Localisation in action?

Operationalising support to local leadership in

Sulawesi

1
Front page photo credit: Karina

Acknowledgements
The research team was led by Puji Pujiono and supported by Anggoro Budi Prasetyo, Zela Septikasari
and Sugyarso Sanan of the Pujiono Centre. Jessica Lees of Humanitarian Advisory Group also provided
support. The team would like to extend its thanks to all the representatives who gave their time to take
part in the research, especially the members of the DRA Localisation working group, in particular Inge
Leuverink and the IDNJR coordinator, Nicole Slootweg.

Localising our research partnership

The principles of localisation were operationalised during this research. The review was
undertaken as part of an evolving partnership between the Pujiono Centre and Humanitarian
Advisory Group (HAG). The partnership was formed during a previous study on the localisation
(see ‘Charting the New Norm? Local Leadership in the First 100 Days of the Sulawesi Earthquake
Response’) commissioned by the Pujiono Centre and led by HAG. For this review, the tables were
turned, with Pujiono Centre acting as the lead agency and sub-contracting HAG. This was the
Pujiono Centre’s first direct contract with an international donor, and the first time it had sub-
contracted a partner organisation.

2
Executive Summary
The Central Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami response has been a highly visible test case of how the
global community is tracking against World Humanitarian Summit commitments to truly respect,
empower and resource national and local actors. This report seeks to highlight how the government
policy influenced response from the DRA and to some extent the SHO, and the broader humanitarian
sector from an operational perspective, drawing upon reflections from different stakeholders.
Within the DRA mechanism, most funding was channeled through national affiliates of international
organisations or national branches of international network partners who in turn work with national and
local partners. Whilst this directed funding further towards the local level, there were many layers
involved. 24% of the total DRA funding was committed to national and local partners. As such, whilst the
government policy may have increased funding to local partners, the modalities largely remain
unchanged, challenging commitments for funding to be channeled as directly as possible to local actors.
National and local actors in Central Sulawesi benefited from large volumes of locally-sourced funding
from a range of emerging sources – there are implications and considerations for international donors
bringing stringent requirements and comparatively smaller amounts of money.
There is evidence to suggest that some alternate approaches to partnerships are actively being pursued
by international actors with a view to increasing capacity for local leadership in Indonesia, particularly at
the national level. There is scope for further support to ensure that national actors can best work with
their local partners to strengthen response capacity, and for partnerships between national and local
actors to promote principle-based partnerships, including aligning with the Charter4Change. This review
found that consortia and network-based models were critical for national and local actors in their
responses, and support from international partners including DRA and SHO organisations should
continue to pursue and strengthen these mechanisms over project based subcontracting arrangements.
Whilst it may appear these models lengthen funding chains and are therefore more inefficient, these
models were considered effective in mobilising shared resources, coordinating joint assessments and
information sharing, measured decision making around best-placed responders and present
opportunities for joint capacity strengthening initiatives and consolidated funding chains.
Coordination mechanisms reflected an increased focus on supporting locally led response, though not
without challenges. There is scope to use lessons from Sulawesi to promote coordination reform
alongside localisation commitments at the national level, and further refine the role of the AHA Centre
at the regional level.
Various capacity strengthening initiatives were pursued within the DRA member network and partners
prior to and immediately after the response. Whilst gaps have been identified that align with technical
disaster management capabilities and broader organisational development priorities, there is a need for
a specific focus at the individual organisation level to tailor approaches. Local actors would benefit from
coordinated approaches to building capacity, in line with DRA Strategic priorities around shared capacity
strengthening.
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Contents
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 2

Executive Summary...............................................................................................3

Contents ...............................................................................................................4
List of abbreviations and acronyms ......................................................................................... 5

Introduction ..........................................................................................................6
Review scope and methodology .............................................................................................. 8

Findings ................................................................................................................12
Impact of the GoI regulations .................................................................................................. 12
Funding ..................................................................................................................................... 18
Partnerships ............................................................................................................................. 22
Coordination............................................................................................................................. 27
Capacity gaps and strengthening ............................................................................................. 30

Conclusion ............................................................................................................33
Annex A – TOR .......................................................................................................................... 34
Annex B – Funding analysis of DRA budget.............................................................................. 40
Annex C – SHO Funding Flows.................................................................................................. 41
Annex D – Resource List ........................................................................................................... 42

4
List of abbreviations and acronyms
AHA Centre ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNPB Badan Nasional Penaggulangan Bencana/ National Disaster Management Agency
BPBD Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah/ Local Disaster Management Agency
CARE NL Care Netherlands
CRS Catholic Relief Services
DRA Dutch Relief Alliance
ERAT Emergency Response Assessment Team
ERCB Emergency Response Capacity Building consortium
FGD Focus Group Discussion
GoI Government of Indonesia
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
ICCG Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
IDNJR Indonesia Joint Response
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LPTP Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan (Indonesian national NGO)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PKPU Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummah (Indonesian national NGO)
PMI Palang Merah Indonesia/Indonesian Red Cross
RTRR Real Time Response Review
SHO Cooperating Aid Agencies (public fundraising alliance of Netherlands based INGOs)
UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
YEU Yakkum Emergency Unit (Indonesian national NGO)

5
Introduction
On September 28th 2018 an earthquake of magnitude 7.4 struck central Sulawesi province, triggering a
tsunami that struck Palu. The earthquake and tsunami were compounded by resulting liquefaction and
landslides causing immense loss of life and damage across Central Sulawesi, killing 2,101 people,
displacing 130,000 and causing an estimated USD 910 million in material damage.1 This disaster followed
the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Lombok on August 5th. The compounding disasters resulted
in a strained response capacity across Indonesia.
In the days following the tsunami, on October 1st, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) issued the
Regulations for International NGOs aiming to provide Assistance in Central Sulawesi (Table 1).2 The
regulations address the conduct of international organisations, including limiting their ability to directly
manage implementation, personnel and access, and mandate local partnerships.3 The GoI considers
international organisations as those either “within the scope or structure of the United Nations or that
carry out the task representing the United Nations or international organisations” or Foreign Non-
governmental organisations that “functionally organized international organisations that are free of and
do not represent any government; or international organizations that are formed separately from
countries where they are established”4 These definitions do not clarify the classification of nationalised
branches of international NGOs, as whilst they are representatives of international organisations, they
are still locally registered.

Table 1: Regulations for International NGOs aiming to provide assistance in Central Sulawesi

Foreign NGOs are not allowed to go directly to the field. All activities must be conducted in
1 partnership with local partners.

Foreign citizens who are working with local NGOs are not allowed to conduct any activity on the
2 sites affected by disasters.

Foreign NGOs which have already procured/prepared relief items in Indonesia need to register
3 their assistance with the relevant ministries/agencies and receive approval to work with local
partners in distributing aid.

1
HCT Indonesia. 2018. Humanitarian Country Team Situation Report #10. 10 December 2018
2
Disaster Management Law 24/2007 Art. 7 (1c.) Provides that government may establish cooperation with an international agency in
the management of a disaster, except in the case of an emergency, in which case international agencies may be allowed to proceed to
the disaster site after reporting the number of their personnel, logistics, equipment and the targeted location. However, the BNPB
regulations stipulate specific requirements for Central Sulawesi.
3
BNBP regulations,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/bnpb_rules.pdf
4
Government Regulation 23/2008; BNBP No. 22/2010
6
 If the respective NGOs have not registered their assistance with the relevant ministries/agencies,
4 they are asked to register with BNPB before working with the affected population in the field.

Foreign NGOs wishing to provide aid can do so through the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) with the
5 guidance of the related ministries/agencies or local partners.

6 Foreign NGOs who have deployed foreign personnel are to retrieve their personnel immediately.

7 Monitoring of foreign volunteers is required.

The delivery of relief items is being coordinated temporarily by BNPB through Makassar and
8 Balikpapan.

The GoI directive was no surprise to many actors, particularly those well versed in response in Indonesia,
but it challenged many international responders to rethink and re-evaluate their approaches. It proved a
highly visible test case on how the global community is tracking against World Humanitarian Summit
(WHS) commitments to truly respect, empower and resource national and local actors. Is the response
in Central Sulawesi an example of a locally led response (notwithstanding its government-mandated
nature) from which to draw lessons for the future? If so, what can be learned? What has worked well?
What – if anything – could be applied in other response contexts?

The DRA Response

The Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA), a coalition of 16 humanitarian organisations funded through the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is committed to putting local actors at the heart of humanitarian responses,
and this principle is central to DRA’s 2017- 2021 strategic plan. Supported by a localisation working
group, the localisation efforts of the DRA are guided by international initiatives. Ambitiously, localisation
objectives to 2021 include increasing the proportion of funding going to local actors to 35%; minimising
transaction costs to make funding flows more efficient; enhancing capacity strengthening (with a target
of at least 5% of all response budgets by 2021); amplifying local voices; and promoting improved
partnerships with local actors in conflict contexts. Preliminary findings of localisation efforts in recent
DRA responses have shown some progress against objectives. The Stichting Samenwerkende
Hulporganisaties (SHO; the Foundation of Cooperating Aid Organisations) is a partnership of 11 aid
organisations,5 most of which are also members of the DRA. It is a cooperative effort of aid organizations
to inform the public and mobilise humanitarian assistance to disaster affected people. Leveraging its
cooperation with national public media as well as, when needs arise, the commercial media, SHO
launches appeals, or Giro555, that usually lasts two to three months, and distributes the funds to
organisations to deliver aid worldwide. SHO raised over EUR 15 million for the Sulawesi response.6

5
Member organisations are CARE NL, Cordaid Mensen in Nood, ICCO & Kerk in Actie, Dutch Red Cross, Oxfam, Plan International
Nederland, Save the Children, Stitchting Vluchteling, Terre des Hommes, UNICEF Nederland and World Vision.
6
https://giro555.nl/actions/nederland-helpt-sulawesi/
7
The DRA has two mechanisms, an acute crisis mechanism with an implementation period of 6 months
and a 12 month protracted crisis mechanism. The Sulawesi response used the acute mechanism, in
which localisation objectives are not specifically articulated. Localisation objectives are shared and not
necessarily to be achieved per response. As such, the DRA as a whole report against progress towards
funding and capacity building targets, rather than per program.
This study provides evidence about how the DRA response in Central Sulawesi contributed towards
shared DRA objectives on localisation as well as its alignment with global commitments. This research
builds upon the initial findings produced by HAG and the Pujiono Centre on the strengths and challenges
of the localised elements of the response. This study sharpens the analysis to the operational modalities
that challenged or supported locally-led response in the complex context of Sulawesi and provides
recommendations that could be applied elsewhere in Indonesia and considered further afield.

Review scope and methodology

Purpose
The purpose of this study commissioned by the DRA is to collect data that will enable an evidence-based
analysis and conclusions as to what extent and in what aspects the Sulawesi response has been a locally
led response, and what according to key local, national as well as international actors the major
implications and challenges of the regulation of GOI have been for effectiveness of the response.
Additional purpose is to collect good practices and learnings from the Sulawesi response that generate
content to develop/ describe models of locally led responses that can be used to increase effectiveness
of humanitarian response in the future for the use of both DRA and the wider humanitarian community.

Scope
The review sought to answer the following specific review questions (Table 2).

Table 2: Review questions

Funding flows Provide insight into funding flows and chains starting with DRA and SHO
and chains organisations and, depending on data availability, a broader picture for response
over the first 6 months: who funded which actor? Are there examples of locally led
funding? Do actors feel the regulations had implications for the financing of the
response? What are actors’ preferred financing modalities?

Implications How did international actors adapt to the GoI regulations? Are there innovative or
of GoI best practice examples of support to locally led response?
regulations Describe and compare actors’ perspectives on the implications (positive and
negative) of the GoI regulations on the overall quality of response (as far as possible

8
 using informants who can compare with previous disasters in Indonesia):
○ timeliness of the response
○ quality: technical (SPHERE or GoI guidance Perka BNPB 7/2008) and core
humanitarian standards
○ accountability to donors and beneficiaries
○ relationships with communities

Coordination Did the coordination mechanisms at the regional, national and sub-national levels
reflect or support locally led response? Were the coordination forums effective?
What are the implications of the role of the AHA centre in the region vis-a-vis
OCHA?

Partnerships What can be learned from different partnership approaches between actors? How
did international actors work with national actors, both those with ongoing
relationships and those establishing partnerships during the response? How do
partnerships align with C4C Principles of Partnership? Were there examples of
national–national or national–local partnerships? If so, what can we learn from
these? Were any burdensome requirements placed on national actors? Are there
best practice examples of equitable partnerships?

Capacity What capacity gaps and capacity-strengthening (CS) needs of local actors were
observed by local actors themselves and by international actors? How were they
addressed, and if not, why not? What CS in humanitarian aid had local actors
received previously? Based on this response, what do local actors list as their
priority for CS for the future?

Methodology
Figure 1: Methodology

9
The methodology used a largely qualitative approach. The data collection process combined stakeholder
interviews with key representatives of DRA and SHO agencies and their partners, as well as other key
humanitarian actors engaged in the response. Interviews were conducted in Palu, Jakarta and remotely
with stakeholders in the Netherlands. Four focus group discussions were held, and over 27 documents
read in desk review. A survey was devised and administered to representatives of organisations that
received funding from the DRA and SHO to provide quantitative insights to complement the qualitative
data collection.

Limitations
● The timeframe of the review was brief (16 days total) and the breadth of stakeholders and data
available meant that some data could not be analysed in depth. As such, some of the findings,
such as the analysis of funding flows, are presented at a high level rather than in detail.
● Some stakeholders, particularly those from local organisations, could not respond to specific
questions on funding received from multiple sources. This prevented detailed mapping of
funding flows across the entirety of the DRA and SHO members and their partners. Nonetheless,
the data available gives considerable insight into funding flows and trends.
● Some of the questions referred to both DRA and SHO recipients, but not all SHO agencies were
part of the data collection process. There is some overlap between agencies, but findings and
recommendations are less applicable to the broad spectrum of SHO agencies than to agencies
funded under the DRA mechanism.
● The research questions generated rich data, but also meant that data pertained to the general
response environment as well as to DRA and SHO and their partners. This challenged the team
in framing findings and recommendations relevant to the broad range of stakeholders in this
review.
● Working definitions of ‘local actor’ were inconsistent across individuals and agencies, including
between DRA members, and in some cases differed from the definition utilised for the purpose
of this review (see definitions on page 11). Specifically, the trend of ‘nationalisation’ of
international NGOs meant that organisations affiliated with international structures that had
registered considered themselves to be national actors, despite this being inconsistent with
global definitions. This hindered interpretation of some of the data, as noted in the findings
below.

10
Definitions
This review employed the following definitions:
Localisation7: Local and national humanitarian actors increasingly empowered to take a greater role
in the leadership, coordination and delivery of humanitarian preparedness and response in their
countries.
Local and national non-state actors8: organisations engaged in relief that are headquartered and
operating in their own aid recipient country and which are not affiliated to an international NGO.
National and sub-national state actors: State authorities of the affected aid recipient country
engaged in relief, whether at local or national level
Internationally affiliated organisations: Organisations that are affiliated to an international
organisation through inter-linked financing, contracting, governance and/or decision-making
systems.9
Partnership: the relationship between international humanitarian actors (especially international
NGOs) and local and national actors (especially local and national NGOs), whereby the
international actors work with, support and resource their local and/or national partners to
design and implement humanitarian preparedness and response programming.
DRA organisations: organisations that receive and channel funds from the Dutch Ministry,
coordinated through the Joint Response Lead
SHO organisations: organisations that receive and channel funds mobilised from the public via the
joint mechanism.
DRA and/or SHO partners: national organisations or networks that receive, utilise and/or further
channel funds received from the direct recipients of DRA and SHO funding.

7
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Accelerating%20Localisation%20Research%20Summary_Global.pdf
8
IFRC Localisation Worksteam: Identified categories for tracking funding flows;
http://media.ifrc.org/grand_bargain_localisation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/12/2018/06/categories_for_tracking_direct_as_possible_funding_to_local_and_national_actors_003.pdf
9
IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, Localisation Marker Working Group Definitions Paper. 24 January 2018;
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hftt_localisation_marker_definitions_paper_24_january_2018.pdf
11
Findings
Impact of the GoI regulations

Fifty per cent of international agencies felt that leadership was less effective due to the GoI
regulations. Fifty-two per cent of national and local actors felt that leadership was about as
effective as before the GoI regulations.

The GoI regulations affected international agencies, including members of the DRA and SHO, in different
ways. There were different perceptions of how the government policy restricted international support,
but broad agreement about the challenges associated with the speed with which the decision was made
and its impact on organisations’ ability to find other response modalities.
Several of the DRA and SHO member organisations operating in Indonesia are affiliates of international
networks which have national registrations, such as World Vision Indonesia, Plan Indonesia and Save the
Children Indonesia. CARE Indonesia was in the process of nationalising its registration during the
response. For these actors, the primary challenge was in mobilising international surge to the field. For
organisations that had been registered for some time in Indonesia, such as World Vision Indonesia and
Yayasan Sayangi Tunas Cilik, and thus acquired the status and privileges as ‘national NGOs’ and
therefore not being required to work through partners, there was no significant change to their
implementation modality or to their partnerships with local organisations for the DRA funding.10

“Sometimes national NGOs become local NGOs and [they] become strong
competitors for local NGOs.”11 (national actor)

International organisations that prioritise working through partners –national with international
affiliates or otherwise – reported some challenges and changes to ways of working related to the GoI
regulations. These included in identifying new partners and supporting new and existing partners to
manage larger volumes of funding than they had historically received. For example, the evolving
Oxfam/JMK partnership model eventuated in JMK requesting Oxfam’s support in leading the response
as the scale - including managing the funding - was far larger than they had previously experienced.
There has since been recognition of the need to enhance financial management within the partnership
including in speed of transferring funds - assuring rapid response - and support to partners is managing
financial risk.12

10
Interview 16
11
FGD 1
12
Interview 25
12
A representative from a UN agency spoke to the process of shared proposal development with the agency’s new
local partner. This involved using a simplified proposal format and approaching the process together rather than
through the traditional funding solicitation model. 13 This projects a more proactive role of international actors to
jointly assess the need, simplified its business process, and help local partners to submit project proposals to
qualify for the selection, and in time, to be in better position to decide what and how to respond to the
emergency. Examples such as this, when done in a way that complements and not undermines local actor
capacity, demonstrate ways in which traditional requirements and processes can be adapted to better support
locally led responses.

APPROACHES TO SURGE
At the outset of the response the regulations created some confusion in international
organisations who had activated surge protocols to deploy human resources to Indonesia. This led
to some rigorous internal dialogue and sometimes tension between head offices in the field over
how to provide assistance whilst adhering to the GoI directive.
“[The] normal procedure is that people are in-country…[there was] incredible frustration, always a
lack of information...there's a challenge doing it by distance.”14 (international actor)
International partners employed different approaches to surge to overcome the restrictions on
their staff. For example, some organisations redeployed Indonesian staff from other locations to
strengthen capacity at the field level, overcoming some of the challenges reported by many actors
in recruitment of experienced humanitarian responders. Other international actors, such as
Oxfam and Save the Children, drew upon regional surge platforms to deploy staff from elsewhere
within Asia rather than those from other regions.
One international partner referenced the use of remote support in proposal development,
undertaking what was traditionally an in-country deployed function but from outside Indonesia.15
Whilst this was not the intended modality, it was seen as an effective way to draw on support
without the need to deploy someone to Indonesia, and possibly a modality that could be
strengthened or institutionalised.
“Remote support and advisory – this is a model to work towards – most of the Asian countries will
use this sort of model to strengthen their capacity in their own country and say no to international
aid.” (international actor)16
Indonesia lacks consolidated shared platforms. DRA and SHO agencies could learn from models
piloted by the START Network’s Transforming Surge Capacity project on shared approaches to
surge at the national and local level to ensure the availability of qualified staff within existing
networks. DRA and SHO organisations should consider further institutionalising arrangements for
remote surge support to mitigate challenges in future responses.

13
FGD 4
14
Interview 26
15
Interview 26
16
Interview 27
13
Timeliness

“Why do you impose so many rules just to distribute the relief, while the
needs are real, right there, aplenty?”17 (national actor)

Figure 2: Perceptions of response timeliness compared with previous responses

Overall, the response was perceived to be faster than previous responses in Indonesia despite the GoI
regulations, with very few respondents feeling that the response was slower across assessment,
planning and design; resource mobilisation or implementation.18 Survey results showed a significant
discrepancy in perceptions on implementation; 70% of National actors felt that implementation was
somewhat or much faster than previous responses, compared with only 33% of international actors.

17
Interview 29
18
Survey data, DRA RRTR Report
14
55% of international actors felt that resource mobilisation was much or somewhat faster than previous
responses, compared with 64% of national actors. 73% of national actors felt that assessment, planning
and design were faster than previous responses, compared with only 55% of international actors. These
perceptions demonstrate a perceived improvement in timeliness, however that local actors felt things
moved faster than their international counterparts.
Investment in local partnerships and capacity over many years has led to a range of consortia or
network models that were able to rapidly mobilise assessment teams and funding. Coordination around
local and national actor joint assessments was an integral factor in timely mobilisation. A range of joint
assessments were conducted, including ‘Joint Needs Assessment’19; ‘Market Assessment in Central
Sulawesi’20; ‘Listening to Children21; Joint structural assessment of schools22; Joint assessment of
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices related to WASH23; Joint gender assessment24, and Comprehensive
Gender Assessment25.

INVESTMENT IN CONSORTIA FOR TIMELY RESPONSE

The Emergency Response Capacity Building (ERCB) Consortium was widely referenced as an
effective model in timely locally led response. The consortium of 10 Indonesian-based
organisations,26 evolved from a capacity building project supported by Catholic Relief Service
(CRS) and the Dutch INGO Cordaid in previous years. A protocol has been established through
which seed funding can be drawn down (to a maximum of EUR 50,000) from Cordaid emergency
funds to initiate a response. The protocol, established as part of the ongoing work of the
Consortium, articulates that strategic decisions around which organisation is best to lead as the
Focal Point Organisation, in which sectors and locations, are to be taken by a group of
organisational Focal Point Personnel.27 The ERCB was activated during the Sulawesi response
under the LPTP’s leadership and received an initial EUR 500,000 of response funding from Cordaid
SHO funds, followed by an additional EUR 290,000 SHO funding from Cordaid for early recovery.
The ongoing readiness of the ERCB consortium and its multi-agency structure and established
protocols were vital to the ability to activate and respond quickly.

“[the response in Central Sulawesi] was faster because of participation of

local and national humanitarian actors. In emergencies we [ERCB members]

19 October 2018 including CARE Indonesia, Caritas, CRS, Save the Children Indonesia and World Vision Indonesia
20 December 2018 inlcuding WFP, Oxfam and World Vision Indonesia
21 Including Plan Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia, Save the Children Indonesia and UNICEF
22 Including UNICEF Save the Children Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia and Plan Indonesia
23 World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam and YKMI
24 Led by CARE
25 Jointly conducted by UNFPA, UN Women, Plan International Indonesia, Oxfa and Ministry of PPPA
26 Pusaka, Aman, Mitra Aksi, Bina Swadaya, Primari, Perkhaki, LPTP, Caritas, CRS and Cordaid

27 Protocol Engagement of ERCP - Cordaid partners

15
 have joint post disaster needs assessments.”28 (local humanitarian actor,
member of ERCB)

In cases where partnerships did not previously exist, the process of finding new partners hampered the
agencies’ ability to rapidly respond.29 Even in cases where partnership processes were adapted to
expedite timeframes there were delays and some levels of strain placed on local actors to navigate
multiple concurrent requests to partner.

“Many of the tasks are time-wasting. For example, capacity assessments,

consultants’ turnover, demand for repetitious information.” (national actor) 30

Quality
Both international and national and local humanitarian actors felt that the quality of the response was
the same or better than in previous responses, as highlighted below in Figure 3. International actors felt
that responsible resource management had remained the same as in previous responses, compared
with 78% of national actors feeling it either somewhat or significantly improved. Nevertheless, several
international actors mentioned challenges in being able to triangulate information from field reports in
the early stages due to limitations on field access.31 Many actors referenced adherence to Sphere
standards, though the DRA Real Time Response Review (RTRR) highlighted some challenges in achieving
technical quality standards. Actors consistently referenced working knowledge and application of
community feedback and complaints mechanisms, but few mentioned operationalisation of Core
Humanitarian Standards (CHS).32 Application of CHS is considered to not be as progressed as Sphere,
particularly as Sphere standards have been adapted by the GoI, whilst CHS has not. As highlighted in the
RTRR there was evidence of accountability mechanisms being established at the field level, which was
confirmed in interviews undertaken for this review, but monitoring and assurance of quality of
mechanisms was variable amongst partners and programs. Communities largely used feedback
mechanisms to request further assistance rather than to comment on quality of operations.

28 Interview 8
29
Interviews 21, 22, 26, 28
30
Interview 28
31
Interviews 24, 26, 27
32
Interviews 8, 5,
16
Figure 3: Perceptions of response quality compared with previous responses

17
Funding
The restrictions placed on international organisations directly implementing and needing to work
through partners increased pressure on local and national actors to receive and program funding that
for many far exceeded their absorption capacity. This was the case both for new and established
partnerships, in which local and national actors were receiving funds from their international partners.33
Many local and not always necessarily humanitarian actors were either saturated or overwhelmed and,
in some cases, turned down the offers from international partners for funding.34 For some of the larger
national humanitarian actors, the complex and time-consuming process required to receive funds from
international sources was incommensurate with funding volumes, particularly compared to the funding
that they were able to mobilise locally.35 The review showed that consortium and network-based
models through which funding can be centralised channeled, were beneficial in supporting local partner
responses and reducing the burden associated with managing multiple funding sources.36

“For local NGOs [it] is very hard to hold some projects from several donors.
This needs attention.”37 (national actor)

The DRA response in Sulawesi went some way in meeting localisation funding targets as outlined in the
DRA Guidance Note on Localisation. As can be seen in Figure 4 below, drawn from the final IDNJR
budget, 24% of the EUR 4 million total budget was committed to local partners, situated against a whole
of DRA target to get to 25% by the end of 2019 and 35% by the end of the strategic period in 2021. This
demonstrates significant advancement from the 2015–17 period, in which an average of 15% of funding
per response was committed to local partners.38 However, funding flows and chains remain largely
unchanged, with multiple layers of funding in many cases, channeled from international donors. This is
also the case with the SHO funding chains. 25% of the SHO funding was transferred to local partners39
however the funding chains remained extensive with several instances involving four transaction layers.

33
FGD 3, interview 29
34
Interview 28
35
Interview 28
36
Interviews 8, 13, 30, FGD 4
37
FGD 3
38
DRA Localisation report
39
Annex C. SHO Funding Flows
18
 “Local NGOs become weak because [they] receive [funding from] so many donors,
but have no capacity. Large amounts of funding with limited time becomes a big
problem, and it will be repeated.”40 (national actor)

Figure 4: Percentage of funding committed to local partners

Funding requirements associated with receiving international donor funding, including through the DRA
mechanism were also highlighted as challenging for some actors, particularly national actors. The
pressure to spend within a short window was referenced by representatives from international, national
and local actors as particularly challenging, particularly as many local actors were managing huge
unprecedented levels of funding. Almost half (48%) of national and local actor respondents reported
their funding for the Sulawesi response as one-off emergency funding,41 which undermines
predictability of funding for local actors and does not align with Charter for Change commitments
around the provision of robust organisational support and capacity building.42 Within the DRA, inability
to absorb and expend within the acute window resulted in a 6-week extension granted across all DRA
partners. By comparison, funds mobilised through the SHO are considered more flexible, with phase II

40
FGD 3
41
Survey results
42
https://charter4change.org/

19
finishing in September 2020. Whilst not being guided by strategic localisation commitments, the multi-
year flexible modality did not come with the same pressures as funding via DRA.
Multiple factors influenced funding decisions, including DRA lead agencies considering the impact of
donor requirements on their partners. One international actor, when considering disbursement of
funding, chose to direct different sources of funding to different partners based on analysis of flexibility
of funding requirements and perceived partner capacity to absorb and manage funding.
Emerging sources of local funding and non-traditional humanitarian donors played a significant role in
the response, particularly for supporting local and national actor responses.43 This demonstrates a
future trend and possible shift in the role of international humanitarian financing. Many of the emerging
funding streams that supported the response, such as Zakat44, Infaq45, Sadaqah46 and Waqf47 Islamic
Financing, may not have stringent requirements for partners and are not necessarily always in alignment
with Principles and Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship.48 Whilst this enabled local partners to
respond more flexibly than with other sources of funding, there is scope for international actors to share
models of accountability for these streams and enhanced coordination with other funding mechanisms.

Profile: Locally mobilised funding

Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) is the sole official body formed by the government of
Indonesia which has the duty and function of collecting and distributing zakat, infaq, and sadaqah
at the national level.
Baznas deployed IDR 12.250 millions (USD 850,000) to the Central Sulawesi operation across
immediate relief, search and rescue, transitional housing and economic recovery. The projects
were implemented by Baznas’ own arms both national and local offices as well as sectoral
programmes, and in a few exceptional cases, implemented by NGO partners. The projection for
2019 Islamic financing collection by Baznas is around IDR 10 Trillion (USD 700 Million)49
demonstrating the importance of this type of financing in future responses in Indonesia.

Figure 5 provides a snapshot of some of the funding mobilised for the response as reported on the
OCHA Financial Tracking Service (primarily bilateral or multilateral funding commitments)50, by ASEAN

43
Interviews 8, 28
44
Zakat is a liability to be paid by all practicing Muslims who have the financial means as one of the five pillars of Islam upon specific
belongings in a specific time to purify wealth
45
Infaq is wealth spent as guided by Islam, strongly encouraged but not an obligation, for certain purposes including expiation and
donation.
46 Shadaqah is a voluntary act that involves giving or donating especially to those in need.
47 Waqf is a voluntary, permanent, irrevocable dedication of a portion of ones wealth – in cash or kind – which fruits may be utilised
for any Islamic Law -compliant purpose
48 24 Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship: https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-
of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html
49 Baznas, 2019, Laporan Program Respon dan Recovery Pasca bencana Gempa Bumi, Tsunami dan Likuifaksi Sulawesi Tengah,
forthcoming; Baznas, 2019, Zakat Outlook 2019
50 https://fts.unocha.org/
20
members51 and by Forum Zakat52. There are multiple challenges, however, with tracking funding
contributions because reporting is not mandatory. This snapshot highlights that whilst international
financing featured heavily in the response, locally and regionally mobilised funding played a significant
role.

Figure 5: High-level snapshot of reported funding for Sulawesi response

Recommendations - Funding
● International organisations seek opportunities to coordinate the response funding modalities at
the field level in order to streamline and harmonise requirements for local and national
partners, including examining how international funding supports or undermines funds
mobilised locally.
● The DRA to consider establishing global targets for multi-year flexible funding for local and
national actors in future activations, building in longer timeframes and phased funding

51 ASEAN Member States’ Response to Central Sulawesi Earthquake, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/02-

October09-ASEANResponse%20Masterfile.pdf
52 https://forumzakat.org/. Forum Zakat is a 400-organsiation strong association that aims, amogn others, to facilitate the
coordination, optimise the utilisation of zakat, builds members' capacities, standardize and accredita the Zakat Management
Organisations.;
21
 approaches. This could also be in the form of better coordination and phasing alongside SHO
funding, including around capacity development for preparedness in recovery
● International organisations to continue to support local and national partners to be able to
accept and absorb funding.
● National and local actors to advocate to international organisations and donors for more flexible
requirements around funding – maintaining accountability but reducing administrative burden
● The DRA mechanism to consider options to reduce funding layers in a response. This includes
providing clear parameters for funding to be provided ‘as directly as possible’ as outlined in the
DRA Strategy 2018-2021, through increased reporting on the full chain of funding, and joint
analysis of total funding being implemented by local actors
● Donors and GoI to explore a country-level pooled fund mechanism accessible for national and
local actors that includes regulatory frameworks to govern the access eligibility, resource
utilisation, and accountability
● International donors and national emerging financing mechanisms to seek opportunities to
coordinate around Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles

Partnerships

“This is where I feel like we’ve moved into a more equitable capacity...where
(international organization) brings in the technical lead and liaison with
donors but they are a partner rather than a lead” (international actor)53

The Sulawesi response clearly demonstrated the roles of international actors were shifting, stepping to
the side and supporting partners in mobilising and brokering funding, liaising with donors, providing
technical support and strengthening capacity rather than leading on direct implementation.

There were significant differences in partnership approaches between agencies, both in terms of
arrangements that pre-dated the response and those that were created in the immediate aftermath of
the emergency. Agencies receiving funding from DRA align with the broad categories as outlined in the
DEC Real Time Response Review; each modality was impacted differently in the response. Figure 6 on
page 24 shows the scale and relationship between different partnership approaches for DRA lead
agencies, showing that multiple approaches were taken, and the majority of partnerships were with
existing local NGO partners. It also demonstrates the scale of the trend towards ‘nationalization’ of
INGOs

53
Interview 25
22
Figure 6: Partnership arrangements for DRA Lead agencies

There were cases of DRA and SHO direct recipients working with the same partner organisations, and
broader examples of this highlighted in other response review reports. The DEC Real-Time Response
Review refers to the NGO ‘marketplace’ and points to the important cross-organisational learning that is
possible for agencies that work with the same partners. For example, the Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU)
is a partner for three DEC member agencies54, as well as two DRA and SHO member agencies55, as well
as other sources of funding. In the case of two of the DRA and SHO organisations that chose to partner
with the same organisation, discussions were had in advance to assess implementation capacity and
mitigate the risks of overburdening the partner.56 This dialogue could be broadened in future to bring
together more international actors that have the interest to jointly explore such partnership, and involve
the local partner in these discussions to reaffirm the commitment to transparency and equitable
partnership dialogue, as well as identifying possible capacity gaps that need immediate addressing.
Partnerships that had been established before the response (Existing local NGO partnership) were more
closely aligned to the Principles of Partnership57 as reaffirmed in the Charter 4 Change (C4C). For
example, Oxfam’s longstanding partnership and support to JMK was instrumental in its response,
enabling JMK to mobilise quickly despite funds not yet having been transferred for implementation, as

54
Action Against Hunger, Age International and Christian Aid
55
Plan International NL and Tearfund NL
56
Interviews 21, 26, 23
57
The Principles of Partnership (2007) are Equality, Transparency, Results-Oriented Approach, Responsibility and Complementarity

23
their partnership was founded with trust as a core value.58 However, some DRA and SHO agencies with
longstanding partnerships in Indonesia still do not reference partnership principles in agreements and
continue to operate on project-based funding models, both within the Sulawesi response and in other
programs.59 Such agreements would benefit from broader partnership dialogue and agreements that sit
across project funding contracts and instill partnership principles, including in some cases those that
align with C4C.

“Localisation is inevitable, but it has to be undertaken carefully, under the

normal circumstances and not during emergency”60 (National actor)

Consortium and network-based partnerships were incredibly effective in supporting local partners to
rapidly respond and maximise skills and capacities across a range of local and national humanitarian
actors, and leveraging support from international organisations. These networks promoted better
preparedness, information sharing, comparative advantage analysis, and resource brokering between
member agencies. For example, the Jakomkris network, which has been supported by Tearfund
Netherlands for the past five years and has 38 registered member churches and organisations, was an
instrumental network activated for the response. Six of the registered agencies responded, but through
the network of relationships other partners have been able to augment the response of those on the
ground in sectors including shelter, cash and health services.61 Tearfund Netherlands funded YEU (a
Jakomkris network member agency) through the DRA, and was one of more than 15 partners. YEU
struggled to manage the high volumes of competing requests from multiple partners, despite having
strong implementation capacity. Drawing upon global partnership guidance, Plan has standby
arrangements with national and local partners including a six-year Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) covering emergency response with YEU and a two-year MoU with the Jakarta-based Yayasan
Rebana. Such long-standing arrangements, particularly where there are capacity strengthening
components, are good practice examples of how international actors can approach partnership based
standby-arrangements for response.

“The ad hoc arrangement is burdensome to local actors, particularly when the

international actors do not do their homework”62 (National actor)

Partnerships that had not been established prior to the response were less likely to be underpinned by
principles and more likely to be more traditional project-based, sub-contracting funding agreements. For

58
Interview 25, DEC RTRR
59
Interview 27
60
Interview 31
61
Integral Alliance Newsletter, https://www.integralalliance.org/newsletter/integral-responding-sulawesi-earthquake-indonesia-
update-q/
62
Interview 28
24
example, whilst CARE had previously worked with their partner under the DRA (PKPU), they also
pursued new partnerships with organisations and adapted their partner selection criteria to expedite
the process. Due to time constraints these partnerships were largely focused on service delivery for the
emergency phase, but there is now intention to undertake a more detailed capacity mapping exercise.
The results will underpin longer-term support, with more of a strategic focus on capacity strengthening
and partnership through the recovery phase.
Some national and local actors were overwhelmed by the multiple requests for new partners. Local
actors reacted to the swell of requests in several different ways, including 1) broadening their portfolios
to accommodate the surging international partnerships 2) leveraging their local network to cope with
the partnership offers and 3) opting to receive only NFIs commodities to avoid burdensome monitoring
and reporting requirements, and 4) declining new international partnerships, in some cases opting to
receive locally-sourced funds (however not partnerships) that came with less stringent requirements.
There are examples outside of Indonesia that demonstrate how standby partnerships could be
established to support local capacity and mitigate the risk of multiple partner requests in the aftermath
of a disaster. In the Philippines, CARE has undertaken a partner mapping exercise across all parts of the
country, applied standard MoUs for response partnering, and provided support for training in core
areas.63 This model could be applied in Indonesia to better prepare international and national
partnerships for future responses.

Layers of Localisation - National - Local partnerships

“You don’t have more capacity than us”
(national actor, referring to sentiments from their local partners)64
National humanitarian actors in Sulawesi assumed a role similar to that played by international
organisations. This highlights both the emergence of strengthening civil society with humanitarian
capacity within Indonesia and the advance of the humanitarian sector towards localisation
objectives. Whilst this shift is positive, there were reports of tensions between national and ‘local
local’ organisations in the Sulawesi response, including in pursuing project-based sub-contracting
arrangements without long-term capacity strengthening and imposition of burdensome
administrative and compliance requirements. In this shifting environment, national organisations
are applying standards and compliance requirements such as Sphere and Child Protection to their
local partners. There is scope for national partners to operationalise the Principles of Partnership
to further promote localisation downstream, and avenues for international partners to support
these emerging discussions.

63
Interview 26
64
FGD 4
25
Recommendations – Partnerships
● International actors to continue to invest in strengthening humanitarian networks between
national and local humanitarian actors in Indonesia and elsewhere as a preparedness measure
to support more effective response
● International organisations without established partnerships in high-risk priority countries
consider partner mapping and establishment of standing response agreements to mitigate local
actors facing high volumes of requests for new partnerships in response
● National actors to pursue principles based long-term partnership models that align with the
Principles of Partnership in their approaches with local actors
● International actors to support national actors in aligning with principles-based partnership
approaches

26
Coordination
Coordination in Sulawesi was layered, and effectiveness varied. At the international level, BNPB
requested the AHA Centre to support with coordination, assuming some of the traditional roles of UN
OCHA, which retained some of its coordination mandate. At the national level, coordination
mechanisms reflected principles of a locally led response, with government line ministries leading all the
established clusters, conducted primarily in Bahasa (in some cases with English translation), and
coordination support being provided by international cluster leads. The President appointed the
Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security as responsible at national level. Eight clusters were
established, being: Health, Education, Logistics, Infrastructure and Facilities, Economy, Early Recovery,
Search and Rescue, WASH and Displacement and Protection, which notably did not follow the structure
as set out in the HCT response plan, which was a source of confusion for a range of actors.65

“[coordination is] run by Indonesian people, it uses Indonesian language, it

feels and tastes Indonesian.” (national actor)66

At the Provincial level, the Governor was responsible for overall coordination, which was performed by
the Permanent Executive Secretary (Sekda). Downstream management was the responsibility of the
Chiefs of the affected districts and cities. The provincial government established a Command Centre
(Posko) to make strategic decisions to be followed at district/city levels. The military joint command to
manage the operations was attached to this Provincial Command Centre. BNPB established a National
Support Centre (Pos Pendampingan Nasional/Pospenas) to align its services and those of national line
ministries, with local priorities. BPBD has technical downward supervisory lines to the provincial and
district/city level BPBDs that usually serve as the secretariat of the command centres.
Cluster meetings took place at the provincial-level in Palu. Provincial-level clusters were managed at the
provincial offices of the respective responsible sectors or attached to the Provincial Command Centre, or
the Pusdalops. The first few weeks of provincial-level coordination were considered a “coordination
vacuum”67, in which non-traditional civil society-led coordination mechanisms flourished, primarily
through the use of Whatsapp groups.68
Whilst there was active participation by local and national civil society in coordination at the Jakarta and
Palu levels, respondents felt there was a gap in local and national civil society leadership in coordination,
which presents opportunities for further strengthening the role of non-government actors in
coordination fora.

65
Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team After-Action Review
66
Interview 32
67
Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team After-Action Review, p. 11
68
Humanitarian Advisory Group and Pujiono Centre, Charting The New Norm? Local Leadership in the first 100 days of the Sulawesi
Earthquake Response (2018)
27
 Only 22% of international actors saw the AHA Centre as facilitating access for
international responders.

INGOs, national and local NGOs have for several years proceeding Sulawesi been aligning and
developing roles and competence around the cluster approach, aligned with the Humanitarian Country
Team. As was seen in Sulawesi, the coordination leadership assumed by the government under the
national response system weakened linkages to the HCT, creating confusion for civil society. Further,
there is an emergence of national NGOs that don’t have a humanitarian mandate, but are increasingly
engaged in the humanitarian space, particularly those that are Islam faith based. Many of these
emerging actors are not linked with, or do not understand, the coordination architecture.
Without any umbrella organisation at the national level, coordination amongst humanitarian NGOs in
Indonesia is fragmented, which was evident in Sulawesi. This was both problematic in the response as
there was an absence of shared local civil society perspective, and confusion amongst agencies on
where they stand in the shifting humanitarian landscape in Indonesia. There is an opportunity to better
situate localisation both amongst NGOs themselves as well as within the current government policy
environment and coordination with international actors.
Table 3 below gives a snapshot of coordination levels, challenges and future opportunities.

Table 3: Challenges and opportunities in coordination

Localising layers of coordination

Level Challenges Opportunities

Regional ● The distinction between the ● Regional dialogue, which includes local
AHA Centre’s and OCHA’s roles actors, on the interoperability of the AHA
was confusing for many actors Centre and UN OCHA and ensuring an
● The AHA Centre lacks strong enabling environment for localisation
connections with civil society in ● Capacity strengthening for Indonesian
Indonesia actors to support coordination and to
● International actors, unclear on better engage with ERAT and UNDAC
the role of the AHA Centre vis- missions
a-vis OCHA, saw it as another ● Establishing a clear policy and
hoop to jump through operational guidance outlining regional
coordination modalities and methods of
socialisation amongst key stakeholders
including national civil society

28
National ● National coordination ● International and national actors
mechanisms were multiple and collectively advocate for critical
complex, involving BNPB, examination of the HCT and ICCG and
sectoral ministries and agencies identify coordination mechanisms to
and the military on one hand, strengthen local leadership
and the shifting roles of UN ● Unify and strengthen civil society
OCHA and AHA Centre in the coordination mechanisms for
other humanitarian actors
● Cluster formation and ● National and provincial cluster
composition was inconsistent, architecture to be clarified and
with some clusters ‘too supported to broaden functionality from
active’69, which was confusing information sharing to enhanced
for actors following sector- effective response, joint assessment,
based coordination norms strategic planning and accountability
● Increased international support and
resource for national cluster leadership
capacity

Provincial ● Coordination was slow to begin ● Capacity strengthening for provincial

● Provincial coordination not level cluster leads on their functions and
seen as strategic or facilitating responsibilities
joint response, rather being ● Capacity strengthening for local actors on
perceived to be useful for the cluster architecture and importance
information sharing only of coordination
● Local actors not experienced in ● National NGOs to support local NGOs to
response did not understand understand coordination mechanisms
the mechanisms or value of and streamline the processes to help
coordination, and in many cases more productive attendance
faced difficulties in attending
cluster meetings

69
The Displacement and Protection, under the leadership of MoSA, for instance, absorbed other sectors such as shelter, WASH,
CCCM, Security, vulnerable group, GBV, child protection, psychosocial support, and later even the community engagement.
Meanwhile the Economy and Early Recover clusters are almost invisible
29
Recommendations - Coordination
● International and national actors to continue to support nationally-led priorities for future
developments of national and provincial disaster coordination architecture
● International actors to work with national apex organisations70 and local actors to understand
knowledge and capacity gaps in coordination, and plan to resource closing these gaps
● International actors to advocate for regional dialogue about the role of the AHA Centre vis a vis
OCHA and support national level socialisation of arrangements amongst partners
● International actors to support national actor priorities to establish an alliance of humanitarian
NGOs in peace time to undertake, among others, coordination of localisation efforts in
Indonesia and consolidate perspectives of local and national actors

Capacity gaps and strengthening

Reflections on the support from international actors as part of DRA and SHO mechanisms to their local
partners were largely positive, as evidenced by Figure 6 below, however there remains scope for
increased capacity strengthening and opportunities for different approaches.

Figure 6: Perceptions of support for capacity building under DRA and SHO partnerships
Organisations with ongoing relationships had been undertaking a range of capacity-strengthening
initiatives with their partners before the emergency, better equipping them for response in areas
including disaster management, contingency planning, application of principles and standards and
monitoring and evaluation. CRS (as an international NGO with a branch in Indonesia) is part of ERCB

70
for instance the National Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction, Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, Indonesian Society for Disaster
Management, and Rumah Zakat
30
network that at the same time delivered capacity-building support to the member of ERCB as well as to
its local partners PKPU and Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre.71
In the aftermath of the disaster in Sulawesi, DRA and SHO organisations provided partners with capacity
strengthening in wide-ranging areas including:
● rapid induction into humanitarian emergency response
● sector-specific planning and implementation
● emergency response management
● field safety and security
● joint need assessment/post disaster needs assessment
● Paket Pelayanan Awal Minimum (Initial Minimum Service Packages)
● Core Humanitarian Standards.
Broadly speaking, the capacity gaps and areas for further strengthening fell into two distinct categories.
These were: 1) technical disaster management, as many of the local actors are not traditionally
humanitarian agencies, and 2) organisational development. Table 4 below identifies the specific areas
mentioned by local grassroots partners, which except a few, are not humanitarian NGOs, highlighting
that although there is broad alignment under disaster management and organisational development,
prioritisation should take an individual organisational approach to be most effective.

“To be successful, localisation requires field supports such as standard

Operating procedures, protocols, or guidance.”(national actor) 72

Table 4: Areas identified for capacity strengthening of local actors

Technical Disaster Management Organisational development

● Humanitarian principles ● Development and implementation of

● Sectoral/cluster coordination MoUs
● Response to recovery transition ● Organisational policy development and
● ‘Scaling up’ from development programs to implementation
humanitarian response ● Administration
● Needs assessments and data collection ● Reporting (narrative and financial)
● Monitoring and evaluation ● Financial management
● Community engagement ● Human resource management
● Gender ● Logistics
● Psychosocial and psychological first aid ● Self-awareness and self-care for staff

71
Interview 2
72
Interview 31
31
In addressing these gaps there is a clear need for targeted support at the partner level, but there is a risk
in multiple capacity assessments and plans being undertaken by multiple partners that do not align,
which would possibly be a strain on national and local partners. To mitigate this, DRA and SHO
organisations should work with their local partners on longer-term partnership approaches and to
coordinate capacity development strategies, in line with DRA strategic commitments to localisation.
Noting the acute mechanism is only 6 month activation, partners should seek alternate avenues to
progress longer-term partnerships. There is scope for this coordination to extend beyond DRA and SHO
partners, which would further benefit local actors in consolidating capacity development and holistically
addressing identified needs. A consolidated approach to capacity building aligns with recommendations
from the DEC RTRR Review.
Local actors that had pre-existing partnerships had greater humanitarian capability than local actors that
were approached to partner at the time of the response. National organisations that had received
capacity strengthening from international partners had even greater capacity. Most local organisations
had not received capacity-strengthening support before the disaster as only a small number had
previously engaged in humanitarian operations as those at the local level were for the most part
development-focused organisations. There is an opportunity for national and international organisations
to work with local partners to identify priorities for response specific capacity strengthening, however
these approaches should be based on identified needs and priorities for local partners, not broadly
applied.

Compared with local non-humanitarian organisations, national actors referenced capacity strengthening
needs including support with managing large volumes of donor funding, mobilising of networks,
clarification on localisation objectives, developing of local partner capacity, and enhanced coordination.

Recommendations – Capacity Gaps and Capacity Strengthening

● International organisations work with national and local partners on developing longer-term
organisational capacity strengthening, rather than individual project or short-term initiatives
● International organisations to promote and coordinate on capacity strengthening initiatives and
emergency preparedness to consortium and network partners
● International organisations. coordinate on joint approaches to strengthening local partner
understanding and application of CHS, monitoring systems and feedback & complaints
mechanisms.
● International and national humanitarian organisations in Indonesia progress dialogue on
context-appropriate surge models, drawing on lessons from shared surge approaches
● National actors consider initiatives that build humanitarian capacity for local non-traditional
humanitarian actors
● International organisations advocate for, and resource national and local actor humanitarian
networks to broaden to ensure greater coverage of organisations with capacity and networks to
support response

32
Conclusion
Sulawesi tested international humanitarian structures operational commitments towards locally-led
response. The existence of consortia and networks amongst national and local partners, which had been
built and strengthened in the years prior to the Sulawesi response, was integral in operationalising
locally-led response. These arrangements – including several examples supported by member agencies
of the DRA and SHO, such as JMK, ERCB and YEU – were able to rapidly mobilise through accessing seed
funding, conducting joint assessments and brokering additional support across technical areas.
The role of international humanitarian financing continues to shift. There is scope for further
advancements towards financing mechanisms that better support locally-led response, particularly with
regards to the length of funding periods. Examples from Sulawesi showed the pressures put on local
actors absorbing and programming short term funding from multiple international sources with
different requirements, simultaneously. This was challenging for local and national actors. The
emergence of regionally brokered support from other ASEAN nations and the swells of locally sourced
funding to national actors throw into question the shifting role of international donors in future.
Sulawesi showed that whilst progress has been made against commitments to increase funding to local
partners, there is still room for improvement through better understanding the financial cost of
downstream funding, and subsequently streamlining to ensure funding flows as directly as possible, or
seeking alternate funding models that are accessible directly by national actors including promoting
Good Humanitarian Donorship for the emerging Islamic-based financing organisations. There are also
opportunities to consider country-based pooled funding accessible directly for national and local
organisations.
The humanitarian coordination system in Indonesia is at a critical point whereby there is growing
evidence and commitment for reform to better support local leadership. Key stakeholders, including the
BNPB, OCHA, the HCT, the AHA Centre, civil society platforms and donors can leverage the lessons from
Sulawesi to reshape coordination to align with the localisation agenda whilst avoiding repetition of the
challenges.
Evidence from Sulawesi suggests strengthened humanitarian leadership at the national level, though
demonstrates that there is a need to continue to focus on the last mile of localisation. National
organisations should be further supported by donors and international partners to strengthen response
preparedness capacity of the ‘local local’ partner organisations especially non-humanitarian NGOs in
disaster high-risk localities, and better coordinate approaches to capacity strengthening which focus on
individual organisational needs and gaps.

33
Annex A – TOR

TOR for research into locally led response after the earthquake in Sulawesi
BACKGROUND
On 28 September 2018, a tsunami triggered by a 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck Indonesia’s Central
Sulawesi Province. The BNPB (the National Agency for Disaster Management) estimated that in the
immediate weeks following the disaster, 4340 people died, 1,084 went missing, 4,400 sustained major
injuries, and over 211,000 people were internally displaced. The earthquake caused widespread
structural damage, displacing families temporarily from damaged and unsafe shelters. The disaster
mainly affected Palu city, and the districts of Donggala and Sigi.
The impact of the earthquake and mortality was more extensive than originally estimated due to
liquefaction, a rather unknown phenomena, that led to high mortality and displacement and loss of
thousands of houses.
The disaster raised international attention especially due to the occurrence of a tsunami, which was the
cause of one of the biggest disasters in the last century73 and this provoked International fundraising
activities and pledges for support. International and national organizations mobilized fast to provide
emergency response in Sulawesi.
Responders included the Dutch relief Alliance74 that used their acute response mechanism for a joint
response Sulawesi and the SHO (Dutch cooperating aid agencies)75 that starting a public fundraising
campaign for Sulawesi.
Early on in the response, and according to their mandate, the national government of Indonesia (GOI)
took a leading role. They decided to not allow international agencies and staff to enter the area to
implement response. The BNPB (national disaster management authority) published a strong 8 point
statement titled : regulations for international NGOs that aim to provide assistance in central Sulawesi
1. Foreign NGOs are not allowed to go directly to the field. All activities must be conducted in
partnership with local partners.
2. Foreign citizens who are working with foreign NGOs are not allowed to conduct any activity on
the sites affected by disaster.
3. Foreign NGO who already procured / prepared relief items in Indonesia need to register their
assistance with the relevant ministries / agencies and mandated to work with local partners in
distributing the aid.
4. If the respective NGOs have not registered their assistance with the relevant ministries
/agencies they are asked to register with BNPB for the distribution to the affected population on
the field.

73
the 2004 Tsunami hitting several Asian countries among them Indonesia’s province Aceh
74
The Dutch relief alliance ( DRA) is a collaboration of 16 Dutch NGOs providing emergency response funded by
the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs.
75
The Dutch cooperating aid agencies are a collective of 14 Dutch organisations that organise public fundraising
campaigns in the Netherlands in case of major disasters to generate funds for members response.
34
 5. Foreign agencies wishing to provide aid can do so through the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) with
the guidance of the related ministries/agencies or local partners.
6. Foreign NGOs who have deployed foreign personnel are advised to retrieve their personnel
immediately.
7. A monitoring of foreign volunteers is required.
8. The delivery of relief items are being coordinated temporarily by BNPB through Balikpapan.

International organizations that were registered already or had an MOU with GOI could implement but
only in collaboration with local & national partners unless the GOI explicitly invited them to implement
(directly?). The regulations of the BNPB are maintained to date putting emphasis on national and local
responders ( local govmt, Red Cross/PMI , national & local NGOs) in the response. The GOI had already
communicated a similar regulation in a previous disaster, the earthquake in Lombok earlier in 2018 but
the difference was that in this disaster GPU declared they had the capacity and also did not need foreign
resources. In the Sulawesi GOI were open to receive funding support.
RATIONALE for the study: Sulawesi an example of locally led response?
Since 2016, the WHS and Grand Bargain76 and related initiatives as the Charter for Change ( C4C) have
put localization of humanitarian response on the agenda. Localization refers to a stronger role for local
responders, increased leadership of local responders (locally led responses) and increased humanitarian
financing as directly as possible to local actors with the purpose to increase effectivity of humanitarian
assistance.
The Sulawesi response is currently discussed an example of locally led response and potentially as an
example of a locally led response that could inform response models elsewhere. It has generated a lot of
interest among DRA stakeholders as an example to learn from – looking at what has worked well, what
challenges have emerged, and what could be adopted – if anything – in other response contexts.
However, many stakeholders ask critical questions as well on the extent of leaderships of local actors
questioning whether National government, UN and national branches of international agencies were
still dominant and subcontracting to national and local actors, which replicates many of the inequities
and inefficiencies of the dominant model. Additionally critical questions on implications for the quality
of the response have been raised among others related to ”a scramble for local partners” as a reaction
to the regulation of the BNPB, putting pressure on local responders.
The DRA members are interested in gathering more information on whether and how the government
restrictions lead to the international system partnering differently with local actors (INGO-LNNGO
partnership models, donor govt-national govt support, UN, etc.) what worked well and what didn’t, to
enable local actors to respond effectively and exercise leadership over the different elements of the
response.

76
The grand bargain is a commitment of humanitarian actors and donors to enhance effectivity of humanitarian
aid (financing) It is includes commitment to provide more funding (25 % of humanitarian funding) as directly as
possible to local responders.
35
The DRA overall strategy plan mentions localization as a major strategic objective and DRA has
established a localization working group that monitors and supports localization efforts within the DRA.
The Dutch government, donor of DRA, has committed to the Grand Bargain and is interested and
requesting DRA to support localization.
Considering this, the DRA JR in collaboration with the localization working group DRA ( guidance group)
commissions this research.
Many DRA partners are also SHO members and the research will also engage SHO members not in DRA.
Within SHO (partly overlap with DRA members) there has been discussion on ( possible) implications of
the GOI policy for members’ response. As of yet most members indicated they were already working
with national and local partners and did not find major challenges to support the humanitarian
response. SHO emergency aid coordinators showed an interest in cooperating with research efforts that
would provide more insight in the response in Sulawesi.
PURPOSE of the study:
This study is to collect data that will enable an evidence based analysis and conclusions as to what
extent and on what aspects the Sulawesi response has been a locally led response, and what according
to key local, national as well as international actors the major implications and challenges of the
regulation of GOI, and ensuring response models, have been for effectiveness of the response.
Additional purpose is to collect good practices and learnings from the Sulawesi response that generate
content to develop/ describe models of locally led responses that can be used to increase effectiveness
of humanitarian response in the future.
Localisation is a key strategic priority in the DRA 2017-2012 strategic plan and is defined as “more
effectively supporting locally led responses”. The goal of the DRA’s localisation efforts is to contribute
to more effective and efficient delivery of humanitarian aid. The DRA vision on localisation is
characterised by the complementarity of different actors. ( Putting local actors at the heart of
humanitarian response, The Dutch relief alliance guidance note on localisation, August 2018)
The study will use the Dutch members of DRA and SHO, their local partners and networks as entry points
for the study but will not limit data collection to DRA & SHO members. Findings of the research will be
shared within the DRA and SHO, with C4C ( charter for change) and the wider international
humanitarian community.
The information collected will include local and (inter)national NGO, local and national government
agencies and private sector on the response in central Sulawesi to ensure different perspectives are
included. (DRA uses IASC HFTT definitions of local and international responders)
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
The study will focus on the first 6 months of the response from October 2018 to March 2019. The study
will further interrogate areas that arose from the rapid analysis undertaken by Humanitarian Advisory
Group and Pujiono Centre and will focus on the following specific objectives:

36
 1. Provide insight into funding flows and chains starting with DRA and SHO organizations and
depending on data availability a broader picture for response over the first 6 months, who
funded which actor? Are there of locally-led funding? Do actors feel there were implications
of the regulation for the financing of the response. Are there different perceptions of actors
on preferred financing modalities?
2. How did international actors adapt to the GOI regulations? Are there innovative or best
practice examples of support to locally-led response?
3. Did the coordination mechanisms at the regional, national, sub-national levels reflect or
support locally led response? Were the coordination forums effective? What are the
implications of the role of the AHA centre in the region vis a vis OCHA?
4. Describe and compare perspectives of different actors on the implications (positive and
negative) of the GOI regulations on the overall quality of response (in as far as possible
select informants that can compare with previous disasters in Indonesia) :
- timeliness of the response
- quality : technical ( SPHERE or GOI guidance Perka BNPB 7/2008) and core humanitarian
standards
- accountability to donors and to beneficiaries
- relationships with communities
5. What can be learned from different partnership approaches between actors? How did
international actors work with national actors, both those with ongoing relationships and
those establishing partnerships during the response. How do partnerships align with C4C
Principles of Partnership? Were there examples of national-national or national-local
partnerships? If so, what can we learn from these? What requirements were placed on
national actors that were burdensome? Are there best-practice examples of equitable
partnerships?
6. What capacity gaps and capacity strengthening needs of local actors were observed by
local actors themselves and by international actors? How were they addressed or if not why
were they not addressed? What capacity strengthening in humanitarian aid had local actors
received previously and what do local actors list as their priority for CS for the future
learning from this response.

Good practices and learnings for future responses should comprise part of the final report.
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The study is to employ a mixed methods approach, collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. The
quantitative data should ensure statistical representativeness. A combination of the following
methodologies is proposed:
1. Desk review: The desk review should include, at a minimum :
- actors mapping based on WWW and other cluster or GOI information
- funding flows
- Review of partnership documentation
2. Survey (short and focused) among selected responders to collect quantitative data.
3. Semi structured Interviews and focus group discussions with key actors ( list will be based on
actor mapping) :
37
 - national and local government depts ( BNPB national level, district ( bupati ) and subdistrict
- cluster leads and other relevant formal or informal coordination mechanisms
- International, national and local NGOs with emergency response programming starting with
DRAJR members and SHO members.
4. Collection of organization case study example/s of innovative approaches or good practice

DELIVERABLES AND TIMELINE

1. Inception report: to include details of methodology, tools and timeline/work plan for the
assignment
2. Draft and final report(s), page limit (max 25 pages excluding annexes), executive summary (to
include Methodology and limitations, summary of findings answering the above mentioned, key
Recommendations)

Indicative Timescale with Deliverables:

16 days consultancy contract in the period March ( contract date) up to 10 th of May 2019. Field work to
be completed by end April 2019 (DRA JR ends 16 th of May 2019 )
Phase Deliverables Time frame indication Payments Working days
indication

Inception & Deliverable 1: short final one week after 30 % of 2 days

instrument research proposal including contracting total
development budget, methodology and
phase research tools including survey
development

Data collection Desk review, skype interviews April 2019 ( the current 10 days ( excluding
and analysis and field research DRA response ends 15 th travel days)
Indonesia/Sulawesi of May 2019

Report phase Deliverable 2: Draft report in Before 30 April 2019 30 % of 3 days

English for comment by total

DRA & selected SHO members.

Deliverable 3: Final Report with Before 15 May 2019 40 % of 1 day

comments reviewed and total
incorporated in as far as relevant

Total 100%
16 Days

( excluding
travel days)

38
REQUIREMENTS
DRA proposes this assignment to be conducted by a team of 2 consultants of which one is the team
leader. There is strong preference for a team with an Indonesian consultant team leader and an
international consultant in order to support good access to different networks, actors and perspectives.
DRA (and SHO) will provide contacts of members, their partners and networks.
Qualifications expected (combined) :
Minimum graduate degree in social sciences relevant for the assignment
Extensive experience in quantitative and qualitative research including in the humanitarian sector,
experience with localization research or research on partnership is an asset.
Experience in working in a humanitarian organization , preferably also with local partners.
Up to date knowledge of an experience with the humanitarian system and recent discussions in the
humanitarian sector on effectiveness of aid, Grand Bargain and localization debate.
Relevant network for the assignment is an asset.
Good communication skills in English (writing and speaking), at least one but preferably both
consultants to be fluent in Bahasa.

EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST
Expressions of interest are requested from suitably qualified candidates and addressing the following:
- An outline of the proposed methodology to complete the assignment.
- Response to the criteria as set out in the ‘consultant requirements’.
- Consultants daily rate and proposed budget for the study.
- CVs of consultants with professional referees and list of previous assignments completed.

Expressions of interest that do not cover these requirements will not be considered.
Deadline for submission of expressions of interest by 25 March 2019 COB
Submissions should be sent latest March 25 2019 COB to
Nicole Slootweg, CARE , JR lead DRA Sulawesi joint response : [email protected]
Inge Leuverink, co-chair localization working group DRA : [email protected]

39
Annex B – Funding analysis of DRA budget
Plan Save the
Oxfam International Children Tearfund World Joint lead Joint-lead
Lead agency CARE NL Cordaid Novib NL NL NL Vision NL ZOA NL budget budget
Total funding
(EUR) 481,152 529,268 479,8 384,922 577,383 529,268 433,037 433,037 152,133 4,000,000
Total %
received 12% 13% 12% 10% 14% 13% 11% 11% 4% 100%
EUR committed
to local
partners 46,631 74,234 186,73 10,365 449,873 173,569 0 941,402
% 10% 14% 39% 3% 0% 85% 0% 40% 24%

of the 24% who

contributed
what % 5% 8% 20% 1% 0% 48% 0% 18% 0%

40
Annex C – SHO Funding Flows

41
Annex D – Resource List
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Partnerships.
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ch%20Summary_Global.pdf

AHA Center. 2017. ASEAN Joint Disaster Response Plan. https://ahacentre.org/files/AJDRP.pdf

AHA Centre & OCHA. 2019. Central Sulawesi Earthquake Response. Not for the Record and 2019 Priority
Action. 10 January 2019.

ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). 2009.

http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119170000.pdf

ASEAN Declaration on Enhancing Cooperation in Disaster Management. 2013.

https://www.asean.org/storage/images/pdf/Final_Draft_ASEAN_Declaration_on_Disaster_Man
agement_-_23rd_ASEAN_Summit.pdf

ASEAN Joint Disaster Response Plan (AJDRP). 2016. https://ahacentre.org/files/AJDRP.pdf

BAZNAS Center of Strategic Studies. 2018. Indonesia Zakat Outlook 2019.

https://www.puskasbaznas.com/publications/outlook/indonesia-zakat-outlook-2019/899-
indonesia-zakat-outlook-2019

BNBP regulations for international NGOs aim to provide assistance in central Sulawesi. 2018.
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Charter4Change. Localising of Humanitarian Aid. Accessed 30 July 2019. https://charter4change.org/

Common Framework for Preparedness (CFP). 2014.

https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/256650/common-framework-for-preparedness-iasc

Core Humanitarian Standard. 2014. Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability.
https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-
%20English.pdf.

Core Humanitarian Standards on Quality and Accountability (CHS). 2014.

https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-
%20English.pdf

Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) & Swiss Solidarity (SwS). 2019. Real-Time Response Review of the
2018 Indonesia Tsunami Appeal Disasters Emergency Committee and Swiss Solidarity. July 2019.

Dutch Relief Alliance. 2018. Dutch Relief Alliance Strategy 2018-2021. https://www.dutchrelief.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Dutch-Relief-Alliance-Strategy-2018-2021-Final-13-Oct-2017.pdf
42
Financial Tracking System (FTS). Accessed January 29, 2019:
https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2018

Focus Group Discussions 1, 3, 4.

Forum Zakat. Accessed 30 June 2019: https://forumzakat.org/

Giro55. Nederland helpt Sulawesi. https://giro555.nl/actions/nederland-helpt-sulawesi/

Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiatives. 2018. 24 Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian
Donorship. https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-
good-practice-ghd.html

Government of the Republic of Indonesia & United Nations System in Indonesia. 2015. UNPDF.
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Government of the Republic of Indonesia. 2008. Participation of International Institutions And Foreign
Nongovernmental Institutions In Disaster Management. Regulation 23/2008.
https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/719EN.pdf

Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Implementation of Disaster Control. 2008. Regulation

21/2008. http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins86769.pdf

Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Law Number 24/2007 Concerning Disaster Management.
https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/139604/Indonesia_DMAct_2007.pdf

Government of the Republic of Indonesia. National Disaster Management Authority. 2015. Indonesia’s
Disaster Risk Management Baseline Status Report 2015.

Government of the Republic of Indonesia. National Disaster Management Authority. 2018. Indonesia
National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF). March 2018.

Government of the Republic of Indonesia. National Disaster Management Authority. 2010. Regulation
No. 22/2010.

Grand Bargain. 2016. The grand bargain is a commitment of humanitarian actors and donors to enhance
effectivity of humanitarian aid (financing). It is includes commitment to provide more funding
(25 % of humanitarian funding) as directly as possible to local responders.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-
2.pdf

HCT. 2018. Lessons from Lombok and Sumbawa Earthquake Response. West Nusa Tenggara Province.
Draft 3 December 2018.

Humanitarian Advisory Group and Pujiono Centre. 2018. ‘Charting the New Norm? Local Leadership in
the First 100 Days of the Sulawesi Earthquake Response’.

Humanitarian Response website accessed 1 April 2019. Inter-Cluster Coordination.

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/how-to/do-inter-cluster-coordination

43
IASC Commitments on Accountability to Affected Populations and Protection from Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse. 2017. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/accountability-affected-
populations-including-protection-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/documents-56

IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, Localisation Marker Working Group Definitions Paper. 24
January 2018;
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aper_24_january_2018.pdf

IASC. 2017. Standard Terms of Reference for Humanitarian Country Teams.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iasc_tor_for_hcts_final_0.pdf

IFRC Localisation Worksteam: Identified categories for tracking funding flows. 2018.
http://media.ifrc.org/grand_bargain_localisation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/12/2018/06/categories_for_tracking_direct_as_possible_funding_to_loc
al_and_national_actors_003.pdf

Integral Alliance Newsletter. 2018. Integral Responding to the Sulawesi Earthquake in Indonesia - update
Q&A. https://www.integralalliance.org/newsletter/integral-responding-sulawesi-earthquake-
indonesia-update-q/

OCHA Indonesia. 2014. Introduction to Cluster System. Cluster Familiarization Workshop for
Government of Indonesia. 26 February 2014.

One ASEAN One Response Declaration. 2016. https://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Declaration-on-One-

ASEAN-One-Response.pdf

Operationalising One ASEAN One Response. 2016. https://ahacentre.org/wp-

content/uploads/2018/03/AHA-GDE-One-ASEAN-One-Response-FINAL-1810318-1.pdf

Peraturan Kepala BNPB No. 22 Tahun 2010. 2010. https://bnpb.go.id/peraturan-kepala-bnpb-no-22-

tahun-2010

Plan International Netherlands. Accessed 30 June 2019: https://www.planinternational.nl/

Tearfund Netherlands. Accessed 29 June 2019: https://www.tearfund.org/

The Dutch Relief Alliance guidance note on localization. 2018. Putting local actors at the heart of
humanitarian responses. July 2019. https://www.dutchrelief.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/4-page-A4-localisation-report-v05-digitaal11.pdf

The Principles of Partnership. 2007. Equality, Transparency, Results-Oriented Approach, Responsibility

and Complementarity.

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