AzureGoat : A Damn Vulnerable Azure Infrastructure
Jeswin Mathai, Nishant Sharma, Sherin Stephen, Rachana Umaraniya
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About US
Jeswin Mathai
• Chief Architect, Lab Platform @ INE
• Published Research at Black Hat US/Asia Arsenal, DEF CON USA/China Demolabs
• Gave research talk at DEF CON China and Rootcon Philippines
• Co-Trainer in Training:
- Black Hat Asia
- HITB AMS, GSEC
- NZ OWASP day
- Rootcon 13
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About US
Nishant Sharma
• Director, Lab Platform @ INE
• Firmware developer, Enterprise WiFi APs and WIPS Sensors, Mojo Networks (Acquired
by Arista Networks)
• Masters degree in Infosec
• Published research at Blackhat US/Asia, DEF CON USA/China, HITB Amsterdam and
other venues
• Conducted trainings in HITB, OWASP NZ day and for multiple private clients
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About US
Sherin Stephen
• Cloud Developer @ INE
• Presented his work at BlackHat Asia Arsenal 2022
• Experienced in Building and maintaining reusable code and robust cloud services
Rachana Umaraniya
• Cloud Developer @ INE
• Master's Degree in Computer Science
• Two years of experience in software development and specializes in Java Frameworks
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Threatscape
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Threatscape
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Motivation
• Training Needs
• Lack of Real World Azure Pentesting Environment
• Contribution from the open source community and security professionals
• Release of OWASP Top 10: 2021
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Introducing AzureGoat
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AzureGoat : A Damn Vulnerable Azure Infrastructure
• Mimics real-world infrastructure but with added vulnerabilities
• Multiple application stacks - Multiple exploitation/escalation paths
• Features OWASP Top 10: 2021
• Focused on Black-box approach
• Still in early stage
- Module 1 : Blog Application
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OWASP Top 10
Image Reference: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
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AzureGoat : Module 1 (Blog Application)
• A01: Broken Access Control
• A02: Cryptographic Failure
• A03: Injection
• A04: Insecure Design
• A05: Security Misconfiguration
• A07: Identification and Authentication Failures
• A10: Server Side Request Forgery
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AzureGoat : Module 1 (Blog Application)
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Building Realistic Insecure Application : Challenges
• Security Professional vs Seasoned Developers
• Mimicking Development Process
• Multiple Developer Environments
• Fast-paced development
• Lack of secure code practices
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Project Family
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Installation
• Repository: https://github.com/ine-labs/AzureGoat
• Requirements
- AZ Utility
- Terraform
- Python
- Git
• Commands
- az login
- git clone https://github.com/ine-labs/AzureGoat
- terraform init
- terraform apply
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Installation
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Attacking the Application
• Reflected XSS
• SQL Injection
• Insecure Direct Object Reference
• Server Side Request Forgery Click
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• Sensitive Data Exposure text
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• Password Reset
• S3 Misconfiguration
• IAM Privilege Escalation
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Exploitation
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Server Side Request Forgery
• Reading the source code of the application
• Reading the environment variables
- Storage Account Credential StringsClick to add
- CosmosDB Credentials. Click DALL-E
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- Escalate Privileges text
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• Enumerate other applications/instances in the network
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Hunting Storage Accounts and Containers
• Globally unique
• Company-wide naming practices: Predictable names - based on departments/applications
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Misconfigured Storage Account - plethora
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Privilege Escalation
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Future Plans: Multiple Applications across Multiple Tenants
Click DALL-E
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Image Reference: Architecting multitenant solutions on Azure
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Future Plans
• More modules: Virtual Machine, Container Instances and AKS
• Multi Tenant infrastructure
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• Working with the community text
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• IaC Misconfigurations
• Secure coding/deployment practices
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Thanks
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[email protected]
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