THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA

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The Development
Dilemma
Displacement in India

S. Parasuraman
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Bombay, India

with an Introductory Study by

Michael M. Cernea

in association with
Palgrave Macmillan
 First published in Great Britain 1999 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-27250-1 ISBN 978-1-349-27248-8 (eBook)
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First published in the United States of America 1999 by

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
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ISBN 978-0-312-22010-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Parasuraman, S.
The development dilemma : displacement in India / S. Parasuraman ;
with an introductory study by Michael M. Cemea.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-22010-5
1. Economic development projects-Social aspects-India.
2. Socially handicapped-India. 3. Land settlement-India.
4. Economic assistance,Domestic-India. I. Tille.
HC440.E44P37 1999
338.954-dc21 98-30659
CIP
© S. Parasuraman 1999
excluding Introductory Study © Michael M. Cernea 1999
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01
 To my mother, Pushpa Datta
and Ankita Anirban, my daughter
Contents

List of Tables xn
Abbreviations XIV
Glossary xvi
Acknowledgements xxii

Development's Painful Social Costs

Introductory Study by Michael M. Cernea 1
The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement 2
Social Costs: Theory, Policy and Practice 4
Forced Resettlement in Developed Countries 7
The Global Magnitude of Displacement 9
Displacement in India 10
Narmada: International Aid, Impoverishment and Resistance 12
The Absence of Policy and Legal Frameworks 20
Resettlement and Development 24
References 25

Part I
THE FRAMEWORK

1 Development, Displacement and Resettlement

in India: An Overview 35
1.1 Introduction 35
1.2 Capitalism, Colonialism and Development 36
1.3 The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Power of the State 41
1.4 Dimensions of Impoverishment 44
1.5 Why Has Displacement Been Problematic in the Indian
Context? 47

vii
viii Contents

1.6 Demographic and Social Factors Exacerbating the Impact of

Displacement 49
l. 7 The Magnitude of Population Displacement 50
1.8 The Case Studies 52

2 Assessing the Impact of Displacement:

Methodological Issues 57
2.1 Problems of R&R Studies 57
2.2 Research Design 58
2.3 Data Available 62
2.4 Difficulties Obtaining Data 64
2.5 R&R Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy 66
Appendix 2A
Tracer Study Techniques 69
Appendix 2B
The Household Survey: Selection of Households 72
Appendix 2C
The Focus Group Method 75
Appendix 2D
Overview of Data Collection and R&R Issues 77

3 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy in Practice 81

3 .I Introduction: The Lack of Adequate Policy 81
3.2 The Land Acquisition Process 82
3.3 The Threshold Approach to Basic Amenities 85
3.4 Provisions in Industrial Projects 87
3.5 Provisions in Irrigation Projects 89
3.6 Constaints and Contradictions 91
3.7 The Use of Compensation Money 92
Appendix 3
An Example of New R&R Policy: The National Thermal
Power Corporation (NTPC) l0 l
 Contents ix

Part II
THE CASE STUDIES
Map: Location of Case Study Projects 106

4 Displacement Due to the Durgapur Steel Plant 107

4.1 Introduction 107
4.2 Land Acquisition 108
4.3 Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Displaced People 109
4.4 Rehabilitation of Households from Partially Affected Villages Ill
4.5 Population Pressure: Squatter Settlements 114
4.6 Conclusions 116

5 Displacement Due to the Jawaharlal Nehru Port 118

5.1 Introduction 118
5.2 The Birth of the Twin-city Concept 119
5.3 Land Acquisition and People's Protest 121
5.4 Consequences of Displacement 123
5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations 128

6 Displacement Due to the Bolani Iron Ore Mines 132

6.1 Introduction 132
6.2 Socioeconomic Conditions in the Original Villages 133
6.3 Socioeconomic Conditions in Hutments 140
6.4 The Environmental Impact of Mining in the Bolani Region 144
6.5 Conclusions 148

7 Displacement Due to the Maharashtra II

Irrigation Project 151
7.1 Introduction 151
7.2 The Social Background of the Displaced People 152
7.3 R&R Provisions 154
7.4 Resettlement Patterns 155
7.5 Economic Conditions After Resettlement 156
7.6 Conclusions 164
X Contents

8 Displacement Due to the Upper Krishna

Irrigation Project 167
8.1 Introduction 167
8.2 The Displacement and Resettlement Process 168
8.3 Social and Economic Consequences of Displacement 170
8.4 Conclusions 177

9 Displacement Due to the Sardar Sarovar Project 179

9.1 Introduction 179
9.2 The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award 181
9.3 R&R Policy in the Three States (1980-93) 182
9.4 Socioeconomic Conditions in Manibeli Prior to
Displacement 183
9.5 The R&R Process 187
9.6 Socioeconomic Conditions in Parveta 193
9.7 Conclusions 204

Part III
CONCLUSIONS

10 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 211

10.1 Introduction 211
10.2 Consequences of Industry-induced Displacement 214
10.3 Consequences of Mine-induced Displacement 218
10.4 Consequences of Irrigation Projects and Dams 220
10.5 Conclusions 226

The Narmada Movement: People's Protests and

11 229
the Potential for National Policy
11.1 Introduction: The Incremental Approach 229
11.2 The Sardar Sarovar Project and People's Action 232
11.3 The R&R Policy for the SSP-displaced Evaluated 248
11.4 The Potential for National R&R Policy 250
 Contents XI

Appendix II
The R&R Policies of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh 253

12 Conclusions 255
12.1 General Observations 255
12.2 Some Emerging Issues 259
12.3 Concluding Comments 264

Notes 267
References 280
Index 292
List of Tables

No. Page
2.1 Research design of the studies 60
2.2 Stages of the M&E strategy 68
3.1 Distribution of households from completely displaced
villages by use of compensation money received for land 94
3.2 Distribution of households in partially affected villages by
use of compensation money received for land 99
4.1 Sources of livelihood of resettled households in Durgapur in
1989-90 109
4.2 Percentage distribution of households by extent of land
acquired in the 1950s 113
5.1 JNP: Per capita monthly income of project-affected
households (base 1991-92) 128
5.2 Percentage distribution of households by caste and monthly
per capita income 129
6.1 Population of Bolani, Balagoda and Champua, 1951-90 134
6.2 Households of original inhabitants and migrants in Bolani,
Balagoda and Champua, December 1989 136
6.3 Land acquisition and compensation payment in the original
villages 138
6.4 Income-generating activities of main earners in original and
migrant households in Champua, Balagoda and Bolani 139
6.5 Economic conditions of households in original village,
December 1989 142
6.6 Occupation of main earners in hutments 143
6.7 Main occupation of women in hutments 143
7.1 Number of PAPs, land granted and resettlement location for
fully submerged villages 154
7.2 Contribution of each source of livelihood to total income 157

xii
 List of Tables xiii

No. Page
7.3 Percentage distribution of households by caste and by per
capita monthly income, 1990 160
7.4 Annual per capita income by size of landholding, 1990 160
8.1 Percentage of households in fully affected villages 171
8.2 Share of income derived from various sources, of landed
and landless households, 1991 172
8.3 Per capita monthly income of various castes in completely
affected villages, partially affected villages and unaffected
villages, 1991 174
9.1 Sources of income prior to displacement in Manibeli 187
9.2 Parveta crop yields, 1990-91 196
9.3 Distribution of households in Parveta according to share
of income derived from various sources (n=l68) 197
9.4 Distribution of Parveta households by per capita expenditure
and calorie intake, 1990-91 198
9.5 Children aged 6-14 attending school, 1991-92 202
Abbreviations

ASP Alloy Steel Plant

BIOM Bolani Iron Ores Mines
BJA Bharat Jan Andolan
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
CAFs Canal-affected families
CIDCO City and Industrial Development Corporation
CIL Central Institute of Labour
CPM/CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)
css Centre for Social Studies, Surat
DP(s) Displaced Person(s)
ORO District Rehabilitation Office(r)
DSP Durgapur Steel Plant
EGS Employment Guarantee Scheme
GO(s) Government Order(s)
GOG Government of Gujarat
GOI Government of India
GOK Government of Karnataka
GOM Government of Maharashtra
GOMP Government of Madhya Pradesh
GR(s) Government Resolution(s)
HHs Households
HoH Head of household
HSGU HS Gour University, Sagar
ICDS Integrated Child Development Scheme
ILO International Labour Organization
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Programme
ITI Industrial Training Institute
JNP Jawaharlal Nehru Port
JNPT Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust
JRY Jawahar Rojgar Yojana
KIW Kalinga Iron Works

XIV
 Abbreviations XV

KVIC Khadi and Village Industries Commission

LAA Land Acquisition Act 1894
LAO Land Acquisition Office(r)
LPC Land Purchase Committee
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE/MoEF Ministry of Environment & Forests
Mil Maharashtra Irrigation II Project
NAPM National Alliance for Peoples' Movement
NBA Narmada Bachao Andolan
NCA Narmada Control Authority
NEP National Employment Programme
NICMAR National Institute of Construction and Management
NSS National Sample Survey
NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation
NWDT Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal
PAFs Project-affected families
PAPs Project-affected persons
PCI Per capita income
PDS Public Distribution System
PHC Primary Health Centre
PWD Public Works Department
PWP Peasants and Workers Party
RO Rehabilitation officer
R&R Resettlement and rehabilitation
RSSS Rajpipla Social Service Society
SAIL Steel Authority of India, Limited
SC&ST Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
sse Secondary School Certificate I Xth Standard
SSP Sardar Sarovar Project
TISS Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay
To I Times of India
UKP Upper Krishna Project
Glossary

Adivasi Indigenous people, often associated with

tribals.
Ambadi A green vegetable.
Anganwadi A creche, usually run by the state.
Banjaras A nomadic tribal group in Rajasthan, Maha-
rashtra, Kamataka.
Benami Land or other assets held in someone else's
name, generally to evade regulations such as
the Land Ceilings (Holding) Act, the income
tax act etc.
Bhagat Variously used for sacred men, traditional
medical practitioners, mendicants and devotees
in various parts of India. In the tribal context,
usually denotes traditional medical practition-
ers.
Bharatiya Janata Party A right-wing, Hindu political party.
Bhilori Language spoken by the Bhils.
Bhils The largest group of tribals in Western India.
Bhindi/bhendi Lady's finger, a vegetable.
Bhuyia A tribal group in Eastern India, particularly in
Orissa and Bihar; a Hindu caste group is also
known by the same name.
Bidis Tobacco rolled in Apta (Bauhinia racemosa) or
Temru (Diospyros melanox/on) leaves is called
bidi or local cigarette.

xvi
 Glossary xvii

Bighas An indigenous measure of land, the ratio of the

bigha to the acre varies from region to region.
Brahmins The highest caste in the Hindu caste system.
Chowli A green leguminous vegetable, a pulse.
Collectorate Office of the administrator at the District level.
The collector is responsible for revenue collec-
tion, the maintenance of law and order and all
other administrative affairs.
Dais Traditional birth attendant, still very common
in rural India.
Dalits Literally the oppressed, denotes former un-
touchables and other low castes.
Denotified tribes In the mid-nineteenth century, the British listed
a number of groups as criminal caste and
tribes, and all individuals born into these caste
and tribal groups were regarded as criminals
and treated accordingly. This continued until
the 1960s, when the Government of India de-
notified them, that is, removed these groups
from the list of criminal tribals. Since then,
these groups have been known as denotified
tribes.
Ghee Clarified butter.
Ghar-jawai Normally, marriages in India are virilocal. If
the husband resides in his wife's paternal
house, he is called a ghar-jamai. If the bride-
groom's family was incapable of paying the
brideprice, the groom provided labour to the
bride's family for a defined period of time.
Gobar gas Biogas, used as a fuel, derived from cattle
dung.
Goval A caste group responsible for care of cattle
belonging to a lineage/clan or hamlet/village.
Gram Sabha Association of all the adults, usually the males,
of a village. Sometimes this body, the lowest
xviii Glossary

unit of government, comprises one adult from

each household residing in the village.
Gujarati A language, mostly spoken in the state of
Gujarat.
Hadia(/) A caste in eastern India whose traditional oc-
cupation was brewing rice beer. Hadia refers to
rice beer.
Indira Awas Yojana A low-cost housing scheme for the poor pro-
moted by the Government of India in the name
of former prime minister Mrs Indira Gandhi.
Jagirdar The holder of a Jagir.
Jagirdari The system of Jagirs.
Jag irs The land and other revenues of certain area
assigned to an individual who is also given the
power to administer the area in lieu of services
rendered or as a mark of favour.
Jalgars Fisherpeople of western India, particularly in
Karnataka.
Jal Samadhi Suicide by submergence in a body of water,
such as a river, as a mark of protest.
Jamin Bachao Samiti In local Marathi language, this means 'Save
the Land Committee'.
Jowar Sorghum.
Karadis An agricultural caste group in coastal
Maharashtra.
Khadi Handwoven cloth.
Kolis Caste in western India which includes many
fishers, particularly in Maharashtra.
Kurburs A low-caste group in north Karnataka.
Lingayats Peasant caste of south India, particularly in
Karnataka (an upwardly mobile, politically
powerful group; located at the middle level of
Hindu caste system).
Lok Sabha House of Peoples in the Parliament of India.
 Glossary xix

Mahato Refers here to a tribal group in the Chotanag-

pur Plateau in eastern India; a caste group
with similar name exists in West Bengal.
Mahua Madhuca indica, Madhuca latifolia.
Malis The caste of gardeners.
Marathas Peasant caste of Maharashtra in the western
part of India.
Marathi The language spoken in the state of Maha-
rashtra.
Morcha A procession as a mark of protest, also a
front.
Munda A tribal group in eastern India. In 1991, the
Munda group numbered over 7 million
people.
Nalla Drain/water course.
Narmada Bachao A peoples' movement to save the Narmada
Andolan river and its people from the ills of develop-
mental project, initiated in the 1980s.
Narmada Dharnagrastha Committee of Narmada Dam affected
Samiti people
Narmada Nigam A government agency (corporation) set up to
implement the developmental projects (dams
and hydel) on the Narmada, particularly the
Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat State.
Pada Hamlet or a village.
Panchayat A local self-government involving one or
more villages, constitutionally recognized.
Patta Lease or title deed.
Purdah Literally the veil, refers to the system of
seclusion of women, exclusion of women
from the public sphere, decision-making
processes etc.
Raiyats Cultivators.
Sal Shorea robusta.
XX Glossary

Samiti An association.
Scheduled caste (Dalit) Caste groups listed in the Vth
schedule of the Constitution of India for
preferential treatment (positive
discrimination) in education and government
employment; list renewed/modified every l 0
years by Presidential promulgation.
Scheduled tribe Tribal groups listed in the Vth schedule of
the Constitution of India for preferential
treatment (positive discrimination) in
education and governmental employment
renewed, modified every 10 years by
Presidential promulgation.
Shiv Sena An extreme right-wing organization in Maha-
rashtra. At present, it is the ruling party in
the state.
Sutars The caste of carpenters.
Swaraj Self-rule.
Tadvi A subgroup of the Bhil tribe, mostly in
Gujarat and Maharashtra, living along the
Narmada river.
Talati Land revenue collector and keeper of land
records at the village level.
Tapu An island formed by backwaters of a
reservoir.
Tehsilltahsil/taluka A unit of revenue and administration. Several
such units constitute a district or Zilla.
Tuar A kind of pulse.
Vasava A subgroup of the Bhil tribe, in Maharashtra
along the Narmada river.
Zamin Land (Persian).
Zamindari The system of land tenure and taxation in-
volving Zamindars; also the jurisdictional
area of the Zamindar.
 Glossary xxi

Zamindars From the Persian Zamin, literally the keeper

of the land (dar= keeper). In the pre-British
period, the Zamindar was responsible for col-
lecting the revenue from the land held in com-
mon by the cultivators and villagers. The Za-
mindar was not the landowner but merely a
tax farmer who paid certain proportion of the
tax revenue collected to the state. The British
perceived the Zamindars as the actual land-
owners and the cultivators as tenants.
Zilla Parishad Local self-government at the district level
responsible for all development activities.
Acknowledgements

At the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, I am thankful to Gabriele

Dankert, George Groenewold, Liesbeth Heering, Azfar Khan, Bridget
O'Laughlin, Eric Ross, Maitreye Krishnaraj, Niru Acharya, Purnendu Ka-
voori, Rekha and Ajay Tanka, Shanti George and other friends who facili-
tated development of the book.
At the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, I am grateful to
Armaity Desai, Sarthi Acharya, Vinay Kamat, Nandini Rao, Bipin Das and
several other colleagues who worked with me on projects used as case
studies in the book.
Medha Patkar, Sripad Dharmadhikari, B.D. Sharma and other col-
leagues in the National Alliance of Peoples Movement and Bharat Jan An-
dolan enabled me to learn from grassroots concerns. I am thankful to all
of them.
I am extremely thankful to Ms. Jacqueline de Vries and her colleagues
at the ISS Publications Department for meticulous and painstaking work in
editing the manuscript. I am thankful to Gary Debus for all his support
throughout the preparation of this book.
I am thankful to three reviewers and their elaborate comments which
enabled me to substantially revise the manuscript. I am thankful to Dr
Michael Cernea for his introduction to the book.
I am thankful to my foremost guru Professor Marc Wuyts for his guid-
ance and support in writing this book. My involvement in rehabilitation
work following the 1993 Marathwada earthquake, my membership in the
Government of India committee reviewing the controversial Tehri Hydro-
electric Project, and a short stint with Oxfam considerably diverted my
attention from the book. The feeling that Marc would be happy to see this
book kept me going. My wife Sulabha, and my daughter Mukta provided
enormous support which enabled me to participate in a number of projects
and complete the book. I am grateful to them.

S. Parasuraman
April 1998
The Hague
Development's Painful Social Costs
Introductory Study
by Michael M. Cernea

Ten years ago, a young Indian anthropologist, Dr S. Parasuraman, was

asked to undertake a monitoring and evaluation study on population
displacement and relocation caused by the now famous Sardar Sarovar
dam project on the Narmada river. Together with three colleagues from
the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Bombay, he accepted the as-
signment. Before long, however, his colleagues decided to drop out of
the study. The political heat surrounding the Sardar Sarovar project
became increasingly 'suffocating'. But Dr Parasuraman stayed and car-
ried out the study for a few years. Little could he imagine at that time
that the assignment would considerably change the remainder of his
professional career, and would bring his work on resettlement to broad
international attention.
The present volume is an unanticipated product of that assignment-
and of his related work- and presents the author's research on popula-
tion resettlement to a wide international audience.
By inviting me to write an introduction to this volume, both the In-
stitute of Social Studies of The Hague and the author wanted, I under-
stood, to put India's resettlement processes, analysed in this book, into
a world-wide perspective. Indeed, international comparisons beyond In-
dia impose themselves inevitably.
Involuntary resettlement today is not just an isolated accident occur-
ring in one country or another. It is ubiquitous. It is frequent. It will
occur in the future as well. Examining its nature, causes, implications
and consequences in a world-wide context is indispensable for those re-
flecting on the philosophy and practice of induced development.
2 Introduction

This introduction will review, first, the nature of involuntary popula-

tion resettlement as a development dilemma facing all countries, not
only the developing ones, and as a process that often causes profound
political and economic tensions. I will further project India's numerous
displacements on the background of global trends in resettlement, and
discuss some of the extraordinary problems epitomized by the Sardar
Sarovar resettlement. I will comment on some of the issues addressed
by the author of this book, and raise a few additional questions of my
own.

The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement

Contrary to a widespread but mistaken perception, involuntary resettle-
ment- the very subject of this book- is not a recent phenomenon. Hu-
man history has been accompanied, from its beginnings, by innumera-
ble instances of involuntary relocations, forced migrations, compelled
rearrangements in settlement patterns (Sowell I 996). Causes have
changed over time, but such processes, with their hardship, pains, vic-
tims and beneficiaries, have been continuous. They reoccur in every
generation. And we must be aware that forced displacements will not
disappear soon either: they will continue and probably even multiply
in the near future. Population densities keep increasing, and every new
major infrastructure requires 'space', space that often is inhabited or
already in use otherwise.
Sometimes, there are alternatives that may render a specific instance
of displacement avoidable. But considered in a broad sociological per-
spective, as a class of socio-demographic events, resettlement processes
are not avoidable. For development cannot occur if existing patterns of
human settlement remain forever frozen.
What usual parlance describes as 'involuntary population resettle-
ment' consists in fact of two sets of distinct but related processes:
(a) displacement of people and dismantling of their patterns of eco-
nomic and social organization, and
(b) resettlement at a different location and reconstruction of their live-
lihood and social networks.
Each segment of this double process has its own content, dynamics,
logistics, and demands on people and institutions.
 Michael M Cernea 3

Displacement implies not only physical eviction from a dwelling, but

also the expropriation of productive lands and other assets to make pos-
sible an alternative use of the space. This is not just an economic trans-
action, a simple substitution of property with monetary compensation.
Iiwoluntary displacement is a process of unravelling established human
collectivities, existing patterns of social organization, production sys-
tems and networks of social services. The concept of displacement also
describes situations in which some people are deprived of their produc-
tive lands, or of other income-generating assets, without being physical-
ly evicted from their houses. Overall, forced displacement of collec-
tivities causes an economic crisis for all or most of those affected,
entails sudden social disarticulation, and sometimes triggers a political
crisis as well.
Resettlement refers to the process of physical relocation of those dis-
placed and to their socioeconomic re-establishment as family/household
micro-units and as larger communities.
The concept of involuntary resettlement, which is the comprehensive
concept most used in the current social science literature, integrates
'displacement' and 'resettlement' into one single term, in which the
emphasis on involuntariness connotes directly the forced displacement.
In the Indian context, the conceptualization of these two sets of pro-
cesses is slightly different. The official terminology used in India is 're-
settlement and rehabilitation', or 'R&R'. This government-preferred
terminology has influenced the language of many Indian researchers as
well. Two observations are in order. First, this official terminology
avoids the explicit reference to' displacement', which connotes socioeco-
nomic hardships and losses. Further, it suggests that the post-displace-
ment phase consists of two distinct processes: 'resettlement' refers only
to the physical relocation of displaced people, while 'rehabilitation'
connotes the restoration of lost economic and social abilities.
By leapfrogging over 'displacement' and omitting the term 'involun-
tary', the 'R&R' expression sounds more neutral and may be politically
more convenient. 'Displacement' is a harsher term which many offi-
cials and politicians prefer to avoid. But omitting it neither enhances
conceptual precision, nor makes the real problems disappear. On the
other hand, perhaps separating the two 'R's is a useful refinement, be-
cause it calls attention to their distinctiveness and to the unfortunate
fact that people can be resettled without being 'rehabilitated'.
4 Introduction

In fact, many resettlement scholars from India's social science and

legal communities have generated convincing empirical evidence dem-
onstrating that government agencies are concerned more with the physi-
cal resettlementthan with the socioeconomic 'rehabilitation' of oustees.
And as every case analysed by Parasuraman in this volume illustrates,
most often such physical resettlement unfortunately occurs without re-
habilitation, but with abject and chronic impoverishment following it.
In theory, resettlement and rehabilitation should be consecutive parts
of a single continuum, but most often they aren't. Here we have anoth-
er instance of the discrepancy between development theory on the one
hand, and development policy and practice on the other hand. This dis-
crepancy is documented convincingly by this book and by many other
students of resettlement, in India and elsewhere (Appa & Patel 1996,
Cook 1994, Fernandez& Asif 1997, Fernside 1989, Mathur & Marsden
1998, Pandey 1997, Ota 1996, Salem-Murdock 1989, Thangaraj 1996).

Social Costs: Theory, Policy and Practice

Development theories and actual development policies often live in an
uncomfortable cohabitation. While development policies and practices
are said to be grounded in, and 'consistent' with, lofty development
theories, feedback from real-life processes reveals frequent and severe
discrepancies.
Discrepancy is normal to a certain extent, when theory is ahead of
current practice. By definition, policies have to close a gap between
forward-looking theory and existing real-life situations. Policies intend
to improve past practices and raise operational standards. Dilemmas and
tensions resulting from this dialectic relationship between theory and
policy engulf many governments. Such tensions are particularly visible
in connection with a class of painful social processes that occur
frequently in current development: the forced population relocations
entailed by major infrastructural developments, such as the construction
of dams, highways, or urban infrastructure.
While development theories proclaim the goal of poverty reduction,
development-caused displacements have generally resulted in the con-
trary - the impoverishment of those directly affected. Orthodox devel-
opment theory promises 'growth with redistribution', while develop-
ment policies have failed in practice to distribute growth benefits equal-
 Michael M Cernea 5

ly. Situations in which some share in the gains, while others share only
in the pains of development are too frequent to be discounted lightly.
Development policies entail not only financial costs, but sociocultural
costs as well: disintegration, anomie and 'atomie' (Galtung 1996,
Cernea 1996a, McCully 1997). The former - the financial costs - are
measured carefully, while the latter- the social costs- remain analyti-
cally unexplained, are covered up and overlooked in practice.
Compulsory relocation is a type of recurrent social cost of infrastruc-
ture development programmes in particular. This specific social cost
has attracted increasing attention during the last 15-20 years, for two
reasons: first, because the magnitude of displacements induced by devel-
opment programmes has grown considerably; and second, because some
of the largest developing countries - India, Brazil, China - have han-
dled displacement operations in a disastrous way, generating unprece-
dented resistance. Therefore, the tragic social costs, inflicted upon the
uprooted resettlers, have become more visible than ever before.
In India, for instance, a 1982 decision of the Supreme Court forceful-
ly highlighted the injustice of imposing social costs on a segment of the
project area population:
. . . Before any developmental project is taken up, the social cost in-
volved must be evaluated with a view to balancing the advantages ...
Every developmental programme must provide for the simultaneous re-
habilitation of the persons who are thrown out of their land and houses
on account of acquisition of land for such developmental projects. No
developmental project, however laudable, can possibly justify impover-
ishment of large sections of people and their utter destitution. (Supreme
Court of India 1982)

Social scientists studying involuntary displacement often go beyond the

particulars of resettlement itself. They make the broader intellectual ar-
gument for a new model of thinking and action- in other terms, a gen-
eral development paradigm that would recognize and address the path-
ologies that intervention programmes cause. This argument holds that
the social costs of change must be reduced and spread more equitably
across the societal spectrum.
Despite vast research on voluntary settlement during the 1960s and
1970s, sociologists and anthropologists have given less analytic atten-
tion to involuntary resettlement. A shift has become visible since the
6 Introduction

early 1980s, and the last ten years can clearly be seen as a decade of
growing research on involuntary resettlement (see the impressive bibli-
ography compiled by Guggenheim, 1994). Due to their size, frequency,
complexity and consequences, resettlement processes now stimulate
more theoretical and operational research than ever before.
Recent progress in resettlement research is characterized not only by
a quantitative explosion, but also by substantial thematic changes. Most
significant is the shift from predominantly descriptive research to pre-
scriptions, from academic analysis to applied and operational research.
Theorizing in resettlement research tends to be more comprehensive,
and noticeable progress is underway from defining the 'stages' of re-
settlement (Scudder & Colson 1982) to a content-oriented conceptual
framework which reveals in-depth impoverishment and social exclu-
sion, while also charting the ways of needed socioeconomic recovery
from displacement (Cernea 1990, 1997a). Further, the production of
single-case ethnographies is now supplemented by research-based craft-
ing of general policies.
In India, for instance, social researchers have made an extraordinary
effort to articulate resettlement policy grounded in their empirical find-
ings. Parasuraman's present book is part and parcel of this great wave
of Indian resettlement scholarship. Researchers in India militantly press
the government to formally adopt a national resettlement policy and
enact relevant laws. They have written and widely circulated drafts and
plans for such policies. Dhagamwar (1989, 1997), Fernandes (1995,
1998), Ganguli-Thukral ( 1992), Mathur (1995), Kothari (1995, 1996),
Joshi (1997), Ramanathan (1995), and many others have enriched both
the general argument for policy and the specific inventory of proposed
measures, setting a model of intellectual militancy worthy of emulation.
Yet much remains to be done in resettlement research. Indeed, social
scientists can and must make further contributions not only by studying
disruptions, but particularly by helping formulate reconstructive strate-
gies to turn displacement into development opportunities.
Reoriented this way, resettlement research of the kind reported in the
present book could help contain the social costs of development, as
well as their misallocation. We should not forget that those planning
models which externalize the social costs of development out of project
budgets, in fact transfer the heavy burden of these costs upon the
shoulders of the victimized groups. This unethical, unjust practice
 Michael M Cernea 7

exploits the political powerlessness of the affected people and their lack
of access to information. Social research has therefore a great responsi-
bility: it must conceptualize theoretically the social costs issues, and
craft methodologies to measure and internalize these costs into the rou-
tine economic analysis of development investments.

Forced Resettlement in Developed Countries

I have often noticed, with some surprise, how one-sided is the public's
image of involuntary resettlement, because of information bias. The
high visibility given by the international media to dams like Narmada
in India, Xingu in Brazil, Three Gorges in China, Asswan in Egypt,
Pergau in Malaysia, Kiambere in Kenya or Yacyreta in Argentina, leads
some people to think that development-caused displacements occur only
in Third World countries. The implicit assumption is that developed
countries have managed to avoid the scourge of imposing forced relo-
cation upon their citizens and that this does not happen any longer in
those societies. Can this not be avoided also, they ask, in developing
economies?
Alas, this is not the case. Only the uninformed believe that involun-
tary resettlement happens exclusively in India, China and other devel-
oping countries. While the media focus is on the 'third world', process-
es of involuntary resettlement take place constantly in all industrialized
and post-industrialized countries as well, from the United States to
France, from Canada to Japan. Industrialization and urbanization in de-
veloped countries were accompanied by dramatic population displace-
ments from the outset. Unfortunately, the resettlement record of these
countries is nothing to be proud of.
Under the mayorship of the famous Baron Haussman, for instance,
in the mid-19th century Paris experienced wrenching and massive dis-
placements in order to make room for the great Place de L'Etoile and
endow the city with its huge rose of Grand Boulevards. And some testi-
monies suggest that at least part of the displaced groups were angry
enough to enrol under the flag of the 1870 Paris Commune, trying to
reverse the injustices they suffered.
Even today, the continuous expansion of beautiful Paris is not free
of forced displacements. All around Paris, as elsewhere in France, the
current construction of railways for the new network of high-speed
8 Introduction

trains ('TGV') requires the expropriation of numerous farmlands and

houses within the peri-urban areas. In 1996, for instance, the French
government expropriated 3,000 hectares for the construction of a third
airport close to the Paris conurbation. The description of how the dis-
placement-affected population responded ('with death in their hearts')
to the government's decision is strikingly similar to what we read about
India or Latin America. I quote the embittered account published in a
local French newspaper:
. . . the 200 inhabitants of Beauvilliers, south-east of Paris, have
received the (government's) decision with death in their hearts. The bell
of the village church started tolling . . . People gathered in front of
churches ... Symbolically, they lowered the barriers on the railways
around the villages . . . The mayors of Beauvilliers and of 22 other
neighbouring cantons affected by the airport project went to complain
. . . The mobilization against the airport is quasi-general . . . National
flags were lowered at half mast. 'Nobody will invest here from now on.
This is the programmed death of our villages,' predicted one of the local
leaders. Everybody feels threatened. 'None of us here was consulted be-
fore,' declared the Beauvilliers mayor, 'because they said it was too
early. Now that the Government already made its decision, it is too late
for them to go back on it. They pronounced our obituary.' (Serafini
1996)

Paris is not an isolated case, either. The city ofNew York has literal-
ly carved some of its large cross-expressways through densely populat-
ed residential areas. In hindsight, the chroniclers of the Bronx express-
way have concluded that much of the displacement could have been
avoided with better engineering and routing (Caro 1975).
Japan, as a developed country with a high population density, has
faced and continues to face the need to relocate various urban and rural
population groups, or to convert private agricultural lands into indus-
trial platforms, airports, highways, and so on. Such conversions have
generated sharp political conflicts, mass demonstrations, and sometimes
even violent clashes. The memory of the epic battles against the exten-
sion of the Narita airport is still alive. But even a developed country
with a low population density such as Canada has involuntarily relocat-
ed some aboriginal groups from the James Bay area, and adversely af-
fected many others - the Inuit, the Cree, the Naskapi - to make possi-
 Michael M. Cernea 9

ble the construction of the huge La Grande hydroelectric complex in

that region (see the four volume synthesis by Proulx, Vincent, Laurin
& Monpetit 1992, Scudder 1996, Senecal & Egre 1997).
The ubiquity of displacement and resettlement processes throughout
the now industrialized world is a documented, indisputable reality. The
difference, however, is that developed countries have strong legal sys-
tems and effective grievance mechanisms, and the civil society is gen-
erally able to enforce and protect the entitlements of those at risk to be
displaced. This ability may not always eliminate discontent and cultural
traumas, but can prevent blatant abuses and guards against mass impov-
erishment at the hand of the state. This difference is important and
should not be lost on governments, NGOs, and legal institutions from
developing countries. The latter can and must do much more, as I will
argue, to protect the rights and livelihoods of displacement-affected
people in those countries.

The Global Magnitude of Displacement

The magnitude of resettlement world-wide is staggering. Aggregate glo-
bal statistics about development-induced displacements are still lacking,
and this impedes public awareness about the severity of the displace-
ment problem.
The first estimate of the world-wide magnitude of displacements was
generated by a World Bank research team that I led in 1993 in carrying
out a broad review of resettlement outcomes (World Bank 1994). We
calculated that the displacement caused by the roughly 300 large dams
on which construction starts on average each year is about 4 million
people. We also estimated that the urban development and transporta-
tion programmes started each year displace an additional 6 million peo-
ple. In total, approximately 10 million people per year, or a total of
90-100 million people over the past ten years, have been displaced and
relocated as a result of infrastructure programmes for dam construction,
urban development, and transportation projects.
Asia has the highest numbers of displaced people. In India, for
instance, around 21 million people were affected during the last four
decades (Fernandes 1991 ). In China, water conservation projects alone
caused the evacuation of over 10 million people between 1950 and
1990, while urban projects and transport projects account for 7 million
10 Introduction

and 14 million respectively (Chao 1990). In Africa, displacements

caused by hydropower and irrigation projects decreased between 1985
and 1995, compared to prior decades, but urban involuntary displace-
ments are on the rise (Cook 1991, Cernea 1997b).

Displacement in India
The studies presented in this book analyse in depth six major cases of
development induced-displacement in India, part of the country's drive
for industrialization. They shed light on several sectors of India's
economy and allow a long-term view on resettlement's effects, with the
benefits of hindsight.
The first is the big Durgapur steel plant in West Bengal, one of four
integrated steel plants built by the government of India in the 1950s
and 1960s, which together displaced over 125,000 people. Durgapur
alone displaced some 33,000 people of various ethnic and caste groups
- tribals, Dalits, Hindus, and others. While the current resettlement
literature is vastly dominated by reservoir-caused displacements, Para-
suraman' s detailed research of displacements entailed by huge industrial
plants reminds today's reader of a now almost overlooked category of
displacements. The second case presented is a project for port construc-
tion and enlargement, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port near Bombay, which
displaced some 12,000 people.
The two irrigation developments studied, the Maharashtra II irrigation
project in the Satara district and the Upper Krishna Irrigation project
in Northern Karnataka, both have large-scale displacement impacts: the
five dams developed in Maharashtra displaced over 200,000 people,
and the Dhom dam, on which the book's study focuses, displaced about
43,000 people. In the Karnataka programme, involving two dams
displacing over 220,000 people, the author studied the completed
Narayanpur dam, which displaced about 55,000 people. The second
dam, Almatti dam, is still under construction at the time this book goes
to press.
In my view, the case of the Karnataka programme on the Krishna
river is among the biggest resettlement failures in India currently. In
some respects it is worse than Narmada Sardar Sarovar. The Almatti
reservoir itself displaces more people than the Sardar Sarovar reservoir.
 Michael M Cernea 11

Yet this case has been comparatively much less analysed in the liter-
ature and less focused upon by the NGO movement.
Further, a mining development case, from among 18 public sector
mines in Eastern India, is analysed in this book: the Bolani Iron Ore
mines in Orissa displaced some I ,300 people, mainly tribals. And last
but not least, the author devotes a chapter to the internationally known
Sardar Sarovar project, a high dam on the Narmada river whose reser-
voir extends into three Indian states - Gujarat, Maharashtra and Mad-
hya Pradesh. The dam will create a major power generation capacity
for India, and an expected irrigation capacity for an immense area- up
to one million hectares. According to various estimates, its reservoir
and the downstream network of roads and main canals will displace or
otherwise adversely affect between 220,000 and 300,000 people. The
Narmada project has given rise to fierce resistance in India and has
become a symbol for socially and environmentally motivated opposition
to dam construction.
The cases discussed in this volume are more or less characteristic for
developments in the industrial, energy, irrigation, and mining sectors
of India, though the author does not claim statistical representativeness.
There have been thousands of such projects in India over the last few
decades, large and small. Some of these project-caused dislocations
have become 'causes-celebre' in India: the Srisailam and Tehri dam
projects, and the Singrauli projects in the coal mining sector. Singrauli,
where displacement has been massive and repeated, has been carried
out until recently with great disregard for the fate of those displaced.
The World Bank, which has co-financed those projects over many
years, recently criticized them publicly and severely on grounds of poor
resettlement (World Bank 1994). Indian coal sector authorities have
recently adopted new standards, in better recognition of the entitlements
of those displaced. But the implementation record is still below the new
standards. It remains to be seen to what extent these standards will be-
come reality or remain appeasement rhetoric.
There is also considerable displacement in India in sectors that are
not covered in this book. The reader must remain aware that the full
picture of displacement in the country is much larger than this book
can draw. Such displacements are those currently caused by urban pro-
jects, highway construction projects, park conservation projects,
defence-related projects, and others.
12 Introduction

Urban development projects, for instance, which introduce better

municipal services, also dislocate many urban dwellers, including squat-
ters. Urban squatters are a numerically large social category, hardly hit
by development, whose overall circumstances and lack of assets com-
pound the difficulties of resettlement enormously. Many squatters have
lived for years and even decades on land owned by municipal authori-
ties. Even though these squatters dwell 'illegally' on municipal lands,
their improvised settlements have often been recognized by authorities
in some formal or informal ways. Uprooting them raises major policy
and moral dilemmas, because, as some municipalities argue, compensat-
ing them through allocation of alternative land ownership would en-
courage other people to squat on other municipal lands, in expectation
of similar allocation. On the other hand, not recognizing that they must
be given reasonable alternatives is tantamount to causing - in cold
blood - further impoverishment of people who are poor to begin with.
Without a close examination of these types of dilemmas, again part of
the broader social costs' problem, the development and resettlement
difficulties facing India, and many other developing countries cannot
be understood.

Narmada: International Aid, Impoverishment and

Resistance
When the final go-ahead was given for starting the Sardar Sarovar pro-
ject (SSP), in the late 1970s, nobody in India could credibly predict
that a huge social movement would arise against the construction of
this dam and would gather strength with each passing year. Even less
would have anybody predicted that a grassroots movement would suc-
ceed in interrupting the construction by bringing lawsuits against the
dam - first to Gujarat's High Court, then all the way to India's Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court put a hold on construction at a time
when the cement colossus was already more than half built.
At the moment this Introduction is being written, construction is
interrupted and India's Supreme Court's final decision is awaited. But
regardless of what this final decision will be - whether to resume con-
struction, stop it, or continue it with modified parameters for dam
height and for the bulk of resettlement that is still ahead - the enor-
mous national and international implications of the SSP saga are al-
 Michael M Cernea 13

ready obvious. The extraordinary struggle around SSP has turned a new
page in the history of development-induced resettlement world-wide.
It has exposed to national and international scrutiny some deeply rooted
flaws of development policies and planning practices that- I emphasize
- characterize not only India, but many other countries too. And it has
demonstrated that the latent but truly huge forces of the to-be-displaced
people can be awakened and organized in protest movements of incal-
culable consequences.
SSP history already has taught major lessons to the government of
India, the governments of Indian states, the World Bank and other do-
nor agencies, the NGOs involved, and the project-affected people, not
only around the Narmada River, but in India at large and in other coun-
tries as well. Surely, many more lessons will be derived through further
analysis. The social science literature on Narmada is rapidly expanding,
and I would like to signal to the interested reader two recent very solid
volumes, edited by Fisher (1995) and by Dreze, Samson and Singh
(1997). The present book itself makes a new and valuable contribution
to Narmada's analysis, although by necessity it treats only some parts
of the complex Narmada history.
Going beyond this book's reported empirical findings, I would like
to discuss three issues of general interest: the role of international aid
in resettlement; impoverishment caused by displacement; and the
emergence of opposition movements that coalesce to protest the social
costs of development.

Narmada's missed opportunities

More than any other project, the World Bank's co-financingofthe SSP
has brought to the limelight an issue of political, financial, and moral
relevance: the role of international development aid in addressing de-
velopment's social costs- and directly, in addressing population dis-
placement as one of these costs.
The Bank's involvement in Narmada has been, and continues to be,
roundly and loudly criticized. Part of this criticism, particularly the
Morse panel's report, was well-founded (Morse & Berger 1992). The
World Bank has publicly accepted the essence of the Morse panel's
criticism through a statement of its President (Preston 1992). There
were indeed grave deficiencies in the World Bank's appraisal and nego-
tiation of the projects, unacceptable flaws in the government agencies'
14 Introduction

implementation activities, and persistent weaknesses in the Bank's su-

pervision work. These deficiencies were criticized on the record inside
the World Bank as well, as the Morse report documented and revealed
publicly, for the first time, even though those directly responsible for
the Bank's programmes in India stubbornly and erroneously resisted the
in-house criticism. The result was that performance under these projects
fell far short of what was called for under Bank policies and under the
Indian guidelines as well.
What is less known, however, and did not appear even in the Morse
report, is that there were several missed opportunities, year after year,
in the way the Bank managed and carried out the supervision of SSP
implementation by project agencies. The actual project execution pro-
cess constantly conflicted on resettlement matters with the legal
agreements that the Bank had concluded with the relevant Indian gov-
ernments. Yet the Bank was not firm in enforcing these agreements
consistently and adequately, and hesitated in a self-defeating way to use
all its levers or the occasional favourable opportunities.
One such important opportunity, missed by both India's government
and the Bank, was created shortly after the project start, in 1988-89,
when much could have been still improved in the Narmada resettle-
ment.
At that time, already very worrisome signals were coming from the
dam and reservoir areas. These signals confirmed some of the worst
concerns expressed inside the Bank at appraisal time about the risks
and poor preparation of the massive Narmada resettlement (see Morse
& Berger 1992). Reluctant to listen to and address such concerns at ap-
praisal time, those responsible for the project set them aside completely
as soon as the project 'passed the Bank's Board' and became effective.
But the critical predictions and warnings were gradually validated by
facts on the ground. Soon it became factually obvious that the design
of the projects' resettlement 'component', the absence of a sound long-
term resettlement plan (rather than their short-term 'rolling plan'), the
financing non-commensurate with the magnitude of the task, the insuf-
ficient legal entitlement protection for displaced people, and the incred-
ibly weak institutional arrangements were on the way of snowballing
into enormous displacement problems as the project advanced. There-
fore, at that time, following a resettlement seminar organized by the
Bank and attended by high-level Indian officials, the Bank's resettle-
 Michael M. Cernea 15

ment advisor informally approached the Secretary for resettlement of

the Government of Gujarat (GOG) and proposed an entirely new strate-
gy. This initiative called for recognizing the inadequacy of treating re-
settlement as a side 'component' of the Narmada projects, ill-appraised
to boot. It recommended instead a total reappraisal and the design of
a distinct full-scale project for resettlement, with considerable supple-
mentary financing from the Bank and the governments. It was intended
also as a totally different, participatory assessment of resettlers' needs,
entitlements and preferences. Such a full-scale stand-alone resettlement
project, instead of the second-rate resettlement 'component' in the dam
building project, would have also created a large institutional capacity
focused on socioeconomic recovery, placed on a stronger legal basis
and equipped with improved resources.
That informal initiative was examined by the GOG: the answer to the
Bank was fast and affirmative, giving hope for a reversal. On that
ground, soon thereafter the Bank's resettlement advisor and senior of-
ficials of the Bank's New Delhi resident mission held formal conver-
sations with the central Government of India. It was then agreed that
a full reappraisal should take place, to result in removing the doomed
resettlement 'component' from the Narmada Dam project and develop-
ing it into a separate project with a different and improved strategy,
capable of meeting the tasks in a different manner.
As agreed, the three state governments and the government of India,
following the Bank's initiative, submitted a formal request for reap-
praisal. During August-September 1988, the Bank prepared a strong
memorandum, over the signature of the Vice President for the Asia re-
gion, creating the basis for the inclusion and financing of such a project
in the lending programme.
To our consternation however, as this process was well underway, the
Government of Madhya Pradesh suddenly changed its position. It unex-
pectedly informed the Bank that it withdrew its support and request for
reappraisal and for a new project. This destroyed the entire initiative.
Neither the central Government of India nor the Bank pursued the
matter convincingly to obtain a change of position in Madhya Pradesh.
The old project dragged along, with all its birth defects, without sup-
plemental financing and without design change, and lacking commen-
surate institutional arrangements for this massive resettlement. A huge
16 Introduction

opportunity to improve the prospects of tens of thousands of Narmada's

displaced people, particularly in Madhya Pradesh, was lost.
The situation in the Narmada resettlement areas continued to worsen,
compounded by multiple conflicts, during 1989-90. Increasingly con-
cerned about the inadequacy of its own supervision, and faced with
different accounts provided by the NGOs, the Bank empanelled the 'in-
dependent review' that resulted in the Morse Report mentioned above.
The acceptance of, and the discussion of, the findings of the Morse
Report, publicly supported by the NGOs as well, made the Bank con-
siderably more determined to adhere strictly to the quality benchmarks
resulting from the Bank's own resettlement policy.
In 1992 the Bank made its determination and precise quality bench-
marks formally known to India. But then another surprise occurred:
faced with the Bank's demands for substantially improving resettlement
standards, the Government of India decided to eliminate the Bank's
presence in the Narmada projects. To do this, it resorted to an unex-
pected and dramatic 'way out' of its 'development dilemma' (handled
for the occasion more as a public relations dilemma). The Government
of India suddenly renounced the remainder of the Bank's financing-
no less than US$ 170 million still undisbursed from the Bank's loan.
This effectively pre-empted further in-depth presence, scrutiny and
criticism from the Bank on SSP resettlement. As Anil Patel, a veteran
NGO militant and researcher, put it:
By March 1993, the Government of India had realized that it was not
possible to fulfil the minimum preconditions it had accepted. . . Rather
than having the World Bank monitor the implementation of the condi-
tions, and face subsequent defamation and withdrawal from the project,
the government decided to avoid the embarrassment by asking the Bank
to withdraw from the SSP. (Patel 1997: 54)

The issues of resettlement quality are, however, larger than even the
SSP and the role of the World Bank in it. These issues have interna-
tional relevance in that they involve both developed and developing
countries, particularly in the provision of development aid. For in-
stance, when major NGOs from developed countries- Germany, Brit-
ain, the USA or Japan- powerfully criticized the SSP, they had more
on their agendas than the World Bank and SSP alone. In line with the
Latin adage mutatis mutandis, de te fabula narratur, those NGOs also
 Michael M Cernea 17

envisaged in their criticism the bilateral donor agencies of their own

countries. These agencies co-finance many dams and comparable infra-
structure projects that entail displacement in many countries other than
India, yet without much public scrutiny and documented adherence to
their own resettlement policy guidelines.
Thus, a broader question is to be answered: to what extent do bilater-
al aid agencies, by financing programmes supporting the industriali-
zation of less-developed countries, implicitly assume not only partial
credit for beneficial effects, but also shoulder the responsibility for the
programmes' adverse impacts and social costs? Don't these agencies
also have the duty to constantly monitor, and help remedy, the negative
social impacts which may result from the way their aid money is being
used?
Although the primary responsibility indisputably belongs to the na-
tional governments of the countries that carry out these programmes,
such criticism cannot be glossed over. This is a crucial issue and di-
lemma, at the heart of development policy and aid politics, challenging
their moral underpinnings. These issues are relevant not only to the
SSP chapter of Parasuraman's book, but also to its analysis of other
programmes, particularly the irrigation projects in Maharashtra and
Karnataka. Parasuraman's detailed case studies thus involve analytical
issues, and national and international policy issues, that I hope will be
further explored and deepened by other scholars in future research.

Impoverishment
The crux of the multiple issues raised by the Narmada SSP is the im-
poverishment or rehabilitation of the already displaced and the still to
be displaced people. The historical record in India in this respect is not
encouraging. Researchers oflndia's resettlements have found that over
four decades the country's development programmes have failed to 're-
habilitate' about 15 million of the over 21 million displaced people
(Fernandes 1991, Fernandes, Das & Rao 1989). In other words, three
out of every four displaced people have been made poorer than they
were before.
This indefensible record validates the anguished fundamental ques-
tions from many quarters to policy-makers: can huge development pro-
grammes be justified on grounds of poverty reduction, while they also
demonstrably cause impoverishment? (Mahapatra 1991 ). Can such de-
18 Introduction

velopment be regarded as 'sustainable development'? (Fisher 1995).

Even if (though many refuse to accept this claim as factually con-
firmed) the expected 'beneficiaries' will ultimately largely outnumber
the 'losers', is it morally justifiable to condemn a number of people to
impoverishment? 'Whose nation benefits?' (Kothari 1996).
Many years of research on resettlement, and of personal involvement
in development programmes that entail resettlement, have persuaded me
that the core issue in population displacement and relocation is im-
poverishment - economic and cultural impoverishment. Based on this
research, and on the empirical findings reported in both academic and
operational social studies, I identified the intrinsic risks typical in popu-
lation displacement, and formulated a conceptual model to help predict
and counteract impoverishment: I call it the 'impoverishment risks and
livelihood reconstruction model' for resettling displaced populations
(Cernea 1990, l997a).
The common and fundamental risks of impoverishment through dis-
placement are: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization,
food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of common
property assets, and social disarticulation.
However, I argue that the conversion of these risks into reality is not
an ineluctable fatality. These risks can be controlled and reversed, or
at least mitigated, by an integrated reconstruction and re-establishment
strategy, if this strategy is supported politically, adequately financed
and purposively targeted against each one of them (Cernea 1997a).
In reading this book, I found that the empirical evidence from India
richly reported by Parasuraman confirms the conceptual model referred
to above- as does empirical evidence from many other locations. From
his field studies Dr Parasuraman has reported more evidence that shows
how these impoverishment risks became reality than evidence that illus-
trates the reconstruction part of the model. I suspect, however, that it
is not Parasuraman who is to be faulted for lack of this evidence. Rath-
er, inadequate policies and the poor management of resettlement opera-
tions must account for not effectively counteracting those intrinsic risks
and for too little reconstruction work. The evidence the author found
for 'rehabilitation', suggests that only partial, late, and segmented re-
habilitation has taken place in the cases he studied.
 Michael M Cernea 19

Social protest
Inadequate resettlement induces increased resistance all over the world.
Even if carried out adequately, involuntary resettlement causes social
disarticulation and economic disruption. But when it is executed with
disregard for its great risks, it leads to additional social pathologies:
avoidable hardship, more losses, delays of project benefits, sharp polit-
ical tensions. It is the multi-sided threat of impoverishment of hundreds
of thousands of people that is the ultimate basis of the formidable op-
position movement to the SSP, notwithstanding the dam's expected
benefits. The project's lack of a genuine rehabilitation strategy,
convincing to the affected people, has fuelled resistance. In the final
analysis, the politicians' and managers' troubles with the SSP have
been self-inflicted.
Similar opposition is reported from many other countries, not just
from India, although resistance has not taken such sharp forms every-
where. Strong local protest has contributed to delaying the impound-
ment of the Zimapan dam in Mexico, and protests against the proposed
San Juan Tetelcingo project included highway blockades and large
demonstrations in Mexico City. In Brazil, community activists formed
the Regional Commission Against Large Dams (CRAB), which has
evolved into a national federation of people affected by displacement.
In Indonesia, the resistance of families from the Kedung Ombo reser-
voir has evolved from refusal to move, to grievances carried all the
way to the country's Supreme Court.
The anthropological literature has made important contributions to the
analysis of the growth, structure, patterns and results of expanding
social movements opposing displacement (Oliver-Smith 1991, Guggen-
heim 1993, Good 1992, West 1991 and others). Government officials
and agencies who belittle and dismiss the opposition as just the product
of a handful of 'agitators' or 'trouble-making NGOs' are sadly deceiv-
ing themselves and deceiving the public. Responsible social research
has found that when large numbers of people engage in active resis-
tance to resettlement they do so because they have been left with no
other effective avenues to defend themselves, bargain for, and promote
their interests.
Opposition to displacement is not cost-free and painless to those who
resist. But resettlers' struggles have resulted in significant improve-
ments in the 'packages' given to resettlers. And in addition, social pro-
20 Introduction

test movements begin to achieve success in some cases even in trigger-

ing remedial activities of past disastrous displacements which left many
people not re-established economically.
Perhaps the clearest instances of such retro-fitting activities are those
which were undertaken in India's coal fields starting in mid-1990s by
India's National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) in the Singrauli
area. They are the result of converging pressures on NTPC - coming
from the NGO-Ied protest activities, and from the World Bank. It is
very significant that such convergence can bring powerful national
agencies to recognize past errors and initiate corrections. The backlog
needing correction is vast, however, and this appears to be an area in
which grassroots protest movements are likely to increase their efforts.

The Absence of Policy and Legal Frameworks

The state assumes a responsibility when it forces people to relocate and
it has a responsibility for not leaving them impoverished. For the state,
the recovery of resettlers' livelihoods is first a matter of political will
and financial resources. Resource allocation is a political matter, not
just an economic one. My simple argument holds that, because govern-
ment agencies employ the weight of the state and the force of the law
to impose expropriation and displacement, it is incumbent upon the
same government to also enable those displaced to get back on their
feet and benefit from the development for the sake of which they are
displaced.
At the root of recurrent resettlement failures in India, as in many oth-
er countries, is the absence of a national policy setting standards in the
state and the private sector in involuntary displacement and relocation
operations. The vacuum at the national policy level is aggravated by the
absence of a comprehensive legal framework defining the rights and en-
titlements of the people affected, the obligations of the agencies per-
forming displacement, and the remedies necessary for reconstructing
the disrupted livelihoods and communities of those displaced. Parasu-
raman addresses these general issues through an incisive analysis of
India's Land Acquisition Act that dates from 1894, with only some
changes.
Multi-country data show a clear association between performance in
resettlement and the presence or absence of a domestic, national or sec-
 Michael M. Cernea 21

toral policy for resettlement (World Bank 1994, Cernea 1996b). Some
governments prefer to maintain a policy vacuum rather than issue bind-
ing norms and legislation for activities they know are going to be prob-
lematic, difficult, and controversial. But hard facts teach us that the ab-
sence of policy is a policy by default. The absence of policy and legal
frameworks adversely affects the interests of displaced people, and of
development in a broader sense. The state evades its responsibility
when it turns a blind eye on how its decisions affect various population
segments.
When I was confronted with this national policy vacuum in India
while working on programmes entailing resettlement, I had repeated
discussions with senior Indian officials, and told them how much
India's R&R practice puzzled me. Why, I inquired, does India- a big
country where national development programmes have also resulted in
frequent and massive population displacements - not have a national
all-India policy and legislation regarding population displacements and
oustees' entitlements?
The answer was that resettlement is regarded as a state-level matter,
meaning that policies or legislation on this matter should be issued not
at the national level, but by the individual states. After voicing my dis-
agreement, I turned to gather information at the state level. Yet I found
that policies and legislation were missing in most of India's states, as
well, and they still are missing today. The state officials argued, not
completely without reason, that since the Land Acquisition Act is ana-
tional law, the legislation regulating displacement should have the same
national 'source of authority': forced displacements result from the ap-
plication of the national Land Acquisition Act. 'If Delhi doesn't take
action,' those officials argued, 'why should our state government obli-
gate itself?'
The ball of legal responsibility is thus tossed back and forth, from
the centre to the states and back to the centre, testifying to the abun-
dance of bureaucratic excuses and to the absence of political will. The
sad result, meanwhile, is the perpetuation of a legal void within which
people's rights remain undefined and unprotected, while unsatisfactory
practices can thrive.
A voidance of making commitments, or flight from commitments al-
ready made, takes multiple and insidious forms at state and local levels
in India. I have pieced together a long repertory of 'subtle' procedures
22 Introduction

for evading and postponing legal responsibility from reports of direct

field observers.
In my own experience in India I found that in Karnataka, for in-
stance, the state legislature did adopt a bill on resettlement, and this has
been widely advertised. In fact, however, for many years afterwards
that bill has not become an effective legal act because the state govern-
ment has deliberately blocked its sending to the state's Governor for
formal signature. In Orissa, outside donors pressing for a policy state-
ment were year after year shown draft versions of the policy, but drafts
not enacted, while in the meantime tens of thousands of people were
being displaced without the protection of a state policy. In turn, Mad-
hya Pradesh did legislate a state-wide Act in 1985, but simultaneously
exempted important sectors of the economy from it, so that massive
forced displacements caused by mining and thermal plants were not
covered. India's so-called 'forest villages' are generally not eligible for
compensation under India's Land Acquisition Act. In Gujarat the legal
entitlements of the oustees from the Sardar Sarovar project have been
truly improved, but the relevant policy is restricted to the SSP, so that
oustees in similar situations in other irrigation projects in the same state
(!) do not enjoy the same legal protection. Some state governments
adopt ad hoc resolutions instead of laws, thus avoiding the establish-
ment of a framework for oustees' legal claims to be adjudicated in
court. In other instances a law has been adopted, but it includes a fine-
print provision that it won't apply unless a 'notification' is issued for
each specific site; then, the agency in charge simply does not issue the
'notification' thus bypassing the entire law, while displacement and ex-
propriation nevertheless proceed.

Perverse effects of inadequate legislation

In addition to legal voids or to the evasion of adopted policies, the
narrow application of inadequate 'eminent domain' legislation may also
have profound perverse effects. For instance, laws designed to give
preference to the 'public purpose' over an individual's interest may
prove inadequate and may yield pernicious effects when applied not to
an individual but to entire communities. The difference results from the
fact that a community is more than simply the sum of individuals: it is
a social body with structures and networks, with common assets and
public social services. This major difference is typically not envisaged
 Michael M. Cernea 23

in eminent domain laws, which are not concerned with restoring what
makes a community a community. The land acquisition laws based on
the state's eminent domain privilege induce the fragmentation of com-
munities into individuals (Kothari 1995, Ramanathan 1995).
India's Land Acquisition Act, adopted in 1894 and partly modified
in 1984, was primarily tailored for the relatively small-scale expropria-
tion of individual property for what was termed 'public purposes'. But
during the last century the situation has changed dramatically. State in-
terventions in development have expanded to unanticipated magnitudes
and frequencies, and the Land Acquisition Act is now applied regularly
for mass expropriation, not just for infrequent expropriations of scat-
tered individuals.
Expropriations that affect entire settlements and their common prop-
erty assets are studiously indifferent to customary rights in commons,
and dismantle the social capital embedded in these systems. As Parasu-
raman correctly points out:

The law (of eminent domain) does not have any provision to determine
the effect of the public purpose on the person from whom the right or
interest is being taken away . . . In narrowing down the understanding
of persons interested in the event of acquisitions, in reducing every right
and interest to a claim, in monetising compensation, and in making com-
pensation the only logical response within the scheme of acquisition, the
law effectively reduced all issues to fit this frame. There is little space
in this understanding . . . for resettlement and social justice.

The inescapable conclusion of the analysis of resettlement in India, as

in many other countries, is that changing current practices and adopting
a policy for resettlement with development is the imperative. The very
logic of equitable development asserts the need for new legal frame-
works, and for the matching of old legislation to the new circumstances
of current national development processes. Social justice can hardly be
obtained in a legal vacuum, or under grey and confusing regulations.
As an eminent development jurist wrote, in many countries
national laws do not provide a fully adequate framework for develop-
ment-oriented resettlement. New legislation often must be introduced, or
existing laws must be modified, in order to plan and carry out involun-
tary resettlement adequately. (Shihata 1991)
24 Introduction

This is a conclusion based on factual observation of resettlement and

of legal systems around the world, not on ideological reasoning. I can
only emphasize that this conclusion finds new empirical and intellectual
substantiation in the evidence and argument of the present book.

Resettlement and Development

What does the future hold regarding involuntary resettlement? Develop-
ment processes will continue to change land and water use patterns. In
some instances this will require that people be relocated. Economic lib-
eralization programmes will bring more private capital into infrastructu-
ral investments, pursuing the acquisition of vast stretches of land. This,
unfortunately, will expose more people to displacement. Thus, the com-
plexities and difficulties of involuntary resettlement will still be ex-
perienced primarily and most profoundly in developing countries. They
will face the allocation competition between either providing resources
for equitable resettlement with development or withholding them from
those impoverished through displacement in order to make some addi-
tional investments. Every major programme that necessitates resettle-
ment must therefore explore all options to avoid displacement, if pos-
sible, or to reduce the number of people affected. But the need for
resettlement will not be altogether eliminated during the ascent of de-
veloping countries to higher levels of industrialization and urbanization.
Annually, developing cou1_1tries invest some US$ 200 billion in new
infrastructure. The social and economic returns from these investments
have been high. In the past 15 years, the share of households with ac-
cess to clean water has risen by 50 per cent, bringing dramatic im-
provements in health and the quality of life. Access to electric power
and telephones has doubled in the same period, enabling increased pro-
ductivity and human welfare. Food production has risen sharply, doub-
ling in the past quarter century, with over half of this gain coming
from investments in irrigation. And investments in transportation have
reduced costs and improved farm gate and producer prices.
The only way ahead to reduce poverty further, to increase employ-
ment, and to improve standards of living, is to continue development.
This is why the solution is not to demonize development itself and op-
pose the creation of needed new infrastructure. World-wide, more than
2 billion people still lack access to electricity and are forced to use
 Michael M Cernea 25

sticks and dung for their energy needs. Some I. 7 billion lack sewerage
systems, and I billion lack access to clean piped water, resulting in the
unnecessary death of 2-3 million infants and children each year. Food
production will need to double again in the next 40 years- an impossi-
bility without additional investment in irrigation. And the world's pop-
ulation will grow by almost I billion each decade over the same period.
Therefore, substantial further investment in infrastructure will be abso-
lutely essential.
This is why this book's strong argument against the fallacies of reset-
tlement strategies, approaches, and practices in India is so important.
Parasuraman's sociological analysis, empirical findings, interpretations,
and conclusions point convincingly to the need to reduce as much as
possible the social costs of development.
Development dilemmas do have solutions. Development is necessary
and inevitable, but its social costs are not all inevitable. Such social
costs should not be accepted passively and resignedly, or be thrown by
the state upon the shoulders of people who cannot bear them without
becoming further impoverished. They should be reduced purposively,
mitigated systematically, and when they cannot be eliminated altogether
they should be fairly carried by the society in its entirety, not by a
victimized group.
Because it makes this case convincingly, this book is a valuable con-
tribution towards deepening national and international awareness about
resettlement, and hopefully also towards improving resettlement poli-
cies and practices.

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 Part I
THE FRAMEWORK
 Development, Displacement
1
and Resettlement in India:
An Overview

1.1 Introduction
In the dominant development paradigm, economic development is con-
sidered to be synonymous with large projects. Governments and devel-
opment planners alike are inclined to invest in very expensive projects.
In India, irrigation and power projects such as the Narmada Valley
Irrigation and Power Project, the Tehri Hydro-Electric Project, the
dams on the Krishna river, and many others, are currently being exe-
cuted. More projects are planned for the Narmada, Krishna, Indravathi
and other river systems. Economically and politically dominant groups
- large farmers, contractors, bureaucrats and politicians - are pushing
many more projects that will cause massive displacement. As economic
liberalization and globalization facilitate the penetration of the Indian
interior, the lives, livelihoods and lifestyles of those who critically de-
pend on the natural resource base will continue to be seriously affected.
This book analyses the resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) experi-
ence in India, and aims to draw lessons from a range of development
projects. This analysis should enable us to assess the ability of the gov-
ernment to carry out 'just' rehabilitation, and will help us to develop
a framework for policy on development, displacement and rehabilita-
tion. A number of issues, centering around the development paradigm
adhered to, the nature of the projects implemented, the rehabilitation
entitlements of displaced people and the extent to which they are
honoured, and the commitment of the state to protecting the rights and

35
36 The Framework

livelihood of vulnerable groups, will be addressed. Can displacement

be avoided? Have the projects actually attempted to minimize displace-
ment? What factors determine the policies proposed and implemented?
How are vulnerable groups, such as landless peasants, Dalits and tribal
people, women and children affected by displacement? What do the
R&R experiences of development projects teach us? What kind of re-
habilitation policy would not marginalize vulnerable groups? The role
of the state as the principal agent in development projects will be
assessed, as well as the role of international agencies and the private
sector in promoting development and managing the rehabilitation of
displaced people.

1.2 Capitalism, Colonialism and Development

The displacement of people from their land and livelihood has been a
part of India's history even before the advent of the British. The use of
land has always been defined by the needs of dominant groups, and
displacement of other parts of the population has often been justified
as legal and rational. Prior to British rule, highly skilled agricultural
groups displaced tribal cultivators and less organized groups from their
land, in response to the pressures of land scarcity and high population
density. For example, in the tribal areas of Eastern India, state forma-
tion and the desire for wealth led chieftains to encourage the immigra-
tion of non-tribal peasants who engaged in surplus-generating agricul-
ture. In clear violation of their rights, large numbers of indigenous
people were displaced when the rulers invited intermediaries (jagirdars)
and settled cultivators from other regions on their land (Roy 1912).
In medieval India, private ownership of land was not prevalent. The
riyals had rights to the land they had cleared and tilled, while those
who were granted service tenures (jagirs) only had conditional grants
and were dependent on the state. Surplus extraction from socially and
economically weaker groups took the form of rent, labour, gifts and
services. As long as only surplus was extracted, the self-sufficiency of
the common people was sustained, as in the case of cultivators who
paid rent for the land they cultivated, or gave part of the produce to the
owners in return for its use (Habib 1963). Eventually, some groups lost
their access to land, as they were unable to meet the demands for pay-
ment. In addition, a few vulnerable groups, particularly Dalit and
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 37

nomadic communities, had insecure positions and usually contributed

labour under adverse conditions, for meagre benefits (SC&ST I 989).
The economic agenda of colonialism led directly to the plundering
of natural resources, to enable the colonial power to meet the demands
made by rapid industrial and commercial expansion in the West. Thus
the advent of the British caused further displacement of people from
land and livelihood. The security which tenants had enjoyed prior to
the onset of colonialism was fractured by the need of the colonial state
to finance its operations almost exclusively from land. This need inter-
fered, often arbitrarily, with pre-existing patterns of landownership. The
legal and taxation systems introduced by the British administration in-
stitutionalized the exploitation of peasants (Bagchi 1992, Devalle 1992).
In 1793, Lord Cornwallis, the Governor General of India, introduced
the Permanent Settlement Act, which conferred private property rights
on individuals who were not the ryots but non-cultivating landlords
(Guha 1963). In Madras and the Bombay Presidency areas, where the
ryotwari system operated, the British rulers gave themselves the power
to take away land. The fundamental change resulting from permanent
settlement was that zamindars obtained the status of proprietors. Per-
manent settlement granted land proprietorship to a host of landholders
en bloc, who becamezamindars and could freely inherit, sell, mortgage
and give away their land. While permanent settlement reinforced the
zamindars' position, it seriously weakened that of the common peasant-
ry (Devalle 1992).
Fundamentally, colonial expansion was economically motivated.
Frank (1982), pointing to the boom in both production and trade, ar-
gues that the British conquest of India, especially the conquest of Ben-
gal, was a by-product of European commercial rivalry, rather than the
result of purposeful British imperialism. Colonial legislation facilitated
commercial expansion through a wide range of measures, overruling
people's customary rights and physically capturing their resource bases.
Community-based institutions which traditionally had control over such
resources were systematically dismantled. A poignant description of the
havoc wreaked by colonial forest policy on the adivasi way of life was
provided by the Bombay Forest Commission in I 887:
Slowly and surely, man after man and village after village was made to
give up his or its rights in regular succession in favour of the contem-
plated forest, and thereby brought on himself or itself manifold incon-
38 The Framework

venience and hardships. In this subserving to the wants of the Forest Of-
ficer, the rayat brought upon himself a manifold curtailment of his own
rights and was left to the mercy of heaven alone for the fulfilment of his
own requirements and thereby became an unwilling instrument of his
country's ruin. (... ) Whatever quantity of land the forest area gains, the
several residents and the village lose, therefore the actual quantity of
available land for the various uses of the villages is reduced by many
hundred acres. (... ) Government have traded in wood like merchants,
and in increasing their forest revenue have forgotten altogether the ne-
cessity of conservancy; and eventually its officers have thought of plac-
ing the blame on the innocent shoulders of the people at large. (Volume
IV, p. 38)

Legal instruments such as the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894

further consolidated state power and legalized all forms of state-spon-
sored acquisition. Common property rights were eclipsed. Vast expans-
es of forests, land, water-bodies, etc., otherwise used by the people, be-
came the property of the state (Gadgil & Guha 1992).
Thus, the state established and consolidated its authority over and
ownership of land and other natural resources. The idea of the state as
the supreme owner of all natural resources, including land, is crucial to
an accurate understanding of colonialism and displacement and their
relation to present-day development concepts and models. Colonialism
can be seen as the precursor of the development projects that today
force large groups of marginalized people from an existence at a rea-
sonably comfortable subsistence level to a life of abject poverty. While
many contradictions and inequalities existed in the Indian pre-industrial
era, lower population densities and access to common properties guar-
anteed socioeconomically disadvantaged groups at least a minimal sub-
sistence level. Colonial economic and political intervention condemned
these segments of the population to impoverishment and deprivation,
dividing the community and exploiting some groups with the help of
others. This gave rise to a sharply unequal distribution of wealth and
resources, especially land. People who were displaced- physically, re-
source-wise or occupationally - migrated to other areas, thus causing
further displacement or pressure on the labour market, further pressure
on resources, and social conflicts.
Not only did the people suffer exploitation, but the physical and
occupational changes caused serious ecological damage as well. Respect
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 39

for human life was compromised because the resource base on which
people and communities depended for survival was not protected and
conserved, and access to it was not guaranteed. This entailed a threat
to cultural and ecological diversity: the knowledge necessary for the
maintenance of that diversity was encoded in cultural patterns.
The collapse of colonialism meant a shift from one type of 'develop-
ment' to another. After Independence, the system of permanent settle-
ment was abolished: tenancy reforms were enacted and land ceilings
imposed to rehabilitate those displaced or affected by the earlier sys-
tems. However, the effectiveness of these policies in altering access to
and ownership of land in favour of the dispossessed was very limited
in most parts of the country. The reforms benefited the middle classes,
which gained prominence in both landownership and power, but the
impact on the position of the rural poor was largely negative. Further,
the political economy shifted from a system focused on conquest (dur-
ing the colonial period) to a post-colonial system facilitating the consol-
idation of resources by certain dominant groups, through the displace-
ment of people from land and other resources. The consequences are
as harmful as those of colonial rule.
In most countries which obtained independence after World War II,
the transfer of power was of little significance to the general populace.
In the Indian case, power shifted from the 'white sahibs' to their col-
oured counterparts. The 'white man's burden' to modernize and devel-
op the 'primitive' societies became the burden of the new ruling elite.
Not surprisingly, the entire legislative and administrative set-up' es-
tablished by the colonial government to appropriate resources in favour
of certain groups was meticulously copied upon Independence. Struc-
tural inequalities remain basically unchanged.
The most powerful logic for modernization and development in India
is based on the notion that the standard of living can be improved by
modern science and technology, and by creating basic infrastructure.
While there may not be much wrong with this argument as such, this
'development' has benefited a small minority only, while millions of
people pay the price without reaping any benefits. Thus, in recent years
the type of development promoted in India has been subjected to in-
creasing criticism, to the extent that the idea of development itself is
currently in crisis. Increasing disappointment about the failure of 'de-
velopment' to produce the promised benefits, and the distress caused
40 The Framework

by the victimization of many of the targeted beneficiaries of 'develop-

ment', especially among the marginalized, have led to a reconsideration
of the potential of the dominant development paradigm to create a just
and humane society (Sen 1983). The social and economic contradic-
tions inherent in 'development' are becoming increasingly visible: an
increase in both poverty and affluence, increased rates of underemploy-
ment and unemployment despite the expansion of production, and ma-
jor environmental destruction. Large-scale development projects have
resulted in ecological damage and the displacement of large numbers
of people, especially tribals and small-scale farmers. Such contradic-
tions are exacerbated by modern technology, and are thus reminiscent
of European capitalism and its dissemination throughout the non-Euro-
pean world.
The World Bank and related Western financial institutions turned out
to be major promoters of European forms of capitalism. In 1970, the
World Bank launched a policy of 'poverty focused lending', with more
emphasis on 'equity with growth'. However, the outcome was the
same: the flow of profits was from the poor to the rich within the bor-
rower nation, and from the borrower nations to the richer ones. In the
1980s, culture was brought into development policy, when it was rec-
ognized that development must be culturally sensitive if it is to benefit
the poor and marginalized (Chambers 1983, Cernea 1995). In addition
environmental concerns became influential in development policy the
world over. Thus, the emphasis is now on 'sustainable development'.
Sustainable development involves the incorporation of environmental
costs and benefits into project accounting. But the extent to which
'externalities' can be internalized remains to be seen, considering the
intangibility of environmental and cultural factors. How can develop-
ment-related damage to community institutions, especially tribal and
agrarian, be measured and compensated? In India, the tribal people con-
stitute one of the major groups affected by development. It is argued
in this book that environmental conservation is essential for survival,
and not simply the preservation of tribal cultures or agrarian modes of
resource use. The critical question is: who will be the custodian of the
resource base? Should that task be entrusted to the state, or the nation,
or elite segments of society? Should these entities be able to exercise
unrestricted control over any resource base, or are there alternative
ways to manage the natural resources?
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 41

The dominant political and economic systems maintain a studied si-

lence on the social and cultural implications of development. Ecological
movements, social protest groups, and affected people agitate against
this culture of silence. Development-induced displacement is inherent
in the ideology and policy of development itself, and should be an im-
portant consideration in any discussion on development, firstly because
of the sheer numbers of people evicted for the sake of 'national well-
being', and secondly because displacement resulting from development
questions whether informed participation and active co-operation should
be the basis of democracy.

1.3 The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Power

of the State
The legislation concerning the acquisition of land dates back to the
Bengal Code of 1824. This code was primarily intended to enable the
East India Company to obtain land or other immovable property for
roads, canals or other public purposes. The Indian Forest Act of 1878,
the precursor of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act, established the state's
absolute proprietary right, converting land into state property. The
Forest Act defined state ownership, regulated its use, and gave the state
the power to transfer or nullify customary rights as and when it so
desired. This annexationist approach led to the acquisition of 84,700
square miles of forest area by the year 1890 (Gadgil & Guha 1992).
The 1894 LAA was formulated at a time when the role of the state
in promoting public welfare was negligible (Vaswani 1992). 1 However,
since Independence, the role of the state in promoting economic devel-
opment has greatly increased. The state and central governments began
to acquire land under the public purpose clause of the LAA for a var-
iety of goals. The concept of 'public purpose' is very broad, and the
government has used this provision indiscriminately (Dhagamwar 1989,
Vaswani 1992). The Act was originally designed to enable exploitation
by the colonial administration, and is being applied by the post-colonial
state in much the same way, for purposes that could hardly be de-
scribed as public (SC&ST 1990). It is widely recognized that the LAA
deprives certain sections of the population, particularly tribals, of all
means of survival, because it recognizes only the rights of individuals
with title to the land and denies the rights of sharecroppers, agricultural
42 The Framework

labourers, shepherds, hunters and others with customary rights to culti-

vate land. The LAA has been used systematically to redefine the rela-
tionship between land and people in various social and economic
positions. The absolute powers bestowed on the government to acquire
land, the range of purposes for which acquired land can be used, and
the speed with which land can be expropriated have all increased, in
the interest of dominant groups.
The power of the state to expropriate property for public purposes is
a recurrent theme in the land acquisition laws. This power of 'eminent
domain' has been described as 'the highest and most exact idea of prop-
erty remaining in the Government, or in the aggregate body of the peo-
ple in their sovereign capacity' (Ramanathan 1995). The power to ac-
quire private property for public use is an attribute of sovereignty and
is essential to the existence of a government. The state's right to ac-
quire land without the owner's consent has assumed an increasing im-
portance as a result of the increasing demand for land for the realiza-
tion of works promised by the framers of the Indian Constitution (Ra-
manathan 1995).
The jurisdiction of the LAA supersedes all other laws. For instance,
the Constitution provides for a special position for scheduled tribes, and
for protected communities inhabiting scheduled areas, guaranteeing
their protection. Nevertheless, if a development project submerges a
scheduled area, or disperses the tribal people, the protection provided
by the Constitution proves feeble, and the rights of the tribals dissipate
(Ramanathan 1995).
It is significant that the state enacts protection for tribals in the matter
of alienation of land (Ramanathan 1995, Sachchidananda 1979). It is
also significant, though contradictory, that the state retains the power
to displace whole communities on the mere claim of a (perhaps unspe-
cified) 'public purpose'. The protection, then, applies only in relation
to other individuals. The acquisition laws deliberately ignore the protec-
tive laws: for lack of an expressed responsibility on the part of the
state, the power of the state has an overriding effect. This all too often
results in the assertive and pervasive use of acquisition laws, and the
neglect and even perversion of protective laws (Ramanathan 1995). The
conversion of a principle intended to protect a right to land into one
that effects a reduction to a lesser right in compensation, is a reflection
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 43

of the force of the dominant law. The need for a definite, articulated
departure from the dominant model stands demonstrated.
The state has not defined the 'public purpose' for which land can be
expropriated, leaving it to the executive's unrestrained will to determine
when 'public purpose' weighs more heavily than individual or commu-
nity property rights. The law is used indiscriminately to deprive the
people of their livelihood, even for such things as holiday homes and
luxury hotels. Even on the issue of compensation, the scales tip heavily
in favour of the vested interests. It is the colonial mind-set of the ruling
elite which has allowed such an iniquitous and even unconstitutional
state of affairs to persist (Baxi 1994, Kothari 1995, Ramanathan 1995).
The LAA induces the fragmentation of communities into individuals,
and converts bundles of rights and interests into tangible and computa-
ble claims. The law deals with individual claimants who endeavour to
establish legal rights, which may result in the payment of compensa-
tion. The relevance of identifying the person with an interest in the
land or the natural resource is merely to extinguish the right, using the
device of compensation. The law does not have provisions to determine
the effect of the public purpose on the person from whom the right or
interest is being taken away. It does not allow for participatory deci-
sion-making (Ramanathan 1995, Fernandes & Chatterji 1995).
The law effectively reduces all issues to fit this frame. This is evident
in actions such as reinforcing the power of eminent domain of the state,
narrowing the definition of interested parties, reducing every right and
interest to a claim, monetizing compensation, and making compensation
the only logical response within the scheme of acquisition. There is lit-
tle room in this understanding for avoiding displacement, and even less
for resettlement and social justice (Ramanathan 1995, Kothari 1995,
Fernandes & Chatterji 1995).
State law is the creation of the state. Land acquisition laws and forest
laws are instances of empowerment of the state through statute, and
they exemplify the potential of the law to legitimize the discrepancy
that may exist between state action and justice. The function of the
state is both to make laws and to enforce them. Hence, the state has al-
most exclusive statutory power to determine what constitutes a public
purpose, the resources over which it needs control, and the costs, in-
cluding social costs, which will be reimbursed. The law is reductionist:
it has simplified the issues into propositions and positions that can be
44 The Framework

stated in a statute and has reduced considerations which may render the
process more democratic and just as non-existent. Expediency and man-
ageable standards take their place. Examples include the curtailment of
transaction costs and the non-computation of real costs by including
limiting clauses and by making externalities of all interests, claims and
rights which are not specifically acknowledged by the law (Ramanathan
1995: 49).
More recent legislation, which recognizes project displacement of
whole communities, is caught in the stranglehold of the dominant
approach to land acquisition. 'Person interested' has become 'affected
person', and rehabilitation is to be effectuated in an area which will
benefit from the project which caused the displacement. It is further
recognized that certain amenities should be an integral part of the
rehabilitation plan. Even so, the term 'rehabilitation' is still not defined.
Thus, the allocation of land is 'subject to the availability of sufficient
land' and is not based on an indisputable right of the affected person.
The right of the state to acquire land for the 'public purpose' of rehabi-
litation, however, is reinforced. 2

1.4 Dimensions of Impoverishment

Displacement leads to the direct or indirect destabilization of commun-
ity support systems and to loss of employment, markets, kin groups and
access to the outside world. Cernea ( 1990) has identified seven dimen-
sions of the risks of impoverishment induced by displacement. These
are landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food in-
security, morbidity and social disarticulation.
In present-day India, agricultural land is still the most important as-
set. Agriculture supports over two-thirds of India's 970 million people
(in 1996), and land accounts for two-thirds of the value of all assets in
rural areas. In rural India, those who control land control the major
source of income as well as other institutions. After examining exten-
sive data on rural poverty in India, Singh (1990) concluded that the
rural poor consists predominantly of agricultural labour households and
smallholders with cultivated holdings of less than five acres. Further,
the incidence of poverty was found to be higher among agricultural la-
bourers than among cultivators. Evidence clearly indicates that in rural
India loss of land, in the absence of' facilitated alternatives', eventually
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 45

reduces households to poverty. Although both landed and landless peas-

ants risk destitution as a result of development-induced displacement,
landless, small and marginal farmers experience the most serious de-
privation (MIDS 1996).
Thus, loss of land is the single most important cause of post-displace-
ment impoverishment in India. Landed farmers whose lands are expro-
priated in full or in part typically receive compensation. The level of
compensation is not linked to replacement price, but calculated arbitrar-
ily. However, empirical evidence from many countries indicates that
compensation in cash usually does not ensure the replacement of the
lost land. Many expropriated farmers remain landless forever. The like-
lihood of landlessness is higher for farm families which have only cus-
tomary rights to their land, rather than formal title (for example, tribal
groups, families cultivating temple lands, and others).
Marginalization is a component of impoverishment and occurs when
affected families (for example, those losing only part of their land due
to submergence) cannot be fully restored to their previous strength.
Medium-sized farmers become smallholders. Smallholders previously
balancing precariously above the poverty line may fall below it and
pever recover, even without becoming landless. Highly productive farm-
ers on fertile valley-bottom land are marginalized when moved uphill
where the land is less fertile, even though they may be given plots of
the same size. Marginalization also occurs due to the Joss of off-farm
income sources previously available. For several categories of people
who hold jobs in the reservoir area, there is a high risk of becoming
permanently jobless after displacement. Agricultural labourers, includ-
ing tenants, whose livelihood depends on being hired by landed farmers
(who themselves become displaced), could be relocated to other sites
and are uncertain of maintaining their old jobs, or finding new ones.
Small private enterprises which are displaced (workshops, rural indus-
tries, artisan units, and so on) may not be re-established at all, and
large-scale unemployment may result. Opportunities for small shop-
keepers, service workers, vendors and others to re-establish their busi-
ness successfully depend on the nature of provisions for resettlement.
The loss of shelter through displacement is temporary for most of
those displaced, but for some families homelessness may become a per-
manent condition. If resettlement policy does not explicitly provide for
improvement in housing conditions, or if compensation for demolished
46 The Framework

shelters is paid at their assessed rather than their replacement value, the
risk of homelessness will increase. The labour cost involved in rebuild-
ing a house may delay house reconstruction considerably and force the
displaced into temporary shelters.
Social disarticulation is less quantifiable than landlessness and
economic marginalization, but is nevertheless real and profound. Kin-
systems and other tightly knit social networks are vital assets and life
support mechanisms for many families, including mutual help arrange-
ments, labour exchange relationships, production-oriented informal or-
ganizations, child-care reciprocity, food borrowing, burial activities and
post-calamity help, among others. When these support networks and ar-
rangements are dismantled, a multifaceted resource is lost. Social disar-
ticulation also results from the disintegration of authority systems and
loss of leadership. Self-management and social control weaken or col-
lapse, resulting in anomalies and an increase in deviant behaviour. The
overall potential for group action is diminished. Research has also doc-
umented that a feeling of powerlessness and alienation is often engen-
dered in those who are displaced, especially when entire communities
are uprooted from familiar surroundings. Impoverishment is exacerbat-
ed by displacement procedures that are oblivious to the need for reloca-
tion of former social units as social units (villages, extended families,
neighbourhoods, etc.) and for preserving or re-articulating the social
networks that maintain cohesion.
The affected people require support to re-establish livelihood systems.
People displaced by irrigation projects need land or employment oppor-
tunities, or both. People displaced by mines, industries and power pro-
jects need secure industrial employment and assistance to re-establish
access to land and other common property resources. The initiative and
financial support for this obligation must come primarily from the pro-
ject itself. The inability of the secondary and tertiary sectors to absorb
the displaced people would increase the number of people available for
work in agriculture and other informal sectors, which are already over-
crowded. This results in an increase in the number of dispossessed peo-
ple without adequate income-earning opportunities.
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 47

1.5 Why Has Displacement Been Problematic in the

Indian Context?
The Indian experience of displacement induced by development pro-
jects shows that the government made too weak an effort to minimize
the extent and the trauma of displacement, and to comprehensively re-
settle the displaced. A number of factors have contributed to make re-
habilitation and development of the displaced people difficult and un-
manageable.
The pace of change has exceeded the limits of resilience of the prev-
alent social and economic system, and has thus led to its disruption.
The people have been left to fend for themselves in a new world about
which they know nothing. Adverse forces, therefore, overwhelm them.
Sudden changes in technology, and the rapid penetration of the market
economy are well-known examples resulting in extensive dislocation of
traditional economies (Cernea 1990, 1995).
One important cause of displacement is the lack of recognition of
people's rights. Farmers' rights, even though partial, are on record, as
agriculture is their dominant activity. But pastoralists or people who
practice shifting cultivation have no rights whatsoever. Forest-dwellers
became encroachers when the forests were declared state property. The
rights of tenants on land belonging to farmers have largely been ig-
nored. The state or any agency on its behalf can claim the resources for
alternative use, at best after paying some compensation. People whose
rights a~e not recognized at all cannot claim even nominal compensa-
tion (Fernandes & Raj 1992, Thukral (ed.) 1992, Cernea 1995).
Even when development is planned, its impact on the people is not
taken into account in the planning process. The impact of development
projects is, at best, calculated in strictly economic terms, which take no
account of the infringement of rights and lack genuine concern for so-
cial consequences. That something is awry is realized only when people
organize protest movements, or when spontaneous resistance occurs -
invariably labelled as 'revolts' or problems of law and order (World
Bank 1993, 1994).
Displacement has consistently been treated as a non-issue because in-
tellectuals, political leaders and development planners fail to appreciate
the empirical reality. The planners viewed people living in and around
the site of a development project as impediments to progress, as those
48 The Framework

who must make sacrifices in the interests of the nation. Most planners
assumed that displacement is inevitable, and often attempted to deal
with the fallout only when the affected people resisted eviction. The re-
habilitation policies which emerged were mere mitigating strategies.
This non-appreciation has two facets. First, the system established to
compensate for the loss of property and livelihoods is limited by its
own definition. It cannot take into account anything which is not for-
mally provided for. For example, if persons' displaced' in a river valley
project are defined as those whose land or dwelling, or both, will be
submerged, people whose land or home was not submerged by water
but acquired to house the workers will be excluded from that definition.
Similarly, the displaced people in an industrial project may be defined
as only those whose land will be expropriated. The landless, who are
dependent on the expropriated land, are left to face a hostile world (Sen
1994, Fernandes & Chatterji 1995).
The second problem arises from the mind-set of the administrators
of the system. They are primarily concerned about the physical loca-
tion. To them the question of livelihood is not an issue. It is expected
that the people will take care of that themselves, particularly after their
legal claims have been settled. Even in cases of physical relocation,
there is little appreciation of the requirements of people engaged in
farming and little recognition of the importance of the role played by
the community. The people are deemed to be 'poor' ex-hypothesis, low-
er than the lowest in the system. This status is thrust on rural people
through the provision of grants which are accepted without it being
clear what the implications for their social status will be. Thus, basic
needs remain unsatisfied, while superficial pay-offs are made which at
first glance suggest that justice is being done. In fact, rehabilitation is
a lengthy process which may take several generations: normalization is
rarely achieved (Parasuraman 1994b, Baxi 1994, Singh 1994).
Further, displacement has not been recognized as a serious issue be-
cause most of the people affected belong to the weakest sections of the
community (Fernandes & Chatterji 1995, SC&ST 1990). More often
than not, when land is acquired for development projects in the so-
called advanced areas, the landowners are not dependent on the land for
their subsistence. Those who do depend on the land for their livelihood
- tenants or sharecroppers- have no rights and therefore can be pushed
aside without any fuss. In the tribal areas, where the incidence of dis-
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 49

placement is highest, the people may have no formal rights or may not
be in a position to master the complex procedures for redressal.
All in all, the approach to displacement has been ad hoc. There is no
policy and thus no commitment. Guidelines are interpreted variously,
changed at will and applied, if at all, mechanically. The affected people
have generally been left to fend for themselves. Promises for a better
future, often made in the early phases of a project, are rarely honoured
(TISS 1992, Morse & Berger 1992). Professed good intentions are ren-
dered meaningless by qualifications such as 'as much as possible' and
escape clauses convenient for those in a hurry to achieve so-called de-
velopment. The state has not deemed it necessary to enact legislation
in favour of the affected, even where the protection of tribals, which
is the government's explicit constitutional responsibility, is at stake.

1.6 Demographic and Social Factors Exacerbating the

Impact of Displacement
In the context of mounting population pressure and the scarcity of land
for rehabilitation, displacement gives rise to serious economic, social
and ecological pressures. The population of India has more than dou-
bled during the last 40 years, but the proportion of the population de-
pending on land, and the proportion of the rural population living be-
low the poverty line has only marginally declined during this period.
Population pressure exacerbates the consequences of displacement.
First, it increases the number of people displaced, particularly the poor,
and secondly, it dramatically increases the number of people poor in
resources: by definition, displacement decreases the number of people
with secure access to land.
In 1990, in any given state the number of people displaced (per equal
unit of land acquired or submerged) was 2.5 to 3.0 times as large as the
number of people displaced during the 1950s. For example, the Hira-
kud Dam in Orissa, for which construction commenced in 1948, sub-
merged 69,740 hectares and displaced 132,684 persons (Viegas 1992).
By comparison, the Upper Kolab Multipurpose Dam in Orissa, con-
structed in the 1980s, submerged 9,190 hectares of land and displaced
50,771 persons (Fernandes & Raj 1992). Thus, the number of persons
displaced per hectare increased from 1.9 during the 1950s to 5.52 per-
sons during the 1980s. Both dams were located in Orissa, and accord-
50 The Framework

ing to the 1951 and 1981 censuses, the districts had comparable popula-
tion densities.
Land loss does not have the same impact on people belonging to dif-
ferent ethnic and economic groups. In the event of displacement, cer-
tain groups suffer more than others because of the difficulties they face
in gaining entry into the organized sector, or because of the difficulties
they face in gaining access to alternative sources of livelihood. Tribals,
Dalits and women are more seriously affected than higher caste groups.
Similarly, as noted above, landless, small and marginal farmers suffer
more, both economically and socially, from displacement (Dogra 1992,
Fernandes & Raj 1992, Thukral (ed.) 1992). Social and economic status
are interrelated, creating further complications. Dalits and tribals are al-
so landless or marginal landowners. Displacement affecting access to
existing sources of livelihood may aggravate the existing social and
economic inequalities in the society.

1.7 The Magnitude of Population Displacement

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of people displaced by
development projects in India, because of the lack of data for individ-
ual projects and because of enumeration problems. However, crude es-
timates of the extent of direct displacement are possible.
Fernandes and Raj ( 1992), reconstructing data from various sources,
estimate the total number of people displaced by irrigation and power
projects, mines, industries and other infrastructure projects in India
between 1951 and 1990 at between 18.5 and 30 million. This estimate
does not include families displaced by irrigation infrastructure such as
canals, housing sites and project office structures, which might have
displaced over I 0 million people. There is no estimate available on the
number of people displaced by defence projects: this may affect several
million people. Further, millions of people have been displaced from
land and livelihood due to secondary displacement induced by develop-
ment projects.
The resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced people remains
highly unsatisfactory. Fewer than 30 per cent of those displaced in the
1950s and 1960s have been resettled; the situation for people displaced
after 1970 is no different (Handsa 1983, Mahapatra 1990). Over 50 per
cent of the people displaced by development projects are tribals, who
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 51

account for 7.85 per cent of the total population of India (Fernandes &
Chatterji 1995). Dalits and tribal people suffer further marginalization
as the state has failed to honour their R&R entitlements and often vio-
lates their constitutionally guaranteed protection. In 1996, development-
induced displacement remained one of the major causes of poverty and
deprivation among Dalits, tribals, women, artisans and other vulnerable
groups in India (Oxfam 1996).
Until recently, project preparations in India failed to include a
complete survey of the area to be submerged, and an enumeration of
all affected families and persons was not performed. Nor were plans for
R&R included. In irrigation and hyde! power projects, displaced people
were counted and plans for their resettlement prepared only a few
months prior to the actual submergence of houses and the displacement
of the people. The enumeration of affected people, the payment of com-
pensation and the actual displacement were dependent on the progress
in the construction of the dam and on the submergence schedule.
In all projects, villages and affected people should have been sur-
veyed at least one year prior to the planned submergence. Unexpected
submergence due to heavy rains created serious problems for the peo-
ple, forcing them to move out of the submergence area. If people move
out due to unexpected submergence without having received all R&R
provisions prior to their departure, they may miss out on all R&R ben-
efits. Once people move out of the submergence zone, it may not be
possible for them to exert pressure on the government to provide R&R
benefits. Often, displacement was not anticipated, and resettlement was
not provided for in the annual R&R budget.
There is no single definition for project-affected households and
Project Affected Persons (PAPs) eligible for R&R provisions offered
by the government. In inter-state projects, the problems are more com-
plicated. For example, in the case of the Pong irrigation project, which
will provide benefits to Rajasthan and cause displacement in Himachal
Pradesh, it took over a decade for the two states to agree on a defini-
tion of PAPs. Eventually, the Himachal Pradesh government designated
20,722 families as project-affected, and eligible for resettlement. How-
ever, the government of Rajasthan accepted only 16, I 00 families for
resettlement (Bhanot & Singh 1992). The Rajasthan government would
not recognize two independent households holding land jointly as two
households. Only the households headed by people in whose name land
52 The Framework

had been registered were recognized as project-displaced. Those house-

holds which had legal rights to land but did not actually possess title
to the land were not counted at all. Households with customary rights
to land were not enumerated.
Such inconsistencies and contradictory policies are not at all uncom-
mon, and in fact can be found in all categories of projects. Households
that were landless, those with customary rights to land (as was common
among the tribals) and those legally entitled to land (as was common
in Hindu households) account for a considerable number of displaced
households, but most never qualify for benefits according to the defini-
tion adopted by most state governments.
Final estimates of the numbers of displaced people are never pre-
pared. If projects are abandoned midway or delayed, as is the case for
the majority of irrigation and power projects attempted in India, the
number of displaced people may never be known. 3

1.8 The Case Studies

Development projects can be divided into three broad categories, ac-
cording to the nature and extent of displacement they cause (SC&ST
1990).
The first category includes irrigation and hydro-electric projects
which require large areas of land. Projects in this category cause large-
scale, direct, one-time displacement, after land is acquired for the con-
struction of reservoirs and canals.
Second, there are industrial, power, mining and port projects, which
require land but cause less displacement in the initial stages. However,
in these instances, displacement continues even after the project is com-
pleted. Initially, the industry itself may attract a large number of mi-
grants. A variety of other activities may pick up around the industry,
attracting even more migrants. Even if industrial expansion does not
occur, the prospect of non-farm wage labour attracts a large number of
dispossessed people from rural and tribal areas. People from areas sur-
rounding the industry lose land due to two factors. The government
may notify all agricultural lands surrounding the township for residen-
tial purposes and acquire them using the LAA. Further, squatter settle-
ments normally appear on such lands, and the owners may not have the
capacity to evict the encroachers. Common and forest lands, and agri-
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 53

cultural lands owned by small and marginal farmers and weaker social
groups might be occupied or expropriated due to population growth.
Thus, though levels of direct displacement may be low, the indirect dis-
placement caused by projects in this category is large.
Third, there are projects such as highways, which displace very few
people directly. The expansion of commercial activities along highways
eventually displaces a large number of people indirectly. People affect-
ed by indirect displacement are never adequately compensated.
In any area selected for the construction of an industrial project, a
number of affected groups may be found. The situation of each group
is different, and each requires differential state attention. The groups
found in the industrial area are:

• Displaced people: People displaced due to land acquisition for the

project, people displaced due to the indirect effects of the project,
people displaced by other development projects and left to fend for
themselves.
• Migrants to the industrial area: People who, having been evicted
from their land and dispossessed in rural and tribal areas, migrate to
the industrial area for employment.
• Industrial workers drawn from the above categories: A major portion
of the work force in industrial projects is recruited in other parts of
the state in which the project is located, and in other parts of the
country. Most of the better-paid managerial, supervisory and techni-
cal staff may come from the areas outside the project, and they are
represented by dominant high caste, better educated migrants mostly
from urban areas.

The economic and social status of these groups vary considerably.

The first group may be compensated by the R&R provisions of the pro-
ject. The others share in the gains of industrialization according to their
social and political strength.
This book discusses a cross-section of development projects executed
in the past 30 years in various Indian states. The studies of the various
projects were conducted independent of one another, but they addressed
similar issues. The studies were conducted at the request of various or-
ganizations (state and central governments, public sector industries, the
World Bank, and international Consultancy firms). The case studies
54 The Framework

selected for this book include one steel plant, one port, one iron ore
mine, two irrigation projects, and one irrigation-cum-power project: the
Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP), the Upper Krishna Project (UKP), the
Maharashtra Irrigation II Project (Mil), the Durgapur Steel Plant
(DSP), the Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP), and the Bolani Iron Ores
Mine (BIOM). These projects broadly represent the development pro-
jects implemented in the past five decades, since Independence.

Industrial projects
The Government of India (GOI) invested heavily in four integrated
steel plants during the 1950s and 1960s. These plants were located in
Durgapur in West Bengal, Rourkela in Orissa, Bhilai in Madhya Pra-
desh and Bokaro in Bihar. They represent large-scale industry in terms
of investment, the area of land acquired, and the number of people dis-
placed: together, the four plants displaced over 125,000 persons. The
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), a public sector organization
managing all four steel plants, permitted the author to study any one
plant. The Durgapur Steel Plant, completed and commissioned in the
early 1960s, was selected because it caused the massive displacement
of persons belonging to diverse ethnic groups representing all layers of
the caste system. The progressive political system in West Bengal
provided an interesting contextual variable.
Secondly, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port, located in New Bombay across
Greater Bombay Harbour, was selected for this study. Completed and
commissioned around 1985, the JNP displaced over 2,000 households.
The port is situated in the Bombay-Thane-New Bombay-Panvel indus-
trial belt in Maharashtra State, the largest area of industrial concentra-
tion in the country. This provided an important contextual variable for
the study of the impact of displacement in an area assumed to have
good employment opportunities.
The Bolani Iron Ore Mines were selected from 18 GOI-owned public
sector mines located in the Jharkhand region in Eastern India. The Bo-
lani mines, owned by the SAIL, are located in the Keonjhar district of
Orissa, bordering on Bihar. They are typical of the iron ore mines in
forested areas of Bihar and Orissa. The Bolani mines were explored in
the 1930s, and full-scale operation commenced in the early 1960s. Like
all other mines in Orissa, Bihar and West Bengal, they displaced
primarily the tribal population.
 Development, Displacement and Resettlement in India 55

Two factors have an important bearing on the well-being of house-

holds displaced by industrial projects. These are resettlement and rehab-
ilitation policies, and the time at which the industry was initiated. The
policy factor distinguishes the projects noted above, as in 1967 the
Government of India directed all public sector industries to provide
employment for one person from each family losing land. The DSP and
the Bolani mines were commissioned before 1967 and not affected by
this directive, while the JNP was commissioned in the early 1980s.
However, the directive to provide employment to the displaced was not
a policy measure, and thus non-compliance could not be challenged in
a court of law. In practice the provision of employment was left to the
discretion of the industry.

Irrigation projects
Two irrigation projects, namely the Maharashtra Irrigation II in the
Satara district of Maharashtra, and the Upper Krishna Irrigation Project
in Northern Karnataka were initiated in the 1960s and completed in the
early 1980s. Both dams were constructed across the river Krishna and
caused large-scale displacement. The Mil consisted of five dams, which
together resulted in displacement of over 200,000 persons. In this book
the focus is on the Dhom dam, which resulted in the displacement of
42,768 persons.
The Upper Krishna Project, which included two dams, namely
Almatti and Narayanpur, displaced over 250,000 persons. This study
evaluates the displacement of 54,678 persons caused by the Narayan pur
dam.
The sixth project discussed in this book is the Sardar Sarovar Project,
which is part of the Narmada Irrigation and Power Systems. The Sardar
Sarovar dam was expected to create a reservoir that would submerge
37,000 hectares of land in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra
states, in a region inhabited mostly by tribals. The population displaced
in Gujarat and Maharashtra consists solely of tribals. In Madhya
Pradesh, 40 per cent of the affected people were tribals. The remaining
submergence area in Madhya Pradesh extends upstream to include caste
villages, where irrigated agriculture is the mainstay of the economy.
About 23,500 people in Gujarat, 28,000 in Maharashtra and 150,000 in
Madhya Pradesh will be displaced by the reservoir, in a total of 297
villages. 4 The inter-state nature of the project has made resettlement
56 The Framework

extremely difficult and complex. Inter-state politics, strong anti-dam

agitation by the displaced people and a high level of international
interest has made the SSP one of the most challenging projects in
contemporary India. The outcome of the SSP project is expected to
greatly influence the nature of future development projects in India.
To sum up, this study seeks to analyse the resettlement and rehabili-
tation experience in India, given the current development paradigm,
drawing from a wide range of development projects. Six major devel-
opment projects executed in the country since Independence have been
selected for in-depth analysis. The lessons from the case studies enable
us to examine the ability of government to carry out 'just' rehabilita-
tion. Further, an attempt is made to develop a framework for policy on
development, displacement and rehabilitation.
 Assessing the Impact
2 of Displacement:
Methodological Issues

2.1 Problems of R&R Studies

The study of involuntary displacement is methodologically complex, be-
cause displacement, resettlement and rehabilitation are lengthy and
complex processes involving various settings, several phases and num-
erous players. The dispersal of displaced families complicates data-
collection. There may be a gap of more than 15 years between the time
a household is notified of the government's intention to acquire the
land or the house, or both, and the actual move to the relocation site
(or some other place). In this transition period, households may under-
go serious changes.
One methodological complication particular to displacement studies
is that of the expectations of informants. Often the studies raised the
expectations of the affected people, who hoped that an increase in ben-
efits would result from the studies' findings. Although conscious at-
tempts were made to dispel any such expectations, and the researchers
disassociated themselves from the sponsors of the research projects
(government, industry, or World Bank), people's expectations certainly
influenced the data collected.
The time required to establish a satisfactory rapport was prolonged.
People tended to misrepresent their situation in the hope of receiving
better benefits. As a result, much of the data collected in the initial
weeks proved to be unusable, and the research team had to resort to a
multiplicity of research methods. Thus, until a fair understanding of the

57
58 The Framework

socioeconomic position of the affected persons had been established,

through informal discussion, case studies and group discussions, the re-
search team refrained from household interviews and focus group dis-
cussions. Often this process took many weeks. The training programme
for the research staff was prolonged, and the number of supervisory
staff was increased to guard against misrepresentation.
In many areas, the affected people turned their frustration with the
government towards the research team, often resorting to physical and
verbal abuse (for example in the case of the SSP and the JNP). The re-
searchers were confronted with ethical problems, as governments and
industries used the study to buy time with the affected people, or to de-
velop strategies to crush agitation (for example in the JNP case). These
forms of abuse were dealt with in two ways: it was negotiated that the
affected people, their representatives and the media would be granted
access to the reports (TISS 1991, Parasuraman & Sengupta 1992), and
the duration of the research project was shortened by injecting large
funds and reassigning staff (Parasuraman 1991 a & b).

2.2 Research Design

The studies presented in this book make use of various research de-
signs. The impact of displacement and resettlement would have been
best assessed by comparing conditions prior to displacement with con-
ditions a few years after resettlement. Such an approach was not em-
ployed in the research on displacement caused by projects executed be-
fore 1990, but only for projects executed after 1990, such as the Sardar
Sarovar Project. For the SSP, a comprehensive socioeconomic and de-
mographic situation assessment was carried out a few years prior to
displacement for all households destined to be displaced. The displaced
households were followed for several years after resettlement, at pre-
determined intervals.
For the Maharashtra II and the Upper Krishna Projects, a post hoc
test-control design was used. In these two projects, baseline assessment
was not carried out. However, in order to assess the impact of displace-
ment, a control group was introduced in the post-resettlement situation
assessment. In the UKP, unaffected villages close to submerged villages
were selected as a comparison group. The caste composition and land
distribution characteristics of the affected and unaffected villages were
 Assessing the Impact of Displacement: Methodological Issues 59

matched. In the case of the Mil project, people were resettled in a com-
mand area close to existing villages. Once the resettled villages had
been selected from among many host villages adjoining the resettled vil-
lage, by multi-stage random sampling, the host village showing the
strongest ethnic compatibility with the resettled village was selected as
the control village.
For all the industrial projects, a post hoc research design was em-
ployed. All displaced people were traced to their current place of resi-
dence, and their situation was assessed. This assessment was compared
with data for similar population groups, data obtained from government
statistical departments and research institutions. In all research projects
except the one on the SSP, the situation of people in partially affected
villages was assessed in addition to the situation of people from com-
pletely displaced villages. This allowed for a comparison of the impact
of complete displacement and relocation to partial loss not resulting in
relocation.
All projects except the SSP were visited a minimum of five years af-
ter relocation and 'official' rehabilitation were completed. Displaced
households may require five to fifteen years to fully realize the impli-
cations of relocation. Certain negative impacts such as morbidity and
mortality are short-term in nature, while others, such as changes in eco-
nomic status and integration with the host communities may take sever-
al years.
In all the studies presented in this book, extractive and participatory
methods were used to assess the nature and extent of problems involved
in the displacement and relocation process, and the way people dealt
with the problems individually and collectively. A combination of re-
search methods was used for data collection and triangulation: tracer
study, household interview, focus group discussion, life history and
case study methods. In addition, for the SSP participant and non-parti-
cipant observation methods were used to study ongoing R&R work.

Tracer studies
Displacement deprives both the landed and the landless of their sources
of livelihood. If the official R&R policy makes no provision to replace
lost livelihood, the displaced households may disperse widely, resettling
where they expect to find economic opportunities. In the case of pro-
jects which allot housing plots to the displaced, many PAPs decide to
60 The Framework

Table 2. 1 Research design of the studies

Research design employed

DSP Post hoc design

JNP Post hoc design
BIOM Post hoc design
Mil Post hoc test-control design
UKP Post hoc test-control design
SSP Pre-displacement assessment Post-resettlement assessment
(3-5 years prior to displacement) at 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 years after
with updating of data one year the move to new (official or non-
before eviction official) location

settle in the resettlement site. If the resettlement area is located in an

area with better employment opportunities, most of the displaced, in-
cluding the landless, may settle there. The chance that households stay
in the project area is greatest in industrial projects which offer the dis-
placed people direct and indirect employment (Parasuraman & Singh
1993). Further, 'internal' factors emanating from households' life-
cycles determine the extent of dispersal: after a period of time, house-
holds may split up and may move to other places for education, em-
ployment or marriage.
Keeping track of the affected households is difficult. Continuous
monitoring of resettled households over a period of time is possible,
but (as in the SSP case) expensive, and project authorities usually avoid
this method, as it may be used by the government or funding agencies
to assess the efficiency of the R&R programme and its implementation.
The tracer studies conducted for the cases presented in this book fol-
lowed two methods to identify the current location of displaced
households. The first method used the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO)
and Rehabilitation Officer (RO) records along with group discussions
with community elders at the resettlement sites. The second method
was based on canvassing of a few questions in a survey. While the first
technique made it possible to trace the whereabouts of the original
households, the second technique traced the location of all members of
 Assessing the Impact of Displacement: Methodological Issues 61

the original households. A step-by-step description of the tracer study

method is included in Appendix 2A.

Focus group discussion

Household surveys generated quantitative data on the impact of dis-
placement and resettlement on economic and social conditions. Howev-
er, the surveys were not designed to provide a full assessment of R&R
experiences. Thus, in addition to tracer studies and household surveys,
in all projects qualitative data were collected from various focus
groups.
The focus group discussions were conducted after the official records
(see section 2.3) and household surveys had been analysed. Examina-
tion of official documents, and discussions with officials provided an
understanding of the R&R process from the government's point of
view. Familiarity with the government's position enabled the research-
ers to cross-check various aspects of R&R activities with the house-
holds during interviews. Focus groups were particularly valuable in the
assessment of the R&R experiences of vulnerable groups such as tri-
bals, Dalits, landless people and women.
For more details regarding the assessment of R&R issues using the
focus group method, please see Appendix 2C. The household survey
method is described in Appendix 2B.

Household case studies

Case studies were conducted for a few selected households in each pro-
ject. This was one of the most effective ways to record the process of
change. A few case studies were conducted before the household inter-
views were started. Often, typical households were identified during the
household interviews, and pursued over a number of sessions.
For example, in Durgapur one Dalit household, formerly engaged in
sharecropping and agricultural wage labour, was selected for the case
study. Men from this household found work with contractors, while
women were engaged in agricultural wage labour. This household also
received three bighas (one acre) of land under the land redistribution
scheme of the Communist Party (CPM). This household was typical in
the sense that most landless people had had similar experiences.
An attempt was also made to document recollections of experiences
from individuals representing different subgroups, using the life-course
62 The Framework

approach (Krueger 1988). A few women representing high caste, Dalit

and tribal groups who have gone through the process of displacement
and resettlement were selected for discussions of their experiences and
the impact of the accompanying changes on their lives.

2.3 Data Available

Data on project-affected people are patchy and inadequate, and demand
considerable reconstruction. The basic data available are derived from
records on landownership, housing and other properties, maintained by
village-level revenue officials, and land acquisition and compensation
data maintained by land acquisition officers.

Records maintained by village officials

House-ownership and landownership records constituted basic data
sources for tracer studies. In revenue villages, records of households in
possession of their own homes were maintained by talati or comparable
village-level officials. Such records would be updated when houses
were transferred to others. When house taxes were paid, a receipt was
issued to the owner of the house.
Registers of persons who owned land were also maintained by talati:
all agricultural and non-agricultural land in the village was recorded.
Landowners could be private farmers living in or outside the village,
absentee landlords, religious trusts, government departments (Revenue,
Forest), or court receivers. Land could be registered in the name of one
or more persons, depending on the arrangements made by the owner(s).
These house and land records were maintained by the village official,
as well as by the Revenue Department at the tehsil headquarters. After
the villages were submerged or displaced, the records were maintained
only at the tehsil offices.

Records prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer

All agricultural lands and houses noted in Section IV ofthe 1894 LAA
were destined for acquisition. The Land Acquisition Officer, from the
Revenue Department, assessed the value of all lands - agricultural,
non-agricultural, individual, temple, and government-owned- specified
in the Section IV notice. Similarly, the value of all structures- houses,
temples, schools, hospitals, wells and so on - was assessed. The LAO
 Assessing the Impact of Displacement: Methodological Issues 63

prepared a list of all households with land and/or housing structures in

the village. The LAO's documents were as comprehensive as the vil-
lage official's records and thus comparable.

Records maintained by the Rehabilitation Officer

The Rehabilitation Officer assumes further responsibilities when the
LAO has completed procedures related to land acquisition. In states
where there is no well-defined R&R structure, the district revenue offi-
cial, most often a Deputy Collector, acted as RO. The R&R documents
are available at the district collectorate, where the office of the RO is
generally located. A copy of the document can also be found at the de-
partment executing the main project, for example, the Irrigation Depart-
ment in case of irrigation projects. Data were derived from the follow-
ing RO records:

• Compensation payment records: Records of all households which had

land and/or housing or other properties such as trees or wells, which
had been acquired by the LAO and paid for in cash;
• Housing plots as compensation: Households which lost their homes
were eligible to receive housing plots as compensation in the resettle-
ment area. However, for projects without this basic provision, such
records were unavailable;
• R&R provisions: In certain projects, R&R provisions might include
land, housing plots and loans. Further, moving allowances and sub-
sistence allowances might have been paid during the transition pe-
riod. Records listing those who had received such provisions were
kept in the RO's files.

Records maintained by project officials

Industrial and mining projects maintained records of all households
which lost land and/or houses. Information relating to jobs (generated
directly or indirectly by the industry concerned) provided to the
project-affected households may also be maintained by the industry.
Government departments and industries responsible for the execution
of projects, and the organizations which funded the projects sometimes
did have pre- and post-project appraisals, mission reports, evaluation
studies, budget proposals, and so on.
64 The Framework

Data from the household survey

A household survey was conducted for all cases presented in this vol-
ume. In all studies, the 'sources of livelihood' approach was followed.
Specifically, the surveys focused on the following aspects:
the extent of ownership of land, cattle and access to various other
sources of income before displacement;
• the extent of loss of land and other sources of income;
• the amount of compensation money and other R&R provisions re-
ceived;
• the sources of livelihood at the time of the survey (land, employ-
ment, wage labour, etc.);
• the levels of income and expenditure at the time of the survey.
Per capita income and consumption were considered indicators of the
standard of living. Total and per capita incomes and consumption were
computed for each household.
The identification of people's sources of livelihood before and after
displacement was essential. Difficulties arose in accurately assessing in-
come due to the multiplicity of sources and variations in wages paid.
Case studies and focus group discussions with a number of households
and groups were conducted to gather data. A thorough inventory of em-
ployment avenues, wage levels and variations according to age, sex and
type of employment was developed before the survey was started. Giv-
en the size of the task of assessing income and expenditure, expenditure
data were collected only in longitudinal studies such as the one attempt-
ed for the SSP, but not in others. Thus, the size of the sample of house-
holds was different in each study. (Further details on the selection of
samples for the household survey are presented in Appendix 2B.)

2.4 Difficulties Obtaining Data

Obtaining information was problematic. Permission from the District
Collector was required before access could be gained to any of the
documents mentioned above. The Collector in turn required permission
from the state government to release the documents. Usually, access to
documents relating to land and R&R was granted to academics and re-
 Assessing the Impact of Displacement: Methodological Issues 65

searchers only if the work was commissioned by the government, pub-

lic sector industries or the World Bank.
Further, the data maintained by the RO were incomplete, and collect-
ed in numerous files. The collation of information from files located in
various offices was tedious and time-consuming. However, the RO files
could serve as supplements to LAO documents. While the RO's docu-
ments played an important role in introducing the research team to the
relocation process and sites, it was necessary to carefully cull out and
corroborate information from other sources. By its very nature, and due
to the incremental approach adopted, R&R is a long, drawn-out pro-
cess, and as a consequence records are stored in many places, even in
tehsils in different states, in inter-state projects.
Fundamental difficulties arose from the fact that certain categories of
households were left out of the records. According to the 1894 Land
Acquisition Act, only individuals who had land, a house (or houses) or
other property were entitled to compensation. Thus, many categories of
households did not have a legal identity in the R&R process. The fol-
lowing categories, in particular, do not fit the conceptualization of the
LAA:

(1) Among Hindu households, land and house(s) may be recorded in

the name of the father or eldest brother, although the sons or
brothers may have formed separate households. According to Hin-
du inheritance rules, all these men are entitled to a share in the
property, but independent households without registered property
are not found in official R&R records. Similarly, joint households
are invisible in the records, for in such cases property was regis-
tered in the name of the lineage or household head.
(2) Landless and houseless households were not recorded. It is com-
mon in Indian villages for landless labourers and occasionally ten-
ants - migrants from other villages - to live in the house of the
landlord. Dispossessed people from the same village, mostly Dalits,
often lived on the land of their masters. Labourers and tenants
formed separate households, but customarily built huts on their mas-
ters' land. In the event of land acquisition, the owner of the land
was eligible for compensation, but not the tenants. Here, the LAA
contradicted the Land Reform and Tenancy Acts. Invariably, the
LAA superseded. Although many households cultivated land as
66 The Framework

tenants, it has been impossible to find data on those households in

the older projects, where displacement has been completed.
(3) Households with customary rights to cultivate forest or temple
lands were also left out of records. In certain areas, a significant
proportion of households was involved in this kind of cultivation.
In tribal areas the lack of data is acute, because of the prevalence
of common land and customary rights.'
An attempt was made to trace and account for the unrecorded
households. Voter lists for the period prior to displacement, when
they were available, proved to be a good source. These were com-
bined with Forest Department records to compile a list of house-
holds residing in various hamlets at the time of land acquisition
(Parasuraman 1990a).

2.5 R&R Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy

The Sardar Sarovar project provided for continuous monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) by independent institutions. It was expected that
such continuous monitoring would facilitate the development of amel-
iorative measures to minimize the negative impact of displacement. Re-
settlement has potentially powerful social, economic and political con-
sequences, and the design of the R&R policy package itself is based on
certain assumptions and expectations that may or may not prove to be
appropriate and sustainable in social, economic and environmental
terms. Further, the achievement of project objectives cannot be meas-
ured simply in quantifiable measures based on post-resettlement studies.
For the SSP, the World Bank developed an M&E programme2 to as-
sess the progress and achievement of four basic objectives:

• Displaced persons should be compensated for their losses at full re-

placement cost prior to actually moving. They should receive assist-
ance in moving and be supported during the transition period in the
resettlement site. They should be assisted in their efforts to improve
upon their living standards, income-earning capacity and production
levels, or at least in restoring them.
Displaced persons should be resettled as viable social units, which
may be in the form of a village or hamlet as a whole, as a communi-
ty or as a household.
 Assessing the Impact of Displacement: Methodological Issues 67

• Displaced persons should be provided with all the infrastructure and

civic facilities and amenities necessary at the resettlement sites.
• Resettlers should be integrated socially and economically into the
host communities so that adverse impacts on resettlers and the host
communities are minimized.
A comprehensive baseline survey of households was conducted two to
three years before the actual move took place. The baseline study con-
sisted of a season-based survey, in three rounds, of all households. The
survey took into account social, economic, and cultural issues. The base-
line data was updated once every year until relocation. To facilitate
long-term comparison and measurement of change, quantitative and
qualitative indicators were developed on the basis of the baseline data.
Further, the baseline work involved the study of the host area and the
host population before and after the resettlement of the displaced peo-
ple in the host viilage area. Socioeconomic indicators of the host popu-
lation were developed to enable comparison with the affected popula-
tion.
In addition to the development of the socioeconomic database for
each affected household, an in-depth study was made of a few dis-
placed villages. In-depth studies were to focus on economic, social, cul-
tural, demographic, ecological characteristics of the people and the
area. At the end of the first year after relocation, all shifted households
were studied. Follow-up studies are to be conducted every two or three
years.
The M&E programme as described above was expected to yield the
following results:

• comparison of the conditions of the displaced people before and after

resettlement;
• comparison between the displaced population after resettlement and
the host population;
• comparison of the situations of truncated villages before and after
submergence;
• analysis of the changes in the social, economic, psychological, and
health conditions of individuals according to age and sex in the var-
ious phases of displacement, resettlement and rehabilitation.
Table 2.2 Stages of the M&E strategy 0\
00

Phase/Component Focus Method

Pre-resettlement phase
1. Planning issues and Definition. identification and enumeration of PAPs. Baseline studies;.
preparing for move Assessment of economic and social systems of PAPs. Review of government and other data and studies.
R&R policy review.

Resettlement phase
2. Participation and Type/content/style of information dissemination. Procedural analysis.
PAPs awareness Methods used in consultation with community. Discussion.
NGO involvement.
3. Monitoring of R&R Observing the activities of PAPs. the government. activists and Participant and non-participant observation. ;;!
~
process the World Bank. Document scan.
Discussion. ~
4. R&R package and Policy entitlements and expectations. Regular 6-monthly survey and regular field ~
~
entitlements Efficiency of delivery systems & content of delivery. verification.
Problem resolution method. Examination of government documents.
Involvement of PAPs in programme implementation. i
5. Shift to new area Logistics. timing and method, with special attention to vulnerable Participatory observation.
groups, PAP participation. problems and the resolution process. Sample enquiry.
Temporary housing arrangements at the site. Discussion.
6. Adaptation/integration Settling-down process: house construction. employment. relationship Regular monitoring.
process with host community. capacities for adaptation to new environment, Sample survey.
especially regarding women, children and the elderly.
7. Impact assessment R&R outcome. Evaluation based on all studies done earlier.
Achievement of objectives. Repeat survey.
Lessons learned and future policy objectives. Indicator comparison.

Source: Spooner 1991, TISS 1987-93.

 Appendix 2A
Tracer Study Techniques

Tracer Study Using Land Acquisition Records

Step I: Compilation of data from various sources and creation of records
for each household
A list of households in the original village prior to displacement was
obtained from the Revenue Department. The records of the LAO were also
obtained. For each household, a computer record was created including the
name of the original village, a household identification number in the
original village, the name, age and sex of the head of the household, details
regarding the household's land, house and other property, and information
on the compensation and R&R provisions received.

Step 2: Tracing of original households in official resettlement sites

For each displaced village, the displaced households were divided into two
categories: households which, according to the RO list, were resident in the
government-provided resettlement sites, and those which settled elsewhere,
on their own.
The households at the resettlement sites were traced using data from two
sources: voter lists and panchayat and revenue records for the village.
Tracing was done with the help of village elders, panchayat members and
R&R officials, if available. Knowledgeable persons were asked about the
whereabouts of each household in the original list.
At this point, information on two more aspects was obtained about each
household, namely the caste and religion of the household head, and wheth-
er or not the current head of the household was the same as the one in the
original record.

69
70 The Framework

The records of households from the original village list that were resid-
ing at the resettlement site were separated from the records for missing
households. The project team ordinarily stayed at the resettlement sites or
villages throughout the project period, so tracer work was done during the
evenings and nights, and if necessary visits were made to specific houses
for clarification.
A list was drawn up of households which had not relocated to the re-
settlement site, and an attempt was made to determine their whereabouts.
A caste-specific approach was adopted, because it seemed likely that house-
holds belonging to the same caste in the original village might stay in
touch in spite of being dispersed. Groups of adult males and females were
invited for discussion to determine the whereabouts of households which
had belonged to their caste in the original village but were not at the re-
settlement site. Such discussions were conducted for each caste separately.
Both men and women were consulted, for they might have access to differ-
ent information.
There were problem cases. Some households, for example, had moved
more than once. In some cases the original household had split up into
many units, which resettled in different places.
Tracer studies were a part of all the studies presented in this book, but
the extent to which tracing was conducted varied according to the purpose
of each individual study. Displacement due to the DSP and BIOM occurred
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The present study was carried out
during 1990-91. Given the time lapse, elaborate tracing was not deemed
useful. In the Durgapur study, a list was obtained from the project office
of households that had lost lands and houses. All further research focused
on the households specified in that list. In the Bolani study, not all house-
holds had been recorded, due to common ownership of land. In that case,
a list of original households was drawn up based on voter lists from the
pre-land acquisition period and based on discussion with community elders.
For the Mil project, tracer studies were done for all 13 completely sub-
merged villages. In the UKP, tracer studies were done only for the six fully
affected villages selected for the study. In the JNP, all affected households
were covered by the tracer studies. Although R&R work in JNP was com-
pleted over eight years ago, funding was made available to trace as many
households as possible, as the aim of the studies was to identify and assist
vulnerable households.
 Tracer Study Techniques 71

Tracer Study Using Survey Questions

Tracer studies based on revenue, LAO and R&R records, in addition to dis-
cussions with caste groups, provided indications of the location of the
heads of households who had had land or a house in their names. These
sources did not yield information on other men and women who had legal
access to the property registered in the name of common head, however.
Further, household structure might have changed due to displacement:
households might have split up into two or more units, and formerly sepa-
rate households might have joined together to form a new unit. For exam-
ple, independent households in Manibeli village, displaced by the SSP,
formed joint households in the resettlement area. Among the tribal people
inhabiting the Satpuda mountains in Maharashtra prior to displacement,
young males who married had formed patrilocal households; parents nor-
mally lived with their youngest married son. When they moved to the re-
settlement area to be able to meet vastly increased labour requirements, the
siblings formed joint households. In many projects, loss of land also meant
the disintegration of joint households and the dispersal of their members.
The second tracer study technique aimed to trace the movement of peo-
ple with legal access to property, so that the nature of changes in house-
holds could be analysed. In a household survey, questions were included
on the whereabouts of individuals who had legal access to common proper-
ty and on the whereabouts of other male members ofthe households. Using
the data thus collected, an index of dispersion was calculated. Data on the
dispersal of individuals with legal access to land and other male members
of the household were collected in partially and unaffected villages for com-
parison with households from displaced villages.
 Appendix 2B
The Household Survey:
Selection of Households

The Jawaharlal Nehru Port

In the JNP study, the object was to identify, for rehabilitation purposes,
households with an income below the poverty line. Thus, all affected
households were surveyed.

Table 28.1 JNP households suNeyed

Covered in Focus groups

Affected HHs Traced HHs
HH-survey covered

2,010 1,753 1,753 28

The Durgapur Steel Plant

In the Durgapur study, the object was to assess the condition of displaced
people and to provide a reference for other such projects. In that study, a
sample of households was considered sufficient. Employment with the DSP
was considered a stratifying variable. A list of households in each resettle-
ment area was prepared using voter lists and documents from the local
council (Durgapur Notified Area Authority). The list was verified to elimi-
nate migrant households. The list of employees, obtained from the DSP,
was superimposed on the general list. A similar procedure was followed
with regard to the partially affected villages.
About one-fourth of all households from the fully displaced villages lo-
cated in resettled villages, and eight per cent of the households from par-
tially affected villages were selected for the survey. Sample selection was

72
 The Household Survey: Selection of Households 73

relatively easy in partially affected villages compared to resettled areas

because of the lower number of migrant households residing in those areas.

Table 28.2 DSP households surveyed

Total Sample Number of

HHs survey groups

Fully affected
-landed 1,511 400 18
-landless 660 100 8
Partially affected
-landed 2,436 160 18
-landless 878 100 10

Maharashtra II and Upper Krishna

In both irrigation projects, households from submerged and partially affect-
ed villages were selected by multi-stage stratified random sampling.

(a) All submerged villages were identified and then divided into three cat-
egories, corresponding to three phases of submergence. Separate lists
were prepared for villages located on each side of the reservoir. From
each category, one village was selected. Thus, a total of six submerged
villages was selected for the study. Further, lists of all households in
each resettled village were prepared and subdivided according to caste
and landholding status. The sample size allotted to each village was dis-
tributed proportionately across caste and landownership status.
(b) All partially affected villages were identified, on both sides of the
reservoir. Villages on each side were listed and divided into three
groups. In each phase, one village was randomly selected. Thus, six
partially affected villages were selected. Households in each selected
village were stratified by caste and landownership status. The sample
size was proportionally distributed across all groups, and households
were selected using the systematic random sampling method.
(c) Selection of control villages: In the UKP case, three villages not af-
fected by submergence but close to submerged villages and comparable
in terms of caste and landownership composition were selected for the
study. In the Mil case, the displaced were relocated in a command area
close to already existing settlements. Six existing villages correspon-
74 The Framework

ding to six resettled villages, with similar ethnic characteristics, were

selected for the study.

Table 28.3 Mil and UKP households surveyed

Villages Villages HHs in

Groups
affected selected survey

Mil
-fully affected 13 6 160 24
- rim villages 13 3 80 6
- host villages (control) 13 6 120 14
UKP
- fully affected 37 6 210 24
- partially affected 53 6 120 16
- unaffected 53 3 110 6
 Appendix 2C
The Focus Group Method

Focus groups were formed on the basis of caste, sex and economic strata
(defined in terms of the amount of land owned and/or access to employ-
ment in the organized sector). Men and women were grouped separately,
and subdivided according to caste and economic stratum. Thus, for exam-
ple, among the DSP-affected resettled households in New Waria village,
five groups were formed: men and women belonging to high castes and Da-
lits formed four groups. One mixed group of tribal households was also
formed. In other resettlement sites, men working with contractors and rick-
shaw-pullers constituted two additional groups. In certain areas, tribal
households were subdivided into Christian and non-Christian categories.
For each project, a discussion guide was prepared and modified appropri-
ately for discussion with different groups.
Each focus group consisted of 8 to l 0 persons. Discussions were held
when people had time, and this could often stretch beyond one meeting.
There were few problems in getting groups together, as the research team
lived in the village and notified the groups members of scheduled meetings
in advance.
Focus groups discussions proved particularly insightful with regard to the
position of vulnerable groups such as tribals, Dalits, landless people and
women. They seem to experience greater difficulties and deprivation than
other groups do in conditions of displacement and resettlement, hence spe-
cific attention was paid to such groups. With regard to women, the follow-
ing aspects were considered:

employment opportunities in the new area;

• the availability of water, fuel and fodder;
the nature and extent of changes in level of and diversity in food con-
sumption;

75
76 The Framework

the condition of children's health;

• the household's access to health care services, food from the public dis-
tribution system, and loans;
• prenatal and postnatal care, child care arrangements, and so on.
 Appendix 2D
Overview of Data Collection
and R&R Issues

Table 20.1 R&R issues covered by various sources of data (see next page)

77
 -...)
Table 20.1 R&R issues covered by various sources of data OQ

Data from official records and other Data collected from individual
Data generated from focus groups
sources households

Baseline study on affected households Sources of livelihood the household had Nature of assets people had access to
access to
Method of fixing compensation Land held (owned, leased & encroached) Extent of loss of livelihood
General policy Land lost; loss of house, trees & other Perception of compensation; fixation,
Total land acquired (agricultural, forest structures; compensation received for land, method of payment
revenue land) house, trees, etc.
~
(I)
Compensation paid Representation for enhancing compensa- Opportunities for investment
tion, outcome; number of persons sharing; ~
use of compensation money; guidance in ~
(I)
use of money

Policies regarding R&R measures: i

provision of land, provision of employment, Receipt of provisions by the household People's perception & experience on
loans & subsidies for acquiring income pro- provision of land, employment, loans &
viding assets, housing plot, house construc- subsidies, houseplots & construction
tion assistance assistance
Actual provision of:
land, employment, loans & subsidies, hous- Perception of the group regarding who
ing plots, house construction assistance gained and who lost in terms of R&R
provisions in the village
(Continued)
Table 20. 1 (Continued)

Data from official records and other Data collected from individual
sources Data generated from focus groups
households
:::;:,
Policies regarding shifting & assistance in Assistance received in shifting; Problems faced in shifting; experience R<>
establishment: nature of assistance given assistance received in establishment of people during shifting; role of gov- :::;:,
to shift; support during transition period ernment; voluntary organizations; help :;;..
at the resettlement site; temporary sheds; in mitigating problems faced during ~
"'
subsistence allowance; support to clear transition period ~
land; support to sustain cattle (""]
Cl
'<::!
Sources of livelihood accessible to the resettled household and standard of living ~!:l..
Provisions aimed at asset and income Economic activities, extent of engagement Experience of people re employment
creation: loans, subsidies to gain income & wages earned by each member of house-
~
opportunities, wages; economic condi-
creating assets; direct employment created; hold; total and per capita income of the tion of sub-groups; employment oppor- ....~
indirect employment created; activities of household; nature and extent of migration tunities for men, women; strategies c:;·
the project in facilitating employment to by members of household; indebtedness adopted by people, government, vol- ~
affected families details untary organizations in restructuring ~
livelihoods of people
~
Infrastructure provision ~
Provisions according to R&R policy: Deaths and births in household after shift-
-Q.,
When each provision was actually
Actual provision of health services, water ing; school attendance; education achieve- operational; problems faced by people
facilities, school, electricity and others ment of members after shifting in access to basic services ~
(Continued)

-..J
\0
Table 20. 1 (Continued) oc
0

Data from official records and other Data collected from individual
Data generated from focus groups
sources households

Social aspects related to relocation

Policies regarding: social unit for relocation, Resettlement experience of the caste
place of resettlement; people's choice of group; experience in choice of reloca-
relocation site tion site; problems faced with marriage
alliances, continuation of relationships

Actual relocation
~
Ill
Number of villages fully affected; number Financial cost of displacement & resettle- Experience of the resettled with host
of PAPs; number of resettlement sites; ment to the household; skills available community; people's perception of how ~
financial outlay for R&R; actual amount for self-employment; nature of assistance R&R should have been done; nature of ~
Ill
spent required assistance required to improve
socioeconomic condition

Access to information and consultation

i
Government's method of information Source of information about the project
provision & consultation with PAPs; and R&R component; consultation of
participation of PAPs in decision-making the government about R&R provisions,
relocation sites, infrastructure creation,
and other issues
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation
3
Policy in Practice

3.1 Introduction: The Lack of Adequate Policy

Research has documented important findings on the economic, social
and psychological impacts of displacement and on experiences with re-
settlement in India. 1 However, these findings have had little impact on
national policy or on official interventions. Despite the magnitude and
persistence of displacement and its accompanying traumas, the govern-
ment has failed to develop a national policy, and, more importantly, to
promulgate national and state legislation to defend the interests of peo-
ple who are forcibly displaced in the national interest (Kothari 1995,
Fernandes & Chatterji 1995). An R&R policy for displaced tribals is
currently under consideration at the Lok Sabha, but legislation covering
all groups is nowhere near.
Before August 1995, only two state governments had developed poli-
cies for the rehabilitation of project-affected people: the government of
Maharashtra (GOM) enacted legislation in 1976 (and in 1986 and
1990), and the government of Madhya Pradesh (GOMP) legislated an
act in 1985. These state policies dealt only with displacement caused
by irrigation projects. Resettlement of people displaced by all other
projects (mines, industries, sanctuaries and parks, urban development,
nuclear and defence installations, etc.) was dealt with by ad hoc gov-
ernment resolutions.
Since the early 1980s, resistance by the affected people against the
projects that displaced them has increased. The Narmada Movement
against the Sardar Sarovar Project has brought the problems of dis-
placed people to the fore, and has exposed the inability of the govern-

81
82 The Framework

ment to relocate and rehabilitate the displaced people with just compen-
sation (Parasuraman 1993). Activists have assumed a leading role in
determining the guiding principles of rehabilitation, and have put great
pressure on the government to develop a comprehensive R&R policy
(Fernandes & Thukral (eds) 1989, Fernandes 1995, Kothari 1995).
At the same time, the new economic policy of the Indian government
has stimulated the demand for land for the establishment of industries,
mines and other projects. The urgency to satisfy the land needs of the
private sector heightened the need for regulatory mechanisms (Fernan-
des & Chatterji 1995).
In response to these economic and social pressures, the national
government and Indian public sector industries drafted a number of
R&R policies (Kothari 1995, Fernandes & Chatterji 1995, NTPC 1993,
CIL 1990). The National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) formu-
lated a policy in 1993, and Coal India Ltd (CIL) drew up a policy in
1990. (The NTPC policy is described in Appendix 3). In 1994, the na-
tional ministries of Rural Development and Water Resources prepared
a draft national policy on the R&R of project-displaced people. That
draft policy was under discussion at the time this book was written.
Further, since 1990 the national Ministry of Welfare has been in the
process of drafting a rehabilitation policy for tribals displaced by devel-
opment projects.
This chapter evaluates the R&R provisions made available to PAPs
in various projects. Further, this chapter will describe the actual land
acquisition process and the ways in which compensation money was
put to use by the displaced people.

3.2 The Land Acquisition Process

According to the 1894 LAA, the government follows a four stage pro-
cedure. In the first stage (Section 4.1 ), a preliminary notification is
issued, declaring that land in a particular location is needed or may be
needed for a public purpose. In the second stage (Sections 6.1 and 6.2),
the government declares its intention to actually acquire land. Notice
under Section 6.1 must be issued within one year of the issuance of the
Section 4.1 notice. In the third stage, the government invites concerned
persons to raise objections, if they have any. The property to be ac-
quired is valued and the final award is made at this stage. The award
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 83

must be served to the owner within two years of the notice under Sec-
tion 6.1. In the final stage, compensation is paid and the government
takes possession of the property.
The law identifies the persons who may have to be addressed by the
state in this process. The LAA refers to them as 'interested persons'.
By definition, 'interested persons' must have a stake in the compensa-
tion. There must be a direct or indirect interest either in the title to the
property or in the amount of compensation. The law has narrowed
down the categories of persons whom the state must take into account
(Ramanathan 1995).
There can be several categories of 'interested persons': landlord and
tenant, the members of a joint Hindu family, mortgager and mortgagee,
and others. An interested person's ability to file a claim often depends
on his social and economic position. In affected villages throughout the
country, tenants have found it difficult to register claims (Parasuraman
et al. 1995). In some cases, powerful and knowledgeable persons have
been able to demonstrate 'interest' in the property easily. In order to
acquire PAP status, persons from outside the project area have back-
dated loan agreements, land transfers, mortgages or leases. The number
of PAPs in industrial project areas increased substantially after land
acquisition procedures started (Parasuraman & Singh 1993, Parasura-
man, Singh & Prashad 1995). 2
The LAA does not empower individuals to prevent alienation from
their land. Individuals can only delay acquisition, by objecting that the
purpose is not a public one, or that the land is not suitable for the pur-
pose (MARG 1990, SC&ST 1990). As the government never defines
the purpose of acquisition in the Section 4.1 notice, detailed informa-
tion on the proposed project would be required. Such information rests
with the government and is out of bounds for most Indians, even
though they are legally entitled to such information. 3 Objections must
be raised within one month. However, the Act also grants the govern-
ment emergency powers to enable it to do away with the notice proced-
ure and deny citizens their right to object.
The method by which compensation is determined is inadequate, and
always disadvantag~ous to the oustees. Often, the compensation for
land is not enough to replace even 50 per cent of the land lost. Further,
opportunities to invest the compensation are lacking. Compensation is
almost always individualized and monetized. The LAA lists factors to
84 The Framework

be taken into consideration in determining compensation, and factors

to be ignored (including, for example, 'any disinclination of the person
interested to part with the land acquired' (Ramanathan 1995)). The Act
prescribes that the land is acquired 'by agreement on such terms and
at such a price as may be approved by the Standing Committee' ap-
pointed under the Act. However, the illusion of voluntary co-operation
collapses altogether in the succeeding provision, which enables the
government to acquire property for public purpose without the owner's
consent in case of difficulties in reaching an agreement (Ramanathan
1995, Fernandes 1995).
With a few exceptions, compensation is computed in money terms.
The compensation for land is strictly regulated within the framework
of the Act. The value of the land can be fixed in terms of the market
price for land of comparable quality in the area at the time the Section
4.1 notice was issued, but if land is not widely sold in the area, market
prices may not be readily available. In such cases, a proxy for the mar-
ket value is determined. The actual, immediate or prospective profits
or rent which the owner might expect from the land are multiplied by
the appropriate rate of interest for a specific period, in order to arrive
at the value of the land (Srivastava, Sitaraman & Mehta 1991 ). In gen-
eral terms, 15 times the net income of land is taken to be a reasonable
compensation. For land acquired before 1984, 15 per cent of the market
value was awarded as solatium in addition to the market value of the
land. Further, an interest of five per cent per annum on the market
value of the land was paid for the period between the issuance of the
Section 6.1 notice and the actual payment of compensation. After the
amendment in 1984, the solatium and the interest increased to 30 per
cent and 12 per cent respectively (MARG 1990).
The LAA accepts the concept of 'present depreciated value' only for
assets carrying ownership titles, which always puts the displaced at a
disadvantage. The value of houses is determined on the basis of their
size, nature and the quality of material used in the construction. Those
with financial means often have their land and house revalued: courts
sometimes raise the compensation amount by 15 to 50 per cent of the
amount originally determined. The 1984 Amendment Act ruled that if
a court raised the compensation money for any piece of land, all other
lands covered in the Section 4.1 notice could claim enhancement. Nor-
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 85

mally, most of the land acquired from a village is covered in a com-

mon Section 4.1 notice.
The market value approach is not appropriate. Conservative estimates
are used to arrive at the base value of the land. In rural and urban
areas, most transactions are undervalued by 30 to 50 per cent to avoid
stamp duty on land transfers (MARG 1990). Further, market prices for
land are determined separately for each village, and there is no uni-
formity in prices. The valuation is not based on objective criteria such
as the productive capacity of the land, the increase in value expected
in the future in the context of changes in land use patterns, or the
extent of the economic loss. It was observed that the land price is delib-
erately undervalued to force the affected to take the compensation ques-
tion to court. Lawyers and revenue officials benefit greatly if the com-
pensation issue is settled in court, for nearly half of the court-enhanced
money goes to lawyers and revenue officials (Parasuraman, Singh &
Prashad 1995).
Further, land owned by tribals is generally undervalued, based on the
perception that land in tribal areas was a less productive asset. Since
land is rarely traded in tribal areas, the market value of the land is not
known. Thus, the land acquisition officer normally uses the capitaliza-
tion method, and prejudices about productivity depress the estimates.
Tribal lands are granted very low compensation, because tribals have
been increasingly pushed onto marginal lands. Both movable and im-
movable properties on the land are valued at the depreciated cost rather
than at the level of replacement cost. In the case of compensation for
trees, the prices rarely corresponds to the true value. Trees such as
mango, mahua, and other long-term fruit-yielding trees are not seen as
productive assets. Thus, the compensation for land, trees and other
movable and immovable properties is insufficient to even partially re-
place the assets lost.

3.3 The Threshold Approach to Basic Amenities

The responsibility for the implementation of R&R policies lies with
various agents, depending on the type of project and the R&R envi-
sioned. The 1894 Act held the government of the state where the pro-
ject was situated responsible for land acquisition and the payment of
compensation. The original Act did not foresee industries acquiring
86 The Framework

land, but when the Act was modified in 1984, acquiring land for pri-
vate and public sector industries was made legal: since then, the indus-
try concerned deposits the compensation money with the government,
which disburses it after the compensation proceedings are completed.
In industrial projects, R&R was executed by the industry concerned,
while state governments played a very marginal supervisory role. In
irrigation projects, on the other hand, the state government concerned
was responsible for executing R&R work.
The quality of the resettlement sites and of the basic services pro-
vided differed considerably among the projects studied. All projects
expressed in their policy statements a commitment to provide the fol-
lowing civic amenities and other facilities, depending on the number of
families at the resettlement site:
• primary school facilities and a placeof worship if at least 100 fami-
lies are resettled;
• a community hall, seed store, dispensary and children's park for
every 500 families relocated;
a well and a wooden platform (as a meeting place) for every 50 fam-
ilies;
• 3 kilometres of road for every dwelling site;
• street lights;
• water and sanitary arrangements and site levelling for all relocation
sites, irrespective of the number of families settled.
Logically, the relocation site should be prepared and basic services
created before the people are actually moved. But since policy does not
specify when these services should be provided, in practice people were
moved first and the infrastructure developed afterwards, in most
projects.
The idea of the threshold number of families required for the pro-
vision of basic civic amenities is an important one, with great conse-
quences. Should the government not succeed in resettling the required
number of families together, and should the number of relocation sites
exceed the number envisaged, then the resettled families may be denied
most of the basic provisions.
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 87

The government used the threshold principle to justify not providing

services, asking the resettled people to make use of the services in the
host village. Whether the resettled people were then granted access to
those amenities depended their ethnic identity, the host community's
perception of the resettled people, and other contextual factors. In cases
where the host community considered the resettled community to be so-
cially inferior, access to amenities became an important source of con-
flict between the two groups. In addition, the resettlement sites were
located at a considerable distance from the host villages, so resettled
people's access to basic facilities was restricted.
In several cases, the resettled people were scattered throughout a
large area, so that services such as health care, schools, a community
hall and so on could not be created at all. For example, about 3,500
families affected by the SSP were resettled in over 225 locations in
three districts in Gujarat (CSS 1993). Most basic facilities were not
created in many of those sites, and as much as 50 per cent of the SSP
money earmarked for basic facilities in resettlement sites remained
unused. The unused money was diverted to other state sectors (GOG
1994).
Access to civic amenities and other provisions is extremely important
to the welfare of resettled people. The resettlement of originally cohe-
sive communities as non-viable social groups in different locations,
compounded by a lack of schools, health care, veterinary dispensaries,
community halls and other amenities deprived people of very funda-
mental needs, and contributed to the impoverishment of the affected
people. Levels of morbidity and mortality, in all age groups, and levels
of malnutrition of children are higher in resettlement sites without pota-
ble water and other civic amenities than in resettlement sites which do
have these basic provisions. The education of children was impeded
and their future thereby compromised, so that impoverishment of the
future generation(s) is also likely.

3.4 Provisions in Industrial Projects

Jobs
Prior to 1967, industrial projects that acquired land usually provided
one job to each household losing land to the project. In 1967, the na-
tional government directed the public sector industries to provide one
88 The Framework

job to each family that lost land (Fernandes & Raj 1992). The adminis-
trative directive did not entail a legal obligation: it was left to the
industry to decide on the number of persons it would employ, and con-
sequently the industries concerned redefined the criteria for job eligibil-
ity. Many households which had lost land, particularly small and mar-
ginalized farmers, were denied employment. Landless households were
not eligible for employment. In 1986, the government directive was
withdrawn. Thus, at present, the public sector industries cannot even be
pressured morally to provide employment to the displaced families.
Enterprises owned by state governments were more forthcoming in
providing jobs to displaced families than enterprises owned by the na-
tional government. The location of industries owned by the state gov-
ernments is normally determined by political factors. For instance, the
chairmanship of state-owned industries is usually held by local politi-
cians. Political considerations largely determine the distribution of jobs
to affected families. On the other hand, industries owned by the nation-
al state had fewer political reasons to provide the affected people with
more jobs.
The industries adapted their policies according to the situation at
hand. For example, nationally owned industries operating in ethnically
and politically sensitive states such as Assam, Punjab and Kashmir, lo-
cated close to international borders, gave more jobs to the affected fam-
ilies than was the case in states such as Bihar or Orissa, where political
upheaval was less likely. In Assam, Punjab and Kashmir, job provision
was restricted to people from the respective states. Finally, the bargain-
ing capacity of the local people played an important role in determining
job provision policy.

Land
Private sector industries are expected to buy land from individual own-
ers at market prices. State governments and the national government,
however, circumvented this by diverting land acquired for other pur-
poses to private industries at low cost. For example, the government of
Maharashtra acquired agricultural land around the fringes of towns and
cities, for the Maharashtra industrial development corporation, on the
basis of the 1894 LAA. The government invested public money to de-
velop the land, and the developed plots were redistributed to industries
at extremely low rates. Industries were not under any obligation to pro-
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 89

vide jobs to people from whom the government had originally acquired
land.
In a few instances, the public sector industrial projects and mines
gave land in lieu of the land lost (Roy 1961, Reddy 1994, 1995). Tribal
people experienced serious problems in the transition from primarily
agriculture-based economies to industrial economies. Negative values
and assumptions held by non-tribals led to discrimination, and prevent-
ed the integration of tribal people with the dominant groups in indus-
trial areas. A lack of education among the tribal workers also impeded
their upward social mobility. Therefore, a land-for-land compensation
alongside access to industrial employment was the strategy which most
successfully helped tribals to regain economic independence (Roy
1961 ).
Most public sector steel plants gave land to about five per cent of the
families affected by land acquisition. Most of the families which re-
ceived land belonged to the tribal groups. The new R&R policies of the
NTPC and of CIL agree to provide land for those losing land (see Ap-
pendix 3 for NTPC details).

3.5 Provisions in Irrigation Projects

In certain irrigation projects, the R&R provisions which were executed
immediately after Independence were better than the provisions of more
recent projects. This may be explained by the higher and increasing
population pressure on land, an increase in the number of people dis-
placed, a lack of political will to acquire land in command areas, and
the lack of policy and legal provisions (Thukral (ed.) 1992).
Resettlement and rehabilitation provisions for people displaced by
irrigation projects vary greatly among the states, but in general the
R&R packages of irrigation projects do not include employment provis-
ions. Besides (inadequate) cash compensation for land and housing, and
housing plots in government resettlement sites, irrigation projects offer
little else in terms of employment or increased opportunities in the in-
formal sector. Landed and landless people, fishers, shepherds and oth-
ers in the complete I~ displaced and partially affected villages were left
to fend for themselves in irrigation projects.
The R&R policies of Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh fall in this cate-
gory, offering cash compensation but no land or employment assist-
90 The Framework

ance. A few state governments did nominally help the affected people
to buy land. For example, the R&R policy of the government of Maha-
rashtra provided a minimum of one hectare of land in the command
area of the project, or any other project in the state, if PAPs deposited
75 per cent of the compensation money received for land lost in a gov-
ernment fund. The difference between the amount paid by the govern-
ment for the allotted land and the money deposited by the PAPs would
be recovered in instalments, after the land was irrigated. Landless
households which were fully dependent on wage labour in agriculture
would be given one acre of agricultural land if they resettled together
with those given land, and if land was available. The value of one acre
land was to be repaid in suitable instalments (GOM 1990). Andhra Pra-
desh has similar provisions.
In reality, in both Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, obtaining land
from the government was similar to buying it with one's own money.
However, those who were not in a position to bargain and buy land on
their own did benefit from the government's support in locating and
purchasing land. Landless people, in particular, benefited from the op-
portunity to obtain one acre of land.
The policies of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Guja-
rat and most other states are similar to those of Maharashtra and And-
hra Pradesh. Of all the states, Gujarat had the most progressive R&R
provisions for people displaced by the SSP. There, heads of landed and
landless households and those with encroached land were eligible for
two hectares of irrigable land, as were all men aged 18 and over (on
1 January 1987) irrespective of previous land ownership. Further, the
government would provide a subsistence allowance for one year after
relocation, and would facilitate the acquisition of income-generating as-
sets on loan and subsidy, and give preference to PAPs in lower-level
government jobs (NCA 1992).
However, the Gujarat package for the SSP was not applicable to peo-
ple displaced by other irrigation projects. Those people were compen-
sated as per the R&R policy resolutions of the state government, which
more closely resembled the Maharashtra policy.
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 91

3.6 Constraints and Contradictions

A II R&R policies are ad hoc in nature. The 1894 LAA grants the state
the power to acquire land without the people's consent and without hav-
ing to guarantee the re-establishment of means for subsistence. Yet all
R&R policies refer to this Act for guidelines on compensation.
A recurrent flaw in these policies is that they consider only individ-
uals who lost land, housing or other property eligible for compensation.
Further, the policies deal with individuals, but not families. In a
situation where all the family members depend on the land, and each
of the siblings of the registered owner is entitled to a share - according
to Hindu laws - individual family members should also be considered
affected people. Only then will it be possible to pay due attention to the
specific needs of women, children, the aged, Dalits and tribals. The
current R&R policies do not consider women separately, though wom-
en face specific difficulties in re-establishing and earning a living in the
new area.
None of the policies recognize the historically established rights of
the people to their livelihood, including land, natural resources and
knowledge. Good R&R policy would recognize not only land rights,
but also customary rights such as those held by nomads, fishers, land-
less peasants, artisans and cattle-grazers who may not have legal doc-
uments indicating ownership but do depend on land for their survival.
In the SSP, for example, people are not compensated for their loss of
access to river and forest, which was essential to their social, cultural
and economic life. The Maharashtra R&R policy does not even recog-
nize people's right to common property. Thus, the people affected by
the JNP lost access to the sea and saltpans, without any compensation.
Ecological and environmental factors are not taken into account: the
policies provide no protection against irreversible environmental de-
struction.
The existing policies lack legal clout. The state has no legal obliga-
tion to rehabilitate those affected. There is no way to ensure that the
government or industry concerned will fully implement the R&R policy
as envisaged.
The policies formulated by the Indian government, the NTPC and
CIL lack a firm commitment to provide cultivable land. The Maharash-
tra Act's envisaged provision of one acre of land to the landless people
92 The Framework

who had depended on agricultural wage labour prior to displacement

can only be realized if land is made available. Landless people who did
not receive one acre of land cannot legally force the government to
provide them with land.
The shortage of available land impedes the implementation of any
land-for-land policy. State governments acquire land for resettlement
and cultivation in a number of ways, and often combine various meth-
ods. In the past, the first choice was to make use of forest land, but the
national Forest Protection Act (1980) restricts the use of forest land for
resettlement. Some state governments have been able to negotiate the
release of poor forest land for resettlement. Alternatively, revenue lands
are used, but much revenue land, if not already occupied by people, is
wasteland unsuitable for cultivation. In a few projects, such land was
used for R&R. A third option is to purchase land on the market. Final-
ly, state governments can make use of the Land Ceiling Act or the
Land Reform Act, or both, legislation enacted shortly after Indepen-
dence, but land acquisition based on the Land Ceiling Act has been po-
litically difficult.
In practice, R&R provisions depend on the nature and extent of the
pressure brought to bear by the affected population, and on political
and bureaucratic will. Neither the R&R policies which are already oper-
ational nor the policies which are currently being developed are devel-
oped with the participation of the affected people. The people are not
consulted about the R&R provisions or about the method of implemen-
tation. Even in the SSP, provisions have been added, over a period of
time, only in response to agitation. None of the projects evaluated in
this book include provisions to inform and consult with the people
about the project and its R&R policy provisions.

3.7 The Use of Compensation Money

Completely displaced villages
People used the compensation money for various purposes, depending
on the social and economic attributes of their households. The amount
of compensation paid for land varies largely, depending on the quality
of the soil, irrigation, the location, property on the land, and so on.
In the area affected by the DSP, most households used the com-
pensation money to construct new homes, to meet consumption needs,
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 93

to pay for expenses related to marriage, and to repay loans. Only 17

per cent of the households invested the money in productive assets. In
the case of the JNP, 68 per cent of the households used the compensa-
tion money to meet consumption needs and to acquire durable goods.
Only 15 per cent invested the money in productive assets. In the DSP,
all affected households received permanent employment in the plant.
Thus, the DSP households had less reason to invest the compensation
money productively. The JNP households, on the other hand, used the
money unproductively, expecting to receive permanent employment in
the port: in their efforts to encourage people to part with their land,
JNP authorities had promised the affected households permanent em-
ployment.
In the Maharashtra case, 93 per cent of the households invested the
compensation money in land or other productive assets. In the UKP, 69
per cent of the households spent the money constructing a new house,
repaying loans, or meeting social obligations. These two irrigation pro-
jects present striking contrasts in the use of compensation money, re-
flecting the nature of the opportunities open to the displaced households
and the circumstances under which they were resettled.
In the Sardar Sarovar Project, all PAPs received land from the gov-
ernment, and they invested the money on clearing and improving the
quality of the land. In addition, a few invested money in business. Only
a few used the money for consumption purposes. The originally re-
source-rich people of the Narmada valley showed considerable restraint
in the way in which they spent the compensation money (Parasuraman
1993).
In all projects, the most common problem was the inadequacy of the
compensation received. Low values attributed to the land in combina-
tion with delayed compensation payments created serious obstacles to
investment. 4 If the compensation matter was taken to court, the waiting
period was further prolonged. The escalation of land prices made it
very difficult for farmers who had received low compensation to re-
place the lost land.
In some projects, this problem was tackled by policy and a strong
political will. For example, in the Mil project, PAPs wanting land in
the command area deposited 75 per cent of the compensation money
with the government at the time the compensation was paid. About 68
per cent of the households receiving compensation deposited money,
94 The Framework

Table 3.1 Distribution of households from completely displaced villages

by use of compensation money received for land

Compensation money % of households

used for UKP Mil JNP DSP BIOM SSP

Marriage and loan repayments 25 2 17 33 13

Household consumption,
consumer durables (TV, cycle) 6 51 20 80
House construction and repair 38 5 17 31 7
Purchase of land, land clear-
ance, acquisition of productive
assets, safe deposit of money
in bank 31 93 15 17 100

Sources: UKP- Parasuraman 1991b; Mil- Parasuraman 1991a; JNP- Parasura-

man & Sengupta 1992; DSP- Parasuraman 1990b; BIOM - Parasuraman
1990a; SSP- TISS 1992.

and thus acquired land in the command area. Most of the depositors
were small and marginal farmers. About 5 per cent of the originally
landless people also deposited money from their own funds and thus
acquired land. Policies can thus help small and marginal farmers who
otherwise lack the capacity to handle the land market in the command
area on their own. The majority of those who did not deposit money
bought land independently, and a few others used the money for other
purposes.

The cost of new housing

Displaced households were crippled by the need to build a new house
in the resettled area. Evidence from the projects under review, except
BIOM and SSP, proved that the compensation money paid for the old
house was not sufficient to finance even 50 per cent of the cost of
building a new house. Houses in the original villages were valued at
very low rates, especially if they happened to be mud structures with
little wood. Ninety per cent of the houses in the villages were of this
type, with very few items that could be re-used in the construction of
the new house.
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 95

Due to the lack of R&R stipulations that PAPs should re-establish in

the new area, people tried to stay in the old villages until they were
finally threatened with submergence. Thus, it took people several years
after receiving compensation to move to a new area and start construc-
tion. By that time, the compensation money had often been used for
consumption or other purposes. A few households attempted to build
bigger houses, to enhance their social prestige, though they often lacked
the funds to complete such houses and were compelled to use the com-
pensation money or even borrow additional sums. In the villages affect-
ed by the UKP, 45 per cent of the houses was still unfinished even af-
ter several years.
In the SSP and the BIOM cases, displaced tribal people dismantled
old house structures made of bamboo and teak wood, and re-used the
materials for new houses. A few households bought new tiles: this was
the only expense they incurred.
To some extent, policy can help the displaced people to deal with this
problem. In the Mil case, the government provided house construction
assistance (up to Rs 8,000) to supplement the compensation money re-
ceived for the old house. This money was given to the people at the
time they were moved to temporary sheds in the resettlement area. In
the UKP, where the R&R policy did not provide any such assistance,
people faced serious problems. Small and marginal farmers could not
mobilize the resources to construct new houses.
The experiences of the people in reconstructing their houses provide
a few concrete lessons. First, the compensation for the house should be
enough to reconstruct the house at the new area, rather than the depre-
ciated value at the time of land acquisition. Secondly, an appropriate
relocation schedule, implemented by a well-staffed administrative
machinery, is very important. Thirdly, displaced people require subsi-
dies and loans to rebuild their houses in new areas. Landless people,
marginal and small farmers must be provided with loans and subsidies,
or they may not be in a position to rebuild a house in the new areas.

Opportunities for investment

Often people were not able to find opportunities to invest the compen-
sation money. If they were resettled in and around their original vil-
lages, it was difficult for them to buy land, because of the acquisition.
In the UKP and the DSP cases, land purchase became increasingly dif-
96 The Framework

ficult as resettlement sites were selected closer to the old village. In the
Mil project, the displaced people were resettled in the command area,
so that only those with money could purchase land.
In the case of JNP, investment in land was impossible, because all
land within an area of 343 square kilometres was acquired for the New
Bombay project. Only 15 per cent of the households invested in self-
employment ventures. The rest used the compensation money for a var-
iety of non-productive purposes. Three factors led people to spend mon-
ey on non-productive purposes. First, a large majority received less
than Rs 20,000, as there were 3.7 persons per household with legal
claims to compensation. Second, people did not have any access to ad-
vice regarding investment. Neither the port nor the government made
any attempt to assist the people in investing money productively. Third,
during the prolonged agitation against land acquisition, the government
promised one job per land-losing household in the port. With such a
promise in mind, people spent money on house repairs, televisions, bi-
cycles and other items.
This was true for most of the industrial projects. Since the land-for-
land scheme was normally not implemented in industrial projects, PAPs
usually relocated in and around the newly created industrial town, and
direct and indirect employment generated by the industry became the
main source of livelihood. The industry could help people to invest
their compensation money in productive assets.
In addition to fighting for better R&R provisions, local groups could
help the displaced people to make wise investments. We have not en-
countered a project where people received such guidance. In the Mil
case, policy compelled people to deposit money for land. Besides, peo-
ple affected by the Mil project were also educated and able to decide
for themselves. But in most other projects, tribal people, Dalits and oth-
er lower caste households lacked the education, prudence and opportun-
ity necessary to manage on their own. They also ran the risk of being
cheated by middlemen. In certain projects, middlemen appropriated as
much as 40 per cent of the compensation money (Parasuraman, Singh
& Prashad 1995). The emergence of advocacy groups aiming to help
the displaced people to reconstruct their livelihoods can help them to
make suitable investments. But professional guidance in financial mat-
ters should also be an integral responsibility of the government, and
thus included in R&R policy.
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 97

Money use by landless people

House construction was one of the most serious problems faced by
poor and landless households. Many had to resort to living in inferior
houses, or to living without a shelter. These groups invariably consisted
of Dalits, other backward caste groups and tribal people, who had no
other resources from which to draw support. Except in the DSP case,
none of the projects helped these groups to benefit from policies meant
for them.
Dalits, Kurburs and Jalgars and most backward castes in the UKP
affected villages were protected by positive discrimination policies
which accorded them priority in access to subsidies for house construc-
tion. National and state governments have development programmes to
assist socially vulnerable groups. For example, Dalits and most back-
ward caste households are entitled to assistance for building houses
(under a government housing programme called Indira A was Yojana),
but these groups did not receive R&R benefits for house construction.
These groups are also entitled to 80 to 100 per cent subsidy to acquire
productive assets under the Integrated Rural Development Programme
(IRDP). Due to the lack of R&R officials to help the people to re-
establish in the new area, the poorest and most needy were unable to
take advantage of the provisions available to them.
For landless people dependent on wage labour in agriculture, loss of
land meant loss of livelihood, but the compensation package offered
them nothing. In industrial projects they could hope to find employ-
ment as casual or contract workers, but would have to compete with
other rural migrants attracted by the industries. Unskilled workers
flooding the labour market depressed wages. Landless people evicted
by irrigation projects could hope to regain their previous standard of
living only if most households from the village were resettled in the
command area, with at least the originally landed receiving land. Agri-
cultural development induced by canal irrigation could also absorb addi-
tional labourers. If the displaced were resettled closer to the reservoir,
it was observed that they would be joined by new groups of landless
people freshly evicted from the land in an area with considerably re-
duced land resources. Cycles of migration - seasonal and permanent-
often led the high caste and educated groups to move out, leaving be-
hind the Dalits, nomadic and denotified tribes and other lower caste
groups.
98 The Framework

Households with skills specific to the submergence area may not find
opportunities to replace their source of livelihood. For example, fisher-
men and salt workers may not find work opportunities after displace-
ment, for Jack of land in coastal resettlement areas. Households en-
gaged in such activities may not have the appropriate skills to shift to
non-agricultural activities or service-based employment. Rehabilitation
policies must include provisions to help people with traditional skills
to switch to other occupations long before actual displacement.
Groups already socially and economically deprived were left out of
programmes intended to alleviate their deprivation, for Jack of imagin-
ation. There are other regular government programmes intended to
prevent the further marginalization of vulnerable groups. However, the
Jack of co-ordination and communication between project authorities
and government agencies meant that in practice these groups were un-
able to benefit from the programmes intended precisely for them.

Partially affected villages

The originally landed
In JNP, 90 per cent of the partially affected villages was left with only
the homestead land. All agricultural, common, forest and revenue lands
were acquired. In effect, households in such villages were in a position
similar to that of completely affected villages with respect to the loss
of agricultural and saltpan land. The difference was that they were not
required to move to a new place and build new houses.
In DSP, BIOM and all irrigation projects, the projects occupied part
of the agricultural land in many villages. The partially affected villages
of these projects were left with varying proportions of agricultural and
common lands. The households that received compensation money for
the lost land used it for agricultural improvement and for the purchase
of land.
In the partially affected villages of DSP, 91 per cent of the house-
holds used the money for agricultural improvement activities, such as
increasing the area of land under irrigation, purchasing bullocks or a
cart (or both), buying other agricultural implements, and purchasing
land in neighbouring villages. Many households gradually expanded
their land base by purchasing in neighbouring areas, using the income
from permanent employment in the steel plant.
 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions 99

Table 3.2 Distribution of households in partially affected villages by

use of compensation money received for land

% of households
Compensation money used for
UKP Mil DSP

Household consumption, marriage, house

repair, loan repayment 34 15 9
Land purchase, agricultural improvement and
acquisition of other income-providing assets 66 85 91

Sources: UKP- Parasuraman 1991b; Mil- Parasuraman 1991a; DSP- Parasu-

raman 1990b.

In the partially affected villages of the UKP and Mil projects, a large
proportion of households used their money to improve their resource
base. In Mil, 85 per cent of the households invested in agricultural im-
provement and purchased land. The farmers were permitted to use
water from the reservoir for irrigation. The government gave loans to
farmers who wanted to expand or create irrigation facilities. In many
partially affected villages, the area under irrigation increased during the
post-land acquisition period. Even in the UKP's partially affected vil-
lages, farmers who were left with some land were able to re-establish
their economic survival. Most of the marginal and small landowning
farmers who lost all land were unable to invest in productive assets.

The landless
Landless people from the partially affected villages of the DSP had bet-
ter avenues for earning a livelihood, as agricultural improvement in-
creased the demand for wage workers. Many men from households that
lost land obtained industrial employment and thus left agriculture. Em-
ployment opportunities in agriculture for landless households thus in-
creased, and so did opportunities for casual and contract-related work
in Durgapur.
In JNP villages, the landless lost all avenues of agricultural employ-
ment because all agricultural land was lost. Their only hope was to
switch to non-agricultural activities.
In the initial stages of establishment of the industry or dam, construc-
tion provided employment. After the construction phase, the availability
100 The Framework

of employment depended on the capacity of the industry to generate

subsidiary activities, and on the demand for services from the salaried
employees of the industry.
In irrigation projects, the landless from partially affected villages
initially overcame the loss of work resulting from the loss of land by
working in the construction of dams and canals. Later, agricultural im-
provement partially compensated the loss of wage labour. The original-
ly landless and new landless confronted the loss of employment
through seasonal and permanent migration.
 Appendix 3
An Example of New R&R Policy:
The National Thermal Power
Corporation (NTPC)

The Policy
The public sector industries National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)
and Coal India Limited (CIL) have exceptionally well-developed and
operationalized R&R policies. The NTPC policy is detailed below.

The policy of statement of intention

NTPC involvement in the rehabilitation activities will continue until such
time as NTPC has taken all actions in accordance with the Rehabilitation
Action Plan to enable project affected persons (PAPs) to improve or regain
their previous standard of living.

Land-for-land provision
A person losing land is entitled to land for land. If government land is not
available, private land may be acquired through a Land Purchase Commit-
tee (LPC) on a 'willing buyer- willing seller' basis. The maximum area
allotted will be two hectares. Permanent owners of land are entitled to land
or employment, a shop, a small contract or a job.
In a joint family or joint holding, a (major) person who has a share is
entitled to employment, a shop, a small contract or a job.
People whose homestead and agricultural land are acquired are entitled
to land for land and employment, a shop, a petty contract or a job.

101
102 The Framework

Livelihood regeneration
Persons left with land not economically viable (less than two hectares) are
entitled to employment, a shop, a petty contract, or a job.
A person (tenant tiller) in actual possession of land is entitled to land if
no claim is made by the original landlord.
An agricultural labourer without legal title to land is entitled to self-
employment, a shop, or a small contract job.
Persons with client relationships with the displaced community are enti-
tled to assistance to establish the type of facilities lost. Assessment in such
cases will be separately carried out by the NTPC or the state adminis-
tration, or both, in consultation with PAPs. These people will be provided
with land or employment, a shop, a small contract or a job.
Tribals residing on or deriving their livelihood from forest land are en-
titled to an alternative housing site measuring 50 by 40 feet, as well as to
community infrastructure facilities, relocation and other rehabilitation as-
sistance, or land, employment, a shop, a small contract or a job.
If alternative land is not available or acceptable to the eligible PAP as
per the procedure, or in cases where a PAP is not entitled to land-for-land,
the PAP will be offered a variety of income-generating schemes on the
basis of the socio-economic survey and in consultation with the PAPs. The
schemes most preferred were: dairy, poultry, handicrafts, limited shops,
small contracts, and jobs in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories with
contractors. PAPs are entitled to Rs 15,000 for these schemes.

House site provision

Persons whose homesteads are acquired are entitled to an alternative
housing site measuring 50 by 40 feet, community infrastructure facilities
and relocation, and other rehabilitation assistance.
The tenants are entitled to alternative housing sites measuring 50 feet by
40 feet, community infrastructure facilities and relocation and rehabilitation
assistance if the original landlord claims compensation under the LAA.
Landless people cultivating government land are entitled to alternative
housing sites measuring 50 by 40 feet, community infrastructure facilities
and relocation, and other rehabilitation assistance.

Weaknesses of the NTPC Policy

The draft policies of the NTPC do not mention that in 1986 public sector
enterprise abandoned the T.N. Singh Formula (1967), which stipulated that
the PAPs of industrial and mining projects should be given a job per
 An Example of New R&R Policy: The NTPC 103

family. Mechanization has reduced the number of unskilled jobs. The

NTPC draft also fails to state that the capital-intensive New Electricity
Project has a limited employment generation potential. The policy only
suggests that project authorities should train PAPs in literacy and skills
required for some of the jobs, form them into a co-operative and give them
jobs from the stage of project construction.
These provisions are inadequate for successful transition. Project
authorities are not obliged to adhere to the norms, or even to accept a PAP
co-operative as the main, let alone only, partner. The land available for
redistribution would depend on the availability of government land. If land
is to be purchased from private parties, it may located away from the
original village. It should be noted that private land cannot be purchased
in large blocks, which implies that the affected families may be dispersed.
 Part II
THE CASE STUDIES
Location of Case Study Projects

New Delhi• PROJECTS

1. Jawaharlal Nehru Port, New Bombay, Maharashtra State
2. Sardar Sarovar Project, Gujarat State
3. Maharashtra Irrigation II Project, Maharashtra State
4. Upper Krishna Project, Karnataka State
5. Bolani Iron Ores Mines. Orissa State
6. Durgapur Steel Plant, West Bengal State

New Delhi•

•Kanpur

Varanasi•

INDIA
New Delhi•
New Delhi•

Nagpur•
New Delhi•

New Delhi•

New Delhi•
New Delhi•

New Delhi•

New Delhi•

New Delhi•
New Delhi•

New Delhi•
 Displacement Due to the
4
Durgapur Steel Plant

4.1 Introduction
Upon Independence in India, there was a sense of urgency to eliminate
poverty and improve the quality of life of the people. A massive indus-
trialization programme was carried out in the 1950s and 1960s, to ena-
ble the industrial sector to fuel development in other sectors. Enormous
sums were invested in large projects such as irrigation and power in-
stallations, steel plants, and mining projects.
The post-Independence industrialization efforts included the govern-
ment's establishment, in the late 1950s, of three new integrated steel
plants (Bhilai, Durgapur and Rourkela) in the iron- and coal-producing
region of Eastern India. A fourth plant was built in the 1960s in Bo-
karo. These steel plants, the largest in India, were administered by the
public sector Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL). All were built
on 'greenfield' sites, and thus necessitated the development of new
towns to provide housing and essential services for the newly recruited
labour force. Together, these four steel plants and the infrastructure
created for them directly displaced 135,200 persons from landed house-
holds (BHPE-KINHILL 1991), and over 50,000 persons from landless
households (Parasuraman l990a, 1990b).
This chapter presents an assessment of the nature and extent of the
displacement caused by the Durgapur Steel Plant (DSP) in the Burdwan
district of West Bengal, and an evaluation of the consequences of dis-
placement and resettlement for people from both fully and partially af-
fected villages. The chapter examines the interaction of factors that de-
termine the social and economic condition of displaced people, the role

107
108 The Case Studies

played by the steel plant in mitigating their economic hardship, and the
impact of population pressure on the social environment of the steel
town.
Displacement in Durgapur occurred during I955-65; the study was
conducted during I989-90. Due to the fact that displacement took place
long before this study was carried out, data on socioeconomic con-
ditions prior to displacement could not be collected. Neither the gov-
ernment of West Bengal nor the DSP had baseline socioeconomic in-
formation about the displaced households. However, there were records
providing details of the amount of land owned and lost, and the com-
pensation paid for land and housing.

4.2 Land Acquisition

In order to launch the DSP project, the government of West Bengal
acquired I6,384 acres of land in the I950s. Some II, I64 acres came
from 3,947 households in 37 villages, 5,077 acres had been forest, and
I44 acres came from the Revenue Department. Over two-thirds of the
land acquired was under cultivation: Burdwan district was densely pop-
ulated in the I950s, and forest land was rapidly being converted for ag-
ricultural use. The DSP devoted 6, II6 acres to the establishment of the
plant itself and I 0,270 acres to the establishment of a township that
would far exceed immediate needs, but could be expanded in the fu-
ture.1
In II villages, all houses and agricultural lands were acquired for the
DSP project. These villages were called displaced villages. The 2, I7I
households in these villages were resettled in five localities within the
Durgapur limits, close to the township and to the plant. Thus, people
did not move long distances for resettlement. In the displaced villages,
27.6 per cent of the households were landless. A few households
owned land in excessof25 acres in 1950. About one-fourth of the land-
less and marginal landowning households cultivated land as tenants
when land was acquired.
In another 26 villages, 40 to 80 per cent of the arable land was ac-
quired. These villages are known as partially affected villages. Of the
3,900 households in these villages, 3,315 were directly affected by land
acquisition. In the partially affected villages, 26.5 per cent of the house-
holds were landless.
 Displacement Due to the Durgapur Steel Plant I 09

Table 4.1 Sources of livelihood of resettled households in Durgapur

in 1989-90

Households %of HHs

with monthly
Type of employment
PCI
Number %
< Rs 180

Permanent job in DSP/ASP/

other steel industry 1267 a 58.4 none
Non-agricultural wage labour/
agric. wage labour/cultivation 520 b 23.9 24
Permanent job in industry/
cultivation 116 a 5.3 none
Self-employed 268 c 12.4 22
Total 2171 100.0 8.5

Notes:
a These categories include government and local authority employment.
b Contract labour, transportation, rickshaw-workers (hired rickshaw), employees in
shops and restaurants, skilled and unskilled workers in small industrial establish-
ments, other services.
c Hotels and restaurants, provision stores, rickshaw pullers, dairy & poultry sector,
garage and other repair-shop ownership.

Source: Parasuraman 1990b and additional fieldwork in 1992.

4.3 Resettlement and Rehabilitation

The resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced people in the Dur-
gapur case illustrate the way in which various factors interacted to de-
termine the economic and social welfare of the people involved. Partic-
ularly important in the Durgapur case is the timing of the project: in the
1960s, public sector industries were regarded as instruments of growth
and employment. The then Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru, took an active interest in the appropriate rehabilitation of af-
fected people. Compensation was paid on time and employment provid-
ed for affected households due to Nehru's intervention. 2
In the Durgapur case, all households that lost land were paid cash
compensation. Households which lost housing were paid cash compen-
sation and were given housing plots in resettlement sites. Further, the
110 The Case Studies

DSP gave one job to each household that lost land, if the household in-
cluded an adult male capable of working. A few landless households
were also given employment. In all, over 3,500 jobs were given to the
DSP-affected people. Most of these were lower-level jobs. When the
plant was inaugurated in 1962, the DSP employed a total of 15,000
people, double the initial forecasts (BHPE-KINHILL 1991 ).
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of households according to the main
occupation of the households' principal earning members in 1989-90.
At the time this study was conducted, nearly two-thirds of the resettled
households were permanently employed by the DSP or by the Alloy
Steel Plant (ASP) owned by SAIL. Public sector industries paid high
wages, so these households had a monthly per capita income of over
Rs 2,000, as well as benefits including bonuses, health care, education,
vehicle and travel allowances, and consumer items at fair prices. Some
24 per cent of the households were engaged in informal sector indus-
trial and service activities. The CPM was very strong in the DSP, the
ASP and other industries in Durgapur, and used its influence to ensure
that employment was granted to the project-affected people, and to sec-
ure relatively long-term contracts or related employment opportunities
for those without permanent positions in the industries.
The remaining households, about 11 per cent, were self-employed.
They included rickshaw-pullers, petty traders, shop-owners and so on.
The rickshaw-pullers faced stiff competition from migrant workers
from Bihar: most self-employed families with low incomes were rick-
shaw-pullers' families.
The overall economic condition of households with industrial em-
ployment was superior to that of households engaged in casual or con-
tract work. About 8.5 per cent of the resettled households had trouble
satisfying basic needs. Most people with an income below the poverty
line (Rs 180 per capita per month in 1991) were not permanently em-
ployed in industry. One-fourth of all casual labour and 22 per cent of
the self-employed households had a per capita monthly income of less
than Rs 180 per month. Further, the majority of the poor were Dalits
or tribals, which strongly suggests a correlation between caste or ethnic
group on the one hand and poverty on the other.
For at least 50 per cent of the households whose loss of land was
compensated by permanent employment in the steel plants, the future
looks bleak. Labour problems emerged in 1990, when the workers from
 Displacement Due to the Durgapur Steel Plant Ill

resettled households, who joined the industry in the 1960s, started re-
tiring. The Supreme Court had relieved the public sector industries of
the commitment to replace the retired workers with kin members, and
unemployment among the displaced households has risen. At the time
that this study was carried out, 1,426 young persons from the 3,94 7 dis-
placed households, with higher secondary and college level education,
had been unemployed for at leasttwo years. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion worsened their prospects, particularly as the DSP had been the re-
gion's major employer. 3 Opportunities for self-employment in Durga-
pur are available in transportation, repairs, trade and business. Poultry
and dairy are unexplored sectors with enormous potential for self-
employment. But the educated young men from resettled households
are ill-prepared to venture into self-employment. The widespread ex-
pectation that these young men would easily obtain employment in the
steel plants has led to the evolution of a reserve of technically less-
qualified men, unable to compete successfully in the labour market.
The DSP has not made any serious attempts to develop future eco-
nomic security for the employees. Upon displacement, thousands of
men were abruptly transferred from agriculture to industry, without be-
ing seriously prepared for the new lifestyle. The DSP, though it provid-
ed good health care services, made no attempt to motivate its workers
to limit their family size. Most workers had four or more children, and
fertility remained high among the first generation of industrial workers.
Inadequate education for children, in the context of stagnation in indus-
trial and government employment in Durgapur and in West Bengal as
a whole, is a problem for most households, particularly those belonging
to Dalit and tribal groups. The ever-increasing pressure from migrants
from Bihar, Orissa and other parts of West Bengal is a threat to the
livelihood of the self-employed.

4.4 Rehabilitation of Households from Partially

Affected Villages
In the partially affected villages, the economic condition of all house-
holds, both (formerly) landed and landless, has changed considerably
since the launching of the DSP project. Since the 1950s, when most
households depended on agriculture, agricultural wage labour and share-
cropping, the opportunities for income generation have been greatly
112 The Case Studies

diversified. Household data for the 1950s is not available, but inter-
views with elderly informants indicate that economic opportunities out-
side agriculture influenced their economic position. These people con-
tinue to cultivate land in addition to working at the steel plant or in the
informal sector.
In the partially affected villages, 24.3 per cent of the households lost
all the land they had owned, while 34.8 per cent lost part of their land.
Another 14.4 per cent did not lose any land. The remaining 26.5 per
cent was landless. Due to land acquisition, the share of landless house-
holds in the partially affected villages rose to 50.8 per cent.
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the occupational characteristics of
households in the partially affected villages in 1990. The table shows
that the main earners in 5.4 per cent of the households were engaged
in cultivation. In addition, 32.6 per cent of the households included
members permanently employed in industry who had land for cultiva-
tion as well. Another 13 per cent of the households had only permanent
employment in the DSP or the ASP. Thus, 46 per cent of the house-
holds had permanent industrial employment. Another 36.2 per cent of
the households was engaged in cultivation and wage labour in industry
and agriculture or in self-employment. The remaining 12.5 per cent of
the households was engaged in either casual wage labour or in self-
employment.
As in the wholly displaced villages, households that lost land were
granted permanent employment at the DSP. However, unlike people
from fully displaced villages, people from households in partially af-
fected villages invested the compensation money in land purchase or
land improvement (or both). Agricultural production and income from
industrial employment helped at least 35 per cent of the households to
broaden their economic base. These households made significant eco-
nomic and social progress.
The originally landless and sharecropper households also benefited
from industrialization in Durgapur. First, men from these households
found employment in industry and in the service sector, as contract and
casual workers. Second, agricultural improvement and diversification
by the first group (i.e. the 35 per cent of households with land and in-
dustrial employment) created wage labour for men and women of this
group. Further, many landless households benefited from land redistrib-
ution. The CPM, with informal support from the government, assumed
 Displacement Due to the Durgapur Steel Plant 113

Table 4.2 Percentage distribution of households by extent of land

acquired in the 1950s

% of households by extent of % HHs

land acquired in the 1950s with
Current sources Currently monthly
of livelihood cultivating PCI
Land-
All Part None Total <Rs
less
160

Cultivation only Own land 1.8 1.8 1.8 8 5.4

DSP Iande
Subtotal 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 0
Cultivation and Own land 13.1 3.6 16.7
permanent job Own+DSPe 5.4 5.4
DSP Iande 6.9 3.6 10.5
Subtotal 6.9 18.5 3.6 3.6 32.6 0
Cultivation and Own land 4.3 3.6 7.9
wage labour DSP Iande 4.1 8.6 12.7
Own+DSPe 3.0 3.0
Subtotal 4.1 7.3 3.6 8.6 23.6 13
Cultivation and Own land 5.4 5.4
self-employed DSP Iande 3.6 3.6
Own+DSPe 3.6 3.6
Subtotal 3.6 3.6 5.4 12.6 12
Permanent job No land 4.3 3.6b 5.4 13.3 0
Wage labour No land 7.1 7.1 25
Self-employed No land 5.4 5.4 23
All categories 24.3 34.8 14.4 26.5 100.0 8

Notes:
a These households bought land after 1960.
b These households have given away land for sharecropping to landless people in the
village.
c Refers to the DSP-acquired land redistributed by CPM.

Sources: Parasuraman 1990b: 73 and additional fieldwork in 1992.

114 The Case Studies

control over 2,500 acres of unused DSP land and distributed it to 2,500
landless households. Most of these changes contributed to an increase
in real income among the originally landless households. The resulting
economic change also enabled Dalit households to become independent
of large landowners and high caste households (Parasuraman 1990).
In the project-affected villages, 49 per cent of the households owned
land in 1990, and another 5 per cent held land on a sharecropping ba-
sis. In all, 75 per cent of the households were engaged in cultivation.
The difference between the number of households that owned land and
the total number engaged in cultivation is due to the redistribution of
land to villagers. About 30 per cent of the households benefited from
land redistribution for cultivation. Land received through redistribution
was not recorded in the name of the person cultivating it. The redistrib-
ution of land and employment in the industry-related informal sector
helped the poor to earn a living. Table 4.2 shows that 8 per cent of
households had difficulty meeting consumption needs. They belonged
to the wage labour and self-employed categories. A few were female-
headed households.

4.5 Population Pressure: Squatter Settlements

The economic opportunities presented by the DSP and later by other
industries attracted a large number of people to the Durgapur township
area. Between 1951 and 1990, the population of Durgapur grew from
21,710 to 411,000. The migrants came from other parts of Burdwan
district, other districts in West Bengal, and other Eastern Indian states.
The population of Durgapur in 1990 can be classified in four categor-
ies, according to place of residence:
(1) People in the resettlement colonies: people displaced by the DSP
and other industries (about 18,000 people), and a large migrant
population (about 21,000 people).
(2) People in the partially affected villages, where 40-50 per cent of
the land had been acquired for the DSP but the houses had been
left intact: about 90,000 people. Many of these villages had a large
number of migrants who either rented houses from residents or con-
structed houses on land bought from the village.
 Displacement Due to the Durgapur Steel Plant 115

(3) People in squatter settlements: unauthorized settlements which

emerged, inhabited by migrant workers. There were 7 large (com-
prising 500-5,000 houses), 8 medium (250-500 houses) and 36
small settlements (up to 250 houses). In 1990 the total population
in these settlements was around 175,000. The population of these
'encroached settlements' is growing rapidly due to natural increase
and due to the further influx of migrants (Crook 1988). Most of the
recent migrants to Durgapur end up in these settlements. Of these
migrants, about 65 per cent were landless, 22 per cent owned less
than one acre of land, mostly homestead land, and 13 per cent
owned over one acre, in their place of origin. About 55 per cent of
the migrants is illiterate and rest has had some education (Parasura-
man 1991).
(4) People in the townships adjoining the industries: over 100,000 per-
sons. Most of these people are migrants with permanent jobs in the
industries. This group is well-placed in terms of income and access
to education and health and transportation facilities.

Like other Indian industrial towns, Durgapur is a place of stark con-

trasts. The DSP township has luxurious open spaces, tree-lined avenues
and small concrete bungalows with gardens, and is serviced with a
piped water supply and private toilets. The streets are paved and well-
lit, and the township families are served by the DSP bus service. The
investment in the township accounted for 20 per cent of the total costs
of the DSP project (Crook 1988). Most township households own vehi-
cles which are fully financed and serviced (including petrol) by the
steel plants.
On the other hand, the informal sector and contract workers have
settled in the squatter settlements in and around the township. These
settlements house the families with the least secure jobs and lowest in-
comes, and lack basic amenities, health and education facilities. Most
settlements have no water, electricity, school or ration shop. There is
no local transportation service - transportation consists of cycle rick-
shaws, an important source of livelihood for people living in the settle-
ments. The lack of transportation facilities has forced migrants to con-
centrate in settlements to gain easy access to township and other work
places.
116 The Case Studies

4.6 Conclusions
The location of the steel plant in a densely populated area caused pro-
found changes in the economic, social and cultural complexion of the
area. Industrial employment, contract work, and non-agricultural wage
labour became the main sources of livelihood for thousands of previous-
ly (landed and landless) agricultural people, who had to 'unlearn' their
skills as cultivators. For most people, the transition from agriculture to
industrial work was too abrupt.
In Durgapur, resettled households with industrial employment had a
steady income in 1990. But they had no other sources of income, as
they could not replace the land that they had lost to the DSP in the
1950s. Most households with industrial employment failed to diversify
their economic interests. But unlike land, employment in industry can-
not be inherited. This means that households without alternative sources
of income are increasingly vulnerable, as the first generation of dis-
placed steel plant workers retires: households have invested in the edu-
cation of their children for work in the plants, while employment op-
portunities at the steel plants are ever declining. With the exception of
Dalit and tribal households, most households were able to provide their
children with an education at least up to secondary school, but this is
not sufficient to ensure industrial or government employment: a techni-
cal education, employable skills and investment capacity are required.
Without such skills and resources, it is difficult for young people from
affected households to find employment in the economic climate of
West Bengal.
People who formerly owned land in the partially affected villages
used the earnings from their DSP or ASP jobs to upgrade their agricul-
tural production and to diversify their sources of income. They invested
in business ventures such as hotels and restaurants, repair shops, trans-
portation, movie halls and other activities. Some accumulated land, by
way of purchase from neighbouring villages.
The crucial difference between the economic prospects for the house-
holds from fully displaced villages and partially affected villages was
their access to land. People who had access to land in addition to
employment in the steel plants were relatively well-off, compared to
people without land.
 Displacement Due to the Durgapur Steel Plant 117

Landless people from partially affected villages benefited from agri-

cultural improvements and from opportunities in informal sector indus-
trial activities. Industries contributed to improvements in agricultural
productivity and employment generation, increasing the opportunities
for landless people and women to secure stable employment in agricul-
ture. Landless people and those seriously affected by land acquisition
received some land through the redistribution of unused land.
Industrial development in Durgapur has increased economic disparity
in the area. The distinction between people employed in the organized
sector and people employed in the unorganized sector has become sharp-
er. Among the people with organized-sector employment, those with
access to land and other sources of income have a position far stronger
than those with only industrial employment.
The swelling population at the squatter settlements in Durgapur is at
the bottom of an ever changing economic scale. These people face
great hardship and neglect. They are the least organized, and seriously
lack access to stable employment and basic provisions. The number of
migrants in this vulnerable position is increasing rapidly, due to a high-
er rate of natural increase and the ongoing migration of newly dispos-
sessed people from West Bengal and other parts of Eastern India. Cer-
tain ethnic groups suffer more adverse economic conditions than others:
the non-Christian tribals and Dalits need the support of the state, politi-
cal parties and voluntary organizations, but received none at the time
this study was carried out.
The Durgapur experience shows that displacement need not necessar-
ily bring economic disaster to affected families, including the originally
landless people and those who lost all land. But different groups expe-
rience varying degrees of economic and social change. The DSP was
launched in the I 950s, when the political commitment to proper rehab-
ilitation was high. The nature of technology employed was labour-
intensive, and many people were given jobs.
Such favourable conditions do not exist in any other part of the coun-
try. The conclusion that displacement need not lead to economic disas-
ter for all may not hold true in new industrial projects, given the great-
er magnitude of displacement, increased population density, the use of
labour-minimizing technology, and the prevailing social and political
environment.
 Displacement Due to the
5 Jawaharlal Nehru Port

5.1 Introduction
The subject of this chapter- the displacement caused by the Jawaharlal
Nehru Port (JNP)- differs in many respects from the other projects dis-
cussed in this book, as the JNP was embedded in an urban context. The
study of land and property in urban areas involves many agents: own-
ers, speculators, developers, bankers, real estate dealers, consumers and
planners. The behaviour of landowners is fundamentally different from
that of all the other agents: for the owner, land may be the only source
of livelihood, while for all these other agents, land is purely an element
for speculation and profit. The relationship between the owner and the
land is often determined by agents other than the owner himself or her-
self. The state and planners have redefined the use of land and the rela-
tionship between the land and the owner. The government of India and
various state governments have actively intervened in redefining land
use patterns, often to the detriment of the peasant cultivators. In most
cases, the real beneficiaries were the speculators, developers, builders,
bureaucrats and the planning and executing bodies.
The government of Maharashtra had previous experience in using
land acquired from farmers in the fringe areas of cities and towns to es-
tablish industrial estates that were subsequently sold. These industrial
estates generated vast surpluses because the land was acquired very
cheaply and infrastructure development did not cost much. The govern-
ment and the industries benefited at the expense of the poor farmers.
Bombay, the commercial capital of India, needed vast amounts of
land for the expansion of commercial and industrial activities. Born-

118
 The Jawaharlal Nehru Port 119

bay's wealthy wanted the government to replicate the industrial estate

experience on a grand scale in New Bombay, using the lands of peas-
ants and fishermen of Thane and Raigad districts. Indirectly, the gov-
ernment subsidized the activities of Bombay's rich by impoverishing
the peasants and fishers.
The success of the industrial estate concept motivated the government
to accept the twin-city idea, to use land as a resource to develop New
Bombay (Verma 1985). New Bombay, which was developed in the
1970s to decongest Greater Bombay, is a classic example of the way
in which state intervention completely reshaped the relationship be-
tween land and peasant cultivators. For the New Bombay project, large
amounts of agricultural and saltpan land were acquired from peasants
in 95 villages. The lands were developed using public money and dis-
tributed to developers, builders, industries and private individuals. By
the mid-1990s, New Bombay had become an urban centre with over
one million inhabitants.
This chapter will describe the origins of New Bombay and will assess
the condition of peasants who lost land to the project. The chapter fo-
cuses on the people who lost their land and livelihood to facilitate the
creation of Jawaharlal Nehru Port, which was designed to decongest
Bombay Port. First, the idea for the creation of New Bombay will be
reconstructed. Second, the process of land acquisition and the protest
by the people will be analysed. Third, the transformation of peasants,
salt-workers and fishermen into organized and unorganized sector wage
workers and the consequent change in their economic position will be
discussed. Finally, suggestions will be put forth to modify rehabilitation
policy to mitigate the economic and social marginalization of affected
people. Data are derived from a larger study on the socioeconomic con-
dition of households that lost land to the JNP. 1

5.2 The Birth of the Twin-city Concept

In 1961, the city of Bombay covered an area of 603 square kilometres.
The population of 4.2 million was dispersed all over the island, and fur-
ther expansion was judged difficult. A number of options to ease the
congestion were discussed. The first option was to shift the state capital
to Nagpur, which was already accepted as the winter capital of Maha-
rashtra. The second option was to move the headquarters of selected
120 The Case Studies

ministries to areas outside Bombay, possibly to the mainland across the

Bombay harbour. The third option was to decentralize industries and
businesses and to relocate them elsewhere. New Bombay was thus
based on the idea to ban the establishment of new large and medium
industrial units in Bombay and to provide incentives to the established
businesses to move out (Verma 1985).
In 1964, the First Development Plan for Greater Bombay for the pe-
riod 1964-8 I was presented by the Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay for government approval. The Plan recommended the decen-
tralization of industry and commerce in the city to suburbs and beyond.
The decongestion of industries and business was expected to lead the
population to move to the extended suburbs and beyond. The Plan pro-
posed the development of a number of satellite towns in nearby dis-
tricts to absorb migrants who otherwise would have settled in Bombay
(GOM I964).
The relocation of business and industries meant crossing the Thane
and Bassein creeks and moving onto the mainland (Verma I 985). The
business and industrial community of Bombay, hesitant to invest anew
in infrastructure and re-establishment far from the city, opposed the
development plan fiercely, arguing that future urban growth should be
entirely restructured, to stop the flow of migrants to Bombay from oc-
cupying land which otherwise would have been used for industrial or
commercial purposes. Opponents of the Plan maintained that newly es-
tablished satellite towns would not serve their purpose unless they were
sufficiently close to Bombay to attract businesses and population.
Thus the idea was born to develop a twin-city, New Bombay, across
the harbour and opposite Bombay. It was of utmost importance to the
industrial and business community that the government accept and
support this idea, as it was becoming increasingly difficult to expand
within Bombay, and the corporate sector was unwilling to assume inde-
pendent responsibility for the investments necessary to develop the in-
frastructure on the mainland.
The New Bombay plan was accepted by the government in I971.
The plan envisaged the creation of a new modern port across the exist-
ing Bombay port, and the creation of infrastructure for the development
of industries, business and housing. Land on the mainland, to be ac-
quired from peasants and fishermen, was conceived of as a crucial pri-
mary resource for the development of New Bombay. This form of ur-
 The Jawaharlal Nehru Port 121

ban development is oriented towards private business, and leads to a

situation where the control over the main resource - land - lies not
with the government, but with profiteers and speculators (Sharma
1991).

5.3 Land Acquisition and People,s Protest

For the development of New Bombay, the government of Maharashtra
designated an area of 343.7 square kilometres, affecting 0.2 million
people, for acquisition. Some 95 villages would be affected: 33 villages
were to be completely displaced, that is, they would lose all land and
houses, and 62 villages were to lose all agricultural and common lands,
but not housing. The fully displaced villages were to be given alterna-
tive sites to build new houses.
The government founded the City and Industrial Development Cor-
poration (CIDCO) to administer the development and administration of
New Bombay. CIDCO was responsible for acquiring, developing, and
disposing of land throughout the project area in order to achieve the
specific nodal and city structure goals and priorities (Verma 1985).
However, CIDCO did not have the financial capacity to acquire all the
appointed land and develop it in a short period. In the 1970s, land was
acquired only when it was immediately necessary, as it was impossible
to forecast future land requirements. However, in the early 1980s
CIDCO was able to quantify more accurately and to acquire the land
that would be needed within the next decade. The rest of the land ori-
ginally designated as project land by the government was temporarily
undesignated.
People who were to lose land to CIDCO were not willing to part
with their agricultural and saltpan lands. Their opposition was sus-
tained, though only for a limited period, by two forces.
First, the Peasants and Workers Party (PWP), which had strong sup-
port in the project-designated areas, opposed the New Bombay project.
The opposition also had the support of leaders of the ruling Congress
Party: leaders of the Congress Party and of the PWP had large areas of
Benami lands in the affected districts (Verma 1981). 2 Delays in land
acquisition normally meant higher compensation.
Second, elite groups and academics in Greater Bombay disapproved
of New Bombay and the displacement of such a large number of peo-
122 The Case Studies

pie. They provided the protestors with financial support, petitioned to

government ministers and political leaders, organized public lectures on
the issue, and campaigned against the applications of Bombay residents
for housing in New Bombay. This campaign reduced the demand for
housing in New Bombay from Bombay residents, resulting in a short-
age of funds for investment in the housing development. Throughout
the 1970s, the government was confronted with difficulties in stimulat-
ing the demand for housing from Bombay residents.
The project-affected people expressed their opposition in a variety of
ways. After prolonged agitation, CIDCO reached a settlement with the
leaders of PAPs in 1979, fixing the price of land at Rs 15,000 per acre
(Verma 1985). But the 1979 settlement could not be applied to all
PAPs in all the 95 villages: according to the government, this agree-
ment was only valid for the land closer to Bombay, in villages easily
accessible via the main road. Agitation erupted when new land was ac-
quired, for LAA norms were used to establish the price, which was
lower than the 1979 price.
All land acquisition within the state of Maharashtra is governed by
the 1894 LAA. Since the 1976 Maharashtra Resettlement and Rehabili-
tation Act dealt only with irrigation projects, a notification was issued
specifically to compensate New Bombay project-affected families. The
R&R provisions included:
• cash compensation for those losing land and/or housing registered in
their name;
• housing plots in resettlement sites for those who lost houses;
• employment in the New Bombay project: one job, if available, for
each household losing one acre of land or more;
• preference in lower-level state government jobs;
• admission to the CIDCO Industrial Training Institute (ITI) for young
men and women from project-affected households;
• water, roads, transportation, rations, educational and medical facilities
to be provided by CIDCO.
People engaged in saltpan work on government land, those engaged in
fishing, landless people and self-employed people were not awarded
any compensation. Those who lost less than one acre (a large number
 The Jawaharlal Nehru Port 123

of households owned less than one acre of land) were not eligible for
employment with the New Bombay project.
In 1980, Section 4.1 notices were issued in 12 villages of Uran tehsil
for the purpose of constructing a port. This was followed in 1981 by
the Section 6.1 declaration of the government's intention to acquire
land. The Section 9 compensation notice was issued in 1982-83. Land
was to be acquired at Rs 15,000 per acre, a rate paid for land acquired
in the 1970s. Deep resentment of the suggested compensation led to the
founding of the Jamin Bachao Samiti (Save the Land Committee) in
1980, to unite the project-affected people in their struggle for better
compensation. The leadership of the Samiti came from outside the
project-affected villages.
In 1984, the land acquisition process intensified. By that time the
opposition movement had become quite strong, and people demanded
a compensation of Rs 40,000 per acre. Many meetings were held with
CIDCO officials and the Government of Maharashtra, but no settlement
could be reached. Police force was employed to restrain agitating peo-
ple in protest rallies, and police action killed five people. In February
1984, the government, Samiti and CIDCO officials reached a compro-
mise and agreed on a cash compensation of Rs 23,000 per acre. Further,
12 per cent interest per annum would be paid for the period between
issuance of Section 4.1 notice and the payment of compensation. Thus,
the government paid Rs 27,000 per acre plus a grant of Rs 3,000 per
acre. The amount paid per acre varied according to the quality of the
land and trees on the land (Parasuraman & Sengupta 1992). A total of
2,584 hectares was acquired: I, 185 hectares was private agricultural
and housing plot land, 1,023 hectares was saltpan land owned by the
government, and 376 hectares was Revenue Department land.

5.4 Consequences of Displacement

Social differentiation in the New Bombay area
In the project-affected villages, caste groups such as Agris, Kolis and
Karadis accounted for 98 per cent of the population. All of these are
so-called 'backward communities' in the government classification of
caste groups. Marathas and Brahmans, the economically and socially
higher caste groups in Maharashtra, accounted for only two per cent of
the population in the project area.
124 The Case Studies

Agris were the largest caste group (78 per cent of 1,753 households)
in the project area. Agris (which in the Marathi language literally
means gardeners) were found along the creek banks of Alibag, Pen and
Uran tehsils. The Agris are salt-makers and tillers of salt rice land. No
other group from the district (Kolabha) had greater or even equal skills
in salt land tillage (GOM 1968, 1964). Agris also engaged in fishing,
but not as a main occupation.
Ten per cent of the population in the affected villages were Kolis,
traditionally fishermen and sailors. In the social hierarchy, Kolis rank
below Agris. The seven islands that constitute present-day Bombay
were originally populated by Kolis and Agris. A large number of Kolis
and Agris who originally lived on the Bombay islands were evicted
from there many decades ago, and settled in areas from where the New
Bombay project has been evicting them since 1970.
Karadis account for another I 0 per cent of the population. They were
cultivators, labourers in salt-making and also engaged in fishing. In so-
cial status they were close to the Agris (GOI 1931, GOM 1968, 1964).
The Chaukalsis and Packalsis are sub-sects of the Marathas, and to-
gether account for two per cent of the population in the villages. Ma-
rathas and Chaukalsis were relatively large landowners and engaged in
industrial and government service. Packalsis are also known as sutars
(woodworkers) and malts (gardeners). The Marathas, Chaukalsis and
Packalsis are located in the middle of Hindu caste hierarchy.

Economic differentiation prior to land acquisition

In the period prior to land acquisition, there were three major sources
of livelihood: agriculture, saltpan work and fishing. During the mon-
soon, people worked on rice fields, and for eight months beginning in
October, they concentrated on saltpan work and fishing. A small share
of households had persons working in industries and government ser-
vice, in nearby Thane, Panvel or Bombay. A few others were involved
in construction and public works in and around their villages. However,
despite the proximity of the project-affected villages to the industrial
cities, the economy remained mainly agricultural and dependent on land
and sea.
 The Jawahar/al Nehru Port 125

Saltpan work
When land was acquired, 1,023 hectares of saltpan lands were in use.
A few households owned saltpans (250 hectares), but most saltpan land
belonged to the government (773 hectares). For 988 out of 1,753 house-
holds, saltpans were a major source of livelihood: 533 households
owned saltpan land, 343 were engaged in saltpan wage labour, and 112
both possessed saltpan land and engaged in wage labour. Income from
saltpan work was steady for about eight months per year.
Fishing
All households had access to the sea. Brahmans and Marathas were not
involved in fishing. Fifty-three per cent of Agris, 62 per cent of Kara-
dis and 95 per cent of Kolis were engaged in fishing for as long as
they had access to the sea. In all, 908 of 1, 753 households were in-
volved in fishing. All of these households retained some fish for house-
hold consumption and sold the rest at Uran or Panvel, or within the vil-
lage. Women handled the sale of fish. In the post-displacement period,
all households except those resettled near the sea lost access to the sea
and thus income from fishing.
Agriculture
Ninety per cent of households owned land before land acquisition. Most
had less than 3 acres: the average landholding was 3.13 acres. About
13 per cent of the households owned more than five acres. In all vil-
lages, the size of landholdings had declined considerably due to re-
peated division. Land was very rarely traded, as is illustrated by the
very small number of landless households. Most landless people were
Kolis, the caste group whose main occupation was fishing. Only one
crop, rice, was harvested during the monsoon.
In 46 per cent of the households, the harvest did not meet consump-
tion demands. About 40 per cent harvested enough for consumption.
Some 14 per cent harvested enough to be able to sell a surplus. For
most households, the loss of land meant the loss of their capacity to
produce enough food through agriculture. Rice and fish had been the
staple food. The shortage of rice was met through earnings from labour
in the saltpans and other non-agricultural activities.
126 The Case Studies

Wage labour
In all, 20 per cent of households were engaged in agricultural wage
labour. About 17 per cent of the households had access to industrial
employment before displacement.

Economic conditions after land acquisition

Employment
Land was acquired from 1,753 households. The JNP was able to offer
jobs to about 450 to 600 persons. To reduce the number of eligible
households, JNP modified the job provision policy to apply only to
those who lost over one acre of land. The number of eligible house-
holds decreased by 22 per cent. However, JNP could not provide jobs
even to this reduced number. So a new strategy was adopted, and jobs
were offered only to households which had lost more than 2.5 acres of
land. Thus, households which had been well-placed prior to displace-
ment obtained employment from the JNP, while small landowning
households were further marginalized.
Although the port was originally obliged to provide employment for
every household that had lost land, less than 33 per cent of those house-
holds obtained employment. The port's obligation to provide employ-
ment for all displaced households was not legally binding. People who
could not obtain employment with the port or other industries in the
area took recourse to various non-agricultural wage labour activities
(loading, unloading and other contractor-related activities in port and
port-related establishments, sand extraction, Public Works Department
and Employment Guarantee Scheme work, or industry-related casual
wage labour in the Thana-Belapur industrial belt).
Replacement of lost resources
Of the households which owned land before land acquisition, 93 per
cent lost all land and the rest lost part of the land. The remaining land
was to be acquired later, for other purposes under the New Bombay
project. All saltpan lands were lost. Of the 12 villages affected by the
construction of the port, one village was completely displaced and re-
located in three places 6-10 kilometres from the original village. One
relocated village, Hanuman Koliwada, was closer to the sea. Except for
the Koli households in this relocated village, all others lost access to
the sea and to fishing.
 The Jawaharlal Nehru Port 127

Per capita income after resettlement

The impact of land acquisition and subsequent offers of permanent em-
ployment varied for the households concerned. Some 25 per cent of the
households experienced a significant increase in income (see Table
5.1 ). These were the households that obtained port employment. Many
households in this category had more than one permanent industry job.
For another 32 per cent of households, there was no change in income
level. The establishment of the port and associated employment enabled
these households to regain their previous income level. However, for
about 40 per cent of households, the situation worsened.
At the time of land acquisition, 3.7 persons per household had legal
access to agricultural and salt land. The compensation money was div-
ided among those entitled to receive it. However, employment in the
port could go only to one person, preferably a person with education
or technical skills. The remaining men automatically lost any claim to
preferential treatment for jobs. Those who obtained jobs in the port
supported their parents in most cases, and moved to the company town-
ship, leaving male siblings to fend for themselves. The economic dis-
parity among men from the same original household thus increased. Pre-
viously, saltpan and agricultural land had been the collective possession
of all men in the household, and was cultivated by them all. All had
equal access to the sea. The shift from collective ownership and equal
access to individual employment increased the economic disparities
among the members of the original household.
Though the port affected all households, certain caste groups were af-
fected more severely than others (Table 5.2). Compared to Agris and
Marathas, a higher proportion of Kalis and Karadis had a per capita
monthly income of less than Rs 160. Households with permanent em-
ployment in industry and services had higher incomes than those en-
gaged in other non-agricultural wage labour. Most Kolis and Karadis
depended on fishing and salt-making, and they usually owned Jess agri-
cultural land than the other castes did. Children of Kalis and Karadis
had very little or no education, while technical training would have in-
creased their chances of securing jobs.
The difficulties in replacing lost economic opportunities were com-
pounded by the influx of migrant labourers working for contractors.
The PAPs could not prevent contractors from bringing their own la-
bourers from other areas. Contractors preferred migrant labourers be-
128 The Case Studies

Table 5.1 JNP: Per capita monthly income of project-affected house-

holds (base 1991-92)

Households
Monthly PCI (Rs) 1983-84 1991-92
Number % Number %

Less than 81 151 8.6 512 29.2

81-110 200 11.4 185 10.6
111-160 507 28.9 231 13.2
161-280 806 46.0 351 20.0
281-370 54 3.1 175 10.0
Over 370 35 2.0 299 17.0

Total 1,753 100.0 1,753 100.0

Source: Parasuraman & Sengupta 1992.

cause they were subservient. They were also willing to live in work
camps and work for less than minimum wage. To some extent, the lo-
cal people succeeded in preventing contractors from hiring migrant la-
bourers, by attacking the labour camps.

5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

In 1993, New Bombay was a thriving city with a population of over
one million, with land speculators making enormous gains by manipu-
lating the planning body and the market. The source of investment for
both the planning body and the developers is the public deposits. To a
great extent, the planning body itself has become a speculator, with
massive deposits collected from the organized-sector salaried class from
Bombay. The arrival of large developers from Bombay has pushed up
the cost of land by 240 per cent and the cost of houses by 350 per cent
within one a decade. On the other hand, peasants losing land in 1990
were paid compensation amounts fixed in the early 1980s (CIDCO Doc-
uments 1990).
The LAA and the R&R policy failed to compensate for the loss of
common resources- saltpans and fishery - which had previously been
 The Jawaharla/ Nehru Port 129

Table 5.2 Percentage distribution of households by caste and

monthly per capita income

HHs with
Monthly PCI (Rs)
permanent
Caste jobs in port
< 160 160-280 > 280 or industry
(%)

Agris 48.4 21.2 29.4 40.3

Maratha &
related castes 17.1 46.4 36.5 83.3
Karadi 59.5 22.6 17.9 30.9
Koli 64.6 17.6 17.8 27.8

Note:
The port affected more households than the distribution in Table 5.2 suggests. The
survey households that existed in 1992 were reorganized according to the original
household that existed at the time of displacement. Income earned by each consti-
tuent household in 1992 was regrouped to refer to the income for the original house-
hold, with all members from the constituent households forming the denominator. The
results presented in Table 5.2 refer to reorganized households that correspond to the
original households. If the constituent households are treated as separate entities, as
they existed in reality in 1992, the income distribution presents a disturbing picture.
The proportion of households with a per capita income below Rs 11 0 would stand
close to 48 per cent, rather than 39.8 per cent as indicated in the table.
Source: Parasuraman & Sengupta 1992.

a source of livelihood. People lost access to both these resources after

the establishment of the port, without compensation. All Kalis, and the
majority of Karadis and Agris were thus devastated economically. De-
velopment projects neither recognized the rights of people to the com-
mon resources nor helped people to switch to other income-generating
activities compatible with their skills and expertise.
Too much land was acquired, for meagre cash compensation based
on outdated norms, impoverishing unnecessarily high numbers of peo-
ple. The land acquired was far in excess of the amount required for the
present and future needs of the port (Verma 1985). The port could have
functioned efficiently with less than 50 per cent of the land acquired.
On the other hand, due to the modern technology used in port opera-
tions, only a very small number of workers could be provided with
jobs, and only those with appropriate technical qualifications and from
130 The Case Studies

formerly large landowning households were eligible. The unused land

is now being handed over to private sector builders, for large-scale
housing projects catering to the needs of organized-sector workers in
the area.
The cash compensation for land did not enable people to buy com-
parable land anywhere in the district. Further, there were no viable in-
vestment opportunities. There was no land left to purchase. In the port
and in other industrial projects, five to ten years lapsed between the
time compensation was paid and the time investment opportunities
arose. It was only after the completion of construction and after opera-
tion had started, that employees and their families arrived in the project
area, creating a demand for a variety of services. About 75 per cent of
the displaced people received less than Rs 10,000 and were unable to
save the money until it could be invested. Only those who had received
high compensation could invest during the construction stage in con-
tract or transportation activities or could save the money for investment
at a later date.
The port was in a good position to rehabilitate the affected people
because of its financial and managerial autonomy as a public sector en-
terprise, yet it failed to provide social amenities for vulnerable groups.
The port never publicly acknowledged that it was unable to provide em-
ployment to all project-affected households. Measures could have been
developed to help households not eligible for jobs, but the port failed
to recognize the skills and capacities of the people to engage in
alternative productive activities. The region is the most rapidly indus-
trializing area in the country. There was, and still is, immense scope for
gainful employment in these areas. The area also offers many opportun-
ities for self-employment in contract activities, transportation, repair
work and business. However, the project-affected people, being fisher-
men and saltpan workers, are ill-equipped to take advantage of the
growing industrial employment opportunities. Port authorities failed to
create the conditions which would enable people to acquire new skills,
finance and initial support to obtain employment in industries.
The government of Maharashtra has a strong Department of Relief
and Rehabilitation headed by a senior secretary. The government is re-
sponsible for land acquisition, the payment of compensation and the im-
plementation programme. In the case of the New Bombay project, once
the compensation was paid, the Collector issued eligibility certificates
 The Jawaharlal Nehru Port 131

for employment to those who lost land. Beyond that, the port was
responsible for implementing R&R work: the creation of infrastructure
in the resettled and partially affected villages, the provision of health
care services and the provision of employment. Once an industry has
been made responsible for the R&R work, the government will rarely
intervene. The port provided some access to medical services and in-
stalled a few water taps.
The Department of Administration of the port was responsible for im-
plementing R&R work, but the port lacked officials with experience in
rehabilitation work. Most officials involved were insensitive to the
losses people suffered. They did not attempt to comprehend the needs
of different groups of affected people or to develop suitable interven-
tion measures. The authorities could not see beyond the narrow focus
of the government's R&R guidelines, and made no deliberate effort to
establish a rapport with the people in the resettled and partially affected
villages.
Port authorities found it difficult to work with the project-affected
people, in part because the people had not been encouraged to be recep-
tive to alternative ideas. Rehabilitation planning was lacking altogether.
Imaginative strategies were Jacking. Vulnerable groups, including wom-
en, landless people and marginal landholders and fishermen were the
most severely affected by displacement.
 Displacement Due to the
6
Bolani Iron Ore Mines

6.1 Introduction
Mining contributes heavily, both directly and indirectly, to rapid defor-
estation and to the economic and social marginalization of indigenous
people. This chapter analyses the impact of mining activities on indi-
genous people in the forested areas of Bihar and Orissa. It will be
stressed that mining activities not only displace people from their land,
but give rise to a rapid population increase in the area, due to migra-
tion.'
The experience of tribal groups in Bolani with mine-related develop-
ment and displacement is common to much of the Chotanagpur region,
comprising tribal areas in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West
Bengal. Extensive mining has displaced over two million tribals in this
area (Fernandes & Raj 1993), depriving the people of their land, the
forest and the river.
Mining directly displaces indigenous people and causes environment-
al degradation in a variety of ways: by depleting forested areas, by
transforming formerly agricultural land into mines, by polluting air, soil
and water. The indirect effects on indigenous people and the environ-
ment may be serious as well, for people poor in resources and skills are
attracted by the mines. Not only is agricultural land, formerly owned
by indigenous people, acquired by the mines: increasingly, land is ac-
quired by non-tribals employed in the mines, for housing and other pur-
poses. Further, people who migrate to the area for employment in the
informal sector occupy land illegally, in squatter settlements.

132
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 133

Thus, the poor integration of the market in tribal areas, the extreme
pressure on the forest, and conditions that encourage indebtedness per-
petuate poverty and underdevelopment. The strategies which displaced
and poor migrant people adopt under such circumstances are often in-
compatible with sustained, environmentally sound land use, and lead to
the deterioration of soils and other natural resources.
Prior to 1950, Bolani was a small village which, together with the ad-
joining villages Balagoda and Champua, had 800 inhabitants, according
to the 1951 census. In 196 I the population of these villages had more
than doubled, to 1, 780, and by 1971 the population had increased to
7,277. In 1981, when Bolani and Balagoda merged with the new SAIL
township, the population was 9,575. Subsequently, when a hamlet of
Bolani and the Camp of Bolani - which had originally been excluded
-were added to the new town, the total population of the three villages
rose to 11 ,591. Table 6.1 demonstrates the increase in the population
of Bolani, Balagoda and Champua villages between 1951 and 1990.
In 1990, the population ofBolani included four groups of people: des-
cendants of the original inhabitants ( 1,308), migrants belonging to tribal
groups similar to those in the original villages (2,646), tribal and non-
tribal migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other parts of Orissa,
who settled in autonomous colonies throughout Bolani (9,885 persons)
and SAIL employees (5,705) in the SAIL housing colony.

6.2 Socioeconomic Conditions in the Original

Villages
Ethnicity and demographic change
Prior to the development of iron-ore mines in the area, Bolani, Cham-
pua and Balagoda were small and sparsely populated villages. Tribal
people named the Mundas and the Bhuiyas shared the Bolani and Bala-
goda ecology. They lived in separate hamlets, and the houses within the
hamlets were located at considerable distances from each other. Most
households within the hamlets were bound by descent, and sometimes
by affinal relationships, and there was social and ritual equality among
the men from these households (Sachchidananda 1980, Areeparampil
1988).
To some extent, the people of this area were socially and economi-
cally self-reliant (Fernandes et al. 1985, 1988). Every household owned
134 The Case Studies

Table 6.1 Population of Bolani, Balagoda and Champua, 1951-90

Year Population %increase

1951 1,520
1961 2,980 96.0
1971 9,000 202.0
1981 12,490 38.8
1990 19,544 56.4

Sources: Census of India: Orissa, District Census Handbook, Keonjhar District,

1951-81: Parasuraman 1990a.

land. Upon marriage, sons normally cleared small patches of forest land
for cultivation and established independent homes.
Agriculture in the area was dependent on the monsoon. Rice,jowar
and other cereals and millet were cultivated. The Bolani valley and the
commons around the village provided pastures that enabled most house-
holds to rear a few cows, goats and bullocks. Livestock served as insur-
ance against drought and scarcity. Further, the cattle facilitated the
payment of brideprice and the celebration of a variety of religious and
social events.
The forest was a major source of livelihood: people collected a vari-
ety of fruits, roots, leaves and small game from the forest (Sachchida-
nanda 1980). Mahua flowers were also collected from the forest. Indiv-
idual households also owned Mahua trees, which provided flowers for
brewing liquor, fruits for consumption and seeds for oil. Karo river,
which flowed through Bolani, was unpolluted. Medicinal plants in the
forest were essential to traditional medicine men. 2
The amount of forest produce collected was small, as the population
density was very low (80 persons per square kilometre). To safeguard
the forest and ecological balance in the area, the tribals declared a few
species of trees 'sacred' and thus protected. Grazing in, and removal of
wood from sacred groves was prohibited. Further, tribal laws helped to
protect the common property within and around the village, and devia-
tion from the norms was punished.
The cultivation of land, the collection of forest produce, and activities
such as hunting and cattle-herding took place according to a fixed
schedule. Women's labour, which was essential to the survival of the
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 135

household, was highly valued. A community cattle-grazer took care of

all of the community's livestock, ensuring that all households had equal
access to grazing land.
The households and the community were in a position to exercise con-
siderable control over the labour and the living conditions of the com-
munity and its members (Toppo 1992, Sachchidananda 1980, 1985).
Economic and social self-sufficiency were based on access to several
alternative sources of production. In Eastern Orissa, where the refer-
ence villages are located, middlemen and large landlords were relatively
unknown. People seem to have exercised some control over their fer-
tility, and knowledge of contraception was widespread. Population
growth among tribal people in Eastern Orissa was low, compared to the
growth rate among tribal groups in other parts of the country (NFHS
1992).
The ethnic composition of the three villages which constitute Bolani
changed between 1950 and 1991. First, the ratio of migrants to non-
migrants has changed. In 1951 original settlers accounted for 76 per
cent of the population, while in 1990 that figure had dropped to 6. 7 per
cent. Secondly, in 1951 tribal people accounted for 96 per cent of the
population, while in 1990 that figure was only 28.3 per cent. Tribal and
non-tribal migrants have settled in all three villages. The non-tribal
migrants have taken control of the panchayats, co-operative societies
and commerce. In these villages, tribal families have been pushed out
to the periphery of the villages, socially segregated from the rest of the
population.

Loss of land, compensation and current landholdings of

original village households
A total of 1,320 hectares of land was acquired from private landowners
and Forest and Revenue Departments for the Bolani mines. An area
measuring 300 hectares was thickly forested at the time of the initial
mining exploration. The amount of land acquired was many times more
than the area actually used for mining: 202 hectares was used for man-
ual mining and 53 hectares for mechanized mining. The township and
over 11 hutment colonies together occupy about 500 hectares. Only a
small amount of the land acquired remains forested. In Bolani, Balago-
da and Champua, about 80, 90 and 55 per cent of the households re-
spectively lost land to mines, roads and railways. The Balagoda and
136 The Case Studies

Table 6.2 Households of original inhabitants and migrants in Bolani,

Balagoda and Champua, December 1989

Number of households
Caste
Original Migrant

Munda 128 332

Bhuiya 75 4
Goval 15 7
Mahato 45
Other castes 46
Dalits 7
Total 218 441
Population 3625

Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

Bolani households lost all or most of the land they owned. In Cham-
pua, only a few households lost all their land.
All households which lost land to the mines were compensated in
cash (Rs 150-400 per acre), and one member of each household was
granted employment in the mines. Households which lost land to the
PWD or to railways were granted only cash compensation. Birla In-
dustries established an iron works establishment in Bolani, for which
about 100 hectares of land from Champua village was purchased in
1984 for the unusually high price of Rs 12,000 per acre. However,
usually when private mines acquired land the prices paid were very low
and the employment granted was temporary and poorly remunerated.
Most of the households which lost land subsequently cleared forest
land for cultivation. In 1989, all households in Champua possessed
some land. In Bolani, 80 per cent owned land and a few others had en-
croached on land. In Balagoda, about 48 per cent of the households
owned land. Most of the migrant tribal men living in Bolani village
owned three to five acres of land each. In all, the original village
households which lost land and the tribals who had migrated to the ori-
ginal village together cleared about 180-250 hectares of forest land for
cultivation.
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 137

The acquisition of agricultural and forest land for the initiation and
expansion of mining activities for the construction of road, railway and
housing complexes, and the subsequent clearing of forest land for culti-
vation are continuing relentlessly. These interconnected phenomena
have depleted the forest cover of a vast area.

Sources and levels of income

In 1989, of the descendants of the original settlers and migrants in the
three villages, 50 per cent had permanent employment in mines, and a
few were employed in Kalinga Iron Works.
The 'permanently employed' category in Table 6.3 includes a few
persons employed in outside the mines, in government jobs. In another
45 per cent of the households, the main earners were engaged by con-
tractors. For the remaining five per cent of households, cultivation was
the main source of income. In Champua, most men who were offered
employment in the Kalinga Iron Works (KIW) left their jobs because
of the arduous working conditions. These men are now engaged in
stone-crushing work, as day labourers.
Cultivation and the collection of wood for household use as well as
for sale are the most important secondary activities of the households.
Cultivation takes place during only three to four months per year.
About 54 per cent of the main earners with permanent employment in
mines, KIW or government service are engaged in cultivation. Absen-
teeism among the tribal workers in SAIL and private mines is very
high during sowing and harvesting seasons. Some 27 per cent of the
main earners with permanent employment and 54 per cent of the people
engaged in contract labour are involved in the collection and sale of
wood. Only 19 per cent of the main earners with permanent employ-
ment did not engage in other income-providing activities.
Households with cultivation as the major activity owned more land.
The extent to which these households are involved in exploiting the
forest depends on agricultural production: in good monsoon years, the
exploitation of the forest is limited, while in drought years, forest
resources are intensively exploited.
In all tribal households under research, women were involved in
gainful employment. The range of activities in which these women
were involved has increased in recent years. They are engaged in cul-
tivation, wage labour in agriculture and mines, the collection of minor
13 8 The Case Studies

Table 6.3 Land acquisition and compensation payment in the original

villages

Champua Bolani Balagoda

Landownership
• before mines all had land all had land all had land
• at present all have land 80% have land 48% have land
Current landholdings
per household 5.2 acres 4.1 acres 3.5 acres
Land acquired for PWD & Birlas (1982) SAIL & railways SAIL & railways
KIW (1970)
Nature of SAIL provided jobs (as hand miners) after 1965
compensation PWD paid about Rs 250 per acre (1965-70)
Railways paid Rs 250 per acre (1965-70)
Birlas paid Rs 12,000 per acre (1984)
KIW provided jobs and paid Rs 350 per acre

Source: Parasuraman 1991 a.

forest produce, and household activities. Firewood for household use

is collected exclusively by women and children.
Women are not permanently employed in the mines. The idea that
women might take up regular salaried jobs is unheard of in the area. A
large number of small private mines does employ indigenous tribal
women on a daily basis, but the SAIL mines do not employ them at all.
Women from all villages, especially Champua, do work as casual la-
bourers in stone quarry and mica mines in the area. Most of the work
which they do is strenuous and pays poorly (Rs 9 per day). The heavy
influx of migrant workers has made wage labour scarce and has helped
to suppress wages. Participation in wage labour has become more in-
tense in the lean agricultural months because the loss of land and a de-
cline in soil fertility - due to pollution - have caused a decline in ag-
ricultural production.
Table 6.4 presents an overview of the economic condition of house-
holds in the original villages. This analysis includes both original and
migrant households.
The incomes of households with at least one member holding a per-
manent job were higher than the incomes of other households. House-
holds which had steady incomes from mine employment and owned ag-
riculturalland as well were better off than landless households. Mahato
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 139

Table 6.4 Income-generating activities of main earners in original and

migrant households in Champua, Balagoda and Bolani
(percentages)

Main activity of which:

% %
- secondary activity

Permanent 50
employment in mines - no other work 19
or iron works - cultivation 54
- sale of wood 27

Contract/day labour 45
- sale of wood 54
- cultivation 30
- contruction work 16

Cultivation 5
- sale of wood 50
- contruction work 50

Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

and other Hindu households had income from employment in the mines
and from investments in commerce and agriculture. Their average
monthly income was higher than the incomes of tribal and lower caste
Hindu households with poorer access to resources, investment advice,
and so on. Indigenous tribal households were unable to use their mine
wages and land resources for income-enhancing ventures.
About one-third of the households with permanent jobs but without
agricultural land were in a better economic position than other groups.
The remaining two-thirds of the households had serious economic prob-
lems. Expensive liquor consumption and perpetual loan-taking habits
pushed many households into poverty. Despite the better salaries paid
by the SAIL mines, at least 70 per cent of the original village house-
holds reported that they had loans. Local interest rates are very high.
Households with main earners engaged in contract or daily wage la-
bour find life difficult. Wage labour is available for six to eight months
per year. Of the landowning households in this category, 66 per cent
find it difficult to satisfy consumption needs, and only about 17 per
cent find it easy. The households in this category without land, howev-
er, all find it difficult to satisfy consumption needs.
140 The Case Studies

Households with agriculture as a major source of livelihood seem to

adequately satisfy their consumption needs. Only those households with
7 acres of land or more are engaged in cultivation full-time. The aver-
age landholding of these households is 7.8 acres. Some 18 per cent of
indigenous tribal households had 7 or more acres of land.
In the 1960s, 180 of the 218 households in the original villages were
offered employment in the state mines. However, less than half of the
households in the original villages were employed in the mines in
1990. In Champua village, only about 20 per cent of the households
had one or more persons engaged in mine employment.
In the state-owned Bolani mines, from 1965 to 1974 over 90 per cent
of the men from indigenous tribal households were employed as hand-
miners. Hand-mining is very strenuous and wages are based on produc-
tion. Accustomed to cultivating for subsistence, tribal men coud not
manage the work in the mines. They performed poorly, abstaining of-
ten. Compared to these tribal men, non-tribal migrant workers from
other parts of the country and more accustomed to quarry work per-
formed well, and were rarely absent from work. 3 Tribal workers even-
tually lost their jobs on account of poor performance and lack of dis-
cipline.
The terms and conditions of work in the mines are far removed from
the ways of life of the tribal people in the area. Those managing the af-
fairs of the mines are not sensitive to the feelings of the people. Festi-
vals and customs of the tribal people are viewed with disrespect by the
majority of non-tribals. Even in their own area, indigenous tribal peo-
ple feel unwanted. Alienation from mining is forcing them to resort to
cultivation, clearing patches of forest and trading in wood.

6.3 Socioeconomic Conditions in Hutments

In 1990, 9,885 people in Bolani (out of a total population of 19,544)
were staying in squatter settlements - called hutments in Bolani - on
land owned by the Bolani mines. Some 1,189 huts had been established
on mine land, and another 450 on forest and other village land. The
people living in these hutments are migrants from other parts of Orissa
and other Eastern Indian states such as West Bengal and Orissa, who
were attracted to the area by employment prospects. The Bolani mines
could absorb only 620 workers, however, so the tremendous influx of
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 141

migrants placed great pressure on other employment opportunities, in

the informal sector and in forests.
Over 95 per cent of the people who migrated to Bolani and live there
in huts came from rural and tribal areas. The remaining five per cent
came from urban areas. About 60 per cent of the migrants living in hut-
ments belong to Dalit and tribal groups. A few hutments are populated
mainly by tribal or Dalit groups.
Most men (62 per cent) in the hutments came to Bolani before 1970. 4
Another 17 per cent came between 1971 and 1975, and 16 per cent
came between 1976 and 1980. Only 5 per cent of the men now living
in the hutments migrated to Bolani in the 1980s. The number of people
migrating to Bolani dropped considerably in the 1980s, but since 1990
the number of migrants has increased again due to temporary employ-
ment opportunities created by the modernization of the SAIL mines in
the 1990s.
About 40 per cent of respondents surveyed for this study owned land
in their places of origin, but landholdings were small, averaging about
1.5 acres. Another 19 per cent owned only a housing plot. A few hut-
ment dwellers owned land in Bolani, and many were leasing land at the
time this study was carried out, in 1990.
The main earners of the hutment households had various sources of
income. About 60 per cent of the men had mine-related employment:
some were permanently employed by the mines, others were engaged
by contractors, or involved in loading and unloading iron ore for the
railways. In the remaining 40 per cent of households, men engaged in
casual labour. The nature of the job held by the main earner determined
the economic condition of the household.
Persons with daily wage or contract work also collected and sold
firewood and timber, brewed and sold liquor, and carried out other ac-
tivities. About 30 per cent of the men with daily wage labour or con-
tract work were also involved in secondary activities.
About 60 per cent of the women living in the hutments had gainful
employment in Bolani. Most of the tribal and Dalit women had paying
jobs. Much of the work women did was contractual or daily wage la-
bour, cultivating or working for the Forest Department, the stone quar-
ries or the Public Works Department. About 36 per cent of the women
had more than one source of income.
142 The Case Studies

Table 6.5 Economic condition of households in original village,

December 1989

Contract labour/ Agri-

Permanent job
day labour culture
with land w/o land with land w/o land with land

Economic condition
- good(%) 72 35 17 70
- not bad(%) 28 25 17 30
- bad{%) 40 66 100
Workers per HH
(average) 1.6 1.9 3.2 3.9 3.0
Landholdings
(average in
acres) 6.2 1.7 7.8
Mean monthly
income (Rs) 2,000 1,200 850 550 1,200

Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

Hutment households with employment in the mines had steady in-

comes, access to education and health care, and were able to purchase
consumer goods from the Co-operative Society store at controlled pri-
ces, on credit. The average income of households in this category was
Rs 1800 per month.
The position of households with contract or daily wage labour was
less secure. Contract-related work was available for about six months
per year, at a daily wage of about Rs 25. The average monthly income
of these households was Rs 500. They did not have access to schools,
health services or the public distribution system.
Self-employed households - involved in petty trade, the preparation
and sale of hadia (local liquor), the sale of wood, hairdressing, tailor-
ing, masonry, and so on- earned up toRs 1200 per month.
About 10 per cent of the households living in hutments derives 78
per cent of their income from the sale of fuelwood and timber. In an-
other 12 per cent of the households, the sale of wood accounts for over
half the monthly income. The demand for firewood is very high in Bo-
lani colony and in the hutments. Much of the firewood demand of Bo-
lani residents is met through illegal felling.
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 143

Table 6.6 Occupation of main earners in hutments

Permanent company job 12

1. Permanent company job 38

2. Temporary company job (contract) 12
3. Work in contractor activities (SAIL and private mines,
railways, PWD, Forest Department, Kalinga Iron works, brick
and tile factory, forest department) 20
4. Daily wage employment (loading/unloading, agriculture,
stone-breaking, etc.) 10
5. Brewing and selling liquor 10
6. Selling wood 10

Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

Table 6. 7 Main occupation of women in hutments

Permanent company job 12

1. Contract work in railways, stone-breaking 12

2. Wage labour in agriculture, forest, public works department 10
3. Assistance to men in brewing and sale of liquor 10
4. Maidservants to households in colony 15
5. Collection of fuelwood for sale 22
6. Prostitution 1
7. Household work 30
Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

In each hutment, a few households are involved in the preparation

of hadia for sale. There is a great demand for hadia in Bolani, as the
people employed in mines have money to spend.
For almost a quarter of the households in the hutments, it is difficult
to meet consumption needs. A few households reported that for about
three months in 1989-90 they were not able to eat two meals a day.
The households dependent on contract work and daily wage labour
were most vulnerable to prolonged periods of unemployment and star-
vation. Most households with permanently employed members reported
144 The Case Studies

that their economic condition was better than that of their neighbours
without mine employment. However, 23 per cent of tribal and Dalit
households with permanent BIOM jobs reported financial difficulties,
due to alcoholism, absenteeism and the difficulty of meeting minimum
productivity requirements in the piece-wage system.
All informants living in huts, regardless of the sources of income of
the household's main earner, described their economic condition as
good compared to their condition prior to their migration to Bolani. In
Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, unemployment and underemployment
rates are high, and it has become impossible for the dispossessed in
rural areas to meet their consumption needs in the villages.

6.4 The Environmental Impact of Mining in the

Bolani Region
Mining activities in the Bolani region have contributed and continue to
contribute to serious environmental degradation in the area. The ferti-
lity of the land has decreased due to soil pollution, the forest wealth
has been depleted due to excessive encroachment by both mines and mi-
grants, and the Karo river and other water sources have become pollut-
ed. Rice yields per hectare have dropped 10-14 per cent in Bolani and
Balagoda, and over 15 per cent in Champua (Parasuraman 1990a,
BHPE-KINHILL 1991).
Various explanations for the environmental decline have been put
forth by the people concerned. The climate of the area - expressed in
terms of the quantity and the duration of rainfall, the temperature and
moisture levels- has changed, due to the combination of mining opera-
tions, deforestation and loss of vegetation. Deforestation in mining
areas seems to have reduced the moisture-retaining capacity of the soil,
causing erosion and a consequent decline in productivity. The pollution
of the soil, due to widespread mining operations, further decreases soil
fertility. In addition, dust and stone particles carried down by rainwater
settle on the arable land, damaging the soil. Mining activities reduce
the stream flow and cause the irrigation systems to dry up. The pollu-
tion of the river, due to the washing of iron ore, has further exacerbat-
ed the problems.
The acute disregard for pollution control has damaged agricultural
and grazing land near the mines and in the area drained by the Karo
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 145

river and its nallas. Except for one, none of the nallas draining the
mine area has any silt-trapping equipment, so that large quantities of
silt are allowed to be washed down onto the flat land during the mon-
soon. Although the SAIL mines do make use of a silt-controlling mech-
anism, this is extremely ineffective.
In mining, water is used for dust suppression and beneficiation. Nor-
mally, the polluted water is treated at the tail end dam. However, the
water becomes unsuitable for drinking. No specific studies have been
conducted on the extent of pollution in Bolani, but studies of com-
parable cases indicate that river pollution due to mining is very serious.
A study on the iron ore mine at Bailadilla in Madhya Pradesh con-
cluded that water pollution was the most serious of the mine's envi-
ronmental impacts:
The screening and washing plants of the iron ore mines are located at the
very source of Sankhani river, which is the principal source of water for
people of the valley. The tribal people who used to fetch water from the
river no longer do so and not even the animals frequent the place. It has
been found that such polluted water is no longer useful for irrigation
purposes. This has created serious problems in 23 villages. (BHPE-
KINHILL 1991)

The situation in Bolani is no different from that in Bailadilla. If any-

thing, it is worse, given the extent and nature of mining by state and
private enterprises.
The Karo river is under ever-increasing pressure from the mines: the
SAIL Bolani, Gua and Charia mines, as well as over 40 private and a
few state mines are located in the catchment of the river. Further, the
river system faces serious problems because a wet beneficiation plant
is planned in the SAIL mines, as part of the modernization programme
initiated in the 1990s. This will pollute the river beyond control.
The pollution of the Karo river has already effectively eliminated it
as a source of drinking water. Previously, the Karo river served as a
primary water source for over 40 villages. A few villages continue to
filter and use the water for drinking purposes. It comes as no surprise
that the people living in areas along the river report skin diseases and
water-borne diseases as major problems, attributable to the pollution of
the water.
146 The Case Studies

Pollution appears to have severed the formerly close connection be-

tween the people and the river which once served as a source of drink-
ing water for both humans and animals, and as a source of fish. In
most villages downstream from the mines, the river has ceased to play
this role, and an alternative water supply - such as the mines' water
supply system in authorized hutments, Bolani township, Balagoda and
part of Bolani village - is lacking in the downstream villages.
Deterioration of the forest, too, is a consequence of unchecked
mining activity. Forest conditions have changed. Close to Bolani, the
forest cover has disappeared. Near the township, forests have been
thinned out to the point that only individual mature trees and occasion-
ally very young saplings remain. Shrubbery is either absent or consists
of undesirable species such as lantana. The remaining plant communi-
ties have very low densities, with very few perennial species. In the dry
season, the ground cover is minimal and much of the soil has been
burnt. The tree density and forest cover increase again further away
from the mines: intermediate-age trees and shrubbery appear. The di-
versity increases, and even late in the hot season, unburned areas
remain. But then, after some distance, another mine makes its presence
known: hutments, villages and naked patches reappear.
The destruction of the forest cover has several causes. The forest is
destroyed to make way for mining, township, roads, rails, electricity
lines and other purposes. The forest cover is also destroyed by pollu-
tion from mining operations. The demand for fuelwood has increased,
and a growing number of people depend on the sale of fuelwood and
timber as a source of income. Further, the forest is cleared for agricul-
ture and settlement.
The most serious threat to the forest comes from the people, who fell
trees for fuel, furniture and construction - for their own use and for
sale. In early 1990, at least 10 per cent of the households in the en-
croached settlements derived their livelihood solely from the sale of
wood. Another 25 per cent of the households derived part of their live-
lihood (30-50 per cent of the total income) from the sale of wood. In
the original villages, the sale of wood accounted for about 18 per cent
of the total income. The number of households depending on the sale
of fuelwood and timber is growing, and in the process the price of
wood is kept low.
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 147

The government assumes no responsibility for checking pollution.

Households are unable, and mining authorities unwilling, to take action
to safeguard agricultural land and grassland from soil pollution. Rather,
strategies to cope with environmental deterioration have even increased
the stress on the environment. People who had resources bought more
manure and fertilizer to compensate for soil erosion. Encroachment of
the forest around Bolani - to provide land for cultivation - has contin-
ued (or even increased), while agricultural practices which disregard
basic soil conservation principles, combined with mining and road con-
struction, have contributed further to deforestation and soil erosion.
The tribals living in villages in the outer circle of the Bolani mines
have also been adversely affected by the mining operations. Declining
soil fertility has affected many households.
In the Barbil area where the Bolani mines are located, there were 65
private mines in 1989, as well as many SAIL and state mines. Around
Bolani, there are four small and eight large mines owned by SAIL,
which together occupied an area of 17,481 hectares (SAIL 1990). Fur-
ther, private mines in the Barbil region occupy well over 20,000 hec-
tares. Since the nationalization of the mines in 1971, large-scale mining
by private contractors has become illegal, so that it has become difficult
to assess how much land is used for mining purposes (Areeparampil
1989), but it is clear that mining, the associated townships, and the
encroachment of forest and common land have made demands on vast
expanses of forest land.
The effects of deforestation will be very seriously felt in the coming
years. Several mining leases are contiguous with other leases. The dis-
tance between SAIL, private and state mines is rapidly diminishing, due
to the expansion of existing leases, the increase in legal and illegal
mining by private parties, and the rapid expansion of the population
due to migration. There are no joint efforts either to check deforesta-
tion or to initiate measures to reforest the area. Although 12 SAIL
mines are located close to each other, no coordinated attempt has been
made to reverse the process of rapid deforestation. In fact most mines
have no programme at all to check deforestation and environmental de-
gradation.
Nor do the central or state governments initiate any efforts to check
deforestation. On the contrary, the Indian government's policies regard-
ing the granting of forest land for mining will further aggravate the sit-
148 The Case Studies

uation. Recent changes in government policy have removed some im-

pediments to the allocation of forest land to mining: where regional
Chief Conservators of forests previously were authorized to allocate up
to one hectare of forest land, they are now allowed to divert up to five
hectares. Projects involving up to 20 hectares will in future be cleared
by the respective state advisory committees. (In the past the jurisdiction
of these committees was restricted to projects involving up to five hec-
tares). Further, according to the new regulations, separate environ-
mental clearance is not necessary for mining proposals if the forest area
involved is less than 20 hectares (TOI 1992).
These changes in the regulations governing the release of forest land
for mining are intended to encourage private operators to open new
mines. This will accelerate deforestation. Population growth, induced
by the increase in private mines, will also have adverse effects on the
forest, given the employment conditions and wages offered in such
mines. Mining generates dust, which will adversely affect vegetation in
the immediately adjoining the area. (The nature and extent of damage
caused by dust are not examined here because of the lack of data.)
Because of the depletion of the forest vegetation, the bhagat can no
longer prescribe traditional medicines, and women no longer use tradi-
tional contraceptives. Yet alternative modern medicine remains inacces-
sible. It is becoming increasingly problematic to find enough mahua
flowers to brew liquor or to cultivate enough rice to make rice beer.
The consumption of liquor, which was once an integral part of the life
of people, is now considered a serious problem. The tribal philosophy
of combining work and leisure, which at one time was the norm, is
now considered by mine authorities to be a serious discipline problem
(Sachchidananda 1985, Areeparampil 1988).

6.5 Conclusions
In sum, mining may have been beneficial to the country at large, but
it has adversely affected the tribal people living in the Bolani area, and
has caused damage to the forest and to the river. The tribal people have
been deprived of many of their resources: the land, the forest and the
river. In the long run, this will threaten the resources of the country as
a whole. If the current deforestation continues, the scattered pockets of
 Bolani Iron Ore Mines 149

bare patches in the midst of densely forested areas will become wide-
spread throughout the forest belt of Orissa and Bihar.
The indigenous tribal people have not benefited from the transition
from subsistence agriculture to mine-related employment. These people
were least prepared to shift from subsistence cultivation, which de-
manded only seasonal labour, to industrial and mining work, which. de-
manded hard labour throughout the year. The tribal people required
training and mental preparation to adapt to the new work environment,
but the Bolani mines made no effort to improve the skills of the hand-
miners. Instead, the mine authorities effectively segregated the tribal
people from the non-tribal workers and eventually excluded them from
mining employment (Viegas 1992). Most tribal workers employed as
hand-miners are being forced to retire, while it is impossible for their
children to find employment in the mines, as they are unskilled. Until
recently, hand-miners were treated as contract workers. Thus, they can
never hope to live in the company township. Schools and health facili-
ties are almost always located in or near the company township.
Mining activities have divided the tribal people into a number of
different groups: permanent, piece-wage and contract-workers in mines,
casual wage labourers in mine-related activities, cultivators, families
dependent on the sale of wood, and so on. By displacing people from
land and aggravating land alienation, the mines have helped to create
an army of unskilled, cheap labour. The immigration, from Orissa and
Bihar, of tribal and lower caste peasants- usually displaced by similar
development projects - has further increased the availability of un-
skilled labour.
Women in general did not benefit from the mining activities. Em-
ployment in the state-owned mining sector could not provide employ-
ment for women (whether tribal or non-tribal). Women seeking em-
ployment can find work as hand-miners in private mines, but they face
competition on the labour market (from migrants) and are paid low
wages. Women miners have been largely replaced by male migrants
willing to accept poorer pay.
Bolani illustrates the deep cultural divide among the people living in
that area. The tribal people from the original villages, the migrants liv-
ing in hutments and the people living in Bolani township represent
three distinct cultural groups, which interact very little. The original
village tribal people have become strangers in their own area. The tri-
150 The Case Studies

bal people are perceived by company management, government offici-

als and other important persons as lazy, irresponsible, illiterate, alco-
holic and socially and ritually impure. There is no recognition of tribal
culture as valid, with distinct values. Tribal people who have shed their
cultural values and fully adopted high caste Hindu practices are con-
sidered to be progressive, while those adhering to age-old customs are
considered backward and uncivilized.
The future holds little hope for the indigenous tribal people. Less
than 60 per cent of the children of school age ever enrol in school, and
about 75 per cent of those who do, drop out before completing VIII
standard. A few Munda households in Bolani village managed to keep
their children in school up to or beyond higher secondary level, but
most of the tribal households from Champua and Balagoda were not
successful in ensuring education for their children. Various factors con-
tribute to the low enrolment and to the high drop-out rate, including the
location of the pupils' homes (which makes it difficult to attend school
during the monsoon), the lack of parental support, and the need for chil-
dren's labour in wood collection and in other economic activities.
Life has changed drastically for the people of Bolani, Champua and
Balagoda. Their economy and ecology have become closely linked to
the wider market economy. The original inhabitants have been forced
to become silent spectators of this change. They have been excluded
from the planning process, and have lost control over their own lives.
 Displacement Due to the
7
Maharashtra II Irrigation
Project

7.1 Introduction
Large dams are the result of an ideology of development which as-
sumes that all positive change derives from technology, a modernized
market economy, and a community of both small and large entrepre-
neur-farmers (Adams 1992). In conditions of widespread poverty, fre-
quent droughts and an acute scarcity of drinking water, large dams are
readily welcomed as solutions. But these dams demand a large-scale in-
vestment of scarce and borrowed capital, long periods are required for
the construction, and many years pass before the benefits materialize.
Possible benefits in terms of increased irrigation potential and crop pro-
duction may indeed occur in the long run, but often the nature and the
extent of the returns are uncertain. In India, for instance, of the 205
major irrigation projects taken up since Independence, only 29 have
been completed, and even those were delayed for many years beyond
schedule (PAC 1983).
Irrigation projects create winners and losers, and redefine the en-
titlement and economic status of different segments of the population.
One group of losers is made up of the people displaced by the reser-
voir, canals and other irrigation infrastructures. In the context of in-
creasing population density, large-scale irrigation projects are displacing
and dispossessing millions of people, and adequate ameliorating meas-
ures are lacking.

151
152 The Case Studies

Increased agricultural productivity and rural employment were the

major objectives of India's Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans, which
aimed to increase the area of irrigated land and implement programmes
to optimize the use of land and water resources. The government strove
to increase the area served by large-scale irrigation projects by 1.6 mil-
lion hectares annually in the plan periods. Throughout the country, irri-
gation schemes were initiated, including the Maharashtra II Irrigation
Project (Mil). The Mil project principally consisted of five gravity irri-
gation projects in Maharashtra State. The Dhom composite dam, cross-
ing the river Krishna near Dhom village in Satara District of Maharash-
tra State, was one of the five irrigation schemes planned under Mil
(GOM 1988). 1
The Dhom dam was intended to provide irrigation for 32,925 hec-
tares of land in Satara District. The reservoir, the seat of the dam, quar-
ries, colony and roads required 12,840 hectares of land: 2 12,637 hec-
tares acquired from private owners and 203 hectares from government.
The construction of the dam started in 1968-69 and the gorge-filling
started in 1975-76. People started moving in 1971, but the majority of
the project-affected households was moved between 1975 and 1977. By
1988 the government had closed the R&R files related to the Dhom
project. The study presented here was conducted 10 to 16 years after
displacement.

7.2 The Social Background of the Displaced People

The villages submerged by the Dhom reservoir were located in Wai teh-
sil of Satara District in western Maharashtra. Nearly three-quarters of
the households involved were Marathas, located in the middle of the
Hindu caste hierarchy. They represented the dominant economic and po-
litical group in Maharashtra. Dalits accounted for 12.5 per cent of the
population affected by the Dhom reservoir, and the remaining 10.2 per
cent consisted of members of service castes including Malis, Sutars and
others.
Satara District is a drought-prone area. Male out-migration to Bom-
bay takes place on a large scale, mostly due to the inability of the rain-
dependent agriculture to support the rapidly growing population. Satara
District accounted for almost 15 per cent of all migrants to Bombay be-
fore 193 1, and it has continued to be a major supplier of industrial Ia-
 Maharashtra II 153

bour (Parasuraman I 98 I). All groups - landed and landless people,

high and low caste- participate in male out-migration. Landed house-
holds participate more heavily in out-migration than landless house-
holds do.
Before displacement, about 80 per cent of the households owned land
(Parasuraman I99Ia). Much of the land was held by the Marathas. The
average landholding was 3. I hectares. The average area of land owned
per household was relatively large because of the predominance of joint
or extended families among the Marathas. Most households avoided
subdividing land. The out-migration of men helped to achieve that aim.
In all, 32 villages were affected by the Dhom reservoir: I3 villages
were fully affected, and I 9 partially. In 12 of the 13 fully affected
villages all of the land and houses were completely submerged; in the
thirteenth fully affected village over 50 per cent of the land was sub-
merged. 3 In 8 of the 19 partially affected villages, a few landowners
who were to lose more than 50 per cent of their land demanded that
their houses also be acquired.
The government of Maharashtra considered 4,496 people to be pro-
ject-affected persons (PAPs), as follows:

Number of landholders fully affected 3,017

Number of landholders partially affected 1,329
Number of landless affected 150
Total PAPs 4,496

The guidelines used to define PAPs were extremely narrow, and there-
fore failed to recognize a large number of affected people as PAPs. For
example, the definition excluded landless people who, in addition to ag-
ricultural wage labour, were also engaged in non-agricultural activities.
In all villages, many families were engaged in traditional occupations
as well as in agricultural wage labour. Of the 760 landless households
in the fully submerged villages, only I 50 were fully dependent on agri-
cultural wage labour.
The PAPs definition also excluded joint owners of land. Some 2,250
joint owners of land were not eligible for compensation because they
were not recognized as PAPs.
The tracer study conducted shows that the number of persons from
the fully submerged villages displaced by the project adds up to 6,027:
3,017 persons with land registered in their name, 2,250 persons with le-
154 The Case Studies

Table 7.1 Number of PAPs, land granted and resettlement location

for fully submerged villages

R&R provided New location

Total
PAPS Land HP R&R Else- Rima
& HP only site where

Landed 3,017 1,980 2,081 936 0

Landless 760 49 101 120 286 354
Joint owner b 2,250 1,480 550 220

Total 6,027 c 2,029 101 3,681 1,772 574

- HP = housing plot
Notes:
a Moved to rim of reservoir;
b Joint owners were not recognized as PAPs, although they were entitled to
equal shares under Hindu property laws;
c 1,329 PAPs from partially affected villages were not eligible for relocation and
thus not added to the total.
Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

gal entitlement to the land, and 760 landless people. Together with
1,329 landowners from partially affected villages, the total number of
PAPs was 7,356. This total does not include the joint owners or the
landless people affected in the partially affected villages. In reality the
number of people displaced by the construction of the Dhom reservoir
was even higher than 7,356, as the canal, too, affected people not in-
cluded in this study.

7.3 R&R Provisions

The resettlement of the people displaced by the Dhom project was un-
dertaken in the 1970s. Most of the Dhom PAPs had been moved before
the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Irrigation-Project Affected Per-
sons Act ( 1976) was enacted. The guidelines for the rehabilitation of
the Dhom PAPs were based on Government Resolutions (GRs). These
resolutions stipulated that the government acquire land in the Krishna
project command area and distribute it to PAPs. The government could
 Maharashtra II 155

also acquire land from command areas of other irrigation projects out-
side Satara District.
The land which was to be allotted to PAPs normally amounted to 50
per cent of the land lost in the submerged village. The agricultural land
and housing plots were granted against payment of occupancy prices
equal to the market value of the land plus expenses incurred in locating
and acquiring the land. Thus, PAPs were required to deposit 75 per
cent of the compensation they had received for their land in the affect-
ed village, or to pay the actual cost of the land granted, whichever was
less. The difference between the amount of the deposit and the actual
cost of the land granted was recovered in six annual instalments start-
ing after irrigation was made available. The tribal and backward caste
PAPs were to pay the difference in 12 instalments. Previously landless
agricultural labourers, if they had moved with others, were given one
acre of agricultural land and a homestead plot of a certain prescribed
size. They were not required to pay the occupancy price.4
Table 7.1 shows the distribution of the 6,027 affected PAPs from
fully submerged villages. Of the 3,017 landed PAPs, 2,045 deposited
75 per cent of the compensation money they received for their original
land. Of them, 1,980 received land, while 49 of the recognized landless
PAPs were given land and housing plots, and 101 received only hous-
ing plots.
The 1,329 PAPs from partially affected villages, except the 273 who
managed to sell their land and houses, and resettled elsewhere on their
own, were paid cash compensation. No follow-up was done to find out
what happened to the people in the partially affected villages who lost
land and possibly livelihood. PAPs from partially affected villages were
not considered eligible for alternative land, so none of the PAPs from
the partially affected villages paid the 75 per cent of the compensation
money as a deposit for alternative land.

7.4 Resettlement Patterns

The people displaced by the Dhom reservoir can be divided broadly in-
to three groups, according to the location of their resettlement sites.
First, there are those who moved to one of the 23 government reset-
tlement sites. These resettlement sites, in four tehsils in Satara district,
were located close to the existing villages, referred as host villages, in
156 The Case Studies

the Krishna irrigation project command area. The land for the resettle-
ment sites was either common land, formerly of the existing villages,
land acquired from households under the Land Ceiling Act, land ac-
quired from those volunteering to sell land, or non-arable land belong-
ing to the government. About 61 per cent of the 6,027 families from
the totally submerged villages moved to the government resettlement
sites, referred to as resettled villages.
The second group of families moved upwards on the hills above their
original village, and settled around the rim of the reservoir. None of the
fully affected villages lost 100 per cent of the agriculturalland. 5 About
12 per cent of the agricultural land was not submerged. Two categories
of people took advantage of non-submerged land. The originally land-
less households who had nothing to gain from the R&R policy hoped
to be able to earn a living by moving to the rim of the reservoir. A few
households that lost less than 50 per cent of their original land bought
some additional land from other such families, and continued cultivat-
ing. The settlements around the reservoir are referred to as rim villages.
About 9.5 per cent of the project-affected families settled in rim
villages.
The third group, about 29 per cent of the affected families, settled in
areas other than resettled and rim villages. This group included both
originally landed and landless people. The landed people who chose not
to settle in either the resettled or the rim villages were those who had
owned a lot of land, and thus would have had to pay a larger compen-
sation sum to buy land where they wanted. People entered into a varie-
ty of arrangements to resettle themselves in new places. Groups of relat-
ed men moved together and bought land with the compensation money
in areas where it was not expensive. A few families moved to places
where they had affinal relatives. A few others migrated to Bombay or
Pune. The landless people generally went where they had relatives,
mostly in the command area of the Dhom dam, and not more than
40-50 kilometres away from their submerged village.

7.5 Economic Conditions After Resettlement

Landownership
It was mostly those who availed of the government's land offer who
moved to resettlement areas. Also, the joint owners of land moved with
 Maharashtra II 157

Table 7.2 Share of various sources of livelihood in total household

income (1990)

% of total income

Source of Rim villages Resettled villages Host villages

income
Land- Land- Land-
Landed Landed Landed
less less less

Agricultural wage labour

- within village 15.9 17.8 1.2 36.5 5.6
- outside village 20.0 13.2 5.3
Non-agricultural wage labour
- within village 3.6 1.0 15.0 4.2 1.5
- outside village 53.7 47.7 50.6 30.1 49.0 26.9
Cultivation 31.9 58.8 57.8
Business 6.8 6.2 11.3 9.9 10.3 8.2
Number 15 65 48 112 22 98
Total annual household income
(Rs) 12,942 20,180 20,620 40,618 13,261 31,500

Source: Parasuraman 1991 a.

the main households. In effect, 2,201 households accepted to move to

government-prepared sites. Out of these households, 2,029 had received
land. Thus, upon resettlement, 82 per cent of the PAPs from fully sub-
merged villages owned land. In the period following resettlement, a
number of joint households split up. A few sold land subsequently. In
the resettlement sites surveyed in 1990, 29 per cent of the households
reported that they were landless. The people who had received land
from the government lacked the resources to buy land in places of their
choice.
At the time of the actual resettlement, 88 per cent of PAPs who set-
tled in the rim villages did not own land in their old villages. Land-
holdings of those who settled in the rim villages averaged 2.3 hectares.
However, landownership among people in the rim villages became
more widespread as time went on: in 1990, only 19 per cent of the
PAPs were landless. People had acquired land in a variety of ways: 58
per cent of the PAPs had been granted land by the government, 20 per
cent had bought directly from departing PAPs whose non-submerged
158 The Case Studies

land had not been acquired by the government, and 17 per cent had
bought land in neighbouring villages unaffected by the reservoir. In
1990, the averageamount of land owned by rim village PAPs was 1.6
hectares.
It has proved impossible in this survey to locate the PAPs who set-
tled elsewhere, and thus an accurate overview of the landownership pat-
tern of those PAPs is not available. However, oral testimonies suggest
that those who resettled on their own were relatively well-off economi-
cally. The tracer study confirmed this observation.
The host village households lost some land because the government
acquired their land to provide for the resettled people. The resettled
people could replace only 33 per cent of the land they owned prior to
displacement.

Sources and levels of income

Table 7.2 shows the various sources of income in the resettled, rim and
host villages.6 Income from non-agricultural wage labour outside the
village consisted largely of remittances from migrants.
In 1990, among the landowning people in the rim, resettled and host
villages, 32, 59 and 58 per cent of the total income derived from culti-
vation, respectively. The landholdings in the rim villages were small
and lacked irrigation. Thus, the rim village households were highly de-
pendent on agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour. By contrast,
much of the land in the resettled and host villages was irrigated by can-
als and was cultivated intensively for larger profits.
Remittances from migrants, represented as non-agricultural wage
labour in the table, together with the income from cultivation, raised
the income levels of households with land in resettled and host villages.
A number of landed households also had some income from business
or self-employment. Co-operative poultry farms, repair shops, provision
stores and tea stalls, milch animals, rickshaws and tractors constituted
sources of income for many landed households in resettled, rim and
host villages.
Among the landless households, agricultural wage labour was an im-
portant source of livelihood in all villages. Canal irrigation increased
the potential for wage labour in agriculture. The landless people in the
rim, resettled and host villages respectively derived 36, 23 and 37 per
cent of their total income from agricultural wage labour. Both the avail-
 Maharashtra II 159

ability of wage labour and the wage rate increased considerably in re-
cent years, despite the fact that the actual amount of land owned per
household decreased and the number of people depending on agricul-
ture increased considerably.
Non-agricultural wage labour constituted a large portion of the total
household income. Non-agricultural wage labour consisted of four com-
ponents: remittances from migrants, earnings from work in sugar fac-
tories and agro-industries, earnings from work generated by the govern-
ment employment programmes, and earnings from construction work
and other non-farm activities. Migrants contributed substantially to the
household income. However, opportunities for non-farm employment
were increasing within the district itself, as well. Canal irrigation, con-
struction activities in villages (due to the increase in the flow of cash),
self-employment ventures and a creative use of government employ-
ment programmes greatly increased employment opportunities for both
landed and landless households.
The economic condition of displaced households varied. Factors such
as landownership and access to industrial employment in Bombay af-
fected income levels. There were large differences in the access various
social groups had to resettlement provisions, irrigation, loans and sub-
sidies and non-agricultural employment.
Table 7.3 shows the distribution of households in resettled and host
villages by caste and by monthly per capita income at the time this
study was carried out. Households that were resettled in the command
area seem to have improved their economic condition considerably,
compared to the situation prior to displacement. Among Marathas, who
had land, only 6.6 per cent had a monthly per capita income lower than
Rs 125. In the resettled villages, the proportion of Dalits and service
caste groups with low incomes was higher than in host villages and ru-
ral Maharashtra (NSSO 1992).
About 9.5 per cent of the affected households remained in the un-
affected areas of the original villages or moved up to the rim of the
reservoir. In the rim villages, the proportion of households with low in-
comes is higher than it is in the resettled villages. However, the situ-
ation of these households is better than it was in the pre-project period,
and better than the situation of households of similar ethnic groups in
host villages. About 30 per cent of the Dalit and 25 per cent of the ser-
vice caste households had a monthly income of less than Rs 125. How-
160 The Case Studies

Table 7.3 Percentage distribution of households by caste and by

monthly per capita income, 1990

% of households
with a monthly PCI Number
Caste groups
(Absolute)
< Rs. 125 Rs. 125-300 Rs. > 300

Resettled village households

Marathas 3.4 39.6 57.0 114
Dalits 21.6 78.4 20
Service castes 16.7 65.1 18.2 16
All households 6.6 42.4 51.0 160*
Rim village households
Marathas 11.6 49.7 38.7 16
Dalits 30.7 46.7 22.6 56
Service castes 23.9 50.7 25.4 8
All households 26.2 47.7 26.1 80
Host village households
Marathas 13.9 20.1 66.0 84
Dalits 32.4 67.6 18
Service castes 26.7 64.3 9.0 14
All households 19.8 35.3 44.9 120*

• A few small caste groups were omitted from the table.

Source: Parasuraman 1991a.

Table 7.4 Annual per capita income by size of landholding, 1990 (Rs)

Resettled villages Host villages Rim villages

Landless 4,405 (189) 2,414 (104) 2,322 (100)

<1 ha. 6,022 (259) 4,334 (187) 2,471 (157)
1-2 ha. 5,139 (221) 3,081 (133) 3,647 (157)
>2 ha. 772 (464) 5,271 (227) 4,159 (179)

Note: The figures in the parentheses represent the per capita incomes of other groups
expressed as a percentage of per capita income of landless households in rim
villages.
Source: Parasuraman 1991a.
 Maharashtra II 161

ever, 23 per cent of households from these two caste groups had a high
per capita income, compared to their counterparts in host and resettled
villages. Much of the gains can be attributed to improved access to
land, increased opportunities for wage labour and contributions from
migrants.
Table 7.4 shows the per capita income of households according to the
size of their landholding. In the resettled villages, the landed and the
landless households exhibit higher income levels than their counterparts
in the rim and host villages. This is due to several factors. The resettled
households had better access to credit and agricultural inputs, because
of their status as displaced people. Secondly, a higher proportion of the
land owned by the resettled households received irrigation. The reset-
tled households managed to pool their resources more rapidly to build
sub-canals to serve their fields, and the resettlement authorities were
helpful in this regard. Thirdly, a higher proportion of resettled house-
holds had members employed outside the village, in industry or in the
service sector, who contributed to the income of the households. Fur-
ther, the resettled households engaged in self-employment ventures
such as co-operative poultry farming and cattle-raising.

The physical and social infrastructure

The resettled villages were better provided with physical and social in-
frastructures than the rim and host villages were. All resettlement sites
were located close to main roads served by public transport. They also
had better access to educational facilities, up to college level, and en-
joyed a closed water system with outlets near to most households. All
resettled villages had electricity, flour mills and anganwadis. The reset-
tled villages were better connected to places where medical services
were available. A few villages had PHC sub-centres.
Compared to the resettled villages, the rim villages faced serious dep-
rivation, due to the lack of infrastructure. People had moved to the rim
of the reservoir primarily because of the availability of land there, de-
spite the fact that access to water, schools, health facilities and trans-
portation was poor. Children were sent to stay with relatives in the re-
settled villages or Bombay, in order to ensure that they would receive
the education required for industrial employment. Strong support from
kin enabled people in the rim villages to cope with migration and eco-
nomic insecurity.
162 The Case Studies

People's initiatives
The government of Maharashtra must be credited with the fact that it
could acquire over 2,500 hectares of arable land in the command area
of the project. The government applied the Land Ceiling Act to acquire
land. It offered a good price, and large landowners were happy to sell
their relatively unproductive land. The acquisition of land for rehabili-
tation in the command area was possible because of the political sup-
port the affected people enjoyed. As was noted earlier, 75 per cent of
the displaced households, and almost all those who lost land were Ma-
rathas. People from all affected villages forged a strong alliance and
exerted tremendous pressure on political leaders at the district and state
levels. The panchayats in all villages, the Satara Zilla Parishad and the
state government were controlled by the Congress Party (1), and at all
levels the administration was headed by a Maratha. The project com-
mand area was dominated by Marathas who were prepared to accom-
modate the displaced people. The incoming Marathas added to the nu-
merical strength of the Maratha population in command area villages.
It was noted above that the government did not give away land free,
but that displaced landowners could acquire land by paying a deposit
equal to 75 per cent of the compensation they had received for their
land. The government bought the land at market prices, and recovered
the difference later. 7 The government would have never bought the
land in the command area if there had been no political pressure: there
are numerous examples of other projects in which the Maharashtra gov-
ernment failed to obtain land in the command area, and resettled people
in dry areas instead. 8 In fact, in terms of policies and resettlement ef-
forts, the Maharashtra government had a very poor record. In the Mil
case, however, the government helped to plan and prepare adequately
provisioned resettlement sites. Further, the government provided loans
of up to Rs 8,000 to help people finance the construction of houses.
Those who moved to rim villages and other places were also eligible
for house construction loans.
Project-affected people took the initiative to ensure that well-provi-
sioned villages were established. Most of the resettled village pancha-
yats were elected by well-educated young men, some of them returned
migrants who left well-paying industrial jobs in Bombay. The pancha-
yats used Jawahar Rozgaar Yojana and other government programmes
to develop the infrastructure and collective income-generating ventures.
 Maharashtra // 163

The resettled villages were well-planned and clean settlements. In

fact, the nearby host villagers have grown extremely resentful of the fa-
cilities made available to, or created by, the resettled villages. To a
great extent people seized the opportunity provided by displacement to
construct well-designed houses.
The intensive involvement of sugar factories and co-operative socie-
ties in the command area made credit and agricultural inputs available.
A large proportion of the land in the host and resettled villages in the
command area has been reserved for sugar-cane and groundnut produc-
tion, despite the government's stipulation that sugar-cane should not be
cultivated in the Dhom dam command area. 9
The government helped people to obtain loans through banks. Most
households spent some of that credit to clear and improve the land al-
lotted to them. Loans were also used to finance self-employment activi-
ties. In a few villages, people have invested in co-operative poultry
farms. In I 990, 62, 63 and 55 per cent of the resettled, rim and host
village households respectively had outstanding loans, amounting to
Rs 11,807, 6,525 and 10,037 respectively.
The government's role in providing land in the command area and
ensuring that irrigation became available was important. However, the
project described in this chapter is all the more remarkable for the ef-
forts of people to rebuild their economic base. The Marathas, the eco-
nomically and politically dominant group in Maharashtra, were able to
force the government to acquire land in the command area. But this on-
ly partially compensated the loss of land, and increased male migrant
wage labour was necessary. In textile mills, manufacturing industries
and the service sector, port and other industrial activities, in the formal
and informal sectors in Bombay, the people from Satara District devel-
oped a strong network that made life easier for new migrants. These
people, together with those from the out-migration prone Konkan dis-
trict of Maharashtra, have made careful and systematic use of the 'sons
of the soil' policy, forcefully advocated by the militant and communal
Shiv-Sena political party in Bombay, to obtain lower level, but better-
paying industrial and other organized sector employment (Parasuraman
& Sengupta 1992).
The experience of Dalits, too, is a lesson in the importance of oppor-
tunity. The opportunity basically came from the independence they es-
tablished for themselves, free from large landholders, by carving out al-
164 The Case Studies

ternative ways to earn a living. Historically, Maharashtra had been

home to a strong backward-caste Dalit movement, and many Dalits had
converted to Buddhism in protest against the oppression and dominance
by high-caste groups. This history instilled in the Dalits a strong sense
of pride and confidence, which enabled them to pursue their inde-
pendence from landowning high-caste groups by migrating to Bombay.
This was not possible for landless Dalits and other low-caste groups in
many other Indian states, as they lacked opportunities to diversify their
economic activities. 10

7.6 Conclusions
The Mil project in the Satara district illustrates that the government and
the people can help each other in resettlement and development pro-
jects. A number of lessons can be learned from the Mil R&R experi-
ence.
First, in the Mil case as elsewhere, an R&R policy which would in-
crease the chances of the displaced to regain social and economic wel-
fare was needed. Yet, as this chapter pointed out, the R&R provisions
were extremely limited. The policy excluded joint landowners and land-
less people who depended on non-agricultural employment in the vil-
lage. However, due to the historically rooted focus on male labour mi-
gration, most joint owners were migrants and had already moved out
of agriculture. The diversity of income-earning strategies which existed
prior to displacement mitigated the loss inflicted by the limitations of
the R&R policy.
Second, the R&R policy included arrangements to provide displaced
people with assistance in replacing the land they had lost. The require-
ment that people who wanted to buy land deposit 75 per cent of their
compensation money at the time payment was received ensured that the
households did not spend the scarce resources on household expenses,
in contrast to what often happens in such projects. Further, the land
policy ensured that land was available to small and marginal farmers
who would not otherwise have had the resources to locate and purchase
land on their own. The promise of irrigation for the land in the com-
mand area was expected to provide additional opportunities for wage
labour in the future. Landless people who had depended on agricultural
 Maharashtra II 165

wage labour in the original village and moved with the landed people
also received one acre of irrigated land.
To ensure that the government really did purchase land in the com-
mand area and granted it to those for whom it was intended, the people
organized themselves and launched a concerted struggle. Social mobil-
ization aiming to wage a prolonged struggle on behalf of the displaced
groups is needed to support displaced groups lacking in political power.
However, this does not happen in all projects because those who can
help the displaced often have conflicting interests.
The resettlement of the displaced people in the Mil command area
was possible for three fundamental reasons:

(I) People from all affected villages forged a strong alliance and exert-
ed tremendous pressure on political leaders at the district and state
levels. The potential political strength of the united affected popu-
lation could not be ignored by the leaders;
(2) The project command area was dominated by Marathas who were
ready to accommodate the displaced people, as the majority of
them were Marathas. The co-operation of the command area people
was obtained to facilitate the resettlement of the displaced in their
area;
(3) The incoming Marathas added to the numerical strength of the Ma-
ratha population in the command area villages. In a situation where
political advantage was measured in terms of numerical strength of
the caste groups, any increase in the size of the group was wel-
comed. The Mil experience suggests that ethnic and political com-
patibility increases the likelihood of the successful integration of
the resettled people and the host groups.

A third finding of the Mil study is that the timing of the actual de-
livery of benefits to the affected people was very important. Land was
provided immediately after or within four years of displacement, and
irrigation was arranged soon after. If the amount of land granted was
much smaller than what had actually been lost, irrigation could make
up for some of the loss. The early availability of irrigation and the con-
sequent intensification of cultivation gave rise to an increase in the
availability of wage labour, in turn helping landed and landless people
to earn a living.
166 The Case Studies

Fourth, access to other sources of income- in addition to agricultural

wage labour- proves to be very important. Access to industrial employ-
ment, facilitated and sustained largely by an extensive social network
of native industrial workers, helped the displaced. While displaced
people everywhere counter loss of land with increased migration, very
few manage to regain their livelihood as successfully as the Dhom dam
displaced people have managed to do.
 Displacement Due to the Upper
8
Krishna Irrigation Project

8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the displacement and resettlement resulting from one of
the large-scale irrigation projects in Karnataka, namely the Upper Krish-
na Irrigation Project (UKP) will be evaluated. The UKP, involving the
construction of two major dams and reservoirs, at Narayanpur and
Almatti, was initiated in the 1960s to irrigate the drought-prone area of
northern Karnataka. The Narayanpur dam was constructed in a rel-
atively flat, broad valley situated about 60 kilometres downstream from
Almatti dam, which is still under construction. Narayanpur and Almatti
reservoirs are linked. The irrigation potential of the Narayanpur
reservoir can be fully exploited only after the completion of the Almatti
dam. Together, the Narayanpur and Almatti reservoirs have displaced
about 300,000 people, excluding those displaced by canals and other
irrigation structures, by far the largest displacement ever caused by any
project in India (Partridge 1985).
The objective of this chapter is to show how different groups were
affected by the displacement caused by the UKP, and to examine the
efforts various groups made to re-establish their livelihoods. Further,
the R&R experience of the UKP is recounted here so that certain mis-
takes may be avoided in planning future ventures. The chapter will fo-
cus on the displacement and resettlement schemes which were complet-
ed in 1986.
The UKP Narayanpur reservoir submerged 27,707 hectares of land,
displacing people from 37 villages in Bijapur, Raichur and Gulbarga
districts in the process. These villages were called 'displaced or fully

167
168 The Case Studies

affected villages'. Estimates of the number of displaced households,

whether landed or landless, vary considerably, averaging around 5,794
households (GOK 1990).
The government of Karnataka did not have an official policy on
resettlement and rehabilitation for project-affected people. The R&R
work was carried out through government resolutions. These GRs stipu-
lated that cash compensation would be paid for the land and houses ac-
quired for the project, that a housing plot, as well as assistance in
moving to the relocation sites, would be provided for those who lost
their homes, and that civic infrastructure would be created at the relo-
cation sites. The Karnataka government prepared 27 relocation sites lo-
cated within three kilometres of the submerged villages. These sites are
called 'resettled villages'. In a few cases, villages that had been located
close to each other originally were grouped together in one resettled vil-
lage (Office of the Deputy Director 1991 ).
In addition to submerging the fully affected villages, the reservoir
also submerged portions of the agricultural and common land in 53 vil-
lages, called 'partially affected villages'. About 3,000 households from
partially affected villages lost all or part of their lands due to submerg-
ence. People from the partially affected villages were not displaced and
resettled (GOK 1990, Parasuraman 1991b). All those who lost land
were compensated in cash. PAPs whose houses were affected were giv-
en compensation and housing plots in unaffected parts of the village.

8.2 The Displacement and Resettlement Process

The R&R of the people affected by the Narayanpur dam was very com-
plex. Preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LAA
began in 1971; the payment of compensation was completed in 1984
(GOK 1990). Submergence started in 1982, and the reservoir was com-
pletely filled by the 1986 monsoon. There was a considerable time
lapse between the payment of compensation, the flooding of land and
houses, and the actual moving of the affected households.
Thus, people who were supposed to have been displaced and relocat-
ed to a resettlement site remained, and cultivated their land for a long
time. Even after the initial submergence of the village, some land to-
wards the edge of the reservoir was still usable, and this was cultivated
as well. Further, displaced landowners, landless labourers, artisans and
 Upper Krishna Irrigation Project 169

service workers who found work on the dam site remained in their vil-
lages of origin until homes and lands were actually submerged. Other
families, whose farmlands were above water-level, or whose land was
only seasonally submerged, continued to live in non-submerged parts
of the original village and continued to cultivate. Only those house-
holds whose lands and houses were permanently submerged moved to
the resettlement site or migrated out of the area.
In all villages, people desperately hung on to their land as long as
possible, even at the risk of being drowned, primarily because the R&R
measures did not guarantee access to land or employment. Many house-
holds developed a lifestyle based on wage labour elsewhere for part of
the year, and cultivation of their land for the remainder of the year,
when the land was dry enough for farming. Such arrangements made
it difficult to organize government-funded transportation and assistance
in relocation: people moved at different times, and headed for different
locations. Most households thus could not benefit from the free trans-
port provided by the government (Parasuraman 199lb).
It is difficult to estimate how many people moved to various places.
The tracer study carried out for this book shows that about 15 per cent
of the households continued to live in non-submerged parts of the ori-
ginal village. When Almatti dam is completed, the homes and lands of
most of these households will also be submerged. Fifty per cent of the
households have moved to the resettlement sites, and 35 per cent mi-
grated out of the area.
All people who had lost houses in the fully submerged villages were
given housing plots in the resettlement sites, though only about 65 per
cent attempted to construct houses. Others hope to build a house later
(Parasuraman 1991 b). Various factors seriously undermined the eco-
nomic capacity of most households to build houses in the resettlement
sites. For the wealthy, and for those who had received ample compen-
sation for their land and houses, the construction of a new home was
not a serious problem, but the landless, marginal and small farmers
were reluctant to move to the resettlement site, for they encountered
considerable difficulties. First, the time period between the payment of
compensation and the actual shifting was over five years: during that
time much of the compensation money had been spent on consumption
and on loan repayments. Second, construction costs had increased in
the intervening period. Further, the displaced people could not rely on
170 The Case Studies

any government assistance with regards to house construction. About

30 per cent of the people who attempted to build a new house started
construction before leaving the old site, while the rest started construc-
tion only after moving to the resettlement site. In 1991, 8 per cent of
the households that had shifted to the resettlement site had not yet start-
ed house construction, 56 per cent had started but not completed, and
39 per cent had completed construction. Chances are that without gov-
ernment assistance, those who had not completed construction in 1991
never will.

8.3 Social and Economic Consequences of

Displacement
Most of the displaced villages were multi-caste in nature, numerically
dominated by lower caste groups. Kurburs (shepherds and cultivators)
accounted for 43 per cent of the population. Lingayats, the dominant
caste in Karnataka, accounted for 26 per cent of the households. Dalits
(agricultural labourers), Jalgars (fishermen by profession) and Muslims
(traders) accounted for 16, 5 and 10 per cent of the households, re-
spectively.
All Lingayat and 80 per cent of the Kurbur households owned land
in the original villages. However, 76 per cent of the land was owned
by a few large landowners. Before land acquisition, about 30 per cent
of the households were landless. Most of the Dalits, Jalgars and Mus-
lims were landless. At the time of land acquisition, 17 per cent of the
households leased or sharecropped land belonging to large landholders.
People cultivating leased or sharecropped land were not eligible for
cash compensation.
Baseline data on economic and social conditions at the time of dis-
placement were not collected prior to land acquisition. Thus, it is im-
possible to arrive at a clear understanding of the socioeconomic situa-
tion of the people prior to displacement. In order to make a comparison
- the lack of baseline data notwithstanding - between the pre- and
post-displacement situations, three villages not affected by the dam, but
comparable to the fully and partially affected villages in terms of caste
composition and land distribution, were selected for this study. These
villages are called unaffected villages in this study.
 Upper Krishna Irrigation Project 171

Table 8.1 Post-resettlement landownership of households from fully

affected villages (1991)

Category Percentage

Originally landless 25-30

Pushed to landless category 30-60
Landless after acquisition 55-90
Landless (average) 76
Those who lost partial land 12
Those with all land intact 12

Sources: MYRADA Survey Tables; GOK: Pilot Project Tracer

Studies; Parasuraman 1991.

In fully affected villages, 12-50 per cent of the agricultural land was
not submerged (Table 8.1 ). When all displaced villages were considered
together, 28 per cent of the land was not submerged, and thus remained
available for cultivation. In addition to the 30 per cent of the house-
holds which were already landless, another 40 per cent of the previous-
ly landed people were rendered landless. All common land and grazing
lands belonging to the village were either submerged or used by the
government for resettlement. Most households could not invest the com-
pensation money received for land in productive assets. First, there was
no land available for sale in the area where the displaced people were
resettled. Second, the money was either spent largely on consumption
or it was not enough to buy new land. Only 13 per cent of households
that lost land eventually bought alternative land. Even those who
bought land could replace only about 21 per cent of the land lost (Para-
suraman 1991 b).
The R&R policy did not help affected people to replace lost land or
obtain other income-generating assets. Displacement left most of the
small and marginal farmers landless. Although over 60,000 hectares of
arable land in the command villages of the UKP could have been ac-
quired under the Land Ceiling Act (GOK 1971), the government did
not make use of that option. Rather, as a mission evaluating the project
observed,
172 The Case Studies

Table 8.2 Share of income derived from various sources, of landed

and landless households in 1991

% share of income among

Sources of income
Landed Landless

Agricultural wage labour within village 3.7 8.6

Agricultural wage labour outside village 4.3 15.0
Non-agricultural wage labour within village 3.5 12.4
Non-agricultural wage labour outside village a 25.4 45.9
Business and other self-employment 2.1 6.8
Income from fishing or sheep herding 1.5
Cultivation 61.0 b 9.8c

Total average annual household income in rupees 19,979 8,499

Total households in the study (n=) 50 160

Notes:
a Includes income from service and all other non-agricultural activities.
b Includes income from sharecropping.
c Includes income from land obtained through land redistribution, and sharecrop-
ping.
Sources: Parasuraman 1991b, and Pilot Project Tracer Study.

[T]he UKP utilises government funds and World Bank assistance to enor-
mously enrich one segment of society and destroy the economic produc-
tion capacity, social organisations and the lives of another segment
(displaced people) of society. (Partridge 1985)

Rehabilitation was not addressed in the GRs which governed the reset-
tlement, so that in effect, rehabilitation was entirely left to the people
themselves. This resulted in a disintegration of households into numer-
ous fragmented units trying to survive.
Displacement had a limited impact on the households that retained
most of their land, and the same applies to a few others which managed
to replace at least some of the assets they lost. But those who could not
replace lost assets, as well as the originally landless households, ex-
perienced economic marginalization. Employment opportunities in agri-
culture decreased drastically because most productive lands were sub-
 Upper Krishna Irrigation Project 173

merged. Further, the labour market was flooded with former landown-
ers who had become landless. In 1991, agricultural and other wage la-
bour outside the resettled villages constituted the primary sources of
livelihood for about 70 per cent of the displaced households (see Table
8.2).
The households with land derived 61 per cent of their total annual
income from cultivation. Households with land have annual incomes in
the rangeRs 12,952 (households with less than 3.5 acres) to Rs 32,318
(households with over 10 acres). Most large farmers increased their
landholdings by buying additional land from neighbouring villages, and
consolidating small holdings which remained after submergence.
Small and marginal landowning households were also engaged in ag-
ricultural and non-agricultural wage labour in and outside the resettled
viilage. A quarter of the total income per household in the small and
marginal landowning category (average Rs 12, I 00) came from non-agri-
cultural wage labour outside the village, involving seasonal migration.
Landless people relied for 45.9 per cent of their total annual income
(average Rs 8,499) on non-agricultural wage labour in distant places
such as Goa and Bombay, and cities in Karnataka. Only about 8.6 per
cent of the income of landless households derived from agricultural
wage labour within the village.
Table 8.3 indicates that the impact of displacement on the economic
condition of the people affected was serious for a large proportion of
affected households. In unaffected villages, the proportion of house-
holds below the poverty line (that is, with an income lower than Rs 125
per capita per month) was relatively high. The North Karnataka dis-
tricts, particularly Gulbarga, Raichur and Bijapur, were economically
backward, with a large proportion of the people living below the pover-
ty line (Mukherji & Prakasam 1990). In the unaffected villages, all Da-
lit households were landless. Over 50 per cent of them had a per capita
income of less than Rs 125. Over one-third of all households in the un-
affected villages lived below the poverty line. There was a strong rela-
tionship between access to land and poverty.
The economic conditions of households vary according to caste
(Table 8.3). Poverty was widespread among Dalits, small and marginal
farmers in North Karnataka villages. The economic condition of all
caste groups from the displaced villages had deteriorated. However, the
Dalits and Jalgars were very seriously disadvantaged: 67 per cent of the
174 The Case Studies

Table 8.3 Monthly per capita income of various castes in completely

affected villages, partially affected villages and unaffected
villages (1991)

% Distribution of households
by monthly PCI (Rs) Number of
Caste
households
<125 125-300 >300

Completely affected villages

Lingayat 47.3 40.0 12.7 55
Kurbur 43.3 47.8 9.0 90
Dalit 66.7 27.3 3.0 33
Jalgar 72.7 27.3 11
All 49.6 41.4 9.0 210 *
Partially affected villages
Lingayat 18.6 53.5 27.9 80
Kurbur 14.8 51.9 33.3 27
Dalit 35.3 64.8 13
All 17.5 51.7 30.8 120
Unaffected villages
Lingayat 38.1 50.0 11.9 42
Kurbur 13.0 43.5 43.5 27
Dalit 55.5 44.5 21
Lambani 33.3 38.1 28.3 20
All 34.5 40.0 25.5 110

* Castes listed here do not add up to the subtotal as a few small caste groups
were left out of this table.
Source: Parasuraman 1991 b.

Dalit households and 73 per cent of the Jalgar households had incomes
below the poverty line in 1991. Among the Lingayats the economic sit-
uation was better, but still worrisome: 47 per cent of the households
lived below the poverty line. On the whole, about 50 per cent of the
households had incomes far below the poverty line in the post-UKP
period.

The fully affected villages

Displacement affected various groups in different ways. A quarter of
the displaced households were left with some land, while a few bought
land from neighbouring villages. Some obtained land on a sharecrop-
 Upper Krishna Irrigation Project 175

ping basis in nearby unaffected villages. Among those with land, 54 per
cent possessed less than five acres after displacement. People who
owned considerable areas of land were able to reorganize their resour-
ces effectively, to extract maximum benefit from the UKP displace-
ment. Young educated men migrated to Bangalore or other cities in Kar-
nataka and Maharashtra for employment. Many large landowners used
the compensation money as a bribe to obtain government jobs for their
sons. The government permitted people with land to use water from the
reservoir for irrigation: the most economically secure farmers were able
to make use of this resource.
The households which benefited most belonged to the Lingayat and
Kurbur castes, which had incomes higher than Muslims and Jalgars did.
However, most households reported that their current income was lower
than what it had been previously. About 8 per cent of the households
among Lingayats and Kurburs had a per capita monthly income of less
than Rs 125.
A new landless category of 10-15 per cent of the displaced house-
holds emerged. Young couples from households which had formerly
had small and marginallandownings migrated to Bombay, Goa and Rat-
nagiri districts in Maharashtra State in search of employment. In Goa
they worked in mining, and in Ratnagiri they were involved in agri-
cultural wage labour. It is interesting to note that men from UKP-
affected villages considered wage levels in Ratnagiri and other Konkan
districts of Maharashtra to be good, while men migrating away from
those places considered wages and conditions to be poor. This group
was made up of Lingayat and Kurbur households. Of the households
in this category, 3~0 per cent had per capita monthly incomes lower
than Rs 125.
Men and women from Dalit, landless Kurbur and other low caste
groups, representing about 45 per cent of households in completely dis-
placed villages, divided into two groups. One group migratedto Bom-
bay and other large cities close to Bombay (Thana, New Bombay and
Poona industrial belt) to work in construction. Most resorted to sea-
sonal migration (eight months in Bombay and four months in the vil-
lage).1 Others, generally men and women over 35 years of age, re-
mained behind in the resettled village. They were the poorest, both be-
fore and after the land acquisition. They were involved in agricultural
wage labour within and outside the village. However, in agriculture
176 The Case Studies

there was little wage labour available, and wages were low (Rs 7 for
men and Rs 4-5 for women), less than half of the legal minimum wag-
es in I991. 2 In the agricultural season, most of the migrant labourers
were also available for wage labour.
Under the government land distribution scheme, about three per cent
of the Dalit households received two acres of unirrigated land each, IS
to 20 kilometres away from the resettlement sites. Due to the impracti-
cal location of the land, and the lack of finances to enable cultivation,
most of the recipients have leased the land to others, though a few do
cultivate it themselves. Over two-thirds of the households in this group
had monthly per capita incomes lower than Rs 100. 3
Another 10 per cent of the households in the displaced villages con-
sisted of Muslims who were engaged in trading. Most Muslim house-
holds left the villages and settled in towns in North Karnataka. The
tracer study found only II per cent of the Muslim households resettled
in the resettled villages.
About 5 per cent of the households, mostly Kurburs, owned sheep.
Land loss in and around the original village forced them to migrate out
of the command area seasonally, but the diversification of agriculture
in the command area, due to canal irrigation, has increased the demand
for cheap, organic manure. This demand enables sheepowners to derive
a steady income from their herds. Displacement did not affect this
group seriously, except that the men stayed away from the resettled
village for most of the year.
Jalgars constitute a fishing community that derived most of its live-
lihood from river fishing. They have lost access to the river and are ill-
equipped for reservoir fishing. They have not been able to compete
with fishermen from Andhra Pradesh, who had motor boats for reser-
voir fishing. Three-fourths of the Jalgar households had a per capita
income of less than Rs 125.

The partially affected villages

In the partially affected villages, 40-75 per cent of the land was left
unacquired. People used the compensation money and government
loans to create irrigation facilities or to buy land. Agricultural improve-
ment, an increase in landholdings, and draw-down cultivation of the res-
ervoir land in summer helped most affected households to a quick eco-
nomic recovery.
 Upper Krishna Irrigation Project 177

Land loss also prompted young men from landed, high-caste house-
holds to migrate. Large landowning households from partially affected
villages turned the loss of land to their advantage. High caste people
with economic means used their status as PAPs to gain loans and gov-
ernment jobs. Only I 7.5 per cent of the partially affected households
had a per capita income lower than Rs 125.
The originally landless people in the partially affected villages largely
escaped the potentially negative effects of displacement. In the initial
stages of the project, households that were dependent on agricultural
wage labour were absorbed in dam and canal construction work. Land
improvement and irrigation facilitated intensive cropping, thereby in-
creasing the need for labour. A few landless people left the village in
search of employment. In 1991, about 35 per cent of the Dalits lived
below the poverty line, compared to 66.7 and 55.5 per cent in fully and
unaffected villages respectively in the period preceding displacement.
It was important that the landless people in partially affected villages
had not had to construct new houses, as was the case in displaced vil-
lages.

8.4 Conclusions
The government of Karnataka, which had no official R&R policy, re-
settled people with only the absolute minimum of provisions. Displace-
ment affected all social and economic groups. Those who were left
with some land and invested the compensation money in land purchase,
agricultural improvement, and irrigation, and made the most of their
position as PAPs, were able to recover or even improve upon the stan-
dards of living they had enjoyed prior to displacement. This group
accounted for about one-fourth of all households, and included primari-
ly the high caste Lingayats and a few Kurburs. The Dalits and other
low-caste groups who were originally landless or owned very little
land, suffered more. They could not buy land due to a lack of resources
and were eventually pushed into the category of migrant labourers and
construction workers. Displacement aggravated poverty in this group.
Women from all castes and economic groups suffered seriously.
Women from high caste and formerly large landowning households
were pushed out of the labour force, while the break-up of joint fam-
ilies and the out-migration of men exacerbated matters. Most women
178 The Case Studies

from lower caste and originally landless households were forced to un-
dertake repeated and unrewarding seasonal migration, to the detriment
of their and their children's present and future welfare. Others were left
behind in the relocation villages, forced to struggle to earn a living in
uncertain labour conditions.
Many factors contributed to the failure of the R&R programme. First,
the resettlement of people in the submergence area deprived people of
the opportunity to replace their lost land. Though the government was
aware that it could acquire land in command area under the Land Ceil-
ing Act, it did not make any attempt to do so. Secondly, a clearly de-
fined R&R policy was lacking: in the absence of a policy, no genuine
attempts to assist the people to regain economic stability were made. 4
The institutional mechanism to carry out R&R work was inadequate
and lacked direction. Further, the R&R machinery was concerned only
with relocation, and did not provide for rehabilitation. Third, the ab-
sence of advocacy groups had serious negative consequences for the
welfare of the displaced people. The multiplicity of castes, the numeri-
cal predominance of backward castes and the strong economic differ-
ences within and between the caste groups effectively prevented the
people from organizing themselves to bargain for better R&R provi-
sions. At the same time, the intervention of advocacy groups from out-
side the affected villages was also absent.
In 1990, the Karnataka government announced a policy for the eco-
nomic rehabilitation of the displaced people all over again. The new
package intends to help those who lost land to buy some. Originally
landless people would be given monetary assistance to acquire produc-
tive assets. Ten years after displacement, and despite a considerable
loss of faith in government measures, people still hope for some bene-
fits. Those who lost land are to be given Rs 30,000 to buy 1.5 hectares
of irrigated land. However, land is not available for purchase in the
currently resettled village. Thus, the new resettlement programme may
mean secondary displacement of those buying land.
 Displacement Due to the
9
Sardar Sarovar Project

9.1 Introduction
The Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) involves the construction of a dam
across the Narmada River in Gujarat State. The dam is designed to pro-
vide irrigation for 1.8 million hectares of land, and drinking water for
4,720 villages and 131 towns in Gujarat. The SSP is to generate 1,450
MW of electricity. The dam will result in a reservoir that will sub-
merge about 37,000 hectares of forest and agricultural land in three
states: Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The dam will divert
9.5 million acre foot water from the Narmada River into canal and irri-
gation systems running a total of 75,000 kilometres, with a main canal
460 kilometres long. The canals and waterways will submerge 80,000
hectares of land (NCA 1991 ). 1 This does not include another 72,500
hectares of land required for water courses and field channels (Srivasta-
va, Sitaraman & Mehta 1991, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam 1993).
A sanctuary has been proposed, to mitigate the environmental damage
resulting from the SSP: this sanctuary would affect 108 villages in
Gujarat, displacing 42,000 persons (NBA 1992). 2 Further, compensa-
tory afforestation is being carried out in the upper reaches of the
catchment area. This programme is expected to affect many thousands
of families, again in three states.
In total, 297 villages are to be submerged by the reservoir: 19, 33
and 245 villages respectively in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pra-
desh. At least 163,500 people will be displaced: about 23,500 people
in Gujarat, 20,000 in Maharashtra and over 120,000 in Madhya Pra-
desh. In 1991, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam (the agency created by

179
180 The Case Studies

the Gujarat government to implement the project) estimated the total

number of displaced families at 27,000, a population of 162,000 per-
sons. The Minister of Water Resources, responsible for the SSP, an-
nounced in Parliament in 1992 that over 30,000 families would be
affected by the reservoir. Since the survey of households and people is
not yet complete in Madhya Pradesh, the number is expected to change
(NCA 1991, Morse & Berger 1992). It is expected that 10,834 land-
owners will lose land (Srivastava, Sitaraman & Mehta 1991) and that
65,004 will be affected. The latest government estimate ( 1996) of the
number of affected families was 41,500 to be displaced by the reservoir
(McCully 1996).
The extent of secondary displacement has not yet been properly as-
sessed. First, the displacement of people living in the Taloda forest -
now used for the resettlement of displaced people from Maharashtra-
is currently underway. At least 600 families will eventually be evicted
from the Taloda forest (TISS 1993). Second, in Gujarat land for re-
settlement is being acquired from private landowners. Increasingly,
landless tenants and labourers are being evicted from land owned by
absentee landlords. The number of tenants and labourers evicted may
end up equivalent to the number of people resettled.
Displacement due to the SSP started in the early 1980s. By 1996,
families from 29 villages had been displaced and resettled in over 250
sites located in five districts in Gujarat and one district in Maharashtra.
The dam is built in a region inhabited by tribal people. All people dis-
placed in Gujarat and Maharashtra are tribals, and in Madhya Pradesh
40 per cent of the affected people are tribals. In all three states, the
tribals have a mixed economy, cultivating land, herding cattle, collect-
ing forest produce and fishing. The remainder of the submerged area
in Madhya Pradesh extends upstream to include the caste villages,
where irrigated arable agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. The
land in these villages is more fertile.
This chapter examines the displacement of people from Manibeli, and
their resettlement in Parveta. The resettlement of people from Manibeli
in Parveta is a classic example of how resettlement should not be done.
The government, its prestige at stake, wanted to demonstrate how well
it could rehabilitate affected people, and thus regarded Manibeli as a
challenge. A model village was created- Parveta - in a freshly cleared
forest area in Gujarat. The Save the Narmada Movement focused on
 Sardar Sarovar Project 181

Manibeli village from 1985 to 1993, when the village was partially
submerged. 3

9.2 The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award

In 1969, the government of India established the Narmada Water Dis-
putes Tribunal (NWDT) to resolve the differences which had resulted
from the fact that Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat states
shared the Narmada waters. The tribunal's verdict, called the NWDT
Award, came in 1979. The award established many of the fundamental
design parameters for the series of dams on the lower Narmada river
- the Narmada Sagar and Sardar Sarovar Projects. The parameters in-
clude dam height, regulation of water flows, canal level and gradients,
and so on.
Further, the award prescribed the benefits and the resettlement pro-
cedures for people in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra who would be
displaced due to the reservoir, and apportioned the cost of their resettle-
ment to the government of Gujarat. The NWDT award declared that
people who would be expropriated would receive benefits that amount-
ed to an opportunity for economic and social progress. Besides provid-
ing cash compensation for the property lost, the award also provided
for resettlement grants and grants-in-aid, civic amenities in new or
existing villages where displaced people would relocate, and housing
plots. Most important of all, agricultural plots equal in size to the
holdings prior to displacement would be made available to all displaced
families who lost more than 25 per cent of their holdings, subject to
land ceiling laws, with a minimum of two hectares of land per house-
hold. The price charged for the land would be as mutually agreed be-
tween Gujarat and the concerned state. A sum equal to 50 per cent of
the compensation which the displaced family received for the land lost
would be required as an initial payment for the new land. The balance
would be recovered 20 annual instalments free of interest. If land was
allotted in Madhya Pradesh or Maharashtra, Gujarat having paid for it,
all recoveries for the allotted land were to be credited to Gujarat. Fur-
ther, the award provided that 'major sons' would also receive compen-
sation benefits in their own right. 4
The award did not make provisions for encroachers, though they had
customary rights to the land they were cultivating. The award did not
182 The Case Studies

mention the status of those whose land was to become tapu (i.e. sur-
rounded by water but not submerged). The award did not make provi-
sions of land for the landless people.
In 1979, the NWDT award was considered progressive primarily be-
cause it moved away from the earlier practice of 'money only' compen-
sation, adding land to the compensation.

9.3 R&R Policy in the Three States (1980-93)

Gujarat
Before 1985, Gujarat had no official R&R policy. From time to time
the government passed resolutions on R&R provisions, as the need
arose. With regard to the SSP, the government agreed to tailor its R&R
package to match the requirements of the NWDT award. Thus, the
Gujarat government announced that all displaced people with land in
their names would be eligible for two hectares of land. Joint holders,
landless people and those with encroached land were not eligible for
land. Major sons, defined as sons aged 18 years or older, were not eli-
gible for land.
Between 1985 and 1993, the government of Gujarat implemented im-
portant improvements in the R&R provisions made available to dis-
placed people. These changes were the result of determined and pro-
longed resistance from affected people and activists. After the policy
changes, all landless families were eligible to receive two hectares of
land. Encroachers and joint holders were considered landless and thus
also given two hectares. Major sons of landed, landless and encroached
landholding families became eligible for land as well. The cut-off date
to decide who qualified as major sons was postponed, from I January
1980 to 1 January 1987.

Maharashtra
In Maharashtra state, the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced
Persons Act had been enacted in 1976. According to that act, all people
with land to their names were eligible for one to two hectares of land.
The PAPs were required to pay 75 per cent of the compensation for the
land lost, or the actual cost of new land. The difference between the
amount deposited and the actual cost of the land would be collected in
six annual instalments. Joint holders, landless people and those with en-
 Sardar Sarovar Project 183

croached land were not eligible for land after 1978. 5 Landless people
might be given one acre of land if they moved with landed people to
the relocation site, and if land was available.
Between 1987 and 1993, Maharashtraalso modified its R&R policy.
Joint holders were made eligible to receive two hectares of land. The
major sons of landed displaced people were treated as landless people
and were made eligible to receive one hectare of land, if land was
available. In June 1992, landless people, people who had encroached
on forest land, major sons and unmarried major daughters became eli-
gible for one hectare of land. The cut-off date to decide who would
qualify as a major son or daughters was postponed to I January 1987.

Madhya Pradesh
This state dealt with resettlement through occasional resolutions. How-
ever, the Madhya Pradesh Project Displaced Persons Resettlement Act
had been enacted in 1985. According to the act, the landed people were
entitled to receive a minimum of two hectares of land. Those who en-
croached land before 4 April 1987 were eligible for a minimum of one
hectare and a maximum of two hectares. Major sons, as well as those
who encroached land after 4 April 1987, did not qualify to receive
land.

9.4 Socioeconomic Conditions in Manibeli Prior to

Displacement
Located in Akkalkuwa tehsil of the Dhulia district in Maharashtra, Ma-
nibeli village was one of the first to be submerged by the reservoir of
the Sardar Sarovar Dam in 1993. The resettlement and rehabilitation of
the Manibeli people started early in the 1980s, and has not yet been
concluded.
Prior to displacement, Manibeli village consisted of four padas (ham-
lets)- Patilpada (also called Manibelipada), Kudamodupada, Vavipada
and Sarpanchpada- organized in sharply defined lineage systems. Patil-
pada and Kudamodupada households trace their origins to one 'Kuver'.
Vavipada households trace their origins to one 'Margya'. The head of
Patilpada and Madakudipada lineages seems to have moved into
Manibeli six generations ago, while the head of the Vavipada lineage
settled in Manibeli around the same time as the Tadvis, who came from
184 The Case Studies

across the river (the Gujarat side) while the Vasavas were pushed out
from other Akkalkuwa tehsil villages.6
On the other hand, the Sarpanchpada households did not originally
belong to any lineage of original settlers. The affinal relatives of Patil-
pada and Kudamodupada gradually established themselves in Manibeli
as ghar-jawais, and finally settled in the areas which later came to be
called Sarpanchpada. The descendants of the original settlers claimed
the right to the land and area in which they had settled. It was common
practice among the Vasavas and the Tadvis to invite men who did not
have the resources to pay brideprice, to marry their daughters and live
with the girl's father's family. Thus, Sarpanchpada was inhabited by
the descendants of the ghar-jawais and other migrants - all of them
Tad vis.
The affinal relatives of the original settlers were also permitted to
clear lands adequate to support the family. Tadvi and Vasava migrants
from other villages were allowed to settle in Manibeli and clear some
land for cultivation. But non-Vasavas and non-Tadvis were not allowed
to settle or to clear land in Manibeli. The cattle-grazers and the priest
of the Surpaneshwar temple were invited to settle in Manibeli, but were
not permitted to clear land. The cattle-grazers who were invited to look
after the cattle of the entire community have remained landless through-
out the past five generations.
There was little variation in the area of land owned by the house-
holds. Each household normally owned about 2.5 to 3 hectares, depend-
ing on the quality of the land. Clearly, a mechanism existed to ensure
equality with regard to access to and ownership of land, cattle, forest
produce and other resources.
The Tadvis spoke Gujarati and had affinal relationships with Tadvi
families in Gujarat. The Vasavas spoke Bhillori, a dialect linked some-
what to Marathi, the dominant language of Maharashtra. The Vasavas
had affinal relationships with people in the Dhulia district, particularly
in Akkalkuwa, Akrani and Taloda tehsils.
People who lived in the Maharashtra villages affected by the SSP,
particularly Manibeli, derived their livelihood from land, cattle and
livestock, wage labour, the forest and the river (Parasuraman l989b,
Rao 1989, TISS 1992). Prior to displacement, these resources provided
the people of Manibeli with a stable set of production and consumption
 Sardar Sarovar Project 185

alternatives (Rao 1989, Reddy 1989, Sivaraju 1989, Sengupta & Das
1989).

Agricultural production
Land was the major life-sustaining resource for all households in SSP-
affected villages. Aside from the cattle-grazer, everyone possessed land,
and a major share of the consumption needs was met by agricultural
production (see Table 9.1). Much time and energy (in terms of availa-
ble resources) was invested in agricultural production, yet total pro-
duction was just enough to meet consumption needs. There was little
surplus. Few cash crops were grown, so that the economy was almost
'non-monetary', though certain items, such as cloth, kerosene, sugar,
oil, ribbons and trinkets, had to be purchased.
Per year, one crop was grown. The major item of production and con-
sumption, for both Tadvis and Vasavas, wasjowar. About 50 per cent
of a household's land was allotted to jowar, 25 per cent was planted
with maize, chowli or minor millets, and the rest was used to grow
pulses, oil seeds and vegetables (ambadi, bhindi, and so forth). Jowar,
other millets, pulses and vegetables were retained for household con-
sumption. Oil seeds were mainly sold, though from a certain quantity
oil might be pressed for household use. Pulses were occasionally sold,
and the earnings used to buy cereals or other consumption items not lo-
cally produced.

Forest and river produce

The range of items, consumable and non-consumable, collected from
the forest was greater than the range of items available through agri-
cultural production. 7 The collection of forest produce ensured that con-
sumption needs could be met in the agriculturally lean months. Wood
was readily available. Bamboo and wood were used in house construc-
tion. Wild onions and bananas, tubers, roots and other fruits ensured a
varied diet. The real nutrient value derived from forest produce is dif-
ficult to estimate, but it was considerable. Though the forest has been
systematically destroyed by the Kathi estate and government-appointed
contractors since 1960 in anticipation of submergence (Rao 1991 ),
people managed to collect roots and tubers by moving further into the
forest.
186 The Case Studies

Fishing
The Vasavas fished far more than the Tadvis did. The Vasavas were
fairly expert at fishing and used different types of nets and traps at dif-
ferent times of the year. Fish was an important part of consumption in
summer months, when the shallowness of the river facilitated fishing.

Wage labour
Wage labour was scarce within the village. However, wage labour was
important, as it provided people with an income. Occasionally, wage
labourers were employed by villagers to help with ploughing, weeding,
cattle-grazing, and so on. This was in addition to the reciprocal labour
that was a part of the agricultural cycle: farmers helped each other and
were 'paid' only with the food they consumed and the tobacco they
smoked while at work.
In recent years, in response to pressure from activists, the govern-
ment occasionally provided wage labour under the Employment Gua-
rantee Scheme (EGS) in the summer months, in and around the village.
Many households have taken advantage of the scheme. Young men
from many households also moved to Baroda, Surat, Baruch and Talo-
da for employment in construction and road work during the period
from February to June: at Rs 35 per day, wages were high. These mi-
grant labourers returned to the villages before the first rains.

Cattle
In the SSP-affected villages, the social and economic role of cattle was
extremely important and varied. Cattle was used in religious practices
as an item of sacrifice, in marriages for brideprice and gifts, in condi-
tions of drought and scarcity as a security measure enabling the pur-
chase of food grains and other life-sustaining materials, as security in
loan transactions, as a source of milk and dairy products, and it was
used to plough and assist in other agricultural operations. Milk and
dairy products were mostly consumed within the household. Occasion-
ally, ghee was sold.
Almost every household in Manibeli owned cattle. On average,
households owned 2.08 bullocks, one cow and 6.2 goats. The exception
was the community cattle-grazer's household (TISS 1990). The occa-
sional sale of cattle ensured the supply of cash. Occasionally, a male
 Sardar Sarovar Project 187

Table 9.1 Sources of income prior to displacement in Manibeli

Contribution of various sources (%)

Source
Good monsoon year Poor monsoon year
of income
April-Sept. Oct. -March April-Sept. Oct. -March

Cultivation 76.0 90.0 53.0 87.0

River 2.8 2.0 5.0 3.0
Forest 9.6 8.0 16.0 10.0
Wage labour 6.6 16.0
Cattle 5.0 10.0

Source: TISS 1990.

goat was sold, for about Rs 200. Chickens were typically sold for be-
tween Rs 25 and Rs 40. Cattle (cows or bullocks) were rarely sold, as
they were expensive and the people did not normally have enough to
pay such a large amount at one time.

9.5 The R&R Process

Informing the people
Most Manibeli people came to know of the proposed dam in 1978,
when they were approached by officials of the government of Maha-
rashtra, but a few elderly persons had heard of the proposed dam as
children, when in the early I 950s preliminary land surveys were con-
ducted in and around Vadgaon, a village close to Manibeli. Some peo-
ple even recalled when the foundation stone of the dam had been laid
at Vadgaon by the late Prime Minister Pandit Nehru.
Although the people had been aware that a dam was soon to be con-
structed in their area, they had no idea that they would be losing their
land and other assets. They were certainly not happy when they were
told in early 1980s that they would have to leave their village and re-
settle elsewhere.
In I 980, the panchayat members were called to Mulgi and Akkalku-
wa (tehsil headquarter towns) by revenue officials who informed them
of the impending submergence of their village. The meetings were
short and dealt only with the eventual displacement. No opinions were
188 The Case Studies

invited and no consultations made. The Section 4( I) notice was issued

in July 1981. The legal arrangements were concluded swiftly.
The people faced a number of problems with respect to compensa-
tion. Many households were left with some land which was not ac-
quired or eligible for compensation. Only land that would be sub-
merged in water was acquired: land that would not be submerged but
would become tapu was not considered to be project-affected, and thus
was not acquired, despite the fact that it is impossible to cultivate
tapu. 8 As most of the households had some land in this category, re-
sentment was acute. For about 10 per cent of the households, almost all
land fell in this category. Further, any tract of land of which less than
25 per cent would be submerged was not acquired by the government.
The Kathi estate forest land was acquired by the Maharashtra govern-
ment in 1978, but the land survey carried out afterwards was incom-
plete, so that it was difficult for people to prove that they had been cul-
tivating the forest land previously. If they failed to prove that they had
been cultivating forest land before 1978, people faced the prospect of
being treated as landless and thus ineligible for compensation land. A
land survey was carried out in 1985 to clear up the problems connected
to land registration, but the government initiated the relocation process
even before the land survey was completed. Even the 1985 survey was
not complete in all respects.

Payment of compensation
The Section 6.1 notices, assessing the value of the land, housing and
trees, were served in 1983.9 The first group of people received compen-
sation money in May 1984, and a few people received compensation
money later that year. However, the majority of the people did not
receive compensation money until June/July 1987 or August 1988. The
payment was made in one instalment. Only 50 per cent of the compen-
sation amount was actually handed over to the PAPs. The remaining 50
per cent was considered the price for land granted as a rehabilitation
measure. For quite some time, most people believed that the remaining
50 per cent of the compensation amount had been deposited in their
names at the bank, and that they would have access to this money.
Eventually it transpired that the Maharashtra government had trans-
ferred the money to the government of Gujarat, in lieu of the land al-
lotted to the people of Manibeli in Parveta, as the NWDT stipulated.
 Sardar Sarovar Project 189

The total value of the Manibeli people's lands, houses and trees, ac-
quired from 153 households, was settled at Rs I ,598,000. Manibeli vil-
lage had 2,500 hectares of agricultural, common and forest land. Rs
800,000 compensation was paid to the people, and Rs 780,000 was
taken by the government as the first instalment for the land to be
allotted. 10 On average, Manibeli households had land, house and trees
valued at Rs 10,439. In other words, each household received Rs 5,220
as compensation, i.e. Rs I ,500-1 ,800 per hectare.
Manibeli people were unhappy with the amount they had received,
especially when they learned that their counterparts in Gujarat had re-
ceived up to Rs 4,000 per hectare. The village leaders protested. They
also approached a lawyer in Jalgaon to take up their case for fair com-
pensation. The lawyer disappeared with their money.
Considerable expenses accompanied the compensation procedure.
Each household paid Rs 200 for legal support. Some money was spent
on travel related to land identification. Many people spent money on
transportation to Mulgi, Akkalkuwa and Dhulia to attend meetings with
the officials. People also spent money to attend meetings, rallies and
morchas called by activists outside Manibeli. A few households spent
some money on marriages. Much of what was left after such expenses
was invested in clearing land granted at the resettlement site in Parveta.

The identification and allotment of land

Land identification and selection was a complex affair. The Tadvis and
the Vasavas originally wanted to resettle in Maharashtra. 11 The Tadvis
had strong affinal relationships with people in Gujarat, but the Vasavas
had no such relationships and were willing to resettle only in Maharash-
tra. However, the better resettlement provisions offered by the gov-
ernment of Gujarat created problems, and the Vasavas stood to lose if
they were to resettle in Maharashtra because most of them did not have
registered title to land. In the early 1980s, the people were very reluc-
tant to move, as it was unclear what the consequences would be. They
were not given alternatives, however, and they did not know whether
it was possible for them to resist relocation. 12
Land was made available in a number of places in Maharashtra and
Gujarat. Manibeli people demanded that all households should be reset-
tled in one place. 13 The land at Parveta belonged to the Forest Depart-
190 The Case Studies

ment, and in 1984 it was considered large enough to accommodate all

Manibeli households.
The actual allotment of land in Parveta was a complex process,
involving some subtle power games. One fact was very obvious. Land
was allotted according to the 'first come-first served' principle. This
motivated a few people to move out of Manibeli in a hurry, disregard-
ing the pathetic infrastructure facilities available at Parveta at that time.
Indeed, some of the early birds did acquire relatively good quality land,
while those who moved later received rocky land. This caused bitter-
ness. People continue to complain about the quality of the land, and
many have approached the R&R authorities for a change of land.
Though all Manibeli people (except the cattle-grazers) owned land,
the policies on encroachments and tapu land rendered about 22 per cent
of the families landless. No clear directions were available regarding
land allotment to 'landless' people. Gujarat's policy of giving two hec-
tares of land to landless people and their major sons was not imple-
mented in Parveta until 1990.
No policy decision was made until 1988 about the acquisition status
of tapu land, when the government decided to acquire such land and
pay compensation. Many households with tapu land were moved to Par-
veta between 1985 and 1988, but land was allotted only in 1991.
There was confusion about the cut-off date determining who qualified
as a major son. The people wanted the date of the actual move from
the original village to be the cut-off date, as opposed to a fixed date.
The Gujarat government finally established the cut-off date as 1 Janua-
ry 1987. This raised the number of people eligible for land far above
the number that could be accommodated in Parveta. Thus, the major
sons were given land in areas around Parveta. 14
Changes in policy resulted in changes in the number of persons eli-
gible for land. According to the Gujarat policy of 1985, 110 men were
eligible. When in 1987 the landless people became eligible for land,the
number increased to 153. When major sons were made eligible in 1988,
with the cut-off date set at 1 January 1980, the number rose to 186.
Finally, when in 1989 the cut-off date for determining major son status
was changed to 1 January 1987, the number of men eligible increased
to 217.
Not all PAPs have received land yet: Manibeli did not have enough
to provide land for all eligible PAPs. Thus, those who became eligible
 Sardar Sarovar Project 191

for land after I 989 have been allotted land in places 6-40 kilometres
away from Parveta. In consequence, parents and sons have been separ-
ated and scattered in different places.

Moving from Manibeli to Parveta

Considerable time lapsed between the issue of the Section 4(1) notice
and the actual shifting. The average time-gap for the Tadvis was five
years, but for the Vasavas it was over I 0 years. The move to Parveta
took place in three stages. In the first stage, one or two persons from
a group of related households moved to Parveta. In the second stage,
the official shifting occurred: Manibeli houses were dismantled, women
and children were moved out of Manibeli, along with the houses and
household materials. A few people remained behind to continue the cul-
tivation of Manibeli land. In the third stage, the remaining members
left Manibeli. At the end of the third stage, all members of the original
household had reached Parveta, and their contact with Manibeli village
was completely terminated.
This stage-wise shifting helped the displaced people to adjust to the
new living conditions. The advance party assessed the situation and
worked on the housing and the land. The more vulnerable group came
at the second stage, which was the official move. The people who had
stayed behind in Manibeli during the first two phases were young cou-
ples who had the capacity to put in extra physical labour to continue
cultivation. The people had consciously decided that they could not af-
ford to abandon cultivation in Manibeli until the Parveta land was ripe
for cultivation.
The government provided free facilities to move building materials
and other items. Each independent household was entitled to one trip.
People made arrangements to move materials on a co-operative basis.
The government paid each household a Rs 1,200 moving allowance,
though until early 1988 a moving allowance was not necessary as the
households were offered free transport. Nonetheless, people had in-
curred considerable moving expenses due to the fact that the move took
place in three phases. The moving allowance was granted years after
the people had officially moved to Parveta.
The people of Manibeli moved into Parveta in batches. The first
batch of 10 families, known as 'Patil's clique', enticed by the promise
of better land, shifted in a hurry during March-April 1985, when the
192 The Case Studies

Narmada near Manibeli-Vadgaon was very shallow. 15 The second batch

shifted to Parveta in April 1986, and in early 1988 the third batch of
families moved. The fourth batch of 30 families of the Tadvi group
was forcefully moved in April 1991, with the assistance of about 1,000
police officers and pro-dam activists from Gujarat.
The first and second batches of displaced people went through seri-
ous hardships. Until 1987 - by which time the majority of the house-
holds had moved - the resettlement site was barren, without basic pro-
visions. Only a few tinsheds had been erected. People suffered serious
health problems due to nutritional deficiency and a lack of proper water
and medical facilities (Parasuraman 1989b). The host villages were
hostile to the resettled people and refused to allow access to water
facilities due to caste differences. The displaced families were disorgan-
ized, with some members (mostly the elderly) in Parveta and others left
behind in Manibeli. Food shortages, a lack of proper cooking facilities,
and difficulties in obtaining potable water compounded the difficulties.
Uncertainties regarding R&R benefits added to the misery.

People's protests
Medha Patkar of the then Narmada Dharnagrastha Samiti (the Commit-
tee for Narmada Dam-Affected People) encouraged the Parveta people
to organize and protest. After a prolonged struggle, proper water faci-
lities were established. 16 People have had to fight for each and every
basic service provided in Parveta. Without determined struggle, Parveta
would not have received any basic facilities.
By early 1993, all households from Kudamodupada and Sarpanchpa-
da, and most households from Patilpada had moved to Parveta. Howev-
er, all households from Vavipada refused to move out. Vavipada is in-
habited by Vasavas who have consistently refused to move, irrespective
of the fact that all eligible people have been given land. Some 30 Tad vi
households (mostly belonging to Patilpada and Kudamodupada) have
refused to move out primarily because they are unable to obtain land
or other rehabilitation provisions from the government. These house-
holds did not own land, and included a few men who had come to Ma-
nibeli as ghar-jawais, cattle-grazers without land in Manibeli, de-
pendents of Surpaneshwar temple, and men who were originally from
Manibeli but Jived elsewhere. They demanded land and other provi-
sions before moving out of Manibeli.
 Sardar Sarovar Project 193

The people resisted the serious threat of submergence during the

1991 and 1992 monsoons, and heavy pressure from police, government
officials, pro-dam activists and people from Gujarat. Manibeli did ex-
perience partial submergence in the 1993 monsoon, and all of Manibeli
became permanently submerged due to the 1994 monsoon. The house-
holds from Vavipada and a few households from Patilpada moved high-
er up the hills, cultivating land located at higher elevations.

Settling in
People planned their move to Parveta well in advance. They collected
fresh bamboo and wood from the forest, and had these brought to Par-
veta by the advance party. Housing materials were collected from old
Manibeli houses. People built small houses to start with, and subse-
quently expanded. Not all the bamboo and wood brought from the for-
est and Manibeli houses was used, so that many people accumulated a
good stock of wood and bamboo for future use. By the end of 1994,
about 25 per cent of the households had built concrete houses.

9.6 Socioeconomic Conditions in Parveta

The subsistence allowance
In early 1988, it became clear that conditions in Parveta prevented the
people from re-establishing their economic position, and the govern-
ment of Gujarat decided to pay each family a subsistence allowance of
Rs 15 per day, for 25 days per month, for one year after relocation.
The problem was particularly serious in Parveta, as the people had dif-
ficulty clearing the land, and could not engage in wage labour or cul-
tivation. The Gujarat subsistence allowance resembled the employment
guarantee programme of Maharashtra, which paid people to develop
their land. The subsistence allowance was not included in the original
R&R package, but was a result of pressure from the people and the ac-
tivists.
The subsistence allowance came rather late. By the time it was paid,
the first batch of people had spent 36 months in Parveta, and the sec-
ond batch of people had lived there for more than 15 months. In that
time they experienced serious hardships, and paid a great price in terms
of deaths. However, the subsistence allowance brought some relief to
the people, who badly needed money to repay loans taken from Kaledi-
194 The Case Studies

ya shops and relatives. People also used the money to finance the land-
clearing.

Land-clearing
Much of the Parveta land was rocky and unfit for cultivation. Land-
clearing took several years and was costly _17 A few households re-
ceived land which was not suitable for cultivation at all. About 13 per
cent of the households have applied to exchange their Parveta land, and
a few have received land in the distant village Siyadra.
About 15 per cent of the households lost land - between 5 and 45
per cent of their total holdings - for the construction of a canal. In
some cases, the canal runs through the land, making it difficult to cul-
tivate the remainder: for these households, the land-improvement ef-
forts of the last eight years have gone to waste. The government has
paid cash compensation for the land lost.
In 1988, most households in Parveta were able to reap their first har-
vest, which was modest. The land in Parveta is radically different from
that in Manibeli. Manibeli is hilly terrain, while the land in Parveta, is
flat, completely devoid of trees. The cultivation of Parveta land re-
quired different attitudes and skills of the people.
Currently, the agricultural cycle involves sowing jowar and rice in
early July. Jowar is intercropped with tuar, while rice is a mono-crop.
Some land is left for cotton and tuar. By October, rice and jowar are
harvested. The rice field and the unused land (up to one acre) are sown
with winterjowar. Monsoonjowar, rice, and winterjowar have become
the staple crops. Tuar is cut in January, while winterjowar is harvested
in February. Part of the tuar harvest and all of the cotton are meant to
generate cash income.
Cultivation in Parveta is an expensive affair, compared to cultivation
in Manibeli. There has been a considerable increase in the proportion
of households using fertilizers and pesticides. In 1991, 65 per cent of
the households used fertilizer, and all bought hybrid seeds (jowar and
cotton). In 1990, 25 per cent of households used pesticides; in 1993
that figure was 71 per cent. Households with bullocks and cows had
manure for the land and did not buy any inorganic fertilizers. However,
the amount of organic manure has declined gradually, with the dung
being used for other purposes. Households spent an average of Rs 450
per hectare on hybrid seeds, Rs 300 on fertilizers, Rs 425 on pesticides
 Sardar Sarovar Project 195

and Rs 250 on tractor rental. Hybrid seeds were bought from private
shops and co-operative societies in Vagaya and Kalediya. Fertilizers
and pesticides were bought from private shops.
The increase in the number and proportion of households using ferti-
lizers and pesticides could be attributed to loans provided by a national-
ized bank in nearby Kalediya. About 64 per cent of the households
took out loans ranging from Rs 1,500 toRs 3,000 in 1993. Another 14
per cent took private loans because they already had bank loans to be
repaid. Some households which received land in 1990 were not eligible
for loans because they had not been granted proper land tenure titles.
The remaining households - about 22 per cent - managed to finance
the required agricultural inputs from their own sources.

Crop yields
Agriculture is the most important source of livelihood for the Parveta
households. Since 1985, the households have gradually managed to
come to terms with their new land in Parveta. The overall yield of
crops has increased. Table 9.2 shows the average yields per acre for all
crops cultivated in Parveta. About nine per cent of the households
proved unable to benefit from land because of the poor quality of their
land. Much of their income was derived from wage labour.

Sources of income
Over 50 per cent of the households were not engaged in agricultural
wage labour during 1991-92. The remaining 46 per cent earned a part
of their income in agricultural wage labour. Activities such as weeding,
harvesting and cotton-picking provided work for women and children.
Such work was available for three months per year. Depending on the
nature of work, women received between Rs 7 and 10 per day. The av-
erage annual income of households engaged in agricultural wage labour
was Rs 817.
People derive an income from various sources of non-agricultural
labour. A few young people continued to work at the dam and canal
sites, earning Rs 25 for a day's work. In 1991-92, a labour contractor
engaged 30 persons to harvest sugar-cane in Baroda district, for about
three months. A ginning mill in Kalediya provided employment for be-
tween 12 (in 1989) and 4 (in 1992) people from Parveta. The daily
wage rate was Rs 8 in 1988, Rs 9 in 1989 and Rs 16 in 1992 for 10
196 The Case Studies

Table 9.2 Parveta crop yields, 1990-91

Range Average
Crop
(quintals* per acre) (quintals per acre)

Jowar (monsoon) 1.0-3.1 1.5

Rice 0.8-3.0 1.8
Cotton 0.7-2.4 1.0
Tuar 0.5-1.8 0.8
Jowar (winter) 1.6-5.0 2.8
Maize 0.8-2.0 1.0

*one quintal = 100 kg

Source: TISS 1992.

hours of work. The ginning factory could provide work to a few more
people, but young men preferred to migrate to areas where wages were
higher. Further, the R&R policy provided PAPs or their children with
employment opportunities in government service.
In 1990-91, the share of income from non-agricultural wage labour
was high in Parveta. About 26 per cent of the households were not in-
volved in non-agricultural wage labour. These households either had no
need to engage in wage labour or had nobody to spare. The average an-
nual income of households engaged in non-agricultural wage labour
was Rs 3,362.
The total income of Parveta households increased considerably from
1988 to 1992. The average net total household income increased from
Rs 5,621 in 1989-90 to 11,078 in 1990-91. The average per capita in-
come was Rs 2,014 per annum in 1990-91.

Evaluating economic performance

Parveta village is different from other villages in many respects. All
households have land, and 88 per cent of the land is fit for cultivation.
Most households have more land than they did in Manibeli, or at least
the same amount of land. The resettled people were given bullocks,
carts, agricultural implements, sprayers and dusters. Related households
co-operated to form groups eligible for this type of government sup-
port. Most had access to a government tractor, though not all could hire
 Sardar Sarovar Project 197

Table 9.3 Percentage distribution of households in Parveta according

to share of income derived from various sources (n=168)

Percentage of Agricultural Non-agricultural

Cultivation
total income wage labour wage labour

none 53.8 26.2

less than 20 3.8 45.0 53.8
20-40 2.5 1.2 17.5
41-60 17.5 2.5
61-80 37.5
81-100 38.7

Source: TISS 1992.

it. The households have further had access to institutional loans and ag-
ricultural inputs.
The overall economic performance of the Parveta households appears
to be good. If we consider only those households that had been granted
land by 1986, and have been cultivating since then, the improved eco-
nomic performance is impressive. The yield per acre for jowar and rice
has increased. The output of cotton was not very impressive, but tuar
did very well. For the households in Parveta, except for 8 to 10 with
poor quality land, income has increased.
Two issues must be kept in mind in such an evaluation. First, the
R&R machinery is still active, and its presence has facilitated the avail-
ability of institutional credit and agricultural inputs. Secondly, the pres-
ence of R&R officials has kept moneylenders and illicit liquor brewers
out of Parveta. 18
Further, the Parveta people are uneasy about the stability of their
economic situation. The Parveta farmers are aware of the limitations of
rain-fed agriculture. In 1991-92, for example, despite the increased in-
vestment in agricultural inputs, the overall production was very low due
to poor monsoon. This problem affects every village in Gujarat, but the
circumstances in Parveta were different in two respects. First, people
believe that irrigation is possible in Parveta. The government may assist
people, as the R&R package provides for irrigation. 19 Further, the
Parveta people are continuously comparing their current condition with
their past situation in Manibeli. Most people stated that in Manibeli
198 The Case Studies

Table 9.4 Distribution of Parveta households by per capita expenditure

and calorie intake, 199()-91

Per capita
% Distribution Per capita % Distribution
monthly
of HHs calorie intake of HHs
expenditure (Rs)

Up to 100 4 <2200 22.6

101-160 24 2201-2400 26.0
161-220 58 2401-2600 38.2
>221 14 >2600 13.2

Source: TISS 1992.

they never sought fertilizers and pesticides and did not take out loans
to buy these inputs. People did not invest money to grow crops, and the
crops 'never really failed'. The total harvest of food grains, pulses, and
vegetables produced in Manibeli fluctuated from year to year, but the
crops rarely failed to support the population. Even when production
failed, the people had no outstanding loans to bother them. When the
situation worsened, they could rely on the river, the forest and the
goats. Life was difficult in Manibeli, but people never suffered for
want of money. In fact such a comparison has no meaning, because by
resettling in Parveta they have joined the Indian economic mainstream.
Prior to displacement, the Parveta people avoided taking out loans.
But in 1991, about 80 per cent of the households borrowed between
Rs 1,500 to Rs 3,000 from a bank, to buy agricultural inputs and to
meet consumption needs. People are worried about not being able to re-
pay their loans, and are concerned about the money required to finance
agricultural inputs. Intensive involvement in wage labour could mitigate
the problem. But the people are not used to depending on wage labour,
and it will take a few more seasons for them to come to terms with the
drastically altered reality.

Consumption levels
In the period under consideration (1992-93), the overall consumption
expenditure was high, and people were better able to meet consumption
needs than in earlier years. A good harvest and sustained involvement
 Sardar Sarovar Project 199

in wage labour gave the people more purchasing power. Less than a
quarter of the households had difficulties obtaining the required cereals
for consumption. The per capita monthly expenditure and per capita cal-
orie intake suggest that about 20 per cent of the Parveta families was
unable to meet consumption demands (see Table 9.4).
In contrast to the situation for cereals, there was a general lack of
financial capacity to buy pulses and vegetables. Households with large
areas of land could devote more of it to tuar. In about 50 per cent of
the households, the vegetable production could satisfy the consumption
needs for only about seven months. The availability of vegetables con-
tinues to pose difficulties for most of the year. The bhendi and ambadi
grown by individual households was sufficient for less than four
months a year.
Since oil had to be purchased throughout the year, people have mini-
mized oil consumption. Meat and fish have almost completely vanished
from the diet of Parveta people. The Tadvis do not eat beef, and mut-
ton and chicken are too expensive for regular consumption. Fish, for-
merly a prominent source of protein, has disappeared from their diet.
In Manibeli, the second source of protein and calories had been vegeta-
bles, but in Parveta the people have lost the vegetable protein sources
too. Under existing conditions, the scope for increasing vegetable out-
put is limited. At the same time, purchasing power is insufficient to
enable the people to buy fish and meat.

The availability of grazing land in Parveta

Grazing land in Parveta is very scarce. The settlement of people from
various project-affected villages in and around Parveta has put very se-
rious pressure on the grazing land in the area. The occupation of forest-
and common land for cultivation has completely eliminated communal
grazing. At present, rice,jowar and maize crop leftovers provide fodder
for a few months per year. Since 1985, people have continuously com-
plained about the scarcity of grazing land. But the situation has
changed, as people have started to develop ways to deal with fodder
shortage. First, most households did not bring goats and cows to Par-
veta as expected. Goats were either sold or left with relatives in the
Narmada valley. Second, most households could generate more fodder
due to the stabilization of agricultural production. The rest of the fod-
der requirement was met through market purchases. Thus, grazing land,
200 The Case Studies

though scarce, is in fact adequate, as fodder needs are lower than ex-
pected, and are met through alternative means.
The number of cows, buffaloes, bullocks and goats owned by the
households has changed because of resettlement. In Parveta, cattle-
owning households had an average of 2.03 bullocks, 1.92 cows and 0.6
goats. The government subsidized loans to 75 households to buy 148
bullocks, out of which 109 were alive in 1992. A few other households
bought cows, but most households judged it to be too difficult to raise
cattle.

Health conditions
The data collected for the reference period ( 19 November 1987 to 18
November 1988) show that there were 17 deaths in a mid-year popula-
tion of 350 persons. The figures were on the high side, suggesting that
the situation was not conducive to good health. Out of the 17 deaths,
11 concerned children under the age of four. During the period 19
November 1988 to 18 November 1989, the number of deaths in Parveta
was 13, out of which 10 concerned children under the age of four.
There were six deaths between October 1989 and September 1990,
against 22 births - a natural growth of 16 persons during this period.
This was the first normal year in Parveta, in terms of population
growth due to natural increase. There were eight deaths in Parveta
during 1991. Four of these were infant deaths.
Likely causes for the reported deaths were low birth weight, neo-natal
tetanus, nutritional deficiency (arguably the most significant cause),
diarrhcea/dysentery, measles and fever. Low birthweight, illnesses relat-
ed to nutritional deficiency, and measles seem to have caused most of
the infant deaths. Life in a very changed environment, together with
poor water quality, might have contributed to the deaths. In the initial
years of resettlement, the calorie and protein intake of the Parveta
people was relatively low. The lack of medical attention in the event
of illness contributed to the rise in mortality. During 1989-90, about
62 per cent of the households spent an average of Rs 334 on medical
care, while the remaining households had not incurred medical expens-
es.
In the period 1987-92, newborn babies who became ill within one
month after birth, had only a slight chance of receiving adequate medi-
cal care. Most of the infant deaths in these years occurred before the
 Sardar Sarovar Project 201

children were one month old. In this regard, the picture of the Parveta
situation is no different from that for the people left behind in Mani-
beli, or for people in other submerging Akkalkuwa villages. In all cas-
es, infants less than a month old were not taken out of the village for
medical treatment, and Parveta did not receive regular visits from medi-
cal officials (even though a doctor from the nearby PHC was to visit
Parveta every Monday). When the Parveta people had been in Manibe-
li, they had access to the bhagat, the local medicine man. Displacement
eliminated the bhagat from the scene.
In the case of the SSP, no attempt was made to assess the health con-
ditions in the original villages, or to design appropriate measures to
safeguard their health. Even after repeated reminders, health care facili-
ties are still lacking in Parveta and the other resettled villages in the
area.

Education
The thing people in Parveta are most happy about is the school. In Jan-
uary 1992, 70 per cent of all children between 6 and 14 years of age
attended school. A large new building has been constructed in Parveta
to house a secondary school. Already, standard X classes have started.
In Parveta, the school is dominated by boys: girls are usually educated
until the primary level, after which they drop out, willingly or unwill-
ingly. There is an increasing need to engage girls in a number of
activities such as cattle-minding, dung collection, water-fetching and
agricultural wage labour (Table 9.5).

Water
Reference has already been made to the water problems in Parveta, in
particular to the inconveniences experienced by the people who had
moved between 1985 and 1987. Five years after the first group of peo-
ple moved to Parveta, the situation has improved significantly. Parveta
now has three handpumps and a main watertank. Water is available
throughout the year. The electricity bill for the pumphouse amounts to
about Rs 5,000 per year, and is paid by the government. Once Parveta
is turned over to the panchayat, the people of Parveta will have to bear
this cost. 20
202 The Case Studies

Table 9.5 Children aged 6-14 attending school, 1991-92

Number Percentage

Total children in 6-14 age group 94 100.0

- not attending school 28 29.7
- attending in Parveta 38 40.4
- attending in Chameta 9 9.6
- attending in Kalediya 19 20.3
Ratio of male children to
all children attending school 66.0

Source: TISS 1992.

The availability of water has brought about changes in daily life,

especially in the activities of women. Fetching water in Parveta is con-
siderably less strenuous than it was in Manibeli, and the women seem
to have been relieved of much of their physical labour. But there is al-
so a drawback: the handpumps and the main watertank in Parveta have
assumed the role which the Narmada river and four nallas had played
in Manibeli. All people, particularly women and children, felt the loss
of access to the Narmada river sharply. In Manibeli, the river had
brought women together, providing an opportunity to socialize and to
share information. The river also provided complete privacy for bath-
ing: this women completely lack in Parveta. The women find it very in-
convenient to defecate during daytime due to lack of privacy.21
In Manibeli, the river had also been important in the social life of
children, who swam and fished in the river. Often children roasted and
ate the fish they caught, so that fish was an important source of nutri-
tion for children.

Electricity
Manibeli had no electricity, and people were accustomed to living with-
out it. Parveta has electricity, and all houses and the main street have
been connected. In Manibeli, life was confined to indoors after sunset.
In Parveta, men stay up very late (up to 9 pm), and an (illegal) liquor
outlet has been established at Kalediya. The households' electricity
connections (one single bulb per house) are an expensive blessing.
Although all households can afford to pay the monthly bill of about
 Sardar Sarovar Project 203

Rs 25, the bulbs must be replaced periodically because of the erratic

electricity supply. On average a household uses two bulbs each month.
The people find this very expensive.

Roads
There is a road connecting old Parveta and Kalediya. Transportation
facilities are not a problem for the people of Parveta. There is a train
twice daily between Kalediya and Naswadi. Men are more mobile in
Parveta than they were in Manibeli. A few have bought bicycles. Trav-
el expenses have increased significantly since I 987.

Firewood and gas

The Gujarat government has allotted between Rs 8,000 and Rs IO,OOO
to each of I 9 households for the construction of Go bar Gas Plants.
Households with gas used gas and firewood alternately for cooking. No
household depended entirely on gas. The women from the six house-
holds with fully operational gas plants generally felt that gas reduces
their workload. The plant have also helped to partially reduce the
amount of smoke in the house, though firewood is still used.
In Parveta, fuel needs were met by the roots of trees that were dug
out from the new land, and the firewood brought from Manibeli, initi-
ally. Currently, the leftover cotton and tuar stubble, and some firewood
collected around the villages meet the firewood needs of households.
However, women using gas said that the time they saved by not having
to collect firewood was now spent on the collection of cow-dung for
the gas plant. The job of collecting dung invariably falls on the women
and girls.
Firewood continues to be one of the major concerns in Parveta, as
the available firewood meets only part of the demand. Not all house-
holds are able to install gas plants, because some lack the cattle neces-
sary for the generation of gobar. Most people either sold their cattle or
left their cows in other villages. The lack of fodder and public grazing
pastures will prevent households from increasing their cattle herds.

Social organization of Parveta

Parveta consists of four separate sections, for the households from the
four Manibeli padas (Patilpada, Kudamodupada, Sarpanchpadaand Va-
204 The Case Studies

vipada). The houses in Parveta are located closer to each other than
they were in Manibeli. All of the households from Patilpada, Sarpanch-
pada and Kudamodupada have moved to Parveta and constructed their
houses. The Vavipada households have not yet moved, although they
have received land and house plots.
The move to Parveta meant the reorganization of living arrange-
ments. In many instances, brothers who lived in nuclear households in
Manibeli formed joint households in Parveta. In a few other cases,
parents and married sons who had had nuclear households in Manibeli,
preferred to live together in Parveta.
The reorganization of households was due to changes in the organiza-
tion of labour. First, labour was required to clear and to cultivate the
Parveta land until the Parveta land was improved to the extent that it
could yield enough to support all members of the community. Second,
the move to Parveta meant that labour exchanges could not go beyond
the limits of extended/joint households, at a time when everybody was
involved in land clearing.
The joint households were supposed to be temporary, and now that
the transition phase has come to a close, people are exploring the possi-
bility of constructing separate houses on plots allotted to them. Further,
many young men who were living with their parents in Parveta have
received land in other places, and are moving there with their families.
About 40 families have moved to 6 villages located between 6 and 40
kilometres from Parveta.

9.7 Conclusions
The initial five years, from 1985 on, were extremely frustrating and de-
bilitating for the people who moved to Parveta. The lack of cooperation
between the department responsible for R&R and the department re-
sponsible for civil engineering resulted in the neglect, or delayed devel-
opment, of infrastructure. Further problems arose due to the inter-state
bureaucracy: the government of Maharashtra was responsible for all
land acquisition and compensation payment formalities, while the gov-
ernment of Gujarat was responsible for R&R.
Eventually, the R&R policy of Gujarat evolved favourably, towards
compensation of families with agricultural land. The criteria establish-
ing eligibility for compensation in land have been expanded consider-
 Sardar Sarovar Project 205

ably. But the entire resettlement process was ad hoc. For many years,
the institutions to develop and implement R&R policy were lacking.
Policy changes resulted not from any serious concern for the welfare
of the affected people, but from the pressure exerted by the anti-dam
movement. The affected people had no role in determining or executing
the R&R policy. In fact, in the 1980s most people did not know what
their R&R entitlements were. This was true in 1995, too.
The excess demands on household labour, the general conditions pre-
vailing in the relocation sites, and the uncertainties with regard to the
R&R entitlements had a very unsettling effect on the people of Manibe-
li. The prolonged social and economic disorganization created by the
ad hoc resettlement process had a telling effect on morbidity and mor-
tality.
Eight years after resettlement, income levels have increased. Cultiva-
tion is an important source of income, as well as non-agricultural wage
labour (cutting sugar-cane). In 36 per cent of the households, women's
involvement in wage labour was considerable, compounding women's
contribution to household agricultural work. About 28 per cent of the
households, with per capita expenditures of less than Rs 160 per month,
could be considered to be below the poverty line.
The amount and diversity of foods consumed have decreased, while
incomes have increased. In 23 per cent of all households, the per capita
daily intake is less than 2,200 kilocalories. The consumption of oil,
vegetables, pulses, meat and fish has declined, as the families have not
developed the capacity to buy these items. In Manibeli, most of the
consumption items were generated from the sources accessible to the
household, but in Parveta, the dependency on cash income has in-
creased, while incomes are too low to meet the many needs (agricultur-
al inputs, transportation, medical costs, consumption items, repayment
of loans). This confirms that people, particularly women and children
who were less mobile and had access to food only at home, gained on-
ly when the households produced the food. When things were left to
market forces, people with low incomes lost their capacity to buy basic
food.
Economic stratification is becoming increasingly pronounced in Par-
veta. The area of land which a household received depended on the age
of the head of the household and on the number of major sons. A few
households were able to acquire early loans and irrigation, because of
206 The Case Studies

their familiarity with the R&R system, and have thus been in an advan-
tageous position from the beginning. On the other hand, the proportion
of households facing economic hardship has been increasing since
1989. Households with unproductive land and households experiencing
secondary displacement (due to land acquisition for the canal) are accu-
mulating debts, mortgaging their land. At least 15 per cent of the
households have received land that is unfit for cultivation. Seven years
after moving, these households could cultivate only part of the land.
Families which became eligible to receive land after modifications in
policy were granted land far away from Parveta. This means that they
are either compelled to move, and to build new homes, for which no
money is made available, or that the young men move away from their
parents and elder siblings. Numerous households have split up into two
or three units, settling in various places. These households are moved
to villages populated mostly by Hindus, with few people from their eth-
nic group. In a society deeply divided by caste and class, where the
rich and powerful seldom hesitate to inflict crippling social and eco-
nomic hardship on the weak and powerless, affected people are reluc-
tant to leave their social and economic environment. For most people
in India, caste and kinship are important, because mutual assistance
flows from such ties. Vasavas who speak only Bhilori have repeatedly
rejected the idea of resettling in Gujarat, because of language and eth-
nic problems. In the early 1980s they agreed to accept Parveta land, be-
cause they were unaware that there were alternatives.
Parveta illustrates clearly the importance of social aspects in resettle-
ment. Some form of social and ethnic compatibility analysis should
have been carried out before the location was determined. The Vasavas
seem to be convinced that they cannot adjust and survive in an environ-
ment to which they are new, for they lack the necessary language skills
and social networks, and they are not Hindu enough. The resettled peo-
ple cannot survive in areas where the culture and the beliefs are incom-
patible with their own. A good and meaningful resettlement programme
would identify areas which are ethnically compatible with the group to
be displaced.
Careful examination of the resettlement process prompts us to con-
clude that Parveta is an example of how resettlement should not be
done. In a well-planned process, the R&R policy would be operational
in the early stages of the project, and the creation of infrastructure
 Sardar Sarovar Project 207

would have preceded the relocation of the people. In Parveta, the re-
verse order occurred: people were moved first, and the basic infrastruc-
ture created later. People who moved to Parveta in I 985 and I 986
received a shifting allowance in 1989, and a subsistence allowance in
March 1988. Further, as the households within a hamlet have been split
up and resettled in various places, the men who were members of one
and the same household in Manibeli were granted land in various plac-
es. Thus, the Vavipada people who refused to move out of Manibeli
expected areas near the rim of the reservoir to provide better social and
economic protection than would be possible in the areas where land
was being allotted.
The Vasavas held out for a long time. In the end, when Manibeli
became permanently submerged, people moved to areas at higher alti-
tudes. By September 1995, all of Manibeli had been immersed. In the
meantime, Vavipada families re-established themselves higher in the
Satpuda mountains, relinquishing all claims to the lands allotted to
them at Parveta.
 Part III
CONCLUSIO NS
 The Consequences of
10
Displacement for Women

10.1 Introduction
No special provisions were made in R&R policy for vulnerable groups
such as landless people, tribal people and Dalits. Constitutional safe-
guards for the Dalits and tribal people were never taken into account
in resettlement plans, and only those who had formal access to resour-
ces were recognized as PAPs. The landless people who depend on the
land and on the landed did not receive compensation or other provi-
sions which might have enabled them to regain access to resources es-
sential to their livelihood.
Similar problems exist for women. They are one of the more vulner-
able groups for whom specific R&R provisions were lacking. The ob-
jective of this chapter is to examine the impact of displacement on the
social and economic condition of women.
Women have never been identified as a priority group for interven-
tion in development projects (Schenk-Sandbergen 1991 ). In the plan-
ning, execution and management of R&R activities, women were not
recognized as a distinct group with specific needs, and women were
rarely included among the decision-makers. The author encountered no
female government officials dealing with R&R at state, district or tehsil
levels, or in the project villages. Two top bureaucrats in New Delhi
were women: they were involved with resettlement issues for a short
period of time, but they never addressed issues pertaining to women in
particular. The World Bank evaluating missions rarely included women
officials. Even in a high profile project such as the Narmada irrigation
project there was no clear policy on the specific needs of women, al-

211
212 Conclusions

though at the implementation stage some efforts were made to increase

women's opportunities for self-employment. In the absence of a clear
policy framework, these efforts have been fragmented and thus unsus-
tainable. Even the people's action groups focused on demands for high-
er cash compensation or employment for men (Fernandes 1992, Thuk-
ral (ed.) 1992).
Development projects and R&R plans revolved around men and the
landed. 1 Women lost many of the advantages they had enjoyed in their
original place of residence without receiving any tangible benefit in
exchange. Most women in rural and tribal areas shoulder a tremendous
burden, collecting fuel," fodder and water, and thus contributing to
household income. Their apprehension regarding the situation in the re-
settlement areas is acute and justified. The uncertainties involved render
the displacement and resettlement process extremely unsettling for
them, and while displacement is unsettling for the entire household and
for the community at large, women rarely articulate their needs and
problems. They may not find advocacy groups to articulate demands on
their behalf. 2
Women suffer along with other members of the household if the
household's losses are not adequately compensated: women's interests
are bound up with the collective interests of the household (Kabeer
I 990). Women will become poorer if displacement breaks up the
household and kin groups that provided economic and social support.
Project administrators may neglect to attempt to modify the forces
which undermine the social and economic welfare of women even if
their problems are apparent because the necessary mechanisms have not
developed in the project planning stage.
Most displaced people prefer to move together with the rest of their
community, neighbourhood or kinship group for a variety of reasons.
This applies even more strongly to women than to men, for several rea-
sons. Because women are less mobile than men, the breakdown of so-
cial units thus affects them more severely (Thukral (ed.) I 992, TISS
I 992). For women in rural and tribal areas, kin relationships still con-
stitute the prime avenues of access to scarce resources such as infor-
mation, economic assistance and other social support (Dyson & Moore
I 983). Social networks furbish a great deal of support, including child
care, assistance during sickness, access to information, and economic
assistance. Resettlement which moves women far away from their natal
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 213

homes can seriously affect their welfare, as support in times of crisis

may no longer be forthcoming.
Displacement may greatly alter access to services and provisions such
as ration shops, health care, child welfare, schooling and mid-day meals
for children, grinding mills (for flour), toilets, water and firewood. The
change can be positive or negative depending upon the R&R provisions
and their implementation. Displacement and resettlement which forced
women to engage in seasonal migration deprived them and their chil-
dren of access to welfare services. Any change that negatively alters ac-
cess to basic provisions affects women and children most. The availabi-
lity of water and access to water, firewood and a mill determine wom-
en's workload and welfare.
Land, the forest, the river, the sea, cattle and grassland mean differ-
ent things to men and women. For women, access to these resources
means a diversity of livelihood strategies, and thus security. In condi-
tions that allow access to a multiplicity of resources, women's labour
normally benefits production for household use, and the women usually
have some control over the nature and intensity of their labour. They
may also have some control over what is produced for household con-
sumption.
Displacement normally alters access to most of these resources, and
R&R provisions rarely enable households to reclaim their multiple
sources of livelihood. The resource replacement may focus only on
men, since only they are considered affected. When rehabilitation pol-
icy aims to provide no more than the bare minimum of support to
households in their efforts to regain their livelihood, women suffer the
most. The loss of access to traditional productive resources tends to re-
duce women's involvement in gainful employment. Further, diminished
production tends to undermine women's and children's nutrition.
While women in general will be at a disadvantage to men of the
same social and economic background, the extent to which women's
socioeconomic position is affected by R&R measures will depend on
the social and economic status of the women concerned prior to
displacement (Standing 1985). For instance, women from landless and
small and marginal landowning households are likely to experience
greater economic and social deprivation in the event of displacement.
In certain situations, women may retain their previous economic posi-
tion. In other situations, their economic contribution may improve or
214 Conclusions

may deteriorate. Social and economic differentiation prevents women

from organizing themselves effectively to put the project to their ad-
vantage (Schenk-Sandbergen 1992, Perera 1992, Majumdar 1991, Fer-
nandes 1991 ).

10.2 Consequences of Industry-induced Displacement

The location of industries, ports and mines in rural settings can have
disastrous consequences for women, because of the forced shift from
agricultural to non-agricultural wage labour. Serious economic depriva-
tion results in the event that the new industries lack the capacity to
absorb the dispossessed.
For women, agriculture is an important source of employment. In
rural India about 32 per cent of the women were members of the la-
bour force in 1987-88. About 85 per cent of the women in the labour
force were engaged in agriculture. Agriculture continues to be the most
important source of empioyment for Indian women (Chandrasekhar
1993, Visaria & Minhas 1991, Banerji 1989). High caste women nor-
mally worked on their own land and refrained from wage labour, while
women from landless and lower caste households engaged in their own
cultivation if they owned or share-cropped land. They also worked as
casual wage labourers in agriculture. The loss of arable land to industry
and the increase or industrial wage labour (at the expense of agricul-
ture) meant that women from both landed and landless households lost
most avenues of employment.
The problem was compounded by the fact that most industrial em-
ployment opportunities fell to men. Industries, mines and ports invaria-
bly granted employment to men first, for both the project authorities
and the people perceived men as the primary providers of livelihood.
Further, some industrial labour was unskilled and arduous, and thus
considered more suitable for men. Women sometimes had an opportun-
ity to obtain wage labour outside the industry. For example, women
who were entitled to a job on account of having lost land, but who
were refused employment in the public sector mines, worked as casual
workers in private mines (Parasuraman 1990a, Fernandes 1992, Viegas
1992). Women were in high demand in small private mines, for they
worked for lower wages.
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 215

Dominant social values make the employment situation for women

even more difficult. Even in situations where no suitable man was
available in a household, the job to which the household was entitled
would not go to a girl. In such a case, a household may get a ghar-
jawai (boy who upon marriage changes residence to his wife's father's
house) to take the job and support the household. In many projects,
households facilitatedgharjawais, but not the girl from the household,
to obtain industrial employment (Parasuraman 1990a). In industries
which provided jobs to a member of a retiring employee's kin, if there
were no men available from the household, such replacement employ-
ment was often traded as dowry. A girl's employment and earnings
would be accepted as dowry only if the boy had a better job, and even
then only in certain social circles. In most areas of India dowry meant
a direct transfer of resources to the boy or the men of his household,
but not through the girl. Increasingly, replacement jobs are being trad-
ed, as one element of a dowry package.
Opportunities for women to engage in wage labour were limited, and
they faced competition from men from landless households for casual
and contract-related wage labour. In the case of industry-induced dis-
placement, where agriculture ceased to be a source of livelihood, wom-
en from low caste and economically disadvantaged households compet-
ed with an increasing number of migrant women for work in the poorly
paying, supply-driven informal sector. Women from high caste house-
holds were prevented from performing informal sector non-agricultural
wage labour on account of prestige and the threat of ritual pollution
from manual work (Bardhan 1984, Betellie 1983). The total withdrawal
of high caste women from the labour force was the result. Other caste
households that were experiencing economicand social upward mobili-
ty due to industrial employment withdrew their women from informal
sector employment.
In the DSP case, in all social groups women's economic contribution
suffered tremendously from displacement. Both in the past and at pres-
ent, the proportion of women in the labour force was much lower in
rural West Bengal than in the rest of rural India. Women's participation
in the labour force has steadily decreased in Durgapur since 1971.
Labour participation had always been low among high caste women in
West Bengal, but the abrupt shift from agriculture to industry com-
pletely removed women from the labour force. Women from previously
216 Conclusions

landless and poor households, whose participation in the labour force

had been higher, were seriously affected by the loss of land. Women
from such households completely lost the opportunity to work in agri-
culture. In the resettled villages women's chances of employment in the
non-agricultural sector were affected by the heavy influx of migrants.
In 1990, 2.3, 2.4 and 33 per cent of women aged 15-59 from high,
middle and lower caste households respectively were engaged in wage
labour. A large proportion of women from lower caste households who
were reportedly working were underemployed. Most of them were
working as domestic servants in the company township. Many informal
sector industry and service activities which had previously been con-
sidered women's work were taken up by migrant men.
In villages affected by the Jawaharlal Nehru Port, women had worked
as fish traders, salt-makers, cultivators and agricultural wage labourers.
About 60 per cent of all activities related to salt-making and rice culti-
vation were done by women. Because of their involvement in the sale
of fish, women had in the past had better access to money than people
engaged in agriculture or wage labour. They also had independence in
decision-making regarding the money used for household expenses.
Women belonging to the Agri and Koli castes (90 per cent of the house-
holds affected) had more autonomy and access to economic resources.
The port acquired all agricultural and saltpan land and closed access to
the sea, causing women to lose access to all sources of labour, without
viable employment alternatives.
The booming but extremely exploitative construction industry in New
Bombay and Panvel (about 10 kilometres from the affected villages)
provided alternative employment, but women from displaced house-
holds were not accustomed to such work. A few women from desperate-
ly poor households have taken up work as petty traders, construction
workers and casual labourers. In a way, the port is a symbol of the
total exclusion of women from income-providing work. Traditional
sources of livelihood had facilitated women's work, and enhanced their
honour and dignity. Now, men have become the exclusive contributors
to household income. Most women considered their current position to
be humiliating, in contrast to their former position as proud, self-
employed, economically strong and content individuals (Parasuraman
& Sengupta 1992).
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 217

In DSP- and JNP-affected villages, agriculture had been a well-

defined domain of women's activity, unlike in industries, power plants
and ports where women had no defined role. Men were better placed
to obtain factory employment. Employers and trade unions preferred
men even when qualified women were available. This has Jed to the
impoverishment of displaced women and has also increasingly confined
women to the margins of the labour market. In Durgapur, many women
from completely displaced villages are still unemployed after three dec-
ades. Industrial stagnation and the continued influx of migrants has
rendered the entry of women into regular paid employment very diffi-
cult. Conditions for their educated and uneducated daughters( -in-law)
have also worsened.
Villages which had easy access to industry and to the newly estab-
lished township(s), and which retained some land, present a more prom-
ising scenario. They illustrate that any diversification in avenues of
employment, when at least part of the land base is kept in tact, leads
to increased employment opportunities for women.
In many projects, the affected villages lost only part of their land,
often retaining over 40 per cent of the agricultural land. The increase
in employment opportunities for women in these partially affected vil-
lages was unique to the Durgapur case. The DSP provided all house-
holds that had lost land with employment, and presented them with an
excellent opportunity to invest in agriculture. Thus, people who had re-
tained some land after acquisition invested the compensation money
and income from industrial employment in improving the quality of the
land. Many bought new land from neighbouring villages. All sections
of the project-affected population benefited. Women who wanted to
work were able to find employment in agriculture. The fundamental
element that facilitated work for women was land availability. Employ-
ment and income loss due to partial land loss was compensated by land
improvement and irrigation, facilitated by compensation money and in-
dustrial employment. If land purchase was not possible, non-farm self-
employment opportunities were available.
Meanwhile, labour supply declined in these partially affected villages,
for various reasons. Men from landed households who were originally
involved in cultivation shifted to industry jobs. Further, a large number
of men from originally landless and sharecropper households shifted to
better-paying contractor and other industry-related informal sector em-
218 Conclusions

ployment in Durgapur. High- and middle-caste households with indus-

try employment withdrew women from whatever agricultural work they
were performing. All these factors increased the demand for labour
throughout the year. Women from landless, poor and lower-caste house-
holds took advantage of this increase in demand for wage labour and
the resultant rise in wages. Women living in encroached settlements in
Durgapur town could have competed for wage labour in agriculture in
the surrounding villages, but the distance and the lack of transportation
prevented them from doing so.
The partially affected villages of the DSP case point to two other
lessons. First, women from middle and high caste households with in-
dustrial employment withdrew from the labour force. The transition of
men from agriculture to permanent industrial work eliminated the need
for women's work. This led to a drop in the participation in the labour
force of women from such households to almost negligible levels. Sec-
ond, women froin landless and lower caste households could take up
the agricultural work left by the men who took up better-paying indus-
trial employment in the unorganized sector in Durgapur. Men were ea-
ger to break away from the traditional caste-linked bondage imposed
by agricultural work and to escape the domination of higher caste men.
Women could not escape from such a situation, though the domination
of high-caste households weakened considerably due to industrializa-
tion.
When no land base was retained, industrial development was not ben-
eficial to women. In the JNP case, the outer periphery villages also lost
all land, unlike in the DSP case. Thus, the marginalization of JNP wom-
en on the labour market was comprehensive.

10.3 Consequences of Mine-induced Displacement

The mining activities in Bolani in Orissa affected the lives of women
in four ways: labour became more casual, social problems increased
due to the breakdown of the social order, there was a lack of drinking
water, and problems related to firewood collection increased as well.
The nature of women's work has changed in the post-mine period.
Women who were previously primarily engaged in cultivation, the col-
lection of forest produce and household activities have increasingly
become involved in non-agricultural wage labour. None of the women
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 219

from the original village households found permanent employment in

the mines or with the government. The government mines did not
employ tribal women, but a large number of small private mines in the
area employed them as wage labourers on a daily basis. Women from
all affected villages worked as casual labourers in stone quarries and
mica mines. Most of these activities were difficult, strenuous and
poorly paid (Rs 9 per day in 1990). Further, the collection and sale of
wood and firewood became a source of income for tribal households
that could not find gainful employment in other sectors. In Bolani, in
at least I 0 per cent of the households women engaged in wood collec-
tion for sale in the mine township or other towns in the area.
The pollution of the Karo river has increased the workload of wom-
en, as they have to go further afield to find potable water. The problem
of water is serious in the villages downstream, because neither the
mines nor the government have made any attempt to create alternative
water sources. The government has transferred all responsibility for
basic services, including water, to the public mines. When the mines
failed to provide such services, people located downstream suffered a
great deal.
Mining operations have seriously affected the forest cover. Forests
had to make way for mines, townships, roads, railways, electricity lines
and so on, and the forest cover has been destroyed by pollution from
mining operations. Deforestation has become a serious problem because
of the increased demand for firewood and forest land for agriculture
and settlement. As the number of people collecting firewood has in-
creased, so has women's workload. The distance travelled and time in-
volved are a serious strain on the lives of women and children. The
fear of repressive measures further aggravated the tension.
Social and cultural aspects of tribal life have failed to change at the
same pace as the economy and ecology. For example, when people had
access to rice and mahua, liquor was brewed at home and served at all
social occasions. The loss of land deprived people of rice and the de-
struction of the forest eliminated their access to mahua flowers. Con-
tractors have taken over the liquor business. Alcoholism among the
men has become a serious problem, fostered largely by liquor contrac-
tors who are also private mine owners and traders and have effectively
enslaved tribal men. The contribution of men to the household income
declined due to alcoholism, further increasing the pressure on women.
220 Conclusions

10.4 Consequences of Irrigation Projects and Dams

Irrigation projects can improve women's economic prospects, or com-
pletely marginalize them. Several factors determine women's economic
opportunities. First, whether or not households replaced lost land lost
with 'new' land is important. Second, the extent to which the labour
force has been depleted due to the out-migration of men and women
from project-affected households is a determining factor.

Maharashtra II
The Mil project resulted in the partial replacement of land, increased
male migration, investment in land and improvements in the economic
position of women. Satara in Maharashtra State was traditionally a dis-
trict with a high level of male out-migration among all groups - landed
and landless, high caste and low caste. Most landed households (62 per
cent) remained extended (or joint) in order to facilitate male out-migra-
tion. The remaining 38 per cent were nuclear families. Extended
households and male labour migration facilitated the cultivation of land
owned in the village, made it possible to accumulate capital to expand
the resource base in the village, and provided security to women and
children left behind in the village. Together with the older men in the
household, women managed the household's economic and social af-
fairs. Of the landless households, some 76 per cent were nuclear.
In both landed and landless households, women enjoyed autonomy
and were involved in decision-making on matters of short-term import-
ance. In the pre-project phase, all women, irrespective of caste or the
amount of land owned by the household, were involved in agricultural
activities. No social taboo prevented women from Maratha and other
high-caste households from performing manual labour. Women's parti-
cipation in the labour force was high: about 65 per cent of women be-
tween the ages of 15 and 59. Between 55 and 60 per cent of the house-
holds had at least one male working in Bombay or elsewhere. Due to
the absence of young and adult men, the demand for women's labour
in cultivation and as agricultural wage labourers was high. As men
moved on to better-paid regular employment in industry and non-agri-
cultural activities, women's participation in agricultural labour in-
creased further. Displacement from land increased the labour migration
of men, increasing women's labour contribution.
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 221

Twelve per cent of the land owned in the original village was re-
placed in the resettlement sites. Renewed male labour migration after
displacement reduced the labour available. People were resettled in the
command area of the project. Most of the land allotted to resettled
households was irrigated, and cultivation intensified. The status 'dis-
placed' resulted in easy access to credit and to agricultural inputs which
helped to improve productivity. Remittances from the migrants made
further land improvements possible, and a few households bought
land. 3
People who preferred to settle around the rim of the reservoir in rim
villages belonged to lower caste and landless households from the ori-
ginal village. These households cultivated land located above the res-
ervoir, land not acquired by the government. Thus, the proportion of
landless households decreased. In the rim villages, 59 per cent of the
agricultural work was done by women. Much of the land possessed by
rim village households was located on slopes. Ploughing and land prep-
aration were done by men. Thereafter, women shouldered much of the
agricultural burden, while men went to command area villages for agri-
cultural and non-agricultural wage labour. In the rim villages 71 per
cent of the adult women engaged in agricultural activities.
In the resettled villages, about 68 per cent of the agricultural work in
landed households was done by women. In households with more than
one hectare of land, 47 per cent of the agricultural work was done by
hired labour. Households with less land depended mostly on their own
labour, hiring labour only for limited purposes. In all, 66 per cent of
the women between 15 and 59 years of age engaged in agricultural ac-
tivities.
The fact that resettlement occurred in the command area meant that
wage labour opportunities for women from landless households in-
creased. The intensification of cultivation brought on by irrigation
prompted a shift to cash crops such as sugar-cane, groundnut and puls-
es. This increased labour requirements. An adult woman engaged in ag-
ricultural wage labour earned up toRs 14 per day.
Almost all households displaced by Mil followed strategies that
enhanced their economic prospects. These strategies were: residence in
the rural area for the main household, joint or extended family struc-
ture, a firm grounding in agriculture or wage labour, and the migration
of men to Bombay or other industrial cities. Women exercised consid-
222 Conclusions

erable influence in the household economy, the upbringing of children

and decision-making. They learned to live with family dislocation, with
men visiting the village only a few times per year.
The social background and persuasive powers of the displaced people
brought school, integrated child development services, water, sanitation,
ration shops and other basic services to the resettled villages. Medical
services in Satara city were easily available. The rim villages could not
obtain such provisions, primarily because of their location and the
small number of households settled there.

The Upper Krishna Project

The UKP in Karnataka resulted in people being unable to replace land,
haphazard resettlement, and the social and economic marginalization of
women. The government made no attempt to provide replacement land
or other income-providing assets, and provided affected people with
meagre cash compensation only. The proportion of landless households
was high (over 30 per cent) in the pre-project phase, and displacement
pushed all marginal, small, medium-sized landowning farmers into the
category of landless labourers. Second, the government did not try to
find resettlement sites in the command area, where people would have
had an opportunity to buy land. This led to the dispersal of households.
In the post-displacement phase, 76 per cent of the households re-
mained landless and were left to earn a living from less than 25 per
cent of the land that had not been submerged. Displacement broke the
joint households into nuclear units. Out-migration increased. In another
22 per cent of the households, men went in search of employment
while women stayed behind to perform whatever wage labour was avail-
able in and around the village.
Although women's contribution to household incomes was significant
in the post-displacement period, it was rarely acknowledged. The
uncertainty of the availability of wage labour and the low wages mask
women's contribution. About 30 per cent of the households migrated
together, women and children included, to Goa, Ratnagiri or Bombay,
to work in mines, agriculture and construction, respectively. The mi-
gration of families to work as construction labour in places like Bom-
bay in harsh conditions had disastrous consequences for women and
children. Most of the child- and women-related services, such as health
care, child care, pre-school, ration shops, schools and other important
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 223

basic services are available in fixed places, while construction work

involved frequent moves from site to site. People Jiving in encroached
areas or construction sites and seasonal migrants are automatically elim-
inated from services intended for them (Parasuraman 1991 b). Poor and
landless people, Dalits and tribal people living in nuclear families, and
female headed households suffered most.
Women from landless and dispossessed households depended on agri-
cultural wage labour in and around the village. Wages were very low:
Rs 7 for men and Rs 4 for women, which is less than half of the mini-
mum wage fixed by the Karnataka government. The increase in female
agricultural labour occurred mostly among the low caste and nomadic
tribes (Banjaras). Women in this group constitute the most impover-
ished and disadvantaged group amongst the displaced. This group rep-
resented about 20 per cent of the displaced households. The majority
of the children belonging to this group did not attend school and had
poor access to health care services. Men from this group migrated to
command villages and towns in Northern Karnataka for employment.
Women from Muslim households did not engage in agricultural acti-
vities even before displacement. Muslim men were involved in trade-
related activities. Most Muslim households moved out of the original
villages and settled in towns in Northern Karnataka (Gulbarga, Raichur
and Dharwad). Migration to the city intensified the practice of purdah,
which greatly restricted women's mobility.
In Jalgar, households engaged in fishing, while women worked as
fish traders. With the loss of fishing in the river and the inability of
Jalgar men to start reservoir fishing for want of motor boats, women
lost trading activities and access to money. Among the shepherds, the
submergence of land caused the men to migrate to the command area
with their herds, leaving women behind to mind household affairs.

The Sardar Sarovar Project

The people ofManibeli in Maharashtra were resettled in Parveta village
in Gujarat. In Manibeli village, all households except the cattle-grazer's
had access to land. All households except the cattle-grazer's had cows,
bullocks, goats and chickens, as well as access to forest and river pro-
duce. The resettlement of Manibeli people in Parveta was facilitated by
the provision of a minimum of two hectares of land to all households
and major sons. Resettlement caused the temporary reorganization of
224 Conclusions

related nuclear households into joint families to facilitate labour, to pro-

long the cultivation of Manibeli land, and to facilitate the clearing and
cultivation of Parveta land.
All women- young and old -worked in agriculture. As in Manibeli,
agriculture is the primary occupation in Parveta. The nature and intensi-
ty of the work performed by men and women are undergoing signifi-
cant changes. Women, on the whole, now work for a longer period on
cultivation than they did in Manibeli, due to intensive winter cropping.
The intensity of the work has changed. All households own bullocks,
cart and plough, and thus the labour involved in the preparation of land
for cultivation, weeding and carrying loads has been reduced. In Mani-
beli, women never went out of the village for wage labour, but in Par-
veta a growing number is involved in agricultural and non-agricultural
wage labour, in and outside the village. Young women are moving out
of Parveta for wage labour in sugar plantations.
The increased involvement of women in agricultural and non-agricul-
tural wage labour involving seasonal out-migration is inevitable due to
the increasing need for cash. In addition to their contribution to the
household's agricultural needs, women contributed to the household
income through wage labour: in 59 per cent of the households women
did not participate in wage labour, in 25 per cent of the households
women contributed up to 50 per cent of the total income, and in 16 per
cent of the households women contributed more than half of the total
income.
Parveta women received training in certain traditional trades such as
spinning and tailoring. In 1990, 80 women had started training on
Amber Charkha (a spinning machine). Twenty of them completed their
training after six months, after which these women were given the
machine by the Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC).
Usually, it is possible to spin 20-25 bundles yielding in total Rs 15-20
per day. Women found time in the afternoons and evenings to work on
the Charkha, but problems related to the machine and irregular supplies
from KVIC have made this activity unviable and almost redundant. In-
terestingly, the men demand to be trained as well, as they have more
free time than women and girls do. Twenty women were given training
in tailoring. Those who completed training were given sewing mach-
ines, but Parveta is a small village and can generate work for not more
than two or three tailors.
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 225

Collecting water and grinding flour were the most difficult and time
consuming tasks performed by women in Manibeli. In Parveta, after the
initial exasperating years, the water situation improved considerably.
Water for drinking, washing and cattle is now available quite close to
homes. The drudgery of grinding flour has been eliminated by flour
mills. Gobar gas is available to a few women, and is expected eventual-
ly to relieve at least 40 per cent of the women from the task of fire-
wood co1lection.
Traditionally, Tadvi men in Manibe!i married women from Gujarat.
By moving to Parveta, the women found themselves closer to their na-
tal homes. From the women's point of view, acquiring land was the
most important concern. About 60 per cent of the women were happy
with the land received. The rest, with poor quality land, had to engage
in wage labour and feared poverty.
The health and mortality situation in Parveta has been a serious cause
of concern for most women. After shifting to Parveta, they felt that the
incidence of sickness among men and children increased. The health
condition of most people had deteriorated in Parveta due to the changes
in water and environment. A very high proportion (about 30 per cent)
of those who gave birth during 1986-90 lost their children. At least
five women lost all children born to them during six years. The situa-
tion has not stabilized. The higher incidence of cattle death is also attri-
buted to poor water quality and lack of green fodder.
Women are concerned about the increasing dependence on cash crops
and agricultural inputs. A large proportion of households could not re-
pay loans from banks and private sources for the purchase of agricul-
tural inputs with earnings from the 1991-92 harvest. This affected the
capacity of households to procure agricultural inputs following the
1992 monsoon.
The level and diversity of consumption has become another concern
for worn en. The cropping pattern in Parveta has affected household con-
sumption of vegetables and pulses. The lack of vegetable cultivation in
Parveta has seriously reduced vegetable consumption. Meanwhile, the
increased demand for cash for other purposes has undermined the capa-
city of households to buy vegetables and pulses.
Resettlement in Parveta, in the midst of villages inhabited by caste
Hindus, has intensified 'Hinduization' and high caste social practices:
Tadvis have stopped demanding or paying brideprice, and are instead
226 Conclusions

moving towards dowry, purdah has become common, male children re-
ceive preferential treatment in schooling and parents demand less la-
bour from them. Two factors have contributed to this change. First, the
R&R programme, through its emphasis on males for all provisions, has
enhanced the value of sons. Land provision, subsistence allowances,
and government jobs were intended only for men and major sons. Un-
less women had land to their name, they were not eligible for any pro-
visions. Fierce competition for the R&R provisions that might be avail-
able over and above common entitlements has placed female-headed
households at a distinct disadvantage. Second, women's labour was in-
dispensable in Manibeli, but in Parveta the resettlement package has en-
abled men to buy or hire all kinds of modern agricultural implements.
Because of the presence of caste Hindu villages all around Parveta,
landless labourers are available at cheap rates and can be hired at short
notice. Thus women's labour has become dispensable.

10.5 Conclusions
The case studies have one outcome in common. That is, any loss of ac-
cess to traditional sources of livelihood - land, forest, sea, river, pas-
ture, cattle or saltpan land - marginalizes women on the labour market.
It is only when land and other sources are replaced that women at least
partially regain their economic status.
The loss of access to traditional sources of livelihood and the in-
ability of the household to replace these sources pushes women into the
most exploitative sectors, where they end up working as construction,
mining and stone workers, domestic servants, and agricultural labourers
in markets flooded with dispossessed men and other women.
Industries, mines, irrigation and power projects have failed to offer
women training which would facilitate their entry into self-employment
activities. No projects examined in this study, except SSP, made any
attempt to enable women to gain non-farm employment. Women and
children seem to have paid a very heavy price in a large proportion of
households affected by UKP, BIOM and JNP. Women not only suf-
fered in terms of health and nutrition, they also lost the capacity to pro-
vide a secure future for their children. By resorting to seasonal migra-
tion they have unwittingly denied their children access to school, health
care, child welfare, and other welfare services.
 The Consequences of Displacement for Women 227

Women found work as agricultural labourers in projects only when

men had moved away to find employment in the non-agricultural sec-
tor. Women from the partially affected villages of DSP and the com-
pletely affected villages of UKP fit into this category. Women from
partially affected villages in Durgapur found work that occupied them
for most of the year primarily because men moved to non-agricultural
activities in Durgapur. In the UKP women found work as agricultural
labourers because men moved out to work as agricultural labourers in
the command area, or migrated to Bombay and Goa. In the DSP and
UKP areas, women basically filled the slots vacated by men. But one
fact makes the welfare of women in these two places very different: in
Durgapur, labour was in high demand in agriculture, and thus wages
were high, between Rs 14 and 18 per day in 1990, depending on the na-
ture of work. In UKP-affected villages, on the other hand, women com-
peted for scarce wage employment in agriculture, where the wages paid
were low (Rs4-5 per day in 1991). Most of the households that were
landless prior to land acquisition, and small and marginal farmers who
were rendered landless by the project, could not escape poverty, ir-
respective of the involvement of men and women as casual labourers
in agricultural and non-agricultural sector.
When land loss was compensated with land, women regained their
status as workers on own land. In the Mil and SSP cases, adult wom-
en's participation in wage labour after resettlement remained high or
increased after resettlement. Women from most households affected by
the project managed to survive displacement with dignity, partly
because of the government's R&R policy and to a large extent due to
their own efforts. Women in Satara district had been socialized to live
with permanent disturbance. The pattern of joint or extended house-
holds, together with male out-migration, the maintenance of effective
social networks in Bombay to help new migrants to obtain gainful em-
ployment, and an emphasis on the education of children all worked to
women's advantage.
Displacement from the original land base and the loss of diversified
sources of livelihood in the SSP and BIOM cases meant that women
joined men in taking up wage labour in and outside the village. The
proportion of women engaged in agricultural and non-agricultural wage
labour increased steadily after resettlement. Women's labour became
increasingly casual and thus detrimental to their status.
228 Conclusions

Displacement and resettlement also benefited women to some extent.

In the SSP case, resettlement in a plain area and the provision of water
closer to homes, the installation of flour mills, and the provision of bul-
locks, carts, and agricultural implements generally reduced the labour
involved in fetching water, grinding flour and agricultural work. The
women saved enough time to engage in income-earning activities such
as wage labour, spinning and tailoring.
 The Narmada Movement:
11
People's Protests and the
Potential for National Policy

11.1 Introduction: The Incremental Approach

Can the R&R policy which has been developed for the SSP-affected
people in Gujarat be translated into a national R&R policy? In order to
answer this question, this chapter analyses the rationale underlying the
R&R strategies devised by the government. Further, this chapter pre-
sents the historical context of the Narmada movement and describes the
R&R package for the SSP-displaced in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Mad-
hya Pradesh.
Irrigation projects in India have typically carried out according to the
incremental approach (pari pasu) to resettlement, in that people were
resettled according to the construction and submergence schedule. A
clear demarcation of the level and area of submergence, identification
and enumeration of affected households, survey and acquisition of land
in the submergence area were undertaken in phases, in accordance with
the tentative submergence schedule. The government defended the in-
cremental approach by stating that
in large irrigation projects, R&R process that continues over a long
period of time has to be carried out in steps and not in one go. Lands
under submergence cannot be kept frozen for the purpose of acquisition
over years, to the detriment of the displaced. The entire process is a time
stream of actions and has to be judged from how far the scheduled R&R

229
230 Conclusions

targets are in keeping with the main physical works of the projects and
how best they have been met with. (Chitale 1992)

This argument reinforces the idea that R&R is dictated solely by the
progress of the project work. Displacement and environmental destruc-
tion are considered by-products, to be dealt with as and when they be-
come problematic in the project cycle.
Further, the government's claim that delaying land acquisition is to
the benefit of the displaced is unfounded, for once an area has been
identified for submergence, its value as property for sale and collateral
for loan drops, and the incentive for improvement vanishes automatical-
ly. In many projects with prolonged waiting times, farmers encountered
greater difficulties in obtaining credit and access to agricultural im-
provement programmes. The moment the government identifies an area
for submergence, all forms of development assistance to that area come
to a halt.
Some aspects which are fundamental to the satisfactory execution of
R&R, especially the survey of the submergence area, are not planned
in this approach. Nor is the identification and enumeration of affected
people carried out carefully, or is the number of people affected by res-
ervoir, canals and other irrigation structures estimated. An assessment
of the nature and extent of resources and institutional mechanisms for
resettlement is lacking (Partridge 1985, CSS 1987, Fernandes & Thuk-
ral 1989, Thukral (ed.) 1992).
People are usually moved to resettlement sites at the last minute,
when immense pressure is exerted on PAPs and R&R staff to move.
This creates a situation in which people have no choice but to shift,
irrespective of whether they have received compensation, land and oth-
er benefits, and whether R&R sites are adequately prepared. Once the
people have moved, they automatically lose their bargaining power (Pa-
rasuraman 1991b, Viegas 1992).
Successful rehabilitation demands the involvement of project person-
nel over a long period (Cernea 1991, Scudder 1991 ). In an incremental
strategy, the involvement of personnel to implement R&R provisions
is always brief and ends immediately after shifting, although the reset-
tled require a considerable amount of time to establish a decent liveli-
hood and restructure their social organization in the new setting (Baxi
1989). In an incremental strategy, the emphasis is on relocation and not
rehabilitation.
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 231

Following the incremental approach, agricultural land, resettlement

sites, and manpower for R&R work are identified on a year-to-year
basis. Money for R&R work is allocated in the same way. Thus, when
land for resettlement has to be acquired from individual farmers, its
availability and its price are subject to drastic changes. Meeting R&R
demands on a year-to-year basis has proved impossible, because irriga-
tion projects tend to displace large numbers of people, and the number
of families to be resettled fluctuates considerably (Partridge 1985,
TISS 1 1988, Thukral 1992). Furthermore, unexpected flooding adds to
the number of people displaced. The backlog of displaced people ac-
cumulates, and the government's R&R system is unable to deal with it.
Where droughts and floods have become regular phenomena, the al-
location of funds for R&R work cannot be taken for granted. In India,
dam construction and irrigation infrastructure development are very
often financed by the World Bank or other loan-providing agencies. 2
Thus, the disbursement of funds is linked to the construction schedule,
and construction activity can continue even during years disturbed by
droughts and floods. However, R&R activities are financed purely by
the state. In the event of a drought, money for resettlement work either
becomes very difficult to obtain or is substantially reduced. A pro-
longed construction schedule and the fragmentation of social groups un-
dermines the capacity of the affected people and outside activists to
engage in organized action. Thus, a large number of people slated for
resettlement at a later point in the project cycle invariably end up as
losers. For example, in the UKP the R&R machinery was disestablished
after some of the R&R infrastructure had been created. In many instanc-
es, villages in peripheral areas were left unattended (see Parasuraman
1991b).
The government's commitment to resettle PAPs depends on various
factors. For instance, the perception and political interests of the ad-
ministrators and political leaders may be important. This in itself could
determine the priority groups warranting urgent R&R, as in the case of
disaster-affected families. Economic difficulties created by external fac-
tors such as balance of payments difficulties can also adversely affect
the government's commitment to resettle and rehabilitate certain groups
(Parasuraman 1991 a, 1991 b).
Political forces have distorted the planning process by initiating pro-
jects even before clearance is given by the Planning Commission and
232 Conclusions

the government of India. Often the process of project appraisal, that

includes R&R and environmental aspects, is avoided. Projects that are
economically unsound are not abandoned, because of political expe-
diencies (Singh, Kothari & Am in 1992). As more and more projects are
formulated and initiated to satisfy political needs, the project priorities
and the attention to be paid to people for R&R also change, as do ad-
ministrators and political leaders. The proliferation of projects which
are under construction in the various states has resulted not only in a
thin spread of financial, managerial and technical resources but also in
unnecessary displacement and unmanageable R&R problems. In fact,
the incremental strategy can be seen as a carefully calculated admin-
istrative and political instrument to enable people in power to escape
accountability. New projects are initiated and additional people are
displaced simply because the number of people already displaced and
awaiting resettlement was neither clearly defined nor targeted and bud-
geted for resettlement. Less than 25 per cent of those displaced by de-
velopment projects have been rehabilitated, and even they were rehabi-
litated only to a very limited extent (Fernandes & Raj 1992).

11.2 The Sardar Sarovar Project and People's Action

The tribal people of the Satpuda ranges are known for their resistance
to outsiders who may undermine their resource base and independence.
However, their position was weakened due to the subjugation of the
Mehwasi territories by the British and the continued neglect of their
area by the state government after Independence (TISS 1992). Al-
though they were aware of the consequences of displacement due to the
dam, they gave no indication in the early 1980s that they would fight
for better resettlement. In fact, fearing that the government would not
provide alternative land, many households in the first phase submerg-
ence villages in Maharashtra and Gujarat started clearing land in the
upper reaches of the Satpuda mountains for occupation if and when
their land and houses would be submerged (Parasuraman 1989).
The tribal villages ofMaharashtra and Madhya Pradesh are physically
isolated. When activists arrived in the valley in 1985, none of the gov-
ernmental infrastructure and other social and economic provisions that
should have been provided several years earlier, were in place. The dif-
ficult terrain and the absence of mechanized transportation prevented
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 233

the school teachers, health care personnel and other service providers
from reaching the villages.
An uneasy relationship between the government, people and the activ-
ists started in 1980. The nature of that relationship changed often
between 1980 and 1993, from confusion to tension, confrontation and
accomplishment.

Period of confusion: The early 1980s

The years 198 I-85 constituted a period of tremendous confusion for
both the people as well as the government. The Narmada Water Dis-
putes Tribunal (NWDT) gave its verdict in 1979, after which the gov-
ernment of Gujarat started preparations for the SSP, even before the
government of India and the Planning Commission gave permission to
start the work, as was noted above.
By early 1980, the R&R process was set in motion in the affected
villages of Gujarat and Maharashtra. Since Madhya Pradesh would ex-
perience flooding only in the second and later phases of submergence,
the R&R process in that state was delayed. People from 10 villages of
Gujarat and two villages of Maharashtra were relocated in this period.
Neither the government officials nor the people were aware of the R&R
provisions and entitlement, but displacement was effected nonetheless.
The R&R policy in the early 1980s consisted of the following ele-
ments:
(a) The NWDT Award established the benefits and procedures of re-
settlement of those who would be displaced by submergence in
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra in the reservoir area, and appor-
tioned the cost of their resettlement to the government of Gujarat.
The NWDT Award declared that persons to be dispossessed were
to receive benefits that amounted to an opportunity for economic
and social progress (for details see Section 9.2).
(b) Project-affected people of the submergence zone were to be given
land to replace land they were losing, housing sites and short-term
financial protection.
(c) The A ward did not make provisions for encroachers or those
whose land was to become tapu.
234 Conclusions

In the early 1980s, in all three states, neither the number of people
to be displaced was known nor had plans to resettle them been devel-
oped. All three states had different government resolutions on R&R
provisions (CSS 1991 ). For instance, the Gujarat government accepted
the NWDT's suggestions for the resettlement of people displaced by
the project: people losing land were to be given two hectares of irri-
gated or irrigable land. Landless people, people who had encroached
land, persons whose land became tapu, and major sons were not eligi-
ble for land.
By contrast, the government of Maharashtra enacted R&R legislation,
in 1976, which stipulated that if the project-affected households de-
posited 75 per cent of the money received as compensation for the land
lost, they would be allotted a minimum of one hectare of irrigated land.
Landless households fully dependent on agricultural wage labour
moved with the landed, and if land was available, they were to be giv-
en one acre of land (GOM 1976).
The government of Madhya Pradesh did not have R&R legislation,
but passed resolutions promising cash compensation for land lost
(NICMAR 1991). By 1980, the World Bank had a well-defined policy
on resettlement of people affected by the projects it funded (Cernea
1988).
The R&R policy notwithstanding, the Bank neither appraised the
R&R component nor motivated the state governments to develop R&R
policies in tune with the NWDT stipulations. Only after the appraisal
carried out in connection with the Indian government's request for a
loan, did the Bank realize that R&R had been neglected. An expert on
resettlement issues, Dr Scudder, was deputed by the Bank to evaluate
the nature and extent of displacement and the R&R measures adopted
by the state governments. His assessment was that

India's past record of reservoir related relocation did not meet World
Bank standards, the reason being: absence of a national policy and pres-
ence of an inappropriate legal instrument for property acquisition and
compensation (the Land Acquisition Act, 1894); an inadequate institu-
tional framework in each of the three states- they lacked the means and
skills to implement resettlement; bureaucratic insensitivity and apathy
towards social and communal aspects of displacement and relocation; and
rigid orientation towards compensation to individuals rather than reset-
tlement of whole communities. The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal's
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 235

1979 provisions, though representing a major advance in India, did not

meet the requirements of the World Bank policy guidelines on involun-
tary resettlement. There were serious shortcomings, for example, with re-
gard to landless people and forest cultivators. The state governments
were not serious about honouring the provisions ofNWDT Award. Their
plans and cost estimates were inadequate and unreliable. (Cited in Morse
& Berger 1992: 43-4)
He concluded that the resettlement of the SSP-displaced was likely to
take place in a very unfavourable environment.
Advocacy groups had taken interest in the SSP in early 1980. Two
such voluntary organizations located close to the project area in Gujarat
had started working with the affected people: Arch-Vahini, based in
Mangrol, and the Rajpipla Social Service Society (RSSS), based in Raj-
pip Ia. Arch-Vahini was already interacting with Gujarat PAPs, the Gu-
jarat government and the World Bank for better resettlement provisions.
Medha Patkar, an activist who later spearheaded the anti-dam move-
ment, started working with Arch-Vahini around 1985. The RSSS
helped people in land-related matters through court action. Though the
successes of Arch-Vahini and RSSS were limited at that time, they had
pioneered a people's movement.
The lack of uniformity in government policies, and the inability of
the three state governments to collaborate in the development of a co-
herent policy caused a great deal of confusion among the people and
among the officials responsible for R&R work. The World Bank added
to the confusion by neglecting to assess properly, in the early stages of
the project, the magnitude of the displacement and the R&R capacity
of the states. To complicate matters further, the Gujarat government
started shifting people even before R&R policy issues had been settled.
The tribal people in all three states were not informed about their
status, or about how and when they would be displaced. Maharashtra
and Madhya Pradesh governments did not complete the surveys of sub-
merging villages and thus lacked clear data on the magnitude of dis-
placement and its consequences.

Period of tension: March 1985-June 1988

The second phase was a period of immense tension between the gov-
ernment and the affected people. This period witnessed the emergence
236 Conclusions

a strong people's movement which questioned the whole approach of

the government towards R&R.
Conditional clearance
In 1980, the government of India amended the Indian Forest Act of
1927 to prohibit state governments from declaring any reserved forest
as non-reserved without prior approval of the central authorities (Ro-
sencranz, Diwan & Noble 1991), and a separate Ministry of Environ-
ment (MOE) was created. The SSP was to submerge a largearea of pro-
tected forest and to displace over I 00,000 tribal people. In order to
obtain MOE clearance for the project, the state governments had to con-
duct detailed appraisals of the extent of displacement and its negative
effects on the environment and forests, and to submit to the MOE plans
to deal with these effects. The state governments requested time to
prepare the plans, but demanded clearance to initiate dam construction.
The MOE and later the Planning Commission agreed, under protest,
to give conditional clearance for the project. The state governments
agreed that critical studies and plans justifying the dam, such as com-
mand area development, catchment area treatment, carrying capacity,
seismicity, and the impact on R&R would be completed by the end of
1989. The go-ahead signal was a purely political decision (discussed
later in this chapter), and it was clear to both central and state govern-
ments, as well as to the World Bank, that the SSP was in fact not ready
for initiation. However, even before the GOI gave conditional clearance
to initiate the project in 1987, about 2,000 families from Gujarat and
90 families from Maharashtra had already been displaced and moved
to the resettlement sites.
The lack of information
People facing eviction and loss of livelihood due to the SSP were neith-
er informed nor consulted by the authorities in any of the three states.
The tribal people of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh were not even
informed about the imminent eviction before the Section 4 notice was
served. Given the manner in which governments normally deal with the
tribal people in general, there was no question that the state gov-
ernments would have ever consulted them (SC&ST 1990). All available
evidence suggests that the people received little or no information about
the SSP, a project that was going to greatly disrupt and change their
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 237

Jives. It was only after the activists arrived in the valley that some
awareness was generated in this regard (MARG 1987, TISS 1989).
The government's lack of action was a result of its belief that the tri-
bals would not understand the issues involved, even if such information
were given to them. The government will not accept that appropriate
methods can be found to provide information to the illiterate (for in-
stance, group discussions and individual contacts). 3
The mobilization of the people and the demand for satisfactory
rehabilitation
People resented being asked to move before the R&R provisions had
been clearly outlined. In 1985, Medha Patkar arrived at the Maharash-
tra' s project-affected villages. Under her leadership, the affected people
began to organize themselves as Narmada Dharnkarsta Samiti. In due
course, the tribal villages of Madhya Pradesh joined the movement. In
1987, an organization called the Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti was
revitalized in the Nimad region of Madhya Pradesh. This organization
mobilized the non-tribal people displaced by SSP. In the meantime, in
Gujarat the Narmada Asargrasta Sangharsh Samiti started its work
among the people of six villages displaced to make way for the project
and the residential colony. These villagers were not given adequate com-
pensation. Arch-Vahini was already demanding adequate life renewal
resettlement for the Gujarat people. In 1985, a few other activists came
to the valley from Bombay, Delhi and Ahmedabad. These activists
learned the local dialects (Bhilori and Pauri) and Gujarati and travelled
the valley extensively. Their urban background, intelligence, high levels
of academic qualification and the intense rapport which they were able
to establish with the people, impressed the top bureaucrats in the state
capitals. In the initial stages, the state officials were willing to co-
operate with the activists.
The activists brought the issue of the utter lack of basic facilities in
the villages to the notice of authorities at the highest levels of govern-
ment. For the first time, the government became aware of the urgency
of the matter. The activists set up village committees for R&R work,
imparted functional literacy to the committee members, initiated adult
education programmes, motivated the government to appoint teachers
for the non-functioning schools, and at the same time motivated teach-
ers to live in the villages where they were posted. In fact, in a few vii-
238 Conclusions

!ages in Maharashtra, people constructed schools during the Jean agri-

cultural season in 1986-87, using their own resources. Local dais (mid-
wives) and medicine men were trained to practice modern medicine
along with their traditional expertise. The government established a few
primary health care sub-centres and trained local young men and wom-
en as community health volunteers. The activists highlighted the preva-
lence of sickle-cell anremia in the villages and urged the government
to initiate intensive treatment and research programmes. The govern-
ment established a few ashram (residential) schools in 1987, to enable
children living in distant hamlets to attend school.
Young men and women were in the forefront of the emerging move-
ment to demand better compensation. New leadership was emerging un-
der the guidance of the activists. They composed songs on health care,
education, self-sufficiency, self-respect, tribal independence and assert-
iveness. The activists gave detailed information on the NWDT A ward,
the SSP dam, submergence levels, the project beneficiaries, the extent
of forest Joss, the number of villages and people facing dislocation,
R&R provisions, and other basic information. About two years after the
activists had come to the villages, people started questioning the offi-
cials and persuaded them to come to their villages to talk about the
project and R&R issues.
Collection of data
The village committees collected comprehensive household data on
landownership, cattle and trees owned, the amount of produce from
land, forest and river, the size of houses and the construction materials
used. The data collected included births, deaths, migration and other
vital aspects. The data was carefully collected by the villagers and ac-
tivists to help the government calculate compensation and R&R entitle-
ment.
As long as the people were submissive and demanded better resettle-
ment, the government used the data to update its own database. In a
few villages, the government and the people conducted joint land sur-
veys and prepared lists of project-affected people. When the govern-
ment found itself unable to answer the people and to improve the R&R
package, it stopped accepting the data provided by the people. Interest-
ingly, the same data is now being used in court cases by the activists
(TISS M&E files, 1987-93).
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 239

Government response
With the activists on their side, the people demanded the following:
• the right to information on all technical aspects of the dam, the ex-
tent and schedule of submergence, the basis for estimating the cost-
benefit of the SSP, the method used to assess the value of land, hous-
ing and trees;
• the adherenceto NWDT Award stipulations by all three states, acqui-
sition of and compensation for tapu land, a new land survey includ-
ing those excluded from earlier surveys, and compensation for people
on encroached land (on the basis of their customary right to use the
land for agricultural, grazing and other purposes);
a comprehensive resettlement plan which detailed R&R provisions,
compensatory land availability, the schedule, and the establishment
of basic infrastructure in the relocation sites;
• the right of displaced people to resettle within their own state, closer
to their original area, with all the R&R provisions to which they
would have been entitled if they were to be resettled in Gujarat;
• the extension of R&R benefits to those affected by the colony, canal,
sanctuary and compensatory afforestation programmes.
In response to the demands of the people, officials argued that the tri-
bals could not understand the project planning process and the technical
issues such as cost-benefits or land assessment. When the activists came
forward to act as facilitators, the government declared that providing
information to the activists would amount to a 'security threat' (NBA
1992).
The GOM and GOMP had problems in accepting even the basic
NWDT provision that all landed people who were displaced should be
allocated two hectares of land. There was no way that the GOM and
GOMP would be willing to give land to encroachers and landless
people, though such households possessed land and claimed customary
right to such land.
The GOG claimed that it had sufficient land to give to the displaced
people from all three states. When the activists and the people demand-
ed the identification of such land, it became clear that there was no
land readily available (TISS 1989). After this revelation, the GOG re-
sorted to buying land from the public. 4 However, lands were purchased
240 Conclusions

in pieces spread over a large area. It was difficult to obtain connecting

pieces of land large enough to accommodate 25 to 30 families together.
People from the same village would have to be resettled in different
places, and thus a viable social unit could not be maintained. Infrastruc-
ture would be built and other basic provisions provided only when a
minimum of I 00 families was settled.
The GOM initially wanted all its people to resettle in Gujarat, so that
it would not have to go to the trouble of finding land and then taking
care of R&R. When the people demanded that they be resettled within
the district, the government started looking for land (the NWDT Award
stated that the people could claim resettlement in their own state). The
R&R law of Maharashtra permitted the government to acquire land in
the command area of other dams to resettle people displaced by dams.
Thus, the GOM started identifying land in the command area within the
Dhulia district, upon which the political parties in Dhulia organized the
farmers in the command area to pressure the government to drop the
plan. The District Collector who initiated the plan was transferred and
the plan was dropped for good.
In the meantime, the people demanded that they be resettled in the
forest area of the district. People also refused to resettle in forest areas
given to them by displacing people who were already cultivating or us-
ing the land for other purposes. In June 1988, the GOM declared that
it had no land to resettle people within the district. Though the GOM
knew that the national government could not release forest land for re-
settlement, it appealed for, and eventually succeeded in obtaining, the
release of 2,700 hectares of forest land in Dhulia district. 5 With that,
the GOM's land search came to a complete halt.
Madhya Pradesh, which was to benefit the least from the project, yet
suffer a great loss in terms of the number of people displaced and the
forest and agricultural land lost, was not enthusiastic about R&R work
(Patel 1990). It neither conducted any survey of the number of people
displaced nor identified any land for the resettlement of displaced peo-
ple. It did not adopt the NWDT Award provisions, either.
Thus, the period between 1985 and 1988 did not see any change in
the R&R policies of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. Though the
R&R policy of Gujarat showed some improvement, the lack of land
and the decision to buy land from the public created serious problems.
By mid-1988 it was evident that the state governments did not recog-
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 241

nize the extent and the gravity of displacement. The state governments
made no attempt to implement a coherent policy. Issues such as com-
pensation to people with access to common property resources, recog-
nition of customary rights and compensation for people on encroached
or tapu land remained unresolved. The availability of land to resettle
people became uncertain. The governments had lost credibility. The evi-
dence from resettled villages pointed to increasing misery and pro-
longed deprivation of basic facilities such as water, ration shops,
schools, health care, roads, transport and so on (CSS 1991, TISS 1990,
1991, 1992). The shortage of grazing land exacerbated insecurity. Ten-
sions persisted and no solutions were forthcoming.
The dedsion to oppose the dam
In August 1988, all local organizations working with the project-affect-
ed villages held rallies in the tehsil towns of Akka1kuwa, Akrani, Ali-
rajpur and Nimad, declaring their total opposition to the SSP. They
vowed to work towards halting the SSP to save the environment and
the economic and social base of the people slated for displacement, and
to work for sustainable development alternatives. Local organizations
joined together and formed a new group called the Narmada Bachao
Andolan (Save Narmada Movement). A large number of influential or-
ganizations working for the welfare oftribals, slum dwellers, small and
marginal farmers and environmental groups from Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh, and other parts of the country joined forces to oppose the
SSP. Paving the way for alternative forms of development, a loose fed-
eration of NGOs from all over the country decided to wage a deter-
mined struggle to halt the SSP. The central group waging the struggle
in the valley and the 'federation' agreed in principle to avoid political
parties and leaders.
In the meantime, Arch-Vahini decided to support the GOG to resettle
the displaced people of Gujarat. A number of NGOs sprang up in Gu-
jarat to counter the anti-dam strategy of Narmada Bachao Andolan. 6
Their objective was to ensure that the SSP would be completed and
that the GOG would co-operate constructively in resettling the dis-
placed.
242 Conclusions

Period of confrontation: June 1988-0ctober 1992

When the people decided to oppose the dam itself, tensions gave way
to open confrontation. This stage began in June 1988 and continued un-
til October 1992. The nature and intensity of agitation during this pe-
riod forced the government to change R&R policies comprehensively.
The objective of confrontation was to force the GOI to order a com-
plete review of the SSP. A technical and cost-benefit analysis of the
dam, taking into account the social and environmental costs of the pro-
ject, and providing proof of the governments' capacity to mitigate dis-
placement and environmental problems was demanded. The activists ar-
gued that if the technical feasibility and benefits are proved inadequate,
the government should make way for alternative development strate-
gies.
The GOG, as the major beneficiary of the project, aimed to avoid a
review of the SSP, accelerating, instead, dam construction work such
that the project would reach a stage of irreversibility. Thus began a bit-
ter confrontation in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The GOG knew
that if the people refused to move from their villages in these two
states, construction work could not proceed beyond a certain level un-
less people were evicted by force or threatened by imminent submerg-
ence.
Towards the end of 1988, the activists were supported by a growing
number of organizations, and people from 297 affected villages in Ma-
harashtra and Madhya Pradesh were on one side. At this stage Baba
Amte, one of the most respected social workers in the country, moved
out of his ashram at Anandwan (in the Wardha District of Maharash-
tra), housing thousands of lepers, to the banks of the Narmada in Mad-
hya Pradesh. He came to Narmada with a vow to stop the SSP to save
the Narmada River, declaring that if he failed in his mission, he would
drown in the rising waters of the reservoir. People made a hut for Baba
Amte on the banks of the Narmada, whence he refused to move. The
urban elite, high profile print media, and international groups supported
the movement.
The GOG led the pro-Narmada movement, forcing the GOM, GOMP
and the GOI to comply with its wishes. The rich community of Gujarat
(the business people and the landed), powerful government media and
the police force were on the government side (Mukta 1990). The gov-
ernment launched a powerful publicity blitz describing the SSP as the
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 243

lifeline of Gujarat and those who opposed the dam as betrayers of Gu-
jarat's interests. The GOG also resolved that it would never negotiate
with the forces opposing the dam.
The World Bank found itself in a difficult position, aware that the
state governments were neither willing nor capable of resettling people
along the lines suggested by the NWDT Award. The Bank was caught
between the demands of the people, and the loan contract with the In-
dian government. The Bank also repeatedly criticized the poor perform-
ance in the SSP resettlements, and Bank demands brought about many
improvements in the Gujarat R&R provisions. However, regardless of
the government's non-performance, the Bank continued to support the
project. The activists and the people perceived the Bank as the greatest
obstacle between them and their government. The government also
perceived the Bank as a serious threat to its independence and believed
that the Bank held the key to change.
Divide and rule in Gujarat
In this period, the people and the activists organized meetings, marches,
demonstrations, petitions, strikes, public confrontations with authorities,
and similar forms of action. The authorities responded with intimida-
tion, arrests, and the prohibition of gatherings around the dam site. Pro-
longed agitation during 1988-90 in Madhya Pradesh brought assurances
from the Chief Minister that he would place the demand for a compre-
hensive review of the SSP before the central government. Similar ac-
tion in Maharashtra prompted its Chief Minister to promise that not an
inch of Maharashtra's land would be submerged unless a comprehen-
sive resettlement plan acceptable to the people was implemented. 7 La-
ter, in 1990, hundreds of people agitated in front of the Prime Minis-
ter's residence in New Delhi. After four days of action, an assurance
for a thorough review was given by the then Prime Minister (TISS
1988-93).
Nothing came of the assurances of the Chief Ministers and Prime
Minister. The Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra and
the Prime Minister succumbed to the pressure exerted by the Gujarat
Chief Minister and the powerful bureaucrat-contractor lobby support-
ing the SSP. The minority government of the then Prime Minister de-
pended on the support of Gujarat's Members of Parliament. Successive
governments were also silent on the SSP for fear of losing the support
244 Conclusions

of Gujarat. In effect, the SSP has become the lifeline of Gujarat politi-
cians and no more bargaining seems possible.
Having failed to bring about a review, even after assurances from the
Chief Ministers and Prime Minister, the activists prepared for direct
confrontation with the Gujarat government. In early December 1990,
Baba Amte and Medha Patkar, along with 20,000 people, started a long
march from Madhya Pradesh, from the source of the Narmada, to the
dam site in Gujarat. After traversing Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra,
they were stopped by the police at the Maharashtra-Gujarat border and
were prevented from entering Gujarat. In the meantime, Gujarat politi-
cians and farmers, Jed by the wife of the Chief Minister, collected
around I 0,000 people and went to the Maharashtra border. The stand-
off continued for 21 days, with both groups holding their ground and
police standing between them. Seven activists went on a hunger strike
for 21 days (Mathew 1989).
The Gujarat government had successfully pitted pro-dam people
against anti-dam people, thereby reducing the activists' capacity to bar-
gain. The condition of the hunger strikers only deteriorated and Baba
Amte returned to the GOI the Padma Bhusan and Padma Vibhusan hon-
ours, prestigious civilian awards granted by the GOI for his social work
with leprosy patients in Anandwan Ashram (Maharashtra) in the 1970s.
Peaceful opposition: The non-cooperation movement
Embittered, the activists and people returned to the villages, but not be-
fore they took a vow that they would not leave their villages come
what may. They resorted to hamara gaon hamara raj (our rule in our
village). Thus, starting in January 1991, the people did not allow any-
one connected with the SSP work to enter their villages. The prohibi-
tion was complete. It was non-cooperation of a peaceful type and it
completely deterred government officials, World Bank personnel, con-
sultants and all others connected with SSP work from entering the vil-
lages. No World Bank missions in 1991 and 1992 could reach Madhya
Pradesh and Maharashtra. 8
The threat of ]al Samadhi
The movement entered a critical stage when the first village of Maha-
rashtra faced submergence in the monsoon of 1991. Faced with possi-
ble flooding and the submergence of Manibeli, 50 families of Manibeli,
who had refused to move to R&R villages, activists and affected people
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 245

from other villages waited to take jal samadhi (to drown in the rising
water of the reservoir) in the village. This was in response to the gov-
ernment's challenge that it would go ahead with the construction of the
dam. While the people waited in Manibeli on the Maharashtra side of
the river for the water level to rise, a large contingent of police person-
nel waited on the Gujarat side of the river. The police could not cross
over to Maharashtra because of the constant vigil kept by the people.
Due to poor rainfall, the flooding of Manibeli was not serious enough
to drown the agitators (TISS 1992).
The government of Gujarat had one aim: not to halt the project work.
It completely modified its R&R policy to accommodate all the initial
demands of the affected people. Further, it pressured the governments
of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh to change their policies to con-
form to its new policy, though in vain. Gujarat promised to resettle all
PAPs from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh with full benefits accord-
ing to its new policy. An attempt was made to marginalize the activists
and create divisions among the people, by inducing the vulnerable to
move out. This was somewhat successful. Further, to gain the support
of the people from Gujarat, the state government argued that to solve
the drinking water problem of millions of people, a few thousand could
be moved to other places. This stimulated opposition to the anti-Narma-
da activists. Above all, the government adopted a 'wait and see' policy,
with the dam work continuing unaffected.
The World Bank intervenes
The international interest in the Narmada project complicated matters
for the World Bank. The anti-Narmada movement was honoured with
two prestigious awards in 1991. 9 The stand-off in Manibeli and the
virtual standstill of all R&R work due to the non-cooperation of the
villagers unnerved the Bank. The consequences of the stand-off, if
allowed to continue, might prove damaging to the Bank, given the
strength of the anti-Narmada campaign and the support for the affected
people from NGOs in Western Europe, Japan and America.
Thus, in June 1991 the World Bank ordered a review of the SSP, for
internal purposes. The government of India co-operated only reluctant-
ly, stressing that the findings would have no bearing on its decision to
execute SSP work. A commission appointed by the World Bank Presi-
dent, called the Independent Review, conducted an inquiry from Octo-
246 Conclusions

ber 1991 to May 1992, and submitted its report in June 1992. The re-
view concluded as follows:

(... ) environmental and social trade-offs have been made and continue
to be made in SSP, without the full understanding of the consequences.
As a result, (financial) benefits (of the dam) tend to be overstated, while
the social and environmental costs are frequently understated. Further,
rehabilitation of all displaced is impossible under present circumstances.
(Morse & Berger 1992: 355-6)

The review advised the Bank to 'step aside from the projects and con-
sider them afresh'. If the Bank persisted on its way, the dam construc-
tion could continue only by 'unacceptable means'.
The 1992 review corroborated Dr Scudder's 1984 findings, support-
ing conclusions drawn by the activists August 1988. Besides, the re-
view highlighted important issues related to environment and hydrolo-
gy.
Faced with intense criticism from the international media and NGOs,
the World Bank took a number of steps to reduce the damage done by
the Independent Review. In June-July 1992, another review mission
was set up, this time composed of World Bank staff and consultants.
The World Bank justified the mission by saying that the Independent
Review had recommended the Bank to step aside from the SSP, while
the Bank wanted the new mission to suggest ways to deal with R&R
and environmental deficiencies in the SSP, in case it decided to contin-
ue funding. The Independent Review had undertaken extensive tours of
the Narmada valley, project-affected villages, and the command area
and had held detailed discussions with the people. The World Bank re-
view mission concentrated on official documents, discussions with offi-
cials and a tour of the Gujarat villages, to which it had access. The in-
vestigation of the Independent Review lasted eight months, whereas the
mission completed its work in six weeks.
The mission concluded that the SSP is viable on all counts, and made
a series of recommendations to deal with R&R and environmental
problems. In October 1992, the World Bank agreed to continue funding
the project on the condition that the Indian government agreed to meet
six R&R benchmarks, and to deal with certain environmental rehabilita-
tion issues. A high-powered World Bank mission was to assess the im-
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 247

plementation of R&R provisions and to report to the Bank in April

1993 (World Bank 1992).
The benchmarks which the Indian government was expected to
achieve were:
( 1) Satisfactory improvement of the data-collection on the number. of
PAPs in the reservoir area, including an analysis of affected tribal
people; Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were expected to agree
on the interpretation of eligibility criteria applying to various PAPs,
including landless agricultural labourers and major sons;
(2) Preparation of satisfactory R&R plans for all three states;
(3) Strengthening of institutional arrangements for the implementation
of R&R, including an appropriate role for local NGOs;
( 4) Satisfactory demonstration of improvements in consultation practic-
es;
(5) Satisfactory demonstration that enough land could be acquired in
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh;
(6) The development of a satisfactory policy package for canal-affected
families (CAFs) and adequate assistance for those already dis-
placed.
The benchmark tasks drawn up by the World Bank resemble closely
the demands made by the people in 1988. All these tasks should have
been completed even before the project work was initiated in 1987.
Both the government and the Bank worked on attaining the bench-
marks. However, by mid-March 1993, it was clear that none of the
tasks could be accomplished. The government acknowledged that politi-
cal circumstances and institutional arrangements prevented it from
accomplishing most of the tasks. The governments of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh refused to alter their R&R policies to conform with
those of Gujarat, though both governments had made some concessions.
As resistance to eviction continued, consultation with PAPs was not
possible in most villages in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. Pro-
longed confrontation has resulted in intense bitterness between the par-
ties. Further, people perceive the government's efforts as a patchy ef-
fort, conducted only because of the conditions laid out by the Bank.
248 Conclusions

Officials engaged in the consultative process suggested that they had

been forced into the futile task by the Bank (TISS 1992).
Additional land was not forthcoming in either Maharashtra or Mad-
hya Pradesh. The GOM did not try to acquire land from the command
areas within the state using the LAA or the Land Ceiling Act. Instead
it asked the central government to release 1,500 hectares of forest land
in addition to the 2,700 hectares released in 1989. On the other hand,
Madhya Pradesh made no attempt to acquire land for resettlement, for
two reasons: unwillingness to make any more land available for work
related to the SSP, and the lack of an elected government which could
take a decision on land acquisition.
Comprehensive studies, data and plans should have been submitted
to the government of India by the end of 1989, as was agreed when
conditional clearance for the project was given in 1987, but these stud-
ies were delayed until the World Bank benchmark demand in 1992.
Such studies could not possibly have been commissioned and complet-
ed within a six month period. In fact, the government made no serious
effort to commission any comprehensive studies between October 1992
and April 1993.
When in became apparent that the Indian government would not be
able to meet the Bank's conditions, the government asked the Bank to
withdraw from the SSP. Thus the government could avoid having the
World Bank monitor the implementation of the conditions. The govern-
ment of India formally requested the cancellation of the remainder of
the Bank's Narmada loan. This prevented further review by the Bank.

11.3 The R&R Policy for the SSP-displaced Evaluated

The Narmada movement is unique in terms of its achievements. It
brought the question of the adverse impact of displacement and the
need to resettle people with full development provisions to the fore.
The R&R package of Gujarat has improved considerably, mainly due
to the pressure exerted by the movement. The provision of land to ori-
ginally landed and landless people, and the provision of development
assistance to establish a meaningful livelihood is progressive in the
Indian context. The movement has helped to improve the R&R imple-
mentation process significantly. It is widely acknowledged by govern-
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 249

ments and aid agencies that the R&R gains were primarily due to the
movement and its opposition to the SSP.
A large share of the people displaced in Maharashtra, and most of
those displaced in Madhya Pradesh, are expected to opt for resettlement
in Gujarat, due to the poorer R&R policies in their states (TISS
1992). 10 If the people from these states decide to resettle in Gujarat,
there will be a shortage of land. It will be difficult to obtain areas of
land large enough to resettle groups of 30 or 40 families. The resettle-
ment experience of Gujarat villages is already available as evidence:
families from 19 villages are resettled in over 150 locations (NCA
1992, CSS 1987, 1991, 1992). One group of families still remains in
the original village, waiting to be moved.
The R&R policies of Gujarat must take into account the unwilling-
ness of people with different linguistic and cultural characteristics
(from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh) to settle in Gujarat. The lack
of suitable and adequate land delays the development of basic infra-
structure, and the unwillingness of people to move to unknown areas
may give rise to coercion.
The government's 'divide and shift' approach has devastating effects
on the welfare and community life of originally cohesive groups. For
most displaced people, caste, religion, language and kinship continue
to determine economic and social security. Education and formal sector
employment may provide people with some capacity to survive without
such ties, but this applies only to a small minority.
Further, the marginalization of advocacy groups has reduced the pres-
sure on the government to resettle people with full provisions and to
provide opportunities for development. The World Bank had an import-
ant role in motivating the government to improve R&R policies and im-
plementation. With independent agencies monitoring and evaluating
R&R, the Bank, the Supreme Court of India and all concerned parties
had access to information on R&R activities and progress, but the
withdrawal of the World Bank has also brought to an end M&E. In the
absence of a third party such as the World Bank, objectivity in M&E
work may be curtailed.
250 Conclusions

11.4 The Potential for National R&R Policy

The SSP is complicated because of its interstate and highly political
nature. The SSP in its present form was rooted in the influence Gujarat
had on the NWDT: although Gujarat has only I 0 per cent of the rights
to the Narmada river, the state was granted 33 per cent of the water
and 16 per cent of power generated (Patel 1990). Translating the GOG
R&R policy into nationwide policy is further complicated by the fact
that the SSP policy does not apply to people displaced by other irriga-
tion projects. As long as governments define R&R entitlement on an ad
hoc basis, depending on the strength of protest movements, there can
be no common policy.
Further, the implementation of a national policy may not be possible.
The experience of the three states described earlier clearly shows that
land for cultivation and resettlement cannot be acquired easily. None
of the governments has shown the political will to use legislative
measures such as the 1984 Amended LAA, the Land Reform Act or the
Land Ceiling Act. Rather, the GOM chose to resettle people in forest
areas, the GOG resorted to purchasing land on the open market, and the
GOMP has remained passive.
The SSP has shown very clearly that large-scale displacement of peo-
ple from land cannot be sustained. It may be relatively easy to provide
a good R&R policy framework for the social and economic develop-
ment of tribals, Dalits and other economically weaker sections of the
population. The problem lies in their implementation. The time has
come to look for alternatives to large dams, to minimize the submerg-
ence of land and the displacement of people.
Divisive government strategies have serious social and political con-
sequences. At present the government is pitting the presumed benefici-
aries against the affected, and one group of affected people against an-
other, in order to be able to continue with SSP execution. But a large
majority of the projected beneficiaries will never receive the benefits
such as drinking water and irrigation (Paranjpye 1990, Morse & Berger
1992, NBA 1992). Quick solutions should be sought to the grave
drought situation in backward regions, rather than pumping all available
financial resources into the SSP.
A nationwide R&R policy should attempt to replicate Gujarat's live-
lihood regeneration provisions for the SSP-displaced with some modifi-
 The Narmada Movement: People's Protests & National Policy 251

cations and with substantial safeguards to ensure implementation. On

paper, the R&R package put forward by the government of Gujarat for
the SSP-displaced does have promise. In addition to the R&R provi-
sions, the displaced families are granted access to all anti-poverty meas-
ures available to people below the poverty line. Such measures can be
effectively and imaginatively used to clear and improve land, construct
houses, create infrastructure in the resettled village, train men and
women for self-employment, obtain loans to initiate self-employment
and other income-generatingactivities, and so on. A number of projects
have made successful use of measures such as the Employment Guaran-
tee Scheme (EGS) and the Jawahar Rojgar Yojana (JRY) (Parasuraman
1991 a). All groups, including Dalits and women, have benefited from
the project initiatives. Government programmes that facilitate the con-
struction of new houses through grants and loans should be made avail-
able to all, specifically to tribals, Dalits, and female-headed households.
Constraints on collective action
In Indian society, inequalities based on caste, tribe and economic status
not only undermine the economic and political opportunities of certain
groups of affected people, but also divide them and impede the forging
of an unified front to demand better R&R provisions. Strong public ac-
tion to confront the government and to protect the rights of the affected
people is absent.
Action and participation emerge in response to individual or group
perception of deprivation, in this case land loss and inadequate compen-
sation. The universally applicable 1894 LAA and R&R provisions com-
pensate only those who owned land. Large and medium-sized landown-
ers and the merchant groups perceive the loss to be serious, and react
spontaneously. For these groups, the loss of land would mean the loss
of the social, economic and political power they wield. Small and
marginal farmers are threatened with complete marginalization, but this
group lacks political and economic power. The socially and economic-
ally marginalized but numerically strong low caste, landless groups
never have an opportunity to evaluate their stake in the whole process,
and they remain silent spectators.
The government has used a variety of methods to enlist the support
of the large landowners. When R&R provisions are accepted by this
group, other groups tend to effectively fall in line. The government's
strategy to deal with dissent has involved coercion, bribery, dividing
252 Conclusions

the people and sheer neglect (see Parasuraman l990b, 1991 a, 1991 b).
On the basis of their experience with people displaced by other projects
in the country, social activists and social workers are sceptical about
the SSP. Given the magnitude of displacement and the predominance
of tribal people among the displaced in SSP, they fear serious dislo-
cation in the social and economic life of the people.
The Parveta case suggests that a successful resettlement programme
should lay emphasis on the following aspects:
(I) A clear R&R package should be developed, with the potential to
help people to re-establish themselves economically and socially in
a new area;
(2) The acceptance of the people must be secured before they are
moved;
(3) Land should be provided and infrastructure in relocations sites
established prior to relocation;
(4) The welfare of the relocated people should be monitored for sever-
al years after relocation.
Involuntary resettlement programmes which neglect these priorities are
bound to fail. In the Parveta case, the government implemented a delib-
erately divisive policy. A few people were lured into moving away by
the promise of better land. When a few influential people were per-
suaded to move away, the community became destabilized: immense
insecurity, which forced others to move out under adverse conditions,
was the result.
 Appendix 11
The R&R Policies of Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh

The R&R Policy of Gujarat

As of January 1993, heads of landed and landless households and those
with encroached land were eligible for two hectares of irrigable land. Fur-
ther, all men aged 18 and above on I January 1987 were eligible to receive
two hectares of irrigable land, irrespective of their earlier landownership
position. Tapu and encroached lands were to be acquired and compensation
paid.
Subsistence allowance (Rs 15 per day for 20 days a month) would be
provided to each family receiving land, for a year after moving; financial
and transportation assistance would be provided for the move to resettle-
ment sites.
Families would be helped to acquire income-generating assets; men and
women would be helped to acquire skills and loans in order to be able to
start up self-employment ventures.
Preference would be given to PAPs and their children in the allocation
of lower category government jobs (NCA 1992).

The R&R Policy of Maharashtra

If the displaced people from Maharashtra wanted to resettle within the
state, landowners and joint holders were to receive two hectares of irrigable
land. Landless people and those with encroached land, major sons and
unmarried major daughters of landed and landless households were entitled
to one hectare of land. I January 1987 was the cut-off date to determine
major sons and daughters (NCA 1992, GOM 1992).

253
254 Conclusions

The R&R Policy of Madhya Pradesh

The landed were to receive a minimum of two hectares of land. Those who
had encroached land before 4 April 1987 were eligible for one to two
hectares of land. Landless people, major sons from all families, and those
with land encroached after 4 April 1987 are not eligible to receive land
(GOMP 1992).

All state governments were to provide plots for new houses, sheds for tem-
porary accommodation, moving allowances, subsistence allowances for a
year after moving (Rs 4500 per PAP), access to electricity, educational and
medical services, water, roads, transportation, and other infrastructure at the
relocation site.
In Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, the provisions are better than the
previously legislated R&R policies. Thus, SSP-displaced people from
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, if they decide to resettle in their own
states, are better off than people displaced by other irrigation projects.
12 Conclusions

12.1 General Observations

The major objective of this study was to examine the resettlement and
rehabilitation of people displaced by various industrial, mine, port and
irrigation projects executed by state governments and the state-owned
public sector in the last three and a half decades in India. 1
Public sector industries reviewed for this study invariably acquired
land far in excess of their requirements. In all three cases (DSP, JNP
and BIOM) the land required for the industrial complex, roads, rail-
ways and other related infrastructure and the township was about one-
third of the total land acquired. The housing constructed was extra-
vagant: the most modest of homes was a bungalow with a garden. Effi-
cient land use and a real concern for the rural people who depended on
land for their subsistence would have reduced the amount of land ac-
quired to less than half.
Further, the industries proved unable to provide employment for the
displaced people. When they embarked on their program of industrial
expansion in the 1960s, the rulers of newly independent India held
idealistic views on development and social justice. They encouraged
industries to employ project-affected people, even though this would
mean inflating the size of the labour force. To some extent, the labour-
intensive technology used in mines and steel plants justified such an
employment policy. Though there was no legal obligation to provide
displaced people with jobs, the mines and steel plants did offer employ-
ment to most affected households, as did most of the industrial projects
established prior to 1970 (Fernandes 1992).
In 1967, the Indian government 'directed' all public sector industries
and mines to grant one job to each household losing land, but this di-

255
256 Conclusions

tive was not legislation, so that people who were denied employment
had no legal recourse. Most industries did not follow the government's
directive, and mechanization and the concomitant reduction in the num-
ber of unskilled jobs led the Bureau of Public Enterprises to abrogate
this directive in 1986 (Fernandes & Chatterji 1995). The volume of
displacement, the nature of the technology used, the skills required, and
the supply of better-educated persons from other areas made it next to
impossible to provide each displaced family with employment. Few
jobs were created at the lower level after 1980. Thus, only a few
project-affected people with a technical education were eligible for
employment.
The social consequences of large-scale displacement combined with
a shortage of opportunities for industrial employment were severe. Peo-
ple who had previously been landless- and thus dependent on agricul-
tural employment - were most seriously affected, as they not only lost
employment opportunities in agriculture but also had to compete for
scarce non-agricultural employment with the new landless. In many in-
dustrial areas, a large proportion of the affected people lived in misera-
ble conditions, while the new industrial workers enjoyed the benefits
of industrial employment and comfortable housing.
The industrial development of an area often stimulated the initiation
of related industries and induced further displacement. For example, in
the mine areas, mining activities by private parties followed the public
sector mining initiatives. Generally, the private sector is least commit-
ted to social justice and provides few development opportunities to the
displaced people. In most parts of the country, private sector industries
acquired land indirectly, through public sector corporations or special-
ized government agencies. The responsibility for the acquisition of land
and payment of compensation rests with the public sector organization.
The private sector industry was not held responsible for the provision
of employment or the creation of income-providing assets for the dis-
placed people. Tens of thousands of hectares of land are being acquired
by the government using the 1894 LAA. Infrastructure is developed
with public money and then handed over to private investors from
within and outside the country.
Industrial projects seriously undermined the economic position of a
large number of households. The cash compensation was inadequate,
for the amount paid was too small to allow for the replacement of even
 Conclusions 257

a small proportion of the land lost. Further, viable investment oppor-

tunities were not available due to the extensive land acquisition
throughout a large area. If port-affected farmers wished to buy land,
they had to move out of the area acquired for the New Bombay Project
(an area measuring some 390 square kilometres). Obviously, most peo-
ple were not in a position to make such a move.
In most industrial projects, five to ten years lapsed between the time
compensation was paid and the time when investment opportunities be-
came available. Only after construction had been completed and indus-
trial activities had commenced did employees and their families move
into the project area, bringing with them a demand for a variety of ser-
vices. In all industrial projects, over 80 per cent of the households
which received compensation money for land used that money to fi-
nance the construction of a new house or for repairs and consumption.
Only those people who received high compensation were able to retain
some money to invest in contract or transportation activities during the
construction stage, or otherwise save the money for investment at a
later date.
The success ofR&R measures was partially determined by the effect-
iveness of the institutions charged with the execution of the work. The
agency responsible for the execution of R&R work is different in each
case. In industrial projects, the responsibility of the government ends
when land acquisition is completed and compensation paid, after which
the industry is responsible for R&R work. The governmental Relief and
Rehabilitation Department is supposed to supervise the rehabilitation
work carried out by the industry, but in fact there is no such depart-
ment in many states. After an industry assumed the responsibility for
R&R work, the government rarely interfered. Even the government de-
partments responsible for education, health care, water and community
infrastructure normally refrained from providing such services, leaving
the responsibility wholly to the industry. The industries normally pro-
vided access to medical services and installed a few water taps in the
resettlement colonies, but no serious attempt was made to meet basic
needs such as access to drinking water, school and income-providing
resources.
The industries were in a good position to rehabilitate the affected
people because of their financial and managerial autonomy. They had
the resources but lacked vision or interest in the rehabilitation of the
258 Conclusions

affected people. The industries normally did not have staff with training
or experience in rehabilitation work. The industry could have assessed
the skills and capacities of women and young men to work in alterna-
tive productive activities. The industries also had the capacity to pro-
vide the appropriate training to prepare project-affected people for
employment in other industries in the area. People dependent on tradi-
tional skills needed re-orientation programmes, training in new skills
and financial leeway to exploit employment opportunities. Vulnerable
groups such as Dalits, tribal people and women needed special attention
in order to benefit from industrial ventures. A few public sector indus-
tries, such as the National Thermal Power Corporation and Coal India,
did develop R&R policies to deal with displacement. However, these
policies exclude people who did not possess land or other properties
prior to displacement.
The government's approach to R&R is of crucial importance. In In-
dian irrigation projects, resettlement was normally based on an incre-
mental approach, whereby people were shifted and resettled according
to construction and submergence schedules. The demarcation of the lev-
el and area of submergence, the identification and enumeration of af-
fected households, and the survey and acquisition of land in the
submergence area took place in phases. The displacement of people and
the environmental damage induced by the projects were considered re-
sidual elements, to be dealt with when they threatened the planned pro-
ject cycle.
It is obvious that state and national governments lack the willingness
and capacity to properly resettle and rehabilitate people displaced by
development projects. The displaced people not only have very few le-
gally guaranteed rights to appropriate rehabilitation, but are denied even
their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, in a form of
development which takes for granted the inevitability of displacement.
Even in situations where some form of legal framework to rehabilitate
the displaced exists, most people among the vulnerable groups end up
poorer than they were before displacement. In all projects examined
here, the vulnerable groups - Dalits, tribals, nomadic and denotified
communities, fishers, and artisans- suffered the most. Women belong-
ing to these communities, as well as people from landless, small and
marginal landowning families from other communities turned out be
losers.
 Conclusions 259

12.2 Some Emerging Issues

Exacerbation of socioeconomic differentiation
Groups which traditionally had social and economic advantages over
others benefited more from R&R measures than did the rest in all pro-
jects reviewed in this study. Further, those with traditional social and
economic advantages were able to cope with and recover from the neg-
ative effects of displacement more quickly than others, even when the
R&R measures were poor. There were significant differences in the en-
titlements available to different economic groups. The R&R provisions
for the landed were better than those for the landless, and the large
landowners were in a better position than small and marginal landown-
ers to realize their entitlements. In most projects, the landless had no
place in the rehabilitation plan.
Ethnicity is an important factor determining the consequences of dis-
placement. In all projects, high and middle caste groups made a better
economic recovery than Dalits and tribals did. The resettlement meas-
ures were only partially responsible for the recovery; the ability of high
caste groups to put to use their status as displaced people to gain from
other government development programmes also played a major role
in their recovery. Marathas in Maharashtra II, Brahmans in Durgapur,
Marathas and large landowning Agri households in Jawaharlal Nehru
Port were economically well-placed in the post-displacement period,
compared to low caste groups.
Brahmans are not numerically strong in rural areas, but their promi-
nent position in the social structure, combined with the advantage of
higher education enabled them to negotiate R&R benefits successfully,
particularly in industrial projects. They secured clerical, administrative
and supervisory positions in the industry. The landless and the Dalits,
by contrast, were relegated to the contract labourer category. In effect,
high caste and landed households exchanged land for permanent and
relatively well-paid industrial jobs, while Dalits and other low caste
landless and sharecropper households exchanged wage employment in
agriculture for uncertain wage labour in the unorganized industrial and
service sector, without the privileges which accompany permanent em-
ployment.
Marathas in Maharashtra were able, on account of the power they
exercised in social and political spheres, to persuade the government to
260 Conclusions

provide them with land in the command area. They were also able to
benefit from government loans and subsidies because of their social and
political connections in district and state level administrations. In most
industrial projects, criteria for job provision were modified such that
only people who had lost large areas of land were granted permanent
employment. Thus, socially weaker groups who had little land to lose
and no technical skills, such as Kolis and Agris, were unable to obtain
industrial employment.
In Orissa, tribals were first rendered landless due to land acquisition,
and later excluded from mine employment. Many tribal workers lost
mine employment and were replaced by non-tribal workers. Prejudices
of the largely high caste management about the work ethics and values
of the tribal people worked against them. Thus, when non-tribal mi-
grants came to take up mine employment, tribals migrated out of their
original villages to work as labourers in the informal sector in cities.
Other factors, such as employers' demands that workers had a higher
education, the need for technical skills and the advantage of being able
to pay bribes favoured large farmers. Children of large landowners had
more educational opportunities, and ports, power and steel plants and
other industries demanded workers with qualifications in engineering
or training in specific trades for skilled positions, and college education
for administrative and clerical positions.
People who earned a living using traditional skills, and people de-
pendent on common property found it extremely difficult to recover
from displacement. Those dependent on common resources were nei-
ther compensated for the loss of access to those resources, nor provided
with an alternative source of income. According to the 1894 LAA, only
people with title to the property were compensated. Fishers, salt work-
ers, shepherds, traditional cattle grazers and tribal subsistence cultiva-
tors were the worst hit. The caste groups specializing in fishing, in Ma-
harashtra and Karnataka, were seriously affected by the loss of access
to the sea. Most of the affected Kolis (in Maharashtra) and Jalgars (in
Karnataka) lived below the poverty line in the post-resettlement period.
Similarly, salt workers in Maharashtra and shepherds in Karnataka lost
access to saltpan and grazing lands respectively. In the villages of Oris-
sa affected by mining, most tribal households without land and industri-
al employment had low incomes. The caste groups which depended on
 Conclusions 261

common property resources had little education and limited access to

political and social power.
Displacement and resettlement widened the gap between rich and
poor households and also caused economic differentiation among men
within households. The land which projects acquired had formerly been
an asset to which all household members had access. By recognizing
as project-affected only the member in whose name the land was regis-
tered, R&R policies rendered a formerly common resource private prop-
erty. The individualization of resources was furthered in cases where
employment was granted to one member of the household.
Among the tribal families, economic differentiation within a village
had been very limited prior to displacement. The composition of the af-
fected household came to determine the amount of land allotted to
households after displacement. The nature and extent of additional
R&R benefits depended on the bargaining capacity of individual house-
holds; individuals who occupied important social positions in the ori-
ginal village were granted more land. Influential people used their po-
sitions for personal gain, and community interests were sacrificed. In
Bolani, tribal households which obtained permanent employment in the
mines and owned some land made significant economic progress, com-
pared to those without land or mine employment.

The marginalization of women

Provisions to rehabilitate women specifically are not included in the
R&R policies of any of the projects studied. Women faced serious eco-
nomic and social marginalization in most displacement situations irres-
pective of the nature of R&R measures. The loss of traditional sources
of livelihood such as agricultural land, saltpan land, cattle and access
to common resources such as forests, rivers and the sea affected women
in all social strata. When such losses were not compensated by new
sources of livelihood, women lost employment opportunities.
When the traditional source of livelihood was replaced with employ-
ment in the organized industrial sector, women were at a disadvantage.
Displacement meant the complete marginalization of women from the
labour force. The women from displaced families who resettled in and
around the industrial townships were unable to find viable employment.
Most of the heavy industries and mines were located in greenfield
areas. Other manufacturing or service sector activities were virtually
262 Conclusions

absent, except those generated by the mines or industry. But even if

other manufacturing and service sector activities were available, men
were preferred by employers. Men were able to find work as unskilled
labourers in industry, but women, with less education than men, were
unable to obtain industrial employment.
For higher caste women, who were mostly engaged in their own cul-
tivation activities, displacement from land meant a complete withdrawal
from the labour force. Women from lower caste and Dalit households
had to compete with migrant men and women for poorly paid casual
labour. The work in industrial areas was more suited to men. Women
worked mostly as servants for families of employees settled in the
industry township. Women from formerly landowning families felt hu-
miliated by having to work as maidservants in their own area.
In the partially affected villages where some agricultural land re-
mained unacquired, women found work as agricultural labourers only
when men sought employment in the non-agricultural sector. Women
from the partially affected villages of DSP and UKP fit into this cate-
gory. In Durgapur, there was a high demand for labour, a spin-off of
the invested compensation money and of income from industrial em-
ployment. Thus, wages were high, and household earnings of most for-
merly landless or sharecropping households were adequate. In UKP-
affected villages, however, women competed with men for scarce wage
employment in agriculture, and wages were very low. Most of the
households that were landless prior to land acquisition, and the small
and marginal farmers who were rendered landless due to land loss to
the project, were unable to avoid poverty, irrespective of the involve-
ment of men and women as casual labourers in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors.
In cases where land loss was compensated with land, women re-
gained some of their status as workers. In the Mil project and the SSP,
women's participation in the labour force after resettlement was as high
as, or higher than, in pre-displacement times. For about 50 per cent of
the time, women worked as wage labourers in the area. Women from
villages affected by the SSP saw their status lowered. From the wom-
en's point of view, resettlement and the provision of land in the com-
mand area was the best form of rehabilitation; women partially re-
gained their former economic position only if their family received
land.
 Conclusions 263

The displacement of tribal families and the loss of various sources of

livelihood meant that tribal women joined men in taking up wage la-
bour both in and outside the villages. The proportion of tribal women
engaged in agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour increased
steadily after resettlement. The casual nature of women's labour in the
post-displacement era has had a negative impact on women's status.

People's movements and rehabilitation benefits

This study has pointed to the tangible benefits of people's organized
efforts to pressure government and industry to counter some of the ill-
effects of displacement. Organization increased the bargaining power
of the displaced people. Political support and support from voluntary
organizations benefited even the poorer and disadvantaged groups.
Small and marginal farmers and landless people benefited by aligning
with advocacy groups. The provisions agreed on in the SSP case are
promising, if the measures are properly implemented. The Narmada
movement helped to unite the forces opposed to the development pro-
jects that cause large-scale displacement, and forced the government to
make policy concessions. The final outcome of resettlement in the SSP
will depend on the continued pressure exerted on the government by
the people and the activists. The success of the Narmada movement is
likely to have far-reaching consequences for the type of development
projects that may be undertaken in the future.
In the DSP case, the Communist Party (CPM) played a crucial role
in enabling the economic recovery of affected households. In no other
part of the country did party affiliation make such a difference as in
West Bengal, where CPM activists directly influenced the labour mar-
ket in favour of local workers and also distributed land left unused and
unoccupied to landless households. Over 2,000 households received up
to one acre of land for cultivation.
The proper implementation of policy depends on the continued exer-
tion of pressure by the affected people. In situations where displaced
people remained divided on the basis of caste, landownership and ac-
cess to political power, all suffered. Activists engaged in the mobiliza-
tion of displaced people are trying to focus attention on the violation
of human rights and the right to livelihood issues, and to erase the caste
and class differentials which impede cohesion among the displaced
people.
264 Conclusions

Fragmentation of cohesive social groups

Increasing population pressure and dwindling forest reserves mean that
government has to buy land from individual farmers for the resettle-
ment of the displaced people. Displaced families are dispersed over a
large area, wherever land has been found. Displacement and resettle-
ment fragments formerly cohesive social groups, if social groups are
divided into smaller segments, and resettled in different locations. In
a society organized along caste and religious lines, where kinship regu-
lates social and economic support for most of the rural population, such
scattering is highly problematic, particularly when it involves the relo-
cation of tribal families in non-tribal areas.

12.3 Concluding Comments

The case studies presented in this book clearly indicate that the political
and economic power wielded by dominant groups impedes the formula-
tion and implementation of a just rehabilitation policy. Resettlement
and rehabilitation policy frameworks with better provisions emerged on-
ly when dominant groups and forces were faced with serious threats to
their interests. The case studies clearly show that the proper resettle-
ment and rehabilitation of displaced people is difficult, perhaps even
impossible, in conditions similar to those prevailing in the Sardar Saro-
var Project.
Population pressure is increasing, as is the volume of displacement.
Many of the recently executed projects induced large-scale displace-
ment of people from lands and livelihood. The Narmada and Krishna
river projects reviewed in this study together affected more than two
million people in several states. Such a high level of displacement can
seriously undermine the capacity of any government to carry out proper
rehabilitation given the current sociopolitical and economic environ-
ment. The eviction of people dependent on agriculture, whose proper
rehabilitation would have to involve the provision of land, will become
increasingly difficult in the future. Arable land for rehabilitation pur-
poses is said by the government to be scarce, even though tens of thou-
sands of hectares of agricultural land are being diverted to non-agricul-
tural and industrial purposes benefiting a few.
It is clear that the form of development which leads to large-scale
displacement should be reconsidered. Development projects are increas-
 Conclusions 265

ingly appropriating resources crucial to the physical and cultural sur-

vival of tribal people and other vulnerable groups, without creating
sustainable livelihood opportunities. The nature and extent of displace-
ment, the failure of the state to comprehensively rehabilitate the dis-
placed, and the inability of policy-makers to effectuate adequate social
security measures point to the need for radical changes in the dominant
model of development.
In the event of displacement, R&R must be seized as an opportunity
for development in the affected communities. Development opportun-
ities for the displaced and large-scale displacement do not go hand in
hand: the magnitude of displacement should be minimized. The excess-
ive appropriation of resources of tribals and others such as fishers,
grazers, nomads, Dalits and artisans should be halted. Efforts to prepare
the displaced people economically, socially and psychologically for a
new life should also include the sensitization of the host population to
the problems of the displaced.
Any R&R policy must have the capacity to challenge the legality of
projects themselves: they must be held to conform to the Constitution,
which guarantees the right to dignity. Such an R&R policy will sub-
stantially reduce project-induced displacement. At the heart of such a
policy should be the fundamental right of the potentially affected
people to question the nature of the public good envisaged by the de-
velopment project. Projects should obtain clearance only after a nation-
al debate, in which the potentially affected people can participate on
equal terms. This entails a prior free flow of information to all con-
cerned, but especially to the potentially displaced people.
The R&R policy should recognize the social and psychological trau-
ma caused by dislocation and displacement, and develop methods to
compensate and relieve the distress. The displaced should be resettled
as a social unit - village or hamlet as a whole - in an area that is com-
parable to their original social, cultural and ecological settings. Repeat-
ed displacement should be avoided at all cost. 2 The long-term develop-
ment plan for the area must be examined before affected people are
resettled there. The logical steps in the process of displacement and re-
habilitation must be elaborated as time-bound conditions, e.g. the kind
of baseline survey which uses a participatory approach, the criteria for
compensation, the financial and logistical requirements of total rehabili-
266 Conclusions

tation. The project should provide for the continuous monitoring and
evaluation of the rehabilitation programme by independent agencies.
The policy must address specifically the gender question and enunci-
ate the rights of women. The concept of the family as a unit must be
re-examined to emphasize the basic entitlements of women, including
their right to rehabilitation and to participate in the decision-making
process at all levels.
Whether or not displacement is inevitable should be determined not
by the state, but by the people, in a national debate. Resettlement must
be treated as an opportunity, a mandate for reconstructing production
systems, raising standards of living, restoring community and kinship
relations and minimizing conflict with the host community, and the
terms of resettlement should be defined by the communities in ques-
tion.
The 1894 Land Acquisition Act requires substantial modification. It
is essential that the right of the state to acquire land for any purpose be
questioned. The notions of public interest and national interest must be
challenged to protect the interests of vulnerable groups. All forms of
resources to which people have access should be recognized, including
common property resources and other assets which contribute to peo-
ple's livelihood. Displacement and social dislocation must be reduced
to the absolute minimum, and legislation must guarantee a comprehen-
sive set of rights that will rehabilitate the displaced and enhance their
livelihood, in keeping with the Constitution.
Notes

Chapter 1
I. For an enlightened and thorough critique of the 1894 LAA, see Rama-
nathan 1995.

2. After the 1894 LAA was amended in 1984, land acquisition in the fol-
lowing cases was also considered to be acquisition for a public pur-
pose:
• the provision of village sites or extensions, or the planned develop-
ment of village sites;
• the provision of land for rural and urban planning;
• the provision of land for the planned development of land from pub-
lic funds under any scheme or policy of the government, and the
subsequent disposal of such land by way of lease, assignment or sale;
• the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the
state.

3. Of the 205 major projects initiated since Independence, only 29 had

been completed in 1979-80 (Singh et al. 1992).

4. The canals and irrigation network and Kevadia colony required over
80,000 hectares. The number of people affected by canals may be clos-
er to the number of persons displaced by the reservoir.

Chapter 2
I. Of the 33 villages affected by the SSP, 18 were forest villages. The
LAA does not recognize the households in these villages as legal enti-
ties entitled to compensation.

267
268 Notes

2. Directly after the World Bank withdrew funding for the SSP, the
M&E structure was dismantled in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.

Chapter 3
I. Professor Walter Fernandes, the most influential academic activist and
writer on displacement and rehabilitation in India, has, together with
colleagues, thoroughly surveyed the development, displacement andre-
habilitation scene in the country. Fernandes has been instrumental in
taking the Draft National Policy of the Ministry of Rural Development
to the activists working with displaced people throughout the country
(see Fernandes & Thukral (eds) 1989, Thukral 1992, Fernandes & Raj
1992). The National Alliance for Peoples Movement (NAPM), led by
Ms. Medha Patkar, and the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS)
have brought together over 200 NGOs from various parts of the
country for an intensive debate on the draft policy. Similar efforts
were facilitated by the Bharat Jan Andolan (BJA), led by Dr B.D.
Sharma. The BJA activist groups and the TISS discussed the Mabali-
patta Declaration, which demanded that a 'share in benefits' generated
by the industrial projects accrue to the affected people. While all
groups press for serious reconsideration of the dominant development
paradigm, and campaign for people-oriented sustainable development,
the NAPM and BJA actually attempt to facilitate such shifts by mobil-
izing marginalized groups.

2. For instance, in the National Thermal Power Corporation's Ramagun-

dam project, about 26 per cent of the PAPs were not from the affected
area at all. They were knowledgeable outsiders who bribed the talati
and created documents demonstrating their interest in land belonging
to someone in the village. Often, the poor and uninformed peasants
lost their claim to their own land, while outsiders used their PAP
status to obtain employment in the industry.

3. Information on projects is usually confidential and is extremely diffi-

cult to obtain from the government. For the common man, even entry
into government offices is difficult. In all projects where displaced per-
sons are fighting for better R&R provisions, one of the major demands
is access to information. Over the years, this problem has only become
greater.
 Notes 269

4. For example, in the SSP, households that received a Section 6.1 notice
in 1985 had not yet received compensation money in March 1993.

Chapter 4
1. The envisaged expansion did not take place, however, so that a consid-
erable amount of land remained unused. The unused land was eventu-
ally devoted to a variety of other purposes, namely:
• about 4,000 acres was leased to industries and institutions, so that
many public and private industries, institutions and voluntary organ-
izations benefited from the excess land acquired;
• numerous unauthorized settlements in and around the township and
plant occupied over 800 acres of land;
• the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM) took over and distrib-
uted about 2,500 acres for cultivation to landless people and to
people who had lost land. The originally landless people, along with
those who had lost all land benefited from this redistribution. The
rich and the poor were granted land equal in size (up to one acre).
These leases, encroachments and redistribution measures notwithstand-
ing, large tracts of land remained unused in the area surrounding the
township and the steel plant.

2. Interviews with community leaders and Focus Group Discussion with

various groups.

3. The problem of unemployment among the educated youth has become

chronic in West Bengal, and the situation in Durgapur is not different
from the situation at the state level.

Chapter 5
I. A study conducted by S. Parasuraman and Chandau Sengupta 1992 for
the Port Administration (Parasuraman & Sengupta 1992).

2. The term Benami land refers to the land registered in the name of a
proxy person, related or unrelated to the actual owner. Unrelated per-
sons are generally bound to the actual owner by some strong obligation
or by patronage. Land is held under proxy names in order to circum-
vent the stipulations of the Land Ceiling Act.
270 Notes

Chapter 6
l. This chapter is based on a more extensive report prepared by the auth-
or for BHPE-KINHILL Joint Venture and SAIL. All the views ex-
pressed here are those of the author. The Tata Institute of Social Sci-
ences (TISS), where the author is based, BHPE-KINHILL or SAIL are
not responsible for the views expressed.

2. The oral transmission of indigenous knowledge regarding medicinal

plants is jeopardized by 'modem civilization', due to its negative im-
pact on tribal unity and continuity.

3. Mine authorities described migrant workers from the Gorakphur region

in Uttar Pradesh as animals, because of their physical strength.

4. There are only 568 women per 1,000 men in the hutments. About two-
thirds of the men who came to Bolani were unmarried, and married
men normally left their families behind in their native villages. Most
migrants brought their families to Bolani in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The population increase in the 1980s was due to family migration and
natural growth resulting from the large number of births. Only 80
women migrated to Bolani independently.

Chapter 7
l. The Dhom reservoir system is also referred to as the Krishna project
in government documents.

2. The government figures note the extent of land loss at 2,840 hectares.
However, data collected from people reveals that they lost 4,508 hec-
tares (at 2.6 acres of land lost per household. There were 3,017 and
I ,329 landowners from fully affected and partially affected villages
respectively). With the government land included, the total land loss
to the reservoir alone would stand around 4, 700 hectares. The amount
of land lost for the canal and the base colony was around l ,000 hec-
tares. In other words, the land loss in the Krishna project was close to
18 per cent of the total area to be irrigated ( 14 per cent loss due to
reservoir and 3 per cent due to canals and base colony). This is com-
parable to the extent of land lost to reservoirs in other projects in the
Maharashtra II Irrigation Project, which stood at 13 per cent of the po-
tential irrigable area.
 Notes 271

3. The thirteenth village was declared fully affected on the people's re-
quest.
4. The Maharashtra Resettlement and Project Displaced Persons Act 1976
incorporated this element. However, according to the Maharashtra-
Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act 1986, effective from I
January 1990, landless persons receiving land and housing plots were
required to pay for the land granted.

5. Government policy labels any village losing 75 per cent or more of its
land as 'fully submerged' or 'fully affected'. That definition is used
here.

6. A few unaffected villages comparable to displaced villages in terms of

caste composition and land distribution were selected and studied. The
displaced and comparison villages had similar conditions before the
project was initiated. The displaced were resettled in the command
area, adjacent to the villages selected for comparison. Income and ex-
penditure data, land use and labour arrangements and other issues were
canvassed among the resettled and host village households selected to
represent the caste and landholding categories. In the Mil and Upper
Krishna projects a comparative approach was followed, tocompensate
for the lack of social and economic data for the situation prior to
displacement.

7. This was one reason that about 15 per cent of the households decided
to buy land on their own, in places of their choice. Groups of related
households which owned and lost more land, bought land in other
places within the district, where they had relatives.
8. For example, in 1987 the collector of Dhulia wanted to buy land from
large farmers who benefited from irrigation projects in the district, to
provide land for the SSP-affected people. The large landowners agitat-
ed against the proposal, declaring that no land from Dhulia would be
made available to resettle displaced tribal people. Congress and the
BJP joined in the campaign. The government dropped the plan and
transferred the collector and other officials connected with it. In re-
sponse to immense pressure from the World Bank, the government re-
sorted to releasing forest land, contradicting the provisions of the 1980
Forest Protection Act.
272 Notes

9. In 1990, 50 and 30 per cent of the total irrigated area in host and
resettled villages respectively was used for sugar-cane. Increasingly,
households devote larger areas of land to the cultivation of sugar-cane.
The cyclical process of debt and obligation to sugar factories is likely
to increase this tendency.

10. The out-migration rate is lowest among Dalits and tribals in many
states, as these people are poorest in access to resources and informa-
tion.

Chapter 8
l. The migrant workers from North Kamataka accounted for nearly 35
per cent of the construction workers in Bombay (NICMAR 1990).
Construction is the largest and one of the exploitative industries in the
unorganized sector. This industry has traditionally offered its workers
no protection.

2. Wages in Northern Kamataka were very low, forcing many young men
and women to migrate in search of better-paid work. Work was not
available for more than 150 days annually, so most of the households
depending on wage labour were unable to satisfy their consumption
needs.

3. The poorest 20 per cent of the households in rural areas account for
98 per cent of the rural poor. These households obtain less than 15 per
cent of their grain from the Public Distribution System. PDS's role in
increasing the consumption level of the poor seems to be very limited
in rural and urban areas (IDBI 1992).

4. A framework for an R&R policy was approved by the Kamataka legis-

lature in 1990, but the bill is still awaiting Presidential approval.

Chapter 9
I. Other sources estimate the area affected by the canals to be 85,123
hectares (Patel 1990; Srivastava, Sitaraman & Mehta 1991 ).

2. Data on this aspect of the project are not available from government
sources.
 Notes 273

3. Data for this chapter were derived from a longitudinal study of the
period 1987-94 (Parasuraman 1989a). The author was the leader of the
project 'Monitoring and Evaluation of Resettlement and Rehabilitation
of People Displaced by SSP in Maharashtra'.

4. NWDT Award, sub-clause IV.7.

5. The Indian national and state governments normally recognized and

transferred forest land to the encroachers. Legal ownership was con-
ferred on the people who had encroached forest land prior to I January
1978.

6. The area affected by the Sardar Sarovar in Maharashtra and Gujarat is

largely populated by the Bhils, one of the largest tribal groups in
India. The Bhils include endogamous groups such as Tadvi, Vasava,
Bhil, Padvi, Gam it, Paura, Bhilala, Rathwa and Naik. These groups are
at different levels of' Hinduization'. Vasa vas and Tadvis are endogam-
ous branches of the Bhil tribe in western India. These groups have ab-
sorbed Hindu cultural practices to some extent. The Tadvis are more
Hinduized than the Vasavas.

7. Some of the trees used by the forest dwellers (Rao 1989):

Apta (Bauhinia racemosa): leaves used to make bidis;
• Awla (Phyllanthus emblica): fruit eaten both fresh and preserved,
bark used in tanning;
• Aal (Morinda tintora): roots and bark used to make dye;
Anjan (Acacia arabica): used for fuel; bark used for tanning; yields
yellow dye; sap useful as gum; leaves eaten by goats; long seed pods
eaten by livestock;
• Bamboo (Dendrocalamus strictus): house-building, baskets, traps;
• Bel (Aegle marmelos): fruit consumed; considered to have medicinal
properties (cure for diarrhoea); leaves used in worship; seeds yield
varnish;
• Bor (Zizyphus jujuba): fruit eaten; bark used in tanning;
• Jambul (Eugenia Jambolana): edible fruit;
Mango (Mangifera indica): edible fruit; leaves used in ritual;
• Mahua (Madhuca indica): flowers eaten fresh and preserved; used to
distil liquor; seeds pressed for oil with medicinal properties;
Neem (Melia azadirachta): twigs used to clean teeth; medicinal
properties;
• Salai (Boswellia serrata): flowers and nuts eaten; fuel;
274 Notes

• Ain (Termina/ia tomentosa): house-building (second-best only to

teak);
Chinch (Tamarindicus indica): wood and fruit used.
• Sag (Tectona grandis): leaves used to line thatched roof; also used
in rituals, especially death ceremonies; leaves used to make storage
containers for preserved vegetables; leaves made into plates and
bowls; timber excellent for house-building and furniture; timber also
yields oil;
• Temru (Diospyros melanoxy/on): edible fruit; leaves made into bidis.

8. In fact, the issues were of simple common-sense type. When a plot of

land becomes an island in the middle of the reservoir, there is no way
people can cultivate that land. The government argued that legally, on-
ly land that would be submerged was eligible for acquisition and com-
pensation. Similar arguments were extended to land expropriated by
the government for houses, offices and canals.

9. According to the LAA, the compensation should be paid within one

year of the issuance of notice under Section 6.1. Delays beyond that
are to be compensated by l 0 per cent interest annually on the compen-
sation money. In other affected villages in Akkalkuwa tehsil, which
received Section 6.1 notices along with Manibeli, compensation mon-
ey was not paid for over eight years because of the agitation against
the dam.

10. Government of Maharashtra records at Dhulia and Akkalkuwa and

Government of Gujarat records at Baroda are the sources of data on
the basis of which these figures have been computed.

11. The NWDT Award stipulated that the Maharashtraoustees have the lib-
erty to resettle in either Maharashtra or Gujarat, assuming that R&R
provisions were the same in both the states. However, the Maharashtra
R&R provision of June 1992 awarded the major sons of landed people,
landless people and encroachers alike one acre of land, if available.
GOM has modified the act to provide this category of people with one
hectare of land. After 1988, the Gujarat provisions were far superior,
providing two hectares of land to landed people, landless people, en-
croachers and the major sons of families in all these categories.

12. Narmada Dhamagrastha Samiti (Committee of Narmada Dam affected

people), initiated by Ms Medha Patkar, started working for better re-
 Notes 275

habilitation of the oustees in 1985. However, in 1988 it concluded that

given the magnitude of displacement and the lack of capacity and will-
ingness on the part of the government, proper resettlement was not
possible. At that point the organization's name was changed to Narma-
da Bachav Andolan, and a movement aiming to stop the construction
of the dam was founded. In recognition of their work, the Andolan and
Medha Patkar were awarded the 'Right to Livelihood Award' in 1991.

13. One of the objectives of resettlement and rehabilitation as agreed be-

tween the government and the World Bank was that people should be
resettled as viable social groups, so that they would be able to re-
establish community life as soon as possible. Manibeli people contend-
ed that all four hamlets together represented a viable social unit.

14. According to the stipulations concerning tapu land, encroached land,

land for landless people, and the 1 January 1980 cut-off date for desig-
nating major sons (in the early 1980s), all Manibeli PAPs and a few
PAPs from Dhankhedi village could easily have been resettled in Par-
veta. However, policy changes on all these aspects increased the num-
ber of eligible PAPs, who could not be accommodated in Parveta.
Such PAPs were given land in four new areas about l 0-15 kilometres
from Parveta.

15. People can only be moved to resettlement sites between December and
June. Between July and September, the river and the nal/as become
flooded, and the roads are completely washed away by the monsoon.
From October to December, only jeeps and four-wheel drive trucks
can traverse the road along the riverbed, a mud path levelled exclu-
sively for use by government officials. No attempt was ever made to
provide the area with public transport.

16. The construction of the infrastructure at the resettlement colony was

the responsibility of the Civil Engineering Department also responsible
for construction of the dam, whereas moving people was the responsi-
bility of the government Relief and Rehabilitation Department. Both
agencies worked according to their own schedules, so that people were
moved even before basic facilities were operational. There was no cer-
tainty that the facilities would ever be made available.

17. The cost of clearing the land ranged from Rs 750-2,500 per hectare,
depending on the quality of the land.
276 Notes

18. Although Gujarat state has enacted and implemented strict prohibition
laws, illicit liquor brewing remains a serious problem throughout the
state. The tribal people of Maharashtra are used to brewing Mahua li-
quor for their own consumption. Due to the presence of police and
government officials, Parveta people have been abstaining from liquor.
Once the officials leave, things may change.

19. According to the R&R stipulations, the government is to resettle SSP

oustees in the areas to benefit from the project. Parveta is in the com-
mand area of the SSP. Parveta will receive canal water by 1997. In the
meantime irrigation through tule-wells is being tried.

20. The viability of Parveta as an independent panchayat is dubious, due

to the small size of its population, thus R&R authorities are not unwill-
ing to combine Parveta with the existing panchayat in Kalediya.

21. Even if community toilets were constructed, it is not certain that they
would be used at all, as the people were accustomed to defecating in
the open in Manibeli.

Chapter 10
I. According to Section 45 of the 1894 LAA and the 1984 Amendment
Act if an eviction and compensation notice is served on a woman, it
is not legal. It is strange to find so outdated a clause in the laws of a
country whose constitution prohibits sexual discrimination by the state
(MARG 1990). The government was urged to remove this clause from
the LAA when it was amended in 1984, but to no avail.

2. Activists working with the PAPs are young women who either oppose
the project or demand better R&R provisions. Their demands incorpor-
ate women's needs and interests such as special training and income-
generating measures. However they take care not to antagonize men
and thus they play down women-related aspects.

3. It is difficult to buy land in the command area, as most of the villages

around the resettled villages have received canal irrigation. Irrigation
has increased the income-generating potential of the land to such an
extent that few owners are willing to sell their land, and prices have
increased.
 Notes 277

Chapter 11
I. The Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), as an independent agen-
cy, has monitored and evaluated the resettlement and rehabilitation
process since 1987. All events and activities by the affected people,
activists and organizations, state and central governments, the Nannada
Control Authority and the World Bank were monitored and recorded
by TISS.

2. In recent years the World Bank has altered its policy. It no longer
insists that the amount allotted to R&R and environmental measures
should not exceed 5 per cent of the total project cost. It is also pos-
sible now to incorporate money required for R&R measures into the
loan requested.

3. In early 1992, to educate people in Maharashtra about the project and

to steer them away from the activists, the top policy-makers at the
NCA level decided to implement the following strategies: press releas-
es and press conferences, press tours, pamphlets and brochures describ-
ing the benefits to be expected. Theatre troupes perfonned in various
project-affected villages, and exhibitions were put up highlighting the
benefits of the project. Messages pertaining to the dam were also to be
broadcast on radio (NCA 1992: 3-6). The target group was the tribals
in inaccessible villages where the highest education ever achieved by
any person was third standard. A few children who had attended an
ashram school reached 3rd standard in 1992. No adult members in the
villages can read. None of the infonnation - providing strategies
would have worked among the tribal people in Nannada valley. None
of the strategies were implemented by the government.

4. Absentee landlords sold land to the government at very high prices.

This created problems for tenants - landless and marginal fanners -
who were cultivating land.

5. At one stage, in 1989, it looked as if the people and the activists

would be motivated to accept the resettlement option of suitable forest
land. According to the 1980 Indian Forest Act, the GOI cannot release
forest land for resettlement purposes. However, ignoring the Act, the
GOI signed an SSP loan contract with the World Bank, which includ-
ed a clause stating 'forest land will be made available for resettlement,
if no other suitable land is available' (Morse & Berger 1992).
278 Notes

6. They were: Narmada Lok Sangharsh and Sahakar Samiti, initiated by

Shri. Harivallabhbhai Patel, as part of his Rangpur Ashram activities;
Narmada Sahakar Sangh, initiated by Urmilaben Patel, wife of the
Chief Minister ofMaharashtra. These two organizations, together with
Arch-Vahini, are engaged in the delivery of R&R provisions, motivat-
ing people to move, and disseminating information.

7. The Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Mr Sharad Pawar, made the an-

nouncement in one of the meetings with the activists. No written evid-
ence of the statement exists.

8. In early 1992, the Narmada Control Authority classified access of gov-

ernment personnel to villages as follows:
• Gujarat: no resistance, free access to all work;
• Maharashtra: no access to all 33 villages;
• Madhya Pradesh: 34 villages hard core resistance, no access; 99 vil-
lages moderate resistance, but access difficult; 60 villages no resis-
tance (NCA 1992).

9. The Ramon Magsaysay and The Right to Livelihood Awards.

10. The GOMP in all certainty will not be able to resettle its displaced
people with the R&R provisions of its policy. Since 1987, the GOMP
has not even completed enumeration of PAPs, and no move has been
made to locate land within the state (HSGU 1992, NCA 1992). On the
other hand, Maharashtra has 4200 hectares of forest land, while it re-
quires over 6,000 hectares of agricultural land (TISS 1992). Thus most
of the displaced from Madhya Pradesh and about 35 per cent of the dis-
placed from Maharashtra will have no alternative except to move to
Gujarat.

Chapter 12
1. Although the private sector played an important role in the displace-
ment of people and the alienation of their land and livelihood, state-
sponsored projects accounted for much of the displacement. Defence
projects and nuclear installations also displaced a large number of peo-
ple, but could not be examined for this study due to lack of access to
data.
 Notes 279

2. Even in the high profile and 'well-planned' R&R process in the SSP,
at least 15 per cent of the resettled families will face a second disloca-
tion.
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Index

Adams, W.M. 151 Berger, K.R. 13-14,49, 180,235,246,

Agri caste 123-4, 125, 127, 129,216, 250,277n
259,260 Beteille, A. 215
Akkalkuwa 183-4, 187, 189,201,241, bhagat 148, 201
274n Bhanot, R. 51
Akrani 184,241 Bharat Jan Andolan 268n
Alibag 124 Bhilai Steel Plant 54, 107
Alirajpur 241 Bhilala 273n
Alloy Steel Plant (ASP) 110, 112, bhillori 184, 206, 237
116 Bhils 273n
Almati Dam 10, II, 55, 167, 169 bhindi 185, 199
ambadi 185, 199 BHPE-KINHILL Joint Venture 107,
amber chakra 224 110, 144, 145, 270n
Amin, A. 232 Bhuias 133, 136
Amte, Baba 241, 244 bighas 61
Anandwan Ashram 242, 244 Bihar 54,110, Ill, 132,133,149
Andhra Pradesh 90, 176 Bijapur 167-8, 173
Arch-Vahini 235,237,241, 278n Birlas 136, 138
Areeparampi1, M. 147, 148 BJP 27ln
Assam 88 Bokaro Steel Plant 54, I 07
Bolani 132-50, 270n
Bagchi, A.K. 37 Bolani Iron Ore Mines (BIOM) 60, 106
Bailadilla mines 145 compensation money 94-5, 98,
Balagoda 133-9, 144, 146, 150 135-7
Bangalore 175 displacement II, 54, 70, 132-3,
Barbil 147 255
Bardham, P.K. 215 employment 137-44, 148-50
Baroda 186, 195, 274n environmental impact 144-8
Baruch 186 impact on women 138, 143, 149,
Baxi, U. 43, 48, 230 218-19, 226-8
Belapur 126 R. & R. policy/provisions 55
benami land 121, 269n socioeconomic conditions in the
Bengal Code 41 original villages 133-44

292
 Index 293

Bombay 54, I 18-22. I24, 128, 152, Dhom dam 10, 55, 152-6, 163, 270n
I56, 161, 162, I63, 164, 173, Dhulia district 183-4, I 89, 240, 27 In,
I75,22I,222,227,272n 274n
Bombay Harbour 54, I 20 displaced persons
Brahman caste 123, 125, 259 caste 54, 62, 123, 127, I 77-8,
Buddhism 164 259-62,264
Burdwan 107, 108, 114 category 48-9
Bureau of Public Enterprises 256 employment opportunity of 55,
88, 102-3, 110, I26, 127,
canal affected village 154, 167, 247 255-6,259-61
Cernea, M.M. 6, 18, 21, 40, 44, 47,230 encroachers 52-3, 115, I81-3,
Chambers, R. 40 223,234,254,269n,273n,
Champua 133-40, 144. 150 275n
Chandrasekher, C.P. 214 mobilisation I21-3, I65, 192-3,
Charla mines 145 237-8
Chatterji, S. 43, 48, 51, 81, 82, 256 number 49-52
Chaulkalsi caste 124 religion 264
Chitale, M. 230 standardofliving 101,266
Chotangpar region 132 displacement from
CIDCO (City and Industrial common property resources 127,
Development Corporation) 128-9,260---1
121-3, 128 forest I 02, 132-8, 180, 226, 261,
Coal India Ltd. (CIL) 82, 89, 91-2, 101 267n
collector 63, 64-5, 130---1, 240, 271 n land 170---7, 226, 26 I
colonialism 36-41 salt pan 91. 98, 119. 121. 123.
Communist Parties of India Marxists 125, 127,226,260.26I
61, 110, 112-13,263, 269n sea 91, I 24, 125, 127, 223, 226,
Congress Party 121, 162, 271n 260,261
Crook, N. 115 Diwan,S. 236
CSS (Centre for Social Studies) 230, Dogra, B. 50
234,241,249 Draft National R. & R. Policy 81-2,
101-3,268n
dais 238 Durgapur99, 110-11,114-15,117,
Dalits 10,36-7,65, 91, 97, Ill, 116, 215,217-18,227.259,262,
136, 14I, 144, I52, I59-60, I70, 269n
I73 Durgapur Steel Plant (DSP)
see also impact of displacement compensation money 92-6,
on 98-9,112
Das, Bipin 17, I 84 displacement I 0, 70, 98, 255,
denotified tribes 97, 258 263
Devalle, S.B.C. 17, 37 focus groups 75, 108-9
Dhagamawar, V. 6, 41 household survey 72-3
Dhankkedi 275n impact on women 215-I7, 227,
Dharwad 223 262
294 Index

Durgapur Steel Plant - continued Gulbarga 167-8, 173, 223

R. & R. policy 97, 109-14, Gunder, Frank A. 37
116-17
squatter settlements 114-15, Habib, I. 36
117 hadia 142-3
Dyson, T. 212 Hamara gaon hamara raj 244
Handsa, Subotu 50
East India Company 41 Hanuman, Koliwada 126
Employment Guarantee Scheme 125, Haryana 90
186,193,251 health care services II 0, Ill, 115, 122,
Fernandes, VV. 6, 9, 17,43,47,48,49, 131, 142, 161, 192,200-1,213,
50, 51, 81, 82, 84, 88, 132, 133, 222-3,225,226,233,238,241
212,214,230,232,255-6, Himachel Pradesh 90
268n Hindu caste hierarchy 124, 152
fodder 75, 199, 203, 212, 225 Hindus 10, 91, 139, 150, 154,206,
food insecurity 18, 44 225-6
Forest Protection Act (1980) 92, 271 n Hirakud dam 49
fuel75, 142, 143, 146,203,212,219 host community 59, 68, 80
fully affected village 92-8, I 08-11, host village 67, 74, 155-61, 27ln,
116, 121, 167-8,227 272n
house, compensation for 63, 78, 84-5,
Gadgil, M. 38, 41 89,94-5,102,122,188-9
Gamit 273n HSGU (Hari Singh Gour University)
ghar-jawais 184, 192,215 278n
Goa 173, 175, 222, 227
gobar gas 203, 225 lOBI 272n
gorakhpuri 270n impact of displacement on
Goval caste 136 Dalits 36-7,50-1,61-2,75,91,96,
Government of India (GOI) 15, 16, 54, 98, 117, 159-60,163-4,173-7,
91-2, 124, 147-8,232,233,236, 211,251,258,259,262,265
241,243-52,255-6, 273n,277n tribals 49,50-1,61-2,75. 117,211.
Government Resolutions (GRs) 168 251,258,259-65
Greater Bombay 119-22 women 50-1,61-2,75-6,91, 117,
Municipal Corporation of 120 175-6, 177-8,211-28,251,
Gua Mines 145 258,261-3,266, 276n
Guha, R. 38, 41 impoverishment 17-18, 44-6
Gujarat 55, 179-82, 188-9, 192-3, incremental approach 65, 229-31
206,232-3,276n Indian Forest Acts 41, 236, 277n
Government of 15, 180-2, 188, indigenous people see tribals
193-4,203,204-5,233-5, Indira Yawas Yojana 97
239-48,274n, 278n Indravathi River 35
R. & R. policy/provisions in infrastructure affected village 161-2
22,90, 182,190,229, Integrated Rural Development
233-52,253,274n,278n Programme (IRDP) 97
 Index 295

involuntary resettlement 2-4, 7, 24 Krishna River 10, 35, 55, 152

Krueger, Richard A. 62
Jal Samadhi 244-5 Kudamodupada 183-7, 192,203-4
Jalgar caste 97, 170, 173-4, 175, 176, Kurburs 97, 170, I 74, 175, 176, 177
260 Kuver 183
Jarmin Bachao Samiti (Save the Land
Committee) 123 land
Jawahar Rojgar Yojana (JPY) 162-3, acquisition of 41-4, 108-9, 121-8,
251 135-7
Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP) 58, 60, choice of 189-91, 199-200
106, 118-22 purchase of 95-6, 98-9, 112
compensation money 92-6, 127 requirement and availability 44
consequences of development land acquisition
123-8 Officer (LAO) 60, 62-3, 65, 69, 71
displacement I 0, 54, 98, 119, 255, preliminary notification 82
259 section 4 notification 82, 84, 123,
household survey 12 168,188,236
impact on women 216-18, 226-8 section 6 notification 82-4, 123,
R. & R. policy/provisions 70, 188,269n,274 n
122-3, 128-31 Land Acquisition Act (LAA 1894)
Joshi, P.C. 6 20-3,38,41-4 ,52,62,65-6,
jowar 134, 185, 194, 196, 197, 199 82-9,91,102, 122,234,248,
251,256,260, 266,267n,274 n,
Kabeer, N. 212 276n
Kalediya 193-5, 202-3. 276n Land Acquisition Modified Act (1984)
Kalinga Iron Works (KIW) 137, 138, 84-5,86,250, 267n,276n
143 Land Ceiling Act 92, 156, 162, 171,
Karadis 123, 124, 125, 127, 129 178, 181,248,250, 269n
Kamataka 10-11, 167, 170, 173, 175, land, compensation for 42-3, 78, 83-5,
176,222-3,26 0 89-90,93-4,1 22,129-30,
Government of 168, 171-2, 175, 136-8, 181, 188-9
177-8,223 Land Reform Act 92, 250
R. & R. policy/provisions 22, landlessness 44-6, 48, 50, 52, 59, 60,
89-90,272n 61, 65, 90,97-100, 102, 107,
Karo River 134, 144, 145,219 I 12-13, I 17, 125, 153-4, 156,
Kashmir 88 151, 158-60, 164-5, 169, 110-1,
Khadi and Village Industries 173, 175, 178, 182-3, 190,211,
Commission (KVIC) 224 254,259,263
Kolaba 124 Lingayats 110, 174, 175, 177
Koli caste 123, 124, 125, 127, 129, Lok Sabha 81
216,260
Konkan District 163, 175 Mabalipatta Declaration 268n
Kothari, A. 18, 232 Madhya Pradesh 11,55, 132,145,179,
Kothari, S. 6, 23, 43, 81,82 180-1,232,23 6,268n
296 Index

Madhya Pradesh - continued Margya 183

Government of (GOMP) 15, 81, Mathew, Kalathil 244
234-5,239,242-8 McCully, P. 180
R. & R. policy/provisions 22, Mehta, S.S. 84, 179, 180, 272n
89-90,183,229,233,237-52, Mehwasi Territories 232
278n Minhas, B.S. 214
Madras 37 Ministry of Environment 236
Mahapatra, L.K. 17, 50 Ministry of Rural Development and
Maharashtra 55, 71, 119, 122-3, 152, Water Resources 82, 180,
159, 163-4, 175, 179, 180-2, 268n
184, 189,260, 268n, 276n Ministry of Welfare 82
Government of 81, 88-9, 90, 91-2, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)
118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 66-8,238,249, 268n
129-31, 153, 162-3, 187, 188, Moore, Mick 212
204,234-5,239-40,242-8, morchas 189
253,274n Morse, B. 13, 14, 49, 180, 235, 246,
R.&R. ploicy/provisions in 88--9, 250,277n
90, 182-3, 193, 229, 232-52, Mukherji, S. 173
253-4,274n, 278n Mukta, P. 242
Maharashtra Irrigation II Project (Mil) Mulgi 187, 189
10,54,58-9,60, 70,106,152-4 Mundas 133, 136, 150
compensation money 93-6, 98, 155 Municipal Corporation of Greater
economic conditions after resettle Bombay 120
ment 156-64 Muslims 170, 175, 176, 223
household survey 73-4
impact on women 220-2, 227, 262 Nagpar 119
R. & R. policy/provisions 154-6, Naik 273n
164-6, 259-60,270-Jn na/las 145, 202, 275n
Mahato caste 136 Narayanpur Dam 18, 55, 167-8
malum 85, 134, 219, 276n, Narmada Asargrasta Samiti 237
major daughters 183 Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) 179,
major sons 181, 182, 183, 190, 205, 239,241,250,275n
223,234, 247,254,274n,275n Narmada Central Authority 179, 180,
Majumdar, M. 214 249,253,277n, 278n
Mali caste 15 2 Narmada Dhramagrastha Samiti 192,
mango 85, 273n 237,274-5n
Manibeli 71, 180-1, 183-209,223-6, Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti 237
244-5,274n,275n,276n Narmada Lok Sangharsh 278n
Maratha caste 123, 124, 125, 127, 152, Narmada Movement 81-2, 180-1,
153, 159-60, 162, 163, 165,220, 229-52,263
259-60 Narmada River II, 13, 55, 179, 181,
M.A.R.G. 83, 85, 237, 276n 192,202,242-4,250,264
marginalization 44-6, 51, 98, 172-3, Narmada Sagar 18 I
218,249,251,261-3 Narmada Sahakar Saugh 278n
 Index 297

Narmada Valley Irrigation and Power pari pasu 229

Project 35, 55, 93, 211-12 partially affected village 59, 72-4, 89,
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal 98-100, 108, II 1-14, I 16-17,
(NWDT Award) 181-2, 188, 131, 154, 155, 168, 170, 174,
233-5, 239-41,243,250,273n, 176-7,2I8,227,262
274n Parveta I 80--1, 188, 189-207, 223-6,
Naswadi 203 252,275-6n
National Alliance for People's Patilpada 183-7, I92-3, 203-4
Movement 268n patil's clique 191-2
National Sample Survey Organisation Patridge, W. 167, I 72, 230, 231
(NSSO) 159 Patel, Ani! 16
National Thermal Power Corporation Patel, J. 240, 250, 272n
(NTPC) 20, 82, 89, 91-2, 101-3, Patel, Shri Harivallabhb Lai 278n
268n Patel, Urmilaben 278n
New Bombay 119-31, 175, 216, 257 Patkar, Medha 235, 237, 244, 268n,
New Delhi 211, 243 274--5n
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharla1109, 187 Paura 273n
NGOs 9, II, 13, 15-17, 19, 20, III, Pawar, Sharad 278n
241,245,246-7, 268n Peasants and Workers Party (PWP)
NICMAR 234, 272n 121
Nimad 241 Pen 124
Noble, M.L. 236 Perera, M. 214
nomadic communities 36, 37, 258, 265 PHC sub centres 161, 20 I
nomadic tribes 97, 223 physical environment 40- I, 91,
144-8
Orissa II, 22, 54, II I, 132-3, I 35, Planning Commission 231, 233, 236
140, 144, 149,218,260 Pong Irrigation Project dam 5 I -2
Oxfam 51 Poona 175
port affected village 121-31
PAC (Public Accounts Committee) 151 Prakasam, C.P.S. 173
Packalsi caste 124 project affected households 51-2, 55,
Padma Bhusan 244 57-74, I 10-14, 128-30, 135-40,
Padma Vibhusan 244 152-64
Padvi 273n project affected persons (PAPs) 13,
panchayat 69, 135, 162-3, 187,201, 51-2,59-61,68,80, 82,83,90,
276n 93-5, I 01-3, 122, 127-8,
Panvel 54, 124, 125,216 153-64, 168, 177, 182-3, 188,
Paranjpye, V. 250 190-1,211,230,231,233,235,
Parasuraman, S. 48, 58, 60, 82, 83, 85, 238, 245,247,256,268n,271n.
93, 96, I 15, 123, 128, 136, 139, 275n,278n
144, 153. 160, 163, 168, 169, project affected village I I0, I 14, 124,
171, 184, 192,214,215,216, 126
223,230,231,232,251,252, Pune 156
269n, 273n Punjab 88, 90
298 Index

R. & R. policy provisions see specific Sankhani River 145

cases Sardar Sarovar dam 55, 179, 183
Raichur 167-8, 173, 223 Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam
Raigad 119 179-80
Raj, A. 49, 50, 86, 232, 268n Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) 11, 54-6,
Rajasthan 90 58-60,64,71, 106,267-Sn
Rajpipla Social Service Society compensation money 93-5, 182-3,
(RSSS) 235 189,269n
Ramanathan, U. 6, 23, 42, 43, 44, 83, impact on women 223-8, 262
84,267n monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
Ramon Megassay Award 278n 66-8
Rao, Nandini 17, 184-5, 273n R. & R. policy 81-2,90,91, 182-3,
Rathwa 273n 187-93,197,204-7,226,229-52
Ratnagiri 175, 222 resistance to 12-17, 19,81-2,
Reddy, I.V.B. 89, 184 179-82,192-3,232-52
Rehabilitation Officer (RO) 60, 63, 65 socioeconomic conditions in
reservoir affected village 73-4, Manibeli 183-7
152-64, 167-70, 179-93 socioeconomic conditions in Parveta
Resettlement and Rehabilitation 193-204
Policies 21-2,55-6,59-66, Sarpanchpada 183-7, 192, 203-4
79-80,85-7,265-6 Satara 152-3, 155, 163, 164, 220, 227
constraints and contradictions 91-2 Satara Zilla Parishad 162
in industrial projects 87-9 Satpuda Mountain 71,207,232
in irrigation projects 89-91 SC&ST Commission 37, 41, 52, 83,
incremental approach 229-32 236
monitoring and evaluation strategy scheduled castes see Dalits
66-8 Schenk-Sandberger, L. 211, 214
success of 257-8 Scudder, T.6,230,234-5,246
see also specific places; schemes Sen, A.K. 40
resettled village 59, 72-4, 131, 156, Sen, J. 48
157-63, 168-73, 175-6,221, Sengupta, Chandan 58, 123, 128, 163,
251,271n,272n 184,216,269n
see also Parveta Sharma, B.D. 268n
rickshaw pullers 75, 109, I 10 Sharma, R.N. 121
rim village 74, !56, 157-61,221 Shiv Sena 163
Right to Livelihood Award 275n, 278n Singh, A. 48
Rourkela Steel Plant 54, 107 Singh, M. 267n
Rosencranz, A. 236 Singh, M.A. 44
Roy, B. 89 Singh, S. 51, 232
Roy, S.C. 36 Singrauli 11
Sitaraman, S.P. 84, 179, 180, 272n
Sachchidananda, S. 42, 133, 134, 135, Sivaraju, S. 184
148 social environment 117
Sahakar Samiti 278n Sons of Soil Policy 163
 Index 299

Srivastava, V.K. 84, 179, 180, 272n Upper Kolab mutipurpose dam 49
Standing, H. 213 Upper Krishna Project (UKP) 10, 54,
Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) 58-60,70, 106,27ln
54, 107, 110, 133, 137-9, 143, compensation money 93-6, 99,
145, 147, 270n 169
subsistence agriculturists 149 household survey 73-4
Sujadra 194 impact on women 222-3, 226-8,
Surat 186 262
Surpaneshwar Temple 192 R. & R. policy/provisions 167-72,
Sutar caste 152 177-8,231
social and economic consequences
Tadvis 183-6, 189, 191-2, 199,225-6, of displacement 55, 170--7
273n Uran Tahsil 123, 124, 125
Talati 268n Uttar Pradesh 133, 144, 270n
Taloda 184, 186
Taloda Forest Land I 80 Vadgaon 187, 192
tapu village 182, 188, 190, 233-4, 239, Vagaya 195
275n Vavipada 183-7, 192-3,203-4,207
Tehri dam I I, 35 Vasavas 184-6, 189, 191-2,206
Thane 54, 119, 124 Verma, H.S. 119, 120, 121, 122, 129
Thane and Bassein Creeks 120 Viegas,P. 49,149,214,230
Thukral, Ganguly 6, 47, 50, 82, 89, Visaria, P. 214
212,230,268n voters list 66, 69,70, 72
TJSS (Tata Institute of Social Studies)
49, 58, 180, 184, 186, 212, 232, welL compensation for 63
237,239,243,245,248, 268n, West Bengal 54, 107, 108, Ill, 114,
270n,277n 116, 117, 132, 140,215,263,
TOI (Times of India) 148 269n
Toppo, E. 135 WorldBank9,11,13-1 7,20,21,40,
trees, compensation for 63, 78, 85, 47,53,57,65,66,68, 172,211,
188-9 231,234-5,236,243-9, 268n,
tribals 10, 85, 89, 91, 117, 132, 148, 271n, 275n,277n
149-50,
tuar 196, 203 zamindars 37