The History of Christian Doctrines

by Louis Berkhof

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

PROLEGOMENA

I. The Subject-Matter of the History of Dogma

II. The Task of the History of Dogma

III. Method and Divisions of the History of Dogma

IV. History of the History of Dogma

PREPARATORY DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

I. The Apostolic Fathers and Their Doctrinal Views

II. Perversions of the Gospel

III. Reform Movements in the Church

IV. The Apologists and the Beginnings of the Church's Theology

V. The Anti-Gnostic Fathers

VI. The Alexandrian Fathers

VII. Monarchianism

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

I. The Trinitarian Controversy

II. The Doctrine of the Trinity in Later Theology

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST

I. The Christological Controversies

II. Later Christological Discussions

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN AND GRACE AND RELATED

DOCTRINES

I. The Anthropology of the Patristic Period

II. The Pelagian and Augustinian Doctrines of Sin and Grace

III. The Anthropology of the Middle Ages

IV. The Anthropology of the Period of the Reformation

V. Anthropological Views of Post-Reformation Times

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT OR OF THE WORK OF

CHRIST

I. The Doctrine of the Atonement Before Anselm

II. The Doctrine of the Atonement from Anselm to the Reformation

III. The Doctrine of the Atonement in the Period of the Reformation

IV. The Doctrine of the Atonement After the Reformation

THE DOCTRINE OF THE APPLICATION AND

APPROPRIATION OF DIVINE GRACE

I. The Soteriology of the Patristic Period

II. The Soteriology of the Scholastic Period

III. Reformation and Post-Reformation Soteriology

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS

I. The Doctrine of the Church

II. The Doctrine of the Sacraments

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS

I. The Intermediate State

II. The Second Advent and the Millennial Hope

III. The Resurrection

IV. The Last Judgment and Final Awards

Literature

Preface
The Historical Volume of what was originally called "Reformed
Dogmatics" now appears with a new title, namely, History of Christian
Doctrines. Works on the gradual development of theological truth in the
Church of Jesus Christ usually appear alongside of those which deal with
the systematic reproduction of it, and thus stand out as separate works. It
was thought best to follow this practice, since this will stress the fact that
after all the history of the development of Christian thought in the
Church is a separate study.

But while it is a separate study, it is not one which students of theology

can afford to neglect. The study of doctrinal truth, apart from its
historical background, leads to a truncated theology. There has been too
much of this in the past, and there is a great deal of it even in the present
day. The result has been the lack of a sound understanding and a proper
evaluation of the truth. There was no appreciation of the fact that the
Holy Spirit guided the Church in the interpretation and development of
the truth as it is revealed in the Word of God. The checks and the
roadsigns of the past were not taken into consideration, and ancient
heresies, long since condemned by the Church, are constantly repeated
and represented as new discoveries. The lessons of the past are greatly
neglected, and many seem to feel that they should strike out entirely on
their own, as if very little had been accomplished in the past. Surely, a
theologian must take account of the present situation in the religious
world, and ever study the truth anew, but he cannot neglect the lessons of
the past with impunity. May this brief study of the history of doctrines
serve to create a greater interest in such historical study, and lead to a
better understanding of the truth.

L. BERKHOF

Grand Rapids, Michigan

August 1, 1949.

PROLEGOMENA
I. The Subject-Matter of the History of Dogma

The History of Dogma is not concerned with theology in general. It deals

primarily with dogmas in the strict sense of the word, and only
secondarily with doctrines that have not yet received ecclesiastical
sanction.

1. THE MEANING OF THE WORD "DOGMA". The word "dogma" is

derived from the Greek dokein, which in the expression dokein moi
meant not only "it seems to me", or "it pleases me", but also "I have
definitely determined something so that it is for me an established fact".
The last meaning gradually predominated, so that the word "dogma"
became the designation of a firm, and especially a public, resolution or
decree. It was applied to the self-evident truths of science, to well
established and admittedly valid philosophical convictions, to
government decrees, and to officially formulated religious tenets.

The Bible uses the word as a designation of government decrees in the

Septuagint, Esth. 3:9; Dan. 2:13; 6:8; Luke 2:1; Acts 17:7, of the
ordinances of the Old Testament, Eph. 2:15; Col. 2:14, and of the
decisions of the Assembly of Jerusalem, Acts 16:4. While it was the
philosophical and not the biblical usage of the term that gave rise to its
later meaning in theology, yet its use in Acts 16:4 has points of
resemblance with its later usage in theology. The Jerusalem Assembly, it
is true, did not formulate a doctrine but a regulation for the ethical life of
the Church; yet its decision was occasioned by a doctrinal controversy,
had doctrinal bearings, and was not merely a piece of advice but a
positive injunction with ecclesiastical sanction.

While the word "dogma" is sometimes used in religion and theology with
a great deal of latitude, as practically synonymous with "doctrine," it
generally has a more restricted meaning. A doctrine is the direct, often
naive, expression of a religious truth. It is not necessarily formulated with
scientific precision, and when it is, may be merely the formulation of a
single person. A religious dogma, on the other hand, is a religious truth
based on authority and officially formulated by some ecclesiastical
assembly. This meaning of the word is not determined by its scriptural
usage, in which it always denotes a decree, a commandment, or a rule of
practical life, but is more in harmony with the philosophical use of the
word to denote a proposition or principle. Some of the early Church
Fathers used it to describe the substance of doctrine. Cf. Hagenbach,
History of Doctrines I., p. 2 f.; Hauck, Realencyclopaedie, Art. Dogmatik.

2. THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF DOGMAS. Religious doctrines

are found in Scripture, thought not in finished form, but dogmas in the
current sense of the word are not found there. They are the fruit of
human reflection, the reflection of the Church, often occasioned or
intensified by theological controversies. Roman Catholics and Protestants
differ somewhat in their description of the origin of dogmas. The former
minimize, if they do not exclude, the reflection of the Church as the body
of believers, and substitute for it the study of the teaching Church or the
hierarchy. Whenever a new form of error arises, the teaching Church, that
is the clerus, which now has its infallible spokesman in the Pope, after
careful examination, formulates the doctrine taught in Scripture or by
tradition, declares it to be a revealed truth, and imposes its acceptance on
all the faithful. Says Wilmers in his Handbook of the Christian Religion,
p. 151: "A dogma, therefore, is a truth revealed by God, and at the same
time proposed by the Church for our belief." Similarly Spirago-Clarke in
The Catechism Explained: "A truth which the Church puts before us as
revealed by God is called a truth of faith, or a dogma." p. 84. And since
the Church is infallible in matters of doctrine, a truth so proposed is not
only authoritative but also irrevocable and unchangeable. "If any one
shall assert it to be possible that sometimes, according to the progress of
science, a sense is to be given to doctrines propounded by the Church
different from that which the Church has understood and understands:
let him be anathema." Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council, Canons
IV. 3.

The Reformers substituted for this Roman Catholic view another which,
in spite of its similarity, yet differs from it in important points. According
to them all truly religious dogmas derive their material contents from
Scripture and from Scripture only. They do not recognize the unwritten
word or tradition as a source of dogmas. At the same time they do not
regard dogmas as statements taken directly from the Bible, but represent
them as the fruit of the reflection of the Church, as the body of believers,
on the truths of revelation, and as the official formulations of competent
representative bodies. Since the reflection of the Church is often
determined and deepened by doctrinal controversies, the formulations to
which Church Councils or Synods are finally led under the guidance of
the Holy Spirit often bear the earmarks of past struggles. They are not
infallible but yet have a high degree of stability. And they are
authoritative, not merely because they are proposed by the Church, but
formally as defined by the Church and materially as based on the Word of
God.
Under the influence of Schleirmacher, Ritschl, Vinet, and others, a
radically different conception of the origin of dogmas was developed,
which found ready acceptance in many Protestant circles. It represents
the Christian consciousness, Christian experience, the Christian faith, or
the Christian life as the source of the material contents of dogmas, and
regards this as more in harmony with the principles of the Reformation.
The dogmas of the Church are simply the intellectual formulations of its
experiences, sentiments, and beliefs, which, according to some, are
awakened by an objective factor, in which piety recognizes a divine
revelation. Schleiermacher contends for the immediacy of these religious
experiences, while Ritschl and his School maintain that they are mediated
by some objective factor, which faith honours as a revelation of God. The
religious community reflects on these experiences and finally by some
competent body gives them formal intellectual expression and thus
transforms them into dogmas. On this view, as well as on the other, the
formulation of dogmas is not the work of an individual theologian, but of
a community, either the Church (Schleirmacher), or the State going hand
in hand with the Church (Lobstein). This view of the origin of dogmas is
held by Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Kaftan, Lobstein, Vinet, Sabatier, Is. Van
Dijk, and others. It should be noted, however, that it does not describe
the way in which the existing dogmas actually originated in the Protestant
Churches, but only the way in which, according to these writers, dogmas
should come into existence. They regard the old dogmas as antiquated,
because they are too intellectual, and do not give adequate expression to
the life of the Church, and call for a new dogma vibrant with the life of the
religious community.

Harnack's view deserves special mention here. In his monumental work

on The History of Dogma he seeks to discredit the whole dogma (i.e. the
whole complex of dogmas) of the early Church by representing it as an
unnatural mixture of Greek philosophy and Christian truth, in which the
foreign philosophical ingredient is the preponderating element. Says he:
"Dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit
on the soil of the Gospel." The Church yielded to the temptation to
represent its message in a form that would make it appear as wisdom
rather than foolishness and thus to gain for it the proper respect of the
educated people. The practical faith of the Church was transformed into
an intellectual concept, a dogma, and this became the real pivot of the
history of the Church. This was a great mistake, and a mistake that was
continued in the later formation of dogmas, so that the whole history of
dogma is really the history of a colossal error. It is the great ambition of
the Ritschlian School, to which Harnack belongs, to eliminate all
metaphysics from theology.

A dogma may be defined as a doctrine, derived from Scripture, officially

defined by the Church, and declared to rest upon divine authority. This
definition partly names and partly suggests its characteristics. Its subject-
matter is derived from the Word of God and is therefore authoritative. It
is not a mere repetition of what is found in Scripture, but the fruit of
dogmatic reflection. And it is officially defined by a competent
ecclesiastical body and declared to rest upon divine authority. It has
social significance, because it is the expression, not of a single individual,
but of a community. And it has traditional value, since it passes the
precious possessions of the Church on to future generations. In the
History of Dogma we see the Church becoming ever increasingly
conscious of the riches of divine truth under the guidance of the Holy
Spirit, mindful of her high prerogative as pillar and ground of the truth,
and engaged in the defense of the faith once delivered to the saints.

II. The Task of the History of Dogma

The task of the History of Dogma is, briefly stated, to describe the
historical origin of the dogma of the Church and to trace its subsequent
changes and developments; or, in the words of Seeberg, "to show how the
Dogma as a whole and the separate dogmas have arisen and through
what course of development they have been brought to the form and
interpretation prevailing in the churches of any given period." The
following general remarks may be made respecting its presuppositions,
its general contents, and the point of view from which it is written.

1. ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS. The one great presupposition of the History

of Dogma would seem to be that the dogma of the Church is changeable
and has, as a matter of fact, undergone many changes in the course of its
historical development. That which is unchangeable is not subject to
development and has no history. Protestant theology has always
maintained the position that the dogma of the Church, while
characterized by a high degree of stability, is yet subject to change and
has in the course of history been enriched with new elements, received
more careful formulation, and even undergone certain transformations.
It has no difficulty, therefore, with the idea of a history of dogma. The
situation is somewhat different, however, in Roman Catholic theology.
Roman Catholics glory in the fact that they have an unchangeable dogma
and feel far superior to the Protestant who, in the words of Cardinal
Gibbons, "appeals to the unchanging Bible in support of his ever-
changing doctrines." He says that the creed of the Church "is now
identical with what it was in past ages." Faith of our Fathers, pp. 11, 87.
Winners speaks in a similar vein when he says: "The Christian religion is
unchangeable in all its revealed doctrines—in all those precepts and
institutions which are intended for all men. No article of faith (for of
doctrine there is mainly question) can be added or subtracted; nor can
any dogma receive a different meaning from that given it by Christ."
Handbook of the Christian Religion, p. 67. We are told repeatedly by
Roman Catholic authors that the Church cannot make new dogmas, but
can only hand down the sacred deposit that was entrusted to her.

But if the repeated assertions that the Church cannot make new dogmas
is true, then it follows that the dogmas were already given in the original
deposit, in the faith once delivered to the saints and contained in
Scripture and in the apostolic tradition. No dogma was ever added to the
sacred deposit, and no dogma contained in it was ever changed. The
Church only has power to declare a truth to be revealed by God and to
give it an infallible interpretation, thus dispelling uncertainty and
increasing the positive knowledge of the faithful. It did this in the past
and will continue to do it whenever historical occasions call for it. The
dogma itself then does not develop and therefore has no history; there is
development only in the subjective apprehension of it, and this
determines the Roman Catholic conception of the History of Dogma. Says
B. J. Otten, the Roman Catholic author of A Manual of the History of
Dogmas (third edition), "It (the History of Dogmas) presupposes that
revealed truths are objectively permanent and immutable, and also that
their subjective apprehension and outward expression admits of
progress." Vol. I, p. 2.

For a long time Roman Catholics looked askant at the History of Dogma.
Neander says that a "modern theologian, Hermes of Bonn, has asserted
that to treat the History of Dogmas as a special branch of Study, on
account of the change in development which it presupposes, militates
against the Catholic Church, and for that reason he has scrupled to give
Lectures upon it." The History of Christian Dogmas, I. p. 28. Petavius was
the first of the Roman Catholics to suggest something like a doctrine of
development, but his work was not well received, and he had to qualify
his statements. Later on Moehler and especially Newman advocated a
theory of development, which met with considerable, though no
universal, favor. The latter's theory is to the effect that many of the
doctrines of the Church were only germinally present in the original
deposit. They were like seeds implanted in the mind of the Church that
were pregnant with unsuspected possibilities and in course of time
unfolded into full-blown doctrines. While opposition often arose to the
new doctrinal expressions, they gradually gained ground and increased in
popularity. Finally the teaching Church, the hierarchy, stepped in to test
the results of this new development and to set the stamp of its infallible
approval on some of them by declaring them to be divinely revealed
truths. This theory found favor with many of the Roman Catholics, but
did not commend itself to all and never received official approval.

A second presupposition of the History of Dogma is that the development

of the dogma of the Church moved along organic lines and was therefore
in the main a continuous growth, in spite of the fact that the leaders of
the Church in their endeavors to apprehend the truth often wandered
into blind alleys, chasing will-o'-the-wisps and toying with foreign
elements; and that even the Church itself, as a whole or in part,
sometimes erred in its formulation of the truth. God's special revelation is
the progressive unfolding of the ectypal knowledge of God and of the
redemptive idea in Christ Jesus. It is an organic whole in which all the
parts are interrelated, the comprehensive expression of divine thought.
The Church in its endeavors to apprehend the truth is simply seeking to
think the thoughts of God after Him. It does this under the guidance of
the Holy Spirit, which is the Spirit of truth and as such guarantees that it
will ever-increasingly see the truth as an internally connected organism.
The History of Dogma may not be a mere chronicle, recording the
external history of the various dogmas of the Church. It is the history of
an organic growth and of the inner workings of the mind of the Church,
and therefore presupposes a rather continuous development of the
ecclesiastical dogma.

If the Church in the past had proceeded on the assumption, now

advocated by many, that the changing conditions of the religious life ever
and anon call for a new dogma, and that every age must formulate its own
dogma, discarding the old and substituting for it another more in
harmony with the spiritual condition of the times, it would have been
quite impossible to write a history of dogma in the organic sense of the
word. We shall have to proceed on the assumption that the Church,
despite the melancholy aberrations that characterized her search for the
truth and often led her into ways of error, yet gradually advanced in her
apprehension and formulation of the truth. We shall have to assume that
even such a tremendous religious upheaval as the Reformation did not
constitute a complete break with the doctrinal development of the past.
While many errors were exposed and corrected, the Reformers sought
support for their views in the early Church Fathers, and did not even
hesitate to adopt some of the views that were developed during the
Middle Ages. There was continuity of thought even here.

2. ITS SUBJECT MATTER. The fact that the History of Dogma deals
primarily with the dogmas of the Church does not mean that it need not
concern itself with those doctrinal developments that were not yet, and
perhaps were never to be, incorporated in the official Creeds. It would be
a mistake to assume that it can begin with the Council of Nicea and end
with the adoption of the last of the historical Confessions. In order to
describe the genesis of the earliest dogmas of the Church, it must take its
starting point at the close of the period of special revelation in the study
of the Apostolic Fathers. It will have to take account of those
preformations of the dogmas of the Church that resulted from the
theological discussions of the day and met with rather general approval,
though they did not receive the official stamp of the Church; of those
peripheral truths that necessarily followed from the central and
controlling dogma, and yet did not receive special ecclesiastical sanction;
and of those further developments of doctrinal truth that point forward to
and prepare the way for additional formulations of theological dogmas.
Since the dogma of the Church is not the fruit of a mechanical
construction but rather of an organic growth, the study of its history
cannot afford to limit its attention to the clearly defined results obtained
at various times, but must also consider the intervening stages with their
promise of even better and richer fruits.

From this it follows that, as far as the external history is concerned, the
History of Dogma cannot neglect the study of the great doctrinal
controversies of the Church, which were the birth pangs of new dogmas
and often had a determining influence on their formulation. Though this
study may not always be edifying, it is absolutely essential to a proper
understanding of the genesis of ecclesiastical dogmas. In these
controversies differences of opinion became apparent and in some cases
gave rise to different lines of development, and doctrinal formulations
arose which were at variance with the united consciousness of the Church
in general or of some particular denomination. Even these departures
from the main line of thought are important for the History of Dogma,
since they often led to a clearer and sharper formulation of the truth.

But while the History of Dogma cannot afford to ignore any of the
external facts that bear on the development of dogma, it should never
lose sight of the fact that it is primarily concerned with the development
of theological thought in the consciousness of the Church and should
therefore trace the development of the idea which is inherent in the
revealed revelation of God itself. Hegel and Baur rendered good service to
the History of Dogma, when they directed attention to the fact that the
development of dogma is controlled by an inner law, though their
principle of interpretation does not commend itself to Christian thought.
We can discern a certain logical necessity in the successive stages of the
development of each dogma, and in the order in which the various
dogmatical problems presented themselves. In general it may be said that
the logical order, usually followed in the study of Dogmatics, is reflected
more or less in the History of Dogma.
III. Method and Divisions of the History of Dogma

There has been considerable difference in the division of the subject-

matter of the History of Dogma and in the method followed in its
treatment. We briefly call attention to some of these differences.

1. DIVISIONS OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMA. The common division

found in most of the older works on the History of Dogma is that into
General and Special History of Dogma. This division is followed in each
of the successive periods, the General History sketching the general
philosophic background, the main themes of discussion, and the general
direction of doctrinal study in each period under discussion; and the
Special History tracing the genesis and development of the separate
dogmas, especially those which are central and have a controlling
influence on the formation of more peripheral dogmas. The special
dogmas are usually discussed under the customary rubrics of Dogmatics:
theology, anthropology, christology, and so on. This is called the lokal-
methode, and is followed by Hagenbach, Neander, Sheldon, and others.
Ritschl objected to both parts of this method of division on the ground
that they represented an anatomic rather than an organic method of
treatment; and in later works on the History of Dogma both its division
into General and Special History and the lokal-methode are abandoned.
This is one of the striking differences between the works of Harnack,
Loofs, Seeberg, and Fisher on the one hand and most of the previous
Histories on the other hand. The great objection to the division of the
History of Dogma into General and Special is that it separates what
belongs together; and to the lokal-methode, that it is artificial rather than
historical and does not do justice to the difference of emphasis in the
various periods, or to that which is distinctive in the discussions of each
period. The later writers, though not in complete agreement as to the
division to be applied in the study of the History of Dogma, all strive to
give a more unified view of the genesis and development of the dogma of
the Church. The divisions of Harnack and Loofs reveal great similarity,
while that of Seeberg runs to a great extent along similar lines. His
division is as follows: I. The Construction of Doctrine in the Ancient
Church. II. The Preservation, Transformation, and Development of
Doctrine in the Church of the Middle Ages. III. The Development of the
Doctrinal System through the Reformation, and the Opposing
Crystallization of Doctrine by Roman Catholicism.

2. METHOD OF TREATMENT. Under this general head two distinctions

call for consideration.

a. That between the horizontal and the vertical method. Some follow the
horizontal and others the vertical method in their study of the History of
Dogma. They who adopt the former take up the history of doctrinal
development as a whole by periods and trace the genesis of all the various
dogmas in each particular period, leaving them at the stage at which the
close of the period finds them, and taking them up again at that point, to
trace their further development. Thus the unfolding of the doctrine of
God is studied up to the beginning of the Middle Ages; then this is
dropped and is followed by a study of the development of the doctrine of
Christ up to the same point; again, this is discontinued and is succeeded
by a consideration of the gradual expansion of the anthropological
doctrines of sin and grace within the same period of time; and so on all
along the line. They who follow the latter method, however, take up the
study of the separate dogmas in the order in which they become the
center of attention in the Church, and trace their development until they
reach their final form. The doctrine of God is taken up first, because it
was the first to engage the special attention of the Church, and its
development is traced up to the time of its final formulation in the
historic Creeds of the post-Reformation period. In a similar way the
remaining central doctrines, such as those of Christ, of sin and grace, of
the atonement, and so on, are studied in their various stages of growth
until they reach their final official form. The former method is followed
by Hagenbach, Neander, Sheldon, Harnack, Loofs, and Seeberg; the
latter, though with certain differences, by Thomasius, Shedd, and
Cunningham. Each one of these has its advantages and disadvantages. In
our brief discussion it seems preferable to follow the latter, because it
keeps the separate dogmas more prominently before the mind, and
enables us to trace their development from start to finish without
diverting the attention from the regular flow of thought by a more or less
mechanical division. Of course, the danger lies at hand, and ought to be
avoided as much as possible, that the doctrines under consideration will
appear more or less detached from their historical setting and from their
logical connection in the systems of thought of the great theologians of
the Church, such as Tertullian, Origen, Augustine, Anselm, Thomas
Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and others. Happily, this danger is obviated to a
great extent by the fact that the central doctrines of the Church, with
which we are mainly concerned, did not occupy the center of the stage
simultaneously. Moreover, the reading of another work on the History of
Dogma, such as that of Seeberg, Sheldon, or Fisher, will help to off-set
this handicap. While pursuing this method, we shall not terminate our
historical discussion of each one of the dogmas at the point of their
incorporation into the last of the great historic Creeds, but shall also
consider the changes or developments suggested in later theological
literature, since they may in course of time lead to sounder, clearer, or
more complete dogmatical formulations.

b. That between a purely objective and the confessional method. Some

are of the opinion that the only proper, the only scientific way, to treat the
History of Dogma is according to the purely objective method. They
regard it as the task of the historian to describe the genesis and
development of the dogma of the Church without any prepossessions,
without manifesting any sympathy or antipathy, and without in any way
judging of the truth and falsity of the various doctrinal formulations.
Such judgment, we are told, is not in place in the History of Dogma, but
only in Dogmatics proper. And so, whenever the general course of
doctrinal development divides itself into various currents, which yield
diversified and even antithetical doctrines, as in the Greek, the Roman
Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Reformed Churches, the historian should
simply describe these, one after another, without testing them in any way
and without expressing any preferences. Dr. Kuyper correctly calls
attention to the fact, however, that no one could follow this method in
describing the history of his country, or in writing the biography of a
friend, since one would not be able to write as a disinterested spectator.

Just so the historian, who has definite doctrinal convictions and

subscribes to a certain Creed, will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
write a history of dogmas without any prepossession and without
revealing his ecclesiastical standpoint. He will prefer the confessional
method, according to which he will take his starting point in his own
Confession and will seek to give a genetic explanation of its contents. In
judging of the various doctrinal developments he will employ not only the
standard of God's Word, but also the criterion of his own Confession: the
former as the absolute standard of religious truth, and the latter as the
well considered and carefully formulated result of previous investigations
which, while not infallible, should yet be regarded as a true
representation of Scripture truth until the contrary is proved. History so
written will not be colorless, but will naturally reflect the standpoint of
the author on almost every page. It will not wittingly pervert the facts of
history, but will judge them primarily by the standard of Scripture by
which all religious truth should be judged, and secondarily by a
predetermined ecclesiastical criterion. This is the method we prefer to
follow in our study of the History of Dogma.

IV. History of the History of Dogma

1. FACTORS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE HISTORY OF DOGMA AS A

SEPARATE DISCIPLINE. The study of the History of Dogma as a
separate discipline is of comparatively recent date. Valuable materials for
such a study were gathered in the centuries preceding the Reformation,
but, as Harnack says, "They scarcely prepared the way for, far less
produced a historical view of dogmatic tradition." History of Dogma I, p.
24. Since the Church of Rome proceeded on the assumption, and still
maintains the position, that dogma is unchangeable, it may be said that
the Reformation by breaking with that view opened the way for a critical
treatment of the history of dogma. Moreover, it was a movement which,
in its very nature, was well calculated to furnish a special incentive for
such a study. It raised many questions respecting the nature of the
Church and her teachings, and sought to answer these not only in the
light of Scripture but also with an appeal to the Fathers of the early
Church, thus furnishing a direct and powerful motive for a historical
study of dogma. Yet the Reformers and the theologians of the era of the
Reformation did not initiate such an investigation. Though they appealed
to the Fathers of the first centuries to substantiate their views, they did
not feel the need of a careful and critical inquiry into the historical
genesis of that whole body of doctrine that constituted the content of
their faith. They harbored no doubts as to the scriptural character of the
doctrines which they believed. Moreover, these doctrines entered into
their very life and were verified by experience. And not only did their
robust faith have no need of such a historical investigation, but the
dogmatical and polemical interests that were uppermost in their mind
left little time for historical study.

That fact remains, however, that the Roman Catholic and Protestant
Churches accused each other of departing from the historic faith of
Christendom, and that only a careful study of history could settle that
dispute. While this motive remained inoperative for a long time, due to
dogmatical and polemical interests, it was there and was bound to have
some influence in course of time. It did not become operative, however,
until it was reinforced by other motives, supplied by movements which
were unfriendly to the dogma of the Church. Pietism was born of the
conviction that Protestant Scholasticism exercised a petrifying influence
and thus threatened the living truths of the Reformation. It reacted
against what it regarded as the barren intellectualism of the seventeenth
century and saw in this a departure from the faith of the Reformers. And
Rationalism was hostile to the dogma of the Church, because it was based
on authority rather than on human reason and with its vaunted stability
represented a check on the free inquiry of the human mind. It was
interested in showing that the dogma of the Church had been changed
repeatedly, and therefore could not lay claim to the permanence and
stability usually ascribed to it. These two movements, however different
and even antagonistic in some respects, joined hands in their opposition
to dogma and began the study of its history with the ill-concealed desire
of undermining it.

Another factor that should be taken into consideration, is the awakening

of the historical spirit under the influence of Semler and others. Semler
initiated the modern historical study of Scripture and wrote a work
intitled, An Experiment of a Freer Method of Teaching, which was a
pioneer work in which the practical value of the historical method was
explained. In Church History the fruit of this new spirit was first seen in
the great work of Mosheim. While it did not take up the history of dogma,
it nevertheless gave great impetus to this study. Important elements for it
are found in the works of Lessing and Semler.

2. EARLIER WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMA. The real

beginnings of the study of the History of Dogma are seen in the works of
S. G. Lange and Muenscher. The work of the former was planned on a
large scale, but was never completed. The latter wrote a work consisting
of four volumes in 1797, and followed this up with a compendium. By an
unbiased study he sought to answer the queestion, How and why the
doctrine of Christianity gradually assumed its present form? His work is
marred by the influence of Rationalism and left the question unanswered,
whether the proper object of the study is doctrine or dogma. He
introduced the division of the study into a General and Special History of
Dogma, which is found in many of the later works. The manuals that
followed the work of Muenscher did not mark any special advance in the
study of the subject.

Under the influence of Hegel a better historical method was introduced.

The application of it to the study of the History is seen especially in the
work of F. C. Baur, the father of the Tuebingen School of New Testament
criticism. The Hegelian principle of evolution was introduced in tracing a
definite order and progress in the rise of ecclesiastical dogmas. It was
regarded as the object of the History of Dogma (a) to ascertain the facts in
their actual settings as attested by accredited witnesses, and (b) to
interpret them in accordance with an exact law of inner unfolding. For a
long time, however, it was a purely speculative idea of development, as
embodied in the familiar Hegelian triad, that was superimposed on this
study. This appears most clearly in the work of Baur.

The idea of development, however, gradually acquired other than

Hegelian applications. It is assumed in the productions of
Schleiermacher's school of theology. It is also applied by such mediating
writers as Neander and Hagenbach, who surpass the Hegelians in their
estimate of Christianity as a religion and of the religious value of
doctrine. They fall short, however, in their application of the historic
principle where they continue the old division into a General and Special
History, and in the latter also apply the so-called lokal-methode. Other
modifications are found in the writings of such confessionalists as
Kliefoth and Thomasius. In the work of the former the idea of dogma in
distinction from doctrine emerges and is made the proper object of this
study. According to this writer each epoch yields its own cycle of
dogmatic truth and leaves this to succeeding generations as a treasure to
be preserved rather than as material to be reshaped, or even to be
cancelled (Baur). It is to be incorporated as a whole in the following
development. Thomasius carefully distinguished between central and
peripheral dogmas, the former being the great fundamental doctrines of
God, of Christ, and of Sin and Grace, and the latter the more derivative
doctrines which are developed on the basis of the central doctrines. His
work is written from the confessional standpoint of the Lutheran Church.

Roman Catholic scholarship was slow in taking an interest in the study of

the History of Dogma. And when it did, it took its startingpoint in the
distinct conception of dogma as the authoritative deliverance of the
Church on the fundamentals of the Christian religion. The older works
proceed on the assumption that the early Church was in possession of the
complete dogma of Christianity, and that there is no possibility of
material alteration from one generation to another. It is claimed that
there has been no addition to the original deposit but only interpretations
of it. Newman introduced the theory of development. According to him
the original deposit of revealed truth in the Bible is largely implicit and
germinal, and only gradually unfolds under the stimulus of external
conditions. The process of development is absolutely controlled, however,
by the infallible Church. But even this theory, however, carefully put, did
not meet with general acceptance in Roman Catholic circles.

3. LATER WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMA. Later works on the

History of Dogma reveal a tendency to break with the mechanical
arrangement of the earlier works with their division of the subject into a
General and a Special History and their application of the lokal-methode.
This is still found, indeed, in the work of Sheldon, and partly also in that
of Shedd, but is conspicuous by its absence in other recent works. There
is a growing conviction that the History of Dogma should be treated more
organically. Nitzsch adopted a genetic arrangement under the following
heads: The Promulgation of the Old Catholic Church Doctrine, and The
Development of the Old Catholic Church Doctrine. A similar division is
found in Harnack, who speaks of The Rise of Ecclesiastical Dogma and
The Development of Ecclesiastical Dogma.

Harnack shows affinity with both Thomasius and Nitzsch, but advances
far beyond their position. He limits his discussion to the rise and
development of dogmas as distinguished from doctrines, and takes into
account the constantly changing aspects of Christianity as a whole,
particularly in connection with the general cultural development. His
work breaks radically with the lokal-methode. But he has an erroneous
conception of dogma, regarding it in its inception and structure as a work
of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel, a mixture of Christian
religion and Hellenistic culture, in which the latter predominates. As he
sees it, propositions of faith were wrongly turned into intellectual
concepts, which were supported by historical and scientific proofs, but by
that very process lost their normative value and dogmatic auhority.
According to him that corruption began, not in the New Testament itself,
as later writers assert, but in the second and third centuries with the
development of the Logos doctrine, and was continued in the Roman
Catholic Church up to the time of the Vatican Council, while
Protestantism at the time of the Reformation in principle set aside the
dogmatic conception of Christianity. Its dogmas are constantly subject to
revision. Strictly speaking, it has no place for fixed truths, for dogmas,
but only for a Glaubenslehre. Harnack takes too limited a view of dogma,
does not do justice to the aversion of the early Church Fathers to heathen
influence, and makes the whole History of Dogma one gigantic error.

Loofs and Seeberg do not follow the division of Harnack, but seem to feel
that the second division of his great work really covers practically the
whole of the History of Dogma, though the former still has a separate
chapter on the genesis of dogma among the Christians. And though he
does not entirely agree with Harnack's conception of dogma, he shows
greater affinity with him than Seeberg does in his monumental work. This
work is somewhat of a sourcebook, since it contains numerous quotations
from the authors whose doctrinal views are discussed. Like Harnack,
Seeberg has also written a textbook in two volumes, which was translated
into English by Dr. Charles E. Hay and appeared in 1905 under the title,
Textbook of the History of Doctrines. It is a work of considerable value
for the student.

Questions for Further Study: How do the Roman Catholic and the
Protestant conceptions of dogma differ? How did Newman's theory
change the Roman Catholic view of the history of dogma? What
objections are there to Harnack's view of dogma? Has his view met with
general favor among the Ritschlians? Are Roman Catholics and
Protestants agreed as to the task of the history of dogma? Is the
changeable element of dogma, presupposed in its history, found in its
form or in its content or in both? What can be said for and against the
Hegelian method as applied to the History of Dogma? Did Baur in
applying it do justice to the external historical facts? Must the history of
dogma, in order to be truly scientific, be written in a purely objective
way?

Literature: Harnack, History of Dogma I, pp. 1–40; Seeberg, History of

Doctrines I, pp. 19–27; Loofs, Handboek der Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 1–
9; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas I, pp. 1–32; Fisher, History of
Christian Doctrine, pp. 1–22; Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, I, pp. 1–
47; Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 1–48; Rainy, Delivery and
Development of Christian Doctrine; Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der Heilige
Godgeleerdheid, III, pp. 370–386.

PREPARATORY DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENT
I. The Apostolic Fathers and Their Doctrinal Views

1. THEIR REPUTED WRITINGS. The Apostolic Fathers are the Fathers

who are supposed to have lived before the last of the apostles died, of
whom some are said to have been disciples of the apostles, and to whom
the earliest Christian writings now extant are ascribed. There are
especially six names which have come down to us, namely, Barnabas,
Hermas, Clement of Rome, Polycarp, Papias, and Ignatius. The first is
generally regarded, though with doubtful warrant, as the Barnabas who is
known as the companion of Paul in the Acts of the Apostles. He is the
reputed author of a strongly anti-Judaic Epistle of doubtful genuineness.
Hermas is supposed to have been the person mentioned in Rom. 16:14,
though on insufficient grounds. The Shepherd of Hermas ascribed to him
contains a series of visions, commands, and similitudes. It is a work of
doubtful authenticity, though it was held in high esteem by the early
Church. Clement of Rome may have been Paul's fellow-worker named in
Phil. 4:3. He is commonly represented as bishop of Rome, though he may
have been, and most likely was, merely an influential pastor there. He
was author of an Epistle to the Corinthians, containing general moral
injunctions and special exhortations, occasioned by discords in the
Corinthian church. The authentictiy of this Epistle is also doubted by
some, though without good reasons. It is probably the earliest of the
genuine remains of early Christian literature. Polycarp is usually
designated "bishop of Smyrna", but Eusebius speaks of him more
correctly as "that blessed and apostolic presbyter." He was a disciple of
John and wrote a short Epistle to the Philippians, consisting chiefly of
practical exhortations in Scripture language. Papias, called "bishop of
Hierapolis", was a contemporary of Polycarp, and perhaps also a disciple
of John. He was the author of an "Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord,"
of which only a few doctrinally insignificant fragments were preserved by
Eusebius. Ignatius, commonly known as "bishop of Antioch", also lived in
the days of the last of the apostles. Fifteen letters were ascribed to him,
but only seven are now regarded as genuine, and even these are doubted
by some. To these writings two of unknown authorship must be added,
namely, the Epistle to Diognetes and the Didache. The former is
sometimes ascribed to Justin Martyr, since he wrote an Apology to
Diognetes. His authorship is very unlikely, however, in view of internal
evidence. The writer gives an account of the grounds on which many
Christians had abandoned Paganism and Judaism, describes the leading
features of the character and conduct of Christians, and traces this to the
doctrine of Christianity, of which he gives an admirable summary. The
Didache, discovered in 1873, was probably written about the year 100 A.
D. The first part contains moral precepts under the scheme of the Two
Ways, the way of life and the way of death, while the second part gives
directions pertaining to worship and church government, interspersed
with statements respecting the last things.

2. FORMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIR TEACHINGS. It is

frequently remarked that in passing from the study of the New Testament
to that of the Apostolic Fathers one is conscious of a tremendous change.
There is not the same freshness and originality, depth and clearness. And
this is no wonder, for it means the transition from truth given by
infallible inspiration to truth reproduced by fallible pioneers. Their
productions were bound to lean rather heavily on Scripture and to be of a
primitive type, concerning itself with the first principles of faith rather
than with the deeper truths of religion.

Their teachings are characterized by a certain meagerness. They are

generally in full agreement with the teachings of Scripture, are often
couched in the very words of the Bible, but add very little by way of
explication and are not at all systematized. And this need not surprise any
one, for there had as yet been but a short time for reflection on the truths
of Scripture and for assimilation of the great mass of material contained
in the Bible. The canon of the New Testament was not yet fixed, and this
explains why these early Fathers so often quote oral tradition rather than
the written word. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that there were
no philosophical minds among them with special training for the pursuit
of the truth and outstanding ability for its systematic presentation. In
spite of their comparative poverty, however, the writings of the Apostolic
Fathers are of considerable importance, since they witness to the
canonicity and integrity of the New Testament Books and form a
doctrinal link between the New Testament and the more speculative
writings of the Apologetes which appeared during the second century.

A second characteristic of the teachings of the Apostolic Fathers is their

want of definiteness. The New Testament records various types of the
Apostolic kerugma (preaching): the Petrine, the Pauline, and the
Johannine. The three are in fundamental agreement, but each one of
them represents a different emphasis on the truth. Now it may seem
surprising that the Apostolic Fathers, while revealing some preference for
the Johannine type, with which they may have been best acquainted, yet
did not definitely attach themselves to any one of these types. However,
several considerations may be offered in explanation. It requires
considerable reflection to distinguish these types. These early Fathers
stood too near the Apostles to grasp the distinctive features of their
teachings. Then, too, for them Christianity was not in the first place a
knowledge to be acquired, but the principle of a new obedience to God.
While they were conscious of the normative value of the words of Jesus
and the Apostolic kerugma, they did not attempt to define the truths of
revelation, but simply to restate them in the light of their understanding.
And, finally, the general conditions of their life, in so far as these were
influenced by the popular heathen philosophy of the day, and by heathen
and Jewish-Helenistic piety, were not favorable to the proper
understanding of the characteristic differences between the several types
of the Apostolic kerugma.

3. MATERIAL CONTENTS OF THEIR TEACHINGS. It is a matter of

common observation that the writings of the Apostolic Fathers contain
very little that is doctrinally important. Their teachings are generally in
harmony with the truth revealed in the Word of God, and are often
represented in the very word of Scripture, but for that very reason cannot
be said to increase or deepen our insight into the truth or to shed light on
the interrelations of the doctrinal teachings of Scripture. They testify to a
common faith in God as the Creator and Ruler of the universe and in
Jesus Christ, who was active in creation and throughout the old
dispensation, and finally appeared in the flesh. While they use the
scriptural designation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and also
speak of Christ as God and man, they do not testify to an awareness of the
implications and problems involved. The work of Christ as the Redeemer
is not always represented in the same way. Sometimes His great
significance is seen in the fact that He, by His passion and death, freed
mankind from sin and death; and sometimes in the related, but not
correlated fact that He revealed the Father and taught the new moral law.
In some cases the death of Christ is represented as procuring for men the
grace of repentance and as opening the way for a new obedience, rather
than as the ground of man's justification. This moralistic strain is,
perhaps, the weakest point in the teachings of the Apostolic Fathers. It
was related to the moralism present in the heathen world of that day and
characteristic of the natural man as such, and was bound to serve the
interests of legalism. The sacraments are represented as the means by
which the blessings of salvation are communicated to man. Baptism
begets the new life and secures the forgiveness of all sins or of past sins
only (Hermas and II Clement); and the Lord's Supper is the means of
communicating to man a blessed immortality or eternal life.

The individual Christian apprehends God in faith, which consists in true

knowledge of God, confidence in Him, and self-committal to Him. Man is
said to be justified by faith, but the relation of faith to justification and
the new life is not clearly understood. An anti-Pauline strain of legalism
becomes manifest at this point. Faith is simply the first step in the way of
life, on which the moral development of the individual depends. But after
the forgiveness of sins is once granted in baptism and apprehended by
faith, man next merits this blessing by his good works, which become a
second and independent principle alongside of faith. Christianity is often
represented as a nova lex, and love, leading on to a new obedience, takes
the leading place. Not the grace of God, but the good works of man
sometimes appear in the foreground.

The Christian is represented as living in a Christian community, the

church, which still rejoices in the possession of charismatic gifts, but also
shows an increasing respect for the ecclesiastical offices mentioned in the
New Testament. In some instances the bishop stands out as superior to
the presbyters. A vivid sense of the vanity and transitory character of the
present world, and of the eternal glory of the future world, is manifest in
their writings. The end of all things is thought to be very near, and the
representations of the end of the present world are derived from Old
Testament prophecy. The Kingdom of God is regarded as the supreme
good and as a purely future blessing. According to some (Barnabas,
Hermas, Papias) its final form is preceded by a millennial kingdom. But
whatever attention is devoted to the millennium, there is far greater
emphasis on the coming judgment, when the people of God will receive
the rewards of heaven, and the wicked will be condemned to everlasting
destruction.

Questions for Further Study: How is the indefinite character of the

teachings of the Apostolic Fathers to be explained? On which point are
these teachings defective? What seeds of the doctrines peculiar to Roman
Catholicism are already present in these writings? How can we account
for their different representations of the work of Christ? In what
particular points does the moralism or legalism of the early Fathers
appear? What can be said in explanation of this phenomenon? Could it
have been occasioned in any way by Scripture statements? Is Harnack
correct when he says that the Christology of the Apostolic Fathers is in
part "Adoption Christology"?

Literature: Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers; Lechler, Das apostol. u.

nachap. Zeitalter; Moxom, From Jerusalem to Nicaea, pp. 99–162;
Cunningham, Historical Theology I, pp. 94–120; Scott, The Nicene
Theology, pp. 82–87, 142–160; Moody, C. N., The Mind of the Early
Converts, pp. 10–101; Harnack, History of Dogma I, pp. 141–221;
Seeberg, History of Doctrines I, pp.55–82; Loofs, Handboek der
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 57–66; Otten, Manual of the History of
Dogmas I, pp. 62–98; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 41–47.

II. Perversions of the Gospel

In the second century the Christian religion as a new force in the world,
revealing itself in the organization of the Church, had to engage in a
struggle for existence, It had to guard against dangers from without and
from within, had to justify its existence, and had to maintain the purity of
doctrine in the face of subtle error. The very existence of the Church was
threatened by State persecutions. The first persecutions were entirely
Jewish, due to the fact that the Church was largely limited to Palestine,
and that the Roman Government for some time considered the followers
of Christ as a Jewish sect, and therefore regarded their religion as a
religio licita. But when it became apparent that Christianity laid claim to
a universal character, thus endangering the State religion, and that the
Christians largely disregarded the affairs of the State and refused to join
in the idolatrous worship of the Romans, and particularly in their
emperor worship, the Roman government inaugurated a series of
persecutions which threatened the very existence of the Christian Church.
At the same time Christianity had to suffer a great deal from the written
attacks of some of the keenest minds of the age, such as Lucian,
Porphyry, and Celsus, men of a philosophical bent of mind, who hurled
their invectives against the Christian religion. Their arguments are typical
of the philosophical opposition to Christianity throughout the centuries
and frequently remind one of those employed by rationalistic
philosophers and higher critics in the present day. But however great
these dangers from without were, there were even greater dangers which
threatened the Church from within. These consisted in different types of
perversions of the Gospel.

1. JEWISH PERVERSIONS. There were three groups of Jewish

Christians which revealed a Judaistic tendency. Traces of them are found
even in the New Testament.

a. The Nazarenes. These were Jewish Christians who adopted the tenets
of the Christian religion. They used only the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew,
but at the same time recognized Paul as a true apostle. In distinction from
other Jewish sects they believed in the divinity and the virgin birth of
Jesus. And while they bound themselves in practice to a strict observance
of the law, they did not demand this of Gentile Christians. "They were," as
Seeberg says, "really Jewish Christians, whereas the two following groups
were only Christian Jews."

b. The Ebionites. This sect really constituted the continuation of the

Judaistic opponents of the Apostle Paul and was of a Pharisaic type. Its
adherents refused to recognize the apostleship of Paul, whom they
regarded as an apostate from the law, and demanded that all Christians
should submit to the rite of circumcision. They had a Cerinthian view of
Christ, which was probably due to their desire to maintain the Old
Testament monotheism. Both the divinity of Christ and His virgin birth
were denied. In their opinion Jesus distinguished Himself from others
only by a strict observance of the law, and was chosen to be the Messiah
on account of His legal piety. He became conscious of this at the time of
His baptism, when He received the Spirit, which enabled Him to perform
His task, the work of a prophet and teacher. They were reluctant to think
of Him as subject to sufferings and death.

c. The Elkesaites. This group represented a type of Jewish Christianity

marked by theosophic speculations and strict asceticism. While they
rejected the virgin birth of Christ and claimed that He was born as other
men, they also spoke of Him as a higher spirit or angel. They regarded
Him as an incarnation of the ideal Adam, and also called Him the highest
archangel. Circumcision and the sabbath were held in honour; there were
repeated washings, to which a magical cleansing and reconciling meaning
was ascribed; and magic and astrology were practiced among them. They
had their secret doctrines respecting the observance of the law. Their
movement was probably an attempt to gain general recognition for
Jewish Christianity by adapting it to the syncretistic tendencies of the
age. In all probability the Epistle to the Colossians and First Timothy
refer to this heresy.

2. GENTILE PERVERSIONS: GENTILE-CHRISTIAN GNOSIS. In

Gnosticism we meet with a second perversion of Christianity. It had this
in common with the Judaistic sects, that it conceived of the relationship
between the Old Testament and the New, and between their respective
religions, as one of opposition. Its original form was rooted in Judaism,
but it ultimately developed into a strange mixture of Jewish elements,
Christian doctrines, and heathen speculative thought.

(1) Origin of Gnosticism. There are indications in the New Testament that
an incipient Gnosticism was already making its appearance in the days of
the Apostles. There were heretical teachers even then who drew their
immediate impulse from Judaism, engaged in speculations respecting
angels and spirits, and were characterized by a false dualism, leading on
to asceticism on the one hand, and to an immoral libertinism, on the
other hand, who spiritualized the resurrection and made the Church's
hope the object of derisive mockery, Col. 2:18 ff; 1 Tim. 1:3–7; 4:1–3; 6:3
f.; 2 Tim. 2:14–18; Tit. 1:10–16; 2 Pet. 2:1–4; Jude 4, 16; Rev. 2:6, 15, 20
f. There was also a tendency to religious philosophical speculation, which
appeared especially in the heresy of Cerinthus, who distinguished
between the human Jesus and Christ as a higher spirit which descended
on him at the time of his baptism and left him again before the
crucifixion. John indirectly combats this heresy in his writings, John 1:14;
20:31; 1 John 2:22; 4:2, 15; 5:1, 5, 6; 2 John 7.

From the early part of the second century these errors assumed a more
developed form, were openly proclaimed, and at once had an amazingly
wide circulation. This can be understood only in the light of the general
syncretism of the period. There was a widespread religious unrest and a
surprising eagerness to absorb all possible religious ideas, and to
generalize and harmonize them. Western religions had ceased to satisfy,
and Eastern cults, diligently propagated by itinerant preachers, were
eagerly embraced. The great aim was to gratify the thirst for deeper
knowledge, the desire for mystic communion with God, and the hope of
securing a sure path for the soul in its ascent to the upper world at death.
It is no wonder that this tendency attached itself to Christianity, which
seemed to address itself to the same task with marked success. Moreover,
it found support in the claim of Christianity to be the absolute and
universal religion. It may be said that Gnosticism mistakenly sought to
elevate Christianity to its rightful position, that of universal religion, by
adapting it to the needs of all, and by interpreting it in harmony with the
wisdom of the world.

(2) The Essential Character of Gnosticism. Gnosticism was first of all a

speculative movement. The speculative element was very much in the
foreground. The very name Gnostikoi, adopted by some of its adherents,
indicates that they laid claim to a deeper knowledge of divine things than
could be obtained by common believers. The Gnostics grappled with
some of the deeper problems of philosophy and religion, but approached
them in the wrong manner and suggested solutions totally at variance
with the truths of revelation. Their two greatest problems were those of
absolute being and of the origin of evil, problems not of Christian but of
heathen religious thought. They developed a phantastic cosmogony, in
which they borrowed freely from oriental speculation, and with which
they sought to combine the truths of the Gospel. Undoubtedly, they were
serious in their attempts to make the Gospel acceptable to the educated
and cultured classes of their day.

In spite of its speculative character, Gnosticism was also a popular

movement. In order to sway the masses, it had to be something more
than mere speculation. Therefore attempts were made in special
associations to popularize the general cosmical theory by symbolical,
rites, mystic, ceremonies, and the teaching of magic formulas. In the
initiation into these associations strange formulas and rites formed an
important part. These were supposed to form a necessary and effective
protection against the power of sin and death, and to be a means of
gaining access to the blessedness of the world to come. In reality their
introduction was an attempt to transform the Gospel into a religious
philosophy and into mystic wisdom. Yet Gnosticism claimed to be
Christian in character. Whenever possible, it appealed to the words of
Jesus explained in an allegorical way, and to a so-called secret tradition
handed down from the times of the Apostles. Many received its teachings
as genuine Christian truth.

Gnosticism was also a syncretistic movement within the sphere of

Christianity. It is still a matter of discussion, whether the Gnostics were
Christians in any sense of the term. According to Seeberg Gnosticism was
pagan rather than Gentile Christian. It addressed itself to the solution of
problems that originated in the religious thought of the heathen world,
and merely gave its discussions a somewhat Christian colouring.
Apparently it placed a high estimate on Jesus Christ as marking the
decisive turning point in human history, and as a teacher of absolute
truth. Harnack speaks of it as "the acute Hellenizing of Christianity," and
calls the Gnostics "the first Christian theologians." Prof. Walther is more
correct, when he says that Gnosticism is … "a stealing of some Christian
rags to cover heathen nakedness." This corresponds with the description
of Seeberg when he speaks of it as "an ethnicizing of Christianity."

(3) The Main Teachings of Gnosticism. We cannot discuss the various

Gnostic systems, such as those of Valentinus and Basilides, but can only
briefly indicate the teachings of Gnosticism in general. A trait of dualism
runs through the whole system and manifests itself in the position that
there are two original principles or gods, which are opposed to each other
as higher and lower, or even as good and bad. The supreme or good God
is an unfathomable abyss. He interposes between Himself and finite
creatures a long chain of aeons or middle beings, emanations from the
divine, which together constitute the Pleroma or fullness of the divine
essence. It is only through these intermediate beings that the highest God
can enter into various relations with created beings. The worlds is not
created by the good God, but is the result of, probably, a fall in the
Pleroma, and is the work of a subordinate, possibly a hostile, deity. This
subordinate god is called the Demiurge, is identified with the God of the
Old Testament, and is described as an inferior, limited, passionate, and
vengeful being. He is contrasted with the supreme God, the source of
goodness, virtue, and truth, who revealed Himself in Christ.

The world of matter as the product of a lesser and possibly an evil god, is
essentially evil. There is found in it, however, a remnant from the spirit-
world, namely, the soul of man, a spark of light from the upper world of
purity which in some inexplicable way became entangled in evil matter.
Its deliverance can be obtained only through some intervention of the
good God. A way of deliverance has been provided by the sending of a
special emissary from the kingdom of light into the world of darkness. In
Christian Gnosticism this emissary is regularly identified with Christ. He
is variously represented, either as a celestial being appearing in a
phantasmal body, or as an earthly being, with whom a higher power or
spirit temporarily associated himself. Since matter is in itself evil, this
higher spirit could not have an ordinary human body.

Participation in redemption, or victory over the world, was gained only

through the secret rites of the Gnostic associations. Initiation into the
mysteries of marriage to Christ, of peculiar baptism, of magic names, and
of special anointing, by which the secret knowledge of Being was secured,
formed the path of redemption. At this point Gnosticism became more
and more a system of religious mysteries. Men are divided into three
classes: the pneumatic who constitute the elite of the church, the psychic
consisting of the ordinary Church members, and the hylic or the Gentiles.
Only the first class is really capable of higher knowledge (epignosis) and
thus obtains the highest blessedness. The second class may be saved
through faith and works, but can only attain to an inferior blessedness.
Those belonging to the third class are hopelessly lost.

The ethics or moral philosophy, accompanying these views of

redemption, was dominated by a false estimate of sensuousness, which
resulted either in strict ascetic abstinence or in low carnality, born of the
assurance that nothing could really hinder those who were favored of
heaven. There was asceticism on the one hand and libertinism on the
other. The ordinary eschatology of the Church had no place in this
system. The doctrine of the resurrection of the dead was not recognized.
When the soul was finally released from matter, it returned to the
Pleroma, and this marked the end.

(4) Historical Significance of Gnosticism. Even Gnosticism, however

formidable an enemy of the truth, was not able to check the onward
march of Christianity. Many were indeed swept along for a time by its
daring speculations or by its mystic rites, but the great body of believers
was not deceived by its phantastic representations nor by its alluring
promises of secret bliss. In fact, Gnosticism was short-lived. Like a
meteor it lit up the sky for a moment, and then suddenly disappeared. It
was overcome by the direct refutations of the Church Fathers, by the
preparation and circulation of short statements of the fundamental facts
of the Christian religion (Rules of Faith), and by a more rational
interpretation of the New Testament and a limitation of its canon, to the
exclusion of all the false Gospels, Acts, and Epistles that were in
circulation. Yet it did not fail to leave a lasting impression on the Church.
Some of its peculiarities were absorbed by the Church and in course of
time came to fruition in the Roman Catholic Church with its peculiar
conception of the sacraments, its philosophy of a hidden God, who should
be approached through intermediaries (saints, angels, Mary), its division
of men into higher and lower orders, and its emphasis on asceticism.

The Church also derived actual profit from the appearance of Gnosticism,
but only in an indirect way. It learned to mark off clearly the limits of
divine revelation, and to determine the relation of the Old Testament to
the New. Moreover, it became keenly alive to the necessity of drawing up
short statements of the truth, based on current baptismal formulas,
which could serve as standards of interpretation (Rules of Faith). There
was also a very evident doctrinal gain. Christianity was now first
conceived as a "doctrine" and as a "mystery." The intellectual element in
the Christian religion was emphasized, and this marked the real
startingpoint for doctrinal development. The Christian idea of God was
rescued from the mythological speculations of the Gnostics. The Church
came into conscious possession of the truth that God is the Supreme
Being, the Creator and Upholder of the Universe, the same in the Old and
in the New Testament. The doctrine of the Demiurge and his creative
activity was set aside, and the dualism of the Gnostics, making matter
essentially evil, was overcome. Over against the Gnostic tendency to
regard Jesus Christ merely as one of the aeons, His unique character as
the Son of God was emphasized, and at the same time His true humanity
was defended against all kinds of docetic denials. The great facts of His
life, His virgin birth, miracles, sufferings, death, and resurrection, were
all maintained and set in clearer light. Moreover, the doctrine of
redemption through the atoning work of Christ was put forward in
opposition to the speculative vagaries of the Gnostics; and the universal
receptivity of men for the Gospel of Jesus Christ was stressed in answer
to Gnostic exclusiveness and pride.

Questions for Further Study: Are there any traces of the Nazarenes,
Ebionites, and Elkesaites in the New Testament? How does the Ebionite
denial of the divinity of Christ follow from Judaism? Does the New
Testament contain any indications of an incipient Gnosticism? Where are
these found? Are there any elements of New Testament teaching to which
Gnosticism could rightly or wrongly appeal? On which sources did
Gnosticism draw? Wherein does the anti-Judaistic character of the
movement in its final form appear? Why is its Christology called docetic?
What method of interpretation did the Gnostics adopt in founding their
system on Scripture? How did the Gnostics distinguish between pistis
and gnostis? Are the Gnostic distinctions between the world and the
kingdom of God, between good and evil, of an ethical nature? Is there
anything in other systems corresponding to their doctrine of an
unapproachable God and intermediate beings? What lent Gnosticism its
temporary popularity, its speculations or its esoteric religion? Why is
Harnack hardly justified in speaking of the Gnostics as "the first Christian
theologians"?

Literature: Burton, Heresies of the Apostolic Age; Mansel, The Gnostic

Heresies of the First and Second Centuries; King, The Gnostics and their
Remains; Lightfoot, Commentary on Colossians, pp. 73–113; Moody, The
Mind of the Early Christians, pp. 148–203; Scott, The Nicene Theology,
pp. 87–133; Faulkner, Crises in the Early Church, pp. 9–51; Cunningham,
Historical Theology I, pp. 121–133; Neander, History of Christian
Dogmas I, pp. 33–45; Harnack, History of Dogma I, pp. 222–265;
Seeberg, History of Doctrine I, pp. 87–102; Otten, Manual of the History
of Dogmas I, pp. 99–105; Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine I, pp.
105–117; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 48–58; Orr, Progress
of Dogma, pp. 54–70.

III. Reform Movements in the Church

1. MARCION AND HIS MOVEMENT OF REFORM

a. His character and purpose. Marcion was a native of Pontus (Sinope),

who was driven from his home, so it seems, on account of adultery, and
made his way to Rome about the year 139 A. D. He is represented as a
man of deep earnestness and marked ability, who labored in the spirit of
a reformer. He first made the attempt to bring the Church to his way of
thinking, and when he did not succeed in his work of reform, felt
constrained to organize his followers into a separate church and to seek
universal acceptance of his views by active propaganda. He has often
been classed as a Gnostic, but the correctness of this classification is now
doubted. Loofs says that the statement of Hahn, "Marcion perperam
gnosticus vocatur, is to the point, since Marcion had a soteriological
rather than a cosmological purpose, faith rather than knowledge occupied
the most important place in his system, he did not work out oriental
myths nor Greek philosophical problems, and excluded allegorical
interpretations. This is in general agreement with the statement of
Harnack, who says that he should not be classed with Gnostics like
Basilides and Vanlentinus and gives the following reasons for his opinion:
" (1) He was guided by no metaphysical, also by no apologetical, but only
by a purely soteriological interest, (2) he therefore placed the whole
emphasis upon the pure Gospel and upon faith (not upon knowledge), (3)
he did not employ philosophy—at least not as a main principle—in his
conception of Christianity, (4) he did not endeavor to found schools of
philosophers, but to reform, in accordance with the true Pauline Gospel,
the churches whose Christianity he believed to be legalistic (Judaistic)
and who, as he thought, denied free grace. When he failed in this, he
formed a church of his own." Seeberg also singles him out for separate
treatment.

b. His main teachings. The great question for Marcion was how to relate
the Old Testament to the New. He found the key to this problem in the
Epistle to the Galatians, which speaks of a Judaistic opposition to Paul,
and proceeded on the assumption that the other apostles shared in this.
He became convinced that the Gospel was corrupted by commingling it
with the law. So he set himself the task of separating the Jaw and the
Gospel, and worked out his theory of opposites or antitheses. He accepted
the Old Testament as the genuine revelation of the God of the Jews, but
declared that He could not be the same as the God of the New Testament.
He is the Creator of the world, but a God by no means perfect. He rules
with rigour and justice, is full of wrath, and knows nothing of grace.
However, He is not opposed to the God of the New Testament as the
principle of evil, but only as a lesser God.

The God of the New Testament, on the other hand, is good and merciful.
He was unknown until the fifteenth year of Tiberias, when He revealed
Himself in Christ, who is often spoken of as the good God himself. Christ
is not to be identified with the Old Testament Messiah, since He does not
answer to the prophetic delineations of the coming Redeemer. He came
as the manifestation of the good God, and did not defile Himself by
taking on a real body, since He would take nothing from the kingdom of
the Demiurge, but merely assumed an apparent body, in order to make
Himself intelligible. He abrogated the law and all the works of the
Demiurge, who for that reason secured His execution on the cross by the
princes of the world. But because of the unreality of His body, the
crucifixion did not harm Christ. He proclaimed the Gospel of love and of
freedom from the law of the Old Testament God, thus opening a way of
salvation for all who believe and even for the wicked in the nether world.
It was understood, however, that the majority of mankind would perish
by being consigned to the fire of the Demiurge. The good God does not
punish them; He simply will not have them. That is His judgment on the
wicked. Since Marcion believed that Paul was the only apostle who really
understood the Gospel of Jesus Christ, he limited the canon of the New
Testament to the Gospel of Luke and ten Epistles of the great Apostle of
the Gentiles.

2. THE MONTANIST REFORMATION:

a. Its origin. While Montanism may be regarded as a reaction against the

innovations of the Gnostics, it was itself also characterized by innovating
tendencies. Montanus appeared in Phrygia about the year 150 A. D., and
therefore his teaching is often called the Phrygian heresy. He and two
women, Prisca and Maximilla, announced themselves as prophets. On the
basis of the Gospel of John they held that the last and highest stage of
revelation had been reached. The age of the Paraclete had come, and the
Paraclete spoke through Montanus now that the end of the world was at
hand. The revelations given through Montanus were mainly concerned
with those things in which it seemed that the Scriptures were not
sufficiently ascetic. From this it would seem that the most essential
element in Montanism was its legalistic asceticism.

b. Its main teachings. According to Montanism the last period of

revelation has opened with the coming of the Paraclete. Hence the
present age is one of spiritual gifts and especially of prophecy. Montanus
and his co-laborers are regarded as the last of the prophets, bringing new
revelations. On the whole the Montanists were orthodox and accepted the
rule of faith. They strongly emphasized the nearness of the end of the
world, and in view of this insisted on strict moral requirements, such as
celebacy (or at most a single marriage), fasting, and rigid moral
discipline. They unduly exalted martyrdom and absolutely forbade flight
from persecution. Moreover, they revealed a tendency to exalt the special
charisms in the Church at the expense of the regular offices and officers.
While Marcion appealed especially to the writings of Paul, Montanus
sought support more particularly in the Gospel and Epistles of John.

c. Its reception in the Church. The Church was placed in a somewhat

embarrassing position by Montanism. On the one hand it represented the
orthodox position over against the speculations of the Gnostics, and as
such deserved appreciation. And in view of the Scriptural emphasis on
the nearness of the end of the world, on the great importance of the
charismatic gifts, particularly prophecy, and on the necessity of keeping
oneself unspotted from the world—it is not difficult to understand that
many regarded it with favor. On the other hand the Church followed a
true instinct in rejecting it, especially because of the fanaticism it
involved and its claim to a higher revelation than that contained in the
New Testament.
Questions for Further Study: Why is Marcion often ranked as a Gnostic?
In what respects does he differ from the Gnostics? What contrasts
dominate all his teachings? What objections did he have to most of the
New Testament writings? To what New Testament books is Marcion's
canon limited? How did the Church indirectly profit by the Marcionite
controversy? What factors gave rise to Montanism? How do you account
for its asceticism, and for its emphasis on special charisms? How should
we judge of its claim to a new outpouring of the Holy Spirit and to
prophetic gifts? Was its strict discipline justified?

Literature: Consult the books on Gnosticism mentioned in the previous

chapter for Marcionism; Faulkner, Crises in the Early Church, pp. 52–75;
McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought I, pp. 149–174; Harnack,
History of Dogma I, pp. 266–286; II, pp. 94–104; Seeberg, History of
Doctrine I, pp. 102–108; Fisher, History of Doctrine, pp. 59, 60, 81–83.

IV. The Apologists and the Beginnings of the Church's Theology

1. THE TASK OF THE APOLOGISTS. Pressure from without and

from within called for a clear statement and for defense of the truth, and
thus gave birth to theology. The earliest Fathers who took up the defense
of the truth are for that very reason called Apologists. The most
important of these were Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus of
Antioch. They addressed their apologies partly to the rulers and partly to
the intelligent public. Their immediate object was to mollify the temper of
the authorities and of the people in general towards Christianity; and
they sought to do this by setting forth its, true character and by refuting
the charges proffered against the Christians. They were particularly
solicitous to make the Christian religion acceptable to the educated
classes by stressing its rationality. With that in view they represented it as
the highest and surest philosophy, gave special emphasis to the great
truths of natural religion: God, virtue, and immortality, and spoke of it as
the fulfilment of all the truth found in both Judaism and Hellenism.

Their task assumed a threefold character, defensive, offensive, and

constructive. They defended Christianity by showing that there was no
evidence for the charges brought against its adherents, that the offensive
conduct ascribed to them was altogether inconsistent with the spirit and
precepts of the Gospel, and that the character and lives of those who
professed the Christian faith were marked by moral purity.

Not satisfied with a mere defense, they also attacked their opponents.
They charged the Jews with a legalism that lost sight of the shadowy and
typical character of much that was found in the law and represented its
temporal elements as permanent, and with a blindness that prevented
them from seeing that Jesus was the Messiah, promised by the prophets,
and as such the fulfilment of the law. Moreover, in their assault on
paganism, they exposed the unworthy, absurd, and immoral character of
the heathen religion, and particularly of the doctrine of the gods, as
compared with the doctrines of the unity of God, His universal
providence, His moral government, and the future life. Tatian saw little
or no good in Greek philosophy, while Justin recognized a true element in
it, which he ascribed to the Logos. A common feature in their writings is a
blending of general and special revelation.

Finally, they also felt it incumbent on them to establish the character of

Christianity as a positive revelation of God. In demonstrating the reality
of this revelation, they relied mainly on the argument from prophecy, but
also, though in a lesser degree, on that from miracles. They appealed
repeatedly to the remarkable spread of the Christian religion in spite of
all resistance, and to the changed character and lives of its professors.

2. THEIR POSITIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TRUTH. In

stating the doctrinal contents of the divine revelation the Apologetes did
not always clearly distinguish between general and special revelation, and
often failed to discriminate carefully between that which is the product of
the human mind and that which is supernaturally revealed. This is due to
the fact that they conceived of Christianity too much as a philosophy,
albeit the only true philosophy, superior to all other philosophies in that
it was based on revelation. Says Harnack: "Christianity is philosophy and
revelation. This is the thesis of every Apologist from Aristides to Minucius
Felix." They regarded it as a philosophy, because it contains a rational
element and satisfactorily answers the questions that have engaged all
true philosophers; but also as the direct antithesis of philosophy, since it
is free from all mere notions and opinions, and originates from a
supernatural revelation.

They represented God as the Self-existent, Unchangeable, and Eternal

One, who is the primal cause, of the world, but because of His uniqueness
and perfection can best be described in terms of negation. They hardly
got beyond the idea of the divine Being as to on or absolute attributeless
existence. In speaking of the Son they preferred the use of the term
"Logos", undoubtedly because it was a common philosophical term and
therefore appealed to the cultured classes. At the same time its use shows
that the Church's attention was focused on the divine and exalted Christ
rather than on the man Jesus. The Apologists did not have the biblical
conception of the Logos, but one somewhat resembling that of Philo. To
them the Logos, as He existed eternally in God, was simply the divine
reason, without personal existence. With a view to the creation of the
world, however, God generated the Logos out of His own Being and thus
gave Him personal existence. Essentially the Logos remains identical with
God, but in view of His origin as a person He may be called a creature.
Briefly stated, Christ is the divine reason, immanent in God, to which
God gave a separate existence, and through which He revealed Himself.
"As the divine reason," says Seeberg, "he was not only operative at the
creation of the world and in the Old Testament, but also in the wise men
of the heathen world." It should be noted particularly that the Logos of
the Apologists, in distinction from the philosophical Logos, has an
independent personality.

The Logos became man by assuming a real human nature, consisting of

body and soul. Yet He was not an ordinary man, but God and man,
though His divinity was concealed. Hence it was not a mere man, but the
very Son of God that hung on the cross. All emphasis is placed on the fact
that He became the teacher of the race, as He had already shown Himself
before the incarnation. The main content of His teaching is found in the
ideas of the one God, the new law requiring a virtuous life, and
immortality, particularly the resurrection, carrying with it rewards and
punishments. Because God created man free, the latter has the ability to
keep the commandments of God. Grace consists only in the revelation of
doctrine and of the law. The sufferings of Christ hardly appear to be
necessary, except as a fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. Yet the
Apologists do insist on the reality and the great significance of these
sufferings as obtaining for men the forgiveness of sins and deliverance
from sin and the devil.

The origin of the new life is represented somewhat dualistically by the

Apologetes. Sometimes it appears to be wholly dependent on the free
choice of man, and then again it seems to be entirely contingent on the
free grace of God. Baptism stands in the closest relationship to the new
birth, and marks the beginning of the new life. The Church consists of the
people of God, the true Israel, and the high-priestly generation of God,
and is characterized by strict morality, holy love, and readiness to suffer
with rejoicing. The Apologists firmly believed in the resurrection of the
dead, but there was some difference of opinion among them about the
essential immortality of the soul. Tatian and Theophilus regarded
immortality as a reward for the righteous and a punishment for the
wicked, and Justin seems to have shared this view. In their description of
the blessedness of the future the millennial kingdom sometimes plays a
part, (Justin).

3. THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE HISTORY OF DOGMA.

Harnack and Loofs are of the opinion that the Apologists completely fell
away from the right apprehension of the Christian Gospel. They claim
that these early Fathers sought the substance of Christianity solely in its
rational contents, valued the objective facts of revelation, such as the
incarnation and the resurrection, merely as certifying the truths of
natural revelation, and Hellenized the Gospel by turning faith into
doctrine and by giving Christianity, especially through their Logos
doctrine, an intellectual character. But while there may be some
semblance of truth in their representation, it is clearly the result of a
onesided contemplation of some of the teachings of the Apologists and
fails to take all the facts into consideration.

It must be admitted that these early Fathers gave great prominence to the
truths of reason and sought to demonstrate their rationality. But it should
be borne in mind, (a) that they were writing Apologies and not doctrinal
treatises, and that the nature of Apologies is always determined more or
less by the opposition; (b) that the truths which they stressed also
constitute a very essential part of the system of Christian doctrine; and
(c) that their writings also contain many positive Christian elements,
which do not merely serve as props for the fundamental truths of reason.

Again, it must be admitted that they represented Christianity largely in

terms of philosophy, that they did not clearly discriminate between
philosophy and theology, and that their representation of the truths of
revelation, and particularly of the Logos doctrine, suffered from an
admixture of Greek philosophical thought. But they evidently meant to
give a correct interpretation of the truths of revelation, though they did
not always succeed. The fact that they sought to give a rational
interpretation of Christianity cannot be held against them, for this does
not consist exclusively in religious experiences, as Ritschlians sometimes
seem to think, but also has an intellectual content and is a reasonable
religion. It is quite evident from the writings of the Apologists that their
conception of Christianity still suffered from the same defects and
limitations as that of the Apostolic Fathers. This is seen especially in the
doctrine of the Logos and in that of the way of salvation (moralism). At
the same time their work marked the beginnings of Christian theology,
though this was forced into a philosophical framework.

Questions for Further Study: How do you account for it that the early
Apologetes placed so much emphasis on natural theology; on Christ as
the Logos rather than on Christ as the Redeemer; on His teaching rather
than on His death? Did they succeed in harmonizing the work of Christ as
Logos with His work as Redeemer? How does their moralism compare
with that of the Apostolic Fathers? What do you think of the idea that
Christianity is a nova lex? What was the prominent element in faith as
understood by the Apologists? How did they conceive of the forgiveness
of sins after baptism? What do you think of their conviction that such
Gentiles as Socrates and Plato were saved? Was their Logos doctrine that
of the Greeks and therefore a perversion of Christianity?

Literature: Scott, The Nicene Theology, pp. 160–178, 208–210, 219–229,

271–275; Moody, The Mind of the Early Converts, pp. 102–147;
McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought I, pp. 96–131; Harnack,
History of Dogma II, pp. 169–229; Cunningham, Historical Theology I,
pp. 134–139; Seeberg, History of Doctrine I, pp. 109–118; Loofs,
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 72–81; Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas
I, pp. 110–137; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 61–69.

V. The Anti-Gnostic Fathers

From the Apologists we naturally pass on to the anti-gnostic Fathers who

succeeded them. Three of these stand out with great prominence.

1. THE ANTI-GNOSTIC FATHERS. The first one that comes into

consideration here is Irenaeus. He was born in the East, where he became
a disciple of Polycarp, but spent the main part of his life in the West. At
first a presbyter, he afterwards became bishop of Lyons. He evinces a
practical Christian spirit in his writings, and represents a Johannine type
of Christian doctrine, though not without some traces of a more sensuous
conception. In his chief work, Against Heresies, he takes issue
particularly with Gnosticism. It is a work marked by ability, moderation,
and purity in its representation of Christianity.

The second of these Fathers is Hippolytus, who is said to lave been a

disciple of Irenaeus and greatly resembled his teacher in mental make-
up, being simple, moderate, and practical. Less gifted than Irenaeus, he
gave evidence of a greater fondness for philosophical ideas. After laboring
in the neighborhood of Rome, he seems to have suffered martyrdom in
that city. His principal work is entitled The Refutation of All Heresies. He
finds the root of all the perversions of doctrine in the speculations of the
philosophers.

The third and greatest of the famous trio was Tertullian, a man of
profound intellect and deep feeling, of a vivid imagination, and
distinguished by acuteness and great learning. As presbyter of Carthage
he represents the North African type of theology. Due to his violent
temper he was naturally passionate in his representation of Christianity
and somewhat given to extreme statements. As a lawyer he was familiar
with Roman law and introduced legal conceptions and legal phraseology
into theological discussions. Like Hippolytus he, too, was inclined to
deduce all heresy from the philosophy of the Greeks, and therefore
became a zealous opponent of philosophy. His native fervor reacted
strongly against the lax spirit of the age, and even induced him to
embrace Montanism in later life. Convinced of the futility of arguing with
heretics, he said it was best to meet them with a simple demurrer. He
influenced Western theology more than any of the others.

2. THEIR DOCTRINE OF GOD, MAN, AND THE HISTORY OF

REDEMPTION. They regarded the separation of the true God and the
Creator as the fundamental error of the Gnostics, as a blasphemous
conception suggested by the devil, and stressed the fact that there is but
one God, who is both Creator and Redeemer. He gave the law and also
revealed the Gospel. This God is triune, a single essence subsisting in
three persons. Tertullian was the first to assert the tri-personality of God
and to use the word "Trinity". In opposition to the Monarchians he
emphasized the fact that the three Persons are of one substance,
susceptible of number without division. Yet he did not reach the proper
trinitarian statement, since he conceived of one Person as subordinate to
the other.

In the doctrine of man they also opposed the Gnostics by stressing the
fact that good and evil in man do not find their explanation in different
natural endowments. If evil is inherent in matter, and therefore in man as
such, he can no more be regarded as a free moral being. Man was created
in the image of God, without immortality indeed (i. e. without
perfection), but with the possibility of receiving this in the way of
obedience. Sin is disobedience and brings death, just as obedience brings
immortality. In Adam the whole race became subject to death. The
connection of our sin with that of Adam is not yet clearly apprehended,
though Tertullian makes some suggestive statements on the subject. He
says that evil became, as it were, a natural element in man, present from
birth, and that this condition passes over through generation upon the
whole human race. This is the first trace of the doctrine of original sin.

Irenaeus has something special on the history of redemption. He says

that God expelled man from paradise and suffered him to die, in order
that the injury sustained might not remain forever. From the start God
was deeply concerned for the salvation of the race, and sought to win it by
three covenants. The law written in the heart of man represented the first
covenant. The patriarchs were righteous before God because they met its
requirements. When the knowledge of this law faded away, the decalogue
was given, representing the second covenant. On account of Israel's sinful
disposition the law of ceremonies was added, to prepare the people for
following Christ and for friendship with God. The Pharisees made it of
non-effect by robbing it of its chief content, namely, love. In the third
covenant Christ restored the original law, the law of love. This covenant is
related to the preceding as freedom to bondage, and requires faith, not
only in the Father, but also in the Son, who has now appeared. It is not,
like the preceding, limited to Israel, but is universal in its scope
Christians received a stricter law than the Jews and have more to believe,
but they also receive a greater measure of grace. To these three periods
Tertullian, while an adherent of Montanism, still added the era of the
Spirit.

3. THEIR DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON AND WORK OF

CHRIST. Irenaeus and Tertullian differ considerably in their doctrine of
the Person of Christ, and therefore it may be well to consider them
separately.

a. Irenaeus. The Christology of Irenaeus is superior to that of Tertullian

and Hippolytus and influenced the latter to a great extent. He is averse to
speculations about the Logos, because these lead at most to probable
guesses. He merely asserts that the Logos existed from all eternity and
was instrumental in revealing the Father; and then takes his real
startingpoint in the historically revealed Son of God. Through the
incarnation the Logos became the historical Jesus, and thereafter was at
once true God and true man. He rejects the heresy of the Gnostics that in
His suffering and death the passible Jesus was separated from the
impassible Christ, and attaches the greatest significance to the union of
God with human nature. In Christ as the second Adam the human race is
once more united to God. There is in Him a recapitulation of mankind,
which reaches backward as well as forward, and in which mankind
reverses the course on which it entered at the fall. This is the very core of
the Christological teaching of Irenaeus. The death of Christ as our
substitute is mentioned but not stressed. The central element in the work
of Christ is His obedience, whereby the disobedience of Adam is
cancelled.

b. Tertullian. Tertullian takes his startingpoint in the doctrine of the

Logos, but develops it in a way that became historically significant. He
stresses the fact that the Logos of the Christians is a real subsistence, an
independent Person, who was begotten by God and thus proceeded from
Him, not by emanation, but by self-projection, just as a root projects a
tree. There was a time when He was not. He emphasizes the fact that the
Logos is of the same substance with the Father, and yet differs from Him
in mode of existence as a distinct Person. He did not come into existence
by partitioning but by self-unfolding. The Father is the whole substance,
but the Son is only a part of it, because He is derived. Tertullian did not
entirely get away from the idea of subordination. His work is of lasting
significance in connection with the introduction of the conceptions of
substance and person into theology, ideas that were utilized in the
construction of the Nicene Creed. It may be said that he enlarged the
doctrine of the Logos into a doctrine of the Trinity. In opposition to the
Monarchian theory he stressed the fact that the three persons in the
Godhead are of one substance, susceptible of number without division.
Yet he did not succeed reaching the full trinitarian statement. He too
conceived of the Logos as originally impersonal reason in God, become
personal at the time of creation. And subordination of the one person to
the other is presented in the crude form of a greater and lesser
participation of the first and second persons in the divine substance.

Relative to the God-man and His two natures Tertullian expressed

himself very much as the School of Asia Minor did. He surpasses all the
other Fathers, except Melito, in doing justice to the full humanity of
Christ, and in his clear distinction of the two natures, each one retaining
its own attributes. According to him there is no fusion, but a conjunction
of the human and the divine in Christ. He is very emphatic on the
importance of the death of Christ, but is not entirely clear on this point,
since he does not stress the necessity of penal satisfaction, but only that
of penitence on the part of the sinner. While he does recognize a punitive
element in justice, he exalts the mercy of God. At the same time a certain
legalism pervades his teaching. He speaks of satisfaction made for sins
committed after baptism by repentance or confession. By fasting and
other forms of mortification the sinner is able to escape eternal
punishment.

Of the Antignostic Fathers Irenaeus gives the fullest description, of the

work of redemption, but his representation is not altogether consistent.
While he is regarded as one of the most orthodox of the early Church
Fathers, there are two lines of thought present in his writings which are
hardly Scriptural, the one moralistic and the other somewhat mystical.
According to the former man regains his destiny, when he voluntarily
chooses the good which he is still able to do. The real significance of
Christ's work lies in the fact that He brought the sure knowledge of God
and thus strengthened the freedom of man. According to the second
Christ recapitulates the whole human race in Himself, and thus
establishes a new relation between God and man and becomes the leaven
of a new life in humanity. The Logos identifies Himself with humanity in
His sufferings and death, and becoming instrumental in raising it to a
higher level by sanctifying and immortalizing it. He recapitulates in
Himself the whole human race and reverses the course which derives its
impetus from the fall of the first Adam. He communicates to it the leaven
of a new and immortal life. This may easily be, and has frequently been
interpreted as teaching atonement by a mystical process begun in the
incarnation and resulting in the deification of man. The emphasis on this
idea in the writings of Irenaeus may be due to the fact that he was
influenced by the Johannine writings more than by the Pauline Epistles.
It is quite evident, however, that Irenaeus did not mean to teach a purely
mystical or hyper-physical redemption. While he strongly emphasizes the
necessity of a living union of Christ with the subjects of his redemption—
something which Anselm failed to do—he associates this with other ideas,
such as that He rendered for us the obedience required by God, that He
suffered in our stead, paying our debt and propitiating the Father, and
that He redeemed us from the power of satan.

4. THEIR DOCTRINE OF SALVATION, OF THE CHURCH, AND

OF THE LAST THINGS. Irenaeus is not altogether clear in his
soteriology. He emphasizes the necessity of faith as a prerequisite for
baptism. This faith is not only an intellectual acceptance of the truth, but
also includes a self-surrender of the soul which issues in a holy life. By
baptism man is regenerated; his sins are washed away and a new life is
born within him. He evidently has no clear conception of the Pauline
doctrine of justification by faith, for his representation of the relation
between faith and justification is different. Faith necessarily leads on to
the observance of the commandments of Christ, and is therefore
sufficient to make a man righteous before God. The Spirit of God endows
the Christian with new life, and the fundamental characteristic of the new
life is that it brings forth the fruits of righteousness in good works

The work of Tertullian marks no particular advance in the doctrine of the

application of the work of Christ. Moralism again appears in the view that
the sinner by repentance earns for himself salvation in baptism. His
representation of the doctrine of penance is of special interest, however,
since he introduces legal terms here which were in later theology applied
to the redemptive work of Christ. He regards God as a Lawgiver and
Judge, who looks upon sin as transgression and guilt, and therefore
demands satisfaction, and in lieu of satisfaction inflicts punishment. Sins
committed after baptism require satisfaction by penance. If this is
rendered, the punishment is warded off. In this representation we find
the foundation for the Roman Catholic sacrament of penance. The legal
terms employed, such as "Judge", "guilt", "punishment", and
"satisfaction", were transferred to the work of Christ in the theology of
the Church.

In their teachings respecting the Church these Fathers reveal a tendency

to yield to Judaism in substituting the idea of an external community for
that of a spiritual fellowship. They sowed seeds which bore fruit in the
Cyprianic or Roman Catholic conception of the Church. They do indeed
still retain the idea that the Church is a spiritual community of believers,
but represent this as coinciding with an external fellowship. In fact, they
represent the visible organization as the channel of divine grace, and
make participation in the blessings of salvation dependent on
membership in the visible Church. They who separated themselves From
the external communion of the Church, which was of Apostolic origin and
had as its head the sedes apostolicae, thereby also renounced Christ. Due
to the influence of the Old Testament the idea of a special mediating
priesthood also came to the foreground.
The Antignostic Fathers in general championed the doctrine of the
resurrection of the flesh, and based it on the resurrection of Christ and on
the indwelling of the Spirit. The end will come when the devil has
succeeded in giving the entire apostate throng a new head in Antichrist.
Then Christ will appear, and the six thousand years of the world will be
followed by the first resurrection and the sabbatic rest of the millennium.
In Palestine believers will enjoy the riches of the land. After the
millennium there will be a new heavens and a new earth, and the blessed
will live in graded order in the mansions prepared for them.

Questions for Further Study: Do the Antignostic Fathers mark any

advance in the doctrine of God? How must the recapitulation idea in
Irenaeus Christology be understood? Does it agree with Schleiermacher's
mystical theory of the atonement? What other conceptions of the work of
Christ are found in his writings? Does his recapitulation theory reckon
with sin as individual guilt, and provide for individual redemption? Did
he believe in a deification of man? How are divine grace and human merit
related in his soteriology? At what point did he change the current
conception of the Church? What was his conception of the last things? In
what respect was Tertullian's doctrine of the Trinity defective? What was
characteristic of his Logos doctrine? What effect did Montanism have on
his views? What legal terms did he introduce into theology? Were they
applied to the work of Christ. Does the legal element constitute a
deterioration of the pure Gospel?

Literature: Scott, Nicene Theology, pp. 95–102, 178–184, 210–212, 230–

236, 281–286; Moody, The Mind of the Early Converts, pp. 204–237;
Cunningham, Historical Theology I, pp. 139–146, 158–163; Morgan, The
Importance of Tertullion in the Development of Christian Dogma;
Harnack, History of Dogma II, pp. 230–318; Seeberg, History of
Doctrines I, pp. 118–140; Loofs, Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 87–101;
McGiffert, History of Christian Thought I, pp. 132–148; Otten, Manual of
the History of Dogmas I, pp. 138–152, 160–169; Fisher, History of
Christian Doctrine, pp. 84–98.

VI. The Alexandrian Fathers

Just as in a former century Jewish religious learning and Hellenistic
philosophy combined to produce the type of thought represented by
Philo, so in the second and third centuries Hellenistic learning and the
truths of the Gospel were combined in a rather astonishing way to give
birth to the Alexandrian type of theology. The attempt was made by some
of the leading theologians to utilize the profoundest speculations of the
Gnostics in the construction of the Church's faith. In doing this they
resorted to the allegorical interpretation of the Bible. The truths of the
Christian religion were turned into a science couched in literary form.
The most important representatives of this form of Christian learning
were Clement of Alexandria and Origen.

1. THE ALEXANDRIAN FATHERS. Clement and Origen represent

the theology of the East, which was more speculative than that of the
West. Both were influential teachers of the school of the catechetes at
Alexandria. Clement was not an orthodox Christian in the same measure
as Irenaeus and Tertullian. He did not adhere to the Rule of Faith as
much as they did, but followed in the path of the Apologetes in seeking to
wed the philosophy of the day, as he understood it, to the Christian
tradition, and sometimes practically substituted the former for the latter.
In distinction from Tertullian he was friendly to philosophy, and insisted
on it that the Christian theologian should build a bridge between the
Gospel and Gentile learning, He found the sources of the knowledge of
divine things in Scripture and reason, exalted the latter unduly, and by
his allegorical interpretation opened wide the door for all kinds of human
speculation. His estimate of Greek philosophy is not altogether
consistent. Sometimes he ascribes it to a partial revelation, and
sometimes he stigmatizes it as plagarism from the Hebrew prophets.

Origen was born of Christian parents and received a Christian education.

He was a precocious child, and from early childhood practiced a rigorous
asceticism. He succeeded his teacher, Clement, as catechist at Alexandria.
To fit himself for the work he made a thorough study of Neo-Platonism,
which was then coming into favor, and of the leading heretical systems,
especially Gnosticism. His fame soon spread and large numbers attended
his lectures. He was the most learned and one of the profoundest thinkers
of the early Church. His teachings were of a very speculative nature, and
in later life he was condemned for heresy. He battled against the Gnostics
and also struck a decisive blow against Monarchianism. But this was all
incidental to his main purpose, that of constructing a systematic body of
Christian doctrine. His principal work, De Principiis, is the first example
of a positive and well-rounded system of theology. Part of his teachings
were afterwards declared heretical, but yet he had an enormous influence
on the development of doctrine. It seems that he desired to be an
orthodox Christian: he took his stand squarely on the Word of God and
on the Rule of faith as a standard of interpretation; and maintained that
nothing should be received that was contrary to Scripture or to a
legitimate deduction from Scripture. Yet his theology bore the earmarks
of Neo-Platonism, and his allegorical interpretation opened the way for
all kinds of speculation and arbitrary interpretation.

2. THEIR DOCTRINE OF GOD AND OF MAN. Like the Apologetes,

Origen speaks of God in absolute terms, as the incomprehensible,
inestimable, and impassible One, who is beyond want of anything; and
like the Antignostic Fathers, he rejects the Gnostic distinction between
the good God and the Demiurge or Creator of the world. God is One, the
same in the Old and in the New Testament. He ascribes absolute causality
to God, and since he can conceive of such attributes as omnipotence and
justice only as eternally in action, he teaches the doctrine of eternal
creation.

Clement of Alexandria is by no means clear in his representation of the

Logos. He stresses the personal subsistence of the Logos, His oneness
with the Father, and His eternal generation; but also represents Him as
the divine reason, and as subordinate to the Father. He distinguishes
between the real Logos of God and the Son-Logos who appeared in the
flesh. From the beginning the Logos mediates the divine revelation by
stamping divine wisdom on the work of creation, by imparting to men the
light of reason, by making special disclosures of the truth, and by His
incarnation in Jesus Christ. The light of the Logos serves the Gentiles as
stepping-stone to the fuller light of the Gospel. Origen says that the one
God is primarily the Father, but He reveals himself and works through
the Logos, who is personal and co-eternal with the Father, begotten of
Him by one eternal act. In connection with the generation of the Son
every idea of emanation and division is rejected. But though he
recognizes the full divinity of the Son, he uses some expressions that
point to subordination. While he speaks of eternal generation, he defines
the phrase in such a way as to teach not merely an economic but an
essential subordination of the Son to the Father. He sometimes calls the
Son Theos Deuteros. In the incarnation the Logos united himself with a
human soul, which in its pre-existence remained pure. The natures in
Christ are kept distinct, but it is held that the Logos by the His
resurrection and ascension deified His human nature.

Clement does not try to explain the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other
Persons of the Trinity, and Origen's view of the third Person is farther
removed from the Catholic doctrine than his conception of the Second
Person. He speaks of the Holy Spirit as the first creature made by the
Father through the Son. The Spirit's relation to the Father is not as close
as that of the Son. Moreover, the Spirit does not operate in creation as a
whole, but only in the saints. He possesses goodness by nature, renews
and sanctifies sinners, and is an object of divine worship.

Origen's teachings respecting man are somewhat out of the ordinary. The
pre-existence of man is involved in his theory of eternal creation, since
the original creation consisted exclusively of rational spirits, co-equal as
well as co-eternal. The present condition of man presupposes a pre-
existent fall from holiness into sin, which was the occasion for the
creation of the present material world. The fallen spirits now became
souls and were clothed with bodies. Matter was called into being for the
very purpose of supplying an abode and a means of discipline and
purgation for these fallen spirits.

3. THEIR DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON AND WORK OF

CHRIST. Both of these Fathers teach that in the incarnation the Logos
assumed human nature in its entirety, body and soul, and thus became a
real man, the God-man, though Clement did not entirely succeed in
avoiding Docetism. He says that Christ used food, not because He needed
it, but simply to guard against a denial of his humanity, and that he was
incapable of emotions of joy and grief. Origen maintains that the soul of
Christ pre-existed, like all other souls, and was even in its pre-existence
united, with the Logos. In fact, even before the incarnation a complete
interpenetration had taken place between the Logos and this soul. The
Logos-filled soul assumed a body, and then even this body was
penetrated and divinized by the Logos. There was such a mingling of the
divine and the human in Christ that by his glorification He became
virtually ubiquitous. Origen hardly succeeded in maintaining the integrity
of the natures in Christ.

There are different representations of the work of Christ, which are not
properly integrated. Clement speaks of the self-surrender of Christ as a
ransom, but does not stress the idea that He was a propitiation for the sin
of mankind. He places far greater emphasis on Christ as the Lawgiver and
Teacher, and as the way to immortality. Redemption does not so much
consist in undoing the past as in the elevation of man to a state even
higher than that of unfallen man. The dominant thought in Origen is that
Christ was physician, teacher, lawgiver, and example. He was a physician
for sinners, a teacher of those who had been purified, the lawgiver of his
people, requiring obedience to God and faith in Christ, and the perfect
example of a virtuous life for His followers. In all these capacities He
makes sinners, as much as possible, partakers of the divine nature. At the
same time Origen recognizes the fact that the salvation, of believers is
dependent on the sufferings and death of Christ. Christ delivers them
from the power of the devil, and does this by practicing deceit on Satan.
He offers Himself to Satan as a ransom, and Satan accepts the ransom
without realizing that he would not be able to retain his hold on Christ,
the Sinless One. The death of Christ is represented as vicarious, as an
offering for sin, and as a necessary atonement. The redemptive influence
of the Logos, extends beyond this life. Not only men who have lived on
earth and died, but all fallen spirits, not excluding Satan and his evil
angels, are brought under redemptive influences. There will be a
restitution of all things.

4. THEIR DOCTRINE OF SALVATION, OF THE CHURCH, AND

OF THE LAST THINGS. The Alexandrian Fathers recognize the free
will of man, which enables him to turn to the good and to accept the
salvation that is offered in Jesus Christ. God offers salvation, and man
has the power to accept it. But while Origen represents faith as an act of
man, he also speaks of it as an effect of divine grace. It is a necessary
preliminary step to salvation, and therefore salvation may be said to
depend on it. However, it is only an initial acceptance of God's revelation,
must be elevated to knowledge and understanding, and must lead on to
the performance of good works. Faith saves because it ever has works in
view. These are the really important things. Origen speaks of two ways of
salvation, one by faith (exoteric), and another by knowledge (esoteric).
These Fathers certainly did not have the Pauline conception of faith and
justification. Moreover, Origen stresses the fact that faith is not the only
condition of salvation. Repentance is even more necessary, Which
consists in the confession of our sins before God. He ascribes to it a more
inward, and less legal, character than the Western Fathers, and
particularly Tertullian.

Origen regards the Church as the congregation of believers, outside of

which there is no salvation. He discriminates between the Church
properly so called and the empirical Church. And while he recognizes all
believers as priests, he also speaks of a separate priesthood with special
prerogatives. Both he and Clement teach that baptism marks the
beginning of the new life in the Church, and includes the forgiveness of
sins. Clement distinguishes between a lower and a higher state of the
Christian life. In the former man attains to holiness under the influence
of fear and hope, while in the latter fear is cast out by perfect love. This is
the life of real knowledge that is enjoyed by him to whom the mysteries
are revealed. The eucharist bestows participation in immortality, for
through it the communicant enters into fellowship with Christ and the
divine Spirit. In Origen the sacraments are spiritualized. They are
symbols of divine influences, though they also represent gracious
operations of the Holy Spirit.

According to both Clement and Origen the process of purification, begun

in the life of the sinner on earth, is continued after death. Chastisement is
the great cleansing agency and cure for sin. Origen teaches that at death
the good enter paradise or a place where they receive further education,
and the wicked experience the fire of judgment which, however, is not to
be regarded as a permanent punishment, but as a means of purification.
Clement asserts that the heathen have an opportunity to repent in hades
and that their probation does not end until the day of judgment, while
Origen maintains that God's work of redemption will not cease until all
things are restored to their pristine beauty. The restoration of all things
will even include Satan and his demons. Only a few people enter upon the
full blessedness of the vision of God at once; the great majority of them
must pass through a process of purification after death. Both of these
Fathers were averse to the doctrine of a millennium, and Origen had a
tendency to spiritualize the resurrection. He seems to have regarded the
incorporeal as the ideal state, but did believe a bodily resurrection.
According to him a germ of the body remains and gives rise to a spiritual
organism, conformed to the nature of the particular soul to which it
belongs, whether it be good or evil.

Questions for Further Study: How did the theology of the East in general
differ from that of the West? How do you account for the difference?
What bearing did the allegorical interpretation of Scripture have on the
theology of the Alexandrian Fathers? Did the Logos doctrine of these
Fathers differ from that of the Apologists? If so, how? How does their
doctrine of the Trinity compare with that of Tertullian? Do they shed any
light on the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son? How do
they represent the main sources of sin and its chief remedy? Does Origen
have a self-consistent theory of the origin of sin? In what direction did
they develop the doctrine of free will? (cf. Scott, The Nicene Theology, p.
212). How do they conceive of the work of Christ? Do the sufferings of
Christ form an essential element in their teachings? In what sense do they
teach the deification of human nature? How does Origen's theology offer
points of contact for Arianism? How does his eschatology compare with
that of the Roman Catholic Church? Is Allen justified in considering
Greek rather than Latin theology as expressing the Christian faith? What
points of similarity may be noted between Greek theology and present
day Modernism?

Literature: Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology; Scott, The

Nicene Theology, pp. 188–194, 212–219, 236–251, 286–289; Moody, The
Mind of the Early Converts, pp. 258–301; Cunningham, Historical
Theology I, pp. 146–158; McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought I, pp.
177–231; Harnack, History of Dogma II, pp. 319–380; Seeberg, History of
Doctrines I, pp. 140–161; Loofs, Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 106–126;
Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine I, pp. 274–277, 288–305; II, pp. 3–
10, 31–36, 226–237, 395, 396; Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas I,
pp. 190–209; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, cf. Index; Fisher,
History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 94–97, 104–116.

VII. Monarchianism

While the great heresy of the second century was Gnosticism, the
outstanding heresy of the third century was Monarchianism. The Logos
doctrine of the Apologetes, the Antignostic Fathers, and the Alexandrian
Fathers did not give general satisfaction. Apparently many of the
common people regarded it with misgivings, since it seemed to impinge
on their theological or on their Christological interests. Where the
theological interest was uppermost, the doctrine of the Logos as a
separate divine Person appeared to endanger the unity of God or
monotheism; and where the Christological interest was in the foreground,
the idea that the Logos was subordinate to the Father seemed to
compromise the deity of Christ. In course of time men of learning took
notice of the misgivings of the people and attempted to safeguard, on the
one hand the unity of God, and on the other hand the deity of Christ. This
gave rise to two types of thought, both of which were called
Monarchianism (a name first applied to them by Tertullian), though
strictly speaking it could justly be applied only to that type in which the
theological interest was uppermost. In spite of its partial impropriety, the
name is generally used up to the present time as a designation of both
types.

1. DYNAMIC MONARCHIANISM. This is the type of Monarchianism that

was mainly interested in maintaining the unity of God, and was entirely
in line with the Ebionite heresy of the early Church and with present day
Unitarianism. Some find the earliest manifestation of it in the rather
obscure sect of the Alogi, but Seeberg questions the correctness of this. In
all probability its earliest representative was Theodotus of Byzantium,
who was excommunicated by Victor, the bishop of Rome. After that
Artemon, a Syrian by birth, tried to prove the peculiar views of this type
of Monarchianism from Scripture and tradition. His arguments were
effectively refuted, however, in the publication of an unknown author,
entitled the Little Labyrinth. The sect gradually dwindled away, but was
revived again through the efforts of the man who became its most noted
representative, Paul of Samosata, the bishop of Antioch, who is described
as a worldly-minded and imperious person. According to him the Logos
was indeed homoousios or consubstantial with the Father, but was not a
distinct Person in the Godhead. He could be identified with God, because
He existed in Him just as human reason exists in man. He was merely an
impersonal. power, present in all men, but particularly operative in the
man Jesus. By penetrating the humanity of Jesus progressively, as it did
that of no other man, this divine power gradually deified it. And because
the man Jesus was thus deified, He is worthy of divine honour, though
He cannot be regarded as God in the strict sense of the word. By this
construction of the doctrine of the Logos Paul of Samosata maintained
the unity of God as implying oneness of person as well as oneness of
nature, the Logos and the Holy Spirit being merely impersonal attributes
of the Godhead; and thus became the forerunner of the later Socinians
and Unitarians. Like them he was interested in the defense of the unity of
God and of the real humanity of Jesus. McGiffert asserts that the latter
was his primary interest.

2. MODALISTIC MONARCHIANISM. There was a second form of

Monarchianism which was far more influential. It was also interested in
maintaining the unity of God, but its primary interest seems to have been
Christological, namely, the maintenance of the full divinity of Christ. It
was called Modalistic Monarchianism, because it conceived of the three
Persons in the Godhead as so many modes in which God manifested
Himself; was known as Patripassianism in the West, since it held that the
Father Himself had become incarnate in Christ, and therefore also
suffered in and with Him; and was designated Sabellianism in the East
after the name of its most famous representative. The great difference
between it and Dynamic Monarchianism lay in the fact that it maintained
the true divinity of Christ.

Tertullian connects the origin of this sect with a certain Praxeas of whom
little is known, while Hyppolytus claims that it originated in the teachings
of Noëtus of Smyrna. However this may be, both were evidently
instrumental in propagating it. Praxeas was absolutely inimical to
personal distinctions in God. Tertullian says of him: "He drove out the
Paraclete and crucified the Father." Praxeas, however, seems to have
avoided the assertion that the Father suffered, but Noëtus did not
hesitate at this point. To quote the words of Hippolytus: "He said that
Christ is Himself the Father, and that the Father Himself was born and
suffered and died." According to the same Church Father he even made
the bold assertion that the Father by changing the mode of his being
literally became His own Son. The statement of Noëtus referred to runs as
follows: "When the Father had not yet been born, He was rightly called
the Father; but when it pleased Him to submit to birth, having been born,
He became the Son, He of Himself and not of another."

The most important representative of this sect was Sabellius. Since only a
few fragments of his writings are extant, it is hard to determine in detail
just what he taught. It is perfectly clear, however, that he distinguished
between the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of its
manifestations, which are represented as following one another like the
parts of a drama. Sabellius indeed sometimes spoke of three divine
persons, but then used the word "person" in the original sense of the
word, in which it signifies a role of acting or a mode of manifestation.
According to him the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are simply
designations of three different phases under which the one divine essence
manifests itself. God reveals Himself as Father in creation and in the
giving of the law, as Son in the incarnation, and as Holy Spirit in
regeneration and sanctification.

Questions for Further Study: What accounts for the rise of

Monarchianism? In what countries did it make its appearance? Is it
correct to say with McGiffert that Monarchianism was only moderately, if
at all, concerned about the unity of God; and that its main interest was
Christological? To what other early heresies was dynamic Monarchianism
related? Has it any modern counterpart? What did the two types of
Monarchianism have in common? Has Sabellianism any modern
counterpart? What Fathers combatted this type of heresy? Was the
position of the Alogi in any way related to this heresy? Is Harnack's
sympathy with Monarchianism justified?
Literature: Scott, The Nicene Theology, pp. 89, 184–188, 275–280;
Faulkner, Crises in the Early Church, pp. 76–96; McGiffert, History of
Christian Thought I, pp. 232–245; Harnack, History of Dogma III, pp.
14–118; Seeberg, History of Doctrines I, pp.162–168; Loofs,
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 112–126; Neander, History of Christian
Dogmas I, pp. 164–171; Orr, The Progress of Dogma, pp. 91–102; Otten,
Manual of the History of Dogmas I, pp. 153–156; Fisher, History of
Christian Doctrine, pp. 98–104.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

I. The Trinitarian Controversy

1. THE BACKGROUND

The trinitarian controversy, which came to a head in the struggle between

Arius and Athanasius, had its roots in the past. The early Church Fathers,
as we have seen, had no clear conception of the Trinity. Some of them
conceived of the Logos as impersonal reason, become personal at the
time of creation, while others regarded Him as personal and co-eternal
with the Father, sharing the divine essence, and yet ascribed to Him a
certain subordination to the Father. The Holy Spirit occupied no
important place in their discussions at all. They spoke of Him primarily
in connection with the work of redemption as applied to the hearts and
lives of believers. Some considered Him to be subordinate, not only to the
Father, but also to the Son. Tertullian was the first to assert clearly the
tri-personality of God, and to maintain the substantial unity of the three
Persons. But even he did not reach a clear statement of the doctrine of the
Trinity.

Meanwhile Monarchianism came along with its emphasis on the unity of

God and on the true deity of Christ, involving a denial of the Trinity in the
proper sense of the word. Tertullian and Hippolytus combatted their
views in the West, while Origen struck them a decisive blow in the East.
They defended the trinitarian position as it is expressed in the Apostles'
Creed. But even Origen's construction of the doctrine of the Trinity was
not altogether satisfactory. He firmly held the view that both the Father
and the Son are divine hypostases or personal subsistences, but did not
entirely succeed in giving a scriptural representation of the relation of the
three Persons to the one essence in the Godhead. While he was the first to
explain the relation of the Father to the Son by employing the idea of
eternal generation the defined this so as to involve the subordination of
the Second Person to the First in respect to essence. The Father
communicated to the Son only a secondary species of divinity, which may
be called Theos, but not Ho Theos. He sometimes even speaks of the Son
as Theos Deuteros. This was the most radical defect in Origen's doctrine
of the Trinity and afforded a steppingstone for Arius. Another, less fatal,
defect is found in his contention that the generation of the Son is not a
necessary act of the Father, but proceeds from His sovereign will. He was
careful, however, not to bring in the idea of temporal succession. In his
doctrine of the Holy Spirit he departed still farther from the
representation of Scripture. He not only made the Holy Spirit
subordinate even to the Son, but also numbered Him among the things
created by the Son. One of his statements even seems to imply that He
was a mere creature.

2. THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY

a. Arius and Arianism. The great trinitarian strife is usually called the
Arian controversy, because it was occasioned by the anti-trinitarian views
of Arius, a presbyter of Alexandria, a rather skilful disputant, though not
a profound spirit. His dominant idea was the monotheistic principle of
the Monarchians, that there is only one unbegotten God, one
unoriginated Being, without any beginning of existence. He distinguished
between the Logos that is immanent in God, which is simply a divine
energy, and the Son or Logos that finally became incarnate. The latter
had a beginning: He was generated by the Father, which in the parlance
of Arius was simply equivalent to saying that He was created. He was
created out of nothing before the world was called into being, and for that
very reason was not eternal nor of the divine essence. The greatest and
first of all created beings, He was brought into being that through Him
the world might be created. He is therefore also mutable, but is chosen of
God on account of his foreseen merits, and is called the Son of God in
view of His future glory. And in virtue of His adoption as Son He is
entitled to the veneration of men. Arius sought Scripture support for his
view in those passages which seem to represent the Son as inferior to the
Father, such as, Prov. 8:22 (Sept.), Matt. 28:18; Mark 13:32; Luke 18:19;
John 5:19; 14:28; 1 Cor. 15:28.

b. The Opposition to Arianism. Arius was opposed first of all by his own
bishop, Alexander, who contended for the true and proper deity of the
Son, and at the same time maintained the doctrine of an eternal sonship
by generation. In course of time, however, his real opponent proved to be
the arch-deacon of Alexandria, the great Athanasius, who stands out on
the pages of history as a strong, inflexible, and unwavering champion of
the truth. Seeberg ascribes his great strength to three things, namely, (1)
the great stability and genuineness of his character; (2) the sure
foundation on which he stood in his firm grasp on the conception of the
unity of God, which preserved him from the subordinationism that was so
common in his day; and (3) the unerring tact with which he taught men
to recognize the nature and significance of the Person of Christ. He felt
that to regard Christ as a creature was to deny that faith in Him brings
man into saving union with God.

He strongly emphasized the unity of God, and insisted on a construction

of the doctrine of the Trinity that would not endanger this unity. While
the Father and the Son are of the same divine essence, there is no division
or separation in the essential Being of God, and it is wrong to speak of a
Theos Deuteros, But while stressing the unity of God, he also recognized
three distinct hypostases in God. He refused to believe in the pre-
temporally created Son of the Arians, and maintained the independent
and eternally personal existence of the Son. At the same time he bore in
mind that the three hypostases in God were not to be regarded as
separated in any way, since this would lead to polytheism. According to
him the unity of God as well as the distinctions in His Being are best
expressed in the term "oneness of essence." This clearly and
unequivocally expresses the idea that the Son is of the same substance as
the Father, but also implies that the two may differ in other respects, as,
for instance, in personal subsistence. Like Origen he taught that the Son
is begotten by generation, but in distinction from the former he described
this generation as an internal and therefore necessary and eternal act of
God, and not as an act that was simply dependent on His sovereign will.

It was not merely the demand of logical consistency that inspired

Athanasius and determined his theological views. The controlling factor
in his construction of the truth was of a religious nature. His
soteriological convictions naturally gave birth to his theological tenets.
His fundamental position was that union with God is necessary unto
salvation, and that no creature but only one who is Himself God can unite
us with God. Hence, as Seeberg says, "Only if Christ is God, in the full
sense of the word and without qualification, has God entered humanity,
and only then have fellowship with God, the forgiveness of sins, the truth
of God, and immortality been certainly brought to man." Hist. of Doct. I,
p. 211.

3. THE COUNCIL OF NICEA. The Council of Nicea convened in 325 A. D.

to settle the dispute. The issue was clear-cut, as a brief statement will
show. The Arians rejected the idea of a timeless or eternal generation,
while Athanasius reasserted this. The Arians said that the Son was
created from the non-existent, while Athanasius maintained that He was
generated from the essence of the Father. The Arians held that the Son
was not of the same substance as the Father, while Athansius affirmed
that he was homoousios with the Father.

Besides the contending parties there was a great middle party, which
really constituted the majority, under the leadership of the Church
historian, Eusebius of Caesarea, and which is also known as the
Originistic party, since it found its impetus in the principles of Origen.
This party had Arian leanings and was opposed to the doctrine that the
Son is of the same substance with the Father (homoousios). It proposed a
statement, previously drawn up by Eusebius, which conceded everything
to the party of Alexander and Athanasius, with the single exception of the
above named doctrine; and suggested that the word homoiousios be
substituted for homoousios, so as to teach that the Son is of similar
substance with the Father. After considerable debate the emperor finally
threw the weight of his authority into the balance and thus secured the
victory for the party of Athanasius. The Council adopted the following
statement on the point in question: "We believe in one God, the Father
Almighty, Maker of things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus
Christ, begotten not made, being of one substance (homoousios) with the
Father", et cetera. This was an unequivocal statement. The term
homoousios could not be twisted to mean anything else than that the
essence of the Son is identical with that of the Father. It placed Him on a
level with the Father as an uncreated Being and recognized Him as
autotheos.

4. THE AFTERMATH

a. Unsatisfactory Nature of the Decision. The decision of the Council did

not terminate the controversy, but was rather only the beginning of it. A
settlement forced upon the Church by the strong hand of the emperor
could not satisfy and was also of uncertain duration. It made the
determination of the Christian faith dependent on imperial caprice and
even on court intrigues. Athanasius himself, though victorious, was
dissatisfied with such a method of settling ecclesiastical disputes. He
would rather have convinced the opposing party by the strength of his
arguments. The sequel clearly proved that, as it was, a change in emperor,
an altered mood, or even a bribe, might alter the whole aspect of the
controversy. The party in the ascendancy might all at once suffer eclipse.
This is exactly what happened repeatedly in subsequent history.

b. Temporary Ascendancy of Semi-Arianism in the Eastern Church. The

great central figure in the Post-Nicene trinitarian controversy was
Athanasius. He was by far the greatest man of the age, an acute scholar, a
strong character, and a man that had the courage of his convictions and
was ready to suffer for the truth. The Church gradually became partly
Arian, but predominantly Semi-Arian, and the emperors usually sided
with the majority, so that it was said: "Unus Athanasius contra orbem"
(one Athanasius against the world). Five times this worthy servant of God
was driven into exile and succeeded in office by unworthy sycophants,
who were a disgrace to the Church.

The opposition to the Nicene Creed was divided into different parties.
Says Cunningham: "The more bold and honest Arians said that the Son
was heteroousios, of a different substance from the Father; others said
that He was anomoios, unlike the Father; and some, who were usually
reckoned Semi-Arians, admitted that He was homoiousios, of like
substance with the Father; but they all unanimously refused to admit the
Nicene phraseology, because they were opposed to the Nicene doctrine of
the true and proper divinity of the Son and saw and felt that the
phraseology accurately and unequivocally expressed it, though they
sometimes preferred to adduce other objections against the use of it."
Historical Theology I, p. 290. Semi-Arianism prevailed in the eastern
section of the Church. The West, however, took a different view of the
matter, and was loyal to the Council of Nicea. This finds its explanation
primarily in the fact that, while the East was dominated by the
subordinationism of Origen, the West was largely influenced by
Tertullian and developed a type of theology that was more in harmony
with the views of Athanasius. In addition to that, however, the rivalry
between Rome and Constantinople must also be taken into account.
When Athanasius was banished from the East, he was received with open
arms in the West; and the Councils of Rome (341) and Sardica (343)
unconditionally endorsed his doctrine.

His cause in the West was weakened, however, by the accession of

Marcellus of Ancyra to the ranks of the champions of the Nicene theology.
He fell back on the old distinction between the eternal and impersonal
Logos immanent in God, which revealed itself as divine energy in the
work of creation, and the Logos become personal at the incarnation;
denied that the term "generation" could be applied to the pre-existent
Logos, and therefore restricted the name "Son of God" to the incarnate
Logos; and held that, at the end of his incarnate life, the Logos returned
to his premundane relation to the Father. His theory apparently justified
the Originists or Eusebians in bringing the charge of Sabellianism against
their opponents, and was thus instrumental in widening the breach
between the East and the West.

Various efforts were made to heal the breach. Councils convened at

Antioch which accepted the Nicene definitions, though with two
important exceptions. They asserted the homoiousion, and the
generation of the Son by an act of the Father's will. This, of course, could
not satisfy the West. Other Synods and Councils followed, in which the
Eusebians vainly sought a western recognition of the deposition of
Athanasius, and drew up other Creeds of a mediating type. But it was all
in vain until Constantius became sole emperor, and by cunning
management and force succeeded in bringing the western bishops into
line with the Eusebians at the Synods of Arles and Milan (355).

c. The Turning of the Tide. Victory again proved a dangerous thing for a
bad cause. It was, in fact, the signal for the disruption of the anti-Nicene
party. The heterogeneous elements of which it was composed were united
in their opposition to the Nicene party. But as soon as it was relieved of
external pressure, its lack of internal unity became ever increasingly
evident. The Arians and the Semi-Arians did not agree, and the latter
themselves did not form a unity. At the Council of Sirmium (357) an
attempt was made to unite all parties by setting aside the use of such
terms as ousia, homoousios, and homoiousios, as pertaining to matters
far beyond human knowledge. But things had gone too far for any such
settlement. The real Arians now showed their true colours, and thus
drove the most conservative Semi-Arians into the Nicene camp.

Meanwhile a younger Nicene party arose, composed of men who were

disciples of the Originist School, but were indebted to Athanasius and the
Nicene Creed for a more perfect interpretation of the truth. Chief among
them were the three Cappadocians, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa,
and Gregory of Nazianze. They saw a source of misunderstanding in the
use of the term hypostasis as synonymous with both ousia (essence) and
prosopon (person), and therefore restricted its use to the designation of
the personal subsistence of the Father and the Son. Instead of taking their
startingpoint in the one divine ousia of God, as Athanasius had done, they
took their point of departure in the three hypostases (persons) in the
divine Being, and attempted to bring these under the conception of the
divine ousia. The Gregories compared the relation of the Persons in the
Godhead to the divine Being with the relation of three men to their
common humanity. And it was exactly by their emphasis on the three
hypostases in the divine Being that they freed the Nicene doctrine from
the taints of Sabellianism in the eyes of the Eusebians, and that the
personality of the Logos appeared to be sufficiently safeguarded. At the
same time they strenuously maintained the unity of the three Persons in
the Godhead and illustrated this in various ways.

d. The Dispute about the Holy Spirit. Up to this time the Holy Spirit had
not come in for a great deal of consideration, though discordant opinions
had been expressed on the subject. Arius held that the Holy Spirit was the
first created being produced by the Son, an opinion very much in
harmony with that of Origen. Athanasius asserted that the Holy Spirit
was of the same essence with the Father, but the Nicene Creed contains
only the indefinite statement, "And (I believe) in the Holy Spirit." The
Cappadocians followed in the footsteps of Athanasius and vigorously
maintained the homoousis of the Holy Spirit. Hilary of Poitiers in the
West held that the Holy Spirit, as searching the deep things of God, could
not be foreign to the divine essence. An entirely different opinion was
voiced by Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, who declared that the
Holy Spirit was a creature subordinate to the Son; but his opinion was
generally considered as heretical, and his followers were nicknamed
Pneumatomachians (from pneuma, spirit, and machomai, to speak evil
against). When in 381 A. D. the general Council of Constantinople met, it
declared its approval of the Nicene Creed and under the guidance of
Gregory of Nazianza accepted the following formula respecting the Holy
Spirit: "And we believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Life-giving, who
proceeds from the Father, who is to be glorified with the Father and the
Son, and who speaks through the prophets."

e. Completion of the Doctrine of the Trinity. The statement of the Council

of Constantinople proved unsatisfactory in two points: (1) the word
homoousios was not used, so that the consubstantiality of the Spirit with
the Father was not directly asserted; and (2) the relation of the Holy
Spirit to the other two Persons was not defined. The statement is made
that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, while it is neither denied
nor affirmed that He also proceeds from the Son. There was no entire
unanimity on this point. To say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the
Father only, looked like a denial of the essential oneness of the Son with
the Father; and to say that He also proceeds from the Son, seemed to
place the Holy Spirit in a more dependent position than the Son and to be
an infringement on His deity. Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa,
asserted the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, without
opposing in any way the doctrine that He also proceeds from the Son. But
Epiphanius and Marcellus of Ancyra positively asserted this doctrine.

Western theologians generally held to the procession of the Holy Spirit

from both the Father and the Son; and at the Synod of Toledo in 589 A.
D. the famous "fileoque" was added to the Constantinopolitan Symbol. In
the East the final formulation of the doctrine was given by John of
Damascus. According to him there is but one divine essence, but three
persons or hypothases. These are to be regarded as realities in the divine
Being, but not related to one another as three men are. They are one in
every respect, except in their mode of existence. The Father is
characterized by "non generation", the Son by "generation", and the Holy
Spirit by "procession." The relation of the Persons to one another is
described as one of "mutual interpenetration" (circumincession), without
commingling. Notwithstanding his absolute rejection of
subordinationism, John of Damascus still spoke of the Father as the
source of the Godhead, and represents the spirit as processing from the
Father through the Logos. This is still a relic of Greek subordinationism.
The East never adopted the "fileoque" of the Synod of Toledo. It was the
rock on which the East and the West split.

The western conception of the Trinity reached its final statement in the
great work of Augustine, De Trinitate. He too stresses the unity of essence
and the Trinity of Persons. Each one of the three Persons possesses the
entire essence, and is in so far identical with the essence and with each
one of the other Persons. They are not like three human persons, each
one of which possesses only a part of generic human nature. Moreover,
the one is never and can never be without the other; the relation of
dependence between them is a mutual one. The divine essence belongs to
each of them under a different point of view, as generating, generated, or
existing through inspiration. Between the three hypostases there is a
relation of mutual interpenetration and interdwelling. The word "person"
does not satisfy Augustine as a designation of the relationship in which
the three stand to one another; still he continues to use it, as he says, "not
in order to express it (the relationship), but in order not to be silent."
With this conception of the Trinity the Holy Spirit is naturally regarded
as proceeding, not only from the Father, but also from the Son.
Questions for Further Study: What different views of the Logos and of His
relation to the Father were prevalent before the Council of Nicea? How
did Origen's doctrine of the Trinity compare with that of Tertullian? In
what points was his doctrine defective? What conception did Arius have
of God? How did his view of Christ follow from this? To what passages of
Scripture did he appeal? What was the real point at issue at the Council of
Nicea? What was Athansius' real interest in the matter? How did he
conceive of man's redemption? Why was it essential that the term
homoousion rather than homoiousion should be used? Why were the
Semi-Arians so opposed to its use? How could they detect Saballianism in
it? What valuable contribution did the Cappadocians make to the
discussion? How must we judge of the anathema at the end of the Nicene
Creed? How was the question of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the
other Persons settled in the West and how in the East? Why was the East
unalterably opposed to the famous "fileoque"? Does the final statement of
the doctrine of the Trinity by John of Damascus differ much from that by
Augustine?

Literature: Bull, Defense of the Nicene Faith; Scott, The Nicene Theology,
pp. 213–384; Faulkner, Crises in the Early Church, pp. 113–144;
Cunningham, Historical Theology I, pp. 267–306; McGiffert, A History of
Christian Thought I, pp. 246–275; Harnack, History of Dogma III, pp.
132–162; Seeberg, History of Doctrines I, pp. 201–241; Loofs,
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 140–157; Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine
I, pp. 306–375; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte I, pp. 198–262; Neander,
History of Christian Dogmas I, pp. 285–316; Sheldon, History of
Christian Doctrine I, pp. 194–215; Orr, Progress of Dogma, pp. 105–131.

II. The Doctrine of the Trinity in Later Theology

1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN LATIN THEOLOGY

Later theology did not add materially to the doctrine of the Trinity. There
were deviations from, and consequent restatements of the truth.
Roscelinus applied the Nominalist theory that universals are merely
subjective conceptions to the Trinity, and thus sought to avoid the
difficulty of combining the numerical unity with the distinction of
persons in God. He regarded the three Persons in the Godhead as three
essentially different individuals, which could be said to be one generically
and in name only. Their unity is merely a unity of will and power. Anselm
correctly pointed out that this position logically leads to Tritheism, and
stressed the fact that universal conceptions present truth and reality.

If Roscelinus gave a Nominalistic interpretation of the doctrine of the

Trinity, Gilbert of Poitiers interpreted it from the point of view of a
moderate Realism of the Aristotelian type, which holds that the
universals have their existence in the particulars. He distinguished
between the divine essence and God and compared their relation to that
between humanity and concrete men. The divine essence is not God, but
the form of God, or that which makes Him to be God. This essence or
form (latin forma, i. e. that which makes a thing what it is) is common to
the three Persons and in that respect they are one. As a result of this
distinction he was charged with teaching Tetratheism.

Abelard spoke of the doctrine of the Trinity in a way that caused him to
be charged with Sabellianism. He seemingly identifies the three Persons
in the divine Being with the attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness.
The name of Father stands for power, that of Son for wisdom, and that of
Holy Spirit for goodness. While he also uses expressions which seem to
imply that he distinctions in the Godhead are real personal distinctions,
he employs illustrations that clearly point in the direction of Modalism.

In Thomas Aquinas we find the usual representation, of the doctrine of

the Trinity, and this was the prevailing view of the Church at the time.

2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE PERIOD OF THE

REFORMATION. Calvin discusses the doctrine of the Trinity at length in
his Institutes I. 13, and defends the doctrine as formulated by the early
Church. On the whole he preferred not to go beyond the simple
statements of Scripture on the matter, and therefore during his first stay
at Geneva even avoided the use of the terms "person" and "trinity". In his
Institutes, however, he defends the use of these terms and criticizes those
who are averse to them. Caroli brought a charge of Arianism against him,
which proved to be utterly baseless. Calvin held to the absolute equality
of the Persons in the Godhead, and even maintained the self-existence of
the Son, thereby implying that it is not the essence of the Son, but His
personal subsistence that is generated. He says "that the essence of both
the Son and the Spirit is un-begotten", and "that the Son, as God,
independently of the consideration of person, is self-existent; but as the
Son, we say, that He is of the Father. Thus His essence is unoriginated;
but the origin of His person is God Himself." Institutes I. 13, 25. It is
sometimes said that Calvin denied the eternal generation of the Son. This
assertion is based on the following passage: "For what is the profit of
disputing whether the Father always generates, seeing that it is foolish to
imagine a continuous act of generating when it is evident that three
persons have subsisted in God from eternity." Institutes XIII. 29. But this
statement can hardly be intended as a denial of the eternal generation of
the Son, since he teaches this explicitly in other passages. It is more likely
that it is simply an expression of disagreement with the Nicene
speculation about eternal generation as a perpetual movement, always
complete, and yet never completed. Says Warfield: "Calvin seems to have
found this conception difficult, if not meaningless." Calvin and Calvinism,
p. 247 f. The doctrine of the Trinity, as formulated by the Church, finds
expression in all Reformed Confessions, most completely and with the
greatest precision in chapter III of the Second Helvetic Confession.

In the sixteenth century the Socinians declared the doctrine of three

Persons possessing a common essence, to be contrary to reason, and
attempted to refute it on the basis of the passages quoted by the Arians,
cf. above p. 89. But they even went beyond the Arians in denying the pre-
existence of the Son and holding that Christ, as to His essential nature,
was simply a man, though He possessed a peculiar fulness of the Spirit,
had special knowledge of God, and since His ascension received
dominion over all things. They defined the Holy Spirit as "a virtue or
energy flowing from God to men." In their conception of God they were
the forerunners of the present day Unitarians and Modernists.

In some quarters subordinationism again came to the foreground. Some

of the Arminians (Episcopius, Curcellaeus, and Limborch), while
believing that all three Persons shared in the divine nature, yet ascribed a
certain preeminence to the Father over the other Persons in order,
dignity, and power or domination. In their estimation belief in the
equality of rank was almost sure to lead to Tritheism.

3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AFTER THE PERIOD OF

REFORMATION

In England Samuel Clarke, court preacher to queen Anne, published a

work on the Trinity in 1712, in which he approached the Arian view of
subordination. He speaks of the Father as the supreme and only God, the
sole origin of all being, power, and authority. Alongside of Him there
existed from the beginning a second divine Person called the Son, who
derives His being and all His attributes from the Father, not by a mere
necessity of nature, but by an act of the Father's optional will. He refuses
to commit himself on the question, whether the Son was begotten from
the essence of the Father, or was made out of nothing; and whether He
existed from all eternity or only before all worlds. Alongside of these two
there is a third Person, who derives His essence from the Father through
the Son. He is subordinate to the Son both by nature and by the will of
the Father.

Some of the New England theologians criticized the doctrine of eternal

generation. Emmons even called it eternal nonsense, and Moses Stuart
declared that the expression was a palpable contradiction of language,
and that their most distinguished theologians, for forty years past, had
declared against it. He himself disliked it, because he regarded it as
contrary to the proper equality of the Father and the Son. The following
words seem to express his view: "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are words
which designate the distinctions of the Godhead as manifested to us in
the economy of redemption, and are not intended to mark the eternal
relations of the Godhead as they are in themselves."

Sabellian interpretations of the Trinity are found in Emanuel

Swedenborg, who denied the essential Trinity and said that what we call
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is simply a distinction in the eternal God-
man, assuming human flesh in the Son, and operating through the Holy
Spirit; in Schleiermacher, who says that God in Himself as the unknown
unity underlying all things is the Father, God as coming into conscious
personality in man, and especially in Jesus Christ, is the Son, and God as
the life of the risen Christ in the Church, is the Holy Spirit; and in Hegel,
Dorner, and others who adopt a somewhat similar view. In Ritschl and in
many Modernists of the present day the view of Paul of Samosata
reappears.

Questions for Further Study: In what sense did the Scholastics regard the
doctrine of the Trinity as a mystery? Why did Roscelinus deny the
numerical unity of essence in God? How did the Church judge of his
teaching? Why was Gilbert of Poitiers charged with Tetratheism? What
was the nature of Abelard's Sabellianism? What was the attitude of the
Church to his teaching? What was the generally accepted definition of a
person in the Trinity, as given by Boethius? What criticisms were leveled
against it? Did the Scholastics regard the divine essence of the Son or his
personal subsistence as the object of generation? How did they
distinguish between the generation of the Son and the procession of the
Holy Spirit? What relation did they express by the term 'circumincessio'?
How did Calvin define a person in the Trinity? How did he conceive of the
generation of the Son? Where do we find the doctrine of the Trinity
developed along Arian lines? Where along Sabellian lines? And where
along the line of a purely economical Trinity?

Literature: Seeberg, History of Doctrine II, cf. Index; Otten, Manual of

the History of Dogmas II, pp. 84–99; Sheldon, History of Christian
Doctrine I, pp. 337–339; II, pp. 96–103, 311–318; Cunningham,
Historical Theology II, pp. 194–213; Fisher, History of Christian
Doctrine, cf. Index.
 THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST
I. The Christological Controversies

The Christological problem can be approached from the side of theology

proper and from the side of soteriology. Though the early Church Fathers
did not lose sight of the soteriological bearings of the doctrine of Christ,
they did not make these prominent in their main discussions. Breathing
the air of the trinitarian controversies, it was but natural that they should
approach the study of Christ from the side of theology proper. The
decision to which the trinitarian controversy led, namely, that Christ as
the Son of God is consubstantial With the Father and therefore very God,
immediately gave birth to the question of the relation between the divine
and the human nature in Christ.

The early Christological controversies do not present a very edifying

spectacle The passions were too much in evidence, unworthy intrigues
often played and important part, and even violence occasionally made its
appearance. It might seem that such an atmosphere could only be
productive of error, and yet these controversies led to a formulation of
the doctrine of the Person of Christ that is still regarded as standard in
the present day. The Holy Spirit was guiding the Church, often through
shame and confusion, into the clear atmosphere of the truth. Some claim
that the Church attempted too much when it tried to define a mystery
which from the nature of the case transcends all definition. It should be
borne in mind, however, that the early Church did not claim to be able to
penetrate to the depths of this great doctrine, and did not pretend to give
a solution of the problem of the incarnation in the formula of Chalcedon.
It merely sought to guard the truth against the errors of the theorizers,
and to give a formulation of it which would ward off various, palpably
unscriptural, constructions of the truth.

The Church was in quest of a conception of Christ that would do justice to

the following points: (a) His true and proper deity; (b) His true and
proper humanity; (c) the union of deity and humanity in one person; and
(d) the proper distinction of deity from humanity in the one person. It felt
that as long as these requirements were not met, or only partly met, its
conception of Christ would be defective. All the Christological heresies
that arose in the early Church originated in the failure to combine all
these elements in the doctrinal statement of the truth. Some denied
wholly or in part the true and proper deity of Christ, and others disputed
wholly or in part His true and proper humanity. Some stressed the unity
of the person at the expense of the two distinct natures, and others
emphasized the distinct character of the two natures in Christ at the
expense of the unity of the Person.

1. FIRST STAGE OF THE CONTROVERSY

a. The Background. This controversy also had its roots in the past.
Ebionites, Alogi, and Dynamic Monarchians denied the deity of Christ,
and Docetae, Gnostics, and Modalists rejected. His humanity. They
simply ruled out one of the terms of the problem. Others were less radical
and denied either the full deity or the perfect humanity of Christ. The
Arians denied that the Son-Logos, who become incarnate in Christ, was
possessed of absolute Godhead. And on the other hand Apollinaris,
bishop of Laodicea (d. 312), denied the true and proper humanity of
Jesus Christ. He conceived of man as consisting of body, soul, and spirit,
and sought the solution of the problem of the two natures in Christ in the
theory that the Logos took the place of the human pneuma (spirit). In his
opinion it would be easier to maintain the unity of the Person of Christ, if
the Logos were simply regarded as taking the place of the higher rational
principle in man. Over against Arius he defended the true divinity of
Christ, and sought to safeguard His sinlessness by substituting the Logos
for the human pneuma, which he regarded as the seat of sin. According to
him a complete human nature would naturally involve sinfulness.
Moreover, he tried to make the incarnation intelligible by assuming an
eternal tendency to the human in the Logos Himself as the archetypal
man. But the solution of Apollinaris could not satisfy, because, as Shedd
says, "if the rational part be subtracted from man, he becomes either an
idiot or a brute." His purpose was praiseworthy, however, in that he
sought to safeguard both the unity of the Person and the sinlessness of
Christ.

There was considerable opposition to the solution of the problem offered

by Apollinaris. The three Cappadocians and Hilary of Poitiers maintained
that, if the Logos did not assume human nature in its integrity, He could
not be our perfect Redeemer. Since the whole sinner had to be renewed,
Christ had to assume human nature in its entirety, and not simply the
least important parts of it. They also pointed to a docetic element in the
teachings of Apollinaris. If there was no real human will in Christ, there
could be no real probation and no real advance in His manhood. Even the
opponents of Apollinaris, however, while stressing the complete
humanity of Christ, conceived of this as overshadowed by His divinity.
Gregory of Nyssa even says that the flesh of Christ was transformed and
lost all its original properties by union with the divine.

One result of this preliminatry skirmish was that the Synod of Alexandria
in 362 asserted the existence of a human soul in Christ. The word "soul"
was used by the Synod as inclusive of the rational element, which
Apollinaris called pneuma or nous.

b. The Parties to the Controversy

(1) The Nestorian Party. Some of the early Church Fathers used
expressions which seemingly denied the existence of two natures in
Christ, and postulated a single nature, "the incarnate and adorable
Word." From this point of view Mary was often called theotokos, mother
of God. It was particularly the School of Alexandria that revealed this
tendency. On the other hand the School of Antioch went to the other
extreme. This appears especially in the teachings of Theodore of
Mopsuestia. He took his startingpoint in the complete manhood of christ
and the perfect reality of His human experiences. According to him Christ
actually struggled with human passions, passed through a veritable
conflict with temptation, and came out victoriously. He owed the power
to keep himself free from sin (a) to His sinless birth, and (b) to the union
of His manhood with the divine Logos. Theodore denied the essential
indwelling of the Logos in Christ, and allowed only for a mere moral
indwelling. He saw no essential difference, but only a difference of
degree, between the indwelling of God in Christ and that in believers.
This view really substitutes for the incarnation the moral indwelling of
the Logos in the man Jesus. Nevertheless, Theodore shrank from the
conclusion to which his view would seem to lead inevitably, that there is a
dual personality in Christ, two persons between whom a moral union
exists. He said that the union was so close that the two might be spoken
of as one person, just as husband and wife can be called one flesh.

The logical development of this Antiochian view is seen in Nestorianism.

Following in the footsteps of Theodore, Nestorius denied that the term
theotokos could properly be applied for the simple reason that she only
brought forth a man who was accompanied by the Logos. Although
Nestorius did not draw the inevitable conclusion that followed from this
position, his opponent, Cyril, held him responsible for that conclusion.
He pointed out (a) that, if Mary is not theotokos, that is, the mother of
one person, and that person divine, the assumption of a single human
being into fellowship with the Logos is substituted for the incarnation of
God; and (b) that, if Mary is not theotokos, the relation of Christ to
humanity is changed, and He is no more the effectual Redeemer of
mankind. The followers of Nestorius did not hesitate to draw the
conclusion.

Nestorianism is defective, not in the doctrine of the two natures in Christ,

but in that of the one Person. Both the true and proper deity and the true
and proper humanity are conceded, but they are not conceived in such a
way as to form a real unity and to constitute a single person. The two
natures are also two persons. The important distinction between nature
as substance possessed in common, and person as a relatively
independent subsistence of that nature, is entirely disregarded. Instead of
blending the two natures into a single self-consciousness, Nestorianism
places them alongside of each other with nothing more than a moral and
sympathetic union between them. The man Christ was not God, but God-
bearer, theophoros, a possessor of the Godhead. Christ is worshipped, not
because He is God, but because God is in Him. The strong point in
Nestorianism is that it seeks to do full justice to the humanity of Christ.
At the same time it goes contrary to all the scriptural proofs for the unity
of the Person in the Mediator. It leaves the Church with an exalted
example of true piety and morality in the human person of Jesus, but
robs it of its divine-human Redeemer, the source of all spiritual power,
grace, and salvation.

(2) The Cyrillian Party. The most prominent opponent of Nestorianism

was Cyril of Alexandria. According to him the Logos assumed human
nature in its entirety, in order to redeem it, but at the same time formed
the only personal subject in the God-man. His terminology was not
always clear, however. On the one hand he seemed to teach simply that
the Logos assumed human nature, so that there are two natures in Christ,
which find their indissoluble union in the one Person of the Logos,
without any change in the natures themselves. But he also used
expressions in which he stressed the unity of the two natures in Christ by
means of a mutual communication of attributes, and spoke of the Person
of Christ as if it were a resultant unity. His great significance lies in the
fact that, over against Nestorianism, he stressed the unity of the Person of
Christ. The three points which he emphasized above all were in perfect,
harmony with the catholic doctrine of the day, namely; (a) the
inseparable conjunction of the two natures; (b) the impersonality and
dependence of the manhood, which the Logos uses as His instrument;
and (c) the unity and continuity of the Person in Christ Occasionally he
used expressions, however, which seemed to justify the later Eutichian
error. He applied the term phusis (nature) to the Logos only, and not to
the humanity of Christ, thus using it as a synonym of hypostasis. This
gave some occasion to saddle on him the doctrine that, after the
incarnation. there was only one divine-human nature in Christ, and made
it possible for the Monophysites to appeal to him, when they wanted to
prove that, as there was but one Person, so there was also only a single
nature in the Mediator. They continued their appeal to him in spite of his
strenuous denial of any mixture of the natures. The Council of Ephesus
effected a sort of compromise by maintaining on the one hand that the
term theotokos could be applied to Mary, and asserting on the other hand
the doctrine of the two distinct natures of Christ.

(3) The Eutichian Party. Many of Cyril's adherents were dissatisfied. They
did not take kindly to the doctrine of the two distinct natures. Eutichus,
an aged monk of rather unbalanced convictions and with a strong anti-
Nestorian bias, espoused the cause of the Alexandrian theology at
Constantinople. According to Theodoret he maintained in effect, either
an absorption of the human nature in the divine, or a fusion of the two
natures, resulting in a sort of tertium quid. He was of the opinion that the
human attributes were assimilated to the divine in Christ, so that His
body was not consubstantial with ours and He was not human in the
proper sense of the word. Condemned by the Council of Constantinople
in 448, he appealed to Leo, the bishop of Rome. After Leo received a full
report of the case from Flavian and was urged to express his opinion, he
addressed to Flavian his celebrated Tome. Because this Tome profoundly
influenced the Chalcedonian formula, it may be well to note its main
points, which are as follows: (a) There are two natures in Christ, which
are permanently distinct. (b) The two natures unite in one Person, each
one performing its own proper function in the incarnate life. (c) From the
unity of the Person follows the communication of attributes
(communicatio idiomatum). (d) The work of redemption required a
Mediator both human and divine, passible and impassible, mortal and
immortal. The incarnation was an act of condescension on the part of
God, but in it the Logos did not cease to be very God. The forma servi did
not detract from the forma dei. (e) The manhood of Christ is permanent,
and its denial implies a docetic denial of the reality of the sufferings of
Christ. This is really a compendium of western Christology.

c. The Decision of the Council of Chalcedon. After several local Councils

had met, some favoring and some condemning Eutichus, the ecumenical
Council of Chalcedon convened in the year 451, and issued its famous
statement of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. This reads as follows:

"We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to
confess one and the same Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in
Godhead and also perfect in manhood; truly God and also truly man, of a
reasonable soul and body; consubstantial with the Father according to
the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in all
things like unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father
according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our
salvation, born of the virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the
manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be
acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly (asuggutos), unchangeably
(atreptos), indivisibly (adiairetos), inseparably (achoristos), the
distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but
rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one
Person and one subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but
one and the same Son, the Only-begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus
Christ; as the prophets from the beginning have declared concerning
Him, and the Lord Jesus Christ Himself has taught us, and the Creed of
the Holy Fathers has handed down to us."

The most important implications of this statement are the following: (1)
The properties of both natures may be attributed to the one Person, as,
for instance, omniscience and limited knowledge. (2) The suffering of the
God-man can be regarded as truly and really infinite, while yet the divine
nature is impassible. (3) It is the divinity and not the humanity that
constitutes the root and basis of the personality of Christ. (4) The Logos
did not unite with a distinct human individual, but with a human nature.
There was not first an individual Person in the Godhead associated
Himself. The union was effected with the substance of humanity in the
womb of the virgin.

2. SECOND STAGE OF THE CONTROVERSY

a. Confusion after the Decision of the Council. The Council of Chalcedon

did not put an end to the Christological disputes any more than the
Council of Nicea terminated the trinitarian controversy. Egypt, Syria, and
Palestine harbored many fanatical monks of Eutichian convictions, while
Rome became ever-increasingly the center of orthodoxy. In fact, the
process of dogmatic development was fast passing from the East to the
West. After the Council of Chalcedon the adherents of Cyril and Eutichus
were called Monophysites, because they conceded that after the union
Christ had a composite nature, but denied that He-had two distinct
natures. As they saw it, two distinct natures would necessarily involve a
duality of persons. There was a lengthy and rather unseemly struggle
between the different parties. Even the Monophysites were not all agreed
among themselves. They were divided into several sects, of which the
names alone, says Dr. Orr, "are enough to give one a cold shiver." There
were the Theopaschitists, who emphasized the fact that God suffered; the
Phthartolatrists, who came nearest to the formulation of Chalcedon, and
stressed the fact that the human nature of Christ was, like ours, capable
of suffering, and were therefore said to worship that which is corruptible;
and the Aphthartodocetists, who represented just the opposite view,
namely, that the human nature of Christ was not consubstantial with
ours, but was endowed with divine attributes, and was therefore sinless,
imperishable, and incorruptible.

The ablest and most prominent defender of the Chalcedonian theology

was Leontius of Byzantium. He added an element to the dogmatical
construction of the doctrine of Christ, which was more fully worked out
by John of Damascus. The point is this: The rejection of Nestorianism
might lead to the idea of an independent impersonal existence of the
human nature of Christ. This idea was apt to be fostered by the use of the
terms anupostasis and anupostasia. Therefore Leontius stressed the fact
that the human nature of Christ is enupostasia, not impersonal but in-
personal, having its personal subsistence in the Person of the Son of God
from the very moment of the incarnation.

In 553 the emperor Justinian summoned the fifth oecumenical Council at

Constantinople, which was favorable to the Monophysites in its
condemnation of the writings of Theodore, but unfavorable to it in so far
as it anathematized those who declared that the Council of Chalcedon
countenanced the very errors which it condemned. This did not satisfy
the Monophysites, but rather sealed their separation from the Church of
the empire.

b. The Monothelitic Controversy. It soon became evident that the

attempted settlement of the Monophysite controversy by the Council did
not restore harmony. Several vital questions remained unanswered. Not
only did the how of the two natures in Christ remain unsolved, but the
additional question arose, How much is included in the person and how
much in the nature? In this connection the very important question was
raised, whether the will belongs to the former or to the latter. This is
equivalent to asking, whether there is but one will in Christ or two? To
say that there is but one seems to rob Christ of true human volition, and
therefore to detract from the integrity of His humanity. On the other
hand, to say that there are two seems to lead right into the Nestorian
camp.

The result was that a new sect arose among the Monophysites, called
Monothelites. As the name indicates, they started from the unity of the
Person and asserted that there is but one will in Christ. This doctrine also
took two forms: either the human will was regarded as merged in the
divine, so that the latter alone acted; or the will was re garded as
composite, resulting from the fusion of the divine and the human. The
opponents of the Monothelites were called Duothelites. These took their
stand on the duality of the natures and asserted the presence of two wills
in Christ. The Monophysites charged them with the destruction of the
unity of the personal life of Christ.

For a time the term energeia (energy) was used in this controversy in
preference to thelema (will), but soon the latter, as the more definite
term, prevailed. It should be borne in mind, however, that the word "will"
was used in a broad sense. Strictly speaking, we mean by "will" the faculty
of volition, of self-determination, and of choice. But the word is often
used in a broader sense, as including the instincts, appetites, desires, and
affections, with their corresponding aversions. All this was covered by the
term "will" in the ancient controversy, so that this included the question,
whether Christ was capable of fear and of shrinking from suffering and
death. The denial of the human will in Christ would therefore give His
humanity a somewhat docetic character.

The sixth ecumenical Council of Constantinople (680), with the co-

operation of the bishop of Rome, adopted the doctrine of the two wills
and two energies as the orthodox position, but also decided that the
human will must always be conceived as subordinate to the divine. The
established opinion was that the human will by its union with the divine
did not become less human, but was heightened and perfected by the
union, the two always acting in perfect harmony.

c. The Construction of the Doctrine by John of Damascus. In John of

Damascus the theology of the Greek Church reached its highest
development, and therefore it is of importance to notice his construction
of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. According to him the Logos
assumed human nature, and not vice versa, that is, the man Jesus did not
assume the Logos. This means that the Logos is the formative and
controlling agency, securing the unity of the two natures. The Logos did
not assume a human individual, nor human nature in general, but a
potential human individual, a human nature not yet developed into a
person or hypostasis. Through the union of the Logos with this potential
man in the womb of Mary, the latter acquired an individual existence.
While the human nature of Christ has no independent personality of its
own, it nevertheless has personal existence in and through the Logos. It is
not non-hypostatic, but en-hypostatic. He illustrates the union of the two
natures in Christ by the union of body and soul in man. There is a
circumincession of the divine and the human in Christ, a communication
of the divine attributes to the human nature, so that the latter is deified
and we may also say that God suffered in the flesh. The human nature
only is thus affected, and is therefore purely receptive and passive. The
Son of God, now including His complete humanity, is an object of
worship for the Church. Though there is a tendency to reduce the human
nature of Jesus to the position of a mere organ or instrument of the
Logos, it is admitted that there is a co-operation of the two natures, and
that the one Person acts and wills in each nature. The will is regarded as
belonging to the nature, but it is claimed that in Christ the human will
has become the will of the incarnate God.

d. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE WESTERN CHURCH. The Western

Church remained comparatively unaffected by the controversies that
were raging in the East. It seems that on the whole the western mind was
not sufficiently familiar with all kinds of fine philosophical distinctions to
take an active part in the discussion of questions that were so deep and
subtle as those that divided the Eastern Church.

A new movement of Christological thought appeared in Spain, however,

in the seventh and eighth centuries, called the Adoptionist Controversy.
The term "adoption" was already familiar in Spain, since a Council of
Toledo declared in 675 that Christ was the Son of God by nature and not
by adoption. The real champion of the Adoptionist doctrine was Felix,
bishop of Urgella. He regarded Christ as to His divine nature, that is the
Logos, as the only-begotten Son of God in the natural sense, but Christ on
his human side as a Son of God by adoption. At the same time he sought
to preserve the unity of the Person by stressing the fact that, from the
time of his conception, the Son of Man was taken up into the unity of the
Person of the Son of God.

This theory therefore makes a distinction between a natural and an

adoptive sonship, the former predicated of the divinity and the latter of
the humanity of Christ. Felix and his followers based their opinion: (1) On
the distinction of natures in Christ, which, according to them, implied a
distinction between two modes of sonship. (2) On passages of Scripture
which refer to the inferiority of Christ as man to the Father. And (3) On
the fact that believers are sons of God by adoption, and are also called
"brethren" of Christ. This would seem to imply that Christ as to his
human nature was a Son of God in the same sense. In order to explain
their meaning still farther, they distinguished between a natural birth of
Christ at Bethlehem and a spiritual birth, which had its inception at the
time of baptism and was consummated in the resurrection. This spiritual
birth made Christ the adopted Son of God.

While the opponents of this view did not charge the Adoptionists with the
explicit error of teaching a dual personality in Christ, they asserted that
this would be the logical result of a dual sonship. Alcuin, the noted
scholar of the days of Charlemagne, took issue with Felix and charged
him with dividing Christ into two sons. He maintained that no father
could have a son, who was such both by nature and by adoption.
Undoubtedly, the Adoptionists were in error, when they assigned to the
human nature of Christ a sort of alien position until He was made to
partake of divine sonship by a special act of adoption. This error was
condemned by the Synod of Frankfort in 794 A. D.

Questions for Further Study: Did the position of Apollinaris find any
point of contact in Arianism? What interests did he seek to safeguard?
What traces of Platonic and Manichæan influence are found in his
theory? What was his peculiar view of the Logos as the archetype of
humanity? What were the main objections to his theory? In what sense
was Nestorianism a reaction against Apollinarianism? How many kinds
of indwelling did Theodore distinguish? What led to the application of the
term theotokos to Mary? Did Cyril really confuse the two natures? How
can we account for a great deal of the misunderstanding current on this
point? What was the strong point in Nestorianism? How did the Church
meet its error? What was Cyril's view of the unity of the Person, and of
the relation of the two natures in Christ? What was the particular interest
of Eutichianism? In what respect did it err? How did Leo in his Tome
construct the doctrine of Christ? What element did Leontius of
Byzantium contribute to the construction of the doctrine of Christ? How
did the Monothelite controversy arise? What did it involve and how was it
settled? On what was the Adoptionist theory based? Were the
Adoptionists really Nestorian in their view?

Literature: Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ, pp. 39–82; Ottley, The

Doctrine of the Incarnation, pp. 323–481; Mackintosh, The Doctrine of
the Person of Christ, pp. 174–230; Harnack, History of Dogma, IV, pp.
138–267; Seeberg, History of Doctrine, I, pp. 243–288; Loofs,
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 153–170; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, I, pp.
287–378; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 316–339; Shedd,
History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 393–408; Cunningham, Historical
Theology, I, pp. 307–320; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 148–
160; Orr, Progress of Dogma, pp. 173–206.

II. Later Christological Discussions

1. IN THE MIDDLE AGES. During the Middle Ages the doctrine of the
Person of Christ was not in the foreground. Other problems, such as
those connected with the doctrines of sin and grace, and with the doctrine
of the work of redemption, became the center of attention. A brief
indication of the most salient points of Thomas Aquinas' construction of
the doctrine of Christ will be sufficient to indicate how the matter stood at
the time of the Reformation.

As to the hypostatic union in Christ Thomas Aquinas adhered to the

received theology. The Person of the Logos became composite after the
union at the incarnation, and this union "hindered" the manhood from
arriving at an independent personality. A twofold grace was imparted to
the human nature of Christ in virtue of its union with the Logos, namely:
(a) the gratia unionis or the dignity that resulted from the union of the
human nature with the divine, so that the human nature also became an
object of worship; and (b) the gratia habitualis, the grace of sanctification
which was vouchsafed to Christ as man, sustaining the human nature in
its relationship to God. The human knowledge of Christ was twofold,
namely, scientia infusa and scientia acquisita. In virtue of the former He
could know all things that can be so known by men and all that is made
known to them by revelation, a knowledge perfect in its king but yet
subject to creaturely limitations. And in virtue of the latter he knew all
that can be known through the intellectual faculties. There is no
communication of attributes between the natures in the abstract, but
both human and divine attributes may be ascribed to the Person. The
human nature of Christ was not omnipotent, but was subject to human
affections, such as sorrow, sadness, fear, wonder, and anger. There are
two wills in Christ, but ultimate causality belongs belongs to the divine
will. The human will is always subject to the divine.

2. DURING THE REFORMATION. There is one peculiarity of Lutheran

Christology which deserves special attention. Luther held firmly to the
doctrine of the two natures and their inseparable union in the Person of
the Logos. But his doctrine of the real presence in the Lord's Supper
necessitated the view that, after the ascension, the human nature of
Christ is omnipresent. This led to the Lutheran view of the communicatio
idiomatum, to the effect "that each of Christ's natures permeates the
other (perichoresis), and that His humanity participates in the attributes
of His divinity." Neve, Lutheran Symbolics, p. 132. But while certain
divine attributes, such as omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence,
were ascribed to the human nature, there was considerable hesitation in
ascribing human attributes to the divine nature, and in course of time
this side of the matter was dropped altogether. According to the Formula
of Concord the divine nature imparts its attributes to the human nature,
but the exercise of these is dependent on the will of the Son of God. It
should be noted, however, that the Formula is very ambiguous, if not
actually inconsistent in its statements. Cf. Schmid, Doctrinal Theology, p.
340. Small wonder therefore that Lutheran theologians themselves do
not agree on the subject.

The doctrine of the communication of attributes led to a controversy in

the Lutheran Church. Lutheran theologians evidently realized that the
logic of the case required a communication of attributes at the very time
of the union of the two natures. But on this assumption they at once faced
the question, how to explain the life of humiliation as it is pictured in the
pages of the Gospel. This led to the dispute between the Giessen and the
Tuebingen theologians. The former held that Christ laid aside the divine
attributes received in the incarnation, or used them only occasionally;
and the latter, that He always possessed them, but concealed them, or
used them only secretly. Chemnitz is the most important representative
of the former, and Brenz of the latter opinion. The Formula of Concord
on the whole leans to the side of the former, and his view gradually
prevailed in the Lutheran Church. In the work of Quenstedt, at whose
hands the doctrine received its final shape, the presence of strictly divine
powers in the manhood of Christ becomes a mere potentiality. There is a
noticeable tendency among some of the Lutherans today to discard their
characteristic view of the communicatio idiomatum, and to conform to
the Reformed view that the properties of each one of the natures can he
ascribed to the Person. Cf. Lectures on the Augsburg Confession, p. 91 f.;
Sprecher, Groundwork of a System of Evangelical Lutheran Theology, p.
458.

The most complete official deliverance on the Reformed position with

respect to the doctrine of Christ is found in the Second Helvetic
Confession, prepared in 1566. We quote some of the most pertinent
statements:

"Therefore the Son of God is co-equal and consubstantial with the Father,
as touching His divinity; true God, and not by name only, or by adoption,
or by special favor, but in substance and nature … We therefore do abhor
the blasphemous doctrine of Arius, uttered against the Son of God … We
also teach and believe that the eternal Son of the eternal God was made
the Son of Man, of the seed of Abraham and David; not by means of any
man, as Ebion affirmed, but that He was most purely conceived by the
Holy Spirit, and born of the virgin Mary … Moreover, our Lord Jesus
Christ had not a soul without sense or reason, as Apollinaris thought; nor
flesh without a soul, as Eunomius did teach; but a soul with its reason,
and flesh with its senses … We acknowledge, therefore, that there be in
one and the same Jesus Christ our Lord two natures—the divine and the
human nature; and we say that these two are so conjoined or united that
they are not swallowed up, confounded, or mingled together, but rather
united or joined together in one person (the properties of each nature
being safe and remaining still), so that we do worship one Christ, our
Lord, and not two … As, therefore, we detest the heresy of Nestorius,
which makes two Christs of one and dissolved the union of the person, so
do we abominate the madness of Eutichus and of the Monothelites and
Monophysites, who overthrow the propriety of the human nature.
Therefore we do not teach that the divine nature in Christ did suffer, or
that Christ, according to His human nature, is yet in the world, and so in
every place. For we do neither think nor teach that the body of Christ
ceased to be a true body after His glorying, or that it was deified and so
deified that it put off the properties, as touching body and soul, and
became altogether a divine nature and began to be one substance alone;
therefore we do not allow or receive the unwitty subtleties, and the
intricate, obscure, and inconsistent disputations of Schwenkfeldt, and
such other vain janglers, about this matter; neither are we
Schwenkfeldians."

3. IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. During the eighteenth century a

striking change took place in the study of the Person of Christ. Up to that
time the point of departure had been prevailingly theological and the
resulting Christology was theocentric. Scholars engaged in constructing
the doctrine of Christ took their startingpoint in the Logos, the Second
Person in the Trinity, and then sought to interpret the incarnation so as
to do justice to the unity of the Person of the Saviour, but also to the
integrity and veracity of both natures. But in the course of the eighteenth
century there was a growing conviction that this was not the best method,
and that more satisfying results could be obtained by beginning closer at
home, namely, with the study of the historical Jesus. A new Christological
period was ushered in. For more than a century the attention was
focussed on the picture of the Saviour presented to us in the Gospels, and
many are so delighted with the results of this study that they speak of it as
the rediscovery of Jesus. The point of view was anthropological, and the
result was anthropocentric.

Now the statement of Mackintosh may be true, that "these adjectives

need imply no serious difference of opinion as to ultimate conclusions,"
since "anthropomorphic must not be confused with humanitarian," but as
a matter of fact the new method was employed in such a manner as to
yield destructive rather than constructive results. Its application went
hand in hand with a strong aversion to authority and the supernatural,
and with an insistent appeal to reason and experience. Not what the Bible
teaches us concerning Christ, but our own discoveries in investigating the
phenomena of His life and our experience of Him, was made the
determining factor in forming a proper conception of Jesus. A far-
reaching and pernicious distinction was made between the historical
Jesus, delineated by the writers of the Gospels, and the theological Christ,
the fruit of the fertile imagination of theological thinkers from the days of
Paul on, whose image is now reflected in the Creeds of the Church. The
Lord of Glory was shorn of all that is supernatural—or nearly so—and the
doctrine of (concerning) Christ gave way for the teachings of Jesus. He
who had always been regarded by the Church as an object of divine
worship now became a mere teacher of morality. Attempts were not
wanting, however, to retain something of the religious significance of
Jesus Christ, while yet conceiving of Him in a manner that conformed to
the spirit of the age. We limit ourselves to a brief indication of some of the
outstanding views respecting Christ.

a. The View of Schleiermacher. In the Christology of Schleiermacher

Jesus can hardly be said to rise above the human level. The uniqueness of
His Person consists in the fact that He possesses a perfect and unbroken
sense of union with the divine, and also realizes to the full the destiny of
man in His character of sinless perfection. He was the second Adam, truly
man like the first, but placed in more favorable circumstances and
remaining sinless and perfect in obedience. He is the new spiritual head
of the race, capable of animating and sustaining the higher life of all
mankind. His transcendant dignity finds its explanation in a special
presence of God in Him, in His supreme God-consciousness. He is the
perfectly religious man, the fountain of all true religion: and through
living faith in Him all men may become perfectly religious. The
extraordinary character of Christ points to the fact that He had an
unusual origin, for there is no hereditary influence in Him that makes for
sinful tendencies. It is not necessary to accept the virgin birth. His Person
was constituted by a creative act which elevated human nature to the
plane of ideal perfection.

b. The Conceptions of Kant and Hegel. The speculative Rationalism of

Germany also claims a sympathetic appreciation of specifically Christian
doctrines, and finds in them a large deposit of rational truth.

(1) The Kantian Christ. To Kant Christ was first of all merely an abstract
ideal, the ideal of ethical perfection. What saves is faith in this ideal, and
not in Jesus as a Person. The Church made a mistake when it applied to
Him epithets and conceptions which rightly belong only to the ethical
ideal, which He merely symbolizes. This ethical ideal, which hovered
before the mind of God from the beginning and can be called the Son of
God, came down from heaven and becomes incarnate in the measure in
which it is realized on earth in a perfect humanity. It is revealed in the
truths of reason, and is the content of a rational faith, of which Jesus was
the most eminent preacher and pioneer. If truly appropriated, it will save
man irrespective of any personal relation to Jesus Christ. This view
eliminates the Gospel of the New Testament, robs us of our divine Lord,
and leaves us only a preacher of morality.

(2) The Hegelian Christ. For Hegel the beliefs of the Church respecting
the Person of Jesus Christ are merely man's stammering utterances of
ontological ideas—symbols expressive of metaphysical truth. He regards
human history as the process of God's becoming, the self-unfolding of
reason under conditions of time and space. This is the only sense in
which the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. God becomes
incarnate in humanity, and this incarnation expresses the oneness of God
and man. Though students of Hegel differ as to the question, whether he
conceives of the incarnation as purely racial, or regards the unique
incarnation of Jesus Christ as its culminating point, the latter seems to be
the correct interpretation. According to Hegel the historical
manifestation of God in Christ is viewed in two different ways. Humanity
in general regards Jesus as a human teacher, bringing the doctrine of the
Kingdom of God and a supreme code of morality, and giving us an
example by living up to this teaching even unto death. But believers take
a higher view. Faith recognizes Jesus as divine and as terminating the
transcendence of God. All that He does becomes a revelation of God. In
Him God Himself draws near unto us, touches us, and so takes us up into
the divine consciousness. Here we meet with a pantheistic identification
of the human and the divine in the doctrine of Christ. Of course, the
Church expresses this idea only in a symbolical and imperfect way;
philosophy, we are told, gives it more perfect expression.

c. The Kenotic Theories. A remarkable attempt was made in the so-called

Kenosis doctrine to improve on the theological construction of the
doctrine of the Person of Christ. The term Kenosis is derived from
Philippians 2:7, which says that Christ "emptied Himself, taking the form
of a servant." The Greek word here translated "emptied" is ekenosen, the
aorist of kenoo. A misinterpretation of this passage became the Scriptural
basis for the Kenosis doctrine, along with 2 Cor. 8:9. These passages were
interpreted as teaching that Christ at the incarnation emptied or divested
Himself of His divinity. But there are serious objections to this
interpretation: (1) as Dr. Warfield has shown the rendering "emptied
Himself" is contrary to the usual meaning of the term "to make oneself of
no account" (Christology and Criticism, p. 375); and (2) the implied
object of the action expressed is not Christ's divinity, but His being on an
equality with God in power and glory. The Lord of glory made Himself of
no account by becoming a servant. However, the Kenoticists base on this
passage and on 2 Cor. 8:9 the doctrine that the Logos literally became,
that is, was changed into a man by reducing (depotentiating) Himself,
either wholly or in part, to the dimensions of a man, and then increased
in wisdom and power until at last He again assumed the divine nature.

This theory evidently resulted from a double motive, namely, the desire
(1) to maintain the reality and integrity of the manhood of Christ; and (2)
to throw into strong relief the exceeding greatness of Christ's humiliation
in that He, being rich, for our sakes became poor. It assumed several
forms. According to Thomasius the divine Logos, while retaining His
immanent or moral attributes of absolute power or freedom, holiness,
truth and love, divested Himself temporarily of His relative attributes of
omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, but after the resurrection
resumed these attributes. The theory of Gess, which was more absolute
and consistent, and also more popular, is to the effect that the Logos at
the incarnation literally ceased from His cosmic functions and His eternal
consciousness, and reduced Himself absolutely to the conditions and
limits of human nature, so that His consciousness became purely that of a
human soul. It comes very close to the view of Apollinaris. Ebrard, a
Reformed scholar, assumed a double life of the Logos. On the one hand
the Logos reduced Himself to the dimensions of a man and possessed a
purely human consciousness, but on the other hand He also retained and
exercised His divine perfections in the trinitarian life without any
interruption. The same ego exists at once in the eternal and in the
temporal form, is both infinite and finite. And Martensen postulates in
the Logos during the time of His humiliation a double life from two non-
communicating centers. As the Son of God, living in the bosom of the
Father, He continued His trinitarian and cosmic functions, but as the
depotentiated Logos He knew nothing of these functions and knew
Himself to be God only in the sense in which such knowledge is possible
to the faculties of manhood.

This theory, once very popular in one form or another, and still defended
by some, has now lost a great deal of its charm. It is subversive of the
doctrine of the Trinity, contrary to that of the immutability of God, and at
variance with those passages of Scripture which ascribe divine attributes
to the historical Jesus. In the most absolute and most consistent form it
teaches what La Touche calls "incarnation by divine suicide."

d. Dorner's Conception of the Incarnation. Dorner may be regarded as

the main representative of the Mediating School on the doctrine of Christ.
He stresses the fact that God and man are akin, and that there is in the
essential nature of God an urge to communicate Himself to man. In view
of this fact the incarnation was transcendentally and historically
necessary, and would have taken place even if sin had not entered the
world. The humanity of Christ was a new humanity, in which the
receptivity of the human for the divine was raised to the highest point.
This was necessary, since Christ was destined to be the Head of the
redeemed race. Now the Logos, the ante-mundane principle of revelation
and self-bestowal in God, joined Himself to this humanity. But the
bestowal of the Logos to the new humanity was not complete at once; the
incarnation was of a progressive nature. The measure of it was at every
stage determined by the ever-increasing receptivity of the human nature
for the divine, and it did not reach its final stage until the resurrection.
This theory is subversive of Scripture, since it represents the incarnation
as the birth of a mere man, who gradually became the God-man in His
conception and birth. It is really a new and subtle form of the old
Nestorian heresy. Moreover, by making the union in Christ to consist of a
union of two persons, it makes this even less intelligible than it is
otherwise.

e. Ritschl's View of the Person of Christ. With the single exception of

Schleiermacher no one has exercised greater influence on present day
theology than Albrecht Ritschl. In his Christology he takes his
startingpoint in the work of Christ rather than in His Person, and
emphasizes the former far more than the latter. The work of Christ
determines the dignity of His Person. Christ is a mere man, but in view of
the work He accomplished and the service He rendered we rightly
attribute to Him the predicate of Godhead. He who does the work of God
can properly be described in terms of God. Christ, revealing God in His
grace, truth, and redemptive power, has for man the value of God, and is
therefore also entitled to divine honour. Ritschl does not speak of the pre-
existence, the incarnation, and the virgin birth of Christ, because these
have no point of contact in the believing experience of the Christian
community. His view of Christ is in reality only a modern counterpart of
the construction put on the historical Jesus by Paul of Samosata.

f. Christ in Modern Theology. On the basis of the modern pantheistic idea

of the immanence of God, the doctrine of the Person of Christ is today
often represented in a thoroughly naturalistic way. The representations
vary, but the fundamental idea is generally the same, that of an essential
unity of God and man. Christ differed from other men only in that He was
more conscious of the God immanent in Him, and consequently is the
highest revelation of the Supreme Being in His word and work.
Essentially all men are divine, because God is immanent in all, and they
are all sons of God, differing from Christ only in degree. The latter stands
apart only in view of His greater receptivity for the divine and of His
superior God-consciousness.)

Questions for Further Study: What ancient errors were virtually revived
by Roscelinus and Abelard? What was the Christological Nihilism in
vogue among the disciples of Abelard? How did Peter the Lombard view
Christ? Did the Scholastics bring any new points to the fore? What is the
Boethian definition of personality, generally accepted by the Scholastics?
Did Luther give occasion for the characteristically Lutheran view of the
communicatio idiomatum? Where do we find the official Lutheran
Christology? How can we account for the seemingly inconsistent
representations of the Formula of Concord? What Christological
differences were there in the Lutheran Church? What objections are there
to the Lutheran view that divine attributes may be predicated of of the
human nature? How did the Lutherans and the Reformed differ in their
interpretation of Phil. 2:5–11? How does the Reformed Christology differ
from the Lutheran? What is the main difference between the
Christological discussions of the last two, and those of the previous
centuries? How do the Christologies of Kant and Hegel, and those of
Schleiermacher and Ritschl differ? What objections are there to the
Kenosis doctrine? What are the objectionable features of the Christology
of Modernism?

Literature: The Formula of Concord and the Second Helvetic Confession;

La Touche, The Person of Christ in Modern Thought; Schweitzer, The
Quest of the Historical Jesus; Ottley, The Doctrine of the Incarnation, pp.
485–553, 587–671; Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus
Christ, pp. 223–284; Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ, pp. 74–236;
Sanday, Christologies Ancient and Modern, pp. 59–83; Heppe, Dogmatik
des deutschen Protestantismus, II, pp. 78–178; Dorner, History of
Protestant Theology, pp. 95 f., 201 f., 322 f.,; Seeberg, History of
Doctrine, II, pp. 65, 109 f., 154 f., 229 f., 321 f., 323 f., 374, 387;
Hagenbach, History of Doctrine, II, pp. 267–275; III, pp. 197–209, 343–
353; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, II, pp. 380–385, 388–429; Otten,
Manual of the History of Dogmas, II, pp. 171–195.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN AND GRACE AND

RELATED DOCTRINES
I. The Anthropology of the Patristic Period

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

While the Christological controversies were agitating the East, other
problems, such as those of sin and grace, of the freedom of the will and
divine predestination, were coming to the foreground in the West. Their
importance can scarcely be overrated from the point of view of practical
Christianity. Their bearing on the work of redemption is even more
directly apparent than that of the Christological questions. It is in this
field that the chief lines of demarcation between the great divisions of
Christianity are found. Says Dr. Cunningham: "There never, indeed, has
been much appearance of true personal religion where the divinity of the
Son of God has been denied; but there has often been a profession of
sound doctrine upon this subject, long maintained, where there has been
little real religion. Whereas, not only has there never been much real
religion where there was not a substantially sound doctrine in regard to
the points involved in the Pelagian controversy, but also—and this is the
point of contrast—the decay of true religion has always been
accompanied by a large measure of error in doctrine upon these subjects;
the action and reaction of the two upon each other being speedy and
manifest." Historical Theology I, p 321.

2. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE GREEK FATHERS. The main

interest of the Greek Fathers lay in the field of Theology and Christology,
and while they discussed anthropological questions, they touched these
but lightly. There was a certain dualism in their thinking about sin and
grace, which led to rather confused representations with a preponderant
emphasis on doctrines which show a manifest affinity with the later
teachings of Pelagius rather than with those of Augustine. In a measure, it
may be said, they prepared the way for Pelagianism. In our brief
discussion a bare indication of the main ideas prevalent among them
must suffice.

Their view of sin was, particularly at first, largely influenced by their

opposition to Gnosticism with its emphasis on the physical necessity of
evil and its denial of the freedom of the will. They stressed the fact that
Adam's creation in the image of God did not involve his ethical
perfection, but only the moral perfectability of his nature. Adam could sin
and did sin, and thus came under the power of Satan, death, and sinful
corruption. This physical corruption was propogated in the human race,
but is not itself sin and did not involve mankind in guilt. There is no
original sin in the strict sense of the word. They do not deny the solidarity
of the human race, but admit its physical connection with Adam. This
connection, however, relates only to the corporeal and sensuous nature,
which is propagated from father to son, and not to the higher and rational
side of human nature, which is in every case a direct creation of God. It
exerts no immediate effect on the will, but affects this only mediately
through the intellect. Sin always originates in the free choice of man, and
is the result of weakness and ignorance. Consequently infants cannot be
regarded as guilty, for they have inherited only a physical corruption.

It should be noted, however, that there were some departures from this
general view. Origen admitting that a certain hereditary pollution
attached to every one at birth, found the explanation for it in a pre-natal
or pre-temporal fall of the soul, and came very close to a doctrine of
original sin. And Gregory of Nyssa came even nearer to teaching this
doctrine. But even the great Athanasius and Chrysostom scrupulously
avoided it.

Naturally the doctrine of divine grace that was prevalent in the teachings
of the Greek Fathers was profoundly influenced and largely determined
by their conception of sin. On the whole the main emphasis was on the
free will of man rather than on the operation of divine grace. It is not the
grace of God, but the free will of man that takes the initiative in the work
of regeneration. But though it begins the work, it cannot complete it
without divine aid. The power of God co-operates with the human will,
and enables it to turn from evil and to do that which is well pleasing in
the sight of God. These Fathers do not always make a clear distinction
between the good which the natural man is able to do and that spiritual
good which requires the enabling power of the Holy Spirit.

3. THE GRADUAL EMERGENCE OF ANOTHER VIEW IN THE WEST.

This Greek anthropology also influenced the West more or less in the
second and third centuries, but in the third and fourth centuries the seeds
of the doctrine that was destined to become prevalent in the West
gradually made its appearance, especially in the works of Tertullian,
Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose.
The traducianism of Tertullian was substituted for the creationism of
Greek theology, and this paved the way for the doctrine of innate sin, in
distinction from innate evil. His famous maxim was, Tradux animae,
tradux peccati, that is, the propagation of the soul involves the
propagation of sin. He wedded his doctrine of traducianism to a theory of
realism, according to which God created generic human nature, both
body and soul, and individualizes it by procreation. In this process the
nature does not lose its distinctive qualities, but continues to be
intelligent, rational and voluntary at every point and in every one of its
individualizations, so that its activities do not cease to be rational and
responsible activities. The sin of the original human nature remains sin in
all the individual existences of that nature. Tertullian represents only the
beginning of Latin anthropology, and some of his expressions still remind
one of the teachings of the Greek Fathers. He speaks of the innocence of
infants, but probably assumes this only in the relative sense that they are
free from actual sins; and does not altogether deny the freedom of the
will. And though he reduces human efficiency to a minimum, he
sometimes uses language that savours of the synergistic theory of
regeneration, that is, the theory that God and man work together in
regeneration.

In the writings of Cyprian there is an increasing tendency towards the

doctrine of the original sinfulness of man, and of a monergistic renewal of
the soul. He seems to hold that the guilt of original sin is not as great as
that of actual sin. The doctrine of a sinful, as distinguished from a
corrupt, nature is even more clearly asserted in the writings of Ambrose
and Hilary. They clearly teach that all men have sinned in Adam, and are
therefore born in sin. At the same time they do not hold to an entire
corruption of the human will, and consequently adhere to the synergistic
theory of regeneration, though they appear to be more uncertain and
contradictory in this matter than some of the earlier Fathers. All in all we
find in them a gradual preparation for the Augustinian view of sin and
grace.

Questions for Further Study: Who were the principal representatives of

early Greek theology? How did their opposition to Gnosticism influence
their anthropology? Did Platonism have any effect on it? How did they
conceive of the original condition of man? Does the fall receive due
emphasis in their teachings? How do you account for their conception of
sin as corruption rather than guilt? How did they conceive of the
propagation of sin? Who were the principal representatives of early Latin
theology? How did their anthropology differ from that of the East? How
do you account for the difference? How do creationism and traducianism
differ?

Literature: Morgan, The Importance of Tertullian in the Development of

Christian Dogma; Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology;
Moody, The Mind of the Early Converts, cf. Index; Scott, The Nicene
Theology, pp. 209–219; McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, cf.
Index under Sin; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 182–192;
Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, pp. 17–46; Seeberg, History of Doctrine, I,
pp. 109–161; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 104–110.

II. The Pelagian and Augustinian Doctrines of Sin and Grace

1. AUGUSTINE AND PELAGIUS

Augustine's view of sin and grace was moulded to some extent by his deep
religious experiences, in which he passed through great spiritual
struggles and finally emerged into the full light of the Gospel. He tells us
in his Confessions that he wandered far from the path of morality and
religion, sought escape in Manichaeism and almost fell into its snares,
but finally turned to Christ. He was never quite at rest during the years of
his wanderings, and Ambrose was instrumental in winning him back to
the faith. His conversion took place in a garden at Milan after deep
agitation, weeping, and prayer. He was baptized in 387, and became
bishop of Hippo in 395. Some find traces of a Manichaean influence in his
gloomy view of human nature as fundamentally evil, and in his denial of
the freedom of the will. It is more likely, however, that it was exactly his
sense of inherent evil and spiritual bondage that caused him to turn to
Manichaeism temporarily, for he combats the Manichaeans on the very
points in question, holding that human nature was not originally and
necessarily evil, and insisting on a measure of freedom as a basis for
human responsibility.

Pelagius was a man of an entirely different type. In comparing the two

Wiggers says: "Their characters were diametrically opposite. Pelagius was
a quiet man, as free from mysticism as from aspiring ambition; and in
this respect, his mode of thought and of action must have been wholly
different from that of Augustine … Both therefore thought differently,
according to their totally different spiritual physiognomy; and both,
moreover, must have come into conflict just as soon as an external
occasion should be presented." Augustinianism and Pelagianism, p. 47.
Pelagius was a British monk, a man of austere life, of a blameless
character, and of an even temper, and perhaps partly for that very reason
a stranger to those conflicts of the soul, those struggles with sin, and
those deep experiences of an all-renewing grace, which had such
profound influence in moulding Augustine's thought.

The question is sometimes raised, whether Augustinianism was not

simply a reaction against Pelagianism and therefore largely determined
by its antipode. It may be said, however, that in their original form the
two views were developed independently before the authors became
acquainted with each other's teachings. At the same time it cannot be
denied that, when the two engaged in mortal combat, the formal
statement of Augustinianism was determined in some of its details by
Pelagianism and vice versa. Both represented elements that were already
present in the writings of the early Church Fathers.

2. THE PELAGIAN VIEW OF SIN AND GRACE

The most important questions in debate between Pelagius and Augustine

were those of free will and original sin. According to Pelagius Adam, as he
was created by God, was not endowed with positive holiness. His original
condition was one of neutrality, neither holy nor sinful, but with a
capacity for both good and evil. He had a free and entirely, undetermined
will, which enabled him to choose with equal facility either one of these
alternatives. He could either sin or refrain from sinning, as he saw fit. His
mortality could not depend on his choice, for he was created mortal in the
sense that he was already subject to the law of death. Without any
antecedent evil in his nature, which might in any way determine the
course of his life, he chose to sin. His fall in sin injured no one but
himself, and left human nature unimpaired for good. There is no
hereditary transmission of a sinful nature or of guilt, and consequently no
such thing as original sin. Man is still born in the same condition in
which Adam was before the fall. Not only is he free from guilt but also
from pollution. There are no evil tendencies and desires in his nature
which inevitably result in sin. The only difference between him and Adam
is that he has the evil example before him. Sin does not consist in wrong
affections or desires, but only in the separate acts of the will. It depends
in every case on the voluntary choice of man. As a matter of fact man
need not sin. He is, like Adam, endowed with perfect freedom of the will,
with a liberty of choice or of indifference, so that he can, at any given
moment, choose either good or evil. And the very fact that God
commands man to do what is good is proof positive that he is able to do
it. His responsibility is the measure of his ability. If notwithstanding this
sin is universal—and Pelagius admits that it is—this is due only to wrong
education, to bad example, and to a long established habit of sinning. In
turning from evil to good man is not dependent on the grace of God,
though its operation is undoubtedly an advantage and will help him to
overcome evil in his life. But the grace of which Pelagius speaks in this
connection does not consist in an inward-working divine energy or, in
other words, in the influence of the Holy Spirit, inclining the will and
empowering man to do that which is good, but only in external gifts and
natural endowments, such as man's rational nature, the revelation of God
in Scripture, and the example of Jesus Christ. Though there would hardly
seem to be any place for the baptism of infants in such a system, Pelagius
holds that they should be baptized, but regards their baptism merely as a
rite of consecration or an anticipation of future forgiveness. Rather
illogically, he takes the position that children are excluded from the
Kingdom of Heaven, though not from a lower state of blessedness, which
is called eternal life.

3. THE AUGUSTINIAN VIEW OF SIN AND GRACE. Augustine's view of

sin and grace was undoubtedly influenced somewhat by his early
religious experiences and by its opposite in the Pelagian system, but was
primarily determined by his careful study of the Epistle to the Romans
and by his general conception of the soul's relation to God. He regarded
man, even in his unfallen state, as absolutely dependent on God for the
realization of his destiny.

a. His View of Sin. In opposition to the Manichaeans Augustine strongly

emphasizes the voluntary character of sin. At the same time he believes
that the act of sin by which the soul cut loose from God brought it under
an evil necessity. As a result of the entrance of sin into the world man can
no more will the true good, which is rooted in the love of God, nor realize
his true destiny, but sinks ever deeper into bondage. This does not mean
that he has lost all sense of God for, as a matter of fact, he continues to
sigh after Him.

Augustine does not regard sin as something positive, but as a negation or

privation. It is not a substantial evil added to man, but a privatio boni, a
privation of good. He finds the root principle of sin in that self-love which
is substituted for the love of God. The general result of man's defection is
seen in concupiscence, in the inordinate power of sensuous desires, as
opposed to the law of reason, in the soul. From sin and the disturbance it
introduced death resulted. Man was created immortal, which does not
mean that he was impervious to death, but that he had the capacity of
bodily immortality. Had he proved obedient, he would have been
confirmed in holiness. From the state of the posse non peccare et mori
(the ability not to sin and die) he would have passed to the state of the
non posse peccare et mori (the inability to sin and die). But he sinned,
and consequently entered the state of the non posse non peccare et mori
(the inability not to sin and die).

Through the organic connection between Adam and his descendants, the
former transmits his fallen nature, with the guilt and corruption
attaching to it, to his posterity. Augustine conceives of the unity of the
human race, not federally, but realistically. The whole human race was
germinally present in the first man, and therefore also actually sinned in
him. The race is not constituted individually, that is, of a large number of
relatively independent individuals, but organically, that is, of a large
number of individualizations which are organic parts of that generic
human nature that was present in Adam. And therefore the sin of the
human nature was the sin of all its individualizations.
As the result of sin man is totally depraved and unable to do any spiritual
good. Augustine does not deny that the will still has a certain natural
freedom. It is still capable of acts that are civilly good, and from a lower
standpoint even praiseworthy. At the same time he maintains that man,
separated from God, burdened with guilt, and under the dominion of evil,
cannot will that which is good in the sight of God. As he sees it, that only
is good in the sight of God which springs from the motive of love to God.

b. His View of Grace. The will of man stands in need of renewal, and this
is exclusively a work of God from start to finish—a work of divine grace. It
is necessary to guard against a possible misunderstanding here. When
Augustine ascribes the renewal of man to divine grace only, and in this
connection speaks of "irresistible grace," he does not mean to intimate
that divine grace forces the will, contrary to the nature of man as a free
agent, but rather that it so changes the will that man voluntarily chooses
that which is good. The will of man is renewed and thus restored to its
true freedom. God can and does so operate on the will that man of his
own free choice turns to virtue and holiness. In this way the grace of God
becomes the source of all good in man.

From what was said it follows that Augustine's doctrine of regeneration is

entirely monergistic. The operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary, not
merely for the purpose of supplying a deficiency, but for the complete
renewal of the inner disposition of man, so that he is brought into
spiritual conformity to the law. Says Shedd: "Grace is imparted to sinful
man, not because he believes, but in order that he may believe; for faith
itself is the gift of God." The divine efficiency in regeneration results in
the conversion of the sinner, in which man may be said to co-operate.
Augustine distinguishes several stages in the work of divine grace, which
he calls "prevenient grace", "operative grace", and "co-operative grace'. In
the first the Holy Spirit employs the law to produce the sense of sin and
guilt; in the second He uses the Gospel for the production of that faith in
Christ and His atoning work which issues in justification and peace with
God; and in the third the renewed will of man co-operates with Him in
the life-long work of sanctification. The work of grace includes the entire
renewal of man in the image of God and the spiritual transformation of
the sinner into a saint. It is hardly in line with his main thought when he
also represents the Church as a more or less independent dispenser of
divine grace, and speaks of baptismal regeneration.

Augustine's representation of the grace of God as the efficient cause of

salvation led on to his doctrine of predestination. What God does in time
for the gracious renewal of the sinner, He willed to do in His eternal plan.
At first Augustine, manifested a tendency to consider predestination as
contingent on divine foreknowledge, and to represent God as electing
those of whom He knew that they would believe. This really makes
predestination conditional on the foreseen free action of man. He soon
saw, however, that consistency and a fair interpretation of the relevant
passages of Scripture, demanded that he should consider man's choice of
the good and his faith in Christ as themselves the effect of divine grace;
and therefore modified his doctrine of predestination accordingly. He
usually views predestination in connection with the sinner's salvation,
and even held that it might be called this salvation viewed sub specie
aeternitatis (from the point of view of eternity). With reference to the
non-elect, he conceives of the decree of God as one of pretermission only.
Reprobation differs from election in this that it is not accompanied with
any direct divine efficiency to secure the result intended. But while
Augustine is a strict predestinarian, there is also here an element in his
teachings that is foreign to his main thought, namely, the idea that the
grace of regeneration can again be lost. He holds that only those who are
regenerated and persevere, or in whom, after loss, the grace of
regeneration is restored, are finally saved. There is a redeeming feature,
however, in his assertion that the elect never die in an unregenerate
condition.

4. PELAGIAN AND SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES. In the

Pelagian controversy the views of Augustine on sin and grace were put to
the test. Small wonder that his views met with opposition, since the
problems involved had never yet been discussed in a thorough manner.
The Eastern Church preferably emphasized the element of freedom in
human nature, in opposition to the pagan idea of fate or destiny. It was
admitted that the human will was corrupt, and had become subject to
Satan, to sensuous temptations, and to death; and that the new life was
communicated in baptism. On the whole the Greek Fathers were content
with placing the grace of God and free will side by side.

In view of all this it was perfectly natural that Augustine's deriving

everything, free will included, from divine grace, collided wtih the
opposite tendency, as represented in Pelagius. The two systems were
absolute antipodes. Pelagius advanced his views first at Rome from 409
to 411 A. D. His system was introduced into the North African Church by
his pupil Coelestius. At the same time Pelagius went to Palestine to
propagate his views. The matter of his departure from the generally
accepted teachings of the Church was brought up in several Councils. In
412 Coelestius was adjudged heretical at Carthage, and was
excommunicated when he refused to retract his opinions. Pelagius
himself was accused of heresy before the Synods of Jerusalem and
Diospolis (also in Palestine), but by specious explanations and by
qualifying several of his statements succeeded in satisfying his judges,
and was acquitted, 414–416 A. D. In the year 416 Pelagianism was
condemned as a heresy by the Synods of Mileve and Carthage, and this
decision was finally endorsed by the vaccilating bishop of Rome,
Zozimus, who had first handed Pelagius a certificate of orthodoxy, 418 A.
D. Finally, in. 431 A. D. the Council of Ephesus, which condemned
Nestorianism, also passed a sentence of condemnation on Pelagianism.

Between the extremes of Augustinianism and Pelagianism a mediating

movement arose, which is known in history as Semi-Pelagianism. As a
matter of fact that halfway position served to bring out clearly—as
nothing else could have done—that only a system like the Augustinian,
with its strong logical coherence, could maintain its ground successfully
against the onslaughts of Pelagius. Semi-Pelagianism made the futile
attempt to steer clear of all difficulties by giving a place to both divine
grace and human will as co-ordinate factors in the renewal of man, and
by basing predestination on foreseen faith and obedience. It did not deny
human corruption, but regarded the nature of man as weakened or
diseased rather than as fatally injured by the fall. Fallen human nature
retains an element of freedom, in virtue of which it can co-operate with
divine grace. Regeneration is the joint product of both factors, but it is
really man and not God that begins the work.

Semi-Pelagian views spread especially in Gaul. Their chief representative

was Cassian, abbot of Massilia (Marseilles). It found able defenders also
in Faustus of Rhegium and Gennadius of Massilia. But it lacked internal
coherence, and could not hold out in debate against such a close-knit and
compact system as Augustinianism. The system was condemned at the
important Council of Orange, which vindicated a moderate
Augustinianism.

Augustine's doctrine of sin and grace was adopted as the anthropology of

the Western Church, though its acceptance was never general even there.
Influential men, like Leo and Gregory, Bede and Alcuin, adhered to it,
though they were not as strong as Augustine in asserting the preterition
and reprobation of the lost. They placed great emphasis on the
enslavement of the human will, and on the absolute need of divine grace
in renewal. It may be said that the most important leaders of the Church
remained true to the most practical part of Augustinian anthropology for
two or three centuries after Augustine. And the Synod of Orange adopted
a moderate Augustinianism as the doctrine of the Church. Pelagianism
and Semi-Pelagianism were both condemned as contrary to the orthodox
faith. The Augustinian doctrine of salvation by grace only was victorious,
but the doctrine of the irresistible grace of predestination was supplanted
by that of the sacramental grace of baptism. And the doctrine of a double
predestination—predestination also to evil—was abandoned in 529 A. D.
Gradually the general decline in the Roman Catholic Church led to a drift
in the direction of Semi-Pelagianism, which had long before secured a
rather sure footing in the East. In course of time the Latin Church
adopted the anthropology of the Greek Church and adhered to it ever
since.

Questions for Further Study: In what respect did the anthropology of the
East differ from that of the West? Were the Pelagian and Augustinian
tenets new in the Church? What was the fundamental error of Pelagius?
How did his doctrine of free will affect the doctrines of sin and grace?
Why did he stress the free will of man? Is his doctrine of free will
psychologically tenable? Why is his explanation of the universality of sin
insufficient? How did he conceive of the grace of God? What value did he
ascribe to it? Did he altogether deny grace as an inward spiritual energy?
What Scriptural basis did he have for his doctrine? How did Augustine
conceive of the freedom of willing before and after the fall? Did he ascribe
a voluntary character to sin or not? Did he regard concupiscence as sin or
not? How do you account for his emphasis on sin as privation? Did his
doctrine of original sin go beyond that of the earlier Fathers? If so, how?
How did he conceive of the transmission of sin? How did his doctrine of
sin and grace lead him to his doctrine of predestination? What was his
conception of the decree of reprobation?

Literature: Wiggers, Augustinianism and Pelagianism; Cunningham, St.

Austin; Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, pp. 47–140; Cunningham, Historical
Theology, I, pp. 321–358; Harnack, History of Dogma, V, pp. 61–261;
Seeberg, History of Doctrine, I, pp. 328–381; Loofs,
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 183–238; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, I,
pp. 437–557; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 345–356;
Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas, pp. 357–386; Sheldon, History
of Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 222–243; Shedd, History of Doctrine, II, pp.
26–110; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 176–198; McGiffert, A
History of Christian Thought, II, pp. 71–143.

III. The Anthropology of the Middle Ages

1. THE VIEWS OF GREGORY THE GREAT. Gregory the Great, born at

Rome about 540 A. D., was a diligent student of Augustine, Jerome, and
Ambrose. His religious disposition prompted him to renounce the world,
and after the death of his father he devoted his wealth to good works, and
particularly to the building of cloisters for the promotion of the purely
contemplative life. Unanimously elected Pope in 590, he accepted the
position only with great hesitation. Though not an original thinker, he
became an author of great repute and did much to disseminate sound
doctrine. Next to Augustine he was the most influential authority in the
Church. In fact, Augustine was understood in the early Middle Ages, only
as interpreted by Gregory. For that reason the history of doctrine in the
Middle Ages must begin with him.

The Augustinianism of Gregory was somewhat attenuated. He explains

the entrance of sin into the world by the weakness of man. The first sin of
Adam was a free act, in which he surrendered his love to God and became
subject to spiritual blindness and spiritual death. Through the sin of the
first man all men became sinners and as such subject to condemnation.
This sounds rather Augustinian, but Gregory did not carry these ideas
through consistently. He regarded sin as a weakness or disease rather
than as guilt, and taught that man had not lost the freedom but only the
goodness of the will. At the same time he stressed the fact that without
grace there can be no salvation nor any human merits. The work of
redemption is begun by the grace of God. Prevenient grace causes man to
will the good, and subsequent grace enables him to do it. The change of
man is begun in baptism, which works faith and cancels the guilt of past
sins. The will is renewed and the heart is filled with the love of God, and
thus man is enabled to merit something with God.

Gregory retained the doctrine of predestination only in a modified form.

While he speaks of the irresistibility of grace, and of predestination as the
secret counsel of God respecting the certain and definite number of the
elect, this is after all only a predestination based on foreknowledge. God
appoints a certain definite number unto salvation, since He knows that
they will accept the Gospel. But no one can be certain of his own election
or of that of any other person.

2. THE GOTTSCHALKIAN CONTROVERSY. Augustine had occasionally

spoken of a double predestination, and Isodore of Seville still wrote of it
as being twofold. But many of the Augustinians in the seventh, eighth,
and ninth centuries lost sight of this double character of predestination,
and interpreted it as Gregory had done. Then came Gottschalk. who
found rest and peace for his soul only in the Augustinian doctrine of
election, and contended earnestly for a double predestination, that is, a
predestination of the lost as well as of the saved. He was careful, however,
to limit the divine efficiency to the redemptive line and the production of
holiness, and to regard sin merely as the object of a permissive decree
which neverthless rendered it certain. He explicitly rejected the idea of a
predestination based on foreknowledge, since this makes the divine
decree dependent on the acts of man. Prescience merely accompanies
predestination and attests the justice of it.

He met a great deal of unwarranted opposition. His opponents did not

understand him and lodged against him the familiar accusation that his
teachings made God the author of sin, His doctrine was condemned at
Mayence in 848 A. D., and the following year he himself was scourged
and condemned to life-long imprisonment. A debate ensued, in which
several influential theologians, such as Prudentius, Ratramnus, Remigius,
and others, defended the doctrine of a double predestination as
Augustinian, while especially Rabanus and Hincmar of Rheims assailed
it. But this controversy proved to be after all little more than a debate
about words. Both the defenders and the assailents were at heart Semi-
Augustinians. They expressed the same idea in different ways. The former
spoke with Augustine of a double predestination, but based reprobation
on foreknowledge, while the latter applied the term "predestination" only
to the election to life, and also based reprobation on prescience. Both
subscribed to the idea of sacramental grace, and feared that the strict
theory of predestination would rob the sacraments of their spiritual value
and make them mere forms.

The decisions of the Councils of Chiersy and Valence were altogether in

harmony with these views, the former reproducing the views of the
assailants, and the latter those of the defenders. The statement of the
Council of Valence reads as follows: "We confess a predestination of the
elect to life, and a predestination of the wicked to death; but that, in the
election of those who are saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit,
and in the condemnation of those who will perish, evil merit precedes the
righteous judgment of God. But that in predestination God has
determined only those things which He Himself would do, either from
gratuitous mercy or in righteous judgment … But that in the wicked He
foreknew the wickedness because it comes from them; and does not
predestinate it, because it does not come from Him." Quoted by Seeberg,
History of Doctrine, II, p. 33. These Councils met in 853.

3. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ANSELM

There was one great thinker during the Middle Ages who not only
reproduced the Augustinian anthropology, but also made a positive
contribution to it, namely, Anselm of Canterbury.

a. His Doctrine of Sin. He emphasizes the doctrine of original sin, but

stresses the fact that the term "original" does not refer to the origin of the
human race, but to that of the individual in the present condition of
things. In his opinion original sin may also be called peccatum naturale
(natural sin), though it does not belong to human nature as such, but
represents a condition into which it has come since creation. By the fall
man became guilty and polluted, and both guilt and pollution are passed
on from father to child. All sin, original as well as actual, constitutes guilt.

Since sin presupposes the exercise of free will, he raises the question, how
sin can be ascribed to children, and why infants should be baptized for its
remission. He finds the explanation in the fact that human nature
apostatized after creation. Like Augustine he regards every child as an
individualized part of that general human nature which Adam possessed,
so that it has actually sinned in Adam and is therefore also guilty and
polluted. If Adam had not fallen, human nature would not have
apostatized, and a holy nature would have passed from father to son. In
the present state of affairs, however, a sinful nature is propagated.
Original sin therefore has its origin in a sin of nature, while later actual
sin is altogether individual in character.

Anselm raises the question, whether the sins of the immediate ancestors
are imputed to posterity as well as the sin of the first father. And his
answer is negative, because these sins were not committed by the
common nature in Adam. The sin of Adam was unique; there never was a
second like it, because it was the transgression of an individual who
included within himself the whole of humanity. This is undoubtedly a
weak point in the system of Anselm, since all the following sins are
committed by the same human nature, though individualized, and
because it does not answer the question, why only the first sin of Adam is
imputed to his posterity, and not his later sins. He further calls attention
to the fact that in Adam the guilt of nature, that is, original sin, rests upon
the guilt of the individual, while in his posterity the guilt of the individual
rests upon the guilt of nature. In the person of Adam the whole human
race was tried. At this point he approaches the later covenant idea.

b. His Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will. Anselm also discusses the
problem of the freedom of the will and makes some valuable suggestions.
He declares the popular definition of freedom as the power of sinning or
not sinning, or as the possibilitas utriusque partis, to be inadequate. It
does not hold with reference to the holy angels. They have perfect moral
freedom, and yet are not able to sin. He holds that the will which, of itself
and without external compulsion, is so strongly determined to the right
as to be unable to desert the path of rectitude, is freer than the will which
is so feebly determined to the right as to be able to depart from the way of
righteousness. But if this is so, the question arises, whether we can call
the apostasy of the angels and of our first parents a free act. To this
Anselm replies that the act of our first parents was certainly an act of
spontaneity, of pure self-will, but not an act of genuine freedom. They
sinned, not because of their freedom, but in spite of it. by virtue of the
possibilitas peccandi (the possibility of sinning). The power to do
otherwise than they were doing added nothing to their freedom, because
they were voluntarily holy without it. He distinguishes between true
freedom and the voluntary faculty itself. The former was lost, but the
latter was not. The true end and destination of the will is not to choose
either good or evil, but to choose the good. The voluntary faculty was
intended by the Creator to will the right and nothing else. Its true
freedom consists in its self-determination to holiness. This means the
rejection of the idea that freedom is caprice, and that the will was created
with the liberty of indifference. It is by creation shut up to the choice of
but one object, namely, holiness. But the acceptance of this end must be a
self-determination, and not a compulsion from without. The power to
choose the wrong, when given for the purpose of probation, subtracts
from the perfection of real freedom, because it exposes to the hazards of
an illegitimate choice.

4. PECULIARITIES OF ROMAN CATHOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY. The

Roman Catholic Church clearly harbored two tendencies, the one Semi-
Augustinian and the other Semi-Pelagian, of which the latter gradually
gained the upper hand. We cannot follow the discussions of all the
Scholastics here, and therefore merely state the characteristic teachings
that gradually emerged.

The view gradually prevailed that original righteousness was not a

natural but a supernatural endowment of man. Man, it was held,
naturally consists of flesh and spirit, and from these diverse or contrary
propensities there arises a conflict (concupiscence), which often makes
right action difficult. To offset the disadvantages of this original languor
of nature, God added to man a certain remarkable gift, namely, original
righteousness, which served as a check to keep the inferior part of man in
proper subjection to the superior, and the superior to God. This original
righteousness was a supernatural gift, a donum superadditum, something
added to the nature of man, who was created without positive
righteousness, but also without positive unrighteousness.

With the entrance of sin into the world man lost this original
righteousness. This means that the apostasy of man did not involve the
loss of any natural endowment of man, but only the loss of a supernatural
gift, which was foreign to the essential nature of man. Original
righteousness was lost and man lapsed bark into the condition of an
unrestrained conflict between flesh and spirit. The supremacy of the
higher over the lower element in his nature was fatally weakened. Man
was brought back to the neutral condition, in which he was neither sinful
nor holy, but from the very constitution of his nature subject to a conflict
between the flesh and the spirit.

Since Adam, the head of the human race, was constituted the
representative of all his descendants, they all sinned in him and come
into the world burdened with original sin. While the Scholastics differ
very much as to the nature of original sin, the prevailing opinion is that it
is not something positive, but rather the absence of something that ought
to be present, particularly the privation of original justice, though some
add a positive element, namely, an inclination to evil. By original justice
some understand that original righteousness that was super-added to
man, and others in addition to this also what is called the justitia
naturalis. This sin is universal and is voluntary as derived from the first
parent. It should not be identified with concupiscence, with the evil
desires and lusts that are present in man, for these are not sin in the
proper sense of the word.

Roman Catholics reject the idea of man's spiritual impotence and his
utter dependence on the grace of God for renewal. They adopt the theory
of synergism in regeneration, that is, that man co-operates with God in
the spiritual renewal of the soul. He prepares and disposes himself for the
grace of justification, which is said to consist in infused righteousness. In
the days of the Reformation the monergism of the Reformers was
opposed by the Roman Catholic Church with greater vehemence than any
other doctrine.

Questions for Further Study: Why did the Church hesitate to accept strict
Augustinianism? In what direction did the Church move at first, and what
view gradually gained the upper hand? How did the views of Gregory the
Great differ from those of Augustine? Did Gottschalk hold that God
predestinated the reprobate to commit sin? What practical interests were
thought to be endangered by his teaching? In what respect was Anselm's
conception of original sin defective. Did he give an adequate explanation
of the transmission of sin? How did his conception of the freedom of the
will differ from that of Pelagius? What different views of original sin were
current among the Scholastics? Do Roman Catholics believe that the fall
of man affected the constitutional nature of man? How do they define
original sin? How does it differ from concupiscence? Do they ascribe
freedom to the will after the fall? In what sense?

Literature: Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, pp. 142–165; Otten, Manual of

the History of Dogmas, II, pp. 129–170; Welch, Anselm and His Work;
Seeberg, History of Doctrine, II, pp. 21–23, 30–33, 114–118, and so on, cf.
Index; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, II, pp. 508–512; Sheldon,
History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 343–356; Thomasius,
Dogmengeschichte, II, pp. 115–121, 125–142; Shedd, History of Christian
Doctrine, II, pp. 111–151; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, cf. Index.

IV. The Anthropology of the Period of the Reformation

1. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS. The Reformers

followed Augustine and Anselm in their construction of the doctrine of
sin and grace, though with some modifications. They gave a more exact
definition of the relation of Adam's sin to that of his descendants by
substituting for the realistic theory of Tertullian, Augustine, and Anselm,
the covenant idea. It is true that they did not fully develop this idea; yet
they utilized it in defining the relation between Adam and his
descendants. Beza especially emphasized the fact that Adam was not only
the natural head of the human race, but also its federal representative;
and that consequently his first sin is imputed as guilt to all his
descendants. And because all are guilty in Adam, they are also born in a
polluted condition.

Calvin stressed the fact that original sin is not merely a privation, but also
a total corruption of human nature. And where Augustine sought this
corruption primarily in the sensual appetites, Calvin pointed out that it
has its seat in the higher as well as in the lower faculties of the soul, and
that it operates through these as a positive evil. In opposition to the
Roman Catholics the Reformers maintained that original sin is something
more than a mere absence of original justice; and that also the first
movements of the desires, which tend in the direction of sin, are actually
sins., even before they are assented to by the will, and not merely the
fomes or fuel of sin. They are indwelling sins, which make man guilty and
worthy of condemnation. According to Calvin and the Reformers
generally, original sin is a hereditary depravity and corruption of human
nature, rendering man obnoxious to the divine wrath and producing in
him the works of the flesh. We are by nature guilty and polluted in Adam,
and stand justly condemned in the sight of God.

The generally prevailing view among the Reformers was that, as a result
of the fall, man is totally depraved, incapable of doing any spiritual good,
and therefore also unable to make the least advance toward his recovery.
Luther and Calvin express themselves strongly on this, point, and Zwingli
is in general agreement with them here, though he seemingly regards
original sin as a disease and a condition rather than as sin in the proper
sense of the word. Even Melanchton subscribed to this view at first, but in
a later period modified his opinion. But while maintaining the doctrine of
total depravity, the Reformers also held that the unregenerate could still
perform civil righteousness, a righteousness which God approves in the
social relations of men. Even Luther, who uses exceptionally strong
expressions respecting the spiritual inability of man, clearly recognizes
his ability to do good in secular affairs. Melanchton went even farther
than Luther; and Calvin did more than anyone else to direct attention to
the fact that there is a common grace of God. which enables man to
perform civil righteousness.

The natural correlative of the doctrine of total depravity, is that of the

absolute dependence of man on the grace of God for renewal. Luther,
Calvin, and Zwingli are a unit on this point, but Melanchton, though first
in perfect agreement with Luther, under the stress of the opposition to
the doctrine of the bondage of the will, ascribed a certain measure of
material freedom or spiritual power to the will and taught a synergistic
theory of regeneration.

In view of all the preceding it was but natural that the Reformers should
be strict predestinarians. Luther and Calvin both believed in a double
predestination, though the former does not make the doctrine as
prominent as the latter and sometimes manifests an inclination to deny
the doctrine of reprobation or to make it dependent on foreknowledge.
Zwingli also taught this doctrine in unmistakable terms, and was not as
cautious as Calvin in describing the relation of the divine agency to sin,
but insists on reprobation as an efficient decree. Melanchton, of course,
wavered here, as he did in his teaching on sin and regeneration. He
avoided the subject of predestination as much as possible.

After the Reformation the covenant idea was more fully developed,
especially in the writings of Bullinger, Polanus, Gomarus, Cloppenburg,
and Coccejus. It became evident that Adam was not merely the natural
head of humanity, but also its federal head, the moral and legal
representative of all his descendants. As a result the idea that all men
sinned in Adam literally and realistically gave way to the thought that
they sinned in him representatively. Because the first man sinned as the
legal representative of all his descendants, the guilt of his sin is imputed
to them, and consequently they are also born corrupt. The realistic theory
was abandoned, more generally in Reformed than in Lutheran circles,
and the covenant idea was utilized in its stead to explain the transmission
of sin.

2. THE SOCINIAN POSITION. Socinianism represents a reaction against

the doctrine of the Reformation, and in the doctrines of sin and grace it is
simply a revival of the old Pelagian heresy. According to it the image of
God in which man was formed consisted merely in man's dominion over
the lower creation, and not in any moral perfection or excellence of
nature. Since Adam had no positive righteousness or holiness, he could
not lose it as the result of sin. While he sinned and incurred the divine
displeasure, his moral nature remained intact, and is transmitted
unimpaired to his posterity. Man dies, not because of the sin of Adam,
but because he was created mortal, Men are even now by nature like
Adam in that they have no proneness or tendency to sin, but are placed in
somewhat more unfavorable circumstances because of the examples of
sin which they see and of which they hear. While this increases their
chances of falling into sin, they can avoid sin altogether, and some of
them actually do. And even if they do fall in sin and are thus guilty of
transgression, they do not therefore incur the divine wrath. God is a kind
and merciful Father, who knows their frailty and is quite ready to forgive
them when they come to him with penitent hearts. They need no Saviour
nor any extraordinary interposition of God to secure their salvation. No
change in their moral nature is required, and no provision for effecting
such a change was made. However, the teachings and example of Christ
are helpful in leading them in the right direction.

3. ARMINIAN ANTHROPOLOGY. In the beginning of the seventeenth

century the Calvinistic doctrine of sin and grace met with a determined
opposition in the Netherlands, which centered in the great Arminian
controversy. Arminius, a disciple of Beza, and at first a strict Calvinist,
became a convert to the doctrine of universal grace and free will. He
denied the decree of reprobation and toned down the doctrine of original
sin. His successor at Leyden, Episcopius, and his other followers, such as
Uytenbogaert, Grotius, Limborch, and others, departed still farther from
the accepted doctrine of the Church, and finally embodied their views in a
remonstrance, consisting of five articles.

The position taken by the Arminians is practically that of Semi-

Pelagianism. While they do believe that Adam's transgression had an evil
effect on the spiritual condition of all his descendants, they reject the
doctrine of original sin as it was taught by the Churches of the
Reformation. They maintain that the guilt of Adam's sin is not imputed to
his descendants, though its pollution is passed on from father to son. This
pollution they do not regard as sin in the proper sense of the word but
only as a disease or a weakness. It does not bring man under a sentence
of condemnation, but weakens his nature, so that he is incapable of
attaining to eternal life, either by reestablishing himself in the favor of
God or by discovering for himself a way of salvation. They do not believe
in the total depravity of human nature, though they occasionally express
themselves as if they do, but leave room for the free will of man in the
material sense of the word, that is, as a natural power or ability in man to
do something that is spiritually good, so that he can also in some measure
prepare himself for turning to God and doing His will.

They also propose a theory of grace which differs essentially from that of
the Confessions, distinguishing three different degrees in grace, namely,
(a) prevenient or common grace; (b) the grace of evangelical obedience;
and (c) the grace of perseverance. The Holy Spirit confers on all men
sufficient grace to counteract the effect of the inherited depravity and to
enable them to co-operate with the Spirit of God in regeneration. If some
are not regenerated, it must be due to the failure of the human will to co-
operate with the divine. He who makes proper use of this sufficient or
enabling grace becomes the object of God's efficient grace. He receives
the higher grace of evangelical obedience, and in the way of obedience
may become a partaker of the still higher grace of perseverance.

This theory of sufficient grace is supposed to safeguard the doctrine of

human responsibility. Since original sin cannot be imputed to man as a
fault, God cannot demand faith of him irrespective of the bestowal of
enabling grace. But if He bestows a grace on him, as He does, which
removes his spiritual inability, He also has the perfect right to demand
faith. If man resists this grace of God and refuses to co-operate with it, he
is naturally responsible for the fact that he is not regenerated.

In harmony with these views the Arminians naturally did not believe in
absolute election or reprobation, but based election on foreseen faith,
obedience, and perseverance, and reprobation on foreseen unbelief,
disobedience, and persistence in sin. In that respect they were far less
consistent than the Socinians, who clearly saw that, if they rejected
predestination, they had to reject foreknowledge as well.

4. THE POSITION OF THE SYNOD OF DORT. This Synod was

summoned by the States General of the Netherlands in 1618, and was
indeed an august assembly, consisting of eighty-four members and
eighteen political delegates. Forty-eight of these were Hollanders, and the
rest foreigners, representing England, Scotland, the Palatinate, Hesse,
Nassau, Bremen, Emden, and Switzerland. The delegates of France and
Brandenburg did not appear. The Arminians were not seated as
members, but appeared only as defendants. One hundred and fifty-four
sessions were held, and a large number of conferences. It was the most
representative body that ever met. The Synod was uncompromising in the
doctrinal matters that were brought before it: it rejected the five Articles
of the Remonstrance, and adopted five thoroughly Calvinistic canons, in
which the doctrines of the Reformation and particularly Calvin, on the
disputed points are set forth with clearness and precision, and the
Arminian errors are exposed and rejected.

The Synod affirmed the doctrine of a double predestination, based on the

good pleasure of God, and not on foreseen faith and unbelief. Both
election and reprobation are therefore absolute. Election is from the
fallen race, subject to condemnation on account of the sin of Adam; and
reprobation consists in preterition, the passing by of a certain number of
the fallen race, leaving them in their ruin, and condemnation on account
of their sin.

It asserted the doctrine of original sin in the strict sense of the word.
Since Adam was the legal representative of all his descendants, the guilt
of his first sin is imputed to them, and in consequence the corruption of
human nature is also propagated to them. They are totally corrupt, that
is, corrupt in every part of their being and so corrupt that they cannot do
any spiritual good and cannot make a single effort to restore the broken
relationship with God. At the same time the Canons also say: "There
remain, however, in man since the fall, the glimmerings of natural light,
whereby he retains some knowledge of God, of natural things, and of the
difference between good and evil, and discovers some regard for virtue,
good order in society, and for maintaining an orderly external
deportment. But so far is this light of nature from being sufficient to
bring him to a saving knowledge of God, that he is incapable of using it
aright even in things natural and civil." III and IV, Art 4.
Regeneration is regarded as strictly monergistic, and not at all as the
work of God and man. Without regenerating grace no one can turn to
God, and none can accept the offer of salvation apart from an efficient act
of God founded on election. Yet salvation is offered in all seriousness to
all who hear the Gospel on condition of faith and repentance. They who
are lost will have only themselves to blame.

The decisions of the Synod of Dort were of great importance for various
reasons: (a) They were deliverances on some of the most important
points of Reformed theology, which up to that time had not received such
careful consideration. (b) They were to all intents deliverances of an
Ecumenical Council, composed of many of the ablest theologians of the
day, the most representative body that ever met. (c) They terminated the
uncertainty that prevailed in the churches of the Netherlands, an
uncertainty that was also felt in other countries, and warded off a great
danger that threatened the Reformed faith. (d) They had a determining
influence on the composition of the later Westminster Confession.

5. THE POSITION OF THE SCHOOL OF SAUMUR. The School of

Saumur made an attempt to tone down the Calvinism of the Synod of
Dort especially on two points. Amyraldus distinguished between a
universal and conditional, and a limited and unconditional decree. In the
former God decreed to provide a universal salvation through the
mediation of Jesus Christ, to be offered to all alike on condition of faith,
and in the latter He, seeing that of himself no man would believe, elected
some to eternal life and decided to give them the necessary grace of faith
and repentance. And Placaeus, another representative of the School,
denied the immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. Men are
not accounted guilty in Adam and therefore born corrupt, but derive from
him the corruption of nature, and this is now imputed to them as guilt.
Placaeus calls this mediate and consequent imputation.

The case of Amyrald was brought up at three Synods, which did not
condemn him, but found it necessary to guard against the misconceptions
to which his view might lead, while the Synod of Charenton in 1645
rejected the theory of Placaeus. In opposition to both the Formula
Consensus Helvetica was drawn up by Heidegger, Turretin, and Geneler,
which gave a clear statement of the Reformed position and was for a time
honoured in Switzerland as an official standard. The Articles bearing on
the position of Amyraldus and Placaeus are quoted by Shedd, History of
Doctrine II, pp. 472, 473.

Questions for Further Study: How do Calvin and Luther differ with
respect to the doctrine of predestination? What advantage has the
covenant idea in the explanation of original sin? Is the total depravity
taught by the Reformers the same as absolute depravity? What is the
Arminian view of sin and grace? Does it differ in any way from Semi-
Pelagianism? How do the Wesleyan Arminians differ from the original
Arminians on these doctrines? Does the position of the Synod of Dort
differ from that of the Heidelberg Catechism on these points? What
objections are there to the position of Amyraldus? What is the difference
between mediate and immediate imputation?

Literature: Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Books II and III;

Luther, The Bondage of the Will; Canons of Dort; Cunningham, The
Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, pp. 413–470; Koest-lin,
The Theology of Luther, cf. Index; Dorner, History of Protestant
Theology, 2 vols., cf. Index; Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, pp.
371–513; Seeberg, History of Doctrine, II, pp. 227–272, 398–408;
Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, II, pp. 117–133; Neander, History
of Christian Dogma, II, pp. 653–660; Shedd, History of Christian
Doctrine, II, pp. 111–196.

V. Anthropological Views of Post-Reformation Times

It is not necessary to discuss the anthropology of the Post-Reformation

period at length. There have been no controversies that brought new
elements to the foreground, and no Synods or Councils that formulated
new dogmas. It may be well, however, to notice a couple of divergenges
from the teachings of the Reformation, and to give a brief description of
the most important theories of sin that were advanced by individual
theologians during the last two centuries.

1. DIVERGENT VIEWS. There are especially two that deserve

consideration.

a. A Modification of the Arminian View in Wesleyan Arminianism. It is a

well known fact that Arminius himself did not depart as far from
Scripture truth and from the teachings of the Reformers as did his
followers at the time of the Synod of Dort. Moses Stuart even thought it
possible to prove that Arminius was not an Arminian. Now Wesleyan
Arminianism. which originated in the middle of the eighteenth century,
claims the parentage of Arminius himself rather than that of later
Arminianism, though it differs in some respects even from Arminius. "Its
theology", says Sheldon, "was shapen by a warm evangelical piety, and
hears the impress at once of a deep sense of dependence upon God, and
of an earnest, practical regard for human freedom and responsibility."
History of Christian Doctrine II, p. 263. It differs from the doctrine of sin
and grace of the earlier Arminians in the following points: (1) It stresses
the fact that original sin is not merely a disease or a pollution of nature,
which cannot be called sin in the strict sense of the word, but is really and
truly sin and renders man guilty in the sight of God. The guilt of Adam's
sin is indeed imputed to his descendants. But at the same time it holds
that this original guilt was cancelled by the justification of all men in
Christ. This means that the idea of original guilt has after all only a
theoretical place in this system, since its cancellation is one of the
universal benefits of the atonement. (2) It denies that man, as he is by
nature, has any ability whatsoever to co-operate with the grace of God,
and admits his entire moral depravity, so that he is absolutely dependent
on the grace of God for salvation. But at the same time it holds that no
man actually exists in that state of inability. In view of the universal
bearing of the redemption through Christ God graciously endows every
man with sufficient enabling grace, so that he can turn to God in faith and
repentance. The original Arminians held that it was only just that God
should thus enable men to believe and repent, since they could not be
held accountable without some spiritual ability. The Wesleyan
Arminians, however, regard this as a matter of free grace on the part of
God.

b. A Modification of the Reformed Views in New England, The

anthropology of the New England theologians differs in some respects
from that of the Reformers and of the Reformed Churches in general. The
most important of these departures are the following:

(1) That on the Relation of God's will to the fall of man. Jonathan
Edwards ruled out the category of efficiency from God's connection with
the fall of man, and used the ordinary Calvinistic phraseology. But some
of his followers were not so careful, and either implied or stated explicitly
that there is a divine efficiency in connection with the production of evil.
Hopkins seems to imply this in some of his statements, and Emmons
teaches it explicitly. In later New England or New Haven theology,
represented by such men as Timothy Dwight and N. W. Taylor, there was
a strong tendency to reduce the divine connection with the entrance of
sin into the world to the lowest possible point consistent with an all-
inclusive providence. The general view seems to be that God's
determination to create a moral universe naturally included the creation
of free moral agents with the power of contrary choice, and thus rendered
sin possible, but hardly certain. At the same time sin is also regarded as
"necessarily incidental to the best system."

(2) That in Connection with the Free Will of Man. Jonathan Edwards
somewhat over-emphasized the determinate character of the will, and
thus exposed himself to the charge of determinism. He was perfectly
right, however, in emphasizing the fact that freedom has its laws, known
to God, and that in view of this fact it is perfectly consistent with
certainty. Man as he was created by God possessed moral freedom and
possesses it still; and it was in the exercise of this freedom that he
brought sin into the world. He also possessed real freedom, however, that
is, his will was determined in the direction of goodness and holiness by
the original constitution of his nature. This real freedom he lost by sin.
Later New England theologians stressed the fact that the power of
contrary choice must be predicated of a free and responsible moral being.
They approached the Arminian standpoint, but yet subscribed to the
theory that given antecedents will be followed by given consequents, that
the power to vary the result is never used, and that the divine
foreknowledge is dependent on this variable, but non-necessitated
succession of consequents from antecedents.

(3) That Respecting the Transmission of Sin. Edwards adopted the

realistic theory. We are connected with Adam as the branches are with a
tree, and consequently his sin is also our sin and is imputed to us as such.
This theory is not peculiar to him, however. It finds great favor among the
Lutherans, and is also advocated by such Reformed scholars as H. B.
Smith and Wm. T. Shedd. Some New England theologians, such as
Woods and Tyler, defended the Placaean theory of mediate imputation.
Through his natural connection with Adam man inherits moral depravity,
and this is imputed to him as guilt and makes him worthy of
condemnation.

2. SOME MODERN THEORIES OF SIN

a. Philosophical. Some prominent philosophers of the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries expressed themselves on the nature and origin of
sin, and in a measure influenced theological thought. Leibnitz looked
upon the evil of the world as something metaphysical rather than ethical,
regarding it as the simple and nature result of the necessary limitation of
the creature. Kant struck a discordant note in his day by postulating a
radical evil in man, a fundamental inclination to evil that cannot be
eradicated by man. It precedes all empirical acts, but is nevertheless
rooted in an autonomous will, and therefore involves guilt. He does not
identify this "radical evil" with what is generally called original sin, for he
rejects the historical account of the origin of sin and also the idea of its
physical inheritance. To him sin is something that defies explanation.
Hegel regarded sin as a necessary step in the evolution of man as a self-
conscious spirit. The original condition of man was one of naive
innocence—a state almost resembling that of the brute—in which he knew
nothing of good or evil, and merely existed in unity with nature. That
state, however natural for animals, was not natural for man, and was
therefore not ideal. Man was destined to separate himself from it and to
become a self-conscious spirit. The transition from the natural to the
moral state was effected by knowledge. The eating of the tree of
knowledge caused man to fall out of his state of paradisaical bliss. With
the awakening of the self-conscious life, the beginning of the ego-sense,
man involuntarily begins to follow his natural desires and makes the new
found self the center of these, that is, he becomes selfish and thus evil.
This is a stage, however, through which he must necessarily pass in his
self-development. While this selfishness is sinful, it cannot really be
ascribed to man as guilt until he wilfully chooses it even after he has
awakened to the consciousness that he must rise above it, and that the
selfish man is not what he ought to be. The struggle against this
selfishness is the path to virtue.

b. Theological. Schleiermacher regards sin as the necessary product of

man's sensuous nature—a result of the soul's connection with a physical
organism. It is found where the bodily appetites prevent the determining
power of the spirit from performing its proper function, and the sensuous
nature exercises a dominating influence. He denies the objective reality of
sin, however, and ascribes to it only a subjective existence, that is, he
regards it as existing only in our consciousness. The sense of sin, the
consciousness of strife within man is due to the inadequacy of his God-
consciousness as long as the sensuous nature predominates. God has so
ordained that man should ascribe guilt to this feeling of deficiency, not
because it is really sin, but so that there might be occasion for
redemption. "Original sin" is simply an acquired habit that has gradually
been formed, and that is now the source of all actual sin.

Julius Mueller, a disciple of Kant and a representative of the Mediating

School, wrote an important monograph on the doctrine of sin. He agrees
with Kant in regarding sin as a free act of the will in disobedience to the
moral law. He went beyond Kant, however, in an attempt to explain the
origin of sin. The Koenigsberg philosopher found it impossible to shed
any light on this. Mueller saw that the "radical evil" of which Kant spoke
was present in human nature from birth, or at least prior to any conscious
decision of the will, apart from which there is no sin. Since he could not
discover the origin of sin in time, he sought it in a non-temporal or pre-
temporal determination of the will. In some previous existence the choice
was made, and therefore man is born guilty and depraved. This theory is
so extremely speculative and so utterly beyond the possibility of
verification that it has found little acceptance.

Ritschl agrees with Hegel in regarding sin as a species of ignorance and as

a necessary stage in man's moral development. Like Schleiermacher he
holds that man knows sin only from the point of view of the religious
consciousness. Man must seek the Kingdom of God as the highest good,
but in his ignorance of the perfect good does the opposite. Actual sin—
and this is the only sin which Ritschl recognizes—sets itself in opposition
to the Kingdom of God. Increasing knowledge of the ideal carries with it
the consciousness of sin, which man imputes to himself as guilt. In
reality, however, as Orr says, "The guilt attaching to these acts is but a
feeling in the sinner's own consciousness, separating him from God,
which the revelation of God's fatherly love in the Gospel enables him to
overcome." The Christian View of God and the World, p. 179. God does
not impute sin as guilt because of the ignorance in which, we now live. It
is purely imaginary to think that He is angry with the sinner.

Tennant in his Hulsean Lectures on "The Origin and Propagation of Sin"

develops the doctrine of sin from the point of view of the evolutionary
theory. He denies that the impulses, desires, and qualities which man
inherited from the brute can be called sinful. These constitute only the
material sin, and do not become actual sin until they are indulged in
contrary to ethical sanctions. In the course of his development man
gradually became an ethical being with an indeterminate will (Tennant
does not explain how such a will is possible in a being subject to the law
of evolution), and this will is the only cause of sin. Sin is defined as "an
activity of the will expressed in thought, word or deed contrary to the
individual's conscience, to his notion of what is good and right, his
knowledge of the moral law and the will of God." In the measure in which
the race develops the ethical standards become more exacting and the
heinousness of sin increases, Tennant recognizes the universality of sin,
And admits that our nature and environment are of such a kind that they
make the realization of our better self a "stupendously difficult task."

Questions for Further Study: What theories were advanced respecting the
origin of the human soul? In what circles is traducianism favored? Why
do the Reformed Churches favor creationism? Was the covenant idea
generally utilized to account for the transmission of sin? Where do you
meet with a realistic explanation? What extremes do we meet in New
England respecting God's connection with the fall? Can we conceive of sin
as a necessity in human life, and yet maintain man's responsibility? What
objections are there to the view that the guilt of sin is merely a matter of
our subjective consciousness? Does the doctrine of evolution allow for a
fall of man? Can it consistently find a place for sin as guilt?

Literature: Girardeau, Calvinism and Evangelical Arminianism;

Boardman, New England Theology, pp. 61–130; Foster, History of New
England Theology, cf. Index; Taylor, Moral Government, I, pp. 302–325;
Mackintosh, Christianity and Sin, pp. 119–147; Moxon, The Doctrine of
Sin, pp. 176–219; Orchard, Modem Theories of Sin, pp. 30–46, 49–58,
65–88, 94–103; Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, especially
Lecture III; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, II, pp. 324–347;
Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 381–423, 502–528.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT OR

OF THE WORK OF CHRIST
I. The Doctrine of the Atonement Before Anselm

1. IN GREEK PATRISTIC THEOLOGY. The Apostolic Fathers speak in

general, usually Scriptural terms, of the work of Christ. The most
significant statement is found in the Epistle to Diognetus. It combines the
ideas of man's sin as deserving punishment, of God as giving His Son as a
ransom for sin, and of the resulting covering of sin by the righteousness
of Christ. The Apologists contain very little on the subject that is of
importance. In so far as Christ is represented as a Redeemer, it is usually
as a Redeemer from the power of the devil. In the Gnostic systems the
redemption wrought by Christ is a redemption from the kingdom of
darkness, the world of matter. In Marcion the death of Christ is the price
at which the God of love purchased men from the creator of the world.

Irenæus, who stands mid-way between the East and the West, agrees
with the Apologists in contemplating man as enslaved by the powers of
darkness, and looks upon redemption partly as deliverance from the
power of Satan, though he does not look upon it as a satisfaction due to
Satan. His idea is rather that the death of Christ satisfied the Justice of
God and thus liberates man. At the same time he gives great prominence
to the recapitulation theory, the idea "that Christ recapitulates in himself
all the stages of human life, and all the experiences of these stages,
including those which belong to our state as sinners." (Orr) By His
incarnation and human life he thus reverses the course on which Adam
by his sin started humanity and thus becomes a new leaven in the life of
mankind. He communicates immortality to those who are united to him
by faith and effects an ethical transformation in their lives, and by his
obedience compensates for the disobedience of Adam.

In the Alexandrian School we find several representations. In one of his

minor works Clement of Alexandria represents the death of Christ as a
payment of man's debt and as a ransom; but in his main works he gives
more prominence to the thought that Christ as Teacher saves men by
endowing them with true knowledge an inspiring them to a life of love
and true righteousness. Origen presents several different views without
combining them into a synthetic whole. Christ saves by deifying human
nature through the incarnation; by giving the supreme example of self-
sacrifice, thus inspiring others to a similar sacrifice; by laying down his
life as a sacrifice for the expiation of sin; and by redeeming men from the
power of Satan. In connection with the idea of man's redemption from
the power of the devil Origen introduces a new idea, namely that Satan
was deceived in the transaction. Christ offered Himself as a ransom to
Satan, and Satan accepted the ransom without realizing that he would not
be able to retain his hold on Christ because of the latter's divine power
and holiness. Satan swallowed the bait of Christ's humanity, and was
caught on the hook of His divinity. Thus the souls of all men—even of
those in hades—were set free from the power of Satan.

The first systematic treatise on the work of the atonement was

Athanasius' De Incarnatione. This work also contains several different
ideas. The Logos became incarnate to restore to man the true knowledge
of God, which had been lost by sin. The incarnate Logos is also
represented as man's substitute, who pays his debt for him by enduring
the penalty of sin. The necessity of this satisfaction is based on the
veracity rather than on the justice of God. It is not said that the price was
paid to Satan. The idea of Irenæus that the Logos assumed flesh in order
to deify and immortalize it, however, is made particularly prominent. At
the same time the representation of Athanasius differs from that of
Irenæus on two points: (a) the incarnation is connected up more directly
with the death and resurrection of Christ in the saving process; and (b)
the emphasis is on The ethical rather than on the physical element in the
process. Christ operates by his word and example on the hearts of man.

The true successors of Athanasius are the three Cappadocians. Basil

contributed little to the doctrine of the atonement. His younger brother,
Gregory of Nyssa, is of far greater importance as the author of the second
important systematic treatment on the work of Christ, the Great
Catechism. He repeats the idea of the deceit practiced on Satan, and
justifies the deceit on two grounds: (a) the deceiver simply received his
due when he was deceived in turn; and (b) Satan himself benefits by it in
the end, since it results in his salvation. The underlying thought of the
Great Catechism is the idea, borrowed from Athanasius, that in the
incarnation God joined himself to our nature, in order to free it from
death. It is pointed out, however, that not only death but sin also was
destroyed. Gregory of Nazianze repudiates with scorn and indignation the
idea of a ransom paid to Satan. But he also rejects the idea that God the
Father required a ransom. For the rest he virtually repeats the teachings
of Athanasius. John Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria stress the
immense value of the death of Christ. The main contribution of the latter
lies in his emphasis on the infinite value of the death of Christ as the
death of a divine Person. Baur finds that in him we have practically the
full concept of satisfaction, except the express reference of it to God and
the divine righteousness.

Greek patristic theology culminates in John of Damascus. He gathers up

the previous thoughts on the work of Christ, but adds no distinctive
contribution of his own. In summing up the development thus far, we
may say that the doctrine of the work of Christ appears under two main
aspects in Greek theology. (a) On the one hand salvation is contemplated
as the direct result of the incarnation, as a new divine revelation given to
man, or as (along with Christ's death and resurrection) communicating
new life to mankind. (b) On the other hand it is viewed as the result of the
fulfilment of certain objective conditions, such as that of a sacrifice to
God, or of a satisfaction to the divine justice, or of a ransom paid to
Satan. If we were to name any theories that are characteristic of the Greek
patristic period, we would point to what Mackintosh calls "the great
exoteric doctrine of atonement in the Greek Church", the doctrine of a
ransom paid to the devil; and to what he styles "the esoteric theory of
recapitulatio."

2. IN LATIN PATRISTIC THEOLOGY. Though the doctrine of the work

of Christ in Latin patristic theology has several points in common with
that of early Greek theology, yet even in this early period important
differences begin to emerge. The distinctively Latin type of theology
begins with Tertullian. To a certain extent he adopts Irenaeus'
recapitulation theory, but conceives of the incarnation as affecting
mankind chiefly through precept and example. Yet this whole idea
recedes somewhat into the background. He stresses far more than
Irenæus the central significance of the death of Christ on the cross,
regarding it as the culminating point in, and as the real end of, the
mission of Christ. It cannot be said that he went far beyond Irenæus in
the definite formulation of the doctrine of the death of Christ. His real
significance lies in the fact that he introduced the use of several legal
terms into theology, such as "guilt", "satisfaction", "merit", and so on,
which were destined to play a great part in the theological development of
the doctrine of the work of Christ. It should be noted, however, that he
did not yet apply these terms to the sacrificial work of Christ, but to the
repentance and good works that should follow sins committed after
baptism. He laid the foundation for the development of the doctrine of
penance in the Roman Catholic Church.

From Tertullian we pass on to Hilary of Poitiers and Ambrose, who

interpreted Greek thought to the West. The former represents more than
any other the Greek conception of the restoration of humanity by the
incarnation. But this does not prevent him from ascribing the most
definite significance to the death of Christ. In distinction from Tertullian
he even views it as a satisfaction rendered to God. Christ died voluntarily,
in order to satisfy a penal obligation. He infers the necessity of this
satisfaction, like Athanasius, from the veracity rather than from the
justice of God. Ambrose also shares the view of Irenæus, and in addition
repeats the idea of Origen that Christ paid a ransom to Satan and
practiced deceit on him. At the same time he strongly stresses the fact
that the death of Christ was a sacrifice to God, and regards this sacrifice
as a satisfaction of the divine sentence of death pronounced on sinful
humanity. However, he does not explain why this sacrifice was necessary.

We naturally feel inclined to expect that Augustine, the greatest Church

Father of the West, added greatly, both materially and formally, to the
doctrine of the work of Christ. But this is not the case; his main
accomplishments lie elsewhere. Summing up in himself the previous
development, he presents a variety of views. There is the idea of the
deification of human nature by the incarnation, though only in an ethical
manner; and there is also the notion that Satan had a claim on man,
complemented, however, by the thought that the claim of Satan was
annulled by the death of Christ. But in what may be considered as his
main line of thought Augustine is far removed from Greek theology. Both
his presuppositions and his conclusions are different. The central ideas
are those of original sin, of justification by grace, and of reconciliation by
the sacrifice of Christ. The new Western type of thought is asserting itself
and we find ourselves moving in a Pauline circle of ideas. Man is
contemplated as subject to the wrath of God, and the sacrifice of Christ as
placating this wrath and reconciling man to God. Augustine does not
work out these thoughts into a complete system; his statement falls far
short of Anselm's well articulated theory of the atonement. He does not
sharply distinguish between the judicial and the renovating side of
redemption. Justification is sometimes made to rest, not upon the
removal of the guilt of sin by Jesus Christ, but on the sanctifying
influence of the Holy Spirit. Again, he sometimes teaches that, though the
atonement by Christ was the most suitable way of salvation, God might
have saved sinners in some other way, thus making the atonement only
relatively necessary. This really means that God's power might have gone
against His wisdom.

Of the theologians that were strongly influenced by Augustine only one

calls for special mention, namely, Gregory the Great. His writings contain
a passage which has been called "the completest synthesis of ancient
Latin theology on the atonement." Its thought runs as follows: Man
voluntarily fell under the dominion of sin and death, and only a sacrifice
could blot out such sin. But where was the sacrifice to be found? An
animal could not serve the purpose; only a man would do, and yet no
man could be found without sin. Therefore the Son of God became
incarnate, assuming our nature, but not our sinfulness. The Sinless One
became a sacrifice for us, a victim that could die in virtue of His
humanity, and could cleanse in virtue of His righteousness. He paid for
us a debt of death which He had not deserved, that the death which was
our due might not harm us. This statement of Gregory may be regarded
as a distinct advance in the development of the doctrine of the
atonement.

Questions for Further Study: At what points did the philosophy of the day
affect the doctrine of the work of Christ? In what sense did the early
Church Fathers speak of the deification of human nature? How is it to be
understood that man becomes immortal through the work of Christ? Is
there any scriptural basis for Irenæus' recapitulation theory? Is the idea
that the incarnation saves man fundamentally Johannine? Does Origen
have the same conception of deification as Irenæus? How can we explain
the origin of the idea that a ransom had to be paid to Satan? Did all the
early Fathers conceive of salvation by the incarnation in the same way?
Did they have a clear conception of the death of Christ as rendering
satisfaction to the justice of God? How did Tertullian apply the concepts
of guilt, satisfaction, and merit? What Pauline ideas do we meet with in
Augustine? How did Gregory the Great conceive of the atonement?

Literature: Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, I, pp.

34–140; Scott, The Nicene Theology, pp. 219–245; Fairweather, Origen
and Greek Patristic Theology; Morgan, The Importance of Tertullian in
the Development of Christian Dogma; Mozley, The Doctrine of the
Atonement, pp. 94–125; Mackintosh, Historic Theories of the Atonement,
pp. 80–116; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, I, pp. 379–395; Shedd,
History of Christian Doctrine, II, pp. 203–272; Sheldon, History of
Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 115–125, 251–258; Orr, Progress of Dogma, pp.
209–220; Histories of Harnack, Seeberg, Loofs, Neander, Fisher, cf.
Indices.

II. The Doctrine of the Atonement from Anselm to the

Reformation

The theological discussions in the five centuries between Gregory the

Great and Anselm were of such a nature that they did not contribute
much to the development of the doctrine of the atonement. With Anselm
the systematic study of the doctrine of the atonement began. He opens a
new era in the history of this doctrine.

1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT IN ANSELM. Anselm of

Canterbury made the first attempt at a harmonious and consistent
representation of the doctrine of atonement. His Cur Deus Homo is an
epoch-making book, a masterpiece of theological learning, in which the
author combines metaphysical depth with clearness of presentation. The
opening portion of the work testifies to the fact that at the time of its
writing many minds were occupied with the question of the nature and
necessity of the atonement. It also indicates that the problem of the
atonement was generally approached from the Christological side as a
question respecting the necessity of the incarnation. Several questions
were raised at the time, such as the following: Could not God have saved
man by a mere act of His omnipotence, just as easily as He could create
the world? Could not He, the merciful God, simply have pardoned the sin
of man, without demanding satisfaction? And if a mediator was
necessary, why did He choose His only-begotten Son for the work of
mediation, and not some other rational being? Once the incarnation was
admitted, it was felt that it could only find its explanation in some
stupendous exigency. This question respecting the incarnation explains
the title of Anselm's work.

The Alpha and Omega of the position of Anselm is the absolute necessity
of the atonement for the redemption of man. He deliberately rejects as
unsatisfactory the Recapitulation Theory, the Ransom-to-Satan Theory,
and the idea that the death of Christ was merely a manifestation of the
love of God to man, since these do not explain the necessity of the
atonement adequately. In his opinion the absolute necessity of the
atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ must be grounded in an immanent and
necessary attribute of the divine nature. He finds the ultimate ground for
it in the honour of God.
The exact position of Anselm can be understood only in the light of his
conception of sin and satisfaction. As a creature of God man was under
obligation to subject his will absolutely and entirely to the divine will, and
when he refused this in a spirit of revolution, he dishonoured God and
thus contracted a debt. God was robbed of His honour and this must be
restored in some way. His mercy could not simply overlook sin, for this
would be an irregularity and an injustice. There were two and only two
ways in which the divine honour could be vindicated, namely by
punishment or by satisfaction. God did not pursue the way of
punishment, since this would have spelled ruin for the human race and
would have defeated His very purpose. He chose the way of satisfaction,
which included two things: (a) that man should now render to God the
willing obedience which he owed Him; and (b) that he should make
amends for the insult to God's honour by paying something over and
above the actual debt. But since even the smallest sin, as committed
against an infinite God, outweighs the whole world and all that is not
God, and the amends must be proportionate, it follows that these are
beyond the power of man. A gift—and Anselm looks upon satisfaction as a
gift rather than as a punishment—surpassing all that is not God can only
be God. God only could make true reparation, and His mercy prompted
Him to make it through the gift of His Son. It was not sufficient that the
one rendering satisfaction should be God; He had to be man as well, one
of the human race that contracted the debt of sin, but a man without sin,
who was not himself burdened with debt. Only the God-man could satisfy
these requirements and thus do justice to the honour of God.

It was necessary for the God-man to render the obedience which man
failed to render to God. But this was not sufficient to maintain the honour
of God, for in doing this He did nothing more than. His duty as man, and
this could not constitute merit on His part. However, as a sinless being
He was not under obligation to suffer and die. This was entirely voluntary
on His part, and by submitting to bitter sufferings and a shameful death
in the faithful discharge of His duty to His Father, He brought infinite
glory to God. This was a work of supererogation, which could accrue to
the benefit of mankind, and which more than counterbalanced the
demerits of sin. Justice required that such a free gift should be rewarded.
But there is nothing which the Father can give the Son, for He needs
nothing. Therefore the reward accrues to the benefit of man and assumes
the form of the forgiveness of sins and of future blessedness for all those
who live according to the commandments of the Gospel.

The theory of Anselm marks an important advance in the development of

the doctrine of the atonement. Its real value lies in the fact that it
establishes the objective character of the atonement and bases its
necessity on the immutable nature of God, which makes it impossible
that He should permit the violation of His honour to go unpunished. It is
defective, however, as compared with the later penal substitutionary
doctrine, in several points: (a) It erroneously represents punishment and
satisfaction as alternatives from which God Could choose. (b) It has no
place for the idea that in His suffering Christ endured the penalty of sin,
since it regards the sufferings of Christ as a voluntary tribute to the
honour of God, a superfluous merit which served to compensate for the
demerits of others. This is really the Roman Catholic idea of penance
applied to the work of Christ. (c) It is inconsistent in so far as it starts out
with the principle of "private law" or custom, according to which the
injured party may demand whatever satisfaction he sees fit, and then, in
order to establish the absolute necessity of the atonement passes over to
the standpoint of public law. (d) It is one-sided in basing redemption
exclusively on the death of Christ, and denying the atoning significance of
His life. And (e) it represents the application of the merits of Christ to the
sinner as a merely external transaction. There is no hint of the mystical
union of Christ and believers.

2. ABELARD'S THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. Abelard's theory has

little in common with that of Anselm, except the denial that a price was
paid to Satan. The death of Christ is not regarded as a ransom, not even
as a ransom offered to God. Abelard rejects the Anselmian view that God
was reconciled by the death of His Son. God could not take such pleasure
in the death of His only-begotten Son as to make it the ground for the
forgiveness of sins. Moreover, no such ground was needed, since God is
love and is quite ready to forgive irrespective of any satisfaction. All He
requires is penitance in the sinner; and He is ready and even eager to
pardon the penitent. At the same time it may be said that we are justified
and reconciled to God by the blood of Christ. Christ revealed the love of
God by assuming our nature and by persevering as our teacher and
example even unto death. This great love calls for and awakens a
responsive love in the heart, of the sinner, and this is the ground for the
forgiveness of sins Luke 7:47. The newly awakened love redeems us by
liberating us from the power of sin and by leading us into the liberty of
the sons of God, so that we obey God freely from the motive of love. Thus
the forgiveness of sins is the direct result of the love kindled in our hearts,
and only indirectly the fruit of the death of Christ.

This theory brought Abelard into difficulty in connection with the

common doctrine of the forgiveness of sins through baptism. If the love
that is kindled in our hearts by the death of Christ justifies us, why is
baptism still necessary unto salvation? To this question Abelard replies
that, unless baptism or martyrdom follows the kindling of this love, it
must be concluded that perseverance has been lacking. This means that
the remission of sins does not really take place until baptism is
administered, even though love was kindled before. Particularly in the
case of children Abelard had to admit that the remission of sin was
independent of the love kindled in the heart. Loofs correctly remarks that
Abelard's new view could not be maintained without more changes than
he was prepared to make. It is probably due to this fact that he sometimes
speaks of Christ as having borne our sins, and of His death as a sacrifice
for sin.

In distinction from Anselm's doctrine of the atonement, this theory of

Abelard is thoroughly subjective. It is sadly lacking in that moral depth
and inner coherence that is so characteristic of Anselm's view. We have in
it a typical representation of what is today called the Moral, or Moral
Influence Theory of the atonement. It proceeds on the false principle that
love is the central and all-controlling attribute in God, and ignores the
demands of His justice and holiness. Moreover, it furnishes no adequate
reason for the sufferings of Christ. If God could have forgiven sins
without demanding satisfaction, why did He give up His Son to bitter
sufferings and a shameful death? Was this not a very dubious revelation
of love, seeing that He could have awakened the sinner's love in many
other ways? This theory robs the sufferings of Christ of their redemptive
significance and reduces Him to a mere moral teacher, who influences
men by His teachings and by His example.

3. REACTION TO ABELARD IN BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. Bernard of

Clairvaux criticized Abelard's theory, but did not present one of his own.
Neither did he accept the view of Anselm … He took Abelard to task
especially for his rationalistic interpretation of Christianity, and
maintained that the example of Christ makes us saints just as little as the
example of Adam made us sinners. He was quite willing to admit the
greatness and importance of the example of the love of Christ, but only as
founded in His redemptive work. In fact, it may be said that he had this in
common with Abelard, that he stressed the love of Christ manifested in
His human life and passion; but he saw in this not merely a revelation of
the love of God, but the saving manifestation of Christ's own divinity.

This idea of Bernard may be regarded as the Western counterpart of the

doctrine of Irenæus and Athanasius, that the incarnation was the
transforming entrance of God into humanity. It should be observed,
however, that he did not emphasize the physical result of the incarnation,
as bringing life and immortality, but its psychological effect, as inspiring
a patience and love similar to that of Christ. At the same time he did not
rest satisfied with this purely subjective idea, but firmly believed in an
objective redemption as the basis for the subjective. The Father did not
require the death of His Son, but accepted it as an oblation: and now it
serves to redeem us from sin, death, and the devil, and to reconcile us to
God.

4. SYNCRETISTIC VIEWS OF THE ATONEMENT. In such Schoolmen as

Peter the Lombard, Bonaventura, and Thomas Aquinas, we find traces of
the influence of both Anselm and Abelard. They adopt elements from
both, but do not succeed in combining them into an inner unity.

a. Peter the Lombard and Bonaventura. Peter the Lombard. takes his
startingpoint in the merits of Christ. By His pious life Christ merited for
Himself freedom from suffering and glorification, and when he entered
into sufferings, and death, He did it voluntarily, not for Himself but for
sinners. He thereby merited for them redemption from sin, punishment,
and the devil, and admittance to paradise. Up to this point the train of
thought is Anselmian. But when the question is asked, how the death of
Christ effects this deliverance, the answer is that it reveals to us the love
of God. By so great a pledge of love to us, we are moved and prompted to
love God, and are thus released from sin and made righteous. And when
we are free from sin, we are also free from the devil.

b. Bonaventura. According to Bonaventura it was the required

satisfaction that made the incarnation necessary. A simple creature was
not able to make satisfaction for the whole human race, and it was not
proper that a creature of another race should be taken for that purpose.
Hence it was necessary that the person rendering satisfaction should be
both God and man. This satisfaction was rendered by the merits of Christ,
which He won by acting and suffering. To make satisfaction is to pay the
honour that is due to God, and this is done by the sufferings of Christ as
the most appropriate means for placating God. Thus the righeousness as
well as the mercy of God is displayed. With this Anselmian idea, however,
the Abelardian is combined, that the passion of Christ was also the most
fitting means, since it was best suited to arouse in man a responsive love
to God. By developing the thought of Christ's relation to the Church as
that of the Head to the members of the body, Bonaventura explains far
better than Anselm had done, how the blessings of Christ are transferred
to believers.

c. Thomas Aquinas. The greatest of the Schoolmen was Thomas Aquinas.

He absorbed the thoughts of his predecessors more completely than any
other mediæval theologian. In view of this it is not surprising that we find
in him traces of both the Anselmic and Abelardian views, and that there
is no unity in his representation of the work of Christ.

There is a representation that reminds us of both Irenæus and Abelard.

The fulness of all grace dwells in the human nature of Christ. and because
He is now the Head of the human race, His perfection and virtue overflow
to the members of the body in so far as they are willing to belong to the
head. Christ as the new man is the principle and the leaven of the new
humanity. The work of redemption is thus considered from the point of
view that makes Christ the teacher and pattern of the human race by His
teachings, acts, and sufferings. These sufferings reveal more particularly
the love of God and awaken a responsive love in the hearts of men.
However, there is also a more Anselmic line of thought, and this is
generally followed in the Roman Catholic Church. Aquinas maintains that
redemption was not absolutely necessary, since God might have
permitted mankind to perish in its sins; yet he regards it as most fitting in
view of all the attributes of God. Again, he is of the opinion that God
could have redeemed man without demanding any adequate satisfaction.
He admits that a human judge could not simply overlook a violation of
the law, but asserts that God could do this in the case of sinful humanity,
since He is Himself the source of justice and was also the injured party in
the case under consideration. He Himself determined by an act of His will
what was right in this case, and could very well have remitted sin without
satisfaction, since this would have wronged no one. God chose to demand
satisfaction, however, and this made the incarnation of the Son of God
necessary, because a mere man could not atone for sin committed against
an infinite God.

The merits of Christ extended throughout the whole time of His earthly
existence, so that every action of His life contributed to the atonement of
man's sin. And this was really all that was necessary to render to God
condign satisfaction. The passion and death of Christ were, strictly
speaking, not needed. There were special reasons of congruity, however,
why God wanted full redemption to be wrought by the passion and death
of Christ, namely, that this was in keeping with both His mercy and
justice, and at the same time ensured the greatest possible effect. The
death of Christ reveals the great love of God, sets man an example of
obedience, humility, constancy, and so on; it not only delivers from sin,
but also merits justifying grace and eternal bliss, and offers a strong
motive for refraining from sin.

The passion of Christ effects the salvation of sinners in four different

ways: (a) by meriting the blessings of salvation, which are passed on to
sinners; (b) as a superabundant satisfaction well-pleasing to God, the
benefits of which are communicated to the faithful in virtue of the
mystical union; (c) as a voluntary sacrifice with which God was delighted;
and (d) by redeeming sinners from slavery and punishment. Though man
was reduced to spiritual slavery by the devil, the latter had no rightful
claims, and therefore did not receive the ransom. The superabundant
satisfaction of Christ does not save man, however, apart from baptism
and penance; and the reason for this lies in the necessary "configuration"
of the members to the Head in the mystical body of Jesus Christ.

While these views of Thomas Aquinas reveal considerable similarity with

those of Anselm, they are in some respects inferior and in others superior
to them. They are inferior, since they do not manifest the same logical
coherence and fail to ground the necessity of the atonement in the divine
nature, making, it dependent simply on the will of God, which might have
chosen another way and might even have dispensed with satisfaction
altogether. This element of arbitrariness readily became a bridge to the
acceptilation theory of Duns Scotus. They are superior, however, in their
approach to the idea of penal satisfaction, that is, of satisfaction through
punishment; in their greater emphasis on the merits of Christ, in which
the later distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ is
anticipated; and in the introduction of the idea of the mystical union to
account for the transmission of the merits of Christ to believers.

5. DUNS SCOTUS ON THE ATONEMENT. While Aquinas represents the

Dominican theology, which is the official theology of the Church of Rome,
Duns Scotus may be regarded as the founder of the Franciscan theology.
His work is primarily critical and negative. He wrote no Summa like
Aquinas, but incorporated his views on the atoning work of Christ in his
Commentaries on the Sentences of Lombardus. We may proceed on the
assumption that he shares the views of Lombardus where he does not
correct them. In this way it is possible to obtain a somewhat more
positive construction of his view of the atonement than would otherwise
be available. He differs in some important points from his predecessors.

He makes the atonement itself, the character it assumes, and the effect
which it has, depend altogether on the arbitrary will of God. He asserts
that there was no inherent necessity for rendering satisfaction. This was
necessary only because God willed it; but it was not necessary that He
should will it; this was altogether a contingent act of God. Furthermore,
he holds that, even if the necessity of satisfaction were granted, it would
not follow that it had to assume the exact form which it actually took. It
was not necessary that the one rendering it should be God, or should be
greater than the whole creation. One pious act of Adam might have
served to atone for his first sin. Again, he does not consider it capable of
proof that satisfaction had to be rendered by a man. God might have
accepted the deed of an angel as a sufficient atonement. It all depended
on the arbitrary will of God.

However, God foreordained from eternity the passion of Christ as the

means for the salvation of the predestinated. This passion has a peculiar
value and a special efficacy only because it was foreordained as the means
of salvation, and because God was willing to accept it as effectual. Duns
denies the infinite value of the merits of Christ, because they were merits
of the human nature, which is after all finite. By an act of His will,
however, God determined to accept them as sufficient. A merit that is not
at all commensurate with the debt owed is willingly accepted by God. This
theory is generally called the Acceptilation Theory, but according to
Mackintosh (Historic Theories of the Atonement, p. 110 f.) should really
be called the Acceptation Theory of the atonement.

Questions for Further Study: Does the Roman Catholic Church follow
Anselm in maintaining the absolute necessity of the atonement? How do
you account for it that Anselm represents the honour rather than the
penal justice of God as demanding satisfaction? What was his conception
of sin? Where did he get the idea that sin must be followed by either
punishment or satisfaction? How can it be accounted for that he centers
his thought of merit exclusively on the death of Christ? Why is his theory
sometimes called the "Commercial Theory"? In what sense did Abelard
regard the atonement as necessary? Why is his theory called subjective?
Is it proper to speak of the so-called subjective theories as theories of
atonement? Does Abelard give a sufficient explanation of the sufferings
and death of Christ? What is the great objection to the view of Duns
Scotus? What remains of the merits of Christ in his view? What is the
difference between acceptilation and acceptation? In what respect does
the view of Thomas Aquinas mark an advance on that of Anselm?

Literature: Mackintosh, Historic Theories of the Atonement, pp. 117–148;

Mozley, The Doctrine of the Atonement, pp. 125–140; Franks, A History
of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, I, pp. 147–328; Welch, Anslem and
His Work, particularly pp. 172–184; Otten, A Manual of the History of
Dogmas, II, pp. 201–213; McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, II,
pp. 185–305; Seeberg, History of Doctrines, II, pp. 66–74, 110–114; 156–
160; Loofs, Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 260–264; Thomasius,
Dogmengeschichte, II, pp. 95–115; Neander, History of Christian
Dogmas, II, pp. 514–521, 580–584; Shedd, History of Christian
Doctrines, II, pp. 273–320; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrines, I,
pp. 361–370; Orr, Progress of Dogma, pp. 220–233; Fisher, History of
Christian Doctrines, pp. 216–228.

III. The Doctrine of the Atonement in the Period of the

Reformation

The doctrine of the atonement did not constitute one of the subjects of
debate between the Reformers and the Roman Catholic Church. Both
regarded the death of Christ as a satisfaction for sin, and a satisfaction of
infinite value. Their differences concerned primarily the subjective
application of the work of Christ. Yet there was a difference of emphasis
even in connection with the atonement. The Reformers moved along
definite lines in fundamental agreement with Anselm, though differing
from him in some details, while the Roman Catholic Church reflected the
uncertainty and indeterminateness of the scholastic era, though in the
main agreeing with Thomas Aquinas.

1. THE REFORMERS IMPROVING ON THE DOCTRINE OF ANSELM.

There is substantial agreement between the Reformers and Anselm. Both
maintain the objective nature of the atonement and both regard it as a
necessity. They differed, however, as to the nature of this necessity.
Anselm speaks of this as absolute, while some of the Reformers regard it
as relative or hypothetical. Speaking of the requirement that the Mediator
should be both God and man, Calvin says: "If the necessity be inquired
into (the very question of Anselm), it was not what is commonly termed
simple or absolute, but flowed from the divine decree on which the
salvation of mankind depended. What was best for us, our most merciful
Father determined." Institutes II. 12. 1. They are all agreed, however, that
the atonement through the sufferings and death of Christ is most in
harmony with divine wisdom and highly appropriate. And it is certainly
unfair to say that Calvin, like Duns Scotus, makes the atonement
dependent on the arbitrary will of God. He knows of no indeterminate
will in God, but only of a will that is determined by the whole complex of
His attributes, and duly emphasizes the fact that the atonement in Christ
fully satisfies the justice of God.

In several points the doctrine of the atonement, as developed by the

Reformers, is superior to its Anselmian form. While Anselm regards sin
primarily as an infringement on the honour of God, the Reformers look
upon it first of all as transgression of the law of God and therefore as guilt
rather than as an insult. And while the former views the atonement in the
death of Christ as a superabundant gift to God in vindication of His
honour, the latter think of it as a penal sacrifice to satisfy the justice of
God. Thus the atonement is lifted out of the sphere of private rights into
that of public law.

This means that the Reformers also rejected the Anselmian alternative
"satisfaction or punishment", and pointed out that the one does not
exclude the other, but that the satisfaction rendered through the sacrifice
of Christ was satisfaction through punishment. In other words, they
stressed the fact that the sufferings of Christ were penal and vicarious.

Again, they went beyond Anselm in distinguishing clearly between active

and passive obedience in the mediatorial work of Christ, and in
recognizing the former as well as the latter as a part of the atoning work
of Christ. The God-man satisfied the demands of the divine justice, not
merely by His sufferings and death, but also by obedience to the law in its
federal aspect. His atonement consisted not only in making amends for
past transgressions, but also in keeping the law as the condition of the
covenant of works. As the last Adam He did what the first Adam failed to
do.

Finally, they also surpassed Anselm in their conception of the manner in

which the merits of Christ were passed on to sinners. Anselm's view of
this had a rather external and commercial aspect. Aquinas improved on
this by stressing the significance of the mystical union as the means of
transferring the blessings of salvation to those who stood in living
relationship to Jesus Christ. He failed, however, to give due prominence
to the receptive activity of faith. The Reformers shared his opinion
respecting the great importance of the mystical union, but in addition
directed the attention to that conscious act of man by which he
appropriates the righteousness of Christ—the act of faith. They were very
careful, however, not to represent faith as the meritorious cause of
justification.

2. THE SOCINIAN CONCEPTION OF THE ATONEMENT. A formidable

attack was made on the doctrine of the Reformers by Socinus. He began
with an attempt to remove the very foundation on which it was based,
namely, the idea of justice in God as understood by Anselm and the
Reformers. He denied the presence of any such justice in God "as
requires absolutely and inexorably that sin be punished." That perpetual
and constant justice by which He is characterized is merely His moral
equity and rectitude, by virtue of which there is no depravity or iniquity
in any of His works. The justice which is commonly so called and which is
opposed to mercy is not an immanent attribute of God, but only the effect
of His will. This also holds for that mercy of God which is opposed to
justice. It is not an internal quality in God, but is merely an effect of His
free choice. Such mercy does not prevent Him from punishing anyone;
neither does such justice keep Him from pardoning whom He pleases,
and that without satisfaction of its claims.

The burden of Socinus' criticism is to the effect that it is inconsistent to

combine the grace of God and the merits of Christ as the ground of
forgiveness and reconciliation. It is possible to maintain one of two
things: either that God forgives freely, or that He forgives for the sake of
Christ; but you cannot say both, for they are mutually exclusive. Of the
two alternatives he chooses the former, namely, that God forgives freely.
He also holds that, since guilt is personal, substitution in penal matters is
impossible; and that, even if it were allowable, it cannot be said that
Christ bore the exact penalty of the law, since this would mean that He
died as many eternal deaths as there are sinners. And yet he did not even
suffer one endless death, but only finite pain. Moreover, Socinus
maintains that the ideas of satisfaction and imputation are self-
contradictory. If Christ rendered complete satisfaction, that settles the
matter by setting the world free. It is inconsistent to make the enjoyment
of its fruits dependent on divine imputation and on the faith of man.

Socinus never tires of saying that the forgiveness of sins is an act of pure
mercy, simply on the basis of repentance and obedience. The only
conditions are sorrow for sin and an earnest desire to obey the law. He
realized, however, that he had to give some explanation of the unique
significance of Jesus, whose saving work was really excluded by his
system. He says that Christ saves sinners by revealing to them the way of
faith and obedience as the way to eternal life; by giving them an example
of true obedience both in his life and in his death and by inspiring them
to a similar life; by giving a concrete representation of obedience as the
way of life in an obedience unto death followed by the resurrection; and
by bestowing eternal life, by virtue of the power received at the
resurrection, on all those that attach themselves to Him in faith. God gave
Him this power as a reward for His obedience. This theory establishes no
direct connection between the death of Christ and the salvation of
sinners. The death of Christ did not atone for our sin, neither did it move
God to pardon sin. The forgiveness of sins depends exclusively on the
mercy of God. But because Christ received the power to bestow eternal
life on believers immediately after His death, Socinus considers it
possible to maintain that this death expiated our sins.

The Socinian doctrine is really nothing but a concoction of several

heresies condemned by the early Church; a revival of ancient Pelagianism
with its belief in the inherent goodness and spiritual ability of man; of the
old Adoptionist doctrine, making Christ as to His human nature a Son of
God by adoption; of the Moral Influence theory of the atonement with its
emphasis on the exemplary life of Christ; and of the Scotist doctrine of an
arbitrary will in God. It found little favor even among those who opposed
the penal substitutionary doctrine of the atonement. And this is no
wonder in view of the fact that it is thoroughly rationalistic, a mere
abstract play of human logic that fails altogether to do justice to the facts
revealed in the Word of God and experienced in the lives of the
redeemed.

3. THE GROTIAN THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. This theory really

represents a middle course between the doctrine of the Reformers and
the Socinian view. Grotius himself evidently did not so consider it, for he
entitled his work, Defense of the Catholic Faith Concerning the
Satisfaction of Christ Against Faustus Socinus of Siena. It is the work of
an able jurist who, on the basis of Roman law, to which Socinus appealed,
points out several flaws in the latter's arguments. At the same time he
fails to meet the most important criticism of Socinus on the doctrine of
the Reformers, namely, that Christ did not and could not really bear the
penalty of the law imposed on sinners. In fact, he himself abandons this
idea and broaches a new theory. He maintains that there is no dominant
quality of distributive justice in God which demands that the
requirements of the law be met in every particular, and which, in case of
transgression, makes full satisfaction by punishment imperative. The law
with which the sinner is concerned is not a transcript of the inherent
righteousness of God, but a positive law (as opposed to natural law), a
product of the divine will, by which God is in no way bound and which He
can alter or abrogate as He pleases. Both the law itself and its penalty can
be modified or even abolished altogether by the Ruler of the universe.

While God certainly intended this law to be valid and binding, He

reserved the right to relax it, if He should deem this best for some
important reason. This is the fundamental idea which Grotius applies in
his theory of the atonement. In strict justice the sinner deserved death,
even eternal death; but as a matter of fact that sentence is not strictly
executed, for believers are free from condemnation. A relaxation takes
place: the penalty is dispensed with, and that without strict satisfaction.
Grotius indeed speaks of Christ as rendering satisfaction, but this should
not be understood in the strict sense of an exact equivalent of the penalty
due to man. It is only a nominal equivalent, something which God is
pleased to accept as such. "This act of the Father," says Grotius, "so far as
it relates to the law is relaxation, but so far as it relates to the criminal is
remission." According to the doctrine of the Reformers there is such a
relaxation on the part of the Supreme Judge in the adoption of the
principle of vicarious substitution, but not in the substitution that is
made; this is a real and not a mere nominal equivalent. Grotius extends
the principle to both. The sufferings of Christ were only a nominal
equivalent for the sufferings due to the human race. Grotius disclaims
that his theory is a theory of acceptilation, for this, according to him,
denotes an act by which a creditor, without any compensation
whatsoever, absolutely remits an indebtedness.

But now the question naturally arises, Why did not God simply abrogate
the law, seeing that this was within His power? Why was it necessary at
all that Christ should suffer? Why was not the penalty remitted outright?
Grotius answers that God as the Ruler of the universe had to maintain
order in His great realm. It would not have been safe for Him to remit sin
without revealing in some way the inviolable nature of the law and His
holy displeasure against sin. Says Shedd: "The sufferings and death of the
Son of God are an exemplary exhibition of God's hatred of moral evil, in
connection with which it is safe and prudent to remit that penalty, which
as far as God and the divine attributes are concerned, might have been
remitted without it." The necessity of the atonement is therefore based on
the interests of the moral government of the universe. Hence the theory is
called the Governmental Theory of the Atonement.

On the one hand the theory of Grotius shows some leanings to the
doctrine of the Reformers. It has at least some appearance of teaching an
objective atonement, and maintains that the atonement was necessary to
safeguard the moral government of the universe, a consideration which
occupies a secondary place in the doctrine of the Reformers. On the other
hand it also has affinity with the Socinian theory. Both deny that the
satisfaction of Christ was required by the nature and attributes of God,
and was a full equivalent for the penalty of sin. It is perfectly evident that,
according to Grotius, the death of Christ is merely exemplary and not at
all retributive, while the Reformers claim that it is both. And finally, on
this theory the sufferings of Christ merely serve the purpose of preventing
future sins, and do not really atone for past sin.

4. THE ARMINIAN VIEW OF THE ATONEMENT. This took shape after

Grotius had published his work, and the two theologians that were most
active in its construction were Curcellæus and Limborch. They did not
adopt the Grotian scheme, though they joined him in the attempt to sail
in between the Scylla of the Socinians and the Charybdis of the Church
doctrine. In line with the Reformers they based the necessity of the
atonement on the divine nature rather than on the interests of the moral
order, though they failed to carry the idea through with logical
consistency.

It is quite characteristic of the Arminian view that it represents the death

of Christ as a sacrificial offering, but at the same time maintains that this
sacrifice should not be regarded as the payment of a debt, nor as a
complete satisfaction of justice. It is rather somewhat of a concomitant or
a conditio sine qua non of the forgiveness of sins. In both the Old
Testament and the New God sees fit to connect the manifestation of his
pardoning grace with the antecedent death of a sacrifice. The sufferings
and death of Christ are regarded as penal and judicial, and therefore as of
the nature of punishment. This does not mean, however, that He endured
what man deserved to endure, but only that by a divine appointment His
sacrificial death took the place of a penalty, and as such had the effect of
reconciling God to man and procuring the forgiveness of sins. This means
that the death of Christ is not regarded as a substituted penalty, which is
a strict equivalent (the view of the Reformers), but as a substitution for a
penalty, which may be of inferior worth. It is spoken of as a satisfaction of
benevolence. On this point the Arminians are quite in agreement with
Grotius.

They have several objections to the officially adopted doctrine of the

atonement, the most important of which may be stated as follows: (a)
Christ did not endure the full penalty of sin, since He did not suffer
eternal death, either in time or in degree. There was no endless suffering
in His case, neither was there absolute despair. (b) If Christ completely
atoned for sin, there is nothing left for divine grace to accomplish. If
justice is satisfied, the remission of sin can no longer be a matter of divine
compassion. And (c) if Christ rendered full satisfaction, God has no right
to demand faith and obedience, nor to punish the sinner, if he fails to
obey, for it is unjust to exact double punishment for one and the same
sin.

Moreover, they regard the atonement of Christ as general or universal,

which means that he "made an atonement for the sins of mankind in
general, and of every individual in particular." God sent Christ into the
world, and Christ offered Himself willingly for the purpose of saving
every individual of the human race. But while the atonement is universal
in the divine intention, it is not universally effective, since many are lost.
This partial failure is ascribed to the obstinacy of the sinner in refusing
the offered atonement and defeating the divine intention. The effective
application of the atonement depends ultimately on the sinner's will,
which can and does in many cases defeat the very purpose of God.

In opposition to this Arminian error the Synod of Dort took the position
that the atonement of Christ, though quite sufficient for the salvation of
all men, was nevertheless intended only for those to whom it is effectively
applied, in other words, for the elect. Moreover, it maintained that the
effectual application of the atonement does not, ultimately, depend on
the sinner's decision, but on the divine determination to exert special
grace. By the power of the Holy Spirit the atonement of Christ is made
effective in the hearts and lives of all those for whom Christ shed His
blood. They are all saved, and they owe their salvation exclusively to the
grace of God.

5. THE COMPROMISE OF THE SCHOOL OF SAUMUR. The School of

Saumur represents an attempt to tone down the rigorous Calvinism of the
Synod of Dort, and to avoid at the same time the error of Arminianism.
This is seen especially in the work of Amyraldus, who boldly taught a
hypothetical universalism, which was really a species of universal
atonement. God willed by an antecedent decree that all men should be
saved on condition of repentance and faith in Jesus Christ. He therefore
sent Christ into the world to die for all men. But seeing that, left to
themselves, none would repent and believe, He by a subsequent decree
elected some as the objects of the saving operation of His grace. These
and these only are actually saved.

The outcome proved this to be an untenable position. Of the followers of

this school some emphasized the first decree and the universal offer of
salvation based on it, with the result that they landed in the Arminian
camp; and others stressed the second decree and the necessity of
effectual grace, and thus returned to the Calvinistic position. The views of
the School of Saumur were practically shared by Davenant, Calamy, and
especially Richard Baxter, in England. Its peculiar opinions gave occasion
for the construction of the Formula Consensus Helvetica by Turretin and
Heidegger, in which these views are combatted.
Questions for Further Study: Did the Reformers agree with Anselm on
the absolute necessity of the atonement? What was Calvin's view on this
point? Are the Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century in
agreement with him? Do they base the necessity of the atonement on the
honour or on the justice of God? Did the Lutheran and the Reformed
theologians agree on the extent of the atonement? Are they agreed in
their view of the active obedience of Christ? What is your criticism of the
Socinian system? Did Socinus regard Christ as a priest during His earthly
life? In what sense did he regard the death of Christ as a means of
redemption? How did Grotius seek to escape the Socinian position? What
criticism would you offer on the Governmental Theory? Does the
universalism of the Arminians imply that the atonement of Christ is
universally efficacious? Why did the Synod of Dort insist on the limited
nature of the atonement? On what grounds did Piscator deny that the
active obedience of Christ was part of his satisfaction? Wherein lies the
weakness of the Amyraldian position?

Literature: Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, I, pp.

353–444; II, pp. 1–120; Mackintosh, Historic Theories of the Atonement,
pp. 149–187; Mozley, The Doctrine of the Atonement, pp. 141–158;
Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, pp. 237–370; Seeberg, History of
Doctrines, cf. Index; Shedd, History of Christian Doctrines, II, pp. 348–
386; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrines, II, pp. 138–152; Fisher,
History of Christian Doctrines, pp. 317–325, 337–346; Orr, Progress of
Dogma, pp. 236–239.

IV. The Doctrine of the Atonement After the Reformation

1. THE MARROW CONTROVERSY IN SCOTLAND. An interesting

controversy arose in Scotland in the beginning of the eighteenth century.
Neonomianism, very prevalent in England in the seventeenth century,
also made its appearance in Scotland. The name is due to the fact that it
practically changed the Gospel into a new law. According to this view
Christ atoned for all men in the sense that He made salvation possible for
all, and thus brought them all into a salvable state. He met all the
conditions of the covenant of works, and thereby abrogated the old law of
that covenant, so that His work can be called our legal righteousness.
Having met all the conditions of the covenant of works, He then
introduced a new law, the law of the Gospel, which requires faith and
conversion. These constitute the evangelical righteousness of the believer
which, however imperfect it may be, is the ground of his justification
rather than the imputed righteousness of Jesus Christ. Thus the covenant
of grace was changed into a covenant of works. This is simply
Arminianism under a new name.

The Neonomian position was opposed in England by Fisher's Marrow of

Modern Divinity, published in 1647. On the appearance of
Neonomianism in Scotland this work was re-published in that country
under the care of James Hog in 1718, and found ardent admirers in
Thomas Boston and the two Erskines. These men, together with Hog,
were soon called the Marrow-men, and were in course of time accused of
teaching antinomianism (which was not true; they were
antineonomians), and also of sponsoring a doctrine of universal
atonement and universal pardon. Though this charge did not do them
justice, yet it must be said that their desire to establish firmly the warrant
of the universal offer of salvation led them to use dubious language, by
which they laid themselves open to the charge in question. They heartily
endorsed the soundly Calvinistic principle that Christ died, in pursuance
of the covenant of redemption, to secure the salvation of the elect. But at
the same time they insisted on a general reference of the atonement. They
said that, while Christ did not die for all, that is, to save all, yet He is
available for all, was dead for all, if they will but receive Him. The giving
love of God made a gift of Christ and of the benefits of redemption to all
men, to be claimed on condition of faith. This is the basis for the
universal offer of salvation. At the same time only the elect are the objects
of God's elective love, and they only secure salvation. Their position was
condemned in 1720, and this gave rise to the separation of 1733.

2. SCHLEIERMACHER AND RITSCHL ON THE ATONEMENT

a. Schleiermacher. We meet with a comparatively new line of thought in

Schleiermacher. He rejects altogether the doctrine of penal satisfaction.
His constructive work on the doctrine of the atonement reveals little
resemblance to earlier theories, except when, in dwelling on the
sympathetic sufferings of Christ and its effect on men, it recalls the view
of Abelard. His main line of thought may be said to echo somewhat the
thoughts of those early Church Fathers who stress the incarnation as the
great redemptive act of Christ, though they certainly did not share his
pantheistic notions. Under the influence of Hegel the idea that the
incarnation was the central fact of redemption was rejuvenated; and it
was adopted by Schleiermacher, though with a slightly different
emphasis.

Schleiermacher regards Christ as the archetypal man, the perfect

prototype of humanity, whose uniqueness consisted in the fact that He
possessed a perfect and unbroken sense of union with God, and also
realized to the full the destiny of man in his character of sinless
perfection. He was the second Adam, like the first truly man, but placed
in more favorable circumstances and remaining perfect and sinless in
obedience. He was the spiritual Head of humanity, capable of animating
and sustaining the higher life of all mankind, the perfectly religious man
and the fountain of true religion, through living faith in whom others may
also become perfectly religious. This transcendant dignity finds its
explanation in a peculiar presence of God in Him. He entered into the life
of humanity as a new leaven, making those who come in contact with
Him receptive for higher things and communicating to them an inner
experience of God-consciousness similar to His own. His activity is of a
creative kind, an inspiring and life-giving influence of spirit upon spirit.
His voluntary sufferings and death served to reveal His love to mankind
and His devotion to His task, and to intensify the influence which He
brings to bear on souls that were previously alienated from God. This
view is called the Mystical Theory of the atonement. It is thoroughly
subjective and is therefore, strictly speaking, no theory of atonement at
all. It takes no account of the guilt of sin, but only seeks to explain how
man is delivered from its pollution, which in his theory is really no sin at
all. It also fails to explain how the Old Testament saints were saved.

b. Ritschl. The influence of Ritschl in modern theology is second only to

that of Schleiermacher and is still potent in present day theological
thought. Ritschl views Christ as a man who has for us the value of a God
and to whom the predicate of Godhead can be ascribed on account of His
work. He denies the fact and even the possibility of a vicarious
atonement, declares that reconciliation consists exclusively in the sinner's
change of attitude to God, and maintains that the work of redemption
pertains primarily to a community, and only secondarily to individuals in
so far as they become members of the redeemed community and thus
share its benefits. Christ wrought redemption, according to him, as the
bearer of the perfect and final revelation of God, and as the founder and
sustainer of the Christian community—the Kingdom of God. He founded
the Christian community by living His life in perfect trust and obedience,
and by exhibiting the same qualities when fidelity to His vocation made it
necessary for Him to endure sufferings and death. However, this death
had no significance as a propitiation for sin. Its value lies in the fact that
it is a power which continues to awaken steadfast faith in God's love, a
spirit of obedience unto death, and a sense of victory over the world. Yet
God pardons sin on the basis of the work of Christ in founding the
Kingdom, or for the sake of the Kingdom. In distinction from the Moral
Influence Theory, therefore, Ritschl posits an objective ground for the
forgiveness of sin. Sometimes he seems to regard Christ merely as an
exemplar, but this is only apparent. He traces the influence of Christ
primarily through the collective spirit and life which passes from the Lord
to the community which He founded.

3. SOME OF THE MORE RECENT THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT.

In the English speaking countries we meet with reproductions of most of
the typical theories considered in the preceding, though often with
variations. The following are the most important.

a. The Governmental Theory in New England Theology. The history of

New England theology reveals a downward trend in the doctrine of the
atonement. At first the penal substitutionary doctrine of the atonement
found a congenial soil there. But even as early as 1650 William Pynchon,
a prominent layman, attacked the doctrine that Christ suffered the very
torments of the lost, and the doctrine of imputation founded on it. He
was answered by Norton in 1653. Bellamy introduced what was
afterwards known as the New England doctrine of the atonement, and
was in essence simply a reproduction of the Governmental Theory of
Grotius. He also denied the limited, and asserted the universal design of
the atonement. Hopkins was in agreement with him, and maintained that
Christ did not suffer the exact penalty for sin, but something that was
substituted for it. Moreover, it was generally denied that Christ merited
anything by His active obedience; only the sufferings of Christ were
regarded as having redemptive significance. The Governmental Theory
became the dominant view of the atonement in New England theology.
Emmons tried to improve upon it by the introduction of a moral element.
He stressed the fact that the government of God is a moral government,
actuated by love. And Horace Bushnell went still farther by introducing
the Moral Influence Theory.

b. Different Types of the Moral Influence Theory

(1) Bushnell. Horace Bushnell rejected both the penal and the
governmental theories, but considered the former as superior to the
latter, since it does not lose sight of the justice of God. He does not
understand how a spectacle revealing God's abhorrence of sin can ever
issue in the forgiveness of sin. But he objects to both theories on the score
that they are too legal and external and fail to do justice to the ethical
element in the atonement. In his Vicarious Sacrifice he rejects the idea
that God had to be propitiated, and maintains that the only requirement
was that man should be reconciled to God and manifest a new spirit of
love and obedience. God Himself went forth in Christ to save man and
even suffered in the Son of His love. Christ came to lead man to
repentance and thus to reconcile him to God. In order to do this, He had
to reveal God to man and to gain a new power over him, by which He
could lead him away from sin. So He came on earth and actually entered
into the lot of man, suffered from man's opposition and sin, served him in
every way, healed his diseases, sympathized with him in his troubles, and
thereby revealed God to him in all His holiness and suffering love. By
doing this He broke man's opposition and gained his love. This was the
atonement. Christ is not only man's exemplar, but also a power of
righteousness in the life of man.

Later on Bushnell received new light, and then saw that God had to be
propitiated. Consequently, in his Forgiveness and Law he retracted the
last part of his former publication, and substituted for it the idea of self-
propitiation by self-sacrifice. He laid down the principle that neither God
nor man can forgive a sinner until he has sought to do him good and has
suffered under his repulses. When man contemplates the forgiveness of
one who has wronged him, he feels a resentment that hinders him; but he
can overcome this resentment by sacrificing something or by suffering for
the culprit. So God by His self-sacrifice overcame His resentment to
forgiveness, and thus made objective atonement. Bushnell evidently did
not realize that he made God inferior to good men, who often forgive
freely and gladly without resorting to such unusual methods.

(2) Frederick Dennison Maurice. Maurice takes his startingpoint in true

Alexandrian fashion in Christ as the Logos, and regards Him as the
archetype or root of humanity. As such Christ stands in a unique and
original relation to the race—an eternal second Adam. In the incarnation
He becomes the Mediator between God and man, bringing man into
union with God through fellowship with Himself. He is not a substitute
for, but the representative of the human race. His sufferings and sacrifice
are those due to God from the humanity of which He is the Root and
Head, and are accepted by God as a perfect satisfaction. Thus in Christ all
men are redeemed, irrespective of their faith, and they need only to be
brought to the consciousness of this redemption. The basis of this theory
is a realistic union of Christ with mankind. It can be called a Moral
Influence Theory in so far as it holds up Christ's offering of obedience as
an example for us to follow. Evidently, Maurice's view is also related to
that of Schleiermacher.

(3) McLeod Campbell. The theory of Campbell is sometimes described as

the theory of vicarious repentance. Campbell examined the doctrine of
the atonement as taught by Owen and Edwards and had great respect for
this type of theology. Yet he regards their view of the atonement as
defective in that it is too legal and does not sufficiently reflect the love of
God. In the admission of Edwards that a perfect repentance would have
availed as an atonement, if man had only been capable of adequate
repentance, he finds a hint of the true theory of the atonement. He
maintains that Christ offered to God, on behalf of humanity, the requisite
repentance, and by so doing fulfilled the conditions of forgiveness. The
work of Christ really consisted in the vicarious confession of sins in behalf
of man. The question naturally arises, how the death of Christ is related
to this vicarious confession. By His sufferings and death Christ entered
sympathetically into the Father's condemnation of sin, brought out the
heinousness of sin, and condemned sin; and this was viewed by the
Father as a perfect confession of our sins. This condemnation of sin is
calculated to produce in man that holiness which God demands in sinful
humanity. The great trouble with this theory is that it has no scriptural
basis whatsoever, and that it is hard to conceive of vicarious repentance
in a sinless beings. Moreover, it falls short woefully in its conception of
the seriousness of sin.

c. The Mystical Theory of the Atonement. There is another theory that is

popular in some circles, namely, the mystical theory that was first taught
by Schleiermacher. Bruce speaks of it in its later development as the
"theory of redemption by sample." It is also known as the Irvingian
Theory, or the Theory of Gradually Extirpated Depravity. We conclude
our sketch by calling attention to the views of Edward Irving, the great
English preacher and contemporary of Thomas Chalmers. According to
him Christ assumed human nature as it was in Adam after the fall, that is,
human nature with its inborn corruption and predisposition to moral
evil. But through the power of the Holy Spirit, or of His divine nature, He
was able to keep this corrupt human nature from manifesting itself in any
actual or personal sin, gradually purified it through His sufferings,
completely extirpating the original depravity by death, and thus reunited
it to God. This purifying of human nature in the person of Jesus Christ
constitutes His atonement. Consequently, men are saved, not by any
objective propitiation, but by becoming partakers of Christ's new
humanity by faith.

Questions for Further Study: How did the Marrow-men expose

themselves to the charge of universalism? Is it correct to say that Christ is
dead for all men, or is available for all? What type of theory did
Schleiermacher advocate? Did he conceive of sin as a reality? Does a
theory of atonement have a logical place in his system? Does the
Ritschlian theology do more justice to the doctrine of the atonement? Do
these systems do justice to the death of Christ in the work of redemption?
Was Jonathan Edwards in any way responsible for the introduction of the
Governmental Theory in New England? What advantage has this theory
over the Moral Influence Theories? Why is it, strictly speaking, incorrect
to call the latter theories of atonement? Why are these theories so much
more popular than the theory of vicarious atonement? Does the theory of
Irving do justice to the holiness of Christ? Do his followers still teach it in
its original form?

Literature: Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, II, pp.
225–259, 329–370, 387–414; Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ, pp. 309–
326; Mackintosh, Historic Theories of the Atonement, pp. 207–258;
Crawford, The Atonement, pp. 297–381; Sheldon, History of Christian
Doctrines, II, pp. 353–362; Orr, Progress of Dogma, pp. 338–345; Fisher,
History of Christian Doctrines, pp. 411–413, 437–445, 477–479; Mozley,
The Doctrine of the Atonement, pp. 165–201; Park, The Atonement (In
New England Theology).
 THE DOCTRINE OF THE APPLICATION
AND APPROPRIATION OF DIVINE GRACE
I. The Soteriology of the Patristic Period

It is natural to pass from the doctrine of the atonement, or of the

objective work of redemption through Christ, to a discussion of the
method in which believers obtain a share in its benefits, or of the
subjective application of the merits of Christ through the operation of the
Holy Spirit.

1. THE SOTERIOLOGY OF THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES. It would

be unreasonable to look for a common, definite, well integrated, and fully
developed view of the application of the work of redemption in the
earliest Church Fathers. Their representations are naturally rather
indefinite, imperfect, and incomplete, and sometimes even erroneous and
self-contradictory. Says Kahnis: "It stands as an assured fact, a fact
knowing no exceptions, and acknowledged by all well versed in the
matter, that all of the pre-Augustinian Fathers taught that in the
appropriation of salvation there is a co-working of freedom and grace."

In harmony with the New Testament statement, that man obtains the
blessings of salvation by "repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord
Jesus Christ", the early Fathers stressed these requirements. This does
not mean, however, that they at once had a full and proper conception of
faith and repentance. Faith was generally regarded as the outstanding
instrument for the reception of the merits of Christ, and was often called
the sole means of salvation. It was understood to consist in true
knowledge of God, confidence in Him, and self-committal to Him, and to
have as its special object Jesus Christ and His atoning blood. This faith,
rather than the works of the law, was regarded as the means of
justification. These ideas are repeatedly expressed by the Apostolic
Fathers, and re-occur in the Apologetes alongside of the idea that the new
knowledge or wisdom revealed by the Logos has saving significance.
Later Fathers, such as Irenæus and Origen, share the idea that man can
be saved by faith, while the Latin Fathers, Tertullian, Cyprian, and
Ambrose, even surpass them in stressing the utter depravity of man and
the necessity of justification by faith. It cannot be said, however, that a
clear conception of faith emerged in the thinking of the first three
centuries. In their emphasis on faith the Fathers largely repeated what
they found in the Bible. It is not altogether clear just what they meant
when they spoke of faith. The prevalent idea seems to be that of a merely
intellectual assent to the truth, but in some cases it apparently includes
the idea of self-surrender Yet it generally falls far short of the full and rich
conception of it as saving trust in Jesus Christ. The Alexandrians
sometimes contrast faith and knowledge, representing the former as the
initial stage, the acceptance of the truth in a general way, and the latter as
the more perfect stage in which its relations and bearings are fully
understood.

Moreover, in spite of all their emphasis on the grace of God and on faith
as the appropriating organ of salvation, the early Fathers reveal a
moralism that is not in harmony with the Pauline doctrine of salvation.
The Gospel is frequently described as a new law (nova lex). Faith and
repentance are sometimes represented as being simply dependent on the
will of man. Salvation is made to depend now on the grace of God, and
anon on the voluntary co-operation of man.

Alongside of faith repentance was also regarded as a preliminary

condition of salvation. There is some doubt as to the exact connotation of
the term "repentance", as it is found in the early Fathers. It is uncertain,
whether they conceived of it merely as an act or condition of the mind, or
regarded it as including amendment of life. At the same time it is quite
evident that, when they speak of it in the former sense, they attach great
importance to its external manifestations in penitential deeds. These
deeds are even regarded as having expiatory value in atoning for sins
committed after baptism. There is a tendency to stress the necessity of
good works, especially works of self-denial, such as liberal almsgiving,
abstinence from marriage, and so on, to attach special merit to these, and
to co-ordinate them with faith as a means of securing the divine favor.
The view taken of good works is legal rather than evangelical. This
moralistic perversion of New Testament Christianity found its
explanation in the natural self-righteousness of the human heart, and
opened a doorway through which a Judaistic legalism entered the
Church.

There is another point that deserves notice. The Church Fathers of the
first three centuries already reveal an initial drift towards ceremonialism.
The idea is widely prevalent among them that baptism carries with it the
forgiveness of previous sins, and hat pardon for sins committed after
baptism can be obtained by penance. Moreover, the thought is gradually
gaining ground that the good works of some, and especially the sufferings
of martyrs, may serve to atone for the sins of others. Towards the end of
this period an excessive value is ascribed to the intercessions of
confessors and martyrs, though some of the Church Fathers discourage
this idea. Sohm finds the explanation for this departure from the
teachings of Scripture in the fact that "the natural man is a born
Catholic." It was inevitable that in course of time these two
fundamentally different types of thought should come into conflict with
each other.

2. THE SOTERIOLOGY OF THE REMAINING CENTURIES OF THE

PATRISTIC PERIOD. Pelagius deviated much farther from the Scriptural
representation of the application of redemption than any of the earlier
Church Fathers. It may even be said that he forsook the biblical
foundation which was sacred to them, and re-asserted the self-sufficient
principle of heathen philosophy. His conception of sin and its results led
him to deny the absolute necessity of the grace of God in Christ unto
salvation, and to consider it quite possible for man to obtain salvation by
keeping the law. He did not altogether despise the "help of grace" or
"divine assistance," but even considered this desirable "in order that what
is commanded by God may be more easily fulfilled." But the grace of
which he speaks is not the gratia interna, the regenerating grace of God
by which the mind is enlightened and the will is inclined to goodness and
holiness. It consists only in: (a) "the good of nature", that is, man's
endowment with a free will, so that he can do either good or evil; and (b)
the preaching of the Gospel and the example of Christ, both of which are
directed to the mind of man and teach the way of salvation. The grace of
nature is universal and absolutely essential or necessary, but the grace of
the Gospel is neither universal nor necessary, though rendering it easier
for men to obtain salvation. It is given only to those who make a proper
use of their natural powers. This grace does not operate directly and
immediately on the will of man, but only on his understanding, which it
illuminates, and through this on the will. Moreover, it is quite possible for
man to resist its operation. Christianity is regarded as a new law and, in
comparison with the Old Testament, as an enlarged law. The real
Christian is one who knows God, believes that he is accepted by God,
obeys the precepts of the Gospel, and imitates the holiness of Christ
rather than the sin of Adam.

Augustine takes his startingpoint in a radically different view of man's

natural condition. He regards the natural man as totally depraved and
utterly unable to perform spiritual good. He also speaks of grace in the
objective sense, consisting in the Gospel, baptism, the forgiveness of sins,
and so on, but realizes that this is not sufficient, and that sinful man has
need of an internal, spiritual grace, a supernatural influence of the Spirit
of God by which the mind is enlightened and the will is inclined to
holiness. This grace, which is the fruit of predestination, is freely
distributed according to the sovereign good pleasure of God, and not
according to any merits in man. It is a gift of God that precedes all human
merits. It renews the heart, illumines the mind, inclines the will,
produces faith, and enables man to do spiritual good. Up to the time of
man's renewal its operation is strictly monergistic. Augustine at one time
thought it was in the power of man to believe, but was taught otherwise
by Paul in 1 Cor. 4:7.

He distinguishes between a gratia operans and a gratia co-operans. The

former "goes before man when unwilling, that he may will"; the latter
"follows him when willing, that he may not will in vain." This grace is
irresistible, not in the sense that it constrains man against his will, but in
the sense that it inevitably renews the heart, so that the will voluntarily
chooses the right. Man receives the first blessings of grace through
baptism, namely, regeneration or the initial renewal of the heart and the
forgiveness of sins. Both of these blessings can be lost; in fact, neither of
them can be retained unless the grace of perseverance is also received.

Great significance is attached to faith as marking the beginning of the

Christian life and as the source of all good works. Augustine conceives of
faith primarily as an intellectual assent to the truth, though in some
passages he evidently rises to a higher conception. He distinguishes
between faith in general and Christian faith, between believing in Christ
and believing Christ. One really believes in Christ only when one loves
Him and fixes one's hope on Him. Christian faith is a faith that works by
love. His conception of faith does not yet give due prominence to that
childlike trust in Christ which is the crowning element of saving faith. He
does regard faith as functioning in the. justification of the sinner, for he
says that man is justified by faith, that is, obtains justification by faith.
But he does not conceive of justification in a purely forensic sense. While
it includes the forgiveness of sins, this is not its main element. In
justification God not merely declares but makes the sinner righteous by
transforming his inner nature. He fails to distinguish clearly between
justification and sanctification and really subsumes the latter under the
former. The notable feature of Augustine's doctrinal system is that he
refers everything to the grace of God.

The Semi-Pelagians took an intermediate position, denying the total

inability of man to do spiritual good, but admitting his inability to
perform really saving works without the assistance of divine grace. The
grace of God illumines the mind and supports the will, but always in such
a manner that the free will of man is in no way compromised. In fact, the
two co-operate in the work of redemption. While the grace of God is
universal and intended for all, it becomes effective in the lives of those
who make a proper use of their free will. Strictly speaking, it is really the
will of man that determines the result. It is up to man to believe and to
continue in faith, and grace is needed only for the strengthening of faith.
There is no such thing as irresistible grace. Pelagianism was condemned
by the Synod of Carthage, by the Council of Ephesus, and again by the
Synod of Orange, which also rejected Semi-Pelagianism; and, in a
fashion, Augustinianism appeared triumphant in the Church.

This does not mean, however, that the doctrine of Augustine did not
undergo certain modifications. The teachings of this great Church Father
himself contained some elements that were in conflict with the idea of
man's absolute dependence on the grace of God, and pointed in the
direction of ceremonialism and work-righteousness. The following points
may be mentioned: (a) Participation in the grace of God is sometimes
made dependent on the Church and its sacraments. (b) It is considered
possible that the grace of God in the forgiveness of sins and regeneration
is lost again. (c) The doctrine of justification by faith, so vital to a true
conception of the way of salvation, is represented in a way that can hardly
be reconciled with the doctrine of free grace. The grace of God freely
given, does not consist primarily in the forgiveness of sins—which is in
fact a minor point in Augustine's system—but in regeneration, in the
infusion of a grace which enables man to do good works and to merit
everlasting life. Faith justifies, not because it appropriates the
righteousness of Jesus Christ, but because it works by love. Man, it is
true, has no merits antecedent to the operation of grace and the gift of
faith, but when the grace of renewal and faith is wrought in the heart, his
works are indeed meritorious. Fundamentally, therefore, grace merely
serves the purpose of making it possible for man once more to merit
salvation.

Now these elements are certainly foreign to Augustine's main line of

thought, but were eagerly seized upon by some in the Church and gave
countenance to teachings that were more Semi-Pelagian than
Augustinian. There was a protracted struggle between Augustinianism
and Semi-Pelagianism, which revealed a strong opposition to the
doctrines of predestination, the total inability of man to do spiritual good,
and irresistible grace. And the position that was finally sanctioned by the
Church, was that of a moderate Augustinianism. Seeberg says that "the
doctrine of 'grace alone' came off victorious; but the doctrine of
predestination was abandoned. The irresistible grace of predestination
was driven from the field by the sacramental grace of baptism. The
doctrine of grace was hereby brought into closer relationship with the
popular Catholicism, as also by the exaltation of good works as the aim of
the divine impartation of grace." History of Doctrines I, p. 382.

There were influences at work in the Church that were contrary to the
doctrine of grace as the source of all spiritual blessings, and of faith as the
principle from which good works proceed; influences which induced
many to exalt outward works, to insist on their meritorius character, and
to stress them at the expense of the great subjective conditions of
salvation. The following should be noted particularly: (a) There was a
tendency to confound faith with orthodoxy in the assumption that to
believe was simply to hold an orthodox creed. The attention was focussed
on a list of doctrines that required assent, and was diverted from faith as
an attitude of the soul to God, productive of the fruits of righteousness.
(b) Works of mercy and self-discipline were highly commended and often
described as the proper way of making satisfaction for the sins of
believers. (c) Many Church Fathers distinguished between divine
commands and evangelical counsels, of which the former were absolutely
binding on all Christians, while compliance with the latter was a matter of
choice, but brought greater reward to those who observed them. This
distinction was made in the interest of monasticism, and tended to make
eminent holiness The prerogative of a class that was diligent in the
performance of certain externals. (d) The increasing practice of saint-
worship and dependence on the intercession of saints, and especially of
the virgin Mary, proved detrimental to spiritual conceptions of salvation.
It led to externalism and to reliance on the works of man. The underlying
idea was that the saints had a superabundance of good works, and could
simply transfer some of them to others. (e) There was a growing tendency
to make salvation dependent on baptism, which marked the entrance into
that Church outside of which there is no salvation. In the East the
possibility of being saved without baptism was doubted, and in the West
it was absolutely denied. Even Augustine taught that children which die
unbaptized were lost.

Questions for Further Study: What accounts for the emphasis on faith
from the very beginning? Does Scripture justify the special prominence
given to repentance? Does the patristic conception of repentance agree
with the scriptural idea of it? How does penance differ from repentance?
What led to the conception of Christianity as a new law? How can it be
explained that faith was primarily understood as intellectual assent to the
truth? Do the early Fathers relate faith to justification? Have they a
proper conception of this relation? Do they regard good works merely as
the fruits of faith, or as meritorious performances? How do they conceive
of the forgiveness of sins after baptism? What did Cyprian mean, when he
wrote, "There can be no salvation to any except in the Church"? In how
far does Augustine regard divine grace as operating in a purely
monergistic manner? Did he consider regeneration as a sure sign of
election? Did he regard it as possible that some of the elect are finally
lost?

Literature: Means, Faith, An Historical Study, pp. 80–176; Scott, The

Nicene Theology, Lecture IV; Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification,
pp. 77–98; Swete, The Forgiveness of Sins, pp. 87–116; Bavinck,
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, III, pp. 573–586; Wiggers, Augustinianism
and Pelagianism, pp. 177–228; Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas,
I, pp. 89–98, 180–189, 368–381; Sheldon, History of Christian
Doctrines, I, pp. 125–132, 258–267; Crippen, History of Christian
Doctrine, pp. 146–153; Seeberg, History of Doctrines, I, cf. Index under
"grace," "faith," justification," "baptism," "penance," "good works," and so
forth.

II. The Soteriology of the Scholastic Period

When we come to the scholastic period, we meet with a variety of

opinions respecting the main elements of the saving process, such as
grace, faith, justification, merit, and good works. On the whole the
position of the Church was that of a mild Augustinianism. though there
appears in the Schoolmen a drift in the direction of Semi-Pelagianism.
We shall briefly consider some of the main concepts.

1. THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF GRACE. There was one point on

which the prevailing opinion among the Scholastics was in agreement
with Augustinianism rather than with Pelagianism and Semi-
Pelagianism. While the latter asserted that it lay in the power of the
natural man to originate and increase faith, the Scholastics generally
maintained that man could not do this without the aid of sufficient grace.
But this is about as far as the agreement with Augustine went. And even
here the agreement was not complete, for Augustine asserted the
necessity of efficient grace. There was no general agreement on the
subject of grace among the Schoolmen. The views of Peter the Lombard,
which show an unmistakable affinity with those of Augustine, were rather
widely accepted. He considered it difficult to define the exact nature of
grace, but preferred to think of it as a supernatural quality or power
wrought in man, and distinguished between a gratia operans, which
enables man to turn to God in faith, and a gratia co-operans, which co-
operates with the will and is effective in bringing about the desired result.
Only the former, and this merely as it is first bestowed on man, is
wrought in him without any action on his part, and is purely a gift of
gratuitous mercy. All further communication of grace to man is
dependent on the active consent and co-operation of the will. The free
will of man acts, but divine grace assists it as a co-operating principle,
and thus secures the desired effect.

The representation of Alexander of Hales is in general agreement with

that of Peter the Lombard, but he introduced another division, which is
characteristic of scholastic theology, when he spoke of a gratia gratis
dans, a grace giving freely (referring to the gracious activity of God), a
gratia gratis data, a grace given freely (designating all actual graces and
infused virtues), and a gratia gratum faciens, a grace making gracious
(grace as a permanent quality of the soul, making it well-pleasing to God).
Thomas Aquinas uses these terms in a somewhat different sense, and
thereby determined their later usage. While he employs the term gratia
gratum faciens as a designation of all the supernatural helps intended for
the recipient's own sanctification, he restricts the term gratia gratis data
to those gratuitous gifts that aim at the good of others rather than at that
of the recipient. In connection with the gratia gratum faciens he
distinguishes between prevenient or operating and subsequent or co-
operating grace. The former renews the will, and the latter assists it in its
operations; the former may be called sufficient and the latter efficacious.

2. THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF FAITH. There was a general

tendency in the scholastic period to distinguish between faith as a form of
knowledge, a mere assent to the truth, and faith as a spiritual affection,
productive of good works. Peter the Lombard makes a threefold
distinction here, namely, Deum credere, Deo credere, and in Deum or
Christum credere. The first two mean practically the same thing, that is,
to accept as true what God says; but the last denotes faith in a deeper
sense, by which we enter into communion with God. He says that it is one
thing to believe God, to believe that what He says is true, and quite
another to believe in God, that is, to believe so as to love Him, to go to
Him, to cleave to Him, and to be joined to the members of the body of
Christ. He also makes a distinction between the faith which is believed,
that is, the creed or dogma, and the faith by which one believes and is
justified.

After his day it became customary to distinguish between a fides

informis, consisting in a mere intellectual assent to the truth, and a fides
formata (charitate), a faith which is augmented, vivified, and determined
by the power of love, and of which love is therefore the formative
principle. Moreover, it was emphatically declared that, while the fides
informis was one of the preparations for justification, only the fides
formata, which includes the right inward disposition and works by love, is
the faith that justifies. At the same time the priesthood considered it
advantageous to stress the idea that unquestioning submission to the
authority of the Church was the main characteristic of faith, and some of
the theologians rather encouraged that notion.

3. THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTIFICATION AND MERIT.

Augustine's confusion of justification and sanctification was not rectified
but rather intensified by the Schoolmen. Their common teaching is that
justification is effected through the infusion of sanctifying grace into the
soul by God. It includes on the part of God the infusion of sanctifying
grace and the forgiveness of sins, and on the part of man the turning of
his free will to God through faith and contrition. Naturally, the last
elements are not included in the case of infants, for in them justification
is entirely the work of God, and as such comprises only the infusion of
grace and the remission of original sin.

The Scholastics were generally agreed as to what was included in

justification, and never conceived of it as a mere imputation of the
righteousness of Christ to the sinner. They differed, however, in their
determination of the logical order of the various elements in justification.
According to Thomas Aquinas there is first of all the infusion of grace,
then the turning of the free will to God, next the turning of the free will
against sin, and, finally, the remission of guilt. Alexander of Hales and
Bonaventura, however, contend for a different order, namely, attrition or
turning from sin, infusion of grace, remission or expulsion of sin, and the
turning of the free will to God. The moment grace is infused, however,
attrition becomes contrition, and then sin is expelled by grace.

Duns Scotus has an altogether different opinion. He conceives of

justification as consisting of two divine operations, namely, the
forgiveness of sins and the renovation of the soul through sanctifying
grace. While the two are simultaneous in time, in the order of nature the
forgiveness of sin precedes the infusion of grace.

The Scholastics speak of justification as an instantaneous act, but the

Council of Trent makes mention of a progressive increase of justification.
With respect to the assurance of possessing the grace of justification,
Aquinas maintains that this is not the common privilege of believers in
general. These must be satisfied with a reasonable conjecture, based upon
the signs of grace. Absolute assurance is given only to those who have
accomplished or suffered much for the sake of religion, and then by
means of a special revelation.

Alongside of the doctrine of free grace, and in connection with that of

justification, the doctrine of merit came to the foreground. The
meritoriousness of virtue, especially as expressed in good works, was
generally taught in the Middle Ages, and was hardly opposed by any
scholastic theologian of note. Thomas Aquinas distinguished between two
kinds of merit, namely, "merit of condignity," which in strict justice
deserves reward and belongs to Christ alone, and "merit of congruity",
which is fit to be rewarded and can be acquired by men. However, his
followers, the Thomists, went so far as to assert that after justification a
man may by the and of divine grace acquire a merit of condignity, that is,
can do something that gives him a claim on God. The followers of Duns
Scotus denied this, but maintained that good works done before
justification might obtain a merit of congruity and on this basis receive an
increase of grace. They held that the perfection of the divine character
would impel God to bestow on man the grace thus merited.

The Roman Catholic doctrine of the application and appropriation of

divine grace finally assumed the following form. Children born within the
pale of the Church receive the grace of regeneration, including an
infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, in baptism. Others, however, who
come under the influence of the Gospel in later years, receive sufficient
grace, that is, an illumination of the understanding and a strengthening
of the will by the Holy Spirit. They can resist but also yield to this work of
God and follow the promptings of the Spirit. By yielding to it and co-
operating with God they prepare themselves for the grace of justification
(gratia infusa). This preparation consists of the following seven elements:
(a) Assent to the truth taught by the Church; (b) insight into one's sinful
condition; (c) hope in the mercy of God; (d) the beginnings of love to
God; (e) an abhorrence of sin; (f) a resolution to obey the commandments
of God; and (g) a desire for baptism.

It is quite evident that faith does not occupy a central place here, but is
co-ordinated with the other preparations. It is merely an intellectual
assent to the doctrines of the Church (fides informis), and acquires its
justifying power only through the love that is imparted in the gratia
infusa, by which it becomes a fides caritate formata. It can be called
justifying grace only in the sense that it is the first of the seven
preparations, and in that sense the basis and root of justification.

After this sevenfold preparation justification itself follows in baptism. It

consists in the infusion of grace, (supernatural virtues), followed by the
forgiveness of sins. The measure of this forgiveness is commensurate with
the degree in which sin is actually overcome. It is given freely and is not
merited by the preceding preparations. And it is preserved by obeying the
commandments and by doing good works. In the gratia infusa man
receives the supernatural strength to do such works, and thus to merit
with a merit of condignity all following grace and everlasting life. The
grace of God, therefore, serves the purpose of enabling man once more to
merit salvation. But it is not certain that the precious gift of justification
will be retained. It may be lost, not only through unbelief, but by any
mortal sin. It may be regained, however, by the sacrament of penance,
consisting in contrition (or attrition), confession, together with
absolution, and works of satisfaction. Both the guilt of sin and eternal
punishment may be removed by absolution, but the temporal penalties of
sin can only be cancelled on the basis of works of satisfaction.

Questions for Further Study: What factors contributed to the

externalization of religion in the Middle Ages? Did the Scholastics
emphasize external or internal grace? What was their conception of
divine grace, and how does their view compare with that of Augustine?
How did their representations of the gratia gratis dans differ? How does
Aquinas' use of the terms gratia gratis data and gratia gratum faciens
differ from that of the earlier Scholastics? What was the most prevalent
conception of faith in the scholastic period? Did they conceive of faith as
excluding merit? Did they have the Pauline conception of justification by
faith? What did justification include? How is faith related to justification
in the Roman Catholic system? How do you account for the Roman
Catholic position that ordinary believers cannot have an assured faith?

Literature: Means, Faith, An Historical Study, pp. 177–226; Buchanan,

The Doctrine of Justification, pp. 87–99; Swete, The Forgiveness of Sins,
pp. 117–127; Ritschl, History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification
and Reconciliation, pp. 73–120; McGiffert, History of Christian Thought,
II, pp. 185–312; Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, III, pp. 580–586;
Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas, II, pp. 234–271, 338–360;
Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrines, I, pp. 370–380; Crippen,
History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 153–158; Histories of Seeberg and
Fisher, cf. Index.

III. Reformation and Post-Reformation Soteriology

1. THE LUTHERAN ORDER OF SALVATION

It was especially the system of penances as developed in the Roman

Catholic Church and the traffic in indulgences closely connected with it,
that prompted Luther to take up the work of reformation. He himself was
deeply engaged in works of penance, when from Rom. 4:17 the truth
flashed upon him that man is justified by faith only, and he learned to
understand that the repentance demanded in Matt. 4:17 had nothing in
common with the Roman Catholic works of satisfaction, but consisted in
real inner contrition of the heart and was a fruit of the grace of God only.
It dawned upon him that the really important thing in repentance was not
the private confession before a priest, which has no foundation in
Scripture, nor any satisfaction rendered by man, since God freely forgives
sin; but a heartfelt sorrow on account of sin, an earnest desire to lead a
new life, and the forgiving grace of God in Christ. Therefore he made the
doctrine of sin and grace central once more in the doctrine of salvation,
and declared that the doctrine of justification by faith alone was "the
article of a standing or falling Church." The result was that the
Reformation rejected all that was most distinctive in mediæval theology,
such as indulgences, expiatory penances, priestly absolution in the
Roman Catholic sense, works of supererogation, and the doctrine of
human merit.

Scholars differ as to the relation in which Luther placed repentance and

faith to each other. Ritschl holds that he first regarded repentance as a
fruit of faith, but afterwards placed it before faith as wrought by the law;
but Lipsius denies this change and maintains that the great Reformer
always regarded poenitentia as including contrition, wrought by the law,
and faith as a believing acceptance of Jesus. Both are instrumental in
leading the sinner to Christ, and therefore do not yet presuppose a union
with Him. At the same time it can be said that in the earlier period of his
life his opposition to Roman Catholic work-righteousness prompted him
to stress the fact that true repentance is the fruit of faith, and that in a
later period he met antinomianism with the assertion that true faith is
preceded by a deep feeling of penitence. But he always conceived of the
way of salvation as consisting in contritio (penitence in the limited sense,
that is sorrow on account of sin), fides, and bona opera, a life consecrated
to God. This order is retained by the early Lutheran theologians, and is
also that of the confessional standards of the Church.

The Lutheran ordo salutis, which at first comprised only three elements,
became far more elaborate in the writings of the great Lutheran
theologians of the seventeenth century. It was based rather artificially on
Acts 26:17, 18, and made to include calling, illumination, conversion,
regeneration, justification, renovation and glorification. In the doctrine
that all who live under the Gospel receive sufficient grace, either in
baptism or through the preaching of the word, whereby they are enabled
to not-resist the grace of God in regeneration, the germ of synergism
made its appearance in Lutheran soteriology, and the process of salvation
was conceived of as follows: Children born of Christian parents, who
cannot yet resist the grace of God, are regenerated in baptism and receive
the gift of faith. Others, however, are called in later life with a vocatio
sufficiens, which is alike in all cases, and which by illumining the mind
and strengthening the will enables them to not-resist the grace of God. If
they do not resist the work of the Holy Spirit in calling, they are brought
to contrition (penitence in the limited sense), are regenerated, and are
endowed with the gift of faith. By faith they are then justified, receive the
forgiveness of sins, are adopted as children of God, are incorporated into
Christ, are renewed by the Holy Spirit, and are finally glorified.

Such is the process in all those in whom it is completed; but its beginning
does not yet insure its completion. The grace of God is always resistible,
can be resisted all along the line, can always be lost no matter how far its
work has progressed, and that not merely once but several times.
Notwithstanding the strong assertions that man owes his salvation
entirely to God, it is held that man can frustrate the divine operation
effectively, so that the decision really lies with him.

Furthermore, the Lutheran ordo salutis centers in faith and justification.

Strictly speaking, calling, repentance, and regeneration, are merely
preparatory and serve the purpose of leading the sinner to Christ. It is not
until he by faith accepts the righteousness of Christ, that God pardons his
sin, sets him free from the law, adopts him as His child, and incorporates
him into the mystical body of Jesus Christ. Everything, therefore,
depends on faith. With it man enters increasingly on the possession of the
blessings of salvation, but without it he loses all. Hence it is of the utmost
importance to retain this faith. While this is the ordo salutis as it is
usually represented, it does not always reveal exactly the same form in
later Lutheran theology.

2. THE REFORMED ORDER OF SALVATION. In Reformed theology the

ordo salutis acquired a somewhat different form. This is due to the fact
that Calvin consistently took his startingpoint in an eternal election and
in the mystical union established in the pactum salutis. His fundamental
position is that there is no participation in the blessings of Christ, except
through a living union with the Saviour. And if even the very first of the
blessings of saving grace already presupposes a union with Christ, then
the gift of Christ to the Church and the imputation of His righteousness
precedes all else. In the Council of Peace a union was already established
between Him and those who were given unto Him by the Father, and in
virtue of that union, which is both legal and mystical, all the blessings of
salvation are ideally already the portion of those who are of Christ. They
are ready for distribution and are appropriated by them through faith.

From this fundamental position several particulars follow. The salvation

of the elect is not conceived atomistically, since they are all eternally in
Christ, and are born out of Him, who is the Head, as members of His
mystical body. Regeneration, repentance, and faith are not regarded as
mere preparations, altogether apart from any union with Christ, nor as
conditions to be fulfilled by man, either wholly or in part, in his own
strength. They are blessings of the covenant of grace, which already flow
from the mystical union and the grant of Christ to the Church. Penitence
assumes a different place and character than in the Lutheran order.
Calvin recognized a repentance preceding faith, but saw in it merely an
initial fear, a legal repentance that does not necessarily lead to faith and
cannot be regarded as an absolutely essential preparation for it. He
stresses the repentance that flows from faith, that is possible only in
communion with Christ, and that continues throughout life. Moreover, he
does not regard it as consisting of contritio and fides. He recognized the
close connection between repentance and faith, and did not consider the
former possible without the latter, but also pointed out that Scripture
clearly distinguishes the two, and therefore ascribed to each of them a
more independent significance in the order of salvation.

But however Calvin may have differed from Luther as to the order of
salvation, he quite agreed with him on the nature and importance of the
doctrine of justification by faith. In their common opposition to Rome
they both describe it as an act of free grace, and as a forensic act which
does not change the inner life of man but only the judicial relationship in
which he stands to God. They do not find the ground for it in the inherent
righteousness of the believer, but only in the imputed righteousness of
Jesus Christ, which the sinner appropriates by faith. Moreover, they deny
that it is a progressive work of God, asserting that it is instantaneous and
at once complete, and hold that the believer can be absolutely sure that
he is forever translated from a state of wrath and condemnation to one of
favor and acceptance.

Lutheran theology did not always remain entirely true to this position.
Faith is sometimes represented as a work that is basic for regeneration;
and the mediating theologians base justification on the infused
righteousness of Jesus Christ.

3. THE ARMINIAN ORDER OF SALVATION. The Arminians teach that

God bestows a universal grace on man, which is sufficient to enable the
sinner to believe and obey the Gospel; and that the call which comes to
man through the preaching of the Word exerts a merely moral influence
on his understanding and will. If he assents to the truth, trusts in the
grace of God and obeys the commandments of Christ, he receives a
greater measure of divine grace, is justified on account of his faith and, if
he perseveres to the end, becomes a partaker of life eternal.

The School of Saumur moved in the same general direction. Cameron

teaches that the will of man always follows the final dictate of the
understanding, and that therefore in regeneration and conversion an
effective illumination of the mind is all that is required and all that
actually takes place. There is no supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit
directly on the will of man. And Pajon holds that a special internal
operation of the grace of God is unnecessary, and that the efficacy of the
divine calling depends on its congruity with the external circumstances in
which it comes to man.

These Arminian teachings led to that representation of the ordo salutis,

which was known in England as Neonomianism. According to the
Neonomians Christ atoned for the sins of all men, that is, made salvation
possible for all and brought them all into a salvable state. He did this by
meeting the demands of the old law, the law of the covenant of works,
and by substituting for it a new law, a law of grace which is satisfied with
faith and conversion, and a true, albeit imperfect, obedience of the
repentant sinner. This work of Christ may be called the sinner's legal
righteousness, since it was instrumental in satisfying and abrogating the
old law. But evangelical righteousness, consisting in obedience to the new
law, that is, faith and conversion, constitutes the ground of the sinner's
justification. This rationalistic tendency finally resulted in that liberalism
which recognizes Christ only as a great prophet and teacher, who
proclaimed the truth of God and sealed it with His death, and whose
example man has but to follow, in order to obtain eternal salvation.

Methodism is another, more pietistic, form of Arminianism. It is averse

to the idea of gradual conversions, and knows of no lengthy period of
contrition, followed by a period in which the darkness is dispelled and the
light breaks through, and a still later season when doubt turns into the
glad assurance of salvation. It concentrates all efforts in the preaching of
the Gospel on a single point: casting the sinner down by the preaching of
the law, dragging him, as it were, to the very brink of the abyss, filling his
heart with fear and trembling; and then placing him at once before the
glorious Gospel of redemption, and pleading with him to accept Jesus
Christ by faith and be saved from eternal damnation. The sinner who
does so accept Christ passes in a single moment from the greatest misery
into the most rapturous ecstasy, and from the deepest gloom into the
most transcendent joy. This sudden transition carries with an immediate
assurance of being saved. Many Methodists hold that a second radical
change is necessary, and is actually wrought in man, for entire
sanctification.

4. MINOR CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORDER OF SALVATION

a. Antinomian. The Antinomians really leave no room for a subjective

application of the redemption wrought by Christ. They do not distinguish
between the work of Christ in procuring, and that of the Holy Spirit in
applying the blessings of saving grace; but speak as if Christ did all there
is to be done, as if he took upon himself not only our guilt but also our
pollution, so that we are justified, regenerated, and sanctified—in short,
are perfect in Him. In view of the fact that man is subjectively righteous
and holy in Christ, the only thing required of him is to believe, that is, to
become conscious of that fact. He may rest assured that God can see no
sin in him as a believer. His so-called sins are not really sins, but merely
works of the old man, which are not reckoned to the believer, since he is
free from the law, is perfect in Christ, and glories in the grace of God.
Sometimes the Antinomian will go even farther than that, and claim that
Christ did not really merit salvation, since this was eternally ready in the
counsel of God, but merely revealed the love of God. To believe, is simply
to lay aside the false notion that God's anger is kindled against us. Such
ideas as these prevailed among some of the Anabaptists, the Libertines,
the Hattemists, and certain sects both in England and in New England.

b. Mystical. In Germany, England, and the Netherlands a large number of

preachers arose who sought the essential thing of the Christian life in
experience, and emphasized the fact that true faith is experience. They
enlarged on what one must needs experience before one can be
considered as a true believer, and in doing this were primarily guided, not
by the representations of Scripture, but by the experiences of those who
were reputed to be "oaks of righteousness." They held that the law should
be preached to all, but the Gospel only to certain "qualified" sinners.
Before men might really believe themselves to be children of God, they
had to be brought under the terrors of the law, had to pass through
agonizing struggles, had to feel the accusing pangs of conscience, and had
to writhe in the throes of a fearful anticipation of eternal damnation.
They were not permitted to believe without some special warrant of the
Holy Spirit, and even then their faith could at first be only a faith that
flees for refuge to Jesus Christ, a hungering and thirsting for
righteousness. This faith precedes and is the condition of justification; in
it the sinner entrusts himself to Christ, in order to be justified. This
refuge seeking faith does not at once turn into an assured faith. There is a
great distance between the two, and it is only after many ups and downs,
after all kinds of doubts and uncertainties, and through many spiritual
struggles, that the believer passes into the assurance of salvation—the
privilege of but a select few. This assurance often comes to him in a very
special way, by a voice, a vision, a word from Scripture, and other similar
means.

Questions for Further Study: What were the three usual stages of the ordo
salutis in the theology preceding the Reformation? Should the ordo
salutis stress the application or the appropriation of the work of
redemption? How do Lutherans, Reformed, and Arminians differ on this
point? What elements do the Lutherans consider as the most important
in the ordo salutis? How do the Reformed differ from them in this
respect? What views did Schwenkfeld, Agricola, Osiander, and the Dutch
Mennonites hold as to faith and justification? How do the Lutherans and
the Anglicans conceive of regeneration by baptism? Do the Reformed
connect the grace of regeneration with baptism in any way? What is the
Wesleyan doctrine of entire sanctification? What views did the Reformed,
the Arminians, and the Wesleyans hold as to the assurance of salvation?

Literature: Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek III, pp. 587–690;

Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, pp. 100–219; Swete, The
Forgiveness of Sins, pp. 128–141; Heppe, Geschichte des Pietismus; ibid.,
Dogmatik, II, pp. 262–395; Pope, Christian Theology, II, pp. 439–451;
Bavinck, Roeping en Wedergeboorte; Kramer, Het Verband van Doop en
Wedergeboorte; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrines, II, pp. 153–181;
Crippen, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 158–169; Seeberg, History of
Doctrine, II, cf. Index.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AND THE

SACRAMENTS
I. The Doctrine of the Church

1. IN THE PATRISTIC PERIOD. The doctrine of the Church also has its
roots in the earliest literature of the Christian era. In the Apostolic
Fathers and in the Apologetes the Church is generally represented as the
communio sanctorum, the people of God, which He has chosen for a
possession. While it is spoken of as the true Israel, its relation to its
historic preparation in Israel was not always well understood. But even in
the second century a perceptible change came about in the conception of
the Church. The rise of heresies made it necessary to designate some
external characteristics by which the true Catholic Church could be
known. The result was that the Church began to be conceived as an
external institute, ruled by a bishop as a direct successor of the apostles,
and in possession of the true tradition. The idea became prevalent that
the universal Church was the historical prius of all local churches. The
local churches were not conceived as so many separate units, but as parts
of the universal Church with the episcopacy; and they were regarded as
true churches only as long as they were loyal and subject to the catholic
Church as a whole.

In the sects, however, another tendency manifested itself, namely, to

make the holiness of its members the real mark of the true Church. It was
represented by Montanism in the middle of the second, by Novatianism
in the middle of the third, and by Donatism in the beginning of the fourth
century. These sects were born of a reaction against the gradual
secularization and the increasing worldliness and corruption of the
Church. The Montanist leaders inveighed with prophetic authority
against the laxity and worldliness of the churches, and insisted on ascetic
practices. They spoke of gross sins committed after baptism as being
unpardonable; but also of the possibility of atoning for mortal sins by
martyrdom. The Novatians did not share the prophetic claims of the
Montanists, but followed their example in striving for the purity of the
Church. They held that the Church had no power to forgive those who
had denied the faith during the Decian persecution and sought
readmission to the Church. Finding that many bishops readmitted such
members, and that the churches in general were lax in discipline, they re-
baptized those who joined their circle. The Donatists represented the
same tendency during the persecution of Diocletian. They insisted on
rigorous ecclesiastical discipline and pure church-membership, rejected
unworthy ministers, and protested against State interference in religious
matters; but at the same time themselves courted the favour of the
emperor.

The Church Fathers took issue with all these sectaries and emphasized
ever increasingly the episcopal institution of the Church. Cyprian, the
disciple of Tertullian, has the distinction of being the first to develop the
doctrine of the episcopal Church. He regarded the bishops, chosen by the
Lord Himself, as the real successors of the apostles, and maintained on
the basis of Matt. 16:18, that the Church was founded on the bishops. The
bishop was regarded as the absolute lord of the Church. It was up to him
to decide who could belong to the Church and who might be restored to
its fellowship. He conducted the worship of the Church as a priest of God,
and in that capacity offered sacrifices. Cyprian was the first one to teach
an actual priesthood of the clergy in virtue of their sacrificial work.
According to him the bishops constituted a college, called the episcopate,
and as such represented the unity of the Church. He based the unity of
the Church on the unity of the bishops. At the same time he maintained
the parity of the bishops and ascribed no primacy to the bishop of Rome.
Rebellion against the bishop was regarded as rebellion against God.
Anyone who refused to submit to the rightful bishop thereby forfeited his
fellowship with the Church and consequently also his salvation. True
members will always obey and remain in the Church, outside of which
there is no possibility of being saved. This conception of the Church
logically caused Cyprian to deny the validity of baptism administered by
heretics. To him it was perfectly evident that one who was himself outside
of the Church could not induct others into it. Moreover, he believed that
only the leaders who received the Spirit—and He was received only in the
Church—could impart the forgiveness of sins. Thus Cyprian was the first
to bring out clearly and distinctly the idea of a catholic Church,
comprehending all true branches of the Church of Christ, and bound
together by a visible and external unity. This is what Cunningham calls
"Cyprian's grand contribution to the progress of error and corruption in
the Church." Historical Theology I, p. 169.

Augustine moved in the same general circle of thought. It was his struggle
with the Donatists that compelled him to reflect more deeply on the
essence of the Church. Sad to say, his conception of the Church does not
altogether harmonize with his doctrine of sin and grace. As a matter of
fact there is a certain dualism in his idea of the Church. On the one hand
he is the predestinarian who conceives of the Church as the company of
the elect, the communio sanctorum, who have the Spirit of God and are
characterized by true love. The really important thing is to belong to the
Church so conceived, and not to be in the Church in a merely outward
sense and to partake of the sacraments. It is through the intercession of
this community that sins are forgiven and that gifts of grace are
bestowed. The real unity of the saints and therefore of the Church is an
invisible one. At the same time it exists only within the catholic Church,
for it is there only that the Spirit works and that true love dwells.

On the other hand he is the Church-man, who holds to the Cyprianic idea
of the Church, at least in its general aspects. The true Church is the
catholic Church, in which the apostolic authority is continued by
episcopal succession. It is spread throughout the world, and outside of it
there is no salvation, for it is only within its pale that one is filled with
love and receives the Holy Spirit. Its sacraments are not merely symbols,
but are also accompanied with an actual exertion of divine energy. God
really forgives sins in baptism, and in the Lord's Supper actually gives
spiritual refreshment to the soul. For the present this Church is a mixed
body, in which good and evil members are present, but it is destined for
perfect purity in the future.

The Donatists criticized Augustine by saying that he split the Church into
two Churches, the mixed Church of the present and the pure Church of
the future in heaven. In answer to them he manitained the purity of the
one catholic Church also in the present, but sought it more particularly in
the objective institution with its offices, sacraments, and ministrations. In
addition to that, however, he also defended a certain subjective purity.
While he admitted that good and evil members were commingled in the
Church, he held that these two were not in it in exactly the same sense.
While the wicked cannot be outwardly excluded, they are nevertheless
inwardly separated from the pious: they belong to the house, but are not
in the house; they are the evil tumors in the body of Christ that are
destined to be sloughed off. Thus Augustine effected in thought the purity
which the Donatists sought to realize in actual life.

Another point to be taken into consideration here, is Augustine's doctrine

of the Kingdom of God. The earlier Church Fathers used the term
"Kingdom of God" to describe the result and goal of the Church's
development, that is, as the designation of the eschatological Kingdom.
But Augustine says: "The Church is even now the Kingdom of Heaven."
By this he means primarily that the saints constitute the Kingdom of God,
though he also applies the term to the leaders of the Church collectively.
While the Kingdom is essentially identical with the pious and holy, it is
also the episcopally organized Church. The contrast between the city of
God and the city of the world (or, of the devil) is regarded as equivalent to
that between Christianity and heathenism, between the good and the bad
(including angels and devils), between the saints and the wicked even
within the Church, between the spiritual and the carnal, between the elect
and the non-elect. The evil world is never represented as equivalent to the
State, but since the civitas Dei may be and is frequently conceived as the
empirical Church, it is possible that—as is frequently said—he thought of
the civitas mundi as finding its concrete embodiment in the State.

Augustine did not effect a true synthesis of his divergent views respecting
the Church, and it may well be questioned, whether such a synthesis is
possible. Harnack calls attention to the fact that in Augustine "the
externa societas sacramentorum, which is communio fidelium et
sanctorum, and finally also the numerus praedestinatorum are one and
the same Church." Outlines of the History of Dogma, p. 362.
Consequently a threefold answer may be given to the question, Who are
in the Church? It may be said: (a) all the predestinated, including those
who are still unconverted; or (b) all believers, including those who will
relapse; or (c) all those who have part in the sacraments. But then the
question arises, Which is the true Church, the external communion of the
baptized, or the spiritual communion of the elect and the saints, or both,
since there is no salvation outside of either? Moreover, how is the
Church, as constituted of the number of the elect, related to the Church as
the communion of the faithful? They are clearly not identical, for some
may be of the faithful who are not of the elect and are finally lost. And
when Augustine says that no one has God for a Father, who does not have
the Church, that is the one visible catholic Church, for a mother, the
question naturally arises, What about the elect who never join the
Church? Again, if the one visible catholic Church is, as he maintains, the
true body of Christ, does not this prove the contention of the Donatists
that wicked persons and heretics cannot be tolerated in it? Once more, if
the Church is founded on the predestinating grace of God, how is it
possible that they who have once received the grace of regeneration and
the forgiveness of sins in baptism, should lose this again and thus forfeit
salvation? And, finally, if God is the only absolute source of all grace and
dispenses it in a sovereign way, can it be considered proper to ascribe this
power to the visible Church with its sacraments, and to make salvation
dependent on membership in that organization? In connection with this
point it may be said that Augustine's predestination views kept him from
going as far as some of his contemporaries did in the direction of
sacramentalism.

2. IN THE MIDDLE AGES. It is a striking fact that, while the theologians

of the Middle Ages have very little to say about the Church, and therefore
contribute but few elements to the development of the doctrine of the
Church, the Church itself actually developed into a close-knit, compactly
organized, and absolute hierarchy. The seeds for this development were
found in the writings of Cyprian and in the teachings of Augustine
respecting the Church as an external organization. The other and more
fundamental idea of the great Church Father, that of the Church as the
communio sanctorum, was entirely disregarded and thus remained
dormant. Two ideas became very prominent during the Middle Ages,
namely, that of the primacy of Rome, and that of the identity of the
Church and the Kingdom of God.

The tradition gained currency in the fourth and fifth centuries that Christ
had given Peter an official primacy over the other apostles, and that this
apostle had been the first bishop of Rome. Furthermore, it was asserted
that this primacy was passed on to his successors, the bishops of the
imperial city. This idea was not only fostered by successive bishops, but
also appealed to the popular imagination, because at the fall of the
Western Empire it seemed to contain a promise of the renewal, in
another form, of the ancient glories of Rome. In the year 533 the
Byzantine Emperor Justinian recognized the primacy of the bishop of
Rome over the occupants of the other patriarchal sees. Gregory the Great
still refused the title "Universal Bishop", but in 607 it was conferred on
his successor, Boniface III, who had no scruples in accepting it. From this
time on the spiritual primacy of the succeeding bishops of Rome was
generally honoured in the West, though strenuously resisted in the East.
It marks the beginning of Popery. The Church thus received an external
and visible head, who soon developed into an absolute monarch.

Alongside of this the idea developed that the Catholic Church was the
Kingdom of God on earth, and that therefore the Roman bishopric was an
earthly kingdom. This notion was greatly encouraged by two notorious
forgeries, the "Donation of Constantine" and the "Forged Decretals", both
of which were foisted upon the people in the ninth century to prove that
the authority then claimed by the Popes had been conferred upon, and
exercised by, their predecessors as early as the third century.

The identification of the visible and organized Church with the Kingdom
of God had important and far-reaching consequences. If the Church alone
is the Kingdom of God, then all Christian duties and activities must take
the form of services rendered to the Church, for Christ speaks of the
Kingdom as the highest good and as the goal of all Christian endeavor.
Natural and social life thus assumed a one-sided churchly character. All
that did not come under the control of the Church was considered as
purely secular, and its renunciation became a work of special piety. The
life of hermits and monks stood out as a grand ideal.

Another result was that an undue significance was ascribed to the

outward ordinances of the Church. The Kingdom of God is represented in
the New Testament, not only as the aim of the Christian life, but also as
the sum-total of Christian blessedness. Consequently, all the blessings of
salvation were thought of as coming to man through the ordinances of the
Church. Without their use salvation was considered to be impossible.

And, finally, the identification of the Church and the Kingdom led to the
practical secularization of the Church. As an external kingdom the
Church felt in duty bound to define and defend its relation to the
kingdoms of the world, and gradually began to pay more attention to
politics than to the salvation of souls. Worldliness took the place of other-
worldliness. It was but natural that the Roman Pontiffs, in view of the
superior character of the Kingdom of God and of its all-comprehensive
destiny, should seek to realize the ideal of the Kingdom by demanding of
the emperors subjection to the rule of the Church. This was the
consuming ambition of such great Popes as Gregory VII (Hildebrand),
Innocent III, and Boniface VIII.

It was not until after the Reformation that the Roman Catholic
conception of the Church was officially formulated. Yet it is best to call
attention to the form it finally assumed at this point, because the idea
already found actual embodiment in the Church of Rome before the
Reformation, and because the Protestant conception is best understood
when seen against the background of the Roman Catholic idea of the
Church. The Council of Trent did not venture upon a discussion of the
proper definition of the Church. This was due to the fact that, while the
highest officials of the Church desired recognition of the papal system, a
great number of the bishops were thoroughly episcopal in their ideas.
They were not ready to admit that all ecclesiastical authority belongs
primarily to the Pope, and that the bishops derive their authority from
him; but held that the bishops derive their authority directly from Christ.
This clashing of views made it imprudent to attempt the formulation of a
definition of the Church.

The Tridentine Catechism, however, defines the Church as "the body of

all the faithful who have lived up to this time on earth, with one invisible
head, Christ, and one visible head, the successor of Peter, who occupies
the Roman see." Cardinal Bellarmine (1542–1621) surpassed all others of
his day in giving a clear representation of the Roman Catholic conception
of the Church. According to him the Church is "the company of all who
are bound together by the profession of the same Christian faith and by
the use of the same sacraments and are under the rule of legitimate
pastors and principally Christ's vicar on earth, the Roman Pontiff." The
first clause of this definition (profession of the same Christian faith)
excludes all unbelievers; the second (use of the same sacraments),
catechumens and those that are excommunicated; and the third
(obedience to the Roman Pontiff), all schismatics, such as the Greek
Christians.

The following particulars should be noted in connection with the Roman

Catholic conception of the Church:

a. The visible nature of the Church is strongly emphasized. The ultimate

reason for the visibility of the Church is found in the incarnation of the
divine Word. The Word did not descend into the souls of men, but
appeared as a man among men, and in harmony with this appearance
now carries on his work through a visible human medium. The Church
can even be regarded as a continuation of the incarnation. Christ Himself
provided for the organization of the Church by appointing the apostles
and by placing one of them (Peter) at the head of the apostles. The Popes
are the successors of Peter, and the bishops, of the apostles in general.
The former possess direct and absolute authority, while the latter have
only a limited authority derived from the Popes.
b. A very important distinction is made between the teaching church
(ecclesia docens) and the hearing, learning or believing church (ecclesia
audiens, discens, or credens). The former consists of the whole clerus
with the Pope at its head; the latter, of all the faithful who honour the
authority of their lawful pastors. It is primarily to the ecclesia docens that
the Roman Catholic ascribes the attributes which he applies to the
Church. She is the one only, catholic, apostolic, infallible, and perpetual
Church, which denies all others the right of existence, and therefore
assumes an intolerant attitude over against them. The ecclesia audiens is
altogether dependent on it, and has part in the glorious attributes of the
Church only in a derivative manner.

c. The Church is made up, like a human person, of body and soul. The
soul of the Church consists at any particular time of "the society of those
who are called to the faith of Christ, and who are united to Christ by
supernatural gifts and graces." Not all the elect are in the soul of the
Church; neither are all those who are in it elect, since there are always
some that fall away; and some of those who are not in the body of the
Church may be in the soul, such as catechumens possessing the necessary
graces. The body of the Church is the society of those who profess the true
faith, whether they be just or sinners. Only baptized persons belong to the
Church; but some baptized persons, such as catechumens, do not yet
belong to it.

d. In the Church Christ distributes the fulness of those graces and

blessings which He merited for sinners. He does this exclusively through
the agency of the clergy, that is, through the legitimate officers of the
Church. Consequently, the institute of the Church logically precedes the
organism, the visible Church precedes the invisible. The Church is a
mater fidelium before she is a coetus fidelium. The ecclesia docens
precedes the ecclesia audiens, and is far superior to it.

e. The Church is exclusively an institute of salvation, a saving ark. As such

she has three functions: (1) to propagate the true faith by means of the
ministry of the Word; (2) to effect sanctification by means of the
sacraments; and (3) to govern believers according to ecclesiastical law.
But it is only the ecclesia docens that can do all this. Strictly speaking,
therefore, she constitutes the Church. She is (under Christ) the only
Mediator of salvation, the depositary and distributor of grace for all men,
and the only ark of safety for the entire human race. The order in the
work of salvation is, not that God by means of His Word leads men to the
Church, but just the reverse, that the Church leads men to the Word and
to Christ.

3. DURING AND AFTER THE REFORMATION. The conception of the

Church that was born of the Reformation was quite different from that of
the Roman Catholic Church. Luther was gradually weaned from the papal
conception. The Leipsic disputation opened the way for new ideas on the
Church and its authority.

a. The Lutheran View. Luther rejected the idea of an infallible Church, of

a special priesthood, and of sacraments that operate in a magical way;
and restored to its rightful place the scriptural idea of the priesthood of
all believers. He regarded the Church as the spiritual communion of those
who believe in Christ, a communion established and sustained by Christ
as its Head. He stressed the oneness of the Church, but distinguished
between two aspects of it, the one visible and the other invisible.
According to Seeberg Luther was the first to make this distinction. He
was careful to point out, however, that these are not two churches, but
simply two aspects of the same Church. His insistence on the invisibility
of the Church served the purpose of denying that the Church is essentially
an external society with a visible head, and of affirming that the essence
of the Church is to be found in the sphere of the invisible: in faith,
communion with Christ, and in participation in the blessings of salvation
through the Holy Spirit.

This same Church, however, becomes visible and can be known, not by
the headship of the Pope, nor by the rule of cardinals and bishops, nor by
all kinds of external paraphernalia, but by the pure administration of the
Word and the sacraments. The really important thing for man is that he
belongs to the spiritual or invisible Church; but this is closely connected
with membership in the visible Church. Christ gathers the Church by His
Spirit, but in doing this binds Himself to the chosen means, the Word and
the sacraments. Hence the necessity of an outward ecclesiastical society,
which Luther describes as "the number or multitude of the baptized and
believing who belong to a priest or bishop, whether in a city, or in a whole
land, or in the whole world." He admits that the Church, externally
considered, will always harbor a number of hypocritical and wicked
members, who do not share in the spiritual exercises of the Church. The
Augsburg Confession defines the visible Church as "the congregation of
the saints in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments are
rightly administered."

b. The Anabaptist View. The Anabaptists represent the most extreme

reaction against the Roman Catholic externalization of the Church. While
Rome based its Church organization largely on the Old Testament, they
denied the identity of the Old Testament Church with that of the New,
and insisted on a Church of believers only. Though children had a place
in the Church of the Old Testament, they have no legitimate place in the
Church of the New Testament, since they can neither exercise faith nor
make a profession of it. In their insistence on the spirituality and holiness
of the Church many of them even scorned the visible Church and the
means of grace. In distinction from the Lutherans with their territorial
system, the Anabaptists demanded the absolute separation of Church and
State, some even going to the extreme of saying that a Christian can not
be a magistrate, may not swear an oath, nor take part in any war.

c. The Reformed View. The Reformed conception of the Church is

fundamentally the same as the Lutheran, though differing from it in some
relatively important points. Both agree that the real essence of the Church
is found in the communio sanctorum as a spiritual entity, that is, in the
invisible Church. But while the Lutherans seek the unity and holiness of
the Church primarily in the objective ordinances, such as the offices, the
Word, and the sacraments, the Reformed find these to a far greater extent
in the subjective communion of believers. According to the former the
blessings of salvation can be obtained only in and through the Church,
since God in dispensing His grace binds Himself absolutely to the
ordained means, the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of
the sacraments. Some of the Reformed, however, were of the opinion that
the possibility of salvation extends beyond the borders of the visible
church, and that the Spirit of God is not absolutely bound to the ordinary
means of grace, but may work and save "when, where, and how he
pleases." Then, too, the Reformed spoke of the invisibility of the Church
in more than one sense: (1) as ecclesia universalis, because no one can
ever see the Church of all places and all times; (2) as coetus electorum,
which will not be completed and visible until the parousia; and (3) as
coetus electorum vocatorum, because we are not able to distinguish
absolutely the true believers from the false. Finally, the Reformed found
the true marks of the Church, not only in the true administration of the
Word and the sacraments, but also in the faithful administration of
Church discipline. Besides all these there were also important differences
as to the government of the Church.

d. Divergent Post-Reformation Views

(1) Socinian and Arminian. This altered conception of the Church had
important practical consequences. Uniformity made way for
multiformity, and this, in turn gave rise to various Confessions. The
Reformers sought to maintain the proper connection between the visible
and the invisible Church, but history proved this to be very difficult. And
churches outside of the Lutheran and Reformed communions often
sacrificed the invisible to the visible Church, or vice versa. The Socinians
indeed spoke of the invisible Church, but in actual life forgot all about it,
since they conceived of the Christian religion simply as an acceptable
doctrine. And the Arminians followed suit by denying explicitly that the
Church is essentially the invisible communion of the saints and by
making it primarily a visible society. Moreover, they robbed the Church of
its independence by yielding the right of discipline to the State, retaining
for the Church only the right to preach the Gospel and to admonish its
members.

(2) Labadist and Methodist. The opposite tendency also manifested itself,
namely, to disregard the visible Church. Jean de Labadie founded an
"evangelical congregation" at Middelburg in 1669, to which only true
believers might belong. Pietism in general insisted strongly on a practical
religion. It not only combatted worldliness, but viewed the world itself as
an organism of sin, which every "awakened" Christian must shun, lest he
put his soul in jeopardy. At the same time it made people indifferent
towards the institutional Church with its functions and sacraments, and
brought them together in conventicles. The real Church was considered
ever-increasingly in such circles as the communion of those who shared
in a special illumination of the Holy Spirit, and who, in virtue of the inner
light, also agreed outwardly in their profession and life. This view is also
found in some circles of Methodism, the consistent application of it being
seen in the Salvation Army. The converts do not form a church, but a
standing army of Jesus Christ, distinguished from the world by a
distinctive uniform and a special mode of life.

(3) Roman Catholic. The Roman Catholic Church moved even farther in
the direction of an absolute hierarchy since the days of the Reformation,
and became more pronounced in affirming the authority of the Pope. The
Gallican Party, of which Bousset was the original leader, maintained for
two centuries, in opposition to the Jesuits and the Ultramontane Party,
that the Pope may err in his decisions, and is always subordinate to an
oecumenical council. This was also the common teaching of a large
number of Roman Catholic textbooks. In 1791 fifteen hundred English
Catholics signed a statement denying that papal infallibility was a dogma
of the Roman Catholic Church. However, the opposition of the Gallicans
was gradually overcome, and in 1870 the Vatican Council declared that
"the Roman Pontiff when speaking ex cathedra—that is to say when
fulfilling the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians in virtue of his
supreme apostolic authority—defines a doctrine regarding faith or
morals, de fide vel moribus, as a doctrine to be held by the universal
Church, then through the divine assistance which has been promised him
in the person of St. Peter he enjoys fully that infallibility which the divine
Redeemer wished his Church to have in defining doctrine touching faith
and morals; and consequently such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are
of themselves unchangeable and are not to be changed through approval
of the Church." The Germans were not willing to submit to this decision,
and therefore constituted themselves the "Old Catholic Church", with Dr.
Doellinger, the historian, as leader, and Dr. Reinkens as its first bishop.
Over against the Protestants the Roman Catholics continue to glory in
their unity, though this is more apparent than real. The Church is not
only divided on the question of papal infallibility, but also harbors an ever
increasing number of monastic orders, often leading to rivalries and
bitter disputes, which show that they stand farther apart than many of
the Protestant denominations. Moreover, the Reform, the Los-von-Rome,
and the Modernistic movements clearly show that the boasted unity of
the Church of Rome is a mere corporate uniformity rather than a unity of
spirit and purpose.

Questions for Further Study: What special significance did Cyprian have
for the development of the doctrine of the Church? Can Augustine's views
on the Church be reduced to a consistent unity? How can we account for
the duality in his representation? How did the priestly conception of the
ministry arise? How do the Augustinian and the Roman Catholic
conception of the Kingdom of God differ? What is the essential difference
between the Roman Catholic view of the Church and that of the
Reformers? How do the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, and the
Reformed respectively conceive of the relation between the Church and
the State? How do present-day Modernists conceive of the Church?

Literature: Bannerman, The Church of Christ, Vol I; A. Taylor Innes,

Church and State; Schaff, Church and State; Hagenbach, History of
Doctrines, I, pp. 271–277; II, pp. 62–67, 312–319; III, pp. 122–140, 369–
374; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 218–228; II, pp. 394–
398; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrines, I, pp. 133–136, 268–270,
384–391; II, pp. 182–191, 378–382; Otten, Manual of the History of
Dogmas, I, pp. 171–179, 323–337; II, pp. 214–233; Crippen, History of
Christian Doctrine, pp. 170–172, 182–189, 209–221; Seeberg, History of
Doctrine, cf. Index.
 II. The Doctrine of the Sacraments
1. THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

a. Development of the Doctrine Before the Reformation

The term "sacraments" is derived from the Latin "sacramentum", by

which the Vulgate rendered the Greek musterion, which is used in the
New Testament to designate something that was not revealed in the Old
Testament, but later on acquired another connotation. It became the
designation of all that was mysterious and incomprehensible in the
Christian religion and in other religions, including mysterious actions or
things. This meaning of the term was also transferred to the Latin word
sacramentum, which originally designated an oath required of a soldier,
or a sum of money deposited as security in cases of litigation and
forfeited to the State or to the gods, if the case was lost.

This accounts for the fact that the word "sacrament" had a rather wide
application in the early Christian centuries. It could be used of anything
to which the idea of sanctity could be attached. Tertullian applies it to the
works of the Creator, and to the work of the incarnate Son, particularly
His death. The sign of the cross, the salt that was given to the
catechumens, the ordination of the priests, marriage, exorcism, the
celebration of the sabbath—they were all called sacraments. At the same
time the term was applied predominantly to baptism and the Lord's
Supper. The same loose usage of the term is found in the writings of
Augustine, Hilary, Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, and others.

On the whole it may be said that the Scholastics followed the Augustinian
conception of the sacraments as visible signs and mediums of an invisible
grace. There was no unanimity as to their number which ranges all the
way from five to thirty (Hugo of St. Victor). Peter the Lombard was the
first to name the well known seven of the Roman Catholic Church. In
virtue of the fact that his Sententiae became the general handbook of
theology, his private opinion soon became a communis opinio, and finally
the Council of Florence officially adopted these seven in 1439: baptism,
confirmation, eucharist, penance, priestly consecration, marriage, and
extreme unction.

This restriction of the number of sacraments naturally led to the

delimitation of the concept. A doctrine of the sacraments was still a
desideratum: the relation of the sensible to the spiritual element was not
clearly defined; neither was there a clear representation of the manner in
which the sacraments work. Augustine had occasionally made the
operation of the sacraments so dependent on faith in the recipient, that
the external sacrament became only an image of what God works in the
soul. This notion was also clearly reflected in one of the views that was
prevalent in the scholastic period and which, in fact, was dominant for
some time, namely, that the sacraments do not contain but only
symbolize grace, though God has covenanted to accompany the use of the
sacraments with a direct operation of His grace in the souls of the
recipients. This view is found in Bonaventura and Durandus, and became
the prevailing one in the Middle Ages through the advocacy of Duns
Scotus.

Alongside of this view, however, there was another, namely, that grace
truly resides in the visible sacrament. This does not mean that it resides
in the visible elements as a permanent power, but that "the words of the
institution effect a spiritual efficacy (virtus) in the external sign, which
resides in the latter until this virtus has accomplished its end." Hugo of
St. Victor and Thomas Aquinas advocated this view, which was finally
adopted by the Church.

In connection with the question, whether the operation of the sacraments

depends in any way on the worthy or unworthy reception or
administration of them, Scholasticism gravitated to the opinion that they
are effectual ex opere operate, that is, in virtue of their objective
administration. This means, of course, that the reception of sacramental
grace is not dependent on the spiritual devotion of the recipient, nor on
the character of the officiating priest, though a spiritual preparation for
the reception of the sacrament will certainly bring its reward. The
working of the sacraments ex opere operato was considered to mark the
superiority of the New Testament sacraments over those of the Old
Testament.
The Council of Trent passed several decisions respecting the sacraments,
of which the following are the most important: (1) The sacraments are
necessary unto salvation, that is, they must be received or at least desired
by those who would be saved. It cannot be said, however, that they are all
necessary for every man. (2) They contain the grace which they signify,
and confer this ex opere operato, or through the act performed, upon one
who does not present an obstacle to their operation, such as a mortal sin
or some other obstacle. (3) The intention of the officiating priest to
administer the sacrament in all sincerity, doing what the Church intends,
is essential to its validity. He must intend to do what the Church does, but
for the rest may be in mortal sin. (4) The sacraments of baptism,
confirmation, and order (or, ordination) impress an indelible character
on the soul of the recipient, and therefore are not repeated. (5) The
priests, and the priests only are the legitimate administrators of the
sacraments. However, confirmation and ordination can be administered
by bishops only, and baptism may in cases of necessity be administered
by laymen.

Besides baptism and the Lord's Supper the following sacraments are
recognized: confirmation, penance, extreme unction, ordination (orders),
and marriage. These may be briefly described as follows: (1) Confirmation
is the sacrament in which, through the bishop's laying on of hands,
unction, and prayer, those already baptized receive the sevenfold grace of
the Holy Spirit, so that they may steadfastly profess their faith, and
faithfully live up to it. (2) Penance is the sacrament by which forgiveness
for post-baptismal mortal sins is obtained by those who are heartily sorry
for their sins, sincerely confess them, and are willing to perform the
penance imposed upon them. (3) Extreme unction is the sacrament in
which those who appear to be near death, by the anointing with holy oil,
and by the prayer of the priest, receive special grace to confide in the
mercy of God and to resist the final attacks and temptations of the devil.
(4) Ordination or Holy Orders is the sacrament which communicates to
those who receive it the full power of the priesthood, together with a
special grace to discharge their duties well. (5) Marriage is the sacrament
by which a man and a woman are joined in holy wedlock, and receive the
necessary grace to discharge the duties of their state faithfully until death.
The following points deserve attention here: (1) Rome conceives of the
grace communicated in the sacraments exclusively as an infused
sanctifying grace that raises man to the supernatural order and makes
him a partaker of the divine nature. It is regarded as a supernatural gift
that comes to man from without. The forgiveness of sins, which is
generally connected with baptism in Scripture, occupies a relatively
unimportant place in the system of Rome. (2) The connection of the
sacrament with the Word is practically ignored. The Word has some, but
only a preparatory significance in that it works a purely historical faith,
which cannot really save, except when it is informed by love, that is, by a
gratia infusa. Since this love is communicated only by the sacrament, the
latter acquires an independent significance alongside of the Word and
really surpasses it in value. (3) Faith is not an absolute requirement for
the reception of the sacrament. Sanctifying grace is present as a material
element in the sacrament, is communicated by it ex opere operato, and
presupposes at most that the recipient places no insuperable obstructions
in the way.

b. The Doctrine of the Reformers and of Later Theology

In every one of the points just mentioned the Reformation subjected the
doctrine of the sacraments to a scriptural revision. Luther, Calvin, and
Zwingli were agreed in their opposition to Rome. They united in the
position that the grace imparted in the sacrament is first of all the
forgiving grace of God, which bears on the guilt of sin rather than on the
lower nature of man deprived of the donum superadditum. They also
shared the conviction that the sacraments are signs and seals attached to
the Word, which communicate no kind of grace that is not also imparted
by the Word, and which have no value apart from the Word. And, finally,
they also concurred in the opinion that, not the sacrament itself, but its
operation and fruit is dependent on faith in the recipient, and therefore
always presupposes saving grace.

But while they were at one on these particulars, it soon became manifest
that they differed on important points. The sacraments became a bone of
contention among them. In opposition to Rome, Luther at first stressed
the fact that the operation of the sacraments is dependent on faith in the
recipient, and later on gave greater prominence to their intimate and
essential connection with the Word, of which they are signs and seals.
They differ from the Word especially in this that they are not addressed to
the Church in general, but to individuals. As a result of his struggle with
the Anabaptists he, after 1524, emphasized the absolute necessity of the
sacraments and their objective character, making their effectiveness
dependent on the divine institution rather than on the subjective state of
the recipient. Cf. Heppe, Dogm. III, p. 380. The same controversy caused
him to insist on the temporal, corporal, and local connection between the
sign and the thing signified. In his opinion the divine power is present in
the sacrament as the visible Word, and as such the vehicle of divine grace.

Since the sacraments are administered only to believers, Zwingli

conceives of them as being first of all signs and proofs of faith, and only
secondarily means for the strengthening of faith as reminders of the
blessings appropriated by faith, and as directing our faith away from
ourselves to the grace of God in Jesus Christ. For him the sacraments
were memorials and badges of profession, though he also uses
expressions which seem to point to a deeper significance.

Calvin also regards the sacraments as acts of confession, but only

secondarily. To him they are first of all signs and seals of the promises of
God which direct attention to the riches of His grace. He finds their
essential element in the word of promise, in the covenant of grace, and in
the person of Christ with all his blessings. But he did not conceive of
these spiritual blessings as deposited in the visible elements, as inherent
in these, making them more or less independent distributors of divine
grace. For him God is and remains the only source of grace, and the
sacraments are merely the instruments by which it is communicated. God
communicates this grace only to believers by nourishing and
strengthening their faith. Unbelievers may receive the external sign, but
do not participate in the thing signified.

Outside of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches the Zwinglian

conception of the sacraments enjoyed great popularity. The Anabaptists
denied that the sacraments are seals and regarded them as signs and
symbols only. They give a visible representation of the blessings conveyed
to believers, but do this merely as acts of confession; they communicate
no grace.
Socinians regarded the Lord's Supper as a memorial of Christ's death,
and baptism merely as a primitive rite of profession for Jewish and pagan
converts, without any permanent validity. The Arminians do speak of the
sacraments as exhibiting and sealing the blessings of grace, but do not
want to convey the idea that they are seals of the promise of God and
communicate grace. They are rather simply signs of the covenant
between God and man, in which the former exhibits His grace, and the
latter pledges to lead a holy life.

Rationalists reduced the sacraments to mere memorials and badges of

confession, aiming at the promotion of virtue. Schleiermacher made an
attempt to maintain their objective character, and to unite all the
different views in a higher synthesis, but did not succeed. In the
nineteenth century many Neo-Lutherans and the Puseyites in England
advocated a doctrine of the sacraments that reminds us very strongly of
the Roman Catholic conception.

2. BAPTISM

a. Development of the Doctrine Before the Reformation

Baptism was foremost among the sacraments as the rite of initiation into
the Church. Even in the Apostolic Fathers we find the idea that it was
instrumental in effecting the forgiveness of sins and in communicating
the new life of regeneration. In a certain sense it may be said, therefore,
that some of the early Fathers taught baptismal regeneration. Yet this
statement requires some limitations: (1) They held baptism to be
efficacious in the case of adults only in connection with the right inner
disposition and purpose, though Tertullian seemed to think that the very
reception of the rite carried with it the remission of sins. (2) They did not
regard baptism as absolutely essential to the initiation of spiritual life, or
the life of regeneration; but viewed it rather as the completing element in
a process of renewal.

Infant baptism was evidently quite current in the days of Origen and
Tertullian, though the latter opposed it on the ground of the inexpediency
of placing young children under the heavy responsibility of the baptismal
covenant. The general opinion was that baptism ought in no case to be
repeated; but there was no unanimous opinion as to the validity of
baptism administered by heretics. The bishop of Rome asserted that it
could be regarded as valid, but Cyprian denied this. The former finally
gained the upper hand, and it became a fixed principle not to re-baptize
those who had been baptized according to the trinitarian formula. The
mode of baptism was not in dispute. While immersion was practiced, it
was not the only mode, and certainly was not considered to be of the
essence of baptism.

From the second century on the conception of baptism gradually

changed. The idea gained ground ever increasingly that the sacrament
works more or less magically. Even Augustine promoted this view to
some extent, though he considered faith and repentance as the necessary
conditions of baptism in the case of adults. In the case of infants,
however, he seems to have assumed that the sacrament was effective ex
opere operato. He held that children which die unbaptized are lost, and
that in the case of those who are baptized the faith of the Church,
represented by the sponsors, can be accepted as that of the child.
Moreover, he maintained that baptism in every case impresses on the
child a character indelibilis, in virtue of which it belongs by right to Christ
and His Church. He defined the effect of baptism more specifically than
was customary by stating that, while it wholly removes original sin as a
matter of guilt, it does not wholly remove it as a corruption of nature. In
general baptism was now considered as absolutely necessary, though
martydom was regarded as a full equivalent for baptismal washing. In
view of these facts, it stands to reason that infant baptism was generally
practiced.

The Scholastics at first shared the view of Augustine, that baptism in the
case of adults presupposes faith, but gradually began to consider the
sacrament as effective ex opere operato, and to minimize the importance
of subjective conditions. Thus the way was paved for the Roman Catholic
conception of baptism, according to which it is the sacrament of
regeneration and of initiation into the Church. It contains the grace which
it signifies and confers it ex opere operato on all those who do not put an
obstacle in the way. The grace so conferred is of the utmost importance,
since it includes: (1) The character indelibilis, which brings one under the
jurisdiction of the Church. (2) Deliverance (a) from the guilt of original
sin and from the guilt of sins committed up to the time of baptism; (b)
from the pollution of sin, though concupiscence remains as the fomenting
agent of sin; and (c) from eternal punishment and also from all temporal
punishments, except in so far as these are the natural results of sin. (3)
Spiritual renewal by the infusion of sanctifying grace and of the
supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and love. (4) Incorporation into the
communion of the saints, and into the visible Church of believers.
Because of this importance of baptism, it was deemed quite essential that
it should be administered as soon as possible, and in cases of necessity by
laymen or even by non-Christians.

b. The Doctrine of the Reformers and of Later Theology

The opposition of the Reformation to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the

sacraments did not center in baptism, but in the Lord's Supper. In fact,
the German Reformers adopted much of the baptism of the Roman
Catholic Church, even retaining many of the ceremonies connected with
it, such as the sign of the cross, exorcism, sponsorship, and so on. Luther
taught that the Word of God with its intrinsic divine power makes the
water of baptism a gracious water of life and a washing of regeneration. It
is not simply common water, but "the water comprehended in God's
command and connected with God's Word." Smaller Catechism IV. 1. At
first he made the salutary effect of baptism dependent on faith, but in
view of the fact that children can hardly exercise faith, he next held that
God by His prevenient grace works faith in the unconscious child, and
finally he turned the question involved over to the doctors, saying, "We
do not baptize upon that (faith in the infant), but solely upon the
command of God." Many of the Lutheran theologians, however, retained
the doctrine of an infant-faith, either as a pre-condition for baptism, or as
an immediately produced effect of its administration. In the latter case
the implication is, of course, that the sacrament works ex opere operato.
It works regeneration and takes away the guilt and power of sin, but does
not entirely remove its pollution. The radix aut fomes peccati remains.

In opposition to both Luther and Zwingli a new sect arose, during the
Reformation, in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, which
denied the validity of infant baptism. Its adherents were called
Anabaptists by their opponents, since they insisted on rebaptizing those
who were baptized in infancy, when these desired to join their circle.
They did not consider this a rebaptism, however, because they did not
regard infant baptism as a true baptism. In their estimation there was no
true baptism that was not preceded by a voluntary profession of faith in
Jesus Christ. Children really have no standing in the Church. The
spiritual successors of the Anabaptists prefer to speak of themselves as
Anti-Pædo-Baptists.

The Reformed proceeded on the assumption that baptism was instituted

for believers and therefore does not work but strengthens faith. But by
proceeding on this assumption they faced a twofold difficulty. They had
to prove in opposition, especially to the Anabaptists, but also to the
Roman Catholics and the Lutherans, that children can be regarded as
believers before baptism, and as such ought to be baptized. And in
addition to that they had to define the spiritual benefit which the child
receives in baptism, seeing that it is not yet in a position to exercise active
faith, and therefore cannot be strengthened in it. On the whole little
attention was paid to the last point. It was generally said that baptism
gives the parents the assurance that their child is incorporated in the
covenant, is a rich source of consolation for the child as it grows up, and
gives it, even in its unconscious state, a title to all the blessings of the
covenant.

The answers to the question, how the children that receive baptism are to
be considered varied from the start. There was general agreement in
establishing the right of infant baptism by an appeal to Scripture and
particularly to the scriptural doctrine of the covenant. Children of
believers are covenant children, and are therefore entitled to the
sacrament. Opinions differed, however, as to the implications of this
covenant relationship. According to some it warrants the assumption that
children of believing parents are regenerated until the contrary appears
in doctrine or life. Others, deeply conscious of the fact that such children
often grow up without revealing any signs of spiritual life, hesitated to
accept that theory. They admitted that regeneration before baptism was
quite possible, but preferred to leave it an open question, whether elect
children are regenerated before, at (during), or perhaps long after
baptism. It was felt that the cases varied and did not conform to a general
rule. In harmony with this idea the spiritual effect of baptism as a means
of grace was not limited to the time of the administration of the
sacrament. Some even regarded baptism as nothing more than a sign of
an external covenant. Under the influence of Socinians, Arminians, and
Anabaptists it became quite customary in some circles to deny that
baptism was a seal of divine grace, and to regard it as a mere act of
profession on the part of man.

3. THE LORD'S SUPPER

a. Development of the Doctrine Before the Reformation. At first the

Lord's Supper was accompanied with a common meal, for which the
people brought the necessary ingredients. These gifts were called
oblations and sacrifices, and were blessed by the bishop with a prayer of
thanksgiving. In course of time names derived from this practice, such as
prosphorai (oblations), thusiai (sacrifices), and eucharistia
(thanksgiving), were applied to the Lord's Supper itself. This was rather
harmless in itself, but led to a dangerous development, when the clerical
idea was strengthened and the bishop became a priest. Then the
thanksgiving was regarded as a consecration of the elements in the Lord's
Supper, and the Supper itself assumed the character of a sacrifice brought
by the priest (bishop). This, in turn, affected the representation of the
sacramental union. The symbolical or spiritual conception found in
Origen, and essentially also in Eusebius, Basil, Gregory of Nazianze, and
others, was supplanted by the doctrine that the flesh and blood of Christ
were in some way combined with the bread and wine in the sacrament
(Cyril, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, John of Damascus), and this again
passed into the doctrine of transubstantiation.

In the West the development of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper was
slower, but led to the same result. Augustine admitted that the sacrament
was in a sense the body of Christ, and in the language of Scripture often
spoke of bread and wine as the body and blood of Christ. At the same
time he clearly distinguished between the sign and the thing signified,
and asserted that the substance of bread and wine remains unchanged.
He stressed the commemorative aspect of the rite, and maintained that
the wicked, though they may receive the elements, do not partake of the
body. He even protested against the superstitious reverence that was paid
to the ordinance by many in his day. In fact, the views of Augustine
retarded the full development of the realistic theory for a long time.

During the Middle Ages the doctrine as taught by Augustine gradually

gave way for the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. In 818 A. D.
Paschasius Radbert formally propounded the doctrine that the material
elements in the sacrament are by divine power literally changed into the
very body that was born of Mary, the outward appearance of bread and
wine being, after consecration, a mere veil that deceives the senses. This
doctrine was opposed by the foremost theologians of the day, and
particularly by Rabanus Maurus and Ratramnus, who points out that the
new teaching confounds the sign with the thing signified and replaces
faith by a gross materialism. The new doctrine was defended, however by
Gerbert (1003), and shortly after that became the subject of a furious
controversy. About the year 1050 Berenger of Tours affirmed that the
body of Christ is indeed present in the Eucharist, not in essence, but in
power; that the elements are changed but not in substance; and that, in
order to secure this change and power, not merely consecration, but faith
on the part of the recipient as well is needed. His views were strenuously
opposed by Lanfranc (1089) and Humbert (1059), who made the crass
statement that "the very body of Christ was truly held in the priest's
hands, broken and chewed by the teeth of the faithful." This view was
finally defined by Hildebert of Tours (1134), and designated as the
doctrine of transubstantiation. It became an article of faith, when it was
formally adopted by the fourth Lateran Council in 1215. This doctrine
suggested a good many problems to the Schoolmen, such as those
respecting the duration of the change effected, the relation of substance
and accidents, the manner of Christ's presence in both elements and in
every part of them, the adoration of the host, and so on.

The Council of Trent dealt with the subject of the eucharist as recorded in
Sessio XIII of its Decrees and Canons. The gist of what is contained in
eight Chapters and eleven Canons may be stated as follows: Jesus Christ
is truly, really, and substantially present in the holy sacrament. The fact
that He is seated at the right hand of God according to the natural mode
of existence does not exclude the possibility that He may be present in
several other places at the same time according to a higher, spiritual and
supernatural mode of existence. We may not be able to explain how, but
we can conceive of the possibility of His substantial and sacramental
presence in several places simultaneously. By the words of consecration
the whole substance of bread and wine is changed into the body and
blood of Christ. The entire Christ is present under each species and under
each particle of either species, so that he who receives one particle of the
host receives the whole Christ. He is present not only in the moment of
the administration, but even before the reception of the elements by the
communicant, since the Lord called the bread his body even before the
disciples received it. In view of this presence of Christ in the eucharist the
adoration of the host and the festival of the Corpus Christi are but
natural. The chief effects of the sacrament are: "increase of sanctifying
grace, special actual graces, remission of venial sins, preservation from
grievous (mortal) sin, and the confident hope of eternal salvation."

b. The Doctrine of the Reformers and of Later Theology

The Reformers one and all rejected the sacrificial theory of the Lord's
Supper and the mediæval doctrine of transubstantiation. But that is
about as far as their agreement in the matter went. When they addressed
themselves to the positive task of constructing a scriptural doctrine of the
Lord's Supper, their ways parted. Luther at first taught that bread and
wine were signs and seals of the forgiveness of sins, but soon adopted
another view, in which he opposed Zwingli's figurative interpretation of
the words of the institution. He asserted the necessity of taking these
words literally and assumed a real bodily presence of Christ in the Lord's
Supper. At the same time he rejected the Catholic doctrine of
transubstantiation, substituting for it the doctrine of consubstantiation,
defended at length by Ockham in his De Sacramento Altaris. In his larger
Catechism Luther expresses himself as follows: "The very body and blood
of our Lord Jesus Christ are, by the word of Christ, instituted and given to
us Christians to be eaten and drunk in and under bread and wine."
According to him the body is also received by unbelievers who partake of
the sacrament, but only to their condemnation.

Zwingli opposed especially the idolatry of the mass, and denied

absolutely the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. He
interpreted the words of the institution figuratively, taking the word "is"
to mean "signifies", as in Gen. 41:26; John 10:9; 15:1. In the bread and
wine he saw mere symbols, and in the sacrament itself an act of
commemoration. Yet he did not deny the spiritual presence of Christ.
"The true body of Christ", says he, "is present to the contemplation of
faith; but that his natural body is really and actually present in the
Supper, or is eaten with our mouths.… we constantly assert to be an error
repugnant to the Word of God." While he says, "There is nothing in the
eucharist but commemoration", he also uses expressions that would seem
to point to a deeper significance. His position is not altogether clear.

Calvin held an intermediate position. He agreed with Zwingli in rejecting

absolutely the bodily, local, and substantial presence of Christ in the
Lord's Supper. But he had especially two objections to the view of the
Swiss Reformer, namely that the latter, (1) stresses the activity of the
believers rather than the gracious gift of God in the sacrament, and
therefore conceives of the Lord's Supper one-sidedly as an act of
profession; and (2) sees in the eating of the body of Christ nothing else
and nothing more than an expression of belief in His name and confident
trust in His death. While denying the bodily and local presence of Christ
in the Lord's Supper, he yet agreed with Luther, that Christ is really and
essentially present in his entire person, and is received as such by
believers. His view is succinctly and correctly expressed by Sheldon when
he says: "His theory" in brief was that the glorified humanity of Christ is a
fountain of spiritual virtue or efficacy; that this efficacy is mediated by the
Holy Spirit to the believing recipient of the eucharistic elements; that
accordingly the body of Christ is present in the eucharist in virtue of
efficacy; that the eating of Christ's body is entirely spiritual, by means of
faith, the unbelieving having no part in it, and an oral manducation being
out of the question." History of Christian Doctrines II, p. 207. This view
was incorporated in the Reformed Confessions, and became the common
property of Reformed theology. The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of
England are not very definite on the subject.

After the Reformation the Zwinglian conception of the Lord's Supper

found favor in some circles. It was sometimes regarded as a sacrament of
a purely external covenant, to which all who gave no offense were
entitled. Thus the way was paved for Rationalism, which adopted the
views of the Socinians, the Arminians, and the Mennonites, who saw in
the Lord's Supper only a memorial, an act of profession, and a means for
moral improvement. Under the influence of Schleiermacher the objective
character of the sacrament as a means of grace was again stressed. Many
of the mediating theologians (Vermittelungs-theologen) rejected the
Lutheran consubstantiation and manducatio oralis, and approached the
doctrine of Calvin by teaching that Christ is spiritually present in the
Lord's Supper, and in the sacrament imparts Himself and His spiritual
blessings to believers. Others, such as Scheibel, Rudelbach, and Philippi
reaffirmed the old Lutheran position. In England the Oxford Movement
marks a return to the position of Rome. Many of the High Church party
teach that the consecrated elements in the Lord's Supper are really, be it
mystically, the body and blood of Christ.

Questions for Further Study: What are the marks of a sacrament? Are the
sacraments necessary unto salvation? Do Roman Catholics defend the
position that their sacraments were instituted by Jesus? What scriptural
grounds do they adduce for their various sacraments? How did the idea of
baptismal regeneration arise? How did the Anabaptist view of baptism
differ from that of the Reformers? On what grounds do they deny infant
baptism? How did the sacrificial idea of the Lord's Supper arise? Why do
Roman Catholics withhold the cup from the laity? How did Calvin
conceive of the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper?

Literature: Wahl, History of Infant Baptism; Dimock, The Doctrine of the

Sacraments; Hebert, The Lord's Supper, History of Uninspired Teaching;
Ebrard, Das Dogma vom heiligen Abendmahl; Hagenbach, History of
Doctrines, I, pp. 277–299; II, pp. 67–86, 319–377; III, pp. 140–173, 219–
226, 374–381; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 227–247; II,
pp. 398–413, 455–463, 527–537, 588–595, 613–619, 688–702; Sheldon,
History of Christian Doctrines, I, pp. 136–144, 270–281, 388–404; II, pp.
191–212, 382–388; Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas, I, pp. 180–
189, 338–356; II, pp. 272–396; Crippen, History of Christian Doctrine,
pp. 189–207; Cunningham, Historical Theology, II, pp. 121–154; Seeberg,
History of Doctrine, cf. Index.
 THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS
I. The Intermediate State

The doctrine of the last things never stood in the center of attention, is
one of the least developed doctrines, and therefore calls for no elaborate
discussion. Its main elements have been rather constant, and these
constitute practically the whole dogma of the Church respecting future
things. Occasionally deviating views occupied a rather important place in
theological discussions, but these were never incorporated in the
Confessions of the Church. It may be that, as Dr. Orr surmises, we have
now reached that point in the history of dogma in which the doctrine of
the last things will receive greater attention and be brought to further
development.

The Apostolic Fathers did not yet reflect on the intermediate state.
According to the common opinion of their day the pious at death
immediately inherit the heavenly glory prepared for them, and the wicked
at once suffer the punishment of hell. It was only when it became
apparent that Christ would not immediately return, that the Church
Fathers began to reflect on the state between death and the resurrection.
One of the first was Justin, who said: "The souls of the pious are in a
better place, those of the unjust and wicked in a worse, waiting for the
time of judgment." He denounced as heretical those who said "that their
souls, when they die, are taken to heaven."

The general opinion of the later Fathers, such as Irenæus, Tertullian,

Hilary, Ambrose, Cyril, and even Augustine, was that the dead descend
into hades, a place with various divisions, where they remain until the
day of judgment or, according to Augustine, until they are sufficiently
purified. In the measure in which it became apparent that the parousia of
Christ was a far distant event, it became increasingly difficult to maintain
the idea of hades as a merely temporary and provisional habitation of the
dead. An exception was soon made for the martyrs who, according to
Tertullian, were at once admitted into glory. The descent of Christ into
hades was interpreted as having effected the deliverance of the Old
Testament saints from the limbus patrum. And when the doctrine of the
meritoriousness of good works became prominent, it was taught that
those who were diligent in their performance were worthy of passing into
heaven at once. Hades was gradually robbed of its righteous inhabitants.
Finally, the wicked were about the only ones left, and it began to be
regarded as a place of punishment, sometimes identified with gehenna.
Origen taught explicitly that Christ transported all the righteous of
former ages from hades to paradise, which from that time on became the
destination of all departing saints.

In connection with the idea that many Christians are not sufficiently holy
at death to enter the region of eternal bliss, the conviction gradually
gained currency that these are subjected to a process of purification
beyond the grave. The early Church Fathers already spoke of a purifying
fire, which some of them located in paradise, and others associated with
the final conflagration. They did not always have in mind a literal or
material fire, but often thought merely of a spiritual test or discipline.
Origen conceived of hades, including gehenna, and also of the final
conflagration at the end of the world, as a purifying fire. Several of the
later Greek and Latin Church Fathers, such as the three Cappadocians,
Ambrose, Ephræm, Augustine, and others, entertained the idea of a
purgatorial fire in the intermediate state.

It was especially in the West that the idea of a special purgatorial fire was
developed. Gregory the Great already stressed it as a matter of
unquestioned belief. Says he: "It is to be believed that there is, for some
light faults, a purgatorial fire before the judgment." Hence he is usually
called "the inventor of purgatory." He was also the first one who clearly
propounded the idea, vaguely entertained by others long before him, of
deliverance from this fire by intercessory prayers and oblations. The
mediæval Scholastics and Mystics were very explicit in their description
of purgatory, and the majority of them conceived of it as a material fire.
The Greek Church never cordially accepted the gross views current in the
West.

The locality of purgatory was also discussed, and it was generally

regarded as that division of hades that was nearest to hell. At a little
remove from it was the limbus infantum, the place where, according to
the Scholastics, children who died in an unbaptized state are confined,
suffering no positive pain indeed, but yet kept forever out of heaven. Still
farther away from hell was the supposed limbus patrum, also called
"paradise" or "Abraham's bosom", where, it was held, the Old Testament
worthies were retained until the descent of Christ into hades. The
doctrine of purgatory was solemnly affirmed by the Council of Trent in
1546. It was in connection with this doctrine that the vicious practice of
selling indulgences grew up in the Church.

The doctrine of purgatory was opposed towards the end of the Middle
Ages by such forerunners of the Reformation as Wyclif and Huss. Luther
fulminated against the pernicious practices that grew up in the Church in
connection with it, and the Reformers, one and all, rejected the whole
doctrine of purgatory as contrary to Scripture. The Smalcald Articles
speak of purgatory as belonging to "the vermin brood of idolatry,
begotten by the tail of the dragon." And the Thirty-Nine Articles of the
Church of England declare that "the Romish doctrine concerning
purgatory.… is a fond thing, vainly invented, and grounded upon no
warranty of Scripture."

II. The Second Advent and the Millennial Hope

The early Christians were taught to look for the return of Jesus Christ,
and it is evident even from the New Testament that some of them
expected a speedy return. The literal interpretation of Rev. 20:1–6 led
some of the early Church Fathers to distinguish between a first and a
second resurrection, and to believe in an intervening millennial kingdom.
Some of them dwelt very fondly on these millennial hopes and pictured
the enjoyments of the future age in a crassly materialistic manner. This is
true especially of Papias and Irenæus. Others such as Barnabas, Hennas,
Justin, and Tertullian, while teaching the doctrine, avoided its
extravagances. The millennial doctrine also found favor with Cerinthus,
the Ebionites, and the Montanists. But it is not correct to say, as
Premillenarians do, that it was generally accepted in the first three
centuries. The truth of the matter is that the adherents of this doctrine
were a rather limited number. There is no trace of it in Clement of Rome,
Ignatius, Polycarp, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Clement of
Alexandria, Origen, Dionysius, and other important Church Fathers.

The Millenarianism of the early Church was gradually overcome. When

centuries rolled by without the return of Jesus Christ, when persecutions
ceased, and when Christianity received a sure footing in the Roman
Empire and even became the State religion, the passionate longing for the
appearance of Jesus Christ very naturally gave way for an adaptation of
the Church to its present task. The allegorical interpretation of Scripture,
introduced by the Alexandrian school, and sponsored especially by
Origen, also had a chilling effect on all millennial hopes. In the West the
powerful influence of Augustine was instrumental in turning the thoughts
of the Church from the future to the present by his identification of the
Church and the Kingdom of God. He taught the people to look for the
millennium in the present Christian dispensation.

During the Middle Ages Millenarianism was generally regarded as

heretical. There were, it is true, here and there transient and sporadic
buddings of the millennial hope in the sects, but these exercised no
profound influence. In the tenth century there was a widespread
expectation of the approaching end of the world, but this was not
accompanied with chiliastic hopes, though it was associated with the idea
of the speedy coming of Antichrist. Christian art often chose its themes
from eschatology. The hymn Dies Irae sounded the terrors of the coming
judgment, painters depicted the end of the world on the canvass, and
Dante gave a vivid description of hell in his Divina Comoedia.

At the time of the Reformation the doctrine of the millennium was

rejected by the Protestant Churches, but revived in some of the sects,
such as that of the more fanatical Anabaptists, and that of the Fifth
Monarchy Men. Luther scornfully rejected "the dream" that there would
be an earthly kingdom of Christ preceding the day of judgment. The
Augsburg Confession condemns those "who now scatter Jewish opinions,
that, before the resurrection of the dead, the godly shall occupy the
kingdom of the world, the wicked being everywhere suppressed." Art.
XVII. And the Second Helvetic Confession says: "Moreover, we condemn
the Jewish dreams, that before the day of judgment there shall be a
golden age in the earth, and the godly shall possess the kingdoms of the
world, their wicked enemies being trodden under foot." Chapter XI.

A certain form of Millenarianism made its appearance, however, in the

seventeenth century. There were several Lutheran and Reformed
theologians who, while rejecting the idea of a visible reign of Christ on
earth for a thousand years, advocated a more spiritual conception of the
millennium. Their view of the matter was that, before the end of the
world and the return of Jesus Christ, there will be a period in which the
spiritual presence of Christ in the Church will be experienced in an
unusual measure and a universal religious awakening will ensue. The
Kingdom of Jesus Christ will then stand out as a kingdom of peace and
righteousness. This was the early form of Post- as distinguished from
Premillennialism.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the doctrine of the

millennium again met with great favor in some circles. It was advocated
by the school of Bengel and more recently by that of Erlangen, and
numbered among its adherents such men as Hofmann, Delitzsch,
Auberlen, Rothe, Elliott, Cumming, Bickersteth, the Bonars, Alford,
Zahn, and others. There is great diversity of opinion among these
Premillenarians as to the order of the final events and the actual
condition of things during the millennium. Repeated attempts have been
made to fix the time of Christ's return, which is with great assurance
declared to be imminent, but up to the present all these calculations have
failed. Though there is a widespread belief to-day, especially in our
country, that the return of Christ will be followed by a temporary visible
reign of Christ on earth, yet the weight of theological opinion is against it.
In liberal circles a new form of Post-millennialism has made its
appearance. The expected kingdom will consist of a new social order "in
which the law of Christ shall prevail, and in which its prevalence shall
result in peace, justice and a glorious blossoming of present spiritual
forces." This is what Rauschenbusch has in mind when he says, "We need
a restoration of the millennial hope." A Theology for the Social Gospel, p.
224. Up to the present time, however, the doctrine of the millennium has
never yet been embodied in a single Confession, and therefore cannot be
regarded as a dogma of the Church.
III. The Resurrection

Most of the early Church Fathers believed in the resurrection of the body,
that is, in the identity of the future body with that of the present. The
views of Clement of Alexandria are somewhat uncertain, but it is clear
that Origen, while defending the doctrine of the Church against Celsus,
rejected the idea that the identical body would be raised up. He described
the resurrection body as a refined and spiritualized body. Some of the
Church Fathers shared his view, but the majority of them held that the
resurrection body would be in every respect identical with the body
formed in the present life. Augustine was in agreement with Origen at
first, but finally accepted the prevalent view, though he did not consider it
necessary to assume that the present differences of size and stature would
continue in the life to come. In fact, he believed that at the resurrection
all would have the stature of the full-grown man. Jerome, however,
insisted on the identity of the very hairs and teeth. On the whole it may be
said that the East manifested a tendency to adopt a more spiritual view of
the resurrection than the West. The two Gregories, Chrysostom, and
Synesius, were in general agreement with Origen. John of Damascus did
affirm the restitution of the same body, but was satisfied with that view of
identity which is suggested by the analogy of the seed and the plant. They
who believed in a future millennium spoke of a double resurrection, that
of the pious at the beginning, and that of the wicked at the termination, of
the millennial reign.

The Scholastics speculated in their usual way about the body of the
resurrection. Their speculations were rather fanciful and had little
permanent value. Thomas Aquinas seemed to have special information
on the subject. He informs us that they who are alive at the coming of
Christ will first die, and then be raised again with the rest of the dead.
The resurrection will take place towards evening. That substance will
arise which existed at the moment of death. All will be in the bloom of
youth. The body will be tangible, but fine and light, and not subject to
growth. In obedience to the impulse of the soul it will move swiftly and
easily. The bodies of the wicked, on the other hand, will be ugly and
deformed and capable of much suffering, though incorruptible.
The theologians of the Reformation period were quite agreed that the
resurrection body would be identical with the present body. This doctrine
is also embodied in the confessional standards of the Churches of the
Reformation. With the advance of the physical sciences some of the
difficulties with which the doctrine of the resurrection is burdened were
accentuated, and as a result modern religious liberalism either bluntly
denies the resurrection, or explains the scriptural representations of it as
a figurative representation of the idea that the full human personality
with all its powers will continue to exist after death. This view is popular
with many at the present time.

IV. The Last Judgment and the Final Awards

The earliest Church Fathers have very little to say about the last
judgment, but generally stress its certainty. Most of them are of the
opinion that the saints in heaven will enjoy different degrees of
blessedness, commensurate with the virtues which adorned them on
earth. Some of their writings abound with sensuous representations of
the pleasures of the future world. Those of Origen, however, reflect a
more spiritual conception. The punishment of the wicked was generally
thought of as eternal, Origen forming an exception. It is true that in his
popular discourses he also speaks of eternal punishment, but in his De
Principiis he tends to rule this out altogether. But even he does not
conceive of the future punishment as purely spiritual. He really resolves it
into chastisement by holding out hope even to the wicked, and expresses
belief in the final restoration of all things.

The later Fathers also stood firm in the conviction that there would be a
final judgment at the end of the world. But they spoke of this mostly, just
as of other eschatological events, in a highly rhetorical fashion, without
conveying any definite information. Augustine proceeds on the
assumption that the scriptural representations of it are figurative. He
expresses the conviction that Christ is coming again to judge the living
and the dead, but maintains that Scripture leaves it uncertain how long
this judgment will last.

There was no unanimous opinion as to what will constitute the

blessedness of heaven. A more fully developed knowledge, intercourse
with the saints, deliverance from the fetters of the body, and true liberty—
these are some of the outstanding elements that were named. The
sufferings of the damned were regarded as the very opposite of the joys of
heaven. Some believed in degrees of bliss and torment, though both of
these were generally regarded as eternal. Most of the Church Fathers also
clung to the idea of a material fire, though some surmised that the
punishment of the wicked would consist chiefly in separation from God
and a consciousness of their own wickedness.

The Scholastics paid particular attention to the location of heaven and

hell. According to them heaven is divided into three parts, namely, (1) the
visible heavens (the firmament); (2) the spiritual heaven, the
dwellingplace of saints and angels; and (3) the intellectual heaven, where
the blessed enjoy the immediate vision of God. They also conceived of the
underworld as divided into different departments, namely, (1) hell,
properly so called, the abode of devils and of the damned; and (2) regions
that might be called intermediate between heaven and hell, of which
there are three: (a) purgatory in close proximity to hell; (b) the limbus
infantum, where unbaptized children remain; and (c) the limbus patrum,
the abode of the Old Testament saints.

The Reformers were content with the affirmation of the simple doctrine
of Scripture that Christ will come again to judge the world. They were
careful to distinguish between the general judgment at the end of the
world and the secret and particular judgment which takes place at the
death of each individual. The purpose of the former was understood to be
the public vindication of divine justice in making final awards. They
shared the common belief in the eternal bliss of heaven and the eternal
torments of hell. Some Anabaptists taught restorationism, and some
Socinians, the annihilation of the wicked. Some Protestant theologians
held the opinion that material fire will play a part in the endless
punishment of the wicked; others were non-committal on the subject;
and still others interpreted all that the Bible says about fire in a figurative
manner. The doctrine of future rewards and punishments, as taught by
the Reformation, remains the official doctrine of the Churches up to the
present day, though since the middle of the previous century the doctrine
of conditional immortality enjoyed great popularity in some circles. Only
thorough-going Universalists—and they are few—believe in universal
salvation and in the restoration of all things in the absolute sense of the
word.

Questions for Further Study: Is it true that Chiliasm was the generally
accepted doctrine of the Church in the second and third centuries? What
accounts for it in the early Church? Was all Chiliasm even then of the
same type? What was Augustine's view of the millennium? What can be
said in favor of it? What accounts for the repeated re-occurrence of
Chiliasm? Are the historical Confessions of the Churches favorable or
unfavorable to it? Did the Reformers encourage chiliastic hopes? Is the
Premillennialism in the present day the same as the Chiliasm of the early
centuries? How did the Scholastics seek to prove the idea of purgatory
from Scripture? Does Scripture favor the idea that the dead are in some
intermediate place, neither heaven nor hell? Who taught the sleep of the
soul and on what grounds? What are the doctrines of conditional
immortality and of a second probation? What sects believe in the
annihilation of the wicked? Does the doctrine of universal restoration
find considerable favor?

Literature: Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, Chap. V; Brown,

The Christian Hope, Chap. VIII; Alger, Critical History of the Doctrine of
a Future Life; Hoekstra, Het Chiliasme, pp. 9–59; Case, The Millennial
Hope; Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, I, pp. 301–322; II, pp. 87–105,
378–405; III, pp. 173–175, 226–229, 382–390; Neander, History of
Christian Doctrines, I, pp. 247–256; II, pp. 413–417; Shedd, History of
Christian Doctrines, II, pp. 389–419; Sheldon, History of Christian
Doctrines, I, pp. 145–155, 282–290; II, pp.213–217, 389–399; Crippen,
History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 231–253; Otten, Manual of the History
of Dogmas, I, pp. 105–107, 457–463; II, pp. 418–437; Seeberg, History of
Doctrines, cf. Index; Addison, Life Beyond Death in the Beliefs of
Mankind.
LITERATURE

GENERAL

Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought, Boston, 1885.

Boardman, A History of New England Theology, New York, 1899.

Cunningham, Historical Theology, Edinburgh, 1870.

Crippen, History of Christian Doctrine, Edinburgh, 1883.

Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, New York, 1901.

Foster, A History of New England Theology, Chicago, 1907.

Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, Edinburgh, 1880.

Harnack, History of Dogma, Boston, 1897–1905.

Harnack, Outlines of the History of Dogma, New York, 1893.

Klotsche, An Outline of the History of Doctrines, Burlington, 1927.

Loofs, Handboek der Dogmengeschiedenis, Groningen, 1902.

McGiffert, History of Christian Thought, New York, 1932–'33.

Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, London, 1858.

Orr, The Progress of Dogma, New York, 1902.

Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas, St. Louis, 1922.

Seeberg, Textbook of the History of Doctrines, Philadelphia, 1905.

Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, New York, 1889.

Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, New York, 1886.

Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, Erlangen, 1874.

SPECIAL

Addison, Life Beyond Death, New York, 1932.

Bavinck, Roeping en Wedergeboorte, Kampen, 1913.

Berkhof, The Assurance of Faith, Grand Rapids, 1928.

Berkhof, Vicarious Atonement Through Christ, Grand Rapids, 1936.

Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ, New York, 1901.

Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, Edinburgh, 1867.

Candlish, The Kingdom of God, Edinburgh, 1884.

Case, The Millennial Hope, Chicago, 1918.

Dee, Het Geloofsbegrip van Calvijn, Kampen.

De Jong, De Leer der Verzoening in de Amerikaansche Theologie, Grand

Rapids, 1913.

Dimick, The Doctrine of the Sacraments, London, 1908.

Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Edinburgh, 1871.

Ebrard, Das Dogma vom heiligen Abendmahl, Frankfort a. M., 1845.

Emmen, De Christologie van Calvijn, Amsterdam, 1935.

Emerton, Unitarian Thought, New York, 1916.

Flew, The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology, Oxford, 1934.

Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, New York.

Girardeau, Calvinism and Evangelical Arminianism, Columbia, 1890.

Hatch, The Organization of the Early Christian Church, Oxford and
Cambridge, 1881.

Hebert, The Lord's Supper, Uninspired Teaching, London, 1897.

Henderson, The Religious Controversies of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1905.

Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus in sechzenten

Jahrhundert, Gotha, 1857.

Heppe, Geschichte des Pietismus.

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