MAU MAU: TH E PEAK OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

AND STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION IN COLONIAL KENYA*

By
Maina-Wa-Kinyatti

The renewed and growing i ntellectual and political interes·

in Mau M~u history, both here in Kenya and abroad, is a very im·
portant development. For us, Kenyan Historians, the true dis-
tinction of our profession will depend on how far we succeed, o
fail, to bring out .clearly , without fear or favour, the histori1
significance of Mau Mau to Kenya ' s political development up to
toda~ and subsequently.

Indeed the timing could not be more opportune. Indication:

are that interest groups and individuals, including as we shall
see later , some University historians, have started revising im·
portant aspects of Kenya's political history especially of Mau
Mau development . If crucial documentable occurrences of the Ma
Mau f.lovement are ignored, purposely or otherwise, if dubious
new information is smuggled into the discussion , then certainly
unjustifiable analyses, deductions and conclusions wi l l result.
But if our reputation is to remain positive, and in order to pl<
an enlightening role in the future development of Kenya's socie1
we must discard the speculative and encourage the objective.
Clearly , a national movement that attracted hundreds of thousan<
of our people, a movement whose goals and aims were so appropri·
ate to the common desire of so many, a movement which so profou1
influenced Kenya's political evolution and inspired so many fra·
ternal peoples, in short, a movement which was part of the worl<
wide anti-colonial onslaught can not be dismissed merely with a
flick of a pen .
The extent of our contribution to this issue is to intro-
duce some important new information to reinforce one of the
existing, but unfortunately under-utilized but excellent docume1
tations, namely, Karari Njama ' s Ma u Mau From Within. Our infor·

*A different version of this paper appears in Kenya Historical

Review, Vol . 5 No . 2. Our rendering remains faithful to the
author's patriotic passion and ideological stance . All the pri·
mary sources as documented in the original manuscript have been
retained. Permission to publish is by private arrangement .
The original manuscript is al so a private collection, ~ Maina-
Wa-Kinyatti, 1977. Ed. K.M.

90
mation is based on intervi ews with surv1v1ng cadres of che Mau
Mau Movement. We are also introducing hitherto little known and
little used documents , such as Kimathi's Papers, Mau Mau Docu-
ment, guerrilla revolutionary songs as well as the works of the
former Mau Mau cadres .: The Urban Guerrilla by Mohamed Mathu,
The Hardcore By Karigo Muchai and The Man in the Middle by Ngugi
Kabiro.
The Mau Mau Movement used the folk-poetry method of mass-
communication and in the process produced a most formidable po-
litical literature in song-form , thus politicizing in a short
time a largely peasant membership condemned by colonialists as
illiterate and irredeemably superstitious. Did these songs and
other such symbols express national.istic, anti - colonial, Kenyan
feelings? Did the Mau Mau guerrilla leadership articulate the
feelings of the great majority of the Kenyan people? These
questions form the essential basis of my argument.
II

In essence, the occupation of our country by British imper-

ial-ism in the 1800's meant the beginning of the enslavement of
the Kenyan people, the systematic destruction of our peop·le's
culture and history. Imperialism now could decide what to do
with whoever or whatever was in the country. Kenyans were de-
clared .the subjects of the British King and their country the
property of British imperialism. Clearly, the brutal methods
used to rob our people of the country , to d'r ive them from their
best land, to uproot them from their culture and history, were
not any· different from what took place in Asia, Latin America,
the Caribbean and the rest of our continent.
The invasion and occupation of our country by imperialism
were resisted by Kenyan people courageously. If we exclude the
random, isolated but fierce incidents of resistance between 1400
and llOO we can, for the purposes of this analysis, divide the
recent Kenya people's resistance . aga.inst imperial ism into four
stages .
The first stage began 1800 to 1900 when the imperialist
forces were establishing their colonial settlement and pol iti.cal
domination over Kenyans and their country. It was in this per-
iod that the Kenyan people across the land began their protracted
struggle against the forces of oppression and exploitation.
Between 1895 and 1905, for instance, the Kalenjin people put up
a strong and b'loody resistance against the foreign intruders.
This resistance, which was heroically led by Koitalel, lasted
for .ten years before it was contained by the invading forces.
In the Southwestern highlands of Kenya the foreign enemy forces
had to fight the Gusii people to occupy their land. The people

91
of Central Kenya* also had to wage a bloody r~sistance against
the British imperialist forces whose aim was to occupy their
country. Francis Hall, who commanded the British imperialist
forces against the people in Murang'a in the 1890's gives the
following account:
As usual the natives had deserted their villages and
bolted with their livestock. However, we scoured the
forest and collected a good deal and then proceeded
to march quietly through the country, sending columns
out to burn the villages and collect goats, etc. We
rarely saw any of the people; when we did, they were
at very long ranges, so we did not have much fun, but
we destroyed a tremendous number of villages and,
after fourteen days, emerged on the plains to the east-
ward, having gone straight from one end to the other of
the disaffected districts . We captured altogether some
10,000 goats and a few cattle, and this on top of
previous expeditions, must have been a pretty severe
blow to their resistance • .. we killed 796 Kikuyu. 1

Similar patterns of Kenyan people's armed resistances against

imperialism took place in other parts of our country. Since
these resistances were isolated, uncoordinated and weak the
people were defeated. Perhaps a united front against their
common enemy would have made defeat less certain. Nevertheless,
they learned some lessons from these failures. Besides the
failure to form a united front they were also using comparativel
primitive weapons vis-a-vis the enemy's.
The second stage was a continuation of the struggle which
began in the 1800's, but this time at a slightly higher level
of political consciousness, and with more awareness of the mani-
·pulations of imperialism and its brutal presence in the country.
But in order to break the people's growing resistance the imper-
ialist rulers resorted to fascist acts against Kenyans . They
"systematically passed and enforced a 11 sorts of oppressive meas
ures, such as direct statutory compul~ion, imposition of hut and
poll tax, curtailment of African lands," 2 using the "Kipande"
system "for controlling movements of African labourers and for
locating and identifying them." 3 lt was required by the law for
all African males to carry this slave-identification with them
at all times "and to produce it when demanded by the pol ice.""
Anyone without a Kipande was liable for arrest "and none could
employ him if he had no Kipande or if he had not been signed off
by his previous employer." 5 This was convenient for the forced
labour policies .

*The old colonial Central Kenya included the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru,
Mbere, and Akamba peoples.

92
 This second stage started about 1900, whith the Kenyan
working class regrouping in the East African Association (EAA),
under the leadership of Harry Thuku, for the intensification of
the struggle against colonialism. Thuku's political strategy
was to rally the Kenyan masses in a bid to overthrow the dic-
tatorship of the colonialists by means of mass protests, demon-
strations, petitions and other non-violent actions. It worked
to a certain extent but predictably it led to violent clashes
with the colonial security forces. What Thuku did not realize
was that imperialism is in essence violent. As Stephen Nkomo
of ZANU* has said, "it lives and grows only through force and
the use of force increases as the opposition to it grows . " 6
The British imperialists considered Thuku's EAA as a great
threat to their interests in the country and East Africa as a
whole. They banned the fAA and arrested its leaders. Immedi-
ately after the EAA leaders . were locked i~, the Kenyan masses
came out in their thousands to demand the .unconditional release
of their leaders. For twenty-four hours they surrounded the po-
lice station (the former Kingsway Police station) where their
leaders were held. The fascist forces, excited and frightened
by the show of the people's strength, unity and determination,
responded by savagely firing on the unarmed protestors . When
the shooting stopped many patriots lay dead on the streets and
many others were seriously injured. It was cold-blooded murder.
Job ~luchuchu who was involved in the struggle gives the follow-
ing account :
I went to the police lines with Harun Mikono. We had
been there the previous evening, the fifteenth of March,
thousands of us, and we were determined to get Harry
Thuku out . ••. Mary Nyanjiru, a great patriot from Murang'a,
leapt to her feet, pulled her dress right up over her
shoulders and shouted to the men: You take my dress
and give me your trousers. You [damn] coward men.
What are you waiting for? our leader is in there. Let
us get him! The hundreds of women trilled their "Ngemi"
(Gikuyu ululati@n) in approbation and from that moment
on trouble was probably inevitable. Mary and the other
patriots_ pushed on until the colonialist bayonets of
the rifles were pricking at their t .h roats, and then the
firing started. Mary was one of the first to die. My
companion, Harun Mikono, was badly wounded in the right
leg.

On the other side of the lines the European settlers

sitting drinking on the verandah of the Norfolk hotel

*Zimbabwe African National Union, the political organisation

which finally won independence in Zimbabwe under the leadership
of Robert Mugabe, now the President of the country. Ed. K.M.

93
 joined in the shooting and it is said that they were
responsible for most of the deaths over there. One
of our people employed at the mortuary told us than
56 bodies* were brought in, although the government
said only ll were killed . 7

Thuku and his two comrades were exiled, without trial, to Kis-
mayu . ** The banning of the EAA and the arrest of its leader-
ship were acts of violence against Kenyans "in reply to their
demand that their country be restored to them . " 8 This clearly
demonstrated that Kenya was plagued by a merciless foreign re-
gime whose ideological creed was to maintain repression and
exploitation by force of arms. Second, it also demonstrated
to many that nonviolence as ·a form of struggle was inapplicable
to the social reality of the country then. It was a big lesson
to the people. It taught them the violent nature of imperialism
and its agents, but it also heightened their fighting conscious-
ness and their determination to resist further oppression, as
the s~bsequent stages of the struggle demonstrated .
The third stage began in the late twenties and continued to
the early fifties . The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) replaced
EAA as the organized force . It was organized by a then rela-
tively radical group of men, e.g., Joseph Kang'ethe, Jesse
Kariuki , James Beauttah and a few others who possessed some
skills of mass organization, men who took their political work
seriously. Unlike Thuku's loose leadership, the KCA leadership
was centralized and well-disciplined.. Oath pledging, the tra-
ditional means of group discipline, albeit weak, was utilised
for the purpose.
However, learning from past experience the KCA leadership
worked hard during the interwar period to build its organization
and to strengthen the bond between its regular membership and
the masses in the countryside including the working class in
Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru . It is important to point out that
Kenyan nationalism as expressed through KCA was not insular ,
that there was general widening of pol itical consciousness among
all Kenyan masses. This linked, at least in purpose , the leader-

*It is known now that at least one hundred and fifty Kenyans
lost their lives on that historic day . See the Manchester Guar-
dian of March 20 , 1929. Also see Makhan Singh, History of Kenya ' s
Trade Union Movement to 1952, pp. 16.

**Whilst in detention Harry Thuku was bought out by imperialism

and became its running dog after his release. He was one of
the imperialist collaborators during the Mau Mau war of national
liberation.

94
ship of the KCA with similar political associations in the
country. For instance, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Associ -
ation (KTWA), the Ukamba Members Association (UMA), and the
Taita Hil l s Association (THA) were objective allies as were
all other organizations fighting the forces of colonialism.
Significantly the struggle against imperialism· had devel-
oped into a national struggle and had made a great impact in
the world by the early thirties . Beside KCA's activities in
Central Kenya, its leadership was in touch not only with the
Akamba and Taita patriots, such as Isaac Mwalozi, Samuel
Muindi Mbingu, Elijah Kavulu, Jimmy Mwambichi and Woresha Mengo,
but also with Luo and Abaluyia patriots, men like Benjamin
Owori, Jonathan Okwiri, Paul Agoi, Anderea Jumba and Limaded
Kisala, as well as the Ruganda patriotic leaders. By the late
thirties these leaders and their associati'ons were now formally
affiliated with KCA and together formed not quite a united
front but a loose fraternity against British colonialism. At
the same time the KCA leadership was worki ng closely with leaders
of the Kenya Trade Union Movement and the international Pan-
African ~ovement led by W.E.B . Du Bois. Its international
connections were of great propaganda importance. The subsequent
international support of the struggle was an advantage to the
Movement .
With its relative political radicalism, its national and
patriotic outlook, its relations with the then-militant inter-
national Pan-Africanism and other Third World national Movements,
KCA helped to broaden the national base of the Movement in Kenya
and abroad. Most significantly for us today., it heightened the
national consciousness of Kenyans during the interwar period.
It aroused great hatred among the colonialists for mobilizing
popular opposition .
The Association was suppressed in 1940 as "Com~unist subver-
sive" following its militant agitation against:
- the alienation of land in Kenya
- the Kipande system
- the hut and poll tax
- exploitation of the African working class
- ban on many respected traditions considered "savage"
by colonialists.
Again as with EAA, KCA's leadership was detained and the Organ-
ization driven underground. Muigwithania, its official organ,
was suppressed. Unlike the EAA, KCA continued mobilizing people
secretly, particularly in Nairobi, Mombasa and among squatters
of the Rift Valley and Central Kenya, but under serious diffi-
culties . Although KCA was able to achieve numerous isolated
successes underground, it never regained its former position

95
in the national political arena. It was finally incorporated
into KAU* under Jomo Kenyatta's leadership. Interestingly the
KCA members refused incorporation into KAU under Harry Thuku's,
and J . Gichuru's, leadership until Jomo Kenyatta took over in
1946. James Beauttah tells us:
The leaders of the new party tried hard to get the
well-known KCA people to join them, but they would
have none of it. our suspicions were that KAU was
a colonial government front and those in leadership
were colonial stooges. It was Jomo Kenyatta who
convinced most of the KCA members that KAU was a
genuine African political Party whose aim was to
unite all Kenyans and to fight for national independence. 9

The formation of KAU as a political Union was characterized

by increasing mass resistance and expression against British
imperialism. To a large extent, · the leadership of KAU was
petty- bourgeois nationalist in its conceptions of the politics
and socio-economics of a Kenyan society in the future. As far
as the political system was outlined its horizon was constitu-
tionalist, reformist and parliamentary at best. We therefore
see for the first time the dominance of the educated strata in
Kenya's political leadership and their conservative stance.
Because of their narrow nationalism, the KAU leaders failed,
from the beginning, to understand that without politically di-
rected armed resistance , it was impossible to wage a victorious
struggle against imperialism and colonialism in this country.
Again while the leadership was superficially anti-imperialist,
it did not, at any time in its existence, have a clear-cut and
consistent conception of what was to replace the colonial society.
For a revolutionary organization involved in a national liber-
ation struggle must be ideologically clear, have a seriously
worked-out programme and a coherent sense of direction. This,
KAU clearly did not have. As a result the KAU political pro-
gramme was phrased in a vague, abstract and populist way. The
main political slogans were: "We want our land back," "We want
to rule ourselves, " "Remove the colour bar," etc. But those
were merely political slogans of protest, they were not revolu-
tionary in the sense of giving some indication of an alternative,
a new point of departure, some preparedness for self-defence
and political mass education, in short: a new kind of direction .
Besides exciting the masses with such appea 1s as: "The freedom
tree can only grow when you pour your blood on it •.. I shall
firmly hold the lion's jaws so that it will not bite you. Will
you bear its claws?" 10 the KAU leadership had not thought of,

*Kenya African Union, founded in October, 1944 . Ed . K.M.

96
 and was not ready for, an armed confrontation with the colon-
ialist forces. Consequently when our people decided to confront
colonialists with revolutionary violence, the KAU leadership
were howhere to be seen. This point is wel l expressed by
Mohamed Hathu in his book, The Urban Guerrilla. He writes:
••• The minds of the [Kenyan] people were turned
toward violence and revolt by the preacbings and
political agitation of men such as Kenyatta, Koinange
and other KAU leaders. The question we now ask is:
Why did these men abandon us in our hour of greatest
need? 11

It is also a well-known fact that "the KAU leaders gained knowl-

edge of the Emergency Declaration" 12 and their arrest the day
"before [the) October 20, 1952, announcement," 1 3 and yet none
of them tried to escape and join Dedan Kimathi and other patriots
in the forests. All of them allowed themselves to be arrested
without. any struggle at all. Kaggia explains:
On the 19th OCtober, 1952, at Wanza Mansion, the Mau
Ma~ Central Committee was meeting in the offices of
Isaac Gathanju when one of our informers sent for me •
••. He told me that the colonial government planned to
arrest all KAU leaders during the next 36 hours. In
the light of the information received we decided
this meeting would be the last meeting of the Mau Mau
Central Committee . •• we made provision for our own
arrest and laid down a number of directives for
after our arrest. 14

Now the fundamental question is this: if Kaggia and Kubai were

members of the Mau Mau Central Committee, why didn't they join
the Kenyan patriotic forces in the forests instead of giving
themselves in to the enemy?
In essence, KAU's aim was to achieve some national indepen-
dence through constitutional and peaceful means. From 1947 to
1952 the leadership made several attempts to reach a compromising
understanding with the British, but each of these attempts was
met with increasing resistance and hostility from the imperialist
circles. All attempts failed miserably. These failures were
to affect KAU in the future . The more militant within the Union
would insist that the KAU leadership take a hard line against
British imperialism.
These dillusioned militants were soon to find allies. In
Nairobi where the life of the workers was "characterized by
chronic unemployment, hopeless housing conditions" 15 and inev-
itable police harassment and brut a1ity, "there grew an enormous
number of people who were extremely dissatisfied" 16 with the

97
oppressive conditions. They gradually decided to do something
about these unbearable conditions ; they began to organize them-
selves into an anti-colonial group called the "Forty's Group"
(Anake a 40). The membership of the group included the more
militant patriots such as Fred Kubai. Charles Wambaa . Mwangi ·
Macharia~ Eliud Mutonyi, Isaac Gathanju, Stanley Mathenge.
Domenico Ngatu and many others. Since most of them were dissat-
isfied with the conservative stand KAU continued to advocate.
the majority decided to join the Kenya Trade Union Movement .
which by. this period of the country's history was the most pro-
gressive. anti-imperialist force under Makhan Singh's leadership.
Kaggia says:
In the Trade Union Movement I found the place for my
ambitions. The people I worked with were as militant
and revolutionary as myself. They were not suffering
from any inferiority complex. We had little respect
for KAU, which we regarded as an instrument of the
Governor through Mathu, his nominated member of Legis-
lative Council. 11

In June 1951 this group of militants took over the KAU leader-
ship in the Nairobi branch. As Nairobi was KAU's most important
base because of its large working class . th i s change was signi-
ficant. Kaggia writes:
The KAU Nairobi branch election was approaching and
the trade union leaders met long in advance and
planned to capture all posts. We would put our
strong men in all the important posts and leave room
for only one or two non-trade unionists .••• The final
results were: F. Kubai, Chairman (Transport and
Allied Workers Union); J. Mungai, Vice-Chairman
(Transport and Allied Workers Union); B.M. Kaggia,
general secretary (Clerks & Commercial Workers Union) .
The three of us were staunch trade unionists and very
militant . 18

Again he writes:
Before the trade unionists took over the leadership
of the Nairobi branch, KAU was very unpopular. All
of the Nairobi people looked to the trade unions to
represent them . Even Kenyatta did not seem to

*Makhan Singh was arrested and detained in Lokitaung by the Co-

lonial Government in 1950. ·"Makhan Singh," the dictatorship of
the colonialists declared. "will be detained there for an inde-
finite period . unable to leave the area without written consent
of the Police Commissioner . and even unable to visit shops.
stations or telegraph offices. without written permission."

98
 have any faith in KAU. He didn't come often to KAU
headquarters. Everything was left in the bands of
vice-president Mbotela. Kenyatta concentrated on
the Kenya Teachers' College at Githunguri. 19

By August 1951 it was clear that the moderate and conservative

forces in the Union were very weak. The militant were gaining
strength in other branches also . * Under these circumstances,
Kenyatta was left with one choice: to break the Union by ex-
pelling the militants or to side with them against his own po-
litical stand and that of the British. He took an apparently
neutral line--a middle-of-the road policy between the KAU con-
servatives and the militants. He was afraid to oppose the mili-
tants as he clearly understood the danger involved. For instance,
way back in 1948, he had told an American journalist, Negley
Farson: "I am afraid of this left-wing group. I believe that
their dark and half-educated minds will lead them to use force." 20
Between Augu~t 1951 and October 1952 it was evident that
the Kenyan masses were getting impatient with old-styled KAU
politics. r~eanwhile Kenyatta and Mbiyu Koinange made an unsuc-
cessful attempt "to ensure a peaceful transition to African
self-government by opening a fresh dialogue" 21 with the British
colonialists in Lond9n and the settler interests in Kenya. Mbiyu
and Achieng Oneko were sent to London to explain KAU ' s policy
to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office ignored them and
refused to see them. The Colonial Secretary scornfully dismissed
them as "irresponsible black monkeys . " Kaggia writes:
The KAU militants who were at the centre of the Hau
Hau introd~ced a resolution which was passed at the
KAU Kaloleni meeting on the day when Mbiyu Koinange
and Achieng oneko were leaving for Britain ••.• The
resolution declared this deputation would be the last
one sent to Britain . We had no faith in deputations,
but we were willing to give Britain a last chance ...
some of us believed that there would be no favourable

*The leading militants within KAU were Bildad Kaggia, Secretary

of Nairobi Branch, F. Kubai, Chairman of Nairobi Branch, James
Beauttah, Chairman of Murang'a Branch and Vice-President of the
Central Kenya KAU Council, Harrison Wamuthenya, Chairman of
Nyeri Branch, Henry Wambogo, Vice-Chairman of Nyeri Branch,
Kiragu Kagotho, secretary of Nyeri Branch, Pratt Njogu, Chairman
of Embu Branch, Romano Jamumo Gikunju, secretary of Embu Branch ,
John Mbiyu Koinange, Chairman of Kiambu Branch, Kungu Karumba,
Chairman of Limuru sub-Branch, Charles Munyua Wambaa, Chairman
of Kikuyu sub-Branch, J.D. Kali, assistant secretary of Nairobi
Branch, P.J. Ngei, KAU assistant secretary.

99
 result from that deputation •••

our expectations were fulfilled when Achieng Oneko

returned from Britain and said that the British
Colonial Secretary did not meet them ••.. Achieng
also proved a very good representative for our
cause when he described the treatment the deputation
received from the Colonial Secretary. All his
emphasis on the insulting attitude of the British
towards Africans helped our committee convince the
people that deputations to London were useless, a
waste of our money and time . 22

On the home front, through the Kenya Citizens' Association,*

Kenyatta tried to sell KAU's policy to the Kenya settlers but
they too rejected it. Both attempts failed. Thus opened the
way for physical confrontation between the Kenyan people and
British imperialism.
After these failures to convince British imperialism that
a peaceful transition to African self-government would head off
the mounting confrontation, the KAU militants and other patriots
openly began to advocate a violent uprising against the British
independent of the regular KAU approach. Kaggia explai ns:
"The collection of guns was accelerated and our intelligence
network strengthened. The Mau Mau Central Committee authorized
more and more aggressive methods and a~tivities." 23 The mili-
tants consolidated their hold among the working class in Nairobi
and the squatters of the Rift Valley. To a great extent they
had the support of the great majority of peasant masses in Centra
Kenya. It was clear by now that Kenyatta had little control of
the situation and he knew very little of what was going on in
secrecy. Again Kaggia explains:
The Hau Hau Central Committee asked Kenyatta to see
them. For the first time Kenyatta met the Hau Hau
Central Committee. He was surprised to see Kubai
and myself there. And be noticed to his further
surprise that other leaders, whom be did not know,
were running the meeting. E. Hutonyi and I. Gathanju
were the chairman and secretary. 24

Obviously the situation now called for a new leadership and a

new kind of Organization to direct the People's Movement. To
quqte Kaggia further:

*The Kenya Citizens' Association was inaugurated on October 23 ,

1950, to deal with race relations . It was controlled by the
settlers and the Christian church leaders. Kenyatta and Mbiyu
were members.

100
 •• • Hau Hau was an Organization formed by KAU mili-
tants who had lost faith in constitutional methods
of fighting for independence ••.• It was clear [to us]
that the government would never give up Kenya with-
out a struggle • . • 25

What Kaggia is saying is simply that since KAU had failed to

bring national independence through constitutional methods, the
more politically aware saw no other alternative than to impose
their w.i 11 through armed struggle. And this 1ed to the organi-
zation of the Mau Mau Movement . As Philip Bolsover wrote in
1953 :
If Hau Hau and other secret societies exist, they are
the direct result of land robbery by white settlers,
suppression of trade unions and democratic rights,
and the use of violence by the British Government
against the African people. 26

Again he pointed out:

What is going on in Kenya today is a great liberation
movement of the African people, and the struggle is
being waged by the only methods left open to them as
a result of the violence and suppression exercised by
the British imperialists. 21

The organization of the the Mau Mau Movement marked the fourth
and still higher stage of our people's struggle . In fact, for
most Kenyan people, particularly those in Central Kenya, Mau Mau
was "food and drink for a hungry and thirsty traveller." 28
The Movement pointed out clearly to the Kenyan patriots the road
of the armed struggle , stirring up a vigorous nationalist political
upsurge throughout the country in which the workers and peasants
became an independent leading political force . In essence, this
historic event marked a fundamental turning point in the history
of the Kenyan anti-imperialist resistance . It saw the death of
KAU as a petty-bourgeois political force, combined with the birth
of a new leadership of workers and peasants based in the country-
side under the direction of Dedan Kimathi and Stanley Mathenge.
The first task of Mau Mau's overall strategy, say between
1950 to 1952, was to educate, mobilize and unite as many people
as possible against British occupation. Oathing, as a traditional
pledge of commitment , was designed as an instrument to unite
those who could be united around the Movement. The basic aim of
the Organizers of Mau Mau was not to create a movement of a par-
ticular class or national ity, but a nationalist movement which
united the ranks of the workers, peasants, members of the petty-
bourgeois and other patriotic elements who were determined to
fight colonialism and imperialism for national independence. To

101
use oa.thing as a weapon to unite the Kenyan people was only a
part of the Movement's strategy. Much political education was
carried out using whatever media . was available . It was clearly
spelt-out that the objective aim of the Mau Mau Movement was:
to defeat imperialism and colonialism, win national independence
and regain stolen land . This point is · clearly expressed in one
of the Mau Mau songs:
We are fighting for our land
Some of our people
Don't seem to understand
The root-cause of our struggle
Can't they see that we are tormented
Because of asking for our independence
And full rights to our land.

Or again:
Rise up, you Kenyan masses!
Seize your freedom
Expel the foreign imperialists
From this country .

At any rate , as the oathing and political education contin-

ued to spread secretly in Nairobi, Central Kenya and among the
squatters of the Rift Vally during the latter part of 1951 , the
political consciousness of our people continued to heighten sig-
nificantly . The nature of racism ("colour bar") and the land
and labour questions were better 'than ever grasped . By June
1952, many of the "militants had started preparing for resistanc
in the forests , " 29 as the dictatorship of the colonialists be-
gan to resort to fascist measures, and to consolidate and strengl
then its hold on our country. In addition to oathing other anti·
imperialist activities were being conducted like boycotting
European goods, e . g. , beer, cigarettes , hats and public buses
(Kenya Bus), combatting prostitution and the elimination of
the homeguard traitors , informers and other imperialist accom-
plices. The colonial regime , confused about the turn of events ,
was seriously shaken by our people's collective revolutionary
daring. This early period continued till October 20 , 1952,
when the dictatorship of the colonialists declared a state of
emer gency in the country and launched its fascist offensive a-
gainst the people.
As one report puts it:
On 20th October 1952, the Kenya Government declared
a state of emergency, and on the instructions of the
Churchill Government, and with the vociferous support
of the white settlers in Kenya, launched an attack
against the Kenya people's democratic organizations. 30

102
 The British colonial offensive was a calculated .plan to
destroy the Movement and the unity of the people in order to stem
the revolutionary spirit of the people. As colonel Ewart Grogan
declared:
We Europeans have to [go] on ruling this country
and rule it with iron discipline tempered by our
own hearts. 31

And again:
We are going to stay here for the good of Africa,
and as long as we stay we rule. 32

Using repressive action the British began with the banning of

KAU, arresting its leaders, suppr-essing its political activities
and destroying its bases both in urban centres as well as in the
country-side. The limited freedom of speech, press, association,
movement and assembly were thrown overboard. The independent
schools, catering for more than 62,000 students, which the
people of Kenya had patiently built at the "cost of great self-
sacrifice to make up for the Government's neglect of education," 33
were forced to close down. Murder, imprisonment, detention and
torture of thousands of our patriots became the order of the
day . In the city and towns · much African property was lost in
these bloody campaigns of which "Operation Anvil" was but one.
In the countryside, the peasant ' s means of livelihood- -his cattle,
sheep and goats--were rounded up by the colonial troops and
armed settlers; and the peasant himself was hunted down like a
dog in a vain attempt to intimidate him . "The only answer to
Mau Mau", declared Colonel Grogan, "is to teach the whole Kikuyu
tribe a 1esson by pro vi ding a 'psychic shock' . "sr. The Mau Mau
patriotic army in the forests accepted this challenge unflaggingly
and courageously replied: "We have to be violent in a violent
situation, we must fight when a war is imposed on us, defend our
rights in the face of aggression. There can be no peace when
the foundations of peace have 'been unilaterally undermined. " 35
The arrest of Kenyatta and other KAU leaders was undertaken
with the misguided notion that these leaders were the main or-
ganizers and managers of the Mau Mau Movement. Their removal,
the imperialists believed, would smash Mau Mau at the embryonic
stage. To their great disappointment and surprise most Kenyans
held on finrrly and continued with the resistance. Blinded by
rac·ism and with typical colonial arrogance the British did not
realize the crucial distinction that Mau Mau was a separate,
independent force with its directions and aims under the guer-
rilla army in the forests. Kaggia writes:
Although many Mau Mau members were KAU members, others
were not. And many KAU members were not members of

103
 Mau Mau. More important, some of our leaders knew
nothing about this militant movement within KAU.
KAU took orders. from its Ce.n tral Committee; Mau Mau
had a separate Central Committee . There was no
organized link between the two . 36

At one of the Mau Mau guerrillas' conferences in the forest

Dedan Kimathi made the following observation:
Let us make this very clear: If one of the KAU leaders
or anybody else gets in our way, we will cut him down
just the same as we have done to those who stood in
our way. 31

It seems clear that the arrest and imprisonment of Jomo

Kenyatta as a Mau Mau organizer and manager was a great injusti~
that was done to him since in fact he was not its organizer.
Again to quote Kaggia:
Although the Mau Mau Movement looked upon Kenyatta as
the national leader, it was not under his direct con-
trol ..•• He knew little of what went on in the Mau Mau
Central Committee meetings. 38

Enraged by the revolutionary stand taken by our people,

the imperialists deployed thousands of troops, police, warplanes
armoured cars, police dogs, armed European settlers, homeguard
and "taitai"* traitors, in a vain attempt to crush the resistano
George Padmore writes:
What started as an emergency has already become a
full-scale military operation--the biggest colonial
war in African since the Boer War. over thirty thou-
sand British troops have be~n assembled to assist
the local police force, the Kenya Regiment, recruited
exclusively from among the European male population,
the Kikuyu Home Guards, ·and the King's African Rifles
are in open warfare against what the Africans call
the Kenya Land Liberation Army. 39

A.ll rural areas of Central Kenya, a large part of the Rift Valle
and the urban centres of our country were occupied by the fascis
forces. Untold miseries were the order of the day--including
who 1esa 1e massacres and wanton destrucuo·n of property. The

*Taitai were educated Africans who were working in the CID .

[Crime Investigation Department, the Kenyan edition of the CIA .
Ed . K.M. ] as pro-colonial intelligence agents during the Mau Mau
War of National Liberation. Taitai literally means "those who
wear ties"--the Elite.

104
British contention that only 11,000 Africans died is a gross
under-estimate.*
on March 24, 1953, the "Irish Revolutionary Press" stated:
we only get one side of the story and that, as we in
Ireland know so well, is told in a way that destroys
the African's case •..• The papers are constantly re-
porting the killing of Africans while 'resisting ar-
rest', 'failing to halt', or 'attempting to escape' .
These are terms which Irish people remember as synon-
ymous with sheer murder by British forces and Police
of unarmed Irishmen and women. The recurrence of
such expressions in reports from Kenya has a sinister
ring in Irish ears •... Whatever the happenings it has
become evident that the mass of people are against
the present regime.~ 0

Writing to his friends in London about the war, Tony Cross, a

former officer of the Kenya Police, stated:
We have three home guard sections, each about fifty
strong and they go out and bring in information.
Some are pretty good, and we go out and raid and
knock a few off. Don't ask me why ... just because
the home guard say they are bad men.

Anyway, after persuasion they usually confess some-

thing. I inspect all the prisoners and if they are
a bit dubious I refuse to have them. The next mor-
ning I am usually called to a dead body and proceed
normally.

If you go on patrol and find some men hiding in t .h e

bush you call on them to stop and if they don't they
are shot, or rather shot at. These boys are often
rotten shots, so I grab the first bloke's rifle and
have a go.

Compared with coppering in London, this really shakes

you. There seem to be no judge's rules, cautions,
etc., but I am gradually getting some proper policing.

I am sure all this gestapo stuff never got anyone

anywhere.~ 1

*A conservative estimate is that at least 150,000 Kenyans lost

their lives, 250,000 were maimed for life and 400,000 were left
homeless .

105
Anyway, to avoid being killed or arrested many of the youth vol·
untarily join~d the Mau Mau guerrilla army in the forests or pe1
formed ancillary chores . By the end of 1954 about 150,000 work•
peasants and the patriotic elements of the petty-bourgeoisie ha;
been hauled without trial into prisons and detention camps wher•
they were to undergo unspeakable tortures. Many died, others
lost their limbs, others went insane while some were even cas-
trated. The Mau Mau leadership understood this as a necessary
price for national dignity.
Whilst the colonial fascist regime was pouring thousands o
its mercenary troops across the country, Mau Mau forces continu•
to win victories both in the battlefields as well as in recrui-
ting more men. It also had the support of the great majority. o
our people and the progressive forces of the world. Philip
Boslover writes:
For years now the national struggle of the Kenya
Africans has been gaining strength ••.. And for years
the Kenya Government has been trying to suppress
that struggle • . • but never with final triumph. 42

In fact, the assassination of Senior Chiefs Waruhiu and Nderi

and pro-colonial collaborator elements like Ofafa, Tom Mbotela
etc . , was seen as a great victory for this movement. This was
immortalized in a song entitled "Ndiri Hindi Ngendia Bururi"
( "T wi 11 never sell out the country") after the victorious ass a
sination of Waruhiu:
I will never sell out the country
Or love money more than my own country
waruhiu sold out his own country (for money)
But he died and left the money.

In connection with that, Mohamed Mathu tells us how the

people celebrated his [Waruhiu's] death with three days of beer
drinking. They were happy that one of Kenya's 'Black Europeans
had left the earth. 43 Waruhiu, Ofafa, Nderi and Tom Mbotela we
the foremost colonial government agents and it seems there were
many others . Reporting the state of war in Kenya to the House
of Commons on July 3, 1954, Henry Hopkinson, Under-Secretary of
State for the colonies, gave the following information:
Mau Mau insurgents killed numbered 5,567 and wounded,
622. The casualties suffered by the security forces
amounted to 422 killed (including twenty-five Euro-
peans, two Asians and 395 Africans), and 367 wounded,
among them forty-four Europeans, ten Asians and 313
Africans. 4 4

Again in November 1954, the Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, ga

106
the following report to the House of Commons:
Mau Mau adherents killed 1,186 civilians (twenty-four
Europeans, seventy Asians and 1,145 Africans). The
total number of Mau Mau suspects arrested and screened
was 138,235 • • • ~ 5

The fight was becoming fiercer . It is not necessary here

to go into details of each heroic victory of the people against
the forces of imperialism, since Karari Njama has recorded all
these events. Suffice it only to mention in passing the two
major ones which greatly affected the course of the war by height-
ening and boosting the revol utionary spirit and morale of the
Mau Mau Patriotic Army on the one hand, while shaking and fright -
ening the imperialist forces on the other. The first was the
successful battl.e of .Naivasha which took place on March 2, 1953.
The Mau Mau Patriotic Army courageously attacked and over-ran
the Naivasha Police base. It captured many guns and much ammu-
nition, killing and capturing ·a considerable number of the enemy
personnel . General Mbaria Kaniu was the guerrilla commander
in this battle. The other important battle against colonialist
occupiers took place on September 17, 1954. The Mau Mau Patrio-
tic Army over-ran Lukenya Prison and successful ly freed all the
prisoners. They captured a substantial amount of war material ;
and the enemy 'personnel were either killed or ran away. The
following song was composed to eulogize the Lukenya battle:
While fighting in the forests,
Encamped in the coffee field,
We young fighters planned
OUr raid on Lukenya Prison

When the discussion was over

And we all agreed,
OUr scouts were sent to investigate .

They went and returned,

Giving us a report,
We should prepare
OUrselves for the attack,

We began our journey,

We young fighters ·towards Lukenya,
Keeping well-hidden all the way.

When we arrived our fighters lay down

We opened fire and killed two guards.

The Black people imprisoned

Were crying for help saying
'Oh, our people, open the doors for us' .

107
 After fighting and releasing the prisoners,
We prayed to god in us
So that he might assist us to [return] safely.

All Black people of Nairobi were happy

Congratulating us for brave deed. 46

These two battles, as we have mentioned , influenced the course

of war between our people and imperialism. They encouraged and
reinforced the iron-determination and fighting spirit of the Ma
Mau Patriotic Army, earned it much support and loyalty of the
worker and peasant masses. The imperialists were forced to bri
what they considered their best Generals, namely, George Erskin
and William Hinde. The head of the British Intelligence Servic
Sir Percy Sillitoe , was also sent to Kenya to organize the in-
telligence service. A war cabinet was formed, under the new
military dictators, Generals Erskine and William Hinde. In ad-
dition, more troops , aircraft, armoured cars, and bombs were
brought in. The whole country was turned into a fortress in
their desperation to crush the will of the people.* At the sam!
time the white settlers were bitterly criticising General Erskit
for his inability to exterminate the Mau Mau patriots. Answerir
to the white settlers' criticism, the General replied :
••• there is no question of the Mau having strong
defence or being particularly gallant. It is just
the opposite.

Mau Mau defence consist of sentries down every trail

leading to hideouts. As soon as a sentry is engaged,
the gang disperses and reassembles at prearranged
places. Sitting in an armchair, it sounds very easy
to get a sentry or two but much more difficult to
get into or surround a gang. The gangs never wait
to fight. 47

The Mau Mau Patriotic Army was able to achieve considerabl

victories over the enemy forces between 1952 and the early part
of 1955. However, in the late 1955 the "tide seemed to be
turning against the guerrilla forces." 48 First, through "Opera-
tion Anvil", the col onial government was gradually able to dis-
rupt the guerrillas' major base in Nairobi by arresting and de-
taining more than 70,000 people who were its great supporters.
The Nairobi base provided guerrillas with arms, ammunition ,

*The war was costing the British Government at least one million
pounds in 1954 . It was costing the British Government more
than 20,000 pounds to capture one "Mau Mau terrorist . " See
G. Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p. 255 .

108
medical supplies, clothing, well-trained cadres and money. Now
with all these desiderata cut off, the guerrillas faced a serious
problem of shortage of supplies . And then, most devastating of
all in this relation: the capture and surrender of General China.
Accordi·ng to Karari Njama, "China's confession and ultimate
collaboration with Special Branch Officers,"" 9 affected the en-
tire Mau Mau activities and communications. His confession and
betrayal revealed to the colonial security forces most of the
guerrillas' military secrets and plans. Through China's sellout
deal, the enemy forces were able to arrest a considerable number
of guerrilla leaders and they successfully destroyed some guer-
rilla units. Second, the "Villagization Program," used by the
British in Malaya, was introduced in the countryside after "Op-
eration Anvil." Though not immediately, this cruel programme
was relatively able to isolate the guerrillas from the peasant
masses who were their major· source of supplies, communications,
and food. Lack of significant victories after 1955, poor dis-
cipline among the guerrilla units and the ideological division
among the leading Mau Mau Generals weakened further the fighting
spirit of guerrilla forces. By the middle of 1956 the Mau Mau
Movement was in its decline.
The Mau Mau Movement has been attacked and interpreted from
di.f ferent angles and by different groups and indi vi dua 1s. Occa-
sionally attacks and criticisms of the Movement are heard from
certain members of the Kenya National Assembly . Some even
proudly and loudly boast how courageously they fought Mau Mau
in the pay of British imperialism. As a former Mau Mau guerrilla
interviewed for this paper remarked: "Why should they (M.P.'s)
continue to condemn Mau Mau--a Movement which fought for their
rights to be in that "House" they call Parliament? Was it a
crime to fight for our land and our country ' s independence?"
Another line taken by this group is to urge the people to forget
Mau Mau . To quote Ngugi Kabiro's book, The Man in the Middle:
"We are told to forget the past. But I, for one, fail to under-
stand why we should so easily forget the great sufferin~ endured
by our people in their struggle for land and freedom." 5 Simi-
larly Mathu states:
Looking back on Mau Mau today, I still consider it
to have been a just and courageous struggle for
freedom. Though mistakes were made, and some people
entered the revolt for narrow or selfish interests.,
the ••• people as a whole fought and suffered bravely
and I am proud of them. Our fight against British
colonialism, by throwing fear into the hearts of
imperialists and settlers, quickened the pace of po-
litical development and independence in Kenya . I
should like to remind those African leaders who now
condemn Mau Mau and tell us to forget our past struggle

109
 and suffering, that their presenc positions of power
in the Legislative Council and elsewhere would not
have been realized except for our sacrifices. I
would also warn them that we did not make these
sacrifices just to have Africans step into the shoes
of our former European masters. 5 1

Bas.ical.ly, there are three interpretations of the Mau Mau

Movement. The first interpretation .is based on the imperial is
and Christian school of thought. The second one is articulate
by the University of Nairobi school of thought and the third
one stems from a chauvinist clique in Central Kenya.
The Imperialist and Christian School of Thought
According to this school of thought as it is well articul·
by L.S.B . Leakey,* F.D. Corfield, Fred Majdalany, Dennis Holma1
lone Leigh, R. Ruark .and the . leaders of the Christian Church,
Mau Mau was
--a barbarous and atavistic organization
--an anti-white tribal cult whose leaders planned
to turn Kenya into a land of darkness and death
--a product of primitive Gikuyu forest mentality
--primitive and a lunatic barbarism
--an advanced. form of Gikuyu insanity
--an· anti-christianity and anti-western civilization
--a product of the Gikuyu people's failure to adapt
to the demands of western civilization .
--a terrorist movement whose aim was the drinking of
human blood
--a communist subversive movement**
--etc . , etc.
The imperialist and Christian school of thought is easily
understood because it is a straight racist position. One sees

*L. S. B. Leakey was working as an Intelligence Officer in the

C.I.D. during the Mau Mau War of National Liberation. His
brother, who was killed by Mau Mau in October 1954, was a lead·
Kenya Settler spokesman .
**For detailed information see The Psychology of Mau Mau by J.
C. Carothers; Historical survey of the Origins and Growth of
Mau Mau by F.D. Corfield; Mau Mau and the Kikuyu and The Defea1
of Mau Mau by L.S.B. Leakey 0 lone Leigh, Ln the Shadow of Mau
Mau; D. Holman, Bwana Drum; Fred Majdalany, state of Emergency ,
and R. Ruark, Uhuru.

110
their point since they were the enemy forces Mau Mau was deter-
mined to overthrow . To expect them to eulogize the victory of
their slaves, is like expecting Henry Kissinger to eulogize· the
victory of the Vietnamese people over American imperialism in
1975 . What these enemies of Kenyans are trying to accomplish
is to destroy the real essence of our national movement. Their
ulterior motive is one : to try to justify their mission as
"agents of world civilization" in our country in order to cover
their exploitation and brutal oppression of the Kenyan people.
This reasoning, which is racist in nature, fails to undermine
the fundamental contradictions which brought the Mau Mau to its
birth . And it can not erase in our history the monumental task
the Kenyan people took up for their national liberation. It is
obvious that the colonialists and their agents, the Christian
Church, were not in our country for humanitarian purposes . They
came for one underlined aim: to enslave and ex~loit Kenyans.
Essentially the Christians, particularly the more confused
African Christians, condemned Mau Mau as a "terrorist movement
whose aim was to drink human blood." Yes, it is true that Mau
Mau killed a lot of Africans relative to the European casualties.
But the fundamental question is: What sort of people were killed?
They were outright traitors and colonial collaborators who owed
Kenyans many blood debts and were bitterly hated and opposed by
them . In a movement which involved thousands and thousands of
people, the masses would not be able to heighten their political
consciousness if it allowed traitors and re~ctionary intellec-
tuals or religious agents to spread their pro-imperialist propa-
ganda freely among the people. If these elements are not wiped
out quickly they would sabotage the people ' s movement and even-
tually destroy it . Truly, if Mau Mau did not act immediately
to wipe out most of the traitors the Kenyan masses could not have
supported it nor could they have allowed its presence in their
midst. In its methods of struggle Mau Mau was always able to
distinguish between enemy and friend. In fact it seems to be
the case that too many selfish and opportunist elements were left
in the movement and subsequently derailed it and betrayed it.
The University of Nairobi School of Thought
In their effort to distort the fundamental aim of Mau Mau
and to deny the Movement its national character, some University
of Nairobi historians and other academics use arguments essen-
tially similar to the imperialist and Christian school of thought.
That Mau Mau was:
--a primitive Gikuyu movement
--a Gikuyu chauvinist movement
--Gikuyu nationalism as opposed to Kenyan nationalism
and that it was not a national movement because:

111
 --all the Mau Mau symbols and songs were Gikuyu
--other nationalities did not take part in or support i t,
-- it did not spread beyond Central Kenya ,
--oathing was typically Gikuyu, Embu and Meru
--etc. , etc .
To be more specific, let us quote the two leading. anti-Ma
Mau academicians: William Ochieng ' and B. E. Kipkorir. Williad
Ochieng' argues that:
Mau Mau was definitely not a nationalist movement • .•
[it] had no nationalist programme ••• [further] the
Central Committee that managed the Mau Mau Movement
contained representatives from Murang'a, Nyeri, Embu,
Meru, and Machakos ••. It is therefore important to cor-
rectly evaluate Mau Mau as a primarily Kikuyu affair. 52

He conti nues:
The Mau Mau administrators never took into account
the interests of the Pokot, Giriama, Luo, Turkana
or Somali. 53

In the same vein Kipkorir argues that since Mau Mau did not dis
tribute its political programme nationwide it was therefore not
a nationalist movement . He writes sarcastically:
Kaggia has put forward the view t .h at to steal from a
European a cow, in the cause was 'nationalist' • • • But
he fails to show that Mau Mau had a programme for na-
5
tional leadership which would have been truly 'national.'

Agai n according to Kipkorir, Mau Mau did not have any support
outside Central Kenya because it was a tribal movement:
It is not therefore surprising that hardly anyone,
outside Central Kenya, voiced sympathy or support
for Mau Mau. 55

During the August 1976 conference of the Historical Associ

ation of Kenya, Professor Ogot strongly argued that Mau Mau
songs expressed Gikuyu nationalism as opposed to Kenyan nation-
alism. We quote:
In conclusion, I would like to state that what emerges
from a study of these hymns is a strong sense of Kiku¥u
nationalism as opposed to Kenya African nationalism. 5

To label and condemn Mau Mau as a "chauvinist and tribalis·

movement" is not enough to convince anyone because the reasons
advanced do not explain the historical and social contradiction:

112
which brought about its birth and development. Moreover, this
school of thought fails to understand that although the Mau Mau
Movement was perhaps different in form from other Third World
national movements, it was not different in political content.
Mau Mau was a struggle similar to those then being waged by the
colonized peoples all over the Third World . Further, it is im-
portant to understand that the Kenyan people did not choose the
road of armed struggle because they loved to shed human blood,
They came to the conclusion that it was the only effective way
to dethrone British colonialism, win independence and regain
their stolen land. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind
that the organizers of Mau Mau and those who went to the forests
to wage war viewed Mau Mau as a countrywide movement whose aim
was to fight for national independence . Mathu writes:
our principal aim was to forge an ironclad unity
among the people of Central Kenya--and all other
Africans whose support could be won--so that we
might take action as a single body to achieve
our national objectives . 51

we will come to this point later.

The Chauvinist Interpretation
The third interpretation of the Mau Mau Movement is a purely
chauvinist one . Simply stated, it goes like this: "We Gikuyu,
Embu and Meru fought and died for this independence; therefore,
we bought it with our blood . All positions of privilege, power
and wealth must by occupied by us!" This is the other side of
the argument that the University of Nairobi School of Thought
is pushing.
In addition to denying the Mau Mau Movement its national
character, this chauvinist group has another dangerous ulterior
motive, viz., to use Mau Mau revolutionary prestige as a tool
to monopolize national leadership and to use it as an instru-
ment to enrich themselves.* Ironically, those who proudly
praise Mau Mau now are largely the same elements--the homeguards,

*"I have closely watched the activities of our political leaders

and am not happy with much of what I see. Much of the money
collected overseas or from our poor peasants and workers at
political rallies and Harambee programmes goes into the pockets
of politicians for their personal use instead of for the devel-
opment of the country and the welfare of our people. Some
leaders are becoming rich Africans, driving around in fancy
cars, building new houses in the city and using our money for
women, drink and foreign travel." See Mathu's The urban Guer-
rilla, p. 87.

113
loyalists and taitai elements branded ~ime and time again as
traitors by Dedan Kimathi. Their chauvinist outlook is well
portrayed by Ngugi's and Micere Mugo's recent play , The Trial o
Dedan Kimathi . It is a struggle between Kimathi and these chau·
vinists who use Mau Mau heroism as a tool to divide Kenyans for
their selfish ends . We quote:
Politicians: We have been given two alternatives.
We can get independence, province by province.
Majimboism. As a token of their goodwill, they
have now allowed District and Provincial Political
Parties. Independence for Central Province. After
all, it is we Gikuyu, Embu and Meru who really
fought for Uhuru.

Kimathi: Would you too call the war for national

liberation a regional Movement? What has colonialism
done to your thinking? Hear me. Kenya is one indi-
visible whole . The cause we fight for is larger
than provinces, it shatters ethnic barriers. It is
a whole people's cause ... 58

Similarly Mathu observes:

Remembering how many of these leaders abandoned us
during the revolution, I am suspicious of those who
now claim to speak in our name . Are they not aban-
doning us again in their quest ror p<:!~:sonal power
and wealth? The vast majority of Africans remain
very poor. Are the masses of people simply to become
the slaves of a handful of wealthy Black men?

III
While .we would admit that some organizational methods and
techniques which were utilized by the Movement produced negativE
consequences in terms of its development, recruitment and expan·
sion nationally, the notion that the symbols, songs and oaths
were anti-Kenyan nationalism is totally baseless. Also it does
not mean that because the overwhelming bastion of the Movement
was in Central Kenya, Mau Mau was therefore less nationalist.
Essentially one can ask: Where in the world has a self- susta i ni
revolutionar movement been started s ontaneousl b the masses 1
Emphasis added, Ed. K.M. Isn't it true that the revolutionarJ
upsurge always starts with the most politically conscious ele-
ments, groups or sections in any country? In Czarist Russia
it was the Great Russian nationality which provided the Bolshev
Party with the base to begin the Revolution. The early leading
supporters of the Chinese Revolution were the Han nationality.
Why then should our national struggle, because of its national
uniqueness and development, be condemned and damned as a tribal

114
insurrection? Basically it is not true as B.E. Kipkorir wants
us to believe that the Movement did not spread beyond Central
Kenya . Mau Mau had a considerable number of supporters in
Narok District. Ole Kisio, a Mau Mau General, was a Maasai,
from Narok. All the squatters of the Rift va.lley fully suppor-
ted the movement. The Akamba were also involved in the Mau Mau
Movement.
In essence, those who strongly argue that Mau Mau was not a
national movement, and those others who want to convert it into
a regional movement, should seriously examine the documents and
speeches, now available, of Dedan Kimathi, who was the chief
architect of the l~ovement. In one .of the pamphlets which was
distributed mostly in Nairobi, Kimathi condemned the injustices
of British imperialism against the people. He stated:
I£ colour prejudice is to remain in Kenya who will
stop subversive action, for the African has eyes,
ears, and brains . It is better to die than to live
in distress, why confine distress to the soul?*

Giving the reason why the Kenyan people have taken the road of
armed struggle, he declared :
We resort to armed struggle simply because there is
no other alternative left to us, because our people
are exploited, oppressed, plundered, tortured ...

From 1952 to the middle of 1956 Kimathi made genuine efforts

to provide the ideological leadership of the resistance in the
forests. He toured and visited various guerrilla units ex-
plaining the direction and aims of the Movement . He also called
the Mau Mau "Kenya Parliament" meetings regularly to review
and analyze the war situation and more importantly to discuss
the future of Kenya. At one of those meetings Kimathi is re-
ported to have replied to the imperialist propaganda:
I do not lead rebels but I lead Africans who want
their self-government . My people want to live in
a better world than they met when they were born.

*Even though most of Kimathi's writings and speeches were burned

by the Colonial Government, there are individuals who have some
of Kimathi's Papers in their private collections. We wete
lucky to be allowed to examine some of these Papers. In their
recent publication A Bibliography on Hau Mau, pp . 75, M.S.
Clough and K.A. Jackson, Jr. inform us that "There appear to be
a few copies in private possession of the Dedan Kimathi Papers."
According to them some individual writers have been able to
examine a few of these Papers .

115
 I lead them because god never creat~d any nation
to be ruled by another for ever .

Further, in a letter he wrote to Fenner Brockway,* Kimathi ar-

gued:
We are not fighting for an everlasting hatred but are
creating a true and real brotherhood between White
and Black so that we may be regarded as people and
as human beings who can do each and everything.

The ideological position of the Movement is articulated

clearly in a document Kimathi published in October 1953 and it
was followed by letters he sent abroad to different individuals
such as Fenner ~rockway in defence of the Mau Mau Movement.
The document consists of 79 articles. Copies of the document
were sent to the Colonial Office in London, the Indian Govern-
ment, the Government of Egypt, the United Nations, Mbiyu Koinange
in London, Fenner Brockway, the Chairman of the Pan African
Congress in London, President Eisenhower of the United States,
the French Government, George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah.~* The
following extracts from the document clearly show that Mau Mau
was a national Movement and part of a worldwide movement against
imperialism and against exploitation by capital . The document
states:
We want an African self-government in Kenya now . . •

We reject the foreign laws in Kenya for they were

not made for Kenya and are not righteous .

*We learned that the Government had started using propaganda

to defeat us. We agreed to start campaigns against Government
propaganda and at the same time preach our propaganda • . .. The
first one was a copy of a letter written to Fenner Brockway ••.
The letter accused the British Government of giving their forces
and the Kenya settlers authority and arms to shoot to Africans.
See Njama's Mau Mau From Within pp. 357.
**In his article, "Mau Mau: A case study of Kenyan Nationalism"
Africa Quarterly vol. 8, No.1 (April-June 1968) pp. 10-25, D.P.
Singh has extracts from this document. In the Shadow of Mau Mau,
pp. 190-191, lone Leigh has quoted this document. He refers to
this document as "Mau Mau charter". The document was particu-
larly sent to Mbiyu Koinange and Fenner Brockway to present it
to the United Nations.

116
 we reject to be called terrorists when demanding
our people's rights.

our real fight is not against the white colour

but is against the system carried on by the
white rulers.

Fighting for our stolen land and our independence

is not a crime but a revolutionary duty.

Nothing is more precious than independence and

freedom. Only when we achieve our independence
can our people have genuine peace.

we reject a foreign Attorney-General in Kenya

for he deals with appearances more than righteousness.

we reject to be called Mau Mau. We are Kenya

Land Freedom Army (KLFA).

We reject colonization in Kenya for being in

that state we turned into slaves and beggars.

OUr people will chase the foreign exploiters,

wipe out the traitors and establish an independent
Government of the Kenyan people.

After going through Kimathi's document one cannot hold the

view that Mau Mau was "a tribal and atavist insurrection" or a
"Gikuyu chauvinist movement" unless one has certain motives
other than a search. for the truth .
As a matter of fact, "throughout Kimathi 's writings and
speeches, and in the reports of the meetings held by guerrillas,
there is a consistent emphasis on the need for justice, on the
possibility of reconciliation, and on the right to self-govern-
ment."60 In this connection, Mau Mau songs and poetry express
succinctly the political aims of the Movement. A quick perusal
of extracts from some of these songs will, like Kimathi's
writings, show that Mau Mau was a national movement. The most
well-known one is entitled "Rwimbo Rwa Afrika" ("Africa Song"):
God gave to the Black People
This land of Africa
Praise the God who dwells in the high places
For his blessings .

Chorus:
We will continue in our praises
Of the land of Africa
From East to West

117
 From North to South

After much suffering

The country of Egypt
Was delivered from bondage
And received its freedom

Abyssinia (Ethiopia) saw the light

Shining .down from the North
Her people struggled mightily
And rescued themselves from the mire

If you look around the whole of Kenya

It is only a river of blood
For we have one single purpose
To lay hold of Kenya's freedom

Listen to the painful sobbing

Of our brothers in South Africa
w.here they are being oppressed
By the Boer oppressors

We shall greatly rejoice

In the unity of all the Black people
Let us create in our unity
A united states of all Africa.

The song expresses Mau Mau ' s international solidarity with

the people of Africa against imperialism and colonialism. It
also calls for a creation of a Pan-African states of Africa.
Since Mau Mau was fighting foreign exploiters and their
friends in our country, the song below, "Inyui Nyakeru Muri
A eni Bururi U u Witu" ("You White People are Foreigners in Ou~
Country" , makes these points very clear.
You white people are foreigners in our country
You brought slavery and exploitation in our
country .
Now leave our country.

Chorus:
I will fight our enemy
I will fight our enemy
Until our country is free

And you traitors who sell us

To the white oppressors
You must realize that
We will expel the white oppressors
From this land

1.18
 Then you will pay
For your treacherous act
With your life.

All along the struggle , Kimathi consistently continued to stress

the justice of the struggle. This is reflected in the following
song entitled, "Ndi ri Na Kieha No Nguthi" ("I am Not worried I
must Go").
When enemy comes
I will not be afraid
I will wipe him out
Because I am fighting for justice.

Understanding of the violent nature of imperialism and its

racist pol icy is clearly expressed in a song entitled, "Rwimbo
Rwa Kimathi" ("The Song of Kimathi ") ---
We are tormented
Because we are Black
We are not white people
And we are not their kind
But with god in us
we will defeat them.

It is evident that the true "political Kernel" of the Mau

Mau Movement has, up to now, not been cracked. This is due
largely to the failure by Kenyan historians to examine crucial
internal ideological struggles within that organization. Per-
tinent to this are the splits and subsequent shifts in internal
KAU alliances prior to 1952, the historic regrouping of the
disenchanted young militants into the Mau Mau , the organization
and growth of the ensuing armed struggle, their eventual dis-
persal and most significantly their silencing and in many cases ,
the betrayal of their political goals after 1960. It is evident
further that instead of attempting to crack this "kernel" with
objective investigation, there are efforts to subvert even that
part of Mau Mau history which is already amply documented. The
various schools responsible for this are, in our view, not only
doing a great intellectual disservice to Kenyans, but also play-
ing a treacherous political role in complete defiance of facts.
It is evident that resistance movements since the 1800's
progressed from lower to higher levels of organization and po-
litical awareness culminating in the Mau Mau armed confrontation.
This was the peak of African anti-colonial politics in Kenya.
However, weaknesses in organization all along especially the
failure to weed out counter-tendencies and greedy opportunists
who later liquidated the struggle at tremendous cost, are also
quite evident.

119
 Plentiful information already exists for the collecting.
(It is true that perhaps critical documents lie hidden under
the 30-year British Government "secrecy" clause); But there
are people still alive with useful documentary evidence which
is in stark opposition to some current hypotheses. We have
endeavoured to bring out some of this new information, through
interviews and documents. It is hoped that this will help re-
align the Mau Mau debate more correctly and at least lay to rest
the more blatant anti-Mau Mau myths and the "revised" positions .
This in no way exhausts the sources of information . It is but
the beginning of what necessarily must be a long discussion of
this chapter of Kenya's history.
This investigation shows doubtlessly that the Mau Mau Move-
ment answered an urgent desire of the Kenyan peasantry and
workers for land redistribution and that on strategic difference
its leadership split between the moderates and the conservative
KAU, that Kimathi and the Mau Mau Defence Council* were clear
about the need for armed struggle, the essentially anti-imper-
ialist political content of such a struggle and its Kenya-wide
nature. That Mau Mau had serious organizational weaknesses is
also made clear by the ease with which it was cut off from the
urban and rural population by about 1956 after three years of
spectacular success and more so by their utter failure to re-
group after 1960 as a political force that could not be betrayed
or sold-out.
This latter weakness still affects Kenya's politics today.*·

*Mau Mau Defence Council was the Supreme Governing Council of

the Movement.
**As Kari go Mucha i, a former Mau Mau cadre puts it: "I don't
know what the future has in store for me . I can only hope that
with Kenya's independence my suffering _of the past ten years
will somehow be rewarded. I want only a decent job or a piece
of land to cultivate so that I can provide for my family and
see to it that my children go to school and have an opportunity
for a better, richer life than my own. These are the things we
(Kenyans) fought and died for. I only pray that after indepen-
dence our children will not be forced to fight again." See
The Hardcore, p. 85.

NOTES
1
Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism
in Kenya, New York, 1966, p. 15.
2
Makhan Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to
1952, Nairobi, 1969, p. 4.

120
 3Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement, p. 4.

\Sin!]h, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement, p. 5.

5Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement, p. 6.

6
Stephen Nkomo, "The Rhodesia Crisis: Its Source and Na-
ture" in Africa: National and Social Revolution, Prague, 1967,
p. 134.
7Rosberg, The Myth of Mau Mau, p. 51.

8
Stephen Nkomo, "The Rhodesia Crisis", p. 135.
9
Interview with James Beauttah, November 1976.
10
A speech made in 1947 by KAU leadership at a meeting in
Nyeri. See also Mohamed Mathu's The urban Guerrilla, p. 7.
11
Mohamed Mathu, The Urban Guerrilla: History of Mohamed
Mathu, Richmond, British Columbia, Canada, Life Histories from
the Revolution: Kenya Mau-Mau, No . 3, p. 17, c. 1974.
12 Mathu, The Urban Guerrilla, p. 7.
13 Mathu , The Urban Guerrilla, p. 7.
14
Bil dad Kaggia, Roots of Freedom 1921-1963, Nairobi,
p. 116.
15
D. P. Singh, "Mau Mau: A Case Study of Kenyan Nat iona 1ism"
in Africa Quarterly, Vol . B, No . 1 (April-June 1968), p. 14.
16
Singh, D.P., "Mau Mau: A Case Study", p. 14.
17
Kaggi a, Roots of Freedom, p. 79.
18
Kaggi a, Roots of Freedom, p. 79.
19
Kaggia, Roots of Freedom, p. 80.
20 Singh, D.P., "Mau Mau: A Case Study", p. 14 . Also see
Negley Farson's The Last Chance in Africa, New York .
21
Singh, D.P., "Mau Mau: A Case Study", p. 15.
22
~'lggi a, Roots of Freedom, p. 114 .
23
Kaggia, Roots of Freedom, p. 115.
24
Kaggi a, Roots of Freedom, p. 114.

121
 25
Kaggia, Roots of Freedom, p. 113 .
26 Philip Bolsover, Kenya: What .are the Facts, London,
Communist Party, 1953, p. 4.
27
Bol sover, Kenya: What are the Facts, p. 4.
28
Le Duan , The Vietnamese Revolution, New York, 1971, p.
29
Singh, D.P., "Mau Mau: A Case Study", p. 15.
30
World .Trade Urion Movement, Terror in Kenya: The Facts
Behind the Present Crisis, London, W. F. T.U . Publications Ltd.,
1952, p. 3.
31
George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism , London,
1953' p. 255.
32 W.E . B. Du Bois, The World and Africa, New York , 1955 ,
p. 284.
33 World Trade Union Movement, Terror in Kenya,· p. 3
34 Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p. 256.
35
Nkomo, "The Rhodesia Crisis", p. 135.
36 Kaggia, Roots of Freedom, p. 113.
37
An extract from Dedan Kimathi's Paper. See also D. P.
Singh, "Mau ~4au: A Case Study", p. J8.
38
Kaggia, Roots of Freedom, p. 113.
39
Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p. 254.
40
Bolsover, Kenya: What are the Facts, p. 9.
41 Bolsover,
Kenya: What are the Facts, p. 11.
42 Bolsover,
Kenya: What are the Facts, p. 3.
43
Mathu, The Urban Guerrilla, p. 15.
44
Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p. 257.
45
Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p. 257.
46
Mathu, The Urban Guerrilla, p. 54.
47
Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, p. 257 .

122
 48
Kara~i Njama, Mau Mau From Within, New York , 1966, p. 375 .
49 Njama , Mau Mau From Within, p. 330.
50
Ngugi Kabiro , Man in the Middle, Richmond, British Co-
lumbia, Canada , 1973, p. 75 .
51 Mathu, The Urban Guerrilla, p. 75.
52 William
R. Ochieng', Review of Kaggia's Roots of Freedom
1921-1963 in Kenya Historical Review, Vol. 4, No.1, 1976,
Nairobi, 138-140.
53
0chieng', Review of Kaggia, pr . 138-140.
54 B. E. Kipkorir, Review of Kaggia's Roots of Freedom 1921-
1963 in Kenya Historical Review, Vol . 4, No . 1, Nairobi , pp .
140-143.
55
B.E. Kipkorir, "Politics and the Transfer of Power:
Kenya 1957-1960". An unpublished paper, 1977.
s 6 B. A. Ogot, "Politics, Culture and Music in Central Kenya :
A Study of Mau Mau Hymns : 1951-1956", p. 10.
57
Mathu, The Urban Guerrilla, p. 17.
58 Ngugi wa Thiongo and Micere Mugo , The Trial of Dedan
Kimathi, Nairobi, 1977, p. 46.
59
Mathu, Xhe Urban Guerrilla, p. 87 .
60
Singh, D.P., "Mau Mau: A Case Study" , p. 19.

123