The Future of Political Leadership in

the Digital Age

This book comprehensively describes the impact of modern technologies

on political leadership by providing a new paradigm of the phenomenon
of neo-leadership, that is political leadership oriented on creating both the
image and political influence on the Internet.
It examines its functioning in the new media environment and identifies
the most important transforming trends, taking into account their impact
on political and social relations in an era of dynamic technological devel-
opment. Systematically exploring various dimensions of leadership, it pre-
sents new notions relevant in a networked world where leaders are created
and conduct themselves against the backdrop of a technological revolution,
including the development of AI, automation, algorithms and ultrafast net-
works, all of which strengthen or disrupt their impact and create a new set
of virtual authorities exerting an increasing impact on society, ethical con-
siderations and political life and requiring new methods for study.
This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners
of leadership and elite studies, media and communication studies, politi-
cal marketing, political science, international relations; public policy, and
sociology.

Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka is Professor of Political Science and Director of

the Institute of International Relations and Public Policy at Jan Kochanowski
University, Poland.

Tomasz Gajewski is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of the Institute

of International Relations and Public Policy at Jan Kochanowski University,
Poland.
Routledge Research in Comparative Politics

Think Tanks in the US and EU

The Role of Policy Institutes in Washington and Brussels
Christopher J. Rastrick

Institutions, Partisanship and Credibility in Global Financial Markets

Hye Jee Cho

Health and Political Engagement

Mikko Mattila, Lauri Rapeli, Hanna Wass and Peter Söderlund

Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence in Times of Austerity

Studying Social Movements in Comparative Perspective
Joanna Rak

Interest Group Organisation in the European Union

How Internal Organisational Structures Shape Interest Group Agency
Michelle Hollman

Coalition Government as a Reflection of a Nation’s Politics and Society

A Comparative Study of Parliamentary Parties and Cabinets in 12 Countries
Edited by Matt Evans

Transparency and Secrecy in European Democracies

Contested Trade-offs
Edited by Dorota Mokrosinska

Climate Governance across the Globe

Pioneers, Leaders and Followers
Edited by Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel, Mikael Skou Andersen and Paul Tobin

The Future of Political Leadership in the Digital Age

Neo-Leadership, Image and Influence
Edited by Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka and Tomasz Gajewski
The Future of Political
Leadership in the Digital Age
Neo-Leadership, Image and Influence

Edited by Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka

and Tomasz Gajewski
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
© 2021 selection and editorial matter, Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
and Tomasz Gajewski; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka and Tomasz Gajewski to be
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors
for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with
sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-0-367-68519-5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-13792-4 (ebk)
Typeset in Times NR MT Pro
by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.
Contents

List of tables vi
List of contributors vii
Introduction 1
AGNIESZKA KASIŃSKA-METRYKA, TOMASZ GAJEWSKI

1 Neoleadership paradigm 4
AGNIESZKA KASIŃSKA-METRYKA

2 Society immersed in mediacracy 17

MARIA NOWINA KONOPKA

3 The technology of future leadership 34

TOMASZ GAJEWSKI

4 The (non?)ethical dilemmas of political leadership 52

ARTUR LASKA

5 Authority in the network -- who is it? 76

KATARZYNA GRUSZKO, WITOLD SOKAŁA

6 How to research neoleadership? 100

WERONIKA ŚWIERCZYŃSKA-GŁOWNIA

7 Leaders of parties or parties of leaders? The position

of party leaders and models of their selection on the
example of Poland and the Czech Republic 124
MACIEJ HARTLIŃSKI, MICHAL KUBÁT

8 The development of technopopulism in a globalised world 140

RAFAŁ DUDAŁA

Conclusions 158
AGNIESZKA KASIŃSKA-METRYKA,TOMASZ GAJEWSKI

Index 162
List of tables

5.1 Differences between the old and new model of functioning

of the authority category 96
7.1 The party leader’s membership in other bodies of the party 128
7.2 Competences of the party leader towards other party organs 129
7.3 Competences of the party leader to apply for specific
positions in the party 130
7.4 The body electing the party leader 132
7.5 Leadership selection in Law and Justice 134
7.6 Leadership selection in PO, votes at party Congress (%) 135
7.7 Leadership selection in ANO 2011 135
List of contributors

Rafał Dudała He received PhD from Pontificia Università Lateranense and

PhD with “habilitation” title from Wroclaw University. He is an Associate
professor and lecturer at the Institute of International Relations and
Public Policy, Jan Kochanowski University. He specializes in political
theory, contemporary populisms. He also researches Mediterranean
political systems, state-religious systems relations and national identities.
Author of numerous monographs and articles.
Tomasz Gajewski Assistant professor, Deputy Director of the Institute of
International Relations and Public Policy, Jan Kochanowski University,
specializing in international forecasting and studies of technological
development (especially information technologies) and climate change
on international system's stability and parameters of strategic security
environment. Member of Polish Political Science Association and
Polish International Studies Association. Analyst in Po.Int Foundation,
publicist in New Confederation (thinkzine).
Katarzyna Gruszko Assistant professor at the Institute of International
Relations and Public Policy, Jan Kochanowski University. She is the
author of papers and studies in the field of global order, international
security and international organizations, as well as in the area of political
myth application in foreign policy.
Maciej Hartliński Associate Professor at University of Warmia and Mazury
in Olsztyn. He has held visiting positions at University of Oxford, Indiana
University – Bloomington and many other European universities. He
is the author of several books, chapters and articles in peer-reviewed
journals on party politics, political leaders and party leadership in post-
communist countries.
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka Professor of Political Science, Director of the
Institute of International Relations and Public Policy, Jan Kochanowski
University, specializing in political leadership, social communication,
political marketing and women political activity in Poland. She is a member
of international political science organizations (International Political
viii List of contributors

Science Association, Central European Political Science Association) and

vice-chairman of Polish Political Science Association (PTNP).
Michal Kubát Associate Professor of Political Science at Charles University
in Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of several books, chapters
and articles in peer-reviewed journals on party politics, political regimes
(semi-presidentialism), political systems of Central European countries
and the life and work of Giovanni Sartori.
Artur Laska Associate professor at the Kazimierz Wielki University in
Bydgoszcz; Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences and Administration.
He is a political scientist specializing in political theory. In 2010–2016,
he was the president of the Polish Political Science Association branch
in Bydgoszcz. Author of over 60 scientific publications, including 4
monographs. His research interests focus on the moral and emotional
basis of political subjectivity. In 2017, he proposed his own integral
theory of politics, taking into account the latest achievements of cognitive
neuroscience. Innovative leadership is the second of his important interests.
Maria Nowina Konopka Associate Professor at the Institute of Journalism,
Media and Social Communication of Jagiellonian University Doctor
with “habilitation” of Social Studies in the field of media science (the
title of academic achievements: “The Media Evolution of the Network
Society”). Her scientific and research interests to date focused on three
areas: socio-political aspects of the impact of the Internet, political
communication, with particular emphasis on political marketing and the
information management.
Witold Sokała Assistant professor and Deputy Director at the Institute of
International Relations and Public Policy, Jan Kochanowski University.
His researches include issues of information warfare, asymmetrical threats
and transformations of the network-centric security environment. He is
the chairman of the Board and an expert of the Po.Int Foundation and
an expert of the “New Confederation” (think-zine). He used to work as a
journalist, government officer, manager in a private sector and independent
consultant, in the field of marketing and business intelligence.
Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia Associate professor at the Institute of
Journalism, Media and Social Communication at the Jagiellonian
University. Head of the Department of International Communication
and Media. She carries out scientific research in the field of management
of media organisations, media economics, and changes in the functioning
of the media market. She focuses her work on analysing the process of
media digitization in the aspect of activities and strategies adopted by
media institutions. Author of award-winning monographs and numerous
of scientific publications. She specialises in designing effective channels of
internal communication and developing tools for their implementation.
 Introduction
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka, Tomasz Gajewski

Political leadership is one of the most widespread and most difficult to

define social phenomena. This well-known saying does not lose its rele-
vance despite the constantly changing leadership context. A review of world
leadership literature gives a glimpse of the different trends of its descrip-
tion. In addition to theoretical scientific papers (Burns, 2010; Elcock, 2001;
Johnson, 2013; Kearns, 2019; Northouse, 2018, 2020), there are many guides
simplifying the phenomenon of leadership and reducing it to a set of learned
competences and acquired features. In our belief, there is no formal leader-
ship algorithm, and its effectiveness is always the result of both exogenous
and endogenous factors. This book is therefore not a new theory of lead-
ership or a guide/self-help book on how to gain power and influence. Its
purpose is to try to prove that a new kind of leadership is emerging before
our eyes, the so-called neoleadership, which involves not only the personal
predisposition of individuals (traditional leadership) and the organisational
efficiency of its environment (marketing-oriented leadership), but also tech-
nological achievements, and above all the Internet tools. We focused on
analysing only political leadership in democratic systems, because, first,
political communication in non-democratic regimes does not exist outside
of propaganda, and second, forecasting leadership trends is possible in pre-
dictable systems.
The social actors are “caught in the digital net”. It is the voters – both
convinced and potential ones – who are subject to media influences that
reduce the cognitive function of the individual and, in addition to informa-
tion, also provide their interpretation. On the other hand, political actors
are “stuck” in the network, because leaving it, giving up the opportunities it
offers mean political non-existence. However, is technical progress respon-
sible for the quality of the politics? What role are political parties playing
these days? How are authorities created and can they be managed exter-
nally? What ethical dilemmas is today’s politics raising? Why are populist
groups growing in strength? How will technology affect leadership in the
future? These are just some of the questions that accompanied the creation
of the book written by a team of experts – political scientists and media
2 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka, Tomasz Gajewski
experts. We all have a desire to explore the direction in which leadership is
evolving, as well as to seek answers regarding its systemic conditions, i.e. the
condition of liberal democracy.
The book was created just before the global crisis caused by the pan-
demic, which proved the fragility of existing socio-economic dependencies,
the complexity of the globalised world and the limited predictability of
events affecting the fate of humanity. Leaders at the head of the countries
have chosen various strategies to deal with the threat, while at the same
time fundamental principles of humanism such as solidarity, responsibility
and support have been verified. In this way, political reality added an annex
to our considerations, ordering to undertake research on the condition of
leadership in the “new normality” in relation to individual countries (which
we intend to do in the second volume of the book).
The structure of this book corresponds to eight levels of analysis and is
built in accordance with the principle of theoretical and general introduc-
tion (definitions and history of leadership) and gradual refinement of the
areas studied. In this way, the closing chapters have the most pragmatic
dimension and are based on empirical research of party and populist lead-
ership. The following chapters of the book are:

• Neoleadership paradigm?
• Society immersed in mediacracy.
• The technology of future leadership.
• (Non)ethical dilemmas of leadership.
• Authority in the network – who is it?
• How to research neoleadership?
• Leaders of parties or parties of leaders?
• The development of technopopulism in a globalised world.

The presented theory of leadership is of general nature, but with references

to global political systems in which individual researchers specialise. Their
origins from Central and Eastern Europe, however, do not narrow down
the research perspective, but bring an original non-stream perspective on
the transformation of leadership. The adopted research methodology was
motivated by the desire to create universal descriptions, based largely on
comparative studies. The most important methods used in the work are,
in addition to the already mentioned comparative method, system analysis
(meso and macro) as well as selected, heuristic methods of forecasting. The
latter are particularly important from the perspective of the implementation
of the prognostic function, because in the aforementioned “new normality”
it is the phenomenon of leadership that will be one of the most important
determinants of changes taking place.
The nature of the publication was inspired by the image of its reader. On
one hand, it may be a researcher or a student of social sciences who wants
to deepen and update her/his knowledge. However, on the other hand, the
 Introduction 3
language of the work is adapted to the so-called ordinary person, striving to
consciously interpret a phenomenon as common as political leadership. To
make the book more reader-friendly, the most important (and innovative)
definitions were highlighted in the form of blocks.
We hope that “The Future of Political Leadership: Caught in the Network”
will be an invitation to discuss political leadership and its impact on the
functioning of modern societies in conditions of changing democracy.

References
Burns, J. M. (2010). Leadership. New York: Harper & Row.
Elcock, H. J. (2001). Political leadership. London: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Johnson, C. E. (2013). Meeting the Ethical Challenges of Leadership: Casting Light
Or Shadow. London: Sage.
Kearns, D. (2019). Leadership in turbulent times. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Northouse, P. (2018). Leadership: theory and practice. London: Sage.
Northouse, P. (2020). Introduction to leadership: concepts and practice. London:
Sage.
1 Neoleadership paradigm
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka

Introduction
Political leadership belongs to the fundamental cognitive categories within
social sciences in the broad sense. Its political, sociological, philosophical
or media-analytical perspectives may present different aspects of this phe-
nomenon, which does not change the fact that it remains a phenomenon
in the Weberian understanding. The methodological individualism used
in relation to political leadership is justified, because there is no universal
algorithm of effective leadership, which should always be studied as a result
of the characteristics of the individual and the context of the individual’s
functioning in the political space.
The aim of the undertaken considerations is to indicate the specificity of
changes taking place within the phenomenon of leadership, and especially
the theoretical reflection on its current character. To what extent it is an ad
hoc modification of previous leadership models, and to what extent they
can be treated as a cognitive creative paradigm, i.e. a structure by which
detailed theories can be created. The challenge itself is the attempt to define
neoleadership and derive a linear relationship between the preceding mod-
els. In addition to the method of system analysis treating leadership as a
set of interrelated and interacting elements, it is also necessary to resort to
the comparative method, because it allows one to see identical features and
differences between successive patterns of leadership.
A critical view of the literature on the subject indicates a kind of paradox.
Apparently, the literature on leadership is numerous, but one closer analysis
of it indicates the existence of several classical philosophical and scientific
works and many quasi-textbook studies. Such a basic term as “leadership”
is more often analysed at a pragmatic level than theoretical, which leads to
a definitive blur. The mentioned pragmatism narrows the cognitive perspec-
tive, reducing leadership to a set of skills (know-how) that can be learned at
any time, provided that the science is accompanied by the right motivation.
The lack of logical focus in the treatment of the concepts of “leadership” and
“management” means that these terms are used interchangeably, especially
on the border between management and political science. In literature, this
 Neoleadership paradigm 5
manifests itself in the abovementioned number of textbooks encouraging
“to become a leader” and freely incorporating mixed-up sociological, eco-
nomic, psychological concepts into the narrative, etc.
The omnipresence of leadership in social life, in turn, generates problems
in identifying distinctive features of political leadership, as well as creating a
definition framework for the categories associated with it. From the perspec-
tive of the analysis undertaken, it is the “leadership”, “influence”, “power”,
“individual” and “group” that will form the nodes of the concept grid used.
The individual phenomenon, i.e. the individual, is a psychological concept
necessary to describe leadership, which always has an individualised dimen-
sion in politics. The group, on the other hand, is treated in accordance with
the sociological perspective, i.e. as a set of people who interact showing sep-
aration from others and have a relatively uniform system of norms and val-
ues (the supporters of the leader). More dilemmas arise when choosing the
most useful definition of power and influence. The behavioural definition
of Weber (2015), which reduces the exercise of power to the possibility of
influencing the behaviour of others, requires confirmation that this happens
within the framework prescribed by law (normative theory of power). At
the same time, it should be clearly emphasised that exercising power is not
always synonymous with being a leader and vice versa.
The adopted research hypothesis assumes that throughout history, lead-
ership has evolved from a traditional model, i.e. based on personality traits
and the natural abilities of a leader, through marketing-oriented leadership,
and currently we are dealing with leadership developed on the basis of pop-
ulism and conditioned by the media (neoleadership) which must be defined.
As already mentioned, neoleadership functions in the communication space
more as a category understood intuitively than scientifically defined. Until
now, it has not been defined in the literature, and in our opinion the cur-
rently observed change in political reality, i.e. the crisis of liberal democra-
cies, the development of new populisms and the intensified medialization of
politics, generate a new model of relations between those in power and those
who are led. However, the definition of new leadership should be preceded
by asking questions about: elements conditioning neoleadership; the con-
ditions of its effectiveness in post-modern times; changes in the impact on
the expectations and reactions of supporters (in the Easton approach to the
incoming energy system and balanced by decisions)

Traditional (classical) leadership model

The most classic considerations of political leadership are contained in
the works of modern theorists such as Max Weber, Friedrich Nietzsche,
Gustave Le Bon, José Ortega y Gasset, Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno,
although fundamental issues regarding the nature of the exercise of power
by the individual appeared in ancient political thought (including Plato and
the idea king-philosopher) and since that time one can mostly speak only
6 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
about their development or transposition in a changing historical and social
context. If you want to recall the classic definition of leadership based on an
asymmetrical relationship but resulting from the personality of the leader
(the theory of an outstanding individual), it is worth reaching into consid-
erations that take into account its psychological conditions. In this way, it
is possible to create your own proposal, taking into account the three most
common ways to describe leadership, i.e. as a skill, a relationship or a pro-
cess. Researchers do not agree/cannot reach an agreement on which of the
above ways of perceiving leadership is optimal, but one can try to combine
them, i.e. treat leadership as a relationship based on the skills (competences
of the leader) that is a part of the social process, i.e. an ordered sequence of
consecutive changes.
Particularly inspirational from the adopted perspective should be the
reflections on leadership that James MacGregor Burns (1978) concluded
in the book Leadership. Although it has been criticised in the researchers’
society, and Burns himself pointed out the need to update his concept after
many years, the distinction of transformational and transactional leader-
ship based on moral determinant inspired subsequent theorists (including
Bernard Bass) to look at this phenomenon precisely from the perspective
of the relationship between the leader and the supporters (benefits gained).
Burns’ proposal is also useful due to the fact that the issue of ethics he
exposes is a repetitive factor in the leadership evolution triad adopted by us,
i.e. traditional leadership – marketing-oriented leadership – neoleadership
A separate part of the book is devoted to this issue, but it is worth men-
tioning that the progressive “professionalisation” of leadership relationships
generates questions about the limits of ethics of undertaken actions. The
essential one concerns the primacy of effectiveness over moral aspects. Of
course, the dilemma outlined in itself is not new (Machiavelli, 2003), while
the question about the change in ethics of followers’ behaviour is innovative.
In conclusion, leadership in the classical sense can be defined as:

the relationship formed between the leader and the group (supporters)
in which the leader receives support because of her/his characteris-
tics and competence. The leader sets goals and motivates followers to
achieve them, and they follow the indicated path, trusting in obtaining
positively valued goods (tangible and intangible).

The already mentioned Burns’ concept assumes that in the transforma-

tional approach there is a “transformation” of supporters whose motivation
and value system are evolving to a higher level. On the other hand, the trans-
actional (less ethical) option was interpreted as realising specific interests.
Despite the aforementioned shortcomings of the above typology –Bass and
Avolio (1993) distinguished other attributes of transformational leadership),
it is a suitable starting point for our considerations towards marketing-
oriented leadership.
 Neoleadership paradigm 7
Marketing-oriented leadership
Extracting marketing leadership is difficult, especially in identifying its
beginning. It is obvious that since the dawn of history, leaders have built, in
the eyes of their subjects, their image based on the majesty of power and used
the context in which they lived to strengthen their influence on the environ-
ment. However, if we take the professionalisation of political activities based
on mass communication tools as a distinctive feature, it can be concluded that
the year 1952, i.e. the election campaign of Dwight Eisenhower in the USA
was the beginning not only of political marketing, but also of marketing-
oriented leadership. Earlier attempts were made to build an “improved”
image of a leader (for example, photographing a wheelchair moving F.D.
Roosevelt only from the waist up), but it was only in Eisenhower’s campaign
that marketing tools were used comprehensively. A well-thought-out cam-
paign plan, the use of television advertising (O’Shaughnessy, 1990, p. 48),
identification of target groups, directed political talk-show with the par-
ticipation of the candidate translated into electoral success. The following
decades brought further professionalisation of communication with voters,
including the involvement of more media, the specialisation of advisors and
opinion polls. The example of the aforementioned Eisenhower campaign
shows that even a politician deprived of natural leadership attributes (in this
case, communication skills) can be effectively created as a leader.
Therefore, it is justified to claim that the vector of the change of classic
leadership boils down to a reduction of the personality factor in favour of
creation by specialised experts (image makers). In this way, the opinion for-
mulated by researchers (Kouzes & Posner, 2012) confirms that leadership is
an observable and possible to learn set of actions, not something mystical,
ethereal that cannot be understood by ordinary people. A properly created
politician with financial resources and expert support can be chosen as a
leader and in contrast to the so-called Zeitgeist theory is not the “spirit of
the age” that elevates this individual to the height of power, but marketing
efficiency. It can be compared to the economic mechanisms described by
Kotler and Keller (2005), which are aimed at effective sale of a properly
prepared product. Its packaging (image), distribution (channels to reach
voters), brand (personal brand) and sales strategy (electoral strategy) can
translate into success, with the difference that in the “sales” policy takes
place one day, i.e. on the election day.
The economic roots of political marketing cannot be overlooked,
although the treatment of politicians and parties as products is perceived by
some researchers as a dehumanising concept. On the other hand, however,
examining electoral behaviour and comparing it to consumer behaviour
confirms many existing analogies. Marketing is not just the creation and the
sale of a potential leader. It is a form of communication with voters, a com-
prehensive process (Maarek, 1995) and extends beyond political advertis-
ing, preparation of party conventions and speeches by leaders. As Lock and
8 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
Harris (1996) noted, political marketing is becoming a collection of tools for
communicating with both voters and party members, the media and “cam-
paign funding sources”. It was the development of the media that made the
contact with the leader gain a mass character, and at the same time acquired
the characteristics of a “secondary experience”. The mediatisation of the
political offer (understood as a combination of image and program assump-
tions) required streamlining the processes of managing the overall image of
a leader in a way that limits the possibility of making a mistake.
The history of political marketing, which came to Western Europe from
the USA, and after the period of transformation also to Central and Eastern
Europe, prove the weakening role of the natural political backing (parties)
for the benefit of specialised external entities1. They prepare the candidate
for public appearances, search for sources of campaign financing, analyse
the activity of competitors, develop a strategy, and monitor social moods,
especially in terms of loyalty and the flow of voters.
It should be emphasised that the described activity is not limited to the
classically understood electoral marketing (i.e. only concerning the elec-
toral situation), because post-electoral behaviour (which can be compared
to post-purchase behaviour) has made political marketing permanent. For
definitional clarity it can be indicated that:
Political marketing = Electoral marketing +
Post-electoral marketing ( Inter-electoral marketing ) .

The intensified communication before the election is followed by strategi-

cally long-term actions, i.e. aimed at maintaining and strengthening the
acquired power. This corresponds to the American principle that “the cam-
paign begins the day after the election”. Bearing in mind the “relational
core” of leadership, one can attempt to indicate its marketing determinants
that decide on a different from the classical model.

Marketing-oriented leadership is therefore a relationship between a

leader and his supporters based on “buying promises” or a declaration
of the fulfilment of previously diagnosed needs of voters. The election is
followed by marketing talks of maintaining supporters’ interest, mainly
through mass media.

The above proposal highlights the transactional nature of leadership, as the

price for the voter’s vote is the promise of fulfilling the obligations contained
in the offer (political adequacy). Unlike the leadership understood in a clas-
sical sense, it is not the personality of the leader and her/his vision of the
world that are dominant, but the actions taken are a response to the diag-
nosed social demand. So, there is a significant reversal of roles relative to
traditional leadership. The leader is not the one who creates the vision and
convinces to implement it, but the one who says, “tell me what you need,
 Neoleadership paradigm 9
and I promise this to you”. From this perspective, the creative function of
leadership is limited, because its duration becomes a goal per se. The role
of party background is also reduced, as they are not directly responsible
for the preparation and the implementation of the campaign, but only play
roles prepared by spin doctors. The attributes of transformational leader-
ship mentioned by Bass and Avolio, i.e. charisma, motivation, intellectual
stimulation and personalised attention, become secondary to the ability to
read the needs and build a message so universal that it will reach the widest
possible group of voters (also potential).
Intensive development of marketing tools and techniques occurred at
the turn of the 1980s and 1990s and was associated with the development
of the new media. Although marketing practice has had a tangible impact
on the political phenomena and processes, many scholars have maintained
a negative attitude towards treating political marketing as a political
sub-discipline rooted in economy. Retrospective analysis proves that only a
small proportion of researchers have noticed the characteristic advantages
of political marketing that go beyond the theory of political science. On
the other hand, voices that raised its importance for the development of
democracy appeared in the discussion on the role of marketing. Scammell
(1995, pp. 18–19) noted that despite existing threats (e.g. the involvement
of political consultants in the government’s internal work), the use of mar-
keting tools can improve the quality and amount of information reaching
the electorate, which increases the electorate’s awareness. According to the
researcher, marketing activities can rationalise the behaviour of candidates
(leaders) in conditions of competitive democracy.
Acceptance of the growing influence of marketing on political reality
has increased the number of questions related to the ethics of operations.
Rooted in antiquity, the model of a leader with a virtue of morality was con-
fronted with utilitarianism. Importantly, the rigor of supporters was also
questioned, those who support not only morally impeccable leaders, but
also those who are deprived of so-called private and/or public virtue. At
the end of the 90s, the discussion on the moral condition of the leader flared
up after the so-called zippergate, i.e. revealing the affair of US President
Bill Clinton with an intern and with the moral assessment of this episode
by the Americans. Despite the legal consequences that reached the presi-
dent (the impeachment procedure), his popularity among the Americans
increased. The good economic condition of a country led by an efficient
politician turned out to be more important than Clinton’s use of a lie in the
public space.

Towards neoleadership
From the current considerations, the direction of the evolution of leadership
emerges, which originally had transcendent legitimacy to rely on the norma-
tive concept of government (philosophical legitimacy), custom (traditional
10 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
legitimacy) and finally the democratic process of selecting leaders (proce-
dural legitimacy).
The division cited after Friedrich (1963, p. 236) ceased to be sufficient in
times of crises of liberal democracy. The plural was used here to emphasise
the beginning of the 21st century brought not one global economic crisis,
but a series of crises that directly contributed to the development of a new
leadership model, i.e. neoleadership. In the analysed aspect, the crisis of the
elites, the crisis of trust and the crisis of political communication were par-
ticularly important. They are closely related and boil down to “lack of being
listened to” and an increase in asymmetry in the ruling-ruled relationship.
Party systems that were not supplied with new entities, party leaders deriv-
ing from the same ideological environments, message simplification and
avoidance of confrontation are just some of the reasons for the upsetting
of the rules of the political game developed so far. To put it simply, it can
be said that in the times of economic, the signals of the existence of patho-
logical processes (corruption, nepotism, lack of information about threats,
e.g. cheap loans) were ignored by citizens and downplayed by the rulers, in
the circumstances of economic downturn (Greece, Spain, Italy) there was
social disagreement with the current model of exercising power. The rulers
were criticised not only for errors or inaction, but the entire mechanism
of elite election and replacement were subjects to contestation. The change
in demand for the current style of leadership has been confirmed by many
examples from Europe, but also from outside. It is enough to recall: the
victory of Donald Trump in the USA, the support of Marine le Pen in
France, the reforms of Viktor Òrban in Hungary, the success of Beppe
Grillo and the Five Star Movement in Italy, the position of the Podemos
and VOX parties in Spain, the result of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands,
and the success of the Slovak movement “Normal People and Independent
Personalities”. The examples cited are connected by the populist subsoil
on which new leaders grew and their anti-systemic pedigree.
The history of democracy proves that the appearance of populisms in it
is usually temporary and leads to a correction of its functioning. This is in
line with the approach of Rustow (1970, pp. 357–358), who drew attention
to the need to take into account the so-called genetic paradigm in research
on the development of democracy. Paradoxically, both democracy and pop-
ulism are concepts that are often – especially in public discourse – stereo-
typed. However, while democracy is attributed to the “beautiful and bright”
(Crick, 1992), populism is often treated pejoratively, identified with manip-
ulation and attributed to extreme groups (Mény & Surel, 2002). One could
venture to say that most voters see democracy as a fuzzy ideal, described
intuitively (“democracy is something that is with us”), not labelled with an
adjective or limited to people’s rule.
Is it possible in such circumstances to define the features of optimal lead-
ership in the system of liberal democracy? Is it possible to separate the image
of democracy from its real image? And finally, how are societies prepared
 Neoleadership paradigm 11
for the dialogue on alternative models of democracy, if in the space of pre-
vious discussions, it appeared as a no-alternative system? It seems that the
answer can be seen in treating democracy as “ideal and reality at the same
time”. Two components of the described phenomenon, i.e. the democratic
dimension and the liberal dimension, mean the conjunction of classical rep-
resentative (institutional) principles and the freedom within which the indi-
vidual forms her/his “identity and interests”. As Lamentowicz (2015, p. 1)
writes, it is the degree of internal consistency of the amalgam that deter-
mines the degree of ideological coherence of democracy. While the freedom
and dignity of the individual may be considered as axiologically “positive
components of democracy”, it is not legitimate to treat liberal democracy
in corpore as such. Therefore, when considering the functioning of leader-
ship in the conditions of changing democracy, one should make a reser-
vation protecting against the unauthorised extrapolation of conclusions,
namely that “liberal democracy is a form of many modern Western states
and still remains an attractive social ideal, which, however, can still not be
stated adapted to the cultural traditions of Asia, Africa and Latin America”
(Lamentowicz, 2015, p. 2).
Nowadays, the fundamental question is no longer about the nature of
transformation in individual systems (because the ways of transition from
non-democracy to democracy have been thoroughly studied by transi-
tology), but the answer to the question about the sources of democracy
defects and possible ways of transforming it. Some researchers – e.g.
Andrzej Antoszewski (2012, pp. 21–40) – see the reasons for the collapse of
the existing mechanisms of democracy not in its institutional dimension or
in the quality of the party system, but in the level of political culture. The
most important source of obstruction is the crisis of trust, which affects
communication disruptions, changes the conditions for elite selection and
redefines the type of political culture dominating in a given system. When
citizens do not believe the rulers, this distrust also extends to the function-
ing of individual institutions, which threatens the stability of the state.
Research by the Pew Research Center shows invariably that there is a cor-
relation between a belief that citizens have little impact on the govern-
ment and satisfaction with democracy. It is the citizens of many European
consolidated democracies who show a much lower degree of satisfaction
with democracy than, for example, the citizens of India or some African
countries.
In the conditions described, “marketing-controlled” leadership, i.e. cut
off from its traditional roots understood as the natural strength of the
leader, is threatened by two change scenarios:

• Radicalisation and evolving towards undemocratic power (despite the

existence of democratic institutions in the state).
• Populism, both in the variant of traditional populisms with a leftist basis
and the so-called new populisms (including right-wing populisms).
12 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
The first scenario is already confirmed by the transformations that are tak-
ing place, among others, in Turkey, Poland, Hungary. On a global scale,
only about 40 percent of population live in countries that are considered
free, and in the past decade the number of those in which the principles of
representative democracy have not been respected has risen (see Freedom
House study). Such data are a counterweight to Western European cen-
trism, which requires treating liberal democracy systems as optimal,
non-alternative and immutable. So, what sins of the “crisis of democracy”
burden the leaders and contribute to the search for new patterns of leader-
supporter relationships? Although the socio-economic context, as well as
the mental one is specifically different for each country, some common bur-
dens arising from the globalisation of the marketing process of creating
leaders can be distinguished.
First of all – the crisis of democracy leads to the oligarchisation of lead-
ership mechanisms, i.e. strengthening the control of the functioning of the
state by the apparatus of power (the so-called radicalisation scenario).
Second – the illusory nature of political participation resulting from the
“dormancy” of civil societies (in many young democracies they have not yet
been fully educated or this process has been stopped).
Third – maintained bureaucratisation of power mechanisms limit-
ing the efficiency of decision-making processes (abandoned or deferred
implementation).
Fourth – the instrumentalisation of the law used to strengthen the
acquired power and weaken the activities of the opposition
Fifth – a change in the role of the media manifested in, among others,
limiting the control function towards the ruling elites and strengthening the
propaganda function. The universality of the so-called inverted informa-
tion pyramid reduces the cognitive independence of the recipient of political
messages.
The described leadership crisis in its marketing setting takes place in the
conditions of de-democratisation of political systems. The qualitative elite
(the “capable elite”) indicated by G. Sartori is increasingly being replaced
by Lasswellian “possessing elite” (power). As Zygmunt Bauman (1957, p. 19)
noted, the concept of Harold Lasswell means in practice that “group X is
the elite because it governs (…) and does not govern because it is the elite”.
This de-democratisation is defined by the author of these considerations as:
processes of erosion of democratic rules of the political game and replacing
them with new principles initiated from below (Kasińska-Metryka, 2012,
p. 28). The fact that the described processes are not “ordinary” transfor-
mations within the system is proved by, among others the fact that, unlike
transformation, vectors and effects of changes cannot be predicted effec-
tively, and new phenomena (e.g. new populisms) are control resistant.
To sum up, it can be said that the emergence of so-called new populisms
has intensified the formation of the neoleadership pattern as an emanation
of “anti-systemic”. While contesting social problems remained the driving
 Neoleadership paradigm 13
force of leftist populisms in the past, now ideological classification ceases to
be decisive because anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism are just as attrac-
tive to both conservative and liberal audiences.
The great emigration crisis that hit Europe in 2015 naturally strengthened
xenophobic behaviours, especially in the context of the great helplessness
of the European Union in the face of the growing problem of insecurity. It
seems that Poland is an excellent example of a country in which the lack of
a reliable public debate on migration policy has translated into a very large
increase in attitudes that are unfavourable towards refugees (which reached
a peak of 72%). In the face of beliefs shaped in this way, populist actions of
the rulers found a fertile ground.
The ideological compass is therefore no longer the most important deter-
minant of new populist movements, but the fact that they are directed
against a thoughtful order of things (both at the level of states and supra-
national communities), anti-intellectual, anti-elitist, strongly inclusive and
having “bottom-up” roots (as opposed to populism) “Traditional”, i.e. pro-
posed by professional political actors).

Neoleadership or what?
“The democratic leader relies on a large group of lower-level leaders,
whose support is necessary for her/him first to acquire and then to hold
the office of the leader. (…) The one at the head can afford to conflict and
even part with one of them, but not with most of them, because then he
would lose his leadership position” (Wiatr, 2008, pp. 73–76). The cited defi-
nition – however seemingly universal – loses its truthfulness in so-called
post-modernity. Narrowing down the possibilities of defining this term, we
will limit ourselves to accepting Bauman thesis that it is the time in which –
“we are still moving, but we do not know where we are going; we do not even
know whether we are moving in a straight line or moving round and round”
(Bauman, 1994, p. 72). The outlined chaos is consistent with the political
reality and creation of new leadership. While traditionally understood lead-
ership was based on the personality and competences of the individual,
marketing-oriented leadership was a joint creation of the leader and spe-
cialists corresponding to social tastes, neoprene leadership growing on the
ground of dissatisfaction does not yet have its “DNA”.
Comparing the leaders of those European democracies in which pop-
ulism developed the most, one can point out to some comparable person-
ality traits (e.g. egotism), which, however, do not yet entitle to speak of an
axiom of neoleadership. What, then, is its distinguishing feature? What
elements make up this new conduction model? Certainly, it is the ability
to associative communication (Castells, 2010). The traditional power pyr-
amid flattens under the influence of self-mutating elites. The leader, whose
authority is not built on competences, is dependent on the environment and
help of those who have deserved in the fight to win it, even if their “public
14 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
virtues” or “ethics of responsibility” remain in question. A leader operating
in conditions of systemic uncertainty, reaching for the instruments of pop-
ulism depends on the political base/background she/he can manage through
the conflict. Paradoxically, such activities are often accompanied by her/his
solipsistic ambitions and belief in the processual impact on the implemen-
tation of decisions.
Another factor shaping the new type of leadership is the “scissors of ine-
quality”, which escalates conflicts, destroys the sense of solidarity, but also
negatively affects economic development. It is the social sense of injustice
that elevates leadership, a new type of political actor. National crises accu-
mulate dissatisfaction with the values that have constituted the European
community over the years – human rights, free market, multiculturalism,
solidarity etc. Their place is taken by distrust, xenophobia, rhetoric refer-
ring to the figure of “the other” and separatism. On a macro scale, Donald
Trump’s victory in the US and the UK’s exit from the European Union
have created a new quality of political life in which it is legitimate to ask
questions about the role of the United States as both a global leader and a
guarantor of security in Europe. In turn, the Schengen agreement may be a
victim of the migration and epidemiological crisis.
Erosion of so-called culture of trust has re-evaluated the way leaders are
assessed, the scope of their roles, the organisation and functioning of state
institutions, and relativised the sense of responsibility for the word. It can
be argued that the idealistic vision of democracy was subjected to a brutal
confrontation with the populist force of persuasion, in which confabulation
ceased to be a reprehensible trait. The Habermasian vision of deliberative
democracy becomes useless in the face of tribalism.
In conclusion, both the rulers and the ruled are stuck in the title network,
i.e. civic activity practices are increasingly the domain of virtual reality.
Can these changes lead to a “free state” (according to T. Adorno’s vision)?
Or rather, after Martin Heidegger, can one speak of a situation of “making
room for some other authority”? (Mörchen, 1999, p. 215).
While the phenomenon of leadership seems to be unwavering (this was
demonstrated, among others, by the ephemeral nature of contestation
movements, which were supposed to be deprived of a leader), neoleadership
is a phenomenon in statu nascendi. Still, one can try to define it as:

a social phenomenon resulting from the support that is shown to the

individual by the group on the basis of a fragmentary image created and
distributed using network communication models. Supporters support
the leader driven by the need for change, even if her/his authority is
external and communication with the environment is based on propa-
ganda and new technologies

Can leadership defined in this way be a threat to political systems? Populism

itself, from which the new leadership model largely derives, is not a denial
 Neoleadership paradigm 15
of democracy, but it can be a destructive factor in systems that are not
institutionally strong enough. On the other hand, it can be diagnosed that
the rapid economic crisis that many global economies will face after the
pandemic will once again redefine the social demand for leadership style.
Lack of resources, facilities and time to continue PR-populist leadership,
the need to deal with many serious problems at the same time, may direct
social expectations towards less spectacular and more effective leadership.
Also, the need to rebuild security and global economic order may prove
stronger than populist demagogy, even at the price of limiting the liberties
of individuals. The analysis conducted above, based on searching for par-
tial responses to the formulated research problem, allows us to positively
verify the hypothesis set out at the beginning. Leadership as a relationship
that is part of political processes undergoes constant transformations acti-
vated by both exo- and endogenous factors. Technological development,
and especially the progress in the inclusion of new media in the political
space, improves communication between the leader and the environment,
which, however, is not synonymous with raising the so-called quality of gov-
ernance. Neoleadership exists as a phenomenon, but it is not legitimate to
raise it to the rank of a paradigm. The pace and nature of transformations
taking place in socio-political life allows forecasting the emergence of a new
(reactivated or hybrid) model of political leadership in the near future.

Note
1. The separation of the party base and expert base was clearly revealed during
the election campaign in Poland in 2020 in relation to the incumbent President
Andrzej Duda seeking re-election. Attorney Jolanta Turczynowicz-Kiryłło
became the head of his electoral staff (who soon resigned), but the other peo-
ple in the staff were MEPs. Adam Bielan became a spokesman for the staff,
Joachim Brudzinski was responsible for the organizational staff, and former
Prime Minister Beata Szydło for the program staff. The first meetings revealed
a lack of involvement of party staffers, problems with their temporal availa-
bility and a lack of focus on domestic matters in the face of new obligations
arising from work in the European Parliament.

References
Antoszewski, A. (2012). Demokratyzacja w polsce w świetle tranzytologii,
demokratyzacja w polsce w świetle współczesnej tranzytologii. In Ł Daniel, &
J. Kornaś (Eds.), Dylematy polskiej demokracji. Kraków: Fundacja Gospodarki i
Administracji Publicznej.
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1993). Transformational leadership and organizational
culture. Public Administration Quarterly, 17(1), 112–121.
Bauman, Z. (1957). Vilfredo pareto i teoria elit. Myśl Filozoficzna, 3, 3–33.
Bauman, Z. (1994). Dwa szkice o moralności. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu
Kultury.
Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers.
16 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
Castells, M. (2010). Społeczeństwo sieci. Warszawa: PWN.
Crick, B. (1992). In defense of politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Friedrich, C. J. (1963). An empirical theory of politics. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill
Book Company Inc.
Kasińska-Metryka, A. (2012). Proces kreacji przywódców politycznych. Od uję-
cia tradycyjnego do współczesnego. Kielce: Wydanictwo Uniwersytetu Jana
Kochanowskiego.
Kotler, P., & Keller, K. L. (2005). Marketing management: analysis, planning, imple-
mentation and control. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; London: Prentice Hall.
Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (2012). The leadership challenge (5th Edition). San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bas.
Lamentowicz, W.. (2015). Paradoksy liberalnej demokracji. Retrieved May 3, 2020,
from https://www.academia.edu/1136816/Paradoksy_liberalnej_demokracji
Lock, A., & Harris, P. (1996). Political marketing – vive la difference! European Journal
of Marketing, 30(10–11), 14–24. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/03090569610149764.
Maarek, P. J. (1995). Political marketing and communication. London: John Libbey.
Machiavelli, N. (2003). The Prince. London: Penguin Classics.
Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). Democracies and the populist challenge. London:
Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403920072.
Mörchen, H. (1999). Władza i panowanie u heideggera i adorna. Warszawa: Oficyna
Naukowa.
O’Shaughnessy, J. (1990). The phenomenon of political marketing. Basingstoke, UK:
Macmillan Press.
Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to democracy. Toward a dynamic model.
Comparative Politics, 2(3), 337–363. doi:. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421307.
Scammell, M. (1995). Designer politics: How elections are won. Basingstoke, UK:
Macmillan Press.
Weber, M. (2015). Weber’s rationalism and modern society. New York, NY: Palgrave.
Wiatr, J. J. (2008). Przywództwo polityczne. studium politologiczne. Łódź:
Wydawnictwo Akademii Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej.
2 Society immersed in mediacracy
Maria Nowina Konopka

Introduction
The evolution of the media is taking place constantly. Its slow process
escapes everyday cognition, leaving a significant mark on successive gener-
ations. Roger Fidler described media transformation as mediamorphosis,
indicating that this process extends over a long historical continuum. On
this axis of the history of change, one technological solution results from
another, from its development or contestation, while the driving force of
this development is the stabilising power of coexistence, allowing for the
coexistence of different media transforming in different directions and at
different times (Fidler, 1997). This change is also affecting politics. This is
not a new phenomenon however its scale and character differ significantly
from the known patterns of exercising and applying for power. It seems that
the sphere of politics is currently governed by a new media logic and a love
of algorithms (Nowina Konopka, 2017, p. 9).
Jesper Strömbäck (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 240) also described these changes
by defining the phenomenon of the fourth phase of mediatisation as the
moment when media becomes the dominant source of information, imply-
ing profound transformations in the way politics is created. The growing
importance of the media understood as an intermediary in the process of
transferring content from a professional political broadcaster to their audi-
ence has significantly shaped new relationships and standards in the field
of political communication. Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh argue that
this change is so profound that it permeates the entire media system and
results from an increase in the overall number of media, the hybridisation of
genres, changes in formats, the blurring of boundaries between professional
and amateur journalism, media politics, the expansion of the political land-
scape and the growing role of those responsible for the marketing side of
politics. The last of these features, according to the authors, determines the
evolution towards a “third century” of political communication (Blumler
& Gurevitch, 2005, p. 156).The change in the logic of the media, the grow-
ing role of online media, the increase in the amount of content received by
the individual and the growing role of marketing communication within
18 Maria Nowina Konopka
political communication are building a new social order. This order can be
called mediacracy.
In order to argue this approach, it is necessary to answer some basic
questions:

• How is the concept of mediacracy defined?

• How does mediacracy position itself in the broader semantic field of
related and synonymous terms?
• In what does mediacracy manifest itself?
• What are its socio-political consequences?

In the new sphere of political communication, only a politician who is

highly media oriented, using the latest technology for building and trans-
mitting content, and meeting the expectations and needs of media concerns
with whom she/he must cooperate to stay on top, can count on popularity.

The concept of mediacracy

The concept of mediacracy has been disseminated through a publication by
the German philosopher and political scientist Thomas Meyer titled Media
Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics (Meyer, 2002). The author
describes how the media is transforming traditional party democracy into
media democracy and called for media culture to be directed towards serv-
ing democracy, enabling citizens to deepen their understanding of political
reality.

The concept of mediacracy, a combination of the two terms media and

krátos, is a neat conceptual hybrid which covers several important con-
cepts. The first can be referred to as a clear emphasis on the departure
from the traditional understanding of sovereignty which ceased to be
demos and began to be media. This means, therefore, that the social role
of the latter has significantly increased, pushing aside the vox populi.
The second concept is a strengthening of the position of the media in
relation to the traditional separation of powers. They redefined their
role and from the position of “the fourth estate”, began to usurp the
right to be the “first”.

It is worth noting that the concept of “the fourth estate” was first used at the
beginning of the 19th century by the American thinker Thomas Macaulay
and referred to the free press, to which he attributed three key functions:
social control, sharing reliable information and being an open forum for
public debate. According to his position, independent media was able to
capable of responsibly fulfilling the role of the “fourth estate” subjecting
legislative, executive and judicial power to social control. However, it seems
that mediacracy is an age when journalists “pass sentence” faster than the
 Society immersed in mediacracy 19
courts, and the success of governments is increasingly determined by the
proportion of corporations sympathetic to the authorities. As an exam-
ple, the resignation of the head of the Israeli government, Ehud Olmert,
which according to Szewach Weiss (2008) “is leaving in the atmosphere of
a scandal caused by the prosecutor’s investigation into financial embezzle-
ment that has been ongoing since the beginning of his term. Prime Minister
Olmert, who has become the victim of a media campaign, simply concluded
that he would no longer be able to rule in an atmosphere of social pressure.
The unprecedented media campaign and harsh rhetoric aimed at the prime
minister resembled a rather primitive form of return to direct democracy.
It seemed that the investigation into the head of government’s abuses had
moved from the prosecutor’s office to the media. Israeli media is no longer
the fourth, but almost the first estate in the country”.
Another issue that falls within the semantic spectrum of the term in ques-
tion is the problem of the responsibility and electability of those in power.
For Montesquieu power is democratic in so far as it is elected in free, univer-
sal and direct elections. The management boards of media companies are
unelected and unremovable and are therefore not subject to social control.
On the other hand, as Tomasz Gackowski writes, “While rulers submit to
the assessment of voters every few years, the media are assessed by their
addressees every day” (Gackowski, 2013, p. 7), and it can be added that
millions of viewers who consume media content every day legitimise their
actions.

Related concepts
The changes taking place in the media market and the social and political
processes implied by them have been described and characterised in many
ways. The concept of mediacracy can therefore be surrounded by a wide
network of related or highly similar terms. Their density clearly indicates
the importance of the issues discussed in the chapter. Among the most com-
mon ones we can mention, for example, the mediatisation and medialisa-
tion of the political space, infotainment, politainment, tabloidisation or
berlusconisation.

Mediatisation or medialisation of political space

Giovanni Sartori, writing at the beginning of the millennium about a vio-
lent multimedia revolution, pointed out that the television and video life
have become an accelerator of the transformation of homo sapiens into
homo videns (Sartori, 2007, p. 13). This product of visual culture emerging
from the media sphere loses the ability to think abstractly and create sym-
bols, reduces language competence and is imbued with the cult of the image.
A dozen or so years later, the process accelerated significantly and the level
of society’s immersion in the media environment reached unprecedented
20 Maria Nowina Konopka
proportions. Often, in the context of politics, the terms medialisation and
mediatisation are used interchangeably to describe this process or, perhaps,
more of a condition or state. For the purpose of taxonomy it is, however,
worth noting that

medialisation should be understood as the situation in which the media

are the most important source of information and means of communi-
cation between those in power and those who are led by them (Walecka-
Rynduch, 2019, p. 101).

Thus, the media is becoming a channel of bilateral communication, for pol-

iticians about their voters and for the viewers about those in power (and/or
contenders for power). This approach merely provides for the existence of
the phenomenon but does not depict its dynamics. This one can be found in
the analysis of the phenomenon of the

mediatisation of politics, which Friedrich Krotz defines as “a set of pro-

cesses resulting from changes in the media itself as well as social and
cultural changes” (Krotz, 2007).

As Sasińska-Klas (2014, p. 163) argues, “using this approach, researchers

in the field of social sciences are trying to describe and explain the nature
of this meta-process. It is assumed that mankind as a social being natu-
rally uses the whole set of various forms of communication which she/he is
given in her/his environment. Communication is treated as a source of basic
knowledge about reality”. It is therefore difficult to underestimate the role of
the media in the dynamic process of transmitting knowledge about politics
or more broadly about the reality that surrounds us. It is particularly visible
during election campaigns, although its assessment cannot be unambigu-
ous. Medialisation and mediatisation determine the effects on both the cam-
paigns themselves and on the way voters behave, which in turn has either a
positive or a negative impact on political processes. Positive effects include:

• The expansion of forms and channels of communication in a campaign.

• The professionalisation of campaign management.
• The growing number of sources of information and activation of non-
political citizens.

Negative aspects include:

• Increasing demands on campaign management centres.

• Personalisation.
• The disappearance of substantive debate.
• Ferocity and aggression.
• Loss of authenticity.
 Society immersed in mediacracy 21
• Addiction to television.
• A personal attitude to actors/contenders instead of evaluating their
programmes.
• A general despondency about politics (Kolczyński, Mazur, &
Michalczyk, 2009, p. 11).

Each of the above features requires a separate discussion and evidence-based

substantiation based on empirical research relating to local political mar-
kets. An attempt to average opinions or create generalisations seems meth-
odologically risky in this case. There is no doubt, however, that all the
aspects taken together show the direction of change and the emergence of a
new quality of political communication.

From infotainment to politainment and back

Colin Seymour-Ure (1974) was the first to address the issue of press polit-
icisation in his book The Political Impact of Mass Media. Decades later,
the media problem was described by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini
(2004) in Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics.
The tightening of cooperation or even inseparable coexistence is manifested
by a number of phenomena that generate significant socio-political effects,
the most fraught of which are certainly infotainment or the politainment
which is growing on its foundation.
Infotainment is a hard to define “skeleton key”, which is eagerly used
by journalists and media experts; originally most probably used by Ron
Eisenberg in February 1980 (Murray, 1999, p. 103). Published in the peri-
odical; “Phone Call” the term has been faithfully implemented in many
European languages and successfully functions in a specific terminology
set along with such terms as politainment, politicotainment or edutainment
(Fras, 2013, p. 8). In modern media studies, infotainment is understood as a
media genre that combines information and entertainment, a form of media
entertainment. “In practice, this means that the journalist focuses more on
how to present information than on what content to convey” (Dajnowicz &
Miodowski, 2017, p. 12).
The imperative of entertainment has become generally binding. It should
be noted, however, that “information and entertainment content have
existed alongside each other in mass communication for a long time. The
technological revolution of the 20th century, however, deregulation of the
audiovisual market, the dynamic development of commercial stations and
intensified competition made the media begin to compete for audiences,
mainly by constantly making its appeal more attractive, providing more and
more entertainment” (Pisarek, 2006, p. 82). The category of entertainment
and the level of its saturation of media messages have therefore become
one of the key determinants in media typology. What is important is that
this process has been observed not only within commercial media but also
22 Maria Nowina Konopka
as a permanent feature on public television or in the prestige press. The
increase in popularity of tabloid press on the newspaper market has forced
other press titles to compete for readers’ attention by redefining the logic of
constructing their messages. No wonder therefore, that the opinion-forming
press has begun to feature elements characteristic of the tabloid press,
including among other things: the narrative form of texts, the emotional
character of the message or the dominance of attractiveness over informa-
tional value. As a result, as Agnieszka Hess writes, there is “a manifesta-
tion of changes in informational press genres towards making the message
more entertaining, scandalous and sensational, the increase in the share
and exposure of entertainment, scandalous and sensational content in the
message of prestige dailies an increase in the share and exposure of journal-
istic materials based on the scheme of dispute rhetoric, i.e. confrontation
of opinions or people, a personalisation of the content of the message and
the increasingly common construction of the identity of the publication’s
protagonists between their public role and private life, as well as an increase
in the participation and exposure of press releases with a clear appreciation
and simplification of the content and form of the message” (Hess, 2013, pp.
96–97).
A similar situation is observed on the television market. Focus on enter-
tainment has become noticeable within almost all formats, and it has become
no different in the case of news services. Neil Postman wrote about this in
the mid-1980s. In his book Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in
the Age of Show Business (Postman, 1985), he emphasised the importance
of the music/sound layer at the opening and closing of a single edition of a
news service, about the need to select an appropriate looking TV presenter,
whose appealing appearance attracts the attention of viewers, and about
the visual appeal of audiovisual materials presented during the editions.
Interestingly, this world of media dominated by commercial and entertain-
ment television has been repeatedly criticised in relation to the infotainment
process. Thus, a pejorative connotation has been written into the concept.
For example, in the circles of journalists and media researchers (princi-
pally schools of criticism), infotainment has become synonymous with the
deliberate shallowing or superficial treatment of news and the pursuit of
cheap sensation, on the one hand, and the degradation of the journalistic
profession and commercialisation of mass media on the other. This term is
often used interchangeably with equally negatively perceived processes of
tabloidisation, berlusconisation, medialisation or the eponymous medioc-
ratisation (Fras, 2013, p. 8). Some authors would also include the concept
of politainment in this set. This is another hybrid term on the borderline
between the disciplines of media studies and political science.
The etymology of the term politainment should be looked for, obviously,
in a combination of two other words: politics + entertainment. Less obvious,
however is the very concept of combining two, seemingly quite different,
areas of human, or more broadly social activity, into one closely intertwined
 Society immersed in mediacracy 23
space of functioning. This phenomenon has already been pointed out by
Jurgen Habermas when writing about the tendentious integration of the pub-
lic sphere with the private area, Richard Sennett emphasises the phenomenon
of politics as consumption and Janusz Golinowski exposes the issue of pub-
licising “matters, feelings, sensations, experiences which, being constitutive
for the private sphere (according to its definition) should be secret, hidden
and exclusive. At present, however, the problems in the area of human pri-
vacy are at least partially becoming the subject of public discourse and com-
mon interest” (Golinowski, 2012, p. 124). This issue is broadly described by
Ewa Nowak (2009, p. 208), who defines it as a journalistic genre in which
“combining politics with entertainment in the form of media ‘entanglement’
of political actors, matters, topics and processes with popular and enter-
tainment culture” becomes clear. This entanglement manifests itself in two
forms, either as political entertainment or entertainment policy. The first
type is therefore observed when politicians (or political themes) become the
guests of entertainment formats, while the second is observed when impor-
tant themes are presented in a light or even entertaining way.
Dorota Piontek and Olgierd Annusewicz (2013, p. 18) go even further in
their thoughts, characterising politainment as:

“the conscious use of entertainment forms and formats by politicians in

the process of their communication with citizens”.

They believe that this phenomenon is an effect of the implementation of

long-term image strategies of politicians and their base. At the same time,
they cite the constructive features of the new policy described by David
Schultz (2004, p. 58):

• The presence of narrative and storytelling.

• Focusing on the future.
• Arousing and showing passion by politicians.
• Demobilising political opponents’ voters.
• Competing mainly for floating voters.
• Looking for opportunities to be present in mass media.
• Focusing on image and subordinating political decisions to it.
• Using the latest communication technologies to convey messages to
voters.
• A constant search for sympathy from voters (Piontek & Annusewicz,
2013, p. 15).

Infotainment and politainment create a system of connected vessels within

which the content and form overflow. By creating entertainment, the media
also creates from politics a light, attractive and trivial realm. Politicians, on
the other hand, cannot exist without media visibility and fit into this narra-
tive, even creating their long-term image strategies based on it.
24 Maria Nowina Konopka
Tabloidisation and berlusconisation of the media
In the 21st century, with the expansion of new media, traditional print
media found itself in a deep crisis. The qualitative decline “is also
accompanied by an economic one. As a result, a process has been ini-
tiated leading to loss of independence by the press and its proprietors.
More serious than this, since the turn of the 20 th and 21st century, an even
greater threat to the independence of publishers press and journalists,
their identification with individual political forces, has gone too far”
(Dajnowicz & Miodowski, 2017, p. 12). Perhaps the most vivid example of
this is Italy. The three-time prime minister of this country is the propri-
etor of the Mediaset media empire and the Banca Mediolanum banking
group, holding political, financial and media influence in his hands and
having extraordinary abilities to use them efficiently. As Umberto Eco
writes, “Berlusconi built a day-by-day system of government based on
identifying the party, country and state with a range of entrepreneur-
ial interests. He did so without resorting to police operations or arrest-
ing MPs, but by gradually taking control of the most important media
(or attempting to take over still independent press organs by means of
complicated financial machinations, fortunately not always successfully)
and creating appropriate forms of consent based on populist calls” (Eco,
2007, p. 149).

This peculiar combination of media of power and the power of media

is therefore called media berlusconisation. This phenomenon is simul-
taneously associated with the provision of sensational and cheap infor-
mation, a poor quality of programmes, direct control over the media
and indirect control over the audience of this media (Wyka, 2007).

The aforementioned poor quality of programmes, entertainment and tab-

loidisation of the media are concurrent processes not only in Italy. The
tabloid style of the daily and magazine press, the acquisition of the same
characteristics by other media, the decline of hard news in favour of scan-
dal, sex and infotainment, and submission to the influence of tabloid media
– these are characteristics of the media market in most European countries.
The phenomenon of “the convergence of form, language, image of the world
in the mainstream media to the content, form, language and image of the
world of tabloid press” is observed in most European countries (Lisowska-
Magdziarz, 2009, p. 199).
It is worth noting that the cited concepts jointly present a situation of
society’s immersion in the media ecosystem, which is closely related to
the financial sector and the political sphere. This coexistence implies the
primacy of profit logic on the media market and the adaptation of politi-
cal messages to popular media frameworks and formats. These transfor-
mations have an impact on the system of governance and the condition of
 Society immersed in mediacracy 25
democracy. For this reason, the concept of mediacracy was considered to be
the widest and most broadly defined concept and term.

Manifestations of mediacracy
The issue of mediacracy is the subject of reflection by media experts, polit-
ical scientists and politicians mainly due to its total character. What this
implies is a situation in which not only commercial media, but also public
media start to follow a new logic.

This phenomenon indicates the departure of public media from service

to society and fulfilling its public mission towards it by forming atti-
tudes of social responsibility, creating high ethical standards, being a
forum for the presentation and exchange of a wide spectrum of world-
views and political beliefs in favour of joining the narrative stream
of popular performance, personalising politics or polarising (or even
antagonising) points of view.

Mediacracy, therefore, homogenises the media by formatting it on the

pattern of and similarities to mainstream media which has long ceased to
be informative, presenting facts in a holistic, objective, ethical way, and
instead, has begun to be a platform for propagating a certain quantum of
information tailored to the needs and interests of the media corporations
which it represents.
According to the canonical principles of the media, gatekeeping and
agenda setting, the media make a preselection of content transferred to the
auditorium, thereby determining the topics that are in social circulation.
The process of information selection is an immanent feature of every
media editorial department, since in an information society, the amount
of information generated on a daily basis exceeds human cognitive capa-
bilities. The media must therefore decide which information will reach the
media and which is considered less important. Participation in this pro-
cess is therefore an extremely responsible and damaging task, to say that
all media and all journalists participating in it strive for a “government of
souls”. However, it should be clearly stated that maintaining a presence on
the demanding media market forces editorial staff to take into account the
needs, expectations and tastes of audiences who have already been to a large
extent saturated with entertainment media formats. The position of elite
media in media democracy has lost its significance and is giving way to pic-
torial, tabloid, simplified and emotional forms. There is no doubt, however,
that the simple logic of media selection and presentation is in opposition to
the complex logic of political processes, since the first is focused on conflict
and polarisation, and the second is based on compromise and the search for
common ground. Therefore, it is worthwhile to analyse the key symptoms of
mediacracy and to reflect on its socio-political consequences.
26 Maria Nowina Konopka
A highly staged performance
Mediacracy is, as Piotr Legutko writes, a kind of convention. Politicians
take part in the show with commitment, play their roles in accordance with
the scenario, which is written for them by entertainment media or by jour-
nalists seeking to polarise their positions (Legutko, 2009). The staging of
political events comes close to being a reality show in which fiction becomes
more real than the reality itself (Krzemiński, 2011). With time, the stag-
ing ceased to be merely a form and more and more often becomes the con-
tent of a performance. Electoral conventions or political rallies are turning
into cost-consuming shows not inferior to pop or Hollywood galas. Ronald
Reagan began his presidency by organising in January 1981 the most
expensive and spectacular celebration in the history of the United States.
Referring to the president’s acting past, it was considered to be “the first
administration to hold a premiere” (Pastusiak, 2015, p. 215).
The form is to attract attention and build a social image of greatness,
momentum and modernity, elitism and inclusiveness at the same time, the
enormity of support and the unique nature of the event in which one wants to
take part. The moderated joyful crowd of support and enthusiasm becomes
the content, the lure, the premise for the decision to support. Therefore,
making a positive impression, influencing the opinions not only of the par-
ticipants, but also of second tier audience (TV viewers, social media users,
etc.) becomes an end in itself. As an illustration, it is worth recalling in this
context the 1984 electoral convention of the US Democratic Party candidate
Walter Mondale. His campaign staff distributed two pennants to each of the
10,000 participants of the rally so that they could wave both hands at once.
In this way, the waving sea of pennants gave the impression that there were
twice as many people in the hall than were actually assembled (Neumann
& Ross, 2007, p. 89).
On a smaller scale, the staging of the show manifests itself in the pres-
entation of politicians in television programmes, in the press or on social
media. In this case, image experts play a key role, as they plan the event with
attention to the smallest detail. Photogenicity thus becomes a key feature
of a politician, who presents herself/himself in front of a well-thought-out
background, dressed in the outfit most appealing to the audience’s imagi-
nation. For example, the announcement of the end of military operations
in Iraq took place on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. On
May 1, 2003, George W. Bush, dressed in a military uniform, standing on
the captain’s bridge and carrying the mission accomplished banner behind
him, was to be identified not with a politician, but with a soldier fighting
for America’s well-being and security (Neumann & Ross, 2007, p. 101). The
perfectly directed performance had a significant information and emotional
load and was undoubtedly more memorable than a standard public speech.
It has also become standard practice for politicians to take part in enter-
tainment programmes or to create such messages themselves on social
 Society immersed in mediacracy 27
media. In a relaxed atmosphere, their task is to introduce themselves as
normal people close to the voter, someone who understands their problems.
During these casual “chats” they express themselves on topics far beyond
their political roles, and often beyond their competences. Basing one’s image
on being an “ordinary citizen” brings great political benefits, as exemplified
by the career of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and US President
Barack Obama. During the 2008 campaign, the US president stated that he
did not look like all these other presidents on dollar bills, perfectly transform-
ing his political and image weakness into a key watchword of his campaign
and becoming at the same time the president of change and a representative
of multicultural American society. Dissociating himself off from the stereo-
type of an inaccessible politician and building a voter-oriented image was a
sign of his understanding of the needs of a society immersed in mediacracy.
No wonder, therefore, that politicians create their own profiles and chan-
nels on many social networking sites, efficiently selecting content for a
well-researched target group for each profile or channel.
A political performance, the ability to attract attention, and the creation
of a political slogan undoubtedly increases media visibility and “sells” well,
thanks to which the media have content, and the politicians have the voter
attention. This is a type of mutually beneficial arrangement from which it
does not pay to withdraw. The problem, however, is that reducing politi-
cal discourse to the level of a talk show damages the culture of parliamen-
tary discussion, debate in journalistic programs, and of public discourse.
Politicians in the television studio either do not present a high level of per-
sonal culture by shouting out their desire to break through sharply and
emphatically or infantilise their message by striving to be understood by
the masses. Therefore, television democracy is accompanied by the erosion
of political culture and classic political parties. Spectacular political events
reduced to form, banality and short slogans make it difficult for voters to
correctly prioritise them, as it is difficult to discern due to media presenta-
tion, which event was stage managed and which was happened exactly as
shown.

Personalisation
The personalisation of politics is a consequence of the processes of individ-
ualisation that have been deepening for decades. The primacy of thinking
about the individual as a reference point over collective thinking has its con-
sequences for the political sphere, and according to Ian McAllister, person-
alisation is actually the most important property of 21st century ­democracy.
Personalisation understood as “the perception of politics through the prism
of people not processes, and a more important role for the individual than
institutions” (Piontek, 2012, p. 114), is observed in two main dimensions,
which Anthony Mughan (2000) defined in terms of presentation and impact.
The first concerns the political leader as the main subject of the idea or the
28 Maria Nowina Konopka
party represented, which means that the leader’s image becomes ­public.
The second dimension indicated refers to the influence that the leader has
on decisions made by the voters. Importantly, this influence is not only
dependent on the role of the media, but also on the institutional political
structure or the position of the leader (Brenner, 2010, p. 118). The person-
alisation of politics is therefore a multifaceted issue and manifests itself in
various aspects and manifestations of political activity. Rosa Van Santen
and Liesbet Van Zoonen (2009, p. 7) point to seven types of personalisation:

• Institutional personalisation (at the level of institutional change, pro-

moting individual politicians is considered to be the key issue).
• Focus on politicians (at the expense of parties).
• Party leaders become the personification of the party.
• Individual political competence (the professional competence of politi-
cians is judged by the media).
• Personal narratives (the media expose the emotions and political back-
ground of the leaders).
• Privatisation: in the media the private life of the politician comes to the
fore (Piontek, 2011, p. 114).

It is worth noting that for the voter, focusing on a politician is easier and
allows for electoral decisions. Evaluating a politician is far more cogni-
tively available than the analysis of complicated and extensive election
programmes. In addition, rivalry between politicians is more readable and
allows an ongoing selection of “winners” and “losers”, which further rein-
forces the need to relate political processes to the people who represent
them in the media and to create an internal sense of “orienting themselves”
in politics by “identifying” individuals operating in political space. As can
be seen, this process is mutually beneficial: for parties that manage their
image in a more targeted and coherent manner, and for voters for whom the
complicated political process is becoming more accessible. The impact of
the personalisation of politics on democracy is assessed in a different way.
Marek Mazur (2014, p. 7) points to several destructive effects of this process;
above all he points to:

• An unjustified reduction in the complexity of the political process to

the motivation and choices of individual politicians in relation to the
citizens’ perception of politics, and on the level of factors of electoral
behaviour: promotion of politically insignificant features and facts
related to the personalities of politicians.
• An impairment of the basic functions of political organisations as a
result of the flow of power towards individuals at the expense of groups
and institutions, manifested in the devaluation of the criteria for the
selection of the political elite, the weakening of the importance of
 Society immersed in mediacracy 29
collegial decision-making and the avoidance of debates and eliminating
political dissent.
• Lowering the quality of political discourse in the public sphere by mar-
ginalising the discussion of political problems in favour of personnel,
often trivial, aspects.

The problems of blending journalism with politics manifested in the transi-

tion of journalists to politics and politicians to the world of media could be
added to those issues. These transfers are often not straightforward, making
it more difficult for the audience to identify. Journalists assuming the role of
political commentators, often cross the thin boundary of reliable journal-
ism, becoming advocates of a chosen political option or politician. This is
becoming increasingly apparent to the audience when media corporations
identyify with a specific political issue and openly support its representa-
tives and maginalise or discredit politician.

Polarisation
“Neutral journalism and neutral media will not return”, argues Paolo
Mancini, and in one of his interviews he continues, “big media is weaken-
ing. There is more and more small media. Technology favours fragmenta-
tion. And fragmentation favours engaged journalism that shows a strong
identity. Compare traditional media with the Internet. On the Internet,
where there are many more players, you need a strong identity to be noticed.
Among traditional media – print media, radio, television – those with a
strong identity also triumph. Why did Fox News beat CNN so quickly in
America? Because CNN tried to be impartial. And Fox has views. It does
not hide its political sympathies. Fox is conservative. If CNN wants to sur-
vive, it must become more liberal and democratic. Otherwise it will fade,
losing to a liberal-democratic station that will appear” (Żakowski, 2011).
Breaking through the informational smog forces the media and politicians
to formulate statements that are easy to grasp, memorable, radically antag-
onistic, playing on emotions, touching, appealing, and therefore short, slo-
gan, scandalous, anxiety-inducing or terrible. These criteria are therefore
met by a message based on brevity and squabbles, i.e. polarised views, opin-
ions and beliefs. The more expressive the message is, the easier it is to iden-
tify, and the less extreme it is, the more difficult it is to place on the political
map of opinions. An easy to implement media performance highlights and
over-represents, in the eyes of the public, the occurrence of pathological
phenomena, since polarisation presents objects in a unilateral, biased, and
often false manner (Lewek, 2010, p. 25). Bipolarity blurs areas on the axis
of continuum; there is no room for moderate, neutral, “average” players.
In mediacracy, the society is therefore left largely without a choice, since
according to the new logic, only polarised individuals gain media visibility.
30 Maria Nowina Konopka
D’où venons nous? Que sommes nous? Où allons nous?
The reference in the title to Paul Gauguin’s allegorical painting seems pro-
foundly justified at this point. When the French artist left France and moved
to Tahiti in 1981, he was looking for a simple, natural and authentic life, not
restricted by the corset of artificial convention. The individuals presented in
the post-impressionist painting reflect on human existence and seek answers
to the questions contained in the title of the work: Where do we come from?
What are we? Where are we going?
Where are we going? This is a question which, in the context of the
immersion of society in mediacracy, should be raised not only in academic
textbooks and articles. Reflecting on the consequences of the phenomena
and processes discussed in this text seems an urgent and necessary topic of
social debate. Essentially, it can be put into several detailed problem frame-
works: the condition of democracy, populism as a new style of political com-
munication, as well as neoleadership and authorities.
First of all, it should be noted that mediacracy apparently increases the
level of political participation. The media, in simplifying the message about
politics and politicians, create an illusory idea of the simplicity or even the
obviousness of political processes, ease in making political choices, poli-
tics, i.e. conducting social discourse about politics, but not in politics, since
this must be accompanied by deep reflection and solid knowledge about
the essence of political processes. Otherwise, we can talk about horizontal
(superficial) engagement, not vertical (deep) engagement. Therefore,

media democracy is a situation in which the audience make electoral

decisions based on a message predefined by the logic of the media group
whose content they are recipients.

Not on the basis of an analysis of the parliamentary work or views of a given

candidate, but rather, on the basis of how she/he presents themselves and
how they are presented in the media. For many, media narration becomes
a form of implantation of their own thoughts. The readiness to accept this
is a result of laziness and of a belief that it is impossible to acquire reliable
knowledge in a society in which the media manipulates audiences. It is worth
noting, which may seem absurd, that the responsibility for disseminating
required information in a mediatised society shifts to the media, instead
of the individual taking on the burden of collecting the necessary informa-
tion to make informed and responsible election decisions. Mediacracy is,
therefore, like a self-perpetuating spiral to which there is universal consent,
to whom society willingly gives away its sovereign prerogatives in terms of
responsibilities but leaves them absolutely free in terms of privileges.

Another issue is that of the susceptibility of the society to absorb con-

tent that is simplified, slogan-like, rounded in form but empty inside.
 Society immersed in mediacracy 31
This characteristic, in turn, becomes fertile ground for the development
of populist groups, although, as Paolo Mancini claims, “this is not pop-
ulism. It is new politics. People have become so addicted to television that
other politics have become impossible” (Żakowski 2011). It seems that after
almost 20 years of the new millennium, we can confidently add that people
have also become addicted to the Internet, in which much more sophisti-
cated forms and possibilities of manipulating audiences (this issue will be
discussed more broadly in the chapter Populism Flourishing In the Network)
are included in its way of functioning.
An attempt to chart new pathways also forces one to look at the issue of
a new type of leadership described in the previous chapter (Neoleadership
Paradigm). A marketing-oriented leader is an apparent authority (as presented
in the chapter entitled Authority in The Network – who is it?), concentrating
all the media’s attention on herself/himself (we discuss this topic in a part of
the book entitled Leaders of Parties or Parties of Leaders?), often operating
on the boundaries of ethics (the chapter Non/ethical Dilemmas of Leadership
is devoted to this) and employs advanced media tools in the field of tradi-
tional media and the new media in their media-political activities (the chapter
Technology of the Future Leadership). This new type of leadership is also a
great challenge for researchers trying to categorise, organise and give it some
theoretical shape to neoleadership activity. So how does one explore neoleader-
ship? This is the question we asked ourselves in the last part of the book. The
answer to this question will serve as a more responsible predictor of our future
path, although it is certain that the discrepancy between the way politics (or
the world at large) functions and the way it is presented in the media is grow-
ing. Together, the processes, phenomena and situations presented together
indicate the evolution of the current paradigm of political communication.

References
Blumler, J., & Gurevitch, M. (2005). Rethinking the study of political communi-
cation. In J. Curran, & M. Gurevitch (Eds.), Mass media and society. London:
Hodder Arnold.
Brenner, M. (2010). Zjawisko personalizacji politycznej. Studia Politologiczne, 16,
117–132.
Dajnowicz, M., & Miodowski, A. (Eds.). (2017). Polityka i politycy w prasie XX i XXI
wieku: prasa organizacji politycznych. Białystok: Wydawnictwo Humanica.
Eco, U. (2007). Rakiem gorąca wojna i populizm mediów. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
W.A.B.
Fidler, R. F. (1997). Mediamorphosis: Understanding new media. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Pine Forge Press.
Fras, J. (2013). O pojmowaniu infotainmentu i nadmiernej rozrywkowości mediów
masowych we współczesnym medioznawstwie. Studia Politologiczne, 7–31. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2013.1.01.
Gackowski, T. (2013). Władza na dywaniku. Jak polskie media rozliczają polityków?
Nowy model komunikacji politycznej. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
32 Maria Nowina Konopka
Golinowski, J. (2012). Infotainment jako narzędzie formatowania społeczeństwa w
warunkach medialnej demokracji. Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne. 2:117–
136. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2012.2.08.
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems. Three models of
media and politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Hess, A. (2013). Społeczni uczestnicy medialnego dyskursu politycznego w polsce.
Mediatyzacja i strategie komunikacyjne organizacji pozarządowych. Kraków:
Wydawinctwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Żakowski, J. (2011, March 5). Z prof. Paolo Mancinim włoskim medioznawcą.
Retrieved from Polityka: https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1512660,
1,z-prof-paolo-mancinim-wloskim-medioznawca.read?f bclid=IwAR02p-
B99oIpu5wIbz16bV8xOFgemVFVYrDn3xA193ADfkueVxH7lTACt3NY
Kolczyński, M., Mazur, M., & Michalczyk, S. (Eds.). (2009). Mediatyzacja kampanii
politycznych. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
Krotz, F. (2007). Die mediatisierung kommunikativen handels. Der wandel von alltag
und sozialen beziehungen, kultur und gesellschaft durch die medien. Wiesbaden:
Westdeutscher Verlag.
Krzemiński, A. (2011, April 19). Co media robią z politykami? Retrieved from Polityka:
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1514716,1,co-media-robia-
z - p o l i t y k a m i . r e a d? f b c l i d=IwA R13AC MpE qH r v a i X fo a M U i EvR Fx-
NAh6SYQukCwM8fVt7b9537-LAR3I6isg
Legutko, P. (2009, September 3). Widowisko pod dyktando rozrywkowych mediów.
Retrieved from Rzeczpospolita: https://www.rp.pl/artykul/357728-Widowisko-pod-
dyktando-rozrywkowych-mediow.html
Lewek, A. (2010). Kościół a mediokracja w polsce. Kultura – Media – Teologia, 2(2),
24–43. doi: https://doi.org/10.21697/kmt.2.2.
Lisowska-Magdziarz, M. (2009). Media powszednie. Kraków: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Mazur, M. (2014). Polityka z twarzą. Personalizacja parlamentarnych kampanii pol-
itycznych w Polsce w latach 1993-2011. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytet
Śląskiego.
Meyer, T. (2002). Media democracy: How the media colonize politics. Cambridge,
MA: Polity.
Mughan, A. (2000). Media and the presidentialization of parliamentary election.
Lodon: Palgrave. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403920126.
Murray, M. D. (Ed.). (1999). Encyclopedia of television news. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx
Press.
Neumann, R., & Ross, A. (2007). Kodeks władzy. Reguły manipulacji. Gliwice:
Helion.
Nowak, E. (2009). Komercjalizacja komunikacji politycznej – infotainment i pol-
itainment w programach informacyjnych. Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-
Skłodowska. Sectio K, Politolgia, 16(2), 201–213.
Nowina Konopka, M. (2017). Infomorfoza. Zarządzanie informacja w nowych medi-
ach. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Pastusiak, L. (2015). Prezydenci USA w anegdocie. Od trumana do obamy. Warszawa:
Bellona.
Piontek, D. (2011, Marzec). Tabloidyzacja i dziennikarstwo. Retrieved from
Miesięcznik Znak: http://www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/6702011tabloidyzacja-i-
dziennikarstwodorota-piontek/
 Society immersed in mediacracy 33
Piontek, D. (2012). Personalizacja rywalizacji wyborczej w kampanii parlamenta-
rnej. Rocznik Nauk Społecznych, 4(40)(3), 109–126.
Piontek, D., & Annusewicz, O. (2013). Polityka popularna: Celebrytyzacja polityki,
politainment, tabloidyzacja. e-Politikon, 5, 6–28.
Pisarek, W. (Ed.). (2006). Słownik terminologii medialnej. Kraków: Universitas.
Postman, N. (1985). Amusing ourselves to death: Public discourse in the age of Show
business. New York, NY: Viking Penguin Inc.
Sartori, G. (2007). Homo videns. Telewizja i postmyślenie. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Sasińska-Klas, T. (2014). Mediatyzacja a medializacja sfery publicznej. Zeszyty
Prasoznawcze, 57(2), 162–175. doi: https://doi.org/10.4467/2299-6362PZ.14.008.2329.
Schultz, D. (2004). Lights, camera, action. Ethics and the California recall. Public
Integrity, 7(1), 57–65.
Seymour-Ure, C. (1974). The political impact of mass media. Los Angeles, CA: Sage
Publications.
Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatiza-
tion of politics. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(3), 228–246. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208319097.
Van Santen, R., & Van Zoonen, L. (2009). Popularization and personalization
in political communication. A conceptual analysis. 59th Annual Conference of
the International Communication Association (ICA). Chicago, IL: International
Communication Association.
Walecka-Rynduch, A. (2019). MediaEgo w MediaPolis. W stronę nowego paradyg-
matu komunikowania politycznego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Pedagogicznego.
Weiss, S. (2008). Mediokracja. Wprost(32).
Wyka, A. W. (2007). Berlusconization of the mass media in East Central Europe.
The new danger of italianization? Retrieved from http://www.kakanien-revisited.
at/beitr/emerg/AWyka1.pdf
3 The technology of future leadership
Tomasz Gajewski

Introduction
Social and technological change go hand-in-hand. The appearance of
new technology generates far-reaching changes in the way individuals and
groups function. The first fundamental change of this type, the transition
from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist societies, was enabled by the domesti-
cation of animals. In turn, the Agrarian Revolution enabled a significant
increase in agricultural efficiency and the emergence of larger human settle-
ments. An indirect effect of the subsequent development of larger-scale agri-
culture was the loss of land by peasants who then began to migrate to cities.
In turn, in those towns and cities, craftsmen began to grow in influence, one
of the factors which formed the basis for the ensuing industrial revolutions.
Not only did this change the structure of economic relations, it also brought
change to relationships on all rungs of the social ladder.
The industrial revolution is defined as interconnected, rapid turning
points that form “constellations of interdependent technologies” (Perez,
2010, p. 189). Technologies, referred to in this definition are disruptive tech-
nologies. They are characterised on two levels.

First, disruptive technology changes the conditions prevailing in the

market in which it has existed and still operates. The second level of
disruption is markedly broader – it is not limited to the relevant new
technology in the market and generates social changes of a significant
range and scope (Schuelke-Leech, 2018, p. 262).

The first industrial revolution (1760–1840) in the full sense of the term,
brought into the world the steam engine and the development of railway
infrastructure as well as rapid social change – lifestyle modification, demo-
graphic change, and the emergence of new movements and political organ-
isations. The second industrial revolution (starting in the mid-19th century
and lasting until the early 20th century), the symbols of which were electrifi-
cation and the introduction of production lines, led to mass production and
as a result, to changes in the way societies function. The result was a final
 Future leadership technology 35
collapse of the old elites and the emergence of new groups (e.g. industrial-
ists) who were able to turn economic capital into political power (Bowen &
Gleeson, 2019, p. 221).
These revolutions, widely described in literature, replaced purely physical
power with subsequent iterations of mechanical technology. They created
foundations for the Third Revolution, also called the Digital Revolution,
in which a transition from mechanical electronic technology to digital elec-
tronics took place. Its beginnings date from the 1950s, and its symbols are
the Internet and the development of computer and cellular communication
technology. The effect of this transformation is the creation and dynamic
development of the information society. Jeremy Rifkin (2011), in his famous
book, described the impact of the Digital Revolution on economic and
social systems. The rapid acceleration of development that has taken place
in recent years has become an impetus for creating the concept of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.
The originator of this concept is the founder and executive chairman of
the World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab, according to whom the Fourth
Industrial Revolution is based on the achievements of the Digital Revolution.
It does not only rely on completely new solutions, but also covers further,
far more sophisticated iterations of these technologies – “smaller and more
powerful sensors that have become cheaper, and by artificial intelligence
and machine learning” (Schwab, 2016, pp. 1–3). Schwab refers directly to the
publications of scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, who defined the period in
which modern societies and economies operate as “the second machine
age” (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014).
Schwab’s concept is controversial in scientific and expert communities. J.
Rifkin himself criticises it stating that the Digital Revolution is “maturing”
with the emergence of every new network and the creation of newer and
more complex systems (Rifkin, 2016). Regardless of the debate surrounding
definitions, the author acknowledges that one can agree with Schwab on the
fundamental issue – the pace of change that we are witnessing is unprec-
edented. The development of new technologies, about which the author
writes, has a broader meaning and includes interconnected breakthroughs
in the fields of “gene sequencing, through renewable energy sources to quan-
tum computers”. He demonstrates that the Fourth Revolution which he
affirmed, is developing much faster than “previous ones” – electrification,
an achievement of the Second Revolution has not yet been fully attained,
because 1.4 billion people are still without electricity, and the Internet, a
symbol of the Digital Revolution, is as yet unavailable to 4 billion people in
developing countries” (Schwab, 2016, p. 12).
From this reflection, an image starts to emerge of the impact of technology
on the methods and techniques of political leadership and the prognosis for
their further development. Consequently, based on Schwab’s reasoning, the
author will move within the parameters set by the technological megatrends
36 Tomasz Gajewski
outlined by him to identify their role in a specific area of political activity –
political leadership.

Technologies of which a “Cambrian explosion” is being seen today, will

notably affect social systems in all their complexity. They will affect
the increase in human cognitive ability. The changes that the develop-
ment of information technology has already brought about, with social
media as their icon, are an impressive example.

Politics, as a result of the spread of networked media, has changed fun-

damentally, introducing new tools, processing discourse and massively
engaging citizens. Individual empowerment, one of the effects of this pro-
cess, means far-reaching empowerment of the individual. Political lead-
ership has also been transformed, as described by Agnieszka-Kasińska
Metryka in the first chapter. Traditional models of authority have been
modified. New forms of populism have emerged. A new range of polit-
ical instruments has also brought change to the field of ethical norms.
The author will therefore analyse the impact of selected technologies on
the evolution of political leadership, especially in its practical dimen-
sion. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the algorithms based on it, as well
as the development of information technologies such as 5G, will be tested
to identify vectors of their impact on leadership. These technologies are
characterised by their high potential to influence its character and, more
broadly, democratic processes.
There are questions that need answering about how the above-mentioned
technology that makes up Schwab’s Fourth Industrial Revolution will influ-
ence the creation of and the actions of political leadership. Technology is
neutral by definition; however its use by leaders will give it specific political
significance. It is also important to address the existing and projected fac-
tors which distort the functioning of traditional political leaders operating
in democratic states.
There is a gap in the scientific literature of this area. On the international
academic market there are many scientific works in recent years, in which
technological development and its impact on various areas of life is ana-
lysed1. The same is true of articles in scientific journals, in which this issue is
broadly analysed on many levels2. It is worth noting that additionally these
issues are covered in journals which deal with the widely understood fore-
casting of the impact that technology has on society3.
Scientific publications that focus on the correlation between technology
and political leadership primarily address the matter of social media4. There
is a need, however, for a broader perspective on the impact of technological
processes in the areas indicated above. Its outline will allow the building of
a more comprehensive picture of these interdependencies. It is also essential
in this respect to derive a forecast that will allow us to further identify the
trajectory of their development.
 Future leadership technology 37
The analysis should start with a presentation of its methodological frame-
work and the definitions of basic concepts relevant to the influence of tech-
nology on political leadership.

Methodology and research assumptions

The author’s methodological position is defined by scientific pragmatism.
This means focusing on specific situations and their consequences. The
most important element of this is taking a liberal approach to the selec-
tion of specific research methods, techniques and procedures. The most
important criterion is therefore their maximum utility in the implementa-
tion of subsequent stages of the research procedure. The source of such an
approach is emphasised by pragmatists striving to achieve their set goals
(Creswell, 2013, pp. 10–11). Therefore, the author will apply morphological
analysis and heuristic forecasting.
Morphological analysis is an approach created by the Swiss astronomer
Fritz Zwicky, who found it useful in the study of structural links not only
between physical objects, but also between phenomena and ideas, regard-
less of their character (Zwicky, 1969). The method can be defined as a way of
examining summaries of possible relations or configurations of phenomena,
processes and other variables (impossible to quantify) contained in a given
complex problem and deriving generalisations from them (Ritchley, 2013).
From Zwicky’s approach it follows that that every complex “socio-technical”
problem that requires an integrated approach can be examined using mor-
phological analysis (Álvarez & Ritchley, 2015, pp. 2–3). The method is
applied in the area of analysis of the impact of technology on social develop-
ment, the evolution of economic structures and political and social systems.
In order to outline the perspective of the impact of technology on politi-
cal leadership, the author decided to use heuristic forecasting instruments,
primarily the scenario method. Its origin dates back to antiquity and has a
military origin. According to the Polish theoretician and practitioner of sci-
entific forecasting, Mirosław Sułek, an important part of the scenario, which
he calls “weak forecasting”, is “an outline of the chain of hypothetical (pre-
sumed, assumed, anticipated) activities and events” (Sułek, 2010, p. 30). In
turn, Seyom Brown, in a 1968 document prepared for the use of the US Air
Force, claims that the scenarios present hypothetical parameters of situa-
tions in which individual entities or complex systems would have to operate
(Brown, 1968, pp. 299–300). According to Peter Schwartz, an expert in the
field of interdisciplinary forecasting, the scenario is a form of “disciplined
thought process” and an “ordering of the areas of perception of the future
environment” (Schwartz, 1996, p. 4). Nazli Choucri maintains in turn, that
heuristic forecasting is “limited and disciplined speculation”, which serves
to reduce uncertainty around further development of the socio-political sit-
uation (Choucri, 1974, p. 63). The result of forecasting may be the creation
of scenarios for the development of the events in the researcher’s field of
38 Tomasz Gajewski
interest. Taking into account the problem outlined in the introduction and
the methodological instruments applied, the author makes the following
research hypotheses:

• The latest technological achievements/scientific advancements (artifi-

cial intelligence and its algorithms, the development of 5G networks)
will equip political leaders with highly effective instruments to generate
influence on the environment.
• The development of leaders’ technology-based capability and potential
will create distortions in widely understood democratic processes.

The verification of the above hypotheses requires answers to the following

questions:

• What opportunities will political leaders gain from these technologies?

• How will the parameters of their influence on the environment change?
• How will available technologies strengthen the potential for manipula-
tion by political leaders?
• What will be the negative consequences for democratic processes of the
actions of political leaders?

A necessary step to analyse such a research problem and to verify research

hypotheses will be to define key analytical categories: artificial Intelligence
and its algorithms, as well as 5G networks and the technological ecosystem
that is developing alongside it.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a wide-ranging branch of computer science
that deals with the creation of intelligent models of various behaviours that
can be used in computer software, applications and large-scale IT systems.

Its general goal is to imitate intelligent human behaviour (Russell &

Norvig, 2016, pp. 2–4). It should be emphasised that AI is more than
just a category of IT. A result of its rapid development is the emergence
of ecosystems of various types of programs and devices operating on
the basis of its technology, which are used in various aspects of life.
Therefore, it is also associated with other areas of science – economics,
neuroscience, psychology, philosophy or linguistics.

Elements that contribute to its rapid development are: the creation of large
data sets (Big Data) and the development of digital infrastructure (Taulli,
2019, p. 17). The application of the effects of AI development supports
human cognitive abilities, primarily in the analysis of various types of data,
the products of human activity in the network environment and their means
of carrying out their own activities. This is of particular importance for the
planning of various political activities, which in turn is closely related to
leadership.
 Future leadership technology 39
Consideration of the impact of AI development on political processes is
necessarily connected with machine learning, i.e. machine learning algo-
rithms and systems that increase the effectiveness of one’s own knowledge
through experience gained (Flach, 2012, p. 3).

A machine learning algorithm, as opposed to one which is a sequence

of instructions telling the computer what to do, creates a new model of
instructions for its own performance of the task based on the learning
data provided to it (Domingos, 2015, pp. 1–7).

Algorithms have a growing impact on many levels of human life: social

media activity, the labour market, the justice system, economic activity and
many others (O’Neil, 2016). An important aspect of algorithms’ operation
is insufficient knowledge about how the most advanced of them process
and apply information. This is particularly important for the social conse-
quences of their operation (Simonite, 2017).
Another key technology from the point of view of this analysis is the
dynamically developing ultrafast 5G network, i.e. the fifth-generation
mobile network that enables the transfer of much larger amounts of data, at
higher speeds and with reduced latency, by many more devices in the same
geographical area.

It is assumed that up to a million devices may operate per square kilo-

metre (Held, 2016), a great technological leap for the Internet of Things
(Lia, Xu, & Zhao, 2018, pp. 6–7). This will result in the collection of
large amounts of data in real time, building smart cities, homes, indus-
trial automation, autonomous transport, development of telemedicine,
public security and many other areas.

Full development of the 5G network will therefore allow for effective digiti-
sation of almost every area of reality that surrounds us.
After presenting the parameters of the research problem, research meth-
ods, assumptions and hypotheses, one should move to the crucial part of
the analysis; a reflection on the significance of the indicated technologies
for political leadership and the impact of their application on democratic
processes.

Technology in the service of political leadership

Contemporary political leaders use large data sets. Dynamically evolving
technologies give them new instruments that enable them to not only contin-
uously increase the volume of this data, but also to analyse it more and more
effectively. The expertise surrounding political leaders will play an impor-
tant role in this context. This is especially true if the leader lacks her/his own
experience or extensive knowledge. The leader must then rely in many cases
40 Tomasz Gajewski
on simplified formulations from her/his advisors. In turn, leaders with high
intellectual competence use more complex decision-making methods based
on expert information (Preston & t’Hart, 1999, pp. 63–64). Social devel-
opment and the greater availability of various types of data, however, will
force the implementation of more advanced methods of organising, analys-
ing and reasoning, also predictive. So, in both cases, leaders will be forced
to rely on their own analytical resources.
The use of algorithms has become common among free market economic
institutions operating. It has developed within the field of industrial produc-
tion. Barry Libert and Megan Beck state that in this context that one should
“accept the fact that the machines have already dominated factories. Now
they are moving to the offices of executive directors and to boardrooms.
So, it’s time for leaders to learn the basics of AI” (Liber & Beck, 2019). The
same applies to political leaders. Knowing the basics of machine learning
algorithms has become essential. This does not mean however that it will
be assimilated by them. According to the author, they will assign it to their
own base of experts or implement outsourcing in this area.
The construction of the 5G network architecture will increase network
capacity. As previously mentioned, this leads to a leap forward in the
Internet of Things. This in turn will increase the volume of data to be found
in many network locations (Howard, 2015, p. 179). What does this mean
for political leadership? Currently, they primarily use data on the sub-
ject of Internet habits, especially social media. The dissemination of the
Internet of Things will introduce a new type of information available to
all entities interested in behavioural analysis and predicting political pref-
erences, identifying problems and creating a detailed picture of the social
situation. If one assumes that the expression of citizens’ political actions
is activism, including various types of activities in a broadly understood
context and participation in elections, that means a geometric growth of
analytical material. Kara Swisher said that “whatever can be digitised, will
be digitised” (Swisher, 2019). This opinion corresponds with an extremely
important issue from the point of view of political leadership – millions of
networked devices, including smart homes, autonomous cars and many
others – will provide accurate behavioural data about specific neighbour-
hoods, cities or regions.
A political leader will have access to large datasets in real time, thus accu-
rately mapping needs and, making the specific plans and programs based
on this much more effective. There will also be widespread susceptibility to
the hostile influence of various types of actors. There will be a need to intro-
duce new legal regulations (Dabbagh & Rayes, 2019, p. 196). Threats to the
security of the Internet of Things’ architecture as such are outside the sub-
stantive scope of this analysis. However, this issue is directly linked to the
issue of unauthorised access to data. Nonetheless, various forms of illegal
acquisition which can be undertaken with knowledge and consent of leaders
focused on achieving their own political goals should be taken into account.
 Future leadership technology 41
The leader, supported by professional expert resources, will gain a wide
range of opportunities to create her/his message based on the results of
analyses of available, detailed data. Relying on her/his advisors will min-
imise the need to develop her/his own knowledge. The leader’s individual
competences and predispositions will be, as always, significant, however the
need to rely on her/his own unquantified instinct or political knowledge will
gradually fade.

The leader’s impact will increase thanks to technical instruments, espe-

cially in the case of a leader empowered by government structures. The
possibility of influence will therefore expand due to the type of behav-
ioural data itself which will become the subject of analysis. In the ecosys-
tem created by the Internet of Things, citizens will (often unknowingly)
unite even more strongly within “digital communities”, whose behav-
iours and needs can be measured and described. These are only mani-
festations of the potential for causing social changes via the Internet of
Things – this is not yet fully understood (Tzafestas, 2018, p. 111).

To discount this technology, as already mentioned, the political leader must

use experts – either their own or hired on the open market of this type of
analytical service (it is developing especially dynamically). These experts in
turn, must take advantage of other achievements of the technological revo-
lution – algorithms, especially those based on Artificial Intelligence.
Algorithms will be the strongest instrument for a political leader designing
and implementing her/his activities. However, machine learning algorithms
are opening up yet another field of influence, starting with the analysis,
preparation and implementation of strategies. Thanks to machine learning
algorithm bots (computer programs which imitate human behaviour, e.g. in
the sphere of communication) leaders will maintain a permanent presence
in the network and use them to promote (and persuade users of) their nar-
rative, especially social media users (Guilbeault, 2016, p. 5008). This instru-
ment is widely applied in propaganda and disinformation activities (which
will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the analysis), however,
it is impossible to underestimate their potential usefulness in communicat-
ing and maintaining the narrative of a political leader.
The automation of communication will, based on analytical instruments
referred to above, allow a leader to direct an unending flow of appropriately
constructed information streams on the basis of a primary analysis of target
groups. It should be stressed, however that these instruments, though easily
accessible, will require professional expertise. Considerable financial outlay
will therefore be needed, and therefore not all of those who are interested in
using such tools will have genuine access to them. The use of simple solutions
in this area may prove to be largely inefficient (Murthy, et al., 2016, p. 4954).
The scope and impact of political leaders will increase as the volume
of data available on citizens increases and their ability to analyse the
42 Tomasz Gajewski
data by means of fully automated machine learning algorithms will grow.
The anthropologist Genevieve Bell describes it as the “new empiricism”
(Gonzalez, 2017, p. 10).

The development of artificial intelligence will be the main driving force

behind these processes. It will allow complex problems faced by polit-
ical leaders to be solved by computer programs. The use of advanced
software of this type will gradually change social structures at all levels.

The effects of these processes are broadly described by Yuval N. Harari in

his books Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (2016) and 21 Lessons
for the 21st Century (2018). As can be seen from the above reasoning, the
political sphere will not be outside their sphere of influence. If programs and
devices constructed in such a way turn out to be more effective in perform-
ing an ever-wider range of tasks than people, it is reasonable to ask whether
they are able to replace political leaders as well.
Politics is guided by emotions that can be used more and more effectively
by political leaders equipped with comprehensive data. Zeger van der Wal
and Yifei Yan, on the pages of the World Economic Forum website (2018)
ask whether or not “robogov” is going to be more effective and more resistant
to often atavistic emotions in making the most important decisions? While
such forecasts seem too bold at the moment, some symptoms of upcoming
changes have already appeared in the political arena.

Michihito Matsuda, a Japanese artificial intelligence, “ran” for mayor

of the city of Tama. Her “avatar” in the real world was a local govern-
ment politician of the same name, who unsuccessfully ran for office on
several occasions. The bot took the third place, running a campaign
based on an algorithm-controlled analysis program (Christou, 2018).

A similar case is the New Zealand artificial intelligence SAM whose cre-
ator did not hide the political goals of its creation (Wagner, 2017). On the
program’s website, one can read that as a “virtual politician” SAM is not
“limited by the problems of time or space”, so she/he can start a conversa-
tion “anytime and anywhere”. “Her/His goal is to engage the people of New
Zealand in a constructive dialogue and to work towards a better under-
standing and representation of their views in order to achieve the goals
which everyone desires” (SAM).
The above examples illustrate in a specific way the direction in which
political leadership is developing. This does not necessarily mean that the
political leaders will soon be replaced by artificial intelligence making deci-
sions based on complex calculations. The emergence of such projects may in
itself be seen as an “avatar” of new instruments of political leadership that
will increasingly define actions of leaders.
 Future leadership technology 43
Algorithms for analysing large data sets are already an integral part of
leadership building strategies in the economic world. Norton Paley (2017,
p. 9) presented the principles of effective competitive leadership building
that can be adapted and applied on the political level:

• Speed – due to the dynamics and non-linearity of the social environ-

ment, a political leader will be able to use algorithm-based analysis to
take decisive actions. Responding to rapidly changing moods and social
needs are key to effective political leadership. With algorithm-based
analytical instruments, a leader will be able to select actions appropri-
ate to a given situation. The speed at which these calculations are made
and the conclusions and recommendations that are based on, provides
an advantage in the political “market”. This also applies to all kinds of
actions aimed at competitors which can help the leader consolidate her/
his position.
• Focusing on critical areas – thanks to advanced analytical instru-
ments based on machine learning algorithms equipped with predic-
tive abilities, a political leader will be able to identify the key areas
in which to focus her/his efforts. This will allow for the building of
leverage (short, medium and long-term) at the levels chosen by the
leader.
• Indirect actions – analytics based on slow learning algorithms will allow
a political leader not only to recognise her/his own potential areas of
effective influence, but also to analyse actions pursued by her/his com-
petitors to identify their weaknesses. Thanks to this, the leader uses
her/his own strengths to counteract their weaknesses. This analysis may
include data illustrating opponents’ various activities – e.g. an extensive
catalogue of online behaviour or even their consumption habits (thanks
to the Internet of Things).
• Offensive stance – aggregated data and effective instruments for their
analysis will allow political leaders to take decisive steps, both in the
area of building support, and also in competition with their competi-
tors. Information, including pre-emptive information, is a highly effec-
tive material for offensive action. Not only from the point of view of
promoting one’s own ideas, but also as part of specific actions aimed
at rivals.

Undoubtedly, political leaders will consistently increase the scope and effec-
tiveness of their influence. In the long run, they will become dependent on
technology and on those who develop and implement it.
The development of the aforementioned technologies generates serious
risks for the democratic process, as already mentioned. Reflecting on them
will complete the analysis of the technological tools of future political
leadership.
44 Tomasz Gajewski
Technologisation of political leadership
and democratic processes
Modern technology causes changes in the functioning not only of the mar-
kets in which it is developing, but also in the broadly understood social envi-
ronment. The examples characterised above will also generate changes in
the area of political leadership.
Under conditions determined by the development of ultrafast and sta-
ble networks a human presence in the network will expand. These trends
can be seriously reinforced by lifestyle changes as a result of the SARS-
CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic, during which even more human activity has
moved online. As this process develops, the vulnerability of societies to
manipulation will increase, and the tools used to manipulate will develop
consistently.
The best-described examples of manipulation supported by modern tech-
nologies are the campaigns preceding the presidential election in the United
States and the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union,
both in 2016. On a massive scale, so-called computational propaganda, i.e.
the use of automated algorithms and deliberate human action, took place,
aimed at disseminating misleading information on social media (Woolley &
Howard, 2017, p. 3).

Automated forms of communication, both established and emerging,

have been used by political leaders to promote content online, aimed at
manipulating target groups. 2016 was in a sense a breakthrough, how-
ever this was not so much in the technological dimension but a break-
through in awareness. Societies have found that using well-structured
campaigns, political leaders such as Donald Trump, Boris Johnson or
Nigel Farage are able to cause massive social consequences.

As the example of the American presidential campaign shows, political bots

have been programmed for actions leading to the construction and decon-
struction of political views (Howard, Woolley, & Calo, 2018, p. 5). Cambridge
Analytica, whose data was to be used in Donald Trump’s campaign (Isenstadt,
2020) implemented psychometric profiling based on the OCEAN model
(Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism),
using data from “personality quizzes”, mostly on Facebook.
The analysis of this data, carried out by machine learning algorithms, has
allowed the fine-tuning of advertisements and political messages (Gonzalez,
2017, p. 10). The emerging political leader at that time, Donald Trump, most
likely used sophisticated analytical instruments to generate influence and
achieve political effect. Was it, however a rivalry between his worldview and pro-
gramme and that of the other contenders for the office of President of the United
States? The criterion for success in political rivalry is consistently evolving in the
direction of technical efficiency. This opens up a wide field for various types of
manipulation and makes democratic processes vulnerable to external action.
 Future leadership technology 45
It is possible to imagine a situation in which an entity possessing high
technologies for data collection and analysis (both by legal and illegal meth-
ods) will be able to effectively influence the most important element of the
functioning of the democratic system – elections. Political discourse, espe-
cially in the West, is brimming with information on the activities of Russian
intelligence and their suspected influence on the election process. However,
the activities of non-state entities should also be taken into account – cor-
porations, groups centred around various terrorist ideologies or criminal
organisations. This threat is increased by the relative ease of access to criti-
cal technologies, once traditionally reserved for strong states.

The most pessimistic forecast that can be made in this context is that
accurate elections have become virtually impossible because of the
threats of external interference. The “shield and sword” race goes on –
successive layers of security are created by the state and other actors to
build social resilience. In the case of the methods described above and
their technological support, however, the offensive gains an advantage
which can only be diminished. It is impossible to completely eliminate it.

Modern technologies such as artificial intelligence and algorithms based

on it, and the “digitised” lifestyles of societies will define modern democra-
cies. The accuracy of the results of analyses of large data sets will allow not
only for adjusting the activities of political leaders to the “temperature” of
social moods. Predictive algorithms will be able to indicate ways to control
these moods in the desired direction. The leader will be able to do this far
more effectively than by using the traditional art of politics – image, public
appearance, the substantive areas of the programme or the attractiveness of
the idea. It is the political imponderables, embedded in the social and cul-
tural outline of a given socio-cultural imponderabilia that may be destined
to decline in social significance.

The political leader will not attract others by her/his ideas but by accu-
racy of analysis, determined by the computing power of analytical
software. The leader will thus become a product of the technology that
nominally only supports her/him. However, this relationship will grad-
ually be disrupted. This will mean that the dialogue and in-depth politi-
cal debate, essential components of a democratic system, will gradually
be flattened. The political leader will not persuade citizens round to her/
his views because she/he will already know the structure of their views
and behavioural patterns. Reliance on technology will make political
leadership hostage to computing.

This state of affairs will be exacerbated by already emerging opinions about

the legitimacy of ceding political decisions to artificial intelligence. In a sur-
vey conducted by the Center for the Governance of Change (2019, p. 10),
46 Tomasz Gajewski
25% of respondents from European countries were in favour of this solution.
These opinions result from uncertainty connected to the further function-
ing of democratic states (which will be deepened by the SARS2-CoV-2 pan-
demic) and from contesting the activities of traditional elites.
However, efficiency does not have to remain in line with democratic stand-
ards. Uneven access to analytical tools will create a new kind of advantage,
equipped with comprehensive data in the hands of political leaders. They
will gain the ability to manipulate by creating “alternative information
spaces”, strengthening the phenomenon of so-called information bubbles
(echo chambers) that will result in a deepening of social polarisation.

Views will be strengthened through targeted social media, which will

open the way for political leaders to focus (in accordance with the
principles of business effectiveness supported by technology-assisted
leadership adopted by the author) in their chosen areas, generating and
consolidating their influence through optimised public relations tools.
This applies in particular to populist leaders.

Authoritarian leaders will be among the largest beneficiaries of the devel-

opment of the technologies described thanks to which they will be able to
create more and more advanced systems of social control and more effec-
tive influence on citizens. It should also be emphasised that the strength
of their influence will be much broader than solely within their own soci-
eties. Generating impact on mass awareness will become technologically
easier and easier. The development of 5G networks and the growing Internet
addiction, especially social media, will strengthen the potential for manip-
ulation, something which is already observable. Lack of trust in democratic
leaders is aggravated by means of external influence in social media. Mass
disinformation campaigns carried out by Russia and China in both Europe
and the United States are already well recognised and described. The
noticeable increase in populist tendencies in the Euro-Atlantic countries is,
as Jan Zielonka (2018) argues, a general crisis of democratic elites, but it has
been, as evidence shows (Mueller, 2019), aggravated by authoritarian states
whose leaders grow into trusted statesmen (Giliza, 2020) and who have the
right skills and instruments to conduct effective policy. Authoritarian lead-
ers will thus gain a whole range of instruments to disrupt democratic pro-
cesses around the world (Wright, 2018).
Political leaders, relying on decisions supported or even defined by
machine learning algorithms, will be increasingly dependent on their deci-
sions based on the results of their work. A scenario in which artificial intel-
ligence makes choices in budget planning and distribution of state funds
or distribution of finances for public investment illustrates the potential
for serious disruption to the functioning of democratic societies. A ques-
tion arises about whether or not political leaders under such conditions
will be able to act to satisfy the need for social justice and equal access to
 Future leadership technology 47
public resources. Cathy O’Neil quoted previously (2016, pp. 74–89), anal-
yses, among other things, the impact of algorithms on the functioning of
the justice system within which blatant errors in the profiling of potential
criminals on the basis of predictive algorithms may occur. If the criterion
of effectiveness in the operation of political leaders prevails, paradoxical
situations may occur where individuals and social groups are stigmatised as
potential sources of criminal activity.
According to the author, with regard to access to in-depth data analysis,
political leaders will opt for increasing the effectiveness of their decisions,
which will result in the disruption of democratic processes and strengthen-
ing authoritarian tendencies, which then find their explanation and justifi-
cation in optimising actions “for the common good”.

Conclusions
The development of high technologies, primarily artificial intelligence and
machine learning algorithms based on it, under conditions created by the
fully developed 5G network architecture will give political leaders broad
scope for action.
They will benefit from the support of experts in the field of analysing large
data sets, they will gain unprecedented knowledge of behavioural patterns
and political choice. This will help them in creating political programmes
and constructing targeted messages as well as generating influence in the
community. With intelligent predictive algorithms, leaders will also be able
to adapt their actions to processes that are just beginning. A possibility to
influence the community will increase due to the aforementioned accuracy
of data and an apparent tendency to accept optimal decisions; even at the
cost of shortcomings in the democratic process.
Nonetheless, using these technological advances will require a reliance
on expert knowledge. This has the potential of putting political leadership
in the hands of free market players concerned only with operational effi-
ciency in which there may not be a place for democratic values. This type of
instrumentation, in turn, favours authoritarian leaders who, thanks to the
conclusions of data analysis assisted by artificial intelligence, gain instru-
ments for even more effective control over societies.
It is these leaders and their actions that will pose another threat to the
functioning of democratic states. The relative ease in which the means of
manipulating the views of democratic societies are exported, will pose a
growing threat to electoral procedures and the stable functioning of democ-
racy. Rivalry among political leaders will be reduced to their ability and
effectiveness in using technology. A modern political leader will solely be,
as in the case of the Japanese municipal elections described previously, an
avatar of the analytical infrastructure and its operators. Political agendas,
ways of winning the support of groups within society will become a func-
tion of the results of analytical and predictive algorithms.
48 Tomasz Gajewski
Notes
1. See: Alpaydin, E. (2016). Machine learning: The new AI. London: MIT Press;
Bostrom, N. (2016). Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; Costandi, M. (2016). Neuroplasticity. London: MIT
Press; Culey, S.A. (2018). Transition point: From steam to the singularity. New
York, NY: Troubador Publishing; D’Aveni, R. (2018). The pan-industrial rev-
olution: How new manufacturing titans will transform the world. New York,
NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; Design anthropological futures. (2016). R. C.
Smith, K. T. Vangkilde, M. G.Kjærsgaard, T. Otto, J. Halse, T. Binder (eds.).
London: Bloomsbury Publishing; Ford, M. (2016). Rise of the robots: Technol-
ogy and the threat of a jobless future. New York, NY: Basic Books; Greengard,
S. (2015). The Internet of things. London: MIT Press; Hornick, J. (2015). 3D
printing will rock the world. North Charleston: SC; Hanson, E.C. (2008). The
information revolution and world politics. New York, NY: Rowman & Little-
field Publishers; Jordan, M. J. (2016). Robots. London: MIT Press; Kozubek, J.
(2018). Modern prometheus: Editing the human genome with Crispr-Cas9. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press; Kurzweil, R. (2006). The singular-
ity is near: When humans transcend biology. New York, NY: Penguin Books;
Parrington, J. (2016). Redesigning life: How genome editing will transform the
world. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Pasquale, F. (2016). The Black Box
society: The secret algorithms that control money and information. New York,
NY: Harvard University Press; Payne, K. (2018). Strategy, evolution, and war:
From apes to artificial intelligence, Washington, WA: Georgetown University
Press; Paus, E. (2018). Confronting dystopia: The new technological revolution
and the future of work. New York, NY: Cornell University Press. Ross, A.
(2017). The industries of the future. New York, NY; Simon & Schuster; Ruppel
Shell, E. (2018). The job: Work and its future in a time of radical change, New
York, NY: Random House; Schwab, K. (2016). The fourth industrial revolution.
London: Penguin Books; Shanahan, M. (2015). The technological singularity.
London: MIT Press; Sharre, P. (2018). Army of none: Autonomous weapons and
the future of war. New York, NY: WW Norton; Skilton, M., Hovsepian, F.,
(2017). The 4th industrial revolution: Responding to the impact of artificial intel-
ligence on business. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan; Springer, P. J. (2018).
Outsourcing war to machines. The military robotics revolution, Santa Barabara:
Praeger Security International; Tegmark, M. (2017). Life 3.0: Being human in
the age of artificial intelligence, New York, NY: Random House.
2. See: Advanced Materials; Algorithms; Artificial Intelligence in Medicine; Arti-
ficial Intelligence Review; Autonomous Robots; Big Data & Society; Big Data
Research; Biomaterials; Biomedical Microdevices; Biosensors and Bioelec-
tronics; Cognitive Science; Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Network-
ing; Ethics and Information Technology; Foundations and Trends in Machine
Learning; Information Science; Information Systems Research; Information
Technology and People; Information, Communication and Society; Interna-
tional Journal of Business Intelligence and Data Mining; International Journal
of Data Science and Analytics; International Journal of Intelligent Systems;
International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics; International jour-
nal of nanomedicine; International Journal of Robotics Research; Journal of
Algorithms; Journal of Big Data; Journal of Biomedical Nanotechnology; Jour-
nal of Information Technology; Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing; Journal
of Machine Learning Research; Knowledge-Based Systems; Mobile Media and
Communication; Nano Research; Nanomedicine, Nanotechnology, Biology, and
Medicine; Nanoscale; Nature Nanotechnology; Networks and Spatial Econom-
ics; Neural Networks; Neurocomputing; New Media and Society; Physics of Life
Review; Scientometrics; Social Science Computer Review; Soft Robotics.
 Future leadership technology 49
3. See: European Journal of Futures Research; Foresight: The Journal of Future
Studies, Strategic Thinking and Policy; Futures; International Journal of
Forecasting; Journal of Evolution and Technology; Journal of Forecasting;
Journal of Futures Studies: Epistemology, Methods, Applied and Alternative
Futures; Technological Forecasting & Social Change; World Future Review: A
Journal of Strategic Foresight; World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm
Research.
4. See: Power Shift? Political Leadership and Social Media. (2020). R. Davis, D.
Taras (ed.). New York: Routledge

References
Bowen, W. H., & Gleeson, R. E. (2019). The evolution of human settlements. Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95034-1.
Brown, S. (1968). Scenarios in system analysis. In E. S. Quade (Ed.), Systems
analysis and policy planing: Applications in defense (a report prepared for
United States air force project rand). New York, NY: Elsevier Publishing
Comany, Inc.
Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2014). The second machine age: Work, progress,
and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies. New York, NY: W. W Norton &
Company.
Choucri, N. (1974). Forecasting in international relations: Problems and prospects.
International Interactions, 1, 63–86.
Christou, L. (2018, August 29). Artificial intelligence and the future of politics.
Retrieved from Verdict: https://www.verdict.co.uk/ai-in-politics/
Creswell, J. M. (2013). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method
approaches. London: Sage Publications.
Dabbagh, M., & Rayes, A. (2019). Internet of things security and privacy. In A.
Rayes, & S. Salam (Eds.), Internet of things from hype to reality. The Road to digi-
tization (pp. 199–203). New York, NY: Springer International Publishing.
Domingos, P. (2015). The master algorithm: How the quest for the ultimate learning
machine will remake our world. New York NY: Basic Books.
European Tech Insights 2019. Mapping European Attitudes to Technological Change
and its Governance. (2019). Retrieved from Center for the Governance of Change:
https://docs.ie.edu/cgc/European-Tech-Insights-2019.pdf
Flach, P. (2012). Machine learning. The art and science of algorithms that make sense
of data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511973000.
Giliza, C. (2020, January 9). The world trusts Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping more
than Trump. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/
donald-trump-xi-jinping-vladimir-putin/index.html
Gonzalez, R. J. (2017). Hacking the citizenry? Personality profiling, ‘big data’ and
the election of Donald Trump. Anthropology Today, 33(3), 9–12. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1111/1467-8322.12348.
Guilbeault, D. (2016). Growing bot security: An ecological view of bot agency.
International Journal of Communication, 10, 5003–5021.
Harari, Y. N. (2016). Homo deus: A brief history of tomorrow. London: Harvill
Secker.
Harari, Y. N. (2018). 21 lessons for the 21st century. New York, NY: Spiegel & Grau,
Jonathan Cape.
50 Tomasz Gajewski
Held, V. (2016, April 20). 5G enabled by massive capacity, connectivity. Retrieved from
Nokia: https://www.nokia.com/blog/5g-enabled-massive-capacity-connectivity/
Howard, P. N. (2015). Pax technica: How the Internet of things May set us free or lock
us up. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Howard, P. N., Woolley, S., & Calo, R. (2018). Algorithms, bots, and political com-
munication in the US 2016 election: The challenge of automated political commu-
nication for election law and administration. Journal of Information Technology &
Politics, 15(2), 81–93. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2018.1448735.
Isenstadt, A. (2020, February 19). Trump campaign hires alum of controversial data
company. Retrieved from Politico: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/19/
trump-cambridge-analytica-oczkowski-114075
Lia, S., Xu, L. D., & Zhao, S. 2018. 5G Internet of things: A survey. Journal of
Industrial Information Integration. 18:1–9. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jii.2018.
01.005.
Liber, B., & Beck, M. (2019, June 2). Algorithms are replacing leadership strategies.
Retrieved from Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/barrylibert/2019/06/02/
algorithms-are-replacing-leadership-strategies/
Mueller, R. S. (2019, March). Report on the investigation into Russian interference
in the 2016 Presidential Election. Retrieved from United States Department of
Justice: https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf
Murthy, D., Powell, A. B., Tinati, R., Anstead, N., Carr, L., Halford, S. J., & Weal,
M. (2016). Bots and political influence: A sociotechnical investigation of social
network Capital. International Journal of Communication, 10, 4952–4971.
Álvarez, A., & Ritchley, T. (2015). Applications of general morphological analysis
from engineering design to policy analysis. Acta Morphologica Generalis, 4(1), 1–40.
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of math destruction. How Big Data increases inequality
and threatens democracy. New York, NY: Crown Publishers.
Paley, N. (2017). Leadership strategies in the age of Big Data, algorithms, and analyt-
ics. New York, NY: CRC Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315164977.
Perez, C. (2010). Technological revolutions and techno-economic paradigms.
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 34:185–202. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/
bep051.
Preston, T., & t’Hart, P. (1999). Understanding and evaluating bureaucratic politics:
The nexus between political leaders and advisory systems. Political Psychology,
20(1), 49–98. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00137.
Rifkin, J. (2011). The Third industrial revolution. How lateral power is transforming
energy, economy, and the world. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rifkin, J. (2016, January 14). The 2016 World Economic Forum misfires with
its fourth industrial revolution theme. Retrieved from Huffington Post:
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-2016-world-economic-f_b_8975326?-
g u c c ou nt er=1&g u c e _ refer rer=aHR0 cHM6Ly 9t Z W Rp dW0 uY29tL0B -
hbH B l c nV0 a 3Uvd G h l LW Zvd X J0 aC1p b m R1c3Ry aW FsL X J l d m 9 s d X
Rpb24taXMtYS1ob2F4LWFuZC1pdC1oYXMtbmV2ZXItaGFwcGVuZWQt
ZmVkMWE3ZDlmMjgz&guce_referre
Ritchley, T. (2013). General morphological analysis. A general method for
non-quantified modelling. Retrieved from Swedish Morphological Society: http://
swemorph.com/pdf/gma.pdf
Russell, S., & Norvig, P. (2016). Artificial intelligence. A modern approach. Harlow:
Pearson Education Limited.
 Future leadership technology 51
SAM. (n.d.). Learn about SAM. Retrieved from Politciansam: http://politiciansam.
nz/about.html
Schuelke-Leech, B.-A. (2018). A model for understanding the orders of magnitude
of disruptive technologies. Technological Forecasting & Social Change. 129:261–
274. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.09.033.
Schwab, K. (2016). The fourth industrial revolution. London: Penguin Books.
Schwartz, P. (1996). The art of the long view. Planning for the future in an uncertain
world. New York, NY: Currency Doubleday.
Simonite, T. (2017, October 18). AI experts want to end ‘Black Box’ algorithms in
government. Retrieved from Wired: https://www.wired.com/story/ai-experts-want-
to-end-black-box-algorithms-in-government/
Sułek, M. (2010). Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe. Warszawa:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Swisher, K. (2019, March 22). Owning a car will soon be as quaint as owning a horse.
Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/opin-
ion/end-of-cars-uber-lyft.html
Taulli, T. (2019). Artificial intelligence basics. A Non-technical introduction. New
York, NY: Apress. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5028-0.
Tzafestas, S. G. (2018). Ethics and law in the internet of things world. Smart Cities.
1:98–120. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/SMARTCITIES1010006.
Van der Wal, Z., & Yifei, Y. (2018, October 17). Could robots do better than our cur-
rent leaders? Retrieved from World Economic Forum: https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2018/10/could-robot-government-lead-better-current-politicians-ai/
Wagner, M. (2017, November 23). This virtual politician wants to run for office.
Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/23/tech/first-virtual-politi-
cian-trnd/index.html
Woolley, S. C., & Howard, P. N. (2017). Computational propaganda worldwide:
Executive summary. Retrieved from Oxford Internet Institute: http://comprop.oii.
ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Casestudies-ExecutiveSummary.
pdf
Wright, N. (2018, July 10). How artificial intelligence Will reshape the global order.
Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/
2018-07-10/how-artificial-intelligence-will-reshape-global-order
Zielonka, J. (2018). Counter-revolution. Liberal Europe in retreat. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Zwicky, F. (1969). Discovery, invention, research – through the morphological
approach. Toronto: The Macmillian Company.
4 The (non?)ethical dilemmas
of political leadership
Artur Laska

Introduction
Studying the ethics of political leadership is not an easy task, and its results
are always a matter for discussion. There are many ethical systems, often
contradictory, which make explicit analysis and explanation difficult. At
most, the immutable and shares features of mankind as a species allow for
a degree of universality (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, pp. 55–56). Leaders, fur-
thermore, although they may be ethical in one aspect, are not necessar-
ily ethical in all aspects at the same time. An attempt to answer the basic
questions of whether the leader is acting in a good cause, whether they are
acting in the right way and whether they are acting with the right moti-
vation is always highly problematic, and the questions posed here cannot
always be resolved. However, this does not change the fact that ethics and
moral responsibility are at the heart of leadership. Like any other form of
intentional political influence, it has its moral and emotional component
(Boehm, 1993, pp. 227–250). In this case, however, it has special significance
since it is about setting goals and courses of action for collective entities.
Therefore, leadership itself may be treated as a relationship with a moral
nature, based on mutual obligation and at least a partially shared vision of
what is good (Ciulla, 2004b, p. XV).
The emotional-moral foundation of political subjectivity means that its
manifestations cannot be studied only in terms of its expressive aspect. It
seems more appropriate to treat it as a manifestation of certain motiva-
tions related to the system of social relations, norms, patterns and the rules
that govern them. These determinants basically fall within the sphere of
consciousness phenomena, but sometimes also balance within unconscious
mental states. As a result, the decision-making mechanism, including lead-
ership, is never free from mental predispositions, evaluation/valuation and
emotions (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015, pp. 799–823). The abstract
moral reflection that follows, connected with the ability to anticipate what
may happen if a man allows the reprehensible (albeit unrelated to him/her-
self) behaviour of others, to go unpunished, is unique to of Homo sapiens.
A person can also imagine how such behaviour will affect the welfare of the
 Dilemmas of leadership 53
general public and of individual groups, which is already a fundamental
competence of homo politicus. Although the process of evolution has not set
unambiguous moral rules and values for mankind, it has equipped human
beings with psychological mechanisms, tendencies and abilities to take into
account the interests of others and the whole community, something which
is the foundation of morality and political leadership.
The existence of human moral intuition does not raise any major doubts
today (Masters, 1989, pp. 227–233). It is revealed, among other ways, by the
co-operation of people who are not bound by blood ties. This intuition is a
derivative of epigenetic rules, which are hereditary predispositions occur-
ring in the development of the mind and determining the resulting concepts
and decisions. Although morality is rooted in genes, it undergoes significant
and systematic cultural adjustment. In addition, it is no more than a limited
potential, because in practice it depends on the psycho-emotional maturity
of an individual. Therefore, it is determined not only by the naturally gen-
erated capacity to feel compassion, learning and understanding, but also by
the practice of interaction, including above all co-operation and individual
sensitivity. A person makes decisions based upon social instincts, and try-
ing to maximise the implementation of interests, he or she also gives them
an ethical dimension.
The moral infrastructure that is created through the subtle mechanisms
of the mind (primarily intentionality, reciprocity and empathy) allows par-
allel circuits to arise in the brains of many people, which in turn enables a
shared sense of what matters at a given moment (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004, pp. 169–172). This creates a sense of immediacy within the collec-
tive political entity, a sense of directness, of shared experience in a given
moment. Such a state of mutual harmony is called “empathic resonance”,
i.e. a kind of brain-to-brain connection, which creates a subconscious and
collective neural circuity. Thanks to this, shared emotional elation becomes
possible, followed by the creation of a leadership relationship and taking
targeted actions within its framework.
Regardless of biological determination, however, these are primarily
social interactions that underlie the process of moral reasoning, and con-
sequently the political line of. The moralising mind condemns man to per-
manent dilemmas and moral conflicts. Tackling them occurs both through
emotional-intuitive reactions, as well as within the framework of rationalisa-
tion processes (Delli Carpini, 2010, pp. 25–30). Decisions made on this basis
are not always morally right, which in the case of politics is not only natural
but also, in a sense, necessary. Paradoxically, if the human mechanisms of
formulating such judgments guaranteed accurate moral assessments, this
could lead to catastrophic consequences. For example, in certain situations,
people would take the side of their enemies, acting against their friends or
family. As a result, politics would be replaced by the process of objectivising
the resolution of particular arguments, and an arbitrator would take the
place of a leader. The dilemmas mentioned above, and above all else, the
54 Artur Laska
ambiguities of choice that appear within them, should therefore be recog-
nised as a distinguishing feature of politics as such.
Within the framework of the assumptions made, it is hard not to notice
that resolving ethical leadership dilemmas, although not easy and marked
by questions to which there are no unambiguous answers, are of funda-
mental significance. Not only the ethical well-being of leaders, but also the
welfare of specific groups and communities depends on them. The analysis
of their specificity in modern democracies will become the primary goal of
this text. First of all, the author, treating leadership as a result not only of
the traits of the leader, but also of the context in which she/he operates, will
try to present the conditions in which these dilemmas occur. Then, he will
highlight their main areas of common ground, as well as manifestations of
(non?)ethical behaviour, in order to finally present a leadership model which
doesn’t eliminate these dilemmas (because it is impossible), but allows them
to be overcome in accordance with the imperative of public responsibility.
The analysis will verify the hypothesis that political challenges in the 21st
century, and above all ethical dilemmas and their cultural and institutional
context, imply the need to reorient the dominant leadership style, which has
already been reflected in the proposed theoretical models.

The context of contemporary dilemmas

Leadership of groups or political associations always takes place in a spe-
cific environment and is about noticing the opportunities that emerge in
it and effectively using those considered best. Therefore, it means build-
ing a desired vision of the future and mobilising people to implement it.
Challenges that arise for societies in the 21st century reinforce the impor-
tance of effective political leadership. Meanwhile, political leaders, having
moral responsibilities towards society, are confronting ongoing axiological
pluralism and heterogeneity. In the realities of democracy, this causes a
great deal of confusion and a lack of clear criteria for what is good or bad,
and which perspective is morally the most appropriate.
The literature of the subject and social research indicate that citizens are
more interested in the morality of political leaders than their competence
(efficiency), although in their assessment they use both these categories
(Marciniak, 2018, pp. 82–83; Bennis, 2004). This issue is illustrated, among
others, by the results of research conducted as part of the GLOBE program
(The Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness) imple-
mented under the direction of Robert J. House. The aim of the analyses
started in 1991 was broad and amounted to collecting empirical data on
the relationship between a society’s culture and leadership styles. Although
research conducted on five continents has shown that differences in recog-
nised values influence preferred leadership styles, there has always been a
recurrence of honesty and integrity among the key traits and behaviours iden-
tified as qualities of leadership. Appropriate resolution of ethical dilemmas
 Dilemmas of leadership 55
was therefore a major expectation for leaders (House, Dorfman, Javidan,
Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2013).
Meanwhile, the scale of current challenges, the axiological pluralism
mentioned above, and above all, the technocratisation of leadership make
public trust in political leaders low. The moral quality of political strate-
gies is also a source of widespread disappointment. Although, with ethically
speaking, democracy is probably superior to other political systems because
openness is encouraging the spread of truth as a public value, citizens do
not usually trust their representatives and suspect them of lying. This par-
adox arises because leaders are seen as servants of a sovereign nation that
can replace them through elections. This motivates them not so much to
tell the sovereign the often-difficult truth, as to deliberately and hypocriti-
cally tell the sovereign what the sovereign would like to hear (Kane, 2007,
pp. 33–52). Thus, the image of falsified reality becomes the starting point for
their actions. Of course, the effect of a natural care for one’s reputation is to
act in a way that may convincingly be justified or explained to others. This is
all the more necessary for a public leader exposed to this kind of judgment.
Regardless of her/his motivations or consequences of actions taken, in order
to affect the reactions of the environment on which her/his success often
depends, these explanations are formulated post hoc. The leader presents
the reasons for making this and not another choice not only when she/he
has to explain her/his decision to others, but also when looking for justifica-
tions to convince herself/himself, with moral justification being particularly
important (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003, p. 433). These quite natural reactions
are nowadays superimposed on the media and liberal public sphere.
Leadership is a communications process, and the dynamics of changes
taking place in the sphere of communication is one of the fundamental
determinants of its contemporary evolution. The dominant functions and
phenomena here are increasingly organised as part of a network that is
determined by social morphology. Its logic also radically changes the func-
tioning of politics. Both governance and competition for power take place
in the space of visual media, which strengthens the meaning of persuasive
images in their message (Castells, 2007, pp. 19–42). The game is not only
about convincing potential supporters, but also taking their emotions to
higher ground with the dramaturgy of staged scenes. Ultimately, the result-
ing spectacle is a professionally constructed overture tailored exactly to
what people want to see and experience. As a result, real politics is often
obscured by a propaganda show played with unprecedented dynamics and
a multitude of threads. The network allows for a considerable individual-
isation of the message, which is particularly important in liberal societies.
Liberal individualism, or rather its extreme, even atomistic form, implies
two other phenomena affecting the ethical condition of leadership in the
21st century. First of all, the above-mentioned technocratism should be
mentioned. Usually referred to as professionalism, it reveals itself where
the criterion of effectiveness in conjunction with instrumental rationality
56 Artur Laska
is a response to the radical separation of what is public and private. As a
result, the analysis of normative dilemmas of decision becomes marginal,
and what serves the optimal implementation of the objectives is considered
rational, regardless of its content.

The technocrat focuses on measures, the goals are given, obvious, clear
and indisputable, as they result from the objective indications of the
expert. In principle, the technocrat invokes the strict laws of science
(usually the “iron laws of economics”), the requirements for effective
operation, reliable methods and techniques.

This approach puts an end to any leader’s dilemmas, because it excludes

alternative and choice, and in this sense is one-dimensional. Technological
rationality becomes political rationality. The theory is even fetishized here,
and expert methods of action based on it are treated as optimal ways of
dealing with reality (Horkheimer, 2007, p. 37). The answer to technocratism
is its ideological opposite, which is extreme and equally pathological for
democracy. Populism, because it is mentioned here, although it is clearly
saturated with moral narrative, reaches for similar technocratic tools in the
practice of governance. The omnipotent populace steps into the expert’s
shoes, maintaining the non-alternative and illusory character of social
participation.
The domination of means over goals, or tools over needs, leads to dep-
ersonalisation of interpersonal relationships, alienation and even social
anomy. The individual is objectified and reduced to a cog in the social
machine. The technocratic vision of society implies no fundamental con-
flict of interest. This is based on a belief in the possibility of pursuing an
objective and rational policy which would involve solving only technical
issues. The dangers associated with this involve a total loss of sensitivity
to the policy context and the closure of opportunities to learn from experi-
ence. Such “professionals” give priority to technical proficiency which they
treasure more than traditionally understood wisdom. As a result, they also
underestimate the conflict between the producers of knowledge and its con-
sumers, trusting that it can be resolved by appropriate legal regulations.
Meanwhile, the lack of social conflicts and their moral reference is illusory,
while technocratism at best exacerbates them.

An essential feature of technocratism is adiaforisation, which involves

the fact that certain types of behaviour are clear of moral judgments,
making them seem ethically indifferent.

A clear manifestation of this process in administration and politics is

bureaucracy, which frees the consciences of officials and their superiors
from responsibility and moral dilemmas. The correctness of their behav-
iour is determined only by compliance with instrumentally used law and
 Dilemmas of leadership 57
procedural rationality. This is a form of lifeline in a situation of multiple
axiological narratives. As a result, however, the public sphere does not so
much lose its moral and pluralistic dimension but is treated as if it had lost
it. The elimination of the prism of values from politics translates into a pro-
cess of actual depoliticisation. Where there is no room for ethical disputes
and dilemmas, there is no room for morality in the public sphere. For exam-
ple, it is often forgotten that not only democracy, but also liberalism and
capitalism are also moral projects (Laska, 2017, p. 54).
The second phenomenon, which has a major impact today on the ethical
condition of leadership, comes down to the occurrence of narcissistic per-
sonality disorders. The individual then shows: an exaggerated self-esteem;
fantasies of unlimited success; a belief in her/his uniqueness that can only
be understood by others who are exceptional or in high-ranking positions;
an expectation of excessive admiration; a sense of having special powers;
exploratory-instrumental attitude towards other people; a deficit of empa-
thy; a jealous attitude towards others or a conviction that others are envi-
ous of her/him; a haughty and arrogant attitude (Millon & Davis, 2005,
pp. 366–367). Although these disorders have a highly pathological impact
on the quality of leadership, they often form the foundation of individual
ambitions and motivate an individual to gain a dominant position. The
scale of their occurrence, being a characteristic sign of the times, deter-
mines the resolution of ethical dilemmas of leadership on a wider scale.
As a rule, it leads not only to an egotistic focus on the leader her/himself
and an arbitrarily defined self-interest, but also to the elimination of any
moral dilemmas. These disorders go hand-in-hand with a low level of intu-
ition and moral reasoning, and thus a limitation of the ability to distin-
guish moral good from evil, and sometimes also to recognise other values.
Sensual perception (George E. Moore draws attention to this), emotional
(Max Scheller), instinctive (Henri Bergson), as well as an intellectual view
(Roman Ingarden) are important here. According to Lawrence Kohlberg’s
theory, in the latter context, people who reach a higher stage of moral rea-
soning are more strongly perceived as ethical. The relationship between the
level of reasoning of the leader and his supporters/followers is also impor-
tant. When a leader presents a higher level, her/his subordinates assess her/
him as more ethical (Jordan, Brown, Treviño, & Finkelstein, 2013, pp. 660–
683). Ethical leaders are also characterised by a higher level of moral iden-
tification, understood as internalisation and demonstrating through their
own actions (symbolisation) the norms they adhere to (Mayer et al., 2012,
pp. 151–171).
However, the research of social psychologists shows that the ultimate per-
ception of the leaders’ moral dilemmas and decisions is through the prism
of their own and the common understanding of ethics. It is built on every-
day life experiences and internalised norms (Wojciszke & Baryła, 2001,
pp. 49–66). Thus, also on the ethical level, a pattern is confirmed that leader-
ship is a function of political culture, which in turn is situated in the broader
58 Artur Laska
context of social attitudes and norms (Thompson, Elliot, & Wildavsky,
1990). Questions about the ethics of leadership are therefore also, and per-
haps above all, questions about social morality – not only about the stand-
ards of the leader, but also those of her/his supporters’.

Fundamental levels of dilemmas

There are at least four interlinked ethical dimensions within which political
leadership dilemmas emerge:

• The ethics of the leader as a person, i.e. her/his individual morals or

traits perceived as virtues (e.g. altruism) and allowing a classification of
her/his ethical choices.
• The ethics of the effects and instruments of the leader’s actions, includ-
ing what she/he does and/or does not do.
• The ethics of expectations formulated by supporters, as well as their
attitude towards (non)moral leadership behaviour.
• The ethics of leadership relations, in particular the relationship between
the leader and supporters.

An attempt at ethical diagnosis of leadership should be based on an inter-

dependent analysis of these dimensions. Moral determination here con-
cerns both the intention and justification of an action (which includes
deontological theories), but also its results (teleological theories). A reli-
able consideration of leaders’ ethics requires taking these two dimensions
into account. In addition, the dilemmas that appear at this point also stem
from the expectations that are placed on leaders. Although their manifes-
tations may be different, they heavily influence the necessity of a resolution
between self-interest and the interests of the organisation or the political
union, and perhaps also taking into account some abstractly defined will.
The questions:

• What should leaders and their supporters be guided by?

• What are they ultimately guided by?
• What leadership relationships and the effects of leadership do they
create?

The above questions are at the heart of in-depth reflection on politics.

Within the answers given, there is a well-established belief that public life is
governed by laws other than interpersonal relations. Therefore, the possibil-
ity of simple transfer of ethical principles developed at the individual level
into the field of politics is limited. The dominant elements of public space
are on the one hand power and conflict, and on the other hand consensus
and cooperation, whilst the truth about social relations is highly complex
(Niebuhr, 1960, pp. XIV–XV). By using Max Weber’s categories, it can be
 Dilemmas of leadership 59
concluded that a person who responsibly draws attention to the effects of
her/his actions will be more suitable for political leadership than a follower
of the absolute ethics of beliefs (Weber, 1998, p. 100).
This approach corresponds to the classic thought of Nicolo Machiavelli,
who separated the prescriptive standards of leadership from those of
morality. Although he placed the emphasis on the effectiveness of lead-
ership, it was intended to serve the ethical purposes of the republic. The
prince should know when to act in accordance with common moral ideas
and when to break them in the name of far-reaching political goals.
Machiavelli emphasised that the leader’s goal is not to gain recognition
as moral but as effective (Cosans & Reina, 2018, pp. 275–300). Today,
“Machiavellianism” is seen as a calculating and completely unethical set
of tactics for action.

It is spoken of when deceitfulness based on cunning, outwitting and

surprising others rules a leader’s ruthless conduct, especially at the
price of violating commonly accepted principles and values (Karwat,
2014, p. 74).

The search for a formula for effective leadership is not limited to a

Machiavellian separation from moral dilemmas, or a technocratic strategy
for neutralising ethical conflicts. For at least several decades, an alternative
current of research has been developing, with questions about the ethical
aspects of leadership at its heart. It is recognised that this is the result of
processes changing the legitimacy of the foundations of power relationships
in modern societies. The origins of this are also to be found in the aforemen-
tioned erosion of trust towards the elites. As a result, attempts are made to
define ethical standards of political leadership.
The precursors of this approach were Rabindra Kanungo and Manuel
Mendonca, who pointed out the need to go beyond the traditional under-
standing of leadership. They indicated that the research on the technical side
of effective impact should be supplemented with an analysis of the leader’s
values and principles, as in today’s environment the ethical implications of
her/his actions take on special importance (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996, p.
8). Similarly, Joanne Ciulla observed the complementarity of the pragmatic
(reflecting effectiveness) and normative (indicating ethical responsibility)
significance of “good leadership” (Ciulla, 2004a, p. 308). Today, it is becom-
ing increasingly common to believe that the search for any optimal models
must take into account both performance criteria and related ethical aspects
(Ciulla, 2012, pp. 517–520; Palmer, 2009, pp. 525–526). Underestimating the
normative dimension is not only a manifestation of cognitive ignorance, but
also a misunderstanding of the role and importance of political leadership.
It seems all the more justified to draw attention to the current manifestations
of dilemmas, the (non)ethicality of which – due to the nature of the policy
and its contemporary context – are accompanied by a clear question mark.
60 Artur Laska
Signs of dilemmas
The beginning of the 21st century will be recorded as time of fabricated
images and lies spread in the public sphere at an unprecedented speed.
Politicians have always sought self-promotion using the means and tools
available to them. However, they have had never previously had such spe-
cialised tools to create their own image – on the one hand far from the
truth, and on the other – so difficult to verify. In a political spectacle that
consists of meticulously directed behaviour, the image is of fundamental
importance.

It comes down to a certain image which, by evoking associations, gives

the object additional and desirable values, and thus contributes to its
emotional reception. However, it is more than just a sum of judgmen-
tal opinions, but also a relatively lasting mental structure kept in one’s
mind (McGraw, 2008, p. 363).

Political leaders live from a broadcast of impressions mediated by the

media (Herbst, 2006, pp. 285–290). By creating their image, they make sure
that the information they consider beneficial to themselves is displayed in
the message and omit information that could negatively affect the trust
of potential supporters. Developing image strategies is therefore often a
simple fraud. There is both ex-ante cheating, meaning various types of
information manipulation and concealing intentions when the parties
communicate before concluding a contract, and also ex-post cheating,
consisting of breaking its arrangements in line with predictions regarding
the partner’s behaviour. Paradoxically, however, given the results of stud-
ies according to which most people treat politics as a game calculated to
win votes, the skilful implementation of image strategy appears to them as
evidence of the politician’s professionalism rather than as the aforemen-
tioned deception (Żukiewicz, 2011, p. 211). So, when such a temptation and
dilemma arise, the solution to the question mark placed near it turns out
not to be so simple and obvious.
The use of social engineering, optimising the political position of a
leader within the framework of democratic mechanisms, is one of her/his
most common ethical dilemmas. Ruth W. Grant rightly points out that all
democracies even induce leaders to be hypocritical, because power rela-
tions are also dependency relations, meaning that political leaders must
secure an agreement, cooperation or alliance of groups of people having
different interests and goals. According to her, the management of such
“dependency networks” cannot be done without hypocrisy. Grant notes
that limiting manipulation would require the abolition of democratic egal-
itarianism and the transfer of greater autonomy to leaders (Grant, 1997,
pp. 44–45, 53–54).
 Dilemmas of leadership 61
Manipulation should be understood here

as a hidden, often exceedingly sophisticated form of intentional enslav-

ing of a person who is treated objectively or instrumentally, i.e. deprived
of her/his dignity and brutally or deceitfully forced to make decisions/
actions that she/he would probably not have taken spontaneously.
(Taras, 2013, p. 214; Mandal, 2008, p. 52)

What is important and emphasised in this definition is the fact that

the manipulated person is convinced that he or she controls the situa-
tion, while the motive of the person exercising influence is to maximise
self-interest.
The temptation of demagogy seems equally inevitable. A leader who suc-
cumbs to it claims to be at the services of the people whom she/he flatters
and convinces them that she/he acts for justice and against the forces that
oppress her/him. In reality however, she/he only exploits her/his support-
ers, treating them as means to build her/his own position, sense of strength,
satisfaction and consequently, to bolster her/his authoritarian self-agency
(Kane, 2007, pp. 33–52). Again, the strategy of image creation strategy faces
the fundamental dilemma of applying a lie.
Lying is a complex communication act in which the intention of the lying
sender is to deceive (mislead) the interlocutor (Ekman, 2006, p. 40; Masip,
Garrido, & Herrero, 2004, p. 148). This phenomenon occurs when someone
makes a statement about which they know or suspect to be false, exam-
ple, concerning facts that have not occurred, or denying facts which have
occurred, in the hope that others will find them true. It may also involve
dishonestly putting facts together in such a way as to present a false picture
of things or refraining from providing information. In such cases, the liar
leads the listener to false conclusions, although she/he clearly does not for-
mulate them herself/himself (Mearsheimer, 2012, pp. 34–35). Lying can also
focus on emotions. There are even situations when it consists only in show-
ing emotions that the sender does not feel or intentionally giving informa-
tion that is untruthful without falsifying emotions (Masip et al., 2004, pp.
147–171). In practice, these mechanisms boil down to, among other things,
embellishing, free juggling of data, numbers, sentences, examples and con-
cealment, which in principle makes up a package of colloquially and erro-
neously understood political public relations tools.
An average person lies 1.65 times a day (Garber, 2013, pp. 15–16; Kagle,
1998, pp. 234–250). Other primates also lie, mostly, because it has signifi-
cant evolutionary benefits. The ability to lie skilfully, as well as the ability
to manipulate are associated with personal and professional successes and
significantly affect social significance (Lindsey, Dunbar, & Russell, 2011,
p. 55). In this context, Roy Lewicki (1983, p. 74) points out that the basic func-
tion of lying is to gain power and tactical advantage in social interactions.
62 Artur Laska
Their source is, among others, access to information unknown to the per-
son lied to, which builds the sender’s asymmetrical advantage. Lying also
does not meet with burdensome sanctions, because severe punishment for
such widespread behaviour would not make much sense. In turn, the study
of Bella DePaulo and colleagues (1996) indicates that the vast majority of
lies remain undetected (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). All of this significantly
strengthens the leader’s temptation and poses the dilemma of possible
exploitation. Hannah Arendt, therefore, once pointed out that the use of
artificial and lying images of reality as totalitarian techniques of power is
also characteristic of democratic leadership. This procedure completely dis-
rupts people’s ability to judge leaders fairly. Such lies are not individual, but
they are intended to transform the entire political sphere, and thus inspire
unlimited confidence in decision-makers (Arendt, 1968, pp. 252–253). It is
worth remembering, however, that creating and maintaining a culture of
political lies requires not only perpetrators, but also observers.
Research results indicate that the ability to create reliable and deceptive
messages allows us to predict dominance in preschool children, although
this applies to men and not women. They confirmed that lying helps to gain
power and is therefore a significant temptation for leadership (Keating &
Heltman, 1994, p. 312). Leaders are, by definition, people with power, and
the analysis show that such people lie more often and with greater ease.
Resources of power reduce the impact of stress associated with dishonesty
and give an illusory sense of control which can help create convincing nar-
ratives. Leaders therefore have a strong motivation not to answer simple
questions directly. It is hardly surprising that they rarely seem to say what
they really mean. If this happens, it is often for political benefits and not
out of devotion to the democratic precept of transparency. Although such
leaders can declare and even profess values of honesty and openness, their
natural (or at least political) instinct seems strongly opposed. As a result,
belief in the hypocrisy of politicians is so widespread that candidates for
leaders often base their campaigns on the claim that they are not politicians,
but instead are ordinary people who share their outrage at political decep-
tion. Such an anti-political position is often effective.
The use of lies in the leadership process also reinforces the phenomenon
of “the euphoria of the liar”.

This is the positive elation people experience when they get away with
it and it is stronger than the negative emotional consequences that peo-
ple mistakenly think they will experience after unethical behaviour.
(Ruedy, Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013).

It perpetuates a tactics based on a lie, which, when repeated often and

with sufficient conviction, can become the truth – which sometimes ben-
efits everyone. This is because what people say, regardless of the truth of
their words, helps to build a social reality that then becomes real. Among
 Dilemmas of leadership 63
other ways, this is how a self-fulfilling prophecy works, which also leads to
self-deception. However, having a so-called false belief, which assumes that
the leader is telling the truth, but it is consistent with what she/he remembers
and what she/he is convinced of is something else. This action is somewhat
reminiscent of self-deception, but the difference is that false belief develops
slowly due to repetition, which expands every time it is repeated (Ekman,
2006, p. 285). It is impossible to resist the impression that the image strategy
based on having false belief is used by most modern leaders, and above all
those who change “political colours”.
(Non)ethical dilemmas of leadership may also relate to the temptation
to use conspiracy narratives (which may include political paranoia). The
demand for this type of instrument increases with the state of social anomie,
which implies “hunger for meaning or significance” and manifests itself
especially in states of puzzlement and confusion when the world is shaken
on its foundations. The explanation for this situation is often sought exter-
nally, outside one’s own group, while at the same time marking as guilty
those responsible for the disturbing threat. Such hunger for meaning is then
satisfied by the simplest cognitive means, i.e. searching for the perpetrator
of all things, and thus a kind of “scapegoat”. It is not always easily discerni-
ble, sometimes it must be tracked down, detected, her/his evil intentions and
actions must be revealed to finally pin it all on the culprit (Korzeniowski,
2002, p. 305). The political leader, building her/his own potential for sup-
port, will often be forced by circumstances to persuade people of both an
explanatory reality and a convincing vision of conspiracy.
In times of escalating threats and the aforementioned social anomie,
these types of unethical strategies are effective and popular. In the politi-
cal cyber network, which allows for reaching the individual recipient of a
message without the agency of people who verify its quality, the principle
of telling the truth is marginalised (Beasley & Haney, 2013). Information
posted on platforms, emphasising specific parts of the message, often bend
the truth or avoid it altogether. All this is done to increase the attractiveness
of information or persuade recipients of a given assessment of the situation.
This phenomenon is called post-truth and it is no accident that the editors of
the Oxford Dictionary chose this word as the most important word in public
discourse in 2016.
A reliable assessment of the attitude of a political leader who lies requires
precise identification of what was it about, what was its main incentive,
who was being lied to and in what context? This applies to all forms of
her/his (non)ethical behaviour. The aforementioned Weberian postulate of
domination of the ethics of responsibility in politics means that each case
requires an individual analysis. In recent years, the concept of unethical
organisational activities, which also apply to the political sphere, has been
popular in general leadership theories. Its authors Elizabeth E. Umphress
and John B. Bingham (2010) came to the conclusion that both leaders and
subordinates/supporters sometimes engage in unethical activities with the
64 Artur Laska
intention of benefiting the organisation and/or its members. Thus, the vio-
lation of basic values takes place in order to increase the effectiveness of the
organisation’s functioning, which in principle is consistent with the classical
interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought (Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell,
2010; Castille, Buckner, & Thoroughgood, 2018).
Finally, it is worth noting that leaders wishing to overcome their own
ethical dilemmas use a variety of neutralisation techniques. They make it
possible to commit an unethical act without guilt or responsibility. This
happens on the basis of such definitions of situations that allow behaviour
contrary to the current moral order, and even indicate such actions as neces-
sary. However, if the postulated moral values are highly consistent with the
organisational interest, then the level of acceptance of the unethical organ-
isational behaviour of the leader will be low (Miao, Newman, Yu, & Lin,
2013). Furthermore, a positive influence of the leader’s inspirational motiva-
tion and charisma on the increase in acceptance of unethical organisational
behaviour in subordinates/supporters has also been observed (Graham,
Ziegert, & Capitano, 2015). However, the leadership model, in which the
strategy of action and the attitude of the leader are embedded, is crucial.

Ethical dilemmas versus key types of political leadership

All political theories have axiological references. It is no different with lead-
ership theories. For the issues addressed in this text, this is all the more
important because each of the proposed models carries the potential of
identified ethical dilemmas, or even demands to solve them. Therefore, they
are also a normative reference for current practice, and therefore it is worth
examining at least three fundamental ones.
In the context of various areas of leadership, it is in the political sphere
that the traditional and transactional approach (Hollander, 1958) is still
valid. This is due to the high level of clientele systems that appear in polit-
ical governance relations. Within this framework, and in democracies,
especially during the election period, a specific contract is concluded. Its
construction is based on the relationship of mutual benefits between parties
and the belief in the future effectiveness of this contract (Kaptein & Wempe,
2002, pp. 205–208). In practice, however, it depends on the willingness of
the parties to comply with the agreement. In the case of political leadership,
which is not the same as gaining institutionalised power, the post-electoral
reality is a kind of credibility test and breaking the contract in the long run
can bring considerable costs. This “keeping the promise” is a fundamental
dilemma within this leadership model. Other and more detailed ones have
their axiological reference in the content of the contract and it from this
perspective that the election of the leader is subject to the assessment of
citizens.
In turn, transformational leadership poses significant ethical challenges
for leaders. Their main task is the transformation of supporters whose
 Dilemmas of leadership 65
motivation and value systems are to evolve. Therefore, they convey and
enhance a sense of mission, stimulate the process of learning and open-
ness to change, and inspire new ways of thinking, which make their goals
and the aspirations of the supporters unite. This model is the result of the
emancipatory discourse that transformed America in the 1960s and 1970s.
Its creator James M. Burns refers not only to the Enlightenment idea of
progress, but also to the republican tradition which emphasises civic virtues
and the need for cooperation. The ethical dimension of leadership is quite
transparent here, as the normative system is inscribed in their supporters,
which is to contribute to their moral change. In such a vision, a political
leader is therefore a role model within a specific axiology. By creating a
lasting relationship and motivating a high commitment by their followers,
she/he determines their expectations, broadens the spectrum of needs, and
develops creative potential, contributing to the broadening of their moral
awareness (Burns, 1978, p. 461). In the event of any dilemmas emerging here,
she/he seeks ethical justifications in the sphere of universal values and moti-
vates cooperation for common good. The goal is to stimulate engagement
so that it exceeds selfish motivations. As a result, the leader can contribute
to the moral development of the organisation and its community, which in
practice amounts to, for example. expanding the scope of individual free-
dom, realising justice, equal opportunities, etc. (Burns, 2004, p. X; Zhu,
Avolio, Riggio, & Sosik, 2011, pp. 801–817). It is worth noting, however, that
this will not happen if the persuaded normative system itself is far from
universal ethical standards.
Bernard M. Bass (1996) and Bruce J. Avolio (1999) defined four basic
dimensions of transformational leadership. These are:

• Idealised identification with the leader (idealised influence).

• Inspirational motivation.
• Intellectual stimulation.
• Individualised consideration.

In turn, Bernard M. Bass and Paul Steidlmeier (2004) defined specific eth-
ical criteria for each of these dimensions, defining the reciprocal opposi-
tion of “authentic leadership” and “pseudo-leadership” as ideal types. The
alignment between them determines ways of overcoming dilemmas that
appear before leaders.
“Idealised identification with the leader” means the willingness to sac-
rifice your own benefits when needed. The leader behaves consistently, in
accordance with her/his own declarations. An additional factor supporting
identification is also the feeling of shared risk. Leadership messages here
are based on values and devoid of any manipulative elements (e.g. imposing
we – you/them on the antagonist matrix). In this context, pseudo-leaders
are oriented on strengthening their power and their own position, which
may or may not be associated with their immoral intentions, as it often
66 Artur Laska
results from a false assessment of their own leadership competence or lack
of responsibility.
In the case of “inspirational motivation”, the guiding principle of a lead-
er’s ethics is to focus on values commonly recognised as desirable and ethi-
cal. Subjective treatment of supporters is particularly important here, which
excludes one-way communication. “Intellectual stimulation” means stim-
ulating supporters to question their existing ways of thinking and acting,
and to be independent and creative. The postulated ethics of such stimula-
tion is to be limited to the openness of a leadership vision enabling cultural
and institutional transgressions. This imposes a discursive communication
model open to arguments and criticism.
In turn, the component of the “individual approach” includes leadership
activities focused on supporting the development of supporters and an altru-
istic attitude. This is in opposition to pseudo-leaders who are trying to make
their supporters dependant on them (Szczupaczyński, 2012, pp. 287–289).
As mentioned, the ethical foundations of the Burns model are highly ideal-
istic and become complicated in a situation where there is a great diversity
of propagated axiological systems. In the context of heterogenous societies,
its practical functionality, based on a homogeneous and coherent set of val-
ues, is highly limited. Contrary to the author’s intentions, it does not have
to lead to moral progress, on the contrary, it may mean the followers’ close
themselves in a dogmatic, ideological attachment. In connection with this,
there are significant attempts to modify its original assumptions.
One of the most interesting proposals is the concept of transposition
leadership.

It refers to the idea of moral discourse as a premise for ethical legiti-

macy (Price, 2007). It is based on the assumption that the goals and val-
ues constituting a leadership relationship should be subject to debate,
which is an attempt to agree on and morally verify them.

On this basis, a political leader can take legitimate actions, and the debate
is to be a tool to overcome her/his moral dilemmas.
The discourse stimulated here would be both internal and external
(among political communities). In the first case, the idea of transposition
leadership resembles the concept of Ronald Heifetz (1994). He argues that
the most important domain of leadership is determined by the problems of
adaptation of individuals in a changing environment and dilemmas related
to values. The role of the leader is to help resolve them by classifying the
values on which collective aspirations are based. This imposes an obligation
on her/him to initiate a discursive process of agreeing on goals. In turn,
the external debate, in addition to having a positive impact on the develop-
ment of civic competence, is to perform two functions. First, to identify the
axiological perspectives of other political communities, which would allow
the leader a better understanding of the needs of her/his supporters and
 Dilemmas of leadership 67
the assumptions on which the proposed goals are based. Second, the aim
of the debate should also be an attempt to reach a compromise regarding
the moral value systems of neighbouring communities (Keelay, 2004). The
leader is to assess the needs and axiological assumptions of her/his group
in the context of cultural diversity of the environment, which is to foster a
harmonious arrangement of relations among communities and increase the
chances of cooperation among them. This is an important consequence in
a world of deepening problems, the solution of which requires cooperation
on a global scale. It is worth noting, however, that the transposition leader’s
openness to other moral perspectives cannot mean the radical impartiality
of the mediator. This would mean the abolition of leadership as a relation-
ship based on the aspirations and needs of specific communities.

An ethical model of political leadership

The outlined interpretation of theoretical models in the context of emerg-
ing ethical dilemmas leads to the concept of so-called ethical leadership,
by Michael Brown, Linda Treviño and David Harrison (Brown, Treviño,
& Harrison, 2005). While ethical leadership was treated as a component
of various styles in the first period of intensified research on the moral
conditions of leaders’ activity, in recent years it has been recognised as a
completely separate style (Fehr, Yam, & Dang, 2015, p. 183). Its conceptual-
isation is the effect of systematising knowledge in the field of moral behav-
iour of leaders, while at the same time drawing attention to the fundamental
impact of ethics on the effectiveness of leadership (Brown & Mitchell, 2010,
pp. 583–616). In the literature on the subject, it is treated primarily as an
original synthesis of transformative, but also spiritual, authentic, charis-
matic and constructive leadership. In these models, the leader, by referring
to common ideals and moral values, not only creates and promotes a spe-
cific vision of a desired future, but also takes care of the ethical development
of the organisation (Ilies, Judge, & Wagner, 2006, pp. 4–6). Ethical leader-
ship is defined as

“the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through per-

sonal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of
such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforce-
ment, and decision-making.” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120; Yukl, 2006;
Ciulla, 2004c)

Although the emphasis is placed on the relational aspect, which is consist-

ent with the transformative model, the relationship is at most an instrument
here, and the ethical connotations of behaviour are of fundamental impor-
tance. This approach therefore goes beyond the theories presented ear-
lier. The leader is characterised not only by openness, orientation towards
people, a high level of commitment to visible ethical actions, but also by
68 Artur Laska
honesty, integrity and credibility, and above all an inclination to create
such positions in the environment and this is her/his autotelic goal. This
approach is consistent with the classic Aristotelian approach, assuming that
the role of the leader is not only to secure the community’s interests related
to the survival and efficient administration of policies, but also to ensure a
good, valuable life based on virtues and freedom.
The proposed concept refers to Albert Bandura’s theory of social learning,
emphasising that by modelling, the leader influences her/his followers’ ethi-
cal choices (Sims Jr. & Manz, 1982, pp. 55–63). Some researchers, however,
postulate adopting the perspective of social exchange theory. According
to its assumptions, the behaviour and attitudes of employees are a form
of reciprocity of actions taken by the leader towards them (Hansen, 2011,
pp. 41–55). However, for the modelling process to be effective, it is insuf-
ficient that the leader is merely seen as a pattern of ethical behaviour, but
that she/he genuinely engages in resolving the conditions of ethical dilem-
mas that she/he and her/his supporters face. This requires a developed eth-
ical awareness, which manifests itself in caring for the affairs of different
stakeholder groups and influencing decisions, taking into account emerg-
ing considerations (Treviño, Brown, & Hartman, 2003, p. 21; Brown et al.,
2005, pp. 119–120). Research indicates that the persuasive power of the
leader significantly increases when it is assessed primarily as conciliatory
and conscientious (Walumbwa & Schaubroeck, 2009, pp. 1275–1286). On
the political level, however, it is also crucial for the leader to make decisions
that take into account the public interest and are perceived as objective and
fair, as well as consistent with other universal ethical principles (Treviño,
Hartman, & Brown, 2000, pp. 130–133).
Based on an in-depth analysis of leadership theory and the results of pre-
vious research, Karianne Kalshoven, Deanne Den Hartog and Annebel De
Hoogh (2011, p. 54) pointed to seven dimensions of ethical leadership that
correspond to leaders’ resilience. With some modifications, this distinction
is also relevant in the context of political relations. These authors mention:

• Impartiality – recognised as non-application of protection, fair and

equal treatment of others.
• Sharing power – that is, taking into account the voice of supporters in
the decision-making process and listening to their ideas and concerns.
• Clarification of the role, and more specifically responsibilities, objec-
tives and expected results.
• Being people-oriented – understood as care, respect and support for
followers.
• Integrity, that is, consistency of words and deeds and keeping promises.
• Ethical guidance, consisting of communicating and explaining ethical
principles and, promoting and rewarding ethical behaviour.
• Concern for sustainable development – defined as care for the natural
environment while setting/achieving social and economic goals.
 Dilemmas of leadership 69
The (un)moral behaviour of the leader affects both his reputation and the
image of the entire organisation, including the political union (Allison &
Eylon, 2005, p. 309). The impact of ethical leadership is therefore broad and
concerns not only subordinates or supporters. Its effects are revealed at var-
ious levels of the organisational hierarchy, as well as outside it (Frisch &
Huppenbauer, 2014, p. 37). Promoting ethical attitudes through leadership
influence is effective and causes a type of “cascade effect” in the organisa-
tion and even in the social structure. In this way, the leader fosters the for-
mation of an ethical civic culture (Schaubroeck et al., 2012, p. 1054; Mayer,
Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009, pp. 1–13; Avey, Palanski,
& Walumbwa, 2011, pp. 573–582). Research also indicates that this type of
leadership demonstrates a positive correlation with the satisfaction of sub-
ordinates/supporters, as well as a greater readiness to sacrifice and put extra
effort into working for the organisation (Brown & Mitchell, 2010, p. 586).
Finally, it is worth pointing out that well-established proposals referring
to the achievements of Christian personalism are going in a different direc-
tion. Their authors focus their attention on altruism as a premise for ethical
leadership. This virtue is understood as a permanent disposition to actions
that benefit other people without harming them. Supporters of this approach
are the aforementioned Canadian researchers Rabindra N. Kanungo (2011)
and Manuel Mendonca (2001), who formulate the radical thesis that only
leadership based on altruistic motives can be effective leadership.

Conclusions
The contemporary context of political leadership, and above all the threat
of its radicalisation, implies the need to expand the scope of cooperation
and agree on responsibilities between subjects of collective preferences and
needs. Various forms of dialogue, social consultation and reconciliation
mechanisms at various stages of producing public goods serve this pur-
pose, which help to develop a common vision of the future (Kaszkur, 2017,
pp. 59–76). It should therefore be remembered that democratic leadership
means the significant empowerment of social groups (Bass & Steidlmeier,
2004). In this context, modern communication tools play a special role.
Importantly, however, the proper use of networks focused on creating pub-
lic value can be not only a legitimate basis for leadership, but also a tool for
resolving ethical dilemmas that are revealed. This will be possible if lead-
ers renounce their authoritative position and some of the prerogatives to
support democratic deliberation, without losing the status of being active
creators of the public interest (Dobel, 2012, p. 158). This requires the con-
struction of “deconcentrated leadership”, based on the network involvement
of many environments in the development and implementation of political
goals (Blandin, 2007).
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that political leadership
is an emanation of the social context, which means that leaders tend to
70 Artur Laska
cross ethical barriers just as much as their supporters. The supporters are
engaged significantly with the leadership process and therefore ethical
standards should also apply to them. The proposed emancipation cannot
therefore consist only of strengthening their control over the behaviour of
the leaders, but also of assuming part of the responsibility for this process.
However, this is not the same as transforming the role of a leader into an
arbitrator. Regardless of contemporary conditions, the essence of political
leadership remains unchanged. Socialisation of decision-making processes
does not relieve the leader from responsibility for making clear axiological
choices and basing an articulated/implemented vision of actions on them.
Only highly authentic behaviour, based on internalised norms, can build
up the support resources necessary for effective leadership. This is also evi-
denced by identified social expectations, namely disappointment with the
quality of modern leaders.
Solving ethical leadership dilemmas is not about any form of reducing
them, but about making choices that are consistent with both the public
interest and generally accepted social norms. On an individual level, this
requires not only emotional intelligence and moral sensitivity, but also
“contextual intelligence” (Masciulli & Knight, 2009). It consists of cognitive
skills based on analytical skills, experience, continuous learning, intuition,
and at the same time the traditional virtues of a leader, such as courage and
determination. In turn, a leader’s capacity for reflection requires the use of
different types of knowledge and different cultural perspectives.
Basing leadership on the aforementioned dialogue, empathy, as well as
reciprocity and solidarity can be an effective way to solve ethical dilemmas,
both on the part of the leader and of those who are subject to her/his influ-
ence. Such a view is formulated and well justified by the concept of ethical
leadership. Political leadership in the 21st century cannot mean imposing
domination and dogmatic consistency in following bad moral choices while
declaring ethical neutrality. Even in politics, it is usually possible to turn
back from this path. This, however, will only be possible with a leader’s
high moral awareness. Ultimately, leadership is formed in her/his mind
when the role she/he fulfils fuses with her/his own being and inner duty to
other subjects. Vaclav Havel, an outstanding leader of the late 20th century,
was right when he pointed out that the struggle for the realisation of the val-
ues of kindness, harmony and respect for humanity and nature never ends,
and that this struggle is not only between good and bad people, but within
everyone (Havel, 1992, pp. XVII–XVIII).

References
Allison, S. T., & Eylon, D. (2005). The demise of leadership: Death positivity biases
in posthumous impressions of leaders. In D. M. Messick, & R. M. Kramer
(Eds.), The psychology of leadership: New perspectives and research (pp. 307–330).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
 Dilemmas of leadership 71
Arendt, H. (1968). Truth and politics. In: Between past and future: Eight exercises in
political thought. New York, NY: Viking Press.
Avey, J. B., Palanski, M. E., & Walumbwa, F. O. (2011, February). When leadership
goes unnoticed: The moderating role of follower self-esteem on the relationship
between ethical leadership and follower behavior. Journal of Business Ethics,
98(4), 573–582. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0610-2.
Avolio, B. J. (1999). Full leadership development: Building the vital forces in organiza-
tions. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Bass, B. M. (1996). A new paradigm of leadership: An inquiry into transformational
leadership. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences.
Bass, B. M., & Steidlmeier, P. (2004). Ethics, character, and authentic transforma-
tional leadership behavior. In J. B. Ciulla (Ed.), Ethics, the heart of leaderships.
Westport–Connecticut–London: Praeger.
Beasley, B., & Haney, M. R. (2013). Social media and the value of truth. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group.
Bennis, W. (2004). The crucibles of authentic leadership. In J. Antonakis, A.
T. Cianciolo, & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The nature of leadership (pp. 331–342).
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Blandin, N. M. (2007). Leading at the edge of chaos. In R. S. Morse, T. F. Buss, &
C. M. Kinghorn (Eds.), Transforming public leadership for the 21st century. New
York–London: M.E. Sharpe.
Boehm, C. (1993). Egalitarian behavior and reverse dominance hierarchy. Current
Anthropology, 34(3), 227–254. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/204166.
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. doi: https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957
pspr1003_2.
Brown, M. E., & Mitchell, M. S. (2010, October). Ethical and unethical leadership:
Exploring new avenues for future research. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(4), 583–
616. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/beq201020439.
Brown, M. E., Treviño, L. K., & Harrison, D. A. (2005). Ethical leadership: A
social learning perspective for construct development and testing. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97(2), 117–134. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.obhdp.2005.03.002.
Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Burns, J. M. (2004). Foreword. In J. B. Ciulla (Ed.), Ethics, the heart of leaderships.
Westport-Connecticut-London: Praeger.
Castells, M. (2007). Społeczeństwo sieci. Warszawa: PWN.
Castille, C. M., Buckner V, J. E., & Thoroughgood, C. N. (2018). Prosocial citizens
without a moral compass? Examining the relationship between Machiavellianism
and unethical pro-organizational behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 149(4),
919–930. DOI: https://doi/10.1007/s10551-016-3079-9.
Ciulla, J. B. (2004a). Ethics and leadership effectiveness. In J. Antonakis, A. T.
Cianciolo, & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The nature of leadership. Thousand Oaks,
CA: SAGE Publications.
Ciulla, J. B. (2004b). Introduction. In J. B. Ciulla (Ed.), Ethics, the heart of leader-
ships. Westport-Connecticut-London: Praeger.
Ciulla, J. B. (2004c). Leadership ethics: Mapping the territory. In J. B. Ciulla (Ed.),
Ethics, the heart of leaderships. Westport-Connecticut-London: Praeger.
72 Artur Laska
Ciulla, J. B. (2012). Ethics effectiveness: The nature of good leadership. In D. V.
Day, & J. Antonakis (Eds.), The nature of leadership. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE
Publications.
Cosans, C. E., & Reina, C. S. (2018). The leadership ethics of Machiavelli’s
Prince. Business Ethics Quarterly, 28(3), 275–300. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/
beq.2017.13.
Delli Carpini, M. X. (2010). The psychology of civic learning. In E. Borgida, C.
M. Federico, & J. L. Sullivan (Eds.), The political psychology of democratic cit-
izenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:
oso/9780195335453.001.0001.
Dobel, J. P. (2012). Public management as ethics. In E. Ferlie, L. E. Lynn Jr., &
C. Pollitt (Eds.), Oxford handbook of public management (pp. 156–181). Oxford:
Oxford University Pres. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199226443.003.
0008.
Ekman, P. (2006). Kłamstwo i jego wykrywanie w biznesie, polityce i małżeństwie.
Warszawa: PWN.
Fehr, R., Yam, K. C., & Dang, C. (2015). Moralized leadership: The construction
and consequences of ethical leader perceptions. Academy of Management Review,
40(2), 182–209. doi: https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0358.
Frisch, C., & Huppenbauer, M. (2014). New insights into ethical leadership: A qual-
itative investigation of the experiences of executive ethical leaders. Journal of
Business Ethics, 123(1), 23–43. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1797-9.
Garber, M. (2013). How to Catch a Liar on the Internet, The Atlantic, 9,
pp. 15–16.
Graham, K., Ziegert, J., & Capitano, J. (2015). The effect of leadership style, fram-
ing, and promotion regulatory focus on unethical pro-organisational behav-
ior. Journal of Business Ethics, 126(3), 423–426. doi: httpa://doi.org/10.1007/
S10551-013-1952-3.
Grant, R. W. (1997). Hypocrisy and integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau and the ethics of
politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions
generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, 133(4), 55–66. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1162/0011526042365555.
Hansen, S. D. (2011). Ethical leadership: A multifoci social exchange perspective.
The Journal of Business Inquiry, 10(1), 41–55.
Havel, V. (1992). Summer meditations. London: Faber and Faber.
Heifetz, R. A. (1994). Leadership without easy answers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Herbst, S. (2006). Legitimate power in the mediated age: Revisiting Carl J. Friedrich
“Authority, reason and discretion. Political Communication, 23(3), 285–290. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600600808653.
Hollander, E. P. (1958). Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit. Psychological
Review, 65(2), 117–127. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042501.
Horkheimer, M. (2007). Krytyka instrumentalnego rozumu. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
Naukowe Scholar.
House, R. J., Dorfman, P. W., Javidan, M., Hanges, P. J., & Sully de Luque, M.
F. (2013). Strategic leadership across cultures, GLOBE study of CEO leadership
behavior and effectiveness in 24 countries. London: SAGE Publications. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781506374581.
 Dilemmas of leadership 73
Ilies, R., Judge, T., & Wagner, D. (2006). Making sense of motivational leader-
ship: The trail from transformational leaders to motivated followers. Journal of
Leadership & Organizational Studies, 13(1), 1–22. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1071
7919070130010301.
Żukiewicz, P. (2011). Przywództwo polityczne. Teoria i praktyka. Warszawa: Difin.
Jordan, J., Brown, M. E., Treviño, L. K., & Finkelstein, S. (2013). Someone to
look up to Executive–Follower ethical reasoning and perceptions of ethical
leadership. Journal of Management, 39(3), 660–683. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/
0149206311398136.
Kagle, J. D. (1998). Are we lying to ourselves about deception. Social Service Review,
72(2), 234–250. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/515752.
Kalshovena, K., Den Hartog, D. N., & De Hoogh, A. H. (2011, February). Ethical
leadership at work questionnaire (ELW): Development and validation of a mul-
tidimensional measure. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(1), 51–69. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2010.12.007.
Kane, J. (2007). The ethical paradox of democratic leadership. Taiwan Journal of
Democracy, 3(2), 33–52.
Kanungo, R. N. (2011). Ethical values of transactional and transformational lead-
ers. Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, 18(4), 257–265. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1936-4490.2001.tb00261.x.
Kanungo, R. N., & Mendonca, M. (1996). Ethical dimensions of leadership.
London:SAGE Publications.
Kaptein, M., & Wempe, J. (2002). The balanced company. A theory of corporate
integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:
oso/9780199255504.001.0001.
Karwat, M. (2014). Przywództwo jako pokusa makiawelizmu. In I. Kuraszko (Ed.),
Etyka przywództwa. Ujęcie interdyscyplinarne. Warszawa: Difin.
Kaszkur, A. (2017). Innowacyjne formy partycypacji na poziomie lokalnym w
polsce. In A. Kaszkur, & A. Laska (Eds.), Innowacyjność w warunkach współcz-
esnych miast. Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego.
Keating, C. F., & Heltman, K. R. (1994). Dominance and deception in children
and adults: Are leaders the best misleaders? Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 20(3), 312–321. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167294203009.
Keelay, M. (2004). The trouble with transformational leadership: Toward a feder-
alist ethic for organizations. In J. B. Ciulla (Ed.), Ethics, the heart of leaderships.
Westport-Connecticut-London: Praeger.
Korzeniowski, K. (2002). Utrata i poszukiwanie społeczno-politycznego sensu.
Anomia i paranoja polityczna. In K. Skarżyńska (Ed.), Podstawy psychologii pol-
itycznej. Poznań: Zysk i S-ka.
Laska, A. (2017). Populizm jako implikacja technokratyzacji polityki. In F.
Pierzchalski, & R. Bartosz (Eds.), Autorytarny populizm w XXI wieku. Krytyczna
rekonstrukcja. Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa.
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Bridging individual, interpersonal, and institu-
tional approaches to judgment and decision making: The impact of accountability
on cognitive bias. In S. L. Schneider, & J. Shanteau (Eds.), Emerging perspectives
on judgment and decision research (pp. 431–457). New York: Cambridge University
Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609978.015.
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. 2015. Emotion and decision
making. Annual Review of Psychology. 66:799–823. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-psych-010213-115043.
74 Artur Laska
Lewicki, R. J. (1983). Lying and deception. A behavioral model. In M. H. Bazerman,
& R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in organization. Beverly Hills: SAGE
Publications.
Lindsey, L. L., Dunbar, N. E., & Russell, J. C. (2011). Risky business or man-
aged event? Perceptions of power and deception in the workplace. Journal of
Organizational Culture, Communications and Conflict, 15(1), 55–79.
Mandal, E. (2008). Miłość, władza i manipulacja w bliskich związkach. Warszawa:
PWN.
Marciniak, E. M. (2018). Komunikacyjny wymiar przywództwa politycznego. In E.
M. Marciniak (Ed.), Przywództwo, etyka, polityka. Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy
Elipsa.
Masciulli, J., & Knight, W. A. (2009). Conceptions of global leadership for contex-
tually intelligent, innovatively adaptive political leaders. In J. Masciulli, M. A.
Molchanov, & W. A. Knight (Eds.), The ashgate research companion to political
leaderships. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Masip, J., Garrido, E., & Herrero, C. (2004). Defining deception. Anales de
Psicologia, 20(1), 147–171.
Masters, R. D. (1989). The nature of politics. New Haven-London: Yale University
Press.
Mayer, D. M., Aquino, K., Greenbaum, R. L., & Kuenzi, M. (2012). Who displays
ethical leadership, and why does it matter? An examination of antecedents and
consequences of ethical leadership. Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 155–
171. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2008.0276.
Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., Greenbaum, R., Bardes, M., & Salvador, R. B. (2009).
How low does ethical leadership flow? Test of a trickle-down model. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processe, 108(1), 1–13. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
obhdp.2008.04.002.
McGraw, K. M. (2008). Wizerunki polityczne: tworzenie i sterowanie. In D. O. Sears,
L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (Eds.), Psychologia Polityczna. Kraków: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Mearsheimer, J. (2012). Dlaczego politycy kłamią. Cała prawda o kłamstwie w poli-
tyce międzynarodowej. Warszawa: PWN.
Mendonca, M. (2001). Preparing for ethical leadership in organization.
Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 18(4), 266–276. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1936-4490.2001.tb00262.x
Miao, Q., Newman, A. H., Yu, J., & Lin, X. (2013). The relationship between eth-
ical leadership and unethical proorganizational behavior: Linear or curvilinear
effects? Journal of Business Ethics, 116(3), 641–653. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10551-012-1504-2.
Millon, T., & Davis, R. (2005). Zaburzenia osobowości we współczesnym świecie.
Warszawa: Instytut Psychologii Zdrowia PTP.
Niebuhr, R. (1960). Moral man and immoral society. A study in ethics and politics.
New York: Scribner.
Palmer, D. E. (2009). Business leadership: Three levels of ethical analysis. Journal
of Business Ethics, 88(3), 525–536. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0117-x.
Price, T. L. (2007). Leadership and common purpose. In R. A. Couto (Ed.),
Reflections on leadership. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. 2004. The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of
Neuroscience. 27:169–192. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230.
 Dilemmas of leadership 75
Ruedy, N. E., Moore, C., Gino, F., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2013). The Cheater’s High:
The unexpected affective benefits of unethical behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 105(4), 531–548. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034231.
Schaubroeck, J. M., Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., Kozlowski, S. W., Lord, R. G.,
Treviño, L. K., & … Peng, A. C. (2012). Embedding ethical leadership within and
across organizational levels. Academy of Management Journal, 55(5), 1053–1078.
doi: https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0064.
Sims, H. P. Jr., & Manz, C. C. (1982). Social learning theory the role of modeling In
the exercise of leadership. Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 3(4),
55–63. doi: https://doi.org/10.1300/J075v03n04_06.
Szczupaczyński, J. (2012). Etyczny wymiar przywódczej komunikacji. Studia
Politologiczne, 25, 279–301.
Taras, B. (2013). Agresja. studium semantyczno-pragmatyczne. Rzeszów: Wydanictwa
Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego.
Thompson, M., Elliot, R. J., & Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural theory. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Treviño, L. K., Brown, M., & Hartman, L. P. (2003). A qualitative investigation of
perceived executive ethical leadership: perceptions from inside and outside the
executive suite. Human Relations, 56(1), 5–37. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/001872
6703056001448.
Treviño, L. K., Hartman, L. P., & Brown, M. (2000). Moral person and moral
manager: How executives develop a reputation for ethical leadership. California
Management Review, 42(4), 128–142. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/41166057.
Umphress, E. E., Bingham, J. B., & Mitchell, M. S. (2010). Unethical behavior in the
name of the company: The moderating effect of organizational identification and
positive reciprocity beliefs on unethical pro-organizational behavior. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 95(4), 769–780. doi: http://doi.org/10.1037/a0019214.
Walumbwa, F. O., & Schaubroeck, J. (2009). Leader personality traits and employee
voice behavior: Mediating roles of ethical leadership and work group psycho-
logical safety. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(5), 1275–1286. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0015848.
Weber, M. (1998). Polityka jako zawód i powołanie. Krakow-Warszawa: SIW ZNAK.
Wojciszke, B., & Baryła, W. (2001). Potoczne rozumienie moralności. In M. Lewicka,
& J. Grzelak (Eds.), Jednostka i społeczeństwo. Podejście psychologiczne. Gdańsk:
Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne.
Yukl, G. A. (2006). Leadership in organizations. Pearson, NJ: Prentic Hall.
Zhu, W., Avolio, B. J., Riggio, R. E., & Sosik, J. J. (2011). The effect of authen-
tic transformational leadership on follower and group ethics. The Leadership
Quarterly, 22(5), 801–817. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.07.004.
5 Authority in the network –
who is it?
Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała

Introduction
Analysing social structures at various stages of historical development and
in various places around the globe, it is relatively easy to distinguish between
individuals and institutions that perform the function of an “authority”.
This category is very often related to politics and used in the conceptual
grid of political sciences. However, it is worth remembering in the context
of further considerations that certain regularities related to its functioning
go far beyond the sphere of politics.
It is assumed that the designation of the concept of “authority” is –
generally speaking – a social position, usually obtained in a manner deter-
mined by clear procedures, verifiable thanks to easily discernible attributes,
translating into the ability to influence others effectively. In this sense, par-
ents and grandparents were authorities for children, teachers for students,
priests for the faithful, managers for subordinates, monarchs for subjects,
prime ministers and ministers for citizens, and doctors for patients.
The use of the past tense is no accident here. Critical observation of
the reality leads to the conclusion that this simple and hierarchical world,
with its traditionally understood authorities, is now a thing of the past. A
process is underway that Jay G. Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh referred
to as secularisation – that is, stripping old authorities of the more or less
well-deserved nimbus of “ divinity”. This is the end of the power associated
with their unquestioned status and appreciated competence, the loss of
institutional ways connecting politics with the sacred: “relations of elites
to masses are transformed by the evaporation of deference and increased
scepticism about the credentials, claims, and credibility of authority hold-
ers in many walks of life” (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, p. 210).
Hierarchies are now generally replaced by network structures. Authority
and the associated causative influence on the views and behaviour of others
no longer depend on social status, education and experience. Optionally, it
indirectly depends on these factors. What is more important is the ability to
“be taken into account” by other network users, both virtual and real. On
the basis of this observation, in fact quite obvious, Swedish authors Bard
 Authority in network 77
and Söderqvist (2002) created the brilliant concept of “attentionalism” as
a new social formation. It later gained wide resonance in scientific debate
and journalism. Another asset valued in new times is also the ability to for-
mulate the message in a way that meets the needs, expectations and percep-
tion of other network participants. This factor – which requires a separate,
in-depth analysis – favours shifting the focus from the objective competence
and utility of the authority to its subjectively perceived “convenience” for
the recipient. The dependence signalled here means that – although it seems
to sound absurd – for many people, celebrities, stars of stage or sports has
become the authorities in political assessments as well as engineers or taxi
drivers in the field of disease treatment, It is enough that they managed to
catch the attention of a sufficiently large group of observers, especially on
social media. The presence of this phenomenon in our social life undoubt-
edly deserves scientific reflection – and this chapter is devoted to it.

Methodological assumptions
The key research objectives of this chapter are to analyse the manifestations
and causes of erosion of traditional authorities in the network society, as
well as to analyse the conditions that favour the emergence of a new type of
authority. The authors suggest that they should be called “neo-authorities”.
In addition, on this basis, an attempt was made to forecast the effects that
the spread of “neo-authorities” has on political life and democracy.
The authors adopted the fundamental assumption that the well-known
human need to orient themselves towards authorities, as sort of focal points
facilitating our assessments and activities, does not disappear in the con-
ditions of modern network society. On the contrary, with the increase in
factors such as the uncertainty of conditions and the intensity and pace of
social change, the need for an orientation towards an authority may even
increase. The very existence of “authority” as a kind of institution of social
life can therefore be considered a permanent element. At the same time, it
was assumed that it was highly likely that this need would be met differ-
ently than it was in the past; the way authority is created and functions, and
the possibilities of verifying its credibility are increasingly different from its
historical equivalents. There is a change in this regard we are dealing with.
In this situation, the authors set, as a starting point of their research, the
following, consecutively cascading hypotheses:

• The process of erosion of traditional authorities is associated with tech-

nological transformations, as well as the resulting changes in the domi-
nant manner of communication.
• Modern network society creates new authorities (neo-authorities)
according to patterns qualitatively different than it was/used to be in
traditional society.
78 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
• The key element ensuring obtaining and maintaining the role of neo-
authority by a given entity is primarily the attractiveness of both the
content and the form of information distributed by her/him, perceived
subjectively by other network participants.
• The advantage of neo-authorities over their traditional counterparts
will increase in the foreseeable future, becoming one of the increasingly
important factors modifying political processes, related, for example,
to political leadership.

Due to the intention to verify the above hypotheses, it was considered

appropriate to formulate the following research questions:

• What were the conditions for the creation of authorities in traditional

society and what was their social role?
• How do the technological transformations of recent decades and the
consequent change in social conditions – with particular emphasis on
shaping the network society in place of a hierarchical – undermine tra-
ditionally understood authorities?
• How does the creation of neo-authorities take place in network con-
ditions and to what extent it is a spontaneous and intentional process?
• What factors decide about gaining attention (attention) in the network?
• How sustainable is the trend of replacing traditional authorities with
neo-authorities?
• What relationship exists between the dominance of neo-authorities of
the network society over their historical counterparts, and the quality
of political leadership and social institutions?

The most important theoretical categories used in the chapter include:

• The concept of “authority” in social and political life.

• The concept of “customer/recipient” inseparably connected with it (or
according to some authors: the subject), i.e. a person who is oriented on
a given authority.
• The concept of “network” in the narrower sense (the Internet) as well
as a specific social structure and set of interactions characteristic of it,
qualitatively different from the structure and hierarchical interactions.
• The concept of “message” and its “perception” in the context of chang-
ing technological and civilisational conditions of the “infosphere”.

All these categories will be used, taking into account their dependence on
“information” as the subject and tool of activities that create “authority” and
consume its existence as part of “influencing”. Definitely less obvious, and
very important for some considerations is the concept of “informal power
networks” (NSW). It was introduced to the discourse of security sciences
by Piotr Stankiewicz (2012), based on studies on lobbying and corruption
 Authority in network 79
as well as pathological systems at the interface of politics, economy, media
and special services. The starting point for the presented considerations is a
critical analysis of the current scientific achievements in this field. The focus
was on the query regarding political science and sociology, in some cases it
was also useful to reach positions in such fields as security science, econom-
ics, psychology and pedagogy.
At further stages, in the spirit of research pragmatism, primarily qualitative
methods were found to be useful. Among them, a special place falls to partic-
ipant observation, according to the principles of “action research”, inspired by
the methods of Davydd Greenwood and Morton Lewin (1998). This mainly
applies to the authors’ own experience related to their activity in social media
(Facebook, Twitter, thematic forums), advisory and expert activity as well as
journalistic and commentary activities implemented in network structures.
To a large extent, based on this knowledge and experience, cases of par-
ticularly characteristic events and phenomena were selected on a mono-
graphic (non-statistical) basis. They then became the subject of an in-depth
study, enriched, if necessary, with problem interviews with other partici-
pants in these events. The supplementary source query, conducted at this
stage of research, also related to non-scientific sources (journalism, Internet
forums, etc.) relevant for their informational content.
Among the instruments, one of the most useful tools was the network
analysis (Prell, 2011), with elements of inductive reasoning (mainly incom-
plete enumeration) at the inference stage based on previously collected
research material.

Authority in the traditional approach

In the initial phase of the literature review, the authors focused primarily
on attempts to define the concept of “authority”. The aim was to eliminate
colloquial meanings and ambiguities, as well as compare the definitions
used and indicate the differences among them. There was no presumption
of searching and indicating a single specific definition as the leading one in
further considerations. In view of the assumed variability of the designa-
tion, the concept of “authority” as a function of time was not considered
justified and expedient, even at the stage of analysing the traditional under-
standing of this category, and even more so at the stage of constructing the
framework of the theory of neo-authority.
The query showed that “authority” is a widely analysed concept, but by
no means unambiguous. Max Weber (1968) represents the classic approach;
he considers authority as:

a function of legitimate domination and divides it into three types:

legal, traditional and charismatic authority, which is based on the per-
sonality’s unique personality traits. A feature of this approach is that
authority is limited to power.
80 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
Over time, this resulted in the critical reflection of other researchers and
many scientific positions in which the too narrow perception of the complex
issue was emphasised in the presented Weberian approach.
John Coleman (1997) pointed to the need to link the authority with influ-
ence; He perceived leadership as:

a kind of not necessarily formal authority, arising not from the position
in the institutional understanding, but from knowledge, wisdom, com-
petence, experience and character.

Also – which is extremely important for the further content of this chap-
ter – with the placement in the centre of interpersonal relationships in the
group. He also noticed that only Weber’s charismatic leadership stems from
the characteristics of a person, not the institution the authority represents.
Harry Beran (1983) made a partial distinction between power and
authority. In his approach only authority-over results from the position
of an individual in a hierarchically organised group, while the source of
authority-on is the knowledge that a given person possesses. Authority-with
results from the willingness and ease with which others submit to this kind
of leadership, regardless of whether it results from characterological fea-
tures, position or expert knowledge. This “ease of submission to leader-
ship” can also be considered as a step towards a modern understanding
of authority, taking into account the needs and expectations of “clients”
or “addressees” of authority more than previously. In earlier approaches,
the “authority” – an institution or person – exists, as it were, objectively
and “in and of itself”, has this status quite independently or in a significant
detachment from those entities which recognise it as the authority. Hence,
with time, a distinction/separation in the literature on the subject was made
into authoritarian and authoritative.
In the first case, instead of choosing an individual, we are dealing with the
power of law, policy or structure. In the second case, however, on the con-
trary, it is the individual who decides to recognise authority, usually on the
basis of trust or recognition as an expert (Lankes, 2008, p. 679). Authority
understood in this way plays a significant role in the context of leadership,
where the condition of authority is the trust, we place in a given person or
institution. It is a substitute for atavistic domination – societies in the course
of progress have developed trust/confidence not so much in strength but
in purpose. Charisma then does not only mean certain characterological
features (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002), but also the ability to plan
the future, give those plans meaning and to implement them (Paschen, 2014,
p. 38). However, leadership cannot be exercised without power, whereas
having power is not enough to be a leader. It is necessary to have followers
(Kellerman, 2008) who follow the leader in accordance with their beliefs,
instinct or socialisation. In the first case, the mechanism for recognising the
leader as an authority is decisive (Teles, 2012).
 Authority in network 81
Before the above background, it is worth presenting selected scientific
achievements in the field of research on types of authority. Józef Maria
Bocheński (1965, pp. 164–167) divides the concept of authority into:

authority epistemic and deontic; each of them has the character of a

tripartite relationship, in which one entity is the object of authority
(provides -x), the other is the subject of authority (receives -y), i.e. the
first entity is its authority, and the third element of the relationship is a
domain (d), the area in which they operate. The type of authority will
depend on the last element. If it is a statement, it can be accepted as true
and we are dealing then with epistemic authority, if it is conveyed as a
binding imperative – with deontic authority.

Patrick Wilson (1983, pp. 13–35) distinguishes, in contrast, between two

types of authority: cognitive (epistemic) and administrative.

The first is based on knowledge and consists in influencing the opin-

ions and behaviour of others; the second results from the position or
positions that predispose the individual to decide about others, to give
orders to them.

The impact of cognitive authority is desired by the recipient, sought and

accepted on the basis of the assumption that she/he has sufficient grounds
to speak on a given issue. At the moment when such authority loses cred-
ibility – the recipient in effect loses the above confidence. The author
emphasises, however, that cognitive authority is valued not so much
for the knowledge or information she/he has, but for the opinions and
even advice she/he provides to her/his clients/recipients. These author-
ities have a specific gradation and a field in which they are considered
as such. In practice, this means that the recipients “weigh” the words of
people who they recognise as authority, and such weight is determined
by the trust and credibility of the person, not the message, and there-
fore cognitive authority is determined by her/his social reception, not
objective quality. The condition is, however, in this approach that such a
person speaks in the scope/field in which she/he is considered an author-
ity. Hence, the author uses the term geography of authority, in which
the boundaries are smooth, not sharp. The basis of cognitive authority
will be expert knowledge resulting from the profession or education, or
at least a reputation associated with practical experience, which gives
people without proper education the opportunity to express expert-like
opinions.
Richard T. de George (1970) distinguishes seven types of authority. The
overwhelming majority of them result from the relationship of a particular
type of power: political, paternalistic, operational, charismatic, moral, reli-
gious authority. The only exception is cognitive authority, based on expert
82 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
knowledge; it may also be referred to as intellectual authority (Hardwig,
1985). It is complex:

it occurs in the form of an expert chain, where each of the experts has
her/his own intellectual authorities, which she/he can refer to.

Thus, a kind of hierarchy is created in which the subject of authority is

simultaneously the object of another authority, and the tripartite relation-
ship described by Bocheński (1965) is multiplied.
The relation of epistemic authority is an asymmetrical cognitive depend-
ence in its nature. People have always had to rely on specialists, but in mod-
ern times where we are dealing with an intensification of the division of
labour, accelerated fragmentation of knowledge and the growing pace of
outdating old information, this relationship has intensified. Oliver Sholz
(2018, p. 30) distinguishes the following combinations of relations: laymen-
expert (e.g. patients-physician, clients-lawyer) and novice-experts (e.g.
students-teacher, apprentices-master).
In both cases, specialists have a dominant position not only in relation
to non-specialists, but also in relation to individuals (experts) with more
general knowledge. The author also divided the determinants of objectivity
of experts into four groups:

• Individual cognitive abilities and achievement, including prob-

lem-solving skills, experience, in-depth knowledge and consistent
beliefs.
• Social relations confirming the status of an expert, including recogni-
tion from laymen, relationships with other experts.
• Commitment and flexibility, including diligence and some degree of
automation in expressing opinions.
• Effectiveness and success, including the ease of applying knowledge
in a new, dynamic situation, the ability to forecast, pedagogical skills
(Sholz, 2018, p. 32).

The category of credibility is of key importance for considerations on

authority building. Research on this subject, carried out by Carl I. Hovland
and Walter Weiss back in the 1950s (1951) focused on the dependence on
how the characteristics of the sender of the information affected its accept-
ance by the recipient. The conclusions showed that the evaluation of the
source’s truthfulness was more important than the actual quality of infor-
mation, and the opinions of recipients were shaped relying on trust in the
source. Following the path set at the time, Miriam J. Metzger and Andrew
J. Flanagin (2008, str. 8) define credibility as:

the believability of a source or message, which is made up of two pri-

mary dimensions: trustworthiness and expertise.
 Authority in network 83
In addition to the main factors, other factors may be of secondary impor-
tance, such as charisma or physical attractiveness. All of them will be sub-
jective. Trustworthiness is synonymous in the literature of the subject with
terms such as: with good intentions, honest, impartial, and the person
assessed in this way is simultaneously categorised as good, moral. Expertise,
on the other hand, means that a person is competent and experienced (Fogg
& Tseng, 1999).
To sum up, the scientific achievements in this respect should be assessed
as rich in quantity. In many studies on traditional authority, the starting
point is the Weberian concept of authority, in which the power plays the
leading role. Critical literature emphasises the need to consider power in
correlation with influence and to treat the authority not only as an object
“in itself”, but also in a relational approach, taking into account recipients/
clients and interaction with them. However, the assumption, which seems
to be automatically accepted, that these recipients accept or actively seek
authorities, guided by their traditional values, including primarily compe-
tence and credibility, still dominates.

The network as a space for social interaction

The network provides an important context for considering authority on
two levels, penetrating each other: technological – medial and social. In a
narrower sense, the Internet is an infrastructure that has made communi-
cation qualitatively different than before, and thanks to which “new” and
“new-new” media flourished – according to a well-known term introduced
by Paul Levinson (2013).

The wider network is a social construct; it is a structure different from

hierarchy and a specific system of mutual relations among individuals
and institutions.

As many authors note, dealing with the issue of the relationship between
the two indicated “networks” (Barney, 2013, p. 37; Aleksandrowicz, 2014,
p. 63) – these social ones are a considerably older phenomenon than modern
communication technologies. For example, Albert-László Barabási (2014)
cites in this context the case of Saint Paul. In preaching Christ’s teachings,
he travelled the world, choosing the largest population centres and multiply-
ing his message through them. So he actually created a network – according
to classic definitions consisting of nodes, connections and flows – based on
the tools available at that time.
Network organisation models, as well as the network principle of social
impact, were described as early as in the 1970s as SPIN (Segmented,
Polycentric, Ideologically Integrated Network). Their key feature was the
existence of communications among individual nodes (or autonomous
links) of a certain specific nature and with sufficient capacity to ensure the
84 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
interaction of these nodes (Gerlach & Hine, 1981). However, the problem
was how to re-create/duplicate a piece of information created in one net-
work node as quickly and accurately as possible in another (Gleick, 2011,
p. 3). There is no doubt, therefore, that only the rapid development of tech-
nology at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries caused that qualitatively new
conditions appeared, enabling the birth of a truly “networked” society, with
the Internet located at the centre of this gigantic structure and the count-
less clouds of smaller and larger, dynamically evolving sub-networks with
extremely diverse functionality. The merger of SPIN networks and technol-
ogies such as the Internet and mobile networks has provoked the emergence
and development of, among others, the phenomenon of Al-Qaeda, and
more broadly – the transformation of all international relations, the nature
and functioning of states, as well as the society itself. In this context, Ulrich
Beck and Edgar Grande wrote about a vertically diversified and intertwined
structure of reign, in which the commanding authority passes into the power
of negotiation, and by the way – can no longer be focused on the top, moves
to intersection points and control points in the network, amongst individual
institutions and layers of the system (Beck & Grande, 2004, pp. 126–128).
Describing this process and its effects, Manuel Castells (1996) pointed
out the mechanisms that make the functioning of the network accelerate
and intensify interactions compared to the hierarchy. Following similar
research paths, Tomasz Goban-Klas and Piotr Sienkiewicz (1999) used an
extremely pictorial method of explanation in one of the studies, at the end of
the 20th century. They compared the entire period of human history to one
full day, during which one hour corresponds approximately to 1500 years of
real time; when at midnight a man was still communicating using gestures,
facial expressions and simple words, at 8.00 in the morning he mastered
painting techniques, at 8.40 pm – the hieroglyphs, at 9.38 pm – alphabetical
writing, at 11.30 pm – printing, and the personal computer appeared 49 sec-
onds before midnight. It is worth adding that since the publication of this
comparison, i.e. within a few successive seconds, the mobile internet has
appeared in the world, and improved smartphones allow you to carry entire
data libraries with you anywhere in the world. The level of retail prices has
made it real to access these novelties, and now, thanks to 5G technology, the
Internet of Things will become everyday reality (IoT, Internet of Things),
with all the far-reaching consequences of this fact (more in a separate chap-
ter by Tomasz Gajewski).
This shows the great challenge contemporary people face. Earlier gener-
ations were usually born, matured and died in worlds quite similar to each
other – now there is hardly anyone to whom it is given. According to the
popular formula, globalisation is about “shrinking time and space”, and
in fact the same theorem can be applied to the effects of functioning on
the web. Time accelerates, because first, actions and reactions occur in real
time or in fractions of a second, and second, technological progress and its
socio-political-cultural consequences are multiplied by the network. Space
 Authority in network 85
also shrinks because physical distance ceases to matter in communication,
exchange of views, ideas and even money. Soon, with the popularisation of
industrial 3D printing, it will cease to be relevant for the real transfer and
sharing of many material goods. All this is conducive to putting us under
pressure with much more data that we need to process.
It is worth noting that in social practice we rarely deal with the simplest
chain type networks (with a linear structure and a scheme of information
flow through individual nodes in turn). Very often, we identify the most
complex full-matrix (or all-channel) type network, where information is
dynamically distributed directly and indirectly among many (or even all)
nodes. A star network is also common, where one can distinguish a cen-
tral node, dominating as the recipient and/or sender of information relative
to other network participants. This useful distinction is based on the net-
works’ classification coined by John Arguilla and Ronfeldt (2001, pp. 7–8).
Information, increasingly nuanced and circulating faster in the network
(both “social”, real - and “technological”, virtual), in the face of the above
becomes the most important factor shaping human communities and rela-
tionships within them. Previous civilisations’ main resources were raw
materials and energy, the ways of their exploitation were – mining and pro-
duction, respectively – and the game against Nature was to deprive it of
those resources. Contemporary post-industrial civilisation puts information
and its processing in the centre of attention, while its main goal –the game
among people. This gives rise to uncharted and unimaginable civilisational
effects for almost all spheres of our lives. Almost two decades ago, at the
threshold of the signalled processes, it was visually described by Alexander
Bard and Jan Söderqvist, cited earlier – introducing, among others, the
concepts of new “social classes” emerging in the network, such as curators,
nexalists and eternalists, as well as network pyramids and attentionalist
hierarchy of power (Bard & Söderqvist, 2002, pp. 107–130; 197–216).
Importantly, the flood of information available to each of us, even despite
its will, dangerously quickly reaches a level that exceeds the ability to absorb.
According to estimates, the amount of information “produced” every year
for at least a decade exceeds 20 billion times (sic!) everything written in the
history of all mankind before 2010; An average resident of a highly devel-
oped country has as much information per hour as her/his grandfather had
throughout his life. Therefore, what appears – according to the formulation
of James Gleick (2011, p. 11) – is the Devil of Information Overload.
There is no need to quote here, even after Manuel Castells (2012), well-
known, detailed considerations about the nature of the information soci-
ety. However, it is worth emphasising that in the described situation the
key issue is the proper use of information – also as a basis for the optimal
selection of authorities. It is required, in turn: the ability to effectively select
information absorbed from the extremely chaotic info-ocean that surrounds
us; then the ability to analyse them as quickly and purposefully as possible
in terms of reliability and usefulness; and finally the ability to rationally
86 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
integrate similarly processed information in order to build functional syn-
thesis, to develop life, political and professional decisions, etc.
The most advanced, theoretical and practical studies in the field of profes-
sional selection, analysis and use of information are conducted for the use
of special services, including their structures responsible for the so-called
white interview, or explicit source (see, among others, Pham, 2003; Wark,
2005; Hulnick, 2010). Using these achievements, at least two statements can
be made for the purposes of these considerations. First, the key element cre-
ating the advantage of one entity over another (or over a group of entities) is
the phenomenon of so-called information asymmetry, i.e. the difference in
access to valuable information and in the tools of its proper analysis and use
(by the way, in 2001 Joseph Stiglitz, George Akerlof and Andrew M. Spence
received the Nobel Prize for work on information asymmetry in marketing).
Second, even the most professional institutions are sensitive and prone to
misinformation and propaganda.
This applies, for example, to the study departments of large intelligence
services or specialised think tanks. Rich and equipped with professional
staff and modern equipment supporting their work, capable of eliminating
internal threats resulting from, for example, the subjectivity of the individ-
ual, thanks to advanced and multi-stage procedures of dealing with infor-
mation, by almost 100%, but they lose with threats coming from external
centres (Volkoff, 1999; Mandaville 2009). Misinformation is particularly
dangerous and difficult to identify, implemented in modern conditions
largely through the so-called sound boxes. Media is defined in this way,
which is not clearly associated with the sender of the disinformation mes-
sage or the entity using the effects of disinformation (Clark, 2010, pp. 18–27),
with particular emphasis on new and new-new media: blogs, tweets, wiki-
tionaries and encyclopedias of social networking sites, podcasts posted on
various portals (Levinson, 2013).
In this situation, it is difficult to expect that the average citizen will secure
information security for her/his own use. Not only does she/he not have ade-
quate expertise, but even in most cases she/he is not aware of the complexity
of the problem and the pitfalls set by the modern infosphere. At the same
time, whether or not, this citizen must, after all, make various decisions with
varying weight and consequences.

The problem of credibility in the network

Once, even in conditions of much less variability and uncertainty, in all
of the previously mentioned activities (selection, analysis and the use of
information) we were largely relieved by authorities. They were created
by hierarchy – a system in which by birth, property, diploma or experi-
ence it was obvious who was higher and who was lower. To a large extent,
this translated into the phenomenon of power, not just the strictly polit-
ical one. At the time, the basis for choosing authority was trust. It was
 Authority in network 87
relatively easy to verify: both with formal signs of the status of a given
entity, perceived as an authority, and with the own experience of the recip-
ient (customer) of this authority, which meant the earlier use of the “ser-
vices” of that particular authority (or possibly other similar to her/him).
Therefore, one could take general assessments as well as specific advice
from the authority with little risk.
Modern society largely deprives us of this comfort. Among other things,
because networks replace hierarchies – and network nodes, by their very
nature, cannot be easily classified on the up-down axis. Connections between
nodes run chaotically and flows flow in different directions. Identifying the
authority node has ceased to be as obvious as it once was. And the decision
on who to listen to, who to follow and whose suggestions will be more prof-
itable to us – we have less time to compare, because everything, as has just
been pointed out, is happening faster and faster. A sure, but only partial
solution – to assess credibility in virtual space, people or websites – is to use
the Prominence-Interpretation Theory. In its light, the assessment of credi-
bility of a person (or other authority) takes place in two stages. The first is
the need to notice (prominence), and then to make an assessment (interpre-
tation). Both stages must follow each other in a series, and people repeat the
process until they find the results satisfactory for them, or other factors do
not interrupt the sequence of actions – for example, limited ability, lack of
interest, limited time (Fogg, 2003).
Interactions in virtual society take place through tools (hardware and
software) available due to technological progress. Particularly noteworthy
are social networking sites that only offer infrastructure for conversations
and objects (artefacts) around which the discussion takes place. Website
users expect access to reliable artefacts, facts and topics, and content pro-
viders read the community’s needs in this area.
This will be determined by recipients’ comments, reviews, open discus-
sions on specific topics, as well as specific actions may be taken to strengthen
the website’s credibility. Lack of activities in this area may lead to the search
for or creation of alternative websites. The Internet creates conditions for
grassroots, which creates a situation where the content provider on the site
is looking for users of its content, and not the other way around. Initially,
this mechanism concerned the commercial sphere, and in time also it
embraced the political sphere (Lankes, 2008, p. 670). This dependence has
an inverted pyramid structure, known from management and policy the-
ory and practice. On the platform (e.g. a political party), where only cer-
tain rules and incentives are set, and standards that exclude unethical and
unlawful behaviour, there are consumers whose needs have priority and
who bottom-up influence the decisions and actions of leaders, constantly
verifying their credibility. Impulses and incentives for actions taken come
from individual users, gradually reaching critical mass (Reddy, 2012, p. 89).
Researches (Korfiatis, Poulos, & Bokos, 2006) on trust in Wikipedia
articles have shown that the greater the decentralisation in the process of
88 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
creating entries in the same field, the greater the trust in them by the recip-
ients. This results from the assumption of the recipients that the authors’
interests result from the research carried out by them, and the knowledge
is specialised. If we use Bocheński’s tripartite model (Bocheński, 1965), in
which epistemic authority is based on three entities: x, y and d, the higher y
and the smaller d, the grater will be the authority in the network.
Research on trust in blogs have shown that, compared to mainstream
media, they are perceived as more independent, analytical, shaping opin-
ions and personal as well as credible. At the same time, pluralism of both
traditional journalistic and virtual forms strengthens trust in both - by
default, mutual, distributed control in real time. It was also noted that in
this area we cannot talk about the separation of physical and digital space -
they both influence and interact with each other. Traditional media, includ-
ing those without authority, are a reference point for bloggers (Johnson &
Kaye, 2004).
Soo Young Rieh and Nicholas J. Belkin (1998) on the basis of the con-
ducted research on the reliability of websites, confirmed that the theses put
forward by Patrick Wilson (1983) are applicable in a network environment.
Authority has been recognised as one of the foundations of trust in a web-
site; it was divided into institutional authority (“www authority”), which is
influenced by the institution’s confirmed URL domain, the type of institu-
tion, its current reputation and individual authority, i.e. the ability to iden-
tify the author of the page, her/his affiliation and personal data.
However, information on the Internet can be published by anyone with-
out the option of verifying the source, anonymously or under a false iden-
tity. In this situation, verification of cognitive authority is impossible. The
phenomenon of plagiarism is also common, or the phenomenon when
an unknown person is impersonating a known and recognised authority
(Fritch & Cromwell, 2001).
Therefore, many authors emphasise the process of assessing credibility
on the web. Nicholas C. Burbules (2001) points out that credibility on the
web is fundamentally different from the credibility used in the physical
world – and this is not only due to common misinformation in the virtual
world. For the author, it is a process that begins with a preliminary selec-
tion and superficial assessment of credibility, the stage at which we assess
information based on its usefulness, validity, interests (useful, relevant, or
interesting). The next stage in this process is timeliness and our expecta-
tions that the information will be updated and comprehensiveness, which
the author describes as follows: “the selectivity we require for making cer-
tain kinds of credibility judgments conflicts with the comprehensiveness
we require as a condition of other credibility judgments” (Burbules, 2001,
p. 450). However, Soo Young Rieh and David R. Danielson (2007) distin-
guish three levels of credibility assessment in the network: assessment of
networks, assessment of places/websites within a network and assessment
of information in the network.
 Authority in network 89
Credibility in the network is related to the phenomenon that R. David
Lankes (2008, p. 669) calls information self-sufficiency. This is a broad con-
cept, not limited to the Internet, but a feature of a digital society in which
political, economic and cultural processes take place. An extremely impor-
tant condition for the quality of these processes is the issue of trust in infor-
mation. Importantly, under these conditions, the task of determining and
assessing their credibility lies with the recipient, not its source. Michael
Hauben (1996), creator of the term netizens – network citizens – described
self-sufficiency as follows:

The connection is people to people rather than governments to gov-

ernments. Citizen Journalists can now distribute to more than those
they know personally (…) Personal publishing is now joined by wide
personal distribution.

Old authorities in new conditions

Traditional authorities, however, have not completely disappeared. More
precisely - there are still entities that historically played the role of author-
ities. They are, for example, mentioned at the beginning: priests, parents
and political experts. It is worth looking at the current position of these
typical, old authorities separately – because the processes of their desa-
cralisation (in the sense proposed here after Blumler and Kavanagh) are
slightly different.
The priest’s role as an authority (for simplicity, we limit ourselves here to
Western Christianity, because it is not a study of the history and sociology of
religion) has evolved for centuries. Originally, until around the late Middle
Ages, it had a multi-dimensional and universal character, it concerned prac-
tically all areas of life, from faith, through politics, to culture, medicine and
agriculture. The Reformation (with its gradually developed self-limitation
of the priesthood caste), the simultaneous development of secular education
and science, as well as the general decline in religiosity and political secu-
larism arising out of it, inflicted blows on this priestly omnipotence. Despite
this, the tendency to treat the priest as an authority has survived to this day
in various parts of Western civilisation, not only in religious matters.
Examples are provided by observing the processes taking place in the
United States, with particular emphasis on the so-called Bible Belt (Fowler,
2014). Also, in completely different conditions in Poland, the Roman
Catholic Church has enjoyed a specific, well-established position of institu-
tional, moral and political authority, as well as economic power, for years.
Until recently, the priest was treated not only as a spiritual guide for believ-
ers in the Polish society, but also as an organiser and sometimes a controller
of non-religious social activities. At the same time, he often functioned with
special rights, rarely being subject to criticism from lay people and often
avoiding criminal liability for any offenses. This condition began to change
90 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
in the late 20th century (Baniak, 2002). However, the next decades brought
two deceptively contradictory trends. On the one hand, political clerical-
ism intensified, combined with corruption of the Church by the parties (sig-
nificant financial and administrative benefits in exchange for propaganda
support of public power; interestingly, such a policy was pursued by gov-
ernments identified as left-wing as well as centre and right-wing, in different
degree and in different circumstances). On the other hand, there is a clear
increase in anti-clerical attitudes.
There is no doubt that the development of the network society in Poland
is at least partly responsible for this process. People harmed in various ways
by representatives of the Church (including victims of pedophilia) have the
possibility of self-organisation to claim damages. Secular environments
offer and promote alternative value systems and life models in the networks
of informal connections. The Internet and social media are an agora on
which anti-clerical voices resound and are multiplied on a scale unimagi-
nable just a few years ago, in the conditions of one-way communication of
the old type.
At the same time, adjustment strategies on the Church’s side can be seen.
Many priests, especially better educated and younger ones, make various
and often interesting attempts to build their authority on new principles,
adapted to the network conditions. This includes reaching for internet tools
with courage, but first of all actions for building new social networks in
the form of charity campaigns, prayer groups, sports and cultural initia-
tives, etc. Priests conducting this kind of activity largely give up the classic
attributes associated with the authority in the hierarchical model, in favour
of attitudes typical of the “central node” of the star network. They shorten
the social distance in various ways, and even – discreetly – make serious
compromises with the orthodox doctrine and teaching of the Church in the
name of satisfying the emotional and social needs of their recipients/clients.
The final result of this game of using the network to preserve the position
and authority of the Church and its priests in Poland is not in any way cer-
tain today. The church’s asset is undoubtedly the huge material resources of
the institution, but it is disadvantaged by the progressive decline in the aver-
age intellectual level of young priests, caused by a largely negative selection
for seminaries.
Of course, similar processes are taking place today not only in Poland;
due to the scale of the Church’s impact on public life and the recently
completely unquestioned power of priests’ authority, the case of this coun-
try is, however, of particular importance for analysing the impact of the
networking of society on the erosion of traditional authorities (Grzymała-
Busse, 2015).
In the case of another type of traditional authority – that is, a parent – its
evolution is conditioned primarily by two factors interesting for our con-
siderations. The first of these is a general change in the nature and the role
of the family as a social unit. Over the centuries, it has departed very far
 Authority in network 91
from its former role as a real mini enterprise, within which almost all life
activity was concentrated of even several generations at a time. Alvin Toffler
described this trend suggestively in “The Third Wave” (1980).
Along the way, family has been the subject to atrophy with almost all
traditional relaying of gestures, customs and conventions, emphasising the
unique and privileged formal position of older people over younger ones
such as kissing their parents in the hand as a form of greeting (after all, it
used to be common in many cultures 150 or even 100 years ago). Also, in this
respect, the family has clearly lost its hierarchical structure and functional
organisation, in favour of a more networked nature, with flatter and change-
able relationships, shorter distances (widespread use referring to parents by
their first name, etc. in some communities).
The second factor is the development of the network, with particular
emphasis on social media, providing an attractive information and educa-
tional, entertainment and social offer. The Internet provides much more in
this respect than parents can provide, even the best educated and commit-
ted mums and dads. So, if at least temporarily, we take for granted the true
concept of linking authority with substantive competence and credibility
as well as an advantage over the subject over the subject-matter (according
to Bocheński’s terminology) – it should be recognised that in many cases
parents must, inevitably, lose their rivalry with Wikipedia and a thousand
other online sources of knowledge. Children, usually freely surfing the
cyberspace, often search for necessary information with greater ease than
their parents (for simplicity, let’s temporarily abstract from the quality of
this information and from the ability of a young person to critically analyse
and evaluate it).
What’s more, in many life situations, for centuries, it was the age that gave
a natural advantage in terms of the average quality of decisions made. In a
relatively unchanging world (in terms of the nature of dominant processes
and conditions), the experience accumulated over the years was an asset diffi-
cult to balance by others and built the natural competence advantage of par-
ents (and especially grandparents). In the present world of increasingly faster
technological and social change as well as deepened cultural diffusion, we
deal with the opposite situation. Often, the excess of outdated information
and getting used to already inadequate patterns is a ballast, and the advan-
tage is “childish” courage in learning new things and experimenting, as well
as a better (though rather instinctive) understanding of new conditions.
All this weakens the authority of parents, or at least makes it less auto-
matic than in the recent past (Yaffe, 2020). Because, as indicated earlier, the
need for authority is, however, a relatively constant motive for human emo-
tional and intellectual search, in many cases a specific vacuum is created.
Unless the parent is able to balance the weaknesses described here with
other “authoritative” elements, the child will reliably look for a substitute
outside of the immediate environment, on the Internet or in a real-life social
network.
92 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
Similarly, as in the case of the Church’s adaptation strategies, there is a
piece of advice. “Building authority in the eyes of a child is being authentic,
spontaneous, talking about your feelings, naming them, talking about real-
ity and ensuring a sense of security” as written on a blog, intended for par-
ents, by a psychologist Joanna Trochimczuk from the University of Social
Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw. It is impossible to overlook the symp-
tom of the “soft” leadership model characteristic of the intelligently built
position of the “central node” in a star-type network. In the contemporary
literature on the subject, in this context a reference is made to “the opera-
tionalization of the theoretical conceptualization of parental authority as
bi-dimensional theoretical construct, consisting of parental power and its
perceived legitimacy” (Yaffe, 2017).
Expert is another example of traditional authority, very strongly exposed
in the content of classic definitions. The expert’s role was actually particu-
larly important in the model of politics, characteristic of the second half
of the 20th century (which is discussed more broadly in the chapter of this
volume, by Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia). It consisted primarily of
in-depth analysis of various aspects of reality and the provision of reliable
and competent data to decision-makers in order to optimise jointly under-
taken actions. It also frequently meant significant participation in public
promotion of agreed policy. The key aspects of the expert’s authority were,
therefore, a strong formal position in the power elite, and, verifiable in prac-
tice, high professional competences, and a high level of ethics, directed at,
among others, loyalty towards the state or organisation. These qualities
ensured (in a way casually) authority also outside a relatively narrow group
of collaborators. A characteristic example of a highly respected expert from
that era was, for example, Zbigniew Brzeziński; his authority as an expert
on international relations and security issues went beyond the borders of
one country and beyond the framework of one party.
Along with the gradual mediation of the political process, the position and
tasks of the expert in the processes of exercising political power changed.
In the past, political leadership was about setting goals that the leader (in
collaboration with experts) considered particularly important from a col-
lective point of view and convincing the society (again in collaboration with
experts) to commit to achieving them. Currently, we are dealing with a situ-
ation in which experts analyse social moods and needs (often with the deci-
sive participation of artificial intelligence, as Tomasz Gajewski mentions in
his chapter) and basing on them, they make decisions that (after possible
consultation with lobbyists, for example) are given as hints to politicians.
In this model, the latter act as a leader only formally and for show, they are
a kind of avatars. Real leadership, on the other hand, is dispersed among
technocrats, who support increasingly sophisticated instruments for ana-
lysing public opinion, specialists in negotiations with formal and above all
informal interest groups, and finally – the leaders of these groups (Robins,
2009; Stankiewicz, 2012).
 Authority in network 93
Without denying the high professional competence of experts involved in
this process - it is difficult, however, to recognise them as authorities in the
light of the understanding of this concept adopted here. It would be closer
to classifying them as hired, highly qualified technology operators, working
in the shadows, off the stage, for efficient operation of the process, which is
beyond their control. Technological progress has meant that — according
to the most-advanced statements — authority is generated by algorithms.
Technologies based on Big Data are more and more commonly used not
only for commercial purposes, not only to study social preferences in terms
of optimising decisions in accordance with them, but also for the offensive
shaping of opinions, attitudes and political choices. In the book The Black
Box Society, Frank Pasquale even uses the perverse phrase that algorithms
have become an authority (Pasquale, 2015).
Some subcategory of experts, however, seems to have survived the
described change. They are based on a fairly widespread resentment and
the social need to justify their opinions and actions through the specialist’s
“seal”. This creates a market for people with formal status, for example,
an academic title, a high military rank, etc. – no longer to tell leaders the
optimal decision, but only to justify their marketing. In other words, they
become hired actors (and sometimes even extras) in an advertising spectacle
addressed to the public. The politician will gladly pay for the report signed
by experts, provided that the conclusions from it will agree with her/his own
thoughts, and even more often - with the interests of the lobbyists behind
her/him. The politician will also invite an expert to a press conference so
that the expert, from the heights of the expert’s substantive authority, helps
to justify decisions, especially the unpopular ones.
For their part, cynically, they also use the neo-expert media. There, in
turn, the increasingly simplified and trivialised message about politics is
decorated and substantiated by a short statement of such a person with a
high formal status of a specialist in a given field. Short – because air-
time or the ability to concentrate the reader of web portals does not allow
for more – and necessarily vague, often because of these conditions on
the border of substantive error. For the price of such risk, an expert who
decides to participate in this game gains recognition, sometimes financial or
professional profits. Above all, however, being able to remain an authority,
despite the changed conditions is the expert’s payment. She/he can count on
the fact that in favourable circumstances her/his more elaborate and sub-
stantive opinion will be taken into consideration by someone. If not by a
real decision-maker, then at least by a niche part, but interested in in-depth
analysis of the public opinion (Plehwe, 2015).
Both the media and the media era politicians are interested not so much in
the substantive value of public debate as in controlling the emotions of the
community. So, experts become actors of this show, not its directors. Their
ability to be an authority for mass audiences is limited, as demonstrated by
the case of Greta Thunberg. The Swedish teenager managed to become an
94 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
authority (or – to put it more precisely – play the role of authority) much
more effectively than many titled climatology specialists. Her success was
largely based on the optimal use of network tools; both in the narrow, tech-
nical and communication sense, as well as in the broad sense, regarding the
optimal use of mechanisms of propagation of information and emotional
communication in mega-networks.
To sum up this part of considerations, it should be noted that traditional
authorities, in view of the rapid pace of changes in conditions, often become
non-functional or underestimated by recipients/clients. They are replaced
by entities and persons who do not traditionally have predispositions and
qualities required by the classical definitions but offer a message much bet-
ter profiled in accordance with the subjective expectations and needs of the
addressees.
The original and controversial French thinker Guy Debord in The Society
of Spectacle (1988) wrote more than 30 years ago (sic!):

“The show, which now has all the means of falsifying the entire produc-
tion, as well as perception, has become the absolute lord of memories,
just as it is the uncontrolled lord of projects that mark the most dis-
tant future. It reigns universally and indivisibly; carries out its ad hoc
adjudication. In such circumstances, unexpectedly, in an atmosphere of
carnival fun, a parodistic abolition of the division of labor; the moment
was perfectly chosen, because this parody is accompanied by a common
process of disappearance of all competences. The financier becomes a
singer, an attorney becomes a snitch, the baker shares his literary pref-
erences, the actor rules, the cook makes philosophical reflections on the
various stages of baking as levels of universal history… five coupled fea-
tures: constant technological innovation, fusion of economy and state,
universal secrecy, false replication, eternal present”.

Summary and conclusions – towards neo-authority theory?

In the light of the above considerations, one can notice significant differ-
ences between the “historical” and contemporary understanding of the
category of authority. They are caused primarily by a change in external
conditions, including the spread of network forms of social organisation,
as well as the simultaneous development of new communication technol-
ogies. The departure from the hierarchical organisation, which naturally
preferred the functioning of formal authorities (using Patrick Wilson’s
administrative terminology), to the network – is the reason for shifting the
focus to cognitive authorities (Wilson, 1983, pp. 13–35); they are based on
the ability to influence the opinions and behaviour of others, without using
various forms of coercion. The differences also begin to become apparent
when we examine more thoroughly Wilson’s point of view on the conditions
of the authority’s maintenance of her/his credibility.
 Authority in network 95
It remains debatable whether the recipient/client today expects advice and
opinions from cognitive authority or information to a greater extent. On
the one hand, reliable and quick information has become a relatively more
desirable good on the market. On the other hand, the excess of information,
mostly impossible for non-accidental selection and verification based on
fully professional standards, causes a growing temptation to cede independ-
ent analyses to authorities. It is becoming increasingly attractive to obtain
from them a “highly processed product”, i.e. ready opinions and assess-
ments, and even advice on specific behaviour regarding specific dilemmas.
The assumption that one of the side effects of “networking” and “comput-
erizing” society is its increasing diversity and, as a result, the divergence of
recipient/customer groups with different preferences seem to be the closest
to the truth. Recalling once again the vivid terms of Bard and Jan Söderqvist
(2002), it could be pointed out that the “netocrats”, i.e. the new ruling class,
will be interested in seeking authorities distributing “raw” information to a
greater extent. They will then be willing to process and use it according to
their own individual needs and preferences. However, the new proletariat,
known by the Swedish authors as the “consumerism”, will probably focus
primarily on the most processed commodity, and will look for authorities
that offer it.
Similar variations will also probably occur, increasingly, in terms of the
activity of individual types of customers/recipients. Those more intellectu-
ally and socially sophisticated will probably take advantage various oppor-
tunities offered by the network society – and will offensively seek their own
authorities best suited to their needs. A noticeable and signalled trend in
this area will be strengthened. On the other hand, also the new possibili-
ties of manipulating public opinion and the needs of entire social groups,
previously signalled, associated with the use of advanced technologies and
algorithms, will accelerate the artificial, purposeful creation of authorities.
They will be tailored by decision-makers (formal and informal pressure
groups) to suit their particular needs and addressed to individual segments
of the new subclass, i.e. the consumerism.
Compared to classical theory, the client/recipient’s expectations regard-
ing the authority’s field of activity also change. Earlier it was strongly asso-
ciated with the real competences of the authority. Today this dependence
is often repealed. The attractiveness of the message and compliance of the
opinion with the conscious or even subconscious expectations of the client/
recipient can be more important than real competence. Perhaps, this is asso-
ciated with the growing expectation of pleasure above all as the goal of our
activity. This is more and more clearly signalled by some papers in the field
of social psychology (McGuirk, Kuppens, Kingston, & Brock, 2017).
The conducted research and analysis do not allow, in the authors’ opin-
ion, to unequivocally answer the question about the impact of changes in the
rules of authority creation on the future quality of institutions and broadly
understood policy. It seems that – like any new long-range trend – this one
96 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
Table 5.1 Differences between the old and new model of functioning of the
authority category

Features of Network authority Traditional authority

the authority Grassroots. Top-down.
Inverted pyramid structure Hierarchic.
Decentralised. Centralised.
Anonymous (source of Transparent (easily verifiable
credibility is difficult to source of reliability).
identify).
Self-sufficiency of the recipient. Recipient dependent on the
“supply” of information.

Source: Own study

also has both positive and negative effects. Among the latter, undoubt-
edly, one should notice above all dangers, signalled, among others, by
Shosahana Zuboff (2019) in her reflections on “surveillance capitalism”.
They rely on the use of modern technologies of knowledge aggregation
to manipulate people, by creating artificial trends and authorities. The
American social psychologist applies this primarily to commercial enti-
ties and their activities on the market, but the same mechanism applies
in politics. On it de facto, and on the so-called psychographic profiling,
the activities of companies such as Cambridge Analytica were based
during the 2016 presidential election in the USA or the Brexit campaign
(Vaidhyanathan, 2018). In the conditions of distributed network power
(between state institutions, lobbyists and informal influence groups, com-
mercial entities, etc.) and the widespread occurrence of network, often dif-
ficult to verify, constantly fluctuating authorities, new threats are born for
liberal democracy.
The above statements make us consider the premature postulate of
constructing a new paradigm based on the concept of “neo-authority”.
However, it is worth further researching and perceiving the practical effects
of the changes taking place, among others in the scope of different authority
building rules in network conditions.
The research hypotheses set out at the beginning can be considered to be
largely confirmed. The relationship between technological transformations
and the resulting changes in the dominant manner of communication, the
evolution of authority and the entire network of related categories proved
indisputable. The creation of new authorities shows some noticeable, signifi-
cant differences compared to the model known from the past (see: Table 5.1).
The key element ensuring obtaining and maintaining the role of authority
by a given entity is currently primarily the attractiveness of both the content
and the form of information distributed by it, perceived subjectively by other
network participants. The objective, substantive quality of the message
clearly decides about authority. In the face of research and investigation,
 Authority in network 97
it is highly probable that the dominance of neo-authorities over their tra-
ditional counterparts will increase in the foreseeable future, becoming one
of the factors modifying not only strictly political processes, e.g. related to
political leadership, but also by influencing on other spheres of our lives.

References
Aleksandrowicz, T. R. (2014). Świat w sieci. Państwa, społeczeństwa, ludzie. W
poszukiwaniu nowego paradygmatu bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Warszawa: Difin.
Arguilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. (2001). The advent of netwar. In J. Arguilla, & J.
Ronfledt (Eds.), Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Baniak, J. (2002). Prestiż kościoła instytucjonalnego w polsce a zmiana społeczna.
Studium socjologiczne. Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne, 13, 153–195.
Barabási, A. L. (2014). How everything Is connected to everything else and what It
means for business, science, and everyday life. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Bard, A., & Söderqvist, J. (2002). Netocracy: The new power elite and life after capi-
talism. London; New York: Pearson Education.
Barney, D. (2013). The network society. Cambridge, MA: Polity.
Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2004). Das kosmopolitische europa. Gesellschaft und politik
in der zweiten moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Beran, H. (1983). What is the basis of political authority? The Monist, 66(4), 487–
499. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198366434.
Blumler, J. G., & Kavanagh, D. (1999). The Third age of political communication:
Influences and features. Political Communication, 16(3), 209–230. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1080/105846099198596.
Bocheński, J. M. (1965). The logic of religion. New York, NY: New York University
Press.
Burbules, N. C. (2001). Paradoxes of the web: The ethical dimensions of credibility.
Library Trends, 49(3), 441–453.
Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society, the information age: Economy,
society and culture (Vol. I). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope. Social movements in the Internet
age. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Clark, R. M. (2010). Intelligence analysis: A target-centric approach. Washington,
DC: CQ Press.
Coleman, J. (1997). Authority, power, leadership: Sociological understandings. New
Theology Review, 10(3), 31–44.
De George, R. T. (1970, Summer/Fall). The function and limits of epistemic
authority. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 8(2/3), 199–203. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1970.tb02110.x.
Fogg, B. J. (2003). Prominence-interpretation theory: Explaining how people assess
credibility online. In CHI03: Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing
Systems. New York: Association for Computing Machinery. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1145/765891.765951.
Fowler, R. B. (2014). Religion and Politics in America. Faith, Culture, and Strategic
Choices. New York, NY: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429493164.
98 Katarzyna Gruszko, Witold Sokała
Fritch, J. W., & Cromwell, R. L. (2001). Evaluating Internet resources: Identity, affil-
iation, and cognitive authority in a networked world. Journal of the American
Society for Information Science and Technology, 52(6), 499–507. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1002/asi.1081.
Gerlach, L. P., & Hine, V. H. (1981). People, power, change: Movements of social
transformations. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Gleick, J. (2011). The information. A theory. A history. A flood. New York, NY:
Pantheon Books.
Goban-Klas, T., & Sienkiewicz, P. (1999). Społeczeństwo informacyjne: szanse,
zagrożenia, wyzwania. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Postępu Telekomunikacji.
Greenwood, D., & Lewin, M. (1998). Introduction to action research: Social research
for social change. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Grzymała-Busse, A. (2015). Nations under god: How churches use moral authority to
influence policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/
DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv7h0sfx.
Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic dependence. The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335–
349. doi: https://doi.org./10.2307/2026523.
Hauben, M. (1996, June 5). The net and netizens: The impact the net has on people’s
lives. Retrieved from Columbia University in the City of New York: http://www.
columbia.edu/∼rh120/ch106.x01
Hulnick, A. S. (2010). The dilemma of open sources intelligence: Is OSINT really
intelligence? In L. K. Johnson (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of national security
intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfor
dhb/9780195375886.003.0014.
Judge, T. A., Bono, J. E., Ilies, R., & Gerhardt, M. W. (2002). Personality and lead-
ership: A qualitative and quantitative review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4),
765–780. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.765.
Kellerman, B. (2008). followership: How followers are creating change and changing
leaders. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Korfiatis, N., Poulos, M., & Bokos, G. (2006). Evaluating authoritative sources
using social networks: An insight from Wikipedia. Online Information Review,
30(3), 252–262. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/14684520610675780.
Lankes, R. D. (2008). Credibility on the Internet: Shifting from authority to
reliability. Journal of Documentation, 64(5), 667–686. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1108/00220410810899709.
Levinson, P. (2013). New New media. Boston, MA: Pearson.
Mandaville, M. (2009). Citizen-soldier handbook: 101 ways every American can fight
terrorism. Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing.
McGuirk, L., Kuppens, P., Kingston, R., & Brock, B. (2017). Does a culture of hap-
piness increase rumination over failure? Emotion, 18(5), 755–764. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1037/emo0000322.
Metzger, M. J., & Flanagin, A. J. (2008). Digital media and youth: Unparalleled
opportunity and unprecedented responsibility. In M. J. Metzger, & A. J. Flanagin
(Eds.), Digital media, youth, and credibility (pp. 5–28). Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
Paschen, M. D. (2014). The psychology of human leadership. How to develop charisma
and authority. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Pasquale, F. (2015). The Black Box society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 Authority in network 99
Pham, T. N. (2003). Open source intelligence – doctrine’s neglected child. Newport,
RI: Naval War College.
Plehwe, D. (2015). The politics of policy think-tanks: Organizing expertise, legit-
imacy and counter-expertise in policy networks. In F. Fisher, D. Torgerson, A.
Durnová, & M. Orsini (Eds.), Handbook of critical policy studies (pp. 358–380).
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/97817
83472352.00028).
Prell, C. (2011). Social network analysis: History, theory and methodology. London:
SAGE Publications.
Reddy, U. B. (2012). Democracy Uncaged: An Idea to liberate India’s Democracy
and What new political formations could practise for success. Scotts Valley, CA:
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Rieh, S. Y., & Belkin, N. J. (1998, January). Understanding judgment of information
quality and cognitive authority in the WWW. Journal of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology, 35, 279–289.
Rieh, S. Y., & Danielson, D. R. (2007, January). Credibility: A multidisciplinary
framework. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 41(1), 307–364.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/aris.2007.1440410114.
Sholz, O. R.(2018). Symptoms of expertise: Knowledge, understanding and other
cognitive goods. Topoi. 37:29–37. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9429-5.
Stankiewicz, P. (2012). Od lobbingu do układu. Niemieckie badania nad nieformal-
nymi sieciami władzy. In K. Pietrowicz, & P. Stankiewicz (Eds.), Za kulisami.
Szkice o władzy, interesach i bezpieczeństwie. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka.
Teles, F. (2012). Political leaders: The paradox of freedom and democracy. Revista
Enfoques, 10(16), 113–131.
Vaidhyanathan, S. (2018). Antisocial media: How Facebook disconnects us and under-
mines democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volkoff, V. (1999). Petite histoire de la désinformation: du cheval de troie à internet.
Paris: Du Rocher.
Wark, W. K. (Ed.). (2005). Twenty-first century intelligence (studies in intelligence).
New York, NY: Frank Cass.
Weber, M. (1968). Economy and society. An outline of interpretive sociology. Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Wilson, P. (1983). Second-hand knowledge: An inquiry into cognitive authority.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Yaffe, Y. (2017). Development and validation of a new parental authority instru-
ment (PAI). North American Journal of Psychology, 19(1), 169–194.
Yaffe, Y. (2020). Parental authority: A contemporary integrative-theoretical con-
ceptualization. In N. Roman (Ed.), A closer look at parenting styles and practices
(pp. 73–96). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at
the New frontier of power. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.
6 How to research neoleadership?
Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia

Introduction
Nowadays, it can be assumed that social media has become the main instru-
ment of political communication in democratic countries. This state of
affairs is, among others, a consequence of a kind of communication revolu-
tion involving the transition from the “television age” to the “era of social
media” (Ott, 2016, p. 66). As a result of the transfer of the political dis-
course new to the social media space, a new personalised form of policy
appeared under which the focus shifted from the choices made on political
platform to the personal qualities of leaders as well weakening of the role
of political parties as intermediaries between political leaders and citizens
can be noticed (McAllister, 2007). We are currently observing the process –
described in the first chapter by Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka – evolution
of political leadership towards the phenomenon of neoleadership. As one
of the main elements of creating the proposed new model of leadership, the
author indicated the ability to associate. The purpose of this chapter is to
answer the question what constitutes the contemporary paradigm of politi-
cal communication? A few preliminary observations should be made in the
introduction to the proposed discussion. First, political leaders have gained
unprecedented means of influencing the public opinion. This is due, inter
alia, to a change in the way political leaders and the electorate interact,
i.e. a departure from indirect communication (via mass media) to forms of
direct communication – more on this subject in Chapter 2 by Maria Nowina
Konopka. Second, the subject scope of discourse has been significantly
expanded. As far as in the era of mass communication, it mainly covered
programming, both ideological and party, in the era of personalised com-
munication, political leaders must constantly relate to current issues raised
in public space – regardless of its nature, subject or relevance, which unde-
niably shifts political discourse towards populism – more on this in Chapter
8 by Rafał Dudała. Third, in building the electorate and the political com-
petitive political advantage, the political leader must increasingly resort to
her/his reputation (more on this in Chapter 5 by Katarzyna Gruszko and
Witold Sokala), a network of supporters and communication skills, not to
 Research for neoleadership 101
party organisation. For these reasons, they are given a kind of personalised
ID card that allows them to exercise full control over their parties (Poguntke
& Webb, 2005, p. 22). What constitutes the contemporary paradigm of polit-
ical communication?

• Political leaders have gained unprecedented means of influencing the

public opinion. This is due, inter alia, to a change in the way political
leaders and the electorate interact, i.e. a departure from indirect com-
munication (via mass media) to forms of direct communication.
• The subject scope of discourse has been significantly expanded. As far
as in the era of mass communication, it mainly covered programming,
both ideological and party, in the era of personalised communication,
political leaders must constantly relate to current issues raised in public
space – regardless of its nature, subject or relevance, which undeniably
shifts political discourse towards populism.
• In building the electorate and the political competitive political advan-
tage, the political leader must increasingly resort to her/his reputation
a network of supporters and communication skills, not to party organ-
isation. For these reasons, they are given a kind a personalised ID card
that allows them to exercise full control over their parties.

As J. G. Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) indicate, political communication

and the form of action of the leaders and political parties are constrained by
the processes taking place in both social and media space. No matter how
the authors linked the operation of these processes to the changes occur-
ring in democratic societies of the late 20th century, their relevance nowa-
days cannot be denied. The first of these processes is modernisation, i.e. the
process of increasing social differentiation and internal specialisation with
simultaneous social and identity fragmentation, as well as an increase in
identity policy (Luhmann, 1975; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). The second
process is individualisation involving an increase in personal aspirations and
consumerist attitudes of the electorate while reducing the level of accept-
ance and the need to belong to established institutions, including political
parties. The next process is secularisation seen as, among others, an increase
in social scepticism towards existing authorities, including political leaders,
while growing competition among politicians for media coverage and public
attention. The fourth process is economisation seen as the growing influ-
ence of economic factors on political programs and other areas of social life
(Märtenson, 1998). As the fifth factor J. G. Blumler and Kavanagh (1999)
pointed to is the aestheticisation which, according to Ulrich Beck (Beck,
Giddens, & Lash, 1994) should be understood as the increased interest of
people in style, image, presentation, which in effect binds politics with pop-
ular culture (Cloonan & Street, 1997). The resulting equality boils down to
an increase in the intensity of these processes in the area of communication
and the nature of contemporary political activities. The resulting equality
102 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
it boils down to an increase in the intensity of these processes in the area of
communication and nature contemporary political activities.

Concepts and literature review

As Robert Elgie (2015) notes, it is difficult to talk about one thing – common
to all research approaches – the theory of leadership. As the author indi-
cates, the leadership study is ontologically and epistemologically diverse,
which in turn is an area to look for new shots and research perspectives.
Contemporary thinking about leadership draws the attention of researchers
towards the interaction between the leader and the environment in which
the leader operates. It constitutes the basic paradigm of interactionism.
Interactionism is the idea that human behaviour is a product of interac-
tion dynamically occurring between the aspects of personality and situa-
tion (Mischel, Shoda, & Ayduk, 2007). The key concept here is fit, which
is understood as the interaction between different dimensions of a man/
human and the environment (Caplan, 1987; Ostroff & Schulte, 2007). The
man/human in this approach is perceived through the prism of her/his indi-
vidual, biological and psychological needs, values, goals, possibilities, per-
sonality type or traits, while the environment is internal or external awards,
position requirements, cultural values or traits of others forming a collec-
tive (French, Rodgers, & Cobb, 1974).
Symbolic interactionism is a research approach initiated by Herbert
Blumer in 1937 (Blumer, 1986) focused on the analysis of the processes of
mutual impacts, analysed in the convention of the exchange of symbolic
meanings. Interaction means mutual impact of units/objects (Florenthal &
Shoham, 2010, p. 29). Interaction appears within a specific context created
by the nature of the relationship, the structure and position of a given entity
in a given social network. Technological progress and, as a result, the devel-
opment of social media has created a new one context for social interactions.

Interactionism is the idea that human behaviour is a product of inter-

action dynamically occurring between the aspects of personality and
situation (Mischel, Shoda, & Ayduk, 2007). The key concept here is fit,
which is understood as the interaction between different dimensions of
a man/human and the environment (Caplan, 1987; Ostroff & Schulte,
2007). Symbolic interactionism is a research approach initiated by H.
Blumer (2007) in 1937 focused on the analysis of the processes of mutual
impacts, analysed in the convention of the exchange of symbolic mean-
ings. Interaction means mutual impact of units/objects. (Florenthal &
Shoham, 2010, p. 29)

Along with the development of communication and media technologies, new

forms of communication have appeared. The transformations of communi-
cation mean a change in personal forms of communication, personalised
 Research for neoleadership 103
mass communication and relationships with interactive media mass media.
In addition to the traditional media, new communication environments
are emerging, based on the integration of traditional and interactive media
(Alver & Ceglar, 2015). Elimination of barriers of space and time as well as
restrictions related to the social context have become a new form of inter-
personal communication. Given that media communication is a modifica-
tion of face-to-face communication between/among people, it can be said
that communication takes place based on its participants’ conditions and
roles, as well as face-to-face communication. Every understanding and
interpreting of the message depend on the perception of imaginary roles
and perspectives communication, and every media communication is
accompanied by an internal dialogue. Hence, in Friedrich Krotz’s (2007,
p. 86) opinion, media communication is a form of symbolic action and mod-
ification of interaction. Therefore, new media technologies that expand the
scope of interaction, offer new perspectives in the analysis of personal and
collective communication activities. From this point of view, it becomes
important to understand the essence of the change in communication from
mass communication to personalised communication. In this place a refer-
ence should be made to the research on political personalisation understood
as “the process in which the political weight of the individual actors in the
political process increases over time, while the centrality of the politi-
cal group (i.e. political party) decreases” (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007, p. 65).
However, political personalisation is a multi-faceted phenomenon and three
main types of it can be distinguished, therefore, institutional, media and
behavioural personalisation, for the purposes of these considerations – the
aspect of media personalisation is important. Media personalisation may
be interpreted from the point of view of a political leader as well as it can
be considered through the prism of the recipients of political messages –
personalised or otherwise fragmented electorate (current and potential). To
reach the electorate effectively the political message must be directed to the
communication platforms on which – speaking colloquially – the electorate
spends time.
For example, knowledge about which search engines, recommendation
sites or social media sites are used to look for a given content is now becom-
ing essential (Van Tassel & Poe-Howfield, 2014). It is therefore necessary
for leaders to define how and where they should promote their content.
Changing habits of using the media by citizens force the leaders to adjust
their philosophy of promotion of their own demands and political pro-
grams. The system of recommendations (which will be discussed in greater
detail later) plays a significant role in this process. Social media are a space
that serves as a driving force in the recommendations process as well as
in promoting and generating attention. Considering the last of the factors
mentioned, i.e. generating attention, it is necessary here to bring closer the
concept of “attentionalism”. It was introduced by Alexander Bard and Jan
Söderqvist (2002) in Netocracy: The new power elite and life after capitalism.
104 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
Attentionalism is an important feature of late capitalism. Whilst in the case
of feudalism the possession of land was crucial, in early capitalism it was
the capital that played such a great role, in the era of late modernity, draw-
ing “attention” is crucial. This “attention” is synonymous with quantity of
connections, the weight of their strength, the extent of the relationship and
the possibilities of their stabilisation. The number of connections trans-
lates however into the ability to manage the network, which directly affects
the ability to impact on the whole of society. (Nowak, 2013, p. 147). “(…)
the most sought after, and therefore, the most valuable information on the
network will be the one that concerns itself: how to create a network and
manage it in the most sensible way” (Bard & Söderqvist, 2002). This obser-
vation currently becomes crucial from the perspective of political commu-
nication. Struggle on the attention market – including political one – leads
to the fact that only informational winners count. But who are they? As
Nowak indicated, attentionism becomes better understood when we look
at the ontology of a network. It is dominated by “undemocratic” processes
of self-organisation. Important, key nodes in the network are growing, the
number of connections to them increases immeasurably, other, smaller ones
quickly disappear from the “attention” field. Key nodes are the informa-
tional winners. They create new hierarchies called by Bard and Soderquist
“the attentionalist pyramids of power”. While it is indicated that on a macro
scale, the winner in the age of attentiveness is network netocracy, and there-
fore the winners are those who manage the network connections, in person-
alistic terms these are individuals – including political leaders – having the
ability to attract attention and mass distribution of specific content in per-
sonalised communication environment. Therefore, some attention (nomen
omen) should be devoted to the issue of “attention”.
In the digital age, attention has become the subject of economic analysis.
On this plane it is treated not so much as a state of mind at a given moment,
but as a resource at the disposal of people making decisions about how to
spend their free time (Piekarski, 2014, p. 9). In highly developed societies in
which – using the traditional language marketing paradigm – many needs
are met, seeking attention is a model, referring to the relationship between
communication and influence on a society (Kreft, 2009, p. 151). As empha-
sised by Marek Krajewski (2007b), the problem of attention concerns both
the subjects transmitting their attention as well as those who seek it. Both
in the world of overwhelming abundance of information, they must care
about why and to what extent they are to sacrifice this valuable resource.
The problem, however, is that individuals who give their attention, select
whom to devote it to, while those accumulating the attention of others care
first of all about how to earn it and maintain it. Therefore, both sides have
different needs. In addition, attracting the attention requires deflecting it
from something else, obtaining it at the expense of other objects. Therefore,
attention is a zero-sum game, its attraction is always at the expense of some-
thing (Mika, 2016, p. 113).
 Research for neoleadership 105
It should be noted that the potential of “attention” in creating a new kind
of economy arises or depends on several factors.
First, attention is a resource that, like other goods, can be an object of
exchanges (Crawford, 2015, p. 11). In other words, attention can be bought.
However, you can pay for someone to listen to you, but you cannot actually
do anything to interest someone in your message if the person is not genu-
inely interested in it (Krajewski, 2007a). Alike reflection, consideration and
interest are therefore “goods” that cannot be purchased.
Second, the value of attention is based primarily on its exclusivity, which
is the result of a relatively constant level of attention that we can devote to
our environment as human beings. Attention is therefore an internally lim-
ited resource, and its deficiency is real and restrictive (Mika, 2016, p. 114).
Recipients, including the recipients of political messages, having a limited
amount of time during the day that they can spend on network presence/
being online, take constant decisions regarding the content they devote their
attention to. As in the case of other traditional markets, use of the resource
(attentions) on a given website or application, makes it impossible to use it
with competitors (Kanton, Łukawski, & Murek, 2018).
Third, the importance of attention arises out of the potential of power
that lies within it. A person endowed with attention can influence the activ-
ities of the collective by directing the collective’s attention (Goldhaber,
1997). However, Georg Franck (2002, p. 13) related the power of attention
perceived in the aspect of the ability of scientific theories to attract the
attention of researchers, paraphrasing the insights of the author one can
indicate that the ability of a leader – also a political one – to attract atten-
tion increases if the demands or opinions are expressed by a recognised
(recognisable) politician, in the right environment and to the right audience,
or if the politician’s statement remains verified by influential (recognised/
respected) reviewers. However, the best way of promoting these demands or
opinions is to transform the key information into slogans.
Fourth, attention has great rewarding potential, which means people
blessed with it simply feel good (Franck, 2018).
Fifth, attention may be transmitted. It can circulate in social systems,
passing among individuals and groups enjoying high attention as well as
esteem resulting from it, and therefore an individual enjoying fame (and
therefore rich in attention) can pass it on. (Mika, 2016, pp. 114–115). Such
transmission can take place, e.g. between a recognised party leader and an
unknown candidate representing a specific party.
Sixth, attention is perceptive. The attention we make to a particular mes-
sage depends on additional factors, such as the duration of attention or the
required level of concentration. An important factor affecting attention is,
moreover, respect, and more precisely – respect for the person whom we
receive this attention from. The person (attention) we admire is the most
valuable. Her/his/its value derives from the fact that it comes from those we
treasure. In the event that attention comes from a person we are indifferent
106 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
to – its meaning is minor. In a situation where the attention comes from
people we despise or whom we are afraid of – the attention may even be of
negative value (Franck, 2002).
Seventh, attention is asymmetrical. Assuming that individuals “pay” for
the desired information (in the broad sense) with attention, it can be seen
that not everyone has the same amount of it. Now, a media person who is
recognisable and enjoys a lot of attention has more to give than just her/his
own – resulting from psychophysical features – attention. It has some accu-
mulated “asset” in this respect, which makes her/his attention more valu-
able than others. In other words, the power of influence of our individual
attention is not just dependent on perceptive abilities, it is socially rooted,
related to how much attention we can collect and whose attention we can
attract. Popularity is, as it were, accumulated “asset” of attention, which
we can dispose of more efficiently than, for example, an average media con-
sumer (Mika, 2016, p. 117).
The potential of “attention” in creating a new kind of economy arises or
depends on several factors:

• Attention is a resource that, like other goods, can be an object of exchanges

(Crawford, 2015, p. 11). In other words, attention can be bought.
• The value of attention is based primarily on its exclusivity, which is the
result of a relatively constant level of attention that we can devote to our
environment as human beings.
• The importance of attention arises out of the potential of power that lies
within it. A person endowed with attention can influence the activities
of the collective by directing the collective’s attention (Goldhaber, 1997).
• Attention has great rewarding potential, which means people blessed
with it simply feel good (Franck, 2018).
• Attention may be transmitted.
• Attention is perceptive. The attention we make to a particular message
depends on additional factors, such as the duration of attention or the
required level of concentration.
• Attention is asymmetrical.

Conceptualisation of approach
J. G. Blumer and D. Kavanagh (1999) in pointed out the stages of transfor-
mation of political communication. As far as the authors have carried out a
broad and comprehensive multi-faceted and multi-dimensional analysis of
the change of the paradigm of political communication over the years, for
the purposes of these considerations’ factors related to the form and direc-
tion of this kind of communication were recalled as well.
The first stage is the period covering two decades after World War II was
called “the golden age” of the party (Janda & Colman, 1998, p. 612). During
this period, the political system was considered to be the main source of
 Research for neoleadership 107
initiatives, reforms and public debate, and political institutions enjoyed a
great deal of trust (Hallin, 1992, p. 17). Political communication was sub-
ordinate to relatively strong and stable political institutions and was based
on ideology. The political message concerned – as a rule – matters impor-
tant to the functioning of the society, amendments and reforms proposed by
political parties and the information was widely reported by means of mass
media of this period (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, pp. 210–211).
In the authors’ opinion, the second stage falling in the 1960s is connected
with the growing importance of television, which has become the dominant
means of political communication over time. This process was accompa-
nied by a weakening sense of loyalty of political parties towards the vot-
ers. The requirements of a new medium the television turned out to be, a
larger audience and – as a result – increased mobility of the electorate forced
political parties to adapt to new realia in the area of political communica-
tion. The ability to adapt to the specific nature of television information,
knowledge of the principles of creating a media agenda or implementation
of media communication strategies became the basic tools in the area of
political communication, which later emerged as a model of modern polit-
ical campaign. During this period, public opinion polls and communica-
tion based on the principle of “speaking their minds” directly to the public
began to gain in importance as well as the growing role of experts. (Blumler
& Kavanagh, 1999, pp. 210–213).
In the first and second phase indicated above, a significant part of polit-
ical communication was a top-down, and the most important issues were
primarily defined and discussed by politicians, journalists, experts and
leaders of interest group. Members of the public could reward or punish
authoritative messengers only by continuing to listen to them or “silencing”
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, p. 220). A substantial part of the political com-
munication had internal character, the selection of topics discussed was –
by nature – poor and the media audience was pretty much universal.
The third stage of the transformation of political communication J. G.
Blumler, D. Kavanagh located in last decade of the 20th century, in which
the development of cable and satellite television takes place, as well as the
process of media digitisation. As a result, media market fragmentation
occurs along with fragmentation of the communication system that creates
new conditions for political communication. The number of mass audience
(electorate) has decreased, and the development of the number of channels
and media as such allowed to reach the recipients (electorate) who have
diverse identities, needs and expectations. It also became possible to include
previously excluded voices and opinions in the debate. Communication
diverts its direction then and centrifugal diversification occurs in the third
phase. The structure of media recipients (electorate) changes. In addition,
the phenomenon of populism and its development begins to increase, which
is combined with various phenomena. On one hand, it is pointed out that
“the trends of populism” are derived from the expansion of the media, which
108 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
“has created new opportunities and pitfalls for society to enter the political
world” has created new opportunities and pitfalls for the public to enter the
political world (Delli Carpini & Williams, 1998, p. 23). On the other hand, it
indicates that the development of populism is due to the widespread fall of
ideology, which has left a kind of a gap in public debate and which gap pop-
ulism has helped to fill in. In addition, the populist narrative is connected
with the development of political marketing as an addition to the campaign
strategy, as well as the weakening position of political parties and the fall of
egalitarianism (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999).
As a result of the above factors, the way the message from political parties
is formulated to the electorate changes. There has been a change in the form
of the message, more precisely of the code of communication from elite
to colloquial, which is understandable to every recipient (independently
e.g. from her/his education), in all conditions and using any medium. The
content of the message has also changed. In political communication, the
ability to attract the attention of the audience (electorate) becomes more sig-
nificant. Politicians are forced to speak on the subjects ordinary people find
interesting, engaging or relevant, as well as to gain social support for their
actions. On the other hand, media organisations strive to search for ways to
make politics more attractive and acceptable to their audience.
Continuing to define the stages of transformation of political communi-
cation proposed by J. G. Blumler and D. Kavanagh one can now point to the
next, fourth phase of evolution of this kind of communication. It should be
mentioned here that at the end of the 1980s Katz (1987) anticipated radical
segmentation of the political audience resulting from the fragmentation of
media manifested in multichannel abundance, increased competition and
breakup of public (centralised) broadcasting. By contrast, Page and Shapiro
(1992) associated “media abundance” with “political abundance” perceived
as the capacity of media recipients(electorate) to make political decisions
not only based on public debate in mainstream media, but also based on the
feedback of public opinion leaders and a wide range of problems presented
in media of various levels/scope and coverage. The era of digital media has
radically changed the flow of information in society. It was determined by
interactivity, virtual communities that, as a result, allowed the members of
the society to increase their participation in public life, including political
discourse. The Internet, or more precisely, social networking sites, blogs,
Twitter and the development of mobile communication devices not only
increased the number and the variety of information available to the recip-
ients (electorate), but also enabled them to participate in the debate and to
express their opinions. Media users have received, among others the ability
to respond to information received, but they are also able to change, edit
and forward existing content as well as create and publish the original con-
tent. However, change this is associated with a sort of costs. Digital media
increase social and political participation of citizens, potentiate the pluralism
reaching the recipients both in terms of forms and content of information.
 Research for neoleadership 109
However, with the greater selection of the sources of information, the recip-
ients are not able to get interested in all of them. Therefore, they choose
sources that are familiar or – in their opinion – significant. Therefore, the
recipients create their catalogues of information sources based on their own
preferences (Prior, 2007). Furthermore, as Manuel Castells notes, the new
communication technology – the Internet – has enabled the formation of a
new type of social relationship pattern, called by the author “third degree
relationships” or, as Barry Wellman points out “personalized community”
(Wellman & Leighton, 1979; Wellman, 1999). In the opinion of M. Castells,
network individualism is a social pattern and not a set of alienated units and
the relationships are embedded in networks concentrated around an indi-
vidual. In this approach, individuals build networks for themselves, both
on the Internet and outside of it, guided by a personalised shared interest,
values, ventures and the sense of similarity (Castells, 2003). So how can one
consider the specificity of political communication in the digital era – which
can be considered a continuation of the phases indicated by J. G. Blumler
and D. Kavanagh? The answer should be started by recalling the theory of
media impact. Maxwell Mc Combs and Donald Show in the agenda setting
theory drew attention to the fact that the media influence the recipient’s
thinking process and are responsible for creating information hierarchy
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972), and therefore agenda setting determines the per-
ception and interpretation of the information presented. Recipients distin-
guish between more important issues and those of less importance basing
their assessment solely on the way the media deal with them. According
to the agenda setting hypothesis, media influence their recipients (elector-
ate) by emphasising some topics against others. Focusing media attention
on certain issues increases their availability and thus affects the degree
of public interest in these issues (Sheafer, 2007, p. 22). In turn, the sec-
ond theory – framing – is based on the assumption that the way an issue
is presented in media reports, can affect how it is understood by recipients
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). Therefore, frame is a central organi-
sational idea or a plot that provides the meaning (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989). As Ervin Goffman points out, the term framing refers to “schemes
of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify or
label” events or information (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). One can therefore indi-
cate that the agenda setting can be defined as public awareness of a set of
issues, and also as the increase or expiration of a particular problem over
time. Framing, on the other hand, includes cognitive schemas that individu-
als use to understand individual issues. The basic difference – at the psycho-
logical level – between agenda setting on the one hand and framing, on the
other hand, is the difference between whether we think about the problem,
and how we think about it (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 21). Both of
these theories in a significant way determined political communication in
the third phase highlighted by J. G. Blumler and D. Kavanagh. By contrast,
the era of digital media has diverted attention-focused vectors. It can be
110 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
stated, that in the analogue era, producers, editors and journalists decided,
what stories will be covered, regardless of what audience considered signif-
icant or interesting. In turn, in digital era a scenario, in which this relation
will be reversed is possible. Because if a discussion about a subject attract-
ing great interest of the audience would start in the social sphere, media (as
well as politicians) will probably jump on the story (Shiraev & Sobel, 2016,
p. 2).
So it seems adequate – to these new directions of information flow in
the digital era – to apply the approach referred to as reverse agenda-setting,
which concerns whether and to what degree, the public agenda influences
the media agenda (Weiman & Brosius, 2016, p. 28). The phenomenon of
reverse agenda-setting is fostered by a new, personalised media environment.
On the one hand, it became possible to publish and obtain user (elector-
ate) opinions about professional journalistic content, as well as monitor-
ing these opinions. On the other hand, however the media, by monitoring
internet portals, social networking sites and other areas of users’ activity
are able to get new ideas for news and other publications (what was unreal/
impossible in the first three phases) (Ragas, Tran, & Martin, 2014, p. 52) In
this way the hierarchy of topics popular among the society and presented
in the media social media affects the subject of interest and the hierarchy of
issues raised in media. The conceptualisation of the above observations is
presented in the chart.
The starting point in the diagram is an informational event, which for
some reason – no matter if it the judgment of journalists about the impor-
tance of the information itself or whether it is publishing policy, did not
initially get the attention of the media and – thus – did not achieve suffi-
cient coverage. However, the Internet users show great interest in this event
and they discuss it online intensively. Online discussion raises the meaning
and the value of the original information and turns it into a problem. As
a result, the media begin to be interested in the specific problem that they
previously overlooked for various reasons. So, the subject, though initially
disregarded by the media, becomes relevant and interesting for mainstream
media because of it attracts interest in the virtual space. Eventually, a value-
added process takes place. The term used by William Gamson and Andre
Modigliani emphasises the impact of online public opinion on the selection
of subjects covered by mainstream media – frame building (Zhou & Moy,
2007, p. 87). The process of shaping public opinion online is also important
in this case. The communication space on the Internet, and above all, social
media allow users connect, communicate and interact with one another,
often by publishing, sharing or contributing to information. These two
functions – social interaction and exchange of information – underpin the
formation of public opinion on the web.

The communication space on the Internet, and above all, social media
allow users connect, communicate and interact with one another, often
 Research for neoleadership 111
by publishing, sharing or contributing to information. These two func-
tions – social interaction and exchange of information – underpin the
formation of public opinion on the web.

This process consists mainly of two modes. The first mode of accumulation
is that opinion formation happens quickly and spontaneously – somewhat
“without a warning”, and its participants are not able to spot the direction
and the process of its development. The second type is a smooth progressive
mode, consisting of the emergence of an issue that raises social controversy
and gathers a variety of, many times conflicting, emotions and attitudes that
lead to the formation of opinions of the network users. Then, through the
network of interactions and clues from opinion-forming leaders, the process
of creating public opinion on the web begins.
Therefore, it seems justified to refer to the concept of The Tipping Point
by Malcolm Gladwell. This concept is an attempt to explain how conta-
gious behaviour – such as, for example, fashion trends, the appearance of a
bestseller or slogan or a political concept – arise and grow organically, like
viruses, without central control or overarching plan. The concept of The
Tipping Point by Malcolm Gladwell

is an attempt to explain how contagious behaviour – such as, for exam-

ple, fashion trends, the appearance of a bestseller or slogan or a polit-
ical concept – arise and grow organically, like viruses, without central
control or overarching plan.

M. Gladwell says there are three factors responsible for the public interest in
a given idea. The first factor is “The Law of the Few”. The author points to
three types of people who can spread an idea like an “epidemic”. They are
connectors, mavens and salesmen. The first group indicated by the author
is the “Connector”. As the author points out, there are people who seem
to know everyone. In addition, there is high probability that the informa-
tion on the network will go to the connector, and if it catches attention of
the connector, the connector will pass it to a huge number of people in a
short time, thereby creating a tipping point. The second group indicated
by the author is “Mavens”, or information experts. These are people who
know absolutely everything about the topic and are happy to share what
they know. The Mavens are important tipping points because they are at
the forefront of the process of gathering new information. In the network
of individuals, they are likely to be the first to learn about the news. If they
keep in touch with the connector, information about it he news can spread
very fast. The third group is “Salesmen”. These are typical people who
have the gift of persuading others to make specific decisions and undertake
actions that would never come to their minds if it wasn’t for the salesmen.
According to the “Law of the Few”, triggering an orally transmitted epi-
demic of information requires focusing on these three groups. The second
112 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
factor that is responsible for creating public interest in a given idea accord-
ing to the concept of Malcom Gladwell is “The stickiness factor”. An idea
must be presented in a way that makes remembered as well as motivating.
Otherwise, the Law of the Few will not lead to a constant epidemic. The
third factor, “ the Power of Context”, decides whether those who spread the
idea will be able to create groups and communities around them (Gladwell,
2000). In the light of the analysis of political communication in the era of
digital media it should be concluded that political leaders’ good command
of mechanisms and concepts mentioned above become a necessary condi-
tion for their presence in the social discourse.
The process of spreading recommendations on the Internet works to a
large extent based on the above concept. However, these activities can take
various forms. First and foremost, it should be noted that Recommender
Systems (RS) area particular type of information filtering systems. They are
designed to filter relevant information for both the consumer (the electorate)
and the sender (the political leader) depending on the context of their activ-
ities and goals.

Recommender Systems (RS) area particular type of information fil-

tering systems. They are designed to filter relevant information for
both the consumer (the electorate) and the sender (the political leader)
depending on the context of their activities and goals

Social interaction within the network communities and the vastness of those
co-created within these information communities are great for filtering
and recommending, i.e. sharing specific opinions, recommendations, ideas,
experiences of other people and companies. An activated consumer (the
voter), the recipient of recommendations, often becomes at the same time
the producer of “good” and becomes a prosumer. From a prosumer’s per-
spective the recommendation system should be treated as a tool that makes
it easier for a sender (the political leader) to choose potential prosumers,
and to help the consumers (voters) select interesting content in development
of which the consumers may or may not want to participate more or less
deliberately and mainly due to the expected own benefits (Flis, 2014, p. 95).
One of the classic forms of recommendation marketing is shilling, or
shill marketing. In this case, the carriers of information should be pri-
marily the ambassadors of brands (Dwornik, 2010) – in such case, polit-
ical information – who identify themselves with specific ideas and views
and want to share them with others. Effective marketing of recommenda-
tions also includes prosumer activities, crowdsourcing and crowd-funding.
Prosumerism is the concept of the client’s (in this case voter’s) participa-
tion in creating an offer (political program) and then promoting it actively,
mainly through modern forms of communication (Niedzielska & Herbuś,
2010). In turn, crowdsourcing allows one to integrate and associate large
groups of people to share opinions, introduce ideas, raise funds or create an
 Research for neoleadership 113
event (Krawiec, 2013). Crowd-funding, i.e. the mechanism of crowd-funding
ventures, on the other hand, makes for capital raising, to finance creative
ideas coming from a virtual community that expects a certain returnable
benefit, usually profits from the implemented project (including political
one), or products resulting from it. (Bzdyra-Maciorowska, 2012, p. 66).
Effective marketing of recommendations:

• Prosumerism is the concept of the client’s (in this case voter’s) partic-
ipation in creating an offer (political program) and then promoting it
actively, mainly through modern forms of communication.
• Crowdsourcing allows one to integrate and associate large groups of
people to share opinions, introduce ideas, raise funds or create an event.
• Crowd-funding – the mechanism of crowd-funding ventures, on the
other hand, makes for capital raising, to finance creative ideas com-
ing from a virtual community that expects a certain returnable benefit,
usually profits from the implemented project (including political one),
or products resulting from it.

The ability of the public to comment on the content, redistribution via the
network of social media, and the delivery of messages and information is
changing the way various entities, including the media and politicians func-
tion these days. However, it should be noted that the comments, opinions
and redistribution of the content indicated above constitute the essence of
the recommendation. It is particularly important when it concerns the con-
tent that is not available in the mass media. Redistributing such content
helps create the necessary action/motion such as promotion of the content,
ideas or views (Picard, 2011, p. 23).
Insofar as the issues outlined above relate to the competences of political
leaders and factors determining the effectiveness of their messages, so much
attention should also be devoted to the electorate itself and its structure in
the environment of digital communication. What is this personalised digital
age electorate like?

• Social fragmentation and the disappearance of group loyalty triggered

an era of personalised politics in which individual expression displaces
the framework of collective action in the area of political activities. As a
result, individualism results in instability and changeability of political
attitudes.
• An individualised form of political participation, and more precisely the
attitude and actions of the electorate result from the expectations they
formulate towards political leaders as well as in the ratio of expected
particular (individual) benefits.

The question then arises: what is this personalised digital age electorate
like? First of all, one should refer to its structure. As Lance Bennett (2012)
114 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
points out, social fragmentation and the disappearance of group loyalty
triggered an era of personalised politics in which individual expression dis-
places the framework of collective action in the area of political activities.
The increase in personalised forms of political participation is perhaps a
decisive change in the political culture of our times. As a result, individu-
alism results in instability and changeability of political attitudes. It man-
ifests itself even in the views expressed in the context of “public opinion”.
Contemporary public opinion is driven by unstable, unexpected fluctua-
tions in emotions and attitudes that emerge under time pressure. In addi-
tion to professional and public communication channels, parallel Internet
communication platforms developed, enabling recipients to exchange their
thoughts and opinions freely. Zygmunt Bauman highlighted the instability
of views and attitudes that are features of the modern-day society. In the
author’s opinion, traditional social bonds are being broken up these days,
which is resulting in a growing sense of isolation and uprooting.
Traditional communities in which emotional ties dominated and where
people were interdependent are replaced by market-driven and commercial
communities in which people are temporarily bounded by shared interest,
as well as cloakroom and carnival communities in which people are united
by events, situations. Creating explosive “cloakroom” or “carnival” commu-
nities, according to the author, is a characteristic of contemporary interper-
sonal relationships. “Cloakroom communities” need a spectacle that will
raise similar interest in different people and bring them together. By creat-
ing an opportunity for such communities to arise such spectacles, however,
do not merge individual needs in the “group interest”. Taken together, they
neither create nor take on new quality, and the illusion of co-participation
caused by such spectacles lasts just a little longer than the stir they cre-
ated. “Carnival communities” are similar in their nature. They offer people
a momentary respite from lonely everyday hardships. As the author points
out, “the explosive life of the community is an event that breaks the monot-
ony of day-to-day loneliness. Like other carnival events, it triggers passion
suppressed day after day and allows one to cope with daily routine that
awaits them anyway when the spectacle moves to its end.
On the other hand, the “common goals” offered online, which virtual
communities are able to focus on, create “new banners” under which you
can gather to march (in the virtual space) “side my side” (Bauman, 2000).
The issue of the instability of virtual communities was also described by
Bailey (Bailey, 1999, p. 31) proposing the term “Identity multiplexing” to
describe

“layering and ranking by individuals of their different identities in dif-

ferent arenas”. As indicated by Deleon and Naff (Deleon & Naff, 2004),
identities are self-defining psychocultural constructs, which give mean-
ing and purpose to the life of the individual. They are constructed in
the process of internal dialogue and social interaction. In addition,
 Research for neoleadership 115
people – by their very nature – have complex and multiple identities
that are selectively expressed on different arenas (including virtual)
and at different times. However, as the authors point out, the identities
are smoother than the social roles or interests performed by people.
However, identities and roles may coincide. Identities provide meaning
and roles organise the functions of an individuals in a society. (Castells,
1997, 7)

Another important factor characterising the modern electorate is the fact

that an individualised form of political participation, and more precisely
the attitude and actions of the electorate result from the expectations they
formulate towards political leaders as well as in the ratio of expected par-
ticular (individual) benefits. When considering the category of expecta-
tions, a reservation made by Robert C. Angell about the ambiguity of this
concept should be included (Angell, 1958, p. 34). As the author points out,
using this term, anticipation of an event (anticipating that something will
happen) is mixed up with moral duty (expecting that some state of affairs
should take place because someone desires it no end). We can talk about
probabilistic expectations regarding probability of such occurrences in the
future and normative, including what should happen in the opinion of indi-
viduals (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 2013, pp. 581–582). In defining the concept
of expectation, it is also important, aside from focusing attention on the
anticipated expectations and the ambiguity of the concept, to pay attention
to the object of expectation (what it refers to): “Expectations can be under-
stood as more or less justified beliefs about the future, concerning external
states of reality (material expectations), us themselves (auto-expectations)
or other people (interpersonal expectations)” (Trusz, 2013).
From the point of view of political leaders, it is also important that expec-
tations are expressed towards entities in relation to whom they are articu-
lated should be considered in the category of challenges, not problems. In
addition, these kinds of challenges come from expectations that are either
social or individual and should be distinguished from the challenges arising
from conditions such as: social, economic or political system, defined today
and outlining the framework, in which they have to operate (Giełda, 2015,
p. 37).In the context of expectations formulated towards political leaders,
attention should be paid to several key issues.
First, not all social expectations are manifested. There exist certain
expectations accepted in the form of axioms and thus not reflected in social
demands.
Second, each of the actual and potential stakeholder groups (e.g. mem-
bers of the party, electorate, media, political opponents, etc.) has different
needs and expectations towards political leaders and evaluates them from
multiple perspectives. Different requirements also concern the amount and
type of information communicated to them by leaders through various
channels of communication (Szwajca & Gorczyńska, 2013). This diversity
116 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
of expectations of external groups inevitably leads to a conflict situation.
Each party is convinced of its case and considers its expectations the most
important. Lack of satisfying postulates causes disappointment and a cer-
tain level of dissatisfaction, failure to meet the expectations of individual
groups. Stakeholders lead to negative assessments and opinions. Therefore,
defining of these conflict communication planes and finding a balance that
enables satisfying the expectations of all stakeholders becomes one of major
challenges.
Third, the category of expectation is associated with the concept of trust
indicating that the chance of getting disappointed increases as the partners
interact more and more along with stronger requirements: from performance
expectations (regularity, consistency, predictability, rationality, responsi-
bility, competence, efficiency, effectiveness), through axiological (justice,
truthfulness, morality), to protective(selflessness, altruism) (Sztompka,
2005, p. 311). The holistic approach indicates, on the other hand, that trust,
its structure and showing is a derivative of the whole relationship, context
and the person providing the information, not just the way the information
is provided. What is important in this case is the reputation, knowledge
and experience that one party has in contacts with the other, and hence the
factors that build credibility. The assessment of the credibility of people or
objects depends, among others, on some immanent criteria (directly related
to objects or people), which we take into account when assessing credibil-
ity (Czajkowska, 2010). Reputation, achievements and physiognomy can be
included. Reputation is understood as the history of earlier actions/deeds
of a person or an institution. The more extensive the knowledge on this
subject, the wider the time horizon, the more confident the reputation of the
trustee. Current achievements are the second immanent criterion. It turns
out to be more unreliable than the previous ones. Third, most the unreli-
able criterion includes physiognomy and status symbols and other exter-
nal props used by persons or institutions (e.g. symbols that are part of the
organisational culture). Such grounds for trust are so weak that it is hard to
find any predicting future behaviour. (Sztompka, 2007, p. 134).
Summarising the above solutions, it should be indicated that the public
opinion online gains, via the reverse agenda setting, in importance from the
point of view of the public discourse and its specific nature should be taken
into account. Yet, it seems that the potential for media users to express
themselves is has some serious limitations.
First of all, various mechanisms for measuring and detecting trends in
communication activities of the general public usually do not have enough
context to determine the direction of opinion formation. In other words, the
frequency of the topics the Internet users discuss do not necessarily signal
what positions and opinions will ultimately be presented in these matters.
The inability to interpret the intentions of people chatting online limits
the possibility of understanding the direction in which online opinions are
shaped.
 Research for neoleadership 117
Second, the alarming limitation of the society’s ability to independent
expression of thoughts and opinions is a kind of manipulation. Rules and
algorithms connected with functioning of search engines become an obsta-
cle here, which constitutes a potential mechanism of manipulation of infor-
mation to which the internet users, and therefore the voters, are exposed
(more broadly on this subject in Chapter 3 by Tomasz Gajewski).
Third, online discussion is a compressed form of opinion formation that
is a result the accelerated nature of network communication. Acceleration of
communication is not simply a function of the speed at which the messages
are sent and edited but is the result of a wider social phenomenon in which
the length and stability of social relations are limited through constant and
quick changes. As Bruce Bimber (1998) points out, the speed at which dis-
cussed topics are formulated and articulated as part of public communica-
tion is a form of accelerated pluralism, in which problems develop and move
more rapidly because of swifter cycle of mobilisation and reaction of social
groups which are not connected in any form of stable bonds, they are not
connected by membership or links with specific institutions. Such a form
of forming opinions enables free communication of the society. However,
what Timothy Kersey (2011, p. 256) emphasises, this form of public debate
gives privileges to reactive public opinions, i.e. reflex reactions to problems
in relation to opinions that develop more slowly and are based on reflection
or pondering. Public opinion online gains, via the reverse agenda setting, in
importance from the point of view of the public discourse and its specific
nature should be taken into account.

Conclusions
Answering the question: “what is the paradigm of contemporary political
communication?” one must say that this is attention and a key competence
the modern political leader (neo-commander) is the ability to generate the
attention. What is significant, however, there are the following reservations
in this case.
First of all, individuals who pass/forward their attention decide on whom
to devote it to while those that accumulate the attention of others primarily
care about how to get it and maintain it. Therefore, both sides have different
needs. The ability to identify and satisfy these needs are contemporary chal-
lenges for political leaders in the aspect of political communication.
Second, as long as the attention of the electorate can be bought, that
is, you can pay for someone to listen to you, but you cannot actually do
anything to make someone interested in our message, unless the person
is genuinely interested in it. The leader’s knowledge of the current needs
and expectations of the electorate is of key importance here as well as the
awareness to whom the message is directed. It is important to note that the
multiplicity of these expectations leads to conflict situations, and the ina-
bility to satisfy the demands or postulates results in disappointment and a
118 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
certain level of dissatisfaction that leads to expressing negative assessments
and opinions. So, defining these conflictogenic communication planes and
finding a balance that allows to satisfy the expectations of all stakeholders
becomes one of major challenges in the age of neoleadership.
Third, the message must have the ability to spread quickly and geomet-
rically. The ability to create a network (the right amount of connections,
considerable balance of their strength, and vastness of relationships and the
possibilities of their stabilisation) and the ability to manage it to generate
attention is currently a key challenge from the perspective of political com-
munication. Knowledge of where (and therefore on which search engines,
sites or communities) one can find and attract current or potential voters
gains in importance.
Fourth, the ability to build and make good use of the recommendation
system is important from this point of view. Changing social habits of using
the media force the leaders to change the philosophy of promoting their
own postulates and political programs The recommendation system plays a
significant role in this process, which in the era of excess information allows
to direct the message to a precisely defined target group, doing it at the right
time and place. An effective recommendation system becomes nowadays a
key factor determining the success of creation and maintenance of political
leadership. In addition, the ability to attract attention increases if demands
or opinions remain expressed by a recognised (recognisable) politician in
the right environment and to the right audience or if the statement is verified
by influential (recognised) reviewers. Recognition is now associated with
the category of respect.
An important factor that influences attention is respect for the person
whom we get attention from. The person (attention) we admire is the most
valuable. Her/his(its) value is due to the fact that it comes from those we
treasure. In the case where the attention comes from a person, we are indif-
ferent to – its importance is small. In a situation when attention comes from
people we despise or are afraid of – attention can even take negative value.
Therefore, the category of respect, apart from the existing ones: trust and
recognition, is becoming a new determinant of political competition. “What
is the paradigm of contemporary political communication?”

• Individuals who pass/forward their attention decide on whom to devote

it to while those that accumulate the attention of others primarily care
about how to get it and maintain it. Therefore, both sides have different
needs.
• The attention of the electorate can be bought, that is, you can pay for
someone to listen to you, but you cannot actually do anything to make
someone interested in our message, unless the person is genuinely inter-
ested in it. The leader’s knowledge of the current needs and expecta-
tions of the electorate is of key importance here as well as the awareness
to whom the message is directed.
 Research for neoleadership 119
• The message must have the ability to spread quickly and geometrically.
The ability to create a network (the right amount of connections, con-
siderable balance of their strength, and vastness of relationships and
the possibilities of their stabilisation) and the ability to manage it to
generate attention is currently a key challenge from the perspective of
political communication.
• the ability to build and make good use of the recommendation system
is important from this point of view. Changing social habits of using
the media force the leaders to change the philosophy of promoting their
own postulates and political programs. The recommendation system
plays a significant role in this process.
• The ability to attract attention increases if demands or opinions remain
expressed by a recognised (recognisable) politician. Recognition is now
associated with the category of respect.

References
Alver, F., & Ceglar, S. (2015). The impact of symbolic interactionism on research
studies about communication science. International Journal of Arts & Sciences,
8(7), 479–484.
Angell, R. C. (1958). Free society and moral crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Bailey, R. (1999). Gay politics, Urban politics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Bard, A., & Söderqvist, J. (2002). Netocracy: The new power elite and life after capi-
talism. New York, NY: Pearson Education.
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization. Politics, tradition
and aesthetics in the modern social order. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Bennett, L. (2012). The personalization of politics political identity, social
media, and changing patterns of participation. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 644(1), 20–39. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1177/0002716212451428.
Bimber, B. (1998). The Internet and political transformation: Populism, commu-
nity, and accelerated pluralism. Polity, 31(1), 133–160.
Blumer, H. (1986). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Los Angeles,
CA: University of California Press.
Blumer, H. (2007). Interakcjonizm symboliczny. Perspektywa i metoda. Kraków:
Nomos.
Blumler, J. G., & Kavanagh, D. (1999). The third age of political communication:
Influences and features. Political Communication, 16(3), 209–230. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1080/105846099198596.
Bzdyra-Maciorowska, A. (2012). 12 trendów 2012 roku. Marketing w Praktyce, 2, 60–69.
Caplan, R. D. (1987, December). Person-environment fit theory and organizations:
Commensurate dimensions, time perspectives, and mechanisms. Journal of
Vocational Behavior, 31(3), 248–267. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-8791(87)90042-X.
Castells, M. (1997). The power of identity. New York, NY: Blackwell Publishers.
120 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
Castells, M. (2003). The Internet galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, business, and
society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cloonan, M., & Street, J. (1997). Politics and popular music: From policing to pack-
aging. Parliamentary Affairs, 50(2), 223–234. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxford-
journals.pa.a028722.
Crawford, M. B. (2015). The world beyond your head, on becoming an individual in an
age of distraction. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Czajkowska, M. (2010). Zaufanie w organizacji – filozoficzny zarys podstaw zagad-
nienia. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis Folia Oeconomica, 234, 409–420.
Deleon, R., & Naff, K. C. (2004). Identity politics and local political culture: The
politics of gender, race, class, and religion in comparative perspective. Urban
Affairs Review, 39(6), 689–719. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1078087404264215.
Retrieved March 4, 2020, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
228956536_Identity_politics_and_local_political_culture_The_politics_of_gen-
der_race_class_and_religion_in_comparative_perspective
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Williams, B. A. (1998). The politics of “popular” media”,
paper presented at the workshop on mediated politics. Philadelphia, PA: Annenberg
School for Communication – University of Pennsylvania.
Dwornik, B. (2010, August). Szeptanie jest w cenie, Report: Marketing szeptany.
Retrieved from Interaktywnie.com: interaktywnie.com/index/index/?file=
raport_marketing_szeptany.pdf
Elgie, R. (2015). Leadership — the interactionist paradigm. In R. Elgie (Ed.),
Studying political leadership. London: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-1-137-34708-4_1.
Flis, J. (2014). Złudzenia wyboru społeczne wyobrażenia i instytucjonalne ramy w wyb-
orach do sejmu i senatu. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Florenthal, B., & Shoham, A. (2010). Four-mode channel interactivity concept and
channel preferences. Journal of Services Marketing, 24(1), 29–41. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1108/08876041011017871.
Franck, G. (2002). The scientific economy of attention: A novel approach to the
collective rationality of science. Scientometrics, 55(1), 3–26. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1023/A:1016059402618.
Franck, G. (2018). The economy of attention. Journal of Sociology, 55(1), 8–19. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1440783318811778.
French, J., Rodgers, W., & Cobb, S. (1974). Adjustment as person-environment fit.
In G. V. Coelho, D. A. Hamburg, & J. E. Adams (Eds.), Coping and adaptation
(pp. 316–333). New York, NY: Basic Books.
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on
nuclear power. A constructivist approach. American Journal of Sociology, 95(1),
1–37.
Giełda, M. (2015). Wyzwania i oczekiwania wobec administracji publicznej – wybrane
zagadnienia. In G. Małgorzata, & R. Raszewska-Skałecka (Eds.), Administracja
publiczna wobec wyzwań i oczekiwań społecznych (pp. 37–50). Wrocław: Wydział
Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
Gladwell, M. (2000). The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference.
Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. New
York, NY: Harper and Row.
 Research for neoleadership 121
Goldhaber, M. H. (1997). The attention economy and the net. First Monday, 2(4).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v2i4.519).
Hallin, D. C. (1992). The passing of the “high modernism” of American journalism.
Journal of Communication, 42(3), 14–25. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.
1992.tb00794.x.
Janda, K., & Colman, T. (1998). Effects of party organization on performance dur-
ing the “golden age” of parties. Political Studies, 46(3), 611–632. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1111%2F1467-9248.00157.
Kanton, K., Łukawski, J., & Murek, S. (2018). Rynek uwagi: pojęcie i wyzwania przy
antymonopolowej ocenie koncentracji. Internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy
i Regulacyjny, 8(7), 15–28. doi: https://doi.org/10.7172/2299-5749.IKAR.8.7.1.
Katz, E. (1987). The new media and social segmentation. Paper presented at the “New
Media and Conceptions of Communication” symposium. Heidelberg.
Kersey, T. (2011). Public communication in the networked public sphere. Indiana, IN:
Indiana University.
Krajewski, M. (2007a). Reklama społeczna w czasach nieuwagi. In P. Wasilewski
(Ed.), Szlachetna ProPaganda Dobroci, czyli drugi tom o Reklamie SPołecznej (pp.
285–286). Kraków: Agencja Wasilewski.
Krajewski, M. (2007b). Ultura dystrakcji – deficyty uwagi i strategie jej kumulacji.
Retrieved from http://krajewskimarek.blox.pl/resource/Ekonomia_uwagi.doc
Krawiec, W. (2013). Crowdsourcing – szybki sposób rozwiązywania niechcianych
produktów i usług. Handel Wewnętrzny, 1, Maj–Czerwiec.
Kreft, J. (2009). Media a ekonomia uwagi. Studia Medioznawcze, 3(38), 142–152.
Krotz, F. (2007). Die mediatisierung kommunikativen handels. Der wandel von alltag
und sozialen beziehungen, kultur und gesellschaft durch die medien. Wiesbaden:
Westdeutscher Verlag.
Luhmann, N. (1975). Macht. Stuttgart: Enke Verlag.
McAllister, I. (2007). The personalization of politics. In R. J. Dalton, & H.-D.
Klingemann (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political behavior (pp. 571–588).
Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199270125.003.0030.
McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass-media.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/267990.
Mika, B. (2016). Ekonomia uwagi – gospodarczy fundament społeczeństwa infor-
macyjnego widziany oczami sceptyka. Przegląd Socjologiczny, 65(3), 111–129.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Ayduk, O. (2007). Introduction to personality: Toward an
integrative science of the person. New York, NY: Wiley.
Märtenson, B. (1998). Between state and market: The economy in Swedish televi-
sion news. In N. T. Gavin (Ed.), The economy, media and public knowledge (pp.
112–133). London: Leicester University Press.
Niedzielska, A., & Herbuś, A. (2010). Prosumerism as a manifestation of conver-
gence of a company with a customer. In J. Urbańska (Ed.), Procesy konwergencji w
zarządzaniu polskimi przedsiębiorstwami. Częstochowa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału
Zarządzania Politechniki Częstochowskiej.
Nowak, A. W. (2013). Zalani wiedzą. Spiętrzenie czasu i informacji a atencjonal-
istyczne piramidy władzy. Kultura Współczesna, 1(76), 137–151.
Olson, J. M., Roese, N. J., & Zanna, M. (2013). Oczekiwania. In S. Trusz (Ed.),
Efekty oczekiwań inter-personalnych.Wybór tekstów (pp. 580–630). Warszawa:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
122 Weronika Świerczyńska-Głownia
Ostroff, C. L., & Schulte, M. (2007). Multiple perspectives of fit in organizations
across levels of analysis. In C. L. Ostroff, & T. Judge (Eds.), Perspectives on organ-
izational fit (pp. 3–69). New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ott, B. L. (2016). The age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the politics of debase-
ment. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 34(1), 59–68. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1080/15295036.2016.1266686.
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in
Americans’ policy preferences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Picard, R. G. (2011). The economics and financing of media companies. New York,
NY: Fordham University Press.
Piekarski, K. (2014). Ekonomia percepcji. Mechanizmy selekcjonowania informacji
w internecie. Retrieved from https://sbc.org.pl/Content/126980/doktorat3505.pdf
Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. D. (2005). The presidentialization of politics in Democratic
societies: A framework for analysis. In T. Poguntke, & P. D. Webb (Eds.), The presi-
dentialization of politics. A comparative study of modern democracies (pp. 1–26). DOI:
https://doi.org//10.1093/0199252017.001.0001). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prior, M. (2007). Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequal-
ity in political involvement and polarizes elections. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139878425.
Ragas, M. W., Tran, H. L., & Martin, J. A. (2014). Media-induced or search driven?
A study of online agenda-setting effects during the BP oil disaster. Journalism
Studies, 15(1), 48–63. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2013.793509.
Rahat, G., & Sheafer, T. (2007). The personalization(s) of politics: Israel 1949–
2003. Political Communication, 24(1), 65–80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/
10584600601128739.
Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: the
evolution of three media effects models. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 9–20.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326.x.
Sheafer, T. (2007). How to evaluate it: The role of story-evaluative tone in agenda
setting and priming. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 21–39. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.0021-9916.2007.00327.x.
Shiraev, E., & Sobel, R. (2016). People and their opinions. Thinking critically about
public opinion. New York, NY: Routledge.
Swanson, D. L., & Mancini, P. (1996). Politics, media, and modern democracy: An
International study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences.
Westport-London: Praeger.
Sztompka, P. (2005). Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa. Kraków: Wydawnictwo
Znak.
Sztompka, P. (2007). Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.
Szwajca, D., & Gorczyńska, A. (2013). Communication of company with the envi-
ronment in process building reputation. Journal of Knowledge Society, 2(1), 1–7.
Trusz, S. (2013). Efekty oczekiwań interpersonalnych: ujęcie interdyscyplinarne. In
S. Trusz (Ed.), Efekty oczekiwań interpersonalnych. Wybór tekstów (pp. 33–52).
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Van Tassel, J., & Poe-Howfield, L. (2014). Managing electronic media: making, mar-
keting, and moving digital content. Abingdon: Focal Press.
Weiman, G., & Brosius, H.-B. (2016). New agenda for agenda-setting research in the
digital era. In G. Vowe, & P. Henn (Eds.), Political communication in the online world:
theoretical approaches and research design (pp. 26–44). New York, NY: Routledge.
 Research for neoleadership 123
Wellman, B. (1999). The network community. In B. Wellman (Ed.), Networks in the
global village. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Wellman, B., & Leighton, B. (1979). Networks, neighborhoods and commu-
nities. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 14(3), 363–390. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177
%2F107808747901400305.
Zhou, Y., & Moy, P. (2007). Parsing framing processes: The interplay between online
public opinion and media coverage. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 79–98. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9916.2007.00330.x.
7 Leaders of parties or parties of leaders?
The position of party leaders and
models of their selection on the example
of Poland and the Czech Republic
Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát

Introduction
The issue of party leadership is in many cases the key to understanding
political processes within party. It also significantly streamlines analyses
aimed at discovering the mechanisms behind policies at the inter-party level,
and more broadly – of politics as such. The contemporary role of political
leaders and parties for the functioning of democracy is extremely important
(Aarts, Blais & Schmitt, 2013; Bean & Mughan, 1989; Bittner, 2011; Garzia,
2012, 2013; Helms, 2005; King, 2002; Mughan, 2000; Passarelli, 2015;
Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Rhodes & t’Hart, 2014) The greater importance
of leaders than parties leads to the search for premises for such influence in
different contexts (Ardal & Binder, 2013; Jenssen & Aalberg, 2006; Kestilä-
Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2014; Lobo, 2014; Lobo, 2008; Midtbø, 1997;
Mughan, 2015; van der Brug & Mughan, 2007; Stewart & Clarke, 1992). The
key problem we are going to solve concerns the role and the importance
of leaders in contemporary political parties. First of all, we will focus on
the leader’s position within a party and the selection process. Based on the
analysis, we will seek to determine whether we deal with political parties
operating in a democratic and pluralistic manner. However, if the leader’s
position is very strong and there is no competition in the selection process,
then we have the example of a leadership party.
This is particularly important because it lets the reader take a closer
look at this issue after 30 years of transformation. Poland and the Czech
Republic, as well as other post-communist countries in this part of Europe,
are still in the process of building a stable democracy based on the function-
ing of political parties and their leaders. An indication of the model politi-
cal parties follows – in the context of leadership – will allow a thesis about
the contemporary model of leadership within parties. Thus, the content
of the chapter corresponds to the idea of the book by indicating a change in
the role and meaning of contemporary political parties as a base for party
leaders.
The presented research is the first attempt to go over the contemporary
role of political parties’ leaders in Poland and the Czech Republic. Of
 Party leaders, position and models 125
course, there are various interesting studies corresponding to the prob-
lem (Hartliński 2011, 2013, 2019; Hloušek & Kopeček, 2019; Hloušek,
Chytilek, Kopeček & Svačinová, 2018; Kopeček, 2016; Kubát, 2015; Kubát
& Hartliński, 2019; Linek & Voženílkovska, 2017; Sobolewska-Myślik,
Kosowska-Gąstoł & Borowiec, 2010). However, none of the previous stud-
ies had focused on a comparative analysis and an attempt to indicate the
importance of leaders for the functioning of modern political parties in
these countries. The main research hypothesis is the supposition of the
dominant role of leaders in contemporary political parties, especially in
the context of their competence and selection. The main research questions
include the following: have leaders played a key role in the formation of
the party? Is the leadership position in the party dominant? Were the party
leader’s elections competitive?
In the methodological aspect, we will use the analysis of the content of
the mission statements/statutes of political parties as well as the party and
media documents demonstrating the course of the selection processes. The
chapter combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of the prerogatives
of party leaders and the results of individual in-party elections. The most
important political parties in Poland and the Czech Republic will serve as
the basis for an empirical research. This is particularly important because it
also allows one to look at this issue after 30 years of transformation. Poland
and the Czech Republic, as well as other post-communist countries in this
part of Europe, are still in the process of building a stable democracy based
on the functioning of political parties and their leaders.
The chapter is divided into five parts. After customary introduction, the
characteristics of the parties under examination will be brought closer.
Moving on to the analysis, the position of leaders in political parties and
their selection process will be presented. Finally, conclusions from the
research will be discussed.

The role of leaders in the formation of a party

Looking at the emergence of the discussed political parties in Poland, it
can be stated that in the case of Law and Justice (PiS) as well as the Civic
Platform (PO) to a large extent, a significant role and impulse to create the
party were sourced from their leaders. In the case of the Polish People’s
Party (PSL) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), however, the parties
were more focused around a wider environment of politicians and activists
with common ideological beliefs. Recognizing the chronological order, we
should start with PSL. This party was founded in 1991. Its creation was
a continuation of the Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe – United People’s
Party (ZSL) and was not associated with the particular role of individual
politicians. The situation was similar in SLD, which continued the activi-
ties of SdRP (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) and earlier the
PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party). The establishment of this grouping in
126 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
1999 was primarily associated with the search for a new formula for action,
the former group of people coming from the SLD coalition (mainly the men-
tioned SdRP). The rallying point, however, was the common vision, unity
of views and their former political path, more than the leading figures of the
leaders. However, in the case of other parties, the current leaders played a
significant role in their creation. In the case of PO, next to Donald Tusk, the
co-founders were Andrzej Olechowski and Maciej Płażyński. It is difficult
to authoritatively say what the impulse to form the party was – the concen-
tration of circles centred around these politicians or the ideological commu-
nity. It seems, however, that the first one decided to a greater extent, because
three main factors determining the operation of the three main actors can
be pointed out. First of all, the situation on the party scene, when the declin-
ing Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność – the Solidarity Electoral Action – created
the prospect of establishing a new grouping and seeking a new formula for
their action. The second factor is A. Olechowski’s good result in the 2000
presidential election. The third is the defeat of D. Tusk in the competition
with Bronisław Geremek for the leadership in Unia Wolności – the Freedom
Union. So, these and probably many other minor determinants decided on
the joint initiative of the “three tenors”.
Lech Kaczyński and Jarosław Kaczyński played a much more expressive
role in creating their party. The establishment of the PiS in 2001 is a good
example of the setting up of a political group based on the popularity of
leaders. In addition, they had their power base in the form of many politi-
cians from the former Porozumienie Centrum, the Centre Agreement, as
well as many people and formations that were previously parts of the Akcja
Wyborcza Solidarność.
When discussing the role of leaders in the process of forming political
parties in the Czech Republic, two types of parties need to be distinguished.
First of all, they are “traditional” parties, i.e. they have been active on the
Czech political scene since the beginning of the 1990s to this day. Second,
these are the new parties that began to appear around the years 2009–2010.
In traditional parties, the role of leaders in their creation was limited,
but with one significant exception, which is the Civic Democratic Party,
Občanská demokratická strana (ODS). The party was formed as a result of
the collapse of the Civic Forum, Občanské fórum (OF), in 1991.
Václav Klaus, who was the chairman of the OF and who later became
the chairman of the new ODS party, played an irreplaceable role here.
The remaining traditional parties still existed not due to the leader’s ini-
tiative and determination, as in the case of ODS, but as a result of other
events. Some were the result of a larger or smaller transformation of par-
ties operating before 1989. This is the Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia-Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM) and the Christian
and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party – Křesťanská a
demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (KDU-ČSL). In turn,
the Czech Social Democratic Party – Česká strana sociálně demokratická
 Party leaders, position and models 127
(ČSSD) was created as a consequence of the complex process of joining var-
ious political environments, former dissidents and representatives of OF,
politicians returning from emigration including pre-war social democrats
and, to a lesser extent, former communists.
The second group are new parties. In some cases, the role of leaders in the
formation of the party was downright decisive. The ANO 2011 party was
founded in 2012 by its sole leader and “owner” businessman Andrej Babiš.
Similarly, businessman Tomio Okamura established both his parties – the
first called Úsvit přímé demokracie – Dawn of Direct Democracy – Tomio
Okamura (ÚPD) in 2013, and then Svoboda a přímá demokracie – Freedom
and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura (SPD) in 2015. In the case of
TOP 09, the party founder Miroslav Kalousek was formally only the first
vice-chairman (Karel Schwarzenberg became the party’s head), neverthe-
less his position in the party was so strong that he could be seen as an infor-
mal party leader (from 2009 to today). The Mayors and Independent Party,
Starostové a nezávislí (STAN) was established in 2009 as a transformation
from the local group of Independent Mayors for the Province (NSPK) and
has had several leaders since then. A completely different case is the Czech
Pirate Party – Česká pirátská strana (ČPS) founded by Jiří Kadeřávek who
did not become its leader, only the first vice-chairman and in addition only
for a few months (from June to October 2009).
In conclusion, we can point to two main paths to the emergence of these
political parties in the context of party leadership. The first is relying on the
current formula for the functioning of the party. The second, of particular
interest to us, is focusing on the leader or leaders, which is illustrated by the
case of PiS, PO, ANO 2011, TOP 09, ODS, SPD. Of course, the link between
these parties was the attempt to establish new parties on the political scene.
At the same time, the Polish case shows that it was about a new formula for
the functioning of well-known politicians. However, in the case of the Czech
Republic, it was the pursuit of new faces on the party scene.

In-party leadership position

The formal conditions of party leadership are formulated in the statutes/
mission statements of political parties. Understanding this content will
allow you to identify many key issues related to the role of the leaders in
their groupings. This knowledge is the starting point for understanding
in-party competition processes and exercising leadership. The party’s stat-
utes/mission statements indicate important conditions regarding the pro-
cess of leadership selection and the scope of their prerogatives.
An analysis of the statutes/mission statements of political parties is also
important from the point of view of the changes taking place in the par-
ties, which is then reflected in these documents. All changes regarding
the position or leader selection procedure are then adopted in subsequent
statutes.
128 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
Table 7.1 The party leader’s membership in other bodies of the party
ANO TOP KDU-
PO PiS SLD PSL ČSSD 2011 09 KSČM ODS ČSL SPD STAN ČPS
Congress/ No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting
Convention/ Yes - Yes - Yes - - - Yes - - - -
Conference
Committee/ Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Council
The National Yes - Yes - - - - - - - - - -
Board
The - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presidium/
Bureau
Advisory - - - - Yes - - - - - - - -
Board
Supervisory - - - - - - - - - - - No -
Board

Source: Own study

The powers of the party leader contained in the statute are important,
though sometimes downplayed. The formal scope of power is no less
important than informal arrangements and intra-party games. This doc-
ument can be an indication of the extent of influence the leader has. Thus,
it is a suggestion of how the party perceives the role and position of its
leader.
In each case, the statute devotes a separate article to the leader. However,
this is not the only place devoted to this function and careful reading of
the entire statute is required. Only then can you talk about a full descrip-
tion of the role and position of the chairman or the president. Hence, it is
crucial to trace and list all the most important formal aspects related to
leadership.
Starting from the basic issue, it should be noted that the party statutes
use two basic terms to describe the party leader. They are the chairman and
the president. In the case of the groups in question, they are supplemented
with the abbreviation or party name. Hence, the following names are found:
The President of PSL; The PiS president; The Chairman of the SLD; The
Chairman of the Platform; The President of the Movement. The debated
Czech parliamentary groupings are headed by a “chairman” (předseda; no
other names). In the case of KSČM, this is the “Chairman of the [Central
Committee] KSČM” (předseda ÚV KSČM).
It is important whether the party leader is part of the other authorities
(Table 7.1). In most cases, it can be stated that, by virtue of her/his position,
she/he belongs to the most important central organs of the party, directly
or indirectly. The data contained in Table 7.2 indicate individual statutory
Table 7.2 Competences of the party leader towards other party organs

PO PiS SLD PSL ČSSD ANO 2011 TOP 09 KSČM ODS KDU-ČSL SPD STAN ČPS

Congress/ - Convenes No No No Convenes No No Convenes Convenes Convenes No Convenes/

Meeting runs
Convention/ Convenes - No - No - - -
Convenes/ - - - -
Conference runs
Committee/ Runs Runs Runs Runs - Convenes/ Convenes/ Convenes Convenes/ Convenes/ - Convenes/ Convenes/
Board runs runs runs runs runs runs
The - - - - Convenes Convenes/ Convenes/ Convenes Convenes/ Convenes Convenes/ Convenes/ Convenes/
Presidium runs runs runs runs runs runs
Advisory Convenes - - - - - - - - - - - -
Board
Supervisory - - - - - - - - - - - No -
Board
Parliamentary No Runs No No No No No No No No No No No
Club

Source: Own study

Party leaders, position and models
129
130 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
Table 7.3 Competences of the party leader to apply for specific positions
in the party
TOP KDU-
PO PiS SLD PSL ČSSD ANO 2011 09 KSČM ODS ČSL SPD STAN ČPS

Vice-president/
vice-chairman Yes Yes No - No No No No No No No No No
of the party
Vice-president of
the Supreme
- - - Yes - - - - - - - - -
Executive
Committee
Secretary-
General/
Yes - Yes Yes No Appoints Yes - Appoints Yes No Nie -
Manager/
Executive
Financial
Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - - - - - -
Secretary
Secretary of the
Council/ - Yes - - - - - - - - - - -
Committee
Disciplinary
Proceedings Yes Yes No No - - - - - - - - -
Representative
The President of
the Executive - No - No - - - - - - - - -
Committee
The Chairman of
the Leading - - - No - - - - - - - - -
Council
Members of the
Supervisory - - - - - - - - - - - No -
Board
Members of the
No - No - - - - - - - - - -
National Board
The Presidium of
the National Yes - - - - - - - - - - - -
Board
The chairman
and the
members of the
Ethics
Committee as
well as the No
- Yes - No No No No No No No No No
members of the -
Control
Commission/
Comptroller/
the Board of
Conciliation
The Press
No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No
Secretary
(Continued)
 Party leaders, position and models 131
Table 7.3 Competences of the party leader to apply for specific positions
in the party (Continued)
TOP KDU-
PO PiS SLD PSL ČSSD ANO 2011 09 KSČM ODS ČSL SPD STAN ČPS

Members of the
Committee/ - - - - - No No No No No No No No
Council
Members of the
- - - - No No No No No No No No No
Presidium
Members of the - - - - No - - - - - - - -
Advisory Board

bodies and the attribution of a leader to them. This can be done in a way that
clearly indicates such delegation or by belonging to another party body – but
to which the leader also belongs because of her/his position.
In most of the analysed groups, their leaders participate in the work of
key bodies. In fact, only in three cases the party leader does not form a very
important body. The chairman of the PO is not automatically a delegate
to the party’s congress. In turn, in SPD and STAN party leaders are not at
all part of the other organs. Thus, it can be concluded that being a party
leader also affects the simultaneous holding of other positions in the party.
In addition to being assigned to specific party organs, it is also important
to be able to influence their operation. Directing the actions of individual
structures also allows a deeper look at the leadership position in the party.
The information in Table 7.3 shows that in many cases the competences of
party leaders are not limited to passive participation. They are statutorily
guaranteed the power to convene or manage key organs of internal party
power. This is a very broad authorization that gives them the opportunity
to directly shape the party’s activity. In Polish and Czech parties, the lead-
ership position in this aspect is vast.
The PiS president manages not only the party’s authorities, but also the
parliamentary club, which gives him the opportunity to influence both the
activities within the party and its representatives in the parliament. This is
the only case in Polish and Czech parties that the party leader has a direct
impact on the functioning of the parliamentary club.
One of the fundamental prerogatives of party leaders is the ability to
choose collaborators/associates. The creation of personnel policy largely
determines the later activities of the party. What is more, it is a serious tool
for managing the party. As it results from the data contained in Table 7.4,
the party leaders have a diverse impact on applying for the appointment of
individual persons for given positions in their parties.
Again, as in the previous criteria, the PiS President comes to the fore and
controls the appointments to all important positions. Thus, it can be said
at this point that he basically creates the overall personnel system. As you
132 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
Table 7.4 The body electing the party leader

The National The General

All members Convention Council
PO X
PiS X
SLD X X
PSL X X
ČSSD X X
ANO 2011 X
TOP 09 X
KSČM X
ODS X
KDU-ČSL X
ČPS X
STAN X
SPD X
ÚPD X X
Source: Own study

can guess, this gives him complete supremacy over the party apparatus.
Also, in this case, albeit to a slightly smaller extent, but clearly significant, it
concerns the competences of the President/Chairman of the Civic Platform
and the Polish People’s Party. To a lesser extent, this applies to leaders of
other groups. Disparities between Polish and Czech parties are particularly
evident.
First of all, leaders request the appointment of party vice-presidents/vice
chairmen (except SLD) as well as secretaries. Therefore, they can decide
on the selection of people from their immediate environment who at the
same time have an impact on decision-making and the functioning of party
structures.

Coronation or competition, that is the

course of in-party selection
One of the most interesting aspects of party leadership, followed closely by
the media, is the selection process. Well, in Polish political parties you can
find examples of many solutions used to choose leaders. One of the basic
questions is – who chooses? PO grants this right only to all its members.
The SLD statute allows both universal suffrage/popular vote and election by
Congress or the Convention. PiS applies the principle that the delegations
make their choice to Congress. However, PSL choose leaders during the
Congress and by the Supreme Council.
 Party leaders, position and models 133
In the case of Czech parties, leaders are elected through the highest party
organs – conventions consisting of delegates (the statute of ČSSD also
enables direct party elections of party leaders. However, this is only a the-
ory, because such elections in ČSSD have not yet taken place). Congresses
are called differently, but it is only a formal difference. ČSSD and KDU-
ČSL have “conventions” (sjezd), ANO 2011 and TOP 09 “national seyms”
(celostátní sněm), and ODS “congress” (congress). Meetings are convened
every two years. The exception is KSČM with a four-year turnout attend-
ance and SPD and Pirates with annual turnout.
Candidates are nominated by delegates of congresses, but tradition (not
a formal condition) is prior to obtaining nomination of provincial party
organizations. So, the candidates for the party’s head come to the congress
with voivodship nominations. The favourites always have the most nomi-
nations. The condition of conducting elections (not only) of group chair-
men is voting of over half of all delegates. The selected candidate for the
chairman must obtain more than half of the votes of the current delegates.
If the president is not elected for the first time, the communists and social
democrats conduct the second round of elections, which is approached by
the two candidates with the most votes in the first round of voting. The rest
of the groupings allow three voting rounds. In the event of a failure of two or
three-round voting, the election shall be repeated in the same way.
The first party of Tomio Okamura ÚPD approached the issue of elect-
ing the chairman differently and very specifically. The procedure of electing
the chairman himself was not explicite decided in the ÚPD statute (MV-
60042-26/VS-13), except for one information. It is such that the term of the
office of the chairman is five years (Article VI/2). According to the statute,
the President of ÚPD was a one-man body. Formally, “members of all the
Movement bodies” were elected by the highest movement’s body – a “con-
ference”. The conference was created by members of the entire movement,
there was no system of delegates. The conference should take place at least
once every 12 months. At least half of all its members (i.e. members of the
entire movement) had to participate in the elections, and to be elected, it
was necessary to obtain the majority of ¾ electors (i.e. members of the
entire movement again). The fictitiousness of intra-party democracy was
reinforced by the fact that officially the “first members” of ÚPD were only
members of the founding committee (Article III/2). The party did not create
field organizations (Article V), and the procedure for accepting “not the
first” members was not discussed in the statute at all (Stanovy politického
hnutí Úsvit přímé demokraci, 2014). So, it was practically impossible to
join the party. Parties in the Czech Republic are not required to inform
about the number of members (information from April 2014) – according
to unofficial data, ÚPD had only nine (sic!) members (Hnutí Úsvit má víc
poslanců než členů, 2013). At the same time, the statute stated that the con-
ference did not consist of delegates, but members of the movement itself.
This means that the chairman of the ÚPD was theoretically elected by the
134 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
majority of three-fourth members of a nine-person conference (with more
than half of them participating)! Practically, we were dealing with a quasi-
commander system, in any case undemocratic one, which is in obvious con-
tradiction with the Czech Act on political parties and movements. In § 4(b)
it states that parties and movements that do not have democratic statutes
and democratically elected party organs cannot be created and operate
(Zákon č. 424/1991 Sat. o sdružování v politických stranách a v politických
hnutích, 1991). The second party of Okamura SPD, referring to ÚPD, did
not continue such undemocratic solutions and when it comes to the way it
functions, including the election of the chairman, it joined the democratic
standards of the rest of the Czech parties.
National conventions are therefore the dominant way to choose a leader. It
is now a standard procedure in the vast majority of parties in Poland and the
Czech Republic. This does not differ in any way from the trends adopted by
parties in other countries. In the PO, the leader is elected by all the members.
In three cases, however, the statute allows this possibility (SLD, ČSSD, ÚPD).
Focusing on the selection process, it is worth paying special attention to
the competitiveness of the choices. This dilemma is important because it
will tell us how much we are dealing with the coronation of a leader, and
how much with actual competition for leadership in the party. When ana-
lysing the selection process, it should be clearly indicated that PiS is a great
example of the dominance of one leader (Table 7.3). Although the first leader
was Lech Kaczyński, after swapping with his brother, Jarosław Kaczyński
has been leading the party since 2003. In all previous elections he wins the
overwhelming number of votes, and most importantly he is the only candi-
date. The example of this party shows that the combination of unusually
broad formal prerogatives and support in in-party elections suggests that
we are undoubtedly dealing with the dominant role of leader.
In PO we also had a long-term dominance of Donald Tusk, who from
2003 until his resignation in 2014, had an extremely strong electoral legiti-
macy (Table 7.6). He won the election of the chairman four times. In 2006
and 2013 he had opponents, but his advantage was so significant that it is
difficult to say about the actual competition for the leadership. After his

Table 7.5 Leadership selection in Law and Justice

Candidates Year In favour Against Abstentions

L. Kaczyński 2001 50 0 0
J. Kaczyński 2003 316 1 1
J. Kaczyński 2006 1231 19 8
J. Kaczyński 2010 999 51 14
J. Kaczyński 2013 1131 17 12
J. Kaczyński 2016 1008 7 1
Source: Own study
 Party leaders, position and models 135
Table 7.6 Leadership selection in PO, votes at party Congress (%)

Candidates Year In favour Against Abstention

Tusk 2003 97 3 -
Tusk 2006 85 - -
Machowski 15 - -
Tusk 2010 858 11 3
Tusk 2013 80 - -
Gowin 20 - -
Schetyna 2016 91 9 -
Budka 2020 79 - -
Siemoniak 12 - -
Sienkiewicz 2 - -
Zdrojewski 7 - -

Source: Own study

departure from the party, rivalry appeared, and many candidates were will-
ing to take the highest position. However, the results showed that the major-
ity of members vote for the main front-runner.
In PSL or SLD, the selection process was very competitive. First of all,
there were many changes in leadership. Second, in most cases there were not
only many candidates, but as the results of the voting showed, the elections
were competitive.
In general, competition in the election of the heads of Czech political par-
ties is quite limited. There is no rivalry in the strongest and ruling Czech
party ANO 2011. The founder of the party and its chairman Andrej Babiš
has never had a counter candidate and in each election he gained a clear
advantage (Table 7.7).
Likewise, the founder and head of his both parties, Tomio Okamura, has
never had to face any opponents. There were no de facto elections of the
chairman in the ÚPD. The first ordinary election conference of his second
SPD party took place in July 2018. Okamura had no competitor in the elec-
tion and received 150 votes out of 152. There has been no competition in
ODS in recent years. From 2016, he ran for the election as the only candidate
receiving over 90% of the votes of delegates. Similarly, in STAN since 2014,

Table 7.7 Leadership selection in ANO 2011

Candidates Year In favour Against Abstentions

Babiš 2012 73 3 0
Babiš 2013 169 3 1
Babiš 2015 186 0 0
Babiš 2017 195 15 0
Babiš 2019 206 22 0

Source: Own study

136 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
the delegates have always voted for the only candidate giving him over 90%
of the votes, and in 2014 it was even 100% of the votes. In TOP 09 there was
no competition in the years 2009 – 2015 (the only candidate receiving more
than 90% of the votes of the delegates). In 2017, two candidates ran, the win-
ner (Jiří Pospíšil) received 147 votes in 177 and his rival – 13 votes. In 2019,
however, there were also two candidates for the party’s head, nevertheless
the new party chairman received only 53.9% of the votes of the delegates.
Weak competition has appeared in ČPS (since 2016) and KDU-ČSL (except
for the years 2013–2015, when only one candidate ran for the post).
Social Democracy is the Czech party with the strongest competition/
rivalry. This party often changes the presidents/chairmen who always face
strong opposition in internal party elections. An interesting case is the sec-
ond Czech political party with a long history – KSČM. From 1993 to today,
the communists had only two presidents (Miroslav Grebeníček 1993–2005
and Vojtěch Filip since 2005), who, however, had to defeat their competitors
in the election as party leader.
The analysis of the selection of leaders leads to the conclusion that the
main political parties in Poland and the Czech Republic were not in actual
competition for leadership, but only confirmation of the current position of
Kaczyński, Tusk or Babiš. The selection of leaders was a coronation pro-
cess, not actual competition.
Trying to find a common denominator, it can certainly be pointed out
that the parties that formed around the leaders do not practice competi-
tion in their selection. Political leaders who establish their political parties
exercise power in them as long as they want to. There are no strong oppo-
nents, and the leader’s victory is undeniable. It looks different in left-wing
parties, which are well-established on the party scene. In their case, we are
dealing with both leadership changes and actual competition among many
contenders.

Conclusions
The examples of Poland and the Czech Republic show the changing relation-
ship between party leaders and political parties. First of all, the role of lead-
ers in “traditional” parties, which originated in the 1990s, is significantly
smaller. The importance of leaders is clear in the “new” parties. This is
mainly indicated by the role of leaders in their formation and, consequently,
the process of internal elections which confirms their dominant position.
Parties of leaders are parties in which the leaders played an initiating role
in their calling. The leader and her/his closest base/resources were the main
determinants of the party’s establishment. The gathering of collaborators/
associates and supporters was an important aspect of the effective start of
the party. Their ambitions and effectiveness were the main determinants to
initiate the establishment of a party and gain a key role in the political life.
Examples of this are Kaczyński (PiS), Tusk (PO) and Babiš (ANO 2011). The
 Party leaders, position and models 137
most important political parties in Poland and the Czech Republic owe their
effectiveness and greatest successes to their leaders.
In-party position – formal – is not such a clear determinant. Rather, there
are differences between parties in individual countries. Leaders’ compe-
tences are greater in Polish parties, especially PiS and PO, than generally in
the Czech parties.
The third issue analysed, which is the process of internal selection, showed
a lack of competition in the most important parties. Leaders who formed
parties gained noticeable support in the next election. What’s more, there
are not even opponents (PiS, ANO 2011).
Summing up the above considerations, it is worth pointing out that in
emerging parties we are dealing with parties of leaders and not leaders of
parties. The example of the analysed countries and parties shows that the
role of the leader is clearly increasing. On the Polish and Czech political
scene, parties created by leaders who have firmly managed their parties,
have played the most important role in recent years. The examples of PiS,
PO and ANO 2011 are the best examples that a dominant leader is far more
effective today than well-established and democratic structures.

References
Aarts, K., Blais, A., & Schmitt, H. (Eds.). (2013). Political leaders and demo-
cratic elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/
acprof:osobl/9780199259007.001.0001.
Ardal, B., & Binder, T. (2013). Leader effects and party characteristics. In K.
Aarts, A. Blais, & H. Schmitt (Eds.), Political leaders and democratic elections
(pp. 108–126). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/
acprof:osobl/9780199259007.001.0001.
Bean, C., & Mughan, A. (1989). Leadership effects in parliamentary elections in
Australia and Britain. The American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1164–1179.
doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1961663.
Bittner, A. (2011). Platform or personality? The role of party leaders in elec-
tions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:
oso/9780199595365.001.0001.
Garzia, D. (2012). Party and leader effects in parliamentary elections: Towards a reas-
sessment. Politics, 32(3), 175–185. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01443.x.
Garzia, D. (2013). The rise of party/leader identification in Western Europe. Political
Research Quarterly, 66(3), 533–534. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912912463122.
Hartliński, M. (2011). Przywództwo partyjne w polsce. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam
Marszałek.
Hartliński, M. (2013). Contemporary “Prince”. Influence, the position and authority
of party leaders. South-East European Journal of Political Science, 1(4), 131–146.
Hartliński, M. (2019). Twins in power. Jarosław kaczyński and Lech kaczyński as
leaders of law and justice. Polish Political Science Review, 7(1), 96–106. doi: https://
doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2019-0006.
Helms, L. (2005). The presidentialisation of political leadership. Political Quarterly,
76(6), 430–438. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2005.00702.x.
138 Maciej Hartliński, Michal Kubát
Hloušek, V., & Kopeček, L. (2019). The role of the leader in the process of insti-
tutionalisation of entrepreneurial parties: Czech ANO and the public affairs
party. In R. Harmel, & L. G. Svasand (Eds.), Institutionalisation of political par-
ties: Comparative cases (pp. 43–67). London-New York: ECPR Press/Rowman &
Littlefield.
Hloušek, V., Chytilek, R., Kopeček, L., & Svačinová, P. (2018). Já platím, já
rozhoduji! Političtí podnikatelé a jejich strany. Brno: Barrister & Principal.
Hnutí Úsvit má víc poslanců než členů. (2013, November 12). Retrieved from
Novinky.cz: https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/hnuti-usvit-ma-vic-poslancu-
nez-clenu-209492
Jenssen, A. T., & Aalberg, T. (2006). Electoral studies, 25(2), 248–269. DOI: https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.008.
Kestilä-Kekkonen, E., & Söderlund, P. (2014). Party, leader or candidate? Dissecting
the right-wing populist vote in Finland. European Political Science Review, 6(4),
641–662. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000283.
King, A. (Ed.). (2002). Leaders’ personalities and the outcomes of democratic elec-
tions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199253137.
001.0001.
Kopeček, L. (2016). “I’m paying, so I decide”: Czech ANO as an extreme form of
a business-firm party. East European Politics and Societies, 30(4), 725–749. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0888325416650254.
Kubát, M. (2015). Przywództwo partyjne w czechach: pod znakiem gwał-
townych przeobrażeń politycznych. In M. Hartliński (Ed.), Przywództwo par-
tyjne w państwach postkomunistycznyc. Olsztyn: Instytut Nauk Politycznych
Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego w Olsztynie.
Kubát, M., & Hartliński, M. (2019). Party leaders in the Czech populist parties
and movements. Polish Political Science Review, 7(1), 107–119. doi: https://doi.
org/10.2478/ppsr-2019-0007.
Linek, L., & Voženílková, M. (2017). Strany na ústupu, lídři na vzestupu?
Personalizace volebního chování v České republice. Sociologický časopis/Czech
Sociological Review, 53(2), 147–180. doi: https://doi.org/10.13060/00380288.2017.5
3.2.304.
Lobo, M. C. (2008). Parties and leader effects: Impact of leaders in the vote
for different types of parties. Party Politics, 14(3), 281–298. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354068807088123.
Lobo, M. C. (2014). Party and electoral leadership. In R. A. Rhodes, & P. t’Hart
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political leadership (pp. 362–75). Oxford: Oxford
University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199653881.013.015.
Midtbø, T. (1997). The electoral effect of party leader approval in Norway.
Scandinavian Political Studies, 20(2), 135–158. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9477.1997.tb00189.x.
Mughan, A. (2000). Media and the presidentialization of parliamentary elections.
London: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403920126.
Mughan, A. (2015). Parties, conditionality and leader effects in parliamentary elec-
tions. Party Politics, 21(1), 28–39. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462930.
Passarelli, G. (Ed.). (2015). The presidentialization of political parties: Organizations,
institutions and leaders. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1057/9781137482464.
 Party leaders, position and models 139
Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. D. (Eds.). (2005). The presidentialization of politics: A
comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199252017.001.0001.
Rhodes, R. A., & t’Hart, P. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford handbook of political lead-
ership. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfor
dhb/9780199653881.001.0001.
Sobolewska-Myślik, K., Kosowska-Gąstoł, B., & Borowiec, P. (2010). Struktury
organizacyjne polskich partii politycznych. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Jagiellońskiego.
Stanovy politického hnutí Úsvit přímé demokraci. Změna stanov registrována dne
2.06.2014 pod č.j. MV-60042-26/VS-13. (n.d.). Retrieved 2020
Stewart, M. C., & Clarke, H. D. (1992). The (Un)importance of party leaders:
Leader images and party choice in the 1987 British election. Journal of Politics,
54(2), 447–470. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2132034.
Van Der Brug, W., & Mughan, A. (2007). Charisma, leader effects and support for
right-wing populist parties. Party Politics, 13(1), 29–51. doi: https://doi.org/10.117
7%2F1354068806071260.
Zákon č. 424/1991 Sat. o sdružování v politických stranách a v politických hnutích.
(1991). Retrieved from Parlament České republiky, Poslanecká sněmovna: https://
www.psp.cz/docs/laws/1991/424.html
8 The development of technopopulism
in a globalised world
Rafał Dudała

Introduction
In describing processes taking place on the global political scene affect-
ing party systems and leadership concepts, Joseph Nye (2016) used the
term “populist revolution”. This does not mean, however, that we are
talking about a new phenomenon, but rather about one that is escalating
with unpredictable consequences. The very term “populism” retains an
extremely polysemic character, sometimes with its connotational scope cov-
ering ambivalent content. Cas Mudde (2007, p. 385) indicates this complex-
ity when he discusses 26 types of populism. In turn, Paul Taggart (2007,
pp. 111–117), while searching for a universal approach, characterises the
so-called perfect populism with six features:

a hostile attitude towards representative politics; identification with

the cantered (heartland); a lack of core values; a reaction to a sense of
severe crisis; self-limitation; a changeable nature.

Being a thin-centred ideology, populism captures the dichotomic society

divided into “two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “simple people”
versus “corrupt elites”, where the task of politics is to express the volonté
générale of the people (Mudde, 2004, pp. 541–563).
The definition is complemented by two important elements inextricably
linked to the phenomenon described:

populist rhetoric, which, using linguistic emotionality, anti-elitism and

anti-intellectualism exposes the opposition “we – they” and the populist
leader who impersonates the “voice of the people”.

Both of these elements, defining the style of leadership and affecting the
selection of tools of populist influence, are subject to permanent evolution,
which is influenced by the dynamic development of the latest technology,
with particular emphasis on the means of social communication. Hence,
more and more often the leader’s charisma is replaced by media understood
 Technopopulism in globalised world 141
as the ability to present herself/himself to the public. This also results in
radical transformations in the ways of doing politics, presenting political
demands and choosing methods of communicating with the voter (Campus,
2010).
The subject of this article is a description of the phenomenon of pop-
ulism and its flourishing in the public arena, with particular emphasis on
the global network and social media existing within it. The basic research
questions relate to the importance of contemporary technopopulism for
today’s political discourse. How should this phenomenon be defined? What
is the extent of technopopulism in the context of socio-political and cultural
diversity? What is its impact on the creation of a new leadership model?
What should be seen as the reasons for such a dynamic spread of techno-
populism? The three-part structure of the text will serve to find answers
to such questions. The first is an approximation of the significance of the
phenomenon of technopopulism and an attempt to define it. The second
part, by describing specific examples, shows the scale of activity and the
diversity of neopopulist movements on each of the continents. The third
summarising part is a description of the further inevitable development of
the phenomenon in the event of a lack of action by democratic institutions
and authorities. The terms for this article are populism, technopopulism,
leadership (and crisis) of democracy.

The importance of technopopulism

Given the difficulties in defining the concept of “populism”, it is still worth
looking for those basic meanings that are applicable in the social sciences.
Emiliana de Blasio and Michele Sorice (2018), situating this phenomenon
between direct democracy and technological myth, point to four approaches
to it. Structural understanding emphasises the social origin of populism,
and its development is associated with subsequent stages of industrialisa-
tion. According to this approach, regimes that use widespread mobilisation
to support industrialisation in place of imports are considered populist. The
second is economic understanding which populism equates to economic
results, understood as the immediate effects of politics, something which
appeals especially to the poorer part of a society. Another is a political
approach in which populism is a space to fight for control over government,
politics and fundamental social values. In the fourth discursive definition,
the concept of populism refers to the Manichean dichotomy, where good
is identified with the united will of the people, and evil with the conspiring
elite.
The ambiguity of the concept of “populism”, confirmed everywhere, also
means the heterogeneity of the phenomenon itself. Therefore, all kinds of
aspirations aimed at clearly defining its political provenance – right-wing
or left-wing – should be considered unfounded. As Margaret Canovan
(1981) notes, populism “can be both one or the other – all depending on the
142 Rafał Dudała
combination of varieties that is currently under discussion” The departure
from the principles of liberal democracy invoked on this occasion does not
necessarily mean replacing them with populist mechanisms. After all, the
processes of popularisation of democracy, the increase in the role of grass-
roots decision-making mechanisms and the erosion of existing rules of the
political game are still being observed within the framework of the trend
towards a qualitatively different power (Kasińska-Metryka, 2018, p. 129).
The phenomenon of “neopopulism” that has been growing since the
beginning of the century has been particularly closely associated with eco-
nomic processes (Grassi, 2004, pp. 739–740; Patiño A., 2007). By gradually
delegitimising traditional political institutions, neopopulism establishes a
new form of political representation and identification. The crisis of rep-
resentation, the weakness of the democratic system and the dismantling
of the welfare state model have, in many cases, enabled the “revival” of
populist leaders. Thanks to personal predispositions and through modern
communication tools, they have been created as providential saviours of
the nation and defenders of the lost social order. Trying to define the min-
imum of shared formal reference, Marco Revelli (2017) points to the three
most important. Firstly, he mentions strong personalisation, which means
that the populist leader plays a major role on the political scene, he de facto
creates it. The second is the mechanism of disintermediation, i.e. a specific
style of communication and action based on a direct relationship with the
audience/public; since it is essentially undefined, it allows for the broad-
ening of traditional social and cultural areas, thus transcending current
political constraints. The addressee of the message is the whole “populace”
(populos), and the style of the formulated message is popular (pop refers to
mass culture). The third common reference of neopopulist leaders is self-
presentation aimed at presenting themselves (and their own party) in the
context of rupture, i.e. distinguishing them from the current elite and indi-
cating a new beginning. This is usually done by distancing oneself from the
past and criticising the existing order; the tool used to strengthen this atti-
tude is the rhetoric, full of hyperbole and empty promises.
In this context, the question arises about the place for and signifi-
cance of contemporary discourse of one of the latest phenomena in social
sciences – political and economic, called technopopulism, its definition and
application.

In its broadest sense, the term can be used to describe a political move-
ment in which anti-system populist rhetoric is communicated (con-
verted) through/to digital means of communication, becoming an
indicator of the ideology itself. By supporting the primary postulates
of the populist trend, it combines them with technocracy, and the open
communication formula makes technopopulism a political tool for
each of the groups or movements that stand “close to the people” and
which speak on their behalf.
 Technopopulim in globalized world 143
Technopopulist movements have gained momentum in the 21st century,
mainly due to the spread of Internet access and the emergence of social
media (Bloom & Sancino, 2018). As a result, populist politics and its cre-
ators have gained both access to a wide audience as well as the ability to
quickly transfer their own narrative to the farthest corners of the world.
Co-created social networks have allowed more and more citizens to par-
ticipate in the democratic process, creating a completely new public sphere
focused on discursive and participatory practices (de Blasio & Sorice, 2018).
A different understanding of technopopulism makes one see a political ide-
ology that addresses a group of people deprived of participation in power
and or even of interaction from participants in political and economic
discourse, which is achieved thanks to technological knowledge (Woods
& Wejnert, 2014). Other researchers, in a concept combining technocratic
and populist ideology, observe the requirement for voters to entrust power
to leaders who recognise the general interest of a given community on the
basis of rational speculation. According to Marco Deseriis (2017), techno-
populism is the belief that government “of the people, by the people, for
the people” can be achieved using communication and information tech-
nology. The term “belief” here means an ideology not in the Marxist sense
of false consciousness, but in the sense used by Louis Althusser (1971) – a
set of ideas that exist materially. Technopopulism can also be understood
in terms chosen by Michel Foucault as an emerging discourse (Foucault,
1972), i.e. as a collection of knowledge, norms, attitudes and practices that
arise from the hybridisation of the two previous discourses – populism and
technolibertarianism. Although both discursive practices are historically
distinct, they have become convergent since the global financial crisis in
2008. Widespread frustration over poor solutions undertaken by the rul-
ing elites has triggered international protest movements and has led to the
emergence of a new generation of “technoparties”.
Although populism and democracy are ideas widely known in the
world, the flourishing of populist movements was only possible due to the
development of technology such as the Internet. Similarly, the popularity
of technopopulism, the spread of which in all regions of the world over the
two decades of the present century, has primarily been associated with
access to the Internet. At the same time, as noted by Daniele Caramani
(2017), the perception of technopopulist mobilisation should not be lim-
ited to a geographical approach and specific regional areas associated
with it, but also to specific issues, often overlooked by mainstream leaders.
In the era of the observed IT revolution, nation-states have irrevocably
lost their monopoly on information in favour of satellite television, the
Internet, social media and mobile telephony. The scale of the phenome-
non and, at the same time, its international and intercontinental diversity
can be observed in specific examples of individual leaders and their par-
ties, organised political groups and informal movements expressing social
moods.
144 Rafał Dudała
The international heterogeneity of technopopulism

Europe

The role and importance of technopopulist movements in European politics

has increased with the emergence of wide access to the Internet. This has
directly influenced the selection of methods for conducting election cam-
paigns and resulted in a growing number of populist parties having rep-
resentation in regional, national and the European parliaments. The most
famous include Movimento 5 Stelle (Italy), Podemos (Spain), Alternative für
Deutschland (Germany), Rassemblement National (France), Freiheitliche
Partei Österreichs (Austria), Akce nespokojených občanů (ANO 2011, the
Czech Republic), Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti (OĽaNO, Slovakia),
Fidesz (Hungary), Syriza (Greece), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Poland), Partij
voor de Vrijheid (PVV, the Netherlands), Vlaams Belang (VB, Belgium). The
international socio-political movement known as the Pirate Party deserves
distinct attention among organised groups. Its main demands include sup-
port for civil liberties, direct democracy (including e-democracy), copy-
right and patent law reforms, open access to cultural product, respect for
freedom of expression, counteracting corruption and maintaining internet
neutrality (Pirate Parties International, 2020). The group has found numer-
ous representatives in nearly twenty countries around the world, and the
Icelandic Pirate Party (Piratar) was the first to obtain parliamentary seats in
a national parliament: in 2013 their support amounted to 5.1%, which gave
the party 3 seats, while in 2016 – 14.5% and 10 seats.
A spontaneous example of a technopulist initiative, not falling within the
framework of organisational structures, is the mass social movement that
emerged in autumn 2018 in France known as the Yellow Vests Movement (Le
mouvement des Gilets Jaunes). A reflective vest, which is mandatory equip-
ment for a French haulage driver, became an easily recognisable hallmark
of the protesters. Owing to their actions, roadblocks were coordinated, and
various demonstrations organised which often turned into violent riots and
regular fights with the police. Taking into account the specifics of the pro-
tests, however, attention should be paid to those features that distinguish the
Movement from the landscape of European technopopulism: whilst all the
organised populist parties focused their message on defending the “people”,
often using nationalist rhetoric, the Yellow Vest Movement supported the
postulate of class equality (Nossiter, 2018). What connects these two trends
is the dissemination of “the right ideas” through new technology. Thanks to
live coverage and short film broadcasts, the demands of French drivers from
the suburbs quickly became a national issue, and soon a global one.
Such a large representation of populist groups and movements in Europe
must necessarily also mean ideological diversity. The European Data
Journalism Network project cited above proves this, with its conclusions
confirming the heterogeneity of European technopopulism: “Right-wing
 Technopopulim in globalized world 145
populists want a homogenous state for natives only. Left-wing populists
reject capitalism. And centrist populists focus on curbing an allegedly
corrupt elite: they have a less radical tendency to either left-wing or right-
wing ideology, or may even reject both altogether” (Pauly, 2019). In turn, as
the authors of The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment
report note, a result of research conducted as part of The Institute for Global
Challenges, the wave of European populism, although high, has still not
reached its maximum level (Kyle, 2018). One of the authors of the report,
Yascha Mounk, notes: “in 2016, populism broke into public opinion, but
our data clearly shows that this increase in support began long before, even
before 2008. This is a huge, long-term change in European policy, which
is powered by a sense of economic uncertainty, opposition to immigration
and multi-ethnic societies, as well as the ease with which extreme voices can
be heard in the social media” (Krupa, 2018).

North America
Over the past decade, technopopulist trends have also grown significantly
in the United States. They have usually expressed an objection to neocon-
servative ideas and corporate organisational structures in the party system.
The rise of social discontent reached its peak at the time of the financial
crisis of 2007–2008. On the wave of recession, technopopulist movements
came to the fore, drawing attention to growing economic problems. The
Occupy Movement, dubbed a “global justice movement” (James & Steger,
2013), opposing social and economic inequalities and the disappearance of
“real democracy”, conducted protests in 951 cities in 82 countries. However,
the movement was most active in the United States, where the first protest
was also organised: September 17, 2011, Occupy Wall Street (in total, there
were over 600 protests and occupations throughout the country). The hall-
marks of the movement have become – the slogan We are the 99%, the hash-
tag #Occupy and the websites Occupy Together (Berkowitz, 2011). From the
very beginning, the movement was largely based on social media, thanks
to which information was disseminated and extensive support was gained.
Activists, in order to coordinate the activities, used almost all informa-
tion channels available at that time – IRC, Facebook, Twitter and Meetup
(Conover, Ferrara, Menczer & Flammini, 2013; Daubs & Wimmer, 2017).
The Independent Media Center, forming an open network for groups of
journalists – activists reporting social and political issues, supported the
movement’s activities by co-organising Skype conferences and broadcasting
live conversations/chats with independent observers. May First/People Link,
a non-profit organisation that supports the development of the Internet net-
work to build a fair world, has offered free membership to many groups
around the world, enabling the use and security of website data and mail-
boxes. An extremely original initiative was the media promotion of the idea
of the movement through the works of art gathered in the National Museum
146 Rafał Dudała
of American History and the New York Historical Society. The goal of most
of the created works was visual impact through images, thereby strength-
ening the bonds of unity and solidarity among the activists (Knodel, 2011).
Another important example of American technopopulism is the activity
of the Tea Party movement, which emphasises the value of producerism,
claiming that members of a society engaged in the production of material
wealth bring more benefits to the society than elites who inherit their wealth
and position. This movement, formed in 2009 on the wave of mass street
protests directed against government anti-crisis plans, was led by people
with little political experience. For this reason, social media played such an
important role in the course of their activities: they constituted a democratic
forum for exchanging ideas about the ideology of the movement (Contract
from America) and creating a network of supporters. The first attempts
to unite the “tea” movements were made as early as 2002 under the aegis
of Citizens for Sound Economy, and the website www.usteaparty.com was
to serve this purpose. At that time, it was emphasised that the Tea Party
initiative was a nationwide undertaking, organised online and open to all
Americans convinced that taxes were too high and that the tax system was
too complicated (Fallin, Grana, & Glantz, 2012). A famous initiative of the
Movement, in the organisation of which new technologies were also used,
was the Taxpayer March. Moreover, the way this action was reported has
become the subject of journalistic disputes. As Howard Kurtz notes, most
media seem to position themselves quite clearly against these protests: Fox
News sees it as a big story, CNN as a modest story, and MSNBC as a great
story to make fun of. And for most newspapers this is no story (a non-story)
(Political Bulletin, 2009).
In Canada, a party with a distinct populist ancestry was the Reform
Party, formed on the wave of protest as a movement to defend the inter-
ests of Western Canada, evolving over time towards a centre-right group
with socially strong conservative elements. Since the party was dissolved
in 2000 becoming the main force of the newly formed Canadian Reform
Conservative Alliance, it has not made extensive use of new digital commu-
nication technology in its operations (Harrison, 2017). On the other hand,
social protests – Occupy Canada and Yellow Vests Canada, widely present
on social media, i.e. Facebook, Twitter and activists’ blogs (CASIS, 2019)
have become examples of typical technopopulistic movements.

South America
Latin America, as Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser note, has
probably the most enduring and widespread populist tradition. The rea-
sons for this should be sought in the coexistence of democratic governance
over the past century with a high rate of socioeconomic inequality. This
has resulted in the emergence of widespread prejudices that talented poli-
ticians have cemented their own populist ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser,
 Technopopulim in globalized world 147
2017, pp. 127–128; This phenomenon has been socially and politically
described as successive waves of Latin American populism: the first caused
by the Great Depression of the 1930s (lasting until the end of the 1960s)
and the second, which took place in the early 1990s. The third wave began
at the turn of the millennium, and in its ideological dimension it referred
to Americanism, anti-imperialism and opposition to the free market.
Among the numerous populist leaders are Presidents – Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela (Hawkins, 2010), Evo Morales in Bolivia (Farthing & Kohl,
2014), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (Conaghan & de la Torre, 2008), Daniel
Ortega in Nicaragua (Close, Martí i Puig, & McConnell, 2012) and the cur-
rent President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro (Foley, 2019). Although populism
in this region does not have a single political identity and occurs both in
left-wing and the right-wing variants, it uses modern media in each case.
The use of these new communication channels has made the Internet a
place of ideological disputes, and for technopopulists a tool to improve
their own image in the eyes of citizens. Kirk A. Hawkins (2009) empha-
sises that Latin political leaders are overwhelmingly populist leaders with
technocratic tendencies. At the same time, social media is becoming a
space for genuine discourse around the very idea of democracy in Latin
America, the weakness of its neoliberal model and its impact on the polit-
ical future of this part of the world (de la Torre, 2009; Campos-Herrera,
Umpierrez de Reguero, 2019). As the authors of the Latin America’s new
wave of populism – a movement more alive than ever before briefing, pop-
ulism appears in this region as an increasingly important factor affecting
the political scenarios of subsequent South American countries (Chile,
Honduras, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Colombia and Mexico should be added
to the ones mentioned above). Populist leaders, both those in power and
those in opposition, are characterised by charisma, authoritarian tenden-
cies, political incorrectness and rhetoric that attracts media attention. By
rejecting nuance in favour of confrontational language antagonising the
“good” oppressed people with “evil” and influential mafias, they are gain-
ing more and more interest (García & Vallejo, 2017). Determined by the
righteousness of the ideas they proclaim, they use new tools to commu-
nicate with the people, but often violate the law. An example of such a
practice was the use of WhatsApp during the last presidential campaign in
Brazil: the supporters of the far-right Bolsonaro sent out false information
about his opponent, the leftist mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddada and
his alleged approval of paedophilia via the free service. The rumour had
the intended political effect, and the app became a hidden platform for the
radicalisation of Brazilian right-wing groups (Nemer, 2019)

Asia
The political scene of Asia is characterised by clear differentiation between
two major political systems – democracy and authoritarianism (Huang, 2016;
148 Rafał Dudała
Hsiao, 2014). The countries of Central Asia and East Asia have maintained
unchanged political order over the decades through autocratic or economic
leadership (Hayes, 2012). The situation is different in the south-eastern
region of the continent, where the largest increase in technopopulist mobi-
lisation was noted (Pye, 1974; Mizuno & Phongpaichit, 2009; Croissant &
Lorenz, 2018; Kenny, 2018). Populists of this region, however, differ in their
priorities from their counterparts in Europe or South America, which can
be seen especially in the selection of the leading themes of the campaigns.
While others focus mainly on immigration, economic downturn or trade,
Southeast Asian populists are stoking religious and ethnic divisions, advo-
cating a rigorous fight against drug trafficking, and appealing to the work-
ing and lower classes. The latter, as noted by Joshua Kurlantzick (2018),
unequivocally express their profession of democracy, accusing politicians
of not tackling inequalities in a decisive way, of not tackling inequalities
in a decisive way. Another expression of uneducated democracy were the
defects of the party system, where the groups were often dominated by
clientelism and neopatrimonialism, managed individually or ancestrally.
Therefore, after gaining power, the populists took actions aimed at under-
mining democratic institutions and norms – they subordinated traditional
parties and took control of state institutions. The rightly indicated rea-
son for the success of populists (and autocrats) in countries such as the
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Burma is the ability to draw on the
collective frustrations arising in the face of the inefficiency of state institu-
tions both in the area of civil society and the task of providing basic goods
and services (Heydarian 2017). Moreover, the above-mentioned inter-ethnic
and inter-religious tensions are fuelled by social media and ongoing dis-
cussions on their forums. It is the populist leaders who have proved to be
particularly efficient in using new communication tools, allowing them to
reach out directly to society. For example, the President of the Philippines
Rodrigo Duterte has created an “army of bloggers and Facebook profiles”
that runs a “patriotic trolling” campaign aimed at silencing criticisms of
those in power (Etter, 2017).
A separate analysis, however, is demanded in case of the events in the
Middle East in 2011, called by the media the “Arab Spring” (Lynch, 2011).
However, this was not a purely populist movement, but a powerful rebellion
against autocratic regimes, supported by social issues, such as dissatisfac-
tion with living conditions, unemployment, rising food prices as well as cor-
ruption and nepotism by the authorities. Its technopopulist nature should
be looked for in the spread of political awareness on the occasion of these
events: neither the big political parties nor opposition leaders were behind
the organisation of the protests. And although the growing demonstrations
did not undermine the credibility of state media, they revealed their weak-
ening influence on the society of this part of the Asian continent (Telhami,
2011, p. 13; Bielińska, 2014; Fiedler, 2014; Godziński, 2014).
 Technopopulim in globalized world 149
Africa
The phenomenon of populism has not bypassed Africa, although its descrip-
tion in this case is extremely difficult due to the dominant specificity of the
local system: an authoritarian model of exercising power in the absence of a
clear ideology underlying the activities of political parties (Resnick, 2017).
In Africa, populist movements have criticised governments for electricity
and water shortages, garbage disposal, housing availability and food prices
(Resnick, 2010).
A new generation of populists has appeared on the African scene, pre-
senting conflicting and often disturbing visions about the future of the Dark
Continent. For example, Julius Malema and members of the Economic
Freedom Fighters party are pursuing concepts of politics historically linked
to with leftist demands – anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist (Forde, 2012). In
turn, David Bahati and homophobic activists from Uganda present deeply
conservative views, supported by religious rhetoric (Ruby, 2011). A large
cohort of contemporary populist groups finds their roots in older politi-
cal movements, while others have many new features. During the period of
decolonisation (the 1950s and 1960s), the newly created states were forced
to confront the emerging populist movements that questioned the techno-
cratic and nationalist framework, thus undermining the legitimacy of the
entire postcolonial project. In the 1970s, in turn, African dictators very
often used the media, mainly radio and television, imposing a new political
and cultural identity on their audiences. In turn, modern social media, hav-
ing a wider range and a greater power of persuasion, allow the creation of
new areas and organisational forms for conducting political discourse. For
example, social movements supported by social media, including queer and
feminist organisations, are attracting more and more participants, thus set-
ting the axis of technopopulist dispute. The goals they pursue significantly
shape the populist rhetoric, becoming either the subject of many demands
or the object of mocking attacks.
The “populist” label is used especially for African political leaders
such as the presidents of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni (Carbone, 2005), of
the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo (Piccolino, 2014), of Zambia, Michael
Sata (Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015) or the Republic of South Africa Jacob
Zuma (Beresford, 2011). All introduce themselves as the true defenders of
the “people” against the “elite” who betrayed them. However, African pop-
ulism has traditionally eluded Western analytical categories describing this
phenomenon in political categories of left-wing or right-wing. Moreover,
its impact on democracy is also unclear. There is no shortage of those who
perceive in African populism a potential for further development and who
attribute to populist leaders the ability to build multi-ethnic coalitions
(Cheeseman, Casal Bértoa, Storm, & Dodsworth, 2018). They also main-
tain that in the context of dynamically progressing urbanisation, populism
can provide young poor urban voters with a chance of participating in
150 Rafał Dudała
the political debate. Opponents of these assumptions, in turn, prove that
African populism, by fuelling social aspirations, becomes at most an incen-
tive for exclusionary nationalism, while offering empty promises of national
reconciliation. One thing seems to be beyond doubt: in achieving their own
goals, technopopulists rely on the dissatisfaction of urban and rural resi-
dents, using new communication technologies: this allows them to make
their message more direct and attractive. Thus, they reduce tensions on two
social levels: “urbanisation” and “informalisation” as well as “metropoli-
tan” and “peripheral” (Resnick, 2010, pp. 3–7).
The phenomenon of technopopulism is also present on the political
scene of Oceania. In the case of Australia, it is customary to point to a
stable two-party system (leftist Australian Labour Party and right-wing
the Coalition). The financial crisis (2007–2008) brought about numerous
changes, on the wave of which a number of small parties gained rep-
resentation in parliament. However, politics of protest is still growing,
visible at the local level: during the 2016 federal elections, where minor-
ity parties achieved their best result since 1949 (Wood, Chivers & Daley,
2018; Kenny, 2019). Among the leading issues highlighting the specifics
of Australian technopopulism are accusations of economic and politi-
cal elites benefiting at the expense of society, breaking social agreements
and even the law (Hogan, 2019). There is no difference in populist atti-
tudes between the municipal and regional electorate. The main subject
of technopopulist rhetoric is not primarily the challenges of immigration
or overcrowding, but economics. Protectionist economic policy, anti-
globalisation and restriction of free trade are gaining popularity thanks to
the media slogan Australia First. (Wood, Chivers, & Daley, 2018). Most of
the minority parties are based on technopopulist messages, mainly using
social media, both for promotional purposes and in the search for new
voters. Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and Clive Palmer’s United Australia
Party remain particularly active in this field, and the seats gains in the
Senate were a significant effect of their campaigning.
In New Zealand, Robert Muldoon, the Prime Minister in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, is considered an icon of populism. A democratic leader
in a populist style, extremely effective during television appearances, who
argued in the press, and who, when he headed the right-wing National Party,
gave it an interventionist character (Cowen, 2017; Kefford & McDonnell,
2018). The strategies used during the 2002 campaign by the nationalist New
Zealand First party and the centrist United Future New Zealand were con-
sidered almost exemplary. The so-called Orewa Speech delivered in 2004 by
the New Zealand National Party leader Don Brash on allegations regarding
Maori privileges sent a shock wave across the country. His populist over-
tones were associated with the fact of earlier polls, which clearly showed
that the topic of race relations is extremely delicate and has a significant
impact on voters (Johansson, 2017).
 Technopopulim in globalized world 151
Conclusion

The inevitability of development

A number of the analyses and evaluations undertaken and formulated une-

quivocally warn about the threat posed by growing populism on the stabil-
ity of liberal democracies. On the other side are the voices of those who see
populism as a sign of democratic resilience providing a necessary correc-
tion, helping to solve identified problems, limiting the excessive power of the
elite and allowing political systems to be more democratic. Meanwhile, as
the results of the research carried out in The Populist Harm to Democracy:
An Empirical Assessment project (2018) prove that the damage caused to
democracy by populist leaders is extremely acute.

• Populists are lasting longer in office. On average, populist leaders

remain in office twice as long as democratically elected non-populist
leaders. In addition, populists are five times more likely to hold their
position for over ten years than non-populists.
• Populists often leave office in dramatic circumstances. Only 34% of
populist leaders leave their positions as a result of free and fair elections
or because they respect their term of office. Many more are forced to
resign, are indicted or do not leave office at all.
• Populists put democracy at greater risk. 23% of populists allow dero-
gations from democratic principles, compared to 6% of democratically
elected non-populist leaders. In other words, populist governments
expose democratic institutions to four times more risk of destruction
than non-populist ones.
• Populists often destroy checks and balances of executive power. Over
50% of populist leaders change the constitution of their own country or
adopt a new one, and many of the changes introduced extend time lim-
its or weaken the control of the executive. Research shows that populist
attacks on the rule of law open the door to increased corruption: 40% of
populist leaders are accused of corruption, and the countries they lead
usually sink like a stone on international corruption rankings.
• Populists attack individual rights. Under populist rule, press freedom
drops by 7%, civil liberties by 8%, and political rights by 13%.

In the light of the above data, unequivocally confirming the negative impact
of populist governments – whether left or right-wing – on political systems
and the growing risk of erosion of democratic order, one should also look at
the new phenomenon of technopopulism with growing concern. Although
there can be no indication of the existence of causal links between the media
and the spread of populism the strong conviction that populism is also gain-
ing in popularity also thanks to media support cannot be undermined. In
152 Rafał Dudała
addition, the growing importance of social media is significantly expanding
the global reality of mass media, which is irresistible, and which facil-
itates the circulation of streams of populism in the democratic body
(Mazzoleni, 2010). Appreciating their informative and socialising role,
it is not uncommon to observe their destructive power when Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp and Gab serve as incubators for conspiracy
theories and misinformation influencing political discourse. And then it
ceases to be important whether the power is taken over by the populist
left or nationalist right. As Sarah Engler of the Center for Research on
Direct Democracy in Aarau notes, there are many reasons for the success
of technopopulist groups: exclusion in the era of globalisation, corruption
scandals at the heights of power or the decline of traditional mainstream
parties in the eyes of the electorate. “The populists” demand that politics
be conducted in the interests of the people does not at first sound unrea-
sonable – what else should the people’s representatives be doing, after all?
But populism goes further, explains Engler: “It assumes the existence of
a unified will of the people, to which basic elements of liberal democracy,
such as pluralism and protections for minorities, must be subordinated.
He also argues that in some countries populists openly question the sepa-
ration of powers” (Pauly, 2019).
A legitimate question therefore arises about the place of technopopulist
movements and their leaders as well as their importance for democratic
order. The theses formulated by the German historian and political scien-
tist Jan-Werner Müller (2017, pp. 162–166) can be helpful in searching for
answers. The first of these allows one to define technopopulism as an insep-
arable shadow of the principle of political representation, and its leaders as
merely claiming the right to represent. The second thesis points out that the
criticism of technopopulists concerns not only the elites but also pluralism,
hence they recognise the nation as a moral, homogeneous unity whose will
is infallible. Then, under the slogan of the common good, they hide conceal
their true aim, i.e. a convergence with their interests. It is false to call for fre-
quent referendums that are not intended to broaden political participation,
but instead to reinforce what they have defined as the will of the real people.
The fifth of these theses is a probable description of the technopopulist gov-
ernments representing the nation: the takeover of the state, mass clientelism,
corrupt practices, stifling civil society, and causing serious constitutional
conflict. The sixth thesis concerns the method of discourse: technopopulists
should be engaged with, without using their rhetoric; on the contrary, the
problems they raise should be taken seriously without accepting the ways
they define them. The last thesis maintains that technopopulism, not being a
correction of liberal democracy, may, however, prove useful, indicating that
some citizens are actually underrepresented. It should be assumed that such
dialogue, which is the backbone of the democratic-liberal tradition, can not
only provide an exclusive defence against the abuses of technopopulism, but
is also an inclusive form of involving its leaders in the political debate.
 Technopopulim in globalized world 153
References
Althusser, L. (1971). Lenin and philosophy and other essays. New York, NY: Monthly
Review Press.
Beresford, D. (2011). Truth is a strange fruit: A personal journey through the apartheid
war. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
Berkowitz, B. (2011, October 17). From a single hashtag, a protest circled the world.
Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/wallstreet-protests-
s o c i a l /f rom- a- s i ng l e -h a sht ag- a-prot e st- c i r cl e d-t he -world-idUS -
N1E79G1Q620111017
Bielińska, K. (2014). Od Al-dżaziry do twittera – wpływ mediów na arabską wiosnę.
Przegląd Politologiczny, 1, 381–394. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2014.19.1.24.
Bloom, P., & Sancino, A. (2018). Disruptive democracy: The clash between tech-
no-populism and techno-democracy. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526465658.
Campos-Herrera, G., & Umpierrez de Reguero, S. (2019). Populism in Latin
America: Past, present, and future. Latin American Politics and Society, 61(1),
148–159. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2018.63.
Campus, D. (2010). Mediatization and personalization of politics in Italy and
France: The cases of Berlusconi and Sarkozy. International Journal of Press/
Politics, 15(2), 209–235. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1940161209358762.
Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Caramani, D. E. (2017). Will vs. Reason: The populist and technocratic forms of
political representation ant their critique to party government. American Political
Science Review, 111(1), 54–67. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000538.
Carbone, G. M. (2005). ‘Populism’ visits Africa: The case of Yoweri Museveni and
no-party democracy in Uganda (Vol. 73). London: London School of Economics
and Political Science.
CASIS, V. (2019). Yellow vests, right-wing extremism and the threat to Canadian
democracy. The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare, 1(3), 1–12. doi:
http://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v1i3.819.
Cheeseman, N., & Larmer, M. (2015). Ethnopopulism in Africa: Ppposition mobili-
zation in diverse and unequal societies. Democratization, 22(1), 22–50. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.809065.
Cheeseman, N., Casal Bértoa, F., Storm, L., & Dodsworth, S. (2018, May 24).
How populism can be turned into an opportunity, not a threat. Retrieved from
The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/how-populism-can-be-turned-
into-an-opportunity-not-a-threat-96934
Close, D., Martí i Puig, S., & McConnell, S. (2012). The sandinistas and Nicaragua
since 1979. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Conaghan, C., & de la Torre, C. (2008). The permanent campaign of Rafael Correa:
Making Ecuador’s plebiscitary presidency. The International Journal of Press/
Politics, 13(3), 267–284. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1940161208319464.
Conover, M. D., Ferrara, E., Menczer, F., & Flammini, A. (2013). The digital evolu-
tion of occupy Wall Street. PLOS ONE, 8(5), e64679–https://doi.org/10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0064679. doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0064679.
Cowen, T. (2017, February 13). Feisty, protectionist populism? New Zealand tried that stuff.
Retrieved March 8, 2020, from Bloomberg Businessweek: https://www.bloomberg.
com/opinion/articles/2017-02-13/feisty-protectionist-populism-new-zealand-
tried-that
154 Rafał Dudała
Croissant, A., & Lorenz, P. (2018). Comparative politics of Southeast Asia: An intro-
duction to governments and political regimes. Cham: Springer. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-68182-5.
Daubs, M. S., & Wimmer, J. (2017). Forgetting history: Mediated reflections on
occupy Wall Street. Media and Communication, 5(3), 49–58. doi: https://doi.
org/10.17645/mac.v5i3.979.
de Blasio, E., & Sorice, M. (2018). Populism between direct democracy and the tech-
nological myth. Palgrave Communications, 4(1), 1–11. doi: https://doi.org/10.1057/
s41599-018-0067-y.
de la Torre, C. (2009). Populismo radical y democracia en los Andes. Journal of
Democracy en Español, 1, 24–37.
Deseriis, M. (2017). Technopopulism. The emergence of a discursive formation.
Triple C: Communication, Capitalism & Critique, 15(2), 441–458. doi: https://doi.
org/10.31269/triplec.v15i2.770.
Etter, L. (2017, December 7). What happens when the government uses Facebook as a
weapon? Retrieved from Bloomberg Businessweek: https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2017-12-07/how-rodrigo-duterte-turned-facebook-into-a-weapon-
with-a-little-help-from-facebook
Fallin, A., Grana, R., & Glantz, S. (2012). ‘To quarterback behind the scenes, third-
party efforts’: The tobacco industry and the tea party. Tobacco Control, 23(4),
322–331. doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050815.
Farthing, L. C., & Kohl, B. H. (2014). Evo’s Bolivia: Continuity and change. Austin,
TX: University of Texas Press.
Fiedler, R. 2014. Arabska wiosna – szanse i wyzwania dla polityki USA wobec blisk-
iego wschodu. Przegląd Politologiczny. 1:33–49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14746/
pp.2014.19.1.3.
Foley, C. (2019). In spite of you: Bolsonaro and the New Brazilian resistance. New
York, NY: OR Books. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvmd82x7.
Forde, F. (2012). An inconvenient youth. Julius Malema and the ‘new’ ANC. London:
Portobello Books.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. New York, NY: Pantheon
Books.
García, L., & Vallejo, C. (2017). The new populism in Latin America, more alive than
ever. Madrid: Developing Ideas. Llorent & Cuenca. Retrieved from Developing
Ideas. Llorente & Cuenca: https://ideas.llorenteycuenca.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/5/2017/09/170914_Informe_Populismo_ENG_OK.pdf
Godziński, M. (2014). Wpływ mediów społecznościowych na rozwój arabskiej
wiosny ludów. In M. Wożniak, & D. Ściślewska (Eds.), Cyberprzestrzeń w krajach
orientu: wolność i zniewolenie (pp. 17–27). Łódź: Katedra Bliskiego Wschodu i
Północnej Afryki Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.
Grassi, D. (2004). Il neopopulismo. In N. Bobbio, G. Pasquino, & N. Mateucci
(Eds.), Il dizionario di politica (pp. 739–740). Torino: UTET.
Harrison, T. W. (2017, June 1). Reform party of Canada. Retrieved from The
Canadian Encyclopedia: https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/
reform-party-of-canada
Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez populist?: Measuring populist discourse in com-
parative perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414009331721.
 Technopopulim in globalized world 155
Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s chavismo and populism in comparative perspec-
tive. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511730245.
Hayes, L. (2012). Political systems of East Asia: China, Korea, and Japan. New York,
NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Heydarian, R. J. (2017). The rise of Duterte: A populist revolt against elite democracy.
Singapore: Palgrave Pivot. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5918-6.
Hogan, W. (2019, February 24). Australia’s populist moment has arrived. Retrieved
from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/australias-populist-moment-
has-arrived-111491
Hsiao, H. H. (Ed.). (2014). Democracy or alternative political systems in Asia: After
the strongmen. Abingdon: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315852119.
Huang, M. H. (2016). Polarized politics, government legitimacy and democratic legiti-
macy in Taiwan. In J. Chan, D. C. Shin, & M. S. Williams (Eds.), Political legitimacy
in East Asia: Bridging normative and empirical analysis (pp. 166–189). Camridge:
Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316466896.008.
James, P., & Steger, S. M. (2013). Levels of subjective globalization: Ideologies,
imaginaries, ontologies. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology,
12(1–2), 17–40. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341240.
Johansson, J. (2017). Orewa and the rhetoric of illusion. Political Science, 56(2), 111–
129. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F003231870405600212.
Kasińska-Metryka, A. (2018). Demokracja liberalna w okowach „nowego pop-
ulizmu”. In K. A. Wojtaszczyk, P. Stawarz, & J. Wiśniewska-Grzelak (Eds.),
Zmierzch demokracji liberalnej? Warszawa: ASPRA-JR.
Kefford, G., & McDonnell, D. (2018). Inside the personal party leader-owners, light
organizations and limited lifespans. British Journal of Politics and International
Relations, 20(2), 379–394. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1369148117750819.
Kenny, P. (2019, May 10). Populism and the Australian election: What could fringe
voters deliver to our parliament? Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.the-
guardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/11/populism-and-the-australian-elec-
tion-what-could-fringe-voters-deliver-to-our-parliament
Kenny, P. D. (2018). Populism in Southeast Asia. Canberra: Cambridge University
Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108563772.
Knodel, M. (2011, November 1). Art from the 99%. Groundswell. Retrieved from
https://web.archive.org/web/20120515105055/http://groundswellcollective.
com/2011/11/01/art-from-the-99
Krupa, J. (2018, January 1). Wielka Brytania: Populiści zmieniają mapę poli-
tyczną Europy. Retrieved from Cooltura 24: https://www.cooltura24.co.uk/
wiadomosci/36085,wielka-brytania-populisci-zmieniaja-mape-polityczna-europy
Kurlantzick, J. (2018, November 1). Southeast Asia’s populism is different but also
dangerous. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/
in-brief/southeast-asias-populism-different-also-dangerous
Kyle, J. M. (2018, December 26). The populist harm to democracy: An empirical
assessment. Retrieved from Tony Blair Institute for Global Change: https://insti-
tute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-
Empirical-Assessment.pdf
Lynch, M. (2011, January 6). Obama’s ‘Arab Spring’? Retrieved from Foreign Policy:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/06/obamas-arab-spring/
156 Rafał Dudała
Mazzoleni, G. (2010). Populizm i środki przekazu. In O. Wysocka (Ed.), Populizm.
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Mizuno, K., & Phongpaichit, P. (Eds.). (2009). Populism in Asia. Singapore: NUS
Press-Kyoto University Press.
Müller, J.-W. (2017). Co to jest populizm? Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki
Politycznej.
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–
563. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037.
Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.
001.0001.
Nemer, D. (2019, August 16). WhatsApp is radicalizing the right in Bolsonaro’s Brazil.
Retrieved from HuffPost: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-
whatsapp_n_5d542b0de4b05fa9df088ccc
Nossiter, A. (2018, December 5). How France’s ‘Yellow Vests’ differ from populist
movements elsewhere. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/12/05/world/europe/yellow-vests-france.html
Nye, J. (2016, October 17). Populistyczna rewolucja to reakcja na zmianę wartości.
Retrieved from Wirtualna Polska: https://opinie.wp.pl/joseph-nye-populistycz-
na-rewolucja-to-reakcja-na-zmiane-wartosci-6048583814497409a
Patiño A., L. G. (2007). El neopopulismo en el contexto de la democracia latino-
americana. Revista Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas, 106, 239–261.
Pauly, M. (2019, April 26). Europa i ugrupowania antysystemowe. Retrieved from
European Data Journalism Network: https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/
pol/Wiadomosci/Data-news/Europa-i-ugrupowania-antysystemowe
Piccolino, G. (2014). Ultranationalism, democracy and the law: Insights from côte
d’Ivoire. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 52(1), 45–68. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0022278X13000827.
Pirate Parties International. (2020). Retrieved from https://pp-international.net
Political Bulletin. (2009, April 16). Retrieved from U.S. News & World Report:
https://web.archive.org/web/20100503154045/http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
politics/bulletin/bulletin_090416.htm
Pye, L. (1974). Southeast Asia’s political systems. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Resnick, D. (2010). Populist strategies in African democracies. Working Paper No.
2010/114, Helsinki: United Nation University - World Institute for Development
Economics Research.
Resnick, D. (2017). Populism in Africa. In C. R. Kaltewasser, P. Taggart, P. O.
Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.4.
Revelli, M. (2017). Populismo 2.0. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore.
Ruby, C. D. (Ed.). (2011). Parliament of Uganda, National Resistance Movement, The
Uganda Scouts Association. Fidel.
Taggart, P. (2007). Populizm i patologie polityki przedstawicielskiej. In Y. S. Mény
(Ed.), Demokracja w obliczu populizmu (pp. 111–117). Warszawa: PWN.
 Technopopulim in globalized world 157
Telhami, S. (2011). Arab public opinion. What do they want? In D. L. Byman, &
K. M. Pollack (Eds.), The Arab awakening. America and the transformation of the
Middle East. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Wood, D., Chivers, C., & Daley, J. (2018, March 12). Rise in protest votes sounds warn-
ing bell for major parties. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversa-
tion.com/rise-in-protest-votes-sounds-warning-bell-for-major-parties-93068
Woods, D., & Wejnert, B. (Eds.). (2014). Many faces of populism: Current perspec-
tives (Vol. 22). Bingley: Emerald.
 Conclusions
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka, Tomasz Gajewski

The purpose of the scientific reflection in this monograph on the phenom-

enon of political leadership was to examine the perspectives of its func-
tioning and development based on eight levels of analysis: the paradigm of
new leadership and the elements that build it; new tools and methods for
studying “online leadership”; building authority in the virtual/cyber space;
ethical aspects of creating the image of political leaders, with particular
emphasis on the role of lies in politics; new populisms and their impact via
the Internet; changes in the role and importance of contemporary political
parties as a back room for leaders; the impact of new leadership on society
(mediocracy); technological changes and their impact on the ways political
leaders act.
The most important conclusion from the analysis is the described emerg-
ing paradigm of neoleadership. Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka proves that
leadership, which is an integral part of political processes, is undergoing
constant transformation triggered by both internal factors and the pressure
of the wider environment. The author forecasts that the pace and structure
of these transformations heralds the emergence in the near future of a new
model of political leadership, which will be defined by technological pro-
gress and the consistent inclusion of new media in the political space. Its
determinants will be the ability to associative communication, the disap-
pearance of the importance of competence and ethics of responsibility, and
a consistent increase in the effectiveness of instruments of populist leader-
ship. The author also draws attention to the impact of “scissors inequalities”,
causing a degeneration of a sense of solidarity and a crisis of democratic val-
ues, already visible in Europe and the United States and manifesting, inter
alia, the erosion of a culture of trust. According to the author, citizens and
political leaders were “caught” in the eponymous network – their practices
are increasingly the domain of virtual reality.
The emergence and development of mediaracy is one of the transforma-
tions outlined above. Its expansion affects political neoleadership in statu
nascendi. As part of mediocracy, the creation and functioning of political
leaders is realised. Analysing this level of reflection on the political lead-
ership of the future, Maria Nowina Konopka argues that recipients make
 Conclusions 159
decisions based on a message predefined by the logic of media centres, pri-
marily based on how the leader presents herself/himself and how she/he
is presented in the media. “For many, media narration becomes a form of
implant of their own thoughts”, concludes the author. The narrative of the
future political leader will be “instrumented” by the latest technologies –
artificial intelligence and predictive learning algorithms working on it. This
will allow the leader and the leader’s environment to obtain accurate anal-
yses of Big Data. There will be more and more of it thanks to the devel-
opment of ultra-fast, high-speed 5G networks and the deeper and deeper
“immersion” of society in mediocracy. Democratic leaders in the “arena
of mediocracy” will compete in the field of the ability and effectiveness of
using analytical technologies.
The negative features of emerging neoleadership are, as Agnieszka
Kasińska-Metryka noted, the consistent increase in populist tenden-
cies among political leaders. In his reflection, Rafał Dudała sketches the
development of this issue, emphasising the problem of the impact of new
media on the development of a new variety of the so-called technopulism,
for which they are peculiar “incubators” of simplified, excluding messages.
Technopopulists will effectively construct and deconstruct social views.
Rafał Dudała presents an analysis of the developmental stages of this phe-
nomenon around the world, concluding that political leaders – technopopu-
lists will hijack/seize countries, which will result in corruption, destruction
of the foundations of civil society and traditional democratic values.
The emerging paradigm of political neoleadership will generate ethical
dilemmas. Artur Laska argues that preserving the coherence of democratic
systems will require leaders who have grown up in new conditions to give up/
quit enforcing their dominance to declare ethical neutrality of choices that
are fundamentally bad. His reflection shows that the moral awareness of the
leader, even in a world of brutal political struggle with increasingly effective
instruments of exerting influence at the leader’s disposal, may allow her/him
to “turn back” from such a path.
Katarzyna Gruszko and Witold Sokała focused on the creation of
authority in the socio-political scenery defined by the dispersed paradigm
of network power. In the light of the transformations of the phenomenon of
political leadership, the authors state that in the socio-political landscape
defined by the network, obtaining and maintaining the status of authority
will depend on the attractiveness of the content and the form of the message,
subjectively perceived by network participants. The authors predict that the
classic model of authority will gradually give space to a neoauthority who
will influence political leadership.
The new model of political leadership will also put pressure on party sys-
tems. Maciej Hartliński and Michał Kubát conducted an analysis of the
functioning of political parties, on the example of Poland and the Czech
Republic, pointing to the strong trend of transformation into leader-
ship-based organisms, which calls into question the coherence of democratic
160 Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka, Tomasz Gajewski
systems. This is particularly important in the perspective of the evolution of
the social and technological contour.
In the light of the above conclusions, new research questions arise, the
main one of which is how to examine political leadership created and largely
implemented in the virtual space? The existing instruments of social sciences
become insufficient and one should reach for tools from the discipline of
media science. Only in this way can the socially anticipated competences of
the new leader be recognised, among which generating attention becomes
dominant. Based on the research we can already conclude that this genera-
tion of attention is limited by several reservations.
First of all, the entities that provide their attention select who to devote
it to, while the entities accumulating the attention of others care primarily
about how to get and maintain it. Therefore, both sides have different needs.
The ability to identify and meet these needs are contemporary challenges
for political leaders in terms of political communication, but also knowl-
edge in the field of psychology of political behaviour.
Second, while the attention of the electorate can be bought (to pay some-
one to listen to us), the non-electoral interest must be generated naturally,
i.e. the recipient should assess the message as relevant and worth reading.
In this context, the knowledge of the leader regarding the current needs and
expectations of the electorate to whom the message is directed is crucial.
It is important to note that the multiplicity of these expectations leads to
a conflict situation, and the lack of satisfaction of postulates causes dis-
appointment and a certain level of dissatisfaction, which leads to negative
assessments and opinions. Defining these conflict-generating communica-
tion platforms and finding a balance that satisfies the expectations of all
stakeholders becomes one of the most important challenges in the age of
neoleadership.
Third, the message must have the ability to spread quickly and geomet-
rically. The ability to create a network (the right number of connections,
the considerable weight of their strength, the extent of relationships and
the ability to stabilise them) and the ability to manage it to generate atten-
tion is now a key challenge from the perspective of political communication.
Therefore, knowledge about where (and therefore on which search engines,
sites or social networking sites) current or potential voters actually can be
found gains importance.
Fourth, from this point of view, the ability to build and use a recom-
mendation system becomes important. Changing social habits of using the
media forces the leaders to change the philosophy of promoting their own
postulates and political programs. The system of recommendations plays
a significant role in this process, which in the era of information overload
allows directing the message to a precisely defined target group, at the
right time and place. An effective recommendation is nowadays becoming
a key factor determining the success of creating and maintaining political
leadership.
 Conclusions 161
In addition, the ability to attract attention increases if demands or opin-
ions are expressed by a recognised (recognisable) politician, in the right
environment and to the right audience, or if the statement is verified by
influential (recognised) reviewers. Recognition is now associated with the
category of respect, i.e. a person is more eager to receive attention the more
we respect her/him. The category of respect, in addition to the previous
ones: trust and recognition, is becoming a new determinant of political
competition.
In conclusion, the extremely clear transformations of political leadership
concern all its aspects - personality, communication, competence and image.
Our adoption of a relational perspective has shown that citizens are sub-
ject to the same changes – their needs, expectations and ways of acquiring
knowledge about politics. The rulers-ruled symbiosis that has been known
for centuries – ruled people are now “immersed” in the virtual world, and
the pandemic that hit the world in spring 2020 has further emphasised the
power and importance of “remote change management”. In this context, it
becomes necessary to supplement the theoretical analysis contained in this
book with the practice of selected countries and show how different scenar-
ios were chosen by the leaders of changing democracies and which effects
they can be accounted for. A description of these changes will be presented
in the next volume of the book.
Index

adiaforisation 56 Centre Agreement (Porozumienie

aestheticisation 101 Centrum, PC) 126
Africa 11, 149, 150, 153, 156 charisma 9, 64, 83, 99, 140, 147; charis-
agenda setting 25, 109, 110, 116–117, 121 matic 79–81
algorithms 17, 36, 38–47 Christian and Democratic
ANO 2011 127, 133, 135, 136, 137 Union – Czechoslovak People’s
Arab Spring 48, 148, 154, 156 Party (Křesťanská a demokratická
Arendt, Hannah 62 unie –Československá strana lidová;
artificial intelligence 35–36, 38, 41–42, KDU-ČSL) 126, 133, 136
45–47; see also Ciulla, Joanne 59
Asia 11, 14, 147, 148, 149 Civic Democratic Party (Občanská
attention 9–10, 22, 26–27, 31, 57, 59, 67, demokratická strana; ODS) 126, 133,
69, 77–78, 85, 101–106, 108–111, 113, 135
115, 117–120, 134, 140, 145, 147, 158, Civic Forum (Občanské fórum; OF) 126
160–161 Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska
attentionalism 77, 103–104; Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; PO) 125,
attentionalist pyramids of power 104 126, 131, 132, 134–137
authoritarian: leaders 46; tendencies Coleman, John 80
47, 147 communication 5, 8, 11, 15, 20, 23, 55, 77,
authority 13, 14, 31, 36, 85, 96, 100, 102–104, 107, 110, 140–143,
72–96 147–148, 161; associative 13, 159; auto-
Avolio, Bruce J. 6, 9, 65 mation of 4; code of 108; conflict 116;
digital 113; discursive 66; emotional
Babiš, Andrej 127, 135, 136 94; fragmentation of 107; marketing
Bandura, Albert 68 17; mass 7, 101, 103–104; modern 69,
Bard, Aleksander 76, 85, 95, 103–104 142; network 14, 117; new 147–148, 150;
Bass, Bernard M. 6, 9, 65, 69 one-way 66, 90; personalized 101, 103;
Bauman, Zygmunt 12, 13, 154 political 1, 10, 17–18, 21, 31, 100–101,
Beran, Harry 80 106–109, 112, 117–119, 160; public 114;
Bergson, Henri 57 social 140; two-way 67
Berlusconisation of the media 19, 22, 24 Communist Party of Bohemia and
Bingham, John B. 63 Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech
Blumler, Jay G. 2, 76, 89, 101, 107–108 a Moravy KSČM) 126, 133, 134, 136
Bocheński, Józef Maria 81–82, 88, 91 computational propaganda 44
Brown, Michael 67 conspiracy narratives 63
Burns, James MacGregor 6, 65, 68 consumerism 95
contextual intelligence 70
Canovan, Margaret 141 credibility 64, 68, 76–77, 81–83, 86–89,
Castells, Manuel 84–85, 109 91, 94, 116, 148
 Index 163
Czech Pirate Party (Česká pirátská Heifetz, Ronald 66
strana; ČPS) 127, 133, 136 homo politicus 53
Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká House, Robert J. 54
strana sociálně demokratická; ČSSD)
126, 133, 136 identity multiplexing 114
image 2, 7–8, 10, 14, 19, 23–24, 26–28,
Danielson, David R. 88 35, 45, 55, 60, 61–63, 69, 101, 146–147,
Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit 158, 161
přímé demokracie; ÚPD) 127, 133, Independent Mayors for the Province
134, 135; see also Okamura, Tomio (Nezávislí starostové pro kraj;
de Blasio, Emiliana 141 NSPK) 127
De Hoogh, Annebel 68 individualisation 101
demagogy 15, 61 influence 1, 5, 7, 9, 13, 24, 28, 34,
Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz 36–38, 40–47, 52, 54, 58, 61, 64–65,
Lewicy Demokratycznej; SLD) 125, 68–69, 76, 83, 87–88, 94, 96, 104–106,
132, 134, 135 109–110, 118, 124, 128, 131, 140, 144,
Den Hartog, Deanne 68 148, 159
DePaulo, Bella 62 informal power networks (NSW) 78
Digital Revolution 35 information asymmetry 86
Disruptive technologies 34 infosphere 78, 86
dominance 22, 62, 78, 97, 134 infotainment 19, 21–24
Duterte, Rodrigo 148 Ingarden, Roman 57
interactionism 102
economisation 101 Internal Power Network 78
empathic resonance 53 internalisation 57
empathy 53, 70
epigenetic rules 53 Johnson, Boris 44
euphoria of the liar 62
expectations 5, 15, 18, 25, 58, 65, 70, 77, Kaczyński, Jarosław 126, 134, 136
80, 95, 107, 113, 115, 116–118, 160–161 Kaczyński, Lech 126, 134
expertise 39, 41, 82–83, 86, 99 Kadeřávek, Jiří– 127
Kalousek, Miroslac 127
Five Star Movement 10, 151 Kalshoven, Karianne 68
Flanagin, Andrew J. 82 Kavanagh, Dennis 17, 76, 89, 101,
Fourth Industrial Revolution 35–36 106–109
Fragmentation 29, 82, 101, 107, 108, Klaus, Václav 126
113–114 Kohlberg, Lawrence 57
Freedom and Direct Democracy Krotz, Friedrich 20, 103
(Svoboda a přímá demokracie; SPD)
127, 131, 134, 135; see also Okamura, Lankes, David 89
Tomio Law and Justice (Prawo i
Freedom Union (Unia Wolności; UW) Sprawiedliwość; PiS) 125, 126, 131,
126 132, 134, 136, 137, 144
leadership 1–10, 12, 14, 31, 36–38, 52,
Geremek, Bronisław 126 54–55, 63–70, 80–81, 100, 102, 118,
Goban-Klas, Tomasz 84 124–126, 128, 131, 134–136, 140–141,
Grant, Ruth W. 60 158; authentic 65, 67; charismatic
Grebeníček, Miroslav 136 80; classic 7; creation of 53; decon-
Greenwood, Davydd 79 centrated leadership 69; democratic
Grillo, Beppe 10 62, 69; dominant 54; economic 148;
effective 4, 15, 43, 59, 70; ethical 54,
Harrison, David 67 67, 69–70; evolution of 9; marketing-
Hauben, Michael 89 controlled 11; marketing-oriented 1,
Havel, Václav 70 5–8, 13, 31; natural 7; neoleadership
164 Index
1–2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12–14, 30–31, 100, Olechowski, Andrzej 126
118, 158–161; neoprene 13; (non) Oliver, Sholz 82
moral 58; party 124, 127, 132; phe- Òrban, Vikror 10
nomenon of 2, 14; political 3, 5, 14,
35–40, 42–45, 47, 52–54, 58–59, 64, Personalisation of: politics 27, 28;
70, 78, 81, 159–160; PR-populist 14; content 22
technology-assisted 46; temptation for personalized community 109
62; traditional 1, 5–8; transactional Pirate Party 144
64; transformation of 2; transforma- Płażyński, Maciej 126
tional 64–66; transposition 66–77; Podemos 10, 144
polarisation 25, 29, 46
Machiavelli, Nicolo 59, 64; Polish People’s Party (Polskie
Machiavellianism 59 Stronnictwo Ludowe; PSL) 125, 132,
machine learning 35, 39–44, 135
46–47 Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska
Machowski, Andrzej 135 Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza;
manipulation 44, 60, 117 PZPR) 125
mediacracy 18, 19, 25–27, 29–30; see also politainment 19, 21–23
politainment political lying 61–62; see also manipula-
medialisation 19, 20, 22; see also info- tion; misinformation; propaganda
tainment; politainment political marketing 7–9, 108
mediatisation 8, 17, 19–20; see also political paranoia 63
infotainment;politainment political subjectivity 52
Mendonca, Manuel 59, 69 populism 5, 10, 13–14, 30, 36, 56,
Metzger, Miriam J. 82 100–101, 107–108, 141, 143, 145, 147,
misinformation 86, 88, 152 149–152; see also manipulation; mis-
modernisation 101 information;neopopulism; new pop-
Moore, George E. 57 ulism; propaganda; technopopulism
moral intuition 53 Pospíšil, Jiří 136
Morton, Lewin 79 post-truth 63
Mudde, Cas 140, 146 power 1, 5, 7–8, 10–13, 17–20, 24, 28,
Müller, Jan-Werner 152 35, 45, 55, 57–62, 64–65, 68–69, 76,
78–81, 83–86, 89–96, 103–106, 112,
narcissistic personality disorders 57 126, 128, 131, 136, 142–143, 145,
neo-authority 79, 94, 96 147–149, 151–152, 159, 161
neopopulism 142 primarily intentionality 53
netizens 89 Prominence-Interpretation Theory 87
netocrats 95 propaganda 1, 12, 41, 44, 55, 86, 90;
network 1–3, 14, 19, 31, 35, 38, 40–41, see also computational propaganda;
44, 55, 60, 69, 76, 78–79, 83–92, 96, manipulation; misinformation
100–101, 104–105, 109, 111–113, public opinion 93, 95, 100–101, 107–108,
117–119, 144, 146, 159–160; 5G 38, 40, 110–111, 114, 116–117, 145,
46–47, 159; cyber 63; dependency 60; public sphere 29, 55, 57, 60, 143
global 141; media (networked) 36;
mega- 94; open 145; social 27, 86–87, Rabindra, Kanungo 59,
90–91, 102, 108, 110, 143, 160; society 69
77, 95; SPIN 83–84; Star-type 92; see reciprocity 53, 68, 70
also informal power networks (NSW) Recommender Systems, RS 112
new populism 11–12, 158 Reform Party (Canada) 146
North America 145 relevant information 112
representation 42, 142, 144, 152
Occupy Movement 145–146 reverse agenda-setting 110, 116, 117
Oceania 150 Rieh, Soo Young 88
Okamura, Tomio 127, 133–135, Rifkin, Jeremy 35
 Index 165
Scheller, Max 58 technology 1, 18, 29, 34–39, 41, 43–46,
Schetyna, Grzegorz 135 84, 93, 109, 140, 143–144, 146
Schwab, Klaus 35–36 technopopulism 141, 143–144, 146,
Schwarzenberg, Karel 127 150–152
secularisation 76, 101 The Mayors and Independent Party
shilling (shill marketing) 112 (Starostové a nezávislí; STAN) 127,
Sienkiewicz, Piotr 84 131, 135
social anomie 63 The Tipping Point 111
Social Democracy of the Republic Toffler, Alvin 91
of Poland (Socjaldemokracja TOP 09 127, 133, 136
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; Treviño, Linda 67
SdRP) 125 Trochimczuk, Joanna 92
social exchange theory 68 Trump, Donald 10, 14, 44,
social media 39, 71, 79, 91, 100, 102, 113, trustworthiness 82–83
141, 143, 145, 148 Tusk, Donald 126, 134, 135, 136, 159
Söderqvist, Jan 77, 85, 95, 103
Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Umphress, Elizabeth E. 63
Wyborcza Solidarność; AWS) 126 United People’s Party (Zjednoczone
Sorice, Michele 141 Stronnictwo Ludowe; ZSL) 125
South America 146–148
Steidlmeier, Paul 65 Vojtěch, Filip 136
symbolisation 57
Weber, Max 4–5, 59, 63, 79–80, 83
tabloidisation 19, 22, 24 Wilders, Geert 10
Taggart, Paul 140 Wilson, Patrick 81, 88, 94
Tea Party 146
technocratism 55–56 Yellow Vests Movement 144, 146