Log PLTN
Log PLTN
NOVEMBER 2021
ATP 4-90.5 i
Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. Echeloned sustainment using field, combat, and company trains .............................. 1-5
Figure 1-2. Echeloned sustainment using supply point, unit, and throughput distribution. ........... 1-6
Figure 4-1. Map of the mission area .............................................................................................. 4-2
Figure 4-2. Troop leading procedures ........................................................................................... 4-5
Figure 4-3. Additional lesson learned for Anderson .................................................................... 4-10
Figure 4-4. Anderson’s projected timeline for the day. ................................................................ 4-11
Figure 4-5. Anderson’s list of lessons learned ............................................................................. 4-18
Figure A-1. Chief of Staff of the Army - work life balance example ............................................... A-4
Figure A-2. 8-Step training model .................................................................................................. A-6
Figure A-3. Forward support company platoon training strategy................................................... A-9
Figure A-4. Platoon training via Combined Arms Training Strategy (1 of 2) ............................... A-10
Figure A-5. Platoon training via Combined Arms Training Strategy (2 of 2) ............................... A-11
Figure A-6. Mission essential task to individual task via Combined Arms Training Strategy ...... A-12
Figure A-7. Platoon notional training path ................................................................................... A-13
Figure A-8. General Scenario Illustration..................................................................................... A-15
Figure C-1. Sub-hand receipt responsibilities ................................................................................ C-2
Figure C-2. Primary hand receipt example .................................................................................... C-4
Figure C-3. Sub-hand receipt example .......................................................................................... C-4
Figure C-4. Component listing/hand receipt .................................................................................. C-5
Tables
Table 3-1. Typical enemy situation template items ..................................................................... 3-12
Table 3-2. Army support relationships ......................................................................................... 3-30
A logistics platoon leader tactically employs their platoons, attains proficiency in their
branch functions, executes the orders process utilizing troop leading procedures, and
leverages teams and squads to accomplish tasks.
ROLES
1-5. The platoon leader provides effective command and control of platoon personnel to enable
accomplishment of any and all missions and tasks for which the platoon is responsible. The platoon leader is
responsible for the platoon command and control system to include driving the operations process at the
platoon level. The platoon leader also executes the full range of personnel management, training, counseling,
mentorship, readiness, and supply accountability.
1-6. The balance of the platoon leader, warrant officer (WO), and NCO responsibilities is critical to
successful platoon operations. The platoon leader is the primary planner and ensures the platoon is properly
resourced, the WO provides technical expertise and the “how to” for logistics functions, and NCOs ensure
Soldier and equipment readiness and oversight of task execution.
PLATOON LEADER
1-7. The platoon leader is the first officer in the chain of command. Platoon leader duties include planning
platoon operations, resourcing subordinates, planning collective training, and synchronizing and overseeing
platoon execution of the mission. The platoon leader’s top priority is to prepare the platoon to perform the
assigned mission and maneuver to the decisive point. Platoon leaders will accomplish this using the principles
of mission command. See page 1-6 for definition and further discussion of mission command principles.
1-8. The nation entrusts the Army leader with its most precious commodity, its sons and daughters. Army
leaders embrace this responsibility and keep the well-being of their subordinates and their families in mind.
There are times when leaders place their subordinates in harm’s way; this is not because they do not care for
them, but because they have a duty to the Nation. Leaders also care for subordinates by maintaining their
training level so in the event of combat they are well prepared.
1-9. Leaders who respect those with whom they work will likely garner respect in return. Simple actions
can demonstrate respect and care, such as listening patiently or addressing families’ needs. Detecting change
in morale and actively seeking honest feedback about the health of individuals and the organization indicate
care.
1-10. Platoon leaders are responsible for equipment maintenance and property accountability. These are two
very important responsibilities as they ensure the platoon has the right equipment on hand and equipment is
fully mission capable in order to conduct the platoon’s mission. For more information consult AR 750-1 for
maintenance and AR 735-5 for property accountability.
1-11. Platoon leaders represent the commander’s intent at the platoon level, serving as the officers in charge
of mission execution, readiness, and Soldier development. This means platoon leaders are also responsible
for ensuring their Soldiers understand the commander’s intent.
1-12. Platoon leaders counsel and rate platoon sergeants, but the platoon leader can also gain a better
perspective on the platoon’s strengths and weaknesses by developing a strong professional relationship with
their NCO counterpart. Platoon leaders conduct quarterly counseling sessions as the tool to assess platoon
collective tasks, training, administrative tasks, and maintenance actions.
1-13. Platoon leaders support their company mission essential task list (METL) tasks as they execute or plan
collective tasks to include ensuring individual training events, to prepare the platoon for their core LSCO
functions.
1-14. A functional platoon requires a cohesive team. Exercising mission command and empowering junior
leaders requires teams that are built through mutual trust. Platoon-level leaders gain this mutual trust through
building a team based on shared experiences, enforcing standards, creating a platoon identity, building trust
in training environments, and having a welcome program. A platoon where leaders do not share hardships
may not function as well.
1-15. Trust and cohesion are characteristics of the Army culture that have direct impacts on climate. Leaders
encourage subordinates to work together for the greater good while promoting pride in organizational
accomplishments. Subordinates trust leaders who underwrite their good faith efforts to act in accordance with
their leaders' intents. If the outcome is not what the leader expects, the leader and subordinate discuss the
problem and develop a strategy to get back on track.
1-16. Trust also follows when a team appreciates a concerted, honest effort even when the results are
incomplete. Army members gain confidence in leaders who enable them to achieve standards and demand
quality performance. Leaders build cohesive teams by setting and maintaining a collective mindset among
team members and enabling successful performance.
1-17. Conflict occurs when people disagree about ideas or feel their interests are threatened. Conflict does
not require the involvement of two people, nor is it necessarily based on facts. One person may be in conflict
with another, without the second person realizing it or being at fault. Leaders should identify and resolve
conflict before it affects personal and organizational functioning, good order and discipline, and cohesion.
1-18. Leaders should be able to resolve two kinds of conflicts: work-related and personal. Any given conflict
is likely to contain some level of both elements. Work-related conflict can stem from disagreement over a
course of action, workload perceptions, or the best steps for completing a specific task. Personal conflicts
generally stem from people who do not like or respect each other or some perceived grievance based upon
individual behavior. Leaders need to develop the skills to address both types of conflicts as rapidly and
effectively as possible. Conflicts that simmer lower the morale and duty performance of those involved and
can corrode an organizational cohesion when not quickly addressed.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-19. Platoon sergeants are the enlisted advisors to the platoon leader and serve as the NCOs in charge of
mission execution, readiness, and Soldier development.
1-20. Platoon sergeants are rated by the platoon leader and senior rated by the company commander. The
PSG performs assigned duties and supports and advises the platoon leader in the execution of the
commander’s intent.
1-21. The platoon sergeant is the NCO support chain leader within the platoon and is responsible for enlisted
Soldiers’ development, discipline, training, and well-being. These are accomplished with the mentorship and
guidance of the company first sergeant and supported by the squad/team level NCO leaders.
Platoon sergeants execute platoon level individual and collective tasks and ensure that Soldiers continue to
develop and maintain tactical and technical MOS proficiency. By developing individual competence and
confidence, platoon sergeants enable Soldiers to work together and execute missions collectively.
1-22. For a further look into what the relationship between a platoon leader and platoon sergeant should be
refer to chapter 4, The Resupply of Duffer’s Drift.
WARRANT OFFICERS
1-27. WOs are the technical experts within their assigned fields. Their experience and understanding of
policy and doctrine enable them to manage operations, provide added perspective to senior leaders within the
commander’s intent, and build relevancy and professionalism within their assigned organizations.
1-28. The rating scheme for WOs varies based on the organization and will be assigned by coordination
between the company commander and battalion commander.
1-29. A WO is directly in charge of a logistics activity and generally supervises a team chief who manages
Soldiers in execution of day-to-day mission support tasks. Examples of WO duties include the following:
Supply support activity technician.
COMPANY COMMANDER
1-30. The company commander is responsible for the accountability, mission readiness, and professional
development of all personnel within the company. The commander influences others to establish a culture
that supports organizational missions while also supporting development of assigned Soldiers and leaders in
accordance with (IAW) and supporting Army command policy (AR 600-20) and regulations. The commander
executes command programs that support general readiness, including the following:
Physical fitness, health, and mission readiness of all company Soldiers.
Professional counseling, evaluations, and promotion determinations.
Treatment of Soldiers with dignity and respect.
Equal opportunity program.
Sexual harassment and assault response program.
Family readiness groups and care planning.
Safety and risk management.
1-31. The commander is responsible for the property accountability and mission readiness of equipment
systems, facilities, property, and supplies within the company in accordance with Army regulations. The
commander executes command programs that support these activities, to include the following:
Property accountability – hand receipt management, inventories, documenting and ordering
shortages when necessary.
Command maintenance program – preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS)
validation, dispatch control, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
Physical security – key control and container management.
1-32. Commanders execute missions within regulatory requirements and may compete for recognition within
specific areas outlined and evaluated externally, such as the command supply discipline program, command
maintenance discipline program, and command deployment discipline program.
1-33. Commanders are responsible for collective mission readiness of the company to include training
proficiency, relationships, and communications with higher headquarters and supported units. The
commander integrates internal equipment and processes with available personnel to meet requirements for
sustainment, survivability, and deployability, including the following:
Identification and certification of crews on assigned vehicles/equipment platforms.
Weapons proficiency and qualification (individual and crew served).
Communications equipment (digital and field manual proficiency).
Key collective training tasks within the company mission essential task list.
Unit movement operations.
Hazardous material (HAZMAT) handling and documentation.
1-34. Company commanders establish and maintain a culture of good order and military discipline. The
commander enforces orders, policies, and regulations in accordance with Section 934, Title 10, United States
Code (10 USC 934), Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), supported by:
Partnering with legal advisors to ensure proper processes are followed in the application of this
authority- may initiate investigations, inquiries, and reasonable searches of property.
Punitive Actions:
Administer non-judicial punishment (Article 15, UCMJ).
Initiate and provide recommendations of courts martial.
Initiate administrative actions on assigned Soldiers that may include:
Suspension of favorable actions.
Suspension of security clearance.
Bar to reenlistment.
Administrative separation of enlisted personnel.
RESPONSIBILITIES
1-35. Platoon leader responsibilities vary widely depending on the type of platoon and the operational
environment in which the platoon operates. The subsequent paragraphs illustrate responsibilities a platoon
leader can anticipate.
CONTINUOUS SUPPORT
1-36. Logistics platoon leaders accomplish tasks that provide for continuous support to their supported units
in order for those units to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Continuous support maintains operational
tempo and enhances capabilities throughout the battlefield. Requirements for continuous support depend on
daily consumption rates and phases of the operation.
1-37. The support at the brigade combat team level is executed through the echeloned trains concept. Trains
are a unit grouping of personnel, vehicles, and equipment to provide command and control and sustainment.
The combat train is the basic sustainment tactical organization (see figure 1-1). Commanders at the battalion
and company level in the supported battalions are responsible for the train’s emplacement, and that decision
depends on mission variable of mission, enemy, time, troops available, terrain, and civil considerations
(METT-TC).
1-38. To ensure the most efficient and expedient way of executing the echelon sustainment concept using
supply point, unit, and throughput distribution (see figure 1-2 on page 1-6), logisticians use the
synchronization matrix to capture requirements from their supported units throughout all phases of the
operation. This tool enables sustainment leaders to identify current capabilities and address any shortfalls to
assist with future re-supply operations. The requirements and synchronization matrix drives tasks that
logistics platoon leaders will execute to ensure continuous support.
Figure 1-1. Echeloned sustainment using field, combat, and company trains
Figure 1-2. Echeloned sustainment using supply point, unit, and throughput distribution.
SECTION II – LEADERSHIP
1-39. Effective logistics platoon leaders must possess the Army leader attributes. Leadership is the activity
of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve
the organization. As an element of combat power, leadership, coupled with information, unifies the
warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, and command
and control). Leadership focuses and synchronizes organizations. Effective leaders inspire people to achieve
desired outcomes.
1-40. First impressions have a lasting impact on leaders’ effectiveness, especially at the platoon level.
Soldiers remember whether their leaders take charge and demonstrate competence. Logistics leaders are full
partners with the leaders of the forces they support. They receive guidance from the chain of command and
translate this guidance to their platoons. Platoon leaders should clarify expectations, provide back briefs, and
understand how the platoon fits within the larger mission of the company and battalion. Asking the right
questions, synthesizing feedback, and providing clear guidance are more important than demonstrating
technical expertise.
Provide clear commander’s intent – clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation
and the desired military end state that supports mission command, focus to the staff, and helps
subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without
further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.
Exercise disciplined initiative – action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit
the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise in order to create opportunities.
Use mission orders – directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how
they are to achieve them.
Accept prudent risk – deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges
the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
1-43. Logistics platoon leaders must understand and execute missions within their commander’s intent.
Commander’s intent defines success for the mission and includes purpose, key tasks, and the conditions that
define the end state. It describes the “what” for platoon leaders, allowing them to achieve desired results
without further orders. The commander’s intent must be simple, concise, and easily understood two echelons
lower in the chain of command to enable Soldiers to act quickly and decisively in fluid and chaotic situations.
PLATOON FUNCTIONS
2-7. Logistics platoons are organized to execute specific functions, each of which is tied to a logistics
element and is necessary to enable mission accomplishment. Logistics platoons provide functional capability
that does not exist elsewhere in the Army structure. Proper application of these functional capabilities ensures
that platoons are an effective force on the modern battlefield and that they contribute directly to mission
success.
PLATOON CHARACTERISTICS
2-9. A platoon is normally an organic subdivision of an Army company-sized unit led by a lieutenant. A
platoon is typically the smallest military unit led by a commissioned officer. The platoon is an all-weather,
all-terrain unit capable of operating independently in any operational environment.
2-10. In many instances, the platoon or elements of the platoon operate closer to the forward line of troops
and enemy threats than any other sustainment unit. The platoon must adapt to various levels of conflict in
various environments. The platoon’s ability to accomplish its assigned mission depends upon proper training,
good planning, sound leadership, and motivated subordinate leaders and personnel. Platoon personnel tactics
must reflect the tempo and intensity of large-scale combat operations while balancing protection with
execution.
2-11. A functional platoon requires a cohesive team. To exercise mission command and empower junior
leaders, the platoon leader must develop teamwork by building mutual trust. Platoon leaders gain this mutual
trust by sharing experiences, enforcing standards, creating a platoon identity, and building confidence in
training environments. A platoon where leaders do not share hardships may not function as well.
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
2-15. The headquarters normally consists of a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant. The headquarters may
have additional personnel such as unit supply sergeant, armorer, administrative, and operations personnel.
2-16. The platoon headquarters personnel provide required leadership. The platoon leader and platoon
sergeant employ the operations process to organize efforts, integrate the warfighting functions across multiple
domains, and synchronize forces to accomplish the platoon mission. Working as a team, platoon leaders and
platoon sergeants use troop leading procedures to plan, prepare, execute, and assess platoon operations. They
engage all subordinate leaders in troop leading procedures to ensure complete understanding of mission
requirement throughout the platoon.
2-17. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant use troop leading procedures to make timely and effective
decisions to accomplish the mission. Throughout the operations process, making and communicating
decisions quickly and effectively ensures proper use of available time. These decisions include assigning
tasks; prioritizing, allocating, and organizing subordinate elements and resources; and selecting the critical
times and places to act.
Platoon Sections
2-19. A section is a subordinate platoon element that is generally larger than a squad. The section provides
functional capability for the platoon and is designed to perform a specific task.
2-20. Sections are made up of personnel with a specific expertise. This expertise may include supply stock
control, supply warehousing, field maintenance management, field maintenance, or field services.
2-21. The section has a leader or chief who is normally a staff sergeant (E-6). However, specialized sections
may have leaders of higher rank. Examples of higher ranking leaders of specialized sections include:
A sergeant first class (E7) for air traffic services.
A warrant officer (WO) for electronics maintenance sections.
Platoon Squads
2-22. A squad is a subordinate platoon element that is generally smaller than a section. The squad provides
functional capability for the platoon and are designed to perform a specific task. The squad has a leader that
is normally a sergeant (E6).
2-23. Squads are made up of personnel with a specific expertise related to the parent company.
Transportation platoons are normally comprised of squads each of which has expertise in transportation
execution.
Platoon Teams
2-24. A team is a subordinate platoon element that is generally, but not necessarily, smaller than a squad.
The team provides functional capability for the platoon and is designed to perform a specific task. Such as a
maintenance support team.
2-25. Teams are made up of personnel with a specific expertise. Field services platoons are often comprised
of teams. Expertise includes field feeding and casualty collection. The team leader is normally a staff
sergeant, although field feeding team leaders are normally sergeant first class (E7).
PLATOON EMPLOYMENT
2-26. Platoons are often the most important units in logistics operations because they actually execute the
logistics tasks necessary to provide the required support. Because of the platoon’s relatively small size, it can
move and maneuver quickly and effectively support other units during combat.
2-27. Since a single platoon cannot provide the full complement of logistical support, an operation usually
requires multiple platoons to operate simultaneously and in conjunction with each other. This teamwork
ensures timely and effective logistical support. Logistics platoons operate in a synchronized fashion in
accordance with the concept of support and a synchronization matrix to support their supported units. The
support battalion and logistics company assign at least one specific task and purpose to each logistics platoon
based on the concept of support and the synchronization matrix. These two documents enable a shared
understanding of what logistics platoons are doing and why.
2-28. Most logistics platoons are organic elements of a company and, as such, deploy with the company.
Separate platoons have unique unit identification codes and standard requirements codes. These separate
platoons deploy individually based on a time-phased deployment list. The theater army establishes command
relationships for separate platoons once they arrive in theater.
The platoon leader is responsible for everything the platoon does or fails to do. With
the platoon sergeant, the platoon leader uses a variety of techniques to plan and prepare
a platoon’s mission. The planning process is often more important than the final plan
itself, as it provides platoon leaders with a greater understanding of the enemy,
environment, and assigned task, increasing their tactical flexibility when the situation
unexpectedly changes or when opportunities arise. TLP provide platoon leaders a
framework for planning and preparing for missions. Smaller units, company and below,
lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. At the platoon-level,
this places primary responsibility for planning on the platoon leader.
PLANNING
3-3. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying
out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). A platoon leader receives a task and purpose from
the company commander as a warning order (WARNORD) or operation order (OPORD) and begins the
planning process.
3-4. Planning is an ongoing process and continues as necessary during preparation and execution. Parallel
planning occurs when the platoon leader and company commander plan for the same mission at about the
same time. See figure 3-1 on page 3-2.
3-5. At the platoon-level, planning focuses on fully developing the platoon’s role in the company
commander’s directed course of action (COA), and rehearsing for likely contingencies that may cause the
COA to develop in unexpected ways. Brigades and/or battalions frequently have tactical standard operations
procedures, often referred to as a TACSOP, that platoon leaders must be familiar with.
PREPARATION
3-6. Preparation includes activities performed by the platoon to improve its ability to execute the assigned
task. Preparation includes, but is not limited to plan refinement, rehearsals (see section III for more
information), coordination, checks and inspections, and movement.
3-7. Detailed and customized platoon SOPs consider the specific personnel and equipment in the platoon.
When consistently executed and continually updated after each mission, the SOP can increase the platoon
leader’s time available to plan and prepare for a particular assigned task. The most effective SOPs are ones
developed with input from all leaders in the platoon.
EXECUTION
3-8. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP
5-0). The platoon leader uses situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment
decisions during the process.
ASSESSMENT
3-9. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the
enemy, along with the progress of the assigned task(s). Assessment entails these tasks:
Assess the platoon readiness and capacity of support capability. Immediately report aspects that
affect mission accomplishment.
Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities which may lead to windows of
opportunity to exercise disciplined initiative.
Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation towards the company
commander’s desired end state.
Note. Chapter 10 in FM 6-0 contains a more in-depth discussion of each step of TLP.
Prepare an initial planning timeline using backwards planning. Backwards planning starts at the
end state and then logically works the steps backwards to the current point.
3-18. The WARNORD has no specified format, though it may follow the five-paragraph OPORD format
and include the following items:
Enemy situation as currently known.
Company mission or nature of the operation.
Commander’s intent (if available).
Initial operational timeline.
Platoon mission (may modify after step 3).
Updated graphics (analog and digital).
Reconnaissance to initiate, if any.
Note. Figures 3-3 on page 3-6 and figure 3-4 on page 3-7 are examples of sketches a platoon leader
may receive from their company commander. The platoon leader will use sketches to make a
tentative plan.
MISSION ANALYSIS
3-22. Mission analysis helps answer the following questions for the platoon leader:
What is the current situation?
What is my mission?
3-24. Though mission analysis is an ongoing process, the platoon leader adheres to the “one-third/two-thirds”
technique to give subordinates sufficient time to prepare at their level. One-third/two-thirds technique is
accomplished through parallel planning i.e. for a convoy mission having the NCOs preparing the Soldiers
and vehicles while the platoon leader is working final route and security. One-third of the time available
remains set aside for the platoon leader to prepare and issue an order, while the remaining two-thirds of the
time is for squad/section leaders to disseminate the order to their squads/sections and prepare for the mission.
3-25. The platoon leader conducts their own more in-depth mission analysis by evaluating the mission
variables: METT-TC. Platoon leaders convey to their subordinates deductions from these variables and the
effect they will have on the platoon’s mission. A thorough mission analysis helps the platoon leader in
recognizing and capitalizing on opportunities.
MISSION VARIABLES
3-26. Mission variables describe characteristics of the area of operations (AO) and their impacts to a mission.
The mission variables are:
Mission.
Enemy.
Terrain.
Troops and support available.
Time available.
Civil considerations.
3-27. Analyzing METT-TC is a continuous process. During execution, continuous analyses of the mission
variables facilitates the issuing of well-developed FRAGORDs. Platoon leaders assess if any new information
presented during the planning process changes their mission and if so, decide how to adjust the plan to meet
these new situations.
3-28. As METT-TC analysis does not need to occur in any particular order, how and when platoon leaders
analyze the variables depends on when they receive information. It also depends on their experience and
preferences. One technique is to parallel the TLP based on the products received from their company.
Mission
3-29. The platoon leaders look to answer, for themselves, the question, “What have I been told to do, and
why?”
3-30. Platoon leaders must understand the mission, intent, and operational concept one and two levels higher.
Doing so makes it possible to exercise disciplined initiative and act within limited windows of opportunity.
3-31. Platoon leaders use the following to gain this understanding—
Battalion/squadron (two levels up) mission, intent, and concept.
Company (one level up) mission, intent, and concept.
Unit’s purpose.
Constraints.
Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
Restated mission.
Unit’s Purpose
3-34. The platoon leader locates the platoon’s purpose in the concept of the operation in paragraph three of
the company OPORD. The platoon’s purpose helps achieve the purpose of the immediate higher HQ. If
platoon leaders are unclear of their purpose, they should ask the company commander for further explanation.
3-35. Understanding the company commander’s intent and purpose helps the platoon leader in executing the
philosophy of mission command. In the presence of new information, the platoon leader knows the intent
and purpose of the next higher headquarters, and so, can adjust as needed to meet them. The platoon leader
must be able to answer the question “If all else fails around me, what must my platoon accomplish and why?”
Tasks
3-36. Platoon leaders identify and understand the task(s) required to accomplish a given mission. The three
types of tasks are—
Specified.
Implied.
Essential.
3-37. A specified task is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters (FM 6-0). These
types of tasks are found in paragraph three of the company OPORD, under tasks to subordinate units.
3-38. An implied task is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is not
stated in the higher headquarters’ order (FM 6-0). Implied tasks come from a detailed analysis of the company
OPORD, enemy situation and COA, terrain, and from knowledge of doctrine and history. The platoon leaders
rely upon their experience and the experience of the leaders in the platoon to help with identifying the implied
tasks.
3-39. An essential task is a specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission (FM
6-0). The platoon leaders make the decision on which task is essential or may be told directly by the company
commander. The essential task, along with the platoon’s purpose, is in the company OPORD, paragraph
three’s concept of operations (if an implied task) or tasks to subordinate units (if a specified task). Essential
tasks build the mission statement.
Note. Some specified, implied, and essential tasks that directly affect the platoon may be written
into an annex and not included in paragraph three of the company OPORD itself. Either the platoon
leader or platoon sergeant should review, at a minimum, Annex C Operations from the
battalion/squadron OPORD, if available and if time permits.
Constraints
3-40. A constraint is a restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an
action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander (FM 6-0). Constraints
are primarily found in paragraph three of the company OPORD.
3-41. Examples of constraints may be resource limitations, such as class III or class V transport capacity, or
in the operational environment, such as the load capacity of a bridge the platoon must traverse. Overlay
graphics such as restricted fire lines or no-fire areas are also examples of constraints.
Restated Mission
3-42. The platoon leader concludes the mission analysis by restating the platoon mission. To do this, they
answer the five Ws:
Who (the platoon)?
What (the platoon’s essential task and type of operation)?
When (this is the time given in the company OPORD)?
Where (the objective or location stated in company OPORD)?
Why (the platoon’s purpose, taken from the company’s concept of the operation)?
Note. Example mission statement: 1/A/115 Brigade Support Battalion, conducts a resupply from
brigade support area to logistics release point 3 not later than 121200JUN2020 to link up with 1-7
Infantry and conduct replenishment operations. See ATP 4.90 for information on the brigade
support battalion.
Visual Aids
3-43. Platoon leaders prepare, or receive, a graphic depiction of terrain to help explain their findings
regarding the effects of terrain and weather on the mission. The graphic depiction of terrain can be a
photograph, digital map, overlay for a map sheet, or a terrain model. In it, leaders show terrain mobility
classifications, key terrain, intervisibility lines, known obstacles, avenues of approach, mobility corridors,
main supply routes (MSRs), alternate supply routes, logistics release points, supply points, and maintenance
collection points.
Enemy
3-44. The second mission variable to consider is the enemy. Intelligence on enemy posture will come straight
from the battalion and company orders. The platoon leader will put out the parts that affects the platoon
mission. The battalion/squadron intelligence officer (S-2) provides an analysis of the enemy with which the
battalion/squadron or company anticipates contact. However, platoon leaders still need to know and
understand the enemy’s disposition, composition, strengths, doctrine (if known), equipment capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and probable course of action. Additionally, the line between enemy combatants and civilian
noncombatants is sometimes unclear and therefore requires the leader to understand the laws of war, the rules
of engagement, and the local situation.
3-45. Analyzing the enemy answers the question, “What is the enemy doing and why?” The platoon leader
also looks to answer—
What is the composition and strength of the enemy force?
What are the capabilities of their weapons? Other systems?
What is the location of current and intercepted enemy positions?
What is the enemy’s most probable course of action? (defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or
delay).
Assumptions
3-46. Platoon leaders continually improve their situational understanding of the enemy and update their
enemy templates (analog and digital) as new information becomes available. Deviations or significant
conclusions reached during enemy analysis that could positively or negatively affect the company’s plan are
brought to the company commander for awareness and acted upon if necessary.
Composition
3-49. Platoon leaders determine the types of vehicles, soldiers, and equipment the enemy could use against
the platoon. They should be familiar with the basic characteristics of the enemy units and platforms identified.
Disposition
3-50. From the battalion/squadron S-2 and company commander’s input, platoon leaders determine how the
enemy is (or might be) arrayed, the echelon from where the enemy originated, and the disposition of the next
two higher enemy elements. Previous terrain analysis also helps illuminate where the enemy may or may not
be able to go, based upon the number and types of vehicles in their formation.
Strength
3-51. The strength of the enemy element in the platoon’s AO can be made available by way of requests for
information made through the company commander to the battalion/squadron S-2.
Capabilities
3-52. The platoon leader must know what weapon systems the enemy possesses. Knowing the maximum
effective ranges of the enemy systems, the platoon leader can better determine when to transition to tactical
movement or when to initiate contact within the defense.
Recent Activities
3-53. Through the company commander, platoon leaders can request any recent enemy activities in the
platoon’s or company’s AO from the battalion/squadron S-2. Knowing what the enemy has done in the past,
can be an indicator as to what is to come in the future.
3-55. The situation template is a briefing tool for the platoon leader and is only an estimate of the enemy
disposition and must be changed when new information adjusts previous assumptions.
Note. Many current allies possess and operate equipment similar or almost identical to that of
current threat militaries. All platoon members need to possess a robust knowledge of vehicle
identification, capable of identifying allied and enemy vehicles from multiple angles, at varying
distances, and in limited visibility conditions.
Information Requirements
3-56. Commander’s critical information requirements consist of priority intelligence requirements and
friendly force information requirements. This translates to the platoon as items that must be reported to the
CO and battalion (BN) (see figure 3-5):
Priority intelligence requirements are information a leader, in this case the company or
battalion/squadron commander, needs to know about terrain or enemy to make a critical decision.
They are clear, answerable, focused on a single question, and necessary to drive an operational
decision.
Friendly force information requirements include information leaders need to know about their
units or about adjacent units to make critical decisions.
3-57. The platoon leader may be tasked either directly or indirectly to answer one or more of the company
or battalion/squadron commander’s information requirements and must ensure all personnel in the platoon
know what to look for, or report changes to friendly capabilities.
3-58. Essential elements of friendly information are not commander’s critical information requirements, but
are critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would compromise or lead to failure
of the operation. Consequently, this information must be protected from identification by the enemy. For
example, the location of the company command post or company trains.
Terrain
3-59. Analysis of terrain answers the question, “What is the terrain’s effect on the mission?” Platoon leaders
consider the effects of manmade and natural terrain in conjunction with the weather on friendly and enemy
operations.
3-60. Terrain can be categorized into three separate categories:
Unrestricted. Terrain free of restrictions to movement; no actions are needed to enhance mobility.
For the logistics platoon, unrestricted terrain typically is flat or moderately sloped, with scattered
or widely spaced obstacles such as trees or rocks.
Restricted. Terrain hindering movement somewhat. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility,
but units might have to adjust speed and formations, or make frequent detours. For the platoon,
restricted terrain typically means moderate to steep slopes or moderate to dense spacing of
obstacles such as trees, rocks, or urban. Swamps and rugged ground are two examples of restricted
terrain for armored forces.
Severely restricted. Terrain which severely hinders or slows movement in combat formations
unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. Engineer forces might be needed to improve
mobility or the platoon might have to deviate from doctrinal tactics. Steep slopes, densely spaced
obstacles, urban, and an absence of a developed road system characterize severely restricted
terrain.
3-61. Terrain analysis should produce several specific conclusions for the platoon leader:
Potential battle, support-by-fire, and attack-by-fire positions.
Possible engagement areas (EAs) and ambush sites.
Asset locations such as enemy command posts or ammunition caches.
Template of enemy forces and essential weapon systems.
Likely avenues of approach.
Observation post locations.
Potential breach locations.
Areas which increase the range of communications systems.
Positioning of own assets.
Understanding of time and space relationships of events, leading to thorough contingency plans.
Identifying possible enemy indirect firing points.
Selecting of movement techniques and formations, including when to transition from movement
to tactical maneuver.
3-62. Limited planning time may force platoon leaders to prioritize their terrain analysis. For example, for a
distribution mission, the platoon leader might prioritize the terrain along the distribution route.
3-63. From the modified combined obstacle overlay developed by the battalion/squadron S-2, platoon
leaders gain an appreciation of the general nature of the ground and effects of weather. They must go beyond
passing along the modified combined obstacle overlay to their squad/section leaders or making general
observations of the terrain such as “This is high ground,” or “This is a stream.” They must conduct their own
analysis and determine how the terrain and weather uniquely affects the enemy and their platoon.
3-64. In general, terrain and weather do not favor one side over the other unless one is better prepared to
operate in the environment or is more familiar with it. The terrain, however, may favor defending or attacking.
Platoon leaders analyze terrain using the categories of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach,
key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment often referred to as OAKOC or in a different order as key
terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach often
referred to as KOCOA.
Obstacles
3-66. Platoon leaders identify existing (natural or manmade) and reinforcing (tactical or protective) obstacles
limiting mobility in the AO:
Existing obstacles.
Natural obstacles include rivers, mountains, ravines, gaps and ditches more than three meters
wide, tree stumps and large rocks more than 18 inches high, forests with trees eight inches or
more in diameter (with less than four meters between trees.)
Manmade obstacles include urban areas, canals, railroad embankments, buildings, power
lines, or telephone lines.
Reinforcing obstacles.
Tactical. Inhibit the ability of the opposing force to move, mass, and reinforce. Examples include
mine fields (conventional and situational), AT ditches, or wire obstacles.
Protective. Offer close-in protection and are important to survivability.
3-67. Offensive considerations when analyzing obstacles and restricted terrain include:
How is the enemy using obstacles and restricted terrain features?
What is the composition of the enemy’s reinforcing obstacles?
How will obstacles and terrain affect the movement or maneuver of the unit?
If necessary, can such features be avoided or reduced?
How does the platoon detect and, if desired, bypass the obstacles?
Where has the enemy positioned weapons to cover the obstacles, and what type of weapons are
they using?
If the platoon must support a breach, where is the expected breach site and where will the enemy
overwatch the obstacle?
3-68. Defensive considerations when analyzing obstacles and restricted terrain include:
Where does the enemy want to go?
Where can the platoon kill the enemy?
How does the platoon get the enemy to go there?
How will existing obstacles and restricted terrain affect the enemy?
How can the platoon use these features to force the enemy into its engagement area, deny the
enemy an avenue, or disrupt the enemy’s movement?
Avenues of Approach
3-69. An avenue of approach is a path used by an attacking force leading to its objective or to key terrain.
Avenues of approach exist in all domains. Avenues of approach are classified by type (mounted, dismounted,
or air, formation, and speed of the largest unit traveling on it.
3-70. If not already identified by the company commander or battalion/squadron staff, the platoon leader
may group mutually supporting mobility corridors to form an avenue of approach.
3-71. Mobility corridors are classed based on the distance between the terrain features that form the corridor,
though their ranges are not absolute but reflect the relative and approximate distance between terrain features.
3-72. Considerations the leader can include in an evaluation of avenues of approach are—
How can the platoon use each avenue of approach to support movement and maneuver to the
logistics release point?
How will each avenue support movement techniques, formations and, once the platoon makes
enemy contact, maneuver?
Will variations in trafficability force changes in formations or movement techniques, or require
clearance of restricted terrain?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of each avenue?
What are the enemy’s likely counterattack routes?
What lateral routes could the platoon use, and which could the enemy use to threaten the platoon’s
flanks?
How will each avenue of approach affect the rate of movement?
3-73. Other considerations the leader can include in an evaluation of avenues of approach are—
What are all likely enemy avenues into my AO?
How can the enemy use each avenue of approach?
What lateral routes could the enemy use to threaten the convoy?
What avenues would support a friendly counterattack or repositioning of forces?
3-80. Platoon leaders determine how the weather will affect the visibility, mobility, and survivability of the
platoon and that of the enemy, reviewing the company commander’s conclusions and identifying their own.
Visibility
3-81. Platoon leaders identify critical conclusions about visibility factors such as light data, fog, smog,
smoke, and dust. They consider light data and identify critical conclusions about begin morning nautical
twilight, sunrise, sunset, end of evening nautical twilight, moonrise, moonset, and percentage of illumination.
Some additional visibility considerations include:
Will the sun rise behind the platoon or in the platoon’s eyes?
Will the platoon attack toward the sunrise?
How can the platoon take advantage of the limited illumination?
Winds
3-82. Winds of sufficient speed can reduce the combat effectiveness of a force downwind as the result of
blowing dust, obscurants, sand, or precipitation. The upwind force usually has better visibility. Chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear operations usually favor the upwind force. Windblown sand, dust, rain,
or snow can reduce the effectiveness of radar and other communications systems.
3-83. Wind is described as “from…to…” as in “winds are from the east moving to the west.” The leader
must answer these questions:
Will wind speed cause obscurants to dissipate quickly?
Will wind speed and direction favor enemy use of obscurants?
Will wind speed and direction affect the employment of available mortars?
What is the potential for chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear contamination?
Will wind speed affect the ballistics of organic platoon weapon systems?
3-84. The smell of petroleum products used by the platoon can carry in heavy winds, revealing the general
location of a concealed or camouflaged position. Depending on the direction, heavy winds can either mask
the sound of a truck engines or cause the sound to carry considerable distances. All leaders in the sustainment
platoon must consider how their individual vehicle will benefit from, or be hindered by, the wind.
Precipitation
3-85. Precipitation includes rain, sleet, snow, and hail. Precipitation affects soil trafficability, visibility, and
optical systems. Heavy precipitation can reduce the quality of supplies in storage. Heavy snow cover can
reduce the efficiency of many communications systems. Some precipitation questions to answer include:
How will precipitation (or lack of it) affect the mobility of the unit or of enemy forces?
Are there particular locations in the AO that the platoon should avoid during times of increased
precipitation either due to flooding or extremely loose soil?
Are there particular portions of the route that may be susceptible to freezing or black ice due to
precipitation?
How will cloud cover affect helicopter and close air support?
What is the present physical condition of the platoon (health, morale, sleep)?
What is the condition of assigned platoon equipment?
What is the unit’s training status and experience relative to the mission?
What additional personnel or units will accompany?
What additional assets are required to accomplish the mission?
What is the condition of attached units or those in direct support?
What type of indirect fire, by type, is available and when will it become available?
3-88. The platoon leader cannot be expected to think of every aspect of the platoon to analyze and so asks
for help when the situation exceeds the platoon’s capabilities. Assistance can come from either within, or
external to, the company.
Time Available
3-89. Platoon leaders see their platoon in time and space. As events occur, the platoon leaders adjust the time
available to the platoon and assess its impact on what they want to accomplish. Understanding how long it
takes to execute a task determines where in space the platoon is upon completion of that task. Therefore,
considerations should include:
Overall time available.
Priorities of work to be accomplished, including security, maintenance, resupply, coordination,
rehearsals, inspections, and sleep.
Planning and preparation.
Times specified by the commander in the OPORD for such activities as movement,
reconnaissance, rehearsals, and logistics package (LOGPAC) operations.
Company and battalion/squadron timeline.
Enemy timeline.
3-90. Platoon leaders conduct reverse planning to ensure that all specified, implied, and essential tasks can
be accomplished in the time available. They develop a reverse planning schedule (timeline) beginning with
actions on the objective and working backward through each step of the operation and preparation to the
present time.
Civil Considerations
3-91. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and
activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of
military operations (ADP 5-0). Civil considerations of the environment can either help or hinder friendly or
enemy forces. The difference lies in taking the time to learn the situation and its possible effects on the
operation. Examples of civil considerations are a market day in town or a pilgrimage taking place. Analysis
of civil considerations answers three critical questions:
How do civilian considerations affect the operation?
How does the operation affect the civilians?
How do our forces build national will in our AO?
3-92. Battalion/squadron provides the company and platoon with civil considerations affecting the brigade’s
mission. The memory aid the battalion/squadron may use to analyze and describe these civil considerations
include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (Also called ASCOPE). (Refer to
ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)
Risk Assessment
3-93. Risk assessment is the identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of the risk management
process) (JP 3-26). Leaders at all levels manage risk to protect the force and aid in mission accomplishment
and so the platoon leader identifies risks based on the results of their mission analysis. Risk assessment is a
continual process undertaken by the platoon leader and platoon sergeant throughout the duration of the
mission.
3-94. Once identified, risk is mitigated or eliminated through the use of controls. The commander will
establish overall risk tolerance level for the mission. Platoon leaders determine in their plan how to reduce
risk to an acceptable level. For example, fratricide may be mitigated by taking into consideration surface
danger zones and risk estimate distances, resulting in the emplacement of target reference points and phase
lines used to control movement and thus reduce this risk.
3-97. Platoon leaders may be able to accomplish the given task and purpose in more than one way. They
consider TTP from doctrine, company or battalion SOPs, history, or other resources to determine if a solution
to a similar tactical or logistical problem exists already.
3-98. Platoon leaders determine what combinations of personnel and systems are needed to accomplish the
assigned task. This is known as “assigning troops to task,” and is based on the METT-TC conditions the
leader faces, such as having an attachment of engineers or other enabler.
3-99. Platoon leaders identify the best ways to use the available terrain and employ the platoon’s strengths
against the enemy’s weaknesses. They develop the control measures necessary to execute the mission,
prevent fratricide, and clarify the task and purpose.
3-100. Platoon leaders ensure every vehicle in the platoon is fully employed, every asset is attached, and
adequate control is provided for each element.
3-101. Platoon leaders solidify the plan by notionally fighting it against how they believe the enemy will
operate. Asking the question “what if?” throughout the process can help identify points of friction not
previously considered up to that point.
3-102. This process may be done solely by platoon leaders who review the plan up to that point, or by
including the platoon sergeant’s and other squad/section leader’s input as well. This enables the platoon
leader—
To determine how to maximize the effects of the platoon while protecting the platoon and
minimizing collateral damage.
To anticipate events in the AO.
To determine conditions and any additional resources required for success.
To identify additional control requirements.
To identify friendly coordination requirements.
To appreciate the time, space, and triggers needed to integrate direct, and if available, indirect fire
support.
Develop control measures to aid in control, flexibility, and synchronization.
Project sustainment expenditures, friendly casualties, and resulting medical requirements.
Complete paragraphs three, four, and five of the OPORD.
The OPORD is delivered quickly, with confidence, and in a manner allowing subordinates to concentrate on
understanding the platoon leader’s vision—not just copying what is said verbatim.
3-112. The platoon leader uses a terrain model, sand table, sketches, or the map to orient the platoon. They
can also build a model of the AO using a briefing kit that contains such items as engineer tape, colored yarn,
3-by-5-inch index cards, and “micro” vehicle models.
3-113. Whenever possible, platoon leaders issue the order in person. They look into the eyes of their
subordinate leaders to ensure each one understands the mission and what the platoon must achieve. If platoon
leaders already addressed an item adequately in a previous WARNORD, they simply state “No change,” or
provide necessary updates. Ultimately, the platoon leader is free to brief the OPORD in the most effective
manner to convey information to subordinates, whether over the radio, through the available digital mission
command platform, or on a sand table, terrain model, or map.
3-114. Platoon leaders complete the order with a confirmation brief. At a minimum, squad/section leaders
should be able to backbrief the platoon’s mission and intent, the company commander’s intent, their own
tasks and purpose, and time they will inform their squad/section of the mission details if they were not present
at the OPORD brief itself. This confirmation brief provides an opportunity to highlight issues or concerns.
The operation order format is shown in figure 3-6.
Note. A rehearsal is different from the process of talking through the plan. For an example, in a
rehearsal, squad/sections leaders send a complete spot report when reporting enemy contact, rather
than simply saying, “I would send a spot report now.”
REHEARSAL PURPOSES
3-118. Platoon leaders use well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following purposes:
Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.
Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.
Synchronize the actions of the squads/sections.
Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units.
Improve each crewmember’s understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct and indirect
fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that
may arise during the operation.
REHEARSAL TYPES
3-119. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, which include:
Backbrief.
Combined arms rehearsal.
Support rehearsal.
Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.
BACKBRIEF
3-120. A backbrief is a briefing by the vehicle commanders to the platoon leader to review how each intend
to accomplish their portions of the mission. Normally, subordinates perform backbriefs throughout
preparation. These briefs allow platoon leaders to clarify the mission early in subordinate planning and use
the backbrief to identify any problems in the concept of the operation. In the sustainment platoon, the platoon
leader conducts backbriefs after the vehicle commanders have had a chance to review the OPORD but before
the platoon rehearsal begins.
SUPPORT REHEARSAL
3-122. The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the overall operation.
Platoon leaders may take part in the support rehearsal depending upon their task and purpose and how it
relates to the higher HQ operation.
METHODS OF REHEARSALS
3-124. Rehearsals should follow the crawl-walk-run methodology whenever possible (see figure 3-7 on
page 3-24). This prepares the platoon for increasingly difficult conditions. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more
information.) Security must be maintained, however, units can conduct these forms of rehearsals if mission
variables permit—
Full-dress rehearsal.
Key leader rehearsal.
Terrain-model rehearsal.
Digital terrain-model rehearsal.
Sketch-map rehearsal.
Map rehearsal.
FULL-DRESS REHEARSALS
3-125. A full-dress rehearsal includes every participating platoon member and system, executed on terrain
similar to the AO, initially under good light conditions, and then in limited visibility. Any attachments to the
platoon take part in this rehearsal, bringing with them any specific equipment they will require to execute the
mission.
TERRAIN-MODEL REHEARSAL
3-127. This technique employs an accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle.
When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model near, or where it overlooks, the actual terrain of
the AO. The model should be large enough to depict graphic control measures and important terrain features
for reference and orientation. Based on size, participants walk or move icons around the table or model, using
complete radio transmission, to practice the actions of their own vehicles in relation to other members of the
platoon. One consideration is to conceal the terrain model form enemy air assets.
SKETCH-MAP REHEARSAL
3-128. Sketch-map procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large
enough to allow all participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive oral presentation
of their actions. Squads/Sections can use symbols or “micro” vehicles to represent their locations and
movement on the sketch and use complete radio transmissions when executing their movements.
MAP REHEARSAL
3-129. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch-map rehearsal except that the leader uses a map and
operation overlay of the same scale as the platoon leader used to plan and control the operation. This
technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or backbrief involving subordinate leaders and
vehicle commanders.
Note. The standardization of load plans allows the platoon leader and platoon sergeant to quickly
check accountability of equipment. It also ensures standard locations of equipment in each vehicle.
This can be an important advantage if the platoon leader is forced to switch to a different vehicle
during an operation.
3-131. PCIs allow the platoon leader to check the platoon’s operational readiness. The key goal is to ensure
that crews and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming mission. The platoon leader includes the
time and location for PCIs in the platoon OPORD, reinforcing their importance, and ensuring they occur as
part of the pre-mission preparation.
3-132. It is essential that the entire platoon chain of command know how to conduct PCCs and PCIs per
applicable SOPs. Examples of an inspection include the following:
Perform before-operation maintenance checks, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.
Perform communications checks of voice and digital systems.
Inspect and verify maps and corresponding analog and digital graphics.
Ensure that crews understand the plan and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented
protection posture level based upon the threat level.
Ammunitions types as required by mission.
Review the supply status of rations, water, fuel, oil, all types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, first-
aid kits, and batteries (for such items as flashlights, night vision devices, and chemical, biological,
radiation, and nuclear alarms).
Ensure that vehicles are correctly camouflaged so they match the AO.
3-133. The platoon leader or platoon sergeant observes each crew during preparation for combat. They
conduct the inspection once the vehicle commanders report that their crews and vehicles are prepared. It is
understood that platoon leaders will check items they deem critical for the upcoming operations, but the
vehicle commanders check all items based on the platoon SOP. Failure at the vehicle commander level to
check all systems, and not just the ones the platoon leader inspects personally, could lead to a critical element
or piece of equipment to fail during operations.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
3-141. The command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders.
The platoon is under command of the company commander. However, within the platoon, command
relationships exist between the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and the vehicle commanders. Command
relationships unify effort and give the platoon leader the ability to employ the platoon with maximum
flexibility. Command relationships include—
Organic.
Assigned.
Attached.
Operational control.
Tactical control.
ORGANIC
3-142. Organic forces are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed
in its table of organization and equipment. Army commanders exercise OPCON and administrative control
(ADCON) of organic forces.
ASSIGNED
3-143. Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary
function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. Army assigned units remain subordinate
to the higher echelon headquarters for extended periods, typically years. Assignment is based on the needs
of the Army, and it is formalized by orders rather than organizational documents. Although force tailoring or
task-organizing may temporarily detach units, they eventually return to either their headquarters of
assignment or their organic headquarters. Army commanders exercise OPCON and ADCON of assigned
forces.
ATTACHED
3-144. Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
temporary. When an Army force is attached to another Army headquarters, the attachment order specifies
the command relationship of OPCON or tactical control also called TACON. The gaining units exercise
ADCON of the attached Army force unless the command relationship is modified operational control
3-145. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces
involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and
giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
3-146. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations necessary to
accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority should be exercised through the commanders
of subordinate organizations. OPCON provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to
employ those forces as the commander exercising OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned
missions.
TACTICAL CONTROL
3-147. Tactical control is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
Tactical control is a command authority inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by
commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient
authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of support assets within the
assigned mission or task.
Area Support
Area support is not a support relationship. It is a task given to sustainment units that
directs them to support units transiting or operating within a specified geographic
boundary and for which a support relationship has not been established. This is
normally for units that are in immediate need of support and are not near their organic
or designated supporting unit.
Area support is not synonymous with general support. It is a viable and necessary
support consideration given the limitations of existing sustainment force structure.
Commanders must anticipate the need to provide area support and must also
anticipate the increased demand for commodities. However, utilizing the area support
task does not absolve commanders of the responsibility to do mission analysis, task
organize, and designate support relationships for subordinate units. Commanders
cannot simply direct subordinate units to provide area support to any and all units in
an area of operations. If this occurs, supporting units are unable to forecast
requirements and are constantly in a reaction mode. This, in turn, leads to ineffective
sustainment support.
In order for unit commanders to be able to plan and develop viable support concepts,
commanders must know the type and quantity of units supported and for how long.
The commander’s higher headquarters provides this information by task organizing
subordinate units and designating clear support relationships between each
subordinate unit and supported units. This information is communicated via an
OPORD.
Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific
force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for
assistance (joint doctrine considers direct support as a mission rather than a support
relationship). A unit assigned a direct support relationship retains its command
relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by and has priorities of support
established by the supported unit.
3-149. Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. A logistics platoon assigned
a direct support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent company, but is positioned by
and has priorities of support established by the supported unit. The logistics platoon leader of a unit in direct
support recommends position areas and coordinates for movement clearances where the platoon can best
support the maneuver commander’s concept of the operation.
3-150. Reinforcing support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit.
Only like units (for example, supply reinforcing supply) can be given a reinforcing mission. A logistics
platoon assigned a reinforcing support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent company,
but is positioned by the reinforced unit. A logistics platoon that is reinforcing has priorities of support
established by the reinforced unit first, and then by the parent company.
3-151. General support reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a
whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit. A logistics platoon assigned a GS-reinforcing support
relationship is positioned and has priorities established by its parent company and secondly by the reinforced
unit.
3-152. General support is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any
particular subdivision thereof. Units assigned a general support relationship are positioned and have priorities
established by their parent unit.
3-153. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is
inappropriate. Assigning support relationships is one aspect of command and control. Commanders assign a
support relationship when—
The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For
example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It would
be inappropriate for the brigade to be subordinated to the battalion; hence, the echelon uses an
Army support relationship.
The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support
priorities to allocate resources to supported units exists.
3-154. Units that have a command relationship with a unit are not designated a support relationship with
the same unit. Since a command relationship is established, it provides adequate authority for the gaining
unit to direct support efforts. Support relationships do not alter ADCON.
3-155. Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to
achieve results required by supported commanders. Supporting commanding officers clearly designate
support relationships to subordinate units in OPORDs. The designation must identify the supported unit, the
specific support relationship designated, and the duration of the relationship. The duration may be based on
time, duration of a phase, or based on achieving an objective. This information is included in the ‘Task
Organization’ paragraph of the OPORD. Supported commanders must also identify supporting units to
subordinates in the same paragraph. Commanders may place this information in annex A of the order. The
support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the
supporting unit rather than the supported commander.
3-156. Support relationships can be an exclusive relationship between two units, (direct support), or a broad
level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters (general support). While
reinforcing and GS reinforcing relationships are not commonly used by sustainment units these relationships
are valid for sustainment units and may be designated based on support requirements.
3-157. Although all support relationships are applicable to sustainment units, direct and GS are the most
commonly used. Direct support requires a unit to support another specific unit and authorizes it to answer
directly to the supported unit’s request for assistance. A unit assigned a direct support relationship retains its
command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the
supported unit. The parent unit may end or redirect the direct support relationship at any time if directed to
do so by its higher headquarters.
3-158. GS requires a unit to support multiple units simultaneously and not to any specific subdivision of
the unit. A unit assigned a GS relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit and is
positioned and has priorities established by the parent unit. The parent unit may end or redirect the GS
relationship at any time if directed to do so by its higher headquarters. Table 3-2 on page 3-30, lists Army
support relationships.
The following narrative provides a fresh take on an old book, Ernest Dunlop Swinton’s,
The Defence of Duffer’s Drift. The 1904 novella recounts a series of dreams in which
a British junior officer tries and fails to defend a critical river crossing, until he finally
absorbs the lessons and accomplishes the mission. In light of the U.S. Army’s renewed
emphasis on platoon leader development, this updated story borrows from Swinton’s
original work to illustrate core principles of small unit leadership in the twenty-first
century.
kilometers from their current location. Two convoy protection platforms from battalion headquarters would
provide security. The convoy would move along Main Supply Route (MSR) Titans. Captain Bagley would
provide additional information within the next two hours. Anderson’s platoon should be ready to move no
later than 0700.
4-9. Anderson jotted down the relevant grid coordinates and checked his watch; it was already 0200. He
had less than five hours to prepare. He had led convoys before, but never this far forward.
4-10. Captain Bagley interrupted Anderson’s racing thoughts. “Lieutenant,” said Bagley, “go make your
preparations. Report back to me in one hour for more information.”
4-11. Anderson left the tent, marked his map, and checked the coordinates for Task Force Landry. Carefully
tracing the route of MSR Titans, Anderson saw a paved, two-lane highway passing through rolling hills with
farmland on either side of the road. He observed no bridges or overpasses that might interfere with the
convoy’s progress. Travelling in broad daylight, he and his soldiers would be able to see in every direction
for several hundred meters. (See figure 4-1.)
4-12. Next, he found Sergeant Carroll, shook her awake, and told her about the mission. “I need the whole
platoon to assemble at my vehicle as soon as possible, fully dressed and ready to receive a warning order,”
said Anderson. Carroll acknowledged and moved off to notify the squad leaders. Meanwhile, Anderson began
jotting down notes for a five-paragraph order. In the distance, he could hear whispered orders and the clink
of soldiers reaching for their gear.
4-13. Within fifteen minutes, the platoon had formed a ragged formation near the front bumper of Anderson’s
HMMWV. Huddling the group around him, Anderson issued a brief warning order. Several
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) asked questions he couldn’t answer. Running short on time, Anderson
abruptly ended the briefing, telling his soldiers to follow the tactical standard operating procedure (SOP) in
the absence of specific guidance. Turning the platoon over to Sergeant Carroll, he sprinted back across the
moonlit assembly area to the command post.
4-14. Captain Bagley greeted him with a frown: “You’re late, lieutenant. That’s a bad habit to develop
anywhere, but especially in a combat zone.”
4-15. Anderson responded with an apologetic “No excuse.”
4-16. Bagley’s update contained bad news. “The Krasnovians are still attacking along the entire division
front. Our brigade continues to defend in place, but front-line units are running low on Class V. Your mission
is one of several emergency resupply convoys going out this morning.”
4-17. The captain continued, providing many of the details that Anderson had been unable to answer earlier
that morning. The weather would be sunny and warm. Enemy contact was possible but unlikely along MSR
Titans. A recovery vehicle and ground ambulances would be standing by at the brigade support area in case
Anderson’s platoon needed assistance. The security vehicles would report to Anderson no later than 0530.
Anderson’s soldiers needed to be at their vehicles, ready for the commander’s walk-through at 0600. The
ATHP would be ready to transfer flat racks to Anderson’s vehicles at 0730.
4-18. Bagley asked if he had any questions. Anderson couldn’t think of any. “Good luck,” said Bagley. “I’ll
be in your area at 0600.”
4-19. The lieutenant hustled back to his platoon area. In the darkness, he could hear his platoon sergeant
chewing out one of the squad leaders because of a filthy crew-served weapon. “I am sorry to interrupt,
Sergeant Carroll,” said Anderson, “but I am going to need another platoon formation in fifteen minutes.”
4-20. “Okay, sir,” responded his platoon sergeant. She turned and gave the squad leader a last look conveying
her displeasure over the weapon, then strode off toward the other squad leaders.
4-21. Within ten minutes, Anderson began another, longer briefing. Reading from notes, he talked his
platoon through the situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and control for the convoy.
Aware that time was short, he briefed as quickly and concisely as possible, but received several more
questions; some he couldn’t answer. When the briefing finally ended at 0445, Anderson directed his platoon
sergeant to get the vehicles ready for movement and set out for the company command post to get answers
to the questions he hadn’t thought of earlier.
4-22. Captain Bagley was surprised to see him again, but decided not to point out the time remaining. When
Anderson got back to his platoon, the first rays of sunlight were glowing on the eastern horizon. He trooped
the line of vehicles, checking that all vehicles were mission-ready and all soldiers were in uniform and had
their weapons.
4-23. The two protection platforms did not arrive at 0530. After waiting ten minutes, Anderson sent a runner
to the command post to report their absence. Moments later, he heard the growl of engines as the two heavily
armored HMMWVs crawled toward him behind a ground guide.
4-24. While Anderson’s soldiers took a break to enjoy their meal ready to eat (MRE) breakfasts, an
embarrassed staff sergeant saluted and apologized for showing up late.
4-25. Anderson began briefing the two new crews on the convoy plan when Captain Bagley and First
Sergeant Doubletree arrived. Anderson interrupted his briefing to greet the commander.
4-26. “Carry on, lieutenant,” said Bagley. “The first sergeant and I are fine.”
4-27. Sergeant Carroll immediately intercepted the first sergeant and guided him toward the left side of the
trucks. Seeing their approach, crews put aside their MREs and rose to their feet, like dominoes in reverse.
4-28. Anderson resumed briefing the security crews, and Bagley strolled around to the other side of the truck
line, where news of his arrival quickly brought the remaining crews to their feet.
4-29. After finishing his briefing, Anderson noticed the commander and first sergeant in deep conversation.
He moved toward them, but Bagley held up a hand warning him to stand fast. The first sergeant was clearly
upset about something, and Bagley was nodding in agreement.
4-30. Their conversation finished, Bagley summoned Anderson to join him. The first sergeant walked over
to speak with Sergeant Carroll.
4-31. “Lieutenant Anderson, have you reconnoitered the ammunition transfer holding area yet?” asked
Bagley.
4-32. “No sir,” responded Anderson. “I haven’t had time.”
4-33. “Then how are you going to find it with twenty-two vehicles behind you?” asked Bagley. “Sir, I have
the grid coordinates. It’s right down the road,” replied Anderson.
4-34. “Have you been there before?” asked Bagley. No, Anderson had never been there. Bagley shook his
head. “Okay,” he continued, “have you done a rehearsal yet?” Anderson responded with an embarrassed
look: “A rehearsal?”
4-35. “Yes,” said Bagley, “a rehearsal for actions on contact. A rehearsal in case one of your vehicles breaks
down. A rehearsal for actions at the transfer point. A rehearsal for actions at the logistics release point.”
4-36. “Sir, I hadn’t scheduled one yet,” said Anderson. “I was going to give a final mission brief, then do
pre-combat inspections (PCI) with Sergeant Carroll.” Fortunately, your platoon sergeant initiated movement
and began doing PCIs on her own, observed the commander. “But you have wasted too much time doing
everything but get this platoon ready for its mission.”
4-37. “Sir, I was just trying to ensure they had the right information,” responded Anderson.
4-38. “I get that,” said Bagley. “But we don’t have time to run down every answer. The battalion staff are
doing their best to push us good information as soon as they get it, but in the meantime, you have forty
soldiers and twenty-two vehicles to prepare for movement into a dangerous forward area. There’s an entire
battalion up there depending on your platoon.”
4-39. Anderson nodded. Bagley continued, “We can’t afford to fail this mission. I have no choice but to
relieve you. The company executive officer will take your place and lead this convoy. Report to my CP and
stand by for further instructions. We’ll sort this out if and when we make it through this day. In the meantime,
I want you to review the Army’s troop leading procedures. If you had followed them, you would have gotten
more done in less time and we wouldn’t be having this discussion.” (See figure 4-2).
4-40. Anderson saluted, turned, and walked slowly toward the company command post, his mind reviewing
the last four hours. What had he done wrong, and how could he have done better? Regardless of his future,
he was going to spend the next few hours learning everything he could about the troop leading procedures.
Gazing at the pink clouds in the eastern sky, Anderson swore that given a second chance, he’d do a much
better job.
4-46. Anderson asked a few questions. What was the communications plan for this operation? Would indirect
fire support be available? What about vehicle recovery and medevac? Was there an alternate route if the main
supply route was blocked?”
4-47. The major finally cut him off. “These are all good questions, lieutenant, but we are still working out
some of those details.” Said Smith. “Your commander will have more details soon. We’re giving you a
warning order now so that you can start your own preparations.”
4-48. Outside the tent, the lieutenant reached for a three-by-five card in his pocket and looked at it under his
flashlight. The card contained a handwritten list of eight steps: the troop leading procedures. He figured he
suddenly had more to do than he had time to accomplish; a checklist would at least point him in the right
direction.
4-49. His watch read 0215. Anderson had already completed the first step (receive the mission), but he had
less than five hours to accomplish the other seven steps and prepare his platoon. He walked quickly back to
his platoon area and woke the platoon sergeant.
4-50. “Sergeant Carroll, we just received a warning order directing us to prepare to conduct a resupply
convoy,” said Anderson. “Battalion is sending us two convoy protection platforms for security. The platoon
needs to be ready to go no later than 0700. The commander will give me additional information at 0300.
Notify the squad leaders now to get their soldiers and vehicles ready.”
4-51. “Okay sir,” responded Carroll. “Do you want me at the 0300 brief?”
4-52. “No thanks,” responded Anderson. “We’re short on time, so I want you to focus on preparing the
soldiers and their equipment. I will brief the whole platoon as soon as I have the details.”
4-53. Carroll nodded, and began pulling on her boots. Anderson took out his notebook and started planning
backward, assuming he would need to initiate movement at 0700 hours.
4-54. He figured he might need thirty minutes right before the deadline to provide any updates, such as
changes in the friendly or enemy situation. Having sat through battalion rehearsals, he figured he could use
a similar format to rehearse actions at the pickup and drop-off points and discuss other contingencies, such
as a broken vehicle. If that took an hour, he was already back to 0530. Before that, he’d want to do final PCIs
and give soldiers enough time to correct minor issues. That was another thirty minutes. Thirty minutes to
reconnoiter the transfer point and thirty minutes to brief the platoon moved him back to 0400.
4-55. The commander would provide him with more information at 0300, and it was already 0245. At some
point, he was going to have to put all that information into an operations order and brief the platoon. Anderson
decided he’d figure it out once he knew more. He took two minutes to roll up his sleeping bag, brush his
teeth, and jot down his timeline, then walked back to Bagley’s tent.
4-56. The update contained grim news. The enemy attack had forced withdrawals in several sectors. The
brigade continued to hold, but every unit was running low on ammunition. Anderson’s convoy would be one
of several emergency resupply missions going out that morning.
4-57. Bagley’s briefing answered several of Anderson’s earlier questions: the weather forecast was clear and
sunny; the enemy threat to MSR Titans was low; indirect fire support would be available on a general support
basis; recovery vehicles and ground ambulances would be standing by to provide support from the BSA
(brigade support area). The protection platforms from battalion would report at 0530. The commander would
do a walk-through at 0600.
4-58. Anderson’s platoon needed to be at the ATHP no later than 0730 to receive ammunition flat racks.
Bagley agreed to provide an extra HMMWV so Anderson could take two vehicles on his reconnaissance.
4-59. Bagley wished him luck, and Anderson walked back to his platoon area. He checked his watch: 0345
hours.
4-60. He found his platoon sergeant lecturing one of the squad leaders on weapons maintenance. He waited
a moment before interrupting: “Sergeant Carroll, I am going to do a quick recon of the ATHP. Captain Bagley
is providing a second HMMWV and driver, but I’ll need an NCO to ride shotgun. When I get back, I will
brief the platoon on our mission.
4-61. “Okay, sir,” responded the platoon sergeant. “I assume we’re hauling ammo. Are we still leaving at
0700, and do you know where we are going?”
4-62. Anderson told her about the 0730 pick up at the ATHP and showed her the route on his map.
4-63. “Roger, sir,” she acknowledged. “If it’s okay with you, I will send Sergeant Velasco on the recon
mission.”
4-64. Anderson nodded agreement, and began reviewing his notes.
4-65. “Sir, did the commander say anything else about our mission? What’s the threat level on that MSR?”
asked Carroll.
4-66. “The two protection platforms will be here at 0530. Minimal threat along the route, but medevac and
recovery vehicles will be on standby here at the BSA in case we need them,” he said.
4-67. Carroll paused, waiting for more information, but Anderson turned back to his notes.
4-68. “Your vehicle should be ready to go in fifteen minutes,” said Carroll. Anderson gave a distracted
thumbs-up gesture, and his sergeant moved off into the darkness.
4-69. Twelve minutes later, Anderson heard the rumble of the extra HMMWV arriving from the company
command post. He could see his own driver doing checks and services. A moment later, Sergeant Velasco
from third squad arrived. Anderson summoned the two drivers and briefed the small group. With Anderson
leading the way on foot, the two vehicles crept across the assembly area, past the security checkpoint, and
out onto the MSR.
4-70. Four kilometers south of the brigade support area, a small white sign marked the turn-off for the ATHP.
Again, Anderson got out and ground-guided his small convoy toward the security checkpoint. A bored
sergeant called in his arrival and allowed him to pass through. Creeping forward, the two vehicles emerged
from the tree line into a large open area. In the darkness, they could make out cargo trucks coming and going,
their movements orchestrated by a dozen flashlight-wielding ground guides. Small white signs marked lanes
and directed one-way traffic toward long, straight rows of flat racks awaiting retrieval.
4-71. Wary of the time. Anderson walked his two vehicles past the activity and toward the exit. When they
got back to the MSR, he asked his driver to hurry. He was already twenty minutes behind schedule, and still
needed to brief the platoon.
4-72. By the time Anderson returned, his soldiers had gathered in a loose formation before the lead cargo
truck. Working from an outline in the brigade tactical SOP, Anderson began briefing his order. Sergeant
Lewis asked a question about enemy activity along the route. Anderson reiterated the low threat, but promised
to get a more specific answer before the convoy departed.
4-73. He continued the briefing. Sergeant Carson asked about the possibility of follow-on missions. For
example, might the platoon need to make a second turn to this same location?
4-74. Anderson responded that he had no information about that at the moment, but a second mission was a
possibility.
4-75. Specialist Johnson asked about artillery support. Good question, but the interruptions were extending
the briefing. Anderson finally asked his soldiers to hold their questions to the end.
4-76. At 0540, the arrival of two protection platforms from battalion caused another delay. Anderson directed
his platoon sergeant to flag down the two vehicles, then pressed on with the convoy order. He finished at
0555 and gave the platoon a ten-minute break to hit the latrines before reporting back to their vehicles for
pre-combat inspections.
4-77. At that moment, Captain Bagley and the first sergeant arrived. “Is your platoon ready to go?” asked
the commander.
4-78. “Sir, I am just getting ready to do PCIs now,” said Anderson. “Have you done any rehearsals?” asked
the commander patiently.
4-79. “We will do those right after I conduct PCIs,” said Anderson. “I still think we can make our start point
at 0700.”
4-80. “Okay, lieutenant,” said Bagley. “The first sergeant and I are going to get a cup of coffee, and I’ll be
back in twenty minutes. I expect to see you doing rehearsals when I return.”
4-81. That didn’t happen. With the platoon sergeant at his side, Anderson began spot-checking soldiers and
vehicles. Private First Class Holliday had forgotten to fill his camelback, and Specialist Turner was missing
the signature on his dispatch, but there were no major problems with the first five vehicles. The sixth vehicle,
however, was missing its tow bar. Specialist Lowe swore it had been there before the last mission and stated
flatly that somebody must have stolen it. His squad leader, Sergeant Velasco, could not verify whether it had
been there yesterday.
4-82. “Hey Sir, we’ll borrow a tow bar from Bravo Company,” said Sergeant Carroll. “We can figure this
out later.”
4-83. “I don’t understand how a tow bar could just walk off in the middle of the night,” said Anderson, losing
patience.
4-84. “Sir, that stuff happens all the time,” said Sergeant Velasco. “We don’t do it, but some of the guys in
other companies have no problem making midnight requisitions.”
4-85. Carroll glared at Velasco. This was the wrong time to complain about pilferage. “Sir, let us fix this,”
she added. “We still have rehearsals to do.”
4-86. “Oh shoot,” said Anderson, too late.
4-87. In the morning light, he could see the commander returning. Anderson directed his platoon sergeant to
call another formation, and strode out to intercept Captain Bagley.
4-88. “I don’t see any rehearsals,” commented the captain, his earlier patience gone.
4-89. “We’re starting them now,” replied Anderson.
4-90. I tell you what, lieutenant,: said the commander. “This is an important mission but I don’t want to rush
so fast that we get soldiers killed. So—take these rehearsals seriously and do them right. Make sure every
soldier knows what to do, including your protection platform crews. I will call battalion and try to adjust your
pickup time. When I get back, you need to be ready.”
4-91. “Yes, sir,” he responded. The young officer’s head was buzzing from the lack of sleep and the indirect
reprimand. He walked back to his platoon, trying to look confident.
4-92. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he began, “We are going to spend the next thirty minutes doing rehearsals.
Line up in chalk sequence, drivers on the left, assistant drivers on the right.”
4-93. The commander and first sergeant returned at 0705. Bagley informed Anderson that battalion was
trying to coordinate a later pickup time. The commander and first sergeant split up and walked down the two
sides of the vehicle line, asking soldiers about the mission, and checking their weapons and radios.
4-94. They completed their walk-through in less than ten minutes. Bagley wished Anderson luck and told
him to move out. The convoy reached the ATHP at 0745. The lieutenant in charge hadn’t heard anything
from battalion. There were two other serials in line, and no, he couldn’t move up Anderson’s convoy.
4-95. Anderson reported his situation to the company CP, and was told to stand fast.
4-96. After an hour-long delay, ground guides finally called the convoy forward to load its flat racks. By
0915, Anderson’s trucks were back on MSR Titans heading toward Task Force Landry and the logistics
release point. Black smoke drifted toward them from a ridgeline to the north.
4-97. Halfway to their destination, Anderson received a change of mission. Task Force Landry had gone
black on ammunition and was withdrawing from Duffer’s Drift to occupy hasty defensive positions farther
south. His convoy should return immediately to the BSA and await further instructions; Anderson should
report to the company CP.
4-98. When Anderson got there, he found Captain Bagley in the midst of three different radio conversations.
The battalion support operations office was trying to coordinate a new logistics release point for Anderson’s
convoy. The fuel and water platoon had lost a rifle. The first sergeant’s driver had just received a Red Cross
message.
4-99. Bagley finally noticed Anderson standing by the tent flap. “Let’s talk,” said the commander, grabbing
his helmet.
4-100. Emerging from the tent, the two walked toward the mess tent.
4-101. “We will get you back on the road as soon as we identify a new logistics release point,” began the
captain. “In the meantime, how did things go this morning?”
4-102. I got behind in my timeline, sir,” responded Anderson. “Because of that we missed our SP (start
point) time, which may have impacted the mission.”
4-103. “That’s true,” said Bagley. “If your vehicles had made their original pickup time, Task Force Landry
might still be holding its position. On the other hand, you were trying to pull things together on a pretty short
timeline. Is there anything else you would have done differently?”
4-104. Anderson shrugged: “I’m not sure, sir. I had a lot on my plate.” “How much help were your NCOs?”
asked Bagley.
4-105. “They were great,” responded Anderson. “Especially my platoon sergeant. They got the troops and
the vehicles ready while I did the reconnaissance and put together the plan.”
4-106. “I agree that you have good NCOs,” replied the captain. “But here’s what I saw. You seemed to be
working through the troop leading procedures by yourself. Those steps are a good place to start, but don’t
forget to leverage your NCOs. Every one of them is an experienced leader. You seemed unwilling to delegate
responsibility, much less share the information necessary to prepare for this mission. You have a pretty good
leadership team in your platoon, but they can’t help you if you don’t let them.” (See figure 4-3 on page 4-
10).
4-107. Anderson returned to his vehicle and slumped into the passenger seat. The platoon was on standby
until Task Force Landry established new positions. In the meantime, he thought about how to share more
responsibility with his NCOs. As he replayed the morning’s events in his mind, Anderson dozed off in the
midday sun.
4-112. If Captain Bagley’s briefing took an hour, Anderson still had thirty extra minutes for squad leaders
to prepare their Soldiers and vehicles. He also needed to send a team to reconnoiter the ammunition transfer
holding point (ATHP); he was not going to get lost trying to find a transfer point three klicks south of the
assembly area.
4-113. Sergeant First Class Carroll returned with the four squad leaders, and Anderson relayed the warning
order. Two of the sergeants asked questions he hadn’t thought of. Writing them in his notebook, the platoon
leader promised to get answers.
4-114. The meeting broke up, and the squad leaders dispersed. Reviewing his notes, Anderson asked his
platoon sergeant who they should send to reconnoiter the ATHP. “Velasco’s got the most experience,” said
Carroll, “but we’re going to need another HMMWV. “
4-115. “Roger, let’s identify that issue at the update,” said Anderson. “Did I miss anything else?”
4-116. “No sir,” said Carroll. “So far, so good. Of course, the night is young.”
4-117. Anderson smiled, vaguely recalling an old saying about no plan surviving contact. The two leaders
walked back to the command post.
4-118. Sure enough, the update complicated matters. While their brigade continued to hold in sector, enemy
pressure had forced several other units to withdraw. All combat forces were running low on fuel and
ammunition. Anderson’s platoon would be one of several emergency resupply missions going out that
morning. Recovery vehicle and casualty evacuation support from the BSA would be standing by to assist, if
needed. The protection platforms would join the platoon at 0530.
4-119. Carroll and Anderson asked several questions. Bagley answered to the best of his ability, and agreed
to lend a vehicle for the recon mission. As part of his back brief, Anderson shared his tentative timeline,
including the pre-combat inspections at 0600.
4-120. Nodding his approval, Bagley wished him luck. “I’ll be in your area at 0600,” added Bagley, “but I
won’t need any special attention. You and SFC Carroll just go on about your business.”
4-121. It was already 0345. On the way back to the platoon area, Anderson and Carroll compared notes.
“I’m worried about those protection platforms,” said Anderson. “Even if they show up on time, they are still
going to miss the orders briefing.”
4-122. Carroll agreed, but suggested there might be time at the ATHP to brief the crews.
4-123. “I am more concerned about coms,” she added. “If we can’t talk internally, any problem along the
route could turn into a dumpster fire. And if we can’t talk to higher, we’ll be on our own if we make contact.”
4-124. Back at the platoon, Carroll moved off to organize Velasco and the reconnaissance mission, while
Anderson began organizing his notes into a five paragraph order. The vehicle from headquarters arrived a
few minutes later. By 0415, Velasco and two HMMWVs were en route to the ATHP with orders to bring
back a legible sketch of the transfer point.
4-125. By 0430, Carroll had organized the platoon’s vehicles into a single line, and the Soldiers had
assembled in a horseshoe formation by the lead vehicle. The convoy brief took 45 minutes. Anderson
delivered his five paragraph order, then asked Carroll to speak. She emphasized the need to check vehicles,
radios, and weapons before leaving the wire. After a short break, the Soldiers reassembled, just as Sergeant
Velasco and his team returned from their reconnaissance.
4-126. “Ladies and gentlemen,” said Anderson, “We are going to spend the next 30 minutes doing
rehearsals. Line up in chalk sequence, drivers on the left, assistant drivers on the right.”
4-127. In the half-light of dawn, Anderson’s Soldiers imitated the convoy’s movements like a camouflaged
dance troupe, walking and talking their way through vehicle reactions, radio calls, weapons orientation, and
rules of engagement at the pick-up point, release point, and in case of accident or enemy attack. Halfway
through the drill, two security vehicles arrived—late--from battalion headquarters. SFC Carroll intercepted
and directed their crews towards the rehearsal.
4-128. The rehearsal finished, Anderson released the Soldiers back to their squad leaders for pre-combat
inspections. As they dispersed, Captain Bagley and the first sergeant arrived.
4-129. “Is your platoon ready to go?” asked the commander.
4-130. “Sir, we are on schedule. Doing PCIs now,” said Anderson.
4-131. “Carry on lieutenant,” he responded. “Your pick up at the ATHP is still 0730. Let me know if you
need anything. We‘ll just take a quick look and get out of your hair.”
4-132. Anderson acknowledged, grateful that he wouldn’t have to spend the next twenty minutes escorting
Bagley. The commander and first sergeant headed down the right side of the line-up.
4-133. He and Carroll went down the other side, spot checking weapons, and vehicles while quizzing the
Soldiers. They spotted a few minor issues, including a missing tow bar on one of Velasco’s trucks and a dirty
crew served weapon on Sergeant Carson’s vehicle. Carroll sent Velasco to borrow a replacement tow bar,
and gave Carson and his squad leader a few choice words on weapons maintenance.
4-134. The security vehicles from battalion were last in line, their .50 caliber machine guns pointing
menacingly from each cupola. While Carroll inspected the vehicles, Anderson spent a few extra minutes
talking with the senior NCO, Staff Sergeant Nelson, to ensure that he and his team understood the mission.
4-135. Carroll rejoined them, her jaw clenched. “Sergeant Nelson,” she asked, “Why are your vehicles half-
empty?”
4-136. Nelson gave a lame excuse, citing last minute notification and a problem rounding up the two crews.
Anderson directed him to top off his vehicles immediately and rejoin the convoy at the ATHP.
4-137. “What do you think,” asked Anderson on their way back to their vehicles.
4-138. Carroll paused before answering. “Those knuckleheads from battalion have spent most of this
deployment in the TOC,” she responded. “I don’t want them freaking out at the first sign of trouble.”
4-139. Anderson nodded, and stifled a yawn. He left Carroll at her truck and walked to the company CP for
an update. Captain Bagley had no further information. He wished Anderson luck, and told him to get moving.
4-140. Anderson jogged back to his HMMWV, circling his arm above his head. 21 engines roared to life,
and he did a radio check on the platoon frequency. Each vehicle acknowledged, and the convoy moved
forward. Anderson notified the command post, then heard gunfire crackling as his Soldiers test fired their
weapons.
4-141. It was 0700, and the sun was shining over the tree line in the east. Anderson called the command
post again, and the convoy crept out of the assembly area and onto the main supply route, with Velasco’s
truck leading the way towards the ATHP.
4-142. The loading of pallets went smoothly. By 0800, the two security vehicles had rejoined the convoy,
and the trucks were back on the MSR, heading towards Task Force Landry and a thin line of black smoke.
The convoy drove north at a steady pace through rolling hills and farm country.
4-143. Anderson’s vehicles bristled with firepower. In each truck, a soldier manned either a machine gun
or grenade launcher mounted on top of the cab. Bullet proof windows, armored plates, and chicken wire
provided further protection. Enemy contact was unlikely, but open terrain on both sides provided good
visibility and clear fields of fire, just in case.
4-144. From his map recon, Anderson knew the MSR would take them through three small villages.
Entering the first village, the trucks drove slowly past a deserted collection of boarded up homes, looted
shops, and stripped vehicles. The only occupant was a stray dog barking at them from the gas station. They
drove past and back out into the open fields beyond the village.
4-145. Ten kilometers later, the convoy crested a low ridgeline and descended a gradual slope towards the
next village. A stone bridge led them over a small brook and into another deserted village. Underneath the
bridge, Army engineers had built steel bars to discourage explosive devices.
4-146. This village looked similar, less the barking dog. As they crept through town, Anderson saw the
same shuttered homes and looted storefronts, the same disabled vehicles and piles of refuse on the sidewalks.
4-147. Unsure why, Anderson called Velasco in the lead truck: “Delta Five One, this is Delta One Six:
sitrep?”
4-148. Before Velasco could answer, Anderson heard a massive explosion from the front of the convoy.
The PLS trucks jerked to a halt. A black mushroom cloud of smoke floated up from the front of the convoy.
4-149. Buildings on the left came alive with muzzle flashes, and a hail of gunfire peppered the vehicles.
Bullets thudded against Anderson’s windshield, leaving white spider webs that limited visibility.
4-150. Anderson squeezed the handset and stated the obvious: “All elements, this is Delta One Six: we are
in heavy contact. Return fire and keep moving. Rally point is one kilometer north of the village.”
4-151. Anderson yelled to his vehicle gunner: “Watch out for RPGs!”
4-152. To his driver, Anderson pointed forward and barked: “Johnson, get us up there.”
4-153. Meanwhile, a hail of return fire from Anderson’s vehicles perforated the buildings up and down the
street, turning bricks and masonry into a thick grey dust.
4-154. Switching frequencies, Anderson called in his location and situation to Bagley, who echoed
Anderson’s initial guidance: get as many vehicles out of the kill zone as fast as you can.
4-155. Anderson’s driver maneuvered left around the next truck, and moved forward towards the gunfire at
the front of the convoy.
4-156. Switching frequencies, Anderson called his platoon sergeant: “Delta One Seven, this is Delta One
Six: sitrep.”
4-157. He paused a moment, then called the security team: “Bandit Two Five, this is Delta One Six: we are
receiving heavy fire at the front of the convoy. I want both trucks up here now to provide suppressive fire.”
4-158. The radio crackled, and Anderson heard his platoon sergeant’s voice: “Sir, we’re taking sporadic
small arms fire back here. I don’t think the enemy counted on this many trucks. Recommend we exit the
village the way we came in.”
4-159. “Can you get out that way?” asked Anderson.
4-160. “I think so,” responded Carroll, “But it’s too tight to turn around. We’re going to have back out of
here.”
4-161. “Do it,” said Anderson.
4-162. Bandit Two Five came on the net to acknowledge Anderson’s order.
4-163. Looking rearward, Anderson saw trucks slowly backing out of the village.
4-164. Ahead, a PLS truck lay on its side, blocking the northern exit. Thick black smoke poured from the
engine compartment. Behind this obstacle, three stationary trucks continued to exchange fire with the enemy.
The drumming of bullets intensified as enemy fire shifted to Anderson’s vehicle.
4-165. The lieutenant reached up and pulled his gunner down into the safety of the cab, signaling him to
wait a minute. Cupping his ears to hear the radio headset, Anderson shouted into his microphone: “Bandit
Two Five, where are you?”
4-166. “Sir, we’re heading your way,” came the answer. After a pause, he added, “But we have a problem.
The .50 cal on Bandit Two Three is jammed.”
4-167. Anderson cursed, then squeezed the handset: “I want both vehicles here anyway, in case we need to
evacuate wounded Soldiers.”
4-168. Bandit Two Five paused before answering. “Sir, are you sure? My crew is basically unarmed. Why
risk additional casualties?”
4-169. Anderson shook his head. “Bandit Two Five, I do not have time for a debate. Get both vehicles up
here now to provide suppressive fire, and be prepared to evacuate casualties. That’s an order.”
4-170. Their HMMWV stopped next to, Sergeant McDonald’s truck, Delta Six Eight. From his window,
Anderson saw that McDonald’s turret was empty. The other two vehicles continued firing, their pace slowing
to conserve ammunition. Over the radio, McDonald reported that they were out of ammunition.
4-171. The two security vehicles arrived. Bandit Two Five’s .50 caliber machine gun poured heavy fire into
what was left of the buildings on the left side of the street. Anderson checked the ammunition left in his
vehicle –three canisters—and signaled his gunner to resume firing from the cupola.
4-172. Behind them, an RPG exploded against the third truck, Delta Seven Niner. When the smoke cleared,
Anderson saw that it had destroyed the two front tires on the driver’s side, immobilizing the vehicle.
4-173. Over the radio, SFC Carroll reported in with an update: ten trucks had evacuated with her to the
south, and two trucks, including Velasco’s, had made it to the rally point north of town. That left four more
trucks and crews behind him.
4-174. Anderson directed Carroll to continue the mission, then contacted the remaining vehicles in the
village: “Continue to suppress enemy forces on our left, but conserve your ammunition. Delta Six Eight, we
will give you a can of our 7.62 ammunition. Bandit Two Three, evacuate the crew from Delta Seven Niner.
When you have them on board, we are going to back our way out of here.”
4-175. Johnson maneuvered the HMMWV towards McDonald’s truck. Anderson cracked open the door to
make the transfer. Another RPG streaked out of the wreckage, this one headed towards their vehicle.
Anderson’s world went black.
4-193. The loading of pallets went smoothly. By 0800, the two security vehicles had rejoined the convoy,
and the trucks were back on MSR Titans, heading toward Task Force Landry and a thin line of black smoke.
The convoy drove north at a steady pace through rolling hills and farm country, Anderson calling in at every
checkpoint to report progress.
4-194. Six hundred meters short of the first village, Anderson halted the convoy. He knew the mission was
urgent, but avoiding ambush was worth a ten-minute delay. He ordered Nelson’s two protection platforms to
reconnoiter the village. While the convoy gunners provided overwatch, Nelson led his heavily armed
HMMWVs down the main street past a barking dog. On the far end, they u-turned and sped back.
4-195. “All clear,” reported Nelson.
4-196. The convoy moved forward, through the town and back into open countryside.
4-197. A half kilometer south of the next village, Anderson took the same precaution. Through binoculars,
he watched Nelson’s vehicles drive north across a stone bridge and up the main street, weaving past garbage
piles and abandoned vehicles.
4-198. At the far end of the village, a massive explosion shattered the morning stillness, followed by a
deadly chorus of assault rifles firing at the two vehicles.
4-199. Over the radio, Anderson heard Nelson shouting over the gunfire: “Enemy contact! Left side of the
road! Bandit Two Three is hit!”
4-200. Anderson tried to respond calmly: “Bandit Two Five, this is Delta One Six. What is Bandit Two
Three’s status?”
4-201. “Vehicle’s flipped over . . . not sure about casualties,” shouted Nelson.
4-202. “Roger, Bandit Two Five. Continue to suppress enemy fire. We’ll get help to you ASAP.”
4-203. Anderson switched frequencies and called in his situation to Bagley and battalion headquarters. The
battalion support operations officer responded: “Roger, Bandit One Six. We are sending the QRF (quick
reaction force) now. We will re-route your convoy to Alternate Supply Route Chrysler. Stand by for further
instructions.”
4-204. Switching back to the platoon net, Anderson summoned his platoon sergeant. Five vehicles back,
Sergeant Carroll jumped down from her truck and ran toward his vehicle.
4-205. The lieutenant’s mind raced. He needed to get help to Bandit Two Five fast, but the cargo trucks
were too big and slow, so he would need to send his HMMWV. If he went with the vehicle, he risked taking
himself out of the fight. On the other hand, he didn’t have time to brief his plan and didn’t like sending an
NCO in his place.
4-206. “We need to get those guys out of that kill zone,” barked Anderson.
4-207. “You’re going to need more suppressive fire,” responded Carroll. “The QRF will never get here in
time.”
4-208. Looking past Anderson, she pointed to a farmyard 300 meters left of the road. “I think we can range
the target with .50-caliber machine guns from over there.”
4-209. “Do it,” said Anderson. “I am going down there to get Bandit Two Three’s crew. I’ll call when we’re
in position:
4-210. “Sir, you don’t need to be a hero,” said Carroll.
4-211. “I’ll be careful,” replied Anderson. “If we don’t make it back, notify battalion and continue the
mission.”
4-212. “Good luck,” said Carroll. “Watch out for RPGs.”
4-213. Anderson nodded. Carroll moved out to reposition the guns.
4-214. The lieutenant climbed back into his HMMWV, briefed his crew, and notified battalion.
4-215. The support operations officer answered: “QRF is leaving now. Estimated time of arrival at your
location is twenty minutes.”
4-216. “Too slow,” Anderson responded. “We are going in now to help Bandit Two Three.”
4-217. Switching back to the platoon net, Anderson notified Nelson of his plan and warned that friendly
fire would be coming from his nine o’clock position. Two trucks from the convoy were already rumbling
toward the farmyard to provide fire support. Anderson’s driver pulled their vehicle onto the main road and
sped toward the village.
4-218. The main street through the village was less than 200 meters long. Bandit Two Three lay overturned
at the far end, black smoke roiling out of its engine compartment. Bandit Two Five was parked between
Bandit Two Three and the enemy. Small arms fire poured into both vehicles. Approaching from their rear,
Anderson’s gunner cut loose on his M249 machine gun, spraying fire into the right flank of the enemy
position. Enemy fire shifted toward Anderson’s vehicle, bullets bouncing off the window shield.
4-219. Sergeant Carroll’s voice crackled on the radio: “All elements, this is Bandit One Seven. We are
prepared to fire.”
4-220. “Marking our position with red smoke!” shouted Nelson, tossing a smoke grenade from Bandit Two
Five into the street. Enemy fire subsided as Carroll’s two heavy machine guns perforated neighboring brick
buildings where the enemy was hiding.
4-221. Anderson’s vehicle pulled behind the overturned HMMWV. His gunner continued firing short bursts
toward the enemy position, while the lieutenant dashed to the driver’s door. Inside the cab, all three
crewmembers lay prone, clutching their weapons, on what had been the vehicle’s roof. The two front seaters
were able to crawl out, but the gunner couldn’t move. With Anderson’s help, the crew dragged the wounded
soldier out the back door.
4-222. Anderson loaded the driver and wounded gunner into his HMMWV. The third soldier crouched by
Anderson’s open passenger door. Bandit Two Five roared back to life and repositioned behind the
lieutenant’s HMMWV to recover the third man. With both vehicles buttoned up, Anderson notified Carroll
that they were coming out.
4-223. The hail of .50-caliber rounds from the farmyard halted. Seconds later, Anderson’s HMMWV and
Bandit Two Five rumbled out of the village. Anderson notified battalion of their situation, and arranged to
evacuate the three soldiers from Bandit Two Three. Reassembling on the road, the convoy turned east toward
Alternate Supply Route Chrysler, and resumed its mission.
4-224. Later, after they delivered the ammunition, after they got back to the BSA, and after he had
confirmed accountability of all personnel and sensitive items, Anderson reported to Bagley’s tent.
4-225. Anderson summarized the mission, then Bagley nodded. “Let’s take a walk.”
4-226. The two fastened chinstraps, grabbed their weapons, and strolled toward the mess tent. The late
afternoon sun cast long shadows across the nearly empty assembly area.
4-227. “So,” said Bagley casually, “how would you rate your platoon’s performance today?”
4-228. “Sir, I thought we made a good plan and executed it okay,” said Anderson. “We had a few hiccups,
but my NCOs made sure our crews and vehicles were ready and that we stayed on schedule.”
4-229. “Yes,” said Bagley. “Good use of troop leading procedures, and great teamwork with your NCOs.”
4-230. Anderson said an embarrassed thanks.
4-231. “But what about the ambush?” continued Bagley. “You lost one vehicle, the other got pinned down,
and you basically led a one-vehicle rescue into a very hot kill zone. What were you thinking?”
4-232. “We didn’t have time to wait for the QRF,” explained Anderson. “My other trucks were too big and
slow to send into that village, so my HMMWV was the only option. I know I risked taking myself out of the
fight, but I didn’t have time to brief another NCO, and I wasn’t exactly comfortable sending someone else in
my place.”
4-233. “I’m okay with it,” answered Bagley. “Under other circumstances, I’d rather not have my lieutenants
charging into ambushes. If your vehicle had been hit, your only hope would have been the QRF, which was
still twenty minutes away. I realize you had to make a quick decision, and you couldn’t abandon those
soldiers. I think you made a good decision. You probably save their lives.”
4-234. “Thank you, sir,” repeated Anderson.
4-235. “Okay, lieutenant,” the captain finished. “You earned your pay today. Get some sleep.”
4-236. Anderson walked back to his vehicle, stripped off his gear, and crawled into his sleeping bag.
4-237. He woke up in his barracks room at the ISB.
4-238. There had been no assembly area, no ambush, and no rescue mission. He stared at the ceiling for a
moment, then turned on the bedside lamp, grabbed his notebook, and wrote down what he could remember.
(See figure 4-5).
4-239. Anderson replaced the notebook, turned out the light, and drifted back into a dreamless sleep.
Logistics platoon leaders and platoon sergeants are the leadership team that directly
impacts the readiness of their platoon. Here are some guidelines to success at the
platoon level.
A PL’s and PSG’s primary job is to inspire and influence their platoon to accomplish the
mission. They do this by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the
mission and improve the organization. PLs and PSGs are responsible for all missions their
platoon accomplishes or fails. This responsibility comes with the position, but PLs are only
successful because of character, presence, and intellect.
- CALL Handbook 18-24, The First 100 Days of Platoon Leadership, May 2018
Point of contact between the company commander and the platoon; receive mission for the platoon
and communicate needs to the commander.
Communicate with higher headquarters for reporting and receipt of mission.
Develop the platoon supporting concept of the operation; depending on unit SOP, may require an
OPORD, WARNORD, or FRAGORD.
Lead rehearsals; conduct pre-operations checks.
Responsible for property; assigned equipment readiness.
Develop junior leaders through leader profession development sessions (LPDs); conduct
assessments.
After Action Reports.
Risk assessment and risk management.
of issue and components of end item in accordance with the current equipment manual. Your involvement in
monthly cyclic inventories is crucial to setting conditions for maintaining equipment accountability.
KNOW YOURSELF
A-13. Understand your strengths and weaknesses and develop a plan to improve your weak areas. If you are
weak in writing and presenting information to leaders, focus on improving these important skills. These
topics should be covered during quarterly counseling sessions, but if you are unsure of your strengths and
weaknesses, do not hesitate to ask your rater, senior rater, or even your peers for feedback. Utilize tools such
as Azimuth Check through ArmyFit, and encourage your Soldiers to do the same. This annual survey is a
self-assessment of one’s physical, emotional, social, spiritual, and family health.
Figure A-1. Chief of Staff of the Army - work life balance example
A-14. As a leader, your available time is limited and precious. Time management is important. You need to
know how much time you can allocate for planning and management, while still maintaining a healthy
physical fitness schedule, spending time with family and indulging your hobbies and interests. It is important
to develop these habits of time management now, as they will stay with you as you move along in your career.
Hobbies and interests are equally important; people who devote their whole time to the Army succumb to
stress quickly. When managing time, establish priorities and ensure your subordinates know where your
priorities lie. Similarly, you must understand the priorities of your company and battalion as well. Knowing
your higher unit’s priorities will aid in identifying where you can assume risk, should you become
overwhelmed or over tasked. REST: Read, Exercise, Sleep, and Think.
TRAINING OBJECTIVES
A-19. Training management at the platoon level is designed to train individual Soldiers to support higher-
level collective tasks. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must use their knowledge and experience to look
at the company training calendar, identify which tasks support company event training objectives, and which
tasks the platoon is deficient in. This analysis will enable the platoon leader and platoon sergeant to design a
crawl-walk-run training path to prepare their Soldiers.
T-WEEK CONCEPT
A-20. Companies plan and execute training using the T-week concept. The T-week concept, an up to 16-
week calendar that ensures companies properly plan, resource, prepare for, and execute training. Platoons are
expected to support the company by planning and briefing within the T-week calendar. Platoon T-week
calendars should be published and redistributed as updates and changes occur. Platoon leaders and platoon
sergeants should use the less formal eight-step training model (see below paragraph) to plan and resource
individual training and small collective training events within their commander’s training calendar.
Step 3: Recon training sites. Leaders perform reconnaissance of training site(s) and report back
observations and potential issues prior to training execution.
Step 4: Issue the OPORD. This order specifies responsibilities, timelines for execution, tactical
scenarios, and other key information necessary to execute the event.
Step 5: Rehearse. Leaders conduct rehearsals to ensure plans are synchronized and actions are
understood by subordinates.
Step 6: Train. Training is executed; tasks are observed and evaluated; training objectives are
trained until proficiency is achieved.
Step 7: Conduct after action reviews. After action reviews are conducted during training and after
the event. Evaluation feedback is provided to the unit commander to assess task proficiency.
Lessons learned are discussed and recorded for future use.
Step 8: Retrain. Tasks not performed to standard are retrained and re-evaluated until the standard
is achieved.
TRAINING MANAGEMENT
A-24. Platoons manage training at echelon by understanding how company training management works,
providing input during the company-training meeting, tracking the platoon, and developing training that
supports higher-level METL collective tasks. This is done in support of the company commander and through
dialogue between the platoon and company leadership.
TRAINING GUIDANCE
A-25. Leaders must understand their commander’s intent when deciding what tasks to train. If their intent is
to validate the ability of the company to conduct refuel on the move, but the platoon training is focused solely
on testing fuel quality, this may not lead to successful execution of a refuel on the move. Knowing the
commander’s training path and intent will allow leaders to complement it.
Figure A-6. Mission essential task to individual task via Combined Arms Training Strategy
BATTLE FOCUS
A-33. The battle focus concept (ADP 7-0) is used to plan, execute, and assess training in the operational
domain. Battle focus aligns a unit training plan to support the METL so commanders and leaders can allocate
time and resources to conduct unit training management. Battle focus also relies on the integration and nesting
of the individual and collective tasks Soldiers and units train to achieve battle focus. Central to planning
training events are the combined arms training strategies.
Table 1 – Individual: Consists of individual tasks in support of unit METs and the identified
platoon battle tasks T&EOs. Table 1 may include training events of Team Training, STT, or a
class. Completion of Table 1 applicable CATS training events is required for progression to Table
2.
Table 2 – Team/Crew: Consists of team or crew collective tasks within applicable unit CATS task
sets in support of unit METs or unit Convoy Protection Platform crew proficiency in accordance
with TC 4-11.46. Table 2 may include training events of STT or tactical exercise without troops
also referred to as a TEWT. Completion of Table 2 applicable CATS training events is required
for progression to Table 3.
Table 3 – Section/Squad: Consists of section/squad collective tasks within applicable unit CATS
task sets in support of unit METs or unit convoy protection platform section proficiency. Table 3
may include training events of STX, Communication Exercise, or even STT. Completion of Table
3 applicable CATS training events is required for progression to Table 4.
Table 4 – Platoon: Consists of identified battle tasks within applicable unit CATS task sets in
support of unit METs. Table 4 may include STX training events. Completion of Table 4 applicable
CATS training events is required for progression to Table 5 – Company level training events, such
as an FTX.
Deploy Unit
Relocate Unit (Conduct Tactical Convoy)
Establish Unit Area
Defend Unit
Conduct Support Mission
event task set numbers and task set titles. A task set describes a specific function or capability to train. It
includes collective tasks that support training for that function or capability. A task set may include differing
collective task echelons, such as 63-CO-1234, 63-PLT-1234, 63-SEC-1234, or 63-TM-1234. Note that a
platoon may use differing collective task echelons to build and assess training readiness. A platoon may use
a company echelon collective task (63-CO-1234) that has platoon level steps and measures requiring training.
Task sets are trained utilizing a progressive series of crawl-walk-run training events.
Most company level CATS will have similar TEM training events. Within a training objective
focus area, a platoon leader will review their unit CATS TEM report task set in order to identify
task sets that support the platoon battle tasks, those tasks that support the company METL. Upon
identifying those applicable task sets, the platoon leader then reviews the recommended crawl-
walk-run unit CATS training events and determines the applicable training table to conduct them.
Crawl training events include STT, tactical exercise without Troops, and classes. “Walk” training
events include STX and COMEX. “Run” training events include FTXs and CPXs. Note: crawl-
walk-run training plans are not limited to a single level of training per event. For example, STT
may train Soldiers on both individual (“crawl”) and collective (“walk”) tasks simultaneously.
Opportunity Training
A-41. Opportunity training is planned individual or collective training and should focus on the basics as well
as nest with the platoon’s training path. Often referred to as “hip-pocket” training, it is executed in the event
of downtime during the duty day, taking advantage of the opportunity at hand to train. Reference earlier in
this appendix in paragraph A-5 for further detail.
Ongoing Training
A-42. Training proficiency measures how well a unit or individual performs to approved standards. Soldiers
and units train and are evaluated on their ability to meet standards in individual tasks, collective tasks,
weapons qualification, and employment. Proficiencies built at the foundational Soldier level link directly to
the unit’s ability to execute complex mission related tasks.
A-43. Building proficiency in the unit’s METL is a unit leadership primary focus. Understandably, leaders
must also plan for other training requirements that fall in areas such as warrior tasks and weapons
qualification. In coordination with company leadership, platoon leaders must identify available training
events to build proficiency in these other areas.
OPPORTUNITY TRAINING
A-45. “Hip-pocket” is a type of opportunity training that focuses on the individual or crew level. Ideally, hip-
pocket training should take 10 to 20 minutes, giving leaders flexibility to insert it when needed. This type of
opportunity training maximizes training time and prevents lost training opportunities. Hip-pocket training
should focus on the basics and nest with the platoon training path. This integration may require a collaborative
discussion with subordinate leaders to decide the tasks on which to train. Radio operations, camouflage, and
concealment of equipment, and setting up communications are all examples of tasks that may nest within a
platoon’s train-up for a STX.
A-46. Opportunity training should be planned using the eight-step training model. When selecting what to
train on, leaders should look at collective tasks in ATN and identify individual tasks. Using T&EOs from
ATN or the CAR provides leaders with tasks, conditions, and standards for training and helps leaders identify
the required training resources. Certifying leaders remains a key step in the planning process to ensure quality
training. Another key resource is STP 21-1- SMCT which lays out the Army’s key individual tasks within
the categories of shoot, move, communicate, and survive. The platoon leader should list opportunity training
tasks on the training schedule to remind leaders what tasks they agreed to train so they can prepare to execute.
A-47. Some sustainment units have difficulty finding time to train, but there is often time available that
leaders tend to overlook. For example, in garrison, if a platoon is supporting a unit in the local training area,
this mission offers opportunity to train. Providing support can be accomplished through tactical means to
include drawing radios, conducting convoy briefs, and practicing mission command. With the proper
planning, what could be a simple ammunition drop at a range, could be resupplied at a logistics release point
with customer unit. This approach allows the platoon to test its equipment and improve its tactical skills
without using any additional time.
A-48. Opportunity training is key to ensuring units sustain proficiency and do not miss chances to train.
Platoon-level leaders should develop a training plan that integrates their training, focuses on the basics, and
is planned with the eight-step training model. Platoon leaders should back brief their company leadership to
get buy-in from their leaders. Having squad leaders prepare and maintain “smart books” with tasks,
conditions, standards, and equipment needed enables platoons to execute and track training.
Mission Analysis. The platoon leader must start by conducting training mission analysis. The
platoon leader should consider commander's training guidance and higher unit training plan to
identify which collective tasks to train.
Company METL. Identify METs and supporting collective tasks the platoon supports via the
company's METL on ATN or DTMS.
Platoon Battle Task. Based on the commander's training guidance and METs/SCTs identified
above, the platoon leader will choose additional collective tasks the platoon should train; these are
battle tasks. While chosen by the platoon leadership, Battle tasks are approved by the company
commander.
A battle task is a platoon or lower echelon collective task that is crucial to the successful
accomplishment of a company, battery, or troop mission essential task. (FM 7-0)
To ensure that lower echelons and staffs have a logical process to nest the collective and
individual tasks they train back to the unit's METs, commanders use the concept of battle
tasks. A battle task is a collective task platoons and staffs train that support unit mission-
essential tasks (ADP 7-0).
Leaders at lower echelons should assist in identifying battle tasks. These leaders include
warrant officers, squad leaders, section sergeants, and team leaders.
Mission Analysis Back Brief. The platoon leadership will then present their mission analysis to
the commander.
This back brief will include platoon battle tasks to be trained, timeline for training, and
collective live fire tasks to train. The brief should include a risk assessment, in accordance
with unit SOPs and ATP 5-19.
Commanders will provide additional guidance if necessary, at which point the platoon leader
should begin developing a COA for creating their platoon training plan.
COA Development. Before the platoon training plan can be created, the platoon leadership should
create a COA for training the platoon. The platoon leader will start planning backwards from the
point at which the Commander designated the platoon must be proficient. Working in reverse
order, the platoon leader should identify milestones to achieve proficiency in platoon battle tasks,
and before that the squad/section/team battle tasks, and before that the individual tasks. This is
what is meant by the often used terminology of Crawl-Walk-Run.
Combined Arms Training Strategy. Platoon leaders should use the Company's Combined
Arms Training Strategy (CATS) for a technique to train the platoon in a Crawl/Walk/Run
progression. At the company level, the CATS reflects a proponent-recommended crawl-walk-
run progression of training events given the METs selected to train. Additionally, each
strategy provides recommendations on who, what, and how often to train.
The CATS also provides fundamental planning and event information to include training aids,
devices, simulators, and simulations (known as TADSS); training gates; multi-echelon
training events; major resources; and a purpose, outcome, and recommended execution
guidance (ADP 7-0).
Individual Tasks. Individual tasks such as MOS-specific tasks, Army Warrior Skills (STP 21-1-
SMCT), and crew drills, are identified. These will likely be trained during STT.
Individual Soldier skills and proficiencies establish a solid foundation for unit collective
training proficiency (ADP 7-0).
Unit NCOs constantly monitor-as well as constantly train and retrain as necessary-the
underlying proficiencies at the individual level. In units where Soldiers cannot perform
individual skills to standard, the unit cannot effectively execute collective tasks to standard
(ADP 7-0).
MOS Specific individual tasks can be found within T&EOs of battle tasks and other
supporting collective tasks. Search the task numbers in the CAR, ATN, or DTMS to review
T&EOs.
Battle Focus. The integration of these collective tasks and individual tasks is vital because units
cannot simultaneously train every task to standard because of time or other resource constraints
(ADP 7-0).
8-Step Training Model. At the platoon level, this echelon's training will likely culminate with an
STX. When planning a training event like a STX, or any smaller scale training event, the 8-step
training model should be used.
The 8-step training model provides a flexible and reliable vehicle for creating continuity for
planning and managing simple training events (FM 7-0, 3-12, OCT 2016).
Within the context of planning training horizons, long-range to mid-range to short-range,
generally the 8-Step Training Model is during the short-range planning horizon.
Leader Coordination. All of the above information must be discussed and synchronized amongst
the platoon leadership, to include warrant officers, and squad/section/team leaders. The dialogue
between platoon leadership is laying out the platoon's COA. This synchronization will ensure all
echelons are in lock step toward meeting the commander's intent through the weeks or months of
training ahead.
Platoon Notional Training Path. Platoon leaders should use the Platoon Notional Training Path
Model framework (see figure A-7 on page A-12) in order to assist in developing their crawl-walk-
run platoon training plan. This model demonstrates the progressive build-up of training events
from individual to collective, similar to the TEM report within your company's CATS. The Platoon
Notional Training Path Model can be applied to long and mid-range training calendars.
Platoon Training Plan. The platoon leader may seek additional approval or guidance for the COA
prior to moving on to creating the platoon training plan. The platoon leader can now plot the COA
on a calendar in a crawl-walk-run progression, assigning specific individual and collective tasks
to particular days. Again, the CATS and Platoon Notional Training Path are great resources for
developing the platoon training plan, which is integrated within the company's unit training plan..
QUALIFIED OPERATORS
B-2. Only trained and licensed operators are qualified to use assigned equipment. New personnel can be
scheduled for training and licensing with the unit’s master driver. The company commander must approve
and sign off on each operator’s license to authorize them for operations.
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
B-3. All operators and vehicle commanders conduct PMCS whenever the equipment is used. These are
conducted BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER all operations using the technical manual and PMCS checklists,
and documented on the DA Form 5988-E (Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet). The
operator receives the DA Form 5988-E when opening the dispatch for the equipment at the maintenance
control office, then returns it when the dispatch is closed.
SCHEDULED SERVICES
B-4. All equipment operator (-10 level) technical manuals (TMs) provide routine maintenance intervals.
DA Form 5988-E lists scheduled services with a description, interval, and due date. Platoon leaders ensure
that equipment is available to maintenance teams when specified and ensure operators are available to
support. Scheduled maintenance involves the equipment, operators, and maintenance personnel.
FAULT RESOLUTION
B-5. When new or additional faults are identified during PMCS or scheduled maintenance, they are added
to the DA Form 5988-E, including the details of the fault listed in the equipment’s TM. This documentation
begins the maintenance process toward resolution. Faults may be resolved at operator level (as listed in the
TM) or may require a mechanic to validate or troubleshoot and order parts. Upon receipt of required parts,
operators assist the maintenance team as they install the parts and return equipment to fully mission capable
status.
Supply discipline must be a daily part of every unit’s activities. The command supply
discipline program is a commander’s program to ensure compliance with Army supply
policies and procedures. Commanders and supervisors at all levels are responsible for
establishing and fostering a viable command supply discipline program, also called
CSDP, within their respective units, activities, or organizations.
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY
C-1. Platoon leaders are directly responsible for supervisory, direct, and personal responsibility. Platoon
leaders may be assigned as investigating officers for financial liability investigations of property loss also
called a FLIPL. For more information, see AR 735-5 and AR 15-6.
COMMAND
C-2. The commander’s obligation is to ensure all government property within the command is properly used
and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping of government property are maintained. Command
responsibility is inherent in command and cannot be delegated.
SUPERVISORY
C-3. The supervisor’s obligation is to ensure all government property issued to, or used by subordinates, is
properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping of the property are provided. It is
inherent in all supervisory positions and is not contingent upon signed receipts or responsibility statements;
it arises because of assignment to a specific position.
DIRECT
C-4. The obligation of an individual is to ensure all government property is properly used and cared for, and
that proper custody and safekeeping are provided. Direct responsibility results from assignment as an
accountable officer, receipt of formal written delegation, or acceptance of the property on hand receipt from
an accountable officer.
CUSTODIAL
C-5. The obligation of an individual for property in storage awaiting issue or turn-in, to exercise reasonable
and prudent actions to properly care for and ensure proper custody and safekeeping of the property are
provided. Custodial responsibility results from the assignment as a supply sergeant, supply custodian, supply
clerk, or warehouse person, and is rated by and answerable directly to the accountable officer or the individual
having direct responsibility for the property.
PERSONAL
C-6. The obligation of a person to exercise reasonable and prudent actions to properly use, care for, and
safeguard all government property in his or her physical possession. It applies to all government property
issued for, acquired, or converted to a person’s exclusive use, with or without receipt.
INVENTORIES
C-7. The unit commander is the primary hand receipt holder. The commander can designate the platoon
leader as a sub-hand receipt holder. Platoon leaders are responsible to conduct internal platoon inventories
of assigned equipment and participate in the commander’s change of command inventories, cyclic monthly
inventories, and sensitive items inventories.
C-8. Additionally, the platoon leader is responsible to further sub-hand receipt assigned equipment to the
user level. The following diagram illustrates these responsibilities (see figure C-1).
Cyclic Inventories
C-12. An annual 100% inventory of all unit property must be completed down to component level. The BN
S4 designates the 10% method, which identifies certain line item numbers for inventory conducted monthly.
The commander, working with the supply sergeant, will create a monthly inventory schedule at unit level,
distribute to primary hand receipt holders, and conduct the inventories. All hand receipt holders will inventory
equipment for accountability and serviceability and reconcile all discrepancies as needed.
CONDUCTING INVENTORIES
C-13. Before inventories:
Verify equipment authorization utilizing MTOE, common table of allowances, and local
authorization.
Prepare a detailed schedule that outlines date; people; equipment; and time allocated for each piece
of equipment to be inventoried. This schedule must include make-up dates based on the unit
mission.
Coordinate with the supply NCO to review each item publication, latest updates, TMs, supply
catalog, and safety messages.
Obtain a copy of historical documents such as the last change of command inventory or cyclic
inventory and shortage annex validated by the company commander or PBO when applicable.
Conduct pre-inventory rehearsal, laying items in an organized format. Put like items together or
by the numbers layout utilizing component list or set kits, and outfits. At a minimum, identify all
equipment is present and ready for layout. If equipment is unavailable due to service, compile all
applicable documents and schedule a visit to the service locations.
Verify that all equipment is on hand receipt or sub-hand receipt to the user level.
C-14. During the inventories:
Identify a clean and secure area, away from personnel or vehicle traffic.
Lay/display the equipment ahead of schedule time and conduct final checks and inspections.
Conduct physical inventories by serial number with the latest hand receipt provided with sub-hand
receipt holders present.
Check for serviceability of equipment.
Utilize the latest publications, list all components of end item, component lists, and additional
authorization list to conduct the physical inventory. Previously identified missing components
must be on a valid requisition.
Upon completion of the physical inventories, allow time for Soldiers to lock and store equipment
in its secure locations.
C-15. After the inventories:
Consolidate all discrepancies found. Check serial number and record any changes required on
assigned equipment. Report discrepancies to the company supply sergeant, executive officer, and
commander as they are identified.
If excess equipment is identified, be prepared for redistribution or turn-in through supply channels
as directed by the commander.
If shortages of major end items, non-expandable components or durable equipment are identified,
consolidate the information and report the discrepancies to the company supply sergeant,
executive officer and commander. An inquiry will be initiated to determine responsibility
surrounding those shortages found utilizing the adjustment methods outlined in AR 735-5, such
as statement of charges, cash collection vouchers, or financial liability investigations of property
loss.
Maintain the adjustment documents with each hand receipt.
C-16. Expendable consumable items are not accounted for on hand receipts.
C-17. Expendable non-consumable items must be on hand or on order.
C-18. Accounting requirement codes (ARC):
N = Non expendable
D = Durable
X = Expendable
C-19. Shortages with accounting requirement codes N and D require a valid property adjustment document.
For more information on conducting inventories, reference Army Publishing Directorate or Logistics
Information Warehouse.
Receipt/Annex Number) or system generated DA Form 2062-E (Hand Receipt/Annex Number). All hand
receipts will be signed, dated, and updated every month, to include the oldest change document affecting that
hand receipt. All supervisors will further sub hand receipt this equipment down to user levels. The following
illustration provides sample primary and sub-hand receipts. See figure C-2 on page C-4 and C-3 on pages C-
4 and C-5.
Shortage Annexes
C-21. Identify component shortages to the end-item. The PBO may grant authority to the company
commander to approve all expendable and durable shortages. If so, the commander is authorized to validate
expendable/durable shortages. The PBO retains the authority on all non-expendable components. Therefore,
all non-expendable shortages must be validated by the PBO.
“Sexual assault and sexual harassment violate everything we stand for as Soldiers. It
is our responsibility as One Army to take care of one another and not tolerate these
violations.”
– Gen. James C. McConville, Chief of Staff United States Army
LEADERS
D-1. Leaders at all levels, specifically our Army junior leaders, must be visible and adaptable and display a
sincere commitment in the fight against sexual harassment and sexual assault. Junior leaders must champion
and model this effort by remaining fully engaged and owning this issue with the same commitment they have
towards their duties and other responsibilities.
D-2. The Army profession demands leaders of high competence and strong character who foster a command
climate that encourages dignity and respect by responding appropriately to incidents when they occur. Junior
leaders need to provide a safe and trusting environment that will prevent sexual offenses from occurring and
encourage reporting without fear of retaliation.
D-3. One of the Army’s highest priorities is readiness, which depends on an environment that is inclusive,
supportive, and free of misconduct. Sexual harassment and sexual assault directly undermine unit readiness
and deter from preparedness. The Army is committed to equipping junior leaders with the right tools and
knowledge to build successful command climates by setting the tone for social and duty relationships and
modeling behaviors of respect and dignity.
D-4. For more information on SHARP visit the Army Resilience Directorate website.
SPC Smith reports to the SARC/VA that Soldiers are discussing rumors about his case
and are posting favorable comments for his section sergeant on Facebook. He feels
he is experiencing retaliation because he reported a sexual assault.
REPORTING
D-5. There are two ways of reporting sexual harassment/assault, restricted and unrestricted. If a victim
confides in a family member, friend, or roommate it does not prevent them from filing a restricted or
unrestricted report. If a victim confides in the platoon leader, unit commander, chain of command of
Department of Defense (DOD) law enforcement, then a restricted report cannot be filed.
RESTRICTED REPORTING
D-6. The benefits of restricted reporting is the victim has access to medical, legal, and counseling services,
control the release of personal information, and can change to a unrestricted report at any time. The
limitations of restricted reporting is the alleged offender will not be held accountable, no command support,
and cannot receive a protective order.
UNRESTRICTED REPORTING
D-7. The benefits of unrestricted reporting is the victim has access to medical, legal, and counseling
services, alleged offender may be held accountable, command support, and can receive a protective order.
The limitations of unrestricted report is more people will know about the sexual assault, investigation may
be intrusive and difficult, and cannot change to a restricted report.
PREVENTION
D-8. Prevention aims to stop incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault before they occur. Prevention
requires a comprehensive approach involving a range of activities. Everyone plays a part at the individual,
peer group, unit, and Army community levels. Prevention protects the force and supports implementation of
the Army People Strategy, which describes how we Acquire, Develop, Employ, and Retain Talent.
D-9. The Army’s prevention activities are supported by a system that includes:
Leaders at all levels building cohesive teams and maintaining professional unit climates.
Army SHARP professionals helping leaders to plan, implement, and assess prevention activities.
Collaborative relationships that share innovative prevention methods and help to integrate efforts.
Prevention information and knowledge flow that enhances understanding and decision-making.
For more information on prevention visit the United States Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response website.
DEPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES
E-1. Four principles apply to the broad range of activities encompassing deployment—
Precision applies to every activity and piece of data. Its effect is far-reaching, and the payoff is
speed. For example, precise unit deployment lists ensures that correct lift assets are assigned
against the requirement. Precision includes accurate weights, dimensions, and quantities. This
degree of precision eases loading requirements and improves departure speed and safety. Precision
allows units to meet the CCDR’s timeline and supports the concept of employment.
Synchronization. Deployment activities must be synchronized to successfully close the force.
Effective synchronization of scarce lift assets and other resources maximizes their use.
Synchronization normally requires explicit coordination among the deploying units and staffs,
supporting units and staffs, a variety of civilian agencies, and other Services. Realistic exercises
and demanding training are paramount to successful synchronization.
Knowledge. One of the more critical pieces at this stage of deployment is the knowledge upon
which decisions are made. There is a short period of time during which the deploying commander
must make crucial decisions on employment. These decisions set the tone for the remainder of the
deployment. Many decisions are very hard to change and have significant adverse impacts if
changed; others are irrevocable.
Speed is more than a miles per hour metric. The proper focus is on the velocity of the entire force
projection process, from planning to force closure. Critical elements of speed associated with force
projection include agile (state-of-the-art) ports, submission of accurate information, safe and
efficient loading, trained unit movement personnel at all levels, timely arrival of throughput
enablers, maintaining unit integrity, delivering capability rather than entire units, and force
tracking information.
MOVEMENT PLANNING
E-2. To meet contingency support requirements, units develop movement plans and SOPs. An effective
movement plan contains sufficient detail to prepare units to execute strategic deployments while the SOP
outlines functions that should occur upon notification of a unit movement. In addition to movement plans
and SOPs, units maintain movement binders containing movement information and instructions.
E-5. The USTRANSCOM’s component commands schedule lift against the unit line number to meet the
earliest arrival date - latest arrival date window. Army Materiel Command publishes airflow schedules to call
forward personnel and equipment to the aerial port of embarkation, often referred to as the APOE. These
schedules are in global command and control system, often referred to as GCCS. The call forward schedules
are movement directives that specify when units must have their equipment at the port of embarkation (POE)
to meet the available-to-load dates. Based on these schedules, deploying units and their respective commands
backward plan movements to the POE to meet the available-to-load dates. Movement directives (if published)
provide windows by mode for cargo arrival at the POE.
TRAINING
E-6. Individual and unit deployment training are essential in developing the skills required to rapidly project
combat power.
DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
E-7. Units with deployment missions are required to have an appropriate number of personnel trained to
perform special deployment duties. These duties include unit movement officer, unit loading teams,
hazardous cargo certifying officials, and air load planners. Some commands and installations maintain a local
capability to provide deployment training to ensure the supported units have ready access to the required
training.
LOADING TEAMS
E-9. Units must have personnel trained in vehicle preparation and aircraft and rail loading/unloading
techniques. The type and quantity of equipment to be loaded and the time available for loading determines
the composition of the team. Training is arranged through the installation unit movement coordinator and
once completed the load teams are put on unit orders.
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
E-12. Companies and battalions train to meet unit and individual training requirements for deployment
operations. Deployments can occur at any time leaving the deploying unit with little or no time to correct
training deficiencies. The objective of collective deployment training is to implant the knowledge, skills,
attitudes, and abilities so it becomes a reflex activity executed with precision. Units must identify deployment
as a mission essential task, annotate it on their METL and gain and maintain proficiency. Many Army training
programs offer the opportunity to include deployment training in major training events.
E-13. Units with deployment missions normally participate in periodic Emergency Deployment Readiness
Exercise/Sealift Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises also known as EDREs and SEDRE. These
events are designed to exercise unit or command movement plans for overseas deployment. Emergency
Deployment Readiness Exercise/Sealift Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises may involve the unit
moving to POEs and loading unit equipment on strategic sealift/airlift assets. Major commands, installation,
and brigade level commands normally have SOPs and/or deployment regulations and policies establishing
subordinate unit required activities in an hourly deployment sequence. These documents guide unit activities
during Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise/Sealift Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises.
E-14. Deployment training begins in the train/ready phase and ideally culminates in a meaningful
deployment exercise that challenges all facets of unit deployment in a realistic venue. A well planned
deployment exercise includes a process to assess the performance of the Soldiers, units, and support agencies.
For the assessment to be effective it must identify the areas needing attention in terms of additional training,
revision to a SOP, or coordination with one of the support agencies.
DUTIES
E-18. The UMO is the commander’s appointed representative and attends to the details of getting the unit
ready for movement. This appendix outlines the responsibilities of the UMO and provides the references for
them. Commanders appoint, in writing, an officer or NCO (E6 or above) as a UMO and an alternate (E5 or
above). The designated persons will attend an approved school.
E-19. The UMO must focus on thorough planning, coordination, training, and execution of unit deployment.
Specific responsibilities of the UMO include—
Preparing and maintaining documentation for unit movement in TC-AIMS II. This includes
maintaining the unit movement data, from which the operational equipment list (OEL) is
generated, and creating and processing the unit deployment list.
Preparing the unit movement plan.
Planning convoy movements.
Requesting commercial and military transportation.
Coordinating with higher headquarters and support activities for unit movements.
Coordinating logistical support for the move.
Coordinating with the arrival/departure airfield control group, also known as A/DACG, and the
contingency response element, also known as CRE, at the APOE and aerial port of debarkation,
often referred to as the APOD.
Coordinating with Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, also known as the
SDDC, representatives at the seaport of embarkation, also known as the SPOE and seaport port of
debarkation, also known as the SPOD.
Transporting of the units’ organic equipment and cargo.
Establishing and training unit loading teams.
Obtaining 463L pallets, containers; and blocking, bracing, packaging, crating, and tie down
(BBPCT) materials.
Ensuring all cargo is properly labeled with military shipping labels and RF tags when directed.
Ensuring unit personnel are authorized to certify HAZMAT.
Ensuring a DD Form 1750 (Packing List) is prepared for containers.
Maintaining movement binders or continuity books that include appointment orders, training
certificates, recall rosters, OEL, transportation requests, and BBPCT requirements.
E-20. The UMO will maintain a deployment binder for reference and continuity. The following is a list of
recommended contents—
Unit movement SOP.
Appointment orders and training certificates for UMOs, load teams, and HAZMAT certifiers.
Recall rosters and instructions.
Coordination requirements for plan execution and a list of supporting agencies and POCs.
Major equipment shortage list.
Supply list by supply support activity, coordination requirements, and prepared requisitions.
List of BBPCT on hand and due out.
OEL.
Copies of DD Form 1750, the packing lists.
Prepared copies of transportation requests, convoy movement requests, and special hauling
permits.
Strip maps for convoy routes.
Advance party composition and instructions.
Sample forms required for personnel support during deployment.
Transportation requirements.
Rear detachment and family support group operations plans.
Unit-generated checklists or SOPs to assist in deployment planning and execution.
Off-duty hours contact telephone numbers for deployment support organizations.
DEVELOPING A PLAN
E-21. The following paragraphs describe a recommended step-by-step process for developing a unit
movement plan:
Step 1 - Identify what needs to be moved. Based upon METT-TC and command guidance,
deployment planning must reflect personnel, equipment, supplies, and how the unit will
accomplish the move. For planning purposes, units plan to deploy with assigned personnel and
on-hand equipment. Upon execution, the plan may need to be modified if additional personnel are
assigned or equipment cross-leveled to bring the unit to the required readiness level. Units should
plan to move their basic load of supplies to sustain their operations upon arrival in the theater. The
quantities to be deployed are normally defined in OPLANs, unit or Army Command SOPs, or
ASCC instructions. The UMO must have a detailed listing of each piece of equipment to be
deployed based on the authorized unit equipment list, often referred to as AUEL. All outsize,
oversize, overweight, or hazardous equipment/cargo must be identified, as it will require special
considerations.
Step 2 - Identify equipment to accompany troops. Yellow to accompany troops, often referred to
as TAT, equipment must accompany troops and be accessible enroute. Examples include class I
basic load items, individual carry-on baggage, and weapons. For personnel traveling via
commercial air, this is generally only the baggage that will fit under the seat. Red to accompany
troop items must be available at the destination before or upon unit arrival. This equipment may
be sensitive cargo that requires special security or handling at the POE or port of debarkation. Red
to accompany troops items must be unitized/palletized and reported on the AUEL/deployment
equipment list. Not-to-accompany-troops equipment is normally shipped by surface and consists
of all other equipment required by the unit to perform its mission.
Step 3 - Identify what needs to move by air. This could include personnel, advance parties,
baggage, and some equipment. The balance of equipment normally moves by sea. For
deployments supporting combatant commander OPLANs/OPORDs, the time-phased force and
deployment data, also known as the TPFDD, will designate the strategic movement mode.
Step 4 - Identify hazardous (also sensitive and classified cargo) for packaging, labeling,
segregation, and placarding for movement. 49 CFR, Transportation, provides guidance on the
packaging, labeling, placarding, and movement of hazardous materials.
Step 5 – Identify bulk cargo that needs to be moved and develop packing lists. All consolidated
cargo (boxed, crated, etc.) loaded in vehicles, containers, and on 463L pallets must display a
separate packing list, DD Form 1750 that shows all contents. Packing lists are not required for
items that do not need identification, such as empty vehicles, nested cans, or bundled shovels,
however, they must be listed on the load diagram if loaded in a truck or container.
Step 6 - Develop vehicle load plans for unit equipment. Equipment that cannot be loaded on
organic vehicles should be planned for movement by other means (container, commercial rail or
highway, or military assets). Vehicle load plans are recorded on DD Form 1750 for organic
vehicles and trailers carrying secondary loads. The installation transportation officer, also known
as the ITO, is responsible for obtaining commercial transportation to move equipment to POE that
is beyond the unit’s organic capability. Unit cargo (vehicles and equipment) is prepared for
shipment according to the mode of transportation. Depending on the strategic lift full reduction
may or may not be required. Reduction details are normally in the Military Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command port call message or the operations order for sealift. For deployment
by air, reduction is determined by type of aircraft. Vehicle modifications (that is, shelters, bumper
modifications, and so forth) made by the unit which change the vehicle
configuration/dimensions/weight normally must be approved by the unit’s Army
Command/ASCC and ultimately by Transportation Engineering Agency. Vehicle modifications
must be reflected on the authorized unit equipment list and deployment equipment list.
Information on dimensions, weights, and cubes for all Army equipment is in CD-ROM and World
Wide Web versions of TB 55-46-1. The hard copy version only contains major end items.
Step 7 - Identify BBPCT requirements. All crates, containers, boxes, barrels, and loose equipment
on a vehicle must be blocked, braced, and tied-down to prevent shifting during transit. The POC
for blocking and bracing requirements is normally the UMC.
Step 8 - Translate what needs to be moved into transportation terms. Personnel and equipment
data are translated into transportation terminology as UMD and recorded on the OEL. Upon
deployment execution, units use TC-AIMS II to update the OEL and create the deployment
equipment list. The UMC provides assistance to deploying units for OEL updates and deployment
equipment list development.
Step 9 - Determine how the personnel and equipment will move to the POEs. In the continental
United States (CONUS) wheeled vehicles and tracked vehicles move via commercial rail, truck,
or barge. Unit personnel usually move to the POE by military or commercial buses. Army rotary
wing aircraft normally self-deploy to the POE, where they will be disassembled for shipment.
Step 10 - Prepare the unit deployment plan. The administrative, logistical and coordination
requirements for the plan must be determined. Items such as enroute medical, messing, and
maintenance for movement to POEs must be coordinated and documented.
Step 11 - Maintain the plan. Update the OEL as changes occur in the OPLAN, equipment,
commander’s intent, and mission execution. The OEL is used to produce the unit’s equipment
manifest and MSLs and errors can result in the equipment being lost while in transit.
Platoon leaders need access to a great deal of information to assist them in leading their
platoon. In this appendix platoon leaders will find links for various topics in order to
help them develop knowledge to lead their Soldiers and run their platoon.
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
F-1. The following links will help platoon leaders with their individual training and development. All
websites listed were accessed on 22 June 2021.
Army Career Tracker: https://actnow.army.mil/.
Army e-Learning: https://www.pdmatis.army.mil/e-Learning_Catalog.pdf.
Army Learning Management System: https://www.lms.army.mil/Saba/Web/ALMS.
Army Logistics University: http://www.alu.army.mil/.
Army Combat Fitness Test: https://www.army.mil/acft/.
Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS): https://www.atrrs.army.mil/.
CASCOM Learning Beyond the Classroom YouTube Channel:
https://www.youtube.com/user/SCoEMobile.
Center for the Army Profession and Leadership Army Ethic Development Course:
https://capl.army.mil/army-ethic-development-course/.
Civilian Human Resources Training Application System:
https://www.atrrs.army.mil/channels/chrtas/.
Property accountability resource page: https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/ind-property.html.
Credentialing Opportunities Online (COOL): https://www.cool.osd.mil/army/.
Defense Travel Management Office Travel Explorer (TraX) Defense Travel System (DTS)
Training Site: https://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/neoaccess/login.php#.
DoD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide: https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm.
Drivers Training Toolbox: https://safety.army.mil/ON-DUTY/DriversTrainingToolbox.aspx.
eOrdnance University:
https://ordnance.ellc.learn.army.mil/webapps/portal/execute/tabs/tabAction?tab_tab_group_id=_
13_1.
Federally Mandated Training: http://www.opm.gov/wiki/training/Federally-Mandated-
Training/Print.aspx.
GCSS-Army Training: https://www.gcss.army.mil/Training/Default.
Army Ignited (replaced Go Army Ed): https://www.armyignited.com/app/.
Information Assurance Training (Cyber Awareness Challenge): https://cs.signal.army.mil/.
Initial Military Training Leadership School:
http://usacimt.tradoc.army.mil/ltb/IMTLS/index.html.
Logistics Planning and Estimation Tools:
https://cac.cascom.army.mil/cdi/fdd/multi/pdb/estimationtools.htm.
Joint Knowledge Online: https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/page/login/Login.jsf.
The Lavern E. Weber Professional Education Center (PEC): http://www.pec.ng.mil/.
MOBCOP:
https://mobcop.aoc.army.pentagon.mil/MOBCOPPortal/UI/Login.aspx?name=Eq1hZxW6pLlK9
tLO1UGbHw%3d%3d&rtu=lfsethkrorzdsayysmpsvcvkiimgopdcfga.
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
F-2. Use these links along with the guidance written in Appendix A for collective training.
Central Army Registry (CAR): https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard.
Center for Army Lessons Learned: https://call2.army.mil/.
Command Post Exercise-Functional: https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/#CPX-loc.
Defense Support to Civil Authorities: DSCA Course Instruction (army.mil)
Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE): https://date.army.gov.au/.
Joint Lessons Learned Information System: https://www.jllis.mil/.
Joint Training Information Management System: https://jtims.jten.mil/jtims/welcome.do.
Logistics Exercise & Simulation Directorate: https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cact/nsc/lesd.
MilGaming: https://milgaming.army.mil/.
Mission Command Training Program (MCTP): https://cacmdc.army.mil/cact/MCTP/.
National Guard Operations and Training Directorate:
https://gko.portal.ng.mil/arng/G3/SitePages/Home.aspx.
Standards in Training Commission (STRAC):
https://www.atsc.army.mil/tcmlive/strac/stracweb.asp.
Unit Training Assistance Program (UTAP): https://utap.army.mil/home.aspx.
Army Sustainment Resource Portal: https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/.
Sustainment Force Structure: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-869311.
TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Center: https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/operational-
environment-center/.
TRAINING CENTERS
F-4. The training centers are a wealth of knowledge and lessons learned.
Army Reserves Readiness Training Center: http://www.usar.army.mil/83rd-USARRTC/.
Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center (CAJMTC):
http://www.atterburymuscatatuck.in.ng.mil/Home.aspx.
Camp Grayling Joint Maneuver Training Center (CGJMTC):
http://www.minationalguard.com/grayling_subdomain/index/.
Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center (CSJFTC):
https://ms.ng.mil/installations/shelby/Pages/default.aspx.
Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC): https://www.7atc.army.mil/JMRC/.
Joint Multinational Simulations Center (JMSC): https://www.7atc.army.mil/JMSC/.
Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC): https://www.7atc.army.mil/.
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC): https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/jrtc-operations-
group/overview.
Mission Command Training Program (MCTP): https://cacmdc.army.mil/cact/MCTP/.
Mission Training Complex Dodge:
https://gko.portal.ng.mil/arng/G3/TR/MTC_Dodge/SitePages/Home.aspx.
National Training Center (NTC): https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/ntc-operations-group.
National Guard Sustainment Training Center: https://www.stcia.com/.
Volk Field Combat Readiness Training Center
(VFCRTC):https://www.volkfield.ang.af.mil/units/.
LEGAL SUPPORT
F-13. For legal support related questions and professional development.
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): https://www.ecfr.gov/.
Commander’s Legal Handbook:
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/jagc.nsf/0/EE26CE7A9678A67A85257E1300563559/$File/
CommandersLegalHandbook.pdf.
Ethics Guidance by Subject:
https://ogc.altess.army.mil/EandF/Documentation/ethics_material.aspx.
Judge Advocate General Corps (JAGCNet): https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/.
JAG School: https://tjaglcs.army.mil/school.
JAG University:
https://jagu.army.mil/webapps/portal/execute/tabs/tabAction?tab_tab_group_id=_22_1.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
F-14. For religious support related questions and professional development.
Chaplain Corps website: https://www.army.mil/chaplaincorps/.
Strong Bonds Program: https://www.strongbonds.org/.
U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School: https://usachcs.tradoc.army.mil/.
MUSIC SUPPORT
F-15. For music support related questions and professional development.
U.S. Army Band “Pershing’s Own” Site: http://www.usarmyband.com/.
U.S. Army Band Information Site: https://www.bands.army.mil/.
U.S. Army Field Band Site: http://www.armyfieldband.com/.
REFERENCES
F-16. Listed below are various useful resources.
MilSuite: https://www.milsuite.mil/.
NATO E-Library: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/publications.htm.
Official DoD Plain Language Website: https://www.esd.whs.mil/dd/plainlanguage/.
OPLOG Planner: https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/. In commonly referenced sustainment resources
section. Click OPLOG Planner to request via email.
Other Planning Tools: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/sustainnet/logistics-
planning-tools/other-tools.
This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it
lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number. All websites accessed
21 June 2021.
4-1 Swinton, Ernest Dunlop. The Defence of Duffer’s Drift. National Capital Press, INC., Washington
D.C. 1916.
A-1 “A PL’s and PSG’s primary job…”: CALL Handbook 18-24, The First 100 Days of Platoon
Leadership, May 2018.
D-1 “Sexual assault and sexual harassment…”: General James C. McConville. 40th CSA. Available at
https://www.armyresilience.army.mil/sharp/index.html.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. January 2021.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 09 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 10 November 2020.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine
JP 3-26. Joint Combating Terrorism. 30 July 2020.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
ADP 7-0. Training. 31 July 2019.
AR 15-6. Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers. 1 April 2016.
AR 25-50. Preparing and Managing Correspondence. 10 October 2020.
AR 350-1. Army Training and Leader Development.10 December 2017.
AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. 24 July 2020.
AR 600-55. The Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program (Selection, Training, Testing,
and Licensing). 17 September 2019.
AR 710-2. Supply Policy Below the National Level. 28 March 2008.
AR 735-5. Property Accountability Policies. 9 November 2016.
AR 750-1. Army Materiel Maintenance Policy. 28 October 2019.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 1 March 2019.
ATP 4-33. Maintenance Operations. 9 July 2019.
ATP 4-35. Munitions Operations and Distribution Techniques. 5 September 2014.
ATP 4-41. Army Field Feeding and Class I Operations. 31 December 2015.
ATP 4-42. Materiel Management, Supply, and Field Services Operations. 2 November 2020.
ATP 4-43. Petroleum Supply Operations. 6 August 2015.
ATP 4-44. Water Support Operations. 2 October 2015.
ATP 4-46. Contingency Fatality Operations. 17 December 2014.
ATP 4-48. Aerial Delivery. 21 December 2016.
ATP 4-90. Brigade Support Battalion. 18 June 2020.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 18-24. The First 100 Days of Platoon Leadership. May
2018. Found at https://usacac.army.mil/node/2046.
Swinton, Ernest Dunlop. The Defence of Duffer’s Drift. National Capital Press, INC., Washington D.C.
1916.
The Sustainment Force Structure Book. September 2020. Found at https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/.
Training Management at the Company Level, Individual Critical Task List. August 2018. Found at
https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/0F0AA95C-8EC3-4A87-8256-
7DD43779C4B6-1535398780723/report.pdf.
10 USC 934. General Article. (Article 134. UCMJ). https://uscode.house.gov/.
49 CFR. Transportation. https://www.ecfr.gov/.
WEBSITES
23rd Quartermaster Brigade (AIT) at https://www.quartermaster.army.mil/23rdbde/23rd_brigade.html.
369th AG Battalion (AIT) at http://www.ssi.army.mil/369/index.htm.
59th Ordnance Brigade (AIT) at https://www.goordnance.army.mil/59th/59th.html.
Adjutant General (AG) School at http://www.ags.army.mil/.
Aerial Delivery & Field Services Department at
http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/adfsd/adfsd_main.html.
AG Tube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCzDR7Qehue6eP6AEgmkNO3A.
AMEDD Lessons Learned at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/amedd-lessons-learned.
AMEDD Virtual Library at https://medlinet.amedd.army.mil/.
Ammunition Community of Practice at https://www.dau.edu/cop/ammo/Pages/Default.aspx.
Army Career Tracker at https://actnow.army.mil/.
Army Casualty Estimate at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-92117.
Army Combat Fitness Test at https://www.army.mil/acft/.
Army e-Learning at https://www.pdmatis.army.mil/e-Learning_Catalog.pdf.
Army Force Management School Digital Library (Includes How the Army Runs) at
https://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/digitallibrary.html.
Army Geospatial Center at http://www.agc.army.mil/.
Army Ignited (replaced Go Army Ed) at https://www.armyignited.com/app/.
Army Knowledge Management at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/kmnet.
MilSuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/.
Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) at https://cacmdc.army.mil/cact/MCTP/.
Mission Training Complex Dodge at
https://gko.portal.ng.mil/arng/G3/TR/MTC_Dodge/SitePages/Home.aspx.
MOBCOP at
https://mobcop.aoc.army.pentagon.mil/MOBCOPPortal/UI/Login.aspx?name=Eq1hZxW6pLl
K9tLO1UGbHw%3d%3d&rtu=lfsethkrorzdsayysmpsvcvkiimgopdcfga.
Munitions and Explosives Safety at https://www.dau.edu/cop/ammo/Pages/Default.aspx.
National Guard Operations and Training Directorate at
https://gko.portal.ng.mil/arng/G3/SitePages/Home.aspx.
National Guard Sustainment Training Center at https://www.stcia.com/.
National Training Center (NTC) at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/ntc-operations-group.
NATO E-Library at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/publications.htm.
OCS Connect at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ocs/SitePages/Home.aspx.
OCS Information Portal at https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/ocs.html.
Official DoD Plain Language Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/dd/plainlanguage/.
OPLOG Planner at https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/. In commonly referenced sustainment resources
section. Click OPLOG Planner to request via email
Ordnance Crucible at http://www.goordnance.army.mil/OD_Crucible/index.html.
Ordnance Training Sites by State at http://www.goordnance.army.mil/UnitLocations.html.
Other Planning Tools at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/sustainnet/logistics-
planning-tools/other-tools.
Petroleum and Water Department at http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/pwd/pwd_main.html.
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) at http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat.
Pregnancy/Post-partum Physical Training (P3T) at
https://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/healthyliving/al/Pages/PregnancyPostPartum.aspx.
Property accountability resource page at https://cascom.army.mil/asrp/ind-property.html.
Protection Net at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/protectionnet.
QMS Logistics Training Department at http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/ltd/ltd_main.html.
Quartermaster Training Sites by State at
http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/rcao/rcao_locations_map.html.
Quartermaster-Logistics Training Department at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/quartermaster-
logistics-training-department.
Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) at
https://www.rmda.army.mil/RMDA/RMDA.html.
S1 NET at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/s1net.
S3 / XO Net at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/s3-xo-net.
S6 Community of Purpose at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/s6-community-of-purpose.
S6 Net at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/signallink/s6_net.
SASMO Share milBook at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/sasmo.
Simulation Operations Net at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/joinapf/join-son.
Soldier Support Institute at http://www.ssi.army.mil/.
Soldier Support Institute Learning Resource Center at https://ssilrc.army.mil/.
Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) at https://www.atsc.army.mil/tcmlive/strac/stracweb.asp.
Strong Bonds Program at https://www.strongbonds.org/.
Sustain Net at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/sustainnet.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD)
website at https://armypubs.army.mil. DD forms are available on the Executive Services
Directorate website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/forms/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2062. Hand Receipt/Annex Number.
DA Form 2062-E. Hand Receipt/Annex Number. (available through the unit GCSS-Army)
DA Form 5982-E.Dispatch Control Log. (available through the unit GCSS-Army)
DA Form 5987-E. Motor Equipment Dispatch. (available through the unit GCSS-Army)
DA Form 5988-E. Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet. (available through the unit
GCSS-Army)
DD Form 1750. Packing List.
D E M
deployment principles, E-1 8-Step training model, A-21 mission command principles, 1-41
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2130100
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. Distributed in
electronic media only (EMO).
PIN: 211295-000