How Islamic is an Islamic State?

A Theoretical Debate on Islamic Political Order

Zaman Stanizai

Department of Political Science, California State University, Dominguez Hills, Carson,

California 90747 USA

1-424 395-7400 [email protected] or [email protected]

Zaman Stanizai is a Professor of Political Science at California State University, Dominguez

Hills, and Professor of Mythological Studies at the Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara,
California. Dr. Stanizai has earned an MA degree in linguistics at the University of Washington
in Seattle as a Fulbright scholar and he has earned a Ph.D. and MA degrees in political science
at the University of Southern California. His recent research in political theory focuses on
national and sub-national identities and the viability of third world nation-states encountering
globalization. He has lectured widely on Islamic contributions to world civilization.

1
How Islamic is an Islamic State:

A Theoretical Debate on Islamic Political Order

Abstract
The Muslim world is at the bottom rung of participatory democracy,
representative governance, and political stability in comparison to the rest of the
world. Prevalent and perpetual social disintegration, economic stagnation, and
resistance to modernity are all problems in search of answers whose validity and
relevance are constantly questioned. Some have vested hopes in the ideal of an
‘Islamic state,’ but very few have defined such a loosely defined state, and even
fewer have critically analyzed or offered its theoretical parameters. In this regard,
Islamist political activism suffers from a theoretical disconnect with the present
political reality. They pursue two divergent paths: regression to a largely
irrelevant political past or digression from historical models that the reformists
claim to champion. In this writing, we delineate the inconsistencies between
these arguments and offer solutions.

Keywords: Islamic state; Islam and democracy; Islamic democracy; theocracy;

Islamic political traditions; political Islam; Salafism; vicegerency; sovereignty;
civil rights and liberties in Islam; Religion and State; Deen wa Dawla; ummah;
hakimiya; estekhlaf;

The Tradition of Governance in Muslim Societies

The concept of an Islamic state is misunderstood by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

The ever-widening cultural divide and today’s Muslims’ inability to reconnect with

their past in a meaningful way may be the main culprits, but there is also the challenge

to re-contextualize the tradition of governance in the political reality of our times.

Caught between a sense of mission and a veil of perception, the Salafists, for instance,

idealize the Medina Caliphate and wonder why it worked so well then and why it

doesn’t seem to work now. Perhaps we should join them on that journey, not out of an

idealized nostalgia, rather for an analytical look at the difference between the two

2
realities and the historical events that bridge the present with the past of Muslim

civilization.

When speaking about a model Islamic state, the city-state of Medina established by the

Prophet of Islam is often cited. Medina, however, was not a city or an Islamic state, in

the theocratic sense of the word as is commonly believed, but more akin to a republic: A

government having a chief of state who was not a monarch but the equivalent of the

modern-day president, governed by Madani law, a civil law etymologically derived

from the very name of Medina, serving the ummah, a religiously diverse constituency

that is the modern equivalent of “we the people.”

When Prophet Muhammad arrived in Yathrib, people favored him over, Abd-Allah ibn

Ubayy,1 one of the two contenders for the rulership of the city. Muhammad ended the

political conflict by reconciling the tribes of Banu Aus and Banu Khazraj. He named the

city Medina, a city of civil order, and under the provisions of Mithaq-al-Medina, ‘the

compact’ or ‘the Constitution of Medina,’2 that he signed with the various faith

communities, he established a politically and religiously pluralistic polity. By

accommodating not just political pluralism, as is the norm in modern democracies, but

also religious pluralism, the Medina model was more democratic than modern

democracies.

These faith communities followed their own scriptures in matters of faith, family law,

rites, and rituals, whereas in matters of social welfare, defense, and external affairs they

all adhered to the civil law:

1
Maxime Robinson, Muhammad: Prophet of Islam (2002), Page 156.

2
The Islam Project. The Constitution of Medina and the Mayflower Compact

http://www.islamproject.org/muhammad/muhammad_09_PrimarySourceDocuments.htm

3
 Identity and loyalty were no longer to be based on family, tribe, kinship,
or even religion: the overriding identity was membership in the ummah
of Muhammad. The Constitution of Medina decreed that the citizens of
the Islamic State were one and indivisible regardless of religion. Be they
heathen, People of the Book, or Muslims, all those who were subject to
the Constitution belonged to the same ummah. In so doing, he
[Muhammad] created a tolerant, pluralistic government which protected
religious freedom.3

Specific provisions of the Constitution of Medina state, for instance, that “The Jews of

Banu ‘Awf are one community with the believers, the Jews have their religion and the

Muslims have theirs…”4 It follows, “The same applies to Jews of Bani Al-Najjar, Bani

Al Harith, Bani Saeeda, Bani Jusham, Bani Al Aws, Thaalba, and the Jaffna, (a clan of

the Bani Thaalba) and the Bani Al Shutayba.”5

Orientalist Peters finds it fascinating that “The Jews of Banu ‘Awf are one community

with the believers,” adding, “If the Jews were permitted from the outset to practice their

religion within the newly constituted ummah, then Muhammad’s original Medinan

‘community’ was a purely secular one, and the word ummah was being used in a sense

different from its Qur’anic occurrences”6

3
John Andrew Morrow. The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad with the Christians of the World.

Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis. 2013. Page 32.

4
Ibid. Page 30.
5
Woven Teaching | Human Rights Documents: Constitution of Medina (accessed February 7, 2019)

Page 3.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5097fe39e4b0c49016e4c58b/t/5c8153eeec212d7117477f8f

/1551979503244/Constitution-Medina.pdf

6
Francis E Peters. Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. Albany: State University of New York

Press, 1994. Page 201.

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According to Houtsma, “In the Quran the ummah typically refers to a single group that

shares common religious beliefs, specifically those that are the objects of a divine plan

of salvation. In the context of pan-Islamism and politics, the word ummah can be used

to mean the concept of a Commonwealth of the Believers (‫ أﻣﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﻣﻨﯿﻦ‬ummat al-

muʼminīn).”7 Since Islam is not a new religion, but a continuation of the monotheistic

tradition, the Medina usage of the term ummah complies with the Qur’anic usage of the

term ummah. “The apostle, and the believers with him, believe in what has been

bestowed upon him from on high by his Sustainer: they all believe in God, and His

angels, and His revelations, and His apostles, making no distinction between any of His

apostles;”8 (emphasis added). In stressing on the literal, "we make no distinction

between any of His apostles," Muhammad Asad elaborates that, “Inasmuch as all the

apostles were true bearers of God's messages, there is no distinction between them,

albeit some of them have been ‘endowed more highly than others’"9

In essence, the spirit of this Qur’anic injunction was reflected in the body of the

Medinan ummah comprising of Jews, Christians, non-theists as well as Meccan Muslim

refugees and Medinan converts to Islam.

7
Houtsma, M. Th. (1987). E.J. Brill's First Encyclopedia of Islam, 1913–1936. E.J. Brill.

8
The Qur’an: 2:285 Al-Baqara (The Cow). ِ‫ َوَﻣﻶﺋَِﻜﺘِﮫ‬F ِ ّ ‫ﺳﻮُل ﺑَِﻤﺎ أُﻧِﺰَل ِإَﻟﯿْﮫِ ِﻣﻦ ﱠرﺑﱢﮫِ َواْﻟُﻤْﺆِﻣﻨُﻮَن ُﻛﱞﻞ آَﻣَﻦ ﺑِﺎ‬
ُ ‫آَﻣَﻦ اﻟﱠﺮ‬
ُ ‫ق ﺑَﯿَْﻦ َأَﺣٍﺪ ﱢﻣﻦ ﱡر‬
‫ﺳِﻠِﮫ‬ ُ ‫َوُﻛﺘُﺒِﮫِ َوُر‬
ُ ‫ﺳِﻠﮫِ ﻻَ ﻧُﻔَﱢﺮ‬
9
The Qur’an: 2:285: The Message of the Qur’an: Translated and Explained by Muhammad Asad for

people who think. The Ayah literally says, "we make no distinction between any of His apostles."

Footnote 277 Page 64.

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“The Prophet Muhammad’s Community was a unique system which had never existed

before and which has never been seen since despite honest efforts to emulate it.”10

The critical distinction of the Medina state lost on many in the West can be understood

only when contrasted with the Greek and Roman models idealized in European political

thought. In the Greek democracy of 5th century BCE only free adult males of Athens or

Sparta were considered citizens, but not slaves, women, children, and foreigners, or

peasants who constituted more than 50% of the population. Similarly, in the Republic of

Rome, only the aristocracy and the landowners who controlled the Senate were

represented, but not the common people. “[T]he plebeians, which comprised the vast

majority of Romans… could not rule, elect rulers or make use of land, all of which was

reserved for the patricians or nobles.”11 In fact, “The social structure of Ancient Rome

revolved around the distinction between the patricians and the plebeians.”12

Public perception and the prevalent slant in academia notwithstanding,13 the idea of a

popular rule proposed by the Achaemenid Otanes in 522 BCE seems as original as that

of his contemporaries in the Athenian demokratia in the Greek city-state. Based on that

proposal, Giulia Sissa considers democracy, ‘a Persian Invention:’ “The law ought to be

the same for all, tight limitations are imposed upon the executive, and all the adult free-

10
John Andrew Morrow. The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad with the Christians of the

World. Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis. 2013. Page 32.

11
Ibid.
12
Wikipedia. Patricians: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrician_(ancient_Rome)

13
E. Harris, “Pericles’ Praise of Athenian Democracy, Thucydides, 2.37.1”, Harvard Studies in

Classical Philosophy 94, 1992, p. 157-167.

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born male citizens can participate in the decision-making process.”14 Add to that the

contributions of the many Muslim thinkers throughout the centuries we alluded to make

democracy as much an Eastern tradition as it is Western.

With the rise to power of the Umayyads, the word ummah was hyphenated as ummat al-

Islām, 'the faith-exclusive Islamic community' depriving it of its comprehensive

universality. This shift in the meaning and emphasis of the word is the reason for the

failure of all the subsequent Islamic states.

Today’s Muslims steeped in the post-Umayyad revisionism are ignorant of the fact that

the ummah in the Medina model was a religiously diverse citizenry. Ignoring that

critical distinction renders a modern Islamic state as a theocracy which stands in stark

contrast to the pluralistic polity that the Islamic State of Medina was.

Fair governance is characterized not just by the relationship between the governing and

the governed, but by the way each is defined. In the Islamic State in Medina, the

governing body was headed by Muhammad, the Prophet, the philosopher-king, and

more importantly a peacemaker who brought warring factions into a city-state of civil

order. Equally significant was the governed, the citizenry, or the ummah in

contradistinction to today’s political terminology of qawm, millat, and/or sha’b.

In contemporary parlance, qawm, means people, millat, a national/ideological

following, and shaʻb, a nation with common ancestry or geography. The modern

14
Otanes’ whole proposal reads: “firstly, justice is regularly administered and respected. The law

ought to be the same for all. Second, tight limitations are imposed upon the executive. Access to

the office is assured by elections at random, and magistrates are subjects to examination. Third, all

the adult free-born male citizens can participate in the decision-making process, which relies on the

majority.” G Sissa, “Democracy: A Persian Invention?” Anthropologies des mondes grecs anciens

N.S. 10 2012. p. 228.

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equivalent of ummah is a supra-national community with a common history as reflected

in its plural usage of umam meaning nations as in Al-Umam Al-Mutahedah, the United

Nations.

The Evolving Relationship Between Religion and State

Traditionally, Deen wa Dawla or the affairs of ‘religion and state’ were kept separate by

the early ulema or Muslim theologians and jurists who took pride in the independence

of their thought and resisted co-optation into the government apparatus. Concordance

was incidental and not necessarily obligatory. Muslim scholars and theologians

consistently rejected theocracy both as a matter of principle and practice. In essence,

this separation of the state and the non-existing ‘church’ may well have prevented the

formation of theocracies in the Muslim world.

The great jurist Abū Ḥanīfah (699-767 CE) “suffered severe persecution [as he]

steadfastly refused a judgeship”15 of a high standing offered by the Caliph Al-Mansur

who wanted to make his Ḥanafi school of thought as the only official version of

shari’ah jurisprudence throughout the Abbasid Caliphate. Abū Ḥanīfah rejected the

offer saying that his systematization of Islāmic legal doctrine carried more weight and

prestige in its own right and in competition with the legal opinion of other jurists and he

did not want to jeopardize that by becoming a ‘mouthpiece’ of the caliphate. That

obviously didn’t bode well with the caliph.

15
Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Abū Ḥanīfah: Muslim Jurist and Theologian. ENCYCLOPÆDIA

BRITANNICA. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. January 01, 2020

URL: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abu-Hanifah

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Abū al-Hasan al-Māwardī, known in Latin as Alboacen (972-1058 CE), the first

political scientist in Islam, did not see any incompatibility in bringing religious norms

into politics but took the necessary steps preventing the formation of theocracy in the

Muslim world.16 In Tashil al-Nadhar wa Ta’jil al-Dhafar (Facilitating Administration

and Accelerating Victory) al-Māwardī discusses the concept of ‘checks and balances’

between state and religion, but he “does not entertain in any way a theory of divine

rights of kings. In his view, the ruler is needed to protect religion, but he is not a God-

appointed person. He has to be chosen by the people, and he is only their mandub

(deputy).”17

Al-Māwardī’s work inspired Ibn Khaldun (1331-1406) who in his own right became the

first social scientist. In his Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun advocated that any shari’ah law

must protect an individual’s right to the free exercise of religion, life, intellect and

reason, progeny, and property18—the essence of the bill of rights.

The idea of the compatibility of reason and revelation that Ibn Rushd or Averroes

introduced to Thomas Aquinas and Moses ben Maimon or Maimonides further

enhanced and refined the concept of political pluralism in a more comprehensive and

inclusive system of government. People in Western societies who enjoy guaranteed civil

rights and liberties owe it to the thoughts of Ibn Rushd.

16
Abūl Hasan Ali ibn Muhammad Māwardī, (Assadullah Yate. Trans.) Al Ahkam As Sultaniyyah:

The laws of Islamic Governance. Dar ul Thaqafah, Doha, Qatar. 2018. Pp. 11-12.
17
Abdulqadir Hamid Eltigani, “Al-Mawardi’s Theory of State: Some Ignored Dimensions,” AJISS,

Vol. 18, No. 4, 2001, Pp. 5-6.

18
Abd Ar Rahman bin Muhammed ibn Khaldun. The Muqaddimah. Translated by Franz Rosenthal.

Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1970).

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In the Mirror of History

With all such great thoughts that Muslim thinkers presented to the world of political

philosophy, there were occasional attempts by Muslim leaders with authoritarian

tendencies who, short of establishing theocracies, were able to drag their religious

convictions to the playing field of politics. The ensuing disasters of these tragedies are

the result of the revisionist interpretation of ummah and its application as a privilege to

an exclusive citizenry.

These efforts may have been successful for political mobilization for a time, but they all

had devastating consequences, often with backlash from the affected non-Muslim

citizenry. Often what was idealized was rarely analyzed or thoroughly thought out. The

Medina model, whether it emulated Plato’s Republic or as was later elaborated on by

Abū Naṣr al Fārābī or Alpharabius (872 – 951) in Al-Madina(t) al-Fadila19 has never

been replicated successfully since, in a good many cases, among them:

• The Fatimid Caliphate (al-Fāṭimīyūn - 909-1171) that ruled over North

Africa and Egypt where al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, "The Ruler by the Order of

God," the sixth Fatimid caliph and 16th Ismaili imam (996–1021) who deified

himself by claiming sovereignty, vicegerency, and imamate or spiritual

leadership was not only intolerant of the Sunnis, he also began attacks on

19
The complete title of al Fārābī’s work is Mabadi’ ara’ ahl al-madinah al fddilah, ‘Principles of

the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City’ in which he sets forth his idea for the

establishment of an ideal civil society, i.e. the best regime, with emphasis on opinions about

natural science, the soul, and politics with religion.

10
 Christians and Jews calling for the destruction of the Church of the Resurrection

in Jerusalem. These events set the Crusades in motion.

• The Almohad Caliphate (al-Muwaḥḥidūn, "the monotheists" - 1121-

1269) resorted to the strict rules of Muslim orthodoxy in Spain that met with

Christian resistance from the north, culminating in the Battle of Las Navas de

Tolosa, the loss of nearly all of the Moorish dominions in Iberia, leading to the

fall of Cordova and Seville to the Christians in 1236 and 1248 respectively, that

eventually ended Muslim rule in Spain.

• In the late Mughal period in India, the religiously conservative Muhi-ud-

Din Muhammad Aurangzeb, Alamgir "Conqueror of the World" (1618 – 1707)

who because of his conservative religious tendencies abandoned his

predecessors' legacy of pluralism and religious tolerance, introduced the jizya

tax and tried to impose policies based on Islamic ethics on non-Muslims. That

resulted in a backlash by his Hindu subjects providing the British with an

opportunity to exploit the chasm that speeded up the British colonization of

India.

• The Safavid (“the pure ones,” - 1501 - 1722) claimed their legitimacy to

power in Persia on claiming descent from the Prophet20 and established the

Twelver Shi’i Islam. Even though they became great patrons of arts, literature,

and architecture, their zeal for the forced conversion to Shiism and attempted

Persianization resulted in political repression, the brain drain, and the flight of

the intellectuals. Their persecution of the Sunnis led to the devastating seven-

20
Historians believe that the Safavid were Kurdish lineage Turkicized in Azerbaijan where they

thoroughly intermarried with Pontic Greeks, Georgians, and later Circassians.

11
 decade-long wars with the Ottomans and their eventual demise at the hands of

the Hotaki Afghans in 1722.

These examples indicate that every time Muslim rulers have played with the idea of

combining Deen or religion with Dawla or state, the result has been devastating. These

failures send political theoreticians back to the drawing board to review the most

authentic sources for answers:

The Qur’an - Rights and Responsibilities

In addition to the misinterpretation and misapplication of the concept of ummah other

elements are missing from the current debate on establishing an Islamic state, namely

the duties and responsibilities assigned to a government as the principle of

representation. The Qur’an establishes moral parameters by saying, “and whose rule [in

all matters of common concern] is consultation among themselves,”21 and that of moral

conviction, “and enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is

wrong.”22 Both injunctions begin with the same word ‫ َوْأُﻣﺮ‬implying encouragement or

recommendation, but the first injunction contains the word ‘among themselves,’

implying a collectives responsibility, while the second does not contain such wording.

We can conclude that:

A. The Qur’an uses the word ‫ َوْأُﻣﺮ‬implying encouragement or recommendation

and not the command imperative ‫ َوأﺣﮑﻢ‬which would have implied order or
command (imposed or enforced from above).
B. The accountability of the government is collective and is clearly indicated by
the wording, “consultation among themselves.”
C. A citizen, on the other hand, is personally responsible and individually
entitled to his/her rights.

21 ُ ‫َوَأْﻣُﺮھُْﻢ‬
The Qur’an: 42:38. Ash-Shura (The Consultation) ‫ﺷﻮَرى ﺑَﯿْﻨَُﮭْﻢ‬
22
ِ ‫“ َوْأُﻣْﺮ ﺑِﺎْﻟَﻤْﻌُﺮو‬And
The Qur’an: 22:41 Al-Hajj (The Pilgrimage) and 31:17 Luqman ‫ف َواﻧْﮫَ َﻋِﻦ اْﻟُﻤﻨَﻜِﺮ‬

enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong.”

12
We can conclude that the different branches of government have a collective

responsibility in their duties towards the people while citizens are individually

accountable. This individual accountability has been stressed through repeated

revelations that, “no bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another's burden.”23

Therefore, people who are individually accountable in regards to moral values and

ethical issues should not be forced collectively to follow certain norms and authoritarian

regimes should not place matters of free will and individual responsibility under their

jurisdiction. Moral prerogatives are matters of a citizen’s civil rights and are not subject

to the authority of governments.

The so-called Islamic governments of today either deliberately misinterpret or otherwise

misuse the clear injunctions of the Qur’an when it comes to consultation, instead they

impose their will on the people in clear contradiction of the Qur’anic injunctions.

People are denied their civil rights in matters of personal prerogatives that are not the

responsibility of the government. Worse yet, agencies for the enforcement of these

restrictions are often named with the wording of these same Qur’anic Ayahs that

ِ ‫”َوْأُﻣْﺮ ِﺑﺎْﻟَﻤْﻌُﺮو‬, And enjoin the doing of what is

recommend the otherwise: “‫ف َواْﻧﮫَ َﻋِﻦ اْﻟُﻤﻨَﻜِﺮ‬

right and forbid the doing of what is wrong.

In reality, there isn’t much of “enjoining the doing of what is right,” but plenty of “the

forbidding of the doing of what is wrong” in their rulings. The great majority of these

prohibitions are imposed on women turning these so-called Islamic states into

misogynistic theocracies.

Disconnected from the 21st-century reality, these authoritarians are neither understood

by the world community nor are they appreciated by the people they rule over. Instead

23
The Qur’an: 6:164, 17:15, 35:18, and 39:7. ‫َوﻻَ ﺗَِﺰُر َواِزَرٌة ِوْزَر أُْﺧَﺮى‬

13
of planning a system of government that meets the challenges of the here and now, they

validate their agenda by claiming a ‘return to the time of the Prophet.’

The second set of principles missing from the so-called Islamic states are Hakimiya and

Estekhlaf. Western political thought recognizes sovereignty as the only principle of

legitimacy in governance. When perceived as the sole domain of the Divine,

sovereignty results in a theocracy, but when transferred to the people, the result is a

secular democracy. This black and white perspective rejects any alternative to

‘Western’ democracy.

Islamic political thought addresses this either/or prerogative with a both/and alternative

based on two principles: 1) The principle of hakimiya, (‫ ﺳﯿﺎدة‬/‫ )ﺣﺎﮐﻤﯿﮫ‬or Divine

sovereignty that delineates the duties of the government, and 2) The principle of

estekhlaf (‫ )اﺳﺘﺨﻼف‬or popular vicegerency that guarantees the rights of the governed i.e.,

that every human being as a vicegerent of the Divine on earth has free will and is

entitled to its exercise in the context of political freedoms and civil rights and liberties.

This critical distinction, lost on many both in the Muslim world as well as outside of it,

is called caliphate—not as a slogan, but as a principle in governance.

Just like democracy, the caliphate has to establish its parameters a safe distance away

from hereditary authoritarianism. Given the prism of historical adversarial relations

between the Muslim East and the Christian West, Western cultural relativism looks at

the concept of the caliphate with recalcitrant suspicion. The abuse of the name

‘caliphate’ by corrupt governments and extremist movements doesn’t help either.

Muslim cultural sensitivities, on the other hand, reject Western secular democracy.

Western political interference in Muslim societies on the pretext of exporting

democracy makes matter worse. Thus, an Islamic state presented in the context of a

14
caliphate has become an unrealizable ideal for some Muslims and a boogieman for the

rest.

The concept of estekhlaf, or vicegerency, a derivative of khilafah or caliphate, has no

relevance in the Western world, but more critically, it has lost its place in the debate

among Muslims too. As the advocates of Islamist agenda essentially reassigned

estekhlaf to the realm of the Divine along with hakimiya, they make people obey the

laws of the state but deny the citizenry their own rights. In assigning both vicegerency

and sovereignty to God, such ‘Islamic states’ are not much different from the

suppressive Christian theocracies of the Dark Ages of Europe.

Eliminating estikhlaf or vicegerency from the equation amounts to ignoring clear

Qur’anic injunctions that are essential to good governance.24 For instance: “We have

sent you the Book in Truth that you [O Prophet] might judge between men, as guided by

Allah.”25 While literally, as in the case of the Caliphal city-state of Medina, a khalifah

or caliph is perceived as a political successor to the Prophet, in general, however, every

human being is the khalifah of God on earth, as the progeny of the archetypal Adam.

“Allah has promised to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds that He

will assuredly make them succeed (those who rule) and grant them vicegerency in the

land just as He made those before them succeed others.”26 The success and

empowerment here obviously include political power.27

24
Inferences to estekhlaf are made in the Qur’an are in 7:54, 12:40, 24:55, and 4:105.
25
The Qur’an: 4:105 An-Nisa (Women).
26
The Qur’an: 24:55 An-Nur (The Light).
27
Additional references to the principle of vicegerency are made in the Qur’an in: 2:30, 6:165, 7:69,

7:74, 7:129, 24:55, 27:62, 35:39, and 38:26.

15
A traditionalist view of bridging sovereignty and legitimacy in an Islamic political order

with the concept of ummah is that of Siraj Islam Mufti who writes: “The people or the

Ummah are the actual repositories of khilafah and those in authority must have the

confidence and support of the Muslim population. In this context, shari’ah provides a

broad framework within which the people under the umbrella of Divine Guidance

participate in developing civil society and its institutions including various organs of the

state.”28 Mufti correctly identifies the ummah as ‘the actual repositories of khilafah,

however, he still defines the ummah as a ‘Muslim population.’

In practice, the few instances of declared ‘Islamic states’ have totally ignored the

critical duties of a government such as social welfare, economic development, and

political freedoms, instead, they have trampled on the principle of people’s vicegerency

and have concerned themselves with issues of religious rites: prayer, dress codes,

fasting… and the prohibition of arts, recreations, and cultural expressions primarily

targeting women. But even if they can overcome all that, the perspective is devoid of

the universality of the ummah.

Democracy vs. Theocracy: The Contemporary Debate

In the course of the past half a millennium or so the Muslim East and the Christian West

have gone through a complete role reversal in several ways. In respect to governance, it

would be interesting to assess the viability of an Islamic state based on the exegesis of

the Qur’an and the Sunnah or the tradition of the Prophet. Based on the primary sources

of shari’ah we discussed here, the establishment of an Islamic state will contradict the

28
Siraj Islam Mufti. 2014. Basic Islamic Dynamics: “Major Principles of Islamic Governance.”

Pastoral Care Publishers & Mufti Publishing. Chestnut Hill, MA. P. 91.

16
Qur’an and the Sunnah, unless it adheres to the Medina model in spirit and principle. To

avoid the pitfalls of establishing ‘unIslamic’ Islamic states, we offer the following

suggestions:

1. In an ideal Islamic state, the duties of the government are delineated

through the principle of sovereignty and the rights of the governed are

guaranteed by the principle of vicegerency. The absence of any one of these two

essential components will result in a theocracy. A theocracy is un-Islamic

because:

A. all citizens of the state would be obligated to adhere to the laws of one
religion, and
B. forcing other faith communities to Islamic laws constitutes “coercion
in matters of faith” which is strictly prohibited in the Qur’an.29

2. A faith-based government in its modern sense denies religious pluralism

in society that is clearly prohibited in the Qur’an: “Unto every one of you

[denoting the various communities of which mankind is composed] have We

appointed a [different] law and way of life [for the Jews, Christians, and

Muslims]. And if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one

single community: but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of

what He has vouchsafed unto, you. Vie, then, with one another in doing good

works!”30

3. Perhaps the most convincing injunction of the Qur’an against coercion,

29
The Qur’an: 2:256 Al-Baqara (The Cow) “THERE SHALL BE no coercion in matters of faith. َ‫ﻻ‬

‫ِإْﻛَﺮاَه ﻓِﻲ اﻟﱢﺪﯾِﻦ‬

30
The Qur’an: 5:48: The Message of the Qur’an: Translated and Explained by Muhammad Asad for

ِ ‫ﷲُ َﻟَﺠَﻌَﻠُﻜْﻢ أُﱠﻣﺔً َواِﺣَﺪًة َوَﻟـِﻜﻦ ﱢﻟﯿَﺒُْﻠَﻮُﻛْﻢ ﻓِﻲ َﻣﺂ آﺗَﺎُﻛﻢ ﻓَﺎْﺳﺘَﺒِﻘُﻮا اﻟَﺨﯿَْﺮا‬
people who think: ‫ت‬ ّ ‫ِﻟُﻜﱟﻞ َﺟَﻌْﻠﻨَﺎ ِﻣﻨُﻜْﻢ ِﺷْﺮَﻋﺔً َوِﻣﻨَْﮭﺎًﺟﺎ َوَﻟْﻮ َﺷﺎء‬

17
 especially in public life, is the following: “And so, [O Prophet,] exhort them; thy

task is only to exhort: thou canst not compel them [to believe].” Lit., "thou hast

no power over them".31 In these two integrated Ayahs the Prophet is asked

to remind people of their natural disposition to do good and by extension to

exercise their free will in doing good. That should be enough to make coercion

unnecessary. In essence, the Qur’an presents two mutually exclusive concepts,

i.e. if reminding is done, coercion is not necessary; if coercion is allowed,

reminding is irrelevant. If the Qur’an is telling a person of no less significance

than the Prophet of God, as the head of state and the head of a religious

community, that he is not authorized to use coercion in matters of faith or

politics, that is a clear injunction that no other entity—political, religious or

otherwise—has the right to compel people to their whims.

4. Islam recognizes the collective rights of all religious communities to

exist in their equality before the law. “Islam does not restrict itself to providing

merely a theological and philosophical framework for thinking about pluralism.

Islam also provides a legal framework, the shari’ah, for the concrete practical

realization of it in society, and the regulation of its societal expressions in the

interest of the common good.”32 That common good must be all-inclusive

regardless of faith.

31
َ ‫ﺖ ُﻣَﺬﱢﻛٌﺮ ﻟﱠْﺴ‬
َ ‫ﺖ َﻋﻠَْﯿﮭِﻢ ِﺑُﻤ‬
Qur’an: 88:21-22 Al-Ghashiyah (The Overwhelming) ‫ﺼْﯿِﻄٍﺮ‬ َ ‫َﻓَﺬﱢﻛْﺮ إِﱠﻧَﻤﺎ أَﻧ‬

32
Osman bin Bakar, Pluralism and the “People of the Book” in Robert A. Seiple, Dennis R. Hoover

(editors) Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations. Lanham, Maryland:

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2004. Page 105.

18
 5. The level of religiosity and the degree of adherence to it varies in every

society. Outlining the strata and structure of a state based on a particular religion

is a daunting task. Abdolkarim Soroush a contemporary Islamic thinker believes,

“that no understanding of Islam can offer a detailed and effective blueprint for

the foundation and administration of any form of religious government,

democracy included. It is wrong, he maintains, to judge the religious nature of a

state based on the degree to which its institutions reflect some aspect of religion.

The institutional role of religion in government is at best limited to the

establishment of a legal code that incorporates, and is congruent with, fiqh.”33

6. Another critical distinction lost on most Islamists is that of administering

an Islamic government versus establishing an Islamic state. An Islamic

government implies that a political party with an Islamist platform, upon

winning an election, can undertake the duties of the state institutions in the name

of and on behalf of all its citizens. Such an administration has the political

mandate to stay in power for a term specified by law. Islamists often do not

differentiate between an Islamic state and organizing an Islamist party. When

they come to power, they make the who state subservient to their party

platform—just like the communists did.

The ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ that Lenin launched for political exploitation

and political manipulation, to attain ‘ideological legitimacy’ became an

instrument of totalitarianism throughout the communist world as they took over

33
Valla Vakili, Debating Religion and Politics in Iran: The Political Thought of Abdolkarim

Soroush. Council on Foreign Relations. 1997. Pages 26-27.

19
 the state apparatus. Ultimately at the highest stage of their oppression, they dug

their own grave. If Islamist movements and parties subconsciously imitate such

a model and take over the state apparatus and impose their agenda on people in

the name of ‘the rule of God’ and deprive people of their civil rights, their fate

won’t be much different.

Alternatively, the many moderate Christian democratic parties in Europe, and

some ultra-conservative Jewish and Hindu ones like the Shas/Likud and the

Bharatiya Janata Party respectively, and the Justice and Development Party or

AKP in Turkey; have successfully participated in the political process of their

countries without creating theocracies. Their record, however, shows that over

time, political parties with religious or ideological agendas have a strong

tendency towards becoming oppressive and authoritarian.

7. An Islamic state is sometimes framed in the concept of dar el-Islam, a

term that implies a dominion of peace, a Pax Islamica, like its historical

counterpart the Pax Romana. The term was coined at the height of the Islamic

Civilization in the Middle Ages to distinguish the prosperous and relatively

peaceful Muslim societies in contrast to the warrior culture of Europe. Some

extremists incorrectly interpret dar el-Islam to mean the establishment of a

global Islamic theocracy. This argument by the Islamists is as flawed as its

portrayal by their Western ideological opponents who claim that Muslim jihadis

are out to dominate the world. This recipe for an Islamic government does not

meet the Qur’anic criterion either.

8. If interpreted correctly, the Qur’an is as relevant today as it was 14 centuries ago,

says Osman bin Bakar, because Qur’an addresses human needs in the context of

20
 changing time and circumstance: “Islamic shari’ah has to be necessarily broad

and comprehensive in its treatment of societal laws and ethics since it is the last

sacred law to be revealed to humankind. In this sense it must always be

“contemporary” and even modern; it has to address itself to the needs of a world

that is increasingly complex in its cultural makeup and societal organizations.”34

The Salafist perspective on the “return to the time of the Prophet” constitutes a

regression from the present reality and a digression from the belief that the

Qur’an as the last revelation, is timeless, i.e. that its teachings and edicts defy

the passage of time in principle, but the application of its commands may be

interpreted to accommodate varying circumstances of time and place. The

Salafists don’t seem to be aware of this critical point and consider Islam so rigid

and inflexible that the only way to apply it is to replicate the times of the

Prophet of Islam. Must we assume then that the many millions who lived

Islamically in Muslim societies over the centuries were wrong?

Conclusions

A critical review of history shows that Muslim societies of today are not just adopting

the medieval Christian theocracies of Europe, but in a complete role reversal, they are

adopting the entire Dark Ages along with them. Today’s Muslims are holding on to the

ways that kept medieval Europe in the Dark Ages but are avoiding the ways that

34
Osman bin Bakar. Pluralism and the “People of the Book” in Robert A. Seiple, Dennis R. Hoover

(editors) Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations. Lanham, Maryland:

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2004. Page 105.

21
elevated them to the top of world civilization. Europeans who had been condemned to

the Dark Ages of medieval theocracies ran to the Age of Enlightenment. Muslim

societies are at a critical historical juncture: they can either learn from the bitter and

bloody experience of Europe, or they will have to experience such miseries themselves

a la George Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat

it.”

For the Islamist movements to succeed, they will have to make sure their political

agenda is rooted in an authentic theoretical understanding of the Qur’an and in a more

accurate interpretation of verifiable historical facts. They must also adjust their 7th-

century ideals for a present-day reality. Muslims will have to be able to reclaim their

ideals in modernity and democracy, not because they are claimed as a ‘Western’

tradition, but because the Muslim’s own tradition and their circumstances demand them.

Therefore, any agenda aimed at establishing an ‘Islamic state’ or forming an Islamic

political party, as an alternative to a strictly secular system, must redefine the ummah

based on the Sunnah of the Prophet and accommodate the principles of sovereignty and

vicegerency to address the duties of the government and the rights of the people.

Returning to the time of the Prophet may be a good spiritual journey, but in terms of the

present reality, it doesn’t make sense because the demands of a modern cosmopolitan

Muslim society are very different and more challenging from the Medina city-state.

While the universality of the principles of governance is timeless, the demands of the

times and the methods and manners of tier application are different. Idealizing the past

is not to regress, but to learn from it and move forward.

Islamists disown democracy without realizing that the contributions of Muslim

philosophers, theologians, and jurists in the development of democracy are greater than

22
those of the West. The name democracy may be rooted in Greek etymology, but the

evolved concept of democracy is more of a Muslim tradition. The Prophet established

the first republic in Medina, Abu Hanifah effectively prevented the formation of

theocracy, Al-Māwardī explained the division of power in government and wrote about

the balance of power between state and religion, Ibn Khaldun wrote about the basic

human rights and their guarantee in the context of vicegerency, Iban Rushd wrote about

the compatibility of reason and revelation…

Democracy is not the form or structure of a state. It is those principles of governance

that are based on the expressed desires of a people for the ideals of governance, and

people in every society manage their affairs by those principles. It’s a pity that even in

the dire circumstances of the Muslim world today they avoid implementing democracy

practically and deny it theoretically. The dissemination of this negative mentality adds

to the miseries of the Muslim world.

A deeper understanding of this reality by today’s Muslims is imperative for any search

for a meaningful solution to their problems: moral bankruptcy, religious hypocrisy,

political corruption, economic stagnation, resistance to modernity, and crises of political

identity that muddle the superstitious minds of Muslims with pain and agony.

In light of these recommendations and conclusions, the prevalent state of affairs

demands a paradigmatic shift in the perceived roles of state and society in the Muslim

world. The stakes are very high for the successful implementation of such reforms and

they are certainly beyond the power of any one political party, movement, or state. Yet,

the challenge awaits any existing or emerging political movement to carry the

theoretical to the realm of a new reality.

23
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