วงการกฎหมายไทย (๔), accessed at www.dailynews.co.th/​article/​368572 on
16 April 2020.
29 Interview, Tej Bunnag. For a detailed treatment of how and why Siam’s par-
ticipation resulted in improvement in its global standing see Raymond, ‘War as
Membership’.
30 Kitti Prasirtsuk, ‘An Ally at the Crossroads: Thailand in the US Alliance System’,
in Michael Wesley (ed.), Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century
(Canberra: ANU Press, 2017).
31 Foreign Records of the United States (FRUS) (1944) Proposed declaration by the
British government in regard to Thailand, p. 1312.
32 Ibid., p. 1312.
33 Foreign Records of the United States (FRUS) (1944), The Department of State
to the British Embassy. Note handed to the British Ambassador (Halifax) on
20 March by the Assistant Secretary of State Berle, p. 1314.
34 Ibid., p. 1314.
35 Foreign Records of the United States (FRUS) (1944), the secretary of state to
the ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, 16 August 1944,
p. 1315.
96 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
36 Office of Strategic Services, ‘American Interests in Regard to Thailand’, 30 May
1945, NND 760050 Box 3398, General Records of the Department of State,
Declassified Authority 760050, p. 13.
37 Ibid., p. 22.
38 Letter from American political adviser Bangkok Charles Yost to Secretary of
State, dated 4 January 1946. NND 760050 Box 3398, General Records of the
Department of State, Declassified Authority 760050
39 Sinsawat, Yikhan and Bangyi, Baep-​rian sangkhom-​sueksa panha rawang prathet
chan matayom-​sueksa ton-​plai, p. 131.
40 Professor Piyanat Bunnak, ประวัติศาสตร์สมัยใหม่ ตั้งแต่การทำ�สนธิสัญญาบาวริงถึง เหตุการณ์
14 ตุลาคม พศ, 2516 New Era Thai History (from the Bowring Treaty to the 14
October Incident 1973) (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2010).
41 Triam Udom Suksa School, สรุปคำ�สอนวิชาประวัติศาสตร์ สากล และ ไทย, Teaching
Materials for Thai and Western History (Bangkok: Khurutpha, 1965), p. 95
42 Ministry of Culture, ประวัติศาสตร์ชาติไทย, History of Thailand (Bangkok: Ministry
of Culture, 2015), p. 184.
43 Photo from Seri Thai Museum in possession of the author.
44 Posted on the page of Duangjai Navachit, accessed at www.facebook.com/​
duangjai.navavichit/​videos/​2391989967491799/​ on 17 April 2020. At this date the
video had been viewed 112,000 times, shared 1,800 times, and had received 2,000
likes and 675 comments.
45 The 2013 figures. The Nation, 20 July 2015.
46 Workshop with Strategic Studies Centre, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters,
20 November 2016.
47 มิติการุณย์ มิ่งรุจิราลัย สหรัฐฯเปิดสึกจับนางเมิ่ง, ‘The US Opens Hostilities with the Arrest of
Miss Meng’, Thai Rath, 10 December 2018, p. 2.
48 Phleerng Phuuphaa, สงครามกลางเมือง กบฏ แมนฮตตัน, Civil War: The Manhattan
Rebellion (Bangkok: Siam Knowledge, 2015), p. 43.
49 Amrung Sakunrat, ‘Krai Wa Phao Mai Di?’, Who Says that Phao Was Bad? as
quoted in Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 149.
50 George K. Tanham, Trial in Thailand (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974), p. 127.
51 Moshe Lissak, Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-​ Military Relations in
Thailand and Burma (London: Sage, 1976), p. 94.
52 Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the United States: Development Security and
Foreign Aid (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 65
53 Ibid., p. 65.
54 Between 1951 and 1971, US military assistance to Thailand was equivalent to half
the Thai military’s own budget. Chai-​Anan Samudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse and
Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive: Attitudinal
Transformation of Thai Military Officers since 1976 (Bangkok: Institute of Security
and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1990), p. 21.
55 That is, USD$5,820. Asian Development Bank, ADB and Thailand: A Development
Partnership toward Inclusive Growth (Thailand: Asian Development Bank,
2017), p. 4.
56 These types of social problems have occurred elsewhere where there have been
large American military bases, and have had serious impacts on alliances
with partners such as the Philippines and Japan. See, for example, Masamichi
Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of
Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) and Victoria Reyes,
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 97
Global Borderlands: Fantasy, Violence, and Empire in Subic Bay, Philippines
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).
57 Staff Report for the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Thailand, Laos and Cambodia January 1972, dated 8 May 1972, Approved for
release 2001/​11/​16: CIA-​RDP74B00415R000600080024-​8.
58 Edwin F. Stanton, Brief Authority: Excursions of a Common man in an Uncommon
World (London: Robert Hale, 1957), pp. xiii, 262.
59 Matthew Phillips, Thailand in the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 179.
60 Comments made by the British minister, Josiah Crosby, Great Britain,
F. O. 371/​18207, 12 September 1934 as quoted in Scot Barme, ‘Luang Vichit
Wathakan: Official Nationalism and Political Legitimacy Prior to the Second
World War’, MA thesis, Australian National University, December 1989, p. 91.
61 In fact it was only with the ascent of army strongman Sarit Thanarat in 1957
that Thai politics began to stabilise, albeit in the form of a partnership between
the authoritarian Sarit and the nascent monarchy embodied by the young King
Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX 1946–​2016).
62 O. I. R Contribution to SE-​22: Consequences of Certain Possible US Courses
of Action with Respect to Indochina, Burma, or Thailand, 21 February 1952,
Approved for release 2000/​08/​29: CIA-​RDP79S01011A000600030001-​0.
63 Central Intelligence Estimate, ‘Resistance of Thailand, Burma, and
Malaya to Communist Pressures in the Event of a Communist Victory
in Indochina in 1951’, 20 March 1951, Approved for release 2000/​ 08/​
29:
CIA-​RDP79R01012A000400050005-​6.
64 Letter Ambassador to Thailand Edwin Stanton to Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, 1 September 1949, Declassified 760050NND File 1945-​49 Box 3398
General Records of the Department of State.
65 Stanton, Brief Authority, p. 255.
66 Ibid., p. 255.
67 ‘Various Newspaper articles concerning the state of the war including whether
the role of the United Nations and the impact of the Korean War on the Thai
Economy’, 1 May–​21 July 1950, in TNA, Supreme Command Headquarters 6.1/​2.
68 See Raymond, ‘War as Membership’.
69 The first shipment of arms arrived in late July. Fineman, Special Relationship,
p. 118. In August of 1950 the US Embassy in Bangkok requested further detail on
the management of rotations, numbers of officers and men, training, readiness to
travel, communications systems, capacity to support the force, fuel, food, logistics
and additional requirements for sending forces. Minutes of the Defence Council
(Banthuek yo raingan kanprachum sapha klamo khrangthi) 29/​2493 16 August 1950
TNA, Supreme Command Headquarters 6.1/​2.
70 Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 66.
71 Vu Tuong, ‘Introduction’, in Vu Tuong and Wasana Wongsurawat (eds.), Dynamics
of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1–​16.
72 Ibid., p. 69.
73 Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 148.
74 Minutes 1012/​51 dated 2 July 1951, FO 628/​79, UK National Archives.
75 Ibid.
76 For example, a former OSS officer Willis Bird had settled in Bangkok and married
the sister of former Free Thai officer and later foreign minister Air Force Colonel
98 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
Siddhi Savetsila. Bird was instrumental in bringing a number of senior Thai
officials from the Thai police and army together with the then US Ambassador
Stanton to form the so-​called Naresuan Committee, a group dedicated to opposing
communism and obtaining US assistance for this purpose. Bird also set up links
between the CIA and the Thai police to enable training for Thai police and mili-
tary officers. Desmond Ball, Tor Chor Dor Thailand’s Border Patrol Police (BPP)
Volume 1: History, Organisation, Equipment and Personnel (Bangkok: White
Lotus Press, 2013), p. 63. The intelligence organisation was the Krom Pramuan
Ratchakan Phaen-​din. Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 181.
77 Ball, Tor Chor Dor, p. 65.
78 Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 213.
79 Ibid., p. 216.
80 Ibid., p. 241.
81 Charnvit, Studies in Thai and Southeast Asian Histories, p. 379
82 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘The Changing Landscape of the Past: New Histories in
Thailand since 1973’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 26, no. 1 (March 1995),
pp. 99–​120
83 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (2nd ed.) (Yale, New Haven, 2003),
p. 289.
84 Charnvit, Studies in Thai and Southeast Asian Histories, p. 381
85 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–​ 1976, Volume E-​ 12,
Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–​1976. Telegram 8690 from the
Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, 13 May 1975, 1315Z.
86 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–​ 1976, Volume E-​ 12,
Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–​1976. Minutes of the Secretary of
State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, 16 May 1975, 8:08 a.m.
87 Prasan Mrikphithak, อานันท์ ปันยารชุน: ,ชีวิต ความคิด และรางงาน ของอดีต นายกรัฐมนตรีสองสมัย
Anand Panyanchun: Life, Thoughts, and Work of a former Former Prime Minister
of Two Terms (Bangkok: Amarin, 2542), p. 53.
88 Nicholas Grossman, Chronicle of Thailand: Headline News since 1946
(Bangkok: Bangkok Post, 2009), p. 204.
89 M. L. Bhansoon Ladavalya, ‘Thailand’s Policy under Kukrit Pramote: A Study in
Decision-​Making’, PhD thesis, Northern Illinois University, 1980, p. 159.
90 Ibid., p. 165.
91 Faulder, Anand Panayarachun, pp. 170–​186.
92 Bhansoon, ‘Thailand’s Policy under Kukrit Pramoj’, p. 221.
93 Diana Wong, ‘Memory Suppression and Memory Production: The Japanese
Occupation of Singapore’, in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White and Lisa Yoneyama
(eds.), Perilous Memories: The Asia-​Pacific War(s) (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2001), p. 233.
94 Jittipat Poonkham, A Genealogy of Bamboo Diplomacy: The Politics of Thai
Détente with Russia and China (forthcoming, Canberra: ANU Press). “A genealogy
of Thai Détente: discourses, differences and decline of Thailand’s triangular dip-
lomacy (1968–​1980)”, PhD Thesis. Aberystwyth University.
95 As we shall see in the next chapter, the decision to open relations with Beijing
and start to practise a more equidistant diplomacy was highly controversial,
and not without turbulence, as old nostrums and personal interests had to be
set aside.
 Memory and the US-Thai alliance 99
96 US Diplomatic Cable US Embassy Bangkok, ‘Speculation on US Bases in
Thailand’ dated 4 February 1986, Sanitised Copy Approved for release 24/​10/​
2011, CIA-​RDP90B01390R000700910009-​4.
97 Jasmine Chia, ‘Military Rule and Military Prominence in Thailand Is a Legacy
of American Imperialism’, Thai Enquirer, 8 July 2020, accessed at www.
thaienquirer.com/​15313/​military-​rule-​and-​military-​prominence-​in-​thailand-​is-​a-​
legacy-​of-​american-​imperialism/​ on 14 July 2020.
98 Jan R. Weisman, ‘Rice Outside the Paddy: The Form and Function of Hybridity
in a Thai Novel’, Crossroads 11, no. 1 (1997), p. 51.
99 Ibid., pp. 51–​78.
100 Jim Glassman, ‘On the Borders of Southeast Asia: Cold War Geography
and the Construction of the Other’, Political Geography 24, Issue 7 (2005),
pp. 784–​807.
101 An exception is the Thai Heroes memorial (anusawari wirathai) in Nakorn Sri
Thammarat. This bronze statue of an infantryman with a bayonet commemorates
Thai resistance to the Japanese landing and is known locally as cha dam.
102 Thai Veterans’ Department (2015a) Website of the War Veterans Organization
of Thailand under Royal Patronage of His Majesty the King. Accessed at www.
thaiveterans.mod.go.th/​index_​eng_​test.html on 18 September 2015.
103 ชมเวอร์ชั่นเต็ม “แผ่นดินของเราในมุมมองด้านความมั่นคง” โดย บิ๊กแดง พล.อ.อภิรัชต์ คงสมพงษ์,
YouTube, 11 October 2019, accessed at www.youtube.com/​watch?v=L4nkevF1P8g
on 28 October 2019. See mention at 26 minutes.
104 Joshua Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth
of a Military CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), pp. 5, 243.
105 Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 38.
106 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, Thaksin: The Business of Politics of in
Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004), p. 15.
107 Kasian Tejapira, ‘The Sino-​Thais’ Right Turn towards China’, Critical Asian
Studies, October 2017, p. 5.
108 Interview, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Bangkok, 2016.
109 ‘Prescriptions for ASEAN and Thailand: Better Governance, Stronger
Institutions’, Nikkei Asian Review, 28 August, accessed at https://​asia.nikkei.
com/ ​ E conomy/ ​ Korn- ​ C hatikavanij- ​ P rescriptions- ​ for- ​ A sean- ​ a nd- ​ T hailand-​
Better-​governance-​stronger-​institutions on 20 April 2018.
110 Interview, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Bangkok, 2016.
111 Scot Marciel, principal deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, 24 June 2016, accessed
at http://​bangkok.usembassy.gov/​062414_​scot_​marciel_​testimony.html on 25
February 2016.
112 Ibid.
113 ‘Thailand Rebukes US for Diplomat’s Comments on Freedom’, Today Online,
29 January 2015, accessed at www.todayonline.com/​world/​thailand-​rebukes-​us-​
diplomats-​comments-​freedom on 28 April 2020.
114 Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘US Political Posturing Kills US-​Thai Relations’, The
Nation, 20 July 2015.
115 Dr Arnon Sakwirawit, ‘Panda Gold versus Cobra Gold’, Thai Post, 2 June
2014, p. 4.
100 Memory and the US-Thai alliance
116 A. G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2018), p. 176.
117 Stanton, Brief Authority, p. 255.
118 Larry Diamond, ‘The Future of Democracy: What It Means for China, the
West and the Rest’, A Dream Thailand Public Lecture and Panel Discussion, 23
August 2018, Chulalongkorn University, accessed at www.youtube.com/​watch?
v=ayV70usUvTY&feature=youtu.be on 20 September 2018.
119 Khien Teerawit, ‘Nayok khonnok pen khonthai reu plao?’ (Is an Outsider PM
a Thai or Not?). Thaipost, 23 August 2016 as cited in Kasian, ‘The Sino-​Thais’
Right Turn towards China’, p. 9.
120 Connors, ‘Thailand and the United States’.
121 Linda Quayle, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on Regional Alliance Dynamics: The
Philippines and Thailand’, International Politics, 5 September 2019, https://​doi.
org/​10.1057/​s41311-​019-​00193-​9.
122 With regard to the degree of welcome or unwelcome for United States’ influ-
ence in Thailand, there was weak correlation for the Cold War and post–​Cold
War years, with older respondents tending to see US influence as more welcome
than younger respondents. [Cold War r(751) = 0.146, p<.001) and post–​Cold
War to 2008(r(751) = 0.113, p<.001).] For survey mean and median scores for
the question ‘In general, how significant has US influence been on Thailand?’,
see Table A.14, Annexure.
123 Thomas L. Ahern, Jr, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos
1961–​1973 (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006), p. 5.
124 Sinae Hyun, ‘Building a Human Border: The Thai Border Patrol Police School
Project in the Post–​Cold War Era’, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast
Asia 29, no. 2 (July 2014), p. 336.
125 In 2016, for example, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-​ ocha asked “Is
Thailand a Colony?” after hearing of US Ambassador Glyn Davies criticising
Thailand’s human rights record. ‘US Envoy Erred, Says Prayut’, Bangkok Post,
17 May 2016, accessed at www.bangkokpost.com/​thailand/​politics/​975465/​us-​
envoy-​erred-​says-​prayut on 20 April 2020.
126 Connors, ‘Thailand and the United States’, p. 140.
127 Interview, mid-​ranking Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
128 We also tested whether study in North America (Canada and United States)
had any effect on perceptions of the level of threat from all Great Powers and
perceptions of the level of threat from the United States. The test showed no
statistically significant difference between respondents who had studied in North
America and those who had studied overseas in other countries. Mann-​Whitney
U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (two-​tailed) p>0.05 in both cases. See Figure A.11
in the Annexure for survey results on overseas study participation.
129 In relation to perceptions of how welcome or unwelcome US influence was over
six periods, there was no statistically significant difference between respondents
who had studied overseas and those who hadn’t. Mann-​Whitney U Asymp. Sig.
(two-​tailed), p>0.05 in all six time periods. See Table A.15 in the Annexure for
median and mean scores on the extent to which the influence of United States
was accepted in various time periods.
130 Paul Chambers, ‘Unruly Boots: Military Power and Security Sector Reform Efforts
in Thailand’, PRIF Report No. 121, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, p. 26.
131 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
4 
Rediscovering China

Ties with China go way back. Our King Taksin, before Rattanakosin, in the
Thonburi era, was Chinese. We lost the war, then Myanmar occupied. Taksin
went to Chanthaburi to set up an army. He was Chinese. His ancestors came
from China, 100% Chinese.
–​former Thai foreign minister, 2015

Every year a mixture of military, civil servant and private sector high achievers
at Thailand’s National Defence College develop and present a national strategy.
In 2003 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra listened while Dr Chulacheeb
Chinwanno summarised the strategy’s key points. Chulacheeb argued that
strategic competition between the United States and China was an important
factor that Thailand had to consider in its relations with both powers and
with the Asian region generally. He recommended balanced relationships
with various Great Powers to preserve the national interest. Thaksin, in
responding, spoke of the difficulties of pursing balanced relationships:

If we say we will go with this country, how will other countries view us?
Some analyse incorrectly that Thailand has already gone with the United
States after the Iraq war … other say we have already gone with China
… to sum up, nations must clone themselves to go with every nation …
to create balance they must go with them all: China Russia, Japan, India.

He then evoked the country’s most famous leader on the national stage,
Chulalongkorn, Rama V, and his famous 1897 visit to Europe at the height of
the colonial threat:

I remember the royal foreign policy of King Rama V one hundred years
ago … he was amazing. How great a hero was he … to sail to Russia,
Europe, regardless of the risks of pirates, to rescue Thailand from
becoming a colony … I realise this well … I study history, know history
but I am not a person who accepts drowning in history … I study and
transform.1
102 Rediscovering China
Thaksin’s comments illustrate the hold that Chulalongkorn retains on
Thailand’s international strategy in the contemporary era.2 Thaksin here was
demonstrating utter familiarity with, and subscription to, one of the central
canons of Thai royalist nationalism, the saving of Thailand by its wise kings.
That the sentiments could have come from a lukjin, a grandchild of Hakka
Chinese who emigrated from Guangdong province to Thailand in the 1860s,
demonstrates the hold that royalist-​nationalist discourse has across Thai
society.3 It is no small irony that he was nonetheless later attacked, including
by other prominent and powerful lukjins such as Sonthi Limthongkul and
Jamlong Srimuang, for his alleged lack of respect for the Thai monarchy.
Thailand’s relationship with China, and its memories of China, are deeply
enmeshed with the place that Sino-​Thais inhabit in Thai society. At the offi-
cial level, state-to-state relations with China have at times been entangled with
internal dynamics involving the local Chinese community. Prior to the Second
World War when Phibun Songkram pursued a pro-​Japan policy, he introduced
stringent measures to reduce Chinese influence, causing tensions with local
Chinese. The nationalist government in China protested.4 Conversely, when
relations between China and Thailand improved after 1975, the climate for
expression of Sino-​Thai identity warmed.
Being of Chinese ancestry in Thailand is not unusual but it has not always
been easy. Up to one third of Bangkokians can trace Chinese ancestry.
Thailand’s assimilation of its Chinese immigrants is sometimes cited as one
of the region’s most successful events, but this success has not been without
coercion.5 For parts of the twentieth century, Sino-​Thais were required to
take Thai names and conceal as much as possible their Chinese origins. For
periods the Thai state disallowed Chinese language schools and newspapers.
But the community’s special relationship with the Thai monarchy helped
Sino-​Thais integrate in Thai society. The phrase “under the patronage of His
Majesty the King [Phaitai phrabonma phothi somphan] remains one of the
most potent and important for the Sino Thai business community.
Sino-​Thais have origins going back to as early as the fourteenth century,
when the city state Ayutthaya became a stop in junk trade routes.6 By the
seventeenth century about 5,000 Chinese lived in Ayutthaya.7 The large waves
of Chinese immigration which led to today’s concentration of Sino-​Thai
in Bangkok, however, mostly arrived in the late nineteenth century. These
Chinese immigrants were of different language groups: Teocheoh, Hakka,
Hokkien, Cantonese and Hainanese. Many have retained these languages in
addition to Thai, and also retained a sense of family and clan loyalty based
on these language and kinship ties. The museum celebrating the cultural heri-
tage of Thailand’s Sino-​Thais, established in Suphanburi by former Prime
Minister Banharn Silpa-​archa, details the names of these sae, or clan groups.
Towards the end of his career, famous Asianist and political scientist, Benedict
Anderson, argued that competition between different sae and Chinese lan-
guage groups explained the tumult of recent Thai politics.8 While this places
too much weight on the explanatory power of the sae phenomenon, it does
 Rediscovering China 103
indicate the degree to which some think these identities might influence Thai
politics. The question for this book is, of course, how much might it influence
the Thai state’s perceptions of its northern Great Power neighbour, the PRC.
Whether as a result of ethnic linkages or not, our survey results certainly
suggest that China is seen as a different kind of Great Power.

A statistical pointer to a rich perception

Our survey asked Thai military officers to rank the relative threat from Great
Powers (maha amnat). On average the United States was rated the most
threatening, and China the second most threatening. What showed that China
is viewed differently from other major powers, however, was this response in
combination with the response to another question on how they felt about the
threat from Great Powers generally. When we tried to see the extent to which
responses to the question about the individual Great Powers could predict the
rating for question about Great Powers generally, we obtained an interesting
result. The individual threat ratings for the United States and Russia were
the only statistically significant predictors of ratings of the threat of Great
Powers overall.9 In other words, respondents who rated the Great Powers a
significant threat were most likely thinking of the United States and Russia.
The finding that China ranks second amongst Great Power threats but is a
less significant guide than Russia in predicting whether a respondent would
rate the general threat from Great Powers as significant, seems anomalous.
But what this is telling us is that there is greater variability in the way China
is seen, perhaps because China has a distinctive relationship to Thailand and
Thais. China is closer geographically and culturally, and there is a sense of a
long shared history driven by this cultural and geographic proximity. Overall,
these factors make the China site of memory richer and more complex than
that associated with the United States.
In this chapter, our goal is to understand the site of memory associated
with China. This chapter will consider the recollections, and their construc-
tion, of China in Thai history. As we have suggested, this is a multi-​faceted
topic. The role of the Chinese people in the national identity, domestic pol-
itics and economy of Thailand is important, as is the many chaptered story
of bilateral political, diplomatic and strategic relations between the two states.
The rich history of the ethnically Sino-​Thais is important to perceptions of
the bilateral relationship, but at the same time its influence on the conduct of
Thailand’s international diplomacy can be overstated. In this chapter we will
argue that the China site of memory can be divided into parts: (1) homeland;
(2) protector; (3) adversary and (4) proximate giant. In the first hub, ‘home-
land’ we consider how the Sino-​Thai identity has emerged over time, distinct-
ively and patriotically Thai, but also fully cognisant and proud of Chinese
heritage. In the second, we look at how a memory of China as friend and pro-
tector has deep roots going back to the times of King Taksin (1767–1782) and
the fall of Ayutthaya. In the third, we look at how a brief Cold War period in
104 Rediscovering China
which Thailand held much greater apprehension about China has gradually
been forgotten. In the last, we look at the memory of China as a centre of
power and ever-present near neighbour that presents opportunity, demands
respect and is beginning to create anxiety.

China as homeland: ethnicity and the remembrance and suppression

of heritage and identity
Over the course of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century,
between 200,000 and 300,000 Chinese immigrants arrived in Thailand,
forming a substantial minority of a population of 4–​5 million.10 Between 1882
and 1950, 5 million arrived in Bangkok via steamship, of whom 1.2 million
remained.11 Most worked as labourers, including in tin mines, rice mills, mills
and the port of Bangkok.12 Chinese labourers built canals, including the 72
km long khlong Saensaep which still provides boat transport from the old part
of the city to the eastern province of Chachoengsao.13 Over the longer term,
the exemption of the immigrant Chinese from slavery and corvée labour, and
freedom of movement in the kingdom, facilitated their movement into trade
and commerce.
Many, if not all, assimilated. Assimilation was eased by the fact that
most immigrants were single men, who subsequently married Thai women.
Assimilation was also eased by Thailand’s religious practices, mainly
Theravada Buddhism. There was similarity between this form of Buddhism
and the variant found in mainland China, Mahayana Buddhism. Moreover,
both types of Buddhism were permissive of animist beliefs and practices.
Unlike Islam and Christianity, no definitive ceremonies of initiation existed
and converts were not required to relinquish previous beliefs. G. W. Skinner
argues that these aspects alone may have seen Thailand’s Chinese immigrants
assimilated more easily than in neighbouring Indonesia.14
Though assimilation was substantial it was not total. Vestiges of Chinese
identity remained, including in family structures, the practice of remittances,
and the persistence of secret societies.15 The secret societies organised opium
availability, smuggling and piracy, but were tolerated provided they remained
invisible. When their rivalries became violent, the Thai authorities would
act. Thus, Chinese secret societies emerged as one of the first significant
challenges for internal security for the Siamese. Suppressing a rebellion in
1848 in Chachoengsao saw casualties of between 2,000 and 10,000 Chinese.16
One of the earliest tasks for the professional Thai military was in 1889 when
the Thai army quelled a Chinese clan fight in Bangkok, and rioting Chinese
in Ratburi and Nahkon Chaisi.17 The secret societies remained powerful, how-
ever, disrupting the Bangkok economy through a three-​day general strike in
1910 when the Chinese were asked to pay the same annual tax as Thais.18
Issues of identity intensified after 1911, when the Qing dynasty was over-
thrown in China. Here we must consider that the construction of Chinese
identity, incorporating a memory of China as homeland, took place against a
 Rediscovering China 105
broader backdrop of a construction of a Thai national identity. The fostering
of Thai nationalism and the construction of a Thai national identity began
in the late nineteenth century under Chulalongkorn. Under his rule a Siamese
word for ‘life’ or ‘existence,’ chat, was redesignated to mean nation. In the
early twentieth century, Chulalongkorn’s son Vajiravudh, a prolific writer
and essayist, propelled Thailand’s nascent nationalism further by enunciating
the Trinitarian ideology of chat, satsana, phramahakasat –​nation, religion
and monarchy –​as the pillars of the Thai nation state. To be Thai was to be
someone who was Buddhist and loved the king. In defining Thainess, it was
also useful to define who Thais were not. Thais were not, for example, Burmese,
against whom many wars had been fought, and which were memorialised in
Thailand’s first work of significant nationalist history Thai Rop Phama (Our
Wars with the Burmese), published in 1921 by Chulalongkorn’s talented half-​
brother, Prince Damrong Rajanuphab.19 As the twentieth century progressed
the question of the identity of the millions of Chinese who had emigrated to
Thailand became more pressing. Were they ‘Other’ or were they Thai?
The question was further complicated by extraterritoriality, which provided
a useful shield for many ethnic Chinese who wished to work, live and prosper
in Thailand but limit their exposure to Thai laws.20 Under the extraterritorial
provisions of Siam’s trade treaties of the late nineteenth century, Europeans,
Americans and Japanese were immune to Siamese laws-​and so were e­ thnically
Vietnamese, Burmese, Chinese and Indians who claimed membership of the
French or British empires.
The installation of a nationalist government in China in 1911 stirred a
new sense of identity amongst Thai Chinese and crystallised the question of
Chinese identity. This incipient nationalism, together with the 1910 demon-
stration of Chinese labour power, prompted Rama VI’s 1914 racist pamphlet
describing the Southeast Asian Chinese as the “Jews of the Orient.” Thai
commentators argue that Rama VI did not seek to unleash a pogrom, but had
two objectives: first, to strengthen Thai nationalism by casting the domestic
Chinese as “Other” and, second, to reinforce awareness amongst the Chinese
that their welfare and security depended on loyalty to the Thai monarchy.21
The struggle over identity was also manifested in citizenship laws and regimes.
In 1909, the struggling Qing dynasty passed a Chinese Nationality Act making
all offspring of Chinese parents Chinese nationals. Rama VI responded some
four years later, passing a Nationality Act in 1913 that made children of Thai
fathers born anywhere, as well as every person born on Thai territory, Thai
citizens.22
As the mid-​twentieth century unfolded, assimilation slowed for various
reasons, and the question of identity again emerged. Chinese women began to
migrate from the beginning of the twentieth century. Previously, migrants were
overwhelmingly single men who married Thai women and integrated in Thai
society. The Chinese began to intermarry within their own community, and
bring up their children as Chinese. Chinese schools and Chinese studies were
established. As this Chinese population grew and remained unassimilated,
106 Rediscovering China
fear of a “Chinese state within a state” grew. The Thai state’s policies towards
its domestic Chinese community became more punitive, especially when Sino-​
Thais presented difficulties for Thai foreign policy. Under Phibun Songkram’s
nationalist government, discrimination grew much more severe in its impact,
particularly after the Sino-​Japanese war broke out in 1937 and Chinese firms
refused to handle Japanese goods.23 Phibun passed laws forcing the Chinese
businesses out of industries such as rice-​milling, salt production, fishing and
retail trade. Schools and newspapers were restricted and eventually shut
down. Chinese were restricted in where they could live and what land they
could own. Billboards were taxed at higher rates if their lettering carried more
than 50% non-​Chinese writing.24
Moving into the geopolitical orbit of the United States in the 1950s,
the Thai government cracked down on communism and another period of
repressive and discriminatory policy ensued. After the reintroduction of anti-​
communist legislation in 1952, Sino-​Thais either returned to China or made
concerted efforts to assimilate, including by taking standard Thai names,
learning standard Thai, and finding a Thai political or bureaucratic patron.
Consequently, Sino-​Thais born in the 1950s felt they had a “double identity.”
For many this was an experience “morally disingenuous and corrosive of self-​
respect.” Kasian Tejapira states that being a lukjin student in Thai schools
through the 1960s and 1970s could be alienating:

One could not really partake in the Thai historical imagination when one
was taught, in all earnest, that the ethnogenesis of the Thai race had lain
on the Altai mountain range near the northern border of China several
millenniums back while one’s father actually immigrated to Thailand
from Guangdong Province in southern China only a few decades earlier.25

Thai government pressure on Chinese schools –​by denying funding and

denying autonomy –​accelerated the assimilation. Between 1948 and 1956
the number of Chinese schools fell from 430 to 195.26 Skinner found, after
meeting the principals and teachers at Chinese schools in the 1950s, that
students could speak read and write Thai far better than they could Chinese.
He predicted that without Chinese education, the grandchildren of Chinese
immigrants would become Thai.
And in fact, outward displays of being Chinese largely disappeared during
the 1960s and 1970s in Thailand; instead, real or feigned suppression of
memory of Chinese origins became the norm. Reflecting on how Chinese
ancestry and identity lay buried under the trappings of Thainess such as love
for the king, academic Thak Chaloemtiarana wrote:

I suspect that after several generations of becoming Thai, my own family had
fallen prey to self-​denial and self-​lobotomy about its past and had subcon-
sciously severed all ties with and discarded all memories of its Chineseness.27
 Rediscovering China 107
The geopolitical realignment that began with the re-​establishment of diplo-
matic relations with China, together with the strengthening influence of King
Bumibol on Thai politics, meant that 1975 was a significant turning point, grad-
ually offering a friendlier domestic climate for Sino-​Thais. Thai royals visiting
China was a particularly clear signal for this realignment and changed climate.
In 1981, Princess Sirindhorn visited China, the start of a long-​standing and
deep interest in Chinese language, culture and history. Although other royals
visited, such as Prince Vajiralongkorn in 1987 and Queen Sirikit in 2000,
Princess Sirindhorn’s engagement has been the most substantial.28 She can
translate from Chinese into Thai, and she now has 12 translations of novels,
poems and documentaries to her credit.29
Indeed, besides acting as weathervanes indicating shifts in the foreign policy
of the Thai state, the monarchy is part of the remembrance of Chinese heri-
tage. The first Chakri monarch Rama I’s mother was Chinese, the daughter of
a rich Chinese family within the southeastern quarter of Ayutthaya.30 More
intermarriage with Chinese occurred when Rama II married Queen Suriyen,
who was herself three-quarters Chinese. Through tracing these relations,
Skinner concludes that Rama V was one quarter Chinese while Rama VI
and Rama VII were over half. Thais today remember these blood relations.
One interviewee emphasised that marriage between Thai royals and Chinese
is permissible for the Thai monarchy, but marriage between Thai royals and
Westerners is not.
Around the same time that the Thai monarchy signalled that the region’s
geopolitics had changed, the importance of China as an economic partner
began to accelerate. Between 1996 and 2006, trade with China grew by 568%.31
Sino-​Thais who had retained memory of their ancestry greatly enhanced the
capacity of Thailand to reap dividends from the post-​Mao Chinese economic
success story. Many leaders of Thailand’s banking sector, including the heads
of Bangkok Bank, Thai Military Bank and Thai Farmers Bank were Teo
Chiou speakers with roots in China’s Kwangtung Province. As recalled by
Lien Ying Chow, a Singaporean businessman who worked with these Thai
bankers:

we all came from China from the same province, same county and same
district. So we also cooperate together and up to now, we are still very
close and on account of this, in view of our relationship, our banks were
able to cooperate and work closely for mutual benefit.32

Similar linkages allowed the head of agribusiness conglomerate Charoen

Pohkphand, Dhanin Chearavanont, to become the first and largest for-
eign investor in China during the 1980s. Dhanin’s father emigrated from
Guangdong in 1921 and, despite being born in Bangkok, Dhanin attended
school in Guangdong and Hong Kong. In 2008 Charoen Pokphand Group
had 75 retail outlets in China competing with Wal-​mart and Carrefour.33
108 Rediscovering China
The combination of royal patronage, geopolitical realignment and trade
and investment expansion encouraged Sino-​Thais to reclaim their Chinese
identities. They began to acknowledge and celebrate their ancestry much
more publicly. From the early 1990s, callers to a talk-​back radio began to
disclose their Sino Thai identity and use their Chinese surnames. TV series
depicted a Chinese shopkeeper arguing with an ethnic Thai and claiming
to be loyal to Thailand and hardworking Thais. Chinese New Year festiv-
ities expanded to include sponsorship by both the Chinese government and
Thai royal family. The still-​popular Sino-​Thai businessman-​turned-​politician
Thaksin Shinawatra, elected prime minister in 2001, made a very public visit
to the village of his grandparents in Guangdong in 2005.34 There he made
a passionate and consummately diplomatic declaration, well-​received and
often-​since cited in China:

When the Chinese people see a Thai leader and so many entrepreneurs
come to China to pay homage to the place where their ancestors once
lived, they will understand that the Thais and Chinese are from one
family, and they are relatives.35

As Sino-​Thais have become more open in celebrating their Chinese traditions

and origins, Chinese identity has been deployed in domestic politics. In the
case of Banharn Silpa-​archa, adversaries weaponised it. Banharn, a Sino-​Thai
businessman-​turned-​politician from the town of Suphanburi in Thailand’s
central region, had become well-​known as a Sino-​Thai seeking to take a more
positive view of the Chinese ancestry of many Thais. He built the Dragon’s
Descendants Museum (phiphitphan luk lan phan mangkon) depicting China’s
history in the form of colourful dioramas and displays. But Banharn’s stint as
prime minister ended at least partly on the issue of his Thainess. In 1996 he
was successful in defending a thinly veiled attack in parliament by army gen-
eral and later Prime Minister Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh on the question of his
loyalties given his ethnicity. But when it later emerged that his father’s nation-
ality had been changed from Chinese to Thai 25 years after he had died, he
was forced to resign.36 Others made political gains from emphasising their
Chinese lineage. Jamlong Srimuang successfully campaigned to win the gov-
ernorship of Bangkok by using his Chinese name Lu Jinghe and emphasising
his Chinese ethic background. Notably, however, Jamlong had previously kept
his Chinese ancestry hidden when he applied for entry to Chulachomklao
Royal Military Academy.37
While Sino Thais are a significant force politically, they occupy all parts of
the political spectrum. Thaksin was a successful and prominent Sino-​Thai, but
it was another Sino-​Thai media business owner Sondhi Limthongkul (Chinese
name Lin Ming Da) who arguably did the most to generate the movement
that ultimately led to Thaksin’s downfall in 2006.38 Sondhi described himself
as a “patriotic lukjin” who was enjoying a happy life living in Thailand “under
the patronage of His Majesty the King (Phaitai phraborom phothi somphan).
 Rediscovering China 109
Sondhi, in using this phrase, was deploying what Kasian Tejapira has called
the discourse of patriotic lukjins. In the run-​up to the March 2019 general
election, its continuing potency was evident in the attacks made on emer-
ging Sino-​Thai politician Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, criticising him
for being insufficiently grateful for living under the protection of the king.39
It should also be considered that the place of Chinese culture within
Thailand is ubiquitous but subordinate, especially with respect to official
conceptions of Thainess and Thai culture. A good example is the Chinese
classic Romance of the Three Kingdoms or in Thai Sam Kok. It was first
translated into Thai during the reign of Rama I and since that time has been
translated many more times. The characters are common cultural reference
points, and the ideas have been applied in many other spin-​off books, mainly
business but also in the self-​help genre. But as Craig Reynolds has argued,
Sam Kok has never supplanted Indian classics Ramayana and Mahabharata
from the niche of official high Thai culture.40 Moreover it is important to
observe that when Sam Kok was first translated into Thai, the Confucian cos-
mology and moral universe of the Chinese version was replaced by Buddhist
concepts matching the Thai worldview.41 Nonetheless, the presence of Chinese
cultural reference points probably has increased in recent years. In 2009, for
example, the Thai government issued stamps with Chinese cultural and reli-
gious themes for the first time.42
So how does the remembrance and suppression of Sino-​Thai heritage play
out in questions of Thai foreign and strategic policy? Externally, both China
and Thailand have seen advantage in playing up the Sino-​Thais as a bridge
and evidence of a special relationship between the countries. For example,
when Banharn Silpa-​archa passed away in 2016, China’s Ministry of Culture
sent condolences to relatives and this was publicly reported.43 Thais today
often admire Sino-Thais who are both loyal to Thailand and dedicated to
using their ancestry to advantage in dealings with China, as one of our
interviewees told us:

I heard Dr Somkid give his speech that really touched my heart. He said,
even though his father and grandfather were Chinese but they live in
Thailand. Thailand had given them both opportunities to be better off in
the Thai society so those who have the Chinese ancestor or family must
pay back to what Thailand has done for his ancestors. He dedicates him-
self to helping the Thai economy by using his connections with Chinese
businessmen and the Chinese government. And a lot of time it’s like
Khun Jaroen, who is the one who really facilitate bringing representatives
of the Thai government to meet with the Chinese high-​ranking officials.44

More recently Kasian Tejapira has documented prominent Sino-​Thais advo-

cating for Thailand to ditch its alliance with the United States and move
closer to China.45 But to interpret this as a simple case of ethnic affinity
shaping policy would be mistaken. Far more than ethnicity, at work here are
110 Rediscovering China
conservative views about the principles under which Thailand ought to be
ruled. The Sino-​Thais militating against the United States are conservative
royalists, enraged by the United States’ criticism of the 2014 coup and sus-
pension of democracy. They value China’s neutrality on Thailand’s regres-
sion to authoritarian rule. At the same time, opportunities for the ethnic
Chinese connection to be a conduit for influence have arisen in the past. For
example, one of our interviewees told us that some Sino-​Thai politicians had
approached the Chinese government for funds to establish a political party.46
PRC influence operations, using, for example, Buddhist connections, are an
emerging area for further research.47
Overall, our surveys found little separating Sino-​Thai and non-​Sino-Thai
military officers on matters of foreign and defence policy, including towards
the Great Powers. In our sample of over 1,800 military officers, some 36%
stated that they had Chinese ancestry. When we tested for statistically signifi-
cant differences in the way this cohort responded to an array of questions –​
relating to threats facing Thailand, the threats posed by the Great Powers,
the influence of the Great Powers over various time periods –​we found that
in almost all cases the Sino-​Thai cohort answered no differently than non-
Sino-Thai officers. Importantly, in questions relating to the relative threat
posed by the United States and China, unease about China’s growing military
power, reliance on either the United States or China as sources of security,
there were no statistically significant differences. The single question which
elicited a different response to the Sino-​Thai cohort suggestive of ethnic
affinity and memory influencing a policy choice was about Thailand’s policy
on the South China Sea. Here we found that a slightly higher proportion of
Sino-Thais were likely to favour Thailand recognising China’s claims in the
South China Sea.48 When we asked one of our interviewees whether they
thought the Sino-​Thais could influence foreign policy, the proposition was
seen as dubious: “It can influence some I think but … Thailand is Thailand
and China is China.”49

China as protector
Bangkok’s Icon Siam, a new luxury shopping centre, opened on the Thonburi
side of the Chao Phraya river in 2018. Stationed alongside was a floating
museum in the form of a 50m Chinese junk. Redolent with historical
overtones, the museum ship was itself symbolic given that junks were the
means of Siam’s tribute and trade with imperial China in the pre-​colonial
era. But more than that, the museum is devoted to Thailand’s legendary King
Taksin. Taksin, a Chinese of Teochiu ethnicity founded Thonburi as Siam’s
capital after the Burmese sacking of Ayutthaya in 1767. In a biography of
Taksin on board the ship, he is remembered as a king who “fought to unify
the kingdom” and who symbolises “Thonburi-​China trade relations and dip-
lomacy, world trade routes –​the ship is a symbol of prosperity.”50
 Rediscovering China 111
The memory of Chinese who helped Thailand against its threatening
neighbours, the Burmese and the Vietnamese, is powerful. That it is was
brought to the fore, in the pre-COVID era when Chinese tourism represented
a bountiful bonanza for Thai business, is telling. Icon-​Siam, a riverside pro-
ject of luxury shops and condominiums, aimed to attract 250,000 visitors a
day, largely from mainland China and Hong Kong.51 The developers behind
Icon Siam, which will be serviced with its own monorail, are Siam Piwat,
Charoen Pokphand Group, and magnolia Quality Development Group. At
least one of these, Charoen Pokphand, better known as Charoen Pokphand
Group, is a powerful Sino-​Thai conglomerate.
The place of the Chinese in Thailand in Thai memory changed signifi-
cantly with the birth and deeds of Phraya Tak, who had a Teochiu father
and Thai mother. He was given the nickname “Sin” meaning wealthy. He was
appointed governor of Tak province in 1764 at the age of 30, hence the name
Taksin.52 After the Burmese razed Ayutthaya in 1767, a traumatic event of
enduring significance in Thailand’s strategic imagination, it was the charis-
matic Taksin who rallied opposition to the Burmese. He established a new
capital 60 km further south, on the west bank of the Chao Phraya in what
is today known as Thonburi (and which is now part of Bangkok). To obtain
taxes, strategic materials and weapons to continue the struggle against the
Burmese, Taksin sought assistance from the Teochiu Chinese trading com-
munity and the Manchu court. He was successful in obtaining iron, salt-​petre
and cannons, partly because the Qing dynasty was itself involved in a struggle
with the Burmese in the Yunnan-​Burma border area.53 A month later he
defeated the Burmese forces remaining in the area.54
The image of Taksin as a warrior king, remains powerful in contemporary
Thai imagination. Historians credit Taksin and other Chinese residents in
the later Ayutthaya period as having “played a key part in the transition of
Siam from a defeated and devastated kingdom into a vibrant and vigorous
state.”55 Today shrines to Taksin can be found across Thailand in at least six
provinces. They memorialise the king who “saved Thailand’s independence
after Ayutthaya was invaded” in 1767 (kop ku ekkarat ban mueang klap khuen
ma langchak ti phaen din krungsiayutya thukkhasuekbukthamlai).56 One of our
interviewees, a former foreign minister, recounted the Taksin legend in the
context of relations with China:

Ties with China go back a long way, to our King Taksin, before
Rattanakosin, in the Tonburi era. After we lost the war and Myanmar
occupied, Taksin went to Chanthaburi to set up an army. He was Chinese.
His ancestors came from China. 100% Chinese, Teochiu. He got full
support from China to take Thailand back from Burma. And very good
support from Vietnam, including wood for ships. The Chinese also gave
them some weapons. And later, he came by boat to Ayutthaya, and drove
the Burmese away.
112 Rediscovering China
The potency of this memory of Taksin is also demonstrated by its deployment
in the domestic politics of the twenty-​first century. The anti-​establishment Red
Shirt movement that emerged after the 2006 coup drew associations between
King Taksin and deposed Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, despite
the absence of any actual familial relationship.57 In Serhat Unaldi’s view they
sought to demonstrate that Thaksin possessed the barami (charisma) to com-
pete with the Chakri monarchs. For many conservative Thais reverential of
Bhumibol and invested in the Thai monarchy, attributing such charisma to
Thaksin was a reason to fear and loathe the upstart politician.
While the memory of China as protector from the early Rattanakosin era,
embodied in the form of the Teochiu King Taksin, remains powerful, this site
of memory is strengthened further by the memory of China’s assistance in
two comparatively recent episodes. Two of Thailand’s most serious crises in
the second half of the twentieth century were the crisis caused by Vietnam’s
invasion of Cambodia in late 1978 and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In
each of these, China cemented itself more firmly as a benign supportive friend
of Thailand, accelerating the forgetting of China as Cold War communist
adversary.
In late 1978, the Vietnamese leadership, though exhausted by decades
of anti-​colonial war against first the French and then the United States,
could no longer tolerate the border incursions of their erstwhile communist
brothers, the Cambodian Khmer Rouge. Shattering monolithic communism
in Southeast Asia, Vietnam launched an invasion the idea of aimed at
toppling the Pol Pot regime. The experienced and capable People’s Army
of Vietnam (PAVN) achieved this within days, earning the admiration and
approval of much of the world for ending the Khmer Rouge’s programs of
mass murder, epitomised in the Tuol Sleng torture centre and the killing
fields. Vietnam, however, did not withdraw its military, but installed the
puppet regime of Heng Samrin and signed a treaty legitimising an open-​
ended military occupation. Southeast Asia became apprehensive. Thailand
was particularly concerned by the prospect of the PAVN permanently
stationed on its eastern borders, only 300 km from Bangkok.58 Singapore
was worried about the precedent of a large Southeast Asian country
invading and annexing a smaller neighbour. Both led the push for ASEAN
to oppose the occupation.
Thailand’s elite shared the view that Vietnam’s occupation was endangering
Thai security, and many believed that Vietnam wanted an Indochina Union
that would eventually include Thailand. So, when China responded to
Cambodia’s “liberation” with an attack on northern Vietnam, they were
heartened. Though the two-​month conflict generated heavy Chinese losses
and exposed its military weaknesses, including poor logistics, Thais believed
that the threat of further Chinese attacks limited the forces Vietnam could
station in Cambodia.59 Thus, the local balance of power brought China and
Thailand into alignment, and indeed a quasi-​alliance, despite dissimilar pol-
itical systems.
 Rediscovering China 113
Only seven years previously, Thailand’s diplomats had struggled to con-
vince the Thai military of the value of opening diplomatic relations with com-
munist China. Tej Bunnag, a junior in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the
time, was assigned the job to win over the staunchly anti-​communist Thai
military, a task he described as “difficult”:

In those days, nearly about a thousand people died on the government

side as a result of the communist insurgency. We had a great public
funeral for them every day, so it was very difficult for me then to say “you
don’t have to worry about China and the CCP and the CPT.”

The generals in power, General Thanom Kittikachorn and his deputy,

Praphat Charusathien, were particularly opposed to normalising relations,
seeing China’s support to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and
Chinese road construction in northwestern Laos as evidence of the China’s
threat to Thai security.60 Then Foreign Ministry’s Permanent Secretary
Anand Panyarachun’s role in pushing for Thailand to open to China, likely
earned him the ire of pro-​United States anti-​China officials such as Prasong
Soonsiri and Siddhi Savetsila. This may have contributed to his investiga-
tion for pro-​communist sympathies in the wake of the 1976 anti-​communist
backlash.61
Nonetheless, with looming defeat of the United States in Vietnam, the
ping-​pong diplomacy of 1972 and the Kukrit visit of 1975 smoothing
the way for official diplomatic links and better relations, the Thai mili-
tary was very gradually won over to the notion of China as a protector
and preserver of a local balance of power. As the 1970s progressed, the
Thais no less than the Americans saw the benefits of being able to exploit
the Sino-​Soviet split in its local form, deepening distrust between Hanoi
and Beijing. Trade between China and Thailand gradually increased, but
more importantly, an understanding about China’s support to the CPT
was reached. Beijing began to subtly communicate that its party-​to-​party
relations with the CPT were as much to prevent Vietnam and the Soviet
Union from sponsoring the CPT as they were to encourage the overthrow
of the Thai monarchy. For example, Beijing ensured that the official line
was to encourage a long-​term struggle, implying that its materiel aid would
be limited.62 Moreover, the broadcasting of communist propaganda into
Thailand from Kunming was gradually reduced. The Voice of the People
of Thailand broadcasts had begun in 1962, the same year of the signing of
the Thanat-​Rusk Communique. During Kukrit’s visit to Kunming, a request
was made that the broadcasts cease, but while they did not immediately, the
vitriol decreased.63
As relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh deteriorated in the late
1970s, and the likelihood of war between the two became increasing
apparent, contact between Thailand and China increased. Most signifi-
cantly, in November 1978, on the eve of the Vietnamese invasion, Deng
114 Rediscovering China
Xiaoping visited Thailand and was invited to attend the Buddhist ordin-
ation of Prince Vajiralongkorn. This was a powerful sign to Thais of the
increasing warmth in the relationship and set the stage for the entente that
was to emerge shortly thereafter.64
From the time of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, links were stepped
up dramatically, including directly between the Chinese and Thai militaries.
In January 1979, members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew to
Thailand for a day-​long meeting with Prime Minister Kriangsak at Utapao
airbase. Not long after, the so-​called “Deng Xiaoping Trail” opened up.65
Chinese ships delivered arms to Sattahip and Khlong Yai ports. The Thai
army then transported the materiel to Khmer Rouge and non-​communist
groups along the Thai-​ Cambodian border. The Chinese Embassy and
Bangkok supplied food, medicine and other supplies. China also paid the
Thais a transportation fee, allowed them to keep some of the arms and
assisted Thailand with production of anti-​tank weapons in a Thai ordnance
factory. There was also operational coordination, via a hotline between the
Thai Supreme Command Headquarters and PLA regional military head-
quarters in Kunming. If the Thais reported Vietnamese military activity on
the Thai-​Cambodian border, such as shelling, Chinese soldiers would shell
Vietnam’s northern border.66 Equally importantly, regular high-​level visits
commenced.
By the late 1980s, a sea change in Thai-​Chinese military relations had
occurred. With the end of Chinese support to the CPT, the memory of con-
flict had been replaced with fresher recollections of cooperation. Writing in
1987, CIA analysts argued that the emerging generation of Thai military
leaders would be “less cautious in dealing with China than their seniors” at
least partly because “memories of the Chinese supply link” to the CPT had
“faded in the current era of close cooperation with Beijing.”67 The CIA ana-
lysis was accurate and prescient.
Our research with Thai military officers some 30 years later suggests that
for many, the memory of cooperation in the last phase of the Cold War has
remained dominant –​and indeed crowded out the memory of China as an
adversary in the previous phases. Recalled one officer:

Thailand was fighting communism from Vietnam, China was the one
who helped Thailand by starting a war with Vietnam, or maybe some
lobbying behind enemy lines, that’s why we fought off the communists.
It gives us a sign of friendship even though we are from different polit-
ical systems.68

Surprisingly, China is praised for having ceased support to the CPT, rather
than condemned for having aided the deaths of many Thai soldiers when
the CPT insurgency was at its peak. For example, asked when China had the
greatest influence in Thailand, an officer answered:
 Rediscovering China 115
I think it’s during the Cold War, especially when we had a problem
with the CPT. We won the war against communism because our PM
established a relationship with China. We asked China to stop giving
support to the Communist Party of Thailand. And since that time,
I think we have good relations with China. China’s support during the
period of Vietnam’s occupation was important to Thailand’s survival.
Because it was very risky to be under that situation, we might have been
invaded by the Vietnamese. Luckily the Chinese helped us.69

The new security strategy Thailand adopted after the US defeat in the Vietnam
War was an important factor allowing this memory construction. It created
a permissive setting for this development of memory of China as protector.
The United States’ exit from Southeast Asia was a critical turning point
in which Thailand reassessed its close alliance with the United States and
decided to refocus on relations closer to home. While Thailand was following
the path the United States had trod to Beijing, exploiting the Sino-​Soviet
split, Thailand also had an appetite for a more independent foreign policy.
The views of diplomats like Sarasin Viraphol, who believed that “past mili-
tary governments had acquiesced in the American policy and action so much
that Thai foreign policy was thought to be merely an adjunct to Washington’s
thinking,” had become ascendant. The new grand security strategy supported
the construction of the memory of “China as protector” because the turn to
China for military support after the Vietnam invasion was supported from
elites across the spectrum. It meant there was little opposition to the Thai
military burying its memory of China’s support to the counterinsurgency.
The memory construction was also assisted by two other factors. Firstly,
the Thais firmly distinguished Chinese communism from Russian and
Vietnamese communism. As one officer told us:

If you’re speaking about communist threats, people generally see that

threats that come from communists towards Thailand, was not from
Chinese communism. It was the threat from Russia.70

Secondly, the rehabilitation of China’s image in Thai perceptions was also

aided by Thai military officers drawing on advice from China, after 1979, in
defeating the CPT. Surachart Bamrungsook found in his research on the Thai
military’s belated embrace of democracy in the 1980s that Army Chief and
Prime Minister General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh led a faction later known
as the Democratic Officers. This faction concluded that only democracy, and
understanding of political approaches to combat, would stop communism
flourishing. They arrived at this conclusion through a combination of their
own primary research and borrowing of overseas concepts, including iron-
ically, from the Chinese communists.71 Their domestic victory burnished the
perception of China.
116 Rediscovering China
As the CIA analysts of 1987 noted, many of the young officers who
had become more enamoured of China were also involved in the counter-
insurgency effort against the CPT, and were “convinced that it was a stunning
victory for the [Thai]Army.”72
More broadly, the memory of China as friend was aided by the Thai
military’s low key overall approach to war memory. Most pertinently, we
are not aware of any specific war memorials or anniversaries devoted to the
counterinsurgency that might have hampered the “China as friend” memory
construction.
More speculatively, another factor which may have assisted the building
of a positive memory associated with China and national security is the Thai
military’s productive relationship with Chinese Kuo Min Tang remnants who
fled to Thailand following the victory of the CCP over the nationalists in
1949. While some moved to Taiwan, another 4,000, under the KMT gen-
erals Li Mi and Duan, continued to be active along the Thai-​Burma border.73
They played lead roles in Operation Paper, two ill-​fated attempts to take back
Yunnan province in China, with the support of the CIA and the tacit con-
sent of the Thai government.74 In 1968 the Thai government agreed with
the nationalist government in Taiwan that Thailand would take care of the
soldiers. The explanation given at the Chinese Martyr’s Museum in the nor-
thern Chiang Rai village of Doi Mae Salong, where many of the former KMT
and their descendants continue to reside, is that the rising threat from the
local Miao communist insurgents prompted the Thai government to employ
the KMT soldiers to help suppress their insurgency. Positive memory of the
KMT assistance may enhance the generalised memory of Chinese people as
helpful and unthreatening, given all Chinese are generally known in Thai lan-
guage through the umbrella term kon chin.
The final chapter of the construction and reinforcing of the memory of
China as protector was the 1997 Financial Crisis. In 1997, after many years of
high growth, Thailand was shaken by a crisis initiated by foreign speculation
on the Thai Baht. As the Thai central bank tried to protect the Baht’s value,
foreign investors became alarmed and many sought to withdraw their cap-
ital. As the value of the Thai Baht plummeted, Thai companies with debts in
foreign currencies were left exposed, and at the same time, Thai banks were
found to have had lent unwisely. The Thai economy was shaken, thousands of
business bankrupted, and many ordinary Thais thrown into unemployment
and poverty. In the wake of the crisis, which spread to other economies in the
region, China appeared as a “good guy,” including for not devaluing its own
currency the remnimbi, thereby allowing Southeast Asian goods to maintain
competitiveness.75 China also provided financial assistance and stimulated
bilateral trade. This was the context for the signing of a bilateral framework
agreement on cooperation in 1999, which emphasised that “Asian, especially
East Asian Countries, after making necessary adjustments, will be able to
gradually overcome their temporary difficulties caused by the recent financial
turmoil.”76 Since then, China has become more important as an economic
 Rediscovering China 117
partner, and the memory as financial as well as military helper has remained.
As one of our interviewees emphasised:

Please go back to the Tom Yum Goong crisis [of 1997]. That period
really made a lot of Thais feel grateful towards the Chinese government
for the policy China took towards Thailand. Because they didn’t blame
Thailand as a source of economic crisis. Putting pressure, like the IMF,
which has the US at the back, put pressure on Thailand. China they never
did that. So this is the period that I feel that a lot of Thai businessmen,
Thai politicians, and even Thai military asked themselves “why does our
good friend, good ally, put a lot of pressure on, force us to run the policy
that really, really takes advantage of Thailand?” That’s the moment that
really made Thai people feel grateful to China.77

The brief period of China as an adversary

In the early 1950s, China loomed as a potential military threat. This memory
has eroded, but what led to Thailand to see China as a threat and what then
allayed these fears? Thailand’s fear of communism spiked after the North
Korean attack on South Korea.78 US Ambassador to Thailand Edwin Stanton
dated fear of communism in Thailand from this time, writing in his memoirs
that “A small country like Thailand must have strong friends like the United
States and the United Nations, people began to say.” Anxiety existed through
the 1960s with Thai representative Sukich Nimmanhaeminda stating at the
UN General Assembly on Chinese representation in the UN, on 24 November
1966, that Thailand saw itself as “no exception to Peking’s grand design for
conquest and expanding influence.”79 Thai soldiers posted to the Korean War
may well have killed their Chinese counterparts, something which disturbed
Phibun Songkram and his adviser Sang Phathanothai, as Sang’s daughter
Sirin later recalled:

Father had watched films of various battles between the United Nations
and the Chinese troops. He was shaken by what he saw. Thailand, he
repeatedly said, had committed itself by sending troops to fight on the
allied side, and the Chinese had held their own against the greatest mili-
tary power on the globe.80

Three developments heightened fears of China. As mentioned in the previous

chapter, these views may have been influenced by US intelligence assessments
that, in retrospect, appear to have been flawed. The first was China’s proclam-
ation of a Yunnan Thai Autonomous Zone in 1953. Today the Xishuangbanna
Museum of Ethnology explains that:

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Dai people
were granted regional autonomy and enjoyed every right as master of
118 Rediscovering China
their land. The Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Region was set up
on January 23, 1953, and transformed into the Xishuangbanna Dai
Autonomous Prefecture in June 1955.81

The Dai people were ethnically and culturally related to Thais in Thailand,
part of the family of Tai speakers that today are distributed across five
modern nation states including Burma, Laos and Vietnam as well as China
and Thailand.82 The 1953 setting up of the “Thai Nationality Autonomous
Area” was seen in this potentially irredentist light. Thais interpreted the proc-
lamation as a possible Chinese attempt to leverage cross-​border ethnic links
to incite a communist pan-​Thai movement in Thailand’s northern provinces.83
The Thai Prime Minister Phibun told the first SEATO ministerial meeting
that there were “20,000 Thai speaking troops ..massing along the southern
border of the Chinese province of Yunnan” and asked for SEATO forces to
be stationed in Thailand.84 The United States assessed that the establishment
of the area might “foreshadow a future Chinese Communist effort to create a
greater Thai state embracing all people of Thai stock, possibly also including
ethnically related groups in Laos and Burma.”85
The second event was former Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong making
China his base. Pridi had fled Thailand in 1946 after his royalist political
opponents accused him of involvement in the mysterious death of the
young King Ananda Mahidol. Pridi attempted to regain power through an
attempted coup in 1949, but failed, after which he stayed in exile. Pridi had
always been suspected of leftist and even communist plans for socialising
the Thai economy and opposed the move into the US orbit. He made a
public statement from exile in Beijing calling for reduced ties with the
United States, arguing that “the Thai people must wage struggle against
American imperialism which is holding Thailand in its grip and the reac-
tionary government of Thailand which is subservient to American imperi-
alism.”86 These fears became conflated with Thais fearing a Pridi-​led Thai
Autonomous Border region subverting northern Thailand.87
The third development was the rapid expansion of the road network in
Yunnan during the early 1950s. In 1953 the CCP spent a fifth of its road
building budget in Yunnan, and the road network there expanded by 50% as a
result. Many of the roads offered new routes from Kunming to border areas.
While it was recognised that the expanding road network might be purely for
internal reasons, the United States also believed that it significantly increased
“Chinese Communist capabilities for further economic, political and military
penetration across China’s borders into Southeast Asia.”88 These assessments
were probably shared with Thai leaders.
Matters came to a head at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Thailand’s
Foreign Minister Prince Wan made a strong statement against China. The
Singaporean journalist, politician and diplomat Lee Khoon Choy later recalled:

delegates of Iraq, Thailand and the Philippines were very interesting.

They were very, very anti-​communist, they went all out to attack China.
 Rediscovering China 119
Thailand was represented by Prince Vanh (that is, Wan). He accused
China of harbouring Thai-​speaking overseas Chinese, ready to invade
Thailand through Yunnan. Prince Vanh in 1955, said the 3 million over-
seas Chinese with dual nationalities and the large number of North
Vietnamese were potential threats to Thailand’s security.89

Bandung was to prove a turning point of sorts. China, represented by the

urbane and capable Chou En Lai, responded by saying that “China had no
intention to propagate her ideology or political system and … had no inten-
tion to subvert her neighbours.”90 Chou’s announcement reflected a significant
shift in CCP foreign policy that had taken place over the previous three years.
Previously communist China designated all countries not under socialism
as “imperialist” and hence the Thai government was berated regularly as
“criminal,” “fascist” and a “lackey of Wall Street.”91 After Stalin’s death, this
approach was softened to allow the possibility of countries being classified
as neutral or non-​aligned. By 1954, China’s approach to other Asian coun-
tries had mutated further to a policy of “co-​existence,” which “recognised that
Asian nations also sought time and opportunity to strengthen themselves to
protect their independence.”92
Chou articulated and expounded this policy at Bandung in 1955. Thais
were impressed with the diplomatic skill of Chou En Lai and came away
feeling that most countries in Asia and elsewhere would eventually recognise
China at the United Nations.93 Chou responded to Prince Wan’s concerns
about the use of China’s south as a base of subversion by inviting a Thai
delegation to visit Yunnan.94 Even after the accession of Sarit Thanarat in
1957 put an end to the warming which proceeded from Bandung, the fears of
China using Yunnan as a base to encroach on Thailand subsided and did not
return. Thai attention moved instead to concern with the rise of communism
in Laos and the threat this and Vietnamese communism posed to Thailand.
Today, the preparations for establishing road and rail connectivity from
Bangkok to Kunming, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), are a
measure of the degree to which this memory of China as an adversary has
faded. When we conducted a statistical analysis of our survey results, we
found that the memory of China as a Cold War adversary is fading over time.
Asked about China’s influence in military and security matters over various
periods, we found younger respondents saw Thailand as more welcoming of
China’s influence than older respondents.95 And some of our interviewees
thought that Thais no longer remembered the brief period in which China
was a threat: “I remember the lingering fear of China’s physical threat to
Thailand, in the form of its support for the CPT that continued. But now
that’s all gone. So people don’t remember those details anymore.”96

Memory of China as a proximate giant

During the Cold War, trusted aide of Phibun Songkram debated with his
comrade Sang Phathanothai, a Sino-​ Thai himself, about the wisdom of
120 Rediscovering China
establishing contacts with China. At a time when Thailand was moving closer
to the United States, having just deployed troops to fight in the Korean War,
Sang was troubled and argued with Phibun. In his view “Thailand needed
to learn to live with China, that America was far while China was near.”97
Sang won the argument and in 1955 travelled to Beijing via Hong Kong and
Canton for meetings with Chou En Lai and Mao. The communist leaders
urged Thailand to adopt a neutralist policy and promised trade.98 Sang’s visit
paved the way for Phibun to meet with Chinese officials in Rangoon, where
they signed an agreement stating that China and Thailand would have cul-
tural and trade contacts with a view to normalising relations in the longer
term.99 In the end, Sang decided famously to send his son and daughter to live
and study in Thailand under the care of Chou En Lai. Sang’s daughter Sirin
later recalled Phibun Songkram’s words in her memoir The Dragon’s Pearl:

In the old days we small nations often sent our ruler’s children to China
to show our loyalty and devotion to the emperor. By your suggesting that
I send your son on my behalf to study in China under the care of the
Chinese government, we could once again show Zhou Enlai our sincere
determination to improve relations and our implicit trust in China.100

Sirin’s account continues to attract interest in Thailand, with the book first
published in Thai in 2008 and now reprinted three times. There is also a TV
series. When China and Thailand celebrated their 40 years of diplomatic
relations in 2015, Sirin was interviewed about her experience and commented
“Remember, we were friends with China when China had no friends. And
now you see the relationship today.”101
To what extent does the memory and influence of the tribute system live on
in Thailand? Described by renowned China scholar Fairbank as non-​Chinese
rulers taking part in the Chinese world order by participating in “the appro-
priate forms and ceremonies (li) in their contact with the Son of Heaven,”
the extent to which echoes of this pre-​colonial system of “international
relations” persist has been a question of increasing interest in recent years.102
More than a decade ago, Australian scholar Martin Stuart-​Fox argued that
Southeast Asia’s memory of “bilateral relations regimes,” in which Southeast
Asian states pragmatically complied with tributary obligations for trade and
security benefits, remained influential. Citing the way in which Vietnamese
leaders travelled to Beijing after the 1979 Sino-​Vietnamese War, he argues
that this memory gives rise to a deeply grounded reflex in which Southeast
Asian states are reluctant to join balance of power coalitions against China.103
Anthony Milner has similarly argued that pre-​modern habits of thought per-
sist in Southeast Asia.104 He argues that the pre-​modern concept of nama,
which denotes a ruler’s dignity and status, and inherently accepts hierarchy
in international relations, inflects Malaysia’s foreign policy. This posture
downplays the importance of territorial sovereignty and accurately defined
boundaries. The consequence is that contemporary Malaysian leaders have
 Rediscovering China 121
been relatively relaxed in dealing with China’s rise, despite conflicting terri-
torial claims in the South China Sea.
In Thailand’s case the tribute system has tended, in recent times, to be
viewed as largely transactional and trade oriented. The scholarship of Sarasin
Viraphon has been important here, a powerful influence on Thailand’s con-
temporary view of the tribute system. Sarasin’s Tribute and Profit: Sino-​
Siamese Trade 1652–​1853 framed the Siamese motives for complying with
the tributary protocols as primarily profit. The historiography of Sarasin
and other Thai historians, and hence the contemporary Thai memory of the
tribute system, may have been influenced by Rama IV’s proclamation of 1868
which not only ended tribute but stridently denounced the paying of tribute
to China as a shameful practice.105
The British Governor of Hong Kong Sir John Bowring had encouraged
Mongkut Rama IV in this direction. As early as 1852, Bowring advised
Siamese envoys returning from a tribute mission to Beijing that “You should
not pay tribute to China any more.”106 Hence, by the time the Mongkut
wrote to W. Adamson Esquire in 1864, Mongkut, who had developed a close
friendship with Bowring, was beginning to express dissatisfaction with the
requirements of the Chinese emperor and the tribute system. He explained to
Adamson that he could not be a consul for the Siamese in Hong Kong because
“our Chinese Merchants here who are trading within China Ports [are as]
yet still generally unwilling to have any European person be our consul over
their vessels under Siamese Colour.” He then complained further about the
merchants and Chinese rulers, saying:

None of our Siamese Government have objection or unwillingness

like the Chinese merchants who are yet seemed to be very ignorant of
civilized custom and international law, they yet are only urging us to pay
tribute to their young Emperor & co. and endeavouring to compel us to do
in formal manner of the late kings of Siam who had done with Chinese
Emperor & Government of Canton before Chinese war with English
(italics added).107

Mongkut and Sarasin’s legacy in the remembering of the tribute system has
eclipsed the substantial cultural meaning attached to the suzerain relations
prior to the nineteenth century. As mentioned earlier, all the early Chakri
monarchs sought and received imperial letters of investiture from the Chinese
emperor, and when translated into Siamese, the titles of Rama III and Rama
IV contained a transliteration of the Chinese name for King of Siam (Siam-​
lo-​kok-​ong).108 These titles may have been used to raise domestic the status
of the invested Siamese monarchs; Ji-​Young Li has argued convincingly that
domestic political gain over rivals was an important incentive for leaders in
Korea and Japan to participate in the tribute system.109
Regardless of the tribute system, China’s proximity and size are rarely for-
gotten. One interviewee stated that “since 1975, and the diplomatic restoration
122 Rediscovering China
of relations, we having been moving closer to China. One, they’re truly a
major power. Secondly, its nearer to Thailand, it’s in Asia. Thirdly, inevitably,
trade relations, economic cooperation, culture have been increased five-​fold,
ten-​fold. This is a natural process.” The proximity was expressed, in the past,
much more through the connection by sea than by land. Thailand sent tribute
via sea until the 1850s, and it received immigrants the same way.
This may seem surprising given that Thailand, while not sharing a border
with China, is separated only by thin strips of Burma and Laos. But for
centuries the border areas between China and Thailand were a patchwork
of small principalities that were largely autonomous, in country that was
mountainous and rugged. In the nineteenth century and earlier the emerging
modern states of Qing China, Burma and Siam did not exercise absolute sov-
ereignty over these frontier regions. As Han Chinese moved into Yunnan and
the southernmost Sipsongbanna region bordering today’s Laos and Burma,
they encountered Tai-​speaking elites who could not easily be displaced and
who swore allegiance to many states, in addition to the Qing.110 Consequently,
Thailand’s memory of Chinese proximity is perhaps less via Yunnan than
Canton and Beijing.
This may now be changing. Under the Asian Connectivity Plan, the 225
km road from Houayxay district on the Thai-​Lao border to the Boten area
on Lao-​Chinese border was upgraded in 2014, by the Asian Development
Bank, the Thai government and the Chinese government.111 The road mostly
carries heavy trucks travelling between China and Thailand.112 Chinese
tourism into Thailand by road has increased markedly, with the number
of Chinese tourists entering from Southern China via the Lao-​Thailand
Friendship Bridge at Chiang Khong increasing from 1,487 vehicles in 2013 to
9,248 vehicles in 2015.113 And a key plank of China’s BRI for Southeast Asia,
as well as ASEAN’s connectivity plan, is a train running from Kunming in
Yunnan to Singapore.114 A route passing from Kunming to Vientiane to Laos
is scheduled for completion in 2021.115 Our Thai interviewees see this growth
of overland connectivity as legitimate:

I think mostly the need to have a gateway into Thailand, even if in a lit-
eral sense, that’s why this East-​West highway, North-​South highway, all
leading to the sea, to the ports, be it Maptaphut, be it Laem Chabang,
you know why, because China needs an opening to the sea.116

Nonetheless the northern proximity of China is beginning to trigger some

uneasiness, a matter we address below.

Concerns in the current era

At least part of way in which a net positive memory of China has emerged
in Thailand is due to the strategy towards Southeast Asia that the CCP
enunciated in the mid-​1950s and which it has largely adhered to in the
 Rediscovering China 123
decades since. Thailand, though an American ally, could be a friend. The
five principles of coexistence that had been articulated to solve the Sino-​
Indian dispute on Tibet, could be applied to pursue agreements with
Thailand.117 Under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, with regime legitimacy
demanding continued economic growth, Southeast Asia generally was seen
as part of a strategy for economic growth and a stable hinterland.118 As we
have seen, Thailand and China’s goals for stable balance of power in main-
land Southeast Asia dovetailed with Thailand’s, and the two countries felt a
shared interest in opposing Vietnam.
China has been careful in recognising and adapting to Thailand’s domestic
political arrangements and dynamics. It understood the importance of culti-
vating the Thai royal family, a fact not lost on our Thai interlocutors, one of
whom alluded to this in the following comment:

I think it is Asian culture to always take good care of VIPs. I think, how-
ever, that overdoing it without appropriate backup action can mean insin-
cerity. We also have to be fair to our friends, especially non-​Asian, who
had been good to us in action. The US have been very helpful to us for
many decades in many areas, especially the military, and we should not
forget it in the midst of what come afterward.119

Naturally, China was happy to participate in and reap the benefits of the
renaissance of Sino-​Thai identity in recent years. The relationship took a
step forward when Sino-​Thai Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister,
and the countries accelerated their business ties, one example being a free
trade agreement in agriculture signed in 2003.120 After Thaksin was deposed,
however, and conducted another visit to his ancestral home in Guangdong
in 2019, China minimised coverage of the visit and kept the reception warm
but low key, not wishing to be seen as interfering in Thai domestic politics.121
China has also recognised important foreign policy goals of Thailand. It
recognises Thailand’s preference for equidistant relationships, and according
to Jurgen Haacke, realises that pushing for exclusivity would be counter-
productive.122 This preference meant Thailand, despite being a US ally, was
happy to allow language referring to increasing multipolarity in the inter-
national environment to enter the 1999 agreement.123 More recently, China
has recognised that Thailand has its own vision of itself as a regional logistics,
manufacturing and transport hub, and is willing to marry this to its own BRI.
As the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, a reliable barometer of Beijing
policy, recorded in a recent publication:

The government of Thailand has launched the development plan for

the eastern economic corridor, which is being used as a major strategic
measure to achieve the overall development strategy. Following the
national development strategy of the past twenty years, the Thailand gov-
ernment put forward the strategic policy of “Thailand 4.0.” China and
124 Rediscovering China
Thailand should strengthen strategic integration in the building of the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road Economic Belt.124

There is evidence, however, that the relationship will face challenges. Two
areas of concern could erode the reservoir of positive memory and goodwill.
The first is large numbers of Chinese tourists, assuming they return to pre-
Covid levels. Chinese tourism to Thailand is a two-​edged sword at present.
Tourism as a whole has been increasingly important to the Thai economy,
in 2017 employing 2,336,500 directly and contributing 9.4% to Thailand’s
GDP.125 Chinese tourists were increasingly important to this industry. Until
early 2020 at least, anywhere between half a million and a million Chinese
tourists arrived in Thailand each month, making China the largest source of
tourists among any country in the world.126 But an undercurrent of dissatisfac-
tion with Chinese tourists has been increasing. Many Thais felt that Chinese
tourists were ill-​mannered or do not respect Thai customs or traditions.127
Incidents such as a Chinese woman undressing in the bathrooms at an airport
are widely discussed, as is behaviour in queues. Thais also have felt that the so-​
called “zero baht” package tours many Chinese tourists take primarily profit
Chinese travel companies and limit the flow of economic benefit to Thais.
Consequently, there have been calls for the country to limit the number of
tourists entering Thailand.128 One interviewee told us:

Culturally they don’t seem to fit the kind of standards, the mannerisms,
the manners we have come to expect. We think we are better than them.
More polite, more cultured, more decent. But … the Chinese have had
a period in which they were reduced to nothing. Cut off from their
cultural heritage. If you go back 1000 years they would look at us as
barbarians.129

The second area of concern is China’s presence in Laos, and in the Mekong
river more generally. In our workshops with the Thai military we heard that
“The fact that China gives assistance to countries like Laos means they are
entering in large numbers. Especially countries with natural resources. From
Thailand’s point of view, it is scary” (italics added). Another said “we talk a
lot about this. Even now China is coming in to lease Laos land for 99 years.
China has now promised to help the Laos government to have quite big infra-
structure projects. There are a lot of promises going on. So to lease the land
for 99 years is quite … we are trying to think whether this is good or bad.”130
After relations between China and Laos warmed in the post–​Cold War era,
the number of Chinese living in Laos surged. By 2009 the official number was
30,000 but numbers may have been as many as ten times higher.131 Many have
worked in Laos’ urban centres in markets, shops, restaurants and guesthouses.
But Chinese investment in rubber plantations and casinos has also brought
with it flows of migrant workers. Up to 20,000 may have arrived as part of the
high-​speed railway construction.132 Large numbers of Chinese tourists also
 Rediscovering China 125
arriving to gamble at the new casino in Bokeo Province. All of this has led
Thais to feel some loss.
The Mekong river is another area where Thai uneasiness with China can
be detected. In 2012, the murder of 13 Chinese sailors prompted an outcry
in China, a joint investigation, and ultimately a Chinese proposal for joint
patrols on the Mekong. A Thai Parliamentary Committee considered the
matter and noted concerns that any formal agreement for the patrols might
be inconsistent with Article 190 of the 2007 constitution (since abrogated).133
Article 190 stated that any international agreement which affects Thai sover-
eignty (sitthi athippatai) must be subject to parliamentary approval. The even-
tual outcome was a hand-​off system where each country patrols the section
within its jurisdiction.134 In 2016, the Thai Cabinet agreed to a plan to develop
Mekong navigability. Subsequently, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and China
agreed to improve navigability in the Mekong to allow the passage of ships
greater than 500 tonnes. But a study conducted by some Thais in the Chiang
Rai province between October 2017 and May 2018 revealed strong concerns
about the removal of obstacles to improve navigability, especially in terms of
the impact on the environment and the livelihoods of affected locals.135 As a
result, in late January 2018 the Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinay said
that China had agreed to halt the blasting program. Although this decision
may have been prompted by environmental concerns, it may also have been
motivated by the trepidation at having large Chinese vessels moving freely
down the Mekong into Thai territory.

Conclusion
Thailand’s collective memory of China is a site that has been shaped not
only by what is remembered, but also by what has been almost deliberately
forgotten. It is a rich and complex site in which Thailand’s ethnic linkages,
its physical proximity and its intertwined history with China all play a part.
It is a memory site that, thanks to both the passing of time and the restraint
and tact with which China has managed its relations with Thailand since
the mid-​1950s, has produced a rather benign perception of China. China
has been a threat, but that memory has faded into obscurity while the mem-
ories of China as a protector have remained strong, reinforced by more
powerful memories of China’s help during the Vietnam crisis and the 1997
financial crisis.
The fact that, as our surveys clearly showed, China’s influence is perceived
to be at its zenith now, is also important. We must consider the effect of pres-
entism, the tendency for respondents to attribute greater importance to recent
events. Yet just as likely respondents are accurately observing that China’s phe-
nomenal economic growth since Deng, becoming the world’s second largest
economy in 2010, in the context of a globalisation and the emergence of an
economically integrated Asia, is giving it greater influence than at any time in
the past 200 years. China’s economic success and the memory of China as a
126 Rediscovering China
proximate giant (as well as a protector) have contributed to a cultural renais-
sance for Sino-Thais. This convergence between Sino-Thais ‘coming out,’ the
proliferation and celebration of Chinese cultural reference points and the re-​
emergence of China as a Great Power –​with the concomitantly huge oppor-
tunities that represents for Thai prosperity –​is a self-​reinforcing phenomenon.
But the extent to which this burst of economic and identity exuberance
has influenced Thai foreign and security policy outside the domain of trade
and business relations is, however, less certain. There are limitations in the
degree to which the positive memory of China can affect Thailand’s China
calculus: the institutions and stronger conceptions of Thainess, including the
stronger institutional remembrances of the role of the Thai monarchy in pre-
serving Thai sovereignty, are important constraints.
Finally, although China is remembered and respected as a proximate
power, China’s presence in Thailand and in Thailand’s near north has become
much more palpable, firstly through a massive inflow of Chinese tourists,
and secondly through the growing connectivity of northern Thailand
with southern China. Both are provoking profoundly ambivalent feelings.
Although Thailand welcomes Chinese tourism as much needed support to
the Thai economy, there is some frustration and irritation, for the most part
held in check, but occasionally exposing itself in ugly incidents or public
outbursts. And although Thailand desires the development of north-​south
infrastructural connectivity, as part of its own plan for becoming Southeast
Asia’s logistics and transport hub, it is concerned at the possible implications
for Thai sovereignty posed by easier movement of Chinese assets, particularly
into Thailand’s north. We return to this question, in the context of US-​China
competition for influence, in the book’s concluding chapter. But for now, we
turn to Thailand’s memory of pan-​Asianism, ASEAN and neighbouring
countries, important pieces in the contemporary outlook and national iden-
tity of modern Thailand.

Notes
1 ทักษิณไม่ห่วงสมดุลจีน-​สหรัฐยกหูคุยชาติมหาอำ�นาจสบาย (16 ก.ย. 2546), ‘Thaksin Not Worried
about Balancing the US and China’; Daily Manager ผู้จัดการรายวัน, 16 September
2003, pp. 14, 15.
2 For the centrality of Chulalongkorn in Thailand’s strategic culture see Raymond,
Thai Military Power.
3 ‘Beijing Treads Carefully When Scions of Thai Political Dynasty Arrive in
China in Search of Their Roots’, South China Morning Post, 7 January 2019,
accessed at www.scmp.com/​news/​china/​diplomacy/​article/​2181064/​beijing-​treads-​
carefully-​when-​scions-​thai-​political-​dynasty
4 Jain, China and Thailand 1949–​1983, p. xi.
5 Peleggi estimates between one-​third and one-​half. Peleggi, Thailand: The Worldly
Kingdom, p. 46. With regard to assimilation, see, for example, the comment of
Singaporean Lee Khoon Choy, “Siam (the former name of Thailand) was, in my
opinion, highly successful in assimilating the overseas Chinese community into
 Rediscovering China 127
their society.” Khoon Choy Lee, Golden Dragon and Purple Phoenix: The Chinese
and Their Multi-​Ethnic Descendants in Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific
Publishing, 2013), p. 1.
6 Charnvit Kasetsiri, ‘Origins of a Capital and a Seaport: The Early Settlement of
Ayutthaya and Its East Asian Trade’, in Charnvit, Studies in Thai and Southeast
Asian Histories, p. 144.
7 G. W. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1957), p. 12.
8 Benedict Anderson, ‘Riddles of Yellow and Red’, New Left Review 97 (January–​
February 2016), pp. 7–​20.
9 We conducted a linear regression to consider the extent to which perceptions of
threats from the individual Great Powers could predict the significance of the
threat from the Great Powers collectively. The results suggest that individual
threat ratings for the United States (b= 0.499, t()=15.331, p<0.001) and Russia
(b= 0.151, t()=5.242, p<0.001) are the only significant predictors of overall ratings
of the threat of the Great Powers, with the United States being the greater pre-
dictor of the two. The final model showed that these two predictors could explain
a significant 35% of the variance in the overall threat rating of the Great Powers
[R2= 0.353, F(2,775) = 211.744, p<0.001]. We can infer that respondents who
rate the Great Powers a significant threat were most likely thinking of the United
States and Russia. They are also positive predictors, which means that as ratings
of the threat posed by the United States and Russia increase, so too do the ratings
of the threat posed by the Great Powers.
10 Peleggi, Thailand: The Worldly Kingdom, p. 45.
11 Ibid., p. 45.
12 Anuson Chinvanno, Thailand’s Policies toward China, 1949–​54 (London: Macmillan
Academic and Professional, 1992), p. 28.
13 Khoon Choy Lee, Golden Dragon, p. 14.
14 G. William Skinner, ‘Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia’, in Geoff
Wade (ed.), China and Southeast Asia Volume IV: Interactions from the End of the
Nineteenth Century to 1911 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 267–​268.
15 Remittance of profits to China was an issue, with one British financial adviser
stating that 100% of profits from internal trade are remitted to China. Skinner,
Chinese Society in Thailand, p. 249.
16 Battye, ‘The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–​1910’, p. 24.
17 Ibid., p. 240.
18 Jain, China and Thailand 1949–​1983, p. xxxviii.
19 Rajanuphap, Our Wars with the Burmese. On the construction of Thainess, see
Pavin, ‘A Plastic Nation’.
20 Wasana Wongsurawat, ‘Beyond Jews of the Orient: A New Interpretation of
the Problematic Relationship between the Thai State and Its Ethnic Chinese
Community’, Positions 24, no. 2, doi 10.1215/​10679847-​3458721, pp. 559, 562.
21 Anuson, Thailand’s Policies toward China, p. 30; Kasian, ‘The Misbehaving Jeks’,
pp. 266–​267.
22 Ibid.
23 Charnvit, ‘The First Phibun Government’, in Charnvit, Studies in Thai and
Southeast Asian Histories, pp. 275–​350.
24 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, pp. 263–​266.
25 Kasian, ‘The Misbehaving Jeks’.
128 Rediscovering China
26 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, p. 370.
27 Thak Chaloemtiarana, ‘Are We Them? Textual and Literary Representations of
the Chinese in Twentieth-​Century Thailand’, Southeast Asian Studies 3, no. 3
(December 2014). p. 474.
28 Twenty years after her first visit in 1981, the princess returned to China in 2001
for a month at Beijing University to study reading, writing, speaking, Tai Chi,
Chinese painting, calligraphy and Chinese violin. The princess rationalised her
long stay saying:

I had studied Chinese for 20 years but my knowledge had not progressed as
much as it should. The Chinese Embassy arranged for a teacher to teach me.
This led me to think if I lived in a Chinese environment only studying Chinese
without having to do any other work just in a little while I should improve.
The problem was that there was quite a lot of work in Thailand. This meant
I could only seclude myself a little. Three years previously I had gone to the
US for a month. So I thought I should go to China for a similar period.

พระราชนิพนธ์ ใน สมเด็จพระเทพรัตนราชสุดาฯ สยามบรมราชกุมมารี, Princess Sirindhorn

เมื่อข้าพเจ้าเป็นนักเรียนนอก, When I Was a Foreign Student (Bangkok: Amarin,
2001), p. 3.
29 Klupluthai Pungkanon, ‘Witness to the Times’, The Nation, 23 July 2015.
30 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, p. 26.
31 Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Higinbotham, Norman D. Levin, Julia
F. Lowell, Angel Rabasa and Somi Seong, Pacific Currents: The Response of US
Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise (Santa Monica: RAND,
2008), p. 125.
32 National Archives of Singapore, Oral History Interviews, Mr Lien Ying Chow,
Reel 18 recorded 10 April 1981, Pioneers of Singapore Accession No. 000057,
Reel/​Disc 18. Accessed at www.nas.gov.sg/​archivesonline/​viewer?uuid=22a55450-​
115f-​11e3-​83d5-​0050568939ad-​OHC000057_​018 on 20 September 2018.
33 Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents, p. 136.
34 ‘Thai PM Seeks Out Roots in Meizhou’, China Daily, 4 July 2005, accessed at
www.chinadaily.com.cn/​english/​doc/​2005-​07/​04/​content_​456688.htm on 26
February 2019.
35 Ibid.
36 Jiemin Bao, Marital Acts: Gender, Sexuality, and Identity among the Chinese Thai
Diaspora (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), p. 101.
37 Ibid., p. 102.
38 Kasian, ‘The Misbehaving Jeks’, p. 64.
39 เอนก อัดธนาธร เละ อยู่ที่อื่นอาจถูกฆ่าทิ้ง ชาวเน็ตรุม ลบโพสต์หนี และโพสต์อีกที? ‘Anek Criticises
Thanthorn: Live Somewhere Else You Might Be Killed; Netizens Swarm and
Have the Post Deleted but Posted Again’, Khao Sod,15 February 2019, accessed at
www.khaosod.co.th/​election-​2019/​news_​2213302 on 22 February 2019.
40 Craig Reynolds, ‘Tycoons and Warlords: Modern Thai Social Formations’, in
Anthony Reid (eds.), Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the
Chinese: In Honour of Jennifer Cushman (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 115.
41 Malinee Dilokwanich, ‘ “Sam Kok”: A Study of a Thai Adaptation of a Chinese
Novel’, PhD thesis, University of Washington, 1983.
42 The first Thai stamp on a Chinese religious theme depicted the Chinese Mahayana
Buddhist deity Guan Yin (Kuan Im) on the numerologically significant 9 Baht,
 Rediscovering China 129
issued on 9 September 2009. This was later followed by issues of stamps showing
Taoist deities and stamps commemorating Chinese New Year. Peter Jackson,
‘Spirits of Power in 21st Century Thailand: Magic and the Supernatural at the
Centre of Political Authority in Thailand’, Presentation, Australian National
University, 2015. Also, Peter A. Jackson. ‘The Supernaturalization of Thai
Political Culture: Thailand’s Magical Stamps of Approval at the Nexus of Media,
Market and State’, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 31, no. 3
(2016), p. 861.
43 ยิ่งลักษณ์ พร้อมแกนนำ�พรรคเพื่อไทย ร่วมงานศพ “บรรหาร” กระทรวง วัฒนธรรมจีน ส่งคำ�อาลัย
Yinglaksa phrom kaennam phakphueathai ruam ngansop banhan krasuang
watthanatham chin song khamalai, ‘Yingluck and Phuea Thai Party Leadership
Attend the Funeral of Banharn; China’s Ministry of Culture Sends Its
Condolences’, Matichon Online, 30 April 2016, accessed at www.matichon.co.th/​
news/​122382 on 5 May 2016.
44 Interview, mid-​ranking military officer, Bangkok, 2017.
45 Kasian, ‘The Sino-​Thais’ Right Turn towards China’.
46 Interview, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Bangkok, 2017.
47 See Gregory V. Raymond, “Religion as a Tool of Influence: Buddhism and China’s
Belt and Road Initiative in Mainland Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast
Asia 42 (December 2020).
48 Respondent were asked to rate their levels of support for four options with regard
Thailand’s policy towards the South China Sea dispute. These were: encourage
peaceful resolution of dispute; avoid taking sides; support the claims of ASEAN
countries; support China’s claims. The first option was the most preferred, the
second the second-​most, and so on with supporting China’s claim the least pre-
ferred. The result of those identifying as Sino-​Thai being slightly more inclined to
support China’s claims was significant for one wave (Mann-​Whitney U Wilcoxon
W Z Asymp. Sig. (two-​tailed) p<0.050) but not for a subsequent wave. For statistics
on Thai military officers claiming Chinese ancestry, see Table A.19, Annexure, and
Figure A.12, and for effect of Chinese ethnicity on views on the South China Sea
dispute, see Figure A.13, Annexure.
49 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2017.
50 ‘All Aboard for History’, The Nation, 26 November 2018, accessed at www.
nationmultimedia.com/​detail/​lifestyle/​30359200 on 8 February 2019.
51 ‘Thailand Opens Its Biggest Luxury Shopping Playland –​and Looks to Wealthy
Chinese Tourists to Make It a Hit’, South China Morning Post, 14 November 2018,
accessed at www.scmp.com/​business/​article/​2172962/​thailand-​opens-​its-​biggest-​
luxury-​shopping-​playland-​and-​looks-​wealthy on 1 July 2020.
52 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, p. 19.
53 Sarasin, Tribute and Profit, pp. 138–​143.
54 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2003),
p. 124.
55 Dhiravat na Pombejra, ‘Administrative and Military Roles of the Chinese in Siam
during an Age of Turmoil, Circa 1760–​1782’, in Geoff Wade (ed.), China and
Southeast Asia Volume III: Southeast Asia and Qing China (from the Seventeenth
to the Eighteenth Century) (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 261.
56 ‘On the Trail of King Taksin: Remembering the Great King in Thonburi’ ตามรอย
“พระเจ้าตาก” รำ�ลึกมหาราชแห่งกรุงธนบุรี, Mgronline, 28 December 2018, accessed at
https://​mgronline.com/​travel/​detail/​9600000130010 on 12 February 2020.
130 Rediscovering China
57 Serhat Ünaldi, S. Working towards the Monarchy: The Politics of Space in
Downtown Bangkok, Kindle iOS version, 2016, p. 55.
58 Gregory V. Raymond, ‘Strategic Culture and Thailand’s Response to Vietnam’s
Occupation of Cambodia, 1979–​1989: A Cold War Epilogue’, Journal of Cold
War Studies 22, no. 1 (Winter 2020/​21), pp. 4–​45, https://​doi.org/​10.1162/​jcws_​a_​
00924.
59 King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications
(California: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 104, 114.
60 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum,
‘Bangkok and Peking: Thailand Enters the Ping-​Pong Sweepstakes’, 14 September
1972, Approved for release 2007/​ 10/​22: CIA-​RDP85T00875R002000120014-​
7, p. 2.
61 Faulder, Anand Panyarachun, p. 173.
62 Michael R. Chambers, ‘The Chinese and the Thais Are Brothers: The Evolution
of the Sino–​Thai Friendship’, Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 45 (2005),
pp. 599–​629, doi:10.1080/​10670560500205100, p. 605.
63 Faulder, Anand Panyarachun, p. 131.
64 Chambers, ‘Chinese and the Thais Are Brothers’, p. 613.
65 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 381.
66 Chambers, ‘Chinese and the Thais Are Brothers’, p. 616.
67 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Thailand’s Changing Strategic Outlook: Implications
for Thai-​US Security Relations’, 21 October 1987. Approved for release 3 August
2012: CIA-​RDP04T00907R000200340001-​4.
68 Interview, mid​-ranking Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
69 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
70 Workshop with the Strategic Studies Centre, Royal Thai Armed Forces, 2016.
71 Surachart Bamrungsuk, ‘From Dominance to Power Sharing: The Military and
Politics in Thailand, 1973–​1992’, PhD thesis, Columbia University 1999, p. 92.
Mao himself had previously advised Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramote on
defeating the insurgency as early as 1975, saying:

First of all, don’t you go and condemn them. Don’t say rude words about
them, because they like it. They won’t listen to you, they are thick-​skinned,
these people. Secondly, don’t kill them, because these people want to become
heroes, make martyrs of themselves. As soon as you kill one, another five will
come. So there’s no purpose in killing them. Third, don’t send any soldiers
against them because they’ll run away. Soldiers can’t stay in the jungle forever.
They’ve got to go back to barracks. And when they do, the Communists come
back again. There’s no use. You waste time and money.

Kukrit Pramoj, interview by Asiaweek Magazine, 20 October 1976, in M. R.

Kukrit Pramoj, ‘His Wit and Wisdom –​Writings, Speeches and Interviews’, Steve
Van Beek (ed.) (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1983), p. 143.
72 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Thailand’s Changing Strategic Outlook: Implications
for Thai-​US Security Relations’, 21 October 1987. Approved for release 3 August
2012: CIA-​RDP04T00907R000200340001-​4.
73 Raymond visit to Chinese Martyr’s Memorial Museum, Doi Mae Salong, Chiang
Rai, Thailand, 11 February 2018.
74 Surachart, ‘From Dominance to Power Sharing’, pp. 138–​145.
 Rediscovering China 131
75 Evelyn Goh, ‘The Modes of China’s Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia’, Asian
Survey 54, no. 5 (September/​October 2014), p. 839.
76 Joint Statement of the Kingdom of Thailand and the People’s Republic of China
on a Plan of Action for the 21st Century, signed 5 February 1999, p. 5.
77 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
78 Stanton, Brief Authority, p. 255.
79 Jain, China and Thailand 1949–​1983, p. 123.
80 Sirin, The Dragon’s Pearl, p. 22.
81 Raymond visit to Xishuangbanna Museum of Ethnology, Yunnan, PRC,
December 2018.
82 Antonella Diana, ‘Re-​Configuring Belonging in Post-​Socialist Xishuangbanna,
China’, in Andrew Walker (ed.), Tai Lands and Thailand: Community State in
Southeast Asia (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009), p. 194.
83 Daniel D. Lovelace, ‘ “People’s War” and Chinese Foreign Policy: Thailand as a
Case Study of Overt Insurgent Support’, PhD thesis, Claremont Graduate School
and University Center, 1971, p. 47.
84 Ibid., p. 49.
85 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Strategic Significance of Chinese Communist Road
Development in Yunnan Province 1954’, CIA/​RR IM-​408, p. 5. Approved for
release 1999/​09/​21: CIA-​RDP79T00935A000300150001-​5. We saw in the previous
chapter that this assessment was inaccurate, and may have contributed to con-
temporary Thai doubt about their Cold War fears having been too influenced by
US views.
86 Lovelace, ‘ “People’s War” and Chinese Foreign Policy’, p. 48.
87 Anuson, Thailand’s Policies toward China, p. 138.
88 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Strategic Significance of Chinese Communist Road
Development in Yunnan Province 1954’, CIA/​RR IM-​408, p. 3. Approved for
release 1999/​09/​21: CIA-​RDP79T00935A000300150001-​5.
89 National Archives of Singapore, Oral History Interviews, Mr Lee Khoon
Choy, Reel 32 recorded 5 May 1981, Political History of Singapore 1945–​
1965 Accession Number 000022, Reel/​ Disc 32, accessed at www.nas.gov.sg/​
archivesonline/​oral_​history_​interviews/​record-​details/​1a4583ca-​115f-​11e3-​83d5-​
0050568939ad?keywords=Lee%20Khoon%20Choy%20Bandung&keywords-​
type=all on 20 September 2018.
90 Ibid.
91 David Wilson, ‘China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part I)’, China
Quarterly 30 (April 1967), p. 154.
92 Ibid., p. 160.
93 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, p. 380.
94 David Wilson, ‘China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part II)’, China
Quarterly 30 (April 1967), p. 98.
95 Pearson correlation two-​tailed for question, “In regard to military and security
matters, to what extent was Chinese influence accepted during the Cold War
period?” (r(743) =-​0.079, p<.05). For mean and median scores for all time periods
for this question, see Table A.20, Annexure.
96 Interview, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Bangkok, 2016.
97 Sirin, The Dragon’s Pearl, p. 38.
98 Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 225.
99 Ibid., p. 225.
132 Rediscovering China
100 Sirin, The Dragon’s Pearl, p. 24.
101 ‘A Childhood Spent in the Dragons’ Den’, Bangkok Post, 19 July 2015, accessed
at www.bangkokpost.com/​news/​special-​reports/​626888/​a-​childhood-​spent-​in-​
the-​dragons-​den on 12 February 2019.
102 John K. Fairbank, ‘The Chinese World Order: A Preliminary Framework’, in
Geoff Wade (ed.), China and Southeast Asia Volume III: Southeast Asia and
Qing China (From the Seventeenth to the Eighteenth Century) (Abingdon,
Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 382–​398. From The Chinese World Order (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 390.
103 Martin Stuart-​Fox, ‘Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture
in Shaping Future Relations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (April
2004), pp. 116–​139.
104 Anthony Milner, ‘ “Sovereignty” and Normative Integration in the South China
Sea: Some Malaysian and Malay Perspectives’, in Lowell Dittmer and Ngeow
Chow Bing, Southeast Asia and China: A Contest in Mutual Socialization
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2017), pp. 229–​246.
105 Masuda, ‘Last Siamese Tributary Missions to China’, p. 186.
106 Ibid., p. 184.
107 Winai Pongsripian and Theera Nuchpiam (eds.), Writings of King Mongkut
to Sir John Bowring (AD 1855–​1868) (Bangkok: Khana Kammakan Chamra
Prawattisat Thai lae Chatphim `Ekkasan thang Prawattisat lae Borannakhadi,
1994), pp. 147–​148.
108 Masuda, ‘Last Siamese Tributary Missions to China’, pp. 181–​190.
109 Ji-​Young Lee, China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
110 C. Pat Giersch, ‘Motley Throng: Change on Southwest China’s Early Modern
Frontier, 1700–​1880’, The Journal of Asian Studies 60, no. 1 (February
2001), p. 73.
111 ASEAN, Project Briefs for Selected PPP Projects: ASEAN Public-​ Private
Partnership (PPP) Programme (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016), p. 44.
112 Ibid., p. 44.
113 ทางสองแพร่ง! รถนักท่องเที่ยวจีนทะลักเที่ยวไทยพุ่ง 3 ปีติด-​ปัญหาโผล่, ‘Two Crossroads;
Chinese Tourist Vehicles Touring Thailand Increase, Problems Emerge’,
Manager Online, 24 February 2014, accessed at https://​mgronline.com/​local/​
detail/​9590000019650 on 8 March 2019.
114 ASEAN proposed the Kunming to Singapore Rail line at its fifth ASEAN
Summit in 1995. ASEAN, ‘Enhancing ASEAN Connectivity Monitoring and
Evaluation: Final Report’ (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016), p. 42.
115 Despite COVID, the project remains on track to be completed by December
2021. ‘BRI contributes global post-pandemic recovery by laying foundation
for cooperation and stabilizing global supply chains’, Global Times, 25 January
2021, accessed at https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213878.shtml on
1 February 2021. There is at present no agreement for the construction of the
joining section from Nakhon Ratchasima to Nong Khai, leaving Laos still
landlocked.
116 Interview, Anand Panyarachun, Bangkok, 2016.
117 Sulmaan Wasif Khan, Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao
Zedong to Xi Jinping (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018),
pp. 69–​75.
 Rediscovering China 133
118 Jurgen Haacke, ‘The Significance of Beijing’s Bilateral Relations: Looking
“Below” the Regional Level in China–​ASEAN Ties’, in Ho Khai Leong and
Samuel C. Y. Ku, China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional
Changes (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 113.
119 Interview, General Boonsrang Niumpradit, Bangkok, 2015.
120 Haacke, ‘The Significance of Beijing’s Bilateral Relations’, p. 121.
121 ‘Beijing Treads Carefully When Scions of Thai Political Dynasty Arrive in China
in Search of Their Roots’, South China Morning Post, 7 January 2019, accessed at
www.scmp.com/​news/​china/​diplomacy/​article/​2181064/​beijing-​treads-​carefully-​
when-​scions-​thai-​political-​dynasty on 8 March 2019.
122 Haacke, ‘The Significance of Beijing’s Bilateral Relations’, p. 121.
123 Joint Statement of the Kingdom of Thailand and the People’s Republic of China
on a Plan of Action for the Twenty-​First Century, signed 5 February 1999.
124 Yu Haiqiu, deputy director and associate professor, Institute of Thailand
Studies, Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, ‘Strengthening China-​Thailand
Cooperation on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, in Yunnan Academy of
Social Sciences, Building a Community with Shared Future for Humanity: Deepening
China’s Pragmatic Cooperation with the South and Southeast Asian Countries,
2018. p. 378
125 World Travel and Tourism Council, Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2018
Thailand, pp. 3–​ 4 accessed at www.wttc.org/​-​/​media/​files/​reports/​economic-​
impact-​research/​countries-​2018/​thailand2018.pdf on 12 March 2019.
126 ‘Why Thailand Needs Chinese Tourists, Waives Visa Fee in Hope of Enticing
Them Back’, South China Morning Post, 14 November 2018, accessed at www.
scmp.com/ ​ m agazines/​ p ost-​ m agazine/​ t ravel/​ a rticle/​ 2 172952/​ why-​ t hailand-​
understands-​real-​value-​chinese-​tourists on 12 March 2019.
127 ‘Thai Model’s Unbelievable Rant about Chinese Tourists’, News.com.au
accessed at www.news.com.au/​travel/​travel-​updates/​thai-​models-​unbelievable-​
rant-​about-​chinese-​tourists/​news-​story/​7661f96f54e28f4aefb5f03df824f124 on
12 March 2019.
128 อรรถจักร์ สัตยานุรักษ์: จำ�กัดนักท่องเที่ยวจีนโดยด่วน, ‘Atchak Satyanurak: Chamkat
Nakthong thiao Chin Doi Duan “Limit Chinese Tourists Urgently” ’, Prachatai,
28 February 2016, accessed at http://​prachatai.org/​journal/​2016/​02/​64319?utm_​
source=dlvr.it&utm_​medium=twitter on 28 February 2016; ‘Chinese “Zero
Dollar” Tour Companies Dodge Thai Crackdown –​and Travel Agencies Defend
the Practice’, South China Morning Post, 27 January 2018, accessed at www.scmp.
com/​lifestyle/​travel-​leisure/​article/​2130551/​chinese-​zero-​dollar-​tour-​companies-​
dodge-​thai-​crackdown-​and on 12 March 2019.
129 Interview, retired Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Bangkok, 2017.
130 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
131 Danielle Tan, ‘Chinese Engagement in Laos: Past, Present, and Uncertain
Future’, Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 7, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore 2015, p. 10.
132 ‘Laos-​China Are Building, High Speed Trains. The Cruel Legacy of War and
Colonialism’, Global Research, 29 October 2018, accessed at www.globalresearch.
ca/​laos-​china-​building-​west-​destroying-​spreading-​nihilism/​5658339 on 13 March;
‘Photo Story: The China-​Built Railway Cutting through Laos’, thethirdpole.net,
14 February 2019, accessed at www.thethirdpole.net/​en/​2019/​02/​14/​photo-​story-​
the-​china-​built-​railway-​cutting-​through-​laos/​ on 13 March 2019.
134 Rediscovering China
133 Working Group Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of a Study of
the Case of Murder of Chinese Sailors in Chiang Rai Province Including
Implications for Thai-​ China Relations, รายงานสรุปผลการพิจารณาศึกษาข้อเท็จจริงและค
วามคืบหน้ากรณีฆาตกรรมลูกเรือสัญชาติจีน ณ จังหวัดเชียงราย รวมทั้งผลกระทบต่อความสัมพันธ์จีน,
January 2012, p. 19
134 Jonas Parello-​Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, Murder on the Mekong: The Long
Arm of Chinese Law, Adelphi Series 54, no. 451 (2014), p. 101.
135 รมค้านระเบดแก่งเปิดเดินเรือน้ำ�โขง, Opposition to Blasting Rapids to Open Passage of
Ships in Mekong, Post Today, 6 March 2018, p. B12.
5 
Thailand at the centre I
Pan-​Asianism and ASEAN

I’m optimistic about ASEAN because I have to be, because it’s the only show
in town, and so we have to make it as good a show as possible.
Tej Bunnag, 2016

In this chapter we examine Thailand’s pan-​Asianism as a distinct site of

memory. Thailand’s interest in regionalism has had many forms, the most
conspicuous of which has been its involvement in ASEAN. Our surveys and
interviews validated the enduring, almost totemic importance, of ASEAN
for Thailand, amongst its diplomatic, business and military elites. Indeed
in 1982, ASEAN was described as having been a cardinal principle of Thai
foreign policy since 1975.1 Especially amongst its diplomatic corps, Thais are
immensely proud of Thailand’s leadership role in founding and developing
ASEAN. In this chapter, we also review another site of memory that imagines
Thailand’s region and its place in it: what we term Thailand’s Suvarnabhumi
site of memory, which a superior Thailand, progressive in emphasising
Thailand’s neighbours as assets rather than threats. It imagines Thailand as
an economic centre and political leader within mainland Southeast Asia. It
recalls the shift in Thailand’s grand strategy in the 1970s and 1980s, triggered
by the departure of the United States and the end of the Vietnam War, and
accelerated by the end of the Cold War. As its name suggests, it is deeply
entangled with the idea of Suvarnabhumi, an ancient myth of Southeast
Asia as a Golden Land.
This is an elite site of memory and more deeply rooted amongst Thailand’s
economic planners and politicians than amongst its broader community. In
fact, Suvarnabhumi is not the first pan-​Asian vision Thailand has imagined,
but because of the mnemonic hegemony operating in regard to Thailand’s
domestic politics, a 1930s and 1940s pan-​Asian vision has little legacy in con-
temporary memory. We will argue that resonances of the Suvarnabhumi site
of memory could also be seen in former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s
Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) Initiative, as well as more recent creations
such as the Ayeyawady-​ Chao Phraya-​ Mekong Economic Cooperation
Initiative.
136 Thailand at the centre I
In this chapter we first review Thailand’s pre-​ ASEAN pan-​ Asian
movements, and then consider what echoes remain in Thai memory today.
We then move to looking at pan-​Asian and regionalist visions subsequent to
ASEAN’s founding. In particular, we look at the emergence of a new con-
cept of Thailand’s role amongst its neighbours in the post–​Cold War period,
and how this vision of Thailand as a Suvarnabhumi has endured in an elite
economic strategy. We then move to ASEAN. After addressing an ASEAN
that is increasingly important in regional affairs, and a Thailand that is a
devout, albeit realistic, believer in ASEAN, we cast an eye over some of the
sentiment associated with Thailand’s role in the organisation’s founding and
early development. To conclude, we consider how more recent trends in the
strategic environment, such as more hegemonic China and erratic America,
are recasting Thailand’s understanding of its own history into one that
emphasises the common struggle that Southeast Asian nations have in man-
aging relations with Great Powers.

Early pan-​Asianism
In 2006, scholars of Thailand’s Fine Arts department discovered similar-
ities in skeletons found in Thailand and Southern China.2 They had proven,
they said, that the ‘Thai race’ had been in Thailand longer than previously
thought. These and other efforts to define a Thai race have a long history.
Indeed, the conception of a Thai race remains the main legacy of the first
flowering of pan-​Asian thought in Thailand, as part of the chauvinist-​
nationalist visions of the 1932 revolution, in a period of intense intellectual
and social ferment. Under the governments of Phibun Songkram and Pridi
Phanomyong, altruistic goals for a more meritocratic and less aristocratic
social order and an Indochina free of French colonialism emerged alongside
more chauvinist dreams of reclaiming lost territories and building a greater
Thailand. Interwoven with both was a discourse about race and nation,
drawn in part from the currents of social Darwinism then prevalent in global
affairs. What remains of this vision? While the return of contemporary
Thailand to a period described by Thongchai as hyper-​royalism has seen a
significant obfuscation of the legacy and memory of the post-​1932 period,
as we shall see in this chapter, remnants remain in Thailand’s more recent
efforts to portray a more benign history with its neighbours, in which shared
anti-​colonialism is important.3 The Phibun period also saw the first use of
the Golden Peninsular metaphor for mainland Southeast Asia, though at
that point translated as “laem thong” rather than “Suvarnabhumi” as became
the practice in the 1980s.
Thailand’s pan-​Asianism in part revolved around conceptions of a ‘Tai
race,’ and even a ‘Tai world.’4 The idea of a Tai race and Tai world first gained
greater popularity –​and notoriety –​in the 1930s through the work of influen-
tial ideologue, playwright and later Culture Minister Luang Vichit Wathakan.
Vichit, who spent six years working in France, was a vector for ideas drawn
 Thailand at the centre I 137
from social Darwinism, expressed in his second book (Prawatisart Sakorn).5
Vichit, further influenced by a French map showing a Thai race occupying
a wide geographic area encompassing Southern China, parts of Burma and
what was then French Indochina, as well as a book by an American missionary,
developed his own theory of the origins of the Thais. The Thais, he claimed,
had moved southwards from Sukhothai, overthrown the Khmer kingdom and
established their own kingdom.6 Vichit also published a play Blood of Suphan,
which promoted pan-​Asian themes, including kinship between Burmese and
Thais. The concept of the Tai race was the inspiration for replacing the name
Siam with Thailand, along with the meaning of tai being ‘free.’
In the 1940s, Vichit and Phibun sought to expand the category of the Thai
race to incorporate ethnicities then under French rule, especially the Lao and
Khmer, and even at times the Vietnamese, as part of a discourse and practice
of anti-​colonialism and Thai pan-​Asianism. In 1940 Phibun Songkram stated
in a radio broadcast that:

There are people in Thailand who are under the impression that they are
Khmers or Laos and not brothers and sisters of ours in the Thai race.
But this is wrong. Cambodia and Laos, like Bangkok and Chiang Mai,
are just place names. Just as inhabitants of Chiangmai are Thai people,
so are the inhabitants in Cambodia and Laos Thai people. We are all of
the same blood and are all brothers and sisters … .7

He then brought the unified race and nation to a call against France:

The demand for the return of Thailand’s territories arouses in our

compatriots and in the Vietnamese people an awareness of liberty and
independence. It awakens in us the realization that the day is coming
when the French will have to get out of Indochina.8

The policy was more than rhetorical. In late 1940, as Thai forces were engaged
in hostilities with Indochinese forces under French control, the Thai Ministry
of the Interior announced it would no longer recognise French sovereignty
and would grant Thai citizenship to any person living in Laos and Cambodia.
Vietnamese would be recognised as citizens of another country.9 Vichit
brushed aside objections of linguistic difference, arguing that on that basis
significant parts of France would have to be given to Germany and Italy.10
Pan-​Asian and anti-​colonial rhetoric escalated after Thailand elected to
side with the Japanese following their invasion of Indochina and maritime
Southeast Asia in the last month of 1941. Phibun, aware of the fondness for
British institutions and culture common amongst the Thai elites at the time,
saturated Thailand’s radio broadcasts with propaganda criticising Britain’s
colonialist misdeeds and lauding Japan’s policies of Asia. Extensive radio
broadcasting from Bangkok’s only government-​ controlled radio station
promoted Japan’s East Asia Co-​Prosperity Sphere as an opportunity for
138 Thailand at the centre I
Thailand and all Asian countries to regain respect according to their level
of cultural achievement.11 Maps were published showing Thailand’s terri-
torial losses to Britain. Phibun specifically linked Japan’s driving out Britain
from Singapore and Malaysia to his own campaign, undertaken in 1939, to
drive France out of French Indochina bordering Thailand, along the Mekong
river.12 Britain, he claimed, only wished to use Thailand as a shield against
Japan, just as Britain would be willing to fight “to the very last Indian.”13
To say that Thailand’s anti-​colonial stance was concerned only with self-​
aggrandisement would be inaccurate. There was a belief, for example, that
Thais shared with the Lao and Khmer a concern about the assault on Buddhism
under French colonial rule. Moreover Thailand, prior to and after Japans’ inva-
sion, was prepared to support independence movements, especially in Laos,
but also Cambodia and Vietnam. For example, in 1940 Thailand allowed a
rally of the Khmer independence movement Khmer Issarak, attended by 3,000
Khmers including monks, to take place in Bangkok.14 In 1942, an ethnically
Vietnamese officer in the Thai military forces advised Phibun Songkram that
he was in contact with members of the Vietnamese resistance movement in
Saigon and Tokyo and they were asking him to unite all Vietnamese living
in Thailand. Phibun reportedly commended Lt Binh, saying “Getting back
Vietnam’s independence is OK with us.”15 Members of Thailand’s resistance
movement Seri Thai in northeastern Thailand maintained contact with their
Lao counterparts, the Khana Lao Issara. After the end of the Second World
War, Thais continued to allow Khmer and Lao independence movements to
use Thai territory.
This period of pan-​Asianism also included a meeting of one of the earliest
precursors to ASEAN, the South East Asian League, held in Bangkok in
1947.16 Tiang Sirikhan, the Seri Thai leader from northeastern Thailand
close to former Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong, was the president of the
Central Executive Committee of the League and the vice president was Tran
Van Giau. Today Thais are not strongly aware of this precursor to ASEAN.
For example, when in 2015 a comic book published to promote Thailand’s
entry into the ASEAN Economic Community displayed a timeline tracing
the history of ASEAN, it omitted mention of the Southeast Asia League.
Intentionally or not, the book showed ASEAN’s earliest predecessor as
Association of South East Asia (ASA), founded by Thailand, Malaysia and
the Philippines in 1961.17
The erasure of memory of the post-​1932 pan-​Asian foreign policy reflects
the long-​term eradication of the memory of the revolutionary People’s Party.
Phibun’s biographer noted in 1996 that the reputation of the leader of the
1932 revolution and two-​time prime minister had suffered greatly with the
passage of time, and that in particular he was seen as the “personification
of the anti-​royal sentiments of the 1932 revolution and the People’s Party.”18
Over time an “early ripe, early rotten” narrative emerged, critiquing the 1932
introduction of democracy as too early and destructive of Thai culture. The
constitution celebrations once held widely across Thailand dwindled (replaced
 Thailand at the centre I 139
by Red Cross festivals) and are now held in only one province, Trang. Many
buildings associated with the People’s Party, such as the original Supreme
Court building have been destroyed. Since the 2014 coup, efforts to extinguish
the cultural and political legacy of the Phibun and the People’s Party have
intensified.19 These include the removal of various monuments and memorials
such as the People’s Party plaque commemorating the 1932 revolution and the
victory over the rebellion of royalist forces that followed.20 Thailand’s almost
non-​existent commemoration of its Second World War resistance forces, the
Seri Thai, reflects a similar pattern in which achievements of non-​royals and
especially those regarded as anti-​royal are suppressed.21 From this perspective,
it is unsurprising that memory of ASEAN, the Holy Grail of modern region-
alism, has been mnemonically severed from the 1930s pan-​Asian vision of
Phibun, Luang Vichit and Pridi Phanomyong
Tai studies outlived Vichit’s irredentism to become a substantial field,
albeit still riddled with various political and nationalist agendas. In 2009,
scholar Nicholas Farrelly estimated that the field of Tai studies in Thailand
comprises many hundreds of scholarly works.22 Tai studies remains concerned
with the idea of there being ethnic Dais or Tais spread outside the kingdom of
Thailand. Part of this research agenda remained concerned with the question
of who Thais were and where they had come from. The archaeologist Suchit
Wongthet, for example, argued in the 1980s that Thais had not migrated from
anywhere else, although later he varied his conclusions after he found that he
could communicate easily with the natives of Zhuang in Guangxi province in
China.23

Thailand and the memory of Suvarnabhumi

In 2016, Thailand opened a history museum at Suvarnabhumi airport. In an
interview, the museum director discussed the naming of the airport. “King
Bhumibol,” he said, “never explained his choice of the airport’s name,” which
opened in 2006.24 But he personally believed that the name reflected the
king’s desire to make “our nation a transport centre” (phuea hai prathet rao
kankhonsong).
Thai aspirations for a large share of regional trade commenced in the nine-
teenth century. British commercial hegemony meant that many ideas such as
building canals across the Isthmus of Kra, which had been around since the
fifth reign (1868–1910), did not progress. Other ideas did progress. One was
building a train line to Nong Khai. The line was built in the 1950s with the aim
of bringing Laos into Thailand’s trading zone.25 While the 1930s pan-​Asian
idea of Thailand as an anti-​colonial Laem Thong foundered with the rise of
royalist-​nationalist history after 1947, the idea of Thailand as a Golden Land
returned powerfully in the post–​Cold War guise of the Suvarnabhumi liberal
economic vision.
In the post–​ Cold War Suvarnabhumi version of the Golden Land,
Thailand becomes a central logistical and industrial node linking maritime
140 Thailand at the centre I
and mainland Southeast Asia, as well as China and Southeast Asia. In an
increasingly integrated Asian region, it becomes a master of its own destiny
and in fact a leader amongst Southeast Asian nations. This site of memory
is powerfully evidenced in the naming of Thailand’s main international air-
port. The idea of Thailand as a bridge has become an important part of
its national identity. Indeed, scholars such as Phongpisoot Busbarat argue
that Thailand’s sense of national identity has been an important factor in
its pursuit of pan-​Asian and regional initiatives. National identity, as we
have argued previously, is integrally intertwined with historical memory.
In this case, Phongpisoot suggests, Thailand’s memory of having remained
uncolonised has influenced its perceptions of its neighbours and itself,
leading to a view that it is natural for Thailand to take a leading role in its
region.26 The image of the bridge, focusing on Thailand’s geographical pos-
ition in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia and linking China and main-
land Southeast Asia with maritime Southeast Asia, was later reinforced by
the United States itself emphasising Thailand’s centrality and the need for it
to remain a non-​communist fortress during the Cold War.27 In our interview,
a senior academic and former government adviser used the bridge metaphor
to describe both Thailand’s diplomacy and mediation role in disputes, and
its capacity to have friendships with rivalrous countries, such as China and
the United States.
The economically liberal Suvarnabhumi vision coalesced as resolution of
the Cambodian problem reached fruition, a decade after Cambodia’s inva-
sion by Vietnam.28 Thailand pushed forward a peace settlement based on the
idea of shared prosperity. During the 1990s liberal capitalist trends in Thai
foreign policy and governance brought a convergence between the United
States and Thailand. Foreign Minister Prasong of the first Chuan adminis-
tration noted the ascendancy of liberal economics and democracy following
the dissolution of communism and the Soviet Union, calling “ideological
and military conflict” a thing of the past. He signalled Thai support for
economic growth in Indochina. Thais supported Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), mirroring the United States’ Asian pol-
icies under the Clinton administration, which emphasised multilateralism
and democratic enlargement.
The end of the Vietnam War, which was accelerated by the end of the
Cold War, brought Thailand to the cusp of a new grand strategy. In 1987
Thailand released its Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan.
The document spoke of developing Thailand’s “eastern seaboard” as a zone
that would provide Thailand a new gateway to the world’s major sealanes.29
Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan established a thinktank, called ban
Pitsanalulok. The thinktank coined one of the most significant phrases in
Thailand’s diplomatic history, ‘turning battlefields into marketplaces’ (plian
sanam rop pen sanamkankha).30 Writing a decade later, a Thai biographer of
 Thailand at the centre I 141
Chatchai argued that the ‘battlefields into marketplaces’ was a new diplomatic
idea that

sent a diplomatic signal that countries that had different principles and
political systems, especially in Indochina, could come together on a field
where there was no conflict.31

By 1989 the proposal was being called the Indochina Initiative.32 Privately,
Thai officials spoke of creating a Thailand-​centred region, a Suvarnabhumi
in which Thailand helped its neighbours develop and the Thai baht became
the regional currency.33 The term Suvarnabhumi is thought to have been
first invented by Indian traders to refer to large parts of mainland Southeast
Asia encompassing Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia.34 Because
Suvarnabhumi was also associated with the introduction of Buddhism
into Southeast Asia, probably through missionaries during the reign of
the Indian King Ashoka (304–232 BCE), exactly where Suvarnabhumi was
located has become subject to vigorous debate. Burma and Thailand each
wishes to claim themselves as the birthplace of Theravada Buddhism in
Southeast Asia.
Subsequent Thai prime ministers such as Chuan Leekpai (1992–​1995 and
1997–​2001) and Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–​2006) continued with the initia-
tive, Thaksin Shinawatra most conspicuously. He saw regionalism as a way to
draw on the “economic logic” of Thailand, linking China and other regional
countries, and of harvesting the benefits of Asia’s higher growth compared
with the West.35 There were goals of making Thailand the “Detroit of Asia,” in
reference to the heavy concentration of car manufacturing along the Eastern
Seaboard.36 He drew on the Suvarnabhumi identity and memory during his
term, partly through finalising the long-​held dream for a grand international
airport, opened by his government in 2006, and officially named, as we saw, by
the then King Bhumibol. On the naming of “ultra-​modernist Suvarnabhumi
airport,” political scientist Pavin Chachavalpongpun states it was chosen
to “showcase Thailand’s present-​day economic might in the face of poorer
neighbours, to empower them with cash, and to establish itself as the centre
of modern civilization.”37 Thaksin was acting, in Pavin’s view, ‘as another
great leader who made Siam/​Thailand a hegemonic kingdom.’
Thaksin also drew on the Suvarnabhumi site of memory in founding
the ACD. Aimed at providing a loose non-​institutionalised forum for “the
exchange of ideas and experiences” between Asian countries, the ACD
was inaugurated at another Thai beachside resort. Unlike the founding of
ASEAN, this retreat was on the western side of the Gulf of Thailand, at
Cha Am. In his opening speech Thaksin referenced the Spirt of Bandung,
calling the ACD “a confidence-​building process for Asian countries.”38 He
described the ACD as complementary to existing bilateral and multilateral
fora, but with a specific mission to provide a “region-​wide forum to share
142 Thailand at the centre I
Asia’s common goals.” Here he hinted at the need to cooperate in order to
compete with the West:

Allow me, at this point, to offer an interesting statistic. Asia is a continent

that is rich in natural beauty and cultural sites. And yet the combined
income of our entire continent from tourist arrivals amounts to just
over 55 billion US dollars, while the tourism revenues from only two
European countries combined, namely France and Italy, totals over 57
billion US39 dollars. Such a figure is absolutely fascinating, and we should
congratulate both France and Italy on this tremendous achievement. At
the same time, however, we also have to look at ourselves and consider
why we cannot combine and make better use of our great diversity of
beauty, culture, and vibrancy to at least equal the achievement of these
two countries.

Today, the ACD continues with annual meetings and a membership of 34

countries from Southeast Asia, North Asia, Central Asia and the Middle
East.40
Other regional fora that Thaksin launched included the Quadrangle
Economic Cooperation Initiative and Ayeyawady –​Chao Phraya –​Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). Coming out of an ASEAN
meeting called to combat the SARS virus outbreak in 2003, Cambodian,
Laos and Myanmar leaders met in Bagan and called for the founding of
ACMECS as another framework for economic cooperation. After Vietnam
was admitted in 2004, the goal of transforming the “border areas of the five
countries into zones of economic growth, social progress and prosperity”
was declared.41 ACMECS now plays more of a defensive role against China’s
growing influence as much as it is a vehicle for Thailand’s sub-​regional lead-
ership ambitions.42
After Thaksin’s toppling in 2006, various governments have continued
to pursue the regionalist economic strategy. Though the explicit referen-
cing of Suvarnabhumi has declined, the vision persists. In 2008, the Thai
and Burmese foreign ministers agreed to establish transport links between
Dawei, a deep sea port, and Bangkok. The first stage would be a 160 km
road and rail link between Dawei and the Thai border.43 In 2012, the
National Economic and Social Development Board noted the potential
for Thailand to use the incipient ASEAN Community to position itself
as a vital hub of logistics and transport in ASEAN and even a “major
route for trade with East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and
Africa.”44 More recently, the junta led by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-​
ocha from May 2014 has also spoken of the Eastern Economic Corridor.
This is held out as a means of generating sufficient economic growth to
help Thailand escape the middle income trap by raising per capita income
from USD$6,500 to USD$20,000 within 20 years.45 The Eastern Economic
Corridor, comprising transport links including high speed rail and airports
 Thailand at the centre I 143
(Suvarnabhumi, Don Mueang and Utapao), is supposed to help Thailand
grow its automobile, electronics and IT industries through linkages with
China via the BRI and by placing the Southeast Asian region within an
hour’s reach by plane.46
Since the coup of 2014, the military junta has carried on many of Thaksin’s
economic ideas under new branding. The narrative around the regionalist
economic strategy is beginning to change, to be embedded within the more
empathetic, less hubristic idea of “leave no one behind.” A key economic
adviser to the Thai government, in a clear dig at the Trump administra-
tion, emphasised that for his government “It’s not “Thailand first” its “we”
first” and that mainland Southeast Asia’s development should “leave no one
behind.”47 Foreign policy thinkers in the government are looking at the pos-
sibility of supply chains stretching across the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
Vietnam and Thailand (CLMVT) countries, running east West from Vietnam
to Myanmar. The interviewee pointed out that:

An East-​West corridor, or a southern corridor, that is changing connect-

ivity. That is how you make everyone stronger together. How you create
a CLMVT supply chain. How you integrate and elevate every country, in
your region, your countries at the same time. So we’re looking at the “we.”
It’s not “Thailand first” it’s “we first.”48

The phrase “leaving no one behind” (mai thing khrai wai khang lang) has
peppered Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-​ ocha’s foreign policy speeches
since at least 2016. Its actual origin is in the United Nation’s Millennium
Development Goals launched in 2000, Prayuth has used it in addressing the
G77 countries in 2016, the Emerging Economies and Developing Countries
Dialogue in 2017, and the Belt and Road Forum and the ASEAN Summit
in 2019.49 It is often offered alongside the “sufficiency economy philosophy,”
which Thailand’s King Bhumibol authored in the wake of the disastrous
consequences of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in order to “immunise”
Thailand from the risks of overreliance on foreign capital. Whether this
multilateral vision can transcend the memory of bilateral grievance is yet to
be seen.

ASEAN as a site of memory

ASEAN, as a multilateral organisation, is above all, a site of shared meaning.
ASEAN’s norms of non-​ interference, agreement by consensus and non-​
violent conflict resolution amount to an ‘ASEAN Way’ that has emerged
through lengthy and frequent interactions between ASEAN leaders, including
through compromise and negotiation.50 Michael Vatikiotis, for example,
although sceptical that ASEAN has deeper roots than a shared desire for the
individual states to preserve their sovereignty and regime security, fully admits
that ASEAN’s success has facilitated “the rise of more idealistic notions of
144 Thailand at the centre I
regional identity.”51 Others such as Anthony Reid are open to the idea that
ASEAN may have been built on something more substantial. He points to a
long-​shared experience of maritime interaction and a shared preference not
to fall under the domination of their larger and more powerful neighbours
such as India and China, despite being receptive to their cultural influences.52
Ralf Emmers suggests that the ASEAN idea of neutrality, embodied in
ASEAN’s 1971 declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace Freedom
and Neutrality, originally reflected Indonesia’s preference for outside powers
to remain out of the region’s affairs. This has survived as a preference for
impartiality, or not taking sides with any Great Powers.53
In this chapter, we are concerned with Thailand’s perception of ASEAN,
and the part memory has played. As an initial finding it can be quickly said,
and with some certainty, that ASEAN has been an important socialising
influence on Thai elites in foreign and defence circles. In our surveys of
1,800 mainly Thai military officers we assessed attitudes to ASEAN,
both for its importance to regional prosperity and for its contribution to
Thailand’s security and stability. Respondents considered ASEAN to be very
important in terms of regional prosperity, with 72.3% rating it 8 or higher
(very important) out of 10 on the Likert scale.54 They similarly considered
ASEAN to be important to security and stability, with 67.36% rating it 8 or
higher.55 The confidence in ASEAN we detected paralleled a 2014 survey
conducted by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies. When
asked what would be in the best interests of their country in the future stra-
tegic environment, the Thai preference was a “new community of nations
based on strengthened multilateral institutions,” as it was for Singapore,
India and Indonesia. This was in contrast to Japan, Australia, Korea and
Taiwan, which all put US leadership well ahead of the “new community of
nations” option.56
How then do we characterise ASEAN as a site of memory for Thailand? We
might at first question the notion of an ASEAN site of memory in Thailand’s
collective memory. ASEAN is usually pictured and discussed in terms that
suggest looking forward, whether towards the signing of the Code of Conduct
that will solve tensions in the South China Sea, or to the implementation of
the ASEAN Economic Community that will give the over 650 million citizens
greater economic weight and bargaining power. ASEAN is a tremendously
aspirational organisation, setting forth its goals of rule of law, human rights
and democracy in lofty language. Of course, ASEAN’s critics inevitably point
to a gap between the aspiration and the reality.57
For Thailand, ASEAN indeed exists as a vision and aspiration. Balancing
the Great Powers is a key aspiration. One officer declared: “In ASEAN
I speak with many people. They don’t want the superpowers to come in and
dominate. That is the concept. There are various mechanisms to balance the
powers.” ASEAN now organises a wide range of meetings to help member
states’ relations with external powers. ASEAN offshoots such as the ASEAN
 Thailand at the centre I 145
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) forum provide some of
the wherewithal for attempts to socialise and balance external powers.
Collaboration in the ADMM Plus realm covers the domains of cyber security,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peace-​keeping
operations, military medicine and humanitarian mine action.
Balancing economically is important. Although China has been Thailand’s
single largest country trading partner since 2016, if ASEAN is equated to
a country it is a bigger trading partner. In 2018 Thailand’s total trade with
ASEAN was USD$120.4 billion in 2018, more than its total trade with China
(USD$79.8 billion).58 As ASEAN’s share of world GDP continues to increase,
this market of more than 650 million will offer opportunity to reduce reliance
on external powers.
But Thais also have a memory of ASEAN as a vision which has been
pursued over decades, through its most capable and intelligent leaders and
diplomats. This is the aspect of Thai memory that we are concerned with
here. And there is little doubt here that ASEAN is a revered site of memory,
so much so that when Thais heard an eminent American commentator dis-
miss Thailand’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2019 as “no more than a
hyphen between Singapore and Vietnam’s chairmanship,” they despatched
a senior government spokesman to Washington to refute this perception.59
The emotion associated with the ASEAN site of memory is pride, pride of
ownership.
What remains strongly in Thai memory are the circumstances of its
founding. Thais remember deeply that the meeting that founded ASEAN
took place at Bang Saen, a coastal resort on the Gulf of Thailand no more
than an hour and a half ’s drive from Bangkok. When the headquarters of
the Royal Thai Armed Forces decided to build a coastal Strategic Studies
Centre, they chose Bang Saen, noting that “it was the place used for the
dialogue and drafting of the ASEAN conception paper –​‘The Bangkok
Declaration’, leading to the birth of the Association of South East Asian
Nations, or ASEAN in 1967.”60 As such, according to the Strategic Studies
Centre website, “The center is regarded as a very important site in history,
especially in recognizing the establishment of ASEAN and the follow-​on
implications, which have laid a solid foundation for regional stability and
security.”
If this reverence is strong within the Thai military, it is even more so within
the community of serving and retired Thai diplomats. And here it is the
figure of Thanat Khoman, the legendary Thai diplomat and foreign minister,
who looms largest. Thanat, Thailand’s foreign minister from 1959 to 1971,
remains a protean figure in Thai diplomatic history, deeply associated with
two of the Thailand’s most pivotal diplomatic agreements, the Thanat-​Rusk
Communique of 1962 cementing Thailand’s military alliance with the United
States, and the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 founding ASEAN. Thanat him-
self, in this recollection written in 1988, outlines the circumstances of ASEAN’s
146 Thailand at the centre I
birth, emphasising the informality and warmth which has characterised the
“ASEAN way” since that time:

After a brief official welcome, we moved to Bangsaen, a small seaside

resort on the Gulf of Thailand, to work out the Charter for the new
regional body. After a few days of discussions over the draft prepared
by the Thai Foreign Office, interspersed by tasty repasts and a few games
of golf which unfailingly produced beneficial effects, agreement was
reached.61

Thanat’s thinking on the value of ASEAN was clear. ASEAN could, he said
in 1968, help alleviate the problem of “the withdrawal of the United States
from this part of the world.”62
Thanat remained a towering figure within Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs community past his fall from favour with the Thai military juntas in
the early 1970s. Though their relationship suffered a rift in later years, Anand
Panyarachun, two-​time prime minister and former permanent secretary of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told his Thai biographer that he had been lucky
to have had good bosses, singling our Thanat Khoman for special mention
and calling him “great teacher” (borom khru).

My life has been lucky because I’ve had good bosses who supported know-
ledge and led appropriately, especially my first boss Thanat Khoman who
was my great teacher in international diplomacy63

Anand later played a significant role in ASEAN, including leading the nego-
tiations for the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed in 1992, a role that
has entered collective memory through education, with Thai schoolchildren
learning by rote that Anand achieved the agreement.64
The legacy of Thanat Koman and Thai support for ASEAN carried down
to others. Tej Bunnag, another career diplomat and former Thai foreign min-
ister (2008), told us that:

For me, and I don’t know about others, it is the number one foreign
policy work of Thailand. It was founded in Bangkok, it was the vision
of our great foreign minister Thanat Khoman, and it’s been followed
up by people like Anand Panyarachun, Surin Pitsuwan, by the minister
I worked with Surakiart.65

In our discussion, Tej expanded on his high valuation of ASEAN. It was not,
he explained, simply for sentimental reasons. Part of the thinking was that
support for ASEAN is very much consistent with Thailand’s vision of itself
at the heart of Southeast Asia. More broadly, it helps with Thailand’s idea
of security through buffer zones, and it helps with Thailand’s thinking about
its future economic development. Tej readily conceded that ASEAN was far
 Thailand at the centre I 147
from the level of integration of Europe, while at the same time stating that “we
all stick together, by and large.” Describing his own investment and personal
experience in chairing ASEAN meetings, he noted that he had attended so
many ASEAN senior official meetings that his minister Surakiart threatened
to give him a new name: “SOM-​chair.”
The Thai commitment to ASEAN is not naïve. There is, for example, little
resentment towards Cambodia for its abortive chairing of ASEAN in 2012,
when disagreements over references to the South China Sea dispute resulted
in no communique being issued.66 That domestic political or national interests
will periodically trump regional interest is not in doubt. But that does not
diminish ASEAN’s value. As Tej Bunnag put it, “I’m optimistic about
ASEAN because I have to be, because it’s the only show in town, and so we
have to make it as good a show as possible.”67
How much of Thailand’s earlier experiments with pan-​ Asianism are
remembered when ASEAN is recalled? The answer is, consistent with the
royalist-​nationalist filter applied to Thailand’s past, relatively little. For example,
Tej Bunnag remembers the early incarnations of Thailand’s modern multilat-
eralism not in the 1930s anti-​colonialism, but in the 1950s, with Thailand’s
attendance at the Asia Africa Conference in 1955 in Bandung Indonesia.
Thailand’s memory of its presence at the conference is partially linked to
its fond memory of Prince Wan, one of its most accomplished and revered
diplomats who was later declared a “Great Diplomat and Great Scholar”
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in
1991.68 In 2015 Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayuth attended the 60th anniver-
sary of the conference in Bandung, claiming that Thailand’s role there showed
that it had a role in driving partnerships between nations (khap khluean
khwampenhunsuan rawang prathet) and could be a bridge between Asia and
Africa (samat pensaphan chueam yong rawang esia aefrika).69

Conclusion
Two powerful forces have shaped Thailand’s site of memory for region-
alism, the crown jewel of which is ASEAN. The first is greater confidence
in the norms, principles and modus operandi of ASEAN: the ASEAN way.
Thailand’s membership of ASEAN has, in the post–​Cold War period, begun
to change its view of itself and its view of its neighbours, and in the process
has begun to shape its memory of its Southeast Asian neighbours. In the early
part of the twenty-​first century, despite middle income traps and recurrent
political instability, Thailand like other Southeast Asian countries increasingly
sees itself as captain of its own ship. The rise of ASEAN as a central convenor
in the political and economic affairs of the region, as well as its steady growth
in living standards and growing middle class and export industry support this
growing confidence. Notwithstanding the shocks of the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis, since 1979 Southeast Asian countries have experienced four decades
of peace and economic growth. They are increasingly aware of the economic
148 Thailand at the centre I
heft that ASEAN, as a grouping of over 650 million people, represents along-
side against India and China. Witness, for example, the confidence of Pansak
Vinyaratn adviser to deposed Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra:

The 20th century major powers do not define the world’s future anymore.
The world’s future is about solutions. And a practical intellectual solution
is more valuable than the Seventh Fleet at this moment.70

The second force changing Thailand’s memory of the past arises from the
evolution of Thai domestic politics. As Thailand emerged from the Cold
War, Thais at many levels of society increasingly viewed the Cold War as
a period of oppressive constriction. Constriction, firstly in the sense of
being forced into a close military partnership and worldview overwhelming
shaped by the United States’ Domino Theory. But secondly, constriction in
the sense of Thailand being under near continual military dictatorship since
1947. As argued in Chapter 2, the 1973 revolution was a significant turning
point, in which Thailand moved towards a hybridised democratic system,
with political parties, the military and the monarchy sharing power in various
configurations. As the power of the monarchy increased and Thailand entered
its period of hyper-​royalism, the view of Thailand finding security primarily
in the form of an alliance lost ground to a royalist-​nationalist construction of
history. In this framework, security is found in following the example of its
wise kings, first and foremost of whom is Chulalongkorn and his practice of
balancing Great Powers.
As part of this shift, Thailand’s valuation of ASEAN increased. It saw
ASEAN as not only a good in itself, but also as a vehicle for its own ambitions
for greater centrality in regional affairs. Yet, the royalist-​nationalist construc-
tion of history and the higher valuation of ASEAN sit uneasily together. As
we will see in the next chapter, Thai royalist-​nationalist history education and
its social memory scape generally purveys an “us and them” view of its imme-
diate neighbours; for example, this thinking valorises warrior kings such as
Taksin and Naresuan for their significant defeats of Thailand’s neighbours.
Because elites can dismiss this prejudice as nationalism for the sake of national
unity, there is a divergence between elite and mainstream views of ASEAN
and neighbours. A second outcome of the royalist-​nationalist dominance of
history-​telling is that the previous significant efforts at pan-​Asianism, pursued
under the 1930s and 1940s revolutionary governments dominated by Phibun
Songkram and Pridi Phanomyong, have largely been suppressed, sidelined or
forgotten. Nonetheless, the more confident Thailand that emerged from the
Cold War period has continued to pursue a Suvarnabhumi vision of Thailand
as a regional hub, benefiting from its geographical location linking main-
land to maritime Southeast Asia, and China to Southeast Asia. This vision
also imagines Thailand as a sub-​regional leader, leveraging its higher levels
of economic development and status as the only country to have escaped
colonisation.
 Thailand at the centre I 149
Notes
1 Then foreign minister Siddhi Savetsila stated at that time that

Particularly since 1975, Thailand has clearly defined her foreign policy direc-
tion. It is based on the following objectives: First, to promote the solidarity,
unity, and cooperation of ASEAN, and to extend that cooperation to devel-
opment of good relations with our Indochina neighbours second, to pursue
mutually beneficial relations with all countries irrespective of differences in
political, social and economic systems and ideologies. Third, to contribute,
in her own capacity, to regional global stability and development and finally,
firm adherence to the principles of international law and the UN Charter.

Sukhumbhand Paribatra, ‘The Enduring Logic in Thai Foreign Policy and

National Security Interests: Implications for the 1980’s and Beyond’ (Discussion
paper presented at the conference on ‘Northeast Asia in World Politics’ organised
by the George Washington University’s Institute of Sino-​Soviet Studies and Keio
University in Tokyo, 14–​16 May 1984).
2 Olivier Everard, ‘Nationalism and Genetics: Thai Obsession with Race’, New
Mandala, 18 December 2006, accessed at www.newmandala.org/​nationalism-​and-​
genetics-​thai-​obsession-​with-​race/​ on 21 February 2020.
3 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘Thailand’s Hyper-​Royalism: Its Past Success and Present
Predicament’, Trends in Southeast Asia no. 7 (2016), ISEAS, Singapore.
4 Today there is agreement that there is a Tai language family, speakers of which are
spread from southern China to Assam through of course Thailand. The notion
that this ethnic group is necessarily genetically linked is, however, discounted
because Tai societies have absorbed other peoples over a long period. See Chris
Baker, ‘From Yue to Tai’, Journal of the Siam Society 90, no. 1 & 2 (2002), p. 1–​26.
5 Peleggi, Thailand: The Worldly Kingdom, pp. 120–​121.
6 Scott Barme, ‘Luang Vichit Wathakan: Official Nationalism and Political
Legitimacy Prior To The Second World War’, MA thesis, pp. 129-​130.
7 Eiji Murashima, ‘Opposing French Colonialism Thailand and the Independence
Movements in Indo-​China in the Early 1940s’, South East Asia Research 13, no. 3,
2005, p. 340.
8 Ibid., p. 340.
9 Ibid., p. 229.
10 Ibid., p. 341.
11 Strate, The Lost Territories, pp. 106–​108.
12 Ibid., p. 107.
13 Strate, The Lost Territories, pp. 100, 101.
14 Murashima, ‘Opposing French Colonialism’, p. 365.
15 Ibid, p. 375.
16 Sue Thompson, The United States and Southeast Asian Regionalism: Collaborative
Defence and Economic Security, 1945–​75 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019).
ProQuest Ebook Central, accessed at http://​ebookcentral.proquest.com/​lib/​anu/​
detail.action?docID=5584231.
17 Cocon, ASEAN Village (หมู่บ้านอาเซียน Muban Asian) (Chiang Mai: Silkworm
Books, 2015), p. 9.
18 Kobkua Suwannathat-​Pian, ‘Thai Wartime Leadership Reconsidered: Phibun and
Pridi’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (March 1996), p. 173.
150 Thailand at the centre I
19 Anna Lawattanatrakul, ‘Uprooting Democracy: The War of Memory and the
Lost Legacy of the People’s Party’, Prachatai, 19 December 2019, accessed at
https://​prachatai.com/​english/​node/​8312 on 22 February 2020.
20 Monument marking defeat of royalist rebels removed in dead of night, Khaosod
English, 28 December 2018, accessed at www.khaosodenglish.com/​politics/​2018/​
12/​28/​monument-​marking-​defeat-​of-​royalist-​rebels-​removed-​in-​dead-​of-​night/​ on
Saturday 29 December 2018.
21 Raymond, ‘Mnemonic Hegemony’.
22 Nicholas Farrelly, ‘Tai Community and Thai Border Subversions’, in Andrew
Walker (ed.), Tai Lands and Thailand: Community and State in Southeast Asia
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009), p. 70.
23 Baker, ‘From Yue to Tai’, p. 2.
24 พิพิธภัณฑ์ท่าอากาศยานสุวรรณภูมิ สะท้อนพระมหากรุณาธิคุณ, Youtube, 18 November 2016,
accessed at www.youtube.com/​watch?v=7zx9RZ8mooU on 23 February 2020.
25 Paul Battersby, ‘Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s International
Relations in the 1990s: From Communism to Capitalism’, Pacific Affairs 71, no. 4
(1998), p. 476.
26 Pongphisoot Busbarat, ‘A Review of Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Mainland
Southeast Asia: Exploring an Ideational Approach’, European Journal of East
Asian Studies, 11, Issue 1, (2012), pp. 132–​133.
27 Ibid., p. 133
28 Connors, ‘Thailand and the United States: Beyond Hegemony?’.
29 National Economic and Social Development Board, The Sixth National Economic
and Social Development Plan (1987–​1991), p. 319.
30 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, History of Thailand, (London: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p. 241.
31 Sathien Chanthimathon, ชาติชายชุณหะวัณ ทหาร ‘นัก’ ประชาธิปไตย, Chatchai
Choonhaven: Solider and Democrat (Bangkok: Matichon, 1998), p. 218.
32 N. Ganesan, ‘Thaksin and the Politics of Domestic and Regional Consolidation in
Thailand’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2004). pp. 26–​44.
33 Thailand Seeks to Shape a ‘Golden Peninsula’, New York Times, 30 April
1989, p. 19.
34 Nicolas Revire, ‘Facts and Fiction: The Myth of Suvannabhumi Through the Thai
and Burmese Looking Glass’, TRANS: Trans-​Regional and -​National Studies of
Southeast Asia, 6, no. 2 (July 2018), p. 168.
35 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin, p. 123.
36 Bhanupong Nidhiprabha, ‘The Resilience of the Thai Economy’, in Cavan Hogue
(ed.), Thailand’s Economic Recovery (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2006), p. 5.
37 Pavin Chchavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 118.
38 Opening Statement by His Excellency Dr Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister of
Thailand, at the inaugural meeting of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Cha-​Am,
Thailand, 19 June 2002, accessed at http://​acd-​dialogue.org/​dialogue-​ministerial-​
meeting.html on 3 February 2016.
39 Ibid.
40 Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Oman, Qatar,
 Thailand at the centre I 151
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, United Arab
Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Turkey and Nepal, as per ACD
website accessed at http://​acd-​dialogue.org/​about-​acd.html on 25 July 2019.
41 Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘About ACMECS’, accessed at www.mfa.go.th/​
acmecs/​en/​organize on 23 July 2020.
42 ‘Thailand Plans Regional Infrastructure Fund to Reduce China Dependence’,
Nikkei Asian Review, 4 June 2018, accessed at https://​asia.nikkei.com/​Politics/​
International-​relations/​Thailand-​plans-​regional-​infrastructure-​fund-​to-​reduce-​
China-​dependence on 7 July 2020.
43 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘Dawei Port: Thailand’s Megaproject in Burma’,
Global Asia, 20 December 2011, p. 3/​11, accessed at www.globalasia.org/​v6no4/​
feature/​dawei-​port-​thailands-​megaproject-​in-​burma_​pavin-​chachavalpongpun on
31 October 2019.
44 National Economic and Social Development Board, the 10th National Economic
and Social Development Plan (2012–​2016), p. 96.
45 เศรษฐกิจกับผลเลือกตั้ง? ‘The Economy and the Election Results?’, Editorial, Thai
Rath, 18 August 2018, accessed at www.thairath.co.th/​content/​1356409 on 3
September 2018.
46 ชู ‘อีอีซี” เชื่อมศก.ไทย-​จีน หอฯหนุนพัฒนาเมืองรอง’, ‘Uphold the EEC Connect Thai and
Chinese Industry –​China Thai Trade Council Supports Developing Secondary
Cities’, Matichon, 17 March 2018, p. 9.
47 Interview, senior retired Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2017.
48 Ibid.
49 ว่าด้วยการพัฒนา แบบไม่ทิ้งใครไว้ข้างหลัง โดย พิชญ์ พงษ์สวัสดิ์, accessed at www.matichon.
co.th/​columnists/​news_​1278405; Statement By H. E. General Prayut Chan-​O-​Cha
(Ret.), prime minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and Chair of the Fortieth
Annual Meeting Of Ministers Of Foreign Affairs Of The Group Of 77 At The
Interactive Dialogue On Sufficiency Economy Philosophy For SDGS (New York,
23 September 2016) accessed at www.thaiembassy.org/​unmissionnewyork/​en/​
articles/ ​7364/ ​8 1068-​ 2 3916:-​ S TATEMENT-​ BY-​H .E.-​G ENERAL-​P RAYUT-​
CHAN-​O-​C.html; Intervention by H. E. General Prayut Chan-​o-​cha, prime min-
ister of Thailand at the Emerging Economies and Developing Countries Dialogue,
5 September 2017, at Xiamen, People’s Republic of China. accessed at www.mfa.
go.th/​main/​en/​news3/​6886/​80900-​Intervention-​by-​H.E.-​General-​Prayut-​Chan-​o-​
cha,-​Pr.html; ‘Prayut Lauds BRI at Forum’, Bangkok Post, 27 April 2019, ‘Prayut
Touts Thailand’s Growth Trend’, Bangkok Post, 27 September 2019, accessed
at www.bangkokpost.com/​thailand/​general/​1667740/​prayut-​lauds-​bri-​at-​forum
www.bangkokpost.com/​thailand/​general/​1759114/​prayut-​touts-​thailands-​growth-​
trend; all accessed on 23 February 2019.
50 For examples of those who see ASEAN’s norms as exerting genuine influ-
ence on ASEAN security behaviour see Amitav Acharya, ‘Culture, Security,
Multilateralism: The “ASEAN Way” and Regional Order’, Contemporary Security
Policy 19, no. 1 (1998), pp. 55–​84, doi:10.1080/​13523269808404179 and Nicholas
Busse, ‘Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security’, The Pacific Review, 12:1,
1999, pp. 39–​60; for examples of those who doubt the efficacy of ASEAN norms
in practice, see Samuel Sharpe, ‘An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in
Southeast Asia?’, The Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003), pp. 231–​250, doi:10.1080/​
0951274032000069624; Mathew Davies, Ritual and Region: The Invention of
ASEAN (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
152 Thailand at the centre I
51 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, ‘ASEAN 10: The Political and Cultural Dimensions of
Southeast Asian Unity’, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 27, no. 1 (1999),
pp. 77–​88, p. 77.
52 Anthony Reid, ‘A Saucer Model of Southeast Asian Identity’, Southeast Asian
Journal of Social Science 27, no. 1 (1999), pp. 7–​23.
53 Ralf Emmers, ‘Unpacking ASEAN Neutrality: The Quest for Autonomy and
Impartiality in Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 3 (December
2018), pp. 349–​370.
54 For frequency, median and mean results for this question see Tables A.21 and A.22
and Figure A.14, Annexure.
55 For frequency, median and mean results for this question see Tables A.23 and A.24
and Figure A.15, Annexure.
56 Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, ‘Power and Order in Asia: A Survey
of Regional Expectations’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July
2014, p. 7.
57 See, for example, Kelly Gerard, ‘ASEAN as a Rules-​Based Community” ’, Asian
Studies Review 42, no. 2 (June 2018), pp. 210–​229. Gerard argues that the rhet-
oric reality gap, often explained by way of assuming that rule of law will grad-
ually migrate from the economic domain to other more sensitive domains, or
that ASEAN rule of law is impeded by existing norms such as non-​interference
or consensus decision-​making, is best explained by analysing who benefits from
the selective application of the rule of law in the political economy of competing
groups within the state. Dominant groups, Gerard argues, have seen benefits in
ASEAN advertising an embrace of rules-​based processes to engender foreign
investor confidence following the revelations of poor governance following the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
58 Statistics from Trade map –​International Trade Statistics, accessed at www.
trademap.org/ ​ t radestat/ ​ B ilateral_ ​ T S.aspx?nvpm=1%7c764%7c%7c156%7c
%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1 on 11
November 2019.
59 Author’s conversations with contacts in Thailand. The offending article was
Amy Searight, ‘Southeast Asia in 2019: Four Issues to Watch’, 15 January 2019,
accessed at www.csis.org/​analysis/​southeast-​asia-​2019-​four-​issues-​watchon on 18
June 2019.
60 ‘The Center for Strategic Studies Royal Thai Armed Forces in Commemoration
of HM the King’s 80th Birthday Anniversary’, accessed at www.sscthailand.
org/​index.php/​en/​ssc/​the-​center-​for-​strategic-​studies-​royal-​thai-​armed-​forces-​in-​
commemoration-​of-​hm-​the-​king%E2%80%99s-​80th-​birthday-​anniversary on 17
June 2019.
61 Thanat Khoman, ‘Reminiscences’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 2
(September 1988), p. 212.
62 Thanat Khoman, ‘Transcript of an Interview Given by H. E. Thanat Khoman,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand to Mr Friedhelm Kemna, Southeast Asia
Correspondent of the Die Welt of Hamburg and Berlin at the Foreign Ministry’,
Bangkok, 29 November 1968, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat
Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 2, 1968
(Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 308.
63 Prasan Mrikphithak, อานันท์ ปันยารชุน: ชีวติ ความคิด และรางงาน ของอดีต นายกรัฐมนตรีสองสมัย,
Anand Panyanchun: Life, Thoughts, and Work of a Former Prime Minister of Two
Terms (Bangkok: Amarin, 2542), p. 44.
 Thailand at the centre I 153
64 Faulder, Anand Panyarachun, p. 272.
65 Interview, Tej Bunnag, Bangkok, 2015
66 Interview, retired Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 2015.
67 Interview, Tej Bunnag, Bangkok, 2015
68 Prince Narathipphongpraphan, Centennial of His Royal Highness Prince Wan
Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Thai great diplomat and
scholar, 1991, 25 August 1991–​25 August 1992, p. x.
69 บิ๊กตู่เผยเวทีผู้นำ�เอเชีย-​แอฟริกาเชื่อมั่นไทย … อ่านต่อได้ที่, Thai Post, 22 April 2015, accessed
at www.posttoday.com/​politic/​news/​360721 on 16 April 2020.
70 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground, p. 298.
6 
Thailand at the centre II
Neighbours

I think the most important part of foreign policy is with your neighbours. It is
the most difficult, the most complicated, the most dangerous.
Tej Bunnag

Economists argue that if ASEAN were to be judged by its degree of eco-

nomic integration, it would be judged a failure.1 Levels of intra-​regional trade
have remained stagnant for decades, despite the announcement of an ASEAN
Economic Community in 2015.2 Thailand’s former Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva argues that until ASEAN can create a common identity, non-​tariff
barriers to trade will likely remain obstacles to integration.3 But finding an
ASEAN identity beyond customs of non-​interference and avoiding loss of
face, Abhisit admits, will be no easy task. He suggests ASEAN could begin
with the “idea that it is a caring or giving community,” one that “leaves no-​one
behind.”4 Indeed in 2019, the year of Thailand’s chairmanship of ASEAN,
the phrase “leave no one behind” became a signature theme. Abhisit went on
to suggest that ASEAN could also look to improve education with a view to
raising awareness of history and shared cultural ties, in order to “contribute
to building trust and a common sense of belonging.”5
For Thailand, building this trust and common sense of belonging will be
a long-​term project, due to the ways in which Thai education inculcates Thai
nationalism. Thai scholar Thongchai Winichakul recalls learning little of
the histories of neighbouring countries when growing up in Thailand in the
1960s.6 What little there was tended to be either dismissive or fearful. Laos was
“a poor, backward, inferior, less civilized, pitiful Little Brother,” Cambodia
“not so much a great ancient civilization as an untrustworthy neighbour”
and Myanmar “a wicked evil.”7 A decade later, Chaiwat Satha-​Anand found
little had changed. Thailand’s 1978 school curriculum mentioned Japan, the
ASEAN five (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia) and
the South Asian nations. Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were not
mentioned.8
Thailand’s memory of its neighbours Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and
Vietnam is a site of “us and them” dominated by contemptuous, fearful or
 Thailand at the centre II 155
hateful thoughts. The Burmese are described as aggressive and murderous,
the Cambodians duplicitous and the Vietnamese arrogant. In this chapter we
will argue that this site of memory is beginning to evolve as Thais look to shift
their attitudes and recollections of their neighbours into a more positive light,
in line with Abhisit’s observations, and in line with aspirations for ASEAN
and their Suvarnabhumi project.

“Us and them”: the Other in Thai nationalist memory

Why have Thailand’s memories of its neighbours been so troubled? A simple
answer is that the first nationalist histories of Thailand, which were published
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and which established a
Thai national identity, emphasised darker views of Thailand’s neighbours,
thereby creating a xenophobic “us and them” site of memory. Charnvit
Kasetsiri argued that the Thai site of memory for its neighbouring countries
was reflective of history-​making in the service of fostering nationalism.9 In his
words, “[H]‌istory in our country is a principle more than it is a science. It is
principle that must implant nationalism more than wisdom for understanding
the past and present.”10 Thongchai elaborates on this perspective. Thai
history-​making reproduced, according to him, the relations of tribute and
suzerainty that prevailed in Southeast Asia in pre-​colonial times, in which
there were clear designations of who was superior and who inferior.11
The focus on history in the service of nationalism results in a degree of
myopia. It means that the Cold War period, despite its relative recency, inhabits
a marginal place in Thailand’s site of memory for its neighbours. As Suchit
Wongthet notes, the Cold War was a period in which the study of Thailand’s
neighbours was given little attention, and what was conducted was mainly for
the purpose of strengthening the Thai citizens’ sense of “Thainess.”12 Today
Thais often remember relations with neighbours in the Cold War through the
prism of their alliance with the United States. A PARU officer we interviewed
recalls that this was a time in which “the world has two camps.”13 After the
2014 coup in Thailand, a columnist wrote with chagrin:

In the Vietnam War, Thailand helped the US. Gave its airbases for use by
US aircraft to conduct bombing sorties on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
to the point where neighbouring countries hated Thailand for a long
time.14

Thai state efforts in the Cold War often focused on strengthening Thainess
and excluding non-​Thais. The BPP language teaching programs for Thailand’s
rural and hilltribe areas, for example, aimed to create a ‘ “human border”
along the territorial border.’15 The advent of ASEAN has engendered more
positive views about Thailand’s neighbours, but in more contested political
periods, jaundiced views of neighbours can be reignited.16 This was the case
during the Thai-​Cambodia temple conflict between 2008 and 2011.
156 Thailand at the centre II
In contrast, Thai collective memory of its neighbours from the pre-​colonial
era is rich, comprising many episodes over hundreds of years. In this chapter,
we draw on historiography, popular culture and social and political history,
to select amongst those episodes and sub-​themes which are remembered most
powerfully amongst Thais. We begin our exploration of the “us and them”
site with Laos, Thailand’s culturally, linguistically and historically closest
neighbour, where we find a troubled memory built around opposing views of
violent events of the early nineteenth century. We then turn to Myanmar, the
country around which Thailand’s most vivid memories and nationalist tropes
continue to revolve, especially regarding Burma’s invasion in 1765. Memory
of Cambodia is then addressed. Cambodia is a country with whom Thailand
shares much culture but as with Laos, also a difficult history. We finish with
Vietnam, a country with whom Thailand has never been close, and has had at
times, quite hostile and rivalrous relations. Vietnam is particularly interesting
for it is in this example we see a new focus on shared anti-colonialism, and
some of the clearest evidence of contemporary efforts to establish new ways
of remembering neighbours.

Thai memory and Laos

Laos was the location of one of the bitterest and most destructive Cold War
proxy contests, and Thailand was deeply engaged.17 By the middle of 1961
13 Police PARU teams totaling 99 soldiers were training Hmong soldiers to
fight Laos communist forces.18 By 1972, the numbers had surged to 23,000
Thai soldiers rotating in and out of Laos, and by the end of the conflict some
2,200 Thai soldiers had been killed there.19 But as of 2006 no Thai official
record had revealed Thailand’s (Cold War) military involvement in Laos. In
April 2015 the Thai Veterans’ Affairs Department discussed the interring of
the remains of Thai soldiers killed in Laos, but beyond this there has been
little to indicate any relaxation of Thailand’s long-​standing denial of military
involvement in Laos.20
In 1987–1988, ten years after the victory of the communist forces in Laos,
the two countries fought a brief local war at Ban Rom Klao. The causes of
this conflict are murky, ostensibly about the location of the border, although a
dispute over commissions for illegal logging operations may have also played a
part.21 Despite use of airpower, the Thai armed forces were unable to dislodge
Laotian forces on three hills and suffered significant casualties, with fatalities
numbering in the hundreds.22 In February 1988, Thailand was forced to seek
a ceasefire. This conflict was significantly more costly in terms of loss of life
and territory than the later Phra Wiharn dispute with Cambodia 2008–​2011,
but it has made a smaller imprint on Thai memory of relations with Laos.
Political elites did not use the issue to stir nationalism and negotiations were
undertaken out of the public eye. Under the lead of the army commander
General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh, the dispute was resolved by senior mili-
tary officers from both sides, an approach that Thailand later eschewed in the
 Thailand at the centre II 157
Thai-​Cambodia temple dispute.23 Public knowledge has increased in recent
years, and more public discussion is occurring, such as for the 40th anniver-
sary of the ceasefire that ended the conflict. There is now an unofficial view
that in terms of lives lost, this was the costliest war the Thai armed forces have
ever fought.24
Nevertheless, in broad terms, these Cold War entanglements have not
become part of social memory. In the case of both the Laos secret war and
the Ban Rom Klao conflict, official acknowledgement or commemoration of
these wars has remained minimal. There are no dedicated monuments. These
absences diminish their place in Thai collective memory.
Today, Thais view Laos largely positively. In our surveys, we found that
Laos was seen more positively than Myanmar, Vietnam or Malaysia, but
less positively than Singapore.25 Part of this might be that Thais feel a
kinship with Laotians that they do not with Thailand’s other neighbours.
Not only are the Thai and Laos languages mutually intelligible, there are
familial ties. Members of Thailand’s royal family, such as Bhumibol’s late
sister Kanlayaniwathana and architect Dr Sumet Jumsai, were related to the
Laos King Chao Anu.26 The Thai dictator Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat was
a second cousin of General Phoumi Nosavan, who headed the right faction
of Laos politics in the 1960s.27 Many prominent individuals moved easily
between Laos and Thailand. Chao Sone Bouttarabol is a good example.
Chao Sone’s father served in the Thai army and Chao Sone was educated
in Bangkok. As a native of the province of Champassak (in southern Laos
alongside the Mekong river), Chao Sone was elected as a local member
during the time the province was annexed by Thailand from 1941 to 1946.
After Laos became independent, Chao Sone became a member of the Laos
parliament representing the same province.28
The visit of Princess Sirindhorn to Laos in 1989 was arguably an important
milestone in ensuring the Thai-​Laos relationship buried any Cold War enmity.
During the visit, the princess paid respect to and participated in the culture and
rituals of the Laotian people. It was a visit that some senior Thais, including
former Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj, opposed, since it occurred so soon
after the Ban Rom Klao conflict. Nonetheless it went ahead. In a week-​long
visit, Sirindhorn visited temples and monuments considered the Laos national
heritage, including Haw Pha Kèo National Museum, the temple where the
Emerald Buddha had been housed (see below). In both Luang Prabang and
Vientiene, Sirindhorn participated in baci soukhouan ritual, involving the
tying of threads. These ceremonies were shown on Thai and Laos national
television, sparking new interest amongst Thais in Laotian national heritage.
Sirindhorn later published a book, an account of her trip, titled Boeng bo
than boeng bo mot, an expression in the Laos language meaning “Too Little
Time, Can’t See Everything.” As a further example, since 1989 Sirindhorn has
conducted annual visits to Thailand’s mission in Laos at Songkran, to par-
ticipate in cultural activities as part of this festival shared by both Thailand
and Laos.29
158 Thailand at the centre II
More important than diluting Cold War tension was the way in which the
visits helped shift the dismissive and paternalistic views of Laos prevalent in
Thai thinking since the early nineteenth century.30 To understand what this
colonial view, and important aspect of the “us and them” site of memory
means, we must consider that the Thai memory of Laos is deeply coloured by
memory of events in the era prior to European colonialism, when city-​states
based in Ayutthaya, Bangkok, Vientiane, Chiang Mai and Luang Prabang
vied for status.
Thai memories of Laos are shaped particularly by two critical events in
the pre-​colonial period. The first is the case of the Prakaew Morakot, the
Emerald Buddha. Located at Thailand’s spiritual core in the Wat Prakaew
temple, site of Thailand’s most sacred royal ceremonies, the Emerald Buddha
is a small jadeite statuette of the Buddha. It is regarded as the kingdom’s
palladium, guaranteeing security and prosperity. The exact origins of the
Emerald Buddha statue are uncertain. For some 214 years it was held in
Vientiane, the capital of modern Laos (it was housed in northern Thailand
before that).31 In 1774, King Taksin, the half-​Teochiu king who rallied the
Thai people after the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767, launched a mission to cap-
ture Vientiane. The Emerald Buddha was seized and taken to Taksin’s capital,
Thonburi, and installed at Wat Arun (Temple of the Dawn) on the western
bank of the Chao Phraya river. When the capital was moved across the river
in 1782, the Emerald Buddha was moved to a new temple, at the site now
known as the Grand Palace. So central was the image to the founding of the
new capital that its formal name, Krunthepmahanakornratanakosin (known by
outsiders as Bangkok), contained the words ratanakosin meaning ‘Repository
of the Gem Image.’32
To what degree do contemporary Thais know that their most sacred
object involved violence against Laos? Some contemporary descriptions in
Thai mainstream media downplay the use of force. One author describes
the movement of the Emerald Buddha from Laos to Thailand as having
taken place through King Taksin “respectfully installing” or “inviting” (song
anchoen) the statuette from Vientiane.33 But there is also an awareness that
Laos would like to see the object returned. One popular blog website ran
an informal poll asking whether returning the Emerald Buddha to Laos
would be a good idea.34 Of the 112 respondents, 94 were against the idea.
According to historian Suchit Wongthet, the fact that Laos would like the
object returned makes Thais very angry and even curse the Laotians (da lao
chiphai loei).35
The second episode from the pre-​colonial period to shape Thai memories
of Laos is that of the conflict with Chao Anu, a Laos royal, some decades
after the appropriation of the Emerald Buddha. In this encounter, one that
Thai historian Manich Jumsai calls “one of the bitterest episodes of Thai
history,” the Thai King Rama III (1824–​1851) sacked Vientiane in 1828 and
1829.36 Thai forces razed the capital, forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands
to Siamese territory, and had the Laos king brought back to Bangkok where
 Thailand at the centre II 159
he was publicly tortured and, after death, hung on a gibbet.37 The attack was
prompted by Chao Anu’s defection and march on Thailand, after, he had
lived in Bangkok under the care of the Siamese royal family, as was customary
under tributray relations. Thus, Thai historiography is inclined to accuse
Laos of having acted treacherously, additionally by consorting with Vietnam,
a view that was portrayed in influential novelist Luang Vichit Wathagarn’s
novel Celestial Flower of Champassak.38
What memory exists today of these events? Some claim that because the
primary objective of Thai history-​teaching is the inducing of nationalism,
Thais are rarely taught about Thailand’s own history as aggressor, including
its invasion of Cambodia and burning of Luang Prabang in Laos.39 However,
formal history-​teaching is not the only medium for memory. Indeed, it can
be argued that in the form of a statue of a Thai woman warrior we find a
physical embodiment of the Chao Anu episode, an evocative fragment of
the “us and them” site of memory for Laos, and a powerful vessel of Thai
nationalism.
Located in Nakhon Ratchasima, a large city of northeastern Thailand
also known as Korat, is a statue known as Thao Suranaree or more colloqui-
ally, “Ya Mo.” The statue was designed by the sculptor Corrado Feroci, an
Italian expatriate who worked with the post-​revolutionary regime of Phibun
Songkram and especially with director of Thailand’s Fine Arts Department,
nationalist ideologue Luang Vichit Wathakan.40 Feroci, who also designed the
Victory Monument, finished the Thao Suranaree statue in 1935. It honours the
deeds of the Thai heroine, Thao Suranaree, who defended Thailand against
Chao Anu’s attempted invasion in 1828. According to the story recounted by
Thai historian Prince Damrong Rajanuphab in 1926, Suranaree was the wife
of the local deputy governor when she was kidnapped by Chao Anu’s forces
during their stealthy approach on Siam. But Suranaree deceived her captors
and raised the alarm.41 The invasion was repelled, precipitating Thailand’s
sacking of Vientiane and the capture of Chao Anu, as described above.
Rama III awarded Khunying Mo the title of “Thao Suranaree,” meaning
“brave lady.”
The reverence paid to this legend and statue has grown over time, embodied in
ceremonies and rituals. According to newspaper Kom Chat Luek, “Thais know
well that ‘Ya Mo’ was a Nakhon Ratchasima native who Thais the whole nation
over respect and recall for her heroism in service of the nation.”42 Amongst
fireworks and processions, an annual “Ya Mo Fair” recalls and celebrates
Thao Suranee’s brave deeds.43 Students from the eponymous Suranaree
University of Technology also attend a prayer ceremony (phithikrapsakkara)
at the statue annually. In 2019, the Suranaree University of Technology rector,
Professor Wiraphong Phaesuwan, explained that the ceremony, attended by
over 3,000 students, was to encourage students to understand that they are
the descendants of Ya Mo and to implant (pluk fang) a tradition to develop
good citizens who will pursue development for the nation.44 Thao Suranaree
even appears on a ‘lucky banknote’ for the monk Luang Phor Khun, with the
160 Thailand at the centre II
incantation “Victory, Victory, Victory. Ya Mo goes out to battle. This is an
incantation of victory over enemies and demons.”45
Critical assessment of the Ya Mo legend is now unacceptable for large
sections of Thai society. As narrative truth, it overshadows literal truth.46
In 1995 a Khorat school teacher, Saiphin Kaeongampraserit, published
The Politics of the Thao Suranaree Monument (kanmueang nai anusaori
thaosunnari), tracing the historiography of Khunying Ya Mo. Saipin argued
that Phibun Songkram, concerned that the 1933 Boworadej royalist rebellion
had been launched from Nakhon Ratchasima, sought to restore the loyalty
of the province. To appeal to nationalism, he decided to build a monument
to Thao Suranaree. Saiphin’s book provoked fury. The author received death
threats and was banned from entering the province of Nakhon Ratchasima.47
In March 1996, 25,000 people demonstrated to express their outrage and burn
effigies of the author and other Thai scholars.48 A petition circulated calling
for the book to be burnt and the author and her academic supervisors charged
with lese majeste. Social memory surrounding the monument had acquired
such power through everyday practice, through treatment of the statue both
as a symbol of nationalism, and a local deity, that deconstructing its politics
had become deeply insulting to many.
That the legend is offensive to Laotians has not diminished the Thai
publics’ enthusiasm. Indeed, exacerbating the divisiveness of the issue, for
Laotians, the story of Chao Anu has become a critical part of the making
of an independent Laos nation. Influential works, like Sila Viravong’s 1964
History of Laos, portray Chao Anu’s war with Thailand as an effort to win
freedom for Laos.49 Subsequently when Thai film producers Sahamongkol
(makers of international films such as Ong Bak) were considering a film of
the story of Thao Suranaree in 2001, the proposal was met with concern in
Laos such that the Laos government submitted an official letter of protest to
the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.50
During the Cold War, Thai security elites saw Laos through the prism of its
relations with the rival superpowers, and especially from the vantage point of
its close ally the United States. Thousands of Thais fought and died in Laos,
but this war memory is less potent in Thai collective memory than the era of
vassals and tributary states. Sirindhorn may not have reset the relationship,
but her visits did contribute to a shift in the site of memory for the relation-
ship with Laos. There is still further to go, on both sides. During the 2009
Southeast Asia Games in Vientiane, for instance, Laos spectators vociferously
cheered Vietnam and booed Thailand when the two sides met for a soccer
match. Spectators said they were tired of Thais ‘looking down on’ (du thuk)
them as simple ‘country dwellers’ (ban nok).51

Thai memory and Burma Myanmar

Today, Thai elites are proud of the stance Thailand took during the 1990s in
shielding Myanmar from harsh US policies and bringing Myanmar into the
 Thailand at the centre II 161
ASEAN fold. This is another example of the emerging narrative of “leave no
one behind,” meaning the more developed ASEAN members must help the
less developed. Take, for example, former Thai Prime Minister Abhisit in 2017:

Had ASEAN followed the Western way and decided to alienate Myanmar,
it would be hard to imagine the country achieving its tremendous pro-
gress today. The Western powers had probably mistakenly thought that
ASEAN did not take the issue seriously. In reality, ASEAN always took
up the issue at its meetings, encouraging Myanmar to change from within
through constructive engagement and by letting it know the concerns of
the outside world. No condemnation, public statements, sanctions, etc.
were used. That this approach can be productive could be seen clearly
when cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. With the rest of the world unable to
get into the country to provide assistance, ASEAN was able to serve as a
bridge and was only able to do so because the ASEAN Way had built up
trust and respect.52

We found similar sentiments in our interviews. Former Foreign Minister

Kantathi Suphamongkhon told us that in the George W. Bush era, the United
States had asked Thailand to limit its communication with Myanmar to join
the United States in signalling strong disapproval of the military regime there.
Thailand had pushed back, arguing that:

Thailand had different means than the U.S. to achieve this shared goal.
By keeping an active communication channel with Myanmar, Thailand
could encourage the military regime in Myanmar to allow national
reconciliation.

In this way, by using different means, the United States and Thailand “could
complement one another.” Said one military officer we interviewed, “We need
to help each other, help country at the lower level like Myanmar.” Admitting
that Burmese workers play an important role in the Thai economy, the officer
went on to state that “most of the foreign labourers now in Thailand are
Burmese. Gas stations, vendors, everywhere. They look like Thai people. And
speak Thai very fluently.”53 There is also a recognition that while problems like
agreeing on un-​demarcated borders still loom, the close military-​to-​military
relations of recent years have been a boon for peace. Said another in 2016,
“this period is the peak, the highest point of cooperation between Thailand
and Myanmar because General Min Aung Hlaing and senior officers, espe-
cially General Tanasak are very good. Min Aung Hlaing is very smart, he
asked to become an adopted son of General Prem and called himself a
younger brother of General Tanasak.”54
The views of today’s Thai elites are in sharp contrast to the dominant
social memory of Burma. Our surveys from 2015 to 2017 showed a dim view
of Burma amongst Thai military officers. When respondents were asked to
162 Thailand at the centre II
rank a selection of states according to how positively they viewed them,
Myanmar was grouped with the countries at the second worst rank along-
side Vietnam and Malaysia.55 Only North Korea scored worse. Similarly,
in 2011 researcher Chris Roberts asked some 81 Thais to score Myanmar
on a Likert scale from 1, trust the most, to 10, trust the least. Eighty-​four
percent scored Myanmar between 8 and 10.56 As Sunait concluded in his
1992 article,

it is impossible to prevent a prejudiced view of the Burmese as an histor-

ically hostile state when certain beliefs exist within the social heritage and
are then perpetuated by the leaders through the means of the mass media
and the educational system.57

In fact, there is no memory more deeply embedded in Thailand’s collective

memory than the Burmese invasion of Ayutthaya in 1765. This is largely due
to Prince Damrong Rajanuphab’s retelling of the invasion, and others that
preceded it, in his “Our Wars with Burma” (Thai Rop Phama), first published
in 1917. The history, written by King Chulalongkorn’s half-​ brother and
described as Thailand’s first work of modern history, retains a unique place in
Thai historiography. Critically, it is the source for much of the history taught
in Thai schools. Scholars such as Pavin Chachavalpongpun point out that the
“othering” of the Burmese was critical in the development of a Thai national
identity as well as the promotion of a nationalist-​royalist narrative centred
around wise and brave monarchs.58 Particular incidents from the invasion
of Ayutthaya, in particular the staunch resistance put up by the villagers of
Bang Rachan, who fought the marauding Burmese with nothing but farm
implements converted into weapons, are universally known and provide a
narrative of national unity and heroism.
The way in which the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767 left an imprint in Thai
social memory is arguably due to its contrast to previous attacks; instead of
looting the city and kidnapping its inhabitants, the forces of Hsinbyushin, the
king of Ava, simply destroyed the city. A Western historian using the records
of missionaries later wrote that:

On the 28th April 1767 the town was captured by assault. The treasures
of the palace and the temples were nothing but heaps of ruins and ashes.
The images of the gods were melted down and rage deprived the bar-
barian conquerors of the spoils that had aroused their greed. To avenge
this loss, the Burmese visited their heavy displeasure upon the town’s folk.
They burnt the soles of their feet in order to make them reveal where they
had concealed their wealth, and raped their weeping daughters before
their very eyes.
The priests suspected of having concealed much wealth were pierced
through and through with arrows and spears and several were beaten to
death with heavy clubs.
 Thailand at the centre II 163
The countryside as well as the temples were strewn with corpses, and
the river was choked with the bodies of the dead, the stench of which
attracted swarms of flies causing much annoyance to the retreating army.
The chief officers of state and the royal favourites were in the galleys. The
King, witness of the unhappy fate of his court, endeavoured to escape,
but he was recognized and slain at the gates of the palace.59

Regardless of whether this was done in haste to allow the Burmese forces
to return home to defend against an impending attack from Chinese forces,
the scale of the destruction caused profound material hardship and spiritual
disorientation amongst the survivors. Sunait Chutintaranond argues that the
events of 1767 were a turning point in the way that Thai historians wrote
about the Burmese, and the way in which elites thought about the role of
the military.60 War for the subsequent rulers of Thonburi and early Bangkok
became less about expanding influence outward to distant city-​states, and
more about defence of the people, the kingdom and Buddhism. Grievance
lingered well after Burma became weak and humbled by the British. Siam’s
King Mongkut refused a gift from Burma’s King Mindon on the grounds
he was prohibited by his ancestors, and Chulalongkorn stated he would be
cursed if he formed any alliance with the Burmese.61
As Thailand moved into the era of colonial threat in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and leaders sought to build nationalism in the early twentieth, modern
historians like Prince Damrong, Vajiravudh and Vichit Wathakan would
recast the events of 1765 in such a way as to portray it as a struggle between
nations. The new national histories, like Damrong’s Thai Rop Phama written
to inspire national pride, described the lives of ordinary citizens, laying, for
example, great emphasis on the actions of the villagers of Bang Rachan who
had fought for their nation against the evil Burmese. Numerous school texts
such as Lak Thai (The Thai Basis), awarded by the Thai royal academy in
1928, and novels such as Khun Suk (1969) continued to portray Thais with
the right values of patriotism, courage and self-​sacrifice proving themselves
in battle against the marauding Burmese. The production of plays and films
showing the Burmese as foes has continued into the twenty-​first century, with
such epics as MC Chatrichalerm Yukol’s series of six films about the exploits
of Thailand’s sixteenth-​century king of Ayutthaya, King Naresuan.
A key vessel of contemporary popular memory of Myanmar are shrines
to King Taksin. The shrines to Taksin, found across Thailand in at least six
provinces, memorialise the king who “saved Thailand’s independence after
Ayutthaya was invaded and destroyed in 1767” (kop ku ekkarat ban mueang
klap khuen ma langchak ti phaen din krungsiayutya thukkhasuekbukthamlai).62
Bangkok and Thonburi have four shrines. Common across all are statues of
King Taksin, often with a sword across his lap, and often wearing a distinctive
broad-​brimmed hat. In some cases, the shrines have been built with funds
raised from local communities. As with many Thai monuments, they perform
164 Thailand at the centre II
both religious and historical functions. Thailand’s Tak province, located on its
western border with Burma, holds an annual King Taksin festival.
During the Cold War era, Thailand’s military elites mostly pursued a
buffer policy that involved supporting ethnic armed groups on the Thai-​
Burma border to oppose the Burmese army. This was part of a broader
unofficial policy in which the Thai military often used covert action to under-
mine regimes or support alternative governments in neighbouring countries.63
Under this policy, Thais gave protection and material help to the Karen
National Union in Burma, Hmong in Laos and the Coalition Government
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). This “complex knot of trans-​state
politico-​military linkages” began to decline only at the end of the twentieth
century.64 It was not until 2005 that Thailand finally began to embrace the
idea of forgoing Burma’s ethnic armies, such as the Shan State Army and
the Karen National Union, to constrain the Burmese government forces.65
Nonetheless Thai-​Burma politics has remained burdened by other problem-
atic issues, especially drug-​smuggling and refugees.
In the post–​Cold War era, the view of Burma (renamed Myanmar in 1989)
amongst Thai elites has, at a superficial level, become far less burdened by
consumption of Thai-​Burma war tropes. The Chatchai policy of turning
battlefields into market places activated a keen interest in the possibilities of
commerce and profit-​making. Thailand’s army chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh
saw the scope for Burma in Thailand’s Suvarnabhumi vision and led a delegation
of business and military leaders to Rangoon in 1988, despite the Tatmadaw’s
brutal suppression of protests.66 Thereafter, Thailand began to find itself
on the wrong side of international community views about Burma’s human
rights record. This resulted in ructions between various Thai governments
and agencies. Some, like the Chuan Leekpai Democrat government and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed with a harder line, whilst others, like the
military and Thailand’s King Bhumibol rejected it. For instance, in a speech to
Thai diplomats in 1993, Bhumibol told them that Thailand should have good
relations with its neighbours and didn’t need to comply with the instructions
of “global police,” in a reference to the United States.67
In summary, Thailand’s collective memory for Myanmar has clearly
bifurcated. At the broader national level, Myanmar remains demonised
through education, legend and popular culture. Amongst elites, a pride in
Thailand’s self-​assessed more tolerant and enlightened view of Myanmar is
nested within the emerging narrative of “leave no one behind.”

Thai memory and Cambodia

The Thai “us and them” site of memory for Cambodia is contorted by three
afflictions: an unwillingness to recognise a common heritage, a sense of super-
iority with regard to Angkor’s decline and Cambodia’s twentieth-​century
struggles, and a sense of frustration at Cambodia having benefitted from
France’s colonial ambitions. The Angkor period (9th–​15th centuries) left a
 Thailand at the centre II 165
rich array of shrines, temples and artistic treasures, across the territories of
both modern-​day Cambodia and much of northeast and central Thailand.
Both countries now wish to claim this historical and cultural inheritance in
ways that support their own nationalist projects. The tributary era (from as
early as the fifth century until the nineteenth century), when states practised
a version of China’s tributary system in their relations with each other, has
left another controversial memory-​scape for both. In particular, the memory
of rise of strong Tai-​city states such as Ayutthaya, after the decline of the
Angkor period and subsequent tribute from Cambodia, encourages a Thai
view of Cambodia characterised by paternalism at best and chauvinism at
worst. Finally, the colonial era (roughly from the Anglo-​Burmese wars of
1824 to the First World War) saw a loss of territory that occurred in France’s
period as Indochinese colonial overlord. In Thailand this fosters anger
directed at contemporary Cambodia.
Thailand owes a significant cultural debt to Khmer civilisation. At its peak,
the kingdom of Angkor stretched west as far as modern-​day Suphanburi,
northwest of Bangkok. It sponsored new forms of political thinking, such
as the idea of a Devaraja or cakravartin, a Universal Monarch who would
have to be acknowledged by all other kings as superior. These ideas were
adopted by the Ayutthaya city-​state as it rose in the second millennium AD.
Khmer culture became an element of society in Ayutthaya, especially in the
institution of the monarchy, including the use of rachasap (royal language).
In the fifteenth century, temple inscriptions and public documents such as
letters of appointment were written in at least two languages, including
Khmer.68 Despite the shared inheritance –​the institution and rituals of the
monarchy, the written script –​the tendency is to deny these legacies.69 Thais
have in fact actively obscured the shared inheritance, such as the rachasap
being mainly from Khmer, and many Thai words used in daily life also
being Khmer. There is a view that Thailand later transcended Cambodia
and Khmer civilisation.
Thailand’s approach to its Khmer heritage is to attempt a kind of rebadging.
Over time, however, the Thai state had to grapple with the reality of ancient
Khmer Hindu temples, notably Phimai and Phanom Rung in northeastern
Thailand, being located on the territory of modern Thailand. During the
second half of the twentieth century, Thai authorities found ways to make
its Angkorean past part of Thai cultural heritage without acknowledging
any debt to modern Cambodia. This was done in various ways. The Angkor
period was, for example, referred to as the Lopburi period, after a province
in central Thailand containing important historical sites from the Khmer
empire.70 Similarly, the Khmer people were referred to as the khom, to distin-
guish the creators of the monuments from modern Cambodians and to asso-
ciate them with modern Thais.71 Because Cambodia has worked even harder
to appropriate Angkorean civilisation for its nationalism, Thai attitudes have
on occasion caused serious harm to relations, as with the Thai actress who in
a TV drama allegedly said that Cambodia should allow Thailand to manage
166 Thailand at the centre II
Angkor Wat. In 2003 the result of this remark was rioting, the burning of the
Thai Embassy and the evacuation of hundreds of Thai citizens.72
Memory of Cambodia as a tributary or vassal state is a second problematic
area of the Thai site of memory for Cambodia. In its Thonburi period under
King Taksin, Thailand invaded Cambodia three times because Cambodia
did not provide tribute.73 Thereafter, Thai monarchs sought to maintain tight
control over Cambodian rulers, including by giving one Cambodian mon-
arch, Eng, refuge in Bangkok for over a decade.74 Thailand and Vietnam
competed to gain tribute. Correspondence between Siamese and Vietnamese
elites in the early nineteenth century records them referring to Cambodia
as a “servant” or as a “child.”75 Indeed one of our interviewees admitted to
taking a condescending attitude towards Cambodia, thinking of it as a “little
brother.”76 As Thailand developed its professional military in the late nine-
teenth century, Battye records that in thinking about roles for the new mili-
tary, Thais thought interference in Cambodia to be a routine matter. It was, he
wrote, as appropriate for a Siamese soldier (militiaman) to patrol a Bangkok
lane as to place a candidate on the Cambodian throne and campaign against
his rebel brother.77
By the twentieth century, an assumption of Thai overlordship was the
benchmark against which Thais saw Cambodian efforts to tread a more
independent path. The 1959 Cambodian decision to launch a case in the
ICJ to confirm sovereignty over the temple Preah Vihear (or in Thai, Phra
Viharn) on the Thai side of the Danggrek range on the Thai-​Cambodian
border, in particular was received very bitterly. To that point, Thai leaders
had told the Thai public that Cambodians naturally respected Thailand “as
an elder sibling.”78 Confronted with active displays of nationalism amongst
the Cambodian public, Cambodia’s leader Norodom Sihanouk became
a scapegoat and was type cast in the mould of Cambodian monarchs
ungrateful to Thailand. According to a popular riddle, “What color (si)
do Thai people hate?” The answer is neither red (si daeng) nor black (si
dam), but “Si-​hanouk.”79 As late as the 1980s and after Vietnam’s inva-
sion of Cambodia in 1978, Thailand needed to overcome its anger towards
Sihanouk before it could support an alternative government, the CGDK, of
which Sihanouk was a part.
Thailand’s memory of Cambodia is further coloured by entanglement with
Thailand’s own memory of loss of its own territory at the hands of France
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Labelled a national humili-
ation discourse by historian Shane Strate, this narrative of “lost territories” is
to an extent ahistorical, because it projects back modern notions of statehood
and defined borders to periods in which these did not exist. Under the man-
dala system of relations which preceded the development of Westphalian
states in Southeast Asia, Thailand certainly had long-​standing relations or
suzerainty and tribute with local lords. As colonial pressure built in the late
nineteenth century, however, Thailand first undertook survey projects which
sought to precisely define its borders according to maximalist claims; and
 Thailand at the centre II 167
then to preserve independence, surrendered portions of these to both France
and England in a series of treaties over the course of the first decade of the
twentieth century. As Thailand developed its own nationalist accounts of its
history, through the writings of King Vajiravudh and ideologue Luang Vichit
Wathakan, the failure of these maximalist claims were portrayed as territorial
losses.80 Under nationalist leader Phibun Songkram, Thailand undertook
military operations in 1940 to regain these lost territories, administered them
for the remainder of the war period, but in the post-​war negotiations was
forced to surrender them to French-​administered Indochina. These nation-
alist memories of territorial loss were revived when Thailand and Cambodia
again engaged in hostilities over the border temple between 2008 and 2011,
following the controversial decision to jointly register the temple with the
World Heritage Organisation.
Despite these difficult relations, finally in the twenty-​first century, some
efforts have been made to recast the memory of Cambodia in a more posi-
tive light. After the 2003 burning of the Thai Embassy, for instance, a Thai-​
Cambodia Commission on the Promotion of Cultural Cooperation was
established to try to foster greater mutual respect.81 Subsequently the Thai
Embassy in Phnom Penh reported a clutch of historically related activ-
ities like a Thai-​Cambodian Concert at the Thailand Exhibition in Phnom
Penh, the publication of a Dictionary of Borrowed Khmer Words in Thai
Language, a Seminar on Khmer Studies and Exchange of Thai-​Cambodian
Intellectuals and Students and an opportunity for Cambodian scholars to
show their cultural works in archaeology, museum, poetry and tradition by
the Fine Arts Department.82 Yet none of this could restrain the outbreak of
violence over the Preah Vihear/​Phra Viharn temple dispute in 2008, demon-
strating that the path to erasing the memory of bitter relations still has much
ground to make up.

Thai memory and Vietnam

Thailand’s northeastern border is only 100 km from Vietnam, with thin
stretches of Laos separating the two countries. Hanoi and the northeastern
city of Udon Thani are 500 km apart and have direct flights. But, in the
Thai mind, cultural differences, and in particular Theravada Buddhist and
Indic concepts (vis-​à-​vis Vietnam’s Confucianism, Mahayana Buddhist and
Sinic culture), make Vietnam more distant than Cambodia, Laos or Burma.
The Vietnam War too, is surprisingly inconspicuous in Thai public memory.
Consequently, Thailand’s collective site of memory for Vietnam is overall less
formed in comparison with memory scapes for Laos, Burma and Cambodia.
As we shall see below, this leaves an opening for revisionist scholars to try
to refocus the history of Thai-​Vietnam relations on a long period in which
Thailand allowed Vietnam’s anti-​colonial movement to operate from Thai
soil, rather than the somewhat shorter period of Thailand’s participation in
the Vietnam War.
168 Thailand at the centre II
Certainly, Thailand’s elites retain a memory that, save for some flirtations
with cooperation against colonial France, Vietnam has been for Thailand, an
alien power and rival, and sometimes a threat. The longer term memory of
Vietnam is one of sparring with formidable power as adept in Machiavellian
plotting as Thailand itself. There was wariness rather than frequent direct
conflict. As Astri Suhrki wrote in 1971,

past Siamese-​Vietnamese conflicts have seldom taken the form of direct

military confrontation. Each country tended to support smaller rivals
for power in dynastic and territorial dispute, at times encouraging such
adventures for their expansionist aims, and at times accepting dual suzer-
ainty as the most suitable compromise.83

Thailand’s involvement in the Vietnam War from 1965, its hosting of US forces
engaged in bombing Vietnam, and the later anxiety provoked by Vietnam’s
invasion and occupation of Cambodia added to the uneasiness. This 25-​year
period of significant estrangement, tension and hostility began to thaw only
in the late 1980s. A 1983 survey conducted of 200 political, military, bureau-
cratic, business, intellectual and labour respondents found that three quarters
of respondents viewed Vietnam as by far the biggest threat for direct military
aggression and the highest threat for causing loss of territory.84 Elements of
the Thai military believed that Vietnam had plans for an Indochina Union
that would eventually incorporate Thailand.85 Parliamentarians believed that
Vietnam would try to activate the Vietnamese residents in Thailand to over-
throw the Thai government, with one stating that:

there are Vietnamese migrants along the border of various provinces.

This is the problem of the migration from the battle of Dien Bien Phu.
They requested temporary residence in Thailand, but did the govern-
ment of Thailand ever think or not that these people are an enemy every
day, they are spies, considering opportunities to smuggle weapons. With
respect to the Vietnamese that live in Thailand these days, go and look
at their homes Mr Speaker. We have a picture of the King of Thailand.
The thing that they respect is Ho Chi Minh, who they respect and pray
to every day. Ho Chi Minh is just the essence of communism, this is the
objective of Ho Chi Minh.86

Sukhumbhand Paribatra consequently wrote in 1984, after the Vietnamese

invasion of Cambodia in 1978, that Thailand was always sensitive to land-​
based threats from its east.87 This was why Thailand responded defensively
to the unification of the Vietnamese kingdom in 1802 by taking control of
Laos beyond the Mekong and challenging the Vietnamese in Cambodia, as
occurred in the reign of Rama III. As of 1999, Thai staff college materials still
described encounters between Thai and Vietnamese generals in times gone by,
such as when Thailand sent a military leader in the reign of Rama III, Chao
 Thailand at the centre II 169
Praya Bodin Decha, to defeat the Lao rebellion of Prince Anu.88 In these
contests, and others such as the 1840 military venture to Cambodia, Thais
emphasised their Buddhism compared to the Confucianist “yuan.”89
But the 1990s allowed space for Thais to begin to emphasise different
aspects of their shared history with Vietnam. These were years of seeking
a new relationship under the Chatchai policy of turning battlefields into
marketplaces. The policy found a receptive audience in Vietnam, which had
begun opening up since 1986 under Doi Moi (Renovation), and was also
inclined to wish to reduce its dependence on Great Powers. Thailand assisted
Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN in 1995 and trade between the two countries
increased.
The fainter outlines of memory of Vietnam have also enabled efforts
to establish closer relations in the post–​Cold War, accompanied by efforts
to reconstruct a public memory with a focus on shared anti-​colonialism.
Christopher Goscha’s work in the early 1990s first brought to light Thai-​
Vietnamese anti-​ colonial cooperation which occurred in the later nine-
teenth century. During this period, Vietnamese nationalists sought to use
Thailand as a base from which to resist French colonial rule. They sought
to draw on small Vietnamese communities that had migrated over several
decades, to flee internal strife such as the Tay Son rebellion (1771–​1802),
as well as French expansion, and settled in Thailand.90 The latter emigrants
settled predominantly in Thailand’s northeast in provinces such as Udon
Thani, Nong Khai, Sakhon Nakhon and Ubon Ratchathani. Vietnamese
nationalists were unfamiliar with Thailand’s Buddhist-​ Indic culture, but
given China’s problems with the West in that period, Thailand was a prac-
tical choice. Thai leaders were sympathetic to Vietnamese aims, and prior
to the First World War permitted Vietnamese anti-​colonial leader, Pan Boi
Chau, and his followers to farm land at Ban Tham in central Thailand and
send weapons to Vietnam.91 In the mid-​1920s Ho Chi Minh travelled to
Thailand and established an Udon Provincial Committee in Udon Thani.92
After establishing the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1929, Ho directed the
Udon Provincial Committee to help establish a Siamese Communist Party
(SCP).93 But the SCP failed to attract any significant Thai following, with
the membership comprising mostly Chinese and Vietnamese. The SCP’s
challenges increased when the Thai government passed anti-​ communist
legislation and began to cooperate with French diplomats to monitor and
detain Vietnamese living in northeastern Thailand. After Phibun invaded
parts of Indochina in 1940, relations cooled further, although some cooper-
ation may have taken place between Seri Thai, the Thai anti-​Japanese resist-
ance movement, and the Vietnamese anti-​colonialists.94
Since Goscha’s pioneering work, a cadre of Thai scholars has also sought
to work on deepening understanding of Thailand’s neighbours and their
bilateral relations, including Vietnam. Some have been inspired by the work
of historians such as Sunet Chutintharanon and Charnvit Kasetsiri. These
scholars focus on Thailand’s relations with its neighbours and the goal of
170 Thailand at the centre II
solving problems stemming from misunderstandings between Thailand and
neighbouring countries.95 Settasat Wattrasok’s 2016 work on the Vietnamese
national liberation’s movement activities in Thailand is an example. His
book aims to build on Goscha’s by accessing more Thai language materials.
Settasat openly states his admiration for the way in which the movement over-
came obstacles presented by Great Powers (maha amnat), noting that the
Cold War affected scholarship portraying the two countries as adversaries.96
Other works which explore new perspectives on the relationship look closely
at Vietnam’s views of Thailand, including through evaluation of Vietnam’s
primary education system.97
More broadly, Thai elites now looking back at Thailand’s involvement with
Vietnam question the degree to which it served Thailand’s security interests,
and the degree to which Thailand became a pawn of Great Power competi-
tion. A Thai scholar wrote in 2018 that “Thailand-​Vietnam relations before
the 1990s were highly influenced by international politics and the major
powers, especially the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.”98 There
is also a view that Phibun Songkram’s own career interests led him to seek
external assistance, which was also a significant factor in driving Thailand
into an alliance with the United States that eventually encompassed war with
Vietnam.99
Thailand’s Vietnam veterans are not an obstacle to closer relations. In
fact many of the 37,644 Thai soldiers who fought there under US leader-
ship during the Vietnam War came to develop a fondness and sentimental
affection for Vietnam, often through their contact with Vietnamese women.100
For its part, Thai public consciousness of the Vietnam War has remained dim.
Few Thai scholars have written about Thailand’s involvement in the war, and
the single Vietnam War memorial is located in distant Kanchanaburi prov-
ince, somewhat inaccessibly on a Thai military base.101
With this recasting of Thailand’s views of its neighbours and Vietnam,
the Thai government, at both national and provincial levels, is now actively
leveraging both the Vietnamese Thai community in northeastern Thailand
and the memory of Uncle Ho’s period of residency in Thailand, using them
as resources for building a stronger relationship with Vietnam. In 2019,
the Thai Embassy organised a visit of 26 young Vietnamese to Thailand
where they retraced Ho Chi Minh’s one year and eight month’s journey in
Thailand between 1928 and 1929.102 The group visited three northeastern
provinces where Thais of Vietnamese heritage reside, namely Nakhon
Phanom, Sakhon Nakhon and Udon Thani, which hosts the largest popu-
lation of Vietnamese Thais, some 60,0000. In Nakhon Phanom the group
visited a monument of Ho Chi Minh opened jointly in 2016 by the Thai
and Vietnamese governments. The monument, claimed as the largest over-
seas monument to Uncle Ho, is in the village of Ban Na Chok which was
made a Thai-​Vietnamese “friendship village” in 2004.103 The Ho Chi Minh
memorial, and Udon Thani, also drew an official visit from one of Vietnam’s
Central Party Committee members in 2019.104
 Thailand at the centre II 171

Conclusion
Thais acknowledge frankly that the memory in relations between
neighbouring countries is a burden that must be transcended. As one Thai
military officer told us:

Thailand and neighbouring countries we share a very long history and

a lot of it is a bitter history that we hate each other all the time. History
has made the unity of ASEAN a little bit weak and shaken because they
always think of the way Thailand used to be. Thailand used to invade
Laos, Thailand used to invade Cambodia, Thailand took the Emerald
Buddha from Laos, Myanmar invade Laos.105

Nonetheless there is an increasing determination to leave behind the past that

is perhaps not yet reflected in school histories.

So, what we need in order to make ASEAN stronger and more united is
to learn how to forgive. And forget the history, forget the past.106

But the issue that is clearly emerging is a fissure between the Thai elite’s more
nuanced and critical view of Thailand’s history with its neighbors, and the
collective memory which is still largely based on nationalist history and local
customs, some of which have combined in the case of King Taksin and Ya Mo
(Thao Suranaree). It was put to us that the “younger generation especially
those who went to Chulalongkorn or Thammasat University tend to under-
stand more”; they have a “new revisionist approach.”107 This memory gap
does carry the risk that politicians might again see benefit in exploiting crude
nationalism for political advantage, much as they did in the case of Phra
Viharn/​Preah Vihear temple dispute. “Us and them” memory also carries the
risk of undermining ASEAN unity. On the positive side, Thai diplomats are
well aware of this risk. Some like Tej Bunnag believe distrust will be solved,
“if not in my generation, then certainly in the next generation.” This view is
endorsed by scholar Amitav Acharya, who sees the historical memory of con-
flict in Southeast Asia as more tractable than in Northeast and South Asia.108
Thailand is adjusting its vision in a setting, that is however rapidly chan-
ging. China’s BRI is quickly surpassing many of Thailand’s programs. The
fact that China is giving assistance to Southeast Asia in various areas, without
imposing conditions like the United States, is bringing many nations closer to
China. In 2007 a Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs official predicted China’s
rising influence through its investment, some years before the announcement
of the BRI in these terms:

In some dimensions this closeness might cause Thailand, which used to

have a big role in the region, to lose some of this stature. For example,
Laos, Cambodia, Burma are turning to China increasingly as a source
172 Thailand at the centre II
of investment for building public infrastructure, as well as for knowledge
and technology, and assistance, instead of turning to Thailand as they
did before.109

Thailand’s turn to a less chauvinistic form of regionalism might be timely.

A stronger ASEAN and stronger relations between the states of mainland
Southeast Asia will assist in the preservation of sovereignty and freedom of
manoeuvre as China’s dominance increases.

Notes
1 Jayant Menon, ‘Regional Means and Global Objectives’, East Asia Forum
Quarterly, January–​March 2018, pp. 7–​8.
2 Levels have remained at about 25% of total ASEAN trade. Jayant Menon,
‘Regional Means and Global Objectives’, East Asia Forum Quarterly, January–​
March 2018, p. 7.
3 Abhisit Vejjajiva, ‘The Critical Importance of Socio-​Cultural Community for the
Future of ASEAN’, in Aileen Baviera and Larry Maramis (eds.), ASEAN@50
Volume 4: Building ASEAN Community: Political-​Security and Socio-​Cultural
Reflections (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia,
2017), pp. 346–​357.
4 Ibid., pp. 354, 355.
5 Ibid., p. 349.
6 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘Conceptualizing Thai-​Self under Royalist Provincialism’,
Opening Keynote Address, at the 12th International Conference of Thai Studies,
University of Sydney, Australia, 22 April 2014.
7 Ibid., pp. 2–​3.
8 Chaiwat, ‘Thailand: The Layers of a Strategic Culture’, p. 159.
9 Charnvit, Siamese/​Thai Nationalism, p. 10.
10 Ibid., p. 10.
11 The view of Burma and the Burmese arising from Prince Damrong Rajanuparb’s
early twentieth century work, Our Wars with the Burmese, is the most obvious
example. This history recounts the Burmese sacking of Ayutthaya, as well as
the resistance of the village of Bang Rachan and remains important history for
all Thais, military and civilian. It is taught through formal school curricula and
found in popular culture including cinema and cartoons. Rachel Harrison and
Peter Jackson place these stories “at the heart of nationalist discourses for internal
consumption.”Rachel V. Harrison and Peter A. Jackson (eds.), The Ambiguous
Allure of the West: Traces of the Colonial in Thailand (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2010), pp.11–​12.
12 Suchit Wongthet, ‘Introduction’, in Suchit Wongthet (ed.), เสียมกุก กองทัพสยาม
ที่ปราสาทนครวัดเป็นใคร? มาจากไหน? ไทย ลาว หรือ ข่า, Who Is the Siam Kuk Siamese Army
at Angkor Wat? Where Are They From? Thailand, Laos or Kha? (Bangkok: Arts
and Culture, 2002), p. 9.
13 Interview, Thai police (PARU) officer, Hua Hin, 2015.
14 ‘Understand Thailand’, เข้าใจไทย, Post Today, 27 May 2014, p. 3.
 Thailand at the centre II 173
15 Sinae Hyun, ‘Building a Human Border: The Thai Border Patrol Police School
Project in the Post–​Cold War Era’, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast
Asia 29, no. 2 (July 2014), p. 344.
16 Interview, official National Secuirty Council, Bangkok, 2016.
17 Thailand provided paratroopers for the Central Intelligence Agency’s ‘secret war’
in Laos, 1961–​1975. Texan CIA operative Bill Lair worked with the Thai border
police to found the Police Aerial Reconnaissance Unit, a special forces unit able to
parachute and conduct deniable guerilla operations within Laos. The PARU had
to officially resign from their posts so that if killed or arrested in Laos the Thai
government in Bangkok could deny involvement. Despite the high cost, the neces-
sity of maintaining token adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords meant the Thai
government denied the conduct of the operations.
18 Sutayut Osornprasop, ‘Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina,
1960–​1974’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006, p. 77.
19 Ibid., p. 9,
20 บันทึกข้อความ วันที่๑๖ เม.ย ๕๘ เรื่อง ผอ.อผศ. สั่ง การในที่ประชุม หน.นขต.อผศ ครั้งที่ ๓/​๒๕๕๘,
Minutes of Thai Veteran Organization meeting 3/​2015, dated 16 April 2015. www.
thaiveterans.mod.go.th/​wvoth/​meet/​detail5.pdf accessed on 18 December 2016.
This reference to Thai soldiers in Laos appears to contradict Sutayut Osornprasop
who asserts there has been no public admission of the use of Thai troops in Laos.
‘Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina, 1960–​1974’, PhD thesis,
University of Cambridge, 2006, p. 69.
21 Battersby, ‘Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s International
Relations in the 1990s’, p. 477.
22 Robert Karniol, ‘Thailand’s Armed Forces: From Counterinsurgency to
Conventional Warfare’, International Defense Review 25, no. 2, 97+, 1992 (8p.).
23 Wasana Nanuam, ลับลวงพรางตอน “ศึกพระวิหาร, Secrets Deceptions Disguises in the
Time of the Pra Wiharn Conflict (Bangkok: Post, 2011), 151–​152.
24 See, for example, ‘19 February 1988 the End of the War between Mekong
Brothers’, 19 ก.พ.2531 จบสงครามพี่น้องสองฝั่งโขง,, Kom Chad Luek, 19 February 2018
www.komchadluek.net/​news/​today-​in-​history/​313789.
25 For mean and median results for Thai views of other Southeast Asian states, see
Table A.25, Annexure.
26 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuipanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration: Fifty
Years of Diplomacy and Warfare in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998), p. 18.
27 Sutayut, ‘Thailand and the American Secret War’, pp. 17–​20.
28 Ian G. Baird, ‘Biography and Borderlands: Chao Sone Bouttarobol, a Champassak
Royal, and Thailand, Laos and Cambodia’, TRaNS: Trans Regional and National
Studies of Southeast Asia 5, no. 2 (July 2017), pp. 269–​295.
29 ‘Princess Marks Songkran at Laos Mission’, The Nation, 11 April 2019, accessed
at www.nationthailand.com/​national/​30367567 on 29 January 2020.
30 Charles F. Keyes, ‘A Princess in a Peoples’ Republic: A New Phase in the
Construction of the Lao Nation’, in Andrew Turton and Richmond Surrey (eds.),
Civility and Savagery (UK: Curzon, 2000), pp. 206–​226.
31 Karen Schur Narula, Voyage of the Emerald Buddha (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1994), p. 77.
32 Ibid., p. 82.
174 Thailand at the centre II
33 ‘7 March 1784 Install the Emerald Buddha at Wat Phrasiratnasatdaram’, Kom
Chad Luek, 7 March 2018, 7 มี.ค2327 อันเชิญพระแก้วมรกตประดิษฐานวัดพระศรีรัตนศาส
ดาราม, accessed at www.komchadluek.net/​news/​today-​in-​history/​315636 on 12
February 2020.
34 คืนพระแก้วมรกตให้ สปป.ลาว ดีไหมคะ accessed at https://​pantip.com/​topic/​32620555/​
result on 12 February 2020.
35 ไล่ ‘สุจิตต์ วงษ์เทศ’ ไปเรียนประวัติศาสตร์ไทยอีกรอบ, Way Magazine, 25 Jul 2018, accessed
at https://​waymagazine.org/​race-​nation-​sujit-​wongthes/​ on 12 February 20120.
36 Manich Jumsai, History of Laos, including the History of Lannathai, Chiengmai
(Bangkok: Chalermnit: 1967), p. 27.
37 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuipanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration: Fifty
Years of Diplomacy and Warfare in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998), pp. 23–​26.
38 Ibid., p. 27
39 ‘Thai History Remembered and Forgotten’, The Nation, 23 December 2005.
40 Baker and Pasuk, A History of Thailand, p. 127.
41 Charles F. Keyes, ‘National Heroine or Local Spirit? The Struggle over Memory
in the Case of Thao Suranaree of Nakon Ratchasima’, in Charles F. Keyes and
Shigeharu Tanabe (eds.), Cultural Crisis and Social Memory: Modernity and
Identity in Thailand and Laos (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2002), p. 118.
42 Tha oei nam thaosunnari khonthai cha ruchak kandi wa maithueng yamo kong chao
changwat nakhonratsima sueng thi ching laeo khon thai thang prathet ko hai khwam
khaoropbucha lae ramluekthueng nai winkam thi than song tham wai phuea chati
ban mueang ayu semo, ‘23 March 1826 Engraves the Heroism of Thau Suranaree
Grasping Victory over Laos’, 23 มี.ค. 2369 จารึกวีรกรรม “ท้าวสุรนารี” กำ�ชัยเหนือทัพลาว,
Komchadluek, 23 March 2018, accessed at www.komchadluek.net/​news/​today-​in-​
history/​317495 on 10 February 2020.
43 ‘Remembering Khunying Mo’, Bangkok Post, 17 March 2016, accessed at www.
bangkokpost.com/​travel/​901004/​remembering-​khunying-​mo on 28 January 2020.
44 น้องใหม่ มทส.กราบย่าโม ฝากตัวเป็นลูกหลาน, Matichon, 2 August 2019 accessed at www.
matichon.co.th/​education/​news_​1069625 on 28 January 2020.
45 Peter Jackson, ‘Royal Spirits, Chinese Gods, and Magic Monks: Thailand’s Boom-​
Time Religions of Prosperity’, South East Asia Research 7, no. 3, pp. 284.
46 Donald P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation
in Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), p. 31.
47 Charles F. Keyes, ‘National Heroine or Local Spirit? The Struggle over Memory
in the Case of Thao Suranaree of Nakon Ratchasima’, in Charles F. Keyes and
Shigeharu Tanabe (eds.), Cultural Crisis and Social Memory: Modernity and
Identity in Thailand and Laos (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2002), pp. 113–​137.
48 Ibid., p. 114.
49 Keyes, ‘National Heroine or Local Spirit?’, pp. 122–​123.
50 Scott Rosenberg, ‘Thailand: Pic Puts Nations on Different Sides of History’,
Variety, 23–​29 July 2001, p. 43.
51 Simon Creak, ‘Sport as Politics and History: The 25th SEA Games in Laos’,
Anthropology Today 27, no. 1 (February 2011), pp. 14–​19.
52 Abhisit, ‘The Critical Importance of Socio-​Cultural Community for the Future of
ASEAN’, p. 352.
53 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
54 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
 Thailand at the centre II 175
55 See Table A.25, Annexure.
56 Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and
Institutionalisation (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), p. 106.
57 Sunait Chutintaranond, ‘The Image of the Burmese Enemy in Thai Perceptions
and Historical Writings’, Journal of the Siam Society 80, no. 1 (1992), p. 99.
58 According to Pavin, “In order to certify Thainess, the otherness or the enemy must
be apparent. As a result, Thai-​Burmese history is made in a very hostile way.”
Pavin, A Plastic Nation, p. 33.
59 M. Turpin, History of the Kingdom of Siam, translated by B. O. Cartwright
(Bangkok: American Presby. Mission Press, 1908), pp. 167–​ 168 quoted in
Chutintaranond, ‘The Image of the Burmese Enemy’, p. 91.
60 Chutintaranond, ‘The Image of the Burmese Enemy’, p. 91.
61 Ibid., p. 93.
62 On the Trail of King Taksin, ‘Remembering the Great King in Thonburi’, ตามรอย
“พระเจ้าตาก” รำ�ลึกมหาราชแห่งกรุงธนบุรี, Mgronline, 28 December 2018, accessed at
https://​mgronline.com/​travel/​detail/​9600000130010 on 12 February 2020.
63 See, for example, John Funston, ‘The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Thailand: Some Preliminary Observations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 9,
no. 3 (December 1987), p. 236; Pavin, ‘Plastic Nation’, p. 58; Fineman, Special
Relationship, pp. 138–​143.
64 Battersby, ‘Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s International
Relations in the 1990s’, p. 473.
65 Don Pathan, ‘Ethnic Armies Could Lose Buffer Role in Border Zone’, The Nation,
6 August 2008.
66 Pavin, ‘Plastic Nation’, p. 67.
67 Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles: A biography of Thailand’s Bumiphol
Adulyadej (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006)’, p. 374.
68 David K. Wyatt, Siam in Mind (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002), pp. 5, 26.
69 Surachart, Karani Khao Phra Wihan, the Mount Phra Viharn Case.
70 Charles F. Keyes, ‘The Case of the Purloined Lintel’, in Craig J. Reynolds (ed.),
National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today (Bangkok: Silkworm Books,
2002), p. 226.
71 Ibid., p. 226.
72 ‘Whose Angkor Wat?’, The Economist, 30 January 2003, accessed at www.econo-
mist.com/​asia/​2003/​01/​30/​whose-​angkor-​wat on 31 October 2019.
73 Chandler, ‘Cambodia’s Relations with Siam in the Early Bangkok Period’,
p. 156.
74 Ibid., p. 157.
75 Ibid., p. 153.
76 Interview, mid-​ranking Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
77 Battye, ‘The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–​1910’, p. 46.
78 Strate, The Lost Territories, p. 175.
79 Charnvit Kasetsiri, ‘Thailand and Cambodia: A Love-​Hate Relationship’, Kyoto
Review of Southeast Asia, 3 (March 2003), accessed at https://​kyotoreview.org/​
issue-​3-​nations-​and-​stories/​a-​love-​hate-​relationship/​ on 5 January 202.
80 For detailed accounts of these events and processes, see Thongchai, Siam
Mapped; Strate, The Lost Territories and Puangthong R. Pawakapan, State and
Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2013); Raymond, Thai Military Power.
176 Thailand at the centre II
81 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thais and Cambodians Must Learn to Be Good
Neighbours’, The Nation, 19 August 2008;
82 Royal Thai Embassy, Phnom Penh, Press Release 2/​ 2550, Activities to
Commemorate the 55th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations between Thailand And Cambodia, 7 March 2007.
83 Astri Suhrki, ‘Smaller-​Nation Diplomacy: Thailand’s Current Dilemmas’, Asian
Survey 11, no. 5 (May 1971), p. 435.
84 Kramol et al., ‘The Thai Elite’s National Security Perspectives’, p. 19.
85 Flight Lieutenant Pannida Dhupatemiya, การซื้ออาวุธทันสมัยกับการเมืองระหว่างประเทศ -​
ศึกษากรณีประเทศไทยกับเครืองบิน เอฟ, ‘16 Modern Arms Procurement in International
Politics: A Case Study of Thailand and the F-​16’, MA thesis, Chulalongkorn
University, 1988, p. 61.
86 Mr Saman Chomphuthep, member for province of Lamphun, ครั้งที่๖ ๒๔๒๓
วันพฤหัสบดีที่๒๖มิถุนายน๒๔๒๓ ๒.เรื่องด่วน ๒.คณะรัฐมนตรีขอแถลงข้อเท็จจริงที่เกิดขึ้นเกี่ยวกับส
ถานการณ์ชายแดน, Report of the meeting of the House of Representatives No. 16/​
1980, ‘Urgent Matter: The Cabinet Explains the Facts Concerning the Border
Situation’, 247–​267.
87 Sukhumbhand, ‘The Enduring Logic in Thai Foreign Policy and National
Security Interests’, p. 5.
88 Satha-​Anand, ‘Thailand: The Layers of a Strategic Culture’,
89 Battye, ‘The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–​1910’, p. 8.
90 Christopher E. Goscha, ‘Thailand and the Vietnamese Resistance against the
French’, MA thesis, Australian National University, 1991, pp. 10–​13.
91 Ibid., pp. 17–​18.
92 Ibid., p. 38
93 Ibid., p. 41.
94 Ibid., pp. 76–​77.
95 Settasat Wattrasok, Udon Thani and the Vietnamese National Liberation, อุดรธานีกั
บขบวนการกู้ชาติเวียดนาม (Kon Kaen: Centre for Research on Plurality in the Mekong
Region, 2016)
96 Ibid., p. ข, 7.
97 Sunet Chutintharanon (ed.), Neighbours Perceptions of Thailand, ไทยในสายตาเอนบ้าน
(Bangkok: Mekong Studies Centre, Chulalongkorn University, 2013); Dararat
Mattariganond, Historical Presentations in a Current Vietnamese Primary School
Textbook, ประวัติศาสตร์เวียดนามในแบบเรียนชั้นประถม (Bangkok: Muang Boran, 2007).
98 Kritapas Sajjapala, ‘Thailand-​ Vietnam Relations in the 1990s’, MA thesis,
Cornell University, 2018, p. 1.
99 Ibid., p. 7. Fineman in A Special Relationship assesses similarly.
100 Richard A. Ruth, In Buddha’s Company: Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), pp. 1, 226.
101 Ibid., pp. 11, 137–​177, 225.
102 ‘Thai-​Vietnam Friendship: Thai-​ Vietnam Ties through Youth Studying
History Leads to Future Cooperation’, เพื่อนมิตรไทย-​เวียดนาม: สานสายสัมพันธ์ไทย-​
เวียดนามผ่านการเรียนรู้ทางประวัติศาสตร์ของเยาวชนสู่ความร่วมมือในอนาคต, Thai Embassy
Ho Chi Minh Press Release, 28 August 2019, accessed at www.thaiembassy.org/​
hochiminh/​th/​news/​2123/​108418-​บทความ.html on 13 January 2020.
103 ‘Ho Chi Minh monument for N. Phanom’, Bangkok Post, 1 July 2013, accessed at
www.bangkokpost.com/​thailand/​politics/​357754/​ban-​na-​chok-​friendship-​village-​
to-​host-​ho-​chi-​minh-​monument on 13 January 2020; ‘Memorial in Northeast
 Thailand at the centre II 177
Honours Late Ho Chi Minh’, The Nation, 19 May 2016, accessed at www.
nationthailand.com/​national/​30286281 on 13 January 2020.
104 ‘Udon Thani Welcomes Leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party Together
with Delegation and Thai Ambassador to Vietnam’, จังหวัดอุดรธานี ให้การต้อนรับ
ผู้นำ�ของพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์เวียดนามพร้อมคณะ และเอกอัครราชทูต ณ กรุงฮานอย, Unonthani
Province Press Release, 28 June 2019, accessed at www.udonthani.go.th/​2014/​
news.php?id=2927 on 10 January 2020.
105 Interview, senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
106 Ibid.
107 Interview, officer of National Security Council, 2016.
108 Amitav Acharya, ‘The Evolution and Limitations of ASEAN Identity’, in
Baviera and Maramis (eds.), ASEAN@50 Volume 4, p. 28.
109 คำ�สัมภาษณ์ นายอนุสนธ์ ชินวรรโณ อธบดีกรมเอเชียตะวันออก กระทรวงการต่างประเทศ, Interview
with Mr Anusorn Chinvanno, Head of East Asia Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in LTGEN Sirichai Distagul, ผลกระทบจากถ่วงดุลทางยุทธศาสตร์ระหว่างจีนกับสหรับฯ
ทีมีประเทศไทยในห้วงปี ๒๕๕๐ข๒๕๕๔, Effect of China-​US Strategic Balance of Power
on Thailand during 2007–​2011, unpublished thesis, National Defence College,
2007, p. 123.
Conclusion 
An alliance in trouble

If diplomacy is like a basketball game, then the historical traumas of a people

are like a thousand bottles of olive oil poured on the court.
Vamik Volkan1

In 2003, when Thailand made its final repayment to the IMF, Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra appeared on TV to celebrate what he called an
historic day, indeed an independence day.2 Invoking the collective memory
of an overbearing West still made for good politics in the twenty-​first cen-
tury. Because the most powerful collective memory is that of great kings
defending Thailand against foreigners, Europe and the West generally con-
tinue to occupy an ambivalent place in Thai collective memory. Amidst
annual commemorations of Trat’s independence, memory of France’s colonial
encroachments are easily revived, and the word for Westerner remains phon-
ically connected to France –​the wolf to the Siamese lamb. Indeed, memory
of how territory was lost remains for Thailand, a Chosen Trauma. While
Britain remains less tarred, partly through the Anglophilia which captivated
Thai royalty in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, ambiva-
lent diplomatic memory remains of Britain’s efforts to retain its empire in
the aftermath of the Second World War. Russia, while never as powerful a
presence in Thailand’s past as the other colonial powers, has benefitted from
its strong association with the triumph of Chulalongkorn 1897 European
tour and the sentimentality attached to his relationship with Tsar Nicholas II.
Thai collective memory of the West is complex and can manifest a love/​hate
Occidentalism. This can also come into play in crises.
This Occidentalism cannot be ignored in any ‘self-​ other analysis’ of
Thailand’s international relations. Understanding the Thai outlook on key
global actors through the lens of collective memory is now highly relevant to
the more multipolar character of the post–​Cold War order. Indeed, in an era
where the demand for recognition between nations and within nations is the
source of much international politics, Thailand’s royalist mnemonic hegemony
is taking on growing salience. From the perspective of the increasing tension
between democracies and authoritarian Great Powers, it is an unfortunate
 Conclusion 179
historical fact that those states which were most directly involved in the coer-
cion of Thailand during the colonial period were democracies (France and
Britain, a constitutional monarchy), while those that are perceived to have
provided aid was an authoritarian monarchy (Russia). It has been easy for
Thailand to use memory to justify a domestic politics driven more closer to
Russia. To an extent, China has benefitted as well from this polarising of
global politics along political system identity lines.

Memory and alliances: theoretical findings

In shaping the identity of “the Other” in international relations, this book
has confirmed that collective memory is not neutral, let alone a reflection
of a forensic parsing of history. Collective memory has structure, with some
periods familiar and others much less known. We found this structure in sev-
eral ways. Empirically, structure can be shown when it manifests in its most
dramatic form, when individuals and communities become passionate and
energised by memory of events that occurred decades or even centuries
earlier. This is Volkan’s “time collapse,” which in the Thai context we saw most
prevalent in relations to memories connected with anecdotes of Thai kings
such as Chulalongkorn’s distress after the 1893 Pak Nam incident and pre-​
colonial heroes, such as Ya Mo or Thao Suranaree. We also found structure
in more subtle ways, through statistical analysis of a large sample of survey
respondents. We found in our factor analysis of respondent recollections
of Thai relations with the United States a tendency towards recollection in
three distinct periods: late nineteenth century and early twentieth century,
mid-​twentieth century and Cold War, and post–​Cold War. We matched these
periods to empirical evidence from the memory of interviewees, together with
analysis of history and historiography, to postulate distinct sites of memory
within the overall site of memory for the United States.
We found that multiple factor shape collective memory. The first and
most powerful is education, especially that underpinning the development
of nationalism. The historical education Thais receive has played a powerful
role in shaping views of neighbouring countries, especially in regard to seeing
Burma as an eternal threat. From the earliest decades of the modern Thai
state, recollections of the fall of Ayutthaya at the hands of the Burmese have
been a staple of Thai education. Popular culture is almost as important as
education. Popular culture again, in the form of film and TV, has impacted
on collective memory of neighbouring countries; examples are Chatrichalerm
Yukol’s series of six films about the exploits of Thailand’s sixteenth-​century
king of Ayutthaya, King Naresuan. Popular culture also has the potential to
sanitise otherwise unpleasant memories, such as the case of Thommayanti’s
Khu Kam (Destiny Couple), which has romanticised the memory of Japan’s
occupation of Thailand during the Second World War, papering over feelings
of injured sovereignty. Popular culture in the case of the United States has
centred on the social impact of GIs stationed in Thailand during the Cold
180 Conclusion
War, through the books Khao Nok Na (Rice Outside the Paddies) and the sub-
sequent TV dramatisation. We also contend that “memory by association” is
a likely phenomenon, meaning that memory of the US-​Thai alliance suffered
collateral damage, from its association with the tumultuous and at times trau-
matic events of the 1970s. More research is required to assess the extent of
this effect.
The mnemonic hegemony imposed by dominant institutions means that
education and popular culture often reflect particular mythologies and
worldviews, and ultimately the interests of dominant institutions. Thailand’s
powerful monarchy and military have focused nationalist education and
much popular culture on royal history, and especially pre-​colonial royal his-
tory. War history is not strongly present in public life, public monuments or
popular culture, except where it concerns pre-​colonial heroes. This means
public commemoration or reflection on the extensive Second World War and
Cold War cooperation between the Thai and US militaries is absent or low-​
key, even for cooperation which was very consequential for Thailand, such as
its fate in the aftermath of the Second World War.
In sum, collective memory can exert influence in highly visible ways, such
as in the case of the Thai-​Cambodia temple crisis, but also in less obvious
ways. For example, if a Thai leader uses language with resonances harking
back to the colonial era, in the background of Thai negotiations with Western
powers, such as the European Union or the United States, we can be assured
that they are playing to collective memory. As Neta Crawford suggests, the
proximate cause of tensions and disagreements can hide deeper feelings.
Collective memory is, ultimately the substance of a mental universe
beyond rational bargaining and is the basis of a set of ‘Other’ identities. In
a strategic setting where sources of conflict or threat are not well-​defined,
these identities can both define and limit consciously formulated strategy.
For Thailand, strategy is first articulated with deep acknowledgement of his-
tory. As we saw in Chapter 2, Thai awareness of Great Powers developed in
the nineteenth century and left a powerful memory of Chulalongkorn’s man-
agement of those Great Powers through balancing –​welcoming the devel-
opment of equidistant relationships with multiple Great Powers. This is still
seen as the template of gold standard for Great Power management. But
implementing that memory-​driven strategy is limited by broader factors of
collective memory.
Thailand’s economic and security elites wish Thailand to form strong
relations with multiple Asian Great Powers, as well as ASEAN. They see
India, a future regional Great Power, as a desirable partner. But it would
appear that the less positive identity and collective memory of India may be
one brake on turning those goals into action. We mention in this book that
India remains paradoxically unfamiliar, despite the common cultural heri-
tage, and it would appear the absence of strong positive memory from either
the colonial and Cold War periods has played into a diffidence on both sides.
In contrast, it would appear that the door is open for strengthening security
 Conclusion 181
relations with Japan, facilitated in part by a positive identity of Japan and
sense of long-​standing partnership. This is a clear example of a sustained
effort at engineered memory working over a sustained period. Japan has
fostered the development of monuments and historical sites at the ancient
city of Ayutthaya, telling the story of the Japanese community in Thailand
and painting vividly the stories of figures such as Yamada Namagasa.
This suggests that conscious manipulation of memory for international
relations is plausible. Thailand’s elites have begun to consider similar
‘memory rehabilitation’ projects for ASEAN and neighbouring countries.
Most is carried on under the banner of ASEAN, of which Thailand remains
deeply proud, with the phrase “leave no one behind” used to foster greater
unity. At the level of Thailand’s neighbours, Thailand’s royals, and especially
Princess Sirindhorn, have led efforts to demonstrate respect for the cultures
of Thailand’s neighbours, starting with neighbouring Laos (the princess has
also made efforts with regard to India but these have yet to make a significant
impact). Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also making efforts, fal-
teringly, as in the case of Cambodia after the burning of the Thai Embassy
in 2003, or more confidently in the case of Vietnam, by fostering a shared
memory of anti-​colonial struggle with its former adversary by focusing on the
time Ho Chi Minh spent in Nakhon Phanom and Udon Thani in the 1930s.
Thailand’s academic community has long wanted to place understanding of
Thailand’s history with its neighbours on a more factual and reasoned basis,
and this is certainly yielding results amongst younger generations who attend
elite institutions such as Thammasat or Chulalongkorn University. But there
is still far to go. Thailand’s capacity to build a new collective memory from the
history of its pan-​Asian efforts during the first prime ministership of Phibun
Songkram is particularly limited by Phibun and Pridi’s status as a revolu-
tionary figures, hence anathema to the monarchy.

Identity and memory in US-​China competition for influence

We believe this book’s deeper perspective, based on collective memory and
identity, is crucial to understanding the puzzle we offered at the beginning of
this book: why is Thailand apparently drifting away from its alliance with the
United States even as an assertive and powerful China rises on its doorstep?
To expand on how Thailand’s self-​identity, collective memory and ‘balance
of identity’ towards the United States and China help explain this puzzle,
more so than any purely rationalist approach, we conclude by looking at
the Thailand-​United States-​China triangle in the light of this book’s major
findings.
Today the US-​Thai alliance is a troubled partnership. Beneath the facade
of continued military-to-military cooperation, signs of fragility are emerging.
Thai military officers see the United States as a more militarily threatening
Great Power than China, Russia, India or Japan. Forty percent of Thai
military officers are not aware of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation,
182 Conclusion
the formation of which in 1954 provides the majority of legal basis for
the Thai-​US alliance. In our interviews it was made clear that the United
States’ overt condemnation and criticism of the Thai coup in May 2014 was
deeply disappointing and even infuriating for many Thai military personnel,
diplomats and politicians. They emphasised that they saw in this condemna-
tion a lack of understanding of Thailand, and also hypocrisy, in that other
countries which had experienced similar political instability had not suffered
the same condemnation. Occasionally this dissatisfaction has translated into
concrete policy. In 2015, for example, Thailand denied a US request for basing
of maritime patrol aircraft.3
The trouble in the US-​Thai bilateral relationship raises the question of
whether Thailand is moving closer to China –​indeed into China’s orbit –​to
the detriment of the alliance with the United States. This has been the sub-
ject of intense scrutiny for non-​Thais, and has spawned many newspaper art-
icles and one entire book.4 We would argue that China has assumed a greater
place in Thai affections, but to see this as a triumph of China in the ‘Great
Game’ of competitive statecraft would be an error. There has been both too
much contingency in the way in which Thai collective memory has developed
around the place of both Great Powers and too much agency in the way that
Thailand has pursued its foreign relations for this to be true. Moreover, the
relations between Thailand and China on the one hand and Thailand and
the United States on the other are to an extent proceeding down independent
tracks. That is to say, United States’ missteps do not necessarily benefit China,
and vice versa. Let us offer some specific propositions.
The first is that at a cerebral level, Thai strategy naturally leads Thailand
away from a conventional close alliance relationship with the United States
as China’s power rises. Thailand’s preference for equidistance between major
powers is strengthening, for both external and internal reasons. Internally,
the continued hold of royalist nationalism on Thai governance means Thai
collective memory continues to revere the foreign policy of Chulalongkorn,
and the cardinal principle of balancing major powers (karn amnat, yiap
ruea song khaem) above all. We saw that the profile of Chulalongkorn has
strengthened in contemporary Thailand and that leading figures such as
former Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai commending his example as
the answer to today’s foreign policy conundrums. To a degree there is ‘bipar-
tisanship’ on this stance, as we saw that the deposed Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, now loathed by the monarchy network and conservatives, held
this position just as strongly as others. Externally, Thais see a movement
to a more multipolar distribution of power, and further validation of what
they term the “Saranrom” system of diplomacy. Said a former government
adviser:

dynamics are going to be more and more complicated. There are many
areas that we share interests. Other areas that we might not share interests
and things could become more competitive. So the challenge is how can
 Conclusion 183
you separate. Thailand is in very good position to do that. It’s a Thai dip-
lomatic hallmark. It’s the Saranrom approach. It’s the flexible with the
wind. It’s the Middle Path approach. It’s now officially called a bridge
approach. Saranrom is named after an old palace. It’s very much a model
that many countries try to emulate but it’s not easy. We develop this pos-
ition over centuries with the Thai finesse, leadership, and now political
leaders allow us to do this.

To an extent, this is not a new dynamic in the US-​Thai alliance. When we

put to a former Thai foreign minister that, during the Cold War Thailand
gave up its balancing for a more traditional alliance posture, he disagreed.
He pointed out that Thailand had attended the Bandung Conference of the
non-​aligned movement in 1955, just a year after joining SEATO, and had
founded ASEAN in 1967, the same year Thailand had raised a 1,000 soldier
expeditionary force to fight in Vietnam.5
The balancing policy results in what can appear to be mixed signals.
It means that Thailand will, to a certain extent, seek a closer relation-
ship with China. The increase in the number of joint exercises and arms
procurements from China reflects this.6 But at the same time, Thailand will
want to also maintain, if not strengthen, its military-​to-​military cooper-
ation with the United States and encourage the United States to maintain
its presence in the Indo-​Pacific region. As one diplomat told us, “I would
not like to see China dominate Southeast Asia.” Put more pithily by a Thai
military officer:

We don’t want the Chinese to do what they want, that’s why we appre-
ciate the United States coming into the region to be another big guy on
the block. To make sure the one big guy we have is not pushing people
around.7

In this context, Thailand is also seeking closer relations with other powerful
regional actors, such as India and Japan.
The Thai preference for balancing is not, however, the complete picture.
Another dimension of the relationship is less amenable to pure strategy, and
more linked to identity and emotion, via collective memory. This is where the
respective sites of memory for the United States and China become problem-
atic for the Thai alliance with the United States; the Thai collective memory
of the United States is negatively weighted.
Thailand’s domestic politics, and especially the internal struggle for power
between the monarchy network and other political forces including the mili-
tary, plutocrats, left-​wing forces (communist and socialist movements) and lib-
eral democratic movements, have impacted collective memory and therefore
foreign policy. When taken in tandem with the royalist slant of Thai collective
memory, key consequences are the underweighting of the Cold War and the
strong presence of the colonial era. Given its relative recency, the Cold War
184 Conclusion
has a disproportionately small place in Thai collective memory, thanks in part
to the predominance of royalist nationalist framing of the past. That is to say,
the Cold War is underplayed in Thai historiography and collective memory
partly because Thai collective memory has focused on periods when kings
were the major protagonists. In contrast, the Cold War, was a period in which
the Thai monarchy was initially only a minor player. In the first decade of the
Cold War (1946–​1957) the monarchy was highly constrained. From 1957 to
1989, it was, ironically with US assistance, gradually resuscitated. Because the
Thai-​US alliance was born and achieved its greatest intensity during the Cold
War, the US contribution to Thai welfare has been relatively underweighted
from the right of Thai politics, while on the left it is stigmatised by association
with dictatorships. This leaves the alliance with a relatively small constituency,
the Thai military itself. But this support base is fragile, as the Thai military is
a key backer of monarchical ideology.
The weak memory of the Cold War devalues the alliance, for US
contributions through aid are not fully recognised, and the joint
deployments abroad in Vietnam and Korea receive little public
­commemoration. Instead, residual collective memory is largely not posi-
tive: social problems, political interference and difficult geopolitical
legacies dominate. Some memory of US benevolence in the early and mid-​
twentieth century survives, but in areas where greater commemoration
might have been envisaged, such as the contributions of the Seri Thai
resistance against Japan, there are constraints. The post–​Cold War era has
not rectified this negative cast. The relationship has drifted, more irrita-
tion has accumulated, including with respect to US military unilateralism,
perceived lack of support during the Asian Financial Crisis, and perhaps
most adversely, democracy promotion.
This is the aspect of the relationship which is now most toxic and most
hazardous. In retrospect, the potential for disharmony of political values has
always been present. The first American Consul in Bangkok reported that
King Mongkut “is enamoured of Royalty and has little respect for plain
Republicanism.” In 1900 the American minister in Bangkok reported that his
efforts to encourage the Thai elite to send their children to the United States
to study were unsuccessful because, “[t]he conservative element is afraid of
Republican America.”8 These days are now well behind, with thousands of
Thais choosing to be educated in the United States.
Nonetheless, democracy’s weakness in Thailand has deep roots. It stems
partly from the relative weakness of rule of law and especially constitution-
alism, in Thailand, which in turn reflects the enduring coexistence of modern
and traditional notions of legitimacy in governance. Some observe that
Thailand’s history, as a polity never former colonised, has provided greater
scope for continuity with its pre-​colonial past.9 It is certainly true that powerful
elites have mined Thailand’s past to promote traditional ideologies that both
resonate with the Buddhist cosmology shared by the vast majority and which
reinforce traditional social hierarchies. The Thai moral universe, especially
 Conclusion 185
but not only in elite circles, remains informed by Buddhist principles of merit
and theories of kingship.10 These theories tend to ascribe the position of those
at the top of the social order to their accumulated merit, with the monarch
at the apex reflecting vast reserves of merit. Since people at the bottom are
of low merit, according to this theory, a leader elected by the people has less
legitimacy. To have legitimacy, the leader must have the imprimatur of the
monarchy, which has greater merit.
The stability of recent hybrid incarnations of government, and the roy-
alist ideology which justifies it, is for the time being enhanced by an oligarch-
ical concentration of wealth. Thailand’s monarchy, the world’s wealthiest
at an estimated USD$41 billion in 2005, maintains investments in many
sectors of the Thai economy.11 A small group of Sino-​Thai families dom-
inate the Thai economy and maintain close links with both the military and
the monarchy.
In addition, Thailand’s current regime has embraced autocratic innov-
ation, where authoritarian governments use a menu of clever methods to
maintain power while adhering to a facade of democracy and rule of law.
The political system is in effect “designed to mimic the presence of hori-
zontal and vertical accountability, but also prevent the actual practice of
it.”12 Hence although Thailand held elections in 2019, these were under a
constitution which allowed an unelected senate comprising a high propor-
tion of former and serving military officers to participate in the selection of
the new prime minister. It produced a government which allowed the makers
of the May 2014 coup to continue in office. Meanwhile, the courts have been
used frequently to remove opponents who have become too vocal or too
influential.13
Finally, the stalemate in Thai democracy is further entrenched by the
international environment which is becoming less conducive to democracy
and more hospitable to authoritarianism. The current Thai retreat from
democracy, after 14 years which left some predicting the end of coups, has
been part of a global democracy regression.14 The increasing global influ-
ence of Russia and China has provided Thai anti-​liberal forces with ideo-
logical support and practical alternatives. After the United States took a
hard-​line following the 2014 coup, some were quick to point out that if the
United States chose to withdraw its support from the totemic Cobra Gold
multilateral exercise, there was always the potential to establish an equiva-
lent ‘Panda Gold’ with China.15 This has not occurred, it did communicate
the dangers of US pressure driving Thailand closer to China. Meanwhile,
Thai elites in the political, military and banking circles have become more
positive towards the idea of Thailand adopting the China model of “market
Leninism”16.
These negative developments combine with memories of US overreach
during the post–​Cold War period and perceptions of current US decline.
Together with the subtle undercurrents of Thailand’s Occidentalism and its
complex love-​hate psychology towards the West, they become problematic for
186 Conclusion
the US-​Thai alliance because they are the lens through which the present is
interpreted.
For the time being, the balance of identity and sites of memory favours
China. The memory of China as a protector, from ancient times in King Taksin
repelling the Burmese, and more recently, during the crisis of Vietnam’s 1978
invasion of Cambodia and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, leaves China
with a positive balance of identity. Thailand’s royalist-​nationalism works to
China’s favour here, as collective memory of China is far older, and China
does not suffer from the Occidentalist outlook imprinted from the struggle
with colonialism. The sheer familiarity of Chinese culture and Chinese people,
in the form of the high profile of Sino-​Thais, is a softening factor. Thai Cold
War memory, as we have seen, is not strong. Hence the memory of China as a
military threat is largely submerged, partially as a result of some discrediting
US Cold War strategic judgments. China’s neutrality and quietness towards
Thailand’s political upheavals generally works in its favour.
Many of these factors were in play in the furore over the US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) proposal for Southeast
Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS)
that was planned to take place at the Thai Navy’s Utapao airbase in August
and September of 2012.17 While the project was described as seeking
better knowledge of how Asian emissions were affecting atmospheric phe-
nomena and satellite observability, once publicly known, the proposal
quickly attracted conspiracy theories, including that the experiment would
place in space a weapon able to create natural disasters. It also attracted
opposition criticism, including that the project was a quid pro quo for the
United States giving Thaksin Shinawatra a passport.18 In the face of this
pressure, the government succumbed to nerves. On 26 June 2012 Surapong
Tovichakchaikul, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, noted that his Cabinet was
concerned that the study “might affect or impact the understanding of the
public and neighbouring countries.”19 He further noted that this was partly
because the “opposition had tried to oppose and create misunderstanding,
especially regarding China and the United States” (italics added). While the
national security agencies (National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign
Affair and Ministry of Defence) were reported to believe that in principle
SEAC4RS was a project that had mutual benefit, it was also thought that
“information acquired from the project could be used for military strategic
or economic purposes” and “that the project could create suspicion amongst
neighboring countries including China”20.
The United States proposed this project during the administration of
Yingluck Shinawatra, a proxy government of Thaksin Shinawatra that was
eventually toppled by the coup of May 2014. In the Yingluck government’s
mind was almost certainly the memory of the way in which the agreement
with Cambodia over joint recognition of Preah Vihear/​Phra Viharn had been
used to attack the Samak Sundaravej government, another Thaksin proxy
administration. But hanging over the proposal was also the memory of a
 Conclusion 187
difficult geopolitical legacy left in the 1970s, when US spy facilities and the
US use of Thai bases –​including Utapao –​for military operations had left
Thailand exposed after the Nixon’s Guam declaration of 1969. These factors
alone may have accounted for controversy, regardless of any Thai concerns
about repercussions on relations with China or even direct behind-​the-​scenes
pressure from China. NASA finally withdrew the proposal in 2012.
If China currently benefits from a positive balance of memory and iden-
tity, this net balance is less robust than might be imagined. Certainly China
and some conservative forces in Thailand share an aversion to democracy.
This may even extend to some in Thailand extolling the virtues of a China
model tying authoritarian government to free market capitalism. The polit-
ical violence of 2010, which saw Bangkok occupied and later burnt by Red
Shirt protestors, and highly armed paramilitaries engaging security forces,
generated great consternation among Thai elites, engendering the forma-
tion of a protection pact.21 But any shared authoritarian vision has limits.
Communism is as potentially threatening as democracy to a Buddhist mon-
archy. With the ascent of a Thai soldier-​king who personally fought Thailand’s
own communist insurgency, this relationship will need careful navigation by
Beijing.
The differing diplomatic styles of China and the United States towards
Thai elites work somewhat to China’s advantage. Benjamin Zawacki, in
examining the fractious nature of US-​Thai ties, places much of the blame
on US missteps in diplomacy over a sustained period, including through
the appointment of ambassadors with relatively little local knowledge.22 We
found some similar themes. A former Thai defence attaché to both Beijing
and Washington DC told us that in China he was:

a person rather than an office. In the United States I did the same thing
that I did in China, we liaised with the Pentagon, and MOD of China. In
the States, I met the Colonel, the Foreign Liaison Division colonel, twice,
once when I came in and once when I left. All contact was through a com-
puter. You typed out your visit request. You typed out your questions,
and you got answers back through the computer. And if you had any
recourse you talked to a Sergeant Major.
In China I talked to generals. And when we had Thai Armed Forces
Day, in Beijing we would have someone like General [X]‌come and be
the Chinese dignitary. So, we were more seen, or given the honour, a lot
more so than in the States. So, there was more opportunity to engage the
top brass. And to liaise and to interact with, so there was a sense that the
Chinese accorded us honour and access more so than in the States.23

This sentiment parallels the sense of downgrading that senior Thai diplomats
have felt when they recollect the higher status of US ambassadors formerly
assigned to Thailand. The Cold War saw Thailand’s importance to US stra-
tegic calculations elevated to a height from which it could only fall. Some of
188 Conclusion
the elites, who used to bask in close US attention, now regret and perhaps
resent seeming US indifference.
China is currently doing better in its ‘balance of identity’ account, but
this is mostly incidental, because China is benefitting from Thai collective
memory and Occidentalism are consequences of dynamics over a long period.
China, moreover, is beginning to experience its own image problems amongst
Thai people. In recent years, the volume of China’s tourism to Thailand has
increased to almost one million per month (until 2020 at least), and China
has been pushing Thailand harder in support of its BRI. Chinese tourists are
often seen as disrespectful of Thai customs and values, and the budget tours
as offering too little revenue to local tourism operators. On the BRI, Thai
negotiators became exasperated with the relentless negotiating style of their
Chinese counterparts. In the end, and after the Thai prime minister being
‘disinvited’ from the first BRI forum, Thailand resisted the offer of Chinese
loans and decided instead to finance itself the high-​speed railway connecting
Nong Khai and Bangkok.24
For the careful observer, there are other indications of quiet resolve to limit
China’s encroachments on Thai sovereignty. In 2016, the Thai Cabinet agreed
to a plan to develop Mekong navigability. Subsequently, Laos, Thailand,
Myanmar and China agreed to improve navigability in the Mekong to allow
the passage of ships greater than 500 tonnes. But a study conducted by some
Thais in the Chiang Rai province between October 2017 and May 2018
revealed strong concerns about the removal of obstacles to improve navig-
ability, especially in terms of its impact on the environment and the livelihoods
of affected locals.25 As a result, the Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinay
announced in late January 2018 that China has agreed to halt the blasting
program. By blaming environmentalists, Thailand appeared to have found a
face-​saving way of resisting Chinese pressure.
Then there is the proposed canal across the Isthmus of Kra in southern
Thailand, a project attractive to China because it would alleviate the Malacca
dilemma of relying too heavily on the sea-​routed trade passing through the
thin straits between Malaysia and Singapore. The project is often framed
as another litmus test of Thailand’s accommodation of China. In 2015, an
awkward Sino-​Thai exchange occurred when Chinese media announced an
agreement on the project, reports which were subsequently denied strongly by
the Thai government. At that time, the Thai media interpreted this as China
yohn hĭn tăam taang (floating a test balloon) to gauge levels of Thai support.26
In 2018, the Thai government appeared to accommodate China’s interest in
ordering a feasibility study.27 Here though, caution is warranted; more than 25
similar feasibility studies have been conducted without the project commen-
cing.28 Despite backing from well-​connected groups such as the Thai Canal
Association and the Thai-​Chinese Culture and Economy Association, each
staffed by former generals and high-​profile Sino-​Thais, senior Thais from
General Prayuth to the former Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai have
emphasised the perception that a canal would endanger Thailand’s territorial
 Conclusion 189
integrity by dividing the country into two.29 Some seasoned observers surmise
that Thailand’s king would need to approve this project.30
Finally, viewing Thailand’s positioning as a bipolar zero-​ sum contest
between China and the United States ignores significant other domains of
Thai foreign policy and Thai agency. When Thailand began to reset its stra-
tegic calculus in the 1970s, and arrived at ‘battlefield into marketplaces’ in the
late 1980s, it was acting with independent agency and in service of a vision
of itself as a sub-​regional leader. Although Thai elites have suppressed the
memory of the first iteration of pan-​Asianism, under pseudo-​fascist leader
Phibun Songkram, there is a long history of Thailand seeing itself as a
regional leader, first as part of an anti-​colonial ideology, and more recently
under a neoliberal economic vision promoting the connecting of markets,
resources and logistical hubs. This Suvarnabhumi vision continues to influ-
ence Thailand’s economic plans for regional connectivity, and informs its
intention to ensure that north-​south connectivity under the auspices of the
BRI is balanced by east-​west connectivity and, moreover, by foreign invest-
ment from others, such as Japan. In effect, the Suvarnabhumi site of memory
makes Thailand a competitor with China for sub-​regional economic primacy.
Although Thailand does not have China’s economic clout, it can leverage its
geographic centrality.31
Of course, it must be recognised that the dominance of Thailand’s royalist-​
nationalist collective memory, which fosters negative characterisations of
neighbouring countries, and inhibits trust, also undermines ASEAN and
pan-​Asian visions. This is likely an invisible brake on greater intra-​ASEAN
trade and investment. Initiatives to develop a greater sense of shared identity
are underway, for example, by celebrating Ho Chi Minh’s use of Thailand
as an anti-​colonial base in the 1930s, but Thailand’s effort is too small
to be significant in repositioning Thailand’s others. The corollary of the
underweighting of the Cold War in Thai collective memory is a tendency for
a ‘time-​collapse’ or ‘link-​back’ phenomenon to the colonial period for key
sources of memory. This has been seen most vividly in the Thai-​Cambodia
temple dispute, which has acted as a bridge back to the events of 1893, pro-
voking strong nationalist feeling after both the court case of 1962 and the
World Heritage registration of 2008. The emotion provoked by a scholarly
treatment of the origins of Ya Mo statue in Nakhon Ratchasima shows,
similarly, that events and characters from the nineteenth century continue to
inhabit significant niches in Thai collective memory. Nonetheless, the overall
point stands: the emergence of a Thai identity which imagines Thailand as a
central player in its region in the post–​Cold War era has further diminished
the place of the US alliance in Thai thinking.
As mentioned earlier, Thailand is seeking major partners beyond China
and the United States. Thailand aspires for stronger relationships with India
and Japan particularly. Here, again, collective memory will facilitate and
limit the speed with which these relationships can be strengthened. India is
still unfamiliar, despite the shared cultural heritage, because Thai monarchs
190 Conclusion
sought actively to distinguish Thailand from India in the colonial period, pla-
cing it in a similar category to Thailand’s neighbours: less civilised and conse-
quently colonised and less developed. This hampers relations. Thailand has a
sweeter and more confected collective memory of Japan that highlights long-​
standing ties going back to the Ayutthaya period, and downplays Japan’s inva-
sion and occupation of Thailand in the Second World War. Security relations
with Japan will be easier to strengthen than with India.
As this book was drafted, the world was in the middle of the corona virus
pandemic, an epidemic that has caused many deaths and which will likely sur-
pass the 2008 Global Financial Crisis in its devastating effect on global eco-
nomic growth. How this phenomenon will in future years manifest in Thai
collective memory towards the Great Powers is of course too early to say.
Thailand’s capacity to manage the disease outbreak has so far been positive,
with relatively few deaths compared with Europe or the United States. The eco-
nomic shutdown, however, combined with Thailand’s weak social safety net, is
producing stories of immense hardship and desperation among the country’s
urban and rural poor. It is likely that the economic hardship will be worse than
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. We can expect that this may bring political
consequences. In terms of perceptions of China, there is a strong effort from
the Chinese Embassy to portray China as a benefactor, by donating masks and
protective equipment. At the same time, the recent outbreak of a social media
spat between young people from Thailand, Taiwan and Hong Kong (‘Milk
Tea Alliance’) on the one hand, and PRC youth on the other, revealed that
many Thais are critical of CCP repression as well as their own government’s.
Perceptions of the United States as a fading power will most likely be reinforced
by the Trump administration’s inept handling of the crisis the legacy of which is
likely to endure well beyond the commencement of the Biden presidency.

Implications for other Southeast Asian states

Applying this balance of identity/​ sites of memory approach to other
Southeast Asian states, which by and large are perceived to be hedging, is
likely to be profitable. Statements from a range of Southeast Asian leaders
and actors suggest memory is also a factor in their relations with the regional
Great Powers. For example, in 2018 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad told US interlocutors that:

we have traded with China for nearly two thousand years –​(laughter) –​
exchanging forest products with Le Ko Wei (ph) and things like that. But
China never conquered us. We have relations with Europe. The Portuguese
came to Malaysia in 1509. Two years later, they came and conquered us.
So I always feel that I’m safer with China than with Europe.32

Mahathir’s comments notwithstanding, Malaysia has maintained ties with

the United States and other Western powers with an eye to balancing and
 Conclusion 191
retaining agency. But this anecdote points to the utility of further research
along these lines across other parts of Southeast Asia.
Memory and balance of identity is certainly a promising field for further
research in the case of the Philippines. It is well documented that President
Duterte’s efforts to distance the Philippines from the United States, as well
as his decision to move closer to China, have in part been driven by con-
tinuing resentment at United States’ misdeeds during its colonial rule of the
Philippines, including such events as the Bud Dajo massacre of 1906.33 Some
of the identity factors observed in Thailand may also be present in the US-​
Philippines alliance, such as sharing the Southeast Asian proscription of the
use of force, and both countries resenting the tendency of both China and
the United States to encroach on smaller country sovereignty in pursuit of
national interests.34
Assessing the degree to which memory plays a part in foreign policy for-
mulation is worthy of further study. Take, for instance, statements such as
those of Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan, who in 2015 stated that
“I see both the US and China as simultaneously selective upholders of the
status quo and revisionist, and more alike despite the obvious differences
than they may care to admit.” Another example is Philips Vermonte, a prom-
inent foreign policy scholar in Indonesia, who stated “we cannot depend on
either United States or China, because in the end they will pursue their own
great power politics.”35 Their comments are pointers to what would be obvi-
ously useful lines of investigation. Identifying what if any forms of mnemonic
hegemony restrict or focus historical memory would be useful places to start
these inquiries.

Conclusion
In 2011, US scholar Evan Feigenbaum wrote that the United States no
longer “got” Asia.36 Feigenbaum’s argument was that the United States was
unduly fixated on the rise of China at the cost of a missing an important
new aspect of Asia: the return of its interconnectedness. The rise of a
connected and integrated Asia, resembling in some ways the trade and cul-
tural relations that existed prior to the establishment of colonial empires,
is the new context for the US-​Thai alliance. In this setting, there has been
some inevitability about the United States and Thailand drawing further
apart since the end of the Cold War, notwithstanding Thai interests in
retaining some form of enduring military-​to-​military linkages with the
United States.
In his treatise Diplomacy, former Secretary of State Kissinger reflected
on US Cold War policy and how various strands of logic, historical lessons
and sentiment led it to place enormous, and in Kissinger’s view, dispro-
portionate weight on the tiny nation of Laos.37 There, a lethal and costly
secret war was waged for over a decade, but when it finished in 1975, in
Washington “conversations about the country basically ceased.”38 The
192 Conclusion
Domino Theory also flourished, leading to similar disproportionate
attention towards Southeast Asia. This led to the view that Indochina
and consequently Thailand was important, so that by 1954, “American
policymakers had based their entire strategy in Southeast Asia on Thai
support and committed the United States, for the first time, to defend
Thailand’s security.”39 It is highly doubtful whether Southeast Asia let
alone Thailand commands the same centrality in US thinking today.
Southeast Asia received one paragraph in the US 2017 National Security
Strategy, a 56-​page document. Were, as Great Power contestation intensi-
fied, Southeast Asia to return to a more prominent place in the US geo-
strategic calculus, an attempt to invigorate ties would likely be met with
wariness about US intentions and staying power.
Since the Cold War, Thailand has changed significantly. It has matured
economically and politically, and nested itself within a strong web of
relationships with its neighbours, ASEAN counterparts and Asian Great
Powers. The late 1970s and early 1980s, when communist forces both inside
and outside threatened to dismember the country are a fading memory. South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had all fallen under communist control and a
similar fate beckoned for Thailand.
Thailand is no longer a country on the brink. With a willing labour force
and the assistance of US and Japanese investment over several decades in
both human and physical infrastructure, Thailand emerged from the Cold
War as an Asian Tiger. Joining the integrated supply chains crisscrossing
Asia, its eastern seaboard became a gigantic industrial zone, making Thailand
a leading car manufacturer, the Detroit of Asia. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
and Myanmar still lag well behind this level of prosperity. The gap shows,
both in the countryside and in the cities, in things like quality of housing,
abundance of food and transport infrastructure. In other words, the setting
for the US-​Thai alliance has changed dramatically since the Cold War, just as
in many ways, the place of Thailand in the United States’ strategic calculus
has also changed.
This new context leaves Thai-​US relations in a “halfway house,” where
Thailand’s identity as a hybrid democracy irritates the relationship and Thai
collective memory of the West and the United States provides little relief.
Strategic imperatives are not sufficient to paper over the cracks, but neither
are they so absent as to cause a permanent fracturing of relations. Thailand
and the United States are like an old couple, unable to escape from each
other, bickering and sniping at each other’s perceived inadequacies yet still
possessing memories of mutual affection from years gone by.
The turbulence in the Thai-​US security relationship following the 2014
Thai coup showed how domestic politics can trigger significant strategic
change. But contingency is also a feature of Thai-Chinese relations. Thai
perceptions of China could change rapidly, just as they did in the wake
of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950. A significant inci-
dent where China used force to manage disputes could also see an abrupt
 Conclusion 193
reconfiguration of Thai strategic priorities. In this way, Thailand’s hybridity
resembles the “superposition” of quantum physics, where a subatomic par-
ticle can exhibit more than one state. Like Schrodinger’s cat, both dead and
alive until observed, Thailand tends to view all Great Powers as threats
as well as allies until there is a concrete manifestation of their strategic
intentions.

Notes
1 M. Castelloe (Director) (2020) Vamik’s Room. Psyche Films.
2 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand
(Copenhagen: NIAS, 2005), pp. 181–​182.
3 ‘Rightsizing U.S.-​Thailand Relations Amid Domestic Turmoil’, Interview with
former US military Attaché Bangkok Des Walton, CogitAsia, 14 August 2015,
accessed at www.csis.org/​podcasts/​cogitasia?page=6 on 28 April 2020.
4 As examples of articles, see Zachary Abuza, ‘America Should Be Realistic about
Its Alliance with Thailand’, War on the Rocks, 2 January 2020, accessed at    https://​
warontherocks.com/​2020/​01/​america-​should-​be-​realistic-​about-​its-​alliance-​with-​
thailand/​on 2 July 2020; Richard S. Erlich, ‘China-​Thailand Joint Military Exercise
Shows Longtime U.S. Ally Bangkok Hedging Its Bets’, The Washington Times, 9
November 2015; ‘Thailand Tilts Away from the US’, Wall Street Journal, 30 June
2015; ‘US Frozen Out of Defence Deals’, Bangkok Post, 23 May 2016; Thitinan
Pongsudhirak, ‘The Submarine Deal that Won’t Go Away’, Bangkok Post, 12
May 2017; Patrick Jory, ‘Enter the Dragon: Thailand Gets Closer to China’, The
Interpreter, 14 August 2017; Adam Ramsey, ‘Thailand Is Finally Cozying Up to
China –​Why Now?’, Ozy.com, accessed at www.ozy.com/​fast-​forward/​thailand-​
is-​finallycozying-​up-​to-​china-​why-​now/​79740. The book is Zawacki, Thailand:
Shifting Ground.
5 Interview with Tej Bunnag, Bangkok, 2016.
6 Our surveys found that price and availability were the most important factor in
sourcing arms from China. All four waves put price as the most important reason,
followed in descending order by availability, interoperability and quality.
7 Interview with senior Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
8 Benjamin A. Batson, ‘American Diplomats in Southeast Asia in the Nineteenth
Century: The Case of Siam’, Journal of the Siam Society 64, no. 2 (1976), pp. 43–​44.
9 James Wise, History, Politics and the Rule of Law (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish,
2019), p. xvi.
10 Jory, Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy.
11 T. F. Rhoden, ‘Oligarchy in Thailand?’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs,
34. no. 1 (2015), pp. 1, 3–​25.
12 Lee Morgenbesser, ‘The Menu of Autocratic Innovation’, Democratization 27,
Issue 6 (2020), pp. 1053–​1072. doi:10.1080/​13510347.2020.1746275.
13 ‘Future Forward Leader Thanathorn Removed as MP by the Constitutional
Court over Prohibited Media Link’, Thai Examiner, 20 November 2019.
14 See, for example, L. Diamond and A. Croissant, ‘Introduction: Reflections on
Democratic Backsliding in Asia’, Global Asia 15, no. 1 (March 2020), pp. 9–​13.
15 ‘Panda Gold versus Cobra Gold!’, Thai Post, 2 June 2014, p. 4.
16 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground, pp. 297–​299.
194 Conclusion
17 SEAC4RS Home Page, https://​espo.nasa.gov/​missions/​seac4rs/​content/​
SEAC4RS_​Home_​Page accessed on 8 April.
18 Conspiracy กับ นาช่า, Conspiracy with NASA, Matichon Weekly, 6 July 2012;
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‘The Politics of the Nasa controversy’, Bangkok Post, 3
July 2012.
19 Cabinet brings the NASA project for parliamentary consideration at the next
meeting คณะรัฐมนตรีนำ�เรื่องโครงการนาซ่าเข้าพิจารณาในการประชุมสภาสมัยหน้า Khana rattha
montri namrueang khrongkannasa khaophichanna naikanprachum sapha samai na
เอกสารข่าว Parliamentary News, Year 37, No. 789, July 2012, p. 73.
20 ‘Secrecy in the NASA Program’, ความลับในโครงการนาซา, Khwamlap nai khrongkan
nasa, Thai Rath, 5 July 2016.
21 The term ‘protection pact’ was coined by political scientist Dan Slater in his book
Ordering Power, to denote situations where elites opt for the strengthening of the
state’s security apparatus because of fear of civil unrest or insurgency. For an appli-
cation of Slater’s ideas in post–​Cold War Thailand, see G. Raymond ‘Competing
Logics: Between Thai Sovereignty and the China Model in 2018’, in Daljit Singh
and Malcolm Cook (eds.), Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: ISEAS, 2019).
22 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground.
23 Interview with senior retired Thai military officer, Bangkok, 2016.
24 Pongphisoot Busbarat, ‘Thailand in 2017: Stability without Certainties’, in Malcolm
Cook and Daljit Singh (eds.), Southeast Asian Affairs 2018 (Singapore: ISEAS-​
Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), p. 356; ‘Thai Belt and Road Project Bumps into
Finance and Liability Issues’, Nikkei Asian Review, 12 September 2019, accessed
at https://​asia.nikkei.com/​Spotlight/​Belt-​and-​Road/​Thai-​Belt-​and-​Road-​project-​
bumps-​into-​finance-​and-​liability-​issues on 28 April 2020.
25 รมค้านระเบดแก่งเปิดเดินเรือน้ำ�โขง, ‘Opposition to Blasting Rapids to Open Passage of
Ships in Mekong’, Post Today, 6 March 2018, p. B12.
26 จีนรุกไทยขุดคอคอดกระเพิ่มอำ�นาจมั่นคงมั่คั่ง, ‘China Invades Thailand to Build the Kra
Canal to Increase Power Security and Prosperity’, Manager Weekly, 10 October
2015, p. 8.
27 Kra Phoenix Rises Again, Bangkok Post, 13 February 2018, www.bangkokpost.
com/​opinion/​opinion/​1411502/​kra-​phoenix-​rises-​again
28 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground, p. 313.
29 Surakiart quoted in Zawacki Thailand: Shifting Ground; จิโ๋ ต้ไม่เกีย่ วคอคอดกระ, ‘Chaovalit
Rejects Involvement in Isthmus of Kra Project’, Khao Sot, 23 May 2015, p. 9.
30 Ian Storey, ‘Thailand’s Perennial Kra Canal Project: Pros, Cons and Potential
Game Changers’, Perspective no. 76, 24 September 2019.
31 For an analysis of rail diplomacy, see Wu Shang-​ Su and Alan Chong,
‘Developmental Railpolitics: The Political Economy of China’s High-​ Speed
Rail Projects in Thailand and Indonesia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 3
(December 2018), pp. 503–​526.
32 Council of Foreign Relations, ‘A Conversation with Mahathir Mohamad’,
Wednesday, 26 September 2018, accessed at www.cfr.org/​event/​conversation-​
mahathir-​mohamad on 11 April 2019.
33 See, for example, Trefor Moss, ‘Behind Duterte’s Break with the U.S., a Lifetime
of Resentment’, Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2016, accessed at www.wsj.com/​
articles/​behind-​philippine-​leaders-​break-​with-​the-​u-​s-​a-​lifetime-​of-​resentment-​
1477061118 on 6 June 2018; Tweet Aaron Connelly @ConnellyAL 17 August
2017. ‘At the East Asia Summit Last Year, Duterte Passed around Photos of
 Conclusion 195
the 1906 Bud Dajo Massacre of Moros on Jolo’; Stella A. Estremera, ‘Duterte
Reminds US of Bud Dajo Massacre, SunStar Davao’, 6 September 2016, accessed
at www.sunstar.com.ph/​davao/​local-​news/​2016/​09/​06/​duterte-​reminds-​us-​bud-​
dajo-​massacre-​495916 on 6 June 2018.
34 Linda Quayle, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on Regional Alliance Dynamics: The
Philippines and Thailand’, International Politics, https://​doi.org/​10.1057/​s41311-​
019-​00193-​9, 5 September 2019.
35 ‘Indonesia Warned to Navigate Relations with US, China Carefully’, Jakarta
Globe, 29 January 2018, accessed at https://​jakartaglobe.id/​context/​indonesia-​
warned-​navigate-​relations-​us-​china-​carefully on 16 April 2019.
36 Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘Why America No Longer Gets Asia’, The Washington
Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011), pp. 25–​43. doi:10.1080/​0163660X.2011.562078.
37 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1994), pp. 626–​641.
38 Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War, p. 243. As former diplomat Gunter
Dean later recounted, “of all the places where interest [in Washington] rose and
fell, I think Laos was the [sharpest change]’, p. 244.
39 Fineman, Special Relationship, p. 128.
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Glossary

ACD Asian Cooperation Dialogue

ACMECS Ayeyawady –​Chao Phraya –​Mekong Economic Cooperation
Strategy
ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation
BPP Border Patrol Police
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CLMVT Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand
CPT Communist Party of Thailand
ICJ International Court of Justice
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
INA Indian National Army
JUSMAG Joint United States Military Assistance Group
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PARU Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit
PAVN People’s Army of Vietnam
PLA People’s Liberation Army (China)
PRC People’s Republic of China
SCP Siamese Communist Party
SEA South East Asia
SEAC4RS South East Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling
Regional Study
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation
Annexure: Selected survey results

Table A.1 Comparative threat results for Great Powers (1=not at all significant,
10=very significant)

United States China India Japan Russia

N Valid 1783 1783 1779 1777 1780

Missing 31 31 35 37 34
Mean 7.05 6.72 4.92 4.99 5.17
Median 8.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 5.00

Question Waves 1 and 2 (Wave 1, n=667; Wave 2, n=115): Thinking about

the Great Powers, how significant or not significant is the level of threat
from the following countries?
เ ม ื ่ อ ค ิ ด ถ ึ ง ป ร ะ เ ท ศ ม ห า อ า น า จ ท ่ า น ค ิ ด ว ่ า ภ ั ย ค ุ ก ค า ม ท ี ่ ม า จ า ก ป ร ะ เ ท ศ ด ั ง ต ่ อ ไ ป น ี ้ จ ะ ม ี ค ว า ม ส ั า ค ั ญต่อ
ไทยมากน้อยเพียงใด?
214 Annexure
Question Waves 3 and 4 (Wave 3, n=494; Wave 4, n=507): Thinking about
the Great Powers, how significant or not significant is the level of military
threat from the following countries?
เมื่อคิดถึงประเทศมหาอำ�นาจ ท่านคิดว่าภัยคุกคามทางด้านการทหารที่มาจากประเทศดังต่อไปนี้จะมีความ
สำ�คัญต่อไทยมากน้อยเพียงใด?

Figure A.1 Comparative threat results for Great Powers.

Table A.2 Survey results for US threat perceptions

Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative

percent percent

Valid 1 –​not at all significant 62 3.4 3.5 3.5

2 51 2.8 2.9 6.3
3 91 5.0 5.1 11.4
4 66 3.6 3.7 15.1
5 176 9.7 9.9 25.0
6 185 10.2 10.4 35.4
7 196 10.8 11.0 46.4
8 375 20.7 21.0 67.4
9 295 16.3 16.5 84.0
10 –​very significant 286 15.8 16.0 100.0
Total 1783 98.3 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 30 1.7
Total 31 1.7
Total 1814 100.0
 Annexure 215
Questions as for Table A.2 with United States specified.

Figure A.2 Survey results for US threat perceptions.

Table A.3 Survey results for different types of threat (1 = last significant, 2 = most
significant)

Neighbouring Great Powers Non-​state threats

countries: (Malaysia, (United States, (Climate change/​
Myanmar, Laos, China, India, refugees/​crime)
Cambodia) Japan, Russia)

N Valid 1784 1788 1787

Missing 30 26 27
Mean 6.24 7.28 7.85
Median 6.00 8.00 8.00
216 Annexure
Question: Thinking about the current defence environment in Thailand,
how significant or not significant are the external threats from the
following?
เมื่อคิดถึงสภาพแวดล้อมด้านความมั่นคงของไทยในปัจจุบัน ภัยคุกคามภายนอกดังต่อไปนี้มีความสำ�คัญต่อ
ไทยมากน้อยเพียงใด ?

Figure A.3 Survey results for different types of threat.

Table A.4 Survey results for dependence on the United States for protection against
external threats: mean and media scores

N Valid 944
Missing 870
Mean 6.96
Median 7.00
 Annexure 217
Question: To what extent does Thailand still depend on the United States
for protection against external military threats?
ประเทศไทยยังคงต้องพึ่งพาสหรัฐอเมริกามากน้อยเพียงใด เพื่อป้องกันภัยคุกคามทางทหารจากภายนอก
ประเทศ
Table A.5 Survey results for dependence on the United States for protection against
external threats: frequencies

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid 1 –​doesn’t rely at all 18 1.0 1.9 1.9

2 13 .7 1.4 3.3
3 20 1.1 2.1 5.4
4 21 1.2 2.2 7.6
5 81 4.5 8.6 16.2
6 166 9.2 17.6 33.8
7 224 12.3 23.7 57.5
8 242 13.3 25.6 83.2
9 117 6.4 12.4 95.6
10 –​relies a great deal 42 2.3 4.4 100.0
Total 944 52.0 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 80 4.4
System 789 43.5
Total 870 48.0
Total 1814 100.0

Questions as for Table A.4.

Figure A.4 Survey results for dependence on the United States for protection against
external threats: frequencies.
218 Annexure
Table A.6 Knowledge of SEATO

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid Yes 993 54.7 60.7 60.7

No 642 35.4 39.3 100.0
Total 1635 90.1 100.0
Missing Invalid 5 .3
Missing 174 9.6
Total 179 9.9
Total 1814 100.0

Question: Do you know about the former SEATO once headquartered

in Bangkok?
ท่านรู้จักองค์การสนธิสัญญาป้องกันภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ (SEATO) ในอดีตซึ่งเคยมีที่ตั้งอยู่
ในกรุงเทพฯ หรือไม่?

Figure A.5 Knowledge of SEATO.

Table A.7 Survey results for analogies for US-​Thai relationship: mean and media scores

Friends Parent and Siblings Patron and

child client

N Valid 993 986 986 994

Missing 821 828 828 820
Mean 5.65 4.03 4.75 6.51
Median 6.00 4.00 5.00 7.00
 Annexure 219
Question: The US-​Thai relationship resembles the relationship between:
ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสหรัฐอเมริกากับไทย เสมือนความสัมพันธ์กันระหว่าง:

Table A.8 Survey results for ‘friend’ analogy for US-​Thai relationship: frequencies

The US-​Thai relationship resembles the relationship between: friends (เพื่อนต่อเพื่อน)

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid 1 –​don’t agree at all 87 4.8 8.8 8.8

2 42 2.3 4.2 13.0
3 62 3.4 6.2 19.2
4 77 4.2 7.8 27.0
5 189 10.4 19.0 46.0
6 164 9.0 16.5 62.5
7 130 7.2 13.1 75.6
8 130 7.2 13.1 88.7
9 53 2.9 5.3 94.1
10 –​strongly agree 59 3.3 5.9 100.0
Total 993 54.7 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 31 1.7
System 789 43.5
Total 821 45.3
Total 1814 100.0

Table A.9 Survey results for ‘patron and client’ analogy for US-​
Thai relation-
ship: frequencies

The US-​Thai relationship resembles the relationship between: patron and client
(ผู้อุปถัมภ์กับผู้รับการอุปถัมภ์)

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid 1 –​don’t agree at all 83 4.6 8.4 8.4

2 22 1.2 2.2 10.6
3 37 2.0 3.7 14.3
4 31 1.7 3.1 17.4
5 110 6.1 11.1 28.5
6 135 7.4 13.6 42.1
7 182 10.0 18.3 60.4
8 174 9.6 17.5 77.9
9 119 6.6 12.0 89.8
10 –​strongly agree 101 5.6 10.2 100.0
Total 994 54.8 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 30 1.7
System 789 43.5
Total 820 45.2
Total 1814 100.0
220 Annexure

Figure A.6 Survey results for ‘friend’ analogy for US-​Thai relationship: frequencies.

Figure A.7 Survey results for ‘patron and client’ analogy for US-​
Thai relation-
ship: frequencies.

Table A.10 Survey results for external military threat perceptions: mean and
median scores

N Valid 1791
Missing 23
Mean 6.81
Median 7.00
 Annexure 221
Question: Overall, do you feel very secure or very insecure from external
military threats?
โดยภาพรวมแล้ว ท่านมีความรู้สึกปลอดภัยจากภัยคุกคามด้านการทหารจากนอกประเทศ?

Table A.11 Survey results for external military threat perceptions: frequencies

Overall, do you feel very secure or very insecure from external military threats?

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid 1 –​very insecure 32 1.8 1.8 1.8

2 23 1.3 1.3 3.1
3 96 5.3 5.4 8.4
4 99 5.5 5.5 14.0
5 200 11.0 11.2 25.1
6 207 11.4 11.6 36.7
7 327 18.0 18.3 54.9
8 462 25.5 25.8 80.7
9 243 13.4 13.6 94.3
10 –​very secure 102 5.6 5.7 100.0
Total 1791 98.7 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 22 1.2
Total 23 1.3
Total 1814 100.0

Figure A.8 Survey results for external military threat perceptions: frequencies.

222 Annexure
Table A.12 Survey results for impact of Great Powers on domestic politics: mean and
median scores

N Valid 1679
Missing 135
Mean 7.74
Median 8.00

Question: How significantly is domestic Thai politics influenced by

relationships with Great Powers?
อิทธิพลของประเทศมหาอำ�นาจมีความสำ�คัญหรือผลกระทบต่อการเมืองภายในของไทยมากน้อยเพียงใด?

Table A.13 Survey results for impact of Great Powers on domestic politics: frequencies

How significantly is domestic Thai politics influenced by relationships with Great

Powers?

Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative

percent percent

Valid 1 –​not at all significant 11 .6 .7 .7

2 6 .3 .4 1.0
3 16 .9 1.0 2.0
4 30 1.7 1.8 3.8
5 63 3.5 3.8 7.5
6 151 8.3 9.0 16.5
7 328 18.1 19.5 36.0
8 555 30.6 33.1 69.1
9 349 19.2 20.8 89.9
10 –​very significant 170 9.4 10.1 100.0
Total 1679 92.6 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 134 7.4
Total 135 7.4
Total 1814 100.0
 Annexure 223

Figure A.9 Survey results for impact of Great Powers on domestic politics: frequencies.

Table A.14 Influence of United States in various time periods: mean and median
scores (1=least influence, 10=most influence)

The The early The mid-​ The The The

nineteenth twentieth twentieth Cold post–​Cold Global
century century century War War years Financial
(1800–​ (1900–​ (1919–​ (1947–​ to 2008 Crisis
1899) 1918) 1945) 1991) (1992–​ until
2008) today
(2009–​
2015)

N Valid 1698 1715 1732 1745 1766 1767

Missing 116 99 82 69 48 47
Mean 4.57 5.66 7.13 8.19 8.25 8.11
Median 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
224 Annexure
Question: In general, how significant has US influence been on Thailand?
ท่านคิดว่าอิทธิพลของสหรัฐอเมริกาทีม่ ตี อ่ ไทยในช่วงเวลาต่อไปนีต้ ามข้อ a-​f
มีความสำ�คัญต่อไทยมากน้อยเพียงใด?

Figure A.10 Comparison of perceived influence over various time periods.

Table A.15 Extent to which influence of United States was accepted in various time
periods: mean and median scores (1=least influence, 10=most influence)

The The early The mid-​ The The The

nineteenth twentieth twentieth Cold War post–​Cold Global
century century century (1947–​ War years Financial
(1800–​ (1900–​ (1919–​ 1991) to 2008 Crisis
1899) 1918) 1945) (1992–​ until
2008) today
(2009–​
2015)

N Valid 1686 1695 1712 1729 1704 1734

Missing 128 119 102 85 110 80
Mean 8.96 4.93 5.54 6.94 7.84 7.75
Median 5.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 8.00
 Annexure 225
Question: To what extent was US influence accepted during:
ในช่วงเวลาต่อไปนี้ตามข้อ a-​f ไทยยอมให้สหรัฐอเมริกาเข้ามามีบดบาทและอิทธิพลมากน้อยเพียงใด?

Table A.16 Influence of China in various time periods: mean and median scores
(1=least influence, 10=most influence)

The The early The mid-​ The The The

nineteenth twentieth twentieth Cold post–​Cold Global
century century century War War years Financial
(1800–​ (1900–​ (1919–​ (1947–​ to 2008 Crisis
1899) 1918) 1945) 1991) (1992–​ until
2008) today
(2009–​
2015)

N Valid 1778 1779 1776 1774 1778 1785

Missing 36 35 38 40 36 29
Mean 9.87 9.58 9.37 9.22 8.76 9.22
Median 7.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00

Question: In general, how significant has Chinese influence been on

Thailand?
ท่านคิดว่าอิทธิพลของจีนทีม่ ตี อ่ ไทยในช่วงเวลาต่อไปนีต้ ามข้อ a-​f มีความสำ�คัญต่อไทยมากน้อยเพียงใด?

Table A.17 Comparative United States influence into the future: mean and median
results (1=least influence, 10=most influence)

Now In five years’ time In ten years’ time

N Valid 1743 1760 1760

Missing 71 54 54
Mean 6.86 6.89 6.81
Median 7.00 7.00 7.00
 226 Annexure
Question: Compared to other Great Powers, does/​will the United States
have more military influence over Thailand?
เมื่อเปรียบเทียบกับอิทธิพลของชาติมหาอำ�นาจอื่นแล้ว ท่านคาดว่าสหรัฐอเมริกามี (หรือจะมี)
อิทธิพลต่อไทยในช่วงเวลาต่อไปนี้ มากขึ้นหรือน้อยลงเพียงใด?

Table A.18 Comparative influence of China into the future: mean and median results
(1=least influence, 10=most influence)

Now In five years’ time In ten years’ time

N Valid 1746 1759 1759

Missing 68 55 55
Mean 7.29 7.83 8.19
Median 7.00 8.00 8.00

Question: Compared to other Great Powers, does/​will China have more

influence over Thailand?
เมื่อเปรียบเทียบกับอิทธิพลของชาติมหาอำ�นาจอื่นแล้ว ท่านคาดว่าจีนมี (หรือจะมี)
อิทธิพลต่อไทยในช่วงเวลาต่อไปนี้ มากขึ้นหรือน้อยลงเพียงใด?

60 53.8

50

40
Percent

30 23.6

20 15.9
12.5 11.3
9.2 8.2 7.5
10 4.8 4.2 3.3
2.7 2.9 2.1 1.9
0
lia

in

sia

nd

AN

re

es
da

ia

ne
an
in

re
c

pa

ys
ita

po

at
an
ra

na

ala
ne

SE
Ch

Ko

pi
rm

Ja

ala

St
st

Br

ga
Fr
Ca

do

ilip
rA
Ze
Au

Ge

d
M

Sin
In

ite
he

Ph
w
Ne

Un
Ot

Country studied In

Figure A.11 Survey results for study overseas: percentages.

 Annexure 227
Table A.19 Chinese ethnicity

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid Yes 358 19.7 36.3 36.3

No 629 34.7 63.7 100.0
Total 987 54.4 100.0
Missing Invalid 3 .2
Missing 35 1.9
System 789 43.5
Total 827 45.6
Total 1814 100.0

Question: Do you have any Chinese ethnic background?

ท่านมีเชื้อสายจีนหรือไม่

Figure A.12 Chinese ethnicity.

228 Annexure

Figure A.13 Chinese ethnicity and views on the South China Sea dispute.

Question: Thailand’s policy towards the South China Sea dispute should
be to: support China’s claims
นโยบายที่ดีที่สุดของไทยต่อข้อพิพาทในทะเลจีนใต้คือสนับสนุนข้ออ้างของจีน

Table A.20 Degree of welcomeness to China in military and security matters in

various time periods –​mean and median scores (1=not welcome at all,
10=very welcome)

The The early The mid-​ The The The Global

nineteenth twentieth twentieth Cold post–​Cold Financial
century century century War War years Crisis
(1800–​ (1900–​ (1919–​ (1947–​ to 2008 until today
1899) 1918) 1945) 1991) (1992–​ (2009–​
2008) 2015)

N Valid 1665 1669 1678 1685 1706 1723

Missing 149 145 136 129 108 91
Mean 5.54 5.55 5.64 6.19 6.71 7.51
Median 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 8.00
 Annexure 229
Question: In regard to military and security matters, to what extent was
Chinese influence welcomed during …
ในช่วงเวลาต่อไปนี้ตามข้อ a-​f ในด้านการทหารและความมั่นคงไทยยอมให้จีนเข้ามามีบดบาทและอิท
ธิพลมากน้อยเพียงใด?

Table A.21 Importance of ASEAN to regional prosperity: mean and median scores

(1=not important at all, 10=very important)

N Valid 1761
Missing 53
Mean 8.24
Median 8.00

Question: How important is ASEAN to: regional prosperity?

อาเซียนมีความสำ�คัญต่อไทยในด้านต่าง ๆ ต่อไปนี้ มากน้อยเพียงใดต่อความเจริญของภูมิภาค

Table A.22 Importance of ASEAN to regional prosperity: frequencies (1=not

important at all, 10=very important)

How important is ASEAN to: regional prosperity?

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid 1 –​not at all important 7 .4 .4 .4

2 4 .2 .2 .6
3 5 .3 .3 .9
4 11 .6 .6 1.5
5 63 3.5 3.6 5.1
6 118 6.5 6.7 11.8
7 276 15.2 15.7 27.5
8 440 24.3 25.0 52.5
9 407 22.4 23.1 75.6
10 –​very important 430 23.7 24.4 100.0
Total 1761 97.1 100.0
Missing Invalid 1 .1
Missing 52 2.9
Total 53 2.9
Total 1814 100.0
230 Annexure

Figure A.14 Importance of ASEAN to regional prosperity.

Table A.23 Importance of ASEAN to Thailand’s security and stability: mean and

median results (1=not important at all, 10=very important)

How important is ASEAN to: Thailand’s security and stability?

N Valid 1768
Missing 46
Mean 7.94
Median 8.00
 Annexure 231
Question: How important is ASEAN to: Thailand’s security and stability?
อาเซียนมีความสำ�คัญต่อไทยในด้านต่าง ๆ ต่อไปนี้ มากน้อยเพียงใดต่อความมั่นคงและเสถียรภาพของรัฐ
ไทย

Table A.24 Importance of ASEAN to Thailand’s security and stability: frequencies

(1=not important at all, 10=very important)

How important is ASEAN to: Thailand’s security and stability?

Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative

percent

Valid 1 –​not at all important 12 .7 .7 .7

2 12 .7 .7 1.4
3 11 .6 .6 2.0
4 20 1.1 1.1 3.1
5 101 5.6 5.7 8.8
6 149 8.2 8.4 17.3
7 272 15.0 15.4 32.6
8 479 26.4 27.1 59.7
9 372 20.5 21.0 80.8
10 –​very important 340 18.7 19.2 100.0
Total 1768 97.5 100.0
Missing Invalid 2 .1
Missing 44 2.4
Total 46 2.5
Total 1814 100.0

Figure A.15 Importance of ASEAN to Thailand’s security and stability.

232 Annexure
Table A.25 Thailand’s view of other Southeast Asian countries: mean and median
scores (1=least favourable, 10=most favourable)

Myanmar Malaysia Vietnam Laos Singapore Philippines Indonesia

N Valid 1751 1762 1762 1760 1761 1763 1765

Missing 63 52 52 54 53 51 49
Mean 6.17 6.32 6.46 7.23 7.43 7.12 7.05
Median 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 7.00

Question: How positively or negatively does Thailand view the following

countries?
ไทยมีความเห็นในเชิงบวกหรือเชิงลบต่อประเทศต่อไปนี้เท่าใด?
 Annexure 233

Chakri Dynasty (Rama I–X) Monarchs and Prime Ministers of Thailand

Chakri King Monarch’s Name Prime Minister (term of office)

(Reigning years)
Rama I (1782–1809) Phutthayotfa
Chulalok
Rama II (1809–1824) Phuttaloetla
Naphalai
Rama III (1824–1851) Nangklao
Rama IV (1851–1868) Mongkut
Rama V (1868–1910) Chulalongkorn
Rama VI (1910–1925) Vajiravudh
Rama VII Prajadhipok Manopakorn Nititada (28 June
(1925–1935) 1932–20 June 1933)
Rama VIII Ananda Mahidol General Phot Phahonyothin (21 June
(1935–1946) 1933–16 December 1938
Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram
(16 December 1938–1 August 1944)
Khuang Aphaiwong (1 August
1944–31 August 1945)
Thawi Bunyaket (31 August 1945–17
September 1945)
Seni Pramoj (17 September 1945–31
January 1946)
Khuang Aphaiwong (31 January
1946–24 March 1946)
Rama IX (1946–2016) Bhumibol Pridi Panomyong (24 March 1946–23
Adulyadej august 1946)
Rear Admiral Thawan
Thamrongnawasawat (23 August
1946–8 November 1947)
Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan
(8 November 1947 – 10
November 1947)
Khuang Aphaiwong (10 November
1947–8 April 1948)
Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram
(8 April 1948–16 September 1957)
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (16
September 1957–21 September 1957)
Pote Sarasin (21 September 1957–1
January 1958)
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
(1 January 1958–20 October 1958)
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (20
October 1958–8 December 1963)
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
(9 December 1963–14 October 1973)
Sanya Dharmasakti (14 October
1973–15 February 1975)
Seni Pramoj (15 February 1975–14
March 1975)
234 Annexure

Kukrit Pramoj (14 March 1975–20

April 1976)
Seni Pramoj (20 April 1976–6
October 1976)
Admiral Sangad Chaloryu
(6 October–8 October 1976)
Justice Thanin Kraivichien (8 October
1976–19 October 1977)
Admiral Sangad Chaloryu (20 October
1977–10 November 1977)
General Kriangsak Chamanan
(11 November 1977–3 March 1980)
General Prem Tinsulanonda (3 March
1980–4 August 1988)
General Chatichai Choonhavan
(4 August 1988–23 February 1991)
General Sunthorn Kongsonmpong (24
February 1991–2 March 1991)
Anand Panyarachun (2 March 1991–7
April 1992)
General Suchinga Kraprayoon (7 April
1992–24 May 1992)
Meechai Ruchuphan (24 May 1992–10
June 1992)
Anand Panyarachun (10 June 1992–23
September 1992)
Chuan Leekpai (23 September 1992–13
July 1995)
Banharn Silpa–archa (13 July 1995–25
November 1996)
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (25
November 1996–9 November 1997)
Chuan Leekpai (9 November 1997–9
February 2001)
Thaksin Shinawatra (9 February
2001–19 September 2006)
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (19
September 2006–1 October 2006)
General Surayud Chulanont (1
October 2006–29 January 2008)
Samak Sundaravej (29 January 2008–8
September 2008)
Somchai Wongsawat (8 September
2008–2 December 2008)
Chaovarat Chanweerakul (2 December
2008–17 December 2008)
Abhisit Vejjajiva (17 December 2008–5
August 2011)
Yingluck Shinawatra (5 August 2011–7
May 2014)
Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan
(7 May 2014–22 May 2014)
General Prayuth Chan–o–cha
(22 May 2014 – present)
Rama X Maha
(2016–present) Vajiralongkorn
Index

1973 revolution 9, 13, 15, 83–​84, 148 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): 119, 122,
1997 financial crisis (Tom Yum Goong) 123, 171
88, 112, 116–​117, 125, 143, 147, Bhumibol, King Rama IX 14, 35, 47,
186, 190 139, 141, 143, 157, 164
BIMSTEC –​Bay of Bengal Multi-​
Abhisit Vejjajiva 154–​155, 161 Sectoral Technical Economic
ACD -​Asian Cooperation Dialogue ) Cooperation 51
135, 141–​142 Boonlert Suphadiloke 13
ACMECS –​Ayeyawaddy –​Chao Boworadej, Prince 79
Phraya –​Mekong Economic Bowornsak Uwanno 70–​71
Cooperation Strategy 142 Bowring, Sir John 43, 71, 121
alliances: definition of 5; and hedging 5; BPP -​Border Patrol Police 81, 82,
and mainland Southeast Asia 10; and 91, 155
national identity 2–​3; theory of 5–​11 British/​Britain; Embassy 41–​42; Treaty
Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII 74, 84, 118 69; Foreign advisers 71
Anand Panyarachun 42, 49, 52, 57, 70, Bush, George W. 161
84–​85, 113, 146, 154
Angkor Kingdom 164–​166 Cambodia 6, 18, 20, 31, 37–​40, 46, 49,
APEC –​Asia Pacific Economic 52, 83, 138, 171; Fall 87; Vietnamese
Cooperation forum 140 invasion and liberation 112–​114;
Apirat Kongsompol, General 87 Phibun’s appeal 137; Within ASEAN
ASEAN 19, 91, 93, 112, 122, 126, 141, 140, 142, 143, 147, 154–​156; Phra
143–​147, 180–​181, 183, 192; Pan-​ Viharn dispute 18, 156–​157, 186, 189;
Asianism and ASEAN 135–​148; CGDK –​Coalition Government of
ASEAN and Thailand’s neighbours Democratic Kampuchea 164, 167; and
154–​155, 160–​161, 169, 171–​172; the Vietnam War 167; burning of Thai
Bangkok declaration 1967 145 Embassy 181
Asian Financial Crisis 1997 76, CIA -​Central Intelligence Agency 77,
87–​88, 143 80, 81, 91, 116
Australia 4, 5, 7, 8, 19, 20, 30, 93, Chakrabongse, Prince 48
120, 144 Chantaburi 29, 37
Ayutthaya 10, 32, 50, 52–​54, 57, 102, Chaovalit Yongchayudh 108, 115, 156
107, 110–​112, 158, 162, 163, 165, 179, Charnvit Kasetsiri 36–​37, 50, 83,
181, 190 155, 169
Charoen Pohkphand 107, 111
Bandung Conference 118–​119, 147, 183 Chat Nawavichit 75
Banharn Silpa-​archa 102, 108–​109 Chatrichalerm Yukol 163, 179
Ban Rom Klao conflict 156–​157 China: 67–​68, 93; memory as adversary
Bell, Coral 20 117–​119; memory as homeland
236 Index
104–​110; memory as protector farang 40–​41, 69
110–​117; memory as proximate giant Feigenbaum, Evan 191
119–​122; statistics and perception Feroci, Corrado 159
103–​104; Yunnan 82, 111, 116, First World War 31, 36, 37, 51, 54, 72,
118–​119, 122; Yunnan Academy of 73, 74, 80, 165, 169
Social Sciences 123; Yunnan Thai French/​France 11–​12, 29, 34–​6, 38, 44;
Autonomous Zone 117 Ambassador Thierry Viteau 56
Chinese: Hakka 102; Lukjin 102, 106,
109; Sino-​Thai 119, 123, 126; Teochiu GDP –​Gross Domestic product
110–​112 (Thailand) 78, 124
Chuan Leekpai 44–​46, 140, 141, Gong, Gerrit 34
164 Goscha, Christopher 169, 170
Chou En Lai 13, 119–​120 Great Powers: 30–​32; memory of Britain
Chulalongkorn, Rama V 15, 17, 29–​30, 41–​44; memory of France 34–​41; idea
36–​38, 43162, 182; 1897 tour 44–​45, and experience of 31–​34; memory of
101, 178; India tour of 1872 50–​51; India 48–​52; memory of Japan 52–​55;
Practice of balancing great powers memory of Russia 46–​48
148, 180; University 171, 181; Pak
Nam distress 179 Halbwachs, Maurice. 3
CLMVT –​Cambodia Laos Myanmar Hewison, Kevin 9
Vietnam Thailand 143 Ho Chi Min 168, 169, 181, 189
Cold War 2; Impact on Thailand 12–​15; Hu Jintao 123
Alliances 20, 37, 68–​69, 155, 170; and Hull, Cordell 73
Russia 46; Memory 75, 77–​78, 81, 86, Hussein, Saddam 2
179–​180, 183, 186, 189, 191–​192; Drift
post Cold War 87–​92, 139–​140, 147–​ IMET (US) International Military
148, 178; Apprehension about China Education and Training 92
104, 114–​115, 119, 124, 136; Laos India 4, 48–​52, 101, 106, 123; Indian
proxy 156–​158, 160; And Myanmar classics and source of culture 48–​49,
164; And Vietnam 169 109; In Thai memory 18, 52, 56–​57,
Colonialism 6, 12, 14, 29, 34, 37, 44, 91; Chulalongkorn visit 50–​51; And
47, 48, 71, 76, 136, 158, 186; anti-​ British Empire 32, 33, 37, 44, 105, 138;
colonialism: 52, 57, 136, 137, 156 As ASEAN partner 49, 93, 144, 180,
CPT –​Communist Party of Thailand 181, 183, 189–​190; As a great power
113–​116, 119 18, 30, 67
Crawford, Neta 8, 68, 180
Crawfurd, Sir John 32 Jamlong Srimuang 102, 108
Crosby, Josiah 44, 79 Japan 52–​55, 67; Relations under Phibun
Songkhram 16, 38, 44, 54, 55, 73–​75,
Dai people (in Yunnan) 117–​118 79, 92, 102, 106, 137, 179, 184; In Thai
Damrong Rajanuphab, Prince 14, 37, 39, memory 11, 18, 21, 52–​55; As ASEA
105, 159, 162, 163 N partner 6, 144, 154; Trading ties to
Devawongse, Foreign Minister 43 Ayutthaya 32, 53–​54, 57, 181, 190; As
Deng Xiaoping 113–​114, 125 a great power 36, 46, 49, 101, 181; As
Dhanin Chearavanont 108 a source of investment 78, 189, 192
Diamond, Larry 90 Jiang Zemin 123
Diesing, Paul 6–​7 JUSMAG –​Joint US Military
Dien Bien Phu 4, 168 Assistance Group 82
Don Pramudwinay 125, 188
Duterte, Rodrigo 11, 191 Kantathi Suphamongkhon 161
Kasian Tejapira 106, 110
Emerald Buddha 157–​158 Kausikan, Bilahari 191
Emmers, Ralf. 144 Khao Nok Na (film) 86, 180
 Index 237
Khmer (see Cambodia) Pak Nam incident 35, 44, 179
Kissinger, Henry 84, 191 Pansak Vinyaratn 148
Korean war 78, 80, 81, 87, 92, 117, 120 Paris Peace Conference 1919 72
Kra isthmus 44, 188 PARU -​Police Aerial Reinforcement
Khu Kam (Destiny’s Couple) 54–​55 Unit 67, 81, 82, 155, 156
Khun Suk (novel) 163 Pattana Kitiarsa 41
Kien Theervit 90 Pavin Chachavalpongpun 141, 162
KMT –​Kuo Min Tang 116 Phao Siyanon 81–​82
Konoe, Prince (Japan) 55 Phibun Songkram 37, 79–​82, 102,
Kukrit Pramoj 84–​85, 113, 157 106, 117, 118, 119, 137–​138, 159,
160, 167, 169, 170, 181; Manhattan
Laos 78, 122, 125, 137, 154, 156–​160; incident 81
memory: collective 12; history and Philippines 85; Bud Dajo massacre 191
identity 11–​16; sites of memory 12 Phonpisoot Busparat 140
Lak Thai (the Thai Basis) 163 Phoumi Nosavan, General 157
Lukjin 102, 109 Pisan Manawapat (Ambassador) 69
Liska, George. 6, 67, 88 PLA –​People’s Liberation Army
Luang Prabang 157–​159 (China) 114
Luang Phor Khun 159 Praphat Charusathien 113
Luang Vichit Wathagarn/​Vadakarn Prasong,Soonsiri Foreign Minister
37–​38, 136, 137, 139, 159, 163, 167 113, 140
Prayuth Chano-cha. 142, 143, 147, 188
Machiavelli, Niccolò 15 Preah Vihear /​Phra Viharn 39, 166, 186
Mahathir Mohammad 190 Presley, Elvis 79
Manhattan rebellion 77, 79, 81 Pridi Phanomyong; And Seri Thai 16,
Manich Jumsai 158 75; Rivalry with Phibun 79, 81, 82,
Manila Treaty /​Pact 4, 2 86; Makes China his base 118; Pan
May, Ernest, R. 8 Asianism 136, 138, 139
Mayaguez incident 83–​84
Mekong River (see ACMECS) 124–​125, Qing dynasty 105, 111, 122
135 138, 157 Quale, Linda 91
methodology 16–​18
military threat 4 Ranchman, Gideon 20
Min Aung Hlaing, General 161 Rattanakosin era 45, 111, 112
Mongkut, Rama IV 14, 32, 33, 71, Red Shirt movement 15, 112, 187
163, 184 Reid, Anthony 144
Myanmar 89, 101, 154, 156, 157; In revolution: Chinese 9; 1932 14, 15, 44,
Thai memory 160–​164; As Theravada 51, 79; 1973 9, 15, 83–​84
Buddhist neighbour 78; On sanctions Rice, Condoleeza 88
89; Wars 111, 171; On Mekong River Richardson, Dennis 19
125, 142; And ASEAN 141, 143 Roberts, Chris 162
Rollins-​Jacquemins 73
Naresuan, King 17, 53, 86, 163, Roseberry, Lord 43
179 Royalist-​nationalist history 14, 46, 69,
NASA –​(US) National Aeronautical 90, 92, 102, 139, 147–​148
and Space Administration 186–​187 Russell, Danny 89
Neustadt, Richard 8 Russia 67, 178; As a great power and
Nicholas II, Tsar 178 threat 4, 18, 30, 31, 36, 67, 77, 101,
Nora, Pierre. 11–​12 103, 115, 178, 179, 185; As a site of
memory 45–​48, 56, 181
Occidentalism 15, 18, 41, 56, 69, 78, 90,
178, 185, 188 Saiphin Kaeongampraserit 160
OSS -​Office of Strategic Services 74 Sam Kok (Three Kingdoms) 109
238 Index
Sang Phattanothai 117, 119–​120 Thaksin Shinawatra. 89, 101–​102, 108,
Sanskrit 48 112, 123, 141–​142, 148, 186
Sarasin Viraphol 115, 121 Thanat Khoman. 145–​146
Sarit, Thanarat Field Marshal 4, 39, 157; Thanat-​Rusk Communique 113, 145
Rivalry with Phibun 82–​83, 119 Thanom Kittikachorn, General 83, 113
Sayre, Francis B. (US royal adviser) Thao Suranaree (Ya Mo). 159–​160,
70–​71, 73 179, 189
Schrodinger’s Cat 193 Thongchai Winichakul 16, 36, 40, 83,
SCP –​Siamese Communist Party 169 136, 154, 155, 166; tribute 10, 16, 155,
SEAC4RS –​Southeast Asia 165, 166
Composition, Could, Climate, Tsar Nicholas 46–​47
Coupling Regional Study 186
SEATO -​Southeast Asia Treaty United States; 1833 treaty 69;
Organisation 4, 82 Missionaries influence 70; Royal
Second World War 1, 6, 16, 19, 37, 38, advisers 70; Mayaguez incident 83–​84;
44, 51–​54, 57, 73, 74, 75, 78, 81, 85, memory of drift and disregard 87–​91;
102, 138, 139, 178, 179, 180, 190 memory of gratitude 69–​75; memories
Seri Thai 16, 52, 54, 74–​75, 77, 79, 81, of interference and difficult social and
92, 138, 139 political legacies 75–​87
Settasat Wattrasok 170
Sino-​Thai 102–​110, 123 Vajiravudh, Rama VI 9, 29–​30, 14, 33,
Sirikit, Queen 107 36, 42, 51, 55, 163, 167
Sirin Phattanothai 120 Vajiralonkorn, Prince 107
Sirindhorn, Pincess 39, 107, 157, 181 Vamin Volkan 178
Skinner, G.W. 104 Vatikiotis, Michael. 143
Snyder 6–​7 Vermonte, Philips 191
Somkid, Dr 109 Vientiane 158
Sonthi Limthongkul 102, 109 Vietnam: 167–​170; war 83, 85, 87, 115,
Stanton, Edwin. 78, 80, 89, 117 155, 167–​168, 170; PAVN –​People’s
Strate, Shane 37 Army of Vietnam 112
Suchit Wongthet 158 Viteau, Ambassador Thierry
Surachart Bamrungsook 115 (France), 56
Surakiart Satirathai. 35, 188 Volkan, Vamik.: 12; chosen trauma
Suhrki, Astri 168 37–​38; Waltz, Kenneth 10
Suvarnabhumi site of memory 135–​136,
139–​143 White, Hugh 6

Taksin, King. 13, 17, 86, 101, 104, Ya Mo (see Thao Suranaree)
110–​112, 158, 163 Yingluck Shinawatra 186
Tanasak Patimaprakorn, General, 161 Yunnan 86, 117, 122
Tej Bunnag 73, 113, 135, 154, 171
Teo Chiu 101 Zawacki, Benjamin 187