61

CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER AND POWER

REALIGNMENTS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA
(ECO REGION)
Ayesha Khan*

Abstract
The global political and economic system is undergoing radical transformations, which
might not be as obvious, but they are fast changing the existing global order. The
weakening of US global hegemony, the gain of Chinese economic might and its increasing
influence, the establishment of right-wing populist governments across the world, the
prolonged conflicts in the Middle East, the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the
recent Ukraine crisis have caused governments to re-assess their foreign policy priorities
and to realign themselves in the changing global order. For Russia and China, the
emerging new global order should be based on multipolarity and allowed to be developed
in different ways. The region of Southwest Asia, as a subset of the international system, is
restructuring and realigning itself with the changing geopolitical realities to bring
coherence and stability within and across the region. This paper argues that the region's
geostrategic importance is instrumental in facilitating the emergence of multipolar global
order. Moreover, the new political arrangements also allow the regional states to look
beyond western dominance and realign themselves for greater cooperation and stability.
There have been predictions that the ECO region could become a centre of global power
struggle and play a key role in transforming the global order from unipolar to multipolar.

Keywords: Global Order, Power Realignments, Connectivity, ECO, Multipolarity.

W e are living in interesting times; many happenings around the globe, including
political, economic and social. The most significant is the mass shifts within
global political and economic power structures associated with the East's relative rise
and the West's comparative decline.1 These shifts have been ongoing for some time,
but recently, they have become more prominent as new geopolitical alignments are
evident. In parallel, new global and regional powers, such as China, Russia, Brazil,
South Africa, Indonesia and Turkiye, are emerging with their own world views and
challenging the existing global order. The escalation of China and Russia on the global
political stage is setting the precedence that the world is moving towards multipolarity
with exclusive zones of influence.

*Ayesha Khan is a PhD Scholar at the Department of Global Studies, Shanghai University’s College of Liberal Arts,
China.

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Many perceive China as a different type of power than the one we have seen
in the last century. Analysing China’s power using western experience as a measure is
not helpful. China’s rise needs to be understood in its peculiar terms.2 China is making
alliances with its western neighbours through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
getting closer to Russia. China and Russia are challenging the liberal world order
supported by the western alliance by using their spheres of influence. The Southwest
Asian states, as part of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), are playing a
pivotal role at the crossroads of South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Apart from
being a central strategic struggle and influence for the global powers due to its
strategic location, the Southwest Asian region is a potential nexus for trade, transport,
and energy transit, particularly for China and Russia. These are among the vital driving
factors behind attempts to enhance cooperation with Southwest Asia for geopolitical
and geoeconomic reasons. The region also plays a vital role in the changing global
world order.

In this context, the study intends to conduct a detailed analysis of the nature
of the changing geopolitical world order with the rise of China, Russia and other
regions and to investigate how the emerging world order will be different from the
existing one along with the policy choices for Central and Southwest Asian states to
realign themselves. The following research questions would help to put forward the
study to its conclusion: How has China's economic and political rise and other regional
powers in the last few decades transformed the world order from unipolarity to
multipolarity? How is the emerging global order creating its sphere of influence? How
are the ECO states realigning in the global power struggle?

Changing Global Order from Unipolarity to Multipolarity

International relations experts are pointing towards a defining moment in our

recent history in which they proclaim the end of one era and the beginning of another.
They further claim that the contemporary world is undergoing profound changes, and
therefore, it will be divided between unipolar and emerging multipolar world order
structures with different power centres. The indication of this proclamation has been
evident for the last many years. It is also evident that the international orders or
historical eras do not hinge on singular events if they change, as they are firmly
entrenched to change them rapidly. Therefore, it is imperative to identify the
transitional moments or periods contributing to the rise and fall of specific
international orders. When a transition occurs, the elements of old orders remain
visible, though they function below their marked position, while the new order
features become more prominent and play a more significant and influential role. 3

A similar situation exists today. The international order that emerged after
World War II, primarily constructed and dominated by the US, is still manifest.
However, the global distribution of power is inexorably shifting with the rise of new
powers like China and Russia playing an influential role in global politics. Likewise,
they want to adopt their own rules of global politics and change the existing power

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structure into inclusiveness and multipolarity.4 It is interesting to note that, on the one
hand, the US is reluctant to bear the cost of being the sole superpower and, on the
other hand, unwilling to share its world leadership role. China, Russia and other
regional, small but significant, powers are exploiting that situation in their favour.
They have been more pronounced in recent years asserting their influence to
undermine US authority in world politics.5

Georg Sorensen defines world order as “a governing arrangement among

states meeting the current demand for order.”6 John Ikenberry has defined the existing
world order “as open and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the
United Nations and norms such as multilateralism.”7 In what sense world is ‘open’ and
what are the ‘rules,’ this leads to further discussion. Ikenberry commented that the
nature of the existing world order is liberal; for the last seven decades, it has been
dominated by the US and its allies. They have built a multifaceted and multi-layered
world order organized around economic openness, security cooperation, and
multilateral institutions. In the security realm, NATO has been expanded, WTO was
launched to create economic openness, and in the political arena, G20 took centre
stage.8 He further observed that the current liberal order is in deep crisis.

There are many reasons why this liberal order is going through fundamental
changes. The NATO-led wars around the world have exhausted the US and European
states economically and politically. Britain’s decision to leave the EU mark an end to
the greater union, which has global ramifications. Recently, the trade war between
China and the US, the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Covid-19 pandemic,
and the Ukraine crisis suggest that the existing world order is no longer relevant and
fading its strength. The crisis the liberal world order is facing is both internal and
external. Internally, the rise of nationalist leaders and weak domestic economies due
to prolonged wars have weakened its adherents. Externally, the rise of new regional
powers has diminished the role of existing power structures.9

In the economic sphere, China has already surpassed the US. After the end of
World War II, the US accounted for half of the world's GDP. With its economic
dominance, the US laid the foundations of a liberal economic system and created
financial institutions like IMF, World Bank, and the GATT trading system. However,
for the first time in more than 140 years, the US is no longer the biggest economy in
the world.10 The Chinese economy has grown faster than any other economy over the
last three decades. In purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s economy is 15% larger
than the US.11 China has already become the production hub and replaced the US as
the primary global growth engine. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris argued, "China
is the world's leading practitioner of geo-economics.”12 According to the World Bank,
in 1981, half of the world's citizens were impoverished, whereas today, only one-fifth of
the world is impoverished. It represents a 40% drop in global poverty, and most of the
poverty reduction is in one country, i.e., China. In 1981, China had 41% of the world’s
poorest people. South Asia (29%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (11%) trailed behind China.13
The south Asian poverty rate jumped to 42% in three decades, and Sub-Saharan Africa

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64 Ayesha Khan

tripled from 11% to 34%. The World Bank data demonstrates that China lifted 680
million people out of poverty in the last three decades.14 That economic growth led
China to advance its mega BRI project to invest in the infrastructure development of
developing states. China established its financial institutions, such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund and BRICS, which fund
infrastructure projects worldwide. China has often been accused of a debt trap through
financing these infrastructure projects in developing states. The fact is that the loan
provided by Chinese banks are without conditions and incur less interest. China has
become the leading trading partner of most developing states.

Military might also be an essential component of national power, and major

states use that power to create their influence on weaker states. According to the
Global Firepower report, the US is the world’s strongest country in terms of defence
capability, followed by China and Russia. The US spends $770 billion on the defence
budget, China ranks second with $293 billion, and Russia spends $154 billion on
defence.15 According to a recent global military spending report published by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the total global military
expenditure increased by 0.7% in 2021. The largest spenders, including the US, China,
India, UK and Russia, spend 62% of the total military expenditure.16

Throughout the 20th century, the US remained the dominant military power.
However, long continuous wars in different parts of the world have affected its overall
domination. Although the data shows that the US is still the leading military power,
other major powers are also emerging as potential rivals. In the political realm, the
new international players are challenging the US political values of democracy and
human rights, and it seems that these values are no longer valid and losing their
legitimacy. New regional and financial forums are emerging that counter the
influential role played by US-dominated international forums and organizations.

Power Realignments in Southwest Asia (ECO Region)

As mentioned above, the nature of the world order is becoming multipolar
with different centres of power. With the changing world order, smaller states are
rethinking their global and regional roles and realigning themselves. The Southwest
Asian region also plays a pivotal role in global politics because of its significant
geographical position at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa. The ECO region
consists of ten-member states: Pakistan, Iran, Turkiye, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Historically, these
countries played a pivotal role in the Old Silk Road trade and used to connect China
with the rest of the world. They had power alignments with major global powers.
However, in the changing global political environment, ECO member states can
realign themselves to play their role in shaping the new world order. Because of its
strategic position, the region can either be a regional time bomb for the major powers
or act as a regional pivot for the major political players depending on cooperation and
economic development. Their advantageous position as the centre of continental trade

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Changing Global Order and Power Realignments in Southwest Asia (ECO Region) 65

flows in energy, goods, and ideas could be undermined if they cannot realign
themselves according to the changing geopolitical realities of the world.

Central Asia and the Caucasus

Central Asian states and Azerbaijan (a Caucasus state), being part of the ECO
region, have always been at the centre of influence and power struggle due to their
geostrategic location. Central Asia and Caucasus’s proximity to two rising world
powers, Russia and China, and their nearness to Afghanistan, which is at the centre of
global power struggle, make their importance obvious. China, Russia and the US
perceived the region according to their strategic interests. For the US, the regional
states remained important in the war against terrorism. The US also considers the
region a critical theatre where it can counter the influence of Russia and China. 17
Russia views Central Asian Republics as a vital locale for defending its domestic
interests. After the independence of Central Asian states, they remained under Russian
influence. Russia always undermined any attempt of these states to affiliate with the
US or other European powers. Therefore, Russia formed Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) to prevent former member states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States from aligning themselves with NATO.18 For China, the region is
important mainly for two reasons. Firstly, Central Asia is an important BRI partner as
its two economic corridors are going through this region. Secondly, the region’s
proximity to Xinjiang also leads Beijing to view it from a security lens.19

Recently, the region has become a vital area for China-Russia interaction.
Russia is collaborating in the political and security domain, whereas China is leading
in the region's economic development without questioning Russia's traditional role.
China has become an important trading partner for Central Asian states, and these
states are also part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Sino-
Russian cooperation in the region is also evident at the intersection of the Russian-led
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), comprising
the BRI territories. This cooperation is usually known as the ‘Greater Eurasian
Partnership.’20

China’s SREB, launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, offers a multi-billion-

dollar investment in the transport and energy sector as a vision of free trade across the
region. Many projects related to SREB are undergoing in the Central Asian states.
Many transport infrastructure development projects have already been completed,
which impel regional states to come out of their landlocked situation and enhance
connectivity within and across the region. 21 Russia-led security mechanism provides
security to China's economic and development projects in the region, framing
extensive cooperation. The BRI-EAEU cooperation links with other regional
organizations like SCO. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which are not part of EAEU, rely on
the SCO’s support to finance BRI projects. Including Central Asian states in BRI, EAEU
and SCO provide alternative opportunities for their economic development. 22 Without

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unbalancing their traditional cooperation with Russia, these states have aligned
themselves with another economic power, China, for their economic benefit.

Afghanistan
The situation in Afghanistan remains highly uncertain. The country has been
ravaged and destroyed by continuous wars and oppression. After the September 11
attacks, the US and NATO-led coalition invaded Afghanistan and deposed the Taliban
government. The war continued for twenty years, killing thousands of civilians and
crippling the country's social, economic and political structure. However, after the
Doha peace talks in 2021, NATO forces left the country, and the Taliban returned to
power. The events unfolding in Afghanistan have important geopolitical bearings for
the regional and extra-regional powers, and they have again placed Afghanistan at the
centre of power competition among big players. The withdrawal of NATO forces
offered China and Russia to play their role in the country's stability, and it also showed
that the west could not offer stability and economic development in the region.23

Afghanistan’s future is subject to the role of regional powers and the

realignment of the Taliban government with regional stakeholders. China and Russia
are using the power vacuum left by the US and its allies to expand their positions. 24
From the Chinese perspective, the stability in Afghanistan is essential to avert the
spillover effect on Xinjiang, which could potentially rise from radical jihadist groups
like ISIS. The security situation in Xinjiang is one of the main concerns for Beijing.
China is pursuing its mega infrastructure project in Central Asia, and the stability in
the Central Asian states and Afghanistan is paramount for China to implement the
project successfully. 25 China also intends to extend the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan to connect it with Central Asian states. China has
sought dialogue with the Taliban at different bilateral and multilateral forums. The
Taliban representatives visited China and met Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, to
discuss future cooperation with the Chinese government. 26 Russia also has a
convergence of interests with China in Afghanistan. Moscow wants to prevent
Afghanistan's instability from spreading beyond its borders into Central Asia. The
danger of destabilizing Central Asian states is the primary concern for the Russian
government. Like Central Asian states, the situation also offers Russia to consolidate
its position as a security guarantor for Afghanistan. So that the Chinese offered
infrastructure projects can be implemented successfully.27In 2022, the Chinese Foreign
Minister visited Afghanistan to discuss the prospects of Afghanistan’s role and
cooperation in BRI.28

China and Russia have aligned their interest in Afghanistan to form

coordination to bring stability to the region. In 2021, Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his
Russian counterpart, "China is ready to strengthen coordination with Russia to handle
the issue of Afghanistan jointly.”29 This form of power alignment has also offered
Afghanistan government alternative options to exploit their resources and
geographical position for the betterment of their country. The Russian government is

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likely to offer a security mechanism to Afghanistan as it lacks the economic strength to

build the country's infrastructure intensively. China may fill the economic gap through
its economic integration within the framework of BRI.

Pakistan

Since its independence, Pakistan has always been vulnerable to the

international power structure. During the bipolar era, Pakistan had to make a tough
choice to align itself with one of the opposing camps led by the US and the Soviet
Union. However, a paradigm shift is occurring at the beginning of the 21st century.
Pakistan is again at a point of decisive factor to rethink its position in the evolving
global order. Pakistan’s strategic position at the centre of Southwest Asian
connectivity renders its significance in the emerging multipolar system.

Recent events, such as border skirmishes between China and India, NATO
withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s growing economic and political influence on its
western neighbours, and the Ukraine crisis coupled with trade war and increasing
animosity between China and the US have placed Pakistan at the centre of the great
power competition.30 The US has repeatedly mentioned that its relations with Pakistan
are vital for its regional interests, particularly in bringing stability to Afghanistan.
China also understands and gives importance to its strategic ties with Pakistan in
projecting China’s political and economic goals in the region. China intends to connect
the Southwest Asian region through BRI. The Sino-Russian nexus and the US efforts to
remain relevant in regional politics have increased complexities for Pakistan to make a
transition or realign in the declining hegemonic power of the US and the emerging
role of Russia and China in world politics.

Pakistan and the US have a long history of perplexing relations. Pakistan

remained a close ally of the US in the war on terrorism. Moreover, the US is Pakistan's
biggest trading partner and used to be a defence assistance provider. Pakistan also
played a pivotal role in the peace negotiations between the US and the Taliban.31
However, the US administration still seeks Pakistan’s role in dealing with regional
complexities after the drawdown of NATO forces from Afghanistan. The US had also
signed a strategic partnership deal with India to contain China, which has
repercussions for Pakistan’s security.

Pakistan’s relations with China have always been cordial. Both countries have
always supported each other in different global forums. Beijing has always supported
Islamabad in building energy and transport infrastructure and cooperated in the
defence sector. The signing of CPEC further deepens the relationship. Through CPEC,
China wants to connect Pakistan with Central Asian states via Afghanistan. The
development of Gwadar port as part of CPEC would provide a land route to landlocked
Afghanistan and Central Asian states and the shortest alternative route to Chinese
energy needs.32 Pakistan’s relations with Russia have also entered a new cooperation
era. As mentioned, China and Russia have overlapped strategic interests in the region,

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providing greater connectivity to regional states through different projects. Pakistan is

an energy-starved country, and Russia has offered an alternative source to provide
cheap oil. Pakistan also looks for Russian investment in CPEC and other energy
infrastructure projects.33

The 21st century multipolar world order provides alternative options to the
policymakers of Pakistan. The situation offers ample opportunities for Pakistan to
realign itself concerning its strategic interests and play a pivotal role in connecting the
region by cooperating with China and Russia. Moreover, the situation is challenging as
Pakistan may not afford to become a battleground for the rivalry of big powers. The
geostrategic and political realignment of Pakistan with China and Russia may help the
country defuse India's hostile diplomatic posture towards Pakistan. Likewise, the
infrastructure projects of CPEC have helped the country to diminish the impression
that Pakistan has limited geoeconomic choices.34

Iran
Although Iran is a middle power country, its alliance with any significant
power could somewhat influence the balance of power in the region. Iran shares the
same anti-hegemonic multipolar world order perspective as Russia and China.35 Since
the Iranian Revolution, Iran's relationship with the West, particularly the US, was
estranged. Recently, the Iranian nuclear program and consequent economic sanctions
imposed by the US have further derailed the relationship. The US has accused Iran of
developing an illicit nuclear bomb. In 2015, a nuclear agreement known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran, the US, and several
other world powers to restrict Iran’s nuclear program. In 2018, however, the US
withdrew from the deal on the pretext that Iran was continuing with its proxy warfare
in the region. The US reinstated the devastating economic sanctions on Iran. Since
then, Iran’s economy has been badly affected as Iran cannot sign deals with foreign
companies to export oil. Iran’s GDP contracted by 4.8% in 2018, and the
unemployment rate rose to 16.8% in 2019.36 Iran has suffered the worst economic
sanctions imposed by western states.

Nevertheless, Iran’s growing relations with Russia and China are significant as
both countries have a permanent status in the UNSC. Both Russia and China
supported Iran in striking the nuclear deal. Later, the abrogation of the JCPOA by the
US and the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran elevated the importance of
Russia and China in the Iranian foreign policy calculus. Iran is using the SCO platform
at the regional level to engage with Russia, China, and other regional states.37 In 2005,
Iran obtained observer status in SCO and became a permanent member in 2022 at the
SCO summit in Samarkand. Due to its strategic geographic position, Iran has assumed
a prominent place in fostering regional connectivity with Russia and China. Russia
sees Iran’s potential as a geographic bridge connecting Eurasia with the Middle East
and beyond.

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Iran is also adamant about regional initiatives to promote regional

connectivity through BRI and International North-South Transport Corridor
(INSTC).38 Moscow and Beijing have also linked their goals of BRI and EAEU “to create
an interconnected network encompassing free trade zones, inter-bloc trade and
economic partnerships, and regional integration processes.” 39 Iran is at a crucial
junction of merging BRI and EAEU by building Caspian port infrastructure and
overland transport routes. Moreover, Russia, China and Iran seek financial
independence from the US dollar. Furthermore, in 2021, China signed a 25-year
comprehensive strategic partnership deal with Iran. Although the agreement's details
are not published yet, it is believed to render cooperation in political, economic, and
security dimensions. China will invest $400 billion in multiple sectors of Iran,
including energy, transport and telecommunication. 40 In the changing world order
scenario, the convergence of interest provides Iran with an opportunity to develop its
relations with China and Russia for greater regional integration. The SCO platform has
provided a multilateral forum to Iran for engagement with China, Russia, and other
regional states.

Turkiye
Turkiye has been closely associated with western states through the security
alliance NATO, and it has a greater desire to become a part of the EU. However, the
developing security situation in the region and emerging power dynamics globally
have compelled Turkiye to adjust its international position. In recent years,
Turkiye has developed closer political, economic and strategic ties with China and
Russia. Like other middle-power states of the region, Turkiye is determined to bring a
new world order more representative of the current power distribution and reflect the
norms and preferences of the emerging powers.41

The US-Turkiye relationship has been awful for an accumulated series of

crises in recent years. Turkiye bought a Russian-made-S400 missile defence system for
which the US imposed sanctions on Turkiye. There is also a grievance over the US
coordination with the People’s Protection Units, which Turkiye considers a part of the
Kurdistan Worker’s Party, a terrorist group declared by the US. Turkiye also thinks
that the US was involved in the 2016 coup d’état that killed 249 people, orchestrated by
self-exiled Fethullah Gulen, whom the US had also refused to extradite. 42 These
developments have worsened Turkiye's broader relations with the West.

Turkiye is looking for alternative options in the current geopolitical

decoupling. The purchase of the S-400 missile defence system from Russia was not
solely a defence-motivated consideration but illustrated Turkiye’s realignment away
from NATO and its dependency on US defence procurement. It also has a geopolitical
motivation. With the purchase of the Russian defence system, Turkiye has moved
towards strengthening Turkiye-Russia relations, particularly in Syria. Besides that,
Turkiye is also getting close to China and cooperating on numerous mutual interests,
particularly in BRI. Turkiye signed an MoU in 2015 to align its Middle Corridor with

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BRI to develop connectivity with China via Central Asia and the Caucasus region.43
Through this cooperation with China and Russia, the Turkish government has
signalled to the West that they have other allies if western partners are unsupportive.
It also suggests that Turkiye is an independent actor willing to make counter-decisions
to the traditional alliance once part of it.

The Asian hinterland looked different during the years of bipolarity, it looked
different during the years of US unipolarity, and it looks different today. From Pax
Britannica to Pax Americana, the ECO member states witnessed westernization as
synonymous with development and modernization. Today it does not. The northern
tier of ECO states is still linked with Russia, but Russia is far from Soviet-style
communism. The southern tier of ECO states links with the world economy, driven by
western global institutions, but they are also members of SCO, AIIB, and other Asian
transnational institutions. The world is undoubtedly in the twilight zone but not
permanent. Instead, it is a move to the future in Asia and a harbinger of aberrations
for the West. How this plays out in domains of defence and development will be seen
simultaneously and gradually.

The ECO region viewed the former USSR as a usurper of northern lands and
the West as the colonial and neo-colonial infiltrator of ECO southern states. The
independence of Central Asian Republics, thus, led to a non-colonial and non-
predatory relationship with USSR descendant, modern Russia. In contrast, states like
Pakistan are searching for a balance between East and West. Afghanistan has ousted
the US-led coalition, Iran dismissed the pro-US regime long ago, and Turkiye, despite
NATO membership and EU applicant, is defying the West in one way or the other. All
this signifies a shift from the unipolar American moment to a multipolar Asian
moment.

The Asian multipolar moment rests on a few things. First is the outcome of
the Russia-Ukraine war, which is being fought on the eastern fringe of Eurasia. Second
is Taiwan's impending crisis, in which China seems poised and determined to weed
out US influence from the East China Sea. The third is the Afghanistan situation.
Afghanistan still needs to eliminate proxies, face monetary sanctions and improve its
human rights situation. However, Pakistan is moving towards an independent foreign
policy. Asian multipolarity, connectivity, and a greater level of integration in defence
and development seem apparent in the region. Within the framework of this new
multipolarity, there is a core, and there is a periphery. China and Russia are the core of
this multipolarity, while ECO states are the periphery. India is trying its best to be
respectably accepted in the comity of Asian nations while placating the West, but it is
challenging, if not impossible, to do. Anyone who knows about the consequences of
alliance-making with the US knows that zero-sum thinking of the West may doom
India into oblivion later.

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Conclusion

The world's major powers are radically transforming the existing world order
with far-reaching consequences for the future. However, the drivers of this change are
diverse, and understanding these forces is imperative for global leaders and
policymakers. The existing world order is showing signs of decline, and the
reconfiguration of emerging powers on the global stage is pronounced. The
deteriorating relationship of the West with Russia over the issue of Ukraine is the
latest example that transgressions over the past few decades have weakened inter-state
conduct. Moreover, China's economic rise and military power are other potent factors
responsible for the world changes in the current balance of power and the
transformation of the geopolitical map. Russia and China are countering the
established global order and struggling to bring their own rules to the great global
game. This situation allows small but critical regional players to realign their powers
with emerging political players. Southwest Asian states, as part of ECO and partners in
BRI, are looking for alternatives in the form of China and Russia. They no longer want
to be part of the western-led liberal world order that plunged the region into war and
instability for extended periods. Nevertheless, the emerging global order is at its
culmination stage, and Southwest Asian states can play a significant role in its making
and implementation.

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Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, 2022.

12 Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 2016), 11.

13 The World Bank, “Poverty,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty (accessed March 2022).
14 True GeoPolitik, “Will China Rule the World?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4JjXAIm1ew (accessed March

2022).
15 Military Strength Ranking, Global Firepower, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
detail.php?country_id=russia (accessed March 2022).
16 “World Military Expenditure Passes $2 trillion for First Time,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI), 2022, https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time

(accessed June 2022).
17 Eric McGlinchey and Marlene Laruelle, “Explaining Great Power Status in Central Asia: Unfamiliarity and

Discontent,” October 2019, https://minerva.defense.gov/Owl-In-the-Olive-Tree/Owl_View/Article/2001688/

explaining-great-power-status-in-central-asia-unfamilarity-and-discontent/ (accessed March 2022).
18 Jyotsna Bakshi, “Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia: Implications for India,” Strategic Analysis XXV,

no. 2 (2001).
19 Ibid.
20 Gaziza Shakhanova and Jeremy Garlick, “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union: Exploring

the ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 49, no. 1 (2020): 33-57,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1868102620911666.
21 “Central Asia’s Silk Road Rivalries”, July 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/245-

central-asias-silk-road-rivalries (accessed March 2022).

22 Gaye Christoffersen, "Sino-Russian Accommodation and Adaptation in Eurasian Regional Order Formation,"

in Russia in the Indo-Pacific (Rutledge, 2021): 179-197.

23 Sabine Fischer and Angela Stanzel, “Afghanistan: The West Fails – a Win for China and Russia?” German Institute

for International and Security Affairs, 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021C50/ (accessed March 2022).
24 Giorgio Cafiero, “As West puts Taliban on hold, Kabul eyes Future in China, Russia,” Aljazeera, 2022,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/15/the-talibans-isolation-one-year-after-taking-power (accessed June

2022)
25 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Prospects for Sino-Russian Coordination in Afghanistan,” War on the Rocks, 2021,

https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/prospects-for-sino-russian-coordination-in-afghanistan/ (accessed March 2022)

26 Ibid.
27 Ayaz Gul, “Taliban in Talks with Russia to Import 1 Million Metric Tons of Oil,” Voice of America, 2022,

https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-in-talks-with-russia-to-import-1-million-metric-tons-of-oil-/6708735.html
(accessed June 2022).
28 Charlotte Greenfield, “China's Foreign Minister visits Afghanistan,” Reuters, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/

asia-pacific/chinas-foreign-minister-visits-afghanistan-2022-03-24/ (accessed June 2022).

29 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Prospects for Sino-Russian Coordination in Afghanistan,” War on the Rocks, 2021,

https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/prospects-for-sino-russian-coordination-in-afghanistan/(accessed March 2022).

30 Moeed Yusuf, “Pakistan’s Place in a Changing World”, Pakistan Politico, 2018,
https://pakistanpolitico.com/pakistans-place-in-a-changing-world/ (accessed March 2022).
31 Javid Husain, “Multipolarity And Pakistan,” The Nation, 2019, https://nation.com.pk/2019/01/15/multipolarity-and-

pakistan/ (accessed March 2022).

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Changing Global Order and Power Realignments in Southwest Asia (ECO Region) 73

32 Shreya Talwar, "China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and its Geopolitical Implications," Centre for Air Power
Studies (CAPS), 2015.
33 Riaz Khokhar, “What Is Driving Pakistan’s Outreach to Russia?” The Diplomat, 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/what-is-driving-pakistans-outreach-to-russia/ (accessed June 2022).
34 Syed Mohammad Ali, “The U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry and its Implications for Pakistan,” Stimson, December 2020,
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35 Nicole Grajewski, “An Illusory Entente: The Myth of a Russia-China-Iran “Axis”,” Asian Affairs 53, no. 1 (2022): 164-
183, DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2022.2029076.
36 “Six Charts that Show How Hard US Sanctions have Hit Iran”, BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-48119109 (accessed March 2022).
37 Mandana Tishehyar, “A New Order Outworn Too Soon: An Overview of Iran’s New Position in the Multipolar
World Order,” Valdai, 2022, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/a-new-order-outworn-too-soon-an-overview-of-
iran/ (accessed June 2022).
38 Roy Allison, “Protective Integration and Security Policy Coordination: Comparing the SCO and CSTO,” The Chinese
Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3 (2018): 297–338.
39 Andrei Kazantsev, Svetlana Medvedeva & Ivan Safranchuk, “Between Russia and China: Central Asia in Greater
Eurasia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 12, no. 1 (2021): 57–71.
40 Yasir Rashid, “The Latest Status of the 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement Between Iran and China,”
Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara, 2022, https://iramcenter.org/en/the-latest-status-of-the-25-year-
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41 Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,”
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2022, https://www.swp-
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42 Galip Dalay, “US-Turkey Relations will Remain Crisis-ridden for a Long Time to Come,” Brookings, 2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/29/us-turkey-relations-will-remain-crisis-ridden-for-a-
long-time-to-come/ (accessed March 2022).
43 Imran Ali Sandano, “What are the Keys to Boosting Turkey-China Ties?” Daily Sabah, 2022,
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/what-are-the-keys-to-boosting-turkey-china-ties (accessed June 2022).

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