Demonstration of robust water recycling:

Hazard analysis and critical control point

report
A report of a study funded by the
Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence
Bartlett, S., Northcott, K., Scales, P.J., Sheehan, D. and Gray, S.
October, 2015
Demonstration of robust water recycling: Hazard
analysis and critical control point report
Project Leader Partners
Prof Stephen Gray Victoria University
Victoria University University of Melbourne
Werribee Campus Australian Antarctic Division
PO Box 14428 Veolia
Melbourne, Victoria, 8001, AUSTRALIA AECOM
Telephone: +61 3 9919 8097 TasWater
Coliban Water
Curtin University

Contact: Prof Stephen Gray [email protected]

About the Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence

The mission of the Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence is to enhance management and use of
water recycling through industry partnerships, build capacity and capability within the recycled water
industry, and promote water recycling as a socially, environmentally and economically sustainable option
for future water security.

The Australian Government has provided $20 million to the Centre through its National Urban Water and
Desalination Plan to support applied research and development projects which meet water recycling
challenges for Australia’s irrigation, urban development, food processing, heavy industry and water utility
sectors. This funding has levered an additional $40 million investment from more than 80 private and public
organisations, in Australia and overseas.

ISBN 978-1-922202-57-4

Citation:

Bartlett, S., Northcott, K., Scales, P.J., Sheehan, D. and Gray, S. (2015). Demonstration of robust water
recycling: Hazard analysis and critical control point report, Australian Water Recycling Centre of
Excellence, Brisbane, Australia.

© Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence

This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may be reproduced by
any purpose without the written permission from the publisher. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction right
should be directed to the publisher.

Date of publication: October, 2015

Publisher:
Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence
Level 5, 200 Creek St, Brisbane, Queensland 4000
www.australianwaterrecycling.com.au

This report was funded by the Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence through the Australian Government’s
National Urban Water and Desalination Plan.

Disclaimer
Use of information contained in this report is at the user’s risk. While every effort has been made to ensure the
accuracy of that information, the Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence does not make any claim, express or
implied, regarding it.

i
Executive Summary
Outcomes from three HACCP workshops are listed below.
• A risk register and decision tree analysis is contained in spreadsheet ‘HACCP Workshop Risk
Register_30032015.xlsx’ outlines the water quality risks for the AWTP that is an appendix in the
Recycled Water Quality Management Plan,
• The pathogen CCP tables contained in the RWQMP,
• A chemical risk decision tree analysis and maximum allowable chemical volumes contained in the
Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern Report. The maximum allowable chemical volumes
will inform the purchasing of chemicals and the container sizes that AAD will purchase,
• CCPs for trace organic chemicals contained in the Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern
Report,
• Bromide and iodide was dosed into the AWTP to determine the ability of the AWTP to remove
brominated and iodated disinfection by-products. The AWTP was able to effectively remove
- -
disinfection by-products (maximum dosing levels Br = 0.693mg/L; I = 0.063 mg/L). These results
are reported in the Operating Performance and Water Quality Report, Appendix F.
• Formaldehyde concentrations post-ozone, post-BAC and in the RO permeate were below the
Australian Drinking Water Guideline (ADWG) maximum allowable concentration of 0.5 mg/L
(measured to be <0.1 mg/L).

ii
T ABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Executive Summary .........................................................................................................ii
1.1 Nomenclature ............................................................................................................... iv
2 Introduction ......................................................................................................................ii
3 Workshop Method............................................................................................................1
4 Outcomes..........................................................................................................................1
5 Conclusions....................................................................................................................10
6 Appendix A: Report from the chemicals workshop – March 2015 .......................... 11
7 Appendix B: HACCP Meeting 2 Notes......................................................................... 23
8 Appendix C: HACCP meeting 1......................................................................................2

iii
 Nomenclature
ADWG Australia Drinking Water Guidelines

AWTP Advanced water treatment plant

AGWR Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling

CCP Critical Control Point

CoC Chemicals of Concern

HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point

QMRA Quantitative microbial risk assessment

RWQMP Recycled water quality management plan

iv
 1. Introduction
Three Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) workshops were undertaken to identify water
quality risks and actions to manage the identified risks pertaining to the Advanced Water Treatment Plant
th th th
(AWTP). The three workshops were held on: 5 and 6 August, 2013 (Workshop 1), 6 May, 2014
th
(Workshop 2) and 30 March, 2015 (Workshop 3). The first two workshops were led by Sallyanne Bartlett
from WaterQPlus and the third by Dr Kathy Northcott from Veolia Water.

2. Workshop Method
The HACCP and risk assessment method was based upon the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines
(ADWG) framework element two (assessment of the drinking water supply system) and element three
(preventative measures for drinking water quality management). Reference was made to the Australian
Guidelines for Water Recycling (AGWR) Phase 2 for specific descriptors for health qualitative measures of
likelihood, consequence and impact.

The approach taken during the HACCP workshop was unconventional due to the limited amount of water
quality data available for the Davis Station system. A conventional HACCP process is usually supported by a
vast array of water quality data generated over a period of time, in some cases decades, for various locations
within a water supply system. This was not the case for the Davis Station system. The water quality data that
existed was from a few Davis Station sampling events that provided a snapshot of the chemical
contaminants that were present in the wastewater at that point in time and a quantitative microbial risk
assessment (QMRA) conducted by the University of Melbourne.

In contrast to a conventional water quality system assessment, the physical isolation of the Davis Station
system was unique, and because of this the source water inputs were well known to AAD personnel. The
AAD is the only source of the contaminants likely to be in the wastewater, as all products that are present at
Davis Station are shipped there by the AAD and used by AAD personnel. No other source water inputs exist
controlled or uncontrolled. For this reason it was important that the HACCP team assembled consisted of
AAD personnel with firsthand operational knowledge regarding the products that are shipped to Davis
Station, the application of the products and the potential that these products have to enter the wastewater
stream. This enabled a desktop HACCP process to be conducted that did not rely on data from a
comprehensive water quality assessment. The team was able to construct a source water input and
wastewater stream profile to identify the potential water quality hazards likely to exist in the Davis Station
AWTP (DAWTP) feedwater, assess the risks posed by each of these hazards and capability of the DAWTP
to manage/control these risks.

Further details of the method and assessment protocols are contained in Appendices A, B and C.

3. Outcomes
The minutes from these workshops are contained in appendices A, B and C. A risk register and decision tree
analysis was developed and is contained in a spreadsheet and the final version is named ‘HACCP Workshop
Risk Register_30032015.xlsx’. This spreadsheet constitutes part of this HAACP Report and is also an
Appendix of the RWQMP.

Critical Control Point (CCP) tables were also developed to specify the critical, alert and target values for each
CCP, and the actions to be taken if the alert or critical limits are reached. The CCP tables relating to
pathogens were developed in workshops 1 and 2 and are not contained in this report, but are part of the
1
Recycled Water Quality Management Plan (RWQMP) .

Workshop 3 focused on unresolved issues pertaining to Chemicals of Concern (CoC). The issues raised
during workshop 3 for resolution are listed in Table 1 (page 10), along with the resolution of these items.

1 Demonstration of robust Water Recycling: Recycled Water Quality Management Plan, Australian Water Recycling Centre of
Excellence, June 2015.

1
Areas for further work were identified in the March 2015 Chemical Risk workshop and are listed below along
with their status:
1. Update RWQMP with new information on chemical risk management policies and procedures,
specifically around source water management - Complete.
2. Identify k ey chemical risk s from AAD chemical manifest via decision tree analysis, and maximum
chemical concentrations calculated from volumes on inventory – Included in Table 10 of the “Risk
Assessment for the Removal of Contaminants of Concern Report in the Davis Station Advanced Water
Treatment Plant”.
3. Review Selfs Point operational data and bioassay results and prepare validation report for removal of
COCs across the process – Included in the RWQMP and the ““Risk Assessment for the Removal of
Contaminants of Concern Report in the Davis Station Advanced Water Treatment Plant”.
4. Identify the ability of the treatment process to treat water with bromide and iodide – Dosing of the feed
water with bromide (≤0.693 mg/L) and iodide (≤0.0.63 mg/L) was undertaken and the report is included
in the Operating Performance and Water Quality Report. The AWTP was able to effectively remove
disinfection by-products from bromide and iodide, and the product water disinfection by-product values
were below the Australian Drinking Water Guideline values.
5. Finalise work on impact of trace contamination from flame retardants – no phosphate flame retardants
used.
6. Development of chemical management procedures based on findings of chemical decision tree
analysis, such as maximum chemical container volumes purchased - Risk decision tree and maximum
allowable limits contained in the Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern Report will allow
evaluation of maximum chemical limits and container sizes by AAD.
7. Follow up on list of generic medical chemicals (ie antiseptics) and general pharmaceuticals (ie
antibiotics), as well as biohazard fumigants used by the AAD - Risk decision tree and maximum
allowable limits contained in the Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern Report will allow
evaluation of chemicals. The fumigants used are pyrethrum and methyl bromide. The boiling point of
methyl bromide is 3.5˚C, so it is a gas at normal temperatures and as such is unlikely to be present in
significant concentrations by the time ships reach the Antarctic. Pyrethrum is safe for use near humans
and breaks down quickly in sunlight and is non-persistent in the environment. Pyrethrum is not
mentioned in the ADWG.
8. Break age of a UV tube in the UV disinfection system resulting in release of mercury into the product
water was identified as a risk . This risk is included in the updated HACCP risk register, and control of
the flowrate is used as a preventative measure. The residual risk was moderate.
9. Formaldehyde formation during ozonation was identified as a risk . Formaldehyde concentrations post-
ozonation, post-BAC and in the RO permeate were measured during November 2015 and all
registered <0.1 mg/L formaldehyde. These concentrations were all less than the ADWG maximum
allowable concentration of 0.5 mg/L for formaldehyde.

2
 4. Items still to be addressed
Details of the recommended anti-foam are yet be received from the membrane bioreactor supplies. When
details arrive, its chemical composition will be checked against the decision tree in the Risk Assessment of
Contaminants of Concern Report. However, effluent sprays may be used instead to break down any foam
that might form.

Details of anti-septics used at Davis Station have not been received. Common anti-septics can be compared
against the decision tree in the Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern Report to determine which are
suitable for use at Davis Station.

3
 Table 1: Knowledge gaps identified before workshop 3 (30th March, 2015) and their status.

Identified follow-up
Knowledge or Status of action
Assumption action from initial Status of action March 2015 Resolution at June 2015
Information gap May 2014
workshop
A listing of CoCs (humans) CoCs during the It was suggested a listing New list of CoCs Split EDCs and hormones from Carcinogens added to the Risk
had not been established workshop for risk of the top 50 compounds carcinogens in HACCP risk Register (HACCP Workshop
or water quality data for assessment tested for by Western register. Retain the same risk Risk Register_30032015.xlsx)
these types of compounds purposes were Corridor to be used as a profile for both categories in as a separate source water
collected for Davis Station considered broadly guide to test Davis Station source water. EDCs to be item – row 19, Hazard ID
wastewater. as carcinogens, wastewater samples. addressed in ozone and RO 015a.
endocrine disruptors Noted to review products CCP. Carcinogens to be
and hormones. sent down to Davis addressed in source water QCP
Station, conduct DALY (RWQMP, p47).
and screen for these
compounds.
Volatile Organic Carbons VOCs during the Chemical manifest now VOCs added to the Risk
(VOC) a listing of workshop were available from AAD. Uni Melb Register (HACCP Workshop
compounds was not defined as developing chemical risk Risk Register_30032015.xlsx)
available. degreasers, paint decision tree analysis and as a separate source water
thinners, noted maximum allowable volumes. To item – row 34, Hazard ID 30.
paints are water be covered in source water QCP Risk decision tree and
dispersible lighter (RWQMP, p47). maximum allowable limits
than hydrocarbon contained in the Risk
and more water Assessment of Contaminants
soluble. of Concern Report.
What types of paints and Assumed much of Improve understanding of Chemical manifest now Solvents and paints added to
solvents non water the paint is enamel. painting and associated available from AAD. Uni of the Risk Register (HACCP
dispersible are used at products used at Davis Melbourne developing chemical Workshop Risk
Davis Station? Station. risk decision tree analysis and Register_30032015.xlsx) as a
maximum allowable volumes. To separate source water item –
be covered in source water row 36, Hazard ID 32.
QCP. Risk decision tree and
maximum allowable limits
contained in the Risk
Assessment of Contaminants
of Concern Report.

4
Chemicals that can pass Nil Further investigation Chemical manifest now Risk decision tree and
through MBR process (the required as to what available from AAD. Uni Melb maximum allowable limits
Davis Station Secondary chemicals can pass developing chemical risk contained in the Risk
Wastewater Treatment through a MBR process – decision tree analysis and Assessment of Contaminants
Plant). suggested a list from maximum allowable volumes. To of Concern Report.
Western Corridor. be covered in source water
QCP.
Formaldehyde is used at Formaldehyde is Formaldehyde is used at Chemical manifest now Formaldehyde added to the
Davis Station for laboratory used at Davis Station Davis Station for available from AAD. Uni Melb Risk Register (HACCP
work. Would it be removed for laboratory work. laboratory work. Would it developing chemical risk Workshop Risk
by AWTP process barriers, Would it be removed be removed by AWTP decision tree analysis and Register_30032015.xlsx) as a
pass through or form by- by AWTP process process barriers, pass maximum allowable volumes. To separate source water item –
products? barriers, pass through or form by- be covered in source water row 39, Hazard ID 35.
through or form by- products? QCP. Formaldehyde concentrations
products? Victoria University investigating were measured to be <0.1
formaldehyde DBP formation, in mg/L, and were significantly
collaboration with AAD. below the ADWG maximum
concentration of 0.5 mg/L
What dye and other What dye and other What dye and other Chemical manifest now Dyes added to the Risk
chemicals (e.g. heavy chemicals (e.g. chemicals (e.g. heavy available from AAD. Uni Melb Register (HACCP Workshop
metals) are used in the heavy metals) are metals) are used in the developing chemical risk Risk Register_30032015.xlsx)
laboratory? used in the laboratory? decision tree analysis and as a separate source water
laboratory? maximum allowable volumes. To item – row 40, Hazard ID 36.
be covered in source water Risk decision tree and
QCP. maximum allowable limits
contained in the Risk
Assessment of Contaminants
of Concern Report.
What radiological What radiological What radiological Chemical manifest now Radioactive compounds added
compounds are likely to be compounds are likely compounds are likely to available from AAD. Uni Melb to the Risk Register (HACCP
used at Davis Station for to be used at Davis be used at Davis Station developing chemical risk Workshop Risk
laboratory work and could Station for laboratory for laboratory work and decision tree analysis and Register_30032015.xlsx) as a
these appear in the work and could these could these appear in the maximum allowable volumes. To separate source water item –
wastewater stream? appear in the wastewater stream? be covered in source water row 72, Hazard ID 68.
wastewater stream? QCP. Risk decision tree and
maximum allowable limits
contained in the Risk
Assessment of Contaminants
of Concern Report

5
No information regarding No information No information regarding Review MBR O&M manual – Antifoam still to be determined
antifoam product regarding antifoam antifoam product specifically chemical and will be checked against
constituents used by MBR product constituents constituents used by MBR requirements for operation and the decision tree in the Risk
process. used by MBR process. associated MSDS. Assessment of Contaminants
process. of Concern Report.
What chemicals can pass Improve understanding of Adrian Knight to University of Melbourne/RMIT to Risk Assessment of
through each DAWTP what chemicals are likely provide database. review operational and bioassay Contaminants of Concern
barrier/process? to pass through each data from Self’s Point and Report contains the rejection
AWTP barrier/process. prepare validation report for and passage of COCs through
trace organic chemicals. each treatment barrier.
Chemicals likely to be General identification Review of the chemicals Michael to obtain Chemical manifest now Risk register (HACCP
present onsite at Davis of hydrocarbons, that go to Davis Station AAD chemical available from AAD. Uni Melb Workshop Risk
Station each year. paints, glycol, kitchen and use this information manifest. developing chemical risk Register_30032015.xlsx) was
and general cleaning to establish a listing of decision tree analysis and updated to include glycol,
products, laboratory parameters to be tested in maximum allowable volumes. To hydrocarbons, cleaning
chemicals etc. the wastewater. be covered in source water chemicals and heavy metals
QCP. as a separate source water
items – rows 64, 65, 66, 73
Hazard IDs 60, 61, 62, 69.

What antiseptics are used Review antiseptic use and AAD medical. Michael to chase up list of Anti-septics to be compared
at Davis Station? determine the antiseptics used by AAD against the decision tree in the
constituents e.g. medical on station. Risk Assessment of
hexachlor or iodine Contaminants of Concern
based. If iodine based Report.
consider in relation to
ozonation and the
formation of by-products.
Curtin University may be
able to provide
assistance.

6
Impact of a slug dose of Considered in a spill It was suggested to Use Ammonia in MBR CCP – An ammonia sensor is to be
cleaning products (impact situation in impact of separate a spill situation create a new QCP for the MBR located on the MBR effluent
or ammonia based verses cleaning chemicals out into impact of for control of chemicals. line. A chlorine sensor is not
chlorine based) on AWTP. collectively. ammonia and chlorine Chlorine can also be addressed included as it is unlikely free
based products through new MBR QCP. chlorine will pass through the
separately – consider for MBR. A large slug of chlorine
future risk register review. will kill the bacteria in the MBR
and this will be detected by the
ammonia, phosphate, nitrate,
pH and conductivity sensors
on the MBR effluent.
RWQMP contains the QCP for
control of chemicals.
No water quality data for Nil Analysis of tarn water and Requires chasing Victoria University investigating Disinfection by-product report
tarn iodine levels. exist RO product water for up. DBP formation, in collaboration for iodide and bromide
iodine concentration. with Curtin University. included in the Operating
Performance and Water
Quality Report. All I and Br
-
disinfection by-products (Br
-
<1mg/L; I <0.1 mg/L) rejected
by the treatment process.
Noted that the ceramic Nil Research into what by- Victoria University investigating Disinfection by-product report
membranes that are products may be formed DBP formation, in collaboration for iodide and bromide
proposed for use at the due to the catalytic effect with Curtin University. included in the Operating
ultra-microfiltration across the ceramic Performance and Water
barrier/process step have a membranes. Testing to be Quality Report. All I and Br
-
catalytic effect across part of the pilot plant disinfection by-products (Br
-
membrane surface. studies. <1mg/L; I <0.1 mg/L) rejected
by the treatment process.

7
Noted that an ethyl- Nil Investigation biosecurity AAD biosecurity. Michael Packer to chase up Main fumigants are Pyrethrum
bromide product is used for product and practice AAD biosecurity measures – and some methyl bromide.
everything leaving further. type of fumigant, amounts used. The boiling point of methyl
Australia as a biosecurity This information to be used to bromide is 3.5˚C, so it is a gas
measure what impact could develop maximum at normal temperatures and as
this have upon the final concentrations of trace chemical such is unlikely to be present
treated water produced by contamination in source water at in significant concentrations in
the AWTP. Davis. the Antarctic. Pyrethrum is
safe for use near humans and
breaks down quickly in sunlight
and is non-persistent in the
environment. Pyrethrum is not
mentioned in the ADWG.
Does the DAWTP RO Nil Review the requirement Validation trials to Team agreed there are no plans No antiscalant to be used a
system require the use of for the use of an cover this. to send antiscalant to Antarctica. Davis Station.
an antiscalant? antiscalant for the RO
system and if required
add to the hazard
analysis.
The impact on the DAWTP Nil Pilot plant testing to pH to be managed through pH fluctuations between 6.5-
of pH fluctuations. determine pH fluctuations MBR, and calcite filter CCPs. 7.5 during the demonstration
impacts upon the AWTP. trials did not adversely affect
the AWTP. QCP on MBR
effluent is pH 6.5 - 7.5.
Residual flame retardant Assumed that if it Nil Jianhua has calculated There are no special flame
used on the building was the brominated flame retardants are retardants used on station,
materials could this be concentration would well below ADWG levels. No apart from those normally
present in the wash down most likely be in the work yet done on phosphate included in building materials
water from cleaning nanogram range. based flame retardants. Need and furniture etc. Brominated
activities? full list of flame retardants used flame retardants are known to
by AAD to complete validation be used at Davis Station as
work. Source water they have been detected in the
management through wastewater.
recommendation of appropriate
flame retardants, as bioassay
work indicates they can pass
through process barriers.

8
Workshop and Assumed based on Review of AAD Chemical manifest now AAD has strict procedures for
maintenance potential spill station knowledge procedures. available from AAD. Uni Melb spill clean-up, and these are
volumes? that a glycol spill developing chemical risk also covered in the RWQMP.
max. 200lts, decision tree analysis and RWQMP report contains QCP
hydrocarbon 100lts. maximum allowable volumes. To for source water control.
be covered in source water
QCP.
Bromide pass through Nil Pilot plant to test bromide Validation trials to Victoria University investigating Disinfection by-product report
AWTP. pass through. cover this. anion migration through for iodide and bromide
process, in collaboration with included in the Operating
Curtin University. Performance and Water
Quality Report. All I and Br
-
disinfection by-products (Br
-
<1mg/L; I <0.1 mg/L) rejected
by the treatment process.
Risk of release of Assumed that regular No DO maintaining Risk of release of BAC is a process control. Aeration of BAC is set in
contaminants from BAC runtime would be regular aeration. Part of contaminants from Manage aeration of BAC filters SCADA.
filters during plant every 72 hours when validation trials. BAC filters during through SCADA programming,
shutdown. AWTP is operating. plant shutdown. regular checks of SCADA
During extended trends.
shutdown periods the
filters are to be
aerated and DO
monitored to prevent
anaerobic conditions
developing.

9
 5. Conclusions
Three HACCP workshops were held that identified water quality risks and actions to refine the risk profile.
Outcomes from the HACCP workshops are listed below:
• A risk register and decision tree analysis is contained in spreadsheet ‘HACCP Workshop Risk
Register_30032015.xlsx’;
• The pathogen CCP tables contained in the RWQMP;
• The chemical risk decision tree analysis and maximum allowable chemical volumes contained in
the “Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern Report”. The maximum allowable chemical
volumes will inform the purchasing of chemicals and the container sizes that AAD will purchase;
• CCP for trace organic chemicals contained in the Risk Assessment of Contaminants of Concern
Report;
• Bromide and iodide was dosed into the AWTP to determine the ability of the AWTP to remove
brominated and iodated disinfection by-products. The AWTP was able to effectively remove
- -
disinfection by-products (maximum dosing levels Br <1mg/L; I <0.1 mg/L). These results are
reported in the Operating Performance and Water Quality Report; and
• Formaldehyde concentrations were significantly below the ADWG limit of 0.5 mg/L, with all
concentrations measuring <0.1 mg/L.

10
 6. Appendix A: Report from the chemicals workshop
– March 2015

Davis Advanced Water Treatment

Plant
HACCP WATER QUALITY RISK
ASSESSMENT OUTCOMES
CHEMICAL RISK WORKSHOP – MARCH
2015

Document Number: TBD

This document is uncontrolled when printed. Before use, please check the master list to verify that it is the
current version.
AUTHORS

Author Institution

Kathy Northcott, Sallyanne Bartlett Veolia, WQPlus

VERSION CONTROL REVISION HISTORY

Version Date revised Section Revised Revision

0.1 NA Frist draft issued – Kathy Northcott

APPROVAL

Version Date Approved Person Approving

11
1 INTRODUCTION II
1.1 PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................. 13
1.2 SUMMARY OF K EY R ISK F INDINGS ............................................................................................. 13
1.3 SUMMARY W ORKSHOP A CTIVITIES ............................................................................................. 13
1.4 W ORKSHOP ATTENDEES .......................................................................................................... 14
2 WORKS HOP OUTCOMES 14
2.1 R ISK ASSESSMENT O UTCOMES ................................................................................................. 14
2.1.1 Overall Findings – Chemical Risks 14
2.1.2 Hazardous Events Identified 15
2.1.3 Treatment Capability 15
2.1.4 Risk Assessment Uncertainty 15
2.2 IDENTIFICATION OF CCPS AND QCPS ........................................................................................ 16
2.3 CCP AND QCP PLANS............................................................................................................. 16
3 SUMMARY OF ACTION PLAN 17

12
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document details the outcomes of a ½ day chemical risk review workshop that was conducted for the
Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) Davis Advanced Water Treatment (DAWTP) Project. This workshop
was held to follow up on the findings of the three day water quality Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP) workshop held in August 2013 and May 2014.
1.2 Summary of Key Risk Findings
The first three days of the HACCP workshop indicated that the treatment capability of the DAWTP should
be adequate to control the risks posed from pathogenic microorganisms. However, risk determinations
associated with the treatment capability of the DAWTP to control other high ranking risks from chemical
water quality hazards, such as, chemicals of concern (CoCs), specific contaminants that may be present in
the Davis Station wastewater stream (formaldehyde, antiseptics, glycol, biosecurity residuals etc.) was less
clear. It was identified during the first HACCP workshop that knowledge gaps existed and further research
was required to reduce the uncertainty associated with some of these risk determinations.
The validation and verification phase of the Robust Recycling project provides the opportunity to gather this
information and reduce the risk assessment uncertainty. This is through operation of the DAWTP at
TasWater’s Self’s Point WWTP site.
It was also identified that it is imperative to the implementation of the Davis Station Recycled Water
Scheme that the AAD establish a Recycled Water Policy and associated documentation that supports the
risk assessment determinations e.g. Davis Station approved chemical product inventory and management /
operational procedures, such as, waste management, chemical spill management and return to Australia
procedures.
In this follow-up workshop, the chemical risk knowledge gaps were reviewed and updated against:
• the latest DAWTP operating and monitoring data,
• the AAD chemical manifests, and
• a review of current industry knowledge regarding validation of treatment processes for removal of
trace chemicals.

1.3 Summary Workshop Activities

The HACCP workshop (“the workshop”) was conducted over three days. The first two days were held
consecutively on the 5 & 6 August 2013 with the third follow-up meeting on the 6 May 2014. The outcomes
from the workshop are summarised below:
Day 1 & 2 (5 & 6 August 2013)
• The team defined the intended use statement;
• The DAWTP flow diagram was confirmed;
• Identification of 124 water quality hazards likely to exist in the Davis Station source water, to be
present or occur at each of the treatment process steps. Each of these were risk assessed
• Due to the limited amount of Davis Station water quality data available many of the risk assessment
outcomes highlighted areas that required further research to fill knowledge gaps and reduce the
uncertainty associated with the risk determinations; and;
• Discussion regarding possible Critical Control Points (CCPs) and Quality Control Points (QCPs) to
draft for the team to review.
Note due to time constraints during the initial two day workshop there was no decision made regarding
exactly what CCP/QCP plans would be applicable or the detail required e.g. locations, alert/critical limits
and monitoring procedures. Following the initial workshop a draft document was issued to the AAD project
manager in September 2013 for distribution to attendees for review with a set of potential CCP/QCP Plans
for consideration.
Day 3 (May 6 2014)
• Collation of comments from a review of the draft workshop document including the draft CCP/QCP
Plans;
• The inclusion of the BAC filter as a QCP or a process control point is still be decided and the
associated management strategies required
th
Day 4 (March 30 2015)
• Review of the HACCP Water Quality Risk Assessment Outcomes , Section 4.3 (Overall Findings,
Hazardous Events, Treatment Capability and Risk Assessment Uncertainty).
• Review of Section 4.4 of HACCP Water Quality Risk Assessment Outcomes document, and
recommendations for existing and new CCPs and QCPs.
• Review latest operational and water quality analysis data from the Self’s Point DAWTP operations,
to address knowledge gaps for various trace chemical contaminants.
• Review AAD chemical manifest and discuss development of Quantitative Chemical Risk
Assessment (QCRA), including chemical risk decision tree.
13
 • Review Appendix D (Appendix A of this document) of HACCP Water Quality Risk Assessment
Outcomes document and update knowledge gaps and action plan.

1.4 Workshop Attendees

The chemical risk review workshop was held on the 30th March 2015 at the University of Melbourne. The
table below provides a listing of the attendees.
th
Table 1.1: Workshop Attendees 30 March 2015.

Name Organisation
Kathy Northcott Veolia
David Sheehan Coliban Water
Stephen Gray Victoria University
Peter Scales The University of Melbourne
Michael Packer Australian Antarctic Division
Graham Allinson RMIT
Mayumi Allinson The University of Melbourne

Jianhua Zhang Victoria University

Adrian Knight The University of Melbourne

2. Workshop outcomes
2.1 Risk Assessment Outcomes
At the original HACCP risk workshop there were a total of one hundred and twenty four water quality
hazards identified for the Davis Station system that were likely to exist in the DAWTP feedwater. A number
of these hazards were identified as being chemical in nature. However, at the time many it was considered
there was insufficient knowledge or operating data available to fully quantify the level of risk. The chemical
th
risk workshop on the 30 March 2015 was intended to address these knowledge gaps. The outcome of this
workshop is detailed in the following sections.
Overall Findings – Chemical Risks
High ranking water quality risks likely to pass through the MBR process and be present in the DAWTP
feedwater during normal routine station operations are from:
• Brominated flame retardant compounds;
• TOC/DOC;
• Colour;
• Pharmaceutical products and metabolites;
• Chemicals of Concern (CoCs) the team considered CoCs broadly as carcinogens, endocrine
disruptors and hormones;
• Antiseptics;
• Volatile Organic Carbon (VOCs) water dispersible; and;
• Cleaning products from disposal of field waste.
COCs were originally defined in the first HACCP workshop as being carcinogens, EDCs and hormones. In
th
the March 30 workshop it was agreed that carcinogens would be listed and assessed separately from the
other COCs, to enable a more effective risk assessment and management method. Hence the HACCP risk
register will be updated to reflect this
Source water risks to pass through the MBR process and pose a moderate risk in the DAWTP feedwater
during normal station operations are from:
• Residual cleaning chemicals – ammonia based (all buildings);
• Nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorous) human waste from station, field trip waste disposal and
kitchen activities);
• Turbidity;
• Personal hygiene products - surfactants;
• Colour (kitchen activities);

14
 The original Appendix D of the HACCP Water Quality Risk Assessment Outcomes has been included in
this document (Appendix A), with the addition of a new column with status of each item as of March 2015.
Hazardous Events Identified
The hazardous events (or abnormal operating conditions) identified contributing to elevated source water or
process water chemical risks are:
A station spill event that is not adequately contained or is washed into a drain resulting in the following
water quality hazards (contaminants) to enter the wastewater stream:
- Glycol;
- Hydrocarbons from a fuel or oil spill;
- Cleaning products (all products);
- Radioactive material and heavy metals from the science building; and;
- Iron and manganese from a treatment chemical spill.
Bulk disposal via the wastewater stream of unusable food products i.e. out of date or rotten resulting in a
slug dose to the system elevating the risk posed by the following water quality hazards:
-Nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorous);
- TOC/DOC;
- Turbidity;
- Colour; and;
- TDS.
Failure of existing RO system providing potable water to the station resulting in an elevated risk from the
following water quality hazards:
- Bromide;
- Silica; and;
- Chloride.
Equipment or process failure or suboptimal operating performance resulting in chemical under/dose
situation or inadequate/reduced treatment capability e.g. MBR, membrane or disinfection failure.
A further risk identified under the equipment or process failure was breakage of a UV tube in the UV
disinfection system, resulting in release of mercury into the product water. This risk will be included and
assessed in the updated HACCP risk register.
Treatment Capability
The risk assessment outcome indicated that the DAWTP treatment barriers should adequately control the
health risk derived from physical, chemical and radiological source water hazards that pass through the
MBR process to the DAWTP feedwater or that may occur at a treatment step. However, in the first HACCP
workshop, the team made assumptions regarding some of the risk determinations documented and that
further research will be required to fill the knowledge gaps. The updated knowledge gaps and action plan is
shown in Appendix A.
The following water quality hazards were identified as occurring during the treatment process.
• The formation of bromate during the ozonation process from bromide in DAWTP feedwater posing
a very high risk; and;
• The formation of formaldehyde from aldehyde in the DAWTP feedwater posing a moderate risk.

Risk Assessment Uncertainty

While the source water input and wastewater stream profile was based on firsthand working station
knowledge, there remains a degree of uncertainty concerning the dispatch of chemical products, the use of
certain products and the disposal or return to Australia policy.
It is imperative to the implementation of the Davis Station Recycled Water Scheme that a Recycled Water
Policy is developed by the AAD and is supported by management and operational procedures that are
aligned with certain risk determinations. For example,
managing source water inputs through a controlled approved Davis Station chemical/products inventory,
chemical management procedure, such as, onsite storage, handling and use, spill response/containment,
waste management procedures, and,
15
products for return to Australia procedures.
The establishment of the above and the communication of this information to the DAWTP demonstration
operations validation and verification team will assist with reducing the uncertainty associated with certain
risk determinations.
The latest version of the AAD chemical inventory was provided to the team for the purpose of the chemical
risk workshop. It was agreed that Peter Scales and his team at the University of Melbourne would use this
inventory to develop a “QCRA”, by:
Preparation of a chemical risk decision tree (or matrix) that can identify chemicals likely to pass through key
process barriers, based on typical characteristics (ie molecular weight, charge, solubility etc.)
Calculation of maximum concentrations, based on chemical volumes purchased by the AAD.
Review of COC’s, disinfection by-products and other relevant trace organic chemicals against the Self’s Point
operational data and bioassay results and preparation of chemical removal validation report.

2.2 Identification of CCPs and QCPs

The DAWTP treatment barriers that provide the required removal to guarantee the minimum water quality
criteria have all been identified as CCPs. Those barriers in place that are considered crucial to achieving
the minimum water quality criteria but did not meet the criteria for a CCP were identified as a QCP. Each of
these points within the Davis System are listed below:
CCP – the performance of the MBR process i.e. DAWTP feedwater quality.
CCP - Ozonation – for oxidation and disinfection. It has been recommended this CCP be updated for COCs. In
order to do this a validation report needs to be created to provide the relationship between ozone dose
relative to removal of trace organic chemicals.
CCP - Microfiltration – for removal of solids and larger microorganisms.
CCP - Reverse Osmosis – for removal of Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) and further removal of organic matter
and contaminants e.g. pharmaceuticals, personal hygiene products, chemicals of concern (CoCs) and
microorganisms. This CCP will be updated to better demonstrate management of chemical removal.
CCP Ultraviolet radiation – for deactivation and/or kill of pathogenic microorganisms (particularly protozoa);
CCP - Calcite filter – for treated water ion balance and pH adjustment.
CCP - Chlorination – for deactivation and/or kill of pathogen microorganisms.
QCP – The management of source water inputs such as chemicals and other substances (e.g.
pharmaceuticals, cleaning products, laboratory chemicals, operation and maintenance products) that are
likely to be present and used at the station, kitchen, laboratory, workshop/operations and medical clinic
waste management practices, incident and emergency management practices in the event of a spill and the
training of staff in the correct use of chemicals/other substances and appropriate station waste
management practices;
QCP (New) – Performance of MBR for chemical removal. This would essentially use the same criteria as for the
MBR CCP to validate MBR process health. This in turn ensures maximum chemical removal efficacy
across the MBR process.
QCP to become Process Control Point: Biologically Activated Carbon filtration – for removal of organic matter
and contaminants e.g. pharmaceuticals, personal hygiene products, chemicals of concern (CoCs) – NOTE
during the workshop held on the 6 May 2014 the team recommended removing this QCP.
New Process Control Point – MF process management and monitoring to optimise chemical removal potential.
2.3 CCP and QCP Plans
The CCP and QCP Plans for each of the above points are listed below.
CCP – 1: DAWTP Feedwater Quality
CCP – 2: Oxidation Control
CCP – 3: Filtration Control
CCP – 4: Reverse osmosis
CCP – 5: UV disinfection
CCP – 6: Final pH Correction Control
CCP – 7: Chlorination Control

16
QCP – 1: Source Water Management
QCP – 2: MBR effluent quality management

3. Summary of action plan

The following further work was identified and agreed to in the March 2015 Chemical Risk workshop:
Update HACCP risk register with new items identified in workshop and circulate to team for comment (KN)
Update CCPs and QCPs and circulate for comment (KN)
Update RWQMP with new information on chemical risk management policies and procedures, specifically
around source water management (DS)
Identify key chemical risks from AAD chemical manifest via decision tree analysis, and maximum chemical
concentrations calculated from volumes on inventory (PJS, AK)
Review Self’s Point operational data and bioassay results and prepare validation report for removal of COCs
across the process (PJS, GA, MA)
Follow up on disinfection by-product analysis and findings (SG)
Finalise work on impact of trace contamination from flame retardants (JZ)
Development of chemical management procedures based on findings of chemical decision tree analysis, such
as maximum chemical container volumes purchased (MP)
Follow up on list of generic medical chemicals (ie antiseptics) and general pharmaceuticals (ie antibiotics), as
well as biohazard fumigants used by the AAD (MP)

17
 APPENDIX A
Identified knowledge gaps, risk assumption and additional data/information requirements

Identified follow-
Knowledge or Status of action Status of action
Assumption up action from
Information gap May 2014 March 2015
initial workshop
It was suggested a
listing of the top 50 Split EDCs and
compounds tested hormones from
A listing of CoCs for by Western carcinogens in
CoCs during the
(humans) had not Corridor to be used HACCP risk
workshop for risk
been established as a guide to test register. Retain the
assessment
or water quality Davis Station same risk profile
purposes were
data for these wastewater for both categories
considered broadly New list of CoCs
types of samples. in source water.
as carcinogens,
compounds Noted to review EDCs to be
endocrine
collected for Davis products sent addressed in
disruptors and
Station down to Davis ozone and RO
hormones.
wastewater. Station, conduct CCP. Carcinogens
DALY and screen to be addressed in
for these source water QCP.
compounds.
Volatile Organic VOCs during the Chemical manifest
Carbons (VOC) a workshop were now available from
listing of defined as AAD. Uni Melb
compounds was degreasers, paint developing
not available. thinners, noted chemical risk
paints are water decision tree
dispersible lighter analysis and
than hydrocarbon maximum
and more water allowable volumes.
soluble. To be covered in
source water QCP.
What types of Assumed much of Improve Chemical manifest
paints and solvents the paint is understanding of now available from
non water enamel. painting and AAD. Uni Melb
dispersible are associated developing
used at Davis products used at chemical risk
Station? Davis Station. decision tree
analysis and
maximum
allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP.
Chemicals that can Nil Further Chemical manifest
pass through MBR investigation now available from
process (the Davis required as to what AAD. Uni Melb
Station Secondary chemicals can developing
Wastewater pass through a chemical risk
Treatment Plant). MBR process – decision tree
suggested a list analysis and
from Western maximum
Corridor. allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP.

18
Formaldehyde is Formaldehyde is Formaldehyde is Chemical manifest
used at Davis used at Davis used at Davis now available from
Station for Station for Station for AAD. Uni Melb
laboratory work laboratory work laboratory work developing
would it be would it be would it be chemical risk
removed by AWTP removed by AWTP removed by AWTP decision tree
process barriers, process barriers, process barriers, analysis and
pass through or pass through or pass through or maximum
form by-products? form by-products? form by-products? allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP.
Victoria University
investigating
formaldehyde DBP
formation, in
collaboration with
Curtin University.
What dye and What dye and What dye and Chemical manifest
other chemicals other chemicals other chemicals now available from
(e.g. heavy metals) (e.g. heavy metals) (e.g. heavy metals) AAD. Uni Melb
are used in the are used in the are used in the developing
laboratory? laboratory? laboratory? chemical risk
decision tree
analysis and
maximum
allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP.
What radiological What radiological What radiological Chemical manifest
compounds are compounds are compounds are now available from
likely to be used at likely to be used at likely to be used at AAD. Uni Melb
Davis Station for Davis Station for Davis Station for developing
laboratory work laboratory work laboratory work chemical risk
and could these and could these and could these decision tree
appear in the appear in the appear in the analysis and
wastewater wastewater wastewater maximum
stream? stream? stream? allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP.
No information No information No information Review MBR O&M
regarding antifoam regarding antifoam regarding antifoam manual –
product product product specifically
constituents used constituents used constituents used chemical
by MBR process. by MBR process. by MBR process. requirements for
operation and
associated MSDS.
University of
Improve Melbourne/RMIT to
understanding of review operational
What chemicals
what chemicals are and bioassay data
can pass through Adrian Knight to
likely to pass from Self’s Point
each DAWTP provide database
through each and prepare
barrier/process?
AWTP validation report for
barrier/process. trace organic
chemicals.

19
Chemicals likely to General Review of the Michael to obtain Chemical manifest
be present onsite identification of chemicals that go AAD chemical now available from
at Davis Station hydrocarbons, to Davis Station manifest AAD. Uni Melb
each year. paints, glycol, and use this developing
kitchen and information to chemical risk
general cleaning establish a listing decision tree
products, of parameters to analysis and
laboratory be tested in the maximum
chemicals etc. wastewater. allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP
What antiseptics Review antiseptic AAD medical
are used at Davis use and determine
Station? the constituents
e.g. hexachlor or
iodine based. If Michael to chase
iodine based up list of
consider in relation antiseptics used by
to ozonation and AAD medical on
the formation of by- station
products. Curtin
University may be
able to provide
assistance.
Impact of a slug Considered in a It was suggested to Use Ammonia in
dose of cleaning spill situation in separate a spill MBR CCP – create
products (impact or impact of cleaning situation out into a new QCP for the
ammonia based chemicals impact of ammonia MBR for control of
verses chlorine collectively. and chlorine based chemicals.
based) on AWTP. products Chlorine can also
separately – be addressed
consider for future through new MBR
risk register review. QCP.
No water quality Nil Analysis of tarn Requires chasing Victoria University
data for tarn iodine water and exist RO up investigating DBP
levels. product water for formation, in
iodine collaboration with
concentration. Curtin University.
Noted that the Nil Research into what
ceramic by-products may
membranes that be formed due to
are proposed for the catalytic effect Victoria University
use at the ultra- across the ceramic investigating DBP
microfiltration membranes. formation, in
barrier/process Testing to be part collaboration with
step have a of the pilot plant Curtin University.
catalytic effect studies.
across membrane
surface.
Noted that an Nil Investigation AAD biosecurity Michael Packer to
ethyl-bromide biosecurity product chase up AAD
product is used for and practice biosecurity
everything leaving further. measures – type of
Australia as a fumigant, amounts
biosecurity used. This
measure what information to be
impact could this used to develop
have upon the final maximum
treated water concentrations of
produced by the trace chemical
AWTP. contamination in
source water at
Davis.
20
Does the DAWTP Nil Review the Validation trials to
RO system require requirement for the cover this
Team agreed there
the use of an use of an
are no plans to
antiscalant? antiscalant for the
send antiscalant to
RO system and if
Antarctica
required add to the
hazard analysis.
The impact on the Nil Pilot plant testing
DAWTP of pH to determine pH pH to be managed
fluctuations. fluctuations through MBR, and
impacts upon the calcite filter CCPs.
AWTP.
Residual flame Assumed that if it Nil Jianhua has
retardant used on was the calculated
the building concentration brominated flame
materials could this would most likely retardants are well
be present in the be in the nanogram below ADWG
wash down water range. levels. No work yet
from cleaning done on phosphate
activities? based flame
retardants. Need
full list of flame
retardants used by
AAD to complete
validation work.
Source water
management
through
recommendation of
appropriate flame
retardants, as
bioassay work
indicates they can
pass through
process barriers.
Workshop and Assumed based on Review of AAD Chemical manifest
maintenance station knowledge procedures now available from
potential spill that a glycol spill AAD. Uni Melb
volumes? max. 200lts, developing
hydrocarbon chemical risk
100lts. decision tree
analysis and
maximum
allowable volumes.
To be covered in
source water QCP.
Bromide pass Nil Pilot plant to test Validation trials to Victoria University
through AWTP. bromide pass cover this. investigating anion
through. migration through
process, in
collaboration with
Curtin University.

21
Risk of release of Assumed that No DO maintaining Risk of release of
contaminants from regular runtime regular aeration. contaminants from
BAC filters during would be every 72 Part of validation BAC filters during
BAC is a process
plant shutdown. hours when AWTP trials plant shutdown.
control. Manage
is operating.
aeration of BAC
During extended
filters through
shutdown periods
SCADA
the filters are to be
programming,
aerated and DO
regular checks of
monitored to
SCADA trends.
prevent anaerobic
conditions
developing.

22
7. Appendix B: HACCP Meeting 2 Notes

Davis Advanced Water Treatment

Plant

HACCP WATER QUALITY RISK

ASSESSMENT OUTCOMES

INTERNAL

23
Document Number: TBD
This document is uncontrolled when printed. Before use, please check the master list to verify that it is the
current version.

AUTH OR S

Author Institution

Sallyanne Bartlett WaterQPlus Pty. Ltd.

VERSION CONTROL REVISION HISTORY

Version Date revised Section Revised Revision

1.0 06/08/2014 N/A draft – Sallyanne Bartlett (WaterQPlus Pty Ltd)

APPR OVAL

Version Date Approved Person Approving

Electronic files provided with this document HACCP

workshop risk register_06052014 (excel file) Workshop
Briefing Paper (Final) (PDF file)
CCP-1-1 DAW PT Self’s Point Feedwater Quality (PDF file) CCP-
1 DAW TP Feedwater Quality (Davis Station) (PDF file) CCP-2
Oxidation Control (PDF file)
CCP-3 Filtration Control (PDF file)
CCP-4 Primary Disinfection Control (PDF file)
CCP-5 Reverse Osmosis Control (PDF file) CCP-6
Final pH Correction Control (PDF file)
CCP-7 Distribution Chlorine Residual Control (PDF file)
QCP-1 Source W ater Input Management (Davis Station) (PDF file)
QCP-2 BAC Filter Performance Management (PDF file)

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 2 OF 26

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document details the outcomes of a three day water quality Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) workshop that was conducted for the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) Davis Advanced W ater
Treatment (DAW TP) project.

1.2 Summary of Key Risk Findings

Overall, the HACCP workshop indicated that the treatment capability of the DAWTP should be adequate to
control the risks posed from pathogenic microorganisms. However, risk determinations associated with the
treatment capability of the DAW TP to control other high ranking risks from chemical water quality hazards, such
as, chemicals of concern (CoCs), specific contaminants that may be present in the Davis Station wastewater
stream (formaldehyde, antiseptics, glycol, biosecurity residuals etc.) was less clear. It was identified during the
workshop that knowledge gaps existed and further research was required to reduce the uncertainty associated
with some of these risk determinations. The validation and verification phase provides the opportunity to
gather this information and reduce the risk assessment uncertainty through running trials to simulate the Davis
Station wastewater stream profile for both normal and abnormal operation conditions. It was also identified that
it is imperative to the implementation of the Davis Station Recycled Water Scheme that the AAD establish a
Recycled W ater Policy and associated documentation that supports the risk assessment determinations e.g.
Davis Station approved chemical product inventory and management / operational procedures, such as,
waste management, chemical spill management and return to Australia procedures.

1.3 Summary of Workshop Activities

The HACCP workshop (“the workshop”) was conducted over three days. The first two days were held
consecutively on the 5 & 6 August 2013 with the third follow-up meeting on the 6 May 2014. The outcomes
from the workshop are summarised below:
Day 1 & 2 (5 & 6 August 2013)
• The team defined the intended use statement;
• The DAW TP flow diagram was confirmed;
• Identification of 124 water quality hazards likely to exist in the Davis Station source water, to be present
or occur at each of the treatment process steps. Each of these were risk assessed;
• Due to the limited amount of Davis Station water quality data available many of the risk assessment
outcomes highlighted areas that required further research to fill knowledge gaps and reduce the
uncertainty associated with the risk determinations; and;
• Discussion regarding possible Critical Control Points (CCPs) and Quality Control Points
• (QCPs) to draft for the team to review.
Note due to time constraints during the initial two day workshop there was no decision made regarding
exactly what CCP/QCP plans would be applicable or the detail required e.g. locations, alert/critical limits and
monitoring procedures. Following the initial workshop a draft document was issued to the AAD project
manager in September 2013 for distribution to attendees for review with a set of potential CCP/QCP Plans for
consideration.
Day 3 (May 6 2014)
• Collation of comments from a review of the draft workshop document including the draft
• CCP/QCP Plans;
• The inclusion of the BAC filter as a QCP or a process control point is still be decided and the associated
management strategies required;

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 3 OF 26

 • Limits proposed for the draft CCP Plans;
• A review of process monitoring;
• Discussion concerning the risk assumptions made, the knowledge gaps and the follow-up actions
identified in the initial two day workshop; and;
• TasW ater’s Self’s Point wastewater treatment plant (SPWWTP) was identified as the location for
the DAW TP demonstration operation site and a point of difference comparison against the Davis
Station identified water quality hazards and risk was conducted.

1.4 Workshop Attendees

The initial workshop was held at the University of Melbourne on the 6 and 7 August 2013. The table below
provides a listing of the workshop attendees over the two days. The attendance record has been provided
Appendix A of this document.
Table 1.1: Workshop Attendees 5 & 6 August 2013.
Organisation Day of
Name
Represented Attendance
Tony Foy AAD Day 1
David W aterhouse AAD Day 1 & 2
Joe Brennan AAD Day 1 & 2
Tim Price AAD Day 1 & 2
Peter Scales University of Melbourne Day 1 & 2
Michael Packer AAD Day 1 & 2
Kathryn Mumford University of Melbourne Day 1 & 2
Stephen Gray University of Victoria Day 1 & 2
Jianhua Zhang University of Victoria Day 1 & 2
Kathy Northcott Veolia W ater Australia Day 2

The follow up workshop was held on the 6 May 2014 at the AAD Hobart. The table below provides a listing of
the attendees.
Table 1.2: Workshop Attendees 6 May 2014.
Name Organisation Represented
Kathy Northcott Veolia W ater Australia
Adrian Knight University of Melbourne
Jianhua Zhang University of Victoria
Stephen Gray University of Victoria
Michael Packer AAD
Nicholas Milne University of Victoria
Colin Ellett Veolia W ater Australia

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 4 OF 26

2 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Regulatory Environment
For the purpose of this workshop the legal jurisdiction for the DAW TP project falls under the Australian
Capital Territory (ACT) government as Antarctica is an Australian Territory. It is noted that the AAD is a
Commonwealth Agency and doesn’t fall under this jurisdiction. However, should the AAD outsource the
operation of the AW TP to a third party (e.g. private water business) the applicable jurisdiction would be that of
the ACT government.

2.2 Applicable Drinking Water Legislation

• Australian Capital Territory Public Health Act 1997 Drinking W ater Code of Practice 2007

2.3 Reference Legislation

• Victorian Safe Drinking W ater Act (2003)
• Victorian Safe Drinking W ater Regulations (2005)

2.4 Australian Guidelines

• Australian Drinking W ater Guidelines 2011(ADW G)
• Australian Guidelines for Recycled W ater: Phase 2 Augmentation of Drinking W ater Supplies 2008 (AGRW)

2.5 Intended Use Statement

The intended use of the water produced by the DAWTP is to provide an optional/supplementary potable
water supply for the purposes described below.
General Use – potable water quality for station usage e.g. kitchen, personal hygiene (washing, showering,
laundry), laboratory work, medical purposes, workshop (operations and maintenance) and hydroponics.
Consumption – potable water quality for consumption by the station population and for the preparation of
food.

3 WORKSHOP METHOD
The HACCP and risk assessment method was based upon t he ADW G Framework element two (assessment of
the drinking water supply system) and element three (preventative measures for drinking water quality
management). Reference was made to the AGRW Phase 2 for specific descriptors for health qualitative
measures of likelihood, consequence and impact.
The approach taken during the HACCP workshop was unconventional due to the limited amount of water
quality data available for the Davis Station system. A conventional HACCP process is usually supported by a
vast array of water quality data generated over a period of time, in some cases decades, for various
locations within a water supply system. This was not the case for the Davis Station system. The water
quality data that existed was from a few Davis Station sampling events that provided a snapshot of the
chemical contaminants that were present in the wastewater at that point in time and a quantitative microbial risk
assessment (QMRA) conducted by the University of Melbourne.
In contrast to a conventional water quality system assessment, the physical isolation of the Davis Station
system was unique and because of this the source water inputs were well known to AAD personnel. The
AAD is the only source of the contaminants likely to be in the wastewater, as all products that are present at the
station are shipped there by the AAD and used by AAD personnel. No other source water inputs exist
controlled or uncontrolled. For this reason it was important that the HACCP team assembled consisted of
AAD personnel with firsthand operational knowledge regarding the products that are shipped to Davis
Station, the application of the products and the potential that these products have to enter the wastewater

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 5 OF 26

stream. This enabled a desktop HACCP process to be conducted that did not rely on data from a
comprehensive water quality assessment. The team was able to construct a source water input and
wastewater stream profile to identify the potential water quality hazards likely to exist in the DAWTP feedwater,
assess the risks posed by each of these hazards and capability of the DAW TP to manage/control these risks.
The HACCP workshop source water input and wastewater stream profile was used to select an equivalent
mainland location to commission, validate and verify the performance of the DAWTP.

3.1 Workshop Key Definitions

The following is a list of key definitions used during the workshop.
Hazard – A hazard is a biological, chemical, physical or radiological agent that has the potential to cause harm
(ADW G, 2011).
Hazardous Event – A hazardous event is an incident or situation that can lead to the presence of a hazard
(what can happen and how) (ADW G, 2011).
Risk – is the likelihood of identified hazards causing harm in exposed populations in a specified timeframe,
including the severity of the consequences (ADW G, 2011).
Maximum Risk – risk in the absence of preventative (control) measures (AGRW , 2008).
Residual Risk – risk remaining after consideration of existing preventative (control) measures (AGRW ,
2008).
Critical Control Point (CCP) – is defined as an activity, procedure or process at which control can be
applied and which is essential to prevent a hazard or reduce it to an acceptable level (ADW G, 2011).
Quality Control Point (QCP) – is defined as a management process or step rather than operational control or
it may be an operational process/step that has limited capacity to be monitored and/or corrective action to be
taken in a timely manner.

3.2 Hazard Identification

The identification of the hazards likely to exist for the source water and to occur or be present at each of the
system process steps was based upon the use of the following information:
• The quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) that was undertaken to determine the pathogen
reduction requirements for direct potable reuse at Davis Station (Baker et al 2012);
• The water quality data from samples collected at Davis Station – refer to workshop briefing paper
Appendix B of this document.
• The firsthand working station knowledge provided by the AAD personnel attending the worksho p.
• The expert opinion and knowledge provided by the scientific and technical workshop attendees
experienced in the fields of water treatment and water quality.

3.3 Risk Assessment

The following tables were used during the workshop to conduct a qualitative risk assessment to determine
maximum (or inherent) and residual risk. Due to small scale of the Davis Station AW TP system and population
served the workshop attendees agreed that when attributing consequence catastrophic equated to one death
and a major impact was greater than one third of the population affected.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 6 OF 26

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 7 OF 26
3.3.1 Determining CCPs and QCPs
The ADW G details the criteria that a preventative measure must meet for selection as a CCP. A CCP has
several operational requirements, including:
• Operational parameters that can be measured and for which critical limits can be set to define
the operational effectiveness of the activity (e.g. chlorine residuals for disinfection)
• Operational parameters that can be monitored frequently enough to reveal any failures in a timely
manner (online and continuous monitoring is preferable)
• Procedures for corrective action that can be implemented in response to deviation from critical
limits.

The ADW G provides a critical control point decision tree this was used to determine the potential CPPs
applicable to the operation of the Davis Station AW TP.
Where preventative (control) measures do not meet the criteria for CCP, however, were still considered
important operational/process steps to ensuring the quality of the final product these points were termed
Quality Control Points (QCPs).

4 WORKSHOP OUTCOMES
4.1 System Flow Diagram
A simplified flow diagram taken from drawing 271202-04R3 was tabled at the initial workshop (5 & 6 August
2013) for confirmation prior to commencing the hazard identification and risk assessment process. There
were several changes and additions made to the diagram. The follow up workshop (6 May 2014) reviewed an
amended the system flow diagram once again to accommodate the demonstration operation site at Self’s Point.
A system flow diagram for both the Davis Station system and the Self’s Point system has been included as
Appendix C of this document.

4.2 Water Quality Characteristics

The HACCP workshop held on the 6 May 2014 reviewed the water quality characteristics presented in the
workshop briefing paper for the Davis Station system with additional information supplied and comments
provided from team members. The revised water quality characteristics tables are presented in the sections
below. A comprehensive water quality assessment will be required for the selected demonstration operation
water system and this will occur during the commissioning, validation and verification phase.
4.2.1 DAWTP Feedwater Quality
The table below presents the minimum standard MBR effluent quality required as DAW TP feedwater. The
parameters marked * are expected values and the parameters marked # are the DAW TP design feedwater
quality specifications, and therefore, the MBR effluent must meet this criteria.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 8 OF 26

 Table 4.1: DAWTP Feedw ater Quality (m inim um standard MBR effluent requirem ents)
Parameter Value
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD5)* <20mg/L
Suspended Solids (SS)* <10mg/L

E.coli* >3 log reduction

(drawing 271201-04R3 states 1 log reduction)

Total Nitrogen (TN)* <10mg/L

Turbidity# Max: 1NTU
pH# Min: 6 Max: 8
Ammonia# <5mg/L
Phosphorous# <5mg/L
Upper limit for bromide to be
Bromide#
calculated
True colour# <10NTU
TOC / DOC# <10mg/L
*extracted f rom the AAD document titled “User Requirements Specification Davis Waste Water (Secondary) Treatment Plant
Project”.
#extracted f rom the AAD document titled “Dav is Adv anced W ater Treatment Plant – Functional Description”

4.2.2 DAWTP Final Treated Water Quality

The table below presents the DAWTP final treated water quality specifications reviewed by the team during the
HACCP workshop. This information was sourced from the AAD document titled Davis Advanced W ater
Treatment Functional Description.
Table 4.2: DAWTP final treated w ater quality specification
Minimum Maximum
Parameter Units
Value Value
Turbidity - 0.05 NTU
pH 6 8 Units
Chlorine residual (free) 0.05 - mg/L
Mg/LCaCO
Alkalinity 40 -
3

Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) 500 mg/L

Iron - 0.05 mg/L
Manganese - 0.02 mg/L
Aluminium - 0.1 mg/L
Ammonia - 0.1 mg/L
Bromate - 0.02 mg/L
Colour - 5 HU
Taste and Odour - Acceptable N/A
Total coliforms - 0 orgs/100mL
E.coli - 0 org/100mL
THMs - 0.2 mg/L

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 9 OF 26

The table below presents the minimum pathogen LRV required for the DAW TP final treated water to control the
health risks derived from pathogenic microorganisms.
Table 4.3: Required m inim um pathogen LRV for DAWTP final treated w ater
Minimum
Pathogen Comment
pathogen LRV
Required LRV for norovirus from study
Viruses 13
by Baker et al. 2012
Required LRV 8.1 for Campylobacter
Bacteria 13
from ARW G Phase 2 (2008)
Required 10.2 for Giardia from study
Protozoa 10.5
by Baker et al. 2012
Required LRV for helminths for
augmented drinking water supplies at
Helminths 6
the W estern Corridor Recycled W ater
Scheme

4.3 Risk Assessment Outcomes

There were a total of one hundred and twenty four water quality hazards identified for the Davis Station
system that were likely to exist in the DAWTP feedwater, to be present at or to occur at each treatment step.
These are discussed further in each of the sections below.
4.3.1 Overall findings
During normal routine station operations the highest ranking source water risks to pass through the MBR
process into the DAW TP feedwater is from pathogenic microorganisms - bacteria, viruses, protozoa and
helminths. Identification of specific target pathogens was not part of the HACCP workshop this is expected to
occur during the validation and verification phase.
Other high ranking water quality risks likely to pass through the MBR process and be present in the DAWTP
feedwater during normal routine station operations are from:
• Brominated flame retardant compounds;
• TOC/DOC;
• Colour;
• Pharmaceutical products and metabolites;
• Chemicals of Concern (CoCs) the team considered CoCs broadly as carcinogens, endocrine
disruptors and hormones;
• Antiseptics;
• Volatile Organic Carbon (VOCs) water dispersible; and;
• Cleaning products from disposal of field waste.
Source water risks to pass through the MBR process and pose a moderate risk in the DAW TP feedwater
during normal station operations are from:
• Residual cleaning chemicals – ammonia based (all buildings);
• Nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorous) human waste from station, field trip waste disposal and
kitchen activities);
• Turbidity;
• Personal hygiene products - surfactants;
• Colour (kitchen activities);

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 10 OF 26

 • Antibiotics – including penicillin as an allergen;
• Bacteria from yeast cultures;
• Formaldehyde;
• Dye residual and chemical products; and;
• Bromine – release of spa water to wastewater stream.

4.3.2 Hazardous Events Identified

The hazardous events (or abnormal operating conditions) identified contributing to elevated source water or
process water risks are:
• A gastrointestinal disease outbreak at the station resulting in the wastewater stream having an
elevated pathogenic microorganism loading;
• A station spill event that is not adequately contained or is washed into a drain resulting in the following
water quality hazards (contaminants) to enter the wastewater stream:
• Glycol;
• Hydrocarbons from a fuel or oil spill;
• Cleaning products (all products);
• Radioactive material and heavy metals from the science building; and;
• Iron and manganese from a treatment chemical spill.
• Bulk disposal via the wastewater stream of unusable food products i.e. out of date or rotten
resulting in a slug dose to the system elevating the risk posed by the following water quality
hazards:
• Nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorous);
• TOC/DOC;
• Turbidity;
• Colour; and;
• TDS.
• Failure of existing RO system providing potable water to the station resulting in an elevated risk
from the following water quality hazards:
• Microorganisms;
• Bromide;
• Silica; and;
• Chloride.
• Equipment or process failure or suboptimal operating performance resulting in chemical under/dose
situation or inadequate/reduced treatment capability e.g. MBR, membrane or disinfection failure.

4.3.3 Treatment Capability

The outcome of the risk assessment indicated that the DAW TP treatment barriers will adequately control the
health risk derived from the microorganism risks present under normal station operations and during a
gastrointestinal disease outbreak at the station affecting a third of the population. The table below is a
revised LRV listing for the DAW TP current as of 6 May 2014.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 11 OF 26

 Table 4.4: Required m inim um pathogen LRV for DAWTP final treated w ater
Barrier Pathogen LRV Required
Viruses 13
Whole Plant Bacteria 13
Protozoa 10.5
LRV LRV
Attainable Claimed
Viruses >4 4
Barrier 1 - Ozonation Bacteria >4 4
Protozoa >2 0.5
Viruses >4 0
Barrier 2 - CM Bacteria >4 0
Protozoa >4 4
Viruses >4 1
Barrier 4 - RO Bacteria >4 1
Protozoa >4 2
Viruses >4 4
Barrier 5 - UVD Bacteria >4 4
Protozoa >4 4
Viruses >4 4
Barrier 6 - Chlorination Bacteria >4 4
Protozoa 0 0
Note: The MBR system is used prior to the current plant and w ill provide 2 LRV. It is not tested as part of this system. Barr ier 3 (BAC)
provides no LRV credits.

The risk assessment outcome indicated that the DAWTP treatment barriers should adequately control the
health risk derived from physical, chemical and radiological source water hazards that pass through the MBR
process to the DAW TP feedwater or that may occur at a treatment step. However, it must be noted that the
team made assumptions regarding some of the risk determinations documented and that further research will
be required to fill the knowledge gaps and reduce the risk assessment uncertainty (refer to section 4.3.4).
The following water quality hazards were identified as occurring during the treatment process .
• The formation of bromate during the ozonation process from bromide in DAW TP
• feedwater posing a very high risk; and;
• The formation of formaldehyde from aldehyde in the DAW TP feedwater posing a moderate risk.

4.3.4 Risk Assessment Uncertainty

Due to the limited water quality data available for the Davis Station system assumptions were made for some of
the risk determinations. In some cases, the risk was yet to be determined due to knowledge gaps and the need
for additional research. This has created varying degrees of uncertainty associated with the risk assessment
outcomes and this is expected to be addressed during the validation and verificat ion process. The risk
assumptions, knowledge gaps and follow up actions required are highlighted on the final risk register
against the related hazard/risk and a listing has been provided as Appendix D of this document.
While the source water input and wastewater stream profile was based on firsthand working station knowledge,
there remains a degree of uncertainty concerning the dispatch of chemical products, the use of certain
products and the disposal or return to Australia policy. It is imperative to the implementation of the Davis
Station Recycled Water Scheme that a Recycled W ater Policy is developed by the AAD and is supported by
management and operational procedures that are aligned with certain risk determinations. For
DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 12 OF 26
example,
• managing source water inputs through a controlled approved Davis Station chemical/products
inventory,
• chemical management procedure, such as, onsite storage, handling and use, spill
response/containment,
• waste management procedures, and,
• products for return to Australia procedures.
The establishment of the above and the communication of this information to the DAW TP demonstration
operations validation and verification team will assist with reducing the uncertainty associated with certain risk
determinations.

4.4 Identification of CCPs and QCPs

The DAW TP treatment barriers that provide the required removal to guarantee the minimum water quality
criteria have all been identified as CCPs. Those barriers in place that are considered crucial to achieving the
minimum water quality criteria but did not meet the criteria for a CCP were identified as a QCP. Each of
these points within the Davis System are listed below:
 CCP – the performance of the MBR process i.e. DAW TP feedwater quality;
 CCP - Ozonation – for oxidation and disinfection;
 CCP - Microfiltration – for removal of solids and larger microorganisms;
 CCP - Reverse Osmosis – for removal of Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) and further removal of
organic matter and contaminants e.g. pharmaceuticals, personal hygiene products,
chemicals of concern (CoCs) and microorganisms;
 CCP Ultraviolet radiation – for deactivation and/or kill of pathogenic microorganisms (particularly
 protozoa);
 CCP - Calcite filter – for treated water ion balance and pH adjustment.
 CCP - Chlorination – for deactivation and/or kill of pathogen microorganisms and provision of
disinfection residual to prevent/control regrowth or recontamination of the final treated
water in storage or in the distribution.
 QCP – The management of source water inputs such as chemicals and other substances (e.g.
 pharmaceuticals, cleaning products, laboratory chemicals, operation and maintenance
products)
 that are likely to be present and used at the station, kitchen, laboratory,
workshop/operations and medical clinic waste management practices, incident and
emergency management practices in the event of a spill and the training of staff in
the correct use of chemicals/other substances and appropriate station waste
management practices; and;
 QCP - Biologically Activated Carbon filtration – for removal of organic matter and contaminants
 e.g. pharmaceuticals, personal hygiene products, chemicals of concern (CoCs) –
NOTE during the workshop held on the 6 May 2014 the team recommended removing
this QCP.

4.5 CCP and QCP Plans

The CCP and QCP Plans for each of the above points are listed below and provided as electronic files with this
document.
• CCP – 1: DAW TP Feedwater Quality
• CCP – 2: Oxidation Control
• CCP – 3: Filtration Control
• CCP – 4: Primary Disinfection Control
• CCP – 5: Reserve Osmosis Control

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 13 OF 26

 • CCP – 6: Final pH Correction Control
• CCP – 7: Distribution Control
• QCP – 1: Source W ater Management
• QCP – 2: Biologically Activated Carbon Filter Performance (this may not be required)
The CCP Plan alert and critical limits have been derived from the DAW TP functional specification and
recommended ADW G values. These are to be trialled during the validation and verification process. The
version of the CCP Plans issued with this document contain references for some of the limits proposed, this
was to ensure the knowledge related to the basis of each of the values was retained.

5 DAWTP DEMONSTRATION OPERATIONS

The one day follow up workshop held on the 6 May 2014 confirmed the selection Self’s Point W astewater
Treatment (SPWWTP), Newtown, Hobart, as the site for the demonstration operations location. The other
locations reviewed earlier (in December 2013 and January 2014) were Cambridge and Macquarie Point
Wastewater Treatment Plants. The objective was to select a mainland location (Hobart) with a wastewater
stream that best fit the Davis Station source water characteristics. That being predominately domestic in
composition with some form chemical composition that would undergo secondary treatment (to simulate the
MBR process stage at Davis Station) prior to feeding the DAW TP. The team selected SPWWTP, as the
catchment is predominately domestic with one tradewaste customer a diary manufacturer and a hospital. A
point of difference comparison was undertaken by the team on the 6 May 2014 to compare the source water
hazards identified for the Davis Station system and the likely occurrence of similar hazards and risk scoring at
Self’s Point. This comparison has been provided electronically with this document (refer to excel
workbook titled HACCP workshop risk register_06052014.xlsx). The team concluded that a similar water
quality hazard and risk profile existed and that SPWWTP would be a suitable site for the DAW TP
demonstration operation. A comprehensive water quality assessment will be conducted as part of the
validation and verification of the plant performance.
During demonstration operations the DAW TP feedwater will be SPWWTP effluent that has undergone
secondary treatment and clarification. The DAW TP feedwater will be pumped from the effluent channel pre- UV
disinfection. The intake to the DAW TP will be fitted with a screen that is able to be backwashed,
removing some of the larger materials that may be still present in the water.
A CPP Plan for the Self’s Point Feedwater Quality is required for the demonstration operations period. This has
been provided as an electronic file with this document. All the other DAW TP CCP Plans remain applicable to
the demonstration operations period.
The DAW TP demonstration operations phase at Self’s Point is expected to provide the data and information
required to fill the identified knowledge gaps, confirm assumptions made by the team during the risk
assessment process and reduce the uncertainty associated with some of the risk determinations. It is
expected that this will occur through a series of experimental trials to simulate scenarios that may occur at
Davis Station and potentially pose a significant risk to the DAW TP final treated water quality produced.
Some examples are given below,
• Understanding the fate through the DAW TP and health implications of CoCs, VOCs, formaldehyde,
bromide, antiseptics and any antifoaming product that maybe used.
• Understanding of the chemicals that may pass through the MBR into the DAW TP feedwater;
• Understanding of the chemicals or the by-products that may pass through the DAW TP and be
present in the final treated water; and;
• Simulation of hazardous events, such as, station chemical spills or poor waste management
practices to understand the risk posed to the DAW TP final treated water quality.

6 CONCLUSION
In summary, the desktop HACCP workshop provided a good knowledge base concerning the Davis Station
source water inputs and wastewater stream profile given the limited water quality data that was available.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 14 OF 26

However, there was a degree of uncertainty associated with certain risk determinations and it is expected
that the DAW TP demonstration operations validation and verification phase will address the identified
knowledge gaps with further research and simulation of Davis Station scenarios . The outcomes of the
validation and verification phase and the development by the AAD a Davis Station Recycled W ater Policy that
is supported by a set of detailed management and operational procedures should provide the required
information to build a robust final Davis Station water system risk assessment. Therefore, it is recommended
that the risk assessment is reviewed again by the team during a one to two day workshop following the
completion of the validation and verification phase.

7 REFERENCE
Australian Antarctic Division (2012), User Requirements Specification Davis W aste W ater (Secondary)
Treatment Plant Project. Version 1.0.

Australian Antarctic Division (2013), Davis Advanced Water Treatment Plant Functional Description. Version
0.5.

Baker SF, Packer M, Scales PJ, Gray S, Snape I and Hamilton AJ (2012), Manuscript for publication titled
Pathogen reduction requirements for direct potable reuse in Antarctica: evaluating human health risks in small
communities.

NHMRC (2011), Australian Drinking W ater Guidelines. Canberra, ACT, National Health and Medical
Research Council, Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council.

NRMMC, EPHC, NHMRC (2008), Australian Guidelines for W ater Recycling: managing health and
environmental risks (Phase 2): Augmentation of drinking water supplies. National Water Quality Management
Strategy. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Environment Protection and Heritage Council,
National Health and Medical Research Council, Canberra.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 15 OF 26

 APPENDIX A
Risk assessment team attendance record (5 & 6 August 2013)

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 16 OF 26

 APPENDIX B
HACCP Briefing Paper

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 17 OF 26

 APPENDIX C
System Flow Diagrams

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 18 OF 26

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 19 OF 26
 APPENDIX D
Identified knowledge gaps, risk assumption and additional data/ information requireme nts

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 22 OF 26

Knowledge or information Assumption Identified follow up Status of action 6
gap action from initial May 2014
workshop
A listing of CoCs (humans) CoCs during the It was suggested a New list of CoCs
had not been established or workshop for risk listing of the top 50
water quality data for these assessment purposes compounds tested for
types of compounds collected were considered broadly by W estern Corridor to
for Davis Station wastewater. as carcinogens, endocrine be used as a guide to
disruptors and hormones. test Davis Station
wastewater samples.
Noted to review
products sent down to
Davis Station, conduct
DALY and screen for
these compounds.
Volatile Organic Carbons VOCs during the AAD Engineer
(VOC) a listing of compounds workshop were defined
was not available. as degreasers, paint
thinners, noted paints are
water dispersible lighter
than hydrocarbon and
more water soluble.
What types of paints and Assumed much of the Improve Adrian Knight to
solvents non water dispersible paint is enamel. understanding of provide a list
are used at Davis Station? painting and associated
products used at Davis
Station.
Chemicals that can pass Nil Further investigation AAD Science
through MBR process (the required as to what
Davis Station Secondary chemicals can pass
Wastewater Treatment Plant). through a MBR
process – suggested a
list from W estern
Corridor.
Formaldehyde is used at During workshop It was suggested AAD Science
Davis Station for laboratory assumed it would be confirmation of
work would it be removed by processed by MBR, assumption through
AW TP process barriers, pass ozonation and BAC literature review and
through or form by-products? process barriers. Davis Station
wastewater sample
analysis to understand if
formaldehyde is a
source water input or if it
is managed within
the laboratory through
collection and return to
Australia practices.
Melbourne W ater may
be able to assist with
further information.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 23 OF 26

Knowledge or information Assumption Identified follow up Status of action 6
gap action from initial May 2014
workshop
What dye and other chemicals Nil Suggested further AAD Science
(e.g. heavy metals) are used investigation of the
in the laboratory? laboratory chemicals
and consider including
in the W aste
Management Plan
both environ mental and
human health impacts
of compounds
(particularly those to
be disposed of via the
wastewater stream).
What radiological compounds Assumed laboratory It was suggested AAD Science
are likely to be used at Davis practices would prevent further investigation
Station for laboratory work and entry into wastewater into what radiological
could these appear in the stream. compounds are used
wastewater stream? for laboratory work at
Davis Station and
what management
policy and practice
used.
No information regarding The risk ratings for this Investigate MBR Michael ????
antifoam product constituents hazard is blank and will antifoaming product
used by MBR process. be populated once the and determine
product is further constituents and
investigated. impact upon AW TP
processes and final
treated water.
What chemicals can pass Improve Adrian Knight to
through each DAW TP understanding of what provide database
barrier/process? chemicals are likely to
pass through each
AW TP barrier/process.
Chemicals likely to be present General identification of Review of the Michael to obtain
onsite at Davis Station each hydrocarbons, paints, chemicals that go to AAD chemical
year. glycol, kitchen and Davis Station and use manifest
general cleaning this information to
products, laboratory establish a listing of
chemicals etc. parameters to be
tested in the
wastewater.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 24 OF 26

Knowledge or information Assumption Identified follow up Status of action 6
gap action from initial May 2014
workshop
What antiseptics are used at Review antiseptic use AAD medical
Davis Station? and determine the
constituents e.g.
hexachlor or iodine
based. If iodine based
consider in relation to
ozonation and the
formation of by-
products. Curtin
University may be able
to provide assistance.
Impact of a slug dose of Considered in a spill It was suggested to
cleaning products (impact or situation in impact of separate a spill
ammonia based verses cleaning chemicals situation out into impact
chlorine based) on AW TP. collectively. of ammonia and
chlorine based products
separately – consider
for future risk register
review.
No water quality data for tarn Nil Analysis of tarn water Requires chasing up
iodine levels. and exist RO product
water for iodine
concentration.
Noted that the ceramic Nil Research into what
membranes that are proposed by-products may be
for use at the ultra- formed due to the
microfiltration barrier/process catalytic effect across
step have a catalytic effect the ceramic
across membrane surface. membranes. Testing
to be part of the pilot
plant studies.
Noted that an ethyl-bromide Nil Investigation AAD biosecurity
product is used for everything biosecurity product
leaving Australia as a and practice further.
biosecurity measure what
impact could this have upon
the final treated water
produced by the AW TP.
Does the DAW TP RO system Nil Review the Validation trials to
require the use of an requirement for the use cover this
antiscalant? of an antiscalant for the
RO system and if
required add to the
hazard analysis.
The impact on the DAW TP of Nil Pilot plant testing to
pH fluctuations. determine pH
fluctuations impacts
upon the AW TP.

DAVIS STATION HAACP WORKSHOP OUTCOMES CONFIDENTIALITY INTERNAL PAGE 25 OF 26

 WaterQPlus Pty Ltd

Knowledge or information Assumption Identified follow up Status of action 6

gap action from initial May 2014
workshop
Residual flame retardant used Assumed that if it was Nil
on the building materials could the concentration would
this be present in the wash most likely be in the
down water from cleaning nanogram range.
activities?
Workshop and maintenance Assumed based on Review of AAD
potential spill volumes? station knowledge that a procedures
glycol spill max. 200lts,
hydrocarbon 100lts.
Bromide pass through AWTP. Nil Pilot plant to test Validation trials to
bromide pass through. cover this.
Risk of release of Assumed that regular No DO maintaining
contaminants from BAC filters runtime would be every regular aeration.
during plant shutdown. 72 hours when AW TP is Part of validation
operating. During trials
extended shutdown
periods the filters are to
be aerated and DO
monitored to prevent
anaerobic conditions
developing.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 1 of 15
 WaterQPlus Pty Ltd

8. Appendix C: HACCP meeting 1

HACCP Workshop Outcomes Report

Davis Station Advanced Water Treatment Plant
W orkshop dates 6 and 7 August 2013

Prepared for
Australian Antarctic Division

HACCP Workshop Outcomes Report

Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant

Prepared for
Australian Antarctic Division

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 2 of 15
 WaterQPlus Pty Ltd

Prepared by
WaterQPlus Pty Ltd ABN
89158978520

P.O. Box 77
Maiden Gully VIC 3551
t 0408219245
e [email protected]

Issued
September 2013

Document version
DRAFT

Electronic files provided with this report

HACCP Workshop Risk Register_FINAL (excel file)
CCP-1 AWTP Feedwater Quality (word and PDF file)
CCP-2 Oxidation Control (word and PDF file)
CCP-3 Filtration Control (word and PDF file)
CCP-4 Primary Disinfection Control (word and PDF file)
CCP-6 Final pH Correction Control (word and PDF file)
CCP-7 Distribution Chlorine Residual Control (word and PDF file)
QCP-1 Source Water Input Management (word and PDF file)
QCP-2 BAC Filter Performance Management (word and PDF file)

© W aterQPlus Pty Ltd 2013

The information contained in this document produced by W aterQPlus Pty Ltd is solely f or the use of the Client identified on t he cover
sheet f or the purpose f or which it has been prepared and W aterQPlus Pty Ltd undertakes no duty to or accepts any responsib ility to any
third party w ho may rely upon this document.

All rights reserved. No section or element of this document may be removed from this document, reproduced, electronically sto red or
transmitted in any f orm w ithout the written permission of W aterQ Plus Pty Ltd other than by the Australian Antarctic Division in relation to the
Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant Project.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 3 of 15
 WaterQPlus Pty Ltd

Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................. 4
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1 Purpose........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 Summary of W orkshop Outcomes................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Workshop Attendees .................................................................................................................... 5
2. LEGAL AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................... 6
2.1 Regulatory Environment ............................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Applicable Drinking Water Legislation ........................................................................................... 6
2.3 Reference Legislation ................................................................................................................... 6
2.4 Australian Guidelines .................................................................................................................... 6
2.5 Intended Use Statement ............................................................................................................... 6
3. WORKSHOP METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 6
3.1 Workshop Key Definitions ............................................................................................................. 6
3.2 ADWG Framework for Management of Drinking Water ................................................................. 7
3.2.1 Hazard Identification ............................................................................................................................... 7
3.2.2 Risk Assessment .................................................................................................................................... 7
3.2.3 Determining CCPs and QCPs ................................................................................................................. 8

4. WORKSHOP OUTCOMES................................................................................................................... 8
4.1 System Flow Diagram................................................................................................................... 8
4.1 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Outcomes .................................................................. 9
4.2 Quality and Critical Control Points................................................................................................11
4.2.1 Identification of the Quality and Critical Control Points .............................................................................11
4.2.2 Quality and Critical Control Point Plans...................................................................................................11

5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................................12
6. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................
APPENDIX A – Attendance Record ...............................................................................................................
APPENDIX B - AWTP Flow Diagram..............................................................................................................

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 4 of 15
 WaterQPlus Pty Ltd

ABBREVIATIONS

AAD Australian Antarctic Division

ACT Australian Capital Territory

ADWG Australian Drinking Water Guidelines

AGRW Australian Guidelines for Recycled Water

AWTP Advanced Water Treatment Plant

BAC Biologically Activated Carbon

BOD5 Biological Oxygen Demand (five day test)

CCP Critical Control Point

CoCs Chemicals of Concern

CT Contact Time or expressed as Ct

DOC Dissolved Organic Carbon

DPR Direct Potable Reuse

HACCP Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point

LRV Log Reduction Value

LQ Living Quarters

OPS Operations

PBDE Polybrominanted diphenyl ethers

PDT Pressure Decay Test

QCP Quality Control Point

QMRA Quantitative Microbiological Risk Assessment

RO Reverse Osmosis

SCI Science Quarters

SS Suspended Solids

SWWTP Secondary Waste Water Treatment Plant

TDS Total Dissolved Solids

TN Total Nitrogen

TOC Total Organic Carbon

UF Ultrafiltration

UV Ultra Violet

UVT Ultra Violet Transmittance

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 5 of 15
 WaterQPlus Pty Ltd

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A two day water quality Hazard Analysis Critical Control (HACCP) workshop was held on the 6 and 7 August
2013 at the University of Melbourne for the Australian Antarctic Division Davis Station direct potable reuse
system Advance W ater Treatment Plant (AWTP). The workshop identified in total one hundred and twenty
four water quality hazards that are likely to exist in the source water and to occur or be present at each of the
system process steps. For each of the hazards the maximum risk was assessed and after consideration of
the preventative or control measures to be implemented at each point within the system the residual risk was
then determined. Based on the output of the hazard identification and risk assessment process the
following Quality Control Point (QCP) and Critical Control Point (CCP) Plans are proposed:
 QCP-1: Source W ater Management
 QCP-2: BAC Filter Performance Management
 CCP-1: AWTP Feedwater Quality
 CCP-2: Oxidation Control
 CCP-3: Filtration Control
 CCP-4: Primary Disinfection Control
 CCP-5: Reverse Osmosis Control
 CCP-6: Final pH Correction Control
 CCP-7: Distribution Disinfection Control
Draft QCP and CCP Plans have been created in a tabular format that require further population with
information once the AWTP has been constructed and operational pilot studies conducted. The pilot study
process verification and validation data will provide the input necessary to establish the correct process
performance target criteria, alert and critical limits, monitoring system details and corrective action
requirements.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 6 of 15
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This report details the water quality Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) workshop outcomes for
the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) direct potable reuse Advanced Water Treatment Plant (AW TP) to be
implemented at Davis Station in Antarctica.

1.2 Summary of Workshop Outcomes

The outcomes of the workshop are summarised below and are discussed further within this report.

• The intended use statement was redefined;

• A review, modification and confirmation of the direct potable reuse system flow diagram;
• Identification of one hundred and twenty four water quality hazards that are likely to exist for the source
water and to occur or by present at each of the system process steps;
• Areas highlighted for further investigation or data collection to reduce the uncertainty
• associated with some risk determinations;
• Identification of Quality Control Points (QCP) and Critical Control Points (CCP)); and;
• Draft QCP and CCP Plans.

Over the scheduled two days the water quality hazard identification and risk assessment process was
completed and possible QCP and CCP were discussed. There was no decisions or consideration regarding
what plans may be applicable or any of the specific details due to time constraints.

1.3 Workshop Attendees

The workshop was held at the University of Melbourne on the 6 and 7 August 2013. The table below provides
a listing of the workshop attendees over the two days. The attendance record has been provided Appendix A
of this report.

Table 1.1 Workshop Attendees

Name Organisation Represented Day of Attendance

Tony Foy AAD Day 1

David W aterhouse AAD Day 1 & 2

Joe Brennan AAD Day 1 & 2

Tim Price AAD Day 1 & 2

Peter Scales University of Melbourne Day 1 & 2

Michael Packer AAD Day 1 & 2

Kathryn Mumford University of Melbourne Day 1 & 2

Stephen Gray Victoria University Day 1 & 2

Jianhua Zhang Victoria University Day 1 & 2

Kathy Northcott Veolia Water Australia Day 2

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 7 of 15
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2. LEGAL AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS

2.1 Regulatory Environment
For the purpose of this workshop the legal jurisdiction for the AWTP project falls under the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) government as Antarctica is an Australian Territory. It is noted that the AAD is a
Commonwealth Agency and doesn’t fall under this jurisdiction. However, should the AAD outsource the
operation of the AWTP to a third party (e.g. private water business) the applicable jurisdiction would be that of
the ACT government.

2.2 Applicable Drinking Water Legislation

• Australian Capital Territory Public Health Act 1997 Drinking Water Code of Practice 2007

2.3 Reference Legislation

• Victorian Safe Drinking Water Act (2003)
• Victorian Safe Drinking Water Regulations (2005)

2.4 Australian Guidelines

• Australian Drinking Water Guidelines 2011(ADWG)
• Australian Guidelines for Recycled Water: Phase 2 Augmentation of Drinking Water Supplies 2008
(AGRW)

2.5 Intended Use Statement

The intended use of the water produced by the AWTP is to provide an optional/supplementary potable water
supply for the purposes described below.

General Use – potable water quality for station usage e.g. kitchen, personal hygiene (washing, showering,
laundry), laboratory work, medical purposes, workshop (operations and maintenance) and hydroponics.

Consumption – potable water quality for consumption by the station population and for the preparation of
food.

3. WORKSHOP METHODOLOGY
The workshop methodology used was based upon that described by the Australian Drinking Water
Guidelines 2011 (ADWG) and the Australian Recycled Water Guidelines 2008 (ARWG).

3.1 Workshop Key Definitions

The following is a list of key definitions used during the workshop.

Hazard – A hazard is a biological, chemical, physical or radiological agent that has the potential to cause
harm (ADWG, 2011).

Hazardous Event – A hazardous event is an incident or situation that can lead to the presence of a hazard
(what can happen and how) (ADWG, 2011).

Risk – is the likelihood of identified hazards causing harm in exposed populations in a specified timeframe,
including the severity of the consequences (ADWG, 2011).

Maximum Risk – risk in the absence of preventative (control) measures (AGRW, 2008).

Residual Risk – risk remaining after consideration of existing preventative (control) measures (AGRW,
2008).

Critical Control Point – is defined as an activity, procedure or process at which control can be applied and
which
Title: is essential to prevent
W ater Quality HACCP Waorkshop
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or reduce it to
Report an acceptable
– Davis level W(ADWG,
Station Advanced 2011).
ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 8 of 15
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Quality Control Point – is defined as a management process or step rather than operational control or it may
be an operational process/step that has limited capacity to be monitored and/or corrective action to be taken
in a timely manner.

3.2 ADWG Framework for Management of Drinking Water

The ADWG (2011) Framework for Management of Drinking Water (the Framework) approach was used to
identify water quality hazards, assess the risks posed and establish critical control points and quality control
points.

3.2.1 Hazard Identification

The identification of the hazards likely to exist for the source water and to occur or be present at each of the
system process steps was based upon the use of the following information:

• The quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) that was undertaken to determine the pathogen
reduction requirements for direct potable reuse at Davis Station (Baker et al 2012);
• The water quality data from samples collected at Davis Station – refer to workshop briefing paper.
• The station knowledge provided by the AAD staff attending the workshop.
• The expert opinion and knowledge provided by workshop attendees experienced in the fields of
water treatment and water quality.

3.2.2 Risk Assessment

The following tables were used during the workshop to conduct a qualitative risk assessment to determine
maximum (or inherent) and residual risk. Due to small scale of the Davis Station AWTP system and
population served the workshop attendees agreed that when attributing consequence catastrophic equated to
one death and a major impact was greater than one third of the population affected.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 9 of 15
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3.2.3 Determining CCPs and QCPs

The ADWG details the criteria that a preventative measure must meet for selection as a CCP. A CCP has
several operational requirements, including:

• Operational parameters that can be measured and for which critical limits can be set to define the
operational effectiveness of the activity (e.g. chlorine residuals for disinfection)
• Operational parameters that can be monitored frequently enough to reveal any failures in a timely
manner (online and continuous monitoring is preferable)
• Procedures for corrective action that can be implemented in response to deviation from critical
limits.

The ADWG provides a critical control point decision tree this was used to determine the potential CPPs
applicable to the operation of the Davis Station AWTP.

Where preventative (control) measures do not meet the criteria for CCP, however, were still considered
important operational/process steps to ensuring the quality of the final product these points were termed
Quality Control Points (QCPs).

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 10 of 15
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1. WORKSHOP OUTCOMES
4.1 System Flow Diagram
A simplified flow diagram taken from drawing 271202-04R3 was tabled at the workshop for confirmation prior to
commencing the hazard identification and risk assessment process. There were several changes and additions
made to the diagram. The amended version of the flow diagram used during the workshop is included as
Appendix B of this report.

4.1 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Outcomes

A total of one hundred and twenty four hazards were identified for the Davis Station direct potable water reuse
system. Refer to Davis Station Direct Potable Reuse System Risk Register provided with this report
as an electronic excel file titled HACCP Workshop Risk Register_FINAL.

The water quality data provided by AAD and detailed in the workshop briefing paper was used to assist with the
hazard identification and risk assessment process. It must be noted that the water quality data available was
limited and assumptions were made that may have caused varying degrees of uncertainty associated with some
of the risk determinations. Where knowledge was limited and assumptions were made or where gaps remain on
the risk register, further actions were identified to address the information / data gap. The assumptions,
knowledge gaps and follow up actions are detailed on the risk register against the related hazard/risk. Table
4.1.1 below provides a listing.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 11 of 15
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Table 4.1.1 Summary of knowledge gaps, assumptions and follow up actions.

Knowledge or information gap Assumption Identified follow-up actions

A listing of CoCs (humans) had CoCs during the workshop for risk It was suggested a listing of the
not been established or water assessment purposes were top 50 compounds tested for by
quality data for these types of considered broadly as carcinogens, Western Corridor to be used as a
compounds collected for Davis endocrine disruptors and guide to test Davis Station
Station wastewater. hormones. wastewater samples.
Noted to review products sent
down to Davis Station, conduct
DALY and screen for these
compounds.
Volatile Organic Carbons (VOC) a VOCs during the workshop were
listing of compounds was not defined as degreasers, paint
available. thinners, noted paints are water
dispersible lighter than
hydrocarbon and more water
soluble.
What types of paints and solvents Assumed much of the paint is Improve understanding of painting
non water dispersible are used at enamel. and associated products used at
Davis Station? Davis Station.
Chemicals that can pass through Nil Further investigation required as
MBR process (the Davis Station to what chemicals can pass
Secondary Wastewater Treatment through a MBR process –
Plant). suggested a list from Western
Corridor.
Formaldehyde is used at Davis During workshop assumed it It was suggested confirmation of
Station for laboratory work would it would be processed by MBR, assumption through literature
be removed by AWTP process ozonation and BAC process review and Davis Station
barriers, pass through or form by- barriers. wastewater sample analysis to
products? understand if formaldehyde is a
source water input or if it is
managed within the laboratory
through collection and return to
Australia practices.
Melbourne Water may be able to
assist with further information.
What dye and other chemicals Nil Suggested further investigation of
(e.g. heavy metals) are used in the laboratory chemicals and
the laboratory? consider including in the Waste
Management Plan both
environmental and human health
impacts of compounds (particularly
those to be disposed

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 12 of 15
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Knowledge or information gap Assumption Identified follow-up actions

of via the wastewater stream).

What radiological compounds are Assumed laboratory practices It was suggested further
likely to be used at Davis Station would prevent entry into investigation into what radiological
for laboratory work and could wastewater stream. compounds are used for
these appear in the wastewater laboratory work at Davis Station
stream? and what management policy and
practice used.
No information regarding antifoam The risk ratings for this hazard is Investigate MBR antifoaming
product constituents used by MBR blank and will be populated once product and determine constituents
process. the product is further investigated. and impact upon AWTP processes
and final treated water.

What chemicals can pass through Improve understanding of what

each AWTP barrier/process? chemicals are likely to pass
through each AWTP
barrier/process.
Chemicals likely to be present General identification of Review of the chemicals that go to
onsite at Davis Station each year. hydrocarbons, paints, glycol, Davis Station and use this
kitchen and general cleaning information to establish a listing of
products, laboratory chemicals parameters to be tested in the
etc. wastewater.
What antiseptics are used at Review antiseptic use and
Davis Station? determine the constituents e.g.
hexachlor or iodine based. If
iodine based consider in relation to
ozonation and the formation of by-
products. Curtin University may
be able to provide assistance.

Impact of a slug dose of cleaning Considered in a spill situation in It was suggested to separate a
products (impact or ammonia impact of cleaning chemicals spill situation out into impact of
based verses chlorine based) on collectively. ammonia and chlorine based
AWTP. products separately – consider for
future risk register review.
No water quality data for tarn Nil Analysis of tarn water and exist
iodine levels. RO product water for iodine
concentration.
Noted that the ceramic Nil Research into what by-products
membranes that are proposed for may be formed due to the catalytic
use at the ultra-microfiltration effect across the ceramic
barrier/process step have a membranes. Testing to be part of
catalytic effect across membrane the pilot plant studies.
surface.
Noted that an ethyl-bromide Nil Investigation biosecurity product
product is used for everything and practice further.
leaving Australia as a biosecurity
measure what impact could this
have upon the final treated water
produced by the AWTP.
Does the AWTP RO system Nil Review the requirement for the
require the use of an antiscalant? use of an antiscalant for the RO
system and if required add to the
hazard analysis.
The impact on the AWTP of pH Nil Pilot plant testing to determine pH
fluctuations. fluctuations impacts upon the
AWTP.
Residual flame retardant used on Assumed that if it was the Nil
the building materials could this concentration would most likely be
be present in the wash down in the nanogram range.
Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 13 of 15
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Knowledge or information gap Assumption Identified follow-up actions

water from cleaning activities?

Workshop and maintain potential Assumed based on station

spill volumes? knowledge that a glycol spill max.
200lts, hydrocarbon 100lts.
Bromide pass through AWTP. Nil Pilot plant to test bromide pass
through.
Risk of release of contaminants Assumed that regular runtime
from BAC filters during plant would be every 72 hours when
shutdown. AWTP is operating. During
extended shutdown periods the
filters are to be aerated and DO
monitored to prevent anaerobic
conditions developing.

4.2 Quality and Critical Control Points

4.2.1 Identification of the Quality and Critical Control Points
Based on the output from the hazard identification and risk assessment process the following points in the
system were identified as important for the prevention and/or control of hazards and have been defined as a
QCP or a CCP:

 CCP – the performance of the Secondary Wastewater Treatment Plant (SWWTP);

 CCP - Ozonation – for oxidation and disinfection;
 CCP - Microfiltration – for removal of solids and larger microorganisms;
 CCP - Reverse Osmosis – for removal of Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) and further removal of
organic matter and contaminants e.g. pharmaceuticals, personal hygiene products,
chemicals of concern (CoCs) and microorganisms;
 CCP Ultraviolet radiation – for deactivation and/or kill of pathogenic microorganisms (particularly
 protozoa);
 CCP - Calcite filter – for treated water ion balance and pH adjustment.
 CCP - Chlorination – for deactivation and/or kill of pathogen microorganisms and provision of
disinfection residual to prevent/control regrowth or recontamination of the final treated
water in storage or in the distribution.
 QCP – The management of source water inputs such as chemicals and other substances (e.g.
 pharmaceuticals, cleaning products, laboratory chemicals, operation and maintenance
products) that are likely to be present and used at the station, kitchen, laboratory,
workshop/operations and medical clinic waste management practices, incident and
emergency management practices in the event of a spill and the training of staff in the
correct use of chemicals/other substances and appropriate station waste management
practices;
 QCP - Biologically Activated Carbon filtration – for removal of organic matter and contaminants
e.g. pharmaceuticals, personal hygiene products, chemicals of concern (CoCs);

4.2.2 Quality and Critical Control Point Plans

WaterQPlus Pty Ltd has proposed the following QCP and CPP Plans for application at the Davis Station
direct potable water reuse system:

 QCP – 1: Source Water Management

 QCP – 2: Biologically Activated Carbon Filter Performance
 CCP – 1: AWTP Feedwater Quality
 CCP – 2: Oxidation Control
 CCP – 3: Filtration Control
 CCP – 4: Primary Disinfection Control
 CCP – 5: Reverse Osmosis Control

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 14 of 15
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 CCP – 6: Final pH Correction Control

 CCP – 7: Distribution Disinfection Control (may not be applicable if AWTP final treated water is
to be stored for a long period of time and used as an option/supplementary potable
water supply)

Draft QCP and CCP Plans have been created in a tabular format and have been provided with this report as
individual electronic word and PDF files. Note that the HACCP workshop did not progress to the stage of
defining exactly QPC and CCP Plans may be required or the specific details of each plan due to time
constraints, therefore, the plans are draft proposals for consideration. The text that has been inserted into
the plans is only an example of what may be applicable (particularly the text highlighted yellow). One of
these examples is for CCP-4 Primary Disinfection Control, where a plant log inactivation calculation could be
programed into the control system as actual ct over required ct as a measure to monitor the performance of
each of the disinfection process units. These types of examples and the pilot study process verification and
validation data will provide the input necessary to establish the correct process performance target criteria, alert
and critical limits, monitoring system details and corrective action requirements. It is recommended that a
further workshop is held to discuss and confirm the details of each plan.

5. Conclusion
The output from the HACCP workshop produced an initial risk register for the Davis Station Direct Potable
Reuse System that identified one hundred and twenty four hazards. It highlighted areas of the system where
additional knowledge and data is required to provide more certainty associated with risk determinations. The
suggested follow up actions in conjunction with the operational data from the pilot studies will provide valuable
input to the review of the risk register and finalisation of the QCP and CCP Plans.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Outcome Report – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: September 2013 Version: DRAFT Page: 15 of 15
6. REFERENCES

Australian Antarctic Division (2012), User Requirements Specification Davis Waste Water (Secondary)
Treatment Plant Project. Version 1.0.

Australian Antarctic Division (2013), Davis Advanced Water Treatment Plant Functional Description. Version
0.5.

Australian Antarctic Division (2013), HACCP Workshop Briefing Paper – Davis Station Advanced Water
Treatment. Version Final.

Baker SF, Packer M, Scales PJ, Gray S, Snape I and Hamilton AJ (2012), Manuscript for publication titled
Pathogen reduction requirements for direct potable reuse in Antarctica: evaluating human health risks in
small communities.

NHMRC (2011), Australian Drinking Water Guidelines. Canberra, ACT, National Health and Medical
Research Council, Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council.

NRMMC, EPHC, NHMRC (2008), Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: managing health and
environmental risks (Phase 2): Augmentation of drinking water supplies. National Water Quality Management
Strategy. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Environment Protection and Heritage Council,
National Health and Medical Research Council, Canberra.

Title: W ater Quality HACCP W orkshop Briefing Paper – Davis Station Advanced W ater Treatment Plant
Client: Australian Antarctic Division
Date: July 2013 Version: Final Page: 13 of 15
APPENDIX A- Attendance Record
Record of Attendees
 APPENDIX 8- AWTP Flow Diagram
(as reviewed, modified and confirmed during the workshop)