i

Inside the Muslim Brotherhood

ii

RELIGION AND GLOBAL POLITICS

SERIES EDITOR
John L. Esposito
University Professor and Director
Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-​Christian Understanding
Georgetown University

ISLAMIC LEVIATHAN CHURCH, STATE,

Islam and the Making AND DEMOCRACY IN
of State Power EXPANDING EUROPE
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu

RACHID GHANNOUCHI THE HEADSCARF CONTROVERSY

A Democrat Within Islamism Secularism and Freedom of Religion
Azzam S. Tamimi Hilal Elver

BALKAN IDOLS THE HOUSE OF SERVICE

Religion and Nationalism in The Gülen Movement and Islam’s
Yugoslav States Third Way
Vjekoslav Perica David Tittensor

ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY MAPPING THE LEGAL

IN TURKEY BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING
M. Hakan Yavuz Religion and Multiculturalism from
Israel to Canada
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
Edited by René Provost
POST- ​COMMUNIST ROMANIA
Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu RELIGIOUS SECULARITY
A Theological Challenge to the
PIETY AND POLITICS
Islamic State
Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia
Naser Ghobadzadeh
Joseph Chinyong Liow
THE MIDDLE PATH OF
TERROR IN THE LAND OF THE
MODERATION IN ISLAM
HOLY SPIRIT
The Qur’ānic Principle of Wasaṭiyyah
Guatemala under General Efrain Rios
Mohammad Hashim Kamali
Montt, 1982–​1983
Virginia Garrard-​Burnett CONTAINING BALKAN
NATIONALISM
IN THE HOUSE OF WAR
Imperial Russia and Ottoman
Dutch Islam Observed
Christians (1856–​1914)
Sam Cherribi
Denis Vovchenko
BEING YOUNG AND MUSLIM
INSIDE THE MUSLIM
New Cultural Politics in the Global
BROTHERHOOD
South and North
Religion, Identity, and Politics
Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera
Khalil al-​A nani
iii

Inside the
Muslim
Brotherhood
Religion, Identity, and Politics
z
KHALIL AL-​A NANI

1
iv

1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

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© Oxford University Press 2016

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rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: al-Anani, Khalil, author.
Title: Inside the Muslim Brotherhood : religion, identity, and politics /
Khalil al-Anani.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2016] | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016006858| ISBN 9780190279738 (cloth : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780190279745 (updf)
Subjects: LCSH: Jamʻīyat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (Egypt) |
Egypt—Politics and government—1981– | Islam and politics—Egypt.
Classification: LCC BP10.J383 A635 2016 | DDC 322.4/20962—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016006858

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v

To Howaida, Mohamed, and Aly,

my sources of love, success, and joy
vi
vii

Contents

List of Illustrations ix
Acknowledgments xi
Note on Transliteration xv

1. Introduction: Unpacking the Brotherhood 1

2. Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 14
3. Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 34
4. The Power of the Jama‘a: The Enduring Legacy
of Hasan al-​Banna 50
5. The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 67
6. Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 82
7. The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 99
8. Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 118
9. Enforced Coherence: The Brotherhood under
Regime Repression 135
10. Conclusion 155

Notes 162
Index 191
viii
ix

List of Illustrations

Figures
3.1 Components of the Identity Construction Process 48
4.1 Al-​Banna’s Framework of Islamic Identity 56
4.2 The Jama‘a Paradigm 59
5.1 Stages of the Brotherhood’s Recruitment Strategy 72
6.1 Venues of Socialization (Tarbiyya)
in the Brotherhood 87
6.2 The Brotherhood’s Multitiered System
of Membership 93
7.1 The Vertical Structure of the Brotherhood 104
7.2 The Horizontal Structure of the Brotherhood 105

Table
5.1 Mashhur’s Blueprint of the Individual Call 78
x
xi

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support of many
people. It originated with a doctoral thesis I researched, wrote, and suc-
cessfully defended at the School of Government and International Affairs
at Durham University. As a result I am indebted to Professor James
Piscatori, who supervised my thesis and provided me with invaluable
guidance and advice. Throughout my doctoral study Jim was more than
a supervisor; he was a mentor and a friend who encouraged me to pursue
my research and career objectives. I am grateful to Mehmet Asutay, profes-
sor of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies at Durham University, a source
of inspiration and invaluable support. His course on methodology was
intellectually stimulating and enlightening. I would also like to thank
Dr. Frederic Volpi for his insightful comments.
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the El-​ Masry Foundation for
Community Service in Egypt, which sponsored and supported my post-
graduate studies at Durham University. In particular I am thankful
to Nashwa Bayoum, Tamer Attya, Heba Isaac, and other staff for their
support and understanding. I am also grateful to my friend Mahmoud
Mohieldin, professor of economics at Cairo University, who encouraged
me throughout this project. I owe special recognition and gratitude to
Chris Kato, my research assistant, who helped me diligently throughout
this project. Chris spent hours revising and editing the manuscript and
provided invaluable comments and feedback.
I am thankful to several leaders, members, and ex-​members of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt who agreed to be interviewed for this
project and provided vital thoughts and ideas that deepened my under-
standing of the organization: Esam Al-​’Aryan, Abdul Khaliq Al-​Sherif,
Khaled Hamza, Mohamed Hamza, Abdurrahman Ayyash, Sherif Ayman,
Ammar El-​Beltagy, Mohamed Mustafa, Kamal El-​Helbawy, Abdurrahman
xii

xii Acknowledgments

Mansour, Eslam Ahmed, Mohamed Yussif, Ibrahim Saleh, Mohamed

Soliman, Salah Abdul Halim, Mohamed Ayoub, Ayman Ashraf, Mohamed
al-​Naggar, and Mohamed Sarhan. For their time and attention I would
also like to thank the interviewees who requested their names not be
mentioned.
I thank friends, colleagues, and scholars who influenced my research
either through their writings and scholarship or by engagement and dis-
cussion: Colin Turner, John Esposito, Nathan Brown, Olivier Roy, Asef
Bayat, Carrie Rosfesky Wickham, Alberto Melucci, Salwa Ismail, Jillian
Schewedler, Abdelwahab El-​A ffendi, Marc Lynch, Jason Brownlee, Emad
El-​Din Shahin, Peter Mandaville, M. Hakan Yavuz, Tarek Masoud, Mona
El-​Ghobashy, Maszlee Malik, Samer Shehata, Mohamed Abu Rumman,
Alaa El-​Nadi, Mu’taz Al-​K hatib, Omar Ashour, Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Ziad
Munson, Saif El-​Din Abdelfattah, Heba Ezzat Raouf, Osama El-​Ghazaly
Harb, Radwan El-​Said, Shadi Hamid, Tamara Wittes, Michele Dunne,
Jeroen Gunning, Roel Meijer, Ibrahim El-​Bayoumi Ghanim, Mohamed
El-​Menshawy, the late Husam Tammam, Nabil Abdel Fattah, Tareq Al-​
Beshry, and the late Mohamed El-​Sayyid Said. My apologies if I missed
someone who deserves to be acknowledged. Any errors, omissions, and
misunderstandings in this book are solely my own.
I am grateful to Oxford University Press and its staff and partners,
particularly Executive Editor Cynthia Read, who was so patient and un-
derstanding throughout the journey of putting together this book. I also
thank the editorial team at OUP particularly Glenn Ramirez, David
Joseph, copy editor Judith Hoover who made this book possible. Special
thanks go to the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments on
the initial manuscript.
I am grateful to Abdou Mousa Bermawy and Ahmad Helmy for de-
signing the cover art of the book and to the Design Team at OUP who
worked on it.
This project would not have been finished without my family’s prayers
and constant support. I am indebted to my father, the late Mohamed
Khalil al-​A nani, who passed away before the book was finished. His
diligent spirit was always a source of inspiration. My mother, Fatima
Mohamed Salem, has been a key supporter throughout my life journey.
Her unwavering encouragement, faith, and wisdom helped me endure
many difficulties.
I would like to thank Howaida Soliman who is not simply my beloved
spouse but is also my friend and companion. Without her endless love,
xiii

Acknowledgments xiii

faith, and encouragement, I would not have been able to finish this book.
No words can express my gratitude to her. Finally I would like to thank
my two boys, Mohamed and Aly. I am grateful for their patience and for
enduring days when I could not play with them. May I provide you both as
much joy as you have given me.
To all my family I dedicate this book.
xiv
xv

Note on Transliteration

Throughou t this book I have adopted a simplified transliteration

scheme that roughly follows the logic of the Library of Congress system,
except principally for the diacritics. I have generally designated the ‘ayn
(e.g., shari‘a, da‘wa, jama‘a) and medial hamza (Qur’an, not Quran), but
not the terminal hamza (‘ulama, e.g., not ‘ulama’). The spellings of indi-
vidual and place names that are commonly used in English, particularly
as used in reference to Egypt, are adopted here—​for example, Badie (not
Badi‘), Ismailia (not Isma‘iliyya). “Mohamed” is thus used for all individu-
als except the Prophet Muhammad.
xvi
xvii

Inside the Muslim Brotherhood

xviii
1

Introduction
Unpacking the Brotherhood

This book unpacks the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Unlike other

works that tend to focus on the Brotherhood’s external behavior and activ-
ism, or what can be called the “outer” layer, this book concentrates on the
internal dynamics, processes, and interactions that shape its identity and
politics. In this respect I uncover how the Brotherhood as a sociopolitical
movement came to be. I unravel the tangled processes of recruitment, so-
cialization, indoctrination, and identification that forge the Brotherhood’s
identity and explore how this identity is constructed in everyday life. Put
differently, this book is a journey that explores the inside world of the
Brotherhood through the eyes of its members. By demystifying the multi-
faceted character of the Brotherhood, I explain how the Brotherhood con-
structs its identity, how one becomes an ikhwani (a Brotherhood member),
and how this affiliation manifests itself in one’s everyday life. I explain the
intricate and disciplined structure of the movement, how it has survived
repression, and the relationship between its identity and its durability. As
an ethnographic and analytical study, this book contributes to the grow-
ing literature on the Muslim Brotherhood and sheds light on some of its
understudied aspects.
This book is the culmination of my studies and observations of the
Muslim Brotherhood for more than a decade. I started researching the
Brotherhood in 2004, when Mohamed Mahdi Akef was chosen to become
the new general guide (al-​murshid al-​’am). It was incredibly difficult to
2

2 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

conduct field research during that time due to security repression and
surveillance of the movement, and it took me months to build trustful
relationships with the Brotherhood’s leaders and members.
I published my first book on the Brotherhood in 2007 in Arabic, The
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Gerontocracy Fighting against Time, in which
I explained the startling rise of the Brotherhood in the 2005 parliamen-
tary elections and its impact on the movement’s politics and ideology.
A few years later I realized that I had only scratched the surface and had
little knowledge of the Brotherhood’s intricate structure and dynamics.
Therefore this book delves into more detail regarding the movement’s in-
ternal politics and paints a clear picture of the dynamics and processes
that shape its ideology, behavior, and activism. Informed by dozens of in-
terviews, discussions, meetings, and informal conversations with leaders
and members representing different generations and geographical areas
across Egypt, this book provides a detailed account of the interplay of re-
ligion, identity, and politics within the movement. It also contributes to
the theoretical debate on how to study Islamists and whether or not they
should be considered “social movements.” By doing so this book chal-
lenges some of the conventional and dominant narratives about Islamists
and Islamism as a whole.

The Brotherhood’s Identity

To understand the Brotherhood’s activism, one needs to deconstruct the
underlying factors that shape and motivate it. It is my contention that
identity is one of the key drivers of the Brotherhood’s activism. I define
identity in this book as the code of norms and values that guides and in-
spires individuals in everyday life. This code stems from multiple factors
and is subject to intense socialization and indoctrination processes. As
Craig Calhoun points out, identity is produced by acts of individual will.1
Along these lines in ­chapter 3 I explain that identity cannot be measured;
however, it can be imagined and manifested.
I argue that the Brotherhood’s collective identity is the outcome of mul-
tiple processes and factors. Building on Alberto Melucci’s seminal work
on collective identity I trace how the Brotherhood constructs its identity
through ideational as well as institutional factors. For Melucci collective
identity is not a datum or an essence, a “thing” with a “real” existence, but
the outcome of negotiations, bargains, exchanges, decisions, and conflicts
3

Introduction 3

among actors.2 He aptly defines collective identity as “a process in which

actors produce the common cognitive frameworks that enable them to
assess their environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of their
action.”3 It is also a reflection of the mutually reinforcing processes and
interactions that occur within social movements and are shaped by the
opportunities and constraints in the external environment.4 Throughout
this book I employ Melucci’s interactive and analytical concept of collec-
tive identity to uncover the processes that shape the Brotherhood’s identity
and explain how it came to be.
Over the past two decades collective identity has been a subject of
extensive scholarly work to better understand the rationale of collective
action. Scholars have studied the relationship between culture and collec-
tive action, identity and modes of mobilization, interests and the incentives
of participation in collective action, and grievances and collective identity.5
Despite the literature’s useful contributions, it is mainly concerned with
investigating the impact of identity on collective action, but not the other
way around, that is, how a movement reshapes its individuals’ identity in
everyday life. This book seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examin-
ing the impact of collective action on individuals’ identity, in other words,
how a social movement transforms its members’ mindset, worldviews,
and perceptions—​their identity. By deconstructing the process of identity
construction, I explain how the Brotherhood recruits members, indoctri-
nates them, and reshapes their worldview.
The Brotherhood’s identity formation is intertwined with other pro-
cesses of recruitment, indoctrination, and identification. As I explain in
the following chapters, these processes occur simultaneously and serve as
a concrete foundation for the Brotherhood’s identity and structure. They
also correspond with the Brotherhood’s objectives and ideology. In fact it
is these very rules that distinguish the Brotherhood from other Islamist
social movements. By deftly weaving a web of internal relations, culture,
norms, and values, the Brotherhood produced a distinctive code of iden-
tity that enabled its survival against all odds.
As I show in c­ hapter 5, the Brotherhood has an intricate, multitiered
system of membership, with sympathizers at the bottom and the most
active and committed members at the top. This system not only facili-
tates the alignment of members’ behavior with the Brotherhood’s objec-
tives and ideology but it also ensures their loyalty and commitment to
the leadership. The membership structure also plays a pivotal role in pro-
tecting the movement from state infiltration. It is with this system that
4

4 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

the Brotherhood selects, trains, indoctrinates, and scrutinizes prospective

members’ attitudes and behavior before granting them full membership.
I contend that the relationship between the Brotherhood’s member-
ship and its identity is robust, although it has been overlooked in the
literature. As I will clarify, the recruitment and promotion system was
designed to correspond with the identification process. In order to rise
within the movement’s ranks, members must meet certain requirements
and carry out certain activities. These reflect members’ degree of loyalty
and willingness to submit to the Brotherhood’s ideology and leadership.

Ikhwanism as a Form of “Distinctive” Identity

The key question this book explores is how one becomes an ikhwani and
how this affiliation manifests itself in everyday life. Answering this ques-
tion reveals many facets of the Brotherhood’s identity. As discussed earlier,
the Brotherhood’s identity is not merely a product of the religious or theo-
logical convictions of members; rather it is a socially constructed product
of the movement’s organizational dynamics, symbolic production, and
ideational framework set by its leaders and ideologues. Accordingly this
identity is contested in everyday life by similar or rival identities and, more
important, within the movement itself. As a social entity every organiza-
tion encounters different views and conflicting interests of its members,
leaders, and stakeholders. Without a strong sense of identity, these organi-
zations may be more vulnerable to fracturing and splitting.
As a social movement the Brotherhood has built a distinctive form
of identity that differentiates it and its members from other groups and
allows it to maintain its activism. I call this identity ikhwanism, referring
to the cognitive code of norms, values, and regulations that guides and
directs members in their everyday lives. When individuals join the move-
ment, they abide by its rules and regulations; after a while, they start to
act not as individuals but as brothers (ikhwan). This sense of ikhwanism, or
togetherness, helps the Brotherhood generate collective action, deepen the
commitment of its members, and enhance the resilience of the movement
as a whole. As I explain in c­ hapter 8, ikhwanism is not a rigid set of sacred
or spiritual values but rather a constellation of social and organizational
norms that are created and utilized in everyday life. Moreover ikhwanism
does not negate other facets of members’ personal identities. To be and to
behave as an ikhwani does not conflict with a member’s social identity as a
5

Introduction 5

father or brother or professional identity as a lawyer, doctor, or teacher. In

fact the uniqueness of the Brotherhood’s identity is that its members have
multiple layers of identity that facilitate the dissemination of its ideology
in society.
As the Brotherhood’s code of identity ikhwanism consists of five key
norms and values: allegiance (bay’a), obedience (ta’ah), trust (thiqa), com-
mitment (iltizam), and loyalty (intima). These reflect the Brotherhood’s
distinct identity and define its role in the lives of its members. They play
a key role in ikhwanizing the private and social sphere of the Brotherhood
and strengthening the loyalty of its members.

The Jama‘a Paradigm

Ikhwanism does not operate in a vacuum; it needs an organizational struc-
ture that can activate and sustain it in everyday life. There is a crucial
link between the Brotherhood’s identity and its structure. This is tailored
to intensify and enhance the indoctrination process. The Brotherhood’s
regulations and norms require members to behave in a manner that com-
plies firmly with its objectives and ideology. According to Melucci, norms
refer to the “point at which operational needs (the allocation of resources)
come together with the needs of integration and control (power).”6 These
norms help the Brotherhood institutionalize its ideology. The regularity of
the movement’s activities (e.g., seminars, battalion training, camps) helps
members interact, communicate, and, most important, acclimate them-
selves to its norms and regulations. The incessant processes of indoctri-
nation, ritualization, and habituation reshape individuals’ identities and
foster a strong sense of self-​identification.
The Brotherhood’s organizational structure was created by its founder,
Hasan al-​Banna, and is maintained by his successors. As I explain in
­chapter 3, al-​Banna created a unique organizational structure that blends
the movement’s mission, ideology, objectives, and strategy. I call this the
jama‘a (groupness) paradigm: an organizational framework that connects
the movement’s religious, social, and organizational aspects and galva-
nizes them in everyday life. This framework also responds to the spiritual,
material, and social needs of the Brotherhood’s members by enhancing
their solidarity and strengthening their social bonds. Furthermore this
organizational structure has generated a unique system of values and
norms that defines the Brotherhood’s disciplined and cohesive character.
6

6 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Interestingly, despite the complexity of the organizational structure, it is

far from rigid or static. In fact, as I explain in the following chapters, it
is elastic, inclusive, and adaptable. It helps the Brotherhood recruit, ac-
commodate, and assimilate members from diverse social, cultural, edu-
cational, professional, and geographic backgrounds, integrating them all
under the umbrella of the jama‘a.
The jama‘a paradigm is the outcome of complex processes of social
networking and indoctrination. As a social movement the Brotherhood al-
locates resources, mobilizes individuals, and sets ideological frameworks
that bind members together and foster their commitment. It consistently
capitalizes on social networks, familial relationships, and religious bonds
in order to expand its constituency. The jama‘a paradigm is the lynchpin
of the Brotherhood’s collective identity and serves as the foundation for
its activism and unity. Al-​Banna and his successors always stressed the
importance of being part of a group or a movement, a jama‘a; in fact the
Brotherhood’s organizational structure is based on the very idea of collec-
tiveness, or being a jama‘a.

The Brotherhood’s Durability

Over the past century the Brotherhood has demonstrated a remarkable
degree of resilience. Founded in 1928 as a religious and charitable organi-
zation, it played a key role in shaping Egypt’s politics and society. During
the 1930s it was mainly involved in charitable and social activities, with
little interest in politics. Entry into politics came in the early 1940s, when
al-​Banna decided to run in the parliamentary election of 1942, though he
eventually withdrew in light of pressure from the government.7 At the end
of the 1940s the Brotherhood’s military wing (the Special Apparatus) en-
gaged in violence against British authorities and Egyptian officials, leading
to the assassination of al-​Banna on February 12, 1949, and the dissolution
of the movement. Under the Nasser regime the Brotherhood was subject
to harsh repression and even eradication attempts during the 1950s and
1960s. This repression peaked after the movement was outlawed in 1954;
hundreds of its members were arrested, prosecuted in military courts, and
tortured. However, the Brotherhood experienced a resurgence in the early
1970s after President Anwar Sadat took power. His more accommodating
stance led to the release of many members and their return to political life.
Building from this point, the Brotherhood returned to prominence and
7

Introduction 7

became an influential actor in Egyptian society. It plunged into formal

politics, expanded its social network, and reached out to liberal and secu-
lar forces during the 1980s. However, this growth caused the Brotherhood
to be perceived as a threat to the Mubarak regime in the 1990s, and once
again it became a target of regime repression. The relationship between
President Hosni Mubarak and the Brotherhood reached an impasse after
the fraudulent 2010 elections, when the Brotherhood won no seats and
boycotted the second round of voting.
It was not until the popular uprising of January 25, 2011, and the ouster
of Mubarak that the Brotherhood reemerged as a key political force. In
June 2012 Mohamed Morsi, chairman of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and
Justice Party (FJP), became Egypt’s first democratically elected president.
However, after only one year in power Morsi was ousted by the military on
July 3, 2013, following mass protests. Since then the Brotherhood has wit-
nessed one of the greatest crises in its history: hundreds of its members
and supporters have been killed,8 thousands are in prison or in exile,9 and
several key leaders, including the movement’s most senior leader, General
Guide Mohamed Badie, have been sentenced to death.10 In addition the
movement’s financial assets have been frozen, and its charity and educa-
tional centers have been seized by the government.11
Yet despite this unprecedented repression, the Brotherhood survives
and maintains its activism, particularly in rural and suburban areas. This
extraordinary ability to endure and accommodate repression constitutes
one of the Brotherhood’s most defining features. Not only has it survived
multiple waves of regime oppression and exclusion, but it has also sus-
tained its structure and preserved its identity. It is due to this resilient
identity that the Brotherhood has been able to survive and maintain its
activism.
The durability of the Brotherhood has puzzled scholars and observers;
however, it has not received much attention in scholarly work. This book
provides an explanation for this dilemma. The Brotherhood is not a mere
political force that seeks power; it is an identity-​maker that aims to reshape
societal norms and individualities as Islamic. It is thus heavily involved in
meaning construction and symbolic production that shape its members’
worldviews and perceptions. These processes, as I shall explain, help the
movement accommodate repression by connecting members and enhanc-
ing their solidarity, particularly during difficult times.
Repression sometimes plays into the hands of the Brotherhood and
enables it to achieve three key goals: garnering public support, reinforcing
8

8 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

internal coherence, and avoiding internal change. As I explain in ­chapter 9,

the Mubarak regime’s attempts to destroy the movement actually helped
it survive and expand. I also explain why the Brotherhood did not experi-
ence major internal splits or schisms over the past three decades, despite
a number of disputes between the old and the new guard and between the
conservatives and the so-​called reformists.

Rethinking the Brotherhood

This book is not simply a synopsis of findings on Islamism, and it looks
beyond the stereotypes and clichés about Islamists as rigid and immu-
table actors. It therefore does not treat Islamists as monolithic or homoge-
neous but as sociopolitical agents involved in the production of meanings
and symbols in everyday life. In other words, this book is concerned with
the nature of Islamists as social actors who have material and ideational
interests in altering societal norms to match their ideology and objectives.
The chief question I seek to answer is this: How does the Brotherhood
create its identity in everyday life? I have divided my response into a group
of subquestions: What are the key processes of identity construction in
the Brotherhood? What is the code of norms and values that guides the
Brotherhood’s members? What is the role of the Brotherhood’s structure
in fostering and consolidating members’ identity? What is the impact of
repression on the Brotherhood’s coherence and unity? How may identity
preserve and maintain the Brotherhood’s activism?
These questions are answered by the book’s chief contention: the
Brotherhood’s identity is the culmination of intricate and intensive pro-
cesses of recruitment, identification, socialization, and indoctrination.
These processes are significantly affected by the external environment,
particularly whether it is inclusive or exclusive, authoritarian or demo-
cratic, oppressive or friendly. I follow constructivism as a theoretical
framework for this study. Building on the seminal work of Peter Berger
and Thomas Luckmann, I argue that identity per se is a “social construct”
and is therefore subject to multiple factors and variables. Social construc-
tivism challenges the idea that identity is an immutable phenomenon. In
fact as a socially created reality, identity reflects the interaction between
individuals and society whereby both constitute each other. It is the out-
come of these processes of interactions between the self and society, indi-
viduals and groups, structures and meanings that take place in everyday
9

Introduction 9

life. Berger and Luckmann demonstrate that identity is formed by social

processes and is maintained, modified, and reshaped by social relations.12
The strength of constructivism as an interpretive framework lies in
its ability to uncover the ways individuals and groups participate in the
creation of their perceived social realities. According to Hakan Yavuz, con-
structivism stresses human agency as the prime mover of history and
assumes that society is a human construction, so it is subject to multiple
interpretations and influences.13 As Vivien Burr points out, constructiv-
ism is “an artifact of a social group.”14 As members in that group, individu-
als tend to surround themselves with constructed meanings and symbolic
relationships that foster their activism and give purpose to their actions.

Beyond Social Movement Theory

Over the past decade an influential body of scholarship has sought to in-
tegrate the study of Islamist activism into the field of social movements.
Despite the significant contribution of this new trend in enhancing the
understanding of Islamism as a multifaceted phenomenon, further ef-
forts are still needed. And despite the importance of social movement
theory (notions of mobilization, allocating resources, grievances, culture,
framing, etc.), it is not sufficient to capture the essence of Islamism or
to draw an accurate picture of its intricate nature; it is necessary to inte-
grate other scholarly disciplines and approaches. Therefore, besides social
movement theory, I incorporate social psychology, sociology of religion,
and comparative politics.
I use social psychology to understand the changes and shifts in indi-
viduals’ identities and perceptions within the Brotherhood. I build on the
work of Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema, Hank Johnston, and John
Drury and Steve Reicher to analyze individuals’ motivations to join social
movements and to be involved in different forms of collective action.15
I extend the insights from these scholars into the realm of Islamist move-
ments, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, in order to explain the indoc-
trination and self-​identification processes that occur. Social psychology
enables us to uncover the interactive relationships between the movement
and its members, the impact of collective action on their identity, and the
underlying drivers of their activism and political participation.16
I use sociology of religion to examine the role of religion in construct-
ing identity. Islamist social movements use religion both as a frame of
10

10 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

reference and as an organizational mechanism. This instrumentalization

of religion is crucial for Islamists to conduct recruitment, indoctrina-
tion, and solidarity building among the rank and file. The Brotherhood
reaches out to new members using an integrated and well-​crafted strategy.
It adopts different tactics and tools in order to disseminate its discourse
and ideology; the most important of these is preaching (da‘wa). The du’ah
(preachers) operate as active recruiters who seek to expand and widen the
Brotherhood’s social networks. This can be achieved with a wide range of
tools, including educational, social, cultural, and recreational activities.
I call this recruiting strategy “chasing the prey” to describe how the du’ah
(the recruiters) tend to target religious-​leaning individuals. Once detected
these individuals become subject to a gradual yet intensive process of in-
doctrination that reshapes their mindset and worldview. A second recruit-
ment tool is the Brotherhood’s religious rituals and weekly gatherings.
Several members I interviewed emphasized the role of these meetings
in fostering a sense of belonging and commitment to the Brotherhood’s
ideology and leadership.
Since the Brotherhood is operating in a highly authoritarian and hos-
tile environment, it is vital to understand the impact of this environment
on the movement’s behavior and activism and, more important, on its
internal politics and dynamics. I tackle this issue with a comparative poli-
tics approach, by analyzing the relationship between authoritarianism
and organizational cohesion, and find that regime repression has played
a significant role in shaping the Brotherhood’s internal dynamics and or-
ganization. Repression is not always a curse but can sometimes favor the
victim. The Brotherhood not only accommodated Mubarak’s repression;
it employed that repression to gain public support and to maintain cohe-
siveness and solidarity among its members. The Brotherhood capitalized
on regime repression by creating what I call the mehna (adversity or af-
fliction) narrative. This narrative enabled the movement to create sympa-
thy for them as victims of the regime. At the same time, this framing of
regime repression deepens members’ loyalty to and support of the leader-
ship. However, this is not to say that repression comes without cost or that
the movement seeks it. Rather my point is that its response to repression
can help explain the dialectical relationship between repression and the
Brotherhood’s internal cohesion.
Moreover I argue that repression, among other factors, has played a
key role in shaping the Brotherhood’s internal balance of power. Since
the mid-​1990s repression has enabled the conservative faction within the
11

Introduction 11

movement to control the organization at the expense of the so-​called re-

formists. While the reformists had a key role in the movement during the
1970s and 1980s, they were excluded and marginalized in the following
decades.

Research Methodology
This study is primarily based on qualitative discursive analysis. As Corbin
and Strauss explain, qualitative research produces findings not arrived at
by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification.17 This
research can be about persons, lives, stories, or behavior, or about orga-
nizational functioning, social movements, or interactional relationships.
In order to obtain an in-​depth understanding of the Brotherhood’s iden-
tity and internal dynamics, my research incorporates both primary and
secondary data. The primary data are from observations and interviews;
the secondary data consist of information and documents such as official
statements, textbooks, leaflets, and writings of the movement’s founder
and ideologues.
In terms of research methods, this study relies mainly on semistruc-
tured interviews conducted with Brotherhood members, leaders, and
experts. They were conducted in a way that reflects the Brotherhood’s
diversity and complexity. Therefore some of the interviews took place in
cities and urban areas such as Cairo and Alexandria, while others were
conducted in more rural areas such as Al-​Sharqia, Al-​Dakahlia, and Al-​
Minya. I also visited some of the FJP’s regional branches and held meet-
ings with several low-​level members and middle-​ranking leaders. Most of
the interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2013, and while most
were conducted face-​to-​face, some were done through Skype or phone
conversations. Some interviewees allowed their names to be mentioned,
while other preferred to remain anonymous or provide pseudonyms to
avoid regime retaliation.

Mapping the Book

This book is divided into eight chapters. In c­ hapter 2 I provide a survey
of the literature and scholarly contributions to the study of Islamist move-
ments, with a special focus on the Muslim Brotherhood. Using critical
analysis I examine theoretical and analytical approaches that have been
12

12 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

applied to the study of Islamism since the 1980s. In particular I probe

the “essentialist” and “contextualist” narratives that have dominated the
study of Islamist movements over the past three decades. This reveals the
problems of dealing with Islamism as a monolithic phenomenon, as es-
sentialists argue, and as a reaction to the modernization and urbanization
crises plaguing the Middle East since the second half of the twentieth
century, as the contextualists contend. The chapter also provides a critical
examination of emerging social movement trends that have been used to
analyze Islamist movements over the past decade. Nevertheless, despite
my critique of social movement theory, I view it as a useful tool if com-
bined with other theoretical disciplines. To this end my study interweaves
social movement theory with social constructivism in order to analyze the
Brotherhood’s politics and identity.
Chapter 3 articulates the study’s theoretical framework. The depar-
ture point of this study is social constructivism combined with social
movement theory in order to provide a better understanding of the
Brotherhood’s identity. In ­chapter 4 I trace the role of Hasan al-​Banna,
the founder and chief ideologue of the Brotherhood, in articulating the
movement’s identity framework. By investigating al-​ Banna’s ideologi-
cal and intellectual upbringing, I reveal how his legacy has affected the
Brotherhood and shaped its identity. I investigate the “jama‘a paradigm,”
which distinguishes the Brotherhood and allows it to maintain its identity
and activism during difficult times.
In ­chapter 5 I delve deeply into the internal elements of the Muslim
Brotherhood to shed light on its recruitment and mobilization strategy.
In particular I explain how the Brotherhood leverages what I call “chas-
ing the prey” in order to recruit and attract new members. This chapter
also explains the different phases of the Brotherhood’s recruitment strat-
egy and how they correspond with the socialization and indoctrination
process.
Chapter 6 continues the examination of how the Brotherhood consoli-
dates its identity through an internalization of its ideology, norms, and
objectives. It provides an original and detailed account of the socialization
and indoctrination process that takes places within the Brotherhood. By
integrating the ideational and institutional factors, I propose a new model
to explain how the Brotherhood reshapes and consolidates its members’
identities. This framework is called the “incubation model,” an intensive
socialization process that transforms an individual’s perceptions and
views to align with the movement’s ideology, norms, and objectives. The
13

Introduction 13

model incorporates two primary components: the Brotherhood’s unique

socialization process, known as tarbiyya, and its multitiered system of
membership. I show how the Brotherhood blends its socialization process
with an organized membership structure to consolidate and reinforce its
members’ identities.
Chapter 7 builds upon the incubation model to examine the interplay
between the Brotherhood’s organizational structure and ideology. I begin
by revealing how the movement’s structure has enabled it to endure regime
repression and expand its activism over the decades. I provide a fresh look
into the Brotherhood’s structure by exploring the relationship between its
different organizational levels (usra, shu’ba, mantiqa, etc.) and discussing
the impact of amendments to the bylaws and charter. The chapter also il-
lustrates the Brotherhood’s organizational problems and how they hinder
its image and performance.
In ­chapter 8 I analyze the notion of ikhwanism and argue that it serves
as the code of identity that works to preserve the movement’s activism
and survival. I explore the Brotherhood’s norms and regulations that en-
compass members in everyday life, highlighting five key norms: bay’a
(allegiance), ta’ah (obedience), thiqa (trust), iltizam (commitment), and
intima (loyalty). The chapter shows how the Brotherhood’s structure and
its members internalize these norms.
In ­chapter 9 I demonstrate the vital role that repression plays in shap-
ing the internal dynamics of the movement. The Brotherhood utilizes
repression to maintain coherence and solidarity within its ranks. I also
reveal the shifts in the balance of power within the Brotherhood by ex-
amining the relationship between different factions and generations. In
this respect an important caveat is worth mentioning. This book covers
the Brotherhood primarily during the Mubarak era (1981–​2011). However,
I touch upon developments and dynamics in the post-​2011 period insofar
as they relate to the book’s major themes and topics.
14

Debating Islamism and Theorizing

the Brotherhood

How should we study Islamism? This perennial question has over-

shadowed the realm of Islamist politics in recent decades. Despite the
burgeoning literature on Islamist movements, agreement among scholars
over terminology, classification, and analytical framework has proven elu-
sive.1 In fact it appears that as more literature is produced, less agreement
among scholars is reached. This irony is due to many factors; among them
is the multifaceted character of Islamism, which requires a significant
amount of effort to accurately understand it and an interdisciplinary ap-
proach to explain its changing behavior and tactics. Such an approach
should combine disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, and the
study of social movements in order to comprehensively and compellingly
capture changes in Islamists’ ideology, discourse, behavior, and strategy
over time.
Further, the state of the field is subject to political developments
and contestation in the Muslim world, which impact the way scholars
and analysts perceive Islamism.2 Media coverage of these developments
tends to essentialize and decontextualize them, and analysts often jux-
tapose them in order to advance certain views and objectives. For ex-
ample, the rise of the self-​proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-​Sham
(ISIS) has shaped public discussions and even academic debates on
Islam, Muslims, and Islamism. I described this as the “ISIS-​ification” of
Islamist politics, whereby Islamism is viewed through the lens of ISIS.3
It is true that scholars should not overlook or disregard serious phenom-
ena like ISIS, but a problem arises when it is treated as the norm and not
the exception.
15

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 15

Similarly the events of 9/​11 had an enormous impact on Islamist poli-

tics. Since then Islamism has transformed into a broader label encom-
passing different and sometimes contradictory groups of Islamists that
have no commonalities except the usage of religion in their discourse.
Terminology such as fundamentalism, revivalism, radicalism, reformism,
Salafism, and conservatism are used indiscriminately as synonyms.4 In
addition movements as diverse as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
the Turkish Justice and Development Party, the Palestinian Hamas, and
the Moroccan Justice and Development Party are sometimes studied as
though they were identical. It is true that some of these groups share simi-
lar ideas or religious references; however, they vary greatly in their strat-
egy, discourse, and tactics. This is not to say that Islamism as a field of
inquiry is difficult to grasp or is intrinsically different from other research
fields but rather to highlight the need to move beyond the existing ana-
lytical formulas that dominate our thinking and analysis and seek more
nuanced and explanatory frameworks.
In this chapter I survey the academic literature and scholarly contri-
butions to the study of Islamism, shedding light on how scholars have
studied and interpreted Islamists’ ideology, discourse, and activism. I also
examine different theoretical and analytical approaches that have domi-
nated the realm of Islamism over the past few decades. Most important
I critically investigate the literature on the Brotherhood. Until recently the
Brotherhood was one of the most academically understudied movements
in light of its history, importance, and influence; the number of academic
works on the group, in both English and Arabic, was not abundant until
the 2000s due to several theoretical and practical factors. With regard
to the former, as mentioned, the study of Islamism has been a subject
of debate and disagreement among scholars, impacting the status of the
field and creating divisions on how to study it. Scholarship has been domi-
nated by essentialist and Orientalist views that treat it as an immutable
phenomenon; thus the academic literature on Islamists, at least until 9/​
11, was highly reductionist and shallow. As a religiopolitical phenomenon,
Islamism is a victim of the “modernity paradigm,” which focuses on struc-
tural and cultural interpretations of the religious element and treats it as
irrelevant.5 Consequently the analytical and interpretative frameworks ap-
plied to Islamism can be both flawed and superficial.
On a practical level the Brotherhood’s secretive and disciplined char-
acter has kept scholars from engaging with its members and receiving
access to its records and archives. Meeting with cadres requires significant
16

16 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

time and effort in order to gain their trust and confidence. While meet-
ing with leaders is relatively easy because they tend to be more public and
accessible, interviewing the low-​and middle-​ranking members can be
daunting because they are more reticent to be identified. Security surveil-
lance and the fear of regime repression are pervasive, so the threat of ret-
ribution imposes a serious impediment for both the interviewed and the
interviewer. This was until the uprising of 2011 when the Brotherhood
was legalized and its members became free to speak and to open up.
However, the coup of 2013 reversed the situation and it became tremen-
dously difficult to get hold of the Brotherhood’s members who are either
in prison or exile.

Studying Islam: An Enduring Debate

The academic theorization of religion has proven to be problematic. Not
only has the study of religion undergone several changes over the past
few decades, but scholarship on religion and religious movements has
become significantly intertwined with other disciplines in order to reach
consensus on how to study religion. Social scientists, for example, tend to
tackle religion as a social phenomenon with different manifestations in
everyday life, whereas theologians are interested in its sacred and meta-
physical character. Nevertheless controversy over the study of religion has
not precluded sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and political
scientists from developing theoretical frameworks to expound the intri-
cacy of religious phenomena. A growing body of cross-​discipline studies
has enhanced our understanding of religious movements and activism by
tackling different aspects of this phenomenon.
Max Weber’s and Emile Durkheim’s contributions in the sociology
of religion demonstrate how complex it is to construe religious behavior.
Weber draws our attention to the role of individuals, such as prophets,
priests, saints, and religious leaders, in shaping religious beliefs, world-
views, and values systems;6 Durkheim gives society the final word in de-
fining these outcomes.7 Thus many Weberians and Durkheimians study
religion differently, if not contradictorily.8
Studying Islam and Muslims is not an exception. The vast majority of
scholarly work on Islamist politics raises more questions than answers.
While some scholars are preoccupied by Islam as a faith and a system of
beliefs, others focus on its cultural, social, and political components and
17

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 17

manifestations. Notwithstanding the considerable literature on Islam,

the Muslim world, and Islamist movements, social scientists, historians,
and theologians who study Islam are faced with significant difficulties
in scrutinizing its real essence. According to Richard Martin, those who
study Islam “have come under increasing attack in recent years for their
academic provincialism and for the distorted images of Islamic peoples
and cultures many say they have created.”9 The real problem in study-
ing Islam, however, is not the lack of knowledge about it as a system
of beliefs but the tendency to confuse and conflate Muslim cultures, so-
cieties, and movements. For example, a substantial number of studies
have persistently conflated the terms Muslims and Islamists, and Islamists,
fundamentalists, Salafis, and jihadists have been used interchangeably
and sometimes synonymously.10 The ascendance of violent and radical
movements, such as ISIS and Al-​Qaeda, particularly in the wake of 9/​
11, has also created difficulties in categorizing Islamist movements. For
instance, scholars have failed to distinguish between radical and mod-
erate movements, religious and political groups, and fundamental and
reformist parties. Put differently, the diversity of Islamist actors leads to
a deep misunderstanding of Islam and Muslim politics. To avoid gener-
alizations about Islam and Muslims, James Piscatori explains, scholars
must ask two important questions, “Whose Islam and when?,”11 to which
I add “and where?” John Esposito elucidates this dilemma by revealing
the multiplicity of Islamic interpretations: “While we commonly speak
of ‘Islam,’ many Islams or interpretations of Islam exist. The images and
realities of Islam and of Muslims are multiple and diverse: religiously,
culturally, economically, and politically. Muslims are the majority in some
fifty-​seven countries, and they represent many nationalities, languages,
ethnic and tribal groups, and customs.”12
The crucial question remains: How should Islam be studied? This
question entails various ontological and epistemological dilemmas em-
bedded in the confusion between Islam as a faith system and a politi-
cal ideology. Indeed studying Islam is usually accompanied by questions
about its political ethos. While some scholars impugn the proposition that
Islam is a “political religion,”13 others believe it is inherently political.14
Despite the belated recognition that studying Islam is a thorny and polem-
ical phenomenon, reductionist approaches can still be found. Further, the
ascendancy of a monolithic image of Islam and Muslims hinders many
scholars from discerning the vast differences among Muslim societies.
A number of scholars, including Samuel Huntington,15 Bernard Lewis,16
18

18 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Bassam Tibi,17 and Daniel Pipes,18 tend to view Muslim communities as

homogeneous, stagnant, and static. Edward Said underscores this prob-
lem as part of Orientalism’s legacy, which obscures appropriate under-
standing of Islam:

There are numerous methodological and intellectual problems

that still need settling: Is there such a thing as Islamic behaviour?
What connects Islam at the level of everyday life to Islam at the level
of doctrine in the various Islamic societies? How really useful is
“Islam” as a concept for understanding Morocco and Saudi Arabia
and Syria and Indonesia? If we come to realize that, as many schol-
ars have recently noted, Islamic doctrine can be seen as justifying
capitalism as well as socialism, militancy as well as fatalism, ecu-
menism as well as exclusivism, we begin to sense the tremendous
lag between academic descriptions of Islam (that are inevitably cari-
catured in the media) and the particular realities to be found within
the Islamic world.19

This Orientalist tendency was reinforced by the 9/​11 attacks, which

added more prejudices to the study of Islam. Since then two arguments
have persisted. The first assumes Islam has an authentic problem with
politics. Embedded in an essentialist view, this thesis amalgamates culture
and politics, norms and practices, and text and context.20 The second con-
tends that Islam as a faith system is incompatible with modernity.21 These
two arguments dominated the scholarly perspective toward Islam and
Muslims during the 1980s and 1990s and led some to believe that Islam
is characterized by an inherent political and religious exceptionalism.22
However, several scholars have refuted these arguments. Nazih Ayubi,
for instance, claims that original sources of Islam (the Qur’an and Sunna)
have very little to say about politics, that Islam does not determine a spe-
cific form for the state or government, and that political Islam is a new
“invention” that does not represent a “going back” to any situation that ex-
isted in the past. According to Ayubi, ulama (Muslim scholars) politicized
Islam by incorporating Islamic jurisprudence and shari‘a into state law
and functions.23 The flaw in the argument that Islam and politics are in-
separable lies in its tendency to disregard the cultural and political nature
of Muslim societies.
Many scholars find the argument that Islam is incompatible with mo-
dernity or democracy unconvincing. Asef Bayat points out that viewing
19

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 19

Muslims as “exceptional” or as having a peculiar position on democracy

overlooks the internal dynamics, changes, and diversity that exist within
these communities.24 In fact the tendency to decontextualize Islam and
Muslims and treat them as abstract or given is responsible for this preva-
lent misconception among scholars and policymakers alike.

Theoretical Approaches to Studying Islamism

The literature on Islamist movements presents a considerably diverse
array of theoretical approaches and frameworks. However, before dem-
onstrating this diversity, three important observations need to be high-
lighted. The first is the profound impact of the 1979 Iranian Revolution
on this literature, which encouraged many scholars to study Islam and
Islamism and to revisit secularization theory and reconsider its self-​
fulfilling prophecy about religion and its role in public life. Foucault de-
scribed the Iranian Revolution as the “first post-​modern revolution of
our time,” while Anthony Giddens saw it as a sign of “the crisis of mo-
dernity.”25 The second is the rise of militant Islamists in Egypt, Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s,
which reinforced negative perspectives regarding Islamism in general.
Third is the outrage that followed 9/​1 1, which led many scholars to recon-
sider their theories on how to study Islamism and unpack its multifac-
eted activism.
In this respect the literature on the resurgence of Islamist movements
can be divided into three key trends: the crisis approach, the cultural (also
known as essentialist) approach, and the social movements approach.

The Crisis Approach

This trend emphasizes the significance of the political and socioeconomic
context in explaining the rise of Islamist movements. According to its pro-
ponents, the rise of Islamist movements is merely a reaction to the politi-
cal and economic crises that afflicted Arab countries during the second
half of the twentieth century. The economic and social failures of the
Arab state fueled the ascendance of Islamists and legitimized their cause.
While some scholars focused on the crisis of legitimacy that confronted
Arab regimes after the War of 1967, others concentrated on the rampant
urbanization, poverty, and unemployment that plagued Arab societies.
On the former, Michael Hudson puts forward the idea that most Arab
20

20 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

regimes faced a serious crisis of legitimacy that affected their image and
power: “The shortage of this indispensable political resource [legitimacy]
largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic,
unstable character of all the present Arab governments.”26 On the latter,
Ali E. Dessouki contends that the revival of Islamic movements is the
“product of a crisis situation characterized by economic difficulties, moral
and ideological confusion, and political instability.”27
Some advocates of this trend also focus on the role of the Arab defeat
in the War of 1967 in fueling Islamism. The defeat diminished the appeal
of Arab nationalism as a secular ideology and encouraged Islamism to re-
place it.28 Some however, do not share this view. François Burgat observes
that many Arab intellectuals shifted their position from nationalism to
Islamism by the end of the 1970s. Among others he refers to figures such
as Rachid el-​Ghanouchi, the leader of the Tunisian Ennahda movement,
and Tariq Al-​Bishri, the renowned Egyptian judge and intellectual, who
changed their ideas and discourse after the demise of Arab nationalism.29
Yvonne Haddad asserts that the 1967 defeat is not the sole reason for the
growth of Islamist movements. Although she recognizes the war’s role in
reviving religious sentiment (Islamic, Christian, and Jewish alike), she
also highlights the domestic and international contexts that led to the
defeat and its consequences.30
Lisa Anderson argues that the appeal of Islamist movements is not
confined to the crisis of Arab nationalism but is the result of structural
and institutional problems of Arab states. She explains that the persis-
tence of absolute monarchies and authoritarian regimes in the region cre-
ated political and social grievances that were then seized on by Islamist
movements.31 Gudrun Krämer expands on Anderson’s idea by exploring
the consequences of restricted political liberalization policies on Islamist
activism. She argues that Islamist movements became a key oppositional
force as a result of the unavoidable political opening that occurred in the
Arab world during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Krämer, restricted
political pluralism coupled with economic deprivation and social turmoil
paved the way for the emergence of Islamists.32
In addition the urbanization of many Arab societies from the 1970s
onward created significant socioeconomic problems. The marginaliza-
tion and subsequent alienation of large portions of the lower and middle
classes provided ideal conditions for Islamist recruitment. Over the past
three decades the bulk of Islamist movements have come from urban and
suburban areas. Ayubi asserts that the appeal of Islamists is an upshot of
21

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 21

the urbanization and modernization crises in many Arab states. Policies

promoting rapid urbanization in countries such as Egypt and Syria left
many of the poor frustrated and alienated. This alienation benefited
Islamists, who offered a new path of engagement, particularly for youth.33
Mark Tessler writes that support for Islamist movements stems prima-
rily from economic and political circumstances rather than religious or
cultural traditions. He found that young Arabs have been particularly im-
pacted by the failure of economic and developmental policies led by Arab
governments, an outcome that fuels disenchantment and dissatisfaction.34
According to advocates of this approach, countries with greater income
inequality such as Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, and Morocco encoun-
tered economic hardship as a result of privatization and structural adjust-
ment policies. The socioeconomic consequences of these policies created
an ideal environment for Islamists to exploit; in particular the vacuum
created by the state’s withdrawal encouraged Islamists to fill the void by
expanding their social service and economic welfare networks. Islamist
movements penetrated civil and public spheres and rooted themselves
in universities, professional associations, unions, and schools, creating
a strong network of supporters and beneficiaries. They launched what
Saad Eddin Ibrahim calls “Islamic business,” which served as a vessel to
recruit members and spread their ideology more effectively among the
population.35 In Egypt, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood encour-
aged its members and supporters to establish Islamic institutions, bank-
ing centers, schools, health clinics, and other enterprises. It succeeded
in extending its service coverage to the poor and middle classes around
the country. Similarly in Algeria economic liberalization played a crucial
role in feeding the growth of Islamists. According to Dirk Vandewalle, the
structural economic reforms had an immediate impact on the poor and
generated support for the Islamic Salvation Front.36 The pioneering role
of Islamist networks in building religious and public institutions, such as
mosques, clinics, and day care centers, proved advantageous to Islamists
in the political arena. Tessler claims that Islamist movements, unlike sec-
ular parties, have the benefit of criticizing Arab regimes and delivering
services at the same time.37
Despite the importance of the crisis approach in explaining the emer-
gence of Islamist movements, many scholars have highlighted its short-
comings. Salwa Ismail, for instance, raises two main problems. First,
it fails to capture the micro-​level changes that shape the environment
within which Islamist movements operate. Ismail finds “the focus on the
22

22 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

macro level comes at the expense of the micro level where the everyday-​life
communities wrestle with the effects of the macro changes, initiate new
forms of action, and struggle for and contribute to a reconfiguring of the
political scene.” Second is the inability to examine the impact of struc-
tural changes on cultural and symbolic aspects of everyday life. Although
Ismail disagrees with the essentialist approach that gives primacy to cul-
ture over other factors, she considers the impact of political and economic
transformations on shaping the public sphere where Islamists function.38
There are other problems with the crisis approach. It does not address
why Islamist movements and not other ideological forces, such as leftists
and liberals, are successful in seizing political and socioeconomic crises
in order to gain support and attract the public. Similarly it does not provide
a clear explanation for why people prefer to join Islamist organizations
as opposed to other organizations. It fails to explain why most of these
movements emerged before the creation of many Arab states. The Muslim
Brotherhood, for example, was founded in 1928 and launched plenty of
offshoots throughout the Arab world during the first half of the twentieth
century. In fact this approach overlooks the role of religion in explaining
the rise of Islamists. It is true that Islamist movements benefited from the
failure of the Arab state; however, much of their support stems from their
ideology and religious appeal. Moreover many Islamists are well educated
and belong to the middle and upper-​middle classes, an indication that the
movements’ appeal is not entirely based in lower classes that are more
directly impacted by these crises.

The Essentialist Approach

The essentialist approach dominated the field of Islamic studies for de-
cades. As mentioned earlier, the main premise of this approach is that
the emergence of Islamist movements reflects the tension between Islam
and modernity. Proponents of this trend argue that the rise of Islamist
movements is merely a response to the inability of Muslim societies to rec-
oncile modernity and democracy with their cultures and traditions. They
claim Islam has a profound “cultural” and “ontological” problem with mo-
dernity.39 They thus tend to identify Islamic culture as a rigid cluster of
idioms and symbols that shapes the vision of Muslims toward the self
and the other. As Hakan Yavuz explains, essentialists treat Islam as a set
of fixed texts and doctrines.40 Bassam Tibi, one of the most prominent
essentialists, asserts that the problem of the Muslim world does not lie
23

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 23

in the political ideology of Islamist movements but rather in the cultural

crisis of Islam: “Ever since their encounter with the modern West in the
course of the nineteenth century most Muslims have consistently been ill
at ease with the cultural project of modernity, to which they were and still
are exposed.” Tibi describes modern Islam as characterized by a “defen-
sive culture” that shapes Islamic political thought.41 Despite his criticism
of the philological and anthropological trends in the study of Islam, Tibi
repeats the same mistake by suggesting that “historicizing” the Qur’an
is a precondition for reforming Islam. In his own words, “If all kinds of
essentialism are dismissed, and reference to the Qur’an itself is done in a
historicizing manner, then it is possible to legitimate change in the direc-
tion of modernity.”42
Daniel Pipes, another renowned essentialist, claims that Muslims have
an unavoidable problem with modernity. According to Pipes, the “Muslim
anomie” from modernity lies in the truth that Muslims are not able to
adapt to Western civilization:

Until 1800, Chinese, Indian and Islamicate civilizations enjoyed

roughly the same social power as Europe and possessed full
civilizations—​with cities, classic traditions, written languages …
and formal institutions, which could compete with Europe’s. Of
these three people, the Muslims had much the hardest time coping
with Europe’s primacy…. Civilized peoples faced more difficulties
than primitive peoples and Muslims faced more than the other civi-
lized peoples. In short, Muslims experienced the greatest travails
in coping with modernity; this was the special Muslim dilemma.43

However, Pipes’s argument is built on a selective understanding of

Islamic texts and on a Eurocentric narrative that is rooted in the he-
gemony of the Western modernity model over other cultures. For him
Westernization is a prerequisite for modernization, and Muslims who live
in the West cannot be both Muslims and Westerners at the same time.
He advances the idea that Muslims should abandon shari‘a and embrace
secularism in order to modernize. Like Tibi, Pipes believes Muslims have
to reconcile shari‘a with the cultural dimension of modernity—​in other
words, to be Westernized: “Westernization being inimical to the observ-
ance of the shari‘a, Muslim attitudes toward the west became embroiled
in the question of fulfilling the sacred law [shari‘a]. With Westernization
becoming urgent, ‘the crucial question is whether Islam should serve as
24

24 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

a guide and inspiring ideal, or as a rule of life,’ should Muslims abandon

the Shari‘a or keep it as always?”44
The essentialist perspective suffers many problems that are not lim-
ited to its Orientalist thrust but include theoretical and practical flaws. It
fails to explain the diversity in Muslim societies and cultures; for exam-
ple, all Muslims agree that the main Islamic divine texts are the Qur’an
and Sunna but interpret them differently, and Muslims in Indonesia and
Malaysia adopt different cultural and political styles from those who live
in the Middle East. More important, this trend treats all Islamists as a
homogeneous group with a regressive and backward understanding of
religion. The Islamist spectrum covers many different kinds of Islamists,
ranging from extremist radicals such as those in Al-​Qaeda to progressive
movements such as Ennahda in Tunisia and the Justice and Development
Party in Turkey.
The most compelling critique of this approach is rooted in the field of
poststructuralism. Recent scholarship reveals the inability of the essential-
ist narrative to explain religious phenomena, particularly in the Muslim
world. Contemporary sociologists of religion, such as Peter Berger and
Jose Casanova, stress the resurgent role of religion in the public sphere
and acknowledge the failure of the secularism paradigm in explaining
changes in religious phenomena. Berger explains, “The assumption that
we live in a secularized world is false…. The proposition that modernity
necessarily leads to a decline of religion is, in principle, ‘value free.’ ”45
A critique of essentialism also emerged from the realm of postmoder-
nity and multiculturalism. According to this trend, the main problem with
essentialism is its reliance on modernity theory. James Piscatori and Dale
Eickelman explore the limitations of the modernists’ argument against
the Muslim world by dismissing the causal relationship between mod-
ernization and Westernization. According to them, the main weakness
of modernization theory “lies in the sharp contrast between two artificial
constructs, ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition.’ ”46 They go further by emphasizing
that Islamic “tradition” sometimes operated as a vehicle for revolutionary
change. Fred Halliday expands on Eickelman and Piscatori’s thoughts as
he unpacks the ideological “defect” of the modernity narrative by criti-
cizing the dichotomy of universalism vis-​à-​vis particularism. Halliday
advances the idea that the particularism of the Middle East, like the uni-
versalism of the capitalist modernizer, is shaped by material and ideologi-
cal interests. Unlike the essentialists, Halliday asserts the rise of Islamist
movements is not a transhistorical phenomenon but rather a response
25

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 25

to political and social conditions: “Where Islamist movements arise, or

where particular groups identify themselves primarily as ‘Muslim,’ they
are responding not to a timeless influence [as essentialists presume], but
to the issues their societies and communities face today.”47
Bobby Sayyid provides a robust critique of the modernist and
Eurocentric narratives, arguing that modernity creates a hegemonic dis-
course similar to that which Islamists espouse. He finds that Islamists
adopt a counterhegemonic movement based on Islamic particularism in
order to protect their societies from the hegemony of the Western para-
digm. He aptly observes, “An often made argument is that attempts to
articulate Islamist positions on issues relating to human rights etc. are
doomed to failure, since such positions are possible only through secular-
ization; therefore, the only thing to do is to wait for Muslim societies to
secularize.”48
For some scholars the essentialist explanation of Muslims’ position
toward globalization and modernization is simplistic and inaccurate.
Akbar Ahmed, for instance, reveals the superficiality of the essentialist ar-
gument by stressing what he claims is a global element of Islam: “Islamic
history has had long periods in which we recognize elements from what
we today call globalization: societies living within different ethnic, geo-
graphic and political boundaries, but speaking a language understood
throughout, enjoying a common cultural sensibility and recognizing the
same overarching ethos in the world-​view.”49
Another nuanced critique of essentialism comes from Olivier Roy,
who rejects the rigid textual and cultural understanding of Islam and
Islamism. According to Roy, Islamism is a modern phenomenon, not a
traditional one. He compares Islamist groups with Marxist and revolu-
tionary movements and rejects scholars who adopt a Weberian reading
of Islam and treat it as a culture, a civilization, and a closed system. He
explains, “The [Orientalist] presupposition consists, among Western spe-
cialists or essayists, in defining a timeless “Islamic Culture,” a conceptual
framework that structures both political life and urban architecture, the
thoughts of the ulamas and of their detractors, and whose consequence
would be the nonemergence of capitalism and the absence of an autono-
mous space for politics and institutions.”50
Ultimately the essentialist trend fails to provide a compelling explana-
tion of Islam and Islamism, leading to myriad critiques from scholars who
sought to move beyond the essentialist narrative about Islam and Muslim
societies as a whole.
26

26 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Social Movement Theory

During the past decade several scholars have used social movement theory
(SMT) to examine Islamist movements. They aim to overcome the short-
comings of other theoretical approaches that fail to explain the rise of
Islamism. Instead of looking at texts, idioms, and ideologies, social move-
ment scholars focus on everyday interactions and processes to understand
how they shape Islamists’ worldviews and identities. They investigate
how Islamists allocate resources, recruit members, mobilize the public,
build social networks, and frame their message to their followers. This
trend treats Islamists as social agents seeking political and social change.
Proponents view Islamism as an intricate and multifaceted phenomenon
that cannot be understood without unpacking its institutional as well as
ideational aspects (i.e., identity, framing, solidarity, emotions).51
This trend has three different but related strands: the first tackles
Islamist movements in their political context and is called political pro-
cess theory; the second focuses on political opportunity structures; the
third addresses the cultural framing of Islamist movements. A brief dis-
cussion of these three strands demonstrates the pros and cons of applying
them to the study of Islamism.

Political Process Theory

This strand investigates the impact of political context on Islamists and
emphasizes the importance of political processes in shaping the behav-
ior and strategy of Islamist movements. Proponents of this approach
contend that the political environment determines resources, ideational
frameworks, and institutional factors that shape Islamist movements.
Repression impacts the movements and determines their ideological and
political behavior. Mohammed Hafez finds the political process approach
gives primacy to “process” over “structure” in creating collective action.
According to Hafez, in order for Islamists to be engaged in collective
action, they need to allocate resources that enable them to compete with
their opponents.52
Despite its importance, this strand espouses a structural view that
treats social movements as mechanical agents who react to the political
environment without being able to change or alter it. Jeff Goodwin and
James Jasper offer a lucid critique of the theory’s structural bias. Although
they acknowledge the contribution of political process theory to the
study of social movements, they criticize the vagueness of its theoretical
27

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 27

propositions. They state, “At best, [political process theory] in its current
form provides a helpful, albeit limited, set of ‘sensitizing concepts’ for
social movement research. It does not provide what it frequently and often
implicitly promises: a causally adequate universal theory or ‘model’ of
social movements.”53 Moreover this approach overlooks the dynamics and
interactions occurring within social movements.

Political Opportunity Structures

This strand focuses on the political opportunities created by govern-
ments that enable social movements to mobilize people, allocate re-
sources, and organize collective action. According to proponents, social
movements seize political opportunities to press for more benefits.54
These opportunities play a vital role in articulating the trajectory of social
movements. Sidney Tarrow, for example, identifies four dimensions that
provide incentives for participation in collective action: (1) access to par-
ticipation; (2) shifts in ruling alignment; (3) building strong allies; and
(4) splits within the ruling elite.55 Building on Tarrow’s insights, Quintan
Wiktorowicz finds that political opportunities and constraints shape the
calculations of Islamist movements and help them make rational deci-
sions.56 Hakan Yavuz goes further by emphasizing the role of opportunity
space rather than opportunity structure in strengthening Islamist move-
ments. According to him, opportunity spaces help Islamists articulate a
new sociopolitical consciousness that can be utilized to achieve political
change.57
Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper are among scholars who highlight
the theoretical and analytical problems of this model. They question the
tendency of its proponents to broaden or narrow their model in order to
fit their analyses. As they put it, “the more broadly one defines political
opportunities, the more trivial (and, ultimately, tautological) the political
opportunity thesis becomes; conversely, the more narrowly one defines
political opportunities, the more inadequate or implausible the political
opportunity thesis becomes as an explanation for the rise of any particu-
lar social movement.”58 Furthermore this model fails to answer a crucial
question: Why are Islamists able to capitalize on political opportunity
structures to expand their gains while other groups cannot? In fact the po-
litical opportunities thesis conflates the emergence of social movements
with their activism. The main assumption of this thesis is that people
tend to join social movements whenever there is a political opportunity
to do so. However, this does not explain whether movements create such
28

28 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

an opportunity or simply exploit them. Despite stressing the importance

of the political opportunity structure thesis, Ziad Munson criticizes its
shortcomings when examining specific cases. Munson claims the politi-
cal opportunity aspects mentioned by Tarrow fail to explain the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s. According to
Munson, despite the repressive political environment in Egypt during that
period, the Brotherhood succeeded in expanding its organizational and
social structure to different urban areas.59

Cultural Framing Process

The third strand of SMT concentrates on cultural framing processes
Islamists utilize to construct meaning.60 Social movement theorists claim
the process of creating or manufacturing meaning from traditional cul-
ture is complex and thus requires a certain level of framing alignment.
David Snow and colleagues highlight four alignment processes social
movements use to formulate their messages in relation to the existing
culture: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame
transformation.61 Wiktorowicz contends that Islamist movements use
framing mechanisms as interpretive devices that translate grievances and
perceived opportunities into mobilization of resources and movement
activism.62
Building on the framing process concept, Eickelman and Piscatori il-
lustrate the importance of meaning manufacturing in the Muslim world.
They argue that Muslim politics revolves around contesting both the in-
terpretation of symbols and the control of the institutions that produce
and sustain them, where Islam constitutes the language of politics and
Islamic vocabulary contains words of political resonance.63 Ismail takes
their argument a step further by stressing the changing character of
meanings and symbols when deployed in Islamist politics. Thus Ismail
concludes that there are no inherited meanings to the texts.64 The seminal
work of Yavuz on Turkish political identity underscores Islamists’ ability
to interweave Islamic symbolism with the dynamics of everyday life.65
Despite the significant contributions of SMT in the study of collective
action, it is still nascent in the field of Islamist movements, and more work
needs to be done to gauge its ability to explain the behavior and tactics
of Islamist groups. Moreover some sociologists believe SMT cannot be
applied to religious movements. They assert these movements have an
inherently backward nature that precludes them from being included in
the study of social movements. Theorists such as Alain Touraine, Jürgen
29

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 29

Habermas, and Klaus Eder tend to exclude religious movements from the
realm of new social movements, believing that religious movements do
not present serious challenges to the prevailing social order.66
I argue that SMT provides valuable analytical tools to understand the
dynamism and collective action of Islamist movements only if it can be
incorporated into other analytical frameworks. Therefore, I combine SMT
with the sociology of religion, social psychology, and comparative politics
in order to better understand the Brotherhood’s identity and activism.

Theorizing the Muslim Brotherhood

How can we study the Muslim Brotherhood? Is it a social agent or a re-
ligious movement? How can we explain its multifaceted character? And
most important, how did the movement survive for decades despite regime
repression? To put it simply, how can we theorize the Brotherhood?
These are a few questions that have preoccupied scholars studying the
Brotherhood in recent years. Ironically, despite its long history and influ-
ence across the Muslim world, many aspects of the Brotherhood have yet
to be uncovered.
Over the past few years several scholars from different academic and
disciplinary backgrounds have produced a useful and influential body
of literature on the Brotherhood. This literature can be divided into four
main streams: the history of the Brotherhood, the social activism of the
movement, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian
regime, and the ideological and organizational transformation of the
movement.
Within the first stream is the seminal work of Richard Mitchell,
which provides an insightful historical account of the movement in its
early years.67 Mitchell had extensive access to the Brotherhood’s archives
in the 1930s and 1940s, enabling him to uncover its ideology, organiza-
tional structure, and political history. However, since the publication of
Mitchell’s work, the Brotherhood has experienced significant changes and
transformations that need to be further studied and investigated. Likewise
Brynjar Lia’s study provides a detailed account of the Brotherhood’s in-
ternal dynamics and disputes between the 1930s and 1940s.68 He exten-
sively discusses the role al-​Banna’s charismatic leadership played in shap-
ing the movement’s ideology and organization. Although some parts of
Lia’s study repeat Mitchell’s, Lia’s analysis enhances our understanding of
30

30 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

the formation of the Brotherhood as a mass social movement. Within the

same stream is Barbara Zollner’s study on Hasan al-​Hudaybi, the second
general guide of the Brotherhood. Zollner studies the relationship be-
tween the Brotherhood and the Nasser regime with special emphasis on
how this relationship impacted the movement’s ideology and leadership.
She analyzes the role of al-​Hudaybi in leading the Brotherhood during the
crisis with Nasser’s regime and reveals the impact of regime repression
on the Brotherhood in the 1960s and how this inspired the radical ideas
of Sayyid Qutb.69
The second stream discusses the Brotherhood’s social formation and
activism. Ziad Munson’s pioneering study focuses on the Brotherhood’s
remarkable social capabilities during the 1930s and 1940s. More spe-
cifically he investigates the Brotherhood’s ability to mobilize Egyptians
across the country to such a successful degree that it became a mass social
movement within only a few years. Based on original documents from
the U.S. State Department between 1932 and 1954, Munson reveals the
reasons behind the rapid development of the Brotherhood in urban and
rural areas.70 Abdullah Al-​Arian’s study provides a detailed account of the
Brotherhood’s activism in the 1970s. He highlights the “rebirth” of the
Brotherhood in Egypt’s universities after the years of repression under
Nasser. According to Al-​Arian, student activism enabled the Brotherhood
to reemerge as an influential actor in Egyptian politics and society.71
The interplay between religion, activism, and politics is the theme of
Carrie Wickham’s influential study on the Brotherhood. Wickham details
the Brotherhood’s extraordinary mobilization capabilities and how they
are shaped by the environment within which the movement operates. She
maintains that the Brotherhood’s activism during the 1980s and 1990s
was due to “a deliberate process of mobilization initiated and sustained by
Islamic counter-​elites.” She highlights the impact of political, social, and
cultural environments on Islamic activism, which, she contends, contains
both opportunities and constraints impacting Islamists’ mobilization and
activism.72
The third stream investigates the relationship between the Brotherhood
and political regimes, particularly under Mubarak. While some scholars
conclude that both parties benefited from this relationship (i.e., containing
violent groups in exchange for the Brotherhood’s political gains), others
believe the relationship was more confrontational. Gilles Kepel, for exam-
ple, asserts that Mubarak and the Brotherhood shared a common enemy
in the form of violent Islamists who flourished in the 1980s. Accordingly
31

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 31

the coexistence of the two parties was based on rational calculations.73

However, Hesham Al-​Awadi disagrees with Kepel’s analysis and stresses
that Mubarak attempted to eradicate the Brotherhood, particularly in the
1990s. Al-​Awadi explains that the Brotherhood’s gains in Parliament, pro-
fessional syndicates, and universities threatened Mubarak’s legitimacy
and led him to launch an offensive campaign against the movement in
the 1990s.74 Wickham concurs with Al-​Awadi and highlights the crack-
down against the Brotherhood in the 1990s. She notes, “After more than
a decade of toleration, the government launched a major counteroffen-
sive against the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting many of its most dynamic
leaders and hammering away at its reputation by condemning it as an
‘illegal organization with ties to extremist groups.’ ”75
Clearly the popularity of the Brotherhood was a threat and source of
discomfort to the Mubarak regime. How have scholars explained this
popularity, especially when it manifests at the ballot box? Tarek Masoud
provides a lucid and sophisticated analysis on this point. Unlike accounts
that focus on ideology and religious appeal, Masoud attributes Islamists’
electoral success to “structural factors that shape both citizens’ choices
and parties’ strategies.” He reveals the irony of Egyptian leftists’ failure to
use economic problems such as poverty and unemployment to win elec-
tions or enhance their popularity compared to Islamists.76
Another explanation for the success of Islamists in electoral politics
is their adaptive tactics. Nathan Brown argues that regimes create a “red
line” that binds Islamists from seeking a majority in elections. In authori-
tarian settings Islamists adeptly seize political opportunities to enhance
their political gains, but they are also keen not to provoke the regime.
Brown explains, “[Islamist movements] adapt their organization and bend
their ideologies, but they are wary about the possibility that the political
opening will fizzle or fail to deliver what they wish. The result is a cat-​and-​
mouse game between dominant regimes and shrewd movements.”77
The fourth stream deals with the ideological transformation and or-
ganizational changes within the Brotherhood. Unlike the Orientalist
narrative, which treats Islamists as static and immutable actors, this
stream underscores their dynamic nature. It argues that Islamists,
like other social and political agents, are subject to ideological develop-
ment and change. Mona El-​Ghobashy provides compelling evidence for
this argument. In her cogent study The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers, El-​Ghobashy explains the shifts in the ideology and
organization of the Brotherhood between the 1990s and 2000s. These
32

32 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

changes arose from internal dynamics within the Brotherhood and

from the movement’s participation in party politics and adaptation to
change in the political environment: “[The] ikhwan’s energetic capital-
ization on Egypt’s sliver of electoral competition for seats in Parliament,
the professional unions, and municipal councils has had an especially
profound effect on their political thought and organization.” 78 Bruce
Rutherford supports El-​Ghobasy’s insights on the Brotherhood’s ideo-
logical evolution by highlighting the movement’s ability to articulate
what he calls “Islamic constitutionalism.” According to Rutherford,
this concept “advocates the adoption of laws that apply equally to ruler
and ruled, the creation of institutions that regulate and constrain state
power, and the protection of many civil and political rights. It also sup-
ports broad public participation in governance.” 79
On the organizational changes, El-​Ghobashy refers to the generational
shift within the Brotherhood after its repression during the 1960s. The
1970s witnessed the rise of a middle-​aged generation who would go on
to assume leadership positions in Parliament, universities, and profes-
sional syndicates in the 1980s and 1990s.80 Brown also underlines the
effect of this political opening on the Brotherhood’s organizational struc-
ture. However, he places particular emphasis on the organizational cost
of participation and its role in shaping the movement’s calculations. He
explains that the Brotherhood and other, similar groups actively weigh
the risks of political participation with its impact on other activities. They
tend to “leave a line of retreat, working to protect non-​political activities
and ensuring that the movement’s goals are not forgotten by the entrance
in the political process.”81
These studies have enhanced our understanding of the Brotherhood’s
collective action and political activism beyond essentialist and Orientalist
narratives. However, questions about the Brotherhood’s identity, social-
ization and indoctrination processes, internal dynamics, and balance of
power remain unanswered. This study attempts to provide plausible an-
swers to these questions. Unlike studies that focus on the Brotherhood
as a collective actor, I pay particular attention to the individual brothers
(ikhwan), as they constitute the basic cell or unit of the movement’s col-
lective action.82 Put differently, this study answers the crucial question of
what it means for someone to be an ikhwani in everyday life.
Most studies on the Brotherhood tend to focus exclusively on one
side or the other. By examining the processes of recruitment, social net-
working, and preaching, I explain how the Brotherhood adeptly turns its
33

Debating Islamism and Theorizing the Brotherhood 33

members into social entrepreneurs who play a crucial role in enabling the
movement to expand its influence and constituency.
The starting point in most studies of the Muslim Brotherhood is the
movement’s external behavior, including its political activism, provi-
sion of social services, and electoral participation. These analyses fail
to adequately emphasize how the internal workings of the Brotherhood
impact these external processes. To fill this gap I investigate the inter-
play between the internal and the external. In particular I analyze how
the internal world affects the Brotherhood’s external behavior, and how
this in turn shapes the movement’s political and social activism. I also
illustrate how the external environment impacts the Brotherhood’s
internal dynamics. Within this framework regime repression played
a particularly important role in shifting the balance of power within
the Brotherhood and shaping the movement’s leadership over the past
three decades.
34

Constructing Islamic
Collective Identity

Isl amists are not merely power seekers; they are also identity makers.
They seek to make societal values and norms more Islamic. Their collec-
tive action aims to reshape individuals’ identity and worldview. Therefore
the question of how Islamists shape individuals’ identity is crucial.
Identity is not something given; rather it is a constructed concept that re-
flects individuals’ sense of belonging to a certain family, group, tribe, or
religion. Identity is therefore the byproduct of an intricate, dynamic pro-
cess of constructing meanings in everyday life. In this chapter I explore
how Islamist movements construct their collective identity. I uncover
strategies, mechanisms, and tools that enable collective actors to produce
meanings, symbols, norms, and values that shape their identity. My key
objective is to propose an analytical framework that explains the process
of identity construction within Islamist movements: How do social move-
ments construct their identity? What are the components of collective
identity? To what extent can collective identity sustain collective action?
And what is the relationship, if any, between the political environment
and identity formation processes?
The construction of Islamic collective identity is contingent upon the
movement’s aims and objectives, its internal structure, and the political
environment within which it operates. I treat Islamic identity as a frame of
reference that Islamists use to recruit members, generate collective action,
and preserve their existence. I sketch the theoretical and scholarly debate
on identity formation and explain how Islamist movements create their
own collective identity. I explain how individual identity moves from the
35

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 35

self to the social and then to the collective and how movements bridge the
gap between these different levels of identity.

Echoes of the Self: What Is Identity?

The concept of identity is immensely problematic. Despite the plethora
of literature on the subject, the concept itself remains somewhat of an
enigma. Marilynn Brewer asserts that identity has no single or shared
meaning, as “the problem with trying to extract any common definition
is that the term is integrally embedded in separate theoretical structures
and literatures with little or no cross-​citation or mutual influence.”1 The
multidimensional nature of identity perplexes scholars and has sparked
fervent debate over its meaning and function. The sociologist Zygmunt
Bauman, for example, considers identity a matter of grave concern because
it contains vexing dilemmas for individuals and communities: “Identity-​
seekers invariably face the daunting task of ‘squaring a circle’: that ge-
neric phrase, as you know, implies tasks that can never be completed in a
‘real time,’ but are assumed to able to reach completion in the fullness of
time—​in infinity.”2
In fact the difficulty of defining identity stems not only from its epis-
temological relativity but also from its multiple empirical usages. Identity
is widely cited in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and, recently, po-
litical science; however, the roots of identity theory can be traced to the
American sociologist George Herbert Mead’s major work, Mind, Self,
and Society (1934). Mead’s classical framework of identity is based on
the interaction between the self and society. He explores the genesis of
the self as an organism that communicates with and responds to other
social organisms. The interaction between the self and society he calls
“the generalized other,” which refers to individuals’ tendency to behave
as an “organized community,” or social group. This process of interaction
is contingent upon what he identifies as “self-​consciousness.” According
to Mead, an individual organism enters the social environment through
self-​consciousness.3
Despite criticism of Mead’s insights as simplistic and ambiguous, many
theorists have built on his notion of “interactionism” in studying and in-
terpreting social behavior.4 Identity theory explains how social structures
affect the self and how the self shapes social behaviors. The main assump-
tion of identity theory is that the self is a multifaceted phenomenon that
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36 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

undertakes different social roles, “expectations attached to positions oc-

cupied in networks of relationships; identities are internalized role expec-
tations.”5 Michael Hogg, Deborah Terry, and Katherine White, however,
view the self as a reflection of society and argue that it should be regarded
as an organized construct. According to them, identity theory “views the
self not as an autonomous psychological entity but as a multifaceted social
construct that emerges from people’s roles in society; variation in self-​
concepts is due to the different roles that people occupy.”6
Building on the notion of social roles, Sheldon Stryker and Peter Burke
developed a subtheory of role identity that explains how social behavior
becomes a role-​choice behavior and why individuals choose one par-
ticular course of action.7 This notion stems from Mead’s concept of self-​
reflection, which he identifies as a prerequisite for social interaction. Peter
Callero establishes the link between identity and social roles. He defines
role-​identity as “a particular social object that represents a dimension of
the self.” According to Callero, role-​identity must be shared, socially rec-
ognized, and defined by action.8
The relationship between identity and social roles is paramount in
Islamist movements. By creating a distinctive identity for their followers,
Islamist groups can appeal to new constituents and expand their influ-
ence. In time members act as social entrepreneurs (du’ah) who embody
the movement’s values and ideology in everyday life. Furthermore this
new identity gives Islamists a sense of differentiation and recognition
in society, which is essential for recruiting new members and enhanc-
ing internal cohesiveness. Hogg and colleagues define role identities as
“self-​conceptions, self-​referent cognitions, or self-​definitions that people
apply to themselves as a consequence of the structural role positions they
occupy, and through a process of labeling or self-​definition as a member
of a particular social category.”9 In this sense identity is a crucial link be-
tween social structure and individual actions, which implies that identity
should entail action in the first place.10

From the Self to the Social

Islamist movements are neither mechanical nor dogmatic agents; they
are human and vibrant actors. As in any other group, members possess a
wide range of personality traits, skills, and capabilities. However, for them
to become productive and achieve the movement’s objectives, they must
move away from self-​identity and take on the group’s social identity.
37

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 37

Self-​identity refers to personal traits that create a sense of self-​

reflection; social identity refers to traits in groups that create a sense
of collectivity.11 Charles Taylor believes the starting point of defining
personal identity is to ask “Who am I, and where do I stand?” He ex-
plains, “My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications
which provide a frame or horizon within which I can try to determine
from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done,
or what I endorse or oppose.”12 The self cannot be revealed without
being reflected by others. Mark Leary and June Tangney maintain that
people view themselves as they believe others see them.13 That is, the
social aspect of personality comes to the fore when individuals conceive
themselves as part of others’ consciousness. This cognitive process of
perceiving the self and “the other” has divided identity scholars into
two camps. Some focus on self-​identity, or what they call identification
or self-​verification; others tackle the social aspect of identity through
self- ​categorization.14 The former exemplifies identity theory as explained
in the previous section, and the latter represents social identity theory,
which explains group processes and intergroup relations. It ties identity
to belonging to a social group, which is defined as “a set of individuals
who hold a common social identification or views themselves as a part
of social category.” Jan Sets and Peter Burke contend that identity is
the composition of two processes: identification and self-​categorization.
According to them, social identity is a “person’s knowledge that he or
she belongs to a social category or group.”15
However, the division between the two levels of identity is not absolute.
Proponents of both theories assert that identity cannot be defined with-
out revealing its dualist character. Some tend to treat identity instrumen-
tally depending on the context and the purpose of its use. In this context
Stryker and Burke highlight three popular uses of identity: (1) to refer to
the culture of a people, (2) to show identification with a collective or social
category, and (3) to reflect parts of a self composed of different meanings
and multiple roles.16 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper stress the dif-
ference between using identity as a category of practice and as a category
of analysis. Accordingly they highlight five different uses of identity: (1) to
describe noninstrumental modes of social and political action, whether
individual or collective; (2) to describe a common set of values among
members of a group or category, which they call “sameness”; (3) to iden-
tify the integral aspects of “selfhood” of individuals and social groups;
(4) to highlight the processual interactivity of collective understanding,
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38 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

solidarity, and groupness that enhance collective action; and (5) to reflect
the unstable and fragmented nature of the contemporary self.17
An additional concept that links the self and social identity is identity
salience, which refers to “the probability that an identity will be invoked
across a variety of situations, or alternatively across persons in a given
situation.”18 Identity salience denotes the multifaceted composition of
self-​identities and assumes identities are tied to roles and positions in or-
ganized social relations.19 Further, a number of sociologists contend that
salience facilitates the interplay between personal and social identity.20
It helps individuals who undertake social roles to be involved in social
groups and networks. Salience also enables social movements to recruit
these individuals and generate collective action. Stryker and Burke find
that the salience of religious identities predicts the time spent in religious
activities, and the salience of religious identities is predicted by the com-
mitment to role relationships based on religion.21
However, identity theorists have reached a consensus that identity is
not a fixed and immutable concept, but rather an evolving process of “be-
coming” instead of “being.”22 I thus treat identity as both a fluid and a
constructed concept. That is to say, despite the genesis of identity as a
concept that can be manifested in different aspects of human behavior,
its construction is determined by the agency of individual actors and the
social context in which they operate. As Taylor aptly puts it, “answering
the question of ‘who I am’ cannot be possible without defining where
I [am] speaking from and to whom.”23

Activating Identity: From the Social to the Collective

Islamists believe it is not enough to be a devout and pious Muslim; prac-
ticing and disseminating this piety in everyday life is paramount, and
convincing others to follow Islamic teachings and adopt Islamic values is
a religious duty. To this end social identity may not be sufficient to explain
Islamists’ activism. It is true that social identity is important in reveal-
ing individuals’ tendency to interact and communicate with other social
groups; however, it does not explain why certain individuals are keen to
participate in collective action. Therefore, to understand the rationale of
collective action, it is essential to distinguish between social identity and
collective identity. The former refers to the physiological, structural rela-
tionships between the self and other social groups; the latter treats the self
as an active agent in society. In other words, the social and physiological
39

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 39

traits of individuals do not guarantee their involvement in collective action

until these traits are activated by collective actors.24 Collective identity
therefore should not be perceived as an aggregation of social identities
but as “constructed, activated, and sustained only through interaction in
social movements’ communities.”25 In short, collective identity exempli-
fies the locus of collective action.
For individuals to move from social to collective identity they must be
involved in a collective action process that is organized, permanent, and
meaningful. Social movements are the vehicle through which collective
action and collective identity can be connected and sustained. William
Gamson asserts that social movements tend to include relevant collective
identities as part of their definition of the self.26 According to Verta Taylor
and Nancy Whittier, collective identities are rooted in the communities
of social movements and “[derive] from members’ common interests, ex-
periences, and solidarity.” In fact to some extent, a collective identity re-
flects the combination of cultural and ideational components of collective
action. Taylor and Whittier stress the importance of culture in identity
construction. They also contend that collective identity is more appropri-
ate than ideology for understanding collective phenomena. For them, un-
packing collective identity is fundamental to understand the complexity of
collective action beyond structural views.27

Collective Identity and Social Movements

Collective identity is a key component of social movements’ activism. The
relationship between collective identity and collective action is reciprocal.
Movements construct their identity through constant waves of collective
action. In turn, collective action enables movements to sustain their iden-
tity and secure a sense of belonging for their members. Gamson high-
lights the key role of collective identity in preserving collective action. He
contends that the durability of collective identity is contingent upon the
ability of the collective actor to link solidarity, the movement, and its or-
ganizational layers in the participants’ sense of self.28 Similarly Alberto
Melucci highlights three functions whereby collective identity ensures the
persistence of social movements: (1) it regulates membership; (2) it sets
the prerequisites for joining the movement; and (3) it draws on the criteria
by which members recognize themselves and are in turn recognized by
others.29
40

40 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Scholarship on the importance of collective identity is rich and illu-

minating. Interest in studying the collective identity of social movements
originated from changes across the world in the 1960s and 1970s brought
about by the emergence of new social movements (NSMs) in Europe and
the United States, which tackled issues such as feminism, environmen-
talism, and peace. More important, interest in collective identity reflects
the mounting need to overcome the shortcomings of mobilization and
political process models in studying social movements. Francesca Polletta
and James Jasper believe social movement theorists focus on collective
identity to fill the gap left by other models, to overcome the limitations of
structural analyses of social movements, and to respond to the many new
questions raised by social movements, such as Why do people take part in
collective action? What are the catalysts of social movements’ action? What
is the role of social movements’ identity in fueling collective action? They
also assert that collective identity plays a crucial role in social movements’
emergence, trajectories, and outcomes.30 According to David Snow, Robert
Benford, and Scott Hunt, the NSM perspective holds that the collective
search for identity is a central aspect of movement formation: “Identity
constructions, whether intended or not, are inherent in all social move-
ments’ framing activities.”31
However, a number of sociologists believe the growing interest in
studying identity instead reflects the crisis of the “modernity paradigm.”32
Alain Touraine, for example, addresses the need to study cultural aspects
of social movements in postindustrial society. He describes social move-
ments as “the combination of a principle of identity, a principle of opposi-
tion, and a principle of totality.” The aim of NSMs, Touraine maintains, is
not to change the state, as classical movements were doing, but to change
society.33 Melucci argues that postmodern society poses new challenges
for individuals and movements and that social movements have therefore
shifted their focus from structural issues (e.g., class, race) toward cultural
and symbolic issues: “Collective identity is thus a process in which actors
produce common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess their
environment and to calculate costs and benefits of their actions.”34
More significant is Calhoun’s contention that by focusing on identity,
NSM theory deconstructs the essential and natural assumptions of social
behavior. Although Calhoun criticizes the “newness” of social move-
ments, he acknowledges that identity construction is the main activity for
these “new” movements. Moreover he points out that despite the modern
discourse on NSMs, modernity has imposed dilemmas that force these
41

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 41

movements to respond by emphasizing their identity. He writes, “Recent

approaches to issues of identity have stressed the incompleteness, frag-
mentation and contradictions of both collective and personal experience.
They have shown how complex is the relationship among projects of iden-
tity, social demands and personal possibilities.”35
Calhoun’s insights on identity presume collective actors lack rational-
ity and are merely reacting to identity dilemmas. Many social movement
theorists, including Jean Cohen and Polletta and Jasper, have criticized
this conclusion. Cohen insists that social movements are rational actors
that create their own actions based on strategic calculations. She asserts
most contemporary movements are involved in two main activities: iden-
tity creation and strategic or rational calculation.36 Polletta and Jasper re-
spond to Calhoun with compelling assumptions about the rationality of
social movements. According to them, collective identity responds to the
inadequacies of instrumental rationality as an explanation for strategic
choice:

Collective identity has been a way to get at the cultural effects of

social movements. Dominant models of collective action have been
better at measuring movement outcomes such as policy reform or
expanded political representation than at gauging impacts outside
the formal political sphere. But movements also transform cultural
representations, social norms—​how groups see themselves and are
seen by others. Changes in collective identity captured movement
impacts beyond institutional reform.37

By focusing on identity, NSM theory has fostered the cultural study

of collective actors. Social movements are involved in articulating their
own culture through meaning and symbolic codes. By creating a cog-
nitive map for adherents, social movements can construct an identity
distinctive from the dominant culture. According to Hank Johnston
and Bert Klandermans, social movements invest in, add to, change, re-
construct, and reformulate a society’s culture. They argue that by creat-
ing a distinctive culture, social movements can maintain activism and
longevity.38 Moreover, culture can be used as cognitive repertories to
construct collective action and identity. According to Donatella Della
Porta and Mario Diani, culture provides ideational elements such as
beliefs, ceremonies, languages, and rituals that orient people and influ-
ence their identity.39
42

42 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Social Constructivism and Identity

This debate reveals the interplay of concepts, models, and approaches
on how to tackle collective identity. Building on these insights, I show
that collective identity is a social construct that reflects the interactive
relationship between structure and agency, meanings and actions,
and values and interests. Collective actors are required to give mean-
ing to what they are doing. Thus they are involved in the production
of meanings, symbols, and values to ensure members’ commitment
and participation in collective action. The departure point of this study
is Melucci’s notion of collective identity. As noted earlier, Melucci’s
pioneering study, Challenging Codes (1996), helps us understand the
complexity of identity construction in social movements by connecting
their ideational and institutional aspects. For Melucci collective iden-
tity “is not a datum or an essence, a ‘thing’ with a ‘real’ existence.”40
Collective identity is a socially constructed phenomenon, a reflection of
the multiple processes and interactions that occur inside social move-
ments and that are shaped by the opportunities and constraints in the
external environment.
To explain identity formulation within Islamist movements I have ad-
opted social constructivism as a framework of analysis. Identity per se is a
social construct. It is not something that can be measured; however, it can
be imagined, sustained, and manifested in everyday life. Social construc-
tivism enables an exploration, a deconstruction of the collective identity as
it happens within social movements. Melucci claims that social construc-
tivism reveals the collective agency of social actors by bridging the gap be-
tween objective conditions and subjective motives, behavior and meaning,
and structure and agency.
Social constructivism challenges the idea that identity is an immutable
phenomenon. Identity as a social reality reflects the interaction between
individuals and society whereby each affects the other. As Karen Cerulo
observes, every collective becomes a social artifact or entity molded, refab-
ricated, and mobilized in accordance with reigning cultural scripts and
centers of power.41 Collective identity is the outcome of these processes
of interactions between the self and society, individuals and groups, and
structures and meanings, which take place in everyday life. According to
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, identity is part of everyday reality. It
is “formed by social processes and is maintained, modified and reshaped
by social relations.”42
43

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 43

Hakan Yavuz asserts that stressing human agency as “the prime mover
of history” is the main premise of constructivism.43 It also allows for the
examination of the complex relationship between individuals and soci-
ety, agency and structure, symbols and action, and text and context. Most
important, social constructivism illustrates how collective identity helps
social movements generate collective action. Collective action, Melucci as-
serts, “must be understood in terms of the processes through which indi-
viduals communicate, negotiate, produce meanings and make decisions
within a particular social field or environment.”44
Furthermore social constructivism interprets how and why collective
actors create a distinctive identity for their members. This identity helps
movements to sustain their collective action and to counter other identity
makers in society. Islamist movements, for example, tend to employ cul-
tural and symbolic capital to construct their own collective identity as well
as to respond to the challenges and pressures coming from other rivals,
such as liberals, leftists, and especially the state. Put differently, social
constructivism reveals the ways individuals and groups participate in cre-
ating their perceived social reality.
Islamic collective identity is an ongoing process of creating meanings,
norms, images, and values for social agents. Such a process underlies in-
dividuals’ worldview, perceptions, attitudes, and actions in response to
the external world. By integrating cultural, institutional, and ideational
frameworks, I uncover the process of identity formation as it occurs within
Islamist movements. I use constructivism as an interpretive and interac-
tive approach to examine multiple relationships between aims and inter-
ests, beliefs and practices, and the internal and external environment.

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity

The longevity of Islamist movements stems from their ability to grant
their members a unique and distinctive identity. Islamist movements,
more than other actors, are adept at generating a sense of differentiation
and loyalty among members, which enables these movements to endure
and gain support. It is this sense of distinctiveness that also helps Islamist
movements recruit new members, reshape their worldview, and gener-
ate collective action. While religion underpins the movements’ identity,
they are keen to blend it with a political and social cause, such as politi-
cal injustice, corruption, or unemployment, in order to appeal to a wider
44

44 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

constituency. However, while it is true that Islamist movements are in-

volved in political activities such as forming parties, contesting elections,
and vying for public office, their ultimate goal remains determining so-
ciety’s norms, boundaries, and cognitive codes—​its identity. Therefore
they involve themselves in creating what Olivier Roy calls the “virtuous”
society.45 Yavuz finds that Islamists tend to reconstitute identities, institu-
tional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society by penetrat-
ing the cultural, economic, and educational spheres.46 For most Islamist
movements, producing an Islamic identity, regardless of what definition
they attach to it, is critical for recruiting members, expanding their con-
stituency, and especially continuing their activism.
By Islamic identity I mean the cognitive code of values, symbols,
norms, rituals, idioms, and emotions that Islamist movements employ
to forge individuals’ worldview, behaviors, and attitudes—​their identity.
It also reflects the frame of reference for Islamist movements’ collective
action. This frame is used to mobilize adherents, nurture activism, and
solidify their new identity. It helps individuals identify themselves as part
of a robust and meaningful entity. Further, the process of Islamic identity
formulation reflects an intertwined relationship between the movement’s
aims and objectives, internal system, and the environment within which
it functions. The more deeply the movement can instill its aims, objec-
tives, and norms into its members’ individual identities, the stronger and
more consolidated will be the collective identity.
This study integrates cultural and institutional aspects of Islamist
movements in order to gain a better understanding of their identity con-
struction process. As discussed earlier, this integration is crucial in over-
coming the shortcomings of the political process and resource mobiliza-
tion models in interpreting social movements’ activism. The genesis of
this integrative approach is Melucci’s insight on collective identity as “an
interactive process through which several individuals or groups define the
meaning of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints of
such an action” and as “the outcome of various axes of interaction between
the collective actor, identification declared by the actor, and the identifica-
tion given by others.”47
Primarily, the leadership determines an Islamist movement’s aims
and objectives, which are divided into two categories: expressive, which
refers to the ultimate goals that the movement seeks to pursue, and in-
strumental, which helps the movement to realize its aims. It is the lead-
ers’ task to align individuals’ personal goals and objectives with those of
45

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 45

the movement. For Islamists, establishing an Islamic state is an ultimate

aim. They stress and propagate it in their statements, speeches, and leaf-
lets. This aim can be realized through different instrumental goals, such
as building a robust organization, having a wide and effective social net-
work, and expanding their social base and constituency. Islamist leaders
also play a key role in the framing process that occurs within their move-
ment. It is through this process that Islamist movements can bind mem-
bers together and guarantee their loyalty and allegiance. Erving Goffman
defines framing as a “schemata of interpretation” that enables individuals
“to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life space
and the world at large.”48 According to Benford and Snow, framing is “an
active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the
level of reality construction.”49 This construction of reality is a key instru-
mental objective for Islamist movements. Islamist ideologues and figures
have a significant impact on followers and the organizational bearings of
the movement. Figures such as Hasan al-​Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul A’la
Maudidi, and Rachid el-​Ghanouchi play a fundamental role in identifying
their movements’ aims, strategies, and tactics. In the case of the Muslim
Brotherhood, al-​Banna set a broad aim, namely to “dominate the world and
[master] the humanity according to the teachings of Islam.” He also pro-
vided the means for members to realize this aim by prescribing six instru-
mental objectives: building the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, an
Islamic society, an Islamic government, an Islamic state, and an Islamic
umma (khilafa). Many in the Brotherhood perceive these objectives as a
blueprint for stages that should be followed in order to achieve the move-
ment’s ultimate goal. Al-​Banna also articulated the Brotherhood’s master
framework and ideology, which remains influential and operative among
its members to this day. To connect individuals to the movement’s objec-
tives, he stressed each member’s responsibility in realizing them:

The creation of nations, the education of people, the realization

of hopes, and the defense of principles. The nation which tries to
achieve this or the group which is calling for this will need at the
very least a mighty spiritual strength which may be manifested in
numerous ways: a strong will which no weakness can penetrate; a
steady loyalty unassailable by fickleness or treachery; a noble spirit
of self-​sacrifice, unaffected by greed or avarice; a knowledge of the
principles, having faith in them, evaluating them, and making
sure they are immune to error. They must ensure that there is no
46

46 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

deviation, quibbling or betrayal about it (which are the character-

istics of the soul). Upon this awesome spiritual strength and high
principles will be erected, resurgent nations who will create edu-
cated and zealous people, [and] life will be renewed in those who
have been deprived of it for many years.50

Nevertheless the distinction between expressive and instrumental

objectives is not rigid. An instrumental objective can be treated at cer-
tain stages as expressive. For instance, during repression, survival of the
movement becomes the ultimate goal. In fact the Brotherhood has suc-
cessfully used this tactic to endure regime repression and to mitigate its
consequences. When the movement was systematically repressed under
Mubarak, it accommodated regime crackdown and maintained its organi-
zation. In other words, self-​preservation can be the movement’s ultimate
goal at times.
In addition it is important to discuss whether the movement’s ultimate
target is the state, the society, or both. Islamist movements tend to target
the state and society together. In this regard Yavuz suggested an opera-
tional and useful typology for Islamist movements based on their targets
and strategies. Islamist movements can be divided into two main cate-
gories: society-​oriented movements, which seek to change society from
within, and state-​oriented movements, which seek to change the political
system and seize power as a tool to transform society. The latter is divided
into subcategories: revolutionary movements, which reject the existing
political system and use violence to change it, and reformist movements,
which participate in political processes and are involved in building alli-
ances with other parties in hopes of capturing the state or reshaping its
policy.51
Despite the plausibility of Yavuz’s typological framework, its termi-
nology and classification are ambiguous and contradictory. For instance,
it is not enough for an Islamist movement that abandons violence to be
described as reformist. The Moroccan Al-​Adl wal-​Ihsan movement does
not adopt violence, but it has a revolutionary agenda that targets state and
society. Likewise one cannot put the Brotherhood in the same category
as Al-​Adl wal-​Ihsan just because both abjure violence because there are
significant differences between them. I contend that the Brotherhood is
a movement that targets both the state and society; thus its ideology and
strategy are formulated to change societal norms and values as well as to
make the state more Islamic.
47

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 47

The second component of the identity construction process is the move-

ment’s internal structure, norms, and dynamics. According to Melucci,
the internal system of the collective actor is designed to pursue the move-
ment’s objectives, adapt to the environment, and preserve unity.52 It articu-
lates the power dynamics and identifies organizational roles, membership
and affiliation rules, and the structure of incentives. Together these com-
ponents constitute the movement’s character and identity. The internal
system of Islamist movements has a significant impact on their identity
and can be divided into inclusive and exclusive. The former is a flex-
ible system of membership and affiliation based on a participatory style
of management and interactions. The exclusive system is characterized
by rigidity and homogeneity of membership and reflects an authoritar-
ian style of management. For instance, movements that require intense
ideological identification tend to impose an exclusive internal system that
requires a high degree of commitment.53 These exclusive organizations
demand rigid discipline and intrude upon every aspect of their members’
lives. Della Porta and Diani observe, “The greater the degree to which
an organization is founded on symbolic incentives—​either ideological or
solidarisitc—​the more exclusive it will be.”54 The importance of a move-
ment’s internal system stems from helping the members in allocating
resources and building a solid network and enabling the movement to
produce symbols, values, and rituals that form its collective identity.
This identity also reflects conflict, negotiations, and bargaining relations
within the movement, particularly between members and leadership.
The third component that shapes identity construction is the environ-
ment within which Islamist movements operate. Social movements do
not operate in a vacuum. They naturally involve themselves in conflictual
as well as cooperative relations with similar movements, potential com-
petitors, and the state. This conflict defines the movement’s strategies,
objectives, and tactics. According to Melucci, the environment is made up
of the wider society within which the movement is situated and draws its
support base.55 It contains the opportunities and constraints that enable
the collective actor to formulate its collective identity. It also includes the
“other” with or against whom the movement seeks to define itself. It both
helps and hinders the movement’s ability to delineate and sustain its
character—​its identity.
The impact of the environment on the identity construction process
is therefore crucial. If the movement is operating within a hostile and
repressive environment, its objectives, strategies, and behaviors can
48

48 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

become radical.56 The relationship between repression and radicalization

of Islamist movements is evident.57 A repressive environment heightens
the necessity of affiliation. For instance, Islamist movements operating in
a hostile and repressive environment tend to impose a high degree of com-
mitment on members to ensure loyalty and maintain unity. During times
of conflict the internal system of the movement reinforces and guarantees
identity. In this context, Melucci states, “people feel a bond with others not
because they share the same interests, but because they need that bond in
order to make sense of what they are doing.”58
As Figure 3.1 shows, the relationship between factors that shape
Islamist movements’ identity is reciprocal. They help the movement create
its framework of identity that differentiates it from other movements and
competitors. This framework enables Islamists to draw their objectives
and targets, build their organization, and strategize their relationship
with other adversaries. It also reflects how Islamist movements integrate
religious, cultural, and institutional aspects of their organization in creat-
ing their identity.
Before applying this framework to the Brotherhood, three important
points are worth mentioning. First is the interactive nature of this identity
framework. I do not propose a linear relationship between the underpin-
ning components of the movement’s identity; instead I examine how these
components are intertwined and affect each other. Second, this framework
recognizes the importance of institutional as well as ideational factors

Aims and Obectives

Expressive/
Instrumental

Internal system Collective Targets

Inclusive/Exclusive Identity State/Society

Environment
opportunities/
constraints

Figure 3.1 Components of the Identity Construction Process

49

Constructing Islamic Collective Identity 49

in constructing the Brotherhood’s identity. It thus considers structures

such as mobilization, networking, and protesting, as well as the symbols,
values, and norms of collective action. Third, and most important, this
framework should be perceived as an analytical and operational approach
that can help deconstruct the Brotherhood’s identity formation process—​
“to dismantle the ‘reified’ appearance of those empirical dimensions of a
social movement and to attain the constructive process behind them.”59
50

The Power of the Jama‘a

The Enduring Legacy of Hasan al-​B anna

The current leadership of the Brotherhood doesn’t under-

stand al-​Banna’s teachings. They lack his charismatic
skills and have diverted from the path he drew for the
movement eight decades ago.
K ama El-​Helbaw y in in terview with the au thor,
December 3, 2009

Hasan al-​Banna’s impac t on the Muslim Brotherhood is undeniable.

His legacy extends beyond merely founding the movement; he branded
its ideology, structure, and identity with his ideas and views. Al-​Banna
was not simply a religious scholar or preacher seeking spiritual salvation;
he was also a social activist and political leader who sought to affect, and
indeed change, the entire society. Despite his passing more than six de-
cades ago, al-​Banna remains the Brotherhood’s chief ideologue and most
influential leader. He set the movement’s organizational and structural
underpinnings, the ideology he crafted remains in effect today. In fact
al-​Banna’s writings, statements, and epistles constitute an integral com-
ponent of the Brotherhood’s texts and socialization process. Nearly every
Brotherhood member memorizes and glorifies al-​Banna’s epistles and
strives to follow them in everyday life. Ironically, though, al-​Banna’s views
remain the subject of debate within the Brotherhood because of differ-
ences among members in interpreting his statements and epistles and
because some question the relevance and importance of his views in the
modern day. The Brotherhood has revised some of these views, particu-
larly those on political parties and the role of women in society. However,
his views on organizational commitment, allegiance, obedience, and lead-
ership remain influential and shape the Brotherhood’s structure. Since
51

The Power of the Jama‘a 51

al-​Banna’s death, the Brotherhood has not had a leader who comes close
to matching his charisma and influence.
Scholarship on al-​ Banna tends to focus on his upbringing and
personal journey, without much emphasis on his impact on the
Brotherhood’s identity.1 Despite the contribution of this literature, many
aspects of al-​Banna’s legacy have yet to be uncovered. This chapter pro-
vides a fresh account of al-​Banna’s role in shaping the Brotherhood’s
identity. I illustrate how al-​Banna was able to articulate the foundational
framework of the Brotherhood’s identity. By setting its organizational
structure, drawing its key objectives, and crafting its code of norms and
values, al-​Banna endowed the Brotherhood with a coherent and distinc-
tive identity that has preserved the movement and nurtured its political
and social activism.
Al-​Banna’s brilliance lay in his ability to interweave the collective
identity of the Brotherhood through the Islamic notion of jama‘a. In fact
the very idea of the Brotherhood stems from this notion, which has sig-
nificant religious, spiritual, and organizational connotations. It is rooted
in Islamic traditions, specifically the Qur’an and Sunna, where Muslims
are urged to act collectively in order to unite the entire umma.2 As I ex-
plain in the following chapters, the norms of allegiance, obedience, and
commitment are derived from the jama‘a and its religious foundations.
Moreover al-​Banna transformed jama‘a into an operative and functional
structure that enables the Brotherhood to effectively recruit, manage,
and direct its members, generate collective action, and maintain inter-
nal coherence.

Contextualizing al-​Banna
In order to understand how al-​Banna articulated the Brotherhood’s col-
lective identity, it is essential to contextualize his ideas and thoughts.
Al-​Banna was born on October 14, 1906, one year after the death of the
renowned Islamic reformer Mohamed Abdu. He grew up in the small
town of Mahmudiyya in the province of Buhayra, ninety miles north-
east of Cairo, in a traditional Muslim family in which his father, Sheikh
Ahmed Abdelrahman al-​Banna, was an Islamic scholar and the local
imam (prayer leader) of the mosque in Mahmudiyya. Al-​Banna received
his basic education and religious knowledge from his father and from the
rural community in which he was raised.3 From his early years he was
52

52 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

an active member of his small, tight-​knit community. As a young stu-

dent he was profoundly influenced by the moral and spiritual atmosphere
crafted by Sheikh Mohammed Zahran, the head of the primary school
of Ar-​rashad School. When the 1919 Revolution erupted al-​Banna joined
demonstrations against the British occupation, a decision that fostered
his nationalist sentiment against foreign powers and would become a
key component of the Brotherhood’s ideology.4 Despite his religious in-
clinations, he did not join Al-​Azhar, the beacon of religious education in
the Sunni Muslim world. Instead he chose to pursue his education in a
modern school.5 He joined Dar al-​Mua’lmin (Primary Teaching School)
in Damanhur, the capital city of Buhayara, where he was exposed to the
Sufi Hassafiyya order.6
The most significant impact on al-​Banna occurred when he moved to
Cairo in 1923 to pursue his higher education at Dar-​al-​Ulum (House of
Sciences). Al-​Banna was stunned by the contrast between his life in rural
Mahmudiyya and life in Cairo, where he was surrounded by all manifesta-
tions of modernity and exposed to the cultural and political debates taking
place in the wake of the 1919 Revolution. For al-​Banna, Cairo was not just a
place for obtaining an educational degree; it was a symbolic battleground
over values, morals, and, most important, identity.

Egypt’s Identity Contested

At the turn of the twentieth century Egypt was confronted with an identity
crisis. Some Egyptians wanted society to become more secular; others
held on to the state’s Islamic character, especially following the removal
of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. There was also a debate over how Egypt
would achieve nahdha (renaissance).7 This struggle involved two main in-
tellectual camps: the so-​called Western modernists (tahdithyiun) and the
Islamic revivalists, or reformists (islahyiun).8 The modernists said nahdha
would not be possible without emulating the West and benefiting from its
social, cultural, and political production. For them, modernization was
the lynchpin of Egypt’s push for independence. Therefore they believed
national sentiment should be based on law and modern values instead of
the long-​standing system of Islamic conventions. In contrast, the Islamic
revivalists believed nahdha and modernization should not come at the ex-
pense of Islamic values and morals. They maintained that Egyptians, as
well as Muslims, could benefit from Western scientific and technological
53

The Power of the Jama‘a 53

advancements without embracing Western values or lifestyles. For them,

reinforcing Islamic sentiment was crucial to liberating Egypt and the
Muslim world from imperialism and colonialism.9
The debate over Egypt’s identity extended to religious circles. Islamic
scholars feared that an Egyptian identity based on nationalism and mod-
ernism would be the beginning of the secularization of Egypt. They
claimed liberal-​secular intellectuals sought to emulate the Turkish model
that separated Islam and politics and was led by the Turkish leader Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk.10 They also perceived secularists’ celebration of the re-
moval of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 as a sign of betrayal and a threat
to the Islamic character of Egypt.11 Therefore it is no surprise that many
Al-​Azhar scholars sought to counter Atatürk’s abolition of the caliphate
by convening a conference in May 1926 to discuss its future. However,
the delegates failed to reach a consensus on what should be done or who
should be the new caliph.12
The debate following the demise of the Ottoman Empire was cru-
cial in shaping al-​Banna’s views. In 1926 Sheikh Aly Abdel Raziq, an
Azharite scholar and shari‘a judge, published his controversial book,
Al-​Islam wa’ usul al-​hukm (Islam and the Foundations of Governance),
in which he argues that Islam does not assign a specific type of gov-
ernment or political system, that the caliphate is not a religious duty
that Muslims need to fulfill but a mundane choice. Abdel Raziq’s
views triggered contentious political and intellectual debate and wid-
ened the gap between secular and Islamic scholars. According to the
Islamic camp, the removal of the caliphate was a sign of the demise of
Muslims, who should exert effort to restore it.13 However, liberals and
modernists saw the end of the caliphate as a positive development,
as it paved the way for dissolving the relationship between Egypt and
the Ottoman Empire.14 Al-​Banna was struck by the celebration of the
caliphate’s abolition and argued that reviving it was an Islamic duty
that Muslims should strive to fulfill.15 In other words, the notion of
pan-​Islamism in al-​Banna’s ideology was born from the demise of the
Islamic caliphate in Istanbul. Al-​Banna considered the debate over
Egypt’s identity to be vital. He believed that the only way to preserve
the Islamic character of Egypt was to embody Islamic teachings and
values in everyday life. And the only way to achieve this goal was by
establishing a movement capable of reshaping Muslims’ perception
and identity.
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54 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

The Brotherhood as an Identity-​Created Movement

The Brotherhood’s creation was a response to the identity crisis that con-
fronted Egypt during the first half of the twentieth century. For al-​Banna
it was essential to create an identity-​based movement capable of embody-
ing Islamic values and ideals in everyday life. He was not concerned with
establishing an organization that would compete with other Islamic asso-
ciations.16 Instead he sought to establish a movement that could reshape
societal norms, values, and practices to be more Islamic—​to weave a new
identity for Egyptian society. He wrote, “We call people to have a principle in
their lives, to believe in it…. Our movement has a principle; our principle
is calling for Islam. Islam in our understanding encompasses every aspect
in our life…. Our call [du’atuna] stems from the Qur’an and Sunna.”17
The quest for identity lies at the heart of al-​Banna’s ideology. He always
believed reviving Islamic identity would not only insulate Muslims from
Western subversion but would also provide them with an alternative
system—​ socially, politically, economically, and culturally—​ that could
challenge Western civilization. To legitimize the Brotherhood’s cause and
ideology, he addressed the rampant political and social problems facing
Egypt during the 1920s and 1930s.18 He strove to position himself and his
movement as the savior, not only of Islam and Muslims but of the entire
world. He succinctly stated, “Our call is a call of reviving and rescuing
humanity.”19
However, it should be noted that al-​Banna was preoccupied with produc-
ing a model of identity that could attract a large number of Egyptians who
felt alienated by the manifestation of Westernization in Egypt. Therefore
he appealed to lower-​and lower-​middle-​class Egyptians who were most
significantly marginalized by the economic hardship and class divisions
prevailing in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s.20
In fact al-​Banna was the first scholar to transform Islamic rhetoric
over Egypt’s identity from an elitist to a populist political and religious
ideology. He was convinced that in order to revive and enhance Islamic
identity one had to engage the public. In contrast to scholars such as
Mohamed Abdu and Rashid Rida, who restricted their views on identity
to elite and intellectual circles, al-​Banna brought these conversations to
the public. While Abdu and Rida focused on reforming religious institu-
tions and discourse, al-​Banna focused on reforming society as a whole. In
this respect, Ghanim contends, al-​Banna succeeded where other Islamic
55

The Power of the Jama‘a 55

scholars failed. According to Ghanim, al-​Banna was immensely affected

by the plight of Islam and Muslims.21 However, he leveraged this situ-
ation to galvanize Egyptians and generate Islamic collective action. As
a result al-​Banna’s grassroots mobilization of Egyptian consciousness
is one of the first manifestations of Islamic activism. Today, as Wilfred
Smith notes, the Brotherhood seeks to “transform Islam into an operative
force actively at work on modern problems.”22 Al-​Banna criticized other
Islamic organization for doing nothing to protect Muslims’ identity. As
one of his disciples puts it:

The main concern of the existing Islamic groups was just to fill a
part of the vacuum. Their aim was only to return people to Islam;
however, it’s the superficial Islam, the formal Islam, not the real
one. However, al-​Banna has sought to revive Islamic existence and
provide Islam in a persuasive and new form. He sought to incite
Islamic issues and defend Muslim nations through faith and
thought, system and heritage, inside and outside.23Put differently,
al-​Banna sought to connect the past with the present, structure with
agency, and text with context to forge the Brotherhood’s identity.

Al-​Banna’s Comprehension of Islamic Identity

It was difficult for al-​Banna to construct the Brotherhood’s identity without
first carving out the concept of “Islamic identity,” which he called al-​fikra al-​
islamiyya.24 He envisioned Islamic identity as an inclusive, normative system
of meanings, symbols, and practices that Muslims should abide by in every-
day life. Indeed al-​Banna was keen to distinguish himself from the prevail-
ing Islamic discourse. Thus al-​fikra al-​islamiyya was perceived as innovative
and attractive, granting al-​Banna significant influence in the Islamic milieu.
He also brought questions of identity to the fore in his tracts and statements,
asking, “Who are you? What are the aims of your life? Do you truly under-
stand Islam? Do you follow the Islamic teachings in everyday life?”25
Al-​Banna crafted three primary dimensions of Islamic identity: com-
prehensiveness, adaptability and elasticity, and applicability (see Figure
4.1). However, it is vital to stress that al-​Banna treated Islamic identity not
as abstract and fixed but rather as dynamic and fluid, able to fit different
political contexts.
56

56 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Inclusiveness/
comprehensiveness

Islamic
Identity

Elasticity/ Practicality/
Adaptability Applicability

Figure 4.1 Al-​Banna’s Framework of Islamic Identity

Inclusiveness and Comprehensiveness

Al-​Banna perceived Islamic identity to be an inclusive system of norms,
values, and regulations capable of translating teachings and principles
into the practices of everyday life. He believed Islam is a comprehensive
creed that should encompass all aspects of human life. In one of his most
stunning and enduring statements he emphasized, “We believe that Islam
is an inclusive system; it is a faith and worship, a state, nationality and re-
ligion, a spirit and deed, a holy text and a sword. … The Glorious Qur’an
considers these things to be the core of Islam.”26
Al-​Banna’s notion of inclusiveness (shumuliyyat al-​islam) is derived
from his perception of Islam as a comprehensive way of life. Not surpris-
ingly his solution for Egypt’s political, economic, and social issues is the
return to Islam as a comprehensive order for human existence.27 This is
an integral idea that shapes the worldview of the Brotherhood’s members
to this day. According to Abdullah Essam, a mid-​ranking leader of the
Brotherhood, Islam is an all-​encompassing religion that fits in any society
and survives any circumstance.28
Building on his concept of inclusiveness, al-​Banna was able con-
nect the mundane with the sacred, not with a dogmatic and theologi-
cal approach but by articulating a practical and pragmatic platform for
reform.29 More important, he implanted the notion of inclusiveness in
the minds and hearts of his followers by using expressive and emotional
phrases. In one of his most influential statements, he describes himself
this way:
57

The Power of the Jama‘a 57

I am a traveler seeking the truth, a human searching for the mean-

ing of humanity and a citizen seeking dignity, freedom, stability and
welfare under the shade of Islam. I am a free man who is aware of
the purpose of his existence and who proclaims: “Truly, my prayer
and my sacrifice, my living and my dying are all for Allah, the Lord
of the worlds; no partner has He. This I am commanded and I am
of the Muslims (who submit to Him)!” [Qur’an, 6, 162–​163]. This is
who I am. … Who are you?30

Al-​Banna employed the notion of Islamic inclusiveness to delegitimize

foreign ideologies such as communism and capitalism. He taught that
Islam overrides socialism, capitalism, the East and the West, nationalism
and universalism.31 Ironically he used several Western concepts to outline
his ideology, including freedom, elections, stability, and welfare. However,
he was successful in framing and normalizing them to his audience as
indigenous concepts.

Elasticity and Adaptability

The second key element of al-​Banna’s conception of Islamic identity is
elasticity and adaptability. He argued that Islam transcends time and
space and that it accommodates all other ideologies and philosophies.
As the last revealed message, Islam is eternal and compatible with all
ages and nations. In expounding on his argument, al-​Banna empha-
sized that Islam is consistent with science, pointing to the fact that
Islamic civilization contributed significantly to advancements in sci-
ence and technology.32
Al-​Banna’s belief in the elasticity of Islamic identity is highlighted in
his attempts to fit that identity into the existing Egyptian political system.33
It is widely acknowledged that al-​Banna did not seek to overthrow the
political regime in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s. In fact he praised
constitutional government, which he believed was the most compatible
with Islam due to its emphasis on accountability.34 Despite bitter disputes
between al-​Banna and King Farouk’s government, al-​Banna never at-
tempted to delegitimize the king. In fact he had a good relationship with
the palace and acknowledged the legitimacy of Farouk despite the king’s
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58 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

relationship with the British.35 This flexibility is one of the key drivers of
the Brotherhood’s durability.

Applicability and Practicality

The third aspect of al-​Banna’s perception of Islamic identity concerns its
broadly applicable nature. Unlike many of Islam’s ideologues, al-​Banna
was highly pragmatic. It was useless, he insisted, to disseminate Islamic
ideology without a practical platform that could attract and convince
people. He titled one of his tracts “Are We Practical People?” (“Hal nahnu
qawmun ‘amaliyyun”), in which he stresses the importance of having a
comprehensive and practical platform for reform. Al-​Banna was keen to
present himself not as a traditional theoretician but as a social activist.
Drawing on the notion of inclusiveness, he stressed the comprehensive-
ness of Islamic methodology (shumuliyyat al-​manhj al-​islami), which im-
plies Islamic identity cannot prevail without being applied as a detailed
program for everyday life. He wrote, “If you study the Islamic teachings,
you will find that Islam has set all proper rules and laws for human life; for
men and women, for the family and nations.”36 Therefore al-​Banna pro-
vided a detailed reform platform, ranging from political and social issues
to health, science, and the ethics of everyday life.37

The Jama‘a Paradigm

As the leader of a social movement, al-​Banna articulated the overarching
framework of the Brotherhood’s identity by instilling a collective identity
within its ideology, structure, and objectives. Whether or not he was aware
of it, he integrated the ideational factors—​Islamic symbols, rituals, and
values—​with the institutional aspects of the movement. He was keen to
align the Brotherhood’s members with the movement’s aims and objec-
tives. In other words, he constructed a sophisticated and coherent organi-
zation capable of both embodying his vision and ideology and becoming a
mouthpiece for his ideas.
To integrate his vision of Islamic identity into the Brotherhood’s ideol-
ogy and structure, al-​Banna created what I call the jama‘a paradigm. The
jama‘a is the cognitive system that encompasses and guides Brotherhood
members in everyday life, detailing its aims and objectives, duties and
means, and phases and norms. It contains the Brotherhood’s material,
moral, and expressive aims, as well as its tools and strategies. Moreover
59

The Power of the Jama‘a 59

Aims
(al-Ghayat)

Objectives Mission
(al-Ahdaf) (al-Muhemma)

Duties Methodology Means Phases

(al-Wajibat) (al-Manhj) (al-Wasa'il) (al-Marahil)

Figure 4.2 The Jama‘a Paradigm

this paradigm creates a pattern of identity for the Brotherhood based on

a sense of commitment and solidarity among members who act not as
individuals but as a collective unit—​as brothers.
The jama‘a paradigm defines the movement’s raison d’être, self-​
perception, and worldview. It constitutes the underpinnings of social agents’
identity. Thus al-​Banna constructed the framework of the Brotherhood’s
identity and sought to integrate it within the movement’s structure and
ideology. This cognitive map remains in effect to this day. However, it is not
rigid or stale; on the contrary, it has worked for decades as a dynamic driver
to transfer ideas into action, ideology into identity, and aims into reality.
As Figure 4.2 shows, the jama‘a paradigm comprises seven integral
and connected elements: aims (al-​ghay’at), objectives (al-​ahdaf ), mission
(al-​muhima), duties (al-​wajibat), methodology (al-​manhj), means (al-​was’il),
and phases (al-​marahil).38

Aims and Objectives

Al-​Banna articulated three broad aims (al-​ghayat) for the Brotherhood:
(1) leading humanity toward greater well-​being under the banner of Islam,
(2) reinforcing Islamic identity among Muslims, and (3) creating a move-
ment that embodies Islam in everyday life. He explained, “I devoted myself
to one aim: to guide people to Islam by words and deeds and that is why
I founded the Brotherhood to exemplify Islam in its aims and means.”39
By setting these aims al-​Banna constructed a vibrant and enduring master
frame for the Brotherhood. As Benford and Snow note, master frames link
the beliefs and ideas of a protest group to political opportunity structures,
which allow the social movement to spread its ideas and gain adherents.40
Al-​
Banna then introduced a cluster of instrumental objectives (al-​
ahdaf) in order to achieve these aims. These objectives can be divided into
60

60 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

tentative and permanent. Tentative objectives include liberating Islamic

countries from foreign occupation, resisting the materialistic and atheist
wave that dominates Muslim nations, and reformulating political, social,
economic, educational, and judicial systems to be based on Islamic prin-
ciples. Permanent objectives include establishing an Islamic state that im-
plements Islamic teachings in everyday life, uniting all Muslim countries
under the banner of Islam, and disseminating the Islamic call (al-​Da‘wa
al-​Islamiyya) around the world.41
These aims and objectives are profoundly interconnected. They also play
an integral role in aligning the movement’s members with its ideology and
leadership. Despite the broad ambiguity of the aims, they played a vital role
in creating and legitimizing the Brotherhood’s cause. Al-​Banna, as well
as his successors, employed these aims to recruit and attract individuals
and, more important, to reshape their identity and connect them with the
movement. As Melucci observes, the expressive function of a leader lies in
his or her ability to offer symbolic objects for identification, around which
the solidarity of the members and their individual identities coagulate.42
Al-​
Banna’s aims are greatly broad and vague, which enables the
Brotherhood to employ them flexibly to fit its mobilization and recruitment
strategy. By setting general yet simple Islamic aims and objectives, the
Brotherhood can successfully persuade large numbers of Egyptians to join
the movement. These aims and objectives also enhance the Brotherhood’s
symbolic capital, as they resonate with the ordinary public who believe that
Islam should not be separated from public life. They give the Brotherhood
credibility and influence among other Islamic organizations. By linking
Islam to reform and ideas to action, al-​Banna ensured a powerful position
for the Brotherhood in the religious market. These broad aims enable the
Brotherhood to maintain unity and coherence. By aligning Brotherhood
members with these aims, the possibility of division is more effectively
contained. The Brotherhood tends to treat these aims as part of members’
religious duties that must be fulfilled. Most important, these aims help
the Brotherhood survive and gain support. That is, as long as these aims
remain unaccomplished, the movement can continue to recruit members,
allocate resources, and generate collective action.

Mission
Al-​Banna also posited different meanings and connotations in relation
to the Brotherhood’s mission (al-​muhema). He states, “Our mission
61

The Power of the Jama‘a 61

[muhimmatuna] is to stand in the face of the prevalent wave of material-

ism.” In a more detailed statement, he stresses that the Brotherhood’s
mission is to reform Egypt and enable it to lead the Muslim world. To
this end he emphasizes that the realization of this mission includes
the following indicators: (1) an efficient political system; (2) a new
system of international relations; (3) a practical judiciary system; (4) an
efficient economic system that ensures the independence of individu-
als, society, and the state; (5) a cultural and educational system that
can overcome illiteracy and darkness; (6) a family system capable of
rebuilding private and intimate relationships between Muslims; (7) a
discipline system that can reform individuals’ behaviors; and (8) a ho-
listic spirit based on Islam that encompasses both the ruled and the
rulers.43
The Brotherhood’s mission is deeply intertwined with its aims and
objectives. Interestingly al-​Banna departed from the broad language as-
sociated with the aims and objectives by delineating the specific steps to
be taken in order to achieve the movement’s mission. He successfully in-
fused a unique sense of responsibility and commitment to motivate mem-
bers to change society. In addition he employed the mission to mobilize
adherents and construct meaning for their action. The mission serves as
the vehicle for linking the aims and duties (al-​wajibat) that the ikhwan
should undertake.

Duties
Al-​Banna identified six key duties (al-​wajibat) that the Brotherhood’s
members must practice in order to achieve the movement’s objec-
tives: (1) to be ready to make sacrifices for the sake of the mission; (2) to
demarcate the real boundaries of Islam; (3) to help people follow and re-
spect these boundaries; (4) to strive to achieve the Brotherhood’s aims
and objectives; (5) to adopt the Brotherhood’s credo in everyday life; and
(6) to believe these duties are derived from the teachings of Islam.44 These
duties are noticeably more individualized than the aims and mission of
the movement as a whole. This individualization ensures that members
remain committed and loyal to the Brotherhood’s ideology and leader-
ship. Al-​Banna connected the fulfillment of these duties to organizational
and personal promotion within the Brotherhood. As I explain in the next
chapter, members who seek to move from one level to another within the
Brotherhood must assume these duties and apply them in everyday life.
62

62 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

The more duties members strive to undertake, the higher the position
they might attain.

Method
The Brotherhood’s method (al-​manhaj) is the disciplined approach with
which the movement can achieve its ultimate goals. Al-​Banna asserted that
the movement’s method should be based on three key principals: (1) faith
in Islamic values and principles as the foundation for everyday life;
(2) faith in incremental and comprehensive reform, which starts with in-
dividuals and then encompasses society; and (3) faith in practicality and
connecting words with good deeds. Al-​Banna advanced the idea that the
Brotherhood should adopt a comprehensive manhaj in order to achieve
its goals. In many of his epistles he stressed that Islamic methodology
(shmūliya al-​manhaj al-​islami) should include all aspects of life: political,
economic, social, and moral.45 This holistic approach corresponds with
the broadness of the Brotherhood’s objectives. It is within this framework
that the Brotherhood is capable of presenting itself as an all-​encompassing
movement seeking to reform and change societal norms and values to be
more Islamic.

Means
Means (al-​wasa’il) refer to the strategy and tools the Brotherhood utilizes
to achieve its objectives: (1) deep faith, (2) precise organization, and (3) un-
interrupted work. More specifically al-​Banna established three tools for
the Brotherhood to achieve its goals: propagating the Islamic call (da‘wa)
among the people through persuasion, expanding the movement’s social
network, and adopting a legitimate political and constitutional path to voice
the Brotherhood’s political views. Ironically, although al-​Banna wanted to
achieve fundamental change in Egypt, he stressed that this change should
happen gradually. He consciously avoided revolutionary words and expres-
sions in his epistles. He also reproved members who called for revolu-
tion as a means for change, writing, “The Brotherhood does not believe in
revolution, and does not rely on it in achieving its goals and if it happened,
we will not adopt it…. Our task is to create a new generation of believers
who can reformulate the Islamic umma in its all aspects of life.” Al-​Banna
believed that without reshaping an individual’s identity, any attempt to
pursue change would be superficial and ineffective.46
63

The Power of the Jama‘a 63

Phases
To put all these elements into action, al-​Banna established a firm order
of phases (al-​marahil) for the Brotherhood to follow. He underscored the
importance of progressing in phases in order to ensure the movement
achieved its objectives. He outlined three key stages: (1) disseminating the
Brotherhood’s ideology; (2) recruiting supporters, building the movement,
and mobilizing its followers; and (3) implementing work and producing
action.47 These stages are not to be segregated but undertaken congruently
in order to ensure the Brotherhood’s endurance and dynamism.
Ultimately these stages reflect the Brotherhood’s gradualist character.
In fact al-​Banna implanted this gradualism in the Brotherhood’s struc-
ture and strategy, and the movement adopted a disciplined “bottom-​up”
policy to achieve its goals. This gradualism is based on the ripple effect of
making da‘wa, the task of reformulating individuals’ identities to line up
with Islamic values. This reformulation is set in motion by spreading the
Brotherhood’s ideas across the country through grassroots activities, such
as education and social welfare, to recruit more members. Based on this
gradualist and elastic approach, al-​Banna was able to expand the network
and base of the Brotherhood substantially.48
More significant, the gradualist approach operated as a link between
the Brotherhood’s expressive and instrumental goals. Thus al-​ Banna
introduced a hierarchical structure of “mediating” steps to connect the
tentative and ultimate objectives of the Brotherhood. This structure con-
tains seven steps: (1) educating and forming the Muslim individual; (2) co-
alescing the Muslim individual into the Muslim family; (3) forming the
Muslim family into the Muslim society; (4) forming the Muslim society
into the Muslim government; (5) establishing an Islamic state through the
Muslim government that governs according to Islamic precepts; (6) re-
unifying Muslim nations through the emergence of an Islamic state; and
(7) retaining the supremacy of Islam through this new Muslim unity.49
Regardless of the viability of these phases, they entail significant sym-
bolic power, enabling the Brotherhood’s leadership to preserve the move-
ment’s coherence and dynamism. First, they underscore the bottom-​up
strategy of pursuing change by reformulating individuals’ identities as
a fundamental step in reshaping societal norms and values from below.
Second, they serve as a roadmap for the Brotherhood’s collective action.
Members strive to meet this hierarchical order despite the long-​term
nature of the movement’s objectives. Third, these incremental phases
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64 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

foster a sense of commitment and obligation among members, who

remain keen to reach them. Fourth, they give the Brotherhood’s leader-
ship room for flexibility since the temporal link between the stages is
blurred. As a result subordinates cannot accurately gauge the success of
the leadership in achieving these phases. Fifth, the relationship between
these phases is not clear-​cut; the Brotherhood is operating at all phases
and levels simultaneously.

Activating Identity in Everyday Life

The jama‘a paradigm functions as the main framework of identity that
binds the Brotherhood’s members together and shapes their worldview.
It is through this paradigm that the Brotherhood is able to connect
the triangle of Islamic identity (inclusiveness, adaptability, and prac-
ticality) with the movement’s organization and objectives. In fact the
Brotherhood’s members do not define themselves as individuals but as
a community of brothers, or ikhwan. This collective identity is activated
and stimulated in everyday life. The rank and file as well as the lead-
ers act as a disciplined and committed organization. Many members
believe following the rules and regulations of the movement is not only
an organizational imperative but also a religious duty. Members strive
to match their behaviors and practices with the Brotherhood’s code of
norms and standards. Nevertheless it is important to remember that
the Brotherhood’s norms and rules are not static or rigid but constitute
a dynamic code of conduct reflecting social interactions within the or-
ganization. These norms and regulations help the Brotherhood to run
its activities and to maintain internal coherence and unity. Given that
the Brotherhood is composed of members from diverse social and edu-
cational backgrounds, organizational norms play a key role in fostering
cohesiveness.
The Brotherhood’s leaders and cadres adopted the jama‘a paradigm fol-
lowing the death of al-​Banna in 1949, enabling them to control the move-
ment and maintain its activism. All general guides since al-​Banna have
stressed the need for members to act as a collective entity, or community
of self-​disciplined and pious Muslims. For instance, the emphasis on the
comprehensiveness of Islam translated into the enduring character of the
Brotherhood as a multifaceted movement. The result of this was the last-
ing and all-​encompassing definition of the Brotherhood as “a Salafi call,
65

The Power of the Jama‘a 65

a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, an

intellectual and scientific association, an economic company, and a social
idea.” This multifaceted definition reveals al-​Banna’s desire to portray the
Brotherhood as an inclusive movement capable of achieving different goals
through a “one-​size-​fits-​all” approach. He described the Brotherhood as “a
comprehensive movement contain[ing] all reform meanings.”50 This broad
and inclusive definition instills the leaders with profound symbolic and
religious power that enables them to generate collective action and expand
the organization’s network across different strata of society. It resonates
with Egyptians who seek to join the Brotherhood for different reasons.
And it differentiates the Brotherhood from other Islamic organizations
that confine their ideology and activities to one dimension of everyday life.
The notion of inclusiveness has been repeatedly employed by al-​Banna’s
successors. For instance, the current general guide, Mohamed Badie, as-
serts that the Brotherhood views Islam as a comprehensive system en-
compassing all aspects of life. In Badie’s own words, “The Brotherhood
does not differentiate between religion and politics. It views Islam as an
inclusive system, it extends to all life’s spheres, it encompasses politics,
economics, society, culture, etc. We worship Allah by politics and da‘wa
together and do not separate between them.”51 This inclusiveness is em-
bedded in the internal structure of the Brotherhood, which comprises dis-
tinct groups to supervise politics, social life, students, da‘wa, and welfare.
Al-​Banna’s notion of adaptability has granted the Brotherhood a resil-
ient and elastic identity, able to adapt to different political settings and to
survive despite severe authoritarian conditions. Since its foundation in
1928 it has managed to sustain its structure and develop unique strategies
in each era. This adaptability also enables the Brotherhood to expand its
ideology and organizational network across different social strata, as well
as in urban and rural areas. Moreover al-​Banna articulated a pragmatic
platform for change based on application of the movement’s identity. This
platform, which encompasses all aspects of social and political change,
seeks to rebuild society and the state on the basis of Islam as perceived
by the Brotherhood. Al-​Banna asserted that the practicality of the da‘wa is
crucial to achieve the Brotherhood’s goals. Accordingly the Brotherhood
established many economic and charity organizations during the 1930s
and 1940s.52
Opponents view the Brotherhood’s pragmatism as opportunistic and
deceptive, and they accuse the Brotherhood of using religion for politi-
cal ends. However, the Brotherhood’s pragmatism plays a vital role in
66

66 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

attracting new members and sympathizers. Some members attribute

their admiration of the Brotherhood to its practical nature. Salah Ghorab,
a mid-​ranking member, says, “I joined the Brotherhood because, in addi-
tion to its Islamic character, it provides me with essential guidelines that
I need in my daily life politically, socially, and morally.”53
In closing this chapter, four crucial points should be highlighted.
First, the jama‘a paradigm is a social construct that has been crafted over
years of intricate development. Unsurprisingly it took al-​Banna ten years
to outline a set of clear aims, objectives, and phases for the movement.
It was not until the Fifth Annual Conference of the Brotherhood in 1938
that he decided to unveil this paradigm and to become heavily involved in
everyday politics.54 Second, this paradigm is amenable and elastic rather
than rigid. It is true that al-​Banna sought to make the paradigm as vibrant
as possible to enable organizational growth; however, he constructed it in
a general and broad sense in order to fit different contexts. In fact it would
have been quite difficult for the Brotherhood to survive regime repres-
sion without having such a coherent and solid sense of identity. Third, the
concepts and terminology of the jama‘a paradigm are broad and some-
times elusive, as al-​Banna was inclined to use them interchangeably. For
instance, he occasionally conflates aims with objectives, mission with
duties, and method with means.
Al-​Banna’s influence on the Brotherhood is indisputable. As the
Brotherhood’s founder and chief ideologue, he determined its identity.
By setting broad and strategic objectives he was able to connect sub-
sequent generations to his legacy. To this day it is a common practice
for the Brotherhood’s leaders to invoke al-​Banna’s thoughts and state-
ments to legitimize and enhance their positions within the movement.
Through the jama‘a paradigm al-​Banna granted the Brotherhood a re-
markably distinctive identity, enabling it to operate within different po-
litical environments. His epistles and statements constitute the main
source of socialization and indoctrination within the Brotherhood.
Each member must follow al-​Banna’s teachings and commands, and
those who violate these rules are subject to criticism and censure. It is
through this paradigm that the Brotherhood has been able to survive
repression and remain an influential social and political force in Egypt
ever since.
67

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment

I didn’t join the Brotherhood; I was selected. The
Brotherhood recruited me since I was eight years old
through its children’s [bara’im] program in my village.
Abdurrahman Ayyash, former member of the
Brotherhood, interview with author, March 24, 2012

The Brotherhood is a massive social movement that targets individu-

als from different social strata. To ensure cohesiveness it uses an intensive
process of identification and socialization. Despite its populist character,
becoming a member of the Brotherhood is not an easy task. Individuals
must undergo an intricate and disciplined process of indoctrination before
becoming full-​fledged members. This process introduces new members
to the norms and regulations of the movement as well as the precepts they
should abide by in their everyday lives.
One of the key differences between the Brotherhood and other social
movements is its membership system. Whereas membership in most
social movements is open and accessible, membership in the Brotherhood
and other Islamist movements is highly selective. Those who seek to join
must possess certain traits and attitudes that allow them to advance the
movement’s objectives and abide by its rules and regulations. In fact indi-
viduals do not join the Brotherhood but are chosen by it. As one member
puts it, “The movement selects its sons.”1 Also the Brotherhood scrutinizes
members before officially extending an invitation to join. Functioning in
a repressive environment in which it is frequently targeted by the ruling
regime, the Brotherhood adheres to a policy of caution and vigilance in
recruitment to avoid infiltration.
This chapter provides an extensive account of the Brotherhood’s re-
cruitment tactics and mobilization strategy, explaining how one becomes
an ikhwani and revealing the impact of recruitment on that identity
68

68 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

construction process. Affiliation and membership in the Brotherhood

is a complex process that plays a crucial role in consolidating the
Brotherhood’s identity. As a social movement the Brotherhood requires
that members internalize its ideology, norms, and code of values. This
internalization process starts when individuals join the movement and
continues until they become full-​fledged members. The recruitment
and promotion process enhances the Brotherhood’s ability to engen-
der solidarity and commitment among its members. It creates a sense
of belonging and self-​commitment (iltizam) among individuals keen to
sacrifice their time, effort, money, and sometimes lives to achieve the
group’s objectives. Above all else it enables the movement to implant its
set of norms and regulations within the mindset of the new members.
By setting disciplined procedures for membership and promotion within
the movement’s structure, leaders can shape the worldview and identity
of adherents. This identity-​shaping process in turn helps the movement
maintain coherence and unity.

Recruitment and Participation

in Islamist Movements
Unlike most social movements, recruitment and participation in Islamist
movements is an intricate, disciplined process. Since reshaping societal
norms and values is a key objective, reformulating individuals’ percep-
tions and worldview is of great importance to these movement’s success.
The selection and recruitment of members is a crucial component of the
identity construction process that takes place in Islamist movements be-
cause it is through this process that the movement indoctrinates its fol-
lowers, introduces them to the movement’s norms and regulations, and
internalizes its ideology.
Preaching (da‘wa) is a vital tool for selecting and recruiting new mem-
bers. Throughout the recruitment and mobilization process, the leaders
align their practices and activities with Islamic norms and values. They
strive to act as role models for their followers by linking their behav-
ior to Islamic morals. Islamists also tend to link da‘wa to their social
and political activism. When they participate in elections, they do so
not merely to win but also to recruit members and disseminate their
ideology. Samer Shehata observes, “For the Muslim Brotherhood, elec-
toral participation (and, later, membership in parliament) served as a
69

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 69

mechanism to propagate its ideas and disseminate its ideology to wider

segments of society.”2
Individuals participate in Islamist movements for different reasons.
While it is true that religion is a fundamental motivation for participation,
it is not the only motivating force at work. Some join in order to receive
social benefits and economic assistance, such as healthcare and free edu-
cation, while others join to gain political privileges and influence. Salah
Abdul Halim, a thirty-​six-​year-​old member of the Muslim Brotherhood,
claims that some individuals join for social purposes. He explains, “There
are those who seek social promotion and others who need to improve
their living conditions.”3 In fact in more undeveloped Muslim countries
Islamist movements function as a vehicle for social mobility that provides
members a clear-​cut path to improve their social status. When they make
da‘wa, Islamists astutely blend religion with social and political griev-
ances. As Wickham finds, “the Islamist da‘wa tapped into [people’s] griev-
ances and portrayed Islam as the means to fundamentally transform the
conditions in which they were rooted.”4
Regardless of the underlying reasons for participation (e.g., interests,
morals, emotions), the mode and process whereby recruits are selected
and socialized is crucial in reshaping their identity. Therefore Islamist
movements pay great attention to recruitment. Furthermore it is fun-
damentally important for Islamist movements to control the member-
ship and recruitment process when they operate in authoritarian and
repressive environments. To avoid regime penetration these movements
closely monitor and scrutinize individuals before extending an invita-
tion to join. As a result it can take months, even years before recruits
become full members. Prospective members must also exhibit a high
degree of commitment and loyalty to the movement’s leadership and
ideology. To this end they undergo an intensive process of identification
and observation in order to enhance their commitment and prove their
loyalty.
The influence of Islamist movements is especially pervasive among
the lower and middle classes in Muslim countries. There the mobiliza-
tion and recruitment strategy focuses mainly on the inhabitants of rural
and impoverished suburban areas. Islamist movements therefore rely
heavily on the social networks of friends, kinship, and neighbors to re-
cruit new members. However, the ability to capitalize on these networks
is contingent upon two factors: linking their recruitment tactics with
da‘wa activities and building and maintaining an intimate relationship
70

70 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

with new members. Membership and affiliation in Islamist movements

do not require individuals to break with previous social ties.5 To the con-
trary, Islamist movements draw upon these linkages to attract new mem-
bers, and the appeal of joining an Islamist movement often stems from
the fact that they are an integral part of the existing social fabric. Islamist
movements do not seek to disrupt this relationship but to imbue it with
a more Islamic character. Ultimately the impact of Islamist movements
is more visible in ethnically and socially divided societies because they
can provide a network of safety and shared identity that transcends local
loyalties.

The Brotherhood’s Recruitment Strategy

The Brotherhood follows an astute and effective strategy of recruitment,
which I call “chasing the prey.” This strategy is based on a dynamic, in-
teractive process between the recruiter (the hunter) and the potential
member (the prey). During this process the former attempts to infiltrate
the latter’s private life and initiate a persistent but gradual psychological
and ideological change that leads him to join the Brotherhood. The time
invested varies across individuals, but the recruiter carefully surrounds
the prey with Islamic idioms, symbols, and norms. He also capitalizes on
the individual’s religious and conservative values to facilitate the indoctri-
nation process.
The Brotherhood utilizes many different tools to implement this strat-
egy. The most effective tool is through social networks, such as kinship
and friendship. The movement targets individuals in schools, workplaces,
universities, and neighborhoods. In time the prey is subject to signifi-
cant emotional, religious, and psychological influence, which facilitates
his recruitment. However, at this stage recruiters and cadres take great
pains to refrain from revealing their affiliation with the movement. At
the inception of the recruitment process recruiters focus on propagat-
ing broad Islamic values and ethics among their networks. After a short
period of time they gradually infuse their proselytizing message with the
Brotherhood’s ideology. Those who demonstrate religiosity and sympa-
thy with the Brotherhood’s cause become potential members. Once these
potential members are identified, the recruiters chase them tirelessly
until they officially join the movement; thereafter a new course of recruit-
ment begins. At this stage the key message delivered to the prey is how to
become a good Muslim in everyday life.
71

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 71

Preachers as Recruiters
The Brotherhood’s recruitment strategy is embedded in its preach-
ing activities. According to Shaykh Abdul Khaliq Al-​Sherif, head of the
Brotherhood’s Da‘wa Division, “The Brotherhood has been created for
nothing but da‘wa.”6 Al-​Sherif notes that the Brotherhood has 140 preach-
ing schools with at least 45,000 preachers from Al-​Azhar and other ed-
ucational institutions.7 Da‘wa is a fundamental tool for recruiting new
members: individuals join the Brotherhood not only because of its social
and political activism but also as a result of its preaching and outreach ac-
tivities. Preachers (du’ah) act as recruiters who propagate and disseminate
the Brotherhood’s cause and ideology.8 Due to the state’s repression and
security surveillance, da‘wa is the Brotherhood’s only way to communi-
cate with its constituency. It is also through du’ah that the Brotherhood
can maintain its influence among other Islamic organizations; therefore
du’ah align their preaching activity with Islamic values and exhibit proper
decorum. It should be noted that when reaching out to potential members
through preaching, recruiters tend to frame their interactions with the
banner of Islam and not the ikhwan. For the Brotherhood making da‘wa is
considered a religious duty that every member should fulfill. According to
Al-​Sherif, each member should act as a preacher (da’iah, singular of du’ah)
in his family, among his friends, and with his colleagues at work.9

Stages of Recruitment: The Ripple Effect

The Brotherhood’s recruitment strategy includes distinct but interlinked
stages. These result in a “ripple effect,” where each stage leads to the next
in sequential order. This process originates from al-​Banna’s proselyti-
zation model, which highlights three main phases for recruiting mem-
bers: (1) disseminating and proselytizing the Brotherhood’s ideology;
(2) spotting, selecting, and recruiting potential members; and (3) follow-
ing and implementing the Brotherhood’s ideology and commands in ev-
eryday life.10 According to al-​Banna, these phases must be applied strictly.
The recruitment stages are the beginning of the long path toward full
membership in the Brotherhood; they reflect the complexity and inten-
sity of the recruitment process. However, these stages are not rigid or
clear-​cut in practice. Though recruiters may intend to follow the sequence
according to al-​Banna’s model, actual recruitment varies based on an in-
dividual’s response and readiness to adhere to the movement’s ideology.
72

72 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Disseminating the
Call
(nashr al-da'wa)

General
Connectivity
(arrabt al-'am)

The Individual Call

(al-da'wa al-fardiyya)

Figure 5.1 Stages of the Brotherhood’s Recruitment Strategy

There are three stages: (1) disseminating the call (nashr al- ​da‘wa),
which aims to reach out to society broadly; (2) general connectivity (ar-​
rabt al-​’am), which targets a narrow circle of individuals with whom each
recruiter should operate; and (3) the individual call (al- ​da‘wa al-​fardiyya),
which focuses on potential members. These stages are illustrated in
Figure 5.1.

Disseminating the Call

This stage is the broadest in the sense that recruiters reach out to
the entire public. The primary goal at this stage is to disseminate the
Brotherhood’s ideas and ideology among the general population. It fol-
lows al-​Banna’s command to spread the Brotherhood’s ideology in both
rural and urban areas.11 The objectives of this stage are twofold: establish-
ing the initial connection between recruiters and the public and refut-
ing negative stereotypes perpetuated by the regime or the Brotherhood’s
political and religious adversaries. According to Eslam Ahmed, a twenty-​
eight-​year-​old member, “At this stage we seek to improve the image of the
Brotherhood among people and not to ask them to join the movement.
It is our very basic job.”12 This stage unleashes the first level of commu-
nication between the Brotherhood and the external world. It aims to re-
shape the image of the Brotherhood among people. According to Mustafa
Mashhur (d. 2002), the fifth general guide (al-​murshid al-​’am), this stage
73

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 73

familiarizes people with the Brotherhood’s cause, and recruiters should

take it with seriousness and devotion.13 The forums used to achieve this
stage’s objectives include media campaigns, sermons in mosques, and
public lectures. Throughout this stage recruiters tend to keep their af-
filiation with the movement a secret; they seek to be identified as good
Muslims rather than as members of the Brotherhood. Therefore, when
delivering talks and lectures as well as endorsing social activities, they
stress that their purpose is for the sake of Islam alone.

General Connectivity
The second stage in the Brotherhood’s recruitment strategy, general con-
nectivity (ar-​rabt al-​’am), follows what al-​Banna called nashr al-​fikra, or
spreading the Brotherhood’s message among the public.14 At this stage the
scope for recruitment moves from broader society to target more specific
networks and segments of society. This includes potential members who
express sympathy for the Brotherhood’s cause. Klandermans and Oegema
define potential participants in a social movement as “those who take a
positive stand towards a particular social movement.”15 Those who accept
the Brotherhood’s ideology and identify with its cause become the focus
of recruiters. Once interested individuals are identified, a new course of
action is followed to enhance their sympathy with and attachment to the
movement. To this end recruiters infiltrate the private sphere of individ-
uals’ lives with simple messages on ideology and objectives. This con-
nectivity is established through a variety of tactics, including organizing
sports competitions and retreats, giving gifts, and distributing leaflets.
According to Sherif Ayman, a twenty-​six-​year-​old former member, these
tactics create an intimate relationship between potential members and the
Brotherhood’s recruiters.16
The target audience at this stage is identified through social networks
such as family, relatives, friends, neighbors, and work colleagues. These
informal networks facilitate the Brotherhood’s recruitment and mobili-
zation process at a foundational level. Klandermans and Oegema write,
“Networks condition whether people become targets of mobilization at-
tempts. The more a movement’s reach-​out networks are woven into other
organizations, the more people are reached by mobilization attempts.”17
The Brotherhood’s recruiters strive to penetrate these networks and build
friendly relationships with potential members. They also invest heavily in
kinship and friendship in order to recruit new members. Eslam Ahmed
74

74 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

explains, “At this stage recruiters focus on their relatives and families and
attempt to persuade them to accept the Brotherhood’s message.”18

The Individual Call

The individual call (ad- ​da‘wa al-​fardiyya) is the most crucial stage in the
recruitment process. After identifying potential members, recruiters
begin to preach the Brotherhood’s ideology and become more explicit
about its objectives. This stage also constitutes the core of al-​Banna’s mo-
bilization strategy. He wrote, “At this stage we should select sympathizers,
prepare the soldiers, and mobilize supporters from those who have been
identified and selected in previous stages.”19 At this point recruiters reveal
their affiliation with the movement for the first time and focus on reshap-
ing the perceptions and mindset of potential members. To achieve this
they become heavily involved in constructing meaning and producing
symbols to convince individuals to join the movement. This stage paves
the way for active membership in the Brotherhood. The recruiters build
strong relationships with potential members and introduce them to the
Brotherhood’s code of values and regulations. The process is completed
when the prey demonstrates continued interest and falls into the hands
of the hunter.
Islamist movements pay special attention to the individual call because
of its crucial role in recruitment. For example, Abdul Halim al-​K inani, a
middle-​ranking leader in the Brotherhood and one of its recruiting theo-
rists, defines the individual call as “a direct and personal communica-
tion between two individuals: the preacher who seeks to influence other
people and a targeted person who should be transformed to become a
devout Muslim.”20 Al-​K inani’s definition details three key elements in the
group’s recruitment strategy. First, it draws a direct connection between
the Brotherhood’s recruiter and potential members. Second, it delineates
that the aim of this connection is to alter potential members’ perceptions
and views. Third, this process takes place under the banner of Islam,
which holds significant symbolic power.
In addition potential members who seek to be involved in the activi-
ties of the individual call should exhibit certain skills and characteristics.
These activities are considered a religious duty. Alaa Muharram, one of
the Brotherhood’s recruitment leaders, believes recruiters should meet
three conditions in order to participate in da‘wa activity: desire, ability, and
understanding.21 Each of these elements is divided into two aspects. In
75

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 75

terms of desire, the preacher (da’iah) should have the enthusiasm and mo-
tivation to disseminate the Islamic call; in terms of ability, he should have
the knowledge and skills to do so; in terms of understanding, he should
comprehend the internal and external environments that can impact his
preaching activities. Al-​Sherif says du’ah should be passionate, knowl-
edgeable, truthful, patient, rational and wise, outspoken, and capable of
reaching out to others.22

Stages of the Individual Call

The individual call is the threshold to joining the Brotherhood. Throughout
this stage a potential member is subject to the recruiter’s indoctrination
and observation. Accordingly his behavior and attitude should be in line
with the movement’s commands and regulations. This transformation in
the potential member’s behavior does not happen all at once but gradu-
ally and by building an intimate relationship with the recruiter. Mashhur
offers a clear and detailed blueprint for recruiters to follow while con-
ducting the mission of the individual call. First is to detect the potential
member. At this point the recruiter (da’iah) builds a personal relationship
with the potential member using different means, such as gifts, home
visits, and regular phone calls. It is the task of the da’iah to identify indi-
viduals who might be interested in embracing the Brotherhood’s ideology.
Once a potential member is detected, the recruiter permeates the individ-
ual’s private sphere and surrounds him with Islamic symbols and idioms.
According to Mashhur, this stage can take between three and four weeks.
The second stage is to encourage Islamic faith within potential mem-
bers. The transition to this stage sees recruiters move from the personal
to the religious level. Recruiters guide potential members to fulfill their
religious duties, such as praying, reciting the Qur’an, and giving alms.
The primary aim is to inspire the transformation process within a po-
tential member’s perceptions and behaviors. Sherif Ayman describes his
own experience: “I felt as if I started a new life, or as if I was born again.”23
Recruiters use different tools to achieve this goal, such as videotapes, cas-
settes, and books. Mashhur suggests that this stage should last between
four and six weeks.
The third stage of the individual call aims to instill the idea of Islamic
comprehensiveness within a potential member. Here recruiters link ideas
with practices. Hence they focus on how a potential member acts as a true
Muslim in his everyday life. To accomplish this stage’s goals, Mashhur
suggests recruiters read Yusuf al-​Qaradawi’s Shumuliyyat al-​Islam (The
76

76 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Comprehensiveness of Islam) and Abul Hasan Ali Nadawi’s Madha

Khasr al-​’lam Binhitat al-​Muslimin (What Has the World Lost with the
Degradation of Muslims?). This stage should last for one month; it ends
when a potential member moves from internalizing Islamic values to
practicing them in everyday life.
The fourth stage is “the duty to work for Islam” and focuses on activat-
ing the political identity of potential members. Mashhur explains that this
occurs by increasing their knowledge about the plight of Muslims around
the world. The main goal of recruiters at this stage is to invigorate pan-​
Islamic sentiment within potential members. Mashhur states, “The tar-
geted person should become sympathetic with Muslims around the world,
in Palestine, in Chechnya, in Kashmir, etc. and become eager to help and
support them.”24 Media utilized to achieve this goal include newspapers,
Islamic conferences, and books that explain the hardships Muslims face
globally. This stage also prepares a potential member to move from pas-
sivity to action. Mashhur highlights four signs that prove this stage is
completed before recruiters move to the next step: (1) becoming passionate
and sympathetic with other fellow Muslims; (2) donating money to sup-
port Islamic causes; (3) becoming more active in relationships with family,
friends, and the community; and (4) starting to preach and recruit other
members. Mashhur assigns recruiters a number of al-​Banna’s epistles to
help them incite the duty to work for Islam within the hearts of potential
members. This stage is estimated to last one month, depending on the
time needed to instill a greater sense of activism within the individual.
The fifth stage of the individual call is collective action. After explain-
ing the importance of collective action in achieving the Brotherhood’s ulti-
mate objectives recruiters’ main task is to persuade potential members to
take part in the Brotherhood’s campaign, including participating in dem-
onstrations and elections. According to Mashhur, du’ah emphasize the im-
portance of establishing an Islamic state as the ultimate goal for Muslims.
However, Mashhur draws a subtle link between achieving this goal and
joining the Brotherhood: “Since establishing the Islamic state is the duty
of all Muslims, the only way to achieve it is through joining a movement
or ‘jama‘a.’ ”25 He also highlights five standards to which Brotherhood
members should commit themselves: obedience, brotherhood, vigilance,
sacrifice, and integrity.
The main objective at this stage is to create a self-​disciplined member
who will devote his life to the Brotherhood’s cause. Mashhur’s suggested
readings at this point include Fathi Yakan’s books, such as What Does
77

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 77

It Mean My Belonging to Islam?, Between Individuality and Collectiveness,

and The Path to the Brotherhood.26 This phase is estimated to last approxi-
mately one month.
The last stage of the individual call is to formally ask potential mem-
bers to join the Brotherhood. Mashhur points out that the main goal
of this stage is to convince the recruit that the Brotherhood is the only
Islamic movement he should join:

You [the recruiter] should convince potential members that the

movement they should join is the one that exhibits six features: 1) fol-
lows the path of Prophet Muhammad and seeks to establish the
Islamic state; 2) believes in the comprehensiveness of Islam; 3) has
branches around the world; 4) has a global experience in dealing
with major issues; 5) is moderate and peaceful; and 6) the one that
has a well-​established organization.27

To facilitate potential members’ decision to join the Brotherhood,

Mashhur recommends more of al-​Banna’s tracts, such as The Horizons of
the Teachings, The Fifth Conference Tract, and Brothers under the Banner of
the Qur’an.
By creating an intimate and personal connection between the move-
ment and its potential members the individual call plays a vital role in
enabling the Brotherhood to attract and recruit new members. Many in-
terviewees stressed the role the individual call played in shaping their de-
cision to join the Brotherhood. For instance, Sherif Ayman was recruited
after he participated in activities the Brotherhood held in his neighbor-
hood. He says, “The individual call creates a strong and faithful relation-
ship between the movement and new members who behave as brothers.”28
As Table 5.1 illustrates, the individual call follows a disciplined and
complex system of communication and indoctrination that lasts months
and can even last years. A few points are worth emphasizing. First, the
time scale of these stages is not rigid and is determined by the response of
potential members as well as the ability and skills of recruiters in convinc-
ing them to join the movement. Thus it can take a longer time for some
individuals to become active members in the Brotherhood. Second, the
stages of individual call are conducted gradually in order to acclimate po-
tential members to the Brotherhood’s ideology and regulations. Until they
become members, targeted individuals are subject to regular and close
observation that informs the strategy recruiters’ follow. Third, and most
 78
Table 5.1 Mashhur’s Blueprint of the Individual Call

Stage Goal Tools Time scale The outcome

1. Selection and acquaintance To detect potential members Personal connection, Three weeks Familiarizing potential
gifts, home visits, members with the
phone calls, etc. Brotherhood’s ideology
2. Stimulating Islamic faith To create religious commit- Islamic videotapes, cas- One month Transforming behavior
ment and stimulate moral settes, leaflets, etc. and attitudes toward
behavior in everyday life the Brotherhood
3. Instill the notion of Islamic To implant Islamic ideology Islamic books about the One month Following Islam in every-
comprehensiveness in the mindset of potential comprehensiveness of day life
members Islam and gifts
4. The duty to work for Islam To politicize potential Conferences, lectures, Six weeks or Encouraging Islamic sen-
members religious and public more timent and connection
activities, etc. with the Islamic cause
5. Collective action To create a sense of respon- Demonstrations, elec- One month Reformulating the per-
sibility and commitment tions, camps, etc. sonality of potential
among potential members members to become
more disciplined and
active
6. Affiliating with the Brotherhood To encourage the potential Weekly gatherings and One month Becoming a full-​fledged
member to join an Islamic meetings with senior member in the
movement leaders Brotherhood

Based on data presented in Mustafa Mashhur, The Individual Call, at http://​w ww.daawa-​info.net/​books1.php?parts=168
79

The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 79

important, in many cases potential members do not know about these

stages until they are full-​fledged members. In fact they move from one
stage to the next without realizing the difference between them. Fourth,
the symbolic power of the Islamic call (al- ​da‘wa al-​islamiyya) inspires po-
tential members and reinforces their religious commitment; therefore re-
cruiters strive to align their behavior and activities with Islamic norms
and teachings to gain potential members’ confidence and ultimately con-
vince them to join the movement.
In short, the individual call functions as a laboratory for potential
members. It implants the movement’s ideology and norms within recruits
and prepares them to undertake the Brotherhood’s social and political ac-
tivities. As I explain in ­chapter 6, after being selected to join, new mem-
bers undergo another process of identification to consolidate their new
identity as ikhwan.

The Brotherhood’s Social Networks

The importance of social networks in mobilizing and generating collec-
tive action is unquestionable. Social networks enable social movements
to allocate resources, recruit new members, and generate collective
action. According to Florence Passy, social networks have three key func-
tions: (1) offering participation opportunities to individuals (structural
function); (2) shaping preferences before an individual decides to join a
movement (decision-​shaping function); and (3) socializing and building
individual identities (cultural function).29 The Brotherhood capitalizes on
different types of social networks—​kinship, friendship, social gatherings,
and religious occasions—​to expand its constituency. It thrives in differ-
ent venues: schools, universities, and mosques. As a massive social move-
ment that targets individuals from different social strata, the Brotherhood
adopts unique outreach and recruitment tactics and has different outreach
committees for different social networks. For example, in each district
there is a “buddy” (bara’im) committee that is responsible for attracting
and recruiting young members. Abdurrahman Ayyash, a former young
member of the Brotherhood, recalls that he was recruited at the age of
eight by the “children’s activities” committee in his neighborhood.30 The
Brotherhood also has an active section called Maktab al-​Talaba (Students
Office) that is responsible for recruiting students in high schools and
universities. Sherif Ayman was recruited through the activities of the
Students Office at his university,31 and many others I interviewed affirmed
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80 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

the important role of the Student Office in recruiting new members. The
Brotherhood uses different tactics to spread its message among university
students, including distributing flyers and leaflets, providing financial as-
sistance to poor students (particularly those from rural areas), and con-
testing student union elections.
Historically the Brotherhood expanded its network through this office
during the 1930s and 1940s, particularly in Cairo and Alexandria. At
that time universities were among the most active centers for protesting
against British authorities and the Egyptian government. However, the
Brotherhood’s role at universities waned during the 1950s and 1960s as a
result of Nasser’s move to repress the movement. During the 1970s and
1980s the Brotherhood rebuilt its organization through its robust pres-
ence at universities. Many of its leaders, such as Abdelmoniem Aboul
Fottouh,32 Essam al-​Erian, Helmi El-​Gazar, Mohamed Habib, Abu El-​Ela
Madi, Essam Sultan, and Khaled Daoud, were active members in Egyptian
universities during the 1970s.
The Brotherhood also capitalizes on family connections to recruit new
members. Ammar El-​Beltagi, a twenty-​three-​year-​old and the son of the
prominent Brotherhood leader Mohamed El-​Beltagi, says he was born
ikhwan like the rest of his family.33 The Brotherhood also works to expand
its family and kinship networks through intermarriage and personal
links. In fact many of the leaders have family and intermarriage connec-
tions that strengthen their commitment to the movement. For example,
Khairat al-​Shater, the Brotherhood’s strategist and a business tycoon, is
the son-​in-​law of Mahmoud Ghozlan, the former spokesperson of the
Brotherhood, and Mahdi Akef, the former general guide, is the son-​in-​law
of Mahmoud Ezzat, the former secretary general of the movement.
The Brotherhood has created an extensive network of relatives and
friends who build their relationships on ideology and personal linkages.
For example, many members choose their spouse from ikhwani fami-
lies.34 Marrying a member of an ikhwani family can also achieve one of
the Brotherhood’s ultimate goals: creating an Islamic society. It reflects
the ripple effect, which helps the Brotherhood expand its boundaries
and widen its organizational and social networks. Sobhi Saleh, a senior
leader in the Brotherhood, urges young members to marry sisters in the
movement and avoid outside marriage. He argues that marrying outside
the movement might negatively impact and delay achievement of the
Brotherhood’s objectives. According to Husam Tamamm, a prominent
expert on the Brotherhood, the movement creates its own community
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The Brotherhood’s Art of Recruitment 81

through marriage and kinship relations. He argues that the Brotherhood

is a society within the greater society when he states, “The Brotherhood
creates its own community within society where a member can live, get
education, make friends, get married, find a job, and become politically
engaged fully in the Brotherhood’s environment.”35
Recruitment also occurs through kinship influence. Mohamed Ayoub,
a thirty-​two-​year-​old former member, says he joined the Brotherhood
through his uncle, who was an active member in the movement. He de-
scribes his path to the Brotherhood as “a family business whereby my
uncle used to accompany me to the mosque and introduce me to peers in
my age group when I was twelve years old.”36
However, the use of family ties for recruitment has significant draw-
backs: it creates favoritism and nepotism whereby senior leaders can ex-
ploit their position in order to help their family; it raises questions about
transparency within the Brotherhood and whether leaders can be held
accountable; and it leads to legitimate concerns about the movement’s
promotion process. In fact it is not uncommon for members to leave the
Brotherhood due to the lack of transparency and fairness in the promo-
tion process. Mohamed Yussif, a twenty-​six-​year-​old former member, says,
“My leader was not so transparent when he sided with some members
who were not as committed to the movement as I was, therefore I decided
to leave the Brotherhood.”37
Social networks create ample opportunities for the Brotherhood not only
to recruit new members but also to reshape members’ identity and world-
view. Personal and family ties have a significant impact on the personality
and perceptions of the movement’s members. Moreover the intensive daily
interactions and relations among members creates a subculture that facili-
tates the socialization and identification process within the Brotherhood.
This subculture, Wickham points out, is the springboard of Islamist move-
ments’ activism.38
82

Tarbiyya and Consolidating

the Brotherhood’s Identity
Tarbiyya lives with us from birth to death. It transforms
our identity and personality to become real ikhwan.
Sherif Ayman, former member of the Brotherhood,
interview with author, March 26, 2012

A consolidated iden tit y is the lifeblood of a social movement. By

internalizing the movement’s ideology, norms, and objectives, mem-
bers remain loyal and committed for the long haul. One of the most
effective methods to this end is a socialization process that accustoms
members to the movement’s rules and regulations. Consolidating
members’ identity also depends on the extent to which the movement
can intensify interactions among its members in everyday life. The
more intense and frequent these interactions are, the more strongly the
movement’s collective identity is reinforced among its members. In this
chapter I explore the Brotherhood’s socialization process and investi-
gate different tactics that reshape and consolidate members’ identity.
I integrate ideational and structural factors to develop an “incubation
model,” an intensive socialization process that transforms an indi-
vidual’s perceptions and views to align with the movement’s ideology,
norms, and objectives. In fact incubation is the vehicle that connects in-
dividuals with the movement, ideas with its practices, and norms with
its structure. It stimulates a member’s willingness to become more
involved in the Brotherhood’s collective action, regardless of any risks
this might entail. Incubation also spearheads the identification process
within the movement and imbues a sense of cohesiveness and solidarity
among its members. The more that individuals align themselves with
the Brotherhood’s ideology, objectives, and norms, the more coherent
their identity becomes.
83

Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 83

The Brotherhood’s Incubation Model

The Brotherhood’s incubation model is based on integrating recruitment
and socialization processes. Those who are recruited by the movement
are subject to a lengthy, intensive process of indoctrination and socializa-
tion. In this model I build on insights from social psychology as well as
social movement theory. Several scholars have attempted to integrate the
insights of social psychologists with those of social movement sociologists
in order to understand the process of identity construction and consoli-
dation in Islamist movements.1 I take this scholarship a step further by
examining the socialization and identification process that occurs within
the Brotherhood. In this respect I go beyond the two predominant argu-
ments on identity construction—​the rational calculations of individuals
and the identification within social movements—​to investigate the un-
derlying factors underpinning these two processes. In doing so I consider
recruitment and participation mechanisms (the structural factors) along
with the identification process (ideational and transformational factors)
in order to explain the Brotherhood’s identity construction. On one hand,
the Brotherhood’s recruitment and mobilization tactics enable it to iden-
tify potential members, stimulate their desire to participate, and ensure
their allegiance. On the other hand, the socialization process reformu-
lates members’ perceptions and worldview, enhances their identification
with the movement’s norms and regulations, and consolidates their iden-
tity. These two processes are intertwined, shaping a new identity for the
Brotherhood and enabling it to generate and maintain its collective action.
The Brotherhood tends to incubate its members before granting them
full-​fledged membership. It uses a multitiered membership system that
can last for years until members become sufficiently loyal and committed
to the cause. This incubation enables the Brotherhood to achieve four key
objectives. First, it accustoms new members to the movement’s rules and
regulations. For new members to become committed to the Brotherhood’s
ideology, their worldview and attitudes must be reshaped. This can happen
only through a gradual yet intensive socialization program whereby mem-
bers are exposed to the Brotherhood’s rules, norms, and ideology. Second,
it creates cohesiveness and unity between old and new members. As a
massive social movement with individuals from different social strata,
the Brotherhood uses the incubation process to mitigate internal differ-
ences and create a shared sense of solidarity among its members. Third,
it allows the movement to maintain control over its rank and file. For
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84 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

members to advance from one level to the next, they must meet certain
requirements and conditions that subject them to greater control by the
leadership. Fourth, it helps the Brotherhood remain active under regime
repression. By instilling an ethic of commitment and sacrifice among
members, the Brotherhood can survive regime crackdowns and sustain
its social and political activism. Ultimately the Brotherhood’s incubation
model depends on two chief mechanisms: an intensive socialization (tar-
biyya) process and a disciplined, multilevel membership system.

The Socialization (Tarbiyya) Process

in the Brotherhood
Socialization, or tarbiyya, is a central concept in the Brotherhood’s ideology
and structure. It refers to the process of reshaping an individual’s identity
through practice. Al-​Banna viewed tarbiyya as the “rope that binds broth-
ers together.”2 It is through tarbiyya that the Brotherhood can intensify
its members’ new identity and ensure their loyalty and commitment. As
Abdelhamid El-​Ghazali, one of the leaders, succinctly puts it, “The most
important product which is expected from tarbiyya is that it provides us
with members who adopt the movement’s values in everyday life.” That is,
tarbiyya is the underlying process that reformulates members’ worldview,
perceptions, and behavior to align with the Brotherhood’s norms and
regulations. According to El-​Ghazali, the main objective of tarbiyya is “to
develop, mobilize, and prepare men who are able to shoulder the respon-
sibility of spreading and informing the Call and establishing the project
of the revival to achieve an honourable life based on Islam.”3 Tarbiyya is
the cornerstone to accomplishing the Brotherhood’s mission and objec-
tives. Given its importance, the Brotherhood dedicates an entire division
to supervise and conduct tarbiyya activities, called Qism al-​tarbiyya, or the
Socialization Department.
A prominent figure in the Brotherhood defines tarbiyya as “the proper
way to influence individuals and to change them for the better.”4 For him
it is about how the Brotherhood directs and guides its members in every-
day life. Each member has gone through the tarbiyya process in order to
comprehend its ideology and become accustomed to its norms and regula-
tions. According to Mohamed Badie, the general guide of the Brotherhood
and former head of the Qism al-​tarbiyya, “Tarbiyya is a central concept in
our project as it aims to rebuild individuals’ personalities.”5
85

Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 85

Tarbiyya is a gradual process that continues as long as members are

affiliated with the Brotherhood. Sherif Ayman explains, “Tarbiyya lives
with us from birth to death. It transforms our identity and personality to
become real ikhwan.”6 Tarbiyya is a fundamental part of an individual’s
identity formation. Therefore, in each stage of membership, members
must embrace a certain set of norms and values in their everyday lives,
such as obedience, confidence in leadership, loyalty, sincerity, sacrifice,
and commitment. In other words, tarbiyya is a key tool that enables the
Brotherhood to instill its norms and code of values in an individual’s iden-
tity. It also has different dimensions and objectives. Amer Shemakh, a
middle-​ranking leader, highlights three overarching dimensions for tar-
biyya: religious, social, and political. He further explains that tarbiyya
should be based on five pillars: the oneness of God (rabbaniyya), integra-
tion and comprehensiveness (al-​takamul wa’l-​shumul), positive construc-
tion (ijabiyyat al-​bina’), moderation and balance (i’itidal wa-​twazun), and
collective action ( jam’iyya).7 These concepts are internalized through dis-
tinct mechanisms during the socialization process. As mentioned in pre-
vious chapters, the Brotherhood’s members are not merely religious or
spiritual leaders; they are primarily social and political activists seeking
to transform society.
Tarbiyya’s objectives are threefold: ensuring members’ religious self-​
purification, reinforcing their organizational commitment, and connect-
ing members; thus it fulfills both their spiritual and their social needs.
Al-​Banna stressed the role of tarbiyya in “purifying individuals’ ethics and
practices to be sincere and truthful.” He argued, “Each member should be
physically strong, ethically committed, intellectual, self-​sufficient, faith-
fully purified, organized, and keen to get the maximum benefit from his
time.”8 Al-​Banna wrote an important epistle that is taught as part of the
tarbiyya’s curriculum called Risalat at-​Ta’alim (The Teachings), which in-
cludes the code of norms and values that active members should follow
and embrace in their everyday life.
Tarbiyya also enhances members’ organizational commitment. During
tarbiyya sessions members have to abide by the movement’s norms and
regulations. Members tend to follow the leadership and respect its com-
mands not only to avoid marginalization but also to achieve promotion
within the organization. Mohamed Hamza, a young member, asserts
that the Brotherhood operates a sophisticated system of punishment and
reward that members value and feel obliged to follow.9 In addition tarbi-
yya aims to connect members to create a sense of solidarity among them.
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86 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

According to a twenty-​eight-​year old member named Mohamed Yussif,

“Tarbiyya is the main tool that binds Brothers together.”10 The weekly and
monthly gatherings help members get to know each other better and act
collectively to achieve the movement’s objectives.
Tarbiyya is not limited to a particular level of membership. Senior lead-
ers as well as lower-​level members participate in tarbiyya sessions that
suit their rank. Abdurrahman Mansour, a former Brotherhood member,
confirms that all leaders, including the general guide, participate in tar-
biyya sessions.11

Tarbiyya Venues and Tools

Tarbiyya is conducted in what are called mahdin at-​tarbiyya (socialization
incubators), the locations where Brotherhood members and leaders meet,
communicate, and interact weekly or monthly to strengthen their rela-
tionships and internalize the Brotherhood’s ideology. According to a mid-​
ranking leader, mahdin at-​tarbiyya are the primary place for members to
socialize and get to know each other: “A mhaden [singular of mahdin] is
the primary means for members to deepen their relationship and coalesce
their vision on different issues.”12 The incubator aims to create an inti-
mate environment in which members come together, communicate, and
exchange thoughts.
In addition mhaden serve as venues for religious purification and spiri-
tual salvation. For example, they often include religious rituals, such as
reciting the Qur’an and Sunna and performing prayers, as well as organi-
zational activities. However, the most important role of mhaden is foster-
ing the sense of commitment and solidarity among members. It provides
a free space for them to discuss, debate, and build their views about the
movement and the external world. Mohamed Mustafa, a forty-​two-​year-​
old, stresses the vital role of mhaden in consolidating collective identity. He
describes his relationship with the movement as fundamental to his life: “I
cannot feel anything other than part of the Brotherhood. To me, it is my
family, home, and nation.”13 Clearly, for some members the Brotherhood
is more than a social movement. According to Mohamed al-​Qassas, who
was first exposed to the Brotherhood as a middle school student, the re-
lationship between the Brotherhood and members can be eternal: “The
Brotherhood is more of an educational incubator for a Brother. You get
introduced to the group at an early age and ultimately your formative years
become tied to it.”14
87

Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 87

Katiba
(battalion)

Mu'tamar Rihla
(Congress) (trip)

Usra
(family)

Nadwa Mu'askar
(seminar) (camp)

Dawra
(workshop)

Figure 6.1 Venues of Socialization (Tarbiyya) in the Brotherhood

The main venues are divided into seven components: usra (family),
katiba (battalion), rihla (trip), mu’askar (camp), dawra (workshop), nadwa
(seminar), and mu’tamar (congress). These venues, which are illustrated
in Figure 6.1, are connected and correspond with membership levels.
While some venues, such as usra and nadwa, can include potential mem-
bers and sometimes the general public, katiba and mu’tamar are exclusive
to members only. The platform of socialization at each level is designed to
meet the conditions and requirements set by the Brotherhood’s rules and
regulations.

Usra
Usra, or family, is the basic unit in the Brotherhood’s structure. It consists
of five or six members who meet weekly for religious, personal, and or-
ganizational purposes. The leader of the usra is called the naqib (captain)
and is responsible for supervising the religious and ideological socializa-
tion of members and monitoring their behavior. Each member, including
senior leaders, is placed in an usra, usually close to where he lives. Usra
meetings typically take place in the naqib’s house and aim to achieve three
key objectives: acquaintance (ta’arruf ), understanding (tafahum), and soli-
darity (takaful).15
The usra plays a vital role in linking new members with the movement
by familiarizing them with the movement’s rules and regulations. It also
88

88 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

gives new members an opportunity to explore the Brotherhood from within,

build new relationships, and identify mentorship opportunities with lead-
ers and cadres. In this regard usra gatherings serve as an orientation for
new members. Usra meetings also work to achieve the movement’s objec-
tives by spurring the religious and ideological commitment of members
and facilitating the movement’s organizational communications and ac-
tivities. According to Abdurrahman Ayyash, usra is “the main incubator of
tarbiyya, as it binds members together through education and guidance.”16

Katiba
The katiba (battalion) is an amalgam of seven to eight usra, or approxi-
mately thirty-​five to forty members, who meet monthly for between three
and four days.17 These aim to strengthen members’ religious and ideo-
logical commitment to the Brotherhood through an intensive program of
indoctrination. In contrast to the more informal usra gathering, a katiba
meeting is a “boot camp” for instilling and solidifying the Brotherhood’s
values within its members. According to Abdel Halim, katiba is the most
important incubator of tarbiyya because it relies on direct communica-
tion between the educator and the educated. He points out that al-​Banna
emphasized the importance of educating and directing members through
kata’ib (the plural of katiba) meetings to the extent that he founded a sec-
tion called the Battalions Unit (Nizam al-​kata’ib) to oversee its activities.18
Katiba has two main goals. The first is to reinforce the spiritual and
religious preparation of members and instill norms of obedience, alle-
giance, and confidence in members and leadership. Therefore it includes
a strict program of physical and mental training that members must un-
dergo for three or four days. According to Salah Abdul Halim, kata’ib are
designed primarily to increase the spiritual readiness of members. This
preparation is manifested in night prayers, religious rituals, and lectures.
Abdul Halim states, “Kata’ib help members achieve a high degree of spiri-
tual purification and keep their hearts connected to God.”19
The katiba additionally aims to prepare members physically and
mentally. This happens through an intensive program of athletic activi-
ties, such as running and exercise. According to Ibrahim Saleh, a young
member of the Brotherhood, kata’ib help members learn patience, atten-
tiveness, and self-​control.20 The katiba is also a useful arena to evaluate
a member’s adherence and commitment to the Brotherhood’s rules and
regulations. During the course of the katiba each member must carry out
89

Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 89

certain duties and activities, such as memorizing Quranic chapters or ab-

staining from food and sleep for hours on end in order to gauge discipline
and organizational capabilities.
Each katiba has a leader (amir) and an assistant who organize and su-
pervise its activities. Members must comply with the amir’s commands
and follow his guidance. The amir is usually the oldest and most reli-
giously adept member in each katiba. The duties of members toward the
amir include listening attentively, exhibiting proper decorum, and demon-
strating obedience, respect, love, and a willingness to help.

Rihla
A rihla (trip) consists of ten to fifteen members marching together in
the countryside or the desert. It is typically assigned to those with full
membership in the Brotherhood, but can occasionally include potential
members in order to evaluate their readiness to join. It can also include
families; however, it always avoids mixing men with women. According
to Mohamed Mustafa, during the rihla participants exercise, recite the
Qur’an, and train to tolerate hunger and thirst.21 Rihla takes place monthly
for one day (from dawn to dusk).
The main objective of rihla is to imbue commitment, dedication, obli-
gation, secrecy, and sacrifice in a member’s personality and mindset. Like
katiba, each rihla is overseen by an amir and his aides. The amir is typi-
cally the oldest member in the group and is responsible for supervising
and guiding members during the rihla process.

Mu’skar
The mu’skar (camp) is a continuation of the scouts ( jawwala) system that
was founded by al-​Banna in the 1930s. Its main purpose is to strengthen
the physical and mental capabilities of members by supplementing
the spiritual and intellectual activities of the movement.22 According
to Mahmoud, mu’skarat (the plural of mu’skar) have three chief objec-
tives: grouping (tajmi’), socialization (tarbiyya), and exercise (tadrib).23 To
achieve tajmi’, the camp serves as a place for members to practice religious
and physical activities. Those who attend are typically full members but
can include potential members seeking a deeper understanding of the
Brotherhood. The number of individuals in the camp is around 200 and
the process usually lasts two to three weeks.
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90 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

To ensure effectiveness and differentiation, the participants are grouped

on four distinct levels. The first is open to the public, to anyone “eager to
serve Islam and help other fellow Muslims.” The second is for full mem-
bers who belong to a particular district and come together to strengthen
their relationship. The third is designed for senior members who gather
to discuss different organizational duties and objectives. The final level is
for members and leaders who come from different branches around the
world. They convene to coordinate and discuss the Brotherhood’s affairs
and activities in their countries and to develop policies on how to deal with
problems confronting the movement internationally.24
The second goal of the camps is intensifying members’ tarbiyya.
According to one mid-​level leader, Mohamed Soliman, camps provide a
pure Islamic life of worship, exercise, and brotherhood.25 Abdul Halim as-
serts that camps are an important tool for self-​education: “In camps, mem-
bers learn three rules: to have self-​restraint, to become accustomed to life’s
hardships, and to obey and be committed to leadership.”26 Furthermore
members participate in discussions and readings that foster their loyalty
and collective action.
The third objective of camps is exercise (tadrib). Camps are crucial
for developing members’ physical and mental training. These attributes
are beneficial for the movement because it ensures members maintain
good health and are able to participate in demonstrations and election
campaigns and undertake other duties. Mahmoud explains that members
receive athletic, sporting, and security training and also become more fa-
miliar with the Brotherhood’s rules and regulations.27 During the period
of mu’skar members are expected to follow these rules and behave accord-
ingly. As Ayman puts it, “Camps transform a member’s entire life and
reformulate his personality. In camps each member should behave accord-
ing to the Brotherhood’s norms and regulations.”28
Each mu’skar has a leader (amir) and assistants. The amir must possess
both leadership skills and a wide knowledge of religion in order to serve
as a role model. He is responsible for supervising the camp and ensuring
that members follow the Brotherhood’s bylaws.

Dawra
The workshop, or dawra, is a study group where members gather for one
to two days to attain more in-​depth knowledge of specific issues. This study
group is organized periodically for a select number of members and expert
91

Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 91

individuals and leaders who have sound and deep knowledge on these
issues. According to Mahmoud, the main goal of the dawra is to create well-​
informed and capable cadres who are assigned to undertake more duties
and responsibilities. The topics and issues covered during the workshop
are of a political, social, and economic nature. The workshop is open to
students, workers, peasants, and professionals alike.29 Each workshop in-
cludes sports, preaching, and management. The schedule is set by middle-​
ranking leaders who guide and supervise members during the sessions.

Nadwa
Nadwa is a weekly symposium or seminar in which members meet with
experts to discuss diverse topics, such as politics, religion, and women,
or to resolve specific problems. It is not exclusive to the Brotherhood’s
members but is also open to the general public. According to Mahmoud,
nadwa aims to enhance the intellectual skills of Muslims. Each nadwa is
organized by a leader or manager who is responsible for selecting the topic
and inviting speakers. The leader must possess sophisticated religious
knowledge along with engaging oratory skills and has assistants who help
with organizational and logistical procedures.

Mu’tamar
A mu’tamar is an annual large meeting of the Brotherhood’s members who
are invited to gather from across the country for a few days to discuss a set
of topics and execute decisions on behalf of the movement. The nature of
the congress varies; it can be regional, in which case it is assigned to a group
of the Brotherhood’s districts, or it can be national, where all members can
attend. A mu’tamar can also be held to discuss private matters, including
organizational changes and bylaws. The Brotherhood has convened many
general congresses since its inception; however, the movement was banned
from holding them during the 1950s and 1960s. It was not until after the
2011 uprising that the Brotherhood began holding its public congress again.

Membership in the Brotherhood

Historically al-​Banna’s writings were the source of membership criteria
and requirements. The Brotherhood’s first internal bylaw (al-​la’iha al-​
dakhiliyya) outlined four degrees of membership. First is the assistant
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92 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

member (musa’id), a position that is open to any Muslim who declares

an intention to join the movement, signs a membership card, and pays
membership dues. Second is the associate member (muntasib), a level
that can be achieved if the individual attends regular meetings, can
prove he has mastered the movement’s principles, and is fully obedient
to the leadership. The associate member must be older than fifteen, re-
ceive recommendations from three members, and have his membership
ratified by the Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-​irshad). The third level is
active membership (‘amil). A member is deemed active when he meets
the requirements of the previous levels and becomes fully involved in the
Brotherhood’s activities. He must also receive physical training, memo-
rize a certain number of the Qur’an’s chapters and hadith, and swear
an oath of allegiance (bay’a) to the general guide.30 The duties of active
members include attending meetings, paying monthly fees, and execut-
ing specific missions. The fourth and highest degree of membership is
mujahid.31 This level is available only to those selected by the Guidance
Bureau. Members at this level must follow a stricter program of socializa-
tion (tarbiyya) and be ready to sacrifice their wealth, time, and life for the
sake of the movement.
The movement changed its membership system after clashes with
the Egyptian government culminated in the assassination of al-​Banna on
February 12, 1949, and the dissolution of the movement. Instead of being
based on the four degrees proscribed by al-​Banna, the levels were reduced
to two: provisional (taht al-​ikhtibar) and active (‘amil). The former refers to
those who recently joined the Brotherhood and embraced its ideas but were
still under scrutiny by the leadership. Provisional members were moni-
tored for six months until they fulfilled their membership duties. The in-
dividual then pledged bay’a to the general guide to ratify his membership.
Provisional members did not have the right to vote in the Brotherhood’s
internal elections. Active members were those who abided by the move-
ment’s regulations, fulfilled all the requisite membership duties and re-
sponsibilities, and gave bay’a to the general guide.32 A Brother who did not
meet his duties or abide by the regulations of the movement was subject to
punishment and disciplinary action by the branch head, which included
but was not limited to a warning, fine, suspension, or even expulsion.33
The Brotherhood’s membership system has witnessed many changes
since the foundation of the movement. The first version of the Basic Law
(Al-​qanun al-​assasi) was issued in 1930, and the Internal Bylaws (Al-​
la’iha al-​dakhliyya) were amended in 1932, 1935, 1944, 1945, 1948, 1951,
93

Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 93

1982, 1994, and 2009. The amendments were an attempt to adjust to

the changing internal and external environment. During this time three
main changes have occurred to the membership categories. At the outset
there were four degrees of membership, but in 1945 these were reduced
to only two levels, tentative (taht al-​ikhtibar) and active (‘amil).34 Since the
return of the Brotherhood in the 1970s there have been five levels. For
security reasons these membership levels have been removed from the
Brotherhood’s bylaws. Ironically these rules remain in place following
the political recognition of the Brotherhood in the wake of the January 25
Revolution.
The five levels in the current membership system are muhib (sympa-
thizer), mu’ayyid (supporter), muntasib (associate), muntazim (regular or
registered), and ‘amil (active or operating member). These levels, which
are illustrated in Figure 6.2, reflect how the Brotherhood intensifies and
consolidates its members’ identity.

Muhib
Members at the muhib (sympathizer or lover) level, according to Eslam
Ahmed, start to become acquainted with other members and gradually
participate in the Brotherhood’s activities. The main goal of this level is to
familiarize new members with the Brotherhood’s rules and norms. The
muhib joins the usra (family) in weekly meetings to gradually internalize
the Brotherhood’s ideology.35
Members at this level are not required to be involved heavily in or-
ganizational activities. According to Abdurrahman Ayyash, the main
objective of the muhib level is to change an individual’s morals and be-
haviors.36 Also Eslam Ahmed explains that the Brotherhood does not set

'Amil
(active)
Muntazim
(regular)
Muntasib
(associate)
Mu'ayyid
(supporter)
Muhib
(sympathizer)

Figure 6.2 The Brotherhood’s Multitiered System of Membership

94

94 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

hard conditions for members to fulfill at this point: “The Brotherhood

facilitates membership at this level, and new members are not required
to undertake major responsibilities.”37 However, members at this level
can join any of existing committees that implement specific policies or
tasks. It is also important to mention that members at this level are not
eligible to run or vote in the Brotherhood’s internal elections and are not
required to pay dues.
This stage can last between six months to one year, during which time
the leader of the usra (naqib) closely monitors the muhib and evaluates
their fit with the movement. The tarbiyya program at this level is simple
in order to encourage members and build a positive response to the move-
ment. Each member is encouraged to study Islamic textbooks and read-
ings as part of his socialization process. Ayyash says that books at this
level include subject matter that is suitable to entry-​level members.38

Mu’ayyid
At the mu’ayyid (supporter) level members become more committed to
the Brotherhood’s norms and standards. Muhib that demonstrate the req-
uisite commitment to the movement and its duties are eligible for promo-
tion to this level. At this point members still maintain an unofficial affili-
ation with the Brotherhood; hence they do not have voting rights or hold
a formal organizational position. According to Mansur, mu’ayyid cannot
attend any meeting above the usra level.39
The tarbiyya process at the mu’ayyid level is more intense than at the
muhib level. Members are required to undertake more significant duties,
such as memorizing chapters of the Qur’an, reading the Brotherhood’s lit-
erature, and becoming engaged in local activities, such as providing social
services and assistance to the poor or organizing literacy campaigns. The
main book is Fi rihab al-​Islam (Spaces of Islam), authored by a leader
named Ali Laban.
At this stage leaders more intensely gauge and scrutinize members’
allegiance to the Brotherhood. At the end leaders write a report about the
mu’ayyid and send it to the district office, which convenes a committee to
evaluate the mu’ayyidun (plural of mu’ayyid) members. After evaluation
the committee sends its report to the Governorate Administrative Office,
which determines if members will be promoted to the next level. Similar
to the previous level, members at this level cannot run or vote in the inter-
nal elections and are not required to pay monthly fees.
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Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 95

Muntasib
Muntasib (associate) members are officially registered with the Muslim
Brotherhood. However, their membership is not yet fully complete as they
cannot hold official positions with the movement. According to Eslam
Ahmed, “At the muntasib level, members become real Brothers.”40 They
spend at least two years at this level before moving to the next. Ayyash says
that some members stay for years at the muntasib level.41
The tarbiyya platform at the muntasib level is increasingly strict.
Members must strengthen their commitment not just to the movement’s
ideology but also to its leadership. Ayman emphasizes the importance of
loyalty and allegiance of each muntasib to his leader. As he puts it, “This
level verifies members’ commitment to leaders and the movement.”42
Members at this stage are required to increase their religious knowl-
edge so they can lead religious sermons and talks on religious matters.
They are also asked to undertake more organizational responsibilities
and duties. According to Ayyash, muntasib can attend shu’ba (division)
meetings.43
Promotion from the muntasib level occurs through the same process
as from the mu’ayyid: a committee evaluates the member’s performance,
commitment, and adherence to the Brotherhood and sends a report to the
Governorate Administrative Office, which is the final arbiter of whether or
not that member should be promoted. It is worth mentioning that many
members do not know their level until told by their leaders, who says
Ammar El-​Beltagi, tend to not reveal that information until a member’s
commitment and loyalty to the movement can be verified.44 Members at
this level are eligible to vote in the shu’ba (district) elections but not in the
higher organizational elections. However, they can donate money to the
Brotherhood and do pay dues.

Muntazim
If the muntasib evaluation report is satisfactory, the member can re-
ceive a promotion to the fourth level: muntazim (regular). This is the
last level before full membership in the Brotherhood. The duties and
requirements of members at this level are rigorous; they are subject to
even more intensive monitoring of their behavior, morals, and organi-
zational performance and must demonstrate total submission to their
superiors.
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96 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

The minimum time spent at this level is five years. However, as Mansur
claims, some members stay at this level their entire life.45
The tarbiyya program at this level is characterized by religious and
organizational duties. For example, a muntazim must memorize large sec-
tions of the Qur’an as well as the hadith. He should also be able to give a
khutba (religious speech) and lead people in prayers. The curriculum at
this stage includes a book by Mahmud Abu Ra’ia, Anwar al-​Islam (The
Lights of Islam), a selection of al-​Banna’s epistles, and some of Sayyid
Qutb’s writings.
In terms of organizational duties, all muntazimin (plural of
muntazim) are eligible to join a division. They also can be elected to
the executive board, though not as the head or deputy of the shu’ba.
Members at this level can run for and vote in the shu’ba (division) and
mantiqa (district) elections but not at the higher organizational levels.
They are asked to donate money and contribute to the movement’s local
activities.
After a minimum of five years and a positive evaluation report, a
muntazim can attend a workshop that prepares him for promotion to the
final stage. At the promotion workshop each candidate has to fulfill cer-
tain duties and pass religious and psychological tests to prove his capabili-
ties. If successful, he can be promoted to active member (‘amil).

‘Amil
‘Amil (active) is the final level in the Brotherhood’s membership system.
Members reach this point after completing the duties and responsibilities
of the previous four stages. According to Eslam Ahmed, all active mem-
bers are equal in rights and duties.46 Therefore they are eligible to run and
vote in the internal elections at all levels, from the shu’ba (division) to the
Maktab al-​irshad (the Guidance Bureau).
Because of their important role in the Brotherhood, al-​Banna wrote
an exclusive epistle for active members called Risalat at-​Ta’alim (The
Teachings), which outlines their duties. The epistle stipulates that all
active members should swear an oath of bay’a to the Brotherhood’s
leadership based on ten principles: fahm (understanding), ikhlas (sin-
cerity), ‘amal (action), jihad (struggle), tadhiyya (sacrifice), ta’ah (obedi-
ence), thabat (perseverance), tajarud (devotion), aukhwa (brotherhood),
and thiqa (trust).47 These values should be internalized in an active
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Tarbiyya and Consolidating the Brotherhood’s Identity 97

member’s identity and reflected in their manners and actions. In other

words, active members fully embrace the Brotherhood’s ideology in ev-
eryday life. They must also pay between 1 and 7% of their income for
dues and subscription fees, which ranges depending on their ability
to pay. Members pay dues as part of their religious duty toward the
movement.
The tarbiyya program at this level is more comprehensive than at any
of the previous levels. Members are fully exposed to al-​Banna’s literature,
are required to deepen their religious knowledge by studying the his-
tory of Islam, and are expected to be knowledgeable about the hardships
Muslims face around the world. In addition active members are asked to
increase their religious duties through worship, night prayers, and fasting,
among other activities. They should also engage in daily recitation and
memorization of the Qur’an and hadith. Risalat at-​Ta’alim teaches that
members should demonstrate progress across the different skills and at-
tributes attained at previous levels, such as having a strong and healthy
body, possessing sound moral character, raising their intellectual capacity,
and working hard to earn a living.48

Consolidating Identity through Membership

The relationship between the Brotherhood’s membership system and
identity consolidation is significant. Each level of membership requires
socialization and indoctrination that suit the member’s age, degree of
commitment, and personality. For example, newcomers must follow a
gradual platform that focuses on ethical and moral reform, and those who
have spent more time in the Brotherhood are subject to stricter duties. In
this respect the intensity of a member’s identity depends on the require-
ments and duties of his membership level.
Tarbiyya is the main vehicle of membership promotion within the
Brotherhood. As in any other movement, members must abide by the
group’s rules and regulations in order to receive promotion. The more
they abide by the Brotherhood’s code, the greater the chance that they will
be promoted. In fact the Brotherhood’s membership system is designed to
spur a member’s commitment, dedication, and allegiance. Members are
subject to monitoring in order to ensure they follow the rules and regula-
tions. It is through this system that the Brotherhood selects, scrutinizes,
and consolidates a member’s identity.
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98 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Ultimately the Brotherhood’s system of membership enables it to re-

shape its members’ worldview and behaviors. In fact the complexity and
sophistication of this system reflect two key features of the Brotherhood: its
vigilant and cautious character and the intensity of its members’ identity.
Operating in a repressive environment, the best way to ensure coherence
and unity is by maintaining control over the membership process. This
well-​orchestrated system tightens the leadership’s grip on the movement
and enables them to avoid infiltration.
99

The Brotherhood’s Organization,

Structure, and Ideology
The organizational machinery of the Brotherhood is de-
signed to realize its objectives. … All members, including
senior leaders, follow this structure and abide by its rules
and regulations.
Mohamed Mustafa, middle-​ ranking member of the
Brotherhood, interview with author, April 1, 2012

The Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational structure is potent and

sophisticated. It has distinguished the Brotherhood from other prominent
Islamist movements in recent decades and has enabled the movement to
expand its social network and, more important, endure regime repres-
sion and maintain its activism, particularly during the Mubarak era. The
Brotherhood’s steadfast organization (tanzim) was a significant challenge
to Mubarak, who failed to penetrate and dismantle it. Members take great
pride in their organizational capabilities as a fundamental tool in their
struggle to realize their objectives. Indeed Hasan al-​Banna’s brilliance lay
in intricately weaving the movement’s structure with its ideology and ob-
jectives, a foundational element of each brother’s identity.
One of the key characteristics of the Brotherhood’s organization is its
elasticity and adaptability. The Brotherhood’s structure has evolved over
time in response to both internal and external factors, yet changes to the
bylaws and its internal dynamics and regulations did not affect the dyna-
mism and functionality of the movement, which remained effective and
vibrant. The development of the organization reflects the movement’s re-
sponsiveness to contextual changes. The movement deftly adapted and ad-
justed its structure and organizational tactics in order to remain relevant
and active—​it bent, but never substantially broke.
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100 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Furthermore the Brotherhood’s broad and far-​ reaching ideology

shapes its organizational strategy and tactics. The proselytizing character
of this ideology requires a structure capable of carrying out the move-
ment’s message and reaching out to specific constituencies. And the
Brotherhood’s religious ideology has shaped its norms, regulations, and
internal code of values. The movement’s leaders and ideologues utilize
these norms in order to enhance their positions and maintain control over
the membership.
Previous scholarship on the Brotherhood provides detailed accounts
of its organization and structure. The pioneering studies of Mitchell
and Lia enlightened our understanding of the historical development
of the Brotherhood’s organization, particularly in the 1930s and 1940s.1
Recent studies have also enhanced our knowledge of the Brotherhood’s
organizational dynamics.2 This chapter contributes to the literature by
exploring recent changes in the Brotherhood’s organizational and inter-
nal dynamics. I investigate the impact of ideology on the movement’s
structure and the interplay between these elements in everyday life.
I also examine the impact of repression on the Brotherhood’s structure.
Operating under an authoritarian regime, the Brotherhood developed
a distinct pattern of hierarchy, structure, and leadership, enabling it to
avoid repression and continue its activities. In fact the Brotherhood’s
quasi-​c landestine character can be attributed to this environment,
which significantly impacted the movement’s internal dynamics and
organizational strategy. However, before unpacking the Brotherhood’s
structure, we need to examine the relationship between organization
and identity and situate this discussion within the literature on social
movements.

Organization, Structure, and Identity

The bourgeoning literature on social movements enhances our under-
standing of the relationship between a movement’s organization, struc-
ture, and ideology.3 The seminal work of Della Porta and Diani shows
that organization plays a vital role in helping social movements achieve a
number of key functions, such as encouraging participation, defining or-
ganizational aims, managing and coordinating contributions, and collect-
ing resources from the environment. Della Porta and Diani recognize the
role of organization as a source of a movement’s identity; however, they
largely ignore the role of a movement’s structure in reshaping its identity.
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The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 101

They posit, “For people committed to a certain cause, organizations are an

important source of continuity, not only in terms of identity, but also in
terms of action.”4 A second body of literature reveals the role organization
plays in maintaining organizational unity and accommodating internal
rifts and factionalism.5 Mayer Zald and John McCarthy demonstrate that
heterogeneity can cause splits within movements due to concerns over
ideological and doctrinal purity.6
However, Melucci’s pivotal work on collective identity provides the
most persuasive analysis of the impact of an organization’s internal struc-
ture on its identity and activism. He defines a social movement as “an
actor engaged in a conflict directly or indirectly affecting the distribution
of power within a society.”7 This definition illustrates the extent to which
social movements seek to build complexity into their organization. The
more the movement is involved in social and political conflicts, contests
power, and defies the existing regime and other dominant groups, the
more tight-​knit its organization should be.
In addition the internal structure of a social movement is subject
to various influences depending on its objectives, activities, size, and
ideology. Thus the crucial question is not how a movement creates its
organizational structure, but how it can ensure its efficiency. Melucci
highlights three important, interrelated components of a movement’s
organizational structure: (1) a system of roles and the division of labor,
(2) mechanisms and criteria for the distribution of costs and benefits,
and (3) a structure of incentives. In this sense the key objective of a move-
ment’s internal structure is to pursue the group’s goals, adapt to the en-
vironment it operates in, and maintain the unity and preservation of the
movement as a whole.8
This chapter builds on Melucci’s analysis of organizational structure
in order to unpack the Brotherhood’s organization and understand its
impact on the identity formation process. I contend that the Brotherhood’s
organizational structure is deliberately tailored to create a unique pattern
of identity. Its organizational norms and regulations create a frame of
identity, ikhwanism, that dominates and directs individuals in their every-
day lives. Ikhwanism is responsible for implanting the movement’s objec-
tives, governing its internal dynamics, and reshaping the identity of its
members.
Also the type of organizational structure a social movement employs is
instructive for understanding its identity construction process. It reflects
the movement’s objectives and ideology and also reveals its complexity,
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102 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

elasticity, and cohesiveness. Many studies stress the importance of an

organization’s typology in identifying its strategies, tactics, and internal
structure. Zald and McCarthy, for instance, highlight the relationship be-
tween an organization’s type and its activism. They believe that a social
movement organization is a “complex, or formal, organization which iden-
tifies its goals with the preference of social movement or countermove-
ment and attempts to achieve those goals.”9
A social movement’s organizational structure is manifested differ-
ently based on a variety of criteria. Dell Porta and Diani highlight the
heterogeneity of organizational forms within social movements by illus-
trating three prominent archetypes. First is the “professional movement,”
referring to organizations that are characterized by clear leadership and a
nonexistent membership base. Second is the “mass protest organization,”
which combines internal democracy with certain levels of formalization
and organizational structures. Third is the “grassroots organization,”
which combines strong participatory orientation with low levels of formal
structure.10
Melucci, however, maintains that “instead of thinking in types of or-
ganizations, one should use the dimensions relevant to the classifica-
tion as analytical tools to make distinctions, to ‘deconstruct’ empirical
unities, and to account for their complexity.” He therefore provides vital
criteria for analyzing an organization’s forms. Expressive objectives
refer to the satisfaction of the social and psychological needs of mem-
bers through participation and solidarity; instrumental objectives are
the attainment of specific external goods. Organizational structure can
be built into affiliations and membership requirements, which can be
divided into inclusive and exclusive organizations. The former, accord-
ing to Melucci, do not apply rigid mechanisms for selecting members
and expect only a low degree of commitment; the latter exercise rigid
control over the selection and recruitment of members and require
intensive identification, commitment, and total discipline. Moreover
there are two forms of organizations based on power relations and de-
mocracy within the movement. The authoritarian form reflects a high
level of monopoly of power within the movement, and the participatory
form assumes members have more power in and access to the decision-​
making process.11
As a social movement the Brotherhood has a complex organizational
structure that exhibits many of Melucci’s analytical criteria. For ex-
ample, as mentioned in ­chapter 4, the Brotherhood has two groups of
103

The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 103

objectives: expressive and instrumental. A key expressive objective, as ar-

ticulated by al-​Banna, is “to lead humanity towards the well-​being under
the banner of Islam.” Instrumental objectives include liberating Islamic
countries from foreign occupation, resisting the materialist and athe-
ist wave that dominates Muslim societies, and reformulating the politi-
cal, social, economic, educational, and judiciary systems to be based on
Islamic principles.12
Chapter 6 demonstrated that the Brotherhood utilizes an exclusive
membership system that requires a high degree of indoctrination and
ideological socialization. Members must meet clearly defined conditions
and prerequisites in order to receive full membership. Inside the move-
ment is a centralized decision-​making process dominated by the leader-
ship and senior members. This structure can be partially explained by the
authoritarian and oppressive environment within which the Brotherhood
operates, a factor that exerts significant pressure on the group’s meetings
and deliberations. Nevertheless members at the lower levels have the right
to select their leaders in internal elections.

The Structure of the Brotherhood

Al-​Banna constructed a complex yet effective structure that he believed
would enable the Brotherhood to achieve its objectives. Nathan Brown
calls this structure “the most notable feature of the Muslim Brotherhood
model.” The Brotherhood follows a hierarchal structure that connects
divisions and branches through a well-​controlled system of administra-
tion. The internal system, chain of command and leadership, and norms
and regulations are well defined in the bylaws and basic charter. Brown
points out that Islamist movements that follow the Brotherhood’s model
strive to have “bylaws, clear criteria for various gradations of member-
ship, regular arrangements, established procedures for selecting offi-
cers and determining policies and positions, collegial and consultative
decision-​making organs, and specialized bodies with clear function
tasks.”13
As an ideological movement keen to pursue its objectives and main-
tain the loyalty of its members, the Brotherhood is a tight-​knit structure
that can be divided into two chief axes. The vertical axis is the hierar-
chical and pyramidal structure, which is illustrated in Figure 7.1; it in-
cludes seven administrative levels: usra (family or cell), shu’ba (division
or branch), mantiqa (district), maktab idari (administrative office), Majlis
104

104 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Al-Murshid Al-'am
(The General Guide)

Maktab Al-Irshad
(The Guidance Bureau)

Majlis al-Shura
(The Shura Council)

Maktab Idari
(Adminstrative Office)

Mantiqa
(District)

Shu'ba
(Divison)

Usra (Family)

Figure 7.1 The Vertical Structure of the Brotherhood

al-​shura (the Shura Council), Maktab Al-​Irshad (the Guidance Bureau),

and al-​murshid al-​’am (the general guide). The horizontal axis, as illus-
trated in Figure 7.2, consists of three basic components: sections (aqsam),
committees (lijan), and units (wahdat).14 The main task of this axis is
to facilitate the work of the Brotherhood’s organizational bodies (the
Guidance Bureau and Shura Council) and to enable them to achieve their
assigned objectives. There are no specific instructions articulated in the
Brotherhood’s bylaws on how these components should be organized or
function.
The Brotherhood’s bylaws determine the responsibility and power of
each organizational level and how they should interact and communicate
with each other. Furthermore each level has its own bylaw that identifies
and organizes its tasks. Importantly, both axes are set in a way that serves
the chief objectives of the Brotherhood. Mohamed Mustafa, the head of a
shu’ba, explains that the organizational machinery of the Brotherhood is
designed to realize its objectives. All members, including senior leaders,
follow this structure and abide by its rules and regulations.15
105

The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 105

Guidance Bureau
(Maktab al-Irshad)

Secons Commiees Units

(aqsam) (lijan) (wahadat)

- Finanical
- Disseminang the Call - Planning
- Polical
(da'wa) - Elecons
- Services
- Socilizaon (tarbiyya) - Camps
- Legal
- Students - Sport Acvies
- Media
- Charity - Complaints
- Stascs
- Workers - Scouts
- Promoon
- Peasents - Press
- Professionals
- Families (usar)
- Sisters
- External Affairs

Figure 7.2 The Horizontal Structure of the Brotherhood

The composition, functions, and responsibilities of each organizational

level are spelled out in the Brotherhood’s current bylaws and charter.16

Usra
As discussed in ­chapter 6, the usra, or family, is the basic unit in the
Brotherhood’s structure. It consists of five to seven individuals who meet
weekly to discuss different issues, ranging from religious to political matters.
In the Brotherhood’s early years the key task for usra was to familiarize and
then indoctrinate members with the movement’s ideology and objectives.
However, in recent years the role and tasks of usra have become more orga-
nizational and political. For example, usra activities now include planning for
political events such as elections and demonstrations and organizing social
campaigns to provide social services in poor areas. Usra members now spend
more time with each other during the week, particularly in daily prayers.
Each usra includes a financial unit that covers and sponsors its activities and
provides assistance for members in need. According to the bylaws, each usra
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106 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

must elect a naqib, or captain, who is usually the oldest member in the usra.
Each member in the Brotherhood, including senior members, must join an
usra and actively engage in its activities.

Shu’ba
The shu’ba, or division, comprises between five and six usar (plural of
usra), totaling thirty to forty members.17 The shu’ba is the most important
unit in the Brotherhood’s hierarchal structure because only members are
eligible to join. Members who join shu’ba are either active (‘amil), support-
ers (mu’ayyid), or associates (muntasib). Moreover the shu’ba is the chief
organizational level responsible for achieving the Brotherhood’s organi-
zational, social, and political objectives in a certain geographical area. It
runs the Brotherhood’s da‘wa, recruiting, and social activities through its
local network. It also manages internal affairs, such as promotion, com-
plaints, and financial matters. According to the bylaws, each shu’ba should
elect a head (rais) and deputy (naib), who should be active members. Both
are elected to two four-​year terms.18

Mantiqa
The mantiqa, or district, is an amalgamation of three to four divisions
(shu’ab) that meet regularly to discuss and implement the Administrative
Office’s plans. District members can be either active (‘amil) or associated
(muntasib), but they must have spent at least two years in the Brotherhood.
The district’s key task is to run the Brotherhood’s activities in a designated
geographical area and to provide recommendations to the higher organi-
zational level, the Administrative Office. Districts are also responsible for
supervising a shu’ba’s activities and resolving any organizational or insti-
tutional problems that arise at the lower membership levels. Each district
has an elected office, headed by a chief and deputy who are directly elected
and should be active members. Each governorate can have one district or
more, depending on its population and the number of members in the
region. Typically each governorate contains three to four districts.

Maktab Idari
The Maktab Idari (Administrative Office) constitutes the administrative
authority at the governorate level. Each governorate has an Administrative
107

The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 107

Office composed of districts and members who live in that region. The
Administrative Office exemplifies the executive body of the Brotherhood
on the governorate level. According to the bylaws, the Administrative
Office is responsible for implementing the Brotherhood’s plans in its
governorate.
The Administrative Office holds two meetings each month to discuss
and supervise the Brotherhood’s organizational, social, and political ac-
tivities in a designated geographical area. It has full authority over mem-
bers in each governorate and it has jurisdiction to form technical commit-
tees that serve the Brotherhood’s objectives, such as charity and political
committees.
According to Article 29 of the Brotherhood’s bylaws, the Administrative
Office is required to provide an annual report on its activities to the gov-
ernorate’s Shura Council.19 The Shura Council elects members of the
Administrative Office to four-​year terms, and they are eligible to be re-
elected for subsequent terms. Article 30, however, grants the Guidance
Bureau the authority to suspend an Administrative Office or freeze its
activities for thirty days until the governorate’s Shura Council elects a new
office.

Majlis al-​Shura
The Majlis al-​Shura (Shura Council) is the Brotherhood’s legisla-
tive body and one of its most significant entities for governing. It
consists of ninety members who are elected from the governorates’
Shura Councils.20 Each governorate has a quota of seats on the Shura
Council depending on the number of members in that governorate. The
Guidance Bureau has the authority to appoint members to the Shura
Council, but this number is not to exceed fifteen, and can increase the
quota of each governorate in the Shura Council. Members of the Shura
Council must meet the following requirements: be at least thirty years
old, have been an active member for at least five years, and be a member
of their governorate’s Shura Council. Each representative serves in the
Shura Council for four years.
The general guide calls for the Shura Councils to meet twice a year.
However, either the general guide or at least twenty members of the
Council can call an emergency meeting, for example to deal with the arrest
of senior leaders or a political crisis. Each Shura Council meeting is led
by the general guide and, if he is absent, by either his first deputy or the
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108 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

oldest member of the Council. The Shura Council’s decisions are made
by a simple majority of attendees, unless there is a designated number for
taking the vote on specific issues.
The Shura Council is responsible for discussing, outlining, and ap-
proving the Brotherhood’s broad plans, policies, strategies, and budget.
However, its most important function is electing the Guidance Bureau and
the general guide, the highest executive in the Brotherhood. Therefore the
Guidance Bureau is responsible before the Shura Council and is required
to provide a detailed and comprehensive annual report on its activities
during the previous year. It is also obliged to provide plans and policies for
the coming year to be discussed and approved by the Shura Council. The
Council can dismiss any member of the Guidance Bureau and choose his
successor in secret voting.

Maktab al-​Irshad
The Maktab al-​Irshad (Guidance Bureau) is the Brotherhood’s highest
executive body. Its sixteen members are elected by the Shura Council in
direct, secret voting and should reflect the Brotherhood’s geographical
distribution but without a specific quota. The Guidance Bureau can ap-
point three additional members through majority voting.21 To be elected, a
member should receive more than 50% of the total votes. If this threshold
is not reached, a new round of voting is held between those who received
the highest number of votes in the first round. If a seat becomes vacant,
the person receiving the highest number of votes in the previous elec-
tion is promoted. Members of the Guidance Bureau should be at least
thirty years old,22 be members of the Shura Council, and have been in the
Brotherhood for at least ten years.23
Guidance Bureau members serve a four-​year term, which can be ex-
tended by an additional term by the Shura Council. Moreover the Shura
Council can renew the terms of Guidance Bureau members if it decides
it needs more time to elect a new Bureau. This was the case during the
Mubarak era, as the Brotherhood could not hold internal elections for se-
curity reasons. However, some members claim that the Guidance Bureau
frequently abuses this rule for its own benefit.24 The Shura Council can
also terminate the membership of any member for health or other reasons
in secret voting. The Guidance Bureau can also terminate the member-
ship of any of its members if he does not exercise his membership for a
six-​month period.25 The Guidance Bureau holds regular meetings, usually
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The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 109

weekly, but the general guide or at least five members can call an emer-
gency meeting. The meetings are held in Cairo unless the general guide
or a majority of the Guidance Bureau’s members choose another location.
Guidance Bureau meetings are led by the general guide or his deputy if
he is absent; if both are absent, the most senior member of the Bureau
leads the meeting. The Bureau’s decisions are by a majority vote of those
in attendance. The Guidance Bureau also has the authority to form an
emergency committee of four members headed by the general guide and
his deputy to make decisions in urgent matters.
The key function of the Guidance Bureau is to execute the plans and
policies of the Brotherhood relating to its organizational, political, social,
and religious activities. It is also responsible for making urgent decisions,
such as dealing with the arrest of its members or with regime repression.
It has the power to form technical committees to aid the implementation
of its plans and objectives. The Bureau is responsible before the Shura
Council and the general guide. As mentioned, it provides a comprehen-
sive annual report to the Shura Council highlighting its achievements and
future plans and strategy.

Al-​murshid al-​’am
Al-​murshid al-​’am, the general guide,26 is the head of the Brotherhood and
presides over its executive and legislative bodies. He is elected by the Shura
Council in secret voting and must be at least forty years old and an active
member in the Brotherhood for at least fifteen years. After being elected
the general guide receives bay’a (allegiance) from the Brotherhood’s mem-
bers. He should be totally free to serve the Brotherhood and should not
hold any other position or have any other professional, financial, or eco-
nomic commitments.27 The general guide can select one or more deputies
form the Guidance Bureau and delegate any of them to head the meetings
of the Shura Council or the Guidance Bureau. In the case of the absence
of the general guide, his first deputy assumes the role. If the absence
is permanent due to death or dismissal, the deputy assumes the role of
the general guide until the Shura Council elects a new general guide.
Theoretically the Shura Council can also remove the general guide if he
violates the rules or falls short of achieving expected objectives, which has
never happened. The general guide serves for two terms of six years.28
The general guide is responsible for supervising the Brotherhood’s in-
stitutions and representing the movement in society. He is also responsible
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110 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

for ensuring that those at the lower levels of the Brotherhood’s structure
follow the rules and strive to achieve the movement’s objectives. He has
the power to call the Guidance Bureau or the Shura Council for meetings
and to question any of their members. All plans, policies, and strategies
have to be presented before the general guide and receive his approval
before they are implemented. Put simply, the general guide is the high-
est position in the Brotherhood, with far-​reaching powers over the move-
ment. However, the general guide’s authority is neither absolute nor un-
checked. As mentioned earlier, he is responsible before the Shura Council,
which can remove him if he doesn’t abide by the movement’s rules and
regulations.

Decision Making in the Brotherhood

The Brotherhood is a centralized movement; however, it has a two-​
pronged decision-​making mechanism: a centralized decision-​making pro-
cess and decentralized implementation. Decisions are made by a small,
exclusive circle of leaders at the top, and the lower-​and middle-​ranking
leaders and members at the bottom implement the decisions For example,
if the leadership decides to contest parliamentary or municipal elections,
the local offices and middle-​level leaders are responsible for running the
electoral campaign, reaching out to the constituency, and propagating can-
didates’ slogans and platforms. They thus have freedom and authority to
do whatever they think can help achieve the main objective of winning the
elections.
The Brotherhood’s centralization corresponds with the hierarchal and
disciplined structure whereby the general guide and the Guidance Bureau
preside over the organization and control its structure. According to the
bylaws, the Guidance Bureau and Shura Council vote on key strategic de-
cisions such as participating in elections, negotiating with the regime,
and protesting. In reality, however, the general guide and Guidance
Bureau have the final word. Furthermore, as a result of regime repression
in recent decades, the Guidance Bureau has wielded overwhelming power
in decision making at the expense of the Shura Council, which could not
convene its regular meetings. This led to an imbalanced relationship be-
tween these institutions and created a problem of asymmetric informa-
tion that led to a power struggle within the Brotherhood.
Yet the decentralization of the Brotherhood serves its broad objectives
and extensive network. The local branches and offices exercise relative
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The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 111

freedom in running the movement’s activities according to current cir-

cumstances and needs without needing to confer with the leadership.
Mustafa claims that the districts (shu’ab) and administrative offices enjoy
a high degree of independence and have the ability to craft local policies,
organize events, and oversee social activities.29 Furthermore decentraliza-
tion provides ample opportunities for young members to receive training
and gain managerial and organizational experience. By managing local
activities, implementing the movement’s plans, and following its strat-
egy, young members are exposed to collective action and advance their
leadership and organizational skills. This learning experience also quali-
fies them to be promoted within the Brotherhood and facilitates their rise
to leadership roles. Indeed one of the key objectives of the Brotherhood’s
organizational machinery is to produce new leaders capable of managing
the movement, particularly in the absence of senior leaders. This was evi-
dent after the July 2013 coup that ousted President Morsi and excluded the
Brotherhood. Despite brutal repression against the Brotherhood, whereby
many of its senior leaders were either arrested or in exile, the movement
was able to survive and continue its activities, particularly in rural areas,
thanks to younger leaders stepping forward.30

Ideology and Organization

Ideology plays an important role in molding a social movement’s struc-
ture and norms—​whether it is centralized or decentralized, democratic
or authoritarian, and reflects its worldview and system of beliefs.31 Unlike
some scholars who undervalue the role ideology plays in shaping a social
movement’s actions and decisions,32 I contend that a movement’s ideology
imbues it with certain norms and values and also ensures members’ alle-
giance to these norms and values. Furthermore the relationship between
ideology and structure is reciprocal. Whereas its ideology determines the
breadth and complexity of the organization, its structure enables the move-
ment to implant its ideology and code of norms in members. Ideology
identifies the type of objectives (expressive or instrumental), worldview
(rigid or elastic), and normative reference; structure translates these ab-
stract elements into reality.
As discussed in ­chapter 4, the Brotherhood’s ideology is broad, com-
prehensive, and to some extent vague. This affects the movement’s struc-
ture, code of norms, and everyday practices. From the highest level of the
general guide to the lowest level of ordinary members, all are connected
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112 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

by an inclusive ideology and structure that surrounds them and shapes

their identity. The real impact of ideology on the Brotherhood’s organiza-
tional structure, however, stems from formulating the movement’s norms
and code of values, such as allegiance, obedience, commitment, solidar-
ity, and loyalty. These norms play a fundamental role in pairing ideology
with structure, members with leadership, and objectives with strategy.
Ironically al-​Banna established the Brotherhood’s structure before he fully
articulated its ideology. He astutely blended the organizational structure
(tanzim) with its ideology (al-​fikra al-​islamiyya) in a robust but flexible
formula.
In addition ideology is a key source of the Brotherhood’s political pro-
grams, statements, and actions. Leaders and members utilize the broad-
ness of this ideology to articulate ideas, form policies, and outline their
strategy. The long-​standing mantra of the Brotherhood, “Islam is the
solution,” stems from the comprehensive character of its ideology. As
Nathan Brown observes, “Islamist movements modeled on the Muslim
Brotherhood are indeed highly ideological. And their ideologies do inform
their actions. But their ideologies are also fairly general and allow consid-
erable flexibility not on merely tactics but also on strategy and especially
on the question of elections and even on democracy.”33
The religious aspect of the Brotherhood’s ideology also impacts its
structure. Several of the ideologues and leaders consider organization
a fundamental tool to disseminate the movement’s ideology. For them
building a robust and disciplined organization is a religious necessity be-
cause it promulgates Islam and achieves the goals of da‘wa. For exam-
ple, Said Hawwa, a prominent leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
during the 1970s and 1980s, writes, “Building an organization is a neces-
sity in order to reach Islamic objectives and disseminating Islam.” Hawwa
asserts that Islamists should articulate what he calls an “Islamic organiza-
tional theory” capable of saving the Muslim umma from “intellectual dis-
array.” This theory should be based on Islamic ethics, good manners, and
clear objectives. To this end he believes Islamist movements should have
comprehensive bylaws, clearly delineated hierarchal structures, and con-
sistent membership systems.34 Fathi Yakan, one of the most influential
Islamist ideologues and the founder of the Lebanese Islamic Action Front,
reiterates the need for Islamist movements to build robust organizational
structures. In fact Yakan goes a step further, identifying organizational
structure as a religious duty: “Islamic manhaj should be based on an orga-
nizational system that can guide Muslims in everyday life.”35
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The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 113

An effective organizational structure is crucial for the Brotherhood to

manage the full range of its activities. Its tight-​knit structure enables it to reach
out to its expansive constituency. Munson explains that the Brotherhood’s
structure helps it allocate resources, expand its social network, and dissemi-
nate its ideology among different social strata. For example, he points out
that the Brotherhood’s federated structure facilitated its penetration into
urban and suburban areas in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s.36
Ideology also impacts the Brotherhood’s decision-​making process by
helping leaders legitimize, and sometimes sanctify, their decisions and ac-
tions. Essam al-​Erian declares, the Brotherhood’s former head of Political
Bureau, “Our decisions are made for the sake of da‘wa, not the organiza-
tion.”37 Moreover the leadership occasionally utilizes the vagueness of the
Brotherhood’s ideology to manipulate members and maintain control over
the organization.
Importantly ideology also helps the Brotherhood maintain organiza-
tional cohesion and unity. The movement utilizes its members’ religious
and ideological commitment to ensure their allegiance to the leadership
and to diminish internal opposition. As I explain in ­chapter 9, the more
conservative members succeeded in marginalizing the reformists by dis-
crediting and sometimes demonizing their ideological and religious stance.
Sometimes, however, the Brotherhood’s leaders perceive ideology dif-
ferently. For example, leaders give different meanings to the slogan “Islam
is the solution.” While some view it as a reflection of the Brotherhood’s
comprehensive ideology, others treat it as a pragmatic platform that can
be implemented. It is also important to stress that despite the vagueness
of the Brotherhood’s ideology, its plans and platforms are specific and
clearly defined. As Brown explains, “Movements based on the Muslim
Brotherhood model have only vague ideology texts, and their leaders are
generally highly practical people rather than ideologues or intellectuals.”38
In fact this broad ideology allows leaders and members to adapt their strat-
egies to fit different contexts.

The Institutionalization of the Brotherhood:

An Appraisal
The Brotherhood’s structure and hierarchy reveal a high degree of disci-
pline and institutionalization, which has shaped the Brotherhood as a vig-
orous and resilient organization capable of surviving crises and coexisting
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114 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

with different political regimes. The chain of command and the flow of
orders, decisions, and instructions from one level to another is governed
by the bylaws and follows specific procedures that are respected and fol-
lowed by all members. As Brown aptly observes, “The movements not only
work hard to follow formal procedures; they take great pride in doing so.”39
However, the complexity of this structure has turned it into a highly
bureaucratic movement. On paper the roles, tasks, and powers of each
organizational level are clearly defined, and the bylaws determine the hi-
erarchical relationship between these levels and specify the regulations,
rules, and procedures and the punishment in cases of violation. Yet the
picture is not as clear in practice. First and foremost is the lack of sepa-
ration of power between institutional bodies, particularly the Guidance
Bureau and the Shura Council. In fact the relationship between these two
bodies is confusing and imbalanced. For example, while the Guidance
Bureau is accountable to the Shura Council, it has more power and clout
over the Brotherhood than the latter. Not only does the Guidance Bureau
possess exceptional power in governing the Brotherhood’s affairs along-
side the general guide, but it also dominates the decision-​making pro-
cess, particularly on key issues such as political participation, negotiating
with the regime, and administering the budget. Several Shura Council
members have expressed dissatisfaction with the increasing power of
their counterparts in the Guidance Bureau and the prestige these roles
carry. Sayyid El-​Melegi, a former member of the Shura Council, claims
the Guidance Bureau controls the Shura Council and took over many of its
powers, particularly those relating to the budget and financial resources
of the Brotherhood. He also claims the Guidance Bureau suffers from
nepotism and corruption.40
Second, the Brotherhood’s institutions are subject to power struggles.
Like any other organization, the Brotherhood comprises individuals and
factions who debate, argue, and squabble over interests, influence, and
privileges. Membership in the Guidance Bureau, for instance, is subject to
intense debate within the Brotherhood. Most significant, the differences
between the movement’s conservatives and reformists overshadowed
the movement itself throughout the past two decades. The Brotherhood
may have been able to accommodate and manage these disputes in the
short term, but it proved incapable of preventing them from having last-
ing impacts in the long run. There are also disputes between generations
that have undermined the movement’s organizational structure in recent
years. Divisions between the old guard and youth over strategy, political
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The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 115

and ideological stances, and the relationship with the regime have become
commonplace.
Third is the relationship between the general guide and the
Brotherhood’s institutions, which is highly imbalanced and leans in favor
of the former. Unlike other religious movements where the chief lead-
er’s power is limited to the spiritual sphere, the general guide has both
spiritual and operational authority over the movement. As mentioned, the
bylaws give the general guide comprehensive power over the movement’s
legislative and executive bodies. Not only does this place him above the
Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council in practice, but it also gives him
the right to amend the movement’s bylaws and the charter. Also the gen-
eral guide has significant moral power over the Brotherhood’s members
who revere and respect him as the highest figure and symbol of the move-
ment. On many occasions he has utilized his moral power to influence
members to behave in a certain way, to resolve internal problems, and to
pass certain decisions. This was particularly palpable during the reign of
the first three general guides (Hasan al-​Banna, Hasan al-​Hudaybi, and
Omar al-​Tilmisani), who had far-​reaching power and remain highly re-
spected among the rank and file. Over the past three decades, specifically
since the fourth general guide, Mohamed Hamed Abu al-​Nasr, and the ab-
sence of a charismatic leadership, the position has become akin to an arbi-
trator among factions. True, the general guide still possesses far-​reaching
power, but he has to consider the balance of power within the movement
to avoid splits or fissures.41
Fourth is the stagnation and inertia in the organization. The
Brotherhood’s pyramidal and disciplined structure came at the expense
of its internal vibrancy and vitality. Its determination to ensure the unity
and integration of its organization affected internal dynamics and reduced
the chances of fostering a healthy organizational environment. In addition
the procedures of internal mobility and promotion lack transparency and
do not follow a merit-​based system but are instead based on members’
allegiance and obedience.42 In this respect the organizational culture of
the Brotherhood has actually created a largely subservient and submissive
membership who are not willing to risk losing their membership or being
marginalized by challenging the leadership. Moreover the rigidity of the
Brotherhood’s structure and norms affect the decision-​making process,
which in recent years has become sluggish and sometimes irrelevant. In
fact some scholars have criticized the Brotherhood for treating the orga-
nization, tanzim, as an objective per se.43 In contrast other scholars, such
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116 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

as Husam Tammam, a prominent Egyptian analyst of the Brotherhood,

believe it has built a robust organization similar to the state, which seeks
to replace it.44
Fifth, the Brotherhood’s organization is male-​centered, with no repre-
sentation of women (sisters) in the movement’s institutions, particularly
the Guidance Bureau and Shura Council. Although it is true that there is a
section for women called the Muslim Sisters (Qism al-​akhwat al-​muslimat),
which was founded by al-​Banna in the early 1930s,45 it does not have real
power or authority. And there is no direct communication between the
Sisters and the general guide; rather all communication takes place at the
Administrative Office level. According to Omayma Abdel-​Latif, “In each
bureau, one male member is in charge of women’s activities (al-​Nashat
al-​Nisaaee) and acts as liaison between the Sisters’ division in each gov-
ernorate and district movement headquarters in Cairo.”46 Despite Sisters
undertaking some organizational tasks, such as participating in protests
and charity activities, they are not entitled to the same rights as men.
The marginalization of women within the structure reflects the move-
ment’s patriarchal view of women and their role in public life, which its
leaders believe should be complementary to men.47 Abdel-​Latif points out
that some Sisters have been vocal about this disenfranchisement and have
called for more inclusive practices. She notes, “The majority of women
activists interviewed view integration as crucial in ending the marginal
status of the women’s movement inside the Muslim Brotherhood.”48
Sixth, some scholars describe the Brotherhood’s structure as totalitar-
ian and lacking internal democracy.49 The missionary character of the
movement, the chain of command, and the decision-​making process are
reflective of a closed organization. Some members expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the rigidity of the Brotherhood’s structure because it does not
foster a culture that encourages dissenting opinions or opposition to the
leadership. According to them, the order to “listen and obey” denies egali-
tarianism and hinders accountability.50 Haitham Abu Khalil attributes the
despotic character of the Brotherhood’s structure to the unlimited powers
of the leadership: “The extraordinary powers of the leadership and the
absence of accountability or oversight from members turned it into a des-
potic authority.”51
Nevertheless, while it is true that the Brotherhood’s strict structure
affects its internal dynamics, the movement has made several changes
that enhance its internal democracy and accountability. Since 2004 it
has routinely conducted internal elections on all organizational levels,
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The Brotherhood’s Organization, Structure, and Ideology 117

from shu’ba (district) to the Guidance Bureau. Active members can be

nominated, vote, and select their representatives at different levels, who
serve for specific and fixed terms. The recent changes in the bylaws en-
hanced internal procedures of accountability and responsibility. These
new mechanisms were created after the media exposed the Brotherhood’s
internal problems. The Brotherhood established a committee to hear com-
plaints that has the power to investigate and punish members who violate
the rules.
Notwithstanding the previous observations on the Brotherhood’s
structure, it is quite important to situate them within the broader context
of the relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime. The repres-
sive environment wherein the Brotherhood operates can explain, among
other factors, the strictness of its organization. For example, the Mubarak
regime’s repressive and exclusionary policies toward the Brotherhood
pushed it inward and crippled its internal dynamics. Tammam notes that
during times of repression the Brotherhood tends to focus on maintaining
internal unity at the expense of openness and transparency.52 Furthermore
the Brotherhood’s paranoia about infiltration by state elements has made
it even more sensitive to organizational openness. In fact the regime bears
some responsibility for the stagnation of the Brotherhood. Not only has
repression made the Brotherhood more focused on safeguarding its or-
ganizational integrity, but it also played into the hands of the conserva-
tive elements that came to control the organization at the expense of the
reformists. During repression the Brotherhood’s priority becomes how to
protect and defend the organization at all costs, not how to reform and
modernize it.
118

Ikhwanism
The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity

After spending some time in the Brotherhood, members

start to feel that they not only live within the Brotherhood,
but also that the Brotherhood lives within them.
Sheikh Abdul Khaliq Al-​Sherif, head of the Da‘wa
Division, interview with author, April 5, 2012

The Muslim Brotherhood has a unique code of identity that distin-

guishes it from other Islamist movements. This code reflects the inter-
play of the movement’s organizational norms, structure, and ideology in
everyday life. The Brotherhood’s regulations, values, hierarchy, patterns
of leadership, and social interactions impact its members’ perceptions
and shape their worldview. The intensity of organizational dynamics
creates a subculture that dominates and guides individuals throughout
their lives. This unique subculture plays a fundamental role in articu-
lating the Brotherhood’s identity and delineates its character and prac-
tices. It also defines power relations, organizational roles, membership
and affiliation rules, and the structure of incentives that foster collective
action.
I call the Brotherhood’s code of identity ikhwanism. As a socioreligious
movement that aims to change the views, perceptions, and behaviors
of its members, the Brotherhood constructs its own ideological and or-
ganizational framework for identity that enhances its cohesion and en-
genders social and political activism. It instills a sense of differentiation
and distinctiveness within its members and ensures their loyalty to the
movement. This code of identity is constructed and reinforced through ev-
eryday interactions, organizational rules and regulations, and ideological
identification processes. It reflects the interaction of ideology with struc-
ture, norms with behaviors, and strategy with reality. In fact ikhwanism is
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 119

not a mere ideology or slogan but a way of life. To be an ikhwani is to think,

live, and behave as a committed and obedient member. In other words,
ikhwanism embodies the identity that signifies the uniqueness and dis-
tinctiveness of the Brotherhood as a social movement. As I will explain,
the norms of obedience, allegiance, commitment, and loyalty are the back-
bone of ikhwanism as a form of identity.

The Brotherhood’s Organizational Norms

To ensure cohesion, integration, and competence, social movements
tend to construct a set of norms and regulations that enable them to con-
trol members, organize their activities, and generate collective action.
Members must abide by these clearly articulated standards in order to
avoid marginalization and punishment. Moreover organizational norms
enhance a movement’s coherence and unity by establishing an unshake-
able commitment to the movement’s objectives, leadership, and ideology.
Melucci defines norms as “the point at which operational needs (the
allocation of resources) come together with the needs of integration and
control (power).” Norms and regulations articulate the relationship be-
tween leadership and members, define membership rules and procedures,
distribute power within the movement, and determine the structure of
incentives. Melucci highlights four roles norms can play within an organi-
zation: (1) governing the relationship between the organization and mem-
bers; (2) regulating the relationship between different components of the
organization; (3) articulating the relationship between the movement and
society; and (4) specifying the objectives and means of collective action.1
The Brotherhood’s organizational norms and interactions create a
unique identity that is largely characterized by obedience and submissive-
ness. As discussed earlier, these traits are encouraged and maintained
through the indoctrination (tarbiyya) and ideological identification pro-
cesses. The reach of the movement’s norms and interactions are exten-
sive; leaders and members alike must adhere to them at all times. They
enable the Brotherhood not only to organize its structure and activities but
also to ensure members’ loyalty and obedience. Thus adhering to these
behaviors is compulsory and nonnegotiable. Those found violating these
standards are punished in order to maintain the legitimacy of the move-
ment’s indoctrination processes. In turn these norms decrease the like-
lihood of fragmentation and the emergence of a legitimate opposition.
And the hierarchal order of the Brotherhood utilizes a top-​down approach
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120 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

that does not allow space for serious splits or cleavages in the structure.
However, it should be noted that the Brotherhood’s norms and regulations
are not static or rigid but are more akin to a dynamic code of conduct that
reflects social interactions within the organization.

Ikhwanism as a “Frame” of Identity

From the movement’s inception al-​Banna was deeply cognizant of the
value of creating an impermeable internal culture that could preserve the
Brotherhood and differentiate it from the plethora of organizations emerg-
ing around the same time. In many of his epistles he stressed the neces-
sity of setting clear rules and regulations that connect members with the
movement. In Risalat at-​Ta’alim (The Teachings) he identified the norms
and code of values members should follow and honor in everyday life.
This text is the keystone of the Brotherhood’s indoctrination and identifi-
cation processes.
The Muslim Brotherhood is well known for its organizational coher-
ence. In recent decades it has developed a code of norms and practices
that are institutionalized and engrained in the movement’s structure—​
ikhwanism. In fact ikhwanism reflects the development of the Brotherhood’s
organizational structure over time. If al-​Banna was the leader who sowed
the seeds of ikhwanism in the Brotherhood’s ideology, it was his successors
who implanted it within the organizational structure.
Ikhwanism is not a rigid set of sacred ideas, however, but a constellation
of social norms and organizational values that stems from the internal
dynamics and interactions within the movement. It is a frame of identity
that guides members in everyday life. It gives meaning to their practices
and connects them with the movement. Furthermore ikhwanism does not
negate the fact that the Brotherhood’s members can maintain their per-
sonal, social, or professional identities; being an ikhwani does not mean
that one cannot work as a lawyer, doctor, or teacher. Indeed what distin-
guishes the Brotherhood from other Islamist movements is the multiple
layers of identity that facilitate the dissemination of the Brotherhood’s ide-
ology in wider society.
Ikhwanism revolves around five basic norms: bay’a (allegiance), ta’ah
(obedience), thiqa (trust), iltizam (commitment), and intima (loyalty). The
Brotherhood tends to blend these norms with Islamic teachings and prin-
ciples to preserve their symbolic power and influence. These norms are im-
planted in the Brotherhood’s structure through the intensive socialization
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 121

and incubation process highlighted in ­chapter 5. As a result these norms

penetrate the hearts and minds, in fact the very essence of each member.

Bay’a
Bay’a (allegiance) is a central norm and one of the first procedures un-
dertaken when joining the Brotherhood.2 The ritual has its roots in the
Islamic traditions and signifies a contract or pledge between the ruler
and the ruled to serve Islam.3 According to Ella Landau-​Tasseron, bay’a is
commonly interpreted as “an oath given by a subordinate to a leader as a
token of allegiance.”4 At the Brotherhood’s inception al-​Banna emphasized
the religious character of bay’a by invoking Quranic verses and emulating
the Prophet Muhammad, who took the oath from new converts to Islam
in the early years of his message.5 Al-​Banna took bay’a from the first six
members who, along with him, established the Brotherhood in 1928. He
writes in his memoirs:

One evening of March 1928, six brothers came to my house and

asked to work together for the sake of Islam and the interests of
the nation (watan). I said; let us exchange pledges with Allah (fa-​
l-​nubayi‛ allah ‛ala …) that we shall be soldiers in the service of
the Call to Islam (or, the Cause of Islam, da‛wa), for the life of the
homeland and the glory of the [Islamic] community depend upon
[this call/​cause].6

Al-​Banna linked bay’a to himself as a leader and, more important,

to the Brotherhood’s cause and ideology.7 He implanted the concept of
bay’a within the Brotherhood’s structure by establishing it as a com-
pulsory procedure for joining the movement, and he linked bay’a with
other values and norms such as obedience and commitment. In Risalat
at-​Ta’alim, al-​Banna identified ten pillars of bay’a (arkanu al- ​bay’a) that
should be adopted in order to attain full membership: understanding,
sincerity, action, jihad, sacrifice, obedience, perseverance, devotion,
brotherhood, and trust.8 He provided a detailed explanation for each of
these pillars and urged members to memorize them and put them into
action.
The implications of bay’a for the Brotherhood’s organizational struc-
ture are considerable.9 On the procedural level, members cannot receive
membership without giving bay’a to the leadership. As discussed in
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122 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

c­ hapter 6, the multitiered system of membership spells out certain re-

quirements and conditions that individuals must meet before becoming
fully fledged members. Despite the fact that there is no fixed statement
or formula for bay’a, the common pledge stipulates that each member
should give the following oath:

I pledge with God to abide by the rules of Islam and jihad for Allah’s
sake, and to fulfil and commit myself to the conditions and obliga-
tions of the Muslim Brothers, and to listen and obey its leadership
whether willingly or not ( fi’l-​manshat wa’l-​makrah) as long as he
succumbs to Allah. I swear by God on that and he is the witness on
my pledge.10

According to the Brotherhood’s bylaws,11 the oath of bay’a should be

given to the general guide (al-​murshid al-​’am); however, due to the fear
of security surveillance, the oath can be taken before any other leader at
the provincial level who subsequently relays it to the general guide. This
practice was particularly common during the Mubarak regime when the
Brotherhood was subject to high levels of repression and surveillance.
Members perceive bay’a in different ways. While some stress the im-
portance of giving bay’a in connecting them to the organization, others
view it as merely a symbolic gesture. For example, Ammar El-​Beltagi high-
lights the role of bay’a in ensuring a member’s commitment and loyalty
to the Brotherhood,12 while Abdurrahman Ayyash plays down the impor-
tance of bay’a, saying, “Giving bay’a is a symbolic procedure, not an actual
one, therefore I did not give bay’a literally.”13 However, both individuals
assert that members should embrace the ten pillars of bay’a and put them
into practice to become a full member.
On a more practical level, bay’a reveals the pattern of the relationship
between members and leaders, which tends to be based on submission
and adherence. Bay’a implies that members should obey and follow the
leadership at all costs because the leadership is working toward achiev-
ing the movement’s objectives. Members are therefore expected to respect
and follow orders from their superiors even if they disagree with them. In
this regard by pledging bay’a members renounce their individual desires
and devote their lives entirely to the will of the movement.
Although members justify their allegiance as a reflection of their orga-
nizational discipline and commitment, the religious thrust and character of
bay’a should not be discounted. Members perceive bay’a as a religious duty,
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 123

not just an organizational norm. According to Mohamed Mustafa, bay’a is

a sign of a member’s religious devotion: “Bay’a is a contract between me
and God, who will hold me accountable for this hereafter.”14 He ardently
defends the importance of bay’a in strengthening the relationship between
members and the Brotherhood as a whole. In fact bay’a fosters strong com-
mitment among the movement’s members. Landau-​Tasseron observes, “By
choosing the term bay’a, al-​Banna expressed all at once the ideology, the
modes of its implementation, and the commitment to both.”15 Some mem-
bers believe that violation of bay’a is religiously prohibited (haram).16
Bay’a is a fundamental tool for promotion within the Brotherhood. It
reflects the extent to which members adhere to the movement’s rules and
regulations. According to the bylaws, a member cannot attain the highest
level of membership (‘amil) without first giving bay’a.17 Therefore, to be
allowed to give bay’a, members must demonstrate an unshakeable dedica-
tion to the Brotherhood’s ideology and leadership.
Bay’a imposes certain duties and responsibilities that should be car-
ried out by each member, and violation of bay’a rules can result in pun-
ishment, such as suspending membership or marginalization. According
to Karim Radawan, a member of the Brotherhood’s Shura Council, any
violation of bay’a leaves members subject to penalties.18 Bay’a implies that
members are fully responsible for their actions and practices not only to
the leadership but also to God, making it both a symbolic and a practical
exposition of power.
The organizational aspect of bay’a is palpable. Members perceive bay’a
as a mutual contract with the leadership, who serve as responsible repre-
sentatives of the movement. This became clear after the amendments in
the General Bylaws (Al-​la’iha al-​’ama) introduced in 1982, which clarifies
that the general guide is responsible before members and must also give
bay’a. In accordance with the bylaws, the general guide is obliged to pledge
bay’a to the Shura Council (Majlis al-​shura al-​’am), the legislative body of
the Brotherhood, which is responsible for electing the general guide and
the Guidance Bureau. The general guide recites the following pledge: “I
give my word to Allah and the Sunna of His messenger as far as I am able
to abide by the platform of the Brotherhood and its basic law, thereby per-
forming the resolution of the Society regarding myself even if they differ
from my opinion. Allah is my witness.” The bylaws also stipulate that the
general guide be held accountable for his decisions and actions if he vio-
lates the rules and regulations of the Brotherhood or is incapable of carry-
ing out his duties.
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124 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

The Brotherhood’s opponents have criticized the submissive character

of bay’a and the blank check it grants the leadership. In its defense, the
Brotherhood’s leaders differentiate between general bay’a (al-​bay’a al-​ama)
and special bay’a (al-​bay’a al-​khasa).19 Abdurrahman al-​Barr, a member of
the Guidance Bureau and the mufti of the Brotherhood, explains that citi-
zens should give general bay’a to the leader of the nation (the imam) who
rules according to Islamic teachings and principles and should obey him
as long as he obeys Allah. The special bay’a, however, is a pledge or oath
among people who agree to work for the sake of Islam. In this case when
the leader takes bay’a from the group, the bay’a is binding only within that
group, not society as a whole. The Brotherhood, al-​Barr maintains, em-
ploys special bay’a, not general bay’a.20
Despite the religious and symbolic character of bay’a, members who
oppose the leadership can still abandon the movement without breaking the
bay’a oath. The multiple interpretations of bay’a enable members to contest
the leadership. Some argue that the oath is not given to individuals but to
the ideology and principles of the movement, which members can embrace
even if they leave.21 Landau-​Tasseron maintains that members can reject
the leadership’s decisions without annulling their bay’a.22 Unsurprisingly
bay’a has been a contested subject within the Brotherhood. Some mem-
bers, particularly those adopting reformist views, criticize the misuse of
bay’a as a tool to suppress opponents. They believe bay’a should be limited
to the religious and spiritual sphere and not extend to the Brotherhood’s
organizational structure. A former member named Mohamed Ayoub be-
lieves some leaders politicize bay’a and use it to exclude their opponents.23
Members can boycott weekly meetings or freeze their membership
for a period of time to protest certain decisions. They can also use bay’a
to delegitimize the leadership. For example, the senior leaders Mohamed
Habib, Abdelmoniem Aboul Fottouh, and Ibrahim al-​Za’farani did not
give bay’a to Badie to protest the way he was elected.
Bay’a can best be described as an agreement between members and
leadership based on mutual commitment and responsibilities. As Landau-​
Tarreson puts it, “Bay’a is both a concept and practice…. As such it has
always been broad and flexible.”24

Ta’ah
Ta’ah, or obedience, is the flip side of bay’a, whereby members submit to
the movement’s regulations and rules. Like bay’a, ta’ah is derived from
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 125

Islamic traditions.25 Thus the religious and symbolic effect of obedience is

significant. It enables the Brotherhood’s leaders to maintain control over
the organization and its members. Not surprisingly al-​Banna emphasized
ta’ah as one of the main pillars of bay’a by persistently stressing its role in
achieving the Brotherhood’s objectives.26
The oath of bay’a states that members should listen and obey whether
or not they are willing, which instills the concept of obedience within the
Brotherhood’s structure. As Landau-​Tasseron notes, al-​Banna aptly blended
bay’a and ta’ah to create the Brotherhood’s credo.27 The leaders view the
link between bay’a and ta’ah as inseparable. Accordingly the motto “Listen
and obey” has become one of the key features of the movement. However,
this slogan has been controversial and casts the Brotherhood as an author-
itarian organization. Therefore the leaders and ideologues differentiate
between two types of ta’ah: blind obedience (ta’a ‘am’iya) and sighted obe-
dience (ta’a mubsra). According to Amer Shemakh, a mid-​ranking leader,
blind ta’ah refers to following leaders without questioning their decisions
or actions, which he believes does not exist in the movement.28 Sighted
ta’a, on the other hand, allows members to express their views even if they
disagree with the leadership. Some members contend that ta’ah should be
contingent upon the leadership’s ideological commitment to work for the
sake of Islam.29
In practice differentiation between blind and sighted ta’ah remains
vague and controversial. Many of the Brotherhood’s youth have repeat-
edly criticized the application of ta’ah. They accuse leaders of abusing the
norm to impose certain decisions or justify the Brotherhood’s stance on
certain issues. Over the past decade the Brotherhood has experienced
vocal dissent coming from its youth elements due to the political stances
and internal decisions taken by the leadership. Some of these youth claim
the Brotherhood exhibits an “absolute” form of ta’ah that leaves no space
for debate or criticism. A former member named Ahmed Samir al-​Koumi
claims the Brotherhood does not allow members to voice their opinions
freely; they must obey the leadership’s commands blindly and without
discussion.30
There are four primary ways in which ta’ah impacts the Brotherhood’s
identity. First, it reinforces the pattern of subordination and submission
within the movement. The top-​down hierarchy makes it difficult for
members at the lower levels to influence the decisions and policies of the
Brotherhood as a whole. The relationship between members and leaders
is characterized by obedience more than equality. Members in branches
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126 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

and districts cannot hold their leaders accountable, not only because of
the movement’s rules but also due to the symbolic power of ta’a, which
hinders real accountability.
Second, ta’ah is employed by the leadership to accommodate, and
sometimes suppress, demands for reform and change. Mustafa al-​Naggar,
a former member, claims the Brotherhood always manipulates members’
calls for change. He criticizes the leaders and code of norms, which he
believes made the Brotherhood an autocratic organization. In one of his
blogs, al-​Naggar states, “When people hear words like obedience, alle-
giance, battalion, trust, etc. they start to believe that the Brotherhood has
a secret and quasi-​militant organization.”31
Third, ta’ah is utilized to maintain the internal coherence of the
Brotherhood. Islamist movements, particularly the Brotherhood, have
been accused of internal stagnation and inertia, for which critics blame
ta’ah as the primary factor responsible. Those who disobey the leadership’s
decisions are frequently marginalized and sometimes even demonized.
Mohamed Hamza, a mid-​level member and prominent blogger, asserts
that the Brotherhood does not tolerate dissenters who challenge the lead-
ership. He points out, “The ‘Listen and obey’ motto is a mere weapon used
by leaders to maintain unity of the organization and avoid cleavages.”32
Moreover the Brotherhood employs the religious and symbolic charac-
ter of ta’ah to delegitimize opposition. According to Ayyash, those who
defy the Brotherhood’s leadership are portrayed as deviants (munharifin)
from the path: “If you confront your leader, he will, indirectly, smear and
discredit you among members.”33 Operating in a repressive environment
makes the Brotherhood especially sensitive to criticism and strengthens
the force of its blows when responding to these existential threats. The
Brotherhood strives to contain internal disputes in order to maintain its
image as a unified movement. Therefore, instead of questioning dissent-
ers, the Brotherhood isolates and marginalizes them. Not surprisingly
many dissenters have left the movement without much protest from those
remaining.34
Fourth, like allegiance, ta’ah is an influential instrument for promo-
tion. Those who follow the rules are likely to be promoted. Indeed lead-
ers use obedience as an indicator of a member’s devotion and loyalty.
Ayyash says, “The more you ‘listen and obey,’ the higher position you will
achieve.”35
The promotion procedures in the Brotherhood are a subject of great
importance and debate. On one hand, members merit promotion because
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 127

of their loyalty and obedience. The more they obey the leadership, the
more they will be trusted and promoted. According to Ayman Ashraf, a
former member of the Brotherhood, the only way to become a naqib (cap-
tain), a leader of an usra, is to “listen and obey.”36 On the other hand,
some members believe the promotion procedures are subjective and
unfair. They express dissatisfaction with the nepotism and bias inherent
in this structure. Hamza argues that promotion criteria focus mainly on a
member’s religious obedience and devotion rather than his skills or com-
petence.37 A mid-​ranking member named Anwar Hamed also criticizes
the subjectivity of the promotion process; he claims that several qualified
members left the Brotherhood because they were less “submissive and
obedient to the leadership.”38

Thiqa
Thiqa (trust) is the third pillar of bay’a articulated by al-​Banna in Risalat
at-​Ta’alim. Unlike the previous two pillars it addresses the commitment of
members to the movement’s ideology rather than to the leadership struc-
ture itself. Al-​Banna asserts that relations between leaders and members
should be similar to those “between soldiers and their leader.”39 Though
soldiers must obey their leaders, the comparison intends to evoke an al-
lusion to the greater cause driving the struggle. The concept of thiqa is
predominant within the Brotherhood’s literature and among its members.
As with the other norms, the leadership tends to blend thiqa with reli-
gious symbolism. According to a mid-​ranking member named Mohamed
Hamed Eliwa, thiqa is “a matter of belief and faith.” He reinforces the con-
nection with religion when he states, “Thiqa is part of our inner belief that
connects members with Allah.”40
The Brotherhood treats thiqa as a fundamental tool in solidifying and
enhancing its internal structure. In his explanation of thiqa, a member
named Emad Ghanim highlights five aspects. The first is trust in the move-
ment’s approach (manhaj), which is derived from Islamic teachings. The
second is trust in the organization and collective action, which, according
to Ghanim, should be for the sake of Islam and da‘wa. Ghanim urges
members to believe the Brotherhood is the only “trustworthy” organization
worth following. The third is trust in the Brotherhood’s decisions, which
he believes should be followed and implemented by members. The fourth
is trust in the leadership and submission to its commands, which Ghanim
links to the leadership’s piety and willingness to follow shura (consultation
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128 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

in decision making). The fifth is trust in God’s assistance. Following these

aspects in everyday life, Ghanim maintains, would strengthen members’
commitment and loyalty.41 The vast majority of the Brotherhood’s mem-
bers perceive thiqa to be a religious obligation and a reflection of their
commitment to the Brotherhood and its leadership. For many of them,
trusting the leadership is crucial to achieving the Brotherhood’s objectives.
According to Mustafa, trust is the only way to measure a member’s com-
mitment and loyalty: “The more members succumb to the leaders and
follow their commands, the more cohesive our organization will be.”42
In addition thiqa significantly impacts the organization of the
Brotherhood. The relationship between leaders and members is shaped
by trust and obedience, as members tend to submissively trust the lead-
ership’s decisions and actions as part of their duty and commitment.
Moreover membership conditions and promotion prospects are funda-
mentally built on trust more than skill; the more members trust and
follow their leaders, the more likely it is they will be promoted.
However, like ta’a, the rigid application of thiqa is a source of dissatis-
faction among young members. According to Hamza, some leaders seek
“blind trust” from members and refuse any rejection or questioning of
their decisions or actions.43 Therefore youth occasionally protest by refus-
ing to follow their leaders’ commands. Abdurrahman Mansour, a former
member of the Brotherhood, claims leaders misuse trust to avoid any cri-
tique of their decisions or behavior.44 This abuse of trust eliminates ac-
countability and transparency. A young member named Amr Soliman,
for instance, believes some leaders use trust not to make rational deci-
sions but to suppress opponents. As he explains, “Trust is a double-​edged
sword. On one hand, it strengthens the relationship between leaders and
members, but on the other hand, it undermines the responsibility and ac-
countability of the leadership.”45

Iltizam
Iltizam (commitment) is a central concept in social movement theory.
According to Burke and Stets, social movements seek to create a sense of
commitment among members in order to sustain their collective action.
They define commitment as “a binding tie between an individual and
some other social entity, whether an identity, another individual, a group
or organization, or an exchange relationship.”46
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 129

Islamist movements foster religious and organizational commitment

among members by blending Islamic values with organizational duties in
order to ensure their allegiance. Therefore iltizam is one of the defining
features of the Brotherhood’s identity; it is treated as both a tool and an
outcome. The Brotherhood uses iltizam as a tool to strengthen its internal
coherence. The movement invests in the religious leanings and piety of its
members to generate a sense of commitment that goes beyond the self.
It perceives iltizam as an outcome because it seeks to reshape members’
behavior to make them pious and religiously committed (multazimin). For
the Brotherhood’s leaders, creating a sense of religious commitment is an
objective per se.
As Melucci notes, commitment to a movement is based on solidar-
ity and strong identification with the goals of the organization.47 The in-
cubation and socialization process (tarbiyya) play a vital role in fostering
members’ commitment not only to the movement’s ideology but also to
its leadership. Sustaining commitment, however, requires a movement
to intensify its socialization and habituation process.48 As c­ hapter 6 illus-
trates, tarbiyya venues such as camps, seminars, and workshops play an
influential role in reinforcing an individual’s religious and organizational
commitment.
Accordingly the impact of iltizam on the Brotherhood’s organization
should not be underestimated. Those I interviewed listed four types of
commitment within the Brotherhood: commitment to the movement’s
objectives and cause, commitment to the movement’s rules and regula-
tions, commitment to leaders, and commitment to fellow members. These
constitute a fundamental part of the indoctrination process.
Upon joining the movement members are indoctrinated to be commit-
ted to the movement’s objectives and cause. The Brotherhood tends to keep
members connected with its ideology through the notion of Islamic proj-
ect (al-​mashrou’ al-​islami). According to Salah Ghorab, a mid-​level leader
in the Brotherhood, “Commitment is not merely words but actions and
deeds for the sake of Islam and the jama‘a.”49 The oath of bay’a underpins
individual commitment; once members give the oath, they are expected
to become self-​committed and work tirelessly to pursue the Brotherhood’s
objectives. Mohamed al-​Naggar, a young Brotherhood member, views
commitment as a fundamental component of his membership. He ex-
plains, “My commitment to the Brotherhood’s cause is unshakable; it is
part of my identity.”50
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130 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Members express their commitment by respecting the Brotherhood’s

rules and following its bylaws. Sherif Ayman explains that following the
rules of the movement is an essential part of a member’s commitment.
He believes that “to be a committed brother [akh multazim], one should de-
voutly follow the movement’s rules and regulations and act upon them.”51
Commitment and respect for the leadership’s decisions is an important
norm in the Brotherhood organization. Similar to thiqa and ta’ah, iltizam
is rooted in the religious ideology of the Brotherhood, and members treat
it as a duty that should be fulfilled. Abiding by the rules, following the
leadership, and implementing the movement’s decisions are key manifes-
tations of members’ commitment. A mid-​ranking member named Sayyid
Shoa’iyb agrees that trust in and obedience to the leadership are signs of
members’ commitment.52 Furthermore members’ commitment strength-
ens the personal and social bonds in the Brotherhood. Members adopt
the notion of brethren (ukhwwa) as a mechanism for communication and
interaction. As Mohamed Sarahn, a Brotherhood member, says, “I do not
feel that I belong to the Brotherhood until I interact and communicate
with my fellow brothers.”53

Intima
Intima (loyalty) is one of the most tangible features of the Brotherhood’s
identity. It indicates the adherence and dedication of members to the
Brotherhood’s ideology and leadership. From the movement’s early
years, al-​Banna prioritized loyalty in the Brotherhood’s ideology and
structure. In one of his epistles, Da‘watuna (Our Call), he calls upon
members to demonstrate loyalty to the da‘wa and al-​fikra al-​islamiyya.
He identifies seven ways for members to foster their loyalty: (1) believe in
the movement’s objectives and cause; (2) become a principled believer in
and preacher of the Brotherhood ideology; (3) possess a strong willing-
ness to work for the greater good of the movement; (4) serve as a good
example to others; (5) adopt secrecy in activities; (6) firmly believe and
trust in the leadership; and (7) abide by the laws and regulations of the
Brotherhood.54
Loyalty is closely related to commitment. Indeed commitment is con-
sidered the most visible manifestation of a member’s loyalty. Members
tend to demonstrate their loyalty by aligning their views and practices
with the movement’s code of norms and regulations. Moreover the reli-
gious foundation of loyalty is evident, and the movement’s ideologues and
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 131

leaders link loyalty to a member’s religious adherence. Fathi Yakan wrote

a famous tract titled What Does My Belonging to Islam Mean? in which he
identifies loyalty to the movement’s ideology and cause and loyalty to its
leadership. He asserts that those who seek to work for Islam must possess
a firm belief in the movement and its objectives.55
Members perceive loyalty to be part of their religious commitment.
According to Shoa’iyb, a member’s loyalty to the Brotherhood reflects his
belief that Islam should be a central part of his daily life: “Belonging to
the Brotherhood is belonging to Islam as understood by the movement.”56
The construction of loyalty and reinforcement of its value are key goals
of the socialization processes in the Brotherhood. Weekly meetings and
religious rituals aim to strengthen a member’s sense of belonging and
loyalty to the movement. Mohamed Sarhan proposes that loyalty is a duty
for members to fulfill when he states, “Loyalty to the Brotherhood is not
something to know but to practice in everyday life.”57
Establishing loyalty is also central to solidifying the Brotherhood’s orga-
nizational structure. By securing loyalty the Brotherhood ensures control
over the organization. Loyalty helps the Brotherhood uphold its coherence
and unity. Since the loyalty of members is measured by adherence and
commitment to the movement’s ideology and leadership, dissenters are
marginalized. Ayyash points out that committed members obey their lead-
ers even if they disagree with them. “Loyalty is above personal opinions,”
he asserts. 58
Loyalty also helps the Brotherhood maintain control over its members.
As mentioned, members prove their loyalty to the leadership by obeying
commands. They ardently obey their leaders as part of their religious com-
mitment. Mohamed al-​Naggar claims, “Obeying my leader is part of my
commitment towards the movement and the da‘wa.”59
The Brotherhood employs members’ loyalty in disseminating the
movement’s ideology and expanding its network. Members express their
loyalty by recruiting new members and spreading the Brotherhood’s mes-
sage throughout society. Ayman explains, “Attracting new members is
part of our loyalty as a duty.” 60
Loyalty operates as a bulwark against regime repression and security
penetration. The brutal policies enacted by the Mubarak regime forced
the Brotherhood to adopt a strict, semiclandestine structure based on the
loyalty and adherence of its members. Without ensuring their loyalty and
commitment, the Brotherhood could have become more vulnerable to se-
curity suppression and even disintegration.
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132 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

These five norms constitute the core values of the Brotherhood and
guide members’ behavior and actions in everyday life. These norms are
not abstract or hypothetical ideas but practical and operational tools that
enable the Brotherhood to maintain its organization and consolidate its
identity. The relationship between these norms is not clear-​c ut or fixed;
they are mutual and intertwined. Members do not treat them as dis-
crete concepts but as connected and sometimes as similar. These norms
are constructed, created, and internalized through socialization mecha-
nisms discussed in ­c hapter 6. They also play a key role in the promotion
process; the more a member can follow and abide by them, the better
his chances to be promoted and gain a higher position in the organiza-
tion. Therefore members are keen to honor and apply these norms in
everyday life.

Institutionalization of Ikhwanism
in the Brotherhood
Ideological social movements have a complex and disciplined organiza-
tion. One method of addressing this complexity is by institutionalizing
or routinizing the movement’s norms and regulations among members.
Organizational norms and regulations provide the Brotherhood with a
cognitive map that can preserve the movement from internal cleavages
and external infiltration. As Melucci points out, institutionalizing norms
is crucial to maintaining a movement’s coherence and integration.61 The
degree of institutionalization necessary relies upon the complexity of the
organization and the relationship between members and leadership. The
Brotherhood operates in a hostile environment, which places significant
pressure on its organizational structure. Without institutionalizing the
norms of allegiance, obedience, trust, commitment, and loyalty, it would
be significantly more difficult for the movement to survive.
The Brotherhood’s organizational structure institutionalizes its norms
and regulations through its bylaws and internal charter. Since its incep-
tion the Brotherhood has been governed by bylaws that are widely re-
spected by members. The Brotherhood has embraced a structure of moral
and material incentives that supplement the bylaws by fostering a sense of
commitment and loyalty among members. However, the most important
mechanism for institutionalizing ikhwanism is socialization (tarbiyya).
Many interviewees said that members exemplify the Brotherhood’s norms
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Ikhwanism: The Brotherhood’s Code of Identity 133

and values in their behavior and everyday practices. They act not as indi-
viduals but as committed members—​as ikhwan. Salah Ghorab is one who
emphasizes that individuals behave as fully committed and responsible
members once they join the movement.62
The ikhwanization of social norms, values, and practices is the
Brotherhood’s strategic goal—​not only to ensure the Islamization of mem-
bers’ identity but, more important, to guarantee their commitment and
loyalty to the organization. Members are surrounded by symbolic images
and meanings that shape their worldview and attitudes. It is the organiza-
tional structure rather than just the ideology that keeps them connected
with the leadership and their fellow members. With time ikhwanization is
internalized as a social reality that members seamlessly incorporate into
their everyday lives. This thorough permeation of social norms, values,
and practices marks the defining moment when a member becomes an
ikhwan.
Unlike other social movements in which members have a transient
identity, the Brotherhood’s norms and values create a resilient and perma-
nent identity for its members. Husam Tammam, a renowned Egyptian
expert on the Brotherhood, concludes that the Brotherhood creates a par-
allel community for members that reinforces their commitment and loy-
alty: “The Brother, al-​akh, lives, gets education, makes friends, finds a job,
and gets married, all through the ikhwan network.”63 With time ikhwanism
becomes the foundation of the Brother’s identity. The Brotherhood’s orga-
nization plays a chief role in constructing this cognitive identity frame-
work. The processes of indoctrination, ritualization, and institutionaliza-
tion reshape an individual’s identity and foster self-​identification. The
result is that an individual’s identity is dissolved and absorbed into that of
the movement. The statement by Abdul Khaliq Al-​Sherif that opened this
chapter encapsulates this process.
In addition the Brotherhood’s organizational structure reinforces the
relationship between individual members. The regularity of internal ac-
tivities (e.g., seminars, battalions, camps) helps members interact, com-
municate, and homogenize. Mustafa stresses the importance of weekly
and monthly meetings in fostering collective identity, particularly in rural
and suburban areas: “Camps [mu’askarat] help members interact and so-
cialize with other fellow members and generate a sense of brotherhood.”64
These interactions are particularly important for those living outside
urban areas because it is not as likely that they will interact with other
members in their everyday lives.
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134 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

The organization allows leaders to orchestrate and sometimes manipu-

late the identity of its members. The Brotherhood’s chain of command, hi-
erarchy, and multitiered membership system enable leaders to dominate
and reshape individuals’ perceptions and behaviors. Hamza underscores
the strong influence of these factors on the identity of its members: “The
general guide and other senior leaders constitute a role model [that mem-
bers] attempt to emulate and follow.”65
The top-​down style of the Brotherhood affirms the impact of the lead-
ership on each individual’s identity. This particular structure creates a
distinct identity that tends to be more submissive and obedient to the lead-
ership. As mentioned, members are required to abide by the rules and
bylaws of the organization and also by its norms and standards. Obedience
is mostly voluntary, as a manifestation of their religious and moral com-
mitment to the movement.
This analysis of the Brotherhood’s norms and regulations unpacks
the key factors in the identity formation process. Chiefly ikhwanism pro-
vides members with the symbolic code of everyday values and standards
that reinforce their sense of loyalty and commitment to the movement.
The Brotherhood’s structure connects norms with behavior, bylaws with
values, and members with leadership. It also intertwines the norms of al-
legiance (bay’a), obedience (ta’a), trust (thiqa), commitment (iltizam), and
loyalty (intima), which dominate the thoughts and actions of members
and guide them in their everyday lives. These norms have played a pivotal
role in enabling the Brotherhood to preserve its internal coherence and
avoid fragmentation despite the tumultuous events that have befallen it
in recent decades.
135

Enforced Coherence
The Brotherhood under Regime Repression

In t he pa s t few decades the Muslim Brotherhood has been subject

to significant regime repression, surveillance, and exclusion. Yet the
movement not only survived but was able to build upon its activism,
unity, and coherence. In fact it utilized regime repression to become
stronger. The movement operated in a hostile and restrictive environ-
ment that requires a high degree of discipline and cohesiveness. The
political environment is the arena within which resources, potential
members, adversaries, and the target audience exist. It also contains
opportunities, as well as threats and constraints that impact the calcu-
lus of political and social movements. A repressive environment limits
a movement’s ability to allocate resources, recruit new members, and
generate collective action, but its most important effect is its impact on
the movement’s unity and coherence. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
which assumes political actors have little space within an authoritarian
environment, the Brotherhood flourished and became more politically
and socially influential under the Mubarak regime. The movement
altered its strategy and tactics in order to adapt to changing circum-
stances. It dealt with repression as a tool, not a threat, that can bind
together its members and fosters their allegiance and solidarity. In re-
sponse to repression, a movement’s survival becomes its chief priority
and self-​preservation overrides internal divisions. The Brotherhood’s
leadership was able to contain its internal differences. This strategy was
the Brotherhood’s primary safeguard from fracturing and dissolving
under Mubarak.
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136 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Regime repression did impact the balance of power within the

Brotherhood. Specifically it enhanced the position of the so-​called conser-
vatives, the hardliners, at the expense of the reformists. The conservative
faction took advantage of regime repression to avoid accountability and
delegitimize calls for internal reform. Conservatives tend to utilize repres-
sion to justify their decisions, adopt specific political or ideological stances,
and undermine and sometimes demonize their internal opponents and
rivals. While scholars tend to assume repression is a curse for social and
political agents, I argue that it can be a viable tool that enables them to
strengthen their cohesiveness.

Social Movements under Authoritarian Regimes

Literature on semi-​authoritarianism suggests that regimes tend to manipu-
late the opposition with competitive yet meaningless elections, decorative
representation in government, restricted access to the media, and other
mechanisms.1 Andreas Schedler explains, “Electoral authoritarian regimes
neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By or-
ganizing periodic elections they try to obtain at least a semblance of dem-
ocratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors.”2
Moreover elections can strengthen an authoritarian regime’s legitimacy
and justify its actions. Lisa Blaydes echoes this sentiment when she writes
that the “authoritarian regime [of Mubarak] in Egypt has endured not de-
spite competitive elections, but, to some degree, because of these elections.”3
The relationship between the political environment and social move-
ments is of great importance. As Melucci notes, “The environment of an
organization is made up of the wider society in which the movement is
situated and from which it draws its support base.”4 Social movements
seek to adapt to the changing environment in order to avoid regime re-
pression and maintain their collective identity. The environment is com-
posed of the state (or the political regime) and social actors, including
supporters as well as adversaries. As Hanspeter Kriesi points out, “The
configuration of political actors at any given point in time is partly deter-
mined by the structures of the political context.”5 Several scholars contend
that social movements can be viewed as a product of their “structural”
environments.6
Under relentless waves of oppression and exclusion some movements,
particularly those that are highly ideological and ideational, tend to focus
inward in order to preserve their unity. Over time they develop a more
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Enforced Coherence 137

defensive identity that preserves their coherence. Manuel Castells notes

that defensive or resistant identity is the byproduct of regime hegemony
and repression. He maintains that identity of resistance leads to the forma-
tion of communes or communities as it constructs “forms of collective
resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis
of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography,
or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance.”7
In highly ideological movements such as the Brotherhood, regime repres-
sion heightens the indoctrination and socialization process. Therefore the
greater the repression, the more intense the identification process. Within
this environment the movement’s primary goal is to survive rather than
participate. Over time the sense of self-​preservation becomes more vis-
ible and influential among members seeking to avoid divisions within the
movement.
Under the Mubarak regime the Brotherhood exhibited an unusual
degree of unity and resilience compared with other political forces in
Egypt.8 Although it is true the Brotherhood experienced a number of
quarrels, divisions, and sometimes splits, particularly between the older
and younger generations, these disagreements never reached the point
where they threatened the disintegration of the organization. In fact the
Brotherhood took advantage of its circumstances to develop a narrative
of adversity and affliction (mihna), which helped members overcome the
consequences of repression in the short run. The leaders employed this
narrative to ensure members’ commitment; while members perceived
regime repression as adversity (mihna), leaders viewed it as a tool to main-
tain solidarity.

From Accommodation to Confrontation

Until his downfall in February 2011, Hosni Mubarak presided over one
of the most notorious and durable semi-​authoritarian regimes in the
Third World.9 Since taking power following the assassination of Anwar
Sadat in October 1981, Mubarak sought total domination over the politi-
cal scene. After a short honeymoon period with the opposition, during
which he launched a series of limited and cosmetic reforms in pursuit
of legitimacy,10 Mubarak turned against the opposition and attempted to
undermine its leaders. By empowering his party, the National Democratic
Party (NDP), Mubarak solidified his grip on power and secured his rule
from the 1980s until 2011.
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138 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

After taking power, Mubarak’s most significant threat was Islamist

movements, particularly those espousing radical and violent ideologies.
He realized it would be risky to fight on two fronts at the same time and
decided to pick his battles wisely. So while he sought to eradicate extrem-
ists belonging to al-​Jama’a al-​Islamiyya and the Jihad Movement, he ad-
opted a softer, more accommodating approach toward the Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood astutely seized the new opportunities created by
Mubarak’s limited openness in the 1980s to expand its social network
and enhance its political clout. It took the plunge into electoral politics
and achieved major success running independent candidates in the 1984
and 1987 parliamentary elections. The Brotherhood also made substan-
tial gains in professional syndicates and university unions, establishing
a robust presence in fields such as medicine, pharmacy, and engineer-
ing.11 By the end of the 1980s the Brotherhood had emerged as the most
prominent opposition movement in Egypt, with an expansive social net-
work and political sway it had not held since the 1950s. Moreover the
Brotherhood witnessed the birth of a new political generation that would
lead the movement over the next two decades; this new crop would shape
its ideological and political discourse to become more pragmatic and open
than ever before.12
The rewards of political participation encouraged the Brotherhood to
invest heavily in politics during the 1980s. However, Mubarak realized
that the expansion of the Brotherhood came at the expense of his legiti-
macy and could undermine his rule. By the beginning of the 1990s con-
frontation between the two sides was inevitable. During the 1990s the
Mubarak regime carried out the most devastating state crackdown on the
Brotherhood since the 1950s and 1960s.13 In response the Brotherhood
attempted to delegitimize the regime and discredit its political party, the
NDP. To this end it boycotted the parliamentary elections in 1990 and
sought to renew its alliance with other political forces. It also sought to
replace its political activism with more social activities and an expanded
network.
In the mid-​ 1990s the relationship between Mubarak and the
Brotherhood reached an impasse. As Wickham records, “After more than
a decade of toleration, the government launched a major counteroffen-
sive against the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting many of its most dynamic
leaders and hammering away at its reputation by condemning it as an ‘il-
legal organization with ties to extremist groups.’ ”14 In addition the regime
resorted to military trials to jettison the Brotherhood’s active leaders; many
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Enforced Coherence 139

were prosecuted and imprisoned for more than five years. As Al-​Awadi
observes, the period from 1995 to 2000 witnessed the regime’s strongest
dependence on coercion as a response to the Brotherhood’s growing politi-
cal and social influence.15
If the 1990s the decade of adversity, as a noted Brotherhood leader
dubbed them,16 the 2000s can best be described as a subtle confronta-
tion between Mubarak and the Brotherhood or, as Nathan Brown puts
it, a cat-​and-​mouse game.17 After a decade of outright confrontation,
Mubarak and the Brotherhood became more attuned to the rules of
the game and unconsciously shifted positions. During the first half of
the decade Mubarak caved to international pressure and changes in re-
gional dynamics and assumed a more defensive posture; this created
more spaces for the Brotherhood, which was emboldened to expand its
influence. The Brotherhood reached out to secular, liberal, and leftist
forces and launched an unprecedented initiative for political reform in
March 2004 that unequivocally advocated for a civil and democratic
state.18 The initiative served as both a pragmatic and a symbolic step
to turn the regime’s claims that the Brotherhood was regressive back
against itself. To observers the Brotherhood’s initiative was a hallmark
in the ideological and political development of the movement and was
its most comprehensive platform to date.19 By the end of 2004 the
Brotherhood had developed strong relationships with both Nasserists
and liberals, particularly after the emergence of the Kefaya (Enough)
movement,20 which became the umbrella group for political opposition
against Mubarak.
The relationship between the United States and Egypt become strained
after the reelection of George W. Bush in 2004. The Bush administration
adopted a freedom agenda that sought to promote democracy and politi-
cal reform throughout the Middle East. This complicated the relationship
between the United States and its long-​standing authoritarian allies in
the region, including Mubarak. In order to preserve Egypt’s strategic al-
liance with the United States, Mubarak implemented a limited number
of reforms, all cosmetic. For example, he amended Article 76 of the
Constitution to create a more competitive presidential election for the first
time in Egypt’s modern history. While the official media celebrated the
change as a significant step toward real democracy, opposition leaders,
particularly within the Brotherhood, viewed it as a sign of the Mubarak
regime’s growing weakness. Hence they seized the opportunity to push
for more political gains.
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140 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

In 2005 the Kefaya movement, along with groups of judges, univer-

sity activists, and workers, launched large-​scale protests against Mubarak.
The Brotherhood shrewdly capitalized on the momentum that was gener-
ated and, for the first time since its return to politics in the 1970s, joined
the protests against the regime. The Brotherhood’s persistent pressure
against Mubarak resulted in startling success in the 2005 elections, win-
ning eighty-​eight parliamentary seats (around 20% of the total) despite
brutal repression by the security forces. The Brotherhood’s electoral suc-
cess posed more than an existential threat for Mubarak and jeopardized
the NDP’s domination. Mubarak realized that only more overwhelm-
ing repression could stop the Brotherhood and undermine its electoral
success. As a result the regime unleashed an unprecedented campaign
against the Brotherhood’s leaders and targeted the lifeblood of its organi-
zation: its social and business activities. In addition the startling success
of Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood, in the Palestinian
parliamentary elections in 2006 and the easing of international pres-
sure for democracy in the Middle East encouraged Mubarak to repress
the Brotherhood more brutally. In 2007 approximately forty senior lead-
ers were sentenced to between three and ten years in a military prison;
they included Khairat al-​Shater, deputy general guide, and Hasan Malek,
the Brotherhood’s business tycoon. Between 2008 and 2010 the Mubarak
regime tightened its grip and targeted the Brotherhood’s social and eco-
nomic activities. Security forces arrested many middle-​ranking members
across the country, shut down the Brotherhood’s offices, confiscated their
belongings, and banned them from leaving the country. The Brotherhood
won no seats in the parliamentary elections of 2010, and its political gains
over the previous two decades were completely lost.

The Brotherhood’s Response

to Regime Repression
Islamist movements respond differently to regime repression. Some
become radicalized and react violently; others respond more peacefully
and attempt to tolerate regime repression to the best of their ability. An in-
fluential body of literature suggests that by including Islamist parties re-
gimes can motivate tangible changes in their ideology, behavior, and orga-
nization.21 This strand of scholarship belongs to what has become widely
known as the “inclusion-​moderation” hypothesis. The main premise is
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Enforced Coherence 141

that antiregime movements tend to shift their position and discourse once
they are integrated into the political game. Changes in a movement’s ideol-
ogy and behavior, the thesis maintains, is conducive to their participation
in the political process. Hence great political opportunities and rewards
result in more moderate movements. However, several scholars contest
the inclusion-​moderation thesis because of the vague and controversial
nature of the concept of moderation and because the responses of Islamist
movements to inclusion are not identical.22 Some do become more mod-
erate when they participate in the political process; others do not. And
some movements, such as the Tunisian Ennahda Party and the Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt, were not radicalized despite regime re-
pression from the 1980s until the Arab Spring.
Although I concur with the broad criticism of the inclusion-​moderation
thesis, I am not concerned with the impact of inclusion or exclusion on
the behaviors or ideologies of movements. Rather I focus primarily on the
effects of repression on a movement’s internal dynamics. In other words,
instead of emphasizing the external outcomes arising from regime re-
pression (i.e., moderation or radicalization), I believe it is more useful
to explore the internal impacts of repression on the movement’s struc-
ture and dynamics. Therefore, instead of examining the responses of an
Islamist movement to repression, I focus on the utilization of this repres-
sion within the movement.
The Brotherhood utilized regime repression in order to foster solidar-
ity among its members. This took two main forms: a pattern of enforced
coherence by constructing a narrative of victimization, or mihna (adver-
sity), and an intense balance of power within the movement between dif-
ferent factions.

Constructing the Mihna Narrative

The question of why the Brotherhood did not fracture is significant
and instructive. The movement had experienced different waves of re-
pression over the past decades, yet it was able to survive and maintain
its unity. In fact it turned repression into a source of solidarity rather
than anguish. This occurred because of what can be called the “adver-
sity narrative,” or mihna, the sense of victimization that prevails among
the Brotherhood’s members because of regime repression. This sense is
rooted in the movement’s literature and socialization process. It originates
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142 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

from the movement’s memories of torture and its malaise under Nasser’s
regime (the 1950s and 1960s). Nasser’s brutal attempt to wipe out the
Brotherhood left a significant physiological impact on the movement’s
leaders, who repeatedly invoke these images in order to create solidarity
among members and ensure the movement’s unity. These images foster
identification with the movement because they solidify members’ shared
history. Over time the mihna narrative has become an integral component
of the Brotherhood’s indoctrination and socialization process. It helped
the Brotherhood accommodate repression and avoid internal schisms over
the past decades.
The sense of shared tribulations is frequently evoked in the
Brotherhood’s internal discourse. Its literature is filled with mihna con-
notations and stories. Notions like patience (sabr), test (ibtila), and sacri-
fice (tadhiyya) are predominant in the Brotherhood’s statements and are
regularly invoked during times of crisis, accompanied by religious con-
notations. For instance, Mohamed Mustafa points out that tribulation is
a test of members’ faith and beliefs and that prisons are venues where
members can be tested and endure oppression. Strikingly he calls upon
his fellow members to be ready to sacrifice their freedom for the sake of
the Brotherhood and the da‘wa.23
Repression also boosts the Brotherhood’s appeal among the public.
The movement tends to portray itself as a victim of the regime, a role
that enables it to attract and recruit new members who are also disen-
franchised by oppression. According to Mahmoud Ezzat, deputy general
guide, the Brotherhood gains from repression and torture more than it
loses: “It is remarkable that after each tribulation supporters and mem-
bers of the Brotherhood increase. People always show sympathy and sup-
port with the families of those who are arrested.”24
Furthermore the suffering of members enhances their position within
the organization because it demonstrates their level of sacrifice. Therefore
those who have been frequently arrested or tortured tend to employ their
oppression to reach leadership positions in the movement and gain re-
spect from the rank and file. This does not imply that members seek to be
arrested or tortured; it illustrates how regime repression can sometimes
benefit members materially and organizationally.
The indoctrination and socialization process deepens the salvation
and emancipation narrative, which the Brotherhood employs to accom-
modate repression. Leaders and members view oppression as a signpost
for their cause. As Ezzat says, “Regime repression is the glue that binds
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Enforced Coherence 143

us together and reflects that we are on the right path.”25 Surrendering to

regime repression is employed by leaders to reinforce members’ commit-
ment and adherence to the Brotherhood. A former member named Islam
Lotfi expressed his astonishment at the Brotherhood’s reaction to repres-
sion. He writes in one of his blogs, “After the verdict of many Brotherhood
leaders, I received several comments and messages from young members
who seemed thrilled by the verdict and the imprisoning of the leaders as
they view it as a sign of God’s promise of victory and salvation.”26
During times of repression the Brotherhood typically focuses inward
in order to maintain internal unity. As Melucci observes, “With regime
repression, self-​preservation and group solidarity become the sole goal of
the movement.”27 Mohamed Mustafa puts it this way: “The chief priority
of the movement during repression is to keep members connected and
ensure their solidarity. This can only happen through intensifying the
identification and socialization process.”28 In addition repression prompts
the Brotherhood to change its bylaws; for example, to protect members
from police harassment, the Brotherhood omitted aspects of its member-
ship procedures after the 1990s. It was the first time since the founda-
tion of the movement that the levels of membership (muhib, muntasib,
muntazim, etc.) were not included. Moreover the bylaws were not made
available to ordinary members or to the general public until recently.29
Only leaders and high-​ranking cadres were able to access them.
Another factor that can explain the Brotherhood’s coherence is the
absence of viable political alternatives. The lack of political space in
Egypt under Mubarak discouraged many members from leaving the
Brotherhood. Mohamed Hamza explains that despite his dissatisfac-
tion with the Brotherhood’s policies, he felt he could not leave it because
there was no other option.30 Abdurrahman Ayyash puts the point more
succinctly: “We are stuck between the bad and the ugly.”31 Reformist
figures are caught in the crossfire between regime repression and the
Brotherhood.32
A final factor that can explain the Brotherhood’s resilience is its abil-
ity to marginalize dissenting members without creating major rifts.
One of the key features of the Brotherhood as a social organization is its
ability to undermine dissenting voices and push them to the sidelines.
The movement rarely dismisses members who criticize it or defy its
leadership. Instead it demonizes their cause and ostracizes them. In
fact the Brotherhood has developed internal norms that delegitimize
calls for reform. Dissenting members are confronted with two uneasy
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144 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

options: leave the Brotherhood or remain without the ability to express

their views.

Managing Divisions
Since its foundation the Brotherhood has experienced different types of
divisions. As noted earlier, the Brotherhood is an umbrella organization
that encompasses different factions, trends, and generations who debate
ideology, discourse, and the political stance of the leadership, though these
disagreements rarely lead to major splits within the movement. As Brown
demonstrates, the Brotherhood’s followers and leaders quarrel endlessly;
however, it is usually over short-​term tactical and organizational issues,
and not more serious ideological or religious points.33 Although I agree
with Brown on the Brotherhood’s ideological coherence, I believe divi-
sions can go beyond organizational and tactical issues. For instance, the
dividing lines between conservatives and reformers are chiefly ideological
and religious in nature, which can lead to serious clashes and rifts in the
Brotherhood. Moreover organizational and tactical issues, such as promo-
tion procedures, generational relationships, and accountability, can also
lead to significant divisions. Members of the Al-​Wasat Party, as I explain
later, left the Brotherhood due to ideological and political differences with
the leadership as well as organizational stagnation.
The history of divisions within the Brotherhood dates back to its early
days under al-​Banna’s leadership, when a group of zealous members who
adopted a more radical ideology called for using force against the British
occupation. This group was called Muhammad’s Youth and split from the
Brotherhood in 1939. The second division under al-​Banna was led by a
close friend of his, Ahmed al-​Sokkary. Al-​Sokkary was the first secretary
general of the Brotherhood but openly criticized al-​Banna for governing
the movement in a despotic fashion and accused some members of cor-
ruption and nepotism. For his efforts Al-​Sokkary was expelled from the
Brotherhood in 1947.34 Divisions continued under al-​Banna’s successor,
Hasan al-​Hudaybi, when some leaders of the movement’s armed wing,
the Special Apparatus (Al-​tanzim al-​khas), tried to take over the move-
ment and isolate al-​Hudaybi because of his close relationship to Nasser.
This split was more serious than previous episodes because of the move-
ment’s vulnerability in the aftermath of al-​Banna’s death.
Despite relative openness under Sadat, the Brotherhood maintained
the mihna narrative to rebuild its organization and retain solidarity. Under
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Enforced Coherence 145

Mubarak, however, the Brotherhood experienced increasing division.

With its growing politicization came different opinions regarding its po-
litical and ideological stances. For example, a group of ikhwan at al-​Azhar
University led by an Azharite named Mohamed Rushdi decided to leave
the Brotherhood in protest against what he perceived as “deviation from
the righteous path of Islam.”35
After a decade of political success and social expansion, internal ten-
sions increased during the early 1990s. Emboldened by its political suc-
cess, a group of middle-​ranking leaders who emerged during the 1970s
and 1980s pressed the leadership to take a clear stance on controversial
issues, such as establishing a political party, women’s and Christians’
rights, and political pluralism. In 1994 the Brotherhood issued a bold state-
ment defining its position on these issues. The statement, titled “Shura
and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society,” recognized for the first time the
political rights of women and Christians and emphasized that democracy
is the only viable political system. The Shura statement was a byproduct
of the fervent debate between the older and younger generations. It aimed
to make a clear break from the ambiguous and ambivalent stance of the
older generation on the issues raised by the statement.36 More important,
the statement was published a few months after the Mubarak regime
launched a renewed crackdown on the Brotherhood.
In the mid-​1990s the Brotherhood faced one of its most critical crises
during the Mubarak era when a group of middle-​ranking members led by
Abul ‘Ela Madi and Esam Sultan decided to end the history of on again–​
off again political activity and long-​standing legislation that banned the
Brotherhood. When they failed to persuade the leadership to establish a
political party, they decided to take the initiative and do so themselves,
establishing the Al-​Wasat Party. Wickham notes that in its early days
the Al-​Wasat Party was perceived by the regime as a front to shield the
Brotherhood.37 As a result Madi and several other members of the party
and the Brotherhood were arrested. Madi described the Al-​Wasat Party
as an attempt to thaw the frozen relationship between the Brotherhood
and the Mubarak regime that sought to circumvent the Brotherhood’s ap-
paratus entirely.38 The Brotherhood leadership under Mustafa Mashhur,
the fifth general guide, and his deputy, Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi, did not
tolerate the Al-​Wasat Party and forced its members to resign from the
Brotherhood. Moreover Mashhur and al-​Hudaybi threatened Brotherhood
members who joined the Al-​Wasat Party with expulsion.39 The Al-​Wasat
crisis reveals how the Brotherhood treats those who defy its leadership.
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146 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Despite the organizational consequences of the crisis, the Brotherhood

was able to weather the storm and maintain its integrity; in fact the lead-
ership utilized the crisis to enhance internal coherence and delegitimize
Al-​Wasat’s dissidents. In this case the Brotherhood improved its unity not
by transforming its own brand, but by clearly articulating what they would
not stand for. Further, Mubarak’s refusal to recognize the Al-​Wasat Party
as a legitimate political entity strengthened the position of the Brotherhood
and discouraged others from leaving the movement. Not surprisingly the
Brotherhood has not witnessed serious internal splits since then.

The Balance of Power within the Brotherhood

Scholars of Islamist politics tend to divide Islamists into two camps, call-
ing them conservatives and reformers, hawks and doves, or moderates
and radicals. Regardless of the accuracy of these classifications, faction-
alism within Islamist movements is undeniable. Like other movements
they suffer internal power conflicts between different elements. They
fight over position, interests, and strategy. They also seek to dominate and
shape the power structure to work in their favor.
The Brotherhood is no exception; it experienced its own power strug-
gle between conservative and reformist elements. These currents coex-
isted, disputed, and clashed—​their relationship a constant ebb and flow.
By conservatives, I am referring to leaders who adopt strict ideological
and religious beliefs and are preoccupied mainly with the organization’s
existence and survival. They focus on da‘wa, tarbiyya, and social services
more than politics. They also prefer to operate under the umbrella of the
Brotherhood as a religious movement, not a political party. This group is
usually dubbed al-​tiyyar al-​tanzimi (the organizational current) because
they focus on organizational unity as the Brotherhood’s chief priority.
In contrast reformists adopt a progressive religious and ideological posi-
tion and seek to integrate the Brotherhood in the political process. They
focus on political activity, building cross-​ideological alliances with liberal
and secular forces, and contesting elections. They also call for internal
changes and reform of the Brotherhood’s structure to be more democratic
and transparent. They are usually called taiyyar al-​’aml al-​’am (the public
activity current).
The balance of power between these two currents has vacillated since
the 1970s and has leaned toward the conservatives since the 1990s. As
mentioned earlier, regime repression played a key role in this shift, which
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Enforced Coherence 147

ironically strengthened the position of the conservatives at the expense of

the reformists. To start with, during the 1970s and the 1980s the reform-
ist current was influential. After the political return of the Brotherhood
in the 1970s, a new generation of activists and politicians emerged. The
core of the reformist current was Abdelmoniem Aboul Fottouh, Esam al-​
’Aryan, Abul ‘Ela Madi, Helmi al-​Gazzar, and Ibrahim al-​Za’farani. They
sought to rebuild the Brotherhood after two decades of fragmentation and
anguish under Nasser. They benefited from the relative political openness
under Sadat, who used Islamists to counterbalance his chief adversar-
ies: leftists and Nasserists. This generation rebuilt the institutional struc-
ture of the Brotherhood and pulled it out of its political isolation to become
integrated and more politicized. They pushed the Brotherhood toward
electoral politics and pressed the leadership to develop clear ideological
and religious views. This reformist element flourished in urban centers
such as Cairo and Alexandria, as well as in Upper Egypt, particularly in
Assuit and Al-​Minya. It was backed by Omar al-​Tilmisani, the third gen-
eral guide, who embraced moderate views and was determined to politi-
cize the Brotherhood.40 If the 1970s witnessed the birth of this current,
the decade of the 1980s was its heyday, reaching its peak in the 1984 and
1987 parliamentary elections. This current also strengthened the pres-
ence of the Brotherhood in professional syndicates and universities across
Egypt and reshaped the Brotherhood’s ideology and discourse to be more
politicized, moderate, and pragmatic. Under al-​Tilmisani’s leadership the
Brotherhood renounced violence, became politically active, and built coali-
tions with liberal, leftist, and secular forces.
The death of al-​Tilmisani in 1986 was a major blow to the reformist
current, as many of its leaders were alienated afterward. Abulfotouh re-
calls, “The departure of al-​Tilmissani was a big loss to the movement and
the reformist wing.”41 According to Madi, al-​Tilmisani was not only a gen-
uine supporter of reformists but also a bulwark that protected them from
the domination of the old guard.42 Esam Sultan, a former leader and the
cofounder of the Al-​Wasat Party with Madi, points out that al-​Tilmisani
maintained a balance between the conservatives and the reformists. He
states, “By the death of al-​Tilmissani, the balance between the generation
of the Special Apparatus [al-​tanzim al-​khas] and the reformists ended in
favor of the former.”43
After the death of al-​Tilmisani the balance of power shifted incremen-
tally in favor of the Brotherhood’s older leaders, who had left the country
under Nasser and Sadat and returned in 1980s.44 Three of these leaders,
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148 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

Mustafa Mashhur, Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi, and Mahdi Akef, would go on to

become the fifth, sixth, and seventh general guides.45 At the same time, an-
other group of conservative leaders emerged and sought to counterbalance
the reformists. Among them were Mohamed Badie, who would become
the eighth general guide; Mahmoud Ezzat, who would become secretary
general; and Khairat al-​Shater, the Brotherhood’s business tycoon and its
most powerful leader in the twenty-​first century.
The shift in the balance of power between the conservatives and the
reformists became more visible under the tenure of the fourth general
guide, Mohamed Hamed Abu al-​Nasr (1986–​1996). A veteran member
who spent more than twenty years in prison under Nasser, Abu al-​Nasr
was less progressive than his predecessor, al-​Tilmisani, and his weak lead-
ership created space for the conservatives to become powerful and domi-
nate the organization.46
During the first half of the 1990s the conservative current solidified its
grip on power by dominating the Guidance Bureau, the Shura Council,
and the Administrative Offices. In fact Mubarak’s repression helped
enable this shift. In 1992 regime security forces raided an electronics
company, Salsabil, owned by al-​Shater and Hasan Malek, accusing them
by plotting against the state. The documents seized by the police titled
“The Empowerment” (“Al-​tamkin”), which the regime said contained a
detailed plan for the Brotherhood to take over the country and establish
an Islamic state.47 The Salsabil case revealed the conservatives’ attempt to
control the Brotherhood after the death of al-​Tilmisani. It also accentuated
the role of al-​Shater, who would later become the movement’s chief strate-
gist and most influential leader.
A second incident the regime exploited to repress the Brotherhood oc-
curred when the Shura Council convened in January 1995 to select the
sixteen members of the Guidance Bureau. This was the first time since
the 1950s the Shura Council would select the Guidance Bureau. But the
regime arrested dozens of the Brotherhood’s members and accused them
of attempting to overthrow the government. These members were subse-
quently sent to military trials for the first since the Nasser era.48
In conjunction with the waning influence of the reformists, a new line
of conservatives began consolidating its power over the Brotherhood. After
the death of al-​Nasr in January 1996, the conservatives chose one of their
own to become the new general guide. In a strong show of power, a small
group of the conservative leaders declared Mustafa Mashhur the fifth
general guide immediately after al-​Nasr’s burial, in what became widely
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Enforced Coherence 149

known as the “cemetery pledge of allegiance” (“bay’at al-​maqabir”).49 El-​

Ghobashy describes the moment: “A tight-​knit circle led by Guidance
Bureau members Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi and Mashour himself essentially
anointed Mashour to the highest executive post without election or con-
sultation with Shura Council members, citing as justification the security
clampdown on the last Shura Council meeting in 1995.”50
Mashhur’s inauguration was a declaration of the shift in power
toward the conservatives and paved the way for conservatives to control
the Brotherhood in the following years. Under Mashhur’s tenure, which
was dominated by his bold deputy, Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi, the conserva-
tives adopted an uncompromising stance toward the reformists, result-
ing in the Al-​Wasat crisis. The ideological and religious development of
the Brotherhood was stalled and unenforceable. Mashhur, for example,
declared that Copts should pay jizya (a poll tax) instead of serving in the
army.51 By the end of the 1990s the Brotherhood had come under the
control of the conservatives, who did not tolerate calls from reformists to
implement reforms or share power.

The Power Center of al-​Shater and Ezzat

By the turn of the new millennium the Brotherhood’s reformist current
was on the precipice of fading away. Only Abulfotouh remained on the
Guidance Bureau, which was otherwise dominated by the conservatives.
Other reformist figures, such as al-​ ’Aryan, Mohamed Habib, Gamal
Heshmat, and Ibrahim al-​Za’farani, were sidelined. The new conservative
power center was primarily led by Khairat al-​Shater and Mahmoud Ezzat,
who is currently serving as deputy general guide.
The tale of al-​Shater’s rise within the Brotherhood proves that alle-
giance and loyalty are key credentials for promotion. Born in 1951 to a
middle-​class family in the rural area of El-​Mansoura, al-​Shater depicted
himself as a strong advocate of the Brotherhood’s survival. Ironically he
began his political career as a socialist and was arrested in high school
after participating in protests against Nasser in 1968. During his time
working in academia in the early 1970s he became attached to the emerg-
ing Islamic trend dominating Egyptian universities, leading him to join
the Brotherhood in 1974. There he was influenced by two hardcore conser-
vative leaders, Sheikh Sabri Arafa and Mohamed Al-​Adawy, both veteran
members of the Brotherhood. Both belonged to what was known as the
generation of the 1960s,52 men who were in prison during the 1960s and
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150 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

were profoundly impacted by Sayyid Qutb’s ideology. Many of them were

freed by Sadat and became influential in the Brotherhood. During the
1980s al-​Shater spent seven years in exile in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and the United Kingdom to avoid regime repression in the aftermath of
Sadat’s assassination in 1981. During his travels he made a large fortune
from his extensive business networks that allowed him to become a key
player in the Brotherhood. In 1992 he was arrested and imprisoned for
one year following the Salsabil case, which brought him to the attention of
the Brotherhood’s leadership. A businessman with strategic and outstand-
ing managerial skills, al-​Shater proved himself unflinchingly loyal to the
Brotherhood’s ideology and leadership. In 1995 he became a member of
the Guidance Bureau, which was then dominated by elderly and veteran
conservative members.
Between 1995 and 2000 al-​ Shater solidified his position in the
Brotherhood by controlling most of its financial assets and running its
business operations. As a banned movement, the Brotherhood was not
allowed to invest or accumulate money, and its leaders could not publicly
run its business without the state threatening that it would be confiscated.
The movement was surviving financially because of its membership dues
and donations. (According to several interviewees, dues are paid based on
income. Lower-​income members pay 1 to 2% of their income; medium-​
income members pay 3 to 5%; and higher-​income members pay 5 to 7%.53)
Accordingly the organization needed someone with a relatively low po-
litical profile and with business experience and skills; above all else the
individual had to be trustworthy. Al-​Shater fit the bill precisely and was
chosen to manage business operations. According to a former member of
the Brotherhood named Haitham Abu Khalil, al-​Shater’s main role was
to boost the Brotherhood’s wealth and business.54 To this end he created
and supervised many small and medium-​size businesses that served as
fronts for the Brotherhood’s financial activities without drawing the re-
gime’s attention.55 Over time al-​Shater became a key player within the
Brotherhood in the following decade due to his financial and organiza-
tional capabilities.56
The other influential leader in the Brotherhood who helped al-​Shater
create the conservative power center was Mahmoud Ezzat, the former sec-
retary general, one of three current deputy general guides, and a member
of the Guidance Bureau. Ezzat is considered one of the Brotherhood’s
most conservative hardliners. He joined the Brotherhood at an early age
and was heavily influenced by Sayyid Qutb, as he spent around nine years,
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Enforced Coherence 151

between 1965 and 1974, in prison under Nasser. After he was released
in the early 1970s Ezzat became an active member in the Brotherhood
and played an important role in rebuilding the organization alongside
Mashhur, al-​ Hudaybi, and Ahmed Hassanin, and other conservative
leaders. He fled to Yemen when he found out about Sadat’s harsh cam-
paign in September 1981 and returned to Egypt in 1986.The turning
point came when he was selected as a member of the Guidance Bureau
in 1995. Since then he has consolidated his position by taking respon-
sibility for the Students Section (Qism al-​talabah), which is responsible
for recruiting new members from the universities, and the Socialization
Section (Qism al-​tarbiyya), which is responsible for helping members in-
ternalize the Brotherhood’s ideology. Ezzat grew even more influential
after being selected secretary general in 2004, a post he held until 2010.
Like al-​Shater, Ezzat was promoted primarily due to his loyalty and dedi-
cation to the Brotherhood’s ideology and leadership. His position as sec-
retary general enabled him to control the organizational structure, as he
was responsible for supervising the Administrative Offices and Shura
Councils. He also had a profound impact on the Shura Council’s mem-
bers and influenced their decisions, particularly during internal elec-
tions.57 Not surprisingly domestic media have always portrayed Ezzat as
the Brotherhood’s “iron man.”58
Ezzat and al-​Shater first met in Yemen in the early 1980s after flee-
ing from Sadat. They grew closer when they met again in England while
both were pursuing their postgraduate studies. Since then they have been
close allies and have worked together to enhance the role and position of
the Brotherhood’s conservative elements. When al-​Shater was in prison,
Ezzat was the person he most trusted to run Brotherhood activities. Some
accounts highlight Ezzat’s participation with al-​Shater in establishing the
Salsabil company in the late 1980s, highlighting his arrest in 1992 with
al-​Shater and Malek.59
The death of Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi in 2004 helped al-​Shater and
Ezzat become even more powerful within the Brotherhood. Together
they became the vanguard of the new conservative bloc. According to
Abu Khalil, these two control the Brotherhood, the former through his
financial capabilities, and the latter by his organizational clout.60 After
al-​Hudaybi’s death the Brotherhood selected Mohamed Mahdi Akef as
the seventh general guide. Under Akef’s tenure (2004–​2010) the al-
liance of al-​Shater and Ezzat became more visible. Akef was seventy-​
six, a veteran leader who had joined the Brotherhood in 1940, and was
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152 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

sentenced to death in absentia before the ruling was commuted to life

imprisonment. He was a continuation of the conservatives’ leadership,
albeit with a more accommodating propensity. His tenure was more
inclusive than his predecessors’ and he tried to reengage the reform-
ers in order to counterbalance the hardliners. To this end he appointed
Mohamed Habib as his first deputy and maintained a cooperative re-
lationship with Abulfotouh, al-​’Aryan, al-​Za’farani, and other young
reformers.
However, al-​Shater and Ezzat, who played a crucial role in selecting
Akef, undermined his new policies. Thanks to his financial and organi-
zational capabilities, al-​Shater became the second deputy to Akef, a posi-
tion that had not existed previously. In this role he sought to strengthen
the new conservative power center in three ways. First, he put in place
plans to restructure the organization to become more active and dynamic.
To accomplish this he rebuilt the Brotherhood’s media section and pro-
moted many young leaders in different organizational sections, such as
the Students Section. Second, he engaged with the regional and admin-
istrative offices across the country and supported some of their leaders to
become members of the Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau. Third,
and most important, he became the mediator between the Brotherhood
and the regime during the 2000s.61 According to Abu Khalil, al-​Shater
created a parallel organization within the Brotherhood that was loyal to
him over anyone else, including the General Guide.62 However, al-​Shater
could not have amassed so much power without the help of Ezzat, who
controlled the Brotherhood’s organizational capabilities. Ezzat, who was
Akef’s brother-​in-​law, utilized his strong position in the Brotherhood to
promote his subordinates and followers in the regional offices.63

Al-​Shater and Ezzat as Kingmakers

The influence of al-​Shater and Ezzat became evident during the second
half of the 2000s, when they became the kingmakers of most of the
Brotherhood’s senior and middle-​ranking leaders. This influence mani-
fested itself in two crises that the Brotherhood faced between 2008
and 2010. The first was the election of new members to the Guidance
Bureau, and the second was the succession following the resignation of
Mahdi Akef.
In May 2008 five new members joined the Guidance Bureau, the first
time new members ascended to these positions since 1995.64 According to
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Enforced Coherence 153

the Brotherhood’s bylaws, the Shura Council, which consists of 105 mem-
bers (ninety by election and fifteen by appointment from the Guidance
Bureau), is responsible for electing the Guidance Bureau’s sixteen mem-
bers. The selection of new members revealed the powerful role of the
al-​Shater–​Ezzat bloc, as they all were entrenched within the conserva-
tive current. The five members were Mohamed Sa’ad al-​Katatni, who by
that time was the head of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc and had
previously been the head of the Administrative Office in Al-​Minya; Sa’ad
al-​Husseini, a member of Parliament and the head of the Brotherhood’s
Administrative Office in al-​ Mahalla; Mohei Hamed, the head of the
Administrative Office in al-​Sharqia and a very close associate of Ezzat;
Osama Nasr, the head of the Administrative Office in Alexandria and a
close friend of al-​Shater; and Mohamed Abdel Rahman, deputy in the
Administrative Office of al-​Daqahiyya. The selection of these five mem-
bers sparked outrage in the Brotherhood. The Shura Council’s members
protested the results of the elections, calling them illegal. Some media re-
ports claimed Akef threatened to resign if al-​’Aryan was not promoted—​a
reflection of his dissatisfaction with the conservatives.65 However, Akef
denied these reports and stated he only delegated his powers to his deputy,
Mohamed Habib, and did not resign.66 Habib sought to use the crisis to
strengthen his own position. Initially he attempted to exercise some of
Akef’s powers and sought to defuse the crisis by suggesting that new elec-
tions to the Guidance Bureau could be held in six months, that is, in June
2010. However, the conservatives, led by Ezzat, rejected Habib’s proposal
and campaigned for immediate elections. They interpreted Habib’s sug-
gestion as an attempt to take over the Brotherhood and install himself as
the de facto general guide. They planned to remove him from his post as
deputy general guide and from the Guidance Bureau altogether.
The second crisis was the resignation of Mahdi Akef. As noted in
­c hapter 7, the Brotherhood’s bylaws specifies the general guide’s ser-
vice as two six-​year terms. Akef took the post in January 2004 but an-
nounced in March 2009 that he would step down after his first term in
January 2010 because of his old age.67 Akef’s decision took many by sur-
prise, including the senior leaders, not only because it was the first time
a general guide decided to leave office before finishing his term but
also because of his timing. The relationship between the Brotherhood
and the Mubarak regime was intense, and the movement suffered sev-
eral security blows, which led to the arrest of many of its senior lead-
ers. Moreover internal quarrels were mounting, which required strong
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154 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

leadership to manage. Still Akef was determined to step down, no

matter the consequences.68
The Brotherhood was divided over who should succeed Akef and how
the succession should take place. The conservatives, led by Ezzat and al-​
Shater (who was in prison at that time), called for immediate elections
to the Guidance Bureau and a new general guide. But Mohamed Habib,
Akef’s first deputy, rejected their suggestion and instead called for post-
poning the elections until June 2010. The only way to resolve this con-
flict was through the Shura Council, which was responsible for choosing
the general guide and the Guidance Bureau. After a few weeks of inter-
nal squabbles, the Shura Council, which was entirely under the control
of Ezzat, decided to hold immediate elections for general guide. Habib
rejected the decision and threatened to resign from the Brotherhood.
Moreover he accused Ezzat, al-​Shater, and Mohamed Morsi of staging a
coup against him.69
At the end of December 2009 the Brotherhood announced that the
Shura Council had elected a new Guidance Bureau; it was dominated by
conservatives, with the exception of al ‘Aryan, and excluded Habib and
Abulfotouh. While the latter remained silent, Habib reacted furiously and
accused Ezzat of manipulating the Brotherhood and abusing its bylaws
and rules.70 Al-​Za’farani rejected the elections and sent a petition to the
leadership calling for the formation of a committee to investigate the elec-
tion results and to reform the bylaws.71
On January 26, 2010, the Brotherhood announced that Mohamed
Badie had been elected to serve as its eighth general guide.72 At the press
conference where the announcement was delivered, Akef told journal-
ists that Badie was “chosen by consensus by members of the consulta-
tive council.”73 A veteran member and a hard-​line conservative, Badie took
office amid a cruel power struggle within the Brotherhood. His selection
was a declaration that the conservative current had solidified its control
and that the reformists had lost the battle decisively. Not surprisingly,
after the downfall of Mubarak most of the reformists left the movement
and have not looked back since.
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10

Conclusion

I began writing this book when the Brotherhood was the key opposi-
tion group in Egypt under Mubarak. The book covered the period between
1981 and 2011, before Mubarak was toppled in the aftermath of the popular
uprising of January 25, 2011. However, the course of events in the fol-
lowing years cannot be overlooked. Not only have Egypt’s politics turned
upside down in recent years, but the Brotherhood’s political status and
strategy have also dramatically changed. After the removal of Mubarak
on February 11, the Brotherhood became the chief political force in Egypt
with a unique political history and unmatched social and organizational
capabilities. With the enormous political vacuum left by the collapse of
Mubarak’s regime and the National Democratic Party, the axiomatic
question became whether the Brotherhood would be able to fill this space.
For the first time the Brotherhood’s rhetoric about democracy, freedom,
and human rights was brought to the fore and could be tested. The eu-
phoria from the demonstrations in Tahrir Square boosted the hopes for
democracy and freedom in Egypt after decades of authoritarianism. The
Brotherhood’s ability to live up to those hopes and translate them into
reality was a key challenge to the movement. Furthermore its willingness
to collaborate with and accommodate other ideological and political forces
was questioned closely. The relationship between the Brotherhood and
secular forces after the uprising was subject to widespread suspicion and
mistrust. Not to be overshadowed, the post-​uprising era witnessed the rise
of new “religious” adversaries to the Brotherhood, such as the Salafis, who
rushed into the political arena after decades of shunning it and aspired to
gain political clout in order to advance their ideological agenda.
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156 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

The Brotherhood after the Uprising

During the January 25 uprising the Brotherhood maintained a low profile
in an attempt to assuage fears of its political ascendance. The behavior it
adopted at this stage can best be characterized as one of caution and self-​
restraint. This behavior is consistent with the gradualism of the jama‘a
paradigm, which recognizes that the Brotherhood’s aims can be achieved
only in a steady progression of phases. For example, the Brotherhood
announced it would not seek to dominate Parliament, recalling its long-​
standing slogan “Musharka la mughalaba” (Partnership, not domination),
and that it would not contest presidential elections. The movement’s lead-
ership remained adamant that they would not advocate for applying shari‘a
or curbing personal rights in the post-​Mubarak era. This emphasis on re-
specting the rights of all Egyptians is consistent with the Brotherhood’s
1994 statement “Shura and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society,” which was
intended to position the movement as progressive and signal its ability to
maintain cohesion despite initial disagreement. However, after the upris-
ing the lure of power overshadowed the Brotherhood’s rhetoric and pro-
gressive position. A few months after the removal of Mubarak, the move-
ment decided to contest nearly half of the seats in Parliament and fielded
a presidential candidate. As expected, the Brotherhood won a majority of
seats in the first post-​uprising parliamentary elections, and its presiden-
tial candidate, Mohamed Morsi, became the first freely and democratically
elected president in Egypt’s modern history. After more than eighty years
in the shadows, the Brotherhood had thrust itself into the spotlight by
demonstrating an explicit aspiration to move to the center of the political
stage. From this position the movement played a fundamental role in shap-
ing Egypt’s nascent transition. Along with its Salafi allies, the Brotherhood
drafted and passed the first constitution in the post-​uprising era. Much
to the discontent of the uprising’s key forces (particularly the youth), the
Brotherhood also attempted to accommodate state institutions such as
the military, police, and judiciary. The beginning of the Brotherhood’s
downfall came when Morsi issued a controversial constitutional decree
in November 2012 that granted him sweeping powers transcending ju-
dicial and institutional oversight. The decree sparked outrage among the
opposition, which formed a unified bloc (the National Salvation Front) and
challenged Morsi’s legitimacy to lead Egypt’s transition. The Brotherhood
attempted to reach out to other political and ideological forces, but it was
too little, too late—​the gulf of mistrust had become unbridgeable.
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Conclusion 157

The Brotherhood after the Coup

The Brotherhood’s performance in power was astonishingly poor and
disappointing. During its short reign the movement’s leaders and cadres
demonstrated a lack of key governance skills and failed to adopt a consen-
sual model of government capable of including other political forces. It was
not a surprise, therefore, that these forces turned against the Brotherhood
after only one year and campaigned for its removal. The Brotherhood’s ac-
tions once in a position of political power validated the narrative spun by
its critics, which viewed its calls for steadiness and moderation as nothing
more than a political play. After only one year in power there were mas-
sive protests against the Brotherhood, calling the military to step in and
remove Morsi. The Brotherhood’s reign was over.
Along with the Brotherhood’s mismanagement and political miscal-
culations, one cannot disregard the role of the “deep-​state” in hampering
Morsi’s presidency. The old regime institutions—​the military, police, ju-
diciary, and businessmen—​had nothing in common but their contempt
and fear of the Brotherhood. Either directly or indirectly they worked hard
to remove Morsi from power. The army generals, despite attaining an ex-
ceptional status in the 2012 Constitution, treated the Brotherhood as a
potential threat. Morsi’s dismissal of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein
Tantawy, the former minister of defense, and his chief of staff, Sami
Anan, in August 2012 enhanced this sentiment among the generals.
Police officers, who had repressed the Brotherhood under Mubarak, could
not politically or psychologically tolerate the new reality of being com-
manded by their former victim. They refused to collaborate with Morsi’s
government despite his willingness to appease and accommodate them.
Likewise Morsi’s attempt to restructure the judicial system was seen by
many judges as an attempt to purge them and undermine their social
status and privileges. And Mubarak’s businessmen were suspicious of the
Brotherhood’s economic policies and procedures. While the Brotherhood
did not adopt a different economic policy from that of Mubarak, wariness
and uncertainty overshadowed the relationship between the old guard and
the new.
On July 3, 2013, Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah al-​Sisi deposed Morsi,
suspended the Constitution, and dissolved Parliament. Capitalizing on
public frustration with and distrust of the Brotherhood, the al-​Sisi regime
used a heavy hand to deal with the movement. In one day hundreds of
the Brotherhood’s supporters were gunned down by police responding
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158 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

to sit-​ins at Rab’a and al-​Nahda. These killings marked one of Egypt’s

worst massacres in modern history, according to Human Rights Watch.
The Brotherhood’s senior leaders and figures have been sentenced to life
in prison; some have even received death sentences. Among them are
General Guide Mohamed Badie and several members of the Guidance
Bureau and the Shura Council. Furthermore the movement’s businesses
and financial assets were frozen, and the government has taken over its
social and charity institutions. Much of the social capital that the move-
ment assiduously built over decades was lost in a little more than one
year’s time.

The Brotherhood’s Coherence

Since the coup the Brotherhood has spiraled into a state of disarray. It now
lacks a clear vision, which affects its coherence and unity. It returned to
its historical playbook in responding to regime repression in order to im-
prove its image and regain public sympathy. This invocation of the mihna
(affliction) narrative was also intended to preserve the Brotherhood’s inter-
nal cohesiveness. At the same time, the Brotherhood experienced internal
disputes over its vision and strategy in the months following the coup.
These disputes were primarily between the older and younger generations
and revolve around three key issues: leadership, vision, and strategy. The
older generation, particularly those in exile or hiding in Egypt, such as
acting general guide Mahmoud Ezzat and Secretary General Mahmoud
Hussein, have struggled to maintain their control over the movement. As
a result the younger, mid-​level leaders have gained more control over the
past three years. This group includes Guidance Bureau member Mohamed
Kamal, the new spokesman Mohamed Montasser, and Shura Council
members Essam Talimah and Yehia Hamed, among others. The younger
generation believes the older leadership is responsible for the damage to
the Brotherhood’s internal cohesion and external image and that it is the
time for them to let others lead. They also argue that because the youth
have paid a high price, even sacrificing their lives, to preserve the move-
ment’s survival, they should play a more central role in the leadership
moving forward.
The older generation has adopted a passive stance for dealing with the
al-​Sisi regime and generally tolerates its repression. Having experienced
the waves of repression under the Mubarak regime, they believe the cur-
rent wave is only temporary and that the Brotherhood should play the long
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Conclusion 159

game for its resurgence. Therefore they call upon members to practice self-​
restraint and nonconfrontation. This disciplined response is rooted in the
tarbiyya process, which strengthens the membership’s mental fortitude
and reinforces the primacy of the movement above the individual. The
underlying force at work during this process is the Brotherhood’s social
constructivist approach to identity building. During times of repression
the movement’s socialization process serves as a lifeline for individuals to
grab on to and that reinforces the desire for a shared bond. The older lead-
ers’ call for restraint also reveals that they perceive the current crisis as no
different from the myriad crises the movement has faced throughout its
history; they consider repression under al-​Sisi to be analogous to repres-
sion under Nasser and Mubarak.
The younger generation, however, believes the Brotherhood should
be more defiant toward regime repression. They aim to remove the al-​
Sisi regime and change the rules of the game in their favor. The appeal
of the younger generation’s platform is their shared disenfranchisement
after Morsi’s governance failures and regime violence such as the Rab’a
massacre. Viewed together the visions of the older and younger genera-
tions represent polar opposite characterizations of how the movement
should respond to its current predicament. Throughout the Brotherhood’s
history, its identity construction and reinforcement processes have
managed to contain internal divisions, ranging from the emergence of
Muhammad’s Youth in 1939 to the Al-​Wasat crisis of the mid-​1990s. Yet
the Brotherhood’s recent rise and fall is unique, for the movement as-
cended to its highest level of power only to fall into complete disarray after
one year. Given this swift reversal and the al-​Sisi regime’s crackdown on
many of the older generation’s key leaders, the rise of the younger leader-
ship provides a potent challenge to the movement’s balance of power and
its ability to maintain internal cohesion.
The older leadership also adheres to its reformist and gradualist strat-
egy. In their view this tried and true method is the only way to sustain
the movement and improve its image among the public in the long run.
Abandoning this strategy in response to the downturn in the post-​coup era
is perceived as myopic. They believe it may lead only to continued violence
and a further degradation of the Brotherhood’s public image. However,
the younger generation believes the reformist strategy is obsolete after
the coup and that the movement must adopt a more revolutionary strat-
egy. In order to turn the tide, this group advocates for weekly protests
and agitating against the al-​Sisi regime in any way possible. Driven by
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160 Inside t he M usl im Bro t her ho od

frustration and despair, the Brotherhood’s youth have lost faith in formal
politics and view it as a waste of time. After almost three years since the
removal of Morsi, the Brotherhood maintains its weekly protests and or-
ganizational meetings (usra, shu’ba, etc.) and mobilizes its supporters. The
protests occasionally lead to low-​intensity violence that members justify
as self-​defense against regime brutality. Although the Brotherhood de-
nounced violence decades ago, the brutality of the al-​Sisi regime and the
movement’s current state of humiliation renewed internal debates over
the utility of using violence to counter repression. While the movement’s
leadership remains committed to peaceful means, some of the youth have
considered using what they call “tactical” violence against the state. This
resort to violence is driven by frustration, perceived injustice, and a desire
for immediate retribution. Young members seem to have concluded that
power does not necessarily stem from the ballot box but can be attained by
defiance and rebellion. In other words, this sort of violence is more politi-
cal than religious and is largely the youth’s reaction to regime repression.
The fact that the youth have consistently defied the leadership’s calls for
self-​restraint undermines the old guard’s narrative of resiliency through
gradualism. Moreover the generational divide presents a serious challenge
to the Brotherhood’s cohesion if the passage of time necessitates a pass-
ing of the torch to the younger, more revolutionary strain. The political
and security pressure against the Brotherhood has put the movement’s
leadership in a tough position against its youth, who are dissatisfied with
the leaders’ willingness to accommodate regime repression. Clearly the
Brotherhood’s youth are on a collision course with the old guard and the
regime that is redefining the movement’s image and long-​term prospects.
Yet despite the internal divisions, the Brotherhood still operates as a
unified movement. Even if these divisions lead to rifts and splits in the
future, this will not affect the nature of the movement. As I explained
in ­chapter 9, the Brotherhood withstood many attempts on its existence
over the course of its history, but this did not stop it from continuing its
activism.

The Future of the Brotherhood

The Brotherhood is at a crossroads. Before the January uprising it was at
its height despite regime repression. As I have showed, the key challenge
for the Brotherhood has been to survive and maintain its activism. Since
the uprising and particularly after the coup, the movement has grappled
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Conclusion 161

with many challenges and problems. First, the Brotherhood has come full
circle over the past few years as it moved from opposition to power and
vice versa. Its members seem to be torn between moving back to the old
days, when the movement was a domesticated and compromising force,
and being a revolutionary and confrontational group. Even if they decided
to become the latter, they would need to rethink their ideology, strategy,
and tactics. Simply put, the Brotherhood will not be the movement we
used to know.
Second, the Brotherhood’s experience in power exposed many of its
weaknesses concerning how to govern and how to deal with other ideo-
logical forces. It failed to deliver socially and economically, and it could
not move beyond its ideological boundaries to include other forces. True,
Morsi’s tenure was short and ended abruptly, but it was clear that he was
not acting as a statesman but as a member of the Brotherhood. Third,
the Brotherhood’s image and credibility were severely damaged over the
past few years. It could not live up to the uprising’s hopes and aspira-
tions, and the project of “renaissance” it had long advocated was noth-
ing but a mirage. The post-​coup regime has demonized the Brotherhood
and designated it a terrorist organization, which affected its image and
led to isolation. Fourth, the Brotherhood is facing a brutal campaign of
repression it has not experienced since the 1960s. Al-​Sisi’s regime seems
to be determined to wipe out the movement and end its political existence.
And even if al-​Sisi failed to do so, which is very likely, it is going to take
the Brotherhood a lot of time and effort to rebuild its social network and
improve its image. Fifth, the Brotherhood must rethink the relationship
between its political and religious activities. The amalgamation of both
spheres hindered the movement and exposed its weaknesses. Sixth, for the
Brotherhood to regain its former status as a potent and influential societal
force, it must rethink its ideology, structure, and organization and adapt to
the post-​uprising environment. The Brotherhood may not vanish or disap-
pear; however, its influence and future will remain uncertain unless it can
solve these challenges.
162

Notes

Chap ter 1

1. Craig Calhoun, ed., Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (Cambridge,
MA: Wiley-​Blackwell, 1994), 13.
2. Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 77, 4.
3. Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs
in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 35.
4. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 77.
5. The literature on identity and collective action is vast. See, for example,
Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social
Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 283–​305.
6. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 317.
7. There are different accounts of this issue, but the prevalent one is that Mustafa
el-​Nahhas Pasha’s government threatened to dissolve the Brotherhood if al-​Banna
ran in the elections; hence he had to withdraw. However, in 1944 al-​Banna and
some other members ran in the elections; when they did not win they accused
the government and the British authorities of rigging the elections. For more
see Mahmoud Abdel Halim, Al-​ikhwan al-​Muslimun: Ahdath San’at al-​tarkih (The
Muslim Brotherhood: Events That Made History) (Alexandria: Dar al-​Da’wa, 1979).
8. On August 14, 2013, the police forces brutally dispersed the Brotherhood’s sit-​ins
in Rab’a al-​’Adawiyya and al-​Nahda squares, leaving at least eight hundred people
dead and dozens injured. For more see Human Rights Watch, “All According to
Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and the Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt,” August
12, 2014, http://​w ww.hrw.org/​sites/​default/​files/​reports/​egypt0814web_​0.pdf.
9. According to Wiki Thawra, an independent survey in Egypt, the number of polit-
ical prisoners since Morsi’s ouster ranges between 20,000 and 40,000, and most
of these belong to the Brotherhood. See Abdelhalim Abdallah, “Over 40,000
163

Notes 163

Arrests Related to Political Turmoil since Morsi’s Ouster: Wiki Thawara,” Daily
News Egypt, May 25, 2014, http://​w ww.dailynewsegypt.com/​2 014/​05/​25/​4 0000-​
arrests-​related-​political-​t urmoil-​since-​morsis-​ouster-​wiki-​thawra/​.
10. Roisin O’Connor, “14 Muslim Brotherhood Members Sentenced to Death in
Egypt,” Independent (UK), March 16, 2015, http://​w ww.independent.co.uk/​
news/​world/​a frica/​14-​muslim-​brotherhood-​members-​sentenced-​to- ​death-​in-​
egypt-​10112297.html.
11. Steven Brooke, “Egypt’s Crackdown on Islamist Charities,” Foreign Policy,
December 27, 2013, http://​foreignpolicy.com/​2 013/​12/​27/​egypts-​crackdown-​on-​
islamist-​charities/​#sthash.7f0TCw46.S3hQRKly.dpbs.
12. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Penguin Press, 1967),
249, 250.
13. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 20.
14. Vivien Burr, Social Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2003), 7.
15. Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema, “Potentials, Networks, Motivations,
and Barriers: Steps towards Participation in Social Movements,” American
Sociological Review 52 (August 1987): 519–​ 531; Hank Johnston and Bert
Klandermans, Social Movements and Culture (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1995); John Drury and Steve Reicher, “Collective Action and
Psychological Change: The Emergence of New Social Identities,” British Journal
of Social Psychology 39 (December 2000): 579–​6 04.
16. On this point I rely on the lucid works of Bernard Simon and Stefan Stürmer
on politicized identity. See Bernard Simon and Bert Klandermans, “Politicized
Collective Identity: A Social Psychology Analysis,” American Psychologist
56 (April 2001): 319–​ 331; Stefan Stürmer and Bernd Simon, “Collective
Action: Towards a Dual-​Pathway Model,” European Review of Social Psychology
15 (2004): 59–​9 9.
17. Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (New York: Sage, 2007), 10.

Chap ter 2

1. For a more detailed discussion on the disagreement among scholars of

Islamism see Jillian Schwedler, “Why Academics Can’t Go beyond Moderates
and Radicals,” Washington Post, February 12, 2014, http://​w ww.washington-
post.com/​blogs/​monkey-​cage/​w p/​2 015/​02/​12/​why-​academics-​cant-​get-​beyond-​
moderates-​and-​radicals/​.
2. I define Islamism as a political ideology and project carried out by social actors
who seek to instill and activate religion (Islam in this case) in everyday life for
political purposes.
164

164 Notes

3. Khalil al-​A nani, “ISIS-​ification of Islamist Politics,” Washington Post, January

30, 2015.
4. Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 1.
5. For decades proponents of secularism have predicted that religion would fade
away as an inevitable consequence of modernity. They tended to view religion as
an “irrelevant” phenomenon that should withdraw into the private sphere with
no role in everyday public life. This view was proven false after the resurgence
of religion and religious movements around the globe. For more on this issue
see José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994).
6. Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 20–​31.
7. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 160–​161.
8. For disagreement and division among social theorists on how to study religion
see, for example, James A. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
9. Richard C. Martin, Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies (Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1985), 3.
10. See, for example, Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and
Modern Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); Youssef M.
Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Pinter, 1990).
11. James P. Piscatori, Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 8.
12. John L. Esposito, The Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010), 11.
13. See, for example, Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab
World (London: Routledge, 1993).
14. See, for example, Shabbir Akhtar, Islam and Political Religion: The Future of an
Imperial Faith (London: Routledge, 2011).
15. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996).
16. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in
the Middle East (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002).
17. Bassam Tibi, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity: Religious Reform and Cultural
Change (London: Routledge, 2009).
18. Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1983).
19. Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How
We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 38
20. See, for example, Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
165

Notes 165

21. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam
and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
22. Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1983).
23. Ayubi, Political Islam, 1, 3.
24. Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-​Islamist
Turn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 2.
25. In Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” Third World Quarterly
26, no. 6 (2005): 894.
26. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 2. See also Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab
State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996).
27. Ali E. Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1982), 183.
28. Laura Guazzone, ed., The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist
Movements in the Contemporary Arab World (: Ithaca Press, 1995), 3.
29. François Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movements in North Africa
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 48.
30. Yvonne Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’: The 1967 Awakening,”
Middle East Journal 46, no. 2 (1992): 266–​285.
31. Lisa Anderson, “Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism,”
in John L. Esposito, ed., Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 25.
32. Gudrun Krämer, “Cross-​L inks and Double Talk? Islamist Movements in the
Political Process,” in Guazzone, The Islamist Dilemma, 20.
33. Ayubi, 44.
34. Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movement,” in John
Pierre Entelis, ed., Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1997), 93–​95.
35. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Critical Essays (Cairo: American
University Press, 2004), 60.
36. Dirk Vandewalle, “Breaking with Socialism: Economic Liberalization and
Privatization in Algeria,” in Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan, eds., Privatization
and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1992), 190.
37. Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movement,” 113.
38. Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics, 14.
39. The advocates of this trend include Samuel Huntington, Daniel Pipes, Bassam
Tibi, P. J. Vatikiotis, and Emmanuel Sivan. Most of their work on Islam tends to
essentialize Islam and Muslim societies. They look at Islam through “radicalism
and extremism” lenses without giving much attention to the political context or the
socioeconomic circumstances where religion is interpreted and instrumentalized.
166

166 Notes

40. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 16.
41. Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics, 4, 3.
42. Bassam Tibi, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity: Religious Reform and Cultural
Change (London: Routledge, 2009), 11.
43. Pipes, In the Path of God, 168.
44. Ibid., 111.
45. Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World
Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 2–​3.
46. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 23.
47. Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the
Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 14, 118.
48. Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of
Islamism (London: Zed Books, 1997), 138.
49. Akbar S. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise (London:
Routledge, 1992), 27.
50. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 7.
51. This trend has grown remarkably in the post-​9/​11 era as a response to the limitations of
other theoretical and analytical frameworks. See, for example, Ziad Munson, “Islamic
Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,”
Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2001): 487–​510; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing
Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002); Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey; Quintan Wiktorowicz,
ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2004); Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory.”
52. Mohammad M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the
Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 21, 19.
53. Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The
Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” Sociological Forum 14, no. 1 (1999): 28.
54. See, for example, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and
Contentious Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994);
Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, eds., Social Movements: Readings on Their
Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 1997); Doug
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives
on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
Framings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
55. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 86.
56. Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism.
57. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 25.
58. Goodwin and Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine,” 31.
59. Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 496–​4 97.
167

Notes 167

60. On framing see, for example, David A. Snow, E. Burke RochfordJr., Steven K.
Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization,
and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986):
464–​481; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000):
611–​639.
61. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation,” 467.
62. Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 19.
63. Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 12.
64. Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics, 17.
65. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey.
66. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion, 161.
67. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969).
68. Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic
Mass Movement 1928–​1942 (: Ithaca Press, 1998).
69. Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-​ Hudaybi and Ideology
(London: Routledge, 2009).
70. Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 496–​4 97.
71. Abdullah Al-​A rian, Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
72. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 8.
73. Gilles Kepel, “Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria,” Daedalus 124,
no. 3 (1995): 109–​127.
74. Hesham Al-​Awadi, “Mubarak and the Islamists: Why Did the ‘Honeymoon’
End?,” Middle East Journal 59, no. 1 (2005): 75.
75. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 3.
76. Tarek Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5.
77. Nathan Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 2–​3.
78. Mona El-​Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (2005): 374.
79. Bruce K. Rutherford, “What Do Egypt’s Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and
the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006): 726.
80. El-​Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 374.
81. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option, 160.
82. This notion is widely overlooked in the literature on Islamist movements, par-
ticularly from the social movement theory perspective. The focus is always on
Islamists as collective actors, without paying much attention to individuals and
the configuration of their personal identity.
168

168 Notes

Chap ter 3

1. Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for

Political Psychology,” Political Psychology 22, no. 1 (2001): 115.
2. Zygmunt Bauman, Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi (Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press, 2004), 10–​11.
3. George Herbert Mead and Charles W. Morris, Mind, Self and Society from the
Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934),
130, 154, 172.
4. The literature on interactionism is burgeoning. See, for example, Sheldon
Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (: Blackburn Press,
2003); Sheldon Stryker and Richard T. Serpe, “Commitment, Identity Salience,
and Role Behavior,” in William Ickes and Eric Knowles, eds., Personality, Roles,
and Social Behavior (New York: Springer-​ Verlag, 1982), 199–​218; Sheldon
Stryker, “Exploring the Relevance of Social Cognition for the Relationship of
Self and Society,” in Judith Howard and Peter L. Callero, eds., The Self-​Society
Dynamic: Cognition, Emotion, and Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 19–​41; Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social
Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63, no. 3 (2000): 224–​237.
5. Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an
Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2000): 286.
6. Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two
Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity
Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 58, no. 4 (1995): 256.
7. Stryker and Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” 285–​286.
8. Peter L. Callero, “Role-​Identity Salience,” Social Psychology Quarterly 48, no. 3
(1985): 204.
9. Hogg et al., “A Tale of Two Theories,” 256.
10. Hogg et al., “A Tale of Two Theories,” 257.
11. For more on self-​identity see, for example, George J. McCall and Jerry Laird
Simmons, Identities and Interactions: An Examination of Human Associations
in Everyday Life (New York: Free Press, 1978); Sheldon Stryker, Timothy
Joseph Owens, and Robert W. White, eds., Self, Identity, and Social Movements
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). For more on social identity
see Stryker et al., Self, Identity, and Social Movements; Stets and Burke, “Identity
Theory and Social Identity Theory.”
12. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 36, 27.
13. Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney, eds., Handbook of Self and Identity
(New York: Guilford Press, 2005), 91.
14. See, for example, Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John C. Turner, Rediscovering the Social
169

Notes 169

Group: A Self Categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Dominic Abrams

and Michael A. Hogg, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup
Relations and Group Processes (London: Routledge, 1988).
15. Stets and Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” 225.
16. Stryker and Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” 284.
17. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity,” Theory and Society
29, no. 1 (2000): 6–​8.
18. Stryker and Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” 286.
19. Stryker et al., Self, Identity, and Social Movements, 28.
20. Callero, “Role-​Identity Salience,” 203.
21. Stryker and Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” 286.
22. See, for example, Karen A. Cerulo, “Identity Construction: New Issues, New
Directions,” Annual Review of Sociology 23 (August 1997): 385–​4 09; Lory Peek,
“Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity,” Sociology of
Religion 66, no. 3 (2005): 215–​2 42.
23. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 36.
24. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., Social Movements and Culture
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
25. Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, “Analytical Approaches to Social Movement
Culture: The Culture of the Women’s Movement,” in Johnston and Klandermans,
Social Movements and Culture, 172.
26. William A. Gamson, “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,”
Sociological Forum 6, no. 1 (1991): 27–​50.
27. Taylor and Whittier, “Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture,”
172–​173.
28. Gamson, “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,” 41.
29. Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Informative Age
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 75.
30. Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social
Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (August 2001): 285.
31. Scoot A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, “Identity Fields: Framing
Processes and the Social Construction of Movements’ Identities,” in Enrique
Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., New Social Movements: From
Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 185.
32. See, for example, Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social
Movements (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press); Alberto Melucci, John
Keane, and Paul Mier, eds., Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual
Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989);
Craig Calhoun, Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
33. Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, 81, 96.
34. Melucci et al., Nomads of the Present, 35.
35. Calhoun, Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, 12, 14.
170

170 Notes

36. Jean Cohen, “Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary
Social Movements,” in “Social Movements,” special issue, Social Research 52, no.
4 (1985): 707, 673.
37. Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 284.
38. Johnston and Klandermans, Social Movements and Culture, 5, 12.
39. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd
edition (Oxford: Wiley-​Blackwell, 2006), 73.
40. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 77.
41. Cerulo, “Identity Construction,” 387.
42. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 194.
43. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 20.
44. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 20.
45. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for A New Ummah (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994).
46. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 23.
47. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 67, 76.
48. Ervin Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 21.
49. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements:
An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 614.
50. Hasan al-​Banna, Majmou’t Rass’il Al-​ Imam Al-​ Shahid Hasan al-​ Banna (A
Collection of Hasan Al-​Banna Tracts) (Cairo: Dar Al-​Da’wa, 2002), 15, 20, 22.
51. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 27–​31.
52. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 315.
53. Ibid., 315.
54. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, 126.
55. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 323.
56. Ibid., 325.
57. The relationship between repression/​radicalization and its antithesis, inclusion/​
moderation, is controversial and has recently become a subject of wide disagree-
ment among scholars. Despite this I believe that the relationship in both theses
is not linear or mechanical and that the environment still has a significant impact
on movements’ ideology, strategy, and tactics. For more on this debate see, for
example, Gunes Murat Tezcur, “The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of
Islamic Political Actors,” Party Politics 16, no. 1 (2009): 69–​88; Jillian Schwedler, “Can
Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-​Moderation Hypothesis,”
World Politics 63, no. 2 (2011): 347–​376; Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists
and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
58. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 74.
59. Ibid., 75.
171

Notes 171

Chap ter 4

1. See, for example, David Commins, “Hasan al-​ Banna (1906–​ 1949),” in Ali
Rahnema, ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994); Gudrun
Krämer, Hasan al-​Banna (Oxford: One World, 2010). For Arabic resources see
Jamal al-​Banna, Khitabat Hasan al-​Banna al-​Shab ila abihi (The Young Hasan
al-​Banna’s Letters to His Father) (Cairo: Dar al-​Fikr al-​Islami, 1990); Ibrahim
El-​Bayoumi Ghanim, Al-​fikr assiyasi Lil’imam Hasan Al-​Banna (The Political
Thought of Hasan Al-​Banna) (Cairo: Dar al-​Shorouk, 1992).
2. There are many verses in the Qur’an that call Muslims to be united and avoid
disputes or divisions. One verse stipulates, “Believers are indeed brothers” (Al-​
Hujurat, verse 10), and another verse asks Muslims to avoid disputes and differ-
ences: “Adhere to the Bond of Allah, together, and do not be divided” (Al-​Imran,
verse 103).
3. Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969), 1.
4. Ghanim, Al-​fikr assiyasi lil’imam Hasan Al-​Banna, 140, 141.
5. Ghanim attributes al-​Banna’s decision to his desire to avoid the strict regula-
tions of the traditional educational system at al-​Azhar (ibid., 143).
6. Although al-​Banna embraced Sufism in his early years, he later criticized Sufi
groups for their quietist and apolitical approach. For more on this see Hamada
Ismail, Hasan Al-​Banna and the Society of Muslim Brothers between Religion and
Politics 1928–​1949 (Cairo: Dar el-​Shorouq, 2010), 36.
7. Hourani provides a compelling analysis of the social and educational back-
ground of this debate. He asserts that it was a mere result of the social and eco-
nomic transformations that occurred in Egypt during the rule of Mohamed Ali
and his dynasty. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–​1939
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 138–​144.
8. According to Hourani, modernists were those who had had a Western-​style
education, (e.g., Taha Hussein, Qasim Amin, and Ahmad Lutfi al-​Sayyid), and
Islamic revivalists were those who received a traditional and religious education
at al-​Azhar (e.g., Jamal al-​Din al-​A fghani, Mohamed Abdu, Rashid Rida). For
more see Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 242.
9. For more on the debate between modernists and Islamic revivalists see
Hourani, Arabic Thought in Liberal Age.
10. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–​ 1938) is considered the founder of modern
Turkey. He led the Turkish national movement that ended the Ottoman rule of
Turkey, which had prevailed for more than four centuries, and replaced it with
a national republic. For more on this point see Ghanim, Al-​fikr assiyasi lil’imam
Hasan Al-​Banna, 103–​110.
11. Gershoni and Jankowski describe the reaction to the removal of the Ottoman
caliphate as a “shock at the abrupt termination of such a hallowed Muslim
172

172 Notes

institution. Egyptians of a traditionalist orientation, in particular, seem to have

felt a personal sense of loss and dismay over the end of the Caliphate.” Israel
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for
Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–​1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 56.
12. For more on this issue see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the
Muslim Congresses (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
13. Ghanim, Al-​fikr assiyasi lil’imam Hasan Al-​Banna, 130.
14. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 58.
15. Hasan al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail (The Epistles of Hasan Al-​ Banna)
(Cairo: Shorouk Press, 2002), 23.
16. Zakariyya Bayumi points out that Egypt had a significant number of Islamic
associations and societies after World War I. He estimates this number to be
approximately 135 moral, social, and religious societies. However, these groups
were mainly preoccupied by religious and social activities without any political
role. This might explain why al-​Banna chose to establish the Brotherhood in-
stead of joining an existing Islamic society. For more see Zakariyya Bayumi, Al-​
Ikhwan al-​Muslimon wa’l-​jama’at al-​Isalmiyya fil-​hayah al-​Siyasiyya al-​Masriyya
1928–​1948 (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Associations in the
Egyptian Political Life, 1928–​1948) (Cairo: Maktabt Wahba, 1991), 85–​87.
17. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 25.
18. Al-​Banna identified in detail the social and moral problems that overwhelmed
Egyptian society during the 1930s. He repeatedly stressed that the only way to
recover from these problems and “diseases” was to restore Islamic principles
and values in everyday life (“Our Internal Problems in Light of the Islamic
Order,” in Majmuat ar-​rasail, 255).
19. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 25.
20. Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic
Mass Movement 1928–​1942 (London: Ithaca Press, 1998), 58, 59.
21. Ghanim, Al-​fikr assiyasi lil’imam Hasan Al-​Banna, 112, 113.
22. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1977), 126.
23. Mohamed Abdullah al-​Simman, Hasan al-​Banna: al-​rajul wa-​l-​fikra (The Man
and the Idea) (Cairo: Dar al-​Nasr, 1977), 23.
24. This concept is central in the Brotherhood’s ideology, and al-​Banna was the
first Islamic scholar to coin and use this term. To internalize it within the
Brotherhood, he determined seven principles of al-​fikra al-​islamiyya that were
published on the cover of the Brotherhood’s weekly magazine during the 1930s.
25. According to Ghanim, al-​Banna was always preoccupied by Egypt’s identity
crisis. Ghanim highlights al-​ Banna’s tendency to stress and delineate the
meaning of identity as a part of everyday life art. Ibrahim El-​Bayoumi Ghanim,
interview with the author, Cairo, December 24, 2010.
26. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 171.
173

Notes 173

27. Commins, “Hasan al-​Banna,” 134.

28. Abdullah Essam, interview with author, March 25, 2012.
29. Many scholars hold that al-​Banna created a distinctive discourse that enabled
the Brotherhood to reach out to different audiences. For more see Lia, The
Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 42; Commins, “Hasan al-​Banna,” 135.
30. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 13.
31. Ibid., 171.
32. Ibid., 173, 174.
33. Commins, “Hasan al-​Banna,” 136.
34. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 25.
35. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 140.
36. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 42.
37. Al-​Banna’s epistles encompass a clear and sophisticated platform for compre-
hensive reform. In a well-​known tract called “Our Internal Problems in Light of
the Islamic Order,” he extensively analyzes the problems that Egypt faced and
proposed solutions in a petition sent to King Farouk and Egypt’s prime minis-
ter Mustafa al-​Nahas (in Majmuat ar-​rasail, 209).
38. To create this paradigm I read tracts and statements by al-​Banna. That is, the
seven components or elements of the jama‘a paradigm are drawn from al-​
Banna’s thoughts and ideas about al-​fikra al-​islamiyya. Some of them were ex-
plicitly mentioned in the tracts; others I deduced from al-​Banna’s speeches and
essays published in the Brotherhood’s publications.
39. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 168.
40. Robert Bemford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 614.
41. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 145–​160.
42. Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in The Information Age (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 320.
43. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 114, 115, 116.
44. Ibid., 45.
45. Ibid., 48, 65.
46. Ibid., 161, 336, 188, 187.
47. Ibid., 178.
48. Munson points out the Brotherhood had over 2,000 branches throughout
Egypt, with an active membership of 300,000 to 600,000 by 1949. For more de-
tails about the spread of the Brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s see Ziad
Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood,” Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2001): 487–​510.
49. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 101.
50. Ibid., 174.
51. Mohamed Badie, “Oh, Brothers: Let’s Work,” Weekly Statement, March 31, 2011,
http://​w ww.ikhwanismailia.com/​ismailia/​12345.html, 174.
174

174 Notes

52. Zakaria Bayumi, Al-​Ikhwan al-​Muslimon wa’l-​jama’at al-​Isalmiyya fil-​hayah al-​

Siyasiyya al-​Masriyya 1928–​1948 (Cairo: Maktabt Wahba, 1991), 75–​82.
53. Salah Ghorab, interview with author, Cairo, December 28, 2011.
54. The Fifth Annual Conference of the Brotherhood was a hallmark in the move-
ment’s history. It was the first conference after the remarkable growth of the
Brotherhood, when the number of local branches jumped from five in 1930 to
fifteen in 1931, then to 300 in 1938. The conference also marks a shift in the
Brotherhood’s strategy from being politically inactive to being a political force.
It is after this conference that al-​Banna decided to enter parliamentary elections
and reveal the Brotherhood’s political agenda and aspirations. For more see
Hasan al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 165.

Chap ter 5

1. Salah Abdul Halim, interview with author, December 26, 2011.

2. Samer S. Shehata, “Political Da’wa: Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Participation in Semi-​Authoritarian Elections,” in Samer S. Shehata, ed., Islamist
Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change (London: Routledge), 120.
3. Salah Abdul Halim, interview with author, December 28, 2010.
4. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) 160.
5. Ibid., 152.
6. Abdul Khaliq Al-​Sherif, interview with author, April 5, 2012.
7. Most of these schools were closed by the government after the coup of July 3, 2013.
8. Traditionally du’ah should acquire a sophisticated religious knowledge and edu-
cation. However, most du’ah in Islamist movements are professionals with non-
religious educational backgrounds (e.g., teachers, lawyers, engineers). For them
preaching, or making da‘wa, is not about religion per se but rather about creat-
ing an active member who can change society.
9. Al-​Sherif interview.
10. Al-​Banna, Majmou't Rass'il Al-​Imam Al-​Shahid Hasan Al-​Banna (A Collection
of Hasan Al-​Banna Messages) (Cairo: Dar Al-​Da'wa Publications, 2002), 178.
11. In the Fifth Conference epistle, al-​Banna stressed the necessity of spreading the
Brotherhood’s ideology throughout the country in villages and cities (ibid., 120).
12. Eslam Ahmed, interview with author, January 11, 2012.
13. Mustafa Mashhur, Ad- ​da‘wa al-​Fardiyya (The Individual Call) (Cairo: Dar
Ammar, 1990), 22.
14. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 179.
15. Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema, “Potentials, Networks, Motivations
and Barriers: Steps towards Participation in Social Movements,” American
Sociological Review 52, no. 4 (1987): 519.
16. Sherif Ayman, interview with author, January 12, 2012.
175

Notes 175

17. Klandermans and Oegema, “Potentials, Networks, Motivations and Barriers,” 520.
18. Ahmed interview.
19. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 179.
20. Abdul Halim al-​K inani, Ad-​da‘wa al-​Fardiyya bayin an-​nazriyya wa-​tatbiq (The
Individual Call between Theory and Practice) (Cairo: Dar Iqra’, 2007), 15.
21. Alaa Muharram, “Essential Tools for the Individual Call,” February 15, 2012,
http://​w ww.ikhwanonline.com/​new/​A rticle.aspx?ArtID=69083&SecID=0.
22. Al-​Sherif interview.
23. Ayman interview.
24. Mashhur, Ad- ​da‘wa al-​Fardiyya, 24.
25. Ibid., 25.
26. Fathi Yakan is the former secretary general of the Lebanese Islamic Group
(al-​Jama’ah al-​Islamiyya) and an influential leader who wrote many books and
epistles that are widely read among Islamists.
27. Mashhur, Ad- ​da‘wa al-​Fardiyya, 27.
28. Ayman interview.
29. Florence Passy, “Socialization, Connection, and the Structure/​A gency Gap: A
Specification of the Impact of Networks on Participation in Social Movements,”
Mobilization 6, no. 2 (2001): 173–​192.
30. Abdurrahman Ayyash, interview with author, January 14, 2012.
31. Ayman interview.
32. Abdelmoniem Aboul Fottouh is a key leader who rebuilt the Brotherhood in the
1970s after the imprisonment of senior leaders during the 1950s and 1960s.
He was expelled from the movement in 2011 when he decided to run for the
Egyptian presidency after the January 25 uprising. For more on his role see
Hossam Tammam, Abuel Fottouh: Shahid ala al-​haraka al-​islamiyya min 1970
ila 1984 (Abuel Fottouh: A Witness on the Islamist Movement from 1970 to
1984) (Cairo: Shorouk Press, 2010).
33. Ammar El-​Beltagi, interview with author, March 28, 2012.
34. Marriage within the Brotherhood is a key feature of the movement’s social base.
Since its foundation in the early 1930s, the Sisters Section (Qism al-​A khawat)
has played an important role in facilitating and maintaining marriage and kin-
ship relationships within the movement. Fatima Abdelhady, the first secretary
of the Sisters Section, points out her role in facilitating the marriage of many
leaders. For more see, Fatima Abdelhady, Rihlati ma’ al-​Akhawat al-​Muslimat
(My Journey With the Muslim Sisters) (Cairo: Shorouk Press, 2011), 38.
35. Noha El-​Hennawy, A split in the Muslim Brotherhood? Not so easy, Egypt
Independent, April 17, 2011, http://​w ww.egyptindependent.com//​news/​split-​
muslim-​brotherhood-​not-​so-​easy, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, May 24, 2011.
36. Mohamed Ayoub, interview with author, April 3, 2012.
37. Mohamed Yussif, interview with author, March 29, 2012.
38. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 247.
176

176 Notes

Chap ter 6

1. See, for example, William A. Gamson, “The Social Psychology of Collective

Action,” in Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement
Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1992); Jeff Goodwin, James M.
Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper,
Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion (Oxford: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2003).
2. Al-​Banna, Majmou't Rass'il Al-​Imam Al-​Shahid Hasan Al-​Banna (A Collection
of Hasan Al-​Banna Messages) (Cairo: Dar Al-​Da’wa Publications, 2002), 44.
3. Abdelhamid El-​Ghazali, The Way to the Revival of the Muslim Ummah: A Study
of the Thinking of Imam al-​Banna (Cairo: Al-​Falah Foundation), 128, 130.
4. Ali Abdul Halim Mahmoud, Wasa’il al-​Taribiyya ‘ind al-​Ikhwan al-​muslmiyyn
(Tarbiyya tools in the Muslim Brotherhood) (Cairo, Dar al-​Tawzi’ wal’ Nashr al-​
Islamiyya, 1997), 11.
5. Interview with Mohamed Badie by Abdelgalil Al-​Sharnoubi, March 7, 2010,
http://​w ww.dakahliaikhwan.com/​v iewarticle.php?id=4041.
6. Sherif Ayman, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
7. Amer Shemakh, “Al-​ tarbiyya al-​islamiyya dakhil al-​ ikhwan al-​muslmiyyn”
(The Islamic Tarbiyya in the Muslim Brotherhood), March 27, 2011, http://​
www.ikhwanonline.com/​new/​A rticle.aspx?ArtID=90818&SecID=0.
8. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 92, 94.
9. Mohamed Hamza, interview with author, February 12, 2012.
10. Mohamed Yussif, interview with author, March 29, 2012.
11. Abdurrahman Mansour, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
12. Mohamed Mustafa, interview with author, March 28, 2012.
13. Ibid.
14. Interview with Mohamed al-​Qassas by Noha El-​Hennawy, Egypt Independent,
April 17, 2011.
15. Mohamed Abdul Rahman, Manhaj al-​islah wataghiyyir fi al-​ikhwan al-​muslmi-
yyn (The Approach of Reform and Change in the Muslim Brothers) (Cairo, Dar
al-​Tawzi’ wal’ Nashr al-​Islamiyya, 2006), 25.
16. Abdurrahman Ayyash, interview with author, January 12, 2012.
17. Some accounts claim that al-​ Banna founded kata’ib units to prepare
Brotherhood members for jihad, particularly against Israel in the 1940s. It is
also believed that the kata’ib system was the cornerstone in establishing the
Secret Apparatus, the military wing of the Brotherhood.
18. Mahmoud Abdul Halim, Al-​Ikhwan al-​Muslimun: Ahdath sana’at al-​tarikh (The
Muslim Brotherhood: Events That Made History) (Alexandria: Dar al-​Da’wa,
1979), 150.
19. Ibid., 152.
177

Notes 177

20. Ibrahim Saleh, interview with author, March 30, 2012.

21. Mustafa interview.
22. According to Brynjar Lia, al-​Banna established the Rover Scout units in the
mid-​1930s, and they were officially registered in the Egyptian National Scout
Movement in 1938–​1939. The functions of the Rover Scouts were to recruit
new members through sporting activities, to maintain order and security
in large meetings and conferences, and to prepare Brotherhood members to
resist British imperialism and Zionism. For more see Brynjar Lia, The Society
of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–​1942
(London: Ithaca Press, 1999), 170–​172. However, Lia points out that the Rover
Scouts were rarely involved in militant activities: “The Rover Scout served as a
reservoir of trained youth who could easily be rallied to social welfare services
and public health projects which became a preoccupation of the Society during
the war [World War II]” (172). The Brotherhood’s 1944 bylaws outline the organi-
zation, membership, and structure of Rovers Scouts. According to Abdul Halim,
the Brotherhood had many scout teams by the end of the 1930s. This is when
it became mandatory for all members to join Rover Scout branches, including
al-​Banna himself, who led Rover Scouts in national ceremonies and celebrations
(Mahmoud, Wasa’il al-​Taribiyya ‘ind al-​Ikhwan al-​muslmiyyn, 280).
23. Mahmoud, Wasa’il al-​Taribiyya ‘ind al-​Ikhwan al-​muslmiyyn, 282.
24. Ibid., 282–​284.
25. Mohamed Soliman, interview with author, March 29, 2012.
26. Salah Abdul Halim, interview with author, December 28, 2010.
27. Mahmoud, Wasa’il al-​Taribiyya ‘ind al-​Ikhwan al-​muslmiyyn, 283.
28. Sherif Ayman, interview with author, January 12, 2012.
29. Mahmoud, Wasa’il al-​Taribiyya ‘ind al-​Ikhwan al-​muslmiyyn, 306–​310.
30. Bay’a is an Islamic term that derives from the Qur’an. It refers to an oath given
by a subordinate to his leader as a token of allegiance and was practiced by the
Prophet Muhammad.
31. This degree was added to the bylaws in 1935 and sowed the seeds of the Special
Apparatus (Al-​tanzim al-​hhas), the military arm of the Brotherhood, which
became operationally active in the beginning of the 1940s.
32. Article 7 of the 1951 Bylaws specifies that the candidate should be eigh-
teen years of age, honorable and upright, able to comprehend the ideas of
the Brotherhood, willing to pay membership dues, and willing to swear an
oath to the Brotherhood, Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969) 183.
33. Ibid., 183–​184.
34. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers; Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers
in Egypt.
35. Eslam Ahmed, interview with author, January 11, 2012.
36. Abdurrahman Ayyash, interview with author, January 11, 2012.
178

178 Notes

37. Ahmed interview.

38. Abdurrahman Ayyash, interview with author, January 12, 2012.
39. Mansur interview.
40. Ahmed interview.
41. Ayyash interview, January 12, 2012.
42. Ayman interview, March 26, 2012.
43. Ayyash interview, January 12, 2012.
44. Interview with author, Ammar El-​Beltagi, March 28, 2012.
45. Mansur interview.
46. Ahmed interview.
47. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 211.
48. Ibid., 212.

Chap ter 7

1. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers; Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers
in Egypt.
2. See, for example, Mona El-​Ghobashi, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 1 (2005):
373–​395; Nathan Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements
in Arab Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Carrie Rosefsky
Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
3. See, for example, Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald,
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing
Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1996); Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An
Introduction (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).
4. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, 137, 138.
5. See, for example, David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, Social
Movements: Identity, Culture and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002); Jo Reger, “Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple
Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women,” Gender and
Society 16, no. 5 (2002): 710–​726.
6. Mayer N. Zald and John David McCarthy, Social Movements in an Organizational
Society: Collected Essays (Piscataway: Transaction Books, 1987), 134.
7. Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Informative Age (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 314.
8. Ibid., 317.
9. Zald and McCarthy, Social Movements in an Organizational Society, 20.
10. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, 145–​149.
11. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 326–​327.
179

Notes 179

12. Al-​Banna, Majmou't Rass'il Al-​Imam Al-​Shahid Hasan Al-​Banna (A Collection

of Hasan Al-​ Banna Messages) (Cairo: Dar Al-​ Da’wa Publications, 2002),
168, 169.
13. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option, 66, 67.
14. Mitchell calls this axis the “technical” or operational level, which is mainly
responsible for executing and implementing the Brotherhood’s plans and pro-
grams. He divides this level into the administrative machinery of the move-
ment, consisting of different committees (lijan; e.g., financial, policy, legal,
statistics, and services), and the sections (aqsam), which are concerned with ide-
ology and indoctrination (e.g., propagation section [nashr al- ​da‘wa], students;
Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers, 170).
15. Mohamed Mustafa, interview with author, April 1, 2012.
16. The Brotherhood’s bylaws were amended many times over the past three de-
cades. This section is based on the amendments that were made in May 2009
and were significant particularly in identifying the structure and tasks of each
organizational level. See the Brotherhood’s internal bylaws, March 11, 2012,
http://​w ww.egyptwindow.net/​news_​Details.aspx?News_​ID=17766.
17. Usually shu’ba includes members who live in a specific geographical area and
receives names based on this area.
18. Historically the general guide selected the head of the shu’ba. But since 2005 in-
ternal elections have taken place within the Brotherhood on all levels. Mohamed
Hamza, interview with author, January 11, 2012.
19. Each governorate has a Shura Council (Majlis al-​Shura muhafza) that consists
of a number of active members determined by the Guidance Bureau and based
on the number of members in that governorate. Members of the governorate’s
Shura Council should be at least thirty years old and have been active members
for at least five years. The term of each council is four years. The Guidance
Bureau has the authority to appoint a number of members in the governorate’s
Shura Council, not to exceed one-​fifth of the total and after consulting with the
Administrative Office.
20. During the Mubarak era the Brotherhood could not hold the Shura Council’s
election. The last election was held in 1995, when the security forces raided the
Council’s first meeting and arrested many of its members. After the January
25 uprising the Brotherhood was able not only to hold the Shura Council elec-
tions but also to make its meetings public. After the coup of July 3, 2013, and
the arrest of many of its senior members, the movement again could not hold
Shura Council meetings.
21. The actual number of members in the Guidance Bureau used to be more than
nineteen. This was mainly because of the arrest of members and the inability
to conduct elections to choose their successors. For example, between 1995 and
2008 the number reached twenty-​one, but many of them were arrested and kept
their membership.
180

180 Notes

22. One of the key criticisms of the Brotherhood is the old age of the Guidance
Bureau members, who used to be in their fifties and sixties. The only exception
to this was Mohi El-​Din Hamed, who joined the Guidance Bureau after being
elected in 2008, when he was thirty-​eight.
23. The bylaws allow the Guidance Bureau to make exceptions on the second and
third conditions (membership in the Shura Council and membership in the
Brotherhood for ten years) when they appoint the three additional members.
However, this is contingent upon the approval of at least eleven elected members.
24. Hamza interview.
25. This rule remains theoretical as many members in the Guidance Bureau were
imprisoned for years without losing their membership. In fact the opposite has
happened: members who are arrested remain in the Guidance Bureau as a sign
of appreciation for their sacrifice and solidarity with them.
26. Some media reports and analysts erroneously call al-​Murshid al-​’Am the su-
preme guide, confusing him with Iran’s supreme guide (al-​Murshid al-​A’la).
Linguistically general guide is more accurate and reflects the English translation
of the Arabic phrase al-​Murshid al-​’Am.
27. Although it is not stipulated in the bylaws, the general guide receives a monthly
salary from the Brotherhood so that he can focus on serving the movement.
28. According to the old bylaws, the general guide remained in his position until
death. Therefore the movement has had only eight general guides during its
eighty-​seven years of existence.
29. Mohamed Mustafa, interview with author, April 3, 2012.
30. Khalil al-​A nani, “Who Is Running the Brotherhood?,” Al-​Hayat, April 17, 2014.
31. To avoid the conceptualization polemic of ideology, this study treats ideology as
an operational concept, or a “cover term for [a]‌relatively stable and coherent set of
values, beliefs, and goals associated with a movement or a broader, encompassing
social entity, and is assumed to provide the rationale for defending or challenging
various social arrangements and conditions.” David Snow, “Framing Processes,
Ideology, and Discursive Fieds,” in D. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi (eds.), The
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Oxford: Blackwell, 380–​412, 409).
32. See, for example, Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
33. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option, 73.
34. Said Hawwa, Jundu’ Allah Tanzimann (Organized Soldiers of God)
(Cairo: Maktabbat Wahba, 2004), 15, 51–​52, 54. Hawwa (1935–​1989) joined the
Brotherhood while he was in high school and became one of its eminent leaders
during the 1970s and 1980s. Islamists regard him as one of the most influen-
tial ideologues and theorists in the Brotherhood. He published about fifteen
books, which are widely used by branches around the world. His most impor-
tant books are a series on Jund Allah (Soldiers of God), which are studied in the
Brotherhood’s circles and are part of its tarbiyya curriculum.
181

Notes 181

35. Fathi Yakan, Abjadiat at-​tassur al-​haraki lil’ amal al’-​Islami (The Fundamentals
of Islamic Activism) (Beirut: Muassasat Ar-​R isala, 1981), 14. Yakan (1933–​2 009)
was one of the most influential ideologues of Islamist movements modeled on
the Brotherhood. He was born in Tripoli and was one of the founders of the
Islamic Action Front in Lebanon in the 1950s and the leader of the Islamic
Group (al-​Jama’a al-​Islamiyya) movement. According to Sebastian Elsässer,
“Yakan is regarded as one of the most important contemporary protagonists
of Muslim. Furthermore, many Islamists regard Yakan as the mastermind of
Islamic activism and pragmatism. His books focus primarily on Islamic ac-
tivism, organization, and socialization in Islamist movements.” Sebastian
Elsässer, “Between Ideology and Pragmatism: Fathi Yakan’s Theory of Islamic
Activism,” Die Welt des Islams 47, no. 3 (2007): 376–​4 02.
36. Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood.” The Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2001): 487–​510, 498.
37. Esaam al-​Erian Interview with author, December 24, 2010.
38. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option, 72.
39. Ibid., 67.
40. An interview with Sayyid El-​Melegi, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, July 24, 2008.
41. I explain this point further in c­ hapter 9.
42. Haitham Abu Khalil, Ikhwan Islahiyun (Reformist Brothers) (Cairo: Dawwin
House, 2012), 38.
43. Husam Tammam, Tahwlat al-​Ikhwan al-​Muslimin (The Transformations of the
Muslim Brotherhood) (Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli, 2010).
44. Ibid., 34.
45. Strikingly the Muslim Sister Section is not mentioned in the Brotherhood’s
current bylaws. While some interviewees justified this absence by the fear of
regime repression against Sisters, others believe it reflects the marginalization
of women inside the Brotherhood.
46. Omayma Abdel-​Latif, “In the Shadow of the Brothers: The Women of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” Carnegie Papers, no. 13 (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 10.
47. Mahmoud Ezzat, the deputy general guide, asserts that the best place for a
woman is in her house as a wife and a mother. He believes women should not
undertake administrative tasks, which are beyond their physiological capac-
ity. An interview with Mahmoud Ezzat, Ikhwan Online, December 16, 2004,
http://​www.ikhwanwiki.com/​index.php?title=%D8%A5%D8%B4%D9%83%
D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA_​%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84_​
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA_​
%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89_​%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8_​%D8%
A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF#.D8.A7.D9.84.
D9.85.D8.B5.D8.AF.D8.B1.
48. Abdel-​L atif, “In the Shadow of the Brothers,” 10.
182

182 Notes

49. Some historians and scholars argue that al-​Banna was influenced by fascism
and similar movements that emerged in Europe during the 1930s. They claim
he admired the nationalist and totalitarian structure of these movements.
See, for example, Ana Belen Soage, “Hasan al-​Banna or the Politicization of
Islam,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9, no. 1 (2008): 21–​4 2.
On Islamism and totalitarianism see, for example, Michael Whine, “Islamism
and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences,” Totalitarian Movements and
Political Religions 2, no. 2 (2001): 54–​72; Hendrik Hansen and Peter Kainz,
“Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: A Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s
Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism,” Totalitarian Movements and
Political Religions 8, no. 1 (2007): 55–​7 6.
50. Several interviewees agreed on the lack of internal accountability in the Brotherhood.
Some blamed this on the repressive environment wherein the Brotherhood oper-
ates; others relate it to the movement’s internal norms and regulations.
51. Abu Khalil, Ikhwan Islahiyun, 36.
52. Tammam, Tahwlat al-​Ikhwan al-​Muslimin, 34.

Chap ter 8

1. Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Informative Age (Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 317, 318.
2. This section draws upon the study of leadership and bay’a in the Brotherhood by
Ella Landau-​Tasseron, “Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim
Brothers,” Research Monographs on the Muslim World, no. 2 (December 2010).
Landau-​Tasseron provides a sophisticated historical account of the role of bay’a
in the Brotherhood, particularly during al-​Banna’s era (the 1930s and 1940s).
3. The term bay’a appears repeatedly in the Qur’an in different contexts.
Historically bay’a was an Islamic tradition, “a pledge exchanged with a leader,
entailing obligations of leaders and the led, towards one another” (ibid., 2).
Muslim caliphs and sultans used to be given bay’a by the ‘ulama (ahl al-​hal
wa’l-​aqd), and then by the entire society, or umma.
4. Ibid., 1.
5. It is stated in the Qur’an that the Prophet Muhammad took bay’a from those
who converted to Islam: “Those who exchange pledges with you [Muhammad],
it is with Allah that they exchange them” (48:10). Landau-​Tasseron highlights
that al-​Banna was smart enough to deliberately invoke and emulate the Prophet
when he established the Brotherhood: “Like the Prophet in his time al-​Bannā
created an enclave, that is, a new society that consolidated around an ideology
and a way of life and separated itself as far as it could from the society in which
it lived” (“Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim Brothers,” 5).
6. Cited in Landau-​Tasseron, “Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the
Muslim Brothers,” 1.
183

Notes 183

7. Landau-​Tasseron highlights the link between the emergence of the concept

of bay’a and the Sufi character of al-​Banna. She points out that the relation-
ship between al-​Banna and his followers resembles the spiritual relationship
between the Sufi sheikh and his followers. Hence al-​Banna chose for his title
general guide (al-​murshid al-​’am), similar to a Sufi sheikh being called murshid
(“Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim Brothers,” 3–​4).
8. Al-​Banna, Majmou't Rass'il Al-​Imam Al-​Shahid Hasan Al-​Banna (A Collection
of Hasan Al-​Banna Messages) (Cairo: Dar Al-​Da’wa Publications, 2002), 185.
9. Many Brotherhood ideologues consider bay’a the most important norm. For
instance, Hawwa treats bay’a as the core value and norm of the Brotherhood
in order to achieve its goals. Although Hawwa views bay’a as nonbinding, he
believes that it is the only way to solidify and strengthen the Brotherhood’s
organization, Said Hawwa, Jundu’ Allah Tanzimann (Cairo, Maktabbat Wahba,
1988), 101.
10. Quoted in Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford
University Press, 1969), 165.
11. The main distinctions between these bylaws are the oath of bay’a and member-
ship criteria. For instance, the first bylaw in 1930 did not mention the bay’a,
which was added in 1944. In the 1990s bay’a was removed from the bylaws,
along with the degrees of membership. Landau-​Tasseron posits that this re-
moval was the result of members’ familiarity with the movement’s regulations
and norms, but I contend that it was due to the Brotherhood’s security obses-
sion. Revealing the levels of membership could imperil members and allow
security forces to monitor and arrest them.
12. Ammar El-​Beltagi, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
13. Abdurrahman Ayyash, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
14. Mohamed Mustafa, interview with author, April 1, 2012.
15. Landau-​Tasseron, “Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim
Brothers,” 12.
16. Mohamed Ayoub, interview with author, March 27, 2012.
17. The internal bylaws of the Muslim Brotherhood can be found at http://​w ww.
egyptwindow.net/​news_​Details.aspx?News_​ID=17766.
18. An Interview with Karim Radwan, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, July 15, 2012.
19. Abdul Rahman al-​Barr, “Bay’at al-​murshid wa bay’at ar-​raiys” (The Allegiance
of the General Guide and Allegiance of the President), April 3, 2013, http://​
dakahliaikhwan.com/​v iewarticle.php?id=13503.
20. Al-​Barr was defending President Mohamed Morsi, whose bay’a to the
Brotherhood’s general guide, Mohamed Badie, created controversy over
his relationship with the movement. After the elections he had to break his
bay’a, and Badie publicly released him from his pledges and commitment
to the Brotherhood. See the video of Badie at http://​w ww.youtube.com/​
watch?v=TfoyRRmKKus.
184

184 Notes

21. According to Mustafa (interview), rejection of the leadership’s commands is not

considered a violation of bay’a and does not necessarily result in the termina-
tion of an individual’s membership. However, it reflects his lack of commit-
ment and can complicate his future prospects for promotion in the movement.
22. Landau-​Tasseron, “Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim
Brothers,” 17.
23. Ayoub interview.
24. Landau-​Tasseron, “Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim
Brothers,” 24.
25. Many Quranic verses and prophetic traditions urge Muslims to obey their lead-
ers. Historically some Muslim caliphs and sultans abused the principle of ta’a
to prolong their rule and suppress opposition.
26. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 185.
27. Landau-​Tasseron, “Leadership and Allegiance in the Society of the Muslim
Brothers,” 7.
28. Amer Shemakh, “Obedience in the Muslim Brotherhood,” July 12, 2012, http://​
www.ikhwanonline.com/​new/​A rticle.aspx?ArtID=90818&SecID=0.
29. Mustafa interview.
30. Four members resign from the Brotherhood, El-​Badil, July 12, 2012, http://​elbadil.
com/​2012/​04/​01/​35353/​.
31. Mustafa al-​Naggar, “The Muslim Brotherhood between the Public and the
Private,” http://​2mwag.blogspot.co.uk/​2 009/​0 6/​blog-​post_​15.html.
32. Mohamed Hamza, interview with author, January 11, 2012.
33. Ayyash interview.
34. The internal rifts are discussed in greater detail in c­ hapter 7.
35. Ayyash interview.
36. Ayman Ashraf, interview with author, March 28, 2012.
37. Mohamed Hamza, interview with author, January 12, 2012.
38. Anwar Hamed, “Awaraq min waq’ ashtuh” (Papers from the Reality I Lived), July 10,
2012, http://​2mwag.blogspot.co.uk/​search/​label/​%D9%86%D9%82%D8%AF%20
%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A.
39. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 190.
40. Mohamed Hamed Eliwa, “Thiqa as a Pillar of our Da’wa,” July 12, 2012, http://​
www.ikhwanonline.com/​new/​A rticle.aspx?ArtID=86931&SecID=373.
41. Emad Ghanim, “Trust as a Pillar of Allegiance in the Muslim Brotherhood,”
July 12, 2012, http://​w ww.ikhwan.net/​forum/​showthread.php?16788.
42. Mustafa interview.
43. Hamza interview, January 11, 2012.
44. Abdurrahman Mansour, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
45. Amr Soliman, interview with author, March 25, 2012.
46. Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, “Trust and Commitment through Self-​
Verification,” Social Psychology Quarterly 62, no. 4 (1999): 348.
47. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 318.
185

Notes 185

48. Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,”
Annual Review of Sociology 27 (August 2001): 292.
49. Salah Ghorab, interview with author, December 24, 2012.
50. Mohamed al-​Naggar, interview with author, April 3, 2012.
51. Sherif Ayman, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
52. Sayyid Shoa’iyb, “What Does My Commitment to the Brotherhood Mean?,” July
12, 2012, http://​www.daawa-​info.net/​article.php?id=686.
53. Mohamed Sarhan, interview with author, April 2, 2012.
54. Al-​Banna, Majmuat ar-​rasail, 35.
55. Fathi Yakan, What Does My Belonging to Islam Mean? (Beirut: Mu’assasat ar-​
Risala, 1983), 137–​140.
56. Shoa’iyb, “What Does My Commitment to the Brotherhood Mean?”
57. Sarhan interview.
58. Ayyash interview.
59. Mohamed al-​Naggar interview.
60. Sherif Ayman, interview with author, January 12, 2012.
61. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 312.
62. Salah Ghorab, interview with author, December 24, 2010.
63. Husam Tammam, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Years before the Revolution
(Cairo: Shorouk Press, 2012), 48.
64. Mustafa interview.
65. Hamza interview, January 11, 2012.

Chap ter 9

1. Since the end of the 1970s many authoritarian regimes have become
semi-​authoritarian, hybrid, or competitive-​ authoritarian systems that at-
tempt to maintain power by ostensibly democratic means but with no
genuine changes. See, for example, Andreas Schedler, “Elections without
Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2
(2002): 36–​50; Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Steven Levitsky and Lucan
A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Lisa Blaydes, Elections and
Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
2. Schedler, “Elections without Democracy,” 36.
3. Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt, 1.
4. Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Informative Age (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 323.
5. Hanspeter Kriesi, “Political Context and Opportunity,” in David A. Snow,
Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social
Movements (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 74.
186

186 Notes

6. See, for example, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and
Contentious Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Doug
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives
on Social Movements (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity: The Information Age, Economy, Society,
and Culture (Oxford: Wiley-​Blackwell, 2010), 2: 9.
8. Several liberal and leftists parties witnessed schism and splits under Mubarak,
including the Al-​A hrar Party and the Al-​Ghad Party.
9. See, for example, Mai Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian
Rule (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Brownlee, Authoritarianism in
the Age of Democratization; Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in
Mubarak’s Egypt.
10. Hesham Al-​Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak,
1982–​2000 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004).
11. For more on this, see Carrie Rosefesky Wickham, Moblizing Islam: Religion,
Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press,
2002); Mona El-​ Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim
Brothers,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37(1) (2005): 373–​395.
12. El-​Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 380.
13. Ibid., 384.
14. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 3.
15. Al-​Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 189.
16. Esam al-​’Aryan, interview with author, December 25, 2010.
17. Nathan Brown, When Victory Is Not An Option: Islamist Movements In Arab
Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 85.
18. Essam El-​Din Gamal, “Brotherhood Steps into the Fray,” Al-​Ahram Weekly,
March 11–​17, 2004.
19. The initiative can be found at this link (in Arabic): http://​w ww.aljazeera.net/​
specialfiles/​pages/​a7d9e130- ​0f09-​4b77-​bbb0-​ee07dd61afd3.
20. The Kefaya movement was established in 2004 by various political activists and
forces, including the Brotherhood. Its main objective was to end Mubarak’s
reign and prevent the succession of his son, Gamal. For more see Nadia
Oweidat, Cheryl Benard, Dale Stahl, Walid Kildani, Edward O’Connell, and
Audra K. Grant, “The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study Of A Grassroots Reform
Initiative,” (Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 2008).
21. For more on the inclusion-​ moderation hypothesis, see Carrie Rosefsky
Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation
of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 205–​ 228;
Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Janine A. Clark, “The Conditions of
Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-​ Ideological Cooperation in Jordan,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 4 (2006): 539–​560.
187

Notes 187

22. On criticism of the inclusion-​moderation thesis, see Gunes Murat Tezcur,

“The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors,”
Party Politics 16, no. 1 (2010): 69–​8 8; Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become
Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-​Moderation Hypothesis,” World Politics
63, no. 2 (2011): 347–​376.
23. Mohamed Mustafa, interview with author, April 1, 2012.
24. Interview with Mahmoud Ezzat by Zahraa Bassam, Ikhwanonline, March 24, 2008,
http://​w ww.ikhwanonline.com/​new/​v3/​Article.aspx?ArtID=35751&SecID=211.
25. Ibid.
26. Islam Lofti, “The Brotherhood and Rabbit Culture,” April 16, 2008, http://​
kawakby.blogspot.com/​2 008/​04/​blog-​post.html.
27. Melucci, Challenging Codes, 319.
28. Mohamed Mustafa, interview with author, April 3, 2012.
29. It was not until the Egyptian uprising in 2011 that the Brotherhood revealed
its bylaws on its official website, www.ikhwanonline.com. While there is no
significant difference between the old and new bylaws, the section pertinent to
membership levels and procedures was omitted.
30. Mohamed Hamza, interview with author, January 11, 2012.
31. Abdurrahman Ayyash, interview with author, March 26, 2012.
32. Hamza interview.
33. Brown, When Victory Is Not An Option, 130.
34. The Brotherhood provides a different narrative for expelling al-​Sokkary. It
claims he was spying on al-​Banna and involved in corruption transactions
under the name of the Brotherhood. For more on this see Brynjad Lia, The
Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of An Islamic Mass Movement
1928–​1942 (London: Ithaca Press, 1998).
35. According to Tammam, this group embraced an extreme ideology that
was derived from Sayyid Qutb’s thoughts. Hosam Tammam, The Muslim
Brotherhood: The Years Before the Revolution (Cairo: Shorouk Press, 2012), 46.
36. El-​Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 382–​383.
37. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 218.
38. The establishment of Al-​ Wasat Party was a contested issue between the
Brotherhood and Madi. While many of the senior leaders insisted that the
Guidance Bureau supported the idea of establishing the party, Madi empha-
sized it was his original idea. An Interview with Abu Ela Madi, Al-​Masry Al-​
Youm, March 27, 2009.
39. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 218.
40. Husam Tammam, Abdul Moniem Abulfotouh: Shahid ‘ala tarkikh al-​haraka al-​
islamiyya (Abdul Moniem Abulfotouh: A Witness of the Islamist Movement’s
History) (Cairo: Shorouk Press, 2010), 41.
41. Ibid., p. 42.
42. An Interview with Abu Ela Madi, Al-​Sharq Al-​Awsat, October 5, 2003.
188

188 Notes

43. Esam Sultan, “The Story of Al-​Wasat Between The Brotherhood and National
Democratic Party,” Al-​Youm Al-​Sabi’, September 3, 2009.
44. In September 1981 Sadat unleashed a harsh campaign against his opponents
covering the entire range of the political spectrum. Many of the Brotherhood’s
leaders fled the country and did not return until the second half of the 1980s.
45. Mashhur left the country in 1981 and was living in Kuwait and Germany. He
returned in 1986 and became deputy general guide. After a fierce debate about
his competency he then became the Brotherhood’s fifth general guide and
governed from 1996 to 2002. Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi left Egypt in 1981 for Saudi
Arabia, where he worked at the Ministry of Interior before returning to Egypt
in 1986. He ran in the 1987 elections and became the spokesperson for the
Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc. He became the sixth general guide and gov-
erned from 2002 to 2004. Mahdi Akef fled Egypt in 1981 for Germany, where he
established the Islamic Centre in Munich. He returned in 1986 and joined the
Guidance Bureau. He became the seventh general guide and governed from
2004 to 2010.
46. Habib points out that the selection of Abu al-​Nasr was a surprise to the
Brotherhood’s members because he was ill and old. He claims Mashhur and
Ma’mun al-​Hudaybi orchestrated Abu al-​Nasr’s selection process. Esam Sultan
agrees with Habib’s account and emphasizes that the selection of Abu al-​Nasr
occurred because he was unaware of the internal dynamics of the Brotherhood,
which according to Sultan, were controlled and directed by the conservatives.
See the memoirs of Mohamed Habib in the al-​Shorouk newspaper between
February 9 and 25, 2015, and Sultan’s article “The Story of Al-​Wasat,” in Al-​
Youm al-​Sabi, September 3, 2009.
47. This incident has become widely known in the Egyptian media as the “Salsabil
case.” The roots of this case dates back to the end of 1986 when Khairat al-​
Shater and Hasan Malek established the company to sell electronics and com-
puter devices. Within a few years the company expanded and brought on a
new partner, Taher Abdelmoniem. In February 1992 the security forces raided
Salsabil and confiscated its computers and many secret documents. Al-​Shater,
Malek, and Abdelmoniem were arrested, along with other prominent leaders
in the Brotherhood, among them Ezzat and Gomma Amin, a member of the
Guidance Bureau. For more see Al-​Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 162.
48. El-​Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 384.
49. Esam Sultan says that Mashhur was pushed by al-​Hudaybi to become the gen-
eral guide. He refers to a meeting he had with Mashhur after the of Al-​Wasat
crisis where he asked Mashhur about the illegal manner in which he took
the allegiance oath (ba’ya). Mashhur replied, “I was really surprised by what
al-​Hudaybi did,” referring to al-​Hudaybi’s profound role in bay’at al-​maqabir.
Sultan, “The Story of Al-​Wasat,” Al-​Youm Al-​Sabi’, September 3, 2009, http://​
www.youm7.com/​NewsPrint.asp?NewsID=132880.
189

Notes 189

50. El-​Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 386.

51. An Interview with Mustafa Mashhour, Al-​Ahram Weekly, April, 17–​23, 1997.
52. Other members of the generation of the 1960s include the incumbent general
guide, Mohamed Badie, Mahmoud Ezzat, Sayyid Nezzili, Rashad El-​Bayoumi,
Mahmoud Hussein, and Gomma Amin. For more see Haitham Abu Khalil,
Ikhwan Islahiyun (Reformist Brothers), (Cairo: Dawwin House, 2012).
53. Ibid., 223.
54. There are different estimates of al-​Shater’s fortune. While he admits that his
wealth is no more than five million dollars, others value it at more than fifteen
million. Regardless of the accuracy of these numbers, it is widely known that
al-​Shater is the most important business tycoon in the Brotherhood. His for-
tune came mainly from a range of businesses that include furniture, textiles,
supermarkets, car manufacturing, banking, and software. Many claim that his
business empire flourished even when he was in prison. For more on this see
Matthew Kaminski, “Khairat Al Shater: The Brother Who Would Run Egypt,”
Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2012, http://​w ww.wsj.com/​articles/​SB1000142405
2702304765304577482690379062050.
55. Despite the blurred relationship between al-​Shater and the Brotherhood’s fi-
nancial resources, it is clear that he is the Brotherhood’s economic and business
strategist.
56. Several interviewees highlight Ezzat’s role in shaping election results through
his connections and influence over Shura Council members.
57. A Profile of Mahmoud Ezzat, Elwatan, June 2, 2015.
58. Salah El-​ Din Hussein, “Mahmoud Ezzat: The Castle’s Guardian,” al-​
Islamiyun, January 2, 2010, http://​w ww.islamyun.net/​index.php?option=com_​
k2&view=item&id=74:%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-​
%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%AA-​%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-​%D8%A
7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A9&Itemid=156.
59. Abu Khalil, Ikhwan Islahiyun, 223.
60. Some media reports claim al-​Shater and Mohamed Morsi, who by then was the
head of the Brotherhood’s Political Bureau, coordinated and negotiated with the
Mubarak regime over the Brotherhood’s share in the parliamentary elections of
2005. Mohamed Habib claims that he too held a meeting with officials of the
State Security Apparatus (Jihaz amn al-​dawla) to negotiate the Brotherhood’s
participation in the elections. See An Interview with Mohamed Habib, al-​
Shorouk, February 16, 2015. Mahdi Akef, the former general guide, admitted
that the Mubarak regime offered to let the Brotherhood participate in the elec-
tions in exchange for not pressing or embarrassing the regime, particularly in
light of mounting external pressure. An Interview with Mahdi Akef, Al-​Masry
Al-​Youm, October 24, 2009.
61. Abu Khalil, Ikhwan Islahiyun, 225.
62. An Interview with Haitham Abu Khalil, Al-​Dostor, October 26, 2009.
190

190 Notes

63. The Guidance Bureau’s last election before 2008 was in 1995, when the regime
cracked down on the Brotherhood and arrested many of the Shura Council’s
members, trying them in a military court. The selection of the new members
was to fill the vacuum in the Guidance Bureau. By that time seven of the six-
teen members were unable to exercise their role: three of them were in prison
(al-​Shater, Badie, and Mohamed Ali Beshr) and four of them were old and ill
(Mohamed Hilal, Sabry Arafa, Abdullah al-​K hatib, and Lashin Abu Shanab).
64. Brotherhood’s Elections, Al-​Youm Al-​Sabi’, June 9, 2008.
65. The Meeting of Guidance Bureau Ends with Withdrawal of Akef, Al-​Masry Al-​
Youm, October 19, 2009; “A Crisis Within the Brotherhood,” Elaph, October 19,
2009, http://​elaph.com/​Web/​Politics/​2 009/​10/​4 94812.htm.
66. An Interview with Mahdi Akef, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, October 24, 2009.
67. Akef Announced He Will Step Down as A General Guide by End of 2009, Al-​
Arabiya, March 26, 2009, http://​w ww.alarabiya.net/​articles/​2 009/​03/​2 6/​6 9275.
html; Muslim Brotherhood Leader to Step Down, Ikhwanweb, March 29, 2009,
http://​w ww.ikhwanweb.com/​article.php?id=19723.
68. Akef explained his decision to step down as setting a precedent that any
member who reaches seventy should step down. An Interview with Mahdi
Akef, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, October 24, 2009.
69. Mohamed Habib’s Memoirs, Al-​Shorouk, February 23, 2015.
70. Mohamed Habib Threatens to Leave the Brotherhood, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm,
December 30, 2009.
71. Al-​Za’farani Rejects the Results of Brotherhood’s Elections, Al-​Dostor,
December 21, 2009.
72. The Brotherhood Elects A New General Guide, Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, January
17, 2010.
73. Egypt’s Brotherhood Gets New Leader, Ikhwanweb, January 16, 2010, http://​
www.ikhwanweb.com/​article.php?id=22666.
191

Index

Abdel Halim, Mahmoud, 88 Al-​A rian, Abdullah, 30

Abdel-​L atif, Omayma, 116 al-​’Aryan, Esam, 147, 149, 152, 153, 154
Abdel Rahman, Mohamed, 153 Ashraf, Ayman, 124
Abdel Raziq, Aly, 53 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 53, 171n10
Abdu, Mohamed, 51, 54 athletic training. See socialization
Abdul Halim, Salah, 69, 88, process (tarbiyya)
90, 177n22 authoritarianism and social
Abu Khalil, Haitham, 116, 150, 151, 152 movements, 136–​7
Abu Ra’ia, Mahmud, 96 Al-​Awadi, Hesham, 31, 139
Al-​Adawy, Mohamed, 149 Ayman, Sherif, 73, 75, 77, 79–​80, 82,
adversity/​affliction narrative (mihna). 85, 90, 130, 131
See Mubarak regime repression, Ayoub, Mohamed, 81, 124
response to Ayubi, Nazih, 18, 20–​1
Ahmed, Akbar, 25 Ayyash, Abdurrahman, 67, 79, 88, 93,
Ahmed, Eslam, 72, 73–​4 , 93–​4 , 95, 96 95, 122, 126, 131
Akef, Mohamed Mahdi, 1, 80, 147–​8,
151–​2, 153–​4 Badie, Mohamed, 7, 65, 84, 124, 148,
Al-​Adl wal-​Ihsan movement 154, 158
(Morocco), 46 al-​Banna, Ahmed Abdelrahman, 51
Al-​Azhar University, 52, 53, 71, 145 al-​Banna, Hasan: assassination of
allegiance (bay’a). See ikhwanism (1949), 92; on Brotherhood
(code of identity) objectives, 45–6; elections of 1942/​
Anan, Sami, 157 1944, 6, 162n7; emulation of
Al-​A nani, Khalil, 1 religious figures, 121, 182n5, 183n7;
Anderson, Lisa, 20 as founder of Muslim Brotherhood,
Arab nationalism, 20 5, 12, 29; as general guide, 115; grad-
Arafa, Sabri, 149 ualist approach of, 63; introduces
“Are We Practical People?” (al-​Banna), 58 jama‘a paradigm (1938), 66;
192

192 Index

self-​description, 56–​7; writings of, code of identity. See ikhwanism

50, 58, 62, 66, 76, 77, 85, 96, (code of identity)
97, 120, 121, 127, 130. See also Cohen, Jean, 41
jama‘a paradigm and collective action (Tarrow), 27–​8
al-​Banna; Muslim Brotherhood, collective identity: construction of
introduction Islamic, 43–​9; defined, 38–​9;
al-​Barr, Abdurrahman, 124 scholarship on, 40–​1; and social
Bauman, Zygmunt, 35 constructivism, 42–​3
Bayat, Asef, 18–​9 comparative politics approach, 10, 29
El-​Beltagi, Ammar, 80, 95, 122 Comprehensiveness of Islam, The
El-​Beltagi, Mohamed, 80 (al-​Qaradawi), 75–​6
Benford, Robert, 40, 45, 59 conservatives vs. reformists, 10–​1, 46,
Berger, Peter, 8–​9, 24, 42 114, 136, 144–​54
Al-​Bishri, Tariq, 20 constructivism, defined, 8–​9
Blaydes, Lisa, 136 Cooper, Frederick, 37–​8
blind vs. sighted obedience, 125, 128 Corbin, Juliet, 11
Brewer, Marilynn, 35 crisis approach, 19–​22
Brothers under the Banner of the Qur’an cultural approach. See essentialist
(al-​Banna), 77 approach
Brown, Nathan, 31, 32, 103, 112, 113, 114, cultural framing process, 28–​9
139, 144
Brubaker, Rogers, 37–​8 Daoud, Khaled, 80
bureaus of Muslim Brotherhood. Della Porta, Donatella, 41, 47,
See organizational structure and 100–​1, 102
ideology departments of Muslim Brotherhood.
Burgat, François, 20 See organizational structure and
Burke, Peter J., 36, 37, 128 ideology
Burr, Vivien, 9 Dessouki, Ali E., 20
Bush, George W., 139 Diani, Mario, 41, 47, 100–​1, 102
bylaws. See organizational structure Drury, John, 9
and ideology dues. See Muslim Brotherhood,
introduction
Calhoun, Craig, 2, 40–​1 Durkheim, Emile, 16
Callero, Peter, 36
camps (mu’skar). See socialization Eder, Klaus, 28–​9
process (tarbiyya) Egypt: Constitutional amendment
Casanova, Jose, 24 (2004), 139; elections favorable to
Castells, Manuel, 137 the Brotherhood, 7, 138, 140, 156;
Cerulo, Karen, 42 identity crisis (modernists vs.
Challenging Codes (Melucci), 42 reformists), 52–​3, 171n11; income
chasing the prey. See recruitment and inequality in, 21; January 25
mobilization strategy Revolution (2011), 91, 93, 155, 179n20;
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Index 193

July 2013 coup, 111, 157–​61, 179n20; el-​Ghanouchi, Rachid, 20, 45

relations with G.W. Bush El-​Ghazali, Abdelhamid, 84
administration, 139; urbanization El-​Ghobashy, Mona, 31–​2, 149
and alienation in, 21 Ghorab, Salah, 66, 129, 133
Eickelman, Dale, 24, 28 Ghozlan, Mahmoud, 80
elasticity and adaptability. See jama‘a Giddens, Anthony, 19
paradigm and al-​Banna Goffman, Erving, 45
Eliwa, Mohamed Hamed, 127 Goodwin, Jeff, 26–​7
“The Empowerment” Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-​irshad).
(“Al-​tamkin”), 148 See organizational structure and
enforced coherence. See Mubarak ideology
regime repression, response to
Ennahda movement (Tunisia), 20, 24, 141 Habermas, Jürgen, 28–​9
al-’Aryan, Esam, 80, 113 Habib, Mohamed, 80, 124, 149, 152,
Esposito, John, 17 153, 154
Essam, Abdullah, 56 Haddad, Yvonne, 20
essentialist approach, 18, 22–​5, 165n39 Hafez, Mohammed, 26
exclusive internal systems, 47 Halliday, Fred, 24–​5
expressive objectives, defined, 46, 102–​3 Hamas (Palestine), 15, 140
Ezzat, Mahmoud, 80, 142–​3, 148, Hamed, Anwar, 127
149–​54, 158 Hamed, Mohei, 153
Hamed, Yehia, 158
family (usra), 87–​8, 105–​6 Hamza, Mohamed, 85, 126, 128, 134
Farouk regime, 57–​8, 173n37 Hassanin, Ahmed, 151
Fifth Annual Conference of the Hawwa, Said, 112, 180n34, 183n9
Brotherhood (1938), 66, 174n54 Heshmat, Gamal, 149
Fifth Conference Tract, The Hogg, Michael, 36
(al-​Banna), 77 Horizons of the Teachings, The
Fottouh, Abdelmoniem Aboul, 80, 124, (al-​Banna), 77
147, 149, 152, 154, 175n32 al-​Hudaybi, Hasan, 30, 115, 144
Foucault, Michel, 19 al-​Hudaybi, Ma’mun, 145, 147–​9, 151
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) Hudson, Michael, 19–​20
(Egypt), 7, 11 human agency, 9
Human Rights Watch, 158
Gamson, William, 39 Hunt, Scott, 40
al-​Gazzar, Helmi, 80, 147 Huntington, Samuel, 17–​8
general guide (al-​murshid al-​’am), 107–​8, Hussein, Mahmoud, 158
109–​10, 115, 116, 123, 180nn26–27. al-​Husseini, Sa’ad, 153
See also specific individuals
the generalized other (Mead), 35 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, 21
Ghanim, Emad, 127–​8 identification, 37, 67
Ghanim, Ibrahim El-​Bayoumi, 54–​5 identity, defined, 2, 34
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194 Index

identity, uses of (Brubaker and individual call (ad- ​da‘wa al-​fardiyya),

Cooper), 37–​8 74–​9, 78t. See also recruitment
identity consolidation and tarbiyya, 12–3, and mobilization strategy
82–​98; history of membership instrumental objectives, defined,
system, 91–​3; incubation model, 46, 102–​3
82, 83–​4; membership levels, internal elections. See Muslim
177n32; pillars of tarbiyya, 85. Brotherhood, introduction
See also ikhwanism (code of internalization of norms. See
identity); membership levels; ikhwanism (code of identity)
socialization process (tarbiyya) Iranian Revolution (1979), impact on
identity construction process, 12, 34–49; scholarship, 19
collective identity and social move- Islam and the Foundations of Governance
ments, 39–​41; components of, 48f; (Abdel Raziq), 53
concept of identity, 35–​9; construc- Islamic business (Ibrahim), 21
tion of Islamic collective identity, Islamic constitutionalism
43–​9; from self-​identity to group (Rutherford), 32
social identity, 36–​8; social con- Islamic organizational theory
structivism and identity, 42–​3; (Hawwa), 112
from social identity to collective Islamic Salvation Front, 21
identity, 38–​9 Islamic State of Iraq and al-​Sham
identity of resistance (Castells), 137 (ISIS), 14, 17
identity salience, defined, 38 Islamism, defined, 163n2
identity theory, 35–​8 Islamism and Islamist movements, study
ideology, defined, 180n31. See also of, 11–​2, 14–​33; comparative politics
organizational structure and approach to, 10, 29; crisis
ideology approach to, 19–​22; cultural framing
ikhwanism (code of identity), 4–​5, 13, process, 28–​9; essentialist approach
32, 101, 118–​34, 167n82; allegiance to, 18, 22–​5, 165n39; Orientalist
(bay’a), 121–​4, 182n3, 182n5, 183n9, approach, 15, 18, 24, 25, 31, 32;
183n11; commitment (iltizam), political opportunity structures
128–30; as frame of identity, 120–32; approach to, 27–​8; and political
institutionalization of, 132–4; loyalty process theory, 26–​7; and political
(intima), 130–​2; norms and values scholarship, 16–​8; and religious
of, 5, 119–​21, 132; obedience (ta’ah), scholarship, 16; social movement
124–​7; punishment for violations of, theory, 26–​9; studies on Muslim
85, 92, 114, 117, 119, 123; trust (thiqa), Brotherhood, 15–​6, 29–​33, 167n82
127–​8. See also identity consolidation Islam is the solution (motto), 112, 113
and tarbiyya; jama‘a paradigm and Ismail, Salwa, 21–​2, 28
al-​Banna
inclusion-​moderation thesis, 140–​1 al-​Jama’a al-​Islamiyya, 138
income inequality, 21 jama‘a paradigm and al-​Banna, 5–​6,
incubation model. See identity 12, 50–​66; activating identity in
consolidation and tarbiyya everyday life, 64–​6; aims and
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Index 195

objectives, 59–​60; applicability Lebanese Islamic Action Front, 112

and practicality, 58; Brotherhood Lewis, Bernard, 17–​8
as identity-​created movement, Lia, Brynjar, 29–​30, 100, 177n22
54–5; creation of jama‘a paradigm, Lights of Islam, The (Anwar al-​Islam)
58–​64, 59f; duties (al-​wajibat), (Abu Ra’ia), 96
61–2; early influences on al-​Banna, Listen and obey (motto), 125–​7
51–​2; and Egypt's identity crisis, Lotfi, Islam, 143
52–​3; elasticity and adaptability, Luckmann, Thomas, 8–​9, 42
57–​8, 99; inclusiveness and
comprehensiveness, 56–​7; and Madi, Abu El-​Ela, 80, 145, 147
Islamic identity (al-​fikra Mahmoud, Ali Abdul Halim, 89, 91
al-​islamiyya), 55–​8, 56f, 172n24, Malek, Hasan, 140, 148, 151
173n37; means (al-​wasa’il), 62; Mansour, Abdurrahman, 86, 94,
methodology (al-​manhaj), 62; 96, 128
mission (al-​muhema), 60–​1; phases Martin, Richard, 17
(al-​marahil), 63–​4 . See also Mashhur, Mustafa, 72–​3, 75–​7, 78t, 145,
ikhwanism (code of identity) 147–​9, 151
January 25 Revolution (2011) (Egypt), Masoud, Tarek, 31
91, 93, 155, 179n20 Maudidi, Abul A’la, 45
Jasper, James, 26–​7, 40, 41 McCarthy, John, 101, 102
Jihad Movement, 138 Mead, George Herbert, 35–​6
Johnston, Hank, 9, 41 meaning construction, and cultural
July 2013 coup (Egypt), 111, framing process, 28–​9
157–​61, 179n20 meetings and seminars. See
Justice and Development Party socialization process (tarbiyya)
(Morocco), 15 El-​Melegi, Sayyid, 114
Justice and Development Party Melucci, Alberto: on collective action,
(Turkey), 15, 24 2–​3, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 101; on
collective identity, 39, 40, 60; on
Kamal, Mohamed, 158 commitment, 129; on norms, 5, 119,
al-​K atatni, Mohamed Sa’ad, 153 132; on response to repression, 143;
Kefaya (Enough) movement, 139, 140 on social movements, 101, 102, 136
Kepel, Gilles, 30–​1 membership levels, 91–​8, 93f, 103,
al-​K inani, Abdul Halim, 74 177n32; active (‘amil), 92, 96–​7,
Klandermans, Bert, 9, 41, 73 106; assistant member (musa’id),
al-​Koumi, Ahmed Samir, 125 91–​2; associate (muntasib ), 92, 95,
Krämer, Gudrun, 20 106; history of, 91–​3; military arm
Kriesi, Hanspeter, 136 (mujahid), 92, 177n31; regular
(muntazim), 95–​6; supporter
Laban, Ali, 94 (mu’ayyid ), 94, 106; sympathizer/​
Landau-​Tasseron, Ella, 121, 123, 124, 125, lover (muhib), 93
182n5, 183n7 mental training. See socialization
Leary, Mark, 37 process (tarbiyya)
196

196 Index

Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Muslim Brotherhood, introduction,

Brothers, The (El-​Ghobashy), 31–​2 1–​13; branches of, 173n48, 174n54;
methodology of research, 11 conservatives vs. reformists, 10–​1;
mihna (adversity/​affliction) narrative. defense against state
See Mubarak regime repression, infiltration, 3–4, 67, 98, 117, 132;
response to encouragement of economic
militant Islamists, rise of during liberalization, 21; founding of, 22;
1980s– ​90s, 19 identity and activism, 2–​4; identity
Mind, Self, and Society (Mead), 35 as social construct, 8–​9; inter-
Mitchell, Richard P., 29, 100, 179n14 nal elections, 96, 106, 108, 116–​7,
mobilization. See recruitment and 179nn20–​21; jama‘a paradigm,
mobilization strategy 5–6; literature review, 29–​33;
modernity paradigm and religion, membership dues, 92, 94, 95,
15, 40–​1. See also essentialist 96–7, 150; multidisciplinary
approach approach, 9–​1 1; number of
Montasser, Mohamed, 158 members, 173n48; organization of
Morsi, Mohamed, 7, 111, 154, 156, 157, book, 11–​3; preaching schools, 71;
161, 162nn8–​9 research methodology, 11;
Mubarak, Hosni, ouster of (2011), 7 resilience and durability of, 6–​8;
Mubarak regime repression, response to, rise of during 1930s–​40s, 28,
8, 13, 135–​54; from accommodation 30, 54, 65, 80, 113; rise of during
to confrontation, 137–​40; and 1970s, 6–​7, 20, 30, 32, 80, 145; rise
al-Shater, 140, 148, 149–​54; of during 1980s–​90s, 7, 30–​1, 80,
arrest/​imprisonment of 138–​9, 145, 147. See also identity
Brotherhood leaders, 30–​1, 140, consolidation and tarbiyya;
143; authoritarianism and social ikhwanism (code of identity);
movements, 136–​7; balance of jama‘a paradigm and al-​Banna;
power within, 146–​54; conservatives organizational structure and
vs. reformists, 136, 144–​54; ideology; recruitment and
construction of adversity narrative mobilization strategy
(mihna), 10, 137, 141–​6; development Muslim Brotherhood in
of solidarity, 140–6; division Egypt: Gerontocracy Fighting
management, 144–6; and Ezzat, against Time, The (Al-​A nani), 1
142–​3, 148, 149–54; fraudulent Muslim Sisters (Qism al-​akhwat
2010 elections, 7; self-preservation, al-​muslimat), 116, 181n45
46, 135, 137, 143. See also ikhwanism Mustafa, Mohamed, 86, 89, 99, 104,
(code of identity); organizational 111, 123, 128, 133, 142
structure and ideology
Muhammad’s Youth, 144, 159 Nadawi, Abul Hasan Ali, 76
Muharram, Alaa, 74 al-​Naggar, Mohamed, 129, 131
Munson, Ziad, 28, 30, 113 al-​Naggar, Mustafa, 126
Muslim anomie (Pipes), 23–​4 al-​Nasr, Mohamed Hamed Abu, 115, 148
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Index 197

Nasr, Osama, 153 125, 128, 143–​6; Muslim Sisters

Nasser regime, 30; relations with (Qism al-​akhwat al-​muslimat),
al-​Hudaybi, 144; repression under, 116, 181n45; Shura Council (Majlis
6, 80, 142, 147, 150–​1 al-​Shura), 104, 107–​8, 109, 110, 114,
National Democratic Party (NDP) 116, 123, 148–​9, 151, 152, 153, 154,
(Egypt), 137, 138, 140, 155 158, 179nn19–​20; Socialization
National Salvation Front (Egypt), 156 Department (Qism al-​tarbiyya),
new social movement theory 84, 151; Special Apparatus
(NSM), 40–​1 (Al-​tanzim al-​hhas), 6, 144, 147,
9/​1 1 attacks, impact on 177n31; Students Section (Qism
scholarship, 18, 19 al-​talabah), 79–​80, 151, 152; vertical
axis of structure, 103–​4, 104f
oaths of allegiance, 92, 96, 121–​6, 129 Organized Soldiers of God (Jund Allah
obedience (ta’ah). See ikhwanism Tanzimann) (Hawwa), 180n34
(code of identity) Orientalist approach, 15, 18, 24,
Oegema, Dirk, 9, 73 25, 31, 32
organizational structure and ideology, Ottoman Empire, demise of, 53, 171n11
13, 99–​117, 133; Administrative Our Call (Da‘watuna) (al-​Banna), 130
Office (Maktab Idari), 106–​7, 116,
148, 151, 153; Battalions Unit (Nizam Passy, Florence, 79
al-​kata’ib), 88; conservatives vs. Pipes, Daniel, 17–​8, 23
reformists, 114; decision making Piscatori, James, 17, 24, 28
mechanism, 110–​1; districts political opportunity structures
(mantiqa), 106, 111; divisions approach, 27–​8
(shu’ba), 106; family (usra), 105–​6; political process theory, 26–​7
function of ideology, 111–​3; General Polletta, Francesca, 40, 41
Bylaws (Al-​la’iha al-​’ama), 104, postculturalism. See essentialist
105–6, 107, 110, 114, 115, 117, 122, 123, approach
143, 153, 183n11; general guide preaching (da‘wa), 10, 71, 75, 174n8
(al-​murshid al-​’am), 107–​8, privatization and income equality, 21
109–10, 115, 116, 123, 180nn26–​27; public seminars, 91
Governorate Administrative Office,
94, 95, 106; Guidance Bureau Al-​Qaeda, 17, 24
(Maktab al-​irshad), 92, 96, 104, al-​Qaradawi, Yusuf, 75–​6
105f, 107, 108–​9, 110, 114, 116, 148–9, al-​Qassas, Mohamed, 86
150, 151, 152–​3, 154, 158, 179n19; Qur’an: allegiance (bay’a) in, 182n5;
hierarchal structure, 103–​6; differing interpretations of, 24;
horizontal axis of structure, 104–​5, historicizing of, 23; and jama‘a
105f, 179n14; and identity, 100–​3, paradigm, 51, 54, 56; in
104–​5 f; institutionalization socialization process, 86, 89,
and critiques of, 113–​7, 182n49; 94, 96, 97
internal protests/​boycotts, 124, Qutb, Sayyid, 30, 45, 96, 149–​51
198

198 Index

Radawan, Karim, 123 scouts ( jawwala) system, 89, 177n22

recruitment and mobilization strategy, secularization theory, 19, 25, 164n5
12, 67–​81; Brotherhood’s self-​categorization, 37
recruitment strategy and stages, self-​education. See socialization process
70–​81, 72f; disseminating (tarbiyya)
the call (nashr al- ​da'wa), 72–​3; self-​identity, defined, 37
general connectivity (ar-​rabt Sets, Jan, 37
al-’am), 73–​4; individual call shari‘a (sacred law): and politicization
(ad- ​da‘wa al-​fardiyya), 74–​9, 78t; of Islam, 18; westernization views
and Islamist movements generally, on, 23–​4
68–​70; marriage among al-​Shater, Khairat, 80, 140, 148, 149–​54
members, 80, 175n34; preachers as Shehata, Samer, 68–​9
recruiters, 71, 75, 174n8; Shemakh, Amer, 85, 125
recruitment of students, 79–​80, Al-​Sherif, Abdul Khaliq, 71, 75, 118, 133
86; social networks, 69–​70, 79–​81 Shoa’iyb, Sayyid, 130, 131
reformist movements, 10–​1, 46, 52–​3, “Shura and Party Pluralism in Muslim
114, 136, 144–​54, 171n11 Society” statement, 145, 156
regime repression. See Mubarak regime Shura Council (Majlis al-​Shura).
repression, response to; specific See organizational structure and
regimes ideology
Reicher, Steve, 9 al-​Sisi regime, 157, 158–​61
repression: and radicalization, 48; Smith, Wilfred, 55
social movements under, 136–​7. SMT. See social movement theory (SMT)
See also specific leaders/​regimes Snow, David, 28, 40, 45, 59
research methodology, 11 social constructivism, 8–​9
revolutionary movements, 46 social entrepreneurs (du’ah), 36
Rida, Rashid, 54 social identity, defined, 37–​9
role identity theory, 36 social movement, defined (Melucci), 101
Rover Scouts. See scouts social movement theory (SMT):
( jawwala) system commitment, 128; cultural
Roy, Olivier, 25, 44 framing process, 28–​9; effects of
Rushdi, Mohamed, 145 authoritarianism, 136–​7;
Rutherford, Bruce, 32 limitations of, 9–​1 1; and new social
movements (NSMs), 40; political
Sadat regime, 6, 144, 147, 150 opportunity structures, 27–​8;
Said, Edward, 17–​8 political process theory, 26–​7; and
Salafis, 155, 156 social constructivism, 12, 83
Saleh, Ibrahim, 88 social networks. See recruitment and
Saleh, Sobhi, 80 mobilization strategy
Salsabil, 148, 150, 151 social psychology, 9, 29, 83
Sarahn, Mohamed, 130, 131 socialization process (tarbiyya), 67, 84–91,
Sayyid, Bobby, 25 87f; battalion meetings (katiba),
Schedler, Andreas, 136 88–9; camps (mu’skar), 89–​90;
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Index 199

congress/​annual national meetings Terry, Deborah, 36

(mu’tamar), 91; family (usra), 87–​8; Tessler, Mark, 21
pillars of tarbiyya, 85; trips/​monthly Tibi, Bassam, 17–​8, 22–​3
retreats (rihla), 89; weekly seminars al-​Tilmisani, Omar, 115, 147, 148
(nadwa), 91; workshops/​study groups Touraine, Alain, 28–​9, 40
(dawra), 90–​1. See also identity Turkey: removal of Ottoman caliphate
consolidation and tarbiyya (1924), 53, 171n11
society-​oriented movements, 46
sociology of religion, 9–​10, 16, 24, 29 ulama (Muslim scholars), politicization
al-​Sokkary, Ahmed, 144 of Islam, 18
Soliman, Amr, 128 urbanization, 20–​1
Soliman, Mohamed, 90
Spaces of Islam (Fi rihab al-​Islam) Vandewalle, Dirk, 21
(Laban), 94 virtuous society (Roy), 44
spiritual readiness. See socialization
process (tarbiyya) War of 1967, and rise of Islamist
state-​oriented movements, 46 movements, 19, 20
Stets, Jan E., 128 Al-​Wasat Party (Egypt), 144, 145–​6, 147,
Strauss, Anselm, 11 149, 159
structural adjustment policies, and Weber, Max, 16
income equality, 21 What Does It Mean My Belonging to
Stryker, Sheldon, 36, 37 Islam? (Yakan), 76–​7, 131
Sufism, 171n6 What Has the World Lost with
Sultan, Essam, 80, 145, 147 the Degradation of Muslims?
Sunna: differing interpretations of, 24; (Nadawi), 76
and jama‘a paradigm, 51, 54 White, Katherine, 36
Syria: urbanization and alienation in, 21 Whittier, Nancy, 39
Wickham, Carrie, 30, 31, 69, 81, 138, 145
tactical violence, 160 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 27–​8
Talimah, Essam, 158 women, marginalization of, 116, 181n45
Tammam, Husam, 80–​1, 116, 117, 133
Tangney, June, 37 Yakan, Fathi, 76–​7, 112, 131,
Tantawy, Mohamed Hussein, 157 175n26, 181n35
tarbiyya. See identity consolidation Yavuz, Hakan, 9, 22, 27, 28, 43, 46
and tarbiyya; socialization process Yussif, Mohamed, 81, 86
(tarbiyya)
Tarrow, Sidney, 27 al-​Za’farani, Ibrahim, 124, 147, 149,
Taylor, Charles, 37, 38 152, 154
Taylor, Verta, 39 Zahran, Mohammed, 52
The Teachings (Risalat at-​Ta’alim) Zald, Mayer, 101, 102
(al-​Banna), 85, 97, 120, 121, 127 Zollner, Barbara, 30
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