Jarco Marketing v.

CA
GR No. 129792
December 21, 1999

Facts: Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s Department Store (owned by Jarco Mrktg). The
former was signing her credit card slip when a counter fell upon her daughter Zhieneth and pinner the latter to the
ground. She was immediately rushed to Makati Medical Center where she was operated. 14 days later, her frail
six year old frame was not able to survive the injuries. She died.
After the burial of the daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses. Jarco refused to pay and denied any liability for the
injuries and death of Zhieneth. They claimed that Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Also, the counter
was allegedly made of sturdy wood with a strong support and could not have collapsed if Zhieneth did not climb
on it.

RTC ---- Ruled in favor of Jarco Marketing

Issue: Whether or not the death of Zhieneth was attributable to negligence

Held: Yes, Zhieneth’s death could only be attributable to negligence

Q: While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the child was being treated?
A: At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the doctor asked the child "what
did you do," the child said "nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me."
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN)
You want the words in Tagalog to be translated?
ATTY. BELTRAN
Yes, your Honor.
COURT
Granted. Intercalate "wala po, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta bumagsak."

This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed (and should be admitted as) part of the
res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to
think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor
whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e.,
ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was
the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter
by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was
not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
Additional:
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the
person to whom it happens."
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury."
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. vs. Balandan
G.R. No. L-3422
June 13, 1952

SUMMARY: Respondent’s 8-year-old son drowned in the water tank of petitioner’s factory. Respondent claims
damages for the death of their son. However, the Court ruled that since the water tank is not an attractive
nuisance, it is immaterial to consider whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions. Petitioner is
absolved from liability.

Doctrine: Under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, one who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. However, this doctrine is generally not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location

Facts: Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son,
Mario. Petitioner, Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks full of
water, 9 feet deep, for cooling purposes of their engine. The factory compound was fenced but Ingress and egress
was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the
tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario, who was barely 8 years old, was playing with his
friends who were of his age, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While
bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of
‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ CA and CFI took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance
(the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent and therefore liable for damages

Ruling: No, petitioner is not negligent and therefore not liable for damages. Under the doctrine of attractive
nuisance, one who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises.

However, the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well
as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location. Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the
danger of drowning. Against this danger, children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to
know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely
duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an
’attractive nuisance."

In the case at bar, as petitioner’s tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether
the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner -
that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila
on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no further discussion.
Francisco vs. Chemical Bulk Carriers, Incorporated
GR No. 193577
September 7, 2011

Doctrine: Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place.

Facts: Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex station in Teresa, Rizal. In 1993,Gregorio Bacsa and
three other people came to Francisco’s Caltex station and introduced themselves as employees of CBCI and
offered to sell to Francisco a certain quantity of CBCI’s diesel fuel. After checking Bacsa’s identification card,
Francisco agreed to purchase CBCI’s diesel fuel. Francisco imposed the following conditions for the purchase: (1)
that Petron Corporation should deliver the diesel fuel to Francisco at his business address which should be
properly indicated in Petron’s invoice; (2) that the delivery tank is sealed; and (3)that Bacsa should issue a
separate receipt to Francisco. In 1996, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel fuel delivered
to him but which had been paid for by CBCI, demanded that Francisco pay CBCI 1,053,527 for the diesel fuel in
which Francisco rejected, prompting CBCI to file a complaint for sum of money and damages against Francisco
and other unnamed defendants. According to CBCI, Petron, on various dates, sold diesel fuel to CBCI but these
were delivered to and received by Francisco. Francisco then sold the diesel fuel to third persons from
whom he received payment. CBCI alleged that Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel without
authority from CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of the diesel fuel it had paid for. CBCI argued that Francisco
should have known that since only Petron, Shell and Caltex are authorized to sell and distribute
petroleum products in the Philippines, the diesel fuel came from illegitimate, if not illegal or criminal, acts. CBCI
asserted that Francisco violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code and that he should be held liable.

Issue: Did Francisco exercise the required diligence of a blind person in the conduct of his business?

Ruling: No, Francisco did not exercise the required diligence of a blind person. Standard of conduct is the level of
expected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the
person, time and place. The most common standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a
reasonably prudent person. However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of
care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps and
infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable
person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is
blind. Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the Caltex station for 15years and this
was not a hindrance for him to transact business until this time. In this instance, however, we rule that Francisco
failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind. First, Francisco merely
relied on the identification card of Base to determine if he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other
background check on the identity and authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings
about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of
Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on a
half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official
receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron’s invoice, does not show that
CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of
conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER
G.R. No. 189998
August 29, 2012

DOCTRINE: Negligence; Article 2176 0f the New Civil Code provides Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their
guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of
the business (Arts 2000-2001 New Civil Code).

Hotel owner is liable for civil damages to surviving heirs of hotel guest whom strangers murder inside his hotel
room.

FACTS: Christian Harper was a Norwegian who came to Manila on a business trip. He stayed at Makati Shangri-
la Hotel, but he was murdered in his hotel room.

It was found that the murderer, a caucasian male, was able to trespass into the hotel room of the victim and was
then able to murder and rob the victim. The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the
most basic security system of its guests.

The RTC held in favor of the heirs and ordered Shangri-la to pay damages. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Shangri-la Hotel is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence.

The testimony revealed that the management practice of the hotel prior to the death of the victim was to deploy
only one security or roving guard for every three or four floors of the hotel, which is inadequate because the hotel
is L-shaped that rendered hallways not visible end to end. That there was a recommendation to increase security
to one guard per floor but this was not followed. This ommission is critical. The hotel business is imbued with
public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their
persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.

Therefore, the hotel has a greater degree of care and responsibility for its guests, otherwise the hotelkeepers
would just stand idly by while strangers have unrestricted access to all hotel rooms on the pretense of being
visitors of the guests which is absurd.

Note: The decision of the CA was reproduced in the decision to which the SC concurred. The CA discussed the
test of negligence as:

The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with a perspective as that of
an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test, as applied to the extant case, is whether or not
[Shangri-la Hotel], under the attendant circumstances, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
person would have used in the same situation.
Philippine National Bank v. Santos
G.R. No. 208293 & 208295
December 10, 2014

FACTS: Respondents are children of Angel C. Santos who died on 21 March 1991. Sometime in 1996,
respondents discovered that their father maintained a premium savings account with Philippine National Bank
(PNB), Sta. Elena-Marikina City Branch. As of July 1996, the deposit amounted to 1,759,082.63. Later
respondents would also discover that their father also had a time deposit of 1,000,000.00 with PNB. Respondents
went to PNB to withdraw their father’s deposit. Lina B. Aguilar, the Branch Manager of PNB-Sta. Elena-Marikina,
required them to submit the following: (1) original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of Angel C. Santos;
(2) certificate of payment of, or exemption from, estate tax issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); (3)
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and (5) Surety bond effective for two years and in an amount equal to the
balance of the deposit to be withdrawn.

By April 1998, respondents had already obtained the necessary documents, however, when they tried to
withdraw, Aguilar informed them that the deposit had already “been released to a certain Bernardito Manimbo
(Manimbo) on 01 April 1997.” An amount of 1,882,002.05 was released upon presentation of: (1) an affidavit of
self-adjudication purportedly executed by one of the respondents, Remye L. Santos; (2) a certificate of time
deposit dated 14 December 1989 amounting to 1,000,000.00; and (3) the death certificate of Angel C. Santos,
among others. A special power of attorney was purportedly executed by Reyme L. Santos in favor of Manimbo
and a certain Angel P. Santos for purposes of withdrawing and receiving the proceeds of the certificate of time
deposit.

Respondents filed a complaint for the sum of money and damages against PNB before the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City questioning the release of the deposit amount to Manibmo who had no authority from them to
withdraw their father’s deposit and who failed to present to PNB all the requirements for such withdrawal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine National Bank and Aguilar was negligent in releasing the deposit to Benardito
Manimbo.

HELD: Yes, PNB and Aguilar were negligent in handling the deposit of Angel C. Santos.

The contractual relationship between banks and their depositors is governed by the Civil Code provisions on
simple loan. Once a person makes a deposit of his money to the bank, he is considered to have lent the bank a
money. The bank becomes his debtor, and he becomes the creditor of the bank, which is obligated to pay him on
demand.

The default standard of diligence in the performance of obligations is “diligence of a good father of a family.”
However, other industries are bound by law to observe higher standards of diligence because of the nature of
their businesses. Banking is impressed with public interest as it affects the economy and plays a significant role in
commerce. The public reposes its faith and confidence upon banks that is why the Court recognized the fiduciary
nature of banks’ functions, and attached a special standard of diligence for the exercise of their function––
extraordinary diligence.

PNB and Aguilar’s treatment of Angel C. Santos’s account is inconsistent with the high standard of diligence
required of banks. They accepted Manimbo’s representations despite knowledge of the existence of
circumstances that should have raised doubts on such representations. They did not doubt why no original death
certificate could be submitted; why Reyme L. Santos would execute an affidavit of self-adjudication when he,
together with others, had previously asked for the release of said deposit; and they relied on the certificate of time
deposit and Manimbo’s representation that the passbook was lost when the passbook had just been previously
presented to Aguilar for updating.
Their negligence is not based on their failure to accept respondents’ documents as evidence of the right to claim
the subject deposit. Rather, it is based on their failure to exercise the diligence required of banks when they
accepted the fraudulent representations of Manimbo.