"| SUDTON POCKET HISTORIES | PRISCILLA ROBERTSSUTTON POCKET POCKET HISTORIES THE COLD WAR PRISCILLA ROBERTS SUTTON PUBLISHING A OF py, x ay, & z = a * * ae ® “anneb2HSOIS 16 DEC 2002 For my parents The two bravest people I know First published in the United Ki Sutton Publishing Limited - Thrupp « Stroud - Glouce ingdom in 2000 by Phoenix Mill shire - GL5 2BU Copyright © Priscilla Roberts, 2000 All rights reserved. N reproduced, stored j form or by © part of this publication may be na retrieval ‘stem, or transmitted, in any any means, electronic, me: recording or otherwise, without the publisher and copy, chanical, photocopying, prior permission of the right holder, Priscilla Roberts has a sserted the mor the al right to be identified as author of this work. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is avail lable from the British Library, ISBN 0-7509-2437-3 Cover picture: Military Parade on Red Square, Moscow, 1 May 1968 (N. Sitnikov/1 ASS, courtesy Jonathan Falconer) Typeset in 11/14 pt Baskerville, Typesetting and o Sutton Publishing Printed and boun, J-H. Haynes & Co, rigination by Limited. din England by - Ltd, Sparkford, Contents List of Dates Map | Postwar allianc Map 2 Postwar alliance Africa Introduction The European Dime Korea to Vien: The Quest for Superpower U nderstanding, 1974 the Far East “urope, North the Middle East hsion, 1945-1959 am, 195 Resurgence to E Conclusion Further Reading Index nding, 1973-199] 46 71 95 100 104November 1917 July 1918 November 1918 April 1920 April 1933 : November 1933 August 1939 September 1939 May 1940 June 1941 August 1941 December 1941 November 1943 ’ June 1944 August-October 1944. February 1945 April 1945 May 1945 June 1945, July-August 1945 August 1945 February 1946 List of Dates Successful Bolshevik revolution in ‘Ts Allied intery ist Russia ntion in Russi States participates First World War ends in in Which United armistice aws last troops from Russia nklin D. Roosevelt becomes US president United States recognizes Soviet Union et Non-Aggression Pact rmany and $ and Fi viet Union invade Poland; Britain ice declare war on Germany Germany invades Soviet Union Atlantic Charter Japan attacks P Japan declare w: ‘arl Harbor, and Ger ‘ar on United States Teheran conference D-Day: Wai many and Anglo-American inva asion of Europe UW uprising Yalta conference Death of Fi Ath of Franklin D, Roosevelt; successor as US President Harry . Truman Surrender of Germany San Fra 1 sn Francisco conference approves United Nations Charter Potsdam conference Atomic nic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and sakis Japan sure! ; Pan surrenders; Ho Chi Minh declares namese independence George * Kennan sends Long Telegram iv ee LIST OF DA March 1946 March 1947 June 1947 July 1947 September 1947 October 1947 February 1948 March 1948 April 1948 May 1948 June 1948 April 1949 May 1949 August 1949 September 1949 October 1949 January 1950 April 1950 June 1950 November 1950 April 1951 September 1951 January 1 March 19: June 1953 Churchill's Iron Curtain spy zes Soviet behaviour towards United States eri withdraw forces from Iran Iran and Truman Doctrine speech Treaty of Dunkirk between Britain and F Announcement of Marshall Plan: t of Soviet Conduct Kennan article, ource Rio Treaty to defend Western Hemisphere Cominform established Communist coup i hoslovakia Brussels security pact of five West European powers Organization of American States established ion of Isracl; immediately recognized by Soviet Union and United States Berlin blockade begins North Adiantic Treaty Berlin blockade ends y signed Soviet Union tests atomic bomb Federal Republic of Germany established , led by Mao Zedong, ina on Chinese Chinese Communist P: s People’s Republic of procla mainland -aty of Alliance and Friendship utor Joseph R. McCarthy makes Wheeling, ng of McC Virgit rthyism YSC 68 recommends massive American 4, speech, begins rearmament North Korea invades South Korea; United States successfully urges United Nations intervention Chinese intervention in Korean War Formation of European Coal and Swel Community gnature of Japanese-American peace treaty and S Pact security treaty and AD Dwight D. F Death of Stalin nhower becomes US president Panmunjom armistice agreement effectively ends vya August 1953 September 1953 December 1953 March 1954 May 1954 June 1954 July 1954 September 1954 December 1954 January-April 1955, April 1955 May 1955 June 1955, July 1955 November 1955 February 1956 October 1955 November 1956 January 1957 March 1957 LIST OF DATES United States concludes security tre; with South Korea Workers uprising in assistance st Berlin crushed with Soviet ClA-backed coup overthrows Mohammed Mossadeq’s government in Iran and restores Shah Reza Mohammed Pahlavi II to power Nikita Khrushchev becomes general secretary of Soviet Communist Party Eisenhow 1's ‘Atoms fe Successful United S\ Vietminh de! * proposal s testing of hy at French army at Dienbienphu; French decide to leave Indochina Successful ClA-backed coup government Geneva Jrogen bomb against Guatemalan accords end First Indochina War, ea ‘Moning Vietnam into North and South Wan security treaty First Quet rst Quemoy-Matsu (Qinmen-Mazul ‘Taiwan straits crisis Bandung conference West Germany j Soviet Union es Creation of Bag of neutral nations bins NATO ‘ablishes Warsaw Pact d hdad Pact, later CENTO enhower makes + Ski Comes not M#kes ‘Open Skies’ proposal at eva summit conference Successful Sovie Khrushchey Party's wentieth congress Soviet Uni Uni . on crushes Hungarian uprising testing of large hydrogen bomb der es Stali Sui nounces Stalin at Soviet Communist Announc cement of Fi oa ree Eisenhower Doctrine for Middle October 1957 February-June 1958 July 1958 August 1958 November 1958 January 1959 May 1960 January 1961 April 1961 May 1961 June 1961 August 1961 October 1961 October 1962 May 1963 August 1963 November 1963 August 1964 October 1964 February 1965 March 1965 April 1965 November 1965 June 1967 LIST OF DATES Soviet Union launch 2s Sputnik ‘cond Indochina War Beginning of isted military rebellion in Indonesia United States intervention in Lebanon Second Quemoy-Matsu [Qinmen-Mazu] Taiwan straits crisis Khrushchev begins Berlin crisis Fidel U-2 incident; Paris summit meeting collapses tro wins power in Cuba John F, Kennedy becomes US president Bay of Pigs landing Kennedy ends special forces to Vietnam Kennedy-Khrushchey summit meeting at Vienna Construction of Berlin Wall Announcement of Alliance for Progress Sino-Soviet split made public Cuban missile crisis Sino-Ind Organization of African Unity established Nuclear Test Ban Tr Kennedy assassinated; Lyndon B. Johnson becomes war ty signed US president Ton! in handling Vietnam cri Leonid Brezhnev replaces disgraced Khrushche Gulf Resolution gives Johnson wide latitude is Soviet Communist Party’s general secretary Heavy United States bombing of North Vietnam begins First American combat troops dispatched to United States military intervention in Dominican Republic Beginning of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China Six-Day War in Middle East viiJanuary 1968 March 1968 August 1968 January 1969 March 1969 July 1969 October 1969 November 1969 August 1970 July 1971 September 1971 October 197] December 197] February 1972 May 1972 December 1972 January 1973 March 1973 September 1973 October 1973 August 1974 September 1974 November 1974 April 1975, Tet offensive in South Vieam Johns n announces United States decision to seck peace in ietnam and withdraw Soviet militar Brezhnev announces Brezhnev Doctrine Richard M. Niy y intervention in Czechoslovakia; on becomes US president Sing Gaver t veer ino-Soviet border clashes on Ussuri River Nixon announces Nixon Doctrine and begins reduction of merican troops in Vietnam Willi Brandt becomes West German chancellor, Pursues Ostpolitit Strategic Arms Limitation talks begin in Helsinki Brandt and Brezhne Treaty of Non Kissinger’ sign Soviet-West German Aggression in Moscow secret visit to Beijing Quadripartite Pact on Be United N China signed AUONS votes to admit People’s Republic of Indo-Pakistani War le Banglade Nixon visits China, meets Mao Zedong Nixon—Brezhnev mee sign the ABM West and East Unite ads to independence for n ng in Moscow, where they SALT many sign Basic Treaty d States, South Viet reach pe: United am and North Vietnam © accord at Par ( tes and PRC agre in each other’s capitals President Salvadoy tnilitary coup to open liaison offices Allende of Chile overthrown by Yom Kippur w; Nixon's re: ‘ d beginning of oil crisis ene signation due to Watergate scandal; ord becomes US president lassie overthrown in Ethiopia ‘rd summit meeting at Viadivostock man takes over South Vietnam viii oe August 1975 November 1975 September 1976 January 1977 July 1977 January 1979 February 1979 June 1979 July 1979 November 1979 December 1979 January 1980 August 1980 January 1981 December 1981 June 1982 November 1982 March 1983 October 1983 February 1984 March 1985 November 1985. October 1986 LIST OF DATES Signature of Helsinki accords Civil war begins Death of Mao % Jimmy Carter becomes US president Angola dong War between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden United States and China re-establish full diplomatic rela tions Overthrow of Shah of Iran nd Carter sign SALTAL Ti eaty at Vienna nistas seize power in Ni ragua Beginning of Iranian hostage crisis {invasion of Afghanistan rter Doctrine to protect Per Announcement of ( an Gulf region Beginning of Polish Solidarity movement Ronald Reagan becomes US president; American ed hostages re aackdown on Martial law declared in Poland; Solidarity Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) begin in Geneva Death of Brezhney; succeeded by Yuri Andropov as Soviet Communi: Party general secretary Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’) Military intervention in Grenada Bomb attack on Beirut barracks of United States on troops Death of Andropoy; succceded by Constantin Chernenko as Soviet Communist Party general secretary ded by Mikh al secretary Death of Chernenke uece il Gorbachev as. Soviet Communist Party gene R Reagan-Gorbachey Rey agan-Gorbachev Geneva summit meeting vik summit meeting ixLIST OF DAT eee November 1986 Exposure of Irar December 1987 _R oororse sontra scandal an—Gorl hey Washington summit meeting: signature of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missile Treaty May-June 1988 Reagan January 1989 February 1989 it to Moscow George Bush becomes US president Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan June 1989 Solidarity wins Polish parliamentary election Ayan ie Student demonstrations in Beijing provoke June Mp SANDS tre a avo in 4th repression REP. OF CHINA PACIFIC August 1989 Non-Communist government assumes power in S ae OCEAN Poland KONG "icone i September 1989 Hungary reopens borders to W st Cree punuppine sea MARIANA November 1989 Opening and overthrow of Berlin Wall SoU co a ISLANDS December 1989 Non-Communist government assumes power in si sea Mes amie Guam ws Crechoslovakia , ek Overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu in Rumania Bush-Gor bachey Gorb; Moscow summit meetin, chev elected president of Se Iraqi invasion of Kuwait East and West Germany reunified November 1990 CSCE conte nce procl January 199] Persian Gulf War begins July 1991 March 1999 August 1990 October 1999 ict Union @ we al a ns Cold War's end INDIAN Dissolution of Warsaw Pact ucean . Bush and Gorbachev sign START Treaty | nets is a ign START-1 Treaty ; ICES: The Far East gust 199] Military coup against Gorbachev foiled by Boris POSTWAR ALLIAN . Yeltsin ! EEE Nations having bilateral treaties with U.S December 1991 CO™PACheY resigns as general secretary FEZ] Members of SEATO T1991 Soviet Union disbands to become Commonwealth of Independent States =|] Communist bloc lliances: the Far East Map 1 Postwar al s ait (From America: A Narrative History by George Browne Copyright © 1984 by W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Used by permission of W.W. eee & Company, Inc.) xi(From Am Map 2 Postw: WY TAO ENS son Gout fen renn op Nez Fspansetsses ananian SFA ETHIOPIA S SOMALIA, ar allian erica: A Narr ‘ces: Europe, North Africa, the Middle East ‘ative Hi Y WW. Norton & Con Story OY George Brown Tindall. Copyright © 1984 Company, Inc. Used by p ermission of W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.) xii Introduction The term Cold War generally refers to the ideological, geopolitical, and economic international rivalry between the United States terized the period from approximately 1945 to 1991. and the Soviet Union that charac- These two states, respectively the world’s leading capital- ist democracy and its most prominent Communist nation, were allies during the Second World War, but within a few years perceived and depicted themselv as locked in desperate competition, a conflict in which each antagonist sought not simply to prevail, but also to win the adherence of as many other countries as possible. ‘ar continues to haunt the The heritage of the Cold V world today, symbolized by the fact that the current international system has as yet acquired no better descriptive label than ‘post-Cold War world order’. | The Cold War began when the successive impact of the First and Second World Wars had destroyed the prevailing international order of the early twentieth century. In 1900 several great European powers, pre- ish empire, Germany, and France, together with Russia and a rising power, Japan, dominated the world. The United States had the economic potential to join this exclusive club but had not yet done so. All the great powers were monarchi eminent among them the Bri ions, which in and most had extensive colonial poss many cases they sought to augment. Western empires &INTRODUCTION a ruled the Middle East, Afr balance of power existed ar By 1945 two major wi sa, and much of Asia. A rough mong them. ee ae ‘ars, conflicts that the American ape e. ‘ ma Acheson among others character- War years ca Be Uropean civil war’ in which the inter- =e constituted only , had altered this ee beyond recognition or possibility of et: ma of the Fir st World War helped to ee ee of totalitarian regimes of left ee a y dedicated to enhancing the lives and : BSet general populace even authoritarian controls over Intellectual matters, [n R S brought the ove: a 1 Creation of the Union, a truc they imposed political, economic, and the First World War rthrow in 1917 of Tsar Nicholas I and the world’s f In Italy in 1923 €xperience an, dislocations co, irst Communist state, the Soviet and Germany in 1933 the war vent economic and political substantially to the emergence Ctively led by Benito Mussolini tated objectives to restore their d conseq ntributed St regimes, respe Hider, their S| international Ste the sun, anding and win them a place in The §, econd World . Ger tid War, in many respe . p 7erman and Italian ae any respects the result of tives orts to , ae accomplish these objec- ean state: Class powers. ¢ Pean states to the rank of second- Ptcy and suffering from ©; While greatly o . ‘ nding of both th © greatly enhancing the Unio © Unite. 5 kas The nited Siital United States and the Soviet es! * = cre . “St economic power = Merged as incomparably the i y he world, its industrial plant xiv RODUCTION and superiority decisively enhanced from serving as the ‘arsenal of democracy’ which provided the matériel for the Allied war effort. Although German in on initially inflicted se economic potential and the sheer size of the Soviet military intimidated its smaller, war-crippled European neighbours. In Asia the war left Japan devastated and ere damage on the Soviet Union, Russian defeated and China gravely weakened and wracked by internal revolt and economic difficulties. colonies forceful nationa s, of varying political complexions, emerged or waxed stronger In most Asian st movemen during the war. These had discredited the European colonial overlords, depriving them of the financial, military, and ideological resources to maintain their grip on their imperial possess mental systems and international alignments generally ons, whose future govern- still remained undetermined. Historians have disagreed, sometimes bitterly, as to whether considerations of ideology, national security, or economic advantage predominated in causing the Cold War; over which nation, the United States or the Soviet Union, bore the greater responsibility for its develop- ment; and on the relative moral merits of the two major protagonists. The Cold War is perhaps best understood as the product of an international power vacuum in both Furope and Asia and of the tensions engendered by the gradual definition, demarcation, and delineation of a new balance of power. Much of the world was in flux as a atly affected by the developing bipolar new system, g Soviet-American antagonism which was both a causeINTRODUCTION pe and, increasingly, a self-ge: y ge nerating consequence of the Cold War, eme in : rged incrementally. place at varying speeds in throughout the Cold War always in p: FeRE fe progress, This process took different regions, and local revisions were nearly In Europe a stable over four decades, Africa, and L modus vivendi, which endured for » quickly emerged. In much of Asia, atin America, by contrast, the situation was far mor i e fl 2 res P a : uid, the result of both the fundamental Security of numerous e degree to which the Se European coloni Cold War quickly isting governments and the cond World War weakened the al empires. As Europe stabilized, the j Y shifted its focus from that continent to : ions, especially Asia spite the emergence group of States, th all international overriding and the Middle East. of a consciously non-aligned n€ WO great powers tended to perceive questions. through the prism of their mutual titi C competition for predominance. This tervene in two major il war which began in civil war which, in varying out the three decades from One Pronour caution, Major powe: Other, Despite , hostility, Union sh that one iced Cold War feature was the relative 8 displaye i mutual in Practice th ared ce peae histor} cers Although d when dealing with each protestations of irreconcilable © United States and the Soviet oMmMon inte n has terme in Korea Tlain ¢ rests, to the extent d the period ‘the long and Vietnam alike both the anh xvi INTRODUC United States and the Soviet Union a ted opposing parties involved in direct hostilities, in neither conflict did either great power ever seriously consider any outright declaration of war against the other. Indeed, in both struggles restricting their intervention so as to preclude such an outcome was a prominent, if tacit, The successive preoccupation of both major powers development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons enabled each big power to inflict near devastation upon its rival, but only at the cost of its own destruction. Consequently, from the mid-1950s onwards the two launched efforts to reach some under- atagonis standing on the use of such weapons. The Cuban mi of 1962, the occ seemed most likely, had a sobering € le cris ion when a nuclear exchange fect on both big powers and, indeed, on the rest of the world. Concurrently, the international scene became more complicated, challenging attempts at bipolar definitions. As defence budgets soared and innovative technology grew ever more expensive, attempts to reduce military spending appeared increasingly attractive. In 1949 the emergence of a Communist regime in China, a country with one-quarter of the world’s population, appeared a major victory for the Soviet camp, one likely to advance the Communist cause throughout Asia. Yet by the late 1950s growing hostility between China and the Soviet Union effectively divided the two major Communist powers, a situation which smaller socialist countries, such s Vietnam, could often manipulate to their own advantage. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United xvii oa iINTRODUCTION al split, -ytraeCommunist SP ite ye intra-Com 4 i eee ‘ clashes in 1969, -der cl jet border ¢ Dea a Soviet Union and » governt States successfully loody Sino=' symbolized by b ; » with both the a i to move towards detent nett People’s Republic of on saders had previously included several me om relaxation of st-Wes albeit limited, > China, whose refusec arms Jimite nsions in rican the American Ic The results ements, the sino-Ame! and a de facto, uropes f jeriod one | a etme 1970: until the mid-IS oe I ie hawt a Jd Wat 9 From the la cond Co ce ates ) the © i i epmed the 'S' nt post . an has ter Fiepatetn I a histor! snsions agai acceleral esse preside re te ted States of a conse a Pat i » United St : jon in the i a Id Reagan, who vowee Ronale agian, Who on ized as the Sovicl = eee « further hé urdening of W nent of hig s endorse! hi * anti- missile Wars anc a mode rate al achey, Mikhail G proble ms, rapi War. first wih two ” in /- ame and waa That 5 jistall- ymittec the soviet twO at Afgha as he P& ver ip 50WE i" 0 tober 990 Oc mo! europe ton ith the Col next tion HW INTRODUCTION es later, in December 1991, the Soviet Union itself dis- solved, to become the short-lived Commonwealth of ee Independent States. As John Lewis Gaddis pointed out in We Now Know (1997), until the 1990s a Cold War historian inescapably wrote from the perspective of one living in the era under discus ion, a viewpoint which tended — and the pervasive memories of which sometimes still tend - to make detached analysis somewhat difficult to attain. Moreover, until Soviet, Eastern European, and even some Chinese ns enjoyed archives began to open in the 1990s, histor’ access — and even that partial — only to Western sources on the Cold War, making any discu: pations, mindset, motivation, and policies of Communist Even now, ion of the preoccu- bloc countri and leaders largely speculativ much material from both sides of the divide remains tory of the Cold War will not closed, and a definitive hi notwith- appear for decades, if ever. Yet, such cay standing, in the year 2000 we can at least begin to escape from the often overly simplistic and even propagandist which marred much writing on the Cold War and look back at the period Richard Crockatt has termed the ‘fifty years’ war’ with a new understanding of the complexities and ambiguities which almost certainly characterized its emergence, development and impact. analys xixjoined Bri ONE The European Dimension, 1945-1950 Historians have argued over almost every aspect of the Cold War, including the precise date it began. Some trace its origins as early as 1918, shortly after Bolshevik revolutionaries led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin established a Communist government in Russia. The United States in, France, and Japan in sending troops to Siberia, forces whose stated objective was merely to keep the tran Siberian railway line open and protect Allied supplies near Vladivostock against German seizure. In practice America’s partners quickly expanded this under- taking, which lasted until spring 1920, into attempts to sia. Until 1933 the United States, unlike other Western powe: overthrow Communist rule in Ru refused to yecognition remained cool throughout the recognize the Soviet government. Even afte Soviet-American relatior 1930s, though d pite the purges which the dictatorial Soviet leader Josef Stalin initiated, many leftist W intellectuals em and romantic idealists believed Soviet Communism offered a political model superior to thatenjoyed by their 0 contrast, feared a considering it the ¢ free enterprise system, rights to ‘life, libe enshrined in the Declaration © eligious to boot. Despite pronour antagonism and pre the two powers, it interests into outright colli bellicose, behaviour ingly restive Germar the with the Fascist pow the United States initially a policies of the Gern by the Septem much of Gzect 1939 to a determ concessions. Stalin, should the German viet Union to adopt dif 7 at Britain, Franc ber 1938 Munich ¢ roslovakia to, Ge ination to rear Reich attack So es. Most Aw wn countri nd deplored Soviet is of th omplete antithe destructive of thos' pursuit of rty, and the f Indepen iced Soviet-American dominantly cool rel major war on. During th to took and territorial dem: ry and Italy le ferent S$ ers. Gre equiiesced in the nan Fuhrer, by contrast, was ja to face Fi ations D ands 0 e, and expansionist mbolized c viet territor ascist nericans, by Communism, ne Americal © individual happiness dence, and ideological erweeD bring their 1930s the fin e ry: powers would leave Rus ded N unassisted. In August 1939 he conclu ed pe East jon Pact with Hitler, which safeguare comp? a j attack In @ German frontier agai recalling the cightee two signatories also that state, whose tern between themselves. inst Soviet ¢ nth-century pal agreed to coll itory separated u The Non-Aggres EUROPEAN DIMENSION, 1945-1950 freed Germany to begin the Second World War, counting the Soviet Union, supposedly a sworn ideological oppon- ent, as a friendly neutral or even a tacit confederate, which until 1941 provided Germany with substantial amounts of war supplies. The wartime alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union was based decidedly on not mutual trust. In June 1941 Hitler, convenienc having subdived most of Western Europe, including a, in the France, the Low Countries, and Scandinav blitzkrieg launched in spring 1940, chose to invade the Soviet Union. Following the time-hallowed principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, Britain and the United States, by this time virtual de facto allies against Hitler even though the Americans had yet to declare war, immediately embraced Stalin as a fellow victim of Hitler Winston Churchill, the dogged British wartime prime minister, characteristically remarked: ‘If Hitler invaded Hell he would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil!’ Russia immediately joined the beneficiaries of the nd-Lease programme, under which the United new L States was already sending war supplies in bulk to other opponents of Hitler and Japan. After the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941, when both Germany and Japan declared war on the United States, the ‘big three’ powers were formally allied against Hitler. Serious strains afflicted their relationship. Although official propaganda portrayed the three allies as sharing common objectives, sedulously glossing over the sub- stantial ideological and practical differences separating eoTHE COLD WAR a ae eae systems, within each country many officials Reta! ar wary of their supposed confréres. nance Mien aioe suspected that Britain and face the oe ht Seniaen peace, abandoning him to Franklin D ce 7 idler un ted. Churchill and were similark - ee t thie wartime Ameri individually, Beer reat that the Soviet Union might Atlantic ora eas at Peace with Germany. In the and Roosevelt me: igned in August 1941, Churchill which included ee their countries to war aims of nations to eeledSeernitce Four Freedoms’, economic, and re’ ‘an president, , the rights — auon and to internal political, Reeser. glous freedom, but Stalin declined selinnepeds Sto endorse these objectives. Initially et Ms o| 7 5 ; Neendift oe a Anglo-American allies would open a Breireon its France in 1942, thus relieving the ie vi is ae © Soviet forces and populace who faced man military Den ce dee Nib F- y unaided. The ; ‘i Mvasion, first to 1943 oe mine decision foideferithis 3 and the \ believe with some sie then to 1944, caused him to ficati at hi 7 © expend Russian |iy ‘ation that his allies had chosen 8 Wves to win the war. Soviet wartime {20 million dead, as well as Property and industrial plant, $1941 to 1944 the Soviet wat absorbed ; at leas - German mili ast three-quarters of the effort of the ilitary machine e effort ol amounted to at leas; enormous devastation to Since over the three yea zone h Wa eloAmetican strate est European invasic,. intaltestiods a to June 1944 carried important ference, held in eee Europe. At the Teheran con- “te 1943, the Allied leaders decided that Sic decisions to postpone the THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION, 1945-1950 a Soviet troops would be left to defeat the German occupy- ing forces — or in Rumania and Hungary, allied forces including which controlled most East European count Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, states which by early 1945 were under de facto Soviet control. As Soviet military conquest reached into Eastern Germany, Stalin considered the extension of Soviet power to Eastern Europe a matter of Soviet national Twice since 1900, in 1914 and 1941, Germany had iropean curit invaded Russia, and between the wars most E: and Balkan states were anti-Soviet in orientation, allied with either France or Germany. By ensuring Soviet domin- ance of Eastern Europe and the Balkans and keeping postwar Germany permanently weak, Stalin was deter- mined to prevent the recurrence of this scenario, plans he had some reason to believe his allies would effectively tolerate. On oceasion in 1943 and 1944 Churchill conveyed to Roosevelt and other Americans his apprehensions that : ended an undependable Soviet Communist when the v regime, quite possibly hostile to the Western powers, would dominate much of Eastern Europe, but Roosevelt generally minimized hi fears, leaving him little alternative but pr gmatically to acquiesce in informal understandings sh power in the Balkans. The demarcating Soviet and Br unofficial ‘percentages agreement’ which Roosevelt and Stalin reached in 1944 placed Greece within the British sphere of influence, Rumania and Bulgaria within the Soviet, and acknowledged both British and Sovict interests in Hungary and Yugoslavia.THE COLD WAR 2 G " ae . ‘ ermany and Poland, the traditional invasion pathway from Germany into Russi = , Were more problematic. Stalin incom, isingly i ; i promisingly intended to retain the Eastern Polish eer he had seized in 1939, compensating Poland by ransferring 3 aoa i her formerly German lands east of the ee cisse line, and to control Poland through the oviet-dominated puppet Lublin installed in January 1945. Moreov sition to Russian dominance, he government which he er, brooking no oppo- . attempted to eliminate otential a i-' vi Pp tial anti-Soviet leaders. As early as 1939 Russian oe ee many thousands of captured Polish a ‘ yn and elsewhere. When Polish 1 ig hters launched an autumn 1944 We assuming that approaching Sovie: assist them, Stalin allow Polish opposition befo: mop up the surviving Ge stance saw uprising, t forces would quickly ed the Germans to destroy the re deploying Russian troops to Rebruary 1045 Sea ermans. At the Yalta conference of alin effectively won British and American acquiescence in his made : dee control of Eastern Europe, but he Poland and oth hold ‘free and unfettered elections’ in Cr states. Within two weeks the Soviets imposed a 5 be ul ernment upon Rumania, 4 subservient goy, evidence of how Jit, Gov: os ow iSh little Weight their pledges carried, although until 1948 Stalin c governments with substanti in Czechoslovakia and Hun, The Allies had jj I rea Saal d little real ‘ontinued to tolerate elected ‘al non-Communist elements gary.” wh leverage over Soviet behaviour sidered vital to Soviet sec se whose control Stalin con- compromise. There j Ccurity and therefore would not 1S some reason to suppose that Stalin mn E Europe, an ar 6 THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION, 1945-1950 ae believed that he and his Western allies, effectively dividing Europe into spheres of influence, had left defeated Italy and liberated France under Anglo-American dominance, free from Soviet interference. In early 1945, moreover, Roosevelt eagerly sought Soviet support for the United Nations and Soviet entry into the continuing war against Japan which, until atomic bombs were successfully tested in July 1945, was expected to last at least until 1946. To avoid precipitating inter-allied tensions, throughout the war, even as late as the last summit conferences, the final settlement of many issues, including the postwar government of Germany, was deferred until a later date. Since 1940, however, the Western allics had committed themselves in principle to the self-determination of peoples, views which informed the United Nations Organization whose creation the Big Three wartime allies endorsed at the spring 1945 San Francisco conference. By early 1945 wartime propaganda emphasizing the supposed commitment of the Big Three powers to identical war aims and ideals was wearing thin, and the defeat of Germany eliminated the once overriding concern to paper over all such divisions to facilitate the battle against a common enemy. Ideological and stylistic differences among the former allies, as well as their divergent war aims, assumed new significance. It soon became apparent that Soviet and Western interests in Europe would not be easily reconciled. Stalin’s pronouncedly paranoid and suspicious person- ality may have been largely responsible, as Gaddis has suggested in We Now Know (1997). It virtually precludedTHE COLD W rr him from trusting or reaching lasting agreements with either his allies or the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, wince made the Cold War close to inevitable. Yet while Stalin’s temperamental peculiarities undoubtedly exacerbated the inability of the former allies to negotiate the cc ses! Tel . ‘ ae necessary to solid agreements during he Cold War, dey a gana M freee iepia, developing strains and tensions among m also reflected very real divi ae ; ions and dramatically erent prioriti ili i ts ' priorities. The prevailing power vacuum in ope exacerbated Soviet-Western frictions, absence of real as did the Biceles communication or understanding : s and Westerner: Americans enjoyed a wide contacts with e Suropeans and ange of official and personal “ae eae, other, running the gamut from educadénat. 1 Ships and intermarriages, through shared at, Dusiness, and governmental ties. Whatever } could readily Mipedeen a prevecupations, priorities i and ways of doing busines: \ Communism Soy their disagreeme “Ss, preoccupations, prioriti I of their counterparts. Under viet officials were precluded from numbers; i ot a banishment, even death might well bring disgrace, pounded this mutual iGo; developing 8 in Wi ite their Western opposite Ideological hostility com- prehension, facilitating rapid Postwar deterioration { f terioration in Soviet-Western fdladion | As war ended j ed in Europe. @ in ruins. France. he a ope, German and Italian power lay | G : ©, defeated in 1940 and partic ied by t sermany until late id partially occupied YY ' | resources to cata ‘ lacked the economic and moral ace the ie them. Britain, one of the Big Three 1950 : EUROPEAN DIMENSION, 194 —— allied powers, emerged from the war victorious but effectively dependent upon the United States economically, and, with the abrupt end of Lend-Lease, desperately seeking a substantial loan to facilitate recovery. an aid, war costs forced Britain to liquidate as investments and foreign exchange holdings and incur huge new debts, making any major Despite Ameri most of its overs independent overseas role impossible. Though technologically backward, the Soviet army was by far the largest military force in Europe, an intimidating colossus even after its numbers fell from 11.9 million in 1945 to somewhere between 2.9 million and 4 million three years an a i n authoritarian Slate ri ee publicly characteri ar economic pl an as ne ith the capi an administration request™ oC Se : Crate: unsellor in the United States 16 1950 THE EUROF N DIM embassy in Moscow and a Soviet expert, to explain the s. In perhaps the seminal rationale behind Russian polici document of the Cold War, Kennan replied with an 8,000-vord tele ated that, since Soviet antag- onism towards the West arose from the need of Russian rulers to justify their oppre: to combat the hostility of foreign powe could do little to alter Soviet policies. Ir adopt policies of ‘containment, firmly resisting attempts to expand Soviet influence while awaiting internal changes which would alter the nature of Soviet ighout ‘am. Its sive domestic rule as essential rs, Western states stead, they must government. Kennan’s telegram, circulated throu the higher echelons of American government, and his subsequent article ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, published in the influential quarterly Foreign Affairs, quickly became definitive documents of United States Cold War strategy. Kennan returned to Washington to head the newly created Policy Planning Staff, charged with the long-range planning and conceptualization of United States foreign policy. Until the early 1990s the word ‘containment’ would fundamentally describe American policies toward the Soviet Union. British and European leaders had good reasons to encourage American involvement indeed, the historian Geir Lundestad has characterized United States domin- ance of Western Europe as an ‘em Aware that even united they could not match Soviet 1 that internal economic pire by invitation’. military strength, and fearfu nations € prey to both on and external threat, weakness might make their internal Communist subve 17TH COLD WAR Western leaders actively » United sought to persuade the Unite States to assume f far greater European responsibilities than ever before. The British, until the Second World War ae the world’s greatest Power, took the lead in this effort. Britain, no longer a su Pp atched by erpower, and now outmatched b} both the Unit €d States and the Soviet Union, while its great power status, was 100 merican support and acquies © Cold War gene acted as a United States, while continuing © as defence and his enabled Britain to ‘punch above national scene, but the emphasis on Britain's world role may also have : Sher West Homy to lag behind those of other V les, cence; and throughout th loyal lieutenant to the shoulder disproportio other commitments, ‘T] Us weight’ on the intery nately large ove and European countri In the crucial early Cold War years British officials eyparts exhorted their American counterP it a: ve — mit new economic and military cor st fo: * and then to enlarge them. Most Sen fe (OL arch 1946 the towering figure er » the egendary Bi, ah “the ish wartime prime min » had all the prestige of n, man’, spoke out at ee ‘iron curtain’, he aid, had descended With freedom on on 0 " British and Americans must unite i er extension, Stalin and some America” Churchill’s speech, which was clear vance Wi : : an 1th the Truman administration English aa fe oe aspotis™ € side, totalitarian desp 18 /Y :, 1945-1950 THE EUROP N DIMENSION, 1945 195 a endorsed by the new British Labour government. Other European pleas soon followed. scidle dnformedithe In February 1947 British officia s cereuliearane’ American government that economis a aid TURE vented them continuing their aid to Cre ae ait countries bordering the strategically 1946/47 Europe routes for Middle Eastern oil. In 1946, 2 sing . r many years, closir 5 red its hardest winter for many y ae suffered its har hortages, ing severe food and fuel s factories and generating severe mo «eel aleoufetedieen rising inflation, and social unrest. Eu r iB ing $5 billion. annual balance of payments deficit sur pa S ealectcl s e strikes in France and the growing wo ndttiog an * “ iz 0 UNIS! a Strength of both French and Italian = aE : murs lsiecs najor Wes ‘ ibility that two maj ae ‘aised the ibility ‘st camp, shifting id move into the Communist camp: see would vi - . caselyiin 9 the European balance of forces an a sneseatel . k the lea DE c ow re vernment took a favour. The British govern anentin(all these eventfd nations sively seeking American a: problems. : nly public reside: fruman not on e In March President Tru amme for Greece and context of an American ey ail — ported an extensive aid prog) oi is in the a Turkey, but presented this ry where democracy was y » democracy was i . The effectively commitment to < threatened either e ee : ned oi unlimited global pledge of U = George ©. Maranall to Stary of sta 8! aaa the way for secretary ¢ te © a erainmerforrt announce a major economic Sie ee ae satellites European nations, The Soviet Union a i eee M ea a Se oe an, Tus y 7 Recovery I Ae ee ist nations soon boycotted the : 7 saeeral u d the Marshall Plan, while non-Comn erme “J jarsna 19THE COLD WAR participated in a coordinated four enhance European year enterprise to their economic perform Gconomies once more Historians have deb ance and make the self-sustaining. ated the precise impact of American aid, with some suggesting that it had litle impact on already improv others arguing that it 1 between success and sta doubt, however, i jes and Ing European economies, an a SPR m eh made the crucial det 3 = ele Snation. There can be litt ig one that the Plan made a substantial c¢ iain E verall tribution. Its final Feport, in 1952, noted that ove i I : P . increased by West European industrial Production had increased b} 64 per ce nt since 1947 levels; from 1947 cement Productio cent, 31 per cent, re rewar and 41 per cent over prev ‘I 5 we oy, an 0 1959 coal, aluminium, copper . a 59 pe n levels grew by 27 per cent, 69 | % european + and 90 per cent respectively. Europe fi Populations were able to resume = regain self-confidence, continued European ¢ 4 normal way of life an The Plan also set a precedent for operation, facilitating the cré : ropean Coal and Steel Community: s European Union, on &t divided Western from Eastet ensified the Cold War, Essential t ue ™m European recovery was German €C° vival, at least in those sectors under American British, and French occupation/ It seems that one me to keep Germany weak, wna?! N war or invade Rus res concerns were incompatible, therefor’ and Soyi, ee European quest for economic rede et-Western relations we, ee an furth Europe and in Cessful Weste, Ca third Europea F Curity with the We again re so poor as to I 20 5-1950 EUROP DIMENSION, 19 en romise unattain- any understanding or negotiated See eae ae able, Two Russian historians, ve fhe Sovee Constantine Pleshakov, even a eee of the Cold the Marshall Plan marked the real ee ce tect War They or Pie announced the Europe. In October 1947 Bealin. alta enmeiness ceepilnumen of the Cominform, a = a A grouping of nine major Communist pe ta gael d to sabotage the Marshall Plan, @ a expected to sabotage ally electe Communist coups overthrew demoer governments in Hungary and Czec oe Src Guana Most flamboyantly, in June 2 : ana eterh reforms were introduced in the howe ec tinton Occupation sectors of germane ie eA responded by cutting off land, access £0 ert the symbolically significant a oe ina tnres! Westen Ba edie and the United States, ae later merged into solve; for eleven ‘s into of the in the Soviet se occupying powers, et = e! " ch W had been assigned zones whic aa ‘i erica one. Soviet obduracy met Am aiieaenta|Gunpl months a massive airlift ferried all es terblockade x 1 r nte West Berlin, while a Western on damaging]De se roved economically damagingd Soviet zone proved ecc hich often character powers avoided any mon- . 7 i Wl strating the practical egunon Yh Cold War crises, the Western ion with Soviet force potential direct military confrontat ans Bywae aero Z [ y or! ? " b hewing attempts to resupply Be Soviet-occupied territory. nuributed to the oT sli kade co ae The Berlin blockad - of German reunificat decision to abandon hope ¢ Western jon and 21establish a separate state, the Federal Republic of Germany, in the former We: its foundation in 1949, the Europe were clearly persuaded the U. stern occupation sectors. with territorial borders of Cold W a delineated The first Berlin c ee nited States to conclude a permanel military alliance with most West European states, finally Jettisoning the w . . Loe its first arnings of George Washington, its President, against Truman administr: involvement in Eu any such commitments. Initially, - ation had sought to limit Americal irope to economic aid, hoping “lor ear the primary responsibility . nd European continental defence, and in 1947 Britain an France had Signed the Dunkirk Pact, expanded the Pact, which k Luxembourg Britain would b salty, a mutual aed following year to become the Sd Prought Belgium, the Netherlands, be under its umbrella, Ernest Bevin, the Brits foreign Minister, “epeatedly urged the United States thats i 5 Ran ae a Without its Participation, such arrangements would fa! reassure Western European states that they were sea against Russian attack, which in turn would undercut i ents of the Marshall Plan. ‘The Berlit such pleas added force, teen nited States, Canada, and fourtee +. Treaty: €s concluded the North Atiantic a an att ; European countri nder its ack on one signatory would the ed an assault on all, including hat States, a deterrent so effective # vas ‘0 be such an assault. West Germany NATO member, although NATO (re sure assul n German Soil, some suggested to Nota founding Were Stationed 9 22 45-1950 THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION, 1945 ee iz re German NATO allies of compliant futu acd ervous } allies rape behavi The wealth and sizeable pop si behaviour. The wee pene 5 the German ilitary a Germany represented military ed. a in 19 be permanently oct eee prompting the ic joined the allia ee ea y Pact, a Federal Republic jo a Warsaw Pact, = viet Union in turn to establish the " gt ae Soviet U ing of its East European s able lary grouping s essentially stable, similar m ; : ; s mw By 1950 the European al paling Wise : laries demarca wa vi varly defined bound ne Cold War, Safes - of influence. Throughout tl Soviet spheres their i - » primary interests remained the pri ‘ ity and associated security _ ive European alliances and ate viet and espective Europ foci of both Sov : both sides rical flights on i : icy. Rhetorical interests United States policy. } espected the it notwithstanding, in practice each respe notwi Sta a val, understanding that their opponent considered i co} hat their oppo: nderstanding FE a of i the: rity and would r as vital to its own security an) © areas s. Successive trongly to any encroachments. St ing in strongly any . sing: E, i: Europe — the Berlin ose nd 1968, and the Easter z ar Hungarian and Czech crises of 1956 seen in 1981 — prea f the Polish Solidarity mo from the West. repression o. ral support i so in any but moral suf ituation was more aile > win any bu 7 jtuation wa . ne tos 1 the world, by contrast, a the Communist Elsewhere ir oT for either 4 7 . — rtunities se of thé other. roviding oppor + expense 0 Auid, pr Thu: lien to gain at the exp s of the Cold War or ae nwards, therefore, the por vemionganore a if 3 Europe towards es fphaes shifted from 4 its original emphasis. fundamentally peripheral to its orig 1953