G.R. No.

87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed
office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented
by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He
added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also
argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League,
moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided
instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was
denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending
resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and
at the same time required comments from the respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified
to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really
for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their
petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's
proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the
League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal
capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified
from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not
amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private
respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and
Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were
also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was
not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where
a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of
convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee
on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation
in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus
restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for
being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead
of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We
cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be
here applied.

It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials.
However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation
with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may
now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present
petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned
Orders of the COMELEC.

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely
secondary to this basic question.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees
owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized
as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 23, 1988

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January
20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.

Petition No. 280225.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER

Clerk

by:

(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN

Deputy Clerk

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted,
he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his
agents in the United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so,
it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion
that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater
risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status
as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on
oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held
fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly
not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict
of Nationality Laws as follows:

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of
the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country
in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected.

Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired
naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two
states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the
Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of
our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under
its law who are its nationals."

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case
Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did
lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring
his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss
of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.

Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided
for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary.
That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who
have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and
reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of
candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken.
The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because
he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to
marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in
office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after
his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed
for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws,
which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like
a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate
his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final
and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon -

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was
twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have
re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should
be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally,
he secured the most number of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but
who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a
"permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review
and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December
19, 19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with
the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office
or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On
May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition with the following
disposition6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8 dated May
27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Raul R. Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en
banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul
Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment
of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the
said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30
o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy
said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not
having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and
that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby
ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to
hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to
notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the
prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the
parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions"15:

First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;

Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to
run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No.
123755, as follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others,
Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned
resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by
law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the
period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions
null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related
in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of
governor of the province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to
be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run
for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition
is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the
period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other
matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials,
including that of provincial governor, thus:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice
mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that
he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).

Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship
by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement
of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In
the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from
the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last
mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who
was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing
the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee --
should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at
8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and
since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress
under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them
"to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined
under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23

This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning
or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or
implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on
the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being
rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand,
it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed
"unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be
regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but
left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should
have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential
Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.

Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that
Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . .
.", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application
for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required.
Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for
the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that
such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of
whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere
fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious
and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization
in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of
democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest
on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as
at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist
on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held
that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to
public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid,
then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question
we shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began
-- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This
is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose
for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted
that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why
then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age
and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap
and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not
end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter.
After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he
be a "registered voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could
not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to
reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA
OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province .
. . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official
to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core
of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter
of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote
in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter
of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned,
but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous
elections including on May 8, 1995."3 7

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the
Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably
a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the
candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections
and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date
of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating
judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not
produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the
other hand, says that curative statutes are

"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted
acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes.43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling
certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who)
had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who
could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women
who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the
right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On
the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who
(had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain
evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein
married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63
for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are
considered essentially remedial and curative.

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was
precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where
the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions
not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political
and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective
operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so
construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to
past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so
direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true
of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said
law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied
for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is
not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law
to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994.
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to
the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take
effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there
will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional
guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws
and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were
not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced
his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.4 7

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation
within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant
minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of
wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing
only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the
date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing
his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled.
Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994,
his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from
running for any elective local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor
in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -
- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to
the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains
an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by
Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no
restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected
governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this
Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become
final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an
American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the
Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988
elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus
disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June
21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines."
This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This
is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized
by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only
"possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest
or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No.
95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence,
according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials."
Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions
for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:

The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable.
Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC
after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC,
170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the
proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC
of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186
SCRA 484.)

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question
that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign
will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo 62 case,
as follows:

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected.

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner
Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the
contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be
voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate
of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in
1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not
yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued
an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8,
1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware
in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other
words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible.
If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the
election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic
teaching of Labo:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained
the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was
patently erroneous and should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of theElection Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and
the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because
they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which
reads as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones
issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both
upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)

Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees
a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law.
64
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended
by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by
allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery"
of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of
his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for
the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were
the subjects of such previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing
the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy
on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo
was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995
were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because
"Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his
disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition
to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor
conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo,
repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo
case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political
status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the
duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the
citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such
finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding
and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should
be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely
no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only
of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality
before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?

Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local
officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section]
must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see
it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have
said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail,
the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others,
that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision
should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of
his application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the
Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-
retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree --
we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and
applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws
relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism
or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters'
obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official
at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further
hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political
status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship
and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as
of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S.
nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the
term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of
said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship
requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions
for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to
the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way
of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted).67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular
will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court
must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant
retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the
time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that
he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from
running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork
legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with
Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about
his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people
once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this
Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal
set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and
burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would
have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the
world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land
of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by
a leader of their overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are
AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.