:DITED BY THEODORE W. SCHULTZ FOOD FOR THE WORLD UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS + CHICAGO 37 Agent: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSIDY HESS © LONDON UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS» CHICAGOFuRLIC HEALTIL LIBRARY LIRA THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, The Tewentiesh Institute CARL F, HUTH + DIRECTOR \HE Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of ‘Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as “The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation” on January 27, 1923. The le:ter of gift contains the following statement: ‘The purpose of the foundation shal! be the promotion of @ better undertaeding om the part of American citizens of the eer peoples of the worl, thus eatablihing a basis for improced international relations and a more enlightened worldorder. The aim shall altenys be to give accurate information, aot to propagate opinion. RrseRYrD, PUBLISHED 1945. COMPOSED AND PRINTED BYTABLE OF CONTENTS PART I, THE FOOD MOVEMENT ‘The Isreawarioxat Foop Movenesr 1x Rernoserer Frank G. Boudreau ‘Tae Exrenieses or Aorusratrs Reiavixe ro Fooos aso Nuvamios Fokn D. Black Osseavarions oF Paxricivanrs PART Il, POPULATION Porcianiox—riz Loxe View 2 Frank W, Notetin Porotation as Paontest ix Quauiry rank Lorimer Oasravarioss oF Pannicinants PART INL NUTRITION Aovaxens 1 Norxsriowat Reseanew sw Weurant Cd. Eheehjem Kxowns axp Uxgxowns anour Wat Constirvres ax Abrquave Dirt L.A. Maynard ‘Tue Covratseviox oF Nvraitios 70 Fooo Pouseiss Pond R, Casson AWARENESS aND ATTITUDE OF THE Meoical Pkoreasios towsaD Fooo 1s Retaviow 10 Heaven Ansel Keys ‘Tae Usarvusess axa Lyia 7. Raber, Onservatioss oF Panricinasts ‘antutry of rite Dieraay Attowavers PART IY, FOOD SUPPLIES Tae Mazaisce or Neramos axp Aca Kar! Brandt Foon Sorouies ry Prosper arren rae War Walter W. Wilcox Acnicuirusat Apjusmutesr axp Howard R. Telly Foo axp Icom: P. Lamartine Yates Lait] 8 6 149 164 7TABLE OF CONTENTS Onsractes ro Berrex Nurutios prsvire tw LaKoe Suvrty oF Fooo tx ‘Prosrecr 187 Margaret . Reid Measuats To Iupsove sue Grown oF rue Dewan ror Foo it W. Gaumnite Onsravarions or Paxrtermaxrs 199 PART V. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Posrwan Taave Paticy as Perey W. Bidwell Tas Ferurs os Comsooiry Aoxetstenrs 230 Edward 8, Maron . Foon 45 4 Facer 1x Ivrpaxaniowal, TRabe a8 Leroy D. Stinebouer New Honrzoxs ro Foon 4x AckiovLTuRe 26 Paul H. Appleby ‘Tus Cosrersutions of 4 Pexuavenr [vrexvarionat, Oxeasizarios ox Foon ax Acnicvironr 7 Altay GB. Fisher Mayon Onsractes 18 the. Peru oF IvtnaNarionAl CoLiaworatioy 1x Foon AND AGRICULTURE 284 Howry C. Taylor Onseavarions of Paxricinars ago PART VI, CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY Foop axb Acaicunzune tx « Devesorixa Eeoxos 396 Theodore I. Schultz Basie Euewevrs or ax Ivrsexationat, Fooo Pouier vt Karl Brandt Ossenvartons or Paxrierraxs as Iyoex, asPART It POPULATION [HE LON By Fras W. Nores: pes the greatest hazard in the way of forecasting popu- G VIEW lation trends has been the disposition, both of the makers and of the users of predictions, to treat population growth as an independent variable; te view growth as a dynamic response to laws of nature moving irresistibly toward an inevitable goal. From such trends economie snd political conclusions of great weight are readily drawn, It is no less true that population growth itself is a dependent variable, to be affected in large degree by the techno- logical, social, economic, and political developments of the future. The nature of population grcwth will affect, and in turn be affected by, coming events, We too often fail to consider the response of population growth to the changing setting. OF course, there are elements that give great inertia to growth. Under favorable peacetime conditions the average length of life is approaching sixty-five years. The maximum limit of the population that will be over age sixty in the year 2000 has alreatly been set. All of that group is now living. Even the number of children to be born between now and 1965 has been directly affected by past events, The maximum limits of the parental stocks of 1969 have already been determined. Furthermore, human mortality and fer- tility move in response to rather well-known factors, some of which are in a measure predictabe. Clearly, growth processes contain many predictable elements. ‘The difficulty is that the predictable elements tend to attract seg BESS Os f Ppaasen Reseach, Sho of ube and International Aes, Pice sie Beerieat of Sard nts denture ih faa sane ee Milbank Memorial Fund sad the Carne Corporation of New Yorks however, none f these agencies i to be understood as approving the statements mde or views exposed init, Inll rmatters of factor interpretation the tutor alone is esponibe 36) POPULATION—THE LONG VIE\ our attention to the exclusion of the less predictable ones. We tend to assume the existing technological, social, and political setting as the background. The overwhelming temptation is to project the fature within the general framework of the present. All things con- sidered, this teniptation is probably fortunate. Judgments as to the future of population growth must be made explicitly, or implicitly, in terms of social policy. The predictions are better made on the basis of a general setting that we know, or at which we can reason- ably guess, than in terms of a setting concerning which we ean only hope or dream. The difficulty, then, is not that of making predic- tions in terms of the present, or a reasonably anticipated, setting. Rather, it is that of taking the predictions too seriously once they are made, Having introduced assumptions concerning the govern ing conditions, we must constantly keep in mind the fact that they are assumptions and that a different course of events would lead to different answers. With this warning in mind, we shall consider, first, the course of past developments and something of the processes of past changes next, examine in greater detail three types of population change; and, finally, present some hypothetical population trends for the future, on the basis of which we can discuss the actual prospec for population change. PAST TRENDS AND PROCESSES OF CHANGE ‘The world’s population has increased fourfold since the middle of the seventeenth century. It has more than doubled since 1809 and even now continues its rapid growth. These trends may be seen from Figure 1, which presents the data for the world and its major geographic areas on a logarithmic scale This scale permits the comparison of rates of change but sharply distorts the amounts of change.’ Obviously, the values are estimates even at the most recent dates. In the caves of Asia, Africa, and Central and South America they are little better than informed guesses. For China, opinions concerning the size of the present population differ by CareSaenders Wald Papution (Ox 2 Vatus for the years 1650-1909 ae from 4. 3 ing isnsion ie boeodon thin valeble fords Clarendon Press, 1936), p-42. Mach of she fl work. 2 Fag betwen 180 and 1542 the in for Oceana se shout thes times as far as shat for the word, This idicaes shat svat of growth was about thee esas fast as that of the ‘wold, In absolute umber he sharp is for Ocean epreaeas pit of les hun mcd People hile the smal efor the world represents nearly 20 nich people (71FOOD FOR THE WORLD more than the total population of the United States. Nevertheless, the chart gives a description of the course of population growth sufficiently accurate for our purposes. Fic, 1. Growth of population by continents, (550-1940 (data for 16 saan Wore Pople, Boa) 1920 fon Corr The figure brings out three facts pertinent to this discussion, 1. The world’s population has been growing at a rapid and ac- celerating pace during the last three centuries. Since the middle of the seventeenth century it has grown at an average annual rate of about 5 per thousand. Since 1900 the annual increase has aver- aged § per thousand. Suca prolonged and rapid increase cannot have occurred frequently ir the history of the races and, obviously, [38} POPULATION—THE LONG “IEW increases of this magnitude have never occurred before. For example, if the average rate of increase obtaining since 1650 had been in, force since the beginning of the Christian Era, an initial population of only 10 million would now amount to more than fifty times the present world population. The modern epoch of growth has beca 2 ll sections of the world have participated in tis growth, bur it has been particularly marked in Europe and Europe overseas, especially prior to 1900. Since 1900 the rate of growth has tended to decline in Europe, North America, and Oceania; but in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America there apparently has been some acceleration of the rate of increase. Te will assist the discussion of future trends to examine briefly the processes by which this growth has occurred. The essentials of the story are simple enough. Growth came from the decline of mortality. This decline arose from different sources and occurred in different degrees in various parts of the world, In Europe an era of peace and domestic order began to restore the ravaged continent during the seventeenth century. Then shortly afterward there fol- lowed a series of agricultural innovations that greatly increased the food supply, which was further augmented by the vast resources of the New World. Industrial innovations began to bring spectacular increases in product. Finally, sanitary and mecical advances brought control over the ravaging diseases of childhood and young adult life. In short, the whole process of modernization in Europe and Europe overseas brought rising levels of living, new controls over disease, and reduced mortality. Meanwhile, fertility was much less responsive to the processes of modernization. So far as we can tell from available evidence, no sub- stantial part of the modern population growth has come from a rise in fertility. On the other hand, neither did fertility decline with mor- tality. The reasons why fertility failed to decline with mortality are clear enough in general terms. Any society having to face the heavy mortality characteristic of the premodern era must have high fer- tility to survive. All such societies are therefor: ingeniously arranged to obtain the required births. Their religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, community customs, marriage habits, and family organizations are all focused toward maintaining high fertility. ‘These change only gradually and in response to the strongest stimu- UlFOOD FOR THE WORLD lation. Therefore, mortality declined, but a fertility high enough to permit survival in an earler period began producing rapid growth. Eventually fertility also began to decline, the trend in Europe starting in the northwest in the latter part of the nineteenth century. From this focus it moved east and south across the continent, mean- ‘while having become well established in North America, Australia, and New Zealand.* Ie is important to understand something of the causes of this trend for, so far as the record goes, these are the only populations that have controlled their fertility sufficiently to bring birth rates into balance with the low death rates that modern conditions permit. They are the only populations that have thus far shown a way by which growth can be checked other than through death, the only ones that have attained high efficiency in the maintenance of the stream of life. ‘There is abundant evidence that the decline came about primarily through rational control, largely by means of contraceptive practices. Tt does not follow that contraception can be viewed as the cause of the declining birth rate in any profound sense. Relatively effective methods of contraception were widely known for centuries before they were generally used. Birth rates were reduced largely by means of contraception, but in response to drastic changes in the social and economic setting that radically altered the motives and aims of peo- ple with respect to family size.s ‘The catalogue of such cranges is large and can be only suggested here. Most of them center around the growing individualism and rising levels of popular aspiration developed in urban industrial liv. ing, With the growth of huge and mobile city populations, the vidual came to depend less and less on the status of his family for his place among his fellows. The station to which he was born gave place to his accomplishments and possessions as the measure of his impor- tance. Meanwhile, the family lost many of its functions to the fac- tory, the school, and commercial enterprises. All these developments made large families a progressively difficult and expensive under- taking; expensive and dificult for a population increasingly freed “The decline in Birth rates hogar eae in France and the United States, and perhaps Scundinnva. In France the seculthing infucner of the French Revoltion was undoubtedly Jportan. In the United States the birth rate has Been dropping since the beginning of che Sincteenth century, but the rates ave moved down From the exceptional high levels which ccheucterzeds fronser society hat was uncwully favorable to bigh et. rman E. Himes, Medical History of Contraception Baltimore: Willams & Wilkins Go, 1936); and Regine K, Six and Fran W. Notestein, Cntelled Pry (Baltimore: Wi Tats Witkin Co 19)y chap. x6 fo] POPULATION~THE LONG VIEW from older taboos and increasingly willing to solve its problems rather than to.accept them. In short, under the impact of urban life, the so- cial aim of perpetuating the family gave way progressively to that of promoting the health, education, and material welfare of the in- dividual child; family limitation became widespread and the end of the period of growth came in sight. However, during that period the population of European extraction had increased nearly seven fold throughout the world. The more rapid response of mortality than of fertility to the forces of modernization is probably inevitable. The reduction of mortality is a universally acceptable goal and faces no substantial social ob- stacles. But the reduction of fertility requires a shift in social goals from those directed toward the survival of the group to those directed toward the welfare and development of the individual. This change, both of goals and of the social equipment by which they are achieved, is at best a slow process. As a result, the period of modernization is virtually certain to yield rapid population increase. By the end of the interwar period, in necrly all the countries of northwestern and central Europe, fertility had fallen substantially below the level required for the permanent maintenance of a station- ary population at existing levels of mortality. In the United States, since 1930, it has been at or below the level required for replacement except for che war flurry of the last few years. Australia and New Zealand are in a similar position, In all of these countries growth con- tinues only because of the favorable age distribution of the popula- tion, which time will alter. Populations in which fertility has fallen below the replacement level or those in which it is near and rapidly approaching that level may be characterized as those of “incipient decline,” our first demographic type. Other populations are in an earlier stage of demographic evolution. Among them birth and death rates are still high and growth is rapid, but the decline of the birth rate is well established. These we m characterize as in the stage of “transitional growth,” the second type. Still other populations have scarcely begun their demographic transition. Mortality is high and variable and is the chief determi- nant of growth, while fertility is high and thus far has shown no evi- dence of a downward trend. In these populations rapid growth is to bbe expected just as soon as technical developments make possible a decline in mortality. We may characterize this type as that of “high growth potential.” Our most realistic view of the prospect for future fa}FOOD FOR THE WORLD popalation change can be made by considering the position of each of these demographic types. ‘The populations of northwestern, southern, and central Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand may all be characterized as those of incipient detline. In the interwar period their fertility was Jow and declining, In all of thm only immigration or the reversal of recent trends in fertility can prevent the virtual termination of growth within a generation. I1 most of them fertility would have to rise substantially to forestall decline, and such reversals will not be easily obtained, short of drastic governmental policies of an essen- tially totalitarian kind. Itis not possible to predict the actual course of fature population change. However, we can illustrate the implications of the underlying situation by showing the sorts of population that would develop in the absence of fundamental change. Thompson and Whelpton have done so for the United States, and my colleagues and I have done so for Europe and the Soviet Un‘on on certain assumptions.* The meth- ‘ods used in the two studies are not entirely comparable, but they are sufficiently so for our purposes. The trends for selected areas are shown in Figure 2, which gives the actual populations from 1900 to 1940 and the projected populations from 1940 to 1970. All of the pro- jections disregard war losses, international migration, and interna. tional boundary changes. All of them are based on the general propo- sitions that both fertility and mortality will dectine, most rapidly where they are highest and least rapidly where they are lowest, and that the declines will become less rapid as time goes on, It is apparent from Figure 2 that the population of northwestern and central Europe reaches its maximum by about 1950, even on these assumptions that disregard war losses. The population of the United States, which Thompson and Whelpton have projected on the assumption of a somewha: less rapid decline in fertility than was used for Europe, continues to grow after 1970, but from then on at a very slow rate. The same is true for southern and eastern Europe, but eastern Europe is better characterized as a region of transitional ‘Waren 8. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, Estimates of Faure Population of the Cnitad Suter, so 90-2500 (Natianal Resources Msnsing Board) (Washington: Government Prining (OF x, 19q3 sand Notesten, Taeuber, KEK, Coil, and Kiser, The Future Populations! Europe land the Sener Union (Geneva: Leap 9f Nations, New York: Colunbia Univers Pact, "ase {al POPULATION—THE LONG VIEW growth than as one of incipient decline. By 197 the projected growth of southern Europe is negligible. The trend for the Soviet Union, which is in the stage of transitional growth, is also shown, by way of contrast. The projected increase between 1949 and 1970 amounts to 78 million, yielding a total of 251 million by 197. io. 2-—Population tends fr s42y and peice 1920-79 (cepintd fom Population Indes, Vo. N srs obrved 92 Noo! Uamuer, 1944 Coming changes in the age distribution of the population will be quite as important as those in total numbers from the point of view of international relations and food requirements. Figure 3 illustrates the types of change that may be expected under the assumptions of our discussion. It permits the comparison of age distributions in 1940 with those projected for 1970 for the United States, northwestern and central Europe, and the Soviet Union, the last being a region of transitional growth, In each of the pyramids males are to the left and females to the right, The length of the bottom bar indicates the fal; Sex rutin hppa of ead of hele opel ‘value fr he Usted Ste fam tapoon and Wha, Fumes Pare Popul ie Une nat op so0, pp tea yyy woes or Faroe an te Soe Homie sl sn, Pune Pepuon sy oe and Sie non POPULATION—THE LONG VIEW number of persons aged zero to four years; that of the bar next above, the population aged five to nine; and soon to the top bar, which rep- resents the population aged eighty-five years or more. ‘Much of the demographic history of a populacion can be read from its pyramid. For example, that for northwestern and central Europe in 1940 is concave on the left at ages forty to fifty-four as a result of the easualtics of the first World War. The notches at age twenty to twenty-four are the result of the bitth deficits of that war. The maximum age group falls at thirty to thirty-four years. This group was born between 1905 and 1916, the period of t1e region's maximum number of births. The undercutting of the pyramid at younger ages reflects the shrinking baby crops of subsequent years, a shrinkage that reduced births to their peacetime low in 1930-35. The rise at ages zero to four comes from the larger birth cohort of 1935-39 in- duced by the pre-war boom and the Nazi pro-natalist policies. This erosion of the pyramid at the younger ages shows clearly why we may expect the death rate to rise and the birth rate to fall in the fa- ture When the relatively large groups now in the childbearing ages move on to swell the deaths at ages of high mor-ality, they will be re- placed in the reproductive ages by the smaller groups now in the sof childhood. The pyramid to the right shows the type of age distribution that would be expected by 1970 under present assumptions. Losses of the current war and the effects of migration will, of course, alter the de- tails, and governmental efforts to stem the decline in the birth rate may increase the numbers under age twenty. However, unless the pre-war trends are sharply changed, the aging of the population will be very rapid, and in any case a considerable aging is inevitable. As the pyramid at the top of the chart indicates, the population of the United States in'1940 was further from its maximum, The 1 number of births occurred in 1920-24, some fifteen years later than in Europe. The erosion to be anticipated is considerably le severe, although if we accept Thompson and Whelpton’s “low” in- stead of their “medium” assumption on fertility, it is rather marked In either case, however, the progressive aging and the slowing growth of the population are clear and are characteristic of the type of in cipient decline. It is evident that the era of rapid growth is drawing quickly to a close in Europe and North America, except as it may be reinstated by substantial immigration. Australia and New Zealand are in a similar position.FOOD FOR THE WORLD As noted above, the stage of transitional growth is that in which the decline of both fertility and mortality is well established but in which the decline of mortality precedes that of fertility and produces rapid growth. The populations of eastern Europe are nearing the end of this stage; those of the Soviet Union and Japan and of certain Latin-American countries are in mid-courses while those of Turkey, Palestine, and parts of North Africa appear to be entering it. ‘The age pyramid for the Soviet Union shown in Figure 3 illustrates the growth capacity of this type. That for 1940 is typical. The narrow top and broad base reflect both the high mortality of past years and the fact that, in spite of this mortality, birth rates have been high enough to yield progressively larger numbers of babies. ‘The gashes of the pyramid result from the terrific losses of the war and revolu- tion, and at ages five to nine the effect of the hard years of 1930-34, plus that of the official abortion policy.? ‘The pyramid for 1970 neglects the effect of the present war and is, based on the assumption that both mortality and fertility will decline from the high pre-war levels about as rapidly as they have declined from similar levels in other countries. On these assumptions, during the thirty-year period from 1940 to 1970, the increase alone exceeds the total population of Germany, present or prospective. OF course, war losses will cut the growth; if by 28 million, then the increase would still be s0 million. Moreover, on these assumptions, even by 1979 the parental stocks would not be depleted, so that a very con- siderable capacity for growth would remain, ‘The position of Japan is particularly noteworthy. Obviously it is fatile to speculate on the future size of its population. Growth in Japan will depend almost ertirely on the nature of the war losses and ‘on the economic dispositions of the peace. Its congested population, living in a land deficient in natural resources, is clearly at the mercy of postwar economic arrangements. Japan is interesting, not so much for itself, as for the light +t sheds on the processes of population change in the Orient, Its the only Eastern nation that has undergone a substantial period of industrialization and urbanization, hence the only one in which the demographic responses to these changes can be contrasted with those of the West. “The rogo age distribution ie that estimated by Frank Larimer, The deals of hi are will appese a hs forthcoming bok prepared forthe Offer of Pepulation Resear tied "The Population of the Soviet Union History and Prospects.” [461 POPULATION—THE LONG VIEW Figure 4 is informative in this particular. It compares the trend in the birth and death rates for Japan from 1921 to 1941 with those for England and Wales from 1881 to 1g0t. There is a marked similarity anne Iieth and death ats for Japan, 1921-4, and for Ppland and Wales, 1881~ "Population Changes and the Portwar World” weican Sele? Rev Noot Febranry, 944 34. between developments in Japan during the interwar decades and those in England forty years earlier. Both the birth and the death rates were about the same height, they were declining at about the same rates, and the amount and trend of the natural increase were Lar}FOOD FOR THE WORLD much the same, Figure 5 shows the marked similarity of the tribution of Japan in 193s to that of England and Wales fifty-four years earlier, On the surface, at least, it appears that Japan’s response to urbanization and industrialization has been much the same as that of England when similar changes in the setting were under way." Following rather closely a demographic course analogous to that of the West throughout its modern period, Japan's population has risen from approximately 35 million in 1870 073 million in 1940. [fit were to continue along the general course of European developments with- out war losses, its population probably would approximate 9s million by 1970. As a illuserate the potentialities for population increase inherent in the transitional stage of growth. Modernization and urbanization in Japan have moved rapidly, but population growth has been of the type that implies a tripling of population in a century, and more than half of that increase would come after the birth rate began to fall. In the century lying fifty years earlier (1821-1921) the population of England and Wales, in fact, did triple, despite substantial em tion. More than half of this increase also occurred after birth rates land has experienced There is no reason that regions can achieve their fous period of rapid popula- diction, such a figure is worthless. However, it does began to decline, Moreover, since 1921, Engl more than twenty years of slowing growth the writer knows for assuming that oth demographic transition without an anal More than half of the world’s population has not be sitional growth. Death and birth rates remain close to pre modern standards, and birth r: ely begun to decline Therefore, they may be classified as populations with high growth potentials, , much of the Near East, virtually all of Asia outside the Soviet Japan, the islands of the Pacific and those of the Caribbean, and much of Central and South America fall in this class. ‘The past trend and present rate of growth of the members of this group are far from homogeneous. In some regions—central Afric: and parts of Central and South America, for example—growth been slow and populations remain sparse. In these instances fertility, even though probably close to the biological maximum, has been sub- an its period have * Irene B, Taeuber and Edwin C. Beal, “The Ds Memarat Fund Quterly, SKIT, No.3 July 1934) Las POPULATION OF JAPAN BY AGE 8 SEX,1935 POPULATION OF ENGLAND & WALES BY AGE 8 SEX, i681 81931 Fis, 5-—Age and sex ditibuton of the population of Japan, 1935, ad of England andFOOD FOR THE WORLD stantially canceled by extracrdinarily high mortality.? Such areas of relatively light population and slow growth will become regions of rapid population increase just as soon as mortality is brought under ‘a measure of control. For the immediate future, however, they pre- sent no serious problem of population pressure. They are already sparsely peopled, and the same measures that would reduce mortal- ity would greatly increase their carrying capacity ‘From the point of view of immediate problems, the situation of the relatively dense populations of this type is vastly more critical. These include such areas as India, Java, Formosa, Korea, China, Baypt, and the Caribbean, all regiors with rather highly developed econo- mies of the colonial type. In all of them populations are relatively dense, fertility is high, and mortality is high and variable. The pres fence or absence of growth depends on the state of political order, the abundance of food, and the incidence of epidemic disease. Todia may serve to illustrate the nature of the situation. Its prob- lems, although in many respects the most difficult, are in principle those of the other areas, and its statistical records are superior to those of other areas. Figure 6 traces the course of its total population from 1872 to 1941. It is apparent that, prior to 1921, decades of slow jnerease, due to famine and epidemic, alternated with decades of rapid growth. The last check to growth came during the decade of the first World War, when the influenza epidemic alone appears to have caused more than 15 million deaths. Since 1920, and for the first time in recorded history, there have been two successive decades of rapid growth. In twenty yeers the population increased by 83 mil- lion. At present it exceeds 4oo million and is about as large as that of all Europe west of the Soviet Union. “The factors bringing aboct this growth are characteristic of this type of demographic situaticn. Strong government, improved means of communication, increasingly productive agriculture, a litele sani- tation and epidemic control, have all been essential to the develop- ment of the area as a source of specialized raw materials and as mar- kets for manufactured goods. The result has been population growth ‘The reader wll understand sha throughout mot of the areas of this syne secure 8 ssl Stornaon a sont nonenstvt. Statements mae eategoricly cannot be buts Uy ree evidence: They can nevertces, be proved by inference Fam the general. aCe BF uo Sastes snd cvblenee ofthe demographic consequences of sec uations gathered from fhe setterad mais that ave availabe veRingsey Davis, “Demographic Fast and Policy ix Trin” Milbank Memorial Fund quartet, NRIIL, No.3 (July 1944) 35°78. {501 POPULATION—THE LONG VI without substantial increases in the levels of living, Mortality, low enough to permit growth, nevertheless remains high, the expectation of life at birth falling below thirty-five years even in times of relative order and prosperity. a Fr Thepwth ef he population of Tis 1-19 and of he Ui Sta on roy Gene ivi Thoagrapne Fact and Palin Unda than Memoril Pad Qari in, SX, Now ly tye 38 ° a Meanwhile, the fundamental nature of the agratian family life, of native customs, religious beliefs, and educational horizons has changed little. ‘The result is that the materials out of which declining fertility grew in the West are not present. In short, the modern na- tions of the West have imposed on the world’s nonindustrial peoples that part of their culture which reduces mortality saftciently to per- fsFOOD OR THE WORLD mit growth, while withholcing, or at least failing to foster, those changes in the social setting out of which the reduction of fertilicy ‘eventually developed in the West. The result is large and congested populations living lieele above the margin of subsistence. “The future growth of such populations depends almost entirely on events to come. Prolonged periods of political or economic chaos might result in considerable depopulation. On the other hand, a peri- ‘od of peace and order in which there was a rapid advance in produc tion would bring rapid and sustained growth Such an epoch of growth could be terminated in two ways. If the essentials of the existing agearian society are maintained, there is every prospect that growth will continue until the potentialities for increased production are exhausted. Then it will be checked by re- peated catastrophes and generally increased mortality. In this case, however, large and poverty-stricken populations would be left with the potentiality for a new cycle of growth any time circumstances permitted. If, on the other hand, a period of peace, order, and rapidly rising production were to be accompanied by a thorough and balanced modernization, we could expect the same or even faster immediate growth but a different termination. If such developments brought urbanization, industrialization, rising levels of living, popular educa- n, and popular participation in political life, the same forces that eventually induced a declining fertility in the West would probably come into play. The population would then undergo transitional growth, perhaps tripling in the process, If events marched swiftly and studied efforts were made to induce declining fertility, perhaps only a doubling of present populations would be involved. In sober fact each of these alternatives probably will exist in one place or another. Chaotic political and economic conditions probably will check growth in some areas for a considerable time. In other areas rapid growth will probably be terminated by a series of eatas. trophes, while fertility remains unchecked. In some instances—many, one hopes—wise and vigorous leadership may bring growth to an end. through the reduction of fertility. To be achieved, this last alterna- tive will require a tremencous increase in production, an increase that, in spite of rapid growth, can bring rising levels of living and new vvistas of health and individual welfare to the world’s most poverty stricken peoples. fs] POPULATION—THE LONG VIEW. PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH By way of summarizing this discussion of the prospects for popula- tion growth, we may now consider the hypothetical future trends shown in Figures 7 and 8. For the years from 1759 to 1940 they pre- sent the same materials as Figure I, except that Figure 8 shows the population on an arithmetic, instead of a logarithmic, scale. The hypothetical values for the years 1940-2000 are not intended to show what will happen. They are intended to show sornething of the gen- eral nature of the changes to be expected if the conditions assumed actually come about.#t For all North America we have assumed that the rates of increase will be those projected by Thompson and Whelpton for the United States on their assumptions of “medium mortality, medium fertility, and no migration." This yielded a maximum value of 176 million for the year 1980. We arbitrarily retained this value for the year 2000 in view of Canada’s rather large potentiality for growth. To the writer the figure of 176 million for the year 2000 seems realistic, pro- vided there is no heavy immigration, In the case of Europe west of the pre-war boundaries of the Soviet Union, we have assumed that the value projected by my colleagues and myself will hold until 1970. On this projection the population was already declining. However, we have held the values constant from 1970 to 2000 and have made no allowance for war losses, on the assumption that there will be effective governmental policies to fore- stall any sharp decline in population. Under these conditions the population of Europe west of the pre-war Soviet boundaries would be about 417 million by 2000. For the Soviet Union we have accepted our projection of 251 million by 1970. Beyond thet date we have as- sumed a transition of an essentially European type, to obtain a total of 298 million by the year 2000. This figure makes no allowance for war losses. On the other hand, it assumes that fertility, even when ir reaches the low levels of western Europe, will drop as it has in western Europe. Whether this course of events ccmes about will de- pend on Soviet policy. All things considered, # population in the neighborhood of 309 million by the year 2000 does not seem unlikely. Ifitreaches that igure, then the population of Europe and the Soviet "The writer ia indebted to his colleague, Dr. Benes Jurkat, for assistance in the construc sion of these hypothe! populace. "Ops eit 9.29 fo Notetin and others op. ity pe 240. fsa]ise} Estimated and hrpothetial po fr vys0- yo fom Cate Saunders, ion of bothers value) aprFOOD FOR THE WORLD Union would amount to something of the order of 700 million. Given an era of peace, this, too, seems reasonable. Now we approach the difficult sections of the world. Central and South America contain populations of two demographic types, and the information available concerning them, even as to their present populations, is highly defective. Less by way of a prediction than as an illustration of the growth implications in a European type of tran= sition from high to low mortality and fertility, we have assumed an essentially European course 0” events. Having made our best guess at the present birth rate for all Central and South America, we assumed that those rates would decline along a course midway between the past rates of Italy and Germany and that death rates would be those associated with such birth rates in the average of a wide range of ex- perience. These assumptions result in a population of 283 million by 22000, a number alittle more than double that for 1940. In view of the possibilities for immigration, this figure seems to be rather conserva- tive. Tn the case of Oceania, the principal part of which is Australia and New Zealand, heavy immigration is probable. It is scarcely likely that in the long run they will remain sparsely settled near a teeming East, Therefore, we have asscmed increases that give a population of | 21 million by 2000, a figure slightly more than twice that of the pres- ent population. ‘There remain Asia and Africa, the most dificult of all. We have, in fact, assumed annual rates of growth of « per cent from 1940 to 1970, and of 0.5 per cent from 1970 to the year 2000, Whether the results are too high or too low depends on the course of events. In both con- tinents the rate of 1 per cent represents a slight increase over the esti- mated prevailing rates, but one that is consonant with the past accel- ration. On the other hand, the rate of 0.5 per cent used from 1970 on is lower than any estimated rate of increase as far back as 1850. To the writer the results seem likely to be too low in the case of Africa, where a population of about 250 million is given for the year 2000. The hypothetical population of 1.9 billion for Asia in the year 2000 also may be lower than events will justify. Of course, it could be too high, but ic probably will not be unless there is widespread and pro- longed disorder. This contingency, although not unlikely, is scarcely to be counted upon in constructive planning, If, however, we assume a relatively long period of peace and onder, then the hypothetical figures for Asia are best justified on either of two rather sharply con- {562 POPULATION—THE LONG VIEW trasting assumptions: (1) that the advance in economic productivity will be insufficient to support a more rapid growth cr (2) that the ad- vances in economic productivity will be very large indeed and accom- panied by rapid modernization and strong policy cirected explicitly toward reducing birth rates. Conceivably, such a course of events ‘could hold populations within the hypothetical figure, On the other hand, a rapid increase in production achieved within a slowly chang- ing social framework would probably yield an Asiatic population well over the 2 billion mark by the year 3000. ‘Summing the hypothetical figures for the year 2000, we have a world total of 3.3 billion people. On the assumption of general order and the spread of modern techniques of production the figure is prob- ably conservative. It implies a slightly accelerated growth between 1940 and 1970, but a sharp curtailment after that date. Given wide- spread disorder and catastrophe, the reverse of this sequence might develop, with growth slowing in the coming generation, only to rise still higher in the next. However, it appears to the writer that sen- sible planning for the future should be based on the assumption that the world will have at least 3 billion people by the year 2000. Finally, in connection with the problems of world food supply, one important fact should be kept in mind. There is a considerable chance that the world will reach the 3 billion level in two generations, with the capacity for growth of its backward populations still unimpaired. If it is not to do so, if by that time fertility is to fall sufficiently to bring in sight the end of the epoch of growth, then advances in pro- duction and social political organization will have to be spectacular indeed. Food production will have to increase much more rapidly than population, and equally swift developments must occur in the fields of industrial production, education, public health, and govern- ment, For it is only when rising levels of living, improved health, in- creasing education, and rising hope for the future give new value and dignity to the individual life that old customs break and fertility comes under control. Without such control the growth of the world’s population is limited only by its carrying capacity. In the long run it remains true that the control of mortality without the control of fertility is impossible. Is}