Cogent Social Sciences

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Ethiopian political crisis after reform: Causes of

Tigray conflict

Abdisa Olkeba Jima

To cite this article: Abdisa Olkeba Jima (2023) Ethiopian political crisis after reform: Causes of
Tigray conflict, Cogent Social Sciences, 9:1, 2209991, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2023.2209991

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Jima, Cogent Social Sciences (2023), 9: 2209991
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2209991

POLITICS | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Ethiopian political crisis after reform: Causes of
Tigray conflict
Abdisa Olkeba Jima1*

Received: 24 July 2021

Abstract: Ethiopian politics usually faces conflicts either to bring change or after
Accepted: 29 April 2023 the change. A 2018 Ethiopian political reform aimed to sustain peace among
*Corresponding author: Abdisa Ethiopians. Nonetheless, the conflict has escalated in different regions. Military
Olkeba Jima, Department of confrontations campaigned between the central government and the Tigray region
Governance and Development
Studies, College of Social Science and frequently. Finally, it occurred between the central government and Tigray People’s
Humanities, Bule Hora University,
Bule Hora 144, Ethiopia
Liberation Front in late 2020. Scholars debated the root causes of it. Hence, there is
E-mail: [email protected] no agreement among scholars regarding the cause of the Tigray conflict. This
Reviewing editor: research explores the Ethiopian political crisis after the 2018 reform focusing on the
Mark Bendall, SPS, University of
Chester, United Kingdom
Tigray conflict causes. The researcher employed a qualitative method and ethno­
graphic research design to study the causes of conflict. The research finding reveals
Additional information is available at
the end of the article that though the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Party’s demise,
the constitutional crisis, election delay, and the Amhara region’s ambition to annex
Tigray Region land to regain the lost territories are the causes of conflict, the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front attack on the Ethiopian northern military base was the

ABOUT THE AUTHOR PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

Abdisa Olkeba Jima is an assistant professor and The coming of Abiy Ahmed into power aimed to
researcher at the Department of Governance and last peace in Ethiopia because the power trans­
Development Studies, Bule Hora University, ferred peacefully for the first time. Nonetheless,
Ethiopia. He received a BA degree in Civics and conflicts have escalated in different parts of the
Ethics from Madawalabu University, Ethiopia, and country. Until November 2020, all regions were
an MA in Development Management from Jimma under tension except the Tigray region. Alleging
University, Ethiopia. Now, he is attending his the TPLF to the northern military base attack,
Ph.D. at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, in Abiy commanded his army to the Tigray region.
Development Studies. His research areas include Yet, there is an argument among political scien­
the FDI and local communities, gold mining and tists concerning the causes of the conflict. This
local community, the impact of human traffick­ research explores the Tigray conflict causes. Both
ing, teaching the Gadaa system in higher educa­ primary and secondary data were used to con­
tion, Ethiopian politics, indigenous knowledge vs duct research. The ethnographic research design
Abdisa Olkeba Jima western education, water governance, mutual is used to scrutinize the conflict causes. The
benefits between the investors and the local research finding reveals factors that caused the
communities, rural transformation, and schooling Tigray conflict are rivals for power, the expulsion
and rural unemployment. Mr. Abdisa has served of TPLF members from the central government,
as department head of Civics and Ethical Studies, Eritrea’s intention to retaliate against TPLF, the
and department head of Governance and EPRDF demise, and Amhara region's ambition to
Development Studies. Further, he served as annex Tigray lands.
director of the Internationalization Office and the
Postgraduate School director at Bule Hora
University.

© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu­
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on
which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in
a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

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immediate cause of the conflict. It recommends further research needs to conduct

on the consequences of the conflict.

Subjects: African Studies; Local Government; Political Institutions; Political Leaders;

African & Third World Politics; Political Ideologies; Qualitative Methods; Social Movements;
Introductory Politics

Keywords: Ethiopia; political crisis; reform; causes; Tigray conflict

1. Introduction
Historically, Ethiopia has faced different political challenges. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
and its coalition came to power by overthrowing the Derg government in 1991 (Lyons, 2019). Though
power shifted after the downfall of the Derg, the Ethiopian political process is rigid. The antagonistic
parties aspire to the new political reform that promotes mutual political agreement, but it witnessed little
improvement. The post-1991 reform agenda was promising initially—party formation and elections,
more press freedom, programs for economic development, fiscal reform, decentralization, and judicial
reform. But TPLF has dominated gradually. TPLF removed the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Force
(COEDF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) after a disagreement (Abbink, 2009). If transitional process
failed to use amity and steadiness as an orienting strategy for all government works, it would lose focus
and miss opportunities for fostering community participation (Berhe, 2017).

Slowly but surely, the challenges are more likely to emerge within the party. That means whether in the
form of further accepted political unrest or disagreements within the Ethiopian People’s Revolution
Democratic Front (EPRDF) government (Lie & Mesfin, 2018). Following the 2016 Addis Ababa integrated
master plan with the surrounding areas, Oromo youths began to protest the EPRDF. Then, both the
Oromo and Amhara movements articulated grievances against TPLF domination, declining economic
conditions, corruption, and federal and state security services brutality (Jima & Meissner, 2021; Opalo &
Smith, 2021). Lastly, though it has ruled the state for three decades, the Oromo youths’ high protest
compelled the party to make political reform (Jima & Meissner, 2021).

Subsequently, EPRDF elected Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister (PM) in March 2018 (Jima & Meissner,
2021; Strategic Comments, 2020). The transition from Hailemariam to Abiy was the most signifi­
cant change in Ethiopia’s political history (Strategic Comments, 2020). The coming of the Abiy
brought the “The released political prisoners, returned of exiled political opponents, Ethio-Eritrea
rapprochement, and empowerment of women” (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Nonetheless, the reforms
faced different challenges because of misunderstandings between the incumbent and opposition
political parties. When Abiy came to power as the new PM as the first Oromo politician entering the
former imperial palace, many believed it was the Oromo’s turn to rule. However, he has brought
little for the Oromo so far. Further, the premature internal divisions have resurfaced, old alliances
and allegiances have been remade, and where the inherently fragmented nature of Oromo politics
seems to have prevailed (Ostebo & Tronvoll, 2020).

On the other hand, Abiy’s appointment resembled solving the ethnic conflict in different parts of
the country. Still, it made worse in some areas. The conflict quickly erupted in Oromia, where the
aggressors were perhaps emboldened by the appointment of an Oromo PM, reviving old claims
over disputed territories (Strategic Comments, 2020). Under his administration, the security forces
executed 39 people publically in Oromia regional state, Guji zone (Goro Dola) and West Guji zone
(Dugda Dawa) in 2019. Although the initial points seem the human rights improvement, the old
style in which the security forces violate fundamental rights is restored slowly but surely. Besides,
security forces discharged severe fundamental rights violations in the Amhara region following the
assassination of the region’s leaders in the same year (Amnesty International, 2020). The central
government claimed the TPLF for the atrocity because they dominated the military and security
sectors. The unrestrained political circumstance of the current regime has created dissension and

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violence among the public and thus led to escalating political, economic, and security crises in
Ethiopia (Addis et al., 2020).

Hailemariam, the former PM, had a wholesome relationship with TPLF. On the other hand, the
coming of Abiy reduced TPLF supremacy (Opalo & Smith, 2021). He tried to discuss with people of all
regional states in the country regarding his future government. But he undermined strong opposition
political parties such as OLF and TPLF. Also, the postponed election exacerbates the difference
between Abiy and TPLF (Strategic Comments, 2020). Abiy’s appointment got worse for the
Tigrayans when he acted promptly against the once-dominant TPLF within the EPRDF by removing
officials from government posts, which further reduced the influence of the Tigrayan minority in
governance. The prominent leader of 2018 political reform, Lemma Megersa aspired to political
stability and continuity. Yet, Abiy got rid of TPLF leaders belligerently from the central government.
He also eliminated them from the armed forces and national intelligence service while seeking to
have some arrested. What else, the incumbent administration has repeatedly blamed the TPLF for
stirring unrest without providing evidence for the allegation (Strategic Comments, 2020).

In the same vein, the relationship between the central government and the TPLF is paradoxical.
The central government deteriorated the Tigray regional state people and TPLF. Many political
parties stated that Abiy inflicted the Tigray tensions with neighboring states. Accordingly, the
Tigray region conflicted with Amhara and Afar regions. The opened road which connects Eritrea
and Tigray regional state closed. To control the Media that broadcast from the Tigray region, he
banned the Regional Media. He further cut the Tigray budget to weaken it and cautioned and
kidnapped foreigners not to go to Tigray, especially journalists and investors. But the TPLF held the
Regional election on Nine September 2020 without the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)
recognitions that accelerated the conflict between the central government and TPLF’s region,
Tigray (Jima & Meissner, 2021). In fact, regional states cannot conduct an election without the
NEBE’s permission, mediation, and recognition in the country. Nonetheless, the TPLF sponsored
diverse rebellions in the country to fight against the central government and make it busy.

Lastly, the orchestrated and campaigned military brought a conflict between the central government
and the Tigray region (Opalo & Smith, 2021). PM Abiy commanded the forces to fight the TPLF when it
attacked a northern military base on Four November 2020 (International Crisis Group, 2020). That was
the immediate cause of the war that resulted in the death, eviction, and migration of many people in the
country (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Even though the central government announced the war ended in late
November 2020, the conflict continued with many human casualties (International Crisis Group, 2020).
As it intensified, different actors like federal defense forces, Eritrean troops, and Amhara police partici­
pated in the war (Ibid). However, there is little consensus among scholars concerning the causes of the
Ethiopian Tigray conflict. This research explores the Ethiopian political crises after the 2018 reform
focusing on the cause of the Tigray conflict.

Albeit different factors are responsible for the conflict, this paper does not discuss all issues due
to the absence of data. Also, the author could not go to the study areas and observed the
situation, collected data from the victims, and triangulated their views because of security issues.
As a result, the study delimited to cause of the conflict like military competition between the
central government and TPLF, the demise of the EPRDF Party and the TPLF’s refusal to join the new
part (Prosperity Party), the attempt of the central government to control TPLF, the expulsion of
TPLF members from the central government positions, Amhara region’s intention to annex the
Tigray land, and the TPLF attack of the Northern military base of the country.

2. Theoretical framework
Based on the nature and issues they address, political scientists employ different theories in
politics. The normative political theory, contemplative political theory, political party theory,
game theory, and power transition theory are widely used in political science.

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Normative political theory was an ancient theory that emerged in Greek. It served as
a benchmark for political science research (Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2017). It attempts to practice moral
elements in politics. The realists apply it by presenting political philosophy needs to acclimatize
real politics (Rossi & Sleat, 2014). The normative political theory plays a pivotal role to legitimatize
power (Weale, 2010). However, most scholars encounter that it is difficult to apply normative
political theory at this time due to the selfishness of politicians. Thus, it is non-practicable. On the
other hand, speculative political theory relates to religious points of view. Thus, the relationship
between the ruled and the ruling is a spiritual concept (Komjathy, 2017). The radical democratic
theory attempts to speculate the incarnate democracy practice in every exercise of life (Mariotti,
2020). That form of political theory is exercised in a country where people believe that power is
given to the ruling one by divine power. It deals with the psycho-spiritual development of the
ruling and the ruled.

The other theory is the political party theory. It is used in political science for several years
(Wolkenstein, 2019). It refers to a process where people come together, form a party, set game
rules, and attempt to control power (Bawn et al., 2012; West, 2014). Party plays a pivotal role in
political reason out. If a party exercises its rights and announces its objectives to the public, there
will be an opportunity to be elected. That is possible in democratic states (Muirhead & Rosenblum,
2020). Further, activists and interest groups are prominent actors in a political party. And loyal
candidates are nominated for party and election (Bawn et al., 2012). Nonetheless, it is arguable
that the existence of a political party does not necessarily ensure democratization and lasting
peace. It depends on the degree of exercising democratic culture, the prevalence of the rule of law,
constitutionalism, and the independence of the judiciary to adjudicate the case when
a disagreement happens among or between parties.

Game theory has become an eloquent instrument to describe politics (McCarty & Meirowitz,
2007). It shows that human interaction consists of conflict, cooperation, and competition
(Rosenmuller & Trockel, 2014). The authors present that the main paradigms of game theory are
strategic behavior, incomplete information, the anticipation of actions, bargaining power, mutual,
fairness, and equity. It modeled the mutual rely of the opponent’s strategic behavior, the oppo­
nent’s knowledge, the recursive influence of consideration on the state of knowledge, and the
resulting strategic consequences (Rosenmuller & Trockel, 2014). In Ethiopia, the strategic behavior
the central government and TPLF used against each other caused conflict.

The power transition theory is a flexible and core element to describe global politics. It predicts
harmony and conflict at international, regional, and national levels (Tammen et al., 2017). It can
be a challenge between the incumbent and the opposition party unless it is managed and
exercised wisely (Feng, 2013). In the Ethiopian context, it describes how the power was transferred
from the former Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, to Abiy Ahmed in 2018. Ethiopia entered
into conflict then after though the power was transferred peacefully. The power parity is unsafe in
power transition because two parties cannot take a single position. As a result, the power struggle
between the dominant power and the emerging power is inevitable (Pop & Brînză, 2017). “The
power transition theory also claims that the challenger tends to declare war on the hegemonic
power before reaching power parity with the hegemonic power” (Ibid, p. 61).

In this study, the researcher used game theory and power transition theory to scrutinize the cause
of conflict in Ethiopia. The game theory is applicable to illustrate how the ruling party and TPLF
decision are responsible for it because it helped the researcher to deal with the overlapping areas of
fair division, political economy, public choice, and war bargaining. On the other hand, power transition
theory is used to investigate how power transition was the conflict causes as stated above.

3. Methodology of study
The researcher employed a qualitative method to conduct this research. In qualitative research,
the researcher is central. He is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. The

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researcher plays a pivotal role in constructing concepts, theories, and principles out of detailed
discussion, interviews, and observations (Creswell, 2009). Moreover, the qualitative strategy is
a detailed description of situations, events, people interactions, observed behaviors, and direct
quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts (Crain-Dorough,
2009; Dawson, 2002). And data are collected through focus group discussions and depth inter­
views in qualitative research (Kothari, 2004). The author employed the ethnographic research
design in this research because it is suitable to study conflict and flexible in choosing data
collection methods.

Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews online because of COVID-19 and
the continuity of the war during data collection. The researcher selected six dominant parties’
representatives—Prosperity Party (PP), Oromo Federal Conference (OFC), Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), Ethiopia Social Justice (EZEMA), Amhara National Movement (NAMA), and Tigray People
Liberation Front (TPLF) since they have played a pivotal role in Ethiopian politics and have many
supporters. The researcher selected two participants—one male and a female—from each party
purposively. The researcher attempted to balance the gender because the females are the most
vulnerable during the conflict. Besides, the researcher reviewed secondary data sources such as
books, book sections, journal articles, magazines, newspaper articles, the Ethiopian Constitution,
encyclopedias, proclamations, working papers, reports, and minutes. Additionally, frequent notices
of parties’ are used. Secondary data is triangulated with primary data. Game theory and Power
transition theory were used to analyze how the central government and TPLF used a strategy to
get supporters before and during the conflict. And lastly, the researcher employed thematic and
content data analysis to explore the conflict causes. Finally, the author triangulated primary data
with secondary data.

4. Findings and discussion

4.1. The confrontation between the central government and the Tigray region
After securing his position, Abiy undermined opposition political parties such as TPLF. His tenure
went downhill to public security. And his politics has been full of turbulence (Strategic Comments,
2020). Opposition political parties, OFC, and OLF representatives argued that the Abiy government
showed military parades repeatedly to frustrate TPLF. They also stated that the Tigray region ruling
party, TPLF, did the same things. That showed a rivalry for power between Abiy’s government and
the Tigray Region’s ruling party. The military campaign has brought a humanitarian catastrophe.
Also, it has brought apprehensions of regional randomness (Gavin, 2021).

After the TPLF has cast out from the central government, its members returned to the Mekele
and influenced the Tigrayans under the ethnic federalism umbrella. It continued to dominate the
Tigray Region state’s politics, economy, and security (Opalo & Smith, 2021). The federal govern­
ment and the TPLF were in confrontation for months (International Crisis Group, 2020). However, in
November, long-rising competition between Abiy’s administration and the leadership of the TPLF
turned into military hostility (Gavin, 2021). The outbreak of hostilities reflects a power struggle
between the federal government and the TPLF. The PP alleged the TPLF exacerbated conflicts in
Ethiopia during his tenure (Blanchard, 2020). Nevertheless, both sides were preparing for confron­
tation at the same time, the interview results with OLF and OFC representatives. The war between
the federal government and the Tigray regional state demolished the country (International Crisis
Group, 2020). Interview results with all parties revealed that many civilians died, migrated, women
were raped, inflation raised and the economy collapsed.

4.2. Separatism against TPLF

On coming to power in 1991, the TPLF faced the immediate problem of any guerrilla movement
that seizes control of a national government—of taking over the state apparatus against which it
had been fighting for the previous decade and a half (Clapham, 2009). The TPLF politics depends on
the Tigray people. The interview results with the TPLF representative posited that the party, TPLF, is

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organized by the people. Hence, it is similar to the Tigray people. TPLF and Tigray people are two
sides of one coin. However, the PP representative countered that the party and people are
different. People are beyond party. TPLF traded by the Tigray people throughout its power. But, it
has done nothing for the Tigray people. The people remained poor. In fact, it is not easy to defeat
TPLF unless the central government separates it from the people. Hence, the central government
produced different documentary films against TPLF (Jima & Meissner, 2021). EZEMA and NAMA
favored the central government in an attempt to separate TPLF from the people. But OFC and OLF
took a neutral position. The parties warned the central government that imposing war on Tigray
could cause civilian casualties. “The swift moves against the TPLF have encountered stiff resis­
tance” (Ylönen, 2019, p. 344). The TPLF also appears to enjoy significant support from Tigrayans
(International Crisis Group, 2020).

TPLF representative explained:

The central government did not be fond of the relationship between the TPLF and Tigrayans.
The PM tries to restore the Derg system of administration. Thus, he opened the war on the
Tigray people alleged to North military base attack. The TPLF queued with its people because
it is the party of Tigrayans. He allotted 72 hours for TPLF members to surrender. Nonetheless,
TPLF discussed with people and left Mekele. Then they returned to guerrilla fighters. The
Tigrayans intensely supported TPLF in Abiy’s military defeat. Finally, both Tigrayans and TPLF
recaptured Mekele in June 2021. Albeit Abiy formed his puppet government as an interim
administration, the Tigrayans could not cooperate with them. They support TPLF in to fight
against the defense of Ethiopia. That shows there is a strong relationship between TPLF and
Tigray people.

Unlike the central government’s miscalculation to separate people from TPLF, the Tigray people
supported the TPLF to recapture Mekele, the capital city of the Tigray region June 2021. The TPLF,
under Alula Abba Nega’s military force, defeated many regimes of the central government’s
military forces. Yet, the central government did not accept the defeat. The military retreated
because the Tigray farmers want to plow lands. Indeed, that was not a convincing argument.
UAE, which affords drones to the central government refused to cooperate due to the
U.S. warnings. Actually, the central government also got weapons from Turkey and Iran. In
conclusion, the central government’s tactics to separate Tigrayans and TPLF strengthen the
bondage between them instead. However, it provoked the Tigray conflict.

4.3. The demise of the Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front Coalition
The Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF) emerged from North peripheries of
Ethiopia. The TPLF, the heart of EPRDF, struggled for many years until it controlled power in 1991.
Initially, the TPLF had the idea to form an independent Tigray Empire. But gradually, it reframed
into a national state and mobilized other groups to induce power (Clapham, 2009). The TPLF began
to take military insurrection against the Derg regime in 1975. Step by step, it formed the EPRDF
that led to power in 1991. Before EPRDF, Ethiopia was ruled by a unitary state. However, it
restructured the state into a federal one based on ethnolinguistics and the people’s willingness
in 1990. Finally, the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution adopted
a federal state that grants regional states the right to self-rule and self-determination (Blanchard,
2020). The TPLF was the dominant party in Ethiopia’s ruling coalition for three decades (Gavin,
2021), and it was the center of gravity in the country’s ruling EPRDF coalition (Woldemariam,
2018). Under the umbrella of EPRDF, Tigrayans dominated the protection equipment, National
Defense Force (NDF) officer corps and federal administration, physical exertion near-exclusive
management over economic aid, international loans, and the leasing of public land to amass
billions of greenbacks (Jones, 2020).

However, TPLF’s position among EPRDF grew weaker as the Oromo and Amhara element parties
pushed back against what they perceived as TPLF dominance within the coalition (Ostebo &
Tronvoll, 2020). The EPRDF’s internal power struggle and its inability to deal with the protests

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brought a political transition in 2018 (Ibid). In December 2019, PM Abiy allied the EPRDF coalition
parties into a single party, PP. The TPLF objected and refused to affix (Gavin, 2021). Further, many
Oromo did not join the party claiming that it aimed to reduce their status of self-administration
and self-rule (Strategic Comments, 2020). One of Abiy’s most prominent critics, Oromo opposition
politician Jawar Mohammed, represented the PP’s formation as a shift removed from transitional
ideology to a centralized state, alleging that the PM was steering the country back toward
authoritarian rule. The government, in remission, arrested Jawar in July 2020 through protests
following the death of a preferred Oromo singer, Hachalu Hundessa, inciting ethnic violence and
terrorist act (Gavin, 2021).

Jones (2020) posits the PM launched a series of systematic reforms to reduce TPLF influence and
stabilize the country by merging Ethiopia’s ethnic coalition with a single, nationally oriented PP.
“The TPLF felt threatened by the new government’s personnel and policy choices, and it declined to
join the successor party to the old ruling coalition” (Gavin, 2021, p. 2). The TPLF refused to affix PP,
partly because the unitary party gain-said the ideals of ethnic federalism (Opalo & Smith, 2021).
Offscouring invitations of the PP, the TPLF consequently laid off Abiy’s reforms as an extra-
constitutional, reactionary power grab that vulnerable Mekelle’s authority and regional autonomy
(Jones, 2020). The central government and TPLF moved to war lastly, which caused the death and
migration of many civilians.

4.4. TPLF members’ expulsion from the central government

The popular politics incorporation into the EPRDF regime magnified the contradictions within the
coalition. The continuous supremacy of TPLF in the EPRDF was illegitimate. Finally, the situation
forced TPLF to return to Mekele (Opalo & Smith, 2021). The EZEMA, NAMA, OFC, OLF, and PP
representatives explained that TPLF dominated Ethiopian politics albeit their number is the least.
Jones (2020) states that under the umbrella of EPRDF, Tigrayans dominated the security appara­
tus, NDF officer corps, and federal administration, exercising near-exclusive control over foreign
aid, international loans, and the leasing of public land to amass billions of dollars. But the TPLF
supremacy weathered following the coming of Abiy into power in 2018. The TPLF leaders returned
to their origin, Mekele, and began to challenge Abiy’s administration. Interview results with the
TPLF representative showed that the Abiy administration demolished the TPLF roles at the federal
level. Abiy removed most figurative TPLF members from the central government. Following the
constitutional crisis and the postponed election, the TPLF parliament members pulled out and
returned to Mekele vowing to maintain the Constitution. Finally, the TPLF representative and House
of the Federation speaker, Keria Ibrahim, resigned and returned to Mekele (Jima & Meissner, 2021).

Contrarily, interview results with the PP representative exhibited that Abiy’s administration
attempted to maintain an equilibrium position among Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and peo­
ples. The TPLF members dominated Ethiopian politics irrespective of their population. Rather than
accepting the facts, TPLF members orchestrated propaganda to distance the Tigray people and
elongate their powers. After all, confrontation and quarrel were responsible for the Tigray war. Yet,
“the bloody offensive war aims to eliminate TPLF” (Burke, 2020, p. 2). The transposition between
the central government and TPLF caused the Tigray conflict.

4.5. Election delay and constitutional crisis

The Ethiopian government decided to postpone the scheduled elections for an unlimited period
alleging COVID-19 caused a constitutional crisis (Jima & Meissner, 2021). They further states:

The ruling party presented four possible scenarios to circumvent the constitutional crisis.
Those are dissolving the parliaments, declaring a state of emergency, amending the
Constitution, and seeking a constitutional interpretation. Then, the Parliament endorsed
a constitutional interpretation on 5 May 2020.

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And they have asked the House of Federation to issue an interpretation within a month without
arriving at a political consensus with opposition political parties (The Economist, 2020 in Jima,
2021). For this reason, most opposition parties have rejected the decision (Mulugeta, 2020). “The
ruling party was partial to constitutional interpretation since all the House of People
Representatives and the House of Federation are members of the ruling party” (Jima & Meissner,
2021, p. 11).

However, the Tigray regional government, led by the TPLF, went ahead with its regional council
elections, despite the federal government warning that the vote would be illegal. TPLF won most of
the seats (Blanchard, 2020). The TPLF argued that they made the democratic election in the Tigray
Region. But the central government defied that the Tigray election is illegal and unacceptable. The
EZEMA and NAMA representatives shared the views of the PP and stated that the central govern­
ment needs to take action against TPLF for an unlawful election. Blanchard (2020) contemplates:

The brewing tensions between Abiy’s government and the TPLF came to a standoff with the
Tigray government, quarreling, that the federal government’s term expired in October. The
federal government termed the regional government unlawful and moved to cut federal
funds to Tigray similarly.

Consistent culture of biased decisions and favoritism to the ruling party is the most critical to the
democratization process in Ethiopia (Jima & Meissner, 2021). The OLF and OFC representatives
explained that a constitutional crisis caused a conflict, which was supported by a military cam­
paign on both sides. The research finding showed that the postponed election and constitutional
crisis caused the Tigray conflict. In its turn, the central government conducted in June 2021, where
no Tigray region representative was available. And in the Oromia Region, OLF and OFC parties,
which have many supporters, boycotted the election. Thus, the PP presented for election without
competitors in the Oromia region. During the eve of the election, TPLF regained Mekele, the capital
city of Tigray which forced the central government military to withdraw. The International Crisis
Group (2020) states a constitutional dispute over delayed national elections that brought the spat
between the federal and TPLF gradually resulted in the northern military base attack.

4.6. Amhara’s ambition to annex Tigray lands

Amhara and Tigrayans are Semitic language-speaking people (Negash, 2016). Both regions share
large areas of territories. Withal, there is a debate regarding the ownership of western parts of
Tigray such as Wolkait. The Amhara region claiming the areas following the new structural
administration formed after 1991. The EPRDF, mainly dominated by TPLF, established a federal
structure for the first time in Ethiopian history following the Derg regime’s defeat (Afesha, 2016).
Before 1991, Ethiopia ruled under a unitary state structure (Sherr, 1990). Still, the coming of EPRDF,
a coalition of four parties, structured the state into fourteen regional states during the transitional
government. Later on, it was reframed to nine regional states (Constitution, 1995). According to
FDRE constitution article 46 (2), regional states are formed based on the settlement patterns,
language, identity, and consent of the people concerned.

Furthermore, Tronvoll (2021)depicts:

Administrative borders of provinces have been altered during all regime changes in Ethiopia.
And they are often used as a means for the central government to divide and rule by
maintaining political control over local nobility and political elites aspiring for central power.

For the last 27 years, based on the FDRE constitution, the Tigray Region bordered the Amhara
region’s north Wollo, Agaw, and Gonder. Notwithstanding, following the 2018 political change and
demise of TPLF, the Amhara Region began to claim that areas in the Tigray region such as Rayya
(Maichew, Mohoni, Korem, Alemata, and Waj), Wolkait, Tselemti, Tsegede, Adi Remet, and Humera
are parts of former Amhara. NAMA representative alleged that the TPLF incorporated areas into

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the Tigray Region forcefully. Thus, Amhara needs to regain them. To realize the mission, Identity
Reconstitution Committee (Raya Identity Reconstitution Committee and Tegede Identity
Reconstitution Committee) was formed. Contrarily, the TPLF representative quoted the FDRE con­
stitution and stated that all regions were reframed based on the consent and settlement patterns
of the people. The TPLF did not include any parts of Amhara lands without the people’s consent.
The TPLF representative also challenged why the Amhara Region kept silent so far if their lands
were taken forcefully. In fact, according to FDRE constitution article 48 (1), the House of Federation
settle border disputes based on settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples concerned if
regions, where concern are raised, are unable to solve them.

Surprisingly, Amhara elites argued that the FDRE Constitution does not represent them for two
reasons. Firstly, they claimed that Amhara had no representative during the promulgation of the
Constitution. Secondly, the TPLF designed the Constitution in its best interest without considering
the Amhara people. They argued that TPLF demised Ethiopia and reframed regions based on ethnic
lines. They presumed Amhara is the Ethiopian guard. The TPLF killed, evicted Amhara, and replaced
Tigre, Amhara elites alleged. Howbeit, OFC and OLF representatives encountered that the FDRE
Constitution is not the mere TPLF document. It answered the Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and
peoples’ questions to administer themselves, learn, and judge by their languages. They also argued
that Amhara elites are two sides of one sword. They attempt to implement the Amharization policy
(one language, identity, religion, and people). On the other hand, they hide under the Amhara
people when they face a challenge. The NAMA, for instance, depends on Amhara nationalism.
“Amhara elites’ territorial ambitions are creating trouble for Abiy both domestically and interna­
tionally” (Tronvoll, 2021, p. 1).

Generally, the Amhara region vowed to annex Tigray lands and incorporated them into its
Region. Consequently, they aggravated the conflict between the central government and the
Tigray Region. The OFC and OLF representative contemplated that Amhara partitioned Tigray’s
lands under the curtain of the central government military operation. The Amhara Region kept
silent when Sudan annexed the Amhara Region lands, Al Fashaga. But, they began to control
Tigray’s land and resettle Amhara in the areas where Tigrayans were evicted. Tronvoll (2021)
concludes the Amhara ethnic political elites used Ethiopia’s Tigray war as a mean to recapture the
lost territories in 1991. In a nutshell, they hit the war drum between the central government and
TPLF to accelerate the war. The author argues that territorial ownership claims between the
Amhara and Tigray regions need to be solved constitutionally.

4.7. Eritrea’s intention to retaliate against TPLF

The Ethio-Eritrea relationship was interrupted in 1998 with the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war.
During the period of the war, both political and economic confidence was traumatized due to
a combination of circumstances (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003). Eritrea’s prosecution of the war and
Ethiopia’s intransigent response were driven not by considerations of national security nor national
interest but by the relentless logic of the domestic politics of political transition (Steves, 2003). The
conflict held from May 1998 to June 2000 and resulted in an estimated 70,000–100,000 deaths.
The disputed border has been a cause of the war of the peace treaty in Algiers that brought the
war to an end importantly, established a border commission to resolve the issue (Ylönen, 2019).
The Eritrea president, Isaias, was operating in bad faith. The Eritrea issue had been historically
contentious within Ethiopia and key political terrain upon which Ethiopia’s political class sought to
compete (Woldemariam, 2018). “Eritrea is a hot potato for Ethiopian policymakers. Damned if they
hold it; damned if they do not” (Ibid, p. 411).

Nevertheless, the Nobel Peace Committee awarded Abiy Ahmed in 2019 because he reconciled
Eritrea and Ethiopia after two decades without any arbitration (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Different
politicians and opposition parties argued that the two countries did not yet sign a peace agree­
ment. The bargain is between the leaders—Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afworki. They further accused
that there is no agreement between the two states, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The unlocked road has

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been closed that connects the Tigray Region and Eritrea (Temin & Badwaza, 2019). Burke (2020)
explains Abiy’s rapport with Eritrea isolated the TPLF. Consequently, the TPLF accused Abiy’s
rapport with Isaias is to weakening the Tigray people. The close of Zela Anbessa road that
connects the same people was the manifestation. Hence, the interview results with TPLF, OLF,
and OFC representatives indicated that the reconciliation of Addis Ababa and Asmara is a tactical
agreement between Abiy and Isaias to intimidate, control, and weaken TPLF.

Particularly, the representatives of TPLF claimed that Isaias wanted to retaliate against TPLF
because the late PM, Meles Zenawi, smashed him both at the battle and diplomatic areas. Hence,
Eritrea was under the sanction of the UN and the West for decades. Generally, Abiy and Isaias
were working hard to capture TPLF and revenge them under pseudo reconciliation, interview with
TPLF representatives. Also, interview results with OFC, OLF, and EZEMA representatives showed
that Abiy destroyed the base site of strong opponent political leaders such as OLF and Ginbot-7 in
Eritrea by reconciliation name. Lastly, the participants argued that lasting peace between the two
countries is unthinkable by excluding the Tigray region since the Region shares many border areas
with Eritrea, and both people speak the same language and geopolitics.

The TPLF, OLF, and OFC representatives further claimed that Abiy’s government rapport with
Eritrea to retaliate against TPLF. The Eritrean leader had a longstanding ambition to cut the TPLF
down to size. “Isaias views Tigray leaders as ungrateful junior partners who turned Ethiopia’s
military against his regime in 1998 despite Eritrean support for the TPLF’s rebellion against the
Derg military dictatorship” (International Crisis Group, 2021, p. 8).

During conflicts between the Ethiopian central government and the Tigray Region, different
world media reported that Eritrean troops were involved in the Tigray war. Also, the international
institutions, including the UN, urged the central government to withdraw Eritrea troops and
Amhara police and militia from Tigray. But Abiy and his allies denied it several times. The
Amnesty International (2021) states that the Ethiopian and Eritrean authorities have made contra­
dictory statements regarding the involvement of Eritrean troops in the Tigray conflict. Inconsistent
news produced by the central government. The PP, NAMA, and EZEMA representatives argued that
Eritrea did not involve in the war. Interview results with OFC, OLF, and TPLF demonstrated that the
PM announced the parliament members as Eritrean troops helped the Ethiopian armies allegedly
attacked by TPLF. Accordingly, the Eritrean troops were involved in the Tigray war because TPLF hit
Asmara with rockets.

Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2021) explains:

Eritrean troops’ looting of Tigray could be seen as payback for the destruction Eritrea
suffered in the 1998–2000 war, said a close observer, who dismissed the idea the Eritreans
would pull out: Isaias will not sleep until the TPLF is destroyed. The Eritrean troops were
operating in the Ethiopian cities of Axum and Shire, Tigray, committed a series of human
rights and humanitarian law violations, including killing hundreds of civilians.

By the same token, Abiy has planned to withdraw heavy military weapons and a northern military
base from Tigray. EZEMA, NAMA, and PP representatives argued that most of the country’s military
weapons were in Tigray. Ethiopia invested in them after the Ethio-Tigray war. The representatives
also stated that the PM has restored peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Accordingly, the heavy
military needs to be pulled out from Tigray. The PP representative thrashed out that TPLF inflicted
conflicts among various ethnicities. They also vowed to attack the central government by using
stored weapons. The TPLF representative countered that Abiy tolerated Isaias to retaliate Tigray
people. OFC and OLF representatives added that the PM made a historical mistake when allied with
a foreign enemy to open war on his country’s people. Smith (2007) has forecasted that the global
community needs to work hard to avoid the Ethio-Eritrea conflict in the future. This paper argued
that Isaias used the opportunity of the TPLF to attack the North military base to retaliate against it.

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4.8. Northern federal force attack in Tigray

Relations between Tigray regional state and the central government turned to beset following the
coming of Abiy into power. Abiy downgraded the TPLF as soon as he took office (Marks, 2020).
Blanchard (2020) indicates:

The federal government has accused the TPLF of escalating conflicts along ethnic and
religious lines across the country to make it ungovernable. But the TPLF denies initiating the
conflict on November Four, accusing Abiy of starting a war to consolidate his power.

The tension entered into war in early November with an alleged raid by TPLF units on federal
military bases in Tigray (Burke, 2020; Gebremedhin, 2020). Abiy ordered his troops instantly to
control Tigray and capture TPLF leaders (Burke, 2020). Following that, TPLF attempted to inter­
nationalize the war. For this reason, it fired rockets into the airports of the Amhara region’s towns,
Gondar and Bahir Dar. It also hit Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, with rockets (O’Grady, 2020;
Schipani & Pilling, 2020). Then, Ethiopia’s government ordered the army into the Tigray Region
and declared a six-month state of emergency (Marks, 2020). In addition to the federal forces, the
Amhara region’s Special Forces and militias joined the army and controlled the Tigray. Externally,
Eritrean troops supported the central government’s forces (Amnesty International, 2021). The
finding of this research confirms Gavin (2021) that reported TPLF attack on the north military
base in the Region was an immediate conflict. The TPLF representative denied their atrocities to
begin the war. The Tigray people fought to liberate themselves from Abiy and Isaias’ political
atrocity and maliciousness. Abiy vows to kneel to the Tigray people and TPLF, according to inter­
view results with TPLF representatives. Nonetheless, both of them united more and defended
themselves. Finally, TPLF freed Mekele, the capital city of Tigray, and recaptured it after eight
months in June 2021. But that did not last more since the central government defeated the TPLF in
late 2022 which forced them to surrender to the central government.

On the other hand, interview results with PP representatives demonstrated that the TPLF attacked
the northern military base to control the heavy weapons of the military, fight the central government,
demise it, and come to power easily. In fact, the TPLF leaders accepted the allegations made against
them. They presumed that Eritrea forces had never participated. And the central government could
not use the air force. Their calculation was to control the weapons, fought the central government,
and returned to power, but they failed. The conflict was responsible for many civilians' death, eviction,
wound, and famine. A lot of soldiers were dead and wounded on both sides. Military equipment
damaged. It also caused women rape, abduction, and unwanted pregnancy in Tigray, Amhara, and
Afar regions. The author argues that the TPLF attack on the northern military base was the immediate
cause of the conflict even though different factors contributed.

5. Conclusion
Following the Oromo youths’ protest, Abiy Ahmed came into power in 2018, which brought
peaceful political reform in Ethiopian history (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Initially, the reform has
gotten the world to applaud. Meanwhile, Abiy’s administration faced opposition. The Oromo
people, an agent of reform, began to revolt as the reform was hijacked. The conflict erupted in
all regional states, except the Tigray region from 2018 to November 2020. The central government
alleged TPLF was provocative of the conflict. However, opposition political parties claimed that Abiy
alleged TPLF to cover his weakness concerning the escalated conflict. Both the central government
and the Tigray region campaigned for military parades frequently. Some politicians argued Eritrea
attempted to intimidate TPLF via the invisible hand. That was why Eritrea’s rapport with Ethiopia
sans any arbitrators. Constitutional crisis and election postpone aggravating the tension between
the two. Tigray region held a regional election when the central government postponed scape­
goating the COVID-19 pandemic without the permission of the NEBE.

This research explores the causes of the Tigray conflict after peaceful political reform that
caused the Ethiopian political crisis. The research finding shows that the rivalry between the

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central government and the Tigray region caused the conflict. Eritrea’s intention to retaliate
against TPLF intensifies it. The EPRDF demise, TPLF members’ expulsion from the central govern­
ment, constitutional crisis and election delay, and Amhara Region’s ambition to invade and annex
Tigray lands are the causes of conflict. Abiy neglected engagement with opposition parties,
including the ousted Tigrayan elite. He removed TPLF leaders from federal institutions, including
the armed forces and the national intelligence service (Strategic Comments, 2020). Yet, the
Ethiopian northern military base attack was the immediate cause of the conflict. Addis et al.
(2020) conclude that the unrestrained political circumstance of the current regime has created
dissidence and violence among the public and thus led to escalating political, economic, and
security crises in Ethiopia. The research recommends further research needs to be done on the
consequence of the conflict and the way to lasting peace.

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