Achieving Effective Offshore Safety Regulation in Nigeria

By Donald Ibebuike Esq. LLM (Oil & Gas Law), University of Aberdeen, UK

Introduction

Exploitation of oil and gas is a hazardous and risky activity that takes place in an
unfriendly offshore environment which is capable of causing loss of life and serious
damage to the environment if adequate safety measures are not taken to prevent any
eventuality. To forestall offshore safety calamity, oil bearing governments have
endeavoured to set up offshore regulatory framework for operators in the industry to
adhere to. However, compliance with, implementation of, periodic review and update
of such regulations to progressively meet the ever changing and challenging industry,
remain critical towards ensuring effective and safe operating environment.

The Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 1963 made pursuant to Section 9 of the
Petroleum Act is the principal legal instrument that regulates health and safety in
hydrocarbon exploitation. It is instructive to point out that this Regulation was made
in 1963 with onshore petroleum operations in mind as offshore operation is a recent
development in Nigeria. It follows therefore that the Regulation was made without
contemplating the peculiar technical and environmental challenges in offshore
petroleum operations. Consequently, health and safety offshore without adequate rules
and standards to safeguard its implementation is left entirely at the hands of the
operators who might be tempted by commercial gains to compromise safety.

Offshore Health and Safety Regulatory Framework

The principal legislation that deal with health and safety regulation in Nigeria is the
Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 1963 made pursuant to Section 9 of the Petroleum
Act Cap. P10 LFN, 2004. Others are the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, the
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), Act, 2006, Oil Spill
Recovery, Clean-up, Remediation and Damage Assessment Regulations, 2011, Oil
Spill and Oily Waste Management Regulations, 2011, Oil in Navigable Waters Act
1968, Oil Pipelines Act, Directive on Offshore Safety Permit 2011 and the Directive
on Man Overboard (MOB), 2012.

Offshore Health and Safety Regulators

Presently, the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) which is a department in the

Ministry of Petroleum Resources has in addition to general regulation of the industry,

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the primary responsibility to enforce, health, safety and environmental standards in the
oil and gas sector. In addition to the DPR, there are other government agencies at the
Federal and State levels with supervisory oversight over matters of health, safety and
the environment including the Federal Ministry of Environment which approves
Environmental Impact Assessment reports in respect of oil and gas projects and States
Ministries of Environment.

Other agencies whose functions have direct or indirect bearing on health and safety
are the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), which is
empowered to carry out surveillance on oil exploration and to ensure compliance with
all existing environmental legislation, particularly in detection of and response to oil
spills. The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency
(NESREA), which has responsibility for enforcing compliance with the provisions of
international agreements, protocols, conventions and treaties on the environment.

Under the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), the proposed regulatory bodies are the
Upstream Petroleum Inspectorate (the Inspectorate) for enforcement among others
health and safety standards in the upstream sector and the Downstream Petroleum
Regulatory Agency (the Agency) for enforcement of health and safety Rules in the
downstream sector.

It is to be noted that DPR which enforces health and safety standards in the oil sector
is also the same body that oversees the economic regulation of the industry thus giving
room for conflict of interest. The PIB fails to correct this anomaly completely but only
creates two bodies – the Inspectorate and the Agency to regulate the Upstream and the
downstream sectors respectively as against a single body – the DPR as operated
currently. This negates the current world approach which is directed towards the
establishment of an independent body solely for enforcement of health, safety and
environmental regulations as against the current regime of fusing enforcement of
health and safety standards in the body that regulates the commercial aspect of
industry.

For example in the UK following the Lord Cullen Report after the Piper Alpha
incident, an independent body, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) which was
hitherto saddled with enforcement of health and safety standards onshore was
empowered to enforce health and safety regulations offshore. Similar trend led to
assigning health and safety regulatory functions in Norway to the Petroleum Safety
Authority (PSA). Also in May 21, 2013, the European Parliament in response to the
Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico adopted a draft text for a Directive

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on the Safety of offshore oil and gas with 572 voting in favour and 103 against. The
draft text requires the Member States to ensure that the safety and environment
functions under the draft Directive must be carried out by an authority which is
independent of any functions regarding economic development of the industry. The
fusion of health and safety functions with that of economic development of the
industry under one authority was identified as one of the remote causes of the Gulf of
Mexico incident1. Therefore, for effective offshore health and safety in Nigeria, an
independent body needs to be established in line with international best practice.

There is also the potential under the current regime for conflict of interest between
different agencies/bodies that regulate health, safety and environment in Nigeria
especially where the functions overlap. The PIB seems to have responded to this
potential conflict by granting the Inspectorate and the Agency the power to enforce all
environmental regulations and guidelines made by the Federal Ministry of
Environment and other relevant Government bodies in respect of their respective areas
of operation – Section 289 of PIB. To further reduce the possibility of conflict, the
PIB provides for the Inspectorate and the Agency to consult with the Federal and State
Ministries of Environment on environmental matters – Sections 202 and 289 (3) of
PIB. However, authorizing the Inspectorate or the Agency to enforce health, safety
and environment issues in their respective areas of operation is not sufficient to
remove apparent conflict between the regulatory bodies established by some of the
environmental legislations. There is the need to establish a Joint Body headed by
either the Inspectorate or the Agency as the case may be to coordinate activities of the
regulatory bodies in the event of a major incident offshore requiring coordinated
response of different regulatory bodies.

Approaches to Health and Safety Regulation

a) Command and Control or Prescriptive Regulatory Approach:

This regime recognises the state as the protector of law and order with the task
of deploying its legitimate authority to coerce the operators to fulfil their
obligations as provided for in detailed and prescriptive legally binding rules
that govern all elements of safety. The laws provide for sanctions and
punishments and any violator of its provisions shall be dealt with according to
the legal principles. Due to the power of sanctioning and punishment the role of
the state and regulating agencies tend to create unhealthy relationship between
the regulators and the regulated. It should be noted that detailed and
prescriptive rules are not flexible and discourages exercise of discretion by the
operators thereby providing no incentives to innovations and thus bind the

1 Offshore Oil and Gas in the UK – An Independent Review of the Regulatory Regime, December 2011.

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 operators to the established technology and organizational solutions 2.
Command and control approach to regulation has been criticised for creating
‘compliance mentality rather than a wider consideration of safety3’ in the
minds of the regulated with all efforts directed towards mechanical obedience
than participatory obedience of regulations.

This regulatory approach is currently in practice in the United States with little
modification following the Macondo incident by the enactment of a new safety
regulation – the Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) Rule
which is directed at company management of offshore drilling operations.
SEMS require that management develop internal controls and fulfil several
broadly defined safety-related functions. This bears semblance to the
Norwegian performance-based approach to safety regulation.4 Following the
Piper Alpha incident in the UK in 1988 and Lord Cullen’s report’s indictment
of the then regulatory order, UK shifted from prescriptive to goal-setting
approach. Same applies to Norway

b) Goal-Setting or Permissioning Regulatory Approach:

This regulatory approach recognises the shortcomings inherent in the command

and control regime and stipulates that the detailed written legislative texts are
replaced with non prescriptive legal, industrial and professional standards. The
use of legal standards makes a connection between the regulatory framework
and the regulated activities obvious by involving the operators and their
employees and engaging the professionals in the formulation of statements of
what should be regarded as safe practice, not only leading them to just comply
with legislation5. This regime leads to more updated regulatory practices than
what is possible when relying solely upon written statutes with detailed
content.

The readjustment towards goal-oriented and performance based regulation have

changed how legal binding norms and industrial standards are developed,
formulated and used in practice. When functional responsibilities regarding the
safe conduct of activities are transferred from regulators to operators, the
system provides for cooperative approaches by different stakeholders in
dealing with implementation. A consistent application of a goal setting
regulations requires a comprehensive assessment of health hazards and for the
operator to satisfy itself by means of internal audits that the safety management
system is being complied with and for the regulator to satisfy itself that output

2 Prof. Preben H. Lindo & Prof. Ole A. Engen ‘’Offshore Safety Regimes – A Contested Terrain’’ Draft presented
at Working on Safety Conference 11-14 September 2012, Sopot, Poland
3 Lord Cullen Report para 21.51 cited in John Patterson ‘’Health and Safety at Work Offshore’’ in G. Gordon & J.

Patterson ‘’Oil and Gas Law – Current Practice and Emerging Trends’’ ( Dundee University Press, 2007) p. 135,
para. 6.32.
4 P. H. Lindoe, M. Baram & J Paterson ‘’Robust Offshore Risk Regulation – An Assessment of US, UK and

Norwegian Approaches’’, Paper presented at ESREL 2012, 25-29 June, Helsinki.

5 Ibid no. 2.

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 from the safety management system is satisfactory.6 The advantage of this
approach is that it leads to a co-regulatory regime between the industry and the
regulator with the industry being saddled with more safety responsibilities.

This regulatory model is in use in the UK, Norway and Cyprus. It would appear
that Nigeria’s approach favours this system albeit in a haphazard manner.
Health and Safety Provisions Relating to Offshore Operations

1. Environmental Impact Assessment of Offshore Installations

The combined effect of Section 12 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act

(EIAA), Cap. E12 LFN 2004 and the Schedule attached thereto is that
environmental Impact Assessment is mandatorily required for oil and gas fields
development; construction of offshore pipelines in excess of 50km in length;
construction of oil and gas separation, processing, handling and storage facilities;
construction of oil refineries and construction of product depots for the storage of
petrol, gas or diesel which are located within 3 kilometres of any commercial,
industrial or residential areas and which have a combined storage capacity of
60,000 barrels or more. The Nigerian Environmental Protection Agency (the
Agency) cannot give decision on the activity covered by the environmental
assessment until the public has been given the opportunity to comment on the
proposed project – Sections 7 and 8 of the EIAA.

The requirement for Environmental Impact Assessment of projects seems to have

been jettisoned by the PIB which provides in Section 200 for licensee s or lessees
engaged in upstream petroleum operations to submit an Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) within one year after the commencement of the Act or 3
months after the grant of the license or lease to the Inspectorate for approval. The
EMP shall among others investigate, access and evaluate the impact of the
proposed exploration and production activities on the environment and the socio-
economic conditions of any person who might be directly affected by the
operations. The Inspectorate is required to consult the Federal and State Ministries
of Environment before approving EMP. This provision is in keeping with the
policy of reducing conflict of interest between agencies by streamlining the
regulatory functions in upstream petroleum operations and vesting them in the
Inspectorate.

2. Duties of Licensees and Lessees

6 Ibid no. 3.

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 Having obtained approval for the proposed upstream petroleum project, the
licensee or lessee is required under Reg. 3 of the Mineral Oils (Safety)
Regulations (the Regulation) made pursuant to Reg. 9 of the Petroleum Act to
appoint a manager who shall be in charge of operations authorised by the licence
or lease and notify the DPR of such appointment; provide safety belts, hard hats
and safety boots for workers; provide fire-fighting and first-aid equipment at
every well being drilled or worked over, block station, pump station or installation
handling crude oil, natural gas or petroleum product. Also the licensee/lessee is
mandated to ensure that no person shall drill any borehole for petroleum oil or gas
with its centre within 150 feet of any building in which fire or lights other than a
flame-proof or explosion-proof electric lighting installation are used.

Reg. 4 makes it an offence for any licensee or lessee who fails to comply with
Reg. 3 liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N100 or to imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months or to both. The punishment for failure to comply with Section
3 is illusory and not sufficient to deter a licensee/lessee from infringing the
Regulation. This underscores the point that the law on health and safety is
outdated and needs thorough review to reflect current realities. However, Section
298 of the PIB provides that any person who violates Health, Safety and
Environmental Part of the Bill shall be liable to sanctions including payment of
fines as prescribed by the Inspectorate and the Agency in consultation with the
Minister. This is a better approach in dealing with the issues of fines. Quantum of
fine is not something that can be specified in a legislation but better left to be
decided by the Regulator having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the
situation.

It is to be noted that the duty of the licensee/lessee to appoint a manager is not

qualified thus giving room for the appointment of any person even without the
requisite technical skills as the operator/manager of the petroleum operations. The
current trend in some jurisdictions is to mandate the licensees/lessees to ensure
that any operator appointed by him is capable of satisfactorily carrying out his
functions and discharging the obligations as required and take all reasonable steps
to ensure that the operator does behave in this way. 7 The effect of this requirement
is to make the licensee liable to perform those duties in the event that the
operator/manager is unable to carry out the health and safety duties.

3. Duties of Managers

7 Reg. 5 UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005

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 Part III of the Regulation requires the Manager to among others: appoint in
writing competent persons for the purpose of supervising all drilling, production,
transmission and loading operations and report any such appointment and change
in appointment to the Director of Petroleum Resources; ensure that e very derrick
floor has at least two clearly defined approaches for exits in case of danger and
same shall be clear of obstructions; ensure that every dangerous part of any
machinery is securely fenced and guarded; provide hooks used for hoisting drill
pipe, casing etc; provide lifelines and ensure that safe access is provided on all
drilling rigs and other installations. Reg.
27 of the Regulation provides for a fine not exceeding N100 or to imprisonment
not exceeding six months or to both for any Manager who fails to comply or
ensures compliance with the Regulation. The punishment Section is also
unrealistic and outdated as noted above.

Manager as used in this context appears to be the operator of the installation as

used in the present day. The duties of the Manager as highlighted above are
insufficient to secure the safety of workers offshore. The most worrisome aspect is
the fact that manager is defined by the Regulation to mean ‘’the person appointed
by the licensee under a licence or by a lessee under a lease to be in charge of all
operations authorised by the licence or lease’’. This implies that contractors or
sub-contractors employed by the manager/operator are not covered by that
definition. This further implies that contractors and sub contractors are not under
any obligation to observe the health and safety provisions while operating
offshore and the Manager may not be bound by their actions having regard to
exclusion of liability clauses usually contained in offshore contracts. This is
disastrous in view of the fact that the industry is known for employing the services
of contractors and sub-contractors in the execution of their work programme. The
situation is made worse by the fact that the Petroleum Act and the Regulations
made pursuant to it made no reference to contractors.

In apparent recognition of this lacuna, the UK has adjusted the definition of an

operator to be the person appointed by the licensee to manage and control directly
or by any other person the execution of the main functions of a production
installation 8. The practical effect of this definition is to emphasis to operators that
while they can delegate functions to contractors, it does not relieve them of any
obligation under the health and safety regulations. 9 It is imperative for an
amendment to be made to the definition of a Manager/Operator to reflect the
changes in the industry for effective health and safety regulation offshore. Though

8Reg. 2(1) Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005

9J. Patterson ‘’Health and Safety at Work Offshore’’ in G. Gordon & J Patterson (ed) ‘’Oil and Gas Law –
Current Practice and Emerging Trends’’ (Dundee University Press, 2007) p. 146.

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 manager or operator is not defined in the PIB but it seems that PIB has recognised
this obvious lacuna by providing in Part VII for licensees, lessees and contractors
to observe and be bound by health, safety and environmental regulations and
directives to be promulgated by the Inspectorate/Agency as well as the obligation
to restore the environment in the event of an oil spill.

It is also advocated that the operators/managers of offshore installations be

required to produce health and safety report similar to environmental impact
assessment report (or environmental management plan) to be approved by the
regulatory body identifying potential hazards and ways of containing them before
commencement of operations. Such report is to be subject to periodic review
reflecting changes in the industry in terms of technical as well as technological
advancement. This reflects the current international best practice for instance in
UK under the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005 where the
operator is required to produce a safety case containing Formal Risk Assessment
and Quantitative Risk Assessment in respect of its operations. The safety case
regime requires a systematic approach to the identification of potential hazards,
their consequences, and the methods of reducing any risks as low as reasonably
practicable. The report is subject to approval by the HSE and to be reviewed every
5 years by the operator. This approach imposes health and safety responsibility on
the operators and ensures flexibility of the process by requiring operators to
identify safety issues and articulate steps to address them while the Regulator is to
ensure proper monitoring and inspection. Similar approach operates in Norway.

4. Duties of Employees

Part IV of the Regulation contains provisions relating to duties of employees

working on petroleum installations. It is the duty of the competent person
appointed by the manager to ensure compliance with the provisions of this part of
the Regulation and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding N100 or to
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or to both if he fails to do so. This is
another ridiculous punishment provision in the Regulation. Reg. 29 prohibits any
child or young person to be on the derrick floor while any well is being drilled or
repaired. It also prohibits the accumulation of any inflammable rubbish; mandates
every person working on a drilling rig to wear a hard hat and safety boots and for
those working at a fixed workstation above the derrick floor to wear safety belt;
prohibits storage of loose tools in derricks; prohibits removal o r rendering
ineffective any safeguard while the machinery is in operation; prohibits any
person other than an electrician or electrical engineer from carrying out certain
electrical works. It further prohibits sleeping, drinking on duty or reporting for
duty while under the influence of alcohol as well as smoking, discharging firearm

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 or explosives or use of any naked light or making any fire while on any well or
installation.

Reg. 39 requires a competent person to examine the installation and record the
state thereof at a book kept for that purpose and also inspect the fire fighting and
first aid equipment to ensure it is in its correct position, access to it is
unobstructed and it has been tested within the appropriate period for each
appliance.

The duties of employees as prescribed are capable of creating compliance

mentality in the minds of the workers without imposing on them the responsibility
to see safety as a general obligation that can be achieved beyond obedience alone
but more through involvement of the workforce in identifying safety issues and
monitoring compliance of safety regulations and standards. Reg. 44 attempted to
create a role for employees but in a rather limited manner as it requires employees
to report to the manager or competent person any unusual escape of petroleum
from any well, pipeline or installation or anything unsafe or likely to produce
damage. A similar oversight function is assigned to the Manager/Operator by Reg.
45 to report to the DPR any neighbouring licensee/lessee that conducts its
activities in such a manner as to endanger safety of any person in the vicinity.

In the UK where robust health and safety policy is in place, every installation is
required to have Safety Representatives and Safety Committees comprising the
workforce, membership of which are to emerge through election. 10 The regime in
Norway is similar and based on the Nordic model of Occupational Health and
safety with labour contract negotiations and a tripartite dialogue system involving
the government/regulators, the industry, the unions and the workforce 11 .

5 Offshore Installations/Well Design, Construction, Drilling and Capping

The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 merely provides in

Reg. 35 that an operator of a drilling rig shall have a valid license and Reg. 32
provides that drilling must commence not later than eighteen months from the
date of grant of an oil prospecting licence with a modern drilling outfit and the
licensee must drill an average of one well each year. Reg. 7 of the Mineral Oils
(Safety) Regulations provides that in the absence of any specific provision, all
drilling, production and other operations relating to oil and gas shall conform with
good oilfield practice which shall be adequately covered by the appropriate
current Institute of Petroleum Safety Codes, the American Petroleum Institute
Codes or the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Codes. Reg. 40 of the

10 See Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989.
11 Ibid no. 2.

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 Regulation also provides that a competent person shall be responsible for the
observance of all safety measures at any drilling site or installation handling
petroleum where work is in progress.

It is obvious that the above is grossly inadequate to respond to serious health and
safety issues offshore. The reference to Institute of Petroleum Safety Codes, the
American Petroleum Institute Codes or the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers Codes makes the regulatory framework cumbersome and amorphous.
This implies that both the regulator and the industry will be checking from time to
time to know the updated provisions of the Codes in order to know what to do.
Also, the Codes may not be fit for Nigerian petroleum environment. Infact the
Codes referred to were found to be inadequate to respond to offshore
environmental health and safety challenges following the Gulf of Mexico
incidents 12 .

It is important to point out that no regulation governs effective inspection and

monitoring of design and construction of offshore installations and Wells
including safety measures to adopt in preventing escape of hydrocarbon from any
installation in order to prevent blowout. It is also important to point out that the
Regulation only prescribes duties for the licensee/lessee, manager and the
employees without providing for proper monitoring and enforcement of the
provisions by the Regulators. In sum, health and safety issues are left entirely in
the hands of the operators without adequate standards and goals set for them and
also without a systematic reporting, verification and inspection mechanism. This
self-regulatory approach without proper reporting, monitoring and inspection is
antithetical to offshore health and safety observance. Also there is no clear
requirement from the Regulations for inspection and certification of offshore
installations by the Regulators before operation commences nor was there any
known policy or directive mandating the installation operators to carry out routine
process safety and asset integrity exercise in order to forestall any incident.

The Bonga oil Spill in December 2011 could have been averted if adequate
inspection and monitoring was carried out on the oil export hose which caused the
spill. Regrettably, no public independent enquiry was set up by the government to
ascertain whether absence of safety measures or lack of proper internal control of
Shell caused non-identification of the defective hose that led to the spill.
Obviously, lessons that could have been learnt from such investigation which
would assist in a more robust regulatory framework would be lost. This further

12P. H. Lindoe, M. Baram & J. Patterson ‘’Robust Offshore Risk Regulation – An Assessment of US, UK and
Norwegian Approaches’’ paper presented at ESREL 2012, June 25 -29, Helsinki.

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 shows the level of attention being given to health, safety and environmental issues
by the government.

6 Offshore Installations and Safety of Navigation

Regulation 24 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969

requires the licensee or lessee to ensure that offshore installations are constructed,
placed, marked, buoyed, equipped and maintained as to leave at all times and in
any conditions safe and convenient channels for shipping in the relevant area. The
licensee or lessee is also required to install audible or visual navigational aids as
may be approved by the government.

The provisions of the International Ships and Ports Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code) 2002 (as implemented in Nigeria under Section 215 (k) of the Merchant
Shipping Act 2007 and the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
(NIMASA) being the Agency for its Implementation, has issued a Directive in
that behalf13) is applicable to offshore operations in order to ensure safe and
secure operation of ships, for pollution prevention and for the safety and security
of those on board and ashore. The Code is an urgent response by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) to the September 11, 2001 World Trade Centre
terrorist attack in the United States. The Code establishes an international
framework involving co-operation between contracting governments, government
agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to
detect/assess security threats and take preventive measures against security
incidents affecting ships or port facilities (including offshore platforms).

7. Prevention of Pollution & Spill Response

Reg. 25 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 imposes on

the licensee/lessee the obligation to adopt all practical precautions including the
provision of up-to-date equipment approved by DPR, to prevent the pollution of
inland waters, rivers, watercourses, the territorial waters of Nigeria or the high
seas by oil, mud or other fluids or substances which might cause pollution of the
affected areas. While this provision is functional and designed to encourage
technological development in the industry, the Regulator needs to take steps
13 NIMASA ‘’International Port Facility Security Code Implementation and Governance Handbook’’ 2013.

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 through monitoring and inspection to satisfy itself that the technology employed
by the industry actually responds to the current best practice in blowout
prevention and minor hydrocarbon releases.

The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency Act (No. 15 of 2006) and
the Regulations made under it have robust provisions on oil spill detection and
response. The Agency’s response strategy during the Bonga Oil spill was
classified as effective and attracted commendation from stakeholders.

8. Standard of Training

The International Convention on the Standard of Training, Certification and

Watch keeping applies to offshore petroleum operations in order to ensure that
workers have the basic safety training to operate offshore. It is now a mandatory
requirement under the Offshore Safety Permit that every marine crew must
undergo the STCW 95 training before being granted an Offshore Safety Permit.
The four basic training provided under the STCW 95 are:

 Elementary First Aid – This focuses on Danger, Respond, Airway, Breathing &
Circulation (DRABC) of medical emergencies and Cardio Pulmonary
Resuscitation (CPR), recovery, bleeding, and hypothermia.

 Personal Safety and Social Responsibility – This deals with the following
areas: Emergency procedures, marine environment, safe working practices,
orders and their relation to shipboard duties, human relationships on board ship.

 Personal Survival Techniques – Preparation for sea survival, lifejackets and life
rafts, principles of survival, survival craft ailments, raft management, search
and rescue.

 Fire Prevention and Basic Fire fighting – Risks of fire and prevention, use of
fire fighting equipment, respond to emergencies, fight and extinguish fires.

Aside the STCW’95 training, the DPR recognises the Basic Offshore Safety
Induction and Emergency Training (BOSIET) or the refresher, Further Offshore
Emergency Training (FOET) including Helicopter Underwater Egress Training
(HUET) and Emergency Breathing System (EBS) certified by Offshore Petroleum
Industry Training Organisation (OPITO) or any other certification body approved
by DPR.

9. Current Trends in Offshore Health and Safety Regulation

a) Offshore Safety Permit

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 In apparent recognition of the paucity of effective health and safety regulations
offshore, the DPR and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources launched the Offshore
Safety Permit (OSP) in July 2011 pursuant to Section 44 of the Petroleum
(Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 and Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations
1963.

There are 6 types of Offshore Safety Permits and these are:

1) Travel Safety by Boat (restricted to boat travel only)

2) Full Offshore Safety Permit (for regular offshore workers)
3) Restricted Offshore Safety Permit (for marine crew)
4) Restricted Offshore Safety Permit (for Helicopter-only travellers)
5) Infrequent Offshore Safety Permit (limited to 3 return trips over 3 years)
6) Special Pass (for State Dignitaries and VIP’s)

At the launching ceremony of the OSP in Abuja, the Minister of Petroleum

Resources captured and underscored the purpose as follows:

‘’Our primary focus should be the safety and wellbeing of our workers, without
which we would be unable to sustain our business...the dynamic nature of our
industry and the ever increasing scope of activities especially in the offshore and
deep offshore regions necessitate that we keep pace with the industry with regard
to monitoring Health and Safety and Environment performance among it s several
functions’’.

A Director in DPR, Mr. Andrew Obaje while giving credence to the above noted
that:

‘’the main purpose (of the permit) is to guard against the loss of lives through
effective training and ensure compliance with provisions of the Nigerian
petroleum regulations and applicable international codes, standards and best
practices to achieve the vision of zero offshore incidents’’ .14

Functions of the OSP include the following:

 Management of details of oil and gas workers

 Provision of emergency response functionality
 Tracking of personnel to and from worksites
 Ensuring personnel have access to required medicals and competencies while at
locations
 Management of the transport of personnel to and from locations etc.

14 http://www.dprnigeria.com/in_the_news_alison_madueke_launches_offshore.html

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 West Atlantic Energy Nigeria Limited was appointed as the DPR’s agent for the
issuance of OSP upon the registration of individuals and for maintaining Personnel
on Board (POB) tracking system for the industry. OSP is issued upon payment of
appropriate application fee of Nine Hundred and Thirty Five Dollars (USD935.00)
for initial application. Each permit is valid for twelve months and is renewable
annually upon payment of a renewal fee of One Hundred and Thirty Five Dollars
(USD135.00).

To checkmate the flouting of these permit by industry operators, the DPR said it
will issue the permit in form of electronic card after necessary documentation and
registration of individuals, thereafter, the data will be maintained in the National
Data Repository, NDR.

All exploration and production companies including Oil Service companies

working in offshore areas of the industry are required to obtain OSP for personnel
working offshore. This is a welcome development and is expected to improve
safety of workers offshore. The regulators should ensure its full implementation.

b) Man Over Board Directive

The DPR also came up with another policy to complement the OSP with the
objective of improving the level of personnel safety for all workers in the
upstream industry. According to DPR, the Directive which was issued in June 6,
2012 was focused on reducing risks associated with Man Overboard (MOB)
incidents, helicopter ditching incidents, marine vessels accidents and platform
disasters as well as improving the ability to respond to such incidents in Nigerian
waters.

The MOB entails offshore operating companies ensuring compulsory use by

workers of life jackets at all times while on marine environment and for the life
jackets to be equipped with very high frequency (VHF) maritime survivor locating
device. The directive further provides that all existing life jackets which do not
have marine survivor locating devices should be retrofitted with the device should
any operative wish to continue with the use of such jackets. The device must be
designed to withstand the rough and demanding situation in the offshore
environment and also incorporate a strobe light to assist visual homing for use in
the harshest marine environment. In addition, the device must have in-built
capability to use VHF radio to automatically transmit distress alert to multiple
receivers up to 10 nautical miles away as well as be able to provide a precise

All rights reserved. No publication or reference is allowed unless approved. 14

 Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) that will help in directing rescue at such a
distance 15.

The advantages of using the locator device include helping upstream operating
companies to significantly reduce costs in the areas of legal expenses, reputation
and productivity and transit time; speedy recovery of the MOB casualty from the
water; savings in insurance. This is another positive initiative by the DPR towards
ensuring a robust health and safety operating environment offshore. However,
DPR has expressed dismay over the attitude of the IOCs in observing the
Directive. DPR should step up the pressure on erring IOCs and engage them in
constructive dialogue and consultation towards ensuring its compliance.

The recent tug boat, Jascon 4 that capsized on Sunday May 26, 2013 offshore
Escravos Nigeria while performing towing operations for Chevron and killed 11
crew could have been averted if the owners of the ship had upgraded its safety
jackets in line with this Directive. It took divers 2 days to locate the crew and
miraculously, the cook of the vessel was found alife. The locator device if
installed would have helped the divers to locate the position of the crew and this
could have led to rescue of more lives. The Directive was issued in June 6, 2012
and full compliance was expected by January 1, 2013 but in apparent disregard for
safety, the owners of the tug boat failed to upgrade safety requirements of the
Directive and Chevron on its part failed to insist on such safety measures being in
place before employing the vessel. This incident underscores the importance of
the Directive on Man Overboard and also an indictment on the Regulatory body’s
ability to effectively and expeditiously enforce its standards and policies. Moreso,
the Directive does not provide for any sanction in the event of a default thus
making compliance absolutely discretionary.

c) Some Notable Developments since the Gulf of Mexico Incident

The Gulf of Mexico incident has provoked investigations and research by the
industry, governments and regional bodies like the International Association of
Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), US, UK and EU into assessing the robustness of
health, safety and environmental policies as well as integrity of the installations in
their respective jurisdictions. Unfortunately, Nigerian Government was not
perturbed with the incident and that passive attitude resulted in the Bonga Incident
in 2011.

The major developments from the various investigative/research committees

produced the following result:

15Roseline Okere ‘’DPR to Sanction IOC’s over Man Overboard Compliance’’, The Guardian Wednesday April
24, 2013.

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 i. The body that regulates licensing and award of blocks should be separated from
the body that regulates health, safety and environment.

ii. The regulator should in addition to satisfying itself that a licensee /lessee is
financially sound to undertake the work programme also satisfy itself that the
licensee/lessee has finances to respond to major offshore incident/disaster and be
able to fund drilling of relief well.

iii. Introduction of a robust well design, well construction procedures and well
operation management improvement anchored on three tier review processes – (1)
operators and contractors audit of themselves and their associated operators,
contractors and service providers to verify adherence to standards, processes and
procedures including technical audits of all well control equipment and personnel
competency; (2) operators and contractors to promote independent oversight of
the well design and well procedures both prior to and during day-to-day
construction activities and (3) for the regulator to undertake robust and
meaningful inspections of all operations to assess adherence to applicable local
regulations.16

iv. Formation of Oil Spill Response Joint Industry Project (OSR-JIP) by OGP
consisting of 18 companies to collaborate with key stakeholders around the world
including the European Maritime Safety Agency, Subsea Well Response Project
(SWRP), the American Petroleum Institute, the Marine Spill Response
Corporation, a number of OGP etc in oil spill response strategy. One of the key
missions of the OSR-JIP is to optimise the use of subsea dispersant injection.

Other important development is the consideration of in-situ burning of spilled oil

at sea, satellite observation and the tracking of subsea plumes using 3D modelling
techniques.

16 Deepwater Wells, Global Industry Response Group Recommendations Report No. 463, May 2011 available at
http//www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/463.pdf. for details of the Report.

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 The diagram below shows one of the newly invented Dispersant Injection System.

v. The (OGP) following the Gulf of Mexico Incident set up the Global Industry
Response Group (GIRG) which came up with robust recommendations on
prevention, intervention and response to offshore well blowout incident.17 The
recommendation led to the establishment of the Subsea Well Response Project
(SWRP), a consortium founded by nine leading upstream companies which
invented a new well-capping device aimed at combating a major oil and gas
offshore incident. The capping device is set for use at up to 10,000 ft deep and
works by shutting in and holding pressure on an uncontrolled well. It would work
in remote, deep and harsh conditions.

The figure below shows the new capping device.

17 Please visit www.ogp.org.uk for details of the Report.

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10. Conclusion

It is apparent that health and safety regulation offshore is insufficient to meet

the challenging offshore environment. The industry Regulator (DPR) should
ensure that efforts are directed towards periodic reporting of safety measures
by the operators, adequate monitoring and verification to ensure compliance
and independent third party inspection of the design and construction of wells
in order to satisfy itself that adequate safety measures to prevent hydrocarbon
releases and major well blowout are taken. An independent agency separate
from DPR that oversees economic regulation of the sector should be created to
regulate offshore health, safety and environmental standards in line with the
current international best practice. To this end, National Assembly is being
called upon to reflect this in the PIB pending before it. The Regulator should
endeavour to set up a dedicated website for publishing health and safety
Regulations, Directives and Standards for easy access. This would encourage
studies and research which will ultimately lead to an improvement of the
existing system.

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The regulatory body should carry out physical inspection of offshore
installations to ensure that process safety and asset integrity are being
maintained by the operators. Efforts should be directed towards ensuring that
offshore workers are trained to gain competence on safety measures and learn
dynamics of the industry. Workforce involvement in offshore health, safety and
environmental monitoring and implementation should be encouraged through a
legal framework. The regulator should ensure consultation and collaboration
with the industry to ensure that health and safety regulations and directives are
being implemented without compromise. Government should endeavour to set
up an investigative committee to unravel the cause of any accident/incident
offshore with a view to advancing health and safety measures from the lessons
learnt. Outcome of such investigations should be made public to encourage
further studies and research. The envisaged Regulations, Standards and
Guidelines to be made pursuant to the PIB should incorporate the observed
deficiencies in the offshore health and safety regulation.

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