FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175874. December 11, 2013.]

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, Namely: FRANCISCA T.

MATBAGON, NATIVIDAD T. ABADIANO, CARLITO C.
TRAZONA; and Heirs of EDELBERTO C. TRAZONA
represented by his daughter DOMICINA T. ARANAS, ELADIA
T. ALICAMEN (Now Deceased) Substituted by DOMINGO
ALICAMEN, LUPECIO ALICAMEN, REBECCA ALICAMEN-
BALBUTIN, ELSEI ALICAMEN, GLENN ALICAMEN, LENNEI
ALICAMEN-GEONZON, DANILO ALICAMEN, JOVELYN
ALICAMEN-VILLETA, JIMBIE ALICAMEN and HERMOGENES C.
TRAZONA (Now Deceased) Substituted by LILYBETH
TRAZONA-MANGILA, GEMMA TRAZONA, ELIZALDE
TRAZONA, BOBBY TRAZONA, and PALABIANA B. TRAZONA ,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA, Namely: ROSITA
C. GERSALINA, CONCEPTION C. GEONZON, DANIEL CAÑADA,
GORGONIO CAÑADA, LEOPOLDO CAÑADA, SUSANA C.
DUNGOG, LUZVIMINDA C. TABUADA, AND CEFERINA
CAÑADA; PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR of Cebu and MUNICIPAL
ASSESSOR of Minglanilla, Cebu, respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J :p

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals Cebu
City (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00099. The CA reversed the Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57 (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-
20620, which annulled the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 and
ordered the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959 in the name of
Dionisio Cañada (Dionisio), predecessor of respondents.
Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Cipriano), who owned an
untitled parcel of land referred to as Lot No. 5053-H. The property, located in
Minglanilla, Cebu, is covered by Tax Declaration No. 07764 and has an area
of 9,515 square meters. 4 The land was purchased from the government in
1940. 5 Since then, Cipriano had taken possession of the land, cultivated it
and diligently paid taxes thereon. 6aCTHDA

In 1949, Dionisio bought the adjacent parcel of land from Pilar Diaz. 7 It
was later found that he had encroached on a small portion of Lot No. 5053-
H. He was then summoned by Cipriano for a confrontation before the
barangay captain in 1952. 8 Dionisio offered to buy the encroached portion,
but Cipriano refused the offer. 9 In 1956, the latter gave Dionisio permission
to temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands. 10 No
action for ejectment was filed against Dionisio during the lifetime of Cipriano,
11 who eventually died on 18 May 1982. 12 The latter's son Hermogenes, one
of the petitioners herein who had cultivated the lot since 1972, took over. 13
On 24 March 1992, Dionisio died. 14
The present controversy arose in 1997. Petitioners went to the Office of
the Municipal Assessor to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, as
they intended to sell Lot No. 5053-H to an interested buyer. 15 To their
surprise, they were informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued on 24
June 1996 in the name of Dionisio. 16 Apparently, respondents had caused
the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 27 June 1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of
Dionisio. 17 That sale involved a portion of Lot No. 5053-H described as
follows:
. . . that portion of land of Lot No. FIVE THOUSAND FIFTY THREE-H
(5053-H) under subdivision plan FLR-133 approved by the Director of
Lands Jose P. Dans on September 5, 1953, covered by monuments
No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, of said Lot No. 5053 bounded on the North by Lot
No. 5954 & portion of Lot 5053-H; East by portion of Lot 5053-H;
South by Lot no. 5053-J of Domingo Ababon; West by Lot no. 9479; . .
. . 18
HCacDE

Petitioners summoned respondents before the Lupon Tagapamayapa ,

but the conciliation was not successful. 19 On 28 July 1997, petitioners filed a
Complaint 20 against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of
sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959, recovery of possession and
ownership, damages, and payment of attorney's fees. Petitioners alleged
therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery.
Respondents, in their Answer, 21 alleged that the assailed deed was a
genuine document and asked for the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees, as counterclaims.
During trial, among the witnesses presented by petitioners was Romeo
O. Varona, document examiner of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Region VII. He testified that according to his comparative
analysis of Cipriano's signature on the assailed deed and standard
signatures on other documents, Cipriano's signature on the deed in question
was a forgery. 22
For their part, respondents presented Dionisio's son Gorgonio, who
testified that he was present when the assailed deed was executed. 23 He
also stated that they had enjoyed the fruits of the lot in question from 1956
until 1960, when they were confronted by petitioners. Respondents were
asked to show proof of ownership, but could not present any. 24 Thus, from
1960 onwards, petitioners enjoyed the fruits of the property. 25 Later,
respondents were able to find a copy of the assailed deed in the National
Archives, thereby enabling them to cause the issuance of Tax Declaration
No. 23959. 26
In the presentation of their rebuttal evidence, petitioners presented a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953, 27 executed by Pilar Diaz in favor
of Dionisio. This prior sale involved the exact same portion allegedly sold to
him by Cipriano — except that in the date of approval of the subdivision plan
by the Director of Lands, two figures were interchanged. Whereas the
assailed deed showed the date as "September 5, 1953," the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953 showed the date as "September 5, 1935."
IEaHSD

In its Decision dated 6 April 2004, the RTC annulled the assailed deed
and ordered the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959, as well as the
reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 07764. 28 Respondents were also
ordered to demolish their residential house on Lot No. 5053-H and to pay
petitioners attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 29
The RTC found that respondents' failure to present the deed for 40
years from its alleged execution had not been satisfactorily and convincingly
explained. 30 It also found that the assailed deed was indeed a forgery for
the following reasons:
1. Â It would have been pointless for Dionisio to buy the same
property twice from different owners. aCSHDI

2. Â Cipriano's residence certificate, whose number was

indicated in the assailed deed, as well as in the notarial
register where the deed was recorded, was allegedly issued
in Minglanilla, Cebu. The other persons' residence
certificates, whose numbers were indicated on the same
page of the notarial register, appear to have come from the
same booklet as the residence certificate of Cipriano, judging
from their numerical sequence. However, the residence
certificates of these other persons had been issued in Sogod,
Cebu.
3. Â There was indeed a glaring difference between the alleged
signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed and in his standard
signatures in 10 other documents submitted by plaintiffs.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal dated 30 April 2004.
RULING OF THE CA
On 25 May 2006, the CA issued a Decision reversing that of the RTC.
The appellate court ruled that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite
evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. 31 The deed,
being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and
due execution. Also, the fact that it was an ancient document that "remained
unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its authenticity." 32 CaAcSE

The CA also concluded that the document examiner was not able to
determine the forgery with certainty. What he had examined was a mere
machine copy of the assailed deed. 33 Furthermore, even he admitted that
the standard signatures of Cipriano had shown variations among
themselves.
 Finally, the CA ruled that respondents were the actual possessors of
Lot No. 5053-H, since it was their house that was standing on the property.
34 Thus, the CA granted the appeal and consequently dismissed the

Complaint of petitioners.
ISSUES
Petitioners come before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari 35

alleging that the CA erred as follows:

1. Â Ruling that petitioners were not able to overturn the
presumption of regularity of the assailed deed;
2. Â Finding that the document examiner was not able to
establish the forgery with certainty;
3. Â Finding that respondents were in actual possession of Lot
No. 5053-H;
4. Â Ruling that there was no merit in petitioners' prayer for the
award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses. DaCEIc

OUR RULING
Petitioners presented clear and convincing
evidence that the assailed deed is a forgery.
Well-settled is the rule that petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45 before this Court should involve only questions of law. 36 A reading of the
issues raised by petitioners readily show that they are questions of fact,
which are generally not within the purview of this Court. When a question
involves facts, the findings of the CA, including the probative weight
accorded to certain pieces of evidence, are binding on this Court. Also well-
settled, however, are exceptions to this rule, 37 such as when the findings of
fact of the CA are contrary to those of the RTC, as in this case.
We sustain the findings of the RTC.
At the outset, it is worth pointing out that the sale of a mere portion of
Lot No. 5053-H was what brought about the cancellation of Tax Declaration
No. 07764 and the consequent issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959, each
of which covered the entire lot. The fact that the assailed deed covers only a
portion of Lot No. 5053-H becomes clearer still when one considers that it
was bounded on the north and the east by portions of Lot No. 5053-H itself.
As will be shown below, the assailed deed is a forgery. Assuming it
were genuine, petitioners have a right to the rest of the property not covered
by the purported sale. If the procedure for the issuance of tax declarations
was followed — if care had been observed to make sure that all papers were
in order and understood — this irregularity would not have taken place.
It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as
regards their due execution. 38 Nevertheless, while notarized documents
enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can
be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. 39 Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear
and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed. acCDSH

First, the document examiner determined that the signature of

Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised
about his expertise. The finding of the CA that he had examined a mere
machine copy of the assailed deed was erroneous. The pertinent portion of
his testimony clearly shows otherwise, to wit:
ATTY. DURANO:
Q: Â Now you made mention of the standard documents, could you
kindly tell the Honorable Court what is [the] questioned
document stated in your report? DICcTa

[ROMEO O. VARONA]
[A]: Â The questioned document is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 27, 1956.
Q: Â Do you have a copy of that Deed of Sale as examined by you?
A: Â Well, I have a machine copy. I have examined the original
copy at the archive's office, Mandaue City. 40 (Emphasis
supplied)
In concluding that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed was a
forgery, the document examiner found that there were "significant
differences in letter formation, construction and other individual handwriting
characteristics" between the assailed and the standard signatures of
Cipriano. 41
The fact that the document examiner himself admitted that even the
standard signatures of Cipriano showed variations among themselves does
not make the former's determination any less convincing. He explained that
while every signature of the same person varies, the individual handwriting
characteristics of the person remain the same. 42 In Cesar v. Sandiganbayan,
43 we recognized that there is bound to be some variation in the different

samples of genuine signatures of the same person.

Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the
signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was
forged through independent observation: EcDSTI

Finally, a scrutiny of the signature on the questioned deed of sale

compared to the eleven (11) signatures on the ten (10) standard
documents there exists a glaring difference in the letter formation of
capital letters "C" in Cipriano and "T" in Trazona. The capital C in
questioned signature, the initial stroke stopped at the upper curve of
the letter C while in the standard signatures, it overlaps from the upper
curve. In the word Trazona, the capital T in the questioned signature is
disconnected from the T bar to the body of the questioned signature
whereas, in the standard signatures, the capital T is connected. These
discrepancies can easily be noticed by mere physical appearance that
the letters C and T were written. 44
Third, the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953
brings into question the regularity of the assailed deed. This deed was never
disputed by respondents at any stage of the proceedings, and was in fact
admitted by them in their Comments to Plaintiffs' Additional Formal Offer of
Exhibits. 45 Indeed, the RTC was correct in its observation that no one in
complete possession of one's mental faculties would buy the same property
twice from different owners. Respondents never provided any explanation
for this anomalous situation. In any case, it has been established that Lot No.
5053-H is in the name of Cipriano, who bought it from the government in
1940. Thus, only Cipriano had the right to dispose of the property, or
portions thereof.
Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon
since the time he acquired it from the government, and even after its
purported sale to Dionisio, until his death. 46 Petitioners continued paying
the taxes thereon even after Cipriano had died. 47 Respondents started
paying taxes on the property only after Tax Declaration No. 23959 was
issued in Dionisio's name in 1997. 48 It would be absurd for petitioners to
pay taxes on a property they do not own. AIECSD

Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself, petitioners were the ones

enjoying the fruits of the property from 1960 until the present controversy.
49 Again, it is incongruous for petitioners to enjoy the fruits if respondents

owned the property.

Sixth, as the RTC noted, there was an irregularity regarding the place
of issuance of Cipriano's residence certificate indicated in the assailed deed,
as compared with the residence certificates of the other persons indicated
on the same page of the notarial register.
Finally, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of
Archives presented the assailed deed, the paper was noted to be white,
while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had
turned yellow with age. 50 Further, when the analyst was asked the question
of when the assailed deed was received by the Bureau of Archives, she
answered that it was forwarded to them only on 28 September 1987 by RTC
Region 7, Notarial Division. 51
Clearly, the evidence adduced fully supports the position of petitioners
that the assailed deed of sale is forged and that they are the owners of the
property. Having been forced to litigate in order to protect their interest
therein, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to them is in
order.
The actual possession of Lot No. 5053-H by petitioners has been
properly ruled on by the RTC. Much has been made by the CA of the fact that
respondents' house was standing on the property. However, petitioners have
explained that the house was erected only after Cipriano permitted it. cDCaTS

Dionisio was then well aware that this temporary arrangement may be
terminated at any time. Respondents cannot now refuse to vacate the
property or eventually demand reimbursement of necessary and useful
expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, because the
provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. 52 Persons who occupy land
by virtue of tolerance of the owners are not possessors in good faith. 53
Thus, the directive of the RTC for respondents to demolish their residential
house on Lot No. 5053-H was also proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 00099 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, in Civil Case No.
CEB-20620 is REINSTATED in all respects. aSTECI

SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 100-105. The Decision dated 25 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Cebu City Nineteenth Division was penned by Associate Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican, with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr. concurring.

2. Id. at 106-107. The Resolution dated 8 November 2006 of the CA Cebu City
Special Former Nineteenth Division was penned by Associate Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican, with Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla
concurring.

3. Id. at 204-215.

4. Id. at 204.

5. Id.

6. Id. at 204-205.

7. Id. at 207.

8. Id.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 204.

13. TSN, 4 March 1999, p. 16.

14. Rollo , p. 205.

15. Id. at 205, 207.

16. Id. at 205.

17. Id.
18. Folder of Exhibits, p. 14.

19. Rollo , p. 205.

20. Records, pp. 1-9.

21. Id. at 22-25.

22. Rollo , p. 208.

23. TSN, 5 August 1999, pp. 7-8.

24. Id. at 12-13.

25. Id. at 13.

26. Id. at 13-15.

27. Folder of Exhibits, p. 58.

28. Rollo , p. 215.

29. Id.

30. Id. at 213.

31. Id. at 102.

32. Id. at 103.

33. Id.

34. Id. at 104.

35. Id. at 5-98.

36. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.

37. (1) [T]he factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures, (3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, (5) the appellate court,
in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts,
(7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are
mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set
forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or where the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but
are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Heirs of Ampil v. Manahan, G.R.
No. 175990, 11 October 2012, 684 SCRA 130, 138-139)

38. Basilio v. CA, 400 Phil. 120, 124 (2000).

39. Cleofas v. St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., 381 Phil. 236, 247 (2000).

40. TSN, 14 April 1999, pp. 8-9.

41. Folder of Exhibits, p. 51.

42. TSN, 15 April 1999, pp. 8-9.

43. 219 Phil. 87, 106 (1985).

44. Rollo , p. 214.

45. Records, pp. 206-207.

46. Id. at 213.

47. Id.

48. Id.

49. TSN, 5 August 1999, pp. 12-13.

50. TSN, 9 December 2002, pp. 10-12.

51. TSN, 18 March 2003, p. 8.

52. Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 428.

53. Resuena v. CA, 494 Phil. 40 (2005).