Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal Nos. 1763-1764 of 2022

The State of Karnataka & Anr …. Appellants

Versus

Umesh …. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chadrachud, J

1 The appeals arise from a judgment dated 29 November 2017 of a Division

Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi Bench. The High Court set

aside the judgment of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal dated 25 April 2016
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by

directing the compulsory retirement of the respondent from service following a

Sanjay Kumar
Date: 2022.03.22
13:37:50 IST
Reason:

disciplinary enquiry on charges of bribery.

1
2 The respondent was working as a Village Accountant at Revathagao in Indi

Taluka of Bijapur District in Karnataka. The charge against the respondent is that he

demanded a bribe for deleting the name of a person from Column No. 11 of the RTC

with regard to land bearing Survey No. 54, situated at Shirdona Village. A criminal

complaint was registered with the Lokayukta police against the respondent for the

commission of an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d) read with

Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. After the investigation, a

charge sheet was submitted against the respondent by the Lokayukta police in

Special Case No. 20 of 2011 in the Court of Special Judge at Bijapur. During the

course of the trial before the Special Judge at Bijapur, the prosecution examined

seven witnesses. Twenty-two exhibits were marked in evidence. The respondent

examined one witness and an exhibit was marked at his behest. By a judgment

dated 23 October 2013, the Special Judge gave the benefit of doubt to the

respondent and acquitted him of all charges.

3 A disciplinary enquiry was initiated under Section 7(2) of the Karnataka

Lokayukta Act 1984. Taking note of the complaint, and the fact that the

phenolphthalein powdered currency notes were seized from the respondent, the

Karnataka Upa Lokayukta-1 held that a prima facie case was established. By an

order dated 23 April 2012, exercising powers under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka

Lokayukta Act 1984 and Rule 14-A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification,

Control and Appeal) Rules 19571, the Upa Lokayukta-1 recommended the initiation

of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. On 7 August 2012, the

1
“1957 Rules”

2
Government of Karnataka entrusted the case to the Upa-Lokayukta for enquiry

under Rule 14 (A) of 1957 Rules. By an order dated 14 August 2012, the Upa

Lokayukta nominated the Additional Registrar of Enquiries in the Karnataka

Lokayukta as the inquiry officer for framing the charge and conducting the inquiry.

The following article of charge was framed in the course of the enquiry:

“That you, Sri Umesh Vittala Biradara (here in after referred

to as Delinguent Government Official, in short DGO), while
working as the village Accountant Revathagao Saja, Indi
Taluk, Bijapur District demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs
5000/- on 11/05/2011 from complainant Sri. Gajana S/o
Shireppa Poojari, R/o: Shiradona, Indi Taluk, Bijapur District
for getting deleted the name of one Sri. Nagappa S/o
Annappa Muttinavar from Col. No. 11 of RTC in respect of
the land bearing Sy. No. 54 measuring 4 acres 3 guntas of
Shirdona Village of Indi Taluk, that is for doing an official act,
and thereby you failed to maintain absolute integrity and
devotion to duty and committed an act which is unbecoming
of a Government Servant and thus you are guilty of
misconduct under Rule 3(1)(1) to (iii) of KCS (Conduct)
Rules 1966.

(Anand R Deshpande)
Additional Registrar (Enquiries-3)
Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore”

4 By an order dated 22 January 2015, the Lokayukta held that the charge

against the respondent was proved and recommended the penalty of compulsory

retirement from service under Rule 8(vi) of the 1957 Rules. On 20 February 2015,

the disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice to the respondent. The

respondent contended in his reply that the money seized was not received as a

bribe but was for repayment of a loan borrowed by the brother-in-law of the

complainant. The respondent also contended that since the Special Judge acquitted

3
him on the same set of facts and evidence, there was no ground for him to hold him

guilty of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings. On 25 June 2015, the

disciplinary authority held that the misconduct was proved and imposed a penalty of

compulsory retirement. Aggrieved by the penalty, the respondent moved the

Karnataka Administrative Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the respondent urged that:

(i) The prosecution before the Special Judge, Bijapur was on the same set of

facts on which he was acquitted by the judgment dated 23 October 2013;

(ii) The Upa-Lokayukta is not conferred with the power to recommend the

quantum of punishment;

(iii) The Upa-Lokayukta and disciplinary authority had ascribed undue weight to

the evidence of the investigating officer and the shadow witness which

resulted in a miscarriage of justice; and

(iv) The disciplinary authority did not consider the explanation submitted by the

respondent in a proper perspective.

5 By its order dated 5 April 2016, the Tribunal upheld the order of compulsory

retirement. The Tribunal held that:

(i) Disciplinary proceedings are not dependant on the verdict in a parallel

criminal case ( Commissioner of Police, Delhi v. Narender Singh2);

(ii) Strict rules of evidence do not apply to disciplinary proceedings and even

hearsay evidence is acceptable if it has nexus with the facts of the case.

(State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh3); and

2
AIR 2006 SC 1800

4
 (iii) The contention of the respondent that his reply to the second show cause

notice was not considered by the disciplinary authority before passing the

order dated 25 June 2015 is erroneous.

6 This led to the institution of proceedings before the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution. The Division Bench framed the principal issue in the

following terms:

“Whether the order of the Disciplinary authority in holding the

petitioner guilty of charges despite a finding by a criminal
Court acquitting him of the similar charges on the basis of
similar set of evidence was justified.”

7 The petition was allowed by the Division Bench on the ground that:

(i) The Disciplinary authority while observing that the respondent had improved

his statement while deposing that the money was from DW1, did not

properly assess the evidentiary material;

(ii) After the ‘hand wash’ of the respondent turned pink, indicating that he

touched the tainted currency, his explanation was that the money was a

loan being returned;

(iii) There is no corroborative evidence to prove the commission of the offence;

and

(iv) The exercise undertaken by the Enquiry Officer was based on the averments

made in the complaint and the deposition of the shadow witness. The

respondent did not dispute the possession of the tainted notes. The finding

3
1977 (1) SCR 750

5
 of the enquiry officer and the competent authority is not based on tangible

evidence.

8 Mr V N Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

submitted that:

(i) An acquittal in a criminal proceeding will not preclude the exercise of the

jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority in a departmental enquiry in view of

the consistent position of law enunciated in the judgments of this Court;

(ii) In interfering with the award of penalty following the disciplinary enquiry, the

Division Bench of the High Court has transgressed the limitation on the

power of judicial review;

(iii) The High Court noted that the finding of guilt recorded by the inquiry officer

was based on the complaint and the evidence of the shadow witness.

Though the respondent had not disputed the possession of the tainted

currency notes, the explanation furnished by the respondent has erroneously

been accepted; and

(iv) In the course of the criminal trial, the complainant turned hostile. Moreover,

PW2 stated that the respondent was not a competent person to pass an

order for deletion in the revenue record. On the other hand, in the course of

the disciplinary enquiry there was sufficient evidence which was brought on

the record to sustain the finding of misconduct.

9 Mr Ashwin V Kotemath, learned counsel, on the other hand, has urged that

the finding of misconduct is without an application of mind and is perverse for the

following reasons:

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 (i) In the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the respondent examined DW 1

who is the brother-in-law of the complainant. He stated that the amount of

rupees five thousand represented a loan which was received by him from the

respondent for the purchase of manure in March 2011;

(ii) The defence and explanation of the respondent on 11 May 2011, and on the

date of trap before the Inquiry Officer was that in the month of March 2011, a

hand loan of rupees five thousand was given to the brother-in-law of the

complainant and it was the repayment of the loan which was demanded and

accepted by the respondent;

(iii) The inquiry officer had no authority to recommend the quantum of

punishment;

(iv) Since 11 May 2011, the respondent has been out of service. The High Court

has correctly appreciated the nature of misconduct while directing

reinstatement without back wages; and

(v) In the alternative, the punishment of compulsory retirement may be

substituted by any other punishment such as the stopping of increments in

the interest of justice.

10 During the course of the criminal trial, among other witnesses, the prosecution

led the evidence of PW1 (the complainant), PW2 (the shadow witness), and PW4

(the Village Assistant who was working under the respondent). PW 1 and PW 4

turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. The respondent led

the evidence of DW1, the brother-in-law of the complainant. The trial judge came to

the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges levelled against

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the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Among other reasons, the Special Judge

also weighed the fact that the investigating officer assisted the complainant in the

trap which is contrary to the law laid down in State of Punjab v. Madan Mohan Lal

Verma4. The Special Judge, Bijapur by the judgment dated 23 October 2013 held

that:

“20. In this case paying the amount of Rs.5,000/- to the

accused in his private office room by the complainant is not
in dispute. The accused has stated that he has not
demanded and accepted any bribe amount from the
complainant. By seeing the photos it is clear that there was
an altercation between the accused and the complainant at
the time of trap. So considering the principles stated in the
said decisions and the evidence placed before this Court,
come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to
prove that the accused demanded and accepted the bribe
amount of Rs.5,000/- as gratification from the complainant. In
this case there is no trustworthy evidence regarding the
demand and acceptance of bribe amount by the accused as
gratification.”

11 During the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the complainant deposed as PW

1 but did not support the article of charge. However, PW2 who was the shadow

witness furnished a detailed account of the recovery of the tainted notes from the

possession of the respondent. Besides this, he furnished an account of the tape

recorded conversation with the accused. During the course of the disciplinary

enquiry, the respondent urged in his defense that the amount of rupees five

thousand recovered from him on the date of the trap represented the loan which was

advanced by him to DW1. The complainant stated in the course of his evidence that

he got lands in his village in survey No.54 admeasuring 4.03 acres and that he had

4
(2013) 14 SCC 153

8
met the respondent in connection with the deletion of the name of the holder from

column 11 of the RTC. Though the complainant did not support the case of the

department in regard to the demand of a bribe, he admitted his signatures on the

complaint (Exhibit P1), the signature on the pre-trap mahazar (Exhibit P2) and the

trap mahazar (Exhibit P3). The complainant also admitted that the police had taken

photographs of the scene (Exhibit P4). In this backdrop, the inquiry officer noticed

that the evidence of PW2 who was the shadow witness was “very important” as he

was present at the time of the demand and acceptance of the bribe by the

respondent. The investigating officer was examined as PW3 in the disciplinary

enquiry. The investigating officer corroborated the version of PW2 about the filing of

a complaint by PW1, conducting of pre-trap formalities in the presence of panchas

and the trap formalities. The relevant extract from the enquiry report is extracted

below:

“In the light of the said evidence of PW.1, the evidence of

PW.2 is very important. PW.2 is the shadow panch witness,
who is said to have been present at the time of demand and
acceptance of bribe by DGO from CW .1. He has
categorically stated in his evidence that on 11. 05.2011,
Bijapur police secured him to their office and at that time
CW.1 and 3 were there and the police introduced CW.1 to
them and told about the contents of the complaint given by
PW.1 and the complaint was against the OGO. Then CW.1
produced Rs.5000/- in the denomination of 3 notes of
Rs.1000/- and 4 notes of Rs.500/- and then police smeared
phenolphthalein powder to the said notes and they were kept
in the left side shirt pocket of CW.1. He also speaks about
further procedure of conducting pre-trap formalities by writing
mahazar as per Ex.P.2.

PW.2 further goes to say in his evidence that Lokayukta

police took them all to the village Chadachana at about 1.00
PM and he and CW.1 went to the office of OGO and OGO
was in the office. The police and others were waiting outside.
He was standing near the door, then CW.1 asked DGO

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about his work, then DGO asked CW.1 whether he has
brought the money which he had told yesterday, then CW.1
took the amount from his shirt pocket and handed over to
DGO requesting to do his work, then DGO received the bribe
amount from right hand and kept in his shirt pocket and he
observed the said transaction. Then CW.1 went and gave
pre-arranged signal to the police. Then police and CW.3
came and CW. 1 showed DGO to the police, police washed
both hands of DGO with some solution and said wash turned
into pink colour and the same was collected in bottle and
sealed. Then DGO took out the bribe amount from his shirt
pocket and note numbers were compared with the numbers
recorded and they were tallying. Then police seized the said
amount. He also says that then by providing alternate shirt,
police got removed the shirt of DGO and shirt pocket was
washed in some solution and said wash turned into pink
colour. Then police conducted mahazar as per Ex.P.5
PW. 3 is the Investigating Officer who corroborated the
version of PW.2 about filing of complaint by PW.1 and
conducting of pre-trap formalities in the presence of panchas
and also about the trap formalities. He made clear in his
evidence after conducting pre-trap procedure, he took CW.1
to 3 in their vehicle to the private office of DGO. CW1 and 2
went inside the private office of DGO and after receipt of
signal from CW.1, he and CW.3 went inside and CW.1
showed that DGO has accepted the bribe. Then he washed
both hands of DGO in sodium carbonate solution seperately
and the said wash turned into pink colour and same was
collected in bottle and sealed. He has speaks about washing
of shirt pocket of DGO with sodium carbonate solution and
other formalities.
On careful perusal of evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, it can be
held that PW.1 (CW.1) has intentionally turned hostile and
not supported the case of the disciplinary authority to held
the DGO. The evidence of DW.1 appears to be a story
created for the purpose of this case to escape from the
clutches of law. PW.1 in his evidence has admitted the
signature found on the complaint. If really DGO has not
demanded any bribe and PW.1 returned the loan amount to
DGO as stated by DW.1, there was no necessity for PW.1 to
go Lokayukta office and give and sign the complaint. He was
also present for the pre-trap and trap mahazars and put his
signatures. PW.2 has made clear in his evidence that
explanation given by DGO as per Ex. P.3 with regard to the
alleged loan is false. PW.2 and 3 have nothing against DGO
to depose falsely before this authority. Their evidence
appears to be cogent and reliable and I do not find any
reason to disbelieve their evidence. In their cross-
examination also, defense counsel failed to elicit any material
contradictions to discard their evidence. The defense of DGO
that he received loan amount from PW.1 advanced by him to
his brother-in-law cannot be accepted.”

10
12 The enquiry report concluded in this backdrop that the misconduct was

established on the basis of the evidence of PW2 and PW3. Referring to the

evidence of the complainant, the inquiry officer held that if in truth the respondent

had not demanded a bribe and PW1 was returning a loan amount to the respondent

as stated by DW 1, there was no necessity for the complainant to visit the office of

the Lokayukta and to sign a complaint. The complainant was also present for the

pre-trap and trap mahazar and appended his signatures. The enquiry report finds

that there was no reason for PW2 and PW3 to depose falsely. No material

inconsistencies were elicited during the cross examination by the respondent.

Consequently, the defense that the amount which was recovered from the

respondent represented a loan was disbelieved and the misconduct was held to be

proved.

13 The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those

which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the

criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the

offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of

innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire

into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the

service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal

prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a

disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a

preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial

are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the

11
accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the

exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction.

14 In a judgment of a three judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v.

Rattan Singh5, Justice V R Krishna Iyer set out the principles which govern a

disciplinary proceedings as follows:

“4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and

sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence
Act may not apply. All materials which are logically
probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no
allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable
nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities
and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating
such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly
speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this
proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text
books, although we have been taken through case-law and
other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a
judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
materials or considerations and observance of rules of
natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if
perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence
of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,
even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.
However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps,
in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out
should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a
valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which
counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain
passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that
extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such
rigid requirement. The simple point is, was
there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in
the sense of the technical rules governing regular court
proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of
understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this
way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a
domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any
evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the
court to look into because it amounts to an error of law
apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the
evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad,
is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled

5
(1977) 2 SCC 491

12
 against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that
the order is invalid on that ground.”
(emphasis supplied)

These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions of this Court

including State of Rajasthan v. B K Meena6; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil

Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh7; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation

Ltd.8; and CISF v Abrar Ali9.

15 In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed reliance on the

decision in the Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar10. In that case, six charges

were framed against the respondent. One of the charges was that he demanded a

commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six

charges proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed

the punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article 226

of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there was no evidence to hold that

he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses only said that the

motive/reason for not making the payment could be the expectation of a commission

amount. The respondent placed reliance on the following passages from the

decision:

“21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be

proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal
consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be
liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer
severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a
grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be

6
(1966) 6 SCC 417
7
(2004) 8 SCC 200
8
(2005) 7 SCC 764
9
(2017) 4 SCC 507
10
(2009) 12 SCC 78

13
 proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot
be proved on mere probabilities.
31. […] wherein it has been held that the punishment should
always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct.
However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is
dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of corruption
must always be dealt with keeping in mind that it has both
civil and criminal consequences.”

The observations in paragraph 21 are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These

observations were made while discussing the judgment of High Court. The ratio of

the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the test

of relevant material and compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan

Singh (supra) was reiterated:

““35. …an enquiry is to be conducted against any person

giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and
principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific,
definite and giving details of the incident which formed the
basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague
charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and
not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures
and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion.
Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be
a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving
at the finding of fact in the context of the statue defining the
misconduct.”
36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent
appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers
as there had been an agitation by the railway staff
demanding the payment of pay and allowances and they
detained the train illegally and there has been too much
hue and cry for several hours on the railway station. The
enquiry officer has taken into consideration the non-
existing material and failed to consider the relevant
material and finding of all facts recorded by him
cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.”
(emphasis supplied)

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 On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above decision that there

was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there

was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses assumed that the motive for not

paying the railway staff “could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was

applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings

was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the

principles of natural justice were complied with.

16 In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, this

Court has held:

"9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer

from exercising the power to conduct departmental
proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations.
The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely
different. They operate in different fields and have different
objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is
whether the Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would
merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the
case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the
question is whether the offences registered against him
under the PC Act are established, and if established, what
sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of
proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry
and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and
different.”

The Court also held that:

“Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the

Appellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of the view that
interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court
was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a
Criminal Court does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry
against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is
not bound by the judgment of the Criminal Court if the
evidence that is produced in the Departmental Inquiry is
different from that produced during the criminal trial. The
object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find out whether the
delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for

15
 the purpose of determining whether he should be continued
in service. The standard of proof in a Departmental Inquiry is
not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of
dismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry
Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from
the evidence available to the Criminal Court, is justified and
needed no interference by the High Court."

17 In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum

over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the

evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the

course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must

restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been

complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the

statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been

observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from

perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct.11

However, none of the above tests for attracting the interference of the High Court

were attracted in the present case. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having

exercised the power of judicial review found no reason to interfere with the award of

punishment of compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court

exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched upon a domain which falls

within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquiry was conducted in

accordance with the principles of natural justice. The findings of the inquiry officer

11
State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463;
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; R.S. Saini v State of Punjab (1999) 8 SCC 90; and CISF v
Abrar Ali (2017) 4 SCC 507.

16
and the disciplinary authority are sustainable with reference to the evidence which

was adduced during the enquiry. The acquittal of the respondent in the course of the

criminal trial did not impinge upon the authority of the disciplinary authority or the

finding of misconduct in the disciplinary proceeding.

18 For these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi Bench dated

29 November 2017 in Writ Petition Nos. 202250-251/2016 (S-KAT). The Petition

instituted by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution shall stand

dismissed. The finding of misconduct and the punishment of compulsory retirement

are restored.

19 There shall be no order as to costs.

20 Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

….…………..……………………………..J
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…….………………………….……………J
[Surya Kant]

New Delhi;
March 22, 2022

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