ARBA MINCH UNIVERSITY

SA
WLA
COLLAGE OF COMERCE AND BUSINESS ADMINSTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF; MANAGEMENT

COURCE TITLE; ETHIOPIA HISTORY AND THE HORN

GROUP ASSIGNMENT

SUBMITION DATE: JAN; 06/2016 E.C

GROUP MEMBERS NAME: ID:

1. Abraham Arsibo 002/2012

Submitted to: - Tilahun. A

Sawla Ethiopia
Table of Contents
1. Discuss the current issue of Abbay (Nile) River Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan.................................1
1.1. Introduction...........................................................................................................................1
1.2. The GERD as a threat to Egypt and Sudan.............................................................................2
1.3. Legal instruments governing the Nile....................................................................................3
1.4. Framing the conflict...............................................................................................................4
1.5. A history of failed efforts to resolve conflicts in the Nile Basin..............................................5
1.6. The need for two new treaties in the Nile Basin....................................................................6
1.7. The way forward....................................................................................................................6
References.............................................................................................................................................8

Figure 1 Abay River Originating From Lake Tana...................................................................................1

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1. Discuss the current issue of Abbay (Nile) River Ethiopia, Egypt and
Sudan.

1.1. Introduction

The Abay river tumbles out of the Ethiopian highlands from its source in Lake Tana and
embarks on an 800km journey through a deep gorge as large as the Grand Canyon of the
Colorado River until it makes a sharp western turn and meets the White Nile near Khartoum,
Sudan.

Ethiopia is constructing a hydroelectric dam on this river (called Abay in Ethiopia) at the
edge of its western border with Sudan. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
broke ground in 2011 and is now nearing completion. This project has been fully financed by
the Ethiopian public and has cemented itself as a monument of national pride for the country.
Egypt, a downstream consumer of the Nile River has opposed the construction of this dam
from the beginning. Nonetheless, that didn't stop Ethiopia from breaking ground on the
project nearly a decade ago. The dam is now at the final stages of completion and these two
countries are at a crossroads again about the filling and operation of the dam.

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 Figure 1 Abay River Originating From Lake Tana

Egypt contends that the filling of this dam will reduce its current flow of the Nile waters.
Ethiopia argues that it has the right to fully utilize waters of the Abay River which originates
in its country in Lake Tana. Furthermore, Ethiopia believes that it has already accommodated
Egypt's concerns by agreeing to fill this dam over a prolonged course of three to seven
years. The moral, historical, economic, and legal dimensions of this dispute collectively make
it one of the most interesting and important geopolitical issues of the 21st century and a
harbinger of other climate and resource related conflicts to come. Arriving at a long-term
solution to this dispute is crucial to the development of both these countries and Africa's
economic future. This essay is a four part series that seeks to understand this issue from these
four dimensions. Each section is self-contained and may be read independently or from start
to finish.

In 2011, Ethiopia started building a dam on the Blue Nile called the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD). That decision exacerbated long-simmering conflicts between
Ethiopia and the two downstream States, Egypt, and Sudan. Since then, the three countries
have been unable to agree on legally binding rules on filling and operating the GERD. While
there are many reasons why these three countries have not been able to resolve their
disagreements, especially about the GERD, the most important is the insistence by the
downstream States that the colonial-era Nile Waters Treaties must be made the baseline for
determining the impact of the GERD on their economies. Hence, the key to resolving the
conflict over the GERD is the adoption of a new treaty that is mutually acceptable and
recognizes the rights of all relevant States. For that to happen, both Egypt and Sudan must
give up the claim to the rights acquired through the Nile Waters Treaties.

In the summer of 2021, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi told visiting Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi that he would take a firm stance on "preserving [Egypt's] water security in
the face of an on-going dispute over a giant Nile dam project. El-Sisi also reiterated what he
called Egypt's "historical rights to the Nile waters and stressed the need to reach a binding
legal agreement on the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that
worked in the interests of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

In July 2021, El-Sisi "vowed retribution if Addis Ababa denied Egypt its vital share of the
Nile's waters. In response, Ethiopia's water minister Seleshi Bekele stated: "There is no need
to enter an unnecessary war. A war can't start because of water. Water flows if you fight
today, it'll continue to flow tomorrow. Experts have noted that a decision by Egypt to go to
war with Ethiopia over Nile waters would present Cairo with mostly insurmountable
challenges. These include Ethiopia's geography, the need for Egypt to strengthen its relations
with other African countries, particularly the Nile's upstream riparian states, the political
turmoil in Sudan, and the proliferation of foreign military bases across the region.

The conflict between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan involves much more than the GERD, how
long it will take to fill the reservoir, and how the GERD will be managed. There is also fear
in Cairo that if Addis Ababa is allowed to complete and operate the dam without a legally
binding agreement, that could open the door for other Nile riparian states to act similarly,
effectively threatening Egypt's water security and its ability to control projects on the Nile
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and its tributaries. This is why Cairo wants an agreement that preserves Egypt's acquired
rights, including its ability to veto Nile River projects.

1.2. The GERD as a threat to Egypt and Sudan

On April 2, 2011, then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, announced that the country
would build a dam on the Nile River, about forty kilometers from the Sudanese border. The
decision to build the GERD exacerbated long-simmering conflicts between the downstream
and upstream States of the Nile Basin over the allocation and utilization of Nile waters.

Rivers originating in the Ethiopian highlands, which include the Blue Nile (Abay), Sobat
(Baro-Akobo), and the Atbara (Tekeze), provide over 85% of the water that flows into the
Nile, with the rest coming from the White Nile, which flows from the Great Lakes Region of
Central Africa. For many years, Ethiopia's use of Nile waters has been negligible; this has
been due to many factors, the most important of which lack of capacity is, and legal and
institutional constraints imposed by various bilateral colonial-era treaties. This has resulted in
what has been referred to by one researcher as "one of Africa's cruellest ironies: the land that
feeds the Nile is unable to feed itself.

1.3. Legal instruments governing the Nile

To fully appreciate the nature of the conflict over the GERD, it is important to be conversant
with the various legal instruments that currently exist in the basin, including the colonial-era
bilateral treaties, which are collectively referred to as the Nile Waters Treaties. These include
the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, which was concluded between Britain (representing
Sudan) and Ethiopia to delineate the boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan; the 1929 Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty, in which Britain was representing its East African colonies.
Kenya,Tanganyika, and Uganda; and the 1959 Nile Treaty, which was a bilateral agreement
between Egypt and Sudan.

These treaties are at the Centre of the conflict over the GERD. After estimating the average
annual flow of the Nile River as measured at Aswan to be 84 billion cubic meters (BCM), the
Nile Waters Treaties allocated 55.5 BCM (66%) to Egypt; 18.5 (22%) BCM to Sudan; and 10
BCM (12%) to account for evaporation and seepage, effectively exhausting the Nile's average
annual water flow. The 1959 Nile Treaty called these allocations Egypt's and
Sudan's acquired rights to Nile waters. The upstream States were not granted any water
allocations. In addition, the Nile Waters Treaties granted Sudan and Egypt the power to veto
all construction projects on the Nile and its tributaries. The upstream States have rejected the
Nile Waters Treaties, arguing that they are not party to them and hence are not bound by
them. Additionally, with respect to the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, Addis Ababa has
argued that what that treaty prohibits is a total blockage of the entire Nile flow, and that the
GERD will not do that.

There are two other Nile Basin legal instruments that are relevant to the conflict over the
GERD. First is the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was the outcome of
efforts by the Nile Basin states, including Egypt and Sudan, to create a basin-wide legal
instrument that was acceptable to all of them and that could replace the Nile Waters Treaties.
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Negotiations to draft the CFA began in the 1990s and the treaty was opened for signature on
April 13, 2010. As of 2022, the CFA has been signed by six States and ratified by four States.

Egypt and Sudan, however, have refused to sign and ratify the CFA, arguing that it would
deprive them of their historically acquired rights to Nile waters. Both downstream States
wanted the CFA negotiating process to compel the upstream States to recognize and validate
the Nile Waters Treaties, and the rights that Egypt and Sudan had been granted by these
treaties. This was, however, rejected by the upstream States.

Second, is the Declaration of Principles (DoP), which was signed on March 23, 2015 at
Khartoum by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (Egypt), President Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan), and
Prime Minister H. Desalegn (Ethiopia). The DoP is important because, unlike the Nile
Waters Treaties, it specifically and "expressly considers Ethiopia's interests and recognizes
the significance of the Nile River for the sustainable development of its people. In addition,
the DoP codifies two important and fundamental [End Page 85] principles of international
customary law, the "principle not to cause significant harm," and the "principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization.

However, since it was signed in 2015, it is not clear whether the DoP creates rights for and
imposes obligations on any of the parties. Egypt has argued that the DoP is an international
treaty, which imposes legal obligations on all parties. In an aide mémoire dated May 1, 2020
and addressed to the UN Security Council, Egypt's Permanent Representative to the UN,
Mohamed Edrees, noted that "[i]n an attempt to facilitate the reaching of an agreement on the
GERD, Egypt concluded an international treaty with Ethiopia and Sudan titled the Agreement
on Declaration of Principles on the GERD (DoP) on 23 March 2015. Ethiopia, however, has
argued that the DoP is not a treaty as evidenced, for example, by the fact that Principle V
"merely states the importance of cooperation and does not impose a duty to
cooperate. However, regardless of whether the DoP is a treaty or not, it is important to note
that it codifies two important and fundamental principles of international customary law—the
"principle not to cause significant harm," and the "principle of equitable and reasonable
utilization.

1.4. Framing the conflict

Addressing the present conflict in the Nile Basin actually consists of two important but
related parts. First is the need to develop and adopt a GERD Treaty, which will provide the
legal framework for filling and operation of the GERD, including how to mitigate drought.
Second is that while the design and adoption of a GERD Treaty should result from
negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, the allocation and utilization of Nile waters
should be left to a separate, basin-wide treaty, preferably the CFA, which the Nile Basin
states developed and opened for signature on April 13, 2010.

Accordingly, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan must agree on a legally binding timetable and
modalities for filling the GERD; how the GERD will be operated after it is filled, which
includes how much water Ethiopia would have to release as part of its effort to mitigate
droughts; Ethiopia's right to equitable and reasonable utilization of Nile waters for agriculture

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and household consumption; and Egypt's and Sudan's fears about any significant harm to
their respective countries from the GERD.

The most important issue for Egypt and Sudan is water security, which both countries made
clear during the negotiation of the CFA. To deal with the Nile Waters Treaties, the committee
that negotiated the CFA had introduced the concept of water security into the agreement,
believing that it would help subordinate the existing treaties to general rules of international
law. However, Egypt and Sudan interpreted water security to mean their historically acquired
rights or current water uses. The main problem was Article 14(b), which reads as follows:
The Nile Basin states agree "not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile
Basin states. All NBI states, except Egypt and Sudan, agreed to this wording. Egypt and
Sudan proposed the following alternative wording: All Nile Basin states agree "not to
adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin
states. The alternative phrasing can be interpreted to mean at least the following: water
security means a guarantee of Egypt's and Sudan's acquired rights and current uses and
rights means the status quo that is, both Egypt and Sudan would continue to receive 55.5
BCM and 18.5 BCM of Nile waters respectively, leaving the other Nile Basin states with no
water allocations. As the three countries struggle to secure an agreement for the filling and
operation of the GERD, Egypt and Sudan fear that the dam could impose significant damage
on them by interfering with their access to Nile waters.

Ethiopia has argued that it must be allowed to utilize the waters of the Blue Nile and the other
tributaries of the Nile that originate within its highlands to generate electricity for national
development and eventually for agricultural and other purposes. However, Professor
Mahemud Tekuya, an expert on international water law, has argued that Egypt's "effective
hydro-hegemony in the Nile Basin" has "prevented upstream countries, like Ethiopia, from
utilizing the waters of the Nile. The other upstream States have complained that they do not
want the allocation and utilization of Nile waters to be governed by the colonial-era Nile
Waters Treaties and that is why they participated in the design of the CFA, which they
believed would replace any existing treaties and provide a legal framework that is mutually
acceptable and respects the rights of all Nile Basin states.

1.5. A history of failed efforts to resolve conflicts in the Nile Basin

There are really two conflicts that need to be resolved one over the GERD, and the other over
the allocation of the waters of the Nile. The CFA was expected to resolve issues over the
allocation and utilization of Nile waters, but it remains in limbo because Egypt and Sudan
have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.

After the DoP was adopted, all three countries agreed that international experts should be
engaged to study the impact of the GERD on the downstream countries. This decision,
however, "reignited the dispute over the colonial Nile Waters Treaties" and Egypt's and
Sudan's acquired rights. Egypt, which "still bases its [water] supply on the 55.5 [BCM]
agreed upon in 1959," has insisted that that figure be used as the "baseline to determine the
impact" of the GERD on its economy.

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Although the flow rate of the Nile differs by season, with significant increases occurring
during the rainy season (June through August) in the Ethiopian highlands, Egypt does not
agree to any adjustments in its current uses, which are based on its acquired rights. For
example, in 2004, then Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Doctor
Mahmoud Abu Zeid, declared that "Egypt will reject any proposal to lower its quota of Nile
water," and that the CFA talks would "have to comply with one permanent feature: not to
touch Egypt's historical rights.

Egyptian President El-Sisi reiterated this position with respect to negotiations to draft a
GERD Treaty. After the April 2021 Kinshasa negotiations failed to resolve disagreements
between the three countries and secure an agreement on the GERD, President El-Sisi declared
as follows: "I am telling our brothers in Ethiopia, let's not reach the point where you touch a
drop of Egypt's water, because all options are open. Sudan, like Egypt, has also insisted that
its acquired rights those granted by the 1959 Nile Treaty be the starting point for all
negotiations on the GERD. This unwillingness by Egypt and Sudan to give up the colonial-
era water allocations and seek a legal instrument based on the two international customary
law principles that have been recognized by the three countries and made explicit in the DoP
lies at the heart of the disagreements between the upstream and downstream States of the Nile
Basin.

International water law experts have noted that the "fate of [the] Nile Water[s] Treaties has
been the main sticking point in negotiations" over the GERD and water allocations in the Nile
Basin. While upstream States reject the rights and obligations created by these colonial-
era treaties and seek a new basin-wide treaty that is mutually acceptable and recognizes the
rights of all Nile Basin states, Egypt continues to insist that any agreement must recognize the
Nile Waters Treaties and the rights and obligations created by them, and that these are
binding on all Nile Basin states.

1.6. The need for two new treaties in the Nile Basin

Effectively resolving existing Nile Basin conflicts calls for designing and adopting two new
treaties. First, a basin-wide treaty that recognizes and guarantees the rights of all eleven Nile
Basin states, and which must be the outcome of basin-wide negotiations based on the
principles of no significant harm and equitable and reasonable utilization, must be negotiated
and adopted. What constitutes "equitable and reasonable utilization," as well as "significant
harm," must be clarified by Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia through good faith negotiations and
subsequently elaborated in the treaty. The CFA already exists as a framework for such a
treaty. All eleven States can return to it and use it to provide them with the foundation for
negotiating the new treaty.

If, however, there is disagreement over the meaning of these concepts, the parties "may
jointly request for conciliation, mediation or refer the matter for the consideration of the
Heads of State/Heads of Government. The CFA also has a provision on the settlement of
disputes between the parties if they are unable to resolve the disputes themselves, they can
take them to the Nile Basin Commission or to the International Court of Justice.

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The other one is the GERD Treaty, which must provide legally binding guidelines for filling
and operating the dam, including what each party must do during drought, prolonged drought,
and prolonged periods of dry years. The issue of how much water the GERD should release
during each of these drought periods should also be resolved and elaborated in the treaty.
Water, including that of the Nile, is a scarce resource, which means that no one State can use
as much water as it wants whenever it wants. Hence, there must be some form of rationing
based on generally accepted international customary law principles. Again, all parties can
determine what an equitable and reasonable entitlement is and make that determination part
of the treaty. Finally, as noted by Egypt, "[t]he negotiations on the GERD relate to a single
project on a single tributary of the Nile River, while after sharing and water apportionment
are simply inapposite in these negotiations. Hence, there should be two treaties one for the
GERD and the other covering the allocation and utilization of Nile Waters.

1.7. The way forward

The ICJ has already held that all the riparian states of an international watercourse have a
"basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of the watercourse. With
respect to the Nile Basin countries, this norm requires that access to and the utilization of the
Nile waters be balanced and reflect a standard grounded in equity and reasonableness and is
accepted by all riparian states as mutually beneficial. Thus, after the GERD is completely
filled, Ethiopia's use of Blue Nile waters, even if it negatively affects water flows to Egypt
and Sudan, would be considered harmful and hence a violation of the non-harm rule only if
such utilization exceeds Ethiopia's equitable and reasonable share.

If a GERD Treaty is not secured, Ethiopia will proceed with unilateral filling and operation of
the GERD "not only because it is permissible under international law, but also because the
downstream states' past behaviour suggests they cannot be relied upon to come to an
agreement and will instead drag out the negotiation process in perpetuity. Ethiopia has
already completed two fillings of the dam (2020 and 2021). In October 2021, Egyptian
newspapers reported that "[a]s negotiations remain stalled over the [GERD], Ethiopia is
beginning to make preparations for the third-stage filling of its mega-hydroelectric dam on
the Blue Nile. The two fillings, however, have not imposed any significant harm on the
downstream States.

By February 20, 2022, when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed officially inaugurated
the dam, it was 84% completed, with 18.5 BCM of water in its reservoir. The dam will
initially produce 750 megawatts (MW) of electricity, but it has a potential for generating
6,000 MW of electricity. The GERD's electricity could significantly transform development
in Ethiopia and help the government industrialize its rural areas and reduce deforestation.
Sudan and the other Nile Basin states are also expected to benefit significantly from having
access to clean and relatively affordable power. The GERD is also expected to "smooth
variations in the Nile flow," resulting in "increased water availability during the low-flow
summer months, more hydropower generation from Sudanese dams at Sennar, Roseires and
Merowe, and reduced flood damages. As a consequence, Sudan has a "vested interest in
bringing the dispute to a peaceful resolution" and making certain that the GERD is not
damaged.

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The fact that Sudan has already recognized the potential benefits of the GERD and has
subsequently "aligned itself with Ethiopia means that Egypt will be under pressure to change
its position regarding its current and existing water uses and pave the way for agreement to be
reached on a GERD Treaty.

References

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2. "About The Dam". GERD Coordination Office. Archived from the original on 11
April 2022. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
3. "Ethiopia starts generating power from River Nile dam". BBC News. 20 February
2022. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
4. "Egypt Stays Opposed to Ethiopia's Grand Millennium Dam Project". EZega. 11
April 2011. Retrieved 19 April 2011.
5. "Power Generation Capacity of GERD Slashed to 5150MW – Ethiopian
Minister". ezega.com. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
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tokkoomse". BBC News Afaan Oromoo (in Oromo). Retrieved 1 March 2022.
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April 2011. Archived from the original on 22 March 2012. Retrieved 17 April 2011.
8. Roussi, Antoaneta (10 October 2019). "Nations Clash over Giant Nile
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10. "Ethiopia: GERD Increases Generation Capacity". allAfrica. 28 February 2017.
Retrieved 28 February 2017.
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Archived from the original on 30 April 2011. Retrieved 17 April 2011.
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12. Ahmed, A. T.; Elsanabary, M. H. (13 March 2015). "Hydrological and
Environmental Impacts of Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile River" (PDF). Sharm
El Sheikh– Egypt: Eighteenth International Water Technology Conference (CNKI).
Retrieved 9 April 2015.
13. "Ethiopia: First stage of the filling of the reservoir of the Grand Renaissance
Dam". Tractebel Engie. 10 September 2020. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
14. , Edith A.; Hall, Jim W.; Dadson, Simon J. (6 June 2016). "Cooperative filling
approaches for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam". Water International. 41 (4):
611–634. doi:10.1080/02508060.2016.1177698.