December 14, 2023

Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy

Hamas (or the Islamic Resistance Movement) is a reportedly masterminded the October 7 assault in Israel. He
Palestinian Sunni Islamist military and sociopolitical returned to Gaza from Israel in 2011 as part of a hostage-
movement, and a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist prisoner swap, after 22 years in prison for the abduction and
organization (FTO). Hamas’s primary base of action and murder of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of four
support is in the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since Palestinians. Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa
2007. It also operates in the West Bank and Lebanon, and apparently lead Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al Din al
some Hamas leaders and personnel live and/or work in Qassam Brigades, with a reported 25,000-40,000 fighters as
various Arab countries and Turkey. Hamas reportedly of October 7. Israel claims it has since killed about 7,000
receives material assistance and training from Iran and fighters, and that Sinwar, Deif, and Issa are priority targets.
some of its allies, including the Lebanese Shia group Timeline of Key Events
Hezbollah (another FTO). From its inception, Hamas has
overseen a social welfare network that appears to have 1987-2005 Hamas emerges as main Palestinian “rejectionist”
aided its popularity among Palestinians while serving as a group (with support from Iran and private Arab
conduit for some funding for Hamas military operations. sources) by engaging in violent attacks against
On October 7, 2023, Hamas led a surprise assault against Israelis; the United States begins subjecting Hamas
Israel that killed some 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals to financial sanctions in 1995 and designates
(including 35 Americans) and took around 240 persons Hamas as an FTO in 1997.
hostage (including some Americans)—more than 100 of
2005 After the second intifada (2000-2005), Israel
whom were released in November. The attack’s scope and
unilaterally cedes responsibility for Gaza to the
lethality was unprecedented for Hamas. The ensuing PA, but Israel (with Egypt) retains control over
conflict, which has reportedly killed more than 18,000
land/sea/air access.
Palestinians in Gaza, has reshaped Middle Eastern
dynamics, with implications for U.S. policy and Congress. 2006 Hamas wins a majority in Palestinian Legislative
A Hamas spokesperson has said the group is committed to Council election and leads new PA cabinet; Israel,
repeating October 7-style attacks against Israel. United States, and European Union confine
Origins, Ideology, and Leadership interactions and funding to PA President
Mahmoud Abbas.
An outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Hamas emerged in 1987 in Gaza during the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split: Hamas seizes control of
first Palestinian intifada (uprising). After the Palestine Gaza Strip; Abbas reorganizes PA cabinet to lead
Liberation Organization (PLO) entered into a peace process West Bank; Israel and Egypt impose security-
with Israel that created the Palestinian Authority (PA) to related restrictions on the transit of people and
exercise limited rule in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas goods in and out of Gaza.
established itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah
movement, which leads the PLO, by violently attacking 2008-2021 Rounds of major Israel-Hamas conflict in 2008-
Israeli civilian and military targets. Hamas’s ideology 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021 end with little or no
combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic change to status quo in Gaza; 2011 exchange for
fundamentalism. Hamas’s 1988 charter committed the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit returns more than 1,000
group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of Palestinian prisoners (including Sinwar).
an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine (comprising
present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza), and included 2023 Hamas-led October 7 assault begins major
anti-Semitic (anti-Jewish) rhetoric. Observers differ on the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
extent of Hamas’s pragmatism. The group publicly released Military Capabilities and External Support
a 2017 document stating that Hamas’s conflict is with the
“Zionist project” rather than with Jews in general. It also Hamas’s military capabilities and tactics have steadily
expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state in the advanced in sophistication from the rudimentary guerrilla
West Bank and Gaza if it results from “national consensus,” and suicide attacks it initially employed. The group uses a
but said Hamas would not recognize Israel’s legitimacy. range of domestically produced and smuggled weaponry:
rockets and mortars, drones, anti-tank guided missiles, man-
Hamas’s formal leadership structure consists of a 15- portable air defense systems, and a variety of small arms.
member politburo as the group’s primary decision-making Most of its rockets—the main impetus for Israel’s Iron
entity and a Shura Council that elects the politburo—with Dome anti-rocket system—are only capable of targeting
similar structures for the West Bank, Gaza, prisoners in southern Israel, but some can strike Israel’s main
Israel, and the diaspora. Ismail Haniyeh, a former PA population centers farther north. Hamas has constructed an
prime minister based in Qatar, is chairman of the politburo. extensive system of tunnels within Gaza that it uses to
Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza since 2017,

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 Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy

protect and transport personnel and weapons—significantly economic recovery and reconstruction was minimal—
increasing targeting difficulties for Israeli forces. perhaps partly because some international actors were
According to the State Department, “Hamas has received unsure about the durability of any rebuilding efforts and/or
funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds how those efforts could proceed without bolstering Hamas.
in Persian Gulf countries,” and Iran provides up to $100 President Biden has surmised that one objective of Hamas’s
million annually in combined support to Palestinian October 7 assault may have been to disrupt Israel’s
militants. U.S. officials have said they have not found improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia. Hamas might
evidence that Iran helped directly plan the October 7 have sought to reemphasize the importance of Arab popular
attacks, but argue that Iran’s longtime support for Hamas support for the Palestinian cause to Arab states engaging in
makes it “broadly complicit.” An Economist article has or considering closer relations with Israel. Hamas leaders
estimated Hamas’s annual revenue to be more than $1 and various observers have suggested other possible
billion, with around $360 million in “taxes” on goods objectives for the attack, such as bolstering Hamas’s
brought into Gaza, and about $750 million from foreign domestic popularity amid active speculation over who
sources. According to the Treasury Department and a U.S.- might succeed PA President Abbas, securing prisoner
based expert, these sources include Iran’s government and releases, and capitalizing on Israeli domestic discord.
cryptocurrency exchanges, plus financiers, companies, and It is unclear how the October assault and Israel’s reaction to
charities in other regional countries, including Algeria, it may affect Hamas’s future in Gaza or elsewhere, and
Sudan, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. whether it can realize its basic goals. Israeli Prime Minister
Political Ambition, Control of Gaza, and Popularity Benjamin Netanyahu has declared Israel’s intent to “destroy
Hamas apparently seeks to play a leading role in the the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas.”
Palestinian national movement. In 2006, it won a surprise Domestic and international pressures could influence the
victory over Fatah in PA legislative elections, giving it nature and extent of Israel’s military operations and post-
nominal control over several key PA government ministries conflict security plans in Gaza, and efforts to stifle support
as it vied with PA President Mahmoud Abbas (who also for Hamas or the ideas and practices it represents.
heads Fatah) for power. A Middle East “Quartet” (the U.S. Policy and Options for Congress
United States, European Union, Russia, and U.N. Secretary- Major questions for U.S. policymakers include: How can
General) urged Hamas to recognize Israel, renounce U.S. efforts to counter Hamas and the Iran-led “axis of
violence, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian resistance” bolster Israel, the PA, and other U.S. regional
agreements. Hamas refused. After a Saudi-brokered PA partners while minimizing suffering for Palestinian
unity government collapsed in 2007, Hamas forcibly seized civilians? How should the United States engage with allies
Gaza, and has since presided over worsening economic and or partners—such as Qatar and Turkey—that may host or
humanitarian conditions there as the de facto authoritarian support Hamas and seek to mediate its conflicts? How can
ruler. Since taking power, Hamas and other groups like various actors assist Palestinians in Gaza and reestablish
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have used Gaza to launch post-conflict governance there without empowering Hamas
attacks on Israel, prompting tightened access restrictions or its ideology and tactics? Since 2006, Congress and the
from Israel and Egypt. The PA has countered Hamas’s executive branch appear to have structured certain types of
presence in the West Bank with Israeli and U.S. support. U.S. economic and security assistance partly to help the PA
Media reports since 2022 suggest that Hamas and PIJ, with counter Hamas. Congress also has placed conditions and
Iranian backing, have aided increased militant action in the restrictions on U.S. funding to any PA government that
West Bank to target Israelis and undermine the PA. Hamas controls, joins, or “unduly influences” (for example,
The extent of Hamas’s domestic popularity is uncertain. in P.L. 109-446 and Section 7040(f) of P.L. 117-328).
Hamas portrays itself as defending Palestinian national The Biden Administration publicly supports Israel’s efforts
aspirations and Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites, and is the to end Hamas rule in Gaza, while seeking greater protection
preferred faction of at least 20% of Palestinians (in the and humanitarian assistance for civilians. U.S. and Israeli
West Bank and Gaza, or WBG) in most polls. However, in officials also seek the release of hostages. Debate continues
an Arab Barometer survey just prior to October 7, a about how to achieve these goals. The Treasury Department
majority of Gazans expressed little or no trust in the has designated many actors for sanctions as Hamas
Hamas-led government, and Palestinians (in WBG) voiced supporters, but may have difficulty limiting fundraising
more overall support for Fatah than for Hamas. WBG polls activities abroad that bypass the U.S. financial system.
from late 2023 suggested that the conflict had boosted
Palestinian approval for Hamas, but one analyst said such In November 2023, the House passed the Hamas
views could change when conflict subsides. In the wake of International Financing Prevention Act (H.R. 340), which
past conflicts, Hamas’s domestic popularity has spiked, would require the executive branch to impose sanctions on
before falling again to pre-conflict levels soon thereafter. foreign actors that provide certain types of support to
Hamas, PIJ, or affiliates, subject to a presidential waiver for
Armed Conflict with Israel national security reasons. Some other bills (including S. 489
Hamas has pointed to purported Israeli military and and H.R. 5996) would condition funding to Gaza on
political provocations to justify escalations of violence. certifications that Hamas and other FTOs would not benefit.
During the four rounds of major conflict before October
2023, Hamas and other militants launched rockets Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
indiscriminately toward Israel, and Israeli military strikes
largely decimated Gaza’s infrastructure. After each round, IF12549

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 Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy

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