Theological Quodlibeta in

the Middle Ages

The Fourteenth Century

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 Brill’s Companions
to the
Christian Tradition
A series of handbooks and reference works
on the intellectual and religious life of Europe,
500–1700

VOLUME 7

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Theological Quodlibeta in
the Middle Ages

The Fourteenth Century

Edited by

Christopher Schabel

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2007

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Cover illustration: Detail from St Andrews, University Library B.763.D.7 (1815),
folio 1ra.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all rights holders to any copyrighted
material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful
the publisher welcomes communications from copyrights holders, so that the
appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other
permission matters.

A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 1871-6377
ISBN 978 90 04 16288 4

Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,

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The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910,
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Fees are subject to change.

printed in the netherlands

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 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ....................................................................... vii

Abbreviations .............................................................................. ix
List of Contributors .................................................................... xi

Introduction ................................................................................ 1

The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in

Quodlibeta ...................................................................................... 17
Martin Pickavé

The Quodlibeta of Peter of Auvergne .......................................... 81

Chris Schabel

John Duns Scotus’ Quodlibet ........................................................ 131

Timothy B. Noone and H. Francie Roberts

The Quodlibeta of John of Pouilly ............................................... 199

Ludwig Hödl

The Quodlibet of Thomas Wylton ............................................... 231

Cecilia Trifogli

The Quodlibet of Peter Auriol ..................................................... 267

Lauge Olaf Nielsen

Nicholas of Bar’s Collection ...................................................... 333

Sylvain Piron

Reections on Vat. lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia,

O.E.S.A. ...................................................................................... 345
William J. Courtenay

The Quodlibeta of the Canons Regular and the Monks ............. 359
Thomas Sullivan, OSB

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vi contents

Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330 .................. 401

Russell L. Friedman

Carmelite Quodlibeta .................................................................... 493

Chris Schabel

Augustinian Quodlibeta after Giles of Rome ............................... 545

Chris Schabel and William J. Courtenay

Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta after Scotus .......................... 569

William O. Duba

Oxford Quodlibeta from Ockham to Holcot ............................... 651

Rondo Keele

Postscript: The Demise of Quodlibetal Literature .................... 693

William J. Courtenay

Appendix. Natural Philosophy: An Analytic Index ................... 701

Richard Cross

Index of Main Treatments of Quodlibetal Authors ................. 759

Index Manuscriptorum ............................................................... 761
Index Nominum et Locorum ..................................................... 767

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Even more than was the case with volume I of this book, I was for-
tunate to be able to place much of the burden of volume II on the
shoulders of my closest friends and colleagues, who—unfortunately for
them—could not say “no,” or from whom I would not take “no” for
an answer. In many cases research on broad topics had to be started
from scratch, which goes some way to explaining why the volume has
taken over seven years to complete. On every occasion, however, this
fresh approach resulted in important new nds, so I do not regret the
sometimes extreme discomfort that I caused the contributors. I was
so nasty that, when superb chapters were turned in that took into
consideration everything I had originally requested, if time remained
I often said to them, “Excellent, but wouldn’t it be nice if you added
an appendix . . .” More than one author was pressured by my “advertis-
ing” his as yet unwritten chapter in the introduction to volume I (p. 9),
published only recently. I say “his,” because the only (besides Timothy
Noone’s collaborator Francie Roberts) female contributor to volume II,
Cecilia Trifogli, deserves a special sympathic thank-you and apology,
as do William Courtenay (“Postscript”) and Rondo Keele: they met the
original deadline and turned in their chapters several years ago. By the
time the book goes to press, Cecilia will have co-edited and co-analyzed
several more questions of the same quodlibet she covers for this book! In
the nal stages Brill’s reader went well above and beyond the call of
duty to point out shortcomings of every sort, make wise suggestions,
and provide much precious information that would otherwise have
remained unknown to the authors. The nal result is as I had hoped:
a book that I, personally, will be referring to for decades to come.
In keeping with the tradition established by the rst volume, where
an image from a “new” manuscript of the Quodlibeta of the leading
thirteenth-century theologian, Thomas Aquinas, graced the cover, this
volume’s cover displays a folio from a “new” manuscript of the Quodlibet
of the most important fourteenth-century theologian, John Duns Scotus,
this time from St Andrews University Library. I thank Tim Noone
and Michèle Mulchahey for their efforts to secure the image, and Dr
Norman H. Reid, Keeper of Manuscripts and Muniments, Head of

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viii acknowledgments

Special Collections, University of St Andrews Library, for the photo-

graph. Bill Duba and Olivier Ribordy kindly translated Ludwig Hödl’s
chapter from the German. Once again Julian Deahl and Marcella
Mulder at Brill put up with long delays and frequent e-mails—and my
gross underestimation of the size of this book—and Gera van Bedaf
never complained about the critical editions. My colleagues in the
Department of History and Archaeology at the University of Cyprus
have been very understanding, as always, allowing me a sabbatical leave
to complete the editing process. Most of my job was done while my
wife, a fashion designer, was working, and Alex, my daughter, was busy
with her own life, but Zeno, my son, sacriced time on the basketball
court, the beach, and the sledding slopes.

C.D.S.
Nicosia, Lent 2007

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 ABBREVIATIONS

AFH Archivum Franciscanum Historicum

AFP Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum
AHDLMA Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age
AL Aristoteles Latinus
BAV Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana
Bazàn et al., Les questions disputées = B.C. Bazàn, G. Fransen, J.W. Wippel,
and D. Jacquart, Les questions disputées et les questions quod-
libétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médicine
(Turnhout 1985)
BN(C) Biblioteca nazionale (centrale)
BnF Bibliothèque nationale de France
CUP H. Denie and E. Châtelain, eds., Chartularium Univer-
sitatis Parisiensis, 4 volumes (Paris 1889–1897)
DSTFM Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione losoca medievale
FZPT Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie
Glorieux I P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320,
volume I (Kain 1925)
Glorieux II P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320,
volume II (Paris 1935)
Glorieux, Répertoire I, II = P. Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de
Paris au XIIIe siècle, 2 volumes (Paris 1933–1934)
MPP Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum
RSPT Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques
RTAM Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale
RTPM Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales
Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions” = J.W. Wippel, “Quodlibetal Ques-
tions, Chiey in Theology Faculties,” in Bazàn et al.,
Les questions disputées, pp. 153–222

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 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

William J. Courtenay (Harvard University, 1967), C.H. Haskins

Professor of Medieval History and Hilldale Professor at the University
of Wisconsin, Madison, fellow of the Medieval Academy of America,
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Royal Historical
Society, specializes in later-medieval intellectual history. He has received
numerous awards and honors and serves on several boards. Among his
many publications are Adam Wodeham (1978), Covenant and Causality in
Medieval Thought (1984), Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England
(1987), Teaching Careers at the University of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Centuries (1988), Capacity and Volition. A History of the Distinction of Absolute
and Ordained Power (1990), Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century
(1999), and Rotuli Parisienses, 2 volumes (2002–03). With Heiko Oberman
he edited Gabriel Biel’s Canonis misse expositio, 4 volumes (1963–67)
and he has edited or co-edited ve collective volumes. Currently he is
completing a large study on the University of Paris in the fourteenth
century.
Richard Cross (University of Oxford, 1991), Professor of Medieval
Theology, University of Oxford, and Fellow of Oriel College, focuses
on later-medieval philosophy and theology, in particular on John Duns
Scotus, the history of the doctrine of the Trinity and of Christology, and
philosophy of religion. He is author of The Physics of Duns Scotus: The
Scientic Context of a Theological Vision (1998), Duns Scotus, in the “Great
Medieval Thinkers” series (1999), The Metaphysics of the Incarnation:
Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (2002), and Duns Scotus on God (2005).
William O. Duba (University of Iowa, 2006) is a researcher at the
Université de Fribourg, Switzerland, working on the critical edition of
Francis of Marchia’s commentary on book II of the Sentences, a project
headed by Tiziana Suarez-Nani. He has published numerous articles on
a broad range of topics in later-medieval intellectual and ecclesiastical
history, is webmaster of the Peter of Candia Homepage and a collaborator
on Quodlibase, and is currently writing a history of the debate over the
Beatic Vision, the subject of his dissertation.
Russell L. Friedman (University of Iowa, 1997) is Associate Professor
of Medieval Philosophy at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. His

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xii list of contributors

research and publications deal primarily with later-medieval philoso-

phy and theology, especially cognitive theory and trinitarian theology.
As co-editor, he has published ve volumes on medieval thought and
two volumes of the Diplomatarium Danicum. He is also contributing to
the critical editions of the Sentences commentaries of Peter Auriol and
Francis of Marchia, while preparing for publication Intellectual Traditions
in the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian
Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350 (Brill). He is on
the editorial board of Recherche de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales and is
webmaster of The Peter Auriol Homepage.
Rondo Keele (Indiana University, 2002), formerly at the American
University of Cairo, is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Louisiana
Scholars’ College. A specialist on Walter Chatton, he is responsible
for the corresponding Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry and, with
Girard Etzkorn, he is editing Chatton’s Quodlibet. He is also a contribu-
tor to the Peter of Candia Homepage.
Ludwig Hödl (Universität München, 1955) is Professor Emeritus of
Dogmatics and the History of Dogmas at the Faculty of Catholic
Theology in the Ruhr-Universität in Bochum, Germany. Over the past
half century he has authored scores of important articles and a number
of books on scholastic thought in the 12th to 14th centuries, starting
with Die Grundfragen der Sakramentenlehre nach Herveus Natalis O.P. (†1323)
(1956). He has also edited many texts in later-medieval philosophy and
theology, including volumes in the Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia series
of Leuven University Press.
Lauge O. Nielsen (Københavns Universitet, 1985) is Professor of
Church History at the University of Copenhagen. An expert on the
ecclesiastical and intellectual history of Europe from the 12th to the
18th century, he has published Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth
Century: a Study of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions
of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180 (Brill 1982),
co-edited—both with Russell L. Friedman—a special issue of Vivarium
devoted to Peter Auriol (Brill 2000) and The Medieval Heritage in Early
Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700 (2003), and critically
edited numerous medieval texts. He is currently co-editor in chief of
Peter Auriol’s Opera Theologica.
Timothy B. Noone (University of Toronto, 1988) is Ordinary Professor
of Medieval Philosophy and Director of the Center for Medieval and

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 list of contributors xiii

Byzantine Studies at the Catholic University of America, working in

particular on metaphysics and Franciscan thinkers, especially John
Duns Scotus. He is co-editor, with Jorge J.E. Gracia, of A Companion
to Philosophy in the Middle Ages (2003). Director of the Scotus Project,
he was co-editor of three volumes of the recently completed Opera
Philosophica of John Duns Scotus and he is currently working on Scotus’
Opera Theologica. He is also a professional harmonica player in a blues
and bluegrass band.
Martin Pickavé (Universität zu Köln, 2003) is Assistant Professor
of Philosophy and Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto.
His research interests include medieval metaphysics and philosophy
of mind and especially the philosophy of Henry of Ghent. He is the
author of several articles and recently published Heinrich von Gent über
Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem
letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Brill 2007). He has also co-edited three
volumes of the series Miscellanea Mediaevalia and one on the writings of
Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis.
Sylvain Piron (Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1999),
who also contributed to the rst volume of this book, is maître de
conférences at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris.
He specializes in the thought of the Franciscan theologian Peter John
Olivi and his circle, although he works on a broad range of topics in
later medieval history. As author, editor, or translator, he is responsible
for a half dozen books, and he is webmaster of Quodlibase.
H. Francie Roberts is currently a doctoral student in philosophy at the
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, where she is researching the philosophi-
cal and theological background of late-medieval doctrines of mental
language. She holds an MA in Medieval Studies from the Catholic
University of America (2006) and another in Christian Thought from
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in Deereld, Illinois (2003).
Thomas Sullivan (University of Wisconsin, 1982) is a professed
Benedictine monk of Conception Abbey in Conception, Missouri, and
serves as Professor of History and Humanities at Conception Seminary
College. He has published Benedictine Monks at the University of Paris, A.D.
1229–1500: a Biographical Register (Brill 1995) and the rst volume of
Parisian Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373–1500: A Biographical Register.
Volume I: The Religious Orders (Brill 2004).

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xiv list of contributors

Cecilia Trifogli (Università Statale di Milano, 2001) is Lecturer in

Medieval Philosophy, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls
College. She focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s philosophy in the
Middle Ages and on medieval natural philosophy, metaphysics, and
epistemology. Besides many critical editions in articles, she has authored
Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 1250 –1270): Motion, Innity,
Place, and Time (Brill 2000), accompanied by a CD-rom of editions and
a two-volume analytical repertory of questions, the rst of which has
already appeared: Liber tertius Physicorum Aristotelis: repertorio delle questioni:
commenti inglesi, ca. 1250–1270 (2004).

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 INTRODUCTION

By the last decade of the thirteenth century, the practice of holding

quodlibetal disputations in the Faculty of Theology of the University
of Paris and at various mendicant studia elsewhere was well established.
Each academic year at Paris, during the Advent and Lent periods pre-
ceding Christmas and Easter respectively, the University continued to
suspend classes in theology and to hold more open sessions in which
audience members asked the masters and their bachelors to debate ques-
tions on any topic they wished, de quolibet. As this volume demonstrates,
by the 1290s not only were masters of theology from the secular clergy
holding such quodlibetal sessions, but so were masters from four orders
or houses of canons regular (Saint-Victor, Mont-Saint-Éloi, Val-des-
Écoliers, and Premontré), three monastic orders (Benedictines, Cluniacs,
and Cistercians), and the four main mendicant orders (Augustinians,
Carmelites, Dominicans, and Franciscans). Written records of these ses-
sions survive down to the 1330s, although the disputations themselves
continued to be conducted beyond that date. These records are the
subject of this volume.
Much more than was the case with volume I of this book, volume
II deals with quodlibeta that have never been printed, or have not been
published in modern critical editions. According to the titles, the divi-
sion between the two volumes of this book is chronological: the rst
volume is on the thirteenth century and the second covers the four-
teenth. This division does correspond roughly to the contents of the
volumes, although it would be more accurate to say that the mid-1290s
is the cut-off point. In a few cases, however, due to the character of the
chapters, some of the material in volume II still concerns the previous
years, mainly the early parts of Martin Pickavé’s thematic treatment of
individuation, Russell Friedman’s survey on Dominicans after Aquinas,
and Thomas Sullivan’s piece on monks and canons regular. In the last
two cases, the material is usually less known and unpublished.
In a real sense, then, the division between volumes I and II mirrors
the relative availability of the material. For volume I, there are modern
criticical editions of the often important quodlibeta of Guerric of Saint-
Quentin, Thomas Aquinas, John Pecham, Roger Marston, Henry of
Ghent (still in progress), Godfrey of Fontaines, Vital du Four, Thomas

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2 introduction

of Sutton (volume II), James of Viterbo (volume II), and Peter John
Olivi, as well as more minor collections. For the fourteenth century, it
often appears that quodlibeta have been critically edited based on the
criterion of ease, i.e., when they are in one or two manuscripts or
contain relatively little material. This is the case for Thomas of Bailly,
James of Thérines, John Lesage, Peter Thomae, and Francis of Marchia,
although the somewhat more popular quodlibeta of Durand of St
Pourçain, William of Alnwick, and William of Ockham have also been
published. At any rate Glorieux and many other earlier scholars were
more concerned with the thirteenth century than the fourteenth, and
it seems that his fourteenth-century entries require more revision.
Thus the present volume is more about manuscripts, traditions, and
question lists than about doctrine or the development of any individual
thinker’s ideas. In fact, some of those authors whose quodlibeta are avail-
able in critical editions—such as the seculars Thomas of Bailly and John
Lesage or the Franciscan Gonsalvus of Spain1—have been avoided in
order to focus on unedited material. The authors here have had to do
considerable manuscript work for their chapters, in some cases years
of manuscript work. I believe the result will prove extremely useful
both as a survey of theology in the early fourteenth century and as a
reference work for the coming decades.

As in the case of the rst volume, the present one contains three dif-
ferent types of chapters: thematic chapters, those on individuals, and
those on groups. To these we add a fourth type: two brief chapters
on manuscripts containing unique collections of quodlibetal mate-
rial. Thematic pieces open and close the volume: a treatment of the
principle of individuation in quodlibeta constitutes the rst chapter, and
an index of scientic quodlibetal questions is in an appendix to the
volume. Chapters on individuals cover the secular theologians Peter
of Auvergne, John of Pouilly, and Thomas Wylton, and the important
Franciscans John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol. A few major authors
of the quodlibetal genre do not receive separate chapters, for example
Hervaeus Natalis, John of Naples, and William of Ockham, but they

1
Gonsalvi Hispani, Quaestiones disputatae et de quodlibet, ed. L. Amorós (Bibliotheca
franciscana scholastica, 9) (Florence 1935), pp. 389–426 for the Quodlibet. Glorieux omit-
ted this Quodlibet of 11 questions, contained in Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 661,
ff. 126ra–130va, which Amorós dated to Gonsalvus’ regency in 1302–03. For Thomas
of Bailly and John Lesage, see the chapter on Peter of Auvergne below, n. 1.

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 introduction 3

are dealt with extensively in the chapters on groups. These last treat
the quodlibeta of monks and canons regular, Dominicans, Carmelites,
Augustinians, Franciscans, and Oxonians from the 1320s and 1330s. The
volume concludes with a postscript and the above-mentioned appendix
on natural philosophy. In the rst volume it was announced that vol-
ume II would also include a comprehensive bibliography of editions
of quodlibetal questions in theology, but given space limitations—the
volume is much longer than expected—and the ephemeral nature of
such a bibliography, it was decided to place that information on the
on-line Quodlibase for easy consultation and up-dating.2
Since volume I ended with thematic chapters, ultimately with Jean-
Luc Solère’s piece on the problem of personal identity after resurrection,
that is, of the individual human, especially in the Quodlibeta of Thomas
Aquinas, it seems appropriate to begin volume II with the more general
metaphysical theme of the principal of individuation in quodlibeta in
the period after Aquinas’ death. Martin Pickavé, a highly respected
expert on medieval metaphysics, has accepted the challenge of showing
through this one example how theological quodlibeta are rich sources for
medieval metaphysics—too rich for one chapter on any given topic.
Restricting himself, then, to published quodlibetal questions for the
most part, Pickavé picks up the story with the Condemnation of 1277,
which could be interpreted as censuring Aquinas’ doctrine of individu-
ation, and he concludes his narrative in the 1320s when Peter Auriol
and William of Ockham declared that the search for an explanation
for why individuals are individuals was pointless—or at least pointless
from one perspective. Pickavé demonstrates that the discussion was
more multifaceted than might appear at rst glance, taking us through
the quodlibetal treatments of Henry of Ghent, Roger Marston, Giles
of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, James of Viterbo,
Peter John Olivi, Peter Sutton, Vital du Four, Richard Knapwell,
Thomas of Sutton, John of Paris, Hervaeus Natalis, Henry of Lübeck,
and John of Naples, all of whose quodlibeta receive separate attention
elsewhere in this book. Given more space and time to transcribe all
the pertinent unpublished material, Pickavé could have expanded his
already substantial chapter into a book. As it is, the chapter gives us

2
Quodlibase, a database of theological quodlibeta, was created by Alain Boureau and
Sylvain Piron, and continues with William Duba, Russell Friedman, and Chris Schabel
acting as co-editors. To access it, go to http://www.quodlibase.org/.

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4 introduction

a taste of what lies in store for the historian of “pure” philosophy in

theological quodlibeta. For other stories waiting to be told, one need
only look to this volume’s appendix on natural philosophy in quodlibeta,
compiled by Richard Cross.
Following Pickavé’s thematic chapter there are ve on individual
authors active around the rst two decades of the fourteenth century.
The editor’s chapter on the secular theologian Peter of Auvergne’s six
Quodlibeta (1296–1301) is the product of a complete reading of all 108
questions and an inspection of the nineteen medieval manuscripts that
contain all or large parts of these very popular texts. The critical edition
of three questions (Quodlibet I, q. 1, “Utrum Deus sit innitae virtutis
in vigore,” is printed in an appendix) reveals that, contrary to the pre-
vailing view, there is no good reason to suppose that Peter’s Quodlibeta
were passed down in two different redactions. Rather, Peter redacted
each quodlibet one at a time after each session. The care that Peter took
in composing the written version is illustrated in an appendix giving a
complete question list, which includes the foliation of all manuscripts,
some of which have not been noted previously by scholars studying
Peter’s Quodlibeta. Peter worked hard to organize his material, to gather
auctoritates (over one thousand citations, listed in the chapter), and to
explain each problem to his readers. Written at the end of a long and
prolic career, Peter’s Quodlibeta are characterized by calm reection,
but also by the silent reuse of previous writings, his own and others,
that will make the complete critical edition of his texts a challenge.
Timothy Noone and Francie Roberts’ chapter on the Parisian Quodlibet
of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus, dated 1305–07, is even more
focused on manuscripts. While Scotus had only one Quodlibet, he was a
much more important thinker than Peter of Auvergne. This is reected
in the fact that over sixty known manuscripts survive, an extremely high
number and for Scotus second only to the Ordinatio version of his Sentences
commentary. The rst of over a dozen printings of Scotus’ Quodlibet
was accomplished not long after the invention of moveable type. As
director of the Scotus Project, Noone is in a unique position to take
the status quaestionis to the next level, and he has set out with Roberts
to do as much as possible to prepare the ground for the denitive
critical edition. Having inspected more than forty of the manuscripts,
they present an analysis of the manuscript tradition in two ways: rst,
they focus on major differences in sequence and content, especially in
question 21. Fortunately, in general the tradition is relatively uniform,
and so the second and most important approach in the chapter is the

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rst critical edition of any one question of the Quodlibet, based on a

selection of ten witnesses, the complete collation of which is evident
in the apparatus criticus. Question 16, “Utrum libertas voluntatis et
necessitas naturalis possint se compati in eodem respectu eiusdem actus
et obiecti,” has already drawn the attention of scholars for its doctrinal
content, since the relationship between necessity, contingency, nature,
and freedom is one of the crucial issues in Scotus studies. Because the
tradition for this question also presents textual complexities, it is an ideal
choice for Noone and Roberts’ detailed analysis, which is accompanied
by a tentative stemma codicum.
Although it is a small part of his scholarly production over the past
half century, Ludwig Hödl’s studies of the Quodlibeta of the Frenchman
John of Pouilly are fundamental to our understanding of these texts.
Here Professor Hödl synthesizes and advances his own research on
Pouilly, a Parisian secular master whose ve main Quodlibeta date from
1307–12. The rst three survive in an “ofcial” stationers’ version, but
most manuscripts contain a redaction of all ve that Pouilly himself
revised and expanded, with one witness recording a sixth Quodlibet that
consists of one question. Poully’s Quodlibeta come down to us in much
fewer witnesses than those of Peter of Auvergne and Scotus, ve main
manuscripts—still a respectable number—but their bulk greatly exceeds
those of his more famous predecessors. He has the same number of
texts as Peter of Auvergne, but they are nearly three times as long.
Moreover, while Peter’s Quodlibeta are in general ostensibly detached
from the historical context and mostly devoid of polemics, John of
Pouilly’s abound with controversial and acrimonious discussions of
contemporary disputes. Therefore, as Professor Hödl’s chapter demon-
strates, they are an excellent source for the state of the schools at Paris
in his day, especially the followers of Henry of Ghent and Thomas
Aquinas, whom Pouilly often accused of misinterpreting their masters.
In tracing Pouilly’s career as master as reected in his Quodlibeta, Hödl
provides a fascinating snapshot of the intellectual trends and tensions
of the day, within a number of contexts.
Originally it was planned that Wouter Goris would compose a
chapter on the Oxford Franciscan Richard of Conington, for although
Conington was not of the same stature as those covered elsewhere in
this volume, he did have interesting ideas and an impact on some later
thinkers. More importantly, Glorieux did not identify his work. Conington
produced at least two quodlibeta ca. 1306–10, but the only known com-
plete witness, Torino, Biblioteca nazionale K.III.6, disappeared in the

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re that engulfed the library in 1904. Since no traces of it have yet
been found—although there is still hope—and no new witnesses or frag-
ments have been located, it was decided that the excellent contribution
of Victorin Doucet, published one year after Glorieux’s second volume
and identifying his Anonymous Quodlibet 30 as that of Conington, was
sufcient until a critical edition is available.3
Two chapters follow on two important individuals whose careers at
Paris were closely intertwined, written by scholars whose own careers
are linked: the English secular theologian Thomas Wylton and the
French Franciscan Peter Auriol, by Cecilia Trifogli and Lauge Nielsen
respectively. Wylton’s sole known Quodlibet, most probably from Advent
1315, survives in only one main manuscript and fragments in other
witnesses, its structure is confusing, and until now individual questions
have been published haphazardly. Yet Wylton’s questions provide a
window into the theological debates of the 1310s and deserve more
attention. Eighteen questions of what seems to have been a larger
Quodlibet are known. Cecilia Trifogli, who has spent years working with
Wylton’s Physics commentary, has co-edited with Lauge Nielsen4 six of
the questions. In fact, fourteen of the questions have been printed—six
of them by Wladyslaw Senko—and excerpts of two of the others are
available. Thus Trifogli has chosen to gather all of this together in one
place, explaining the make-up of the extant questions, situating them
within Wylton’s works overall, and presenting a complete catalogue of
the questions. The catalogue not only provides exhaustive information
on manuscripts, editions, bibliography, and even cross references to
other texts of Wylton, but also a doctrinal discussion where none or
only incomplete ones exist. In appendices Trifogli offers question lists
and critical editions of the only two questions that have not yet been

3
Glorieux II, p. 306, listed 17 questions from BAV, Ottob. lat. 1126, although he
knew that the incipit indicates that there were 22 questions. V. Doucet, “L’oeuvre
scolastique de Richard de Conington, O.F.M.,” AFH 29 (1936), pp. 396–442, at p. 417
and 428, remarked that the Torino manuscript contained the 22 questions of Quodlibet I
and 23 questions of Quodlibet II. He also listed Leipzig 470 as containing the rst ve
of the surviving questions and Vat. lat. 1012 as preserving the fth. See his detailed
question list on pp. 424–30, which notes that I.16 is missing but gives the titles of the
lost I.22 and II.1, 7, 8, 11, and 23. Question 2 was edited in S.F. Brown, “Richard of
Conington and the Analogy of the Concept of being,” Franziskanische Studien 48 (1966),
pp. 297–307, but see recently W. Goris, “Le critique de Richard de Conington par
Robert de Walsingham,” AHDLMA 67 (2000), pp. 269–93.
4
And Timothy Noone in one case.

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printed at all: question 11, “Utrum, ubicumque excessus alicuius arguit

excessum alterius ita quod excessus unius in duplo arguit excessum
alterius in duplo et sic ulterius secundum proportionem, ex excessu
unius in innitum sequatur excessus alterius in innitum,” and question
12, “An identitas realis in divinis suscipiat magis et minus.” It seems
that all that is left is to correct previous editions with newly discovered
witnesses and gather them together in a uniform critical edition of the
entire Quodlibet.
That cannot be done easily in the case of Peter Auriol, however.
Lauge Nielsen, who has been working on Auriol’s works and thought
for well over a decade, has been trying to unravel the secrets of the
composition of the Franciscan Auriol’s sole Quodlibet of sixteen ques-
tions, which survives in whole or in part in some fteen manuscripts.
Nielsen provides a question list with foliation from all witnesses. The
Quodlibet was completed in 1320, but Nielsen’s careful examination of
Auriol’s thought on certain issues both in the Quodlibet and in earlier
writings highlights how complicated the question of the composition
and dating of these texts can be. Auriol engaged in long-term debates
with contemporaries, notably Hervaeus Natalis and Thomas Wylton,
using his Quodlibet to say his last word in some cases. But Nielsen’s
study reveals that tying a written Quodlibet to a specic disputation is as
tenuous as claiming that the published “proceedings” of a conference
reect what was actually said during the event. Only a critical edition
of the entire Quodlibet, together with studies of Auriol’s earlier works
and those of his adversaries, can advance our understanding. Nielsen
opts to focus on question 7, “Utrum anima constituta ex duabus reali-
tatibus esse possit forma corporis,” by way of example, putting it into
its context and adding a critical edition based on four manuscripts in
an appendix. Not only is this the rst critical edition of any part of
Auriol’s Quodlibet, it is also a question that was not printed in full in the
1605 Rome edition, omitting much of the master’s determination.
Two brief chapters examine the nature, composition, and dating of
two manuscripts that contain a great deal of quodlibetal questions from
a variety of authors, some of them treated in later chapters. Sylvain
Piron utilizes his considerable codicological and historical expertise to
expand on his brief remarks in volume I (pp. 421–22) concerning the
collection of Nicholas of Bar in Paris, BnF lat. 15850. He rst describes
Glorieux’s background and his approach to the quodlibeta in the manu-
script, then inspects the codex afresh and in situ. Piron notes that the

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selection of questions focuses on ethical issues, especially prominent in

quodlibeta before Easter, and he concludes that, rather than a chronologi-
cally arranged group of reports from disputations dating from 1285 to
1304, as Glorieux supposed, the material probably dates primarily from
the early 1290s, which has signicant repercussions for attribution.
In the following chapter William Courtenay takes a new look at
the career of the Augustinian Hermit Prosper of Reggio Emilia, then
reevaluates the dating and nature of his Sentences commentary and
notebook, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086. Based on his unparalleled familiarity
with the structure, statutes, and personnel of the University of Paris
in the 1310s, Courtenay disposes of some unwarranted or erroneous
assumptions made by Glorieux and proceeds to what we do know or
can guess, mainly that Prosper was likely sententiarius in 1314–15 along
with the Dominican James of Lausanne and that the quodlibetal and
other material he recorded, with a terminus ante quem of 1318, but no
clear terminus post quem, was probably gathered before his Sentences lec-
tures. This has important consequences not only for the dating of the
quodlibetal questions contained in Vat. lat. 1086, but also for our general
knowledge of theology at Paris in those years. In addition, Courtenay
suggests that several disputed questions may belong to the Cistercian
Jacques Fournier, later Pope Benedict XII.
Five rather ambitious chapters surveying the quodlibeta of theologians
from religious orders follow. Thomas Sullivan, a Benedictine himself,
who has already produced important studies of monks at the universi-
ties, here casts his net wider to excompass the quodlibetal questions
of canons regular as well. This material is sporadic, little known, and
usually little studied, so Sullivan’s chapter is the rst attempt to approach
these texts in this way. It turns out that questions survive from Parisian
quodlibeta from four groups of canons regular and three monastic orders,
often in the collections of Nicholas of Bar and Prosper of Reggio just
discussed. Sullivan’s comprehensive analysis doubles as a short history
of the relationship between these orders and the University of Paris.
As for the quodlibeta, the main representatives of the genre are Servais
of Guez, canon of Mont-Saint-Éloi, the Benedictine Pierre Roger
(the future Pope Clement VI), and the Cistercian James of Thérines.
Appendices provide question lists for Pierre Roger and the Cistercians
Guy of l’Aumône and Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay.
Next Russell Friedman covers Dominican “quodlibetal literature”
between Thomas Aquinas and Robert Holcot with his usual skill
and industry, bringing to bear in particular his extensive experience

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 introduction 9

with early fourteenth-century Friars Preacher. Not only does he treat

Dominican quodlibeta per se, but also the Order’s “anti-quodlibeta,” since
the Dominicans followed the example of the Franciscan William de la
Mare’s “correction” of Thomas Aquinas’ work and authored a large
series of rebuttals to William’s attack and to the Sentences commentaries
and quodlibeta of major secular theologians and Franciscans. Glorieux
chose not to include this material is his compendium. As with the other
chapters on groups, Friedman’s study examines and advances issues of
attribution, chronology, location, manuscripts, and redactions, but the
number of authors is higher, the previous literature more vast, and
the amount of individual quodlibeta greater than is the case with the
other synthetic chapters. Of special note are his discussions of Bernard
of Auvergne’s anti-Quodlibeta against those of Godfrey of Fontaines,
James of Viterbo, and Henry of Ghent, and the numerous quodlibeta
of Hervaeus Natalis and John of Naples. Sifting through the texts and
the literature, Friedman concludes that ten of the eleven Quodlibeta
attributed to Hervaeus are authentic, and he presents the theories of
how, when, and where the disputations on which they were based were
conducted. Friedman’s useful research on the Quodlibeta of Henry of
Lübeck resulted in two important discoveries: rst, he saw that Henry
copied at times from Durand of St Pourçain; second, and more excit-
ing, in Leuven itself he discovered a microlm of a Münster manu-
script destroyed in World War II, just in time to be employed in the
forthcoming critical edition—and this seems to be the best witness! In
appendices Friedman publishes a question list for Bernard of Trilia and
editions of questions from the anti-quodlibeta of Bernard of Auvergne
and Robert of Orford against Henry of Ghent’s opinion on the basis
of the distinction between the persons of the Trinity.
The editor’s chapter on Carmelite quodlibeta is an attempt to build
on the work of Bartomeu Xiberta, the Catalan Carmelite who seems
to have read almost every word in every work of the early Carmelite
theologians. The quodlibetal genre was particularly important for the
early Carmelites, both at Paris and Oxford, yet we have no critical edi-
tions for any of their quodlibeta and only those of John Baconthorpe were
ever printed at all. The chapter thus synthesizes all that Xiberta wrote
on Carmelite quodlibeta concerning attribution, dating, manuscripts, and
structure, adding to and correcting Xiberta according to the scholarship
of the last three quarters of a century. Aside from many small details
and a list of possible quodlibetal questions for Simon of Corbie, one
might note three items: rst, the Oxford Carmelite Peter Swanington’s

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Quodlibet was absent in Xiberta, and this chapter provides a question

list, correcting those previously published by Little and Glorieux, and,
in an appendix, an edition of his question “An angelus cognoscat cer-
titudinaliter futura contingentia.” Second, using the critical editions of
Stephen F. Brown, the chapter moves forward the issues of the dating,
manuscript tradition, and redactions of Gerard of Bologna’s Quodlibeta.
Third, using fragmentary manuscript witnesses, the chapter reconstructs
John Baconthorpe’s Quodlibet I, which is confused in the printed editions
due to misbound folios in the exemplar of the editio princeps. Finally, it
should be said that the example of the Carmelites demonstrates, con-
trary to Glorieux, how one’s administrative position did not preclude
one’s conducting quodlibetal disputations at Paris.
The following chapter, on the quodlibeta of the Augustinian Hermits
after Giles of Rome, by William Courtenay and the editor, is more
modest. This is in part because the most important examples, those of
James of Viterbo, are already available in the modern critical edition
by Eelcko Ypma, and otherwise the Augustinians have no Xiberta to
use as a starting point. But it is also the case that quodlibeta were less
important to the Augustinians than to the Carmelites. The chapter
mostly summarizes Glorieux with corrections that are usually minor
except for signicant new dating. Some further questions of Gregory
of Lucca, possibly quodlibetal, are listed, but the main contribu-
tions of the chapter concern the last two Augustinian quodlibeta, by
Gerard of Siena and James of Pamiers. These come down to us in
both manuscripts and printings, but in a confused state, so they are
reconstructed here with question lists. James of Pamiers’ Quodlibet is
particularly signicant, since unlike Gerard’s his Sentences commentary
is no longer extant. James’ Quodlibet survives in six manuscripts and two
early printed editions. The authors provide a much improved question
list with a catalogue of James’ citations of university theologians, and
rather than Glorieux’s vague date of “after 1323,” a terminus post quem
of as late as 1332 is now suggested.
The quodlibetal output of the Carmelites and the Augustinians after
Giles of Rome is in a sense “manageable” for synthetic survey chapters.
This is hardly the case for Friedman’s treatment of the Dominicans
between Aquinas and Holcot, nor for the continental Franciscans after
Scotus, the subject of the contribution of William Duba, whose exten-
sive work on the ubiquitous theme of the beatic vision allows him
special access to these quodlibeta. As is the case in the other chapters,
Duba updates and corrects Glorieux based on the ndings of the past

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seventy-odd years, but here the corrections to Glorieux are much more
frequent, with many improved question lists. For example, Francis of
Marchia’s Quodlibet, which has now been published, does not look at all
as it appeared to Glorieux. Even here, however, Duba argues that the
present opinion on the nature, attribution, location and dating—a quod-
libet by Marchia in Avignon after 1324—of this text is shaky. Nicholas
of Lyre’s output is also very different from that presented in Glorieux,
and there are other examples where Duba’s synthesis entirely super-
cedes Glorieux’s. Duba focuses most of his attention on the quodlibeta of
Francis of Meyronnes and Gerard Odonis, although Duba’s presentation
of the lost quodlibeta of Aufredo Gonteri Brito and William of Rubio
are also highlights. For the mystery of the two quodlibeta of Meyronnes,
Duba sifts through the lengthy studies of Roth and Roßmann and the
texts of the quodlibeta themselves to present the most plausible scenarios.
Duba concludes with a careful analysis of Odonis’ treatise on the beatic
vision, related to a quodlibetal disputation from Advent of 1333, dur-
ing the controversy with Pope John XXII while Odonis was Minister
General of the Franciscan Order. Duba offers a new interpretation
of the events and the text, with reference to Odonis’ position on the
issue in his Sentences commentary of 1326–28. An appendix presents
the quodlibeta in manuscript BAV, Vat. lat. 1012.
The nal chapter on a group is Rondo Keele’s coverage of quod-
libeta from England from William of Ockham to the eclipse of the
written genre. Keele’s extensive work on Walter Chatton and Oxford
theology in the 1320s and 1330s puts him in an excellent position to
analyze these quodlibeta. Since Ockham’s Quodlibeta have not only been
critically edited, but also translated into English, and Keele himself is
collaborating with Girard Etzkorn to complete the critical edition of
the Quodlibet of Chatton, Ockham’s Franciscan confrere and adversary,
Keele knows these texts enough to take a doctrinal approach that he
continues in his treatment of Robert Holcot’s works, although in each
instance questions of manuscripts and dating are covered. The case of
Ockham is particularly perplexing, because he never became master of
theology and yet is thought to have held seven quodlibetal disputations
in two years, and at the Franciscan convent in London. Keele shows
that the time and place are not so certain: the sessions could have taken
place at Oxford and Avignon over a longer span of time. Keele goes
on to follow some of the debate between Ockham and Chatton in the
former’s Quodlibeta, then moves on to a rst schematic presentation of
Chatton’s own Quodlibet, of which Glorieux was unaware. Turning to

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Holcot, Keele exploits the critical editions of some of the Dominican’s

quodlibetal questions to discuss his theory of divine foreknowledge, and
continues with notes on a couple minor, sometimes lost examples, and
on the Franciscan John of Rodington’s more substantial Quodlibet from
about 1333–34. Keele concludes with a few thoughts on the decline
of the genre, the subject of the following chapter.
The genre of written quodlibeta was thriving in the 1310s and early
1320s, then appears to have declined somewhat only to have its
swan song in the early 1330s. The chapters on groups reveal that the
Dominicans John of Naples and Bernard Lombardi, the Carmelite John
Baconthorpe, the Augustinians Gerard of Siena and James of Pamiers,
and the Franciscans Gerard Odonis and John of Rodington—seven
masters—held quodlibetal disputations from 1330 to 1335 from which
manuscript copies survive. But there it ceases. In a “Postscript,” William
Courtenay attempts to describe and explain what happened around
this time, reminding us that the oral exercise did continue and that
there are a few written examples of quodlibeta with theological content
from the fteenth century outside Paris. Why almost nothing seems to
survive from about 1335 to after 1400 is a mystery that Hamesse (in
volume I, pp. 41–45), Duba, and Keele have commented upon, and
Courtenay brings his unsurpassed knowledge of the Universities of
Paris and Oxford in this time to survey the possible causes.
The volume concludes with an appendix by Richard Cross, consti-
tuting a thematic index of quodlibetal questions concerning natural
philosophy broadly construed—a topic that Cross has been examining
ever since his study of Scotus’ scientic views. The index serves two
purposes: rst, its demonstrates how the quodlibetal disputation in
theology could be a forum for scientic discussion. Unlike in the case
of economics or politics, the number of quodlibetal questions dealing
with natural philosophy is so great that any other type of survey of
the genre for this topic would have been too selective. Cross has mostly
employed Glorieux’s lists, since a comprehensive search for corrections,
additions, and reattributions, besides extremely time consuming, would
have been confusing for the user given the space limitations. Some
up-dating has been done, but the reader interested in, say, “motion of
heaven,” is also advised to look elsewhere in the volume and on the
on-line Quodlibase to check whether Glorieux’s numbers, attributions,
and dates have been revised. The second purpose the index serves is to
illustrate how one would go about gathering material for a diachronic
study of any particular theme, such as Pickavé’s opening chapter in

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this volume. The expert on any given issue generally knows where to
go in Aristotelian commentaries and commentaries on the Sentences, for
example, but quodlibetal literature requires a different search technique.
Perhaps some energetic soul will do for all topics what Cross has done
for science, and not only for quodlibeta but for all disputed questions in
theology—a huge book in itself.
Originally a comprehensive index of editions of quodlibetal ques-
tions, compiled by Sylvain Piron and the editor, was to constitute a
second appendix, but as noted above we have opted to put this infor-
mation on-line on Quodlibase. Sufce it to say that the monumental
task attempted in R. Schönberger and B. Kible, eds., Repertorium edierter
Texte des Mittelalters aus dem Bereich der Philosophie und angrezender Gebiete
(Berlin 1994), was almost impossible to achieve with perfection, and
understandably there are numerous omissions and some erroneous
entries. Moreover, almost fteen years have passed since the repertory
was completed and went to press. All told, there are probably twice as
many editions of quodlibetal questions as in the repertory. The reader
is referred to Quodlibase to follow further developments.
The indices of manuscripts and names and places are comprehensive
for both volumes. For ease of reference, I have also inserted a short
index of the main treatments of quodlibetal authors in the two volumes,
following the sequence of the book.

The goal of these two volumes was threefold: to provide a convenient

and stimulating guide to the quodlibetal writings of theologians in a
format different from that chosen by Glorieux; to update and cor-
rect Glorieux; to encourage further research on and publications of
these texts. The reader will judge to what extent the rst aim has
been achieved. As for updating and correcting Glorieux, this has been
accomplished in hundreds of cases of details, and this on-going effort
will be reected in the progress of the on-line Quodlibase. Beyond these
minor and sometimes major modications of Glorieux’s specic nd-
ings, however, this book has called into question or even disproven
several of Glorieux’s main assumptions about the genre in general. He
took it for granted that quodlibeta were to be placed at the Universities
of Paris and Oxford and attributed to masters of theology who were
actually regent and did not have major administrative obligations in
religious orders. He also took University statutes to apply to times and
theologians other than those for which they were promulgated. These
assumptions were very helpful for dating and locating quodlibeta, but

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this book has shown that they were often unwarranted, especially for
the fourteenth century. Quodlibeta were held by bachelors even before
1300, outside the universities, by mendicant masters who were heads
of their orders, by masters who were not actu regentes, and often without
regard to the regulations.5 All told, the history of individual quodlibeta
and the genre as a whole is not a closed issue.
Finally, I hope the book does encourage further work on these texts.
With modern means of communication and reproduction, scholars
can easily request photocopies, microlms, microches, and CD-roms
of manuscripts from library collections all over the world, often at
reasonable prices. A quodlibet surviving in, say, ten manuscripts in ten
libraries can be ordered in one sitting and, with luck, obtained in a
couple of months. Even if one is not embarking on the edition of a
complete work, the critical edition of just one question can provide
valuable information about the manuscript tradition and redactions of
a quodlibet. This work is also satisfying on many levels, and we should
encourage our students to learn the necessary skills and to undertake
such tasks.
All surviving quodlibeta should be published. Of course, I would argue
that any piece of writing from the Middle Ages should be published in
some form, and many intellectual historians would agree that any work
of philosophical theology merits printing. Nevertheless, since some schol-
ars maintain that the publication of such texts should depend on their
intrinsic intellectual value or importance, however one might measure
that, it is necessary to point out the historical reasons for making all
records of quodlibetal debates available. First, they are often the sole
record—or practically the sole record—we have of the philosophical
output and ideas not only of certain individuals, but also of entire
religious orders with long traditions of participation in the intellectual
life of the University of Paris. Publishing these questions illuminates
the contributions of these individuals and groups to this scholarly
society and thereby contextualizes the thought of the most innovative
and inuential thinkers. Second, unlike other genres in philosophical
theology, quodlibeta allowed masters to treat a wide variety of issues

5
W.J. Courtenay, “The Course of Studies in the Faculty of Theology at Paris in
the Fourteenth Century,” in “Ad Ingenii Acuitionem.” Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù,
S. Caroti, R. Imbach, Z. Kaluza, G. Stabile, and L. Sturlese, eds. (Louvain-la-Neuve
2006), pp. 67–92, has recently shown how problematic it is in general to use statutes
to determine the course of the career of any theologian in this era.

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 introduction 15

not directly related to the material they usually taught. They are thus
of immediate interest to the intellectual historian, who can investigate
the opinions of the leading intellectuals of Christendom on subjects
they would not normally approach. Third, in many cases the questions
deal with current events and as such have precise historical signicance
both for the information they provide and for the perspectives of major
thinkers with respect to such events. Finally, quodlibetal questions are,
to varying degrees, records of historical events themselves. While this is
also true of ordinary lectures to some extent, the spontaneous and more
public nature of quodlibetal sessions means that the written remains
record what was a real historical event in itself.
This book, along with the on-going, on-line Quodlibase, is only a
part of the effort to reconstruct the history of Western theology in the
golden century 1250–1350. The Brill volumes on Sentences commentar-
ies constitute another approach, as do the many works dedicated to
describing the careers of individual theologians and the intellectual
life of the universities and studia. Perhaps the next major desiderata are
a multi-volume encyclopedia of medieval universities and a complete
repertory of ordinary disputed questions and miscellaneous theological
treatises, which would be great boons for scholars wishing to present as
fully as possible the historical context and development of any philo-
sophical or theological debate.
This is especially true for the fourteenth century, when scholastic
theologians focused less on system building than on individual issues.
Russell Friedman has labelled this approach “position-centered” rather
than the “argument-centered” method of the thirteenth century, so
that for each problem the theologian looked at one or more competing
solutions rather than individual arguments.6 Accordingly, in his 2007
Gilson lecture at the Pontical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto,
William Courtenay dubbed these theologians “problem-oriented” and
called for an investigation of their “response[s] to particular questions
and issues” to avoid “doing violence to their thought.” Perhaps for the
thirteenth century one can attempt to reveal and demonstrate how
“major intellectual gures sought to create a particular philosophy or
theology whose elements were integrated around certain principles

6
R.L. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the
Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in Mediaeval
Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002),
pp. 41–128, esp. pp. 84–100.

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16 introduction

that can be used to explain various areas of their thought,” Courtenay

remarks, but “[f ]or most fourteenth-century thinkers the philosophical
or theological task, if you will, lay in taking a particular question or
research problem to a new level of solution, whether it be the object
of knowledge, future contingents, or the role of grace and merit in
salvation.”7 Despite what specialists on Aquinas may say, then, studies
of fourteenth-century thought need to be “problem-oriented,” and the
edition of theological quaestiones quodlibetales is essential to our historical
task.

7
W.J. Courtenay, “Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought,” The
Etienne Gilson Series 39, 2 March 2007, Pontical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

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 THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE PRINCIPLE OF
INDIVIDUATION IN QUODLIBETA (1277–CA. 1320):
A FOREST MAP

Martin Pickavé

Quodlibeta allow us special access to philosophical and theological debates

in the Middle Ages because they mirror more closely “the vitality and
the acuity”—in Jean-Luc Solère’s words—of such debates than many
other genres of texts emerging from the university milieu. On the one
hand, quodlibeta not only reect the interests of the magistri holding the
disputations, they also provided an important forum for the interests
of the attending audiences; on the other, quodlibeta often display a more
combative tone and show less inclination to hide the deep disagreements
between the different proponents of a debate. The question titles of
medieval quodlibeta offer us valuable insight into what medieval philoso-
phers and theologians considered important and controversial topics.
One of these topics, treated by Solère at the end of volume I, was the
question whether there is only one substantial form in human beings.
Another, somewhat related, issue was the problem of individuation.
In brief, the problem is this: the familiar objects of everyday life
are all singular or individual items. There is this book next to me, this
lamp in front of me, this tree outside my window, and so on. Maybe
there is also something universal like “treehood,” but all the trees I am
directly acquainted with are individuals. I assume that many people
see nothing particularly worrying here, but what is wrong about asking
the following question: What is the reason for there being only indi-
vidual objects around us? Many medieval philosophers were puzzled
by this question and as a result they sought to determine what exactly
the principle of individuation ( principium individuationis) is, the principle
accounting for the individuality of individuals. Their solutions, however,
were often very diverse.
To understand the intricacies of the medieval debate on individua-
tion, one has to be aware that, upon closer inspection, the meaning of
the term “individuation” (individuatio) is itself far from clear. Is the prin-
ciple of individuation really the same as the principle of the individual-
ity of an object? Or is an inquiry into the principle of individuation

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18 martin pickavé

different from an inquiry into the principle of individuality? For some

medieval authors, as we will see below, the answer to this latter ques-
tion was afrmative. For them, individuation strictly speaking applies
only to the multiplication of forms (within one species). One might
even go so far as to say that beneath the surface of the debate over the
principle of individuation there is also a debate about the very idea of
what individuation actually is.
Yet, there is a further question: What exactly is individuality?1
Medieval authors rarely tell us what they regard as essential features
of individuality before they try to tell us what accounts for it. One
“denition” of individuals is, for instance, “things that are numerically
one.” According to another description, one that is closer to the literal
meaning of the term, an individual is what is “unable to be divided
into subjective parts,” i.e., “into parts of which any given one is that
thing.”2 According to yet a third conception, an individual is what can-
not be further multiplied or divided and what is distinct from something
else.3 These denitions are obviously connected, but it might matter
for an account of individuation which of these circumscriptions of
“individual” is the starting point of a particular author.
The aim of my paper, to attempt an overview of the medieval debate
on individuation, is bold, and so it is no surprise that my study suf-
fers from several severe, but unavoidable, shortcomings. (1) My focus
will be primarily, if not exclusively, on quodlibetal questions. Only by
exception will I use other literary genres to elucidate the teaching of
the authors I intend to discuss. What follows can therefore in no way
be read as a complete history of the medieval debate on individua-
tion. To provide just one important example: no general survey on
individuation should leave out John Duns Scotus’ contribution. In my
study, however, Scotus will not feature prominently, for he left us no
quodlibetal question explicitly devoted to the problem of individuation.
A complete survey would have to take into account at least Sentences

1
For some of these problems see also J.J.E. Gracia, “Introduction: The Problem
of Individuation,” in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-
Reformation, 1150–1650, idem, ed. (Albany, NY 1995), pp. 1–20; P. King, “The Problem
of Individuation in the Middle Ages,” Theoria 66 (2000), pp. 159–84.
2
See John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, ed. C. Balim et al., Opera omnia
VII (Vatican City 1973), pp. 412–13, n. 48.
3
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. J. Badius Ascensius (Paris 1518; reprint
Louvain 1961), f. 166rM.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 19

commentaries,4 commentaries on book VII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,

works on logic,5 and also other genres of university disputations, such
as, for instance, ordinary disputed questions.6 But given that there is still
no even remotely complete treatment of medieval views on individu-
ation,7 my present project shall nevertheless be useful. First, I shall try
to be as exhaustive as possible and I will discuss a couple of texts that
have rarely been studied so far. Second, in quodlibetal disputations
the responding masters often engage more directly with the views of
opponents than elsewhere. Quodlibeta thus allow us to trace better the
debates and the argumentative patterns followed in those debates than
other genres.
(2) The second limitation is the time-frame. I will cover roughly the
years 1277 to 1320. On 7 March 1277 Étienne Tempier, the bishop
of Paris, condemned 219 theses allegedly taught by masters of the
arts faculty. The condemnation is important for our present purpose
since it explicitly censures the theological implications of a specic
doctrine of individuation of forms, namely of the doctrine according
to which matter is responsible for the individuation of forms, an idea

4
Distinction 3 of book II of the Sentences, the treatment of angels, for instance, is
one of the loci classici for discussing individuation.
5
See, e.g., Martin of Dacia, who discusses individuation in his commentary on
Porphyry (Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii, q. 21, ed. H. Roos [Copenhagen 1966], pp.
147–8); Boethius of Dacia does the same in his commentary on the Topics (Quaestiones
super librum Topicorum, VI, q. 12, ed. N.G. Green-Pedersen and J. Pinborg [Copenhagen
1976], pp. 290–2).
6
See, for example, the famous disputation that John Duns Scotus and the Dominican
William of Peter Godin held in 1304/05 on the question “Whether matter is the prin-
ciple of individuation.” The text of this disputation is edited in C. Stroick, “Eine Pariser
Disputation vom Jahre 1306: Die Verteidigung des thomistischen Individuationsprinzips
gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guillelmus Petri de Godino, O.P.,” in Thomas von
Aquino: Interpretation und Rezeption, Studien und Texte, W.P. Eckart, ed. (Mainz 1974), pp.
559–608.
7
Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, provides a reasonably good overview of later-
medieval debates on individuation. See also L. Hödl and M. Laarmann, “Individuum,
-ation, -alität,” in Lexikon des Mittelalters V (1991), cols. 406–11; J. Hüllen, “Individuation,
Individuationsprinzip. 1. Mittelalter,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie IV (1976),
cols. 295–7. M.D. Roland-Gosselin, Le “De ente et essentia” de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris
1926), covers some of the discussion before and including Aquinas (pp. 51–134); T.W.
Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des
Jakob von Metz O.P. (Rome 1971), discusses a long series of authors between Albert the
Great and James of Metz; J. Assenmacher, Die Geschichte des Individuationsprinzips in der
Scholastik (Leipzig 1926), is unfortunately too supercial to be useful.

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20 martin pickavé

often associated with Thomas Aquinas.8 The relevant censured articles

are as follows:
Art. 81: Because intelligences do not possess matter, God cannot produce
many of the same kind.
Art. 96: Without matter God cannot multiply individuals of the same species.
Art. 191: Forms do not receive division except through matter—This is
erroneous unless it is understood about forms educed from the potency
of matter.9
No doubt the condemnation inuenced subsequent debates on individu-
ation. This can already be gathered from the fact that authors writing
after the condemnation frequently refer to the condemned articles.10
The condemnation did not put an end to the view according to which
matter is a principle of individuation.11 On the contrary, in the wake
of the condemnation William de la Mare, an English Franciscan,
compiled his Correctorium fratris Thomae. The work offers a catalogue
of more than one hundred passages from Aquinas’ works to each of
which William added his refutation of Aquinas’ view. Individuation is
a recurring topic in the Correctorium, but articles 8, 11, 29, and 30 (on
the Prima pars of Aquinas’ Summa theologiae) target Aquinas’ position
explicitly.12 The Correctorium provoked a wide-ranging reaction. A few

8
See R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Leuven-
Paris 1977), pp. 82–7 and 181–2.
9
Articuli comdempnati a Stephano episcopo Parisiensi anno 1277, ed. D. Piché (Paris
1999): “81 (43). Quod, quia intelligentie non habent materiam, deus non posset
plures eiusdem speciei facere”; “96 (42). Quod deus non potest multiplicare indiuidua
sub una specie sine materia”; “191 (110). Quod forme non recipiunt diuisionem, nisi
per materiam.—Error, nisi intelligatur de formis eductis de potentia materie.” Please
note that throughout this article I do not necessarily respect the punctuation of the
editions I use.
10
See, for example, Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. R. Wielockx, Opera omnia
VI (Leuven 1983), p. 45, and Quodlibet XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, f. 438vTf; Roger Marston,
Quodlibet I, q. 3, eds. G.F. Etzkorn and I.C. Brady (Quaracchi 1968), p. 12; Giles of
Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7 (ed. Louvain 1646; reprint Frankfurt a.M. 1966), p. 65; Godfrey
of Fontaines, Quodlibet VI, q. 16, eds. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Les philosophes
belges, 3) (Louvain 1914), p. 259, and Quodlibet XII, q. 5, ed. J. Hoffmans (Les philos-
ophes belges, 5) (Louvain 1935), p. 101–2. This list is by no means complete!
11
Of course the condemnation never censured the idea that matter is a principle
of individuation! So no one should expect that the condemnation is generally directed
at the individuation-by-matter view. As the articles show, the censors were worried
about considering matter the exclusive principle of individuation and multiplication
of forms.
12
William’s Correctorium fratris Thomae is edited in P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques
thomistes: I. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare” (Kain 1927). Art. 81 of the 1277 condem-
nation is mentioned in William’s text in art. 11.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 21

Dominicans replied to William’s polemical work by writing Correctoria

corruptorii, intending to “correct” the person whom they thought was
merely a “corruptor” of Aquinas.13 In their responses, of course, they
also defended Aquinas’ teaching on individuation and explained why
the consequences of his position are from a theological viewpoint com-
pletely unproblematic. Thus one of the results of the condemnation
and its immediate aftermath was in a way a renewed debate on the
very issue that the censors wanted to determine, and one can see this
result in the quodlibetal literature.14
The terminus ad quem of my study is ca. 1320. I do not want to sug-
gest that the debates over the principle of individuation came to an
end by this time; this would simply be wrong. But around this time
some authors developed the attitude that it is uninteresting to look for
a principle of individuation. According to these authors, individual-
ity is no longer considered something requiring an explanation, but
something that is a bare fact.
(3) The third limitation concerns my method. My aim, to reconstruct
a historical debate through the medium of quodlibeta, forces me to adopt
a chronological structure. Sometimes it will be difcult to stick to this
structure, for there is often no agreement among scholars about the
precise dating of some of the quodlibeta discussed.15 I adopt this strictly
historical approach reluctantly since it involves a couple of dangers.
The most important is that it might lead a reader to the conclusion
that the topics discussed here are of merely antiquarian interest, and
I don’t think they are.
(4) Not all of the questions I will examine explicitly ask about the
principle of individuation. The issue of individuation appears in many
different contexts, for example, in the context of the (rather technical)
question “whether a supposit adds something to a nature.” And the
problem of individuation itself can be examined with respect to the
different types of individuals: material objects, human souls, immaterial
substances. The various accounts of individuation might then provoke
further questions. Take, for instance, the notion of “indeterminate

13
For the Correctoria debate, see M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria
and the Limits of Metaphysics,” Speculum 57 (1982), pp. 292–314.
14
Two authors of Correctoria Corruptorii (Richard Knapwell and John of Paris) also
left quodlibetal questions on individuation.
15
Some of the extant quodlibeta are “published,” i.e., revised, versions of the original
oral disputations (and there might in some cases be a considerable delay between the
oral delivery and the publication); others have survived only as reportata. This imposes
a further complication on attempts to establish an exact chronology.

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22 martin pickavé

dimensions”: by means of this, some defenders of the view that matter

(or rather quantity in matter) is the cause of individuation account for
the individuality of our everyday objects. Indeterminate dimensions
became themselves the subject of a series of quodlibetal questions.16
Moreover, the problem of individuation has strong links to other philo-
sophical issues, such as the debate about forms (including the debate
over the unity of forms) and the dispute concerning the relationship
between being and essence. All this is to say that there is no (and there
can be no) standardized set of questions on which my study is based
and that my approach will be quite selective.17
(5) Most quodlibeta are still unedited. A complete survey, even within
the limitations just mentioned, would therefore require the inclusion
of many unpublished texts. Nevertheless, given the relatively large
number of edited quodlibetal questions on individuation, on the one
hand, and the lack of space, on the other, I have decided to focus on
edited sources.18 Peter John Olivi once wrote in a well-known passage
of his Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum that with regard to the
principle of individuation one is confronted with an “endless forest of
opinions” (innitam silvam opinionum).19 His metaphor can hardly refer
alone to the candidates that different philosophers put forward for such
a principle; their number is rather limited. It must also be meant to
cover the diverse ways philosophers of Olivi’s days argued in favor of

16
For this debate, which I will only mention briey, see numerous articles by
S. Donati: “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano,” Medioevo
14 (1988), pp. 149–233; “The Notion of dimensiones indeterminatae in the Commentary
Tradition of the Physics in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century,”
in The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century,
C. Leijenhorst, C. Lühty, and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, eds. (Leiden 2002), pp. 189–223;
“Il dibattito sulle dimensioni indeterminate tra XIII e XIV secolo: Thomas Wylton e
Walter Burley,” Medioevo 29 (2004), pp. 177–231.
17
For example, I have decided not to discuss the topic of the individuation of human
souls, an issue that was equally surrounded by controversy after the condemnation of
1277 (see art. 124). The individuation of souls, however, is only a subsection of the
more general discussion on individuation as such.
18
Examples of the texts I have left out in this survey are Alexander of Alessandria,
Quodl. I, q. 8 (“Utrum Deus possit facere subiectum absque omni accidente absoluto”);
qq. 19–21 (“Utrum in substantiis separatis individuum aliquid addat supra speciem,”
“Utrum in substantiis separatis sit compositio essentiae et individui,” “Utrum possint
esse duo angeli eiusdem speciei”); Raymond Rigaud, Quodl. III, q. 5 (“Utrum Deus
possit producere aliqua duo solum substantialibus differentia”), and Quodl. IV, q. 30
(“Utrum individuum addat aliquid re supra speciem”).
19
Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 12, ed. B. Jansen, vol. I (Quaracchi
1922), p. 213.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 23

one or the other principle of individuation. My study will hopefully

serve as a map through this, in large part, still uncharted forest, and
available editions are somewhat like familiar trails whose traces on the
map will, with a bit of luck, allow for systematic access to the lesser-
known groves in the woods.

Henry of Ghent

Henry of Ghent disputed his second Quodlibet in Advent 1277.20 The

chronological proximity, the fact that Henry himself was a member of
the committee of sixteen professors of theology that advised Bishop
Tempier on the condemnation,21 his occasional allusions to the con-
demnation, as well as the polemical tone of Henry’s Quodlibet suggest a
straightforward connection between the Quodlibet and the Condemnation
of March 1277. Question 8, on the individuation of angels, conrms
this suspicion.22 But in examining the individuation of angels, Henry
is not just interested in a theological problem. He quickly notes that
this question touches on the much broader difculty of individuation
in general, namely how an essence or a form “that is of itself one
simple thing . . . can become many numerically different things.”23 His
answer is divided into three parts: rst, he critically recalls what the
“philosophers” ( philosophi) teach about individuation; second, he attacks
the views of “our philosophizers” (nostri philosophantes); and third, he lays
out the view of “our saints” (nostri sancti).

20
For the dates of Henry’s Quodlibeta see the contribution of Pasquale Porro in the
rst volume.
21
See the remarks of R. Wielockx in Aegidius Romanus, Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx,
Opera omnia III.1 (Florence 1985), pp. 97ff.
22
The question asks “Whether two angels can be made distinct by God by their
substantial principles alone.” See S.F. Brown, “Henry of Ghent,” in Individuation in
Scholasticism, Gracia, ed., pp. 195–219; J.A. Aertsen, “Die Thesen zur Individuation in
der Verurteilung von 1277, Heinrich von Gent und Thomas von Aquin,“ in Individuum
und Individualität im Mittelalter, J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer, eds. (Miscellanea Mediaevalia,
24) (Berlin-New York 1996), pp. 249–65; T. Suarez-Nani, Les anges et la philosophie (Paris
2002), pp. 75–85. In this question Henry explicitly mentions those articles of the con-
demnation that deal with individuation (cf. supra n. 9). For Henry’s doctrine of indi-
viduation in general, see J. Paulus, Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique
(Paris 1938), pp. 327–78, and my “Henry of Ghent on Individuation,” forthcoming.
23
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 36: “Quaestio ista tangit dif-
cultatem de causa individuationis, quomodo scilicet id quod ex se est unum simplex,
indivisibile secundum essentiam, possit eri plura secundum numerum.”

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The rst part is basically a summary of what Henry and his con-
temporaries regarded as Aristotle’s account of individuation, according
to which forms are individuated solely by matter. If there is no matter
available (as in the case of immaterial substances) or if there is only
enough matter for one form (as in the case of heaven), there will be
strictly speaking no individuation. But of course there are singular
immaterial substances, there is a singular heaven, and so on. These items
are individual without individuation; they are singulars because in the
absence of matter there can only be one individual under a given form.
A multiplication of forms takes place only if sufcient matter exists for
there to be many members of one species. However, a central tenet of
this view, for Henry, is that forms as such are multipliable.24
Interestingly, Henry’s criticism of the Aristotelian view here never
directly takes issue with the idea that matter is a principle of individu-
ation. Henry only points at absurdities this idea leads to in the case of
heaven and angels. If the forms of angels and of heaven possess qua
form a potency for being multiplied, but if there is no or insufcient
matter to ever actualize this potency, then this seems to contradict one
of the fundamental Aristotelian tenets according to which every potency
must at least in principle have a chance of being realized.25 And fur-
thermore, if immaterial forms such as the forms of angels cannot be
multiplied by matter, this does not yet make them individual things.26
There is a difference between the formal unity belonging to a form or
species and the numerical unity, i.e., the unity which is responsible for
making, for instance, me this particular human being. Insofar as they
are universal forms immaterial forms have the rst kind of unity, but
why should they also have the second? For Henry, this second aw of
the view that matter, and only matter, causes individuation is related
to a faulty understanding of the very nature of immaterial substances.
Those substances are not just forms or essences; or vice-versa, essences
of immaterial substances as such are not complete beings. For no essence

24
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, pp. 40–1: “Et sic posuit causam
quare in formis quandoque sunt plura individua sub ea—licet semper possint esse plura,
quantum est ex parte formae—, non esse nisi materiam. Ut, quod non sit neque potest
esse sub specie nisi unicum individuum, hoc sit solum ex parte materiae, quando forma
continet totam suam materiam in unico individuo, et quod aut sint aut possint esse
plura, quantum est ex parte materiae, quando forma non continet totam materiam
possibilem ad suam speciem in unico individuo.”
25
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, pp. 42–3 and 38.
26
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, pp. 41 and 38–9.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 25

of a creature contains by itself (or is identical with) its existence. To

say the contrary, as Aristotle and his followers do according to Henry,
means to make essences into necessary and God-like beings.27
Henry’s criticism of the “philosophizers” in the second part of his
reply can be read as a possible explanation for why people like Tempier
objected to the Aristotelian view on the grounds that it threatens divine
omnipotence. Henry does not tell us who these “philosophizers” are,
but there is general agreement that the label refers to the followers of
the “philosopher” (i.e., Aristotle),28 including, among others, Thomas
Aquinas.29 If every form really had a potential for multiplication by
matter, as the Aristotelian view seems to suggest, then in the case of
forms of immaterial substances there would be something
in the foundations of the creatures that cannot be reduced to act by the
innite power of the creator. And so it would follow that God would not
really be omnipotent because God couldn’t bring about something which
is possible to happen ex parte rei.30
It might be a problem to say that God cannot Ʒ, but it is an even big-
ger problem to deny that God can Ʒ although there is possibility that
Ʒ-ing can occur.
But a “philosophizer” could of course reply that with forms of
immaterial substances there is no real possibility for their multiplication.
In Henry’s words, he might try to say that the potency for such forms
to receive multiplication exists (for them qua being forms) but that it
is only an incomplete potency ( potentia incompleta) insofar as there is, by
denition, no matter that could bring about the multiplication of forms
of immaterial substances. God could well multiply such forms if only
they had a full or complete potency ( potentia completa) for multiplication.
For Henry, however, this reply cannot remove the difculty. How can
we even talk about an incomplete potency if such a potency can never
brought to actuality? There would be something in nature that is com-
pletely pointless (otiose). But nothing in nature is in vain.31

27
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 39: “Nulla ergo essentia crea-
turae, ratione ea qua essentia est, habet rationem suppositi aut actualiter subsistentis,
ita quod nulla earum, quantum est ex se, de se sit singularitas quaedam, nulla earum,
sicut neque effective sic nec formaliter est suum esse sive sua essentia.”
28
See E. Gilson, “Les ‘philosophantes’,” AHDLMA 27 (1952), pp. 135–40; P. Michaud-
Quantin, “Pour le dossier des ‘Philosophantes’,” AHDLMA 43 (1968), pp. 17–22.
29
Brown, “Henry of Ghent,” pp. 199–200.
30
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 44.
31
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 44. At this point someone

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As already noted, Henry does not atly reject the Aristotelian view
that matter or quantity (in matter) is a principle of individuation. The
Aristotelian model is obviously inadequate for explaining the individual-
ity of some individuals, such as heaven and immaterial substances, but
it does not fail completely. For Henry, it therefore cannot be the “precise
reason and cause of individuation.”32 The latter can be found in the
view of “our saints.” Henry’s intention in comparing the view of the
saints with that of the “philosophizers” is clearly polemical: in questions
about the immaterial world one should rather address oneself to the
adequate authorities. What follows, however, is not anti-philosophical.
Henry develops ideas from Avicenna and the only saint he mentions
is John of Damascus, whose rather obscure remarks on individuation
he quickly replaces with bits from Avicenna’s Metaphysics.33
Since Henry agrees with his opponents that individuals are instan-
tiations of common forms, the problem of the individuality of an
individual amounts for him to nothing else than the problem of the
individuation of forms—this is the point of departure of his account of
individuation. Now the principle individuating forms or essences must
be something added and something external to the essences themselves.
The form or essence “human being” in me is different from the one
in another human being, but this difference is not part of the essence,
for otherwise this other human being and I would not share the same
essence “human being” and therefore we would not be two members
of the same ultimate species. Applying the term “accident” in a broad
sense as designating something non-essential, Henry says that universal
essences are individuated by “accidents.”34 Individuation, however,
does not happen by means of “real accidents” (accidentia realia) such

might wonder whether the “philosophizers” really hold the view that forms as such
are universal and therefore multipliable. If this were not the case the unfortunate
conclusion wouldn’t follow. But I think Henry would have had no problem pointing to
passages in Aquinas’ works were Aquinas describes forms as universal: see Super Boetium
de trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, ed. Leonina, Opera omnia L (Rome 1992), p. 125: “Nulla autem
forma in quantum huiusmodi est hec ex se ipsa;—dico autem in quantum huiusmodi
propter animam rationalem, que quodammodo ex se ipsa est hoc aliquid, set non in
quantum forma.”
32
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 47: “Patet igitur clarissime
quod materia et quantitas non possunt dici praecisa ratio et causa individuationis et
distinctionis individuorum eiusdem speciei, licet sunt causa eius in rebus materialibus
et corporalibus.”
33
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, pp. 46ff.
34
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, pp. 48–50.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 27

as qualities, location, etc. Socrates, for instance, is not an individual

human being because of his color or other accidental features. Those
accidents are ontologically posterior to substances, for they presuppose
the existence of the substances in which they inhere. Instead of causing
the individuation of their subjects these accidents are rather individu-
ated by their underlying substances.35
What is this mysterious “accident” that, according to Henry, indi-
viduates essences or forms and is not an accident in the strict sense
but something he calls (referring to Avicenna) “merely adventitious”
(adventitium tantum)? It is nothing other than existence or subsistence.36
Two angels—to return to the main question Henry is concerned with
here—are fundamentally distinct individuals because of the fact that
they actually exist, and only because they actually exist. Although they
have the same essence, they are two distinct individuals because the
existence of the one angel is not identical with the existence of the
other.37 But nothing in Henry’s treatment indicates that this solution
applies only to immaterial substances such as angels. Every creature is
a contingent being; its existence is not identical with its essence. Were
a creature’s existence identical with or part of its essence, a creature
would exist of necessity. Actual objects of our everyday life are essence-
existence composites and it is the role of existence in such composites
to individuate the essence.
Two points regarding Henry’s account of individuation merit special
emphasis: (1) Henry seems to make an implicit distinction between
an internal and an external principle of individuation. Objects are
individual because of their existence (the internal principle). But exis-
tence is, at least in contingent beings, caused by an external agent.
The existence of a child, for example, is caused by its parents. And
since all existence is ultimately derived from God, there should be no

35
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 55. See also Quodlibet V, q.
8, ed. Badius, f. 165rK– vL.
36
Subsistence denotes the kind of existence proper to substances. But I will use
these terms here interchangeably.
37
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 50: “Duo angeli in solis
substantialibus existentes . . . sunt individualiter distincti hoc solo quod subsistunt in
effectu”; p. 51: “Et sic non est dicendum quod hoc solo differunt quia natura unius
non est natura alterius . . . sed quia subsistentia unius non est subsistentia alterius, quae
facit differre essentiam ut est in uno ab ipsa ut est in altero, et eam quae una est et
simplex in essentia facit esse plures in existentia.”

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surprise when Henry also calls God a cause of individuation.38 But if

universal essences are individuated by means of (presumably) singular
“existences,” then one might ask how the individuation of existence is
brought about? Or are “existences” irreducibly singular? Henry does
not address this question, at least not in Quodlibet II.
(2) We have already seen above that for Henry the distinction
between an essence and what causes the individuation of an essence
corresponds to the essence/existence distinction. Since Henry is well
known for positing a so-called “intentional distinction” between essence
and existence in creatures, we are not surprised to nd this distinction
at work here as well.39 What individuates an essence is something added
to and outside the essence itself. In Henry’s vocabulary, the individuat-
ing factor is something outside the “intention” (intentio) of the essence.
The relationship between the individuating principle and the essence
is, however, not simply a matter of how our intellect grasps the two as
distinct. No essence, as Henry stresses throughout his treatment of indi-
viduation, is by itself an individual. The addition of the individuating
intention to the essence has to be really an addition (that is, the addition
of something mind-independent). Yet, it cannot be a “real addition,” i.e.,
an addition of another thing. There are two sorts of things: substances
and accidents. We saw already why individuation is not caused by
adding another real accident. But neither is it possible for it to happen
by the addition of something “substantial” (substantiale). According to
Henry, the only candidates for such a “substantial” addition would be
matter and form. But if our principle of individuation is also meant
to apply to immaterial substances, then the addition cannot be that of
matter. Nor can it be that of a substantial form, for then the result of
the addition would not be an individual form, but a form of another
species. For Henry, there must therefore be an addition that is more
than just a rational addition, an addition of one concept to another,

38
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 51: “. . . ideo causa indi-
viduationis eorum prima et efciens dicendus est Deus.”
39
For Henry’s famous intentional distinction see, e.g., J. Wippel, “Essence and
Existence,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny,
and J. Pinborg, eds. (Cambridge 1982), pp. 385–410; idem, “The Relationship between
Essence and Existence in Late Thirteenth-Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of
Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo,” in Ancient and Medieval Philosophies
of Existence, P. Morewedge, ed. (New York 1982), pp. 131–64; P. Porro, “Possibilità ed
esse essentiae in Enrico di Gand,” in Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium
on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293), W. Vanhamel, ed. (Leuven
1996), pp. 211–53; L. Hödl’s chapter in this volume, pp. 205–8.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 29

and less than a real addition. This is for him an “addition of what is
intentionally different” (additio diversi secundum intentionem).39a
In Quodlibet V (q. 8), disputed 1280/81, Henry returns to his account
of individuation and adds some further clarications. One of his main
goals in this later text is to arrive at a better understanding of what the
term “individuation” really denotes. He remarks that forms of species,
such as the form “human being,” have a unity by themselves and are
in themselves indivisible. The unity of a form of a species is not like
the unity of a genus, which is a purely mental construct; an ultimate
species is something real and so is its unity. And a form of a species is
indivisible, for there is no difference by which it could be further divided
into other subspecies. Individuation is thus strictly speaking “nothing
else than that a form, which is in itself simple and indivisible, is pluri-
ed by means of something else and is designated in many,” and the
“principle or reason of individuation” (causa et ratio individuationis) is what
is responsible for this plurication. For Henry, the indivisibility of these
forms accounts for the fact that we talk of individuation of forms rather
than division of forms. And from this indivisibility it also immediately
follows that the plurication of forms can, from the perspective of the
forms, only occur by accident ( per accidens), that is, by nothing proper
to the forms themselves.40
Henry goes on to refute, again and with basically the same argu-
ments used in his earlier Quodlibet, the doctrine according to which
individuation occurs by real accidents41 and then takes some space to
explain the Aristotelian account. Aristotle is of importance because
he offers precisely a model of how forms are pluried by accident ( per
accidens). Forms are pluried by nothing pertaining to themselves, but
only in virtue of the divisibility of that in which they inhere: matter.
But why is matter divisible? Matter is not divisible in itself, yet before
it is capable of receiving forms, matter receives quantity which makes
it have dimensions. Quantity is essentially divisible and so it imparts
divisibility to everything it belongs to. If, however, the substantial form
is what nalizes and determines matter and the quantitative extension
of an object, how can quantity be prior to such forms? Henry para-
phrases Averroes’ answer to this objection: the substantial form indeed
determines the exact extension and quantity of the object in which it

39a
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, p. 55.
40
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, ff. 164rE–165rH.
41
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, f. 165rI–K.

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inheres, so the plurication of forms cannot be caused by determinate

quantity, i.e., by something naturally posterior to the reception of form.
The quantity responsible for individuation is therefore a kind of quan-
tity that imparts merely indeterminate dimensions.42 As in his earlier
Quodlibet, Henry states that this doctrine does not explain the “precise
and proximate cause of individuation,” but Henry is more outspoken
when he afrms that the Aristotelian account is basically true in the
case of forms of material things.43
Since on Henry’s view individuation is meant to explain the multi-
plication of forms, his account of individuation is heavily dependent
on his account of form. For Henry it is a basic truth that forms (of
creatures) are as such universal or common. As already noted, this is
a conviction he thinks he shares with those he criticizes and something
that, for him, makes it impossible for forms to be individuated just by
themselves and without anything added. Yet, if all forms are universal,
then there has to be a principle of individuation for each form. But
how can forms of immaterial substances receive their necessary indi-
viduation? Material and formal causes seem unavailable, so the only
remaining alternative seems to be efcient causality: according to Henry,
such forms are individuated by the agent that causes the existence of
a supposit, that is, a thing of this form.44
But an agent causing existence can only be an exterior cause of
individuation. It, too, is not a proximate or “precise” cause of individu-
ation. Still, at least there is no question whether an agent is in principle

42
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, f. 165r–vL. For Averroes’ theory
and its reception, see J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite
Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, DC 2000), pp. 351ff; Donati, “La dottrina delle
dimensioni indeterminate.”
43
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, f. 165vL: “Haec ergo est opinio
sua de causa individuationis et determinationis formae ad suppositum in formis
materialibus . . . et est vera in talibus formis ut secundum cursum naturae, sed non
explicat praecisam et proximam causam individuationis . . . et per ipsam vericantur
opiniones praedictae inquantum talium formarum individuatio t per materiam, ut
est sub quantitate quae est accidentalis.”
44
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, f. 165vM: “Secundum verita-
tem et dem catholicam debet poni quod omnes formae separatae propter primam
creaturae sunt, et quia quaelibet forma creaturae, inquantum forma et essentia est,
habet rationem universalis . . . oportet eas individuari, ut habet rationem suppositi. Et
hoc non debet eri per accidentia alia a quantitate, ut iam ostensum est, neque potest
eri per materiam sub quantitate, quia nullum habent. Oportet igitur in eis ponere
alium modum individuationis. Quare cum illa quae non dependent a materia esse
non recipient nisi per solum agens, et ab eodem habent res esse et esse hoc aliquid
in supposito distincto.”

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 31

capable of individuating forms: every act terminates in something sin-

gular; agents cause by nature singular things, however this might work
in detail.45 On the contrary, the proximate cause of individuation has to
be located in the resulting singular thing or supposit.46 More precisely,
the cause of individuation is the very thing that makes a supposit a
supposit. This also explains why Henry does not consider matter the
precise and proximate cause of individuation either, although it is
undoubtedly involved in bringing about individuation. Agent causes
cease to exist without annihilating the existence and individuality of
their products, and similarly some forms (such as the human soul) persist
as individual forms after separation from matter. Therefore there must
be something more intimately related to forms that is responsible for
their individuation, even if the individuation of forms never occurs
without an agent or matter or both.47
Surprisingly, Henry does not simply restate the conclusion of his
earlier Quodlibet II and say that existence is this intrinsic cause of indi-
viduation. But this has rather to be explained, I believe, in terms of the
different context (Quodlibet V, q. 8, is mainly about the Trinity and asks
“whether in God the supposit is something absolute”) than in terms
of a doctrinal change. Anyhow, Henry declares that this individuating
disposition cannot be something positive, i.e., another existing thing, for
we would then have to ask what makes this other positive thing indi-
vidual and so in innitum. Nor can it be a positive relative thing,
because this would presuppose the individuation of the underlying
thing in which the relation is grounded. The disposition is thus only a
negative condition, one that brings about a double negation:

45
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, 166rM. See also Quodlibet XI, q. 1,
ed. Badius, f. 439rV.
46
The term “supposit” has its origin in discussions on the nature of Christ. In the
vocabulary of medieval theologians, Christ has two natures (divine and human) in one
supposit. On Henry’s understanding of suppositum, see G. Wilson, “Supposite in the
Philosophy of Henry of Ghent,” in Henry of Ghent, Vanhamel, ed., pp. 343–72. Wilson
also discusses Quodlibet V, q. 8, at some length on pp. 354–62.
47
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, f. 166rM: “Sed quid est in
supposito super formam quo habet esse hoc et quo per ipsum forma habet esse hoc
quia est huius? Dico aliquid praeter materiam et praeter agens, quod est quasi dis-
positio suppositi inquantum suppositum est, quod non potest esse materia nec agens.
Haec enim dispositio derelicta est circa formam in supposito et facit suppositum esse
suppositum . . . Hoc enim viso videbitur ratio suppositi et individuationis proxima et
quod est quod formaliter faciat in creaturis. Et est dicendum quod est aliquid extra
intentionem formae concomitans eius productionem vel per agens vel per materiam
vel per utrumque.”

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It removes from inside any possibility for plurication and diversity and
removes from outside any identity, so that in this way the form is called
this form, because it is only this form, not having within the possibility
to be another one.
Henry concludes by emphasizing that, contrary to matter and the agent,
this double negation is the ultimate cause of individuation and what
formally ( formaliter) individuates forms, and he explains again that this
negative disposition can be called, in a broader sense, an accident.48

Roger Marston, OFM

If the dating of Roger Marston’s four Oxford Quodlibeta is correct (1282–

84), Roger is among the rst authors who react to Henry’s doctrine of
individuation.49 The Franciscan master seems to agree with Henry that
there are different aspects under which we can describe individuation
and that because of these different aspects, we can allow for more than
one principle of individuation. For Roger, however,
individuation is brought about by what generates and gives being as by
an efcient cause; matter is what provides the occasion of individuation,
and the form is what formally constitutes the individual. For the form
formally bestows being and consequently also bestows being distinct and
being one.50
So contrary to Henry, Roger considers the substantial form itself, and
not some disposition added to the form, as that which formally ( for-
maliter) causes individuation. And since in Roger’s opinion the role of
matter is here only that of a sine qua non cause,51 it is not astonishing to
see him defending the 1277 Condemnation. For Roger, it is indeed a
challenge to God’s omnipotence to deny God the possibility to individu-
ate forms without matter. For God as the rst cause can do whatever

48
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, f. 166rM. Henry uses the same
way of describing individuation also in Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, a. 39, q. 3, ed.
J. Badius Ascensius (Paris 1520; reprint St Bonaventure, NY 1953), f. 246rR–vS.
49
See G.J. Etzkorn’s chapter in the rst volume, esp. pp. 144ff.
50
Roger Marston, Quodlibet I, q. 3, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, p. 13. The question Roger
is dealing with is “whether there can be in the same species many forms differing
numerically by themselves without matter.”
51
Other Franciscans, e.g., Bonaventure, also regard matter merely as a sine qua non
cause of individuation. See Bonaventure, In II Sententiarum, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 ad 4–6,
Opera omnia II (Quaracchi 1885), p. 110.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 33

any secondary cause can accomplish. And he compares the case where
forms are multiplied without matter to the Eucharist, where accidents
exist without a subject.52
In question 30 of his second Quodlibet, Roger Marston provides his
readers (or listeners) with a direct refutation of the account of indi-
viduation developed in question 8 of Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet V.
The anonymous quidam, mentioned by the Franciscan, who hold that
material forms are individuated by matter and that immaterial forms
are individuated by the efcient cause are clearly identical with Henry.
Roger’s summary is by no means appropriate,53 yet this is only of minor
importance, insofar as he correctly renders the main point of Henry’s
discussion, namely that forms are individuated by what determines them
in a supposit: a double negation. Roger, however, declares that he does
not understand Henry’s subtleties. His reply is what will become the
standard objection to Henry’s doctrine of individuation: individuation
cannot occur by means of a purely negative principle.54 If the double
negation individuates a form by making it distinct from others (rst
negation) and indivisible in itself (second negation), then the double
negation is what causes it to be one (unum esse). Roger’s main argument
then proceeds from an examination of the meaning of the term “one.”
Although “one” indeed expresses a negation, it does so only because
for us and our senses a multitude is easier to grasp than unity and
because we understand unity through multitude, its opposite. By itself
“one” expresses something positive, such as the coherence of the parts
(in composite things) or the “convenience a thing has with respect to
itself ” (eiusdem ad se convenientia).55 Roger concludes:
Through a negation a thing cannot be one and be this particular some-
thing (hoc aliquid). But as it has being (esse) through its principles, so it has
that it is one (unum esse) and that it is an individual (individuum esse).56

52
Roger Marston, Quodlibet I, q. 3, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, p. 13.
53
Compare Roger Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 30, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, pp. 295–6, and
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 8, ed. Badius, ff. 165rK–166rM. In paraphrasing, for
example, Roger seems to pay no attention to the differences between Henry’s summary
of Aristotle’s doctrine and Henry’s comments on this doctrine.
54
See, e.g., Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in II Sententiarum, q. 15, ed. Jansen, p. 277;
John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, ed. Balim et al., pp. 413ff, nn. 49ff.
55
Roger Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 30, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, pp. 296–7.
56
Roger Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 30, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, pp. 296–7.

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However, the principles of a thing, and of a substance in particular,

are its four causes. And Roger again insists that among these causes
the form is what formally causes individuation.
How can a form cause the individuation of that in which it inheres
if the form itself is universal? For Henry, forms are universal or com-
mon; this is the very reason why they have to undergo individuation!
Obviously, Roger has a different understanding of forms. In his view
people like Henry go astray in believing that forms are by themselves
common to many things. But for Roger, everything in nature is singular.57
The universality of forms is nothing pertaining to forms in themselves,
but is rather a consequence of the fact that forms are in many different
individuals. For Roger, the question is not how forms are individuated,
but how things are individual. The problem of individuation as under-
stood by Henry, the question of the multiplication and individuation
of universal forms,58 is clearly not the problem of individuation Roger
aims to address. As we saw in the two quotations, according to Roger,
everything is individual, i.e., distinct from others and one in itself, insofar
as it actually exists. If individuation is the mechanism by which this sort
of unity and difference is brought about, the principle of individuation
seems to coincide with the principle(s) of existence.
What exactly is Roger’s attitude toward the Aristotelian account of
individuation? For Aristotle, matter, or better, matter with quantitative
dimensions, is a principle of individuation. Roger does not entirely reject
Aristotle’s doctrine. But strictly speaking, quantity is not a principle of
individuation for Roger. Imagine that God decides at one point to take
away all quantitative dimensions of the universe. According to Roger,
the distinction between the substances and other parts of the universe
would not be destroyed by such an act. The essential order (ordo essen-
tialis) between all the parts would remain intact. Although quantity is
therefore not a fundamental principle of this order, it is nevertheless
important for us human beings. For it is by means of the quantitative
material parts that we grasp things as distinct individuals. And this is,

57
Roger Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 30, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, pp. 296–7: “Haec ergo
videtur causa deceptionis hominum, quia imaginamur quod forma de se sit communis,
cum secundum veritatem natura numquam intendat nisi singulare et particulare.”
58
That for Henry the problem of individuation is primarily the problem of the
individuation of forms can clearly be gathered from the quotes in nn. 23 and 44.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 35

according to Roger, what Aristotle alluded to when he said that matter

receives its distinctness from quantity.59
Roger Marston discusses Henry’s doctrine of individuation in a ques-
tion that asks “whether individuals belonging to one species differ only
on account of an accident” (Quodlibet II, q. 30). And he concludes his
ofcial reply by saying that, “therefore, individuation is not caused by
an accident, but by the principles of a substance.” Roger apparently
reads Henry’s doctrine as locating individuation in an accident. This
might not be entirely fair to Henry, but Roger will not be alone in
understanding Henry this way.

Giles of Rome, OESA, and Henry of Ghent

Giles of Rome is one of the most important defenders of the (Aristotel-

ian) doctrine that individuation is caused by matter or quantity.60
Giles even goes so far as to defend this doctrine with regard to the
Condemnation of 1277. This attitude is not surprising. Although Giles
was not himself targeted by Bishop Tempier in the Condemnation of
7 March 1277, we know of the existence of a separate inquiry against
Giles’ teachings immediately after Tempier’s rst strike. Giles refused
to recant the doctrines the censors considered erroneous and he had
to leave the University of Paris.61 His university career did not resume
until 1285 when he was rehabilitated and became a regent master of
theology.
His Quodlibet I (1285/86) was held immediately after his return to
the University of Paris and it can, as Giorgio Pini has suggested, be
described as a way for Giles to come to terms with the past.62 In ques-
tion 11, Giles defends the view that corporeal objects are individuals

59
Roger Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 30, ed. Etzkorn-Brady, p. 298.
60
On Giles’ life see F. Del Punta, S. Donati, and C. Luna, “Egidio Romano,”
Dizionario biograco degli Italiani 42 (1993), pp. 319–41; for Giles’ doctrine of individua-
tion, see S. Donati, “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate”; D. Trapp, “Aegidii
Romani de doctrina modorum,” Angelicum 12 (1935), pp. 449–501.
61
His views on individuation, however, were not the subject of this separate
inquiry.
62
See Pini’s chapter in volume I, esp. pp. 255ff. Giles also held two non-university
quodlibetal disputations, both taking place during General Chapters of the Augustinian
friars (in 1281 and 1291). But he did not address the issue of individuation in these
Quodlibeta.

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on account of their matter, or rather, on account of quantity in matter.

For Giles, the individuality of corporeal objects can only be caused by
some intrinsic feature that is primarily individuated (cui de se competat
individuatio); other components of bodies are then individuated through
this feature. He quickly denies that forms can be such a feature, and
he refers to quantity and matter:
Individuation occurs in this way: because it belongs to matter to be
extended by quantity and because different forms are received in different
parts of matter, forms are divided and as divided they are individuated
by extended matter. But since extension is caused by quantity, we have
to look at quantity when we want to talk about the individuation of
corporeal objects.63
But, Giles goes on to explain, because there can be no quantity without
a subject, it is said that matter, “the cause and principle of quantity,” is
“the principle of individuation, which must happen by quantity.”64
Giles makes no effort to conceal that on his view the individuality of
an individual material body is caused by an accident. This, however,
leads to at least two major problems which Giles tries to address. First,
accidents are ontologically posterior to the subjects in which they inhere.
But their subject can only be an actual substance composed of matter
and form. How can they then individuate the forms with regard to which
they are posterior? Giles counters this common objection by pointing
out a difference between kinds of accidents. Some accidents belong
more to matter, some more to form. Quantity is one that “especially”
(specialiter) belongs to matter.65 Thus quantity is posterior with respect
to matter, but not with respect to form.
A second objection says that this doctrine of individuation challenges
the substantiality of individual corporeal objects. If, as it appears,
quantity is the subject of individual forms, individual bodies seem to
fall under the category of quantity, since they derive their ontological
status from their immediate subjects. In his response, Giles introduces
an important distinction between the extension of matter and the exten-

63
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet I, q. 11, ed. Louvain 1646, p. 24. See also ibid., q. 8,
p. 18.
64
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet I, q. 11, ed. cit., p. 24: “Materia ergo, quae specialiter
est causa et principium quantitatis, dicitur esse principium individuationis, quae per
quantitatem eri debet.”
65
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet I, q. 11, ed. cit., p. 24.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 37

sion of quantity. It is true that quantity causes the extension of matter,

for by itself matter has no extension. But the extension of matter is
different from the extension of quantity. For the parts of matter (having
parts is what it means to have extension) are nothing else than matter,
but the parts of quantity are not. This allows Giles to introduce some
precision with regard to the role of quantity in individuation: quantity
does not fundamentally change matter (i.e., change matter into an
accident); it just adds a “mode” (modus se habendi) to matter and to the
substance it individuates.66
In Quodlibet I, Giles also addresses the much more controversial
question of the individuation of angels. This happens only indirectly,
however, and without his explicitly afrming the contentious view that
there is only one angel in each species.67 In question 8 he discusses
the question whether angels have matter. This idea, Giles immediately
notes, has been proposed to explain why there can be many angels
belonging to one species. But for Giles this explanation is completely
ill conceived and fails to attain its goal. In one respect, however, the
proposal does not go completely wrong:
However, there is here something that does occupy the place of matter.
For angels are not pure act, but they have some potentiality mixed in.
Therefore it is also written in the Liber de causis that intelligences have their
yleachin, i.e., their material. And this is probably also what those people
have in mind who posit matter in angels, because they say that this matter
is not of the same kind as the matter of corporeal things.68
The remark is important, for it offers an example of what someone
who holds that, due to the lack of matter, there cannot be more than
one angel for a given species might answer to accusations (of the
kind Henry of Ghent put forth) suggesting that this makes angels into

66
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet I, q. 11, ed. cit., p. 25.
67
But there can be no doubt that Giles holds exactly this. See Reportatio lecturae super
libros Sententiarum II, q. 24, ed. C. Luna, Opera omnia III.2 (Florence 2003), pp. 234–5.
68
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet I, q. 8, ed. cit., p. 18; see also Quodlibet II, q. 1, p. 49;
Reportatio lecturae super libros Sententiarum II, q. 20, ed. Luna, pp. 228–30; In II Sent., d.
3, p. 3, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Venice 1581; reprint Frankfurt a.M. 1968]), vol. I, pp. 160–70.
The Leuven edition of the Quodlibeta has “ƶƭƩƣƸƩƮ,” which is obviously a correction
for forms such as yleachin (this is, for instance, the spelling in the Venice 1504 edition
of the Quodlibeta). The passage referred in the Liber de causis is prop. 8 (9), ed. A. Pattin,
in Tijdschrift voor Filosoe 28 (1966) (pp. 90–203), §90.98–2.

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necessary beings: angels don’t possess matter, but they are neverthe-
less composite beings; this is how they retain their character as non-
necessary beings.69
There are no references to the condemnation in Giles’ discussion of
individuation in Quodlibet I and Giles’ treatment gives the general impres-
sion that he wanted to avoid controversy as much as possible. Yet the
tone has distinctively changed in his Quodlibet II (Lent 1287) where, in
question 7, he directly discusses the individuation of angels and reacts
explicitly to Henry’s doctrine that forms of immaterial substances are
individuated by virtue of their being received in different supposits.70
Giles begins his reply by quoting article 81 of the condemnation and
declaring that he wishes that the condemned articles had been issued
after more careful reection; he expresses his hope that in the future
people will exercise better judgment on the issues in question. In the
meantime he intends, as far as possible, to provide an account of
angelic individuation that complies with the demands of the article.71
It is hard to miss the irony in his handling of the condemnation. “We
can now say,” explains Giles at the end of the question, “that what the
condemned article says is possible.” Yes, it is true that it is erroneous to
afrm “that, because intelligences do not possess matter, God cannot
produce many of the same species.” For God could have created a world
in which things are ordered differently and in that world there would
be many intelligences of one species. Proposing that the condemna-
tion was only concerned with God’s absolute power gives Giles all the
freedom to defend the thesis that under God’s ordained power there
is only one intelligence or angel of each species. Although possible, it
would actually be untting if God, given the order He created among
the creatures, were now to multiply angels of one species.72

69
Henry of Ghent accused Aristotle and the “philosophizers” of holding this view.
See Quodlibet II, q. 8, ed. Wielockx, pp. 41–2 and supra p. 25. In Thomas Aquinas we
can basically nd the same idea as in Giles’ Quodlibet. Jan Aertsen has emphasized the
importance the notion yleachin or hyliatim has for Aquinas’ account of the individua-
tion of immaterial substances and he has defended Aquinas on these grounds against
Henry’s criticism: see Aertsen, “Thesen zur Individuation.”
70
See Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7 in opp., ed. cit., p. 65.
71
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7, ed. cit., p. 65: “Dicendum quod de hoc sit articulus
Parisiensis, in quo dicitur quod error sit dicere quod, quia intelligentiae non habent
materiam, Deus non possit plures eiusdem speciei facere. Optandum vero foret quod
maturiori consilio tales articuli fuissent ordinati, et adhuc sperandum, quod forte de iis
in posterum sit habendum consilium sanius. Hinc in praesenti, quantum possumus et
ut possumus, articulum sustinemus.” See also Pini’s chapter in volume I, pp. 264ff.
72
See Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7, ed. cit., pp. 65 and 69.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 39

But why, according to the given order, are there not many angels
under one species? Giles’ answer is based on the idea that higher beings
and their forms are more perfect than lower ones. The lower forms,
the forms of material substances, have to be determined by being (esse),
and this explains why there can be many different individuals of one
species of material substances. For their forms receive their determining
being in matter. Yet, forms of immaterial substances don’t have to be
determined by something else; rather they themselves determine their
being. This is why we could say that the being belonging to angels is
individuated by their nature.73 Giles puts this hierarchy also in terms
of sufciency of being (esse): forms of immaterial substances such as
angels possess perfect being (esse perfectum), but that just means that
they have all the being their form demands. On the contrary, forms
of lower beings have only imperfect being (esse imperfectum), i.e., they do
not possess all the being the form demands. This is why they are not
capable of existing without matter. They thus have their being only
in accordance with the capacity of the matter in which they inhere,
and this is what, for Giles, accounts for the possible multiplication of
such forms.74
From this understanding of immaterial substances and their forms it
is obvious why it wouldn’t be tting for God to produce (or allow for
the production of ) many members of one species of angels. For if mul-
tiplication involves a limitation of being (esse), this would just mean that
God had to deny to the forms of angels their perfect being, i.e., “that
God would now not give to such a form as much being as the form can
receive.” God could of course do that, but it would completely change
the order of immaterial substances and their relationship to material
ones.75 From this idea Giles’ reply to the argument in oppositum, which
suggests that angels are individuated (and can be multiplied) by being in
different supposita, follows immediately. Giles rejects this (i.e., Henry’s)
account because he holds that the multiplication of forms presupposes
the determination or restriction of forms and their being. But accord-
ing to the normal order, only matter is capable of such a restricting
role and a supposit would only be capable of restricting forms through
matter.76 Some scholars have concluded that Henry of Ghent’s account

73
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7, ed. cit., p. 66.
74
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7, ed. cit., p. 67.
75
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7, ed. cit., p. 68.
76
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 7, ed. cit., pp. 68–9.

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of individuation was driven by the desire to nd a comprehensive

explanation of individuality that covers all objects of reality. For this
reason he was after the “precise” cause of individuation.77 But from
Giles of Rome’s discussion it becomes clear that his opponents also
have an all-encompassing account, an account that is fundamentally
based on the hierarchy of forms and their respective being.
Giles’ discussion of angelic individuation in Quodlibet II received an
immediate response from Henry of Ghent in Quodlibet XI, qq. 1–2,
disputed in Advent 1287. Henry’s later Quodlibeta are full of critical
references to Giles’ opposing doctrines, but in this case Giles’ extrava-
gant attitude towards the condemned articles might have been a further
reason for Henry’s prompt reaction. Henry’s insistence that the relevant
articles were rightly (rationabiliter) condemned78 is surely meant as a
retort to Giles’ doubts in this respect. Henry even devotes two separate
questions to his rebuttal. Question 1 addresses Giles’ theory of angelic
individuation; question 2 attacks Giles’ claim that it would be untting
for God to multiply angels of one species.79
Giles, Henry admits, does not commit the crude mistake of the phi-
losophers who say that in separate substances the species and supposit
coincide so that the mode of being of the essence (esse essentiae) does
not differ from its actual being (esse existentiae), something that would
make angels into necessary, God-like beings.80 Yet, according to Henry,
Giles still upholds that, in the case of angels, being a species and being
a supposit are the same, because for Giles an angel exists “only in one
supposit in which the perfect aspect of the species is present.” The
coincidence of species and supposit, however, precludes the possibility
of another supposit of the same species.81 Henry objects to this identity
by pointing out that to be in a supposit is something accidental with
respect to the essence or form itself (which is in a supposit). For it is
not part of essences or forms to be in supposita, just as it is not part of
them to be in the mind and to be actually existing outside the mind.
Take, for example, a triangle. It is part of the essence of a triangle
that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles, but existence in the

77
See Aertsen, “Thesen zur Individuation,” p. 257.
78
See the passages mentioned in n. 10 above.
79
Henry, however, does not mention Giles by name (he never does so). In the fol-
lowing I will focus only on q. 1.
80
See, e.g., Giles of Rome, Quodlibet I, q. 10, ed. cit., p. 22, where Giles emphasizes
that, unlike in God, there is a difference in angels between esse and essentia or nature.
81
See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, f. 438rO–vP.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 41

mind, for instance, is not part of the essence of a triangle. If it were,

then triangles would of necessity exist in the mind, just as triangles of
necessity have angles equal to two right angles. The same reasoning
applies, for Henry, to the property “to be in a supposit” with respect
to essences or forms. This is why, for Henry, “species”—species just
express forms or quiddities—“of themselves do not have the property
‘to be in a supposit’.”82
The line of reasoning sketched above allows Henry to show two
things. First, the argument explains why forms as such are universal in
the sense that they are common to many. They are common to many
because they are of themselves indeterminate with respect to possible
supposita. In this sense Henry’s later Quodlibet claries this important
presupposition of his doctrine of individuation, for he insisted from the
beginning that every form is universal and multipliable. Second, Giles’
appeal to a perfect being is a non-starter. It is unable to explain the
individuation of immaterial substances because of the difference that
exists between the essence or form in itself and the essence or form
insofar as it is determined to a supposit. Henry expresses this in terms
of his famous notion of esse essentiae: the essential being (esse essentiae) of
a form differs from its being in a supposit; Giles is wrong in apparently
denying this difference. To produce some form in actuality in a supposit
requires thus a further determination of the form or species, even for
immaterial substances, and because of their qualitative difference, no
degree of the former can bring about the latter. Given this requirement
for being a supposit, God is for Henry perfectly capable of producing
different angels of one species.83 Against Giles, one can conclude that
a multitude of angels under a species does not conict with the pres-
ent course of nature; it does not require God’s changing the order of
creation. But whether it follows from this general possibility that there
are actually many existing angels of one species is yet another question
and one that Henry intends to leave completely open.84
Henry also used his controversy with Giles as an occasion to clarify
some central points of his own account of individuation. One passage
is especially important. After repeating the main lines of his earlier
expositions, Henry concludes:

82
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, f. 438vQ.
83
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, f. 439rX.
84
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. 2, ed. Badius, f. 440rF.

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And in this way the positive individuation of an angel is caused “efciently”

only through the producing agent and formally only through this being
[i.e., the being proper to the supposit]. But I have sufciently explained
elsewhere how individuation happens to take place negatively.85
This passage is obviously a reaction to criticism of the sort Roger
Marston advanced against the idea that the principle of individuation
is a purely negative principle, namely a double negation. Yet it should
rst and foremost be read as an explanation of how Henry’s own
accounts of the principle of individuation in Quodlibet II (existence) and
Quodlibet V (double negation) go together: both “principles” are in fact
one and the same explained from different perspectives. From the “posi-
tive” perspective, individuation is caused by something “intentionally”
added to the form or essence—and thus Marston’s objection seems to
fall short, at least in part. But this addition causes a double negation.
And since individuality is often dened in negative terms, namely in
terms of indivisibility and incommunicability, Henry takes recourse to
a double negation as principle of individuation. But both accounts are
best considered as two sides of the same coin.
Although Giles of Rome himself did not dispute another quodlibetal
question in reply to Henry’s criticism,86 it is not difcult to imagine
that he might not have been too impressed with Henry’s objections.
Giles rejects the notion of esse essentiae and does not hold that forms
as such are universal or common. Since Giles defends the real distinc-
tion between essence and being he might not have problems accepting
that being in a supposit is in a sense accidental to the form or essence
of an immaterial substance. Still, given his idea of the perfection of
being in angels, he would presumably have insisted that the degree of
actual being angels have (if they exist) is not accidental. And so angels,
at least according to the present order, are not multipliable by many
“existences.”
In his later Quodlibeta, Giles occasionally comes back to his account
of individuation of material objects. There he is particularly concerned
with the notion of the extension of matter or quantity of matter (quan-
titas materiae) (as distinguished from the extension of quantity or quantity
tout court) and he tries to add further clarications to his earlier account.

85
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. 1, ed. Badius, f. 439rV.
86
Giles’ mature views on individuation can be found in In II Sententiarum, d. 3, p. 1,
q. 2, aa. 1–4, ed. cit., pp. 179–204.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 43

Of what sort is this peculiar quantity of matter that Giles readily iden-
ties with Averroes’ indeterminate dimensions?87 In Quodlibet V, q. 14
(1289/90 or 1290/91), for example, Giles repeats his earlier solution:
quantity causes the extension of matter and it is this extension or quan-
tity of matter (and not a quantitative form) that is then responsible for
individuating forms, for there can be nothing between form and mat-
ter. Yet Giles adds a new nuance: the mode quantity causes in matter
is a real addition, although it is not the addition of another thing (for
instance, of an accidental form), otherwise there would be an innite
regress.88 But despite these minor additions and changes, his general
views on individuation remain fundamentally the same.

Godfrey of Fontaines and Peter of Auvergne

Godfrey of Fontaines shares Giles of Rome’s reservations about the

inclusion of articles on individuation in the Condemnation of 1277.
In his twelfth Quodlibet (debated 1296/97)89 he was asked to reply to
the question “Whether the bishop of Paris sins by neglecting to correct
some articles condemned by his predecessor” (q. 5). Godfrey favors a
correction: “To impose restraints and shackles” in questions that are
of no danger at all to faith and morals means nothing else than to
inhibit “the pursuit of truth.” Truth in these matters is rather to be
sought in disputation than by means of academic censorship. Articles
81 and 96 of the condemnation, to which Godfrey explicitly refers, fall
under this category; they express plausible opinions, for they have been

87
See Giles of Rome, Quodlibet IV, q. 1 (“Whether God can make it so two accidents
of the same species exist at the same time in the same subject”) and q. 9 (“Whether
an accident can exist in two subjects”); Quodlibet V, q. 14 (“Whether something can
really be distinct from itself without something that is called another thing but only
through some other disposition”). For the problems Giles had in further explaining
the idea of extension of matter or quantity of matter, see Donati, “La dottrina delle
dimensioni indeterminate.”
88
Giles of Rome, Quodlibet V, q. 14, ed. cit., p. 307. If quantity weren’t by itself able
to cause extension in matter, then maybe it could by impressing extension on matter.
But if quantity doesn’t have this capacity of immediately producing extension in its
subjects, then this extension too would need to imprint another extension to cause
the extension of its subject, and this new extension again had to impress yet another
extension, etc.
89
For the dates of Godfrey’s Quodlibeta see the chapter by Wippel in volume I, esp.
n. 1, and J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late
Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (Washington, DC 1981), pp. xxiii–xxviii.

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defended by many “Catholic doctors,” so they should never have been

condemned in the rst place.90
Earlier in his career, in Quodlibet VI (Advent 1289) and Quodlibet VII
(1290/91 or 1291/92), Godfrey contributed his part to the pursuit of
truth concerning individuation. Question 5 of Quodlibet VII has received
considerable attention in the secondary literature, partly because
Godfrey’s solution in this question was later “recycled” by Peter of
Auvergne for his own discussion of individuation. Like John Wippel,
however, I believe that Quodlibet VI, q. 16, a question that “ofcially”
deals with the numerical unity of the resurrected body, provides us
with a better understanding of Godfrey’s view and his sources.91 In his
response, which obviously requires some clarication about the notion
of unity involved, Godfrey introduces the traditional distinction between
two kinds of unity. On the one hand, there is so-called transcendental
unity, the unity that is convertible with being; on the other, there is unity
that is the principle of number, unity that belongs to the category of
quantity. This distinction is easily misunderstood, as Godfrey himself
admits, because in a sense both kinds of unity have to do with number,
but the idea behind it is more or less clear: all things insofar as they
exist are one, but there is another sense of unity that applies only to
those things having quantity, i.e., extended objects. Godfrey also offers
a “denition” of unity: to be one is not to be divided in itself, but to
be divided from other things.92
The so-called transcendental unity is obviously closely related to
the issue of individuation. For to be an individual just means to be
numerically one and not divided in itself, but divided (or distinct) from
everything else. So not surprisingly Godfrey turns to the causes of tran-
scendental unity, i.e., to the causes of the individuality of individuals:

90
Quodlibet XII, q. 5, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 101–2. For this passage see also Aertsen,
“Thesen zur Individuation,” pp. 251–2; J.F. Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines at the
University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century,” in Nach der
Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des
13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, and A. Speer, eds. (Miscellanea
Mediaevalia, 28) (Berlin-New York 2001) (pp. 359–89), pp. 386–9.
91
The importance of this text is also emphasized by Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought
of Godfrey of Fontaines, pp. 353–5. For Godfrey’s doctrine of individuation in general,
see ibid., pp. 349–69; J.F. Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, and John
Baconthorpe,” in Individuation in Scholasticism, Gracia, ed., pp. 221–56; E. Hocedez,
“Une question inédite de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation,” Revue néoscolastique de
philosophie 36 (1934), pp. 355–86.
92
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VI, q. 16, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, p. 256.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 45

But what exists does not exist except individually and so everything exist-
ing is an individual. To be an individual, I say, formally belongs to an
individual through its form by which it is what it is and by which it is
undivided in itself but divided from other things. What does the supposit
and individual . . . add to the nature and by what does such an individuation
happen? Although this does not belong to the present inquiry, nevertheless
it seems that the efcient cause is the agent producing the nature into
actual being (esse existentiae). For the endpoint of the action of any agent
whatever is nothing else than a singular thing (hoc aliquid). Formally the
individual or supposit does not seem to add anything positive, but it adds
in some way a negation.
And he then goes on to explain, basically with the same arguments as Henry
of Ghent, why no positive addition can account for individuation.93
The passage is very illuminating. On the one hand, it shows Henry’s
inuence on Godfrey’s account of individuation, and on the other, it
allows us to notice important differences. Since everything that exists
is an individual, matter cannot be the precise cause of individuation.
For Godfrey, as for Henry, the efcient cause of an object is a cause
of its individuation. But because it is by their form as an intrinsic
principle that objects exist in actuality, individuality is formally caused
by forms. Godfrey thus rejects Henry’s idea of something else being
the formal cause of individuation. In particular, he does not say that
actual being (esse existentiae) is the principle of individuation, although
he calls the production of a nature into actual being the result of the
efcient cause. I believe that the reason for this refusal lies in Godfrey’s
rejection of the real as well as of the intentional distinction between
being and essence that he defends elsewhere.94 If the individual really
does not add anything positive to the nature, then it does not add an
intention either.
But what does Godfrey think about quantity or quantitative mat-
ter, traditionally considered principles of individuation? He does not
deny that quantity has a role in individuation, but it cannot be the
sole principle of individuation, for not everything that is individual or
has transcendental unity is also extended. Quantity or, more precisely,
continuous quantity has a special feature that explains its role in indi-
viduation. Continuous quantity is divisible into parts of the same kind:
the parts of a line are still lines, parts of a surface are still surfaces, and
so on. And quantity conveys this characteristic to quantitative objects:

93
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VI, q. 16, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, p. 257.
94
See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, pp. 79–99.

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a part of a stone, as Godfrey remarks, is a stone and generally every

part of a material body is itself a material body. In all of these cases
quantity causes a numerical difference that is not a difference in kind
(species)—the stone that was a part of a stone is obviously not different
in kind!95 Quantity thus has to account for the individuality of objects
belonging to the same species, such as human beings.
In Quodlibet VI, q. 16, it looks as if there are two principles of indi-
viduation or unity, one for substantial or transcendental unity (form)
and one for what we might call “numerical unity” (quantity). But
how do they relate? Some clarication on this issue can be found in
Quodlibet VII, q. 5. The question Godfrey pursues in this later Quodlibet
is “Whether the supposit adds something positive to the essence or
nature.” It can already be gathered from the quotation above that
Godfrey rejects this idea, defended by Giles of Rome and in a sense
also by Henry of Ghent.96
Since different individuals come together under one common spe-
cies, it seems that natures as expressed by these species are contracted
and determined to this or that individual. Yet this determination can
only occur through something outside the essences, something that is
accidental to an essence. Thus it seems as if individuation is brought
about by accidents, as Porphyry, Boethius, John of Damascus, and
Avicenna held. For obvious reasons, however, accidents cannot cause
individuation. Godfrey offers a whole battery of arguments against
this idea. One of these is already well known to us: since accidents are
ontologically posterior to their subjects, accidents are rather individuated
by their subjects than vice-versa.97 Subsuming John of Damascus and
Avicenna in the group of people holding the individuation-by-accident
view is clearly a way to distance oneself from Henry of Ghent’s posi-
tion, for whom these two gures are proponents of what he considered
the correct view of individuation.98

95
See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VI, q. 16, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp. 258–9.
96
Henry would of course deny that the supposit adds some positive thing to the nature;
but Godfrey seems to be justied in treating Henry here together with Giles insofar as
both hold that the supposit is something different from the nature and is thus something
that is more than just the nature (whether because there is a real or only an intentional
addition to the nature); L.M. de Rijk, “Giraldus Odonis, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Peter
Auriol on the Principle of Individuation,” in “Ad Ingenii Acuitionem”. Studies in Honor of
Alfonso Maierù, R. Imbach et al., eds. (Turnhout 2007), pp. 403–36, here pp. 409–22.
97
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp. 319ff. For
a comprehensive interpretation of this question, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought
of Godfrey of Fontaines, pp. 227–41 and 349–64.
98
Godfrey speaks of the view of the philosophi et sancti doctores, which is denitely

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 47

If it were possible for individuation to be caused by an accident,

then, Godfrey remarks, quantity would be the only serious candidate.
But quantity cannot be the efcient or nal cause of individuation.
Nor can it be the material cause, “because the subject or substance
composed of matter and substantial form is the matter (i.e., the material
cause) of an accident (i.e., of quantity), and not the other way round.”
And nally quantity cannot be a formal cause of individuation; if it
were, individual things would only differ from each other accidentally
(namely, by an accidental form), but not substantially.99 But as we know
from Quodlibet VI, Godfrey wants to maintain that quantity plays a
role in the individuation of corporeal objects belonging to the same
species. How is this possible? Godfrey’s way out of this dilemma lies
in his understanding of quantity as a “dispositive principle” ( principium
dispositivum) of individuation, a dispositive principle that belongs on the
side of matter.100 The idea behind this is quite traditional: matter is in
a way the material principle of the individuation of corporeal objects.
But matter as such is indivisible and thus incapable of individuating
forms unless it is rendered divisible by something that is by itself divis-
ible. Quantity is what renders matter divisible, and it is qua matter that
quantity causes individuation. In other words, quantity’s causal role in
individuation is reduced to the causality of matter.101
At this point Godfrey’s account of quantity’s role in individuation
seems to provoke the traditional objections. Isn’t quantity an accident
and thus ontologically posterior to the substance in which it inheres?
Godfrey counters by distinguishing different senses of priority. It is true
that form is prior to matter and extension, for it is form that gives matter
(and extension) its actual existence; but form is not prior to matter and
extension in terms of “subjectivity,” that is, in insofar as form inheres in
matter. In Godfrey’s words, according to the order of formal causality,

a reference to the vocabulary Henry uses in Quodlibet II, q. 8, to introduce different

positions. However, this is as close as Godfrey gets to attacking Henry’s view. Godfrey’s
arguments against the individuation-by-accident view seem to have no force against
Henry’s doctrine. For Henry the individuating factor is something accidental with
respect to the essence or common nature, but it is of course no accident in the strict
sense. And since the essence, for instance, is by itself not a complete subject capable
of receiving real accidents, the above-mentioned argument doesn’t apply.
99
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp. 322–3.
100
The idea that quantity is a dispositive principle is not new; it can already be
found in Thomas Aquinas. See Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 2.
101
See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp.
325–6.

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form is indeed prior to matter and extension (or quality), but accord-
ing to the order of material causality, matter and extension are prior
to form. So the objection according to which quantity is something
ontologically posterior to form (or the substance) does not apply,
because there is a sense in which quantity (Godfrey is obviously
thinking here of undetermined quantity, quantity with undetermined
dimensions) is prior to the individual form and the resulting sub-
stance. And this is enough for Godfrey to make room for quantity
to be a dispositive principle of individuation.102 Godfrey’s response
to the objection sounds like a trick; yet there is undoubtedly some
truth in it. Many people who use the objection believe matter has an
explanatory role in our account of composite substances. But mat-
ter is in a sense ontologically posterior to form. This, however, does
not lead those people to discard the notion of matter and to deny
matter causal roles. Godfrey merely applies this insight to quantity.
In considering substantial form the principle of individuation,
Godfrey’s account of individuation has the virtue of covering material
substances as well as immaterial ones.103 But what exactly does it mean
to call form the principle of individuation? In the passage quoted above,
he calls form that which “formally” makes something an individual.
This sounds like a truism. If forms are really what render their objects
individual, one might say, they can do so only if they themselves are
individual or singular. Are all forms individual forms for Godfrey? But
what makes forms individual? And isn’t the latter the true principle of
individuation? Confronted with such questions, Godfrey would probably
(like Roger Marston) have replied that this concern arises from a cat-
egory mistake. Nowhere in his discussion of individuation does Godfrey
talk about individual or singular forms. Individuality or transcendental
unity applies primarily to things that actually exist and not to forms as
such. An individual, existing tree is therefore individualized by a form
precisely insofar as the form causes it to exist (and not insofar as there
is an individual form for each tree, a form that then transmits its indi-
viduality to what it informs). From here, the role of matter, informed
by quantity, becomes equally clear. Strictly speaking, quantity does not
individuate material objects because it individuates, through matter, the

102
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, p. 327.
103
For Godfrey’s views regarding the individuation of human souls and angels, see
Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, pp. 364–9.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 49

forms of composite substances; rather quantity prepares a chunk of

matter which can then serve as the subject of form. And by providing
a subject for a form, which then brings about the individual existence
of a composite material substance, quantity or matter, respectively, can
be called a principle of individuation.104 Of course, by being in differ-
ent subjects specic forms of material objects, for example the form
of beaver, are multiplied: the form in the actually existing beaver1 is
distinct from the form of the actually existing beaver2. We might even
want to talk about individual forms here, and we might want to say
that through these individual substantial forms each individual has its
individuality.105 Again, however, it is not the individuality of these forms
that makes material substances individual, but their individuality is the
result of these forms’ causing something to exist in actuality.
These clarications are important. (1) Some readers of Godfrey,
both his contemporaries and modern scholars, assume that there is
an ambiguity in his use of the term individuatio. For Robert Arway, for
instance, Godfrey’s main aim in Quodlibet VII, q. 5, is individuality and
not individuation proper. Form is not the principle of individuation
but of individuality. Arway concludes: “With regard to the principle of
individuation Godfrey seems to have agreed with St Thomas in assigning
this role to matter signed by dimensive quantity.”106 I don’t think that
the distinction between individuality and individuation is helpful for
understanding Godfrey’s account. To be an individual is to be undivided

104
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp. 323–4: “Ergo
etiam in materialibus forma per quam individuum est id quod est et subsistit in natura
est etiam principium individuationis, quia per illud per quod aliquid est id quod est est
individuum et unum, sed substantia materialis per formam subsistit in esse . . . Et quia
materia est in potentia ad formam per quam existit in actu, de se est in potentia ad
indivisionem quae est per ipsam formam et pro tanto est principium individuationis
pro quanto est principium quoddam formae, scilicet sicut subiectum.”
105
Godfrey comes close to saying something like this in the following passage (Quodlibet
VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp. 328–9): “Patet ergo quod in materialibus eius
quod est esse individuum sive individuationes, id est indivisionis in se et divisionis
ab aliis eiusdem speciei, quae solo numero differre dicuntur, causa per se secundum
genus causae formalis est forma substantialis in uno existens formaliter in se indivisa
et a forma quae est in quocumque alio eiusdem speciei divisa et distincta, ita quod
illae formae substantiales sunt plures se ipsis ad invicem formaliter differentes, licet
dividi sicut extendi formaliter competit eis ex quantitate qua materia quam percit
forma materialis et simul etiam in hoc ipsa forma substantialis extenditur et dividitur
formaliter.”
106
R.J. Arway, “A Half Century of Research on Godfrey of Fontaines,” The New
Scholasticism 36 (1962), p. 206, n. 36.

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in itself and to be divided from something else; individuality furthermore

is a necessary feature of actual, existing things. In this respect, form
is the primary principle of individuation because it makes things indi-
vidual, it individuates them, by bringing them into existence. Quantity
is a principle of individuation only insofar as it is a subject of form.
By itself, matter does not bring it about that something is undivided
in itself and divided from something else. Godfrey, in my opinion, is
absolutely justied to call form the principle of individuation.
(2) There are some striking similarities between Roger Marston’s
teaching on individuation and Godfrey’s. Both regard individuality
primarily as a concomitant feature of existence, and both call form
a formal principle of individuation. Like Marston, Godfrey too men-
tions a material cause of individuation (matter under the disposition
of indeterminate quantity) and an efcient one (the agent producing a
substance).107 But contrary to Marston, for whom individuation seems
equally caused by all the causes of an object, Godfrey really singles out
form. It is thus not surprising that Peter of Auvergne, whose account
of individuation closely follows Godfrey’s, will nally call form the “per
se cause of individuation.”108
Peter of Auvergne is a good example of the inuence Godfrey’s teach-
ing on individuation exercised on his contemporaries. In his Metaphysics
commentary (one of Peter’s earlier works), Peter defended the peculiar
doctrine that individuation is caused by a relation, namely a relation to
the agent. Form, matter, and accidents are ruled out as individuating
factors because they are all in themselves common and need themselves
to be individuated. Peter agrees that individuation can only occur with
something added to the substance or nature, but this addition can, for
obvious reasons, be neither an accident nor something substantial like
matter or form. Individuation, he therefore concludes, is not caused by
the addition of a thing to the substance but by the addition of a ratio,
namely by a relation to the substance’s agent cause.109 This idea seems

107
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, p. 329.
108
The texts relevant to Peter of Auvergne’s teaching on individuation are edited
in E. Hocedez, “Une question inédité de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation,” Revue
Néoscolastique de Philosophie 36 (1934), pp. 355–86. See here Quodlibet II, q. 5, ed. Hocedez,
p. 377: “Per hoc apparet principium quid scilicet per se sit principium individuationis
substantie composite quoniam forma per quam subsistit. Ex hoc apparet quod indivi-
duum dicit indivisionem in esse, quod est per formam.”
109
See In VIII Metaphysicorum, q. 25, ed. Hocedez, p. 386: “Sic ergo apparet omnibus
istis per quid substantia dicitur individua et hoc aliquid, quoniam non per materiam, nec

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 51

odd: how can relations individualize that in which they are founded?
Isn’t the opposite the case, namely that relations are individualized by
their foundations? However this may be, when Peter, many years later,
disputes his Quodlibet II (Advent 1297), he has completely changed his
mind. In using large junks of Godfrey’s own text, question 5 of Peter’s
Quodlibet II fully endorses Godfrey’s view.110

James of Viterbo, OESA

Not long after Godfrey of Fontaines disputed his Quodlibeta VI and

VII, the Augustinian master of theology James of Viterbo held his
rst Quodlibet (1293).111 Like Godfrey before him, James was asked to
respond to a question about the numerical unity of the resurrected
body and, again like Godfrey, James uses this occasion to talk about
what causes the numerical unity of a composite substance (q. 21). He
admits that what is an individual and what is numerically one might
strictly speaking not be the same; according to some unnamed ancient
writers the causes of individuality are different from those of numerical
unity. But for didactical purposes James is happy to consider them the
same, for this, as he says, allows him to show that one can speak about
the causes of numerical unity in different ways (i.e., according to the
different ways people try to account for individuation).112

per formam, nec per aliquod accidens, nec universaliter per aliquam rem sibi addi-
tam, sed per solum respectum.” Someone might wonder why a relation is, according
to Peter, a ratio and not a thing (res). Peter’s understanding is obviously inuenced by
Henry of Ghent, for whom relations do not add new things to the accidents in which
they are founded. Relations are by themselves mere rationes, but not rationes in the sense
of purely mental constructs. For Henry’s theory of relations see M.G. Henninger,
Relations: Medieval Theories, 1250 –1325 (Oxford 1989), pp. 40–58. Because of Henry’s
impact on Peter’s Metaphysics commentary it seems most likely that the commentary
has to be dated to the late 1270s (after 1277) or early 1280s. See also G. Galle, “A
Comprehensive Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 42
(2000), p. 58, n. 21.
110
For the date of this Quodlibet, see the following chapter by Schabel. Wippel,
“Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, and John Baconthorpe,” offers a detailed
analysis of Peter’s text (pp. 228–35); see also Hocedez, “Un question inédité de Pierre
d’Auvergne.”
111
For the date of James’ Quodlibeta (discussed by Schabel and Courtenay below) as
well as for James’ teaching on individuation, see J.F. Wippel, “James of Viterbo,” in
Individuation in Scholasticism, Gracia, ed., pp. 257–69.
112
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. E. Ypma (Würzburg 1968), p. 223.

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So the rst main section of Quodlibet I, q. 21, basically presents many

well-known views about individuation. The rst view James mentions
is that individuation or individuality is caused by the agent. The causes
of being and the causes of being an individual seem to be identical;
everything that exists exists as an individual. Yet the agent is a cause
of being, so it should also be considered a cause of individuality. This
view is problematic, however, because the agent is obviously only an
extrinsic cause. It cannot explain what makes a composite substance
intrinsically an individual.113 What about accidents as entities that
account for the intrinsic cause of individuation? Quantity seems to be
an especially promising candidate, because quantity has the feature of
being self-individuating. But that can’t be true either: an individual has
a certain essential or substantial unity that is more fundamental than
an accidental unity. How could an accident possibly account for that?
And of course accidents are ontologically posterior to that in which
they inhere. Therefore they cannot render something individual; rather
they are signs of individuals.114 The color of my hair and my skin, my
height, my ngerprints, the spacio-temporal location of my body, all
these are features through which my individuality is manifest, but none
of these actually causes it. If that’s the case, there remain only two
other candidates: matter and form. But since form is of itself common
to many, matter seems to be the intrinsic principle of individuation.
James mentions two versions of how this might be the case: either mat-
ter absolutely and in itself is considered the principle of individuation
or matter is considered to individuate only insofar as it is subject to
indeterminate dimensions. Whatever version we adopt, the view that
matter is a principle of individuation is problematic too. If it is true
that existing and being an individual are the same, then, as was already
said, the principles of existence and individuality seem to be identical.
Now, matter is not a principle that brings about existence, so it can’t
be the principle of individuation. From this last point of view it seems
instead as if form is the principle we are looking for.115
James of Viterbo’s own account of individuation has to be under-
stood against the background of this census of different opinions. All
the positions seem to have something plausible and so James makes

113
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Ypma, p. 224.
114
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Ypma, pp. 224–5.
115
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Ypma, pp. 225–6.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 53

efforts to combine the strengths of these seemingly exclusive views. To

be numerically one, to be an individual, can mean two things. Either the
formula is used to refer to something insofar as it is singular (i.e., to its
singularity) or it is used to refer to something insofar as it is something
complete and perfect belonging to a species. According to this rst
meaning of individual, matter is the principle of individuation. Since
matter functions as a receptacle and cannot itself be received in some-
thing else (as in a receptacle), matter is what accounts for the unshared
singularity of an object. According to the second meaning of individual,
form is the principle of individuation. For it is through its form that
something is an existing and complete member of a species. So matter
and form are both principles of individuation of material substances
but in different respects.116 And at least one accident, namely quantity,
has a role in individuation too. The unity in the sense of singularity,
the unity that matter conveys to the object, has two aspects: there is a
substantial unity or singularity, of which matter, as has already been
said, is the cause, but there is also another kind of unity or singularity,
one that is accidental and thus secondary. James here obviously has in
mind what Godfrey of Fontaines referred to as the unity as principle of
number. The idea is simple: every composite substance has substantial
unity or singularity through its substance. But composite substances
can also be called one with regard to many other substances of the
same kind. Quantity—or better, quantitative dimensions—account for
this secondary kind of unity. Quantity conveys a special divisibility to
matter that allows for the plurality of members of a species.117 James
does not return to the agent, but there is no reason to doubt that his
considered account of individuation does include a positive, though
external, role for the efcient cause of individuation. With changes this
model also explains the individuality of immaterial substances. In this
case, in the absence of matter and quantitative dimensions in matter,
the nature or essence as it is in act is the cause of both their singularity
and their perfection.118
In his second Quodlibet, disputed in the following year (1294), James
further claries his understanding of individuation and makes it clear to
his audience once more that he considers individuation something that

116
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Ypma, pp. 226–8.
117
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Ypma, p. 227.
118
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Ypma, p. 228.

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applies to the whole individual and that is brought about by many differ-
ent factors. Question 1 of Quodlibet II deals with the question “Whether
God can produce an accident without a subject.” It seems as if at least
quantity could exist without a subject, because quantity doesn’t require
a subject for its individuation. Quantity is self-individuating. As we’ve
seen, this latter claim about quantity is quite common in debates about
individuation119 and rarely the object of a critical examination. James
is determined to show why the claim is wrong. Again James starts from
the meaning of the term “individual.” The term is normally applied
in two main respects: (1) to express the singularity of an object; (2) to
express the exclusivity of an object, i.e., to express that in its totality
the object does not conform to something else. Both aspects are genu-
inely different; it is possible that something is a singular and conforms
to something else.120 The new distinction is not identical with the one
James mentioned in his rst Quodlibet, but there seems to be a direct
connection between the exclusivity feature and the perfection feature
(from Quodlibet I). However this may be, a quantity cannot be called
an individual, because quantities are neither singulars nor exclusive.
Singulars are incommunicable; they cannot be received in something
else as in a receptacle. But of course quantities can be received in
something else; quantities are accidents, and accidents, at least accord-
ing the natural order of things, inhere in subjects. Accidents are also
not exclusive in the sense that they do not conform to each other. Two
surfaces of exactly the same size, for example, naturally conform to each
other. Exclusivity is a result of combining many different properties. The
set of properties applying to me makes me very different from the set
of properties applying to other people around me. One quantity is not
of itself capable of being exclusive.121 Quantities, James concludes, are
therefore not self-individuating, but quantity has in itself a capacity to

119
See, for instance, above p. 36 (Giles of Rome).
120
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 1, ed. Ypma, pp. 15–16: “Individuum enim
dupliciter solet accipi a philosophis, quantum ad propositum pertinet. Uno enim modo
sumitur individuum pro singulari; et sic dicitur quod haec humanitas et haec albedo
est individua. Alio modo dicitur individuum quod secundum se totum nulli alii potest
esse conforme; et sic sumptum individuum addit aliquid supra singulare. Illud enim
quod est singulare potest esse alii conforme, ut haec albedo huic albedini.”
121
This idea, according to which individuality in the second meaning is related to
a multitude of properties, can be read as a defense of the individuation-by-accidents
view. James here also mentions Porphyry, who is normally cited as someone defending
the role of accidents in individuation.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 55

be divided.122 Presumably it’s the latter capacity that those who appeal
to quantity confuse with the capacity for self-individuation.
James of Viterbo’s discussion of the principle of individuation is
peculiar. Certainly, his solution is somewhat similar to that of Godfrey
of Fontaines, yet the attitudes of these two writers are different. Unlike
Godfrey, James seems to be driven by the desire to offer a compromise
position with which everyone can to some extent agree.123 Those who
defend matter’s role in individuation will be pleased by his account, as
well as those who claim this role for forms, and so on.

Franciscan Authors before John Duns Scotus: Peter John Olivi,

Peter Sutton, Vital du Four

Godfrey of Fontaines and even more James of Viterbo attempt to pro-

vide an account of individuation that combines insights from opposing
traditions. Theories like that of Roger Marston are partly true insofar
as they rightly stress the role of form in individuation, and theories that
emphasize the role of matter and quantity are also true in a certain
respect. Their harmonizing attitude becomes clearer if we look briey
at the tremendous opposition to the latter view, an opposition that was
mostly articulated by Franciscan authors.
Presumably during his three years in Montpellier (1289–92), Peter
John Olivi debated the question “Whether individuals belonging to the
same species differ according to their substance or only by accident”
(Quodlibet III, q. 4).124 His answer states clearly that individuals differ
by their substances, yet Olivi does not provide us with an explanation
of how exactly this is meant.125 Olivi is more concerned with showing
how individuals do not differ. They cannot differ merely by means of
accidents, for accidents, according to one of the many arguments Olivi
draws upon, by being ontologically posterior to substances in which
they inhere, cannot account for a real difference between individuals.126

122
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 1, ed. Ypma, p. 16.
123
See also Wippel, “James of Viterbo,” p. 264.
124
For the date see the preface (pp. 125–6) of the edition: Petri Iohannis Olivi Quodlibeta
Quinque, ed. S. Defraia (Grottaferrata 2002), and Piron’s chapter in volume I, p. 416.
125
Peter John Olivi, Quodlibet III, q. 4, ed. Defraia, p. 177.
126
Peter John Olivi, Quodlibet III, q. 4, ed. Defraia, p. 177. These passages are
interesting because they show that for Peter individuatio basically means “individuality”
and is not necessarily that by which individuality is attained. See ibid.: “Constat enim

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Matter is equally inappropriate, because in order to individuate matter

would need to have a causal power with respect to forms that it simply
does not have.127 Common to all such attempts, and in Olivi’s diagnosis
the root of all errors, is the idea that unity (and individuality) must be
accounted for by something really added to what is to be individuated.
Nothing is one in virtue of something added to it, however, for this
would lead to an innite regress.128 Further, Olivi puts considerable effort
in his attempt to show that the whole idea of matter’s being pluried by
quantity is also wrong. According to one argument, for instance, matter
can only have (or be under) an accident if it already exists prior to the
accident. Yet in order to exist, matter has to be under a substantial
form and, as actually existing matter, unity and a numerical plurality
would belong to it. So what further role could quantity possibly play in
the plurication of matter?129 To my knowledge there is no discussion
of individuation of angels in Olivi’s Quodlibeta. But this issue is amply
discussed in his Questions on the second book of the Sentences.130
Quodlibet I of the two Quodlibeta attributed to the English Franciscan
Peter Sutton is another example of a more critical attitude towards the
view according to which matter or quantity causes individuation.131 In
question 12 (“Whether there is individuation in corporeal substances”),
Peter distinguishes three kinds of unities: the unity of the genus, the
unity of the species, and the unity of the individual. A thing has the

quod indiuiduatio unius indiuidui est alio numero ab indiuiduatione alterius. Constat
enim quod iste ab inuicem differunt per seipsas . . . Si indiuiduatio est accidens, ergo
est in aliquo, ut accidens in subiecto . . .”
127
Peter John Olivi, Quodlibet III, q. 4, ed. Defraia, p. 178.
128
Peter John Olivi, Quodlibet III, q. 4, ed. Defraia, p. 178. For Olivi’s argument
for why unity cannot be explained in terms of an addition, see his Quaestiones in II
Sententiarum, q. 13, ed. B. Jansen, vol. I (Quaracchi 1922), pp. 231–55.
129
Peter John Olivi, Quodlibet III, q. 4, ed. Defraia, p. 179.
130
See T. Suarez-Nani, “Pierre de Jean Olivi et la subjectivité angélique,” AHDLMA
70 (2003), pp. 233–316. For a general discussion of Olivi’s views regarding individu-
ation, see W. Hoeres, “Der Unterschied von Wesenheit und Individuation bei Olivi,”
Scholastik 38 (1963), pp. 54–61.
131
It is unknown when exactly this Quodlibet was debated. For G. Etzkorn, the edi-
tor, any date between 1285 and 1323 is in principle possible. If Peter Sutton really
is the author, then the Quodlibet was most probably held in the years 1309–11 (the
time when Peter was active in Oxford). See G. Etzkorn, “Petrus Sutton (?), O.F.M.,
Quodlibeta,” Franciscan Studies 23 (1963) ( pp. 68–139), p. 70, and Duba’s chapter in
this volume. But nothing in the author’s teaching on individuation forces us to date
this Quodlibet so late. There is for instance no inuence of Duns Scotus’ teaching on
individuation. From the point of view of the doctrine of individuation this Quodlibet
could be fairly early (late 1280s).

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rst unity from what Peter calls the unity of potency and the second
from the form or the unity of act, and he declares that the unity of
the individual is the result of the actual union of both, i.e., form and
potency (matter). By adopting this view according to which the individu-
ation of corporeal substances happens via both matter and form, Peter
turns out to defend a stance that can be traced back to Bonaventure.132
In his rather short question, Peter also mentions the agent and accidents
and their respective roles in individuation:
But because an agent produces such a union [of matter and form] and
because an accident discloses and highlights it, it is said by some that
individuation is caused by the agent—and it is true [that the agent causes
individuation] effectively [i.e., as an efcient cause]. And by some it is said
that individuation is caused by an accident—and it is true [that accidents
cause individuation] by disclosing it. But individuation is caused formally
and completely by the union of form and matter in effect.133
Whereas as an efcient cause the agent has a real causal role in indi-
viduation, the role of accidents is merely to point out the individuality
of individuals to us human beings. Aristotle, on Peter’s understanding,
seemed to have attributed individuation to matter alone, presumably
because Aristotle thought that matter individuates corporeal substances
due to its own prior individuation (due to quantity). But according to
Peter, matter, insofar as it has been individuated by a preceding form,
is only an accidental cause of individuation.134 The crucial point in the
individuation of a corporal substance is that the matter of this substance
is in potency towards the form of the substance (and not whether mat-
ter already has accidentally some other form). Peter does not explicitly
mention quantity and the role it could possibly play in individuation,
but one suspects he would be equally dismissive. From this perspective
his reply to the question “Whether indeterminate dimensions have to
be posited in matter” (Quodlibet I, q. 8) is somewhat surprising. Instead
of rejecting the idea of indeterminate quantitative dimensions, Peter
calls both opinions—that of the defenders of such dimensions and that

132
See Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ed. cit., pp. 109–10. For
Bonaventure’s teaching on individuation, see also P. King, “Bonaventure,” in Individuation
in Scholasticism, Gracia, ed., pp. 141–72.
133
Peter Sutton (?), Quodlibet I, q. 12, ed. Etzkorn, p. 93.
134
Peter Sutton (?), Quodlibet I, q. 12, ed. Etzkorn, p. 93.

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of their opponents—“plausible,” and he abstains from determining in

favor of one or the other.135
As with Olivi, the Franciscan studium in Montpellier is probably also
where Vital du Four disputed his rst Quodlibet (1296).136 His target in
question 9 of Quodlibet I is the view that spiritual substances are individu-
ated by themselves and material substances are individuals on account
of quantity; no doubt he has Thomas Aquinas in mind. This view is
incorrect with regard to the individuation of immaterial substances,
for it makes those substances into necessary beings. If an immaterial
substance is of itself an individual, then it is also of itself an existing
being.137 Obviously, Vital is here inuenced by Henry of Ghent’s criti-
cism of Aquinas’ theory of individuation. But the view targeted is also
erroneous with regard to the individuation of material substances: quan-
tity cannot turn a universal substance into an individual one, because
quantity is of itself abstract and thus common to many things. And
quantity is ontologically posterior to the subject in which it inheres.138
Vital also advances a more specic argument: quantitative matter is the
subject of change; it basically remains the same in number when, for
instance, air undergoes corruption and re is generated. So if quantity
were the principle of individuation, air and re would be numerically
identical.139 This, I believe, is a very bad argument and it demonstrates
a complete misunderstanding of the opponent’s position. People who
hold that quantity is the principle of individuation are not bound to
hold that quantity or quantitative matter is the principle of identity
(and persistence). Indeed, for many of them, form is the principle that
accounts for identity and persistence over time, yet the individuation of
these forms is due to their (initial) occurrence in matter. Vital’s positive
account of individuation is very similar to Henry of Ghent’s. Essences
are not individuated by the addition of another thing. Such a thing
could only be an accident or a substance, but both alternatives lead
to serious trouble. Essences are nevertheless not individuated by them-
selves, however; they are individuated insofar as they exist in actuality.
Existence is therefore the principle of individuation.140

135
Peter Sutton (?), Quodlibet I, q. 18, ed. Etzkorn, pp. 86–8.
136
For the date see the preface to Delorme’s edition, Vitalis de Furno Quodlibeta tria,
ed. F.M. Delorme (Rome 1947), and Piron’s chapter in volume I, p. 409.
137
Vital du Four, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Delorme, p. 20.
138
Vital du Four, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Delorme, p. 20.
139
Vital du Four, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Delorme, p. 21.
140
Vital du Four, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Delorme, p. 21. For Vital there is obviously no

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 59

There is a way that Vital’s account of individuation can be read as a

direct criticism of Godfrey’s—although it is unclear whether he actually
knew of Godfrey’s relevant quodlibetal questions. On the one hand,
individuation is for Vital (as for Henry) primarily about individuation of
forms or essences (and not of the individual objects); on the other, and
more important, Vital draws a distinction between individuation and
multiplication. The individuality of essences is one thing, the explanation
why there are many individuals under a species is another. For Godfrey,
as we saw, both aspects belong together, but for Vital multiplication
demands a different account. He seems to take it as an irreducible fact
that species allow for degrees among their members. In this sense there
are ve causes for the multiplicity of material individuals: the difference
between the degrees, actual existence (as the principle of individua-
tion), the principles of the individual (presumably the four causes), the
conjunction of these principles, and quantity as merely a sine qua non
cause. The causes of the multiplicity of immaterial substances are only
four, the ve causes mentioned minus quantity.141 To refer to quantity
(and presumably also to quantitative matter) as sine qua non cause (as
opposed to a real cause) seems to have been common among some
Franciscan authors and reminds one of Roger Marston.

The Dominicans Richard Knapwell, Thomas of Sutton, and John of Paris

As it was common for Franciscan authors to reject accounts of indi-

viduation that stress the role of matter or quantity, so it was common
for Dominican authors to defend the role of matter or quantity in
individuation, the view associated with Thomas Aquinas. Compared
with Richard Knapwell’s fervent advocacy of Aquinas’ teaching on
individuation in his Correctorium against William de la Mare, Richard’s
Quodlibet is somewhat disappointing. In question 16 of the Quodlibet
(Oxford, ca. 1284/85),142 Richard discusses the problem “Whether there
are many angels belonging to one species.” He denies this; because they

real distinction between existence and essence. Like Henry of Ghent, he believes that
the defenders of the real distinction are unable to give a proper account of creation
and generation.
141
Vital du Four, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Delorme, pp. 21–2.
142
For the date see T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 4 vols. (Rome
1970–1993), vol. III, pp. 306–7, and Friedman’s chapter in this volume. The Quodlibet
is only preserved in one manuscript, Cambridge, Peterhouse 128 (ff. 112r–119v).

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lack matter, angels differ from each other only as one species differs
from another, that is, by specic differences or, to use Richard’s term,
by degrees of nature (gradus naturae). Richard is not at all concerned
here with the individuation of material substances, and thus he does
not explain why matter is otherwise capable of individuating objects
that have matter. Most of his response deals with disproving the theory
that angels have something like spiritual matter (which might then be
capable of accounting for their individuality).143
Thomas of Sutton, another English Dominican, spent considerably
more effort in discussing quodlibetal questions on individuation. The
exact chronology of Sutton’s Quodlibeta is difcult to determine and the
proposed dates range from 1284–87 (Quodlibeta I–IV) to 1295–1305
(Quodlibeta I–II) and after 1311 (Quodlibeta III–IV).144 From the perspec-
tive of the theory of individuation, the earlier dates are impossible and
Johannes Schneider’s hypothesis of ca. 1293 for I–II and ca. 1300 for
III–IV is most plausible. Quodlibet III briey refers to Duns Scotus’
teaching on individuation, a fact that speaks in favor of a date after
1300. In the questions regarding individuation in Quodlibet I, Scotus’
inuence is completely absent, but this does not necessarily mean that
this Quodlibet was disputed many years earlier. It is plausible to assume
that already by the time of his rst Quodlibet Sutton knew of Godfrey’s
quodlibetal questions on individuation. This would point to a date
after 1291.145
Thomas of Sutton’s Quodlibeta argue strongly in favor of the indi-
viduation-by-accident view. According to Sutton, there is confusion
about the exact meaning of individuation and the principle or cause
of individuation, and once this confusion has been lifted the correct
account of individuation becomes clear. This is how Sutton begins his
reply in question 21 of Quodlibet I:
When it is asked “What is the cause of individuation of material sub-
stances?” the question asked is this: “What is the cause of its incom-
municability (causa incommunicabilitatis) or its being contracted under an
ultimate species (contractionis sub specie specialissima) so that it is predicated
of one thing alone and not of many?” Therefore to ask “What is the

143
See Cambridge, Peterhouse Library 128, f. 116vf. See Correctorium Corruptorii
“Quare,” art. 8 and art. 11, ed. Glorieux.
144
For these dates see the preface (pp. XIXff ) of the edition: Thomas von Sutton,
Quodlibeta, eds. M. Schmaus and M. González-Haba (Munich 1969).
145
See Schneider’s preface in Thomas von Sutton, Quaestiones ordinariae, ed.
J. Schneider (Munich 1977), pp. 45*–51*, and Friedman’s chapter below.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 61

cause of individuation?” is different from asking “What is the cause of an

individual?” An individual substance has all four causes, namely a mate-
rial, a formal, a nal, and an efcient cause. But not all of these causes
are causes of individuation, i.e., of the incommunicability or limitation
under an ultimate species.146
No doubt this remark is directed against some of the theories proposed
by Franciscan authors and also against the more conciliatory accounts
of Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo. These authors seem to
confuse causes and principles of individuation with causes and principles
of individuals. However, it is very unlikely that those criticized would
have been moved by Sutton’s remark. First, if the problem of individu-
ation is really the problem of the limitation and contraction of what is
contained in a species, then this presupposes the existence of something
that can be limited or contracted, namely a common form.147 Some of
the criticized authors reject this kind of common form (for example
Roger Marston). Second, someone might deny that Sutton’s use of the
term “individuation” is correct. Everything that exists is an individual,
so individuation seems to be what makes all things exist as individu-
als. From this point of view it is not unreasonable to run together the
causes of existence with the causes of individuality.
Given this specic understanding of individuation as rendering
something incommunicable, Sutton singles out quantity, or rather
dimensional quantity (quantitas dimensiva), as the “fundamental principle
of individuation” (radicale principium individuationis) of material substances.
Dimensional (or continuous) quantity has the peculiarity that its parts are
of exactly the same kind as that of which they are parts. Parts of lines
are still lines etc., and this is the kind of divisibility that is also needed
in the individuation of different members of the same species.148 On
Sutton’s picture quantity rst informs matter and thereby individuates
matter; forms are then contracted by being received in such individuated
matter. Someone could say that material substances are individuated by
matter, but because the individuality of matter is further reducible to

146
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, pp. 138–9.
Cf. also ibid., pp. 144–5. The title of the question Sutton discusses is “Whether the
principle of the individuation of a substance is a substantial property that by nature
precedes every accident.”
147
As a consequence Thomas of Sutton says that forms (at least the forms of
material objects) are by themselves common or universal. See, e.g., the text quoted
below in n. 149.
148
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 141.

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something else, this something else, namely quantity, is fundamentally

(radicaliter) responsible for individuation.149
As one can see, Sutton’s account of individuation entails two well-
known but controversial claims: (1) Quantity is capable of individuating
material substances because it is self-individuating. Authors such as
James of Viterbo would deny this.150 (2) The principle of individuation is
an accident. Sutton makes no effort to hide this fact, even emphasizing
that only dimensional quantity and nothing from the other categories is
capable of distinguishing one individual of a species from all the oth-
ers.151 He admits that the doctrine of individuation he has laid out is
controversial and might not appeal to many. Opponents would rather
like to say that material substances are individuated by themselves and
not by accidents.152 But such opponents confuse causes of individuals
with causes of individuation.
In the remainder of the reply, Sutton tries to make his account
more attractive by answering obvious objections. One of these objec-
tions derives from the nature of substantial generation. Substance has
a priority with regard to accidents such as quantity, because substance
is the endpoint of generation. Sutton grants this, but he also alludes
to Averroes’ doctrine of indeterminate dimensions and points out that,
before this process of generation comes to an end, there is quantity in
the matter in which this generation takes place.153 Sutton also wants to
make clear that his account of individuation does not deny that two
substances have their own individual substantiality. My individual sub-
stantiality is something that distinguishes me from other human beings

149
See Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 142:
“Materia enim existens sub una quantitate est eiusdem rationis cum materia existens
sub alia quantitate. Quia igitur per quantitatem habet distinctionem huiusmodi partium,
ideo per quantitatem habet individuationem. Forma autem materialis, quae communis
est quantum est de se, contrahitur per hoc quod recipitur in materia determinata. Et
sic individuatur et distinguitur per materiam illam ab omni alia forma eiusdem speciei.
Et sic relinquitur tota substantia composita individuata radicaliter per quantitatem.”
150
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 143: “Sola
quantitas in rebus materialibus per se individuatur.” For dimensional quantity as self-
individuating see also Quodlibet II, q. 6, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba pp. 211ff.
151
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 140: “Illud
autem, per quod distinguitur per se et primo unum individuum ab alio eiusdem speciei,
est quantitas dimensiva et nihil de genere substantiae nec de aliquo genere alio quam
de genere quantitatis.”
152
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 143:
“Verum est quod ista positio multis non placet, sed dicunt quod substantia materialis
per se ipsam individuatur et non per aliquod accidens.”
153
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, pp. 145–6.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 63

or other substances in general. From this, however, it does not follow

that my substantiality or substantiality in general is a rst principle of
individuation. To be sure, it is a principle of individuation; some of
my accidental features are individuated by the fact that they belong to
me. But individual substantiality is derivative, for it could never exist
in the rst place had there not been quantied matter. In this sense
dimensional quantity is the rst cause of individuation.154
Thomas of Sutton is quite explicit about the fact that this theory of
individuation only applies to material beings. But this is no disadvantage;
immaterial substances such as angels don’t have to be individuated.
Individuation as understood by Sutton is what makes species incommu-
nicable. But in the case of immaterial substances there can only be one
substance for each species. These species are already incommunicable.
There are individual immaterial substances, but there is no room or
need for their individuation.155
Later in his career, in Quodlibet III, q. 21 (“Whether a thing belonging
to a material nature has in itself something by which it is individuated”),
Thomas of Sutton is once again presented with the occasion to discuss
individuation. This later treatment repeats many of the points made
in his earlier Quodlibet. But there is one noteworthy addition: using
language recalling Godfrey of Fontaines,156 Sutton now describes the
role of quantity more precisely as disposing matter in a certain way.
Quantity individuates “dispositively” (dispositive):
Quantity is not an instrinsic constitutive principle of the individual, but
it is a disposition through which matter and form happen to become by
virtue of an agent constitutive principles of an individual. For quantity
does not belong to the intrinsic nature of an individual substance in the
way that the specic difference belongs to the intrinsic nature of the spe-
cies. But dispositively (dispositive) through quantity matter and form have
parts of the same kind . . . But matter cannot be made divisible in parts of
the same kind if it is not so disposed by dimensional quantity.157

154
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, pp. 148–9:
“Et videte, non nego in substantiis esse proprietatem substantialem vel substantialitatem
propriam individualem . . . Istam substantialitatem individualem non nego, sed nego eam
esse primum principium individuationis. Istam enim substantialitatem individualem
agens non posset producere, nisi esset materia quanta, in qua produceretur. Et ideo
materia quanta est principium et causa individuationis illius substantialitatis. Materia
etiam est individuata per quantitatem, quantitas autem non per aliquid aliud. Et ideo
prima causa individuationis est quantitas dimensiva.”
155
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet I, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 150.
156
And of course of Thomas Aquinas; see above p. 47.
157
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet III, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 471.

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So to a certain extent Sutton is willing to agree with those who call

matter a principle of individuation. This is true, but only insofar as
matter here means a special kind of matter, namely matter disposed
by quantity. The priority of quantity is not given up.
There is another important addition in the later Quodlibet. Sutton
here explicitly engages with the rival theories of Henry of Ghent and
John Duns Scotus. Sutton advances two arguments against Henry’s
view that individuation is caused by a double negation. First, this idea
is hardly able to explain individuation unless we are further told what
brings about this double negation in individuals. For Sutton, “it is the
same to ask what is the cause of the individuation of a substance and
to ask what is the cause by which the two negations [i.e., the negation
of intrinsic divisibility and the negation of extrinsic identity] apply
to a substance.” Henry’s solution is more a game with words than a
substantial account of individuation. Second, if Henry’s account were
a substantial explanation of individuation, it would be false. Two indi-
viduals under one species are two positive beings. So it seems to follow
that what contracts the species to this or that individual must equally
be something positive.158 As was said earlier, this popular argument
against Henry hardly seems fair in light of Henry’s attempt to provide
a positive account of individuation as well.159
More interesting is Sutton’s criticism of Duns Scotus. After mention-
ing the shortcomings of Henry’s doctrine, Sutton continues:
Because of that, some say that the cause of individuation is something
positive, but that it is neither matter, nor form, nor the whole substance,
nor quantity, nor some accident, but that it is a unity and entity distinct
from every other entity of the same species. And this unity or entity is
not known to us through some operation . . . And so, what the cause of
individuation is cannot be explained other than by means of circumlocu-
tion. For it is not known to us in particular, but in general we conclude
by reason that there is such a unity or entity in an individual in the same
way as there is in a species a difference contracting a genus.160
The passage can equally apply to the various treatments Scotus devotes
to the principle of individuation. In all of these, Scotus rst provides a

158
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet III, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, pp.
472–3.
159
See above p. 42. Sutton also refers to Henry in Quodlibet I, q. 21. But there he
only mentions him with respect to the individuation of angels. See ibid., ed. Schmaus-
González-Haba, p. 149.
160
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet III, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, p. 473.

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critical overview of the accounts of his predecessors and contemporaries

(refuting the candidates named in the quotation), and on all occasions
he remarks in his own positive account that only “by comparison and
analogy” can one explain what the positive feature responsible for
individuation actually is.161 Sutton rejects Scotus’ idea that a special
individual difference (to which Scotus refers by expressions such as
forma individualis, entitas, realitas, gradus individualis, or even haecceitas),162
which is supposed to be different from the items mentioned in the
quotation above, can be responsible for individuation. If there really is
such a special item, then it must fall under one of the ten categories,
i.e., it must be either a substance or one of the accidents. For every
real extra-mental being belongs to one of the categories. But if the
individual difference is neither a substance nor an accident, yet still
something positive added to the nature, then this leads to a contradic-
tion.163 As we can see, his reply to Scotus forces Sutton once again
to embrace fully the view that the principle of individuation is a real
accident, namely quantity. Yet he is prepared to defend this position
against the obvious objections and primarily against those that Scotus
himself has formulated. Consequently, the remainder of Quodlibet III,
q. 21, assembles several objections (seventeen altogether) from Scotus’
Lectura to which Sutton then responds.164

161
John Duns Scotus, Lectura II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–6, ed. C. Balim et al., Opera omnia
XVIII (Vatican City 1982), pp. 229–92; Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–6, ed. Balim et al.,
pp. 391–516; Reportatio Parisiensis II, d. 12, qq. 3–8, ed. J. Vivès, Opera omnia XXIII
(Paris 1894), pp. 20–41; Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, q. 13, ed.
G. Etzkorn et al., Opera philosophica IV (St Bonaventure, NY 1997), pp. 215–80. For
the impossibility of giving a straightforward account of the individuation feature, see,
e.g., Lectura II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, ed. Balim et al., pp. 281–2, n. 169: “Et quid est illud
positivum quod sic ponitur, per quod natura specica individuatur? Quid autem hoc
sit, declaratur per comparationem et similitudinem ad differentiam specicam, iuxta
cuius similitudinem apparet quid sit differentia individualis.”
162
The literature on Scotus’ account of individuation is vast. For more recent dis-
cussions see S.D. Dumont, “The Question on Individuation in Scotus’s ‘Quaestiones
super Metaphysicam’,” in Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del
Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9–11 marzo 1993, L. Sileo, ed. (Rome 1995), vol.
I, pp. 193–227; P. King, “Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual
Difference,” Philosophical Topics 20 (1992), pp. 51–76; idem, “Duns Scotus on Singular
Essences,” Medioevo 30 (2005), pp. 111–37; G. Pini, “Scotus on Individuation,” Proceedings
of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics [http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/
SMLM/PSMLM5/PSMLM5.pdf ] 5 (2005), pp. 50–69.
163
Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibet III, q. 21, ed. Schmaus-González-Haba, pp. 473–4.
Sutton also mentions two other arguments, and all of them are founded on the premise
that there is nothing existing that does not fall under one of the categories.
164
Sutton even follows Scotus’ habit of classifying the arguments against the
individuation-by-accident view in different groups. Sutton’s classication has arguments

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Compared with Thomas of Sutton’s Quodlibet III, John of Paris’

quodlibetal disputation on individuation seems less up-to-date. I follow
Johannes Müller’s suggestion in considering the ten questions edited by
Ambrose J. Heiman as only an incomplete version of John’s Quodlibet,
which John most likely disputed in 1304/05, the year he was magister
actu regens at Paris.165 Müller himself edited two questions that might
well have been part of John’s original disputation. The literary form of
these additional questions denitely points to an oral presentation.166
Like many of his contemporaries, John surveys the traditional list
of candidates for the principle of individuation. He starts by mention-
ing authorities for the view that individuation is caused by accidents
and, after raising two (standard) objections, he turns to the doctrine
that individuation occurs by means of matter. After objecting to this
view, he moves on to the next candidate, quantity, and by the same
procedure he also scrutinizes doctrines proposing being or an external
agent as individuating principles. At the end, after none of the ve
mentioned theories remains unchallenged and when we seem to have
arrived at a complete impasse, John expresses his favor for the second
candidate, matter, because this option seems “more plausible” ( proba-
bilior) to him.167

ex ratione unitatis, ex ratione prioritatis substantiae, ex ratione entis per se, and ex ratione ordinis
praedicamentalis. I do not have the space here to demonstrate this in detail, but Sutton’s
text seems to be closer to the (earlier) Lectura version of Scotus’ Sentences commentary.
For more discussion of Thomas of Sutton’s doctrine of individuation (especially his
view on the individuation of angels and human souls), see J. Schneider, “Einleitung,”
in Thomas von Sutton, Quaestiones ordinariae, pp. 140*–63*; G. Klima, “Thomas Sutton
on Individuation,” Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics [http://www.
fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/SMLM/PSMLM5/PSMLM5.pdf ] 5 (2005), pp. 70–8.
The short q. 5 of Nicholas Trivet’s Quodlibet II (“Utrum principium individuationis vel
unitatis, quod idem est, sit quantitas tamquam prima et per se causa eius?”), disputed in
1304, seems to have been inuenced by Thomas of Sutton. Nicholas repeats Sutton’s
claim that some people confuse the principle of individuation with the principle(s) of
individuals and he holds that quantity is the principle of individuation. The ques-
tion is edited in H. Hauke, Die Lehre von der beseligenden Schau nach Nikolaus Trivet (Diss.
University of Munich 1967), pp. 31*–8*. For the date of this Quodlibet, see Friedman’s
chapter in this volume, pp. 427–9.
165
A.J. Heiman, “The First Quodlibet of Jean Quidort,” in Nine Medieval Thinkers.
A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, J.R. O’Donnell, ed. (Toronto 1955), pp. 271–91.
For the date of John’s Quodlibet, see Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi
II, p. 523, and Friedman’s chapter in this volume.
166
J.P. Müller, “Eine Quästion über das Individuationsprinzip des Johannes von Paris
O.P. (Quidort),” in Virtus politica. Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von Alfons Hufnagel, J. Möller
and H. Kohlenberger, eds. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1974), pp. 335–56. For Müller’s
arguments see esp. pp. 335–8.
167
John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, pp. 348–9: “Videtur

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Clearly, John of Paris knows Henry of Ghent’s discussion of indi-

viduation. This is evident from the way he presents the view that the
external agent is the principle of individuation.168 Godfrey of Fontaines
seems to have been another source of inspiration for John, as is clear,
for instance, from how John presents the authorities for the individua-
tion-by-accident view.169 But surprisingly, John does not list substantial
form, Godfrey’s principle of individuation, among the candidates he
discusses.170 Nor does John mention Scotus’ account of individuation,
a fact that makes John’s discussion more traditional than, for example,
Sutton’s. Yet there is a striking similarity between John’s question and
the discussion of individuation in Scotus’ Quaestiones super Metaphysicam,
book VII, q. 13. John’s ve candidates (accidents, matter, quantity, being,
and external agent) for a principle of individuation are identical with
the ve candidates Scotus lists (and then rejects) at the beginning of
question 13. This coincidence, however, should not be overstated, for
it could be the case that there is a common, but hitherto unidentied,
source for both works.171
Does John’s treatment of individuation reect any inuence of Thomas
of Sutton? John’s critical attitude towards the individuation-by-quality
view is, for Müller, directed against Sutton. By itself, and without precise
textual support, this is not a very strong argument for a connection
between the two Dominican masters. But there are other hints that
John might have known Sutton’s Quodlibeta (at least Quodlibet I). John
begins his presentation of the individuation-by-matter view, the view
he himself will later accept as more plausible, in the following way:

ad praesens opinio secunda recitata superius esse probabilior, scilicet quod materia sit
principium individuationis et quantitas principium multiplicationis sub una specie.”
168
John even mentions that defenders of this view chastise the philosophers for
turning separate substances into divine beings (Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed.
Müller, pp. 348 and 345)—a clear reference to Henry’s Quodlibet II, q. 8.
169
Compare John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, p. 343,
with Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, ed. De Wulf-Hoffmans, pp. 319–20.
170
He mentions Godfrey’s individuation-by-form view in In I Sententiarum, q. 91, ed.
J.P. Müller (Rome 1961), p. 257.
171
Compare John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, pp. 343–8,
with John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, q. 13,
ed. Etzkorn et al., pp. 215–80. With regard to matter and quantity the order of the
two texts is reversed. Although the presentations of the candidates, including the refer-
ences to authorities, are strikingly similar, there seems to be no overlap between the
objections both authors advance against them. The similarities are interesting, because
only in the Quaestiones super Metaphysicam does Scotus discuss accidents, quantity, matter,
being, and external agent in succession.

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Therefore other people say that matter is the principle of individuation,

but not that it is the principle of multiplication under one species. Thus
it [matter] is the principle of individuation, i.e., of the contraction to
a supposit or an individual, as the Philosopher says in book V of the
Metaphysics . . . And this is clear, because a material form, which does not
subsist in itself but in something else, is in itself capable of being common
to many things. And therefore it does not seem to be individuated except
by that in which it is received, and by that it [the form] also becomes
contracted. But matter is of such a kind. For matter receives in it the form
and, since it is the rst subject, is not received in something else.172
As such, this statement sounds unspectacular; yet, if we take it for what
it is, namely John’s own position and a possible reply to Sutton’s claim
regarding the confusion between the principles of individuals and the
principles of individuation, it takes on a more specic meaning. John
turns Sutton’s remark on its head: it is not true, as Sutton maintains,
that quantity is the principle of individuation, that is, the principle of
the individuality of an individual; quantity is merely the principle of the
multiplication of many items under one species. The principle of indi-
viduation has to be sought among the principles of the individual. For
Sutton, to individuate means to render a common form incommunicable
and to limit (or contract) it to one single item. But, as John explains in
the text quoted above, this limiting role can only be performed by matter.
Forms of material objects receive their incommunicability from matter,
which is by itself incommunicable. Quantity, to be sure, has a role in
the individuation of material objects, but this role is limited to bringing
about the multitude of different items and not its individuation.
The third of the three objections that John of Paris initially brought
forward against his own view regarding matter as the principle of indi-
viduation denies that a distinction between a principle of individuation
and a principle of multiplication makes any sense. For contracting a
form to one singular item means at the same time distinguishing it from
something else. In his reply, John partially agrees with the objection,
but to the extent that he now calls matter the principle of both. But,
as he explains, it is in different respects that matter causes individuation
and distinction from something else of the same species. By its very
essence, matter has the capacity to do the rst, but only because matter

172
John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, p. 344.

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is itself distinguished by quantity does it have the power to distinguish

one member of a species from another.173
Another objection follows the lines of Henry of Ghent: how can
there be individual immaterial substances if matter is the principle
of individuation? If one responds that immaterial substances are by
themselves individuals, then this seems to make them into God-like
beings. Every essence of a creature is common and in need of being
determined to this or that supposit. So there has to be a principle of
individuation capable of achieving this. John of Paris responds by
rejecting the very idea that every creaturely essence is common. There
is a hierarchy of being and those creatures at the top of the hierarchy
are not indifferent with regard to existing in many different supposita,
which is why only essences and forms of material things need individu-
ation.174 The remaining objection, one that can also be found among
Scotus’ arguments against the individuation-by-matter view,175 argues
that matter (as well as form) is by itself common. Rather than being
a principle of individuation, it is itself in need of being individuated
by something else. Matter, John responds, indeed has some degree of
indeterminacy with respect to the many material objects it is capable
of constituting. But the indeterminacy of matter is different from that
of form. Material forms are in themselves common, for which reason
they have to be limited; matter, however, is in itself one and it is only
through quantity that matter is divided into many parts. This is why
matter does not have to be individuated and why it in turn is capable
of individuating forms.176

173
John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, p. 352.
174
John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, p. 349.
175
See John Duns Scotus, Lectura II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 5, ed. Balim et al., pp. 272–3,
n. 133.
176
John of Paris, Quaestio quodlibetalis de individuatione, ed. Müller, p. 351. For more
on John of Paris’ teaching on individuation, see In II Sententiarum, q. 15, ed. J.P. Müller
(Rome 1964), pp. 60–71; Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa,” ed. J.P. Müller (Rome 1941), art.
10 (11) and 28 (29). In his quodlibetal question John repeats many of the elements of
these earlier works, e.g., the distinction between a principle of individuation (matter)
and a principle of multiplication (quantity).

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The Dominicans Hervaeus Natalis and Henry of Lübeck

Quodlibetal questions on individuation, as we have seen, for the most

part follow a traditional pattern. Authors attempt to provide a census of
different possible principles of individuation (accidents, matter, quantity,
etc.) with respect to which they then position themselves. This model
receives new input when Duns Scotus’ novel account of individua-
tion, according to which the individuality of individuals is due to an
individual difference or “thisness” (haecceitas), becomes more widely
known. From now on the relevant quodlibetal questions include haec-
ceitas as one of the candidates under scrutiny. A good example of this
new trend is Quodlibet III, q. 9, of Hervaeus Natalis (disputed 1309).177
In his response to the question “Whether matter is the principle of
individuation,” Hervaeus presents three rival accounts of individua-
tion. The rst theory claims that every individual is individual, and
thus distinct from others, on account of its essence. Mark Henninger
has, I believe convincingly, shown that Hervaeus here refers to Richard
of Menneville’s (Middleton’s) teaching on individuation.178 According
to one of the four arguments Hervaeus puts forward for this opinion,
a thing has its being and its unity from the same principles. But the
formal principle of being is the essence. Therefore it must also be the
formal principle of its unity or individuality.179 According to the second
account, individuation is due to quantity, while the third opinion, obvi-
ously Scotus’, traces individuality back to an individual haecceitas.
Hervaeus rejects Scotus’ account in its entirety. He does not really
engage with Scotus’ arguments, but instead he oversimplies Scotus’
reasons for positing “thisnesses.” For Scotus, according to Hervaeus,
matter and form are both common to many, and since nothing indi-
vidual can result from two common things, there needs be something

177
For the date of this Quodlibet and for a thorough discussion of Hervaeus’ teaching
on individuation, see M.G. Henninger, “Hervaeus Natalis and Richard of Mediavilla,”
in Individuation in Scholasticism, Gracia, ed., pp. 299–318. On the complex dating of
Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta in general, see Friedman’s chapter below.
178
See Henninger, “Hervaeus Natalis and Richard of Mediavilla,” pp. 304–7.
Richard develops his own account of individuation mainly in his Sentences commentary.
See In II Sententiarum, d. 3, aa. 3–5 (ed. Brixia 1591), pp. 55–62. Richard’s Quodlibeta
do not contain questions on individuation. See also E. Hocedez, Richard de Middleton:
sa vie, ses œuvres, sa doctrine (Louvain-Paris 1925), pp. 204–8.
179
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9 (ed. Venice 1513; reprint Ridgewood, NJ
1966), f. 81rb.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 71

else by means of which an individual is individual, namely a haecceitas.180

In his reply, Hervaeus remarks that matter and form are common only
secundum rationem, but not in extra-mental reality (secundum rem), for one
and the same existing matter or form (for example, the matter and form
that constitute me) is not actually common to many. But if matter and
form are common in our understanding (secundum rationem), then the
same could be said about “thisness.” But if we allow “thisness” to be a
particular “thisness,” why should we not also concede the existence of
particular (or better: designated) matter and form?181 Moreover, what
exactly is this mysterious “thisness”? Is it identical with form or matter?
If so, then we would better refer to it as the principle of individuation.
If not, then it must be either a substance, or an accident, and so on.182
We have already encountered this argument in Thomas of Sutton; it
was a standard objection to Scotus’ doctrine of individuation.
Hervaeus is less critical with regard to the other two opinions. For
him, they both contain “some truth” (aliquid veritatis), although they are
in themselves not sufcient to explain individuation, namely how it is
possible that there can be multiple subjective parts of the same kind
(for instance, many members of the species “human being”) distinct
from each other. Hervaeus therefore proposes to distinguish between
intrinsic and extrinsic causes of individuation. By the rst, one object
is distinguished from another by what is essential to it, i.e., by its
essence. Extrinsic causes, on the other hand, are of four kinds: there
are efcient, nal, subjective, and dispositive causes. Most important
here are the last two, for they are strictly speaking responsible for the
numerical plurality of individuals under one species. According to
Hervaeus, the subjective cause is ultimately matter and the dispositive
cause is quantity.183 In this way, it is clear how the two general opinions
are both true: one of them accounts for the intrinsic cause of individu-
ation (essence), while the other emphasizes one of the extrinsic causes
(quantity). Matter and quantity, the subjective extrinsic and the disposi-
tive extrinsic cause, however, are closely related, for they individuate or
multiply themselves mutually.184

180
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 81va–b.
181
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 81vb.
182
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 81vb.
183
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., ff. 81vb–82ra.
184
See Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 82ra: “Mutuo sunt sibi causa
pluralitatis, nam pluralitas subiecti est causa subiectiva pluralitatis quantitatis; quanti-
tas autem econverso est causa dispositiva pluralitatis in subiecto, non solum quantum

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Hervaeus’ account of individuation looks quite familiar. If we drop

the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causes of individuation
and if we replace “essence” with “form,” we are back to Godfrey of
Fontaines’ theory. The way Hervaeus distinguishes between intrinsic
and extrinsic causes seems odd indeed. Why is matter or quantity not
an intrinsic cause of individuation? Matter seems to be an intrinsic
part of material objects. By “extrinsic,” as Hervaeus tells us, he here
just means what is “essentially different from something else, however
much this might be identical with it with regard to their subject.”185
Particular matter is obviously what he has in mind as something extrin-
sic to the essence, say, of a human being, although particular matter
and the essence of human being exist in reality in the same subject,
the individual human being. But since the essence of human being
includes matter (human beings are essentially enmattered), there is then
another kind of matter, so-called common matter, which is part of the
essence. But this matter is obviously not the matter Hervaeus refers to
as extrinsic subjective cause of individuation.
Hervaeus Natalis has also left us another quodlibetal disputation on
exactly the same question, “Whether matter is the principle of indi-
viduation,” in his Quodlibet VIII (q. 11).186 According to Glorieux, this
Quodlibet should instead be regarded as the second Quodlibet of John
of Paris. But with respect to the question on individuation this seems
very implausible: (1) The strong defense of quantity as the principle
of individuation (and not just multiplication) is at odds with the view
expressed in John’s works (matter). What is more, the author of the ques-
tion in Quodlibet VIII explicitly denies that matter is the true principle
of individuation.187 (2) There are striking similarities between Quodlibet
VIII and Quodlibet III indicating that both texts were written by the same
person. If we follow Ludwig Hödl, Hervaeus disputed Quodlibet VIII,

ad hoc quod idem numero dividatur in plura sicut cum dividitur lignum, sed etiam
quantum ad hoc quod aliquid idem numero generetur, quia hoc non posset eri nisi
materia existente sub alia parte quantitatis.”
185
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 81vb.
186
Question 10 (on dimensions of matter and dimensions of quantity) of this Quodlibet
is also of interest. In it, the author attacks Giles’ view that quantity causes dimensions
in matter that are not identical with the dimensions of quantity.
187
See Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet VIII, q. 11 ad 1, ed. cit., f. 153ra. Here Hervaeus
calls quantity the rst cause ( prima causa) of individuation; matter is only a secondary
cause (causa secundaria).

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 73

as well as the other so-called “Quodlibeta minora” (i.e., Quodlibeta V–X),

while he was a bachelor of theology under John of Paris.188
It makes good sense to see in this other question an earlier presen-
tation of Hervaeus’ views on individuation. Some of the traditional
candidates for principles of individuation are mentioned and discussed
in Quodlibet VIII, q. 11, but the text does not (yet) engage with Duns
Scotus’ view. Both questions start with a denition of individuum as
what is undivided in itself and divided from others, and following this
in both texts there is an almost identical distinction between two kinds
of “being undivided in itself,” even though this distinction receives a
more developed treatment in Quodlibet III.189 It is true that the author
of Quodlibet VIII is a more outspoken proponent of the individuation-
by-quantity view, and he has not yet applied the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction to the principle of individuation, although he mentions the
distinction at one point (ad 6). But despite his advocacy for quantity, he
too does not regard quantity as the exclusive principle of individuation:
“Individuation,” he says, “occurs partly by quantity, partly by other
things.”190 Quodlibet III, q. 9, is, on this picture, a further elaboration
of the “other things” (alia) on which the earlier Quodlibet is relatively
silent. Moreover, in both texts we nd the author exploring individua-
tion by permanent continuous quantity (spatial dimensions), as well as
by successive continuous quantity (time).191
Hervaeus Natalis was an outstanding gure among the Dominicans of
his day, a celebrated theologian who was successively provincial (1309)
and later (1318) Master General of the order. We might thus expect
that his teaching in general and that on individuation in particular had
followers. One of these followers was the German Dominican Henry of
Lübeck, who disputed his three Quodlibeta probably in the Dominican
studium at Cologne (ca. 1323–25).192 Today we would accuse Henry
of plagiarism; in his rst Quodlibet (q. 19), he recycles large chunks of

188
L. Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta minora des Herveus Natalis O.P.,” Münchener
Theologische Zeitschrift 6 (1955), pp. 215–29; Henninger, “Hervaeus Natalis and Richard
of Mediavilla,” p. 299; Friedman’s chapter below.
189
Compare Hervaeus’ Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 81ra, and Quodlibet VIII, q. 11,
ed. cit., f. 152vb. On this similarity see Henninger, “Hervaeus Natalis and Richard
of Mediavilla,” p. 303.
190
Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet VIII, q. 11, ed. cit., f. 152va.
191
Compare Hervaeus’ Quodlibet III, q. 9, ed. cit., f. 82ra–b, and Quodlibet VIII,
q. 11, ed. cit., f. 152vb.
192
W. Bucichowski, “Le principe d’individuation dans la question de Henri de
Lubeck ‘Utrum material sit principium individuationis’,” MPP 21 (1975), pp. 89–113.
See also Friedman’s chapter below.

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Hervaeus’ Quodlibet III, q. 9. Yet Henry also adds other material and
thus further emphasizes the somewhat harmonizing tendencies of
Hervaeus’ original treatment.
According to Henry, there are generally seven ways to reply to the
question regarding the principle of individuation. Three answers,
answers pointing either to the supposit, to being, or to haecceitas as
principles of individuation, are all hopelessly wrong, but four other
common replies, namely those invoking matter, form, the whole essence,
and quantity, contain some truth, although they seem to contradict each
other.193 Henry’s main task is to show why each of these latter candidates
can rightly be called a principle of individuation. His strategy is to
remind his readers that one can consider an individual in two different
ways: (1) insofar as an individual, i.e., an individual substance, is an
ultimate subject; (2) insofar as an individual is a member of a certain
kind. Matter, form, and the whole essence are related to the rst way
of looking at individuals. Matter is the principle of individuation with
respect to the origin of such an individual as ultimate subject, form is
a principle of individuation with respect to its perfection, and essence
is the same with respect to completeness. Quantity can be called a
principle of individuation because it is linked to the second aspect of
individuality (of material objects), for quantity is primarily responsible
for multiplication under one species.194 In particular, the reasons with
which Henry argues for the role of essence and quantity are taken
verbatim from Hervaeus’ Quodlibet III.
Why does Henry appeal to the twofold consideration of the individ-
ual? This element of his response has no equivalent in Hervaeus’ texts.
The reason, I believe, lies in the uneasiness Henry felt with Hervaeus’
move to make matter and especially quantity a merely extrinsic prin-
ciple of individuation. In the case of matter, Henry simply does not
follow his source; matter is for Henry clearly an intrinsic principle of
individuation. But with regard to quantity, the twofold consideration
of the individual is somewhat applicable. For if we consider an indi-
vidual as it is an individual substance and ultimate subject, quantity is
indeed something extrinsic. It is an accident inhering in a subject. But
if we look at an individual insofar as it is one of many members of a

193
Henry of Lübeck, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Bucichowski, pp. 105–8. The arguments
against haecceitas are, for instance, taken verbatim from Hervaeus.
194
Henry of Lübeck, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Bucichowski, p. 109.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 75

species, then quantity is an intrinsic principle, because quantity is the

principle of number.195

John of Naples, OP

People often regard the quest for a principle of individuation and

metaphysical realism as two sides of the same coin. If one believes in
the existence of universal forms or essences, the existence of individuals
becomes problematic and requires an explanation, so the one cannot be
without the other. From this perspective it is natural to expect authors
rejecting realism also to dismiss the very idea of looking for a principle
of individuation. This is exactly what we nd Peter Auriol doing in his
commentary on the Sentences:
When we talk about reality, there is no real question when one asks, “what
does the individual add to the content of the species?” For each thing is
by the fact that it exists singular and what is indifferent and common is
merely something understood by the mind. Therefore, to look for some-
thing by which an extramental object is singular is to look for nothing.
This would be like asking whether there is some universal extramental
thing and whether there is something joining this thing by which it is made
particular. But this is nothing, because each thing is by the fact itself that
it is an existing thing (and not a concept) a singular thing. Thus when it
is asked “through what is a thing a singular thing?” I answer: each thing
is through itself singular, and through nothing else but through itself.196
In this quotation, the principle of individuation is described as that
which added to the species produces a singular. Since in reality no

195
Henry of Lübeck, Quodlibet I, q. 9, ed. Bucichowski, p. 110: “Licet ergo sic
loquendo de individuo ipsum individuetur per materiam et formam et totam suam
essentiam intrinsece, tamen nihil prohibet, quin quantitas faciat ad individuationem
extrinsece. Sed loquendo de individuo secundo modo, prout videlicet est pars alicuius
multitudinis habentis partes eiusdem rationis, sic necessarium est dicere quod quantitas
sit principium individuationis intrinsecum.” Reconciliatory treatments of individuation,
like Henry’s, seem to have been popular among 14th-century theologians. Another,
somewhat different, example is Gerard Odonis’ discussion of individuation in books
II and III of his commentary on the Sentences. See de Rijk, “Giraldus Odonis, Godfrey
of Fontaines, and Peter Auriol on the Principle of Individuation.”
196
Peter Auriol, Commentarium in secundum librum Sententiarum, d. 9, q. 3, a. 3 (ed. Rome
1605), f. 114a. For Auriol’s views on the principle of individuation, see P. Duhem, Le
système du monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologique de Platon à Copernic VI (Paris 1956), pp.
397ff; R. Dreiling, Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre des Franziskanerbischofs Petrus
Aurioli (Pierre d’Auriole) (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters, 11.6) (Münster 1913), pp. 159–70.

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universal exists outside the mind, there is in consequence no addition

to anything and no need for a principle of individuation. Everything
is by itself a singular or individual. The whole problem of individua-
tion seems to derive from an incorrect understanding of metaphysical
reality.
Auriol’s criticism is targeted at authors such as Henry of Ghent or
Thomas of Sutton who are no doubt realists and conceive of individu-
ation primarily as a mechanism for the limitation and contraction of
existing universal forms or essences. But one lesson we have learned
thus far from the present survey of the debate about the principle of
individuation is that one does not have to be a realist in order to be
interested in individuation. Some of the authors discussed here, Roger
Marston for example, do not consider the problem of individuation
to be the problem of individuation of common forms. These authors
emphasize the fact that everything that exists is an individual, but nev-
ertheless they are eager to explain what is primarily responsible for the
individuality of an individual. If we keep this in mind, then William
of Ockham’s alleged dismissal of the inquiry into the principle of
individuation emerges in a different light. At one point in his discussion
of universals Ockham writes:
We do not have to search for some cause of individuation besides per-
haps the extrinsic causes of an individual and the intrinsic causes, if the
individual is a composite. But rather we have to search for a cause for
how it is possible that there is something common and universal.197
There is more need to inquire into the causes of universals, because
none of the objects surrounding us is a universal. The very nature of
universal seems to be unclear. Individuals are less mysterious and thus
an inquiry into their causes is less pressing. This does not mean that
looking for causes of individuals is absolutely speaking futile, however,
and Ockham does not say this at all. He rather refers us to the intrinsic
and extrinsic causes of individuals as the causes of their individuality.
Ockham would denitely agree with Auriol’s rejection of a principle
capable of individuating universal forms, but there is a different way
to think about individuation, and this way is in Ockham’s eyes appar-
ently not discredited by realism. Indeed this particular understanding
of individuation seems to be neutral with respect to whether someone
is a realist or a nominalist.

197
William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 6, eds. G. Gál and S.F. Brown, Opera
theologica II (St Bonaventure, NY 1970), p. 197.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 77

Ockham’s remark is less original than it looks at rst sight. A similar

passage can be found in the Quodlibeta of the Dominican John of Naples.
As far as we know, John disputed his Quodlibet VII in the academic
year 1316–17 while he was regent master at Paris. Question 6 of this
Quodlibet deals with the rather peculiar question “Whether it is numeri-
cally the same human being as before if the soul of Peter is united to
the matter of Paul or to that of a stone.” Large parts of John’s reply
treat numerical unity or individuality and provide him with an occa-
sion to incorporate (and develop) material from an earlier Quodlibet (III,
q. 5), which he presumably discussed while he was still a bachelor.198
However, if the dating of the Quodlibeta is correct, then John of Naples
predates Ockham’s Oxford lectures on the Sentences (1317–19).
With regard to the strategy followed in the two quodlibetal questions,
John is obviously inuenced by Hervaeus Natalis, James of Viterbo,
and John of Paris.199 He introduces four candidates for a principle
of individuation (matter, form, quantity, agent) and puts forward in
each case a whole series of counter-arguments, followed by a solution
showing that all candidates are genuine principles of individuation. In
the main part of the solution to the question of individuation, John
emphasizes the singularity of real objects and then concludes from this
that universality is something secondary:
A real being (ens reale) of any kind does not have of itself universality,
but only through something else. Therefore it has its individuation from
itself or from its real entity (ex sua entitate reali) and not from something
else except from that by which it has its real entity . . . So nothing is the
cause of individuation or numerical unity except what is a cause and in
the way it is a cause of the real entity. For each thing . . . has its individua-
tion and its numerical unity from its entity and from its reality, but it has
its universality from something else, namely from the fact of being per-
ceived by the intellect. Therefore, as was already said, it is futile ( frustra)
to ask “What is the principle and cause of individuation?” But one should
rather ask “What is the principle of universality?”200

198
John of Naples, Quodlibet III, q. 5, asks more directly “What is the principle of
individuation?” For the dating see Glorieux II, p. 159, and Friedman’s chapter below.
The two questions are edited in P.T. Stella, “Zwei unedierte Artikel des Johannes von
Neapel über das Individuationsprinzip,” Divus Thomas (Freiburg) 29 (1951), pp. 129–66.
199
Hervaeus and James are even mentioned by name at the end of Quodlibet III,
q. 5. See ibid., ed. Stella, p. 156. John Duns Scotus’ teaching is remarkably absent in
both questions.
200
John of Naples, Quodlibet VII, q. 6, ed. Stella, p. 162; see Quodlibet III, q. 5, ed.
Stella, p. 154.

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Yet, although John considers it absolutely clear that everything existing

is an individual, there is still a way we can ask for the causes of the
individuality of an individual, namely for the causes of the existence of
an individual. Exactly like Ockham, he has here in mind the intrinsic
and extrinsic causes of a thing. This nally allows John to explain why
matter as well as form, quantity, and the agent are principles of indi-
viduation. They are, because they contribute differently to the existence
of the individual. Matter and form are intrinsic, the agent and quantity
are extrinsic causes.201

Conclusion

Some readers might be puzzled by this overview and what looks like a
lack of progress in the medieval discussion on the principle of individua-
tion. Why isn’t there in the end, after so much debate, one single solution
medieval philosophers settled on? Although this wish is fair-minded, it
misses the real signicance of the debate: accounts of individuation are
deeply rooted in some other basic metaphysical claims, such as those
about the very nature of hylomorphism, the understanding of essences,
the nature of the categories, and so on. The debate over individuation
is really just the tip of an iceberg and a result of the fundamentally
different ontological conceptions of their key players. Take for example
the view that the individuation of material objects is (at least partly) due
to quantity. This view is only acceptable to someone having a certain
understanding of hylomorphic composition. How all these metaphysi-
cal views hang together exactly is a matter for further inquiry. Here I
have only managed to indicate some of them. There is no reason to
despair in the face of the persisting disagreement. The debates had an
important effect; they forced proponents to strengthen their respective
doctrines as a reaction to contemporary criticism. Without the preced-
ing debate John Duns Scotus, to name just one example, would hardly
have been able to develop his very famous account of individuation.
So in this sense there is progress.
But let me end on a more positive note: there are some conclusions
that we can draw from our overview: (1) Many of the questions on
individuation follow a similar model. To understand this will help to

201
John of Naples, Quodlibet VII, q. 6, ed. Stella, p. 163.

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 the controversy over the principle of individuation 79

better evaluate, for example, Duns Scotus’ contribution. It is often seen

as a distinctive feature of Scotus to have attempted a comprehensive
and thorough review of existing positions.202 From the overview we
gather that Scotus actually follows (and develops) a well-known model.
(2) I have often referred loosely to the “Aristotelian” or the “Thomistic”
account of individuation, an account that stresses the role of matter or
better, designated matter, in individuation—this was deliberate. Many
of the gures in the survey make obvious attempts to defend Aquinas’
teaching on individuation, and many have no doubts that their own
understanding of individuation is identical with Aristotle’s. But we can
see that it is not even clear what exactly these generic (i.e., the “Thomist”
or the “Aristotelian”) accounts of individuation are. Among so-called
early Thomists there are people (like John of Paris) who believe that
matter and not quantity is the principle of individuation, while other
so-called Thomists (e.g., Hervaeus Natalis) hold exactly the opposite.
Compared with the Franciscan authors, for whom matter is merely a sine
qua non cause of individuation, these authors denitely form one group.
But within this group there was considerable room for disagreement.
(3) It has emerged from the survey that there are two main conceptions
of individuation: individuation in the strict sense as limitation or con-
traction of common forms or essences, and individuation in the broad
sense as what accounts for the individuality of individuals. The rst
understanding of individuation is by no means the more widespread.
Yet the fact that it comes under massive attack by nominalist philoso-
phers at the beginning of the fourteenth century might explain why
quodlibetal questions on individuation are less frequent in the years
after 1320. If existence and being an individual are the same, then, as
we have seen, the principles of the individuality of an individual are
simply the principles of existence of that individual. This makes it less
pressing to ask about the principles of individuation in the rst place,
because such a question no longer has a specic target.

202
See, e.g., T. Noone, “Scotus’s Critique of the Thomistic Theory of Individuation
and the Dating of the Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum,” in Via Scoti, Sileo, ed., vol. I,
pp. 391–406, esp. p. 394.

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 THE QUODLIBETA OF PETER OF AUVERGNE

Chris Schabel*

The scholars of the generations of secular masters of theology that

succeeded Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines at the University
of Paris were not of the same stature. Nevertheless, several left written
quodlibeta, including those recorded in the compilations of Nicholas of
Bar and Prosper of Reggio Emilia, other fragmentary collections of
quodlibeta or those contained in single witnesses—notably by John Lesage
and Francis Caracciolo—and, most signicantly, the back-to-back quod-
libeta of a succession of important secular masters dating sequentially
from 1296 to 1316: Peter of Auvergne (1296–1301), Thomas of Bailly
(1301–06), John of Pouilly (1307–12), and Thomas Wylton (master from
ca. 1312, Quodlibet from 1315 or 1316). Thomas of Bailly’s six efforts
from the academic years 1301–02 to 1306–07 have been critically edited
by Glorieux himself. Since they are readily available, they will not be
treated here. In contrast, the quodlibeta of the more inuential scholars
Peter of Auvergne, John of Pouilly, and Thomas Wylton circulated more
widely and had a greater impact on contemporary Parisian theology, yet
they are for the most part unedited, except for the piecemeal publication
of Wylton’s questions. Thus they each receive separate attention in this
volume.1 This chapter concerns Peter of Auvergne’s six Quodlibeta and

* I wish to thank the following for manuscripts, information, and other materi-
als: the libraries themselves, the Thomas-Institut in Cologne, the Pontical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, the Institute de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, the Hill
Monastic Manuscript Library, Stephen F. Brown, Stephen D. Dumont, Christoph
Flüeler, Russell L. Friedman, Griet Galle, Marek Gensler, Thomas Jeschke, Martin
Pickavé, and Marco Toste.
1
Besides the edition of Bailly’s Quodlibeta in Thomas de Bailly. Quodlibets, ed. P. Glorieux
(Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age, 9) (Paris 1960), Glorieux also edited Lesage’s
in Jacques de Thérines Quodlibets I et II. Jean Lesage Quodlibet I, ed. P. Glorieux (Textes
philosophiques du Moyen Age, 7) (Paris 1958), pp. 327–50. For Pouilly and Wylton, see
the chapters by L. Hödl and C. Trifogli, respectively, below. On Nicholas’ collection,
see S. Piron’s chapter in this volume. Prosper’s collection in BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, which
W.J. Courtenay discusses in a chapter in this volume, includes summaries of quodlibetal
questions by the secular masters Alain Gontier, Henry Amandi, and Radulphus Brito.
Glorieux’s Anonymous XIX, XXI, and XXII (Glorieux II, pp. 299–301), from BAV,
Vat. lat. 932, have been dated ca. 1310 and assigned to Francis Caracciolo, the latter

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82 chris schabel

will focus on basic issues, rather than doctrine. Its aim is to facilitate
and encourage further editing work.

The Dating, Composition, and Contents of Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibeta

Peter of Auvergne had been a rather prolic and inuential Parisian arts
master for a quarter of a century before he took over one of the chairs
in theology reserved for canons of Notre-Dame as a secular master in
1296. His numerous Aristotelian commentaries have long drawn the
attention of historians of virtually every aspect of medieval philosophy.
Perhaps the sheer number of his surviving works has obscured the
importance of what is—besides a small fragment of his Sentences com-
mentary2—his only surviving theological work, his Quodlibeta, although
attention to these last has not been completely lacking.3 Nevertheless,
they deserve more, since the Quodlibeta circulated widely and are among
the last things he wrote in his long career. Indeed, since Quodlibeta by
nature can touch on just about any subject, Peter of Auvergne’s forays
into the genre offer historians of medieval thought not only his theo-
logical opinions on a wide spectrum of issues, but also his nal say on
a great variety of topics that he had already treated in his Aristotelian
commentaries. Anyone interested in his earlier opinions should there-

two being his Quodlibeta V and VI respectively. Since late in life Francis joined the
Dominicans, R.L. Friedman claims him for the Friars Preacher in his chapter below.
One might also mention that ve brief quodlibetal questions attributed to Henry of
Harclay, a fragment of a larger group, are on one folio (96v–97v) of BAV, Borghese
36 (Glorieux II, pp. 133–4), while the ve questions that Glorieux (Glorieux II, p. 69)
claims make up a quodlibet from Walter Burley are actually the chapter titles of his
Tractatus primus, not a quodlibet, but probably his Disputatio collativa connected to his
Principium for book IV of the Sentences.
2
Nine somewhat brief questions from the early sections of book I, preserved among
questions from other theologians in the rst few folios of Bologna, Archiginnasio A. 913;
see. V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller
(Florence 1954), pp. 65 and 90–3. The questions are as follows: 1: Quid est <theologiae>
subiectum, utrum videlicet Deus aut non (f. 1ra–v); 2: Utrum theologia sit practica vel
speculativa (3va–b); 3: Utrum theologia subalternet sibi alias scientias et subalternetur
scientiae beatorum (4va–b); 4: Utrum Deus sit unus (5rb–va); 5: Utrum in divinis sit
pluralitas personarum (6vb); 6: Utrum ex creaturis possit haberi cognitio de Deo (7rb);
7: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum (8ra–b); 8: Utrum potentiae animae sint idem
quod animae essentia (8va–b); 9: Utrum essentia generet (12ra–b).
3
For the works of and about Peter of Auvergne, see G. Galle, “A Comprehensive
Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 42 (2000), pp. 53–79
(pp. 64–5 on the Quodlibeta), and the “Supplement” in vol. 47 (2005), pp. 87–96 (p. 89
on the Quodlibeta).

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 the QUODLIBETA of peter of auvergne 83

fore consider the Quodlibeta. Sometimes he changed his mind, as in

the case of the principle of individuation (Quodlibet II, q. 5), as Martin
Pickavé points out in the previous chapter, or in discussing the various
solutions to the problem of the intension and remission of accidental
forms (III, q. 6), where Peter himself reveals that “aliquando videba-
tur mihi” to be one way, but now “videtur aliter esse dicendum.” On
other occasions, as when considering how angels are in a place (III,
q. 1), the old theologian admits that “nec vidi hucusque, nec adhuc
video . . . sed inde conteor intellectum meum decere, sicut in multis
aliis. Et si aliquando apparuerit mihi circa hoc aliquid rationale, tunc
libenter manifestabo.”
Peter left six written Quodlibeta, 108 questions in total, surviving in
nineteen known medieval manuscripts and one later witness, which will
be discussed below in the second section. After Glorieux, Giuseppina
Cannizzo published a lengthy study of Peter’s Quodlibeta in 1964–65,4
and eighteen questions have been printed in some form until now,
plus a few fragments.5 Numerous incipits, explicits, and running titles

4
Glorieux I, pp. 257–63, and II, p. 219, and G. Cannizzo, “I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro
d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo
critico delle Quaestiones de Verbo, 1296, 1300,” Rivista di losoa neo-scolastica 56 (1964) (part
I: pp. 486–500; part II: pp. 605–48) and 57 (1965) (part III: pp. 67–89), henceforth
cited thus: Cannizzo I, II, and III. For previous editions, see below and the question
list. Omar Argerami announced in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 33 (1991), p. 63, that
he was working on the edition of the Quodlibeta, but this has not yet appeared.
5
According to the numbering in the question list below: I.8, ed. R.C. Dales and O.
Argerami, Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World (Leiden 1992), pp. 144–8, with
Portuguese translation in J. Beatriz da Costa, “Se Deus teria podido fazer o mundo
existir desde a eternidade,” Veritas 49 (2004), pp. 569–72; I.14, ed. J. Leclercq, “La
théologie comme science d’après la littérature quodlibétique,” RTAM 11 (1939) (pp.
351–74), pp. 354–7; I.15, ed. J.R. Eastman, Papal Abdication in Later Medieval Thought
(Lewiston, NY 1990), pp. 137–41; I.18, ed. B.G. Guyot, “Textes inédits relatifs à
l’étude précédente: Y. Congar, Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants
et séculiers,” AHDLMA 28 (1962), pp. 153–8; I.20, ed. F. Segarro, “Un precursor de
Durando: Pedro d’Auvergne,” Estudios eclesiásticos 12 (1933) (pp. 114–24), pp. 119–24,
and also ed. H.J. Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der
scholastischen Theologie von Alexander von Hales zu Duns Scotus (Freiburger theologische
Studien, 91) (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna 1973), pp. 372–6; I.21, ed. Cannizzo III, pp.
72–80; II.4, ed. A. Monahan, “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Petri de Alvernia,” in
Nine Medieval Thinkers, J.R. O’Donnell, ed. (Studies and Texts, 1) (Toronto 1955) (pp.
145–81), pp. 177–81; II.5, ed. E. Hocedez, “Un question inédit de Pierre d’Auvergne
sur l’individuation,” Révue néoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934) (= Hommage à monsieur le
professeur Maurice de Wulf [Louvain 1934]) (pp. 355–86), pp. 370–9; II.11, ed. A. Pattin,
Pour l’histoire du sens agent. La controverse entre Barthélémy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun, ses
antécédents et son évolution (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 1.6) (Louvain 1988), pp.
9–15; III.14, ed. E.A.R. Brown, “ ‘Cessante causa’ and the Taxes of the Last Capetians:

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84 chris schabel

testify that Master Peter of Auvergne, canon of Paris, authored these

texts. Almost all surviving quodlibeta from secular theologians stem from
Parisian debates, and the explicit of Quodlibet II in BAV, Vat. lat. 932
(V), species that it was “determined at Paris.” Fortunately, as Glorieux
knew,6 the dating of Peter’s six Quodlibeta is only slightly less secure. The
explicit for Quodlibet III in Berlin, Magdeburg 149 (S), BAV, Ottob. lat.
196 (O), Troyes 269 (T), and Paris, BnF 14562 (X), remarks that the
questions were disputed in the year 1298 before Christmas, i.e., in the
Advent session. In Quodlibet V, q. 15, part of a series of questions on
the date of the coming of the Antichrist in reaction to the theories of
Arnau de Vilanova, Peter mentions “anno isto, scilicet 1300,” allowing
us to date Quodlibet V to 1300, while just below he refers to “Septembri
sequenti, scilicet anno 1301,” thus clarifying that it is Advent of 1300.
A letter of Boniface VIII dated 18 June 1296 granting a canonry to
“Petro de Croc,” as Peter was sometimes known, suggests that Peter
had only recently become master of theology and grants him the
canonry in Notre-Dame that would allow him to be magister regens.7
Thus, since he seems to have preferred Advent anyway and probably
avoided holding two sessions in any given academic year, we can tenta-
tively date Quodlibeta I and II to the Advent sessions of 1296 and 1297
respectively, placing Quodlibet IV in Advent 1299. Although the explicit
in codex V clearly assigns Quodlibet VI to 1304, Paris manuscripts BnF
F 3121 A (W) and 14562 (X), Berlin, Magdeburg 149 (S), and a lost

The Political Applications of a Philosophical Maxim,” in Post Scripta. Essays on Medieval

Law and the Emergence of the European State in Honor of Gaines Post, J.R. Strayer and D.E.
Queller, eds. (Studia Gratiana, 15) (Rome 1972) (pp. 565–87), pp. 585–7; V.9–10,
ed. Cannizzo III, pp. 80–4 and 84–9; V.11, ed. T. Graf, De subiecto psychico gratiae et
virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV, vol. II (Studia
Anselmiana, 4) (Rome 1935), pp. 21*–5*; V.16–17 and 3/4 of a column, or 1/9, of
15, ed. J. Perarnau i Espelt, “Guiu Terrena critica Arnau de Vilanova . . . En apèndix,
tres fragments de teólegs contemporanis relatius a la tesi escatológica arnaldina,” Arxiu
de Textos Catalans Antics 7/8 (1988–89) (pp. 171–222), pp. 214–16, 216–18, and 213–14
respectively; VI.14, ed. J. Koch, “Sind die Pygmäen Menschen? Ein Kapitel aus der
philosophischen Anthropologie der mittelalterlichen Scholastik,” Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie 40 (1931) (pp. 194–213), pp. 209–13, reprinted in M. Gusinde, Kenntnisse
und Urteile über Pygmäen in Antike und Mittelalter (Leipzig 1962), pp. 18–20; VI.16–17, ed.
F. Hentschel, “Der verjagte Dämon, Mittelalterliche Gedanken zur Wirkung der Musik
aus der Zeit um 1300,” in Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, J. Aertsen and A. Speer, eds.
(Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 27) (Berlin 2000) (pp. 395–421), pp. 412–18 and 418–21.
Of course, several other studies make use of unprinted questions in Peter’s Quodlibeta
from the manuscripts.
6
See also Cannizzo I, 491–3 and passim.
7
CUP II, no. 596, p. 71.

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witness have 1301, which is no doubt correct given that Peter died in
September of 1304 and the six Quodlibeta were already available from
the University stationers on 25 February 1304.8 Although Glorieux’s
reliance on Peter’s appointment as bishop of Clermont on 21 January
1302 is unstable, we can probably agree with him in putting Quodlibet
VI in Advent 1301.9
As we shall see, Peter took great care in redacting his Quodlibeta.
Nevertheless, it seems that he did so one-by-one on a yearly basis. When
Peter’s Quodlibeta were advertised in 1304, the stationers offered them
in thirty pecias: “Item, in Quolibet magistri Petri de Alvernia, XXX
pecias, ii sol.,”10 and explicits to each Quodlibet in Paris, Mazarine 3512
(M), indicate that the six Quodlibeta contained 5, 5, 4, 6, 5, and 5 pecias
respectively, a total of thirty—numbers conrmed by surviving mark-
ings in BnF 15841 (Y). That is, each quodlibet was separate. Moreover,
given that the lengths of the six Quodlibeta (in columns, according to
the very uniform witness V), 53.5, 61.2, 40.2, 47.7, 34.5, and 34.5
respectively, do not correspond to the numbers of pecias, the pecias
for any particular Quodlibet differed greatly in size from those of the
others (for I, 10.7 cols. per pecia; II, 12.2; III, 10.1; IV: 8.0; V, 6.9;
VI, 6.9). With the possible exception of Quodlibeta V and VI, then, it
appears that even the exemplars at the stationers were not made all at
once at the same workshop.
Moreover, while Peter does not cite his other works in his Quodlibeta,
he does have about thirty explicit internal references to the Quodlibeta
themselves. With one notable exception, all of these citations refer
either to a question in a previous Quodlibet or somewhere else in the
present one, although there are vague references to the future: “sicut
poterit alias declarari” (I.8), “sicut forte videbitur alias” (II.7), “alias
forte videbitur” (III.10). The exception is in Quodlibet II, q. 1, where
Quodlibet III, q. 4, is clearly presaged: “Sed alias forte videbitur de hoc,

8
CUP II, no. 642, p. 107. See also Cannizzo I, p. 496, n. 12, and below.
9
Actually, there is a slight uncertainty with the dating for Quodlibeta V–VI: if Peter
used a calendar beginning the year on 25 March or Easter, then since in 1301 Easter
fell on 7 April and much of Lent that year would still have been considered 1300,
Quodlibet V might have been from Lent 1301 and “Septembri sequenti, scilicet anno
1301” would refer to what we would consider later that same year. Likewise, Quodlibet
VI may date to Lent 1302, since on the old dating almost all of Lent was still in 1301,
Easter 1302 coming on 30 March.
10
CUP II, no. 642, p. 109. See also G. Murano, Opere diffuse per exemplar e pecia
(Turnhout 2005), pp. 664–5, and Cannizzo I, p. 496, n. 13, and passim on the
pecias.

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si contingat aliquando quaeri ‘utrum essentiae rerum sint essentiae ab

aeterno’.” It would be strange for Peter to resort to such a tentative
construct articially, however, and it seems more likely that “perhaps we
shall see about this elsewhere, if it ever happens to be asked ‘whether
the essences of things are essences from eternity’ ” was wishful thinking
on Peter’s part, prompting that question the following year.
Thus Quodlibet I, which begins with the abrupt “Quaerebatur de
potentia Dei,” has only vague references to what was “dictum prius”
or “sicut declaratum est prius,” and the “sicut poterit alias declarari”
mentioned above, but otherwise there is only a remark in question 6:
“sed de hoc dicitur in quadam alia quaestione posterius,” which turns
out to be question 8 of the same Quodlibet, and later in question 13,
“sicut ostensum est prius in alia quaestione,” a reference to question 7.
Likewise, in Quodlibet II, aside from the hint at III.4 and the “sicut forte
videbitur alias” noted above, we merely have three citations of other
questions in the same Quodlibet and two explicit references to Quodlibet I.
In both mentions of Quodlibet I, moreover, he refers to what “probatum
fuit in alio quolibet,” thus clarifying that only one other quodlibet has
taken place. In Quodlibet V, q. 8, nally, there is another vague reference,
”in quadam alia quaestione posterius,” but again this is to question 10
of the same set of questions. A chart of precise and explicit internal
citations makes manifest the fact that Peter never cites future Quodlibeta,
with the vertical representing where the references are found and the
horizontal containing the texts cited:11

I II III IV V VI
I 0 0 0 0 0 0
II 2 3 0 0 0 0
III 0 0 0 0 0 0
IV 0 3 1 3 0 0
V 1 1 1 1 1 0
VI 1 1 0 0 3 6

11
The citations are as follows: II.4 > II.1; II.5 > II.4; II.6 > I.20; II.6 > I.11; II.9
> II.10; IV.1 > II.1; IV3 > IV.4; IV.5 > IV.4; IV.6 > III.4; IV8 > IV.4 (2x); IV.8 >
II.3; IV.8 > II.3; IV.8 > II.13; V.2 > II.4; V.6 > III.13; V.7 > I.2; V.8 > IV.12; V.17
> V.15; VI.1 > I.2–5; VI.2 > VI.1; VI.4 > V.5; VI.5 > V.2; VI.5 > VI.6 (2x); VI.5 >
VI.3; VI.7 > V.3; VI.9 > II.5; VI.17 > VI.16; VI.17 > VI.16. In V.3 there is also a
reference to “praecedenti quolibet,” meaning IV.4.

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Finally, it should be noted that Quodlibet IV begins: “In ultima dispu-

tatione communi . . .” Whether one takes “ultima” to mean “nal” or
“latest,” it seems that Peter had not held Quodlibeta V and VI when he
redacted IV.
Thus each year, when writing up the latest Quodlibet, he had all previ-
ous ones before his eyes. Indeed, as is often the case, he silently reused
material from earlier Quodlibeta. A good example is from article 1 of
Quodlibet IV, q. 2, which was used as a mine for Quodlibet VI, q. 4, a. 2,
since in both situations Peter wanted to treat God’s eternity:

Quodlibet IV, question 2, article 1 Quodlibet VI, question 4, article 2

Ad declarationem primi accipiendum De secundo est intelligendum quod
est quod Deum ex se necesse est esse. Deus, cum sit primum simpliciter
Si enim non ex se necesse est esse, ex in entibus, nullam habet rationem
se possibile est esse. Quod autem tale termini neque secundum causalita-
est, ex alio dependet priori. Quod tem, neque secundum durationem,
vero ex alio priori dependet in esse suo neque secundum aliquem modum.
primum non est, nec per consequens Si enim haberet aliquam rationem
Deus, cum Deus sit primum simpliciter termini, esset eo aliquid prius, et per
in entibus. Quod autem ex se necesse consequens primum non esset. Et
est esse, omnino est interminabile, ideo est simpliciter intransmutabilis et
nullam habens rationem termini, nec immutabilis per se et per accidens. Si
secundum causalitatem, nec secun- enim aliquo modo mutaretur, esset eo
dum durationem. Si enim hoc habe- aliquid prius a quo mutaretur et non
ret, non esset necesse esse ex se. Tale esset primum simpliciter. Quod autem
etiam secundum omnem modum est interminabile et incommutabile est
incommutabile. Si enim mutabile simpliciter, totum suum esse perfectum
esset, dependeret ex alio. Quod vero simul habet, nihil acquirens in futuro
interminabile et incommutabile est, nec amittens in praeterito. Quia
omnino totum esse suum perfectum etiam omnino primum est in entibus,
simul habet, nihil acquirens in futu- omnino immateriale est. Si enim ali-
rum nec amittens in praeteritum. quo modo materiam haberet, eo esset
Quod etiam ex se necesse est esse, aliquid prius. Actus enim prior est
omnino separatum est a materia. semper potentia simpliciter. Quod
Si enim aliquam rationem materiae autem immateriale est, omnino intel-
haberet, non esset ex se necesse esse. ligens est et vivens vita intellectuali.
Omne autem separatum simpliciter Quod autem vivit vita intellectuali
intelligens est et vivens vita intel- interminabili tota simul et perfecta
lectuali. Deus igitur est intelligens et aeternum est. Et propter hoc Boet-
vivens vita intellectuali perfectissima hius, 5 De consolatione, deniens aeter-
interminabili et immutabili omnino. nitatem, ait quod “aeternitas est
Haec igitur vitae interminabilitas interminabilis vitae possessio tota
‘aeternitas’ dicitur. Unde Boethius, simul et perfecta.” Igitur Deus aeternus
5 De consolatione, eam deniens, dicit est et dicitur aeternitate quae non est

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quod “aeternitas est interminabilis aliud ab ipso. Si enim esset aliud ab

vitae possessio tota simul et perfecta.” ipso, esset in eo aliqua compositio, et
Et hac Deus simpliciter aeternus per consequens non esset primum.
dicitur et est, et secundum rem est Nullum enim compositum potest esse
idem quod ipse. Si enim esset aliud primum simpliciter. Igitur aeternitas
ab ipso secundum rem, esset in ipso qua Deus est aeternus realiter non
aliqua compositio et dependeret ex est aliud ab ipso. Sed est differens
alio et non esset ex necesse. Differunt secundum modum intelligendi nos-
tamen secundum rationem, quoniam trum. Secundum enim quod consi-
secundum essentiam consideratus dici- deratur ut essentia vel vita, ‘Deus’ vel
tur ‘Deus’ vel ‘deitas’, secundum ‘vivus’ dicitur. Secundum autem quod
autem quod interminabilis ‘aeternus’ consideratur ut vita interminabilis tota
dicitur, quemadmodum secundum simul et perfecta, dicitur ‘aeternus’. Et
quod indivisus dicitur ‘unus’, sic apparet quid sit aeternus.
secundum essentiam autem acceptus
‘ens’ vel ‘esse’.

More obvious still is the example from article 3 of the very same
Quodlibet IV, q. 2, which is basically reused as article 2 of Quodlibet VI,
q. 2, since both questions concern different aspects of the problem of
divine foreknowledge of future contingents:

Quodlibet IV, question 2, article 3 Quodlibet VI, question 2, article 2

Propter tertium autem intelligendum Ex parte vero contingentium acci-
quod aliqua sunt semper eodem modo piendum est quod aliqua sunt eodem
entia quae sunt ex necessitate, alia modo semper se habentia quae sunt
vero semper non-entia quae impos- necessaria, alia vero semper non-entia
sibile est esse, alia vero media inter quae sunt impossibilia, alia vero media
haec, aliquando quidem entia, ali- inter haec, quae aliquando quidem
quando vero non-entia. Et in istis sunt sunt, aliquando autem non sunt. Et in
contingentia quae possunt esse et non his sunt contingentia ad utrumlibet.
esse, non quaecumque, sed illa quae Sed istorum quaedam contingunt ut
ut frequenter et ut in pluribus non in pluribus ex causis suis, sicut bipes
procedunt ex causis respectu quarum generat bipidem ut in pluribus, alia
contingentia sunt, quae sunt causae vero non ut frequenter et in pluribus
per accidens. Quia igitur Deus est procedunt ex causis suis per accidens,
causa per se omnium qualitercumque et haec dicimus contingentia proprie.
entium, et nihil inordinatum est rela- Quia igitur Deus est causa per se
tum ad ipsum, nihil est contingens omnium qualitercumque entium, et
ad utrumlibet respectu ipsius, sed nihil inordinatum est relatum ad
omnia per se ordinata et immutabiliter ipsum, nihil est contingens ut ad ipsum
evenientia. Respectu autem causarum relatum est, sed omnia per se ordinata
particularium, quae non habent per se et immutabiliter existentia. Respectu
ordinem ad esse eorum, contingentia autem causarum particularium et
dicuntur proprie. Propter quod futura mediarum quae non habent ordinem

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contingentia dicuntur et sunt quae ex per se ad ea, dicuntur contingentia et

causis particularibus non habentibus sunt.
ordinem ad ipsa in futurum possunt
esse et non esse.

Several other phrases and quotations in Quodlibet IV, q. 2, are more or

less repeated in other sections of Peter’s Quodlibeta, and naturally there
are many other examples from other questions. If the entire text is
ever printed, we will surely nd substantial borrowings from Peter’s
own earlier works and from the writings of other scholastics as well.
Indeed, in his edition of Peter’s Quodlibet I, q. 20, Hermann Weber
recognized verbatim borrowings from Aquinas’ De ente et essentia, while
Edgard Hocedez caught Peter reproducing passages from Godfrey of
Fontaines almost verbatim in Quodlibet II, q. 5, and Frank Hentschel
referred the reader to Peter’s own commentary on the Politics in the
apparatus fontium for Quodlibet VI, q. 16.12
Aside from some erroneous readings, Glorieux’s question list is more
or less accurate except that he missed question 6 of Quodlibet I and,
in his volume I, he omitted question 3 of Quodlibet VI, although he
corrected it in volume II. Not all the questions are well marked in the
manuscripts, which often have incorrect numbering themselves. Peter’s
own internal references, however, conrm the new numbering in the
question list printed as an appendix to this chapter. As was often the
case, due perhaps to space limitations, Glorieux gave only the incipits
and explicits to each Quodlibet and the question titles. Thus Glorieux
left out whatever organizing scheme the author employed in other sec-
tions of the text. Appendix I contains all of this material, including the
foliation of each question in each manuscript witness.
The appendix demonstrates that, although Peter composed each
Quodlibet individually and does not appear to have ever made a new,
comprehensive redaction (contrary to the theory of Giuseppina Can-
nizzo; see below), he put much thought into the organization of each
Quodlibet. What we have is Peter’s determinationes. Before the foliation
information, the question list gives the length of each question in terms
of columns in manuscript V, each column being roughly two printed
pages, as is borne out by previous editions of questions. Most questions

12
Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten, p. 374, n. 8; Hocedez, “Un Question
inédit de Pierre d’Auvergne,” pp. 358 and 376–8 (see also M. Pickavé’s chapter above);
Hentschel, “Der verjagte Dämon,” p. 418, n. 231.

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are brief, between three and six pages long, perhaps corresponding to
the length of Peter’s actual oral determinations. Peter usually employs
the imperfect to explain what “quaerebatur” in the session and then
gives only one or two of the many arguments pro and contra that were
given when the question “arguebatur” by the opponens and respondens.
Only rarely does Peter allude to the intention of the one asking the
question, as in Quodlibet I, q. 12: “sed hoc non intendebat quaerens,”
and Quodlibet III, q. 6: “sed sic non est intentio quaerentis.” Likewise,
the opponens almost never appears, the best examples of his appearance
being in Quodlibet III, q. 10, where he says: “opponens aliud in rationi-
bus videbatur intendere,” and in the same Quodlibet, q. 1, where Peter
remarks: “Quia tamen opponens quaestionem induxit, ut credo, non
propter ipsam sed propter id quod accipitur in ratione de loco angeli,
ut audiret quomodo sit in loco,” at which point Peter focuses the gen-
eral question whether God can make an intellectual nature without a
bodily nature on the specic issue of the place of angels.
Indeed, not only does Peter avoid the adversarial aspect of quodli-
betal debates in his written determinations, but he usually steers clear
of confrontations in general. Although he has more than 1000 citations,
as we shall see, he rarely cites university-era theologians and never by
name. The closest he comes to direct citation is a mention of “that
doctor,” meaning Thomas Aquinas, in Quodlibet IV, q. 2: “Et hanc
credo fuisse intentionem illius doctoris qui posuit futura contingentia
coexistere Deo,” and “that man,” meaning Arnau de Vilanova, in
Quodlibet V, q. 15: “. . . illi qui hoc anno publicavit libellum de adventu
Antichristi.” Where there are mentions of moderni, they are always even
more vague, as for example “sicut aliqui de doctoribus nostris” (II.1; cf.
IV.5), “diversae opiniones magnorum” (II.4; cf. II.9 and III.12), “anti-
qua opinio” (II.5), “sententia doctorum” (II.13), “communis doctorum
sententia” (V.1). Otherwise, we have various references to “aliqui” and
“quidam.” But even these are infrequent, and the overall impression
is that of a kind old teacher trying to explain things to his students
without engaging in polemics.
We can see this didactic aspect in how Peter arranges his Quodlibeta
and how he divides each question. Peter goes to extraordinary lengths
to explain in simple terms, with tremendous repetition, the logic of his
organization—although it sometimes seems as if the general parameters
were proposed beforehand. Quodlibet I will serve as an example, follow-
ing the appendix. Although unsaid, perhaps because it was Peter’s rst

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effort, the main division is between God’s power and creation, and he
further subdivides the twenty-one questions as follows:
1–8 God’s power
1 God’s immensity
2–8 The innity of His power with respect to produced things
2–6 With respect to an innite or innite things
2–5 Questions implied by the main question
6 The main question
7–8 With respect to nite things
7 With respect to separating things conjoined in being
8 With respect to the production of the world
9–21 Created being
9 The nature of the good, which is convertible with being universally
10–21 Various genera and species of beings
10–11 Substance or corporal nature simpliciter
12–21 Human nature
12–19 Present life
12–15 Human cognition
12 Cognition universally
13 Intellective cognition of something specic
14–15 Some things humans do through cognition
16–18 Church duties
19 A sacrament
20–21 Future life
20 Truth of the Resurrection
21 Understanding of the blessed
We see, more or less, an attempt to t things into Peter Lombard’s
scheme for the Sentences, but it is already a stretch, and when one looks
at individual questions the system looks rather articial and forced. For
example, under “Some things humans do through cognition,” ques-
tion 14 is about whether theologians teach and question 15 concerns
astrologers. Peter’s impressive efforts make evident the limitations of
Quodlibeta as a written genre, perhaps one of the main factors in its
eventual decline.
This desire to explain things on a basic level is also evident in the
questions themselves, which means that more frequently than with most
authors we nd Peter dealing rst with the foundations upon which a
question rests. Despite the relative brevity of the questions, this provides
raw material for historians interested in tracing these issues in Peter’s
and others’ thought. For instance, Quodlibet II, q. 10, “utrum immunitas
sit per se principium libertatis,” article 1 rst asks “quid sit libertas?”

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In the pertinent place (III.8) Peter asks “quid sit scientia speculativa
et quid practica?”
Peter’s care for order and clarity, as a teacher, may perhaps explain
the relative frequency of his quotations from authority, although he
himself seems to be a rather independent thinker. He may have wanted
his audience and readers to be more familiar with the great pagan,
Muslim, and Christian thinkers of the distant past, and of course he
knew Aristotle and the pagans and Arabs better than most anyone
because of his long teaching and prolic writing career as a master of
arts. Peter has some 1065 explicit citations in all.
The following is a count of his citations, rst for authors receiving
more than twenty:

Aristotle 406 (20 works) Augustine 149 (20 works) Averroes 78

name only 64 name only 14 name only 12
Metaphysica 103 De trinitate 38 De substantia orbis 22
Physica 60 De libero arbitrio 18 In De anima 15
De anima 42 De civitate Dei 14 In Metaphysicam 13
Ethica 31 83 quaestiones 14 In Physica 12
De generatione 22 Confessiones 11 In De caelo et mundo 4
Politica 19 Super Genesim ad Proclus 54
De caelo et mundo 16 litteram 10 name only 2
Praedicamenta 9 De immortalitate Institutio theologica 50
De sensu et sensato 7 animae 4 De fato 2
Rhetorica 7 De doctrina christiana 4 Boethius 27
Analytica posteriora 7 Enchiridion 4 name only 3
Analytica priora 6 De moribus De consolatione 9
Metheora 3 Manichaeorum 3 De hebdomadibus 5
De interpretatione 2 De natura boni 2 De musica 5
De somno et vigilia 2 De vera religione 2 De duabus naturis 2
De natura animalium 2 In epistolam ad Super Porphyrium 1
Magna moralia 2 Ephesios 2 In Analytica
Topica 1 Homilia in Johannem 2 posteriora 1
Historia animalium 1 Enarrationes in In De interpretatione 1
Sophistici elenchi 1 Psalmos 1 Pseudo-Boethius, De
Pseudo-Aristotle, De magistro 1 unitate et uno 1
Problemata 1 De summo bono 1
Ad Bonifatium 1
Ad Nebridium 1
Ad Ysicium (?) 1

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Those receiving twenty or fewer:

Anselm 20 Peter Comestor Alphagranus 1

name only 2 (Magister Ptolemy, Cosmographia 1
De libero arbitrio 8 Historiarum) 4 Theophrastus 1
Monologion 6 Algazali, Metaphysica 4 Seneca, De naturalibus
Cur Deus homo 3 Alexander of qq. 1
De incarnatione Verbi 1 Aphrodisias, Rabanus Maurus,
Pseudo-Dionysius 17 In Metaphysicam 4 In Matthaeum 1
De divinis nominibus 14 John the Bernard of Pavia,
De caelesti hierarchia 2 Grammarian, On Summa 1
De ecclesiastica John 4 Tholosanus, Nova
hierarchia 1 Peter Lombard, proportione centilogii 1
Avicenna 16 Sentences 3 (H)ali, Super nova
name only 7 Hostiensis 3 proportione centilogii 1
Metaphysica 7 Lectura in Decretales 2 Vetus Testamentum 37
Logica 1 Summa aurea 1 Novum Testamentum 66
Naturalia 1 Cicero 3 Glossa (Bible) 14
Plato 16 De paradoxis 2 Decretum 25
name only 13 De ofciis 1 Glossa (Decretum) 3
Timaeus 3 Pythagoras 3 Decretales 24
John of Damascus 13 Porphyry, Isagoge 2 Digesta 3
De de orthodoxa 13 Simplicius 2 Codex Iustiniani 1
Huguccio, Summa 6 In De caelo et mundo 1 Novellae 1
Eustratius, In Ethica 5 In Praedicamenta 1 Registrum romani
Albumasar, De Orosius, Hormesta ponticis 1
coniunctionibus 5 mundi ad Articuli condemnati
John Chrysostom, Augustinum 2 (1277) 6
On Gospels 5 Gregory the Great 2 Symbolum Athanasii 3
Bernard of Clairvaux 5 Richard of St Victor, Symbolum Nicaenum 1
name only 1 De trinitate 2 Liber de causis 2
De precepto et Origen, In Exodum 2 Sex principia 1
dispensat. 2 Themistius, In De
De libero arbitrio 2 anima 2
Anaxagoras 2

Of these citations, almost 40% are from Aristotle with another 5% from
Aristotelian commentaries, while 15% are from Augustine and only
10% from Scripture. Arab scholars receive as much explicit attention as
Scripture, in fact, and the number of Platonic and Neoplatonic citations
is impressive again. Peter pays particular attention to Proclus, citing him
over fty times, usually with a quotation and the number of the conclu-
sio from the Elements of Theology. The audience at Peter of Auvergne’s
Quodlibeta would have been treated to a wide variety of quotations and

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citations of the Bible, pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Greek commentators,

Roman authors, Greek and Latin Fathers, Boethius, Arab philosophers
and scientists, Roman and canon law texts, and twelfth-century writers.
All along Peter appears not to be merely displaying his erudition, but
providing some basic as well as advanced instruction to his listeners in
a rather neutral way.
Students of Peter’s Quodlibeta have long noted this attitude: in 1931
Joseph Koch spoke of Peter’s dispassionate and methodical objectivity
when determining whether Pygmies are men;13 in 1934 Edgard Hocedez
emphasized Peter’s precision and clarity in a question on individuation;14
in 1939 Jean Leclercq remarked that in Peter’s analysis of theology as
a science he showed his usual precision and subtlety.15 In her article on
Peter’s Quodlibeta published in 1964–65, Giuseppina Cannizzo described
Peter’s approach well when she wrote that he does not “grab everyone’s
attention immediately,” that he was not a “revolutionary” thinker, not a
logician desiring to trap his adversary, not a polemicist, “in a word, not
spectacular.” Nevertheless, he was serious, began by taking what was
indisputable, and built on that with an “extreme simplicity,” without
taking any opponent to task.16
Perhaps this helps explain the relative brevity of most of Peter’s
questions. A few years later John of Pouilly would take over one of
the secular chairs of theology at Paris, but he used his Quodlibeta to
launch lengthy and often angry attacks on his opponents, whom he
occasionally named explicitly.17 Whereas one could t all six of Peter of
Auvergne’s Quodlibeta into one, admittedly large, tome, each of Pouilly’s
ve main efforts would better be published in a separate volume. Thus
while Pouilly goes on at length about the Templars’ heresy, in contrast,
when asked in 1296 (I.16) whether a pope can resign in the context of
Celestine V’s recent and controversial actions, Peter calmly and briey
replies that whatever is permitted by the Church is just, and since the
Church allowed this, “as appears in the resignation of Lord Celestine,
therefore it can happen with reason.” He then goes on to give a dispas-
sionate determination.18 Likewise, a few months after he himself was

13
Koch, “Sind die Pygmäen Menschen?,” p. 200.
14
Hocedez, “Un Question inédit de Pierre d’Auvergne,” p. 358.
15
Leclercq, “La théologie comme science,” p. 353.
16
Cannizzo I, pp. 486–7.
17
On Pouilly’s Quodlibeta, see the chapter by L. Hödl below.
18
As Roberto Lambertini noted in his chapter in volume I, p. 463, n. 83, Eastman’s
edition in Papal Abdication, pp. 137–41, is problematic. While the manuscript the editor

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 the QUODLIBETA of peter of auvergne 95

summoned to play a role in the controversy over Arnau de Vilanova’s

predictions about the coming of the Antichrist, Peter answers the related
quodlibetal questions (V.15–17) without much fuss.
Peter does sometimes present the opposing views of “quidam” and
“alii,” but without being too strident, as when deciding on the primacy
of the will vs. the intellect (II.9): “His suppositis, est intelligendum quod
de hac quaestione sunt opiniones oppositae magnorum, quibusdam
dicentibus intellectum esse principaliorem simpliciter, aliis autem ipsam
voluntatem. Mihi autem ad praesens videtur esse dicendum quasi via
media quodam modo . . .” When asked whether caritas can be remitted
with the effect (III.12), he says that “de ista quaestione fuit et est mag-
norum et multorum opinio” that it can, but that people adhere to this
“opinioni magis propter auctoritatem dicentium quam propter ratio-
nem,” so he argues against it, “dicentium salva reverentia.” Although
he himself is an old and experienced master of theology, Peter shows
restraint when answering the question whether God can assume prime
matter without form in the unity of the suppositum (IV.5): “Quidam
de doctoribus nostris—subtilis intellectus et magnae considerationis,
pie et religiose considerantes—posuerunt Deum non posse assumere
in unitate suppositi naturam irrationalem, ad evitandum aliqua quae
aliquibus minus considerantibus appareant absurda esse, puta Deum
esse asinum vel equum.” “Less reective” is about as strong an insult
one nds in Peter. Once in a while it may appear that Peter is frus-
trated with a question that he thinks is irrational (e.g., VI.12), but this
is rather part of his teaching strategy in bringing out the possible ways
of taking a question.
There is only one real exception to this generalization concerning the
length of Peter’s questions, an exception that proves the rule. Quodlibet
IV, q. 8, “utrum potentia in materia et forma ad quam est sint idem
secundum rem,” is ve times the size of most questions and twice as
long as the next largest. It is really only in this question that Peter loses
his patience. At an early point Peter interjects: “Sed hoc dictum est ne
forte aliqui minus intelligentes credant hoc esse verum, maxime cum hoc
audiunt dici cum assertione a quibusdam.” Peter then presents the gist
of their opinion, so that his point is made more clear, and afterwards
remarks: “Quaedam alia etiam interponunt quae propter brevitatem

employs (BnF 15841) is very good (according to a complete collation done against
Eastman’s text), his transcription is often faulty.

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et manifestam falsitatem omitto ad praesens.” His counterarguments

begin: “Primo, ista <opinio> est falsa et irrationabilis, et contradictoria
implicat, et contradicit opinionibus et dictis sapientum in naturalibus.”
Peter’s long disproofs of what is “absurd” and “stupid” are unusual in
the context of the general spirit of his Quodlibeta.19
Actually, there is one question that is slightly more than half the
length of the longest one: Quodlibet II, q. 2, on whether rainbows are the
work of God. Here Peter goes off on one of his many scientic excursus.
Perhaps if there is something Peter is enthusiastic about, although not
in an argumentative fashion, it is natural philosophy. The two largest
questions deal with natural philosophy, and so do many of the other
more lengthy ones: Quodlibet II, q. 7, asks whether something can rst
move itself; II, q. 10, whether immunity from matter is the basis of
freedom, includes an excursus on the matter of the heavens; several
questions, such as III, qq. 6–7, deal with the intension and remission
of forms; IV, q. 17, asks whether a universal ood is possible naturally;
VI, q. 6, concerns the angels moving the heavens.

19
I have not been able to discover who exactly is the object of Peter’s attack, so I
quote some elements of the position here: “Sed hoc dictum est ne forte aliqui minus
intelligentes credant hoc esse verum, maxime cum hoc audiunt dici cum assertione a
quibusdam, verumtamen quidam, coacti ponere potentiam passivam materiae realiter
differre a forma et per consequens materiam, in maiora dilapsi sunt impossibilia. Quod
ut manifestius at, ponatur opinio sicut a proponentibus accepta est in summa, et post-
modum vera, si qua sunt in ea, supponantur et falsa et impossibilia referantur. Dicunt
igitur primo, supponentes secundum Philosophum, quod nulla potentia nec generabilis
nec corruptibilis est, quoniam si esset, esset materia prima alia prior. Secundo, quod est
potentia simpliciter non habens actum nec sub esse completo nec sub esse incompleto.
Tertio, quod est in potentia ad omnes formas materiales, loquendo generaliter. Et haec,
quia vera sunt, si recte intelligantur, supponantur cum eis.
Quibus suppositis, subiungunt quod materia sic est potentia quod vere et proprie
secundum substantiam suam transmutabilis est in quodlibet ens naturale, et non manet
in ne transmutationis, sed transmutatur in substantiam termini acquisiti habentis esse
specicum, non habens in potentia materiam distinctam a forma. Et per consequens
generatum per se est simplex, non compositum ex diversis naturis, sicut de caelo posuit
Averroes, ita ut forma sit tota essentia rei. Quia tamen huiusmodi forma, quae est
terminus transmutationis, t ex materia sub alia forma, resolubilis est in illam et ipsa
forma est in potentia ad formas alias. Et sic quodammodo entia naturalia composita
sunt ex forma et potentia et habent actum permixtum potentiae materiali, licet materia
non sit in eis secundum substantiam. Et ex hoc nituntur ulterius salvare transmutationes
naturales et reddere causas omnium naturalium, asserentes quod per hanc viam est
liber exitus ad omnia naturalia salvanda et ad vericandum primas propositiones in
naturalibus, et ad evitandum multa gravia et difcilia contingentia aliter potentibus,
puta de productione formarum et salvatione relinquiarum corporum corruptorum de
susceptione magis et minus in substantiis et huiusmodi aliis.”

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Of course, there are also many traditional theological questions in

Peter’s Quodlibeta, as well as the kind of interesting questions one expects
from quodlibeta, such as (II.16) whether murdering someone according to
one’s erroneous conscience is better than going against one’s conscience
and not murdering that person, or (II.18) whether someone who com-
mits incest or theft while drunk should have a double penance. Roberto
Lambertini commented on some of Peter’s political questions in the
previous volume of the present work (pp. 450, 459, 462–63), while
Jean-Luc Solère looked at his Quodlibet I, q. 20, on identity and the
resurrection (pp. 513–16). There is no shortage of interesting material
in Peter’s 108 quodlibetal questions.
It must be said that Peter of Auvergne’s theological impact, while
pronounced, may have been short-lived. A couple of the manuscripts
are post-1400, including Troyes 639 from the seventeenth century, but
most witnesses are rather early and the tradition appears to be hori-
zontal. Neither Gregory of Rimini from the 1340s nor John Capreolus
from the early fteenth century cites Peter’s Quodlibeta. In the quarter
century after his death, however, Peter’s ideas circulated widely. Scotus’
edited Oxford works are a bit early, but he cited Peter of Auvergne in
his Parisian Sentences commentary.20 A search through manuscripts reveals
that John of Pouilly cites Peter’s Quodlibeta explicitly on several occasions:
in his own Quodlibet I, q. 11, referring to Peter’s Quodlibet II, q. 3, but
“nescio si alicubi dixerunt alia verba”; in IV, q. 2, citing Peter’s Quodlibet
III, qq. 8–9; in Quodlibet IV, q. 5, referring to Peter’s Quodlibet V; and
in IV, q. 10, mentioning Peter’s Quodlibet III. In Sentences commentaries
Peter is cited twice explicitly in the Scriptum in primum (dd. 1 and 27) of
the Franciscan Peter Auriol, at least three times in the commentary of
the Franciscan Gerard Odonis, once in Ockham’s book IV, ve times
in the commentary on book I of the Augustinian Dionysius de Borgo
San Sepolcro, and once or twice in the commentary on the rst book
of the Carmelite John Baconthorpe.21 Considering the reluctance of

20
Noted in the apparatus of Ordinatio I, d. 1, pars 2, a. 1, in Ordinatio I, dd. 1–2, ed.
C. Balim et al., Opera omnia II (Vatican City 1950), p. 57, although the editors could
not nd the opinion in Peter’s Quodlibeta.
21
For references in Auriol, Odonis, Dionysius, and Baconthorpe, see C. Schabel,
“Auriol’s Rubrics: Citations of University Theologians in Peter Auriol’s Scriptum in Primum
Librum Sententiarum,” in S.F. Brown. T. Dewender, and T. Kobusch, eds., Philosophical
Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, Brill: Leiden, forthcoming, and the literature
cited there. The Pouilly references are based on the copy of his Quodlibeta in BAV, Vat. lat.
1017, while for Rimini, Capreolus, and Ockham I employed the indices of the critical

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scholastics to cite their contemporaries, especially those with whom

they agreed, this sampling is impressive.
So the prospective editor of Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibeta will be
dealing with an important text. Editing the Quodlibeta will not be an
easy task, especially given Peter’s tendency to reuse his own and others’
material, probably from those who inuenced him the most, Thomas
Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines. But at least the
manuscript tradition, in my opinion, presents few obstacles.

The Manuscripts and Sole Redaction of Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibeta

The medieval manuscripts containing Peter’s Quodlibeta, almost all

from the fourteenth century, are as follows (s = selected questions;
a = abbreviations):

G = Angers, Bibliothèque publique 223 (214) I II — — — —

(ff. 34va–60vb)
B = Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer I II III IV V VI
Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 428 (ff. 48ra–103rb)
S = Berlin. Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer I II III IV V VI
Kulturbesitz, Magdeb. 149 (ff. 1ra–100rb)
R = Brugge, Openbare Bibliotheek 228 I II — — — —
(ff. 61ra–86vb)
E = Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. — — — IV V —
CA 2o 108 (ff. 200ra–231va)
F = Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, I II — — — —
II.II.182 (ff. 419ra–433vb)
C = Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana XVII. 373 I II — — — —
(ff. 128va–146vb)
D = Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana XXIII. 662 I II III IV V VI
(ff. 97ra–186rb)
L = Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, s s s s — s
28 (see Appendix I)
M = Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 3512 I II III IV V VI
(ff. 59rb–119vb)
W = Paris, BnF lat. F 3121 A (ff. 1ra–91rb) I II III IV V VI

editions of their Sentences commentaries. For Odonis’ reaction to Peter on the principle
of individuation, see now L.M. de Rijk, “Giraldus Odonis, Godfrey of Fontaines, and
Peter Auriol on the Principle of Individuation,” in Ad Ingenii Acuitionem. Studies in
Honour of Alfonso Maierù, S. Caroti, R. Imbach, Z. Kaluza, G. Stabile, and L. Sturlese,
eds. (Louvain-la-Neuve 2006) (pp. 404–36), pp. 406–7.

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X =
Paris, BnF lat. 14562 (ff. 2ra–85vb) I II III * IV V VI
A =
Paris, BnF lat. 15350 (ff. 339ra–348rb) sa sa — — — —
Y =
Paris, BnF lat. 15841 (ff. 1ra–51vb) I II III IV V VI
Z =
Paris, BnF lat. 15851 (ff. 3ra–80vb) I II III IV V VI
P =
Praha, Národní Knihovna, XIII.D.5 s s s s s s
(Y.II. 3.n.1.) (2297) (ff. 26vb–57vb)
T = Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 269 I II III IV V VI
(ff. 136ra–196ra)
O = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Ottob. lat. 196 I II III — — —
(ff. 51ra–75rb)
V = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 932 I II III IV V VI
(ff. 102ra–170ra)
Witnesses per quodlibet, not including selected 15 15 12 11 11 10
questions in A, L, and P
* X actually contains two copies of Quodlibet III back-to-back.

This generally corrects or makes more precise Glorieux’s chart, except

that the Angers and Berlin Magdeburg witnesses have not been noted
previously in studies on Peter’s Quodlibeta, nor has the second copy of
Quodlibet III in X (BnF 14562). Likewise, the ten questions copied in
various places in the Pamplona manuscript have not been noted thus
far.22 No doubt other witnesses, or at least fragments, will eventually
come to light.
In Giuseppina Cannizzo’s article on Peter’s Quodlibeta, the author
defended the theory that Peter himself produced a second “edizione”
of the rst ve Quodlibeta (I, 489), represented solely by manuscript Y
(BnF 15841). Her rst evidence was “la quasi irreprensibilità del testo,
la correttezza graca, la presenza di alcune—non numerose ma signi-
cative—varianti d’autore” (I, 498). According to Cannizzo, manuscript
Y, which had rarely been employed until then, is the oldest and best
(II, 605). She knew it to be from the early fourteenth century and so

22
I learned of the Angers manuscript via Murano, Opere diffuse per exemplar e pecia,
p. 665, who found it via Destrez’s index. For the Berlin Magdeburg manuscript, see
U. Winter and K. Heydeck, Die Manuscripta magdeburgica der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin preus-
sischer Kulturbesitz (Wiesbaden 2004), pp. 153–4. For Pamplona, see J. Goñi, “Catálogo
de los manuscritos teológicos de la Catedral de Pamplona,” part 2, Revista Española de
Teología 17 (1957) (pp. 383–418), pp. 399–406 (contains I.15; II.13, 16, 18–19; III.14,
16; IV.16; VI.16–17). According to the Institute de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes,
MS Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 639, is from the 17th century and hence is not
considered here. On the other manuscripts, see especially Cannizzo II, pp. 606–13;
Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, p. 9 (noting that A dates from the end of the 13th
century and belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines); and Hentschel, “Der verjagte Dämon,”
p. 411, and the catalogues cited in those places.

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maintained that it was from before 1304 (II, 609). She also remarked
that the manuscript tradition was almost completely contaminated (II,
607, 634). She was able to look at all medieval witnesses except B (Berlin
428, which she guessed was in Tübingen at the time), P (Prague), and
of course G, L, and S, but her ndings on the manuscript tradition
were based mainly on her edition of three questions de verbo (I.21 and
V.9–10), less than 400 lines of text in all, for which she only employed
six of the eight (ten including B and S) complete witnesses plus manu-
script O for the rst question.
Cannizzo herself concluded that the basic text is fundamentally
the same in all witnesses, but that Y contains consistent variants and
sometimes inserts superior, “corrette” readings, although she gave no
specic examples of this. For the main version of the text, she took Z
to be the best witness, remarking that the two manuscripts are inde-
pendent because of divergent variants (II, 618–20). On the basis of
some internal and external differences between the rst ve Quodlibeta
and Quodlibet VI in Y, and the lack of “quasi impercettibili” (I, 498;
II, 630) indications of pecias in the latter, Cannizzo asserted that the
last Quodlibet was added to Y—or its tradition—after Peter’s death, or
perhaps after he became bishop of Clermont in 1302 (II, 622, 627). In
sum, Y contains “una revisione unitaria ed organica eseguita dallo stesso
autore sulle singole dispute” for the rst ve Quodlibeta (II, 627).
Cannizzo had no doubts about her theory, declaring that Y “è certa-
mente il più antico codice” (II, 628) and “indubbiamente si può parlare
con sicurezza di revisione” (II, 629). Then, again without giving specic
examples, she attempted to construct possible stemmata that would take
into account all combinations of shared variants (II, 637–48), having
stated that eliminatio was not possible (II, 637), no doubt because of the
extensive contamination. In order to explain these variants, Cannizzo
resorted to some rather complex diagrams.
It seems to me, however, that there is a much simpler explanation: the
scribe of Y made intelligent corrections on occasion. Cannizzo herself
admitted (II, 636) that Y contains unshared omissions and errors, and
her edition and my own show that Y even has omissions per homoiote-
leuton, so Y would then have to stem from an exemplar of the revision.
But this would then mean that obvious scribal corrections above the
line or in the margins of Y indicate a awed exemplar, entailing that
Y is at least two steps from the revision. And why then posit a dating
of before 1304 for the manuscript? A better alternative is that there

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is no revised text and that Y’s scribe made smart conjectures, a com-
mon occurrence with an intelligent scribe. The surviving indications of
pecias, moreover, agree with the numbers in M, suggesting that the same
exemplar(s) was used. Finally, the fact that there are no such markings
preserved in Y for Quodlibet VI is of little importance, since only one
of the ve markings remains for Quodlibet II. Thus there is no good
reason to suppose that Quodlibet VI in Y is radically different from the
rst ve.23 In any case, if Y represented a new redaction, one would
have expected other revisions, such as the elimination of the reference
to the “ultima disputatione” in the incipit to Quodlibet IV, or the inser-
tion of an explicit organizing plan in the incipit to Quodlibet I.
Y is not the only witness with an intelligent scribe. In fact, rather
than resort to the extensive contamination theory, it would be easier to
say that all witnesses are independent and that most stem either directly
or indirectly from the exemplar deposited with the stationers. Despite
the requirement that such exemplars be accurate and clear, it is obvi-
ous that in places the exemplar of Peter’s Quodlibeta was neither, as the
editions—and even the question list below24—show. The scribes often
failed to decipher a reading, and we have a great variety of groupings
as a result. Although there is most likely some contamination, there
are also many chance sharings of “erroneous” readings. In some cases
editors have had to go with a sole witness against the rest, probably a
scribal correction rather than a correct copying of the exemplar, and
there are quite a few instances where Cannizzo herself resorted to her
own conjecture or noted a serious problem (e.g., III, pp. 84.14; 86.5).
The pecia system would tend to produce a uniform tradition, especially
when the popularity of the text was relatively short-lived. This is exactly
the situation we have here. In any event, her editing sample amounts

23
Murano, Opere diffuse per exemplar e pecia, p. 665, reports that of the 5 pecia for
Quodlibet I, there are only markings for pecias 2, 3, and 4; of the 5 for II, only for
pecia 2; of the 4 for III, for pecias 1, 2, and 3; of the 6 for IV, for pecias 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6; of the 5 for V, for pecias 2, 3, 4, and 5.
24
Appendix I has no apparatus, but there are numerous occasions when the exemplar
at the stationers was in error or unclear. In several cases it had the indicative rather
than subjuctive, and the scribes of B and/or F made the correction. In I.12 it had
“ad hoc,” “pertinentes,” and “determinata,” where “adhuc,” “pertinens,” and “deter-
minatam” were needed, and no scribe corrected the “pertinentes.” The manuscripts
are in complete disagreement about the “dilectionis oblivionem” in I.15, which could
be any combination of cases for those words (Glorieux omits “dilectionis”). There are
many other examples one could give.

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to about 380 lines of text, she employed only about half of the extant
witnesses, and there were no doubt once many other complete and
partial witnesses, perhaps several times as many as now exist.
Let us rst analyze the apparatus criticus in each of the editions
employing multiple witnesses that were published before and after
Cannizzo’s time. Koch’s edition of VI.14 (1931) employed VX, nd-
ing no omissions per homoioteleuton. Koch wrote that X was “older and
better” than V, but his own apparatus criticus shows that he rejected
an equal number of variants from V and X, and in the rst two cases,
at least, he erred in accepting X’s mistakes over V’s correct readings.25
Hocedez’s edition of II.5 (1934) was more ambitious, using RVXZ. His
apparatus criticus revealed that R and V have several unshared omis-
sions per homoioteleuton each, that X has one large one of 16 words, and
that Z had none whatsoever, a hierarchy reected in smaller variants
as well, RV having the most and Z the least, supporting Cannizzo’s
later preference for Z. Moreover, the poorest manuscripts, RV, share
several variants and appear to be linked, although they are indepen-
dent.26 Thomas Graf only had access to VZ for his 1935 edition of
V.11, nding V better than Z, but still problematic.27 Leclercq’s edition
of I.14 (1939) was based on X and Y, i.e., Cannizzo’s favorite witness,
but he provided no apparatus.28 Arthur Monahan published II.4 from
TV in 1955, showing that T is better, although each manuscript has
two unshared omissions per homoioteleuton.29 B.G. Guyot published I.18 in
1961 from AMXYZ, but without an exhaustive apparatus, while Weber’s
edition of I.20 from 1973 used DT and Segarro’s earlier transcription
of V, again recording almost no variants.30 In contrast, Pattin’s 1988
edition of II.11 made use of eight witnesses, AORVWXYZ, although
he based himself on RXYZ and provided a complete apparatus only
for those witnesses. Not surprisingly, the fragmentary manuscript A was
found to carry a text that abbreviated on occasion, as much as 18 lines.
Surprisingly, of his four primary manuscripts, Z is by far the worst, with
35 variants of one word and ve omissions per homoioteleuton of a total

25
Koch, “Sind die Pygmäen Menschen?” pp. 200 and 209, nn. 17–18.
26
Hocedez, “Un Question inédit de Pierre d’Auvergne.”
27
Graf, De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum, p. 20*.
28
Leclercq, “La théologie comme science.”
29
Monahan, “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Petri de Alvernia,” p. 147.
30
Guyot, “Textes inédits relatifs à l’étude précédente,” pp. 153–8; Segarro, “Un
precursor de Durando,” pp. 119–24; Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten, pp.
372–6.

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of 49 words, while X has one such omission. Of RXY, Y has slightly

fewer unshared variants, but this argues against its carrying a revised
redaction. Moreover, Pattin’s apparatus has Y agreeing with R’s, X’s,
and Z’s otherwise unshared erroneous readings on some occasions.31 In
1991 Dales and Argerami printed I.7, but they chose FX as their wit-
nesses, with F exhibiting three times as many errors as X, although each
manuscript has an omission per homoioteleuton.32 Finally, in 2000 Frank
Hentschel published Peter’s last two quodlibetal questions, VI.16–17,
employing BTVXZ. Hentschel chose X as his base manuscript, and
his apparatus shows that in these questions the witnesses do not differ
drastically in quality, with B perhaps being worse than TVZ, although
Z has a very large omission per homoioteleuton of 22 words. B and T each
have an omission of 8 words, and share one of 6 words, but otherwise
show no signs of representing a family. X itself has a number of small
errors, but along with V it has no large omissions.33
Cannizzo’s apparatus criticus is more difcult to break down, since
she tended to include everything in the apparatus, even orthographical
variations such as “nichil” as a variant for “nihil” or “attribucionem”
for “attributionem.” Again, one may sometimes disagree with her
choice of reading, especially when Y reads against the rest but does not
make better sense. For the six manuscripts she used for all three of her
questions (I.21 and V.9–10), MTVXYZ, the unshared variants in her
apparatus show that the best manuscripts are TXY. T has an unshared
omission of 4 words and shares omissions of 10 and 6 words with Y and
M respectively; the grouping of variants in general, however, does not
link T to either Y or M, so one assumes that these shared omissions are
by chance. X has more small variants but no omission above 3 words.
Y, on the other hand, has about as many small variants as T, but also
has unshared omissions of 4 and 5 words and the 10-word omission
it shares with T. Since Cannizzo considers the entire tradition to be in
error on a dozen occasions, and Y itself has several small errors and
three sizeable omissions, there seems to be little reason to argue that
Y represents an author’s revision, and the singular readings Cannizzo

31
Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, pp. 9–15.
32
Dales-Argerami, Medieval Latin Texts, pp. 144–8.
33
Hentschel, “Der verjagte Dämon,” pp. 412–21. The incipits should read “Ad pri-
mam argutum fuit” and “Et argutum fuit.” Variants 281–2 on p. 420 are problematic
in that two overlapping omissions are reported for B; only 281 is correct. Likewise, in
Cannizzo III, p. 80, l. 3, the incipit should be “argutum fuit,” as on p. 84, l. 3.

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does adopt from Y are probably scribal interventions. Of the other

manuscripts, MZ are good. Z has relatively few small unshared variants,
but three large singular omissions of 13, 12, and 7 words. Finally, V is
a poor witness. Cannizzo also used O for I.21, nding it to be a good
manuscript, with one large unshared omission of 12 words.
The question list in Appendix I and the critical edition of Quodlibet
I, q. 1, in Appendix II are based on complete reproductions of all wit-
nesses. I have also edited IV.2 and VI.2, on divine foreknowledge and
future contingents, for a future publication. Keeping in mind that this
sample is only about 500 lines of text, the results are as follows:

Complete witnesses
B: Cannizzo did not have access to B, which is one of the best manuscripts
here, with relatively few small errors and only two unshared omissions of
4 words each. B’s scribe, however, sometimes intervenes (usually success-
fully) to improve the text, which may account for the numerous variants
in Hentschel’s edition. In Hentschel, moreover, B has an omission of 8
words and shares with T one of 6 words, a link that is not supported in
the questions I have edited.
D: Only Guyot has employed manuscript D but without an apparatus. D
is a relatively poor manuscript, with many small variants, although only
three large omissions of 9, 6, and 4 words. At the end of III.6 and the
beginning of III.7, about two columns of text are missing.
M: The edition of these three questions shows that the rather important
Mazarine manuscript is one of the best here, even better than in
Cannizzo’s questions. It has large omissions of 6 and 3 words (and two
more in the material in Appendix I) and relatively few small errors.
S: This manuscript seems to have been unknown to previous editors of
questions from Peter’s Quodlibeta. The hand is quite clear, and in the ques-
tion edited below S provides the best text of all, with only one unshared
erroneous variant. For the other questions it still has among the fewest
small errors, but in VI.2 there is an omission per homoioteleuton of 8 words
and other omissions of 4 and 3 words. Perhaps, like Z below, its quality
varies, but it appears to be a good witness overall.
T: All previous editions have shown the Troyes manuscript to be good, and
these questions conrm this. T has among the fewest small errors here,
although it does have large omissions of 17 and 8 words.
V: The previous editions, with the exception of Hentschel’s, have shown that
manuscript V is not very good. In these three questions it is by far the
worst in terms of small errors and large omissions, of 25, 13, 13, 13, 10,
and 6 words.
W: Although Pattin did use witness W, he did not report its variants, and
Cannizzo did not employ it. In these three questions it proves to be an

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 the QUODLIBETA of peter of auvergne 105

average witness in terms of small unshared errors, but it has large omis-
sions of 25, 16, 10, and 8 words.
X: Not only is X a complete witness, but for some reason it contains two
copies of Quodlibet III back-to-back, indicated in the question list below by
X1 and X2. I have not edited any question from Quodlibet III, but in some
cases in the question list X2 corrects an error in the exemplar whereas
X1 did not. Koch and Hentschel favored X in their editions, although
Hocedez did report an omission of 16 words. Cannizzo showed it to be
one of the best, and my three questions conrm this: there is only one
omission of 3 words and relatively few minor errors.
Y: Cannizzo’s favorite manuscript, Y is in fact among the best manuscripts
in these three questions, with the fewest small, unshared variants. It does
have large singular omissions of 11 and 10 words, however.
Z: Witness Z is a rather odd case in that its performance differs radically
from question to question. For Pattin, it is very corrupt both in terms of
small errors and large omissions, while for Cannizzo is has few minor vari-
ants but three large omissions, a result reected in Hentschel’s apparatus,
and nally Hocedez’s apparatus shows it to be the best of his witnesses.
Cannizzo thinks it to be the best of her “main” redaction, although I
think her apparatus demonstrates that TX are rivals. In these three ques-
tions, however, Z is one of the best, with a lower-than-average number
of minor errors but no large omissions whatsoever.

Partial witnesses
A: Cannizzo did not use A, a witness to I and II. Godfrey of Fontaines owned
the manuscript, which explains why A does not contain all questions from
I and II and the thirty-one (out of forty) that it does preserve are heavily
abbreviated, usually containing 50% or less of the material, omitting the
beginning and starting with Peter’s determinatio. Not surprisingly, given its
owner, the text is quite good, including several “correct” or corrected
readings, notably in pp. 127.11, 130.1, and 130.5 in Appendix II. Pattin
employed it.
C: This is the rst time that C, containing I and II, has been used. The edi-
tion of I.1 shows that it is a good manuscript, with few unshared errors
and only one omission of 5 words.
E: This is the rst instance for the use of E, which contains only IV and
V. E provides a very good text in IV.2, with few singular variants and no
large omissions at all.
F: Previous to this, only Dales and Argerami employed F, which contains I
and II. The edition of I.1 conrms the impression from their apparatus
that F is a very poor witness, with a great number of small errors and
large omissions of 11 and 9 words, and one of 4 words that it shares with
O, otherwise independent. Since F’s scribe frequently made intelligent
corrections, these shortcomings should probably be attributed to a faulty
exemplar.

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G: As far as I know, G, which contains I and II, has never been used or noted
before in studies of Peter’s Quodlibeta. This is no great loss since, while the
manuscript is written in a clear hand, it provides a rather corrupt text
for I.1 in terms of small errors and omissions, although none of them is
large.
L: It seems that L has not been noted for the ten questions of Peter’s Quodlibeta
it contains. None of these ten corresponds to questions that I have edited
or transcribed, so I collated its VI.17 against Hentschel’s edition, which
employed ve manuscripts, BPTVX. L is independent from these, and
while the others have between ve and ten singular errors each, L has
thirty, so it is rather poor, although it has no large errors, in contrast to
B and T which have omissions of 8 words. At one point, p. 428, par. 3,
L gives the reading Politice, which seems to be a scribal correction of the
other manuscripts’ predicto.
O: The edition of I.1 also shows that O, preserving I–III, is a very good wit-
ness here, with very few small errors and no large omissions, although it
has a large omission in Cannizzo’s I.21, where it is still a good witness.
P: This is the rst time that the Prague manuscript has been employed. It
contains many selected questions from all six Quodlibeta, fty-one of the
total of 108, including all three of the questions I have edited. Despite
this selection, it contains the complete text of each question, including
the therefore sometimes senseless incipits. Nevertheless, it has a relatively
large number of small variants, perhaps due to the scribe’s freedom, and
two large omissions of 13 and 10 words. It is thus an average witness.
R: R preserves I and II. Hocedez’s edition showed it to be quite poor in terms
of minor errors and large omissions and to share several small variants
with V, although for Pattin, who did not employ V, R was an average
witness. In I.1, too, it is average, with one large omission of 6 words.
All witnesses (except E and G, hitherto used for only one question each)
have large, unshared omissions per homoioteleuton in what has been edited
so far, which suggests that no extant manuscript served as the exemplar
for any other extant manuscript, but rather they are all independent.
So far, no two complete manuscripts have exhibited enough striking
shared variants to warrant labelling them a family, although there are
a few interesting coincidences and some manuscripts are certainly not
direct copies from the stationer’s exemplar. Not surprisingly, some of
the witnesses preserving only Quodlibeta I and II, CGR, show a few
commonalities in I.1, with GR sharing a couple of signicant small
variants and CG having a common omission of 5 words. Hocedez’s
edition also suggests that R and V are linked. More evidence is needed,
however, but from what we have there is no reason at this point to
attempt a stemma. The best one can do is suggest a choice of manu-
scripts for future editors. Of the complete witnesses, BMSTXY are the

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 the QUODLIBETA of peter of auvergne 107

best, with Z being inconsistent and P being an interesting case. W is

fair, but DV are to be avoided. In the early section, OC are good, R
is average, A abbreviates—although it is historically important, being
Godfrey of Fontaines’ manuscript—and FG are poor. In IV and V, E
is very good.
As was said, Y’s variants and large omissions argue against its repre-
senting a new redaction. When it does read well against the others, this
is probably a result of scribal intervention, which is not restricted to Y.
For example, in the edition below, p. 127.4, the “probat” is awkward,
although it is followed by a direct quotation from Proclus, so T’s scribe
puts “quod” and Y’s scribe adds it above the line after the fact. There
are many instances where the entire tradition is confusing, if not in
error, and scribal intervention is rampant. Peter’s elliptical style does
not help matters. In pp. 124.8 and 129.16, the exemplar may have had
the abbreviation for “qui” when “quae” was needed, or more likely
it had an ambiguous abbreviation read one way by some scribes and
another way by the others. In line 9 “creatum” was written in a way that
looked more like “tantum.” The exemplar probably did not have the
“in” before “vigore” in the same line, and BDF corrected automatically
to correspond to the phrasing of the question in p. 124.2. Page 127.10
was missing an “est” in the exemplar, and various scribes supplied it
in different places, sometimes above the line or in the margin. The
same thing happens in pp. 128.4 and 130.1. Perhaps the best example
in this question is in p. 130.5. Here the exemplar seems to have had
“Nec etiam in agentibus aequi voluntatis,” which is bad enough as it
is, but then the next sentence begins “Agens enim aequivocum . . .,” so
STWY went back and xed what was probably “aequi votis” to the
correct “aequivocis.” The scribes of ABFP either had already corrected
models before them, or read “aequivocis,” or—more likely—were pay-
ing close enough attention to know that it should be “aequivocis.” The
other witnesses just wrote “aequi voluntatis.”
The other questions and the question list contain numerous other
examples, and frequently the scribes of B, F, and Y are found to attempt
reasonable conjectures. Sometimes the exemplar is awed, as in one case
where it probably had “quo existunt” and most scribes automatically
corrected to “coexistunt.” For IV.8 in the question list, the exemplar had
“transeuntibus,” which only B and V xed as “transmutabilibus,” but
a few lines later, where the exemplar seems to have had the non-sensi-
cal “a quam est sicut,” for the “a quam” some went with “ad quam,”
others with “a qua,” but “acquisita” and “quae acquiritur” were also

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ventured. Only a couple saw that “sicut” should be “sint.” Occasionally

no scribe could gure out what was wrong. Y often fails to make obvi-
ous corrections, and where it makes an attempt Y’s changes are not
always correct. In VI.2, where Peter refers silently to God’s “scientia”
in the previous sentence—a good example of his elliptical style—the
next sentence (and paragraph) begins: “Per ipsam autem immutabilem
et invariabilem existentem immutabiliter et invariabiliter intelligit . . .”
Without the noun “scientiam,” however, Y changes “immutabilem”
to “immutabilitatem,” with the result that the sentence reads better
but is incorrect. Elsewhere, when “immutabilitas” is called for but the
exemplar and several manuscripts have “mutabilitas,” Y later corrects
to “immutabilitas,” against its exemplar’s reading. In another case a
simple “omnes” must have looked like “dicimus” in the exemplar, the
“d” being with a faint and small ascender, and several scribes, including
Y’s, read it that way. Y leaves the senseless reading, but others tried to
x the context in other ways. Near the end, where “contingens” is called
for, all manuscripts have “consequens,” but B goes back and adds “vel
contingens” in the margin. Naturally, Y is just wrong in many cases.
In conclusion, future editors should approach Peter of Auvergne’s
Quodlibeta as a single redaction. This considerably simplies the task
awaiting the individual or team undertaking the critical edition of the
entire set of Quodlibeta, a project that will help illuminate theology at
Paris on the eve of John Duns Scotus’ arrival.

Notes on Appendices: The question list (Appendix I) is based on the

readings of all witnesses, although no apparatus is included. For full
bibliographical references to previous editions, see above, note 5. The
length of the questions, given just before the foliation in the manu-
scripts, is the number of columns in V. The edition of Quodlibet I, q. 1
(Appendix II), employs all witnesses and includes all variants except
for most corrections and things like ergo/igitur. In both appendices,
* = lectio incerta.

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 APPENDIX I

PETRI DE ALVERNIA TABULA QUAESTIONUM

QUODLIBETALIUM

Quodlibet I (probably Advent 1296, 53.5 columns)

Quaerebatur [1–8] de potentia Dei. Et primo quantum ad immensitatem ipsius, [1]

utrum scilicet Deus sit innitae virtutis in vigore. Et arguitur quod non . . . (2.9:
A 339ra–b; B 48ra–b; C 128va–b; D 97ra–va; F 419ra–b; G 34va–35ra; M 59rb–vb;
O 51ra–b; P 26vb–27rb; R 61ra–va; S 1ra–vb; T 136ra–b; V 102ra–va; W 1ra–vb;
X 2ra–va; Y 1ra–va; Z 3ra–vb) (ed. Schabel, this chapter).
Deinde quaerebatur [2–8] de innitate virtutis seu potentiae eius in comparatione ad
ipsa producta. Et primo [2–6] de ipsa in comparatione ad innitum vel innita,
deinde [7–8] per comparationem ad aliqua nita. Circa primum implicite multa [2–5]
quaerebantur, sub una [6] tamen quaestione. Et ut procedatur secundum ordinem
procedatur, fuit quaestio prima de his quae implicabantur [2] utrum Deus possit
facere innita differentia specie aequaliter ab ipso distantia simpliciter. Et arguitur
quod sic . . . (2.3: A 339rb; B 48rb–vb; C 128vb–129rb; D 97va–98rb; F 419rb–va;
G 35ra–va; M 59vb–60rb; O 51rb–vb; P deest; R 61va–62ra; S 1vb–2va; T 136rb–vb;
V 102va–103rb; W 2ra–va; X 2va–3ra; Y 1va–b; Z 3vb–4rb).
Consequenter quaeritur [3] utrum Deus possit facere innita secundum speciem diffe-
rentia inter inmam creaturam et non-ens. Et quod sic arguitur . . . (1.7: A 339rb–va;
B 48vb–49ra; C 129rb–va; D 98rb–vb; F 419va–b; G 35va–36ra; M 60rb–va;
O 51vb–52ra; P deest; R 62ra–va; S 2va–3ra; T 136vb–137ra; V 103rb–va;
W 2va–3rb; X 3ra–b; Y 1vb–2rb; Z 4rb–vb).
Deinde quaerebatur [4] utrum Deus possit facere innita specie differentia inter
supremam creaturam et ipsum. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (2.5: A 339va–b; B 49ra–va;
C 129va–130ra; D 98vb–99va; F 419vb–420rb; G 36ra–va; M 60va–61ra;
O 52ra–b; P deest; R 62va–63ra; S 3ra–vb; T 137ra–va; V 103va–104rb; W 3rb–4ra;
X 3rb–vb; Y 2rb–vb; Z 4vb–5va).
Postea quaerebatur [5] an inter duas species in universo Deus possit facere innitas.
Et quod sic arguitur . . . (1.5: A 339vb–340ra; B 49va–b; C 130ra; D 99va–100ra;
F 420rb; G 36va–37ra; M 61ra–b; O 52rb–va; P deest; R 63ra–b; S 3vb–4rb;
T 137va–b; V 104rb–va; W 4ra–b; X 3vb–4ra; Y 2vb–3ra; Z 5va–b).
Tunc quaerebatur, et erat quaestio principalis in qua pro argumentis ad unam partem
implicabantur quattuor quaestiones praedictae, [6] utrum scilicet Deus possit facere
plura quam innita secundum speciem (1.0: A deest; B 49vb–50ra; C 130ra–b;
D 100ra–b; F 420rb–va; G 37ra; M 61rb–va; O 52va–b; P deest; R 63rb–va;
S 4rb–va; T 137vb; V 104va–b; W 4rb–va; X 4ra–b; Y 3ra; Z 5vb–6ra).
Deinde quaerebatur [7–8] de potentia Dei in comparatione ad quaedam nita, et
primo [7] in comparatione ad separationem quorundam coniunctorum in esse,
secundo [8] in comparatione ad mundi productionem. Circa primum quaerebatur
unum, [7] an scilicet Deus possit facere quod creatura videat essentiam Dei nudam
et non sit beata. Et videtur quod sic . . . (4.6: A 340ra; B 50ra–vb; C 130rb–131ra;
D 100rb–101rb; F 420va–421ra; G 37ra–38rb; M 61va–62va; O 52vb–53va;
P 27rb–28ra; R 63va–64vb; S 4va–6ra; T 137vb–138vb; V 104vb–106ra; W 4va–5vb;
X 4rb–5ra; Y 3ra–vb; Z 6ra–7rb) (ed. Thomas Jeschke, forthcoming; partial ed.—
a. 2 and part of a. 3—Muller 1948, pp. 153–5, from V, calling it no. 7) (= G: 6).

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Consequenter quaeritur [8] utrum Deus potuit facere mundum esse ab aeterno. Et
quod non videtur . . . (2.4: A 340ra–b; B 50vb–51rb; C 131ra–b; D 101va–102ra;
F 421ra–va; G 38rb–vb; M 62va–b; O 53va–b; P 28ra–va; R 64vb–65rb; S 6ra–vb;
T 138vb–139ra; V 106ra–va; W 6ra–vb; X 5ra–va; Y 3vb–4rb; Z 7rb–8ra) (ed.
Dales-Argerami 1992, pp. 144–48, from FX) (= G: 7).
Postea quaerebatur [9–21] de ente creato. Et primo quaerebatur unum [9] circa natu-
ram boni quod videtur converti cum ente universaliter, deinde multa [10–21] circa
diversa genera et species entium. Primum erat [9] utrum in ratione boni formalius
sit ratio communicativi an ratio nis. Et quod ratio communicativi arguitur . . . (1.2:
A 340rb; B 51rb–va; C 131rb–va; D 102ra–va; F 421va; G 38vb–39ra; M 62vb–
63ra; O 53vb–54ra; P deest; R 65rb–va; S 6vb–7ra; T 139ra–b; V 106va–107ra;
W 6vb–7ra; X 5va–b; Y 4b–va; Z 8ra–b) (= G: 8).
Consequenter quaeritur [10–21] de ente creato in particulari magis, et primo [10–11]
de substantia vel natura corporea simpliciter, deinde [12–21] de natura humana sive
de homine. Circa primum proponebatur quaestio [10] utrum substantia corporea
per essentiam suam sit quanta. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (1.4: A deest; B 51va–b;
C 131va–b; D 102va–b; F 421va–b; G 39ra–b; M 63ra–va; O 54ra–b; P deest;
R 65va–b; S 7ra–va; T 139rb–va; V 107ra–b; W 7ra–va; X 5vb–6ra; Y 4va–b;
Z 8rb–vb) (= G: 9).
Secundo quaesitum fuit [11] utrum in substantia corporea dimensiones indetermina-
tae praecedant formam substantialem in materia. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (3.8:
A 340rb–va; B 51vb–52rb; C 131vb–132va; D 102vb–103vb; F 421vb–422rb;
G 39rb–40rb; M 63va–64ra; O 54rb–vb; P 28va–29rb; R 66ra–vb; S 7va–8va;
T 139va–140ra; V 107rb–108rb; W 7va–8va; X 6ra–vb; Y 4vb–5rb; Z 8vb–9vb)
(= G:10).
Consequenter quaeritur [12–21] de his quae ad hominem pertinent, et primo [12–19]
de quibusdam pertinentibus ad ipsum secundum statum praesentis vitae, secundo
[20–21] de pertinentibus ad statum vitae futurae. Adhuc primo circa primum sunt
aliquae quaestiones [12–15] pertinentes ad cognitionem humanam, deinde aliae
[16–18] pertinentes ad praelationis ofcium, tertio quaedam [19] pertinens (mss:
pertinentes) ad quoddam sacramentum. Circa primum primo proponitur quaestio
[12] de his quae requiri videntur ad cognitionem universaliter, secundo quaereba-
tur quoddam [13] pertinens ad cognitionem intellectivam alicuius determinatam,
tertio [14–15] de quibusdam quae homo per cognitionem operatur. Circa primum
quaerebatur unum tantum, [12] utrum scilicet in omni cognitione requiratur aliquid
ineri, ut puta species aliqua. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (4.3: A 340va–b; B 52rb–
53ra; C 132va–133ra; D 103vb–105ra; F 422rb–vb; G 40rb–41rb; M 64ra–65ra;
O 54vb–55va; P deest; R 66vb–67vb; S 8va–9vb; T 140ra–vb; V 108rb–109rb;
W 8va–10ra; X 6vb–7vb; Y 5rb–6ra; Z 9vb–11ra) (= G: 11).
Consequenter quaesitum fuit de quodam pertinente ad cognitionem intellectivam et
erat de cognitione reexa, [13] utrum scilicet intelligens se intelligere intelligentem
Deum per essentiam sit beatus. Et arguebatur primo quod sic . . . (1.3: A 340vb–341ra;
B 53ra–b; C 133ra–b; D 105ra–b; F 422vb–423ra; G 41rb–va; M 65ra–b; O 55va–b;
P deest; R 67vb–68rb; S 9vb–10rb; T 141ra; V 109rb–va; W 10ra–va; X 7vb–8ra;
Y 6ra–b; Z 11ra–b) (= G: 12).
Deinde quaerebatur [14–15] de quibusdam quae homo per cognitionem operatur. Et
proponebantur duo. Primum fuit de doctrina cuius primum est scientia, [14] utrum
scilicet doctores theologiae simpliciter doceant; secundum de imaginibus astrolo-
gorum ad quas ipsi per artem vel scientiam aliquo modo cooperantur, [15] utrum
imagines quae unt per astrologos secundum illorum scientiam habeant efcaciam
in naturalibus. Circa primum [14] arguebatur primo quod . . . non . . . (2.9: A 341ra–b;
B 53rb–vb; C 133rb–vb; D 105rb–106ra; F 423ra–va; G 41va–42rb; M 65rb–vb;
O 55vb–56rb; P deest; R 68rb–vb; S 10rb–11ra; T 141ra–va; V 109va–110rb;
W 10va–11rb; X 8ra–va; Y 6rb–vb; Z 11rb–12ra) (ed. Leclercq 1939, pp. 354–7,
from XY, calling it no. 13) (= G: 13).

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Deinde quaerebatur de secundo, [15] utrum scilicet imagines astrologorum, ad quas

secundum artem eorum cooperantur, aliquam habeant efcaciam in naturalibus,
puta an anuli oblivionis quos Moyses dicitur fecisse habebant virtutem dilectionis
oblivionem inducendi. Et arguo quod sic . . . (3.3: A deest; B 54ra–va; C 133vb–134rb;
D 106ra–107ra; F 423va–b; G 42rb–43ra; L 70r–72r; M 65vb–66va; O 56rb–vb;
P 29rb–vb; R 68vb–69va; S 11ra–12ra; T 141va–142ra; V 110rb–111ra; W 11rb–
12rb; X 8va–9rb; Y 6vb–7va; Z 12ra–13ra) (= G: 14).
Circa statum praelatorum quaerebantur tria [16–18], primo [16] utrum summus
pontifex possit cedere vel renuntiare ofcio suo in aliquo casu; secundo [17] utrum
praelati Ecclesiae male dispensantes teneantur ad restitutionem male dispensatorum;
tertio [18] utrum curati sacerdotes habeant iurisdictionem ordinariam. Circa primum
[16] arguebatur quod . . . nullo modo . . . (2.4: A deest; B 54va–55ra; C 134rb–vb;
D 107ra–va; F 423vb–424ra; G 43ra–va; M 66va–b; O 56vb–57ra; P 30ra–b;
R 69va–70ra; S 12ra–vb; T 142ra–va; V 111ra–vb; W 12rb–13ra; X 9rb–vb;
Y 7va–b; Z 13ra–va) (ed. Eastman 1990, pp. 137–41, from Y, calling it no. 15)
(= G: 15).
Postea quaesitum fuit [17] utrum praelati male dispensantes bona Ecclesiae, si habeant
haeredes succedentes sibi in propriis, teneantur ad restitutionem. Et arguebatur
quod sic . . . (2.3: A deest; B 55ra–b; C 134vb–135rb; D 107va–108rb; F 424ra–b;
G 43va–44ra; M 66vb–67rb; O 57ra–va; P deest; R 70rb–vb; S 12vb–13vb;
T 142va–143ra; V 111vb–112rb; W 13ra–vb; X 9vb–10rb; Y 7vb–8rb; Z 13va–14rb)
(= G: 16).
Deinde quaesitum fuit [18] utrum praelati minores habeant iurisdictionem ordinariam
in subditos. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (3.2: A 341va–b; B 55rb–56ra; C 135rb–vb;
D 108rb–109ra; F 424rb–vb; G 44ra–vb; M 67rb–68ra; O 57va–58ra; P 30rb–31ra;
R 70vb–71rb; S 13vb–15ra; T 143ra–va; V 112rb–113ra; W 13vb–14vb; X 10rb–vb;
Y 8rb–vb; Z 14rb–15ra) (ed. Guyot 1962, pp. 153–8, from AMXYZ, calling it no.
17) (= G: 17).
Deinde quaesitum fuit circa sacramentum ordinis unum tantum, [19] utrum scilicet
subdiaconatus sit ordo. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (1.6: A deest; B 56ra–b; C 135vb–
136ra; D 109ra–va; F 424vb–425ra; G 44vb–45ra; M 68ra–b; O 58ra–b; P deest;
R 71va–b; S 15ra–va; T 143va–b; V 113ra–va; W 14vb–15rb; X 10vb–11rb;
Y 8vb–9ra; Z 15ra–va) (= G: 18).
Post hoc quaerebantur quaedam [20–21] de homine quantum ad statum vitae futurae.
Et quaeruntur duo, unum [20] quod pertinet ad veritatem resurrectionis et aliud [21]
quod pertinet ad intellectum beatorum. Primum fuit [20] utrum sit de necessitate
resurrectionis quod resurgens assumat materiam eandem quam prius habuit. Et
videtur quod non . . . (3.5: A 341vb–342rb; B 56rb–vb; C 136ra–va; D 109va–110va;
F 425ra–b; G 45ra–vb; M 68rb–69ra; O 58rb–vb; P deest; R 71vb–72vb;
S 15va–16vb; T 143vb–144rb; V 113va–114rb; W 15rb–16rb; X 11rb–vb; Y 9ra–va;
Z 15va–16rb) (ed. Segarro 1933, pp. 119–24, from V; ed. Weber 1973, pp. 372–6,
from DT and V via Segarro, calling it no. 19) (= G: 19).
Secundum quod proponebatur de his quae pertinent ad statum vitae futurae fuit [21]
utrum beati intelligendo divinam essentiam forment verbum de ea. Et arguitur quod
sic . . . (3.6: A 342rb–vb; B 56vb–57va; C 136va–137ra; D 110va–111rb; F 425rb–vb;
G 45vb–46vb; M 69ra–vb; O 58vb–59rb; P 31ra–va; R 72vb–73va; S 16vb–18ra;
T 144rb–145ra; V 114rb–115rb; W 16rb–17ra; X 11vb–12va; Y 9va–10ra;
Z 16rb–17rb) (ed. Cannizzo 1965, pp. 72–80, from MOTVXYZ) (= G: 20).
ACDGMORSTVX: Explicit primum quodlibet magistri Petri (D add.: etc.; M add.:
continens V pecias; V add.: Incipit secundum; RSWY add. de Alvernia; W add.
Incipit secundum).
BFPZ: desunt.

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Quodlibet II (probably Advent 1297, 61.2 columns)

Circa Deum [1–3] quaerebatur primo quantum ad principium cognitionis et opera-

tionis, [1] an videlicet in ipso sint ideae particularium accidentium. Et arguebatur
quod non . . . (3.9: A 342vb–343ra; B 57va–58rb; C 137rb–vb; D 111va–112rb;
F 425vb–426rb; G 47ra–vb; M 70ra–va; O 59rb–60ra; P 31va–32rb; R 73va–74rb;
S 18ra–19rb; T 145ra–vb; V 115rb–116rb; W 17rb–18rb; X 12va–13rb; Y 10ra–vb;
Z 17rb–18rb) (unpublished transcription Schabel).
Deinde quaerebatur de eo per comparationem ad operationem, [2] utrum scilicet
inter opera Dei sit annumerandus arcus foederis. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (6.2:
A deest; B 58rb–59rb; C 137vb–138vb; D 112rb–114ra; F 426rb–427ra; G 47vb–49ra;
M 70va–71vb; O 60ra–vb; P deest; R 74rb–75vb; S 19rb–21va; T 145vb–146vb;
V 116rb–117vb; W 18rb–19vb; X 13rb–14va; Y 10vb–12ra; Z 18rb–19vb).
Postea quaeritur de Christo, qui est Deus et homo, [3] utrum scilicet secundum animam
fruatur divinitate, aliquo habitu mediante. Et arguitur quod non . . . (2.2: A 343ra;
B 59rb–vb; C 138vb–139ra; D 114ra–va; F 427ra–b; G 49ra–va; M 71vb–72rb;
O 60vb–61ra; P deest; R 75vb–76ra; S 21va–22rb; T 146vb–147rb; V 117vb–118rb;
W 19vb–20va; X 14va–15ra; Y 12ra–b; Z 19vb–20rb).
Postea quaeritur [4–19] circa creaturas puras, et primo [4–6] de his quae pertinent
ad substantias materiales simpliciter, secundo [7–19] de quibusdam quae pertinent
specialiter ad naturam rationalem humanam. Circa primum quaerebantur tria,
primo [4] quantum ad esse actuale, secundo [5] quantum ad ipsius substantiae indi-
viduationem, tertio [6] quantum ad rationem differentiae. Primo igitur quaerebatur
[4] utrum esse in effectu sit in essentia substantiae compositae aliquid causatum. Et
arguitur quod sic . . . (4.5: A 343ra–va; B 59vb–60va; C 139ra–vb; D 114va–115vb;
F 427rb–428ra; G 49va–50vb; M 72rb–73ra; O 61ra–vb; P 32rb–33ra; R 76ra–
77ra; S 22rb–23vb; T 147rb–148ra; V 118rb–119va; W 20va–21vb; X 15ra–vb;
Y 12rb–13ra; Z 20rb–21va) (ed. Monahan 1955, pp. 177–81, from TV).
Postmodum quaerebatur de substantia composita quantum ad eius indivisionem,
[5] utrum scilicet eadem sint principia individuationis substantiae compositae et
unitatis secundum numerum ipsius. Et videtur quod non . . . (4.3: A 343va–344ra;
B 60va–61rb; C 139vb–140va; D 115vb–117ra; F 428ra–va; G 50vb–51vb;
M 73ra–74ra; O 61vb–62va; P 33rb–vb; R 77ra–78ra; S 23vb–25ra; T 148ra–vb;
V 119va–120va; W 21vb–23rb; X 15vb–16va; Y 13ra–vb; Z 21va–22va) (ed. Hocedez
1934, pp. 370–9, from RVXZ).
Postea quaeritur [6] utrum aliquid differat a se realiter sine additione alicuius realis. Et
arguitur primo quod non . . . (2.4: A 344ra–b; B 61rb–vb; C 140va–b; D 117ra–va;
F 428va–b; G 51vb–52rb; M 74ra–va; O 62va–b; P deest; R 78ra–va; S 25ra–vb;
T 148vb–149rb; V 120va–121rb; W 23rb–24ra; X 16va–17ra; Y 13vb–14rb;
Z 22va–23rb).
Consequenter quaerebatur [7–19] de his quae pertinent ad entia magis determinata, et
circa hoc primo [7–11] de his quae pertinent ad rationem potentiae, deinde [12–19]
de his quae pertinent ad actum, et specialiter hominis et quantum ad defectum in eo.
Circa primum quaerebatur primo unum [7] de potentia universalius, secundo multa
[8–11] de potentiis animae. Primum erat de potentia respectu actus simpliciter, [7]
utrum scilicet aliquid possit se ipsum movere primo vel agere de potentia ad actum.
Et arguebatur primo quod sic . . . (5.3: A 344rb–vb; B 61vb–62vb; C 140vb–141va;
D 117va–119ra; F 428vb–429va; G 52rb–53rb; M 74va–75va; O 62vb–63vb;
P 34ra–35ra; R 78va–79vb; S 25vb–27va; T 149rb–150rb; V 121rb–122va;
W 24ra–25va; X 17ra–18ra; Y 14rb–15rb; Z 23rb–24va).
Consequenter quaerebatur [8–11] de potentiis animae, et primo [8] in universali,
secundo [9–11] in speciali magis quantum ad aliquas potentias. Circa primum
quaerebatur [8] utrum potentiae animae sint differentiae substantiales animae
vel in substantia eius. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (4.2: A 344vb–345va; B 62vb–63va;

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C 141va–142rb; D 119ra–120rb; F 429va–430ra; G 53rb–54rb; M 75va–76rb;

O 63vb–64rb; P 35ra–vb; R 79vb–80vb; S 27va–29ra; T 150rb–151ra; V 122va–
123va; W 25va–26vb; X 18ra–vb; Y 15rb–vb; Z 24va–25va).
Postea proponebantur quaestiones [9–11] de potentiis animae in speciali, et primo
de potentiis pertinentibus ad partem animae intellectualem, scilicet de intellectu et
voluntate quantum ad eorum comparationem ad invicem, [9] an scilicet voluntas
sit principalior intellectu. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (2.9: A 345va–b; B 63va–64ra;
C 142rb–vb; D 120rb–121ra; F 430ra–va; G 54rb–55ra; M 76rb–vb; O 64rb–vb;
P 35vb–36rb; R 80vb–81va; S 29ra–vb; T 151ra–va; V 123va–124rb; W 26vb–27va;
X 18vb–19rb; Y 16ra–va; Z 25va–26rb).
Consequenter quaeritur [10] utrum immunitas a materia sit per se principium liber-
tatis. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (4.4: A 345vb–346va; B 64ra–vb; C 142vb–143va;
D 121ra–122rb; F 430va–431ra; G 55ra–56ra; M 76vb–77vb; O 64vb–65rb;
P 36rb–37ra; R 81va–82va; S 30ra–31rb; T 151va–152rb; V 124rb–125rb;
W 27va–28vb; X 19rb–20ra; Y 16va–17rb; Z 26rb–27va).
Ultimo circa potentias animae quaerebatur [11] utrum sit ponere sensum agen-
tem. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (3.4: A 346va–347ra; B 64vb–65rb; C 143va–144ra;
D 122rb–123ra; F 431ra–va; G 56ra–vb; M 77vb–78va; O 65rb–66ra; P 37ra–vb;
R 82va–83rb; S 31rb–32rb; T 152rb–153ra; V 125rb–126rb; W 28vb–29vb; X 20ra–
vb; Y 17rb–vb; Z 27va–28rb) (ed. Pattin 1988, pp. 9–15, from AORVWXYZ).
Deinde quaerebatur [12–19] de his quae pertinent ad actus potentiarum principaliter
in homine, et primo [12–14] de his quae pertinent ad bonitatem actus, secundo
[15–16] de his quae pertinent ad malitiam eius, tertio [17–19] de his quae pertinent
ad delectationem malitiae vel culpae. Circa primum quaerebatur primo [12] de
dispositione ad actum virtutis seu gratiae, secundo [13–14] de his quae pertinent ad
ipsum actum virtutis. Circa primum quaerebatur unum tantum, [12] utrum scilicet
indelis possit se disponere ad gratiam. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (2.5: A 347ra–b;
B 65rb–vb; C 144ra–b; D 123ra–vb; F 431va–b; G 56vb–57rb; M 78va–79ra;
O 66ra–b; P deest; R 83rb–vb; S 32rb–33ra; T 153ra–b; V 126rb–vb; W 29vb–30va;
X 20vb–21rb; Y 17vb–18ra; Z 28rb–29ra).
Deinde quaeritur [13–14] de actibus virtutum, et primo unum [13] de actu duliae,
secundo aliud [14] de actu fortitudinis. Circa primum quaerebatur [13] utrum in
reliquiis sanctorum, facta resolutione ad materiam, sit aliquid adorandum. Et argue-
batur quod non . . . (2.4: A 347rb–va; B 65vb–66rb; C 144rb–vb; D 123vb–124rb;
F 431vb–432ra; G 57rb–vb; L 86r–87v; M 79ra–b; O 66rb–va; P 37vb–38ra;
R 83vb–84rb; S 33ra–va; T 153rb–vb; V 126vb–127va; W 30va–31rb; X 21rb–va;
Y 18ra–va; Z 29ra–va).
Consequenter quaeritur de quodam quod pertinere videtur ad actum fortitudinis,
[14] utrum scilicet religiosus, petita licentia a superiori, quamvis non obtenta, licite
possit exire ad defensionem rei publicae. Et videtur quod sic . . . (1.9: A 347va–b;
B 66rb–va; C 144vb–145ra; D 124rb–vb; F 432ra–b; G 57vb–58rb; M 79rb–vb;
O 66va–67ra; P deest; R 84rb–va; S 33va–34rb; T 153vb–154ra; V 127va–b;
W 31rb–vb; X 21va–22ra; Y 18va–b; Z 29va–30ra).
Deinde quaeritur [15–16] de his quae pertinent ad actus inordinationem, scilicet de
peccato. Et proponebantur duo, unum [15] de peccato absolute et aliud [16] de
comparatione unius peccati ad aliud. Primum erat [15] utrum praelatus intendens
ad munus in collatione benecii peccet. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (1.9: A 347vb;
B 66va–67ra; C 145ra–b; D 124vb–125rb; F 432rb–va; G 58rb–vb; M 79vb–80ra;
O 67ra–b; P deest; R 84va–85ra; S 34rb–vb; T 154ra–va; V 127vb–128rb;
W 31vb–32rb; X 22ra–b; Y 18vb–19ra; Z 30ra–va).
Postea proponebatur quaestio de comparatione unius peccati ad aliud, [16] utrum
scilicet aliquis habens conscientiam erroneam de aliquo iusto interciendo plus
peccet interciendo quam non interciendo. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (4.4: A deest; B
67ra–vb; C 145rb–146ra; D 125rb–126rb; F 432va–433rb; G 58vb–59va; L 76v–79v;

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M 80ra–81ra; O 67rb–vb; P deest; R 85ra–86ra; S 34vb–36ra; T 154va–155rb;

V 128rb–129va; W 32rb–33va; X 22rb–23rb; Y 19rb–vb; Z 30va–31va).
Postea quaerebantur quaedam [17–19] de his quae pertinent ad delectationem cul-
pae, scilicet de confessione et paenitentia. Et circa hoc primo [17] de confessione,
secundo [18] de iniunctione paenitentiae pro peccato, tertio [19] de iniunctione in
confessione. De primo quaerebatur unum, scilicet [17] utrum ille qui fuit in voluntate
peccati mortalis per aliquod tempus continue, sine interruptione voluntatis, teneatur
de necessitate conteri circumstantiam diuturnitatis. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (1.4:
A deest; B 67vb–68ra; C 146ra–b; D 126rb–vb; F 433rb; G 59va–60ra; M 81ra–b;
O 67vb–68ra; P deest; R 86ra–b; S 36ra–va; T 155rb–va; V 129va–b; W 33va–34ra;
X 23rb–va; Y 19vb–20ra; Z 31va–b).
Circa secundum proposita fuit quaestio [18] utrum ei qui propter ebrietatem commisit
incestum vel furtum sit iniungenda duplex paenitentia. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (1.8:
A 347vb–348ra; B 68ra–b; C 146rb–va; D 126vb–127rb; F 433rb–va; G 60ra–b;
L 82r–v; M 81rb–va; O 68ra–b; P deest; R 86rb–va; S 36va–37ra; T 155va–b;
V 129vb–130rb; W 34ra–va; X 23va–b; Y 20ra–b; Z 31vb–32rb).
Ultimo quaerebatur de paena iniuncta in confessione, [19] utrum scilicet, si sacerdos
contenti et supponenti se arbitrio ipsius iniungat minorem paenitentiam quam
meruit secundum veritatem, illa peracta in via, sit contens immunis a paena
purgatorii. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (1.4: A 348ra–b; B 68rb–va; C 146va–b;
D 127rb–va; F 433va–b; G 60rb–vb; L 82v–83v; M 81va–b; O 68rb–va; P deest;
R 86va–b; S 37ra–va; T 155vb–156ra; V 130rb–va; W 34va–b; X 23vb–24ra;
Y 20rb–va; Z 32rb–vb).
ADMOSTWXYZ: Explicit secundum (secundus Z) quodlibet magistri Petri (om. M) de
(om. Z) Alvernia (om. Z) (M add.: continens V pecias; T add.: Incipit tertium quodlibet
Petri de Alvernia; W add.: Incipit tertium eiusdem magistri).
BCGP: desunt (C2: magistri Petri de Alvernia Ordinis Minorum [!]).
G2: Quodlibeta Jabobi Viterbiensis.
F: Expliciunt duo quodlibet<a> magistri Petri de Alvernia.
L: Et tantum de questione quodlibetali magistri de Alvernia.
R: Explicit quodlibet Magistri Petri de Alvernia. Deo gratias.
V: Explicit secundum quodlibet determinatum Parisius a magistro Petro de Alvernia.

Quodlibet III (Advent 1298, 40.2 columns)

Quaesita fuerunt quaedam [1–3] de Deo, quaedam [4–17] de creaturis. De Deo primo
quaesitum fuit de potentia eius, [1] utrum scilicet possit facere naturam intellectua-
lem sine corporali. Et quod non arguebatur . . . (2.4: B 68va–69ra; D 127vb–128rb;
M 82ra–va; O 68va–69ra; P 38ra–va; S 38ra–vb; T 156ra–vb; V 131ra–va; W 35ra–
vb; X1 26ra–va; X2 35va–36ra; Y 20vb–21ra; Z 32vb–33rb).
Secundo quaerebatur [2–3] de Deo in comparatione ad naturam assumptam, et primo
[2] utrum Filius Dei assumpsit naturam humanam propter exaltationem eius an
propter redemptionem generis humani principaliter. Et arguebatur quod propter
redemptionem . . . (2.2: B 69ra–va; D 128rb–129ra; M 82va–83ra; O 69ra–b; P 38va–
39ra; S 38vb–39va; T 156vb–157rb; V 131va–132ra; W 35vb–36rb; X1 26va–27ra;
X2 36ra–vb; Y 21ra–va; Z 33rb–34ra).
Deinde quaesitum fuit [3] utrum Christus sit Deus et homo divisim. Et arguebatur
quod non . . . (1.5: B 69va–b; D 129ra–va; M 83ra–b; O 69rb–vb; P 39ra–va; S 39va–
40rb; T 157rb–va; V 132ra–va; W 36va–37ra; X1 27ra–b; X2 36vb–37ra; Y 21va–b;
Z 34ra–b).
Circa creaturas [4–17] primo quaerebatur quiddam pertinens quodammodo ad omnia
creata, [4] utrum scilicet essentia rei creatae sit essentia ab aeterno. Et arguebatur
quod non . . . (2.8: B 69vb–70rb; D 129va–130va; M 83rb–vb; O 69vb–70rb; P 39va–

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40ra; S 40rb–41rb; T 157va–158rb; V 132va–133ra; W 37ra–vb; X1 27rb–28ra; X2

37ra–vb; Y 21vb–22rb; Z 34rb–35rb) (unpublished transcription Schabel).
Postea quaeritur [5–17] de his quae pertinent ad naturam creatam magis determinate,
et circa hoc primo [5] de substantia separata et intelligibili, quae est angelus, secundo
[6–17] de ea quae est transmutabilis. De primo quaerebatur unum tantum, scilicet
[5] utrum angelus possit similiter intelligere actus intelligendi alterius angeli et
actus voluntatis ipsius. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (3.0: B 70rb–71ra; D 130va–131va;
M 83vb–84va; O 70rb–vb; P deest; S 41rb–42rb; T 158rb–159ra; V 133ra–vb;
W 37vb–38vb; X1 28ra–vb; X2 38ra–vb; Y 22rb–vb; Z 35rb–36ra).
Deinde quaerebatur [6–17] de ente transmutabili, et primo communiter de substantia
et accidente quiddam [6–7], postea plura [8–17] circa quasdam substantias determi-
nate. Primum erat utrum forma secundum se intendatur et remittatur. Sed propter
facilitatem, distinguitur in duas quaestiones, quarum prima est [6] utrum forma
accidentalis intendatur et remittatur, secunda [7] utrum forma substantialis. Primo
igitur quaeritur [6] utrum forma accidentalis intendatur et remittatur vel suscipiat
magis et minus, quia solutio huius valet ad solutionem alterius. Et arguitur quod
non . . . (4.2: B 71ra–vb; D 131va–132va, missing end; M 84va–85va; O 70vb–71rb;
P 40ra–41ra; S 42rb–43vb; T 159ra–160ra; V 133vb–134vb; W 38vb–40rb; X1
28vb–29va; X2 38vb–39vb; Y 22vb–23va; Z 36ra–37rb).
Consequens quaestio est [7] utrum forma substantialis possit intendi et remitti vel
suscipere magis et minus. Et arguitur quod non . . . (3.4: B 71vb–72va; D 132va–133va,
missing start; M 85va–86rb; O 71rb–72ra; P 41ra–vb; S 43vb–45ra; T 160ra–
vb; V 135ra–vb; W 40rb–41rb; X1 29vb–30va; X2 39vb–40vb; Y 23va–24ra; Z 37rb–
38rb).
Postea quaerebatur [8–17] de quibusdam ad substantias magis in speciali pertinenti-
bus, ubi primo ponuntur quaestiones [8–16] pertinentes ad substantiam rationalem
humanam principaliter, secundo ponitur quaedam quaestio [17] ad materiam,
quae est substantia in potentia. Circa primum, primo ponuntur quaestiones [8–13]
pertinentes ad hominem simpliciter, secundo [14–15] pertinentes ad diversos status
ipsius. Adhuc prius tanguntur quaestiones [8–10] circa hominem quantum ad par-
tem eius intellectualem, deinde [11–13] pertinentes ad partem eius volitivam. Circa
primum quaerebantur tria, quorum primum est [8] utrum scientia speculativa et
practica sint una scientia; secundum, [9] utrum existens in caritate possit scire se
esse in ea; tertium vero [10] utrum aliquis possit scire per certitudinem superiora
corpora et elementa inferiora esse diversa secundum substantiam. De primo [8]
arguitur quod . . . non . . . (2.6: B 72va–73ra; D 133va–134rb; M 86rb–vb; O 72ra–b;
P 41vb–42va; S 45ra–46ra; T 160vb–161rb; V 135vb–136rb; W 41rb–42rb; X 1
30va–31ra; X2 40vb–41va; Y 24ra–va; Z 38rb–39ra).
Secundo circa ea quae pertinent ad intellectum quaerebatur [9] utrum existens
in caritate possit scire per certitudinem se esse in ea. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (1.5:
B 73ra–b; D 134rb–va; M 86vb–87ra; O 72rb–va; P 42va–b; S 46ra–va; T 161rb–va;
V 136rb–vb; W 42rb–va; X1 31ra–b; X2 41va–b; Y 24va–b; Z 39ra–b).
Tertio quaesitum fuit [10] utrum aliquis possit scire simpliciter corpora caelestia
esse diversa in natura a corporibus inferioribus simplicibus. Et arguebatur quod
non . . . (2.4: B 73rb–vb; D 134va–135va; M 87ra–va; O 72va–73ra; P deest; S 46va–
47va; T 161va–162ra; V 136vb–137rb; W 42va–43rb; X1 31rb–32ra; X2 42ra–va;
Y 24vb–25ra; Z 39rb–40ra).
Deinde ponuntur quaestiones [11–13] pertinentes ad naturam rationalem humanam
quantum ad voluntatem vel ea quae in voluntate sunt. Et erant tres, prima quidem
[11] utrum habitus caritatis respectu nis et eorum quae sunt ad nem sit unus
secundum speciem. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (1.5: B 73vb–74ra; D 135va–b;
M 87va–88ra; O 73ra–b; P deest; S 47va–48ra; T 162ra–b; V 137rb–vb; W 43rb–vb;
X1 32ra–b; X2 42va–43ra; Y 25ra–b; Z 40ra–va).
Secunda quaestio erat [12] utrum caritas in habente ipsam possit remitti cum effectu.

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Et arguitur quod sic . . . (2.6: B 74ra–va; D 135vb–136vb; M 88ra–va; O 73rb–va;

P 42vb–43rb; S 48ra–49ra; T 162rb–vb; V 137vb–138rb; W 43vb–44rb; X1 32rb–vb;
X2 43ra–vb; Y 25rb–vb; Z 40va–41ra).
Tertia quaestio circa ea quae ad voluntatem pertinent fuit [13] utrum, cum de minori
caritate t maior, eadem numero maneat in maiori. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (2.0:
B 74va–75ra; D 136vb–137rb; M 88va–b; O 73va–74ra; P 43rb–vb; S 49ra–
vb; T 162vb–163rb; V 138rb–vb; W 44rb–45ra; X1 32vb–33rb; X2 43vb–44va;
Y 25vb–26rb; Z 41ra–vb).
Consequenter ponuntur quaestiones [14–16] pertinentes ad diversos status hominum.
Et erant tres, prima pertinens ad statum principantium, [14] utrum scilicet princeps
qui necessitate rei publicae imminente instituit vectigal aliquod in subditis, necessitate
recedente teneatur ipse vel successor eius removere illud, stipendiis communibus
sufcientibus ad dispensationem ipsius. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (1.8: B 75ra–b;
D 137rb–vb; L 87v–88v; M 89ra–b; O 74ra–b; P deest; S 49vb–50rb; T 163rb–va;
V 138vb–139rb; W 45ra–va; X1 33rb–vb; X2 44va–45ra; Y 26rb–va; Z 41vb–42rb)
(ed. Brown 1972, pp. 585–7, from X).
Secunda quaestio erat pertinens ad statum beneciatorum in Ecclesia, [15] utrum sci-
licet adeptus benecium ecclesiasticum, sciens simpliciter se esse indignum ad ipsum,
teneatur dimittere ipsum. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (2.9: B 75rb–76ra; D 137vb–
138vb; M 89rb–90ra; O 74rb–va; P deest; S 50rb–51va; T 163va–164ra; V 139rb–
140ra; W 45va–46rb; X1 33vb–34va; X2 45ra–vb; Y 26va–27ra; Z 42rb–43ra).
Tertia quaestio fuit circa statum paenitentium, scilicet [16] utrum sit de necessitate
salutis in rite confesso paenitentiam factam in peccato mortali reiterare. Et argueba-
tur quod sic . . . (1.4: B 76ra–b; D 138vb–139rb; L 93v–94r; M 90ra–b; O 74va–b;
P deest; S 51va–52ra; T 164ra–b; V 140ra–va; W 46rb–vb; X1 34va–b; X2 45vb–46rb;
Y 27ra–b; Z 43ra–va).
De corporibus inferioribus in comparatione ad superiora quaesitum fuit unum tantum,
scilicet [17] utrum materia existente unius rationis in superioribus et inferioribus
corporibus sit contradictio ex istis generari illa vel e contrario. Et arguebatur quod
non . . . (2.2: B 76rb–vb; D 139rb–vb; M 90ra–vb; O 74vb–75rb; P 43vb–44rb;
S 52ra–vb; T 164rb–vb; V 140va–141ra; W 46vb–47va; X1 34vb–35rb; X2 46rb–vb;
Y 27rb–va; Z 43va–44ra).
BPVZ: desunt.
D: Expliciunt quaestiones disputatae a magistro Petro de Alvernia.
M: Expliciunt quaestiones de tertio quolibet magistri Petri de Alvernia continens
quatuor pecias.
OSTX1X2: Expliciunt quaestiones de quolibet (T add.2: tertio) disputatae a magistro
Petro de Alvernia anno Domini (OTX1X2 add.: Mo) 1298 ante Nativitatem.
W: Explicit tertium quodlibet magistri Petri de Alvernia. Incipit quartum quodlibet
eiusdem magistri.
Y: Explicit tertium quodlibet disputatum a magistro Petro de Alvernia.

Quodlibet IV (probably Advent 1299, 47.7 columns)

In ultima disputatione communi quaesita fuerunt quaedam [1–5] de Deo in compara-

tione ad creaturas, quaedam [6–17] de ipsis creaturis in se. Circa primum quaesitum
fuit [1] an ideae in Deo sint rationes intelligendi creaturas extra. Et arguebatur
quod non . . . (1.7: B 76vb–77rb; D 140ra–vb; E 200ra–vb; M 91ra–va; P 44rb–45ra;
S 52vb–53vb; T 164vb–165rb; V 141ra–va; W 47va–48rb; X 47ra–vb; Y 27va–28ra;
Z 44ra–vb) (unpublished transcription Schabel).
Postea quaesitum fuit de coexistentia creaturarum ad Deum, [2] an scilicet futura contin-
gentia coexistentia sint ipsi. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (2.2: B 77rb–vb; D 140vb–141va;
E 200vb–201va; M 91va–92ra; P 45ra–va; S 53vb–54va; T 165rb–vb; V 141va–142rb;
W 48rb–49ra; X 47vb–48rb; Y 28ra–va; Z 44vb–45va) (ed. Schabel, forthcoming).

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Tertio quaesitum fuit [3–5] de potentia Dei, et primo [3] an, materia disposita
ad receptionem animae intellectualis, Deus possit eam non infundere. Et quod
non . . . arguebatur . . . (2.0: C 77vb–78ra; D 141va–142rb; E 201va–202ra; M 92ra–va;
P 45va–46ra; S 54va–55rb; T 165vb–166rb; V 142rb–vb; W 49ra–va; X 48rb–49ra;
Y 28va–b; Z 45va–46ra).
Deinde quaesitum fuit [4–5] de potentia Dei in ordine ad materiam primam, [5] an
scilicet Deus possit assumere eam sine forma. Sed quia ad solutionem huius oportet
intelligere [4] an Deus possit ipsam facere esse in actu sine forma, praemittitur quae-
stio de hoc, deinde de principali. Prima igitur quaestio est [4] utrum Deus possit
facere materiam esse in actu praeter formam. Et quod sic arguitur . . . (2.1: B 78ra–va;
D 142rb–143ra; E 202ra–vb; M 92va–93ra; P 46ra–b; S 55rb–56ra; T 166rb–va;
V 142vb–143rb; W 49vb–50rb; X 49ra–va; Y 28vb–29rb; Z 46ra–vb).
Deinde sequitur quaestio quae principaliter proposita fuit, [5] utrum Deus possit assu-
mere materiam primam sine forma in unitate suppositi. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (1.8:
B 78va–79ra; D 143ra–vb; E 203ra–va; M 93ra–b; P 46va–b; S 56ra–vb; T 166va–
167ra; V 143rb–va; W 50rb–51ra; X 49va–50ra; Y 29rb–va; Z 46vb–47rb).
Postea quaesita fuerunt [6–17] aliqua de his quae procedunt a Deo in esse, inter quae
anima Christi perfectior est, non quidem natura, sed gratia, secundum quod dici-
tur in Psalmo <8.6>: “Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis,” etc. Et ideo primo
ponitur quaestio de ipsa, [6] utrum scilicet, circumscriptis proprietatibus naturalibus
et donis gratuitis et gratum facientibus, ipsa sit nobilior anima Iudae. Et argueba-
tur quod non . . . (2.6: B 79rb–va; D 143vb–144vb; E 203va–204rb; M 93rb–vb;
P 46vb–47va; S 56vb–57vb; T 167ra–va; V 143vb–144rb; W 51ra–52ra; X 50ra–vb;
Y 29va–30ra; Z 47rb–48ra).
Sequuntur quaestiones [7–17] pertinentes ad alia ab anima Christi quae procedunt
in esse a Deo. Et primo ponitur quaestio [7] pertinens ad substantiam creatam
intransmutabilem tantum, secundo ponuntur illae [8–17] quae pertinent ad sub-
stantiam transmutabilem. Circa primum quaerebatur unum tantum, scilicet [7]
utrum angelus movens caelum referatur ad ipsum relatione reali. Et argutum fuit
quod sic . . . (2.1: B 79va–80ra; D 144vb–145rb; E 204va–205rb; M 93vb–94rb;
P deest; S 57vb–58va; T 167va–168ra; V 144rb–vb; W 52ra–va; X 50vb–51va;
Y 30ra–va; Z 48ra–va).
Postmodum sequuntur quaestiones [8–17] de entibus transmutabilibus secundum
substantiam. Et primo ponitur quaedam [8] pertinens ad principia huius substan-
tiae, quae sunt materia et forma, deinde quaedam [9–16] pertinentes ad naturam
rationalem specialiter, tertio quaedam [17] pertinens determinate ad elementa
quaedam, scilicet aquam et terram. Est autem prima quaestio [8] utrum potentia
in materia et forma ad quam est sint idem secundum rem. Et argutum fuit quod
sic . . . (10.4: B 80ra–82va; D 145rb–149rb; E 205rb–209rb; M 94rb–96vb; P deest;
S 58va–62va; T 168ra–170va; V 144vb–147va; W 52va–56va; X 51va–54vb;
Y 30va–32va; Z 48va–52ra).
Consequenter sequuntur quaestiones [9–16] pertinentes ad ipsum hominem principa-
liter. Et primo ponuntur quaedam [9–14] pertinentes ad quasdam potentias ipsius,
secundo quaedam [15–16] pertinentes ad ipsum secundum se. Circa primum primo
ponuntur quaedam [9–12] pertinentes ad ipsum intellectum, secundo quaedam aliae
[13–14] pertinentes immediate ad voluntatem. Circa primum quaerebantur quattuor,
primo [9] quiddam pertinens ad obiectum intellectus, secundo [10] quiddam aliud
pertinens ad actum ipsius in ordine ad obiectum, tertio [11] aliud pertinens ad actum
intelligendi effectum in ordine ad causam, quarto [12] aliud pertinens ad potentiam.
Circa primum fuit quaestio [9] utrum ens simpliciter dictum sit primum obiectum
intellectus. Et arguitur quod sic . . . (1.9: B 82va–b; D 149rb–150ra; E 209rb–vb;
M 96vb–97rb; P deest; S 62va–63rb; T 170va–171ra; V 147va–148ra; W 56va–57ra;
X 54vb–55rb; Y 32va–b; Z 52ra–va).
Secundo circa intellectum proposita fuit quaestio [10] utrum actus intellectus sortia-
tur speciem ex obiecto eius primo. Et arguebatur quod non . . . (1.9: B 82vb–83rb;

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D 150ra–vb; E 209vb–210va; M 97rb–va; P deest; S 63rb–64ra; T 171ra–b;

V 148ra–va; W 57ra–vb; X 55rb–56ra; Y 32vb–33rb; Z 52va–53rb).
Tertia quaestio proposita fuit de actu intelligendi effectum in ordine ad causam, [11]
utrum videlicet ad perfectam cognitionem effectus exigatur cognitio causae secun-
dum quod causa. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . . . . (2.2: B 83rb–vb; D 150vb–151va;
E 210va–211rb; M 97va–98ra; P 47va–48ra; S 64ra–vb; T 171rb–vb; V 148va–149ra;
W 57vb–58va; X 56ra–va; Y 33rb–va; Z 53rb–vb).
Quarta quaestio de his quae pertinent ad intellectum fuit de intellectu agente, [12]
utrum scilicet intellectus agens sit perfectio vel forma intellectus possibilis. Et argutum
fuit quod non . . . (5.0: B 83vb–84vb; D 151va–153ra; E 211rb–212vb; M 98ra–99rb;
P deest; S 64vb–66va; T 171vb–172vb; V 149ra–150rb; W 58va–60ra; X 56va–58ra;
Y 33va–34va; Z 53rb–55rb).
Sequuntur quaestiones [13–14] pertinentes ad voluntatem. Et erant duae, quarum
prima fuit [13] utrum actus intellectus secundum ordinem naturae praecedat omnem
actum voluntatis. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.6: B 84vb–85ra; D 153ra–vb;
E 212vb–213va; M 99rb–va; P 48ra–va; S 66va–67rb; T 172vb–173rb; V 150rb–vb;
W 60ra–vb; X 58ra–va; Y 34va–b; Z 55rb–vb).
Secunda quaestio pertinens ad voluntatem fuit [14] utrum, posito quod voluntas ab
obiecto eius primo moveatur, sit potentia passiva pura sicut potentia materiae. Et
arguitur quod sit . . . (2.6: B 85ra–va; D 153vb–154rb; E 213va–214ra; M 99va–
100ra; P 48va–49ra; S 67rb–68ra; T 173rb–va; V 150vb–151rb; W 60vb–61rb;
X 58va–59rb; Y 34vb–35ra; Z 55vb–56rb).
Sequuntur quaestiones [15–16] pertinentes ad ipsum hominem secundum status eius.
Et erant duae, prima [15] pertinens ad statum paenitentium, secunda [16] ad sta-
tum confessorum. Prima fuit [15] utrum contritio sit actus caritatis vel iustitiae. Et
quod sit actus iustitiae argutum fuit . . . (1.3: B 85va–b; D 154rb–vb; E 214ra–va;
M 100ra–b; P deest; S 68ra–b; T 173va–b; V 151rb–va; W 61rb–vb; X 59rb–va;
Y 35ra–b; Z 56rb–va).
Secunda quaestio, pertinens ad statum confessorum, fuit [16] utrum confessor con-
tenti debeat iniungere ea facienda ad quae ex alia causa tenetur. Et argutum
fuit quod non . . . (1.6: B 85vb–86ra; D 154vb–155va; E 214va–215ra; L 83v–84v;
M 100rb–vb; P deest; S 68rb–69ra; T 173vb–174rb; V 151va–152ra; W 61vb–62rb;
X 59va–60ra; Y 35rb–va; Z 56va–57ra).
Ultima quaestio de his quae pertinent ad entia transmutabilia secundum substan-
tiam, pertinens ad quaedam elementa prima, fuit [17] utrum diluvium universale
possit eri a causa agente secundum naturam. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (3.6:
B 86rb–vb; D 155va–156vb; E 215ra–216rb; M 100vb–101va; P deest; S 69ra–70rb;
T 174rb–174bis ra (small piece of folio); V 152ra–vb; W 62rb–63va; X 60ra–61ra;
Y 35va–36rb; Z 57ra–58ra).
BDPSZ: desunt.
EMTWXY: Explicit quartum quodlibet magistri Petri de (E cessat) Alvernia (M add.:
continens VI pecias; Y add.: Deo gratias, amen; W add.: Incipit quintum eiusdem
magistri).
V: Expliciunt quaestiones de quarto quolibet.

Quodlibet V (Advent 1300, 34.5 columns)

In nostra disputatione communi quaesita fuerunt aliqua [1–17] de his quae a Deo
procedunt in esse, et primo [1–3] de quibusdam universaliter ad creata omnia
pertinentibus, secundo [4–17] de quibusdam in particulari magis. Circa primum
quaerebantur tria, quorum primum [1] pertinet ad essentiam, secundum [2] ad
esse, tertium [3] ad suppositum. Primo igitur quaesitum fuit [1] utrum ens sim-
pliciter sit bonum per essentiam suam aut per aliquid additum realiter ab ipso

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differens. Et arguebatur quod sic . . . (2.1: B 87ra–b; D 156vb–157va; E 216va–217rb;

M 101vb–102ra; P deest; S 70va–71rb; T 175ra–va; V 152vb–153va; W 63va–64rb;
X 62ra–va; Y 36rb–vb; Z 58ra–vb).
Secundo circa ens creatum communiter dictum quaesitum fuit [2] utrum aliquid
esse ab alio effective et ex se formaliter includat contradictoria. Et argutum fuit
quod sic . . . (2.1: B 87rb–vb; D 157va–158rb; E 217rb–218ra; M 102ra–va; P deest;
S 71rb–72ra; T 175va–176ra; V 153va–154ra; W 64rb–65ra; X 62va–63rb; Y 36vb–
37ra; Z 58vb–59rb).
Tertio circa ens creatum quaesitum fuit [3] utrum in omni supposito creato necesse sit
ponere materiam primam simpliciter. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (3.3: B 87vb–88va;
D 158rb–159va; E 218ra–219rb; M 102va–103rb; P 49ra–vb; S 72ra–73rb;
T 176ra–vb; V 154ra–vb; W 65ra–66ra; X 63rb–64rb; Y 37ra–vb; Z 59rb–60rb).
Deinde ponuntur quaestiones [4–17] pertinentes ad entia creata in particulari. Et
primo ponitur quaestio [4] pertinens ad substantias intransmutabiles et substantias
immateriales, secundo ponuntur quaestiones [5–17] pertinentes ad transmutabiles.
Circa primum quaerebatur unum tantum, [4] utrum scilicet angelo bono revelanti
aliquid bonum de adventu Christi vel Antichristi futuris credendum sit. Et argutum
fuit quod sic . . . (1.6: B 88va–89ra; D 159va–160rb; E 219rb–220ra; M 103rb–vb;
P deest; S 73rb–vb; T 176vb–177rb; V 154vb–155ra; W 66ra–vb; X 64rb–65ra;
Y 37vb–38ra; Z 60rb–vb) (unpublished transcription Schabel).
Postmodum ponuntur quaestiones [5–17] ad transmutabilia pertinentes. Et primo
ponuntur illae [5–6] quae pertinent ad transmutabilia universaliter quoquomodo,
secundo [7–17] quae pertinent ad transmutabilia secundum substantiam. Circa
primum sunt quaestiones duae, quarum prima pertinet aliquo modo ad motum
universaliter, et est [5] utrum prius et posterius in motibus posterioribus numerata
sint tempus an solum in motu primo. Secunda pertinet ad intensionem formae in
superioribus et inferioribus, quae est [6] utrum duae formae intentionales in eadem
parte medii sint una numero. Ad primam [5] argutum fuit quod . . . sint . . . (2.1:
B 89ra–va; D 160rb–161ra; E 220ra–221ra; M 103vb–104rb; P deest; S 74ra–vb;
T 177rb–178ra; V 155rb–vb; W 66vb–67va; X 65ra–vb; Y 38ra–va; Z 60vb–61rb).
Tertio (sic) proponebatur quaestio de formis quibusdam quae communiter reperiuntur
in superioribus et inferioribus, scilicet [6] utrum plures formae intentionales numero
differentes possint (mss: possunt) esse in eodem subiecto secundum eandem partem
simul. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (2.0: B 89va–90ra; D 161ra–162ra; E 221ra–vb;
M 104rb–vb; P 49vb–50rb; S 74vb–75vb; T 178ra–va; V 155vb–156rb; W 67va–
68rb; X 65vb–66va; Y 38va–39ra; Z 61va–62ra).
Deinde ponuntur quaestiones [7–17] pertinentes ad transmutabilia secundum substan-
tiam. Et primo ponitur una [7] quae pertinet ad prima transmutabilia secundum
substantiam, quae sunt elementa, secundo multae [8–17] pertinentes ad hominem.
Illa una circa generabilia et corruptibilia est [7] utrum ordine naturae aliqua
forma praecedat in materia formas elementorum. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (2.2:
B 90ra–va; D 162ra–163ra; E 221vb–222vb; M 104vb–105va; P 50rb–51ra;
S 75vb–76vb; T 178va–179rb; V 156rb–vb; W 68rb–69rb; X 66va–67rb; Y 39ra–va;
Z 62ra–63ra).
Consequenter ponuntur quaestiones [8–17] pertinentes ad transmutabilia secundum
substantiam in particulari, et specialiter ad hominem. Et primo ponuntur [8–12]
pertinentes ad potentias eius, secundo [13–17] pertinentes ad ipsum. Adhuc circa
primum ponuntur primo quaestiones [8–10] pertinentes ad intellectum, secundo
[11–12] pertinentes ad voluntatem vel appetitum. Circa primum quaesita fuerunt
tria, quorum primum fuit [8] utrum intellectus agens agat aliquid circa obiectum
intellectus possibilis; secundum, [9] utrum primum intellectum ab intellectu possibili
sit verbum; tertium, [10] utrum intellectus possibilis agat aliquid in formatione verbi
vel in inquisitione quod quid erat esse. Ad primum [8] arguebatur quod . . . nihil
agat . . . (1.5: B 90va–91ra; D 163ra–va; E 222vb–223va; M 105va–b; P deest;

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S 76vb–77va; T 179rb–vb; V 156vb–157ra; W 69rb–70ra; X 67rb–68ra; Y 39va–b;

Z 63ra–va).
Sequens quaestio fuit [9] utrum primum intellectum intellectu possibili in nobis sit
verbum. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (1.4: B 91ra–b; D 163va–164rb; E 223va–
224rb; M 105vb–106rb; P 51ra–va; S 77va–78ra; T 179vb–180rb; V 157ra–va;
W 70ra–va; X 68ra–va; Y 39vb–40rb; Z 63va–64ra) (ed. Cannizzo 1965, pp. 80–4,
from MOTVXYZ).
Tertio quaesitum fuit [10] utrum intellectus possibilis in nobis aliquid faciat in
formatione verbi. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.7: B 91rb–vb; D 164rb–165ra;
E 224rb–225ra; M 106rb–vb; P 51va–b; S 78ra–vb; T 180rb–vb; V 157va–b;
W 70va–71rb; X 68va–69ra; Y 40rb–va; Z 64ra–va) (ed. Cannizzo 1965, pp. 84–9,
from MOTVXYZ).
Postmodum ponuntur quaestiones [11–12] pertinentes ad hominem ratione voluntatis
vel appetitus, quae fuerunt duae, quarum prima fuit [11] utrum virtutes morales
sint in appetitu sensitivo an in voluntate, sive in appetitu intellectivo sicut in subiecto.
Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (3.0: B 91vb–92rb; D 165ra–166rb; E 225ra–226rb;
M 106vb–107va; P deest; S 78vb–80ra; T 180vb–181vb; V 157vb–158va;
W 71rb–72va; X 69ra–70rb; Y 40va–41rb; Z 64va–65va) (ed. Graf 1935, pp.
21*–5*, from VZ).
Secunda quaestio circa voluntatem fuit [12] utrum peccatum veniale per circum-
stantiam aliquam possit eri mortale. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (1.4: B 92va–b;
D 166rb–vb; E 226rb–227ra; M 107va–108ra; P deest; S 80ra–va; T 181vb–182rb;
V 158va–159ra; W 72va–73ra; X 70rb–vb; Y 41rb–va; Z 65va–66ra).
Post praedicta ponuntur quaestiones [13–17] pertinentes ad ipsum hominem, et primo
illae [13–14] quae pertinent ad diversos status eius, secundo [15–17] pertinentes ad
unum particularem hominem, scilicet Antichristum. Circa primum fuerunt duae,
prima [13] circa statum sacerdotum, secunda [14] circa statum nihil habentium in
proprio vel communi. Prima fuit [13] utrum sacerdos qui non potest celebrare possit
audire confessiones. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.3: B 92vb–93ra; D 167ra–va;
E 227ra–vb; M 108ra–b; P deest; S 80va–81rb; T 182rb–va; V 159ra–b; W 73ra–va;
X 70vb–71rb; Y 41va–b; Z 66ra–b).
Circa statum nihil habentium in proprio vel communi quaesitum fuit [14] utrum
nihil habentes in proprio vel communi possint facere eleemosynam. Et argutum
fuit quod non . . . (2.4: B 93ra–vb; D 167va–168va; E 227vb–228vb; M 108rb–vb;
P deest; S 81rb–82rb; T 182va–183rb; V 159rb–vb; W 73va–74vb; X 71rb–72ra;
Y 41vb–42rb; Z 66va–67ra).
Ultimo ponuntur quaestiones [15–17] de homine quodam particulari, scilicet
Antichristo. Et fuerunt tres, quarum prima fuit [15] utrum Antichristus sit venturus
in brevi; secunda, [16] utrum expediat scire determinatum tempus adventus eius;
tertia, [17] utrum Antichristum venturum esse determinato et signato tempore sit
error in Scriptura Sacra. Ad primam [15] argutum fuit primo quod sic . . . (2.8:
B 93vb–94va; D 168va–170ra; E 228vb–230rb; M 108vb–109vb; P 51vb–53ra;
S 82rb–83va, 85ra (one column had been omitted); T 183rb–184va; V 159vb–160vb;
W 74vb–75rb (including 74bis); X 72ra–73va; Y 42rb–43ra; Z 67ra–68rb) (fragment
ed. Perarnau i Espelt 1988–89, pp. 213–14, from V).
Ad secundam [16] autem fuit argutum quod expediens sit homini scire determina-
tum tempus adventus Antichristi . . . (1.4: B 94va–b; D 170ra–vb; E 230rb–231ra;
M 109vb–110rb; P deest; S 83va–84rb; T 184va–185ra; V 160vb–161rb; W
75rb–76ra; X 73va–74ra; Y 43ra–b; Z 68rb–vb) (ed. Perarnau i Espelt 1988–89,
pp. 214–16, from V).
Tertia quaestio de Antichristo fuit [17] utrum asserere ipsum esse venturum futuro
tempore determinato sit error in Sacra Scriptura. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.3:
B 95ra–b; D 170vb–171rb; E 231ra–va; M 110rb–va; P deest; S 84rb–vb; T 185ra–b;
V 161rb–va; W 76ra–va; X 74ra–va; Y 43rb–vb; Z 68vb–69ra) (ed. Perarnau i Espelt
1988–89, pp. 216–18, from V).

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BPVZ: desunt.
DESTXY: Expliciunt quaestiones de quolibet (T add.: quinto) disputatae (X: disputato)
a magistro Petro de Alvernia, canonico Parisiensi (X: ecclesiae Parisiensis). (D add.:
Incipit sextum et ultimum quodlibet).
MW: Explicit quintum quodlibet magistri Petri de Alvernia (M add.: continens V pecias;
W add.: Incipit sextum et ultimum eiusdem magistri).

Quodlibet VI (probably Advent 1301, 34.5 columns)

In nostra communi disputatione quaesita fuerunt quaedam [1–2] de Deo, quaedam

[4–17] vero de his quae procedunt ab eo, aliquid [3] vero commune utriusque.
De Deo quaesita fuerunt duo [1–2], quorum primum fuit [1] utrum Deus possit
producere in esse quicquid extra se intelligit. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (3.1:
B 95rb–96ra; D 171rb–172vb; M 110vb–111va; P deest; S 85rb–86va; T 185va–
186rb; V 161va–162rb; W 76va–77vb; X 75ra–vb; Y 43vb–44rb; Z 69rb–70ra)
(unpublished transcription Schabel).
Secundo quaesitum fuit de Deo [2] utrum certitudo scientiae eius stet cum rerum
contingentia. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.7: B 96ra–b; D 172vb–173va; M 111va–
112ra; P 53ra–54ra; S 86va–87rb; T 186rb–187ra; V 162rb–vb; W 77vb–78va; X 75vb–
76va; Y 44va–b; Z 70ra–vb) (ed. Schabel, forthcoming).
Postmodum quaesitum fuit unum quod est commune quodammodo Deo et creaturis,
scilicet [3] utrum ab eadem natura simplici possint procedere extra se immediate
diversa secundum rem, secundum diversos eius respectus primo. Et fuit argutum
quod non . . . (1.5: B 96rb–vb; D 173va–174rb; M 112ra–b; P deest; S 87rb–88ra;
T 187ra–va; V 162vb–163ra; W 78va–79rb; X 76va–77ra; Y 44vb–45rb; Z 70vb–
71rb) (= G: 2a).
Consequenter ponuntur quaestiones [4–17] pertinentes ad creaturas tantum. Et primo
ponuntur illae [4–6] quae pertinent ad creaturas immateriales. Et fuerunt tres. Prima
fuit [4] utrum angelus supremus mensuretur aliqua mensura. Et quod non fuit
argutum . . . (3.1: B 96vb–97va; D 174rb–175vb; M 112rb–113rb; P deest; S 88ra–
89rb; T 187va–188va; V 163ra–vb; W 79rb–80vb; X 77ra–78ra; Y 45rb–46ra; Z 71rb–
72rb) (= G: 3).
Secunda quaestio circa substantias immateriales creatas fuit [5] utrum actus intelligendi
angeli quo intelligit se sit eius substantia vel essentia. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (2.5:
B 97va–98ra; D 175vb–176vb; M 113rb–114ra; P deest; S 89va–90va; T 188va–
189rb; V 163vb–164va; W 80vb–81vb; X 78ra–vb; Y 46ra–va; Z 72rb–73ra)
(= G: 4).
Tertia quaestio de his quae pertinent ad angelos fuit [6] utrum angelus moveat cae-
lum per virtutem aliam ab intellectu et voluntate. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (2.8:
B 98ra–vb; D 176vb–178ra; M 114ra–vb; P 54ra–vb; S 90va–91vb; T 189rb–190ra;
V 164va–165rb; W 82ra–83ra; X 78vb–79vb; Y 46va–47rb; Z 73ra–74ra) (G = 5).
Postmodum ponuntur quaestiones [7–17] pertinentes ad transmutabilia et secundum
substantiam. Et primo ponuntur illae [7–14] quae ad substantiam pertinent, secundo
illae [15–17] quae pertinent ad accidentia. Circa eas quae pertinent ad substantiam,
primo ponitur illa [7] quae pertinet ad primum principium transmutabilium, scilicet
materiam, deinde aliae [8–14] quae pertinent ad ipsam secundum alia. Illa quae
pertinet ad materiam fuit [7] utrum materia prima sit qua aliquid potest esse et non
esse. Et arguitur quod non . . . (1.8: B 98vb–99rb; D 178ra–179ra; M 114vb–115ra;
P 54vb–55rb; S 91vb–92va; T 190ra–va; V 165rb–va; W 83ra–vb; X 79vb–80rb;
Y 47rb–vb; Z 74ra–va) (= G: 6).
Consequenter ponuntur quaestiones [8–14] pertinentes ad transmutabilia secundum
substantiam, et specialiter ad ea quae sunt animata. Et primo ponuntur illae [8–13]
quae pertinent ad actus vel obiecta potentiarum earum, secundo una [14] pertinens
ad quaedam alia. Adhuc primo ponitur una [8] pertinens ad actum partis animae

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122 chris schabel

sensitivae, secundo plures [9–13] pertinentes ad partem animae intellectualem.

Prima, quae pertinet ad actum partis animae sensitivae, fuit [8] utrum actus videndi
hominis et equi respectu eiusdem obiecti sit unius rationis secundum speciem. Et
argutum fuit quod sic . . . (1.5: B 99rb–va; D 179ra–va; M 115rb–va; P 55rb–vb;
S 92va–93ra; T 190vb–191ra; V 165va–166ra; W 83vb–84va; X 80rb–vb; Y 47vb–
48ra; Z 74va–75rb) (= G: 7).
Quaestionum illarum quae [9–13] pertinent ad partem animae intellectualem, quaedam
[9] pertinet ad intellectum, multae [10–13] autem ad voluntatem. Illa autem quae
pertinet ad intellectum fuit in comparatione ad eius obiectum, [9] utrum scilicet
illud quod est perfectius et verius in esse secundum naturam sit magis intelligibile.
Argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.9: B 99va–100ra; D 179va–180rb; M 115va–116ra;
P 55vb–56rb; S 93ra–94ra; T 191ra–vb; V 166ra–va; W 84va–85va; X 80vb–81va;
Y 48ra–va; Z 75rb–vb) (= G: 8).
Deinde ponuntur quaestiones [10–13] ad voluntatem pertinentes, quarum prima, quae
est communis voluntati intellectuali et appetitui sensitivo, fuit [10] utrum delectatio
sit non-existentis. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.7: B 100ra–va; D 180rb–181ra;
M 116ra–va; P deest; S 94ra–vb; T 191vb–192rb; V 166va–b; W 85va–86rb;
X 81va–b; Y 48va–49ra; Z 75vb–76rb) (= G: 9).
Secunda quaestio ad voluntatem pertinens est [11] utrum libertas sit potestas agendi
tantum vel patiendi. Et argutum fuit quod agendi tantum . . . (1.7: B 100va–b;
D 181ra–vb; M 116va–117ra; P deest; S 94vb–95va; T 192rb–vb; V 166vb–167rb;
W 86rb–87ra; X 81vb–82va; Y 49ra–b; Z 76va–77ra) (= G: 10).
Consequenter ponitur quaestio pertinens ad actum voluntatis tantum, qui est electio,
[12] an scilicet magis eligendum sit non esse quam peccare mortaliter. Et argutum
fuit quod non . . . (1.7: B 100vb–101rb; D 181vb–182rb; M 117ra–b; P 56rb–vb;
S 95va–96rb; T 192vb–193rb; V 167rb–vb; W 87ra–va; X 82va–83ra; Y 49rb–vb;
Z 77ra–va) (= G: 11).
Postea circa voluntatem quaesitum fuit ultimo [13] utrum per peccatum, quod ad
eam pertinet, possit tolli tota habilitas ad bonum. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (1.9:
B 101rb–va; D 182rb–183rb; M 117rb–vb; P deest; S 96rb–97ra; T 193rb–vb;
V 167vb–168rb; W 87va–88rb; X 83ra–va; Y 49vb–50rb; Z 77va–78rb) (= G: 12).
Postea ponitur quaedam quaestio pertinens ad substantiam animatam et corporalem,
[14] utrum scilicet pygmaei sint homines. Et argutum fuit quod sic . . . (2.0: B 101vb–
102ra; D 183rb–184ra; M 118ra–b; P 56vb–57rb; S 97ra–98ra; T 193vb–194va;
V 168rb–vb; W 88rb–89rb; X 83va–84rb; Y 50rb–va; Z 78rb–vb) (ed. Koch 1931,
pp. 209–13, from VX; reprinted in Gusinde 1962, pp. 18–20) (= G: 13).
Deinde ponuntur quaestiones [15–17] pertinentes ad accidentia. Et primo ponitur una
[15] pertinens ad accidentia in communi, secundo quaedam aliae duae [16–17]
pertinentes ad quaedam accidentia in speciali. Prima, quae pertinet ad accidentia sim-
pliciter, fuit [15] utrum accidens sit ens formaliter. Et argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.6:
B 102ra–va; D 184ra–vb; M 118va–b; P 57rb–vb; S 98ra–va; T 194va–195ra;
V 168vb–169ra; W 89rb–vb; X 84rb–vb; Y 50va–51ra; Z 78vb–79rb) (= G: 14).
Consequenter ponuntur quaestiones [16–17] pertinentes ad accidentia in particulari.
Et fuerunt duae circa idem. Prima fuit [16] utrum harmoniae musicales sint excita-
tivae passionum, puta raptus vel aliarum huiusmodi; secunda fuit [17] utrum faciant
ad mores. Ad primam [16] fuit argutum primo quod non . . . (2.7: B 102va–103ra;
D 184vb–185vb; L 109v–111r; M 118vb–119va; P deest; S 98va–99vb; T 195ra–vb;
V 169ra–vb; W 89vb–90vb; X 84vb–85va; Y 51ra–va; Z 79rb–80rb) (ed. Hentschel
2000, pp. 412–18, from BTVXZ) (= G: 15).
Ultima quaestio fuit [17] utrum harmoniae musicae ad mores valeant seu virtutes. Et
argutum fuit quod non . . . (1.5: B 103ra–b; D 185vb–186rb; L 111r–112r; M 119va–b;
P deest; S 99vb–100rb; T 195vb–196ra; V 169vb–170ra; W 90vb–91rb; X 85va–b;
Y 51va–b; Z 80rb–vb) (ed. Hentschel 2000, pp. 418–21, from BTVXZ) (= G: 16).
B: deest.

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 the QUODLIBETA of peter of auvergne 123

DSTVWZ: Expliciunt quaestiones de (om. Z) quolibet (om. Z) disputatae a magistro

Petro de Alvernia, canonico Parisiensi (TZ cessant) anno Domini Millesimo (D cessat)
tricentesimo primo (quarto V).
M: Explicit quodlibet magistri Petri de Alvernia continens quinque pecias.
P: non potest legi.
X: Explicit ultimum quodlibet a magistro Petro de Alvernia disputatum anno Domini
millesimo tricentesimo primo.
Y: Explicit VI quodlibet Magistri P<etri> de Alvernia.

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 124 CHRIS SCHABEL

APPENDIX II
PETRI DE ALVERNIA QUODLIBET I, QUAESTIO 1

Quaerebatur de potentia Dei, et primo quantum ad immensitatem

ipsius, utrum scilicet Deus sit infinitae virtutis in vigore.
Et arguitur quod non, quoniam si esset, probari posset vel ex motu,
vel ex creatione, vel ex primitate substantiae eius, a posteriori scilicet
5 vel a priori. Non autem potest probari ex motu, per ipsum enim non
probatur nisi infinitas in agendo successive, non in agendo intensive.
Nec etiam ex creatione, quoniam quantitas virtutis agentis mensuratur
ex quantitate facti, sicut apparet in eis quae fiunt secundum artem, in
quibus tantam dicimus esse virtutem artis in agendo quantam credi-
10 mus esse quantitatem artificiati secundum perfectionem; nunc autem
nullum creatum infinitum est secundum perfectionem; ergo nec virtus
est infinita in vigore sive in agendo. Nec etiam quia substantia prima,
quia secundum quod huiusmodi est aliquod ens distinctum a quolibet
alio et determinatum in se; tale autem non videtur infinitum esse in
15 substantia; quare nec in virtute.
Contra: Deum esse infinitae virtutis tenemus. Et non tantum fide,
quia non est articulus fidei. Nec etiam per se notum, quoniam diversi
circa hoc diversa sentiunt. Ergo tenetur sicut aliquid quod potest ratio-
ne probari.
20 Intelligendum quod infinitum dicitur aliquid secundum quantita-
tem, quod scilicet secundum quantitatem non habet ultimum sive
finem, de quo Philosophus tractat III Physicorum; aliquid autem se-

22-22 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica III, c. 6: 207a2-15 (AL VII.1.2, p. 128, ll. 4-18).

1 quaerebatur] quaerabatur primo D 1-20 quaerebatur... quod1 om. A 3 arguitur]

arguebatur B 4 primitate] primitive G || substantiae] essentiae F; om. V || eius]
substantiae add. F || scilicet] secundum G 5-6 non1... probatur om. W 6 in2 om. D
7 agentis om. D 8 quantitate] veritate F; potestate M || quae BFPTV, Y p.c.] qui
CDGMORSWXZ, Y a.c. || secundum artem] secundum tem D a.c.; praecedentem
FW; per + lac. M a.c.; per et naturam M p.c.2 9 quantam] quantum F 10 artificiati]
artificii D; artitifi<->ti G 10-11 nunc... perfectionem om. per hom. T 11 nullum]
unum D; verum M (om. T) || creatum BPVY, W p.c.] tantum CDGMORSX*Z, W a.c.
(om. T); in add. G 12 in1 BDF; om. cett. || sive in agendo om. F 13 quia] quae P ||
huiusmodi] huius V || ens distinctum inv. B; ens distinctunctum G 14 videtur]
videmus M || infinitum esse inv. F 15 quare om. D; ergo F 16 deum] de non D;
non exp. O; non add. T || virtutis] virtutes Z; in vigore add. F || et om. F 18 diversa]
divisa G || sentiunt] sensciunt G; sensiunt P || aliquid] aliquod B || potest om. G
20 intelligendum] ad hoc est intelligendum V || infinitum dicitur aliquid inv. F
21 scilicet om. Z

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 THE QUODLIBETA OF PETER OF AUVERGNE 125

cundum substantiam, quod finem secundum substantiam non habet ad

quem ordinetur, nec per consequens agens. Quod enim non habet
finem alium, nec principium activum aliud, quia finis et agens sunt
sibi invicem causae et sibi correspondent. Nec etiam determinatur per
5 aliquam formam supervenientem, quoniam tale compositum existens
causas alias, finalem et activam, habet. Nec etiam recipitur in materia
vel subiecto quo aliqualiter determinetur, per eandem rationem. Quia
igitur Deus nec finem alium a se habet, nec causam activam, nec
determinatur per aliquam formam supervenientem, nec etiam per ma-
10 teriam vel subiectum secundum substantiam, infinitus est – non qui-
dem privative, ut natus sit finiri, sed magis negative, quia nullo modo
finem aut terminum habet.
Virtus autem Dei non est aliquid additum substantiae eius – quia
tunc compositus esset et non esset primum ens – sed est id idem quod
15 ipsa substantia eius, differens ratione, ita ut virtus eius per se sit sub-
stantia ipsius ut principium est operationis. Vigor autem virtutis inten-
sionem eius importat, in ordinem scilicet ad operationem. Infinitas
autem vigoris virtutis est infinitas in agendo intensive. Quod ergo
quaeritur, utrum Deus sit infinitae virtutis in vigore, dicendum quod
20 Deus est virtutis infinitae simpliciter.
Primo quoniam virtus Dei secundum quam agit primo est id idem
quod substantia eius, ut iam acceptum est et probatum aliqualiter. Sed
substantia Dei simpliciter secundum se infinita est, ut ex dictis
apparet. Igitur virtus Dei in agendo infinita est.
25 Secundo quia omnis virtus finita, secundum quod huiusmodi,
deficiens est, quoniam omne finitum secundum quod finitum finem

10-12 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 1, a. 1.

1 secundum1] secundam R || secundum2 om. G || habet] nec add. F 2 ordinetur]

ordinem MRZ || agens om. C 3 aliud om. F || finis] finif G 4 sibi invicem causae]
sibi invicem esse ACDGORVX*Z; sibi simul (del.) intentione F || sibi2] invicem add.
P 5 aliquam] aliquem G || compositum] componitur A 5-6 existens causas alias]
causas alias existens B; existens causat alias Z 6 recipitur] recipetur D 8 igitur]
ita F || alium ABFPVWY, M p.c.] aliam CDGORSTXZ || habet om. V || nec2] ubi
(nisi?) RV 9 supervenientem] supervenienientem G || etiam] et Z || per2] aliquam
add. Z 10 vel] etiam add. G || subiectum secundum om. F 11 sit] fit CGPRTXZ ||
sed om. G || negative] nec gative R || nullo] ultimo R || modo] aut add. B; nec add. F
12 aut] sive D; nec F 14 est om. F || id] illud DV; om. R 15 ipsa om. B || sit] sicut
O 16 vigor] vigo R 17 ordinem] ordine ABFMPW 17-18 infinitas... est iter. G
18 est om. W || intensive] intensione R || quod] quando F 19 deus] infinitas dei F
20 est om. D || virtutis infinitae inv. FY 21 primo1 om. O || quam] quod V 22 eius
om. A || probatum aliqualiter inv. D 23 ut] et W 24 infinita est inv. F 25 secundo
quia omnis] solutio quaestionis D 26 est om. F || finitum2] finitus G

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 126 CHRIS SCHABEL

vel terminum habet secundum aliquem modum. Tale autem deficiens

est respectu eius quod non habet finem vel terminum illum. Virtus
autem divina in nullo deficiens est, quia a nullo dependet, et omnes
aliae virtutes dependent ex ipsa et ex se. Manifestum est igitur quod
5 virtus divina infinita est simpliciter, quia prima. Unde dicitur Sapien-
tiae 11: “Virtutem ostendis tu qui non crederis esse consummatus.”
Unde dicit Proclus, 91 conclusione libri sui: “Omnis potentia aut finita
aut infinita. Et finita quidem omnis ex infinita potentia subsistit, in-
finita autem ex prima infinitate.” Est etiam infinitae virtutis in agendo
10 intensive, quoniam quod ex remotiori educit aliquid in actum perfec-
tum maioris est virtutis, sicut maioris virtutis est calidum quod ex
frigido facit calidum quam quod ex tepido, et quod ex magis frigido
facit calidum perfectum adhuc maioris virtutis est in calefaciendo. Et
sic semper quanto aliquid educit aliquid in actum ex remotiori maioris
15 virtutis est, ita ut secundum additionem ad rationem fiat additio ad
quantitatem virtutis. Igitur agens aliquid ex infinita distantia est virtu-
tis infinitae in agendo intensive. Deus autem producit aliquid ex in-
finita distantia, quia ex simpliciter non-ente facit aliquid, siquidem
omnia entia procedunt ab ipso, non solum materialia, sed etiam imma-
20 terialia: “A primo enim aeterno derivatum est esse et vivere singulis,”

5-6 Sapientia 12.17. 7-9 Proclus, Elementa theologica, propositio 91, Proclus:
Elementa theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca, ed. H. Boese (Leuven
1987), p. 47, ll. 1-3. 17-18 Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, Quaestiones in De caelo, in
Petrus de Alvernia, Questions on Aristotle’s De caelo. A Critical Edition with an
Interpretative Essay, ed. G. Galle (Leuven 2003), p. 101. 20-p.127.1 Cf. Auctoritates
Aristotelis, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain-Paris 1974), p. 161; Aristoteles, De caelo et
mundo I, c. 1: 279a28-30; Petrus de Alvernia, Quaestiones in De caelo, prologus, ed.
G. Galle, pp. 7 and 383.
p.125.25-9 secundo... infinitate om. A p.125.26-1 quoniam... deficiens om. per hom. T
1 terminum] iustum G 1-2 habet... terminum om. per hom. W 2 est om. G(W)
3 omnes] omnis R a.c.; omne W 5 divina infinita inv. W 6 ostendis] ostenderis F
|| crederis] credis DORTVW || consummatus] consumatus BDFGV 7 dicit] dici D ||
aut] est W || finita] est add. s.l. D 7-8 finita aut om. R 8 infinita1] finita a.c. R ||
et] aut V || potentia] substantia W 9 etiam] enim A || infinitae] finitae G 10 quoniam]
quo autem V || quod om. F 11 est virtutis inv. F || calidum] calide R 11-12 quod...
calidum mg. T 11-15 sicut... est om. A 12 frigido1] fervido CGR || calidum]
2
capitulum G || quam] quod R || frigido ] finitum* B 12-13 quam... calidum om. per
hom. F 13 calidum] capitulum G || adhuc] ad hunc R 14 semper] sinper G ||
quanto] quando F || aliquid1] ad W || educit] reducitur F || aliquid2 om. F; aliquem O ||
actum] actu B || maioris om. V 15 virtutis] et add. G || ita om. F || additionem]
condicionem F || rationem] actionem A || additio] addictio D 16 virtutis1] virgutis G
|| agens aliquid inv. F || aliquid] quod P; ad W || ex om. G || infinita] infinitata P
16-18 est... distinctia om. (per hom.?) A 17 agendo] et add. G || aliquid] ad W
18 quia om. F 19 ab... materialia iter. M || sed etiam immaterialia om. per hom. R
20 derivatum] dominatum G; divinatum R || est] enim D

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 THE QUODLIBETA OF PETER OF AUVERGNE 127

I Caeli et mundi. Et II Metaphysicae dicitur quod, sicut calidissimum

est causa caliditatis in omnibus aliis, ita quod verissimum est est causa
posterioribus ut sint vera. Proclus etiam, 11 conclusione libri sui,
probat: “Omnia qualitercumque ab una prima causa procedunt.” Igitur
5 Deus est infinitae virtutis in agendo.
Praeterea, agens quod est per se principium actionis infinitae est
virtutis infinitae in agendo, quoniam actio infinita non procedit nisi a
virtute infinita in agendo. Sed Deus est per se principium actionis
infinitae. Est enim per se principium creationis. Nihil enim per se
10 potest creare nisi Deus. Creatio autem est actio infinita, non quidem
infinitate termini ad quem – terminus enim eius creatura est, quae de
necessitate finita est – sed infinitate termini a quo, terminus enim eius
est non-ens simpliciter. Non-ens autem simpliciter infinitum est. Unde
ea in entibus quae magis accedunt ad ipsum aliquam infinitatem
15 secundum quid habent, sicut materia prima et existentia in potentia.
Igitur Deus est infinitae virtutis in agendo.
Et etiam virtutis infinitae in movendo per tempus infinitum. Motus
enim infinitus non procedit nisi a motore virtutis infinitae in movendo.
Nunc autem, et si motus non sit infinitus secundum durationem, potest
20 tamen quantum est de natura mobilis et motoris esse infinitus, saltem a
parte finis. Igitur est infinitae virtutis in movendo per tempus in-
finitum.

1-3 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica II, c. 1: 993b25-28 (AL XXV.3.2, p. 44, ll. 28-30).
3-5 Proclus, Elementa theologica, propositio 11, ed. H. Boese, p. 8, l. 1.

p.126.18-5 siquidem... agendo om. A 1 caeli et mundi om. F || et1 om. M; s.l. T (om.
F) || metaphysicae] ubi add. F 2 aliis om. F || est3 om. BW 2-3 est2...
posterioribus] in posterioribus est causa posterioribus F 3 libri sui inv. B 4 probat]
quod add. T, PY s.l. || una prima causa] una causa prima C; una prima DZ; imagine F
|| procedunt] producit G 5 in] vigore add. F 6 praeterea] prima DZ || per se om. P
7 actio infinita inv. A || a] ad A 8 infinita] infinite G || agendo] deus add. C || per se
om. P 8-9 actionis... principium iter. G 9 enim1] etiam D 10 creatio] actio add.
G || est BF; s.l. M; mg. T; post actio DP; post infinita W; om. ACGORSVXYZ || actio
infinita inv. F; infinita R 11 infinitate AP, Y p.c. s.l.; infiniti cett. || eius om. Y ||
creatura ABDF*PSWY, O p.c.] creatum CDGMRTVXZ; creatam O a.c. || quae] quod
F 12 finita] finitum F || infinitate] a.c. G; infinite G p.c. || enim] a quo add. P 13 est
non-ens] non est ens F || non-ens1 autem simpliciter om. per hom. FO || infinitum
ABPZ, Y p.c.] infirmiter CDFGMORSTWX, Y a.c.; ita firmiter V 14 ea om. TWY;
post entibus B || ipsum] ipsam R 15 quid] quam V || et] in B; om. F || existentia]
existens F || potentia] prima G 17 infinitae] infinitate DGMR, OT a.c. 17-p.129.2
et etiam... infinitum om. A 18 enim om. D; autem FMW; etiam Z 19 nunc] licet
B; non F || et si] terminus B; et termini Z || potest] praeter G 20 tamen om. T ||
saltem lac. M; om. Z

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 128 CHRIS SCHABEL

Non autem est infinitae virtutis in agendo motum velocitatis infi-

nitae, quia hoc est impossibile fieri. Omnis enim motus naturalis
velocitatem habet determinatam ex hoc quod motus et ex hoc quod
naturalis. Ex hoc quidem quod motus, quia motus per se est in
5 tempore, velocitas autem infinita in non-tempore. Ex hoc autem quod
naturalis, omnia enim naturalia ad maius et minus naturaliter terminata
sunt, sicut minima terra naturaliter terminata est. Similiter autem et
minimus ignis. Et similiter se habet in unoquoque naturalium, sicut
dicit Philosophus I Physicorum. Et iterum, libro De sensu, dicit quod
10 divisio passionum et formarum naturalium in partes quae natae sunt
manere separatae non procedit in infinitum, sed necessario terminatur.
Quare et motus naturales secundum velocitatem terminati sunt natura-
liter et ad minus et maius. Deus autem non habet virtutem agendi quod
omnino secundum se impossibile est fieri. Non habet igitur virtutem
15 agendi motum in instanti. Et hoc videtur intendere Commentator, VII
Physicorum, non quidem negans ipsum esse infinitae virtutis in
vigore, sed in agendo motum in instanti.
Apparet etiam quod non est virtutis infinitae in agendo creaturam
infinitam, quia hanc esse secundum se est impossibile et ponit contra-
20 dictoria, ipsam scilicet esse per hypothesim et ipsam non esse, quia
infinita creatura. Si enim creatura est, finita est, causam habens aliam.

1-17 Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, Quaestiones in De caelo, ed. Galle, p. 205 (cf.
introduction, pp. 287* and 308*). 8-9 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 4: 187b13-22
(AL VII.1.2, p. 20, ll. 7-16). 9-11 Cf. Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato, c. 6: 445b7-
29. 15-17 Cf. Averroes, In libros Physicorum VII, e.g. comm. 8 et 35 (Aristotelis
Opera cum Averrois Commentariis IV, ed. Venice 1562, ff. 311ra-b and 334va-
335rb).

1 in om. G || velocitatis infinitae inv. D; velocitatis F 2 est] hoc add. G || enim om. Z
3 quod1] est add. BSW 3-4 quod1... hoc om. per hom. F 4 quidem om. Z || quia]
et Z || motus2 om. F 5 velocitas] velocitatis R, G a.c. || infinita] et add. R || non-
tempore] tempore G 6 maius] magis DP 7 minima] in W p.c. || terra naturaliter
terminata] terrata G || naturaliter om. D || est] sunt est F || et om. F 8 minimus]
minus WZ || et om. BW || similiter] etiam add. B 9 iterum] in add. M 10 formarum]
forma GMS || partes] parte G 11 separatae] separata R || terminatur] terminare V
12 naturales] naturalis V 13 ad] non D a.c.; in D p.c. s.l. || et2] ad add. FMSTWZ ||
autem om. V || agendi] in (s.l.) agendo illud (s.l.) P 13-15 quod... agendi om. per
hom. Y 14 est BP, W s.l.; om. cett. || igitur om. C (Y) 14-15 habet post agendi D
15 in om. D || instanti] infiniti M; viii exp. G; vii exp. R || intendere om. V 15-16 vii
physicorum] et philosophus D; unde et philosophus W 16 quidem] quidam V
17 sed iter. T 18 virtutis infinitae inv. F; virtus infinitae Z 19-20 contradictoria]
contradictionem D 20 scilicet] si V || hypothesim B, PST p.c.; hypotasim R;
hypostasim cett., PT a.c. || et] per add. O || ipsam2] ipsa Z 21 creatura1... finita om.
per hom. V || causam habens aliam] habens aliam causam D

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 THE QUODLIBETA OF PETER OF AUVERGNE 129

Sic igitur Deus est infinitae virtutis: et infinitae in vigore et infini-

tae ad movendum per tempus infinitum. Non autem est infinitae vir-
tutis ad agendum motum velocitatis infinitae, nec creaturam infinitam,
non propter aliquam deminutionem potentiae ipsius, sed quia hoc
5 posse non est aliquid posse. Nec tenetur fide, sicut quidam opinantur,
nec omnino sicut notum ex se omnibus, sed probatum rationibus tum a
priori, tum etiam a posteriori.
Ad rationem in oppositum dicendum concedendo maiorem. Sed ad
minorem dicendum, cum assumitur quod non potest ex motu probari,
10 verum est quod ex ipso non potest probari infinitas virtutis eius in
agendo velocitatem infinitam, quia hoc non potest fieri. Potest tamen
ex ipso probari esse infinita in movendo per tempus infinitum, sicut
apparet ex dictis.
Quod autem assumitur, quod ex creatione non potest probari eo
15 quod “quantitas virtutis agentis mensuratur ex quantitate facti, sicut
apparet in eis quae fiunt secundum artem et naturam,” etc., dicendum
quod in agentibus virtutis finitae mensuratur virtus agentis ex utraque,
scilicet ex quantitate ipsius facti et ex ipso modo fiendi, quia omnia
finita sunt – et virtus agens, et modus agendi, et ipsum factum – et
20 sunt omnia aliqualiter proportionalia. In agente autem virtutis infinitae
non potest virtus agentis ut sic mensurari ex quantitate perfectionis
ipsius facti, quoniam omne factum finitum est, et finitum non mensu-
rat infinitum. Mensurari autem potest ex modo fiendi, qui quidem

8 Hic supra, p.124.3-15.

1 sic] si F || deus om. R || et1 infinitae] et add. G; virtutis add. s.l. W; om. Y || in s.l. X
|| et2 om. G 2 movendum] modum MVZ, G a.c. 3 motum] notum M || velocitatis]
volecitatis G 4 non] nec V || sed om. D || quia om. T 5-13 nec tenetur... dictis om.
A 6 notum] motum GYZ || rationibus tum] tam rationibus F; rationibus tamen P
7 tum] quam F; om. P || etiam om. BF || a om. G; et Z 8 dicendum om. FY; quod
add. W || concedendo] concedendum D || ad] a P 9 dicendum cum] quod est O ||
quod non potest om. F 10 quod om. FY || non] et F || infinitas] infinitatio D || virtutis
eius om. B; virtutis G 11 infinitam] in infinitum D || quia] ex add. R || hoc om. B
12 ipso] ipsa B || movendo] modo V, G a.c. || sicut] sic C 14 quod autem assumitur]
cum dicitur A; quia aut assumitur V || eo om. F 15 virtutis] ignis add. P || sicut om.
G 16 quae BFPVXY] qui ACDGMORSTWZ || naturam] materiam ACGM; ti add.
A || etc. om. F 17 agentibus] gentibus Z || finitae] infinitae F || virtus] virtutis V
17-18 utraque scilicet ex om. A 18 omnia] ipsa X 18-19 quia... agendi om. per
hom. Y 19 finita] fienda R || modus] movetur G || et3 om. F 20 aliqualiter P p.c.
s.l.; aliqua cett., P a.c. || autem] aut R 21 sic] si C 21-22 perfectionis ipsius inv. A
22 factum finitum inv. G || finitum est inv. F; finitum Z 23 potest] ut W

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 130 CHRIS SCHABEL

finitus est ex parte termini ad quem, infinitus tamen potest esse ex

parte termini a quo, quia est ex non-ente, quod quidem infinitum est
quia nullo finitum. Tale autem agens est Deus. Et ideo ratio non
concludit.
5 Nec etiam in agentibus aequivocis. Agens enim aequivocum et per
se semper est maioris virtutis quam factum, secundum illam con-
clusionem Procli: “Omne productivum alterius melius est quam natura
producti.”
Quod autem assumitur, quod non potest probari infinitas virtutis
10 eius eo quod primus, dicendum quod immo. Et quod assumitur, quod
ipse distinctus est ab omnibus entibus, dico quod verum est, sed dis-
tinctus est non sicut finitum a finito, sed sicut infinitum a finito, et
eodem modo, determinatum quidem est, non quidem finitum existens
in se, sed quia infinitum existens, et hoc in se indivisum distinctum est
15 a quolibet finito, et sicut non-ens ab ente.

6-8 Proclus, Elementa theologica, propositio 7, ed. Boese, p. 6, l. 1.

1 est ABF; om. cett. || infinitus] iinfinitus G || tamen] cum RX; est S || potest esse om.
B(D) 1-2 ad quem... termini om. per hom. D; iter. R 2 quo quia] quoque R || est1
om. A || non-ente] natura ente O || quod] non add. G 3 nullo BFP; nullum W; nulla
cett. || finitum] finitur V; sicut W 3 agens om. V || et om. G || ideo om. DRZ || ratio
om. BT 3-4 quia... concludit om. A 4 concludit] includit Z 5 etiam] hoc tenet
add. A || agentibus] gentibus Z || aequivocis ABFP, STY p.c.; aequi voluntatis
CDGMORWXZ, TY a.c.; aeque voluntatis V 7 procli] proclim G || productivum]
adiectivum M; perdicivum CZ; perdictivum GRW || alterius] et in terminis D || melius
est inv. O || est om. A 7-10 quam... eo quod om. (per hom.?) V 9 quod autem] et
quod A || quod2] quia BMY; quoniam P (om. V) 9-10 non... quod3 om. (per hom.?)
A 10 et om. M 11 dico] dicendum F (om. V) 11-12 ab... est om. per hom. V
12 finitum] infinitum A; sed non D; est non M || sed... finito2 om. per hom. CG || sed]
1 2
sied D 13 quidem om. B || quidem ] quidam W 14 in... existens om. per hom. R;
iter. W || et hoc om. B || indivisum] divesum T 15 sicut om. A

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 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS’ QUODLIBET
A BRIEF STUDY OF THE MANUSCRIPTS
AND AN EDITION OF QUESTION 16

Timothy B. Noone and H. Francie Roberts

The Franciscan John Duns Scotus has left us a single Quodlibet, consist-
ing of twenty-one questions stemming from a disputation held at Paris
in the rst decade of the fourteenth century. The rst six questions
bear upon the Trinitarian persons and their relations, though the rst
question tries to locate the discussion of the Trinity in the broader
context of divine properties. Generally speaking, questions 7–11 con-
cern divine omnipotence in some way, though the series is interrupted
by question 8, which asks about the causality proper to the Word or
second person of the Trinity in regard to creatures and hence rein-
troduces some elements of the earlier Trinitarian theme. Question 12
focuses on the metaphysics of creation in general, asking whether the
relation of the creature to God as creative principle is the same as the
relation of the creature to God as conserving cause. Questions 13–18
have the overarching theme of intellectual creatures, that is humans
and angels, though more attention is given to the former than the lat-
ter. Here the questions are concerned with the activities of cognition
and desire, the ability of the soul to know the Trinity within the limits
of natural reason, the extent to which the possible intellect is active in
its knowledge, the compatibility of natural necessity and freedom in
the same act, the identity or non-identity of natural and meritorious
acts of love, and the extent to which the external deed adds evil or
goodness to the internal act of the will. The next two questions treat
quite different matters; question 19 raises a precise Christological issue,
namely, whether the unity of the human nature of Christ to the Word
is simply the dependency of the nature assumed by the Word upon the
person of the Word, while question 20 handles a matter of canonical
concern, namely, whether a priest, already bound to say Mass for one
person and then also bound to say Mass for someone else, discharges
his duty by saying one Mass for both persons. The nal question,
which will be the subject of some detailed analysis in terms of textual
transmission below, explores an issue in metaphysics and the philosophy

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132 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

of history regarding the compatibility of the thesis of the eternity of

the world and providence.
According to early manuscript witnesses, Scotus determined his
Quodlibet at Paris, which entails that it derives from a session presided
over by a master. Thus Scotus’ Quodlibet must date from his period as
master at Paris, a fact that also has manuscript support. Glorieux rst
settled on Advent 1307 as the precise date of the session, but new
research later persuaded him that Advent 1306 or Lent 1307 were
the best possibilities.1 Scotus scholarship over the last several decades
requires that we extend the possible dates of the Quodlibet even earlier:
it took place between Lent of 1305 and Lent of 1307. Naturally, the
Quodlibet of a giant in the history of medieval thought would have
circulated rapidly, widely, and persistently, as the more than ve dozen
extant codices and over a dozen printings—several before 1500—dem-
onstrate. In fact, although Scotus seems not to have found time to work
on his unnished text after his departure for Cologne in the fall of
1307, the demand was high enough that just after Scotus left the city
the manuscript tradition for his Quodlibet became quite complicated. The
present contribution will focus on this complex manuscript tradition,
an important step for the eventual critical edition.
Manuscripts for many of the works of Duns Scotus have received
extensive treatment, from Charles Balim’s wide-ranging study of the
manuscripts for Scotus’ commentaries on the Sentences, to the examina-
tions of Pelster and Balim of the Collationes and the extensive studies of
the philosophical manuscripts in the production of the critical editions
of the Opera philosophica.2 To date, however, no research has focused
directly and exclusively on the manuscripts of Scotus’ Quodlibet, despite
the importance of that work for interpreting his mature philosophical
and theological doctrines. The only efforts towards such a treatment
are the brief indications given by Fr. Felix Alluntis, O.F.M., in his
bilingual edition in the Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos series,3 the

1
Glorieux I, pp. 218–19; II, p. 152.
2
[C. Balim: auctor anonymus], Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatres livres
des Sentences: Étude historique et critique (Louvain 1927); F. Pelster, “Handschriftliches zur
Überlieferung der Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum und der Collationes des
Duns Scotus,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 44 (1931), pp. 79–92; C. Balim, “De collationi-
bus Ioannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis ac Mariani,” Bogoslovni Vestnik 9 (1929), pp.
185–219; and the various introductions of the Opera philosophica, eds. G. Etzkorn et al.
(St. Bonaventure, NY-Washington, DC 1997–2006).
3
Introduction to Juan Duns Escoto, Cuestiones cuodlibetales. Edición bilingue, ed.

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 133

equally brief remarks of Fr. Alluntis and Fr. Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.,
in their English translation of the Quodlibet,4 and the limited analysis
by Dr. William A. Frank in his edition, based on a reading of three
manuscripts, of questions 16–18 of the Quodlibet.5 From the evidence
found in the notes of his edition, Fr. Alluntis seems to have consulted
a Munich witness (München, Bayerische Staatbibliothek, Clm 8717)
and a Vienna manuscript (Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek,
lat. 1447), but only to have done so in the event that the readings of
the Wadding-Vivès edition proved defective. Dr. Frank used the rst
of these two manuscripts and another Munich manuscript (München,
Bayerische Staatbibliothek, Clm 26309) for his main sources for the
text, but added another at the suggestion of the Scotus Commission in
Rome, namely, Worcester Cathedral F.60, to serve as a check on the reli-
ability of the text coming from the Wadding-Vivès edition. Though Dr.
Frank’s edition was based on independent collation of the manuscripts
and not simply upon occasional checking of the text of the editions
against manuscripts, neither he nor Fr. Alluntis attempted to construct
any stemma as a result of their textual investigations.
What we offer here is, rst, a general study of the manuscripts,
demarcating the extent to which they have distinctive features that
might prove valuable in determining their overall liations; second,
a detailed discussion of the textual tradition of question 16, “Utrum
libertas voluntatis et necessitas naturalis possint se compati in eodem
respectu eiusdem actus et obiecti”; third, a tentative stemma for the
relations between the manuscripts observed in question 16 along with
some further observations regarding the manuscripts and the layers of
text contained in the question; and, nally, an edition of question 16
based on the complete collation of ten manuscripts and the preliminary
checking of some thirty more.

F. Alluntis (Madrid 1968), p. xix, for a general characterization, and p. 755 n. 18 for an
appeal to manuscript evidence to understand the nature of question 21. In his general
characterization, Fr. Alluntis states (p. xix): “La confrontación de los manuscritos con
las ediciones pone de manifesto que, a pesar de las inevitables divergencias literarias
debidas a la libertad en uso en las copias y transcripciones, no existen, sin embargo,
divergencias doctrinales dignas de consideración que puedan ser un obstáculo serio
para el conocimento auténtico de la doctrina escotistica.” The present examination of
manuscripts would tend to call this characterization into question.
4
F. Alluntis and A.B. Wolter, God and Creatures. The Quodlibetal Questions (Princeton
1975), pp. xxxi–xxxiii.
5
W.A. Frank, “John Duns Scotus’ Quodlibetal Teaching on the Will” (Ph.D. diss.,
The Catholic University of America, 1982), pp. 204–7.

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134 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

The Manuscripts

In the opening volume of the Vatican edition of Scotus’ Oxford theo-

logical works, the Commissio Scotistica originally listed sixty-seven
manuscripts. Many of the manuscripts that may appear to have Scotus’
Quodlibet, however, in fact contain the abbreviation of that work by
John Sharpe, an early fteenth-century Oxford philosopher.6 Since the
amount of abbreviation is not extensive and the two works are easily
confused, the following manuscripts have been incorrectly listed by
the Commissio Scotistica as containing Scotus’ Quodlibet: Cambridge,
University Library 1235 FF.III.27; London, British Library, Royal 11.B.i,
ff. 106r–158r; Oxford, Balliol College Library 192, ff. 3ra–69rb; Oxford,
Lincoln College Library 36, ff. 147ra–214va; and Oxford, Magdalen
College Library 99, ff. 108ra–167rb. One was lost through re: Münster,
Universitätsbibliothek 199. Moreover, at least two other manuscripts
should be added to those preserving Scotus’ Quodlibet: the witness used
for the cover illustration of this volume, namely, St Andrews, University
Library B.763.D.7 (1815), identied thanks to the attentiveness of Dr.
Michèle M. Mulchahey of the University of St Andrews; and Oxford,
Merton College Library 87, ff. 141va–143vb, which contains ques-
tion 21 of the Quodlibet independent of the balance of the text. To
date, we have examined forty-two of the sixty-three manuscripts that
actually contain the work,7 listing the incipits and explicits of each of

6
R. Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland Before 1540
(Turnhout 1997), p. 315, lists eight manuscripts for this work and two additional
ones attested. See John Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, ed. A. Conti (Florence 1990),
p. 214, n. 3, and L. Kennedy, “The De anima of John Sharpe,” Franciscan Studies 29
(1969) (pp. 249–70), p. 251.
7
The following 21 manuscripts we have not yet studied: Basel, Universitätsbibliothek
H.III, ff. 12–103; Burgos, Biblioteca Municipal 62, ff. 1ra–118; Cambrai, Bibliothèque
Municipale 573, ff. 140r–201r; Dubrovnik, Library of the Dominican Monastery 12,
ff. 137ra–198va; Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F.368, ff. 1ra–59va;
Falconara, Archivio dei Frati Minori delle Marche 17, ff. 1ra–30vb; Firenze, Biblioteca
Medicea Laurenziana, plut. 31 dextr., cod. 7, ff. 1ra–110; Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea
Laurenziana, plut. 31 dextr., cod. 8, ff. 1ra–48vb; Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr. A.2.993
(no foliation); Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 451, ff. 177ra–247vb (in our possession, but
not studied here); Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 228, ff. 137ra–198vb; Madrid, Biblioteca
de Palacio Real 411, ff. 13ra–80ra; Modena, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria K.4.8, ff.
1ra–94vb; Napoli, BN VII.A.36, ff. 1ra–44ra Oxford, Magdalen College Library 163,
ff. 4r–238v; Oxford, University Library 110, ff. 1r–126r; Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine
3511, ff. 1r–147; Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 739, ff. 148r–187r; Todi, Biblioteca
Comunale 70, ff. 155ra–209rb; Venezia, BN Marciana, Marc. lat. 285, ff. 1ra–45va;
Zwickau, Stadtbibliothek I.13.25, ff. 148ra–265va.

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the questions they preserve and collating many of them, at least for
a partial sounding, for the edition of question 16. Here are the forty-
two manuscripts we have studied, along with references to any known
printed descriptions of those manuscripts:
Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco (olim in Biblioteca
Comunale) 136,8 ff. 1ra–57v
Barcelona, Archivo Capitular de la Catedral 54,9 ff. 1ra–35ra
Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library 285,10 ff. 115ra–156vb
Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library 371,11 ff. 1r–144v
Cambridge, St. John’s College Library 149,12 ff. 1r–146v
Cambridge, St. John’s College Library 160,13 ff. 6v–185v
Cambridge, University Library 1231 (FF.III.23),14 ff. 13ra–111vb
Cesena, Biblioteca Maletestiana D.XVII.4,15 ff. 175ra–232vb
Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. 36,16 ff. 1ra–46ra
Città del Vaticano, BAV, Urb. lat. 119,17 ff. 1ra–95ra

8
C. Cenci, O.F.M., Bibliotheca manuscripti ad Sacrum Conventum Assisensem (Assisi 1981),
pp. 128–9, n. 96.
9
F.E. Cranz, A Microlm Corpus of the Indexes to Printed Catalogues of Latin Manuscripts
before 1600 A.D., 38 Microlm reels, New London, CT, obtained from the Connecticut
College Bookstore, 1982, item no. 1050, p. 391, and item no. 1052, p. 392; P.O.
Kristeller, Latin Manuscript Books before 1600: a List of the Printed Catalogues and Unpublished
Inventories (3rd ed. New York 1965), pp. 74b–76a. This manuscript is listed in the on-
line catalogue of the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library (www.hmml.org) as a folio
manuscript: 58 ff. Two catalogues exist: A.F. Grau and J.B. Reig, Catálogo del Archivo
Capitular de la S.I. Catedral Basilica de Barcelona (Barcelona 1969) (this catalogue is avail-
able at the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library), and I. Caresmar, Cathologus codicum seu
librorum manuscriptorum qui in segregatis sanctae Ecclesiae Cathedralis Barcinomensis asservantur
(transcriptum ann. 1972).
10
M.R. James, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and
Caius College I (Cambridge 1907), pp. 332–3.
11
Ibid., pp. 419–20.
12
M.R. James, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of St. John’s College
Cambridge (Cambridge 1913), p. 183.
13
Ibid., p. 191.
14
C. Hardwick, A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of
Cambridge II (Cambridge 1857), p. 420; corresponding entries in Cambridge University
Library, A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge
(Cambridge 1980), and Cambridge University Library: The Great Collections (Cambridge-
New York 1998).
15
G. Avarucci, D. Frioli, G.C. Garfagnini, G. Pomaro, P. Rossi, and A. Velli,
Catalogo di manoscritti losoci nelle biblioteche italiane IV (Florence 1982), pp. 35–6; G.M.
Mucciolus, Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Malatestianae Caesenatis Bibliothecae I (Cesena
1780), p. 68; R. Zazzeri, Sui codici e libri a stampa della Biblioteca Malatestiana di Cesena
(Cesena 1887), p. 152.
16
A. Maier, Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae (Studi e Testi, 120) (Vatican City
1982), pp. 36–9.
17
C. Stornajolo, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Codices Urbinates Latini I (Rome 1902),
pp. 145–6.

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136 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 879,18 ff. 122ra–209vb

Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 31 dextr., cod. 9,19 ff. 1ra–
63vb
Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek 731,20 ff. 1ra–116va.
Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek El.f.36,21 ff. 73ra–
192vb
Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, CCl 307,22 ff. 51ra–96vb
Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 1408,23 ff. 49rb–92vb
London, British Library, Royal 8.G.viii,24 ff. 97ra–132vb
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8717,25 ff. 61ra–100ra
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 15829,26 ff. 1ra–5rb

18
P. Barnaba Hechich et al., eds., B. Ioannis Scoti, Ordinatio: Liber Secundus, in Opera
omnia VIII, “Prolegomena” (Vatican City 2001), pp. 27*–8*; A. Pelzer, Codices Vaticani
Latini II (Rome 1931), pp. 264–5.
19
A.M. Bandinius, Catalogus codicum latinorum bibliothecae mediceae laurentianae IV
(Florence 1777), pp. 703–8.
20
W.G. Bayerer, Die Handschriften des ehem. Fraterherrenstifts St. Markus zu Butzbach:
Teil 1. Handschriften aus der Nummernfolge Hs 42–Hs 760 (Handschriftenkataloge der
Universitätsbibliothek Gießen, 4.1) (Wiesbaden 1980), pp. 136–7. An incomplete
description of this manuscript may be found at the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library’s
electronic catalogue at the following electronic address: http://www.hmml.org/scholars/
catalogue/catalogue by searching under the rubrics “Giessen,” “Universitaetsbibliothek,”
and “731.”
21
B. Tönnies, Die Handschriften der Thüringer Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Jena, Band
I: Die mittelalterlichen lateinischen Handschriften der Electoralis-Gruppe (Wiesbaden 2002), pp.
102–7.
22
M. Dreyer, H. Möhle, and G. Krieger, eds., B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Theoremata, in
Opera philosophica II, “Prolegomena” (Washington, DC 2004), p. 571; H. Pfeiffer, Catalogus
codicum manu scriptorum, qui in Bibliotheca canonicorum regularium S. Augustini Claustroneoburgi
asservantur II (Vienna 1931), pp. 66–7.
23
P. Barnaba Hechich et al., eds., B. Ioannis Scoti, Lectura in librum tertium sententiarum,
in Opera omnia XXI, “Prolegomena” (Vatican City 2004), 4*–7*.
24
J.P. Gilson and G.F. Warner, Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and
King’s Collection in the British Museum I (Oxford 1921), p. 277. C. Balim et al., eds., Ioannis
Duns Scoti, Ordinatio: Prologus, in Opera Omnia I, “De Ordinatio I. Duns Scoti Disquisitio
historico-critica” (Vatican City 1950), pp. 86*–7*. Balim refers to G.F. Warner, Catalogue
of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and Kings Collections I (London 1927), p. 277.
25
C. Halm and G. Meyer, Catalogus codicum latinorum bibliothecae regiae monacen-
sis II.1 (Munich 1968), p. 48; F. Pelster, “Handschrifliches zu Skotus mit neuen
Angeben über sein Leben,” Franziskanische Studien 10 (1923), pp. 16–17; F. Pelster,
“Eine Münchener Handschrift des beginnenden vierzehnten Jahrhundert mit einen
Verzeichnis von Quaestionen des Duns Scotus und Hervaeus Natalis (cod. lat. Movac.
8717),” Franziskanische Studien 17 (1930), pp. 253–72; V. Doucet, “A propos de cod. lat.
Monancensis 8717,” AFH 26 (1933), pp. 246–7; C. Halm, Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum
bibliothecae regiae monacensis IV.1 (Munich 1874); T.B. Noone et al., eds., B. Ioannis Duns
Scoti, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De Anima, in Opera Philosophica V, “Descriptions
of the Manuscripts” (Washington, DC-St. Bonaventure, NY 2006), pp. 51*–3*.
26
C. Halm, F. Keinz, G. Meyer, and G. Thomas, Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum
bibliothecae regiae monacensis II.2 (Munich 1969), p. 39.

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München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 23572,27 ff. 1ra–83ra

München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26309,28 ff. 1ra–81va
Oxford, Balliol College Library 209,29 ff. 1r–98v.
Oxford, Merton College Library 65,30 ff. 1v–65v (lacks q. 16)
Oxford, Merton College Library 87,31 ff. 141va–143vb (only has q. 21)
Oxford, Merton College Library 90,32 ff. 2r–130v
Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 1125,33 ff. 146ra–199ra
Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 2006,34 ff. 167ra–221vb
Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana 173 Scaff. IX,35 ff. 1ra–25ra
Padova, Biblioteca Capitolare C.37,36 ff. 1ra–118vb
Paris, BnF, lat. 15855,37 ff. 101ra–138rb
Paris, BnF, lat. 3062,38 ff. 193ra–211ra
Paris, BnF, lat. 3147,39 ff. 15r–307r
Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université de Paris (olim Bibliothèque de la Sor-
bonne) 38,40 ff. 268ra–312va
Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université de Paris (olim Bibliothèque de la Sor-
bonne), 575,41 ff. 1ra–139ra
Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli C.21.3 (438),42 ff. 109r–180v
Schlägl, Prämonstratenser-Stiftsbibliothek Cpl. 140,43 ff. 196ra–274vb

27
C. Halm and G. Meyer, Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum bibliothecae regiae monacensis
II.4 (Wiesbaden 1969), p. 77.
28
Ibid., p. 183.
29
R.A.B. Mynors, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College, Oxford (Oxford 1963),
pp. 204–5.
30
H.O. Coxe, Catalogus codicum mss. qui in collegiis aulisque oxoniensibus hodie adservantur
I.3 (Oxford 1852), pp. 39–40.
31
Ibid., p. 47.
32
Ibid., p. 48.
33
Biblioteca regia patavina manuscripta catalogus metodicus (F.E. Cranz, reel 172), 51r no.
1820.
34
Ibid., 23r no. 740 and 51r no. 1829.
35
G. Abate and G. Luisetto, Codici e manoscritti della Biblioteca Antoniana 1 (Vicenza
1975), pp. 202–3. Balim et al., eds., Ioannis Duns Scoti, Ordinatio: Prologus cit., pp.
98*–104*.
36
F. Maldura, Index codicum manuscriptorum qui in bibliothecae reverendissimi capituli cathedralis
eccelesiae patavinae asservantur (Padua 1830), p. 125.
37
L. Delisle, Inventaire des manuscripts (Paris 1870), p. 26 (extract from Bibliothèque de
l’École des Chartres 31 [1870]); Balim et al., eds., Ioannis Duns Scoti, Ordinatio: Prologus
cit., pp. 94*–6*.
38
Catalogue générale des manuscripts latins, tome iv (nos. 3014 à 3277) (Paris 1958), pp.
69–72.
39
Ibid., pp. 237–8.
40
Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France: Université de Paris et
Universités des Départements I (Paris 1918), pp. 10–11.
41
Ibid., p. 141.
42
Balim et al., eds., Ioannis Duns Scoti, Ordinatio: Prologus cit., pp. 105*–6*; Barnaba
Hechich et al., B. Ioannis Scoti, Ordinatio: Liber Secundus, in Opera omnia VIII, pp.
49*–50*.
43
An incomplete description of this manuscript may be found at the Hill Monastic

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138 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

St. Andrews, University Library B.763.D.7 (1815),44 ff. 1ra–61rb

Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral y del Cabildo de la Santísima Iglesia
Catedral (Archivo Capitular de Tortosa) 139,45 ff. 248ra–307vb
Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 994,46 ff. 1ra–82
Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447,47 ff. 33va–95vb
Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.3,48 ff. 1r–62r
Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.60,49 ff. 1ra–42va
The general characteristics of the manuscripts so far examined may
be described as follows. The vast majority of the manuscripts contain
the entirety of the work, though they do not necessarily reproduce
the same version of the nal question. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska
1408, and London, British Library, Royal 8.G.viii, do not copy question
21 at all, though they contain the remainder of the work. Worcester,
Cathedral and Chapter Library F.3, and Paris, Bibliothèque de
l’Université de Paris (olim Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne) 38, though
otherwise preserving the entirety of the work, begin ex abrupto in the
midst of the rst questions: the Worcester manuscript has a torn folio
that exhibits text from the rst question50 and its continuous text begins

Manuscript Library’s electronic catalogue at the following electronic address: http://

www.hmml.org/scholars/catalogue/catalogue by searching under the rubrics “Schlaegl”
and “140.” We concur that the manuscript belongs to the fteenth century.
44
N.R. Ker and A.J. Piper, Medieval Manuscripts in British Libraries (Oxford 1992) (Vol.
4—Paisley to York), pp. 252–3.
45
E. Bayerri y Bertomeu, Los códices medievales de la Catedral de Tortosa: novisimo inventario
descriptivo (Barcelona 1962), pp. 296–302. Partial description available through the Hill
Monastic Manuscript Library’s electronic catalogue at: http://www.hmml.org/schol-
ars/catalogue/catalogue under the entries “Tortosa” and “codex 139.” There is, as
noted in the electronically available description, a Patristic anthology in the codex that
begins on the rst folio, but it ends long before f. 308; it ends just prior to the begin-
ning of Alexander of Alessandria’s Quodlibet. The latter, in turn, ends on f. 247va and
is enumerated with bifolia that are continuous throughout its text and that of Scotus.
Furthermore, the copies of both Alexander’s work and Scotus’s own belong to the
fourteenth century and not to the thirteenth as the electronic catalogue suggests.
46
J.G. Bougerol, Les manuscrits franciscains de la Bibliothèque de Troyes (Grottaferrata
[ Rome] 1982), pp. 100–8.
47
B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima, gen. ed.
T. Noone, in Opera Philosophica V, pp. 25*–7*; Academica Caesarea Vindobonensis, ed.,
Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter graecos et orientales in Bibliotheca Palatina Vindoboniensi
asservatorum (Vienna 1864), bd. 1: cod. 1–2000, p. 239.
48
R.M. Thomson, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral
Library (Rochester, NY-Suffolk 2001), pp. 3–4.
49
Ibid., p. 37.
50
The rst identiable portion of the text is the phrase “Verbum sed ista est falsa
propter duo: primo quia nullus actus . . .” This corresponds to q. 1, a. 3 (ed. Alluntis,
p. 37, n. 65; ed. Vivès, vol. XXV, p. 48, [21]).

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 139

with question 3, while the Paris manuscript begins with question 1.51
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8717, has the questions in
an irregular order throughout: questions 1–10 are followed by questions
16–21, then questions 11, 12, 15, 13, and 14, in that order. No other
witness examined has preserved the Quodlibet in this fashion, and it is
likely that the confused order arose from some kind of misordering
of gatherings in the exemplar from which München 8717 is copied.
This manuscript’s handling of question 21 indicates that its copyist
knew of material continuing that question, even though he did not
reproduce it. Truly partial survivals are found in München, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek, Clm 15829, which preserves only the rst few ques-
tions of the text, and the already mentioned Oxford, Merton College
Library 87, which contains only the nal question in the version of the
reporter’s text. The latter manuscript is especially noteworthy, since it
raises the prospect of isolated survivals of the reporter’s text of ques-
tion 21 in manuscripts that otherwise do not contain the Quodlibet. A
number of the manuscripts containing Scotus’ Quodlibet also contain
works by other Franciscan theologians, particularly James of Ascoli and
Alexander of Alessandria.52
That the vast majority of the manuscripts do have all the questions
and that they exhibit those questions in the same order means that pro-
spective editors do not face difculties at quite the same level as those
found in, say, the Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum wherein many
of the manuscripts contain texts with the paragraphs in quite different
orders. Nor do they face the problems and opportunities for inference
afforded by the Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima wherein
the different sequences of the questions align with major manuscript

51
The text begins: “. . . aliquam comparationem . . . probatio minoris comparatio cui-
uscumque intrinseci in Deo ad quodcumque extrinsecum cum sit . . .” This corresponds
to q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Alluntis, p. 21 n. 31; ed. Vivès vol. XXV, p. 20 [12]).
52
In Cambridge, University Library FF.III.23, and Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek,
CCl 307, Ascoli’s Quodlibet immediately succeeds Scotus’s own, while in Wien,
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447, Ascoli’s Quodlibet immediately precedes
Scotus’s Quodlibet. Alexander of Alessandria’s Quodlibet is found in Tortosa, Biblioteca
de la Catedral y del Cabildo de la Sanctisima Iglesia Catedral (Archivo Capitular de
Tortosa) 139, where it immediately precedes Scotus’s Quodlibet, and Wien, Österreichische
Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447, where it immediately succeeds it. The association of
Scotus’s Quodlibet in the manuscripts with the masters who were so closely linked to him
chronologically and geographically at Paris suggests, especially when combined with
the Parisian method of marking bifolia in the Tortosa manuscript, that the exemplar
behind these codices was Parisian in origin.

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140 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

groupings.53 Instead, the text appears to be fairly well organized and not
to have suffered much corruption or major accidents in its transmission.
This general claim is subject, however, to considerable qualication,
something that becomes quite obvious in even a preliminary study of
question 21.

Question 21

The last question of the Quodlibet, q. 21 (Scotus’ quaterni: “Ultimo

quaeritur utrum ponens mundi aeternitatem possit sustinere aliquem
esse universaliter bene fortunatum”; alternative text: “Quaeritur utrum
ponentes mundum aeternum possint ponere hominem bene fortuna-
tum”), has been the subject of some considerable investigation on the
part of scholars. The reason for this interest mainly arises from the
curious way in which the manuscripts preserve the question, though
the question has considerable philosophical interest as well, inasmuch
as it deals with the issue of whether positing the eternity of the world
is consistent with claiming that someone is generally fortunate or unfor-
tunate. The question survives in two basic forms: the text that Scotus
edited and the reporter’s text of the oral discussion of the question
during the actual disputation. Signicantly, the ending of the question
differs in these two forms. The edited text breaks off sharply in all of
the manuscripts that preserve that text in its entirety, as follows:
Tertium in hac particula, scilicet de bene fortunato, stat in quadam
divisione trimembri. Primum membrum: Nullus dicitur bene fortunatus
eo quod semel sibi bene accidit fortuite. Secundum membrum: Nullus
dicitur bene fortunatus ex hoc praecise quod sibi semper fortuite bene
accidit: quia sive intelligatur sic quod cum omni proposito annexum est
aliquod bonum fortuitum, sive sic quod cuicumque proposito suo annexum
est aliquod fortuitum, ipsum est bonum. Neutrum enim istorum semper
accidit sine miraculo speciali; et hoc non solum intelligendo universaliter
absolute, verum etiam in tali actu puta militari vel negotiativo, et hoc sive
de bono eventu simili puta victoria vel lucro, sive dissimili, puta hoc vel
illo annexo casualiter; nullo quidem istorum modorum diceret Philoso-

53
See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis: I–V,
gen. ed. G. Etzkorn, in Opera Philosophica III (St. Bonaventure, NY 1997), Introduction,
pp. xxviii–xxxvii and appendix III, pp. 701–5; B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Quaestiones super
secundum et tertium De anima, gen. ed. Noone cit., pp. 55*–119*.

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 141

phus aliquem esse bene fortunatum, sicut nec ratio probabilis persuadet.
Tertium membrum.54
In light of the broken state of the question in its edited form, question
21 is handled in a variety of ways by different copyists. First, there
is a group of manuscripts that copy the question as it was edited by
Scotus and break off the text where, apparently, Scotus’ editorial work
stopped with the words: “. . . nullo quidem istorum modorum diceret
Philosophus aliquem esse bene fortunatum, sicut nec ratio probabilis
persuadet. Tertium membrum” (Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter
Library F.3, f. 62r). We know that this version of the text comes from
Scotus’ own efforts at editing his quodlibetal questions because of a
note in München, Bayerische Staatbibliothek, Clm 8717, f. 85vb: “Finis.
Quodlibet repertum in suis quaternis; quod sequitur est de reporta-
tione.” Oddly enough, though the Munich copyist indicates clearly in
this note that he knows of other material coming from the reporter’s
version of Scotus’ Quodlibet and intends to reproduce it, the material is
not in fact reproduced in his copy.
The manuscripts that handle question 21 by ending abruptly at the
point where Scotus’ quaterni ceased are: Cambridge, Gonville and Caius
College Library 285; München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8717;
Oxford, Merton College Library 65; (after a fashion) Padova, Biblioteca
Capitolare C.37; Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 1125; Paris, BnF,
lat. 3062; Paris, BnF, lat. 15855; Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université
de Paris (olim Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne) 38; Paris, Bibliothèque
de l’Université de Paris (olim Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne) 575; BAV,
Vat. lat. 879; and Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.3. The
only notable difference amongst these witnesses is the precise word-
ing with which they end the text; some (namely, Padova, Biblioteca
Universitaria 1125, and Paris, BnF, lat. 3062) end the text without
copying “Tertium membrum,” while Padova, Biblioteca Capitolare
C.37, breaks off much earlier than the rest, ending the text in the
middle of the solution to the question with these words: “. . . de primo
habetur succincte . . .”55
A second group of manuscripts reproduces solely the other form
of the text, namely, the reporter’s text, without any indication of

54
Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 21 (ed. Alluntis, nn. 13–15, pp. 754–5; Wadding-Vivès [6]).
55
Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 21 (ed. Alluntis, n. 6, p. 750; Wadding-Vivès [3]).

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142 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

knowing the quaterni text for the nal question. This group of manu-
scripts includes Barcelona, Archivo Capitular de la Catedral 54, a
fourteenth-century witness, and the partial witness Oxford, Merton
College Library 87.
A third group of manuscripts copies the quaterni text up to the
point that it ceases and then begins question 21 all over, copying in
its entirety the reporter’s text as well as the broken edited text. The
manuscripts that thus restart question 21 are Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro
Convento di S. Francesco 136; Cambridge, University Library FF.III.23;
Cesena, Bibliotheca Maletestiana D.XVII.4; München, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26309; Oxford, Merton College Library 90;
Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 2006; and Worcester, Cathedral and
Chapter Library F.60.
A fourth group of manuscripts actually does what München 8717
indicates would occur: these manuscripts supplement the quaterni text
by copying the balance of the question from the reporter’s text. This
group of manuscripts includes Paris, BnF, lat. 3147 (Quia aliquis dici-
tur bene fortunatus); Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek 731 (Quia nullus
potest); Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek El.f.36,
ff. 73ra–192vb (Quia nullus delis potest esse quin in actione sua);
Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library 371 (Quod aliquis
dicitur bene fortunatus); BAV, Borgh. 36 (Quia nullus potest); BAV,
Urb. lat. 119 (Quod aliquis dicitur bene fortunatus); Klosterneuburg,
Stiftsbibliothek CCl. 307 (Quia nullus potest esse); Tortosa, Biblioteca
de la Catedral y del Cabildo de la Sanctisima Iglesia Catedral (Archivo
Capitular de Tortosa) 139 (Quia nullus potest); München, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek, Clm 23572 (In ista quaestione non potest); Oxford,
Balliol College Library 209 (Quod aliquis dicitur bene fortunatus);
Schlägl, Prämonstratenser-Stiftsbibliothek Cpl. 140 (in ista quaestione
non potest); Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli C.21.3 (438) (Quia
nullus potest), Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447 (Quia
nullus potest esse). The manuscripts in this group, however, split into
three different subgroups inasmuch as some of them begin to copy
the reporter’s text at the words “quod aliquis dicitur bene fortunatus,”
others begin slightly further on at the words “quia nullus potest esse
quin,” and still others seem to supply their own text by writing “in ista
quaestione.” Furthermore, this pattern of continuation strongly suggests
that there were several distinct efforts at combining the quaterni text with
that taken down by the reporter; these distinctive medieval attempts
at editing the text need to be investigated further to see whether or

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 143

not they are correlated with internal patterns of readings, but we offer
our own preliminary efforts at establishing a correlation in the section
below devoted to a search for Beta text.56

Question 16

We decided to edit question 16 of the Quodlibet for the present volume

for two reasons: rst, its great doctrinal interest. The question, “Can
freedom of the will and natural necessity be compatible in the same
[agent] with respect to the same act and object?” touches on central
issues in Scotus’ thought and in the secundary literature on the Doctor
Subtilis. A more trustworthy text of this question will be useful to schol-
ars interested in Scotus and in the problems of contingency, necessity,
and freedom more generally. The second reason for the edition is that
the text of question 16 was reputed to have some interesting additions
and alterations, which often prove useful for establishing textual afli-
ations within a manuscript tradition. Altogether we have collated ten
manuscripts in their entirety for question 16:
A = Padova, Bibliotheca Antoniana 173 Scaff. IX
B = Padova, Bibliotheca Universitaria 1125
C = Padova, Bibliotheca Universitaria 2006
D = Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco 136
E = Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université de Paris 38
F = Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.3
G = Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.60
H = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8717
I = Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447
J = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26309
The overall textual situation may be described by saying that the
manuscripts divide into two fundamental groups: EFG and CDIJ. The
remaining witnesses, namely A, B, and H, seem to vacillate in their
afliation from one of these groups to the other. We may readily see
that this is the case by examining the qualitative and quantitative pat-
terns of association among the manuscripts:

56
It should be noted that Vives prints the reportatio without the remark in Munich
8717 and Alluntis reports the remark and gives the reportatio text, while Wolter repeats
in his translation the whole question (with explanation, God and Creatures, p. xxxiii).

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144 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

Quantitative Patterns of Association

A
unique variants—142
when no more than four manuscripts, including A, agree, A is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: B—47 times,
C—40 times, F—35 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including A, agree, A is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: D—19 times,
I—16 times, J—6 times

B
unique variants—174
when no more than four manuscripts, including B, agree, B is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: H—59 times,
A—47 times, C—36 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including B, agree, B is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: E—11 times,
F—15 times, G—16 times

H
unique variants—180
when no more than four manuscripts, including H, agree, H is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: B—59 times,
D—34 times, I—28 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including H, agree, H is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: E—8 times,
C—10 times, G—11 times

C
unique variants—144
when no more than four manuscripts, including C, agree, C is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: D—81 times,
J—80 times, I—68 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including C, agree, C is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: E—10 times,
H—10 times, F—11 times

D
unique variants—87
when no more than four manuscripts, including D, agree, D is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: I—111 times,
C—81 times, J—60 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including D, agree, D is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: G—8 times,
E—10 times, F—16 times

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 145

I
unique variants—138
when no more than four manuscripts, including I, agree, I is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: D—111 times,
J—70 times, C—68 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including I, agree, I is found least often
in combinations that include the following manuscripts: F—11 times, G—12
times, E—15 times

J
unique variants—104
when no more than four manuscripts, including J, agree, J is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: C—80 times,
I—70 times, D—60 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including J, agree, J is found least often
in combinations that include the following manuscripts: A—6 times, G—7
times, E—9 times, B—9 times

E
unique variants—68
when no more than four manuscripts, including E, agree, E is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: F—34 times,
G—28 times, A—20 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including E, agree, E is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: H—8 times,
J—times 9, C—10 times, D—10 times

F
unique variants—112
when no more than four manuscripts, including F, agree, F is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: G—51 times,
A—35 times, E—34 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including F, agree, F is found least often
in combinations that include the following manuscripts: J—10 times, C—11
times, I—11 times

G
unique variants—180
when no more than four manuscripts, including G, agree, G is most frequently
found in combinations that include the following manuscripts: F—51 times,
A—32 times, E—28 times
when no more than four manuscripts, including G, agree, G is found least
often in combinations that include the following manuscripts: J—7 times,
D—8 times, H—11 times

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146 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

ABH appears as a unique variant 5 times

CDIJ appears as a unique variant 38 times

Qualitative Patterns
To assess the qualitative features of these witnesses, we focused upon
the two groups and explored their characteristics in the examples that
follow. By examining these and several other examples, we arrived at a
tentative stemma of the text’s transmission as found in these witnesses,
thereby establishing a likely order for collation and some priorities for
readings.
First, we list the signicant variations, additions, and omissions of
the two groups in the rst twenty-ve paragraphs of our edition; sec-
ond, we consider illustrative examples abstracted from such variations
that serve to indicate the character of the witnesses. The numbers,
indicated by the expression “n.” refer to the paragraphs of the Latin
text found below.

Signicant variations, additions, and omissions in the rst 25 para-

graphs:

n. 1 et om. ABDHJ n. 4 vel perperam om. BDHI

n. 2 obiecti] add. et DGI n. 4 necesse esse] = AEI necesse est
n. 3 Arguitur] Et videtur BC BCDFGJ necessaria H
n. 3 servam] suam CDEG n. 4 omnia] entia CDH etiam IJ
n. 3 quidem] quod BDHI n. 4 libero] libera C add. et DI
n. 3 motui illi] i. m. CDIJ n. 6 diligendi] add. se BCDIJ
n. 3 quod] et D quia EHJ n. 6 per consequens] ideo CIJ
n. 3 eo] add. est CDIJ n. 7 obiectum] add. innitum CDIJ
n. 3 quod] quia BDH n. 7 Quia—perfectione] Quia
n. 3 lapidi] lapidis FG posse non habere (add. circa
n. 3 ille] iste DEHI I) tale obiectum posset carere
n. 3 Haec verba Augustini] dub. H summa perfectione CDIJ
Haec Augustinus ABCDIJ nn. 8–9 De primo—nis ultimus] =
n. 3 quidem ] quaedam CGJ om. EFG dub. H
BDI n. 10 ex] add. illo CDHIJ
n. 3 quisquis] quisque EF n. 10 Nunc—necessario] Intellectus
n. 3 satis patet] = AEF p. s. CDIJ autem necessario assentit CDIJ
satis apparet BH patet G n. 11 ad aliquod invariabile] =
n. 4 inquit] add. illa BCJ add. ista BCE ad aliquid invariabile
DI DFHIJ ad aliquid variabile G
n. 4 quae] quod FG n. 11 actum] add. eius ACDIJ
n. 4 voluntates] mentes AH virtutes n. 11 illud] add. Augustini
BCDIJ ABCDIJ

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 147

n. 11 hoc bonum] b. h. ACDIJ n. 20 nunc] voluntarie (dub.) C add.

n. 12 Istae—necessariae] Sed voluntarie ABDHIJ
istae probationes non videntur n. 21 ponis] ponitur BCIJ potentia
conclusionem probare DH
necessariam de quacumque n. 22 primam] primum CDFGI
(quaecumque I) scilicet voluntate n. 22 obiecto aliquo] a. o. ADHI
in communi nec etiam videntur n. 22 tota] om. AEF
esse in se necessariae CDIJ n. 22 in opposito] illo posito CH
n. 13 quod] =ABE cum DI om. isto posito DI
CFGHJ n. 22 Tamen ista] Tamen illa AG
n. 13 istorum] add. trium BDHI Tamen C Ista tamen DIJ
n. 13 quod om. BCDHIJ n. 22 posset] potest DI
n. 14 dependent om. CDIJ n. 22 velle] nolle DEI
n. 14 obiecto] add. dependent CDI n. 22 nolle] velle CDEI
add. dependens J n. 22 sicut] ut AEFG
n. 15 Deus—causare] = AE Deus n. 22 tactum est supra] e. t. EG est
potest immediate C Deus potest tractatum F
creare immediate DJ potest Deus n. 23 sic om. CIJ
immediate causare F Deus posset n. 23 Maior—inest] om. AEFH
immediate causare G Deus n. 24 dici potest] potest dici DI
potest causare immediate BHI n. 24 volendi] volendi nem A
n. 15 mediae] add. absolutum voluntas B voluntatis nem C
BCDHJ add. absolutarum I voluntatis DHI
n. 15 absolute] om. CDIJ add. n. 24 nolle ] velle C add. nisi ABC
sed G n. 24 velle . . . nolle] nolle . . .velle
n. 16 voluntas] autem CD add. BCI
autem I n. 24 eri om. ABCDHIJ
n. 17 intrinseca ratio] ratio n. 24 nunc—nolibilis] = BE nunc
intrinseca CDJ autem nis non habet aliquam
n. 17 ipsi ipsius AG om. CDJ rationem nolibilis H nis autem
n. 17 semper om. ABCDGH non habet aliquam rationem
n. 18 quandoque continuare] nolibilis ACIJ nis autem non
continuare quandoque CJ habet aliam rationem nolibilis
n. 18 quando] add. etiam I quae? DG si autem non habet rationem
AE quem CFJ quem corr. in G nolibilis F
n. 18 actus] obiecti B om. CDHIJ n. 24 ipsi om. CDIJ
n. 19 est] pos. voluntatis B om. CJ n. 25 videlicet] scilicet ABFG
n. 20 intelligo] intelligendo G n. 25 inter se] om. FG
intelligitur ABCDIJ intelligeretur n. 25 ipsa] ipsam H add. obiecta
H A(mg.) J#2 add. primum (pos. sic
n. 20 quod] add. ipsa ABCDHIJ BC) ABC
n. 20 illud obiectum] = EFG istud
obiectum BCDHIJ obiectum
illud A

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148 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

Illustrative Examples
No. 1: Example Showing the General Preferability of EFG. This example is
taken from a text in which Scotus is quoting Augustine on the freedom
of the will: Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 16, n. 4:
Si necessitas, inquit, dicenda est quae non est in nostra potestate, sed
etiam si nolumus efcit quod potest, ut est necessitas mortis, manifestum
est voluntates nostras, quibus recte vel perperam vivitur, sub tali neces-
sitate non esse.
The crucial variants in this segment are as follows:
Manifestum est voluntates nostras quibus recte vel perperam vivitur
<utitur F> sub tali necessitate non esse = EFG
Manifestum est mentes nostras quibus recte vel perperam vivitur sub tali
necessitate non esse = A
Manifestum est mentes nostras quibus recte vivitur sub tali necessitate
non est <corr. in H#2> = H
Manifestum est virtutes nostras quibus recte vel perperam innititur sub
tali necessitate non est = C
Manifestum est vel quod virtutes nostras quibus recte vel perperam vivitur
sub tali necessitate non est = J
Manifestum est virtutes nostras quibus recte vivitur sub tali necessitate
non esse = BDI

The pattern of copying found in the CDIJ model (at times shared by
B) is clear. The copyist of the CDIJ model misread the abbreviation of
“voluntates” for “virtutes,” but, once that error was introduced, scribes
were then forced to change the sense from “whereby we live either
rightly or wrongly” to “whereby we live rightly” because we cannot
live wrongly through virtues. The model behind AH probably misread
the “voluntates” as “mentes.”

No. 2: The Remarkable Contribution of EFG. There is what appears to be,

but in fact is not, additional material in manuscripts EFG when these
are compared to the other seven manuscripts that were collated for the
edition. Here is the order in which the materials appear in EFG and
in the remaining manuscripts:

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 149

Manuscripts E, F, and G Remaining manuscripts

n. 5 (Alluntis, n. 4, p. 582; Wadding- n. 5 (Alluntis, n. 4, p. 582; Wadding-
Vivès [2]): Hic sunt tria videnda . . . Vivès [2]): Hic sunt tria videnda . . .
naturalitas naturalitas
nn. 8–9 : De primo dicitur . . .nis Not present.
ultimus (not in Alluntis or Wadding
Vivès)
nn. 6–7: De quo primo dico . . . nn. 6–7: De quo primo dico . . . Utra-
Utraque conclusio . . . competet vol- que conclusio . . . competet voluntati
untati innitae esse principiandi innitae esse principiandi spirandi
spirandi illum. (Alluntis, nn. 5–7, pp. illum. (Alluntis, nn. 5–7, pp. 583–
583–84; Wadding-Vivès [2]) 84; Wadding-Vivès [2])
In our edition the following text is In our edition the following text is
a textus cancellatus, but is the same as a textus cancellatus, but is the same as
Alluntis, nn. 8–9, p. 584; Wadding- Alluntis, nn. 8–9, p. 584; Wadding-
Vivès [2]: Ad hanc conclusionem Vivès [2]: Ad hanc conclusionem
ponuntur quaedam probationes quae ponuntur quaedam probationes
etiam concludunt . . . Prima probatio quae etiam concludunt . . . Prima
talis est . . . nec aliquid defectus boni; probatio talis est . . . nec aliquid
nis autem ultimus est huiusmodi defectus boni; nis autem ultimus
est huiusmodi

The problem initially posed is what to make of the material that is

unique to EFG and how it relates to the material found later both in
those manuscripts and in all the other witnesses collated. If we examine
the reply that Scotus makes later in the question (at n. 22) to the rst
of the arguments on behalf of the claim that the will necessarily wills
the ultimate end, the true character of the material uniquely found in
EFG begins to emerge, namely, that the material in EFG is integral to
the text that Scotus intended to have stand in his nal version:

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150 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

Material uniquely Material universally Reply of Scotus

in EFG, nn. 8–9 found in all Mss. at n. 22 (Alluntis,
(Alluntis, nn. 8–9, n. 19, p. 589;
p. 584; Wadding- Wadding-Vivès [2])
Vivès [2])
De primo dicitur quod Ad hanc conclusionem
omnis voluntas neces- ponuntur quaedam pro-
sario vult nem ulti- bationes quae etiam con-
mum, et hoc vel clare cludunt de omni vol-
visum vel etiam a nobis untate respectu istius
in universali apprehen- obiecti, sive clare visi, sive
sum. Ad hoc sunt tres in universali apprehensi
rationes. sicut modo ipsum appre-
hendimus.
Prima est ista: volun- Prima probatio talis: Ad primam, negaretur
tas non potest resilire a Voluntas necessario vult maior: Quantumcum-
proprio obiecto quod illud in quo est ratio que enim in obiecto ali-
est bonum vel ab illo in omnis boni, quia non quo sit perfectio obiecti,
quo est tota perfectio potest aliquod obiectum tamen ad necessitatem
sui obiecti; ergo neces- non velle in quo non est actus requiritur quod
sario tendit in illud malitia aliqua nec aliquis potentia necessario ten-
obiectum in quo nec defectus boni; nis autem dat in illud obiectum;
est aliqua malitia nec ultimus est huiusmodi. et quidquid sit de volun-
aliquis defectus boni; tate creata beata et de
huiusmodi est nis perfectione eius super-
ultimus. naturali qua tendit in
illud obiectum, tamen
diceretur quod voluntas
creata viatoris simpli-
citer contingenter tendit
in illud, et etiam quando
est in universali appre-
hensum, quia illa appre-
hensio non est ratio
determinandi volunta-
tem ad necessario vol-
endum illud; nec ipsa
voluntas necessario se
determinat in opposito,
sicut nec necessario con-
tinuat illud positum, ut
tactum est in secunda
ratione. Tamen ista pos-
set concedi quod vol-
untas non potest resilire

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 151

Material uniquely Material universally Reply of Scotus

in EFG, nn. 8–9 found in all Mss. at n. 22 (Alluntis,
(Alluntis, nn. 8–9, n. 19, p. 589;
p. 584; Wadding- Wadding-Vivès [2])
Vivès [2])
ab obiecto sive nolle
obiectum in quo non
ostenditur aliqua ratio
mali nec aliquis defectus
boni, quia sicut bonum
est obiectum huius actus
qui est velle, ita malum
vel defectus boni, quod
pro malo reputatur, est
obiectum huius actus
qui est nolle. Et tunc
non sequitur ultra, non
potest nolle hoc, igitur
necessario “vult hoc,”
quia potest hoc obiec-
tum neque velle neque
nolle, sicut tactum est
supra, pertractando il-
lam auctoritatem de I
Retractationum.

The use of “perfectio,” the employment of the verb “tendere,” and

most of all the repetition of the phrase “voluntas non potest resilire
ab obiecto” within his response indicate that Scotus is replying to the
former version of the rst argument. The most likely explanation
for the present state of the text is that, in redacting the text, Scotus
decided to restate the rst of the arguments along with the preface
to the three arguments. When he did so, however, he probably wrote
the argument on a schedula, or scrap, of parchment that subsequently
became displaced and ended up being associated with the beginning of
the rst article. Thereafter a model was produced that kept exactly the
order we nd in EFG and another was produced that either committed
a homeoteleutic error by skipping from the text in the model of “De
primo dicitur . . .” to “De quo primo dico . . .,” or was ordered according
to a conscious decision on the part of its editor/copyist to eliminate
seemingly misplaced material. Hence the model for the remainder of
the manuscripts did not reproduce the replacement paragraphs and we

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152 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

do not nd it in other witnesses, save those derived directly or indirectly

from the model behind EFG.

No. 3: Clear Evidence that EFG’s Text Can Be Problematic. In paragraph three
of the question, Scotus is once again quoting words of St Augustine:
Motus quo voluntas convertitur, nisi esset voluntarius et in nostra positus
potestate, neque laudandus neque culpandus homo esset neque monendus;
monendum autem non esse hominem quisquis existimat, de hominum
numero exterminandus est.
What is signicant is the nal part of the quotation in which we nd
the following accidents:
de hominum numero exterminandus est = omnes ceteri codices
de hominum numero existimandus est = Mss EF
de hominum numero existimandus non est = Ms G
de homine movetur excludendus est = Ms C
The text should clearly read: “de hominum numero exterminandus est.”
The copyist of the model behind manuscripts E and F clearly has the
same word in front of him, but mistranscribes it as “existimandus”; such
a reading would entail that the sentence as a whole read: “The motion
whereby the will is turned, if it were not voluntary and placed within
our power, would be such that a person could neither be praised nor
blamed nor even admonished; whoever thinks, however, that a person
should not be admonished should be accounted to be among the number of
human beings.” This meaning is, of course, contrary to the original sense
of the passage. Hence, either the scribe of G or, more likely, the redactor
of the model he is copying revised the reading to: “existimandus non
est.” Such a reading restores a sense close to the original one, though
slightly different: “The motion whereby the will is turned, if it were not
voluntary and placed within our power, would be such that a person
could neither be praised nor blamed nor even admonished; whoever
thinks, however, that a person should not be admonished should not be
accounted to be among the number of human beings.” This revision means
that the copying error found in the model of manuscripts E and F is
what lay before either the redactor of the G model or the G copyist
himself. Hence, this pattern of copying clearly indicates the order of
copying: the common reading for the exemplar behind E, F, and G
is being directly (or at least more directly) copied by the scribes of E
and F; manuscript G’s model (or the copyist himself) is indebted to the

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 153

readings of the model behind the text of E and F, but must be copying
later in the line of transmission.

These qualitative features of the manuscripts used for our edition when
combined with the quantitative patterns listed earlier yield the follow-
ing tentative stemma:
ƣ

ƥ Ʀ

E Ƨ
C J
D I

G
F

The prominent Greek elements in this tentative stemma should be

understood to represent the following likely historical and textual cir-
cumstances. Manuscript Alpha represents Scotus’s own quaterni text,
though the latter is doubtless based upon a reporter’s version of the
oral disputation that was reworked to produce the quaterni text. In
this regard, the present stemma only reects the textual transmission
discovered in editing question 16; if question 21 were the subject of
analysis, the independent survival of the reporter’s text for that question
would require either two stemmata or two points of origination within
one stemma. (For a related complication even within question 16, see
the section below on nn. 41–51.) Next in the order of transmission is
manuscript Beta, a manuscript that was an apograph of Alpha and
likely incorporated the replacement paragraphs for nn. 8–9, probably
themselves written on a schedula in Alpha, into the frame of its text. This
manuscript, moreover, must have had the correct readings of “exter-
minandus” in n. 3 and “voluntas” at n. 4. Manuscript Gamma, the
model underlying the textual community shared by E, F, and G, copied

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154 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

the replacement material already in the frame of its model, manuscript

Beta, but misread the abbreviation for “exterminandus” in n. 3, while
preserving the correct reading of “voluntas” in n. 4. Manuscript Delta,
either through homeoteleutic error or—more likely—by conscious edito-
rial decision, dropped the replacement material and misread “voluntas”
in n. 4, writing instead “virtutes,” though it did preserve the correct
reading of “exterminandus” at n. 3.

A Failed Search for Beta Text

Having determined roughly some of the afliations between the ten
manuscripts used for our edition and taken into account the manner
in which question 21 is recorded in each of these manuscripts, we
originally theorized that if a Ƥ manuscript were found it would likely
begin question 21 by reproducing quaterni text up to the point where
the quaterni text breaks off, followed immediately by the reporter’s text
for the remainder of the question, without restarting the question from
the beginning inasmuch as the majority of the manuscripts used for
our edition do not restart question 21 in this manner. Moreover, we
located exactly this pattern in seven manuscripts:

N = Cesena, Bibliotheca Maletestiana D.XVII.4

P = Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek El.f.36
S = Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library 371
U = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. 36
W = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 879
CC = Oxford, Balliol College Library 209
HH = Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli C.21.3 (438)

In an attempt to discover if any of the above contains text more primi-

tive than that witnessed to by the EFG family, we transcribed the rst
eleven paragraphs of each of these seven manuscripts. Unfortunately,
none of these manuscripts contains Ƥ text, and the similar ways in
which the above-listed manuscripts record question 21 appears to be
the result of medieval text editing that took place further down the
line of transmission, rather than the result of access to more primitive
text on the part of individual scribes. These seven manuscripts are not
members of one cohesive family. N, P, U, W, and HH fall closer to
the CDIJ side of the stemma and exhibit varying degrees of textual
contamination. Manuscripts S and CC, on the other hand, each fall

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 155

under the EFG side of the stemma; S seems to be more directly related
to EF, while CC appears to be a descendant of manuscript G or its
close relative. This is, of course, unsurprising, given the Cambridge
and Oxford provenance of these two witnesses.
Of the NPUWHH witnesses, the manuscript from Cesena (N)
shares the fewest commonalities with the other four, all of which have
proven to be highly derivative and exhibit signs of textual contamina-
tion. The text of BAV, Vat. lat. 879 (W), displays the most evidence of
contamination and shows signs of being based on multiple exemplars.
For example, in paragraph four, W reads “virtutes” and omits “vel
perperam,” as do manuscripts D and I. “Virtutes,” however, is written
over an erasure, suggesting either that the scribe originally misrecorded
what was in front of him or that the manuscript was later corrected
against a different exemplar.
We now think that Ƥ in all likelihood only had quaterni text and that
physically associated with it but distinct from it was the reporter’s text
for the last question of Scotus’ Quodlibet.

Table of All Examined Manuscripts for Seminal Accidents

The following table gives on overview of how the seminal accidents
discussed above for manuscripts A–J are reproduced in all the manu-
scripts we have had the opportunity to examine.57

57
K = Paris, BnF, lat. 15855; L = Paris, BnF, lat. 3062; M= Paris, BnF, lat. 3147;
O = Padova Biblioteca Capitolare C.37; Q = Barcelona, Archivo Capitular de la
Catedral 54, ff. 1ra–35ra; R = Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library 285,
ff. 115ra–156vb; T = Cambridge, University Library 1231 (FF.III.23), ff. 13ra–111vb;
V = BAV, Urb. lat. 119; X = Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek CCl 307, ff. 51ra–96vb;
Y = Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 1408, ff. 49rb–92vb; Z = Tortosa, Biblioteca de la
Catedral y del Cabildo de la Santísima Iglesia Catedral (Archivo Capitular de Tortosa)
139, ff. 243ra–307vb; AA = London, British Library, Royal 8.G.viii, ff. 97ra–132vb;
BB = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 23572, ff. 1ra–83ra; DD = Oxford,
Merton College Library 65, ff. 1v–65v (lacks question 16); EE = Oxford, Merton
College Library 90, ff. 2r–130v; FF = Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université de Paris 575,
ff. 1ra–139ra; GG = Schlägl, Prämonstratenser-Stiftsbibliothek 140, ff. 196ra–274vb;
II = Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek 731, ff. 1ra–116va.

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156 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

n. 3 EFG ABH CDIJ K-HH

de hominum numero KLMNOPSUVWXYCCF
exterminandus est ABH DIJ FGGHH
de hominum numero
existimandus est EF QRAABB
de hominum numero
existimandus
non est G
de homine movetur
excludendus est C
de homine numero
aestimandus non est TEEII
de homine numero
existirpandus est Z

n. 4 EFG ABH CDIJ K-HH

voluntates . . . vel
perperam vivitur EG MNPRSUVAABBCCEEII
voluntates . . . vel
perperam utimur F
mentes . . . vel
perperam vivitur AH
virtutes . . . vivitur B CDIJ KL
vires . . . vel perperam
vivitur O
virtutes . . . vel
perperam vivitur QWXYZFFGGHH

n. 6 EFG ABH CDIJ K-HH

has insert EFG NPRSTUVWCCEEHHII
has insert but
cancelled with
“va-cat” Z
lacks insert ABH CDIJ KLMOQXYAABBFFGG

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 157

A Textual Comment on nn. 41–51

In the framework of article 3 of question 16, paragraphs nn. 41–51
pose a signicant problem. Here Henry of Ghent’s opinion regarding
the procession of the Holy Spirit is presented twice in extremely similar
terms: the rst subsection lasts from nn. 41–48; the second from nn.
49–51. To see how similar these two subsections are, let us consider
for a moment their wording, sources, and the key parallel paragraphs,
n. 44 and n. 51.
In terms of their wording, both the opening paragraphs of the
subsections begin similarly and make the same point regarding the
opinion they are treating:
n. 41: De tertio articulo principali dicitur quod voluntas potest esse
principium spirandi Spiritum Sanctum ita quod ibi est necessitas naturae
concomitans.
n. 49: De tertio principali dicitur quod in aliquo actu voluntatis divinae,
actu scilicet spirandi Spiritum Sanctum, est aliquo modo necessitas
naturalis sic intelligendo: voluntas, ut est simpliciter voluntas, non est
principium elicitivum actus notionalis quo producitur simile in forma
naturali ipsi producenti (quia tunc in quocumque esset, esset principium
elicitivum actus quo producetur simile in forma—quod falsum est in
creaturis), sed voluntas, ut est in natura divina et ut sic per illam habet
quamdam naturalitatem ad productionem notionalem, sic est principium
elicitivum actus naturalis.
When juxtaposed in this fashion, these two paragraphs differ in that the
rst is a briefer and less complex presentation of points similar to those
made in the second. A similar pattern can be discerned by comparing,
for example, n. 43 to nn. 49–50. A parallel similarity emerges, too, in
the sources for the subsections: both subsections draw upon questions
47 and 60 of Henry of Ghent’s Summa (see the apparatus criticus of
the respective paragraphs). Yet a nal and telling point may be seen in
a careful comparison of two paragraphs, n. 44 and n. 51:
n. 44: Est igitur ordo quadruplicis necessitatis: prima qua Deus necessario
vivit; secunda qua necessario intelligit; tertia qua necessario spirat; quarta
qua necessario diligit se.
n. 51: Sunt ergo aliter et aliter istae propositiones necessariae in divinis:
‘Deus necessario vivit’, quia necessitate naturae; ‘Deus necessario intel-
ligit’, quia necessitate intelligibilis determinantis intellectum ad hoc, ubi
est aliqua diversitas rationis; ‘Deus necessario spirat Spiritum Sanctum’,
quia necessitate naturali non praeveniente, sed concomitante; ‘Deus
necessario amat se’, necessitate consequente innitatem libertatis absque
aliqua necessitate naturae.

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158 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

The second of these paragraphs is elaborating the senses of necessity

involved in each of the sample propositions, whereas the rst simply
indicates that there is an order of a fourfold necessity and lists the
sample propositions.
Considering all of these parallel elements, we would like to propose
the hypothesis that paragraphs nn. 41–48 are a lingering passus from
the original reporter’s version of the Quodlibet, a version that has inde-
pendent existence in the case of question 21 but pokes through the
edited text occasionally, as we saw in the earlier case of paragraphs nn.
8–9.58 In other words, our proposal is that Henry’s opinion is treated
twice in the text as we have it, but, in all likelihood, Scotus meant to
replace nn. 41–48 with nn. 49–51. Unfortunately, if that was the case,
his effort to displace the earlier text failed, just as it did in the case of
the rewritten versions of nn. 8–9. Accordingly, we have entitled the
respective sections of the text “Opinio Henrici prima vice tractata”
and “Opinio Henrici secunda vice tractata.” We have not, however,
taken the additional step, as we did in the earlier case with nn. 8–9,
of making the rst treatment a textus cancellatus. The reason for this
hesitation is that we do not have in the present case the conrmatory
evidence of a later section of the text quoting or paraphrasing the sec-
tion intended to stand and hence lack the complete certitude we have
in the case of nn. 8–9 regarding which version was the revision.

Editorial Method
As is apparent from our tentative stemma and the analysis supporting
it, our considered judgement is that manuscripts EF and G represent
a more primitive strand of text than that found in the family of CDIJ.
Hence, we have in the main followed that family whenever possible.

58
The text of nn. 42–48 is marked as an additio in Wadding-Vivès [9], Vivès, 22, 195a–b;
Alluntis, n. 34, note 36, pp. 597–8 (text reproduced in Spanish translation only); and
Frank, p. 216. Whether this means that Wadding had some manuscript authority for
designating this section is unclear. In any case, the section that Wadding marks as an
additio is precisely the portion that we believe is part of the reporter’s text; if anything
should be registered an “additio,” it would be the subsequent section that we believe to
be Scotus’s revision. Perhaps, however, all Wadding meant to register with his indica-
tion was his belief that there was textual repetition, and this is exactly what seems to
us quite apparent.

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 john duns scotus’ QUODLIBET 159

Occasionally, however, we have not done so. The justication is usu-

ally that, in a given instance, the model behind EF and G contains a
copying error, such as an eye-skip error or a reading error. Only on the
rarest of occasions have we preferred the text of CDIJ to that of EFG
on the grounds that its text represents a superior sense.

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 160 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

[BEATI IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI]

[QUODLIBETUM]
[QUAESTIO 16]
[UTRUM LIBERTAS VOLUNTATIS ET NECESSITAS
NATURALIS POSSINT SE COMPATI IN EODEM 5
RESPECTU EIUSDEM ACTUS ET OBIECTI]

1 Consequenter quaeritur de voluntate. Et primo, de actione eius in

communi; secundo, in speciali de distinctione unius actus eius intrinseci
ab alio actu; et tertio, de distinctione actus intrinseci ab extrinseco.
2 Prima quaestio est haec: Utrum libertas voluntatis et necessitas natu- 10
ralis possint se compati in eodem respectu eiusdem actus et obiecti.
3 Arguitur quod non: Quia necessitas et libertas videntur repugnare,
iuxta illud Augustini II De libero arbitrio: “Satis,” inquit, “compertum
est nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate.” Et
statim post: “Qui motus, si culpae deputatur, non est naturalis sed 15

9 Cf. Scotus, Quodl. q. 17 (ed. Vives XXVI 202a–224b; ed. Alluntis, 611–628).
9 Cf. Scotus, Quodl. q. 18 (ed. Vives XXVI 228a–258b; ed. Alluntis, 630–660).
11 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 pars 2 q. 2 nn. 77–158 (II 59–108); Scotus, Ordinatio
IV d. 49 q. 9–10 (ed. Vives XXI 316–383).
13 August., De libero arbitrio III c. 1 nn. 2–3 (CCL 29, 275; PL 32, 1271–2): “Credo
ergo meminisse te in prima disputatione satis esse compertum nulla re fieri mentem
servam libidinis nisi propria voluntate; nam neque a superiore neque ab aequali eam
posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia iniustum est, neque ab inferiore, quia non potest.
Restat igitur ut eius sit proprius iste motus quo fruendi voluntatem ad creaturam a
creatura convertit. Qui motus si culpae deputatur—unde qui dubitat inrisione dignus
tibi visus est—, non est utique naturalis, sed voluntarius, in eoque similis est illi motui
quo deorsum versus lapis fertur, quod sicut iste proprius est lapidis sic ille animi; verum
tamen in eo dissimilis, quod in potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur
inferius, animus vero dum non vult non ita movetur ut superioribus desertis inferiora
diligat. Et ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo vero iste voluntarius.”

7 actione eius] e. a. E 9 et om. ABDHJ || actus] alicuius P 10 quaestio]

ratio J || haec] ista BCDJ illa A om. HI 11 possint] possit B possunt FG || in]
lin. I || eiusdem] eius I || actus] actiones D 11–12 obiecti Arguitur] ostenditur H
11 obiecti] add. et DGI 12 Arguitur] Et videtur BC || Quia] add. et AD 13
Augustini] add. libero C || II] Primo J || arbitrio] add. cap. ACE (seq. spat. vac. A) add.
cap. 1 F || inquit om. CJ || compertum] comparatum J 14 est] add. enim C ||
re] ratione A || re fieri] autem re ferre C || servam] suam CDEG 15 si] lin. F ||
deputatur] deputetur G

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 161

voluntarius; in eo quidem similis motui illi quo deorsum lapis fertur,

quod sicut iste est proprius lapidis sic ille animi, sed in eo dissimilis
quod in potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur deorsum;
animus vero non ita, etc.” Et sequitur: “Ideo naturalis lapidi est ille
5 motus, animo vero iste voluntarius.” Haec verba Augustini. Et, paulo
post, verba discipuli ab Augustino quidem approbata sequuntur ista:
“Motus, quo voluntas convertitur, nisi esset voluntarius et in nostra
positus potestate, neque laudandus neque culpandus homo esset neque
monendus; monendum autem non esse hominem quisquis existimat,
10 de hominum numero exterminandus est.” Ex istis satis patet quod
repugnent naturalis motio et libera respectu eiusdem.
Contra: V De civitate Dei 10: “Si necessitas,” inquit, “dicenda est quae 4
non est in nostra potestate, sed etiam si nolumus efficit quod potest, ut

6 August., De libero arbitrio III c. 1 nn. 2–3 (CCL 29, 276; PL 32, 1272): “Motus autem
quo huc aut illuc voluntas convertitur, nisi esset voluntarius atque in nostra positus
postestate, neque laudandus cum ad superiora neque culpandus homo esset cum ad
inferiora detorquet quasi quendam cardinem voluntatis; neque omnino monendus esset
ut istis neglectis aeterna vellet adipisci atque ut male nollet vivere, vellet autem bene.
Hoc autem monendum non esse hominem quisquis existimat, de hominum numero
exterminandus est.”
12 August., De civ. Dei V c. 10 n. 1 (CCL 47, 140; PL 41, 152): “Si enim necessitas
nostra illa dicenda est, quae non est in nostra potestate, sed etiamsi nolimus efficit quod
potest, sicut est necessitas mortis: manifestum est voluntates nostras, quibus recte vel
perperam vivitur, sub tali necessitate non esse.”

1 quidem] quod BDHI || motui illi] i. m. CDIJ || deorsum] desorsum F 2 quod]

et D quia EHJ || iste] ille B || est] lin. G om. F || est proprius] p. e. E || lapidis]
lapidi B || ille] iste H eo J || eo] add. est CDIJ 3 quod] quia BDH || fertur]
movetur G 4 vero] reus J || non] sup. erasuram A || ita] sic F || ita et cet.] sic G ||
etc.] om. A || Ideo] non D || Ideo naturalis] n. i. I || naturalis lapidi] lapidi naturalis
est C || lapidi] lapidis FG || lapidi est] est lapidi A || ille] iste DEHI 5 animo
… iste] mg. H || animo] animae GI || iste] ille est B om. I || iste] add. cum nota H’
sed exp. H || Haec verba Augustini] dub. H Haec Augustinus ABCDIJ || Et om. F
6 ab Augustino] ad Augustinum C || quidem] quaedam CGJ om. BDI || sequuntur
ista] sequitur ista E’ sequitur iste E || ista] iste J 7 quo … esset] mg. I || esset]
esse A’ corr. in A2 8 potestate] voluntate F || neque … neque2] nec … nec G ||
neque] nec H 9 monendum] monendus B || non esse hominem] h. non esse G ||
esse] est E || quisquis] quisque EF || existimat] mg. H existimet J 10 hominum …
exterminandus] homine movetur excludendus C || exterminandus] existimandus EF
existimandus non G || satis patet] = AEF p. s. CDIJ satis apparet BH patet G 11
repugnent] repugnat A repugnant FG || naturalis … libera] necessitas et libertas G ||
naturalis motio] motio naturalis B || libera] libertas F 12 V] 9 DI 15 E Contra J’
corr. in J2 || Dei] X CDHI 16 Capitulo J || inquit] add. illa BCJ add. ista DI || est om. E
|| quae] quod FG 13 nostra potestate] p. n. A || etiam] et B quae H || si] lin. C
add. volumus vel C || nolumus] volumus G || efficit] efficere H efficitur (dub.) G

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 162 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

est necessitas mortis, manifestum est voluntates nostras, quibus recte vel
perperam vivitur, sub tali necessitate non esse.” Et sequitur: “Si autem
definitur illa necessitas esse secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut
ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus ne nobis libertatem
auferat voluntatis; neque enim et vitam Dei et praescientiam Dei sub 5
necessitate ponimus, si dicamus necesse est Deum semper vivere et
omnia praescire.” Et post: “Cum dicimus: necesse est ut, cum volumus,
libero velimus arbitrio, et verum dicimus, et non ideo liberum arbitrium
necessitati subicimus quae adimit libertatem.”

[I.—Ad quaestionem: de distinctione articulorum] 10

5 Hic sunt tria videnda. Primo, si in aliquo actu voluntatis sit necessitas.
Secundo, si cum hoc stet ibi libertas. Tertio, si quandoque cum libertate
possit stare naturalitas.

[II.—Articulus primus

A.—utrum in aliquo actu voluntatis sit necessitas] 15

6 De quo primo dico quod in actu voluntatis divinae est necessitas sim-
pliciter, et hoc tam in actu diligendi quam in actu spirandi amorem

16 Duo paragraphi subsequentes nempe nn. 6–7 post paragraphos nn. 8–9 in codici-
bus EFG exhibentur.

1 est2] add. vel quod J || voluntates] mentes AH virtutes BCDIJ 1–2 vel perperam]
om. BDHI 2 perperam] add. inititur C || vivitur] utimur F || esse] sed H’ corr. in
est H2 est J 3 definitur] definiatur E differt F om. G distinguitur I || esse] est G ||
necesse esse] = AEI necesse est BCDFGJ necessaria H 4 aliquid] illud G ad H’
sed corr. in aliquid H2 || ita2 om. B || fiat] add. aliquid A || timeamus] teneamus C
4–5 libertatem auferat] a. l. AF 5 et om. BI lin. C || Dei om. A || praescientiam]
praesentiam AH || Dei2] eius I 6 ponimus] ponuntur C || necesse … vivere]
semper necesse Deum vivere H || Deum semper] s. D AD 7 omnia] entia CDH
etiam IJ || cum] quod I 8 libero] libera C add. et DI || et om. E || verum] vero G ||
non ideo] i. n. DI 9 subicimus] submittimus A || quae] quod A || adimit] aufert G
11 si] an G || in] lin. I 12 si cum] sicut G’ corr. in (signo divisionis introducto) G2 || hoc
stet] hac sit DI || stet] scilicet sic C scit J 12–13 quandoque … possit] cum libertate
possit quandoque A 13 possit] posset H || possit stare] s. p. G || stare om. D ||
naturalitas] necessitas A || naturalitas] add. primus articulus si in aliquo actu alicuius
voluntatis sit necessitas et quod sic in Deo probatur mg. C 16 quo om. D || primo
om. FS tamen (mg.) G || dico] dicitur A || divinae] Dei H 17 in actu] secundum
actum D || diligendi] add. se BCDIJ

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 163

procedentem scilicet Spiritum Sanctum. Quod ita sit, patet: quia Deus
necessario est beatus et per consequens necessario videt et diligit obiec-
tum beatificum. Similiter, Spiritus Sanctus est Deus, et per consequens
summe necessarius in essendo; ergo, cum accipiat esse procedendo,
5 actus ille quo procedit est simpliciter necessarius.
Utraque autem conclusio probatur propter quid sic: Voluntas infinita 7
ad obiectum perfectissimum se habet modo perfectissimo se habendi;
voluntas divina est huiusmodi; ergo ad summum diligibile se habet
perfectissimo modo quo possibile est voluntatem aliquam se habere ad
10 ipsum; sed hoc non esset nisi ipsum necessario et actu adaequato dili-
geret, et etiam eius amorem adaequatum spiraret. Quia si aliquod isto-
rum deficeret, posset sine contradictione intelligi aliquam voluntatem
perfectiori modo se habere ad obiectum, quia ille modus posset intelligi
esse perfectior. Et iste non includit contradictionem, quia non est con-
15 tradictio quod voluntas infinita habeat actum infinitum circa infinitum
obiectum, et per consequens actum necessarium et necessario. Quia
posse non habere talem circa tale obiectum est posse carere summa
perfectione. Similiter, si amor adaequatus obiecti est spirabilis, ut cre-
dimus, maxime competet voluntati infinitae esse principium spirandi
20 illum.

1 procedentem] praecedentem C percedentem I om. A praecedentem || scilicet] id

est B || Quod] add. autem B 2 et … consequens] ergo G || necessario2 om. H
3 per consequens] ideo CIJ 4 necessarius] add. est AE || essendo] add. et C || ergo]
igitur BDFH || esse] add. in G 5 ille] iste D || procedit] procedat D 6 autem
om. AI add. propositio sive B || propter quid] prima sic A || quid] quam (dub.) B
7 obiectum] add. infinitum CDIJ || perfectissimum] dub. E perfectum I || habendi]
add. et I 8 voluntas] add. autem B || divina] Dei H || ergo] igitur BFH add. et IJ
|| summum] add. obiectum I || diligibile] diligere G diligible G2 9 perfectissimo
om. FU || perfectissimo modo] m. p. B (perfectissimo add. G2) G || modo … est] modo
est quo possible habendi D modo quo possible est habendi I’ modo habendi quo
possible est I2 || est om. AC || voluntatem om. F || aliquam om. F 10 sed] si I ||
esset] erit? F || ipsum2] add. actu C || necessario … adaequato] ipsum actu adaequato
necessario A 11 etiam om. H || aliquod] aliquid E 12 aliquam] aliam J 12–13
aliquam … modo] aliquomodo F || aliquam … intelligi] om. H 13 modo] non C ||
ille] iste J 14 esse om. FIJ || iste] ille ABE || includit] concludit H 15 infinita] in
simplici corr. in (mg.) F 15–16 infinitum obiectum] o. i. BG 16 consequens om. F ||
et2 om. G 16–18 Quia … perfectione] = E Quia si (lin. F) posset non habere talem
circa tale obiectum posset carere summa perfectione F Quia posse non habere (add.
circa I) tale obiectum posset carere summa perfectione = CDIJ Quia posse non habere
talem (tale H) circa tale obiectum posset carere summa perfectione = BH Quia si posset
non habere talem (add. actum A) circa tale obiectum posset carere summa perfectione
= AG 18 adaequatus] adaequati A || obiecti om. CDI 18–19 credimus] medius B
19 competet] competit AGI competeret CE 20 illum] istum B

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 164 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

[B.—Rationes sive probationes quae omnem

voluntatem necessario velle finem ultimum probant]

8 De primo dicitur quod omnis voluntas necessario vult finem ultimum,

et hoc vel clare visum vel etiam a nobis in universali apprehensum.
9 Ad hoc sunt tres rationes. Prima est ista: voluntas non potest resilire a 5
proprio obiecto quod est bonum vel ab illo in quo est tota perfectio sui
obiecti; ergo necessario tendit in illud obiectum in quo nec est aliqua
malitia nec aliquis defectus boni; huiusmodi est finis ultimus.

Ad hanc conclusionem ponuntur quaedam probationes quae etiam conclu-

a

dunt de omni voluntate respectu istius obiecti, sive clare visi, sive in universali 10
apprehensi, sicut modo ipsum apprehendimus.
Prima probatio talis: voluntas necessario vult illud in quo est ratio omnis
boni, quia non potest aliquod obiectum non velle in quo non est aliqua malitia
nec aliquis defectus boni; finis autem ultimus est huiusmodi.

8 Thomas, Summa theol. I–II q. 10 a. 2 (Ed. Ottaviensis, 775b: 12–19): “Sicut autem
coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde si
proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum
omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, si aliquid velit; non
enim poterit velle oppositum.” Henricus Gand., Quodl. XII q. 26 (AmPh s. 2 XVI,
153): “Si enim est ratio boni in aliquo omnimode perfecta, ut es perfecta in bono quod
in se habet omnem rationem boni et nullam rationem mali sibi coniunctam, qualis est
in eo quod est finis simpliciter, in illo movetur ex se libertate et immutabili necessitate
licet non libero arbitrio. Si vero sit ratio boni in aliquo deminuta, cuiusmodi est ratio
boni in omni eo quod est ad finem vel coniuncta cum ratione mali, … in illo movetur
ex se libertate arbitrii, et potest ab illo resilire …;” Aegidius Romanus Quodl. III q. 15
(ed. Venice 1502, 38ra): “Sic ergo imaginabimur voluntatem seipsam determinare ut
quando intellectus offert ei aliquid sub omni ratione boni voluntas necessitatur ab illo
et de necessitate vult illud sicut de necessitate vult finem. Nihil enim potest voluntas
respuere nisi sub ratione mali.”

3 De] Add. (mg.) Articulus Primus FG 3–8 De primo … finis ultimus] = EFG
in margine vero codicis H exhibentur aliqua verba tres lineas occupantia quae vix legi possint
om. ABCDIJ 4 hoc om. FG || etiam om. F 5 hoc] add. autem G || est om. F
6 est] et G || sui] add. proprii E 7 nec] non G 8 finis] add. ergo etc. ABC
spat. vac. tres litteras comprehendens reliq. B 9 quaedam] aliquae A || probationes]
propositiones H 10 istius] illius AEFI 12 probatio] propositio H add. est B || talis
om. A add. est CEG || illud om. E 13 aliquod obiectum] obiectum aliquod AEG ||
obiectum] omnino F’ corr. in lin. F || non2] add. lin. F || aliqua malitia] m. a. ABCDG
14 aliquis] aliquid J || autem om. A

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 165

Secunda probatio habetur ex dicto Philosophi II Physicorum: “Sicut 10

principium in speculabilibus, sic finis in operabilibus.” Et VII Ethicorum:
“In actionibus, quod cuius principium, quemadmodum in mathemati-
cis suppositiones.” Nunc intellectus assentit necessario principio in spe-
5 culabilibus; ergo voluntas necessario assentit ultimo fini in agibilibus.
Tertia probatio talis: Voluntas necessario vult illud cuius participa- 11
tione vult quidquid vult; ultimus finis est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Probatur
maior: Omne variabile reducitur ad aliquod invariabile, et ita variabili-

1 Aristot., Physica II c. 9 (AL VII 93; Β c. 9, 200a15–16); Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed.

J. Hamesse p. 147): “Finis in operabilibus est sicut principium in speculabilibus.”
2 Aristot., Eth. Nic. VII c. 12 (AL XXVI3 287; VII c. 8, 1151a16–17): “In actionibus
autem quod cuius gratia principium, quemadmodum in mathematicis suppositiones.”
5 Henricus Gand., Summa. a. 47 q. 5 (II f. 27v V): “quoniam secundum Philosophum
et in Physicis et in Ethicis, finis in operandis se habet ad voluntatem sicut principium in
speculandis ad intellectum: et ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut conclusiones. Sed in specu-
lativis intellectus de necessitate assentit principiis, licet non conclusionibus; ergo et fini
de necessitate aequiescit voluntas, licet non eis quae sunt ad finem. Cum igitur Deus
est finis voluntatis cuiusque quia est omnis boni bonum, voluntas quaelibet necessario
vult bonum quod est Deus, dum tamen sit ei cognitum—sibi ipsi autem incognitum
esse non potest, ut patet ex supra determinatis.” Henricus Gand., Quodl. III q. 17.
(f. 78vH–79rH): “dicendum ad hoc quod secundum Philosophum in VII Ethicorum
quod cuius gratia in actionibus principium est quemadmodum in mathematicis sup-
positiones et ut dicit in fine II Physicorum necessitas est in doctrinis: et in his quae
secundum naturam quodammodo similiter. Sicut ergo in doctrinis et in rebus mathe-
maticis suppositiones et primae propositiones per se notae sese habent ad intellectum
ad conclusiones sequentes quod per se de necessitate et naturaliter ab intellectu cogno-
scuntur … sic in iis quae fiunt voluntarie propter finem aliquem, finis ipse se habet ad
voluntatem et ad operabilia quae sunt ad finem, quod per se de necessitate et naturali-
ter velit illud voluntas et propter illa (pro: illud) vult omnia alia quae sunt ad ipsum …”
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. I q. 82 art. 1 corp. (Ed. Ottaviensis, 501b: 10–21).
6 Henricus Gand., Quodl. IV q. 11 a. 5 corp. (f. 102rR) “Si ergo quaestio [de]
dilectione Dei naturali super omnia alia intelligatur de dilectione beneplacentiae, cum

1 Secunda] Secunda … habetur] Secundo probatur hoc A Probatio secunda habe-

tur C Secundum autem probo D Secunda propositio habetur H || ex] add. illo CDHIJ
2 operabilibus] agibilibus A operationibus EJ || VII] 7 I’ III I2 3 In actionibus]
om. BHI || cuius] est E vero F 3–4 mathematicis] metaphysicis H sed. corr. H
4 Nunc … necessario] Intellectus autem necessario assentit CDIJ Nunc autem intel-
lectus assentit necessario primo AG Nunc autem intellectus necessario assentit primo B
Nunc intellectus necessario assentit H 5 ergo] igitur BDF || agibilibus] operabili-
bus A 6 Tertia] add. est F || probatio] propositio H add. est ACG || talis] add. est E
7 vult om. I || ergo] igitur FH || etc om. AC 7–8 Probatur maior] Probatio maio-
ris A Maior probatur CEH 8 ad … invariabile] = BCE ad aliquid invariabile DHIJ
ad aliquid invariable F ad aliquid variabile G in invariabile aliquod A 8–166.1 varia-
bilitas] varietas BEGH

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 166 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

tas actuum circa ea quae sunt ad finem praeexigit actum invariabilem,

et per consequens maxime circa illud cuius participatione alia obiecta
terminant actum. Minor probatur per illud VIII De Trinitate 5: “Tolle,
inquit, hoc bonum, et illud, et vide ipsum bonum si potes, ita Deum
videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed omnis boni bonum.” 5

[C.—De necessitate trium probationum inquantum de

omni voluntate tractant et de necessitate earum in se]

12 Istae rationes non videntur probare conclusionem necessariam de qua-

cumque voluntate in communi, nec etiam videntur in se necessariae.

[1.—Quod tres probationes de omni 10

voluntate non concludant, ostenditur]

13 Primum probatur. Quia quando sunt duae naturae absolutae et essen-

tialiter ordinatae, prior sine contradictione videtur posse esse sine poste-
riori. Nunc autem, istorum trium quae sunt: obiectum diligibile, et

huiusmodi dilectione diligatur bonum simpliciter quia bonum et nullum bonum par-
ticipatum diligitur nisi quia in ipso est participata aliqua ratio boni simpliciter, quae
perfecte habet esse in solo primo bono quod Deus est, gratia cuius illud bonum par-
ticipatum diligitur tanquam gratia eius quod est in se per se et primo dilectum et
cuius cognitione bonum participatum cognoscitur esse bonum … idcirco igitur abso-
lute dicendum est quod dilectione naturali beneplacentiae Deus diligitur a quacunque
voluntate intellectualis creaturae naturaliter super omnia alia …”
3 August., De Trin. VIII c. 3 n. 4 (CCL 15, 272; PL 42 949): “Tolle hoc et illud, et
vide ipsum bonum si potes; ita deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis
boni.”

2 per … maxime] maxime per consequens B || per consequens] om. G 3 actum]

add. eius ACDIJ || Minor probatur] written: b probatur A || probatur] lin. I || illud]
add. Augustini ABCDIJ || VIII om. E || Trinitate] add. cap. BE || Trinitate om. A ||
Tolle] Tollo C 4 hoc bonum] b. h. ACDIJ || ipsum] primum G || potes] add.
et ADH 5 non] nec FG || non … bonum] mg. C || sed om. E 5–8 sed …
rationes] Sed BH 5 omnis … bonum] bonum omnis boni CDFIJ || bonum2 om. E
8–9 Istae … necessariae] Sed istae probationes non videntur conclusionem probare
necessariam de quacumque (quaecumque I) scilicet voluntate in communi nec etiam
videntur esse in se necessariae CDIJ || quacumque] add. scilicet F add. scilicet de G
9 in om. FG || se] add. esse BH 12–13 essentialiter] add. aequaliter C 13 sine
… videtur] videtur sine contradictione B || posse esse] e. p. DGI 13–14 posteriori]
posteriore AB 14 quae sunt] om. I scilicet B || et om. B

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 167

ipsa apprehensio vel visio illius obiecti in intellectu creato, et etiam

ipsa voluntas creata, quodcumque est absolutum et prius naturaliter
actu diligendi illud obiectum, et hoc loquendo de dilectione in volun-
tate creata. Ergo quod quodcumque istorum possit esse—immo quod
5 omnia possint esse—sine illo actu dilectionis, non includit contradictio-
nem; nec per consequens oppositum est simpliciter necessarium. Quo-
modo illud dicitur necessarium cuius oppositum non includit contradic-
tionem?
Hic dicitur quod maior vera est de illis absolutis, quorum unum non 14
10 dependet ab alio, nec ambo a tertio. In proposito autem visio et fruitio
dependent ab eodem tertio scilicet obiecto.
Contra hoc: Quidquid absolutum Deus immediate potest causare, 15
tamen non necessario, si causat per causam mediam, potest non neces-
sario causare, quia illa causa media non necessitat ipsum ad causandum
15 effectum illius causae mediae; ergo, licet ambo ista causentur a causa
communi, tamen secundum non solum absolute contingenter causabi-
tur, sed etiam, posito primo, adhuc contingenter causabitur.

10 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodl. XII q. 5 (AmPh s. 2 XVI, 33): “Alia autem

differunt re, quae tamen habent naturalem connexionem in esse, sic quod unum
eorum, quantum est ex ordine naturae suae, non possit esse sine altero, et hoc quia
unum eorum in esse dependet ab altero, vel ambo a tertio.”

1 vel visio] om. J || illius] huius B istius DI om. H || in om. ABC || etiam om. BH
2 voluntas] voluntate F || quodcumque] quodlibet B 2–3 et … obiectum] et
illud obiectum est naturaliter prius actu diligendi obiectum illud B 2 naturaliter]
natura AB 3 diligendi] add. est AB 4 Ergo] igitur BDFH || quod] = ABE
cum DI om. CFGHJ || istorum] add. trium BDHI || possit] possint B posset H ||
quod2 om. BCDHIJ 5 possint] possunt EF possit H’ corr. a possunt H 6
consequens] add. eius B || oppositum] add. eius H || oppositum] oppositum est] e.
o. DI 6–7 Quomodo] quoniam C modo F’ corr. in mg. F 7 illud om. BH ||
dicitur] est simpliciter A || necessarium] add. illud B || non] scripsimus; omnes codices
perperam omittunt 9 vera est] est vera ABH vera C || non om. A 10 a] lin. I ||
tertio] tertio] 3 F || proposito] opposito C || autem om. I 11 dependent] post
obiecto (dependens J) CDIJ || eodem] eo C || tertio scilicet] om. A s. t. E 12
Quidquid] add. est G || Deus … causare] = AE Deus potest immediate C Deus
potest creare immediate DJ potest Deus immediate causare F Deus posset immediate
causare G Deus potest causare immediate BHI || causare] add. et E 14 illa] ista D
|| causandum] creandum J 15 effectum] dub. B || illius] istius B || mediae] add.
absolutum BCDHJ add. absolutarum I || ergo] igitur BDFH || licet post ista D || ista]
illa H 15–16 causa communi] communi causa C 16 secundum om. C || absolute
om. CDIJ add. sed G || contingenter] rep. I 16–17 contingenter causabitur] causabit
contingenter H || causabitur … causabitur] causabit … causabit B 17 causabitur]
causabit H

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 168 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

16 Praeterea, potentia quae necessario agit circa obiectum, necessario

continuat actum illum, quantum potest; voluntas, saltem viatoris, non
necessario continuat actum circa finem in universali apprehensum,
quantum posset continuare; ergo non necessario agit circa illum.
17 Maior patet in exemplo de appetitu sensitivo; et videtur posse pro- 5
bari per rationem, quia illud quod est intrinseca ratio ipsi potentiae
necessario agendi erit etiam ratio semper necessario agendi, semper
inquantum est ex parte potentiae, et ita continuandi, quantum ipsa
potentia potest continuare.
18 Minor probatur: Quia voluntas viatoris posset quandoque conti- 10
nuare actum intellectus quo considerat finem, quem non continuat, sed
vel convertit intelligentiam ad considerationem alterius actus, vel sal-
tem non impedit quin obiectum aliud occurrens impediat illam consi-
derationem; illa autem consideratione non continuata, non continuatur
actus voluntatis circa illud obiectum, et continuata illa, continuaretur 15
ista.

4 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 p. 1 q. 2 n. 100 (II 77–78).

16 Subintellige: voluntas secundum quod actus voluntatis.

2 illum … potest] om. H || voluntas] autem CD add. autem I 2–3 voluntas …

actum] add. mg. signo in mg. adhibito post continuare posito H 2 saltem om. J || viatoris]
maioris D’ viatoris? D2 3 actum] add. illum E’ exp. E || apprehensum] add. in G 4
quantum] qui H || continuare] contingenter F’ corr. mg. F || ergo non] igitur nec BD
ergo nec EIJ igitur non F || illum] illud BC 5 videtur] add. hoc idem E 5–6
videtur … rationem] potest probari ratione B || posse probari] probari posse H 6
per rationem] ratione H || intrinseca ratio] ratio intrinseca CDJ || ipsi] ipsius AG
om. CDJ 7 necessario agendi] agendi necessario C || erit … agendi] om. D ||
ratio … agendi] necessaria ratio agendi semper (ratio? rep. sed exp. A) AD || semper2
om. ABCDGH 8 inquantum] quantumcumque B quod quantum C || inquantum]
add. quantum G || ita] sic C 9 potest continuare] c. p. B 10 Quia] Quod C ||
posset quandoque] q. p. H || quandoque] add. contingenter? F 10–11 quandoque
continuare] continuare quandoque CJ 11 quem] = CFJ quem (dub.) AE quem
corr. in quando G quando BDHI add. etiam I || continuat] obtinuat(!) D 12 vel
om. H necessario I || intelligentiam] intellectivam H || actus] obiecti B om. CDHIJ
13 aliud] illud C || aliud occurrens] concurrens aliud AG occurrens aliud F’ aliud
(lin.) occurrens F || illam] istam BI 14 illa] ista B || autem om. IJ || continuata]
contra circa?? F’ corr. mg. F2 15 voluntatis … obiectum] c. i. o. a. v. G 15–16 et
… ista] quia continuata ista (illa E) continuaretur (continuaretur ista mg. D) ista DE
quia ista continuata continuaretur ista I 15 illa om. F mg. G 16 ista om. F

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 169

Probatur eadem minor per illud I Retractationum, 9 et 22: “Nihil tam 19

est in potestate voluntatis quam ipsa voluntas.” Quod non intelligitur
quantum ad esse voluntatis, sed quantum ad eius agere. Nunc autem in
potestate voluntatis est quod per eius imperium alia potentia habeat
5 actum vel non habeat, sicut quod intellectus non considerat saltem
illud obiectum sine cuius consideratione potest voluntas habere actum
imperandi; ergo in potestate voluntatis est quod ipsamet non habeat
actum circa illud obiectum determinatum.
Hoc non intelligo sic quod possit voluntarie suspendere omnem 20
10 actum suum, sed voluntarie potest non velle illud obiectum; sed tunc
habet aliud velle, scilicet reflexivum super suum actum, istud scilicet,
“volo modo non elicere actum circa istud obiectum.” Et hoc bene
potest ex se, alioquin non posset omnem actum suspendere post deli-
berationem; et est simile de actu intellectus et voluntatis, quoad hoc
15 quod non potest suspendere illam intellectionem quae necessaria est ad
volitionem illam per quam suspendit intellectionem, sed potest quam-
cumque aliam suspendere. Sic non potest pro nunc suspendere omnem
volitionem, quia non illam qua voluntarie suspendit, sed potest suspen-
dere quamcumque aliam ad hoc non necessario requisitam.

1 August., Retract. I c. 9 (CCL 57, 25; PL 32): “quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa
voluntas sita est?”

1 Probatur … minor] Probatio eiusdem minoris G || minor] maior H1 corr. in H2 ||

et om. G || et] 23 B 29 J 2 est post voluntatis B om. CJ || est … voluntatis] i.
p. e. v. G || in potestate rep. C || voluntatis] add. est quod per eius imperium alia
potentia sed del. signo ‘vacat’ addito E || quam … voluntas] om. J || intelligitur] intelli-
gat B intelligit H 3 esse] add. illius FG || voluntatis post agere C || ad2] ab D ||
eius agere] a. e. G 4 per] add. quod D 5 actum om. B || actum … habeat]
mg. I2 || considerat] cognosceret A considerat H1 corr. consideret H2 6 considera-
tione] add. non lin F || voluntas habere] h. v. EF 7 ergo] igitur BDFH 8 illud]
istud BC 8–10 determinatum … obiectum] om. J 9 non] modo F || intelligo]
intelligendo G intelligitur ABCDIJ intelligeretur H || quod] add. ipsa ABCDHIJ ||
possit] posset H 10 voluntarie … sed] omnem actum suum voluntarie suspen-
dere sed B suspendere voluntarie omnen actum suum sed CE suspendere omnem
actum sed F suspendere omnem actum suum sed G || illud obiectum] istud obiec-
tum BCDHIJ obiectum illud A 10–11 tunc habet] h. t. G 11 habet om. F ||
reflexivum] reflexum BC || suum actum] a. s. AEH add. seu rep. sed exp. sed voluntarie
potest non velle obiectum H || istud scilicet] scilicet istud B illud scilicet A 12 volo]
velle E uno H’ nullo H || actum om. F || istud] illud ABG || Et om. CI 12–13 bene
potest] potest bene C 14 intellectus et] om. F || quoad] quantum ad I 15 illam]
primam A istam B 16 volitionem illam] i. v. G 17 aliam] illam C’ corr. in C || Sic]
Sicut H || non] lin. H || nunc] voluntarie (dub.) C add. voluntarie ABDHIJ 18 quia]
qua? F || illam] add. in I || qua] quam FJ 19 requisitam] add. (mg.) volitionem G

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21 Praeterea, necessitas agendi est ab illo quod est per se principium

agendi (quia si illud non necessario se habet ad agere, nec aliquid per
illud necessario aget); passum autem secundum se est in potentia con-
tradictionis; si ergo, per te, obiectum sit ratio necessitatis in volendo,
quia ponis quod quaecumque voluntas comparata ad ipsum obiectum 5
necessario vult ipsum (nulla autem voluntas necessario vult quodcum-
que obiectum), videretur sequi quod obiectum sit principale activum
respectu volitionis. Quod tamen sic arguens non concedit.

[2. De necessitate probationum

adductarum in se consideratarum] 10

22 Secundum, scilicet quod illae probationes non sint necessariae, patet,

discurrendo per eas. Ad primam, negaretur maior. Quantumcumque
enim in obiecto aliquo sit perfectio obiecti, tamen ad necessitatem actus
requiritur quod potentia necessario tendat in illud obiectum. Et quid-
quid sit de voluntate creata beata et de perfectione eius supernaturali 15
qua tendit in illud obiectum, tamen diceretur quod voluntas creata
viatoris simpliciter contingenter tendit in illud, et etiam quando est
in universali apprehensum, quia illa apprehensio non est ratio deter-
minandi voluntatem ad necessario volendum illud. Nec ipsa voluntas
necessario se determinat in opposito, sicut nec necessario continuat 20

8 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 p. 2 q. 2 nn. 93–96.134–142 (II 67–74.90–96). Verba

sequentia autem hic adiciuntur in margine cod. H: Finis visus obscure in particulari,
non necessario, diligitur; ergo nec visus in universali. Probatur consequentia. Cf. appa-
ratus infra n. 22.
12 Cf. n. 9 et textus cancellatus ei adiunctus.
19 Textum vero paene illegibilem ab verbis ‘nec ipsa’ usque ad ‘et tunc’ codex G
exhibet, imo folio humectatione polluto.

1 per se principium] principium per se G 2 illud] istud D || non om. F || habet]

haberet J 3 aget] agit A ageret G’ corr. in G || autem] igitur H’ corr. in H || est
om. C 4 ergo] igitur BDFH 5 ponis] ponitur BCIJ potentia DH || voluntas]
dub. A || comparata … obiectum] ad ipsum obiectum comparata A comparata ad
istud obiectum B ad illud obiectum comparata C comparata ad illud obiectum H
7 videretur] videtur BH 11 scilicet om. F || illae probationes] istae propositiones HI
|| probationes] propositiones D || sint] sunt BG 12 primam] primum CDFGI
13 obiecto aliquo] a. o. ADHI || aliquo om. F || sit] add. tota BCDGHIJ 15 beata]
limitata I 15–16 eius … voluntas] om. C 15 eius om. A 16 qua] quae B
17 simpliciter] semper A 18 apprehensum … illa] om. C || illa] ista I 19
volendum … voluntas] om. D 20 se determinat] d. s. F || in] illo B || in opposito]
illo posito CH isto posito DI || sicut] sed E

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 171

illud positum, ut tactum est in secunda ratione. Tamen ista posset con-
cedi quod voluntas non potest resilire ab obiecto sive nolle obiectum
in quo non ostenditur aliqua ratio mali nec aliquis defectus boni, quia
sicut bonum est obiectum huius actus qui est velle, ita malum vel defec-
5 tus boni, quod pro malo reputatur, est obiectum huius actus qui est
nolle. Et tunc non sequitur ultra, “non potest nolle hoc, ergo necessario
vult hoc,” quia potest hoc obiectum neque velle neque nolle, ut tactum
est supra, pertractando illam auctoritatem de I Retractationum.
Contra hoc potest argui sic: si non potest nolle hoc obiectum, hoc 23
10 ideo est quia necessario habet in se aliquid cui repugnat istud nolle; tale
autem repugnans non potest esse nisi actu velle hoc obiectum; igitur
illud necessario sibi inest. Maior probatur: quia si unum incompossibile
repugnat, alterum necessario inest. Minor probatur: quia nulla inclina-
tio ad volendum habitualis sive aptitudinalis repugnat ipsi nolle actuali,
15 quia cum actu uno potest stare potentialitas vel aptitudo ad oppositum
actum.
Hic dici potest quod illud repugnans actui nolendi finem est ipsamet 24
potentia volendi, quia ipsa non potest habere nisi velle respectu obiecti

8 Cf. supra n. 19.

1 illud] id J || illud] add. volendum illud nec ipsa voluntas D || positum] oppositum A
|| ut] sicut H || tactum] tractatum F || ratione] quaestione J add. ult. finis etiam visus
obscure in particulari non necessario diligitur ergo nec visus in universali probatur
consequentia J add. finis etiam visus obscuretur in particulari non necessario diligi-
tur ergo nec visus in universali probatur consequentia ista. C || Tamen ista] Tamen
illa AG Tamen C Ista tamen DIJ || posset] potest DI 1–2 concedi] concedit D’
corr. in D 2 nolle] velle C 2–4 obiectum … est] om. F 4 bonum est] e.
b. H || huius] istius H || qui] quia A || velle] add. et F 5 huius] illius I 6 tunc
om. F || ergo] igitur ABDFH 7 hoc] hic D || hoc2] hic I || velle] nolle DEI ||
nolle] velle CDEI || ut] sicut BCDHIJ 7–8 tactum est] e. t. EG est tractatum F
8 pertractando] per G || illam … de] illud Augustini A istam auctoritatem F || I]
libero E om. G || Retractationum] necessario C 9 sic om. CIJ || si om. D || nolle]
velle C 9–10 hoc obiectum … nolle] mg. H 9 hoc2 om. C 10 necessa-
rio om. F mg. G || necessario habet] h. n. E’ corr. in (signo transpositionis adhibito) E ||
se om. H || istud] illud ADG 11 igitur] ergo CEGIJ 12 illud om. J || necessario
… inest] inest sibi necessario AD sibi necessario inest B || sibi] si sed corr. I || inest] J’
corr. in J2 12–13 Maior … inest] om. AEFH 12 incompossibile] incompossibi-
lium G 13 Minor] Maior B dub. F 14 ad volendum] om. F || sive] vel CIJ || ipsi]
illi G isti I || nolle] velle BC 15 actu uno] u. a. G || potest] posset A posse? D ||
oppositum] propositum I 16 actum om. G 17 dici potest] potest dici DI || quod]
? A || illud om. J || nolendi] volendi IJ || est om. J || ipsamet] ipsa BG 18 volendi]
volendi finem A voluntas B voluntatis finem C voluntatis DHI || habere] rep. C ||
nisi] hoc I || respectu om. I

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 172 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

volibilis, vel nolle respectu obiecti nolibilis, quia nullum aliud velle vel
nolle est possibile fieri; nunc autem finis non habet rationem nolibilis
quia nec malitiam, nec defectum boni; unde hoc quod est “nolle finem”
includit contradictionem, sicut “videre sonum,” sicut Augustinus vult
in Enchiridion 86 vel 52: “Sic beati esse volumus, ut miseri esse non 5
solum nolumus, sed nequaquam velle possimus.” Sicut repugnat ipsi
actui volendi tendere in miseriam, ita videtur repugnare actui nolendi
tendere in beatitudinem, vel forte magis, quia non ita caret miseria
omni ratione volibilis, sicut beatitudo omni ratione nolibilis.
25 Ad secundam probationem: Illud simile Philosophi de fine et prin- 10
cipio debet intelligi quoad duo, videlicet quoad ordinem obiectorum
intelligibilium et obiectorum volibilium inter se, et etiam quoad ordi-
nem quem habent respectu potentiarum ordinate tendentium in ipsa.
Intelligo sic quod sicut est ordo in veritate inter principium et con-
clusionem, quae habet veritatem participatam a principio, sic est ordo 15
inter finem et ens ad finem in bonitate sive appetibilitate, quia ens ad
finem habet bonitatem participatam respectu finis.

5 August., Enchirid. 28, n. 105 (CCL 46, 106; PL 40, 281): “qua beati esse sic volumus,
ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus.”
10 cf. supra n. 10.

1 vel] et B || nolle] velle C add. nisi ABC 1–2 velle … nolle] nolle … velle BCI
2 nolle] velle D || fieri om. ABCDHIJ || nunc … nolibilis] = BE nunc autem finis
non habet aliquam rationem nolibilis H finis autem non habet aliquam rationem
nolibilis ACIJ finis autem non habet aliam rationem nolibilis DG si autem non habet
rationem nolibilis F 3 unde] add. seu rep. sed exps. unde hoc quod est nolle respectu
obiecti nolibilis quia nullum aliud velle vel nolle est possibile nunc autem finis non
habet aliquam rationem nolibilis quod nec malitiam nec defectum boni H || hoc] add.
est I 4 sicut … vult] ut … dicit B 5 Enchiridion] 56 C 76 J || 86 … 52] 63 B ||
vel 52] libro q. 2 E vel 72 F || vel] add. Dicens J || Sic] praem. Secundo C add. enim B
5–6 esse … nolumus] non solum esse nolimus A esse non solum nolimus D non
solum nolimus G 6 velle] esse A || possimus] possumus CG || Sicut] Sed F add.
enim B 6–7 Sicut … volendi scrip. bis, prima vice deinde cum signo ‘vacat’ cancell. B
6 ipsi om. CDIJ 7 miseriam] dub. D || actui2 om. J || nolendi] volendi non G
add. id est (dub.) C add. non F volendi I 8 tendere] intendere I add. non (mg.) F ||
non … miseria] miseria non ita caret B 9 omni] ea D || sicut … nolibilis] lin. I
|| beatitudo] beati F’ corr. lin F || omni2 om. G 10 probationem] propositio H1
propositionem H2 add. dicendum quod B || Illud om. H 11 videlicet] scilicet ABFG
|| quoad2] ad H quo ab D 12 obiectorum om. A || inter se] om. FG || et2 om. H ||
et etiam] sicut etiam C 13 habent] ? A habet C habemus FG || ipsa] ipsam H
add. obiecta A (mg.) J2 add. primum (post sic BC) ABC 14 Intelligo] Intellectio I ||
sic om. J || quod] quia GH || est om. J || ordo in add. (mg.) A 14–15 in veritate …
ordo] mg. H 15 sic] sicut F 16 in … appetibilitate] in b. et a. (mg.) I2

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 173

Et ex hoc sequitur secundum, scilicet quod sicut intellectus ordinate 26

tendens in ista vera propter principium assentit conclusioni, sic volun-
tas ordinate tendens in illud quod est ad finem tendit in ipsum prop-
ter finem. Sed non est simile hinc inde comparando ad potentias istas
5 ut absolute operantes, quia tunc non posset aliqua voluntas velle illud
quod est ad finem, nisi utendo eo, scilicet volendo ipsum propter finem;
cum tamen dicat Augustinus 83 Quaestionum quaestione 30, quod: “Per-
versitas voluntatis est in utendo fruendis et fruendo utendis.”
Ex quo habetur quod voluntas potest obiecto utendo frui, non sic 27
10 autem potest intellectus verum scibile intelligere tanquam principium,
scilicet tanquam evidens ex terminis. Et ratio differentiae est quia intel-
lectus movetur ab obiecto naturali necessitate movente; voluntas autem
libere se movet. Patet etiam in aliis quod non est similis necessitas hinc
et inde, quia per principium necessario scitur conclusio, non sic per
15 bonitatem finis necessario appetitur illud quod est ad finem.
Ad tertiam probationem: Maior posset simpliciter negari, quia si 28
voluntas nihil necessario vult, non oportet quod illud, ratione cuius

7 August., De diversis quaest. 83 q. 30 (CCL 44A, 38; PL 40,19): “Omnis itaque

humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui.”
11 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 p. 2 q. 2 n. 147 (II 97–98).
16 cf. n. 11

1 Et om. DHIJ || ex om. C || secundum] tertium H lin. I2 || scilicet om. C || scilicet

quod] q. s. G 2 tendens om. E || ista] illa ACFG || vera om. CDI 3 in] ad H ||
illud] id J || ad finem] ab fine D || ipsum] ipsam J 4 inde om. D add. in F ||
comparando] operando ita C add. illa J || ad om. AF || istas] illas I 5 quia …
aliqua] quia n. p. tunc aliqua E || tunc non posset] n. p. t. F || illud] id B 6 nisi]
non sed. corr. I || eo om. F || scilicet] id est B || ipsum om. CDIJ 7 cum tamen] t.
c. G || tamen om. D || Augustinus om. A || quaestione om. F 7–8 Perversitas] Per
diversas C 8 est om. FG || in … utendis] in fruendo utendis sic in cod.; amanuensis
eadem verba repetivit A || fruendis … utendis] finendis et in finendo utendis I’ fruendis
fruendo utendis I2 || et] add. in HI 9 quo] hoc AF || quo habetur] hoc videtur H ||
potest … frui] fruitur obiecto utendo B || obiecto] aliquo G add. fruendo AB || frui]
et H 9–10 sic autem] a. s. A 10 autem] quod I’ autem I2 || verum] obiectum E ||
scibile] sit simile I’ corr. lin. I2 11 scilicet] id est B || ex terminis] existens H1 corr.
in H2 || differentiae] duplex I || est om. G 12 naturali … movente] movente naturali
necessitate B || autem om. AF quod I’ corr. I2 13 libere se movet] m. s. l. B ||
est om. I 13–14 necessitas hinc et inde] hinc inde necessitas H || hinc et inde] hinc
inde ACG utrobique B 14 sic] autem B 15 illud] id J 16 tertiam] aliam ABH
secundam E’ corr. in E2 secundam G || probationem] dicendum quod B 17 nihil]
dub. G || ratione cuius] c. r. H

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 174 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

vult alia, necessario velit, sed quod illud contingenter velit sufficit ad
volendum alia eo modo quo vult ea.
29 Aliter potest dici quod maior potest habere duplicem intellectum,
unum talem: illud cuius participatione vult alia tanquam participatione
obiecti voliti, illud magis vel prius vult; alium intellectum istum: illud 5
cuius participatione in entitate vult alia quae participant entitatem,
illud prius vult. Primus intellectus videtur esse verus, sed non secundus,
quia etsi color, quem video, participet entitatem suam a primo ente et
etiam visibilitatem a primo visibili, non tamen color visus requirit pri-
mum ens vel primum visibile prius videri, quia non videtur participa- 10
tione eius ut visi, sed ut entis vel visibilis; et tantum in isto secundo intel-
lectu est minor vera, sed et ista probatio adducta tantum probat quod
istud sit bonum vel volibile per participationem primi volibilis, non
autem quod hoc praecise sit volitum participatione illius primi ut voliti.

[3. Summarium articuli primi] 15

30 De isto igitur articulo, quidquid sit de voluntate creata beata— si,

scilicet, per aliquod supernaturale necessitetur ad volendum ultimum
finem vel non—, saltem probabiliter dici potest quod non omnis volun-

12 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 p. 2 q. 2 n. 148 (II 98–99).

1 alia] anima H1 corr. in H2 1–2 necessario … alia] om. C 1 illud contingenter]

contingenter illud BH 2 alia] anima H1 corr. in H2 || ea om. AC alia G 3–4 potest
… participatione] om. J 4 talem] tale I talem I2 || participatione] add. voluntas BCD
add. w I || vult alia] dub. G || alia] anima H1 corr. in H2 5 voliti] add. mg I2
|| alium] alterum A || intellectum] talem A || istum] habet I om. ABCDH 6
participatione] add. vult alia tamquam sed exp. E || in om. I || in entitate] mg. H || alia
quae] aliqua D || participant] participant] qui participent D || entitatem] entitatis A
add. et C 7 intellectus] intelligitur H || sed] et A 8 quem] quam? G || video]
add. requirit E’ exp. E 8–9 et etiam] mg. H 9 etiam om. B || visibilitatem]
entitatem DI add. suam BC || color] calor D || visus om. A 10 ens] esse I ||
non] nunc F || videtur] videntur? A 11 ut] non? A || visi] lin. F || vel] et J ||
et] sed F || tantum] tamen G || in om. BH || isto om. AF 12 sed et ista] sicut
et illa ABCDHIJ sed etiam ista G || probatio] producta primo D || tantum om. A
|| probat] add. terminum? A 13 istud sit] sit illud A illud sit BG || bonum]
obiectum A || bonum … participationem] volibile vel bonum participatione G || vel]
et J || participationem] add. illius F 14 quod hoc om. B || hoc] dub. A istud CDIJ ||
praecise] quia istud B || praecise sit] sit praecise DI || sit om. J || illius] istius BH
respectu G || primi] principii I 16 igitur] ergo E secundo G || de2 … beata]
creata scrip. post spat. vac. decem litteras comprehendens C || creata beata] beata creata DIJ ||
beata] utrum B || si om. B 16–17 si scilicet] scilicet si AFI 17 necessitetur]
necessitatur BDI 18 finem om. E || vel] spat. vac. quinque litteras comprehendens C

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 175

tas creata necessitatur ex natura sua ad volendum finem, non solum

absolute, quod manifestum est, sed nec posita apprehensione obscura
illius obiecti, sicut modo apprehendimus. Hoc saltem certum videtur
quod voluntas divina simpliciter necessitatur ad volendum bonitatem
5 propriam.
Et si quaeratur an necessario velit aliquod obiectum aliud ab eo, pos- 31
set distingui quod, exclusa necessitate coactionis de qua non est sermo,
potest intelligi una necessitas immutabilitatis, quae excludit posse oppo-
situm succedere ei quod inest; alia necessitas omnimodae inevitabili-
10 tatis sive determinationis, quae non solum excludit oppositum posse
succedere isti sed omnino excludit ipsum posse inesse. Loquendo de
sola prima necessitate, Deus necessario vult quidquid vult, quia non
potest succedere oppositum ei quod inest, neque ex parte actus neque
obiecti, quia hoc non posset esse sine aliqua mutatione in Deo; cum
15 enim obiectum esse volitum non ponat aliquid extra ipsum Deum, et
non potest de non volito fieri volitum, vel e converso, quin sit aliqua
mutatio in aliquo. Non enim est transitus a contradictorio in contra-
dictorium nullo aliter se habente, quia tunc non esset ratio quare istud
contradictorium magis esset nunc quam prius, nunc illud falsum.

10 Textum vero paene illegibilem a verbo ‘excludit’ usque ad ‘tunc’ codex G exhibet,
imo folio humectatione polluto.
14 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 2 q. unica nn. 294–301 (IV 322–326).

1 creata] tanta C add. non sed exp. G || necessitatur] necessitetur H || ex … sua]

om. CDIJ || volendum] add. ultimum A 2 quod] quia A || manifestum est] est mani-
festum I || sed om. B || apprehensione obscura] obscura apprehensione B || obscura
om. F 3 illius] huius B || saltem] tamen B || certum videtur] videtur certum CDJ
4 divina] dei H || simpliciter om. F || simpliciter necessitatur] n. s. G || necessitatur]
necessitetur H 6 necessario … eo] velit aliquod obiectum aliud ab illo necessario B
|| aliquod] aliud J || obiectum aliud] a. o. F || eo] illo CHJ isto DI 7 quod] quia? I
|| necessitate coactionis] c. n. AF || de … sermo] dub. D || qua] quo H 8 posse
om. C 8–9 posse oppositum] oppositum posse DI 9 inest] est F’ non (lin.) est F ||
alia] add. est BCJ 10 excludit om. H 11 isti] ei CDIJ || de] add. sole D 13 potest]
add. sibi CDI || ei] eius CDI 14 quia] anticip. seu clarius scrip. quia I2 || hoc om. J
14–15 cum enim] quia cum B cum ei F 15 volitum] add. et I || ponat] ponit F ||
Deum om. CD || et om. BCDIJ 17 aliquo] add. alio I || est om. E || in2] ad F
18 tunc om. CJ || istud] illud H 19 magis esset] esset magis ABCH || esset] ines-
set DJ om. I || nunc … falsum] verum nunc quam prius et quare illud falsum B ||
nunc] nec ABCDGHIJ || prius] add. verum AH add. esset G || illud] add. est FG nisi I
|| falsum] add. hic deficit aliquid post falsum C add. falsum I

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 176 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

32 Sed de secunda necessitate posset dici quod, licet necessario voluntas

divina habeat actum complacentiae respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis,
in quantum in illo ostenditur quaedam participatio bonitatis propriae,
tamen non necessario vult quodcumque creatum volitione efficaci sive
determinativa illius ad exsistendum extra; immo sic vult contingenter 5
creaturam fore, sicut contingenter eam creat, quia si necessario hac
secunda necessitate vellet eam fore, necessario etiam necessitate inevi-
tabilitatis eam crearet, saltem pro tunc pro quando vult eam fore.

[III.—Articulus Secundus: Utrum cum

necessitate stet libertas in voluntate] 10

33 De secundo articulo principali, dico quod cum necessitate ad volendum

stat libertas in voluntate.
34 Hoc probatur, primo, per auctoritates:

bSequitur textus interpolatus: Quod libertas in voluntate stet simul cum necessi-
tate respectu eiusdem actus et obiecti: perfectio actus non tollit perfectionem 15
potentiae sed magis ponit; necessitas est perfectio in actu et libertas in agente;
ergo. Nam voluntatem necessario velle non est nisi eam toto suo conatu in voli-
tum ferre et eius oppositum cohibere, ita quod quanto actus est magis neces-
sarius tanto voluntas volentius et liberius vult obiectum, liberrime et volentis-
sime se tenens cum eo. Unde actui voluntatis nec necessitas nec contingentia 20
repugnat per se ut voluntarius est. Accipiendo necessitatem pro firmitate et

1 secunda necessitate] n. s. BCDHIJ || quod licet] quodlibet H 1–2 licet … divina]

voluntas divina licet necessario B 1 necessario om. A 2 actum] necessarie H ||
cuiuscumque] add. obiecti BH add. create CD creati I add. creati J 3–4 participatio
… non] partitio propiae bonitatis non tamen B bonitatis propriae participatio tamen
non I 4 tamen non] non tamen C || efficaci] necessaria B 5 determinativa] deter-
minata CEFJ terminativa H || illius om. A eius I || exsistendum om. J essendum C
extra essendum G || exsistendum] pro: exsequendum D exsequendum I’ corr. I2 ||
sic om. CG sicut F || vult contingenter] c. v. GI 6 fore] forte G || contingenter
eam creat] contingenter causat eam A contingenter eam causat FH eam contingenter
causat GI || quia] quod E 7 necessitate] add. ad volendum stat libertas in volun-
tate hoc probatur primo per auctoritates scrips. primo (seu anticip.), deinde cum signo ‘vacat’
cancell. E || etiam om. AD 8 eam crearet] causaret eam A eam causaret FGHI ||
pro2] quod H om. E || eam2] ea J 11 De om. J || quod] add. mg. cum necessitate ad
volendum stat libertas F add mg. … secundam inevitabili … necessitate ad volendum
stat libertas cum necessitate G 13 Hoc] Quod B || primo om. C || auctoritates]
auctoritatem F 14 Quod] Quod … cum necessario et contingenti = H

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 177

Prima est in Enchiridion, ubi dictum est, scilicet 86 vel 12: “Sic,”
inquit, “oportebat prius fieri hominem ut bene velle posset et male;
nec gratis et frustra, si bene; nec impune, si male.” Hoc est: et in statu
illo primo meretur vel demeretur. Et sequitur: “Postea vero sic erit, ut
5 male velle non possit, nec ideo libero carebit arbitrio, multo quippe
liberius erit arbitrium quod omnino non poterit servire peccato.” Et
subdit quasi pro probatione: “Neque enim culpanda est voluntas: aut
voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est qua beati sic esse volumus
ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam velle possimus; si
10 igitur habet anima nostra etiam nunc nolle infelicitatem, ita tunc nolle
iniquitatem semper habitura est.”

immobilitate adhaesionis potentiae cum obiecto, non autem pro coactione et

impetuositate ita quod impellatur ad actum—quia sic esset agens per natu-
ram—, unde liberum stat cum possibili et necessario et sic est in plus quam
15 possibile vel impossibile non. Et similiter agere libere stat cum posse agere alio
modo et non alio modo sicut cum necessario et contingenti.

1 August., Enchirid. 28, n. 105 (CCL 46, 106; PL 40, 281): “Sic enim oportebat prius
hominem fieri, ut et bene velle posset, et male; nec gratis, si bene; nec impune, si male.”

1 est] add. Augustinus G || in om. ADGH || ubi] ut AGHI || est2] add. supra B ||
scilicet] supra H || scilicet] dub. C 83 F 63 B || vel] dub. E 52 C 72 F 73 EG
2 inquit] Augustinus CDIJ || prius] add. sic C || prius … hominem] fieri primum
hominem A || velle] vivere G om. A 3 nec … frustra] et g. et f. A nec g. id est
f. E || et] id est E om. H 3–4 et2 … illo] in statu isto B et in statu isto DF sed
in statu isto G etiam in statu isto I 4 primo] pro ut C || meretur] mereretur E ||
demeretur] demereturetur (!) E || vero sic] non sic AI sic non D sic F non GHJ non
sic vero I vero J 5 possit] posset G || carebit] carebunt B || quippe] quidem A
6 liberius erit] erit liberius CG || arbitrium om. AFG arbitrio H atributum I || non]
add. (lin.) B2 || non … servire] servire non poterit A 7 quasi om. G || enim om. G ||
culpanda est] e. c. E 7–8 aut voluntas non est] om. F 7 aut] add. non sed
exp. E 8 dicenda … est] danda est J’ corr. a dicenda est J’ || non2 om. ACDI ||
qua] quia I quam J || beati sic] sic beati B || sic esse] e. s. HIJ 8–9 esse … solum]
et miseri non solum esse A 9 nolimus] velimus E volumus I || velle possimus]
p. v. F || possimus] possumus G || si] sicut ABCJ 10 igitur] ergo EIJ || igitur …
nostra] ergo a. n. h. A || etiam] et ABCD || etiam nunc] n. e. G || nolle] velle CH ||
infelicitatem] infelicitate C || ita … nolle] ita non velle H || nolle2] et non velle C add.
in J 11 habitura] habitum F || est] esse C 14 quam] corr. in H

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 178 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

35 Item, Anselmus, De libero arbitrio c. 1 ait: “Qui sic habet quod decet
et quod expedit, ut hoc amittere nequeat, liberior est quam ille qui sic
habet hoc ipsum ut possit perdere.” Et ex hoc concludit: “Liberior est
igitur voluntas quae a rectitudine declinare nequit.”
36 Item probatur per rationem: 5
Et primo, ‘quia’ ita est. Nam ex praecedenti articulo habetur quod
voluntas divina necessario vult bonitatem suam, et tamen in volendo
eam est libera; ergo cum ista necessitate stat libertas. Probatio mino-
ris: Quia potentia operans circa unum obiectum non absolute sed in
ordine ad aliud, eadem est operativa circa utrumque obiectum, sicut 10
arguit Philosophus in II De Anima quod illa potentia qua cognosci-
mus differentiam obiecti unius ab obiecto alio ipsa nata est cognoscere
utrumque obiectum in se, sicut ipse arguit ibi de sensu communi. Nunc
autem voluntas divina ipsa refert ad finem alia obiecta quae sunt voli-
bilia propter finem. Ergo ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae est opera- 15

1 Anselmus, De libertate arbitrii c. 1 (ed. Schmitt, I: 207; PL 158, 491): “An non vides
quoniam qui sic habet quod decet et quod expedit, ut hoc amittere non queat, liberior
est quam ille qui sic habet hoc ipsum, ut possit perdere et ad hoc quod dedecet et non
expedit valeat adduci?”
11 Aristot., De Anima II c. 27 (Ed. Leonina, XLV1 182a; Γ c. 2, 426b12–19): “Quo-
niam autem et album et dulce et unumquodque sensibilium ad unumquodque discer-
nimus quodam, et sentimus quia differunt, necesse igitur sensu: sensibilia enim sunt …
Neque utique separatis contingit discernere quod alterum sit dulce ab albo, sed oportet
aliquo uno utraque manifesta esse.”

1 Anselmus] Augustinus CG Augustinus scilicet I || libero arbitrio] libertate arbitri H

add. qui CDGIJ || ait om. BG || decet] docet J 2 hoc om. G || amittere] emittere AJ
admittere C || liberior est] om. F || est om. J || ille] iste H 3 hoc om. CI || possit
perdere] perdere possit C || perdere] per se F || concludit] excludit E 3–4 est
igitur] est ergo EG igitur est ABCDHJ est I 4 a om. D || nequit] non potest B
5 Item … rationem] Idem probatur ratione B Idem probatur per rationem CDJ ||
per rationem] pari ratione H’ corr. in H 6 Et om. J || ita est] inest A || Nam om. B
7 suam om. I 8 eam om. AB illam CDIJ || ergo … libertas] igitur cum necessitate
stat ista libertas B ergo cum necessitate ista stat libertas E ergo etc. FG igitur cum
necessitate stat libertas H 9 unum obiectum] o. u. CJ 10 obiectum] add. in
se C || sicut] et sic C ut DIJ 11 arguit Philosophus] P. a. F || in om. ABCDHIJ ||
quod] quia I || illa] ista F 11–12 cognoscimus] cognosceremus I 12 obiecti
unius] u. o. ABCDGHIJ || obiecto] altero CDHIJ om. AB || obiecto alio] a. o. G ||
alio om. CDHIJ || ipsa] est B illa J || est om. B 13 utrumque] utrum G || ipse om. B
|| ibi om. BI 14 divina ipsa] i. d. G || ipsa om. B || alia] omnia B 14–15 volibilia]
volita HI 15 Ergo] igitur ABCDFH || potentiae om. C 15–179.1 est operativa]
operatur H

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 179

tiva circa utrumque. Sed circa illud quod est ad finem libere operatur;
patet, quia contingenter vult illa et contingentia in agendo reducitur in
principium non naturaliter activum sed libere. Ergo ipsa sub ratione
potentiae libere vult bonitatem suam.
5 Praeterea secundo probatur idem, ‘propter quid’. Et hoc primo sic: 37
Actio circa finem ultimum est actio perfectissima; in tali actione firmitas
in agendo est perfectionis; ergo necessitas in ea non tollit, sed magis
ponit illud quod est perfectionis, cuiusmodi est libertas.
Praeterea, condicio intrinseca ipsius potentiae, vel absolute vel in 38
10 ordine ad actum perfectum, non repugnat perfectioni in operando;
nunc autem libertas vel est condicio intrinseca voluntatis absolute, vel
saltem in ordine ad actum volendi; ergo ipsa libertas potest stare cum
condicione perfecta possibili in operando; talis condicio est necessitas,
et specialiter ubi ipsa est possibilis; est autem semper possibilis ubi neu-
15 trum extremum requirit contingentiam in operatione, quae est media
inter extrema—sic est in proposito, sicut probatum est in praecedenti
articulo.
Si quaeras quomodo stat libertas cum necessitate, respondeo: Secun- 39
dum Philosophum IV Metaphysicae, non est quaerenda ratio eorum quo-
20 rum non est ratio: “Demonstrationis enim principii non est demonstra-

19 Aristot., Metaph. IV c. 6 (AL XXVI3 87; Γ c. 6, 1011a13): “Demonstrationis enim

principium non est demonstratio.”

1 finem] add. mg. (dub.) circa illud quod est ad finem contingenter operatur quia con-
tingenter vult alia ergo etiam sub ratione potentiae oporteat velle bonitatem suam,
quod falsum est excidio folii verba puro aliqua desunt circa finem necessario operatur neces-
sitate omnimodae inevitibilitatis ergo ipsa subest potentiae necessario operantis (pro:
operanti) necessitate omnimodae inevitabilitatis … vult spatium decem litteras comprehen-
dens sequitur … finem effective … spatium novem litteras comprehendens sequitur E 2 et
om. C lin. H || in2] ad B 3 Ergo] igitur ABDFH 5 Praeterea om. AB || secundo]
secunda EG || idem] ratione I || quid] add. est ADF || hoc om. FG || primo om. AH
primum B || primo sic] s. p. F 6 perfectissima] perfectissime F’ corr. in perfec-
tissima (mg.) F || firmitas] libertas CDI 7 in agendo] rep. sed exp. G || ergo] igi-
tur BFH 7–8 ergo … perfectionis] om. C 7 sed] imo AC 8 quod om. D ||
cuiusmodi] cuius ACG si H 9 condicio] contradictio J || ipsius] ipsi EI 10 in]
lin. C 12 saltem om. G || ergo] igitur ABFH 12–13 ergo … possibili] om. D
12 ipsa] illa A ista BCDHIJ 13 operando] comperando C 14 specialiter] sim-
pliciter F spiritualiter H’ corr. in H || ipsa] i. e.] e. i. I || autem] enim G 15 requi-
rit] requiritur C requirat H 16 sic] sicut ACH || sicut] ut BCDHIJ || est om. I
16–17 praecedenti articulo] articulo praecedenti CDJ articulo priore I 18 libertas
… necessitate] necessitas … libertate AF 19 IV] 9 H 20 enim principii] p. e. G ||
est2] add. est F

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 180 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

tio.” Ita dico hic quod, sicut ista est immediata: “necessario voluntas
divina vult bonitatem divinam,” nec est alia ratio nisi quia haec est
talis voluntas et haec talis bonitas, sic voluntas divina contingenter vult
bonitatem seu exsistentiam alterius; et hoc, quia ipsa est talis voluntas
et istud est tale bonum—nisi addamus generaliter unum breve, quod 5
voluntas infinita necessario habet actum circa obiectum infinitum, quia
hoc est perfectionis, et pari ratione non necessario habet circa obiectum
finitum, quia hoc esset imperfectionis. Nam imperfectionis est necessa-
rio determinari ad posterius perfectionis requisitae ad prius perfectionis
concomitantis ad illud quod est simul natura. 10
40 Confirmatur istud: Quia non est eadem divisio in principium natu-
rale et liberum, et in principium necessario activum et contingenter;
aliquod enim naturale potest contingenter agere, quia potest impediri;
igitur pari ratione possibile est aliquod liberum, stante libertate, neces-
sario agere. 15

1 Ita] qua ? J || Ita dico] In Deo D || est immediata] i. e. H || necessario] dub. A

necessaria EFHI 1–2 voluntas divina] Dei voluntas H 2 divinam] suam EF ||
nec] non E || alia] aliqua D || nisi] ubi J 3 voluntas … talis] om. H || haec] illa A
|| haec] add. est G 3–5 haec … talis voluntas et] om. EF 3 sic voluntas] add.
mg. G 4 seu] sive BHJ || ipsa om. A || voluntas om. A 5 istud] illud A ||
est om. H || nisi] add. et H || generaliter om. A || quod] quia DI 6 habet actum]
a. h. H 7–8 et … imperfectionis] om. B 7 necessario om. F add. mg. G ||
habet] add. actum ABCDHIJ add. actum mg. G || obiectum] actum C 8 finitum]
infinitum F || imperfectionis] perfectionis C || Nam imperfectionis] mg. H 8–9
necessario determinari] d. n. B 9 posterius] posteriora D 10 concomitantis]
concomitanter? A concommunitatum H || simul] add. in I || natura] om. G add. et H
11 Confirmatur] Contra I || istud] illud A || divisio … principium] divisio principii
in ABDH divisio principii in principium C 11–12 naturale] add. naturale sed exp. G
12 in om. I || principium … activum] principio … activo EF 13 potest om. C
14 igitur om. G || igitur] ergo E || possible est] ponit H

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 181

[IV.—Tertius Articulus: Utrum aliquando

cum libertate stare possit naturalitas

A.—Opinio Henrici: prima vice tractata]

De tertio articulo principali dicitur quod voluntas potest esse princi- 41

5 pium spirandi Spiritum Sanctum ita quod ibi est necessitas naturae
concomitans.
Sed semper videtur dubium in quo stat per se ratio libertatis. Sive 42
enim dicatur quod stat in determinatione ad agendum sive in determi-
natione respectu actus, neutrum videtur posse salvari.
10 Hic diceretur quod cum dicitur voluntatem necessario velle, necessi- 43
tas potest determinare actum volendi ut terminatur ad obiectum. Et
sic est verum manifestum, intelligendo de bonitate divina quae sola
est proprium et per se obiectum; alia autem non sunt per se propria
obiecta; ideo non necessario vult illa. Aut potest necessitas determi-

6 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 47 q. 5 (II f. 28r Z): “Et in hoc differt quodammodo
necessitas concomitans libertatem Dei in actu volendi seipsum et in actu spirandi
Spiritum Sanctum. Quia scilicet in illo non solum ipsa libertas voluntatis sibi ipsi
necessitatem imponit sicut hic secundum iam dictum modum, immo etiam in illo
voluntatem concomitatur naturae necessitas, quia natura ipsa producto communicatur
per actum, ut infra debet exponi.”
9 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 47 q. 5 (II f. 27v X): “Sed tota dubitatio in quaestione
est cum voluntas Dei sit omnino libera, etiam in volendo seipsum, quomodo cum
voluntates libertate stat necessitas volendi—cum ista necessitas non sit ex suppositione,
sicut si dicatur velle seipsum de necessitate quando vult quemadmodum cadit necessitas
circa illa quae secundum se simpliciter et absolute sunt contingentia sed est necessitas
simpliciter et absoluta.”
12 Textum vero paene illegibilem a verbo ‘quae’ usque ad ‘actu libertas’ codex G
exhibet, imo folio humectatione polluto.

4–6 De … concomitans] om. BH 4 articulo om. D || dicitur om. FG || quod om. A

5 Spiritum Sanctum] Spiritus Sancti A 5–6 Spiritum … concomitans] om. G’
add. aliqua verba humectatione paene illegibilia adduntur, signo carentiae adhibito G 5 ibi]
add. non tantum G 6 concomitans] add. quia DI add. vel concomitantes C add.
quia J || concomitans] seq. spat. vac. quindecim litteras comprehendens A 7 Sed] add. quia
hoc C Quia H’ corr. in H2 || videtur] est G || stat] stet D || per se] om. ABH || ratio]
relatio AB 8 stat] constat D || ad] ad … actus] respectu actus sive in determinatione
ad agendum B 8–9 determinatione] divina ratione C dominatione E 10 Hic
om. DIJ || diceretur] diceremus AFJ dicetur enim CD dicere enim I 11 actum]
activum H || terminatur] determinatur B terminetur I || obiectum] agendum CDIJ
12 manifestum om. AGH || intelligendo] add. medium H || bonitate] voluntate I 13
autem om. J 14 obiecta] sola E || ideo] praem. et B || illa] ista DFI alia AGJ ||
potest necessitas] necessitas potest BE

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182 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

nare actum ut egreditur a voluntate. Et hoc potest intelligi dupliciter:

uno modo ut sit necessitas praevia ad voluntatem et voluntas intelliga-
tur cadere sub necessitate tamquam impellente in actum et figente in
actu—si sic esset, voluntas ageretur et non ageret, nec staret in tali actu
libertas; alio modo potest intelligi necessitas concomitans ita quod ipsa 5
intelligatur cadere sub necessitate sic quod voluntas propter firmitatem
libertatis suae sibi ipsi necessitatem imponit in eliciendo actum et in
perserverando sive figendo se in actu. Et si sic, ideo eam concomitatur
necessitas naturae quia vis quaedam naturae primo modo dictae, scili-
cet essentiae, sive naturae secundo modo dictae, scilicet principii natu- 10
ralis productivi similis. Talis enim assistit voluntati in communicando
naturam Spiritui Sancto.

1 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 47 q. 5 (II f. 28r Y): “Et de hac necessitate subdistin-
guendum est in proposito: quod potest considerari ut est praevia vel quasi praevia ad
voluntatem ut voluntas ipsa intelligatur cadere sub ipsa neccessitate in eo quod ad ipsa
egreditur actus volendi; vel potest considerari ut est concomitans ipsam voluntatem
ut ipsa necessitas intelligatur cadere sub ipsa voluntate in eliciendo actum. Necessitas
primo modo procul dubio auferet libertatem in eliciendo actum, ita quod voluntas in
eliciendo actum volendi non esset aliud quam natura … Unde de hoc modo necessita-
tis ut includit voluntatem dico quod Deus non vult se de necessitate sed libere tantum
aliter enim in volendo non ageret sed potius pateretur vel ageretur.”
11 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 60 q. 1 (II f. 154v T): “Ad quarum intellectum et
ad clariorem solutionem argumentorum super inductorum, sciendum est quod natura
in divinis quadrupilicter dicitur. Uno modo apellatur natura ipsa divine essentia in
qua tres personae consistunt et dicitur pure essentialiter. Secundo modo dicitur natura
principium activum naturale et sic natura est vis productiva similis est simili … Tertio
modo dicitur natura quaelibet vis naturaliter exsistens in natura primo modo, etiam etsi
sit libera illa vis et sic voluntas in Deo dicitur natura, quia scilicet est naturalis potentia
exsistens naturaliter in divina natura. Quarto modo dicitur natura incommutabilis
necessitas circa aliquem actum.” Pro elaboratione amplificationeque sensuum naturae
apud Henricum, videsis Henricus Gand., Summa a. 60 q. 1 (II f. 154v T – 155r X).

1 actum] volendi CI || hoc om. C 2 sit … ad] sit necessitas quod AG necessitas sit
praevia ad B necessitas sit praevia ad volendum C necessitas praevia ad D || praevia]
prima H’ corr. in H 2–3 intelligatur] intelligitur AG 3 cadere] eadem CHJ || et]
add. et C in I || figente] figentem F 4 actu] actum H add. quod I || si sic] sic si AG
|| ageretur] ageret AGI 5 ipsa] add. voluntas B 6 intelligatur] potest A || cadere
… necessitate] sub necessitate cadere CDIJ || necessitate] voluntate EG || sic] ita B ||
firmitatem] infirmitatem F 7 libertatis suae] s. l. B || sibi] si D || necessitatem]
necessitate C || actum] rep. B’ sed canc. Et exp. B || et] etiam H add. etiam B || in2
om. HI 8 perserverando] perservando AB perservando corr. lin. E || Et … eam] In
spiratione autem ABCDHIJ || si om. G || ideo om. G || eam concomitatur] c. e. FG
9 quia] et (supra rasuram) G || vis quaedam] q. v. A || dictae] dicto D 9–10 scilicet]
id est ABHIJ vel C id est vel D || scilicet essentiae] om. FG1 10 naturae om. AB ||
dictae] dictum A dicto D || scilicet om. D 11 Talis om. E || Talis enim] enim talis B
12 Sancto om. H

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 183

Est igitur ordo quadruplicis necessitatis: prima qua Deus necessario 44

vivit; secunda qua necessario intelligit; tertia qua necessario spirat;
quarta qua necessario diligit se.
In quo igitur est ista libertas volendi? 45
5 Respondeo: quia delectabiliter et quasi eligibiliter elicit actum et 46
quasi permanet in actu.
Contra: Secundum Richardum: “Gloriosius est quod habetur ex 47
necessitate naturae quam quod aliter habetur.”

5 Henricus Gand., Quodl. II a. 47 q. 5 (ed. Badius II f. 28r Y): “Voluntas talem actum
volendi delectabiliter et quasi eligibiliter elicit.”
7 Cf. Richardus S. Victoris, De Trinitate VI, cap. 14 (PL 196, 924C–925A): “Si
autem concedimus unde post tot praemissas rationes ambigere non possumus, si,
inquam, concedimus unam aliquam personam in vera divinitate esse tantae benevolen-
tiae, ut nihil divitiarum, nihil deliciarum habere velit quod nolit communicare, tantae
potestatis ut nihil sit ei impossible, tantae felicitatis ut nihil sit ei difficile, consequens
est ut fateri oporteat divinarum personarum Trinitatem non posse deesse. Sed ut hoc
melius elucescat, quod diffusius diximus in unum colligamus. Certe si sola una persona
in divinitate esset, non haberet cui magnitudinis suae divitias communicaret. Sed et e
converso, illa deliciarum et dulcedinis abundantia quae ex intimae dilectionis obtentu ei
accrescere potuisset, in aeternum careret. Sed summe bonum, plenitudo bonitatis non
sinit illas avare retinere, nec summe beatum, plenitudo beatitudinis istas non obtinere,
et ad honoris sui magnificentiam tam de illarum largitate laetatur, quam de istarum
fruitione gloriatur. Animadvertis ex his quam sit impossible unam aliquam in divini-
tate personam consortio societatis carere, sed si solam unam sociam haberet, ei utique
non deesset, cui magnitudinis suae divitias communicaret, sed cui charitatis deliciias
impertiret omnino non haberet. Dilectionis dulcedine nihil iucundius invenitur, nihil in
quo animus amplius delectetur. Huiusmodi dulcedinis delicias solus non possidet, qui
in exhibita sibi dilectione socium et condilectum non habet. Communio itaque amo-
ris non potest esse omnino minus quam in tribus personis. Nihil autem, ut dictum
est, gloriosius, nihil magnificentius quam quidquid habes utile et dulce in commune
deducere. Non potest vero hoc summam sapientiam latere, nec summae benvolentiae
non complacere, et quam non potest summe potentis felicitas vel summe felicis pote-
stas suo beneplacito carere, tam non potest geminae personae in divinitate tertia non
cohaerere.”

1 igitur] ergo AE || prima] scilicet una I || qua] quae D 1–2 qua … secun-
da] mg. H'2 2 qua] quae D add. Deus H || tertia] tertio B || qua2] quae D ||
qua2 om. C || spirat] inspirat D 3 qua] quam D || se om. F 4 quo] qua I ||
igitur om. A ergo EG || igitur est] est igitur D || est] erit C || ista] illa AE om. FG
5 quia] quod AF || quia delectabiliter] qua delectatur I || eligibiliter] eligenter ABI
mg. J || et2] id est BH 6 quasi om. ABFH lin. G 7 Gloriosius] add. inquit CDIJ ||
est] lin. F || habetur om. FG post naturae AE 7–8 ex … aliter] secundam naturam G
8 quam … aliter om. F || quod … habetur] quia habetur aliter C || habetur] add.
seu rep. et anticip. Respondeo necessitate naturae habetur non necessitate naturae quam
quod aliter habetur cancell., signo ‘vacat’ adhibito H

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 184 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

48 Responsio: Necessitate naturae habetur velle non necessitate natu-

rae quia esset contradictio. Ergo in ista propositione quae est de dicto
‘Deum velle se est necessarium,’ patet distinctio quod necessitas potest
determinare sic vel sic. Non aeque apparet in ista: ‘Deus vult necessa-
rio’ quae est de re, tamen eadem veritas communis est quod necessitate 5
naturae habetur actus, sed non vult obiectum neccessitate naturae.

[IV.—Tertius Articulus:

B.—Opinio Henrici secunda vice tractata]

49 De tertio principali dicitur quod in aliquo actu voluntatis divinae, actu

scilicet spirandi Spiritum Sanctum, est aliquo modo necessitas naturalis 10
sic intelligendo: voluntas, ut est simpliciter voluntas, non est principium
elicitivum actus notionalis quo producitur simile in forma naturali ipsi
producenti (quia tunc in quocumque esset, esset principium elicitivum
actus quo producetur simile in forma—quod falsum est in creaturis),
sed voluntas ut est in natura divina et ut sic per illam habet quam- 15
dam naturalitatem ad productionem notionalem, sic est principium eli-
citivum actus naturalis. Ex hoc enim quod fundatur in natura divina

17 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 60 q. 1 (ed. Badius II f. 157vI): “Dicendum quod

neque intellectus neque voluntas ratione qua sunt simpliciter intellectus aut voluntas
sunt principia elicitiva actuum notionalium per quos producuntur similes in forma

1 Responsio] add. quod ex G Respondeo HIJ add. in E || naturae … velle] velle

habetur CD velle J 1–2 naturae] lin. F mg. G add. voliti G 2 Ergo] Igitur ABDFH
|| ista] illa A || quae … dicto] om. BH || est] lin. F || dicto] Deo A’ corr. in (mg.) A2
Deo CJ divinis BC 3 patet] apparet BCDHIJ add. et I || quod] quia AG 4
determinare] add. actum volendi ABCDI2 (mg.) || sic vel] voluntatis vel volendi C ||
aeque] tantum A add. autem B || ista] illa A 5 tamen] cum D || eadem] eodem I
|| communis est] e. c. G || est2] consequitur A || quod] add. de A 6 naturae
om. J || naturae] add. si est principium eliciendi actus naturalis C seq. spat. vac. quod
tres lineas saltem textus exhibiti occupat I sic est principium eliciendi actus naturalis J
9 De tertio principali] Aliter A || De] add. articulus tertius in quo in quaeretur an
cum libertate possit stare in aliquo necessitas mg. G2 || aliquo om. J || actu om. A
mg. F || voluntatis divinae] d. v. AB || actu2 om. EGI 10 spirandi] accipiendi G
|| Spiritum Sanctum] id D Spiritum I om. CJ || est om. DI 11 non] add. (lin.)
ut H2 11–12 est2 … elicitivum] est simpliciter elicitivum principium CDIJ 13
quocumque] quibuscumque G || esset2] coniecimus cum cod. H et I et fonte om. ceteri
cod. 14 producetur] producitur D produceretur ABCGHIJ || forma] add. esset
voluntas CDJ 15 voluntas] add. divina CDIJ || ut om. G || sic] sit J || per illam]
mg. F || habet] lin. I 16 naturalitatem] necessitatem G || notionalem] corr. A2 ||
notionalem] add. vel A 16–17 sic … naturalis] = AEG(mg.) H (mg.) J om. BDFI ||
elicitivum … naturalis] a. n. e. A 17 natura] essentia H’ natura H2 || divina] et C

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sive essentia, habet sibi annexam quamdam vim istius naturae, et sic
quamdam necessitatem naturalem ab ista naturalitate sive vi naturali
annexa voluntati. Licet enim in actu voluntatis ut ordinatur in sum-
mum amatum ab ipsa sola voluntate, ratione qua est libera, sit neces-
5 sitas immutabilitatis, tamen, inquantum actio voluntatis ordinatur in
amorem productum tendentem in amatum naturaliter, sic ab illa natu-
ralitate annexa voluntati procedit necessitas immutabilitatis circa solum
actum notionalem elicitum a voluntate—vel potius ab ipsa libertate
voluntatis, ut ei talis naturalitas est annexa.
10 Additur ad hoc quod ista naturalitas in voluntate nullo modo prae- 50
venit eius libertatem nec est ratio elicitiva actus eius notionalis (hoc
enim esset omnino contra eius libertatem) sed potius est consecutiva
et annexa libertati, ut aliquid quo assistente voluntati voluntas ipsa, ex
vi quam habet ex eo quod est voluntas et libera, potest elicere suum
15 actum notionalem, quem sine illo assistente omnino elicere non posset.

naturali ipsi producenti, quia tunc in quibuscumque essent, essent principia elicitiva
actuum quibus produceretur simile in forma, quod falsum est in creaturis.”
10 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 60 q. 1 (ed. Badius II f. 157v I): “Voluntas autem
habet ipsam non ut incedendo in rationem naturae dictae secundo modo naturae sed
habendo sibi annexam vim quamdam naturae primo modo dictae ex hoc quod funda-
tur in illo ut naturalitas ista in voluntate nullo modo sit praeveniens eius libertatem, nec
ratio elicitiva actus eius notionalis penes secundum modum naturae—hoc enim esset
omnino contra ipsam libertatem—, sed potius ut sit consecutiva et annexa libertati.
Et hoc non ut aliquid quo voluntas suum actum notionalem elicit principiative sed ut
aliquid quo assistente voluntati voluntas ipsa ex vi quam habet eo quod est voluntas et
libera potest elicere suum actum notionalem, quem, sine illo assistente, omnino elicere
non posset.”

1 sive] add. in G || sibi annexam] a. s. B || vim] mg. I2 veri J || istius] illius AE

2 naturalem om. I || ista] illa A || vi naturali] n. v. H || naturali om. CDIJ 3
voluntati] add. contrahit, et sic est principium elicitivum actus notionalis G || enim
om. G || voluntatis] voluntati E || in2] ad J 4 est om. G || libera] est libera] l.
e. B 5 tamen] add. necessario G || actio om. A 6 tendentem … amatum] om. B ||
amatum] amantem CDIJ || naturaliter] = EH terminaliter ABDFGIJ terminabitur C
|| sic] sit E || illa] ista BDH 8 elicitum] elicitivum G || ipsa libertate] l. i. G
9 talis om. J || naturalitas] necessitas A 10 Additur] praem. ratio D || ista] illa AH ||
ista … modo] nullo modo ista naturalitas in voluntate CDIJ || in voluntate] mg. G
11 actus eius] e. a. A || eius2 om. G 12 esset omnino] o. e. ABF || consecutiva]
consecutiva … annexa] annexa et consecutiva AF 13 aliquid] aliquod CI || quo
om. G || assistente] coassistente AG 14 et om. A 14–15 suum actum] a. s. AB
15 notionalem] notionale I || omnino om. G || posset] possit C

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 186 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

51 Sunt ergo aliter et aliter istae propositiones necessariae in divinis:

“Deus necessario vivit,” quia necessitate naturae; “Deus necessario
intelligit,” quia necessitate intelligibilis determinantis intellectum ad
hoc, ubi est aliqua diversitas rationis; “Deus necessario spirat Spiritum
Sanctum,” quia necessitate naturali non praeveniente, sed concomi- 5
tante; “Deus necessario amat se,” necessitate consequente infinitatem
libertatis absque aliqua necessitate naturae.

[IV.—Tertius Articulus:

C.—Obiectiones contra opinionem Henrici]

52 Contra istud: Non videtur quod illud quod fundatur in aliquo possit 10
habere duplicem rationem necessitatis et illud in quo fundatur tan-
tum unicam, quia tunc circumscripta per possibile vel impossibile ista
unica ratione necessitatis, adhuc remaneret alia ratio necessitatis in fun-
dato—et ita fundatum necessarium remaneret—, et tamen non mane-
ret necessitas fundamenti. Nunc autem, secundum istos, actus notiona- 15
les fundantur in actu essentiali, et secundum omnes, actus essentiales

7 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 2 nn. 270–281(II 287–294); Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 10

nn. 10–12.30–58 (IV 343–344.352–363).
14 Scripsimus “fundato”; omnes codices autem perperam scripserunt “fundamento,”
scriptis litteris Anglicanis, ut opinamur, male intellectis.

1 Sunt … propositiones] Istae igitur propositiones sunt aliter et aliter B || ergo]

igitur ABDFH || et aliter] a. e. I || istae] illae I || necessariae in divinis] i. d. n. G
2 vivit … necessario] om. F || quia … naturae] om. G || necessitate] necessariae I
3 quia] add. quia J || necessitate] add. seu rep. naturae C 4 rationis] add. seu suppl.
quia necessitate naturae G 5 Sanctum] add. scilicet F || quia] scilicet G 6 se
om. A || se] add. quia B || infinitatem] infinita I 7 naturae om. C 10 quod illud]
i. q. D || possit] posset H’ corr. in H 11 habere] add. rationem aliquam necessitatis
ulteriorem ultra illud in quo fundatur; nec etiam quod fundatum posset habere AH
add. rationem aliquam necessitatis ulteriorem ultra illud quod est fundatum eius; nec
etiam quod fundatum posset habere B add. duplicem rationem necessitas et illud in
quo fundatur posset habere GJ || rationem] rationes B 11–12 tantum] trium? A
12 possible vel impossibile] impossible vel incompossible I || vel impossible] om. E
vel per impossibile (mg.) H || ista] illa ABCDHIJ 13 unica ratione] r. u. B ||
necessitatis] add. in fundamento ABCDHIJ 13–14 adhuc … in fundato] mg. H
13 alia ratio] r. a. B 13–14 fundato] scripsimus fundamento omnes cod. 14 ita]
illud F add. illud A || necessarium] mg. G || necessarium remaneret] r. n. AB || non]
lin. H 14–15 maneret] remaneret A 15 fundamenti] in fundamento B 15–16
actus … fundantur] notionalis actus fundatur H || notionales fundantur] notionalis
fundatur BDF 16 actu essentiali] essentiali actu et notionali F || essentiali] add. et
notionales sed. exp. G

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 187

aliquo modo sunt priores, igitur non potest esse quod in actu essen-
tiali, quo Deus diligit se, sit tantum unica necessitas et ex unica ratione
necessitatis, scilicet ex infinitate libertatis, et tamen quod in actu spi-
randi sit cum hoc alia ratio necessitatis, scilicet naturalis.
5 Praeterea, sicut memoria perfecta in supposito conveniente est per- 53
fectum principium producendi verbum perfectum, sic videtur quod
voluntas perfecta in supposito vel suppositis convenientibus sit perfec-
tum principium producendi amorem perfectum; sicut ergo memoria
in Patre est principium gignendi Filium, sic voluntas in Patre et Filio
10 est principium spirandi Spiritum Sanctum. Nec videtur, ultra rationem
perfectae memoriae vel perfectae voluntatis, coassistentia alicuius esse
necessaria sic quod sine illo assistente non posset voluntas in actum spi-
randi et memoria in actum dicendi.

[Resumptio opinionis Henrici]

15 Si intelligeret assistentiam esse ut obiecti ad potentiam, forte illa requi- 54

reretur tam in memoria quam in voluntate; et magis forte ad hoc ut
per actum communicetur natura quam ad hoc ut actus sit necessarius,
quia principiorum illorum, obiecti et potentiae, utrumque per se est
ratio propriae necessitatis in eliciendo actum suum ut suus est; sed forte
20 non utrumque esset ratio perfecta consubstantialitatis termini ad ipsum
producens. Et tunc verum esset quod non requiritur talis assistentia ad

15 Subaudi: Henricus. Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 10 q. 1, n. 25 (IV 349–350): idem

Lectura I d. 10 q. 1, n. 15 (XVII 120).

1 aliquo modo sunt] sunt aliquo modo F || igitur] ergo CEGJ || quod] lin. I 2
Deus om. FG || diligit se] se diligit CDIJ || sit] add. hoc H 3 necessitatis] add. in
fundamento DI || scilicet] rep. A lin. I || quod om. E 5 sicut] si C || conveniente]
convenienti A concomitante I’ corr. I2 7 vel] add. in DI || suppositis] add. perfectis F
|| sit] sic C 8 producendi] spirandi ABCDHIJ || ergo] igitur ABDGH 9
gignendi] generandi H || et] add. in CJ 10 Sanctum] add. sanctum B 11
perfectae om. H || perfectae memoriae] m. p. B || voluntatis] add. quod ABCGH
|| coassistentia] assistentia BG || alicuius] actus I || esse] esset ABCDFGH 12
necessaria sic] s. n. B || sic] sit E || quod] quasi I || sine om. FG || illo] add. alia A
add. non (lin.) F add. non G || posset] possit E 13 in] mg. J2 || actum] actu C
|| dicendi] add. cum memoria sit vis dictativa et ita voluntas AH 15–188.2 Si
… perfectionem] om. B scrip. in imo folio, signo interpositionis adhibito quo indicat verba
principio n. 53, scilicet ad verba ‘sicut memoria perfecta,’ esse interserenda H 15 assistentiam]
assistentia F 16 ad hoc] adhuc C 17 natura om. H 18 illorum] istorum CHJ ||
utrumque] utriusque E 19 propriae necessitatis] n. p. J 20 ratio perfecta] p.
r. CDHIJ 21 requiritur] requiriretur CDFIJ

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 188 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

actum essentialem, quia licet ibi requiratur obiectum, non tamen ut

principium communicandi suam propriam perfectionem.

[IV.—Tertius Articulus:

D.—Solutio

1. Praenotanda: quomodo natura et libertas intelligendae sint] 5

55 De isto articulo potest dici quod non est hic difficultas, accipiendo
“naturam” extensive, prout extendit se ad omne ens; sic enim dici-
mus “natura voluntatis,” immo extendendo ad non ens dicimus “natura
negationis.” Sic enim, extensive loquendo, necessitas in quocumque
ente posset dici necessitas naturalis, et tunc, cum voluntas, saltem divi- 10
na, ex sua perfecta libertate habeat necessario aliquod velle, ista neces-
sitas perfectae libertatis posset dici, isto modo, necessitas naturalis.
56 Sed difficultas non est nisi accipiendo “naturam” magis stricte, prout
scilicet “natura” et “libertas” sunt primae differentiae agentis vel prin-
cipii agendi, quomodo loquitur Philosophus II Physicorum, ubi dividit 15
causam activam in naturam et propositum: “Eorum,” inquit, “quae
fiunt propter hoc,” id est, propter finem, cuiusmodi sunt omnia quae

6 Textum vero paene illegibilem a verbo ‘De isto’ usque ad ‘prout scilicet’ codex G
exhibet, imo folio humectatione polluto. His tamen locis, in quibus textus legi possit,
eum contulimus.
15 Aristot., Physica II c. 5 (AL VII 68; 196b17–22): “Eorum autem que fiunt alia qui-
dem propter hoc fiunt, alia vero non; horum autem alia quidem secundum propositum,
alia vero non secundum propositum, ambo autem in his que sunt propter hoc; quare
manifestum est quoniam et in his que sunt secundum necessitatem et in eo quod est
sicut frequenter sint quedam circa que contingit esse que est propter hoc. Sunt autem
propter hoc quecumque ab intellectu utique agentur et quecumque a natura.”

1 actum essentialem] e. a. AB || tamen om. F 2 perfectionem] add. hoc erat a

latere ibi: sicut memoria perfecta H 6 isto] add. autem tertio C add. autem D illo H
add. etiam J || potest dici] d. p. ABCDGHIJ || hic difficultas] d. h F 7 naturam
extensive] extensive rationem naturae I || naturam] necessitatem F || prout extendit]
e. p. G 8 natura] add. necessitas F || extendendo om. J extendemus B || dicimus]
dicendo B || dicimus] add. necessitas F add. enim J 9 enim] est B || extensive]
extensione I’ corr. I2 9–10 quocumque ente] e. q. G 10 posset dici] d. p. CDIJ ||
posset] possit BE || necesitas … cum] mg. G || cum] quod C om. F 11 libertate]
liberalite B || ista] ita I 12 isto] illo AC 13 non … nisi] est B || accipiendo]
accidendo D 14 scilicet om. CDI 14–15 agentis … agendi] principii activi J
15 agendi] add. sive activi DI || Physicorum add. Cap. VI A 16 activam om. FG ||
in] esse I’ corr. in lin. I2 || naturam] materiam J 17 fiunt] sunt G || hoc om. D ||
cuiusmodi] eius AI

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 189

fiunt a per se causa, “alia quidem secundum propositum, alia vero non
secundum propositum.” Et paulo post: “Sunt autem propter hoc quae-
cumque ab intellectu utique aguuntur, et quaecumque a natura.” Et
ad istas duas causas per se reducit ibi duas causas per accidens, casum
5 scilicet et fortunam.
De hac etiam distinctione loquitur IX Metaphysicae 5 distinguens 57
modum quo potentiae activae rationales et irrationales diversimode
exeunt in actus suos: “Tales,” inquit (scilicet, irrationales potentias),
“necesse est, quando ut possunt passivum et activum appropinquant,
10 hoc quidem facere, illud autem pati; illas vero (scilicet, rationales), non
necesse” (supple: hoc facere et illud pati).
De hac distinctione loquitur Augustinus V De Civitate Dei 9: “Est 58
causa fortuita, est naturalis, est voluntaria”; et declarat ibi membra.
Ista divisio principii activi diversis nominibus exprimitur, non solum 59
15 apud diversos sed apud Aristotelem, ut patet ex II Physicorum, ubi

6 Aristot., Metaph. IX t. 10 (AL XXV3 184–185; TH c. 5, 1048a 5–10; 21–24): “Tales

quidem potentias necesse, quando ut possint passivum et activum appropinquant, hoc
quidem facere illud uero pati, illas uero non necesse.”
12 August., De civ. Dei V c. 9 n. 4 (CCL XLVII, 138–139): “Quid enim eum [sc.,
Ciceronem] adiuvat, quod dicit nihil quidem fieri sine causa, sed non omnem causam
esse fatalem quia est causa fortuita est naturalis est voluntaria? Sufficit quia omne,
quod fit, non nisi causa praecedente fieri confitetur. Nos enim eas causas, quia dicuntur
fortuitae, unde etiam fortuna nomen accepi, non esse dicimus nullas, sed latentes,
easque tribuimus vel Dei veri vel quorunlibet spirituum voluntati, ipsasque naturales
nequaquam ab illius voluntate seiungimus, qui est auctor omnis conditorque naturae.”
15 Aristot., Physica II c. 5 (AL VII 68; 196b17–22): “Horum autem alia quidem
secundum propositum, alia vero non secundum propositum, ambo autem in his que

1 fiunt] sunt G || a om. G || per om. J 1–2 alio … propositum] mg. H 2 Sunt]
lin. H 3 ab] ab … utique] utique ab intellectu B 4 ibi om. I 4–5 casum scilicet]
s. c. BC 5 scilicet om. J || fortunam] add. Et H 6 hac] secunda C ista BH ||
etiam om. AC || loquitur] add. philosophus A || Metaphysicae] add. cap. ABCDGIJ ||
Metaphysicae] 4 DEFGIJ 7 potentiae] add. potentiales EF add. potentiales sed.
exp. G 8 exeunt] sunt I’ corr. in I2 || irrationales] rationales G’ irrationales G
rationales J’ irrationales J2 || potentias] potentiales BCD potestates A potentiae G
9 necesse est] necessariae F naturae G’ necessariae G || est om. J || quando ut] u.
q. BDIJ || possunt] ponitur B possint DHIJ || passivum] passivum et activum] a.
e. p. BGH || activum] add. in naturalibus AB || appropinquant] approximatum B
approprinquantur G 10 autem] vero BDHIJ 10–11 illas … pati] mg. G3 10
vero om. DI || rationales] irrationales G’ rationales G2 11 necesse] necessarie DE
add. est ADF || et illud] illud vero J 12 V] 5 I || Dei om. EJ add. Cap. ABCD
12–13 Est causa] c. E. J 13 est] lin. H || voluntaria] voluntas quorum primum est
causa per accidens scilicet duo alia causae per se A || membra] add. quorum primum
est causa per accidens duo alia causae per se. CJ 15 sed] add. etiam BDHIJ ||
ut] sicut BH || patet] apparet et B || ex om. ABCDHIJ || II] III E 2 J

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190 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

praemisit: “secundum propositum et non secundum propositum,” et

subdit: “ab intellectu et a natura”; et in IX Metaphysicae, “rationales et
irrationales potentiae.” Per ista tria, “non secundum propositum” et “a
natura,” et “potentia irrationalis,” intelligitur illud principium activum
quod communiter dicimus naturam; per alia tria intelligit aliud prin- 5
cipium activum in quo concurrunt respectu actus extrinseci intellectus
et voluntas. Sed utrumque istorum per se acceptum habet suum pro-
prium modum principiandi: intellectus quidem per modum naturae,
unde et ad suum proprium actum comparatus natura est, sicut Filius in
divinis dicitur produci per modum naturae, licet eius principium pro- 10
ductivum sit memoria; voluntas autem semper habet suum proprium
modum causandi, scilicet libere, et ideo quando concurrit cum intel-
lectu, ut in productione artificialium, totum dicitur produci libere et
a proposito, quia propositum voluntatis est principale et immediatum
respectu illius productionis extrinsecae. 15

sunt propter hoc; quare manifestum est quoniam et in his que sunt secundum neces-
sitatem et in eo quod est sicut frequenter sint quedam circa que contingit esse que
est propter hoc. Sunt autem propter hoc quecumque ab intellectu utique agentur et
quecumque a natura.”
2 Aristot., Metaph. IX c. 5 (AL XXV 3.2; 1048a2–8): “… Et haec quidem secundum
rationem possunt movere et potentiae ipsorum cum ratione, haec autem irrationabilia
et potentiae irrationabiles, et illas quidem necesse in animato esse has vero in ambobus:
tales quidem potentias necesse, quando ut possint passivum et activum appropinquant,
hic quidem facere illud vero pati, illas vero non necesse.”

1 et] lin. F 2 et om. BC || a om. A 3 ista] illa A || tria om. J || et om. ABDH
4 et] add. a CDI || intelligitur] intelligit BCEJ || illud] idem E om. FG 5 com-
muniter] convenienter E || dicimus naturam] n. d. A || alia] ista F || tria om. DIJ
|| tria intelligit] intelligit tria C || intelligit] intelligitur ACFG add. illud DI || aliud]
aliquod F illud J 6 extrinseci] add. et G || intellectus] add. seu antic. quidam G
7 voluntas] voluntatis C || utrumque om. BC || istorum om. A add. activum H || per
… habet] habet per se acceptum B || habet] habens I 7–8 proprium om. ACDIJ ||
proprium] add. principium sed exp. G 8 modum] add. proprium CDIJ 9 pro-
prium] propositum D add. modum sed exp. G || comparatus] comparatum ACDIJ ||
est sicut] eius sed F 10 dicitur produci] producitur G 11 autem] etiam AB om. G
|| semper] per se A || proprium om. E post causandi G 11–12 proprium … cau-
sandi] suum modum causandi proprium H om. B 12 causandi] add. proprium F
significandi G’ corr. in G || scilicet] add. et F || quando om. J || cum om. H 13 ut]
sicut BDHIJ sic C || dicitur] dicimus H || produci libere] producibile D 14 imme-
diatum] add. principium DI 15 illius] istius BDH || extrinsecae] add. seu anticip. etc.
si etiam quandoque concurrat potentia naturaliter activa cum ipsa voluntate sicut est
de potentiis inferioribus quibus utimur (utuntur I’ corr. in I2) ad agendum, licet actio pro-
prie ut est illius principii sit per modum naturae, tamen quia totum subiacet voluntati,
ideo libere utimur et dicimus (dicimur I) totum libere agere a principali agente CI

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 191

Unde Philosophus IX Metaphysicae vult quod ultra intellectum 60

requiritur aliud determinans ut appetitus vel prohaeresis —alioquin
simul faceret contraria. Nam ipsa scientia simul ostendit contraria et
ipsa quantum est ex parte sui esset principium per modum naturae;
5 et necessario, quantum est ex se, causaret quodlibet respectu cuius
est potentia. “Illae,” inquit, “contrariorum quare simul faciet contra-
ria, hoc autem impossible.” Necesse ergo alterum ad esse quod pro-
prium est, hoc est, determinans ad unum oppositorum. Et subdit:
“Dico autem hoc appetitum,” etc.
10 Si etiam quandoque concurrat potentia naturaliter activa cum ipsa 61
voluntate sicut est de potentiis inferioribus quibus utimur ad agendum,
licet actio proprie ut est illius principii sit per modum naturae, tamen
quia totum subiacet voluntati, ideo libere utimur et dicimur totum
libere agere a principali agente. Et hoc modo IX Metaphysicae.

1 Hic interserunt codices ABCD paragraphum subsequentem, scilicet, paragraphum

quae his verbis ‘Si (vel: sicut) etiam quandoque …’ incipit, ante hanc paragraphum,
aliquibus lectionibus variantibus introductis; codex C. autem textum paragraphi subse-
quentis bis exhibet, prima vice ante (vide lectiones variantes supra), secunda vice post
hanc paragraphum. Attamen codex H hanc paragraphum in margine exhibet, signo
intersertionis adhibito.
1 Aristot., Metaph. IX c. 5 (AL XXV 3.2, 1048a8–11): “Hae quidem enim omnes una
unius factiva, illae autem contrarorium, quare simul facient contraria hoc autem impos-
sible. Necesse ergo ulterius aliquid esse quod dominans. Dico autem hoc appetitum aut
prohaeresim.” cf. Aristot., Metaph. IX c. 5 (AL XXV 2, 1048a8–11): “Hae namque
omnes ut una unius poetice, et illae contrarorium, quare simul faciunt contraria, sed
hoc impossible. Ergo necesse diversum quid esse quod proprium est. Dico autem hoc
orexim aut proheresim.” Cf. autem Aristot., Metaph. IX c. 5 (1048a8–11) in Bern-
hard Buerke (ed.), Das Neunte Buch (Theta) Des Lateinischen Grossen Metaphysik-Kommentars
von Averroes p. 43: “Unaquaeque enim omnium istarum agit aliam, illa vero agunt con-
traria. Agit igitur contraria insimul, quod est impossible. Ergo necesse est ut dominus
verus sit aliud. Et dico quod hoc est appetitus aut voluntas.”

1 Unde … Metaphysicae] Et hoc modo loquitur 9 Metaphysicae ubi B || Metaphysi-

cae] add. Cap. 3 A || vult] prae 9 J 2 aliud] aliquod G || determinans] terminans C
|| prohaeresis] add. et D 3 ostendit] agit DI 4 ipsa om. B || sui] sua A || esset]
esse CJ 5 quantum … se] om. B 6 est] add. in CDIJ || Illae] Istae B || simul]
ibi C sic J || faciet] faceret ABCE 7 autem] est A || Necesse] Necessario CFG ||
Necesse] add. est AC || ergo] igitur ABDFH om. C || alterum ad] aliud alterum H ||
ad] aliquid ABCJ aliquod D quidem I 7–8 proprium] propositum EF 8 hoc est]
om. I || est2] add. est E || subdit] subditur F 9 hoc om. ABHI || appetitum] add.
hoc I 10 Si etiam] sicut A 10–14 Si … Metaphysicae] om. I 10 etiam]
igitur C autem FGH || etiam quandoque] quando etiam B || quandoque om. J ||
concurrat] concurrit A || naturaliter] naturalis AB 11 inferioribus om. A 12 illius]
istius B 13 et] lin. J || totum2 om. AFG 14 Et … Metaphysicae] om. ABCDJ ||
modo] vult E || Metaphysicae] add. loquitur G

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 192 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

[IV.—Tertius Articulus:

D.—Solutio

2. Opinio propria]

62 Ad propositum, dico quod, licet aliquod principium possit concurrere

in agendo cum voluntate (puta, secundum aliquos obiectum et secun- 5
dum aliquos intellectus), et illud concurrens, quantum est ex parte sui,
sit naturaliter activum, tamen voluntas, per se loquendo, numquam
est principium activum naturaliter, quia esse naturaliter activum et
esse libere activum sunt primae differentiae principii activi, et volun-
tas, unde voluntas, est principium activum liberum. Non magis ergo 10
potest esse voluntas naturaliter activa quam natura, ut est principium
distinctum contra voluntatem, posset esse libere activa.
63 Si quaeratur: Unde est quod voluntas, licet sit necessario agens, non
tamen naturaliter agit, cum non possit natura magis esse determinata
ad agendum quam quod sit necessitata ad agere? Respondeo: Omne 15
agens naturale vel est omnino primum vel, si est posterius, est ab ali-
quo priore naturaliter determinatum ad agendum; voluntas numquam
potest esse agens omnino primum, sed nec potest esse determinata
naturaliter ab aliquo agente superiore. Quia ipsamet est tale activum
quod seipsam determinat in agendo, sic cintelligendo quod sibi relin- 20

4 possit] posset ABH 5 in … voluntate] cum voluntate in agendo BH || puta]

scilicet ita I 5–6 obiectum … aliquos] om. A 7 sit om. FG || naturaliter] add. est G
add. per se H 8 activum naturaliter] n. a. ABCDHIJ || naturaliter] essentialiter E’
corr. mg. E2 || naturaliter activum] a. n. CDIJ 9 esse om. CDIJ || activi om. J 9–10
voluntas] voluntatis H 10 unde] ut CDIJ || principum … liberum] libera activa BCJ
libere activa DHI || liberum] libere G || ergo] igitur BDFH 11 esse om. I ||
esse voluntas] v. e. ABG voluntas essentialiter esse H || quam] quod BC || est] add.
naturale A 11–12 principium distinctum] d. p. BCDHIJ 12 posset] possit BEG ||
posset esse] esse potest CDIJ 13 Si] Sed A || quaeratur] add. quod sed exp. F ||
est] A2 marg. || sit] si AG om. CHJ || sit … agens] necessario agat B 13–14 non …
agit] tamen non agit naturaliter CDIJ 14 possit] posset H || natura] alia esse H ||
natura … determinata] aliqua causa esse magis determinata B || natura magis] m.
n. CDIJ || magis esse] e. m. EF || esse om. H 15 agendum] I2 || quam] A2 || quod
om. J || sit] sic E || necessitata] necessaria BC necessitas H 16 agens naturale] n. a.
(lin.) F || est om. AC 17 priore] priori ACH || determinatum] determinatur AC ||
voluntas] add. autem A 18 sed] sicut FGI || nec om. CD 18–19 determinata
naturaliter] n. d. A 19 aliquo] alio EF 20 quod] add. secundum F || seipsam] per
se ipsam B || quod2] om. E lin. J2 add. si BH 20–193.1 relinqueretur] add. et BH

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 193

queretur, posito actu primo quo voluntas est voluntas, quod si voluntas
aliquid necessario velit puta A, non tamen istud velle naturaliter cau-
satur a causante voluntatem, etiamsi naturaliter causaret voluntatem,
sed posset contingenter habere vel non habere hoc velle, cum seipsam
5 determinaret ad hoc velle.c
Quando igitur dicitur quod naturale activum non potest magis deter- 64
minari quam quod necessitetur, respondeo: licet necessarium sit summe
determinatum, quoad exclusionem indeterminationis ad utrumlibet,
tamen aliquod necessarium alio modo est determinatum quam aliud,
10 sicut ignem esse calidum vel caelum esse rotundum est determinatum
a causante simul dante esse caeli et rotunditatem; sed grave est deter-
minatum ad descendendum, non habito necessario ab ipso generante

cHic post verba ‘intelligendo quod’ usque ad terminum paragraphi codices ACDGIJ verba

sequentia exhibent: Si voluntas necessario velit aliquid puta A, non tamen illud
15 velle naturaliter causatur a causante voluntatem, etiamsi naturaliter causaret
voluntatem; sed posito actu primo quo voluntas est voluntas, si ipsa sibi re-
linqueretur, et posset contingenter habere vel non habere hoc velle, tamen
seipsam determinaret ad hoc velle.

4 Scripsimus “cum”; omnes codices autem perperam “tamen” tradunt.

1 posito … primo] primo actu posito H || est voluntas] mg. H || voluntas2] add. se
ipsa H || quod om. B || si] sit H 2 aliquid … velit] n. v. a. B || necessario om. F
|| A] alia H || non … istud] istud tamen velle B || istud] illud FH || velle] non B
3 voluntatem] voluntate H || etiamsi] vel si H 4 cum] scripsimus tamen om. cod.
6 igitur] ergo AE || quod] add. hic? C || potest magis] m. p. F 6–7 magis deter-
minari] d. m. G 7 respondeo] responsio J add. quod DIJ || necessarium] acti-
vum F 8 determinatum] add. per se determinationis sed exp. H || indeterminatio-
nis] determinationis H || utrumlibet] utrumque BCDHI 9 alio] aliquo A || est]
add. magis A2 (mg.) G 10 ignem] lignum B || calidum] spat. vac. (mg.) quinque lit-
teras comprehendens C || est] esse I corr. I2 10–11 determinatum … causante]
a causante determinatum C 11 causante] creante J || simul] ut G vel I || caeli]
caelo E || rotunditatem] add. et esse ignis et rotunditatem C 12 descendendum]
descensum G || necessario om. B || necessario] add. et esse ignis et caliditatem J ||
generante] gravante (dub.) J 12–194.1 generante … ipso] om. F 14 necessario velit]
om. A || necessario] necessario … aliquid] a. v. n. G || A om. ACD || non om. A ||
tamen] tantum C || illud om. A istud I 15 velle] non G || naturaliter causatur] c.
n. G || causatur] creatur J || causatur … naturaliter] om. A || causante] creante J ||
voluntatem] voluntate D corr. ex voluntate I2 || causaret] crearet J 16 voluntatem]
mg. G2 volendo volendo I’ volitionem I2 || sed] add. relinqueretur sibi et mg. G2 ||
posito … est voluntas] mg. G2 || si … sibi] quod si mg. G2 17 et om. A etiamsi I ||
et] add. si D || hoc] illud I

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 194 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

actu descendendi, sed tantum habito ab ipso principio naturaliter de-

terminativo ad descendendum. Voluntas creata, si necessario vult ali-
quid, non sic est determinata a causante ad illud velle sicut grave ad
descensum, sed tantum a causante habet principium determinativum
sui ad hoc velle. Si dicas, si descensus gravis causatur a gravitate intrin- 5
seca, tunc grave movet se, quare ergo non aeque libere sicut voluntas
se ad illud velle, respectu cuius ipsa voluntas est necessaria ratio cau-
sandi? Respondeo: illa causatio gravitatis respectu descensus gravis est
naturalis, quia hoc est hoc et illud est illud.
65 Breviter, posset dici quod forma, esse, et modus essendi— agere et 10
modus agendi—sunt immediata; ideo, sicut non est alia ratio quare hoc
habet talem modum essendi, nisi quia est tale ens, sic non est alia ratio
quare hoc habet talem modum agendi, puta libere, licet necessario
agat, nisi quia est tale principium activum, scilicet liberum.

5 Textum vero paene illegibilem ab verbis ‘Si autem’ usque ad ‘illud est illud’ codex G
exhibet, imo folio humectatione polluto.
5 Duobus verbis exemptis, textus qui incipit verbis ‘si dicas’ et explicit cum verbis ‘illud
est illud’ a scriptore codicis B inter paragraphos n. 66 et n. 67 interponitur.
14 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 10 nn. 6–9.30–58 (IV 341–342.352–363); Cf. Scotus,
Ordinatio I d. 2 nn. 327–344 (II 322–332).

1 actu] actum E || sed tantum] licet tamen D || tantum] tamen EI || ab ipso] om. DI
1–2 determinativo] determinabitur B determinato G || determinativo] add. aliquid I
2 Voluntas] add. autem CDJ add. tamen I || creata] causata G || si] scilicet E’ corr.
mg. E2 summo I’ corr. I2 3 non] nec BH || causante] creante ABCJ 4 descensum]
descendendum C || causante] creante ABCDFIJ 5 ad] ab G 5–14 Si … liberum
(ad finem n. 65)] om. A 5–9 Si … est illud] om. EF 5 Si dicas] om. BH ||
gravis om. BH 6 grave om. B || ergo] igitur BDH || aeque] eam D || aeque
libere] l. a. J || voluntas] add. movet B 7 se om. H || ipsa voluntas] om. B ||
voluntas] non J 8 illa om. B || gravis] = C gravitatis HI om. BJ gravis C gravitat
gravitas D 8–9 est naturalis] n. e. J 9 naturalis] add. ista est libera BHJ ||
est om. CI 10 Breviter] add. igitur CDIJ || quod] add. esse BG (lin.) || forma]
formae BG || esse om. CDIJ 11 modus] modo D || immediata] add. et G || non
om. C || alia] aliqua D 12–13 essendi … modum] om. C 12 non] nec H || alia]
aliqua CDI om. F 13 modum] add. seu rep. essendi nisi quia est tale ens sic non est
alia ratio quare hoc habet talem modum BD || libere om. D || licet] vel B 14 agat
om. B || est] habet B || activum scilicet liberum] s. a. l. H || liberum] necessarium G

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[V.—Ad argumentum in contrarium]

Ad argumentum in contrarium: Dici potest quod intentio Augustini est 66

ibi contra Ciceronem, qui negavit praescientiam Dei ne ex illa prae-
scientia concessa, oporteret eum negare liberum arbitrium nostrum.
5 Augustinus autem docet qualiter praescientia et liberum arbitrium
simul stant, et arguendo: “Si,” inquit, “Deo certus est ordo causa-
rum, quod concessit ipse Cicero.” Subdit Augustinus: “Et ipsae quippe
nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, quoniam humanae volun-
tates humanorum operum causae sunt, atque ita, quia omnes rerum
10 causas praescivit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras voluntates igno-
rare non potuit.”
Et post: “Quomodo ergo ordo causarum, praescienti Deo certus, 67
illud efficit ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cum in ipso causarum ordine

3 Cicero, De natura deorum III c. 26ss (De Natura Deorum, v. II, ed. Arthur Stanley Pease
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 1017ss.
6 August., De civ. Dei V c. 9 n. 3 (CCL XLVII 138): “Non est autem consequens, ut,
si Deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nistrae voluntatis arbitrio.
Et ipsae quippe nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo eiusque
praescientia continetur, quoniam et humanae voluntates humanorum operum causae
sunt; atque ita, qui omnes rerum causas praescivit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras
voluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse praescivit.”
12 August., De civ. Dei V c. 9 n. 4 (CCL XLVII 139): “Quo modo igitur ordo
causarum, qui praescienti certus est Deo, id efficit, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cum
in ipso causarum ordine magnum habeant locum nostrae voluntates?”

3 ibi] hic G ibidem I add. arguere AB || Ciceronem] Ciseronem B auctorem H’ Cice-

ronem (mg.) H2 || qui] quae I || Dei ne] sine BH || illa] ista ACDFG 3–4 prae-
scientia] add. Dei AB 4 concessa] add. et ideo G || oporteret] oportet AFG add.
determinet? A || nostrum om. C 6 et] in CI sic EG ita J || Si … Deo] Inquit si
Deo B || inquit] add. in H || Deo] Deus ABD || certus] certum vel C || certus est]
e. (mg.) c. G e. c. H || ordo] add. omnium ACDHIJ 7 quod om. C || Cicero] et
secundo B || Et] Quod F || quippe] quidem ABC 8 nostrae voluntates] v. n. B ||
quoniam] quia I quomodo E 8–9 quoniam … operum] quantum voces huma-
nae humanorum actuum B 9 causae sunt] s. c. CDHIJ || atque] at que H ||
ita] om B || quia om. BCDI quod EG || omnes] omnium C 10 causas] om B ||
profecto] perfecte BC imperfecte (sed corr.) H perfectio J || etiam] et BCJ || nostras]
nosceretur H’ corr. in mg. H2 10–11 ignorare … potuit] stare … ponit I 12 Quo-
modo] Quoniam ACD || ergo om. GJ igitur BFH || causarum om. C || praescienti]
praescitarum a H || certus om. CDIJ creatus H’ corr. H2 13 illud] id J || nihil sit]
vel tunc A || voluntate om. C || in2 om. C

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196 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

magnum habeant locum nostrae voluntates?” Et in sequenti capitulo:

“Non propterea nihil est in nostra voluntate, quia Deus praescivit quid
futurum esset in nostra voluntate; non enim nihil sed aliquid praescivit,
profecto et illo praesciente est aliquid in nostra voluntate.” Respon-
dendo autem vult ostendere quomodo simul stent necessitas illa quam 5
in praescito requirit praescientia, et tamen quod praescitum sit in pote-
state nostra. Hoc quidem non esset verum, si esset ibi necessitas vio-
lentiae, de qua ait: “Si nolumus, efficit quod potest, sicut est necessi-
tas mortis.” Sed si est necessitas qualiscumque, de qua solemus dicere,
“necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat aliquid,” non oportet timere 10
quod talis necessitas, si ponatur in actu nostro praescito, nobis auferat
libertatem, quia ista necessitas praescientiae, vel praesciti ut praesciti,
etsi sit necessitas immutabilitatis, non tamen est simpliciter necessitas
inevitabilitatis sive omnimodae determinationis, sed tantum est inevita-
bile ex praesuppositione ista, quod illud est iam praescitum. 15

1 August., De civ. Dei V c. 10 n. 2 (CCL XLVII): “Non ergo propterea nihil est in
nostra voluntate, quia Deus praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra voluntate. Non
enim, qui hoc praescivit. Nihil praescivit. Porro si ille, qui praescivit quid futurum esset
in nostra voluntate, non utique nihil, sed aliquid praescivit: profecto et illo praesciente
est aliquid in nostra voluntate.”

1 habeant] habeat E’G habeant E2 || voluntates] add. seu rep. in sequenti capitulo
non propterea nihil est in nostra voluntate cum in ipso causarum ordine magnum
habeant locum nostrae voluntates concell., signo ‘va-cat interposito H 2 || Et] Etiam AD
2 propterea] propter hoc E || est om. FG || quid] quod EFG 3 voluntate] add. seu
rep. quia Deus praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra voluntate exp. H2 3–4 non …
voluntate] mg. H2 3 enim] est H || sed] si E om. F || aliquid] verum F 4 et
… praesciente] praesciente et illo C || est aliquid] a. e. G 4–5 Respondendo]
respondeo G responsio J 5 autem] igitur quia C igitur DI Augustinus G igitur
quod J || necessitas illa] i. n. H || quam] qui E 6 praescito] praesciente ABCDFH
6–7 potestate nostra] n. p. H 7 si] sic H 8 nolumus] volumus EIJ || sicut]
illud A 9 necessitas] add. mortis I || qualiscumque] add. est necessitas CDIJ 10 ut]
igitur D || aliquid om. CJ || vel] add. ut G || ita … aliquid] fiat B || non] add. a H ||
oportet] debet D 11 talis] add. esse F || auferat] aufert F 12 ista] illa A ||
ista necessitas] n. i. I || praescientiae vel] praescibilis praesciti ut H || vel om. F ||
ut praesciti] om. ACFH 13 etsi] si A || non] ideo I || tamen est] e. t. AEG ||
simpliciter necessitas] n. s. ABH 14 sive om. CD || est om. CFIJ 14–15 inevitabile]
in evitabile C 15 ex om. BDHIJ || praesuppositione] suppositione ACFG || ista]
illa A ita H || quod illud] quia illud (mg.) tantum G quia illud J

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 beati ioannis duns scoti quaestio 16 197

Et ad ostendendum quod non qualiscumque necessitas tollat liber- 68

tatem, subdit illud ex quo argutum est: “Neque enim et vitam Dei
et praescientiam,” etc. Si praecise dixisset “praescientiam,” facile esset
qualiter illam non ponimus sub necessitate, quae scilicet repugnet liber-
5 tati, quia libere et contingenter praescit hoc, licet supposito quod prae-
sciat, immutabiliter praesciat. Et eodem modo est de actu meo prae-
scito, quod licet immutabiliter sit praescitus, tamen contingenter ex
parte Dei praescientis; et similiter relinquitur contingentia ex parte mei
exequentis.
10 Sed difficilius est quia addit: “Vitam et praescientiam.” Sed ibi potest 69
esse duplex responsio: Una quod vita accipiatur pro actu beatifico, sicut
accipitur vita Iohannis 17: “Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te,” et
sicut loquitur Philosophus XII Metaphysicae: “Intellectus actus vita;” et
pari ratione actus voluntatis est vita; ista vita non cadit sub necessitate
15 excludente libertatem, etiam in Deo. Quod si intelligatur vita pro vita
naturali ipsius Dei, tunc non debet intelligi de illa vita secundum se
accepta, sed de ipsa ut a voluntate divina accepta; bene autem potest

2 August., De civ. Dei V c. 10 n. 1 (CCL 47, 140): “Neque enim et vitam Dei et
praescientiam Dei sub necessitate ponimus, si dicamus necesse esse Deum semper
vivere et cuncta praescire.”
12 Io. 17:3
13 Aristot., Metaph. XII c. 7 (AL XXV 3.2; 1072b25–30): “intellectus actus vita.”

1 Et om. C || necessitas] mg. H2 || tollat] tollit BFG 2 illud] idem G || enim

om. DGIJ || et om. C 3 etc] etiam A || Si] Etiamsi AD?I Similiter C || esset] add.
videre ACJ2 4 quae scilicet] quasi AC || repugnet] repugnaret EFG repugnat J
5 libere] lin. I2 || et om. FGJ || hoc] lin. H2 || supposito] praesupposito BDHI 5–6
praesciat] sciat H’ corr. a praesciat H2 || praesciat … praesciat] sciat immutabiliter A
praesciat mutabiliter praesciat B immutabiliter praesciat et immutabiliter CD immuta-
biliter praesciat IJ 6 Et] In H’ corr a H2 6–8 Et … praescientis] om. J 6 meo]
nostro AC modo H’ sed exp. H2 7 quod] quia AC qui G || immutabiliter sit] s. i. A i.
scit GH 8 parte om. F || similiter] lin. H2 || contingentia] praescientia J’ sed exp. J2
(later hand) || contingentia] contingenter A || mei] nostri ADHI 10 quia] quod J ||
et] ad H 11 esse] esse duplex] d. e. EF || responsio] spat. vac. comprehendens quin-
que litteras J || Una om. F || accipiatur] accipitur I || actu] statu CJ || sicut] sed E’
sicut mg. E2 12 vita om. B || est] add. autem A || aeterna om. B || cognoscant]
cognoscam E || te] add. etc. BCDHIJ 13 sicut] sic H || Philosophus om. H ||
vita] add. est CDIJ || et om. B 14 est vita] v. e. ABCDIJ || vita] add. est. mg. J ||
ista] illa AF || ista vita] v. i. H || vita2 om. G || sub necessitae] om. H 15 Quod si]
lin. I2 || intelligatur] intelligitur H || vita pro] p. v. CJ || pro] add. ut AC add. actu B
16 illa] ista BDHI 17 a] de B || divina] Dei H om. J || accepta2] acceptat D accep-
tata potest F acceptata GH || bene autem] ubi ibi A 17–198.1 bene … aliquid]
potest autem bene aliquid F potest autem aliquid bene G

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 198 timothy b. noone and h. francie roberts

aliquid in se esse necessarium, etiam necessitate repugnante libertati,

quamvis tamen sit libere, immo contingenter acceptum.
70 Exemplum: si quis voluntarie se praecipitat et semper in cadendo
idem velle continuat, necessario quidem cadit necessitate gravitatis na-
turalis, et tamen libere vult illum casum; ita Deus, licet necessitate vivat 5
vita naturali, et hoc tali necessitate quae excludit omnem libertatem,
tamen libere vult se vivere tali vita; ergo vitam Dei non ponimus sub
necessitate; intellige “vitam” ut a Deo libera voluntate dilectam.

8 vitam: subintellige verbum Augustini iam citatum.

1 aliquid in se esse] in se esse aliquid I || in om. C || in … esse] esse in se B ||

etiam] et B 2 quamvis] quam J || quamvis tamen] quod I’ corr. lin. I2 || immo]
in medio EH || acceptum] acceptatum BDGHI 3 quis] aliquis H || voluntarie
se] s. v. CJ || praecipitat] praecipitans A || et semper] om. BCDGHI 3–4 in …
velle] illud velle in cadendo A 4 idem] illud ABCGHJ || continuat] continuet E ||
quidem] quod B’ corr. in B2 4–5 naturalis] add. deorsum (sig. inv. adh.) G 5 illum]
istum BDHI || necessitate] necessario DHIJ 6 hoc] add. in CDI add. etiam J ||
tali] est A 7 tamen] cum C || libere vult] v. l. G || ergo] igitur BDFH || Dei] add.
ut B 8 intellige] dub. I intelligendo A intelligere J || vitam] vita E || ut] et D ||
a Deo] actio H restit (mg.) H2

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 THE QUODLIBETA OF JOHN OF POUILLY († CA. 1328)
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
DEBATES AT PARIS 1307–1312

Ludwig Hödl

In the medieval and early modern periods, John of Pouilly was known
above all for his trial at the Papal Curia in Avignon (1318–21), where
he retracted his censured theses concerning the pastoral authority of
the pope following their condemnation, since this condemnation, long
afterwards the subject of vigorous defense but also criticism, settled the
disastrous conict over the pastoral privileges of the mendicant orders.1
John, born in Pouilly (either near Beauvais or, more likely, near Laon),
held one of the secular chairs of theology at the University of Paris
from 1307 to 1312.2 He was a student of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey
of Fontaines, and he bragged that he had also been a student of the
famous Dominican theologians Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.3
Therefore, in the 1270s he personally experienced the renaissance of
theology at the Dominican studium in Paris, but also the disciplinary
action against the Parisian philosophers and theologians by Bishop
Étienne Tempier.
The secular schools in Paris were particularly affected by the con-
demnation, since, according to the course of study, their teachers
came from the arts faculty. The spokesman for the secular masters in
the last quarter of the thirteenth century was Henry of Ghent, one
of the advisors (assessores) to the Parisian bishop in the condemnation.
But as magister artium (and thus of philosophy), he was familiar with the
inuence and impact of philosophy and the arts masters on theology.

1
See H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum (34th ed., Freiburg
1967), p. 287, nos. 921–4.
2
On his biography see the still valid article by N. Valois in Histoire littéraire de la
France 34 (1914), pp. 220–81, and J. Koch, “Der Prozess gegen den Magister Johannes
de Polliaco und seine Vorgeschichte,” RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 391–422.
3
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10vb; for manuscript sigla, see at note 12 below):
“. . . doctores excellentissimi, scilicet Albertus, Thomas et Godefredus . . . illi mihi
contemporanei et conterranei fuerunt et etiam doctores mei . . .” But when could John
have heard Albert and Thomas in Paris?

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He wanted to stem this inuence and to bring theology back to the

patristic tradition. His followers in the schools, the Gandavistae, swore
by the words of their teacher and would tolerate no contradiction.
The ecclesiastical condemnation (under cover of the authority of Holy
Scripture) and Henry’s reputation within the walls of the University
enticed and seduced these followers into academic intolerance, which
John of Pouilly at times bemoaned bitterly.
In the controversial question whether the freedom of the will has
a rational foundation as free choice (liberum arbitrium), which Henry
of Ghent and his students rejected in the strongest terms on biblical
grounds, John of Pouilly remarks in Quodlibet II, q. 13:
‘God be praised!’ I know—and it was not too long ago—that in Paris
there was only one who tried to defend this position, which I hold as
correct. God knows the reason and, likewise so do I! Now many defend
it at Paris, and among them the better thinkers, and it must be held, as
long as the natural capacity to judge lasts and the nature of things does
[not] change.4
John resisted this “school-conformism” of the Gandavistae and promoted
the argumentative openness of scientic theology, externally in the
realm of the schools and internally in the understanding of science.
In the Quodlibeta he took this path.
This chapter is divided into ve sections with the following topics: 1)
How John of Pouilly’s Quodlibeta I–V (I–VI in the Nuremberg manu-
script) are transmitted in two redactions and are part of a larger body
of questions; 2) how the scholastic debates in these Quodlibeta reveal
numerous insights into the theological schools of the University of
Paris, above all on the opposition to and rejection of Henry of Ghent
and his followers, the Gandavistae; 3) John’s necessary reorientation of
theological knowledge along the lines of Aristotelian thought; 4) how
the scholastic disputes reveal the focal points and difcult issues of
the discussion: a) the truth of faith and its demonstrability, b) human
freedom as freedom of judgment and choice, c) the necessary habitus
of moral goods, of grace, and of the eternal vision of God, d) the
internal and external constitution of the Church, e) current problems;
5) the development of the schools in the Quodlibeta.

4
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 13 (P 58rb).

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 the QUODLIBETA of john of pouilly 201

John of Pouilly’s Quodlibeta I–VI

In accordance with the statutes of the University of Paris, John of

Pouilly’s 1307 promotion to master in the theological faculty began with
the vesperiae, the introductory disputation on the eve of the promotion,
for which the candidate had to propose four questions in advance.5
Two senior masters—in the case of John’s promotion, Henricus
Augustinensis, that is Henry Friemar the Elder (†1340), master of
theology since 1305, and (probably) Thomas of Bailly (†1328), mas-
ter since 1301—posed the question and opened the disputation with
their arguments against the thesis of the candidate.6 The latter had to
respond one last time as bachelor. The next day, in the morning, the
incipient master, acting for the rst time as such, had to take over the
reins of the disputation in the aula of the bishop of Paris’ residence,
putting forth his determinatio, the master’s doctrinal decision. This act
of ofcial disputation and determination signed and sealed the master’s
position and authority.
Naturally, for the promotion to master, the scholars chose themes
of contemporary debate in which they could put their ability to argue
and to determine to the test.7 John of Pouilly discussed God’s creative
power with respect to the innite plurality of individuals, as regards
future contingency and immaterial creatures. Once again the problem
of free will arises in the context of this question: Does what is (con-
tingent) individual and future come to be, exist, and remain under a
persistent essential form, the divine idea, or do only creatable-temporal
circumstances meet the requirements of the free, time-bound choice
of the will? In their response, scholastics gave opinions that were in
sharp opposition, an opposition that in turn divided their positions on
the doctrine of divine ideas.
John’s aula determination ended in an uproar, as I have discussed
elsewhere.8 The students and bachelors engaged in a battle of words,

5
See J. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu
Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, part 1 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,
13) (Münster 1927), pp. 160–8: “Die Vesperien und die Aula des Durandus.”
6
John of Pouilly, Quaestio ordinaria 7 (P 219va): “. . . sed doctores aliqui etiam contra
dicta tunc arguerunt, primo Henricus Augustinensis . . .” Quodl. II, q. 13 (N 47va).
7
Cf. the themes of Durand of St Pourçain, who was promoted to master a few
years later, in 1313. Koch, Durandus, pp. 167ff.
8
L. Hödl, “Die Aulien des Magisters Johannes von Pouilly und der scholastische

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in which the Gandavistae, the followers of Henry of Ghent, stood out.

“One shouted after the other,” John writes, “such that I could not say a
word.”9 His two fellow masters, the co-disputants, did not, as François-
Xavier Putallaz believes, cause this incident, but rather the students
who wanted to block the magisterial determination and thereby John’s
promotion.10 John of Pouilly’s conict with the Gandavistae henceforth
grew all out of proportion and the protagonists did not refrain from
personal disparagements and insults, with accusations of ignorance
and negligence. But the followers of Henry of Ghent found allies in
the other schools, who severely criticized the new master’s doctrine
of the will; indeed in the same place John opines that his opponents
have grouped together like the (biblical) Pharisees and Sadducees at
the condemnation of Jesus (Matthew 22:23). The scientic environment
of the University of Paris in the rst decade of the fourteenth century
was still very tense. The Condemnation of 1277 and a fundamental-
ist party among the theologians opposed academic freedom. John
of Pouilly cast himself with Godfrey of Fontaines on the side of the
secular masters in Paris in favor of academic freedom in research and
teaching at the University.
John of Pouilly wrote ve or, in the Nuremberg tradition, six Quod-
libeta. But this sixth Nuremberg Quodlibet contains just a single question,
as manuscript N explicitly states: “Hic incipit VI quodlibet magistri
Joh<annis> de Polliaco et est una quaestio sola, videlicet utrum Deus
possit producere multitudinem actu innitam.” “Can God bring about
in actuality an innite number (of creatures)?” As was shown above,
this question originally comes from the vesperies. John “labeled” it a
Quodlibet and imparted to it the literary quality of a public University
disputation. He published it together with the ve “ofcial” Quodlibeta.
On the one hand, they were published in accordance with the statutes
by the University stationers and, on the other, by his own account John
also published them himself in their entirety. The difference between
institutional and personal publication deserves great attention, since it
indicates the development of free-standing and independent authorial
publications.

Streit über die Begründung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit,” Scholastik 35 (1960),

pp. 57–75.
9
John of Pouilly, Quaestio ordinaria 7 (P’ 209vb): “. . . suis clamoribus unus post alium
sic me impedierunt, quod non potui dicere verbum . . .”
10
F.-X. Putallaz, Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Vestigia, 15)
(Fribourg 1995), pp. 65ff.

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 the QUODLIBETA of john of pouilly 203

As Glorieux showed,11 Quodlibeta I–III were published in a rst redac-

tion in Paris, BnF lat. 14565 (= P’). This publication, under the aus-
pices of the University stationers, contains the “notarially” certied,
ofcial version, which was copied down at the disputation and (in
accordance with precise regulations) was made available to the public.
The remaining four manuscripts report the unied, complete version
of the Quodlibeta, which John himself undertook:

P = Paris, BnF lat. 15372

F = Firenze, BNC, II.I.117
N = Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III.75
V = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 101712

The principal witness is Paris, BnF lat. 15372, which states explicitly
that it was written in 1328, and which was part of John’s legacy to the
library of the Sorbonne (later, it went from there into the Bibliothèque
nationale de France). This information concerning the origin of the
manuscript should also serve as an indicator of John’s year of death,
for which the traditional “post 1321” is merely conjectural. After his
return from Avignon in 1321 and his retraction of the condemned
theses, John dedicated himself to the publication of his opus. The
other witnesses to the text, F and V, are both copies that were made
in the stationers’ workshop on the basis of the borrowed exemplar.
The Vatican copy is (according to my observations) extremely rife with
errors. The Nuremberg manuscript is demonstrably a copy of P, and
therefore deserves special consideration.13
John of Pouilly reworked and published his Quodlibeta as a unied
whole. There are clear traces of this, if one notes that the frequent
internal references extend not only to the preceding questions that have
already been treated, but also to the following questions that are still to
be discussed. In Quodlibet II, q. 3 (concerning the threefold distinction),
he cites what was said “supra in quaestione praecedenti, membro 3 in
secunda ratione,” immediately he refers ahead to “infra quinto quolibet

11
Glorieux I, pp. 223–8, II, p. 181.
12
L. Hödl, “Die Kritik des Johannes de Polliaco an der philosophischen und theolo-
gischen ratio in der Auseinandersetzung mit den averroistischen Unterscheidungslehren,”
Miscellanea M. Grabmann, Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Institutes III (Munich 1959) (pp. 11–30),
pp. 12–13.
13
L. Hödl, “‘Non est malitia in voluntate . . .’ Die magistrale Entscheidung der Pariser
Theologen von 1285/86 in der Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco, Quodl. I, q. 10,”
AHDLMA 66 (1999), pp. 245–97, esp. pp. 264–6.

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quaestione tertia,” and a little later there appears once more, “ut
ostendetur evidentissime infra quodlibet V quaestione tertia.”14 These
precise indications of passages make it clear that John had his entire
opus at hand. John was also able to take the time and trouble to enrich
the apparatus fontium. For Quodlibet I, q. 11, he studied the doctrinal
position of Thomas Aquinas concerning the (otherworldly) vision of
God and the necessary disposition for it, collecting passages from all the
important works of Thomas and putting them together in a remarkable
apparatus that thoroughly corresponds to our contemporary notions
of an apparatus fontium.15
A comparison of the nal text with the earlier, University-published
one (of the rst three Quodlibeta) shows—as has long been noted16—that
John inserted numerous questions into the draft, such as, for example,
questions 3–5 of Quodlibet II, concerning the demonstrability of Creation
in time. He nished this opus with a comprehensive analysis of its
entirety, such that this authentic text of the Quodlibeta also attests to
their being revised at the master’s “desk.” In the thirteenth century,
quodlibeta are the litteratura of the schools, but in the fourteenth century
they increasingly become also the “literature of the desk.”
In addition to John of Pouilly’s authentic Quodlibeta, the (surviving)
collections of his questions should not be neglected, above all the one
in Paris, BnF lat. 15371, which likewise came to the Sorbonne from
John’s legacy: “Iste liber est pauperum de Sorbonia . . . de legato magistri
Johannis de Polliaco, in quo continentur multae quaestiones disputatae
ab eodem.” Moral-theological questions, especially concerning the essen-
tial and ethical signicance of habitus, take up a great deal of space.
These collections of questions need to be examined. It goes without
saying, however, that a critical edition of the Quodlibeta is rst called for.
Since this work, in turn, requires the critical edition of the Henry of
Ghent’s Quodlibeta, so far further progress has not been possible.

14
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 3 (P 36ra, V 48rb).
15
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 22ra, V 28va).
16
Hödl, “Die Aulien,” p. 64.

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 the QUODLIBETA of john of pouilly 205

The Scholastic Debates with the Gandavistae in the School of Henry of Ghent

The disputations in the schools proceeded by means of arguments pro

et contra that were put forth by the students and bachelors. These were
under the direction of the masters actu regentes, who ofcially supervised
the sessions and determined the debates. In theology, the arguments
were supported by Holy Scripture, Church doctrine, and philosophi-
cal ratio. The latter had been restrained by theological reins since the
Condemnation of 1277, particularly in the school of Henry of Ghent.
At his promotion to master, John of Pouilly must have experienced
this restriction.
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, John of Ghent taught
in the school of Henry of Ghent; documents witness him as master of
theology and canonicus of Paris in 1303 and again in 1304–06.17 In 1309
he acted as a theological expert in the case against Marguerite Porete.18
On 11 March 1310 he acquired from Pope Clement V the privilege of
receiving the proceeds of his parochial prebend of Kieldrecht in Tournai
for three years while teaching at Paris.19 Assuming that John of Ghent’s
writings were not published under the pseudonym of John of Jandun
(Genduno, Gauduno, Ganduno <Ardennes>), we have no direct literary
witness to his doctrine and must rely entirely on information contained
in the Quodlibeta of John of Pouilly.20 This is all the more noteworthy
in that it also markedly limits our information concerning the school
of Henry of Ghent and its later life (to the great detriment of the
Magister Sollemnis). It cannot be excluded that this literary blockade of
the school of the Gandavistae was also directed against the master from
Ghent, one of the assessores of the Paris condemnation, which, insofar
as it pertained to Thomas Aquinas, was repealed in 1325.
In the quaestiones ordinariae of his promotion to master, John of Pouilly
sharply opposed the “intentional distinction” that Henry of Ghent had
employed in connection with the classical (real and rational) distinc-
tions. On the basis of Aristotelian logic and categorical theory, John of
Pouilly could understand and permit this additional distinction only as

17
CUP II, nos. 635 (p. 103) and 658 (p. 121).
18
CUP III, no. 660.
19
CUP III, no. 660 (pp. 142ff.).
20
See C. Lohr, “Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought and Religion,”
Traditio 26 (1970) (pp. 135–216), p. 208.

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a special type of rational distinction. John of Ghent, in the school of

the master from Ghent, rejected this criticism and accused the newly
promoted master from Pouilly of “ignorantia” and “negligentia” of
Henry of Ghent’s doctrinal tradition. Either he did not understand this
doctrine of distinction or he had not read the supporting arguments
at all (in the writings of Henry of Ghent). For the new master, this
accusation was as much an affront to his honor as it was abusive; he
responded and he recorded this reply in Quodlibet I, q. 5. This question
is an important source for the school tradition of the master of the
Gandavistae: “Can a difference of things according to reason actually,
formally, and completely precede every operation of the intellect?”21 The
formulation of the question is remarkable! It concerns not simply what
intentional difference distinguishes, but rather whether such a distinc-
tion is formally and essentially something other than the (usual) rational
distinction. Irrespective of this intentional distinction—however it may
be understood—, it is asked whether something other than the rational
distinction could be meant by it. John of Pouilly rmly denies that, in
the spirit and teaching of Henry of Ghent, the intentional distinction
is some other (free-standing) third difference, and refers to a series of
questions from Henry of Ghent’s fth and tenth Quodlibeta.22
The master from Ghent understood intentio not only in the logical
sense of rst and second intentions, concepts, and categories (species
and genus); “intention” also means that formal element of meaning of
the essence without which the essence cannot be understood (intellectus
tentio).23 The intentional distinction is not real, nor is it purely rational; it
ranks as formal. In Quodlibet X, q. 7, Henry of Ghent, using the classic
example of the identity and difference of essentia and esse, showed his
understanding of the intentional rational difference.24 Properly under-
stood, that is, in an absolute sense, the creative essence is always identical
with its [created] being, but only from the specic consideration of esse

21
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 8ra–11ra; V 10va–14va): “Utrum differentia
rerum secundum rationem actualiter, formaliter et complete possit praecedere omnem
operationem intellectus.”
22
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 8vb, citing Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 12, and
9rb, Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X, q. 7).
23
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 8va): “. . . appellant non primam aut secundam . . . sed
aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentiae alicuius natum praecise concipi
absque alio a quo non differt re absoluta . . .”
24
Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X, q. 7, ed. R. Macken (Leuven 1981), pp. 145–97: “Utrum
ponens essentiam creaturae esse idem re cum suo esse potest salvare creationem.” (Cf.
esp. pp. 155, 160, 182, 186: “differant ratione vel potius intentione.”)

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can it be distinguished. This distinction is not only logically rational, but

also intentional. Henry of Ghent explained the intentional difference as
a specic modal conceptual distinction, but not at all as a third type,
separate and different from the real and rational distinctions.25
John admits it! Henry of Ghent may have occasionally “incidentali-
ter” spoken of a specic intentional difference, but without deliberately
coming back to it. But one should not take such an occasional observa-
tion to be his main doctrine; on the contrary, his main doctrine should
put a chance observation in its proper light. John of Ghent had drawn
the wrong conclusion.
I have often heard this opinion, especially in their determination of a
Quodlibet one time, but they never said that the intentional is contained
within the rational distinction, rather they taught that it is between the
real and the rational distinction. Although being and essence do not differ
in reality, they do in intention, and this middle distinction in intention is
between the real and the rational difference, less than the real, yet more
than the rational.26
This doctrine of distinction did not come from Henry of Ghent, but
rather it was developed in his school.
John of Pouilly is certain of Henry of Ghent’s true doctrine of
distinction. His opponents scurrilously accused him of ignorance and
negligence.27 They too probably let themselves be convinced by a pile
of proofs. He refers to John of Jandun as a “glomerista,” as a “heaper”;
the scribe of the Vatican manuscript could not read this word, and
wrote “geometra.”28 He now insults his colleagues, i.e., John of Ghent,
as dreamers “who most recently reckon some of their dreams to be
true and maintain that there is a medium between these two, saying
that some things differ according to intention.”29
Using the logic of Avicenna, he then accuses his opponent of a double
sin of dialectic! They leave the boundaries of linguistic expression, which
are not exceeded with impunity, and give a new, unfamiliar meaning
to the concept of intention.30 Avicenna’s logic only speaks of rst
and second intentions: “logicus enim considerat secundas intentiones

25
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10rb).
26
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 11rb).
27
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10ra).
28
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10ra, V 13ra).
29
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 8ra).
30
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 8ra).

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applicatas primis.” If Henry of Ghent had changed this usage, he would

have certainly discussed it at length, since “in caustum et pergamenum,”
in polemic and in writing, words never failed him.31
The doctrine of the three types of distinction, with the problematic
notion of the distinctio media, thus should not be attributed uncritically
to Henry of Ghent. He spoke often and explicitly of the intentional
distinction, but he understood it as a rational one, and qualied it in
its specic application to mean the formal aspect of the essence. The
school of the Gandavistae drew further conclusions from this; John of
Pouilly’s opposition and their dispute with him contributed. The master
from Pouilly could be right when he says that his colleague sought to
overcome the criticism by means of a “fuga,” a ight to the front.32 The
school had its doctrine of three types of distinction, making regular
use of it henceforth.

The Theological Reorientation of John of Pouilly towards

Aristotelian Philosophy

The doctrine of the three types of distinction contradicts Avicenna’s

logic as much as it does the philosophy of Aristotle, who, as John of
Pouilly knew and argued, in book IV of the Metaphysics, and again in
books V and VI, understood the logical distinction ontologically: “ens
in anima—ens extra animam.”33 The media distinctio in the school of
Henry of Ghent cannot harken back to tradition. Repeatedly John of
Pouilly nds himself compelled to invoke the indispensable authority
of Aristotle: rst and extensively in the already mentioned question 5
of Quodlibet I, in criticizing the doctrine of distinction, then later again
in question 7, in the conict over the validity of Aristotelian categorical
theory, above all the theory of (categorical) relation.
Henry of Ghent and his school vigorously campaigned for the revi-
sion (starting with Trinitarian theology) of the Aristotelian table of the
categories, and above all for a reworking of the concept of relation.
This work brought the Doctor Sollemnis all honor and recognition, not

31
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10rb).
32
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10rb): “Sed propter argumenta mea hanc
fugam innoverunt. Hoc dico, quia dixerunt me locutum fuisse ex ignorantia vel
negligentia.”
33
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 8ra).

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only in his school. In his school the presumptuous line went: if both
philosophers, Aristotle and Henry, had lived at the same time, then
their teacher would have surrounded and overcome the other teacher.
Theirs was the real “regula in natura” that Averroes bragged Aristotle
had been.34 This bon mot of the school, which is more suited to the
mouths of students than to those of masters, clearly illustrates the
arrogant attitude of the Gandavistae, who were inspired by the Doctor
Sollemnis. John of Pouilly declared himself resolutely and unmistakably
in favor of the authority of Aristotle, and in both questions he twice
incorporates “laudes Aristotelis,” as a gloss in the Vatican manuscript
indicates.35 In both lists John of Pouilly collects a series of sententiae from
Antiquity and the Middle Ages that stress the authority of Aristotle.
Martin Grabmann published the longer one (from question 5) as an
“unparalleled witness of esteem for the Philosopher.”36 In the shorter
list (from question 7) the lasting authority of Aristotle is opposed to the
fading authority of Henry of Ghent and his supporters:
Whom shall we follow? Aristotle with the greater insight, and who is
reputed as the most learned in the human sciences, or those people, who
have recently appeared and only serve to subvert science, as is clear to
those who read their writings?
I deem it safer to follow Aristotle, because, according to the Com-
mentator [Averroes] in I De generatione, he is deemed to have said nothing
without strong proof; but these people say everything without proof, or
if they induce a proof, it does not even attain the level of a probable
opinion (non attingit sermonem probabilem).
Again, the Commentator says of Aristotle in III De anima, “I believe
that this man was the measure which nature fashioned to show the high-
est perfection possible in material things.” But nobody believes such a
thing about those people, rather they seem to have been an ambiguity
in nature.
Again, as Alexander says—and as the Commentator reports in XII
Metaphysics, comment 18—“[I follow Aristotle] because his judgment is
less doubtful and is more suitable to be true”; but the judgment of those

34
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 5 (P 10vb); see on this L. Hödl, “Die Opposition des
Johannes de Polliaco gegen die Schule der Gandavistae,” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch
9 (2004), pp. 115–77, esp. pp. 144ff.
35
L. Hödl, “Die Unterscheidungslehren des Heinrich von Gent in der Ausein-
andersetzung des Johannes de Polliaco mit den Gandavistae,” in Henry of Ghent and
the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, G. Guldentops and C. Steel, eds. (Leuven 2003),
pp. 371–86.
36
M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben II (Munich 1936), pp. 101–2: “Das
Werturteil des Johannes de Polliaco über Aristoteles.”

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people is more doubtful and is more suitable to be false, as is clear in

nearly everything.
Again, [I follow Aristotle], because the Commentator says at the
beginning of De coelo et mundo: when someone considers the opinion of
Aristotle and that of his adversaries, he will nd that from the opinion
of the others, namely of those people, follow many impossibilities and he
will nd that from the opinion of Aristotle nothing impossible follows, and
hence he will acquire greater trust than he had before this consideration.
Therefore Alexander said, “We are only convinced by the judgment of
this man among all others because we see that it has less ambiguity and
is farther from contradiction.” But many impossible conclusions follow
from the judgment of those people, and their judgment has the greatest
ambiguity and is rife with contradictions, and therefore, having abandoned
their judgment, one should adhere to the judgment of Aristotle. But I
say this not only because of the present question, but because in nearly
everything where one can opine thus or differently, I do not know by
what presumption, they seek to contradict Aristotle.37
Strictly speaking “those people” is Henry of Ghent, but the master from
Pouilly later explicitly adds to the “isti” the “sequaces” of the Gandavistae,
whom he reproaches for turning away from Aristotle and perverting his
thought. The theologian from Ghent revised the Aristotelian theory of
the categories, rejected its distinction between substance and accident,
and, starting from the notion of relation, developed a new concept of
the Aristotelian table. “In every being one must consider essence and
relation to being, so that only three genera can be observed in the
table of categories: the substance of the quantitatively and qualitatively
determined thing, its existence in the manner of being-in-another, and
in the manner of the relation of being-in-another-and-to-another (in
alia ad aliud).”38
Relation adds nothing to the thing; being ordered to another is an
aspect of the thing. Respect changes nothing in the thing’s makeup.
The numerous local and temporal, active and passive, positive and
habitual aspects of things need no foundation other than the thing
itself. In God, the relations are founded in the essence itself and con-
stitute this essence in its threefold “suppositum.” In its relations, the
Trinitarian divine essence is absolutely and completely one in form.
In a theological context, Henry of Ghent fundamentally changed the

37
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 7 (P 11vb), ed. Hödl, “Die Opposition,” pp. 161–2.
38
Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 6, ed. Badius, f. 161rD.

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philosophical notion of relation. This conception has been extensively

debated down to this day.39
The school of John of Ghent accentuated Henry of Ghent’s concep-
tual inquiries on relation in two ways: relation as “modus essendi” and
“respectus purus.” The mere relation, stripped bare of reality, can only
be known by reference to a thing, and then as “modus,” as a way of
being of the thing. By means of the notions “modal” and “intentional”
the Gandavistae opposed the prevailing theory of relation as an accident
of a substance. That is, in this sense relation is a “compositum” that
form never permits. For the supporters of Henry of Ghent, this theory
is philosophically and theologically impossible. In eleven arguments
John of Pouilly summarizes the criticism of his disputation opponents.40
In fact, the theological difculties of the Aristotelian notion of rela-
tion could not be overlooked; Duns Scotus also discussed them in his
Quodlibet (1305/07).41
John of Pouilly’s criticism of the reinterpretation of the doctrine of
relations by the school of Henry of Ghent concentrated above all on the
oft-invoked analysis of relation as “purus respectus,” “pura habitudo,”
“purus modus.” John rebukes their incessant, uncontrolled argumen-
tation, which relies on the notion of the modal: “They ll the whole
world with their intentiones and modi.”42 In the end, one knows absolutely
nothing about what they actually mean by the notion of “modi”! If
relation is not founded in reality, and thus must be distinguished from
substance, then it cannot be relevant to reality either. A relation must
be determined in reality, starting from the thing, on the one hand by
the point of reference (“terminus ad quem”), and on the other by the
“terminus a quo.” The real relation is determined in reality.
In this connection John of Pouilly accused his colleague of not being a
realistic thinker, not a “realis.” Then he permitted the accusation that he
himself was a “compositus realis”; this was better than being a “non-realis

39
See the most recent investigation by J.C. Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the
Trinity, With a Critical Edition of Question Six of Article Fifty-ve of the Summa Quaestionum
Ordinariarum (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 36) (Leuven 2006).
40
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 7, ed. Hödl, “Die Opposition,” pp. 166–7.
41
John Duns Scotus, Quodl. I, q. 3 (ed. Lyon 1639, pp. 66–88): “Utrum ista duo
possint simul stare quod relatio ut comparata ad oppositum sit res, et ut comparata
ad essentiam sit ratio tantum.” The formulation of the question clearly betrays the
afnity with Henry of Ghent.
42
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 7, ed. Hödl, “Die Opposition,” p. 171.

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omnino.”43 John of Pouilly was not yet familiar with the designation of
nominalis, but he would have numbered his opponents among them. A
nominalis is someone who abandons propositional logic.

The Theological Focal Points of John of Pouilly’s School Disputations

Quaestiones de quolibet concern contemporary themes that bachelors and

masters deemed worthy and necessary of discussion. In many cases
they illuminate particular historical elements that only in retrospect
can be brought together in a formal frame to make the whole visible.
But John occasionally also discussed thematically related problems, as
in Quodlibet II, qq. 2–5, the problem of creation in time, qq. 11–13,
the question of the rational freedom of choice and of the will, or in
Quodlibet V, qq. 13–14, the theme of the perfect internal and external
constitution of the Church. Together these running themes illuminate
the focal points of theology, clarifying the status and the course of
the history of ideas in the transition to the later Middle Ages. They
deserve our attention.

The Truth of Faith of Creation and Its Demonstrability

The theme of the eternity of the world or of creation in time appears
in all quodlibeta as a problem linked to the Condemnation of 1277.
Is the rst article of faith rational in the sense of Romans 1:20 or,
according to the Condemnation of 1277, can it also be demonstrated,
as the bishop of Paris and his theological advisors believed? The afore-
mentioned questions 3–5 of Quodlibet II, which John of Pouilly revised,
address this problem; in Quodlibet V, q. 4, the whole complex of questions
once again comes up for discussion; and nally he dedicates his entire
“quodlibetal” attention to the question, “Can eternal God essentially
cognize and create (in time) the singular and plural, the contingent and
future?” elevating this solitary question to the rank of a quodlibet.44
Ultimately, these questions concerning the eternal cognizability
and time-determined creation of the cosmos deal with the distinction
between the biblical knowledge of faith and philosophically demon-

43
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 7, ed. Hödl, “Die Opposition,” p. 173.
44
John of Pouilly, Quodl. VI (N 162ra–166va); cf. note 13.

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strable science. John distinguished between them very clearly, rooting

philosophical science primarily in the understanding of the text. He
cited textual passages continuously with very precise references, as he
was accustomed to do for Scriptural interpretation. Does the content
of the revealed truth of Creation in time agree with the philosophical
tradition of Aristotle? Repeatedly John had to answer this question
negatively: the writings of Aristotle, in book VIII of the Physics and in
book X of the Metaphysics, allow for no demonstration that the unmoved
mover can be understood as creative cause.45 If God, the unmoved
mover, corresponds to the rst cause, then it cannot be concluded by
means of Aristotle that God is the creative originator of each and
every individual. The (secondary) intelligences and the heavens are
freestanding forces and powers. Aristotle did not know the revealed
truth of Creation and cannot be held to account for it. The cognitions
achieved under faith are probable, but they are not demonstrations. “But
I do not care if you use them as demonstrationes, because it holds from
the fact that it is not a demonstration: demonstration starts with things
that are known in themselves, or leads to things known in themselves;
but the articles of faith are not of this sort.”46
Under the pressure of the Parisian Condemnation of 1277, Henry
of Ghent and later, more particularly, the Dominican Hervaeus
Natalis professed themselves in favor of the rational demonstrability of
Creation.47 John of Pouilly rejects these efforts harshly. He who reads
the text of the Philosopher “supercially” (superfacialiter) does injury
to the understanding of the Philosopher and of theology. At times
he responds to these attempts, especially to that of Hervaeus Natalis,
with evident derision: “And if they intend to demonstrate by mockeries
and cackles, I confess that I cannot resist them by my own powers, but
rather I must hire an actor to sit next to me.”48 In another passage, he
accuses his opponent of either not knowing the text of Aristotle or of
not understanding the Latin.49

45
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II q. 2 (P 31va–b).
46
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II q. 3 (P 39va, V 53vb).
47
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II q. 3 (P 36ra, V 48rb; P 38ra, V 50vb).
48
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II q. 3 (P 41rb, V 55ra): “Et si per derisiones et cachinnos
ipsi velint demonstrare, conteor me non posse resistere propriis viribus, sed oporteret
me conducere histrionem qui sedebit iuxta.” The scribe of the Vatican manuscript
could not read cachinnos!
49
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II q. 3 (P 40vb, V 54rb).

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The conict with the Dominican theologian Hervaeus, who, along

with John, had obtained the promotion to master in 1307, is particularly
charged in the Quodlibeta. In Quodlibet IV, q. 2, he accused Hervaeus
of ignorance, even of being misguided, in his treatise on the “verbum
mentis.”50 Could this be a foreshadowing of the case that the Parisian
mendicants brought against John at the Papal Curia on account of
his theses on Church governance? In his Quodlibet of Advent 1308,
Hervaeus criticised his secular colleague’s theology of Creation, and
Pouilly, in turn, in his third Quodlibet (1309), strongly refuted this criti-
cism. Prospero T. Stella has carefully traced these attacks.51
In the debate over the (philosophical) demonstrability of creation in
time, John of Pouilly revealed the boundaries of the Condemnation
of 1277 and contributed to neutralizing the condemnation from the
inside, from the domain of theological science. The condemnation
served neither theology and Holy Scripture, nor the Philosopher and
the study of Aristotle, because it did not respect the boundaries of the
two different elds. The creation in time of the world through God
and the ordering of the cosmos with an unmoved mover could not be
reduced to a single concept.

Human Freedom as Freedom of Judgment and Choice in John of Pouilly’s

Quodlibetal Debates
The burning issue of quodlibetal disputations that most occupied
schools, masters, and students concerned the understanding of human
freedom. In the fourteenth century, the Paris condemnation of theses
limiting and determining the freedom of the will with respect to the
intellect52 received full attention in the school of Henry of Ghent. The
student unrest at the promotion of the master from Pouilly and his
own testimony about the constraints on his teaching are proof that it
was difcult for self-critical reasoning in theology to obtain freedom of
judgment again. But John of Pouilly had set himself on it, in spite of

50
Hödl, “Die Kritik,” p. 18.
51
P.T. Stella, “Intentio Aristotelis, secundum superciem suae litterae. La ‘Replicatio
contra magistrum Herveum Praedicatorem’ di Giovanni di Pouilly,” Salesianum 23
(1961), pp. 481–528.
52
According to the count of R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris
le 7 mars 1277 (Leuven-Paris 1977), p. 219, these are articles 150–169.

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his negative experiences with the Gandavistae. The right will of men in
conformity with right reason is free will.
In 1307, the year of his promotion to master, he debated in Quodlibet
I, q. 10, the resolution of the Parisian masters of theology concerning
the assessment of the doctrinal orthodoxy of Giles of Rome (prob-
ably 1285/86, on the occasion of his rehabilitation as master),53 and
in Quodlibet II, qq. 9–14, taking into account the Paris Condemnation
of 1277, he argued that the act of the will, in its complex, entire, and
whole shape, was an “actus exercitus.” These two ofcial Parisian com-
munications of doctrine predetermined John’s future discourse, above
all with the school of Henry of Ghent.
From the beginning of his tenure as master of theology (1276), Henry
of Ghent opposed vehemently the integration and linking of the free
(human) will to practical reason and maintained that such determination
and restriction of the will was philosophically and theologically false.
The rational binding of the will to the intellect limits, even cancels, its
freedom. The example of the drunk in book VII of the Nichomachean
Ethics of Aristotle shows how reason, led astray and corrupted by the
passions, limits the freedom of the will. Moreover, the Apostle Paul,
in chapter 7 of his Letter to the Romans, makes the sinner responsible for
his guilt. As theologian, Henry of Ghent can only understand freedom
and make it understandable in the sense that the will is always, even in
the “nunc stans” of its decision, capable of opposites.54
The theses of 1277 that were condemned by the bishop of Paris—a
condemnation that Henry of Ghent had reinforced with his support—
fell between opposing and denying outright the intellect’s (rational)
freedom of judgment. But in 1286, during the rehabilitation process of
Giles of Rome, the Parisian masters had to concede that an “erroneous
reason” was a requirement for an evil will: “non est malitia in voluntate,
nisi sit error in ratione.” Henry of Ghent took great pains to bring this
position, which he had to deal with as a member of the committee,
in line with the Condemnation of 1277: erroneous judgment is not
the cause of the corrupt will, but rather its penalty. In Quodlibet X he
allowed himself to be convinced by Augustine’s exposition of Psalm
123:3, “Perhaps they had swallowed us up alive,” that the penalty of

53
Hödl, “Non est malitia.”
54
On Henry’s of Ghent’s doctrine of the will, cf. R. Macken, “Heinrich von Gent
im Gespräch mit seinen Zeitgenossen über die menschliche Freiheit,” Franziskanische
Studien 59 (1977), pp. 125–82.

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misguided willing is corrupted and clouded thought and awareness.55

Even at the temporal instant of the good or evil choice, the will remains
free to will the opposite. In order to establish conceptually the simulta-
neity of freedom of choice with error, Henry of Ghent had to make
questionable distinctions in the concepts of “error” and “instans,” which
John of Pouilly rightly criticised severely.
In Quodlibet II, qq. 9–14, John of Pouilly engaged the extremely
formal, fundamental discussion on the freedom of the will with spe-
cic questions concerning the concrete act of the will (“actus exercitus”):
Is the external act of the will also formally a moral good (q. 9)? Is it
directed to many things at the same time as to the ultimate goal (q. 10)?
Is the intellect able to determine and “immobilize” the will through
practical judgment such that an the instant of decision it is no longer
capable of willing the opposite (q. 11)? Can the will, when determined
by the intellect toward the goal, conform to judgment and determine
it (q. 12)? Is goal-willing also determined by something other than the
intellect (q. 13)? Is the intellect or the will the more principal cause of
our acts (q. 14)?
The broad eld of discussion covers the entire range of the topic
under debate. Certainly, the whole scope of the subject matter was
not proposed by the bachelors, but rather by the master himself, who
was able to see the whole issue. This topic is determined both by the
Condemnation of 1277, which opposed providing a rational foundation
and precondition for the free choice of the will, and by the magisterial
doctrinal decision of 1285/86, which permitted keeping this rational
foundation.
Henry of Ghent laid out the skeleton of the discussion with the bones
of contention concerning the philosophical concept of freedom. Even
at the temporal instant of its choice, the human will must be free with
respect to the “oppositum.”56 The free and independent rational power
of the will is as such free for the opposite! By means of questionable
distinctions Henry of Ghent sought to explain both ofcial communi-
qués to the effect that the error of the practical judgment is in no way
the basis and cause of evil choice.57 In this fashion he also sought to
bring Aristotle, with his treatments in the Nichomachean Ethics, into line

55
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 10, ed. Hödl, “Non est malitia,” p. 276; Henry of
Ghent, Quodl. X, q. 10, ed. R. Macken, pp. 258–60.
56
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (P 47va–55rb).
57
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (P 52rb).

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with the “Apostolic prophecy.”58 Moreover, both Parisian doctrinal deci-

sions must be understood in the same sense, since one and the same
master was their originator or advisor.
The rational power of the will is self-acting: it is neither principally
nor causally brought about by the cognized object, and hence by objec-
tive, practical judgment. Right down the line, Henry of Ghent used
intellect and will in a formal-intentional sense, and the Gandavistae made
this formal distinction and way of considering things a central tenet
of their school’s doctrine.
John of Pouilly experienced this. In question 13 of Quodlibet II, as
noted above, he reported that he could not freely and openly establish
a doctrinal position for a rationally based choice of the will, and that
the Parisian theologians nearly unanimously—“God knows it”—held
the opposite. 1308, John of Pouilly’s second year of teaching, was
thus a milestone for the Parisian theologians’ self-critical enterprise.
This enterprise had already been set in motion, above all by Godfrey
of Fontaines and the Dominican theologians, who had rejected the
Correctorium fratris Thomae as a “Corruptorium,” but John of Pouilly
moved it forward decisively.
The formalizing approach to free will masked the concrete and
complex shape of the will’s choice, which, even in its external shape,
is formally a moral good.59 Cognition and willing ought not to be
considered exclusively in their formal difference; their “conformitas” is
equally meaningful. Practical reason and the choice of the will “semper
habent conformitatem,” that is, the practical judgment must ultimately
determine the decision of the will, and, at the temporal instant of
choice, the will can no longer be open to the opposite.60 The choice of
the will is determined by the object; it must be objectively informed and
actualized, because no potency can actualize and form itself.61 “Recta
ratio” and “voluntas recta” belong together.62
Across several columns, John of Pouilly had to engage his opponents
and to defend the philosophical doctrine of actuality and potency.63 He
pointed out the difference between Aristotle and Paul. The ungoverned

58
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (P 53va).
59
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 9 (P 47ra).
60
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (P 48vb).
61
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (P 52ra).
62
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (P 52rb).
63
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 13 (P 56va).

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drunkard of book VII of the Nichomachean Ethics and the sinner of chap-
ter 7 of the Letter to the Romans are not on the same level of argumenta-
tion. The freedom the Apostle speaks of is unfettered, while that of the
Philosopher is blocked! The objective determination and information of
the act of the will by practical reason is no foreign determination of the
will and thus neither is it an objection to the freedom of the will. John
concludes his argument, “what was principally intended follows from
what has been said: regardless of the fact that the object is effective,
because it rst and directly imparts the form and difference to the act
of willing and to the act of cognizing, nevertheless it remains in our
power and is attributed to us and in no way to the object.”64 For this
position John could also call upon Thomas Aquinas, whom he (for all
his criticism) always mentions with great esteem and with all of whose
(major) writings he is familiar.

The Necessary habitus of Moral Good, of Grace, and of the Eternal Vision
of God
The concept of habitus is discussed in all of John of Pouilly’s Quodlibeta,
partly in the context of the moral virtues (Quodlibet I, q. 11; Quodlibet II,
qq. 16–17), in discussing the supernatural virtues and grace (Quodlibet
I, q. 12; Quodlibet IV, qq. 8–10), and in dealing with the eschatological
vision of God (Quodlibet III, q. 7). The broad conceptual eld shows the
deeply concealed path of the history of the concept, which has hardly
been investigated yet, and for which there is no synthesis that can provide
an overview.65 John of Pouilly has a double signicance in this history:
directly, through his analysis of the concept of habitus, and indirectly,
through his inuence on contemporary schools, primarily on the later
school of Thomas Aquinas, especially on Hervaeus Natalis, who had
to engage John’s criticism continuously. John owed many propositions
to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, as will be clear immediately, but
he also provoked the criticism of the Thomists. Future research on
this, long overdue, must work out this chapter in the history of the
concept, and it must do so not merely on the basis of John of Pouilly’s

64
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 13 (P 57vb).
65
G. Funke, “Gehabe(n),” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie III (1974), p. 140,
and M. Bauer, Lexikon des Mittelalters IV (1989), pp. 13–15, provide little historical
understanding.

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Quodlibeta, but employing his entire corpus of questions (especially those

in Paris, BnF lat. 15371).
John’s extensive explanations of the concept of habitus explore its
problematic aspects, which must be tackled from many angles. In its
extension and meaning the concept is not yet contained and secured.
Is it even thinkable? “Is the habitus of virtue the cause of the act of
virtue?” is the fundamental question he asks in Quodlibet I, q. 11.66 If
the habitus does not touch upon the act in its substance, but rather
only in the modus of passion, then it must be asked whether it is even
thinkable. If it signies the act only in a modal respect, then it would
be superuous, since it would mean a “doubling,” which is meaningless
from a philosophical perspective.67 This criticism obviously betrays its
origins among the Gandavistae.
In his doctrine of the categories, Aristotle understood the concept of
habit (hexis) from the aforesaid modal perspective. In the Metaphysics (IX,
c. 1) he speaks of an acquired habit of skill. “Ars is the knowledge of
how a thing is to be made through skill. Knowledge [alone] does not
achieve it; will and choice are also required, as the rational powers are
open to the opposite and are determined by desire.”68 The history of
the concept of habitus achieved a decisive development in theology, in
the doctrine of grace and in eschatology, through the concept of the
so-called infused, received habitus (as opposed to the acquired habitus).
The grace of faith and the glory of the eternal vision of God must be
adapted to and prepared for the subject. He who is not elevated and illu-
minated by the lumen gloriae cannot look upon God. Until then—“usque
adhuc”—all theologians had this conviction; Henry of Ghent was the
rst to bring this tradition into question.69 With regards to the rapture
of the Apostle Paul (II Corinthians 12:1–4), Henry established the light
of faith as a sufcient basis for the eternal vision of God.
The multilayered theological discussion required a consideration of
the habitus. Even from a philosophical point of view, the habitus is not
“frustra.”70 The supernatural perfection of man in the vision of God
presupposes the preparation by grace of the rational soul. Not that
God, in His absolute power, could not give to the blessed the power

66
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 19rb–23va, V 26ra–30vb).
67
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 20vb).
68
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 20va).
69
John of Pouilly, Quodl. III, q. 7: Utrum des remaneat in beatis sive in patria.
70
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 21ra).

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and the grace to see Him, but, according to the established order of
salvation, the vision of God presupposes this elevating, illuminating
grace. John of Pouilly explains anthropologically the necessity of a suf-
cient disposition. For the supernatural—that is, extending beyond the
boundaries of nature—fulllment of the human spirit, it is necessary
that this grace be infused into the prepared subject. A perfection that
transcends nature cannot be brought about naturally.71 John explains
this understanding at length and concludes:
together with the corollary: God grants perfection and goodness to the
recipient who is sufciently disposed to it, having prepared himself—inso-
far as he is capable. [God grants] to him that perfection of the [covenantal]
necessary disposition and ordering to salvation, and by that perfection He
grants that preparation to fulllment, in which preparation He perpetuates
them according to a general and a specic exertion of inuence.72
From the notion of a habitus supernaturally infused by grace John
arrives at the recognition that a habitus is identical neither to potency
nor to actuality (for as such it would be superuous), but rather it is a
medium that falls between them, not dividing, but binding them. The
habitus produces a certain conformity to the actuality and to the object,
and thus contributes to and promotes the passing into actuality in the
realization of the object.73
John of Pouilly elaborated this conceptual analysis following Thomas
Aquinas. In the quaestio he collected an extensive apparatus of relevant
passages from Thomas’ main works. From Thomas’ Sentences commen-
tary, Summa theologiae, Summa contra gentiles, and Quaestiones de veritate, clear
to the Quodlibeta, John put together the texts (with precise references)
that show how Thomas understood the concept, and then added, “I
do not know if elsewhere they said other words that can somehow
be interpreted in the opposite way.”74 To the end, the theologian is
concerned about the concept of habitus and its meaning. But for him
Thomas Aquinas was the teacher who established the concept in the
schools.

71
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 21rb–vb).
72
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 21va).
73
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 22vb): “Habitus quid est medium inter potentiam
et actum, facit quandam conformitatem ad actum et obiectum; quo agente elicitur et
quasi (?) transit in actum praesente obiecto.”
74
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (P 22ra, P’ 77vb, V 28va).

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For John of Pouilly, the concept of habitus has its place in the doctrine
of virtue and grace, but attains its full expression in eschatology. The
light of glory is the necessary disposition for the vision of God. He
rmly refutes the thesis of Henry of Ghent that faith (in this world)
could persist and perpetuate itself in the otherworldly vision of God.
He also objects to Henry’s thesis that virtue lies in the will. Many theo-
logians, including Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines, taught
this understanding of virtue. John of Pouilly turned away from the
opinions that prevailed in the schools. The rational power of the will
does not have or need either virtue or its habitus, because it is directed
towards the (general) good and strives for it. The desiring and striving
sensitive powers and faculties of man need the potentiality of the moral
virtues and their guiding habitus.
Although (even according to Thomas Aquinas) prudence and its
habitus is one virtue with respect to all operations (“agibilia”), formal
and nal, it can nevertheless lead to various specic actions (Quodlibet
III, q. 8); in this way John was also able to clarify (Quodlibet IV, q. 8)
the controversial question from Aristotle’s Ethics (IV, c. 10) concerning
the unity of individual, household, and civic prudence (“monostica,
oeconomica, et politica prudentia”). Many years ago, Thomas Graf
edited and evaluated the relevant quaestio from Quodlibet IV: “Do the
moral, striving virtues have their place in the intellectual appetite, that
is, in the will, or in the sensitive appetite?”75
John turned away from Thomas Aquinas’ ontological foundation
of the doctrine of virtue and made it concrete using a psychology of
virtue, a psychology that Thomas also knew about. On the authority of
Aristotle, he “located” the virtues in the striving and desiring sensitive
faculties of man, where their power and grace are essential. Here, and
only here, does the moral habitus have its proper function as guiding
virtue. Henry of Ghent and his school located the moral virtues in
the power of the will, in order to underscore its autonomous gover-
nance. But if the intellectual virtues have their place in the intellect
of the rational soul because they are used there, John rightly asked,
why should the moral virtues not have their place in the striving and

75
John of Pouilly, Quodl. IV, q. 10, ed. T. Graf, De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum
secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV (Studia Anselmiana, 3/4)
(Rome 1935), pp. 203–12, ed. pp. 55*–104*.

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desiring sensitive powers? In the fourteenth century, he had moved

moral psychology forward considerably.

The Internal and External Constitution of the Church in the Quodlibeta of

John of Pouilly
Another trio of questions in Quodlibet V (1312), qq. 13–15, had its most
lasting effect on the century-long conict over the pastoral privileges of
the mendicant orders. Quaestio 13 describes the priority of the (eccle-
siastical) “status” of the greater and lesser prelates over the ecclesiasti-
cal rank of the mendicant friars. The next question (q. 14) rejects the
claim that perfect poverty is the state of perfection in the Church. And
question 15 discusses the privilege of mendicant pastors in preaching
and in hearing confessions. This (last) disputation gave the impetus to
the denunciation of John of Pouilly at the Papal Curia in Avignon and
to the condemnation of 1321 mentioned at the outset. Throughout
the Late Middle Ages, disputations, court cases, and condemnations
continued to have an effect on the conict over the pastoral care of
the mendicants.
John starts the discussion in quaestio 13 by considering the primacy of
prelates over the status of members of religious orders who, through the
famous vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity, pledged themselves to
the way and status of the perfect imitation of Christ. “Below the status
of prelates, can there be another status, such as that of those with the
cure of souls, more perfect than the status of members of religious
orders?”76 That is, the status of those with cure of souls (pastors) is
more original, more important, and more constant than the status of
those in religious orders. Not only the greater prelates, the bishops, but
also the lesser prelates have their biblical legitimation from Jesus Christ,
according to the witness of the Gospel, Luke 10:1, in the seventy-two
disciples who, after the Apostles, were called and were sent out. They
are original, like the Apostles, and received the promise of continuity
in the time and history of the Church. Likewise, they received from
Christ the ministry and the commission to proclaim the Gospel and
dispense the sacraments. The status of members of religious orders,

76
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 13 (P 169vb–171vb, F 280ra–282vb, V 213vb–
216ra).

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however, was established later, by men; it exists in time and serves the
perfection of individuals.77
Pope and bishops could not cancel this original order of the cure of
souls. Whoever makes any and all pastoral authority, that is jurisdiction,
derive from the pope, opens himself to the accusation of falsifying the
Gospel. “And to him who would question [me], I ask (et rogo illum): if
one says that someone other than the pope immediately received the
commission from Christ, is he a heretic? I do not know whether they
or others say and decree that the Gospel is heresy and that he who
teaches according that the Gospel is a heretic.”78 John of Pouilly was
attacking the Dominican theologian Hervaeus Natalis, whom he also
contradicts elsewhere repeatedly, and who later (as Paris prior provincial)
brought charges against his colleague. All prelates and even the lesser
pastors have from Christ onward their original and absolute mission
and task. Members of religious orders only have an “exercitium,” an
attendance to the spiritual life.
In the next question (q. 14), John demarcates ascetic fulllment
from the general duty to aim at moral virtue that is given to all men
as the goal of perfection.79 Striving for virtue also follows the other,
worldly path, with ownership, marriage, and family. In this way, John
also brought into discussion the Aristotelian view of “extrinsic goods.”
In the internal conict between the Franciscans and Dominicans over
perfect poverty as the way to or goal of perfection, he pointed out that
perfect poverty is an indivisible whole and that one could not distinguish
between ownership and use (usufruct), but he shared Thomas Aquinas’
opinion that the three biblical vows are not the goal, but merely the
way to perfection. This perfection is the undivided love of God. Not
even the mendicant friars’ goal of perfection differs from that of all
Christians.
In the third question of the series, the fteenth of the Quodlibet, the
discussion arrives at the real point of dispute: when a pastor and a
privileged frater seek to preach at the same time, who has priority?80 The
matter concerned above all penitential authority, the confessions that

77
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 13 (P 179va–b).
78
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 13 (P 170vb).
79
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 14 (P 171vb–178ra, V 216ra–223rb): “Utrum status
religiosorum mendicantium sit perfectior statu religiosorum habentium bona in com-
muni sufcientia ad vivendum.”
80
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 178ra–181rb, F 287vb–291ra, V 223rb–
227ra).

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the canon Omnis utriusque sexus of the Fourth Lateran Council required
to be made before one’s own pastor ( proprius sacerdos). This pastor alone
exercised ius ordinarium, in accordance with law and statute, the cura
animarum. The papal privileges granting cure of souls to the mendicants
constituted an exception to the law that should not undermine the law
in force. The canonists held the conviction that the privileges should
be interpreted not excessively, but restrictively. Pope Martin IV’s pas-
toral privilege Ad fructus uberes (13 December 1281) granted mendicant
priests the authority to hear the confessions of parishioners, ordinarily
with the approval of the local pastor, but if need be even without it,
and in these cases without the obligation to repeat the confession to
the pastor in charge.
The canonists and secular theologians established the requirement of
repeated confession by reference to the “duplex servitus,” the double
relation of servitude in the parochial and common ecclesiastical order.
The parochial commitment to the cure of souls and the duty to obey
the instructions of the pope are two different obligations: “If one of the
two servitudes is removed or dropped, the other remains intact.”81 The
papal privilege does not dissolve the parochial obligation; it remains
intact. This canonical argument extends across several columns.
The other argument, in line with the one concerning two servitudes,
emphasizes the difference between general and special permission, and
recognizes in the papal privilege only a general authorization, which does
not include the permission for parishioners to seek another confessor.
John explained this by means of the logical distinction between genus
and difference. The latter is only contained in potency in the genus,
but not in actuality. In these long discussions a “magister Minorum”
had his say,82 and John had to debate him for more than half of the
whole disputation. Evidently, John had consulted notes or records of
the opponent’s disputation, and, in turn, had refuted his arguments in
a disputation inter absentes. We know this form of overowing dispute
from the Quodlibeta of Henry of Ghent.83 It shows that the actual quaestio
disputata de quolibet had left the connes and context of the schools and
had become a means of public relations.

81
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 178va, V 223vb).
82
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 179ra): “Contra praedicta, quamvis bene
et probabiliter dicta, argutum est per magistrum Minorum multipliciter et minus
probabiliter.”
83
Cf. R. Macken, “Heinrich von Gent,” pp. 161–6.

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John of Pouilly rebuked his colleague for attacking the “pauperes

theologos” with accusations of their vices and shortcomings and not
with arguments and auctoritates.84 He repeatedly accused him of lacking
evidence. His opponent reproached John for having taken the distinc-
tion of the double dependencies from the gloss of Bernard (de Botone).
To this reproach, John replied that the fact that he did not shy away
from using the authentic witness as a proof only served to redound to
his reputation and honor.85 His opponent relied much more often on
his own authority and neglected this actual witness.86 He deemed his
own authority more important than that of others. Occasionally his
opponent believed that an argument was directed against him person-
ally.87 Did the magister Minorum have special authority in the Order at
Paris (as provincial?) such that he had to lead the opposition against
John of Pouilly ex ofcio? Such a thesis might nd support in his general
statements that stress the salvation of men. With the magister Minorum,
the conict acquired a public character and ultimately led to the ofcial
charges.

Current Problems
In the context of the literary genre of the quodlibet, John of Pouilly also
discussed current problems and issues: in Quodlibet III, q. 4, he consid-
ered the question of the Immaculate Conception of Mary raised by
John Duns Scotus, which conception he denied,88 and in Quodlibet V,
q. 16, he treated the Templars’ retraction in court of their confession
and their relapse.89

84
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 179va).
85
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 179vb).
86
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 180ra).
87
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 15 (P 180rb).
88
John of Pouilly, Quodl. III, q. 4 (V 89rb–107ra): “Utrum potest teneri pro opinione
probabili quod Beata Virgo non contraxit peccatum originale,” ed. C. Balim, Joannis
de Polliaco et Joannis de Neapoli, Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione beatae Mariae
Virginis (Sibenik 1931).
89
John of Pouilly, Quodl. V, q. 16 (V 227rb): “Utrum si aliquis confessus haeresim et
postea revocet in facie Ecclesiae dicendo se falsum dixisse, talis debeat dici relapsus.”
William Courtenay is currently working on an edition of this large question.

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The Development of the Schools in John of Pouilly’s Quodlibeta

Scholastic disputations were sociologically set in the schools, where argu-

ments were exchanged and problems discussed. According to the statutes
of the University, quodlibeta were held in Advent (before Christmas) and
Lent (before Easter). On the one hand, this temporal determinancy gave
the disputants time to catch their breath, not to rush, but on the other,
it also offered a period to maintain a owing discussion. What was said
the previous year still counted as “satis recenter” (Quodlibet V, q. 7). In
the interval, the problems that were raised could be picked up and
developed in the individual schools. The beginning of the fourteenth
century is (in the history of theology) the era of the schools and the
division of theology into schools. School authorities and different school
traditions determine the history. Many years ago, Cardinal Ehrle made
some important observations on this development.90
The individual schools’ doctrines of distinction were inuenced as
much by their teachers as by intellectual and historical currents. The
Condemnation of 1277 still had a notable effect in the rst decade of
the fourteenth century. The controversial questions over the demonstra-
bility of temporal creation or the (rational) foundation of the freedom
of the will, focal points of John of Pouilly’s disputations, developed
under the pressure and the burden of the Parisian condemnation. Thus
the magisterial determination of 1285/86 achieved the signicance of
a counterweight to the episcopal decree. By their determination, the
Parisian theologians had given a clear sign of academic self-criticism.
Henry of Ghent, who himself was the assessor of the condemnation,
had, along with his school, to confront this correction (Quodlibet I, q. 10).
Only in 1325, when the bishop of Paris annulled his predecessor’s con-
demnation, at least insofar as it went against the teaching of Thomas
Aquinas, did scholastic disputation once again achieve its necessary
freedom.
This historically charged disputation inevitably involved Aristotle
and interpretations, Latin and Arabic, of his thought. John of Pouilly
was convinced that, when the doctrinal position of the Philosopher
came under discussion, that position rst had to be certied by the
littera, by the text. One of John’s main objectives was to establish a

90
F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V.
(Franziskanische Studien, Suppl., 9) (Münster 1925).

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textually sound and resonant interpretation. He cited with precision;

he cited completely, that is with an exact indication of the passage and
according to all relevant texts. In many cases, the doctrinal position
of an author cannot be veried merely by referring to sources and
texts; it requires a whole apparatus of passages. John maintained this
obligation to cite precisely and completely—even when citing himself.
He often adduced all relevant passages from his Quaestiones ordinariae
and Quodlibeta, at times even giving the page: “primo Quolibet, q. 9,
pagina 30.”91 These page indications can only refer to the liber magistri
and cannot be conrmed in the copies.
In his literary compulsion to cite sources precisely, John was also
aware than an author may have later corrected his doctrinal position.
Thomas Aquinas’s explanations of the verbum mentis are not uniform in
his writings. John had to direct his colleague Hervaeus Natalis emphati-
cally to Thomas’ last statements on the matter in the Compendium theolo-
giae, “quod in ne suorum dierum ediderunt.”92 He cited passages from
Thomas against Hervaeus’ interpretation of him. Is there any wonder,
then, that John also considered that, if need be, Thomas might now
have determined differently?93 John clearly recognized the problem of
Thomas’ doctrinal development, but he had not yet drawn the con-
sequences from it. If it concerned an important opinion of Thomas,
John eagerly put together an apparatus of references and established
his doctrinal position: “et hoc tractat per intentionem.”94 The intention
hinges on the text!
* * *
John of Pouilly held the chair of Godfrey of Fontaines. His interlocu-
tors were the masters of all the theological schools in Paris, and he
occasionally mentioned them also by name, and among those even
the lesser known such as Berengarius Praedicator (Quodlibet IV, q. 2),
Henricus Amandi (Quodlibet IV, q. 10), or the oft-mentioned Johannes
Gandavensis (Quodlibet I, q. 5). In contrast to these less often or only
rarely mentioned colleagues, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent
were his permanent interlocutors. He also counted Thomas among his
contemporaries. He often quotes Henry of Ghent by name; Thomas
Aquinas he cites by name more rarely, more often as doctores “solemnes.”

91
John of Pouilly, Quodl. II, q. 11 (V 69ra).
92
John of Pouilly, Quodl. IV, q. 2 (V 138vb).
93
John of Pouilly, Quodl. IV q. 6 (V 200rb).
94
John of Pouilly, Quodl. I, q. 11 (V 28va).

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When he cites both by this honoric title, he counts Thomas among

the “solemniores” (Quodlibet III, q. 6). Thomas unequivocally has prior-
ity; he belongs to the doctores “communissimi” (Quodlibet III, q. 3). But
he is not by a long shot in agreement with the interpretations given to
these teachers by their students, particularly with those given by the
Gandavistae. Among the followers (“sequaces”) of Thomas Aquinas, he
was in conict with Hervaeus Natalis and his reading of Thomas.
He had to point out repeatedly to the students of Henry of Ghent
that they had misunderstood the doctrine of their own master. Henry
of Ghent’s teaching did not support the threefold distinction of the
concept of intention (Quodlibet I, q. 5). In this his students failed by “a
sin of dialect,” as Avicenna said; they did not take the concepts in their
conventional, xed meaning. It was precisely this threefold distinction
that had become accepted as that of Henry of Ghent. This doctrine
had a life of its own. Thomas’ doctrines of the verbum mentis and of the
actus exercitus also took on signicant elements from their contemporary
historical interpretation.
The interpretation of Henry’s doctrine inuenced its transmission.
The history of the concepts of relation, habitus, and actus exercitus,
important for Thomas’ philosophy, can serve as an example. Henry
of Ghent’s formalization of the concept of relation made it necessary
in the other schools to discuss the connection between relation and its
fundament. Thomas’ doctrine of a moral habitus was bolstered precisely
by criticism. John of Pouilly let Thomas lead him in the controversy with
the Gandavistae over the habitus. And in the notion of the actus exercitus,
the rational foundation of the free act of the will was an important
question for the Thomists as well.
At the turn of the fourteenth century, the (theological) schools of the
University of Paris had not yet solidied such that one could speak of
Thomistae or Scotistae. Arnau de Vilanova was one of the rst Parisian
theologians to speak of the “Thomatistas.”95 In Quodlibet I, q. 5, John of
Pouilly spoke of the “Gandavistae,” and then only in the Vatican manu-
script.96 But there, at rst glance, the word appears to be a correction. In
the Parisian manuscript P, f. 10ra, it unmistakably reads “Gallandistae.”
This reading is also supported by the context.97 “Gandavistae” is wrong;

95
Cf. F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar (note 90), p. 263.
96
V 13ra.
97
P 10ra, V 13ra: “. . . nec ab Aristotele nec a Commentatore nec ab Avicenna . . . nec
Gallandistae aliter accipiunt intentionem . . .”

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the copyist of V could not understand the “Gallandistae” in front of

him; he did not know that such a term indicated the Parisian philoso-
phers. Even these Gallandistae, like the ancient philosophers, could not
understand “intentio” in the sense of the Gandavistae, the students of
Henry of Ghent. Evidence for the existence of the term Gandavistae is
the fact that this expression was comprehensible to the copyist. Thus
it should be considered authentic.
Being led by their teacher, Henry of Ghent’s students relied upon
the Parisian Condemnation of 1277 and sought to maintain theological
disputation at Paris on this level. But the theologians had self-critically
freed themselves from the condemnation before and after the turn of
century. This condemnation had already had its day when the school
of the Gandavistae came onto the scene, and it, in turn, had its day.
The Parisian theologian John of Pouilly witnessed and empowered
this passing.98

98
This chapter was translated from German by William O. Duba and Olivier
Ribordy.

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 THE QUODLIBET OF THOMAS WYLTON

Cecilia Trifogli

Thomas Wylton was fellow of Merton College from about 1288 until
1301 and master of arts at Oxford until 1304. He then went to Paris to
study theology and became master there in 1312. He taught theology
in Paris probably until 1322. He was appointed chancellor of St Paul’s
Cathedral in London in 1320, although it is likely that he took this
position only in 1322. The position of chancellor was vacated in 1327,
so Wylton must have died by that date.1 In addition to the Quodlibet, two
other major works by Wylton are extant: a question-style commentary
on the De Anima2 and a question-style commentary on the Physics.3 The
two Aristotelian commentaries were most probably written by Wylton
as master of arts in Oxford. Although the Quodlibet is the only extensive
theological work by Wylton that is extant, Wylton also commented on
the Sentences. The Sentences commentary has not yet been identied, but
Stephen Dumont has recently discovered ve questions that may belong
to the Prologue of a commentary of this kind.4
Thomas Wylton was a prominent and inuential gure as master of
theology at Paris.5 He had disputes with the most important among his
contemporaries over a variety of controversial issues. For example, he
debated with Peter Auriol on the nature of relations (q. 17),6 on the

1
On Wylton’s biography, see especially A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the
University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. III (Oxford 1959), pp. 2054–5.
2
The De Anima commentary is contained in manuscript Oxford, Balliol College
Library 91, ff. 247ra–277vb. This manuscript contains questions on books I and II
only.
3
The Physics commentary is a complete set of questions on the eight books of
the Physics. It is contained in four manuscripts: Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, Plut.
VIII sin. 2, ff. 4r–141v; Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 2015, ff. 1r–217v; BAV, Vat. lat.
4709, ff. 1r–143r; Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA F.178, ff. 57r–73v (only
books VII and VIII).
4
They are contained in manuscript New Haven, Yale University Library, Beinecke
General 470. See S.D. Dumont, “New Questions by Thomas Wylton,” DSTFM 9
(1998), pp. 341–79.
5
Stephen Dumont found a contemporary reference to Wylton as “Magister Thomas
Anglicus, quidam secularis valde famosus.” See Dumont, “New Questions,” p. 341,
n. 2.
6
See the Bibliography sections below for details on Wylton’s debates.

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problem of the innite power of God (q. 1) and on the nature of theol-
ogy and virtue;7 with William of Alnwick on the issue of the eternity
of the world (q. 9); with Henry of Harclay on the innite (q. 9); with
Guy Terrena on the nature of the beatic act (q. 3) and the problem
of nal causation (q. 14); with Durand of St Pourçain on the nature
of intellection.8 Wylton’s treatment of divine foreknowledge of future
contingents was copied verbatim by John Baconthorpe.9 His views on
the separation and unity of the intellect10 and on the innite power of
God (q. 1) had a strong inuence on John of Jandun, one of the main
exponents of Parisian Averroism. In fact, Wylton rst became known to
historians of medieval philosophy especially for being a major exponent
of Parisian Averroism.11 Recent studies have shed light on other aspects
of Wylton’s thought, above all on his realist ontological orientation.
Investigations into his physical theories have revealed his realist oppo-
sition to Averroes concerning the ontological status of motion and of
time12 and the inuence of some of his positions on Walter Burley.13
Studies of his metaphysical and theological thought have pointed out
his strong realism about relations, very similar to that of Duns Scotus,14
and his support of the formal distinction between divine attributes.15

7
See L.O. Nielsen, “The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on
Theology and Virtue,” Vivarium 38.1 (2000), pp. 35–98.
8
See Dumont, “New Questions,” pp. 367–73.
9
Dumont, “New Questions,” pp. 359–62. For an analysis of Wylton’s position, see
C. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge
and Future Contingents (Aldershot 2000), pp. 52–63.
10
W. Senko, “Jean de Jandun et Thomas Wilton. Contribution à l’établissement
des sources des Quaestiones super I–III de Anima de Jean de Jandun,” Bulletin de la Société
Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale 5 (1963), pp. 139–43; Z. Kuksewicz,
De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l’intellect chez les Averroïstes Latins des
XIII e et XIV e siècles (Wroclaw 1968), pp. 209–14; E. Jung-Palczewska, “Jean de Jandun,
a-t-il afrmé la nature active de l’intellect possible?” MPP 27 (1986), pp. 15–20.
11
See the pioneering paper by A. Maier, “Wilhelm von Alnwicks Bologneser
Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus (1323),” Gregorianum 30 (1949), pp. 265–308.
12
See C. Trifogli, “Il problema dello statuto ontologico del tempo nelle Quaestiones
super Physicam di Thomas Wylton e di Giovanni di Jandun,” DSTFM 1.2 (1990), pp.
491–548; eadem, “Thomas Wylton on Motion,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77
(1995), pp. 135–54; eadem, “Due questioni sul movimento nel commento alla Fisica
di Thomas Wylton,” Medioevo 21 (1995), pp. 31–73.
13
See C. Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s Question An contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis
in esse,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4 (1994), pp. 91–141; eadem, “The Reality of
Time in the Commentary Tradition on the Physics: the Case of Wylton and Burley,”
in Il commento losoco nell’Occidente Latino (secoli XIII–XV), G. Fioravanti, C. Leonardi,
and S. Perfetti, eds. (Turnhout 2002), pp. 233–51.
14
See below Q. 17, Bibliography, p. 254.
15
See below Q. 5, Bibliography, p. 243.

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Although his ontology was inuenced by Scotus, Wylton appears to

be an original and complex philosopher.16 A comprehensive picture
of Wylton’s philosophical and theological thought, however, has not
yet been drawn.
The historical importance of Wylton lies also in the fact that his
Quodlibet is the last known secular theological Quodlibet from the period
covered by this book. And since no complete secular Sentences commen-
taries survive from Paris afterwards until after the Black Death, Wylton’s
Quodlibet represents the last extensive work of the secular masters of
theology at Paris for several decades.
Most of the questions of Wylton’s Quodlibet are preserved in the form
of a reportatio in a single manuscript, BAV, Borgh. lat. 36 (henceforth:
V). The rst major studies on Wylton’s Quodlibet are due to Anneliese
Maier. In her paper “Das Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton,” published
in 1947,17 Maier gave a detailed description of V and established which
questions of Wylton’s Quodlibet are actually preserved in it. Wylton’s
questions are found on ff. 47ra–96va, and are preceded on f. 46va–b
by a table of contents, written by a later hand, in which thirty-nine
questions are listed. Glorieux remarked that questions 34–39 on this
list do not seem to belong to Wylton’s Quodlibet, but he took the list of
the rst thirty-three questions to be an accurate index of the contents
of Wylton’s Quodlibet and published that list.18 Maier showed that the
list published by Glorieux and the actual contents of the Quodlibet do
not completely correspond. Questions 8–11 and 20–33 in Glorieux’s list
are not present in the Quodlibet. Questions 1–7 and 12–19 are present
but in many cases the title has a different formulation. Furthermore,
the Quodlibet actually contains three questions missing from Glorieux’s
list.19 The conclusion of the accurate analysis carried out by Maier
is that Wylton’s Quodlibet as preserved in V actually contains eighteen
questions. In Appendix I to this paper, I have reported both the list
of questions published by Glorieux, which is that found on f. 46va–b,

16
Chris Schabel, for example, points out that the rst clear, sustained attack on
Scotus’s theory of divine foreknowledge comes from Thomas Wylton. See Schabel,
Theology at Paris, p. 52.
17
This paper originally appeared in RTAM 14 (1947), pp. 106–10, and was reprinted
in A. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter I (Rome 1964), pp. 87–92. All page references to this
paper and to other papers by Anneliese Maier reprinted in Ausgehendes Mittelalter will
be to the reprinted version.
18
See Glorieux II, pp. 278–9.
19
These are questions 8, 11, 15 in Maier’s list.

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and the list published by Maier, which reects the actual contents of
the Quodlibet. Maier pointed out that the third quaternus, between ff. 70
and 71 (i.e., between qq. 7–8 and q. 9 in Maier’s list), is missing from
the codex, so that Wylton’s Quodlibet must have originally included more
questions than the eighteen contained on ff. 47ra–96va.
The problem of establishing exactly which are the missing ques-
tions of Wylton’s Quodlibet has not yet been systematically investigated,
although an important nd has been made. Stephen Dumont has dis-
covered ve questions by Wylton on the intensication and remission
of forms. They are preserved in two manuscripts: New Haven, Yale
University Library, Beinecke General 470, ff. 21rb–24rb, and Tortosa,
Archivo Capitular 88, ff. 1ra–4vb. The questions on the intensica-
tion and remission of forms correspond approximately to items 8–11
in Glorieux’s list. Accordingly, they most probably belonged to the
Quodlibet and were contained in the missing quaternus of V.20 Dumont
is preparing an edition of these questions.
As for the date of Wylton’s Quodlibet, Glorieux began with a guess
of 1312.21 In 1958,22 Anneliese Maier was the rst to present dating
evidence and concluded that Advent of 1315 was the most probable
date of Wylton’s Quodlibet. The terminus post quem is given by the third
Quodlibet of Guy Terrena, which is quoted by Wylton in the question
of his Quodlibet about the causality of the end (q. 14 in Maier’s list).
According to Maier, Guy Terrena discussed Quodlibet III almost certainly
in 1315. The terminus ante quem is given by Peter Auriol’s Scriptum on the
rst book of the Sentences, where Auriol refers to some doctrines held
by Wylton in his Quodlibet. And Maier claims that Auriol’s Scriptum was
certainly nished by the summer of 1316 and probably already in the
spring of that year.23

20
See Dumont, “New Questions,” pp. 347–8, for the discussion of the author-
ship. For the list of these questions and other questions by Wylton preserved in the
Beinecke and Tortosa manuscripts, see ibid., pp. 380–1. As Dumont has shown, the
two manuscripts contain in whole nineteen theological questions by Wylton. Apart from
the ve questions on the intensication and remission of forms, which most probably
belonged to the Quodlibet, and ve questions that very likely belonged to the prologue
of Wylton’s Sentences commentary (see above, p. 231), for the remaining questions it is
not clear whether they belong to the Quodlibet. They are listed by Dumont under the
heading “Quaestiones Quodlibetales et Disputatae.”
21
Glorieux II, p. 278.
22
“Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentare des 14. Jahrhunderts,” originally appearing
in AFH 51 (1958), pp. 369–409, and reprinted in Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter I, pp.
265–305.
23
See Maier, “Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentaren,” pp. 279–81.

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The dating evidence provided by Maier, however, does not seem

conclusive. Although with respect to the terminus post quem Chris Schabel
agrees that Guy Terrena’s Quodlibet III was probably discussed in Lent of
1315, or perhaps Advent,24 as to the terminus ante quem, however, Lauge
Nielsen remarks that the latter part of Auriol’s Scriptum on I Sentences
reects Auriol’s stay at Paris, and this postpones the date by which it
was certainly nished to the early spring of 1317.25
Elzbieta Jung and Zdzislaw Kuksewicz more recently argued again for
Advent of 1315 as the most probable date for Wylton’s Quodlibet. The
main additional evidence they provide is for the terminus ante quem. In his
disputed question De innitate vigoris Dei John of Jandun gives extensive
quotations from Wylton’s question on the innite perfection of God
(q. 1 in Maier’s list). And the question by Jandun is dated very precisely
to 30 August 1316. Therefore, the terminus ante quem for Wylton’s Quodlibet
is Easter 1316. As to the terminus post quem, the only new evidence they
present is the remark that in his discussion about the innite power of
God in his Physics commentary Jandun does not quote Wylton’s opinion
in the Quodlibet, although he does quote Wylton’s opinion both in his
commentaries on the Metaphysics and on the De substantia orbis. From this
they infer that at the time of writing his Physics Commentary John of
Jandun did not know the quodlibetal question by Wylton. They further
assume that the Physics commentary by Jandun is dated 1315, so that
Wylton’s Quodlibet was discussed not much before the end of 1315.26
One of the problems with this evidence, however, is that it is not certain
that Jandun’s Physics commentary was written in 1315.27 In conclusion,
although Advent of 1315 is a very probable date for Wylton’s Quodlibet,
this has not yet been proved beyond any reasonable doubt and Lent
1316 remains a possibility.
Regarding the question whether the Quodlibet was disputed by Wylton
in England (Oxford) or in Paris, in 194928 Maier argued for England,29

24
See his chapter in this volume on “Carmelite Quodlibeta,” p. 518.
25
Cf. L.O. Nielsen, “Peter Auriol,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages,
J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone, eds. (Oxford 2003) (pp. 494–503), p. 494.
26
See E. Jung-Palczewska and Z. Kuksewicz, “The Date of Wilton’s Quodlibet,” Studia
Mediewistyczne 32 (1997) (pp. 59–63), p. 60.
27
See Trifogli, “Il problema dello statuto ontologico,” pp. 491–5.
28
“Wilhelm von Alnwicks Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus (1323),”
rst appearing in Gregorianum 30 (1949), pp. 265–308, and reprinted in Maier, Ausgehendes
Mittelalter I, pp. 1–40.
29
See Maier, “Wilhelm von Alnwicks,” p. 3, n. 6.

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but she later changed her mind and suggested Paris.30 This latter
hypothesis has been conrmed by Jung and Kuksewicz.31
Since the publication of Maier’s papers, much work has been done on
Wylton’s Quodlibet. Some questions have been edited, new manuscripts
for some of the questions have been found, and doctrinal studies have
been devoted to a variety of topics discussed by Wylton in the Quodlibet.
All the results of these recent studies have not yet been collected and
organised in a single publication, which would provide an up-dated work
of reference on Wylton’s Quodlibet. And this is what I intend to do in
the present chapter. I will proceed as follows. For each of the eighteen
questions contained in the Borghese manuscript V (i.e., the questions on
Maier’s list) I will provide ve types of information: (1) the manuscripts
in which the question is contained (section “MSS”); (2) whether the
question has been edited and where (section “Edition”); (3) an overview
of the bibliography about the question (section “Bibliography”); (4)
the content of the question (section “Content”)—if the content of a
question has been summarised in an existing publication, I will simply
refer the reader to that publication, but if this is not the case, I will
provide a short summary of its content; (5) the questions by Wylton not
contained in the Quodlibet that deal with the same or a closely related
topic (section “Related Questions”).
Since all the questions in the Borghese manuscript have been either
totally or partially (qq. 17 and 18) edited with the exception of two
short questions (qq. 11 and 12), in Appendix II I provide an edition
of these two questions.
I will use the following sigla for the manuscripts containing Wylton’s
questions:

B = New Haven, Yale University Library, Beinecke General 470.

C= Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, Plut. VIII sin. 2.
F = Firenze, BNC, II.II. 281.
O= Oxford, Balliol College Library 91.
T= Tortosa, Archivo Capitular de Tortosa 88.
V= Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. Lat. 36.

30
See Maier, “Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentaren,” p. 281, n. 40.
31
See Jung-Palczewska and Kuksewicz, “The Date,” pp. 60–1.

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The eighteen questions of Wylton’s Quodlibet are very heterogeneous.

They vary greatly both in topic and in length. Although the questions
dealing with theological issues are predominant (qq. 1–5, 9, 11–12,
17–18), there are also questions in natural philosophy (qq. 14–16),
metaphysics (qq. 6, 13) and theory of knowledge (qq. 7–8, 10). The
problems discussed in the theological questions are the innite power
of God (q. 1), the beatic act (qq. 2–4, 11), the distinction between
divine attributes (qq. 5, 12), the eternity of the world (q. 9), and divine
relations (qq. 17–18). The questions in natural philosophy discuss nal
causality (q. 14), the instant of time (q. 15) and the problem of indenite
dimensions (dimensiones interminatae) (q. 16). The metaphysical questions
deal with the problem of the simultaneous existence of accidents of
the same species in the same subject (q. 6) and with the ontological
status of number (q. 13). The epistemological questions are about the
knowledge of singulars (qq. 7–8) and common sensibles (q. 10). As to
the length, there are two extremely long questions: question 1 about
the innite power of God (34 columns) and question 9 about the eter-
nity of the world (35.5 columns). These two questions deal with hotly
debated topics and Wylton discusses at length a number of contempo-
rary positions. The only other question comparable in length to these
two is question 5 on divine attributes, which takes up 28 columns. But
there are also a relevant number of rather short questions: nine out of
eighteen questions take up less than seven columns.32

Q. 1 Utrum essentia divina sit perfectio innita intensive.

MSS: V, ff. 47ra–55rb; T, ff. 5rb–15rb; F, ff. 130rb–137vb.
Edition: E. Jung-Palczewska, “La Question quodlibétique De innitate
vigoris Dei de Thomas de Wylton,” AHDLMA 64 (1997), pp. 347–403.
Bibliography: (1) For the relevance of this question to the problem
of the authorship of Wylton’s Physics commentary, see M. Schmaus,
“Thomas Wylton als Verfasser eines Kommentars zur Aristotelischen
Physik,” Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 9 (1956),
pp. 10–11. (2) For the debate between Wylton and Peter Auriol on
the innite power of God, see A. Maier, “Das Lehrstück von den vires
infatigabiles in der scholastischen Naturphilosophie,” Archives Internationales

32
These are q. 2 (4.5 cols.), q. 3 (6 cols.), q. 4 (2 cols.; this question, however, is
incomplete), qq. 7–8 (4.5 cols.), q. 10 (2.5 cols.), q. 11 (3 cols.), q. 12 (1.5 cols.), q. 17
(4 cols.). As to the remaining questions, q. 6 takes up 15 columns; q. 13, 8 cols.; q. 14,
7.5 cols.; q. 15, 9.5 cols.; q. 16, 13 cols.; and q. 18, 18 cols.

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d’Histoire des Sciences 5 (1952), pp. 25–8; eadem, Metaphysische Hintergründe

der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome 1955), pp. 247–50; eadem,
“Verschollene Aristoteleskommentare des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in eadem,
Ausgehendes Mittelalter I, pp. 244–5 (rst published in Autour d’Aristote
[Louvain 1955], pp. 515–41). (3) For the debate between Wylton and
William of Alnwick, see Maier, “Wilhelm von Alnwicks,” pp. 28–37;
eadem, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik (Rome 1958), pp. 196–205.
(4) For John of Jandun’s use of Wylton’s question in his treatise on
the innite power of God, see C.J. Ermatinger, “John of Jandun in
his Relations with Arts Masters and Theologians,” in Arts Libéraux et
Philosophie au Moyen Age (Montreal-Paris 1969), pp. 1181–3; Z. Kuksewicz,
“Johannis de Janduno De innitate vigoris Dei. Edition Critique,” Studia
Mediewistyczne 24.1 (1985), pp. 98–104. (5) For an analysis of Wylton’s
position, see E. Jung-Palczewska, “Thomas Wylton and his Question
on the Innite Power of God,” MPP 32 (1994), pp. 41–56; eadem,
“Thomas Wylton’s Solution to the Aristotelian Problem of God’s
Innite Power,” in Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages, J. Marenbon,
ed. (Cambridge 1996), pp. 311–21; eadem, “Delimitation between
Theology and Natural Philosophy: the Case of God’s Innite Power
in Thomas Wylton,” Studia Mediewistyczne 33 (1998), pp. 65–71.
Content: See especially Jung-Palczewska, “La Question quodlibétique,”
pp. 340–2; eadem, “Thomas Wylton and his Question,” pp. 49–56.
Related Questions: (1) An motus innitus requirat potentiam innitam in
virtute (QPhys, C, ff. 134rb–135rb). (2) An demonstratio sua concludat (QPhys,
C, f. 135rb–va). (3) An sequatur ‘virtus innita est in magnitudine; ergo movet
in non tempore’ (QPhys, C, ff. 135va–137ra). (4) An virtus nita possit movere
per tempus innitum (QPhys, C, f. 139ra–va). (5) An demonstratio Philosophi
concludat de necessitate (QPhys, C, f. 139va–b). (6) An aliqua virtus in corpore
posset movere per tempus innitum (QPhys, C, ff. 139vb–140ra). (7) An [si]
virtus innita modo supra exposito, si esset in magnitudine, moveret in instanti
(QPhys, C, ff. 140ra–141ra).

Q. 2 Utrum necessario necessitate absoluta requiratur lumen gloriae in visione

beata.
MS: V, ff. 55va–56va.
Edition: L.O. Nielsen and C. Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic
Vision by Thomas Wylton and Sibert de Beka,” DSTFM 17 (2006),
pp. 524–32.
Bibliography: Nielsen-Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision,”
pp. 513–15.

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Content: Wylton attacks the view that supernatural habits are necessary
for both meritorious acts in via and the beatic vision in patria. There
is a strong likelihood that this is the view of the Carmelite Master
Sibert of Beek.33
The question starts with the report of six arguments proposed in
favour of this view. The essential point of these arguments is to show
that a natural potency cannot perform a supernatural act by itself but
only by means of a supernatural habit. In one of the arguments the
following inference is used to make that point: “acting presupposes
being; therefore supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being.”
In the case of meritorious acts, the authority of Augustine is invoked
in support of the claim that infused supernatural habits are required
both in the intellect and in the will. In the case of the beatic vision,
the exponents of this view argue that, if supernatural habits and in
particular the lumen gloriae were not required, then every created intellect
would have the vision of God and without any habit whatsoever.
Wylton also reports an argument against this view. If the intellect
could not immediately receive the beatic act, this should be due either
to a lack of proportion between a natural potency and a supernatural
act or to a lack of proportion between a nite passive potency and the
action proper to an agent of innite power. In the rst case the posi-
tion of a supernatural habit (e.g., the lumen gloriae) as a necessary means
between the natural potency and the supernatural act opens an innite
regress. In the second case, the appeal to a supernatural habit would
be of no help because such a habit does not make the nite potency
proportionate to the action of an innite agent.
Wylton’s formal reply to the question is that the view according to
which God can by his absolute power provide the created intellect with
a beatic act without any intermediate supernatural act is more prob-
able than the opposite view. In order to assert that God cannot do this
by his absolute power, one would need to have certitude that doing this
would imply a contradiction. But Wylton shows that we have no certi-
tude that the claim that the intellect can receive the beatic act without
any intermediate supernatural habit implies a contradiction. There is
no certitude based on faith or Holy Scriptures for claims involving the
absolute power of God. There is no certitude of evidence either, as is

33
On the hypothesis that Wylton’s anonymous opponent in q. 2 is Sibert of Beek,
see Nielsen-Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision,” pp. 516–19.

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shown by the fact that some people doubt that it is contradictory for
God to induce the beatic act without a supernatural habit and in fact
formulate probable arguments for the opposite view. It is similar in the
case of meritorious acts.
As to the claim of the opponent that a natural potency cannot have a
supernatural act, Wylton replies that the claim is false if it is understood
in the sense that a supernatural act exceeds the capacity of a natural
potency. It is true if it is understood in the sense that a supernatural
act cannot be produced in a natural potency by a natural agent.
It is likely that Wylton had already discussed another question on
a similar topic. In connection with the inference “acting presupposes
being; therefore, supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being”
used by his opponents, he says “respondi alias.”
Related Questions: (1) Utrum intellectum creatum videre Deum immediate,
sicuti est, sine aliquo habitu supernaturali, puta gloriae lumine, et voluntatem sine
habitu caritatis diligere Deum beatice implicet contradictionem (T, ff. 46ra–48rb).
(2) Utrum voluntas divina sit totalis causa actus intuitivi beatici circumscripta
omni actione obiecti beatici in quantum tale obiectum beaticum et circumscripta
omni actione cuiuscumque agentis creati (T, ff. 59rb–61va). (3) Utrum ma-
nente actu beatico eodem numero possit terminari notitia circa secundaria obiecta
(T, ff. 61vb–62vb).34

Q. 3 Utrum actus beaticus sit simplex.35

MS: V, ff. 56va–58ra.
Edition: Nielsen-Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision,” pp.
533–43.
Bibliography: (1) Nielsen-Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision,”
pp. 522–3. (2) For the suggestion that Wylton’s opponent in question
3 is Guy Terrena, see B. Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone Terreni, Priore
Generali Ordinis Nostris, Episcopo Maioricensi et Elmensi,” Analecta
Ordinis Carmelitanorum 5 (1925), pp. 258–63.
Content: The issue at stake is whether beatitude consists of both an
act of the intellect, i.e., the contemplation of God, and an act of the

34
The three questions in the Tortosa manuscript are edited in Nielsen-Trifogli,
“Questions on the Beatic Vision,” pp. 548–57, 558–69, and 570–84 respectively.
35
The title is missing at the beginning of the question, but it can be reconstructed
from the incipit: “Quod actus beaticus sit simplex probatur . . .” (ed. Nielsen-Trifogli,
p. 533, l. 3).

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will, i.e., the love of God, or of only one of these two acts, and thus
be simple.
Wylton rst presents a series of arguments, some of them showing
that beatitude is simple and the others that it consists of an act of the
intellect alone. A number of passages from Aristotle’s Ethics are quoted
in favour of the claim that beatitude is simple. Furthermore, the simple
nature of beatitude is argued on the basis of an analogy between
the hierarchy of subsisting forms and that of inhering perfections: as the
highest item of the rst hierarchy is one simple form, similarly, the
highest item of the second hierarchy, namely, beatitude, must be a
simple perfection. Other reasons for the simplicity of beatitude are
that it is the best of all human operations and that the thing that is
made happy by it is only one. The claim that beatitude consists of an
act of the intellect alone is supported by passages from Augustine. The
main arguments for that claim show that the act of the will is not an
essential part of beatitude because it is simply an effect, in the order
of efcient causality, of the act of the intellect, and because it does not
immediately join us to God as object of love. Xiberta suggests that it
is very likely that the view Wylton refers to in these arguments is that
of Guy Terrena.36 The exponent of this view, however, is named in
Wylton’s text as “Magister Laurentius,” perhaps to be identied with
the Benedictine Master Laurentius Anglicus.37
Wylton rejects this view. In his reply to the question he rst introduces
a distinction between two senses of “beatitude.” In the rst sense, beati-
tude is the most perfect of all human operations. In the second sense,
beatitude is the set of operations that make man perfectly happy. He
then argues that if beatitude is taken in the second sense (that relevant
to the question), then it consists of both an act of the intellect and an
act of the will. The main argument for this claim is the following. Any
creature that is apt by nature to immediately join to its ultimate end by
means of different operations is not perfectly happy unless it is joined
to its ultimate end by means of all these operations; but man is apt
by nature to immediately join to God by means of both intellect and
will. The controversial part of this argument is the claim that man is
immediately joined to God by an act of the will, namely, that the will
immediately desires God insofar as God is good. In support of this

36
See Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone,” p. 261.
37
See Nielsen-Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision,” p. 522 and p. 541, l. 272.

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claim Wylton quotes passages from Anselm and Augustine and appeals
to the principle that every potency can immediately tend towards its
rst object and whatever is per se contained in it.38
Wylton further species that the act of the intellect and the act of
the will do not equally concur in beatitude, but one of them is more
fundamental than the other. The more fundamental act is also called
the more perfect portion of beatitude and corresponds to beatitude
taken in the rst sense as the most perfect among human operations.
Whether the will or the intellect is the most perfect portion of beatitude
is left undetermined in question 3 and is the topic of question 4.
To his opponent’s arguments he concedes that the act of intellect
and the act of will cannot equally concur in human beatitude. But he
denies that the act of will does not immediately lead to God as object
of love and that it has the intellect as efcient cause. The intellect is the
cause of the will only as cause sine qua non in the sense that the object
of the will can be present to the will only by means of the intellect.
Related Questions: Cf. q. 2.

Q. 4 Quis istorum actuum <sit> principalior portio beatitudinis.39

MS: V, f. 58ra–va.
Edition: Nielsen-Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision,” pp.
544–7.
Bibliography: Cf. q. 3.
Content: As has been explained above, this question in fact asks
whether the act of the will is more perfect than the act of the intellect.
The question is incomplete (the question stops at f. 58va, l. 37 and the
rest of f. 58v is left blank). It contains a series of arguments in favour
of the superiority of the act of the intellect over the act of the will

38
Note that this principle is also the topic of q. 10, which asks whether a cognitive
potency can have per se knowledge also of something that does not fall under its per
se object and discusses the case of common sensibles. It is therefore possible that q.
10 was intended by Wylton as a clarication of some controversial point about this
principle left unexplained in q. 3.
39
In Maier’s list, this question is given a slightly different title, namely, Utrum actus
voluntatis sit perfectior portio beatitudinis. Although this title is not that present at the begin-
ning of the question, it is suggested by the way Wylton presents some of the arguments
later in the course of the question at ed. Nielsen-Trifogli, p. 545, l. 55: “Quod actus
voluntatis sit perfectior portio beatitudinis . . .” In correspondence to these lines there is
the marginal annotation “quarta quaestio.” The question, however, begins much earlier
at p. 544, l. 1, apparatus, and with the title I have given in the text.

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and a series of arguments in favour of the superiority of the act of the

will over the act of the intellect. Both series of arguments try to show
the superiority of one act over the other on the basis of a comparison
between their respective potencies, their objects and the way these acts
are joined to their respective objects. Wylton remarks that these kinds
of arguments are not adequate. The superiority among the potencies
cannot be used to infer the superiority among the corresponding acts
because potencies are known only in virtue of their acts. Furthermore,
even when a potency is clearly superior to another potency, it is not
always the case that this is true also for the corresponding acts. For
example, the agent intellect is a more perfect potency than the pos-
sible intellect, and yet the ultimate act of the possible intellect, namely,
the vision of God, is more perfect than the ultimate act of the agent
intellect. Also the comparison between the objects of the acts is not
of great help. Again, the case of the possible and agent intellect shows
that, although the agent intellect is more perfect than the possible
intellect, still the object of the possible intellect is more perfect than
that of the agent intellect, if these two potencies have different objects.
Furthermore, many people—Wylton remarks—posit that the intellect
and the will have exactly the same object. Again, the case of the pos-
sible and agent intellect shows that the criterion of superiority among
potencies or acts based on the way they are joined to their respective
objects is not sound. Although the possible intellect is less perfect than
the agent intellect, it is joined to the beatic object in a more perfect
way than the agent intellect. Wylton suggests that those who want to
support the superiority of the will should rather appeal to the freedom
of the will. The question stops here so that we do not know which
position Wylton nally supports.
Related Questions: Cf. q. 2.

Q. 5 An omnes rationes quae dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam sint eaedem

Deo et inter se omnibus modis ex parte rei.
MS: V, ff. 59ra–65vb.
Edition: L.O. Nielsen, T.B. Noone, and C. Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s
Question on the Formal Distinction as Applied to the Divine,” DSTFM
14 (2003), pp. 342–88.
Bibliography: For the structure, the historical setting and the content
of the question, see Nielsen-Noone-Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s,” pp.
330–41.

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Content: Ibid.
Related Questions: (1) Utrum, posito quod attributa distinguuntur ex natura
rei, utrum maior sit distinctio ipsorum ad essentiam quam relationis ad essentiam
(B, ff. 26vb–27vb). (2) Utrum in una proprietate relativa constitutiva personae
divinae . . . sint aliquae realitates quae non omnibus modis sint eaedem ex natura
rei (T, ff. 36rb–39va).40

Q. 6 An accidentia eiusdem speciei possint inesse simul eidem subiecto.

MSS: V, ff. 65vb–69va; T, ff. 52rb–59ra.
Edition: G.J. Etzkorn and R. Andrews, “Tortosa Cathedral 88: A
‘Thomas Wylton’ Manuscript and the Question on the Compatibility of
Multiple Accidents in the Same Subject,” MPP 32 (1994), pp. 65–99.
Bibliography: Etzkorn-Andrews, “Tortosa Cathedral,” pp. 57–64.
Content: Ibid., pp. 63–4.
Related Questions: None.

Qq. 7–8 Circa duas quaestiones de verbo singularium quae habent eandem dif-
cultatem sic procedam et brevissime. . . .41
MSS: V, ff. 69vb–70vb; T, ff. 23ra–24va.
Edition: W. Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona Quaestio disputata de anima
intellectiva,” Studia Mediewistyczne 5 (1964), pp. 117–21.42
Bibliography: (1) For a possible debate between Wylton and Guy
Terrena, see Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone Terreni,” p. 262. (2) For a
summary of Wylton’s position, see Z. Kuksewicz, De Siger de Brabant à
Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l’intellect chez les Averroïstes latins des XIII e
et XIV e siècles (Wroclaw 1968), p. 191.
Content: See Kuksewicz, De Siger de Brabant, p. 191.
Related Questions: None.

40
For a discussion of Wylton’s authorship of these two questions, see Dumont,
“New Questions,” pp. 351–3, 358–9. For other questions on the same topic ascribed
to Thomas Wylton by Glorieux but the authorship of which is very doubtful, see
Nielsen-Noone-Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s,” p. 330, n. 18.
41
The title of the two questions is missing but it can be deduced from Wylton’s
reply to them: “Per istud apparet ad utramque quaestionem. Ad primam, quod intel-
lectus potest formare de singulari aliud verbum a verbo sui universalis. Ad secundam
etiam dico, quod intellectus noster potest de duobus singularibus formare duo verba”
(ed. Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” p. 121). Senko edits the two questions under the title
“An intellectus noster possit de duobus singularibus formare duo verba” (ibid., p. 117),
which is in fact the title of the second question.
42
Senko’s edition is based on the Borghese manuscript alone. The copy in the
Tortosa manuscript was not known to him.

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Q. 9 An ista simul stent quod motus sit aeternaliter a Deo productus et cum hoc
quod Deus sic produxit mundum libere quod potuit ipsum non produxisse.
MSS: V, ff. 71ra–79vb; T, ff. 94va–111va.
Edition: Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 156–90.43
Bibliography: (1) For the debate between Wylton and Henry of
Harclay on the innite, see A. Maier, “Diskussionen über das aktuelle
Unendliche in der ersten Halfte des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in eadem,
Ausgehendes Mittelalter I, pp. 55–7 (rst published in Divus Thomas 24
[1947], pp. 147–66, 317–37). (2) For the debate between Wylton and
William of Alnwick on the eternity of the world, see Maier, “Wilhelm
von Alnwicks,” pp. 23–6. (3) On Wylton’s attitude to Aristotle’s argu-
ments for the eternity of motion, see Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe,
pp. 7–8, n. 8; L. Hödl, “Die Kritik des Johannes de Polliaco an der
philosophischen und theologischen ratio in der Auseinandersetzung
mit den averroistischen Unterscheidungslehren,” in Miscellanea Martin
Grabmann, M. Schmaus, ed. (Munich 1959), pp. 27–9. (4) On the rela-
tion between the discussions of Wylton, Harclay and Alnwick about
the eternity of the world, see J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “The Response
to Thomas Aquinas in the Early Fourteenth Century: Eternity and
Innity in the Works of Henry of Harclay, Thomas of Wilton and
William of Alnwick O.F.M.,” in The Eternity of the World in the Thought
of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries, J.B.M. Wissink, ed. (Leiden-New
York-Copenhagen-Cologne 1990), pp. 90–2. (5) For a detailed and
comprehensive analysis of Wylton’s question, see R.C. Dales, Medieval
Discussions of the Eternity of the World (Leiden-New York-Copenhagen-
Cologne 1990), pp. 208–18.
Content: Dales, Medieval Discussions, pp. 208–18.
Related Questions: (1) An motus sit aeternus vel aliquid causatum
(QPhys, C, ff. 114vb–116vb). (2) Supposito quod mundum fuisse ab aeterno
sit possibile, utrum hoc sit necessarium, ipsum fuisse ab aeterno (QPhys, C, ff.
116vb–118va).

Q. 10 An ista simul stent quod aliquid sit obiectum adaequatum per se et primum
alicuius potentiae et tamen quod aliquid cognoscatur per se ab illa potentia quod
non continetur per se sub obiecto adaequato.
MSS: V, ff. 79vb–80rb; T, ff. 16rb–17rb.

43
The edition is based on the Borghese manuscript alone.

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Edition: Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 131–3.44

Bibliography: None.
Content: Most of the question is devoted to the case of common
sensibles, which seem to provide a positive answer to the question.
Suppose, e.g., that the coloured or the bright is the per se and primary
object of sight. A common sensible, like shape or rest, is per se visible,
although it is not per se a coloured or bright thing.
Wylton reports Averroes’ discussion of common sensibles45 and
concludes from it that common sensibles are per se sensible. There are
a number of reasons suggested by Averroes in favour of this conclu-
sion. Quantity, which is a common sensible, is necessary to produce a
modication in the senses. For example, if a colour existed separated
from quantity, it would not produce a modication in sight. Common
sensibles also account for the fact that a proper sensible can modify
the senses in different ways (e.g., a coloured thing produces different
modications in sight when it is at rest and when it is in motion).
Furthermore, common sensibles as such produce a modication in sight
(a shape, e.g., impresses its species in the eye), although the modica-
tion produced by a common sensible depends on that produced by a
proper sensible.
Wylton further species in which sense of “per se” common sensibles
are per se sensible. He claims that this is neither the rst mode of per se
nor the second mode distinguished by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics.
The reason for this is that common sensibles like shape, number and
quantity abstract from any sensible quality. In his view, the mode of
per se appropriate to common sensibles is intermediate between the
mode of per se appropriate to the proper sensibles (second mode of
per se) and the per accidens.
Wylton’s reply to the question is that it is impossible that something
is known by a cognitive faculty per se in the second mode of per se
and yet does not fall under the per se and primary object of that fac-
ulty. The case of common sensibles is not a counter-example to this
principle because they are not sensibile per se in the second mode of
per se. He also remarks that if “per se” is taken as the second mode
of per se, then the per se objects of sight all belong to the third spe-

44
The edition is based on the Borghese manuscript only.
45
Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F.D.
Crawford (Cambridge, MA 1953), book II, t.c. 65, pp. 227–9.

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cies of quality, but if “per se” is taken as to include the way in which
common sensibles are per se sensible, then the per se objects of sight
do not all belong to one category but are one only by analogy. Finally,
Wylton points out that, if “per se” is taken as the second mode of per
se, there is not a primary and per se object of the intellect. In particular,
being (ens) is not such an object. If it were, then “being” would be per
se in the rst mode of per se predicated of “one,” “good” and “true,”
which is not the case.
Related Questions: Utrum sensibilia communia sint sensibilia per se
(QdeAn, O, ff. 266rb–267rb).

Q. 11 Utrum, ubicumque excessus alicuius arguit excessum alterius ita quod

excessus unius in duplo arguit excessum alterius in duplo et sic ulterius secundum
proportionem, [sequatur] ex excessu unius in innitum sequatur excessus alterius
in innitum.
MSS: V, ff. 80rb–81ra; T, ff. 16rb–17rb.
Edition: See Appendix II.
Bibliography: None.
Content: Wylton remarks that this question mainly arises from the case
of the beatic act. For Aristotle and Averroes a cognitive habit or a
cognitive act is more perfect if its object is more perfect. On the other
hand, the object of the beatic act is innitely perfect. Therefore, if
the principle stated in the title of the question is valid, it follows that
the beatic act would be innitely perfect, a conclusion that Wylton
rejects.
Wylton rst establishes whether the perfection of cognitive acts and
habits is determined by the perfection of their objects. He introduces a
distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic perfection of habits and
acts. The intrinsic perfection, which is the more formal and fundamental
type of perfection, is determined by the perfection of the cognitive pro-
cess in the case of a habit and by the perfection of the way in which it
grasps its object in the case of an act. The extrinsic perfection of habits
and acts is determined by the perfection of their objects. The intrinsic
perfection is that on which the distinction of the species of habits and
acts (e.g., science, faith, opinion) is based. Furthermore, Wylton argues
that the intrinsic perfection of an act is completely independent of the
perfection of its object. E.g., our science of a triangle is intrinsically
more perfect than our science of God. In particular, one can concede
that the beatic act is innite (i.e., innitely perfect), but only in the

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sense that it represents an innite object, and not also in the sense that
it has an innite intrinsic perfection.
As to the general principle formulated in the title of the question,
Wylton maintains that it is valid when one argues from “effect to cause,”
but it is not valid when one argues from “cause to effect.” That is, if
an effect of double intensity is produced by a cause of double power
and so on for any nite proportion, then an effect of innite intensity
is produced by a cause of innite power. But if a cause of double
power produces an effect of double intensity and so on for any nite
proportion, it does not necessarily follow that a cause of innite power
produces an effect of innite intensity. For example, although the rst
cause has an innite power, it does not produce an instantaneous
motion or another effect of innite intensity. Similarly, in the case of
the beatic act, even if the intrinsic perfection of the beatic act were
determined by its object and even if this object were the total cause
of this act (both of these premises are denied by Wylton), the beatic
act would still be of nite perfection.
Related Questions: Cf. q. 2.

Q. 12 An identitas realis in divinis suscipiat magis et minus.

MS: V, f. 81ra–b.
Edition: See Appendix II.
Bibliography: None.
Content: The pro-argument of this question appeals to the real (i.e.,
formal ex parte rei ) distinction between the perfections of God (e.g.,
goodness and wisdom). The contra-argument says that less unity also
implies less entity and less goodness, given the convertibility of “one,”
“being” and “good.”
In his reply to the question, Wylton resorts to a distinction between
two senses of unity that he had introduced in the “quaestio de attributis,”
i.e., in question 5 of the Quodlibet.46 In the rst sense, something is one if
it lacks parts. In the second sense, something is one if it lacks not only
parts but also any multiplicity and distinction of modes or perfections.
God is absolutely one in the rst sense, so that the unity or identity of
God in the rst sense does not admit of degrees. God is not absolutely

46
Wylton often refers to q. 5 as to the “quaestio de attributis.” For the distinction
of two senses of unity in the “quaestio de attributis,” see Nielsen-Noone-Trifogli,
“Thomas Wylton’s,” p. 363.

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one in the second sense. Indeed, in God there are many really distinct
perfections. A multitude of perfections and hence lack of unity in the
second sense do not posit any imperfection in God nor in any creature.
The greater the number of perfections an entity has the more perfect
it is. The contra-argument is valid in the case of God only if unity is
understood in the rst sense.
Related Questions: Cf. q. 5.

Q. 13 Circa numerum an sit ens formaliter praeter animam.

MS: V, ff. 81va–83rb.
Edition: C. Trifogli and L.O. Nielsen, “Thomas Wylton’s Questions
on Number, the Instant, and Time,” DSTFM 16 (2005), pp. 74–87.47
Bibliography: Ibid.
Content: Ibid., pp. 58–62.
Related Questions: Ultrum numerus qui oritur ex divisione continui addat
aliquam rem super continuum (B, f. 29rb–vb).

Q. 14 An nis quo sit causa.

MS: V, ff. 83rb–85rb.
Edition: Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 148–55.
Bibliography: For an analyis of Wylton’s position and his debate
with Guy Terrena, see Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 290–5;
C. Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton on Final Causality,” in Erfahrung und Beweis.
Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, A. Fidora and
M. Lutz-Bachmann, eds. (Berlin 2007), pp. 249–64.
Content: Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton on Final Causality,” pp. 251–60.
Related Questions: Utrum nis sit causa operationis efcienter (QPhys,
C, ff. 28vb–29va).

Q. 15 An nunc secundum substantiam sit mensura propria rei generabilis et cor-

ruptibilis secundum esse permanens eius.48

47
This paper contains also the edition of q. 15 of the Quodlibet (see below) and of
two questions by Wylton on time and number respectively contained in the Beinecke
manuscript. These are Utrum tempus habeat esse reale distinctum a motu secundum suum esse
formale (pp. 106–12; B, ff. 28vb–29rb) and Utrum numerus qui oritur ex divisione continui
addat aliquam rem super continuum (pp. 113–17; B, f. 29rb–vb).
48
The title is not found at the beginning of the question but is specied in Wylton’s
reply to the question: “Dico ergo ad formam quaestionis quod nunc secundum sub-
stantiam est mensura propria rei generabilis et corruptibilis secundum esse permanens
eius, quae fuerit titulus quaestionis” (ed. Trifogli-Nielsen, p. 89, ll. 38–40). The incipit

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MS: V, ff. 85rb–87va.

Edition: Trifogli-Nielsen, “Thomas Wylton’s Questions on Number,”
pp. 88–105.
Bibliography: For an analysis of Wylton’s position and his polemic
against Duns Scotus, see C. Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton on the Instant of
Time,” in Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, A. Zimmermann, ed. (Berlin-
New York 1991), pp. 308–18.
Content: Trifogli-Nielsen, “Thomas Wylton’s Questions on Number,”
pp. 63–8.
Related Questions: (1) Utrum instans maneat unum et idem in toto tempore
(QPhys, C, ff. 68ra–69ra). (2) Utrum instans causet tempus (QPhys, C, ff.
69ra–70ra).

Q. 16 An in materia generabilium praecedat aliqua dimensio formam substantialem

inducendam.
MS: V, ff. 87va–90vb.
Edition: Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 133–48.
Bibliography: For a reference to Wylton’s rejection of the position of
Godfrey of Fontaines, see A. Maier, Die Verläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert
(Rome 1949), p. 47, n. 22.
Content: Wylton species that the question asks whether in the matter
of things subject to generation there is a dimension such that it is a
disposition that matter must have in order to receive form, and that it is
inseparable from matter, and, like matter, it persists as numerically the
same in generation and corruption. When the question is so specied,
then the answer to it depends on the answer to a conceptually prior
question, namely, whether quantity belongs to a composite substance
(i) in virtue of its matter or (ii) in virtue of its form or (iii) one type of
quantity belongs to a composite substance in virtue of its matter and
another type of quantity belongs to it in virtue of its form. Wylton then
presents three opinions about the latter question, which correspond to
the three alternatives (i)–(iii).49
The rst opinion is that quantity belongs to a composite substance in
virtue of its matter and thus posits that matter has a dimension insepa-
rable from it and prior to any form induced in it. Wylton remarks that

of the question is: “Circa hanc quaestionem primo ponam opinionem quam credo
esse veram . . .” (p. 88, l. 3).
49
Cf. Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 134, l. 19–136, l. 37.

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this opinion is common among the Artists, but he thinks that it must
be rejected. This opinion is committed to posit the unity of substantial
form in man. Furthermore, it does not account for the fact that matter
under different forms assumes different quantities.
The second opinion is that quantity primarily belongs to a composite
in virtue of its form. This is the opinion of Avicenna, who posits that
every quantity is determined by the rst form, namely, the form of the
body ( forma corporeitatis).50
The third opinion is that one type of quantity belongs to a compos-
ite substance in virtue of its matter and another in virtue of its form.
This is the opinion of Averroes. Averroes posits that indenite dimen-
sion (dimensio interminata) precedes the form and persists even when the
form no longer inheres in matter, whereas denite dimension (dimensio
terminata) is posterior to and determined by the form. The rest of this
quodlibetal question is devoted to the discussion of the position of
Averroes.
First Wylton extensively reports Averroes’ discussion of this problem
in the De substantia orbis.51 Averroes argues that (i) indenite dimensions
are necessary to account for the divisibility of a substantial form, i.e.,
for the fact that there are many individuals with specically the same
substantial form; (ii) denite dimensions insofar as they are denite
are posterior to the substantial form and determined by it; (iii) inde-
nite dimensions are inseparable from matter; (iv) the form of celestial
bodies, unlike that of bodies subject to generation and corruption,
is not received in matter by means of indenite dimension, but is
totally responsible for the quantity of the composite; (v) the position
of Avicenna is not sound.
Wylton then presents a series of standard arguments against Aver-
roes.52 Most of these arguments are against the position of indenite
dimension in matter prior to any substantial form. This position seems
to imply that the rst act of matter is indenite dimension and not
a substantial form. Similarly, it seems to imply that substantial form
would be the act of matter not by itself but only by means of indenite
dimension, so that the accidental composite of matter and indenite

50
Cf. Avicenna, Sufficientia I, c. 2 (ed. Venice 1508; reprint Louvain 1961), f.
14ra–b.
51
Cf. Averroes Cordubensis, De Substantia orbis, c. 1 (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois
commentariis, 9) (ed. Venice 1562; reprint Frankfurt 1962), ff. 3vb–5ra.
52
Cf. Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 136, l. 38–138, l. 25.

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dimension would be prior to the essential composite. Other arguments

are against the distinction of two types of quantity in a composite, since
this would imply that two quantities exist simultaneously in the same
subject. Other objections show that Averroes’ arguments in favour of
his position are not conclusive.
Wylton remarks that, notwithstanding these objections, there are
people who want to support the opinion of Averroes. Wylton divides
these people into two main groups: those who claim to follow Averroes
but in fact follow Avicenna, the pseudo-Averroists, for short; those who
really follow Averroes, the genuine Averroists.
The rst pseudo-Averroist considered by Wylton is Godfrey of Fon-
taines.53 Wylton claims that Godfrey does not actually follow Averroes’
position because Godfrey denies that there is a quantity that persists as
numerically the same in generation and corruption, so that as a matter
of fact every quantity is determined by the substantial form, and this is
the opinion of Avicenna. Another pseudo-Averroist position reported
by Wylton ascribes to Averroes the view that indenite dimension is
not an accident and hence not a quantity, but some kind of diversity
or extendibility proper to matter and prior to any form. Furthermore,
according to this position, both matter and form, when they actually
exist in the composite, have parts in virtue of their essence and not
primarily in virtue of quantity. Wylton shows that Averroes actually
posits that indenite dimension is an accident and in particular a
quantity. He also shows that a substance is actually extended only in
virtue of quantity.
As to the genuine Averroists, Wylton reports two main arguments
formulated by these people in favour of Averroes’ doctrine of indenite
dimension and not present in Averroes. The rst argument shows that
indenite dimension in matter is necessary to account for the increase
of bodies. The second shows that indenite dimension in matter is
necessary to account for the fact that the locomotion concomitant to
the transformation of air into re is not instantaneous. Wylton, however,
thinks that these two arguments are not conclusive.54

53
Ibid., pp. 138, l. 30–139, l. 34. Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XI, q. 3, ed.
J. Hoffmans (Leuven 1932). On this question of Godfrey, see E.D. Sylla, “Godfrey of
Fontaines on Motion with Respect to Quantity of the Eucharist,” in Studi sul xiv secolo
in memoria di Anneliese Maier, A. Maierù and A. Paravicini-Bagliani, eds. (Rome 1981),
pp. 105–41.
54
Cf. Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona,” pp. 141, l. 20–143, l. 7.

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In the last part of the question Wylton expresses his own view
about Averroes’ position.55 He thinks that Averroes’ position is true
and defends it against the objections to it presented in other parts of
the question. The most original aspects of Wylton’s interpretation of
Averroes’ position appear in the extensive discussion that he devotes
to the objection that two distinct quantities, namely, indenite and
denite quantities, would simultaneously exist in the same subject.56
Wylton rejects the solution given by some people, who distinguish the
primary recipients of these two quantities and claim that the primary
recipient of indenite quantity is matter whereas the primary recipient
of denite quantity is form. He thinks that in Averroes’ intention the
primary recipient of quantity (either denite or indenite) is matter
alone, whereas form receives quantity only accidentally, namely insofar
as it is received in extended matter.
Wylton claries three aspects of his own interpretation of Averroes.
The rst aspect is about how indenite and denite quantity must be
understood. Wylton maintains that a quantity existing in some matter
can be said to be both denite and indenite from different points of
view. It is denite because there is a denite limit such that that mat-
ter cannot be expanded beyond that limit. It is indenite because that
same matter can vary in extension within that limit. For example, the
quantity of a handful of earth cannot be extended beyond that of a
thousand handfuls of re, and in this sense it is denite. However, it can
well be extended to the quantity of ten handfuls of water and of one
hundred handfuls of air, and in this sense it is indenite. The different
termini that quantity assumes within the same matter are compared to
the different degrees that whiteness assumes within the same white body.
As to the type of unity of indenite quantity, Wylton distinguishes two
types of numerical unity of a form: a weaker type, which is determined
by the numerical unity of the subject of that form, and a stronger type,
which is determined by the unity of the terminus assumed by that form.
Indenite quantity has only the rst type of numerical unity.
The second aspect is about the type of distinction between indenite
and denite quantity. The question is whether these two quantities are
basically the same thing or denite quantity is an accident of indenite
quantity. In Wylton’s view, the relation of denite quantity to indenite

55
Ibid., pp. 143, l. 8–148, l. 39.
56
Ibid., pp. 145, l. 13–148, l. 39.

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quantity is analogous to the relation of different degrees of whiteness to

whiteness. Degrees of whiteness are not properly speaking accidents of
whiteness, but can be said to be accidents of whiteness in the sense that
they can vary within the same white subject. Similarly, denite quantity
and indenite quantity are the same thing, and denite quantity can
be said to be an accident of indenite quantity in the sense that it can
vary in matter informed by indenite quantity.
The third aspect is about the relation between denite quantity
and form. Wylton maintains that denite quantity precedes form by
priority of origin and not of time, in the sense that it is presupposed
by form as a necessary disposition in matter in virtue of which matter
is proportionate to that form, but it actually exists as permanent only
after the form has been introduced.
Related Questions: Utrum in quolibet genere sint tria principia transmutationis
naturalis, quae principia sunt eiusdem generis praedicabilis, sicut accidit in genere
substantiae (QPhys, C, ff. 18va–19vb).

Q. 17 An aliqua relatio dicta de Deo ex tempore de novo sit relatio realis.

MS: V, ff. 90vb–91vb.
Edition: Some passages from this question are edited by Mark
Henninger in the footnotes of his paper “Thomas Wylton’s Theory of
Relations,” DSTFM 1.2 (1990), pp. 457–90.
Bibliography: For an analysis of Wylton’s position and his debate
with Henry of Harclay and Peter Auriol, see Henninger, “Thomas
Wylton’s,” pp. 457–90.
Content: Ibid., pp. 468–79.
Related Questions: (1) Utrum relationes respectivae quae dicuntur de Deo
ex tempore sint reales (edited in Henninger, “Thomas Wylton’s,” p. 464,
n. 25). (2) Determinatio contra Petrum Aureoli (edited in F. Del Punta and
C. Luna, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, I: Catalogo dei Manoscritti (239 –293)
1/3* Francia (Dipartimenti) [Florence 1987], pp. 211–18); (3) Utrum ad
relationem realem requiratur (requiritur B) quod habeat fundamentum reale, ex quo
oriatur ex natura rei, et terminum realem in actu et extrema realiter distincta (B,
ff. 25vb–26vb). (4) Replicationes quaedam quod non quaelibet relatio in actu
requirat terminum in actu (T, ff. 43vb–46ra).57

57
For a discussion of Wylton’s authorship for items (3) and (4), see Dumont, “New
Questions,” pp. 348–50, 362–6. An incomplete copy of the Replicationes is preserved
in manuscript BAV, Borgh. lat. 171, f. 36r-v. See ibid., pp. 362–6.

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Q. 18 An relatio originis in divinis secundum rationem eius formalem quae est

ipsum “esse ad” sit perfectio aliqua simpliciter loquendo.
MS: V, ff. 92ra–96va.
Edition: Cf. q. 17.
Bibliography: Cf. q. 17.
Content: Cf. q. 17.
Related Questions: Cf. q. 17.

Note on Appendix II: Appendix II is an edition of questions 11 and 12

of Wylton’s Quodlibet. Question 11 is preserved in two manuscripts: V
(ff. 80rb–81ra) and T (ff. 16rb–17rb). In my edition I have essentially
followed V and used to T to emend V. Question 12 is preserved only
in V (f. 81ra–b). * = lectio incerta.

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 APPENDIX I

Glorieux’s List58
1. Utrum essentia divina sit innita perfectione intensive
2. Utrum in visione beata requiratur lumen gloriae necessitate absoluta
3. Utrum actus beaticus sit simplex
4. Utrum actus voluntatis sit perfectior portio beatitudinis
5. Utrum rationes quae dicuntur de Deo sint eadem inter se omnibus modis ex parte
rei
6. Utrum accidentia ejusdem speciei possint simul inesse eidem subjecto
7. Utrum intellectus noster possit intelligere singulare
8. Utrum cum unitate specica speciei atomae alicujus qualitatis stet distinctio
graduum infra illam naturam sic unam
9. Utrum qualitas eadem numero suscipiat magis et minus
10. Utrum minus calidum opponatur perfecte calido solum privative
11. Utrum gradus albedinis sint simpliciter indivisibiles
12. Utrum ista simul stent, videlicet quod mundus sit aeternaliter productus et quod
fuerit sic productus quod potuerit non produci
13. Utrum ista simul stent, quod aliquid sit objectum alicujus potentiae adaequatum,
et quod aliquid sit apprehensibile ab ista potentia quod non contineatur sub illo
objecto
14. Utrum identitas realis in divinis suscipiat magis et minus
15. Utrum numerus formaliter sit ens praeter animam
16. Utrum nis quo sit causa
17. Utrum in materia generabilium praecedit aliqua dimensio formam quae inducitur
18. Utrum aliqua relatio dicta de Deo in tempore sit relatio realis
19. Utrum relatio originis in divinis dicat perfectionem simpliciter
20. Utrum illa quae sunt idem realiter, unum possit connotare unum quod aliud non
connotet
21. Utrum quaelibet ratio attributalis in Deo sit innita formaliter
22. Utrum in materia prima possit induci a Deo aliqua forma quae non possit per
agens naturale educi de ea
23. Utrum demonstrative possit probari animam intellectivam esse formam corporis
humani
24. Utrum substantia prius intelligatur quam accidens
25. Utrum universale et particulare intelligantur una intellectione in numero
26. Utrum animae Petri et Pauli differant solo numero
27. Utrum <natura> humana cum Verbo dicat absolutum
28. Utrum aliqua virtus moralis pertineat ad vitam contemplativam
29. Utrum expediat amplicare exemptiones personarum ecclesiasticarum
30. Utrum sit magis licitum magistro in theologia tenere plura benecia quam alteri
31. Utrum expediat religionem instituere de puris laïcis
32. Utrum aliquis sciens artem aliquam, in religione existens, debeat religionem exire
et operari secundum artem illam
33. Utrum ars campsoria sit licita59

58
Glorieux’s list comes from the table of contents at f. 46va–b of manuscript V.
Cf. Glorieux II, pp. 278–279.
59
The six questions following in the list at f. 46va–b, which, according to Glorieux

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Maier’s List60
1. An essentia divina sit perfectio innita intensive
2. Utrum necessario necessitate absoluta requiratur lumen gloriae in visione
beata
3. Utrum actus beaticus sit simplex
4. Utrum actus voluntatis sit perfectior portio beatitudinis
5. An omnes rationes quae dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam sint eaedem
[et] inter se omnibus modis ex parte rei
6. An accidentia eiusdem speciei possint inesse simul eidem subiecto
7–8. The title of these two questions is missing. The text begins with: “Circa duas quaestiones
de verbo singularium quae habent eandem difcultatem, sic procedam et brevis-
sime . . .”
9. An ista simul stent, quod motus sit aeternaliter a Deo productus et cum hoc,
quod Deus sic produxit mundum libere quod potuit ipsum non produxisse
10. An ista simul stent, quod aliquid sit obiectum adaequatum per se et primum
alicuius potentiae et tamen quod aliquid cognoscatur per se ab illa potentia quod
non continetur per se sub obiecto adaequato
11. Utrum ubicumque excessus alicuius arguit excessum alterius ita quod excessus
unius in duplo arguit excessum alterius in duplo et sic ulterius secundum pro-
portionem, sequatur ex excessu unius in innitum excessus alterius in innitum
12. Quarta est quaestio in hoc quaterno an identitas realis in divinis suscipiat magis
et minus
13. An numerus sit ens formaliter praeter animam
14. An nis quo sit causa
15. An nunc secundum substantiam sit mensura propria rei generabilis et corruptibilis
secundum esse permanens eius
16. An in materia generabilium praecedat aliqua dimensio formam substantialem
inducendam
17. An aliqua relatio dicta de Deo ex tempore de novo sit relatio realis
18. An relatio originis in divinis secundum rationem eius formalem, quae est ipsum
esse ad, sit perfectio aliqua simpliciter loquendo

and Maier, do not belong to Wylton’s Quodlibet, are: 34. Utrum in voluntate creata sit
ponenda actio differens a voluntate et ab actu volendi. 35. Utrum Deus cognoscat alia
a se distincte. 36. Utrum Deus habeat scientiam futurorum contingentium. 37. Utrum
Deus cognoscat innita. 38. Utrum virtutes intellectuales sint eminentiores moralibus.
39. Utrum virtutes theologicae sint homini necessariae.
60
Maier’s list is that of the questions actually contained in manuscript V. Cf. Maier,
“Das Quodlibet,” pp. 89–90.

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 258 CECILIA TRIFOGLI

APPENDIX II
THOMAE WYLTON QUAESTIO QUODLIBETALIS 11

Utrum, ubicumque excessus alicuius arguit excessum alterius ita quod

excessus unius in duplo arguit excessum alterius in duplo et sic ulteri-
us secundum proportionem, ex excessu unius in infinitum sequatur
excessus alterius in infinitum.
5 Arguitur quod sic ex processu Philosophi, VIII Physicorum, ubi
arguit: si virtus infinita esset in magnitudine moveret in non tempore.
Ad istam conclusionem probandam supponit istum processum: virtus
in magnitudine maior movet aequale mobile in minori tempore sic
quod si in duplo maior movet in duplo in minori tempore, si in quad-
10 ruplo, in quadruplo; ergo si aliqua virtus esset infinita intensive in
magnitudine moveret in non tempore omnino. Fundatur ergo argu-
mentum Philosophi in hoc quod ubi excessus in uno arguit similem
excessum in alio quod infinitas in uno arguit excessum in infinitum in
alio.
15 Contra: actus intelligendi et habitus dicuntur perfectiores et imper-
fectiores proportionaliter secundum perfectionem et imperfectionem
obiectorum; ergo cum actus beatificus in patria habeat obiectum in
infinitum excedens omnia alia obiecta in perfectione, iam esset actus
formaliter et intensive infinitus, quod falsum est.
20 Nec valet si dicatur quod infinitas in obiecto arguit infinitatem
actus ubi potentia per actum comprehendit obiectum et non solum [V
80va] apprehendit quia, licet intellectus creatus in patria non compre-
hendat obiectum, tamen attingit obiectum secundum rationem infiniti.
Aliter non beatificaretur nec attingeret aliquid quod est formaliter in
25 Deo. Nam nullum finitum est formaliter in Deo. Igitur si ex perfecti-
one [T 16va] obiecti quod attingitur per potentiam sequitur propor-
tionaliter perfectio in actu, sequetur quod actus beatificus sit intensive
infinitus.

5 Aristoteles, Physica, VIII.10, 266a24-b6.

1 alicuius] unius T 2 excessum] excessus V 3 proportionem] sequatur add. V

5 Philosophi] Aristotelis T 9 in3 om. T 11 in non tempore omnino] omnino in non
tempore T 11-12 argumentum Philosophi] ratio Aristotelis T 13 excessum2]
excessus V 17 beatificus] beatitudinis V 18-19 iam... falsum est om. V 21 actus]
in potentia sive add. T 25 finitum corr. ex infinitum V || formaliter om. V
26 attingitur] attingatur T || sequitur] sequatur T 26-27 proportionaliter] potentia-
liter T 27 sequetur] sequitur T || sit] formaliter add. T

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 THE QUODLIBET OF THOMAS WYLTON 259

Ista quaestio proponebatur principaliter propter rationem ad oppo-

situm, quae difficultatem suam habet specialiter ex quodam dicto
Philosophi et Commentatoris. Vult enim Philosophus, VI Metaphysi-
cae, quod habitus, ut scientia, et eadem ratione actus est nobilior quia
5 nobilioris subiecti vel obiecti. Et Commentator, VI Metaphysicae,
commento 2, dicit quod hoc est manifestum per se. Ex illo videtur
quod secundum proportionem perfectionis obiecti habitus et actus
dicuntur perfectiores. Propter quod sic procedam: primo dicam quo-
modo actus et habitus capiunt perfectionem ab obiecto et qualiter non;
10 secundo respondebo ad formam quaestionis et declarabo in quibus illa
regula est bona et in quibus non; tertio ex his apparebit responsio ad
argumenta.
<Articulus primus>
Circa primum sciendum quod, ut vult Philosophus, I De anima, notitia
aliqua dicitur nobilior vel perfectior alia duplici de causa: vel quia
15 certiori modo procedens, si sit habitus, vel perfectius obiectum attin-
gens, si sit actus. Alio modo quia est circa obiectum perfectius cui
actus vel habitus assimilat intellectum vel coniungit. Primo modo
dicitur actus vel habitus perfectior vel minus perfectus perfectione
intrinseca sui generis. Et secundum maiorem perfectionem istam et
20 minorem attenditur distinctio inter habitus et actus secundum speciem
et genus proximum. Verbi gratia, sic scientia et opinio et fides distin-
guuntur specie circa idem obiectum. Similiter scientia tam secundum
actum quam secundum habitum circa idem obiectum differt secundum
magis et minus perfectum. Et in talibus habitus vel actus per quem
25 maior evidentia habetur respectu cuiuscumque sic est perfectior. Se-
cundo modo dicuntur actus et habitus perfectiores solum perfectione
extrinseca. Non enim actus intelligendi quo intelligo substantiam dif-

3-4 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI.1, 1026a21-22. 5-6 Averroes, In Metaphysicam,

VI, t. c. 2, f. 146vaH-I. 13 Aristoteles, De Anima, I.1, 402a1-4.

2 difficultatem suam habet] habet difficultatem suam T || habet] principaliter et add. T

3 VI] XI* T, II* V 5 vel] et T 6 per] ex T || illo videtur] quo sequitur T 8 dicuntur]
erunt T 8-9 quomodo] qualiter T 9 actus et habitus] habitus et actus T || ab
obiecto] ex obiectis T 11 in om. V || apparebit responsio] patebit T 13 primum]
est add. T 15 certiori] perfectiori T || procedens] procedit T 15-16 attingens]
attingit T 16 quia] ex hoc quod T 17 assimilat] assimilant TV 19 perfectionem
istam inv. T || et2] vel T 20 habitus et actus] actus et habitus T 21 genus] etiam
add. T 23 actum quam secundum habitum] habitum quam secundum actum T ||
differt] differunt T 24 habitus vel actus] actus vel habitus T 25 maior evidentia...
perfectior] habetur maior evidentia est perfectior respectu cuiuscumque sic T
27-p.260.1 substantiam... intelligo om. hom. V

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 260 CECILIA TRIFOGLI

fert genere ab actu quo intelligo accidens, sed uterque actus est in
eodem genere logico, et eodem modo de actu intelligendi quo intelligo
Deum. Nam actus intelligendi qualitercumque assimilet potentiam
obiecto vel representet obiectum vel coniungat potentiam obiecto eo
5 ipso distinguitur ab obiecto essentialiter, sive isti actus vel habitus
causentur ab obiecto solum effective sive ab intellectu solum sive ab
obiecto et intellectu simul tamquam a duabus causis partialibus. Probo
quia actus intelligendi secundum omnes vel est relatio essentialiter vel
passio vel actio vel qualitas, et per eandem rationem qua actus intel-
10 ligendi asinum est relatio vel passio vel aliquod aliorum per eandem
rationem et actus intelligendi Deum, quia actus intelligendi Deum
assimilat intellectum Deo, sicut actus intelligendi asinum assimilat
intellectum asino.
Ex isto colligo talem rationem: illud quod respectu cuiuscumque
15 obiecti [T 16vb] retinet naturam eiusdem generis essentialiter et etiam
speciei non capit ab obiecto perfectionem essentialem intrinsecam
generis vel speciei; sed habitus scientialis <et> actus intelligendi spe-
cies intelligibiles respectu cuiuscumque obiecti, etiam respectu Dei, si
Deus per speciem intelligatur, retinent et naturam eiusdem generis et
20 speciei. Si enim sint relationes, ad eundem modum relationis, puta ad
tertium, pertinent, si qualitates, ad primam speciem, et sic de aliis;
ideo etc.
Loquendo de perfectione actuum et habituum primo modo dico
quod illa perfectio in nullo variatur nec attenditur penes perfectionem
25 vel imperfectionem obiecti. Immo, secundum hoc scientia quam
habeo de triangulo est perfectior quam cognitio quam habeo de Deo.
Et sic loquens Commentator, II Metaphysicae, commento 16, dicit
quod demonstrationes mathematicae sunt in primo ordine certitudinis.
Loquendo autem de perfectione actuum et habituum non intrinseca a
30 quibus denominantur extrinsece, sic nobilitas actuum et habituum
attenditur ex nobilitate et perfectione obiectorum, et ita absque incon-
venienti potest concedi quod actus noster beatificus est infinitus, quia
representat infinitum, finitus tamen formaliter.

27 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, II, t. c. 16, f. 35vbK.

1 est om. V 3 assimilet] assimilent T, assimiletur V 4 coniungat] coniunget V

5 habitus] actus V 7 obiecto et intellectu] intellectu et obiecto T || Probo] probatio T
9 passio vel actio] actio vel passio T 10 aliquod aliorum] qualitas T 11 Deum2]
Dei V 19 retinent] retineret T || et1 om. T 21 pertinent] pertineret T || primam]
tertiam T || speciem om. T || aliis] et add. T 27 loquens] de aliis T || 16] 3* V

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 THE QUODLIBET OF THOMAS WYLTON 261

Dubium tamen est quare habitus et actus dicuntur perfectiores et

minus perfecti ab extrinseco, cum tamen alia entia, puta individua
substantiae et qualitates, ut albedo, solum dicuntur magis perfecta vel
minus perfecta [V 80vb] perfectione intrinseca. Similiter ex quo res
5 principalius videtur denominari ab intrinseco quam ab extrinseco,
videretur sequi quod simpliciter loquendo non esset scientia nobilior
quia nobilioris subiecti, cuius contrarium dicit Commentator, VI
Metaphysicae, commento 2, ubi dicit quod manifestum est per se quod
nobilior scientia est nobilioris subiecti.
10 Ad primum dicendum quod sicut in motibus corporalibus, qui sunt
actus imperfecti, eo ipso quod sunt actus ordinati ad ulteriorem per-
fectionem, denominantur a terminis ad quos, qui sunt fines motus,
finis autem est causa extrinseca rei, et ideo haec denominatio est
extrinsecapropter quod motus denominatur perfectior vel imper-
15 fectior non solum a perfectione intrinseca, sicut motus primus, qui
dicitur perfectissimus quia in se simplicissimus, dicitur etiam motus
aliquis perfectissimus perfectione extrinseca, et sic generatio est muta-
tio perfectissima, et motus localis imperfectissimus quia terminus eius
est imperfectior substantia, qualitate vel quantitatesic est in actibus
20 et habitibus intellectus, qui sunt quidam motus perfecti coniungentes
intellectum nostrum cum fine ultimo nobis modo possibili et etiam
cum his quae sunt ad finem, et ideo non solum tales actus vel habitus
nati sunt denominari a perfectionibus intrinsecis, sed ab obiectis ex-
trinsecis quae se habent ut fines cum quibus tales habitus et actus nos
25 copulant et coniungunt et assimilant.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet principia intrinseca rei sint
essentialiora [T 17ra] quam extrinseca, principia tamen extrinseca,
saltem finis, principalior est omni causa intrinseca et maxime finis
cuius, scilicet extrinsecus. Et ideo haec est causa quare simpliciter
30 dicunt Philosophus et Commentator quod nobilior est scientia nobili-
oris subiecti, quia subiectum se habet ut finis extrinsecus et ideo tam-

7-8 Cf. supra, p.259.5-6. 30 Cf. supra, p.259.2-3.

1 Dubium tamen est] Tamen est sciendum V 1-3 perfectiores... dicuntur om. hom.
V 3 vel] et T 4 Similiter] alia dubitatio est quia T || res om. T 5 principalius
videtur] videntur principaliter T || ab2] ex V 6 videretur] videtur T 12 quos] et
add. V 14 vel] et T 15 sicut] ut T 16 simplicissimus om. V 16-17 motus
aliquis inv. T 19 qualitate vel quantitate] quantitate et qualitate T || est2] etiam T
22 tales] talis TV 23 nati sunt] natus est T || sed] etiam add. T 24 nos] non V
25 et coniungunt om. T 26 dicendum] dico T 27 principia tamen extrinseca om.
hom. T 29 scilicet] finis add. T

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 262 CECILIA TRIFOGLI

quam ab ultimo et optimo ab eo fit denominatio. Et sic habet intelligi

illud Philosophi quod modicum scire de entibus perfectis et superiori-
bus est perfectius quam plura scire de istis inferioribus, quod habet
intelligi in eadem specie habitus, puta habere notitiam evidentem quae
5 terminetur ad scientiam perfectionis maioris est quam cognitio perfec-
ta de istis corporalibus. Tamen comparando habitum unum imperfec-
tum secundum se ad entia perfecta, puta cognitionem opinionis vel
fidei ad Deum, et habitum perfectum scientiae ad ista inferiora, non
oportet concedere habitum simpliciter perfectiorem qui est respectu
10 obiecti magis perfecti.
<Articulus secundus>
Secundo respondeo ad formam quaestionis quod illa regula in
aliquibus est necessaria et in aliquibus non tenet. Ubi enim arguitur ex
excessu in effectu proportionaliter similis excessus in causa sequitur
necessario ex excessu omnino improportionali vel infinito in effectu
15 infinitas perfectionis in causa, tamen econverso ubi ex excessu virtutis
in causa arguitur excessus in effectu proportionaliter secundum virtu-
tem finitam non sequitur quod ex excessu infinito in causa intensive
sequatur infinitas huius in effectu.
Unde quod Aristoteles in VIII Physicorum infert ex hoc quod, si
20 virtus infinita esset in magnitudine, moveret in non tempore, hoc
sequitur ex antecedente quod implicat contradictionem, non ex ante-
cedente possibili. Nam prima causa secundum veritatem est infinitae
virtutis intensive, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod posset movere in non
tempore vel causare aliquem effectum intensive infinitum. Nam
25 utrumque implicat contradictionem.
<Articulus tertius>
Per istud patet ad rationem primae partis quomodo concludit et super
quo fundatur demonstratio Philosophi, VIII Physicorum.
Ad rationem etiam pro alia parte patet, dato quod actus intelligendi
suam perfectionem caperet intrinsecam ab obiecto, quod nego, simili-
30 ter dato quod obiectum esset totalis causa effectiva actus beatifici sive

3 Aristoteles, De partibus animalium, I.5, 644b31-35. 19 Cf. supra, p.258.5 26 Cf.

supra, p.258.5-14. 28 Cf. supra, p.258.15-19.

3-4 quod habet... habitus om. T 5 terminetur] terminet V 15 ubi om. T 16 effectu]
proportionaliter similis excessu in causa add. et del. V || in effectu proportionaliter]
proportionaliter in effectu T 17 intensive om. T 18 sequatur] sequitur T 19 in
om. T || si om. V 20 non tempore] instanti T 21 ex1 antecedente] existente* T
26 rationem] argumentum T 27 quo] hoc T || Philosophi] Aristotelis T 28 etiam
om. T 29 caperet intrinsecam inv. T 30 totalis causa inv. T || effectiva om. T

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 THE QUODLIBET OF THOMAS WYLTON 263

partialis, ita quod essentia divina ut essentia moveat ad cognitionem

sui non per actum voluntatis, quod similiter nego, adhuc non tenet
haec regula “si causa efficiens effectus alicuius a qua effectus suam
perfectionem capit ita quod a perfectiori causa finita procedit perfec-
5 tior effectus, ergo a causa perfectionis infinitae intensive procedit
effectus infinitus,” quoniam, ut [V 81ra] dictum est, effectui repugnat
infinitas, sive causa sua sit finita sive infinita. Si autem detur quod
actus intelligendi sit totaliter effective ab intellectu et obiectum sit
sine quo non, tunc certum est quod regula non valet, quia licet intel-
10 lectus posset perficere perfectiorem actum circa perfectius obiectum,
praesupposita in ipso specie et similitudine obiecti, tamen ex quo illa
similitudo non tollit ab intellectu finitatem entitatis suae nec per con-
sequens virtutis sequitur quod in nullum actum infinitae perfectionis
possit. Et per hoc patet ad quaestionem et ad argumenta.
15 Sed adhuc arguitur quod actus intelligendi beatificus sit infinitus,
quia actus qui in perfectione excedit omnem alium actum circa aliud
obiectum datum vel dabile est infinitae perfectionis. Probatio huius
statim quia excedit infinitos actus habentes ordinem secundum perfec-
tionem. Sed actus quo beatus videt Deum est huiusmodi, quia excedit
20 actum circa quamcumque creaturam datam vel dabilem.
Dicendum primo quod creaturae datae et dabiles sunt finitae alteri-
us et alterius speciei, quia sunt essentialiter ordinatae et ordini repug-
nat infinitas. Et ideo maior est falsa quod qui in perfectione excedit
omnem alium actum circa aliud obiectum a Deo est infinitus. Si autem
25 antecedens accipiatur quod actus excedens omnem actum finitum est
infinitus, tunc maior est vera, sed minor falsa.
Sed contra: si actus beatificus sit finitus, a virtute finita posset
causari.
Istud non valet, quia secundum hoc angelus, caelum et materia
30 prima possent in esse produci per creaturam. Similiter nihil potest

6 Cf. supra, p.262.25

1 partialis] sive totalis add. V 3 effectus alicuius inv. T 6 quoniam] quia T 9 sine
quo] causa sine qua T || valet om. T || licet rep. V 10 posset om. T 13 virtutis]
virtutem V 14 possit] poterit T 16 in perfectione om. T 17-18 huius statim om.
T 18 quia] quod add. T 18-19 perfectionem] est intensive infinitum add. T
20 dabilem] dato quod infinite essent add. T 23 excedit om. V 25 antecedens]
lectio incerta V, fortasse scribendum aliter; om. T || accipiatur] sic add. T 26 minor]
et minor add. V 27 beatificus] beatitudinis V 27-28 a virtute finita posset causari]
igitur poterit causari a creatura et a virtute finita T 30 in esse produci] produci in
esse T

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 264 CECILIA TRIFOGLI

causare notitiam rei imprimendo propriam eius similitudinem intel-

lectui vel sensui nisi ipsamet res cuius est illa notitia vel aliud quod
virtualiter omnem perfectionem alterius rei contineat, quod soli Deo
convenit, ut patet inductive. Licet enim homo sit perfectior species
5 musca vel ligno, tamen non potest causare in intellectu alicuius nec
speciem muscae nec ligni. Sed perfectionem Dei nihil aliud continet
virtualiter et ideo eius notitiam nihil aliud causare potest, nec mirum
quia, licet sit formaliter finita, est tamen representative infinita. Sicut
species maximae quantitatis in oculo habet esse indivisibile, ut patet
10 per Augustinum, De quantitate animae, 8 capitulo, et per consequens
indivisibile formaliter et divisibile in representando, sic similitudo
formaliter finita potest esse representative infinita.
THOMAE WYLTON QUAESTIO QUODLIBETALIS 12
Quarta est quaestio in hoc quaterno an identitas realis in divinis
15 suscipiat magis et minus.
Quod sic probatur, quia bonitas in Deo est eadem sibi et realiter et
formaliter et non est eadem sapientiae formaliter, et hoc ex natura rei,
scilicet realiter; ergo in divinis est maior et minor identitas ex parte
rei, et per consequens identitas realis in divinis recipit magis et minus.
20 Contra: ubi est minor unitas ex parte rei est defectus gradus ali-
cuius unitatis ex parte rei; sed ens et unum et bonum convertuntur;
ergo est ibi defectus gradus alicuius entitatis et bonitatis, et per conse-
quens perfectionis.
Dicendum, secundum quod dictum est ad primam principalem
25 rationem positam in quaestione de attributis, distinguendo de unitate.
Cum ergo ratio unius sit ratio indivisi, esse tamen indivisum potest
aliquid dici dupliciter. Uno modo ex privatione vel carentia partium
quae natae sunt constituere aliquod totum unum unitate compositionis
realis, alio modo ex privatione non solum huiusmodi partium, sed ex
30 privatione cuiuscumque multitudinis vel dis[V 81rb]tinctionis vel non
identitatis modorum seu rationum perfectionalium, quae multitudo seu
distinctio invenitur in aliquo ex natura rei. Loquendo de unitate primo
modo ad perfectionem pertinet in substantiis seu formis separatis et in

10 Augustinus, De quantitate animae, fortasse XIV 24, CSEL 89, pp. 159.23-160.6.
24 Cf. Nielsen-Noone-Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s,” p. 363.670-691.
1 eius om. T 3 omnem...contineat] continet omnem perfectionem alterius rei T || rei]
virtualiter add. V 6 speciem] ut add. et del. V || nec] vel T || Dei om. V 7 eius]
enim T || notitiam] lectio incerta T 8 representative] representatione T 10 8 capitulo
inv. T || et s.l. V 11 et] est T 12 representative infinita inv. T et etc. add.

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 THE QUODLIBET OF THOMAS WYLTON 265

corporibus simplicibus, puta elementis comparatis adinvicem, sed pro-

cedendo a simplicibus corporibus ad mixta et ulterius ad animata,
quanto compositiora tanto perfectiora. Et causae istorum sunt dicen-
dae. Et secundum istam unitatem non est ponere identitatem in Deo
5 recipere magis et minus, quia minor identitas secundum istum modum
unitatis aliquam compositionem poneret in Deo, quod est ultimae im-
pietatis, per Damascenum, primo libro, nono capitulo.
Loquendo de unitate secundo modo, dico quod sic in Deo est
identitas maior et minor ex parte rei et quod unitas opposita huic
10 multitudini repugnat perfectioni, immo entitati, cuiuslibet creaturae.
Nam <quod> in qualibet creatura ratio entis, boni et unius ex parte
<rei> aliquam habent distinctionem in quaestione de attributis diffuse
probavi. Argueret etiam in Deo imperfectionem quia, licet bonitas in
Deo dicat totam perfectionem divinam realiter, tamen non dicit per-
15 fectionem Dei secundum omnem modum perfectionis, per hoc adicitur
virtus partis.
Ad primam concedo quod ibi est maior et minor identitas secundo
modo dicta, quia non arguit imperfectionem, sed perfectionem.
Et si dicatur: Deus non est verissime unus vel non omnibus modis
20 unus.
Ad quod dicendum cum distinctione quod non est verissime unus
secundo modo, nec hoc derogat perfectioni eius, sed quanto plures
rationes perfectionales sunt ibi ex natura rei, tanto potest argui eius
maior perfectio. Tamen verissime est unus primo modo. Concedo
25 etiam quod non unus omni modo unitatis ex parte rei, tamen omnem
modum identitatis in se habet cuius contrarium imperfectionem in ipso
argueret.
Ad rationem in oppositum, cum dicitur: ens, unum, bonum conver-
tuntur, ergo ubi defectus unitatis et entitatis, dico quod loquendo de
30 unitate primo modo verum est quod ubicumque est defectus unitatis
talis ibi est aliquis defectus gradus entitatis et bonitatis, et hoc est
verum. In omni creatura est uterque defectus.
Sed dicatur: quantum aliquid habet de unitate tantum de entitate et
econverso.

7 Johannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, I.9, PG 94, col. 835. 13 Cf. Nielsen-
Noone-Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s,” pp. 386-7.1470-1510. 17 Cf. supra, p.264.15-
18 28 Cf. supra, p.264.19-22.

3 quanto] quanta V 5 modum] identitatis add. et del. V 10 multitudini] unitati V

11 boni corr. ex poni V

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 266 CECILIA TRIFOGLI

Haec est falsa sive intelligatur de unitate prima sive secunda, quia
secundum hoc ignis esset perfectior homine, quod est falsum.
Et notandum quod ex hoc quod haec propositio est falsa “quantum
aliquid habet de unitate tantum de entitate,” sicut oportet concedere,
5 sequitur quod unum et ens non sunt idem ex parte rei omnibus modis.
Ad argumentum in oppositum concedo quod in Deo est defectus, ut
ita loquar, unitatis secundo modo dictae; sed deficere a tali unitate est
deficere a defectu et non deficere, sicut possumus dicere quod Deo
deficit compositio, quod similiter non arguit defectum, sed perfectio-
10 nem, et habundantiam perfectionis.

6 Ibid.

10 perfectionis] Istud quod sequitur habetur superius in ista quaestione:

distinguendum de unitate et indiviso eo quod aliquid dicitur indivisum ex privatione
multitudinis partium quae natae sunt constituere unum unitate compositi vel ex
privatione cuiuscumque multitudinis distinctionis vel non identitatis modorum vel
rationum perfectionalium in eadem re simplici. Praeterea, indivisio ad perfectionem
pertinet in separatis incipiendo ab ultima substantia separata et in corporibus
simplicibus ita quod maior add. V

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 THE QUODLIBET OF PETER AURIOL

Lauge Olaf Nielsen

The Franciscan Peter Auriol1 served as regent master of theology in the

University of Paris from 1318 to 1320. His appointment to the profes-
sorship was strongly supported by his mentor, Pope John XXII, who
in a letter dated 14 July 1318 advised the chancellor of the University
to promote Auriol, and in a document from 13 November the same
year Auriol is listed as one of the regent masters in theology in the
University. We also know with relative certainty when Auriol vacated
this position, since he was elected by his confreres to the position of
provincial of Aquitaine at the end of 1320 and succeeded Bertrand de
la Tour, who had been appointed archbishop of Salerno at the start
of September.2
As professor Auriol was, as a matter of course, eligible to preside over
and determine disputations de quolibet, but we do not have any explicit
information regarding Auriol’s manner of discharging this part of his
professional role. It would be natural to assume that the questions that
Auriol gathered in his single Quodlibet derive from such occasions,3 but,

1
With regard to Auriol’s family name I adopt the vernacular spelling “Auriol”; see
N. Valois, “Pierre Auriol, frère mineur,” Histoire littéraire de la France 33 (Paris 1906),
pp. 479–528. The Latin “Aureoli” is well documented in the medieval sources; cf.
A. Teetaert, “Pierre Auriol ou Oriol,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique XII.2 (Paris
1935), cols. 1810–81.
2
For the relevant documents published in the “cartulary” of the University of
Paris and their implications for Auriol’s biography, see Teetaert, “Pierre Auriol,” cols.
1813–14; cf. also E.M. Buytaert’s “Introduction” to Peter Aureoli Scriptum Super Primum
Sententiarum. Prologue—Distinction I, ed. E.M. Buytaert (Franciscan Institute Publications.
Text Series, 3) (St. Bonaventure, NY 1952), pp. XVff.
3
In his pioneering study of Auriol’s Quodlibet, Franz Pelster speculated on the various
possible occasions on which Auriol could have presided over disputations de quolibet; see
F. Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung des Quodlibet und anderer Schriften des Petrus Aureoli
O.F.M.,” Franciscan Studies 14 (1954), pp. 392–411. In the following year Pelster expanded
his investigation into the reception of Auriol in the article “Zur ersten Polemik gegen
Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O.P., seine Quästionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli,
das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis O.E.S.A.,” Franciscan Studies 15 (1955), pp. 30–47.
Raymond Bequini was a personal opponent of Auriol and appears to have known
Auriol’s Quodlibet; I have touched on some of the points of contact between Auriol
and Bequini in the article mentioned below, note 18; I anticipate publishing Bequini’s
two Quodlibeta in the not too distant future.

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268 lauge olaf nielsen

as will appear below, several of these questions point to a much more

complex historical context. At any rate, it appears that Auriol’s Quodlibet
was nished and published in the year he gave up his professorship,
since in one of the main manuscripts containing the work, viz., Paris,
BnF lat. 17485, f. 84vb, it is said:
Explicit Quodlibet Magistri Petri Aureoli, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum,
editum et completum anno gratiae millesimo trecentessimo vicesimo.
Deo gratias. Amen.
Moreover, this dating agrees with the fact that in February the following
year Auriol was appointed archbishop of Aix-en-Provence in place of
Peter of Prés, who had become cardinal.4

Manuscripts

In its entirety Auriol’s Quodlibet is preserved in the following eleven

manuscripts:5
A Assisi, Biblioteca comunale 136, ff. 58r–111v6
C Clermont-Ferrand, Bibliothèque Municipale 109, ff. 23va–91rb
F Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 32 dextr., 12, ff. 95ra–
138rb
N Napoli, BN VII.B.31, ff. 1r–60v
Y Paris, BnF, lat. 14566, ff. 7r–81v
P Paris, BnF, lat. 15867, ff. 141r–208r7
B Paris, BnF, lat. 17485, ff. 14r–84v
Z Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 180, ff. 127r–241v
T Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 739, ff. 189r–224v
X Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 744, ff. 193r–254v
V Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. 123, ff. 199r–268v8

4
See Teetaert, “Pierre Auriol,” cols. 1815–16, and E.M. Buytaert, “Introduction,”
p. XVI.
5
Previous lists of manuscripts are found in Teetaert, “Pierre Auriol,” col. 1838, and
F. Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung,” pp. 395ff.
6
At present kept in the Biblioteca e centro di documentazione Francescana in
Assisi.
7
In Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung,” p. 395, this manuscript is mistakenly listed as
15667.
8
This manuscript also contains Auriol’s shorter—and later—commentary on the rst
book of the Sentences; for this work and the studies on it, see, e.g., my “Peter Auriol’s
Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s
First and Fourth Books of the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s
Sentences. Current Research, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002), pp. 149–219.

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 the QUODLIBET of peter auriol 269

Separately, the rst question has been transmitted in one other witness:
Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 901, ff. 13r–15r
Two manuscripts contain abbreviations of selected questions:
M München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26309, ff. 207r–218v
and ff. 220v–222v9
W Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 946, ff. 88r–91v
Early versions of some of Auriol’s quodlibetal questions are contained
in a highly interesting but also difcult manuscript:
O Oxford, Balliol College Library 63, ff. 19r–v, 20v–21v, and 86r–
87r10
In 1605 Auriol’s Quodlibet was printed together with his commentaries on
Peter Lombard’s last three books of the Sentences.11 In the list of questions
below the printed edition is referred to by way of the siglum ‘E’.

Contents

In total, Auriol’s single Quodlibet consists of a prologue, which includes

a table of contents, and 16 questions:
Prologus: Proposui in animo meo quaerere et investigare (A 58ra; C 23va-vb; F 95ra;
M deest; N 1ra; O deest; Y 7rb–va; P 141ra; B 14ra–rb; Z 127ra–rb; T
189ra; X 193ra; V 199ra; W deest; E cols. 1a–2a).
Q. 1: Utrum in aliqua re formalitas et realitas distinguantur (A 58ra–60va; C
23vb–26rb; F 95ra–97ra; M 207ra–208vb; N 1ra–3rb; O deest; Y 7va–
10va; P 141rb–143vb; B 14rb–17vb; Z 127rb–132rb; T 189ra–191va; X

9
In this manuscript the manner of abbreviation is rather peculiar, inasmuch as the
degree to which the questions are abbreviated increases as the work progresses; i.e., the
rst questions are almost complete whereas later ones are severely shortened.
10
For this manuscript, see my “The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas
Wylton on Theology and Virtue,” Vivarium 38.1 (2000) (pp. 35–98), pp. 36ff., and the
literature referred to there. I expect to publish editions of these questions together with
their parallels in the Quodlibet.
11
Auriol’s commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences together with his Quodlibet
were printed in two volumes in 1596 and 1605 at the initiative of the learned Cardinal
Sarnano as Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Primum Librum Sententiarum pars prima et secunda
(Rome 1596) and Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Secundum, Tertium et Quartum Sententiarum
et Quodlibeti tomus secundus (Rome 1605). In the edition of the Quodlibet there is the curi-
ous mistake that each of the questions appears as a separate quodlibet; in actual fact,
there is only a single quodlibet containing 16 questions.

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270 lauge olaf nielsen

193ra–195va; V 199ra–202ra; W 88r–88v; E cols. 2a–8b; Vat. lat. 901,

13r–15r).
Q. 2: Utrum actio agentis differat realiter ab agente (A 60va–63rb; C 26rb–29vb; F
97ra–99rb; M 208vb–210vb; N 3rb–6va; O 20va–20vb; Y 10va–14rb; P
143vb–147ra; B 17vb–21rb; Z 132rb–138rb; T 191va–193rb; X 195va–
198va; V 202ra–205vb; W 88v–89r; E cols. 8b–16a).
Q. 3: Utrum alius et alius modus unitatis seu indivisionis sufcienter tollat contradictiones,
quae videntur occurrere in divinis (A 63va–75va; C 29vb–43vb; F 99rb–108va;
M 220va–222vb; N 6va–19va; O deest; Y 14rb–31ra; P 147ra–162ra; B
21rb–36ra; Z 138rb–162rb; T 193rb–201ra; X 198va–211rb; V 205vb–
220vb; W 89r; E cols. 16a–44b).
Q. 4: Utrum distinctio secundum quid inter essentiam et proprietates vel identitas inconver-
tibilitatis sufcienter tollat contradictiones, quae in divinis videntur occurrere absque alio
modo unitatis vel indivisionis (A 75va–77rb; C 43vb–46ra; F 108va–110ra; M
deest; N 19va–21va; O deest; Y 31ra–33vb; P 162ra–164va; B 36ra–38va;
Z 162rb–166va; T 201ra–202rb; X 211rb–213rb; V 220vb–223rb; W
deest; E cols. 44b–53a).
Q. 5: Utrum sola distinctio rationis sufciat ad tollendum omnem contradictionem in divinis
(A 77rb–81ra; C 46ra–50va; F 110ra–113ra; M deest; N 21va–25vb; O
21va–21vb; Y 33vb–39ra; P 164va–169rb; B 38va–43va; Z 166va–175ra;
T 202rb–204vb; X 213rb–217rb; V 223rb–228ra; W deest; E cols.
53b–64b).
Q. 6: Utrum anima intellectiva sit immediate principium operationis suae (A 81ra–83rb;
C 50va–53va; F 113ra–115ra; M 210vb–212rb; N 25vb–28rb; O deest; Y
39ra–42va; P 169rb–172ra; B 43va–46vb; Z 175ra–180rb; T 204vb–206rb;
X 217rb–220ra; V 228ra–231ra; W 89r–89v; E cols. 64b–71a).
Q. 7: An anima constituta ex duabus realitatibus esse possit forma corporis (A 83rb–86vb;
C 53va–58rb; F 115ra–118ra; M 212rb–214va; N 28rb–32va; O deest; Y
42va–48rb; P 172ra–176vb; B 46vb–52ra; Z 180rb–188va; T 206rb–208va;
X 220ra–224ra; V 231ra–237ra; W deest; E cols. 71b–80b).
Q. 8: Utrum ad visionem beaticam requiratur aliqua similitudo creata (A 86vb–89ra;
C 58rb–61rb; F 118ra–119vb; M 216ra–217ra; N 32va–35rb; O 21vb; Y
48rb–52rb; P 176vb–179vb; B 52ra–55rb; Z 188va–193vb; T 208va–210ra;
X 224ra–226vb; V 237ra–239rb; W 89v–90r; E cols. 80b–88a).
Q. 9: Utrum ad visionem beaticam requiratur aliquis habitus vel lumen creatum (A
89ra–92vb; C 61rb–66rb; F 119vb–122vb; M 217ra–218vb; N 35rb–39va;
O 86va–87rb; Y 52rb–57ra; P 179vb–184ra; B 55rb–60rb; Z 194ra–202ra;
T 210ra–212va; X 226vb–231rb; V 239rb–245ra; W deest; E cols.
88a–98b).
Q. 10: Utrum videns divinam essentiam videat necessario quidquid repraesentatur per eam
(A 92vb–95va; C 66rb–70rb; F 122vb–125ra; M deest; N 39va–42va; O
86ra–86va; Y 57ra–61ra; P 184ra–187vb; B 60rb–64rb; Z 202ra–208va;
T 212va–214rb; X 231rb–234va; V 245ra–247vb; W deest; E cols.
99a–107a).
Q. 11: Utrum virtus in quantum virtus sit ens per accidens (A 95va–96rb; C 70rb–74rb;
F 125ra–127rb; M deest; N 42va–46ra; O 19ra–19va; Y 61ra–65ra; P
187vb–191rb; B 64rb–68rb; Z 208va–215ra; T 214rb–216rb; X 234va–
238ra; V 247vb–251vb; W 90r–90v; E cols. 107a–116a).

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Q. 12: Utrum virtus moralis consistens circa unam materiam, habeat unitatem formae sim-
plicis non constitutae ex multis (A 96rb–100vb; C 74rb–77vb; F 127rb–129va; M
deest; N 46ra–49ra; O deest; Y 65ra–68vb; P 191rb–194vb; B 68rb–71vb;
Z 215ra–220va; T 216rb–218ra; X 238ra–241ra; V 251vb–255ra; W deest;
E cols. 116a–123b).
Q. 13: Utrum virtus moralis in appetitu sensitivo sit qualitas media essentialiter constituta ex
habilitatibus, quae inclinant ad passiones extremas (A 100vb–102vb; C 77vb–79vb;
F 129va–130vb; M deest; N 49ra–50vb; O deest; Y 68vb–69ra; P 194vb–
196vb; B 71vb–73va; Z 220va–223va; T 218ra–219ra; X 241ra–243ra; V
255ra–257ra; W deest; E cols. 123b–128a).
Q. 14: Utrum virtus moralis dividatur in quattuor cardinales tamquam in species subalternas
comprehendentes omnes virtutes (A 102vb–105va; C 79vb–83vb; F 130vb–133va;
M deest; N 50vb–54rb; O deest; Y 69ra–73va; P 196vb–200va; B 73va–
77va; Z 223va–230ra; T 219ra–221ra; X 243ra–247ra; V 257ra–261rb;
W deest; E cols. 128a–137b).
Q. 15: Utrum speculativum et practicum distinguantur penes esse et non esse activum
principium in agente respectu sui obiecti (A 105va–109va; C 83vb–88vb; F
133va–136va; M deest; N 54rb–58va; O 21ra–21va; Y 73va–78vb; P 200va–
205va; B 77va–82rb; Z 230ra–237vb; T 221ra–223va; X 247ra–251vb; V
261rb–266rb; W 90v–91r; E cols. 137b–149a).
Q. 16: Utrum formae miscibilium qualitatum differant realiter a sua actualitate (A 109va–
111va; C 88vb–91rb; F 136va–138rb; M 214va–216ra; N 58va–60vb;
O deest; Y 78vb–81vb; P 205va–208ra; B 82va–84vb; Z 237vb–241vb;
T 223va–224vb; X 251vb–254va; V 266rb–268vb; W 91r–91v; E cols.
149a–155b).

The Historical Context

In order to appreciate the historical context of the questions that went

into Auriol’s Quodlibet it is necessary to take into account the short
reportationes or drafts found in the Balliol College manuscript. In a previ-
ous publication12 I argued that it is highly likely that some of Auriol’s
quodlibetal questions go back to the period while he was still a bachelor
of the Sentences and engaged in heated debate with regent masters in
theology such as the secular Thomas Wylton and Hervaeus Natalis,
who was the Dominicans’ leading representative in Paris until 1318.13
This is most certainly the case with questions such as the second
quodlibetal question on the nature of action, where the underlying
debate is richly documented throughout Auriol’s Parisian career. In this

12
See my “The Debate,” pp. 46ff.
13
See A. de Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël (†1323). Étude biographique,” AFP 8 (1938),
pp. 5–81.

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instance, Auriol’s prime opponent was Hervaeus Natalis and the debate
unfolded in successive stages and can be traced in both participants’
writings starting from the end of 1316 or early in 1317. In fact, Auriol’s
last word seems to be the question included in the Quodlibet.14
In the following three questions on the divine Trinity, i.e., questions
3, 4 and 5, Auriol’s opponents are both Thomas Wylton and Hervaeus
Natalis. Some aspects of this exchange I have already described, show-
ing that the quodlibetal questions result from the reworking of earlier
material that dates from the academic year 1316–17 and in another
form went into Auriol’s commentary on the rst book the Sentences.15 In
the manuscript preserved in the Vatican Library, Borgh. 123, we nd
Auriol’s treatment of the Trinitarian paralogisms in two closely related
forms, i.e., both in his commentary on distinction 33 of the rst book
of the Sentences and in the third and fourth quodlibetal questions.16
Questions 8, 9 and 10 deal with human cognition with special refer-
ence to the blessed vision, and there is a distinct possibility that these
questions reect actual quodlibetal disputations conducted by Auriol
during his Parisian regency as professor of theology. This does not
imply, however, that they are without immediate links to the period
when Auriol was a bachelor of the Sentences. In the years just prior
to 1318 Thomas Wylton had been involved in a erce debate about
the nature of the beatic vision and one of his prime adversaries had
been the Carmelite master, Sibert of Beek. The historical situation that
occasioned this debate was the decree Ad nostrum qui, which was passed
at the Council of Vienne and established the lumen gloriae as a condition
for man’s beatic vision of God and, by implication, transferred this
kind of light from the realm of theological speculation and discussion to

14
There are numerous sources for this debate and in chronological order they
are 1) Petrus Aureoli, Commentarius brevior in I Sententiarum, d. 27, pars 1, in a shorter
and a longer version from the latter half of 1316 or beginning of 1317; 2) Hervaeus
Natalis, Quodlibet IV, q. 4, from the end of 1316 or the start of 1317; 3) Petrus Aureoli,
Commentarius in IV Sententiarum, d. 13, in a draft version and an edited version from 1317;
4) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet IV, q. 8, dating from before the summer of 1318; 5) Petrus
Aureoli, Quodlibet, q. 2, in both a draft and an edited version dating from 1318–19. I
presented a sketch of this exchange and the opposing views of the two combatants at
a conference in Boston in August 2001 at the kind invitation of Professor Stephen F.
Brown and I expect to publish it in the very near future.
15
See my “Peter Auriol’s Way with Words,” pp. 196ff.
16
For the often verbatim correspondance between the twin versions see, e.g., my
“Peter Auriol’s Way with Words,” pp. 199ff. Some aspects of this debate I have ana-
lyzed in “Logic and the Trinity: The Clash between Hervaeus Natalis and Peter Auriol
at Paris,” which will appear in a collection of articles on Trinitarian theology in the
Middle Ages edited by Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen.

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that of ecclesiastical doctrine.17 It is immediately clear that this debate

forms the historical backdrop to those of Auriol’s quodlibetal questions
that address human cognition and the state of bliss, and that Auriol
is indebted to Wylton’ rebuttal of Sibert of Beek and his party. From
Auriol’s questions, however, it also transpires that discussions in Paris
on the beatic vision had lost much of the agitation that animated
Wylton’s and Sibert’s exchange. Equally, it is apparent that the beatic
vision as such was not a topic that engaged Auriol passionately; to him
the nature of the visio beata had a claim to immediate interest rst and
foremost as an example that may serve to reveal essential features of
man’s cognitive apparatus and human cognition.18
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that questions 11 and
15 in Auriol’s Quodlibet go back to Auriol’s time as a bachelor of the
Sentences and the debates in which he had been engaged during this
time. The opponent is Thomas Wylton and, rather remarkably, in this
case some of Wylton’s contributions to the debate have also survived.
On the basis of the available texts it seems that these two questions in
Auriol’s Quodlibet are also nal summations of debates that claimed his
attention in late 1316 and early 1317.19

Question 7

Below in an appendix, I present an edition of the seventh question in

Auriol’s Quodlibet. The immediate reason for choosing this question is
the fact that in the 1605 edition this question was not printed in its
entirety; the last part of Auriol’s response as well as his replies to the
opponent’s initial counter-arguments were omitted. There are, however,
also good reasons for considering this particular question as an illustra-
tive example of the issues that Auriol’s Quodlibet raises.

17
See H. Denzinger, ed., Enchiridion symbolorum, denitionum et declarationum de rebus dei
et morum (34th ed., Rome 1967), no. 895, p. 282.
18
The texts by Thomas Wylton and Sibert of Beek have been edited together with
an introduction by Dr. Cecilia Trifogli and myself in “Questions on the Beatic Vision
by Thomas Wylton and Sibert de Beka,” DSTFM 17 (2006), pp. 511–84. I sketch this
development and its salient features in the article “Parisian Discussions of the Beatic
Vision after the Council of Vienne: Thomas Wylton, Sibert of Beka, Peter Auriol,
and Raymundus Bequini,” which will appear in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early
Fourteenth Century, S.F. Brown and T. Kobusch, eds., Leiden: Brill forthcoming.
19
See my “The Debate,” pp. 48ff.

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In the rst place, it transpires from this text that Auriol conceived
of his Quodlibet as more than a random collection of questions. Thus
in question 7 he explicitly refers to the preceding question, viz., the
sixth, which deals with the composition of an active and a passive
principle in the intellective soul. Apart from the circumstance that the
interrelationship between the topics treated in the two questions calls
for such a reference, the fact of the matter is that cross-references to
other questions are not infrequent in the work as a whole.20 Some of
these references, however, are implicit in the sense that Auriol may in
one place take for granted what he has proved in a preceding ques-
tion. In particular, this is obvious in the case of the rst question where
Auriol provides, inter alia, a forceful rebuttal of the formal distinction.
According to Auriol’s understanding, this opening question has the
nature of a basic statement of ontological commitment, and in question
7 he relies—albeit implicitly—on what he proved there;21 in some of
the other questions references to the same question are explicit.22
The close connection between questions 6 and 7 consists in the
circumstance that Auriol’s answer in the former question exposes his
doctrinal position to the objection that his view on the composite nature
of the intellective soul would appear to prevent viewing the intellectual
soul of man as the human body’s form. If this were the case, however,
it would create a very serious situation for Auriol, since a few years
earlier the Council of Vienne had decided that the intellectual soul
is the form of the human body in the sense that this belongs to the
intellectual soul “per se” and essentially.23 The main goal of Auriol’s
sixth quodlibetal question is to maintain and defend his conviction that
there is a real composition in the intellective soul between the possible
intellect and the agent intellect; while the former is pure potentiality,
the latter is pure act and, consequently, they are two fundamentally
different natures.24 Subsequently, in question 7 Auriol undertakes to

20
E.g., in q. 4 (E, col. 45b) Auriol refers to preceding question; in q. 6 (E, col. 69b)
there is a reference to q. 9.
21
See below, Appendix I, Petrus Aureoli, Quodlibet, q. 7, §3.2.2. Some of the context
as well as the philosophical implications of Auriol’s rst quodlibetal question have
been treated by M. Pickavé, “Metaphysics as First Science: The Case of Peter Auriol,”
DSTFM 15 (2004), pp. 487–516.
22
See, e.g., q. 5 (E, col. 54a) and q. 16 (E, col. 154a).
23
See Denzinger, Enchiridion, no. 902, p. 284.
24
Auriol talks of the possible and the agent intellects as different natures or even
different substances; see, e.g., Quodlibet, q. 6, prop. 1 (E, cols. 65a–b) and ibid., prop. 2
(E, cols. 68b–69a); cf. below note 40.

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establish that this composite nature of the intellective soul does not
prevent the human soul from being the form of man and that this is
in agreement with what both Aristotle and Averroes thought.25
Obviously, in this connection it is not possible to go into a detailed
exposition of Auriol’s rather complex doctrinal position. In order to
gain a more accurate impression of the historical context of these
two of Auriol’s quodlibetal questions, however, it is necessary to look
at Auriol’s previous treatments of these issues. Auriol lectured on the
second book of Lombard’s Sentences in the second half of 1317,26 and
in his subsequent commentaries on distinctions 3 and 16 of that work
there are treatments of the same topics that are up for discussion in his
sixth and seventh quodlibetal questions.27 In the rst part of his com-
mentary on distinction 3 Auriol asks the following four questions:28
Q. 1: Utrum in genere substantiarum intelligibilium sit necesse ponere naturam, quae sit
purum potentiale in illo genere et principium quasi materiale (E, cols. 56a–58a).
Q. 2: Utrum omnes substantiae separatae sequendo principia et intentionem Philosophi sint
compositae ex hac natura potentiali et aliquo pure actuali (E, cols. 58a–b).
Q. 3: Utrum loquendo absolute et secundum dem substantiae separatae sint compositae ex
materia et forma (E, cols. 58b–59b).
Q. 4: Utrum haec materia et haec forma in substantiis separatis sint res differentes in actu
(E, cols. 59a–60b).
Auriol’s commentary on distinction 16 of the second book of Lombard’s
Sentences comprises the following three questions (the titles are listed
according to the manuscript tradition):
Q. 1: Utrum possit probari demonstrative, quod anima intellectiva est forma corporis
(E, cols. 218a–223a).
Q. 2: Utrum secundum veritatem dei oporteat tenere, quod anima sit forma corporis univoce,
sicut aliae formae sunt formae suae materiae (E, cols. 223b–227a).

25
In question 7 Auriol also takes into consideration the theological authority of
Augustine, but this is almost as an afterthought; see below Appendix I, Petrus Aureoli,
Quodlibet, q. 7, §§3.3.5ff.
26
The order and dating of Auriol’s lectures on the four books of the Sentences were
established by Teetaert, “Pierre Auriol,” col. 1832.
27
The close connection between Auriol’s quodlibetal questions and their counter-
parts in his Sentences commentaries was already observed by Teetaert, “Pierre Auriol,”
col. 1839.
28
In the printed edition the terminology is somewhat different, inasmuch as the
rst part is there called the rst “question,” just as the separate questions that make
up this rst part are called “articles.” The rather unfortunate result of this mix-up
in terminology is that the printed edition does not ag Auriol’s division of his ques-
tions into articles. Furthermore, I provide the titles of the questions according to the
manuscript tradition.

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Q. 3: Utrum eaedem rationes, quae probant de aliis formis, quod sunt actuationes purae
materiae, probent hoc ipsum de anima <rationali> (E, cols. 227a–229b).
In the printed edition of 1605 the last question was not marked as a
separate question but appeared as part of question 2. The reason for
this is quite simply that Auriol’s introduction to distinction 16 mentions
only two questions.29 Auriol’s explicit purpose in adding a third question
was to defend himself against the charge of contradicting himself. In
the introduction to the third question he writes as follows:
Et quia in distinctione 12a probavi generaliter, quod forma est pura actua-
tio et non est aliqua natura per se in actu, et hoc puto demonstrari posse,
in praecedenti autem quaestione dixi, quod forte non potest demonstrari
animam esse puram actuationem saltem apud Philosophum, cuius tamen
rationes de aliis formis inducebantur ibi, ideo ne videatur contradictio in
dictis, quaero istam quaestionem: utrum eaedem rationes . . .30
In his response to this question Auriol refuses to accept that the rational
soul is the form of the human body in precisely the same sense as other
corporeal forms are the forms of their substances; in fact, according to
him—at least in this text—the rational soul is the body’s form only in
an equivocal sense.31 Precisely this stance was a potentially dangerous
one for Auriol to adopt since it would seem to put him in jeopardy of
offending ecclesiastical authority. In his commentary on distinction 16
in book II of the Sentences Auriol makes no attempt to obfuscate this
danger, but he tries to sketch both a weak and a strong agreement with
the decision of the Council of Vienne.32 Rather remarkably, Auriol does

29
“. . . et ad evidentiam istius quaestionis circa fundamentum imaginis in homine,
quod est in anima rationali sive intellectiva, quaero has duas quaestiones . . .” (E, col.
218a–b). This is not a unique instance of a discrepancy between the introduction
and the actual questions comprised in a particular section of one of Auriol’s Sentences
commentaries; cf. my “Peter Auriol’s Way with Words,” pp. 189ff.
30
Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 16, q. 3 (E, col. 227a)
31
Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 16, q. 3 (E, col. 227a): “Respondeo: sicut non
est demonstrabile Philosopho animam esse formam corporis univoce cum formis aliis,
sic nec rationes philosophorum, quae convincunt alias formas esse actuationem puram,
convincunt hoc de anima.”
32
Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 16, q. 2 (E, col. 224b): “Et qui teneret illam
viam <scil., Sanctorum>, diceret ad illud, quod allegatum est de Concilio, ‘quod anima
est forma corporis per essentiam sicut aliae animae’, hoc est, quia ordinatur naturaliter
ad corpus sicut animae ceterae ad sua corpora, non autem quod sit pura perfectio
et actuatio corporis, sicut sunt aliae animae. Et quia melius est se tenere cum eo, ad
quod vadit intentio Ecclesiae ex verbis elicita, licet non expresse verba sonent hoc vel
illud, ideo pono propositionem secundam, quod licet demonstrari non possit animam
esse formam corporis modo aliarum formarum, tamen tenendum est, secundum quod

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nothing to hide his concern that this decision by the Church rests on a
dire misunderstanding of the essence of faith and a awed interpreta-
tion of the nature of articles of faith.33
In his earlier treatment of the hylomorphic composition of angels and
the intellectual soul Auriol reveals his awareness of sailing against the
wind. In defending himself he resorts to drawing upon the Franciscan
tradition inasmuch as he presents his own contribution as basically an
elaboration of St Bonaventure’s position.34
Auriol’s stance with regard to the composition of the rational soul
and his, in the nal analysis, less than wholehearted endorsement of
viewing the intellectual soul as simply the form of the human body
transpires also from other sources. One such testimony is from Guy
Terrena, who in his question on the composition of the agent and
possible intellects, viz., question 14 in his fth Quodlibet, argues against
Auriol’s position. According to Guy’s admittedly brief exposition, Auriol
stipulated a real composition between what is active and passive in the
intellectual soul, since the agent and patient intellects are really diverse.35
There can be no doubt that Guy has captured an essential feature of
Auriol’s stance, and it is telling that Guy could take for granted that a
reference to Auriol would sufce to characterize the position that he
opposed. In other words, Guy’s manner of referring to Auriol seems to
indicate that Auriol’s position was, if not notorious, then at least well
known among contemporaries.36

mihi videtur, quod sicut gura est forma et pura perfectio cerae, sic anima est pura
actuatio et formatio corporis eo modo, quo se habent ceterae formae. Et sicut non est
quaerenda causa, quare ex cera et gura at unum, sic non est quaerenda causa, quare
unum at ex anima et corpore. Et ideo est anima purus actus et perfectio materiae
sicut gura cerae; et sicut ex materia et forma in naturalibus sit una res indivisa in
actu, divisa autem solum in potentia, sic ex anima et corpore resultat unum indivisum
in actu, plura autem in potentia, cum possit anima separari a corpore. Illam autem
conclusionem teneo specialiter propter determinationem Concilii, quae ex verborum
apparentia videtur ad intentionem illam.”
33
Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 3, q. 2 (E, col. 223b). For Auriol’s view on
these topics, see my “The Intelligibility of Faith and the Nature of Theology—Peter
Auriol’s Theological Programme,” Studia Theologica 53 (1999), pp. 26–39.
34
Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 3, q. 1 (E, col. 58a): “Hoc puto, intellexit Doctor
antiquus Bonaventura, qui dicit, quod materia istorum sensibilium et intelligibilium
non differt secundum quidditatem, tamen differt secundum esse, quia videlicet ista est
semper sub trina dimensione, et illa non.”
35
See Guido Terreni, Quodlibet V, q. 14, §1.4.1, below in Appendix II. For Guy
Terrena’s Quodlibeta, see Schabel’s chapter on the Carmelites in the present volume.
36
Guy Terrena was also a staunch opponent of Thomas Wylton, whose view of
the human soul collided head-on with the decision of the Council of Vienne. Wylton’s

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But this raises the question of where Auriol would have had an oppor-
tunity to present his understanding of the intellective soul to a wider
audience. One might, of course, assume that Auriol’s Parisian lectures
on the second book of the Sentences drew a huge audience or, at least,
claimed the attention of professors in the theological faculty. However,
it is not really necessary to embark on such speculation, since in his
commentary on distinction 3 Auriol points explicitly to the historical
circumstances in which he expounded the nature of intellectual souls.
At one point Auriol remarks that he will forgo treating the problem
whether the angels or the separate intelligences cognize objects dif-
ferent from themselves by receiving these cognitions from the objects
as efcient causes, since he had already spoken his mind on this “in
principio huius libri.”37 This phrase could be interpreted to mean that
this topic had been broached at the start of Auriol’s commentary on
the second book of the Sentences. But this is not what Auriol intended
to say, since at the beginning of his commentary on book II Auriol had
not dealt with this topic but with the nature of time.38 Consequently,
the “principle” or “beginning” to which Auriol alludes in this passage
must be something different, and this is presumably his and his fel-
low bachelors’ Principium debate in the late summer of 1317, which,
accordingly, must have concerned the separate intelligences’ cognitive
powers.39 As is well known, such Principium debates were conducted
with much publicity in the University, since they were one of the few

highly interesting and inuential question on the intellective soul as the form of man
was published by W. Senko in Studia Mediewistyczne 5 (1964), pp. 75–116. A new criti-
cal edition together with an English translation and a full introduction is currently
being prepared by Cecilia Trifogli, Gail Trimble, and myself, and should appear in the
very near future. An edition of Guy Terrena’s question against Wylton is also being
readied for publication. F. Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung des Quodlibet,” p. 405, expressed
doubt regarding the relative order of Wylton’s and Auriol’s questions on the topic of
the intellective soul as the form of man. There cannot, however, be any doubt that
Wylton’s question antedates Auriol’s, and it is highly likely that Auriol counters some
of Wylton’s arguments in his quodlibetal question.
37
For this particular passage, see below, note 41.
38
In some earlier articles on Auriol’s thought I mistakenly assumed that the nature
of time had been the topic for Auriol’s Principium debate in connection with the start
of the academic year in 1317; see my “Dictates of Faith versus Dictates of Reason:
Peter Auriol on Divine Power, Creation, and Human Rationality,” DSTFM 7 (1996),
pp. 213–43, as well as my “The Intelligibility of Faith.”
39
For this kind of debate, see P. Glorieux, “L’enseignement au moyen age. Techniques
et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIIIe siècle,” AHDLMA
35 (1969), pp. 138ff., and Z. Kaluza, “La nature des écrits de Jean de Ripa,” Traditio
43 (1987), pp. 257ff.

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 the QUODLIBET of peter auriol 279

occasions where the whole faculty would gather. Furthermore, inas-

much as Auriol was convinced that the rational soul and the separate
intelligences are capable of cognition precisely because they consist of
a potential or “material” nature or “substance,”40 he was obliged to
defend the hylomorphic composition of intellectual souls on precisely
this occasion.41

Conclusion

Based on what we know at present42 it seems safe to say that Auriol

conceived of his Quodlibet as a statement of his personal convictions. On
closer inspection, many of the questions turn out to be Auriol’s nal
rejoinder to opponents such as Hervaeus Natalis and Thomas Wylton.
This is incontestably true of questions 2 to 5 and of questions 11 and
15. On the other hand, Auriol’s quodlibetal questions on the human
soul and man’s cognition, i.e., questions 6 to 10, are less narrowly tied
to debates with named contemporaries. Nevertheless, we know that
Auriol’s theory of cognition was closely scrutinized and criticized in
his own time,43 just as it is apparent that the decisions of the Council
of Vienne regarding the human soul and the light of glory sparked
heated debates precisely during the years when Auriol was a bachelor

40
According to Auriol, the agent intellect, the possible intellect and the composite
human intellect are three different “realitates” which are “really diverse.” Moreover,
Auriol does not shrink from classifying the agent and possible intellects as two “sub-
stantiae”; see Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 3, q. 3 (E, col. 59a). Obviously, it is
necessary to distinguish between Auriol’s attempt to reach a congenial interpretation
of Aristotle and Averroes, on the one hand, and his presentation of his own position,
on the other; however, this is something that requires a much fuller and separate
treatment.
41
See Petrus Aureoli, Comm. in II Sent., d. 3, q. 2 (E, cols. 58a–b): “Et ideo vel hui-
usmodi substantiae aliae a primo <scil. substantiae separatae> essent miserrimae nihil
intelligendo extra se, vel necessario habent in se naturam pure possibilem denudatam
ab omni actualitate intellectuali, per quam recipiunt intellectiones aliorum a se, cum
se non intelligant per suam essentiam. Utrum autem omnes tales intellectiones alio-
rum a se recipiant effective ab obiectis et sicut accidentia recepta in eis, de hoc dixi
intentionem meam in principio huius secundi.”
42
As far as I know, research into the historical background of questions 12 to 14
and the nal question 16 is still outstanding.
43
Already from Raymond Bequini we know of forceful opposition to Auriol’s
theory of cognition and his positing of an intentional object; see Raymond Bequini’s
Quodlibet and so-called “Correctorium,” which were described by F. Pelster, “Zur ersten
Polemik,” pp. 34ff.

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of the Sentences at Paris. This does not in any way rule out the possibility
that some of these questions may reect actual disputations de quolibet
presided over by Auriol. However, it is only when these questions are
read in connection with Auriol’s corresponding treatments in the Sentences
commentaries that they reveal their full potential as sources for their
author’s intellectual development as well as for the philosophical and
theological debates at Paris.

Ratio edendi
The edition of Auriol’s seventh quodlibetal question in Appendix I is
strictly preliminary. Four manuscripts—ABNT—have been singled out
for use because of their age and the obvious qualities of the text they
carry as compared to the remaining seven manuscripts. I have not had
an opportunity to examine more than half the manuscripts in situ and
for several of the manuscripts a detailed examination and description
of their provenance and composition still remains to be done. It can-
not be taken for granted that Auriol’s Quodlibet was transmitted as a
unitary work and the single questions may have different stemmata.
I have chosen to follow A as the basic text44 while the—often help-
ful—corrections in T are presumably the work of an intelligent scribe
who strove to improve on the text that reached him.45
Appendix II offers Guy Terrena’s question on the composition of
the human soul. It is transmitted in a single manuscript, BAV, Borgh.
39, and presents only a few problems.*

44
Already F. Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung,” p. 396, drew attention to the qualities of
A; but it is clearly not awless. In the edition a “<. . .>” inserted in a quotation serves
to mark that Auriol leaves out one or several words.
45
It is curious to note that Auriol mistook Augustine’s De vera religione for the
Confessiones (i.e., in §3.3.5), since his references to and quotations from Averroes are so
precise. Whether this is a unique case or it indicates something generally true of the
Quodlibet is a question that can only be answered on the basis of the critical edition
of the whole work.
* I am grateful to my friend Prof. Fritz S. Pedersen, SDU, for his judicious comments
on the editions included in the appendices.

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 281

PETRI AUREOLI
QUAESTIO 7 QUODLIBETI

Utrum anima constituta ex duabus realitatibus

esse possit forma corporis

5 <1.0> Septimo quaerebatur, utrum ponens, quod in anima

intellectiva sint duae realitates intrinsece, quarum una est pure
potentialis in genere intelligibilium, et reliqua actualis, possit
salvare, quod sit per se et essentialiter forma corporis.
<1.1> Et videtur, quod non, quia quod per se et essentiali-
10 ter inest alicui, inest sibi per totam rationem et totum illud,
quod pertinet ad essentiam illius. Sed si anima intellectiva
est constituta ex aliquo potentiali et ex aliquo actuali, non
se tota et ex omni eo, quod ad eius essentiam pertinet,
potest esse forma, quia non per illud pure potentiale, cum
15 potentia non possit esse alterius actus et forma, nec materia
possit informare. Igitur ponens animam intellectivam ex
his duobus constitui salvare non potest, quod sit per se et es-
sentialiter forma corporis.
<1.2> Sed in oppositum est, quia Extra, De summa Trinitate
20 et de catholica, libro 7, in capitulo “Fidei catholicae fun-
damento” denitur, quod quicumque “asserere <. . .>

3 A’ = Assisi, Bibl. comm. 136, fol. 83rb; B’ = Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 17.485, fol.
46vb; N’ = Napoli, Bibl. comm. VII B 31, fol. 28rb; T’ = Toulouse, Bibl. mun.
739, fol. 206rb; E’ = editio 1605, col. 71b

3–4 Utrum . . . corporis] Utrum ponens, quod (in add. T’) anima intellectiva sint
duae realitates intrinsece, quarum una est pure potentialis in genere intelligibilium,
et reliqua actualis, possit salvare, quod sit per se et essentialiter forma corporis
B’T’ om. N’ 5 in] om. B’ 12 constituta] constitutiva A’ 14 pure] purum
B’N’T’ 15 nec] i add. et del. T’ 16 informare] infore B’ 19 quia] quod N’

21 Conc. oecum. XV Viennense, Constitutio “Fidei catholicae” (6. Maii 1312), in Henricus
Denzinger et Adolfus Schönmetzer (edd.), Enchiridion Symbolorum, denitionum et dec-
larationum de rebus dei et morum, editio XXXIV (Romae, 1967), p. 284, no. 902

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praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non

sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam
haereticus sit censendus.” Sed constat, quod multi doctores
catholici, immo etiam ipse Augustinus posuerit in anima
5 rationali aliquid potentiale et materiam. Igitur ex ista
ratione non tollitur ratio formae per se et essentialiter per-
cientis ab anima intellectiva.

Responsio ad quaestionem
<1.3> Ad quaestionem istam respondendo hoc ordine pro-
10 ceditur: primo namque inquiretur, an fuerit de mente
Philosophi et Commentatoris, scilicet quod anima | intel-
lectiva esset constituta ex aliquo potentiali et aliquo actuali
in genere intelligibilium. Secundo inquiretur, an hoc possit
poni catholice. Tertio respondebitur ad quaesitum de veri-
15 tate, perseitate et de essentialitate formae, an possit compe-
tere intellectivae animae, si ponatur taliter constituta. |

Articulus primus
Et primo ponuntur rationes, quibus videtur, quod Philosophus et
Commentator non intellexerunt animam constitui ex aliquo possibili
20 et ex aliquo actuali in genere intelligibilium
<2.0> Circa primum procedetur hoc ordine, quod primo
rationes ponuntur, quibus videtur, quod Philosophus et
Commentator non fuerunt istius intentionis. Deinde osten-
ditur ex eorum clara intentione, quod immo sic intellexe-
25 runt. Deinde vero respondebitur ad inducta.

11 B’ fol. 47ra 16 E’ col. 72a

1 quod] et add. et del. A’ 2 corporis] corr. i.m. ex originis A’ 2 tamquam] tam N’

4 posuerit] posuit T’ 6 et] om. A’B’ 9 Ad] V sic! T’ 9 respondendo] respondeo
N’ 9–10 proceditur] procedetur B’N’T’ 11 scilicet] secundum B’N’ fortasse
scribendum sui 11–12 intellectiva] add. i.m. T’ 12 esset] esse N’ 15 essentialitate]
senlitate sic! N’ 16 intellectivae animae] inv. N’ 18 Et] om. B’ 19 possibili]
potentiali B’N’T’ 20 ex] om. T’ 21 quod] quia T’ 22 ponuntur] ponentur
T’ 22 videtur] videretur B’ 23 intentionis] opinionis T’ 23–24 ostenditur]
ostendetur B’N’T’ 25 Deinde vero] Tertio T’

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 283

<Rationes quod non>

<2.1.1> Videtur ergo alicui non fuisse de mente Philosophi
et Commentatoris sui, quod anima rationalis sit constituta
ex intellectu possibili et agente tamquam ex re possibili
5 et actuali in genere intelligibilium. Impossibile est enim,
quod actus habeat materiam partem sui. Sed in denitione
animae, quam asserit Philosophus competere etiam animae
intellectivae, dicitur, quod anima est actus corporis physici
etc. Igitur non potest habere materiam partem sui.
10 <2.1.1.1> Conrmatur, quia principii non est principium.
Anima est hominis principium tamquam forma, sicut patet
ex II De anima.
<2.1.2> Praeterea, Philosophus dicit de intellectu agente,
quod est substantia actu ens et quod est sua actio. Sed
15 hoc non esset verum, nisi esset substantia separata non
informans possibilem. Forma tamen non est ens actu, sed
actus. Igitur secundum Aristotelem intellectus agens non
est forma possibilis.
<2.1.3> Praeterea, Commentator dicit, III De anima, com-
20 mento 32, loquens de intellectu possibili, quod “opinandum
est secundum Aristotelem, quod intellectus iste ultimus
est in ordine intellectorum abstractorum sive intelligen-
tiarum.” Igitur videtur secundum intentionem Philosophi
et Commentatoris, quod intellectus possibilis sit quaedam
25 substantia separata per se subsistens inmior inter omnes
intelligentias, et per consequens ex ipso et agente non t una
anima nec una substantia secundum mentem ipsorum.

2 Videtur] Videretur B’T’ 2 ergo] igitur B’N’ 4 intellectu] et Commentatoris

add. N’ 6 habeat] habeant T’ 6 denitione] materiae add. et del. T’ 7 asserit
Philosophus] inv. T’ 8 actus] coi add. et del. T’ 9 partem] om. N’ 11 Anima]
Sed anima T’ 15 esset2] verum nisi esset add. N’ 16 informans] in formam
N’ 16 Forma] Formam A’B’ 16 tamen] autem N’ 16 sed] ens add. et del.
T’ 18 possibilis] potentialis N’ 20 opinandum] opiniandum N’ 21 ultimus
est] inv. N’ 23 intentionem] Aristotelis add. et del. T’ 26 et2] add. i.m. T’ om.
A’B’N’

7 Arist., II De anima, cap. 1 (412a); cf. id., VIII Metaph., cap. 3 (1043a) 12 Arist.,
II De anima, cap. 4 (415b) 13 Arist., XII Metaphy., cap. 7 (1072a) 20 Aver., In
III De anima Arist., comm. 19 (ed. Crawford, p. 442, ll. 63–64)

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<2.1.4> Praeterea, secundum Commentatorem ibidem, “pro-

portio intellectus agentis ad intellectum patientem est sicut
proportio principii moventis <. . .> ad materiam motam.” Sed
constat, quod nulla forma agat in suam materiam, cum
5 movens et motum debeant esse distincta | loco et subiecto,
ut patet ex VIII Physicorum. Igitur agens non potest esse
forma intellectus possibilis.
<2.1.4.1> Et conrmatur, quia in III De anima dicit Philoso-
phus, quod sicut in omni natura necesse est dare duas has
10 differentias, agens scilicet et recipiens, | similiter etiam in
anima, quod “ars ad materiam sustinuit,” per hoc innuens,
quod intellectus agens se habet ad possibilem sicut ars ad
materiam, et per consequens ut efciens, non ut forma.
<2.1.5> Praeterea, si agens et possibilis constituerunt
15 intrinsece animam, sequeretur, quod in homine essent duo
principia intellectiva, et quod homo intelligeret duplici
intellectu. Constat enim, quod agens est intelligens secun-
dum opinionem Philosophi, immo est sua intellectio, nec
intelligit aliquid eorum, quae sunt hic, ut Commentator
20 dicit. | Similiter et intellectus possibilis est intelligens, nec
est in eo aliud intelligere et comprehendere quam recipere
intellectiones intellectas, ut patet per totum III | De anima.
Unde Commentator ait, commento 32, quod “possumus
scire intellectum immaterialem esse non-mixtum ex iudicio
25 ac comprehensione eius, quod iudicamus per ipsum res

5 N’ fol. 28va 10 A’ fol. 83va 20 E’ col. 72b 22 B’ fol. 47rb

2 intellectus] om. N’ 3 materiam] naturam B’N’T’ 4 agat] agit N’T’ 9 duas

has] inv. N’T’ 10 differentias] indifferentias N’ 10 agens] gens N’ 11 quod]
quia T’ 14 constituerunt] constituerent T’ fortasse scribendum constituerent 16 et]
aut N’ 17 intelligens] intellectus N’ intellecta lectio incerta T’ 19 dicit] add. i.m.
T’ 20 intelligens] intellectus B’N’ 22 ut patet] add. et del. T’ 23 commento]
om. A’ 23 possumus] possimus T’ 24 immaterialem] materialem T’ 25 ac]
et B’N’T’

1 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 19 (ed. Crawford, p. 442, ll. 59–61) 6 Arist.,
VIII Phys., cap. 5 (256a) 9 Arist., III De anima., cap. 5 (430a) 19 Aver., In III De
anima Arist., comm. 19 (ed. Crawford, p. 442, ll. 57–58 et p. 442, ll. 72 sqq.) 22
Cf. Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 18 (ed. Crawford, p. 439, ll. 76–78) 23
Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 19 (ed. Crawford, p. 441, ll. 35–37)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 285

innitas numero.” Igitur si ponere in homine duo principia

absonum est, non est igitur anima rationalis constituta ex
possibili et agente.
<2.1.6> Praeterea, Commentator III De anima, commento
5 17, deducens demonstrationem Aristotelis, “omne recipiens
necesse est, ut sit denudatum a natura recepti, igitur etc.,”
dicit, quod haec propositio intelligitur de natura speciei
receptae, non autem de “natura sui generis et maxime
remoti.” Et ideo, licet sit declaratum, quod intellectus
10 possibilis non habet aliquam formam materialem, nondum
tamen declaratur ex hoc sermone, utrum habeat diversam
formam in esse a formis materialibus.
<2.1.6.1> Et ideo commento 18, in denitione intellectus
materialis, dicit, quod “non habet aliquam formam materia-
15 lium.” Igitur non est mens sua, quin sit quaedam substantia
actualis | et forma spiritualis, quamvis nullam formam
materialem habeat.
<2.1.7> Praeterea, Commentator XII Metaphysicae, com-
mento 17, dicit, quod intellectus, qui est in potentia, est
20 quasi locus intellectus agentis, et non quasi materia. Hoc
dicit se declarasse in III De anima—commento 21, ubi
etiam ait, quod intelligentiae abstractae mutuo se recipiunt
et perciunt, quod non potest intelligi de receptione per
modum formae inhaerentis, alioquin omnes intelligentiae
25 constituerent unum ens. Sed debet intelligi de receptione,
quae t per modum cuiusdam assistentiae. Unde agens tangit

16 T’ fol. 206va

1 principia] intellectiva add. T’ 4 III] certo N’ 4 commento] om. A’B’ 5

17] 16 N’ 6 igitur] om. T’ 10 aliquam formam] inv. B’ 10 aliquam] sub-
stantialem add. et del. B’ 11 ex] de A’ 12 in] aliquid illegibile add. et del. T’ 13
intellectus] possibilis add. et del. T’ 18 XII] 11q B’ 19 est2 ] om. T’ 20 quasi]
qui N’ 20 intellectus] om. N’ 20 Hoc] Hic T’ 21 21] 37 B’ 27 N’T’ 22
intelligentiae] intellectus A’ 22 se] add. s.l. A’ 26 t] sit N’

4 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 4 (ed. Crawford, p. 385, ll. 67 sqq.) 6
Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 4 (ed. Crawford, p. 386, ll. 92–95) 13 Aver.,
In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 387, ll. 7–8) 19 Aver., In XII
Metaphys. Arist., comm. 17 (VIII, col. 303ra) 21 Aver., In III De anima Arist.,
comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 429, l. 37)

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virtualiter possibilem et sibi coassistit secundum mentem

ipsius. Non est igitur anima constituta tamquam unum ens
ex possibili et agente.
<2.1.8> Praeterea, III De anima, Commentator, commento
5 8, dicit, quod intellectus materialis et intentio intellecta in
actu sic se habent, quod non t ex eis aliquod tertium, sicut
de aliis compositis ex materia et forma. Igitur ex intellectu
agente et possibili non potest eri tertium constitutum,
scilicet anima rationalis.
10 <2.1.9> Praeterea, constat secundum mentem Philosophi et
Commentatoris intellectum possibilem esse aeternum. Sed
XII Metaphysicae, commento 43, dicit Commentator, quod
in substantiis abstractis non est agens, quia non est potentia.
Igitur intellectus possibilis non est realitas pure potentialis.
15 <2.1.10> Praeterea, eodem XII, commento 38, dicit, quod
omne compositum est novum, ubi agens exiret per se de
potentia in actum. Sed non posuit partem intellectivam
novam, sed unam potius et aeternam. Igitur non intellexit
eam componi ex realitate potentiali et actuali.
20 <2.1.11> Ex his igitur visum est aliquibus, quod fuerit de
mente Philosophi et Commentatoris intellectum possibilem
et agentem esse duas substantias seorsum subsistentes, qua-
rum quaelibet esset actualis, sed differebant in hoc, quod
agens erat purus actus et in nulla potentia ad aliquid reci-
25 piendum; possibilis autem, etsi esset substantia actualis in se,
tamen erat in potentia ad recipiendum formas universales
rerum materialium. Erat autem proportio inter agentem
et possibilem tamquam inter substantiam activam respectu
intentionum | universalium et passivam seu receptivam. Et

29 E’ col. 73a

5 et] corr. s.l. ex e A’ 6 non] add. s.l. A’ 12 43] dicit quod add. et del. N’ 15
commento] 3 add. et del. T’ 15 38] fortasse scribendum 18 16 omne] esse N’ 16
ubi] nisi B’N’T’ 18 unam] corr. i.m. ex veram T’ 18 non] add. i.m. A’ om. B’
18 intellexit] intellexerit A’ 22–23 quarum] quantum B’N’ 24 nulla] corr. i.m.
ex natura T’ 26 in] om. N’

5 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 404, ll. 505–508)
12 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 44 (VIII, col. 328rb) 15 Aver., In XII
Metaphys. Arist., comm. 18 (VIII, coll. 304va–vb)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 287

si quaereretur de intellectu agente aut possibili, quomodo

intelligebant substantias abstractas secundum mentem Phi-
losophi, responderent isti, quod per essentiam suam, quae
erat similitudo quaedam omnium substantiarum abstracta-
5 rum, non autem per receptionem similitudinis | aut actus
ab huiusmodi substantiis separatis.
Quod manifeste fuit de mente Philosophi et Commentatoris intellec-
tum possibilem nullam habere materiam in sua essentia, | sed esse
substantiam pure possibilem
10 <2.2> Sed his non obstantibus concluditur ex verbis
Philosophi et Commentatoris triplex conclusio, quae fuit
de mente eorum.
<Prima conclusio>
<2.2.1> Prima quidem, quod intellectus esset realitas pure
15 potentialis, nullam omnino habens naturam in actu nec
existens de numero entium in actu, sed solum in potentia.
Quod patet, quia si esset in potentia tantum ad intentiones
omnium entium, et tamen cum hoc esset in se et in sui
essentia aliqua spiritualis substantia actualis, sequeretur,
20 quod illa verba Philosophi “intellectus possibilis nihil est
eorum, quae sunt actu, ante intelligere,” et illa “necesse est
ipsum esse immixtum cum omnibus, ut iudicet omnia,” et
illa “neque ullam habet naturam nisi eam | tantum, quod
‘possibilis’ sit vocatus,” et illa demonstratio eiusdem “omne
25 recipiens necesse est esse denudatum a natura recepti;

5 B’ fol. 47va 8 N’ fol. 28vb 23 A’ fol. 83vb

1 quaereretur] quaeretur N’ 1 possibili] potentiali T’ 3 responderent] respondent

B’N’T’ 3 isti] om. N’ 7 Philosophi] add. i.m. A’ 8 materiam] naturam B’N’T’ 8
esse] essentia B’N’T’ 9 possibilem] potentialem B’T’ 10 obstantibus] manifeste
add. B’N’T’ 10 concluditur] concludetur T’ 14 esset] fortasse scribendum est 16
actu] sol add. et del. T’ 18 in2] om. A’ 21 ante] om. N’ illa] ita T’ 22 et] om.
N’ 23 ullam] ulla N’ 23 habet] habent A’B’ om. N’ habens T’ 23 naturam]
nec B’ 24 omne] esse B’N’ 25 est] eius add. et del. T’ 287,25–288,2 a . . . de-
nudatum] om. N’

20 Arist., III De anima, cap. 4 (429a) 21 Arist., ibid. 24 Arist., ibid.

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intellectus autem possibilis potest recipere omne ens actuale;

igitur est denudatum ab omni ente actuali”—sequeretur
utique, quod haec omnia referrentur ad praeparationem sive
ad aptitudinem, quae est in intellectu possibili, et non ad
5 essentiam praeparati sive ad substantiam deferentem prae-
parationem seu aptitudinem ad recipiendum. Et hoc patet
manifeste, nam de substantia deferente aptitudinem, quae
est in intellectu possibili, ad intentiones omnium entium,
non esset tunc verum dicere, quod nullam habet naturam,
10 aut quod nihil est actu, aut quod est denudata a natura
specica vel generis omnium rerum, quae recipit, immo
esset quaedam determinata natura, et per consequens haec
omnia referrentur ad praeparationem et aptitudinem.
<2.2.1.1> Sed hoc est absonum, quia tunc verba illa non
15 essent magis vera de intellectu possibili quam de quolibet
alio recipiente. Verum est enim dicere de cera, quod nullam
habet naturam, id est guram, quam sit apta nata recipere,
quamvis in se sit quaedam res actualis. Unde aeque veri-
carentur omnes propositiones, quas Philosophus dicit de
20 pariete aut de supercie respectu colorum et <de> cera
respectu gurarum, sicut de intellectu possibili. Et posset
dici, quod supercies nihil est eorum, quae sunt actu, et
quod nullam habet naturam, nisi quod ‘possibilis’ sit vocata,
et sic de aliis.
25 <2.2.1.2> Haec autem omnia tamquam absona reprobat Com-
mentator, III De anima, commento 18, dicens contra Alexan-
drum, quod hoc dicere “nihil est. Si enim non intendebat
Aristoteles demonstrare nobis substantiam praeparati, sed
substantiam praeparationis,” quare ergo appropriavit hoc
30 intellectui inter alias praeparationes, “cum impossibile sit

1 autem] corr. i.m. ex est A’ 5 deferentem] referentem N’ 6 seu] sive T’ 6

aptitudinem] aptitudine N’ 10 denudata] denudatum T’ 11 quae] quas
corr. i.m. ex quae T’ fortasse scribendum quas 14 verba illa] inv. B’ 15 quolibet]
quocumque N’T’ 18 sit] iter. T’ 20 de1] om. T’ 21 sicut] sint B’ 22 est] in
N’ 26 dicens] iter. et corr. A’ 26 contra] Alen add. et del. N’

21 Arist., V Metaphys., cap. 18 (1022a) 26 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5

(ed. Crawford, p. 395, ll. 246 sqq.)

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dicere, quod aliqua praeparatio sit substantia.” Et subdit,

quod hoc “manifestum est ex demonstratione Aristotelis.
Propositio enim dicens, quod omne recipiens aliquid ne-
cesse est, ut in eo non existat in actu aliquid ex natura
5 recepti, intelligitur de substantia praeparati, natura enim
eius quaerit habere hoc praedicatum. Praeparatio enim
non est recipiens, sed” est sicut accidens proprium ipsius
recipientis. Et commento 27 dicit se confundi et admirari
de hac mirabili expositione: “quomodo | enim possumus
10 exponere illud, quod Aristoteles intendebat hic non demon-
strare de natura intellectus materialis, sed illud, quod est
commune omnibus | recipientibus, in quibus est praeparatio
<. . .> et non ad demonstrandum naturam praeparati per
cognitionem propriae praeparationis, nisi forte intellectus
15 materialis esset solummodo praeparatio sine aliquo subiecto,
quod est impossibile <. . .> Unde Aristoteles, cum invenit
praeparationem, quae est in intellectu, esse diversam ab
aliis,” praeparatio autem ostendit praeparatum, “iudicavit
praecise, quod natura subiecta differt ab aliis materiis prae-
20 paratis, et quod est proprium isti subiecto praeparationis,
est, quod non est in ea aliqua intentionum intellectarum
in potentia aut in actu.” Igitur manifestum est ex verbis
propriis Philosophi et expositione Commentatoris, quod in
substantia et essentia intellectus possibilis non potest esse
25 aliqua determinata natura aut actualitas, sed est possibile
purum.
<2.2.1.3.1> Ex quo patet, quam ridiculosa est vulgaris
expositio, quae dicit, quod Philosophus intelligit possibilem

9 E’ col. 73b 12 B’ fol. 47vb

2 hoc] add. s.l. A’ 6 praedicatum] lectio incerta, fortasse legendum praedispositum

T’ 7 sicut] om. T’ 7 accidens] actus N’ 8 commento] 28 add. T’ 11 intel-
lectus materialis] iter. T’ 11 sed] est add. T’ 11 illud] id B’ 12 quibus] quo
T’ 17 in] om. T’ 18 iudicavit] corr. i.m. ex dicavit A’ 19 natura] non B’ 20
quod] quia N’ 24 substantia] subiecto T’ 24 potest] eri add. et del. T’ 25
aut] ut N’ 25 est possibile] inv. N’

1 Aver., ibid. 8 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 431,
ll. 104 sqq.)

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intellectum non habere aliquam naturam, hoc est aliquam

speciem intelligibilem, aut non esse aliquid actu eorum,
quae sunt per species et similitudines eorum. Hoc enim
esset dicere unum, quod est commune omni praeparationi
5 et omni recipienti, quod nullam habet naturam, nec ali-
quid est actu eorum, quae recipit in se, tamen est aliquid
actu. Cum ergo Philosophus aliquid proprium intelligat de
intellectu possibili, manifestum est, quod loquitur de ipso
in se, scilicet quod non est aliqua natura in actu aut
10 | aliquid de numero actualium entium.
<2.2.1.3.2> Praeterea, si intellectus possibilis in sua sub-
stantia esset aliquid actuale, actus ille posset dici forma
vel materialis vel immaterialis seu intelligbilis; posset etiam
dici quaedam intentio intellecta vel in potentia vel in actu.
15 Sed III De anima, commento 18, expresse Commentator
ait, quod “intellectus materialis nullam habet naturam et
essentiam, qua constituatur, secundum quod est materialis,
nisi naturam possibilitatis, cum denudetur ab omnibus for-
mis, et materialibus et intelligibilibus.” Et per consequens
20 nec habet formam materialem nec intelligibilem, nec potest
istud exponi “secundum quod est materialis, hoc est sub
isto respectu,” non intelligendo de substantia, quae defert
respectum, quia contra hanc expositionem ipse vehementer
innititur. Dicit etiam, commento 27, quod “in intellectu
25 materiali non est aliqua formarum intellectarum <. . .> nec
actu nec potentia.” Constat autem, quod si haberet aliquam
naturam actualem, quod illa esset intellecta in potentia,
omnis enim actus per se intelligibilis est. Igitur in sua essentia
non est aliquid actuale.

9 N’ fol. 29ra

2 esse] est N’ 5 quod] quia B’N’T’ 6 est1] iter. N’ om. T’ 6 in se] inde T’ 7
intelligat] deintellectu add. et del. N’ 9 aut] nec T’ 12 vel] om. N’ 13 vel imma-
terialis] om. N’ 15 Sed] Licet B’ 16 nullam] ullam A’ 21 secundum] scilicet
A’ sed N’ isto] illo N’ 22 defert] differt A’N’ dicit B’ deffert T’ 23 respectum]
respectui N’ 29 non] ubi B’

15 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 387, ll. 12–16) 24
Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 430, ll. 62–65)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 291

<2.2.1.3.3> Praeterea, si ita esset, | nulla esset differentia

quantum ad hoc inter virtutem sensitivam et virtutem intel-
lectivam. Sicut enim virtus sensitiva nihil est in actu eorum,
quae recipit, sed est in potentia ad positivam perfectio-
5 nem in se, tamen est aliquid in actu et prima perfectio,
sic intellectus possibilis esset in potentia respectu postre-
mae perfectionis, in se tamen esset aliquid in actu. Sed
ex intentione Commentator, III De anima, commento 27,
imaginationem hanc reprobat, cuius verba sunt haec, “voco
10 potentiam propinquam actui dispositionem mediam inter
remotam potentiam et postremam perfectionem.” Et secun-
dum hoc in intellectu materiali non est aliqua formarum
intellectarum in actu nec potentia propinqua actui. “Et hoc
est, ut non sit in eo intentio, quae sit in potentia intellecta.
15 Et hoc est proprium soli | intellectui. Perfectio enim prima
sentientis est aliquid in actu et respectu potentiae remotae,
et aliquid | in potentia respectu postremae perfectionis. Et
ideo assimilavit Aristoteles primam perfectionem sensus
geometrae, quando non utitur geometria, scimus enim cer-
20 te, quod habemus virtutem sensibilem existentem in actu,
licet tunc nihil sentiamus.” Haec Commentator. Ubi mani-
feste negat intellectum possibilem habere aliquam actualem
naturam, tunc enim esset sicut prima perfectio sentientis,
quae est aliquid in actu in se, quamvis sit in potentia respec-
25 tu perfectionis postremae. Cum igitur sit differentia in hoc
inter intellectum possibilem et virtutem sentientem, mani-

1 A’ fol. 84ra T’ fol. 206vb 15 E’ col. 74a 17 B’ fol. 48ra

4 positivam] passivam N’ corr. i.m. in postremam T’ fortasse scribendum postremam

8 ex intentione] in extensione A’ sic! 8 Commentator] Commentatoris B’N’T’ 8
III] II A’ 2º B’N’ in 2º T’ 8 27] 21 T’ qui add. i.m. T’ 9 reprobat] improbat
N’ 13 nec] est add. T’ fortasse add. in 16 sentientis] corr. s.l. ex sentientes A’ 16
et] in B’N’T’ 19 geometrae] geometriae T’ 21 Ubi] Non N’ 23 enim esset]
inv. B’ 24 quae] a add. et del. N’ 24 est] add. i.m. A’ 25 in hoc] om. T’

8 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 430, ll. 65–67) 13
Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 430, ll. 67–75) 18 Arist.,
II De generatione animalium, cap. 1 (735a)

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festum est, quod secundum ipsum intellectus possibilis non

est aliquid actu in se.
<2.2.1.3.4> Praeterea, si intellectus possibilis esset natura
aliqua actualis, Philosophus et Commentator valde male
5 definissent intellectum possibilem, quia eorum definitio
non explicaret intellectus quidditatem, sed potius proprium
accidens, scilicet praeparationem et potentiam, cum dicunt
definiendo, quod intellectus possibilis nec unam habet
naturam, sed hanc tantum, quod ‘possibilis’ sit vocatus. Et
10 cum dicat Commentator, quod haec est denitio intellectus
materialis, manifestum est, quod haec est quidditas substan-
tiae eius et non praeparationis seu aptitudinis, quae est in
eo. Unde si haberet actum in se, oportuisset denisse per
aliquid exprimens illum actum, alioquin non fuisset bene
15 notificata natura intellectus. Rursum male comparasset
Commentator hoc genus entis materiae, dicens ipsum esse
quartum genus entis, III De anima, commento 18, ubi dicit,
quod “sicut esse sensibile dividitur in formam et materiam,
sic esse intelligibile oportet dividi in consimilia his duobus,
20 scilicet in aliquo simile formae et in aliquo simile materiae.”
Male etiam assignasset in eodem commento differentiam
inter istam materiam et materiam primam. Debuisset enim
dixisse, quod haec materia est aliquid in actu, prima vero
non, et cum multas differentias assignet, numquam tangit
25 istam, quin potius supponat, quod nec prima materia nec
ista in actu sunt, sed in pura potentia. Dicit, quod differunt,

1 secundum . . . possibilis] intellectus possibilis secundum ipsum T’ 1 possibilis]

om. N’ 9 hanc] habeat N’ 11 materialis] sit vocatus add. et del. N’ 11 haec
est] inv. N’ 11 est2] add. s.l. A’ om. B’ 11–12 substantiae] sub add. et del. B’ 14
non] iter. N’ 15 comparasset] compasset B’ 17 anima] add. s.l. A’ 18 esse] ens
add. N’ 19 esse] omne N’ 20 aliquo] fortasse scribendum aliquod 20 aliquo]
genere add. et del. T’ 20 aliquo] fortasse scribendum aliquod 21 Male] add. i.m.
A’ 23 haec] in add. N’ 24 cum] tamen N’T’ 24 assignet] assignasset A’ 25
supponat] supponit A’ 26 Dicit] tamen add. i.m. A’

17 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 409, ll. 658–661)
26 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 388, ll. 35–37)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 293

quia ista est in potentia ad formas simpliciter et universales,

prima autem materia ad formas istas et particulares.
Quod fuit de mente eorum intellectum agentem et possibilem constituere
rationalem animam
5 <Secunda conclusio>
<2.2.2> Secunda conclusio eorum fuit, quod agens esset for-
ma in possibili, sic quod | ex his duabus realitatibus, una
actuali et altera pure potentiali, constabat humanus intel-
lectus et anima rationalis. Et quod hoc sit de mente eorum,
10 patet. De nullo enim potest dici, quod se habeat ad intel-
lectum possibilem, sicut se habet lux ad diaphanum, aut
quod sit perfectio possibilis sicut lux diaphani, aut quod
habeat idem subiectum cum intellectis speculativis, quae
sunt in intellectu potentiali subiective—de nullo, inquam,
15 talia possunt dici nisi de illo, quod se habet ad intellectum
possibilem sicut forma inhaerens et perciens. Sed III De
anima, commento 18, dicit Averroes, quod “respectus intel-
lectus agentis ad intellectum possibilem est respectus lucis ad
diaphanum <. . .> Quemadmodum enim | lux est perfec-
20 tio diaphani, sic intellectus agens est perfectio materialis;
quemadmodum diaphanum non movetur a colore nec re-
cipit eum, nisi quando lucet, ita iste intellectus non recipit
intellecta, quae sunt hic, nisi secundum quod percitur per
totum intellectum illum et illuminatur per ipsum.” In com-
25 mento vero 49 dicit, quod manifestum est, quod “subiectum

7 N’ fol. 29rb 19 E’ col. 74b

2 istas] suas B’ secundum quid N’ 2 et] om. T’ 4 rationalem] materialem

B’N’ 7 realitatibus] realibus A’ 8 et] om. A’ 9 anima] omnino N’ 10–11
habeat . . . diaphanum] om. N’ 12 diaphani] possibilem sicut se habet lux ad
diaphanum add. N’ 15 intellectum]  add. et del. N’ 16 perciens] ipsum add.
B’N’T’ 17 18] 28 lectio incerta T’ 17 respectus] corr. i.m. ex respectus sic! T’ 20
est] om. T’ 24 totum] om. B’T’ vero] quinto T’ 25 49] om. T’

17 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 410, l. 689—p. 411,
l. 697) 25 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 36 (ed. Crawford, p. 499, ll.
563–566)

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intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis | <. . .>

est unum et idem, scilicet intellectus materialis, et simile est
diaphanum, quod recipit colorem et lucem insimul.” Ergo
intellectus agens secundum mentem eorum est in intellectu
5 possibili sicut forma inhaerens.
<2.2.2.1> Si dicatur, quod huiusmodi perfectio intelligi non
debet per inhaerentiam, sed magis per assistentiam et con-
tactum virtutis, sicut dicimus, quod lux percit colorem, non
valet, quia istud est destruere textum. Non est enim verum
10 dicere, quod illud, quod assistit et non insistit, respiciat |
aliud non subiectum. Hic autem dicitur, quod intellectus
agens et intellecta speculativa habent idem subiectum.
<2.2.2.2> Si etiam diceretur, quod lux percit diaphanum,
non sicut forma substantialis, sed sicut accidens, et ita non
15 probatur, quod intellectus agens constituat unam substan-
tiam cum possibili, sed inest sibi tamquam accidens, non
valet, quia quod vere est, nulli accidit, I Physicorum. In-
tellectus autem agens est substantia actu ens, et ideo in
nullo potest esse forma accidentalis. Et iterum intellectus
20 possibilis est substantia pure potentialis, ut declaratum est
fuisse de mente istorum; quare necesse est, quod at in actu
substantiali vel per intellectum agentem, quem recipit, vel
per alia intellecta. Dignius autem est, quod per intellectum
agentem, quia illum per prius recipit, ut Commentator ait,
25 commento 18.
<2.2.2.3> Praeterea, nisi agens et possibilis essent duae reali-
tates intrinsece existentes in anima, non esset verum, quod
essent duae differentiae et duae virtutes in anima, et quod

1 B’ fol. 48rb 10 A’ fol. 84rb

4 agens] agentis N’ 8 dicimus] dicitur N’ 9 textum] testum N’ 9 enim]

add. i.m. A’ om. T’ 11 aliud] ad N’ 11 non] nisi A’ nec N’ corr. i.m. in sicut T’
fortasse scribendum ut 14 sicut2] sicus T’ et add. et del. T’ 16 accidens] corr. i.m. ex
actus T’ 17 vere est] videtur esse B’ 22 quem] quam N’ 24 per] om. T’ 26
possibilis] potentialis N’ 26–27 duae . . . esset] om. N’

11 Aver., ibid. 17 Arist., I Phys., cap. 3 (186b) 20 Cf. supra ¢2.2.1² 25 Aver.,
In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 411, ll. 701 sqq.)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 295

anima reciperet ratione quasi materiae et ageret ratione

quasi formae, et quod anima esset intelligendo activa et
passiva. Sed Commentator, III De anima, commento 17, di-
cit, quod anima rationalis, “secundum quod movent eam
5 intellecta, est passiva; secundum vero quod moventur ab ea,
est activa. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod necesse est ponere
in anima rationali has duas differentias <. . .> et dicit aperte,
quod utraque eius pars est.” Et commento 33 dicit, quod
“universaliter, quando quis intuebitur intellectum materialem
10 cum intellectu agente, apparebunt esse duo uno modo, et
unum alio modo: duo per diversitatem actionis eorum <. . .>
unum, quia intellectus materialis percitur per agentem.” Et
commento 31 ait, quod “necesse est attribuere animae, quae
est in nobis, has duas actiones, scilicet recipere intellectum
15 et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint substantiae
<. . .> Cum enim invenimus nos agere per has duas virtutes,
cum volumus, et nihil agat nisi per suam formam, ideo fuit
necesse attribuere nobis has virtutes intellectus.” Similiter
XII Metaphysicae, commento 17, commendans opinionem
20 Theophrasti et Themistii et aliorum Peripateticorum ait,
quod ipsi reputabant, quod “intelligentia agens est quasi
forma in intellectu materiali ut compositum ex materia et
forma, et quod ipsa causat intellecta uno modo et recipit
alio modo. Agit enim ea, in quantum est forma, et reci-
25 pit secundum intellectum materialem.” Approbans autem
istam opinionem | subdit, quod “nos perscrutati sumus de

26 E’ col. 75a

1 quasi] iter. et corr. T’ 2 formae] forma B’ 2 anima esset] inv. B’ 5 moven-

tur] corr. i.m. ex movetur T’ 6 est] passivus add. et del. T’ 6 est] add. s.l. A’ 7
in . . . rationali] om. N’ 8 commento] add. i.m. T’ 10 et] om. A’ 13 commento]
13 add. et del. N’ 13 31] 32 B’ 15 sint] sunt B’N’ 17 nihil] nec B’ non N’ 17
agat] aliquis add. N’ nisi] quod add. A’ 17 per] add. i.m. A’ 19 opinionem] theolo
add. et del. N’ 26 perscrutati] perscrubati N’

3 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 4 (ed. Crawford, p. 385, ll. 52–57)
6 Arist., III De anima, cap. 4 (429a) 8 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 20 (ed.
Crawford, p. 450, l. 213—p. 451, l. 219) 13 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm.
18 (ed. Crawford, p. 439, l. 72—p. 440, l. 85) 19 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist.,
comm. 17 (VIII, coll. 302vb–303ra) 26 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 17
(VIII, col. 303ra)

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istis opinionibus in libro De anima, et diximus, quod intel-

ligentia agens est quasi forma in intellectu materiali, et
quod ipsa agit intellecta et recipit ea secundum intellectum
materialem.” Sed constat, quod praedicta non esset | vera,
5 nec modus loquendi esset proprius, nisi eorum mens foret,
quod anima rationalis constitueretur intrinsece ex intellectu
possibili | et agente tamquam ex substantia potentiali
et substantia actuali. Non esset verum enim, quod essent
duae differentiae animae, nec duae partes eius, nec quod
10 essent duae virtutes illius formae, per quam agimus, nec
quod anima reciperet | intellecta uno modo et ageret alio
modo. Sed potius deberet dici, quod una substantia ageret,
et alia reciperet, non autem quod unum et idem uno modo
reciperet, alio modo ageret.
15 <2.2.2.4> Cum igitur propositionibus istis Commentator et
ceteri Peripatetici utantur, patet, quod fuit de mente eorum,
quod anima rationalis constitueretur ex agente et possibili
tamquam ex actuali et potentiali.
<2.2.2.5> Praeterea, anima non est magis simplex quam
20 ceterae substantiae separatae. Sed secundum mentem eorum
omnis substantia praeter primam intrinsece est composita.
Unde III De anima, commento 18, dicit Commentator, quod
in omni intellectu abstracto oportet recipere consimilia his
duobus, aliquid scilicet simile formae et aliquid simile mate-
25 riae. Et ideo declaratum est in prima philosophia, quod
nulla forma liberata est a potentia simpliciter nisi prima,
quae nihil intelligit extra se. Aliae autem formae diversantur

4 N’ fol. 29va 7 B’ fol. 48va 11 T’ fol. 207ra

2 est] a add. et del. A’ 3 agit] congit N’ 3 intellecta] intelligente N’ 4 esset]

essent B’N’T’ 5 foret] ut alia add. et del. N’ 7 agente] in nobis add. et del. N’
8 verum] est add. N’ 9 quod] iter. N’ 17 possibili] potentiali N’ 20 separa-
tae] separata N’ 23 abstracto] abstracta B’ 23 recipere] reperire B’N’T’ 24
aliquid2] quid N’ 24 simile2] formae add. et del. A’

22 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 409, ll. 660–662)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 297

in quidditate et essentia quoquo modo. Et XII Metaphysicae,

commento 50, dicit loquens de prima forma et primo intel-
lectu, quod ipsum est simplex et indivisibile et singulare
et per se extra compositum, scilicet quod eius substantia
5 non est in compositione, per hoc expresse ostendens, quod
substantia omnis alterius intellectus est in quadam compo-
sitione. Igitur secundum ista in omni substantia intellectuali
necesse est ponere aliquid simile materiae et aliquid simile
formae. Si igitur intellectus agens esset substantia per se
10 et possibilis per se, oporteret utrumque constitui ex aliquo
simile materiae et aliquo simile formae et ita | ex possibili
et agente. Quare standum est statim in principio, scilicet
quod agens et possibilis constituunt primo animam quasi
per modum similem materiae et formae.
15 <2.2.2.6> Unde III De anima, commento 27, dicit Commenta-
tor, quod “illud solum, quod est liberatum ab hac natura,” et
loquitur ibi de intellectu possibili, “est primum intelligens.”
Et subdit, quod “ponendo istam materiam in formis abstrac-
tis dissolvitur quaestio, quomodo intelligitur multitudo, et
20 quomodo intelligantur multa ab eis.”
Quod intellectus abstractus non intelligit alias a se per essentiam
suam, immo recipiendo intellectionem ab eis, receptione tamen aeterna
secundum mentem Philosophi et Commentatoris

11 A’ fol. 84va

1 essentia] esse N’ 2 prima] iter. N’ 9 esset] est N’ 10–11 aliquo . . . et1] iter.
N’ 11 simile] sic! A’B’N’T’ fortasse scribendum simili 11 simile] sic! A’B’N’T’ fortasse
scribendum simili 17 primum] principium N’T’ 17 intelligens] intellectus N’T’
20 intelligantur] fortasse scribendum intelliguntur 21 intellectus abstractus] intelligen-
tiae abstractae B’N’T’ 21 intelligit] intelligant B’ in se stant N’ intelligunt T’
21 a] extra B’N’T’ 21 se] sed add. B’ 22 intellectionem] intentionem T’ etiam
add. B’N’ 22 receptione] iter. N’ 22 tamen] om. B’

2 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 51 (VIII, coll. 335rb sqq.) 15 Aver., In
III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 429, ll. 39–40) 18 Aver., In III
De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 429, ll. 41–43)

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<Tertia conclusio>
<2.2.3> Tertia vero conclusio eorum fuit, quod intelligentiae
separatae, etsi intelligerent se ipsas per | essentiam suam, sic
quod intellectio et intellectum essent unum et idem, tamen
5 alia extra se non intelligebant per essentiam suam, sed potius
per intentionem seu intellectionem receptam quamvis ab
aeterno. Et hoc patet per illud, quod Commentator dicit
XII Metaphysicae, commento 43. Dicit enim, quod “tantum
est illic”—loquitur de intelligentiis separatis—“causa et
10 causatum, secundum quod dicimus, quod intellectus est
causa intelligentis, et cum ita sit, non est impossibile, ut
illud, quod est per se intelligentia et intellectum, sit causa
plurium entium, secundum quod ex eo intelliguntur multi
modi.” Et sequitur, quod “tantum est illic intellectus et
15 intellectum, perfectum et perciens, quemadmodum articia
perciuntur ab invicem in hoc, quod accipiunt principia ad
invicem.”
<2.2.3.1> Similiter III De anima, commento | 27, dicit, quod
fuit possibile, quod intelligentiae abstractae percerentur
20 ad invicem et intelligerent se ad invicem ratione illius mate-
riae, quae ponitur in eis, quia alias non esset possibile, ut
intelligeretur in eis recipiens nec etiam receptibile.
<2.2.3.2> Et idem dicit commento 18, quod “nisi esset hoc
genus entis, quod scivimus in scientia animae”—et loqui-
25 tur de intellectu possibili, quae est quasi materia in genere

3 E’ col. 75b 18 B’ fol. 48vb

3 etsi] om. A’ 3 suam] om. B’N’T’ 3 sic] add. s.l. A’ ergo N’ 4 intellectio]
intelligendum N’ intentio T’ 4 tamen] cum B’ 9–11 et . . . causa] iter. N’ 10
intellectus] fortasse scribendum intellectum 11 intelligentis] separatis N’ 12
intellectum] intellectus T’ 15 quemadmodum] Arl add. et del. T’ 16–17
in . . . invicem] om. N’ 16 ad] sic! A’B’N’T’ fortasse scribendum ab 19 percerentur]
percientur A’ 20 ad1] sic! A’B’N’T’ fortasse scribendum ab 22 etiam] om. B’N’
et T’ 23 esset] hic etiam T’ 24 scivimus] scimus T’ 25 quae] sic! A’B’N’ qui
T’ fortasse scribendum qui

8 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 44 (VIII, coll. 327va–vb) 14 Aver., In

XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 44 (VIII, col. 328rb) 18 Aver., In III De anima Arist.,
comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 429, ll. 34–39) 23 Aver., In III De anima Arist.,
comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 410, ll. 668–670)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 299

intelligibilium, quem vocat ‘quartum genus entis’—“non

possemus intelligere multitudinem in substantiis abstractis.”
Vult enim dicere, quod nisi quaelibet intelligentia esset con-
stituta ex aliquo potentiali, per quod reciperet intentiones
5 rerum extra se, nulla intelligentia posset intelligere multa.
<2.2.3.3> Igitur secundum mentem philosophorum | intel-
ligentiae abstractae non intelligunt alias extra se per essen-
tiam suam aut per hoc, quod sunt similitudo eorum.
<2.2.3.3.1> Praeterea, si intelligentiae abstractae intelligerent
10 alias extra se per essentiam suam, utpote quia earum essen-
tia repraesentaret omnia, tunc sequeretur, quod multitudo
intellectorum non faceret compositionem realem in eis
nec etiam alietatem intellectus et intellecti. Sed secundum
Philosophum et Commentatorem, XII Metaphysicae, omnes
15 intelligentiae, quae intelligunt extra se aliud, habent alieta-
tem intellectus et intellecti et multitudinem intellectorum
ponentem compositionem in eis, et deciunt in simplicitate
a prima intelligentia, quae nihil intelligit extra se. Igitur
huiusmodi intelligentiae intelligunt recipiendo et tunc non
20 per essentiam suam, quia ea, quae sunt extra se.
<2.2.3.3.2> Nec valet, si dicatur, quod intelligunt recipiendo
alias intelligentias, quae sunt extra se, per assistentiam, non
autem per inhaerentiam, sicut videtur esse mens Commen-
tatoris. Dicit enim, quod in intelligentiis abstractis idem est
25 intellectus et intellectum, et quod suum esse reale est idem
cum esse in intellectu. Non valet utique, quia numquam
aliqua intelligentia intelligit nisi intellectione sibi formaliter
inhaerente vel secum realiter eadem existente. Nunc autem

6 N’ fol. 29vb

2 abstractis] ul add. et del. T’ 7 alias] om. A’ 15 aliud] ad N’ 17 in2] a B’

18 prima] causa add. et del. T’ 19 tunc] om. B’N’T’ et add. et del. A’ 20 quia]
per add. s.l. A’ 24 in] add. s.l. A’ add. i.m. T’ fortasse omittendum 28 realiter eadem]
iter. B’N’T’

14 Arist., XII Metaphys., cap. 9 (1074b) 14 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm.
51 (VIII, coll. 336va–vb) 24 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 51 (VIII, col.
336rb)

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intelligentia extrinseca, quae intelligitur ab alia, quamvis sit

formaliter intellectio et intellectus in actu, non tamen est
id ipsum realiter, nec etiam inhaeret cum illa intelligentia,
quae ipsam intelligit. Non igitur potest esse intellectio ipsa,
5 qua intelligentiam extrinsecam intelligit. Quare oportet,
quod vel illa intellectio sit recepta, et sic habetur proposi-
tum, vel quod sit id ipsum quod essentia | intelligentiae,
quae exteriorem intelligit, quod non potest esse de mente
eorum, sicut probatum est.
10 Modus ponendi compositionem ex actuali et potentiali secundum
philosophos
<2.2.4> Est igitur considerandum [quod] secundum men-
tem Philosophi et Commentatoris, quod omnis intelligentia
quantumcumque abstracta praeter primam, quae Deus est
15 et nihil intelligit extra se, habet in se intrinsece duas rea-
litates et est composita, non quidem ex forma et materia,
sed ex aliquo simili formae et aliquo simili materiae sive
ex quodam actuali et quodam potentiali. Et hoc expresse
Commentator dicit XII Metaphysicae, commento 17 et 50, et
20 III De anima, commento 18 et 27.
<2.2.4.1> Non concesserunt autem illas proprie componi
ex materia et forma, sed ex aliquo simili, quoniam inter
formam et materiam, ex quibus corpora componuntur, et
actuale et potentiale, ex quibus intelligentiae | constituuntur,
25 est multiplex differentia.

7 E’ col. 76a 24 B’ fol. 49ra

1 quamvis] quam B’N’T’ 1 sit] add. i.m. A’ 2 intellectio] intellectus corr. ex intel-
lecta N’ 2 actu] aliquid illegibile add. et del. T’ 2 est] iter. et corr. T’ 3 inhaeret]
inhaerent B’N’T’ 8 esse] esset N’ 10 actuali] corr. s.l. ex actuale T’ 12 con-
siderandum] consciderandum T’ 12 quod] del. A’ 14 Deus est] iter. B’T’ 16
et2 ] forma add. et exp. B’ 18 quodam2 ] om. N’ 21 concesserunt] consenserunt
T’ 22 materia . . . forma] forma et materia B’N’T’ 24 quibus] quo N’

9 Cf. supra ¢2.2.2.1² 19 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 17 (VIII, coll.
302vb–303ra) 19 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 51 (VIII, coll. 336va–vb)
20 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 409, ll. 658–661)
20 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 429, ll. 23 sqq.)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 301

<2.2.4.2> Inter materiam quidem et illud potentiale hoc

interest, quod materia est principium receptionis transmu-
tabilis. Unde est illud, quo res potest esse et non esse, ut
Philosophus dicit VII Metaphysicae. Unde salvatur in mate-
5 ria tota ratio potentiae passivae, quae est esse principium
transmutandi ab alio secundum quod aliud, ut dicitur in IX
<Metaphysicae>. Illud autem potentiale, quod est in abstrac-
tis substantiis, non habet de ratione potentiae, nisi quod |
est principium receptionis tantum, non autem receptionis
10 transmutabilis, et per consequens caret ratione potentiae
passivae proprie dictae, qualis est potentia materiae, quia
non est principium transmutandi ab alio secundum quod
aliud. Et ideo Commentator dicit III De anima, commento
27, quod non est bona consequentia: si aliquid est princi-
15 pium receptionis, quod propter hoc habeat rationem mate-
riae, nam potentia receptiva in plus se habet quam potentia
transmutativa, quae est propria ipsi materiae.
<2.2.4.2.1> Unde considerandum est, quod potentia mate-
riae est potentia physica, potentia vero huius realitatis est
20 metaphysica. Est autem quadruplex differentia inter istam
et illam: prima, quod physica est principium transmutatio-
nis; metaphysica simpliciter et intransmutabilis receptionis.
Secunda, quod metaphysica est indistans ab actu secundum
illud Philosophi, III Physicorum, “in perpetuis non distat
25 esse et posse;” physica vero potentia distat nec determinat
necessario sibi actum. Tertia, quod physica indiget extra-
hente et reducente ipsam ad actum; metaphysica non. Ideo

8 A’ fol. 84vb

1 potentiale] possibile T’ 4 in] et N’ 5 esse] naturae add. et del. A’ om. T’ 6

in] om. N’ 7 Metaphysicae] om. A’B’N’ Metaphysicorum add. i.m. T’ aliquid
illegibile add. i.m. B’ 11 quia] quae T’ 17 transmutativa] transmutiva N’ 18
considerandum] consciderandum T’ 23 quod] quia B’

4 Arist., VII Metaphys., cap. 7 (1032a) 9 Arist., IX Metaphys., cap. 1 (1046a)

14 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 14 (ed. Crawford, p. 429, ll. 25 sqq.)
24 Arist., III Phys., cap. 4 (203b)

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illa necessario concludit novitatem, haec vero non. | Quarta,

quod physica | est potentia contradictionis, ut patet IX
Metaphysicae; haec autem est determinata ad unum actuale
intrinsecum.
5 <2.2.4.3> Inter formam vero proprie dictam et illud actuale,
quod intelligentias abstractas constituit, hoc interest, quod
forma percit materiam contingenter, potest enim adesse
et abesse materiae. Unde auctor Sex principiorum dicit, quod
“forma est compositioni contingens” et indiget necessario
10 extrahente eam de potentia ad actum, propter quod omne
tale compositum est contingens. Unde XII | Metaphysicae,
commento 38, Commentator ait, quod “esse compositum
est esse novum, nisi dicantur aliqua componi per se. Et si
aliqua essent, quae componerentur per se, tunc exirent de
15 potentia in actum per se et moverentur sine motore per se.”
Illud autem actuale non respicit suum potentiale contingen-
ter, sed per modum necesse esse, sicut gura aut quantitas
et cetera accidentia, quae sunt in caelo et stellis, recipiunt
substantia propria non contingenter, sed per modum neces-
20 sario esse secundum mentem philosophorum, et tamen
ab eis differunt realiter et ad ipsa se habent per modum
perfectionis non contingentis, sed necessario inexistentis. Et
ideo XII Metaphysicae, commento 43, Commentator dicit,
quod “cum ab agente nihil proveniat nisi extrahere illud,
25 quod est in potentia, ad actum, illic autem,” scilicet in sub-

1 N’ fol. 30ra 2 T’ fol. 207rb 11 E’ col. 76b

1 concludit] includit B’ 2 quod] quia N’ 5 vero] vere T’ 5 actuale] corr. ex

actus animae N’ 8 abesse] adesse B’ 9 compositioni] componi A’N’T’ 11
compositum est] inv. T’ 12 esse] omne T’ fortasse scribendum omne 16 respicit]
recipit N’ 17 necesse] est in add. N’ 17 esse] corr. i.m. ex est T’ 19–20 neces-
sario] necessarie B’ 20 esse] inesse N’ 23 43] 42 A’ 25 actum] spatium vacans
add. et explet symbolo uctus maris A’ 25 illic] illud N’

3 Arist., IX Metaphys., cap. 8 (1050b) 8 Liber de sex principiis Gilberto Porretae ascriptus,
edd. Albanus Heysse O.F.M. et Damianus van den Eynde O.F.M., Opuscula et
textus historiam ecclesiae eiusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia, Series scholastica, fasc.
VII, editio altera (Monasterii Westfalorum, 1953), cap. 1, p. 8 12 Aver., In XII
Metaphys. Arist., comm. 39 (VIII, col. 322vb) 23 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist.,
comm. 44 (VIII, col. 328rb)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 303

stantiis abstractis, “non sit potentia,” sequitur, quod “nec

agens, tantum enim est illic <. . .> perciens et perfectum.”
<2.2.4.4.1> Proportio vero materiae proprie dictae ad for-
mam multum refert a proportione illa, quae est inter po-
5 tentiale illud et suum actuale. Sicut enim inter potentiam
passivam et activam reperitur duplex proportio: prima qui-
dem, secundum quam quodlibet individuum potentiae pas-
sivae respicit quodlibet individuum potentiae activae—verbi
gratia, stuppa haec combustibilis pati potest a quolibet
10 comburente, unde non appropriat sibi aliquam combusti-
vam potentiam numeralem, immo quodlibet individuum
contentum sub combustiva | potentia potest in ipsam agere.
Alia vero reperitur proportio, secundum quam quodlibet
individuum potentiae passivae appropriat sibi determinatum
15 individuum potentiae activae, nec potest pati a quolibet
eiusdem rationis—verbi gratia, secundum ponentes, quod
voluntas movetur ab intellectu, non est verum dicere, quod
haec numeralis voluntas possit moveri a quolibet intellectu,
sed ab isto sibi appropriato. Similiter nec intellectus meus
20 possibilis pati potest a quolibet intellectu agente aut quo-
libet phantasmate omnium hominum, quamvis intellectus
agens et possibilis et phantasma sint eiusdem rationis in
omnibus hominibus.
<2.2.4.4.2> Sicut, inquam, haec duplex proportio reperitur
25 in potentia transmutativa inter activum et passivum, sic
etiam in potentia receptiva simpliciter reperitur haec duplex
proportio: prima quidem, secundum quam quodlibet indi-
viduum potentiae receptivae potest indifferenter recipere
quodlibet individuum naturae receptibilis, sicut cera vel
30 supercies potest recipere omnem guram successive, unam
post aliam. Quaedam vero est, secundum quam quodlibet

12 B’ fol. 49rb

4 refert] fortasse scribendum differt 5–6 potentiam passivam] inv. B’N’T’ 6

duplex] dupliciter N’ 10 unde] vel N’ 10 appropriat] approprians N’ 12
contentum] contemptum B’ 15 potest] dari add. T’ 19 meus] om. T’ 25–26
transmutativa . . . potentia] om. N’ 26 receptiva] receptivam N’ 29 naturae] nec
N’ 29 receptibilis] recepit N’ 31 Quaedam] Quandam N’

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determinatum individuum receptivae potentiae appropriat

sibi determinatum individuum naturae receptibilis, sicut pa-
tet in pluribus exemplis. Secundum Philosophum quidem
quodlibet caelum determinat sibi propria accidentia, ut sit
5 impossibile recipere alia eiusdem speciei vel alterius. Secun-
dum ponentes vero, quod esse realiter differt ab essentia,
quaelibet essentia determinat sibi suum proprium esse. Se-
cundum ponentes vero, quod genus et differentia important
diversas realitates, quarum una est potentialis et reliqua
10 actualis, ita quod in hac determinata albedine alia est rea-
litas coloris et alia disgregativi, realitas huius coloris deter-
minat sibi realitatem huius disgregativi, ut sit impossibile
transmutari.
<2.2.4.4.3> Nunc ad propositum. Inter formam et mate-
15 riam proprie | dictam est prima proportio, quia materia
eadem numero manens transit de forma in formam et est
in potentia ad quodlibet individuum formae receptibilis |
indifferenter. Inter potentiale autem illud et suum actuale
est secunda proportio, nam illud potentiale, quod est in
20 Michaele, ita parum potest induere actuale ipsius Gabrielis,
sicut nec corpus Martis induere potest accidentia Solis
secundum philosophos; aut sicut essentia lapidis non potest
induere esse ipsius hominis secundum ponentes, quod esse
differt ab essentia; aut sicut color albedinis non potest in-
25 duere realitatem congregativi | secundum ponentes diver-
sas realitates per genus et differentiam importari.
<2.2.4.5> Si ergo dicatur, quod illud potentiale est eiusdem
rationis in omnibus substantiis abstractis, et per consequens
videtur, quod sit in potentia ad actuale omnium earum,
30 dicendum, quod non valet, sicut nec tenet argumentum
in potentia passiva voluntatis, quod possit moveri ab omni

15 A’ fol. 85ra 17 E’ col. 77a 25 N’ fol. 30rb

2 individuum] et add. B’T’ 6 esse] essentia B’T’ 6 essentia] esse N’ 7 suum

proprium] inv. N’ 10 alia] om. T’ 12 sit] add. i.m. A’ 15–16 materia eadem] inv.
N’ 21 Solis] solum T’ 22 essentia] esse A’ 25 congregativi] aggregativi N’

3 Cf. supra ¢2.2.4.3²

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 305

intellectu, aut de intellectu possibili, quod possit moveri

ab intellectu omni agente, ut superius dicebatur. Unde ali-
quam potentiam passivam et transmutabilem aut absolute
receptivam contingit esse eiusdem rationis vel secundum
5 quandam proportionalitatem, quia scilicet determinat sibi
actus eiusdem rationis numeraliter distinctos, sic quod pro-
portionaliter correspondet potentiae numerali actus nume-
ralis, vel secundum indifferentiam omnium individuorum
eiusdem rationis, ut dictum est.
10 <2.2.4.6.1> Si vero instetur ulterius, quod | purum potentiale
non potest actuale sibi determinare, cum in se sit penitus in-
determinatum, et per consequens non magis respicit unum
actuale quam aliud; nec est simile in praedictis exemplis,
quia non est ibi purum potentiale et simpliciter indeter-
15 minatum, nam essentia est aliquid determinatum et ideo
appropriare potest sibi esse simpliciter; et realitas generis
respectu realitatis differentiae, et corpus Martis respectu
accidentium Solis—haec enim omnia sunt aliquid in actu
et non pura potentia; potentiale vero, quod ponitur in sub-
20 stantiis separatis, nihil est penitus in actu.
<2.2.4.6.2> Dicendum ad hoc, quod immo portiones primae
materiae sub quantitate interminata appropriant sibi diversas
quantitates indeterminatas, quibus ad invicem distingu-
untur, secundum quod consuetum est dici, quod plus est de
25 materia in uno pugillo terrae quam in uno pugillo aquae.
Unde impossibile est, quod una portio materiae recipiat
quantitatem interminatam alterius portionis, alioquin una
eret alia, nec haberent, unde distinguerentur, et genera-
retur et corrumperetur dimensio simpliciter, ut haec omnia

10 B’ fol. 49va

1 aut . . . intellectu2] om. N’ 2–3 aliquam] aliqua N’ 5 scilicet] si N’ 16 esse]

iter. N’ 16 simpliciter] similiter T’ 17 corpus] corr. i.m. ex corpus mar corpus
T’ 18 Solis] solum T’ 18 aliquid] om. N’ 22 quantitate] spatium vacans add.
A’ 22 appropriant] approprians N’T’ 22 diversas] om. T’ 23 indeterminatas]
corr. s.l. ex et determinatas A’ 23 invicem] add. s.l. A’ 23–24 distinguuntur]
distinguunt N’ 28 et] om. T’ 28–29 generaretur] generatur N’ 29 ut] et T’

2 Cf. supra ¢2.2.4.4.1² 9 Cf. supra ¢2.2.4.3²

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patent in De substantia orbis et in IV Caeli et mundi, commento

41, ubi Commentator ait, quod tres dimensiones sunt pri-
mae formarum existentium in prima materia et accipiuntur
quodam modo in eius denitione, sicut qualitates activae et
5 passivae in denitione formarum elementarium. Appropriat
igitur sibi quaelibet portio materiae portionem quantitatis
interminatae, per quam distinguitur ab alia portione, et tota
ratio appropriationis est distinctio, quia non haberet, unde
distingueretur. Consimiliter in proposito appropriat sibi
10 potentiale cuiuslibet substantiae separatae suum actuale, quia
non habet, unde distinguatur, nisi per illud a potentiali alterius
substantiae separatae, et ideo mutuo se appropriant tamquam
proprium distinctivum et proprium distinguibile. |
Responsio ad motiva, quibus videbatur probari, quod de mente philo-
15 sophorum esset oppositum
<2.3> Ad ea igitur, quae inducebantur superius ad proban-
dum, quod mens Philosophi et Commentatoris fuerit ad op-
positum, dicendum est.
<2.3.1> Ad primum quidem, quod anima rationalis, etsi
20 sit actus corporis, est tamen separabilis, et de qua probat
Philosophus, quod habet duas differentias: unam, qua est
omnia eri, per quam anima est omnia in potentia, et illa
est res in potentia; altera vero, qua est omnia facere, et illa
est res in actu. Et ideo non est contra mentem eius, quod

13 E’ col. 77b

1 in1] corr. s.l. ex et A’ 4 eius] eiusdem N’ 5 Appropriat] Appropriatur T’ 7

alia] alio N’ 8 appropriationis] propriationis A’ 12 alterius] po add. et del.
T’ 13 distinctivum] distinctum T’ 14–15 Responsio . . . oppositum] add. i.m. N’ 14
quibus videbatur] deest per mutilationem ms. N’ 15 quibus] qui videlicet T’ 14 probari]
probare T’ 14–15 mente philosophorum] deest per mutilationem ms. N’ 19 quidem]
om. A’ 19 etsi] non N’ 21 qua] quae N’ 22 omnia2] om. T’ 23 est1] om.
N’ 23–24 in . . . res] add. i.m. T’ 23 altera] fortasse scribendum alteram 23 qua]
quae N’

1 Aver., De substantia orbis, cap. 2 (IX, coll. 7rb sqq.) 2 Aver., In IV De caelo
Arist., comm. 41 (V, coll. 269ra sqq.) 16 Cf. supra ¢2.1.1² et seqq. 19 Cf.
supra, ¢2.1.1²

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 307

anima ex aliquo potentiali constituatur, quamvis sit actus

corporis. Et cum dicitur, quod | actus non habet potentiam
partem sui, verum est <quod non habet> potentiam materiae
proprie dictae. Sed quin actus omnis praeter primum, qui
5 solus est purus actus, immixtum habeat potentiale aliquod,
non est verum, praecipue de actu, qui potest separari et
habet operationem per se, cuiusmodi est rationalis anima.
<2.3.1.1> Et quod additur, quod principii non est principium,
verum est in illo genere principii et causae. Unde forma non
10 habet formam, nec materia materiam. Sed quin forma pos-
sit constitui ex duabus realitatibus, quarum una potentialis
sit, et reliqua actualis, ut dictum est, non est verum. Immo
<quod> plus est, Commentator, I Physicorum, commento 1,
hanc propositionem “principii non est principium” interi-
15 mendo dicit, quod “quae sunt praeter primam materiam
et | ultimam formam, quarumlibet rerum naturalium sunt
materiae compositae et formae compositae.”
<2.3.2> Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquando Aristoteles
vocat formam actum, aliquando vero substantiam in actu
20 abstractive et concretive, cuius ratio est, quia forma est in
composito causa, ut sit in actu, et | propter quod unumquod-
que tale, illud magis. Unde et Augustinus, VII De Trinitate,
dicit candorem esse candidum. Est igitur illud actuale per
hunc modum substantia | in actu et est sua actio, cum sit
25 intellectio actualis, ut supra dictum est in quaestione, qua
quaerebatur, utrum anima sit principium suae operationis.
<2.3.3> Ad tertium dicendum, quod Commentator pro tanto
dicit intellectum possibilem esse substantiam abstractam,

2 T’ fol. 207va 16 B’ fol. 49vb 21 A’ fol. 85rb 24 N’ fol. 30va

3 potentiam materiae] materiam B’ 4 dictae] dictam B’ 7 habet] add. i.m.

T’ 7 cuiusmodi] non add. et del. T’ 11 duabus] duobus B’ 11 potentialis]
possibilis T’ 13 quod] om. A’B’N’ add. i.m. T’ 13 plus] corr. in Philosophus
A’ 13 est] corr. s.l. in et A’ 13 I] om. N’ 19 vero] potentiam add. et del. B’ 20
et concretive] om. A’ 21 actu] et potentia add. et del. T’ 22 tale] et add. T’ 24
hunc] habens N’ 25 qua] add. i.m. A’ 28 dicit] quod add. et del. A’ add. B’N’

8 Cf. supra ¢2.1.1.1² 13 Aver., In I Phys. Arist., comm. 1 (IV, col. 6rb) 18 Cf.
supra ¢2.1.2² 22 August., VII De Trinitate, I,1 (PL 42, col. 933) 26 I.e., quaestio
sexta Quodlibeti Petri Aureoli 27 Cf. supra ¢2.1.3²

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quia non est corpus nec virtus in corpore. Unde abstrahitur

a quantitate, non autem ab animae constitutione, cum
ponatur secundum eum virtus et pars et differentia ratio-
nalis animae, et secundum hoc est inmior inter realitates,
5 quae pertinent ad intellectus abstractos, tamquam res pure
potentialis. Agens vero, cum sit res actualis, est quidem praes-
tantius et perfectius.
<2.3.4> Ad quartum dicendum, quod movens et motum,
agens et patiens non oportet esse distincta subiecto semper,
10 sed sufcit, quod sint distincta realiter, ut expresse Commen-
tator dicit, VIII Physicorum, commento 30. Ait enim, quod
“necesse est illa, quae moventur per principium in eis, dividi
in motorem et motum secundum denitionem et essentiam,
et ut non sint idem, quia motor debet esse distinctus a moto,
15 aut secundum denitionem et esse sicut in his, quae moven-
tur ab extrinseco, aut secundum denitionem” et essentiam
“tantum, sicut est dispositio in habentibus animas. Anima
enim, quae est motor in eis, distinguitur a corpore, quod
est motum, secundum denitionem, licet non distinguatur
20 secundum esse, quia impossibile est animam esse sine cor-
pore.” Patet igitur | ex his, quod anima, licet sit forma cor-
poris, agit tamen et movet ipsum. Et idem dicit Philosophus
in libro suo De causa motus animalium. Constat etiam, quod
intellecta speculativa quantum ad primas propositiones sunt
25 causae instrumentales, et intellectus agens causa principalis
respectu notitiae conclusionum, et tamen sunt subiective
in materiali intellectu, ut Commentator dicit III De anima,
commento 49. Videmus etiam ad sensum, quod lux solaris

21 E’ col. 78a

2 animae] hominis N’ 3 differentia] differentiam A’ 12 per] add. s.l. A’ 12

dividi] aliquid illegibile add. et del. T’ 13 denitionem] distinctionem N’ 16
denitionem] distinctionem N’ 18 eis] eas N’ 19 denitionem] distinctionem
B’N’ 24 speculativa] speculata N’ 25 et] add. i.m. A’ 25 intellectus] iter. i.m.
et del. A’ 27 in] et N’ voli add. et del. N’ 27 materiali] rationali N’ 28 etiam]
autem A’ 308,28–309,1 solaris radii] inv. B’

8 Cf. supra ¢2.1.4² 11 Aver., In VIII Phys. Arist., comm. 30 (IV, col. 367rb)
23 Arist., De motu animalium, cap. 4 (VI, coll. 40va sqq.) 28 Aver., In III De anima
Arist., comm. 36 (ed. Crawford, p. 498, ll. 539–546)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 309

radii existens subiective in aere inducit in ipso calorem, et

ita non est universaliter vera haec propositio “nulla forma
agit in suum subiectum vel in suam materiam.” Cum hoc
etiam intellectus agens coagit phantasmatibus ad eductio-
5 nem intentionis de intellectu possibili, non agit autem sicut
causa totalis.
<2.3.4.1> Et quod additur, quod agens se habet ad possibi-
lem sicut ars ad materiam, dicendum secundum Philosophum
in II Physicorum, quod si ars navifactiva esset in lignis, adhuc
10 moveret ea ad formam navis. Et ita quamvis agens habeat
modum artis, non ex hoc tollitur, quin sit in materiali intel-
lectu quasi actus. Praesertim quia III De anima, commento
31, dicit Commentator, quod intellectus agens magis habet
rationem lucis in agendo quam artis. Ars enim ponit to-
15 tam formam in materia, lux vero existens in diaphano dat
diaphano, ut moveatur a coloribus. Et sic est de intellectu
agente, non | enim ponit totam intentionem in intellectu
possibili, sed dat sibi, ut moveatur ab intentione imaginata.
<2.3.5> Ad quintum dicendum, quod si agens et possibilis
20 sint duae realitates inseparabiles in una anima, non sequitur,
quod sint duo principia intelligentia susceptive in uno ho-
mine, sed est unum susceptivum, scilicet realitas potentialis,
et aliud, quae est formaliter intellectio in ipso potentiali et
activum respectu omnium accidentalium intellectionum, et
25 illud est agens.
<2.3.5.1> Ex positione autem alia expresse sequitur, quod sint
duo principia intelligentia in homine, ex quo ponerentur
agens et possibilis duae substantiae unam animam non
constituentes. Expresse enim dicit Commentator, III De

17 B’ fol. 50ra

15–16 dat diaphano] om. N’ 16 coloribus] caloribus N’ 16 intellectu] a add.

N’ 20 realitates] naturalitates B’N’ 20 una] unam B’ 21 susceptive] suscep-
tione N’T’ 22 realitas] et add. et del. T’ 24 intellectionum] intellectionem A’
intellectivum N’ 27 ponerentur] poneretur T’ 28 possibilis] potentialis T’ 29
dicit Commentator] inv. T’

7 Cf. supra ¢2.1.4.1² 9 Arist., II Phys., cap. 8 (199b) 13 Aver., In III De anima
Arist., comm. 18 (ed. Crawford, p. 438, ll. 34 sqq.) 19 Cf. supra ¢2.1.5²

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anima, commento 31, quod “cum nos invenimus agere per

has duas virtutes,” scilicet per agens et possibile, “et nihil
agat nisi per suam formam, necesse est has duas virtutes
attribuere nobis,” et per consequens haberemus duas formas
5 intellectivas. Et idem patet ex commento 49.
<2.3.6> Ad sextum dicendum, quod signicanter Commen-
tator ait nondum esse declaratum, utrum habeat intellec-
tus possibilis aliquam formam diversam in esse a formis
materialibus, per hoc innuens, quod hoc erat postea decla-
10 randum, cum scilicet declaratum esset, quod non solum
recipit formas materiales, immo et immateriales et omnes
naturas existentes in actu, quo declarato | conclusum est,
quod nihil est in actu eorum, quae sunt. Et hoc patet per
demonstrationem illam, quam inducit. Si enim recipiens
15 debet esse denudatum a natura recepti secundum speciem
specialissimam vel saltem secundum genus propinquum,
oportebit dicere, quod vel intellectus possibilis non intelligit
nec recipit formas abstractas; aut si recipit, quod non sit
eiusdem generis cum eis, quod est impossibile, si sit substan-
20 tia abstracta actualis; vel quod in sua substantia et essentia
denudetur in actu ab omni natura abstracta actuali.
<2.3.6.1> Quod vero additur de denitione | intellectus mate-
rialis, quod solum ibi dicitur, quod non est aliqua formarum
materialium, | dicendum, quod statim ibidem Commentator
25 subiungit ‘nec etiam intelligibilium,’ per hoc innuens, quod

12 N’ fol. 30vb 22 E’ col. 78b 24 A’ fol. 85va

1 commento 31] inv. T’ 2–3 scilicet . . . virtutes] om. N’ 2 possibile] possibilem

T’ 3 duas] om. T’ 4–5 et . . . 49] add. i.m A’ 7 ait] no add. et del. T’ 10 cum]
om. B’ 11 immo . . . immateriales] om. N’ 16 propinquum] oportet add. et del.
N’ quando add. T’ 19 impossibile] corr. ex possibile T’ 20 in] om. N’ 22
Quod] natura add. et del. T’ 22 de] add. s.l. A’ 23 solum] aliquid illegibile add.
et del. T’

1 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 18 (ed. Crawford, p. 439, l. 83—p. 440,
l. 85) 5 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 36 (ed. Crawford, p. 493, ll. 388
sqq.) 6 Cf. supra ¢2.1.6² 22 Cf. supra ¢2.1.6.1² 24 Aver., In III De anima Arist.,
comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 387, ll. 15–16) 25 Cf. Aver., In III De anima Arist.,
comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 387, ll. 15–16)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 311

non est natura aliqua in actu, nec materialis sive corporea

nec intellectualis sive incorporea.
<2.3.7> Ad septimum dicendum, quod pro tanto Commenta-
tor dicit, quod non se habet agens ad possibile sicut forma
5 ad materiam, quia secundum rei veritatem non habent
rationem formae et materiae proprie dictae, ut declaratum
est supra. Et ideo ubique, dum agit de constitutione animae
ex his duabus realitatibus, semper addit ibi ‘quasi,’ dicens
commento 18, III De anima, quod agens se habet ad possi-
10 bilem quasi forma de materia, et quod omnem substantiam
abstractam oportet dividi in duo, quorum unum est simile
materiae et reliquum simile formae. Unde, quia receptio
materiae proprie dictae est cum transmutatione, ideo magis
assimilatur possibile loco quam materiae respectu agentis
15 pro eo, quod locus recipit absque intrinseca transmutatio-
ne. Unde in III De anima dicit Philosophus, quod bene
dixerunt antiqui philosophi animam locum specierum non
totam, sed intellectum, magis volens dicere intellectum
locum specierum quam materiam vel subiectum, cum tamen
20 secundum veritatem subiective sibi insint. Non intendit ergo
Commentator XII Metaphysicae agens non uniri possibili per
modum intrinsecum, sed pro tanto dicit, quod se habet sicut
ad locum et non sicut ad materiam, quia cum | uniatur sibi
inseparabiliter et modo intransmutabili, non unitur sibi ut |
25 materiae proprie dictae.
<2.3.7.1> Nec illud de assistentia mutua intelligentiarum

23 B’ fol. 50rb 24 T’ fol. 207vb

2 nec intellectualis] om. A’ 2 incorporea] corr. s.l. ex corporea A’ 8 quasi] quod

N’ 9–10 possibilem] fortasse scribendum possibile 12 et] om. B’ 17 locum esse]
inv. B’N’T’ 17 locum] add. i.m. T’ 19 subiectum] corr. ex substantiam A’ 19
cum] enim add. B’T’ 19 cum] om. B’ add. i.m. T’ 22 intrinsecum] intrincecum
T’ 24 non] iter. N’ 26 assistentia] intelligentia T’

3 Cf. supra ¢2.1.7² 4 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 17 (VIII, col. 303ra)
7 Cf. supra ¢2.2.4.1²et sqq. 9 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford,
p. 404, ll. 510 sqq., et p. 409, ll. 654 sqq.) 16 Arist., De anima, cap. 4 (429a)
21 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 17 (VIII, col. 303ra) 26 Cf. supra
¢2.1.7²

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abstractarum ad invicem potest stare, quod solum intelli-

gitur, quod perciant se per assistentiam solam sine aliquo
reali formaliter perciente, quia nullo modo essent formalis
ratio se mutuo intelligendi sive formalis intellectio, cum
5 necessario intellectio sit subiective in intelligente.
<2.3.8.1> Ad octavum dicendum, quod licet substantia com-
posita sit tertia constituta ex forma et materia, tamen ad
differentiam formae mixtae, quae est tertia conata ex misci-
bilibus non remanentibus, sed corruptis, consuevit dicere
10 Commentator, quod ex forma et materia non t tertium,
ut intelligatur eo modo, quo ex miscibilibus t mixtum; et
sic ex agente et intentione intellecta et intellectu possibili
non t tertium. Et per hunc modum potest responderi, si
referatur dictum Commentatoris ad hoc, quod ex forma et
15 materia non t aliquod tertium.
<2.3.8.2> Si vero intelligatur afrmative, quod ex forma
et materia t tertium, et tamen de intellectu agente et pos-
sibili negetur, quod ex eis non at tertium, tunc hoc dicit,
quia constitutum ex materia et forma, cum sit generabile
20 et corruptibile, videtur esse quoddam accidens partibus,
quia eorum coniunctio est contingens et transmutabilis. In
coniunctione autem inseparabilium rerum, quarum una est
potentialis et reliqua actualis, qualis est coniunctio in anima
rationali, constitutum ipsum non accidit constituentibus.
25 Et ideo non habet sic rationem differentis et tertii sicut
constitutum ex forma et materia proprie dicta.
<2.3.9> Ad nonum dicendum, quod Commentator non negat
potentiam universaliter acceptam utpote mere receptivam

1 abstractarum] om. B 1 ad] ab B’ 1 quod] quasi N’T’ 1 intelligitur] intel-

ligatur B’N’T’ 3 formaliter] om. B’ 4 intelligendi] intelligenda B’N’ 5 in]
om. B’N’ 10 forma . . . materia] materia et forma B’ 11 intelligatur] intelligetur
N’ 12 et1] om. N’ 12 possibili] potentiali N’ 14 ex] est N’ 16 quod] om.
A’ 18 tunc] om. T’ 18 hoc] aliquid illegibile add. et del. T’ 19 quia] add. i.m.
A’ quod N’ 19 materia . . . forma] forma et materia B’N’T’ 19 generabile]
generale N’ 21 transmutabilis] et add. N’ 23 est coniunctio] inv. B’N’T’ 24
rationali] add. et del. A’ 25 sicut] corr. i.m. ex ad T’ 28 universaliter] et add.
N’ 28 mere] materia est N’

6 Cf. supra ¢2.1.8² 27 Cf. supra ¢2.1.9²

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 313

absque transmutatione a substantiis separatis, alioquin con-

tradiceret ei, quod dicit III De | anima, commento 18, quod
nulla substantia est separata a | potentia excepta prima.
Sed intendit negare ibi potentiam proprie dictam, quae est
5 principium transmutandi ab alio secundum quod aliud, cui
correspondet agens, quod est proprie agens, scilicet trans-
mutans et non perciens solum, sicut intellectum percit
intelligentem. Tale enim agens concedit ipse in substan-
tiis separatis, ut patet in illo commento, XII Metaphysicae,
10 quod arguendo inducitur, et per consequens concedit ibi
potentiam proportionalem, scilicet mere receptivum.
<2.3.10> Ad ultimum dicendum, quod omne compositum ex
actu et potentia ad se mutuo se habentibus contingenter,
et per consequens separabiliter, oportet esse novum et non
15 aeternum et per consequens factum ab aliquo extrahente.
Sed ubi eorum coniunctio est immutabilis et quoddam
necesse esse, tale compositum non est novum nec indiget
extrahente. Talis autem est coniunctio rei potentialis et
actualis in anima rationali et in ceteris abstractis substantiis.
20 Et ideo ratio non procedit.

Articulus secundus
Quid circa hoc dicendum theologice, et ponuntur rationes, quibus
videtur, quod hoc non possit teneri
<3.0> Nunc secundo inquirendum, utrum theologice et ca-
25 tholice procedendo haec positio vera sit.

2 E’ col. 79a 3 N’ fol. 31ra

2 ei] eius B’ eiusdem N’ 5 cui] aliquid illegibile add. et del. T’ 9 illo] primo T’ 10
ibi] om. N’ 11 receptivum] receptivam T’ fortasse scribendum receptivam 13 ad
se] add. et del. A’ 13 contingenter] attingenter N’ 14 separabiliter] inseparabi-
liter T’ 17 esse] est N’ 17 compositum] componi N’ 18 est] add. i.m. A’ 20
ratio] om. B’T’ 22–23 Quid . . . teneri] Utrum theologice et catholice procedendo
haec propositio vera sit N’ 22 circa] hic add. et del. T’ 22 hoc] sit add. B’T’ 22
ponuntur] ponentur T’ 22 quibus] in quibus T’

2 Aver., In III De anima Arist., comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 410, ll. 664–665)
10 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 44 (VIII, col. 328rb) 12 Cf. supra
¢2.1.10²

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<3.1.1.1> Et videtur, quod non, per articulum excommuni-

catum Parisius, qui ponitur 25 in 8 capitulo. Dicit enim
articulus ille sic: quod intellectus possibilis nihil est in actu,
antequam intelligat, quia in natura intelligibili esse aliquid
5 in | actu est ipsum esse actu intelligens, error.
<3.1.1.2> Similiter sequens articulus dicit sic: quod ex intel-
ligente et intellecto at una substantia eo, quod intellectio
sit ipsa intellecta formaliter, error.
<3.1.1.3> Sed iuxta praedictam positionem intellectus possi-
10 bilis nihil est in actu, antequam | intelligat.
<3.1.1.4> Et iterum, intellectus agens eo, quod ponitur ali-
quid esse in actu in natura intelligibili, ponitur esse intellec-
tio actualis.
<3.1.1.5> Et iterum, ex ipso possibili dicitur eri una sub-
15 stantia tamquam ex primo intelligente et primo intellecto.
<3.1.1.6> Igitur praedicta positio videtur esse contra articu-
los, et per consequens catholice non videtur posse teneri.
<3.1.2> Praeterea, si intellectio, qua anima se intelligit, est
quaedam realitas actualis constituens essentiam eius, pari
20 ratione et volitio, qua se ipsum vult et diligit, tum quia
non magis est intima animae sua intellectio quam volitio;
tum quia omnem intellectionem sequitur aliqua compla-
centia et voluptas, ut Philosophus dicit XII Metaphysicae,

5 B’ fol. 50va 10 A’ fol. 85vb

1–2 excommunicatum] extricatum N’ extresicatum T’ lectio incerta 3 ille] iste

N’ 5 error] est add. B’ 6 ex] om. N’ 7 intellecto] intellectio N’ 7 una] vita
N’ 7 intellectio] intellecto N’ fortasse scribendum intellectus 11 ponitur] ponit
B’ 14 ex] et ex A’ 14 possibili] potentiali N’ 15 intellecto] intellecto N’ 17
catholice] theologice B’N’T’ 19 realitas] acciden add. et del. N’ 20 ipsum] fortasse
scribendum ipsam 21 est] om. A’ 23 voluptas] voluntas B’T’

2 Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisiis condemnatorum in C. du Plessis d’Argentré,

Collectio iudiciorum de novis erroribus (Paris, 1724), pp. 188 sqq.; cf. Roland Hissette,
Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, Philosophes médiévaux,
tom. XII (Louvain, 1977), p. 220 6 Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisiis condemna-
torum in C. du Plessis d’Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum de novis erroribus (Paris, 1724),
pp. 188 sqq.; cf. Roland Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7
mars 1277, Philosophes médiévaux, tom. XII (Louvain, 1977), p. 224 23 Arist.,
XII Metaphys., cap. 7 (1072b)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 315

et Commentator, ibidem, commento 39; tum quia sicut

oportet intelligentem denudari ab eo, quod suscipit, ita et
principium volitivum oportet esse denudatum, et per con-
sequens sicut principium intellectivum est purum potentiale
5 et actuatur per primam intellectionem, similiter et volitivum
actuabitur per primam volitionem. Sed theologice dici non
potest, quod dilectio, qua anima diligit se ipsam et vult, sit
aliqua substantialis res constituens ipsam, quia secundum
hoc non posset peccare anima amando se. Sed neque angeli
10 apostatae se dilexissent etiam inordinate, alioquin substantia
eorum esset mala, et redit error | Manichaei. Igitur poni
non potest, quod vel intellectio, qua anima se intelligat, vel
dilectio, qua se amat, sint res essentiam eius constituentes.
<3.1.2.1> Et conrmatur, quia vel essent duae res, et sic essent
15 duo actus essentiales disparati in eadem potentia, quod est
impossibile, vel essent una res, et sic in anima sua volitio
esset sua intellectio.
<3.1.3> Praeterea, si intellectus agens esset intellectio actualis
ingrediens substantiam animae, sequeretur, quod intellectio
20 illa, qua anima se intelligit, esset nobilior quam intellectio
beatica, qua intelligit Deum, quia ista esset accidens et illa
substantia. Sed hoc est inconveniens et absurdum, cum hoc
habeat rationem nis, nis autem est melior et perfectior
his, quae sunt ad nem, ut patet ex I Ethicorum. Igitur illud
25 quod prius.
<3.1.4> Praeterea, aut actualis illa realitas importata per
agens totum potentiale intellectus possibilis satiaret aut non

11 E’ col. 79b

1 et] om. A’ 1 tum] add. i.m. A’ 4–5 sicut . . . primam] om. N’ 5 similiter] sic
B’T’ 6 per primam] om. B’ 8 substantialis] specialis B’ 10 etiam] om. N’ 13
sint] sicut B’ 20 se] om. N’ 21 esset] est N’ 22 absurdum] absonum T’ 22
hoc2] scil. accidens 23 est] om. T’ 23 et perfectior] om. B’ est add. i.m. T’ 24
I ] Physicorum add. et del. T’ 24 illud] om. N’

1 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 39 (VIII, col. 322ra) 24 Arist., I Ethic.
Nic., cap. 1 (1094a)

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satiaret. Sed non potest dari primum, tum quia non pos-
set aliquam aliam actualitatem intelligibilem recipere, et
per consequens non intelligeret aliquid aliud extra se; tum
quia vel anima numquam esset beata per aliquam | intel-
5 lectionem vel esset beata per illam essentialem, et per
consequens per essentiam, quod tamquam erroneum re-
probatur Extra, De haereticis, capitulo “Ad nostrum,” libro 7;
tum quia sequeretur, quod animae essent alterius speciei,
quia potentiale earum est alterius rationis, alioquin si eius-
10 dem, non satiaretur per actuale unius animae, sed esset in
potentia indifferenter ad omnia actualia eiusdem rationis.
Nec potest dari secundum, quia si non satiaretur potentiale
unius animae per proprium suum actuale, esset in potentia
et sub privatione alterius, et per consequens esset anima
15 corruptibilis. Ergo impossibile est, quod tale actuale et tale
potentiale in anima ponatur. |

Quid tenendum theologice

<3.2> Sed his non obstantibus dicendum, quod theologice
et secundum veritatem teneri potest via Philosophi, scilicet
20 quod intellectus possibilis et agens sunt duae realitates dif-
ferentes in ipsa anima, quarum una est potentialis et alia
actualis, et intrinsece concurrunt ad ipsam animam, non
quod eam constituant sicut materia et forma, quae sunt
res ab invicem separabiles per transmutationem, sed quod

4 N’ fol. 31rb 16 B’ fol. 50vb

1 Sed . . . primum] Si sic, non valeat N’ 1 non . . . primum] om. B’ 1 dari] poni
T’ 1 tum quia] sequeretur quod add. T’ 1 tum quia] quod B’ 1 potest . . . non]
add. i.m. A’ 3 aliud] aliquid N’ ad T’ 5 illam] essentiam add. N’ 7 libro 7] lig
sic! N’ 13 proprium . . . actuale] actuale suum proprium B’ 17 Quid . . . theologice]
Quid theologice sit tenendum et secundum veritatem B’ om. N’ 18 dicendum]
est add. B’ 24 ab] ad A’ 316,24–317,1 per . . . inseparabiles] om. N’

7 Conc. oecum. XV Viennense, Constitutio “Ad nostrum qui” (6. Maii 1312), in Henricus
Denzinger et Adolfus Schönmetzer (edd.), Enchiridion Symbolorum, denitionum et dec-
larationum de rebus dei et morum, editio XXXIV (Romae, 1967), p. 282, no. 895

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 317

ad eam concurrant sicut duae realitates inseparabiles, ut

declaratum est supra.
<3.2.1> Hoc autem patet primo quidem secundum scholam,
quae tenet, quod impossibile est, quod eadem res moveat
5 se ipsam. Si enim intellectus possibilis est aliqua realitas in
actu, necessario est intelligibilis. Quaero ergo, an intelligat
se per essentiam suam, sic quod sua realitas | sit sua intel-
lectio, aut intelligat se recipiendo intellectionem sui a se
ipsa, sicut et recipit a ceteris obiectis. Sed non potest dari
10 secundum, quia tunc moveretur idem a se et reciperet a se,
quod est impossibile secundum istam scholam. Nec potest
dari primum, quia illud, quod per essentiam suam est intel-
lectio, impossibile est, quod sit susceptivum intellectionis
alterius, quia recipiens non potest esse de natura specica
15 aut generis propinqui rei receptae, sicut patet, quod nulla
gura potest esse principium recipiendi alias guras, nec
albedo alios colores. Cum igitur intellectus possibilis sit illud,
quo anima suscipit omnem intellectionem, impossibile est,
quod intellectus | iste sit essentialiter intellectio. Igitur nullo
20 modo intelligit se, | quod est absonum dicere, si sit realitas
in actu utpote qualitas vel aliquid aliud.
<3.2.1.1> Et si dicatur, quod pari ratione idem sequitur, si sit
realitas in potentia, dicendum, quod non, quia sicut est
essentialiter realitas in potentia, sic est intellectio in potentia,
25 et ideo adveniente quocumque, quo at in actu, t intellec-
tio in actu, et ideo necessario intelligit se intelligendo alia;
cum enim intelligit se intelligere, necessario intelligit se. Et
haec est mens Augustini, VII Super Genesim, capitulo 17. Ait

7 T’ fol. 208ra 19 E’ col. 80a 20 A’ fol. 86ra

3 Hoc] Hic N’ 3 autem] etiam B’T’ 3 primo] quod N’ 3 scholam] quod

add. et del. N’ 6 est] add. s.l. A’ 8 intellectionem] intentionem N’ 9 obiectis]
subiectis T’ 10 quia] iter. N’ 10 et . . . se2] om. N’ 10 reciperet] reciperetur
B’ 14 non potest] iter. N’ 21 aliquid] aliud N’ 23 in] a add. A’ 25 quo] alio
T’ 26–27 intelligendo . . . se2] om. T’

2 Cf. supra ¢2.3.5² et ¢2.3.8.2² 28 August., VII De Genesi ad litteram, XXI, 28

(PL 34, coll. 365–66)

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enim, quod anima se nescire non potest [esse], cum “se,

ut cognoscat, inquirit; cum enim se quaerit, novit, quod se
quaerat, quod noscere non posset, si se non nosceret <. . .>
neque enim si nesciret se, posset quaerentem se scire se.”
5 Haec est etiam mens Philosophi in III De anima, cum ait,
quod anima intelligit se sicut et alia. Unde considerandum,
quod cum anima suam intellectionem intelligit, necessario
intellectum possibilem cointelligit, et ideo possibilis intel-
lectus intelligit se per reexionem.
10 <3.2.2> Secundo idem patet secundum scholam, quae
ponit intellectum possibilem et agentem distingui formaliter
in anima. Licet enim secundum sic ponentes in divinis
distinctio formalis non sit realis propter innitatem divinae
essentiae, tamen in creaturis, ubicumque sunt distinctae
15 formalitates secundum eos, sunt distinctae realitates; unde
genus et differentia dicunt distinctas realitates, etiam in albe-
dine et ceteris formis, et distinctas formalitates. Cum ergo
intellectus agens et possibilis importent distinctas quiddi-
tates et formalitates secundum istos, necessario erunt dis-
20 tinctae realitates. Aut ergo erunt extrinsece ipsi essentiae
animae, et per consequens erunt realitates accidentales,
quamvis inseparabiles, et sic redit opinio illa, quae dicit
eas qualitates. Aut erunt intrinsece, et sic habetur propo-
situm, scilicet quod essentia animae habet intrinsece duas
25 realitates, | quarum una est pure potentialis, et alia pure
actualis.

25 B’ fol. 51ra

1 se2 ] add. s.l. A’ 2 cum enim] corr. s.l. ex enim cum A’ enim cum B’T’ 2 cum]
om. N’ 2 se1] om. B’T’ 6 considerandum] consciderandum T’ 7 anima] et
add. et del. N’ 10 patet] debent B’ 11 formaliter] om. N’ 14 distinctae] iter. et
corr. T’ 15 formalitates] sunt add. N’ 15–16 secundum eos . . . realitates] add.
i.m. A’ 15 secundum] add. et del. B’ eos] om. B’ eas N’ 15 sunt] om. A’B’N’
15 unde] dum T’ 18–19 quidditates] quemditates sic! N’ 19 necessario] om.
N’ 19 erunt] essent A’ 20 ipsi] ipsius T’

5 Arist., III De anima, cap. 4 (429b) 15 Sicut demonstratum est in prima quae-
stione Quodlibeti Petri Aureoli, ubi quaeritur “Utrum in aliqua re formalitas et
realitas distinguantur”

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 319

<3.2.3> Tertio vero idem patet absolute. Constat enim, quod

vero omnia consonant. Fides autem verorum est, nec potest
sibi subesse falsum, et ideo sibi consonat esse demonstra-
tive conclusum. Ratio autem Philosophi et Commentatoris
5 videtur esse in hac materia demonstratio, quae est talis: |
illud, quo recipiens per se primo recipit, necesse est in na-
tura sua quidditative esse denudatum a natura specica aut
generis propinqui rei receptae, sic quod non est eiusdem
speciei aut eiusdem generis propinqui cum illo, quod reci-
10 pitur. Et hoc patet, sive receptio sit realis sive intentionalis.
Unde capio propositionem istam de receptione intentionali
sic: nulla realitas potest esse ratio recipiendi speciem vel
similitudinem alicuius, quod sit eiusdem speciei vel generis
propinqui, immo oportet, quod illa realitas sit in illa specie
15 vel genere potentialiter, non in actu. Non enim illud, quo
oculus recipit speciem coloris, est aliquis color, sed diapha-
nitas; nec illud, quo auris recipit sonum, est fractio aeris,
sed potius aer frangibilis. Et ratio huius est, quia oportet
illud, quo recipiens recipit, esse potentiale et receptum esse
20 actuale. Unum autem individuum infra eandem speciem
non se habet ad aliud sicut potentiale ad actuale, nec etiam
una species ad aliam infra idem genus, cum sint contrariae.
Sed constat, quod anima recipit per intellectum possibilem
omnem entitatem existentem in actu, receptione, dico,
25 intentionali. Igitur non potest esse in actu eiusdem generis
propinqui, aut eiusdem | speciei cum aliquo ente actuali.
Oportet igitur dare unum de duobus, scilicet vel quod
differat genere et specie intellectus possibilis ab omni alio—
quod est erroneum—vel quod in se non sit alicuius speciei
30 in actu, et per consequens erit pure potentialis.

5 N’ fol. 31va 26 E’ col. 80b

1 enim] autem B’ 2 vero] super B’ vera N’ 2–3 potest sibi] inv. B’N’T’ 3
esse] fortasse scribendum omne 5 esse . . . materia] in hac materia esse T’ 6
necesse] esse add. B’ 9 propinqui] qui add. et del. A’ 12 vel] simile add. et del.
T’ 14–15 specie . . . genere] genere vel specie B’ 15 in] add. i.m. T’ 24 recep-
tione] receptive B’ 24 dico] non reali sed add. B’ 25 intentionali] intelligibili
B’ 27 vel quod] inv. B’T’

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<3.2.4.1> Sed forte dicetur, quod secundum hoc non po-

terit intellectus possibilis recipere similitudinem materiae
primae, cum sit eiusdem rationis cum ea, est enim ens in
potentia; sed nec similitudinem alterius possibilis intellec-
5 tus; sed nec similitudinem sui ipsius. Et cum intellectio sit
assimilatio, sequetur secundum hoc, quod intellectus possi-
bilis non cognoscit materiam primam nec alium intellectum
possibilem nec se ipsum.
<3.2.4.2> Praeterea, forte dicetur, quod illa propositio bene
10 est vera de receptione reali, sed de receptione speciei vel
similitudinis non est verum, quin illud, quod est eiusdem
speciei aut eiusdem generis propinqui cum aliquo, possit
recipere speciem aut similitudinem eius, alioquin unus
angelus non potest recipere similitudinem alterius angeli
15 eiusdem speciei vel generis propinqui. Et ratio huius videtur
esse, quia similitudo rei et res non sunt eiusdem speciei.
Immo contingit unum esse substantiam et reliquum accidens.
Licet igitur recipiens aliud realiter non possit esse eiusdem
speciei cum illo aut generis propinqui, similitudinem tamen
20 recipiens poterit esse.
<3.2.5.1.1> Sed si ista dicantur, non obviant. Primum siqui-
dem non, quia prima materia numquam intelligitur nisi
vel per modum cuiusdam pure formabilis aut per modum
cuiusdam actus formati, et per consequens non intelligitur
25 nisi per formam et analogiam ad ipsam. Unde per similitu-
dinem propriam non intelligitur, quod Commentator dicit
XII Metaphysicae. Ait | enim, quod materia non habet inten-
tionem intellectam de ea. Dato etiam, quod materia prima
intelligeretur per propriam similitudinem et intentionem

27 A’ fol. 86rb

3 rationis] rationes N’ 4–5 possibilis intellectus] inv. B’N’T’ 6–7 possibilis]

potentialis N’ 9 illa propositio] inv. B’N’T’ 9 illa] ista N’ 10 de receptione1]
corr. s.l. ex deceptione A’ 14 similitudinem] corr. ex similitudidinem sic! T’ 18
aliud] add. i.m. T’ 23 per1] om. A’ 23 formabilis] formalis B’N’ 25 ipsam]
primam B’ 26 quod] ut B’N’ unde T’

21 Cf. supra ¢3.2.4.1² 27 Aver., In XII Metaphys. Arist., comm. 14 (VIII, coll.
300va–vb)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 321

intellectam de | se, adhuc non obstaret, quia intellectus

possibilis et materia prima non sunt eiusdem generis, ut ex
superioribus patet.
<3.2.5.1.2> Quod vero dicitur de alio intellectu possibili,
5 dicendum etiam, quod non intelligitur nisi per illud, quod
est actuale in eo, quia vel intelligitur ut purum possibile
in genere intelligibilium aut ut possibile actuatum, et ita
semper per actum. Similitudo autem actus illius recipi potest
in alio intellectu possibili pro eo, quod est realitas denudata
10 in actu ab illo.
<3.2.5.1.3> Quomodo autem intelligit se ipsum, dicendum,
quod obiective non intelligitur, sed cointelligitur, quia res
in potentia, sicut non est res actu distincta, sed partialis et
unum faciens per indivisionem | cum actu, sic nec intelligitur
15 per se, sed cointelligitur ipsi actui. Est autem duplex actus in
intellectu possibili: unus quidem essentialis, videlicet realitas
intellectus | agentis, et alius accidentalis, scilicet realitas in-
tellectionum omnium aliarum. Et secundum hoc dupliciter
cointelligitur possibilis intellectus: primo quidem cointelli-
20 gendo ipsum actui essentiali, et ille est proprius intellectus,
quem habet anima separata et angelus de suo intellectu pos-
sibili; secundo vero cointelligendo ipsum actui accidentali,
scilicet intellectionibus aliis. Et sic anima coniuncta intelligit
per reexionem suum intellectum possibilem, in quantum
25 possibilis cointelligit se intelligere. In nullo autem istorum
modorum intellectus possibilis cointelligit se recipiendo in-
tellectionem | sui aut suam similitudinem, sed potius per
essentiam suam realem et potentialem. Et ita remanet pro-
positio vera, quod numquam aliquid recipit similitudinem

1 B’ fol. 51rb 14 in E’ continuatio quaestionis deest 17 N’ fol. 31vb 27 T’

fol. 208rb

1 intellectam] ntellectam sic! A’ 1 quia] quod B’T’ 2 possibilis] potentialis

T’ 4 possibili] potentiali T’ 5 illud] id N’ 6 possibile] potentiale T’ 8
autem] iter. N’ 8 actus] om. T’ 8 recipi potest] recipit N’ 12 quod] se B’ 13
potentia] in add. et del. N’

3 Cf. supra ¢2.2.4.2² 4 Cf. supra ¢3.2.4.1²

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sui nec alicuius, quod sit eiusdem generis propinqui aut spe-
ciei cum eo.
<3.2.5.2> Secundum etiam non obviat, quia aeque est im-
possibile de receptione similitudinis rei sicut de receptione
5 ipsius rei. Et hoc apparet inductive in omnibus. Et ratio
huius est, quia species seu similitudo obiecti propinquissima
est ipsi obiecto, immo non est nisi forma ipsius obiecti dimi-
nuto modo. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in II De anima, quod
sensus recipit formas sine materia, id est rerum similitudines
10 sine earum realitate. Et ideo si recipiens rem est potentiale
in toto genere propinquo et in tota specie illius rei, sic reci-
piens similitudinem oportet esse potentiale. Unde videmus,
quod sicut diaphanitas est ratio recipiendi extremitatem
lucis in perspicuo, qui est color, sic est ratio recipiendi simi-
15 litudinem et speciem coloris, et sic est potentiale respectu
similitudinis sicut respectu coloris. Quare propositio tenet
de receptione similitudinis, quae est intentionalis sicut et de
receptione reali.
<Ad rationes positas in initio articuli>
20 <3.3.1.1> Non procedunt ergo rationes superius inductae.
Prima siquidem non, quia loquitur contra illum errorem,
qui dicebat intellectum possibilem nihil esse in actu in nobis,
antequam intelligeremus, et secundum hoc anima non esset
in nobis in actu a puero, sed in potentia. Unde error ille non
25 ponebat possibilem actuari per agentem, ut eret anima una
in actu. Contra hoc ergo dicit articulus: quod intellectum
possibilem nihil esse, antequam actu intelligat, error est.
Est enim in actu per agentem et pars ipsius animae. Sed

1 alicuius] actus A’ 3 etiam . . . obviat] obviat non etiam N’ 5 omnibus] esse

add. et del. T’ 6 seu] sive T’ 10 realitate] realitates N’ 14 perspicuo] corr. i.m.
ex speculo A’ sperspicuo sic! B’N’ 14 recipiendi] similem add. et del. T’ 20 pro-
cedunt] praecedunt B’ 24 nobis] ens add. B’N’ existens T’ 25 anima] omnia
B’ 26 ergo] corr. i.m. ex quod A’ om. T’ 27 error est] errorem B’N’

3 ¢Cf. supra 3.2.4.2² 8 Arist., II De anima., cap. 12 (424a) 21 Cf. supra

¢3.1.1.1² et sqq.

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 323

non intelligit articulus, quod sit error dicere intellectum

possibilem nihil esse in actu, quantum est ex se.
<3.3.1.2> Quod vero subnectitur: quicquid in natura intelligi-
bili est aliquid in actu, esse actu intelligens, est etiam error,
5 quia habitus intellectuales et caritas et actus voluntatis sunt
aliquid in actu in genere intelligibilium, nec tamen sunt in-
telligentes in actu.
<3.3.1.3> Sequens vero articulus loquitur contra illum | er-
rorem, qui posuit ex omni intellectione et intelligente eri
10 unam substantiam, et qui dicebat, quod substantia intelli-
gitur per substantiam, immo quod omnis intellectio dabat
intellectui possibili esse substantiale. Non loquitur autem
de intellectu possibili et agente, quin possint esse realitates
intrinsece constitutivae ipsius animae.
15 <3.3.2> Secunda etiam non procedit, non est enim simile
de volitione et intellectione respectu sui, quia volitio con-
tingenter elicitur propter indeterminationem voluntatis
respectu actus. Intellectus vero sui in angelo vel anima se-
parata contingenter non inest, et idcirco dici potest, quod
20 essentia animae vel angeli est sua intellectio intuitiva, non
tamen est sua volitio libera et contingens. Dato etiam, quod
aliqua complacentia sui ipsius esset sua essentia, non dif-
ferret realiter ab illo actuali, quod poneretur | intellectio;
nec in illa complacentia aut intellectione naturali, quae
25 recta est, potuit esse peccatum, sed in aliis volitionibus et
intellectionibus, quae potuerunt esse falsae et deordinatae.
<3.3.3> Tertia etiam non procedit, nihil enim prohibet
aliquam intellectionem esse nobiliorem quantum ad suum

8 B’ fol. 51va 23 N’ fol. 32ra

3 subnectitur] subvertitur N’ 4 etiam] om. T’ 5 caritas] corr. i.m. ex causalitas

T’ 10 dicebat] dicebant N’ 10 substantia] intellectus add. et del. N’ 11 per]
essentiam add. N’ 12 substantiale] et add. et del. A’ 13 possibili] esse substantiale
non loquitur add. et del. B’ 13 et] de add. T’ 13 esse] essentia N’ 15 non1]
om. N’ 15 est] om. N’ 16 intellectione] et add. T’ 18 sui] om. A’ 18 vel] in
add. T’ 22 sua] add. i.m. A’ 24 in] om. T’ 27 etiam] vero T’

3 Cf. supra ¢3.1.1.1² 8 Cf. supra ¢3.1.1.2² 15 Cf. supra ¢3.1.2² 27 Cf. supra
¢3.1.3²

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esse, utpote quia est substantia, et tamen erit ignobilior

quantum ad coniungere cum obiecto. Unde nulla est con-
sequentia: est nobilius, igitur beaticat. Constat enim, quod
essentia animae, cum sit imago trinitatis, nobilior est | quam
5 actus beaticus, quod est accidens, et tamen anima per
essentiam non potest esse beata, sed per accidens superad-
ditum. Et attendendum, quod intellectio non beaticat, nisi
quatenus coniungit cum obiecto beatico, et ideo semper
nobilior est in coniungendo quam intellectio sui ipsius, quia
10 coniungit nobiliori, nec aliquid refert, si non sit nobilior in
subsistendo.
<3.3.4> Ultima etiam non procedit, nam satietas illa non ha-
bet locum nisi in potentia physica habente habitudinem ad
actum, quae est potentia transmutativa materiae proprie dic-
15 tae. Est igitur inter realitatem intellectus possibilis et agentis
connexio necessaria sicut inter actum et potentiam meta-
physicam et appropriatio mutua, sicut declaratum est supra.
Et quod additur, quod non poterit recipere secundum hoc
aliam intellectionem, utique verum est sibi essentialem, sed
20 actualem poterit, sicut et caelum recipit lumen et tenebram.
Unde appropriatio ista debet intelligi quantum ad esse sub-
stantiale, non autem quo ad esse accidentale. Omnis autem
intellectio praeter illam, qua intelligit se, accidens quoddam
est, etiam intellectio beatica.
25 <3.3.5> Et si dicatur, quod secundum regulas Dionysii inma
superiorum excedunt suprema inferiorum; intellectus au-
tem possibilis est inmum in genere intellectorum abstrac-
torum; et per consequens excedit omnia entia corporalia,

4 A’ fol. 86va

3 est] om. T’ 4 quam] sit add. A’ 5 beaticus] om. N’ 5 quod] fortasse scribendum
qui 7 non] beati add. et del. N’ 10 nobiliori] nobilior N’ 12 satietas] societas
N’ 13 locum] corr. i.m. ex locus T’ 15 Est] om. N’ 20 actualem] actuale
B’ 20 recipit] et add. B’ 20 tenebram] sic! 22 autem2] ista add. et del. T’ 23
intellectio] intentio T’ 27 genere] gloriae N’

12 Cf. supra ¢3.1.4² 17 Cf. supra ¢2.2.4.2.1² 26 Ps.-Dionysii Areopagita, De

divinis nominibus, cap. 7, 3, 324, secundum expositionem S. Thomae Aquinatis
in In librum Beati Dionysii de divinis nominibus, VII, l. IV, 733 (ed. C. Pera (Romae,
1950), p. 275)

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 325

et ita erit realitas actualis, immo et actualior quam for-

mae corporales, dicendum, quod regula illa Dyonisii tenet
in subsistentibus, non autem in realitatibus constituentibus
potentialibus. Unde manifesta est instantia de habitibus et
5 actibus, qui, quamvis sint spirituales, non tamen excedunt
formas substantiales corporum. Potest etiam dici, quod in-
tellectus possibilis nobilior est formis corporum eo modo,
quo habet esse, scilicet in potentia, quia potest induere
nobilius esse, et talis nobilitas ponenda est in entibus poten-
10 tialibus iuxta illud Augustini XII Confessionum dicentis, quod
capacitas formae nonnullum bonum est. |

Articulus tertius
Ubi directe respondetur ad formam quaestionis
<4.0> Nunc tertio inquirendum est, utrum ponens realitates
15 intellectus possibilis et agentis constituere animam salvare
possit ipsam esse essentialiter et per se corporis formam.
<4.1.1> Videretur enim, quod non, quia vel per suum actuale
praecise corpus informabit aut per actuale simul et poten-
tiale aut per suam totalitatem, ita quod illi totalitati, quasi
20 formae totius, competat ratio informandi. Sed non potest
dici, quod per suum actuale sit forma corporis, quia tunc
unus actus perficeret duas potentias, videlicet potentiam
corporis et potentiam intellectus possibilis. Nec potest dari
secundum, quia pura potentia nullius est actus. Nec potest
25 dari tertium, quia pari ratione dici posset, quod quodlibet
compositum ex materia et forma posset esse per suam for-
mam totius actus et perfectio alterius, quod est impossibile.

11 B’ fol. 51vb

1 erit] iter. N’ 5 sint] sicut N’ 11 formae] add. i.m. T’ 14 ponens] pones

B’ 16 esse] om. T’ 16 corporis formam] inv. B’ 17 suum] esse add. T’ 18
informabit] corr. s.l. ex et formabit A’ informalis B’ informaret T’ 18–19 poten-
tiale] potentialem N’ 21 dici] iter. N’ 21 suum] esse add. T’ 26 posset] quod
quodlibet compositum add. et del. N’

10 August., De vera religione, XIX, 36 (PL 34, col. 137); in libris Confessionum non
invenitur

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Igitur si anima habeat intra se realitatem pure potentialem,

non erit per essentiam forma corporis.
<4.1.2> Praeterea, numquam realitas informans potest in-
cludere aliquod compositum repugnans informationi. Sed
5 informationi repugnat pura potentialitas. Non igitur anima
poterit esse forma vere corporis, si rem pure potentialem
intrinsece | includat.
<4.2> Sed his non obstantibus dicendum, quod Augustinus
in libro De mirabilibus Scripturae Sacrae videtur ponere etiam
10 materiam proprie dictam in anima. Et Super Genesim re-
linquit sub dubio, utrum materiam habeat. Plures etiam
doctores antiqui hoc posuerunt, nec tamen propter hoc
compulsi sunt animam ponere non esse formam corporis.
Multo minus ergo ponendo, quod in anima non est materia
15 nec realitas in potentia physica, sed metaphysica tantum,
quae necessario et inseparabiliter est indistans ab actu nec
est potentia contradictionis, coguntur negare ipsam esse
formam corporis.
<4.3.1> Non procedunt ergo rationes. Prima siquidem non,
20 quia anima non est actus corporis per suum actuale praecise,
immo illud praecise sumptum non posset corpus informare. |
Nec etiam per suum potentiale praecise. Unde nec intellec-
tus possibilis nec agens sunt per se primo corporis forma.
Informat igitur anima per rationem suae totalitatis, quia
25 realitas totalis perfectior est qualibet partium, et propter hoc
percere potest et informare.

7 N’ fol. 32rb 21 T’ fol. 208va

3 informans] et formans N’ 4 compositum] oppositum B’N’T’ 4 informa-

tioni] informationem N’ 5 informationi] in forma N’ formationem add. et del.
N’ 5 anima] non add. N’ 6 potentialem] potentialis N’ 14 Multo] corr. i.m.
ex multis N’ 15 metaphysica] metaphysicus B’N’ 16 necessario] intellectus N’
17 contradictionis] conditionis B’N’T’ 21 immo] illud N’

9 Ps.-August., I De mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae, cap. 1 (PL 35, col. 2151) 10

August., I De Genesi ad litteram, VII, 10 (PL 34, col. 359); cf. ibid., I,2 (PL 34, col.
247) et ibid., V, 13 (PL 34, col. 326) 19 Cf. supra ¢4.1.1²

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 327

<4.3.1.1> Et cum additur, quod pari ratione omne compo-

situm ex materia et forma per formam totius poterit esse
alterius forma, non valet, quia constitutio ex realitatibus
agentis et possibilis non est proprie compositio, sed unitas
5 maior inter eas propter hoc, quod non habent habitudinem
contingentem, immo eorum unitas est quoddam necesse
esse, et propter hoc realitas totalis habet maiorem veritatem
et perfectionem, quam habeat realitas composita. Non est
igitur simile, sicut arguebatur.
10 <4.3.1.2> Et est sciendum, quod Aristoteles non haberet
hanc difcultatem, quia non diceret, quod anima sit forma
materiae eo modo, quo ceterae formae, trahendo scilicet
materiam ad esse et actum, sed alio modo, scilicet largiendo
esse et permanentiam et postremas perfectiones exigitive
15 et complendo speciem. Et ideo non repugnat ei, quod
est isto ultimo modo, habere intra se aliquam potentialem
realitatem.
<4.3.1.3> Est considerandum etiam, quod licet totalis realitas |
animae claudat intrinsece et inseparabiliter praedictas rea-
20 litates, nihilominus constituitur ex ipsis quasi quoddam ens
partiale, quod per essentiam suam est apta nata esse pars
et esse aliquid | alterius per modum complementi. Hoc
autem non competit compositis ex materia et ex forma.
Unde non repugnat alicui constitui ex pluribus, sic tamen
25 quod constitutum habeat rationem entis partialis, quare nec
sibi repugnat, quod habeat rationem formae.
<4.3.2> Secunda etiam non procedit, quia falsum assumit.
Potest enim aliquid competere alicui ratione suae totalis
realitatis et tamen illud totale includat aliquid, cui praecise

18 B’ fol. 52ra 22 A’ fol. 86vb

3 realitatibus] corr. ex realibus T’ 4 unitas] est add. i.m. T’ 6 unitas] veritas

N’T’ 7 hoc] om. N’ 7–8 realitas . . . habeat] add. i.m. A’ 8 realitas] quam hoc
add. et del. T’ 8 composita] composito N’ 14 permanentiam] per materiam
T’ 15 Et] om. T’ 18 considerandum etiam] inv. B’N’T’ 18 considerandum]
consciderandum T’ 19 animae] corr. i.m. ex a se A’ 21 est] esse N’ 22 aliquid]
iter. N’ 23 ex2] om. B’ 24 sic] sed N’ 28 suae] sui N’ 29 includat] fortasse
scribendum includere

1 Cf. supra ¢4.1.1² 27 Cf. supra ¢4.1.2²

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sumpto repugnat. Verbi gratia, visiva potentia et eius actus

competit oculo constituto ex anima et corpore ratione to-
talitatis, fundatur enim potentia visiva in toto coniuncto,
nec etiam videre inest nisi toti coniuncto. Et tamen istud
5 coniunctum includit corpus et animam, et cuilibet praecise
sumpto repugnat recipere visionem aut visivam potentiam.
Similiter in proposito repugnat realitati potentiali praecise
sumptae corpus informare, et similiter realitati agentis, ex
quibus constituitur totalis realitas animae rationalis, et ta-
10 men non repugnat informare ipsi animae. Unde aliud est
partialiter informare et aliud esse partem formae. Nec etiam
possibilis intellectus aut agens partialiter informant corpus,
quia potentiae repugnat informare, et totaliter et partialiter.
Similiter et actui partiali repugnat actuare nisi potentiale,
15 cui appropriatur. Et ideo neuter illorum habet per se habi-
tudinem informantis nec totaliter nec partialiter in ordine
ad corpus. Sed habitudo eorum prima est ad constitutionem
animae per modum cuiusdam naturae partialis et formae.
<Ad argumentum principale>
20 <5.1> Ad argumentum principale dicendum, quod inesse
alicui, quod sit forma per totam suam rationem et per
totum illud, quod pertinet ad illus essentiam, intelligi potest
dupliciter: primo quidem quia insit sibi per quamlibet sui
partem, et hoc modo non inest animae, quod sit forma, quasi
25 quaelibet eius pars partialiter | informet. Secundo vero quod
insit sibi per rationem totalis realitatis et non per aliquam sui
partem praecise nec partialiter, et sic competit animae, quod
sit forma. Constat autem, quod totalitas realitatis nominat

25 N’ fol. 32va

1 visiva potentia] inv. T’ 1 visiva] positiva add. et del. N’ 2–3 totalitatis] non add.
N’ 3 potentia] videtur add. et del. N’ 3 visiva] om. T’ 5 coniunctum] om. T’
communi add. et del. T’ 5 includit] corr. ex incladit N’ 6 aut] ac N’ 6 visivam
potentiam] inv. T’ 8 et] in N’ 8 agentis] add. i.m. N’ 9 totalis] corr. ex totalitas
N’ 9 rationalis] totalis N’ 12 possibilis] potentialis N’ 23 quia] quod N’ 24
quasi] et quod N’ 26 insit] corr. s.l. ex sit A’ 27 et] om. N’ 28 autem] om. N’

20 Cf. supra ¢1.1²

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 petri aureoli quaestio 7 quodlibeti 329

essentiam rei et illud, quod res est per se, quia res non
est aliqua suarum partium, sed potius realitas totalis ex suis
partibus. Et ideo propriissime salvatur, quod anima per se
et essentialiter et se tota est forma, quia sua totali realitate
5 est forma et non per suas partes.

2 totalis] om. N’ 4 totali] essentiali T’

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GUIDONIS TERRENI
QUAESTIO 14 QUODLIBETI V

<Utrum supposito, quod intellectus agens et pos-

sibilis sint distinctae potentiae realiter, sit ex eis
5 unum compositum>

<1.0> Quantum ad potentias intellectus, scilicet quantum

ad intellectum agentem et possibilem, erat quaestio, utrum
supposito, quod intellectus agens et possibilis sint distinctae
potentiae realiter, sit ex eis unum compositum.
10 <1.1> Quod non, quia sunt in una natura simplici animae.
<1.2> Contra, quia sunt quasi sicut actus et potentia.
<1.3> Respondeo. Supponitur communiter, quod sint distinc-
tae potentiae realiter, tum quia absoluta et distincta; tum
quia activum et passivum.
15 <1.3.1> Istud non credo, si attendatur operatio, scilicet
illustrare; per eandem naturam, qua est lumen spirituale,
illustrat. Sed hoc est, quia naturaliter abstracta et naturae
intellectualis.
<1.3.2> Item, non repugnat, quod idem respectu unius sit
20 activum una actione, et ab eodem sit passivum alia.
<1.3.3> Item, quia intellectus agens non <est> activum re-
spectu possibilis vel actus intelligendi, quia tunc intellectus
possibilis | quacumque perfecta suppositione non esset in
actu intelligendi, nec esset intellectus agens.
25 <1.3.4> Item, quia intellectus agens non est <activum> nisi
respectu operationis motivae, scilicet removendo prohibens, et
respectu talis non oportet dare per se potentiam distinctam.
<1.3.5> Ergo prima ratio non valet, quia accipit falsum.

6 V’ = Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 39, fol. 213vb 23 V’ fol.

214ra

28 Cf. supra ¢1.3²

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 guidonis terreni quaestio 14 quodlibeti v 331

<1.3.6> Secunda non <valet>, quia accipit quantum ad

actum intelligendi, quod sit materiale obiectum.
<1.4.1> Quantum ad quaesitum dico, quod si differrent rea-
liter—ut ponit Aureoli—dico, quod non esset compositio ex
5 eis, tum quia unum non inhaereret alteri; tum quia ex
eis non efceretur unum supposito, cum essent duae sub-
stantiae separatae.
<1.4.2> Si vero differrent, ut communius supponitur, sicut
lumen et illud, cuius est lumen, sic videtur, quod essent
10 unum compositum, sicut ex aere et lumine, quia intellectus
possibilis perceretur per agentem, sicut aer per lumen.
<1.4.3> Unde videtur mihi, quod esto, quod essent duae res
distinctae, non deberent poni distinctae potentiae, sed una,
sicut oculus cati cum sua luce.
15 <1.5.1> Ad rationes patet. Ad primam, quia quamvis anima
sit una natura simplex, potest in ea esse intellectus cum
habitu, et ita intellectus cum lumine perciente.
<1.5.2> Ad secundum dicendum, quod est per idem actus
respectu separationis conditionum materialium, est tamen
20 potentia respectu actus intelligendi.

5 inhaereret] corr. ex inhaerere V’ 12 videtur] dicitur V’ 13 poni] corr. ex ponit

V’ 18 secundum] fortasse scribendum secundam

1 Cf. supra ¢1.3² 15 Cf. supra ¢1.1² 18 Cf. supra ¢1.2²

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 NICHOLAS OF BAR’S COLLECTION

Sylvain Piron

The so-called “Collection of Nicholas of Bar” occupies a prominent

place in Palémon Glorieux’s repertory of quodlibetal questions. The 170
questions that it contains were rst listed under the name of Nicholas
in the 1925 volume, before being redistributed, in the second volume
published in 1935, amongst the eighteen different authors involved in
it. In the meantime, an article published in the third volume of the
Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age in 1928 had justied
the respective ascription of the questions to these little-known late
thirteenth-century theologians.1 Before discussing the interpretation
he gave of this collection, one should recall the pioneering role that
Glorieux played in the exploration of scholastic sources. Teaching at
the time in Lille, Glorieux was connected with the French Dominican
school led by Pierre Mandonnet and Marie-Dominique Chenu, based
a few kilometers away at “Le Saulchoir,” near Tournai,2 and whose
“Bibliothèque thomiste” hosted the two volumes of La littérature quodlibé-
tique. In those years, as the editorial program of the Archives made clear,
the priority was given to text editions and research based on rst-hand
knowledge of unpublished materials. Taking his part in these efforts to
tackle the mass of unexplored documentation pertaining to medieval
scholasticism, Glorieux was also pursuing, so to speak, a particular
hobby-horse, reconstructing the succession of masters occupying the
chairs of theology within the University of Paris.3 For that purpose,

1
P. Glorieux, “Notices sur quelques théologiens de Paris de la n du XIIIe siècle,”
AHDLMA 3 (1928), pp. 201–38.
2
Although a detailed account of the impact of the Saulchoir school on medieval
studies is still lacking, a more general picture can be found in the studies accompany-
ing the edition, by G. Alberigo, of M.-D. Chenu, Une école de théologie: le Saulchoir (Paris
1985). See also J.-P. Jossua, “Le Saulchoir: une formation théologique replacée dans
son histoire,” Cristianesimo nella storia 14 (1993), pp. 99–124; A. Duval, “Aux origines
de l’Institut historique d’études thomistes au Saulchoir (1920 et sq.),” RSPT 75 (1991),
pp. 423–48.
3
Glorieux, Répertoire I–II; idem, “D’Alexandre de Halès à Pierre Auriol. La suite des
maîtres franciscains de Paris au XIIIe siècles,” AFH 26 (1933), pp. 257–81.

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334 sylvain piron

he was searching to associate all University exercises he could come

across—be they sermons or quodlibetal disputes—with precise dates,
which would then serve as anchors for the global chronology of the
theology faculty he was trying to construct.4 With all the due respect
one may have for his colossal achievements, it is fair to recall that many
of his conclusions were premature.
This eagerness for precise dates is evident in his approach to Nicholas
of Bar’s collection. To quote Glorieux’s own words: “The rst impres-
sion one gets by reading this list [of the various masters’ names found
in the margins] is that one is confronted with quodlibeta that must have
followed one another on a regular basis from year to year.”5 The rest
of the demonstration serves only as a conrmation of this rst impres-
sion, to which no objection is raised in the course of the article. The
conclusions reached on the basis of that “rst impression” have been
generally accepted by scholars dealing with this material and have not
been questioned so far.6 However, the very statement of this result
sounds rather unlikely: fragments of twenty-nine different quodlibetal
series would have been reproduced in a strictly chronological order, over
a period of twenty years, running from 1285 to 1304. It sufces to add
that these texts were copied by the same hand in only one go for one to
understand that a strict chronological ordering of the quodlibeta is highly
implausible. It would require that the scribe himself would have shared
Glorieux’s obsession with the chronology of the theology faculty.
During the interwar years, another close associate of the Saulchoir,
a Dominican friar himself although not residing at the convent, was
Jean Destrez. His masterpiece on the diffusion of university manu-
scripts through the pecia system was published in 1935, the same year

4
On the use of university sermons by Glorieux, see L.-J. Bataillon, “Guillaume
de la Mare. Note sur sa régence parisienne et sa prédication,” AFH 98 (2005), pp.
367–422 (esp. pp. 368–74).
5
Glorieux, “Notices,” p. 203–4: “La première impression que l’on ressent à la lecture
de cette liste . . . est qu’on se trouve en présence . . . de quodlibets qui durent se succéder
assez régulièrement, sans doute d’année en année . . . La collection aurait été faite au fur
et à mesure des soutenances annuelles, et suivant leur succession chronologique . . . Il
semble parfaitement légitime de la considérer comme s’étendant de façon régulière
sur une assez longue suite d’années.”
6
Through confusion caused by the certitude displayed by Glorieux, some of his read-
ers were misled into thinking that the quodlibeta were actually dated in the manuscript
itself. Such is the case of L. Cova, “Alcune questioni di Simone di Lens sul peccato
originale,” AFH 73 (1980), p. 475, n. 2.

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 nicholas of bar’s collection 335

as the second volume of Glorieux’s La littérature quodlibétique.7 The line

of approach exemplied by Destrez is another crucial feature of the
“Saulchoir School,” which achieved its most splendid results once a
team of scholars educated along such principles was put in charge of
reviving the Commissio leonina in the early fties.8 A major lesson that has
since then been widely accepted by the academic community as a whole
is that at least a minimal level of attention to codicological matters is
a necessary preliminary requirement in any study of medieval texts.
Following this lesson, a few elements of Glorieux’s brilliant treatment
of the issue will be slightly amended here.
The name given to the collection derives from the fact that the
only manuscript that preserves it, Paris, BnF lat. 15850, belonged to
Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc, who, at his death in 1310, bequeathed it to
the “poor masters of the Sorbonne, students in theology,” as is made
clear by two successive notes found on the back of the initial yleaf.9
In his reconstruction of the Sorbonne library, Léopold Delisle identied
six Parisian volumes stemming from Nicholas’ bequest to the College
where he had once been a student.10 Bishop of Mâcon since 1286,

7
See J. Destrez, La Pecia dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIII e et du XIV e siècle (Paris
1935), and its application to the case of quodlibeta in idem, “Les disputes quodlibétiques
de saint Thomas d’après la tradition manuscrite,” Mélanges thomistes (Kain 1923), pp.
49–108. From 1924 to 1928, Destrez was secretary of the Bulletin thomiste for the rst four
issues, residing near Paris. His research has been continued by distinguished Saulchoir
pupils, now members of the Commissio leonina; cf. La Production du livre universitaire au Moyen
Age: exemplar et pecia, L.-J. Bataillon, B.G. Guyot, and R.H. House, eds. (Paris 1988).
8
C. Luna, “L’édition léonine de saint Thomas d’Aquin: vers une méthode de
critique textuelle et d’ecdotique,” RSPT 98 (2005), pp. 31–110, insists on the continu-
ity between the two “ages” of the Commission. Without diminishing the merits of
the rst team set up in the late 19th century, I feel it is necessary to stress more the
human and cultural continuity between the second team and the Saulchoir school. As
an irony of history, the same Master General who had removed Chenu from teaching
in 1942 then asked his disciples to take over the edition of Aquinas’ Opera omnia less
than ten years later.
9
Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 1r: “Istud liber est magistri N. de barro ducis (cancelled);
In hoc volumine continentur questiones collecte de diversis quodlibet, ex legato mag-
istri Nicolai de barro ducis domui pauperum magistrorum de Sorbona in theologia
studentium.”
10
L. Delisle, Cabinet des manuscrits de la bibliothèque nationale II (Paris 1874), p. 163.
The other codices are lat. 15351 (Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibeta), lat. 15818 (Thomas
Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles), lat. 15985 (Thomas of Ireland’s Manipulus orum), lat.
16158 (philosophical commentaries by Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Albert
the Great), and lat. 16160 (more philosophical commentaries, mostly by Thomas
Aquinas).

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336 sylvain piron

Nicholas was apparently a rich man and generous towards his College.
The Sorbonne obituary recalls that he “left us many books and a lot
of money in rents.”11 As a matter of fact, his last will stipulated that all
his belongings within the Paris diocese would go to the College, which
should, in turn, support one master and two students from his kindred
or his native land. The “mitigation” of his will, which reduced that
number to only one student, listing all the properties handed over to
the College, mentions a total of eighteen volumes.12
According to the 1338 Sorbonne library catalogue, cod. lat. 15850
was located within the “Summe questionum” section. The yleaf note
describes it as containing “questions collected out of various quodlibeta.”
The codex consists of two parts that both t such a description. The
second and much longer part, having a medieval foliation of its own, is
made up of a selection from two great masters of the quodlibetal art,
Henry of Ghent (ff. 1r–202v) and Godfrey of Fontaines (ff. 205r–320r),
followed by an incomplete thematic index and a list of questions.13 The
rst part of the codex comprises 44 folios. Its medieval foliation has
been trimmed off on the occasion of a modern binding, so that it is
difcult to make sure whether it had been conceived as a whole before
being united together with the second part of the volume. It contains
three blocks, as follows: A, a quire containing three disputed questions
from the rst mendicant-secular polemics by Bonaventure and William
of St Amour14 (ff. 1ra–5vb); B, another quire containing on its two ini-
tial pages a selection of ve quodlibetal questions by Henry of Ghent
(ff. 6ra–7vb, the rest of the quire being blank); and C, the “collection”

11
“Dies 16 maii obiit magister Nicolaus de Barro Ducis, socius hujus domus, anno
Domini 1310, qui nobis legavit multos libros et multam pecuniam in redditibus,” in
Le registre de prêt de la bibliothèque du collège de Sorbonne, eds. J. Vieillard and M.-H. Jullien
de Pommerol (Paris 2000), p. 568. This register doesn’t record any borrowing of cod.
lat. 15850. The obituary was already edited in P. Glorieux, Aux origines de la Sorbonne.
I. Robert de Sorbon (Paris 1966), p. 165.
12
P. Glorieux, Aux origines de la Sorbonne. II. Le cartulaire (Paris 1965), pp. 519–23.
Surprisingly, Nicholas is presented as lius Ponceti de Barro, Tullensis dyocesis. There is,
indeed, a city called Bar about fteen kilometers north of Tulle. But since the students
he wanted to support should stem, in order of priority, from his kindred, the city of Bar-
le-Duc, Saint-Mihiel, and the diocese of Verdun, a Lorraine origin is beyond doubt.
13
See the details of the questions in J. Hoffmans and A. Pelzer, Etude sur les manuscrits
des Quodlibets (Les philosophes belges, 14) (Louvain 1937), pp. 177–80, and R. Macken,
Bibliotheca Manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo I (Leuven-Leiden 1979), pp. 634–44.
14
Bonaventura, De perfectione evangelica, q. 2, a. 2, Opera omnia V (Quaracchi 1891),
pp. 134–55; A.G. Traver, “William of Saint-Amour’s Two Disputed Questiones De
Quantitate eleemosynae and De valido mendicante,” AHDLMA 62 (1995), pp. 295–342.

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itself, covering three quires (ff. 10ra–42va, f. 43 being blank). These units
all have different page lay-outs and were copied by different scribes on
different occasions, the rst one being presumably much older. Despite
their distinct foliations, section 1–C was apparently produced in the
same circumstances as part 2. The single hand that copied the whole of
the collection was also involved in copying Godfrey’s extracts (ff. 205r–
233v).15 The decoration of the initial letters in red and blue ink is
similar in both sections, and it is also identical to what is found in cod.
lat. 16158, another of Nicholas’ volumes.
More importantly, their contents also point in the same direction.
Both selections of quodlibetal questions are almost exclusively concerned
with practical moral cases. As is well known, such topics are consider-
ably over-represented in quodlibeta.16 Especially in the Lent session, in
the season of the yearly compulsory confession, quodlibetal disputes
provided an occasion to raise the most troublesome cases of conscience
that a confessor might come across, be it through reporting real situa-
tions or making up ctitious ones. Understandably, the same focus could
also determine the form in which quodlibetal questions would circulate.
The case under consideration is by no means an isolated one. It may
be useful to record that the only surviving collection of Quodlibeta by
Servais of Mont-Saint-Éloi belongs to this type, where only a minimal
number of questions (5 out of 85) do not pertain directly to moral issues
or to the administration of confession.17 The formulation of Servais’
questions provided by Glorieux can be misleading. For instance, a
question that seemed to Jean-Luc Solère to be of the most speculative
type18—can someone excommunicate himself ?—in reality introduces a
very specic case, asking whether an ofcial, promulgating a sentence of
excommunication against unnamed wrongdoers, could himself fall prey
to his own sentence.19 The restricted scope of the questions preserved

15
A paleographical study of manuscripts produced around or within the Sorbonne
in that period could produce interesting results.
16
See Elsa Marmursztejn’s chapter in the rst volume of this book.
17
P. Glorieux, “Les Quodlibets de Gervais du Mont-Saint-Eloi,” RTAM 20 (1953), pp.
129–34, argues in favor of a division of the 85 questions by Servais found in Paris, BnF
lat. 15350, ff. 269r–291, into eight different Quodlibeta, on the basis of some marginal
signs and of the recurrence of these rare speculative questions that would mark the
begining of a new Quodlibet. This division is supported by even more marginal signs.
18
See Solère’s chapter in the previous volume, p. 526.
19
Servatius de Monte Sancti Eligii, Quodlibet V, q. 7, Paris, BnF lat. 15350, f. 281v:
Utrum aliquis possit excommunicare seipsum et ponitur talis casus, laicus perdidit uxorem suam,

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in this manuscript doesn’t mean that Servais was unable to deal with
more abstract topics or was not interrogated on such themes. It rather
means that, in the absence of a proper “edition” of his Quodlibeta made
available by the University stationers, his Quodlibeta circulated in such
a format. In the same guise, at one point, the bishop of Mâcon added
to his library a volume containing the “practical” extracts of both the
great and the small masters of theology of the time.
Some more observations can be made based on external criteria. The
questions extracted from Godfrey, copied from the University station-
ary peciae, do not follow a chronological order. Excerpts from Quodlibeta
VII and VIII are placed before extracts of Quodlibeta V and VI. The
nal items stem from Quodlibet XIII, which was disputed during the
academic year 1297–98.20 The absence of any question from Quodlibet
XV, produced in 1303–04 at the earliest, suggests that the collection of
excerpts had been created before that date. Another interesting fact is
that the initial note of possession conveyed by the yleaf is identical to
the one found in cod. lat. 15985, containing the original manuscript of
Thomas of Ireland’s Manipulus orum.21 This volume itself can be rmly
dated to 1306, when Thomas, previously a Sorbonne member, provided
the College with one copy and Nicholas with another. As Richard and
Mary Rouse hypothesize, in doing so, he may well have been searching
for a benecial reward from the bishop of Mâcon.22 At any rate, this
incident shows the position Nicholas occupied in the rst decade of
the fourteenth century as an informal patron of the Sorbonne circles.
It may be in that connection, rather than for his own pastoral use, that
he commissioned the quodlibetal miscellany we are dealing with.
The collection of minor masters was copied continuously by only one
scribe, with no change of ink or size of writing that would suggest an
interruption in the course of his work. This implies that any notion of a
collection composed over a long period of time has to be ruled out from
the start. Nevertheless, a few elements of discontinuity can be pointed
out. At the beginning of the rst quire, there is no rubric announcing

ofcialis autem loci tenet eam clausam, laicus petit ab ofciali ut excommunicet omnes qui detinent
eam, ofcialis autem auctoritate episcopi excommunicat omnes qui detinent eam, modo queritur utrum
ofcialis sit excommunicatus.
20
See John Wippel’s chapter in volume I.
21
The “r” with a long descender in the word Barro is very characteristic.
22
R.H. Rouse and M.A. Rouse, Preachers, orilegia and Sermons. Studies on the Manipulus
orum of Thomas of Ireland (Toronto 1979), pp. 94–5, 164–5.

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 nicholas of bar’s collection 339

the general contents of what follows. Nor is there any ascription of the
initial fourteen questions. Such ascriptions, starting with the fteenth
question, are, at rst, noted by the copyist in the margin. For some time,
he also reproduces the titles of the questions in the lower margin of
the page, a fact that is acknowledged on the yleaf.23 In that respect,
a change can be noticed on folio 35v. Henceforth, ascriptions are no
longer located in the margins but within the page, as a rubric.
From that point on, an even more signicant change regards the
status of the questions themselves. On the previous pages, questions
were rarely very long and elaborate. Some of them probably belong
to the genre of reportationes, jotted down by listeners during the event.
The ten nal quodlibeta (ff. 35v–42v) are unambiguously of that nature
since the master’s response is always introduced by verbal forms such
as “dicebatur,” “dictum fuit,” “dixit” (“it was said” or “he said”).
These questions are deprived of any set of initial arguments, and the
magistral determination can be remarkably laconic, such as Eustache
of Grandcourt’s in his Quodlibet II, q. 10: “Utrum sit licitum celebrare
festum conceptionis Virginis Marie? Dictum est quod sic.”24 When
the question is a complex moral case, it can even happen that the
interrogation itself is longer than the answer, such as with the same
Eustache in his Quodlibet III, q. 10.25 This stylistic change is all the
more obvious when one compares the slightly more elaborate style of
Eustache’s rst Quodlibet, found earlier in the collection, with the later
ones. Even in the case of a very brief question, so short that it passed
under Glorieux’s eyes unnoticed, we still nd a pro and contra structure
before the determination of the question.26 Answering the following

23
Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 1v: Intitulationes quorundam questionum quere fol. xi. et .xii.
These titles are found on ff. 10v–13v, 14v. This implies a continuous foliation of the
rst part of the codex, but doesn’t reveal whether this was achieved after or before
the rst binding.
24
Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 36rb. The same question is tackled by Matthew of
Aquasparta in 1279 (Quodl. II, q. 8), Henry of Ghent in 1291 (Quodl. XV, q. 13) and
John Baconthorpe in 1330 (Quodl. III, q. 18), a sign of continuous interest in the issue.
All these, and many more, are edited by A. Samaritani, “De beatae virginis immaculata
conceptione Quodlibet XIII–XIV saec. primum edita,” Marian Library Studies 5 (1973)
pp. 729–835.
25
Eustacius de Grandicuria, Quodlibet III, q. 10, Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 39va: “Talis
casus est: iste cognovit istam puellam affectu fornicatorio, et habet inde puerum; postea
accipit eam in uxorem, et habent alium lium; modo queritur quis istorum, mortuo
patre, debeat habere progenituram. Dictum fuit quod primo natus quia factus est
legitimus per matrimonium, et ad hoc adducebat multa decreta.”
26
Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 29ra: “Sacerdos dicit nonam ante terciam ex ignorancia et

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question, in a most spectacular fashion, Eustache begins discussing the

ability to marry a monster (a female with two heads, four breasts, and
one sexual organ) by recalling in the rst person a memory of his own
father having witnessed such an extraordinary birth—although it is not
clear whether he was talking about a human being or another type of
animal.27 As absurd as it may sound, the use of the rst person (“ego
intellexi,” “dico”) would signify that a venerable master of theology
did mention such personal memories at a public University event, and
gave his stamp to its written circulation.
The likelier explanation for the stylistic change witnessed within the
collection is the following. Among the various materials the copyist
had at his disposal, the nal ten would have originated from the notes
taken in a very summary way by someone who attended these events.
It may be surmised that these quodlibeta, where the same names often
recur, were not spread over a long period of time—a duration of three
years being a reasonable guess. On such an hypothesis, Eustache of
Grandcourt’s Quodlibet II and Peter of Saint-Omer’s Quodlibet II would
belong to the rst year, while the second would be lled by Eustache’s
Quodlibet III and Peter’s Quodlibet III. Simon of Guiberville’s Quodlibet
I and Rainier of Clairmarais’ Quodlibet II could belong to the second
or third year. The latter one would comprise Eustache’s Quodlibeta IV
and V, Guy of Cluny’s Quodlibet II and Andrew of Mont-Saint-Éloi’s
Quodlibet I. Glorieux understands the mention “a magistro extacio”
found in the margin as marking the beginning of a fth Quodlibet,
distinct from the fourth. This distinction is not necessary in my view,
since all the questions, before and after the note, display strong stylistic

oblivione, postea recolit, queritur postquam talis dixerit terciam debeat iterare nonam.
Videtur quod sic quia ordo ecclesie requiritur ut nona dicatur post terciam, ideo etc.
Contra, qui semel solvit debitum non amplius tenetur ad solutum eius quia solucione
eius quod debetur tollitur obligacio, ideo etc. Dicendum quod tenetur redicere nonam
quia dicendo nonam ante tertiam corrumpit ordinem ecclesie et ideo non solvit sicut
debet, ideo etc.”
27
Eustacius de Grandicuria, Quodlibet I, Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 29rb: “Quoddam
monstrum fuit, habens a dyaphragmo superius duo capita, quatuor brachia et quatuor
mamillas et duo corda; inferius unum instrumentum generationis et duos pedes, queritur
utrum tale monstrum possit contrahere matrimonium . . . Dicendum quod ego intellexi
a patre meo quod ipse vidit tale monstrum habens duo capita et quatuor mamillas et
quod una illorum mulierum mortua fuit ante aliam per tres dies et altera fuit mortua
per nimio fetore quam non potuit sustinere. Nunc dico quod possunt contrahere
matrimonium et cum diversis, quia habent omnia per quem matrimonium potest esse
perfectum quoniam habent consensum per quem matrimonium percitur, habent etiam
instrumentum per quid potest consumari . . .”

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 nicholas of bar’s collection 341

similarities. The marginal note could be understood as a mere reminder

of authorship.
It is now time to turn back to the list of masters found in the margins
or the rubrics of the collection. Once the “chronological” hypothesis
has been discarded, the elements of certainty are rather limited.28 A
few names, given in full, are identied beyond doubt. They are those
of masters who remained regents for a long period of time. Nicholas
du Pressoir held his rst Quodlibet in 1272 and was active in 1286, but
nothing is known of his later career. Eustache of Grandcourt, regent
master in 1272, had stopped teaching by 1303. Peter of Saint-Omer
was already a master in 1289, chancellor in 1296, and active until 1302.
Two other names offer no difculty in identication, but do not shed any
further light on the collection either, since nothing else is known about
their University career: Rainier of Clairmarais’ name is given in full,
while “Guido de Cluniaco” can hardly be other than the Benedictine
theologian Guy of Pernes, master in theology, and abbot of Beaulieu
in 1303, but the notion that his activity as a regent master would have
started as early as 1287 is nothing but an gment of Glorieux’s fantasy.
More precise dates are provided by the two Dominican masters explic-
itely named, who taught in Paris for briefer periods. Oliverus predicator
must be Oliver of Tréguier, regent in 1291–92.29 The Quodlibet raimondi
predicatorum can securely be attributed to Raymond Guilha and dated
to 1293–95.30
The Franciscans are not so easily identied. According to Glorieux,
the most likely candidate for the Quodlibet fratris iohannis de ordine minorum
was John of Murrovalle, regent in 1289–90, and later Minister General
of the Order and then cardinal. The time of his regency happened
to t in perfectly with Glorieux’s global chronological scheme. Yet this
identication is by no means certain, since many other Friars Minor
named John were around in those years. For instance, one can point
to the case of the almost forgotten John of Pershore.31 Vital du Four

28
Except when noted, all these elements were already gathered by Glorieux, “Notice
sur quelques théologiens.”
29
T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum medii aevi III (Rome 1980), pp. 199–
200.
30
Kaeppeli, Scriptores III, p. 280.
31
Vitalis de Furno, Quodlibeta tria, ed. F. Delorme (Spicilegium Ponticii Athenaei
Antoniani, 5) (Rome 1947), pp. 221–9. John of Pershore ought to have been mentioned
in my chapter in the rst volume of this book. I am most grateful to Alain Boureau
for reminding me of him. The abbreviation ends with the words Hic nihil decit, a sign
marking the end of a complete series of questions.

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342 sylvain piron

produced, as a reminder (memoralia), an abbreviated version of eighteen

of his questions, now preserved in Todi, Biblioteca Comunale 95, a
volume that contains most of the literary output of the Gascon theo-
logian. These questions deal mostly with metaphysical and trinitarian
issues, often directed against Peter John Olivi’s positions. The miscel-
laneous nature of the nal four, touching upon practical moral cases or
problems of cognition and grace, gives weight to the notion that we are
facing a quodlibetal dispute. Pershore is known to have been active in
Oxford around 1290, but the anti-Olivian orientation of this Quodlibet
and its relation to Vital render a continental origin of these questions
more plausible. The Quodlibet could have been disputed in Paris, while
Vital was a student there (1288–92). Its contents display no obvious
resemblance to the Franciscan John present in Nicholas of Bar’s collec-
tion, however. If the “friar S. minor” has to be identied with Simon
of Lens, his Quodlibet should be associated with his regency in 1282,
which sounds at odds with the dates obtained so far that rather point
towards the rst half of the 1290s. Therefore, the hypothesis that this
initial “S” could represent a “Stephanus” or a “Simon” that we know
nothing about cannot be totally discarded.
Some other names remain little more than shadows. Who was
Gonterus or Ganterus? What was the exact Christian name of “R. of
Arras”? Here, as with the case of the anonymous Friar Minor to whom
are attributed questions 15–20 of the collection, the disappearance
of Glorieux’s chronology brushes away the little knowledge available
about them. Two other characters, whose identity was reconstructed
by Glorieux, are still in a uncomfortable situation. Twice, the marginal
notes refer to a Cistercian master, clearly labeled as “abbatis sancti ber-
nardi” the second time. Out of his chronological calculations, Glorieux
concluded that he should be identied, “with no hesitation,” with John
of Waarde, a Cistercian master who died, still active, in 1293. The dif-
culty here is that the rst reference to a theologian of Saint-Bernard
in the collection, a few pages above, describes him with a problematic
abbreviation that can be developed in various ways—the most litteral
reading would imply a name such as “Rilus” or “Nilus”—but which
certainly doesn’t t with “Johannes.” While discussing the identity of
the character described as “M. de Walle Scolarium,” Glorieux decides
in favour of John of Châtillon only on the basis that, at the time in
which this Quodlibet would t within his chronology, another possible
candidate, Laurence of Poulangy, was then away from Paris. More
recent research on the Val-des-Écoliers would suggest that John of Bray

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 nicholas of bar’s collection 343

was actually a master regent in Paris for a longer time than Châtillon,
who apparently taught as regent master for a very brief period, in
1297–98, between the regencies of Poulangy and Bray.32
Two masters appearing only in the nal seventy-six briefer questions
limit the time span of that section: Simon of Guiberville was active as
a master from 1296 on, and became chancellor in 1302, while Andrew
of Mont-Saint-Éloi’s regency didn’t begin before 1303–04. That Peter
of Saint-Omer is described as chancellor in the same section, a fact
strongly emphasized by Glorieux, would conrm a date posterior to
1296. Taking into consideration the presence of Andrew, the hypothesis
of a three-year overall duration may have to be slightly extended, for
Andrew’s inception might have taken place after Eustache’s withdrawal
from teaching. In such a case, these seventy-six questions could represent
the state of debate on moral issues during the years 1300–04.
Before closing this chapter, the initial fteen questions, which convey
no trace of identication at all, have to be dealt with. Glorieux had
proposed Bernard of Trilia OP as a candidate for questions 7–14, on the
basis of a complex reasoning. In the rst place, it relied on the ascrip-
tion to Bernard of a justicatory memoir that was later recognised as
being penned by John Quidort.33 Although nothing connects Bernard
to Nicholas’ collection anymore, some scholars have nevertheless been
misled by Glorieux’s certainties.34 By removing this mistaken ascription,
nothing links the early parts of the collection to the 1280s. There is
apparently no reason to conceive that the initial fourteen questions were
produced by more than one author. In order to shed more light on
his prole, a detailed study of his positions on various issues would be
required. All in all, the safer conclusion at present is that the initial parts
of Nicholas of Bar’s collection represent a selection of cases discussed
in quodlibetal disputes during the 1290s, probably most of them during
the rst part of that decade, while the nal section contains reportationes
of questions from the early 1300s.

32
C. Guyon, Les écoliers du Christ. L’ordre canonial du Val des Écoliers (1201–1539) (St
Etienne 1998), pp. 231–3.
33
P. Glorieux, “Un mémoire justicatif de Bernard de Trilia. Sa carrière à l’université
de Paris (1279–1287),” RSPT 17 (1928), pp. 404–25, 18 (1929), pp. 24–58. The his-
tory of the debate is synthesised by P. Künzle, “Prolegomena,” in Bernardus de Trilia,
Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione animae separatae, ed. Künzle (Bern 1969), pp. 16*–17*. On
Bernard’s authentic rst three quodlibeta, see P. Künzle, “Neu aufgefundene Quaestiones
quodlibetales Berhnards von Trilia,” FZPT IV (1957), pp. 52–6,
34
Such is the case of F. Veraja, Le origini della controversia teologica sul contratto di censo
nel XIII secolo (Rome 1960), and myself in the rst volume of this book.

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 REFLECTIONS ON VAT. LAT. 1086 AND PROSPER OF
REGGIO EMILIA, O.E.S.A.

William J. Courtenay

One of the most important documents for early fourteenth-century

thought is the Sentences commentary and “notebook” of the Augustinian
Hermit Prosper of Reggio Emilia, Vatican City, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086.
The manuscript contains a remarkable amount of information on and
material from theologians active at Paris in the 1310s, including a great
many personal reportationes of quodlibetal questions, which have been
dated largely on the basis of their being reported by Prosper. Since
several of the chapters in this volume deal with this collection, a few
words about its dating and the nature of its contents are in order.1
Prosper was born in the 1270s and studied at Paris, probably in the
lectorate program of his order, where he is thought to have heard Henry
of Ghent before 1291.2 Subsequently he was lector at Milan3 and then
returned to Paris to lecture on the Sentences. He incepted as master of

1
The following relies on a close reading of the manuscript, in addition to observa-
tions from the following: A. Pelzer, “Prosper de Reggio Emilia des Ermites de Saint-
Augustin et le manuscrit latin 1086 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane,” Revue Néo-Scolastique
30 (1928), pp. 316–51; Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae Codices manu scripti recensiti. Codices
Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior: Codices 679–1134, ed. A. Pelzer (Vatican City 1931),
pp. 654–83; P. Glorieux, “A propos de Vatic. lat. 1086. Le personnel enseignant de Paris
vers 1311–14,” RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 23–39; Glorieux, Répertoire II, pp. 328–9 (no. 411);
Glorieux II, pp. 233–4; S.D. Dumont, “New Questions by Thomas Wylton,” DSTFM
9 (1998), pp. 341–81; R. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320. General
Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in
Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden
2002), p. 81n; C. Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of
Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, p. 254n; W.J.
Courtenay, “Radulphus Brito, Master of Arts and Theology,” CIMAGL 76 (2005) (pp.
131–58), pp. 148–50. I am grateful to Chris Schabel and Bill Duba for providing pho-
tocopies of sections of Vat. lat. 1086, and to Stephen Brown for allowing me access
to his edition of the prologue.
2
Vat. lat. 1086, f. 304ra: “sed ista positio, licet sicut declaretur a doctore sollempni
a quo multa profeci, tamen ego non bene intelligo eam.” However, Prosper may
have “proted” from arguments in the writings of Henry without having heard him
personally.
3
Vat. lat. 1086, f. 323r: “Utrum sit una materia superiorum et inferiorum, require
xii d. secundi in lectura Mediol<anensi>;” cf. Pelzer, “Prosper de Reggio,” p. 349.

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346 william j. courtenay

theology at Paris early in March 1316 and apparently remained there

until his appointment in 1318 as examiner for the studia of his order
in Italy.4 While in Italy he edited the prologue and questions on the
rst distinction of his commentary contained in the rst part of Vat.
lat. 1086, ff. 14r–87r.5 He was appointed regent at the convent of his
order at Bologna by 1321 and taught there until his death in 1332 or
early 1333.6
Vat. lat. 1086 is a combination of two manuscripts that belonged to
Prosper, along with some other additions.7 The rst main part, folios
13r–87v, contains a tabula questionum (ff. 13r–v) and what remains of
Prosper’s commentary on the Sentences (ff. 14r–87v): forty-three questions
on the prologue—also entitled “de quattuor causis theologie,” divided
into twenty questions related to its formal cause, six questions concerning
its efcient cause, seven questions on its material cause, and ten ques-
tions on its nal cause—followed by questions on the rst distinction.
This section of the manuscript breaks off incomplete (f. 87rb), and at
many points in the prologue the text also seems unnished. The second
part was once a second manuscript, originally numbered ff. 1–226,
but renumbered 101–3258 (plus a partial index, ff. 326r–327v) when it
was joined to the rst manuscript, which reveals that there is a missing
quire (ff. 88r–99v) that was part of Prosper’s commentary, presumably
containing questions on distinction two. The tabula questionum on ff.
13r–v contains the titles of the beginning questions on distinction two.
Throughout both sections of the manuscript, in the margins and on

4
His responses “in Aula” (the nal stage of inception) took place on 1 March 1316;
Vat. lat. 1086, f. 294v; BAV Codices, p. 677: “Utrum Verbum sit principium creaturarum
fuit questio magistrorum in aula anno domini 1315 die lune post brandones (1 Mart.
an. 1316), ad quam respondit frater Prosper ordinis her<emitarum> sancti augustini.”
He was appointed examiner at the General Chapter of the order at Rimini in 1318.
There is the possibility that before licensing he held a brief appointment as vicar
general of his order in 1311 and was away from Paris during that period; Glorieux,
“A propos,” p. 39.
5
The commentary is dedicated to Hugolino, bishop of Faenza (1311–36); Vat. lat.
1086, f. 14r; BAV Codices, p. 654: “domino fratri Hugolino . . . episcopo Faventino . . .”
The Prologus to his commentary is being edited by Stephen F. Brown.
6
He was described as master of theology and regent at Bologna in 1321 when he
received a payment of 50 orins from Pope John XXII (CUP II, p. 404, n. 4, based on
papal records of payment, Introit. et exit. n. 41, f. 155); a papal letter of 19 March 1333
mentions that the position of “magister actu legens in theologia” in the Augustinian
convent at Bologna had recently become vacant (CUP II, no. 952, p. 404).
7
This was the judgment of Pelzer, accepted by Glorieux and subsequent scholars.
For a full description of the manuscript, see BAV Codices cited above.
8
The discrepancy is caused by two folios numbered 164.

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 reflections on vat. lat. 1086 and prosper of reggio emilia 347

what were once blank pages or incomplete columns, a later fourteenth-

century possessor, presumably an Augustinian friar, has added his own
questions and comments in a tiny and highly abbreviated hand. One
quire (ff. 1–12), in the same tiny hand and in a one-column format of
some 80 lines per page, was added at the beginning of the manuscript,
containing additional questions and comments.9 Before dealing with
the second, main part of the manuscript, which is the portion that
concerns quodlibeta, some consideration needs to be given to the dating
and context of the part that contains Prosper’s commentary.
There have been differences of opinion about precisely when Prosper
lectured on the Sentences at Paris. He incepted in March 1316, which
means he was licensed during or just before Advent 1315, an annus
jubileus for licensing in the biennial cycle, and thus he read the Sentences
before that year. But the dedication at the beginning of his commentary
reveals that it was copied and to some extent revised in Italy between
1318 and 1323, even though the content, as he stated in his dedication,
derived from his time at Paris.10 The question is, therefore, how much of
the commentary in its present form reects the intellectual environment
of Paris at the time he read the Sentences, and how much was added
subsequently? And were the questions collected in the second part of
Vat. lat. 1086 assembled after he read the Sentences or before?
In his 1933 article Glorieux argued that Prosper was a formed
bachelor from 1311 to 1315, implying that he read the Sentences before
1311, but in the second volume of his study of quodlibetal literature,
he stated that Prosper read the Sentences “vers 1311–1314.”11 Glorieux’s
dating of Prosper’s Sentences as well as his dating of the second part
of the manuscript (the “notebook”) assumed that Prosper’s academic
career followed the statutes as Glorieux understood them. This meant

9
Pelzer, BAV Codices, p. 680, believed that this initial quire was added in the fteenth
century, but provided no evidence to support his opinion.
10
Vat. lat. 1086, f. 14ra; BAV Codices, p. 654: “Quatenus de quibusdam recollectio-
nibus Parisius disputatis super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones contexerem . . .”
The terminus post quem for the redaction in Vat. lat. 1086 is 1318 because it cites Johannes
Paignote (ms: Pagnotte) OESA as “magister,” and Paignote was regent in 1318 (CUP
II, no. 774, p. 227), which is also the year in which Prosper was reassigned to Italy.
The terminus ante quem is 1323 because Thomas Aquinas is never referred to as “saint.”
Thus, following Pelzer, F. Stegmüller, Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi
I (Würzburg 1947), p. 341, stated “composuit c. 1318–1323.” But that applies to the
preparation of the manuscript and its redaction, not the reading of the Sentences, which
has caused some confusion.
11
Glorieux, “A propos,” pp. 38–9; Glorieux II, p. 233.

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a required four-year period of Parisian residence after lecturing on the

Sentences, attending and participating in disputations and other academic
exercises as a formed bachelor, before being licensed and incepting
as master.12 For Glorieux this interim between Prosper’s lectures on
the Sentences and his inception as master was the period in which the
notebook was composed.
An alternative hypothesis deserves consideration. Nothing in the
redaction of Prosper’s commentary contained in Vat. lat. 1086 apart
from the dedication connects it to Italy, and all those whose opinions are
cited in the commentary were connected with Paris, with the possible
exception of the Franciscan Robert Cowton, whose commentary on
the Sentences Alfred B. Emden assumed to have been written at Oxford
between 1303 and 1308, although others have argued for his Parisian
doctorate.13 Moreover, all those cited were active at Paris before 1315,
although two of them, James of Lausanne and John Paignote, were
cited as masters in Prosper’s commentary, a title they attained between
1315 and 1318.14 Put another way, the only evidence of up-dating
concerns academic titles; apart from that, the actual contents (persons
and arguments) reect a pre-1315 Parisian environment.
Prosper’s citation of James of Lausanne towards the beginning of
his prologue (question 8) is particularly revealing. James was appointed
by the Dominican Order to read the Sentences at Paris in 1314–15.15

12
CUP II, no. 1188, p. 692: “bachalarii qui legerunt Sententias, debent postea pro-
sequi facta facultatis per quatuor annos antequam licentientur . . . nisi papa per bullas,
vel facultas super hoc faceret eis gratiam . . .”
13
A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to 1500 I (Oxford
1957), p. 507. Despite the statement of A.G. Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford (Oxford
1892), p. 222, that “there can be little doubt that he [Cowton] obtained the degree of
D.D. in the latter University [Paris],” Emden rejected, for lack of evidence, the opinion
of J. Bale, Script. Illustr. Bryt., pt. I, p. 424, that Cowton studied theology at Paris. But
Prosper’s citation of Cowton in an otherwise entirely Parisian list provides a context
for Bale’s opinion, and in the late thirteenth century and opening decade of the four-
teenth, the English province of the Franciscan Order was successful in sending its best
candidates to Paris to complete their doctorate in theology: John Pecham, William de
la Mare, William of Ware, John Duns Scotus, and William of Alnwick. The popularity
of Cowton’s commentary in England, which has come down in multiple redactions, is
insufcient evidence to reject the possibility of a Parisian baccalaureate.
14
The reference to John Paignote as magister (of theology, since mendicants did not
take the arts degree) occurs in the margin of 60r: “rationes m. Jo. pagocte.” He was
the Augustinian regent at Paris in 1318 (CUP II, no. 776, p. 227), but his lectures on
the Sentences dated earlier.
15
CUP II, no. 714, p. 172 (May 1314): “Assignamus ad legendum Sententias Parisius
isto anno fratrem Jacobum de Lausanna.”

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 reflections on vat. lat. 1086 and prosper of reggio emilia 349

Prosper cannot have heard James’ arguments before he presented them

at Paris in the fall of 1314. If these arguments and Prosper’s responses
belong to Prosper’s prologue as presented at Paris, then, in light of the
date of Prosper’s inception as master, Prosper also read the Sentences in
1314–15. If, on the other hand, Prosper read the Sentences around 1310
and rewrote his prologue in Italy after 1318, why did he not incorporate
the arguments of other Parisian theologians writing between 1314 and
1318, such as Peter Auriol OFM (sententiarius 1316–18) or Dionysius de
Borgo San Sepolcro OESA (sententiarius 1317–18)?
Glorieux’s depiction of Prosper’s academic career was based on the
assumption that a two-year reading of the Sentences was still current
practice and that there had to be a four-year waiting period between
reading the Sentences and inception as master. Since he also assumed
that Prosper was absent from Paris for a year as vicar general of his
order, that made a ve-year interim. But whether those statutes were
in force in the rst two decades of the fourteenth century and, if so,
whether they were applied to the mendicants is questionable. Pelzer
assumed that the mendicant orders were allowed an exemption from
that rule as long as their candidates had spent four years in residence
at Paris at some point in their career.16 The case of John Duns Scotus
is particularly revealing. Even assuming that Scotus spent a year in
Paris before lecturing on books I and IV of the Sentences in 1302–03, he
incepted as doctor of theology in 1305 after only one additional year
(1304–05) in Paris.17 Only a few months separate Scotus’ completion
of his sentential lectures at Paris (books II and III) and his licensing in
theology. Other examples are the Dominicans William of Lauduno, who
read the Sentences in 1313–14 and was licensed in 1314, and Matthew
Orsini, who read the Sentences in 1315–16 and was licensed in 1316.18
Peter Auriol is another example of receiving the license in theology
shortly after completing his lectures on the Sentences, albeit in his case

16
Pelzer, “Prosper de Reggio,” p. 349: “Promu maître en théologie à l’Université
de Paris, le 1 mars 1316, Prosper y a été admis à lire les Sentences avant cette date,
à une ou plusieurs années de distance, et cela après les neuf années réglementaires
d’études théologiques, dont quatre au moins ont dû être passées à l’Université de Paris
en vertu du privilège des augustins et des ordres mendiants auxquels on tenait compte
de leurs années d’enseignement en d’autres couvents.”
17
A. Callebaut, “Le B. Jean Duns Scot, étudiant à Paris vers 1293–1296,” AFH 17
(1924), pp. 3–12; W.J. Courtenay, “Scotus at Paris,” in Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem
Joannis Duns Scoti, L. Sileo, ed., Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9–11
marzo 1993, vol. I (Rome 1995), pp. 149–63.
18
On Lauduno, see CUP II, no. 696, p. 156; on Orsini, see CUP II, p. 172n.

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through a letter from Pope John XXII to the chancellor at Paris.19 No

such letter exists, or has survived, for Gerard Odonis, who read the
Sentences in 1326–28, and who received the license and incepted in
1328 or early 1329.20
Nothing prevents Prosper’s having been promoted to the magisterium
in the year following his lectures on the Sentences. Like Scotus, who had
probably been sent to Paris earlier in his career for the lectorate pro-
gram in theology and had already lectured on the Sentences at Oxford
before being sent to Paris for the baccalaureate and doctorate, Prosper
seems to have spent time at Paris and to have lectured on the Sentences
at Milan before returning to Paris for the baccalaureate and doctorate.21
To assume that James’ arguments were inserted later makes little sense
and would entail rewriting a prologue Prosper had already composed
and delivered. The simplest explanation is that Prosper and James read
in the same year, 1314–15.
It must be admitted, however, that the structure and length of
Prosper’s prologue is unusual. It consists of forty-three questions
arranged around the theme of the four causes and occupies slightly
more than sixty-three folios of abbreviated text in double column. It is
hard to imagine that he could have presented that much material before
turning to questions on the distinctions of book I and the remaining
three books. No statute species the number of questions to be treated
as long as the bachelor commented on all four books, but the pace at
which Prosper begins his commentary is slow. One suspects, therefore,
that in the process of preparing his text for Bishop Hugolino, some
expansion took place.
If Glorieux’s dating of Prosper’s time as sententiarius is open to
question, so is his dating of the second part of Vat. lat. 1086, which
comprises Prosper’s collection of questions, including several quodlibeta.
Glorieux assumed that this portion of the manuscript was assembled
sequentially, after Prosper had read the Sentences and while he was a
formed bachelor. Following Pelzer, he divided it into two groups of
texts. Group A (ff. 101r–173v), in the hand of an unknown scribe, was
allegedly assembled in 1311–12, and group B (ff. 176r–299v), in what

19
CUP II, no. 772, p. 225.
20
See W.O. Duba’s chapter in this volume.
21
See above, notes 2 and 3.

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 reflections on vat. lat. 1086 and prosper of reggio emilia 351

has been assumed to be Prosper’s own hand,22 was dated by Glorieux

to 1312–14. This was followed by Prosper’s Quodlibet and other texts.
One problem with this chronology is that group A, ff. 156rb–157va,
contains the questions Radulphus Brito disputed in vesperiis, at the time
of his inception as master of theology, which apparently took place early
in 1314.23 It is also in this section that the questions in vesperiis and in aula
of Thomas Wylton (ff. 164ra–164(bis)ra) and Durand of St Pourçain
(ff. 164(bis)ra–166vb) occur, as well as Prosper’s response in Sorbona and
the quodlibeta of James of Ascoli, Gregory of Lucca, John of Mont-Saint-
Éloi, Master Laurence (identied by Glorieux as Laurent le Breton,
OP, and by Pelzer as Laurence of Poulangy of Val-des-Écoliers), Peter
of Saint-Denis, Henry Amandi, Gerard of Saint-Victor, and Master
Garinus. It also includes the treatise Contra exemptos of Giles of Rome,
written in 1311–12. Because this portion of Vat. lat. 1086 (ff. 101r–
173v) includes the questions of Radulphus Brito at the time of his
inception, it was presumably compiled in or later than 1314. Its con-
tents, however, need not (and in the case of Giles of Rome cannot) be
presumed to have occurred during the academic year 1313–14.
Dating the copying of this portion of Vat. lat. 1086 to 1314 or
later depends, therefore, on the date of the inception disputations of
Radulphus Brito. In contrast to the mendicants, who were not held to
a four-year waiting period between reading the Sentences and receiving
the license in theology, there is no example of a secular theologian in
this period receiving the license in less than four years as a formed
bachelor. This does not mean there could have been no exceptions
by way of a dispensation from regent masters in theology, but in the
absence of such evidence the most likely scenario is that Radulphus,
who read the Sentences in 1308–09, was licensed and incepted in the
year before Prosper read the Sentences, namely in 1313–14.24

22
One problem with this assumption is that there appear to be at least two different
hands in this section.
23
For the biography and academic career of Radulphus Brito, see Courtenay,
“Radulphus Brito, Master of Arts and Theology,” pp. 145–51. Radulphus completed
the reading of the Sentences in 1309. As a secular clerk, the regulation in the statutes
of the faculty of theology that required a four-year waiting period before licensing did
apply to him. For the text of the statute, see above, note 12.
24
Three decades later there is one example of a secular theologian receiving the
license upon completion of his reading of the Sentences, namely Alphonsus Dionysii of
Lisbon, but he was noble, had spent almost three decades at Paris in the faculties of
arts, medicine, and theology, and already held a Parisian doctorate in medicine. He

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352 william j. courtenay

Whether or not Radulphus Brito incepted in 1314, as seems most

likely, this second part of Vat. lat. 1086 was not assembled by Prosper or
his appointed scribe while Prosper was a formed bachelor, as Glorieux
argued, but was assembled in the year or years before he read the Sentences,
which makes more sense. He was collecting information that might be
useful in preparing his own lectures and future disputations.
Unfortunately, Glorieux’s dating this section (ff. 101r–173v) to
1311–12 and the following section (ff. 176r–299v) to 1312–14 has
led, in turn, to the dating of a number of inceptions, regencies, and
quodlibeta to those same years. For example, on the basis of two groups
of questions attributed to Gerard of Saint-Victor, one in section A
(ff. 119rb–vb) and a second group in section B (ff. 224r–v), Glorieux
dated the rst to 1311–12 and the second to 1312–13. But Gerard
was already regent master in the faculty of theology at Paris by 1305
and was still regent master in 1317.25 And while it is possible that he
disputed quodlibetal questions in 1311–13, that assertion should not
be based on the belief that the contents of the last half of Vat. lat.
1086 occurred sequentially across the years 1311–14. This applies just
as much to the dating of Durandus’ and Wylton’s inceptions as it does
to the various quodlibeta.
There are a number of unidentied bachelors or masters cited in
Vat. lat. 1086, some of whom, as may well be the case with James of
Lausanne, were fellow bachelors at the time Prosper was reading the

was also about to be appointed bishop of Idanna in Portugal. In the 1370s, when the
evidence allows us to compare dates of sententiarii with their licensing, the period as a
formed bachelor lasted four years, occasionally three: Franciscus Christophori, Johannes
de Diodona, and Johannes Textoris were sententiarii in 1369–70 and were licensed
in 1374; Hugo Lenvoisie and Henricus Heinbuch de Langenstein read in 1370–71
and were licensed in 1374 and 1375, respectively. The same waiting period can be
documented for Stephanus Escaillart de Chalendry, Johannes Caillaudi de Quercu,
Johannes de Trelon, Pierre d’Ailly, Herveus Sulven, and Franciscus Robini de Sancto
Michaele. There are also a few cases of secular theologians waiting far longer. In this
same period there are a number of mendicants who received the license upon comple-
tion of the Sentences, or within a year. For the documentation on seculars, consult the
entries for these theologians in Rotuli Parisienses. Supplications to the Pope from the University
of Paris, eds. W.J. Courtenay and E.D. Goddard, vol. II: 1352–1378 (Leiden 2004).
For promotions of mendicants in the early fourteenth century, see above, notes 16–19;
for the later fourteenth century, the waiting time between completing the Sentences and
licensing varied between two and four years, except for the Dominicans Arnulfus de
Lasteria and Bernardus de Boscarello, who completed the Sentences in 1381 and 1383,
respectively, and were licensed a few months later; see CUP III, nos. 1409, 1416, 1447,
and T. Sullivan, Parisian Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373–1500. A Biographical Register,
vol. I: The Religious Orders (Leiden 2004), pp. 16–17.
25
CUP II, no. 658, p. 121; no. 751, p. 209.

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 reflections on vat. lat. 1086 and prosper of reggio emilia 353

Sentences. One of these is Magister Johannes Birchel, or Berchel, whose

academic title may be in arts if he was a secular theologian. Another
is Magister Jacobus de Corbolio, who is described in association with
Godfrey of Fontaines and John of Pouilly, and who therefore was prob-
ably a secular theologian.
There has been some uncertainty regarding the “m<agister> Laur
<entius>” cited in Vat. lat. 1086, and thus the authorship of the eleven
quodlibetal or disputed questions attributed to him in that manuscript.26
Opinions have ranged from Pelzer’s conjectures of Laurentius Anglicus
OSB or Laurentius de Pollengio ex ord. Vallis Scolarium (Laurence
of Poulangy) to Glorieux’s Laurent le Breton OP. Laurentius Anglicus
OSB can probably be excluded, since his alleged association with Paris
is based only on the assumption that he was the Master Laurence cited
by Prosper.27 This English Benedictine incepted as master of theology at
Oxford in 1301 and later served on the commission at Avignon between
1318 and 1320 that condemned articles from Olivi’s commentary on the
Apocalypse.28 He is presumably the “frater Laurentius sacre theologie
professor” who earlier in 1318 was among the doctors of theology at
Avignon who condemned three opinions of a Franciscan.29 It is also
unlikely that Prosper was referring to Laurence of Poulangy, Prior
General of Val-des-Écoliers in the late thirteenth century. Poulangy
was active at Paris in the 1280s and 1290s, but the assumption that he
was the Master Laurence cited by Prosper was based on the erroneous
belief that Poulangy was the Laurentius de Valle Scolarium, master
of theology, who was active at Paris between 1307 and 1310.30 The
latter, however, was Laurentius de Droco (Laurence of Dreux), prior
of Val-des-Écoliers at that time.31 The last theologian by the name of
Laurence active in this period was the one Glorieux eventually settled

26
Glorieux II, p. 191.
27
T. Sullivan, Benedictine Monks at the University of Paris, A.D. 1229–1500. A Biographical
Register (Leiden 1995), pp. 21–3.
28
CUP II, no. 790, pp. 238–9.
29
CUP II, no. 760, p. 217.
30
CUP II, p. 127, n. 3; Glorieux, Répertoire II, no. 383, p. 280; C. Guyon, Les Écoliers
du Christ: l’ordre canonial du Val des Écoliers (St. Étienne 1998). Poulangy is a village near
the Marne, between Langres and Chaumont, and near the mother house of Val-des-
Écoliers.
31
Those attending the confession of the Grand Master of the Templars, Jacques de
Molay, at the Temple in Paris on 25 October 1307, included “Laurencius de Droco de
Valle Scolarium,” cited as “Laurencius prior Vallis Scolarium” at the meeting on the
following day; see H. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens II (Münster 1907),
pp. 307–13. Droco is Dreux in the diocese of Chartres.

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354 william j. courtenay

on: Laurentius Brito (Laurence of Nantes), OP, who was bachelor of

theology in October 1307 when he attended the second confession of
the Templars, and was licensed in theology in February 1310.32 Laurence
of Dreux of the Val-des-Écoliers, master of theology by 1307, and
Laurence of Nantes, OP, master of theology in 1310, are equally good
candidates for Prosper’s “Master Laurence.”
One of the most interesting individuals in this unidentied group is
Ja[cobus] B’.,33 whose questions are reported in the rst group of the
second half of the manuscript. He is never accorded the ‘m’ for magister
but he was already disputing theological questions. The implication is
that at the time his questions were reported he was a bachelor of the-
ology in a religious order because, unlike secular theological students,
he did not hold a master of arts degree and was not yet a master
of theology. In Vat. lat 1086 and in many other manuscripts of this
period, those in religious orders are often identied by rst name and
order, e.g., Gerardus Carmelita (Gerard of Bologna), Jacobus Minoris
( James of Ascoli, OFM), or Simon Carmelita (Simon of Corbie). On
that principle, and realizing that the hook mark after “B” should be
read as “Ber.,” the second part of “Jacobus Ber.” could be Bernardita,
a common way of referring to a bachelor from Saint-Bernard, the
Cistercian house of studies at Paris.34
There were three Cistercian theologians at Paris in this period by
the name of James: James of Thérines, who was master of theol-
ogy by 1307–08; James of Dijon, master of theology by 1310; and
Jacques Fournier, master of theology in ca. 1314.35 Since this Jac[obus]

32
Finke, Papsttum II, pp. 309–13; the date for his licensing comes from the list of
Bernard Gui edited by H. Denie in Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters
2 (1886), p. 213; see also T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi III (Rome
1980), p. 65.
33
As such in the margin of 102vb and at bottom of 120vb, but as “Ja. B.” imme-
diately above the question on f. 117ra.
34
Hugolino of Orvieto cites Peter Ceffons, the Cistercian bachelor, as “baccalaurius
de Sancto Bernardo” in 1348; John of Falisca in 1361 cites his fellow Cistercian bach-
elor as “Bernardista”; John Regis in 1369 cites James of Eltville, his fellow Cistercian
bachelor, as “Jacobus Bernardita”; Peter Gracilis in 1376 cites the Cistercian bachelor,
Robert de Voto, as “baccalarius Bernardi” and “Robertus de Voto Bernardi.” While
these examples are later in the fourteenth century, they follow a principle that can
already be observed in Vat. lat. 1086.
35
On James of Thérines, also known as Jacobus de Karoliloco (Chaalis), see W.C.
Jordan, Unceasing Strife, Unending Fear. Jacques de Thérines and the Freedom of the Church in
the Age of the Last Capetians (Princeton 2005); Jacques de Thérines, Quodlibets I et II, ed.
P. Glorieux (Paris 1958); and T. Sullivan’s chapter in this volume. On James of Dijon and

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 reflections on vat. lat. 1086 and prosper of reggio emilia 355

Ber[nardita?] was not cited as master, the only one of the three who
was a bachelor of theology in the 1310–14 period was Jacques Fournier,
later Pope Benedict XII. This identication is only a hypothesis, but its
potential signicance merits listing the questions attributed to Jacobus
Ber. in Vat. lat. 1086 along with those immediately following on the
same or a similar theme:

First group:
Utrum persona constituatur in essentia per essentiale vel per relationem
(f. 102vb–103ra)
Possible: Utrum attributum sit attributum formaliter per absolutum vel respec-
tivum; hic implicatur utrum in divinis sit universale (f. 103ra–103rb)
[intervening questions by others]
Second group:
Utrum species sint in intellectu preter actum intelligendi (f. 117ra–117rb)
Possible: Utrum essentia divina possit esse ratio eliciendi actum beaticum
(f. 117rb)
Possible: Utrum in voluntate quantum des stat in intellecto (f. 117rb–117va)
Possible: Utrum actus dilectionis naturalis et supernaturalis differant specie
(f. 117va)
Possible: Utrum Pater constituitur in esse per innascibilitatem (f. 117va–
117vb)
[other intervening questions from “Bel. minor,” Gerard of Saint-Victor, and
Gregory of Lucca]
q. 1: Utrum sanguis sit in corpore Christi in sacramento ex vi sacramenti
(f. 121ra–121rb)
q. 2: Utrum substantia in corpus Christi conversa possit eodem numero repa-
rari (f. 121rb–121va)
q. 3: Utrum religiosus thesaurizans pro persona sua in omni casu mortaliter
peccet (f. 121vb)
Possible: Utrum existens in mortali peccato peccet mortaliter in ministrando
sacramenta ecclesie (f. 121vb)
Possible: Utrum aliquis aliquo casu teneatur revelare confessionem (f. 121vb–
122ra)
Finally, in the questions in the prologue and rst distinction of his
commentary on the Sentences, Prosper cites the following bachelors and
masters active in the 1290–1315 period:

Jacques Fournier, see R.E. Lerner, “A Note on the University Career of Jacques Fournier,
O. Cist., Later Pope Benedict XII,” Analecta Cisterciensia 30 (1974), pp. 66–9.

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356 william j. courtenay

Alanus Brito [Gontier], mag. DTh Johannes Birchel or Berchel, mag.

by 1310 Johannes de Monte Sancti Eligii,
Alexander Ungarus [de Hungaria], OSA, mag., DTh by 1307
OESA, mag., DTh ca. 1300 Johannes de Polliaco, mag., DTh
Alexander de Sancto Elpidio, 1307
OESA, mag., DTh in 1307 Johannes de Napoli dictus Judeus,
Angelus [de Camerino, OESA], mag. [?identical with Johannes de
DTh ca. 1295 Regina OP, DTh 1315]
Arnaldus [Roiardi], OFM, mag. Johannes Paignote de Sancta
Atroposmath. Atheniensis, doctor Victoria, OESA, mag., BTh ca.
Augustinus [de Ancona], mag., DTh 1310, DTh & regent 1317–18
ca. 1313 Johannes de Parisius, OP, mag., DTh
Bertaldus, mag., [OFM?] by by 1300
Ç., mag. Laurentius, mag. [Laurentius de
Durandus de Sancto Porciano, OP, Droco de Valle Scolarium, DTh
mag., DTh 1312 by 1307, or Laurentius Brito de
Franciscus Caraccioli, mag., DTh by Nannetis, OP, DTh in 1310]
1309, Cancellarius 1309–16 Petrus de Palude, OP, mag., DTh
Gerardus de Bononia, OCarm, 1314
mag., DTh by 1307 Petrus de Sancto Dionysio, [OSB],
Godfredus de Fontibus mag., DTh by 1310
Gregorius de Lucca, OESA, mag., Radulphus Brito, mag., DTh by
DTh by 1310 1316, probably in 1314
Guido Terreni, OCarm, mag., DTh Radulphus Normanus, mag.,
by 1313 [de Hotot?, DTh by 1307]
Guillelmus Anglicus, also cited as Ricardus, mag.
Ware, OFM, mag. [Robertus] Cowton
Henricus de Allemania, OESA, Simon [de Corbeia], OCarm,
mag., DTh by 1307 mag., DTh ca. 1310
Henricus Amandi, mag. Thadeus [de Parma], mag.
Henricus Anglicus [Harclay], mag. Thomas Anglicus [Wylton], mag.,
Hugo [de Novocastro], OFM, mag., DTh between 1311 and May
DTh 1321 1314
Jacobus, OFM, mag. [?Jacobus de Thomas de Fabriano, OESA, mag.
Aesculo, OFM, DTh by 1310] Yvo [?Cadomensis OP], mag., DTh
Jacobus de Corbolio, mag. 1312
Jacobus de Lausanna, OP,
Sententiarius 1314–15, mag.

Those who posed questions during Prosper’s disputatio in aula in March

1316:

Alanus Gontier
Gerardus de Sancto Victore, OSA

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 reflections on vat. lat. 1086 and prosper of reggio emilia 357

Hervaeus Natalis, OP
Petrus de Sancto Dionysio, OSB

Those whose questions are collected (heard?) and copied in his note-
book:

Alanus [Brito, Gontier], mag., DTh Ja[cobus de Aesculo], OFM, mag.,

by 1310 DTh by 1310
Amadeus [de Castello, OESA], mag., Ja[cobus] Ber. [?Jacobus
DTh by 1312? Bernardita, OCist]
Bel. [Ber.?] minor, OFM Jacobus [de Viterbio, OESA]
Ber. minor., OFM, mag. (same as Johannes Birchel or Berchel, mag.
previous?, or Bertrandus OFM, Johannes [Duns] Scotus, [OFM],
BTh by 1307 when present at the mag., DTh 1305
confessions of the Templars) Johannes de Monte Sancti Eligii,
Bertaldus, mag. (same as previous?) OSA, mag., DTh by 1307
Durandus [de S. Porciano, OP], mag., Johannes de Polliaco, mag. DTh 1307
DTh in 1312 (cites vespers and Johannes de Sancto V. (or Ber.),
aula) mag. [perhaps = Johannes
Eckhardus, [OP], mag., licensed Pagnota de S. Victoria, OESA;
in 1302, regent in 1311–12 after or Joh. de Sancto Victore, OSA;
being provincial or Joh. de Sancto Bernardo,
Egidius [Romanus, OESA, DTh OCist]
c. 1280] Johannes Vallis Scol[arium], OSA,
[Franciscus Caraccioli, mag., DTh by mag., DTh by 1314
1309], Cancellarius 1309–1316 Laurentius, mag. [Laurentius de
Garinus, mag. (Quodlibet added in Droco de Valle Scolarium, DTh
margin) by 1307, or Laurentius Brito de
Gerardus [de Bononia] Carmelita, Nannetis, OP, DTh in 1310]
mag., DTh by 1307 Martinus [de Abbatisvilla], OFM,
Gerardus de Sancto Victore, OSA, mag., DTh after June 1310
mag., DTh by 1307/08 Pe[trus] de Alv[ernia]
Godfredus de Fontibus Petrus de Sancto Dio[nysio, OSB],
Gregorius Lucanus [de Lucca], mag., DTh by 1310
OESA, mag., DTh by 1310 Radulphus Britonis, mag., DTh
Guido Carmelita [de Perpiniano, by 1316, probably in 1314 (cites
Terreni], OCarm, mag., DTh by vespers)
1313 [Robertus] Cowton
Henricus de Allemania, OESA, mag., Salo[mon]
DTh by 1307/08 Simon de Carmelo [de Corbeia,
Henricus Amandi, mag. OCarm], mag., DTh ca. 1310
Henricus de Gandavo Thomas Anglicus [Wylton], mag.,
Herveus [Natalis, OP], DTh by 1307 DTh between 1311 and 1314
Hugo [de Novocastro], OFM, (cites vespers)
mag. 1321 Witelo
J. minoris, OFM (131v) Yvo [?Cadomensis OP, DTh 1312]

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 THE QUODLIBETA OF THE CANONS REGULAR
AND THE MONKS

Thomas Sullivan, OSB

Teaching and learning played an important role in the spiritual and

intellectual lives of the medieval religious orders. In the thirteenth
century, dissatised with the education offered in their internal schools,
monks and canons turned to the universities for the intellectual forma-
tion of their brightest students. After an initial canonical opposition
between cloister and school, and with the cooperation of the University
of Paris and the papacy, a way was found by the Dominican friars to
reconcile the disciplina of the cloister with the doctrina of the University.
The Dominicans arranged in 1221 for magister John of Barastre,1 royal
chaplain and dean of Saint-Quentin, to provide them with instruc-
tion in theology; this enabled them to receive the most advanced and
sophisticated theological training of the day without having to leave
their cloister, the future Couvent Saint-Jacques.2
Other religious quickly followed the Dominican example by found-
ing houses of study in Paris: the Benedictines of Saint-Denis as early
as 1229–30, the Friars Minor about 1238, the Cistercians in 1246, the
Canons Regular of Prémontré in 1252,3 the Canons Regular of Val-
des-Écoliers about 1250–54,4 and the Cluniac Benedictines in 1258–60.
These studia joined the religious houses already established at Paris:
the Canons Regular of Saint-Victor, the Canons Regular of Sainte-
Geneviève, the Cluniac Benedictines of Saint-Martin-des-Champs,
the Benedictines of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, and others. So rapid was
the growth and signicant the presence of the religious at the Univer-
sity that tensions between them and the University were inevitable.
A witness to these stresses was the circular letter drafted in 1254 by

1
R. Aubert, “Jean de Barastre,” Dictionnaire d’histoire et géographie ecclésiastique (herein-
after DHGE) XXVI, col. 1221.
2
S.C. Ferruolo, The Origins of the University. The Schools of Paris and Their Critics,
1100 –1215 (Stanford 1985), pp. 312–13.
3
B. Ardura, Prémontrés. Histoire et Spiritualité (Saint-Étienne 1995), pp. 186–90.
4
C. Guyon, Les Écoliers du Christ. L’ordre canonial du Val des Écoliers 1201–1539 (Saint-
Étienne 1998), p. 226.

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360 thomas sullivan, osb

the University concerning its grievances against the religious orders;

further witness is the questions asked quodlibetal masters concerning
the status perfectior.5
During the period of the mendicant controversy (1250–70) and the
sixty years beyond (1270–1330), seventeen monks and canons regular
are known to have or thought to have produced quodlibeta, eight canons
regular and nine monks. The canons include a master from the abbey
of Saint-Victor in Paris, Gerard; three from the abbey of Mont-Saint-
Éloi: Servais of Guez, Andrew of Orchies, and John of Maroueil;6 two
from the abbey of Val-des-Écoliers: an anonymous master—Laurence
of Poulangy?—and John du Val; one Premonstratensian canon from
the abbey of Vicogne, John of Tongres; and one canon of an unknown
monastery or congregation, James of Aaleus. The nine monastic quod-
libetal masters count two Benedictine monks: Peter of Saint-Denis7 and
Pierre Roger (the future Pope Clement VI); two Cluniac Benedictines:
Albert and Guy of Cluny; and ve Cistercians: Guy of l’Aumône, John
of Waarde, James of Thérines, Rainier Marquette of Clairmarais, and
Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay.
The quodlibeta assigned to fteen of these masters are found in different
manuscripts and in different forms. The questions of ten of them appear
in the brief extracts or summaries offered in the collections of Nicholas
of Bar-le-Duc8 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia, OESA.9 Nicholas’s col-

5
CUP I, no. 230, p. 253. See also C.H. Lawrence, The Friars. The Impact of the Early
Mendicant Movement on Western Europe (London-New York 1994), pp. 152–61; L. Duval-
Arnould, “Mendicants and Seculars, Quarrel of,” in Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, ed.
A. Vauchez (Chicago 2000), vol. II, p. 939.
6
While these three canons generally appear identied in discussions of quodlibetal
questions under the name of their monastery or congregation, either Gervais or Servais
of Mont-Saint-Éloi (Glorieux I, p. 133), André of Mont-Saint-Éloi (Glorieux II, p. 61),
and John of Mont-Saint-Éloi (Glorieux II, p. 156), the names supplied in this paper for
the quodlibetal authors from among canons regular of Mont-Saint-Éloi are provided in
O. Barubé, L’Abbaye du Mont-Saint-Éloi des origines au XVIe siècle (Arras 1977), pp. 168–9.
They are also found in idem, “La collégiale du Mont-Saint-Éloi, des origines à 1350,”
Revue d’histoire de l’Église de France 61 (1975) (pp. 227–30), p. 230.
7
Glorieux, Répertoire I, p. 448, includes Peter of Saint-Denis among the secular
masters. The reasons for Peter’s inclusion among the monastic quodlibetal masters
will be discussed below.
8
Paris, BnF lat. 15850. The Parisian manuscript is described in detail in R. Macken,
Bibliotheca Manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo, 2 vols. (Leuven-Leiden 1979), I, pp. 634–44.
9
BAV, Vat. lat. 1086. The manuscript is presented in signicant detail in Bibliothecae
Apostolicae Vaticanae Codices manu scripti recensiti. Codices Vaticani Latini, t. II, pars prior.
Codices 679–1134, ed. A. Pelzer (Vatican City 1931), pp. 654–83. The collection is
discussed in A. Pelzer, “Prosper of Reggio Emilia, des Ermites de Saint-Augustin, et le
manuscrit latin 1086 de la Bibliothèque de Vaticane,” Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 361

lection (Paris, BnF lat. 15850, ff. 10r–42v) presents in summary form
170 quodlibetal questions argued in the 1290s (most from the earlier
part of that decade) and between 1300 and 1304 by eighteen different
Parisian masters of theology. Canons regular and monks in Nicholas’s
collection include Guy of Cluny, OClun (ff. 19v–20v; ff. 40v–41r),
Rainier Marquette of Clairmarais, OCist (ff. 35r–35v; ff. 38v–39r), and
Andrew of Orchies, OSA Mont-Saint-Éloi (ff. 41v–42r). Unnamed but
partially identied masters include a theologian named twice as “abbas
sancti bernardi” (ff. 18v–19v) and another labeled “M. de Walle Sco-
larium” (ff. 34v–35r). Glorieux identied these two masters as either
John of Waarde, OCist, or John Sindewint, OCist, in the rst case,
settling nally on John of Waarde,10 and either Laurence of Poulangy,
OSA Val-des-Écoliers, or John of Châtillon, OSA Val-des-Écoliers,
in the second case, settling nally on John of Châtillon.11 Glorieux’s
identications are problematic and will be discussed later.
Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection of reportationes (BAV, Vat. lat.
1086, ff. 101r–299v) presents the quodlibeta of one monk and three
canons regular: Peter of Saint-Denis, OSB (ff. 111r–112v, ff. 252r–255v,
ff. 225v–257r), Gerard of Saint-Victor, OSA Saint-Victor (f. 119r–v,
f. 224r–v), John of Maroeuil, OSA Mont-Saint-Éloi (ff. 126r–128r,
ff. 217r–220v), and John du Val, OSA Val-des-Écoliers (ff. 226r–227v).
In addition to these four theologians, Prosper’s collection includes
quodlibetal questions of a master whose name has been abbreviated
to “M. Laure.” (ff. 122r–137r). Scholars have suggested various possi-
bilities for the identication of this theologian. Pelzer proposed either
Laurence l’Anglais, OSB, or Laurence of Poulangy, OSA Val-des-
Écoliers;12 Glorieux put forward the Dominican Laurence Le Breton,
rejecting another Dominican, Laurence of Fougères.13 The canon
regular of Val-des-Écoliers Laurence of Dreux, active in the rst part

30 (1928), pp. 316–51, and in P. Glorieux, “A propos de ‘Vatic. lat. 1086’. Le personnel
enseignant de Paris vers 1311–14,” RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 23–39. In this present volume,
W.J. Courtenay discusses the dating and nature of the contents in Prosper’s collection:
“Reections on Vat. lat. 1086.”
10
Glorieux I, p. 232, n. 2; II, p. 199; P. Glorieux, “Notices sur quelques théologiens
de Paris de la n du XIIIe siècle,” AHDLMA 3 (1928) (pp. 201–38), p. 213.
11
Glorieux I, p. 236, n. 3; II, p. 199; Glorieux, “Notices,” pp. 233–4.
12
Pelzer, “Prosper of Reggio Emilia,” p. 339.
13
Glorieux II, p. 191.

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362 thomas sullivan, osb

of the fourteenth century, presents someone hitherto unmentioned as

a candidate.14 These identications will be discussed later.
The quodlibetal questions of six masters—James of Aaleus, OSA;
Servais of Guez, OSA Mont-Saint-Éloi; James of Thérines, OCist; Guy
of l’Aumône, OCist; Pierre Roger, OSB; and Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay,
OCist—are each found in disparate manuscripts.15
Finally, we only know of Albert of Cluny’s Quodlibet from the descrip-
tion of a manuscript in a catalogue of the abbey of Saint-Victor in
Paris.16 The same is true for the Quodlibeta of John of Tongres, OPraem,
known only because of their inclusion in the literary histories of his
religious order.

Canons Regular

Canons Regular of Mont-Saint-Éloi

Among the many eleventh-century foundations of canons regular that
of Mont-Saint-Éloi is of great interest to students of quodlibetal litera-
ture. The clergy living there were organized into a community living
under an abbot and a rule about 1068 by Liétbert, bishop of Arras
(1051–76). The community ourished locally, with six dependent prio-
ries, but never grew to a size such that it could have been considered a
congregation.17 In the second half of the thirteenth century, however,
the abbey enjoyed a prolonged period of intellectual brilliance out of
proportion to its place in the ecclesiastical world. This was largely the
work of John of Barastre, prior of Mont-Saint-Éloi before his election
as abbot in 1248, a man whose abbacy was marked by zeal for both
learning and religious observance. John was held in high esteem by
King Louis IX, who made the abbey the spectacular gift of a thorn

14
Guyon, Les Écoliers du Christ, p. 233.
15
James of Aaleus: Paris, BnF lat. 14899, ff. 162r–167v; Servais of Guez: Paris, BnF
lat. 15350, ff. 269r–291r; James of Thérines: Paris, BnF lat. 15565; Guy of l’Aumône:
Paris, BnF lat. 14891, ff. 191v–209r; Pierre Roger: BAV, Borghese 89, ff. 63r–89v;
Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay: an unnumbered manuscript held by the Cistercian abbey
of Tamié, ff. 155v–159v.
16
Les manuscrits de l’Abbaye de Saint-Victor: catalogue établi sur la base du répertoire de Claude
de Grandrue (1514), ed. G. Ouy, 2 vols. (Turnhout 1999), I, p. 255; II, p. 98 (M 7).
17
For the history of the foundation and early growth of the abbey, see Barubé,
L’Abbaye du Mont-Saint-Éloi.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 363

from the Crown of Thorns, brought to France from Constantinople

in 1239–41.18
Under Abbot John’s guidance at least two canons would be sent to
Paris for studies: Stephen of Fermont and Servais of Guez. Andrew
of Orchies and John of Maroeuil may have in turn been sent to Paris
during the abbacy of Stephen of Fermont or, more likely, that of
Servais of Guez. Each of these four—Stephen, Servais, Andrew, and
John—was magistratus in theology with quodlibeta assigned to the latter
three.19 Subsequent abbots of Mont-Saint-Éloi would also be involved
with the University of Paris in different capacities. Nicholas of Duisans,
abbot from 1324 until his death in 1350, was magistratus in theologia at
Paris. Michael Coulon, abbot of Mont-Saint-Éloi probably from about
1350 until 1361, along with the abbot of Saint-Bertin, drew up the
statutes for the Collège de Becoud in November 1357. Finally, Nicholas
de Noulette, abbot from March 1363 to November 1388, earned the
baccalaureate in theology.20

Servais of Guez
Servais of Guez,21 a native of Arras, a canon of Mont-Saint-Éloi, and
the student of Stephen of Fermont, succeeded his master as regent,
after having been licensed in theology and magistratus about 1277–79,
dates consonant with Glorieux’s suggestion that Stephen of Fermont
possibly exercised regency as late as 1279.22 According to Hauréau,
Servais attended a meeting of doctors in theology in December 1282,
called by William of Mâcon, the bishop of Amiens, to debate the
papal bull Ad fructus uberes, published that year.23 His name, however,

18
A man conspicuous for his holiness, John of Barastre was popularly granted the
title of “beatus” (R. Aubert, “Jean de Barastre,” DHGE XXVI, cols. 1271–2). This
abbot of Mont-Saint-Éloi should not be confused with the previously mentioned John
of Barastre, dean of Saint-Quentin and rst master of theology for the Dominicans.
19
Glorieux, Répertoire II, pp. 283–8; Barubé, “La collégiale,” pp. 227–30; Barubé,
L’Abbaye du Mont-Saint-Éloi, pp. 168–9.
20
D. Sainte-Marthe, Gallia Christiana in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa quas series et historia
archepiscoporum episcoporum et abbatum ab origine ecclesiarum ad nostra tempora, 16 vols. (Paris-
Rome 1865–1875), III, cols. 429–30; R. Cazelles, “Pierre de Becoud et la fondation du
collège de Boncourt,” Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 120 (1962) (pp. 55–103), p. 98.
21
R. Hissette, “Une question quodlibétique de Servais du Mont-Saint-Éloi sur le
pouvoir doctrinal de l’évêque,” RTAM 49 (1982) (pp. 234–42), pp. 234–5 n. 1, presents
a discussion of the orthography of our subject’s name.
22
Glorieux, Répertoire II, p. 285.
23
B. Hauréau, “Guillaume de Macon,” Histoire littéraire de la France (hereinafter HLF )
XXXV (Paris 1869), p. 387. Servais appears here under the name “Salvari.”

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364 thomas sullivan, osb

does not appear in a responsum given by the Faculty of Theology in

November 1282 dealing with repeated confessions.24 A letter written by
the bishop of Amiens in February 1287 indicates that Servais was still
regent in 1286.25 A reference in the Domus Sorbonicae historia suggests that
Godfrey of Fontaines was a student of Servais (as well as of Henry of
Ghent).26 At Stephen of Fermont’s death in 1291, Servais was elected
abbot of Mont-Saint-Éloi. After governing Mont-Saint-Éloi and its
congregation for twenty-two years, Servais died on 27 January 1314.
The Gallia Christiana informs us that “fuit is in poenitentia austerus, in
studiis assiduus, in confessionibus audiendis sedulus” and that he had
served as councilor to Count Robert of Artois.27
Servais’s academic career was distinguished: he presided over a series
of quodlibetal disputations, earned a reputation as an accomplished
preacher, and served as dean of the Faculty of Theology. His extant
works include eight or nine sermons28 and the eighty-ve quodlibetal
questions found in Paris, BnF lat. 15350, ff. 269r–292r.29 After presenting
the questions in his rst volume on quodlibeta, Glorieux later apportioned
them into eight quodlibeta, assigning the rst quodlibet to the academic
year 1282–83 and the eighth to 1289–90, with quodlibeta for each suc-
ceeding year after the rst.30 Glorieux may have been too optimistic
about his division of the quodlibeta into various years: the selection of
questions and determinations with its strong concentration on questions

24
CUP I, no. 510, pp. 595–6.
25
CUP II, no. 543, p. 13.
26
See M. De Wulf, Un théologien-philosophe du XIII e siècle. Étude sur la vie, les oeuvres
et l’inuence de Godefroid de Fontaines (Brussels 1904), p. 17; J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical
Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, DC 1981), p. xix n. 23.
27
R. Aubert, “Gervais du Mont-Saint-Éloi,” DHGE XXII, cols. 1086–7; Gallia
Christiana III, col. 429.
28
J.B. Schneyer, Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von
1150–1350, 11 vols. (Münster, Westfalen 1969–1990), II, pp. 185–6; V, p. 399, lists
eleven sermons attributed to Gervais of Mont Saint-Éloi and one more for a Seucianus
of Mont Saint-Éloi (most likely the Servais under discussion here).
29
Paris, BnF lat. 15350 is described thoroughly in Macken, Bibliotheca manuscripta
Henrici de Gandavo I, pp. 577–88. Servais’s questions are described on p. 584. The
description indicates that the manuscript contains quodlibeta of Thomas Aquinas, Henry
of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Giles of Lessines, James of Viterbo, and Peter of Auvergne,
in addition to those of Servais of Guez. The manuscript was owned by Godfrey of
Fontaines and willed to the Collège de Sorbonne on Godfrey’s death.
30
Glorieux I, pp. 133–9; P. Glorieux, “Les Quodlibets de Gervais du Mont-Saint-
Éloi,” RTAM 20 (1953), pp. 129–34.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 365

of conscience or morality appears more the result of a redactor’s interest

than of chronological sequencing of questions and quodlibeta.31
Economic Issues: Many of Servais’s questions address issues of eco-
nomic exchange and value; of all his questions these have attracted the
most attention. We nd in his manuscript questions taking up commod-
ity (bladum) sales with a time element (which we might call “futures”) (qq.
13–14).32 Others treat the permissibility of life rents (redditus ad vitam)
(q. 25),33 money changing (campsoria) (q. 26), whether it is sinful to keep
wealth extra necessitatem (q. 28), and the effect of possessions on the life
of perfection (q. 31). Servais also attended to three questions relating
to usury: the wages of usurious money (q. 42), prot from property
acquired by usurious money (q. 71), and alms given from usurious prot
(q. 72).34 In responding to these questions, Servais and other masters
are thought to have “redescribed current [economic] practices in terms
of incorporeal rights,” thus granting the money economy “a kind of
autonomy.”35
Teaching and Preaching: At least three of the questions directed at
Servais show interest in understanding the role of the master of theol-
ogy in the Church and society. In question 40, he was asked whether
disputing and teaching were more advantageous than preaching; in
question 43, he discussed the quality of preaching appropriate for a
master of theology. While question 69 appears on the surface to be
concerned with a confessor’s knowledge of theology, Servais turns the

31
S. Piron’s chapter in this volume concerning the Nicholas of Bar collection of
questions suggests that only ve of the 85 questions do not concern themselves with
moral issues or matters of confession (Piron, “Nicholas of Bar’s Collection,” p. 337).
32
G. Ceccarelli, “ ‘Whatever’ Economics,” in Theological Quodlibeta I, pp. 487–9.
33
Ceccarelli, “ ‘Whatever’ Economics,” pp. 500–1.
34
See O. Langholm, “Three Masters of the quodlibet, and a Critic: Gerald of
Abbeville, Gervais of Mont-Saint-Éloi, Godfrey of Fontaines, Bernard of Auvergne,”
in idem, Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury accord-
ing to the Paris Theological Tradition 1200 –1350 (Leiden 1992) (pp. 276–98), pp. 283–8;
I.P. Wei, “Predicting the Future to Judge the Present: Paris Theologians and Attitudes
to the Future,” in Medieval Futures. Attitudes to the Future in the Middle Ages, J.A. Barrow
and I.P. Wei, eds. (Woodbridge 2000) (pp. 19–36), pp. 23–4; I.P. Wei, “Intellectuals
and Money: Parisian Disputations about Annuities in the Thirteenth Century,” Bulletin
of the John Rylands University Library 83 (2001) (pp. 71–94), pp. 79–82; I.P. Wei, “Paris
Theologians and Responses to Social Change in the Thirteenth Century,” in Tradi-
tion, Innovation, Invention. Fortschrittsverweigerung unt Fortschrittsbewusstsein im Mittelalter, H.-J.
Schmidt, ed. (Berlin 2005) (pp. 195–209), pp. 201–2, 205–6; Ceccarelli, “‘Whatever’
Economics,” pp. 493–7.
35
Wei, “Paris Theologians,” p. 208.

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question into a discussion of the role of masters and prelates in deter-

mining more arduous problems.
Question 40 asked Servais to compare the value of teaching and
disputing in the Church with the value of preaching and to decide
which is more meritorious. Servais determined that the act of preach-
ing was less valuable for the Church because of the inherent difculty
of the task of teaching and disputing (it was more difcult to explain
something than merely assert it) and the goal of teaching and disputing
was to defend the faith and provide the wherewithal for preaching.36
In question 43, Servais was asked by his questioner whether or not
a preacher refusing to give a colleague an already prepared sermon
was guilty of a mortal sin. Servais saw no evil in refusing to hand over
a sermon to a colleague because there were different circumstances in
which it would be possible to repeat the sermon. While some preach-
ers could copy from notebooks or manuals, the master’s responsibility,
because of his elevated teaching role, was to present original compo-
sitions—the faithful expected more from a master of theology than
from other preachers.37 This elevated status was operative in Servais’s
response to a questioner (q. 69) who sought to learn whether ordinary
confessors were obliged to know which sins were mortal and which sins
were venial. In his determination, he stated that confessors did not have
to have such knowledge but did have to realize that they should turn
to the experts for help in difcult cases.38
Jews and Baptism: Servais responded to a question (q. 29) ostensibly
concerning the murder of Christian boy by a Jew. The focus of the
question is not so much the “blood libel” but baptism’s effect on the
debt due for sin. A Jew has murdered a boy (presumably a Christian)
and ed to a church where he is baptized. Can the boy’s parents bring
a legal case against the Jew or does the Jew’s baptism wipe away all the
debt due to sin? In his determination, Servais distinguished between

36
J. Leclercq, “L’idéal du théologien au moyen âge,” Revue des sciences religieuses 21
(1947) (pp. 121–48), pp. 129–30; I.P. Wei, “The Self-Image of the Masters of Theol-
ogy at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,”
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 46 (1995) (pp. 398–431), pp. 418–19 and nn. 40–6.
37
J. Leclercq, “Le magistère du prédicateur au XIIIe siècle,” AHDLMA XV (1946)
(pp. 105–47), p. 124; Wei, “Self-Image,” pp. 419–20 and nn. 47–9.
38
Wei, “Self-Image,” pp. 407–8 and nn. 22–3; E. Marmursztejn, “A Normative
Power in the Making,” in Theological Quodlibeta I, pp. 355–6 and n. 30.

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the debt for sin owed to God and that owed to men: the debt to God
is wiped out by baptism; that to human beings remains.39
The Mendicant Controversy: An issue to which one of Servais’s
questioners makes allusion is that of the relationship between the
mendicant and secular clergy as it pertains to confession. In November
1282, members of the Parisian Faculty of Theology, regent and non-
regent alike, declared that penitents who had properly confessed to a
religious priest need not confess again to their parish priest.40 Masters
from the religious orders signing the document (including frater Albert,
OClun and prior of Montdidier, a quodlibetal master) outnumbered
the secular theologians. Missing from the signatories, however, is
Servais of Guez, who might have been expected to participate in the
deliberations, since we know he preached as a regent master this year
and had attended a meeting in November called on the same topic.
The bishop of Amiens, William of Mâcon (mentioned above), wrote in
1287 that the masters who disputed “de Quolibet” that year—Henry
of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Servais of Guez, and Nicholas du
Pressoir—all determined that all those absolved by a mendicant priest
had to repeat the confession to their parish priest. Glorieux suggests
that Servais’s question 54 and its determination is the one to which
William of Mâcon was referring.41
Immediately following the question on repeated confessions, the
redactor of the manuscript placed a question dealing with a quodlibetal
master’s refusal to accept a question posed for disputation out of fear
of giving offence—does such a master commit a mortal sin? It is likely
that this question (q. 55) was born from the refusal of certain Dominican
and Franciscan masters in 1286 to answer questions pertaining to the

39
The question reads: “Utrum parentes habeant actionem contra Iudaeum qui
interciens lium eorum fugit ad ecclesiam et ibi fecit se baptizari” and is edited in
G. Dahan, “Juifs et judaïsme dans lat littérature quodlibétique,” in From Witness to
Witchcraft. Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought, J. Cohen, ed. (Wiesbaden 1996)
(pp. 231–45), pp. 243–4, with discussion pp. 228–9.
40
CUP I, no. 510, pp. 595–6; see also W.J. Courtenay, “The Parisian Faculty of
Theology in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,” in Nach der Verur-
teilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13.
Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., and A. Speer, eds. (Berlin
2000) (pp. 235–47), p. 236.
41
The questions reads: “Utrum superior abbas possit conferre inferiori, ut monacho
suo, potestatem absolvendi de his quae pertinent ad superiorem, tali conditione apposita
quod confessi et absoluti ab illis inferioribus teneantur redire ad illum superiorem
et iterum conteri de illis” (Glorieux I, pp. 133, 137). See also Courtenay, “Parisian
Faculty of Theology,” p. 236, n. 4.

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mendicant privileges.42 Servais’s determination argued that a master’s

responsibility was to the truth and that he should never refuse telling
the truth if greater harm among the faithful would be the result of his
refusing to preach the truth out of fear.43
Last Wills and Testaments: Elizabeth Brown, in an article treating of
the legislation of Pope Boniface VIII on the division of corpses, looks
at three quodlibetal questions dealing with King Philip IV’s division
of his father’s body, outing Boniface’s decrees and his father’s wishes.
Questions were posed to three masters for discussion and determination
in quodlibeta held sometime after 1286: Servais and Godfrey of Fon-
taines were asked about the liceity of modifying someone’s last will and
testament44 and Henry of Ghent was questioned about an institution’s
obligation to maintain the integrity of the corpse of someone who did
not wish his body to be divided after his death. In his response, Servais
addressed the issue of corpse division, holding the position that separa-
tion or division of corpses was a novelty—horrible and monstrous—and
arguing that integral corpses would be better prepared for resurrection.
Above all, Servais maintained that the intentions of the dead person
should be respected unless some overriding concern arises.45
Unjust Censures: In voicing the question “Utrum si primas vel epis-
copus condemnavit aliquos articulos illicite, successor suus tenatur illos
revocare” (q. 61),46 Servais’s questioner may not have been responding
to a particular historical event, but may have had in mind the series of
condemnations issued in 1277 by Bishops Étienne Tempier and Robert

42
The question reads “Utrum magister in theologia disputans de quolibet, qui renuit
accipere quaestionem sibi propositam quia tangit aliquos quos timet offendere, peccet
in hoc mortaliter” (Glorieux I, pp. 133, 137).
43
The question is edited and discussed in Leclercq, “L’idéal du théologien,” pp.
132–4; Wei, “Self-image,” p. 424 and nn. 56–7.
44
Servais’s q. 58 reads: “Utrum alius a papa, utpote haeres defuncti, vel monachi
vel presbyteri ubi elegit sepulturam vel executores testamenti possint immutare aliquid
circa ultimam voluntatem defuncti, videlicet quo aliquis non sepeliatur in loco quo
elegit sepulturam” (Glorieux I, p. 137).
45
E.A.R. Brown, “Death and the Human Body in the Later Middle Ages: The Leg-
islation of Boniface VIII on the Division of the Corpse,” Viator 12 (1981), pp. 221–70,
especially pp. 237–41. The edition of Servais’s q. 58 appears on pp. 269–70. See also
E.A.R. Brown, “Authority, the Family, and the Dead in Late Medieval France,” French
Historical Studies 16 (1990) (pp. 803–32), pp. 818–19.
46
Note that a similar question was addressed to Godfrey of Fontaines in his Quodl.
XII, q. 5: “Utrum episcopus Parisiensis peccet in hoc quod omittit corrigere quosdam
articulos a praedecessore suo condemnatos” (Glorieux I, p. 164).

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Kilwardby or Archbishop John Pecham’s at Oxford in 1284 and 1286.47

In discussing a bishop’s authority in doctrinal matters, Servais grants
bishops qualied doctrinal authority. He determined that bishops have
only judicial authority to censure teaching as erroneous and claimed
that such condemnations may be reversed by a successor.48
Finally, there is an edition of Servais’s determination in response to
a question concerning the devolution of the potestas clavium from pope
to minor prelate (q. 80). Servais suggests that the power comes from
God and not necessarily through the pope.49

Andrew of Orchies
A canon of Mont-Saint-Éloi, Andrew of Orchies50 was probably sent to
Paris for theological studies by the abbot of Mont-Saint-Éloi, Stephen
of Fermont,51 and was likely magistratus in 1303.52 Successor to Servais
of Mont-Saint-Éloi as regent master for his order, he was present at
three meetings held in Paris in February 1304. The rst, on 25 Febru-
ary, was a meeting of the taxatores establishing the prices for exemplars
available for copying.53 The second took place on 26 February 1304, this
time at the Collège de Sorbonne, to discuss the election of procurators;
the next day, he met with other masters of theology to determine how
often the procurator major’s accounts should be reported.54
Andrew is credited with a sermon55 preached at Paris on the third
Sunday of Lent (Paris, BnF lat. 3557, f. 163) in either 128556 or in
1302.57 His appearance in University records at the beginning of the

47
J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200–1400 (Phila-
delphia 1998), pp. 97–9; Hissette, “Une question quodlibétique,” pp. 235–6.
48
Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, p. 97l; Marmursztejn, “A Normative Power,”
p. 365.
49
B.G. Guyot, “Gervais du Mont-Saint-Éloi, Quolibet, q. 80,” AHDMLA 28 (1961),
pp. 159–61; see also Marmursztejn, “A Normative Power,” p. 376, n. 117; Lamber-
tini, “Political Quodlibeta,” in Theological Quodlibeta I, p. 459. This question appears in
Quodlibet I.
50
Orchies is a small town about 40 km northwest of the city of Arras. Andrew
also appears under the names of Andrew of Mont-Saint-Éloi, Andrew of Auchy, and
Andrew of Anchin.
51
A. Noyon, “André du Mont Saint-Éloi,” DHGE II, col. 1684.
52
Schneyer, Repertorium I, p. 287.
53
CUP II, no. 642, p. 107.
54
CUP II, no. 617 (note), p. 91; Glorieux, Aux origines I, pp. 206–7.
55
Schneyer, Repertorium I, p. 287.
56
HLF XXVI, p. 460; A. Lecoy de la Marche, La chaire française au Moyen Age (2nd
ed., Paris 1886), pp. 178, 498.
57
Glorieux, “Notices,” pp. 237–8.

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fourteenth century would seem to favor Glorieux’s dating of the sermon

to 1302. Glorieux, suggesting that the post of taxator mentioned above
was always given to recently promoted masters, draws the conclusion
that Andrew was magistratus in 1303 (as previously mentioned) and
that Andrew’s Quodlibet may possibly be dated sometime around 1303
or 1304.58 The six questions attributed to him and found in Nicolas
of Bar-le-Duc’s collection (Paris, BnF lat. 15850, ff. 41r–42r) are, like
those of Servais, focused on either questions of practical morality such
as usury (q. 1) and beneces (qq. 3–4) or on questions of sacramental
practice such as the consecration of hosts at Mass (q. 2) or the recita-
tion of the Divine Ofce (qq. 5–6).59

John of Maroeuil
Another canon regular of Mont-Saint-Éloi, John of Maroeuil60 was
magistratus in theologia sometime between 1304 and 1307. He taught as
regent master for his order, likely in succession to his master, Andrew
of Orchies.61 John appears for the rst time as a master on 25 March
1308 as a member of the commission consulted concerning the Tem-
plars; though not named in the text of the document, his appended
seal is one of the fourteen identied by the editors of the Chartularium
Universitatis Parisiensis.62 He appears among the twenty-one masters of
theology condemning Marguerite Porete’s Miroir on 11 April 1309.63
John of Maroeuil is thought to have authored a number of aca-
demic works: a few quaestiones disputatae from 1311–14 (BAV, lat 1086,
ff. 105r, 139r; BAV, Borghese 156, ff. 124v–126r);64 extracts from John’s
work are quoted in Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s Prologue to book I of

58
Glorieux, “Notices,” pp. 205–6, 209.
59
Paris, BnF lat 15850, ff. 41rb–42ra; Glorieux II, p. 200.
60
Maroeuil, the site of the Abbaye Sainte-Bertille, is a small town a few kilometers
from Mont-Saint-Éloi.
61
R. Aubert, “Jean du Mont-Saint-Éloi,” DHGE XXVIII, col. 309.
62
CUP II, no. 664, p. 127 (note).
63
CUP III, p. 660; P. Verdeyen, “Le procés d’inquisition contre Marguerite Poret et
Guiard de Cressonessart (1309–1310),” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 81 (1986), pp. 47–94
(text of condemnation of Marguerite Porete’s Miroir on p. 50 and repeated on p. 56).
Of the 21 masters appending their seals to this consilium at least ten and probably eleven
appear among the quodlibetal masters listed in Glorieux I and II; four are named monks
or canons regular (Peter of Saint-Denis, OSB; Gerard of Saint-Victor, OSA; James of
Thérines, OCist; and John of Maroeuil, OSA Mont-Saint-Éloi). A fth master is listed
as “the prior of Val-des-Écoliers,” perhaps Laurence of Dreux.
64
Pelzer “Prosper of Reggio Emilia,” p. 333.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 371

the Sentences.65 More to our purposes are two of the Quodlibeta which
Prosper’s student notebook assigned to John: the rst, a Quodlibet of
four questions; the second, with eleven questions (BAV, Vat. lat. 1086,
ff. 126–128, ff. 217–220 respectively).66 John’s rst Quodlibet addresses
theological questions, such as the Word of God (q. 1), the beatic vision
(q. 2), and knowledge of God (q. 4); the second deals more with the
realities of life in the Church, such as oaths (q. 1); possessions held in
common (q. 2); confessions obtained by torture (q. 3); the obligation
of restitution, gambling, and usury (qq. 4, 10); and papal or princely
powers (qq. 5, 9).67 When John of Maroeuil was asked about a prelate’s
need for theological training (Quodlibet II, q. 8), he responded to the
question by stating that, in general, a prelate should have theological
training; if he had none, he would be in a sinful state because he was
attempting something of which he was incapable.68
In one case we are fortunate to possess more than just Prosper of
Reggio Emilia’s brief summary. The title of question 4 of John of
Maroeuil’s rst Quodlibet in Vat. lat. 1086 is identical to that found in
question 5 of the Miscellaneae quaestiones de formalitatibus (formerly attrib-
uted to John Duns Scotus; currently only the rst question carries that
attribution). A comparison of the text of Miscellanea question 5 with the
short reportatio provided by Prosper indicates that the Miscellanea question
contains about seven pages of what is likely either a transcription or
complete reportatio of John of Maroeuil’s Quodlibet I, q. 4, embedded in
an unknown author’s response to John’s question.69

65
BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, f. 19r. Pelzer, “Prosper of Reggio Emilia,” p. 339; see S.F.
Brown, “Due Candelabra Parisiensia. Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s Portrait of the Endur-
ing Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines Regarding the Nature of
Theological Study,” in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, Aertsen, Emery, and Speer, eds.
(pp. 320–56), pp. 332, 335–6.
66
Pelzer, “Prosper of Reggio Emilia,” pp. 333, 343, 499; Glorieux, “À propos,”
pp. 27–8, 34, 37.
67
Glorieux II, pp. 156–7.
68
See Leclercq, “L’idéal du théologien,” pp. 125–6, where he presents an edition
of q. 8 of John’s Quodlibet II (“Utrum prelatus possit tenere statum prelationis non
instructus in theologia”). See also Wei, “Self-Image,” pp. 405–6.
69
The question title reads: “Utrum perfectissimus conceptus possibilis haberi de
Deo sit conceptus entis inniti” (BAV, Vat. 1086, ff. 127r–128r). The correspondence
of question titles is pointed out by Glorieux (Glorieux II, p. 156, n. 2; Glorieux, “À
propos,” p. 37). The author would like to thank the anonymous Brill reader for this
information.

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Canons Regular of Saint-Victor

The abbey of Saint-Victor was founded in Paris by William of Cham-
peaux, canon and scolasticus of Notre-Dame in Paris around 1108. The
early Victorines numbered among their ranks scholars, mystics, and
poets, including Adam, Hugh, Richard, and Walter of Saint-Victor.
The congregation grew—by foundation and afliation—until it num-
bered about seventy abbeys and priories.70 The University of Paris in
1237 recognized the abbey studium as a university college with resident
instruction;71 the recognition required that there be at least four students
provided with special nancial resources. By the early fourteenth cen-
tury the house seemed to have fallen on hard times, as the discussion
of Gerard of Saint-Victor will indicate.

Gerard of Saint-Victor
A document drawn up by the Faculty of Theology about 1317 asked
Pope John XXII to help the abbey of Saint-Victor, known to be in
economic straits. Gerard of Saint-Victor and another canon of the
house were appointed by the faculty to carry the letter to Avignon; the
document notes Gerard as having been a regent master of theology
for twelve years72 (indicating that Gerard was probably magistratus about
1305). Sometime between 1304 and 1306, members of the Faculty
of Theology wrote a letter of recommendation to King Philip IV for
a scholar of theology; Gerard of Saint-Victor, one of these masters,
appears in sixth place (followed by the Cistercian quodlibetal master
James of Thérines).73 He was one of the masters consulted in the mat-
ter of the Templars in March 130874 and one of those condemning
Marguerite Porete’s Miroir.75 In May 1317, the Faculty of Theology
appealed to the abbot of Lagny-sur-Marne, Deodat of Séverac, OSB,76

70
P.-R. Gaussin, L’Europe des ordres et des congrégations. Des Bénédictins aux Mendiants
(VI e–XVI e siècle) (Saint-Etienne 1984), p. 148.
71
CUP I, no. 111, p. 159.
72
CUP II, no. 751, p. 209.
73
CUP II, no. 658, p. 121.
74
CUP II, note to no. 664, p. 127.
75
Verdeyen, “Le procés d’inquisition.”
76
T. Sullivan, Benedictine Monks at the University of Paris, A.D. 1229–1500. A Biographical
Register (Leiden 1995), pp. 315–6.

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a master of theology of Paris, to help with the provisioning of Bernard

de Gamaches, a theologian studying under Gerard.77
Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection of reportationes attributes two
Quodlibeta of ve and twelve questions respectively to Gerard (BAV, Vat.
lat. 1086, ff. 119r–v, f. 224r–v). The questions range from the meta-
physical to the practical: are there two liations in Christ (I, q. 1)? Is
the food Christ has eaten assumed with his body at the Ascension (II,
q. 2)? Is the source of the Church’s postestas ordinaria Christ or the pope
(II, q. 8)? Does tithing arise from natural law or divine (II, q. 11)?78

Canons Regular of Prémontré

The abbey of Prémontré was founded in 1120–21 by Norbert of
Xanten; its canons followed the Rule of St Augustine supplemented
by a very austere observance. The order grew to around 660 houses in
the thirteenth century, with about 130 houses in France.79 The Collège
Sainte-Anne was founded in Paris in 1252 by the abbot of Prémontré,
Jean de Rocquigny, to serve both as a studium for the education of
young canons and as a townhouse for himself and his successors, often
obliged to come to Paris on the order’s business.80 Noted as the order’s
collegium in 1254,81 the college numbered twenty-one socii by 1329–30.82
The Collège Sainte-Anne would ourish over the next two centuries,
producing numerous theologians and canon lawyers.83
In 1924, Martin Grabmann made mention in the Acta Hebdomada
Thomisticae Romae of a question he had noted in Wien, Osterreichische
Nationalbibliotek lat. 2165, f. 142v, entitled “Quod esse non uit ab
essentia in aliquo genere suo”; the question was determined at Paris in
a duplex quodlibet held by “magister Johannes Premonstratensis” and “frater

77
CUP II, no. 760, p. 203; W.J. Courtenay, “John XXII and the University of Paris,”
in La Vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientique à la cour des papes d’Avignon, J. Hamesse, ed.
(Turnhout 2006) (pp. 237–54), p. 241.
78
Glorieux II, p. 96.
79
Gaussin, L’Europe, pp. 151–2.
80
CUP I, no. 214, pp. 238–40.
81
CUP I, no. 230, p. 253.
82
CUP II, no. 1184, p. 663; W.J. Courtenay, Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth
Century. A Social Portrait (Cambridge 1999), p. 222.
83
Ardura, Prémontrés, p. 187; see also J. John, The College of Prémontré (Notre Dame
1953).

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Stephanus” in 1279.84 Glorieux was of the opinion that Stephen of

Fermont, OSA Mont-Saint-Éloi, Parisian master of theology and regent,
is the “frater Stephanus” mentioned, that magister John of Prémontré is
actually the Cistercian master, John of Waarde, and that John of Paris
(Quidort) was the author of the note.85 He suggested that a “duplex
quodlibet” referred to two persons, the determining master and the
responding bachelor.86 As Valvekins relates, other scholars questioned
Grabmann’s reading of the date as 1279, suggesting that it is actually
1299. If the correct reading is 1299, then Stephen of Fermont could
not be the Stephen under consideration: his regency is dated about
1274; sermons attributed to him are dated 6 December 1274 and 20
January 1275; and he died on 15 August 1279.87

John of Tongres, OSA Prémontré

Valvekins suggests, however, that magister Johannes Premonstratensis
could be either John of Tongres, abbot of the Premonstratensian abbey
of Vicogne from 1301 to 1303, or John of Prisches, abbot of the same
house from 1307 to 1312.88 While John of Prisches has an Alphabetum
vitae religiosae listed among his writings and no scholastic works,89 John
of Tongres is credited by the historians of his order as having authored
six books of commentary on the Sentences, three books of quodlibetal
questions, and a book of ordinary Quaestiones disputatae.90 It is likely then
that the magister Johannes Premonstratensis is John of Tongres.

84
M. Grabmann, “Doctrina S. Thomae de distinctione reali inter essentiam et esse
ex documentis ineditis saeculi XIII illustratur,” in Acta hebdomadae thomisticae Romae (Rome
1924) (pp. 131–90), pp. 141–5; the text of the question is presented on pp. 142–4.
On p. 144, Grabmann presents us with the last line of the question: “Nota quod pro
predicto articulo determinaverunt Parisiis anno Domino 1279 magister Johannes Pre-
monstratensis et frater Stephanus in suo duplici quolibet, scilicet quod esse non uit
ab essentia in aliquo genere suo.”
85
Glorieux II, pp. 187, 311.
86
See Glorieux II, pp. 35–6, and Wippel, “Quodlibetical Questions,” p. 181
n. 70.
87
Glorieux suggests that the attribution of the quodlibet itself to Stephen of Fermont
is doubtful (Glorieux, Répertoire II, p. 285). See also HLF XXVI, p. 401; Gallia Christiana
III, c. 425; Barubé, L’Abbaye du Mont-Saint-Éloi, pp. 168–9.
88
J.B. Valvekins, “Johannes Praemonstratensis,” Analecta praemonstratensia 30 (1954),
pp. 129–32.
89
Gallia Christiana III, col. 464; L.C. Van Dyck, “Jean de Prisches,” DHGE XXVII,
col. 478.
90
Gallia Christiana III, col. 464; L.C. Van Dyck, “Jean de Tongres,” DHGE XXVII,
cols. 719–20; J. Le Paige, Bibliotheca Praemonstratensis Ordinis (Paris 1633), col. 306.

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John of Tongres was sent to Paris for studies and there became a
magister theologiae. In 1301 he was elected abbot of Vicogne, his house
of profession, which he governed until 1303 when he resigned the
abbacy to become a Franciscan friar. The canons graciously allowed
John to take with him books and anything pertaining to his studies;
these were to be returned to Vicogne at his death. Not only his books
were returned to Vicogne at his death but also his body: he was buried
in the cloister near the entrance to the chapter room.
Frater Stephanus remains unidentied; he is perhaps a Premonstra-
tensian bachelor of theology responding in one of John of Tongres’s
quodlibetal disputations.

Canons Regular of Val-des-Écoliers

The monastery of Val-des-Écoliers was founded in 1201 by four “mas-
ters” of the University of Paris who wished to exchange the schools
of Paris for the true school, that of the service of the Lord.91 They
established themselves as canons regular following the Rule of St
Augustine and customs inspired by those of the Canons Regular of
Saint-Victor.92 The congregation, approved by Pope Honorius III in
1215, grew to number twenty-eight priories.93 After the motherhouse
itself, the most important dependency was Sainte-Catherine in Paris,
founded in 1229.94
In the two decades immediately following their foundation, the canons
of Sainte-Catherine had little or no interchange with the University. It
was only in the second half of the thirteenth century that the Écoliers
moved to the Left Bank and the Latin Quarter. In 1250 they were
granted two houses behind the church of Saint-Étienne-des-Grès,
almost facing the Dominican Couvent Saint-Jacques. For the rst time,
in 1254, there is mention of a college belonging to the Écoliers95 and,
on 24 June 1259, mention is made of the order’s rst magister theologie.

91
C. Guyon, “Rive droite, rive gauche. Le Val des Écoliers et ses relations avec les
milieux intellectuels parisiens au XIIIe siècle,” in Lector et compilator. Vincent de Beauvais,
frère prêcheur. Un intellectuel et son milieux au XIII e siècle, S. Lusignan and M. Paulmier-
Foucart, eds. (Grâne 1997) (pp. 267–86), p. 271.
92
C. Egger, “Canonici Regolari di Vallis Scholarium,” in Dizionario degli Istituti di
Perfezione, 10 vols. (Rome 1974–2003), II, cols. 84–5; Gaussin, L’Europe, pp. 189–90;
Guyon, Les Écoliers, pp. 21–80.
93
Guyon, Les Écoliers, p. 81.
94
Guyon, Les Écoliers, p. 92.
95
CUP II, no. 230, p. 253.

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The General Chapter of the Order of Val-des-Écoliers, meeting in

1274, recommended to the priors of the order’s houses that they send
students to the college with a pension amounting to 100 s.p.96
Thirteen regent masters from the congregation of Val-des-Écoliers
are noted between 1259 and 1334: Évrard of Voulaines, Gregory of
Burgundy, Giles of Montmirail, Gauthier, Laurence of Poulangy, John
of Châtillon, John of Bray, Laurence of Dreux, John du Val, Gerard
of Troyes, John of Sedeloos, James de Royallieu, and Peter of Verbe-
rie.97 Of these thirteen masters, only two are thought to have authored
surviving quodlibeta, with the possibility of a third.98

Magister de Valle Scholarium

An unnamed canon, noted by Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc as “M de Walle
scolari” (Magister de Valle Scholarium), took part in a quodlibet presenting
only two questions of moral theology: the payment of debts and obser-
vance of the Sabbath rest (Paris, BnF lat. 15850, f. 34v).99 Glorieux
proposed John of Châtillon as the quodlibetal master and assigned a
date of 1294–95 to the disputation.100 Given Piron’s suggestion that
John of Châtillon was regent for only one year, 1297–98, between
the regencies of Laurence of Poulangy and John of Bray,101 then if
Glorieux’s dates of 1294–95 are correct (or even a bit late, based on
Piron’s general dating), the more likely candidate for the brief quodlibet
is Laurence of Poulangy.102 Laurence was a religious of the priory of
Sainte-Catherine in Paris and a student of the order’s second master
of theology, Gregory of Burgundy. He preached a number of sermons
in 1283 and attended the inventory of the priory’s library in 1288.103
Laurence served as prior of Val-des-Écoliers—and therefore General
of the order—between 1297 and 1302, perhaps even later, although
assertions that he was the Master Laurence of the Val-des-Écoliers active
at Paris in 1307–10 confuse Laurence of Poulangy with Laurence of

96
Guyon, Les Écoliers, pp. 226–7.
97
Glorieux, Répertoire II, pp. 275–81; Guyon, Les Écoliers, pp. 227–48.
98
Glorieux II, pp. 151–2, 186.
99
Glorieux II, pp. 151–2; Glorieux, “Notices,” pp. 202, 233–4; Guyon, Les Écoliers,
pp. 239–40.
100
Glorieux II, p. 151; Guyon, Les Écoliers, pp. 232, 239.
101
Piron, “Nicholas of Bar’s Collection,” pp. 342–3.
102
See Guyon, Les Écoliers, pp. 231–2, on Laurence of Poulangy.
103
Lecoy de La Marche, La chaire française au Moyen Age, pp. 178, 519–20; A. Franklin,
Les anciennes bibliothèques de Paris I (Paris 1867), p. 198.

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Dreux (see below).104 On the other hand, Laurence of Poulangy is prob-

ably the “magister de Valle Scolarium” responsible for a large disputed
question—possibly quodlibetal—on the procession of the Holy Spirit,
dating to the mid-1280s and contained in Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro
Convento 158, ff. 128va–133vb.105

John du Val
John du Val or Duval106 is one of those “minor” masters about whom
next-to-nothing is known except the extracts of ten questions from his
quodlibet found in Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s miscellany (BAV, Vat. lat
1086, ff. 226r–228r).107 John’s questions range from the speculative to
the practical: vicious habits (q. 1), the effects of mortal sin on one’s
ability to avoid further mortal sin (q. 2), priestly celibacy (q. 3), angels
in the rst instance of their creation (q. 5), conscience (q. 9), moral
habits (q. 10). Schabel notes that the fourth question, on the univocity
of the concept of being (q. 4), is of signicant length, reaching a total
of one hundred lines.108

“M. Laure”
As mentioned above, Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection of reportationes
includes a quodlibet of eleven questions (Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086,
ff. 122r–137r) and many other disputed questions attributed to a
“M. Laure.,” variously identied as Laurence l’Anglais, OSB, Laurence
of Poulangy, OSA Val-des-Écoliers, and Laurence Le Breton, OP.109
Courtenay, in his study of Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection of ques-
tions in this volume, settles on Laurence Le Breton, OP, and Laurence
of Dreux, OSA Val-des-Écoliers, as the best candidates for Prosper’s
“M. Laure.,” considering both Laurence l’Anglais, OSB, and Laurence
of Poulangy, OSA Val-des-Écoliers, as rather unlikely possibilities. He
notes that there is no evidence that Laurent l’Anglais, a magister theologie
of Oxford, studied or taught at Paris either before or after becoming

104
Courtenay, “Reections,” p. 353.
105
C. Schabel, “A Tractatus on the Distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son by
a Master of the Val des Écoliers,” MPP 35 (2006) (pp. 184–214), pp. 188–91, with
edition on pp. 197–214.
106
R. Aubert, “Jean du Val des Écoliers,” DHGE XXVII, cols. 748–9.
107
Glorieux II, p. 186; Pelzer, “Prosper of Reggio Emilia,” p. 389; Glorieux,
“À propos,” pp. 27, 29; Guyon, Les Écoliers, p. 240.
108
Schabel, “Tractatus,” pp. 189–90.
109
The total number of questions attributable to this Laurence may be over 30,
according to Schabel, “Tractatus,” p. 190 and n. 25, who provides a transcription of a
question on trinitarian relations.

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master at Oxford in 1301 or before his sojourn at Avignon beginning

in 1318. As for Laurence of Poulangy, the historiography identifying
him as the order’s Master Laurence active at Paris after 1307 over-
looks that, at the trial of the Templars in October of that year, he is
called “Laurentius de Droco de Valle Scolarium” and the next day
“Laurencius prior Vallis Scolarium,” obviously the same person, “de
Droco” being “of Dreux.”110 A religious of Sainte-Catherine in Paris,
Laurence of Dreux was magistratus in theology sometime after 1300111
and served as prior of Sainte-Catherine after 1302 and prior of Val-
des-Écoliers by 1307.112

James of Aaleus, O.S.A.

A canon regular named James of Aaleus (of an unknown house or
congregation) is known by means of a reportatio of a Lenten Quodlibet
of twelve questions, disputed or determined on Tuesday after the fth
Sunday of Lent in 1285 (13 March 1285) (Paris, BnF lat. 14899, ff. 162r–
167v).113 While the rubric of f. 162 mistakenly describes the quodlibet
as “Questiones de quolibet a magistro Eustachio et Salvatio,” the attri-
bution may signal the redactor’s knowledge of quodlibeta by Servais of
Mont-Saint-Éloi and a Magister Eustace.114
James of Aaleus is probably the Jacobus Dalos appearing as one of
the University taxatores for houses in 1286 (pace Glorieux I, p. 209),
along with Giles of Rome.115 Often assigned to masters recently mag-
istratus, his appointment as taxator suggests that James may have been
magistratus in the academic year 1284–85 or thereabouts.116 He may
also be the James des Alleus who preached a sermon entitled “Ut lii
lucis ambulate.”117
James’s quodlibet is fairly typical: three questions concerning the soul
(qq. 1–3), one dealing with the desire for wealth (q. 4), and four con-

110
Courtenay, “Reections,” pp. 353–4.
111
C.E. Du Boulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, 5 vols. (Paris 1665–73), V, p. 891.
112
Guyon, Les Écoliers, p. 233.
113
Glorieux I, pp. 209–10; B. Hauréau, Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins
de la Bibliothèque Nationale, 6 vols. (Paris 1890–93), III, pp. 276–94; R. Aubert, “Jacques
d’Aleus,” DHGE XXVI, cols. 614–15.
114
Glorieux II, p. 316.
115
CUP II, no. 556, p. 28.
116
Glorieux I, p. 209.
117
Schneyer, Repertorium III, p. 1.

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cerning sin and confession (qq. 5–6, 8–9). The seventh question asked
him to determine a complicated case concerning entrance into religious
life (q. 7). The last three questions deal with issues concerning Christ’s
human will, multiple accidents existing in a subject, and the gloried
body (qq. 10–12).118

Monks

Monachi Nigri. The Order of Saint Benedict

As noted above, the monastic orders were not slow in imitating the
successful combination of disciplina and doctrina accomplished by the
Dominican friars of the Couvent Saint-Jacques.119 For many years it was
thought that the Cistercians were the rst monks to set up colleges.120
A contemporary clue to the fact, however, that the monachi nigri were
probably the rst can be found in Matthew Paris’s Chronica majora in his
account of the mirabilia occurring between 1200 and 1250. Among the
“prodigies and amazing novelties” Matthew lists for that half-century is
the foundation of the Cistercian house of studies at Paris: “The Cister-
cian monks, following in the footsteps of the order of the Black monks,
having obtained a papal dispensation and constructed suitable buildings
in Paris and elsewhere where the community of scholars ourished,
took up studies lest they be held in contempt by the Preachers and
Minors.”121 In whose footsteps were they following? We cannot be sure
but it is possible that Matthew was referring to the house of studies
initiated at the University of Paris by the royal abbey of Saint-Denis
sometime before 1229–30, when it appears in the abbey’s administrative

118
Glorieux I, pp. 209–10.
119
See U. Berlière, “Les collèges bénédictins aux universités du moyen-âge,” Revue
Bénédictine 10 (1893), pp. 145–58.
120
See, for instance, C.H. Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism. Forms of Religious Life in
Western Europe in the Middle Ages (3rd edition, Harlow 2001), p. 193.
121
R. Vaughan, Chronicles of Matthew Paris: Monastic Life in the Thirteenth Century
(Gloucester 1984), p. 276. The text reads in Latin “Monachi Cistercienses, ex dispen-
satione papali, constructis competentibus aediciis Parisius et alibi, ubi viget universitas
scolarium, student ne Praedicatoribus et Minoribus contemptui habeantur, Nigri ordinis
monachorum vestigia subsequentes” (Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. H. Richards
Luard, 7 vols. [London 1872–1883] V, p. 195).

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records: an expense of 35 livres borne by the abbey “pro domo fratrum

nostrorum scolarum (sic) parisiensi, usque ad tres annos.”122
Other monasteries from among the monachi nigri would found Parisian
houses of study or at least attempt a foundation. The abbot of Fleury
decreed in 1248 that ten monks with an aptitude for study would reside
at the abbey’s priory in Orléans to study theology there; the best of
these would complete their theological studies at the Parisian studium.123
In 1259, the General Chapter of the Order of Cluny approved Abbot
Yves de Vergy’s project of a house of studies in Paris for monk-students
of the ordo cluniacensis. Aware that monks of the order were already at
Paris following courses there, the chapter fathers felt that these monastic
scholars would benet from a monastery or house of studies in the city
where the Cluniac conversatio would be fostered in spite of the many
temptations Paris provided.124 In 1329, Geoffroy of Plessis founded
the Collège de Marmoutier for the monks of that monastery and its
dependent houses; the university computus for that year indicates that
twenty monks were resident in that house.125

Peter of Saint-Denis
Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection of theological questions contains
three Quodlibeta of Peter of Saint-Denis (BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, ff. 111r–
112v, ff. 252r–255v, ff. 255v–257r).126 In addition to Peter’s Quodlibeta,

122
Paris, Archives Nationales, LL 1157 (Cartulaire blanc de Saint-Denis), f. 124r.
See J. Depoin, “Comptes de la préceptorie de l’abbaye de Saint-Denis-en-France
(XIIIe–XVe siècles),” Revue Mabillon 13 (1923), p. 243; D. Nebbiai-dalla Guarda, “Le
collège de Paris de l’abbaye de Saint-Denis-en-France,” in Sous la règle de saint Benoît.
Structures monastiques et sociétés en France du Moyen Age à l’époque moderne (Geneva 1982) (pp.
461–88), pp. 463, 485; T.J. Sullivan, Studia Monastica: Benedictine and Cluniac Monks at the
University of Paris, 1229 –1500 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1982), p. 165.
123
CUP I, nos. 170 –1, pp. 200 –1, and no. 190, p. 218. See also H. Denie, “Das
erste Studienhaus der Benedictiner an der Universität Paris,” Archiv für Literatur- und
Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 1 (1985), pp. 570–83; A. Vidier, “L’hôtel de Saint-Benoît-
sur-Loire à Paris (1258–1421),” Bulletin de la societé de l’histoire de Paris et l’Ile de France
40 (1913), pp. 204 –14.
124
See P. Anger, Le collège de Cluny fondé à Paris dans le voisinage de la Sorbonne et dans
le ressort de l’Université (Paris 1912); J. Leclercq, “Les études universitaires dans l’ordre
de Cluny,” in Mélanges bénédictins publiés à l’occasion de XIV e centénaire de la mort de Saint-
Benoît par les moines de l’abbaye de Saint-Jérôme de Rome (Abbey de Saint-Wandrille 1957),
pp. 351–71.
125
CUP II, no. 587, p. 63; Berlière, “Collèges bénédictins,” pp. 153–4; Sullivan,
Studia Monastica, pp. 144–64.
126
Glorieux II, pp. 221–2; Pelzer, “Prosper of Reggio Emilia,” pp. 495, 499.

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the collection also presents a quaestio disputata of his concerning venial

sin and charity as well as interventions in the vesperies of Durand of
St Pourçain held in 1312 and the aulica of Prosper of Reggio Emilia
(held on 1 March 1316).127 Furthermore, two sermons are attributed
to Peter, the rst preached on 30 November 1305 and the second on
Septuagesima around 1313–15.128 Finally, Little and Pelster make note
of an opinio of Peter in the notebook of questions from Paris in the
1310s contained in Worcester Q 99, f. 102r.129
Peter appears to have been active in the Parisian Faculty of Theology
possibly as early as ca. 1304 and as late as 1316. Sometime between
1304 and 1306, he was one of the theologians recommending a scholar
in theology to King Philip IV.130 He was present among the masters of
theology condemning the writings of Marguerite Porete on 11 April
1309. In the rst text Peter is named without religious order; in the
second, however, he is listed as “Petrus de Sancto Dionysio, Ordinis
Sancti Benedicti” and for this reason is counted among the authors of
quodlibetal materials from among the monks and canons regular.131 It
should be noted, however, that Hauréau, in his short article on Peter of
Saint-Denis in the Histoire littéraire de la France, relates that Peter stated
in one of his sermons that the exemption the religious orders enjoyed
had the effect of protecting heretics—a claim that does not seem to be
of the sort an exempt religious would make. Hauréau suggests that he
is the Peter of Saint-Denis who appears as ofcialis of Rouen in 1300
and who, after having taught theology at Paris, returned to Rouen as
archdeacon of the French Vexin.132

127
Glorieux, Répertoire I, p. 448.
128
Glorieux, Répertoire I, p. 448; Schneyer, Repertorium IV, p. 802.
129
A.G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, c. A.D. 1282–1302
(Oxford 1934), p. 326.
130
CUP II, no. 658, p. 121. A Petrus de Sancto Dyonisio is listed in the computus
of 1329–30; it is possible that he is the master under discussion here, though he did
not pay the tax customary for a magister theologie (CUP II, no. 1184, p. 666; Courtenay,
Parisian Scholars, pp. 202–3, 232).
131
R.E. Lerner, “An ‘Angel of Philadelphia’ in the Reign of Philip the Fair: The
Case of Guiard of Cressonessart,” in Order and Innovation in the Middle Ages. Essays in
Honor of Joseph R. Strayer, W.C. Jordan, B. McNab, and T.F. Ruiz, eds. (Princeton 1976),
pp. 343–64 (text of condemnation of Guiard de Cressonessart, p. 361). The author
is grateful to Prof. William J. Courtenay for bringing this article to his attention. See
also Verdeyen, “Le procés d’inquisition,” pp. 50, 56.
132
B. Hauréau, “Pierre de Saint-Denys,” HLF XXVII, pp. 428–30, esp. p. 429;
V. Tabbagh, Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Répertoire prosographique des évêques, dignitaires et chanoines
des diocèses de France de 1200 à 1500. 2. Diocèse de Rouen (Turnhout 1998), p. 325.

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Only one of Peter’s determinations appears to have been edited,

Quodlibet II, q. 10: “Utrum praedicator qui dimittit praedicare ne revo-
cetur iterum ad praedicandum peccet mortaliter.” Peter states that it
is not sinful for a preacher to defer preaching until a more opportune
time unless he delays preaching in expectation of a better benece,
for instance.133

Laurence l’Anglais
A contemporary of Peter of Saint-Denis and Pelzer’s rst suggestion
for Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s “M. Laure.,” Laurence l’Anglais, OSB,
was a monk of Gloucester Abbey and a magister theologiae of the Uni-
versity of Oxford in June 1301 and a regent master there in 1302. It
was thought that he studied at Paris in 1312/13 and lectured as regent
master there in the academic year 1317–18, but the reasoning is circular
in that it relies in large part on the Vat. lat. 1086 citation itself. It is
unlikely that the Benedictine Laurence is connected to the questions
in Prosper’s notebook.134

Pierre Roger
Born in 1291 at Maumont, Limousin, Pierre Roger entered the Bene-
dictine house of La Chaise-Dieu at the age of ten. He came to Paris
around 1307, perhaps studying grammar at the Collège de Narbonne.135
In 1320–21, he participated in a series of disputations with Francis of
Meyronnes and Peter Auriol concerning Trinitarian theology, showing
himself a disciple of Thomas Aquinas.136 He was also involved in the
controversy surrounding John of Pouilly’s views opposing the mendicant
privileges. In May 1323, at the request of King Charles IV, Pope John
XXII ordered that Pierre be magistratus and granted the licentiate.137
In the University discussions concerning the teachings of Marsilius
of Padua and John of Jandun, he condemned them, their writings,
and their followers as heretical. He was said, too, to have lectured
on canon law as well as theology at Paris, writing a postill, probably

133
Leclercq, “Le magistère du prédicateur,” p. 129.
134
Sullivan, Benedictine Monks, pp. 21–3; Courtenay, “Reections.”
135
J.F. Wrigley, “Clement VI Before His Ponticate: The Early Life of Pierre Roger,
1290/91–1342,” Catholic Historical Review 56 (1970), pp. 433–73; D. Wood, Clement VI.
The Ponticate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope (Cambridge 1989), pp. 7–11; Sullivan, Bene-
dictine Monks, pp. 296–9.
136
François de Meyronnes-Pierre Roger: “Disputatio,” ed. J. Barbet (Paris 1961).
137
CUP II, no. 822, p. 271.

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in 1325, in support of John XXII’s bull Quia quorundam mentes. From

1326 to 1336 he served as provisor of the Collège de Sorbonne.138 In
1329, he participated in the discussions held at Vincennes concerning
the competencies of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction.139 A few
years later he was involved in the controversies concerning the nature
of the beatic vision.140 After signicant success in both secular and
ecclesiastical worlds, Pierre Roger was elected pope on 7 May 1342 in
succession to another monk and Parisian master of theology, Benedict
XII ( Jacques Fournier, OCist) and preceding Urban V (Guillaume
Grimoard, OSB), who had taught canon law de mane at Paris.141 As
Pope Clement VI, Peter would condemn the positions of Nicholas of
Autrecourt in 1346 and John of Mirecourt in 1347.142
Pierre Roger’s Quodlibet is found in one manuscript: BAV, Borghese
89, ff. 63r–89v.143 It appears best to date the Quodlibet to between 1323
(when Peter was magistratus and licentiatus) and 1326 (when he was made
abbot of Fécamp) or 1328 (when made bishop of Arras).144 Of the
Quodlibet’s eleven questions,145 seven treat of metaphysics and specula-
tive theology; sandwiched between the sixth and the eleventh, however,
are four questions of practical theology. The rst discusses fraternal
correction and the necessity of private correction before bringing the
matter to the attention of a superior: is there sin in denouncing the
sinner to the superior before warning the offender privately? The second
asks about breaking a vow of abstinence: if you swear off wine but
drink it one day do you incur sin each time you drink after the vow is
broken? The last question presents a vignette in which two people are

138
P. Glorieux, Aux origines de la Sorbonne. I. Robert de Sorbon (Paris 1966), p. 139.
139
F.J.M. Olivier-Martin, L’Assemblée de Vincennes de 1329 et ses conséquences (Paris
1909), p. 126.
140
CUP II, nos. 970–87, pp. 414–42. See also M. Dykmans, Pour et contre Jean XXII
en 1333. Deux traités avignonnais sur la vision béatique (Vatican City 1975).
141
Sullivan, Benedictine Monks, p. 164.
142
CUP II, no. 1124, pp. 567–87; II, no. 1147, pp. 610–13; Wood, Clement VI,
p. 8.
143
É. Anheim, “La bibliothèque personnelle de Pierre Roger/Clément VII,” in
La vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientique à la cour des papes d’Avignon, Hamesse, ed. (pp.
1–48), pp. 36–7. For this and some of his other scholastic works, see A. Maier, “Der
literarische Nachlass des Petrus Rogerii (Clemens VI.) in der Borghesiana,” in eadem,
Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts II (Rome
1967), pp. 255–315.
144
Maier, “Der literarische Nachlass des Petrus Rogerii,” pp. 290–300.
145
Pierre Roger’s quodlibetal questions are presented in Appendix I to this
chapter.

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riding along, one a cleric and the other a layman. The layman sees his
enemies coming in the distance and asks the cleric if he can have the
cleric’s horse, since his is better than the layman’s. The cleric refuses;
the layman knocks the cleric off the horse, takes it, and ees the scene.
Does he incur the sentence of excommunication?
More interesting still is the third question concerning a baptized
Jewish boy. A young boy is stolen from his Jewish (or indel) parents
by a Christian ex zelo, who has the child baptized. After the child has
reached the age of reason, his birth parents seek to have him returned
to them. Should the Church return this baptized child to his birth par-
ents? This question is similar to the question on Jews posed to James
of Thérines; it involves the effects of baptism. As pope, Pierre Roger
would be the most benevolent of all medieval popes toward the Jews,
forbidding Christians to force unwilling Jews to baptism. He stated that
those who were compelled to be baptized were not believed to pos-
sess the true faith—that is, they were not Christians.146 The problem
of baptized Jewish children would be one with a long history in the
Catholic Church, witness the Edgardo Mortara case in the 1850s and
beyond, which became an international cause célébre. In the nineteenth
century it was held that baptism given in situations where it is not licit
to baptize (i.e., without parental consent) remained, nonetheless, valid;
that in such cases the baptized children should not be returned to their
Jewish parents but raised by Christians in the Catholic faith.147

Monachi Nigri. The Order of Cluny

The list of Cluniac regent masters in theology at the Parisian studium
includes Gaudry, Albert of Cluny, Guy of Cluny, Walter of Gamaches,
Deodat of Séverac, Marcel, and John of Lixy.148 Quodlibetal masters
from among these eight number only two: Albert and Guy of Cluny.

146
Wood, Clement VI, p. 198.
147
D.I. Kertzer, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara (New York 1997), p. 310, n. 2. See
also Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet II, q. 4. a. 2, and Peter of England, Quodlibet II, q. 35.
The text of Thomas’s quodlibetal question is almost identical with that of his Summa
theologiae IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 12 and with parts of Summa theologiae III, q. 68, a. 10.
148
Glorieux, Répertoire II, pp. 269–73. These monks receive fuller treatment in the
present author’s Benedictine Monks: Gaudry (pp. 147–8), Albert of Cluny (pp. 14–15),
Guy of Pernes (pp. 267–8), Walter of Gamaches (p. 149), Deodat of Séverac (pp.
315–16), Marcel (p. 224), John of Lixy (p. 213).

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Albert of Cluny
Albert, a Cluniac monk and prior of Montdidier in the diocese of
Amiens, appears twice as a regent master in theology in University
congregations in late 1282: the rst time in a determinatio held by the
Faculty of Theology in November concerning the confessions of sins149
and the second at a December assembly convoked to reconcile differ-
ences between the seculars and mendicants.150 If the latter document
can be trusted to have listed the masters according to seniority, it is
possible that Albert was magistratus ca. 1270–71. Two extant sermons,
dated Epiphany 1282 and Septuagesima 1282 or 1283, are from his
pen.151 He is likely the Albertus, prior of Saint-Leu d’Esserent and
master of theology, listed as such in the necrology of Saint-Saulve-
de-Valenciennes as well as the magister Albertus who donated to the
Cluniac studium in Paris a house located on the rue des Maçons and
facing the college chapel.152
Gilbert Ouy makes note of a manuscript (once held by the abbey
of Saint-Victor but no longer extant) containing quodlibeta and other
theological questions: six quodlibeta of Thomas of Bailly totaling 101
questions, one quodlibet of Albert, monk of Cluny, and a quodlibet of
Ranulf of Normandy (most likely Ranulph of Houblonnière), a canon
of Paris, as well as various other theological questions.153 Since Albert
appears in University records and sermons in 1282 and 1283, it is pos-
sible that his Quodlibet would have been disputed around this time.

Guy of Cluny
Also known as Guy of Pernes or Guy of Beaulieu, Guy made his pro-
fession as a monk of Cluny at the age of fteen. He was sent to the
University of Paris for theological studies where he was magistratus.154
He authored at least four University sermons (two sermons and two
collationes). One of these was a sermon preached on Palm Sunday

149
É. Baluze, Vitae paparum Avenionsium, ed. G. Mollat, 4 vols. (Paris 1914–1927),
III, no. 43, p. 5.
150
CUP I, no. 510, p. 595; see also HLF XXV (Paris 1869), p. 385.
151
Schneyer, Repertorium I, pp. 91–2.
152
Sullivan, Benedictine Monks, pp. 14–15.
153
Les manuscrits, ed. Ouy, I, p. 255; II, p. 98. Thomas of Bailly’s quodlibetal ques-
tions are listed in Glorieux II, pp. 273–7, and edited in Thomas de Bailly, Quodlibets, ed.
P. Glorieux (Paris 1960). Ranulph of Houblonnière’s quodlibetal questions are listed
in Glorieux I, pp. 264–6.
154
Glorieux’s suggestion that Guy of Cluny was regent master as early as 1287 is
untenable, as S. Piron suggests above in “Nicholas of Bar’s Collection,” p. 341.

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sometime before 1298; he is noted as “Prior Cloniacensis, magister in

theologia.” The second sermon was preached in 1302.155 Guy’s last
known predecessor as regent master was Albert of Cluny (regent in
1282);156 Guy preceded Walter of Gamaches (regent in 1308).157 Before
his appointment by Pope Boniface VIII as abbot of the Benedictine
monastery of Beaulieu-en-Argonne on 23 December 1299, Guy gov-
erned the Cluniac priory of Montdidier, perhaps in succession to his
confrere, Albert. The pope would transfer Beaulieu to the Order of
Cluny in June 1301 and March 1302.158
Guy may have been among the masters of Paris exiled by King Philip
IV in 1303 because of their loyalty to the pope during his dispute with
the king. Guy left Paris that year, perhaps to teach in the papal studium;
he was made administrator of the diocese of Acerenza in 1303 because
the revenues of Beaulieu had been sequestered by the king. Present at
the papal election in 1305, Guy was one of the three messengers sent
to announce the election to Bertrand of Got, who would take the regnal
name of Clement V. Pope Clement appointed Guy as bishop of Toul,
who died en route to take possession of his see.159
The two Quodlibeta from Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc’s collection present
three questions addressing nancial or economic topics: Quodlibet I, q. 3,
deals with the issue of gambling; Quodlibet I, q. 4, discusses credit sales;
Quodlibet II, q. 3, deals with the important question of usury.160

Monks of the Order of Cîteaux

In 1237, Evrard, abbot of Clairvaux, formulated the project of install-
ing a small community of student monks, governed by a warden and
aided by two conversi, in a house Clairvaux owned at Paris. His death in
1238 put an end to the project until his successor at Clairvaux, Stephen
of Lexington, a product of the schools at Oxford, revived it in 1245,

155
Schneyer, Repertorium II, p. 319; T. Kaeppeli, “Praedicator monoculus,” AFP 27 (1957)
(pp. 120–67), pp. 124, 159.
156
Sullivan, Benedictine Monks, pp. 14–15.
157
Sullivan, Benedictine Monks, p. 149.
158
G. Allemang, “Beaulieu-en-Argonne,” DHGE VII, col. 179.
159
R. Aubert, “Guy de Cluny,” DHGE XXII, col. 1266; Sullivan, Benedictine Monks,
pp. 267–9.
160
Ceccarelli, “’Whatever’ Economics,” p. 482 and n. 11 (where a list of selected
quodlibeta dealing with gambling may be found); p. 484 n. 10 (where several quodlibetal
questions by various authors dealing with credit sales are listed).

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receiving tepid approval from the Cistercian General Chapter. By 1250,

monks were resident in the college and by 1256 the Cistercians would
see one of their own as regent in Paris.161
Guy of l’Aumône was the rst in a series of Cistercian regent masters
in theology at Paris between 1250 and 1330; the list includes John of
Limoges,162 John of Waarde, Rainier Marquette of Clairmarais, Hum-
bert of Preuilly,163 John of Hé, James of Thérines, John Sindewint,164
Jacques Fournier165 (the future Pope Benedict XII), and Nicholas of
Vaux-Cernay. Fully named quodlibetal masters among these Cistercian
regents are Guy of l’Aumône, James of Thérines, Rainier Marquette
of Clairmarais, and Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay. Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc’s
collection of questions presents, as mentioned above, an “abbas sancti
bernardi” as a quodlibetal master.

Guy of l’Aumône
A monk of the abbey of l’Aumône, Guy was sent to Paris for studies in
theology; he likely lived at the Cistercian studium in Paris and attended
the Franciscan schools since the Cistercians had no master of their
own.166 Because of the conict between the mendicants and secular

161
F.E. Kwanten, “Le Collège Saint-Bernard à Paris: Sa fondation et ses débuts,”
Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 43 (1948), pp. 443–72; C.H. Lawrence, “Stephen of Lexington
and Cistercian University Studies in the Thirteenth Century,” Journal of Ecclesiastical
History 11 (1960), pp. 164–78; P. Dautrey, “Croissance et adaptation chez les cisterciens
au treizième siècle: les débuts du collège des Bernardins de Paris,” Analecta Sacri Ordinis
Cisterciensis 32 (1976), pp. 122–98; Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism, p. 193.
162
R. Aubert, “Jean de Limoges,” DHGE XXVII, cols. 230–1; C. Obert-Piketty,
“Les lectures et les oeuvres des pensionnaires du collège Saint-Bernard: Jalons pour
l’histoire intellectuelle de l’Ordre de Cîteaux à la n du Moyen Age,” Cîteaux. Com-
mentarii cistercienses 40 (1989) (pp. 245–91), pp. 278–9.
163
HLF XXI, cols. 86–90; É. Brouette, “Humbert de Prully ou de Preuilly,” Diction-
naire des Auteurs Cisterciens (hereinafter DAC), É. Brouette and A. Dimier, eds. (Rochefort
1975–1979), cols. 377–8; Obert-Piketty, “Les lectures,” pp. 273–4.
164
R. Aubert, “Jean Sindewint,” DHGE XXVII, cols. 632–3; Obert-Piketty, “Les
lectures,” p. 281.
165
L. Jadin, “Benoît XII,” DHGE VIII, cols. 1166–1235; “Jacques Fournier,” DHGE
XXVI, col. 670; A. Dimier, “Benoît XII ( Jacques Fournier), DAC, cols. 98–9; Obert-
Piketty, “Les lectures,” pp. 274–5. Courtenay makes the interesting suggestion that the
“Jacobus Ber.” mentioned in Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection could be Jacques
Fournier (Courtenay, “Reections,” pp. 354–5).
166
M. Standaert, “Guy de l’Aumône,” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité VI, cols. 1301–2;
P. Michaud-Quantin, “Guy de l’Aumône, premier maître cistercien de l’université de
Paris,” Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis 15 (1989), p. 16; J.G. Bougerol, “Le commentaire
des Sentences de Guy de l’Aumône et son ‘Introitus’: Edition des textes,” Antonianum
51 (1976) (pp. 495–513), p. 496; Obert-Piketty, “Les lectures,” p. 271.

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clergy, Guy seems to have had some difculty getting the doctorate
and licentiate awarded.167 On 28 January 1254, Pope Innocent IV
ordered the chancellor of Paris to grant Guy the licentiate,168 which
order was ignored. Thinking perhaps that the licentiate was an impos-
sibility, Guy accepted election as abbot of l’Aumône in 1255. In 1256,
Pope Alexander IV summoned Guy to Rome, had him examined for
the licentiate and doctorate there, and, on 31 January 1256, bestowed
on Guy the title of magister regens and ordered the University of Paris
to allow him regency.169
Two works from Guy’s University career survive: a commentary
on the Sentences, dated 1245–55,170 and his Summa de diversis questionibus
theologie, redacted after 1255. The Summa survives in a thirteenth-cen-
tury manuscript originally belonging to the abbey of Saint-Victor but
now in the Bibliothèque nationale de France (Paris, BnF lat. 14891,
ff. 191v–209r).171 Ian P. Wei has determined that, while the overall
structure of the Summa appears to be coherent and homogeneous, the
last two of the Summa’s four parts consist of thirty-eight quodlibetal
questions.172 These questions draw on real problems in human society,
problems from which sin could arise and therefore problems of con-
science.173 Glorieux suggests he was regent at the Collège Saint-Bernard
between 1266 and 1275 and that his Quodlibeta date from this period in
his life. He would be followed as regent at the Collège Saint-Bernard
by John of Waarde.174
The redactor of the Summa has arranged the thirty-eight questions
into two parts, with one question between them. The rst group of
questions, eleven in number, appears under the redactor’s rubric “De
perplexitate conscientie.” There seems to be no predetermined order to
these rst eleven questions; they range from simoniacal priests, religious
life (eremitic as well as monastic), responsibility vis-à-vis the violent, to
the use of the fruits of usury and someone’s promise to eat more than

167
M.-M. Dufeil, Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polémique universitaire parisienne 1250–59
(Paris 1972), pp. 52, 106, 109, 165, 198–200, 208, 253.
168
CUP I, no. 229, p. 252.
169
CUP I, nos. 265–6, pp. 302–3.
170
Bougerol, “Le commentaire,” pp. 513–15.
171
Les manuscrits, ed. Ouy, I, p. 285; II, p. 303 (LL 14).
172
Guy de l’Aumône’s quodlibetal questions are presented in Appendix II to this
chapter.
173
I.P. Wei, “Guy de l’Aumône’s ‘Summa de diversis questionibus theologie’,” Traditio
44 (1988) (pp. 275–323), pp. 288, 314–23.
174
Glorieux, Répertoire II, p. 252.

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he should.175 The redactor then inserts one question under the rubric
“De preceptis specialibus,” that is, specically Gospel precepts. In this
case, the questioner asked to whom does the Gospel command “nolite
portare sacculum” extend.176
The second set of questions appears under the rubric “De preceptis
iudicialibus.” This section contains twenty-six of the thirty-eight ques-
tions presented: the rst subsection discusses persons, the second the
possession of things, and the third actions. The focus of the discus-
sion of persons is the relationship between kingly and priestly power.
In the second subsection, the questioner rst asks whether it is licit
for someone to gather up riches (“thezaurizare”); Guy is then asked if
ecclesiastics could posses an inheritance. Finally, still under the rubric
of possessions, Guy discusses questions, eleven in all, covering tithes,
rst fruits, and offerings. The last section focuses on actions, with four
questions concerning war, two contracts, and the last question concern-
ing manual labor.177
Only one of Guy’s quodlibetal questions has been edited, question 98,
which treats of a case of conscience concerning religious life. A hermit,
vowed to live the eremitic life, is asked to leave the desert to do good in
the city. If he should abandon the eremitic life does he sin or not? Guy
responded that he should remain in the eremitic life because delity to
one’s vocation takes precedence over any other consideration.178

“Abbas sancti bernardi”

Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc’s collection presents two sets of quodlibetal
questions attributed to an “abbas sancti bernardi.” Glorieux stated
that without hesitation this Cistercian could be identied with John of
Waarde, a monk of the abbey of Ter Duinen, master of theology and
regent at Paris at the Collège Saint-Bernard (which had no abbot). Born
about 1240 in the village of Waarde in Zeeland and a monk of the
abbey of Ter Duinen (which he entered sometime before 1251), John
of Waarde spent much of his adult life at the Collège Saint-Bernard
in Paris. Sent to the university in 1268, he studied theology at the
same time Thomas Aquinas was teaching at the Couvent Saint-Jacques

175
Wei, “Guy de l’Aumône,” pp. 315–18.
176
Wei, “Guy de l’Aumône,” p. 318.
177
Wei, “Guy de l’Aumône, pp. 318–23.
178
J. Leclercq, “Deux opuscules médiévaux sur la vie solitaire,” Studia monastica 4
(1962) (pp. 93–109), pp. 100–2.

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(1269–72).179 He was licensed and magistratus in theology in either 1274

or 1275, probably under the direction of Guy of l’Aumône. John served
as regent at the Parisian college as late as 1292, mentioned as such in
a letter written by the abbot of Cîteaux on 9 April of that year. He
died at Paris in 1293.180
Sylvain Piron makes the point, however, that the rst reference to this
theologian indicates that his name can be read as “Rilus” or “Nilus,”
from which it might be difcult to attribute the questions to a man
named John.181 On the other hand, Piron states that the theological
questions appearing in the rst part of Nicholas’s collection probably
date from the 1290s and probably for the most part from the rst part
of the decade. If this is the case, then John of Waarde, still regent in
1292, is possibly the author of the quodlibeta.
The questions contained in the two quodlibeta attributed to the “abbas
sancti bernardi,” whether John of Waarde is accepted as author or
not, are primarily concerned with matters pastoral and confessional.
Two questions show interest in the operation of the act of sacramental
confessions (I, qq. 1, 4; II, q. 1) and two have to do with theft (I, qq.
2–3); three of the questions have monks as their subject, the last of
these concerning itself with disobedient conversi (I, qq. 2, 5, 7).182

Rainier Marquette of Clairmarais

Born in the town of Marquette (Marketta) near Lille and most likely
a monk of the Cistercian abbey of Clairmarais in the Pas-de-Calais,
Rainier Marquette appears in Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc’s collection as
the author of two Quodlibeta of twelve questions (Paris, BnF lat. 15850,
ff. 35r–v, 38r–v).183 Magistratus in theology before his election as abbot
of Clairmarais in 1293, Rainer returned to Paris after his abdication

179
J. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life and Works (Garden City, NY 1974),
pp. 241–92.
180
R. Aubert, “Jean de Weerde, DHGE XXVII, cols. 800–1; É. Brouette, “Jean
du Waarde,” DAC, cols. 417–18; G. Raciti, “Jean de Waarde (Weerde),” Dictionnaire de
Spiritualité VIII, cols. 787–8. See also A. Pelzer, “Livres de philosphie et de théologie de
l’abbaye de Ter Doest à l’usage du maître cistercien Jean Sindewint de 1311 à 1319,”
in Études d’histoire littéraire sur la scolastique médiévale. Recueil d’articles mis à jour à l’aide des
notes de l’auteur, A. Pattin and É. van de Vyver, eds. (Louvain 1964), pp. 78–82.
181
Piron, “Nicholas of Bar’s Collection,” p. 342.
182
Glorieux II, 187–8; DAC, col. 417.
183
Glorieux I, pp. 254–5.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 391

as abbot in September 1295, teaching at the Collège Saint-Bernard

until 1301.184
Glorieux suggested that we should date his rst Quodlibet to 1295–96
and the second to 1300–01;185 it is likely, however, that this dating is
to be mistrusted. Question 2 of Rainier’s rst Quodlibet, addressing the
question of the aureola for a sinful but repentant master of theology, has
been edited. Rainier argues that the master should not get the aureola,
suggesting that a theologian should be in the state of grace when he
teaches.186 The question of the aureola is one that attracted no little
attention from the quodlibetal masters. Glorieux’s “Table idéologique”
shows masters interested in the aureola of Christ, of doctors, of martyrs,
of preachers, and of virgins—for a total of fteen questions. Of these
fteen, six dealt with the aureola of masters and six with the aureola of
virgins.187

James of Thérines
Of all the quodlibetal masters among the canons regular and monks,
Servais of Guez of Mont-Saint-Éloi, in the last part of the thirteenth
century, and the Cistercian James of Thérines, in the rst part of the
fourteenth, have received the most attention from modern histori-
ans—Servais in breadth and James in depth. Servais’s questions, for
the most part, remain unedited. James of Thérines, on the other hand,
has had his Quodlibeta (Paris, BnF lat. 15565) edited and presented by
Palémon Glorieux188 and his Quodlibeta and other writings studied and
presented by both Noël Valois in the Histoire littéraire de la France and
William Chester Jordan in his political biography of this engaged
Cistercian monk.189

184
Gallia Christiana III, col. 528; H.P.F. de Laplane, L’abbaye de Clairmarais, d’àprès ses
archives (Saint-Omer 1863), p. 263; J.-M. Canivez, “Clairmarais,” DHGE XII (cols.
1046–8), col. 1047; Obert-Piketty, “Les lectures,” p. 286.
185
Glorieux II, pp. 199, 254.
186
Leclercq, “L’idéal du théologien,” pp. 143–6; the edition of Rainier’s question
appears on p. 143.
187
See Marmursztejn, “A Normative Power,” pp. 350–2.
188
Jacques de Thérines, Quodlibets I et II. Jacques Lesage, Quodlibet I, ed. P. Glorieux
(Paris 1958).
189
N. Valois, “Jacques de Thérines, Cistercien,” in HLF XXXIV (1914), pp. 179–219;
É. Brouette, “Jacques de Thérines,” DAC, cols. 393–4; R. Aubert, “Jacques de Thérines,”
DHGE XXVI, cols. 750–2; W.C. Jordan, Unceasing Strife, Unending Fear. Jacques de Thérines
and the Freedom of the Church in the Age of the Last Capetians (Princeton 2005).

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392 thomas sullivan, osb

Born in the village of Thérines in the Oise, James of Thérines was

sent to Paris for theological studies after having entered the Cistercian
Order at the abbey of Chaalis. Jordan suggests that James was in Paris
as early as 1290 or 1293, where he may have studied under John of
Waarde. Regent master at the Collège Saint-Bernard between 1306 and
1309, he signed sometime between 1304 and 1306 a letter of recom-
mendation sent to King Philip IV on behalf of a scholar in theology.190
He was consulted in May 1308 concerning the Templars191 and on 11
April 1309 concerning Marguerite Porete.192 We have from the time
of his regency two Christmas Quodlibeta numbering forty-one questions,
in Paris, BnF lat. 15565: the rst was argued in Advent 1306 and the
second in Advent of the following year.193 His biblical commentaries
on diverse books are unfortunately no longer extant.
Abbot James left Paris in 1309, elected in that year abbot of his mon-
astery of profession. He attended the Council of Vienne in 1311–12
and authored a series of important writings concerned with the exemp-
tion of the religious orders, attacked by the secular prelates with the
Augustinian Giles of Rome, strangely, as their spokesman.194 When
Pope John XXII posed two questions, the rst concerning the reform
of the Cistercian Order and the second concerning a subsidy from the
Order required for an expedition to the Holy Land, James replied that
while the Order was in good shape and capable of self-correction, it
was also poor, made the more so by continual wars and burdensome
taxes.195 In 1317 or 1318, James became abbot of Pontigny, which he
governed until his death on 18 October 1321. Sometime during the rst
half of 1318, James was one of the prelates and masters of theology
consulted on doctrines held by certain Provençal Franciscans.196

190
CUP II, no. 658, p. 121. The quodlibetal master Peter of Saint-Denis was one
of the document’s signatories as well.
191
CUP II, no. 664 and note, p. 127. Other quodlibetal masters whose seals were
appended to the document include Gerard of Saint-Victor, OSA Saint-Victor, and
Johannes de Maroeuil, OSA Mont-Saint-Éloi.
192
Verdeyen, “Le procés d’inquisition,” pp. 50, 56.
193
Jacques de Thérines, Quodlibet I et II, ed. Glorieux, p. 11.
194
See Obert-Piketty, “Les lectures,” p. 275, for a list of his works concerning the
exemption of the religious orders and Jordan, Unceasing Strife, pp. 36–55, for a discus-
sion of the same.
195
Obert-Piketty, “Les lectures,” p. 227; Jordan, Unceasing Strife, pp. 75–84.
196
CUP II, no. 760, p. 217. See also Jordan, Unceasing Strife, pp. 88–92.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 393

The majority of James’s questions in Quodlibet I and especially in

Quodlibet II address “the abstract and recondite problems of metaphysics
and ontology.” Jordan provides a list of these questions which he says
“hardly exhausts the matters he [ James] takes on: existence, essence,
potentiality, the scientic status of theology, the beatic vision, the hypo-
static union, the passion, angelic intelligence, nature, motion, innity
and eternity, and the varieties of reason and rationality.”197
Hypostatic Union: An example of one of these more recondite topics
occurs in James’s Quodlibet I, q. 4. Here he enters into the discussions
treating of what happened to the body of Christ during the Triduum:
how to reconcile the hypostatic union with the dead Christ. Questions
surrounding this topic are numerous in the quodlibetal collections;
Solère lists the names of ten different masters, some of whom discussed
the issue directly or in its several variants more than once, including
Henry of Ghent’s six times and Godfrey of Fontaines’s three.198
Pope Clement V: Questions 13 and 14 from Quodlibet I, less esoteric
and speculative than earlier questions in the disputation, sought James’
opinion on whether the pope should remain at Bordeaux or return
to Italy, at a time when Italy was struggling with heresy.199 On Pope
Benedict XI’s death the cardinals, meeting in conclave at Perugia,
were almost equally divided between an anti-French faction demand-
ing vengeance for the attack on Pope Boniface VIII at Anagni in 1303
and a pro-French group seeking rapprochement with King Philip IV. After
eleven months’ bitter debate and intrigue they elected on 5 June 1305
Bertrand de Got, archbishop of Bordeaux since 1299. It was a victory
for the pro-French minority, for although the new pope, Clement V,
could be trusted to respect Boniface VIII’s memory, he had long been
in favor with the French court.
By the time of the disputation of Advent 1306, however, the new
pope had not yet left Bordeaux for Rome. The pope’s supporters stated
that one reason he did not go to Italy was the presence of the followers
of the heretic Fra Dolcino. James spent much time and energy making

197
Jordan, Unending Strife, p. 10.
198
The question reads: “Utrum de necessitate dei sit ponere in Christo aliam
formam substantialem ab anima intellectiva” ( Jacques de Thérines, Quodlibets I et II,
ed. Glorieux, pp. 72–87). See J.L. Solère, “Was the Eye in the Tomb?” in Theological
Quodlibeta I, p. 531, n. 72.
199
The question reads: “Utrum stante haeresi in Italia papa debeat remanere
Burdigalae vel ire in Italiam” ( Jacques de Thérines, Quodlibets I et II, ed. Glorieux, pp.
153–7).

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394 thomas sullivan, osb

it clear that the friar’s specic teachings were of such a nature as to

threaten the papacy and the Church. It therefore made sense for the
pope to remain in France with the expectation that he would return
to Rome ad tempus.200
The Expulsion of Jews: On Friday, 22 July 1306, King Philip IV
expelled the Jews, numbering about one hundred thousand, from the
Kingdom of France. In December of that year, a question was posed
to James in his Advent quodlibetal session: “Utrum Judaei expulsi de
una regione debeant expelli de alia.”201 In his response, James clearly
stated that the Jews should be permitted to live among Christians and
he gave six reasons for his position. He did agree, however, that the
Jews, if they grew in number and became obnoxious to their hosts
and contaminated them, could be expelled every once in a while ad
tempus—temporarily but not permanently.202

Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay
Little is known of the life of Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay except his
monastery of profession (Vaux-Cernay in the Île-de-France) and the
fact that he must have been magistratus in theologia sometime before 1324
when the quodlibetal disputation attributed to him took place.203 He is
likely the regent master the General Chapter of the Cistercian Order
assigned in 1322 to reform the order’s studium at Paris with the help
of the abbot of Preuilly and that of the abbots of Cîteaux, Clairvaux,
la Ferté, Pontigny, and Morimond.204
In an article published in 1938, Étienne Axters determined that
Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay was responsible for a quodlibetal collection
numbering twenty-two questions205 found in an unnumbered manu-
script currently held by the monks of the Trappist abbey of Tamié

200
Lambertini, “Political Quodlibeta,” p. 473; Jordan, Unceasing Strife, pp. 18–22;
R. Orioli, “Jacques de Thérines: una fonte trascurata su Fra Dolcino,” Bulletino dell’Istituto
Storico per il Medio Eva 89 (1980–81), pp. 489–507.
201
Jacques de Thérines, Quodlibets I et II, ed. Glorieux, pp. 157–9.
202
Jordan, Unending Strife, pp. 12–17; Dahan, “Juifs,” pp. 226–7; G. Dahan, “Quelques
réexions sur l’anti-judaïsme chrétien au moyen âge,” Histoire, économie et sociétés 2 (1983),
pp. 355–6; Valois, “Jacques de Thérines,” pp. 188–9.
203
Obert-Piketty, “Les lectures,” p. 284.
204
Statuta capitulorum generalium ordinis Cisterciensis ab anno 1116 ad annum 1786, ed. J.M.
Canivez, 8 vols. (Louvain 1933–1941), III, p. 359.
205
Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay’s quodlibetal questions are presented in Appendix III
to this chapter.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 395

and formerly held at the abbey of Cîteaux.206 A note following the

text of the Quodlibet indicates that Nicholas presided at the quodlibetal
disputation held at the Collège Saint-Bernard on Monday of the third
week of Advent in 1324 and determined on the following Saturday.207
Scholars of the quodlibetal genre have used the information provided
in the colophon to demonstrate that a quodlibet consisted of two sessions
(the disputation and the determination) and that between the sessions
there were only a few days.208
Beyond this identication, little further investigation of Nicholas’s
Quodlibet has taken place. At least two of the questions, however, may
be of interest to the historian. The rst, question 12, discusses whether
or not a monk in choir commits mortal sin if, while standing in choir
with the rest of his brethren and for no good reason, he does not join
in the divine praises.209 At rst glance this may only be a question
investigating the nature of choral prayer as it relates to the obligation
of the divine ofce. It would be interesting to discover the name and
quality of the person posing the question: is he a member of the regular
or secular clergy? Is he a confrere of Magister Nicholas? Does he stand
next to him in choir? Anyone who has chanted the divine ofce for
years knows how easily one slips into a daydream or grapples with a
problem, theological or not, and no longer sings with the choir.
Nicholas’s question 15 is one that allows the historian to connect
clearly a particular question to the person of the master holding the
quodlibet. The question goes as follows: “An excommunicated cleric went
to the [Papal] Curia to obtain the grant of absolution, he procured
a letter from the Supreme Pontiff addressed to the prior of Saint-
Bernard of Paris in Cardinet, but before the letter reached the prior

206
É. Axters, “Le maître cistercien Nicolas de Vaux-Cernay et son quodlibet,” New
Scholasticism 12 (1938), pp. 242–53. The questions comprising Nicholas’s Quodlibet are
found on ff. 155v–159r of the Tamié manuscript. The unnumbered Tamié manuscript
corresponds to item 214 in the inventory of Cîteaux’s manuscripts drawn up by John
of Cirey, abbot of Cîteaux and magister theologie of the University of Paris (T. Sullivan,
Parisian Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373–1500. A Biographical Register [Leiden 2004], pp.
134–6).
207
The colophon reads: “Hec questiones proposite fuerunt die lune tercie septimane
adventus Domini coram Magistro Nicholao in scolis Sancti Bernardi Parisius, quo die
dictus Magister de quolibet disputavit et dictas questiones prout in isto libello recitantur
determinavit die Sabbati” (f. 159r) (Axters, “Le maître cistercien,” pp. 244–5).
208
Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” pp. 163–4, n. 15.
209
The question reads: “An monachus qui tenetur ad Dei servicium stans cum aliis
in choro ad decantandum laudes divinas non habens impedimentum peccat mortaliter
si non cum aliis cantet” (f. 157v) (Axters, “Le maître cistercien,” p. 251).

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the Supreme Pontiff died. Should the prior of Saint-Bernard absolve

him?”210 Since the quodlibet was held in the Collège Saint-Bernard the
prior might have been present at the quodlibet enjoying the question’s
topicality or even proposing the questions himself.
* * *
While each of these seventeen masters of theology of the University of
Paris had arrived “at the summit of a hierarchy of learning,”211 many
would leave only a few traces in the records. Seven, however, would
rise even higher in the ecclesiastical cursus honorum, ve as priors and
abbots, one as a bishop, and one as Summus Pontifex. Albert of Cluny,
OClun, and Guy of Cluny, OClun were appointed priors of Mont-
didier. Servais of Guez was elected abbot of Mont-Saint-Éloi and its
small congregation and John of Tongres would be elected abbot of the
Premonstratensian abbey of Vicogne. The Cistercian masters Guy of
l’Aumône, James of Thérines, and Rainier Marquette of Clairmarais
would become abbots of monasteries of their order and Guy de Cluny,
OClun, after serving as abbot of the Benedictine house of Beaulieu-en-
Argonne and bringing it into the Order of Cluny, would be appointed
bishop of Toul. Finally, Pierre Roger, OSB, after serving in various
abbeys and dioceses as prior, abbot, bishop, and archbishop, would
ultimately be elected pope.

210
The question reads: “Questio, quidam clericus excommunicatus ivit ad curiam
ut impetraret benecium absolutionis, obtinuit litteram a Summo Pontice directam
ad priorem Sancti Bernardi Parisius in Cardineto, antequam littera apprehenderet
priorem mortuus est Summus Pontifex. Questio est an prior Sancti Bernardi debeat
eum absolvere” (f. 158r) (Axters, “Le maître cistercien,” p. 252).
211
Wei, “Paris Theologians,” p. 208.

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 APPENDIX I

QUODLIBETAL QUESTIONS OF PIERRE ROGER, OSB

(BAV, Borghese 89, ff. 63r–89v)212

1. Utrum creatura rationalis naturali dilectione plus possit aut debeat Deum diligere
quam seipsam (ff. 63r–66r).
2. Utrum intellectus agens illustrans phantasmata aliquam dispositionem absolutam
efciat circa illa (ff. 66r–72r).
3. Utrum primum apprehensum ab intellectu sub ratione cogniti sit ipsa species rei
vel id cuius est species (ff. 72r–74v).
4. Utrum subiectum peccati originalis sit anima (ff. 75r–79v).
5. Utrum habitus supranaturalis sit necessarius ad merendum (ff. 79v–82r).
6. Utrum ex principiis philosophie possit probari immortalitas anime (ff. 82r–83r).
7. Utrum in correctione fraterna de necessitate precepti privata monitio et correptio
debeat praecedere denuntiationem faciendam prelato (ff. 83r–85v).
8. Utrum ille qui vovit non bibere vinum aliqua die certa, puta sexta feria, totiens
frangat votum et totiens de novo peccet mortaliter, quotiens bibit vinum illa die,
vel solum prima vice quibus bibit peccavit (ff. 85v–87r).
9. Quidam christianus ex aliquo zelo dei vel ex aliqua alia causa quacumque rapuit
lium cuiusdam Iudei vel alicuius alterius indelis, qui erat infra annos, et illum
baptizavit; cum autem ille baptizatus venit ad annos distinctionis, parentes illius
baptizati repetunt lium suum. Queritur utrum Ecclesia debeat restituere illum
sic baptizatum suis parentibus (ff. 87r–88r).
10. Quidam laicus equitabat cum quodam clerico in via. Dum autem pariter equita-
rent, laicus vidit inimicos suos contra se venientes, et quia malum equum habebat,
rogavit clericum qui habebat bonum equum, quod accommodaret equum suum
et equum laici acciperet, quia de vita sua formidabat. Clericus noluit illi tradere
equum suum. Ille proiecit clericum de equo et violenter ei equum abstulit, fugit
et evasit. Nunc queritur utrum iste qui talem violentiam intulit clerico incurerit
sententiam excommunicationis (f. 88r).
11. Utrum Pater in divinis perfecte possit se intelligere non dicendo Verbum (ff. 88v–
89v).

212
Pierre Roger’s quodlibetal questions are presented in Maier, “Der literarische
Nachlass,” pp. 290–1.

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 APPENDIX II

QUODLIBETAL QUESTIONS OF GUY OF L’AUMÔNE,

OCIST (Paris, BnF lat. 14891, ff. 199r–209r)213

94. Utrum dyabolus apparens in specie Christi possit adorari sine peccato (f. 199r).
95. Utrum in homine cadat perplexitas ad evitandum peccatum (f. 199r–v).
96. Utrum corpus Christi debeat subdito dari existenti in peccato mortali, si petat
(f. 199v).
97. Utrum sacerdos symoniace ordinatus possit celebrare missam sine peccato
(f. 199v).
98. Utrum aliquis vovens vitam heremiticam Deo, possit exire aliquo modo (ff.
199v–200r).
99. Utrum monachus, tenens aliquid ofcium, possit illud dimittere, abbate contra-
dicente (f. 200r).
100. Utrum aliquis, vovens intrare religionem, habens parentes pauperas, timens
defectum eorum, possit eos dimittere (f. 200r).
101. Utrum aliquis, custodiens ensem alicuius sub iuramento, teneatur ei reddere si
at furiosus (f. 200r–v).
102. Utrum uxor usurarii, non habens aliunde vivere, possit comedere de usura
(f. 200v).
103. Utrum aliquis, iurans alicui quod secreta sua teget, et post ille procuret homi-
cidium, an teneatur hoc celare (f. 200v).
104. Utrum aliquis, promittens plus comedere quam oporteat simplici verbo, possit
hoc facere (f. 200v).
105. Utrum aliquis, tenens pecuniam alicuius sub iuramento quod reddet ei, et ille
vult impugnare ecclesiam, teneatur reddere (ff. 200v–201r).
106. Utrum se extendant ad omnes hec mandata: “nolite portare sacculum”
(f. 201r).
107. Utrum mali sint puniendi aliquo tempore (f. 201v).
108. Utrum in novo testamento iustum sit hominem homini dominari (f. 201v).
109. Utrum duplex debeat esse potestas superior, regalis scilicet et sacerdotalis
(ff. 201v–202r).
110. Utrum potestas sacerdotalis in aliquibus sit contraria regali (f. 202r).
111. Utrum ratione delicti persone ecclesiatice sint obnoxie potestati regali (f. 202r–v).
112. Utrum liceat thezaurizare (f. 202v).
113. Utrum persone ecclesiastice possint res hereditarias possidere (ff. 202v–203r).
114. Utrum datio decimarum sit in precepto vel in consilio (f. 203r–v).
115. Utrum decima possi eri de rebus male acquisitis (f. 203v).
116. Utrum decime personales sint in precepto (ff. 203v–204r).
117. Utrum laici possint decimas recipere (f. 204r–v).
118. Utrum religiosi possint decimas habere (ff. 204v–205r).

213
Wei, “Guy de l’Aumône,” pp. 314–23. The numbers given here for each ques-
tion are coordinated with the capitula found in the manuscript of Guy’s Summa and
presented in Wei’s article.

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 the QUODLIBETA of the canons regular and the monks 399

119. Utrum clerici, habentes sufciens stipendium unde vivant, possint decimas per-
cipere (f. 205r).
120. Qui debeant dare decimam, utrum tam divites quam pauperes, et e converso
(f. 205r–v).
121. Utrum clerici debeant dare decimas (f. 205r–v).214
122. Utrum religiosi teneantur dare decimam (ff. 205v–206r).
123. Cum multe sint decime, que illarum debent dari (f. 206r–v).
124. Utrum preceptum sit dare primitias (f. 206v).
125. Quanta debeat esse primitia (f. 206v).
126. Utrum oblatio cotidiana, que t ministris ecclesie, sit in precepto (ff. 206v–
207r).
127. Utrum licitum sit bellare (f. 207r–v).
128. Utrum licitum sit pugnare diebus solempnibus (f. 207v).
129. Utrum in iusto bello requiratur fraudis exclusio (f. 207v).
130. Utrum licitum sit facere tyrochinium (ff. 207v–208r).
131. Utrum merchari sit licitum (f. 208r–v).
132. Utrum clericis et monachis sit licita negotiatio aliquo modo (ff. 208v–209r).
134. Utrum persone ecclesiastice vel saltem religiose teneantur manibus laborare
(f. 209r).

214
Questions 120 and 121 are dealt with together (Wey, “Guy de l’Aumône,”
p. 231).

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 APPENDIX III

QUODLIBETAL QUESTIONS OF NICHOLAS OF

VAUX-CERNAY, OCIST
(Abbaye de Tamié, Unnumbered manuscripts, ff. 155v–159r)215

1. An Deus idem numero quod creatum est possit creare (f. 155v).
2. An Deus immediate possit contraria producere (ff. 155v–156r).
3. An innite ydee sint in Deo actu (f. 156r).
4. An omnes sint predestinati ab eterno (f. 156r).
5. An intellectus beatus possit videre unam personam sine alia (f. 156r–v).
6. An intellectus agens ut agens inuat aliquid in passum (f. 156v).
7. An intellectus agens intelligat (ff. 156v–157r).
8. An voluntas sit potentia passiva (f. 157r).
9. An Filius antequam incarnaretur posset consecrare corpus Christi (f. 157r).
10. An Christus non fuisset mortuus si non fuisset occisus (f. 157r).
11. An voluntas possit moveri ad contrarium eius quod dictat sibi tunc ratio
(f. 157v).
12. An monachus qui tenetur ad Dei servicium stans cum aliis in choro ad decantan-
dum laudes divinas non habens impedimentum peccat mortaliter si non cum aliis
cantet (f. 157v).
13. Utrum scilicet unus homo melius intelligat rem unam et eandem quam alius
(f. 157v).
14. An aliquis sit baptizatus tali positione facta: Nicholaus et Stephanus veniunt ad
baptizandum puerum et proferunt verba....(ff. 157v–158r).
15. Quidam clericus excommunicatus ivit ad curiam ut impetraret benecium absolu-
tionis, obtinuit litteram a Summo Pontice directam ad priorem Sancti Bernardi
Parisius in Cardineto, antequam littera apprehenderet priorem mortuus est Summus
Pontifex. Questio est an prior Sancti Bernardi debeat eum absolvere (f. 158r).
16. Quid magis est eligendum, esse continue in caritate minori vel peccare et esse sive
resurgere postero in maiori caritate et ibi persevare (f. 158r–v).
17. Quod melius est clerico sufcienter in Sacra Scriptura esse in scolis et ibi audire
vel studere vel etiam in sua parochia commorari (f. 158v).
18. An aliquis vendens rem plus quam valeat teneatur ad restitutionem (f. 158v).
19. De resurrectione utrum et vel erit simul vel successive (f. 158v).
20. An possit mereri vitam eternam (f. 158v).
21. An stella que duxit magos ad Christum fuit vera stella (f. 158v).
22. An sacerdos possit consecrare mediam partem hostie sine alia (ff. 158v–159r).

215
The questions are presented in Axters, “Le maître cistercien,” pp. 250–2.

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 DOMINICAN QUODLIBETAL LITERATURE, CA. 1260–1330

Russell L. Friedman*

In the years following Thomas Aquinas’ impressive quodlibetal pro-

duction in the middle of the thirteenth century, up to Robert Holcot’s
large collection of quodlibetal questions from the second quarter of
the fourteenth, Dominican masters of theology held a great number
of quodlibetal disputations and published a signicant number of texts
based on them. One of the purposes of this chapter is to describe the
major sets of Dominican quodlibetal questions that are extant, giving
the status quaestionis of research on them, as well as showing wherever

* Thanks to William J. Courtenay, Sylvain Piron, an anonymous reader, and, above

all, Chris Schabel for comments, help, and encouragement. Abbreviations (in addition
to those standard throughout the volume) used here:
Kaeppeli, Scriptores = T. Kaeppeli OP, ed., Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi,
4 vols. (Rome 1978–1993; vol. 4, edited by T. Kaeppeli OP and E. Panella
OP, contains a supplement to the rst three volumes): lists all known writ-
ings by medieval Dominicans, along with manuscripts containing them and
editions of them, as well as select literature.
Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalters = A. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur
Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, 3 vols. (Rome 1964, 1967, 1977). All page
references in the present chapter to articles by Maier are made to this reprint
edition, although I always also give the original place of publication.
Roensch, Early Thomistic School = F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, IA
1964): gives ne, if somewhat dated, bio-bibliographical sketches of many
of the writers discussed here.
Sharpe, Handlist = R. Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and
Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout 1997; 2nd ed., Turnhout 2001): up-to-date infor-
mation on the works of the English Dominicans mentioned here, including
manuscripts and editions.
Teetaert, “La littérature” = A. Teetaert, “La littérature quodlibetique,” Ephemerides
theologiae Lovanienses 14 (1937), pp. 77–105: a spirited reply to Glorieux II,
with a great deal of manuscript information.
BGPTM = “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelal-
ters” (formerly “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters”).
BAW = Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Veröffentlichungen der Kom-
mission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen
Geisteswelt.
In most cases below I do not refer to the question lists contained in Glorieux I and II,
the lists of manuscripts contained in Kaeppeli (and Sharpe), or editions of individual
quodlibetal questions that are otherwise listed in the “Bibliography of Quodlibetal
Questions” found on Sylvain Piron’s Quodlibase (www.quodlibase.org).

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possible what light they shed on the nature and function of quodlibetal
disputations and questions more generally. When the title of this chapter
is “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature,” however, it is in acknowledgment
of the fact that some Dominican intellectuals used the quodlibetal for-
mat in a way having nothing to do with the quodlibetal disputation,
and hence the works they produced in this manner cannot properly be
labeled “quodlibetal questions” or “quodlibeta.” I refer to a substantial
“anti-Quodlibet” literature from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries, paralleling the Dominican Correctoria corruptorii written in
response to William de la Mare’s Correctorium as well as the Dominican
anti-Sentences-commentary literature, all of which were tightly bound up
with the spread of Thomism as the predominant intellectual framework
in the Dominican Order. Although this anti-Quodlibet literature is just
one part of the Dominican response to perceived attacks on Aquinas’
thought, it is nonetheless a noteworthy aspect of specically Domini-
can quodlibetal production from these years and as such will be dealt
with in some detail below. Although in what follows I will mention in
roughly chronological order all of the some twenty Dominican masters
who have left us examples of quodlibetal literature, I will necessarily
be uneven in my presentation, concentrating on the gures who have
signicant surviving quodlibetal material and passing over more briey
those with smaller productions. One of the points that I hope becomes
clear in the course of the chapter is how the dynamic, evolving nature
of early Thomism is reected in the Dominican quodlibetal literature
of these years.

Early Dominican Quodlibeta, ca. 1264–1280

As Kevin White’s chapter in the rst volume of the present book makes
clear, Thomas Aquinas’ twelve Quodlibeta form one of the most remark-
able examples of the genre for the scholastic period as a whole, and
taken together they dwarf the quodlibetal production of Aquinas’ early
Dominican successors at Paris. In fact, from the period before around
1280, we have only four relatively brief sets of quodlibetal questions that
survive from Dominican masters: those of Hannibaldus of Hannibaldi,
Ferrarius Catalanus, William Hothum, and Peter of Tarentaise.1

1
The very early Dominican Quodlibeta in Guerric of Saint-Quentin, Quodl. I–VII
(1233–42), which has recently been published in a critical edition, should be mentioned

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 403

Hannibalus of Hannibaldi
Of these sets of quodlibetal questions, that of Hannibaldus, regent
master at Paris 1260–61, student and friend of Thomas Aquinas, is
extremely brief, unedited, and (perhaps justiably) neglected. Glorieux
maintained that some of the eighteen questions of Hannibaldus’
Quodlibet, found on just one page of a single manuscript (Paris, BnF
lat. 13466, f. 127va–b), have a very pronounced afnity with questions
from Aquinas’ Quodlibeta VIII and IX.2

Ferrarius Catalanus
Although they are far more substantial pieces of work than that of
Hannibaldus, the Quodlibeta of Ferrarius and William, each surviving in
a sole manuscript, are also unstudied and largely unedited. Ferrarius,
Dominican regent master in theology at Paris roughly in the period
1272–76, probably held the quodlibetal disputation from which his
Quodlibet I descends at Easter 1275; the twenty-one questions found in
Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 379, ff. 225r–233v, range in topic from
philosophical psychology to original sin, from beneces to the sacra-
ments, and from revelation to the beatic vision.3 In addition, Glorieux
assigned to Ferrarius a second Quodlibet of twenty-one questions found
in Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 530 (ff. 166r–169r), on the basis of

here: Guerric of Saint-Quentin, Quaestiones de quolibet, ed. W.H. Principe with J. Black, and
an Introduction by J.P. Torrel (Studies and Texts, 143) (Toronto 2002). See on these
Quodlibeta Torrel’s extremely thorough “Introduction” to the edition (pp. 3–177), as
well as Jacqueline Hamesse’s “Theological Quaestiones Quodlibetales” in the rst volume
of the present book, esp. pp. 26–8.
2
See Glorieux II, pp. 129–30, where Glorieux notes that the Quodlibet begins with
the following remark: “aliud quodlibet a A predicatore termito”; according to Glorieux,
this can only refer to either Albert the Great or [H]annibaldus, and he favors Han-
nibaldus 1) on account of the similarities between this Quodlibet and Aquinas’ and
2) on account of paleographical and codicological grounds making it likely that this
Quodlibet emerged from the early 1260s. It should be noted, however, that Kaeppeli,
Scriptores, no. 1685, questions (without elaboration) whether this Quodlibet indeed belongs
to Hannibaldus. On Hannibaldus as friend of Thomas Aquinas, see J.-P. Torrell, Saint
Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, R. Royal, trans. (Washington, DC
1996), pp. 137, 282–3.
3
According to Glorieux I, pp. 109–10, in the upper margin of f. 225 can be read:
“Istud quodlibet est determinatum a fratre ferrario iacobita de paschate. Anno domini
Mo CCo LXXo quinto,” although the date itself is in a different hand from the main text.
Both Glorieux, loc. cit., and Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 1086, date the Quodlibet to 1276;
M. Grabmann, “Quaestiones tres Fratris Ferrarii Catalani O.P. doctrinam S. Augustini
illustrantes ex Codice Parisiensi editae,” Estudis Franciscans 42 (1930) (pp. 382–90),
p. 382, writes: “Hoc Quodlibetum a magistro Ferrario anno 1275 Parisiis determinatum
est.” There are several fragments of Quodl. I and several of its questions have been
published; see Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 1086.

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the strong resemblance between the structure and language of this

Quodlibet and Ferrarius’ Quodlibet I. Ferrarius’ Quodlibet II deals with the
same kinds of issues as are found in Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta I and
II, and hence it should probably be dated to around 1277.4

William Hothum
William Hothum’s Quodlibet is a series of rather short, interconnected
questions on divine ideas, angelic cognition, the relation between will
and intellect, and the nature of matter, found in Paris, BnF lat. 15805,
ff. 17rb–19ra. The questions are interconnected in the sense that there
are cross-references between the questions in the Quodlibet. As an
example of this, we can take question 10, which concerns whether an
angel knows singulars through species infused in it by God (Utrum angelus
novit singularia per species sibi a Deo inditas). Here, one nds a reference
to a position William rejected in the previous question dealing with
whether angels cognize singulars through the application of universal
species to particulars (Utrum angelus cognoscat singularia per applicationem
specierum universalium ad particularia) as well as a reference to what William
considers to be the correct understanding of angelic cognition already
postulated in question 8 (Utrum unus angelus cognoscat alium loco distantem
a se). William determines question 10 itself by saying that angels do
indeed understand singulars through species infused in them directly
by God.5 Thus, Hothum clearly has reworked his Quodlibet to a certain
extent, imposing upon it a cogent internal structure. From the explicit
to William’s Quodlibet we know that the quodlibetal disputation took
place in Paris on 9 December 1280, when William was magister actu

4
Glorieux II, pp. 86–7, who had listed this Quodlibet as “Anonymous VI” in Glo-
rieux I, pp. 302–3.
5
William Hothum, Quodl., q. 10: “Quia hanc viam praecedentis quaestionis non
teneo, sequitur alia quaestio: utrum angelus novit singularia per species sibi a Deo
inditas . . . Secundum quod dictum est supra in quaestione 8, concedendum est quod
angelus novit singularia per species a Deo sibi inditas, non enim carent notitia rerum
singularium, cum mundum administrent secundum catholicos, orbes moveant secun-
dum philosophos. Nec species rerum a rebus accipiunt, non enim corporeis utuntur
sensibus sicut animae coniunctae corporibus. Unde per species sibi a Deo inditas novit
angelus corporalia sicut spiritualia, singularia sicut universalia, quia totum universum
sicut efuit a Deo in suarum partium naturis, sic efuxit ut quoad cognitionem esset
in angelis. Sicut igitur Deus est causa rerum, non solum quoad naturam universalem
sed quoad individuationis principia, et sicut causat sic cognoscit per suam essentiam
quae est similitudo omnium, etiam singularium et materialium, ita angeli per species
sibi a Deo inditas, quae sunt quaedam repraesentationes divinae essentiae, cognoscant
res, tam universales quam particulares.” Paris, BnF lat. 15805, f. 18rb.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 405

regens in theology there.6 He went on to head the English Dominican

province for two periods (1282–87, 1290–96) and was nominated to be
archbishop of Dublin in April 1296; he died in 1298.

Peter of Tarentaise
The last of these early Dominican quodlibeta, and the only one of them
that has been edited nearly in its entirety, is that of Peter of Tarentaise,
parts of which are found in three manuscripts.7 Perhaps part of the
reason that Glorieux took the trouble to edit most of Peter’s text is
the fact that he was, in the ve months prior to his death on 22 June
1276, Pope Innocent V. Peter’s Quodlibet was in fact listed as anonymous
in Glorieux I, pp. 305–06 (“Anonyme VIII” found in Paris, BnF lat.
16149, ff. 77r–81v), but an explicit reference in John of Paris’ Mémoire
justicatif to a position found in Peter’s Quodlibet allowed Glorieux
to identify it as Peter’s in Glorieux II, pp. 225–27. In the article in
which he edited a good deal of Peter’s Quodlibet, Glorieux maintained
that it was disputed in 1264 (probably at Easter) during Peter’s rst
Parisian regency in 1259–64.8 But already in 1947, L.-B. Gillon not
only showed how dubious Glorieux’ evidence for that dating was, but

6
“Expliciunt quaestiones de quolibet disputatae a fratre Guillelmo de Hozum die
lunae proxima post festum beati Nicholai, videlicet in crastino conceptionis beatae
Mariae virginis anno gratiae MCCLXXX.” On William’s Quodlibet and the manu-
script in which it is found, see A. Noyon, “Théologiens et philosophes Dominicains du
Moyen Age (Notes, analyses et extraits),” RSPT 8 (1914–19), pp. 467–76, esp. 467–9;
G.J. Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” AFH 80 (1987), pp. 321–33, on
these questions, p. 322.
7
The Quodlibet is edited on pp. 242–75 of P. Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet de Pierre
de Tarentaise,” RTAM 9 (1937), pp. 237–80. The order of the questions as found in
both the question list in Glorieux II and the edition in “Le Quodlibet” follows the
ordering in the Paris manuscript, and hence the fteen Vatican questions are not listed
according to the order in which they are actually found in their manuscript. In addi-
tion to the two manuscripts of the work mentioned in the main text below, Kaeppeli,
Scriptores, lists without further specication: ms. Angers 212 (xv), f. 39v. H.-D. Simonin,
“Les écrits de Pierre de Tarentaise,” in Beatus Innocentius PP. V (Petrus de Tarantasia O.P.).
Studia et documenta (Rome 1943), pp. 163–335, esp. pp. 236–9, gives a good description
of the way Glorieux identied the Quodlibet as Peter’s, but his suggestion (p. 239) that
we are dealing here with remnants of more than one Quodlibet has been rebutted by
Gillon (art. cit. n. 9 below, p. 370).
8
See Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet” (cit. n. 7), pp. 237–41. Glorieux establishes his
dating primarily on the basis of q. 2 in the Quodlibet, which he claims refers obliquely
to events leading up to St Louis’ intervention in a dispute on 24 January 1264—but
even a glance at the text shows that the reference, if it is a reference at all, is very
oblique indeed.

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also conducted a more thorough investigation of the Quodlibet in the

Parisian theological context and determined that it was most probably
disputed during Peter’s second Parisian regency in 1267–69.9 Gillon’s
evidence rests on question 36 of Peter’s Quodlibet, “An omnes et soli
qui modo salvantur, salvarentur in statu innocentiae,” which he notes
is by no means a typically asked quodlibetal question, but which was
nevertheless discussed by Gerard of Abbeville in his Quodlibet IX (V),
q. 12, and Thomas Aquinas in his Quodlibet V, q. 5. The best dating for
Aquinas’ Quodlibet V is Christmas 1271, and Aquinas is clearly rebutting
precisely Peter of Tarentaise’s Quodlibet, q. 36.10 Thus, it seems to be an
almost inescapable conclusion that Peter disputed this Quodlibet during
his second regency. Of course, further work with other questions from
Peter’s Quodlibet may help to dispel any remaining doubt.11
One point of note about this Quodlibet is that it gives us a window
onto the way quodlibetal disputations were redacted and perhaps also
conducted. The Quodlibet survives in two distinct redactions: thirty-six
questions are found in Paris, BnF lat. 16149 (xiii), ff. 77r–81v, in a raw
reportatio form—the way it would have been copied down directly by
the student reportator present at the disputation—, while BAV, Borgh.
139 (xiii–xiv), ff. 134va–137va, gives fteen of the Quodlibet’s ques-
tions (qq. 10–11, 15–17, 21–28, 36, plus one extra question = q. 37)
in an ordinated version of the text, i.e., one that Peter himself had
worked through. As Glorieux was able to show, the rst version—the
one found in the Paris manuscript and the one that he edited in its
entirety—records the questions in no particular order, i.e., as they were
asked during the actual disputation; only the second, incomplete but
ordinated redaction includes Peter’s introductory remarks and his own
organization of the questions to impose some order on them (and it
is these remarks, plus the entirety of questions 36–37, that Glorieux
edits from the second version). Thus, the differences between the two
versions clearly show the work a medieval theologian had to do in

9
See L.-B. Gillon, “Sur les écrits de Pierre de Tarentaise et leur chronologie,”
appendix in M.-H. Laurent, Le bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps
(Studi e testi, 129) (Vatican City 1947), pp. 361–90, esp. pp. 370–7.
10
On Aquinas’ Quodl. V and its dating, see Kevin White’s chapter in the rst volume
of this book, esp. p. 54.
11
One could suggest as a possible starting point Peter’s q. 11 (“Utrum accipere usu-
ras sit contra ius naturale”), which Giovanni Ceccarelli in his chapter on “‘Whatever’
Economics” in the rst volume of this book (pp. 483–4 n. 17) mentions together with
quodlibetal questions by Aquinas and Pecham from around 1270.

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order to transform the records of the disputation itself into the type of
polished Quodlibet that we are more accustomed to seeing.
In addition, but much less convincingly in my opinion, the differ-
ences between the versions of Peter’s Quodlibet have been considered
by Glorieux, perhaps by Lottin, and by Wippel as evidence in favor of
the conclusion that quodlibetal disputations comprised two temporally
distinct oral sessions, the rst the disputation proper, the second the
master’s determination. Although it seems to be generally accepted
today that this was indeed how quodlibetal disputations were conducted,
this has been challenged in the past by such experts as Pelster and Pel-
zer.12 Peter’s Quodlibet has been included among much other evidence
that has been marshaled in favor of the theory. The basic idea is that
the reportatio version of Peter’s text, unorganized and raw as it is, must
reect the rst day’s oral disputation, while the second, ordinated version
must be based on a nal oral session. While the view that quodlibetal
disputations took place over two days seems to me quite secure on the
basis of other evidence,13 nevertheless introducing Peter of Tarentaise’s
Quodlibet in support of this conclusion is highly suspect. Let us say for
the sake of argument that there was only one session in a medieval
quodlibetal debate: then the rst, reportatio version of Peter’s Quodlibet
is simply an account of that session; the second, worked-through ver-
sion, on the other hand, is a purely written text, i.e., a reworking of
the very reportatio version that we have, with no intervening second
session. Thus, I cannot see that Peter’s Quodlibet offers any compelling
reason to postulate a second quodlibetal session. On the other hand, it

12
On the challenges to the view, see Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 160
and n. 7. With respect to Peter’s process of reworking the material into an organized
unity (including the suggestion that this speaks in favor of a two-part disputation), see
especially Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet” (cit. n. 7), pp. 275–80; Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet
et ses procédés rédactionnels,” Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 42 (1939), pp. 61–93, esp. pp.
73–5; Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” pp. 161–2, 187 (Wippel, p. 161 n. 10, refers
to O. Lottin, Bulletin de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 3 [1937–40], pp. 531*–2*, no. 1185
[a review of Glorieux’s article on “Le Quodlibet et ses procédés rédactionnels”] as
agreeing with Glorieux’ interpretation of the two versions of Peter’s text, but in fact
Lottin does not explicitly do so). It might be objected to my argument here that the
actual texts as found in both redactions of Peter’s Quodlibet are similar enough to suggest
that they are both pure reportationes; but it could be responded that, e.g., q. 36 as found
in the Vatican version (see Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet” cit., pp. 271–4) is very elaborate
and appears to have been completely reworked; proof would need to be offered that
both versions are pure reportationes in order for Glorieux’s arguments to hold.
13
For much more solid evidence, see, e.g., Wippel “Quodlibetal Questions,” pp.
161–2.

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seems to me that Wippel is absolutely right to point out that, given that
the reportatio version of Peter’s Quodlibet is a reportatio of the rst day’s
events, then this appears to indicate that sometimes the presiding master
played a large role even in this rst day of disputation, since it seems
to be Peter himself who draws the conclusions and who responds to
objections, not a bachelor of the Sentences acting as “respondent.”14 For
my purposes here the most important point is that Peter’s Quodlibet has
been appealed to in trying to settle some of the fundamental questions
about the genre itself and the disputations on which it was based.

Dominican Quodlibeta and Anti-Quodlibeta, ca. 1280 –1310

The years 1280–1310 were an extremely active period for Dominicans

writing quodlibetal literature, and we have examples from both Paris and
Oxford, and even one from the order’s provincial studia in Italy. Here
we will begin with Paris, move on to Oxford, and end with Remigio
dei Girolami in Italy.

Bernard of Trilia
A signicant set of quodlibetal questions appeared in the middle of
the 1280s from the hand of the French Dominican Bernard of Trilia
(†1292). Pius Künzle, who has studied Bernard’s life and works in the
greatest depth to date, proposes that Bernard read the Sentences at Paris
in 1281–83 and was Dominican regent master in theology there in
1283–86.15 These were the years, then, in which Bernard’s three quod-
libetal disputations took place. Glorieux I, pp. 101–04, relying on the
early work of G.S. André,16 listed Bernard’s three Quodlibeta in the order
and with the titles of questions as they are found in just one Vatican

14
Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 185.
15
“Prolegomena” to P. Künzle, ed., Bernardi de Trilia Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione
animae separatae (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Opera philosophica mediae aetatis
selecta, 1) (Bern 1969), pp. 3*–11*, esp. 9* for these dates. It should be noted that these
were also the dates given by Glorieux (I, p. 101) for Bernard’s regency.
16
G.S. André, “Les Quolibeta de Bernard de Trilia,” Gregorianum 2 (1921), pp.
226–65; in addition to providing a question list for the Quodlibeta from BAV, Borgh.
156, André edited four questions from the Quodlibeta and devoted a brief survey (pp.
239–48) to some of the important philosophical and theological themes found there,
also discussing Bernard’s debt to Aquinas.

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manuscript (BAV, Borgh. 156 [xiv]). In 1957, however, Künzle was able
to present evidence found in a Florence manuscript (BNC, Conv. Soppr.
A.3.1153 [xiii–xiv]) that the Quodlibet that Glorieux labeled Quodlibet II
was in fact Bernard’s Quodlibet III, and vice-versa, Glorieux’s Quodlibet
III was in fact Bernard’s Quodlibet II. Moreover, Künzle could show that
Glorieux’s question lists were missing one question for Bernard’s Quod-
libet I (for twenty-four questions total), thirteen questions for Quodlibet II
(= Glorieux’s Quodlibet III, for eighteen questions in all), and no fewer
than thirty-eight questions for Quodlibet III (= Glorieux’s Quodlibet II,
for a total of sixty-two questions!).17
In addition, in this same Florence manuscript (ff. 286ra–299vb), there
is a fourth Quodlibet (quartum quodlibet), which, however, is not directly
attributed to Bernard. Grabmann, who did the earliest work on this
particular manuscript and its relation to Bernard of Trilia, maintained
rather categorically that this fourth Quodlibet was also written by Ber-
nard.18 Künzle, however, dismissed Grabmann’s position, claiming in
fact that the fourth Quodlibet could not have been written before 26
March 1322, since a bull of Pope John XXII promulgated on that date
(Quia nonnunquam) is cited in one of the questions contained in it (q. 16:
“Utrum deceat viros perfectos transferre in alium dominium eorum
quae acquirunt mendicando cum spe habendi totum”).19 More recently,
however, Emilio Panella, in his research on Remigio dei Girolami, has
looked once again at the issue of the fourth Quodlibet. The Florentine
manuscript in which all this material is contained actually belonged
to Remigio, who probably had it made for him while studying and
teaching in Paris around the turn of the fourteenth century. In fact,
Remigio made many autograph notes and corrections throughout the

17
See for this, P. Künzle, “Neu aufgefundene Quaestiones quodlibetales Bernhards
von Trilia,” FZPT 4 (1957), pp. 52–6. I have included in Appendix I to this article a
question list that takes into account the changes that Künzle’s ndings would seem to
require. Note that the Quodlibet of Bernard’s that André and Glorieux called “Quodl.
II” is in fact called “Quodl. II” in the Vatican manuscript (see Appendix I, n. 216,
below), while it is called Quodl. III in the Florence manuscript. Thus, there is some
doubt about the relative order of the second and third of Bernard’s Quodlibeta. Nev-
ertheless, I have accepted the ordering of the Florence manuscript, keeping in mind
that it was copied for and studied by Remigio dei Girolami shortly after Bernard’s
death (see on this below).
18
M. Grabmann, “Bernhard von Trilia O.P. (†1292) und seine Quaestiones de
cognitione animae conjunctae corpori und de cognitione animae separatae,” Divus
Thomas (Freiburg) 13 (1935) (pp. 385–99), p. 389.
19
See the “Prolegomena” to Künzle, ed., Bernardi de Trilia (cit. n. 15), pp. 16*–17*.

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entire manuscript; since Remigio died in 1319, it is not possible that

the fourth Quodlibet refers to documents written in 1322. Upon looking
again at question 16 of this Quodlibet, Panella claims that it denitely
refers to Nicholas III’s bull Exiit qui seminat of 14 August 1279, but
that it is “very likely anterior to the promulgation of the Liber sextus
decretalium (3 March 1298).”20 Although Panella does not explicitly say
that Bernard of Trilia might indeed be the author of this Quodlibet, it
is nevertheless clearly worth further study.21
Putting aside the issue of Bernard’s possible fourth Quodlibet, the three
Quodlibeta that are securely assigned to the Dominican are contained
in four manuscripts, and there are a number of fragments.22 Thus—as
Remigio dei Girolami and Florence A.3.1153 suggest—the three Quod-
libeta that we know to be Bernard’s probably had readers at the end of
the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth, although
they were by no means bestsellers. Bernard’s three Quodlibeta are as yet
mostly unedited, a rather strange fact inasmuch as his Quaestiones dispu-
tatae XIII de cognitione animae separatae were edited twice in the 1960s.23

20
See Panella’s “Introduzione” to his edition of Remigio’s Quodlibeta (“I Quodlibeti
di Remigio dei Girolami,” cit. n. 84 below), pp. 1–11, esp. p. 11: “quodlibeto IV, a. 16
suppone certamente l’Exiit qui seminat (14.VIII.1279) di Niccolò III ma non contiene
elementi che implichino conoscenza o utilizzazione della Quia nonnunquam (26.III.1322)
di Giovanni XXII; molto verosimilmente è anteriore alla promulgazione del Liber sextus
decretalium (3.III.1298).”
21
A list of the twenty questions contained in this Quodlibet is found in Künzle, “Neu
aufgefundene Quaestiones” (cit. n. 17), pp. 57–8.
22
The following manuscripts contain all three Quodlibeta: Barcelona, Arxiu de la
Corona de’Aragó, San Cugat 54 (xiv), ff. 31va–72rb; Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr.
A.3.1153 (xiii–xiv), ff. 3ra–84va; Pisa, Biblioteca Cateriniana del Seminario 45 (xiv),
ff. 1–37v; BAV, Borgh. 156 (xiv), ff. 154r–181v. Fragments are found in Praha, Národní
Knihovna XII.F.6 (xv), f. 207v (excerpt I.16); Venezia, BN Marciana 139 (2010) (xiv),
ff. 110vb–112ra (I.24); as well as Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 770, f. IIr (excerpt
III.20 = Glorieux II.20)—this last fragment is found on an extra leaf at the end of
the manuscript (see Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum medii aevi Latinorum qui in Bibliotheca
Jagellonica Cracoviae asservatur V [Warsaw 1993], pp. 355–62, esp. p. 360).
Glorieux II, pp. 66–7, claims that the qq. 7–14 found in Nicholas of Bar’s com-
pendium of Paris opinions (in Paris, BnF lat. 15850, ff. 12r–16r) are probably part of
Bernard’s Quodlibet IV, but Künzle (op. cit. n. 15, pp. 16*–17*) points out that Glorieux’
original grounds for assigning the questions to Bernard no longer hold, and that sty-
listically these questions do not appear to belong to Bernard (on Nicholas of Bar and
his compendium, see the literature cited in n. 26 below).
23
S. Martin, ed., Quaestiones de cognitione animae separatae a corpore. A Critical Edition of
the Latin Text with an Introduction and Notes (Studies and Texts, 11) (Toronto 1965); Künzle,
ed., Bernardi de Trilia Quaestiones (cit. n. 15). Künzle (“Prolegomena” to op. cit., p. 83*,
and see further pp. 83*–8*) claims that he published a fresh edition, because Martin’s

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As for Bernard’s doctrinal stance, already in the Middle Ages Bernard

had the reputation of being Thomistically inclined; Bernard Gui, for
example, writing a little more than a decade after Bernard of Trilia’s
death, said that he was “steeped chiey in the nectar of brother Thomas’
doctrine” (. . . imbutus potissime nectare doctrinae fratris Thomae).24 Gui’s appre-
ciative judgment on this score has in general been borne out by more
recent work. In the Quodlibeta, as in his other scholastic works, Bernard
never mentions Aquinas by name, but the Angelic Doctor’s ideas are
always at work in the background and sometimes appear verbatim or
in paraphrase. Nevertheless, it has also been the consensus of such
scholars as André, Grabmann, Künzle, and more recently Wouter Goris
that Bernard develops the main lines of Aquinas’ thought in interesting
ways, expanding and expounding them to meet challenges from think-
ers contemporary with him like Henry of Ghent.25 With all this said,
given the little study that has been devoted to Bernard’s work, and to
his Quodlibeta in particular, the extent and the nature of his Thomism
as well as his more general position in later thirteenth-century thought
remain largely an object for future research.

Bernard of Auvergne
From Nicholas of Bar’s collection of questions in Paris, BnF lat. 15850,
we know of quodlibetal questions debated during this period at Paris by
two Dominicans: Oliver of Tréguier (regency 1291–92) and Raymond
Guilha (1293–95).26 But for these two thinkers we have no more than

earlier edition contained many and serious errors, and this may explain the fact that
Martin’s edition is not to be found listed in Kaeppeli, Scriptores.
24
S. de Salaniaco et B. Guidonis, De quatuor in quibus Deus Praedicatorum Ordinem
insignivit, ed. T. Kaeppeli (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historia, 22)
(Rome 1949), p. 35; cf. Künzle, ed., Bernardi de Trilia Quaestiones (cit. n. 15), p. 19*.
25
For André, see n. 16 above; for Grabmann and Künzle, see Künzle, ed., Bernardi
de Trilia Quaestiones (cit. n. 15), pp. 19*–22*. Although it focuses on a question from
Bernard’s incomplete Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione animae coniunctae corpori and not
his Quodlibeta, it is worthwhile mentioning here the only recent study of Bernard’s
thought of which I know: W. Goris, “Die Kritik des Bernhard von Trilia an der Lehre
von Gott als Ersterkanntem. Einleitung und Textausgabe,” RTPM 65.2 (1998), pp.
248–319, which includes an edition of q. 8 of the treatise (for a list of manuscripts
and the 20 qq. in this treatise of Bernard’s, see Künzle, ed., Bernardi de Trilia Quaestiones
[cit. n. 15], pp. 12*–14*). Goris shows that in this question Bernard was responding
to Henry of Ghent.
26
On the collection, and for the dates, see S. Piron’s chapter on “Nicholas of Bar’s
Collection” in the present volume, as well as Piron’s article in the rst volume of this
book: “Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris,” pp. 421–2. Oliver of

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the question titles and a rough knowledge of their dates. Far more
signicant are the extensive, if still mainly unedited, anti-Quodlibeta of
the French Dominican Bernard of Auvergne: his reprobationes of God-
frey of Fontaines’s Quodlibeta V–XIII and III–IV, of James of Viterbo’s
Quodlibeta I–II, and of Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta I–XV.27 We know
extraordinarily little about Bernard’s life.28 He was prior of St Jacques
in Paris in 1303, and had been so for no more than one year at that
time. In 1304, upon the death of Peter of Auvergne, bishop of Cler-
mont, Bernard appears to have been selected as his replacement, but
the election was contested, and, in 1307, Pope Clement V quashed
Bernard’s election and selected his own candidate instead. That is the
last we hear of Bernard. We can only surmise when he might have
read the Sentences, although we can be sure that he read them at Paris.
Whether he ever was magister actu regens is unknown.
Although a part of his Sentences commentary is extant,29 and although
there are references to several of his other works and to sermons,
Bernard of Auvergne’s fame will undoubtedly always rest on his three
reprobationes. Based on Adriaan Pattin’s careful reading of all three, we
can establish a relative chronological order between them. The refuta-
tions of both Henry of Ghent and James of Viterbo refer the reader
to the refutation of Godfrey; the refutation of Henry refers the reader
to that of James. Thus, Bernard wrote the texts in the following order:

Tréguier’s questions are nos. 67–9 listed at Glorieux I, p. 235 (cf. Glorieux II, p. 211),
Raymond Guilha’s are qq. 36–41 in Glorieux I, p. 233 (cf. Glorieux II, p. 239). See
also n. 22 above.
27
I use the term reprobationes to denote Bernard’s works; the terms improbationes or
impugnationes have also been used to describe the works, but as P.T. Stella in “Teologi
e teologia nelle ‘Reprobationes’ di Bernardo d’Auvergne ai quodlibeti di Goffredo di
Fontaines,” Salesianum 19 (1957) (pp. 171–214), p. 172 n. 5 points out, Bernard himself
uses reprobatio quite consistently.
28
On Bernard’s life and works, see A. Pattin, “La structure de l’être ni selon Ber-
nard d’Auvergne, O.P. (†après 1307),” Tijdschrift voor Filosoe 24 (1962), pp. 668–737,
esp. pp. 668–87, reprint in idem, Miscellanea (Leuven 2000), vol. II (Metafysische Thema’s
en notities), pp. 64–133. One point of note about Pattin’s article: he casts doubt (pp.
683–6) on the common attribution to Bernard of the anonymous impugnatio of Giles
of Rome, edited by G. Bruni as Incerti auctoris impugnationes contra Aegidium Romanum con-
tradicentem Thomae super primum Sententiarum (Bibliotheca Augustiniana Medii Aevi, Series
I, 1) (Rome 1942); he is likewise sceptical of Franz Pelster’s suggestion (“Thomistische
Streitschriften gegen Aegidius Romanus und ihre Verfasser: Thomas von Sutton und
Robert von Orford, O.P.,” Gregorianum 24 [1943] [pp. 135–70], pp. 136–52) that Thomas
of Sutton is the author.
29
A. Pattin argues that the short commentary on I Sent. in Praha, Národní Kni-
hovna XIII.D.5, ff. 1–17, is Bernard’s (or an abbreviation of Bernard’s) in RTAM 31
(1964), pp. 135–7.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 413

Contra Godfrey, Contra James, Contra Henry.30 Moreover, Valens Heynck,

through his study of the controversy between Bernard and Godfrey on
a point of sacramental theology, as well as early fourteenth-century
literary echos of that controversy, was able to suggest that Bernard’s
Reprobatio of Godfrey was written between 1298 and 1304; recent work
by Paul Bakker would seem to conrm fully Heynck’s conclusion.31
As far as I know, the terminus ante quem for all three writings is around
1315, this on the basis of the fact that Peter Auriol in his Scriptum super
primum Sententiarum, substantially complete by 1316, refers no fewer
than ve times to Bernard “in impugnationibus Contra Henricum.”32
Thus, it appears that Bernard was working on his three reprobationes
right around the turn of the century, and was nished with them at
latest in the middle of the second decade of the fourteenth century. As
the case of Auriol illustrates, what is very important about Bernard’s
reprobationes, especially those against Godfrey and Henry, is that they
were read. Among those Pattin lists as having explicitly cited these
works of Bernard are Peter of Palude, Henry of Herford, Pico della
Mirandola (!), and most extensively John Capreolus;33 Heynck, Bakker,
and Schabel have added the Dominicans James of Metz, Hervaeus

30
See Pattin, “La structure” (cit. n. 28), esp. pp. 677–8, 682–3.
31
V. Heynck, “Die Kontroverse zwischen Gottfried von Fontaines und Bernhard von
Auvergne OP um die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der confessio informis,” Franziskanische
Studien 45 (1963), pp. 201–42; Heynck (relying on Stella, “Teologi e teologia” [cit. n. 27],
p. 186 n. 38) points out (p. 209 n. 17) that Bernard refers to Boniface VIII’s constitution
Cum ex eo quod felicis recordationis of 3 March 1298 and claims (pp. 239–40) that both
the anonymous Dominican commentary on IV Sent. from 1305–06 found in BAV, Vat.
lat. 985, and the rst redaction of Durand of St Pourçain’s commentary on IV Sent.
from no later than 1308 rehearse the positions of both Godfrey and Bernard. P.J.J.M.
Bakker, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250–c. 1400) (Nijmegen 1999),
vol. I, pp. 218–21, maintains that Bernard’s reprobatio of Godfrey was instrumental in
Hervaeus Natalis’, James of Metz’s, and Durand of St Pourçain’s reading of Godfrey
of Fontaines on the issue of eucharistic change, which would again place Bernard’s
work in the rst few years of the fourteenth century (it has been suggested that the
anonymous author of the commentary on IV Sent. in Vat. lat. 985 may have been a
student of James; see L. Hödl, Die Grundfragen der Sakramentenlehre nach Herveus Natalis O.P.
(†1323) [Münchener theologische Studien, II. Systematische Abteilung, 10] [Munich
1956], pp. 12, 135–6, 163–5, 257–60).
32
See Auriol’s Scriptum, Prologue, q. 4, a. 1, ed. E. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY
1953), vol. I, p. 275, no. 78, Scriptum, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 (as found on the “Electronic
Scriptum” of The Peter Auriol Homepage [http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html],
l. 170); Scriptum, d. 24, a. 1; Scriptum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 (“Electronic Scriptum,” URL
cit., l. 254); Scriptum, d. 44, a. 4—this last mention of Bernard is to both the reprobatio
of Henry and that of Godfrey.
33
Pattin, “La structure” (cit. n. 28), pp. 678–81.

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Natalis, Durand of St Pourçain, the Carmelite John Baconthorpe, and

the Augustinian Hermit Michael of Massa.34 Undoubtedly as we come
to know better the literature of this understudied period, we will nd
further evidence of Bernard’s inuence. Just the number of manuscripts
of his three reprobationes, and especially of that against Henry, would
indicate that he was being read: of the Contra Godfrey we know of
two full manuscripts and four fragments;35 the Contra James is found in
ve manuscripts;36 and the Contra Henry is preserved in no fewer than
nine manuscripts.37

34
See n. 31 above for Heynck and Bakker. Schabel pointed out to me that Bacon-
thorpe in a version of his Sentences commentary refers at least twice to Bernard, and
that Massa in d. 24, q. 1, of his I Sent. refers to Bernard (see for the latter, D. Trapp,
“Notes on Some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa (†1337),” Augustini-
anum 5 [1965], pp. 58–133, esp. p. 86).
35
The following list is compiled from Pattin, “La structure” (cit. n. 28), pp. 672–5,
corrected by T.W. Köhler, “ ‘Reprobationes’ Bernhards von Auvergne O.P. in einer
Harburger Handschrift,” RTAM 38 (1971), pp. 196–210, and C. Zuckerman, “Some
Texts of Bernard of Auvergne on Papal Power,” RTAM 49 (1982) (pp. 174–204), p. 190
(asterisk note). Main manuscripts: Firenze, BNC, II. II. 182 (xiv), ff. 313r–418r, and
BAV, Borgh. 298 (xiv), ff. 1r–153. Excerpts in Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona de’Aragó,
San Cugat 54 (xiv), ff. 19vb–26va (Quodl. VII, q. 5); Augsburg, Universitätsbiblio-
thek (formerly: Harburg, Fürstlich Oettingen-Wallerstein’schen Bibliothek), II.1.2o.1,
ff. 98ra–109vb (27 reprobationes to qq. from Quodl. V–VII, different text from that found
in the main manuscripts, and some texts with a different abbreviation of Godfrey’s
text); Praha, Národní Knihovna XII.F.6 (xv), ff. 89–156v (contains abridgements of
several of Bernard’s reprobationes): BAV, Vat. lat. 772 (xiv), f. 63va (Quodl. IV, q. 22). On
the basis of his manuscript study for several questions from the reprobationes to Quodl.
V and VI, Köhler (art. cit., p. 206) ranks the manuscripts in terms of quality: BAV
(Borgh.), Barcelona, Florence, Augsburg.
36
For the following list, see Pattin, “La structure” (cit. n. 28), pp. 681–3, and cf.
Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 585. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, theol.
fol. 226 (xiv), ff. 77r–125v; Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 1577 (expl. f. 132); Erfurt,
Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA F.321 (xiv), ff. 63ra–92ra (Pattin has: 63r–108v);
Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 744 (xiv), ff. 156ra–191ra; BAV, Borgh. 298 (xiv),
ff. 157r–201r (in addition, Kaeppeli lists Prague, Národní Knihovna XII.F.6 (xv),
ff. 156v–162v as qq. selectae).
37
Cp. Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 583, with Zuckerman, “Some Texts” (cit n. 35), p. 202
(asterisk note). See also on the manuscripts, R. Macken, Bibliotheca Manuscripta Henrici
de Gandavo (Leuven 1978), entries listed in the index s.v. Bernard d’Auvergne (vol. II,
pp. 1185–6, of Macken’s work contains a short description of Bernard’s Reprobatio).
Zuckerman notes there that his edition of the text is based solely on Bologna, Biblio-
teca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A.943, since he collated his text against all but two
of the other manuscripts, and found that they “were all so inferior to” the Bologna
manuscript that to have included their readings “would have resulted in heaping up
variant readings without point.” P. Mazzarella, Controversie medievali. Unità e pluralità
delle forme (I Principi, 13) (Naples 1978), pp. 333–91, who edits on a much smaller
manuscript basis two questions from the Reprobatio Henrici (and one from the Reprobatio
Godfredi), also claims that he found the Archiginnasio manuscript to offer the best text.

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In addition to showing the direct inuence that Bernard had, his-

torians of medieval thought have used his work to create a general
historical trajectory for the development of some medieval ideas; for
instance, Charles Zuckerman has indicated how Bernard’s ideas on
papal power are an intermediate stage between the rather desultory
thirteenth-century comments on the issue and the pointed and detailed
discussions of the 1310s and 1320s.38 Pattin judged Bernard’s responses
to Godfrey and to Henry on the subject of the real distinction between
essence and existence to be “clear, profound, and interesting” and
that Bernard’s criticisms were made with “moderation and serenity.”39
Indeed, with regard to Bernard’s moderation, although at times the
Dominican’s criticism can be rather sharp and categorical—he begins
his response to James of Viterbo’s Quodlibet I, q. 10, by saying that
James “says many unintelligible things here”40—, nevertheless most
often he is quite measured in his response, taking up substantial issues
that separate him from his opponents, sometimes pointing to lack of
clarity in their arguments, sometimes conceding the force of some of
their arguments while objecting to more general conclusions, sometimes
admitting the conclusion while rejecting the reasoning that led to it.41
In nearly all cases studied to date what comes across is that Bernard
was seriously interested in engaging with his opponents’ arguments and
views.42 Given the historical signicance of at least two of these three

My own work with the manuscripts of Bernard’s Reprobationes Henrici also indicates that
the Bologna manuscript presents an excellent text (thanks to Marco Forlivesi for help
in procuring photographs of the Archiginnasio manuscript).
38
Zuckerman, “Some Texts” (cit. n. 35).
39
Pattin, “La structure” (cit. n. 28), p. 689.
40
Bernard of Auvergne, Reprobatio Quodlibetorum I–II Iacobi de Viterbo, Quodl. I, q. 10:
“Hic dicit multa inintelligibilia . . .” Toulouse 744, f. 173vb.
41
Lack of clarity: “. . . argumenta non bene clara . . .” (Reprobatio Quodl. VI, q. 8, Godofridi,
ed. Köhler, “ ‘Reprobationes’ Bernhards” (cit. n. 35), p. 209, l. 6. Conceding the force . . .
objecting to more general conclusions: “Lumen quod aliqui ponunt bene reprobat; sed quod
theologia non sit scientia nisi sicut dicit, non videtur verum, nec tenetur communiter . . .”
Reprobatio Quodl. VIII, q. 7, Godofridi, ed. Stella, “Teologi e teologia” (cit. n. 27), p. 193
(the ‘lumen’ is a reference to Henry of Ghent’s theory about how theology can be a
science in this life). Admitting the conclusion . . . rejecting the reasoning: “Licet conclusio vera
sit, scilicet quod esse non prius creatur quam essentia nec e converso, hoc tamen non
est propter identitatem realem esse et essentiae, quae realiter differunt, ut ostensum
est in praecedenti quaestione . . .” Reprobatio Quodl. III, q. 2, Godofridi, ed. Pattin, “La
structure” (cit. n. 28), p. 701, ll. 1–3.
42
In addition to the other works cited here, see P. Bayerschmidt, Die Seins- und Form-
metaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Christologie. Eine Philosophie- und
Dogmengeschichtliche Studie (BGPTM, 36) (Münster 1941), esp. pp. 159–64, 298–313, which

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works of Bernard’s, as well as their proven intellectual value, a critical

edition of them would serve the dual purpose of making his thought
readily available and allowing us to see better his historical inuence.
Perhaps the best way to give a sense of what one of Bernard’s
anti-Quodlibeta looks like is to examine one question. In Appendix II
to this chapter is a transcription of Bernard’s entire response to two
of Henry of Ghent’s quodlibetal questions dealing with trinitarian
theology: Quodlibet V, q. 9 (dealing with the Filioque), and Quodlibet VI,
q. 1 (on the psychological model of the Trinity), both transcribed
from Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A.943. The
rst thing to notice about the texts is that they are composed of two
main parts: an abbreviatio of Henry’s text and a reprobatio of that same
text. This is typical for Bernard’s replies to the Quodlibeta: he gives rst
an abbreviated version of the text to which he will reply and only
then does he reply to it. Interestingly, we do not actually know who
made the abbreviation of Henry’s text that Bernard presents, whether
Bernard himself or someone else. Prospero T. Stella, who to date has
studied the abbreviations most thoroughly, focusing on the abbrevia-
tions in Bernard’s Contra Godfrey, shows that the two main manuscripts
(Florence and Vatican) of this work of Bernard’s have each their own
abbreviation, the Vatican abbreviation being a further abbreviation
of the Florence abbreviation. Stella has also argued that Hervaeus
Natalis is the ultimate source of these abbreviations, arriving at this
conclusion by comparing abbreviations of Godfrey’s Quodlibeta that are
explicitly attributed to Hervaeus (in, e.g., Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr.
E.5.532, ff. 1r–102r) with the abbreviations in Bernard’s Reprobationes
of Godfrey. Theodor Köhler has further studied the abbreviations in
the Contra Godfrey and has conrmed Stella’s results concerning the
existence of and relationship between the two different sets of abbre-
viations; moreover, Pattin appears to have accepted Stella’s conclusion
also about Hervaeus’ ultimate authorship of these abbreviations.43 As

deals with Bernard’s Reprobatio of Henry; Bayerschmidt concludes (p. 313): “Bernhard
von Auvergne übt seine Kritik mit ruhiger Sachlichkeit.”
43
Stella, “Teologi e teologia” (cit. n. 27), esp. pp. 174–86; Köhler, “‘Reprobationes’
Bernhards” (cit. n. 35), pp. 201–5 (Köhler notes that in the Augsburg manuscript the
reprobationes are usually not preceded by an abbreviation, but an inserted abbreviation
there to Quodl. VII, q. 5, is yet another redaction of the base abbreviation); Pattin, “La
structure” (cit. n. 28), p. 674. On the same issue, see also Heynck, “Die Kontroverse”
(cit. n. 31), p. 210, and Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” pp. 187–9. Already Teetaert,
“La littérature,” p. 104, expressed his regret that Glorieux II did not pay any atten-

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far as I know, it remains to be explored just how many abbreviations

there are in the Reprobationes of Henry (or those of James).
To see Bernard’s modus operandi in more detail, we can look at the
abbreviation in Quodlibet VI, q. 1 below (§§1–15). This abbreviation
is, in fact, a heavy compression of a large question: Henry’s question
takes up more than thirty pages in the Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia;
I estimate the entire question to be a little over 6000 words in all.44
In contrast, the abbreviation in Bernard’s work is some 1500 words in
length. Bernard achieves this reduction by ignoring many of Henry’s
lengthy citations of authorities; for example when “Dionysius, 5 cap. De
divinis nominibus” is mentioned in the text below (§6), some thirty lines of
quotation in Henry’s text are being dropped. Not just quotations, but
also argumentation that the abbreviator considered to be non-essential
is frequently dropped. Indeed, at many points the abbreviation below
is less an abbreviation and more a paraphrase of Henry’s text. With
all that said, the abbreviation is skillfully done, inasmuch as it covers
the major points of Henry’s theory—that we can show that there are
three divine persons, neither fewer nor more, on the basis of the fact
that God the Father has ex se in Himself the divine intellect and the
divine will as productive sources ready to issue into the acts producing
the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively, acts that completely exhaust
the fecundity of these two productive sources. The abbreviation even
manages to touch on some more peripheral points in Henry’s treat-
ment that Bernard will take up and refute in his reprobatio (e.g., §7, with
Bernard’s response in §22). After the abbreviation comes Bernard’s
reprobatio, beginning in this case with the words (§16): “He says many
dubious things” (multa dubia dicit). Bernard has several lines of response,
but his main reply (§16) relies on an argument that goes back to Aqui-
nas: given that the divine will and intellect are only rationally distinct
from each other (which Henry admits), they cannot be the source of
real distinction between the persons, since the sources of two distinct
things must be just as distinct as that which they are making distinct.

tion to the abbreviated quodlibeta (and their refutations), and offered a great number of
examples of the abbreviations, including those mentioned here by Hervaeus Natalis
of Godfrey of Fontaines, and those of Hervaeus’ own Quodl. I, in BAV, Vat. lat. 829,
ff. 61v–65v (qq. 2, 4, 3, 15), ff. 66v–67r (q. 7), ff. 67r–68r (q. 10), ff. 69v–71v (qq. 6, 5).
Wippel, loc. cit., points to the abbreviations as a worthy object of study, if only because
we need to know who compiled them in order to assess their reliability.
44
See Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet VI, ed. G.A. Wilson (Henrici de Gandavo Opera
Omnia, 10) (Leuven 1987), pp. 1–32.

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Given this structure for Bernard’s questions, one can easily understand
why Valens Heynck called Bernard’s Reprobatio of Godfrey “an edition
of Godfrey’s Quodlibeta furnished with critical commentary.”45

John Quidort of Paris

A nal Quodlibet from this period by a Parisian Dominican is that of John
Quidort of Paris (†1306). Quidort is best known for his work of political
philosophy, De potestate regia et papali, as well as his contribution to the
Correctoria literature, the Correctorium “Circa.” His tenure as Dominican
regent master of theology in 1304–06 was marked by controversy over
his positions on, among other things, the Eucharist, and he in fact died
while still awaiting a papal verdict on an injunction imposed on him
neither to teach nor to dispute at Paris. During the period of his regency,
however, in either 1304 or 1305, John produced his short Quodlibet,
containing ten mostly physical and metaphysical questions, and edited
by Heiman.46 The Eucharist gets only a mention in passing in John’s
Quodlibet (q. 5, on whether God could make a will without a soul), but
there are short but interesting questions on, for example, God’s ability
to make a creature last just one instant (q. 6, including an incipit/desinit
discussion), whether anything positive can be produced from non-being
(q. 8, with a discussion on the intention and remission of forms), and
whether the rational soul is directly united with the body (q. 10, on
the plurality/unicity of forms, and with explicit reference to Aquinas).
As far as we know the Quodlibet is contained in one manuscript only,
Paris, BnF lat. 14572 (xiv), ff. 1r–4v, and hence could not have had a
great deal of impact.

Richard Knapwell
If Parisian Dominicans from the period ca. 1280–1310 made signicant
contributions to quodlibetal literature, their brethren across the chan-

45
Heynck, “Die Kontroverse” (cit. n. 31), p. 210 n. 20: “. . . eine mit kritischem
Kommentar versehene Ausgabe der Quodlibeta Gottfrieds . . .”
46
A.J. Heiman, “The First Quodlibet of Jean Quidort,” in Nine Mediaeval Thinkers.
A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, J.R. O’Donnell, ed. (Toronto 1951), pp. 271–91.
The reason that Heiman calls this John’s First Quodlibet is because a Klosterneuberg
manuscript assigns to John what is better known as Hervaeus Natalis’ Quodl. VIII; see
on this below, at and around n. 114. On John and his controversial eucharistic theory
of “impanation,” see, e.g., Bakker, La raison et le miracle (cit. n. 31), vol. I, pp. 253–69.

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nel, specically in Oxford, were no less industrious.47 For example, a

small Quodlibet from the mid-1280s by the English Dominican Richard
Knapwell (†1288) survives in one manuscript: Cambridge, Peterhouse
Library 128, ff. 106r–113v. Knapwell became an important early advo-
cate in England for the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, authoring the rst
Correctorium corruptorii (the Correctorium “Quare” ) in response to William
de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae, as well as a signicant treatise
on the issue of the plurality of forms.48 It was in large part because
of his support for Aquinas’ position on the unicity of substantial form
in human beings that Knapwell ran into trouble with the (Franciscan)
archbishop of Canterbury, John Pecham; in 1286, upon the condem-
nation of several propositions taken from Knapwell’s work, Knapwell,
with the support of the Dominican provincial, William Hothum, went
to Rome to appeal his case to the pope. Unfortunately for Knapwell,
Nicholas IV, who eventually heard the case, was a former Franciscan;
unsympathetic to Knapwell’s appeal, Nicholas imposed perpetual silence
on the Dominican. Knapwell’s Quodlibet of twenty-nine brief questions
was probably disputed around 1284–85, which is the year that we know
he incepted as Dominican master of theology at Oxford.49

47
See on the theology of this period at Oxford, and the specic theologians men-
tioned below, J.I. Catto, “Theology and Theologians 1220–1320,” in The History of
the University of Oxford, vol. 1, The Early Oxford Schools, J.I. Catto, ed. (Oxford 1982), pp.
471–517; also W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton
1987), passim. One of the best sources for Oxford theology of this period, A.G. Little
and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282–1302 (Oxford 1934), with its
detailed study of manuscripts Assisi 158 and Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library
Q. 99 (and cf. the article by Glorieux mentioned in n. 49 below), nevertheless contains
nothing on Dominican quodlibeta. In fact, Assisi 158 contains nothing explicitly quod-
libetal at all (op. cit., p. 31) and the Worcester manuscript contains only the Quodlibet
of the Carmelite Peter of Swanington (op. cit., pp. 248, 277, and see on Swanington,
Chris Schabel’s chapter on “Carmelite Quodlibeta” in this volume).
48
Glorieux edited Knapwell’s Correctorium corruptorii in Les premières polémiques thomistes.
I. Le correctorium corruptorii “Quare” (Bibliothèque thomiste, 9) (La Saulchoir, Kain 1927),
along with the text of William de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae. F.E. Kelley, in
his Introduction to Richard Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (Paris 1982), pp.
18–23, shows conclusively that Knapwell authored the Correctorium “Quare.”
49
See on Richard and his Quodlibet, F. Pelster, “Richard von Knapwell, O.P. Seine
Quaestiones disputatae und sein Quodlibet,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 52 (1928),
pp. 473–91, which also goes some way to painting a picture of the intellectual context.
The date of his inception comes from a notice in Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento
158 (f. 30r); see P. Glorieux, “Le manuscrit d’Assise, Bibl. comm. 158. Date et mode
de composition,” RTAM 8 (1936), pp. 282–95, esp. p. 287.

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Robert of Orford
Another author of a Correctorium, Robert of Orford (also known as
Robert of Colletorto and Robert of Torto Collo), has left us an anti-
Quodlibet, in the form of a virtually question-by-question rebuttal of
Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta I–XIV.50 We know practically nothing
about Orford, except that he died sometime after 22 February 1293, the
date on which he held a sermon at the Dominican church in Oxford,
probably when he was regent master there. That he was still active
into the 1290s is conrmed by the fact that his anti-Quodlibet includes
responses to questions in Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet XIV, disputed in
1290 or 1291.51 He was certainly studying theology at Oxford in the
period 1284–86, and was perhaps bachelor of the Sentences then, and
it is likely that he became regent master in the later part of the same
decade or the early 1290s. Orford’s anti-Quodlibet is found complete in
two manuscripts, Cambridge, Peterhouse Library 129 (xiv), and BAV,
Vat. lat. 987 (xiv), and there is at least one substantial fragment in
Roma, Biblioteca Vallicelliana E.30 (xiv), ff. 119ra–178rb; thus, it was
probably read, although not widely read. Indeed, in conrmation of this
fact, Bayerschmidt has shown that passages from a question written by
Remigio dei Girolami are so extremely similar, in some cases verbatim
so, to passages from Robert’s anti-Quodlibet that “one must assume that
the Florentine master knew” Robert’s work and “used it here.”52 We
have no rm dates for the composition of Robert’s work, although
Vella pointed out that Robert refers to Henry as a living author, which
would indicate that it was completed before Henry’s death in 1293;
Vella suggests a date of 1289–93.53

50
The best readily available information on Orford’s life and works is to be found in
the introduction to A.P. Vella’s edition of Orford’s Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in
primum Sententiarum (Bibliothèque thomiste, 38) (Paris 1968), pp. 9–13 (life), 13–24 (works).
On the manuscripts, one can consult Macken, Bibliotheca Manuscripta (cit. n. 37), entries
listed in the index s.v. Robert d’Orford (vol. II, pp. 1205–6, of Macken’s work contains
a short description of Robert’s Reprobatio). Orford’s Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum”
has been edited by Glorieux (Bibliothèque thomiste, 31) (Paris 1956).
51
See on the date for Henry of Ghent’s Quodl. XIV Pasquale Porro’s chapter in the
rst volume of the present work, pp. 174–9.
52
See Bayerschmidt, Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik (cit. n. 42), pp. 167–8; the ques-
tion of Remigio that Bayerschmidt was studying is his “Determinatio de uno esse in
Christo,” on which see Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 3444. Bayerschmidt deals with Robert
of Orford directly in op. cit., esp. pp. 151–9, 287–98.
53
On the work in general, see most completely Vella’s introduction to Reprobationes
dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum (cit. n. 50), pp. 13–17. Vella claims (p. 17)

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Structurally this work and Bernard of Auvergne’s have much in com-

mon, inasmuch as they both include abbreviations of a large number
of Henry’s questions in the order given them by Henry, each abbrevia-
tion usually immediately followed by replies from a Thomistic stand-
point, although Robert’s questions are in general considerably shorter
than Bernard’s. Despite its being a substantial work—in the Vatican
manuscript, for example, it takes up 129 folios—, very little attention
has been devoted to it. In the studies to date, it has been noted that
Robert often appears to have worked in haste, and his criticisms (not
just of Henry, but also of Giles of Rome and William de la Mare) can
be either beside the point or poorly argued.54
One can see some of these features in the transcription of one ques-
tion by Orford included in Appendix III below, a rebuttal of Henry’s
Quodlibet V, q. 9, dealing with the Filioque and parallel to one of the
two questions from Bernard of Auvergne found in Appendix II. For
instance, the question—both the abbreviation and the reprobatio itself—is
considerably shorter here than those we examined from Bernard, and
to this extent the criticism comes across as somewhat less developed
than Bernard’s does. Nevertheless, Robert employs some of the same

that we have two certain dates for the work: it cannot have been written before
1283–84 when Henry of Ghent released the rst seven of his Quodlibeta; but it cannot
have been written after 1293, since Henry is referred to as a living author. Probably
Vella’s dating of 1289–93 is pretty close to the mark (and cf. Roensch, Early Thomistic
School, p. 43, who gives the same dates), since it seems unlikely that Robert would have
composed his work over more than a three- or four-year period. Unfortunately, it is
now accepted that Henry released his Quodlibeta one at a time (see Porro’s article in the
rst volume of this book, p. 177), so there is no real terminus a quo apart from Henry’s
rst Quodlibet. Moreover, Vella gives no examples of Orford’s referring to Henry as a
living author; thus, only a close reading will reveal whether Henry might have died
during the work’s composition, and whether this is reected in the work itself. For an
excellent account of the attribution of this and other works to Orford, see F.E. Kelley,
“The Egidean Inuence in Robert Orford’s Doctrine on Form,” The Thomist 47 (1983),
pp. 77–99, esp. pp. 77–86.
54
See e.g. Kelley, “The Egidean Inuence” (cit. n. 53), p. 99, who says, “Robert
Orford . . . so often appears hurried in his exposition of theological and philosophical
points”; as Kelly notes, Vella (Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio, p. 28) says much the
same about Robert’s rebuttal to Giles of Rome, as did Glorieux about Robert’s reply
to William de la Mare (in “Correctorium Corruptorii Sciendum” [cit. n. 50], pp. 8–9). The
same point is made in F.E. Kelley, “Two Early English Thomists: Thomas Sutton
and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent,” The Thomist 45 (1981), pp. 345–87, esp. pp.
373–8, on Robert’s response to Henry’s ideas on the relation between the soul and its
faculties, where Kelley sums up by saying that the discussion “shows the mark of a
man in a hurry.” A nal example: C. Vollert, The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis (cit. n. 105
below), pp. 198–9, describes Robert’s defense of Aquinas on the topic of original sin
as “supercial and obscure.”

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argumentation as does Bernard; for example, they both use what can
be called “the psychological argument” in order to show that the Holy
Spirit necessarily proceeds from both Father and Son. The argument
runs like this: the Holy Spirit is Love, and the necessary precondition
for the emanation of Love is a concept or mental word (since we can
only love what we know); in God the Son is the Word; hence the Holy
Spirit necessarily emanates from both the Father and the Word, i.e., the
Son.55 Moreover, like Bernard, Robert takes Henry to task for believing
that the merely rational distinction between the divine intellect and the
divine will could serve as the basis for the real distinction between the
persons.56 Robert ends his discussion (§13) by referring his reader to
the treatments of the issue in Aquinas’ major works—without, however,
mentioning Thomas by name. In general, although there is nothing
particularly new in the text transcribed below, Robert nevertheless
gives a not inarticulate Thomistic response to Henry’s very different
point of view.
Indeed, the most probing studies to date of Robert’s replies to
Henry—those by Francis E. Kelley—have shown that Orford was able
to inject new and not uninteresting elements into the Thomist reply
to criticism on such points as the unicity of substantial form, although
in other areas, like the distinction between essence and existence, the
distinction between the powers of the soul, and the creation of matter
without form, his contribution is less obvious. Given that Robert wrote
a reprobatio of Giles of Rome’s I Sentences, it is of note that Kelley can
show that Giles was in fact a large inuence on Robert’s understanding
of central Thomistic views.57

55
Compare Bernard §13, 18 with Robert §8. On this “psychological argument” and
its theological context, see R.L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions in the Medieval University:
The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans,
1250 –1350, Leiden: Brill, forthcoming, Ch. 4, §5.
56
Compare Bernard §15 with Robert §10.
57
See Kelley, “Two Early English Thomists” (cit. n. 54), pp. 345–87; idem, “The
Egidean Inuence” (cit. n. 53); although not directly dealing with the anti-Quodlibet,
also important is idem, “Robert Orford’s Attack on Giles of Rome,” The Thomist 51
(1987), pp. 70–96. See also on Orford and his critique of Giles of Rome, Pelster,
“Thomistische Streitschriften” (cit. n. 28), esp. pp. 153–66.

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Thomas of Sutton
A large set of four Quodlibeta issued in this time period from the Oxford
theologian Thomas of Sutton,58 and this signicant work stands out
for being available in its entirety in a critical edition. Michael Schmaus
was not the rst scholar to look seriously at Sutton’s Quodlibeta; never-
theless in Schmaus’ attempt, published in 1930, to determine whether
Sutton was the author of the Liber propugnatorius, an attack on book I
of John Duns Scotus’ Sentences commentary from a generally Thomis-
tic (or Dominican) point of view written by an otherwise anonymous
“Thomas Anglicus,” Schmaus edited twelve trinitarian questions from
Sutton’s Quodlibeta.59 Nearly forty years later, Schmaus, with the assis-
tance of Maria González-Haba, brought his earlier work to completion
by publishing all four of Sutton’s Quodlibeta in their entirety, a total of
eighty-ve questions.60 Although Schmaus eventually determined, and
all subsequent research agrees, that Sutton was not the author of the
Liber propugnatorius,61 nevertheless there can be no doubt that he was a
major gure in the early Thomistic movement. Sutton’s Quodlibeta, like
his other works, still await a great deal of study, but the existence of a
critical edition at least facilitates this process.
The major issue that must be addressed here is when Sutton disputed
the Quodlibeta. This has been a highly controversial point, with lead-
ing researchers like Ehrle, Pelster, and Glorieux placing various of the
Quodlibeta at various points in the period 1284–1310.62 Just to take one

58
For a recent bio-bibliography on Sutton, see H.G. Gelber, It Could Have Been Oth-
erwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Studien und
Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 81) (Leiden 2004), pp. 59–61.
59
Schmaus, Der “Liber progugnatorius” (cit. n. 89 below), pp. 6*–85*; the material is
studied throughout Schmaus’ mammoth work.
60
Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta, eds. M. Schmaus and M. González-Haba (BAW, 2)
(Munich 1969).
61
This was stated emphatically in the “Einleitung” to the edition of Sutton’s Quodli-
beta, p. XI; see also H. Theissing, Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM (BGPTM,
42) (Münster 1969), p. 16, and J. Schneider in the introduction to his edition of
Sutton’s Quaestiones ordinariae (BAW, 3) (Munich 1977), pp. 63*–6*, both of whom have
argued that the Liber propugnatorius was not authored by Thomas of Sutton. C. Schabel,
Theology at Paris 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future
Contingents (Aldershot 2000), pp. 52–63, esp. 52–4, has tentatively attributed the work
to another well-known “Thomas Anglicus,” Thomas Wylton, and this attribution has
already gained some support.
62
For a brief history of the most important views on the topic see the “Einleitung”
to the edition of Sutton’s Quodlibeta, pp. XVI–XXII; the editors of Sutton’s text opt
for Quodl. I and II in 1285–87 or 1286–88 and Quodl. III and IV probably at the end
of the rst decade of the fourteenth century (pp. XX, XXII). Wippel, “Quodlibetal

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well-known example, Glorieux (I, pp. 291–96) places the Quodlibeta one
after another in the four consecutive years between 1284 and 1287. The
most recent attempt to deal with the issue is that of Johannes Schneider
in the introduction to his edition of Sutton’s Quaestiones ordinariae,63 and
I will summarize his results. The problem with a scenario like the one
Glorieux proposed is that there is only one piece of information that
suggests that Sutton could have been a master in the period 1284–87,
and that piece of information seems rather to indicate that he was a
master of arts, which would be odd for a Dominican; all other informa-
tion that we have suggests strongly that Sutton rst became a master of
theology sometime between 1290 and 1295, probably 1291–93. On the
basis of this and a careful study of the text of the Quodlibeta themselves,
Schneider determines that Quodlibet I must have been held shortly after
Henry of Ghent’s death in 1293 (Henry’s Quodlibeta are referred to as
“de novo” in Sutton’s Quodlibet I) and Quodlibet II must have been held
only shortly thereafter.64 On the other hand, Schneider can show in a
convincing way that by the time of Quodlibeta III and IV Sutton had
some familiarity, although not deep engagement, with the thought of
John Duns Scotus, the kind of familiarity that an Oxford theologian
might have obtained already in the last years of the thirteenth century.65

Questions,” p. 180 n. 65, notes the difculties, and reports the solution given by the
editors of the Quodlibeta.
63
Schneider’s masterful discussion of the dating is found in the “Einleitung” to
the edition mentioned in n. 61 above, esp. pp. 44*–57*, with summary of results on
p. 54* (the “Einleitung” also includes a very ne “Notizen zu den Werken Suttons,”
pp. 58*–89*, in which Schneider rejects Pelster’s suggestion that the Correctorium “Quare”
was actually written by Sutton, pp. 85*–9*; cf. on Richard of Knapwell as author of
this text n. 48 above).
64
A further problem with Glorieux’s dates for Sutton’s Quodlibeta is that this would
mean he overlapped with Richard Knapwell as Dominican regent master of theology
at Oxford, where, as far as I know, there was only one Dominican chair at the time.
Schneider’s evidence is as follows. Sutton is referred to as respondens in a 1289 theology
disputation, which would make him a bachelor of theology in that year; thus, the refer-
ence by Nicholas of Ockham, around 1286, to a determinatio of Sutton’s on the unity of
form might be to Sutton as master of arts (given that masters normally “determined,”
although mendicants did not usually obtain the MA degree); alternatively, the determi-
natio could have been used to describe a work produced by Sutton as a bachelor of
theology. Further, Henry of Ghent, whose thought is Sutton’s overwhelming concern
in Quodl. I and II, was not the main focus of Oxford debate in the period 1282–90
(as this appears in the Assisi manuscript studied in Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology
[cit. n. 47]), thus placing Sutton’s quodlibetal debates slightly later. See Schneider’s
“Einleitung” to Quaestiones ordinariae, cit., pp. 44*–8*.
65
Schneider (p. 54*) writes: “Wir nden [in Quodl. III and IV] neue Gedanken;
ähnliche Fragen wie in den früheren Quästionen werden unter einem anderen Aspekt
diskutiert. Quodl. 3 und 4 liegen wieder eng beisammen. Es ist die Zeit der ersten

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Along with other evidence (Sutton presided at the Vespers of William

of Maccleseld in 1299, so he was clearly master of theology at Oxford
at this time), this leads Schneider to put Quodlibeta III and IV close to
each other and just before 1300. This is, as far as I am aware, the status
quaestionis on the dating of Sutton’s Quodlibeta.
Thomas of Sutton had an extraordinarily long career, writing prob-
ably into the second decade of the fourteenth century (he died sometime
after 1315). If his earlier works were part of the general discussion about
Thomism current in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, and if
Henry of Ghent was his great opponent in, e.g., his Quodlibeta (even
in Quodlibeta III and IV), in the fourteenth century Sutton perceived
new threats and took to attacking the Franciscans Robert Cowton and,
more to the point here, John Duns Scotus. Indeed, Johannes Schneider
can show a progression from Sutton’s Quodlibeta III and IV, in which,
as mentioned above, Scotus begins to be made a focus of attack, to
Sutton’s Ordinary Questions, in which Scotus is the main object of con-
cern.66 Thus, Sutton’s work is a nice expression of one of the types of
dynamism that one nds in early Thomism: it continually updated itself
in response to new threats and challenges. In line with this progression
in Sutton’s work, in all likelihood Sutton also wrote an anti-Quodlibet,
a detailed rebuttal of roughly half the questions found in Scotus’ sole
Quodlibet, and this anti-Quodlibet has also been edited by Schneider.67
When I write “in all likelihood,” I mean to indicate that the text is unat-
tributed in the single manuscript (Oxford, Magdalen College Library
99) in which it is found. After detailed textual comparisons between
this text and other authentic writings of Sutton (as well as the Liber
propugnatorius and quodlibetal questions of Nicholas Trivet), Schneider
judges that, although there is no evidence ruling out that the treatise
was written by another author, e.g., a student of Sutton’s, on the other
hand, neither is there any evidence speaking against Sutton’s authorship.
While leaving the question open, he is condent enough to attribute
the text to Sutton “ohne Fragezeichen” and says that we can hardly
contest the attribution (“wir . . . kaum bestreiten können”).68

Berührung mit Duns Scotus.” Schneider then goes on to compare Sutton’s much fuller
knowledge of Scotus in the later Quaestiones ordinariae.
66
See n. 65 above.
67
Thomas von Sutton Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti, ed. J. Schneider (BAW, 7)
(Munich 1978). Sutton replies to qq. 1, 2, 4–8, and 15 of Scotus’ Quodlibet.
68
For the quotations, see Schneider’s “Vorwort” to ed. cit., p. V and “Einleitung,”
p. 56; the discussion of the treatise’s authorship is in “Einleitung,” pp. 5–20, and the

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Assuming, then, that Sutton is the author, what does his work look
like? First, there is hardly any summation, let alone abbreviation, of
Scotus’ text: Thomas launches right into his criticism of Scotus’ thought,
sometimes telling the reader to look in Scotus’ text for particular points,
e.g., “Vide ibi dicta contra Thomam.”69 As this last quotation shows,
Sutton thought of his text very much as a defense of Thomistic teach-
ing on, e.g., trinitarian theology, the distinction of the divine attributes,
divine omnipotence, and philosophical psychology.70 The critique found
in the anti-Quodlibet tends not to deal with the overarching issues that
Scotus himself was attempting to explain in his quodlibetal questions,
but rather picks out points in Scotus’ exposition where it appeared to
Sutton that Scotus went wrong. Although at times Sutton is willing
to concede a conclusion to Scotus or to agree that what Scotus said
was true,71 for the most part the text is anything but gentle in its criti-
cism of the Subtle Doctor, going indeed so far as to accuse Scotus of
heresy!72

Nicholas Trivet
A nal set of Oxford Quodlibeta from this period issued from the pen of
Nicholas Trivet (or Trevet, † after 1334). Trivet probably received his

“Einleitung” (pp. 21–56) also contains a study of the formal distinction in genuine
works of Sutton and in the Contra Quodlibet Scoti. The only real problem for attributing
the text to Sutton is that Aquinas is called sanctus in the text itself in three spots, which
would entail the text’s composition being after 1323, and this is nearly ten years later
than Sutton’s active career is thought to have ended; nevertheless, the copy of the
text is in an early fteenth-century hand (Schneider, “Einleitung,” pp. 1–2), so scribal
tampering cannot be ruled out (Schneider, “Einleitung,” p. 4—scribal tampering as
the explanation seems to me to be strengthened since in places Thomas is referred to
as merely “frater” (e.g., q. 6, ed. cit., p. 86, par. 1) or just as “Thomas”; see below at
and around n. 201 for the parallel situation with Henry of Lübeck’s Quodlibeta).
69
Thomas of Sutton, Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti, q. 2, ed. Schneider, p. 65,
par. 1.
70
Schneider writes (ed. cit., “Einleitung,” p. 56): “Thomas von Sutton . . . bewährt
sich hier wie in seinen früheren Schriften als entschiedener Verteidiger der thomist-
ischen Lehre.”
71
E.g., Thomas of Sutton, Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti, q. 8: “Et quantum
ad dicta quae dicit in primo principali concedenda sunt,” ed. Schneider, p. 95, par. 1.
Ibid., q. 7: “. . . oportet videre quae sunt vera et quae non. Verum est quod dicit quod
demonstrari potest Deum esse omnipotentem,” ed. cit., p. 91, par. 1.
72
Thomas of Sutton, Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti, q. 1, parr. 2, 10 (Schneider,
“Einleitung,” pp. 2–3, judges on the basis of these accusations that “Der eifer in der
Verteidigung der Lehre des Aquinaten führt gelegentlich zu einer peinlich wirkenden
Schärfe . . .”).

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 427

license to teach in Oxford, and was certainly Dominican regent master

in theology at Oxford in two periods: in probably 1303–07 and again
in 1314–15; perhaps between the two Oxford regencies he was in Paris
in some capacity. A papal letter from 1324 places Trivet teaching in the
London Dominican convent, and there is reason to believe that he was
still alive into the 1330s.73 Nicholas is a famous author, known for his
scriptural commentaries and his important historical works; especially
his commentaries on works of classical literature led Beryl Smalley
to include him among the “classicizing friars” of the early fourteenth
century.74 His commentary on Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy is found
in some one hundred manuscripts.
That Trivet’s more or less purely scholastic works have received less
attention than these other traces of his literary production is perhaps
unsurprising, but it means that his six extant Quodlibeta are still to a
large extent unedited and unstudied. This is a pity: although Trivet’s
philosophy and speculative theology have not always received high
marks,75 nevertheless such students as Ehrle and Hauke have seen him

73
Most of my information on Trivet is taken from F. Ehrle, “Nikolaus Trivet, sein
Leben, seine Quolibet und ‘Quaestiones Ordinariae’,” in Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der
Philosophie des Mittelalters, Festgabe Clemens Baeumker (Münster 1923), pp. 1–63 (= Baeum-
ker Beiträge Supplementband, 2); reprint in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur englischen Scholastik,
F. Pelster, ed. (Storia e Letteratura, raccolta di studi e testi, 50) (Rome 1970), pp. 305–84
(the page numbers cited below are from the reprint). See also H. Hauke, “Die Lehre
von der Beseligenden Schau nach Nikolaus Trivet” (Inaugural-Dissertation, Munich
1967), esp. pp. 52–67. Kaeppeli, Scriptores, s.v. Nicolaus Trevet, p. 187, claims that
Nicholas “adhuc inter vivos a. 1334” (on this, see the references in R.J. Dean, “Cul-
tural Relations in the Middle Ages: Nicholas Trevet and Nicholas of Prato,” Studies in
Philology 45 [1948], p. 542, n. 1). A.G. Little suggested the Parisian sojourn in Little
and Pelster, Oxford Theology (cit. n. 47), p. 284. In February 1315, Nicholas took part
in a condemnation of eight trinitarian articles culled from an Oxford Sentences com-
mentary, and here he is referred to as “qui tunc resumpserat lectiones suas”; on the
condemnation, see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions (cit. n. 55), Ch. 9, and the literature
referred to there. A recent bio-bibliography of Trivet can be found in Gelber, It Could
Have Been Otherwise (cit. n. 58), pp. 62–4; Gelber (p. 63 n. 10) mentions a commentary
on Lombard’s Sentences belonging to Trivet, but already in 1954 Victorin Doucet, in
Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller (Florence
1954), p. 64, no. 594, had identied this commentary as being Alexander of Hales’
Gloss on the Sentences (see also Sharpe, Handlist, s.v. Nicholas Trevet OP, p. 398).
74
See B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford
1960), esp. pp. 58–65.
75
One exception to the general praise for Trivet’s intellectual merits comes from R.C.
Dales and O. Argerami, Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World (Leiden 1991),
who say (p. 174) on the basis of Trivet’s Quodl. I, q. 5 (which they edit there) that on
the issue of the eternity of the world Trivet presents “a badly organized and sloppily
reasoned case, timidly and ambiguously maintaining the view of Aquinas.”

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as a Thomistically inspired scholar of some interest. Moreover, since

they are found in essentially one copy only, an edition of the Quodlibeta
is well within the realm of feasibility. Trivet’s Quodlibeta I–V are found
in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek B.IV.4 (xiv), ff. 1–47, 53–64,76 in the
following order: II, III, IV, V, I (the explicit of the nal Quodlibet in the
series is [f. 64]: “Explicit primum quodlibet disputatum Exoniae,” i.e.,
in Oxford).77 In this manuscript the questions are assigned to Trivet
in a fourteenth-century table of contents and in marginal notation,
although not incipits or explicits, but through internal and external
references as well as stylistic considerations, Ehrle makes an essentially
unassailable case that all of them must be assigned to Trivet. Indeed,
two further copies are known of Quodlibet I, q. 13,78 and in these copies
Trivet is explicitly credited with authoring the question.79 Quodlibet XI,
on the other hand, is called precisely that in the only manuscript in
which it is found: Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library F.3 (xiv),
ff. 166–181. Trivet’s Quodlibet XI begins with the words “Proponebantur
in disputatione XI de quolibet quaestiones 27”; although it is anony-
mous in the manuscript, an index attached to and contemporary with
the manuscript itself names Trivet as the author.80

76
Ff. 47r–52v of this manuscript contain Trivet’s other purely scholastic work, his
set of ve unedited Quaestiones disputatae (question list in Ehrle, “Nikolaus Trivet” [cit.
n. 73], p. 384).
77
Although Ehrle (“Nikolaus Trivet” [cit. n. 73], pp. 332–3) was aware that the
fth Quodlibet in the manuscript was called “primum Quodlibet” in this explicit, in his
question lists he called this Quodlibet V. Glorieux I, pp. 246–54, gives the Quodlibeta in
the order in which we have to assume they were held. Hauke, “Die Lehre” (cit. n. 73)
follows Ehrle’s numbering of the Quodlibeta. Thus, what Hauke in fact edits in the
appendix to his dissertation is all of Quodl. II; Quodl. III, qq. 19–21; Quodl. IV, qq. 11,
13–15; Quodl. V, qq. 9 and 15.
78
“Utrum omnia sint admittenda quae tradit Ecclesia circa passionem Christi”; cop-
ies in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College Library 298 (xv), ff. 74v–75v and London,
British Library, Royal 6.B.xi (xiv), f. 116.
79
On the attribution of the Quodlibeta to Trivet, see especially Ehrle, “Nikolaus
Trivet” (cit. n. 73), pp. 327–39.
80
Most recently on this manuscript, see A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts
in Worcester Cathedral Library, ed. R.M. Thomson with M. Gullick (Woodbridge 2001),
pp. 3–4. Focusing on this Quodlibet is M.L. Lord, “Virgil’s Eclogues, Nicholas Trivet, and
the Harmony of the Spheres,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992), pp. 186–273, with an edition
on pp. 267–73 of Quodl. XI, q. 19 (“Utrum corpora celestia per suum motum causent
aliquam armoniam”), and intertextual plates there of the leaves in Worcester, Cathedral
and Chapter Library F.3, on which this question is found (ff. 177v–78v); in this article
Lord uses the quodlibetal question as evidence that Nicholas was the author of an
anonymous commentary on Virgil’s Eclogues, and to that end she studies the contents
of the question loc. cit., pp. 207–14, 222–5, and passim. A further noteworthy study

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 429

The rst ve Quodlibeta were probably held by Trivet once a year in
1303–07.81 Two solid pieces of information with regard to the dating
of these Quodlibeta are that in Quodlibet III Nicholas refers to Benedict
XI’s bull Inter Cunctas (17 February 1304), and in Quodlibet IV, q. 4,
Nicholas gives a substantial but non-inammatory reaction to John of
Paris’ eucharistic theory of impanation, which would place that Quodlibet
in the period 1304–06. As for Quodlibet XI, here Trivet makes allusions
to Henry of Harclay (chancellor of Oxford University, 1312–17) in a
rather respectful tone, despite Harclay’s role in the recent altercation
between Oxford and the Dominicans; Ehrle reasonably suggests that the
subdued character of these allusions could be explained by the Quodlibet’s
having been disputed in 1314, when Trivet was newly installed in his
second regency and wanted to get off to a good start in the position.82
As to what happened to Trivet’s Quodlibeta VI–X, we really have no
idea. Two possibilities have been suggested: that the missing Quodlibeta
were held in the years intervening between Trivet’s rst and second
regency; alternatively one could suspect that the “XI” in “Quodlibet
XI” is a mistake for “VI.”83

Remigio dei Girolami

The two Quodlibeta of Remigio dei Girolami, available in a critical edi-
tion prepared by Emilio Panella,84 are signicant if for no other reason
than because they are one of very few extant Dominican Quodlibeta
that we are certain originated in studia outside of Paris or Oxford
(others include the majority of John of Naples’ Quodlibeta and Henry
of Lübeck’s three Quodlibeta, on which see below). After having been
made master at Paris right around the year 1300, Remigio returned

of Trivet is to be found in Johannes Schneider’s “Einleitung” to Thomas von Sutton (cit.

n. 67), pp. 13–16.
81
Glorieux I, p. 246, suggested 1302–06; A.G. Little in Little and Pelster, Oxford
Theology (cit. n. 47), pp. 283–4, proposed rather 1303–07, believing that Trivet rst
incepted in 1303, since Trivet does not appear as master in the manuscript that Little
was investigating there (Worcester Q. 99), which is a notebook on Oxford theology
ca. 1300–02.
82
On the dating, see Ehrle, “Nikolaus Trivet” (cit. n. 73), pp. 345–54, but summed
up admirably in Glorieux I, p. 346.
83
Glorieux I, pp. 246–7, suggests the rst alternative; Little in Little and Pelster,
Oxford Theology (cit. n. 47), p. 283, also offers the second.
84
E. Panella, ed., “I quodlibeti di Remigio dei Girolami,” in Insegnamento e riforma
nell’Ordine domenicano, E. Marino, ed. (= Memorie Domenicane 14) (Pistoia 1983), pp.
1–149.

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to Italy, where his movements can be traced in some detail, including

longer stops in Rome, Viterbo, and Perugia, and a long-running stint as
lector at the Florentine Dominican convent of Santa Maria Novella.85
On the basis of its explicit (“Expl. quolibet fr. Remigii or. Ord. pred.
apud Perusium in Curia”) we can be absolutely certain that Remigio’s
Quodlibet II was disputed at the Dominican convent in Perugia when
the Papal Curia was stationed in that town; this, Panella shows, was
possible between 1305 and 1307. Moreover, Panella convincingly argues
that Quodlibet I was disputed before Quodlibet II, perhaps in Perugia like
Quodlibet II, but maybe in Rome or Viterbo in the period 1303–05,
again when Remigio was connected with the Papal Curia.86 Thus, as
Sylvain Piron has pointed out, as far as we know, and despite Remi-
gio himself having prepared his literary works for public release, we
possess no written Quodlibet that descends from a disputation held in
his capacity as lector in Florence.87 Panella shows that Remigio was,
unsurprisingly, highly inuenced by Aquinas, who is not named but
is referred to at one juncture in Quodlibet II as “Magister meus quem
sequor.” One prominent opponent in the Quodlibeta is the Franciscan
theologian and Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta.88 In part because he
may have taught the young Dante in Florence, there is a large body
of secondary literature on Remigio, some of it taking into account
his Quodlibeta. But with that said, his Quodlibeta (and most of his other
works) could not have made a great impact, existing as they do in just
one manuscript: Firenze, BNC, C.4.940 (Quodl. I = ff. 71r–81v; Quodl.
II = ff. 81v–90v).

85
For a highly detailed chronological survey of Remigio’s whereabouts and activities,
see E. Panella, “Nuova cronologia remigiana,” AFP 60 (1990), pp. 145–311; specically
on Remigio’s time in Paris (1298–1300), pp. 204–8, and on the Quodlibeta, p. 239.
86
For Panella’s arguments concerning the dates and locations of the disputations
on which Remigio’s Quodlibeta are based, see the introduction to the edition of the two
Quodlibeta, pp. 29–32.
87
See Piron’s chapter in the rst volume of this book, “Franciscan Quodlibeta,”
p. 406.
88
On Remigio’s relation with Aquinas, see Panella’s Introduction to the edition, pp.
35–42; on Matthew of Aquasparta and Remigio, loc. cit., pp. 52–6.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 431

Hervaeus Natalis

If for no other reason, the quodlibetal production of Hervaeus Natalis

deserves special attention on account of its size and its wide medieval
distribution: the Quodlibeta bearing Hervaeus’ name take up 186 folios
in the early printed edition and parts of it are contained in more than
forty manuscripts.89 The large readership that his Quodlibeta attracted
is itself a reection of Hervaeus’ enormous stature in early fourteenth-
century theology. Hervaeus was born in Brittany probably in the 1250s,
joining the Dominican Order in 1276. Strangely, he only began his stint
reading the Sentences at Paris shortly after 1300, which means that when
he nished his theological education he was a good ten years older than
was usual at the time. Then, perhaps after having spent some of the
time between ca. 1304 and 1307 teaching at one of the order’s pro-
vincial studia, Hervaeus was regent master at Paris from around Easter
1307 until late 1309 or early 1310; he was probably regent master
there yet again in the period 1316–18. Besides this important academic
position, Hervaeus was an ecclesio-political gure of great signicance:
from 1309 to 1318 he was head of the Dominican province of France,
and from 1318 until his death in 1323 he was Master General of the
Dominican Order.90

89
Abbreviations and compilations of parts of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta also show how
signicant these works were; see, e.g., n. 43 above. There is at least one further example.
M. Schmaus, Der “Liber propugnatorius” des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen
Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen (BGPTM, 29.1–2)
(Münster 1930), pp. 335–6 n. 138a, suggested that the Quodlibet of 24 questions found
in ms. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 295 Scaff. XIII (xiv), was written by an otherwise
unknown Dominican by the name of “Alverius”; Glorieux II, p. 319, s.v. Alverius,
revealed that this Quodlibet was compiled out of extracts from Hervaeus Natalis’ Quodl.
I and VII, “Alverius” being a corruption of “Hervaeus.” This latter example seems to
constitute further evidence that in the fourteenth century, Quodlibet VII was considered
a part of Hervaeus’ literary production (see on this below, at and around n. 112).
90
On the dating of Hervaeus’ Sentences lectures and commentary and the period
between the lectures and Hervaeus’ regency, see esp. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob
von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (BGPTM,
42.1) (Münster 1967), pp. 73–7. For an excellent biographical study of Hervaeus, see
A. de Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël (†1323). Étude biographique,” AFP 8 (1938), pp. 5–81.
That at the various stages of his career Hervaeus was somewhat older than is usually the
case is suggested by the fact that when he joined the Dominicans in 1276 he gave up
rich ecclesiastical beneces; see Guimaraes, pp. 16–18. The dating of the beginning of
Hervaeus’ rst regency is supplied by Bernard Gui in his list of the Dominican regent
masters (see Koch, Durandus [cit. n. 98 below], p. 61, for the text): “Fr. Erveus Brito,
licenciatus tempore paschali anno domini MCCCVIIo.” The regency would have lasted
either until Hervaeus was made head of the French Dominican province in September

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Hervaeus’ thought is characterized perhaps above all by the conscious

intention of defending and promoting the views of Thomas Aquinas.
Whether Hervaeus’ thought itself can be described as “Thomist” in any
strict sense is a matter of debate—he is often labelled an eclectic rather
than a Thomist because, for instance, he does not support Aquinas’ real
distinction between essence and existence, he allows for only two ways
in which to prove the existence of God in contrast with Aquinas’ ve
ways, and he does not make matter the sole principle of individuation
as Thomas did.91 Moreover, in some areas of his thought he clearly
exhibits inuences that are rather alien to Aquinas: a good example are
the Scotistic inuences to be found in Hervaeus’ trinitarian theology.92
But looking at what Hervaeus himself claimed he was doing as well as
what he actually did, it is difcult not to admit that he believed he was
working to defend and to spread Thomistic philosophy and theology.
As examples of this one can mention Hervaeus’ treatise from 1308 or
1309, Defensio doctrinae Thomae;93 his criticisms of Henry of Ghent, James
of Metz, and Durand of St Pourçain from a Thomistic point of view
(and especially his leading role on two panels of theologians assigned
to assess whether various statements taken from Durand’s work were
orthodox and in line with Thomas’ thought);94 and nally his drive
to have Thomas canonized.95 Perhaps one way to reconcile these two
perspectives on Hervaeus is to say that he thought he was remaining

1309 or until his successor, Laurence of Nantes, was licensed in February 1310 (this
date also comes from Bernard Gui); see on this Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël,” p. 51. See
also at and around nn. 100–2 below for how the dating of his rst regency may affect
the dating of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta maiora. On the dating of Hervaeus’ second regency,
see at and around n. 106 below.
91
See for an example of this type of view R.J. Teske’s article on Hervaeus in A
Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone, eds. (Oxford
2003), pp. 314–15.
92
See, e.g., H.G. Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic
Thought, 1300–1335” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison
1974), pp. 106–29 passim; I. Iribarren, “The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis’s
Interpretation of Thomism,” The Thomist 66 (2002), pp. 607–27.
93
For an edition, see P. Piccari, “La Opinio de difcultatibus contra doctrinam fratris Thome
di Erveo di Nédellec,” Memorie Domenicane n.s. 26 (1995), pp. 5–193. For the dating of
the treatise, see the rst introduction in C. Schabel, R.L. Friedman, and I. Balcoyian-
nopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on
Future Contingents,” AFP 71 (2001), pp. 183–300, esp. p. 191 n. 16.
94
On these aspects of Hervaeus’ career and literary production, see the rst intro-
duction to Schabel-Friedman-Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude” (cit. n. 93), esp.
pp. 189–94.
95
See Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), pp. 75–6. Hervaeus did not attend the
canonization ceremony in Avignon on 18 July 1323 on account of illness, dying in
Narbonne on 8 August of the same year.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 433

on the whole faithful to Thomas’ philosophy, while striving to update it

on the basis of more recent philosophical and theological speculation.
Regardless of whether we accept that Hervaeus was taking a Thomist
line or not, his voluminous quodlibetal questions will necessarily play
an important role in our evaluation of his thought.
We have from Hervaeus both quodlibetal and anti-quodlibetal ques-
tions. The latter will be discussed below; rst I will deal with the eleven
series of quodlibetal questions that have at one time or another been
assigned to Hervaeus. All of these Quodlibeta are found in the Zimara
edition of many of Hervaeus’ works published in Venice in 1513
and reprinted in 1966.96 Hervaeus’ quodlibetal production is divided
into two main groups: Quodlibeta I–IV are called the Quodlibeta maiora;
Quodlibeta V–XI have been known since the fourteenth century as the
Quodlibeta minora or parva. It is an assumption running throughout the
literature on Hervaeus’ quodlibetal production that what distinguishes
the Quodlibeta maiora from the Quodlibeta minora is that the maiora were
disputed when Hervaeus was acting as regent master. Let us rst look
at the maiora and then at the minora.
That the four Quodlibeta maiora are Hervaeus’ work is conrmed both
by manuscript explicits97 and by references to them in contemporary
theological works by, e.g., Peter of Palude and John of Naples.98 If

96
Subtilissima Hervei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius pro-
fundissimis tractatibus (Venice 1513; reprint Ridgewood, NJ 1966). The eleven Quodlibeta
are found on ff. 1r–186v. The other works in the edition are De beatitudine (second part
of the volume, ff. 1ra–10ra), De verbo (ff. 10rb–24rb), De aeternitate mundi (ff. 24va–33ra),
De materia caeli (ff. 33rb–53va), De relationibus (ff. 53vb–70vb), De unitate [vel: pluralitate] for-
marum (ff. 71ra–100rb), De virtutibus (ff. 100va–110vb), De motu angeli (ff. 111ra–113vb).
97
E.g. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, theol. lat. fol. 93 (xiv), in
which each of the rst three Quodlibeta are attributed to Hervaeus and said to have
been disputed in Paris; cf. F. Pelster, “Eine Münchener Handschrift des beginnenden
vierzehnten Jahrhunderts mit einem Verzeichnis von Quästionen des Duns Scotus und
Hervaeus Natalis,” Franziskanische Studien 17 (1930), pp. 253–72, esp. p. 268 n. 16. Also
Madrid, BN 226 (xiv), ff. 25va–107rb, assigns each of Quodl. I–III explicitly to Hervaeus
(see P. Beltrán de Heredia, “Crónica del movimiento tomista,” La Ciencia Tomista 17
(1925), pp. 362–88, with description of this manuscript on pp. 377–81 (see also n. 130
below). For Quodl. IV, there is, e.g., Paris, BnF lat. 14572 (xiv), f. 204va: “explicit quar-
tum quodlibetum magistri Hervei Natalis, quondam magistri ordinis praedicatorum”
(Vollert, The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis [cit. n. 105 below], p. 273, claims that at least
twelve manuscripts explicitly ascribe Quodl. IV to Hervaeus).
98
Joseph Koch showed that in his II Sent., Peter of Palude refers to Hervaeus’ Quodl.
I–III; J. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu
Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (BGPTM, 26) (Münster 1927), p. 64 with n. 20; indeed, Koch,
p. 212, claims that Hervaeus’ Quodl. III, q. 8, can be reconstructed on the basis of
Palude’s II Sent., d. 3, qq. 6–8. For the same point, see Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit.
n. 90), p. 47. Palude’s II Sent. was completed around 1313; see the rst introduction to

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we follow the assumption that the Quodlibeta maiora are maiora precisely
because they were held while Hervaeus was regent master, then prima
facie it seems likely that the rst three Quodlibeta maiora were disputed
between 1307 and 1309 during Hervaeus’ rst Parisian regency. Inde-
pendent evidence that Quodlibet III was already in circulation by 1312
or 1313 seems to conrm that Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta I–III were disputed
during his rst regency.99 But when precisely? Mainly on the basis of
the fact that Hervaeus took up his duties as regent master in Paris at
Easter 1307, Joseph Koch proposed (and Glorieux later seconded) that
Hervaeus disputed the rst three Quodlibeta maiora as follows: Quodlibet I
(ed. 1513, ff. 1ra–31rb) in 1307 (Christmas), Quodlibet II (ff. 31rb–67vb)
in 1308, and Quodlibet III (ff. 67vb–87vb) in 1309.100 But Guimaraes, in
his 1938 biography of Hervaeus, suggested placing Quodlibet II at Easter
1309 and Quodlibet III at Christmas in that year; as Guimaraes noted,
if Hervaeus held Quodlibet III at Christmas 1309, then the Dominican
was most probably acting at one and the same time as regent master
in theology and as head of the French Dominican province, and this
situation would presumably have continued from the time of Her-
vaeus’ election as head of the province on 17 September 1309 until
his successor in the chair of theology, Laurence of Nantes, incepted
in February 1310.101 This latter scenario was given some support by
Prospero T. Stella, who noticed that in his Quodlibet II, q. 1, Hervaeus

Schabel-Friedman-Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude” (cit. n. 93), esp. pp. 214–5.

John of Naples in his Quodl. III, q. 5, which deals with individuation and is presumably
to be dated sometime around 1312–13, refers to “ultimo quodlibet Hervei,” a reference
to Hervaeus’ Quodl. III, q. 9 (“Utrum materia sit principium individuationis”), which
was Hervaeus’ last Quodlibet at that time (see also nn. 116 and 183 below); see for the
dating of John’s text, at and around n. 169 below, and for the text itself, Stella, “Zwei
Unedierte Artikel” (cit. n. 170 below), p. 156, ll. 7–8.
99
See the evidence offered in n. 98 above.
100
See Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), esp. p. 64, and Glorieux II, p. 138.
101
Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), pp. 47–8, 57 (on Laurence of Nantes’
inception date, see n. 90 above). Guimaraes was attempting to show there, pace Koch,
that Durand’s Sentences lectures began in September 1308; in order for Hervaeus to
have had enough time to have responded in his Quodl. II to Durand’s work, Guimaraes
postulated the Easter 1309 dating for Quodl. II. The proposal appears to be otiose in
this context, however, since Hervaeus was not responding to Durand’s Sentences lectures,
but rather to the written commentary that he composed between 1304 and 1307/08. It
should be noted that Laurence of Nantes was assigned eleven quodlibetal questions by
Glorieux (II, p. 121), on the basis of Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook; William J.
Courtenay, in his chapter on Vat. lat. 1086 in the present volume, examines this attribu-
tion and nds it possible, but not completely convincing (another possible “Laurence”
whom Prosper could have meant was Laurence of Dreux, Val-des-Écoliers), on whom
see also T. Sullivan’s chapter above.

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replies to Quodlibet II, q. 2, of the secular theologian John of Pouilly.

Now, if this Quodlibet of Pouilly’s can be dated to Christmas 1308, as
Stella suggests, then Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II must be dated to Easter 1309.
On the other hand, while it appears absolutely certain that Pouilly’s
Quodlibet II is from sometime in 1308, I have seen no evidence that puts
it unquestionably at Christmas 1308. Until we have more secure dating
for Pouilly’s Quodlibet II (or for Hervaeus’ own Quodlibet II), the best it
seems that we can do at this point is say that Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II
was disputed either at Christmas 1308 or at Easter 1309.102 Under any
circumstances, Hervaeus’ Quodlibet III can have been disputed no later
than Christmas 1309, since all agree that Hervaeus would have given
up his regency before Easter 1310 (and, again, all hypotheses work from
the assumption that the Quodlibeta maiora stem from Hervaeus’ time as
magister actu regens). Thus, if Guimaraes’ and Stella’s reconstruction of
the chronology of Quodlibet II is correct, then both Quodlibeta II and III
are locked into 1309, giving Hervaeus his quodlibetal disputation for
the 1308–09 academic year and the 1309–10 academic year.103
It should be mentioned that, whether Quodlibet II was disputed at
Christmas 1308 or Easter 1309, there is a possibility that Quodlibet I
was held at Easter 1308, and not Christmas 1307 as Koch originally
proposed. This is indeed a possibility, although I nd it rather unlikely:
Hervaeus was clearly a man with a mission, going places and going
fast, and thus it seems scarcely tenable that he would not take the rst
available opportunity as regent master at Paris to hold a quodlibetal
disputation, i.e., at Christmas 1307. Thus, given the current state of
research, the most likely dating for Hervaeus’ rst three Quodlibeta

102
P.T. Stella, “A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1): La questione
inedita ‘Utrum Deum esse innitum in perfectione et vigore possit efcaci ratione
probari’ di Erveo Natalis,” Salesianum 22 (1960), pp. 245–325, esp. pp. 251–3. On
the dating of Pouilly’s Quodl. II, see Glorieux I, p. 223. See also the brief remarks of
G. Groppo, “La teologia e il suo ‘subiectum’ secondo il Prologo del commento alle
Sentenze di Pietro da Palude, O.P. (†1342) (In I Sent., Prol., q. III; q. V, a. 1),” Salesianum
23 (1961) (pp. 219–315), pp. 302–5 esp. n. 161, who endeavors to show that Hervaeus’
Quodl. II is roughly contemporary with Hervaeus’ treatise Defensio doctrinae Thomae (on
which see n. 93 above). On the dating of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta and other works, I have
benetted from the observations of Dr. Marie-Bruno Borde, O.Carm. On Pouilly’s
dates, see L. Hödl’s chapter above and that of Schabel and Courtenay on Augustin-
ians below, at and around n. 26.
103
Wippel notes, “Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 195, “the practice eventually developed
according to which any given Master would conduct only one quodlibetal disputation
per academic year”; the reconstruction offered here would allow Hervaeus to respect
this general practice.

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appears to be: Christmas 1307 (Quodl. I), Christmas 1308 or Easter 1309
(Quodl. II), and Christmas 1309 (Quodl. III), but more research needs to
be done in order to verify or falsify this chronology.
Regarding the last of the Quodlibeta maiora, Quodlibet IV (ed. 1513,
ff. 88ra–113rb), the major open questions have been when and with
whom in mind did Hervaeus dispute it. As Guimaraes noted in his
biography of Hervaeus, the main piece of evidence in favor of Quodlibet
IV stemming from a second Parisian regency for Hervaeus is that his
main opponent in the Quodlibet appeared to be the Franciscan Peter
Auriol (†1322), bachelor of the Sentences at Paris in 1316–18, and hence
signicantly later than Hervaeus’ 1307–09/10 regency. Nevertheless,
Guimaraes noted that, when he was writing his biography of Hervaeus,
this adversarial relationship remained to be shown denitively, although
it was strongly suggested by the fact that a lost manuscript belonging to
the Paris Dominican convent called Hervaeus’ Quodlibet IV “Quartum
quodlibet Hervei contra Aureolum.”104 Then, in his careful 1947 study
of Hervaeus’ ideas on original sin, Cyrill Vollert argued at length for
the claim that not Auriol but Durand of St Pourçain was Hervaeus’
target in Quodlibet IV, q. 14 (“Utrum peccatum originale habeat ratio-
nem culpae”), and noted that “[a]pparently no study proceeding by the
method of comparative analysis has yet been made so as to determine
the relationship of the Quodlibet with Peter Auriol’s doctrine.”105 Just that
sort of study has been conducted recently by Lauge O. Nielsen, who
has proven beyond any doubt that Auriol was indeed one of Hervaeus’
major interlocutors in this Quodlibet. Nielsen has further shown that the

104
Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), pp. 65–7.
105
C. Vollert, The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin (Analecta
Gregoriana, 42) (Rome 1947), this quotation p. 174, and Vollert shows that Hervaeus’
Quodl. IV, q. 14, is directed against Durand on pp. 271–3. On pp. 316–22, Vollert
includes a discussion of “Peter Aureoli and Quodlibet IV of Hervaeus,” concluding
modestly: “. . . there is apparently nothing in the fourteenth question of Quodlibet IV
denitely to indicate that Hervaeus [had Auriol’s opposition to Thomistic doctrine]
denitely in mind when he developed his views on the culpability of original sin.” It
should be noted that Vollert (pp. 271–3) rejects the suggestion made by Martin and
Teetaert that Quodl. IV is not an authentic work of Hervaeus (see on this n. 116 below),
and he (pp. 167, 173–4) supports R. Martin, La controverse sur le péché originel au debut du
XIVe s. (Spicilegium Sacrum Louvaniense, 10) (Louvain 1930), pp. 327, 335 (cf. 34–5),
vs. Joseph Koch, who in Durandus (cit. n. 98), p. 73, claimed that Durand of St Pour-
çain in his II Sent. (B), d. 30, q. 2, referred to Hervaeus’ Quodl. IV, q. 14 (which would
entail a date of composition for Quodl. IV of ca. 1310); Martin showed that Durand
was citing Hervaeus’ Sentences commentary (Pelster, “Eine Münchener Handschrift”
[cit. n. 97], p. 268 n. 16, also rejects Koch’s view).

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strongly antagonistic relationship between the two scholastics can be

traced throughout several of their works and clearly involved a great
deal of intense, personal interaction, the kind of interaction that can
most easily be accounted for by postulating that Auriol was bachelor
and Hervaeus regent master at one and the same faculty of theology.106
This would seem to clinch the case for Hervaeus having disputed his
Quodlibet IV during his second Parisian regency sometime in the years
1316–18. And this, of course, also ts well with the governing assump-
tion that the Quodlibeta maiora are “maiora” precisely because they were
disputed when Hervaeus was regent master.
Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta maiora represent one of our best sources for the
Dominican master’s thought, containing a treasure trove of quaestiones
dealing with (among other subjects) cognitive theory and psychology,
metaphysics, virtues and ethics, and philosophical theology.107 Moreover,

106
Besides Nielsen’s chapter on Auriol’s Quodlibet in the present volume, see L.O.
Nielsen, “The Intelligibility of Faith and the Nature of Theology: Peter Auriole’s
Theological Program,” Studia Theologica 53 (1999), pp. 26–39 esp. n. 10; idem, “The
Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue,” Vivarium
38.1 (2000), pp. 35–98, esp. at and around nn. 53 and 64; idem, “Peter Auriol’s Way
with Words: The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s First and
Fourth Books of the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,
vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002), pp. 149–219, esp. p. 159 n. 46 and pp. 179–84. I
want to thank Nielsen for discussing with me some of the issues surrounding Hervaeus’
Quodl. IV. In fact, one can suggest that, in addition to Auriol being Hervaeus’ main
opponent there, a corroborating reason to put Quodl. IV in Hervaeus’ second regency
is because there would hardly be time in his rst, two-year regency to conduct four
full quodlibetal debates—it is not entirely outside the realm of possibility, but it would
be extremely unlikely (see the comment by Wippel quoted in n. 103 above). Finally, in
support of a second regency for Hervaeus, as Guimaraes (p. 67 n. 43) mentions, one can
point to evidence from the Augustinian Hermit Prosper of Reggio Emilia, who in his
collection of views from the Paris theological faculty in the 1310s, mentions that “haec
fuerunt argumenta magistri Hervei contra me in aula episcopi . . .”; thus Hervaeus was
present and actively participating in the Parisian academic environment in March 1316,
when Prosper was conducting this disputatio in aula (see on this W.J. Courtenay’s chapter
in this volume on Prosper’s collection); for the theological context of the remark, see
also G. Alliney, “La ricezione della teoria scotiana della volontà nell’ambiente teologico
parigino (1307–1316),” DSTFM 16 (2005), pp. 339–404, esp. p. 366.
107
Several quaestiones from the Quodlibeta maiora have been republished, often with
better texts than those found in the early Zimara edition (see the “Bibliography of
Quodlibetal Questions,” mentioned in the rst note in this chapter). K.H. Tachau,
Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Seman-
tics, 1250 –1345 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 22) (Leiden
1988), pp. 86–7 n. 5, suggests that Hervaeus’ Quodl. IV, q. 11 (“Utrum cognitio intuitiva
requirat necessario praesentiam rei cognitae”) should be reassigned to Peter Auriol,
but this seems to me unlikely; for an analysis, emendated transcription (from the 1513
edition), and translation of precisely this question, see R.G. Wengert, “Three Senses of
Intuitive Cognition: A Quodlibetal Question of Harvey of Nedellec,” Franciscan Studies

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because Hervaeus was a combative gure at the University of Paris,

the debates reected in these four Quodlibeta have proven useful in pro-
viding some historical context for other thinkers and texts, and have
even allowed us to date certain works with a fair degree of accuracy.
Thus, in addition to the case of Peter Auriol discussed above, one can
mention that the dating of the rst version of Durand of St Pourçain’s
Sentences commentary relies exclusively on the fact that in his Quodlibet I
(1307) Hervaeus does not mention any of Durand’s ideas, while in his
Quodlibet II (1308/09) he does; hence, Durand’s text was made public
(or at least public enough that Hervaeus heard about it) sometime in
1308, sparking a controversy between the two thinkers that would last
until Hervaeus’ death.108
If there are still some question marks regarding the story behind
the Quodlibeta maiora, nevertheless the story itself looks to be relatively
straightforward. In contrast, that behind the Quodlibeta minora is fraught
with difculties. Fortunately, this issue was examined in great detail by
Ludwig Hödl more than a half century ago; Hödl’s article is still the
starting point in any discussion of the Quodlibeta minora. I should note
at the outset that the nal word on the matter will probably not be
said before full critical editions of all the texts are made, along with
studies of parallel texts from other works of Hervaeus and of his con-
temporaries. Nevertheless, here I can indicate the problems connected
with the Quodlibeta minora and, relying mostly on Hödl’s work, suggest
possible solutions.109
First, some background. Quodlibeta V–XI in the Zimara edition of
1513 have seemed problematic, if for no other reason than that Her-
vaeus would not have had time in his four or ve years (total) as magister
actu regens to have conducted many more quodlibetal disputations than
the four that are rmly assigned to him. But over and above this basic

43 (1983), pp. 408–31. Although I have found references to Sho Yamazaki, ed., Hervei
Natalis OP De Habitibus (Quaestiones Quodlibetales I, qq. 13 & 14) (Osaka 1969), I have
not been able to locate this work. David Piché is embarking on a project to critically
edit seven questions from Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta maiora dealing with cognition (Quodl. I,
qq. 9 and 12; Quodl. II, q. 5; Quodl. III, qq. 1, 8, and 12; Quodl. IV, q. 11).
108
See Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 60–7. Koch (p. 213) claims: “Wenn ich recht
sehe, beschäftigt sich Hervaeus in Quolibet I in erster Linie mit Scotus, neben ihn tritt
in Quol. II Durandus und in Quol. IV Petrus Aureoli”; moreover, Koch, p. 215, shows
some spots in Quodl. III and IV where Hervaeus responds to Durand.
109
L. Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta Minora des Herveus Natalis O.P. (†1323),” Münchener
theologische Zeitschrift 6 (1955), pp. 215–29. See for remarks on Hödl’s ideas Wippel,
“Quodlibetal Questions,” pp. 181–2, and more on this below.

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worry about the Quodlibeta minora, there are a number of other chal-
lenges. The easiest of the Quodlibeta minora to deal with is Quodlibet XI,
which Auguste Pelzer identied through his work on the Godfrey of
Fontaines edition as being a concatenation of abbreviated questions
taken from Godfrey’s Quodlibeta III and IV. So, Quodlibet XI in the 1513
edition can in no way be attributed to Hervaeus.110
That leaves us with six Quodlibeta minora to account for. Glorieux, in
the second volume of his La littérature quodlibétique, taking into consider-
ation the falsely attributed Quodlibet XI, decided that the 1513 edition
of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta was so awed that we should consider Hervaeus
the author of none of the Quodlibeta minora; it is to this claim by Glorieux
that Hödl is reacting in his article, arguing that Quodlibeta V–X should
all be linked to Hervaeus.111 Hödl’s argument can be divided into two
basic parts. First, Hödl points out that there is, in fact, some evidence,
manuscript and doctrinal, for linking Hervaeus with his Quodlibeta VI,
VII, and X, and no real evidence against making that link.112 Thus,

110
See the Introduction to Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, eds.
M. De Wulf and A. Pelzer (Louvain-Paris 1904), p. x; Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit.
n. 109), p. 216. Wippel (“Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 192) notes that in Hervaeus’ pur-
ported Quodl. XI the rst eight questions follow one organizational scheme, but that
this scheme is abandoned from q. 9 forward, and that this alone would show that we
are dealing here with a compilation from more than one Quodlibet. It should be noted
that it may well have been Hervaeus who made the abbreviation of Godfrey’s two
Quodlibeta; see Stella, “Teologi e teologia” (cit. n. 27), esp. p. 186.
111
Glorieux II, pp. 138–9 (for Hödl, cf., e.g., n. 112 below).
112
See Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), p. 217: “Das er [Glorieux] darüber
hinaus auch die Autorschaft des Herveus am VI., VII. und X. Quodl. in Zweifel
zeiht, obgleich die beiden ersten durch die handschriftliche Überlieferung für Herveus
bezeugt sind, zeigt, daß sich Glorieux in seiner Kritik nicht allein auf das Zeugnis der
Übelieferung stützt . . .” Hödl does not specify the manuscript evidence linking Quodl.
VI and VII to Hervaeus, but Amédée Teetaert had already offered solid manuscript
evidence attributing these two Quodlibeta to the Dominican master; see at and around
n. 119 below (and see for further evidence for Quodl. VII, n. 89 above). For another
argument, based on doctrinal similarity, for the authenticity of Quodl. VI, see Koch,
Durandus (cit. n. 98), p. 241 n. 13. On Quodl. VII, see W. Senko, “Les opinion d’Hervé
Nédéllec au sujet de l’essence et l’existence,” MPP 10 (1961), pp. 59–74, esp. pp. 59–61,
who presents manuscript evidence in favor of the authenticity of the Quodlibet, and
who judges also on doctrinal grounds that the Quodlibet is genuinely Hervaeus’ work;
see also Velázquez Campo, “Dos Cuestiones Cuolibetales” (cit. below n. 165), p. 144,
who shows that a passage from Hervaeus’ Quodl. VII reappears verbatim in John of
Naples’ Quodl. IX, q. 6. Finally, K. Plotnik, Hervaeus Natalis OP and the Controversies over
the Real Presence and Transubstantiation (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes, 10)
(Munich 1970), pp. 7, 14–5, 46, 48–9, integrates into his discussion of Hervaeus’ views
Quodl. VII, qq. 3, 6, and 7, without discovering any inconsistencies. On the basis of
textual similarities and correspondences, Hödl (pp. 219–20) makes a case for Quodl.
X, q. 8 (“Utrum intellectus agens et fantasma agant in intellectum possibilem”) having

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it seems safe to agree with Hödl when he contends that these three
Quodlibeta should denitely be assigned to Hervaeus.
The real challenge comes in the second part of Hödl’s argument,
dealing with Quodlibeta V, VIII, and IX, which manuscript evidence
assigns to theologians other than Hervaeus. Thus, Glorieux noticed
that in the important manuscript BAV, Vat. lat. 1086—the collection
of theological opinions from this period at the University of Paris
recorded by the Augustinian Hermit Prosper of Reggio Emilia—ques-
tion titles identical to those in Quodlibet V are attributed to Ivo of Caen,
a Dominican at Paris slightly junior to Hervaeus (Ivo became Master
of Theology on 24 January 1312).113 Further, in a manuscript contain-
ing Quodlibet VIII (Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 179), that Quodlibet
is assigned to John Quidort of Paris.114 Finally, in manuscripts from
Nuremberg and Florence containing it, Quodlibet IX is attributed to the
Dominican Arnold of Liège (master of theology ca. 1305), although
the Florence manuscript mentions that the Quodlibet was determined
by master (determinatum per magistrum) Hervaeus.115 Thus, there are two
related questions here. First and most basically, should Hervaeus be
given credit for Quodlibeta V, VIII, and IX? Second, what mechanism
can be proposed for him to have had the time to have conducted ten
full quodlibetal disputations?

been composed by Hervaeus roughly simultaneously with the composition of his II

Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 2; while I don’t consider the case airtight, it is suggestive (see also
p. 223 for a similar example concerning the correspondence between Quodl. VI, q. 7,
and I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, both dealing with the Filioque). The important point—both for
Hödl and for me—is that there is no good reason to deny Hervaeus the authorship of
these three Quodlibeta, and actually some positive evidence that they ought to be assigned
to him. Note, however, that A. Samaritani, in “De B.M.V. Immaculata Conceptione in
Quodlibet XIII–XIV saec.,” Marianum 23 (1970) (pp. 15–49), p. 41, claims that Quodl.
VII, q. 22, “Herveo erronee tributum, doctrinam Godefridi de Fontibus magna cum
delitate exprimit”; Samaritani does not appear to know any of the other literature
on Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta.
113
The dates of the inception are again from Bernard Gui (see n. 90 above). See
on Prosper’s collection the contribution of William J. Courtenay to the present volume.
Courtenay tells me that, although it is likely that the “Yvo” referred to by Prosper is
Ivo of Caen, there is no absolutely solid evidence.
114
On f. 281 of this manuscript, the Quodlibet’s explicit runs: “Explicit quodlibet
Johannis Parisiensis.” See Heiman, “The First Quodlibet” (cit. n. 46), p. 271 n. 9.
115
Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek Cent. I.67, ff. 270–278: “Incipiunt questiones magistri
arnolphi”; Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr. D.4.94: “Explicit quodlibet Arnulphi deter-
minatum per magistrum fratrem Herveum quondam magistrum Ordinis Fratrum
Praedicatorum et sacre theologie venerabilem doctorem.” Cf. Pelster, “Eine Münchener
Handschrift” (cit. n. 97), pp. 269–70.

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With regard to the rst question, Hödl presents a variety of evidence

to support the view that these three Quodlibeta are indeed Hervaeus’
work. Thus, for Quodlibet V, Hödl offers three instances in which there
are references to other Quodlibeta of Hervaeus. One of these refer-
ences (in Quodl. V, q. 15) mentions that the author explained a point
at greater length “in quadam quaestione de quolibet primo”; a nicely
matching passage can be found in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet I, q. 13. This
seems to be nearly irrefutable evidence for Hervaeus’ authorship of
Quodlibet V, and it should be noted that both Joseph Koch and Amédée
Teetaert were convinced on similar grounds that this Quodlibet belonged
to Hervaeus.116 Moreover, Hödl offers textual comparisons of Quodlibeta
V, VIII, and IX with other genuine Quodlibeta of Hervaeus as well as
with his Sentences commentary.117 Although there is no denitive proof
here, and indeed some of Hödl’s evidence is not as strong as one might
like, nevertheless, the cumulative effect is clear: at least in the questions
that have been examined to date, the resemblances between these three
Quodlibeta and other works of Hervaeus are so striking that there can
be no reasonable doubt that they are Hervaeus’ own work.118 Finally, as

116
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), p. 218. Hödl nds in Quodl. III (qq. 12,
9) passages corresponding to the other two references found in Quodl. V (qq. 10, 14
respectively). Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), p. 213, mentions that “Herveus sich in Quol. V
q. 10 auf Quol. III q. 12 beruft.” Also Teetaert, “La littérature,” p. 90, makes mention
of the same internal references that Hödl uses. Note that the Quodl. V, q. 10, reference
is to a quaestio “ultimi quodlibeti,” which would make Quodl. III the last Quodlibet at the
time; far from being evidence in support of rejecting Quodl. IV’s authenticity (as Martin,
La controverse [cit. n. 105], pp. 215–16, and more hesitantly, Teetaert, “La littérature,”
p. 90, take this to be), this rather supports the late, second regency date for Quodl. IV
argued for above (see for a parallel case, n. 98 above and n. 183 below, and see n. 105
above for Vollert’s rejection of Martin and Teetaert’s view); hence, Hervaeus’ Quodl. V
falls between Quodl. III and Quodl. IV.
117
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), pp. 220–3; for Quodl. IX and VIII, further
evidence pp. 224–8.
118
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), p. 223: “Gerade jene minora, die Glorieux
auf Grund der handschriftlichen Überlieferung aus dem Korpus der echten Schriften
des Herveus ausscheidet, das V., VIII. und IX. Quodl. der Venediger Ausgabe, sprechen
mit aller wünschenswerten Klarheit und Deutlichkeit für die Autorschaft des Herveus.
Die quodlibeta minora gehören zum corpus quodlibetale des Herveus Natalis.” As
mentioned in the main text, I nd less than convincing Hödl’s arguments about the
resemblance between the “Gliederungen” of the various text samples he gives (esp.
p. 221), but his comparisons focusing on the actual philosophical content (pp. 222–3)
are far more convincing. I think that Hödl is right that these Quodlibeta belong to
Hervaeus, but a sceptic will only be convinced (if at all) by a still more comprehen-
sive examination of the issue. I should note that Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,”
pp. 181–2, appears to accept Hödl’s conclusion about the authenticity of Hervaeus’
Quodlibeta minora. See also T.W. Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip

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evidence independent from that given by Hödl, it should be mentioned

that Amédée Teetaert, in an important article in response to Glorieux’s
volume II, noted that a Berlin manuscript explicitly attributes Quodlibeta
VI, VII, and VIII to Hervaeus. Teetaert, like Hödl, rejected Glorieux’s
reassignment of Quodlibeta V, VIII, and IX to Ivo of Caen, John of
Paris, and Arnold of Liège, respectively.119
But how could Hervaeus have held ten full quodlibetal disputations
in his relatively short stints as regent master of theology? And what to
do about the unexplained manuscript evidence attributing Quodlibeta
V, VIII, and IX to Ivo of Caen, John Quidort of Paris, and Arnold
of Liège respectively? Hödl’s attempt to make sense of the complex
surviving evidence relies almost entirely upon the fact that quodlibetal
disputations were school exercises involving, in addition to the master
who determined the questions, a “respondent” and an “opponent.”
The respondent made an initial answer to the question posed by the
audience; the opponent then offered objections to the respondent’s
arguments. The respondent, at least, was usually a bachelor of the
Sentences, i.e., a highly advanced student of theology. With regard to
Quodlibet V, Hödl, convinced on the textual grounds mentioned above
that Hervaeus was the master determining the disputation, tentatively
suggests that Ivo of Caen, a theology student during Hervaeus’ rst
regency, played a major role as respondent, thereby explaining why the
Quodlibet was assigned to Ivo by Prosper of Reggio Emilia.120
With regard to Quodlibeta VIII and IX, on the other hand, Hödl’s
more rm proposal is that Hervaeus, as bachelor of the Sentences, was
the respondent in a disputation under the masters whose names have
come down to us in the manuscripts, i.e., John Quidort of Paris and
Arnold of Liège, respectively. Thus, if Hödl is correct, Quodlibet VIII

nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P. (Studia Anselmiana, 58) (Rome 1971),
pp. 350–2, who treats Quodl. VIII, qq. 4 and 11, as authentically Hervaeus’ and shows
a remarkable overlap between the text of these questions and passages from James of
Metz’ II Sent., d. 3, q. 2.
119
See Teetaert, “La littérature,” pp. 90–1, specically p. 91 for the remarks on ms.
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, theol. lat. fol. 226 (xiv). On Ivo of
Caen, see further loc. cit. pp. 100–1; Arnold of Liége, pp. 84–5; John of Paris, p. 91.
Hödl does not mention Teetaert’s excellent work, but see above n. 112.
120
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), pp. 228–9; Hödl leaves as an open question
for future research Ivo’s possible role in the disputation. Hödl, following Koch (Durandus
[cit. n. 98], p. 213), notes that Hervaeus’ Quodl. V is lacking the formal literary traits
characteristic of Hervaeus’ other Quodlibeta, i.e., an opening formula, and ends on a
phrase that seems in no way to reect an oral disputation.

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would have been disputed during John Quidort’s regency in 1304

or 1305 (like Quidort’s genuine Quodlibet), with Hervaeus playing an
extremely—one might even say, overwhelmingly—important role as
respondent, as is indicated by Hödl’s evidence in favor of assigning the
Quodlibet to Hervaeus. As corroboration for his view, Hödl mentions that
several questions in Quodlibet VIII center on themes closely associated
with Quidort, e.g., sin, excommunication, and absolution, as one might
expect if Quidort was the one ofcially taking the questions.121 A similar
scheme can be postulated for Quodlibet IX on Hödl’s view: Arnold of
Liège as master, with Hervaeus as extremely active respondent, in a
disputation taking place sometime in the period 1303–07.122 In both of
these cases, Hödl offers evidence that Hervaeus was the respondent in
the quodlibetal disputations. While some of Hödl’s evidence is incon-
clusive, nevertheless textual comparisons showing that the positions
assigned to the respondent match up with known positions of Hervaeus
appear very promising.123
Hödl’s thesis is attractive, and if it is true, then the scenario it describes
“would mark an important step in the evolution of the Quodlibet in the
early fourteenth century,”124 since it would mean a responding bachelor,
and not a presiding master, was viewed as the author of a series of
quodlibetal questions. As we will see below, Hödl’s thesis makes a sort
of reappearance when we deal with John of Naples, so the thesis may
have more general applicability. But in the specic case of Hervaeus,
Hödl’s thesis may have its problems. One of the original difculties with
Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta is that there are so many of them that he would
not have had time during his scant four or ve years of regency to
have held them all. Although Hödl’s thesis would make room for two
of Hervaeus’ six genuine Quodlibeta minora, i.e., Quodlibeta VIII and IX,
by moving them to Hervaeus’ years as a bachelor, nevertheless there
are still four other Quodlibeta minora to account for: when did they take

121
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), pp. 226–8; Hödl (pp. 227–8) also mentions
that in q. 2 of Quodl. VIII (“Utrum Deus posset conferre creaturae potentiam creandi”),
Hervaeus mounts an attack on views of John Duns Scotus.
122
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), pp. 224–6.
123
As an example of inconclusive evidence, Hödl takes the formula in the solution
to Quodl. VIII, q. 1, “respondeo respondendo ad istam quaestionem,” to indicate that
Hervaeus is the “respondent” in the quodlibetal debate, but this turn of phrase is so
common in scholastic works that it is impossible to use it one way or the other (Wippel,
“Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 182 n. 72, is also unconvinced).
124
Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” pp. 181–2, which deals with Hödl’s thesis.

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place? Hödl really has no answer to this question. Now, it should be

said that today we accept that masters were not required to be regent
in Paris in order to hold quodlibetal disputations there (and much
less at other centers of higher education)—we have examples of non-
regent Quodlibeta in Paris, e.g., with the Franciscan Gerard Odonis—, so
Hervaeus, head of the French province and presumably often in Paris,
would in fact have had ample time to have held four more quodlibetal
disputations in the years in which he was a non-regent master.125
But with that said, it is worthwhile to note that there are other
explanations for the number of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta, explanations that
compete with Hödl’s thesis and may eventually have to be appealed
to. For instance, on the basis of a note in a Basel manuscript, Guima-
raes suggested, and Bruno Decker concurred, that Hervaeus disputed
Quodlibeta VI, VII, VIII, and IX outside of Paris while he was a lector
at one of the Dominican Order’s provincial studia.126 Hödl rejects this
theory as not explaining how Hervaeus could have been author of these
texts given the manuscript evidence attributing some of them to other
writers (something Hödl thought he could explain by appealing to
Hervaeus’ role as respondent).127 But as Wippel has noted, it appears
that something like this must have been going on with at least some
of these Quodlibeta, and it offers us a relatively easy way to explain how
Hervaeus could have presided over so many quodlibetal disputations.128
Perhaps it is necessary to entertain some kind of combination of Hödl’s
and Guimaraes’ theories.
Moreover, even Hödl’s specic scenario about Hervaeus’ participation
as respondent in Arnold of Liège’s quodlibetal disputation (Quodlibet IX)

125
Thanks to Chris Schabel and William J. Courtenay for discussing this possibility
with me. On Gerard Odonis, see William Duba’s chapter in the present volume on
Franciscan Quodlibeta.
126
Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), p. 50 and nn. 101–2; Decker, Die Gotteslehre
(cit. n. 90), pp. 74–5. Basel, Universitätsbibliothek F.I.15 (xiv) contains Hervaeus’ Quodl.
I–III and VI–IX, and on f. 115ra has the remark: “Quae alibi existens bacalarius
disputavit.” Guimaraes also appeals to a manuscript in Upsala with the notice “Item
[fecit Herveus] octo [quodlibeta] parva, lector existens.” See on this also Wippel,
“Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 181 n. 71.
127
Hödl, “Die Quodlibeta” (cit. n. 109), pp. 216.
128
Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 182: “Perhaps some of the [Quodlibeta
minora] did not result from his ofcial University functions either as Master or as
Bachelor, but from private disputations carried out by him only for his Dominican
colleagues, either before or after his career as Regent Master.” Wippel (loc. cit., n. 73)
invokes this sort of explanation as a possible way of dealing with the strange literary
characteristics of Quodl. V (on which, see n. 120 above).

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 445

is not entirely satisfactory, since one explicit attributing the Quodlibet to

Arnold of Liège mentions expressly that it was determined by Master
Hervaeus (quodlibet . . . determinatum per magistrum fratrem Herveum).129 It
was for this reason that Franz Pelster suggested, and Amédée Teetaert
accepted, that in 1307 Arnold, occupant of the Dominican chair for
foreigners, had scheduled the quodlibetal disputation, but was prevented
for some reason from determining it, and thus his new colleague,
Hervaeus, recently made regent master in theology in the Dominican
French chair, determined the Quodlibet. This would mean, then, that
Quodlibet IX was the very rst Quodlibet that Hervaeus determined as
regent master in theology—and indeed a Madrid manuscript labels
this Quodlibet “Primum quodlibet parvulorum.”130 One possibly fatal
problem for Pelster’s thesis, however, is that Arnold was a member
of the French Dominican province and hence occupied the French
Dominican chair of theology.131 But perhaps some variant on the idea
is close to the truth.
Clearly, the nal story of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta minora has yet to be
told. Taking stock: Quodlibeta V–X of the Zimara edition seem to be
securely attributed to Hervaeus, Quodlibeta V, VI, and VII unassailably
so, Quodlibeta VIII, IX, and X with only a slightly lesser degree of cer-
tainty. Despite the secure attribution, more research, both manuscript
and doctrinal studies, is necessary, research that may turn up either still
rmer evidence or further problems for this attribution. And clearly
only more research has any chance of untangling the highly difcult
issue of the precise way that these Quodlibeta t into Hervaeus’ academic
career, although this latter point may remain forever in the realm of
conjecture.132

129
See n. 115 above.
130
See Pelster, “Eine Münchener Handschrift” (cit. n. 97), pp. 269–70; Teetaert,
“La littérature,” pp. 84–5; Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” p. 182 n. 72. The Madrid
manuscript is Biblioteca Nacional 226 (xiv); for a description see Stella’s edition of
Durand of St Pourçain’s Quolibeta Avenonensia (cit. n. 140 below), pp. 5–8, where Stella
notes the following explicit numbering for Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta minora: Quodl. minor I
(Madrid) = Quodl. IX (Zimara), Quodl. minor II = Quodl. VI, Quodl. minor III = Quodl.
VII, Quodl. minor IV = Quodl. VIII (see also the earlier description of this manuscript in
Beltrán de Heredia, “Crónica,” cit. n. 97 above). This information (and similar infor-
mation from other manuscripts containing the Quodl. minora) may also prove signicant
in coming to any nal understanding of Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta minora.
131
As Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), pp. 39–40, pointed out, explicitly con-
tradicting Pelster and Teetaert.
132
In the category of “further evidence,” I should note that I also include possible
references to Hervaeus Quodlibeta minora by scholastic authors roughly contemporary

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So much for the works of Hervaeus that, in one way or another,

descend from quodlibetal disputations. Hervaeus, however, also made
important contributions to the Dominican anti-Quodlibet literature that
we have already seen in Bernard of Auvergne, Robert of Orford, and
Thomas of Sutton. Since Hervaeus himself in several of his works
was a staunch critic of Henry of Ghent,133 it can come as no surprise
that he wrote a series of determinationes in reply to Henry’s Quodlibeta,
a series of determinationes known as the De quatuor materiis. Despite its
name, this still mostly unedited work focuses on ve major issues:134 de
formis, de esse et essentia,135 de intellectu et specie, de voluntate et intellectu, and
de voto religiosorum. As Prospero T. Stella, in his edition of De intellectu

with Hervaeus, like the verbatim quotation by John of Naples of Hervaeus’ Quodl. VII
mentioned in n. 112 above.
133
Many of Hervaeus’ quodlibetal questions are directed against Henry’s views;
Hervaeus’ treatise De peccato originali, edited by Martin in La controverse (cit. n. 105), pp.
50–130, critiques Henry’s ideas; moreover, Hervaeus authored the treatise known as
the De divinis personis against aspects of Henry’s trinitarian theology as found in the
secular master’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum (Isabel Iribarren and I are preparing a
critical edition of this text). Interestingly, there is a reference from the De divinis personis
to Hervaeus’ “treatise on the will,” which must be the treatise De intellectu et voluntate
in Hervaeus’ De quatuor materiis (De personis divinis, q. 5: “Et quando ipsi [i.e., Henricus]
probant quod natura agit cum impetu qui repugnat libertati quae voluntati competit,
hoc nihil est, sicut in Tractatu de voluntate fuit tactum”).
134
These ve “matters” are now generally considered to be part of this treatise (see,
e.g., Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 1892), but there is a great deal of confusion concerning
the name even in the manuscripts containing these replies. BAV, Vat. lat. 987, for
instance, calls the rst four treatises taken together De quatuor materiis, but several other
manuscripts add the De voto religiosorum, and even other questions (e.g., De materia et forma,
De peccato veniali). Stella, “La prima critica” (cit. n. 136 below), pp. 132–4, examines
some of the evidence and comes to the conclusion that this group of determinations
against Henry should be called the Contra Henricum de Gandavo, ubi impugnat Thomam.
See also, Roensch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 158–9.
135
As far as I am aware, to date the De ente et essentia has received the most attention
of any of these treatises; see, e.g., Bayerschmidt, Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik (cit. n.
42), pp. 168–75, 314–30; W. Senko, “Les opinion” (cit. n. 112), passim (with edition
of part of the treatise, pp. 63–8), and Senko’s article (in Polish) in Studia Mediewistyczne
11 (1970), esp. pp. 260–79 (with edition of part of the treatise on pp. 260–73—thanks
to Elzbieta Jung for this information); Velázquez Campo, “Dos Cuestiones Cuolibe-
tales” (cit. n. 165 below), pp. 144–5, who shows that John of Naples in his Quodl. IX,
q. 6, echos Hervaeus’ text. Apparently, in 1957 S. Mangiapane edited the entire text
as part of his unpublished thesis entitled “Il ‘De esse et essentia’ nel ‘De quatuor materiis’
di Erveo di Nédellec. Studio e testo critico” (Rome, Ateneo Salesiano); cf. Stella, “La
prima critica” (cit. n. 136 below), p. 130 n. 31, and Velázquez Campo (art. cit.), p. 143
n. 66—I have unfortunately not had access to Mangiapane’s work. Finally, the De ente
et essentia was apparently also edited in a University of Toronto Ph.D. dissertation:
E.B. Allen, “The Notion of Being in Hervaeus Natalis,” 2 vols. (1958)—I have not
had access to Allen’s work.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 447

et specie, shows, Hervaeus subordinates Henry’s Quodlibeta to his own

purpose. Thus, unlike Bernard or Robert, who methodically replied to
nearly each and every question in its proper order, Hervaeus groups
together a selection of Henry’s questions, rst abbreviating them en
masse and then replying to them en masse. For example, in De intellectu
et specie, Hervaeus calls attention to more than fteen questions from
throughout Henry’s Quodlibeta; after presenting abbreviations of these
questions, Hervaeus makes clear why he chose precisely them: “all these
questions have been moved for the most part in order to investigate
whether we ought to posit intelligible species in the intellect” (Omnes
istae quaestiones pro magna parte motae sunt ad investigandum utrum sit ponere in
intellectu speciem intelligibilem).136 Hervaeus then makes what is, in effect, an
independent treatise taking up specic points that need to be dealt with
in order to clarify his disagreement with Henry of Ghent’s doctrine,
e.g., “De specie, an sit, quid sit,” “De comparatione verbi ad actum
intelligendi,” etc. Only after Hervaeus has set down this material does
he deal with the specics of Henry’s positions as found in the relevant
quodlibetal questions (e.g.: Ad decima quartam quaestionem quinti quolibet . . .
dico quod videtur mihi . . .). Thus, although the De quatuor materiis is clearly
in the same anti-quodlibetal genre as we saw in Bernard or Robert,
Hervaeus’ mode of proceeding is quite different from that of the other
two Dominicans (or, for that matter, from Thomas of Sutton’s).
It appears from manuscript evidence that Hervaeus composed the
treatise while still a bachelor of theology at Paris, which puts the treatise
sometime between 1302 and 1307.137 Some eleven manuscripts con-
tain signicant parts of this work of Hervaeus, so it had a fairly large
readership.138 It is clearly a work of major interest, seeing that it pits
perhaps the most signicant early Thomist, Hervaeus, against a major
theologian who had a very different view from Thomas on nearly all

136
See P. Stella, “La prima critica di Herveus Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di
Gand: Il ‘De intellectu et specie’ del cosiddetto ‘De quatuor materiis’,” Salesianum 21
(1959), pp. 125–70; the mapping of the entire De quatuor materiis is found on pp. 130–2.
Now outdated on the treatise is R.-M. Martin, “La table des matières de l’ouvrage De
quatuor materiis d’Hervé de Nédellec, O.P.,” RSPT 18 (1929), pp. 291–5.
137
Stella, “La prima critica” (cit n. 136), p. 135, quoting notices claiming the work
to be by Hervaeus when he was bachelor at Paris from BAV, Vat. lat. 859, ff. 22r
(Determinatio Hervei bachalaurei parisiensis, ordinis praedicatorum, contra magistrum Henricum de
Gandavo) and 40r (Determinatio Hervei bachalaurei parisiensis contra Gand ).
138
On the manuscripts one can see the descriptions in Macken, Bibliotheca Manu-
scripta (cit. n. 37), entries listed in the index s.v. Hervé Nédellec, and see esp. vol. II,
pp. 1191–6, of Macken’s work for a nice description of Hervaeus’ treatise.

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aspects of medieval intellectual endeavor. For all these reasons, it is

good news that L.M. de Rijk is currently working on a critical edition
of the entire treatise.139
A nal work of Hervaeus that belongs to the genre of quodlibetal
literature is his response to Durand of St Pourçain’s rst Avignonese
Quodlibet. Hervaeus and Durand had a history of confrontation from
the time that the rst version of Durand’s Sentences commentary reached
Hervaeus right up until Hervaeus’ death. As mentioned above, begin-
ning in his Quodlibet II, disputed at Christmas 1308 or Easter 1309,
Hervaeus took every opportunity to try to rebut Durand, and he even
organized two committees to sit in judgment on Durand’s Sentences com-
mentary. Apparently, when Hervaeus received a copy of Durand’s rst
Avignonese Quodlibet, disputed at Christmas 1314, he found it provoca-
tive enough to warrant an extended written reply. Out of the eighteen
questions contained in Durand’s Quodlibet, Hervaeus only attacks ques-
tions 1–2, 5–7, and 9–10, but in Prospero T. Stella’s critical edition, the
replies to the rst two questions, dealing with trinitarian issues, take up
thirty pages, while the remainder of Hervaeus’ text makes up a mere
four pages.140 In short, this is by and large a referendum on Durand’s
trinitarian theology.141 The text can be dated with great certainty to the
rst half of 1315, given the solid dating of the Quodlibet it is rebutting.142
Hervaeus’ text is interesting on several planes: on a doctrinal plane as
a specication of Hervaeus’ objections to some of Durand’s views, on
an historical plane as another stage in the ongoing controversy between
the two thinkers, and on a textual plane as a source of useful informa-
tion about other works of both Hervaeus and Durand. The text could
not, however, have had much of an impact in the Middle Ages, given

139
De Rijk announced his edition in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 45 (2003), p. 346
(no. C65).
140
Stella’s edition is an appendix to his Magistri D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano Quolibeta
Avenionensia tria (Textus et studia in historiam Scholasticae cura ponticii Athenaei
Salesiani) (Zürich 1965), specically pp. 293–326 (cf. below n. 148 for more on Stella’s
edition). For an excellent description of the treatise and how it ts into Durand and
Hervaeus’ altercation, see Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 229–36.
141
On trinitarian theology in Durand’s Quodlibet Avenionense I and Hervaeus’ response
to it, see now I. Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow
of Aquinas (Oxford Theological Monographs) (Oxford 2005), pp. 220–34; compare
Koch’s stage-by-stage recapitulation of Durand and Hervaeus’ discussion on trinitarian
theology, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 234–5.
142
See Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 235–6, and below at and around n. 149.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 449

that it exists today in just one manuscript (Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional

226 [xiv], ff. 217ra–222rb).

Dominican Quodlibeta in the 1310s

Durand of St Pourçain
Durand of St Pourçain (†1334) is one of the most colorful gures in
later medieval intellectual history. His seeming lack of concern with
towing a Thomist line on many important issues led to ofcial censure
by the Dominican Order, as well as numerous written attacks by such
theologians as Peter of Palude, John of Naples, and, as we have just
seen, Hervaeus Natalis. Even the process through which Durand’s
many works came into existence makes for a fascinating story, as told
by Joseph Koch in his classic Durandus de Sancto Porciano from 1927. Not
only did Koch reveal that Durand’s troubles with his order were the
reason that he produced no fewer than three versions of his Sentences
commentary,143 Koch also proved that we have written remains from
no fewer than ve quodlibetal disputations that Durand held. Indeed,
to see the impact of Koch’s work, one has only to compare the rst
volume of Glorieux’s La littérature quodlibétique, in which only one Parisian
Quodlibet was assigned to Durand, with the second volume, in which
Durand is credited with two quodlibetal disputations in Paris and three
in Avignon. There is no need for me to go over in detail the evidence
that convinced Glorieux, since it is all found in Koch’s book in his
inimitable mixture of careful and wide-ranging manuscript study with
precise doctrinal comparisons.144
Koch’s results can be summarized as follows. Durand conducted two
quodlibetal disputations while magister actu regens in theology in Paris
in 1312–13. The rst, which is referred to as Durand’s rst Quodlibet
by Hervaeus Natalis in one of his writings against Durand, was dis-
puted in 1312 (probably Easter) and is now found in two redactions,
a lightly reworked one from 1312–13 and a thoroughly reworked one

143
For this story and further literature, see the rst Introduction to Schabel-Friedman-
Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude” (cit. n. 93).
144
See Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 93–128.

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from sometime after 1317.145 The four questions found in the second
redaction, all of which deal with the category of relation, were edited
in 1968 from the four manuscripts known to contain the text.146 A
second Parisian Quodlibet, and the one that Glorieux originally believed
to be Durand’s sole Quodlibet, was disputed at Christmas 1312 or (less
likely, according to Koch) Easter 1313. Durand does not appear to
have revised this Quodlibet at all, since we seem to possess in a single
manuscript exclusively a reportatio of Durand’s actual determinations.
Koch judges that the special value of this Quodlibet is the picture it gives
us of Durand’s style of oral presentation.147
In early 1313, Durand was called to Avignon to be lector sacri palacii,
a position he retained until 1317 when he was raised to the episco-
pate. From the more than three years that Durand taught theology at
the papal school, we have three sizable Quodlibeta, all of which have
been critically edited by Prospero T. Stella.148 The rst of these three

145
Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 105–17. It is in his Reprobationes excusationum Durandi
that Hervaeus mentions Durand’s rst Parisian Quodlibet. The Carmelite Guy Terrena,
in his Quodl. I from 1313, uses the early redaction of Durand’s Quodl. I, thus giving a
terminus ante quem. Glorieux II, pp. 70–1, n. 2, mistakenly claims that the second redac-
tion is found in BAV, Vat. lat. 1076, when in fact this manuscript contains the rst
redaction. For the second redaction, Koch suggests “1317 (?),” but freely admits that
we can only surmise that it was nished sometime after the three Avignonese Quodlibeta,
on the basis of the fact that this Quodlibet is actually called Quodl. IV and follows the
three Quodl. Av. in Vat. lat. 1075, which contains all four, and that in his Quodl. Av. III
Durand refers to his own Quodl. Av. I as his “rst Quodlibet” (in primo quolibet; see on the
dating, Koch, pp. 95–6, 116–17).
146
Durandi de S. Portiano O.P. Quol. Paris. I (q. 1–q. 4), Takeshiro Takada, ed. (Kyoto
1968). This is volume 4 in the extremely rare “Series of Hitherto Unedited Texts of
Medieval Thinkers.” It should be noted that volume 3 in that same series contained a
highly awed edition of Durand’s Quodl. Paris. I, q. 2; the text was heavily revised for
its republication in volume four of the series. I would like to thank Iwakuma Yukio
and Sekizawa Izumi for their help in obtaining these (and several other) very rare edi-
tions. Two questions from Durand’s rst Parisian Quodl. that appear to be found only
in the rst redaction remain to be edited (Vat. lat. 1076, ff. 17r–18): q. 5 = “Utrum
numerus ternarius personarum divinarum vel creaturarum sit aliquid unum realiter”
and q. 6 = “Utrum motio ultimi nis et motio efcientis sint motiones eiusdem ratio-
nis, supposito quod nis et efciens sint idem realiter” (also found in Tortosa, Archivo
Capitular 43, f. 85va).
147
Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 93–5, esp. pp. 117–19. The Quodlibet is found in
Paris, BnF 14572, ff. 5ra–7va. In this manuscript, Durand’s Quodlibet follows directly
after John Quidort’s Quodlibet.
148
See n. 140 above for a reference to Stella’s edition, which contains a detailed
discussion of the tradition found in the four manuscripts containing the text, pp. 1–39
(the table of contents for Quodl. Av. I, ed. cit., records only 17 questions when there are
in fact 18 in the Quodl.; Stella failed to record q. 13, ed. cit., pp. 134–6). Since Stella
made his edition, several more copies of questions from Durand’s Quodlibeta have been

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Quodlibeta can be dated with some precision to Christmas 1314, and

there is a high degree of probability that the second and third took
place at Christmas 1315 and Christmas 1316, respectively.149 The three
Avignonese Quodlibeta are overwhelmingly theological in nature, with
substantial questions on, e.g., trinitarian theology, Christ in the tomb,
sin, bigamy, and monks’ vows. It is noteworthy, however, that ques-
tion 1 of Quodl. Av. III is Durand’s most extensive discussion of the
problem of universals, and given his reputation as an early nominalist
(or conceptualist), this question will be of crucial signicance in any
evaluation of Durand’s position in one of the major developments in
fourteenth-century thought.150

Peter of Palude
Peter of Palude (†1342) was the bachelor from the French Dominican
province reading the Sentences at Paris just slightly after Durand, prob-
ably in 1310–12. Palude was heavily involved in the Dominican Order’s
controversy with Durand. He participated actively in both the rst

found, including Münster, Universitätsbibliothek 175 (xiv), ff. 216va–217vb (Quodl. Av.
I, q. 8) and Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral 28 (xv), ff. 88v–93r (Quodl. Av. III, qq.
5–6), ff. 157r–159v (Quodl. Par. I, q. 2), ff. 159v–160v (Quodl. Av. III, q. 5), and the two
manuscripts mentioned in n. 150 below; Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 936. Koch deals with
these three Quodlibeta in Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 119–28.
149
Koch shows that the questions found in Quodl. Av. I are very tightly connected to
the list of errors published on 3 July 1314 by the commission examining his Sentences
commentary and the Excusationes that Durand himself wrote in response (and are
now no longer extant). Thus, this Quodlibet is basically a second, and expanded, reply
to the commission, and an undertaking like this would have only been pressing for
Durand in the immediate aftermath of the commission’s criticism; Christmas 1314 is
the date that best ts this criterion. There is less evidence for the other two Quodl. Av.,
but there is no dispute about the order in which they come, and they must have been
disputed between Easter 1315 and Easter 1317 (Durand was raised to the episcopate
on 26 August 1317): Christmas 1315 and Christmas 1316 are “wahrscheinlich.” See
Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 119–21, 126–7. It is interesting to note that Girard
J. Etzkorn has recently argued that William of Ockham’s Quodl. V is a sort of reply,
written by Ockham at Avignon, to the criticism of Ockham’s philosophy and theology
made at the Franciscan provincial chapter in 1321; see Etzkorn’s “Ockham at Avignon:
His Response to Critics,” Franciscan Studies 59 (2001), pp. 9–19.
150
Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), p. 128, notes the importance of this question. Interest-
ingly, copies of this question are found in Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego
53/103 (xiv), ff. 225ra–230va, and Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati G.VII.40
(xv), ff. 94ra–101vb, with the incipit: “Quoniam in omni inquisitione veritatis” (pace
Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 936); thanks to Chris Schabel I have been able to look at copies
of the Pelplin folios, and I can say that they clearly contain another redaction of this
question, and the divergences will be worthwhile examining more fully.

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(1314) and the second (1316/17) of the order’s committees assembled

by Hervaeus Natalis to review Durand’s Sentences, drafting in each case
along with John of Naples a list of problematic articles for the com-
mission as a whole to review. Moreover, in his own massive Sentences
commentary, redacted in 1310–11 and thereafter, Palude made a heroic
effort to answer Durand’s commentary at length, incorporating large
portions of Durand’s Sentences commentary into his own. Palude was
regent master in theology at Paris 1314–16/17.151 During this period of
regency, Palude held at least one and probably two quodlibetal disputa-
tions. According to its incipit, the Quodlibet that we have from Palude’s
pen contained originally fteen questions, but today only eleven of its
questions are found in one Toulouse manuscript (Toulouse, Bibliothèque
Municipale 744 [xiv], ff. 75r–118v); even shorter fragments are con-
tained in two other manuscripts found in Leipzig (Universitätsbibliothek
529 [xiv], ff. 122vb–126vb = fragment of q. 1)152 and Naples (BN XIII.
A.17 [xiv], ff. 154–162 = q. 4). Moreover, we can be relatively sure that
at one time two written Quodlibeta bore Palude’s name, since, according
to an eighteenth-century catalogue, the now lost fourteenth-century
manuscript 216 of the Venetian Dominican Convent of San Giovanni
e Paolo contained on ff. 223–260 two of Peter’s Quodlibeta.153
Palude’s surviving Quodlibet is unedited, and as far as I know only its
fourth question has been studied in any detail. This question, “Utrum
episcopus possit committere audientiam confessionum sine licentia
curatorum,” is one of Palude’s written contributions in the controversy
between the mendicants and the seculars over mendicant privileges, and

151
These dates are based on the following observations: Palude received his licence to
teach on 13 June 1314, and it seems likely that Hervaeus Natalis reclaimed the French
Dominican chair in 1316 or 1317, while Peter Auriol was reading the Sentences (see at
and around n. 106 above); Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), p. 64 (cf. p. 66), gives
1317 as the date upon which Palude vacated his chair for good, since the order’s General
Chapter that year in Pamplona, which began on 22 May and which Palude attended,
explicitly ordered Palude to give up his chair to the next bachelor to be licensed. For
a general look at Palude’s life, see J. Dunbabin, A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and
the Fourteenth-Century Church (Oxford 1991). On Palude’s Sentences commentary and its
relation to Durand, see esp. the introductions to Schabel-Friedman-Balcoyiannopoulou,
“Peter of Palude” (cit. n. 93).
152
See on this manuscript P. Burkhart, Die lateinischen und deutschen Handschriften der
Universitäts-Bibliothek Leipzig. Band 2: Die theologischen Handschriften. Teil 1 (Ms 501–625)
(Wiesbaden 1999), pp. 46–51, esp. p. 48, which claims that the text breaks off in
mid-question.
153
This appears to have been noticed rst by Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90),
p. 64 n. 34 (cp. with p. 6 n. 2, for the catalogue information).

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in particular it is directed almost exclusively against the views of the

important secular theologian John of Pouilly. Thus, Joseph Koch studied
this question in his attempt to elucidate the juridical process against
Pouilly, and more recently Brian Tierney, Charles Abraham Zuckerman,
and Thomas Turley have studied it for its more general church political
signicance.154 Through his close reading of this question, Koch was
able to give solid evidence that this was Peter’s rst Quodlibet as regent
master, being disputed at Christmas 1314 (Peter became master on 13
June 1314), and further that the written version of the Quodlibet—to
which John of Pouilly responded—was available during the rst half
of 1315.155 On the basis of this question, Turley claims that Palude was
apparently the founder of a group of pro-papal proponents of papal
infallibility, a group that Turley dubs “curial infallibilists.” This ques-
tion appears to have been seminal in the development of Palude’s ideas
on Pouilly and on ecclesiology more generally, since at least two later

154
J. Koch, “Der Prozess gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco und seine
Vorgeschichte (1312–1321),” RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 391–422, esp. pp. 391–3 n. 6, 400–3,
reprint in Koch, Kleine Schriften (Storia e Letturatura, 127–128) (Rome 1973), vol. II,
pp. 387–422; B. Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150–1350 (Studies in the History
of Christian Thought, 6) (Leiden 1972), pp. 149–53; C.A. Zuckerman, “Dominican
Theories of the Papal Primacy 1250–1320” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University
1971), esp. pp. 197–205 = App. 1 “The Episcopalist Writings of Peter of La Palu”;
T. Turley, “Infallibilists in the Curia of Pope John XXII,” Journal of Medieval History
1 (1975), pp. 71–101, on Palude esp. pp. 74–8, 87–9, but also passim; in addition,
J.T. Marrone, “The Ecclesiology of the Parisian Secular Masters 1250–1320” (Ph.D.
dissertation, Cornell University 1973), p. 251, in his discussion of John of Pouilly’s
ecclesiology, quotes from Palude’s Quodl. q. 4. According to Koch (art. cit., p. 402), the
question is divided into three main parts: 1) a general rejection of Pouilly’s position on
preaching and confession (ff. 84va–86va), 2) a specic reaction to a question (now lost)
on confession that Pouilly determined in 1314 (ff. 86va–96va), and 3) a specic reaction
to Pouilly’s Quodl. V, q. 14, of 1312 on preaching (ff. 96va–98va). A still worthwhile
discussion of the opposition between the two thinkers is J.G. Sikes, “John de Pouilli
and Peter de la Palu,” English Historical Review 49 (1934), pp. 219–40.
155
Koch, “Der Prozess” (cit. n. 154), pp. 400–3; Koch shows that Peter reports John
of Pouilly’s reference to the Council of Vienne (adjourned 6 May 1312) having taken
place two years before, and that Peter himself refers to the papal bull Inter cunctas (13
February 1304) being ten years old. Given Koch’s early dating, Turley’s suggestion
(“Infallibilists” [cit. n. 154], p. 91 n. 24) that the one Quodlibet that we have from Palude
is his second Quodlibet (since it replies to criticism already made of the view Palude is
defending, and, as far as we know, the only place that Palude could have aired his view
previously was in an earlier Quodlibet, since the view does not appear in his Sentences
commentary) seems unlikely but needs to be considered; Turley also claims (loc. cit.)
that Guimaraes “gives evidence for a lost rst quodlibet,” but Guimaraes does not
specify whether he thinks that the lost Quodlibet was Palude’s rst or second.

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works of Palude’s are little more than rewrites of what he says here.156
Although Turley says that Palude’s presentation of his ecclesiological
views in question 4 of his Quodlibet is poorly organized and obscure,
nevertheless Turley can show that the position that Palude develops there
played a signicant role in the Carmelite Guy Terrena’s thought on the
subject, although the inuence was undoubtedly through personal con-
tact and not through the written Quodlibet. Finally, it can be mentioned
that Palude’s Quodlibet provides evidence for the rather sharp backlash
in the period after 1312/13 against Durand of St Pourçain’s theories
both on the relationship between direct and reexive cognitive acts and
on our enjoyment of God as a reexive act; at least four questions in
the Quodlibet (qq. 6, 8–9, 11) deal with this issue directly.157

Francis Caracciolo
The name of one Dominican theologian from whom we have written
quodlibetal questions is nowhere to be found in Glorieux I or II. This
is Francis Caracciolo of Naples, master of theology at Paris around
1308 and chancellor of the University from 1309 until 1316, the year
of his death. He apparently only became a Dominican towards the very
end of his life, since he is referred to as canonicus Parisiensis in letters
from 1308 and 1309, and later as University chancellor (reserved for a
secular), and nevertheless the Dominicans remembered him as one of
their own after his death.158 Out of six quodlibetal disputations that we
know Francis held, we have in BAV, Vat. lat. 932, written remains of

156
Koch, “Der Prozess” (cit. n. 154), p. 392 n. 5, says that Palude’s Responsiones ad ea
quae sibi imposuit mag. Ioannes de Polliaco (= Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 3294) merely repeats
what Palude writes in this quodlibetal question, while Turley, “Infallibilists” (cit. n. 154),
p. 91 n. 25, draws attention to the fact that Palude’s De audientia confessionum (= Kaep-
peli, Scriptores, no. 3295) is “essentially a revision of ” Palude’s Quodl., q. 4.
157
See on the issues, R.L. Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate:
Durand of St. Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect,”
in Philosophical Debates at the University of Paris in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century,
S.F. Brown and T. Kobusch, with T. Dewender, eds., Leiden: Brill, forthcoming 2007;
on Palude see there around n. 45. Thomas Jeschke of the University of Cologne’s
Thomas-Institut is currently writing a Ph.D. dissertation on these early fourteenth-
century debates, which will include a discussion of the material in Palude’s Quodlibet. It
can be mentioned that the early date of Christmas 1314 which Koch gives to Palude’s
Quodlibet would agree well with his interest in this very debate that Durand’s view from
1312–13 brought to a head.
158
For the most complete discussion of Francis’ life and works, see P. Glorieux,
“François Caracciolo, chancelier de l’Université de Paris,” RTAM 33 (1966), pp. 115–36;
on the two letters, pp. 115–16. The acts of the Dominican Chapter General for 1316
include “. . . pro ven. Patre fratre Francisco ordinis nostri, condam cancellario Parisiensi,

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two, his fth and sixth, held ca. 1315–16. In Glorieux II (pp. 300–01),
these two Quodlibeta are listed as Anonymous Quodlibet XXI and XXII,
respectively. Only some thirty years later did Glorieux determine
through textual comparisons with other authenticated works that these
questions were written by Francis Caracciolo, and he even published
an edition of one question in his article on the chancellor.159

John of Naples

One of the most extensive and, despite increasing interest, least known
sets of fourteenth-century Quodlibeta are those of John of Naples († ca.
1350). Thirteen Quodlibeta, comprising some 300 questions on virtually
every conceivable subject, make this a mammoth collection, but the fact
that it is for the most part unedited has made investigation of it dif-
cult. Indeed, until around 1925 it was believed that John had authored
only two Quodlibeta, and Glorieux rst included an entry on him in the
second volume of his La littérature quodlibétique (pp. 159–73).160 Despite
these obstacles, John’s clear importance in the early fourteenth century
has meant that his works, including the Quodlibeta, have been the object
of signicant study over the last century. John was at Paris during the
years of Durand of St Pourçain’s controversy with his order: he prob-
ably read the Sentences at Paris between 1309 and 1311, and he, along
with Peter of Palude, drafted two lists of suspect articles from Durand’s

nuper defuncto . . .”; cf. Kaeppeli, Scriptores, s.v. Franciscus Caracciolo de Neapoli; cf.
Glorieux, art. cit., p. 129.
159
Glorieux, “François Caracciolo” (cit. n. 158), pp. 125–37, for Glorieux’s argu-
ments for attributing these two Quodlibeta to Francis, using Quodl. V, q. 5 (“Utrum beata
virgo contraxerit peccatum originale”) as his basis of comparison. For more on Francis,
and the identication of several of his views, see A. Maier, “Literarhistorische Notizen
über P. Aureoli, Durandus und den ‘Cancellarius’ nach der Handschrift Ripoll 77bis in
Barcelona,” Gregorianum 29 (1948), pp. 213–51 (reprint in Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalters
I, pp. 139–73, see esp. 153–73); R.J. Long, “‘Utrum iurista vel theologus plus prociat
ad regimen ecclesie’. A Quaestio Disputata of Francis Caraccioli. Edition and Study,”
Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968), pp. 134–62.
160
Thus, Jellouschek, “Quaestio Magistri Ioannis” (cit. n. 168 below), believed that
John had only two Quodlibeta. In 1927, Joseph Koch announced that there were thir-
teen Quodlibeta on the basis of his correspondence with J.M. March who had found
the important Tortosa manuscript containing them. In 1933, Thomas Kaeppeli found
in Naples the second major manuscript containing all thirteen of John’s Quodlibeta.
Glorieux incorporated all of this information into his question lists in Glorieux II. See
n. 165 below for references to these works.

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Sentences commentaries in 1314 and 1316/17.161 He was made master

of theology in the Dominican chair for foreigners at Paris probably in
late 1315, but was transferred by the order to the Dominican studium
in Naples in the autumn of 1317. In the process leading up to the
canonization of Aquinas, John was the main Dominican representative,
and he continued to be a papal consultant on such issues as apostolic
poverty (1322) and the beatic vision (1332–33).162 In 1347 John was
chaplain for Pope Clement VI, for whom he gave a sermon the next
year; this is the last we hear of him.163
John’s Quodlibeta and his large set of disputed questions164 are his two
principal scholastic works. The Quodlibeta are contained in two major
manuscripts—Naples, BN VII. B. 28 (xiv) and, more complete, Tortosa,
Archivo Capitular 244 (xiv)—with substantial fragments in some ten
further manuscripts.165 The greatest challenge with regard to John’s

161
John’s Sentences commentary appears to be no longer extant; on the dates of his
lectures, see Guimaraes, “Hervé Noël” (cit. n. 90), pp. 38, 45–7, and T. Kaeppeli,
“Note sugli scrittori domenicani di nome Giovanni di Napoli,” AFP 10 (1940), pp.
48–76, esp. p. 50, who concurs with Guimaraes. On the two commissions and John’s
part in them, see Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 18–19, 200–8.
162
For this information, see Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 285–314, esp. 285–6, in
conjunction with Kaeppeli, “Note sugli scrittori domenicani” (cit. n. 161), esp. p. 51.
163
Much of this information is from Kaeppeli, Scriptores, s.v. Ioannes de Napoli (I); for
more detail see Kaeppeli, “Note sugli scrittori domenicani” (cit. n. 161), pp. 48–71.
164
The Quaestiones disputata were printed by D. Gravina in Naples 1618 (reprint
Ridgewood, NJ 1966); for a question list, see Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 306–9.
Koch dates most of these disputed questions to John’s Parisian regency, but several are
reworked responsiones that John made upon the request of gures such as Pope John
XXII on pressing issues of the day, like marriage (1322 = q. 40), Franciscan poverty
(De paupertate, 1324 = q. 42), the relation between Church and State (De potestate papae,
1328 = q. 39), and the beatic vision (De visione beatica, 1332 = q. 41); see on these
questions especially A. Maier, “Zur Textüberlieferung einiger Gutachten des Johannes
de Neapoli,” AFP 40 (1970), pp. 5–27 (reprint in Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalters III, pp.
481–504).
165
For manuscripts. see Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 2528; some of these manuscripts
are described in Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 287–93. More recently on the Tortosa
manuscript: J.M. March, “Cuestiones cuolibéticas de la Biblioteca Capitular de Tortosa.
Otres códices de Juan de Nápoles, Durando y Santo Tomás,” Estudios eclesiásticos 5 (1926),
pp. 15–25, 150–63, and 6 (1927), pp. 151–6, on manuscript 244, esp. the second and
third installment; much of March’s article was reused by E. Bayerri-Bertomeu, Los
códices medievales de la Catedral de Tortosa. Novísimo inventario descriptivo (Barcelona 1962), pp.
398–412. Koch did not know of the Naples manuscript, which was announced and
described by T. Kaeppeli in “Handschriftliche Mitteilungen über Werke von Domini-
kanerschriftstellern in der Biblioteca Nazionale in Neapel,” Divus Thomas (Fribourg) 11
(1933), pp. 445–56, on the Naples manuscript, pp. 449–55, but Glorieux II was able
to take it into account, and hence Glorieux’s question list is more complete than the
one found on pp. 293–306 of Koch. Later studies of the two main manuscripts can be
found in Maier, “Zur Textüberlieferung” (cit. n. 164), in Ausgehendes Mittelalters, vol. III,

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Quodlibeta is establishing their dating. Two of the Quodlibeta present less of

a difculty than the other eleven: these are the ones called in all modern
lists of questions for and references to John’s Quodlibeta (e.g., Glorieux
II, pp. 164–66; Koch, pp. 293–306) “Quodlibet VI” and “Quodlibet VII,”
following the numbering found in the Naples and Tortosa manuscripts.
What is striking about these numeral designations is that there is no
disagreement among the experts that these two Quodlibeta were disputed
during John’s Parisian regency of 1315–17. Thus, normally we would
expect these two Quodlibeta to be John’s rst and second (not sixth and
seventh). We will pick up this mystery below, after seeing how we can
date these two Quodlibeta with some exactitude.166 The reason that it is
generally agreed that Quodlibeta VI and VII stem from John’s regency
is that both the Naples and the Tortosa manuscript (as well as several
others) claim that they were disputed at Paris. Now, on medieval tes-
timony, John became master ca. November 1315, and an explicit in
yet another manuscript containing Quodlibet VII (Firenze, BNC, Conv.
Soppr. J.X.10 [xiv]) claims that this Quodlibet was editum at Paris in 1317.
This leads Koch to place the disputation for Quodlibet VII at Christmas
1316, and further to conclude that Quodlibet VI (which precedes Quodlibet
VII in all the manuscripts that carry both) was disputed at Christmas
1315 or Easter 1316.167

esp. pp. 493–501; P.T. Stella, “Giovanni Regina di Napoli, O.P., e la tesi di Giovanni
XXII circa la visione beatica,” Salesianum 35 (1973), pp. 53–99, on the manuscripts
esp. pp. 55–62; L. Velázquez Campo, “Transcripción y estudio de dos cuestiones cuo-
libetales inéditas de Juan Regina de Nápoles, O.P.,” La ciencia tomista 107 (1980), pp.
117–50 (and see on this article nn. 112, 135 above).
166
A minor point that should be made is that these two Quodlibeta are called Quodl.
I and Quodl. II in several manuscripts containing only them (e.g., Firenze, BNC, Conv.
Soppr. J.X.10 [xiv], ff. 99ra–140vb; Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 744 [xiv],
ff. 1r–51v). This probably cannot be used to trump the evidence of the Naples and
Tortosa manuscripts, but it should be noted.
167
On the dating, see Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 75, 309–14. It is on this basis
that Koch (pp. 75–6) argues that John gives us a terminus a quo of 1317 for the third and
nal version of Durand’s Sentences commentary (C), based on Durand’s citation (in the
Prologue to I Sent. [C]) of John’s Quodl. I, since we can be certain that Durand, residing
outside of Paris, could have seen John’s Quodl. I by 1317. Long, “‘Utrum iurista” (cit.
n. 159), p. 138 n. 24, claims that “[t]he dating of John of Naples’ licence is given by
two different manuscripts of Bernard Gui, both indicating the month of November,
1316; Hauréau wants to read ‘1315’,” but Long offers no manuscript references there
(which Koch does), and a date of November 1315 for John’s license ts better with the
story (related by Long, loc. cit.) that Francis Caracciolo (†31 May 1316) granted John
his license (there are still problems with the dating, as Long recognizes).

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That Quodlibet VI was disputed at an early date in John’s career as

regent master is perhaps conrmed by the rather cautious attitude that
John takes when, in the second question there, he discusses the articles
condemned at Paris in 1277, and especially nine articles that appear
to run against Aquinas’ views. Here John asks whether all of Thomas’
conclusions can be taught in Paris, a pressing issue for Dominicans who
were admonished in 1286 and in 1309 to hold and defend Thomas’
views. In contrast with the caution of the early Quodlibet VI, in which
John explains how either Thomas or the condemned articles can be
construed in such a way that there is no contradiction between them,
in his slightly later Quaestio disputata 22 (probably disputed sometime
in 1316) John says outright that some of the articles were wrongly
condemned and that the current bishop of Paris should correct them
or remove them from the list.168 This evidence may make Christmas
1315 the best dating for John’s Quodlibet VI, a point at which he had
probably possessed his chair in theology for little over a month.
If it is possible to give relatively rm dates for John’s Quodlibeta VI
and VII, no such clarity can be found with regard to the eleven other
Quodlibeta that we have from him. The main problem with Quodlibeta
I–V, as noted above, is as follows: if we take the numbering of the
Quodlibeta in the Naples and Tortosa manuscripts as governing, then
John appears to have held no fewer than ve quodlibetal disputations
before he even became master of theology. This would almost neces-
sarily mean that they were held during John’s bachelor years at Paris,
1310–15, when he was denitely studying theology, reading the Sen-
tences, and participating in the commissions studying Durand’s works,
as well as perhaps teaching at one of the order’s provincial studia.169

168
For a study and edition of Quodl. VI, q. 2 (called there Quodl. I, q. 2), see
C. Jellouschek, “Quaestio Magistri Ioannis de Neapoli, O. Pr. ‘Utrum licite pos-
sit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusiones eius’
hic primum in lucem edita,” Xenia thomistica 3 (Rome 1925), pp. 73–104, especially
p. 86 for a comparison between John’s two questions. More recently, and taking into
account all of the manuscripts that Jellouschek in 1925 could not have known of, see
P.T. Stella, “Gli ‘Articuli Parisienses, qui doctrinam eximii doctoris beati Thomae de
Aquino tangunt vel tangere asseruntur’ nella accesione di Giovanni Regina di Napoli,”
Salesianum 37 (1975), pp. 39–67, with a reedition (pp. 45–57) and manuscript study of
this question from all manuscripts known to contain it, also offering other mentions
of the condemned articles found in John’s Quodlibeta. See on this also Koch, Durandus
(cit. n. 98), p. 312, and for other examples like this one, pp. 312–13; for the dating of
the Quaestiones disputatae, see ibid., pp. 309–10.
169
M. Mantovani, “Due questioni inedite di Giovanni di Napoli su temi gioachimiti,”
Florensia 13/15 (1999–2000), pp. 259–80 (with editions of Quodl. I, q. 13; II, q. 5), esp.

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Prospero T. Stella has presented some evidence that may corroborate

this chronology for the rst ve Quodlibeta. In brief, Stella has contended
that argumentation from Quodlibet III, q. 5, dealing with the principle
of individuation, reappears in augmented form in Quodlibet VII, q. 6,
which would make Quodlibet III the earlier of the two Quodlibeta. Stella
argues for a similar type of development with regard to John’s engage-
ment with the articles condemned in Paris in 1277 that appeared to
go against Thomas: from the early Quodlibet III, q. 10, to Quodlibet V,
q. 8, and further to Quodlibet VI, q. 2.170 Thus, given what we know
today, it seems highly likely that John disputed his rst ve Quodlibeta
before becoming master.
As for how it could possibly be that a bachelor held quodlibetal
disputations, there are at least two serious alternatives. One of these
two alternatives was suggested by Glorieux (II, p. 159), who in his short
discussion of John’s Quodlibeta proposed applying to John something like
Hödl’s thesis for dealing with Hervaeus Natalis’ Quodlibeta minora: John’s
rst ve Quodlibeta were held when he, still a bachelor of theology, took
on the role of respondent in these quodlibetal disputations. On the other
hand, we seem to have in Giles of Rome a good precedent for John
having held quodlibetal disputations in his own right at a provincial
studium or on some major occasion like a general or provincial chapter
of the order: Giles held such a disputation in Padua in 1281, before

p. 263, claims that the disputations on which Quodl. I and II (which in accordance with
the explanation being advanced here, he dates to 1310–11 and 1311–12 respectively)
were based “presumibilmente potrebbe essere Napoli”—for corroborating evidence
see below at n. 172. Mantovani, it should be noted, announces in this article (p. 261
n. 3) a critical edition of the Corpus Quaestionum disputatarum de quolibet of John of
Naples. Don Mantovani tells me that Prospero T. Stella, who originated the idea for
the critical edition (see “Gli ‘Articuli Parisienses’ ” [cit. n. 168], p. 42), continues work
on the edition.
170
On development in John’s theory of individuation, see P.T. Stella, “Zwei unedi-
erte Artikel des Johannes von Neapel über das Individuationsprinzip,” Divus Thomas
(Fribourg) 29 (1951), pp. 129–66, esp. pp. 131–7. On p. 132 n. 3 of that article, Stella
holds explicitly to the view that Quodl. I-V were chronologically earlier than Quodl. VI
and VII, and rejects a suggestion by T. Kaeppeli (“Handschriftliche Mitteilungen” [cit.
n. 165], pp. 452–3) that Quodl. VII was chronologically earlier than Quodl. VI. Kaeppeli’s
suggestion was made because Quodl. VI, q. 16, refers to a treatment elsewhere (. . . in
alio nostro quolibet . . .), and Kaeppeli can only see either Quodl. III, q. 5, or Quodl. VII,
q. 6, as possibilities, and rejects Quodl. III since it could not be chronologically earlier
than either Quodl. VI or Quodl. VII. On development in John’s approach to the Parisian
articles, see “Gli ‘Articuli Parisienses’ ” (cit. n. 168), pp. 57–60.

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his rehabilitation and subsequent Parisian magistracy.171 Perhaps the

suggestion by J.M. March that John’s Quodlibet V, q. 13 (“Utrum facto
statuto de novo in aliqua civitate de non asportando frumento extra
portum eius, navis quae ante statutum onerata frumento de portu reces-
sit et tandem orta tempestate post statutum ad portum rediit, possit
licite cum frumento de portu recedere”), was likely disputed in some
maritime city, e.g., Naples, would make us lean towards the second of
these two alternatives at least for this particular Quodlibet.172 We can hope
that deeper study of these ve “early” Quodlibeta will turn up further
evidence as to when and where John held these disputations.
One fruitful way that such research might be conducted has been
shown recently by Mauro Mantovani for Quodlibeta VIII–X,173 which
have been presumed to be later than John’s Parisian period and prob-
ably held in Naples, where he was teaching. Mantovani uses two basic
strategies in tandem for establishing some solid dating for especially
Quodlibet VIII: he takes advantage of the fact that John often makes
internal references to his own Quodlibeta, thereby conrming the order
of the individual Quodlibeta vis-à-vis each other, and he looks for
historical and doctrinal references in the texts of the Quodlibeta that
will allow us to date them in absolute terms. Thus, Mantovani found
that in Quodlibet X, q. 9, which Mantovani edited, John cites his own
Quodlibet VIII on at least two occasions. Quodlibet VIII, q. 2, in turn,
mentions “ut in secunda quaestione, VII Quolibet, disputata Parisius,
probatum est,” which shows both that Quodlibet VIII was not disputed
in Paris (but rather, presumably, in Naples, as we already believed)
and that Quodlibet VII preceded Quodlibet VIII. More signicantly still,
following Mantovani, we can argue that Quodlibet VIII was disputed at
Christmas 1317 on the basis of a reference in Quodlibet VIII, q. 20, to
a text “in constitutionibus novellis Concilii Viennensis”; since after 25
October 1317 this text was ofcially promulgated as part of the Con-
stitutiones clementinae, had John written much later than Advent 1317 he

171
See on Giles’ Paduan Quodlibet Giorgio Pini’s chapter in the rst volume of the
present book, esp. pp. 233, 236–9. Thanks to Chris Schabel for having drawn my
attention to Giles’ Paduan Quodlibet.
172
March, “Cuestiones cuolibéticas” (cit. n. 165), part 2 (1926), p. 151, repeated by
Bayerri-Bertomeu, Los códices medievales (cit. n. 165), p. 398–9, and Velázquez Campo,
“Dos Cuestiones Cuolibetales” (cit. n. 165), pp. 119, 137.
173
M. Mantovani, “‘Veraciter, sed non evidenter’. Due questioni quodlibetali inedite
di Giovanni di Napoli sul tema della creazione,” Salesianum 61 (1997), pp. 463–82 (with
editions of John’s Quodl. X, qq. 8–9); on the dating see pp. 466–9.

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would have cited the constitutiones novellae as the Constitutiones clementinae.

In fact, Mantovani’s dating would mean that John disputed Quodlibet
VIII very soon after his transfer from Paris to Naples. In line with
this, Mantovani dates Quodlibet X—the main object of his interest—to
“posteriore al 1318.”
For Quodlibeta IX–XIII we can supplement Mantovani’s ndings based
on the studies of Anneliese Maier, Prospero T. Stella, and Thomas
Turley. Thus, Thomas Turley has suggested that evidence given by
Anneliese Maier concerning a spate of responsiones in the rst half of
1320 dealing with witchcraft and demonology should allow us to place
John’s Quodlibet IX not much later than that year.174 Maier also gives
evidence that would place Quodlibet X in 1322 or more probably in
1323, focusing on question 23 dealing with the sacrament of marriage.175
Finally, building on the work of Maier and Stella, Turley has proposed
a dating of Christmas 1332 for John’s Quodlibet XI, based on the fact
that its question 7 refers to John’s treatise De visione beatica, written in
early 1332 at the request of Pope John XXII and now found as question
41 of John’s Quaestiones disputatae.176 As far as I know, no dating work
has been done specically on Quodlibeta XII and XIII, but they would
presumably be dated to after 1332. Indeed, Thomas Kaeppeli has gone
through all of Quodlibet XIII and shown that there are references in it
to questions in John’s Quodlibeta II, VII, VIII, X, and XII (as well as

174
For Turley’s claim, see “Infallibilists” (cit. n. 154), pp. 96–7 n. 83, referring to
Maier’s “Eine Verfügung Johanns XXII. über die Züstandigkeit der Inquisition für
Zaubereiprozesse,” AFP 22 (1952), pp. 226–46 (reprint in Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalters
II, pp. 59–80). Maier never actually mentions John in this article, but Turley is probably
indicating the overlap between John’s Quodl. IX, q. 24 (“Utrum invocare, conjurare, et
consulare daemones et eis sacricare et baptizare imagines secundum formam et ritum
Ecclesiae ad interciendum vel afliandum, sapiat haeresim vel indelitatem”), and
several of the ve questions that John XXII put to his theologian advisors in 1320 as
found listed in Maier’s article, p. 64. Glorieux II, p. 168 n. 2, asks whether this very
question in John’s Quodl. IX has to do with “l’affaire de Hugues Gérard (1317).”
175
Maier, “Zur Textüberlieferung” (cit. n. 164), pp. 483–4, esp. n. 10.
176
T. Turley, “An Unnoticed quaestio of Giovanni Regina di Napoli,” AFP 54 (1984),
pp. 281–91, esp. pp. 286–7; see also Maier, “Zur Textüberlieferung” (cit. n. 164), pp.
492–501, and especially Stella, “Giovanni Regina” (cit. n. 165), pp. 55–8, 90–6—with
reference in Stella’s text edition of Quodl. XI, q. 7, on p. 98 to the disputed question;
Turley’s argument is more complicated than I have presented it here, making use of the
fact that John seems to have wanted to suppress this particular question in the published
version of the Quodlibet, which only makes sense in the charged atmosphere of 1332–33
on the issue of the beatic vision. See on John’s De visione beatica, n. 164 above.

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one of the disputed questions), thus establishing that Quodlibet XIII is

the last of John’s Quodlibeta.177
That these later Quodlibeta were disputed by John in his role as lector
at the Dominican studium in Naples seems relatively certain. Nevertheless,
there is strong evidence to suggest that several of the questions in these
Quodlibeta were rst written as responsiones to requests for a theological
opinion by, e.g., Pope John XXII, and only later incorporated into the
Quodlibeta proper. This is what Thomas Turley convincingly argues is the
case with Quodlibet XI, q. 13, a question dealing with papal provisions
and specically with whether canons of a cathedral chapter after taking
an oath to resist the installation of a papal claimant could, upon papal
admonishment, legitimately break their oath. Turley shows on the basis
of manuscript evidence that the question was written rst as a responsio
and then with a minimum of editing was included in the Quodlibet.178
Turley mentions several other cases in John’s Quodlibet X where the
Dominican was clearly constructing his “quodlibetal” question on the
basis of an earlier text made in response to a request for theological
advice. This is not unknown in quodlibetal literature—the Carmelite
Guy Terrena is also known to have done this type of “recycling”—but
it seems a characteristic especially to be associated with John of Naples,
and one that can help us with the dating of his Quodlibeta.179
It seems likely that study of John of Naples’ Quodlibeta will repay the
effort, since in the research to date he has been noted to be intelligent
and interesting. Joseph Koch, for example, was full of praise for him
as a thinker. For Koch, John was “the most signicant Thomist of the
beginning of the fourteenth century,” praised for the clarity of his
Thomistic views and for his extraordinarily wide-ranging knowledge of
Thomas’ many works.180 A steady ow of books and articles on John’s
thought, most taking their point of departure in John’s Quodlibeta, has
tended to conrm the view that he was a signicant thinker, one who
developed Thomistic philosophy and theology in interesting ways in

177
See Kaeppeli, “Handschriftliche Mitteilungen” (cit. n. 165), pp. 451–2; these
internal references were essential to Kaeppeli’s proof that Quodl. XIII actually belonged
to John.
178
See Turley, “An Unnoticed quaestio” (cit. n. 176), pp. 284–5.
179
Turley, “An Unnoticed quaestio,” p. 285 n. 19, refers to Maier, “Zur Textüber-
lieferung” (cit. n. 164), esp. p. 484 n. 10 for Quodl. X, q. 23, and he suggests that qq.
23–24, 26 of that Quodlibet are also responsiones on the basis of their being posed as casus,
as well as q. 22, which has none of the trappings of a quodlibetal question.
180
Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 207, 285, 287.

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response to new challenges—not least the challenge posed by Durand

of St Pourçain. Thus, some aspects of John’s thought that have been
studied to date include his ideas on scientic knowledge,181 trinitarian
theology,182 individuation,183 creation and the relationship between God
and the world,184 the beatic vision,185 political philosophy and philoso-
phy of economics,186 education,187 and natural law.188

181
J. Beumer, “Die Kritik des Johannes von Neapel O.P. an der Subalternation-
slehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin,” Gregorianum 37 (1956), pp. 261–70, who shows that
John, like Hervaeus Natalis, rejects that theology is a science, and more particularly
a subalternate science, in any strict sense, thus fundamentally rejecting Aquinas’ view
on the issue.
182
R. Schneider, Die Trinitätslehre in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes
von Neapel O.P. († 1336) (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes, N.F. 16) (Munich
1972).
183
Stella, “Zwei unedierte Artikel” (cit. n. 170); H.J. Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung
der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der scholastischen Theologie (Freiburg 1973), pp. 243–4 n. 406,
claims that John’s Quodl. VII, q. 6, edited by Stella (pp. 156–66), is dependent upon
the Augustinian Hermit James of Viterbo as well as the Dominican Nicholas Trivet
(Quodl. III, q. 37)—indeed, John in the text of his Quodl. III, q. 5 (ed. Stella, “Zwei
unedierte Artikel,” p. 156, ll. 6–9) cites “penultimo articulo primi quodlibeti Jacobi de
Viterbio” as well as “ultimo quodlibet Hervei”; the latter, as mentioned above (nn. 98,
116), must be a reference to Hervaeus’ Quodl. III, q. 9 (“Utrum materia sit principium
individuationis”), which gives a terminus ante quem for John’s question of 1316–17, when
Hervaeus’ “last Quodlibet” would have been Quodl. IV and no longer Quodl. III.
184
M. Mantovani, “‘Veraciter, sed non evidenter’” (cit. n. 173). On the same theme,
although concentrating on John’s disputed questions, is C.J. Jellouschek, Johannes von
Neapel und seine Lehre vom Verhältnisse zwischen Gott und Welt (Vienna 1918) (note that when
Jellouschek wrote this book, John was only recognized to have had two Quodlibeta).
185
See Maier, “Zur Textüberlieferung” (cit. n. 164) (Maier discusses John’s contribu-
tions to the discussion on the beatic vision in several of the articles collected in her
Ausgehendes Mittelalters III; see the index there); Stella “Giovanni Regina” (cit. n. 165);
F. Merta, “Die Lehre von der Visio beata in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones dispu-
tatae des Johannes von Neapel O.P. († 1336)” (Inaugural-Dissertation, Munich 1964),
with generous quotations of texts from the Quodlibeta. More recently, C. Trottmann, La
vision béatique des disputes scolastiques à sa dénition par Benoît XII (Bibliothèque des Écoles
françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 289) (Rome 1995), pp. 574–83, who, however, does
not appear to know Merta’s work.
186
See the chapters by Roberto Lambertini and Giovanni Ceccarelli in the rst
volume of the present book for discussions of John’s Quodlibeta in later medieval politi-
cal and economic debates. Turley, “Infallibilists” (cit. n. 154), p. 98 n. 91, claims that
John’s argument for papal infallibility in Quodl. XI is very sophisticated, and that he
will deal with it in a projected article; but I have not run across that article.
187
P.T. Stella, “Puer quasi res parentum. Breve contributo alla storia della pedagogia
medievale,” Orientamenti Pedagogici 8 (1961), pp. 910–27 (Quodl. X, q. 21)—I have not
examined this article.
188
P. Michaud-Quantin, “Le droit naturel chez Jean de Naples,” RTAM 29 (1962),
pp. 268–87.

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Late Dominican Quodlibeta

Dominican quodlibetal production seems to have begun to taper off

after around 1320; at any rate, there is not as great a density of texts
surviving from this period as from the earlier period. With that said,
there are some Dominican contributions to the genre from this later
period. As we just saw, John of Naples was writing and probably
disputing Quodlibeta in the 1320s and well into the 1330s. Moreover,
in Avignon in 1328, Armand of Belvezer held a quodlibetal dispu-
tation, ve questions of which are preserved in BAV, Borghese 10,
ff. 110v–115v.189 Across the channel, in the mid-1330s, Robert Holcot
held a series of quodlibetal disputations of which we have considerable
written remains, largely unedited and in a confusing state.190 Much
later still, Herman of Augsburg (Hartmannus de Augusta) held a series
of quodlibetal disputations during his period of teaching in Cologne
around 1355, and we nd Quodlibeta IV and VI in Kraków, Biblioteka
Jagielloqska 748, ff. 24ra–47ra.191 While bearing in mind that also these
are late Dominican Quodlibeta,192 nevertheless here I will concentrate on
three other major authors of the period: Raymond Bequini, Henry of
Lübeck, and Bernard Lombardi.

Raymond Bequini
Although Glorieux (II, p. 238) associates only nine quodlibetal ques-
tions with the Parisian master Raymond Bequini (†1328), we have good
reason to believe that twelve questions are extant from two separate
Quodlibeta. In 1955 Franz Pelster announced that there were not just

189
See on the manuscript and the questions, the relevant entry in A. Maier, Codices
burghesiani bibliothecae Vaticanae (Studi e testi, 170) (Vatican City 1952), and the on-line
Quodlibase. Sylvain Piron tells me that Martin Morard is currently working on this
Quodlibet, and may edit it.
190
On Holcot’s Quodlibeta, see Rondo Keele’s contribution to this volume.
191
See on Herman, Z. Wlodek, “Hermann d’Augsbourg et ses ‘Quaestiones de
Quodlibet’ dans le ms. BJ 748,” MPP 6 (1960), pp. 3–50, with discussion of Herman
and his thought (pp. 3–10), detailed description of the manuscript (pp. 11–27), and
edition of Quodl. IV, q. 6 (“Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae humanae”) and
q. 7 (“Utrum verbum mentis sit idem quod actus intelligendi vel non”), on pp. 28–50.
For a complete list of questions, see M. Kowalczyk, “Hartmanus de Augusta,” MPP 3
(1959), pp. 25–6. A description of Krakow 748 can also be found in Catalogus codicum
manuscriptorum . . . Cracoviae V (cit. n. 22), pp. 285–92 (on these Quodlibeta, p. 286).
192
One can nally mention that the seven questions contained in Firenze, BNC,
Conv. Soppr. B.VI.340 (xiv), vol. 2, ff. 81r–137v, and attributed to the English Dominican
Thomas Claxton († after 1414), may be quodlibetal (see Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 3783,
and Sharpe, Handlist, no. 1725).

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the nine questions that Glorieux knew, but in fact eleven questions; on
the other hand, Pelster also observed that only the eleventh and nal
question (“Utrum intellectus creatus videndo divinam essentiam visione
beata de necessitate videat omnia quae possunt in divina essentia reprae-
sentari”) was explicitly marked as belonging to Bequini’s Quodlibet II.
On this basis, Pelster was doubtful as to whether the other ten questions
were quodlibetal questions at all.193 More recently, Lauge O. Nielsen has
been working on this material as part of his study of Peter Auriol and
his contemporaries. Nielsen has found yet another question, bringing
the total up to twelve; moreover, he has found a reference from the
question known to belong to Quodlibet II to question 4 of Quodlibet I,
and this matches with material that we have.194 Thus, we can be quite
certain that we have from Bequini a Quodlibet I of eleven questions and
a Quodlibet II of one question. Parts of Bequini’s Quodlibeta are found in
six manuscripts,195 so it appears to have had some readership. Perhaps
the most signicant feature of Bequini’s quodlibetal questions, however,
is that they are primarily attempts to rebut the theology, psychology,
and metaphysics of Peter Auriol. Bequini read the Sentences at Paris
probably in 1317–19, and was regent master there shortly thereafter;
he thus overlapped with Auriol, which explains his preoccupation with
the Franciscan in these questions, which may themselves date from 1321
or 1322. Indeed, Bequini wrote a fourteen-question Correctorium of the
beginning of Auriol’s Scriptum, criticizing the Franciscan master from
a generally Thomistic point of view.196 Thus, once again we see that
early Thomism “retooled” itself in order to focus on the newest and
most challenging threats: after Henry of Ghent, Durand of St Pourçain
and John Duns Scotus, and after them, Peter Auriol.197

193
F. Pelster, “Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O.P., seine
Quästionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli, Das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis
O.E.S.A.,” Franciscan Studies 15 (1955), pp. 30–47 (pp. 31–9 on Bequini), esp. p. 35;
updated question list on p. 34.
194
Thanks to Nielsen for conveying this information to me.
195
Avignon, Bibliothèque Municipale 314 (xiv), ff. 1–21v; Basel, Universitätsbibliothek
B.VIII.28 (xiv), ff. 1–37v; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 529 (xiv), ff. 93–94; Pamplona,
Biblioteca de la Catedral 28 (xv), ff. 129–145; Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale 502
(xiv), ff. 49–77; Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque Municipale 129 (xv). For information on the
Pamplona manuscript, I am grateful to Chris Schabel.
196
Kaeppeli, Scriptores, has not listed the correctorium of 14 questions from Peter
Auriol’s I Sent. that Pelster, “Zur ersten Polemik” (cit. n. 193), p. 35, securely identi-
ed as Bequini’s.
197
It should be noted that Bequini’s quaestio “Utrum Christus et Apostoli habuerunt
aliqua temporalia in communi quantum ad proprietatem et dominium,” which Pelster
(“Zur ersten Polemik” [cit. n. 193] pp. 32, 35) suggested is a separate treatise on apostolic

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Henry of Lübeck
As far as we know Henry of Lübeck never taught in Paris—all of our
information about his life locates him in Germany: in 1312 we nd
him as vicar for the provincial of the Dominican province of Saxony,
in 1325 and 1336 as prior provincial of Saxony, and in 1336 as vicar
general of the same province. Indeed in the manuscripts containing
his major work, his three Quodlibeta, Henry is described as a Domini-
can from the province of Saxony. This is what has led most scholars
to place Henry’s quodlibetal disputations in the order’s studium generale
in Cologne, rejecting suggestions of Paris or England for which there
is no evidence at all.198 The last we hear of Henry is in the document
just mentioned from 1336.
In line with this sparse information about his life, the dating of
Henry’s Quodlibeta is somewhat problematic. In one of the three manu-
scripts containing the work, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek,
lat. 1382 (ff. 114r–198r), the explicit to Quodlibet II (f. 171r) runs as
follows: “Explicit secundum quodlibet fratris H. de Lubecke ordinis
fratrum predicatorum de provincia Saxonie. Quod fecit scribi frater
Johannes de Dyscowe Bononie anno Domini 1326.”199 This gives us a
terminus ante quem of 1326.200 On this basis, Glorieux (II, pp. 134–37)

poverty, is now recognized to be such by Kaeppeli, Scriptores, no. 3389 (and on the
treatise see U. Horst, “Raimundus Beguin OP und seine Disputation De paupertate
Christi et apostolorum aus dem Jahr 1322,” AFP 64 [1994], pp. 101–18).
198
For a ne summation of the evidence about Henry’s life and works, see L. Stur-
lese, “Gottebenbildlichkeit und Beseelung des Himmels in den Quodlibeta Heinrichs
von Lübeck OP,” FZPT 24 (1977), pp. 191–233, esp. pp. 191–3; for more detail, see
W. Bucichowski, “Le principe d’individuation dans la question de Henri de Lubeck
‘Utrum materia sit principium individationis’,” MPP 21 (1975), pp. 89–113, esp. pp.
89–94.
199
See M. Grabmann, “Forschungen zur Geschichte der Ältesten Deutschen
Thomistenschule des Dominikanerordens,” in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben I (Munich 1926)
(pp. 392–431), p. 422; more generally on Henry, pp. 421–8.
200
Knowing when Henry became a master of theology might help with the dating
of his work; unfortunately there is some disagreement about this in the secondary lit-
erature. Bucichowski, “Le principe” (cit. n. 198), p. 89 n. 7, claims “le titre de maître
(sans plus de précision) est accolé pour la première fois au nom de Henri de Lubeck
dans un document de 1330”; Sturlese, “Gottebenbildlichkeit” (cit. n. 198), p. 191, claims
“Seit 1325 bezeichnen ihn die Urkunden übereinstimmend als Magister der Theologie.”
As far as I can tell, Bucichowski is correct that the rst time Henry is referred to as
Master is in 1330, and not in 1325, but in any case he is not referred to as master in
the document from 1336 in which he is made the vicar general of the order’s province
of Saxony (B. Reichert, ed., Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica IV [Rome
1899], p. 242), so it is difcult to know what one can conclude on this basis.

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conjectured that the three Quodlibeta were disputed in 1323, 1324,

and 1325, supporting the thesis by noting that in his text as found in
the Vienna codex Henry referred to “sanctus Thomas,” which would
require that they took place after Thomas’ canonization in July 1323.
But already Grabmann in 1926 had written that the many instances
in which Thomas is referred to merely as “doctor” or “brother” in
Henry’s text in the same Vienna manuscript might indicate that the
instances of “saint” were a later addition; Grabmann suggested on
this basis that “die Quodlibeta schon vor 1323 entstanden sind.” Loris
Sturlese pursued this line of research by comparing those spots in the
text where Thomas is described as “saint” in the Vienna manuscript
with the same spots as found in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud. Misc.
540 (xiv), ff. 1–101, which also contains the three Quodlibeta: not once
is Aquinas referred to as “saint” in the Oxford manuscript.201 Thus
1323 is no solid terminus post quem, and it may even be, as Grabmann
suggested, a terminus ante quem. Although Grabmann notes that Henry
explicitly refers frequently to Giles of Rome, as well as to Albert the
Great, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, and
even Robert Grosseteste, these relatively early gures do not help us
with a terminus post quem for Henry’s Quodlibeta.202 More promising with
regard to determining a chronology for Henry’s Quodlibeta will be trac-
ing the anonymous doctores moderni he mentions. For example, Sturlese
has established that Henry had rst hand knowledge of Dietrich of
Freiburg’s De animatione caeli from the end of the thirteenth century.
More useful for giving a more exact date to the Quodlibeta is that
Henry, in his Quodlibet I, q. 23 (“Utrum in intellectu possint esse plures
simul actus ut actus”), quotes extensively and sometimes verbatim from
the third question of Durand of St Pourçain’s “Quaestiones de libero
arbitrio,” composed while Durand was regent master in Paris in 1312
or 1313.203 I present here some non-exhaustive evidence of this inu-
ence of Durand on Henry:

201
Grabmann, “Forschungen” (cit. n. 199), p. 424; Sturlese, “Gottebenbildlichkeit”
(cit. n. 198), pp. 192–3 (esp. nn. 7–8).
202
Grabmann, “Forschungen” (cit. n. 199), pp. 424–5.
203
See on the treatise, my “On the Trail” (cit. n. 157), passim; on Henry, see there
around n. 41.

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468 russell l. friedman

Henry of Lübeck, Quodlibet I, Durand of St. Pourçain

q. 23 “Quaestiones de libero arbitrio,”
(W = Wien 1382, ff. 142rb–143va) q. 3205

f. 142va–b
<1> Secundum <motivum> est <p. 486.9–17> Tertio sic: plures
quod cum potentia intellectiva non actus sentiendi possunt esse simul
sit minoris capacitatis quam potentia in sensu. Ergo et plures actus intel-
sensitiva, si in potentia sensitiva pos- ligendi in intellectu. Consequen-
sunt esse plures actus simul, non erit tia patet, quia intellectus non est
hoc inconveniens de aliqua potentia minoris capacitatis quam sensus,
intellectiva. Quod autem in potentia nec actus intelligendi sunt maioris
sensitiva possunt esse simul plures repugnantiae quam actus sentiendi.
actus patet de sensu communi, qui Minor probatur, quia videns scutum
simul percipit immutationes omnium partim album et partim viride vel
sensibilium particularium. Patet rubeum, videt simul totum scutum,
etiam hoc de aliis sensibus. Visus ut experimentum docet, et tamen
enim videt simul scutum quod est non videt uno actu videndi totum;
album in una mediante et nigrum ergo ibi sunt plures actus videndi.
in alia; sed illos duos colores non Probatio minoris, quia idem actus
potest204 videre uno actu. Probatio, non potest esse simul intensus et
quia perfectius et intensius videt remissus. Sed videns scutum partim
album quam nigrum eo quod album album et partim viride seu rebeum,
fortius movet; idem autem actus non maxime si sit remotum, videt inten-
potest esse intensior et remissior sius album quam viride seu rubeum.
simul; ergo diversis actibus eadem Ergo non est unus actus solus.
potentia visiva percipit simul album
et nigrum in uno scuto.
<2> Tertium motivum est de intel- <p. 486.17–20> Quarto sic: ange-
lectu angelico, qui semper intelligit lus simul intelligit se et alia a se. Sed
essentiam suam per se ipsam. Sed illud non potest esse nisi per diver-
alia quae intelligit per speciem illam, sos actus intelligendi. Ergo ibi sunt
quandoque intelligit, quandoque non diversi actus; nam semper intelligit
intelligit. Ergo saltem in intellectu se, quandoque autem intelligit alia
angelico possunt esse plures actus a se. . . .
respectu plurium obiectorum.

204
potest] possunt ms.
205
Page- and line-number references are to the edition found in P.T. Stella, “Le
‘Quaestiones de libero arbitrio’ di Durando da S. Porciano,” Salesianum 24 (1962), pp.
450–524.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 469

<3> Quartum motivum est de actu <p. 486.25–27> Quinto sic: actus
reexo et recto . . . eo quod possint rectus et reexus sunt duo actus.
/W 142vb/ separari. Potest enim Sed isti sunt simul et unus est causa
esse actus rectus sine reexo [sed alterius. Ergo duo actus possunt esse
actus sine reexo], sed actus reexus in eadem potentia simul, quorum
semper supponit rectum quia est unus est causa alterius. . . .
obiectum suum. Nullus autem actus
potest esse sine suo obiecto. Ideo
saltem in eadem potentia potest esse
simul actus rectus et reexus. . . .
<4 = 142vb> Similiter dicunt de <p. 494.3–13> Dicendum ergo est
intentionibus albi et nigri quod non quod sicut calidum et frigidum res-
magis compatiuntur in eodem secun- pectu eiusdem subiecti non causant
dum idem quam album et nigrum, calorem et frigus, quae sunt con-
quia utrobi<que> est formalis repu- traria, sed causant tepidum, quod
gnantia, nec plus se compatiuntur est qualitas media, uno impediente
in esse distincto parvus calor et puram actionem alterius, sic album
parvum frigus quod magnus calor et nigrum causant in eadem parte
et magnum frigus. Dicunt ergo quod medii speciem mediam. Sed contra
duae similitudines albedinum ef- hoc arguitur quia species media a
ciuntur una intentio in puncto medio duobus contrariis imperfecte et de-
ubi concurrunt. Similiter intentio cienter repraesentat utrumque, sicut
albi et nigri in medio faciunt unam patet de tepido respectu calidi et fri-
intentionem in qua includuntur, sicut gidi. Si ab albo et nigro causaretur
calidum et frigidum quando con- in eadem parte medii una species
currunt in idem subiectum faciunt media, illa decienter et imperfecte
unam formam mediam, puta tepi- repraesentaret tam album quam
dum. Et si dicatur contra hoc quod nigrum, et ita tam album quam
si intentio albi et nigri concurrunt nigrum imperfecte videretur per
in unam qualitatem mediam quae talem speciem. Experimur autem
sit utraque virtute, sicut calidum et quod aeque perfecte videmus albe-
frigidum in eodem subiecto faciunt dinem unius anguli domus, existente
tepidum, tunc illa intentio media nigro in alia parte domus, et quoli-
non perfecte repraesentaret nec bet immutante totum medium, sicut
album nec nigrum. Et ideo si in si esset ibi albedo solum. . . .
aliqua domo esset unus paries albus,
alius niger, non ita perfecte videretur
in illa domo color albus aut niger,
sicut si uterque paries esset albus et
niger, quod non est verum, ut docet
sensus, dicitur ad hoc . . .
<5 = ~1 = 143ra–b> . . . Ad illud <pp. 495.46–496.11> . . . ad proba-
quod dicimus quod visus simul videt tionem, cum dicitur quod videns
scutum album et nigrum—dicendum scutum partim album et partim
quod si videt tales duos colores pluri- rubeum, intensius videt album quam
bus visionibus, hoc est ratione exten- rubeum, idem autem actus non
sionis, ut iam dictum est. Et ideo potest esse intensior et remissior—

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470 russell l. friedman

non sequitur quod idem contingat dicendum quod visio illa cum sit
de intellectu. Nihilominus dici potest quanta, aut est intensior in una
quod videlicet illos colores in uno parte quam secundum aliam, et
corpore unita visione et ut unum. illud non est inconveniens si albedo
Et cum arguitur quod videt album est intensior in una parte quam in
intensius quam nigrum, et idem alia; aut, si penitus videtur per ean-
actus pro eodem instanti non potest dem partem album intensior quam
esse intensior se ipso—dicitur a rubeum, hoc non est ex intensione
quibusdam quod idem actus numero actus secundum se, sed ex essen-
potest intensius referri ad unum tialiori et perfectiori habitudine
obiectum quam ad aliud, ita quod actus ad album quam ad rubeum.
actus qui refertur non diversicatur Quia, licet ab albo et a rubeo at
in se, sed habet essentialiorem habi- in oculo una immutatio, efcacius
tudinem ad unum obiectum quam tamen t ab albo quam ab altero,
ad aliud. Quod patet in exemplo et quia apprehensio eorum respon-
sic: unus et alii duo cum eo quorum det immutationi, ideo unum efca-
unus habeat albedinem in eodem cius apprehenditur quam reliquum,
gradu, alius habeat albedinem non quamvis actus secundum se non sit
in eodem gradu, talis albus similior perfectior et minus perfectus. In illis
est uni quam alteri per eandem albe- enim quae cum absoluto includunt
dinem /W 143rb/ non-mutatam. respectum, invenitur magis et minus
Modo in proposito actus videndi respectu diversorum absque aliqua
cum absoluto importat respectum, variatione circa illud quod dicitur
et ideo unus actus videndi numero magis et minus.
potest habere essentialiorem habitu-
dinem ad obiectum unum quam ad
aliud, nulla variatione in se facta.
<6 = ~3 = f. 143va> Ad quar- <p. 497.6–7, 13–17> Quando
tum motivum dicendum quod, cum autem cognosco me cognoscere
intelligo me intelligere, non sunt rosam, nec tunc sunt duo actus sed
simul plures actus sed unus tan- unus. . . .
tum, quod sic potest patere: eadem
intellectione intelligitur aliquod
obiectum et ordo illius ad alterum,
sicut eadem intellectione intelligitur
homo et ordo hominis ad albedinem
quam habet, sicut est in proposi-
tione vera afrmativa cum dicitur
‘homo est albus’ et ordo eius ad
nigredinem quam non habet, cum
dicitur non esse nigrus, sic eadem
intellectione intelligitur rosa in se et
in ordine ad intellectum a quo intel-
ligitur. Cum autem intelligo rosam

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 471

habere ordinem actualem ad intel- Et aliquid consimile, quamvis remo-

lectum meum, intelligo me intel- tis, potest inveniri in corporalibus.
ligere rosam. Ponitur simile ad Motus enim localis quo aliquod
hoc: quia motus localis movetur ad mobile formaliter movetur, movetur
motionem corporis localiter moti, ad motionem mobilis, quia motis
quia motis nobis, moventur ea quae nobis, moventur ea quae sunt in
in nobis sunt, et non movetur talis nobis, et tamen non movetur alio
motus localis alio modo quam se motu quam se ipso. Similiter, cog-
ipso; sic cum intelligo me intelligere, nitio per quam intellectus cognoscit
intellectio est cognita non alia cogni- obiectum, ipsa cognoscitur, non alia
tione quam se ipsa. cognitione quam se ipsa.

Of note here is that in §§1–3, Henry presents objections to the posi-

tion that both he and Durand actually maintain, i.e., to the position
that there can be only one act of the intellect at a time. Henry raises
the same objections in the same order as Durand presented them
in his treatise (rst about sensory acts, then about angelic cognition,
then about reex acts), and there is even some verbal overlap. In §4,
where Henry presents an opinion of Durand’s and then an objection
to that view, Henry has picked up on Durand’s comparison between
a mixture of white and black making one “mediate species,” on the
one hand, and hot and cold coming together and making “tepid,”
on the other; more striking still is the shared use of the house anal-
ogy in the presentation of the objection to Durand’s position. In §5,
Henry’s response to §1, the shared example of the white and black
shield (scutum), carried over from §1, is noteworthy, as is the fact that
the view Henry presents as belonging to “others” (dicitur a quibusdam)
has a great deal of verbal overlap with Durand’s view. Most telling of
all is §6, where Henry explains the relationship between a direct and
a reex act, and how it can be the case that when I understand that
I am understanding something, I am not entertaining two mental acts
at once. Henry’s theory here—that when we have a reex act, we are
understanding through one act of the intellect the object ( presumably
the direct intellectual act) and that object’s order to something else
(i.e., the object of the direct act)—does not seem to be something he
took from Durand; nevertheless, he uses Durand’s example of my
cognizing that I cognize a rose, and, more importantly still, the last
six lines of text are for all intents and purposes lifted verbatim from
Durand’s treatise. The bottom line is that Henry appears to have had
deep familiarity with Durand’s text, and this tells us two things about

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Henry and his context: rst, his Quodlibeta denitely date after 1312 and,
second, Cologne, or whatever other German venue Henry used, was
alive to relatively recent high-prole Parisian debates. On the basis of
this textual comparison, at this point the best rm dating for the three
Quodlibeta we can give is between 1312 and 1325, with a lesser degree
of certainty that they were composed before 1323.
In addition to the Vienna and the Oxford manuscripts containing
Henry’s Quodlibeta, Münster, Universitätsbibliothek 308 (172) (xiv),
ff. 1–62r, was known also to contain them; this manuscript was unfor-
tunately destroyed during the Second World War, and until recently
no microlm copy was known to exist.206 Happily, in 2004 with the
kind assistance of the Abbey of Mont César in Leuven, I was able to
identify a microlm copy of this manuscript in the Abbey’s extensive
holdings. Recent work with this microlm has shown that the Münster
manuscript is a signicant witness to Henry’s text—in fact it is prob-
ably the most reliable of the three witnesses. So, it is all the more
important that Loris Sturlese and his group, who are editing Henry’s
Quodlibeta for the series “Corpus philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii
Aevi,” will now be able to use this third witness in their reconstruction
of Henry’s text.207
Grabmann claimed Henry’s Quodlibeta to be “without doubt the
most extensive and most important Quodlibeta of German Dominican
scholasticism.”208 The Quodlibeta are indeed extensive: seventy-one
questions dealing with various issues in theology, philosophy, science
(particularly astronomy and astrology), and medicine. Earlier students
of Henry’s Quodlibeta, Grabmann for instance, stressed his Thomism,
while acknowledging that on certain topics, like individuation, Henry

206
Sturlese, “Gottebenbildlichkeit” (cit. n. 198), p. 192 n. 2, knew of no lm.
207
Thanks go to Wouter Goris and Dom Guibert Michiels of the Abbey of Mont
César for helping me procure the Abbey’s copy of the microlm. I passed on the
information to Loris Sturlese in early 2004, and his team have been making use of the
manuscript ever since. See U. Villani-Lubelli, “Quodlibet II, Quaestio X (43) Heinrichs
von Lübeck: Versuch einer Erklärung. Das Verhältnis zwischen Erstursache und Intel-
ligenz,” Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 12 (2006), pp. 168–86, at p. 172
(much of the introductory material to this article is from Sturlese’s article mentioned
in n. 198 above); idem, “Mitteilung über den Fund einer Kopie des zerstörten Codex,
Münster, UB, Hs. 308 (172),” Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 47 (2005), pp. 111–16. On
the editorial project, see L. Sturlese, “Idea di un ‘Corpus philosophorum Teutonicorum
Medii Aevi’,” Studi Medievali (3a serie) 25.1 (1984), pp. 459–63, with Henry, whose work
will make up volume IV, 1–3, on p. 462.
208
Grabmann, “Forschungen” (cit. n. 199), p. 425: “. . . ohne Zweifel die umfangreich-
sten und bedeutendsten Quodlibeta aus der deutschen Dominikanerscholastik . . .”

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 473

struck an eclectic chord;209 more recent research by especially Sturlese

has pointed out that, alongside the Thomistic elements, there are clear
Neo-Platonic overtones in Henry’s thought.210 More recently still, in his
intricate study of the complex of philosophical and theological issues
surrounding the unity of substantial form debate, Boureau has high-
lighted Henry’s reliance on Giles of Rome, and drawn a tentative link
between a question in Henry’s Quodlibet II and the 1320 canonization of
Thomas of Cantimpré.211 This goes to show that through more detailed
study of Henry’s Quodlibeta, it may well be possible to x rmer dates
for them. Moreover, when it is available in a critical edition, Henry’s
work will clearly be a highly signicant witness to the currents of early
fourteenth-century thought.

Bernard Lombardi
A nal Dominican Quodlibet from the period is that of Bernard Lom-
bardi. Bernard read the Sentences at Paris in the academic year 1327–28,
and it is likely that he was regent master there in 1331–32. It was prob-
ably at that time that the disputation was held on which was based the
single Quodlibet that we have from Bernard, a series of four questions, and
a further twelve question titles, found in Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek
529 (xiv), ff. 1r–42va, with an additional, apparently complete copy of
question 1 found in BAV, Vat. lat. 817 (xiv), ff. 183ra–202va.212 The
questions are anonymous in the Leipzig manuscript, but the Vatican

209
E.g., Grabmann, “Forschungen” (cit. n. 199), pp. 423–4; on eclecticism on the
issue of individuation, see p. 423, and the much fuller treatment in Bucichowski,
“Le principe d’individuation” (cit. n. 198), pp. 94–103, with relevant text edition, pp.
105–13 (Quodl. I, q. 19).
210
Sturlese, “Gottebenbildlichkeit” (cit. n. 198), esp. pp. 193–9; also Villani-Lubelli,
“Quodlibet II, Quaestio X” (cit. n. 207), pp. 174–86.
211
See A. Boureau, “La preuve par le cadavre qui saigne au XIIIe siècle, entre
expérience commune et savoir scolastique,” Micrologus 7 (1999), pp. 247–81, esp. pp.
265–6, 278–81 (with an edition of Quodl. II, q. 16, which Boureau calls q. 17); idem,
Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle. Le cas de Jean Peckham (L’âne D’or) (Paris 1999),
pp. 260–1, esp. 264–6, 279–80, 285–6 (on p. 264 Boureau gives Glorieux’ old dating
for the Quodlibeta and makes the claim that Henry seems to have been educated in
England, for which we have no evidence).
212
On Bernard’s Quodlibet the place to look rst is Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp.
332–40, who describes the manuscripts and discusses the work. Koch (p. 337) voices
doubt as to whether the Quodlibet’s q. 2 is actually a quodlibetal question, since it is
not listed in the introductory remarks, and q. 3 is introduced as “secundo”; given this,
Koch suggests q. 2 to be a quaestio ordinaria that was added to the Quodlibet (Teetaert,
“La littérature,” p. 85, thinks this a likely explanation, and offers other examples of
quaestiones ordinaria being inserted in Quodlibeta).

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manuscript rmly attributes the rst question to Bernard. Koch, who

has looked most closely at this text, notes that Durand of St Pourçain,
who gures largely in Bernard’s Sentences commentary, here in Bernard’s
Quodlibet takes a back seat to Peter Auriol; also among those mentioned
in the margins of the manuscripts and in the text itself are Hervaeus
Natalis, William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, John Duns Scotus, Francis
of Meyronnes, and the little known Bertrand of Alimania. Koch also
claims that logical issues are in focus in Bernard’s Quodlibet more than
the metaphysical issues that he had been preoccupied with earlier in
his career.213

Conclusion

This chapter pretended to do nothing more than give a status quaestionis

on Dominican quodlibetal literature after Thomas Aquinas. But even
with this rather modest goal, on the basis of the material that has been
studied here, I think that I can offer a little perspective on specically
Dominican quodlibetal literature. Probably the most important of all
characteristics running through the quodlibeta discussed here is the cen-
trality of Aquinas. Without having looked in depth at the content found
in these quodlibeta, I cannot point to any particular doctrinal traits that
run through all or most of them—indeed it is becoming more and more
clear that Thomism in this rst half century or so after Thomas’ death
was a very broad umbrella, and in line with this we probably should
not expect, when the research nally gets done, that doctrinally many
of these authors are “Thomists” in exactly the same way. Nevertheless,
it is striking that, whether they were correct in their interpretation of
Aquinas or not, whether they mentioned him explicitly or not, Aquinas is
the overwhelming—although certainly not exclusive—doctrinal anchor
in nearly all of the literature dealt with here. This goes just as much
for the genuine quodlibeta that we have looked at as it does for what is
perhaps most characteristic of Dominican quodlibetal literature of this
period: the anti-quodlibeta that men like Robert of Orford, Thomas of
Sutton, Bernard of Auvergne, and Hervaeus Natalis pursued in their

213
Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 98), pp. 338–40. Less signicant than Koch, but also deal-
ing with Bernard’s Quodlibet, is S.A. Porebski, “La quaestion de Bernardus Lombardi
concernant la différence réelle entre l’essence et l’existence,” MPP 17 (1973), pp. 157–85,
esp. pp. 160–5 (thanks to Elzbieta Jung for information on this article).

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 475

strikingly diverse ways. While these anti-quodlibeta are certainly a part of

the larger Dominican effort to respond directly to works perceived to be
critical of Aquinas’ thought (e.g., Sentences commentaries, William de la
Mare’s Correctorium), they nevertheless show one way in which Dominican
authors used the quodlibetal format as a means of expression.
But with it said that Aquinas and his thought are the overwhelming
doctrinal compass for the quodlibetal literature discussed here, it must
also be said that Dominican quodlibetal literature reects in full the
dynamic, evolving, and creative nature of early Thomism. Consider
that in the early part of the period examined here, the great threat to
Thomism was clearly thought to be posed by Henry of Ghent, who is
the object of attacks by at least Robert of Orford, Thomas of Sutton,
Bernard of Auvergne, and Hervaeus Natalis; in addition Godfrey of
Fontaines, James of Viterbo, Giles of Rome, and Matthew of Aquasparta
were considered signicant enough challenges to warrant substantial
rebuttal. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Dominican quodli-
betal literature updates itself by turning to new threats, most importantly
John Duns Scotus (Thomas of Sutton, Hervaeus Natalis) and Durand of
St Pourçain (Hervaeus, Peter of Palude, John of Naples), although John
of Pouilly also emerges as a signicant gure (e.g., Hervaeus, Peter of
Palude). Finally, towards the end of our period, a new menace emerges
in the form of Peter Auriol, who is responded to directly by Hervaeus
in his Quodlibet IV, by Raymond Bequini, and by Bernard Lombardi. At
the same time, we have seen several instances in which these “threats”
have inuenced the Dominican quodlibetal literature in a positive and
not merely negative way: witness the inuence of Giles of Rome on
Robert of Orford, of John Duns Scotus on Hervaeus Natalis, and of
Durand of St Pourçain on Henry of Lübeck. In this way, Dominican
quodlibetal literature mirrors Dominican philosophical and theologi-
cal literature of the period more generally: it is Thomist, but open to
other inuences, and it does not stand still but is constantly reacting
and adapting to its changing intellectual environment, in the process
renewing itself. This is part of what makes the Dominican literature
of this period exciting and interesting. What it means, however, is that
in order to come to a genuine understanding of the nature of the
period’s Dominican thought, we are required to investigate not only
the texts themselves, but also their sources and their contexts. And this
in turn will require critical editions of far more of the texts discussed
here than have been made to date. Indeed, the vast majority of the
quodlibetal questions discussed here have never been printed. This in

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itself should show that, despite the immense progress we have made
over the last century in our study of Dominican quodlibetal literature,
we still have a very long way to go.

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 APPENDIX I

TABULA QUAESTIONUM QUODLIBETORUM TRIUM

BERNARDI DE TRILIA214

Quodlibet I

Incipit V: Quodlibet primum fratris Bernardi de Trilia

1) Utrum Deus sciat mala (V 154r)
2) Utrum Deus posset facere materiam actu sine forma (V 155r)
3) Utrum in Christo sit duplex esse (V 156r)—ed. André, “Les Quolibeta de Ber-
nard de Trilia” (cit. n. 16), pp. 261–4; E. Hocedez, Quaestio de unico esse in Christo,
a doctoribus saec. XIII disputata (Textus et documenta, ser. Theol., 14) (Rome 1933),
pp. 35–8 (text 11)
4) Utrum si Christus assumpsisset aliam naturam humanam fuisset duo homines vel
unus (V 156v)
5) Utrum corpus Christi vivum et mortuum fuerit idem numero (V 156v)—ed. André,
“Les Quolibeta de Bernard de Trilia” (cit. n. 16), pp. 254–61
6) Utrum Christus ascenderit super omnes caelos seu supra convexum ultimi caeli
(V 158r)
7) Utrum essentia et esse creaturae sint idem vel diversa (V 158v)
8) Utrum in angelis sit alia potentia quam voluntas vel intellectus (V 159r)
9) Utrum angeli prociant vel possint procere in scientia vel cognitione (V 159v)—ed.
Künzle, Bernardi de Trilia (cit. n. 15), pp. 375–9
10) Utrum per praesentiam corporalem Christi in ascensione sui in caelum fuerit
gloria augmentata (V 160r)
11) Utrum praeter cognitionem dei habuerit Beata Virgo de lio suo aliam altiorem
cognitionem (V 160v)
12) Utrum sensitiva hominis et bruti different specie vel numero (V 161r)
13) Utrum species intelligibiles sint corruptibiles vel non (V 161r)
14) Utrum intellectus intelligendo per species intelligibiles necessario formet verbum
(V 161v)
15) Utrum anima separata cognoscat particularia materialia (V 162r)
16) Utrum in anima separata remaneant scientiae quas hic existens in corpore acquisit
(V 163r)
17) Utrum beatitudo consistat in intellectu (V 163v)
18) Utrum resumpto corpore augebitur gloria animarum beatarum intensive (V
164r)
19) Utrum in separatione animae a corpore spolietur corpus omnibus formis praece-
dentibus (V 165r)
20) Utrum anima sit in qualibet parte corporis tota (V 166r)
21) Utrum omnes apostoli peccaverint mortaliter circa tempus passionis Christi (V
166v)

214
V = BAV, Borgh. 156; F = Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr. A.3.1153. My informa-
tion comes from André, “Les Quolibeta de Bernard de Trilia” (cit. n. 16), pp. 234–8,
and Künzle, “Neu aufgefundene Quaestiones” (cit. n. 17), pp. 53–6.

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22) Utrum religiosi teneantur ad horas canonicas (V 167r)

23) Utrum subditus requisitus in iudicio de veritate dicenda peccet mortaliter non
dicendo (V 167r)
24) Utrum beati videant omnia in divina essentia (F 21vb)—ed. Künzle, Bernardi de
Trilia (cit. n. 15), pp. 380–90

Quodlibet II215

1) Utrum Deus posset equum motuum eundem numero suscitare (V 179r)

2) Utrum Deus scientia visionis cognoscat innita (V 179r)
3) Utrum in divinis sint tria esse personalia (V 180r)
4) Utrum Christus post resurrectionem vere comederit cibum sibi incorporando
(V 180v)—ed. André, “Les Quolibeta de Bernard de Trilia” (cit. n. 16), pp.
264–5
5) Utrum in productione effectuum naturalium sit eadem actio Dei et creaturae
(V 180v)
6) Utrum in angelis differat realiter suppositum et natura (F 28ra)
7) Utrum elementa remaneant in mixtione (F 29ra)
8) Utrum materia sit principium individuationis in rebus naturalibus (F 30ra)
9) Utrum descendente mola de caelo, si granum milii ei proiectum occurreret, faceret
eam quiescere (F 31ra)
10) Utrum cessante motu primi mobilis, si mola esset in medio aeris, descenderet ad
terram (F 31va)
11) Utrum perfor<m>ata terra a supercie in superciem, aqua descendat naturaliter
usque ad centrum (F 32ra)
12) Utrum forma substantialis sit principium motus in corporibus simplicibus
(F 32va)
13) Utrum tempus et motus sint aliquid extra animam in rerum natura (F 33rb)
14) Utrum forma quae apparet in speculo recipiatur in puncto vel in supercie
(F 34ra)
15) Utrum accipiens sacrum ordinem post contractum matrimonium per verba de
praesenti ante carnalem copulam, debeat compelli ad intrandum religionem vel
adhaerere uxori (F 34rb)
16) Utrum quis teneatur pro patre mortuo specialiter orare vel sufciat oratio com-
muniter facta pro omnibus (F 35va)
17) Utrum vovens intrare religionem teneatur statim intrare (F 36ra)
18) Utrum sacerdos debeat absolvere illum qui detinet alienum antequam restituerit
(F 36ra)

Quodlibet III216

Incipit V: Secundum quodlibet fratris Bernardi de Trilia magistri in theologia Parisius ordinis
praedicatorum.
1) Utrum Deus possit in uno instanti creare omne creabile (V 167v)
2) Utrum posito per impossibile quod Deus Pater non generaret Filium posset pro-
ducere mundum (V 168v)

215
In F, the rst ve questions are found on ff. 24rb–28ra.
216
In F, the rst 24 questions are found on ff. 36va–56vb.

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 479

3) Utrum Deus posset facere quod unum corpus esset in duobus locis sine conversione
eius in aliud corpus (V 169r)
4) Utrum Deus sit magis scibilis quam est credibilis (V 169r)
5) Utrum circumscripto intellectu creato esset ponere in Deo pluralitatem attributorum
secundum rationem distinctorum (V 169v)—ed. in Thomas de Aquino, Opera omnia
XLII (Rome 1979), p. 275 (Appendix K)
6) Utrum angeli per unam speciem intelligibilem possunt simul plura intelligere
(V 170r)
7) Utrum angelus cognoscens plura per unam speciem possit unum illorum intelligere
sine altero (V 171r)
8) Utrum supposito quod omnes angeli creati fuerint in gratia meruerint ante casum
beatitudinem aeternam (V 171v)
9) Utrum esse et essentia in qualibet substantia creata sint idem re (V 173r)—ed.
André, “Les Quolibeta de Bernard de Trilia” (cit. n. 16), pp. 249–54.
10) Utrum materia prima sit producta a Deo per creationem (V 174r)
11) Utrum materia prima habeat ideam in Deo (V 174r)
12) Utrum relatio realis praeter suum fundamentum sit aliquid ab eo distinctum quod
faciat cum eo compositionem (V 174v)
13) Utrum aliquod corpus posset esse supra convexum caeli empirei (V 175v)
14) Utrum animal generatum ex semine et ex putrefactione sint eiusdem speciei
(V 176r)
15) Utrum amputata parte animalis anulosi remaneat idem animal numero (V 176r)
16) Utrum potuerit esse maior gratia quam fuerit animae Christi collata (V 176v)
17) Utrum voluntas aliquid intelligat vel intellectus aliquid appetat (V 176v)
18) Utrum species intelligibilis sit similitudo rei quantum ad formam et materiam vel
solum quantum ad formam (V 177r)
19) Utrum in justicatione impii simul in eodem instanti sit introductio, id est infusio,
gratiae, et expulsio, id est remissio, culpae (V 177v)
20) Utrum dubitans de aliquo an sit mortale peccatum, si faciat (V: at) id, peccet
mortaliter (V 177v)
21) Utrum status vidualis sit perfectior quam status coniungalis (V 178r)
22) Utrum animae cognoscant naturali cognitione perfecte omnia particularia
(V 178r)
23) Utrum anima resumpto corpore cognoscat particularia mediantibus potentiis
sensitivis sicut et modo (V 178v)
24) Utrum intellectus humanus possit videre divinam essentiam sine lumine gloriae
(V 178bisr)
25) Utrum homo dicatur dominus actuum suorum propter deliberationem rationis
(F 56vb)
26) Utrum intentio et electio sint idem re (F 57rb)
27) Utrum vegetativum et sensitivum hominis sint ab intrinseco vel extrinseco
(F 57va)
28) Utrum corpus Petri vivum et mortuum sit idem numero vel specie (F 58va)
29) Utrum natura humana possit uniri alicui alteri naturae in unitate suppositi
(F 60va)
30) Utrum anima separata a corpore, si derelinqueretur naturae suae, posset corpus
proprium reintrare (F 61ra)
31) Utrum beatitudo consistat in intellectu vel affectu (F 61va)
32) Utrum in patria, qui plus habebit de caritate, plus habeat de scientia vel cognitione
(F 62vb)
33) Utrum corpus gloriosum possit esse in convexo ultimi caeli (F 63rb)
34) Utrum magis sit consonum dei vel scripturae quod <pueri non-baptizati> deti-
neantur infra vel extra <infernum> (F 64ra)

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35) Utrum pueri non-baptizati puniantur aliqua poena sensibili ignis infernalis
(F 64va)
36) Utrum in prima materia esset potentia ad formas innitas (F 65ra)
37) Utrum formae materiales educerentur in esse virtute alicuius agentis de aliquo vel
de nihilo (F 65rb)
38) Utrum materia abstracta omni forma posset pati (F 67rb)
39) Utrum aliquod corpus possit esse per modum quo corpus Christi est in altari,
absque conversione alterius corporis in ipsum <et quod nusquam esset localiter>
(F 67vb)
40) Utrum relationes in divinis sint assistentes vel insistentes (F 68rb)
41) Utrum quaelibet creatura plus habeat de non-esse quam de esse (F 69ra)
42) Utrum inter ens et non-ens sit innita distantia (F 69va)
43) Utrum omnes angeli boni et mali, supposito quod fuerint creati in gratia, meruerint
beatitudinem aeternam (F 69vb)
44) Utrum aliqua morula fuerit inter creationem angelorum et eorum fruitionem
(F 70ra)
45) Utrum posset esse aliqua creatura immateriales subsistens quae non esset intelligens
(F 70va)
46) Utrum intellectus possit aliquid intelligere cum opposito sui subiecti, ut hominem
sine animali (F 71ra)
47) Utrum intellectu existente in actu, voluntas sit semper in actu suo (F 71va)
48) Utrum voluntas magis sit dicenda potentia passiva quam activa (F 72vb)
49) Utrum radix libertatis eius consistat in ratione (F 73va)
50) Utrum Deus possit communicare virtutem producendi aliquid de nihilo alicui
creaturae (F 74va)
51) Utrum Deus posset plura facere quam possent eri vel esse (F 76ra)
52) Utrum Deus cognoscat futura contingentia in se ipsis (F 77ra)
53) Utrum omnia quae sunt secundum quamcumque differentiam temporis et spatialiter
futura, subsint divinae potentiae secundum suam praesentialitatem (F 78rb)
54) Utrum individua unius speciei habeant in Deo propriam ideam (F 79vb)
55) Utrum quatuor relationes in divinis sint quatuor <res> (F 80rb)
56) Utrum creator et creatura sit maius bonum vel perfectius quam creator solus
(F 80va)
57) Utrum intellectus abstrahat species intelligibiles a rebus vel eas formet de se et in
se (F 80vb)
58) Utrum in anima sit aliqua potentia cognitiva, quae apprehendat bonum sub ratione
boni (F 81vb)
59) Utrum similitudo sit causa amoris (F 82rb)
60) Utrum aliquid possit odire (!) se ipsum (F 82vb)
61) Utrum <in> parte sensitiva sit ponere sensum possibilem et agentem, sicut est
ponere in parte intellectiva intellectum possibilem et agentem (F 83ra)
62) Utrum nutritio quam faciunt species sacramentales cum sumuntur in sacramento
altaris sit naturalis vel miraculosa (F 83va)

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 APPENDIX II

BERNARDI DE ALVERNIA REPROBATIONES HENRICI DE

GANDAVO QUODLIBET V, Q. 9, ET QUODLIBET VI, Q. 1

Quodlibet V, q. 9217

<Abbreviatio Henrici>
<1> Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab ipso. Videtur
quod non, quia dicit Boethius*:218 “Omnia in divinis sunt unum ubi non obviat rela-
tionis oppositio.” Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non esset ibi obviam
relatio<nem>, quia non different inter se relative. Ergo etc.
<2> Praeterea, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non distingueretur ab
eo nisi quia iste nascitur et ille procedit. Sed per hoc non possunt distingui, quia sunt
actiones quibus personae producuntur, et ita praecedunt. Ergo etc.
<3> Praeterea, relatio realis quae debet distinguere, debet habere fundamentum
reale et subiectum, aliter esset relatio secundum rationem sicut eiusdem ad se ipsum.
Sed subiectum omnium relationum in Deo est essentia, non persona, quia subiectum
praesupponitur, relatio autem non supponit personam sed ipsam constituit in divinis.
Ergo etc.
<4> Contra: dicit Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti:219 “Nascendo Filius distin-
guitur, procedendo Spiritus Sanctus . . . etsi non esset alius modus distinguendi, ex hoc
tamen essent diversi.” Sed sic procederent220 ambo a Patre, etiam si Spiritus Sanctus
non procederet a Filio. Ergo etc.
<5> Dicendum quod personae221 divinae \distinguuntur per emanationes quae/
respiciunt et illud a quo emanant et terminum. Ex parte istius* a quo emanant sufcit
quod sint in ipso diversae rationes et principia secundum quae dicuntur emanare. Ex
parte vero terminorum requiritur diversitas in esse perfecto et distincto. Sic sunt ema-
nationes diversae, sicut generare Filium et pingere imaginem suam sunt emanationes
diversae quae ab eodem procedunt, supposito per diversa principia, quae sunt ars et
natura; ad idem tamen terminari non possunt, sed necessario /B 33vb/ ad diversa.
Cum /P 73ra/ ergo emanationes Filii et Spiritus Sancti sint diversae, licet ambae pos-
sunt elici ab eadem persona secundum diversas rationes quae sunt natura et voluntas,
requirunt tamen distinctionem terminorum in esse perfecto qui sunt Filius et Spiritus
Sanctus. Talis autem distinctio non potest esse nisi secundum rem aliquam, quae non
est nisi personalis in divinis. Ergo oportet ponere quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur
a Filio, etiam si non procedat ab eo, et hoc propter diversum emanandi modum quo
emanarent a Patre.

217
B = Bologna, Archiginnasio A 943, ff. 33va–34ra; P = Paris, BnF lat. 15849,
ff. 72vb–73va. Throughout this appendix and the next I use the following sigla: \x/ =
x super lineam vel in margine; <x> = addo x; [x] = deleo x; * = lectio incerta.
218
Cf. Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 1 (in Anselmus, Opera omnia, ed.
F.S. Schmitt [Rome 1946–1961], vol. II, p. 181.2–4).
219
Cf. Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 1 (ed. Schmitt, p. 185.3–11).
220
procederent P] procederet B
221
personae P] emanationes B

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<6 = ~5> Sed cum relationes oppositae solae distinguant—ut dicitur in argumento—,
non essent autem relationes oppositae inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum nisi Spiritus
Sanctus procederet a Filio, sed disparatae, sicut in Patre paternitas et spiratio, non
essent Spiritus Sanctus et Filius nisi una persona, sicut Pater, non obstantibus duabus
relationibus.
<7 = ~6> Sed hoc non est simile, quia sufcit quod principia emanantium sint
rationes diversae, sed terminos oportet esse distinctos.
<8> Unde sciendum quod Spiritus Sanctus, si non procederet a Filio, esset tamen
distinctus ab eo, quia certum est quod esset distinctus a Patre a quo procederet—sicut
duplum, quia est duplum ad unum, simpliciter est unum duplum, licet non sit duplum
ad tria, ita Spiritus Sanctus simpliciter distingueretur a Patre a quo procederet et a
Filio in quantum aliter procederet quam Filius.
<9> Praeterea, per illud res essentialiter distinguitur a quolibet alio et personaliter,
per quod essentialiter et personaliter constituitur in esse. Sed Pater constituitur in esse
\personalitatis/ paternitate non communi spiratione, quae sequitur personas constitutas.
Ergo Pater a quocumque alio distinguitur paternitate. Ergo paternitate distinguitur
a Spiritus Sancto, etiam si non procederet a Patre, dum tamen esset procedens a
Filio. Licet ergo Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, distingueretur tamen ab eo
liatione.
<10 = ~1> Ad primum in oppositum dicendum quod, licet inter Filium et Spiritum
Sanctum non esset oppositio, essent tamen relationes disparatae quibus diversimode
different ad tertiam personam.
<11 = ~2> Ad secundum dicendum quod non distinguuntur personae per actiones
principiantes* sed per personales proprietates quas habent ad generantem et spirantem
in quantum sunt termini illarum actionum. Vel dicendum quod istae actiones sunt
idem secundum rem quod relationes et proprietates personales.
<12 = ~3> Ad tertium dicendum quod relatio aliquando fundatur super essentiam
sui fundamenti ratione essentiae, aliquando ratione suae inhaerentiae in subiecto. Et
hoc secundo modo relatio praesupponit subiectum, sicut similitudo aliquid informatum
albedine—et sic nulla relatio est in divinis, quia non fundatur super aliquam inhaeren-
tiam, immo super essentiam sub ratione essentiae, et ita aut nihil habet pro subiecto aut
habet idem pro subiecto et pro fundamento: pro fundamento in quantum est insistens,
pro subiecto in quantum est assistens. Et quod dicitur quod tunc non esset relatio
realis, dicendum quod verum est si relatio ita referret subiectum suum; nunc autem
non refert subiectum sed personam quam constituit; ideo in divinis non est subiectum
relativum sicut in creaturis sed solum suppositum constitutum per relationem, quod
non praesupponit relatio sicut in creaturis.

<Reprobatio Bernardi>
<13> Conclusio principalis non videtur vera, quia Spiritus Sanctus non haberet unde
distingueretur \a/ Filio, si non procederet ab eo. Nulla enim relatio, etiam in divinis,
distinguit nisi opposita proprie—nec sufcit quod sit disparata, quia cum in Patre sint
duae relationes disparatas, paternitas et spiratio, tunc Pater esset duae personae. Sed
si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non esset inter eos relatio proprie opposita,
sed solum disparata, quae non facit distinctionem personalem. Ergo si non procederet
a Filio, ita quod inter eos esset relatio opposita proprie, non distingueretur ab eo. Immo
maius222 inconveniens sequeretur, quia si non procederet a Filio, non procederet a Patre,
quia Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum amoris, sed amor perfectus non procedit
ab amante nisi mediante Verbo et notitia amati, aliter incognitum diligeremus. Ergo
Spiritus Sanctus non potest procedere a Patre nisi mediante Verbo vel non sine Verbo,

222
maius B] magis P

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ita quod Verbum habeat necessario vim productivam in productione vel processione
Spiritus Sancti. Sed Verbum est Filius. Ergo etc.
<14 = ~5> Ad ea quae dicit quod personae non distinguuntur nisi per emanationes,
dicendum quod non, quia emanationes vel <a> considerantur quantum ad principia
sua, quae sunt intellectus et voluntas, et sic non differrent nisi secundum rationem,
vel <b> secundum terminos quae sunt personae emanantes, et sic emanationes distin-
guuntur magis per personas emanantes et priusquam personae per emanationes. Vel
<c> considerantur emanationes secundum se, /P 73rb/ et sic non possunt realiter
differre, quia nihil realiter differt in divinis nisi per oppositionem relationis. Et ideo per
emanationes non distinguuntur personae sed e converso, sicut et motus in creaturis
per terminos.
<15 = ~5> Simile autem quod adducit de emanationibus per modum artis et per
modum naturae in creaturis non est ad propositum, quia generare et pingere imaginem
sunt emanationes differentes, non solum quantum ad terminos sed etiam quantum ad
principia, quae sunt ars et natura, quod in divinis esse non potest in quibus nulla dif-
ferentia est quam non facit relatio immediate vel mediate. Unde patet quod diversus
modus emanandi non potest facere differentiam inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, tum
quia iste modus emanandi \per modum intellectus/ non differt a modo emanandi per
modum voluntatis nisi secundum rationem in divinis consideratis principiis quae sunt
intellectus et voluntas; tum quia distinctio Filii et Spiritus Sancti est causa distinctionis
(ut dictum est) emanationum, et non e converso. Et ideo oportet quod per aliquid aliud
Filius et Spiritus Sanctus distinguantur, quod non potest esse nisi relatio originis, se ipsis
enim distingui non possunt, cum sint una substantia et nullam omnino oppositionem
habeant ad invicem nisi relationis. Obiectio quam ponit <= §6> vera est, et solutio
nulla <= §7>, ut patet ex dictis.
<16 = ~8> Ad secundum, cum dicit quod, \quia/ Spiritus Sanctus esset distinctus
a Patre, simpliciter esset distinctus, et sic etiam a Filio, sicut duplum etc.—dicendum
quod esse distinctum a Patre non est esse distinctum a Filio, quia tunc Filius, qui est
distinctus a Patre, esset distinctus a se ipso. Et ideo, sicut oportet quod in Patre sit relatio
specialis per quam distinguatur a Spiritu Sancto, ita etiam oportet quod sit in Filio,
quae non esset nisi Spiritus Sanctus procederet ab eo. Nec est simile de duplo, quia esse
duplum non est esse simpliciter sed secundum respectum, scilicet respectu dimidii; esse
autem distinctum est esse simpliciter tale, unde licet duo sint duplum respectu unius,
non potest dici quod sint duplum simpliciter, quia ipsa sunt dimidium respectu quatuor.
Et ideo, licet Spiritus Sanctus esset a Patre tantum, non esset distinctus propter hoc a
Filio nisi aliqua ratio* distinctionis esset inter eos, quae aufertur nisi procederet ab eo,
eo quod per emanationes non potest eri ista distinctio, ut ostensum est.
<17 = ~9> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a
Patre, procederet tamen a Filio qui procedit a Patre, et ideo*, sicut Filius necessario
distinguitur a Patre a quo procedit per immediatam relationem originis, sic Spiritus
Sanctus distingueretur a Patre per mediatam relationem originis, id est quia procederet
a procedente a Patre, licet non immediate procederet a Patre, sicut enim generans
necessario distinguitur a genito, ita etiam* ab omni quod procedit a genito.
<18 = ~9> Ad formam ergo rationis potest dici dupliciter. Primo quia paternitate
constituitur Pater in esse personali et distinguitur directe a Filio et ex consequenti a
Spiritu Sancto, in quantum processio Spiritus Sancti necessario praesupponit gen-
erationem Filii, sicut processio amoris processionem verbi, et ita spiratio passiva in
Spiritu Sancto, licet non directe opponatur paternitati in Patre, indirecte tamen ei [ei]
opponitur in quantum necessario supponit eam, etiam si non procederet a Patre, quia
procederet a Verbo quod procedit a Patre, et sic Pater paternitate indirecte distinguitur
a Spiritu Sancto. Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, tunc processio sua non
necessario praesupponeret liationem in Filio nec aliquid per quod /B 34ra/ posset
distingui ab eo—propter quod non est simile.

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<19 = ~9> Vel potest dici quod communis [in]spiratio supponit personas constitutas
in se, sed non in comparatione ad Spiritum Sanctum, id est ut sunt spirantes, immo
per spirationem formaliter unt spirantes, nec prius est spiratio activa in Patre et Filio
quam sit passiva in Spiritu Sancto, quia relativa sunt simul natura. Unde Spiritus
Sanctus per spirationem passivam et non per aliquid aliud distinguitur a Patre et Filio,
et Pater et Filius per spirationem activam a Spiritu Sancto, licet etiam Pater indirecte,
ut dictum est, distinguatur ab eo per paternitatem.
<20 = ~9> Potest etiam dici quod illa maior solum intelligitur in illis quae constitu-
untur in esse et distinguuntur per absoluta, quia, ex quo aliquid constitutum est in esse
per absolutum simpliciter, est unum in se distinctum a quolibet alio. Sed non sic est de
suppositis divinis quae constituuntur per relativa. Unde sicut non constituuntur in esse
personali nisi per relationes originis, /P 73va/ ita nec distinguuntur directe \nisi/
per relationes tales, et ideo communi spiratione Pater et Filius directe distinguuntur a
Spiritu Sancto et nullo alio.
<21 = ~10> Ad solutionem quam dat, ostensum est quod223 relationes disparatae
non sufcerent ad distinguendum personas.
<22 = ~11> Ad secundum dicendum quod per actiones, ut actiones sunt, non
distinguuntur personae, sed per proprietates relativas originis.
<23 = ~12> Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet relationes divinae habeant idem
secundum rem pro subiecto et fundamento in quantum persona et essentia sunt idem,
tamen non potest dici quod essentia sit subiectum relationum, quia subiectum refertur
relatione cui subicitur, sed essentia non refertur aliqua relatione originis, quia tunc ipsa
multiplicaretur in divinis, sicut personae, per relationes originis. Et ideo nullo modo
est dicendum quod essentia divina sit subiectum harum relationum sed fundamentum;
personae autem sunt subiectum quae supponuntur relationibus originis in quantum sunt
relationes, sed constituuntur* per eas in quantum sunt personales proprietates.
<24 = ~12> Quod autem ponit, quod relatio non refert suum subiectum, falsum
est—immo nihil refert nisi suum subiectum et non fundamentum nec terminum nisi
in quantum terminus est subiectum oppositae relationis.

Quodlibet VI, q. 1224

<Abbreviatio Henrici>
<1> Utrum in divinis sint tantum tres personae. Videtur quod duae tantum, quia dicit
Augustinus, De processione Spiritus Sancti:225 “Omnis persona divina vel est Deus de Deo
vel Deus non de Deo.” Sed una est quae est Deus /P 89ra/ non de Deo. Ergo etc.
<2> Praeterea, cum Deus procedit de Deo, ratio procedendi est divina essentia
quae est unica. Ergo et actio una. Sed una actione non procedit nisi una persona.
Ergo etc.
<3> Videtur quod sint quatuor, quia sunt ibi duae actiones quibus procedunt. Ergo
quatuor termini, duo a quibus et duo ad quos, et sic erunt quatuor personae.
<4> Dicendum quod propter duas rationes principiandi, duas emanationes, quae
sunt in una persona ut in principio, sunt duae personae, et sic sunt tres: una quae est
Deus non de Deo, et duae quae sunt Deus de Deo, quia non sunt nisi tantum duae
rationes emanandi in Deo, quarum fecunditas tota in singulis emanationibus et personis
productis exhausta est, ut nec in producente nec in producto remaneat fecunditas ad

223
quod P] quia B
224
B = Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A.943, ff. 42ra–vb; P =
Paris, BnF lat. 15849, ff. 88vb–90ra.
225
recte: Cf. Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 15 (ed. Schmitt, p. 216.3–4).

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aliam emanationem. Et ideo non possunt ibi esse nisi duae productae et una tantum
producens non producta, et sic sunt tres.
<5> Ad quod sciendum quod omnis maior diversitas habet reduci ad unitatem et
habet reduci ab ea. Unde differentia quae est in creaturis re differentibus habet reduci
ad unitatem realem, et pluralitas quae est in \individuis/ distinctis re absoluta redu-
citur ad pluralitatem quae est in suppositis divinis re relativa, et pluralitas quae est in
suppositis divinis habet reduci ad unitatem personalem Patris in quantum personae
illae quae sunt Deus de Deo, quia sunt principiatae, reducuntur in eorum primum
principium—ideo dicit Augustinus, X De trinitate,226 quod “Pater est origo totius divini-
tatis”—, et pluralitas quae est in Deo re relativa reducitur ad pluralitatem quae est in
divina essentia ratione, cuius<modi> est differentia attributorum.
<6> Et haec pluralitas ratione differentium reducitur ad primam omnium participa-
tionum divinarum, cuiusmodi esse est, quod secundum Avicennam est primum obiectum
intellectus et modo simplicissimo immutat intellectum tam in Deo quam in creaturis.227
Primum enim quod intellectus concipit de Deo est esse, quia Deus non est nisi simplicis-
simum esse, habens in se quemcumque modum essendi, ut dicit Dionysius, 5 cap. De
divinis nominibus.228 Unde [ipsum] \in/ esse Dei quasi in radice omnia quaecumque in
Deo et creaturis considerari* possunt continentur quasi in prima principali omnium
divinarum rationum, ex qua quasi ordine quodam omnia procedit quod est omnino
idem re et ratione cum divina essentia, differens in solo modo signicandi, sicut currere
et cursus. Primo autem procedunt ab esse secundum nostrum modum intelligendi aliae
divinae rationes tamquam minus differentes, et usque ad distinctionem personarum,
quae procedunt ab uno ordine originis quae magis differunt, et hoc ulterius usque ad
diversitatem creaturarum in quibus est summa diversitas inter se et a divino esse, sicut
lineae quanto plus elongant a centro, tanto plus sunt distantes.
<7> Ab esse ergo, quod est prima et principalis ratio divinarum perfectionum pro-
cedit vivere, et a vivere intelligere, et ab intelligere velle. Unde vivere super esse addit
specialem modum essendi, vivere enim viventibus est esse; et signicant ambo actum
primum per modum agere. Intelligere autem et velle signicant actum secundum qui est
operari, et addit intelligere super vivere specialem modum operationis vitae, et similiter
velle. Intelligere enim et velle vivere quaedam sunt. Intelligere autem et velle non sic
se habent ut unum eorum addat aliquid super aliud, sed velle se habet ad intelligere
sic quod supponit ipsum. Nemo enim vult nisi cognitum, quia bonum cognitum est
obiectum voluntatis. Verum autem est obiectum intellectus absolute et non ut volitum.
Unde prior et simplicior est ratio veri quam ratio cogniti boni. Intelligere ergo et velle
habent quasi ordinem rationis in quantum velle supponit intelligere et non e converso,
tamen in quantum unum non addit supra alterum quasi ex aequali habent se ad vivere.
Et in ipsis est status divinarum rationum, et omnes aliae reducuntur ad ipsis. Oportet
ergo quod in divinis sit suppositum ens, vivens, intelligens, et volens, et ex se non ab
alio habens hoc. Et hoc oportet esse ingenitum, quod non potest esse /P 89rb/ nisi
unum, plura enim esse non possunt, quia non haberent quo distinguerentur. Non enim
distinguerentur relationibus contrariis, quia unum esset ab altero; nec per hoc quod
ambo essent innascibiles, quia in hoc communicarent; nec possunt esse plura sup-
posita absoluta, quia talia non sunt in eadem natura nisi participatione illius, quod est
impossibile in natura divinitatis, cum sit quaedam singularitas. Unum ergo suppositum
innascibile est in divinis, quod non potest esse absolutum, quia tunc non essent ibi plura.

226
Augustinus, De trinitate IV, 20, 29 (CCSL 50, eds. W.J. Mountain and F. Glorie
[Turnhout 1968], p. 200.121–22).
227
Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysicae I, 5 (Avicenna Latinus, ed. S. Van Riet [Leiden 1977],
p. 41.78–82)
228
Ps-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 5, §§6–7 (PG 3, coll. 819C–22B).

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Et ideo oportet ponere plures personas quae non subsistant absolute sed relative, ita
quod persona innascibilis constituatur in esse per hoc quod habet esse origo aliarum
per actum non transeuntem sed immanentem, qui in Deo non sunt nisi duo, scilicet
intelligere et velle; plures enim non <pos>sunt esse, quia non sunt nisi duo principia
agendi, scilicet natura et voluntas, nec pauciores, quia non est intellectus sine voluntate
nec e converso. Si ergo in divinis sit persona procedens ab alia, oportet quod sit per
actum intellectus et voluntatis. Sed quia isti actus sunt communes omnibus personis,
nulla autem persona habet produci per actionem quae sibi convenit, oportet quod
praeter istos actus sint alii actus, qui non sint omnibus personis communes.
<8> Et ideo restat videre quomodo in divinis sint tantum duae actiones intellectus
et voluntatis (praeter eorum actiones essentiales) quae sint propriae personis pro-
ducentibus et productis, et quare sint tantum duae, quia scilicet non restat ad ipsas
fecunditas ulterius.
<9> Sciendum ergo quod intellectus numquam percitur donec ex actu suo proce-
dat aliud, quod est verbum, nec voluntas donec procedat amor. Sicut enim intellectus
quiescit in verbo sicut in vero, sic voluntas in amore. Intellectus autem noster, licet
sit passivus in quantum movetur* a re, est tamen activus in formatione verbi, quod
quidem non est prima notitia de re, sed praecedit ipsum quaedam notitia imperfecta et
incompleta, quae completur in verbo. Similiter est duplex operatio ex parte voluntatis,
sicut et intellectus, licet magis appareat in intellectu: una in amore simplici quae est
incompleta, alia completa in amore perfecto. Licet enim voluntas sit activa, tamen
est passiva metaphorice in quantum allicitur a bono. Unde primus amor incompletus
est quasi tepor, sed secundus est completus et t cum quodam fuore, ita quod primus
amor respondeat simplici notitiae et secundus ipsi verbo quod habeat maior dilectatio
de re.
<10> Ad completam ergo operationem intellectus et voluntatis in nobis non sufcit
illa quae est simplicis notitiae et amoris, quae est essentialis /B 42rb/ ex parte intel-
lectus et voluntatis, sed requirit ex parte intellectus notitia procedens, quae est verbum,
et ex parte voluntatis amor (quod tamen est nomen commune et amori incompleto et
completo). Licet autem notitia divina essentialis sit omnino perfecta, cum habet tantum
rationem simplicis manifestationis, \tamen/ verbum habet rationem declarativam eius
quod notitia essentiali manifestum est. Similiter licet amor simplex essentialis sit perfectis-
simus, tamen amor procedens, quae est Spiritus Sanctus, habet rationem inammativi
in idem quod amatur*. Et ideo in divinis ad perfectam operationem intellectus super
simplicem notitiam quae est essentialis, quae etiam non est ex ipso actu, immo dicit
essentiam ipsius actus, requiritur Verbum procedens per actum non essentialem sed
notionalem, qui tamen fundatur super essentialem, quod quidem Verbum non est ut
substantia actus per quem procedit, sed ut terminus, sicut et in nobis, et ideo non potest
solum differe ratione ab eo a quo procedit, nec in divinis re absoluta, quia est manens
in ipsa divina essentia; oportet ergo quod ab ipso differat relatione non quacumque,
sed originis qua refertur ad ipsum a quo est, et sic oportet Verbum esse personam dis-
tinctam ab eo a quo procedit. Similiter super simplicem amorem oportet quod ponatur
amor procedens, qui non dicit essentiam ipsius actus sed terminum, et sic ille amor erit
differens non re absoluta nec ratione tantum sicut prius, sed relatione.
<11> Et sic in divinis sunt tres personae: una innascibilis et duae penes duo principia
agendi quae sunt intellectus et voluntas, super quae fundantur duo actus personales,
scilicet intelligere et velle, et ideo non possunt esse nisi duae personae /P 89va/
procedentes. Et quia tota fecunditas divina [tota] exhausta est secundum duas rationes
principiandi, non possunt plures esse quam tres. Et sic non est ibi nisi unus Filius, quia
tota fecunditas exhauritur in Filii generatione eo quod Filius semper generatur. Unde
si posset ibi generari alius Filius, tunc in eodem simul essent duae generationes et sic
duae productiones eiusdem rationis, quod est impossibile. Similiter non est nisi unus
Spiritus Sanctus.

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<12> Intellectus autem et voluntas in divinis sola ratione differant et sint essentialia,
sunt tamen radices processionum notionalium, quia in omni ordine differentium ubi
invenitur minor differentia, illa est initium maioris differentiae in illo ordine, sicut ratio
primae unitatis simplicissimae in essentia Dei est quasi origo multitudinis et differentiae
divinarum rationum et attributorum, quae maxime est inter intellectum et voluntatem
ad quam omnis diversitas divinarum rationum habet reduci. Et sic in persona innas-
cibili sunt omnia attributa ex se; in aliis duabus non sunt ex se sed ab alio: in una per
modum intellectus, in alia per modum voluntatis. Et sic sunt ibi secundum quendam
ordinem, et originis et rationis.
<13 = ~1> Ad primum dicendum quod maior unitas debet esse in principiis quam
in principiatis, et ideo non est nisi una persona quae est Deus non de Deo a qua aliae
originantur.
<14 = ~2> Ad secundum dicendum quod licet essentia divina sit ratio produc-
tiva omnium divinarum actionum, hoc non est nisi sub ratione alicuius attributi vel
proprietatis. Licet ergo sit essentia in Filio, non tamen sub ratione proprietatis ad
generandum, sicut est in Patre.
<15 = ~3> Ad tertium dicendum sicut ad primum.

<Reprobatio Bernardi>
<16 = ~4> Multa dubia dicit. Primo quod, propter duas rationes principiandi,
duas emanationes, sunt duae personae in divinis procedentes.—Dicendum quod, si
intelligat quod illae duae rationes sint principium distinguendi illas duas personas,
non est verum, quia distincta non possunt magis differre quam principia distinguentia
(unde homo et asinus non possunt plus differre quam rationale et irrationale), et ideo
personae distinctae non possent plus differre quam principia229 per* quae formaliter
distinguuntur; sed illae duae rationes principiandi non differunt nisi ratione, quia sunt
intellectus et voluntas; ergo nec personae different nisi ratione, sicut posuit* Sabellius.
Si etiam intelligat quod per emanationes pluricentur personae, et per consequens
distinguantur, non valet, quia illae emanationes, licet non sint motus, tamen loquimur
de eis quasi de quibusdam motibus. Motus autem distinguitur per terminos, et ideo
emanationes magis distinguuntur per personas quam e converso. Vel etiam si dicamus
magis proprie quod sunt operationes, tunc earum distinctio accipitur penes ea quae
sunt formaliter principia talium operationum, ut sicut motus distinguitur per terminos,
ita operationes per principia; et sic ipsae emanationes non erunt prima distinguentia
in divinis, sed earum distinctio ab alio erit, et per consequens non erunt illa per quae
formaliter distinguuntur in divinis personae, quia etiam, cum Pater non emanet, non
distingueretur ab aliis per aliquid positivum nec constitueretur in esse personali per
aliquid positivum.
<17> Si autem intelligat quod in divinis sunt duae personae procedentes quia ibi
sunt duo actus, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis, secundum quos procedunt, verum
est. Oportet enim quod personae divinae, ex quo per dem ponuntur plures, quod
aliquae sint procedentes. Nec potest esse nisi una non-procedens, quia si essent duae,
non haberent quo distinguerentur: quia non per absoluta (quia in illis omnino conve-
nirent), nec per relationes originis (quia una non procederet ab alia). Sunt ergo plures
procedentes. Non autem possunt procedere nisi per actus qui terminantur ad intra,
quia personas divinas necesse est habere essentiam divinam. Non sunt autem nisi duo
actus qui terminentur ad intra, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis. Et ideo non potest esse
nisi duplex modus procedendi in divinis, nec nisi duae personae procedentes et una
non procedens, \et/ sic tantum tres.

229
principia P] personae B

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<18 = ~5> Quod postea dicit, quod omnis /P 89vb/ diversitas reducitur ad
minorem—dicendum quod verum est quod omnis multitudo reducitur ad unitatem, et
ideo in quantum diversitas includit multitudinem reducitur ad unitatem; sed diversitas
quae omnino est diversa ratione ab alia non reducitur ad eam.
<19 = ~5> Praeterea, licet diversitas reducatur ad unitatem illam, scilicet a qua
diversa dependent, tamen non est universaliter verum quod maior diversitas reducatur
ad minorem, immo magis est e converso, quia minor reducitur ad maiorem. In quolibet
enim genere id quod maius est, potius est, et alia reducuntur ad ipsum, principium
enim maius est virtute, et ideo ad id quod maxime ens est reducuntur omnia entia,
propter quod minor diversitas oportet quod reducatur ad maiorem, et ideo diversitas
quae est in attributis reducitur ad diversitatem quae est in creaturis in quibus attributa
differunt secundum rem, et non e converso.
<20 = ~6> Quomodo autem pluralitas quae est in suppositis distinctis re absoluta
reducatur ad pluralitatem quae est in suppositis distinctis re relativa—sicut dicit—
dubium est, quia creaturae, in quibus sunt supposita distincta re absoluta non redu-
cuntur ad Deum nisi ut procedunt ab eo. Non autem procedunt a Deo in quantum
supposita sunt distincta, immo in quantum sunt unum in essentia et operatione creandi
et conservandi, secundum quod in diversa sunt opera trinitatis. Ergo pluralitas quae est
in suppositis creaturarum non reducitur ad pluralitatem quae est in suppositis divinis,
sed magis ad eorum unitatem. Unde et philosophi qui reduxerunt omnia entia ad
primum, non posuerunt in primo aliquam pluralitatem sed simplicissimam unitatem
ad quam omnia reduxerunt.
<21 = ~6> Quod autem dicit, quod pluralitas quae est in suppositis divinis redu-
citur ad pluralitatem quae est in essentia—dicendum quod in essentia nulla pluralitas
est secundum actum, licet in ea sint innitae perfectiones, non per aliquem modum
distinctum sed unitissime quia modo divino. Unde fundamentum est diversarum perfec-
tionum quas nos intelligimus diversas per comparationem ad creaturas. In Deo autem
eas intelligimus penitus non differre nisi secundum diversum conceptum nostrum quo
non capimus perfectionem divinam nisi dividendo per partes, quod tamen scimus in
se in diversum esse. /B 42va/ Unde diversitas secundum rationem quae ponitur in
attributis non est in Deo sed in nobis, licit ipsa attributa sunt in Deo, non ut diversa
sed ut unum—de quo, propter intentionem, superius est tractatum.
<22 = ~7> Per dicta patet quod non valet quod postea dicit, scilicet quod pluralitas
perfectionum divinarum reducitur ad primam inter omnes, scilicet ad esse, neque enim
in Deo est pluralitas quam ponit nec reductio talis, quia omnia sunt ibi penitus idem
inter quae relatio originis non distinguit. Unde bene verum est quod esse est prius
secundum rationem quam aliae perfectiones, loquendo generaliter. Sed esse divinum,
quod est penitus idem quod vivere divinum, quod intelligere, et quod velle, non est prius
nisi secundum rationem nostram, et ideo nec talis reductio habet eri nisi secundum
rationem nostram, et non secundum rem, quia etiam intellectus divinus non intelligit
aliquam diversitatem inter suum esse et suum vivere nisi comparando ad nos vel ad
creaturas in quibus ista sunt diversa. Et ideo, quia idem penitus secundum rem non
reducitur realiter ad se ipsum, non oportet dicere quod perfectiones divinae reducantur
ad esse, licet secundum nos qui ponimus illas perfectiones differre secundum rationem
esse sit prima inter omnes—supponendo tamen quod differant secundum rationem.
Sed supponendo quod in nullo differant, sicut verum est, nulla differentia est ibi, dif-
ferentia enim /P 90ra/ secundum rationem nulla differentia vera est, sicut nec homo
secundum rationem est verus homo, sed solum homo intellectus. Unde tota reductio
quam ponit non est nisi secundum rationem nostram, nec convenit perfectionibus
divinis in quantum divinae sunt, sed ipsis in communi consideratis, quia sic vivere
supponit esse, et sic de aliis.
<23> Per dicta patet ad omnia alia.

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 APPENDIX III

ROBERTI DE ORFORD REPROBATIONES HENRICI DE

GANDAVO QUODLIBET V, Q. 9230

<Abbreviatio Henrici>
<1> An Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo.
<2> Eodem Quolibet, <quaestione> qua quaerit utrum Spiritus Sanctus distinguer-
etur a Filio si non procederet ab eo, dicit quod sic, quia propter diversum modum
emanandi a Patre, quia secundum Anselmum, in libro De processione Spiritus Sancti:231
“Nascendo Filius distinguitur et procedendo Spiritus Sanctus . . . Et si non esset alius
modus distinguendi, ex hoc tamen essent diversi.”
<3> Et si obiciatur quod relationes non possunt distinguere nisi sint oppositae,
respondet quod non essent relationes contrariae inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, qua
<diversitate> inter se different[er], essent tamen disparatae, qua diversitate different
ad tertiam personam ut ad personam Patris. Unde Anselmus ubi supra:232 “Habent a
Patre esse Filius et Spiritus Sanctus diverso modo, et alter procedendo, alter nascendo,
ut alii sint per hoc ad invicem. Nam quoniam Filius extitit de Deo nascendo, et Spiritus
Sanctus procedendo, ipsa diversitate nativitatis et processionis referuntur ad invicem
ut diversi et alii ab invicem.”
<4> Consimiliter, si obiciatur quod persona Patris est una persona, non obstantibus
duabus relationibus non-oppositis quae sunt in ipso, per quarum unam refertur ad
Filium et per aliam ad Spiritum Sanctum, igitur similiter Filius et Spiritus Sanctus erunt
una, non obstantibus duabus relationibus ad Patrem, respondet quod, cum personarum
distinctio in Deo non accipiatur nisi penes emanationes, diversae emanationes aliter
respiciunt illud a quo emanant et aliter illud ad quod terminantur. Ex parte eius a
quo emanant sufcit quod si<n>t in ipso diversae rationes et principia secundum quae
dicantur emanare. Ex parte eius ad quod termina<n>tur, requiritur illarum diversitas
in esse perfecto et distincto, sicut sunt emanationes diversae, sicut generare lium et
depingere imaginem suam diversae emanationes sunt quae ab eodem supposito pro-
cedunt penes diversas rationes et principia quae sunt in ipso, scilicet natura et ars, ad
idem tamen terminari non possunt, sed necessario ad diversa. Consimiliter, in divinis
ex parte principii generatio et processio non requirunt nisi diversas rationes in una
persona, quae sunt natura et voluntas. Sed ex parte termini requirunt veram distinc-
tionem terminorum in esse perfecto emanantium, qui sunt Filius et Spiritus Sanctus,
quia termini emanationum debent esse perfecti ut perfecti in esse subsistentiae.
<5> Nec valet, ‘Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio per comparationem ad Patrem
a quo diversimode procedunt, et non distinguitur ab ipso per comparationem quam
habet ad ipsum, igitur distinguitur a Filio et \non/ distinguitur’, sicut non valet, ‘duo
est duplum ad unum, et non est duplum ad tria, ergo est duplum et non duplum’,
immo simpliciter est duplum et secundum quid non duplum. Consimiliter, in proposito

230
BAV, Vat. lat. 987, f. 44va–45ra (for abbreviations used here, see n. 217 above).
Chris Schabel made an excellent transcription of this text in the Vatican library; I
have continued work on the text.
231
Cf. Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 1 (ed. Schmitt, p. 185.3–11).
232
Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, cap. 1 (ed. Schmitt, p. 179.12–17).

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distinguitur simpliciter Spiritus Sanctus a Filio, quia Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio
per comparationem ad Patrem, quod est simpliciter distingui ab eo. Alio modo non
dicitur distingui nisi secundum quid.

\Responsio/
<6> Contra: quod Spiritus Sanctus non possit realiter distingui a Filio nisi procedat
ab eo patet sic: quando alia duo conveniunt in aliquo communi, si distinguuntur ad
invicem, oportet quod distinguantur secundum differentias per se et non per accidens
pertinentes ad illud commune, sicut homo et equus conveniunt in animali et distin-
guuntur ab invicem, non secundum album et nigrum quae se habent per accidens ad
animale, \sed/ per rationale et irrationale quae /44vb/ per se ad animale pertinent,
quia cum animal sit quod habet animam, oportet quod hoc distinguatur per hoc quod
est habere animam talem vel talem, scilicet rationalem vel irrationalem; manifestum
est autem quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus conveniunt in hoc quod est esse ab alio, quia
uterque est aequaliter a Patre, et secundum hoc Pater differt ab utroque in quantum
est innascibilis; si igitur Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio, oportet quod hoc sit per
differentias quae per se dividunt hoc quod est ens ab alio, quae quidem non possunt
esse nisi differentiae eiusdem generis, scilicet pertinentes ad originem, ut scilicet unus
eorum sit ab alio; sed Filius non est a Spiritu Sancto; igitur ad hoc quod Spiritus
Sanctus distinguatur a Filio, oportet quod sit ab eo.
<7> Dicatur quod distinguuntur penes diversum modum procedendi a Patre.
<8> Contra: Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis et Filius procedit per
modum intellectus; \sed processio per modum voluntatis praesupponit processionem
per modum intellectus/, ut una procedat ab alia, quia amor procedit a verbo eo quod
nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis* illud concipiamus. Et ita ex hoc ipso quod sic
diversimode procedunt a Patre, sequitur necessario quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a
Patre mediante Filio, et ita ab utroque.
<9> Et per hoc patet ad auctoritatem Anselmi, quia \illi/ diversi modi procedendi
includunt quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio, ut dictum est, et ita sufcienter
distinguitur ab eo. Nisi enim essent tales diversi modi procedendi quod unus modus
esset ab alio, non distinguerentur realiter personae procedentes* ab invicem, quia iste
modus diversus aut diceret relationem diversam aut diversitatem in absolutis. <9a>
Non relationem diversam, quia nulla relatio est aliquorum secundum quod referuntur
ad tertium, sed* secundum quod ad invicem relativum ad suum correlativum refertur
proprium. Igitur dua relativa et duo correlativa, vel si unum correlativum \et unum
relativum/, et ita sicut persona Patris est una quae duabus relationibus refertur ad Filium
et Spiritum Sanctum, sic Filius et Spiritus Sanctus essent una persona quae duabus
relationibus referetur ad Patrem, sicut unus homo potest esse similis et aequalis alteri.
Quia igitur secundum quod ambo procedunt a Patre non referuntur ad invicem, sed ad
Patrem, patet quod in eis secundum hoc non est distinctio, quia nec relatio. <9b> Si
dicat diversitatem in absolutis vel realem, et sic est compositio in Deo, vel diversitatem
secundum rationem, quae non sufcit ad distinctionem personarum. Quod igitur dicit
relationes disparatas esse Filii et Spiritus Sancti ad Patrem, per quas distinguantur,
frivolum est, quia non est reperire tales relationes esse realiter distinguentes personas
nisi simul cum hoc una persona sit ab alia, et tunc inter eas erunt relationes oppositae
quae sufcienter personas distinguunt.
<10> Item, quod postea dicit, quod diversae emanationes non requiruntur ex
parte termini a quo nisi quod simul in ipso diversae relationes et principia, ut sunt in
persona Patris natura et voluntas, omnino falsum est, quia cum natura et voluntas in
Deo Patre non distinguantur per rem sed solum per rationem, sequeretur quod illae
duae emanationes, et per consequens duo emanantes, non different nisi secundum
rationem. Ea vero quae solum ratione differunt de se invicem praedicantur. Vere enim
dicitur quod natura divina est \voluntas/ divina, igitur vere diceretur: ‘Filius est Spiritus
Sanctus’, et e converso, quod est Sabelliana haeresis. Nec est simile de emanationibus

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 dominican quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260–1330 491

in creaturis, quia principia, scilicet ars et natura, a quibus procedunt lius verus per
generationem et pictus per picturam, secundum essentiam differunt, ideo diversae
sunt emanationes et diversa omnino quae emanant. Non sic natura et voluntas in Deo
Patre, ut dicutm est. /45ra/
<11> Item, lius generatus et lius depictus differunt penes absolutum. Nec sic
Filius procedens et Spiritus Sanctus, sed penes relationes, non quascumque, sed solum
penes relationes originis, quae relationes non solum distinguunt, sed etiam constituunt
personas procedentes, quod non potest esse nisi una sit ab alia.
<12> Item, quod dicit Filium simpliciter distingui a Spiritu Sancto quia distinguitur
ab eo per comparationem ad Patrem, est omnino falsum, quia magis notum est distin-
gui quae distinguuntur penes relationes oppositas quam quae solum penes relationes
disparatas; sed secundum ipsum, si Spiritus Sanctus non est a Filio, distinguuntur penes
relationes disparatas; sed si est ab eo, penes relationes oppositas. Ubi magis debet dici
Spiritum Sanctum simpliciter distingui a Filio si procedit ab eo quam si ambo a Patre.
Et ita verba sua semet ipsa destruunt.
<13> Et de hac quaestione quaere prima parte, quaestione 191, et super primum
Sententiarum, distinctione XI, quaestione prima, et Contra gentiles <libro>233 4 et capi-
tulo* 4 quaestione et 15. Item, in quaestione De potentia <eius>234 10, quaestione 8 et
quaestione 5.235

233
ms.: nihil*
234
ms.: cuius
235
Cf. Thomas de Aquino, S. theol. I, q. 36, art. 2; I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1; SCG,
IV, cap. 24; De pot., q. 10, a. 5.

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 CARMELITE QUODLIBETA

Chris Schabel*

In his statistical analysis of the 893 surviving Sentences commentaries

whose authors are known to us, Steven J. Livesey provides a startling
statistic: 139 of these are by Carmelites. This number is only slightly
smaller than that of the Franciscans (181) and Dominicans (175), and
roughly matches the combined total (147) of the other nine religious
orders that are represented by named commentators, including the
Augustinians (86).1 The statistic is startling because for the rst century
of the history of the Sentences commentary we have absolutely no com-
mentary at all from the Carmelites. Even when we take into account
that Carmelite hermits did not move to the West from the Holy Land
until the late 1230s, that they did not begin to adopt the rules of a
mendicant order until 1247, that we do not hear of their studia generalia
until 1281, and that the order only had their rst master of theology
in Gerard of Bologna in 1295,2 it is still remarkable that decades went
by before the 1320s when John Baconthorpe was nally able to pen a
commentary that would be preserved, if only in one manuscript and
in printed editions. Thus for most of the Golden Age of Scholasticism
(1250–1350), roughly co-terminous with the Age of the Theological
Quodlibet, we have nothing to speak of in terms of the primary vehicle

* For various forms of assistance, I thank Marie-Bruno Borde OCD, Stephen Brown,
William Duba, Russell Friedman, Wouter Goris, Jorge Gracia, Mark Henninger, Rondo
Keele, Elzbieta Jung, Lauge Nielsen, Simon Nolan O.Carm., David Piché, Sylvain Piron,
Thomas Turley, the ILL departments of the University of Northern Illinois and of
Parks Library in Iowa State University, the University of Cyprus, the British Library
(via World Microlms), Worcester Cathedral and Chapter Library (via the University
of Birmingham Library), the Vatican Library (via the Vatican Film Library), Pamplona
Cathedral Library (via the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library), the Bibliothèque Natio-
nale de France, and the Pelplin Seminary Library.
1
S.J. Livesey, “Lombardus Electronicus: A Biographical Database of Medieval Com-
mentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002) (pp. 1–23), p. 7.
2
For the general history of the order in this period, see J. Smet, O.Carm., The
Carmelites. A History of the Brothers of Our Lady of Mount Carmel I (Darien, IL 1988). For
its intellectual history, see especially B.M. Xiberta, De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV
ex ordine Carmelitarum (Louvain 1931).

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of theological writing from the religious order that would go on in the

late Middle Ages to match both the Franciscans and Dominicans in
numbers of Sentences commentaries written after 1350.
This is why uncovering and understanding the Carmelites’ role in
the history of this great owering of philosophical theology requires us
to look at other writings, primarily quodlibeta. Although a few Quaestiones
disputatae and ordinariae survive from Guy Terrena, and we have Gerard’s
Quaestiones ordinariae and his important but incomplete Summa theologiae,
no fewer than six Carmelites active before Baconthorpe have left writ-
ten traces of quodlibeta: Peter Swanington and Robert Walsingham at
Oxford, and Gerard of Bologna, Simon of Corbie, Guy Terrena, and
Sibert of Beek at Paris. Baconthorpe himself is responsible for the nal
Carmelite quodlibeta of the Middle Ages. Indeed, we can basically say
that with Baconthorpe the age of the Carmelite quodlibet ends and the
age of the Carmelite Sentences commentary begins.
Despite the importance of quodlibeta for understanding early Car-
melite thought, little work has been done on these texts. Except for
Baconthorpe’s, no Carmelite quodlibeta were printed in the early modern
period, and except for Gerard’s, no Carmelite quodlibeta are preserved
in more than one main manuscript. The amazingly industrious Car-
melite theologian Bartomeu Xiberta (1897–1967), however, probably
read every word that these early Carmelites wrote in their theological
works. In the decade between 1922 and 1932 Xiberta published well
over 1000 pages on these authors, and his studies are the foundation
upon which all subsequent scholarship rests. Nevertheless, perhaps in
part because he wrote in Catalan and Latin, this subsequent scholar-
ship has been piecemeal.3 Even for fundamental questions about such
things as dating, we have only Xiberta’s tentative hypotheses. Given the
immaturity of the topic, this chapter merely attempts to summarize,

3
For Walsingham, Gerard of Bologna, Sibert of Beek, and Baconthorpe, Xiberta’s De
scriptoribus is a corrected and sometimes supplemented summary of some of his earlier
articles, which provide more detailed information for quodlibeta and must also be used:
“Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum (hereafter AOC )
4 (1922), pp. 305–41; “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp, O. Carm.,” AOC 6 (1927),
pp. 3–128; “Robert Walsingham, Carmelità, mestre de teologia d’Oxford a primeries
del segle XIVe,” Criterion 4 (1928), pp. 147–74 and 298–324. Afterwards Xiberta pub-
lished Guiu Terrena, Carmelita de Perpinyà (Barcelona 1932), correcting, supplementing,
and summarizing two of his nine earlier works on Guy: “De Mag. Guidone Terreni,
Priore Generali Ordinis Nostris (sic), Episcopo Maioricensi et Elnensi,” AOC 5 (1924),
pp. 133–206, and “De doctrinis theologicis Magistri Guidonis Terreni,” AOC 5 (1925),
pp. 233–376.

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 carmelite QUODLIBETA 495

correct, and supplement what Xiberta discovered concerning the

attribution, dating, manuscripts, nature, and reception of the surviv-
ing Carmelite quodlibeta, in the light of the research of the past three
quarters of a century.

Oxford Carmelites

The Carmelites arrived in England in 1242, and their Oxford convent

was founded in 1256. The London General Chapter of 1281 decreed
that upper-level schools be set up in the four subdivisions of the Eng-
lish province, including one in Oxford. Unlike the Franciscans and
Dominicans, however, the Carmelites never made the Oxford convent
a studium generale, a distinction reserved for the London convent in 1294.
Despite the absence of foreign students, the Oxford studium particulare
was intellectually more important than the London convent in the
early fourteenth century and even boasted more signicant theologians
than did the Dominican and Augustinian studia in Oxford. Besides the
authors of surviving Oxford quodlibeta, John Baconthorpe was active
at Oxford in his later years, as was Osbert Pickingham, who wrote a
Sentences commentary surviving in several manuscripts.4

Peter Swanington
Curiously, Xiberta seems to have never written much about the earliest
surviving Carmelite quodlibet, indeed the earliest surviving Carmelite
work of philosophical theology, that of “Peter the Carmelite.” In
Andrew G. Little and Franz Pelster’s 1934 book Oxford Theology and Theo-
logians, more than a third is devoted to Little’s analysis of the interesting
collection of disputations in MS Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter
Library Q 99, most of which he dated to between 1300 and 1302.5
As Xiberta already knew, on the top margin of f. 49r of Worcester Q
99 we read: “Incipit quaternus de disputationibus Carmelitarum anno

4
For a brief survey of the Oxford convent, see W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars
in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton 1987), pp. 69–72.
5
A.G. Little, “MS. Worcester Q 99,” in idem and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and
Theologians, c. A.D. 1282–1302 (Oxford 1934) (pp. 219–362), p. 236. See also R.M.
Thomson, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library
(Rochester, NY 2001), pp. 183b–4b.

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gracie MoCC[C]o,” and after one question, on the twelfth line of 49rb:
“Incipit Quodlibet Magistri Petri Carmelite.”6 It appears that the date
“1200” is an error for “1300,” and that we can assign the material to
1300. The quaternus mentioned on f. 49r is number V in the manu-
script, now containing ff. 49–59, but originally the text ended on f. 54r.
Later four questions from Scotus and some anonymous questions were
added, some at least (ff. 54v–57v) in different hands, perhaps after the
manuscript was brought to Paris from Oxford. The questions in the last
two quaterni (IX and XI, since X is missing) are denitely Parisian.7
Who is “Peter the Carmelite” and what material constitutes his
Quodlibet? Whoever Peter was, he played a signicant role in Oxford
theology at the time, for as Little relates, in another quaternus of
Worcester Q 99 there is a reference to “Petrus Carmelita,” while on
that quaternus and three others one nds a total of six references to
“Petrus,” who is, as we shall see, probably the same person. Thus ve
of the original eight quaterni refer to Peter the Carmelite. There are
also four citations of “Carmelita,” but it is less certain that this is our
Peter. Little argued that Peter was probably either Peter Swanington
(Swanyngton) or Peter Starrington (or Scarrington, Scarryngton), since they
both opposed a decision of the 1303 General Chapter in Narbonne
to create the province of Ireland and separate it from the English
province, supporting Provincial Prior William of Ludlington against
Prior General Gerard of Bologna. As a result, in the 1305 chapter in
London, they were both sent to Bordeaux to lecture on the Sentences as
punishment. Little adds the information that Swanington wrote a life
of St Simon Stock and that a commentary on the four books of the
Sentences by a “Swanton” was given to Merton College, probably before
1299.8 Perhaps because of these added attributions and the likelihood
that Swanington, having already read the Sentences, was master of the-
ology by 1300, Glorieux assigned the Quodlibet in Worcester Q 99 to
Swanington, but in his review of Glorieux’s book, Amédée Teetaert
reminded the reader that Starrington was still a possibility.9 At any
rate, everyone seems to have ignored information that Xiberta gives in

6
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 14, n. 3; cf. Little, “MS. Worcester Q 99,” p. 304.
7
Little, “MS. Worcester Q 99,” pp. 220–1, 224, and 226.
8
Little, “MS. Worcester Q 99,” pp. 231, 276–7, and 278–321 passim; cf. Xiberta,
“Robert Walsingham,” pp. 148–9, and idem, De scriptoribus, pp. 113–4.
9
Glorieux II, p. 224; A. Teetaert, “La littérature quodlibétique,” Ephemerides theologicae
Lovanienses 14 (1937) (pp. 75–105), p. 97 (mistakingly claiming that the Quodlibet ends
on 54v rather than 54r).

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 carmelite QUODLIBETA 497

a footnote: the famous ex-Carmelite playwrite and historian John Bale

(1495–1563) assigned to Petro Swanyngton a question whose title matches
that of the rst question of the Quodlibet in Worcester Q 99.10 It seems,
then, that the attribution to Swanington is quite secure.
Following a table of questions on f. 36va, Little listed fteen questions
(and three more not in the table of contents) before those of Scotus,
the rst one (on f. 49ra–b) being “Queritur an spiritus malus aliquid
patiatur ab igne infernali,” followed by “Incipit Quodlibet Magistri Petri
Carmelite” and fourteen more questions; of these, he suggested that
questions 2–15 might all belong to Peter.11 Glorieux followed Little’s
question list, but counted as separate questions 2a, 2b, and one on
f. 54rb that Little listed under fourteen, coming up with seventeen; he
also stated that Swanington’s Quodlibet might have ceased before ques-
tion 17.12 More recently, Richard Copsey has assigned the rst ques-
tion on f. 49ra–b to Swanington.13 Finally, I have found that Little and
Glorieux omitted two questions, and so before dealing with the issue of
the attribution of specic questions, a fresh table of questions is called
for, giving foliation and length in columns (L = Little, G = Glorieux):
*. Quaeritur an spiritus malus aliquid patiatur ab igne infernali. 49ra–b; 1.25
(L 1).
1. Quaeritur utrum ratio speciei possit attribui Deo sine ratione generis. 49rb;
0.25 (L 2; G 1).
2. Quaeritur an veritas in Deo sit essentialis vel personalis. 49rb–va; 1.0 (L 2a;
G 2).
3. Quaeritur, posito quod Deus subtrahat praesentiam suam ab intellectu, an
possit videre Deum sicut est. 49va; 0.75 (L 2b; G 3).
4. Quaeritur utrum expressio formalis in mente angeli vel aliquid intrinsecum
habeat rationem principii effectivi respectu actus intelligendi. 49vb; 1.0 (L 3;
G 4).
5. Quaeritur an species existens in mente angelica sit principium distincte
repraesentativum singularium. 50ra–b; 1.5 (L 4; G 5).

10
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 14, n. 3.
11
Little, “MS. Worcester Q 99,” pp. 224 and 304–6.
12
Glorieux II, pp. 224–5.
13
R. Copsey, “The Carmelites in England 1242–1540: Surviving Writings,” Carmelus
43 (1996) (pp. 175–224), pp. 211–2. Copsey’s entry is confusing: “Quodlibet 47, Lib. 1,
‘Utrum aliquis spiritus malus’.” He cites Little, mentions that Emden identies the author
as Swanyngton, says that the Quodlibet is on “fos. 49ff.,” and provides this curious refer-
ence: Études Carmélitaines, (1911), i, 300–5 (with French translation). The material on pp.
300–5, however, is that concerning the life of St Simon Stock, mentioned by Little.

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6. Quaeritur an angelus possit intelligere simul plura ut plura, videlicet

per plures rationes et plures actus intelligendi simul. 50rb–va; 1.5 (L 5;
G 6).
7. Ad quaestionem, cum quaeritur utrum angelus illuminatus videat in Verbo
vel in aliquo creato. 50va–b; 1.0 (not 1.5) (L 6; G 7).
8. Quaeritur de actu voluntatis utrum velle quod est actus secundus voluntatis
re absoluta differat a voluntate. 50vb–51ra; 0.67 (om. LG).
9. De voluntate dicitur quod voluntas causat actum suum, quia includit in
se duo, et ratione unius est movens et ratione alterius mota. 51ra–b; 0.67
(L 7; G 8).
10. Quaeritur utrum caritas viatoris posset aequari caritati patriae quantum
ad habitum, licet non ad fervorem. 51rb; 0.5 (L 8; G 9).
11. Quaeritur an angelus posset transire de caelo in terram absque hoc quod
transeat per medium. 51rb; 0.33 (L 9; G 10).
12. Quaeritur utrum species existens in mente angeli superioris sit universalior
et plurium repraesentativa quam species in mente angeli inferioris. 51va–b;
1.0 (L 10; G 11).
13. Quaeritur an angeli naturaliter possint cognoscere motus nostros interiores.
51vb–52ra; 1.5 (L 11; G 12).
14. Quaeritur utrum speciei impressio formalis in anima moveat efcienter.
52rb–vb; 3 (not 4) (L 12; G 13).
15. Quaeritur utrum angelus cognoscat certitudinaliter futura contingentia.
52vb–53rb; 1.25 (om. LG).
16. Quaeritur an angelus ex puris naturalibus suis possit attingere ad intel-
ligendum Deum sicut est. 53rb–va; 1.5 (L 13; G 14).
17. Quaeritur utrum intellectus angeli per aliquod donum supernaturale posset
elevari ad videndum Deum sicut est. 53va–b; 1.25 (L 14; G 15).
18. Quaeritur an essentia divina in patria videatur per aliquam speciem aliam
ab actu intelligendi. 54ra–b; 1.25 (L 15; G 17!).
19. Quaeritur utrum in angelo ad videndum Deum sicut est esse necesse sit
ponere aliquod formale principium aliud a lumine gloriae. 54rb; 0.5 (L no
number; G 16!).
All twenty questions appear to be from Carmelite disputations. As
Little notes, these questions seem to cover a short period of time and
maybe only a few days—one quodlibetal period.14 This portion of the
manuscript is somewhat difcult to read because of severe water damage
to the lower section, but just from the question titles one can discern a
certain relationship between most of the questions. The rst question,
“An spiritus malus aliquid patiatur ab igne infernali,” does not seem
connected to the following nineteen, and so there is no compelling
reason to attribute it to Peter the Carmelite. The other nineteen ques-

14
Little, “MS Worcester Q 99,” p. 224.

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tions, however, beginning with the incipit about Peter the Carmelite’s
Quodlibet, do appear to form a thematic unit, moving from God to the
beatic vision. Since this is characteristic of a quodlibet, these nineteen
questions are probably all from Peter Swanington’s Quodlibet, and I have
therefore renumbered them 1 through 19 in the table above. The pri-
mary subject of the Quodlibet is angelology. Of questions 4 through 18
of this Quodlibet, fully a dozen include some form of the word “angelus”
in the title, and eleven of these deal with angelic cognition. In this way
questions 1–3 and 19 are also connected to the theme, because they
form the background to the questions involving how angels can know
God. Frequently one encounters common ideas, terms, and phrases,
even in the question titles themselves. In question 6 of the Quodlibet,
after “Quaeritur,” the scribe wrote “iterum idem quod prius, scilicet,”
before crossing it out, because it was not exactly the same question
after all. Nevertheless, this scribal error is further evidence that at least
questions 5 and 6 belong together.
Finally, a look at the six citations of “Peter” elsewhere in the
manuscript reinforces the attribution of all these nineteen questions to
Peter Swanington, because they often deal with topics treated in the
Quodlibet.15 For example, question 2 of quaternus IV cites “Petrus” and
asks “Whether a future contingent can be known with certainty by any
cognition other than beatic,” while question 15 of the Quodlibet is about
angelic cognition of future contingents. (Since I have been publishing
Carmelite questions on future contingents, this latter question is included
as Appendix II to this article.)16 Again, “Petrus” is cited in question
14 of quaternus VII, “Whether an angel’s intellection, by which he
understands things other than himself, is effectively from Deo creante or
from alio extrinseco movente,” a common topic in the nineteen questions.
Question 16 of quaternus VIII actually cites “Petrus Carmelita.” Other
citations of “Carmelita” are not obviously linked to the nineteen ques-
tions, however, and so they may refer to another Carmelite.
As Little maintains, the manuscript is a collection of quaterni with
which a Benedictine scholar—perhaps Richard Bromwich or, much

15
Little, “MS Worcester Q 99,” pp. 295–321 passim.
16
See C. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine
Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot 2000), pp. 54–7 and 175–9 (on Bacon-
thorpe); idem, “Early Carmelites between Giants: Questions on Future Contingents
by Gerard of Bologna and Guy Terrena,” RTPM 70.1 (2003), pp. 139–205; and idem,
“The Sentences Commentary of Paul of Perugia, O. Carm. With an Edition of His
Question on Divine Foreknowledge,” RTPM 72.1 (2005), pp. 54–112.

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more likely, John of Saint-Germain—went around recording disputa-

tions in Oxford, probably “copied out day by day from the notes taken
while the disputations were going on.” Thus elsewhere in the manuscript
often the disputatio and determinatio are separated, because they happened
on different days.17 As the question printed below shows, then, this is as
close to a raw reportatio as one can get. The damage to the manuscript
aside, it is still difcult to follow the arguments completely, and things
appear to be missing. It seems that there is no real magisterial determinatio
here, although in other questions a conclusion is reached. The topic is
related to the contemporary debate about whether God can know future
contingents through ideas, but it is clear that a good understanding of
the context will require further editing of the manuscript, which contains
ve other questions on future contingents. Likewise, a complete edition
of Peter Swanington’s Quodlibeta will surely be a useful addition to our
knowledge of medieval theories of angelic cognition.18

Robert Walsingham
The biography and bibliography for Walsingham is confusing because,
as Xiberta discovered, earlier writers erroneously attributed some facts
of his life and writings to a non-existent John Walsingham, to whom in
turn were assigned details that pertained rather to John Baconthorpe
and John Walsham. What we do know is that Walsingham seems to
have been a student of William Paganerus at Oxford around 1290, and
that a certain Robert Walsingham was also among the Carmelites who
opposed the decision of the 1303 General Chapter in Narbonne. While
Swanington was sent to Bordeaux as punishment in 1305, Walsingham
was allowed to stay in England supposedly because he was weakened
by old age. In his disputations associated with his becoming master,
his Vesperies, his opponent was Walter of Heyham. We do not know

17
Little, “MS Worcester Q 99,” pp. 228–9 and 240–6. Thomson, A Descriptive
Catalogue, p. 184b, misrepresents Little’s conclusion. On John of Saint-Germain, see
P. Glorieux, “Jean de Saint-Germain, Maître de Paris et copiste de Worcester,” in
Mélanges Auguste Pelzer: études d’histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la Scolastique médiévale offertes à
Auguste Pelzer à l’occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire (Louvain 1947), pp. 521–9.
18
On divine ideas and the problem of divine foreknowledge in this period, see
M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Leiden
1993), pp. 121–35 and 166–84. On angelic cognition, see T. Suarez-Nani, Connaissance et
langage des anges selon Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome (Paris 2003). I am currently editing
the other questions on foreknowledge in Q 99.

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when this occurred, but along with Henry of Harclay he was holding
magisterial disputations on 12 February 1312, our terminus ante quem
for his becoming master. Thus he did not die in 1310, as was once
claimed.19
If the same Robert Walsingham who was “senio confectus” in 1305 is
the author of the two Quodlibeta in another Worcester Cathedral and
Chapter Library codex, F 3, the sole surviving witness of that work,
then he still had many years of active disputation to look forward to
in 1305. Although the incipit to the rst Quodlibet (ff. 215v–247r) claims
that twenty-two questions were asked, questions 19 and 20 are in the
numbered table of questions but absent from the text, where the ques-
tions are numbered in the margin, and number 17 is skipped in both
the table and the text. The second Quodlibet (ff. 247r–259r) contains
only six questions.20
Of a large body of works once attributed to him, only the Quodlibeta
are preserved. Although there were once four other witnesses, now there
is just Worcester F 3, a collection of Oxford quodlibetal and disputed
questions from Scotus, Kykeley, Trivet, Harclay, and Walsingham,
all from roughly the same time period. One of the lost witnesses of
Walsingham’s Quodlibeta reportedly contained Quodlibeta of William of
Alnwick, Trivet, Harclay, Walsingham, and “Johannis Mankael,” i.e.,
three of the ve authors in F 3. Remembering Alnwick’s unusually
close association with Scotus’ works, and the fact that, like Mankael,
Kykeley’s rst name is probably Johannes, perhaps the contents of the
lost codex were actually identical to those of F 3 and the two manu-
scripts were related. With respect to Quodlibeta, in the sixteenth century
John Bale listed Robert Walsingham as having Quodlibeta maiora and
minora. While the maiora appear not to have survived, Bale’s incipit for
the minora matches the incipit for the rst Quodlibet in Worcester F 3,
a fact that, along with citations and even verbatim quotations by later

19
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” pp. 147–57, summarized in idem, De scriptoribus,
pp. 111–14. The previous English Dictionary of National Biography even had an entry
for “John of Walsingham,” as Xiberta notes, but Stephen F. Brown has put the record
straight in the new edition with entries on “Robert of Walsingham” and the ctional
“John of Walsingham.”
20
For the manuscript and a question list, see Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” pp.
164–6 (question list reprinted in idem, De scriptoribus, pp. 119–20, and Glorieux II, pp.
262–3, misreading Xiberta, saying that qq. 19 and 20 of Quodlibet I are missing in
the table as well and simply failing to list q. 17). The pertinent entry in Thomson, A
Descriptive Catalogue, pp. 3b–4b, is incorrect on the foliation.

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theologians such as John Baconthorpe, conrms that Robert Walsing-

ham was the author.21
Xiberta dated the two Quodlibeta to around 1312–13. In question 2
of Quodlibet II Walsingham is disputing with Henry of Harclay, and we
know from the Harclay text in Worcester F 3 (f. 187r) that he held a
disputation in 1313 (and he was still disputing in 1314–15). Working
backwards, Xiberta came up with his dating hypothesis, which t in
with Walsingham’s citations.22 Unfortunately, the dating of Harclay’s
Oxford works as a whole is uncertain, and all we know for sure is
that he was a master of theology and holding disputations, just as
Walsingham, by 12 February 1312, and that he was chancellor of the
University of Oxford from late 1312 to his death in 1317.23 “Walter
of Heyham,” with whom Walsingham disputed his Vesperies as a new
master, is perhaps the rst Oxford Augustinian master of theology,
William of Hycham (or Hikham, Hikam, Hicham, Hicham), who is
noted in Worcester Q 99 from ca. 1300–02.24 Thus Walsingham could
have been master much earlier.
Walsingham’s Quodlibeta are among the earliest scholastic works
where the author cites his contemporaries, and his citations help nar-
row things down a bit. In his Quodlibet I he cites his own Quaestiones
ordinariae sometimes as having already been held, sometimes as to be
held, and in Quodlibet II some Quaestiones ordinariae are still to come. A
list of his citations that John Bale compiled in the sixteenth century
includes Gerard of Bologna, whom Walsingham does not appear to cite
in the Quodlibeta, so perhaps the citation was in his Quaestiones ordinariae.
Gerard’s surviving theological writings date from 1305, since, as we
shall see, his rst Quodlibet is from that period, and Gerard’s Quaestiones
ordinariae are contemporary with or postdate the rst Quodlibet, while the
Summa is from after 1313. Given the fact that Walsingham’s Quaestiones
ordinariae start earlier and end later than his Quodlibeta, however, the

21
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” pp. 158–64, on p. 163, n. 50, citing the lost
manuscript as Dublin, Trinity College 360; idem, De scriptoribus, pp. 114–18, on p. 117,
n. 2, now listing the lost manuscript as St Augustine, Canterbury 606. For Kykeley, see
Little, “MS Worcester Q 99,” pp. 267–9 and 365.
22
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” p. 168; idem, De scriptoribus, p. 118.
23
M.G. Henninger, “Henry of Harclay’s Questions on Divine Prescience and Pre-
destination,” Franciscan Studies 40 (1980) (pp. 167–240), p. 168, n. 5, and idem, “Henry
of Harclay,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone,
eds. (Oxford 2003) (pp. 305–13), p. 305.
24
Little, “MS Worcester Q 99,” pp. 265–6; Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 183
and 314.

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citation of Gerard is of less assistance. In his Quodlibeta Walsingham

does cite Scotus, Thomas of Sutton, and Richard of Conington, but
the possible dating of their writings extends over a great period of time.
It is more important that he cites distinction 26 of book II of Robert
Cowton’s Sentences commentary (f. 231v), dated to Oxford, ca. 1309–11,
although this is uncertain.25 All things considered, Xiberta’s estimation
of 1312–13 seems to be a good guess.
The incipits conrm that the questions come from two quodlibetal
disputations, certainly Walsingham’s rst two. The rst contains a
variety of questions, but the second concentrates on God’s connection
with creation. The questions constitute Walsingham’s determinations
and the text appears to be quite close to the debates themselves, since
we nd frequent references to “ratio opponentis” and statements like
“istam rationem tetigit opponens” and “recitabo dicta cuiusdam doctoris
propter que forte questio ista fuit mota.” Still, cross-references to his
own ordinary and other quodlibetal questions suggest that Walsingham
himself polished the work for publication. The fact that three questions
are missing shows that our manuscript is not a faithful copy of the
nished work, although the three questions edited so far are at least
readable.26 To a certain extent one could check the quality of the text
in Worcester F 3 with a fragmentary witness: question 6 of Quodlibet
I survives in a Florence manuscript that contains assorted Oxford
questions. Unfortunately, a collation revealed that John Baconthorpe’s
incorporation of parts of Walsingham’s rst two questions of Quodlibet
I into distinction 27 of book I of his Sentences commentary, extant in
one manuscript and printed editions, was not close enough to be of
use in editing Walsingham’s text.27 On the other hand, Wouter Goris

25
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” pp. 167–8, 171, and 173, and De scriptoribus,
pp. 82, 118 and 122. On Robert Cowton’s Sentences commentary, see R.L. Friedman,
“The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious
Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, Evans, ed. (pp.
41–128), p. 76, but in his chapter on Vat. lat. 1086 in this volume, W.J. Courtenay
expresses doubts about the dating.
26
See D.T. Graf, De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum
usque ad medium saeculum XIV, vol. II (Studia Anselmiana, 4) (Rome 1935), pp. 104*–10*
(Quodl. I, q. 14); W. Goris, “La critique de Richard de Conington par Robert de Wal-
singham,” AHDLMA 67 (2000) (pp. 269–93), pp. 281–93 (Quodl. II, q. 6); C. Schabel
and R.L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues III: Oxford
1312–1329: Walsingham, Graystanes, Fitzralph, and Rodington,” CIMAGL 74 (2003)
(pp. 39–88), pp. 45–52 (Quodl. I, q. 5).
27
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” p. 165, n. 55, and De scriptoribus, p. 119, nn.
1–2, made these discoveries. Walsingham’s Florence fragment is in Firenze, Biblioteca

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has shown that where Walsingham quotes extensively from Richard of

Conington, there are two omissions per homoioteleuton in the manuscript.
Unless Walsingham himself made these errors, which Goris rightly
considers unlikely, we are unfortunately dealing with a problematic
witness.28
The one surviving manuscript does not reect Walsingham’s inuence
upon British theologians. Walsingham’s confrere Baconthorpe called
him “my reverend master,” although he actually opposes Walsingham’s
theories in the above-mentioned passage that Baconthorpe incorporated
into his Sentences commentary. Walsingham was also known to contem-
porary theologians outside the order. We have seen that he debated
with the secular theologian Harclay, and he had an important impact
on the Benedictine Robert Graystanes. Outside England, the German
Carmelite John Brammart cited Walsingham’s Quodlibeta toward the
end of the fourteenth century.29
Since we have no other writings from Walsingham, it is fortunate that
his twenty-ve quodlibetal questions mostly concern well-studied topics
in philosophical theology such as the increase and decrease of grace,
divine relations, the univocity of the concept of being, and creation.
Thus we can easily place Walsingham in context. The last two ques-
tions of Quodlibet I are interesting exceptions: “Should a church’s prelate
commit the care of his church to a worthy blood relative, overlooking
someone better?” and “Can anyone desire to know the magical arts
without sin?”

Carmelites at Paris

King Louis IX himself established the Carmelite convent in Paris, after

his return from crusading in the East in 1254. The London General
Chapter of 1281 decreed that Paris would have the order’s studium

Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 17 sin., cod. 10, on ff. 24v–27v. It is a 1393 copy, made by
the Franciscan Giacopo Fey, of a compilation done by the Oxford Carmelite Stephen
Patryngton; see R. Copsey, “The Carmelites in England 1242–1540: Surviving Writings
(Additions and Corrections I),” Carmelus 44 (1997) (pp. 188–202), p. 199.
28
Goris, “La critique de Richard de Conington,” p. 278, the omissions being on
pp. 282 (8 words) and 284 (7 words). As Goris notes, he had to intervene on several
occasions.
29
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” p. 163, and De scriptoribus, pp. 171 and 430;
Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 267.

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generale, to which provinces other than Francia were to send a minimum

number of students. Although the Oxford studium was important, Paris
became the Carmelites’ intellectual center. In 1287–88 a Carmelite
bachelor of theology—probably Gerard of Bologna—was opponens in
Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet XI, and later Gerard became the order’s rst
Parisian master. Nevertheless, in 1303 the convent was still insignicant
compared to the studia of the Augustinians, Dominicans, and Francis-
cans. In the following decades, however, important scholars from all
over Europe came to teach theology at the Carmelite studium in Paris,
from Central Italy, Catalonia, the Low Countries, and England. The
reputations they gained at Paris led them to important careers in the
order’s hierarchy and in the secular church.30

Gerard of Bologna
In 1295 Gerard of Bologna (ca. 1240/50–1317) became the Carmelites’
rst master of theology at the University of Paris and, depending on
Peter Swanington’s dates, probably the order’s rst master anywhere.
Thus Gerard holds a special place in the history of Carmelite thought,
and accordingly his Quodlibeta survive in three complete manuscripts
and ve substantial fragments, more than for any other major Carmel-
ite work in philosophical theology written before 1340. Nevertheless,
until very recently little work had been done on the Quodlibeta, perhaps
because Gerard composed a more organized Summa theologiae near the
end of his career, although this appears to have been less inuential
and was left incomplete at his death in Avignon on 17 April 1317.31

30
For a brief survey, see Smet, Carmelites I, pp. 28–32. For the status in 1303, W.J.
Courtenay, “Between Pope and King: The Parisian Letters of Adhesion of 1303,”
Speculum 71.3 (1996) (pp. 577–605), p. 602. For Gerard as bachelor, Xiberta, De scrip-
toribus, pp. 13 and 75, and B. Smalley, “Gerard of Bologna and Henry of Ghent,”
RTAM 22 (1955) (pp. 125–9), p. 129.
31
In 2005 Marie-Bruno (Hubert) Borde completed his PhD dissertation at Paris
IV—Sorbonne, under Ruedi Imbach’s supervision: “Gérard de Bologne O. Carm.
(†1317): sa conception de la théologie et de la puissance de Dieu,” building on his 2003
Toulouse MA thesis “Magis de tenetur: Gérard de Bologne et la scientia sacra.” Borde’s
study includes a new and exhaustive survey of Gerard’s life and writings together
with a critical edition of articles 1–6 of the mammoth question 35 of the Summa, on
divine power. This will replace the earlier study of Gerard’s life in, e.g., Xiberta, De
scriptoribus, pp. 75–80, and of the Summa in idem, “De Summa Theologiae magistri Gerardi
Bononiensis ex Ordine Carmelitarum,” AOC 5 (1923), pp. 3–54 (question list on pp.
16–23). For previous editions of parts of the Summa, see P. de Vooght, Les sources de la
doctrine chrétienne d’après les théologiens du XIV e siècle et du début du XV e avec le texte intégral des

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Two of the complete manuscripts of the Quodlibeta attribute the text

to Gerard explicitly, and later authors such as Peter Auriol conrm this
assignation. The question of the structure and the dating of Gerard’s
Quodlibeta, however, is more complex. There are three main witnesses
of the Quodlibeta—each also containing Gerard’s Quaestiones ordinariae:
Paris, BnF lat. 17485 (= P); Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó,
Ripoll 95 (= B), and Firenze, BNC II.II.280 (= F). These contain two
redactions of Gerard’s Quodlibeta, corresponding to two different lists of
questions. Following P, Glorieux listed questions from four Quodlibeta.
Using BF, Xiberta offered a different list of questions from ve Quodlibeta.
All twenty questions of Quodlibet I and the rst eighteen questions of
Quodlibet II match up in both lists.32 Then the following occurs:

P BF BF P
II, qq. 19–21 = IV, qq. 17–19 III, qq. 1–7 = same
III, qq. 1–7 = same III, qq. 8–13 = absent
III, qq. 8–13 = IV, qq. 9–14 III, qq. 14–22 = same
III, qq. 14–22 = same IV, qq. 1–8 absent absent
IV, 1–5 = V, qq. 1–5 (not B) IV, qq. 9–14 = III, qq. 8–13
IV, qq. 6–7 = IV, qq. 15–16 IV, qq. 15–16 = IV, qq. 6–7
IV, qq. 17–19 = II, qq. 19–21
V, qq. 1–5 (not B) = IV, qq. 1–5

Besides the differing orders, there are other irregularities. Notes in B

(f. 75r) state that the true rst question of Quodlibet II is missing (in all
manuscripts) and suggests that this is on purpose since “erat de for-
malitatibus, de quibus satis est in primo Quolibet.” When Peter Auriol

XII premières questions de la Summa inédite de Gérard de Bologne († 1317) (Versailles 1954), pp.
269–483 (qq. 1–12); Xiberta, “Magistri Gerardi Bononiensis, O.Carm., Quaestio de
Dei cognoscibilitate (Summa Theologica, q. 13),” in Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in Honore
di Bruno Nardi (Florence 1955), pp. 829–70 (q. 13); J.K. McGowan, “The Essence and
Existence of God in Gerard of Bologna’s Summa Theologiae. With a Critical Edition of
Questions 13 and 14” (PhD Dissertation, Louvain 1967) (qq. 13–14), to which I have
not had access; Schabel, “Early Carmelites,” pp. 170–86 (q. 25, a. 7).
32
Glorieux I, pp. 128–32; Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 83–7; Glorieux II, pp. 94–5.
Gerard asked ten Quaestiones ordinariae on the theological virtues, preserved in all three
manuscripts, and then we have three others preserved in one or two of them; see the
list in Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 87. Borde, “Gérard de Bologne O. Carm.,” pp. 5–6,
has found that Avignon, Médiathèque Ceccano 1071, contains part of Gerard’s third
Quaestio ordinaria on ff. 97r–98v, and I have discovered that Worcester, Cathedral and
Chapter Library F 139, contains reportationes of qq. 4 and 7 (see below).

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cites the rst question of Quodlibet II, he refers to the one that is now
in the manuscripts (see below). Likewise, what would correspond to the
rst eight questions of Quodlibet IV in BF are absent in all witnesses,
and so the numbering of Quodlibet IV in BF begins with 9. Quodlibet V
is absent in B and corresponds to P’s Quodlibet IV, qq. 1–5. Although
Stephen Brown doubts the authenticity of F’s Quodlibet V, manuscript
P supports Gerard’s authorship of these questions. Its absence in B
might be explained by the fact that it was not held in Paris but rather
in Avignon, as we shall see.33
Only critical editions can help clarify matters. Although Hubert
Borde, Wouter Goris, Simon Nolan, and David Piché are collectively
working on editions of over 25% of Gerard’s quodlibetal questions,
thus far only three of the seventy-ve or so questions have been pub-
lished. Goris nds that FP carry the same text for Quodlibet III, q. 15.34
Antonio Samaritani published the question “Utrum forma per solum
instans possit esse in subiecto”—touching upon the immaculate con-
ception—which is Quodlibet IV, q. 18, in BF, but Quodlibet II, q. 20, in
manuscript P. Samaritani used only BF, however, not having access to
P. A collation of P with Samaritani’s edition revealed that the three
witnesses carry the same text.35 But is Samaritani’s question originally

33
See note in Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 83, for correspondence table and margi-
nalia. S.F. Brown, “Gerard of Bologna’s Quodlibet I, Quaestio 1: On the Analogy of
Being,” Carmelus 31 (1984) (pp. 143–70), p. 150, cites Xiberta’s De scriptoribus, p. 82,
as doubting the authenticity of Quodlibet V, but Xiberta merely states that “Quolibet V
Avinione habitum esse dicitur (F 152v).” A. Lang, Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung bei
den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts (Münster i. W. 1930), pp. 56–7, uses Gerard’s Quodl.
V, qq. 1 and 5, after F, taking their authenticity for granted.
34
Borde has edited Quodl. I, q. 10, in “Gérard de Bologne O.Carm.,” which includes
on pp. 5–14 and 17–18 an updated version of the study of the Quodlibeta and detailed
question list found in his “Magis de tenetur,” pp. 48–50, 61–2, 64–7, and 70–81. Wouter
Goris has edited material from Quodlibet III from FP. David Piché is preparing for
publication 14 quodlibetal questions on Gerard’s theory of knowledge from the three
complete witnesses, as follows according to the Paris manuscript: Quodl. I, qq. 3, 4, 7,
8, 17; Quodl. II, qq. 4, 6, 11; Quodl. III, qq. 8 (BF’s IV, q. 9), 11 (BF’s IV, q. 12), 14,
15, 16; Quodl. IV, q. 5 (BF’s IV, q. 15). The Carmelite Simon F. Nolan has employed
these same questions and transcribed from P another seven (I.20; II.8 and 19; III.7 and
17; IV.6–7) for his 2006 Gregorian University thesis, “De anima eiusque operationibus
secundum Quaestiones quodlibetales Gerardi Bononiensis, O. Carm. (c. 1250–1317), primi
magistri Parisiensis ex ordine Carmelitarum.”
35
A. Samaritani, “De Beatae Mariae Virginis immaculata conceptione quodlibet
XIII–XIV saec. primum edita,” Marian Library Studies 5 (1975), pp. 729–835 (ed. on pp.
773–85); Samaritani’s question is on ff. 141vb–143rb in P. P does disagree frequently
with BF on minor things, and has an addition of eight words. Generally P is closer
to F than B, as one would expect from the absence in B of questions found in FP.

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from Quodlibet II or IV? Stephen Brown has edited the rst two ques-
tions of Quodlibet I, using all six witnesses known to him in the case
of question 1. Brown found that P preserves the best text and agreed
with Glorieux that it “follows the internal construction, divisions and
sub-divisions announced by the four Quodlibeta.” Thus Brown used P
as his base and considered BF’s overall organization to be the product
of “rearranging,” entailing their posteriority. Signicantly, although it is
not stated explicitly, Brown’s apparatus criticus shows that the differing
question lists correspond to rearrangements within the individual ques-
tions themselves. BF therefore would be a later redaction of the text.
If so, then Samaritani’s question would originally have been Quodlibet
II, q. 20, which accords with a note in B: “Nota, quaestiones 18, 19,
20, quae sunt in 4o quodlibet, sunt ultimatae tres de isto 2o quodlibet.”
And if P’s organization is to be trusted as authentic, then the questions
labelled as F’s Quodlibet V may simply be part of the original Quodlibet
IV as in P, which would have been held in Avignon.36 As we shall see,
however, there are also good reasons to take BF’s arrangement to be
prior to P’s.
Brown’s apparatus allows us to describe the manuscript tradition
with more precision. Besides the three main manuscripts, there are ve
fragments of Quodlibet I: Paris, BnF lat. 14572 (= R), contains questions
1–5 and 7–19 on ff. 7v–22v and question 6 on ff. 47–49 (it should be
stressed that this is a double codex and the foliation starts over again
in the second part, where Gerard’s questions are found); BAV, Vat.
lat. 932 (= V), preserves questions 1–10 (10 is incomplete) on ff. 88ra–
101rb; and BAV, Vat. lat. 829 (= X), has questions 1 (ff. 58ra–59va), 2
(ff. 60va–61ra), 3 (f. 67ra–b), and 5 (f. 61ra–b). X is an abbreviation,
but in question 1 it contains an argument absent in the other witnesses;
perhaps X stems from a separate reportatio of the disputation. In addi-
tion, Xiberta and Brown were unaware that BAV, Vat. lat. 2173 (= W),

Samaritani’s edition was done hastily and has errors in palaeography, punctuation,
and grammar. His unexplained decision to follow B slavishly resulted in further mis-
takes. Given this, P’s alleged “addition” of 8 words after sicut in l. 22 (“secundum eos,
in eodem instanti temporis simul fuit”) may really be B’s (and the editor’s) omission.
S.D. Dumont, “Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will in the Late Thirteenth
Century,” DSTFM 3.2 (1992) (pp. 561–97), on p. 575, n. 39, used P for this question
(although he cited it as “Quodl. I” instead of II).
36
Brown, “Gerard of Bologna’s Quodlibet I, quaestio 1,” esp. pp. 150–1, and idem,
“Gerard of Bologna on the Nature of the Good,” in Die Logik des Transzendentalen.
Festschrift für Jan Aertsen, M. Pickavé, ed. (Berlin-New York 2003), pp. 285–303, edition
of Quodl. I, q. 2, on pp. 293–303.

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contains questions 1–4 and 9 (9 is incomplete) on ff. 210r–214r, and

Hubert Borde has found that a copy of question 6, a. 1, is preserved
in Avignon, Médiathèque Ceccano 1071 (ff. 95ra–96ra). (In addition,
Oxford, Balliol College Library 63, preserves questions 1–7—q. 7 is
incomplete—of Quodlibet II on ff. 100ra–111rb.)37
Disregarding W, which Brown was not able to collate, P and BF (F is
missing the rst 30% of the rst question) represent two traditions, and
RV usually agree with BF. A close analysis suggests that we have a rst
redaction in P, a later revision from which stem BF and RV, the latter
being yet another revision where R is contaminated with P’s tradition.38
A possible stemma:

P ƣ

Ƥ ƥ

B F R V

The incipits talk about numbers of questions that were asked in the
quodlibetal disputations, while individual questions may also begin
“secundo quaerebatur,” and include statements like “ut videtur esse
intentio quaerentis.”39 Thus what we have does not appear to be so
revised by the author as to remove all hints of oral debate. The overall
impression, however, is that Gerard’s Quodlibeta as we have them are
not as close to the actual debates as Walsingham’s.

37
See Borde, “Gérard de Bologne, O.Carm.,” pp. 5–14, for a detailed description
of all witnesses.
38
At one point an entire argument is placed differently in P from BFRV (p. 166 of
Brown’s edition). BF have enough unshared variants that they appear to be independent
of each other, and they are both good witnesses. BF have what seem to be many small
additions, and at one point (p. 160) 72 words are added in the text in F but are put in
the margin in B, suggesting a later authorial revision in BF. RV omit 82 words exactly
where BF and P have differing sequences of arguments (p. 165), and elsewhere (p. 168)
BFP omit 46 words contained (and probably added) in RV, suggesting that RV is yet
another revision. R has a fairly good text, but V is poor and at times abbreviates. BFV
share an omission of 21 words (p. 168) where R has the text in P, so the scribe of R
probably had access to P’s tradition. It should be noted that P alone does not provide
a sufciently good text, either in Brown’s questions or in the one edited by Samaritani,
where P has errors and even omissions per homoioteleuton of 5 and 17 words.
39
E.g., Samaritani, “De Beatae Mariae Virginis,” pp. 773, l. 5, and 783, l. 240.

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The problem of the dating of Gerard’s Quodlibeta is just as complex

as that of their structure. The historical treatment of the dating issue
began badly with Glorieux’s and Joseph Koch’s mistaken assumption
that Gerard could not have participated in quodlibetal disputations as
Prior General of the Carmelites, a post he occupied from 1297 to his
death. Glorieux therefore dated Gerard’s Quodlibeta to 1294–97, thinking
that Gerard had already been master for one or two years by 1295.
Xiberta, however, understood that Gerard’s post as Prior General was no
obstacle to continuing his academic career, and he showed that Gerard
refers in his Quodlibeta to positions developed after 1300. Circa 1307
was Xiberta’s new dating, which Glorieux later adopted in revising his
earlier estimate to 1305–08. Oddly, Teertaert criticized the new dating
and reverted back to the theory of Koch (and of Glorieux himself ) that
Gerard could not have participated in quodlibetal debates after 1297:
“[I]l est très probable, sinon certain, qu’il n’a plus enseigné.” However,
in Worcester F 139, the autograph of the Oxford Benedictine Richard
of Bromwich’s Sentences commentary from after 1300, in material that
Richard added to the manuscript during a stay in Paris while Gerard
was Prior General, one of the disputants is actually referred to as
“Generalis Carm’,” which should put the matter to rest.40
Even with regard to Glorieux’s modied dating of 1305–08, how-
ever, Stephen Brown rightly notes that “the nal word on the years
of authorship has not yet been said.”41 It is possible that Gerard’s
Quodlibeta I–III stem from disputations at Paris as late as 1309–11, and
that Quodlibet IV (which includes F’s Quodlibet V) derives from a later
debate in Avignon. Unfortunately, the dating rests on the sometimes
equally confused chronology of Gerard’s other writings and the works
and activities of Richard Bromwich, Hervaeus Natalis, and Robert
Cowton. The material added to Bromwich’s autograph in Worcester
F 139 not only includes references to Gerard as Prior General, but also
turns out to contain Bromwich’s reportatio of two of Gerard’s Ordinary

40
Glorieux I, p. 128; J. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um
Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Münster i. W. 1927), p. 387; Xiberta, De
scriptoribus, pp. 76 and 82; Glorieux II, p. 94; Teetaert, “La littérature quodlibétique,”
p. 88; Little, “MS Worcester Q 99,” pp. 243 and 245; Moreover, S.D. Dumont, “The
Scotist of Vat. Lat. 869,” AFH 81 (1988) (pp. 254–83), pp. 275–7, shows that an author
writing in Paris ca. 1312–16 had heard (audivi) the chancellor and the Carmelite: the
chancellor is Francis Caracciolo (1309–16) and the Carmelite is Gerard in Quodl. III,
q. 7.
41
Brown, “Gerard of Bologna’s Quodlibet I, Quaestio 1,” p. 150.

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Questions, number 4: “Utrum des sit nobilior habitus omnibus habiti-

bus” (f. 262r) and number 7: “Utrum caritas sit habitus unus creatus in
anima” (f. 264r). In Xiberta’s opinion, Gerard’s Quodlibeta and Ordinary
Questions were composed simultaneously, and question 7 noted above
refers to Gerard’s Quodlibet I, q. 4. Thus the date of Bromwich’s repor-
tatio of Gerard’s Ordinary Questions would give us an approximate date
for the Quodlibeta. The most recent estimate for Bromwich’s Sentences
lectures is ca. 1305–09 in Oxford, and probably closer to 1305–06.
Unfortunately, F 139 explicitly states that the written Sentences com-
mentary contained therein was composed before he actually lectured on
the Sentences at Oxford, leaving open the possibility that Bromwich also
went to Paris to hear Gerard’s Ordinary Questions before giving his own
Sentences lectures in England. Still, it is likely that his journey to Paris
followed his lectures and would be dated after the summer of 1306.
If this is the terminus post quem for Gerard’s Ordinary Question 7, it would
still allow for Glorieux’s 1305 date for Quodlibet I.42
Besides citations of Scotus, Xiberta recognized references to Hervaeus
Natalis in Gerard’s Quodlibeta. Hervaeus received his license in 1307,
and his Paris regency and Quodlibeta I–III have been dated 1307–09/10.
The most important citations Xiberta found are as follows: Hervaeus’s
Quodlibet II, q. 3, on divine ideas, cites Gerard’s objections from the same
Quodlibet I, q. 7. In Quodlibet II, q. 10, Hervaeus replies to objections
raised in Gerard’s Quodlibet III, q. 7, where the Barcelona manuscript
has this marginal note: “Replicatio contra Hervaeum de extensione
animae.” Xiberta also found evidence that Hervaeus’ Quodlibet I and
Gerard’s Quodlibet III were held simultaneously. Thus Hervaeus’ Quod-
libeta and Bromwich’s manuscript would permit us to retain Glorieux’s
dating of Gerard’s Quodlibeta I–III to Paris 1305–07.43
There are two obstacles. First, Xiberta found that in question 7 of
Quodlibet I, Gerard inserts passages from the written version of Her-
vaeus’s I Sentences, d. 36, on divine ideas. Although Hervaeus lectured
on the Sentences early in the rst decade of the fourteenth century, the

42
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 82 (Quodlibeta—Ordinary Questions connection); R.L. Fried-
man and C. Schabel, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues IV: Ware and
Bromwich,” CIMAGL 75 (2004) (pp. 121–60), pp. 124–6 (Bromwich).
43
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 76, n. 1 (for the citations); Glorieux I, p. 201; Friedman’s
chapter in this volume for Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta; P.T. Stella, “A proposito di Pietro da
Palude (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1): La questione inedita ‘Utrum Deum esse innitum in
perfectione et vigore possit efcaci ratione probari’ di Erveo Natalis,” Salesianum 22
(1960) (pp. 245–325), at pp. 317–21.

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Ordinatio of his Sentences commentary appears to date from 1309 or

perhaps later, so Gerard’s Quodlibet I would be from 1309 or later. We
could remove this obstacle, however, by following Prospero T. Stella in
claiming that Gerard was referring to an early version of Hervaeus’
commentary.44 The second obstacle is more troublesome. In the question
Antonio Samaritani edited he identied a position of “aliqui” as that of
Robert Cowton, III Sentences, d. 3. As mentioned above, Cowton’s com-
mentary on all four books has recently been dated to ca. 1309–11, so
that question would be after “ca. 1309.” Unfortunately, we return to the
problem of whether this question is from Quodlibet II or IV: Samaritani
followed Glorieux’s “ca. 1308” dating for Quodlibet IV (following BF),
but Glorieux’s list actually has the question in Quodlibet II and dated
1306 (following P). If we take P to represent the original organization,
then it appears that we must modify our dating of Cowton’s Sentences
commentary by several years, to 1305–06 at the very latest—which is
possible. If we use BF’s arrangement, we would merely have to deal
with Quodlibet IV’s dating.45
One or more of the data provided by Xiberta, Samaritani, and
those who date Bromwich, Hervaeus, and Cowton could be mistaken,
of course, and perhaps all extant versions of Gerard’s Quodlibeta are
in some way the product of revision taking place much later than the
disputations themselves. Nevertheless, if we oppose the opinion of
Glorieux and Brown on the relative dating of the arrangements in
BF and P, we can save the other phenomena as they stand by positing
that BF reects the original organization, in which case we can accept
Glorieux’s dating of Quodlibeta I–III to 1305–07. Quodlibet IV in BF
could be placed somewhat later to take into consideration a dating of
Cowton’s book III to the spring of 1310. Since Gerard attended the
Council of Vienne, the three sessions of which met on 16 October
1311 and 3 April and 6 May 1312, Quodlibet IV in BF would best be
assigned to Advent 1310 or Lent 1311. Afterwards Gerard’s career prob-
ably more closely involved Avignon, where Gerard died in April 1317.
According to a note in the Florence manuscript (f. 152v), Quodlibet V
(= P’s IV) was disputed in Avignon. Gerard began the Summa no earlier

44
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 76, n. 1; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,”
p. 69.
45
Samaritani, “De Beatae Mariae Virginis,” pp. 773 and 778; Friedman, “The
Sentences Commentary,” p. 76; and W.J. Courtenay’s chapter on Vat. lat. 1086 in this
volume (on Cowton’s dates).

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than 1313, although 1314 or 1315 may be the more likely terminus post
quem, so perhaps Quodlibet V should be dated to Avignon after Advent
1312. Again, a critical edition will hopefully clear this up.46
Gerard of Bologna had an impact even outside his order. Prosper
of Reggio refers to him, as do anonymous Franciscans from the 1310s
and 1320s and the Augustinian Gerard of Siena. William of Ockham
even cited him once. In the fteenth century the Dominican Thomist
John Capreolus still referred to Gerard six times, although this was
probably via Peter Auriol.47 Auriol was an important conduit for later
thinkers, such as the anonymous Franciscan of the 1320s. It seems that
Gerard’s Quodlibeta were much more important to these non-Carmelite
authors than the Summa or Ordinary Questions. Writing while Gerard
was still working on the Summa, Auriol has ten citations of Gerard of
Bologna in his Scriptum on the rst book of the Sentences, and seven of
them refer explicitly to the Quodlibeta. It is signicant that all of these
citations are to the rst two Quodlibeta, which suggests that Auriol did
not have access to the later Quodlibeta when composing his Scriptum.
Auriol completed the Scriptum in late 1316 while in Paris. The bulk of
the work was done earlier and elsewhere, however, and it appears that
all of Auriol’s sources were available by about 1310, which is consistent
with the theory that Gerard’s Quodlibet IV is later than that.48
Within his own order Gerard was of course well known. Though
Gerard’s Parisian Quodlibeta appear to be somewhat earlier than
Walsingham’s Oxford disputations, we nd no citations of Gerard in
Walsingham’s Quodlibeta, although according to the sixteenth-century

46
Borde, “Magis de tenetur,” pp. 49–51 (Council of Vienne); Xiberta, De scriptoribus,
pp. 82 (Florence’s note); Schabel, “Early Carmelites between Giants,” pp. 149–50
(Summa).
47
For references to Gerard see BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, f. 23rb (Prosper); Dumont,
“The Scotist of Vat. Lat. 869,” p. 275 (anon. OFM from 1310s, using Quodl. III, q. 7);
R.L. Friedman and C.D. Schabel, “The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in
the 1320s,” AHDLMA 63 (1996) (pp. 357–72), p. 367 (anon. OFM of 1320s, probably
using Quodl. II, q. 1); C. Schabel, “Auriol’s Rubrics. Citations of University Theologians
in Peter Auriol’s Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum,” in Philosophical Debates at the
University of Paris in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century, S.F. Brown, T. Dewender,
and T. Kobusch, eds., Leiden: Brill, forthcoming.
48
See Schabel, “Auriol’s Rubrics.” The list of citations of Gerard’s Quodlibeta is
as follows: Quodl. I, q. 1, in Auriol’s d. 2, q. 1, a. 1 and d. 22, a. 2; I, q. 4, in d. 2,
q. 2, a. 2; I, q. 5, in d. 2, q. 3, a. 3; I, q. 20, in d. 1, q. 3, a. 2; II, q. 1, in d. 1, q. 1,
a. 1; II, q. 6, in the Prologue, q. 2, a. 3. For this last question, in an appendix to S.D.
Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’ Distinction between Intuitive and
Abstractive Cognition,” Speculum 64.3 (1989) (pp. 579–99), p. 595, there is an excerpt
based on P.

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ex-Carmelite John Bale, Walsingham cited Gerard in works that are

now lost. The later Parisians Guy Terrena, Sibert of Beek, John Bacon-
thorpe, and Michael Aiguani cited him, although it is not immediately
obvious to which work they refer. In his Sentences commentary from the
1340s, Paul of Perugia refers to Gerard explicitly on thirteen occasions;
some of these citations are to the Summa, others are unspecic, and a
few are certainly to the Quodlibeta.49
Given this reception and Gerard’s signicance in the history of
his order, a critical edition of his Quodlibeta is certainly needed. The
questions are numerous enough and of a sufcient variety that, along
with the incomplete Summa, they give a fairly comprehensive picture
of Gerard as theologian, despite the lack of a Sentences commentary.50
Thus, for example, although Gerard asks no question on the Filioque,
as would a sententiarius in distinction 11 of book I, one can combine
Quodlibet I, question 6, on emanations, and Quodlibet IV, question 2 (in P),
on the constitution of the hypostases, to discover that Gerard opposes
Scotus and supports Aquinas in afrming the necessity of the Filioque
for the distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit.51

Simon of Corbie
The Carmelite theologian John Trisse of Nîmes, who lectured on the
Sentences at Paris in 1361–62 and died the following year, has left us a
history of the Carmelite masters of theology at Paris from 1295 and
Gerard of Bologna down to 1360. Trisse lists the Frenchman Simon of
Corbie (de Corbeia) as the order’s second Parisian master of theology,
after Gerard and before Guy Terrena. “Beautiful in body, but more
beautiful in regimen and in mind,” in 1309 Simon secured the location
for the new Paris Carmelite convent at Place Maubert by working with
pope and king, and he donated many books to the convent. He was

49
Xiberta, “Robert Walsingham,” p. 171; idem, De scriptoribus, pp. 153, 205, and 363;
idem, Guiu Terrena, p. 103; Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Paul of Perugia” (in
Paul’s book III, q. 2, there is an unspecic reference probably to Samaritani’s question
on the immaculate conception; in book III, qq. 3–5, there are explicit citations of the
Quodlibeta on the incarnation, probably from Quodl. I).
50
Indeed K. Michalski, Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIV e siècle
(Krakow 1926; reprinted in idem, La philosophie au XIV e siècle. Six Études, ed. K. Flasch
[Frankfurt 1969]), who looks at Quodl. II, q. 6 (pp. 120–1) and q. 8 (p. 104) from P,
strangely refers to the Summa as the Sentences commentary (pp. 102–4).
51
See Friedman-Schabel, The Filioque in Parisian Theology from Scotus to the Black Death,
forthcoming.

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named prior provincial of France in the General Chapters of 1318,

1321, and 1324.52
Xiberta, who did not treat Simon separately, was aware that Vat.
lat. 1086 contained several citations of Simon and also “extracts or
reportationes” of questions by Simon the Carmelite, whom Xiberta identi-
ed “most probably” with Simon of Corbie.53 As William Courtenay’s
chapter above shows, Vat. lat. 1086, the manuscript of the Augustin-
ian Hermit Prosper of Reggio Emilia, provides abbreviated reportationes
of hundreds of questions dating from Paris from before 1318, prob-
ably prior to 1314. What Xiberta noted was four questions for which
“Simon” is written above the incipit, numbers 1, 11, 16, and 19 in the
list below, although he neglected to note that number 22 is also assigned
explicitly to Simon. Judging from other sections of Vat. lat. 1086, how-
ever, the normal procedure of the manuscript allows us to assign all of
the questions following the name “Simon” to our Carmelite until we
are given a new explicit attribution. The result is that a full twenty-three
questions are most likely Simon of Corbie’s. With foliation and length
in numbers of lines they are as follows (P = Pelzer):54
1. “Simon”: Utrum damnatus appetat non esse (112vb, 35).
2. Utrum ex venialibus possit generari habitus qui sit dispositio ad peccandum
mortaliter (112vb–113ra, 32).
3. Utrum fruitio creaturae rationalis [P: rationabilis] in patria necessario
requirat in potentia habitum supernaturalem, et similiter de cognitione
quantum ad lumen gloriae (113ra–va, 60).
4. Utrum papa conferens alicui benecium et exinde [P: ex illo] accipiens
(accipiat ms) fructus unius anni committat simoniam (113va–114ra, 107).
5. Utrum curatus pauper videns distrahi [P: distribui] bona ecclesiae possit
propter timorem non repetere (114ra–b, 45).
6. Utrum accipiens benecium per simulationem hypocrisim teneatur ad
restitutionem (114rb–va, 31).
7. Utrum unus canonicus possit commutare suam praebendam in praeben-
dam alterius canonici mediante pecunia, dato quod sint eiusdem ecclesiae
(114va–b, 22).
8. Canonicus existens in carcere se ipsum vulnerat, procurat ofcialis quod
sanetur; iterum postea propter carcerem percutit se et moritur: utrum
ofcialis sit irregularis (114vb, 17).

52
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 3 and 24, n. 2.
53
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, p. 24, n. 2.
54
See also A. Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini II. Pars prior. Codices 679–1134 (Vatican
City 1931), pp. 658, 661–2, and 664–5.

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9. Supposito quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco, utrum sint ibi circum-
scriptive (114vb–115ra, 21).
10. Sed utrum denitive <sint ibi> (115ra–b, 50).
11. “Simon”: Utrum paternitas et communis notio differant realiter ex natura
rei (115rb–va, 68).
12. Utrum paternitas magis distinguatur a liatione quam ab essentia (115va–
116ra, 66).
13. Utrum Deus quacumque specie data possit facere creaturam aliam et hoc
in innitum (116ra–va, 65).
14. Utrum una forma numero possit esse in diversis (116va–117ra, 71).
15. Utrum numerus 4 equorum sit idem numerus (117ra, 23).
16. [135ra] “M. Simon de Ca<r>melo: Utrum possit motus virtute Dei
reparari idem numero (135ra–b, 42).
17. Secunda quaestio, utrum ponentes materiam corporum superiorum esse
alterius generis quam inferiorum habeant ponere quod caelorum materia
sit alterius rationis (135rb–136ra, 105).
18. Utrum cognitio creaturae rationalis in patria et cognitio [exp.!] sibi respon-
dens habeant idem obiectum formale (136ra–va, 84).
19. [138vb] “M. Symon Car<melita>”: Utrum anima Christi in illo triduo
propter separationem fuerit in aliquo retardata a sua beatitudine (138vb,
15).
20. Utrum intellectus sit potentia pura nihil omnino actualitatis includens
(138vb-139ra, 34).
21. Utrum necesse [P: necessarie] sit voluntatem frui obiecto beatico eo
apprehenso sicut apprehenditur in patria (139ra–b, 69).
22. [158va] “M. Simon”: Utrum fruitio patriae et cognitio ei correspondens
sint possibiles viatori non abstracto a sensibus (158va, 25).
23. Utrum fruitio praesupponit in potentia habitum qui sit perfectior omni
habitu existente in intellectu, id est utrum caritas sit perfectior omni habitu
intellectus (158va–159ra, 59).
The rst group, numbers 1–15, includes some questions with common
themes, i.e., 4–8, 9–10, and 13–15, although without a close tie with
question 1, these groupings do not constitute further evidence for the
attribution. Question 11, assigned to Simon, does match up with ques-
tion 12, however. Moreover, questions 13–15, of the rst group, are
close in theme to question 16, the rst question of the second group,
also explicitly assigned to Simon. Likewise, question 22 of “Master
Simon,” on fruition, is connected with both question 21 from the pre-
vious set and the following question 23. On this basis we can say with
more certainty that all twenty-three questions are Simon’s. Moreover,
since there are links across the sets of questions in Vat. lat. 1086, we
can probably claim that these questions belong to a single group of
disputed questions. Finally, given that questions 4–8 concern beneces,
the life of the clergy, and the goods of the Church, topics not usually

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found in most theological questions, the group of questions probably

constitutes a quodlibet.
Judging from the abbreviations or abbreviated reportatio of Guy
Terrena’s Quodlibet I and part of Quodlibet II in the same manuscript
(see below), we can estimate that Vat. lat. 1086 contains only about
10% of the material that Simon’s written version would have contained,
perhaps 20% for certain questions, although there is no evidence that
Simon’s Quodlibet did circulate in written form. Thus these questions
merely provide a glimpse of his thought, and are of limited use.
In 1321 Simon was sent to be regent master in Paris “until he has
a successor,”55 meaning that there was at the time no one to fulll the
duties. This was Simon’s second period as regent master. Judging from
the dates of Vat. lat. 1086 and the Quodlibeta of Gerard of Bologna and
Guy Terrena, Simon’s rst regency and his surviving Quodlibet should
be dated to around 1312.

Guy Terrena
Being a compatriot, Xiberta took a special interest in the Catalan Guy
Terrena, the Doctor Breviloquus (ca. 1260/70–1342). Guy’s extensive
Quodlibeta constitute only a small part of his intellectual output, greater
than that of Gerard. Guy was master of theology at Paris by 1313, the
date of the rst of his six extant Quodlibeta, in question 13 of which,
against Arnau de Vilanova, Guy writes that “a nativitate Christi usque
nunc sunt mille trecenti tredecim, quia computamus mille trecentos
tredecim ab incarnatione Domini.” He served as Prior General of the
Carmelites from 1318 until 1321, when he entered the ranks of the
secular hierarchy as bishop of Majorca. He was transferred to Elna
in 1332.56

55
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 24, n. 2; 145, n. 2; and 172, n. 2.
56
For Xiberta’s nine articles on Guy written before 1932, see Guiu Terrena, p. 337;
for Guy’s life and extremely numerous works, pp. 1–80 (and “De Mag. Guidone,” pp.
113–99); and see pp. 271–3 (“De Mag. Guidone,” pp. 205–6) for lists of his other
theological questions: twelve Quaestiones ordinariae on the Word, of which qq. 1 and
2 were edited by A. Cañedo Cervera, El constitutivo formal de las personas divinas en dos
cuestiones ordinarias de Guido Terreni (Tesi di Laurea, Rome 1973) (pp. 22–65), which I
have not seen; 13 Quaestiones disputatae; and six assorted questions in Vat. lat. 901, edited
by J.P. Etzwiler, “Six Questions of Guido Terreni, O.Carm. († 1342). Vat. lat. 901,
ff. 140r–145v,” Carmelus 35 (1988), pp. 138–77.

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Again on the erroneous assumption that Guy could not have held
quodlibetal disputations after 1318 as Prior General or bishop, Glorieux
dated all of Guy’s Quodlibeta to between 1313 and 1318. Xiberta rejected
this criterion, and responded that Guy’s Quodlibeta VII and VIII are
reported to have once existed, probably held after 1318, perhaps in
Avignon. Moreover, Quodlibet VI, which Glorieux placed in 1318, was
most likely held after August 1320—maybe also in Avignon—when Guy
answered Pope John XXII’s request to give an opinion in connection
with an inquisitorial procedure against sorcery: Guy incorporated an
abbreviation of his response into Quodlibet VI, q. 14. Quodlibet V posses
more problems. Xiberta found that in question 16 from the rst half
of his Summa theologiae, Gerard of Bologna appears to have had access
to Guy’s Quodlibet V, q. 1, which Glorieux dated to 1317. If Xiberta is
right, since Gerard died in Avignon in April of that year, Glorieux’s
dating is too late. But Xiberta also saw “[l]’entrada en escena de Pere
d’Auriol al Quolibet V,” question 4, which if correct would probably
mean that Quodlibet V was held in Advent of 1316 at the earliest, since
this was Auriol’s rst term as bachelor of the Sentences. In addition, in
this volume Lauge Nielsen shows that Guy’s Quodlibet V, q. 14, responds
to material that Auriol would have presented in the summer of 1317 at
the earliest, thus giving Advent 1317 as rst possible session for Quodlibet
V. Finally, Maier found that Thomas Wylton refers to Guy’s Quodlibet
III in a question dated to Advent 1315 or early 1316.57
Assuming that Xiberta is in error about Gerard’s access to Guy’s
Quodlibet V, then Glorieux’s scheme can hold for the rst ve Quodli-
beta: I in 1313, II in 1314, III in 1315 (Lent, probably, but perhaps
Advent), IV in 1316, and V in Advent 1317. If, however, Xiberta is
correct, then the extant written Quodlibet V is a revision done after the

57
Glorieux I, p. 173; Xiberta, Guiu Terrena, pp. 8–9, 51, 68, 100 (quotation from
BAV, Borghese 39, f. 52vb; cf. f. 53rb); idem, “De Summa theologiae,” p. 33; A. Maier,
“Eine Verfügung Johanns XXII. über die Zuständigkeit der Inquisition für Zauber-
eiprozesse,” in eadem, Ausgehendes Mittelalter II (Rome 1967) (pp. 59–80, reprint from
AFP 22 [1952], pp. 226–46), p. 66 and n. 14 (previously, in 1948, she still followed
Glorieux’s 1313–18 dating; cf. p. 261); eadem, “Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentaren
des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in eadem, Ausgehendes Mittelalter I (Rome 1964) (pp. 265–305,
reprint from AFH 51 [1958], pp. 369–409), pp. 279–80; T. Turley, “Infallibilists in the
Curia of Pope John XXII,” Journal of Medieval History 1 (1975) (pp. 71–101), p. 93b,
n. 49. Many historians simply follow Glorieux, as for example P.G. Marcuzzi, “Una
soluzione teologico-giuridica al problema dell’usura in una questione de quolibet inedita
di Guido Terrini (1260–1342),” Salesianum 41 (1979) (pp. 647–84), p. 653, although he
edited Quodlibet VI, q. 12 (not 2, as I stated in “Early Carmelites,” p. 151, n. 19).

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summer of 1317 based on a disputation held in Advent 1316 at the

latest. If the earlier Quodlibeta all took place during the Lent sessions
in 1313, 1314, 1315, and 1316, the fth could have been held in the
next academic year. Unfortunately, the possibility of the later revision
of material stemming from the historical events always makes the dat-
ing of quodlibeta somewhat tentative.
Although three other manuscripts are known to have once existed,
there is now only one witness for Guy’s Quodlibeta: BAV, Borghese 39
(ff. 14ra–241vb), with the overall explicit: “Expliciunt Quelibet Magistri
Guidonis de Carmelo”; other explicits, such as to Quodlibeta I (f. 64va)
and V (f. 214va), also attribute the material to Master Guy of the
Carmelites. The manuscript was owned by the Benedictine theologian
Pierre Roger, the later Pope Clement VI, and was already in the 1369
catalogue of the papal library. It includes not only Guy’s Quodlibeta, but
also those of Sibert of Beek (as we shall see) and the Disputatio between
Francis of Meyronnes and Pierre Roger himself, dated to 1320–21.58
Unfortunately, Borghese 39 is very corrupt, as numerous editors
have noted. Although Guy’s Quodlibeta have received more modern
editorial attention than all other Carmelite Quodlibeta combined, and
more than fteen questions have been critically edited, perceptive edi-
tors have had to reconstruct the text in many places. It is interesting to
compare the efforts of Jorge Gracia and Stephen Brown, both of whom
edited question 1 of Quodlibet IV and saw many difculties.59 Editions

58
On the manuscript, see Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” pp.
312–3; A. Maier, Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae (Vatican City 1952), pp. 44–6;
J. Barbet, François de Meyronnes—Pierre Roger Disputatio (1320–1321) (Paris 1961), pp.
14–15 (on the Carmelites in the manuscript, see also pp. 31–2, although Sibert is not
mentioned). On the Quodlibeta, see Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone,” pp. 147–50, and Guiu
Terrena, pp. 37–8, and for question lists, Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone Terreni,” pp. 200–5,
and De scriptoribus, pp. 265–71; and Glorieux I, pp. 169–74, and II, p. 113.
59
The editions are as follows: Xiberta, Guiu Terrena, pp. 274–315 and 319–20 (Quodl.
I, q. 3, a. 2; III, q. 7; IV, qq. 2–3 and 11) (IV, q. 2, has been translated into Spanish
by J.J.E. Gracia, “Guido Terrena y la unidad real del universal: Quodlibeto IV, q. 2,”
Diálogos 9 [1973], pp. 117–31; on p. 119, n. 9, Gracia announced: “Estoy preparando
una edición critica de los Quodlibetos de Guido,” but he later abandoned the project);
Graf, De subiecto psychico II, pp. 110*–19* (Quodl. I, q. 15); Xiberta, “Guidonis Terreni,
O. Carm. Quaestio de coexsistentia dei et visionis intuitivae (Quodlibet I, q. 12),”
Miscelanea Comillas 34–35 (1960), pp. 355–72 (Quodl. I, q. 12; Xiberta has numerous
emendations, and he comments on p. 356: “Textus haud parum est corruptus; decienti-
bus autem aliis adminiculis emendandus fuit attento sensu, qui in sermone scholastico
normam sat tutam saepe praebet. In nonnullis partibus textum restituere non valui . . .”);
J.J.E. Gracia, “Tres quaestiones de Guido Terrena sobre los transcendentales,” Analecta
Sacra Tarraconensia 45 (1972), pp. 87–130 (Quodl. II, q. 1; IV, q. 1; and V, q. 1; comment-

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without emendations are likely to be problematic, and a collation of

the manuscript against some of the fragments preserved elsewhere
(separately or incorporated into other works of Guy and others) shows
such reconstruction to be not only justied, but also necessary. Given
this corruption and the superiority of other witnesses, the following
table listing the fragments of which I am aware will be useful (with
foliation where known; (?) = uncertain):
Quodl. I and Quodl. II, qq. 1–5, 7 = reportatio of Prosper of Reggio Emilia60
Quodl. I, q. 1 = in Guy, Quaestio ordinaria 2 (Firenze, BNC II.II.281, 139r–
142v)
Quodl. I, q. 3 = in Guy, Quaestiones in libros Ethicorum I

ing on p. 87: “El manuscrito . . . está plagado de lagunas, repeticiones, homoteleuta y

errores gramaticales”); Samaritani, “De Beatae Mariae Virginis,” pp. 798–820 (Quodl.
III, q. 14; Samaritani has a few emendations); Marcuzzi, “Una soluzione teologico-
giuridica,” pp. 654–66 (Quodl. VI, q. 12; Marcuzzi has several emendations, but never-
theless comments on p. 652: “Per il resto possiamo dire che il copista ha trascritto con
diligenza e grande accuratezza il testo, tando da preoccuparsi lui stesso di correggere
più volte gli errori compiuti nel corso della trascrizione”); J. Perarnau i Espelt, “Guiu
Terrena critica Arnau de Vilanova. Edició de la ‘Quaestio utrum per notitiam sacrae
scripturae possit determinate sciri tempus Antichristi’,” Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics 7–8
(1988–89), pp. 171–222, including word index on pp. 203–11 (Quodl. I, q. 13; on p. 181
Perarnau speaks of “deciènces redaccionals,” and his edition has many emendations);
S.F. Brown, “Guido Terrena and the Unity of the Concept of Being,” DSTFM 3.2
(1992), pp. 599–631 (Quodl. IV, q. 1); Schabel, “Early Carmelites between Giants,” pp.
186–205 (Quodl. I, q. 2, a. 2, and Quodl. VI, q. 3); R.L. Friedman, “On the Trail of a
Philosophical Debate: Durand of St Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts
in the Intellect,” in Philosophical Debates, Brown, Dewender, and Kobusch, eds. (Quodl. I,
q. 14); L. Nielsen’s chapter in this volume (Quodl. V, q. 14). For an analysis of Quodl. IV,
q. 5, see F. Desiderio, Il valore apologetico del miracolo (Rome 1955), pp. 58–66 (observing
on p. 59, n. 7: “Il manoscritto che abbiamo consultato contiene molte mende . . . Per
il senso di alcuni periodi alle volte ci ha fatto di guida il contesto”). For a section of
Quodl. I, q. 2, a. 1, see the appendix in Dumont, “Theology as a Science,” pp. 595–6;
of the ten excerpts he publishes, Dumont complains only about Borghese 39, on p.
596, n. 1. Likewise, in quoting just two sentences from Quodl. III, q. 8, Dumont, “Time,
Contradiction,” p. 593, n. 92, had to make two corrections.
60
After two or three of his Ordinary Questions, Guy’s Quodlibet I and qq. 1–5 and 7 of
Quodlibet II are reported in summary fashion in BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, ff. 260v–273v. See
also Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini II, pp. 674–76. To judge from a. 2 of Quodlibet I, q. 2,
edited in Schabel, “Early Carmelites,” pp. 187–92, only about 10% of the material is
contained in Prosper’s abbreviation (f. 260rb): “Secundo videndum quomodo futurum
ut futurum cognoscitur a Deo. Dicunt quidam quod futurum a Deo cognoscitur ut
praesens, ut dicit Thomas, quaestionibus De veritate.—Contra, quidam: Deus per suam
immensitatem non coexistit nisi loco in actu, ita nec secundum aeternitatem non coexistit
nisi rei existenti; sed dicendum quod Thomas intellexit quod solum coexistit secundum
intelligentiam, quia creaturae antequam erant erant in Deo cognitione, ut dicit Augus-
tinus et Anselmus—sed non secundum existentiam, quia ut sic non erant, sed solum
secundum esse cognitum. Sicut enim divina cognitio eius coexistit aeternitati, ita esse
cognitum. De hoc habetur 83 quaestionum quaestione 18, 5 Trinitate capitulo ultimo, XI

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Quodl. I, q. 6 = in Peter of Palude, III Sent., d. 6, q. 2 (ed. Paris 1519, 36v–)

Quodl. I, q. 13 = Paris, BnF lat. 16523 (79v–83r; not used by Perarnau, “Guiu
Terrena”)
Quodl. I, q. 15 = in Guy, Quaestiones in libros Ethicorum II
Quodl. II, q. 15 = Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral 28 (47v–50v)
Quodl. II, q. 16 = Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral 28 (50v–53r)
Quodl. III, q. 1 = Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, lat. A.1024
(65r–)
Quodl. III, q. 10 = in John Baconthorpe, III Sent., d. 36 (British Library, Royal
11.C.vi, 341ra–343vb)
Quodl. III, q. 15 = Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral 28 (53r–54v)
Quodl. IV, q. 1 = in Guy, Quaestio ordinaria 10 (Firenze, BNC II.II.281, 175v–)
Quodl. IV, q. 2 = also in Guy, Quaestio ordinaria 10 (ed. Xiberta, Guiu Terrena)
Quodl. IV, q. 3 = in Guy, Quaestio ordinaria 9 (ed. Xiberta, Guiu Terrena)
Quodl. IV, q. 4 = abbreviated after Quodl. IV, q. 15 (BAV, Borghese 39, mid-
192vb–top 193vb)
Quodl. VI, q. 3 = in Guy, Commentarii super Decretum Gratiani (ed. Schabel, “Early
Carmelites”)
Quodl. VI, q. 10 = in Guy, Concordia Evangeliorum (BAV, Ross. lat. 1065, 203r)
Quodl. VI, q. 11 = in Guy, Commentarii super Decretum Gratiani (?) (Vat. lat. 1453,
217r–v)
Quodl. VI, q. 14 = in Guy, Responsio (Borghese 348, 18r–37r; Valencia, Biblioteca
de la Catedral 200, 219vb–229va)
Quodl. VI, q. 15 = in Guy, Commentarii super Decretum Gratiani (?) (BAV, Vat. lat.
1453, 191v) 61
Xiberta hinted that other quodlibetal questions were included in Guy’s
Ethics and Decretum commentaries,62 and any future scholar working
toward a critical edition of Guy’s Quodlibeta must make a thorough
investigation of Guy’s other works. Xiberta’s edition of questions 2–3
of Quodlibet IV showed that the manuscript of the Quaestiones ordinariae
was of much use, and my edition of Guy’s Quodlibet VI, q. 3, from Bor-
ghese 39 and the two medieval witnesses of the corresponding section
of Guy’s own Decretum commentary demonstrates the vast inferiority of
the Borghese codex.63 Likewise, a collation of a column of Quodlibet II,
q. 10, in Borghese 39 (f. 156va) against the manuscript of Baconthorpe’s

Civitate Dei capitulo 12.—Tunc dico quod futurum a Deo cognoscitur ut futurum, quia
sic est.—Item, cognoscitur ut praesens, quia relucet acsi esset praesens.”
61
Xiberta, “De doctrinis theologicis,” pp. 236, n. 1, and 249, and Guiu Terrena, pp.
32, n. 1, 38, 51, 98, 256–7, and 269; Glorieux II, p. 113; J. Goñi, “Catálogo de los
manuscritos teológicos de la Catedral de Pamplona,” part 2, Revista Española de Teología 17
(1957) (pp. 383–418), pp. 396–7; Dumont, “The Scotist of Vat. Lat. 869,” p. 276.
62
Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone,” p. 182, and Guiu Terrena, pp. 48 and 65.
63
Editions in Xiberta, Guiu Terrena, and Schabel, “Early Carmelites.”

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I Sentences, d. 10 (London, British Library, Royal 11.C.vi, f. 341ra–b)

revealed a few errors in Borghese and an omission of 16 words. The
Pamplona 28 witness to questions 15–16 of Quodlibet II contains the
same text as Borghese, about equal in quality, with occasional signs of
abbreviation.
There are other irregularities. Quodlibet I, q. 15, refers to “primo
Quolibet,” on f. 114vb, perhaps meaning that he was writing later.
Palude’s inclusion of Guy’s Quodlibet I, q. 6, into his III Sentences would
argue for a terminus post quem of 1313 for Peter of Palude’s written com-
mentary on book III, contradicting evidence that Palude had nished
that book by 22 November 1312. While a later date would allow more
time for Palude to have absorbed the second redaction of Durand of
St Pourçain’s Sentences commentary, it is again possible that Guy revised
Quodlibet I well after the disputation. Indeed, Baconthorpe claimed that
Guy’s Quodlibet I, q. 14, is directed at Palude himself, which entails a
terminus ante quem of 1313 for Palude’s Sentences lectures, which ts in
with earlier theories.64
At least one question that is announced is missing (Quodlibet V, q. 16),65
and there is some confusion in the manuscript about the composi-
tion of Quodlibeta III and IV. On f. 171va, after Quodlibet III, q. 15,
the manuscript has a brief note in normal lettering: “Explicit tertium
Quodlibet, incipit quartum,” without any space. Xiberta took this to
be the end of Quodlibet III, and Glorieux followed his numbering. On
f. 179va, however, after what Xiberta and Glorieux call Quodlibet IV,
q. 2, there is a gap with a note in larger lettering: “Explicit quartum
Quodlibet Magistri Guidonis de Carmelo, incipit quintum post per
ordinem usque ad nem,” which is crossed out and under which is
written: “Explicit tertium Quodlibet Magistri Guidonis, incipit quar-
tum quartum (sic) Quodlibet.” Despite the error, the division is closer
in form to other divisions in the manuscript. The following question,
on the top of f. 179vb, is “Utrum possit efcaci ratione probari quod
Deus sit causa effectiva omnium,” i.e., Xiberta’s Quodlibet IV, q. 3, and
in the table of questions on f. 195va, we read: “Quarti Quolibet prima
quaestio est utrum efcaci ratione possit probari Deum esse causam

64
For the Baconthorpe claim, see Xiberta, “De doctrinis theologicis,” p. 305. For
Palude’s dates, see C. Schabel, R.L. Friedman, and I. Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of
Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents,”
AFP 71 (2001) (pp. 183–300), pp. 213–17.
65
Xiberta, Guiu Terrena, p. 270.

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effectivam omnium,” the very same question. Granted, the question

list omitted the question that Xiberta takes to be the rst question of
Quodlibet IV and puts it in the margin, and its editor, Jorge Gracia, then
assumes that the words “Quarti Quolibet prima quaestio est” apply to
the question in the margin. Nevertheless, there is no indication in the
manuscript that this is a correct assumption. The evidence rather is in
favor of changing the appellation of Xiberta’s Quodlibet IV, qq. 1 and
2, to Quodlibet III, qq. 16 and 17 respectively, and then renumbering
the whole of Quodlibet IV. Unfortunately, the topics of these questions
are not typical of the beginning or the end of a quodlibet, so they do
not help us place them.
Given some of the above peculiarities, it is clear that what we have
may not exactly be reportationes of Guy’s determinations from the
quodlibetal debates. Nevertheless there are a great many indications
of the oral origins of Guy’s questions, as Xiberta points out. There are
references to proponentes, respondentes, and opponentes, and even remarks
such as “This question requires an extensive treatment, but I cannot
consider it so much for now, since I have to give up the chair soon.
Thus briey . . .”66
Guy’s surviving quodlibetal questions total ninety-seven, one hundred
if one counts some lengthy sub-questions in Quodlibet I. They touch
upon a great variety of subjects, such as “Whether a spiritual father
carnally knowing his spiritual son ( lium, in the manuscript) sins more
than a carnal father with his carnal daughter.” The questions are not
only interesting, but inuential, since Guy Terrena was an important
scholar in his day. We have seen that a variety of theologians of his
era dealt with him in debate or via his written Quodlibeta: the secular
theologian Thomas Wylton, the Franciscan Peter Auriol, the Augus-
tinian Prosper of Reggio Emilia, the Benedictine Pierre Roger, and
of course the Carmelites Gerard, Sibert, and Baconthorpe. His later
writings secured his reputation, and it is primarily for these that he is
remembered.67 Nevertheless, in the 1340s Paul of Perugia still referred
to Guy’s theological opinions.68 As complicated as it would be, the criti-
cal edition of Guy’s Quodlibeta is much to be desired.

66
Xiberta, “De Mag. Guidone,” pp. 148–9, and Guiu Terrena, pp. 54–5.
67
See, e.g., B. Tierney, The Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150–1350 (Leiden 1972),
pp. 238–72.
68
Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Paul of Perugia,” p. 62.

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Sibert of Beek
The primary surviving witness for Guy Terrena’s Quodlibeta, BAV,
Borghese lat. 39, also contains the two Quodlibeta of Sibert of Beek
on ff. 242ra–298vb, according to the explicit (f. 298va): “Expliciunt
Quelibet Magistri Syberti Ordinis Beate Marie de Carmelo.”69 Sibert
was probably born in the 1260s in Beek near Nijmegen and seems to
have joined the Carmelites in 1280 in Cologne, the nearest convent
at the time. Sibert played an important role in the German province,
helping set up a convent in his homeland, becoming prior there in 1312,
acting as prior of Cologne in 1315–17, and serving as Prior Provincial
of Germany from 1317 until his death in late 1332 in Cologne, where
he was buried. Except for the Quodlibeta and a brief tract against Mar-
silius of Padua’s Defensor pacis written for Pope John XXII, Sibert’s few
surviving writings concern Carmelite rules and regulations, including
his main work, the Ordinale, composed before 1315.70
Since his active years in the order correspond with his academic
career at Paris, we see once again that knowing a Carmelite’s admin-
istrative career does not help in dating his theological works. We know
that Sibert studied in Paris in 1310–12, when, Xiberta suggests, he may
have lectured on the Sentences. Earlier writers claimed that he became
master of theology in 1316 or 1317, and we know he was regent master
at Paris on 11 June 1318 (Pentecost) and still in April 1319. Since in
1321 Simon of Corbie was sent to be regent master at Paris again until
a successor could be found, and Simon took up his post as regent mas-
ter by 7 June (Pentecost), on Xiberta’s hint, Glorieux stated that Sibert
reigned from 1318–20 and probably held the quodlibetal disputations
that are recorded in 1318 and 1319.71 Later, however, Xiberta claimed
that, in his Quodlibet I, q. 11, Sibert refers to Peter Auriol as “Venerabilis
doctor et magister meus” in responding to Auriol’s Quodlibet, q. 9, a. 4,
although probably via the oral debate or a version other than the one
preserved. This would move the terminus post quem of Sibert’s Quodlibeta

69
For a question list, see Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” pp. 313–4,
reprinted in idem, De scriptoribus, pp. 150–1, and Glorieux I, pp. 274–5 (who mistakenly
states that the Quodlibeta are contained on ff. 242v–297v rather than 242r–298v). A
tabula quaestionum is on 298vb.
70
For his life and writings, Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” pp.
307–12, and De scriptoribus, 142–8.
71
Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” pp. 308–9; Glorieux I,
p. 274.

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forward to 1320, and since Xiberta also discovered that Baconthorpe

incorporated question 5 of Sibert’s Quodlibet II into his own distinction
40 of book II of the Sentences, that would be our terminus ante quem.72
Recently, however, Lauge Nielsen and Cecilia Trifogli published
an edition of Sibert’s Quodlibet I, q. 11, as part of a study of Thomas
Wylton’s questions on the beatic vision, coming up with some interest-
ing conclusions. First, they see no reason to identify Auriol as Sibert’s
opponent, thus eliminating the terminus post quem of 1320. Second, Sibert
was most probably attacking Thomas Wylton. Sibert’s and Wylton’s
texts allow the following reconstruction: according to Sibert, during
his inception dispute as master of theology he defended his position in
his Vesperies, i.e., the rst part of the dispute, and some masters did
not get his point and argued against him, including a quodam venerabili
doctore et magistro meo, the presiding master, probably Wylton; the next
day, during the aula, i.e., the second part of the dispute, held in the
bishop’s hall or aula, Sibert defended his position again, according to
Wylton’s testimony; later, in his second quodlibetal question, Wylton
attacked Sibert; nally, Sibert defended his position yet again in his own
Quodlibet I, q. 11. Since Wylton’s Quodlibet could date from Lent 1316,
Sibert’s inception may indeed have occurred in early 1316. Although
Glorieux’s 1318 and 1319 dates for the two Quodlibeta may be correct,
perhaps Sibert’s rst Quodlibet was held in 1317, given that Guy Terrena’s
Quodlibet V may date to Advent 1316.73
Quodlibet I contains sixteen questions and Quodlibet II has ve, although
question 10 of Quodlibet I and the second question of Quodlibet II are
identical: “Consequenter de potestate sacerdotali quaerebatur unum,
utrum scilicet potestas sacerdotalis sit unica.” There are many indica-
tions here and elsewhere that the questions are Sibert’s determinations
stemming from and reecting actual quodlibetal debates. One reads
about the “argumentum proponentis,” for example, and Sibert describes
what was argued “in disputatione.” Nevertheless the text as we have it
is the product of modication and revision. Considering the identical
questions noted above, it is doubtful that Sibert could have given the

72
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 145, 149, and 151–3. There are also excerpts of
Sibert’s Quodl. I, q. 5, in Baconthorpe’s I Sent., d. 19 (“De Magistro Iohanne Bacon-
thorp,” p. 121).
73
L.O. Nielsen and C. Trifogli, “Questions on the Beatic Vision by Thomas
Wylton and Sibert de Beka,” DSTFM 17 (2006), pp. 511–84, especially pp. 512, n. 7,
513, 516–19, 527–8 (ll. 129–130 and 140–141), and the edition of Sibert’s question
on 576–84 (esp. ll. 90–91, 112–113, 227–30, and 250–254).

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same determination on two occasions, and this may cast doubt on the
remaining questions. Moreover, the written Quodlibeta are incomplete,
for the incipit to Quodlibet I says: “In prima disputatione de quolibet
quaerebantur XVII quaestiones, quarum tres fuerunt circa Deum et
aliae circa creaturas.” The rst three of the extant questions do concern
God, so one of the questions on creatures is missing. Since question
11 itself is incomplete, and there is a large lacuna of three columns
afterwards on 273va–274ra, perhaps the original question 12 is gone.
Likewise, the rst article of Quodlibet II, q. 4, is missing.74
Only three questions of Sibert’s Quodlibeta have so far been edited
(Quodlibet I, qq. 3, 5, and 11).75 As Xiberta already noted, the Borghese
manuscript is no better here than it is for the Guy Terrena section.76 A
collation of the two copies of the question on priestly power allows us
to see how poor the manuscript is. In the rst column (ff. 269vb and
289va) each copy has a major omission of six or ten words, and there
are a great number of other errors in one or the other copy. A collation
of a column of Sibert’s Quodlibet II, q. 5 (f. 297ra), against Baconthorpe’s
II Sentences, d. 40 (London, British Library, Royal 11.C.vi, f. 272va–b),
besides the poor quality of the Sibert manuscript, appears to show
either that Baconthorpe made many changes (which is not his usual
procedure) or that he relied on a slightly different version of Sibert’s
question, perhaps a reportatio. Obviously, for the eighteen questions for
which there is only one copy, the same obstacles to getting a good text
for Guy are present here.
Other than his rather ambivalent attitude toward Aquinas and his
dispute with Wylton,77 little is known about Sibert as a theologian.
Baconthorpe must have known his work well, but otherwise Sibert’s
ideas may have been forgotten, both then and now. Nevertheless, his
quodlibetal questions teach us more about Carmelite theories on central

74
See also Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” p. 313.
75
Besides Nielsen and Trifogli’s edition of q. 11 in “Questions on the Beatic
Vision,” see q. 5 in Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” pp. 333–41,
and q. 3 in Friedman-Schabel, The Filioque in Parisian Theology, forthcoming. Xiberta’s
article contains extensive quotations from several other questions.
76
Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” p. 313: “Imperfectiones tran-
scriptionis abundant: pluries spatium unius verbi (quod amanuensis forte non intellexit)
relinquitur.”
77
Xiberta, “Duo ‘quelibet’ inedita Siberti de Beka,” pp. 315–32; Nielsen and Trifogli,
“Questions on the Beatic Vision.”

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theological issues as well as on such things as the death penalty and

priestly power.

John Baconthorpe
The very prolic John Baconthorpe, the Doctor Resolutus, is perhaps
the best known of the early Carmelites. He was so important in his
order that the Carmelites gave ofcial support to his teaching in the
sixteenth century, for example by encouraging the publication of his
works; both his Sentences commentary and his three Quodlibeta have been
printed more than once. By the seventeenth century Baconthorpe had
become de facto the ofcial doctor of the order.78 Nevertheless, his dates
remain uncertain. We know that, already master of theology, he was
the Carmelites’ Prior Provincial for England from perhaps 1326 and at
least by 1327 to 1333; he argued with Thomas Bradwardine and com-
posed a second version of his commentary on book IV of the Sentences
around 1340; he was most likely still alive in 1345 and certainly dead
in 1352; and his probable date of death is 1348 (of the Plague?), the
commonly reported date of 1346 being less likely.79
When Xiberta and Glorieux wrote their main works, the only known
witnesses to Baconthorpe’s three Quodlibeta were the three early modern
editions: Venice 1527 (= A), Cremona 1618 (= B, based on A), and
Madrid 1754 (= C, reprinted from B). Since that time two substantial
fragments in the following manuscripts have come to light: BAV, Vat. lat.
5733 (= V), and Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego 53/102
(= P). V is paper, written in one column, containing Pietro Pomponazzi’s
De fato and some older works of philosophy, unnumbered quodlibetal
questions of Baconthorpe on ff. 294r-368r, a section of another Bacon-
thorpe question on 369r-370v, and questions from an anonymous
Sentences commentary (one of them taken from the Carmelite Francis
Bacon). According to Xiberta, who described the fragment three decades
after the publication of De scriptoribus, the codex is fteenth century, but
the hand actually appears to be sixteenth century. Xiberta seems to have
been unaware of P, described by Wladyslaw Senko around the same
time: parchment, two columns, containing an abbreviation of Peter

78
On his many works, see Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 38–98.
For his later reputation, see Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 67–9.
79
See Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp, O. Carm.,” pp. 10–25, and De
scriptoribus, pp. 168–76.

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Auriol’s Scriptum in I Sententiarum and assorted theological material mostly

from Paris in the 1310s and 1320s, including some of Baconthorpe’s
quodlibetal questions on ff. 201ra–208vb, constituting an entire quire.
Senko dated the manuscript to the rst half of the fourteenth century,
but it could be from the second half. According to Glorieux’s number-
ing, the fragments contain the following questions:80

Vat. lat. 5733 Pelplin 53/102

Quodl. I, q. 10: 294r–300v Quodl. III, q. 7, a. 1: 201ra–b
Quodl. I, q. 12: 301r–307v Quodl. III, q. 8: 201rb–202vb
Quodl. I, q. 11: 307v–315v Quodl. III, q. 9: 202vb–203vb
Quodl. I, q. 13: 315v–319r Quodl. III, q. 10: 203vb–204vb
Quodl. I, q. 14: 319r–326v Quodl. III, q. 11: 204vb–205vb
Quodl. II, q. 1: 326v–333r Quodl. III, q. 12: 205vb–207ra
Quodl. II, q. 2: 333v–342v Quodl. III, q. 15: 207ra–208va
Quodl. II, q. 3; 342v–347v
Quodl. II, q. 4: 347v–352v
Quodl. II, q. 5, beginning: 11 lines on 353r
(353v–355v blank)
Quodl. I, q. 9: 356r–368r

Quodlibet I has fourteen questions, Quodlibet II has twelve, and, according

to B’s and Glorieux’s numbering, Quodlibet III has sixteen (although in A
questions 3 and 4 are both labelled 3, with a corresponding shift in the
numbering of the remaining questions). Of these forty-two questions,
then, the manuscripts preserve all of sixteen and part of two more.
The fragments provoke questions about the original composition of
the Quodlibeta. Xiberta found that A’s editor, Marco Antonio Zimara,
must have followed his manuscript exemplar very faithfully, so that often

80
For the Baconthorpe section in V, see B.M. Xiberta, “Notulae bibliographicae
Carmelitanae,” Carmelus 9 (1962) (pp. 91–5), pp. 92–3. For P, see W. Senko, “Quelques
contributions à l’histoire de la littérature philosophique du XIVe siècle d’après le MS
53/102 de la bibliothèque du Grand Seminaire de Pelplin,” MPP 11 (1963) (pp. 69–85),
p. 81. For the identication of the abbreviation of Auriol, see C. Schabel, “Parisian
Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini and the Problem of Predes-
tination,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, Evans, ed. (pp. 221–65), pp. 240–1 and n. 43. For
question lists, see Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 123–5, and De
scriptoribus, pp. 194–6; Glorieux II, pp. 149–50. In addition, Xiberta, “De Magistro
Iohanne Baconthorp,” p. 46, n. 1, reports that Baconthorpe himself copied his own
Quodl. II, q. 12, into his Sentences commentary, after book II, d. 8, and his Quodl. II,
q. 11, after his II Sent., d. 14.

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cross-references in the edition even include letters that corresponded

to marks in other manuscripts the scribe or author possessed, for
example, “Aliud exemplum tangit q. 2, b.” Nevertheless Xiberta noticed
one irregularity in the rst Quodlibet in A: articles 2–6 of question 12
are attached to question 11, followed by articles 2–6 of question 10.
Obviously folios had been misbound in A’s exemplar, so that questions 10
and 12 were truncated and question 11 became extremely long. Xiberta
saw that the editor of B, the Carmelite Chrysostomo Marasca, xed
these questions, and he concluded that Marasca must have had access
to a manuscript in order to restore the correct sequence.81 Although
the error would grab any diligent reader’s attention immediately, since
one of the breaks occurs in mid-sentence, nevertheless it does appear
that Marasca had a manuscript at hand.
The fragment in V,82 however, suggests that Marasca’s efforts were
not completely successful and that he did not use his manuscript
extensively, something borne out by a comparison of the readings of
A and B (see below). Quodlibet I, q. 10, begins at the top of the page
in V, and Quodlibet II, q. 5, ends in mid-page after just the beginning.
After a blank space meant to be lled in with the rest of the question,
we nd Quodlibet I, q. 9, probably added as an afterthought. This frag-
ment was probably never part of a larger text, but on ff. 404r–407r one
nds summaries of various questions, starting with the rst question of
Baconthorpe’s Quodlibet I, and on f. 407v there is a tabula quaestionum for
all of Quodlibet I. Thus the scribe probably had access to a complete
witness, and we should take its structure seriously.
Since V contains the last ve questions of Quodlibet I and the rst ve
of Quodlibet II in the order of the printed versions, except for revers-
ing questions 11 and 12, the obvious conclusion is that A and B are
incorrect with respect to the sequencing of these two questions. What
actually happened is quite simple but rather difcult to describe, so the
interested reader should refer to Appendix I for the details. Basically,
three sections—probably small quires—had fallen out of A’s exemplar.
When they were replaced, they were misbound and later copied thus

81
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 64–5, and De scriptoribus, pp.
183–4.
82
It should be noted that a leaf is missing in V, between ff. 298 and 299, the recla-
mans on f. 298 referring to the missing leaf. The material corresponds to parts of aa.
4 and 5 of q. 10. It should also be noted that the editions’ awkward division of the
Quodlibeta into three “books” is not in V.

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into A. Marasca realized something was wrong and attempted to x

it in B. Here is a simplied schema, with seven portions of text of
unequal sizes:

A. Original order in A’s exemplar before quires fell out:

Quodl. I, qq. 1–9 quire 1 (text quire 2 (text quire 3 (text text 7 & q. 13
1–2) 3–4) 5–6) to end
B. Rebound order in A’s exemplar as copied by Zimara in A:
Quodl. I, qq. 1–9 quire 3 (text quire 2 (text quire 1 (text text 7 & q. 13
5–6) 3–4) 1–2) to end
C. Marasca’s reconstruction in B:
Quodl. I, qq. 1–9 text 1 text 6 text 3 text 2 text 7 text 4 text 5 & q. 13
to end

The error is signicant for three reasons: rst, it shows that Marasca
probably appealed to his manuscript only when in extreme doubt,
and generally just copied A. Second, we should follow V’s sequence
of questions, thus reversing questions 11 and 12, although except for
a few lines we can more or less keep B’s text of each question intact,
but of course not A’s. Third, the extensive internal references in the
Quodlibeta in the fragments and in the editions, discussed below, need
to be reconsidered in light of V’s correct order: references to questions
10–12 in A are likely to be incorrect, and those to questions 11 and
12 in B should probably be reversed.
The third Quodlibet is also problematic. It has been mentioned that two
questions are listed as number 3 in A (was the second one inserted?),
while in B the second is number 4 and for the remainder A’s and B’s
numbering differ by one. In addition, following the last question (15/16),
A copies the exemplar’s explicit (conrmed by P; see just below) and
then adds a separate question from Baconthorpe on papal infallibility.
B, however, drops the explicit and gives the mistaken impression that the
question on infallibility is question 17 of Quodlibet III. Finally, Xiberta
noticed that a few lines of A’s question 13 (B’s 14) are wrongly placed
at the end of its question 4 (B’s 5).83
Again, the fragment in P provokes questions. P was always a frag-
ment: on f. 201ra–b, what Senko thought was a separate question on

83
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 64–5, and De scriptoribus,
p. 184.

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apostolic poverty, is actually article 1 of question 7 (A’s 6). It is not

a continuation from a previous folio/quire, because it begins with a
large initial in the rst word of the article and, more importantly, it
omits the rest of the question. Also, question 15 (A’s 14) ends on the
bottom of f. 208va, and following the colophon on 208vb the rest of
the column is blank.
Although P is a fragment, there may be reason to respect its sequence
of questions. P contains B’s questions 7–12 and 15 (A’s 6–11 and 14).
Either the scribe of P consciously omitted questions 13–14 and 16, or
there is a problem. Questions 13 and 14 (A’s 12 and 13) both deal with
Mary’s immaculate conception and lack the surrounding questions’ fre-
quent references to socii and other contemporaries that seem to reect
actual debates. Since A—and presumably A’s exemplar—has lines of
question 13 (B’s 14) at the end of question 4 (B’s 5), perhaps both
questions on the immaculate conception originally followed question 4
(B’s 5), which would explain their omission in P. Alternatively, we could
even consider the possibility that these questions are, in fact, a later
insertion of Baconthorpe’s separate but apparently lost opusculum De
conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis, reports of which led Xiberta to say that
it had an “afnity” with these two quodlibetal questions.84 Likewise, it
is possible, since A’s and P’s colophons match, that A’s question 15 (B’s
16) is also a later insertion. This is unlikely, however, given a correct
internal reference in this question to the previous one, also on the topic
of the Verbum mentis. P’s scribe may have thought that the material had
been sufciently covered already.
Dating Baconthorpe’s Quodlibeta is also complicated. We can work our
way backwards. The editio princeps gives this explicit (f. 62rb): “Explicit
hic quodlibet Reverendi doctoris in Theologia, videlicet fratris Johan-
nis de Bacho, ordinis beate Marie de monte carmeli, quod dictum
quodlibet fuit disputatum et determinatum Parisius per dictum mag-
istrum in scholis fratrum de Carmelo anno domini MCCCXXX.” In
addition, question 13 of this Quodlibet refers to the provincial council
of Canterbury held in January 1328 (A, f. 59ra). Therefore, Xiberta
and Glorieux accepted this 1330 Paris date. Teetaert found it hard
to believe, however, given that Baconthorpe was Prior Provincial of
England in those years and held a Provincial Chapter in Cambridge

84
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 89–90.

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in 1330.85 But as we have seen, this is of no account. Moreover, P

contains this colophon (f. 208vb): ‘Explicit questiones reverendi doctoris
magistri Iohannis de Bacho<nthor>p ordinis beate marie de monte
carmeli, disputate Parisius in scolis fratrum de carmelo anno domini
MoCCCoXXXo.” As we have seen, A and P are obviously independent
of one another, and although P does not have “quodlibet,” it is clear
that Baconthorpe was able to dispute a quodlibet in Paris while acting
as Prior Provincial of England. Quodlibet III is from Paris, 1330.
A note in V, between the fragment of Quodlibet II, q. 5, and the text
of Quodlibet I, q. 9, states (f. 355v): “Anno domini M. 1330 Iohannes
Bacco fuit.” We have seen that the scribe of V most probably had
access to a complete manuscript and we should interpret this as refer-
ring to Quodlibet III rather than to I and II, which appear to be earlier.
According to John Bale, a manuscript of Baconthorpe’s Sentences com-
mentary still extant in the sixteenth century stated: “Magister Iohannes
de Baconis oppido . . . complevit primum librum Sententiarum Parisiis a.
D. 1325 die martis ante festum beati Marci evangelistae,” and this rst
book contains citations of all books of the Sentences and the rst two
Quodlibeta, for which 1325 is therefore probably our terminus ante quem
for the disputations. A denite terminus post quem would be the end of
Baconthorpe’s Sentences lectures, but these are hard to date because,
clearly, Baconthorpe reworked them into his written commentary.
Baconthorpe is probably the bachelor “Iohannes Anglicus Carmelita”
attested on 27 June 1321, and he became master before 3 June 1324
(Pentecost), perhaps in 1323. But for four reasons Xiberta concluded
that Baconthorpe probably lectured before 1318. First, no “Iohannes
Anglicus” appears on the lists of those assigned to read the Sentences in
the following triennium at the Carmelite General Chapters of 1318 in
Bordeaux and 1321 in Montpellier. Second, two of those assigned in
1318 became master after Baconthorpe. Third, in distinction 3 of book
I Baconthorpe claimed that he held an opinion like that of Auriol long
before he saw Auriol’s distinction 3, which was rst available in late
1316 or early 1317. Fourth, Baconthorpe calls Guy Terrena “magister
meus” and claims that he heard him lecture.86

85
Teetaert, “La littérature quodlibétique,” p. 90.
86
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 14–18, and De scriptoribus, pp.
171–3; L. Kennedy, “John Baconthorp, O.Carm., and Divine Absolute Power,” Carmelus
38 (1991) (pp. 63–8), cites Xiberta but dates all the Quodlibeta to “about 1330” (p. 64),
although he actually employs Quodl. I, q. 8, apparently from much earlier.

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On the other hand, rst, Guy was still active in 1320. Besides, at one
point (Quodlibet II, q. 3; A, f. 31va) Baconthorpe seems to call Pierre
Roger “magister meus,” so perhaps we should simply read this as a
term of respect. Second, Baconthorpe refers to Auriol’s Scriptum, a
written work. Auriol’s immediate Parisian followers in time, Landulph
Caracciolo and Francis of Marchia, lecturing in 1318–19 and 1319–20
respectively, used reportationes rather than the Scriptum version of Auriol’s
commentary on book I, which does not appear to have been in general
use in Paris until the 1320s. Xiberta himself notes that Baconthorpe
does not seem to have heard Auriol directly. Baconthorpe’s use of
the Scriptum, then, suggests rather a later date for his activities, and
this is why in his Quodlibeta he refers to Auriol’s sequaces. In any case,
we have no idea when Baconthorpe rst saw this work, although he
certainly used it extensively and also the written version of Auriol’s
Paris Reportatio of at least books II and III (dating from 1317–18) in his
own written Sentences commentary. Third, as Xiberta notes, in the 1321
General Chapter at Montpellier a “Iohannes de Parisiis” was assigned
to lecture in 1322–23, and the editor of the acts identied him with
Baconthorpe; although Xiberta is correct that this is unlikely, it is at
least possible. Fourth, later General Chapters would assign alternates,
in case one of the candidates could not lecture, something that appar-
ently became a problem. Thus we do not know for sure who actually
did fulll his commitment.87
As a result it seems just as likely that Baconthorpe, a bachelor at the
end of the 1320–21 academic year, lectured somewhere in 1319–23 as
that he did so before 1318. Other evidence points to 1320–21. Anneliese
Maier, although she generally follows Xiberta in dating Baconthorpe’s
Sentences lectures to ca. 1316–18, provides interesting information from
Borghese 39, the very manuscript containing Guy’s and Sibert’s Quod-
libeta and the dispute between Meyronnes and Pierre Roger. In Roger’s
Principium for book IV of the Sentences, the Benedictine bachelor pref-
aces the objections of others with this remark: “Sed contra istud est
argutum per duos socios.” Then soon afterwards we read: “Alius autem

87
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 15, n. 4, and 106, n. 3, and De
scriptoribus, p. 173; Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries,” pp. 226–8 and 231–2; idem, “The
Sentences Commentary of Paul of Perugia,” pp. 56–7. For examples of Baconthrope
using Auriol’s books II and III respectively, see Schabel, “Place, Space, and Physics
of Grace in Auriol’s Sentences Commentary,” Vivarium 38.1 (2000) (pp. 117–61), p. 139,
and R. Cross, “A Trinitarian Debate in Early Fourteenth-Century Christology,” RTPM
70.2 (2003) (pp. 233–74), p. 262.

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venerabilis socius arguit contra hoc,” to which statement is attached

the marginal note: “Obiectiones Carmelitae.” Maier argued that this
Carmelite might be Baconthorpe, because later, as masters, the two
had other disagreements, as we see in Baconthorpe’s rst two Quodlibeta,
especially Quodlibet II, qq. 2–4. If Maier’s suggestion is correct, then
considering that the text is a principial lecture and the Carmelite is
called a socius, the obvious conclusion is that Baconthorpe was not just
a fellow bachelor, but that he was a fellow sententiarius, lecturing on the
Sentences at the exact same time. True, the later editor of the dispute,
Jeanne Barbet, was not convinced, but she seems to have thought that
Maier’s reasoning was based only on the dating, when in fact Maier
stressed the general opposition between Roger and Baconthorpe.88
Tentatively we can date Baconthorpe’s Sentences lectures to 1320–21.
Then, in his Quodlibeta I and II, Baconthorpe refers to three masters who
did not become doctors until 1322–23: Pierre Roger, the Augustinian
Paganus, and the Dominican Hugh. Since Baconthorpe’s written com-
mentary on book I of the Sentences cites the Quodlibeta and appears to date
from 1325, Xiberta dated the Quodlibeta to a biennium around 1324.89
This seems reasonable for the disputations themselves, and Glorieux
assigned the rst to 1323–24 and the second to the following year.
Much more than the other Carmelite Quodlibeta, however, Bacon-
thorpe’s are a product of a writing process. There are few traces left
of the original structure of the debates, although there is absolutely
no doubt that the questions stem from them. Not only do we have the
explicits and citations of Quodlibeta I and II in the Sentences commentary,
but the number of internal references to other quodlibetal questions
in the Quodlibeta is staggering, as is the number of cross-references to
the Sentences commentary. In Quodlibet I, there are about forty precise
citations of the Sentences commentary, mainly book I, while Quodlibet
II has only a dozen or so. Quodlibet I has eleven citations of itself, but
these generally do not begin until the tenth question. It has only three
references to Quodlibet II, whereas Quodlibet II cites Quodlibet I over thirty
times, but refers to itself on only seven occasions. These statistics suggest

88
Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter II, pp. 266–7 and 286–7; Barbet, Disputatio, p. 31.
Maier follows Xiberta’s dating of Baconthorpe’s Sentences lectures in at least four works,
e.g., Ausgehendes Mittelalter I, pp. 19, n. 32, and 119 (perhaps also erroneously thinking
here that Baconthorpe’s written commentary also dates to 1316–18).
89
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” pp. 18 and 58, and De scriptoribus,
p. 184.

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that, although there are cross-references in the Quodlibeta and Sentences

commentary, there seems to be some linear progression: the Sentences
commentary was substantially complete before the Quodlibeta were writ-
ten, and Quodlibet I was mostly complete before Quodlibet II was written.
Even within Quodlibet I, the earlier part appears to have been nished
before the later part. The whole process may not have been completed
until around 1326, when Baconthorpe took up new duties.
Moreover, building on the tradition of Peter Auriol’s Scriptum, Bacon-
thorpe’s textual references are extremely detailed, down to the level
of articles and even propositions.90 Lest one think that these textual
references are attributable to the early modern editor of A, it should
be stated that they are also present in the two substantial fragments, P
and V, and the same is the case for the editio princeps and British Library
manuscript (L) of the Sentences commentary. Indeed, one of the values
of P and V (and of L) is that they conrm that almost all the textual
references, and in all their detail, belong to Baconthorpe himself. For
the Quodlibeta, A’s editor, Zimara, tells us explicitly on the title page
that he added the marginalia—Additis insuper quotationibus marginalibus.
Included in the marginalia are specic Averroes references, which are
not in V, but which the editor of B, Marasca, moved into the text itself.
A similar process occurred with the Sentences commentary.91 Baconthorpe
cites some fteen theologians active after 1250, giving well over one
hundred references, focusing mostly on Aquinas, Henry of Ghent,
Scotus, and Auriol, along with his debating opponents.
Another value of the fragments, of course, is that they provide a
separate witness for 40% of the questions. A full collation of one ques-
tion each from P (III, q. 15) and V (I, q. 13) against A revealed that
V is about equal to and P is superior to A in quality.92 A and V are
closely related. V and AB have some errors, and B, besides making
unnecessary modications, attempted to correct errors in A. Naturally,
these attempts were hit and miss. For example, in the rst principal
argument, the minor in V reads: “sed Filio Dei repugnat non esse, cum
sit necesse . . .” with “cum” written above the line and “tamen” crossed

90
For Auriol’s method, see Schabel, “Auriol’s Rubrics.”
91
See Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 179–80 and 183–4; Friedman-Schabel, The Filioque
in Parisian Theology; and just below.
92
L.M. Saggi reprinted Quodl. III, q. 12 (Glorieux’s 13, on the immaculate concep-
tion) from A, in “Joannis Baconthorpe, Textus de immaculata conceptione,” Carmelus
2 (1955) (pp. 216–303), pp. 240ff.

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out. Zimara misread the exemplar’s abbreviation for “Filio” as “nitio,”

and, in an attempt to correct A, Marasca simply erased “nitio” and
changed “Dei” to Deo.” And while A faithfully copied the “tamen,”
B, like V, was able to correct it to “cum.” A and P are somewhat more
loosely related, and so one discovers more errors in AB, such as omis-
sions per homoioteleuton of 8 and 11 words.
The existence of the two large fragments provides justication for
a complete critical edition. But because of the great size and com-
prehensiveness of the Sentences commentary, also available in print,
Baconthorpe’s Quodlibeta have been little studied. This is unfortunate,
because the work is fascinating. Quodlibet III is an interesting mix of
subjects, but most of Quodlibet I and much of Quodlibet II are devoted to
the still popular topic of cognition and the intellect. Under this rubric
Baconthorpe discusses past masters such as Aquinas (often Sanctus
Thomas), Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Thomas Wylton,
and Auriol, but he also describes his running debate with colleagues,
especially the Benedictine Master Pierre Roger (later Pope Clement VI)
and an anonymous doctor, perhaps a Dominican, whom Baconthorpe
calls a follower of Thomas (A, ff. 36vb, 62ra, and 63ra). Generally,
Quodlibet I, qq. 9–13, Quodlibet II, qq. 1–8, and Quodlibet III, qq. 9, 11,
and 14–15 (A’s numbering), reect current debate. In fact, questions
9–12 of Quodlibet I and questions 1–3 and 5–8 of Quodlibet II are largely
devoted to defending against his contemporaries his notion that God’s
knowledge is directed at creatures resultative.93 In other contexts there
are references to Hannibaldus, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Durand of
St Pourçain. Of course, Baconthorpe cites Aristotle and Averroes on a
great number of occasions, but there are also direct or indirect citations
of pre-Socratics, classical Latin authors, Greek commentators, and early
medieval writers. The more eclectic Quodlibet III has perhaps the greatest
variety of citations, but it also reects a shift towards interests in canon
law, something Baconthorpe would continue in the second redaction of
his commentary on book IV of the Sentences, around 1340.
Baconthorpe often provides interesting details about books and
debates: “But I proposed to him many serious difculties of this sort
reportatas in the Paris studium” (A, f. 20ra); “Our copy of Dionysius,
which belongs to the community of the English Province at Paris, has

93
See the discussion of the Quodlibeta in Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,”
pp. 58–65, and De scriptoribus, pp. 183–5.

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some different wording, but the meaning is the same” (A, f. 44ra). Of
particular interest are his timely questions on the immaculate concep-
tion of Mary in Quodlibet III, from Paris, 1330. Discussing Anselm’s De
conceptione virginali, Baconthorpe relates: “I rst found this book at the
house of the Friars Minor in Cambridge, but later I found the same
treatise in Paris in the hands of a common stationarius” (A, f. 58va). He
stated concerning [Pseudo-]Anselm’s “letter De conceptione Dei genetricis
Marie, which he wrote to certain bishops of England, which exists in
many places in England and France: I found it in Paris in the abbey of
St Victor” (A, f. 59rb). It is in this context that Baconthorpe refers to
“the Provincial Council of Canterbury in the year of the Lord 1328,
in the month of January, which declared again that the feast of the
conception should be celebrated” (A, f. 59ra). Because he has some
reservations about this, he prefaces his remarks by saying that he, “a
poor Carmelite,” submits his statements “to the correction and judg-
ment of the Holy Apostolic See” (A, f. 59ra–b), something he reiterates
at the end of his treatment (A, f. 60rb).

Conclusion

In general histories of medieval philosophy and theology, the Carmelites

are often ignored entirely or given a mere mention. A half century ago
Étienne Gilson devoted less than two pages of his monumental history
of medieval philosophy to “The Carmelite Group,” concluding: “These
masters can hardly be said to form a school,” because their doctrines
are not distinct.94 Certainly the Carmelites knew each other’s works,
and in that sense they formed a group, but Guy would attack Gerard,
Baconthorpe would oppose Walsingham, and so on. Without Sentences
commentaries, however, it is difcult to nd important subjects that all
the early Carmelites discussed, and even where some of them did treat
a problem, unless there were distinct school traditions outside the order
on that issue, it is difcult to situate the Carmelites. Thus on the issue
of the concept of being in God and creatures, which Walsingham,

94
É. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London 1955), pp. 483–5,
quotation on p. 484. Accordingly, L. Renna, “Prolo di Gerardo da Bologna, primo
maestro Carmelitano a Parigi,” Aquinas 10 (1967) (pp. 279–87), pp. 283–4, characterizes
the Carmelites as “eclectic,” at least before Baconthorpe.

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Gerard, and Guy touched upon in quodlibetal debates, the lines were
not drawn according to ecclesiastical order.95
In the early fourteenth century the issue of Mary’s immaculate
conception did tend to divide Dominicans who were opposed to from
Franciscans who were in favor of the doctrine. Gerard and Guy treated
the issue in their Quodlibeta, mostly taking the Dominican side. In his
Quodlibet III, however, Baconthrorpe shifted slightly in the direction
of the Franciscan position after being wholly opposed in his Sentences
commentary.96
Another issue where the Dominicans and Franciscans were clearly
split was on the necessity of the Filioque. Here the Carmelites were
divided: Gerard, Guy, and Sibert agreed with Aquinas and the Domini-
cans that the Filioque is necessary to preserve the distinction between
the Son and the Holy Spirit, asserting that, if the Holy Spirit did not
proceed from the Son, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be distinct.
On the contrary, Walsingham and Baconthorpe followed Scotus and
the Franciscans in claiming that they would still be distinct, although
Baconthorpe stated that the Holy Spirit would then be like a brother
to the Son.97
Studies of all these Carmelites on certain issues are possible, taking
into consideration their other works. For example, except perhaps for
Peter Swanington, all the Carmelites dealt with the problem of the
increase or decrease of grace, which usually included a discussion of
the physics of the latitude of forms. Something similar could be said
for the problem of God’s knowledge of things ad extra, which is con-
nected with divine ideas.
Although there are signicant disagreements among the Carmelites,
generalizations about any of them are not always safe. For example,
Walsingham has been rightly considered a follower of Henry of Ghent
and strongly in favor of extreme voluntarism, but on the issue of the
moral virtues he supported Godfrey of Fontaines against Henry. Like-
wise Henry heavily inuenced Gerard, but more often for Henry’s
organization and arguments than for his actual doctrines. Neither a
Thomist nor a Scotist, Gerard often adopted a via media. Guy, on the

95
J.J.E. Gracia, “The Convertibility of Unum and Ens According to Guido Ter-
rena,” Franciscan Studies 33 (1973), pp. 143–70; Brown, “Gerard of Bologna’s Quodlibet
I, Quaestio 1”; idem, “Guido Terrena”; Goris, “La critique.”
96
Xiberta, De scriptoribus, pp. 227–40; A. Samaritani, “De B.M.V. Immaculata Con-
ceptione in Quodlibet XIII–XIV saec.,” Marianum 23 (1970), pp. 15–49.
97
Schabel-Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology” and The Filioque in Parisian Theology.

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other hand, was known in the Middle Ages as a disciple of Godfrey

of Fontaines, and in this he seems to have been consistent, defending
for example the extreme primacy of the intellect in many contexts and
generally attacking Henry and Scotus. A new factor for both Gerard
and Guy was Durand of St Pourçain, whom they both opposed on
many occasions, but not always. Guy often took Hervaeus Natalis’
side against Durand when treating Aquinas. Like Guy, Sibert, whom
Xiberta basically characterized as neither top notch nor stupid, leaned
in Godfrey’s direction of intellectualism. Guy and Sibert sometimes
agreed with Thomas, but sometimes they did not, and on some issues
Guy and Sibert have been seen as taking Aquinas as a starting point
and moving toward Augustine, and on others the opposite appears true.
Baconthorpe was wrongly called the “Prince of the Averroists,” and
probably the “Baptizer of Averroes” would be more accurate. Although
Baconthorpe has been termed a “sophisticated if eclectic Thomist,”
as often as not he disagreed with or even ignored Aquinas, devoting
more attention to Peter Auriol or Thomas Wylton and moving toward
voluntarism. Because of his habit of incorporating extensive passages
from others, however, historians are sometimes confused about his own
opinion.98
All the Carmelites knew many of Aquinas’ works well—for example,
Baconthorpe cited no less than eight of his works in the Quodlibeta—but
they were not strictly Thomists. The Carmelites also knew Scotus, but
they were not Scotists. This should not surprise us. In replying to a
scholar’s query, “Why didn’t Baconthorpe follow Divine Thomas?”
Xiberta retorts: “He was a Carmelite, not a Dominican.”99 Herein lies
one of the values of studying the early fourteenth-century Carmelites:
loyal to neither Scotus nor Aquinas, they are “impartial” and inde-
pendent contemporary participants in discussions of topics on which,
with notable exceptions, the lines had already been drawn between
Franciscans and Dominicans.

98
For these characterizations, see in addition to many of the works of Xiberta, Graf,
Lang, Maier, Brown, Dumont, and others cited above, C.O. Vollert, The Doctrine of
Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin (Rome 1947), pp. 117–23 and 280–6
on Guy, with long quotations from Quodl. IV, q. 16; Desiderio, Il valore apologetico del
miracolo, pp. 58–66, on Guy; J.P. Etzwiler, “John Baconthorpe, ‘Prince of the Averroists’?”
Franciscan Studies 36 (1976), pp. 148–76; and recently F. Bertelloni, “Guido Terrena,”
pp. 291–2, and R. Cross, “John Baconthorpe,” pp. 338–9 (for his eclectic Thomism),
in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Gracia and Noone, eds.
99
Xiberta, “De Magistro Iohanne Baconthorp,” p. 103.

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 APPENDIX I

RECONSTRUCTION OF JOHN BACONTHORPE’S

QUODLIBET I, QQ. 10–12

In editing Baconthorpe’s Quodlibet I, q. 10, following Zimara’s editio princeps of the

Carmelite’s Quodlibeta (A), the editor of the second edition (B), Marasca, realized that
something was wrong in A’s f. 19vb. He then went to his manuscript and discovered
that the proper text is interrupted in mid-sentence to be continued on f. 23ra, again
in mid-sentence. B therefore continues with the correct text of question 10 on p. 639b
until the end of the question on p. 644b, A’s f. 24vb. Because at this point A has
already jumped to question 11 and continues with question 12, Marasca decided to go
back to the beginning of A’s question 11 (f. 19vb) and continue from there (p. 645a).
When he reached the point where he believed question 11 actually ended (A’s f. 21vb;
B’s p. 651a), he jumped forward again to the beginning of A’s question 12 (f. 24vb),
continued to the end of the question in A (f. 25ra; B’s p. 652a), and then went back
to gather the rest of question 12 from A’s question 11 (f. 21vb). In effect, Marasca
thought that this section in A has the text like this: 1–3–5–2–4. In fact, however, Vat.
lat. 5733 (V) shows that A reads like this: 1–5–4–2–3, or rather 1–4–3–2–5. That
is, 2–3–4 represent three sections (small quires, perhaps) of A’s exemplar that had
fallen out. When they were replaced 2 and 4 were reversed. Actually, the situation is
more complex with A: –1 2–3 4–5 6–7 8– represent different sized texts (where 2–3,
4–5, and 6–7 are probably quires), and B’s attempt at reconstruction resulted in this:
–1–2–7–4–3–8–5–6–. We know this not only because of V, but because of the contents.
Here is the correspondance chart, with folio and line numbers:

Section 1: “Comprehensio . . . Et sic” [Et sic om. B]

V: 294r top 294v.23 q. 10 start until q. 10, a. 1
A: 19va.46 19vb.27 q. 10 start q. 10, a. 1
B: 639a top 639b.26 q. 10 start q. 10, a. 1
Section 2: “Nihil restaret . . . de cognitione resultativa”
V: 294v.24 300v bottom q. 10, a. 1 end of q. 10
A: 23ra.44 24vb.22 middle q. 11 end of q. 11
B: 639b.26 644b bottom q. 10, a. 1 end of q. 11
Section 3: “Utrum Deus cognoscere . . . per essentiam suam”
V: 301r top 302r.14 q. 11 start q. 11, a. 1
A: 24vb.23 25ra.39 q. 12 start q. 12, a. 1
B: 651a.34 652a.43 q. 12 start q. 12, a. 1
Section 4: “Sicut per primarium . . . secunda [10 B] quaestio supra, capitulo tertio”
V: 302r.15 302r.19 q.11, a. 1 end of q. 11, a. 1
A: 21vb.16 21vb.21 middle q. 11 middle q. 11
B: 651a.27 651a.33 q. 11, a. 3 end of a. 3 and q. 11
Section 5: “Sequitur de secundo . . . unumquodque enim tunc”
V: 302r.19 307v.6 q. 11, a. 2 start q. 11, a. 6
A: 21vb.21 23ra.44 middle q. 11 middle q. 11
B: 652a.52 656a.60 q. 12, a, 2 start q. 12, a. 6
Section 6: “Maxime [om. B] est perfectum . . . relatio [om. B] articulo 6”
V: 307v.6 307v.15 q. 11, a. 6 end of a. and q. 11

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A: 19vb.27 19vb.36 q. 10, a. 1 end of a. and q. 10

B: 656a.60 656b.5 q. 12, a. 6 end of a. and q. 12
Section 7: “Utrum ad hoc quod Deus . . . contingenter volibilia”
V: 307v.16 315v.10 q. 12 start q. 12, a. 3
A: 19vb.37 21vb.16 q. 11 start q. 11, a. 3
B: 645a top 651a.27 q. 11 start q. 11, a. 3
Section 8: “Cuiusmodi sunt . . . exterius producto”
V: 315v.10 315v.15 q. 12, a. 3 end of a. and q. 12
A: 25ra.39 25ra.45 q. 12, a. 1 end of a. and q. 12
B: 652a.43 652a.51 q. 11, a. 1 end of q. 11, a. 1

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 APPENDIX II

PETRI SWANINGTON QUAESTIO QUODLIBETALIS 15

Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library, MS Q 99 (* = lectio incerta; \words/ =

mg./s.l.)

<Q>ueritur an angelus cognoscat certitudinaliter futura contingentia . . . <per spe-

cies?>.

[1] Quod sic: species eodem modo se habens uniformiter representat* rem* sive . . . res
sit sive non sit; sed species . . . <semper se habet eodem modo?>
[2] . . . Patet* de representatione rose. [53ra]
[3] Similiter de representatione vini: patet per circulum quod per ipsum uniformiter
representatur sive vinum sit sive non. Minor patet, quia non habet eas ex rebus, sed
concreatas.*
[4] Item, per species presentes cognoscimus preterita; sed si haberemus species
futurorum sicud preteritorum, eodem modo cognosceremus futura; igitur.

[5] Dicitur quod non, quia cognitio non excedit principium cognoscendi; sed species non
est principium cognoscendi rem nisi vel in se vel in causa determinata, quia derivatur
ab ydea, que est principium cognoscendi res in se vel in suis causis.
[6] [~1] Ad primum, dicitur quod non sufcit uniformitas speciei, sed uniformis
habitudo cogniti; sed cognitum non habet eandem uniformitatem quando est et quando
non est respectu speciei.
[7] [~2] Ad probationem, dicitur quod non est simile de100 specie rose, quia abstra-
hitur a re, et ideo est univeralis cui accidit existere.
[8] [~3] Ad aliud exemplum, de circulo, non est simile, quia imponitur ad signan-
dum vinum in generali.
[9] [~4] Ad aliam rationem, dicitur quod species in angelo non imponitur ad sig-
nandum futura contingentia.

[10] Contra positionem: aut <species> de se representat futurum aut crastinum, aut
non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si non, cum sibi nihil acrescat ex positione rei, nec
cras representabit rem.
[11] Item, species in angelo tantum representat futurum sicud preteritum, quia
nulla impressio vel variatio accrescit* circa speciem a preterito magis quam a futuro,
quia per101 Augustinum, ad hoc quod sit cognitio memorialis preteriti, oportet quod
sit impressio.
[12] Item, res habet duplex esse, scilicet existentie et representatum; sed existere
nihil facit ad esse representatum; igitur, etc.
[13] Similiter, ydea uniformiter representat rem sive sit sive non; igitur eodem modo
species derivata.

100
simile add. et del.
101
per iter.

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[14] [~10] Ad primum, dicitur quod licet speciei non acrescat aliquid ex presentia rei,
tamen requiritur habitudo nova rei ad speciem antequam intelligatur.
[15] [~11] Ad aliud, quod in cognitione preteriti causatur* habitudo que manet,
sic non in futuro.

[16] [~14] Contra: ista habitudo est relatio; sed relatio non est principium cognitio-
nis.
[17] [~14] Item, habitudo preterita ad speciem in angelo non manet; igitur non
manet cognitio. Consequentia patet, quia non cognoscimus rem preteritam que prius
nullam impressionem fecit.

[18] [~16] Ad primum, dicitur quod habitudo non est principium cognoscendi, sed
res sub habitudine, et illa, licet non sit, tamen habitudo manet preterita ad speciem in
anima, sicud habitudo manet accidentaliter ad substantiam que prefuit in heukaris-
tia,102 per quam potest cognosci determinata quantitas substantie que prefuit,103 licet
substantia panis non maneat.

[19] [~18] Contra: exemplum non est competens, quia substantia non habet aliam
latitudinem* vel dimensionem quam habeat quantitas panis; igitur, etc.
[20] Similiter, unum extremum habitudinis non manet; igitur nec habitudo.
[21] Item, species in anima Gregorii representavit* futura; igitur multo magis in
angelo.
[22] Similiter, species in angelo derivantur ab ydea in quantum sunt representative
et non in quantum active; igitur, etc.
[23] Item, species non est representativa nisi quia similitudo; sed non est similitudo
non-entis.

[24] Dicitur ad unam responsionem*104 quod angelus est compositus ex actu et potentia,
et ideo per speciem \illam non* potest cognoscere futura*/.
[25] Item, sint* duo . . . \·a· et ·b·/ angelus non potest [53rb] cognoscere multa
simul. Ponatur105 quod dum intelligit ·a·, corumpatur ·b·. Quero ergo, aut potest
naturaliter cognoscere ·b·, aut non. \Si non, non potest omnem rem existentem in
se vel in causa naturaliter* cognoscere, contra responsum/. Si potest, et numquam
cognoscit ·b· \presens existens, ergo . . . res sibi* sci . . . nec habitudo futura* numquam
secundum* . . . presens ipsi ·b· speciem/.
[26] Item, non cognoscit angelus nisi voluntas copulet intelligibile per speciem cum
intelligente; sed non copulat ignoranter* cognitum; igitur ante cognitionem futuri
precedit cognitio.
[27] Item, sensus prout optime disponit potest in quodcumque sensibile, igitur intel-
lectus in quodcumque intelligibile, cum sit potentior; sed contingens est intelligibile,
quia signabile.
[28] Similiter, cognoscit differentiam inter contingens et necessarium.
[29] Item, omne quod reducitur de potentia in actum reducitur per aliquid novum
impressum vel idem quod prius aliter se habens; sed nihil est impressum; igitur opor-
tet ponere idem aliter se habens; sed sic non nisi habitudo quam non est ponere, ut
videtur.*

102
licet add. et del.*
103
manet add. et del.*
104
dicitur add.
105
simul add. et del.

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 AUGUSTINIAN QUODLIBETA AFTER GILES OF ROME

Chris Schabel and William J. Courtenay*

In many ways the early history of the writings in philosophical theol-

ogy of the members of the Order of the Hermits of St Augustine, or
Austin Friars, parallels that of the Carmelites. Both mendicant orders
had vague prehistories as groups of hermits, evolved well after their
Franciscan and Dominican confreres, and thus came late to the uni-
versities. Like the monastic orders they lagged far behind the two main
mendicant orders in the production of Sentences commentaries until the
third decade of the fourteenth century. Moreover, for the period before
the 1320s, both orders are best represented, on the whole, by written
quodlibeta. Beyond that, however, there are signicant differences. The
great Augustinian Hermits were overwhelmingly Italian, along with
a small number of Germans, French, and Spanish, in contrast to the
Carmelites, whose intellectual leadership was more internationally
represented.1 And although all four major mendicant orders made
their Paris convent the leading studium for their theological program,
the Austin Friars did not utilize their studia at Oxford and Cambridge
in the early fourteenth century to the same extent as did the Francis-
cans, Dominicans, and even the Carmelites.2 On the other hand, the
Augustinian Hermits achieved prominence at Paris earlier than the
Carmelites.3 Further, unlike the Carmelites, the Augustinians early

* We would like to thank Eric Daniel Goddard for inspecting MS Roma, Biblioteca
Angelica 625, and Gisela Drossbach for doing the same for MS München, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26309. Lawrin Armstrong and William O. Duba provided
additional assistance.
1
The geographical distribution of Augustinian scholars corresponds to the provin-
cial structure of the order. By 1300 there were ten Italian provinces containing some
240 convents, four German provinces containing 88 convents, two French provinces
containing 24 convents, England and Ireland with 25 convents, and Spain and Portugal
with 16 convents; see D. Gutierrez, The Augustinians in the Middle Ages, 1256–1356, transl.
A.J. Ennis, vol. I (Rome 1984), pp. 43–5.
2
On the Augustinians at Oxford and Cambridge, see F. Roth, The English Austin
Friars, 1249–1538, 2 vols. (New York 1961, 1966).
3
The rst Augustinian master, Giles of Rome, read the Sentences at Paris in 1276–77,
although his promotion to the doctorate was delayed; Gerard of Bologna, the rst
Carmelite master, became doctor of theology in 1295. In 1303 royal ofcials considered

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on chose an ofcial teaching doctor in Giles of Rome.4 Paradoxically,

although the Carmelites were eventually to compose more Sentences com-
mentaries than the Augustinians (139 to 86),5 the Augustinian Hermits
were to have a much greater impact on Western thought, especially
through Gregory of Rimini. This is attested by the large number of
manuscripts of surviving Augustinian theological works, and far more
Augustinian theological literature is available in early printed editions
and in modern critical editions than is the case with the Carmelites.
Finally, the Augustinian theological masters were more active in writing
treatises on political theory than any other mendicant order.6
Any survey of Augustinian quodlibeta after Giles of Rome should begin
with the repertory of Glorieux. There are ten Augustinian authors of
quodlibeta that are known to survive at least in part, all apparently from
Paris, eight by Italians. According to Glorieux, this is a chronological
chart of these Augustinian theologians:

James of Viterbo, 1293–96 and after (Glorieux I, pp. 214–17; II, pp.
144–47)
Henry the German, 1306 (Glorieux II, pp. 130–31)
Gregory of Lucca, 1310–11 (Glorieux II, p. 106)
Amadeus de Castello, 1313–14 (Glorieux II, pp. 59–60)
Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona, 1315 (Glorieux II, p. 63)
Prosper of Reggio Emilia, 1317–18 (Glorieux II, pp. 233–34)
John of Lana, 1310s (Glorieux II, pp. 153–54)
James of Pamiers, after 1323 (Glorieux II, pp. 142–43)
William of Cremona, before 1326 (Glorieux II, p. 116)
Gerard of Siena, 1330 (Glorieux II, pp. 97–98)

Most of these quodlibeta have received less attention from modern

scholars than those of their Carmelite counterparts, although the

the Parisian convents of the Dominican, Franciscan, and Augustinian orders important
for inuencing religious opinion in their campaign against Boniface VIII, but did not
bother to include the Carmelites; see W.J. Courtenay, “Between Pope and King: the
Parisian Letters of Adhesion of 1303,” Speculum 71 (1996), pp. 577–605.
4
See Giorgio Pini’s chapter in the previous volume.
5
S.J. Livesey, “Lombardus Electronicus: A Biographical Database of Medieval Com-
mentators on Peter Lombard’s Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002) (pp. 1–23), p. 7.
6
The major Augustinian contributors in the area of political thought were Giles of
Rome, James of Viterbo, and Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona.

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 augustinian QUODLIBETA after giles of rome 547

Augustinians’ theology is general is much better known. This is due

to a combination of factors. First, modern Augustinian scholars have
focused on editing the main theological works of individual theologians,
namely the Sentences commentaries of Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino
of Orvieto, and John Hiltalinger of Basel, and the Quodlibeta of James
of Viterbo. Second, unlike the case with the Carmelites, many early
Augustinian works were already available in early printings, including
the Sentences commentaries of Gerard of Siena, Thomas of Strasbourg,
and Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, and the Quodlibeta of Gerard and
James of Pamiers. Third, most of the other Augustinian quodlibeta
are small and fragmentary, and only Henry the German’s has been
substantially edited.
This short chapter will cover Augustinian quodlibeta in approximate
chronological order. Separate entries will discuss, in brief, dating, loca-
tion, manuscripts, editions, and the number and characteristics of the
questions, going beyond Glorieux where possible, and giving an idea
of the impact of these quodlibeta on later theologians.7

James of Viterbo

James Capoccio of Viterbo read the Sentences at Paris around 1288 and
became master of theology in 1293, succeeding Giles of Rome as the
Augustinians’ second regent master at Paris (1293–99). He subsequently
taught at the Augustinian studium generale at Naples (1300–02), was
appointed archbishop of Benevento in 1302, and archbishop of Naples
later in the same year or in 1303. He died in 1307 or 1308.
Of his theological writings, his Quodlibeta are his most important and
broadest work. In the rst volume of his repertory, Glorieux noted that
some early authors had attributed three or four Quodlibeta to James, but
that only two could be conrmed, a supposition supported by the fact
that the Dominican Bernard of Auvergne had composed a refutation

7
Generally for Augustinian theologians of the 14th century, see D. Trapp, “Augus-
tinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and
Book-Lore,” Augustiniana 6 (1956), pp. 146–274; A. Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule
des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre,” Analecta Augustiniana
27 (1964), pp. 167–262; and idem, Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremi-
tenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken (Würzburg 1966).

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of James’ Quodlibeta, but only two.8 The two Quodlibeta consist of twenty-
two and twenty-four questions respectively, and explicits repeat this and
label them Quodlibeta. Glorieux listed six complete manuscripts, and
two more for Quodlibet I. Based on James’ regency at Paris in 1293–95,
Glorieux dated them to 1293 and 1294.
In his second volume, Glorieux reported more manuscripts of these
two Quodlibeta, now totalling some twenty for both sets with a further
four for Quodlibet I and three fragments. Moreover, three of these new
manuscripts contained an additional Quodlibet, one of them with a
fourth, thus conrming the opinion of earlier historians. The third
Quodlibet contains twenty-six questions and carries an explicit stating
this exactly as in the rst two. Since Godfrey of Fontaines appears
to have responded to one of these questions in 1296, Glorieux dated
James’ third Quodlibet to 1295–96. The fourth, with thirty questions, was
found in MS Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale 167 (ff. 205vb–217rb).
Although Bordeaux has the incipit “Incipit quartum quodlibet domini
fratris Jacobi de Viterbio, Ordinis Fratrum Heremitarum Sancti Augus-
tini, quondam archiepiscopi Neapolitani,” and a corresponding explicit,
the fact that this sort of formula is usually missing actually left Glorieux
with doubts about its authenticity, and he left it undated.
Since Glorieux’s time, the industry of the Augustinian Eelcko Ypma
has provided us with critical editions of most of James’ Quaestiones de
divinis praedicamentis and all of his Quodlibeta.9 Ypma’s research, building at
times on that of David Gutierrez, conrmed that the rst three Quodlibeta
were James’ and date from 1293–95, but established that the fourth was
also authentic and dated 1296. The number of manuscripts containing
part of James’ Quodlibeta climbed to thirty, with four for Quodlibet III
(two complete) and three for Quodlibet IV. At rst Ypma believed that
Quodlibet IV was a crude reportatio, in contrast to the ordinationes of the
other Quodlibeta, but then he found that the two new witnesses (Kraków

8
The rst two, in BAV, Borghese 298, ff. 157r–201v. See Russell Friedman’s chapter
in this volume.
9
Ypma has published Jacobi de Viterbio, OESA, Disputatio prima de quolibet (Würzburg
1968), Disputatio secunda de quolibet (Würzburg 1969), Disputatio tertia de quolibet (Würzburg
1973), and Disputatio quarta de quolibet (Würzburg 1975) (= Cassiciacum, Suppl. Bd.
1–4); and Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis I–X (Rome 1983) and Quaestiones de divinis
praedicamentis XI–XVII (Rome 1986), with many further questions being published
in issues of the journal Augustiniana. James also composed a somewhat unimportant
Sentences commentary (in MS Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati G.V.15) and
other works, on which see Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” pp. 196–9.

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 augustinian QUODLIBETA after giles of rome 549

1391 and Cornell University Library B.11) contained a text parallel in

polish to Quodlibeta I–III, whereas the Bordeaux manuscript on which
he based his earlier assessment was in fact defective “to the point of
being almost useless.”10
Ypma’s careful edition makes further discussion of the manuscripts
and the contents of the questions unnecessary here, except that the
signicance of the popular Quodlibeta I and II should be noted. They
were important enough to be placed on the list of texts available at
the Paris stationarii to be copied via the pecia system.11 Thus James’ 102
quodlibetal questions, some extant in a score of manuscripts, obviously
left an impression. Although William of Ockham may have utilized
arguments from the rst question of James’ rst Quodlibet in his ques-
tions on book I of the Sentences,12 James’ main impact was within his
own order, as is clear in the Augustinian Sentences commentaries written
between the late 1310s and the Black Death: Dionysius de Borgo San
Sepolcro13 attacked James; Gerard of Siena considered James, along with
Alexander of Sant’Elpidio, his primary opponent after Peter Auriol; in
turn Michael of Massa focused much of his energy on these same three,
as well as on Gerard of Siena himself; Thomas of Strasbourg knew
James’ work well; and although James is not mentioned in Gregory of
Rimini’s commentary, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo referred to him on
a half dozen occasions. James of Pamiers’ Quodlibet also includes attacks

10
See the introduction to the editions, the quotation being from Quodlibet IV, p. v.
For further debate on the date of Quodlibet I, see J.F. Wippel, “The Dating of James
of Viterbo’s Quodlibet I and Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibet III,” Augustiniana 24 (1974),
pp. 348–86, where Wippel prefers Lent 1293. James was still a bachelor in October
1292, and a master in May 1293, so Wippel assigns his promotion to November 1292.
In the same volume, Ypma, “Recherches sur la carrière scolaire et la bibliothèque de
Jacques de Viterbe †1308,” pp. 247–82, had opted for Advent 1293 based on an Easter
1293 promotion. Ypma also claims that James stayed in Paris until 1300, so perhaps
Quodlibeta III and IV could be slightly later than 1295–96.
11
Introduction to Quodlibet I, p. VII.
12
See William of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum sententiarum, d. 2, q. 7, eds. S.F.
Brown and G. Gál, Opera Theologica II (St Bonaventure, NY 1970), p. 267.
13
The dates given by Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” p. 174, for the academic
career of Dionysius require revision. His year as sententiarius was 1317–18 (Erfurt,
Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F.131, f. 96: “Explicit lect. prim. sent. edita fr.
D. de Burgo, ord. frat. herm., quam nivit Parisius a.d. M.CCC.XVII xii die Jan.,”
i.e. 12 January 1318). He was regent master at the Paris convent in 1325–26 (Paris,
Archives Nationales, JJ.65b, f. 63v); see W.J. Courtenay, “The Augustinian Community
at Paris in the Early 14th Century,” Augustiniana 51 (2001), pp. 159–69.

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on James of Viterbo, the “Doctor Inventivus.”14 Hugolino of Orvieto,

in his Sentences commentary from the late 1340s, a half century after the
publication of James’ Quodlibeta, considered him so important that in
book I he cited James, mostly via his Quodlibeta I and II, almost thirty
times, more frequently than Aquinas, Scotus, and Giles of Rome himself
and, in fact, more frequently than all other theologians except Henry
of Ghent and Gregory of Rimini. For all four books, James shares third
place with Giles of Rome.15 Even in the 1360s, John Hiltalinger would
cite James on seventy-two occasions, the rst three Quodlibeta and the
Quaestions de divinis praedicamentis.16

Henry the German

Henry the German, or Henry of Friemar the Elder, was a prolic and
inuential author. He presumably came from Friemar, near Gotha in
Thuringia. He had served several years as Provincial for the German
province (1296–99) when he was appointed to read the Sentences at Paris
around 1300. He incepted as master of theology around 1305 and
was regent for a few years, numbering among the Parisian masters of
theology who responded to King Philip the Fair in 1308 concerning
the Templars and those who condemned Marguerite Porete in 1310.
He subsequently taught at the studium generale of his order at Erfurt,
where he died in 1340.
His bio-bibliography is confused because of the existence of a Henry
of Friemar the Younger and the misattribution of others’ works to him
and of his works to others.17 Fortunately, the explicit in the sole com-
plete manuscript, Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana 662 (ff. 187–209), of
Henry’s substantial Quodlibet is very clear in its attribution: “Et in hoc
completur quod fuit disputatum et determinatum Parisius per fratrem

14
Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” pp. 156–7, 161–4, 167, 174, 180 (and n. 39),
and 221.
15
Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, OESA, Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed.
W. Eckermann, 4 vols. (Würzburg 1980–88).
16
Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” p. 247.
17
See Zumkeller, Manuskripte, pp. 125–63 and 579–89 (p. 154, no. 328, for the
Quodlibet), and the summary in O. Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools (Leiden
1992), pp. 536–7. Anonymous Quodlibet 32 in Glorieux II, p. 302 (four questions of a
planned 15 found in Napoli, BN VII.C.6, ff. 7ra–10rb), may belong to Henry, but it
is more likely that of Alexander of Sant’Elpidio, OESA, as V. Doucet maintained; cf.
Zumkeller, Manuskripte, p. 154, no. 328b.

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 augustinian QUODLIBETA after giles of rome 551

Henricum de Alemannia, Ordinis Fratrum Sancti Augustini, anno

Domini MCCCVI.” The Padua witness contains twenty questions from
the Paris 1306 Quodlibet: “In disputatione de quolibet prehabita quesita
fuerunt quedam de Deo, quedam de creatura.” Fragments in BAV, Vat.
lat. 1012,18 preserve question 14 (ff. 121r–122r) and the interesting
question 6 on astronomy (f. 124r–v): “Utrum in primis operibus Dei sit
ponere motus excentricos et epicyclos,” which along with question 7 is
also contained in a fragment in Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento
172, ff. 183v–189r.
In 1954 Clemens Stroick published very substantial extracts from all
twenty questions, so much of Henry’s Quodlibet is already available in
print.19 The incipit describes the content of the quodlibetal questions
to be about God and the created order. In addition to theological
questions on divine knowledge, divine power, the Trinity, and creation,
the subjects treated encompass not only the question on excentrics
and epicycles just mentioned, but also questions on the hierarchy of
saints (q. 9), on the human intellect and will (qq. 8, 10–11, 16), and
on the preferability of elective or hereditary kingship (q. 20). Two are
especially interesting for their university links: “Whether any philoso-
pher, however great, can make an argument against the faith that no
theologian could solve” (q. 18) and “Whether someone is able licitly
to obey an oath he has taken not to follow the arts course and not to
be promoted to master” (q. 19).
Stroick’s edition does provoke questions about the explicit 1306
dating, however, if we are to believe his apparatus fontium. In vari-
ous places Stroick identies a “quidam” as Durand of St Pourçain,
IV Sentences; John of Pouilly, Ordinary Questions; and the Carmelite Guy
Terrena, Quodlibet II, all of which postdate 1306, the last coming from
about 1314.20 Could perhaps the manuscript’s MCCCVI be an error
for MCCCXVI, for example? In the last question our loyal German
comes out in favor of elective monarchy rather than hereditary, so
perhaps the question was occasioned by the French royal succession of
1314 (Louis X) or 1316 (Philip V), or the disputed imperial election of
Louis of Bavaria in 1314. A later date would even entail the possibility

18
On which see W. Duba’s chapter in this volume.
19
See C. Stroick, Heinrich von Friemar: Leben, Werke, philosophisch-theologische Stellung in
der Scholastik (Freiburg i. Br. 1954), pp. 191–246; cf. Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,”
pp. 200–1.
20
Stroick, Heinrich von Friemar, pp. 196 and 213.

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that Henry of Friemar the Younger is the author.21 It is probably safer

to discount Stroick’s apparatus fontium, however.

Augustinian Quodlibeta in Vat. lat. 1086

Manuscript BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, is of crucial importance not only for
Augustinian theology in the early 1310s, but for Parisian theology in
general in those years. The manuscript belonged to Prosper of Reggio
Emilia and contains not only his own works, but also those of several
other authors whose writings are otherwise unknown, including some
Augustinians. Auguste Pelzer’s detailed descriptions of the manuscript
allow us to supplement Glorieux.22

Gregory of Lucca
Gregory of Lucca is the earliest of the Augustinians whose quodlibeta are
in Vat. lat. 1086. Gregory was present at the General Chapter meet-
ing at Siena in May 1295, where, already a lector, he participated in a
quodlibetal disputation under Angelus de Camerino, the newly licensed
regent master for the Augustinian Hermits at Paris.23 If, as Zumkeller
surmised, he was sententiarius at Paris around 1300 and regent master
in 1309–10 (1310–13 according to Glorieux), he probably served his
province between the baccalaureate and his promotion to master.24
According to Glorieux, one folio, 119v–120v, contains seven theologi-
cal questions that Prosper recorded from a Quodlibet dating to around
1310–11. The manuscript, however, assigns other questions to Gregory,

21
The Elder is listed as master of theology at Paris in 1308 and 1310 (CUP II,
p. 127, and CUP III, p. 660), so the earlier date seems to require identifying the Elder
as our author.
22
See A. Pelzer, “Prosper de Reggio Emilia, des Ermites de Saint-Augustin, et le
manuscript latin 1086 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane,” Revue neo-scholastique de philosophie
30 (n.s. 5) (1928), pp. 316–51; A. Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini II.1. Codices 679–1134
(Vatican City 1931), pp. 654–83; Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” pp. 203–4; W.J.
Courtenay’s chapter on Vat. lat. 1086 in this volume.
23
CUP II, p. 64n.
24
Gregory is listed among the doctors of theology who participated in the con-
demnation of Marguerite Porete in April 1310 (CUP III, p. 660). Since he was one of
three Augustinian masters in the Paris convent at the time, he was probably regent,
since the other two, Alexander of Sant’Elpidio and Henry of Friemar the Elder, were
no longer regent masters.

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whom Pelzer identied with Lucca, so a new list of the sixteen total
questions is called for:
1. Utrum divina essentia ut omnino indistincta re et ratione sit principium
divinarum productionum ab intra aut non (102r).
2. Utrum Deus possit facere duo alba sine similitudine (108r).
3. Utrum productioni cuiuslibet agentis sit annexa creatio si agat ibi primum
agens (108r).
4. Utrum creatum essentialius dependat a causa efciente quam nali (108r–
v).
5. Utrum divina essentia possit intelligi ab intellectu creato abstrahendo ab
existentia (119v–120r).
6. Utrum sapientia divina in quantum divina sit attributum (120r).
7. Utrum Deus praedestinatum potest damnare (120r).
8. Utrum persona divina possit assumere creaturam rationalem et illa igno-
raret se esse assumptam (120r).
9. Utrum actio de genere actionis in Deo sit (120r–v).
10. Utrum materia possit esse pars essentialis alicuius corporis incorruptibilis
per naturam (120v).
11. Utrum fruitio principalius consistat in actu amicitiae vel concupiscentiae
(120v).
12. Utrum non existente coniuncto principio formali alicui possit sibi com-
petere operatio (133v–134r).
13. Utrum impossibile sit coincidentia subiecti et nis sicut efcientis et subiecti
(134r).
14. <Utrum> substantia generata ex speciebus sacramenti dicatur creari
(134v).
15. Utrum practica scientia vel speculativa specicetur a ne vel ab obiecto
(134v).
16. Quis sit nis theologiae (134v–135r).
In the form recorded by Prosper, Gregory’s questions are brief but
nonetheless interesting. They appear to be the sole surviving theologi-
cal work of Gregory, which may be why he was rarely cited. Prosper
himself, however, cites Master Gregory of Lucca elsewhere in the same
manuscript, on f. 72va.

Amadeus de Castello
Amadeus de Castello lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1301–02.
Based on the inclusion of Amadeus’ quodlibetal questions in Prosper’s
manuscript, however, these questions and Amadeus’s regency have been
dated to a decade or more later (between 1312 and 1317 according

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to Glorieux, or around 1312 according to Zumkeller).25 Nevertheless,

since Prosper also included questions by such theologians as Giles of
Rome and several theologians who were already masters of theology by
1308, it is possible that Amadeus was regent by 1306. Moreover, since
Amadeus’s last question and John of Pouilly’s Quodlibet I, q. 16, both
concern the unusual topic whether someone selling a eld but retain-
ing the option of recovering it can licitly receive the income from it
in the meantime, perhaps Amadeus’s Quodlibet can be dated to around
the same time as Pouilly’s rst disputation: 1307.26
Glorieux listed fteen (seventeen if one counts 1a and 1b) questions
found on ff. 224v–226r, although he incorrectly claimed that they
end on both 225v and 226v. Glorieux proposed a date of 1313–14,
or 1316–17, for this material, which he identied as quodlibetal by
its nature, although it is in a similar abbreviated form as Gregory’s
questions. Glorieux omitted the question “Utrum cognitio creditiva
supernaturalis de Deo sit possibilis communicari creaturae sine lumine
supernaturali,” located on 221v and close in theme to the rst questions
Glorieux listed. The questions display some variety, but most of them
are normal for a theological context. The exception is the last question,
mentioned above: “Utrum vendens agrum sub conditione reddendi
usque ad decem annos possit licite percipere fructus intermedios.”

Prosper of Reggio Emilia

Prosper of Reggio Emilia, who is discussed in more detail elsewhere in
this volume, has a more extended Quodlibet found in this manuscript on
ff. 300v–314v. Although fourteen questions are announced, only the rst
four, on Trinitarian themes, receive full treatment. The incipit labels
the text as from a “generali disputatione de quolibet,” which, if given
at Paris as seems likely, dates between 1316 (when he incepted) and
1317, when he went to Bologna to serve as regent of the order’s studium

25
Amadeus was appointed to read the Sentences at Paris at the General Chapter
meeting of the order at Naples in May 1300, with the stipulation “quilibet qui Sen-
tentias est lecturus vadat per annum ante tempus inceptionis sue lecture” (CUP II,
no. 613, p. 85).
26
The contention of Glorieux I, p. 222, that Pouilly’s rst Quodlibet is from after
September 1307 is incorrect, both Lent and Advent of 1307 being possibilities. If
Lent, then he and Amadeus could have been regent masters in 1306–07, which would
explain the absence of Amadeus’s signature from the statement against the Templars
in March 1308.

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 augustinian QUODLIBETA after giles of rome 555

generale there in 1318–23. Thomas of Strasbourg cited Prosper’s opinion

on intelligible species, which more likely occurred in the Prologue of
Prosper’s commentary on the Sentences.27

Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona

Augustinus Triumphus (1243–1328), from the March of Ancona, is

one of the most important and prolic writers of the Augustinian
Hermits at the opening of the fourteenth century. In addition to his
contributions in the area of political thought, he authored numerous
commentaries on Scripture (Matthew, the Pauline letters, the Apoca-
lypse), as well as philosophical and theological treatises. He read the
Sentences at Paris around 1303, and his commentary on book I survives
in one manuscript, Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 296, ff. 1–214.
He subsequently lectured in various studia of the order in Italy: Padua,
Venice, and Naples.28
We have only one quodlibetal question, from Paris: “Utrum colle-
gium cardinalium possit facere quidquid potest papa.” In BAV, Vat. lat.
939 (ff. 53v–56), it carries the incipit “Tertia questio erat . . .” and the
explicit “Questio ultima <de> quolibet Magistri Augustini disputatum
(!) Parisius de potestate collegii mortuo papa.” So originally there were
only three questions, and Glorieux judged from the topic that the dis-
putation took place between Pope Clement V’s death on 14 April 1314
and John XXII’s election on 7 August 1316 (i.e., between Advent 1314
and Lent 1316). Another manuscript, Paris, BnF lat. 4046, preserves the
question on ff. 32v–34r, and on the basis of this manuscript Richard
Scholz published the question in 1903.29 Given the date, it is possible
that Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s citation of Augustinus on f. 75vb of Vat.
lat. 1086 refers to one of Augustinus’ three quodlibetal questions.

27
Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IV libros sententiarum, III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1
(Strasbourg 1490; Venice 1564, reprint Ridgewood, NJ 1965, vol. II, ff. 36ra–va).
28
On Augustinus, see B. Ministeri, De vita et operibus Augustini de Ancona, O.E.S.A.
(Rome 1953).
29
R. Scholz, Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz’ VIII. Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der politischen Anschauungen des Mittelalters (Stuttgart 1903; reprint Amsterdam
1962), pp. 501–8.

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John of Lana

John of Lana, also known as John of Bologna, read the Sentences at Paris
sometime in the 1310s or 1320s. Glorieux placed his baccalaureate in
theology “avant 1316” and Adolar Zumkeller suggested “um 1316,” but
since Thomas of Strasbourg in the 1330s is the rst person to cite him,
he may have read as late as 1330.30 The date for his death is placed in
1347 at Bologna, where he was presumably teaching at the time.
Manuscript BAV, Chigi. E. VIII. 247, contains two Quodlibeta of
John of Lana of Bologna, along with twenty-two Quaestiones de anima
humana, and ten Quaestiones extraordinariae, which appear to derive from
the Prologue to his commentary on the Sentences.31 Quodlibet I, with
fteen questions, is on ff. 55va–78va (old foliation), with the explicit:
“Explicit primum Quodlibet fratris Johannis de Bononia, qui dicitur de
Lana, Fratrum Heremitarum Sancti Augustini.” Quodlibet II consists of
thirteen questions on ff. 78vb–98vb, bearing a similar explicit, mutato
mutando.
Despite the substantial number of questions, we know very little about
them. The incipit for his quodlibetal questions reads “Incipit primum
Quodlibetum Johannis de Bononia, qui dicitur de Lana, Sacre Pagine
bacelarii, Ordinis Sancti Augustini,” leaving open the possibility that
he never incepted, which some historians maintain. If so, then we have
another example of a bachelor’s theological quodlibeta.
Although John’s questions are on a wide variety of theological top-
ics, they are sometimes grouped according to themes. There are some
curious ones, like Quodlibet I, q. 10, “Whether there is some sign in a
human soul separated from the body by which one can know whether
it was a man’s or woman’s soul.” All of them are interesting, and the

30
Glorieux I, p. 153; Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” pp. 205–6.
31
Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum sententiarum, Prol., q. 2, cited an opinion
of John of Lana that appeared in the latter’s Prologue, q. 8, a. 1, and which is found
in the Quaestiones de anima, q. 8, a. 1; see Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum sen-
tentiarum, vol. I, eds. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino (Berlin-New York 1981), pp. 60–7.
Oxford, Balliol College Library 63, also contains some 18 Quaestiones de anima of John
of Lana, baccellarii in sacra pagina, on ff. 28r–51v; see F. Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung
des Quodlibet und anderer Schriften des Petrus Aureoli O.F.M.,” Franciscan Studies 14
(1954) (pp. 392–411), p. 400.

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 augustinian QUODLIBETA after giles of rome 557

fact that both Thomas of Strasbourg and Gregory of Rimini cited

John shows that he was not forgotten.32

William of Cremona

William of Cremona replaced Alexander of Sant’Elpidio in 1326 as

Prior General of the Augustinians, serving in that capacity until 1342,
when he was appointed bishop of Novara, where he served until his
death in 1356. He read the Sentences at Paris around 1315 and became
master of theology in or by 1320.33 Glorieux dated his two surviving
quodlibetal questions to before 1326, although ca. 1320 is probably a
better date. MS Napoli, BN VII. C. 6, ff. 72vb–73va, contains questions
6 and 7 of his Quodlibet, both on beatitude. Although he obviously com-
mented on the Sentences at Paris as a bachelor of theology, no questions
from that work are known to have survived or even circulated, which
may explain why his opinions are not cited by subsequent theologians of
the order. His only known work apart from his Quodlibet is his Tractatus
de Christi et apostolorum paupertate.

Gerard of Siena

Gerard of Siena read the Sentences at Paris around 1325 and was mas-
ter of theology by 1330.34 Glorieux dated Gerard’s single Quodlibet to
1330, when Gerard was regent master at Paris.35 While Gerard’s com-
mentary on the rst two books of the Sentences survives in twenty-nine
manuscripts (mostly of book I) and a 1598 Padua edition of book I,

32
Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” pp. 180 and 206. Thomas of Strasbourg cites John
of Lana in, e.g., III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (ed. Strasbourg 1490; Venice 1564, vol. II, f.
5va). For Gregory of Rimini’s citation, see above, note 31.
33
Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” p. 205. He should not be confused with a
Franciscan of the same name, Guglielmo Centueri de Cremona, who read the Sentences
at Bologna in 1365–66.
34
Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” pp. 208–9; CUP II, p. 339; see also Trapp,
“Augustinian Theology,” p. 173.
35
An agreement between the Augustinian Hermits and the regent masters of
theology in May 1330 identies Gerard of Siena as being regent master in actu at the
time; see CUP II, no. 904, p. 339. For Gerard, see also Zumkeller, Manuskripte, p. 117,
no. 258.

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Glorieux records only two manuscript witnesses of the Quodlibet: Roma,

Biblioteca Angelica 625, ff. 185v–209r, and München, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek Clm 26309, ff. 224va–227va; along with two print-
ings: Viterbo 1587 and Rimini 1626 (or Bologna, according to Odd
Langholm). The situation among these witnesses is confusing, and it is
difcult to understand Glorieux’s concise description. To further com-
plicate matters, the questions in the Angelica manuscript are preceded
on ff. 158ra–184vb by James of Pamiers’ sole Quodlibet, attributed in the
manuscript to Gerard and printed in the 1626 edition and—as Gerard’s
Quodlibet II—in Cesena in 1630 (see below on James of Pamiers).
Glorieux lists eighteen questions based on the Viterbo 1587 edition.36
For reasons that will become apparent, we will rst deal with questions
1–14. According to Glorieux, in the Viterbo edition “on s’est borné
pour les qq. 12 et 13 à renvoyer à son Comm. in II Sent.” Moreover,
questions 12 and 13 are missing in all other witnesses. Glorieux also
states that questions 4, 7, 12, and 13, are missing in the 1626 edition
and the Angelica manuscript “qu’elle reproduit.” These same questions
are also missing in the Munich manuscript, which further omits ques-
tions 1, 6, 8, and 10. This would be Glorieux’s chart of the status of
the rst fourteen questions, with “x” marking the questions contained
in the witnesses, “o” marking absences:

Place/Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Munich 26309 o x x o x o o o x o x o o x
Angelica 625 x x x o x x o x x x x o o x
1626 edition x x x o x x o x x x x o o x
Viterbo 1587 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Based on an inspection of the manuscripts, we can clarify certain

points. First, the Angelica (and probably the 1626 printing) does in
fact contain questions 4 and 7, although they are unmarked and linked
closely with questions 5 and 6. Question 6 is very brief and question 4
immediately refers the reader to book II of the Sentences commentary:
“Huius autem questionis determinationem hic ponere non curam quia
eam in secundo scripto Sententiarum pertractavi (?) et diffuse . . .” Angelica

36
Glorieux II, pp. 97–8.

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does omit questions 12 and 13, but they are listed in the two tabulae
quaestionum (ff. 185va and 209ra). It is thus likely that, as in the case of
question 4, 12 and 13 are dropped because the material was already
dealt with in II Sentences, as the Viterbo printing states. While the 1626
printing follows the Angelica tradition, perhaps even this witness, shared
variants in the titles of the selected questions in the densely written
Munich manuscript and the Viterbo edition suggest that they belong
to another tradition. Besides the omission of several questions, Munich
does have one other anomaly: after question 9 there is another one,
beginning “Utrum anima humana possit . . .” Only a critical edition will
bring further clarication. The rst fourteen questions are as follows,
with foliation from the manuscripts (A = Angelica; M = Munich):
1. Utrum sola distinctio rationis sufciat ad vitandam contradictionem quae in
divinis apparet inter communicabile et incommunicabile (A 185vb–189ra;
M deest).
2. Utrum generare in divinis sit actus elicitus (A 189ra–190va; M 224va–b).
3. Utrum possit efcaci et necessaria ratione probari universalis productio
universi (A 190va–193va; M 224vb–225vb).
4. Utrum potentia productiva Dei importet respectum ad aliquod possibile
obiectum (A 193va; M deest).
5. Utrum actio et passio sint realiter unus actus (A 193va–195va; M 225vb–
226ra).
6. Utrum in natura intellectuali sit dare purum possibile (A 195va–b;
M deest).
7. Utrum intellectus creatus, angelicus vel humanus, indigeat obiecto extrin-
seco ad quod eius cognitio terminetur (A 195vb–198ra; M deest).
8. Utrum intellectus creatus, angelicus vel humanus, indigeat obiecto
extrinseco cui eius cognitio per commensurationem aliquam adaequetur
(A 198ra–200va; M deest).
9. Utrum cognitio intellectus creati possit absolvi ab indigentia cuiuscumque
obiecti extrinseci (A 200va–203ra; M 226ra–va, then adding Utrum anima
humana possit . . . 226va–b).
10. Utrum cognitio sit actio de genere actionis (A 203ra–204rb; M deest).
11. Utrum intellectus creatus humanus possit dare alicui enti naturali suum
formale complementum (A 204rb–205rb; M deest).
12. Utrum tempus sit numerus in solo motu primi mobilis (AM deest).
13. Utrum in tempore ratio inniti contradicat rationi praeteriti (AM deest).
14. Utrum esse corporeum de genere substantiae sit a forma substantiali vel
a materia (A 205rb–208vb; M 226vb–227va).
With questions 15–18, on usury and other economic matters, the situ-
ation is more confused. Although Glorieux was of the opinion that
the 1626 edition reproduces the Angelica manuscript throughout, Odd
Langholm has shown that this is not quite true. The Angelica manuscript

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contains rst James of Pamiers’ Quodlibet (attributed to Gerard: ff.

158r–185v), then Gerard’s authentic Quodlibet (until Glorieux’s q. 14:
ff. 185v–208v). Now, as Langholm noted, the Viterbo edition on which
Glorieux based himself does not reproduce the Angelica’s economic
questions, but rather substitutes a treatise on usury that it attributes to
Gerard but which turns out to be by Peter John Olivi! Moreover, the
1626 edition does exactly the same thing. So Glorieux is in error and
his questions 15–18 in Viterbo and in 1626 are neither quodlibetal
nor by Gerard.37
However, in the 1630 Cesena edition, following James of Pamiers’
Quodlibet (again, attributed to Gerard), one nds two treatises—De usuris
(with two questions, pp. 165–222) and De praescriptionibus (one question,
pp. 223–55)—that are, according to Langholm, “based on the economic
material of the Angelica manuscript.” Langholm found that after ques-
tion 14 the scribe adds three main questions on usury, restitution, and
prescription that comprise a total of sixteen subquestions (ff. 209r–225r).
Just before this section the scribe states (f. 208vb) that he is adding these
questions separately. Langholm adds that the titles of these questions,
which are not in the Munich witness, “correspond roughly to Glorieux’s
questions 15–17.”38 As we shall see, the attribution of the Angelica
economic questions to Gerard is not in doubt, so the issue is whether
they or the ones in the Cesena edition are quodlibetal.
For clarication, it should be noted that the Angelica manuscript con-
tains the exact titles of all of Glorieux’s questions 15–18 in the incipit
to the entire Quodlibet, beginning “In nostro Quodlibet” and ending with
the two questions on usury and the two on prescription (f. 185va–b):
15. Utrum contractus usurarius sit permissibilis aliquo iure.
16. Utrum homo possit absolvi ab obligatione usurarum sine restitutione per
solam viam remissionis vel per aliam viam.
17. Utrum <praescriptio> [descriptio A] sit contra ius naturae.
18. Utrum in praescriptione acquiratur dominium.

37
Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, p. 550, and for Gerard’s economic
thought, pp. 549–60. See also D. Pacetti, “Un trattato sulle usure e le restituzione di
Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, falsamente attribuito a Fr. Gerardo da Siena,” AFH 46 (1953),
pp. 448–57; Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” pp. 208–10, esp. n. 138.
38
Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, p. 550–1. Lawrin Armstrong is editing
these treatises based on the Angelica manuscript and the Cesena 1630 edition, a sum-
mary in MS Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 4151, plus his primary wit-
ness for De usuris MS Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 894. Armstrong nds that the editor
of Cesena, Angelo Vancio, used the Angelica witness plus another manuscript.

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Then, after question 14 (f. 208vb), the scribe gives the title of question
15 and a slightly rephrased title for question 16, “Utrum usurarius possit
absolvi ab obligatione usurarum sine restitutione vel per aliquam aliam
viam,” and adds the confusing remark that “has duas questiones necnon
et alias duas sequentes de prescriptione” belong to the Quodlibet but
are arranged “cum quibusdam aliis questionibus.” Afterwards we have
the explicit, “Explicit Quodlibet determinatum Parisius per Magistrum
Gerardum de Senis, sacre pagine professorem, fratrum Hermitarum
Ordinis Sancti Augustini,” and nally a tabula quaestionum beginning “Isti
sunt tituli questionum istius Quodlibet” but giving only the rst fourteen.
Following the tabula (f. 209ra) we have the following remark: “Incipit
questio diversa, cum V articulis et cum quodam tractatu addito de
restitutione usurarum continente 4 alios articulos, determinata Parisius
a fratre Gerardo de Senis in sacra theologia magistro fratrum Hermi-
tarum Ordinis Sancti Augustini.” The rst question matches the title
of question 15 and indeed has ve articles (ff. 209ra–214ra). Then we
read “Hic incipit tractatus de restitutione usurarum et quorumcumque
male ablatorum editus a fratre Gerardo . . .,” the treatise containing four
articles (ff. 214ra–219ra). Only article two comes close to question 16
(f. 215va): “Utrum usurarius non reddendo usurias possit liberari ab
earum obligatione per viam remissionis vel per aliquam aliam viam.”
Finally (f. 219ra) we read, “Incipit questio de prescriptione cum VI
(read: IV) articulis infrascriptis determinata a fratre Gerardo . . .,” the
question matching number 17 (ff. 219ra–225ra), but article two also
matches the title of question 18 verbatim. The explicit (f. 225ra),
“Expliciunt questiones de usura et prescriptione disputate et determinate
Parisius a fratre Gerardo . . .,” is followed by a tabula quaestionum with
sixteen entries corresponding to the three main questions and thirteen
articles (f. 225rb).
Given the confusing remark after question 14 and the later descrip-
tions and contents of the economic questions, one is entitled to ask
whether the later questions, as they are, stem in fact from the Quodlibet.
True, some if not all of the material is “disputed” at Paris by Master
Gerard, but part of it is called a “treatise.” Moreover, these questions
are quite large in comparison to the others, and Lawrin Armstrong has
found that at least some of this material circulated separately. Perhaps
the quodlibetal questions on usury and prescription were merely the
basis for the Angelica questions, which survive in different stages of
redaction. We await the completion of Armstrong’s critical edition of
these questions for the possible resolution of this issue.

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It is difcult to gauge the reception of Gerard’s Quodlibet, because

of the popularity of his Sentences commentary, but Gregory of Rimini
cited Gerard once, Alphonsus Vargas referred to him at two places (the
second time to a “quadam quaestione ordinaria”), and John Hiltalinger
of Basel cited him by way of Gregory of Rimini.39

James of Pamiers

James of Pamiers (de Appamiis), from southern France, read the

Sentences at Paris in or by 1325. He was among the six bachelors of
theology at the Augustinian convent in May 1326 awaiting a chance
to be promoted to the magisterium.40 He was master of theology by
1332.41 As mentioned above, ve manuscripts contain James’ Quodlibet
along with an explicit attribution, although it was printed along with
Gerard of Siena’s Quodlibet in Rimini in 1626 and alone—but with
other works of Gerard—in Cesena in 1630, as Gerard’s Quodlibet II,
because a sixth manuscript, Angelica 625, from which the editions
stem, assigns it to Gerard. Thus the Cesena edition (p. 9) modies the
incipit “in nostra disputatione de quolibet . . .” to “in ista (sic) secunda
disputatione de quolibet . . .” According to Glorieux, the extant witnesses
are as follows, adding foliation where available and sigla as required
in what follows:

Avignon, Bibliothèque Municipale 314 (ff. 60r–92v) (= V)

Bordeaux, Bibliothèque municipale 167 (ff. 92va–116vb) (= B)
Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 529 (ff. 94va–112rb)
Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana 426 Scaff.XX
Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 2006 (ff. 144ra–166va) (= P)
Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 625 (ff. 158ra–184vb) (= A)
Rimini 1626 edition
Cesena 1630 edition, pp. 9–160 (= C)

We have inspected the Cesena edition and the Padova Universitaria

manuscript. For the most part they contain the same text, but there
are occasional differences, especially toward the end, with entire argu-

39
Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” pp. 221 and 247.
40
Courtenay, “The Augustinian Community,” pp. 228–9.
41
Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule,” p. 210.

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ments omitted in Universitaria, material missing from Cesena, and

slightly differing arrangements. This can only be explained by positing
two redactions.
The full incipit states that James was asked several questions that
he rst divided into two groups, and the rst group contained three
questions (Universitaria, f. 144ra; Cesena, p. 9):
In nostra disputatione de quolibet [I] quaedam quaesita fuerunt circa
passiones transcendentes sive passiones entis, [II] quaedam circa entia
specialia. Quantum ad [II] entia specialia, [IIa] quaedam quaerebantur
circa ens increatum, [IIb] quaedam circa ens creabile, [IIc] quaedam
circa creatum. Circa [I] passiones transcendentes quaerebantur tria, [Ia]
unum circa distinctionem, [Ib] aliud circa non-identitatem, [Ic] aliud
tertium circa multitudinem.
Accordingly, the rst three questions of Glorieux’s list correspond to
what is found in Cesena and Universitaria and James’ description of
Ia–c. James subdivided his second group of questions [II] concerning
entia specialia into three groups of questions [IIa–c]. Thus after Ia–c we
read the following incipit (Universitaria, f. 148va; Cesena, p. 42):
Circa [IIa] ens increatum quaerebantur tria, [IIa1] primo utrum essentia
et relatio divina possint habere proprias indivisiones sine omni distinc-
tione [Glorieux: indistinctione] (= Glorieux’s q. 4); [IIa2] secundo utrum
generare et spirare in Patre distinguantur realiter (= Glorieux’s q. 5/14);
[IIa3] tertio quaerebatur de signis originis utrum sint ex natura rei vel
per actum rationis.
The Cesena edition calls this second section on ens increatum “Pars
secunda” of the Quodlibet, and begins with “Quaestio prima.” There
is no “Quaestio secunda,” however, because as was said, question IIa2
(Glorieux’s 5, or 14) is absent in the editions and in the Angelica.
Probably the question in Angelica’s exemplar was left incompete.
The Avignon manuscript and the editions stop at the same point as
Angelica. The other manuscripts, however, contain about two columns
of question IIa2, although it is left unnished in Universitaria, breaking
off abruptly. Universitaria’s explicit matches the one Glorieux reports
for the Bordeaux and Leipzig manuscripts. Ypma was of the opinion
that Universitaria and Bordeaux, both of which also contain James of
Viterbo’s Quodlibeta, are very closely related, although independent.42
Perhaps then there are two traditions. None of the witnesses contains

42
Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. Disputatio tertia de quolibet, ed. Ypma, introduction,
p. VI.

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question IIa3, of course, and the entire sections IIb and IIc on ens creabile
and ens creatum respectively are also missing. Judging from the huge
size of IIa1, James managed to rework less than half of his Quodlibet
into Ordinatio form. As a result, in the introduction Cesena speaks of
“quaestiones quatuor Quodlibet secundi” (pp. 3–4), even though the
text gives the titles for two more questions (IIa2–3) and hints at even
more (IIb–c).
Questions Ia–c together are only about one fourth the size of ques-
tion IIa1. For James’ Quodlibet, Glorieux listed a total of fourteen ques-
tions based on the Angelica witness, but noted that most manuscripts
(Glorieux also gives Bordeaux’s foliation) treat numbers 4–13 as articles
of one huge question, number IIa1 or 4. In fact, the Universitaria
and Cesena witnesses list twenty articles for question 4/IIa1, not ten,
although some of them are treated together. It is probable that Angelica
deals with articles as well. Given the fact that there are ten more articles
of question IIa1/4 than those listed by Glorieux, a new question list is
called for. Moreover, since James of Pamiers is in the habit of naming
his interlocutors explicitly, it will be useful to list these as well. Many
of these references are within the text of both Cesena and Universita-
ria, and although some of Cesena’s marginal references are absent in
Universitaria, it is clear that they are correct (G = Glorieux):
Ia. Utrum inter extrema realia quorum utrumque est res possit esse distinctio
rationis [G 1: A 158ra; B 92va; C 9–20; P 144ra–145va; V 60ra–62va].
Peter Auriol mg.; Francis of Meyronnes (de Maronis) mg.; Auriol mg.;
Auriol; Meyronnes (small section absent in Cesena).
Ib. Utrum aliqua possint habere aliquam non-identitatem actualiter [actu-
alem GV], sine aliqua distinctione actuali [G 2: A 160ra; B 94rb; C
20–30; P 145va–147ra; V 62va–64va]. Meyronnes; Auriol.
Ic. Utrum aliqua possint ponere in numerum actualiter sine distinctione
actuali [G 3: A 161va; B 95vb; C 31–41; P 147ra–148va; V 64va–66va].
magister Stephanus, Robertus monachus.
IIa1. Utrum essentia et relatio possint habere proprias indivisiones sine omni
distinctione [indistinctione G] [G 4: B 97vb–116ra; C 42–43; P 148va–b;
V 66va–b].
I. Utrum essentia et relatio possint habere proprias indivisiones sine
omni distinctione seu non-identitate ex parte substrati [om. G:
A 163va; C 43–47; P 148vb–149rb; V 66vb–67va]. Auriol mg.
II. Utrum per tales non-identitates, si ponantur, seu indivisiones suf-
cienter tollatur repugnantia praedicatorum oppositorum quae
dicuntur de essentia et de relatione [om. G: C 47–54; P 149rb–
150rb; V 67vb–69ra]. Auriol mg.
III. Utrum ad tollendum [tollendam C] supradictam [om. V] repug-
nantiam requiratur distinctio realis inter essentiam et relationem
[inter . . . relationem om. G] [G 5].

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IV. Utrum <ad tollendum supradictam repugnantiam requiratur>

distinctio modalis [om. G; III–IV together: A 165vb; C 54–62;
P 150rb–151va; V 69ra–70va]. Durand of St Pourçain mg.; James
of Viterbo mg.
V. Utrum <ad tollendum supradictam repugnantiam requiratur>
distinctio formalis, ponens aliam et aliam formalitatem [aliam . . .
formalitatem om. G] [G 6].
VI. Utrum <ad tollendum supradictam repugnantiam> requiratur
distinctio formalis secundum quod ly “formaliter” est determina-
tio compositionis et non extremorum [om. G; om. per homoio. P in
list].
VII. Utrum posita tali distinctione formali sufcienter tollatur talis
repugnatia [om. G; V–VII together: A 167rb; C 63–88; P 151va–
155va; V 70va–76ra]. Scotus mg.; Meyronnes mg.; Gerard Odonis
mg.; Thomas Anglicus [Wylton] mg.; Francis of Marchia in primo
suo; Meyronnes in primo Sententiarum quod dicitur Conatorum vel
Conatum; Francis <Meyronnes> mg.; Meyronnes in primo suo.
VIII. Utrum per inconvertibilitatem tollatur supradicta [praedicta G]
repugnantia.
IX. Utrum inconvertibilitas ponat aliquam diversitatem inter essen-
tiam et relationem [VII–IX = G 7; VIII–IX together: A 172rb;
C 88–98; P 155va–157ra; V 76ra–78rb]. Hervaeus Natalis mg.;
Hervaeus; Auriol, primo libro Sententiarum, d. 2; Auriol mg; Thomas
Aquinas; Giles of Rome; Auriol mg.
X. Utrum supradicta repugnantia tollatur ex eo quod relatio diver-
simode comparatur ad fundamentum et ad oppositum [different
wording G] [G 8: A 174ra; C 98–105; P 157ra–158rb; V 78rb–
80ra]. Aquinas; Giles; Auriol in primo suo, d. 33; Meyronnes;
Marchia, I Sententiarum; Aquinas; Giles; Aquinas mg.; Giles mg.;
Auriol; Meyronnes mg.; Marchia mg.
XI. Utrum talis repugnantia arguat [arguit G] distinctionem rationis
inter essentiam et relationem.
XII. Utrum <talis repugnantia> arguat distinguibilitatem ex natura rei
ante omnem actum rationis sive [rationis sive om. PV] intellectus
[XI–XII = G 9].
XIII. Utrum <talis repugnantia> arguat non-identitatem indistinguibili-
tatis [om. G; XI–XIII together: A 175ra; C 106–17; P 158rb–160ra;
V 80ra–82rb]. Auriol in primo suo; Meyronnes; Meyronnes mg.
XIV. Utrum sufcienter tollatur talis repugnantia per distinctionem
rationis [different wording G]. [G 10; AC: see XVI; P 160ra–162va
(includes 160bis); V 82rb–88ra].
XV. Utrum <sufcienter tollatur talis repugnantia> per distinguibili-
tatem [om. G].
XVI. Utrum <talis repugnantia> tollatur per non-identitatem indistin-
guibilitatis [om. G; AC have XIV–XVI together: A 177rb; C 117–
40; PV have XV–XVI together: P 162va–163ra; V 88ra–89ra].
Meyronnes; Francis mg.; magister Stephanus mg.; Meyronnes (Ma.
P); Bernard Olivarius Ordinis nostri; Bernard mg.; Bernard mg.;

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Bernard mg.; Meyronnes (Ma. P); Meyronnes mg. (om. P);

Franciscus de Maironis (Ma. P) in quadam quaestione quam
determinavit in curia.43
XVII. Utrum distinctio rationis quae ponitur ad tollendum [tollen-
dam C] supradictam repugnantiam arguat compositionem in
persona [different wording G] [G 11: A 181vb; C 141–46; P
163ra–vb; V 89ra–90ra]. Auriol in primo suo, d. 1; Auriol
mg.
XVIII. Utrum talis compositio rationis repugnet summae simplicitati
[om. G: C 146–49; P 163vb–164va; V 90ra–91va]. Auriol.
XIX. Utrum talis repugnantia arguat veram dualitatem inter
essentiam et relationem [essentiae et relationis PV] [differ-
ent wording G] [G 12: A 183rb; C 149–56; P 164va–165va;
V 91va–92va]. Michael of Massa Ordinis nostri; Michael.
XX. Utrum <talis repugnantia> arguat veriorem [minorem C]
dualitatem essentiae et relationis quam personae et personae
[et personae om. C] [different wording G] [G 13: A 184vb; C
157–60; P 165va–166va]. Dionysius <de Borgo San Sepulcro>
nostri ordinis.
IIa2. Utrum generare et spirare in Patre distinguantur realiter [G 14: ACV
deest; B 116rb–vb, incomplete; P 166ra–va, incomplete]. magister
Thomas de Fabriano.
IIa3. De signis originis utrum sint ex natura rei vel per actum rationis
[ABCGPV deest].
IIb–c: Quaestiones circa ens creabile et creatum desunt ABCGPV.
As Glorieux remarked, James’ primary opponent was Auriol (15 cita-
tions), with attacks on the Dominicans Durand (1 reference) and Her-
vaeus (2), the Franciscans Francis of Marchia, Francis of Meyronnes,
and Gerard Odonis (1), and his confrere Michael of Massa (2). For the
two Franciscans named Francis, our manuscripts give Marchia three
clear references and Meyronnes eleven, while four additional citations
of Meyronnes in Cesena could be read as Ma<rchia> in Universitaria;
there are also two simple citations of Francis. Damasus Trapp gave

43
Based on Trapp, at rst we considered this reference as “Contra istas rationes
arguit magister Franciscus de Ma<rchia> in quadam questione quam determinavit in
curia . . .,” which would be evidence for Marchia’s magisterial activity (his Quodlibet?) in
Avignon; W.J. Courtenay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael of Massa, OESA. A
Redating,” Augustiniana 45 (1995) (pp. 191–207), p. 195, n. 13 (see Trapp, “Augustin-
ian Theology,” p. 174). Later we argued that the reference could be to Meyronnes
(Maronis) instead; C. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem
of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot 2000), p. 190, n. 4. Cesena opts
for Meyronnes, and one manuscript, Avignon 87rb, spells out “Maronis,” so it appears
that Meyronnes is meant. See William Duba’s chapter in this volume for Marchia and
Meyronnes.

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 augustinian QUODLIBETA after giles of rome 567

a fuller list, adding Thomas Aquinas OP and Giles of Rome OESA

(4 each, together), Bernard Oliverii OESA (4, all at once), Master
Stephanus (2), James of Viterbo OESA (1), Dionysius of Borgo San
Sepolcro OESA (1), John Duns Scotus OFM (1), Thomas Anglicus
(Wylton, 1), Thomas of Fabriano OESA (1), Robert the Monk (1,
Trapp’s “Obertus,” but probably Robertus Meduana, master of theol-
ogy before 1335). Thus James cites seventeen theologians about sixty
times. Five of James’ interlocutors are Franciscans, but they receive
most of his attention, especially Auriol, Marchia, and Meyronnes,
lecturing at Paris 1316–21. James only cites six Augustinians, a mere
dozen times in total.44
Glorieux’s dating was very imprecise: “after 1323.” Trapp argued
on the basis of the citations that all the data pointed to 1326 at Paris,
both for Massa’s Sentences commentary and James’ Quodlibet. Now it
turns out that, although Odonis read the Sentences at Paris in 1326–28,
he had already done so at Toulouse before 1320, so 1326 would still be
possible. Moreover, Durand is cited as being bishop of Le Puy, which
he ceased to be after 1326. Nevertheless, Trapp’s dating is too early.
The reference to Durand as bishop of Le Puy is in the margin of one
manuscript in a later hand, diminishing its value as evidence for date
of composition, and the present authors have redated Massa’s Sentences
lectures to the early 1330s. Some of the confusion over the chronol-
ogy of James’ academic career can be cleared up. On 28 May 1326,
James was one of six Augustinian bachelors of theology present at
their convent in Paris. This means he had read the Sentences in that or
one of the previous three years. His licensing and inception as master
must therefore be after 1326, probably around 1330. Thus Zumkeller’s
alternative dating of James’ baccalaureate in theology at Paris “um
1328” is also incorrect, although his promotion to the magisterium in
1332 seems sound, which would put his Quodlibet in or after 1332.45
Although incomplete, James of Pamier’s Quodlibet is signicant in
that it survives in six medieval witnesses. Moreover, the fact that it has

44
Glorieux II, p. 142; Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” pp. 173–4.
45
Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” pp. 173–5; Courtenay, “The Quaestiones in Sen-
tentias”; C. Schabel, “Questions on Future Contingents by Michael of Massa OESA,”
Augustiniana 48 (1998), pp. 165–229; C. Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Gerardus
Odonus, OFM,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 46 (2004), pp. 115–61. In 1326 the other
ve bachelors were Albertus de Padua, Andreas Elemosine de Perugia (DTh 1329),
Johannes de Mes [Metz], Nicolaus de Vich, and Thomas de Argenteuil; see Courtenay,
“The Augustinian Community at Paris.”

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a common theme of distinction and relations should make it useful as

the object of historical studies of those issues.
* * *
The preceding discussion had the limited goal of introducting Augustin-
ian Quodlibeta after Giles of Rome and of correcting and supplementing
Glorieux’s ndings. Besides the revised question lists noted above and
other modications of Glorieux’s picture, we propose the following
chronology:

James of Viterbo, 1293–96 and after

Henry [of Friemar, Sr.] the German, 1306 (less likely, H. of Friemar,
Jr., 1316)
Amadeus de Castello, 1307 (perhaps 1313–14)
Gregory of Lucca, 1309–10 or 1310–11
Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona, 1315
Prosper of Reggio Emilia, 1316–17
John of Lana, 1310s or 1320s
William of Cremona, ca. 1320
Gerard of Siena, 1330
James of Pamiers, 1332

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 CONTINENTAL FRANCISCAN QUODLIBETA
AFTER SCOTUS

William O. Duba*

John Duns Scotus left in his wake a generation of Franciscan theolo-

gians both on the continent and in England who sought to complete
the Subtle Doctor’s work, expound and explain it, correct it, and some-
times overturn it. Reecting the specic inuence of Scotus’ teaching,
and the general interests of the Franciscan theological tradition, the
work of these theologians constitutes a vibrant chapter in the history
of Scholasticism, full of internal debates and responses to external
criticism.
Unfortunately, this work remains only partly understood. Most of the
texts rest in manuscript, with a few early modern printed editions and
even fewer modern editions of any sort. Redactional complications make
matters worse, at times reaching the paradoxical situation of having
more redactions of a text than codices containing witnesses.
The written quodlibeta left by continental Franciscans reect both
the promise of the intense debate after Scotus and the difculties of
sorting out issues of authorship, dating, and textual interrelationships.
The titles of the questions considered reect not only broad theological
issues (such as Trinitarian questions), but also positions associated with
Franciscans (such as a tendency towards voluntarism) and even notions
specically associated with Scotus and Scotism (intuitive and abstrac-
tive cognition, objective and subjective potency, the formal distinction).
This chapter, however, focuses on the textual difculties. While our
understanding remains imperfect, the contribution of three-quarters of
a century of scholarship has signicantly changed the picture painted
by Glorieux.
Since Glorieux, research into the work of individual authors has at
once made the situation less and more clear. The situation becomes
less clear as studies challenge and overthrow basic assumptions made

* I wish to thank F. Amerini, G. Etzkorn, S. Folger-Fonfara, S. Piron, C. Schabel

and the anonymous reader for their comments and assistance in the preparation of
this chapter.

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570 william o. duba

by Glorieux, such as that quodlibeta were only held by regent masters in

theology and that theologians promoted to an administrative position
in their order did not hold quodlibeta. On the other hand, individual
studies and editions have made the situation far clearer through the
identication of texts, their authors and circumstances, and the discovery
of additional quodlibeta and redactions.
This chapter considers the Franciscan theologians active on the
continent in the decades after Scotus for whom some trace of a quod-
libet survives, and it complements, corrects, and extends Glorieux by
integrating the literature published since the second volume of La
littérature quodlibetique and, when possible, a few observations from the
manuscripts. In all, it considers sixteen theologians: Peter Sutton, Peter
of England, Alexander of Alessandria, Nicholas of Lyra, James of
Ascoli, Bertrand de la Tour, Martin of Abbeville, Peter Auriol, William
of Alnwick, Francis of Marchia, Francis of Meyronnes, Aufredo Gonteri
Brito, Peter of Atarrabia (Navarre), Peter Thomae, Gerard Odonis and
William of Rubio. Their quodlibetal activity spans three decades, from
the rst years of the 1300s to the early 1330s.
The presentation of each thinker begins with a brief biographical
discussion and continues with a treatment of the quodlibeta and any tex-
tual problems, usually followed by a question list. Incipits and explicits
are given when available, and when, in the case of incipits, they differ
from the title of the rst question.

Two Peters from England

Peter Sutton (?)

An early fourteenth-century manuscript, Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea
Laurenziana, Aedil. 164, contains parts of two quodlibeta by a Franciscan
referred to as “P. d’Ang.” Glorieux suspects him to be Peter Sutton,
which would place the quodlibeta around 1310, and in Oxford. On the
basis of a reference to Richard of Mediavilla, the text has a terminus post
quem of 1285; the terminus ante quem of 1323 is less certain, as it comes
from the fact that Thomas Aquinas is not called a saint. The editor,
Etzkorn, found a couple references to anonymous contemporary views
that might help in dating the text, but one has not been identied and
the other is actually a mention of a position not discussed, insufcient

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 continental franciscan QUODLIBETA after scotus 571

for identication.1 Still, the lack of mention of Scotus and the cor-
respondences found by Etzkorn between the various thinkers referred
to as quidam and the positions of scholastics active in the 1280s lead
one to suspect that the text is far more likely to be from late thirteenth
century.2 Thus “Peter Sutton”’s Quodlibeta are most likely neither con-
tinental, nor after Scotus.
The manuscript contains parts of two quodlibeta, one on ff. 1r–12v,
the other on ff. 13r–18v. Between ff. 12 and 13, four folios have been
cut out; however, f. 112 has a tabula quaestionum, and the numeration
between the two quodlibeta is continuous, so the rst question of the
quodlibet beginning on f. 13r is numbered q. 44. On the basis of internal
references, Glorieux notes that the quodlibet that starts on f. 13 is also
incomplete. Glorieux labels the quodlibet starting on f. 13 as Quodlibet I,
and the text starting on f. 1 as Quodlibet II, but Etzkorn reverses this
order in his edition.3

1
Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de gratia, ed. V. Doucet (Quarac-
chi 1935), pp. XLV–XLVIII (Codex F b); Glorieux II, pp. 216–18; idem, “Peut-on
identier P. de Ang.?” RTAM 27 (1960), pp. 148–53; G. Etzkorn, “Petrus Sutton (?),
O.F.M., Quodlibeta,” Franciscan Studies 23 (1963), pp. 68–139; idem, “Petrus Sutton (?),
O.F.M., Quaestiones Disputatae,” Franciscan Studies 24 (1964), pp. 101–43. Petrus Sutton,
Quodlibet I, q. 23, pp. 107–8: “Responsio. Sunt quidam novi qui dicunt omnino quod
caritas generari potest ex operibus caritatis, non quidem caritas gratuita, sed alia sibi
consimilis quae informis esse potest et tamen caritas nuncupari debet. Quod ostend-
unt tam a parte causae quam a parte effectus. Ex parte causae sic: quia omnis actus
manens in agente derelinquit aliquod vestigium sive impressionem in suo subiecto, si
subiectum sit tale quod possit aliquam impressionem retinere . . . Ex effectu ostendunt
hoc idem sic: sint hic duo homines quorum unus exercitatus est in operibus per viginti
annos, alius per unum diem tantum . . .” Quodlibet II, q. 1, p. 123: “Ex dictis, iam patet
quomodo secundum quosdam nulla forma substantialis est divisibilis, nec in se nec
in materia; secundum alios, quod omnis forma suscipit magis et minus, et in se et in
materia; secundum tertios, quod aliqua suscipit magis et minus et in se et in materia,
aliqua vero nec in se nec in materia. Omnes tamen in hoc concordant quod substantia
cuiuslibet angeli vel animae sit in gradu indivisibili ac per hoc non potest successive
produci. Est adhuc quarta opinio sed quoniam adhuc nimis recens est, praesentibus
non inserui.” After the latter comment, the author provides his own position, and not
a summary of the fourth opinion.
2
M. Pickavé, in his contribution to this volume (p. 56, n. 131), conrms that, from
the perspective of “the doctrine of individuation, this Quodlibet could be fairly early
(late 1280s).”
3
Etzkorn, “Petrus Sutton (?), O.F.M., Quodlibeta,” although for the question titles
of Quodlibet I, qq. 28–43, on the four folios missing from the Florence manuscript, see
Glorieux II, pp. 216–18.

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Peter of England
Scotus’ contemporary Peter of England appears as a master at Paris
in the period 1303–05, and later as Provincial Minister of Upper Ger-
many between 1309 and 1316. He attended the Council of Vienne
in 1311 as a master of theology. For Peter of England, BAV, Vat. lat.
932, contains three quodlibeta in series, numbered one through three, on
ff. 175ra–189ra, 189ra–204rb, and 204rb–217vb respectively. Quodlibet
III, q. 11, ends with a reference to a discussion in primo quolibet.4 At
the end of the text, a tabula quaestionum appears for all three quodlibeta
(ff. 217vb–218ra), and at the bottom margin of this text appears a sec-
ond explicit, in a different hand, to Quodlibet III, attributing it to Peter
of England (f. 218r): “Explicit tertium quodlibet editum a fratre Petro
de Anglia, ministro conventus (?) Colonie, magistro in theologia ordinis
fratrum minorum.” Glorieux notes that Quodlibet II, q. 18, mentions a
“new statute” of Pope Benedict XI, a constitution that was issued in
February 1304.5 On this basis, he dates Quodlibet I to 1303–04, II to
1304–05 and III to 1305.6 Quodlibet III, q. 6, “De personali distinctione
in Deo, videlicet supposito quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, utrum
distingueretur personaliter ab eo,” has been edited by Schmaus.7
Among the interesting items in Peter of England’s Quodlibeta is the
incipit for Quodlibet I, q. 23 (f. 188rb): “Sequuntur due questiones
pertinentes ad creaturam mere corporalem, quarum prima est de re
articiali, secunda que non fuit in disputatione proposita, sed postea
missa, de re naturali. Prima questio de re articiali erat utrum gura
incisionis sit ab actu nostro vel a natura.” This indication for the second
question (“which was not proposed in the disputation, but was sent
afterwards”) shows that questions were sometimes submitted after the
disputatio, to be dealt with in the master’s determinatio.

4
BAV, Vat. lat. 932, f. 211ra: “In rebus vero incorruptibilibus non est tota causa nec
pars cause, sed in eis est talis pluralitas sub una specie ad pulchritudinem universi et
ad manifestationem divine bonitatis sicut ostensum est, scilicet in primo quolibet.”
5
The statute would be Inter cunctas sollicitudines; BAV, Vat. lat. 932, f. 199ra: Novum
autem statutum domini Benedicti ponit 7 casus in quibus fratres non possunt absolvere
peccata ex vi illius statuti, sed tenentur ad superiorem remittere . . .
6
Glorieux II, pp. 212–15; P. Castagnoli, “Le dispute quodlibetali di Pietro d’Anglia,
O.F.M.,” Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 20 (1931), pp. 413–18.
7
M. Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen
Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus (Münster 1930), vol. II, p. 311, n. 80.

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Glorieux’s question list (Glorieux II, pp. 212–15) is fairly accurate,

but contains only the titles of the questions. Here is a more complete
version:

Quodlibet I
Incipit: In disputatione nostra generali querebantur questiones XXIIIIor; alique
fuerunt de Deo, alique de creaturis. Inter illas vero que fuerunt de Deo una
pertinebat ad divini esse perfectionem, alia ad divine persone esse constitutio-
nem, et plures ad divine persone (lege potentie) extensionem. 175ra.
1. Prima igitur pertinebat ad divini esse perfectionem, et fuit ista: utrum Deus
sit in predicamento. 175ra.
2. Secunda questio pertinens ad divine persone constitutionem erat ista:
utrum essentia et relatio concurrant ad constitutionem <persone> in divinis. 175vb.
3. Postea querebantur tres questiones pertinentes ad divine potentie exten-
sionem, quarum prima erat utrum Deus posset facere aliquam naturam nobiliorem
natura intellectuali. 177rb.
4. Secunda questio pertinens ad potentiam Dei erat utrum, quocumque producto,
Deus possit producere nobilius. 177va.
5. Tertia questio pertinens ad divinam potentiam erat utrum, creatura suprema
creata, Deus sibi posset facere equalem. 178va.
6. Postea querebatur de creaturis, et ibi fuerunt alique questiones pertinentes
ad naturam intellectualem vel angelicam, alique ad naturam rationalem,
puta hominem, et alique ad naturam mere corporalem. Circa naturam
intellectualem sive angelicam querebantur duo, unum pertinens ad angelos
in communi, aliud specialiter ad malos angelos. Questio ad angelos in
communi fuit utrum angeli sint in eadem specie. 179rb.
7. Questio pertinens ad malos [ad malos] angelos fuit ista: utrum unus malus
angelus possit alium illuminare. 179vb.
8. Postea querebatur de creatura rationali, et ibi fuerunt alique questiones
pertinentes ad Christum hominem in speciali, alique vero pertinentes ad
hominem in communi. Circa hominem vero Christum querebantur tres
questiones ad esse corporis ipsius sub sacramento altaris. Prima questio fuit
utrum corpus Christi in sacramento altaris sit visibile ab oculo gloricato. 180ra.
9. Alia questio circa corpus Christi sub sacramento erat, posito quod sacerdos
ponat XII hostias et non intendat consecrare nisi XI, querebatur utrum proferendo verba
sacramentalia super illas omnes non (lege vere) consecret. 180rb.
10. Tertia questio circa corpus Christi sub sacramento erat utrum sacerdos
sciens aliquem esse in peccato mortali, cum propter scandalum non debeat sibi negare
eucharistiam, utrum debeat sibi dare hostiam simplicem non consecratam. 180va.
11. Post questiones de Christo homine in speciali sequuntur ille que respiciunt
hominem in communi, quarum alique [respiciunt hominem in communi,
alique] ex parte anime, alique vero ex parte corporis; inter alias vero que
respiciunt hominem ex parte anime, una pertinebat ad potentias anime
in communi, alie vero ad ipsas potentias in speciali. Ista vero que t de

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potentiis anime in communi erat utrum potentie anime differant per essentiam.
180vb.
12. Postea querebantur de potentiis anime in speciali, et primo de potentia
intellectiva, et postea de potentia voluntativa. Circa potentiam intellectivam
primo sunt questiones respicientes ipsius actum et secundo alie que con-
sequuntur actum ipsius. Circa obiectum vero intellectus querebantur duo,
primo utrum veritas prima sit obiectum intellectus nostri primo et per se. 182rb.
13. Alia questio pertinens ad oppositum (lege obiectum) intellectus erat ista:
utrum intelligibile sub eadem ratione representet se omni intellectui. 182vb.
14. Postea sequuntur due questiones pertinentes ad actum ipsius intelligendi,
quarum una est de actu intelligendi ipsius anime separate, alia de actu
intelligendi ipsius anime reunite corpori glorioso. Prima ergo questio de
actu intelligendi anime separate erat utrum anima post <mortem> intelligat vel
reminiscatur naturaliter. 183rb.
15. Secunda questio de actu intelligibili ipsius anime reunite corpori glorioso
fuit ista: utrum anima resumpto corpore in paradiso intelligat fantasiando. 183vb.
16. Postea sequuntur due questiones circa ea que consequuntur actum intel-
ligendi, quarum prima est utrum quando (mg.) aliqua duo sic se habent quod
unum <non> potest intelligi sine alio, eo ipso faciant compositionem realem. 184ra.
17. Secunda questio circa ea que sequuntur actum intelligendi erat utrum sint
aliqua que minus differant quam re et plus quam ratione. 184va.
18. Sequuntur questiones pertinentes ad voluntatem, et querebantur quedam
circa actum voluntatis et aliqua circa habitum ipsius. Circa actum voluntatis
una questio circa actum ipsius inquantum debet esse bonum et ad Deum
ordinatur (lege ordinatum) et erat ista: utrum teneamur conformare voluntatem
nostram voluntati divine. 185ra.
19. Alia questio circa actum voluntatis inquantum malum et a Deo deordina-
tum erat ista: utrum desperatio in eo qui desperat sine merito sit peccatum mortale.
185va.
20. Postea una questio pertinens ad habitum voluntatis et erat utrum virtus
eroyca distinguatur essentialiter ab aliis virtutibus. 186ra.
21. Postea sequuntur questiones respicientes hominem ex parte corporis et
sunt due, quarum una pertinet ad humani corporis compositionem, alia
ad ipsius defensionem. Prima, que pertinet ad humani corporis composi-
tionem, erat ista: utrum corpus humanum constituitur (lege constituatur) immediate
ex elementis. 187ra.
22. Questio vero pertinens ad corporis defensionem erat utrum clerici possint
pugnare licite contra hostes pro defensione patrie. 187vb.
23. Sequuntur due questiones pertinentes ad creaturam mere corporalem,
quarum prima est de re articiali, secunda—que non fuit in disputatione
proposita, sed postea missa—de re naturali. Prima questio de re articiali
erat utrum gura incisionis sit ab actu nostro vel a natura. 188rb.
24. Questio sequens circa rem naturalem erat ista: quare tempore magne siccitatis
fontes principales deciunt et fontes aquarum ut plurimum non dantes reveniunt et
proponebatur sine argumentis. 188va.
Explicit: . . . cum prius non ebulluissent propter foramina scaturiginum obtu-
rata. 189ra.

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Quodlibet II
Incipit: In secunda disputatione nostra generali proponebantur questiones 27;
alique questiones pertinentes ad scientiam naturalem seu physicam, alique
pertinentes ad doctrinalem seu mathematicam, alique ad harum omnium
principalem, scilicet theologicam. Quamvis autem theologia ordine dignitatis
omnium scientiarum sit prima, ordine tamen adiscendi omnium est postrema.
Ordine enim adiscendi innata est nobis via ex notioribus nobis, cuiusmodi
sunt notioria sensibilia quam intelligibilia, quia omnis cognitio nostra ortum
habet a sensu. Et ideo primo volo incipere ab illis questionibus que pertinent
ad materiam naturalem sive sensibilem, alique ad moralem seu ethicam. Item
questiones vere (?) naturales: una erat de rei universalis principio materiali,
plures vero de ipso principiato, scilicet re naturali. 189ra.
1. Prima igitur questio de materiali principio erat utrum sit dare materiam primam.
189rb.
2. Postea sequuntur questiones de ipsa re universali, circa quam queritur primo
quoad eius constitutionem sive perfectionem, secundo circa eius infectionem,
tertio circa eius corruptionem, quarto circa eius mensuram vel durationem.
De constitutione vero sive rei naturalis perfectione proponebantur due
questiones, una de perfectione hominis, alia de perfectione animalis anulosi
corporis. Circa constitutionem sive perfectionem hominis querebatur utrum
principium intellectivum uniatur corpori humano ut forma. 189vb.
3. Postea querebatur de perfectione animalis anulosi corporis, utrum videlicet
in qualibet parte animalis anulosi corporis de<c>isi sit dare animam sensitivam et
motivam. 190rb.
4. Postea querebatur de re naturali quantum ad eius lesionem sive infectionem,
et erat questio utrum aliquis aspectus malivolus possit incere corpus humanum.
190vb.
5. Postea querebatur de rei naturalis corruptione naturali, circumscripta actione
contraria continentis, et ostendo quod non . . .8 191rb.
6. Postea querebatur de re naturali quantum ad eius mensuram sive duratio-
nem, que quidem mensura est tempus. De ipso vero tempore querebantur
plura, unum videlicet de eius essentia, aliud de eius esse, tertium de instanti,
quod est aliquid ipsius temporis, quarto de futuro, quod est pars temporis.
De essentia vero sive quidditate temporis querebatur utrum tempus sit numerus
numerans vel numerus numeratus. 192rb.
7. Postea querebatur de tempore quantum ad eius esse utrum unum tempus habeat
esse suum in anima vel extra. 192vb.
8. Postea querebatur de instanti, quod est aliquid temporis sicut terminus, utrum
videlicet sit unum et idem instans manens in toto tempore vel sint diversa instantia.
193vb.

8
The title of this question is also missing from the tabula quaestionum at the end,
f. 218ra.

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9. Postea querebatur de futuro, quod est pars temporis sive differentia tem-
poris, utrum videlicet sit de ratione futuri quod aliquando sit presens.194rb.
10. Postea sequuntur questiones pertinentes ad scientiam mathematicam,
quarum prima est de astrologia, scilicet de siderum inuentia, secunda de
geometria, scilicet de partibus continui in potentia. Prima igitur questio
est utrum modica diversitas radiorum faciat diversitatem in effectu. 195ra.
11. Postea sequitur una questio pertinens ad geometriam, de partibus continui
in potentia, utrum videlicet Deus actu intelligat omnes partes possibiles continui.
195vb.
12. Postea sequuntur questiones pertinentes ad scientiam moralem sive ethi-
cam, et primo queritur de habitu virtuoso sive gratioso, secundo de habitu
vitioso. Circa habitum virtuosum sive gratiosum querebatur utrum caritas
Beate Virginis in vita excedebat caritatem existentium in patria. 196rb.
13. Postea querebatur de habitu vel actu vitioso, et primo in generali et
postea in speciali. In generali vero querebatur utrum aliquis possit male agere.
196vb.
14. Postea querebatur de habitu vel actu vitioso magis in speciali, et postea (lege
primo?) querebatur de ipso quantum ad ipsius perpetrationem, secundo
quantum ad ipsius expiationem sive emendationem. De ipsius vero per-
petratione sive commissione fuit questio primo de peccato commisso ex
ignorantia (querebatur del.), secundo de peccato commisso ex certa scientia.
De peccato commisso ex ignorantia querebatur utrum peccans ex ignorantia
invincibili sit damnandus. 197rb.
15. Postea querebatur de peccato commisso ex certa scientia, et primo de
peccato sacerdotis, secundo de peccatis aliorum generaliter. De peccato
sacerdotis querebatur utrum sacerdos obligatus ad celebrandum et existens in peccato
mortali debeat celebrare. 197vb.
16. Postea querebatur de peccatis aliorum generaliter et primo de peccato
affectus sive incontinentie, secundo de peccato effectus sive usure. De
incontinentia vero fuit questio utrum incontinentia que est circa iras sit peior
incontinentia que est circa concupiscentias. 198ra.
17. Questio sequens erat de peccato usure, videlicet supposito quod aliquis usurarius
ex 5 libris quas acquisivit per usuram lucratus fuerit alias 5 libras, utrum teneatur ad
restitutionem lucri. 198rb.
18. Postea querebatur de culpe perpetrate expiatione sive emendatione, et
circa hoc fuerunt due questiones, una pertinens ad confessionem, alia ad
satisfactionem. De confessione querebatur sine argumentis utrum ignorantia
confessoris aut impotentia absolventis faciat quod contens peccata sua non sit vere
absolutus. 198vb.
19. Postea querebatur de satisfactione utrum aliquis medicus iuvenis qui credit se
scire quod nescit, si vadat ad medicandum et interciat personam, teneatur ad emendam
persone vel pecunie. 199rb.
20. Postea sequuntur questiones pertinentes ad scientiam theologicam, circa
quam fuerunt aliqua quesita de Deo, aliqua vero de angelo, aliqua de
gura sive de misteriis ostensis in veteri testamento. De Deo querebantur
4. Primum erat de persone divine constitutione, utrum videlicet paternitas
sub ratione qua est relatio constituat primam personam in divinis. 199vb.

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21. Postea querebatur de divinarum personarum adoratione, supposito videlicet

quod non possimus plura simul intelligere et quod sint tres persone in divinis, cui persone
primo debetur latria. 201rb.
22. Postea querebatur de attributorum divinorum distinctione, utrum videlicet
pluralitas attributorum in divinis sit a Deo vel a creatura. 201vb.
23. Postea querebatur de creaturarum productione a Deo, utrum videlicet
aliquid creatum a Deo possit esse ab eterno. 201vb.
24. Postea querebatur <de angelo>, et primo de ipsius compositione, secundo
de eius motu seu translatione. Prima igitur erat utrum natura angelica sit
composita ex materia et forma. 202va.
25. Postea querebatur <utrum angelus> poterit vel possit movere a loco in locum et in
instanti. 203rb.
26. Postea querebatur de guris sive misteriis ostensis in veteri testamento,
et primo de cuiusdam sompni vericatione, secundo de quadam mirabili
visione sive apparitione. Prima igitur questio erat utrum sompnia Ioseph fuerint
vericata. 203vb.
27. Postea querebatur de quadam admirabili visione sive apparitione, utrum
videlicet ignis quem vidit Moyses in rubo de quo habetur in Exodo habuit virtutem
combustivam. 203vb.
Explicit: . . . sed est quedam manuductio ad possibilitatem predictorum facilius
capiendam. Explicit etc. 204rb.

Quodlibet III
Incipit: In tertia disputatione nostra generali proponebantur questiones 24,
quarum una tangebat generaliter creatorem et creaturam, quedam vero alie spe-
cialiter creatorem, alique vero specialiter pertinebant ad creaturam. 204rb.
1. Illa que tangebat generaliter creatorem et creaturam erat ista: utrum veritas
sive creata sive increata sit principaliter in re vel in intellectu. 204va.
2. Ideo postea querebatur specialiter de Deo, et querebantur aliqua de divine
persone perfectione, aliqua de personali distinctione, alia vero de nature
humane ab ipso Deo assumptione. Circa perfectionem vero persone
(potentie a.c.) fuit una questio de ipsius potentie divine ostensione, plures
vero de eiusdem persone extensione. De primo querebatur utrum in Christo
magis manifestetur virtus divina quam in aliqua alia creatura. 207ra.
3. Postea querebatur de divine potentie extensione, et circa hoc querebantur
tria, primo utrum Deus posset transubstantiare aliud in se, secundo utrum
possit communicare potentiam creandi alicui extra se, tertio utrum possit
facere duas species equaliter distantes a se. Prima igitur questio erat utrum
Christus secundum quod homo posset transubstantiari in Verbum divinum. 207va.
4. Et querebatur utrum Deus posset communicare potentiam creandi. 207vb.
5. Tertio querebatur utrum Deus posset facere duas species equaliter distantes a se.
208rb.

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6. De personali distinctione in Deo, videlicet supposito quod Spiritus Sanctus non

procederet a Filio, utrum distingueretur personaliter ab eo. 208va.9
7. Postea querebatur de humane nature ad personam divinam assumptione,
et fuit questio utrum Verbum fuerit unitum nature humane. 209ra.
8. Et querebatur utrum, si assumpserit duas humanitates, Christus fuisset unus homo
vel duo. 209va.
9. Postea querebatur de creatura, et primo de ipsa in generali, secundo de
quibusdam magis in speciali. Circa creaturam in generali querebantur duo,
primum de eius possibilitate, secundo de eius nitate. De eius possibilitate
querebatur utrum illud quod non est factibile sit possibile. 209va.
10. Secundo querebatur de creature innitate, utrum videlicet in aliquo nito sit
dare potentiam innitam. 210rb.
11. Postea querebatur de quibusdam creaturis in speciali, et primo de causa
(lege creatura) intellectuali, scilicet angelo, secundo de creatura rationali,
scilicet homine, tertio de causa (lege creatura) mere corporali. De creatura
vero intellectuali querebatur utrum substantie separate, sive angeli sive intelligentie,
sint plures in eadem specie. 210va.10
12. Postea querebatur de creatura rationali, scilicet homine, et querebantur
ali<qu>a de homine ex parte anime, alia vero ex parte corporis. Ex
parte vero anime querebantur ali<qu>a que respiciunt statum ipsius ut
coniuncta est, alia vero respicientia statum ipsius ut separata est. Circa
vero statum eius ut coniuncta est querebantur ali<qu>a que pertinent
ad potentiam eius naturalem et unum quod pertinet ad potestatem (?)
eius spiritualem. Circa potentiam vero eius naturalem querebantur tria,
primum utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem, secundum utrum
quidditas abstracta possit movere intellectum, tertium utrum intellectus
speculativus et practicus sint una potentia. Primo ergo querebatur utrum
sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem. 211ra.
13. Querebatur, supposito quod quidditas rei materialis sit abstracta, utrum possit movere
intellectum. 211vb.
14. Tertio querebatur utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus sint una et eadem
potentia. 212rb.
15. Postea querebatur de anima quoad potestatem eius spiritualem, et erat
questio, supposito quod aliquis prelatus, trina ammonitione premissa, excommunicavit
aliquem qui fecerit tale furtum dummodo subsit ipsi excommunicati et iste qui furatus
est impetrat litteras papales ( practicales a.c.) quod possit eligere confessorem et ab eo
absolvi in omnibus casibus qui non reservantur pape, utrum talis confessor ab eo electus
possit eum absolvere a vinculo excommunicationis sicut a furto. 212va.

9
Edited by M. Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus, vol. II, p. 311,
n. 80.
10
Explicit: In rebus vero incorruptibilibus non est tota causa nec pars cause, sed in
eis est talis pluralitas sub una specie ad pulchritudinem universi et ad manifestationem
divine bonitatis sicut ostensum est, scilicet in primo quolibet.

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16. Postea querebatur de anima quantum ad statum ipsius separatum, et circa

statum illum querebantur duo, unum de cognitione naturali ipsius anime
pro statu illo, aliud de cognitione ipsius supernaturali. De cognitione
naturali querebatur, supposito quod anima ante susceptionem specierum separetur
a corpore, utrum actu intellectualis esset. 212va.
17. Postea querebatur de anima separata quoad cognitionem eius supernatura-
lem, utrum videlicet in visione beatica requiratur habitus cognoscitivus. 213rb.
18. Postea querebatur de homine ex parte corporis, et circa hoc querebantur
duo, unum de operatione ipsius hominis mediante corpore in generali,
alia de principio formali cuiusdam operationis, scilicet actus videndi in
speciali. Primo igitur querebatur utrum aliqua (lege aliquae) operatio humana
debeat plus poni in una parte hominis quam in alia. 213vb.
19. Secunda questio erat utrum species rei in oculo sit realis. 214ra.
20. Postea querebatur de creatura mere corporali, et primo fuit quesitum de
ipso in generali, secundo de quibusdam corporibus in speciali. Circa ipsam
vero in generali querebantur tria, primo de eius esse, secundo de eius
eri, tertio de eius numerari. Circa esse vero eius querebatur utrum natura
universalis verius habeat esse in anima aut in ipsis singularibus extra.11 214rb.
21. Secundo querebatur de creatura corporali quantum ad eius eri, utrum
videlicet quidquid est substantie singularis sit per se generabilis et corruptibilis.
214vb.
22. Tertio querebatur de creatura corporali quantum ad eius numerari, utrum
videlicet in numeris sit abire in innitum. 215va.
23. Postea querebatur de quibusdam corporibus in speciali, videlicet de cor-
poribus supercelestibus que pertinent ad quintam essentiam, et circa ea
querebantur duo, quorum unum indifferenter respicit omnes planetas, alia
vero specialiter unum illorum, scilicet lunam. Questio respiciens omnes
planetas erat (mg.) utrum sint ponendi eccentrici et epicycli. 215vb.
24. Secundo querebatur specialiter de luna, utrum videlicet cornua que apparent
in luna in novilunio sint ibi secundum existentiam vel secundum apparentiam tantum.
217rb.
Explicit: . . . communia sunt motus quies numerus gura et quantitas. 217vb.
Explicit tertium quodlibet. Si male quid feci veniam peto, si bene grates.
217vb–218ra has a tabula quaestionum. At the bottom margin of 218r, in a dif-
ferent hand there appears: Explicit tertium quodlibet editum a fratre Petro de
Anglia, ministro conventus (?) Colonie, magistro in theologia ordinis fratrum
minorum.

Alexander of Alessandria

Alexander of Alessandria rst appears as licensed in theology in Rome

on 23 November 1303. He turns up in Paris four years later. A document

11
This title is missing from the tabula quaestionum, f. 218vb.

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dated 26 October 1307 relating to the trial of the Templars at Paris

names four Franciscan theologians. Two of the three named as bach-
elors have been identied as Bertrand de la Tour and Nicholas of Lyra.
The document also names “Alexander ordinis minorum” as “magister
in theologia.”12 In 1309 Alexander was named Prior Provincial of the
Terra di Lavoro, and he became Minister General of the Franciscan
Order in 1313, dying in Rome on 5 October 1314. On the basis of
his duties in the Franciscan Order starting in 1309, Glorieux states that
Alexander’s sole surviving Quodlibet can be dated to the academic year
1307–08 “sans crainte d’erreur.”13
For the Quodlibet attributed to Alexander of Alessandria, Glorieux
counts twenty-two questions in his catalogue, although the explicit he
quotes from Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral 139, reads: “Explicit
quolibet editum a Magistro Alexandro de Alexandria ordinis fratrum
minorum in quo continentur questiones numero XXI, quarum tituli
inferius per ordinem sunt scripti.” Moreover, he lists questions “19”
and “20” as treating similar subjects:
19. Utrum in substantiis separatis individuum aliquid addat supra
speciem. 217a.
20. Utrum in substantiis separatis sit compositio essentiae et individui.
Glorieux does not assign a folio number (from the Mazarine manu-
script) to question “20.” Both the Vatican and the Tortosa witnesses
have question 19 as reading:

12
H. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens (Münster 1907), vol. II, pp.
309–13 (no. 150); F. Pelster, “Quodlibeta und Questiones des Nikolaus von Lyra
O.F.M. († 1349),” in Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J. (Gembloux 1951), vol. II (pp.
951–73), p. 961.
13
Glorieux II, p. 55; L. Veuthey, Alexandre d’Alexandrie, maître de l’Université de Paris
et minister général des Frères Mineures (Paris 1932). For a discussion of the content of
Alexander’s Quodlibet, see F. Krause, “l’Attitude d’Alexandre Bonini d’Alessandria
à l’égard du principe d’inviduation,” Studia Mediawyczne 34–35 (1999–2000), pp.
147–55, using the Mazarine manuscript; cf. idem, “Abriss der Erkenntnistheorie bei
Alexander von Alessandria,” Studia Mediewistyczne 20 (1980), pp. 91–125; idem, “Der
Erkenntniskonzeption von Alexander Bonini aus Alessandria,” in Sprache und Erkenntnis
im Mittelalter, A. Zimmermann, ed. (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/2) (Berlin-New York
1981), pp. 1074–83; idem, “Filozoczne poglady Aleksandra z Aleksandrii i ich wplyw
na Uniwersytet Krakowski,” Studia Mediewistyczne 24 (1985), pp. 1–164; idem, “Die
Charakteristik des Begriffs Substanz bei Alexander Bonini aus Alessandria,” MPP 27
(1986), pp. 33–9; idem, “Die Struktur des Seins im Aspekt der Essenz und Existenz
bei Alexander aus Alexandria,” Studia Mediewistyczne 25 (1988), pp. 119–43.

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Utrum in substantiis separatis individuum aliquid addat supra speciem

ita quod in eis sit compositio ex natura et individuo.
Therefore, Glorieux’s question 20 is most likely a publication error.
The Quodlibet survives in the following manuscripts: London, British
Library, Add. 14077 (ff. 148ra–182vb); München, Bayerische Staats-
bibliothek, Clm 8717 (f. 93ra, q. 1; f. 47a?, q. 14);14 Paris, Bibliothèque
Mazarine 889 (ff. 184ra–220vb); BAV, Vat. lat. 932 (ff. 1ra–27vb,
72va–80rb); Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral 139 (ff. 214ra–247va);
Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447 (f. 96–142); Bologna,
Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A.886 (fragment).
Question list based on two witnesses: P = Mazarine 889, as reported
in Glorieux II, pp. 55–56; V = BAV, Vat. lat. 932; G = Glorieux’s
numeration:
1. Queritur primo utrum in una et eadem re simplici possint includi diverse formalites
sive diversa esse quidditativa. P 184ra; V 1ra.15
2. Secundo queritur utrum aliquis relativus (respectus V ) sit de primario intellectu
(conceptu V ) alicuius absoluti. P 185vb; V 2vb.
3. P: Utrum similitudo inter Cain et Abel, sive inter duo individua eiusdem speciei, sit
relatio realis. 187ra; V: Tertio queritur utrum similitudo inter Abel et Cayn que
fuerunt de individuo (!) eiusdem speciei sit modus realis. 4ra.
4. Quarto queritur que est maior distinctio, aut (an P) illa que est inter attributa aut
(an P) illa que est inter relationes divinas. P 188ra; V 5ra.
5. Quinto queritur utrum magnitudo sit in divinis ex natura rei. P 189vb; V 7vb.
6. Sexto queritur utrum actio in divinis ad intra et relatio differant formaliter. P 192va;
V 9rb.16
7. Septimo queritur utrum cognitio creaturarum in Patre (tempore P) precedat produc-
tionem (cognitionem V ) Verbi. P 194ra; V 11ra.
8. Octavo queritur utrum Deus possit facere subiectum absque omni accidente absoluto.
P 196ra; V 12vb.
9. Nono queritur utrum Deus possit causare cognitionem intuitivam (spat. vac. V ) sine
existentia rei vel (et P) sine reali presentia obiecti. P 198va; V 15rb.

14
Cf. F. Pelster, “Eine Münchener Handschrift des beginnenden vierzehnten Jahr-
hunderts mit einem Verzeichnis von Quaestionen des Duns Scotus und Herveus Natalis
(Cod. lat. Monac. 8717),” Franziskanische Studien 17 (1930) (pp. 253–72), p. 256 (q. 1),
p. 263 (q. 14 = n. 63: “Utrum omnes intellectus actus sint eiusdem speciei”); for q. 14,
the folio is listed as “56a (!),” but the sequentially prior and posterior questions are listed
as starting on folios 46vb and 48va, respectively. The identication between the question
in Munich 8717 and Alexander’s q. 14 is made purely on the basis of the incipit.
15
Edition (from Munich 8717), B. Jansen, “Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung
der Distinctio Formalis,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 53 (1929) (pp. 317–44 and
517–44), pp. 538–43.
16
Partial edition in F. Amerini, “Alessandro di Alessandria sulla natura degli acci-
denti,” DSTFM 16 (2005) (pp. 179–235), p. 232.

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10. Decimo queritur utrum, cum dicitur Deus creator (inv. V ) celi et terre, exprimatur
unus articulus dei. P 199va; V 16rb.
11. Undecimo queritur utrum mundus potuerit ( potuit V ) produci ab eterno. P 201rb;
V 17vb.
12. Duodecimo queritur utrum eri cuiuslibet rei (om. V ) factibilis arguat materiam
que sit pars rei facte (substantie eius V ). P 203va; V 19vb.
13. Tertiodecimo queritur utrum intellectus possibilis sit effectivus ( factivus V ) sue
operationis. P 205va; V 21va.
14. Quartodecimo queritur utrum omnes (omnis V ) actus intellectus sint eiusdem
speciei. P 207rb; V 23ra.
15. Quintodecimo queritur utrum aliquid aliud a voluntate possit causare actum
voluntatis in voluntate. P 208vb; V 24vb.
16. Sextodecimo queritur utrum de ratione voluntatis, ut est distincta contra naturam
(animam V ), sit libertas cum indifferentia ad multa. P 210vb; V 26va.
17. Queritur utrum eri substantiarum separatarum excludat ab eis necessitatem essendi.
P 212ra; V 72va.
18. Utrum eri substantiarum separatarum arguat relationem realem in Deo. P 214vb;
V 74va.
19. Utrum in substantiis separatis individuum aliquid addat supra (super V ) speciem ita
quod in eis sit compositio ex natura et individuo. P 217ra; V 76va.
20. (G: 21) Utrum possint esse duo angeli eiusdem speciei. P 218vb; V 78rb.
21. (G: 22) P: Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo. 220ra–vb; V: Utrum Christus
in triduo fuerit verus homo. 79va.

Nicholas of Lyra

Most likely from Lyre, Normandy, Nicholas of Lyra entered the Fran-
ciscan convent at Verneuil around 1300 and studied theology at Paris,
serving as bachelor in the years 1307–08. He became master of theol-
ogy by April 1309 at the latest, and was regent for at most two years.
He was Franciscan Prior Provincial of France (ca. 1319–24), then of
Burgundy (ca. 1324–26). Nicholas died in October 1349, probably
on the fourteenth of the month. He was buried at the convent of the
Cordeliers in Paris.17
Nicholas of Lyra published a treatise that some refer to as his Quod-
libetum de adventu Christi,18 others as the Quaestiones Judaicam Perdiam

17
Glorieux II, pp. 200–1; H. Labrosse, “Sources de la Biographie de Nicholas
de Lyre,” Etudes Franciscaines 16 (1906), pp. 383–404; idem, “Biographie de Nicolas
de Lyre,” Etudes Franciscaines 17 (1907), pp. 489–505, 593–608; idem, “Oeuvres de
Nicolas de Lyre,” Etudes Franciscains 19 (1908), pp. 153–75, 369–79, and 35 (1923),
pp. 170–87, 400–31.
18
J. Cohen, The Friars and the Jews (Ithaca 1982), p. 180.

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Improbantes, but most frequently as the Probatio adventus Christi (as it will
be here). This text survives in over one hundred manuscripts and at
least twenty-nine early modern printed editions.19 This work states
explicitly that the text was rst written in 1309.20 Moreover, Nicholas
of Lyra made repeated references in his Postilla litteralis to a discussion
“in quadam quaestione de quolibet,” in which he claims to disprove
interpretations that oppose Christ as the Messiah.21 Thus, the treatise
must have had its origin as a quodlibet, and Labrosse supposes that the
text that became the Probatio adventus Christi rst existed as a question
from a quodlibetal disputation held in 1309.
While Labrosse argues that Nicholas’ text exists in two redactions,
one from 1309 and another from between 1331 and 1334, Klepper
convincingly shows that only a single redaction existed.22 Labrosse’s
argument hinges on three elements: rst, in the catalogues he surveyed,
there are two different incipits;23 second, Nicholas makes references to
other works, including his Postilla litteralis, which dates to 1331; nally, in
the version that Labrosse had access to, Nicholas states: “Ista sunt que
dixi de ista ratione quando determinavi, sed postea venit ad manum
meam quidam libellus hebraice scriptus ubi predicta ratio alias solvi-
tur et quantum ad istum articulum dixit sic auctor istius libelli . . .”24
Labrosse believed that he saw here a reference to the treatise Nicholas
criticizes in his 1334 Responsio ad Judaeum. Klepper’s revision, on the
other hand, points out that, except for the incipit, all the texts available

19
D.C. Klepper, “The Dating of Nicholas of Lyra’s Quaestio de Adventu Christi,” AFH
86 (1993) (pp. 297–312), pp. 311–12; E.A. Gosselin, “A Listing of the Printed Editions
of Nicolaus de Lyra,” Traditio 26 (1970) (pp. 399–426), p. 416; E. Longpré, “Le quolibet
de Nicolas de Lyre OFM,” AFH 23 (1930) (pp. 42–56), p. 46; Labrosse, “Oeuvres de
Nicolas de Lyre” (1923), pp. 177–8, claims “over 80” manuscripts and Klepper claims
over 100, but both explicitly list only about 40 of the 80, chiey the ones that appear
in collections in Paris, Munich, the Vatican and Vienna.
20
In arguing that Christ is the Messiah against claims that the Jewish Messiah is
yet to come, Nicholas states (Tortosa 139, f. 311vb): “Quod etiam patet per effectum,
quia ab illo tempore usque nunc uxerunt mille trecenti IX anni adminus, quia toto
anno incarnationis domini scriptum est hoc opus, et adhuc Iudei videntur a predicto
sceptro magis longiique quam a principio.”
21
Labrosse, “Oeuvres de Nicolas de Lyre” (1923), p. 178.
22
Labrosse, “Oeuvres de Nicolas de Lyre” (1923), pp. 178–83; Klepper, “Nicholas
of Lyra’s De Adventu Christi,” pp. 300–8.
23
Labrosse, “Oeuvres de Nicolas de Lyre” (1923), p. 178, gives “Quaeritur utrum ex
Scripturis a Judaeis receptis possit efcaciter probari salvatorem nostrum fuisse Deum
et hominem” and “Quaeritur utrum per Scripturas a Judaeis receptas possit probari
mysterium Christi et in lege et prophetis promissum esse jam completum.”
24
Tortosa 139, f. 96va.

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are identical. Moreover, Nicholas of Strasbourg plagiarized the Probatio

adventus Christi in 1323. Therefore, all versions of the Probatio adventus
Christi report effectively the same text.
Working from Labrosse’s hypothesis of two editions, Ephrem Long-
pré found the original question that served as the basis for the Probatio
adventus Christi in a series of fourteen questions contained in a miscellany
of Franciscan theological works (BAV, Vat. lat. 869). Thus he identi-
ed these questions as Nicholas of Lyra’s Quodlibet. In addition to the
relation between the rst two questions and the Probatio adventus Christi,
Longpré demonstrates that Nicholas, in his Postilla litteralis, refers to the
third question (on the salvation of Solomon). Finally, while three of the
questions appear in the Wadding edition of Scotus’ work, Scotus could
not have been the author, since the eighth question in the series—on
the usus pauper—cites Exivi de Paradiso, promulgated in 1312. Therefore,
Longpré concluded that the entire series of questions constitutes at least
part of a quodlibet by Nicholas of Lyra.25
In a short note, Franz Pelster called into question this full recon-
struction, showing that several questions, starting with the sixth, were
instead those of Richard of Mediavilla. He did, however, nd an inter-
nal reference in the fth question that associated it with the preceding
questions.26 He later attributed to Peter Auriol the question on the usus
pauper that Longpré had edited.27
Building on this debate, Glorieux (II, p. 201) reported ve questions
for Nicolas of Lyra’s Quodlibet (I) with the foliation from BAV, Vat. lat.
869:
1. Quaeritur utrum Iudaei cognoverunt Iesum Nazarenum esse Christum sibi promissum.
130ra.
2. Utrum ex Scripturis receptis a Iudaeis possit efcaciter probari Salvatorem nostrum fuisse
Deum et hominem. 130rb.
3. Quaeritur utrum per Sacram Scripturam possit efcaciter probari nalis salus Salomonis.
138rb.
4. Utrum praelati Ecclesiae possint dimittere poenam debitam pro peccatis secundum
suam voluntatem, hoc est quaerere utrum indulgentiae tantum valeant quantum sonant.
140vb.

25
Longpré, “Le quolibet de Nicolas de Lyre OFM,” passim.
26
F. Pelster, review of Longpré, “Le quolibet de Nicolas de Lyre OFM,” Scholastik
(1931), pp. 127–8.
27
F. Pelster, “Zur Überlieferung des Quodlibet und anderer Schriften des Petrus
Aureoli OFM,” Franciscan Studies 14 (1954) (pp. 392–411), pp. 408–11.

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5. Quaeritur utrum sacerdos in peccato mortali actus ecclesiasticos exercens peccet mortaliter
in quolibet actu. 143vb.
Glorieux repeats Longpré’s observation that questions 3, 4, and 5
are published as Quaestiones Miscellanae 6, 4, and 3 respectively in the
Vivès-Wadding edition of Scotus’ work.28 Likewise, he reports Pelzer’s
discovery in the same codex (ff. 222r–225v) of the rst two questions
“in their original form,” that is, a fragment of the original Quodlibet,
citing two elements in support the relative ordering: rst, in the pas-
sages parallel to the Probatio adventus Christi’s 1309 dating, the “reworked
version” gives 1314; second, the “original” text includes a quodlibet-like
transition between sections of questions.29 Klepper notes, however, that
outside of the 1314 date, the two texts are identical.30 Therefore, the
Probatio adventus Christi was initially part of a quodlibet, but also circulated
as an independent treatise.
Pelster identied three more quodlibeta, contained in BAV, Vat. lat. 982,
ff. 81r–118r (= V), as those of Nicholas of Lyra. The rst of these, also
contained in Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 31 dextr.,
cod. 3, ff. 160r–166v (= F), is Glorieux’s anonymous Quodlibet XVI, and
the other two are anonymous Quodlibeta XVII and XVIII, respectively.
Pelster shows that the three quodlibeta come from same author on the
basis of internal stylistic criteria, and he names the author as Nicholas
of Lyra because of doctrinal consistency, as well as shared terminol-
ogy between question 4 above and the rst of the three quodlibeta in
Vat. lat. 982. That same rst quodlibet, when discussing the coming of
the Antichrist, reveals that it was authored in 1310.31 In addition, the

28
Iohannes Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. Wadding-Vivès (Paris 1891–1895), vol. V,
pp. 404ff. (q. 3 = Quaest. misc. q. 6), pp. 370ff. (q. 4 = Quaest. misc. q. 4), pp. 357ff. (q. 5
= Quaest. misc. q. 3).
29
Codices Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior: Codices 679–1134 ed. A. Pelzer (Vatican City
1931) (pp. 242–54), p. 251; Glorieux II, pp. 200–1; Pelster, “Quodlibeta und Questiones
des Nikolaus von Lyra,” p. 962, n. 13. The 1314 date is supplied both from a statement
(from Pelster) “usque ad annum domini 1314, in quo presens opus fuit scriptum” and
a corroborating dating of the time from the destruction of the Temple to the pres-
ent. The “transition” in Vat. lat. 869 (f. 223r, from Glorieux = V) and Tortosa 139
(f. 313ra = T) reads: “Post questiones (V: conclusiones) que movebantur de Deo in se,
solvende sunt questiones que movebantur de ipso in comparatione ad creaturas. Deus
pro (T: qui) speciali modo comparatur ad creaturam sibi unitam in unitate suppositi.
Et ideo (V: ex unoquoque de hoc movebatur presens solutio | T: una questio que de
hoc movebatur primo solvetur), que talis est: utrum ex scripturis receptis . . .”
30
Klepper, “Nicholas of Lyra’s De Adventu Christi,” p. 305, n. 29.
31
The shared terminology noted by Pelster, “Quodlibeta und Questiones,” p. 966,
is in fact a self-citation in question 4 (f. 141ra), which appears to be borne by q. 18 of

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second of the three quodlibeta (which Pelster signals as incomplete) refers

to a discussion “in primo quolibet quaestione 47a,” which does not
correspond to any text in the rst or third quodlibeta.32

Quodlibet II (= Pelster, Quodlibet 1; Glorieux, Anonymous XVI)33

Incipit: In generali nostra disputatione fuerunt quesita plura respicientia Deum
et creaturas. Et respicientia Deum fuerunt variata, quorum aliqua fuerunt
quoad naturam divinam et aliqua quoad humanitatem assumptam. Et quoad
naturam divinam fuerunt duo, quorum unum respicit productionem persona-
rum, aliud vero productionem creature. V 81r–v; F 160r.
1. Primum fuit utrum ratio generandi in Patri sit essentia vel proprietas. V 81r–v; F
160r.
2. Secundum fuit utrum Deus omnia que fecit bona et bene fecerit. V 81v–82r;
F 160r–v.
3. Quoad assumptam vero humanitatem fuerunt duo, quorum unum respicit
vite ipsius manifestationem, secundum vero sacramentalis existentie ratio-
nem. Primum ergo fuit Quare actus Christi non fuerunt plene ab evangelistis in
scripturam redacti et maxime quare nihil scripserunt a XIIo anno usque ad XXXm. V
82r; F 160v.
4. Secundum fuit utrum Christus prout est sub sacramento altaris possit sentire. V 82r–v;
F 160v.
5. Respicientia vero creaturas fuerunt variata, quorum aliqua respiciebant eas
determinate, quedam vero indeterminate. Et hoc fuerunt duo, quorum unum
fuit utrum subiectum possit esse causa efciens sui accidentis. V 82v; F 160v.
6. Aliud fuit utrum ens esset genus. V 82v–83v; F 160v–161r.34
7. Que vero respiciebant creaturas determinate fuerunt variata, quia quedam
respiciebant creaturas viventes, quedam vero non viventes, quedam vero
utrasque communiter. Et hec fuerunt duo, unum quoad esse nature, utrum
scilicet mixtum possit corrumpi ab aliquo intrinseco. V 83v; F 161r–v.

the rst quodlibet in BAV, Vat. lat. 982 (f. 88va). But since q. 4 belongs to a text with an
explicit date of 1309, and q. 18 to one with an explicit date of 1310, and no evidence
for more serious textual confusion exists, one must exclude the possibility that q. 4 is
in fact referring to q. 18.
32
Glorieux II, p. 295; Pelster, “Quodlibeta und Questiones.”
33
Pelster numbers the quodlibeta found in Vat. lat. 982 as Quodlibeta I–III, while noting
that the second of the quodlibeta refers to a “rst quodlibet” that does not appear to
be either of the other two, but rather Nicholas of Lyra’s Quodlibet I above. Therefore,
I have renumbered these quodlibeta as II–IV and use the Arabic numerals to refer to
Pelster’s numeration.
34
Edited in S.F. Brown, “Nicholas of Lyra’s Critique of Scotus’ Univocity” in Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt
Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag, B. Moisisch and O. Pluta, eds. (Amsterdam-Philadelphia
1991) (pp. 115–27), pp. 121–7 (after V).

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8. Aliud vero fuit quoad esse rationis, utrum scilicet actio et passio sint diversa
predicamenta. V 83v–84r; F 161v.
9. Que autem respiciebant creaturas viventes fuerunt variata, quia quedam
respiciebant viventes vita rationali, quedam vita sensitiva, unum vero
vita intellectuali, et fuit utrum angelus possit simul intelligere innita. V 84r–v;
F 161v–162r.
10. Que autem respiciebant creaturas viventes vita sensitiva fuerunt duo,
quorum unum respiciebat anime consistentiam, aliud vero operacionem.
Primum fuit utrum anima sensitiva sit tota in corde. V 84v–85r; F 162r.
11. Secundum fuit utrum motus cordis sit a virtute cordis. V 85r; F 162r.
12. Que autem respiciebant creaturas viventes vita rationali fuerunt variata
tam quoad beaticationem quam quoad cognitionem quam quoad exerci-
tationem. Quoad beaticationem fuerunt variata tam quoad substantialem
quam accidentalem. Quoad substantialem fuit utrum summa felicitas sive
beatitudo consistat in aliquo particulari bono citra primum. V 85r–v; F 162r–v.
13. Quoad accidentalem vero fuit utrum in anima beati Francisci appareant spiri-
tualiter stigmata illa Christi. V 85v; F 162r.35
14. Que vero respiciebant creaturas rationales quoad cognitionem fuerunt
variata quoad vivos et quoad defunctos. Et quoad vivos fuerunt duo,
quorum unum respicit cognitionem que habetur ex consideratione crea-
turam. Et fuit utrum astrologus possit iudicare de omnibus effectibus rerum inferiorum.
V 85v–86r; F 162v.
15. Aliud vero respicit cognitionem que habetur ex revelatione prophetarum.
Et fuit utrum possimus scire an Antichristus sit natus vel non natus adhuc. V 86r–87r;
F 162v–163r.36
16. Quoad defunctos vero querebatur utrum sciant ea que aguntur apud nos in
mundo. V 87r; F 163r–v.
17. Que vero respiciebant creaturas rationales quoad exercitationem fuerunt
variata, tam quoad exercitationem electivam status inveniendi quam
promotivam per actum vovendi. Quoad primam supponebatur monstrum
quoddam apparuisse in natura humana quod a cingulo inferius37 erat
corpus unum tantum femineum, a cingulo vero supra erant duo corpora;
quorum unum erat sexus feminei, alterum masculini. Masculus volebat
religiose et caste vivere; femina volebat matrimonio copulari. Queritur
ergo cuius voluntati sit standum. V 87r; F 163r–v.
18. Quoad exercitationem vero promotivam per actum vovendi fuit quesitum
utrum pauper usus cadat sub voto paupertatis evangelice. V 87v; F 163v.38

35
Edited in E. Longpré, “Fr. Rogeri Marston et anonymi Doctoris O.F.M. quaes-
tiones ineditae de B. Francisci stigmatibus,” Antonianum 7 (1932) (pp. 238–44), pp.
243–4 (from F).
36
As Glorieux noted, this question gives the date 1310 in two places.
37
Inferius, sic Glorieux sed Pelster omisit.
38
Edited from both witnesses in F. Pelster, “Nikolaus von Lyra und seine Quaestio
De usu paupere,” AFH 46 (1953) (pp. 211–50), pp. 231–50.

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19. Que vero respiciebant creaturas non viventes fuerunt variata tam quoad
proprietatem nature quam quoad transmutationem quam quoad men-
surationem. Quoad primum queritur utrum tota aqua debeat esse naturaliter
congelata. V 91r; F 165v.
20. Quoad transmutationem vero fuit quesitum utrum ex terra possit immediate
generari ignis. V 91v; F 165v–166r.
21. Quoad mensurationem vero quesitum fuit utrum tempus sit passio motus primi
mobilis. V 91r–92v; F 166r–v.39

Quodlibet III (= Pelster, Quodlibet 2; Glorieux, Anonymous XVII)

Incipit (V: 101r): In nostra generali disputatione non fuit aliquid quesitum
directe de creatore, sed omnes questiones fuerunt de creaturis, licet aliqua
fuerint in comparatione ad creatorem. De creaturis autem quesitum fuit
distincte et indistincte.
1. Indistincte autem quesitum est utrum omnia subsint fato. V 101r.
2. Distincte vero quesitum fuit de creaturis multipliciter, quia alique questio-
nes respiciebant creaturas superiores, alique inferiores. Et superiores vel
corporales vel spirituales et utroque modo fuit quesitum unum. Et primo
fuit quesitum utrum corpora celestia sint animata. V 101v.
3. Secundo fuit quesitum utrum visio beatorum sit equalis. V 102r.
4. Questiones vero respicientes creaturas inferiores variate fuerunt secundum
operationes humanas meritorias vel remuneratorias. Et hic secundo modo
fuit una, scilicet utrum aliquis existens in vita presenti possit videre Deum eo modo
quo beati vident. V 102r.
5. Circa operationes vero meritorias fuerunt questiones variate, quia vel
respiciebant operationum potentiam vel regulam vel decentiam vel gratiam
vel licentiam. Circa potentiam vero fuerunt questiones variate, prout hec
potentia considerabatur in uno vel in pluribus. Et primo modo fuit una,
scilicet utrum Paulus post raptum habuit dem. V 102v.
6. Secundo modo fuerunt duo. Quarum una fuit utrum extra statum Ecclesie
possit aliquis salvari. V 102v.
7. Alia fuit utrum in de Christi existens per se possit aliquis operari que sufciant ad
salutem. V 102v–103r.
8. Circa vero decentiam harum operationum fuerunt questiones variate, quia
una fuit magis generalis, altera quasi singularis. Prima fuit utrum mulieres
post partum debeant se representare ecclesie. V 103r.
9. Circa decentiam harum operationum fuit questio utrum beatus Petrus et
Andreas decenter et virtuose fuerint secuti Christum. V 103r–v.
10. Circa vero huiusmodi operationum gratiam fuerunt questiones variate,
quia vel respiciebant gratiam predestinationis vel reconciliationis vel

39
After this question, Pelster lists two quaestiones disputatae, namely “Utrum habitus
caritatis minui possit” (V 94r–97v) and “Utrum virtutes aquisite differant specie ab
infusis” (V 98r–100r).

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absolutionis. Primo modo fuit una, scilicet utrum aliquis predestinetur a Deo
suis meritis. V 103v–104r.
11. Circa gratiam reconciliationis fuit quesitum utrum aliquis peccator possit salvari
absque contritione. V 104r.
12. Circa vero gratiam absolutionis fuerunt 3 questiones, quarum una respicie-
bat eius virtutem, altera eius communicabilitatem, tertia eius iterabilitatem.
Prima est hec: utrum in absolutione penitentiali a sacerdote remittatur tota culpa et
pena. V 104v.

Quodlibet IV (= Pelster, Quodlibet 3; Glorieux, Anonymous XVIII)

Incipit (V 105r): In nostra generali disputatione mota fuerunt dubia respicientia
specialiter Deum et creaturas et communiter utrumque. Respicientia Deum
specialiter fuerunt tria: unum circa notionem, aliud circa unionem, tertium
circa gubernationem.
1. Circa notionem querebatur utrum innascibilitas fundetur super aliquo positivo.
V 105r.
2. Circa unionem vero querebatur utrum persona divina possit sibi unire naturam
irrationalem in unitatem personalem. V 105r–v.
3. Circa gubernationem vero querebatur utrum <Deus> regeret immediate omnia
inferiora sua providentia vel per aliqua media. V 105v–106r.
4. Respiciens vero communiter Deum et creaturas fuit unum, scilicet utrum
idem possit referri relatione reali ad seipsum. V 106r.
5. Respicientia vero specialiter creaturas fuerunt variata, quia aliqua respicie-
bant creaturas speciales [lege spirituales], alia corporales, alia mixtas ex
utraque, scilicet spirituali et corporali. Et spirituales aliqua quoad distinc-
tionem, aliqua quoad operationem. Primo modo fuerunt duo, quorum
unum fuit utrum intellectus agens sit nobilior quam passibilis. V 106r–v.
6. Secundum fuit utrum potentie rationales differant a naturalibus per hoc quod sunt
ad opposita. V 106v–107r.
7. Quoad operationem vero fuerunt duo, quorum unum fuit utrum intellectus
agens aliquid agat super fantasmata. V 107r.
8. Secundum fuit utrum intellectus possit habere aliquam scientiam de actuali existentia
rei solum per fantasma impressum et expressum. V 107r–v.
9. Secundum fuit utrum colores qui apparent in yride sint veri colores. V 107v.
10. Tertium vero fuit quoad actum secundum, scilicet utrum lumen vel motus de
se calefaciat. V 107v–108r.
11. Quoad situm vero erat unum, scilicet utrum aliquod corpus immobile, puta turris,
sit modo in eodem loco in quo—iam sunt C anni vel citra seu ultra—fuit hedicata.
V 108r–109r.
12. Quoad augmentum vero erat unum, scilicet utrum quelibet pars augmenti sit
aucta. V 109r–v.
13. Quoad motum vero fuit unum, scilicet utrum sagitta perveniens ad aliquod
corpus inpertransibile possit resilire posterius. V 109v–110r.
14. Quoad presagium autem querebatur utrum cometa signicet mortem principis.
V 110r.

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15. Respiciencia vero creaturas mixtas ex intellectuali et corporali natura

fuerunt variata, quia aliqua fuerunt quoad statum civilem, aliqua quoad
ecclesiasticum. Quoad statum civilem vel quoad statuum comparationem
vel quoad regiminis comparationem primo modo fuit utrum status phylosophi
sit nobilior statu principis vel econtrario. V 110r–v.
16. Quoad regiminis gubernationem fuit utrum civitas regatur melius optimis viris
quam optimis legibus vel econtrario. V 110v–111r.
17. Quoad statum ecclesiasticum fuerunt dubia et quoad carnis castigationem
et debitorum persolutionem et aliorum instructionem. Quoad primum
fuerunt duo, unum scilicet utrum comedendo semel carnes in die intentione ieiunandi
ieiunetur. V 111r–v.
18. Aliud fuit utrum per potum sumptum ante commestionem solveretur ieiunium.
V 111v.
19. Quoad debitorum persolutionem fuit motum unum, scilicet utrum non
solventes decimas sint in statu salutis vel non. V 111v–113r.
20. Ultimo remanet unum dubium quoad aliorum instructionem, utrum scilicet
predicatores qui populo predicant peccent mortaliter non inducendo populum ad solutionem
decimarum. V 113v.40
Textual evidence therefore supports Nicholas of Lyra’s having held
four quodlibetal disputations. One, in Advent 1308, or Lent or Advent
1309,41 has been claimed to survive in three redactions, but in fact is
a single, substantially revised, text that survives in a fragmentary copy
and as a separate treatise: A) the fragment of ve questions in Vat. lat.
869, ff. 130r–143v, and B) the Probatio adventus Christi. The other three
Quodlibeta are contained in Vat. lat. 982 and do not have clear indica-
tions of relative dating, but are stylistically similar. Moreover, the rst of
the three has an explicit statement placing it in 1310. Given that
James of Ascoli’s Paris regency is dated to 1309–11, his Quodlibet to

40
Afterwards, Pelster lists one quaestio disputata, namely, “Utrum exitus rerum creata-
rum in esse presupponat emanationem divinarum personarum” (V 114r–118r).
41
Klepper, “Nicholas of Lyra’s De Adventu Christi,” p. 299, n. 6, argues that the
dating clauses in the mansucript reect, as they state, when the text was written, but
not when this oral quodlibet was given. Since Paris began the calendar new year with
Easter, both Advent and Lent quodlibeta occurred in the same calendrical year. This
line of reasoning should not be applied to quodlibeta: unlike the civil authorities, the
University of Paris employed the Florentine (Annunciation) style of dating (although
in 1309 the difference between the two would have been ve days!). In any case, in the
passages in question, Nicholas is not interested in giving us a diplomatic date, but in
expressing the number of years that have transpired since the birth of Christ, which
would even permit starting the new year on 25 December (Nativity style). In other
words, when Nicholas writes, “ab illo tempore usque nunc uxerunt mille trecenti IX
anni adminus, quia toto anno incarnationis domini scriptum est hoc opus,” we can
only interpret this to mean that the text was written some time between 25 December
1308 and 9 April 1310, and the quodlibet was held some time before then.

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Lent 1311, perhaps one or more of these three Quodlibeta are from
a Franciscan studium elsewhere. In any case, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, con-
taining Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook, has a seemingly com-
plete record of Parisian disputations held during the academic years
1311–15, yet does not witness any of Nicholas of Lyra’s quodlibetal
disputations.42

James of Ascoli

James of Ascoli rst appears with the title of master of theology in

April 1310, at the process of Marguerite Porete. His regency at Paris
is dated to 1309–11, after which he attended the Council of Vienne.
Two questions from James of Ascoli’s Quodlibet appear in Prosper of
Reggio Emilia’s collection contained in BAV, Vat. lat. 1086.43 Glorieux
hypothesizes that the specic location of James of Ascoli’s quodlibetal
questions in Prosper’s notebook implies that James’ Quodlibet was held in
Lent 1311: in effect, the section of the codex appears to contain quaes-
tiones discussed at the University of Paris from 1311–14, and Glorieux
further suggested that the order of the quaestiones in the manuscript
reects the sequence they were given in. In this section, the very rst
two quaestiones are abbreviations of James of Ascoli’s Quodlibet. According
to Glorieux, if this sequential dating holds, then one would not expect
a collection of questions given in an academic year to begin with those
from a quodlibet, as such disputations are rst held in Advent. Moreover,
James of Ascoli attended the Council of Vienne, which started in Octo-
ber 1311. Therefore, “it is more natural to believe that the scribe had
copied down and underscored a question that had just been edited,
although the session was held several months before.”44 Courtenay, in

42
P. Glorieux, “A propos de ‘Vatic. lat. 1086’. Le personnel enseignant de Paris
vers 1311–14,” RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 23–39; W. Courtenay, “Reections on Vat. lat.
1086,” in this volume.
43
T. Yokoyama, “Zwei Quaestionen des Jacobus de Aesculo über das Esse Obiecti-
vum,” in Wahrheit und Verkündigung, L. Scheffczyk, W. Dettloff, and R. Heinzmann, eds.
(Paderborn 1967), pp. 31–74; Glorieux II, pp. 141–2; on Vat. lat. 1086, see A. Pelzer,
“Prosper de Reggio Emilia, des Ermites de Saint Augustin, et le manuscrit latin 1086
de la Bibliothèque Vaticane,” Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie 30 (1928), pp. 315–51;
P. Glorieux, “A propos de ‘Vatic. lat. 1086’.”
44
Glorieux, “A propos de Vatic. lat. 1086,” pp. 24–9, 34: “Il est plus naturel de
croire que le scribe a consigné et relevé une question qui venait d’être alors éditée,
encore que la soutenance remontât à quelques mois plus haut.”

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this volume, demonstrates that the questions in the notebook are not
in chronological order; consequently, the Lent 1311 date can only be
considered likely.45
The Quodlibet survives in the following witnesses: Assisi, Biblioteca
del Sacro Convento 136 (ff. 112–136) and 172 (ff. 141v–142v, q. 11);
Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 31, dextr., cod. 8
(ff. 51va–78vb); Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 609; BAV, Vat. lat. 932
(ff. 36r–68v); BAV, Vat. lat. 1012 (ff. 46ra–60rb); BAV, Vat. lat. 1086 (ff.
101–102, qq. 1 and 4 abridged); Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep.
Erf. CA Q.170 (ff. 201r–222v, missing question 1); Cambridge, Uni-
versity Library FF.III.23 (f. 129ff.); Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek
307 (ff. 97ra–105vb; 106ra–120vb); Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 470
(ff. 49r–69v); Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 994 (ff. 83–124); Wien,
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1447 (ff. 1–33); New Haven,
Yale University Library, Marston 203 (ff. 17v–55v).46 The question list
is based on four manuscripts: F = Firenze (as recorded by Glorieux);
V1 = Vat. lat. 932; V2 = Vat. lat. 1012; W = Wien.47
Incipit and Prologue (from V1 and W):
Quia teste beato Iohanne, Apoc. primo capitulo, Deus est principium et nis
omnium, scilicet alpha et omega, idcirco oratione previa (premissa W) depreca-
bor Dominum et ad Deum ponam eloquium meum. Excedit naturam multum
que supereminet humani eloqui facultatem divina immensitas; et inde oritur
difcultas fandi, unde adest ratio non tacendi.48 (ad Deum add. W) Deprecabor
ergo in previas (presentis W) Dominum ut meum aperiat intellectum, et ad
Deum (et ad Deum om. W) ponam eloquium meum ab ipso sumendo nostre
inchoationis sermonem.
In nostra disputatione de quolibet querebantur quedam de Deo, quedam
de creaturis. De Deo autem querebantur unum pertinens ad intra tantum, et

45
Courtenay, “Reections on Vat. Lat. 1086.”
46
From Glorieux II, pp. 141–2; V. Doucet, “L’oeuvre scolastique de Richard de
Conington OFM,” AFH 29 (1936) (pp. 396–442), p. 413; B. Shailor, Catalogue of Medieval
and Renaissance Manuscripts in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University
(Binghamton, NY 1984–1992), vol. III, no. 203.
47
This also takes into account Yokoyama’s question list (“Zwei Quaestionen des
Jacobus de Aesculo,” pp. 34–5), based on Vat. lat. 1012, and the Cambridge and
Florence manuscripts, but without foliation.
48
Leo the Great, Tractatus septem et nonaginta, tract. 29, ed. A. Chavasse (Turnhout
1973), vol. I, p. 146.1–6: “Excedit quidem, dilectissimi, multum que supereminet humani
eloquii facultatem diuini operis magnitudo, et inde oritur difcultas fandi, unde adest
ratio non tacendi, quia in Iesu christo lio dei non solum ad diuinam essentiam, sed
etiam ad humanam spectat naturam quod dictum est per prophetam: Generationem eius
quis enarrabit?” This text is also referred to in the Oxford manuscript of Meyronnes’
Quodlibet; see below.

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duo pertinentia ad extra, et tertium quasi mixtim pertinens partim ad intra

et partim ad extra.
1. Illud autem quod querebatur pertinens ad intra erat utrum simplicitas divine
nature compatiatur secum aliquam distinctionem ex natura rei previam distinctioni per-
sonarum. F 51ra; V1 36ra; V2 46ra; W 1ra (Vat. lat. 1086, 101ra–vb).
2. Secuntur due questiones de Deo in comparatione ad extra, et erat prima
questio ista (om. V2): utrum perfectiones ( persones V1) creaturarum virtualiter contente
in essentia divina secundum quod habent ibi esse proprium et distinctum inter se et ab
essentia (divina add. W ) precedant rationes ideales.49 F 53ra; V1 39vb; V2 48rb;
W 4vb.
3. Alia questio sequens (inv. V2W) de Deo in comparatione ad extra erat ista:
utrum Deus posset ( possit V2) facere aliquod compositum ex elementis et aliqua forma
intellectuali (intellectiva V2) differens specie ab homine (et add. W ) nobilius (nobilior
V2) ipso homine. F 54rb; V1 41vb; V2 49ra; W 7ra.
4. Sequitur una questio de Deo per comparationem ad intra et erat questio
(erat questio] extra questio simile V1) ista: utrum potentia generandi in Deo Patre
( proprie V1) cadat sub omnipotentia. F 55ra; V1 42vb; V2 49vb; W 8ra (Vat. lat.
1086, 101vb–102ra).
5. Expeditis questionibus de Deo, secuntur nunc questiones de creaturis,
quarum quedem tangunt omnes creaturas generaliter, quedam vero tangunt
quasdam creaturas specialiter. Et quia communior sit nobis notior (commu-
nior . . . notior] communiora sunt nobis magis notiora V1; communiora nobis
sint notiora V2), sicut patet ex I Phisicorum, ideo ab illis primo incipiendum
est, et erat (enim V1) prima questio ista (prima . . . ista] questio ista prima
V2): utrum potentia que est differentia entis (om. V2) sit potentia (om. V2) obiectiva
vel potentia (om. V2) subiectiva. F 55vb; V1 44rb; V2 50rb; W 9va.50
6. Sequens questio erat utrum omnis (om. V1) habitudo sit relatio. F 56vb; V1 46rb;
V2 51rb; W 11va.
7. Consequenter querebatur utrum respectus sit de conceptu quidditativo (alicuius add.
V2) absoluti. F 58ra; V1 48ra; V2 52rb; W 13rb.
8. Tertio querebatur circa materiam de relationibus sive respectibus utrum
equalitas fundata super duo qualia (equalia F ), puta duo alba, sit alia relatio realis ab
ipsa similitudine fundata super eadem alba. F 58va; V1 49ra; V2 52va; W 14ra.
9. Deinde sequebantur quedam questiones de creaturis in speciali (de . . .
speciali] in creaturis separatis W), (et add. V2) quedam erant de creaturis
spiritualibus et una tantum (erat V2) de creaturis (mere add. V1) corporalibus,
et ideo de hac una expediam me prius, et erat questio ista: utrum scilicet duo
corpora simul esse in eodem loco implicet contradictionem. F 59vb, 61ra; V1 51ra;
V2 53va; W 15vb.

49
Edited in Yokoyama, “Zwei Quaestionen des Jacobus de Aesculo,” pp. 59–74.
50
Edited (from Erfurt, Firenze, Leipzig, Troyes, Wien, Vat. lat. 932 and 1012) by
L. Hödl, “Die Seinsdifferenz des Möglichen im Quodlibet des Jakob von Ascoli OM
(Quaestio 5—Einführung und Edition),” in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert,
O. Pluta, ed. (Amsterdam 1988), pp. 465–93.

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10. Consequenter querebatur: utrum accidentia in sacramento altaris habeant proprie

rationem suppositi. F 63ra; V1 54ra; V2 54vb; W 18va.
11. Expeditis questionibus de creaturis corporalibus, secuntur nunc (om.
W) alique questiones de creaturis spiritualibus, quarum una pertinet ad
intellectum, et alia ad voluntatem, et tertia tam ad intellectum quam
ad voluntatem. Illa que pertinet ad intellectum (tantum add. V1) est ista:
utrum scilicet intellectus agens sit nobilior intellectu possibili vel econverso. F 64vb;
V1 56ra; V2 55vb; W 20va.
12. Deinde querebatur questio pertinens ad voluntatem, et erat questio ista:
supposito quod voluntas sit activa et passiva respectu sui actus (inv. V2), queritur utrum
(om. V2) respectus activi et passivi fundentur super eandem rem vel super aliam et aliam
(et aliam om. V1) rem (necessario add. F ). F 66rb; V1 57va; V2 55A(bis)va;
W 22ra.
13. Consequenter querebatur de habitu caritatis et eius actu, et erat (et erat
om. V1) questio ista (scilicet V2): utrum omnis actus caritatis elicitus sit nobilior
ipso (suo V2 om. W ) habitu vel non. F 69ra; V1 60ra; V2 56va; W 24va.
14. Postea queritur (querebatur V2) utrum agens particulare habeat per se aliquem
effectum (actum V2). F 73rb; V1 63va; V2 58rb; W 28rb.51
15. Consequenter querebatur, supposito quod possibile obiectivum fundetur super
aliquid absolutum reale, utrum potentia creandi possit communicari creature. F 75ra;
V1 65ra; V2 58vb; W 29va.
16. Sextodecimo querebatur de clerico beneciato (de beneciato clerico V2) qui habet
licentiam standi in studio, si stet in studio sine spe prociendi, ita quod studio non
vacet, sed potius ludat, discurrat et sit vacabundus, utrum teneatur ad restitutionem
fructuum perceptorum tempore intermedio pro quo debuit vacare studio et non (vacare
add. FW ) otio. F 78rb; V1 68ra; V2 60ra; W 32rb.
Explicit: (F 78vb; V1 68va; V2 60rb; W 33ra) Argumentum ad oppositum,
quando dicitur quod fraus et dolus nemini (nulli V2) debent patrocinari, con-
cedo, quia concludit verum.
One of the manuscripts containing James’ Quodlibet, BAV, Vat. lat. 1012,
contains other series of questions inuenced by Scotus that claim to be
quodlibeta by James of Ascoli, but in fact are either not quodlibeta or not
by James of Ascoli. Among these gures the question An Deus cognoscat
omnia alia a se edited by Schwamm and attributed to James.52 For a list
of these questions, and a discussion of the manuscript containing them,
see the Appendix to this chapter.

51
Z. Wlodek, “Une question scotiste du XIVe siècle sur la continuité du temps,”
MPP 12 (1967) (pp. 117–34), p. 119, states that Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 732,
has “large parts” of the question; see the Appendix to this chapter.
52
H. Schwamm, Robert Cowton O.F.M. über das göttliche Vorherwissen (Innsbruck 1930),
pp. 44–63.

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Franciscan Quodlibeta in Vat. lat. 1086

Bertrand de la Tour
Bertrand de la Tour is named a bachelor during the trial of the Tem-
plars in 1307–08. Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s collection associates with
a “Bel. Mi.” a series of questions that seems to be a quodlibet. Glorieux
argues that the identication of the “Bel. Mi.” with Bertrand de la Tour
should “without doubt” be made, as he was master of theology in 1312
at his election to Provincial Minister of Aquitaine. Glorieux uses the
appointment to Aquitaine as a terminus ante quem. On Glorieux’s logic,
Bertrand’s Quodlibet, and his regency, date from 1311–12. Bertrand later
became cardinal, and then, when Michael of Cesena was deposed,
vicar general of the Franciscans in 1328. A document from April 1333
mentions him as deceased.53
Bertrand de la Tour gained more attention as a sermonist, politician,
and advisor to Pope John XXII than he did as a scholastic theologian.54
That his work survives only in Prosper’s notebook raises the suspicion
that Bertrand never edited his Quodlibet, and we owe its survival purely
to chance. The question list is from BAV, Vat. lat. 1086:
1. Prima questio utrum innitas sit magis ratio essentie divine quam sua actualis exis-
tentia. 117vb.
2. Secunda questio est utrum in productione Filii contingat Patri cognoscere Spiritum
Sanctum. 118va.55
3. (G. 4) Utrum intellectus beatus una ratione formali cognoscat Deum trinum et unum.
118va.
4. (G. 5) Quarta questio utrum visio divine essentie posset communicari viatori.
118vb.56

53
P. Nold, “Bertrand de la Tour, Omin. Life and Works,” AFH 94 (2001) (pp.
275–323), pp. 275–7; idem, “Bertrand de la Tour, Omin. Manuscript List and Supple-
ment,” AFH 95 (2002), pp. 3–52.
54
On Bertrand de la Tour in general, see P. Nold, Pope John XXII and His Franciscan
Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy (Oxford 2003).
55
Glorieux’s question 3 corresponds to a follow-on question, which is part of the same
quodlibetal question: “Secundo utrum in illo priori contingat Patri aliqua actio” (118va).
56
For the sake of understanding both the nature of Prosper’s collection as well as
Bertrand’s thought, I provide here a transcription of question 4: “Quarta questio: utrum
visio divine essentie possit communicari viatori.—Hic primo quid hic (del.?) vocatur
visio divine essentie. Dicendum quod visio intuitiva.—Viator autem est qui est vivens in
(iter.) carne mortali; quod est in statu merendi (lege mirandi?) largo modo dicitur viator,
cum non habet usum sensuum, ut Paulus in raptu.—Dico igitur quod <si> accipiatur
viator secundo modo et visio in transitu, [dico] quod potest communicari, quia fuit

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5. (G. 6) Quinta questio utrum habitibus existententibus gloriosis in intellectu et voluntate,

possit intellectus intelligere et voluntas non diligere. 119ra.
6. (G. 7) Sexta utrum corpus Christi mortuum est adorandum. 119ra.
7. (G. 8) Septima questio utrum in conversione panis in corpus Christi substantia
adnihiletur. 119rb.
In addition, the same manuscript has, on ff. 128vb–130ra, four questions
on the virtues attributed to a “M. Ber. de Mi.,” probably a “Magister
Bertrandus de Minoribus.” These questions most likely do not derive
from a quodlibet:
1. Utrum donum creatum quod est caritas sit principium actus meritorii. 128vb.
2. Utrum prudentia inquantum est virtus intellectualis sit nobilior ipsa iusticia. 129rb.
3. Utrum donum quod est caritas sit in potentia beatica. 129va.
4. Utrum caritas sit in potentia principalius beaticabili. 129vb.
Explicit: Item ratio boni est nobilior ratione veri. 130ra.

Martin of Abbeville
Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook associates a “Magister Martinus
Minor” with two questions; later a series of seventeen questions is
attributed to a “Mar.” Glorieux, following Pelzer, assigns the questions
to Martin of Abbeville, mentioned as bachelor in 1303.57 Since both
series of Martin’s texts appear in Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook,
they can be dated approximately to the academic years 1311–14. The
rst two questions attributed to Martin (BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, f. 148vb:
Utrum in Deo omnes operationes sint immanentes, and f.149va: Utrum habitus
caritatis habeat rationem principii activi respectu actus meritorii ) occur in the part

communicata Adam in illo sopore et Moysi et Paulo, ut dicit Augustinus Ad Orosium, et

credo quod Virgini et multis aliis. Item, Gregorius secundo Dyalogo videtur dicere quod
fuit communicata beato Benedicto.—Si autem accipiatur viator abstractus a sensibus
et cognitio mansiva, dicendum quod potest Deus, quia quod potest communicari per
instans, potest per quodlibet tempus; sed non est congruum, quia non videretur sensibus.
Item non meretur, etc.—Accipiendo tunc (?) viatorem primo modo et visionem primo
modo et secundo; nam fuit communicata homini unito, scilicet Christo, igitur et non
unito, quia unio non est causa formalis istius visionis, quia tunc nullus esset beatus
gratia cause efficientis, igitur potest sine visione.—Item, nulla contradictio est, quia
vel hec esset quia non stat cum actu merendi (lege mirandi?), nam (illeg.) corporis in
mortalitate; nec propter pronitates (?) ad peccata, quia Deus posset auferre.—Tamen
dico quod sit incongruum, quia non videbit me homo et vivet, nam anima que videt Deum
debet esse supra mundum, Gregorius 2 Dyalogo, nam anima non perciperet alia.—Item,
ille status est tranquillus; ideo debet esse abstractus.—Item, ibi est summa intentio
intellectus, igitur congruum est (?) ut abstrahatur a sensibus. Hoc dicit Augustinus in
quadam epistola ad Paulinum, et est in merito.”
57
Glorieux II, p. 192.

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of the manuscript that Glorieux dates to 1311–12, and are probably

Martin’s principial lectures. In the later, seventeen questions, Glorieux
discerns two quodlibeta, and thus he dates “Quodlibet I” to 1312–13 and
“Quodlibet II” to 1313–14. Since Courtenay undermines Glorieux’s
relative dating scheme for Vat. lat. 1086, however, the most that can
be said is that these Quodlibeta were most likely held at Paris between
1311 and 1314.58

Quodlibet I
1. Utrum, cessante omni operatione intellectus divini et creati, omnia divina essent idem.
209ra.
2. Utrum (mg.: dato quod persona constituatur per relationem) potentia generandi dicat
quid vel ad aliquid. 209va.
3. Utrum in Christo sint due liationes. 209va.
4. Quarta questio utrum Christus potuerit peccare. 209vb.
5. Quinto, utrum virtute naturali possint cogitationes cognosci ab angelo. 210ra.
6. Sexta questio utrum habitus ponantur in potentiis ad agendum vel ad paciendum.
210rb.
Explicit (211ra): Tunc ad questionem patet per dicta.

Quodlibet II
1. Utrum, dato quod potentie anime sint idem quod essentia, homo esset beaticabilis.
211ra.
2. Utrum Deus posset facere quod aliquis eum videret et non diligeret. 211va.59
3. Utrum beatus eodem actu videat Deum et videat se videre Deum. 211vb.60

58
Glorieux, “A propos de ‘Vatic. lat. 1086’,” p. 31. Courtenay, “Reections on Vat.
Lat. 1086.”
59
“Utrum Deus posset facere quod aliquis eum videret et non diligeret.—Dicendum
primo utrum alicui possit inesse habitus beaticus et non sibi inesset actus caritatis.
Dicendum quod de potentia ordinata, non de potentia tamen absoluta, sic, tum quia
magis dependet actus ab habitu quam econverso, sed actus potest esse sine habitu; tum
quia prius potest separari a posteriori; tum quia cessante inuentia divina, non erit
actus.—Sed dicit ‘ergo habitus erit frustra.’ Dicendum quod non esset, quia perceret
subiectum et reddit eum aptum ad actum.—Secundo ad questionem dicunt quidam
quod non posset non diligere. Alii dicunt quod propter libertatem potest, sicut circa alia;
sed potest dici quod aliter se habet respectu nis et eorum que sunt ad nem.—Dicen-
dum ergo quod voluntas non posset non diligere, cum non esset beaticus, nec est in
potestate creature ad oppositum, ex quo habet habitum. Deus tamen posset facere,
etc.—Tertio videndum an possit amari et non videri, et dico quod non, quia talis unio
intellectus necessario requiritur.”
60
“Utrum beatus eodem actu videat Deum et videat se videre Deum. Hic primo,
quod queritur (mg.: an possit <vi>dere actum <suum>). Secundo, utrum eodem
actu. Tertio, in quo actu est beatitudo.—Ad primum dicendo quod sic. Nam visio est

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4. Utrum voluntas velit nem eodem actu et ea que sunt ad nem. 211vb.
5. Utrum, dato quod intellectus non sit liber in iudicando, voluntas esset libera in eligendo.
211vb.
6. Utrum voluntas habeat dominium super actum intellectus speculativi et practici.
212ra.
7. Utrum creatura rationalis intelligens per speciem que sibi per speciem representatur
possit intelligere. 212va.
8. Utrum creatura rationalis magis debeat eligere peccatum mortaliter quam non esse
simpliciter. 212vb.
9. Utrum visio sit actio manens. 213ra.
10. Utrum omnes divine operationes conveniant omnibus personis divinis uniformiter et
indistincte. 213ra.
11. Utrum beatitudo divina consistat in essentia secundum se et absolute sumpta vel
secundum quod operatio. 213va.

William of Alnwick

In all likelihood, William of Alnwick studied with John Duns Scotus

at Paris and served as his secretary. He became bachelor of the Sentences
at Paris ca. 1313–14, and was regent master at Oxford in 1315–16.
William passed through Paris in 1316, perhaps teaching there in
1317–18, then was lector at Montpellier ca. 1318–20; he is found at
Bologna in 1321, and ultimately ended up at Naples, where in 1330
he became bishop of Giovinnazzo. William of Alnwick died at the
start of 1333.61
William of Alnwick has been associated with two quodlibeta, but only
one has been identied. This quodlibet exists in four known manuscript
witnesses. Ledoux published it along with six questions De esse intelligibili

quedam res, ergo potest eam videre. Item, visio representatur in Verbo. Item, licet plura
ut plura non possint videri, tamen ut habent habitudinem possunt.—Ad secundum
articulum dicendum quod, cum videt in verbo, [dicendum quod] eodem actu videt;
sed ut videt in genere proprio, dicendum quod alio actu, tum quia est aliud obiectum;
tum quia unus sit per alium tractum, alius non; tum quia unus beaticus, alius non;
tum quia unus est reexus, alius non.—Ad tertium articulum, dicendum quod in primo
actu recte est beatitudo, tum quia eo attingit solum obiectum beaticum; tum quia
reexus est ex propriis viribus.—Item actus beatitudinis est continuus et perpetuus, sed
reexus non est perpetuus.—Ad illud supra ad quod se convertit, etc., dicendum quod
verum est ut sine ordine se fert.”
61
G. Alliney, Time and Soul in Fourteenth-Century Theology (Florence 2002), pp. xi–xiii;
W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton 1987), p. 188;
Glorieux II, p. 114.

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in 1937.62 The explicit in Vat. lat. 1012 and Assisi 166 (in a different
hand) states that Alnwick disputed his Quodlibet at Oxford, which would
place it in 1315–16. In addition, Ledoux remarks that Doucet found a
reference to a quodlibet from Montpellier in the library catalogue of the
Dominican convent of San Giovanni e Paolo of Venice, to a now-lost
codex 139.63 Alliney hypothesizes that this continental Quodlibet may
be the source for the third redaction of the three Quaestiones de tempore
witnessed by Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 732, ff. 45ra–48vb. This
redaction of the Quaestiones de tempore also appears, in a version that
suggests a reportatio, in BAV, Vat. lat. 1012, ff. 95v–97v.64
William of Alnwick’s Quodlibet survives in the following manuscripts:
Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 166, ff. 20rb–66rb; Padova, Bib-
lioteca Antoniana 295, ff. 51va–81vb (order: fragment of q. 3, then
qq. 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 5, 6);65 BAV, Vat. lat. 1012, ff. 12rb–39ra. Question
list from Ledoux:
1. Utrum ad aliqua non esse formaliter sequatur ista esse formaliter distincta, supposita
constantia subiecti manente.
2. Secundo quaerebatur utrum perfectiones simpliciter sint eaedem formaliter in Deo.
3. Utrum in divinis sit prioritas et posterioritas secundum rem.
4. Quarto quaeritur utrum notitia actualis creaturarum praesupponatur in Deo Patre
productionibus passivis aliarum personarum.
5. Utrum homo possit consequi omnem beatitudinem per naturam quam naturaliter
appetit.
6. Postea quaesitum fuit utrum perfectiones creaturarum, prout continentur in Deo
virtualiter, distinguantur inter se et a Deo formaliter.

62
William of Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet, ed.
A. Ledoux (Quaracchi 1937).
63
Ledoux, preface to Quaestiones disputatae, p. xii, quotes: “Explicit 1um Quodlib-
etum disputatum et determinatum in Monte Pessulano a fratre Ghilielmo de Alvellwic
Anglico.” Alliney, Time and Soul, p. xii, n. 12, draws attention to the Addendum in
Ledoux, p. 644, where the latter species: “Catalogus hic indicatus est opus Dominici
Mariae Berardelli, O.P., et sic intitulatur: Codicum omnium latinorum et italicorum qui MSS.
in Bibliotheca SS. Iohannis et Pauli Venetiarum apud Patres Praedicatores asservantur catalogus, in
Nova Raccolta d’Opuscoli scientici et lologici, T 32, Venetiis 1778, opusculo 6,” and notes
that the codex apparently contained four quodlibeta of William of Alnwick.
64
Alliney, Time and Soul, pp. xv–xxvii. Alliney edits the questions in all three redac-
tions; for the third redaction (pp. 115–74), he uses the Krakow manuscript. The ques-
tions, as they appear in the Krakow manuscript, are as follows:
1. Utrum tempus fundatum in motu rerum mobilium corporalium sit aliquid reale extra ani-
mam.
2. Utrum tempus secundum esse reale quod habet extra animam differat realiter a motu.
3. Quarto est videre Utrum ad multiplicationem motuum sit multiplicatio temporum an omnium
motuum sit tempus unum.
65
Ledoux, preface to Quaestiones Disputatae, pp. xix–xx.

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7. Supposito, ex superiori quaestione, quod omnes perfectiones creaturarum

contineantur in Deo, sequitur secunda quaestio: utrum omnes perfectiones
creaturarum contineantur in Deo unitive per unicam perfectionem ex parte Dei.
8. Quaestio tertia de continentia perfectionum creaturarum in Deo est ista,
videlicet: utrum perfectiones creaturarum, prout continentur in Deo virtualiter, distin-
guantur a Deo et inter se formaliter sive ex natura rei intentionaliter.
9. Deinde quaerebatur utrum Deus cognoscat innita.
10. Utrum intellectus creatus videns Deum per essentiam possit videre omnia quae Deus
videt, et intelligitur quaestio de actu videndi ut accipitur communiter pro
actu intelligendi, non ut notitia visionis distinguitur contra notitiam sim-
plicis intelligentiae.
Explicit: . . . ad quae intellectus non potest se convertere, ut supra probatum
est, etc.

Peter Auriol

Lauge Nielsen’s contribution to this volume considers the complicated

history of Peter Auriol’s Quodlibet, and readers are referred to his
chapter.

Francis of Marchia

Francis of Marchia (Francesco d’Ascoli, Franciscus Rubeus di Pignano)

was born in Appignano del Tronto (AP), Italy, around 1290, and prob-
ably entered the Franciscan convent there. Friedman and Schabel con-
jecture, on the basis of a passage found by Girard Etzkorn, that Francis
studied at Paris around 1310. Francis would have read the Sentences at
Paris in the academic year 1319–20, between Landulphus Caracciolo
(for whom no quodlibet has been identied) and Francis of Meyronnes.
In 1321, Francis of Marchia may have been at the court of Robert of
Naples, and the next year attended the Franciscan General Chapter
in Perugia.66 Later he served as lector in the studium at Avignon.67 In

66
N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie des Franciscus de Marchia: Texte, Quellen und Untersuchungen
zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts (Leiden 1991), p. 15, points out the note from
Wadding, Ann. Min. VI 423 (n. XL): “Floruisse hoc tempore in regio Coenobio sancti
Laurentii Neapoli litteris et virtute, Regique fuisse a consiliis Franciscum Asculanum
Picenum Minoritam, scripturae inde transmissae testantur.” Cf. also Sbaralea, Supp.,
v. 1, p. 257, n. mccclxviii, 595.
67
R. Lambertini, “Francis of Marchia and William of Ockham: Fragments from
a Dialogue,” Vivarium 44.1 (2006) (pp. 184–204), p. 187; J. Weisheipl, “Francis of
Marchia,” New Catholic Encyclopedia VI (1967), p. 32.

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1328, Francis sided with the Franciscan opposition to Pope John XXII
and ed Avignon along with the Minister General Michael of Cesena,
Bonagratia of Bergamo and William of Ockham. Francis of Marchia
was reconciled with Avignon in the early 1340s, and disappears from
view after 1344.68
The Quodlibet, attributed to Francis of Marchia ever since Ehrle’s
classic work on Peter of Candia, survives in one manuscript (Paris,
BnF lat. 16110, ff. 125ra–146vb).69 Question 3 is also contained in BAV,
Vat. lat. 6768, and a redaction of questions 4 and 6 appears in BAV,
Vat. lat. 1085. Nazareno Mariani edited the Quodlibet, and in doing so,
corrected Glorieux’s imprecise question list.70 The date of 1324–28
has been established through a selective use of internal references and
explicit indications. In his Quodlibet, Francis refers to books I and II
of his Sentences commentary, and Mariani has found parallel passages
in the version of Francis of Marchia’s commentary on the Sentences
contained in BAV, Chigi. lat. B.VII.113. The Chigi manuscript has,
after the tabula quaestionum of book IV, this explicit (f. 236ra): “Explicit
reportatio quarti libri Sententiarum sub magistro Francischo de Marchia
Anchonita Ordinis Minorum facta per fratrem G de <Rubione> anno
Domini 1323, etc.” According to the standard interpretation, Francis’
Quodlibet was held in 1323 at the earliest. Pelster found a reference to
Francis at Avignon, for the Augustinian James of Pamiers states in
his Quodlibet (q. 16), “Contra istas raciones arguit magister Franciscus
de Ma<rchia> in quadam questione, quam determinavit in curia, de
qua ibi respondi sibi.”71 This quote has served the claim that Francis
of Marchia was active in Avignon in 1324.72 Francis’ text would most
likely be an Avignon quodlibet, perhaps including the question that he
determined in curia.
This reconstruction is untenable for three reasons. First, there is
no evidence for Francis of Marchia’s “curial determination.” Second,

68
On Francis of Marchia’s life and a comprehensive bibliography, see R.L. Fried-
man and C. Schabel, “Introduction,” Vivarium 44.1 (2006), pp. 1–20.
69
F. Ehrle, Die Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des pisaner Papstes Alexanders V.
(Münster 1925), p. 253.
70
N. Mariani OFM, ed., Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo, OFM, Quodlibet cum
quaestionibus ex commentario in librum Sententiarum (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 29)
(Grottaferrata 1997).
71
F. Pelster, “Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O.P., seine
Quästionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli, das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis
O.E.S.A.,” Franciscan Studies 15 (1955) (pp. 30–47), p. 40.
72
W.J. Courtenay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael de Massa, OESA: A
Redating,” Augustiniana 45 (1995) (pp. 191–207), p. 195.

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Francis’ references to his Sentences commentary do not unequivocally

indicate the redaction contained in Chigi. Furthermore, they show that
the collection is not a quodlibet, and they call into doubt the authorship
of all but one question.
The testimony of James of Pamiers’ Quodlibet has been used to sup-
port the argument for Francis’ tenure as lector in Avignon from 1324,
but without rm basis. As Pelster notes, James of Pamiers refers to
the theologian in question as Franciscus de Ma. In his Quodlibet, James
cites the position of Franciscus de Maronis far more frequently than that
of Franciscus de Marchia. Moreover, while the manuscript Pelster used
only had Franciscus de Ma. in the crucial passage, Avignon, Bibliothèque
Municipale 314, at least, has the name in full (f. 87rb): Franciscus de
Maronis. In addition, Francis of Meyronnes was well known for his
sermons in the Papal Curia.73 In any case, as Courtenay and Schabel
argue in their contribution to this volume, James of Pamiers’ Quodlibet
took place rather late, around 1332, and so the discussion at Avignon
did not have to occur in 1324.74
Mariani notes three cases where the author of the Quodlibet explicitly
cites a Sentences commentary (and one case of scribal error). All three
cases occur on the same page of the Quodlibet (f. 125v), and while all
three do have corresponding passages in the Chigi collection of Fran-
cis’ questions, which Mariani provides in transcription along with the
edition, they also have correspondences in redactions and texts other
than those in Chigi.
Two of the references Mariani nds apparently indicate passages in
book I of a Sentences commentary. For Francis of Marchia, there survive
two major redactions of this work: the Scriptum and the Reportatio. The
explicit to the Reportatio in primum provides the year 1320. The Scriptum
in primum has been dated to 1323 on the basis of the explicit to book
IV in the Chigi codex. While the Chigi manuscript contains Francis
of Marchia’s commentaries on all four books of the Sentences, each
book is copied in a different hand, so the 1323 date is not certain for
the other books.

73
H. Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta und verschiedene Schriften des Franz von Mey-
ronnes,” Franziskanische Studien 54 (1972) (pp. 1–76), pp. 58–9, for example, discusses
treatises on the Eucharist and on indulgences that derive from sermons given at the
Papal Curia in the second half of 1324.
74
See W. Courtenay and C. Schabel’s chapter in this volume on “Augustinian
Quodlibeta after Giles of Rome.”

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One of the three references is an entire question. Question 2 of the

Quodlibet indicates most likely not a text in Francis’ Scriptum, but either
a discussion in the Reportatio, or in a separate quaestio. The Quodlibet’s
question 2 consists merely in a self-reference at the very end of f. 125v,
without even an initial to indicate its status as a question. In its entirety,
it reads: “Utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis distincte: totam illam questio-
nem quere alibi.” For the corresponding question, Mariani publishes
a transcription from Chigi of book I, “d. 1” (= Scriptum in I, q. 23, in
d. 3): Utrum Trinitas personarum possit concludi ex creaturis. The Reportatio
has a question with the same title (q. 25, in d. 3), and the transition
introducing the rst question for the next distinction (q. 27, in d. 4)
species the connection between being the image of God and having in
the mind the image of God: “Having seen what the intellect can achieve
concerning [separate] substances, we must see about something else:
whether the Trinity of persons enters into the rst object of our intel-
lect . . .”75 Therefore, question 2 of the Quodlibet could just as likely
indicate Reportatio, q. 25, and not the Chigi text; in any case, there is
no reason to favor the Scriptum.
Second, Mariani nds a reference to “distinction 5” and links it to
a passage in the Scriptum in primum associated with distinction 4 (q. 24).
This question has a counterpart in the Reportatio in primum (q. 30), and
thus as a target for the reference, the Reportatio is equally plausible. But
the Reportatio, like the Quodlibet, associates the discussion with distinc-
tion 5 (q. 30), and hence is more likely to contain the passage Francis
had in mind.76

75
Francis of Marchia, Reportatio in I, q. 26, in d. 4, in Francisci de Marchia sive de
Esculo Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi II; Distinctiones libri primi a prima
ad decimam, ed. N. Mariani (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 32) (Grottaferrata 2006),
p. 309: “Viso quid intellectus potest attingere de substanciis, aliud videndum: utrum
Trinitas personarum cadat sub primo obiecto intellectus nostri.”
76
Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 1, a. 3, ed. Mariani, p. 17: “Hoc autem patebit
distincione 5, ubi ponetur differencia inter mutacionem et productionem, et quomodo in
diuinis per se ponitur et conceditur produccio et non mutacio.” The corresponding text
in Chigi, (ibid.): “Circa 4 distinccionem, ubi Magister agit quomodo Pater generauerit
Filium, quero utrum formaliter terminus generacionis diuine sit essencia uel relatio uel
suppositum . . . 1o, Utrum in creaturis per se relacio sit per se terminus generacionis;
2o, Utrum forma substancialis in creaturis sit per se terminus generacionis; 3o, Utrum
forma uel proprietas indiuidualis in creaturis sit per se principium agendi et eciam
terminus; 4o, ex hiis, an per se terminus generacionis diuine sit essentia uel relacio uel
suppositum.”—Reportatio in I, q. 30, in d. 5 (cf. R.L. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis
of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences: Question List and State of Research,” Medi-
aeval Studies 63 [2001] [pp. 31–106], p. 77), ed. Mariani, p. 345: “Circa distinctionem
quintam, quero utrum divina essentia sit formalis terminus generacionis divine. Videtur

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The nal reference, to book II of the Sentences, does seem to link

the Quodlibet to a redaction contained the Chigi manuscript. While the
situation of book II is more uncertain than for book I, it is clear that
there were at least two major texts, which Friedman and Schabel have
baptized Reportatio A and Reportatio B. Chigi contains the Reportatio A. As
with book I, the two redactions have many parallels. So, while Mariani
publishes a transcription of Reportatio A’s question 3 as it appears in
the Chigi manuscript, in terms of content, the corresponding passage
in Reportatio B, q. 4, is a just as likely target; both questions fall in the
section to Peter Lombard’s book II.77
But could this reference indicate a Principium in secundum? It reads: “Set
de hoc in principio secundi libri habebitur.”78 Principia were ceremonial
questions dating from his lectures on the Sentences as a bachelor of the-
ology at Paris.79 Yet Francis of Marchia’s Principium secundi, published
by Mariani (as Questiones preambule in IV libros Sentenciarum, liber secundus
questio prima), concerns the applicability of syllogistic logic to discussions
of God, and does not appear to have a passage corresponding to the
reference.80 Reportatio A, however, begins (q. 1) “Circa principium secundi
libri queritur,” and, while the rst question directly parallels the Princi-
pium secundi, the next incipit relating the commentary to the Lombard’s

quod non . . .”; p. 346: “Secundo, quero utrum divina relacio sit formalis terminus
generacionis. Videtur quod non . . .”; p. 347: “Tercio, quero utrum suppositum divinum
sit per se terminus generacionis. Videtur quod non . . .”; p. 348: “Ultimo, quero utrum
essentia divina generet vel generetur . . .”; p. 349: “Quantum ad primum, dico, primo,
ad evidenciam istius, quod aliud est accio, aliud mutacio; mutacio enim concernit duos
terminos, videlicet terminum a quo et terminum ad quem; omnis enim mutacio est
de opposito in oppositum. Secundum enim Philosophum, V Physicorum, ‘mutacio est a
quodam in quoddam’, unde quedam est ‘ex subiecto in subiectum’, ut alteracio; alia
‘ex non subiecto in subiectum’, ut generacio; tercia ‘ex subiecto in non subiectum’, ut
corrupcio. Accio autem non concernit nisi terminum ad quem . . .”
77
Friedman-Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences,” p. 86, 92.
In addition, Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 503 (= D), and Paris, BnF lat. 3071 (= H),
have a “minor” redaction of book II’s Reportatio A.
78
Franciscus de Marchia, Quodlibet (Paris, BNF lat. 16110, f. 125va); ed. Mariani,
p. 17 (reads habetur for habebitur).
79
For a discussion of Francis’ Principia, see R. Friedman, “Principia and Prologue
in Francesco d’Appignano’s Sentences Commentary: the Question ‘Quaeritur utrum
ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae’,” Atti del II Convegno
Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, D. Priori, ed. (Appignano del Tronto 2004), pp.
123–49. See also Ehrle, Die Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, pp. 39–56.
80
N. Mariani, ed., Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum
Petri Lombardi, Quaestiones Praeambulae et Prologus (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 31)
(Grottaferrata 2003).

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text is question 13: “Circa primam partem secundi libri.” So, while
stretching what constitutes a Principium, one could argue that Reportatio
A’s question 3 occurs in the section designated as the Principium secundi.
Reportatio B, on the other hand, does not carry a text corresponding to
the material covered in the Principium secundi; questions 1–3 closely match
Reportatio A’s question 2 and refer to the Principium secundi as a separate
text. Reportatio B, q. 4, begins “Circa distinccionem secundam,” clearly
linking the question to a distinction, and placing the question after the
Principium.81 So, in this case, Reportatio A is a more likely candidate.
Therefore, these references could just as likely be to a different
redaction of Francis’ work. But how certain are the references? Rather,
how secure are the identities of the text containing the references (i.e.,
Quodlibet, qq. 1–2), and how well does Francis’ text bear out these refer-
ences? The evidence supporting the identication of the questions as
a quodlibet is thin, and that for the identity of the author only slightly
better. As Mariani notes, the only indication is the title “Quolibeta
Francisci di Marchia,” written in a later hand on f. 125ra above ques-
tion 1. Mariani argues that “this paternity is exact,” by showing that
question 5 has strong textual afnity to Marchia’s Scriptum in I, q. 27.82
But this comparison merely proves paternity, not the legitimacy of the
child. It does not show that the questions were a quodlibet, nor that all
questions were by Francis of Marchia, just that Marchia was the author
of question 5. The assigned title itself is imprecise: the plural (quolibeta)
in the title suggests that the person doing the labeling did not quibble
over taxonomy and may have used such an appellation to mean simply
“various questions.” Further, there is little explicit connection between
the questions. Outside of the “quodlibeta” contained or suspected to be
in Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook, this collection here is the only
one in this chapter for which there are practically no transition words at
all: the only case of a transition occurs between the last two questions.
But whereas the questions in Prosper’s notes are brief and schematic,
the questions here are extensive and well articulated. In addition, in
that sole case where there is a transition, namely between questions 8
and 9 (on celestial mechanics), the rst question (starting in the middle

81
Friedman-Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences,” pp.
85–6, 92.
82
Introduction to Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo, OFM, Quodlibet, ed. Mariani, pp.
27–38. The text also parallels Francis’ Reportatio in I, q. 34.

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of a column) is missing a title, the rst article, and most of the second!
This break severely needs some positive indication somewhere—a ques-
tion list, an internal reference, structural similarities, instances of textual
borrowing, doctrinal similarities, something—for us to maintain that
what follows belongs with what precedes. Moreover, question 3, which
starts at the top of f. 126ra, is missing the title and the arguments pro
and contra, implying a similar break between questions 1–2 and ques-
tion 3. So the text has one question rmly identied with Francis of
Marchia and eight that are linked to it by proximity.
The references in question 1 and in place of question 2 also point
to this collection being something other than a quodlibet and cast doubt
on the authorship. The reference to “distinction 5” reads: “But this will
be clear in distinction 5, where the difference between mutation and
production will be set forth, and how in things that are in themselves
divine, production is posited and conceded, and not mutation.”83 In the
corresponding passages, Francis certainly includes a distinction between
action and mutation, and he does claim that, in divinis, generation
consists in communication (primarily) and production (secondarily), but
he does not set out the difference between mutation and production.84
The distinction mentioned in the Quodlibet, q. 1, does not appear to be
incompatible with Francis’ view, but it does not seem to be in Francis’
commentary either.
The citation of book II has even less chance of pertaining to Francis’
work:
To the other argument, when it is said that nothing but action or passion
is in coming-to-be, it should be said that this is false; for this does not per
se make something be an action of the genus of action: this is clear in
the case of light. And perhaps every creature is in coming-to-be (in eri)
with respect to the rst agent. But this will be discussed in the principium
of the second book.85
In the section of his commentary on book II, Francis of Marchia does
not argue either that light’s persistence disproves the claim that things

83
See n. 76 above.
84
Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, appendix from Sentences commentary, ed. Mariani,
pp. 325, 343–4.
85
Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 1, ed. Mariani, p. 66: “Ad aliud, cum dicitur quod
nichil est in eri nisi accio vel passio, dicendum quod hoc est falsum; non enim hoc facit
per se aliquid esse accionem de genere accionis: patet de luce; et forte omnis creatura
respectu agentis primi, est in eri. Sed de hoc in principio secundi habebitur.”

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in coming-to-be must be actions or passions, or that every creature is in

coming-to-be with respect to the rst agent. The closest passage defends
a position at odds with the one implied in the reference:
Moreover, fourth I argue thus: the order of every effect to the rst cause
is more essential than the order of any effect to its second cause; but
some effects depend on their second cause not just in terms of coming-
to-be, but even for their being, as is clear of light, species, and many other
things; therefore, all the more do all things below the rst being need to
be conserved in actuality by that rst being.86
For Francis, this argument works because light’s eri can be distinguished
from its esse. That light is conserved in its being is what counts here:
likewise, all persistent beings need to be conserved by the rst cause,
not because they are in eri with respect to divine things, but because
they are beings. At rst blush, Francis’ intention clearly differs from
that of the author of the rst question of the “Quodlibet.”
The nal passage makes even less sense as a citation of Francis of
Marchia’s Sentences commentary. In place of question 2, the reader is
told to “look elsewhere” (“totam illam questionem quere alibi”). If the
text is a quodlibet by Francis of Marchia, why would this question point
the reader to Francis’ commentary on book I, d. 3, while, a few folios
later, question 5 reproduces material from the same commentary? More
likely, this instruction points to a question already copied in the original
manuscript, or to another question in the same collection.
For that matter, question 2 supplies the alibi for the “Quodlibet” as a
whole: it consists in Sentences-commentary excerpts. The title of q. 2 is
“Utrum in mente sit ymago Trinitatis distincte,” and as Mariani points
out, its (unsatisfactory) counterpart in Francis of Marchia’s Sentences
commentary would be in book I, d. 3 (“Utrum Trinitas personarum
possit concludi ex creaturis”). A much better t would be a question
such as that by John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I (d. 3, par. 3, q. 4): “Ultimo
circa istam distinctionem quaero utrum in mente sit distincte imago

86
Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, appendix from Sentences commentary, ed. Mariani,
pp. 348–9: “Preterea, quarto arguo sic: essentialior est ordo quorumcumque effectuum
ad primam causam quam alicuius effectus ad suam causam secundam; sed aliqui
effectus dependent a causa secunda eorum, non tantum quantum ad <eri, sed etiam
quantum ad> esse eorum, ut patet de lumine, de specie, et de multis aliis; ergo multo
magis omnia citra primum indigent actu conservari ab ipso primo.” The words in
angle brackets are omitted per homoioteletuton in the manuscript Mariani employed, but
they are in other witnesses, such as Chigi.

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Trinitatis,”87 or its counterpart in the Lectura I (d. 3, par. 3, q. 4): “Utrum

in mente secundum quod distinguitur a parte sensitiva, sit proprie imago
Trinitatis.”88 In the same part of the distinction one nds in the Ordinatio
(q. 2): “Utrum pars intellectiva proprie sumpta vel aliquid eius sit causa
totalis gignens actualem notitiam vel ratio gignendi,”89 and in the Lectura
(q. 3): “Utrum principalior causa respectu notitiae genitae sit obiectum,
praesens in se sive in specie, vel anima, sive aliquid animae.”90 These
last two questions address the same issues as the Quodlibet’s question
1: “Utrum in intellectu nostro sit aliqua noticia actualis genita.” Most
likely, questions 1 and 2—the source of all the references—come from
a commentary on book I, d. 3, of the Sentences. This is why both the
citation to “distinction 5” and that to “book II, in the principium” use
the future tense, and why the mention “distinction 5” does not need
to specify which book.91
The following ve questions all discuss ontology, and four of them
have “intencio entis” in the title. Sabine Folger-Fonfara is currently work-
ing on a detailed study of these questions, demonstrating their internal
coherence and their close connections with Francis’ unquestionably
authentic Metaphysics commentary, as well as their singular importance
in the history of philosophy. Therefore, while paternity has not yet
been demonstrated, there is cause to suspect Francis for questions 3–4
and 6–7. If they are all by Francis of Marchia, then their thematic
coherence suggests they might be quaestiones ordinariae.92 The last two

87
John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, eds. C. Balim et al., Opera omnia III
(Vatican City 1954), p. 338.
88
John Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, eds. C. Balim et al., Opera omnia XVI
(Vatican City 1960), p. 395.
89
John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, eds. Balim et al., p. 245.
90
John Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, eds. Balim et al., p. 370.
91
Incidentally, while Francis of Marchia’s treatments of the subject in distinction
5 do not have any direct correspondence to the discussion of the difference between
mutatio and productio and their application in divinis, Scotus’ does, further strengthening
the suspicion that the question is strictly Scotist, and not by Francis of Marchia. See
John Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 5, par. 1, q. un, eds. Balim et al., pp. 444–5: “Et ideo
alios terminos habet formaliter mutatio et productio, nam terminus mutationis est ipsa
forma inducta in materia, sed terminus proprius productionis est totum compositum . . .
Et ideo generatio tantum transfertur ad divina prout includit productionem, et non
mutationem . . .”
92
In addition to her forthcoming book, see S. Folger-Fonfara, “Franziskus von
Marchia: Die erste Unterscheidung einer Allgemeinen und einer Besonderen
Metaphysik,” DSTFM 16 (2005), pp. 461–513, esp. pp. 472–3; eadem, “Prima del

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questions, on celestial mechanics, are clearly related, and perhaps come

from a treatment of book II of the Sentences.
In summary, the only positive indication that this collection is a quod-
libet or written by Francis of Marchia is the title applied after the text
was copied. Only question 5 can be positively shown to be by Francis
of Marchia. For the others, there is no other basis for the attribution,
and sufcient evidence to cast doubt on authorship and genre.
“Quodlibet” (from Mariani):
1. Utrum in intellectu nostro sit aliqua noticia actualis genita. (= not by Francis)
125ra–vb.
2. Utrum in mente sit ymago Trinitatis distincte. (= not by Francis) 125vb.
3. Utrum intencio entis sit prima rei intencio. (= uncertain) 126ra–128rb; BAV, Vat.
lat. 6768, ff. 98rb–100vb.
4. Utrum ens includatur quidditative in quolibet. (= uncertain) 128rb–132ra; 138va–vb
(fragmentary); BAV, Vat. lat. 1085, ff. 243vb–248ra (different redaction).
5. Utrum intencio entis sit univoca decem predicamentis. (= Francis of Marchia)
132ra–135vb; 138vb–141vb.
6. Utrum intencio entis sit univoca Deo et creaturae. (= uncertain) 135rb–137rb;
141vb–143vb; BAV, Vat. lat. 1085, ff. 248ra–vb (different redaction).
7. Utrum intencio entis ex natura rei differat positive ab intencione unius, veri et boni, vel
sint omnino idem formaliter. (= uncertain) 137rb–138va; 143vb–145ra.
8. <Utrum motus celi at a virtute intrinseca sive extrinseca.> (= no reason for attri-
bution) 145ra–va.
9. Ex quo supposito tunc erit utrum <motus celi> at ab illa virtute extrinseca
secundum potentiam nitam vel innitam. (= no reason for attribution) 145va–
146va.

Francis of Meyronnes

The Provençal Francis of Meyronnes (born ca. 1288) joined the

Franciscan convent of Digne and lectured on the Sentences at Paris
in the year 1320–21. At the request of King Robert of Sicily, on 24
May 1323, Pope John XXII ordered the University of Paris to award
Francis the title of master of theology. From the same year, Francis
was Provincial Minister of Provence. In 1324, Francis appears in the

Primo: Francesco d’Appignano sui concetti primi,” in Atti del III Convegno Internazionale
su Francesco d’Appignano, D. Priori, ed. (Appignano del Tronto 2006), pp. 47–56.

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Papal Curia in Avignon and on an embassy to Gascony. Francis died

in Piacenza in 1328.93
Francis has left two known Quodlibeta, the rst of which Glorieux
dates to around 1323–24—between Francis’ becoming master and his
departure for Gascony—on the basis of question 11, “Utrum princi-
patus regni Sicilie ex hoc sit nobilior, quia subiectus Ecclesie.” Beyond
evoking the circumstances of Francis’ promotion this question reects
the ongoing negotiations in Paris for Prince Charles’ marriage.94
Francis of Meyronnes’ Quodlibeta present several textual challenges
stemming from the number of copies, redactions, and relatively short
period in which they occurred. Since Glorieux, Meyronnes’ Quodlibeta
have been the subject of two extensive textual studies.95 Roth and Glo-
rieux identify two Quodlibeta and a possible third; Roßmann excludes the
third (Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 157) as containing questions
not by Francis of Meyronnes, but by Henry of Ghent.96
Both of the authentic Quodlibeta for Francis of Meyronnes exist in
multiple redactions. The relation between these two Quodlibeta, and
their various redactions, the dates they were composed, and the order
among them are all open to discussion. Therefore, I adopt Roth’s dis-
tinction between the two as the “Printed” and “Unprinted” Quodlibet,
understood as synecdoche: the “Printed Quodlibet” includes among its
redactions a printed edition; the “Unprinted Quodlibet” appears in its
fullest form in BAV, Vat. lat. 900.

The Printed Quodlibet (Glorieux, Quodlibet I)

One of Meyronnes’ Quodlibeta was printed several times along with
Francis’ Sentences commentary, and is most commonly available in the
Venice 1520 edition.97 Unfortunately, the printed edition is not entirely
reliable; its editor lamented the quality of his (single) manuscript and

93
R. Lambertini, “Francis of Meyronnes,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle
Ages, J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone, eds. (Oxford 2003), pp. 256–7; F. Fiorentino, Francesco
di Meyronnes: Libertà e contingenza nel pensiero tardo-medievale (Rome 2006), pp. 9–55.
94
Glorieux II, p. 89.
95
B. Roth, OFM, Franz von Mayronis OFM, Sein Leben, sein Werke, seine Lehre vom Form-
alunterschied in Gott (Werl in Westfalen 1936); Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta.”
96
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 3, n. 6.
97
Other editions are Venice 1507 and 1519. See Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 4,
and Roth, Franz von Mayronis, pp. 180–3.

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explicitly corrected the text.98 The questions as they appear in the

printed edition:
Incipit/proemium (227A): Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate, tunc
autem facie ad faciem, prima Cor. 13 cap. scribitur istud verbum. Quia
vero, secundum doctrinam beati Dionysii, Celestis hierarchie circa principium,
habitus divinarum disciplinarum quo instruimur in sacra theologia sunt nobis
imago future contemplationis qua illustrabimur in patria, sicut sumptio divine
eucharistie est imitatio illius fruitionis beatice qua satiabimur cum apparuerit
(inquit) gloria eius. . . .
1. Quia in ista salutari doctrina est nobis innata via a difcilioribus ad faciliora,
et a superioribus ad inferiora, secundum premissa, et articulus Trinitatis
in theologica facultate est difcillimus et supremus, idcirco in nostra prima
generali disputatione facta Parisiis fuit prima quaestio facta: utrum articulus
Trinitatis possit defendi a delibus contra philosophicas impugnationes. 227K.
2. Secunda questio est utrum articulus Trinitatis sit demonstrabilis. 229G.
3. Tertia questio est utrum divina essentia sit in tribus personis beatissime Trinitatis
distincte. 230E.
4. Quarta questio est utrum Deus possit revelare suam essentiam alicui viatori abstrac-
tive. 233D.
5. Quinta questio: utrum Deus possit revelare suam essentiam intuitive alicui viatori.
234E.
6. Sexta questio: utrum sit dare entia rationis pertinentia ad scientiam theologie.
235C.
7. Septima questio: utrum entia rationis sint necessaria. 238K.
8. Octava questio est utrum esse essentie creabilium quiditatum fuerit eternum.
241G.

98
Ed. Venice 1520 (cited also in Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 6, nn. 16–17, as
deriving from the 1507 edition), f. 262rb: “Advertat diligentissimus lector quod has
questiones hoc ordine in unico originali, penitus discorrecto et fere totaliter extincto,
reperimus atque emendavimus magno certe labore et vi ingenii plerumque. Sicubi
vero defectus aliquos quod perraro erit, invenerit in dies, quia facile inventis addere
castigabit. Dicam enim cum magno Africano cum nec pigebit me sicubi hesitet querere
nec pudebit sicubi error discere. Possent alio modo ordinari et alie plures, quas doctor
ingeniosissimus iste seorsum scripsit, questiones eis adiungi. Sed ordo in his maxime,
que de quolibet disputantur, non est multum ponderandus . . .” Explicit: “Illuminati
doctoris fratris Francisci de Mayronis ordinis minorum, provincie sancti Ludovici
subtilissime questiones quolibetales, correcte atque decorate antea summa cura atque
sollertia sacre theologie doctoris eximii, patris fratris Mauritii de Hybernia eiusdem
religionis, dignissimi archiepiscopi Tumamensis, dum actu theologiam publice in alma
universitate Patavina legebat, nunc vero per quendam bene doctum virum revise, ne
felici terminantur. Venetiis mandato et expensis heredum quondam nobilis domini
Octaviani Scoti, civis ac patricii Modoetiensis, anno Domini 1520, die 7o Aprilis. Ad
laudem et gloriam domini nostri Jesu Christi qui est benedictus in secula. Amen.” Such
complaints of poor manuscript witnesses need to be understood critically, as they very
often are forms of modesty or invocations of the reader’s benevolence.

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9. Nona questio fuit utrum Christianus sufcienter in theologia instructus possit defendere
articulum creationis contra adversarios veritatis quantumcumque peritos. 244M.
10. Decima questio fuit utrum in Christi humanitate sit aliqua perfectior entitas eius
anima rationali. 248L.
11. Undecima questio fuit utrum principatus regni Sicilie ex hoc sit nobilior, quia
subiectus Ecclesie. 250I.
12. Duodecima questio fuit utrum obedientia sit nobilissima virtutum moralium.
253N.
13. Tertiadecima questio fuit utrum tres persone beatissime Trinitatis servent ordinem
originis in creando, ita quod una divina persona primo producat creaturam secundum
ordinem originis quam alia. 258L.
14. Secunda questio est (a. l. quartadecima. Est 1 lateralis in hac materia
mg.) utrum producat beatissima Trinitas creaturas in esse secundum quid, antequam
producat eas in esse reali simpliciter. 260A.
15. Tertia questio est (a. l. quintadecima questio, sed est 2 lateralis in hac
materia mg.) utrum emanatio creaturarum a Deo presupponat emanationem personarum
divinarum. 260P.
16. Questio fuit facta (a. l. sextadecima questio. Sed est materia incidentalis
seorsum forte mota mg.) utrum in eadem potentia operativa possunt simul esse plures
operationes. 261I.
Explicit (262D): Dicitur autem ad rationem factam in principio questionis quod,
licet simplicia non sint divisibilia, sunt tamen communicabilia; ergo etc.
Roth suspected that the original Quodlibet had thirteen questions,
because of a change in the incipits of the individual questions in the
printed editions. While questions 2–13 begin according to the formula
“secunda quaestio,” “tertia quaestio,” all the way to “tertiadecima
quaestio,” questions 14 and 15 begin “secunda quaestio” and “tertia
quaestio,” respectively. Question sixteen does not contain such an incipit
at all.99 Roßmann counters that marginal notations indicate an alia lit-
tera numeration as 14 and 15; moreover, question 15 contains internal
references to material discussed in questions 13 and 14.100 Francis’
references to his Sentences commentary, to the position of John of Prato,
OP, and to Pierre Roger (promoted to master in 1323) as “unus doctor
famosus” provide positive evidence that Francis held this Quodlibet as a
master in theology; his statement that these questions were raised “in
nostra prima generali disputatione facta Parisiis” means that he must have held
the Quodlibet before leaving in 1324. Therefore, the Printed Quodlibet
can be comfortably dated to Advent 1323 or Lent 1324.101

99
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, p. 182.
100
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 7.
101
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 7–9.

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The printed editions witness a redaction not entirely preserved in

any surviving manuscript. Several manuscripts, however, do have some
of the questions, or different redactions of the questions: Tortosa,
Biblioteca de la Catedral 96, f. 143va has at least the prologue to the
Quodlibet.102 BAV, Vat. lat. 901, has a question (f. 1ra) identical to ques-
tion 9 and one (f. 4vb) very close to question 1 (without proemium)
numbered as questions 1 and 2.103 Roth notes that München, Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3726, ff. 231r–238r, and the printed edition in
Universitätsbibliothek, Incun. 1166, pp. 249–90, provide a shorter ver-
sion of question 1, along with a second part of the question that does
not show up in the printed version, and provides an edition from these
witnesses.104 Roth reports Wien, Österreichische Nationabibliothek,
lat. 1560, as having copies of questions 1, 2, and 10 identical to the
printed version.105
In actuality, the Vienna manuscript has no parallel to question 2 and
reports the same redaction of question 1 as the Munich manuscripts,
and henceforth the version witnessed by Vienna and the Munich texts
will be called the “Munich Redaction.” In addition, after this version
of question 1, there follows immediately (f. 105ra) “tractatus Magistri
Francisci de Maronis de virtutibus moralibus.”106 After the treatise, on
ff. 126ra–127va there is indeed a question identical (same redaction) to
q. 10 of the printed text. It is then followed by the questions (f. 127vb)
Utrum corpus Christi quod fuit sancticatum ex purissimis sanguinibus Beate
Virginis fuit semper a Verbo assumptum and (f. 129ra–b) Utrum anima Christi
intelligat omnia in Verbo que intelligit Verbum.
The Munich Redaction of question 1, Utrum theologus catholicus in
theologicis sufcienter instructus possit articulum Trinitatis defendere contra emulum
veritatis, reports an early version of the question. The text is very similar
to the printed version, but with a few notable changes, such as the use
of emulus veritatis both in the title and throughout the text where the

102
Ibid.
103
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, p. 183; Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 11, n. 36.
104
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, pp. 335–47.
105
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, pp. 183–4.
106
According to Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 62, n. 190, this derives from the
“Verbum caro factum” redaction of Francis’ commentary on book III of the Sentences.
The section preceding the Munich version of q. 1 in ÖNB 1560 is missing from the
manuscript, but the tabula quaestionum at the end of the codex lists questions (f. 128vb)
from the same redaction of book III of Francis’ commentary; see, Roßmann, “Die
Sentenzenkommentare des Franz von Meyronnes OFM,” Franziskanische Studien 53
(1971) (pp. 129–227), pp. 212–17.

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printed redaction has philosophus. The redaction witnessed by the printed

text appears to include extensions and elaborations of arguments found
in the Munich witnesses. For example, a comparison of the two redac-
tions in discussing the objection that expository syllogisms do not work
in Trinitarian arguments reveals that the Printed Quodlibet contains a
more complete list of arguments, and a more nuanced exposition:

Munich Redaction Printed Quodlibet

(Wien 1560, f. 103va; Roth, p. 339) (P = 1520 ed.; V = Vat. lat. 901,
f. 5va)
Quantum ad tertium punctum dice- Quantum ad tertium punctum dice-
rent emuli veritatis quod sillogismus rent philosophi quod syllogismus sin-
expositorius qui t ex puris singula- gularis, qui vulgo dicitur expositorius,
ribus est certissimus, cum at circa ex terminis pure singularibus con-
terminos in quibus nulla multiplicitas stans est certissimus, quia circa ipsum
cadere potest, nec per consequens propter signicationem terminorum
medium variari. Et ideo, cum iste nulla potest contingere multiplicitas.
obviet articulo Trinitatis, non poterit Et ideo, cum forma istius syllogismi
defendi articulus contra ipsum. Quod obviet articulo Trinitatis, non potest
autem forma eius obviet articulo defendi contra ipsum. Quod autem
declaratur tripliciter in tribus guris. ista forma obviet contra istum arti-
culum Trinitatis declaratur quadru-
plici via.
Primo sic: ‘hec essentia est hic pater; Primo in prima gura afrmative:
hic lius est hec essentia; ergo hic ‘hec essentia est hic pater; et hic lius
lius est hic pater’; non tamen sequi- est hec essentia; ergo hic lius est hic
tur conclusio ex premissis. pater’, quod est contra distinctionem
personarum.
Secundo in eadem gura negative:
‘hec essentia non est ad aliud; hic
pater est hec essentia; ergo hic pater
non est ad aliud’.
Secundo sic: ‘hec essentia est hic Tertio in secunda gura: ‘hic lius
pater; hic lius non hic pater; ergo hic non est hic pater; hec essentia est hic
lius non est hec essentia’; et tamen pater; ergo hec essentia non est hic
conclusio est falsa in secunda. lius’.
Tertio sic in postrema gura: ‘hec Quarto in tertia gura: ‘hec essentia
essentia est hic pater; hec essentia est est hic pater; hec essentia est hic lius;
hic lius; ergo hic lius est hic pater’. ergo hic lius est hic pater’.

These passages reveal three major differences between the redactions.

First, as noted, the opponents are called emuli veritatis in the Munich

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Redaction and philosophi in the printed version. Second, in the printed

version, Francis claries a case of sloppy technical language: an exposi-
tory syllogism normally is a syllogism of the third gure (with singular
terms), but the point here is that, in each of the three Aristotelian g-
ures for syllogistic, a valid syllogism can be constructed using singular
Trinitarian terms and yet have a false conclusion. The printed version
notes that expositorius is being used broadly (syllogismus singularis, qui vulgo
dicitur expositorius), while the Munich Redaction merely refers to it as
a sillogismus expositorius that can be constructed according to the three
gures. Finally, the printed redaction has an extra case: “in the rst
gure, negatively.” Since the Munich text announces the three cases
as corresponding to the three gures (declaratur tripliciter in tribus guris),
while the printed version simply states that there are four ways (declaratur
quadruplici via), neither the omission in the Munich Redaction nor the
inclusion in the printed version appears incidental, the result of scribal
error. Nor does a case for the Munich Redaction being an abbrevia-
tion of the printed version seem likely: the addition of the imprecision
concerning expository syllogisms would mix poorly with the added
elegance of a threefold division according to the three gures. Either
both versions derive independently from the same discussion, or, more
likely, the printed version is a later revision of the Munich text.
The latter hypothesis nds additional support in the second article of
the question. In the Munich Redaction, the second article is provided
in full as the investigation of si iste articulus (scil. Trinitatis) potest defendi.107
The argumentation contained in this article has a correspondence in the
printed version of the Quodlibet, but in question 9, a. 2: so the Munich
redaction is not “more complete” because of its developed second
article; rather the Printed Quodlibet contains the same argumentation,
in greater detail, elsewhere.
As rendered in the Munich Redaction, question 1 seems to predate
the redaction contained in the 1520 printed edition of Francis of
Meyronnes’ Quodlibet. This may seem to conrm Roßmann’s suspicion
that the relationship between the Munich Redaction and the Printed
Quodlibet is analogous to that between Meyronnes’ 1320–21 Disputatio
collativa and his later printed Sentences commentary.108 More precisely,

107
Wien, ÖNB 1560, f. 104vb.
108
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 9–10.

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the Quodlibet, as it appears in printed form, seems to contain a written

revision of the text of the Munich Redaction.
Other witnesses further complicate the picture. Oxford, Balliol Col-
lege Library 70, has questions 11 (pp. 195, 197b, 75, 199) and 12 (pp.
199–200b, 76, 202).109 Question 8 also circulated separately as a trea-
tise, called the Vinculum Francisci Maronis, or as just the De esse essentiae et
existentiae, and appears in many manuscripts.110 Ephrem Longpré found
in Marseilles (Bibliothèque Municipale 256) another manuscript of the
Printed Quodlibet, which contains (ff. 52ra–91ra) the same prologue and
questions 1–10 and 13–14 (numbered 1–12), but adds a series of ques-
tions apparently different from those in the Printed Quodlibet, namely
(from Roßmann):111
13*. Tertia decima quaestio fuit: Utrum articulus Trinitatis possit defendi a delibus
sine distinctione essentiae et proprietatis. 91ra.
14*. Quarta decima quaestio fuit: Utrum in divinis sint duae emanationes seu duae
productiones. 101rb.
15*. Quinta decima quaestio fuit: Utrum generatio sit eiusdem rationis in Deo et
creatura. 106ra.
16*. Sexta decima quaestio est: Utrum divina essentia generet. 110ra.
17*. Decima septima quaestio est: Utrum gratia gratum faciens sit composita ex genere
et differentia, sicut ex partibus quiditative distinctis. 118rb.
After question 17 follows a different redaction of the Replicatio from
the Disputatio collativa pertaining to book IV of the Sentences, along with

109
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, p. 183.
110
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, pp. 187–8: 1. Wroclaw, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka B 1604
ff. 320–324. 2. München, Nationalmuseum Bibliothek 935, ff. 473r–478r, “Franciscus de
Mayronis, De esse et essentia” (1478) (cited through Roth from P. Lehmann, Mittelalterl.
Hss des Nationalmuseums zu München [Munich 1916], p. 31). 3. München, Üniversitats-
bibliothek 2o, 40, ff. 54v–61v and 242v–250v. 4. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer
Kulturbesitz, lat. 975 (theol. qu. 32) ff. 157b–162b. 5. Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní
Kapituli 1389 (1453–54), ff. 319a–330a: “Franciscus de Maronis: Vinculum.” 6. Praha,
Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli 1439 (1447–50), ff. 1a–10a. 7. Praha, Knihovna
Metropolitní Kapituli 1446 (mid 15th cent., 1449), ff. 22a–32b. 8. Praha, Knihovna
Metropolitní Kapituli 1599 (late 15th cent.), ff. 95a–101b. 9. Kraków, Biblioteka
Jagielloqska 2060 (15 cent.). 10. Venezia, BN Marciana, Marc. lat. III.104, ff. 73–79:
“Francisci de Maronis de potentia obiectiva” (from the catalog entry; Roth suspects this
to be a manuscript of the Vinculum). To which can be added: 11. Bologna, Biblioteca
del Collegio di Spagna 47, ff. 349r–357v.
111
“Die Quodlibeta,” p. 10; J. Barbet “Un témoin de la discussion entre les écoles
scotiste et thomiste selon François de Meyronnes,” in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti.
Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis . . . 1966 (Rome 1968), pp. 21–33. A comparison
between the Marseilles manuscript and the Printed Quodlibet for the passage from q. 1
compared above conrms Longpré’s observation.

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a transition (“Since incidentally there happened to be two replicationes

concerning this text . . .”) implying that Francis of Meyronnes authored
the revision.112
Since question 15 (which is absent from Marseilles) of the Printed
Quodlibet refers to questions 13 and 14 (in Marseilles as questions 11
and 12), Roßmann suspects that this text reects an early phase of
development of the Quodlibet.
Oxford, Magdalen College Library 9, ff. 113v–144r, contains some of
the questions of the Printed Quodlibet, but in a different order (qq. 14,
15, 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 6 with some additional complications in the copying).
The prologue is written in a different hand from the rest of the text,
and contains a reference to the determinatio: “Et ideo praemissa generali
disputatione ad quaestionum determinationem est accedendum.” While
arguing that the arrangement is probably not authoritative, Roßmann
supposes that this prologue reects an earlier redaction of the text.113
If it is authentic, such a prologue could be seen as reecting the orality
of a reportatio as opposed to a written account.
Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 995, reports a copy of Francis of
Meyronnes’ commentaries on books III and IV of the Sentences, followed
by three separate questions on relations and modes in God, followed
by a quodlibet (ff. 161va–192rb).114 The quodlibet features a prologue very

112
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 11 (Marseilles, BM 256, f. 122rb): “Quia tamen
incidentaliter circa istam materiam occurrebat duae replicationes, quarum una erat
de concordia et altera de collocutione, idcirco circa earum considerationem prolixius
intendendo, pro utraque seorsum sunt duodecim punta declaranda . . .”
113
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 12–14. The full prologue reads: “Cunctae res
difciles, et non potest homo eas explicare sermone; Eccle. primo cap. (v. 8) scribitur
istud verbum. In quo quidem sermone Sapiens describit duas difcultates quae inve-
niuntur in rebus inquirendis: quarum prima est ad res ipsas intelligendas; secunda est
ad res intellectas pronuntiandas. Quorum primum pertinet ad bene addiscendum, et
secundum ad bene docendum. Difcultas actus intelligendi tangitur, cum praemit-
titur: Cunctae res difciles—; sed difcultas fandi patet, cum sequitur: et non potest
homo explicare sermone. Istae autem duae difcultates tolluntur per duplicem actum
scholasticum, quia difcultas fandi tollitur per actum disputationis, difcultas autem
intelligendi per actum determinationis.—Et ideo praemissa generali disputatione ad
quaestionum determinationem est accedendum. Quaestio autem fuit: Utrum christianus
in theologia sufcienter instructus possit defendere articulum creationis contra veritatis
adversarium quantumcumque peritum.”
114
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 14–15; J. Barbet, François de Meyronnes-Pierre Roger
Disputatio 1320–1321 (Paris 1961), pp. 17ff; P. de Lapparent, “Notes sur les manuscrits
994 et 995 de Troyes,” Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes 104 (1943), pp. 261–6. Roßmann
provides a question and article list for the three separate questions and suspects they are
either part of an intermediary redaction of a commentary on book I of the Sentences,
or simply separate questions.

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similar to that found in the Magdalen College version115 and the fol-
lowing questions:116
1**. Inter questiones autem de quolibet proponebatur utrum Christianus sufcienter
edoctus in theologia possit evidenter defendere et defensare articulum Trinitatis contra
veritatis emulum. f. 161va.
2**. Querebatur secundo utrum essentia divina aliquo modo distinguatur in tribus
suppositis divinis. 165rb.
3**. Utrum quidditates creabilium ante omnem creationem habeant esse essentie in se [ante
omnem creationem]. 169va.
4**. Deinde orta est questio de facto utrum quidditates creaturarum distinguantur a
sua creabilitate. 171va.
5**. Deinde orta est questio utrum utrum quidditates creabilium ante suam creationem
vere contineantur in Deo. 174ra.117
6**. Deinde est questio utrum res ante suam creationem sint vere causatae. 176ra.118
7**. Utrum genus et differentia distinguantur formaliter. 176va.
8**. His tres unum sunt; [I] Joan. 5. cap. (v. 7) scribitur istud verbum, quia
vero intentio beati Iohannis evangeliste est in loco isto astruere misterium
beatissime Trinitatis . . . Utrum articulus Trinitatis posset defendi a delibus sine
distinctione essentiae et proprietatis. 181vb.
According to Roßmann, question 1** is yet another earlier redaction of
the printed question 1 similar to the Munich Redaction—and indeed
the reference to an aemulus veritatis suggests an afnity; moreover, in the
passage parallel to the case noted above, the passage begins, “Tertius
punctus est de sillogismo singulari, sive expositorio qui t in terminis
singularibus,” and only gives the three cases.119 The next question (2**)

115
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” p. 16 (Troyes 995, f. 161va): “Cunctae res dif-
ciles, ait Salomon, nec potest eas homo explicare sermone, Eccle. 1 (v. 8). In rebus
namque invenitur duplex difcultas: prima quantum ad actum considerandi, secunda
quantum ad actum pronuntiandi. Prima t per actum determinationis (!), secunda
per actum disputationis. Praemisso igitur actu disputationis de quolibet, sequitur actus
determinationis, secundum quod possibile est. Prima difcultas tangitur ibi: Cunctae res
difciles—; secunda nec potest homo explicare sermone.—Inter quaestiones autem de
quolibet proponebatur utrum christianus sufcienter edoctus in theologia possit evidenter
defendere et defensare articulum Trinitatis contra veritatis aemulum.”
116
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 16–20.
117
Edited in Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 36–43.
118
Roßmann emends the MS’s creatae in causatae.
119
Troyes 995, f. 162va: “Tertius punctus est de sillogismo singulari, sive expositorio
qui t in terminis singularibus, circa quem non contingit multiplicitas et ideo est certis-
simus sillogismus. Modo diceret adversarius quod iste sillogismus non tenet in divinis.
Probatur tripliciter.—Primo sic in prima gura: hec essentia est hic pater; hic lius est
hec essentia; ergo hic lius est hic pater. Maior et minor sunt vere, conclusio tamen
est falsa.—Secundo sic in secunda gura: hec essentia est hic pater; hic lius non
est hic pater; ergo hic lius non est hec essentia. Conclusio est falsa; maior et minor

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is likewise a prior version of the printed question 3. Questions 4**–7**

treat material found in question 8 (that is, the Vinculum), and question
5 apparently has parallels to Francis of Meyronnes’ Conatus (I Sent.,
d. 42, q. 3). Question 8** corresponds not to any text in the Printed
Quodlibet, but to question 13* in the Marseilles manuscript.120

The Unprinted Quodlibet (Glorieux, Quodlibet II)

In addition to these questions that nd a redaction in the Printed
Quodlibet, Roth notes a second, six-question Quodlibet in BAV, Vat. lat.
900 (ff. 87v–116r):121
Incipit: Unus Dominus, una des . . . in omnibus nobis. Ad Ephesios IIIIor (!)
capitulo. Quia vero des catholica est hostium omnium spiritualium perfec-
tionum, existens prima in ordine virtutum theologicarum . . . idcirco in omni
inquisicione theologica a de videtur iniciandum, et propter unius Dei misteria
sacratissima, cum sit des orthodoxa quasi fundamentum permictenda (!),
fuit
1. Prima questio facta in disputatione nostra generali [fuit] utrum sit XIIcim
articuli dei tantum.
2. Secunda questio fuit facta, utrum annuntiatio angelica fuerit virgini sacratissime
gratiosa sive gaudiosa.
3. Tertia questio fuit facta, utrum prestantissimum gaudium sancte Dei genitricis fuerit
in eius felici annunciatione.
4. Quarta questio fuit facta, utrum mater domini nostri Ihesu Christi fuerit sancticata
secundum totam capacitatem beatissime anime sue.
5. Quinta questio fuit facta, utrum mater domini nostri Ihesu Christi fuerit vere gratia
plena.
6. Sexta questio fuit, utrum B. Johannes Baptista sit maximus et supremus omnium
sanctorum post Christum et matrem eius benedictam.
Roth noted that the second part of the rst question circulated sepa-
rately as a Tractatus de articulis dei. Roßmann corrects this, noting that the
text in fact differs from the Tractatus de articulis dei, giving three redac-
tions of the text: a) the one contained in the second part of question
1 of the Unprinted Quodlibet and also in Piacenza, Biblioteca Landiana
112 (393), ff. 69r–79r; b) a separate redaction as its own treatise (the
Tractatus de articulis dei), and c) an abbreviated redaction included in

vere.—Tertio in tertia gura: hec essentia est hic pater; hec essentia est hic lius; ergo
hic lius est hic pater. Conclusio est falsa; premisse vere.”
120
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 16–20.
121
Roth, Franz von Mayronis, pp. 189–90.

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the major redaction of Francis’ commentary on De summa Trinitate et

de catholica of Gregory IX’s decretals (on the creed as described in the
Fourth Lateran Council). According to Roßmann, this latter carries
a secure date of 1321–22 and was a commentary that Francis “had
assembled from many originally independent texts.”122 Therefore,
according to Roßmann, the commentary must be the latest version,
and the Quodlibet the earliest.
From this reconstructive work, there are four possibilities concerning
the text referred to here as the Unprinted Quodlibet. First (and this is
the position that Roßmann favors), the Quodlibet could have come from
a “non-magisterial” quodlibet at Paris, when Francis was a bachelor. If
so, it would represent an important step in the development (or rather,
decline) of the genre of theological quodlibeta, as originally bachelors in
theology did not determine quodlibeta.123 On this reading, the Unprinted
Quodlibet’s mention of “prima questio facta in disputatione nostra
generali,” conicts with the Printed Quodlibet’s reference to “in nostra
prima generali disputatione facta Parisiis.” If the Printed Quodlibet is
from “our rst general disputation at Paris,” how could Francis have
forgotten that he already gave one?
Second, Francis could have held this quodlibet as a lector of theology
elsewhere, before coming to Paris. Such a position has the advantage
of only positing a particular novelty—that of Francis of Meyronnes
teaching somewhere other that Paris—, rather than a general one,
namely of quodlibeta held by persons other than the highest teaching
authority. This particular novelty, moreover, would not be particularly
novel: it would cohere with the Franciscan practice of having students
study at Paris, become lectors at provincial studia, then return to Paris to
read the Sentences and become masters of theology. On this reading, the
operative word in the reference “in nostra prima generali disputatione
facta Parisiis” would be Parisiis and not prima, for Francis had already
held a generalis disputatio somewhere else.
Third, Roßmann’s position that the Quodlibet predates Francis’
commentary could be mistaken. It apparently rests on an assumption
concerning the spontaneous, oral nature of a quodlibet, namely that a

122
Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta,” pp. 3–4; for the dating of the Tractatus de articulis
dei, see p. 46, n. 131. The Tractatus de articulis dei appears in Francis of Meyronnes’
Sermones de laudibus sanctorum (Venice 1493 and Basel 1498).
123
Cf. Hamesse, “Theological Quaestiones Quodlibetales,” and Piron, “Franciscan
Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris,” in volume I.

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quodlibetal question can only provide the basis for a later treatise, and
that treatises and written works do not normally nd their way into
written quodlibeta. If we discard this assumption, then Francis could eas-
ily have disputed the Unprinted Quodlibet after the printed one, and at
Paris or Avignon; the Printed Quodlibet would then be truly the record
of Francis’ prima generalis disputatio.
Fourth, the Unprinted Quodlibet could be part of the same disputation
as the printed one. All redactions of the Printed Quodlibet feature ques-
tions concerning the articles of faith in prominent locations. Likewise,
the Unprinted Quodlibet begins with a discussion of the articles of faith.
Beyond this supercial similarity, however, there is no positive evidence
for these questions having been part of the same debate.
While the evidence cannot exclude any of the possibilities, parsimony
and positive evidence favor the second and the third, with the third
possibility as most likely. Often, the questions raised against a master
in a quodlibetal disputation concerned theses the master was publicly
known to have held, or consequences of those theses. It is not surprising,
then, that a master who had already published material concerning the
articles of faith would be asked about such positions in his quodlibetal
disputations. Afterwards, when he set about to produce a written ver-
sion, Francis of Meyronnes availed himself of material he had already
composed. Nor would it be surprising if, even in preparation for the
oral determinatio, Francis were to consult such works and structure a
response along those lines.

Franciscans at the Barcelona Convent

Aufredo Gonteri Brito

As many as four Franciscans active in the 1320s held quodlibetal dis-
putations at the order’s Barcelona convent, an important intellectual
center at the time. On his own testimony, Aufredo Gonteri was a fol-
lower of Scotus and, as a student in Paris, heard the Subtle Doctor’s
lectures. He later read the Sentences at Barcelona in 1322 and Paris in
1325.124 In the prologue to his Parisian commentary on book I, he

124
S. Dumont, “The Scotist of Vat. lat. 869,” AFH 81 (1988) (pp. 254–83), pp.
280–3; M. Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto,” Rivista di losoa neo-scolastica

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states, concerning intuitive and abstractive cognition, “quomodo possunt

simul esse in intellectu respectu obiecti increati vel creati declaravi in
quadam quaestione de quolibet.”125 Doucet nds in both the Paris and
Barcelona commentaries references to both a quodlibet and a text that
Aufredo Gonteri indicates interchangeably as a Tractatus de beatitudine
and “quaedam quaestio disputata super quartum,” distinct from his
commentary on book IV of the Sentences. Aufredo Gonteri refers to
this text in the Paris and Barcelona commentaries.126
Both Doucet and Amorós point to the testimony of the Franciscan
theologian Guillaume de Vorillon.127 Vorillon, in his ca. 1447–48 com-
mentary on book IV of the Sentences, cites Aufredo Gonteri Brito’s Quod-
libeta in distinction 45, q. 1: “Utrum anime beatorum in suis receptaculis
suffragiorum viantium recordentur aut ea cognoscant.” Specically, in
article 2, conclusion 3, Vorillon argues:
The third conclusion: if distance does not impede, the blessed are always
able to know our prayers in themselves in the Word of God and to
beseech God for us.
The rst part is proven, because a separate substance has power over
the entire created being unless it is impeded from somewhere. For if my
intellect can know my volition, why would a more perfect, unimpeded
intellect be unable to do so? And if an angelic intellect can know the
substance of my soul, which is closer to it than [my] intellection, why can
in it not naturally know that intellection? And if one objects: A) because,
in Isaiah 63(:16), “he said ‘Abraham did not know you and Israel was
ignorant of you’”; B) again, in Psalm 93 (= 94), “The Lord knows the
thoughts of men, that they are vain.”
To the rst (A), the Doctor says three things: rst, that Abraham did
not know by intuitive cognition, because they were too distant. Therefore
the conclusion supposed if distance did not impede. Second, that he was not
then blessed, or he did not have the vision of God in which revelations
of this type come about. Third, that ordinarily (regulariter), to the blessed

24 (1932) pp. 327–55; V. Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist des Vaticanus lat. 1113
Fr. Anfredus Gonteri, OFM,” Franziskanische Studien 25 (1938), pp. 201–40; L. Amorós,
“Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M., discípulo de Escoto y lector en el Estudio General de
Barcelona: Su comentario al lib. II y III de las Sentencias,” Revista española de teología
1 (1940–41), pp. 545–72.
125
Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” p. 226, from BAV, Vat. lat. 1113, f. 11va.
126
Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero,” pp. 560–6; Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,”
pp. 225–7.
127
On Guillaume de Vorillon, see F. Tokarski, “Guillaume de Vaurouillon et son
commentaire sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard,” MPP 29 (1988), pp. 49–119.

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are revealed such things as pertain to their causality with respect to their
beatitude. From this the second part of the conclusion is clear. For it is
not necessary that God do this, but it bets His magnicence.
To the second (B), I say three things: rst, that God knows universally
the thoughts of men, and from His proper perfection, which an angel
does not, and God is superior. Second, that He knows them as judge,
which an angel does not. These two are from Scotus. Third, that God
knows them before they come to be. This third item was added by his
(Scotus’) egregious disciple, Brother Gauffredo or Aufredo Gonteri, licen-
tiatus in theology at Paris, Breton by birth, of the convent of Quimper,
in his Quodlibeta.128
The reference concerns the comparison between God’s knowledge and
that of the blessed. God knows all the thoughts of men, judges them,
and knows them before they are even thought. Created intellects do
not know the thoughts of men in these ways.
Dumont suggests that Aufredo Gonteri’s Quodlibet could be the
anonymous De cognitione Dei, contained partially in BAV, Vat. lat. 890,
and published by Wadding. The fragment truncates the sixth question,
but this text could indeed be a written version of Aufredo Gonteri’s
Quodlibet. Moreover, the De cognitione Dei bears substantial similarities to
a set of Quaestiones in De anima, which Dumont convincingly dates on
implicit evidence to 1313–16 and situates in Paris.129 Aufredo Gonteri’s

128
Guillermus Vorrilong super quattuor libris Sententiarum (ed. Venice 1496), f. 303va–b:
“Tertia conclusio: si distantia non impedit, in se in Verbo Dei semper nostras preces
possunt cognoscere beati et pro nobis Deum exorare.—Prima pars probatur, quia in
totum ens creatum potest separata substantia nisi aliunde impediatur. Si enim intel-
lectus meus potest cognoscere volitionem meam, quare non poterit intellectus perfectior
non impeditus? Et si intellectus angelicus potest noscere substantiam anime mee, que
sibi est intimior quam sua intellectio, quare non poterit cognoscere naturaliter ipsam
intellectionem? Et si obiiciatur quia Ysaie LXIII, Dicit Abraham nescivit vos (sic) et Israel
ignoravit vos. Rursus in ps. dicitur: Dominus scit cogitationes hominum quoniam vane sunt.—Ad
primum (scil. Is.) doctor dicit tria: primum, quod Abraam non novit intuitiva noticia,
quia nimis distabant. Ideo conclusio viam posuit si distantia non impedit. Secundum, quod
non fuit tunc beatus vel non habuit visionem Dei in qua unt huiusmodi revelationes.
Tertium, quod regulariter beatis talia revelantur tamquam pertinentia ad causalitatem
eorum respectu beatitudinis eorum. Ex quo patet secunda pars conclusionis. Non est
enim necesse Deum hoc facere, sed decet magnicentia eius.—Ad secundum dico tria:
primum, quod Deus novit universaliter cogitationes hominum, et ex propria perfec-
tione, quod non angelus, et est superior. Secundum, quod novit ut iudex, quod non
angelus. Hec duo sunt Scoti. Tertium, quod novit antequam ant. Hoc tertium addit
suus egregius discipulus frater Gauffredus seu Auffredus Ganterii licentiatus in theologia
Parisius, Brito natione, conventus Corisopitensis, in suis quolibetis.”
129
Dumont, “The Scotist of Vat. lat. 869,” pp. 281–3; the De cognitione Dei is found
in Iohannes Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. Wadding-Vivès (Paris 1891–1895), vol. V,

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reference to his own Quodlibet in his Barcelona Sentences text produces

a terminus ante quem for the text of 1322: presumably Aufredo Gonteri
held his Quodlibet as lector at Barcelona. But is the De cognitione Dei the
(perhaps reworked) written version of his Quodlibet?
The De cognitione Dei is a collection of six questions arguing for an
intermediate manner of cognizing God, between the cognitio dei, the
knowledge had of God in this life, and the cognitio patriae, the knowledge
obtained through the direct, face-to-face vision of the divine essence.
The cognitio patriae is an intuitive cognition, whereas this intermediate
cognition is abstractive and apparently mediated through species. In the
Wadding edition, the text breaks off before the author species when,
how, and who has this abstractive cognition.
Since Dumont’s suggestion, nearly the entire text of the De cognitione
Dei (missing the beginning of the rst question) has been found in
Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library 335, ff. 139ra–148va.
It conrms the suspicion raised by a question list in another manuscript,
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8717, that there are eleven
questions in all, with the last ve apparently shifting the discussion
from created intellects cognizing God to created intellects cognizing
creatures.130 This shift might constitute an interesting modulation on
the common division of a quodlibet into questiones de cognitione Dei and
creaturarum; in any case, the self-reference to simultaneous intuitive and
abstractive cognition of the same object might be borne out by the last
question of the collection, “Utrum de eodem obiecto cognitio intuitiva
sit prior abstractiva.” However, it is highly doubtful that the De cognitione
Dei contains the passage mentioned by Vorillon, as the discussion does
not seem to provide a suitable opportunity to discuss God’s unique
foreknowledge of human thoughts. Nevertheless, Vorillon’s question
concerned the cognition of separate souls, so he might be referring to
a discussion in the Cambridge manuscript, perhaps in the question
“Utrum intellectus noster separatus ex puris suis naturalibus possit

pp. 318–37. Dumont’s other candidate for the authorship of the treatises in BAV, Vat.
lat. 869, is Hugh of Novocastro. C. Bazàn, K. Emery, R. Green, T. Noone, R. Plevano,
A. Traver, B. Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima, Opera Philo-
sophica V (Washington, DC 2006), pp. 47*–8*, note that Dumont has since withdrawn
his conjecture concerning Vat. lat. 869.
130
Bazàn, Emery, Green, Noone, Plevano, Traver, B. Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones
super secundum et tertium De anima, pp. 31*–3*; V. Doucet, “A propos du Cod. lat. Mona-
censis 8717,” AFH 26 (1933), pp. 246–7; F. Pelster, “Eine Münchener Handschrift,”
pp. 263–4, qq. 83–87.

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habere de re sensibili cognitionem intuitivam.” Irrespective, the De

cognitione Dei also differs from the Tractatus de beatitudine, which contains a
demonstration that the optimal object of the intellect is God considered
in His essence.131 Of course, the De cognitione Dei could derive, in whole
or in part, from Aufredo Gonteri’s Quodlibet.

Peter of Atarrabia
Peter of Atarrabia (Peter of Navarre) served as Provincial Minister of
Aragon in 1317. Very little is known about his life: he may have studied
in Paris, possibly under John Duns Scotus. He probably lectured at
Barcelona in the early 1320s. By 1325, beside the title of “minister of
the province of Aragon,” he is called “professor of sacra theologia,” and a
1328 document refers to him as “maestro en teologia,” and sees him on
an embassy to Paris on behalf of the queen of Navarre. From the end
of the next year, King Philip III of Navarre granted Peter a pension,
which was paid through 1346. Peter most likely died in 1347.132
Pío Sagüés Azcona edited Peter’s commentary on Book I of the
Sentences, and, on the basis of internal references, identied a few ques-
tions in the miscellany contained in BAV, Vat. lat. 1012, with Peter of
Atarrabia, further suggesting that they might be from Peter’s Quodlibet
(see Appendix). In his introduction, he provides a transcription of two
questions, namely utrum cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva distinguantur ab invi-
cem per hoc quod est continere vel non continere existentiam rei sub ratione obiecti
cogniti and utrum circumscriptis relationibus maneant persone distincte. Azanza
discusses the content of the rst question, and, on the basis of the
editor’s hypothesis, refers to it as Quaestio Quodlibetalis I.133

131
Aufredus Gonteri Brito, In III Sent., Lüneborg, Ratsbücherei, Theol. 2 19, f. 125vb:
“Est etiam consona rationi naturali, quia beatitudo consistit in visione perfecta nature
intellectualis cum obiecto optimo sub ratione nobilissima; huiusmodi est Deus sub
ratione essentie sue; ergo etc. Maior patet X Ethicorum, c. 8; minor patet ex questione
quadam disputata super Quartum, et patebit 4o libro, d. 49.”
132
P. Sagüés, Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia sive De Navarra, OFM in Primum Sententiarum
Scriptum (Madrid 1974), pp. 14*–25* and the bibliography there cited.
133
Sagüés. Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia, pp. 38*–48*, 48*–69*; A. Azanza, “La
polémica de Pedro de Atarrabia (m. 1347) con Pedro Auréolo (m. 1322) sobre la intu-
ición del no-existente,” Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 2 (1995), pp. 71–8.

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Peter Thomae
Peter Thomae studied theology at Paris and appears at the condem-
nation of Arnau de Vilanova in 1316. He then became a lector in the
Franciscan studium in Barcelona. In 1332, he shows up in Avignon as
a papal abbreviator. In 1333 he was appointed papal penitentiary under
John XXII. His fortunes turned shortly after Benedict XII became pope,
and in 1336 we nd Peter Thomae under investigation for sorcery and
witchcraft. He died in early October 1340 in the papal prison at Noves.
The most recent study of Peter Thomae’s thought gives “1323–1326” as
a “reasonable guess for Peter Thomae’s commentary” on the Sentences,
a reportatio of his lectures in Barcelona.134 Peter’s Quodlibet, which has
been critically edited,135 contains references to books I and II of his
Sentences commentary, so it dates to sometime after 1323, and most likely
to when Peter was a lector at Barcelona. On Buytaert’s reconstruction,
questions 6 and 7 existed prior to the Quodlibet as part of the treatise
De modis distinctionis and were integrated into the written version.136
In addition, Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 2017, ff. 1–40, is indicated
as being a “quodlibet” of Petrus Thomas.137 This “quodlibet” has also
been identied with the “Anonymous of Prague” contained in BAV,
Vat. lat. 11610, ff. 1ff, and Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli,
M.92, ff. 103–105. In fact, however, the incipit and explicit match that
of Paul of Venice’s Quaestio de universalibus.138

134
C. Schabel, “Peter Thomae’s Question on Divine Foreknowledge from His Sen-
tences Commentary,” Franciscan Studies 61 (2003) (pp. 1–35), p. 3; cf. S. Dumont, “The
Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: II. The De ente of Peter
Thomae,” Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988), pp. 186–256; G. Gál, “Petrus Thomae’s Proof
for the Existence of God,” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998), pp. 115–51; Marti de Barcelona,
“Fra Pere Tomàs (XIV). Doctor strenuus et invincibilis,” Estudis franciscans 39 (1927), pp.
90–103; E.M. Buytaert, “The Scholastic Writings of Petrus Thomae,” in Theologie in
Geschichte und Gegenwart, J. Auer and H. Volk, eds. (Munich 1957), pp. 927–40; I. Brady,
“The Later Years of Petrus Thomae, OFM,” in Studia mediaevalia et mariologica P. Carolo
Balin OFM, septuagesimum explenti annum dicata (Rome 1971), pp. 249–57.
135
Petrus Thomae, Quodlibet, eds. M.R. Hooper and E. Buytaert (St Bonaventure,
NY 1957).
136
Buytaert, “The Scholastic Writings of Petrus Thomae,” pp. 938–9; Petrus
Thomae, Quodlibet, pp. X–XI.
137
Noted in M. de Castro y Castro, Manuscritos Franciscanos de la Biblioteca Nacional de
Madrid (Valencia 1973), pp. 116–17, n. 111.
138
Johannes Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, ed. A. Conti (Florence 1990), pp.
xviii–xix, describing Paris, BnF lat. 6433B, at p. xix, n. 6; see also C. Lohr, “Medi-
eval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Narcissus-Richardus,” Traditio 28 (1972),
p. 316, n. 2. The only major difference is that the explicit noted by Castro has intus
instead of intellectus.

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Peter’s authentic Quodlibet survives in Wien, Österreichische National-

bibliothek, lat. 1494, ff. 67–103, with questions 6 and 7 supplemented
by Oxford, Magdalen College Library 80, ff. 54–60. Question list is
from Hooper and Buytaert:
Incipit: Deus fecit hominem simplicem et rectum, et ipse innitis se miscuit
quaestionibus; Ecclesiastes 7o. In quo quidem verbo innuitur . . .
In Quolibet ergo nostro, secundum istum statum naturae destitutae, fuerunt
quaedam proposita respicientia transcendentia; quaedam alia soli Deo
competentia; alia creaturis communia, alia propria. Quantum ad primum,
quaerebantur octo.
1. Primum est de quiditate perfectionis simpliciter, videlicet: Quid sit perfectio
simpliciter.
2. Utrum haec sapientia creata sit individuum sapientiae transcendentis vel praedicamenti
qualitatis.
3. Utrum unitas, veritas, bonitas, ut sunt passiones entis, dicant aliquid absolutum vel
relativum.
4. Utrum condicio necessarii sit simpliciter perfectior condicione contingentiae.
5. Utrum idem sit aliqua in aliquo contineri virtualiter, realiter, eminenter et unitive.
6. Utrum identitas identica possit poni in aliquo sine innitate intensiva utriusque vel
alterius extremorum.
7. Utrum distinctio ut est ad genus et differentiam et diversitatem dicat aliquid positivum
formaliter.
8. Ultimo quantum ad materiam aliquam quaerebatur: utrum communicatio,
qua natura dicitur communicari supposito, dicat aliquid reale positivum, distinctum ab
ipso supposito et natura.
9. Deinde quereba<n>tur quedam respicientia Deum, et primo utrum ratio
quare memoria in Filio non est principium productivum sit, quia, ut est in proposito,
est terminus productionis sive dictionis adaequatae.
10. Utrum ex comprehensione obiecti inniti possit concedi necessario notitiam comprehen-
sivam esse innitam.
11. Utrum necessarium sit aliquam exsecutivam potentiam distinctam ab intellectu et
voluntate in Deo ponere.
12. Utrum causa prima necessario coagat cuilibet causae secundae agenti.
13. Tertio quaerebantur quaedam communia creaturis, et primo utrum conceptus
decem praedicamentorum sint aeque simpliciter simplices.
14. Utrum constitutio generis et differentiae speciei materialis sit eadem cum constitutione
materiae et formae eiusdem speciei.
15. Utrum aptitudo dicat formaliter aliquid positivum distinctum ab eo cuius est.
16. Utrum tempus habeat esse in aliquo subiective.
17. Utrum instans dicat aliquid formaliter positivum.
18. Deinde quaerebantur quantum ad creaturas in speciali aliqua, et primo
una quaestio personalis: Utrum beatus Franciscus potuit habere stigmata per
naturam.
Explicit: et hoc est quod dicit Glossa.

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William of Rubio
By birth, the convent where he professed as a Franciscan, his role as
the order’s Provincial Minister of Aragon (in 1334 at least), and per-
haps his scholastic writings, William of Rubio ts squarely under the
Barcelona rubric. He did study theology at Paris, acting as reportator for
Francis of Marchia, since William is named as such in the 1323 explicit
to Marchia’s commentary on book IV of the Sentences. Later William
composed his own Sentences commentary, which the Franciscan Order
approved on 25 May 1333.139 Although there is no positive evidence,
it is possible that William’s commentary is based on lectures given at
Paris. Nevertheless, William’s main modern student, José Maria Rubert
Candáu, suggests Barcelona as a plausible place for the Sentences lectures,
especially since William uses the city in examples in his text. Given the
careers of the three Franciscans just discussed, Barcelona would indeed
seem more likely.
The Sentences commentary survives only in a printed edition (Paris
1518) and contains references to at least two Quodlibeta (from Rubert
Candáu):140
Book I, d. 3, q. 4 (f. 49ra), “Prima <conclusio> est quod obiectum non
intellectum nec aliquo modo cognitum potest esse supernaturaliter voli-
tum vel nolitum. Hec, quam alias prolixius probavi in quodam quolibet,
apparet mihi evidens et a quolibet theologo concedenda . . .”
Book I, d. 33, q. 1 (f. 197vb): “Hoc siquidem simpliciter est falsum
ut in quadam questione superius, et in quodam Quodlibet prolixius est
ostensum. Ut enim ibi est probatum omne nitum per seipsum, et per
suam rationem propriam qua est illud quod est, non per aliquid sibi
additum est nitum; et similiter nihil dicitur esse innitum per aliquid
sibi additum positivum, quia alias Deus non posset dici innitus, cum

139
For the explicits to book IV, see Friedman-Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Com-
mentary on the Sentences,” p. 106. On William, see J.M. Rubert Candáu, “Fr. Guill-
ermo Rubió, O.F.M.: Apuntes bio-bibliográco-doctrinales,” Archivo Ibero-Americano 30
(1928), pp. 5–32; idem, “Fr. Guillermo Rubió, O.F.M.: Doctrinas losócas,” Archivo
Ibero-Americano 32 (1929), pp. 145–81, 33 (1930), pp. 5–42; idem, El conocimiento de Dios
en la losoa de Guillermo Rubió: una aportación a la losoa española medievav (Madrid 1952);
idem, La losofía del siglo XIV a través de Guillermo Rubió (Madrid 1952); LL.M. Farré,
“La concepció immaculada de la Verge segons Fr. Guillem Rubió, O.F.M.,” Analecta
Sacra Terraconensia 7 (1931), pp. 1–44; Glorieux II, p. 312; H. Schwamm, Das göttliche
Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus, pp. 255–6; F. Ehrle, Die Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia
des pisaner Papstes Alexanders V (Münster 1925), pp. 254–60.
140
Rubert Candáu, “Fr. Guillermo Rubió, O.F.M.: Apuntes bio-bibliográco-doctri-
nales,” pp. 29–31; idem, El conocimiento de Dios, pp. 24–7.

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non sit in Deo formaliter aliquid a se quomodocunque in re extra dis-

tinctum, ergo, etc.”
Book II, d. 1, q. 2 (f. 248va): “Omnia autem extra intellectum distincta
in creaturis, et realiter et essencialiter distinguuntur, ut in secundo Quod-
libeto fuit prolixius declaratum.”141
Book III, d. 1, q. 4 (f. 11vb): “Hoc autem est falsum et impossibile ut
in prima questione primi quodlibeti est ostensum: nec enim risibile dicit
aliquid distinctum ab homine propter actum ridendi, nec unibile dicit
aliquid in homine nec in verbo propter terminum extrinsecum conno-
tatum . . . Alia etiam multa absurda ad positionem illam sequuntur, ut in
questione prima prolixius explicatur, quare, etc.”
Because the order explicitly approved his Sentences commentary, and it
contains references to quodlibeta, the surviving commentary has been
suspected to be a second redaction. Given that William lectured on the
Sentences after 1323, his quodlibetal disputations would have been held
between around 1325 and Advent of 1332, perhaps at Barcelona.

Gerard Odonis

Gerard Odonis was born around 1285 at Camboulit in Lot, near

Figeac, where he entered the Franciscan Order. He taught at various
Franciscan studia, including Toulouse. He read the Sentences at Paris,
perhaps in the academic year 1326–27, and denitely in 1327–28.
On 10 June 1329, Gerard Odonis became Minister General after
Michael of Cesena was stripped of his leadership. Pope Benedict XII
sent Gerard on a mission to Bosnia where, working with the king of
Hungary, he was to encourage the battle against heretics. The newly
elected Clement VI named him patriarch of Antioch on 27 November
1342 and gave him the rich episcopal seat of Catania, where he died
of the plague in 1349.142
What has been claimed to be Gerard Odonis’ Quodlibet survives in
a single manuscript (BAV, Ottob. lat. 280, 53 folios) and contains a

141
Rubert Candáu, El conocimiento de Dios, p. 25, also points out to a similar reference
in book II, d. 1, q. 12 (f. 264va).
142
Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu aux multiples formes, ed. and trans. C. Trottmann (Paris
2001), pp. 9–15; L.M. de Rijk, “Works by Gerald Ot (Gerardus Odonis) on Logic,
Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy rediscovered in Madrid, bibl. nac. 4229,” ADHLMA
(1993), pp. 173–93; Giraldus Odonis OFM, Opera Philosophica, I Logica, ed. L.M. de Rijk
(Leiden 1997); C. Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, OFM,”
Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 46 (2004), pp. 116–61.

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630 william o. duba

single question, recently published by Christian Trottmann.143 The text

itself presents some problems and has been at the center of academic
controversy for some time. The incipit reads: “In nostra disputatione
de quolibet inter cetera querebatur, utrum doctrina theologica sit speculativa
an practica.”144
The bulk of the text concerns a discussion of when the beatic vision
is obtained and what sort of vision of the divine essence the separate
souls have. It is clearly in support of Pope John XXII’s thesis, rst
stated at the end of 1331, that the full, complete beatic vision of the
divine essence is not granted to the saints until after the Last Judgment.
Ample evidence dates Odonis’ text to the end of 1333.
In September 1333, Pope John XXII sent Gerard Odonis and Arnaud
de Saint-Michel on a mission to negotiate a peace between England
and Scotland. They passed through Paris, where they defended the
pope’s view, irritating King Philip VI Valois. The controversy raged
in Paris, with the king threatening Gerard and Arnaud, and the pope
reprimanding the king. Immediately after the departure of the emis-
saries of the pope, the king convoked a meeting at Vincennes of all
the masters of theology in Paris, and this commission of twenty-nine
masters (four of them, including the Franciscans, arrived late) produced
a statement of doctrine that excluded the pope’s understanding of the
beatic vision and that of Gerard Odonis.145
From this time of crisis comes this single manuscript witness of a sole
question by Gerard Odonis. Pelzer saw the text as a reportatio of Odonis’
Quodlibet, as it begins the way a quodlibet should (In nostra disputatione de
quolibet).146 Glorieux disagreed, classifying Odonis’ text among the non-
quodlibeta and stating rather brusquely that this incipit was merely a refer-
ence to a quodlibetal discussion, since this question was one of several
(inter cetera querebatur). Anneliese Maier found evidence in contemporary

143
The introduction to the published edition at times uses a slight imprecision, which
could lead the reader into believing that the two articles are quaestiones (cf. Trottmann,
Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, pp. 37 and 72).
144
Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, p. 86.
145
Trottmann, Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu; idem, La vision beatique des disputes scolas-
tiques à sa dénition par Benoît XII (Rome 1995), pp. 714–24; A. Maier, “Schriften, Daten
und Personen aus dem Visio-Streit unter Johann XXII,” in eadem, Ausgehendes Mit-
telalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistegeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, 3 vols. (Rome 1964–77),
III, pp. 543–90; eadem, “Die Pariser Disputation des Geraldus Odonis über die Visio
beatica Dei,” ibid., pp. 319–72.
146
A. Pelzer, Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 32 (1936), p. 981; See also the summary in
Trottmann, Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, pp. 36–7.

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chronicles that Gerard Odonis held a disputation at Paris at the end of

1333, one that created a great deal of controversy, and, on 17 December
1333, the king summoned Odonis to the presence of a commission of
ten theologians, who compelled him to recant privately his view on the
beatic vision. On this basis, Maier identied the treatise as a quodlibet
held in Advent 1333.147 Maier further argued that Odonis’ opponents,
such as the king, did the Minister General a disfavor in identifying his
position with that of John XXII; for Odonis, unlike John, holds a cer-
tain kind of vision of the divine essence for the saints before the Last
Judgment. Moreover, at the beginning of the determination, after the
divisio textus, Gerard includes a lengthy protest:
But before I procede in this discussion, I protest that in this question,
as in any other, I do not intend to assert anything pertinaciously, nor
do I wish to defend anything pertinaciously, but rather I submit in all
devotion everything that I will say or write to the correction of the Holy
Apostolic See.
Secondly, I protest that if something different should seem to the ven-
erable masters and doctors to be the case, I am always ready to adhere
to the sounder (saniori) position.
Thirdly, I protest that whatever of my statements may be reported
by word or writing outside of those things that are in the present quire,
which I will give as an exemplar, I hold as not being said, and I reckon
them not to be my sayings, nor expressing my meaning.
Fourthly, I protest that those things that I am about to say I do not
mean to say as Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, but as
an individual master and as an alumnus and member of my venerable
mother, the University of Paris.148
According to Maier, the third statement suggests that Odonis’ position
was misrepresented in reportationes, and that would have explained why

147
Maier, “Die Pariser Disputation.”
148
Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, p. 88: “Ante tamen quam in ista discussione procedam,
protestor quod in ista questione, sicut in qualibet alia, nichil intendo pertinaciter asser-
ere, nichil volo pertinaciter defensare, sed omnia que dixero vel scripsero, correctioni
Sancte Sedis Apostolice, cum omni devotione submitto.—Secundo protestor quod si
venerabilibus magistris et doctoribus aliud videatur, ego semper paratus sum stare sen-
tentie saniori.—Tertio protestor quod quecumque reportabuntur verbo vel scripto de
dictis meis preter illa que in quaterno presenti, quem pro exemplari dabo, habeo pro
non dictis et ea non reputo dicta mea, nec ex mea intentione dicta.—Quarto protestor
quod ea que dicturus sum non intendo dicere sicut Generalis Minister Ordinis Fratrum
Minorum, sed sicut particularis magister et sicut alumpnus et membrum venerabilis
matris mee Universitatis studii Parisiensis.”

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632 william o. duba

the popular understanding of Gerard Odonis’ position differed from

that in his Quodlibet.
Odonis’ protestations should put to rest the arguments that, as
Minister General of the Franciscan Order, Gerard Odonis could not
hold a quodlibet. The fourth protest makes clear that Gerard made his
determination as was his right as master of the University of Paris.
Perhaps, given the controversy, the University recess of Advent, and
his need to leave Paris before the end of the year, Odonis felt that the
quodlibet was the only appropriate forum open for him to defend his
theological position.
In the introduction to the edition, Christian Trottmann reconstructs
the vicissitudes of this debate, and argues that Gerard Odonis in fact
changed his position at the last minute, mitigating his hard-line sup-
port for John XXII’s position. Nevertheless, Odonis’ main goal was to
argue, and strenuously, for the pope’s position. Trottmann’s interpreta-
tion hinges on a quantitative observation: far more columns of the text
engage in polemic than provide doctrine.
The question’s articulation, as presented in the Trottmann edition
(and facing-page translation), with page numbers in parentheses:
(86) Q: Utrum doctrina theologica sit speculativa an practica
Et arguebatur primo quod speculativa . . .
Sed ad oppositum arguebatur . . .
(88) Pro solutione questionis huius et argumentorum que videntur tendere
ad inquirendum nem doctrine theologice, due difcultates occurrunt
primo discutiende, ut ex earum discussione possim clarius ad questionem
respondere.
Est autem difcultas prima scire quis est nis doctrine theologice, secunda
que sit differentia doctrine speculative et doctrine practice.
Ante tamen quam in ista discussione procedam, protestor . . .
Ad evidentiam autem prime difcultatis, sex conclusiones declarare pro-
pono . . .
(90) Prima conclusio (scil. quod beatissima et ex toto perfecta divine
essentie visio, quam post nale iudicium electi omnes habebunt, est ultimus
nis quo doctrine theologice, pro quanto nis consistit in cognitione)
probatur ita . . .
(110) Secunda conclusio principalis, videlicet quod vera divine essentie
visio, quam sancti et sapientes viri nunc habent, est nis proximus doctrine
theologice, declaratur hoc modo . . .
(128) Tertia conclusio principalis, quod scilicet sancta divine essentie
visio, quam sancte anime a corporibus separate iam habent, est nis
medius doctrine theologice, probatur hoc modo . . .

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(156) Quarta conclusio, scilicet quod anime sancte a suis corporibus

separate nondum habent illam perfectissimam visionem quam supra dixi
esse nem ultimum doctrine theologice, probatur quintupliciter . . .
(212) Quinta conclusio, videlicet quod rationes inducte ad probandum
quod anime sancte iam habent visionem, que dicitur ultimus nis doctrine
theologice, non concludunt, probatur hoc modo . . .
(258) Sexta conclusio, scilicet quod rationes inducte ad probandum
quod anime sancte nondum habent illam divine essentie visionem que
superius dicta est nis medius doctrine theologice non concludunt, pro-
batur hoc modo . . .
(260) Sed hic fuerunt mihi facte in quadam cedula quattuor questiones:
prima utrum moderna visio animarum sit per aliquam creatam speciem
an non; secunda utrum anime clarius videant deitatem quam humanita-
tem an e converso; tertio utrum plus gaudeant de visione deitatis quam
humanitatis; quarta utrum clarius videant animam Christi quam corpus
Christi . . .
(262) De secunda vero difcultate dico . . .
(264) Ad questionem igitur principalem secundum premissa respondeo
quod doctrina theologica est simpliciter practica . . .
Per hoc ergo patet responsio ad argumentum in oppositum . . .
Explicit tractatus de multiformi visione Dei per fratrem G. Odonis de
Cambolico magistrum in theologia ordinis fratrum minorum Parisius in
quadam determinatione prolatus.
Trottmann points out that most of the treatise’s space is taken up by
the six conclusiones, and of those, only the rst half discuss Gerard’s
doctrine; nearly 60% of the entire text concerns conclusions four and
ve, which clearly defend the pope’s view. Gerard uses his division of
the multiple levels of vision of the divine essence to defend the pope’s
position. In addition, conclusion ve contains material heavily inu-
enced, in both content and order, by the Avignon condemnation of
Durand of St Pourçain, in which Odonis participated.149
In the sixth conclusion Gerard insists, contrary to John XXII, that
the separate souls have some sort of vision of the divine essence, and
argues against those who would deny it. But, Trottmann judges, the
quantity of arguments pro and contra John XXII, as well as the quality
of those against the pope’s position, call into question Gerard Odonis’
sincerity:

149
Trottmann, Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, pp. 37–41; also idem, “Vision Béatique
et science théologique. Interferences scotistes dans le quodlibet parisien de Guiral Ot
(décembre 1333),” Via Scoti Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, atti del Congresso
Scotistico Internazionale . . ., L. Sileo, ed. (Rome 1995), vol. II, pp. 739–47.

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We even ask ourselves if the last conclusion were not added in haste,
at the moment of the determination, precisely because of the scandal
caused in Paris by his steadfast support of the pope’s thesis, and chiey
with the goal of escaping censure.150
Trottmann concludes that Gerard Odonis’ thesis is very original, but
he casts doubt on its qualities as a faithful representative of the oral
Quodlibet.151
From what we have seen, we can support Trottmann’s suspicions
on the relationship between the written and oral versions of the Quod-
libet. Several authors revised their quodlibeta to include material that
was not discussed; Roßmann reconstructs how Francis of Meyronnes
worked four quodlibetal questions (as reported in Troyes, Bibliothèque
Municipale 995, as 4**–7**) into a single twenty-article question (q. 8
of the Printed Quodlibet), which then circulated independently as the
Vinculum. It is perfectly conceivable that, when Odonis held his quodlibet,
his determination of the question Utrum doctrina theologica sit speculativa
an practica did not provide the conclusions in such detail, or even did
not contain some or any of the conclusions.
When the structure of the text is considered, and not merely the
number of pages, the response to the question does not seem supercial
as much as the six conclusiones seem excessively detailed. One would
expect a reportatio of a quodlibetal question to look something like the
text edited by Trottmann, but only pages 86–90 and 260–64. The
question appears to have been reworked to discuss the beatic vision
in more detail.
Moreover, as Trottmann noted, it is somewhat odd to see Gerard
Odonis use a question on theology as a science as a platform to engage
in an extended polemic about the beatic vision. Without doubt, the
questions are related, for theology involves the knowledge of God,
and the highest form of knowing God is that obtained in the beatic
vision. Still, Nicholas of Lyra (Quodlibet III, q. 4), Bertrand de la Tour
(Quodlibet I, q. 6) and Francis of Meyronnes (Printed Quodlibet, q. 5)
were all asked whether God could grant a vision of the divine essence
to a person in this life. Such a question would be a much better t

150
Trottmann, Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, p. 42: “Nous nous demandons même si
la dernière conclusion n’a pas été ajoutée à la hâte, au moment de la détermination,
précisément en raison du scandale déclenché à Paris par ce soutien afché de la thèse
du pape, et dans le but principalement d’échapper à la censure.”
151
Trottmann, Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu, p. 73.

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for an excursus on the view of the divine essence in the next life than
one about theology as a practical or speculative science. In general,
quodlibeta do not lack questions directly concerning the beatic vision;
after all, quodlibetal disputations were the occasion where members of
the University community could ask masters of theology their opinion
on controversial topics, and even seek to embarrass them. Yet here
we have a question on whether theology is a practical or speculative
science; of the arguments made by the bachelors in the disputatio, the
one for speculative science includes a reference to eternal life as the
cognition of God. Nothing apparent in the logic of the discussion
requires Gerard Odonis to specify that the full cognition of God only
occurs after the Last Judgment, and even his response to the question
does not require such a digression.
Perhaps it was a direct question. For in the prologue of his com-
mentary on book I of the Sentences, Gerard Odonis argues extensively
that theology is a practical science. In responding to the dubium, “if
an angel would have moral knowledge of our temperance if theology
were a practical science,” he states:
It should be said that in an angel, or in a separate soul, or in gloried
man, the knowledge of temperance would be just as truly practical as
in us, because it has being practical precisely from the object, as was
shown above.152
Thus Gerard clearly puts angels, the saints after the Last Judgment,
and the currently separated souls of the saints in a group together
with respect to knowledge, in this case, practical knowledge for which
the praxis is no longer applicable: for “in a similar way, Peter has the
prudence by which he knows his father and mother, concerning whom,

152
Gerardus Odonis, Quaestiones in I Sent, Prologue, pars I, q. 7, Klosterneuburg,
Stiftsbibliothek, CCl 291, f. 269ra: “Quantum ad quartum articulum moventur aliqua
dubia . . . Tertium si angelus haberet scientiam moralem de nostra temperantia, si esset
practica . . . (269ra–b) Ad tertium dicendum quod in angelo scientia de temperantia, vel
in anima separata, vel in homine gloricato, esset eque vere practica sicut in nobis, quia
esse practicum habet precise ab obiecto, ut ostensum est supra. Ipsa enim remaneret
de eodem obiecto et directiva in eandem actionum (lege actionem), quia non oportet
quod scientia practica coexistat illi virtuti que nata est agere secundum directionem
eius, quod quia omnis prudentia est habitus activus et practicus, ex 6 Ethicorum, sed
princeps potest habere aliquam prudentiam que non est nata dirigere aliquam actio-
nem principio, puta notitiam legis huiusmodi, scilicet nullus sit ausus ad regem ingredi
non vocatus. Et simili modo Petrus habet prudentiam qua novit patrem et matrem,
quibus mortuis ridiculum esset dicere, quod ista prudentia esset stellicata et translata
ad scientias speculativas.”

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when they are dead, it would be ridiculous to say that this prudence
were starried (stellicata) and transferred to the speculative sciences.”
Human theological knowledge serves to direct humans to a goal. Those
who possess the goal do not need the means to it. Hence those without
such means can still have the knowledge. Angels and the saints in glory
no longer have the means, because they have achieved the goal; the
implication is that the separate souls are in a similar state.
Odonis states in detail his position on the status of the separate souls
in book IV of his Sentences commentary, dd. 47–48, q. 5:
Fifth it is asked whether beatitude can be had before resurrection. I reply
and say that “having beatitude before resurrection” can be understood
in two ways: either in the souls separated from bodies and in the other
life, or in the souls united to their bodies in this life.
If in the rst way, then still in two ways, because one can ask about
essential or accidental beatitude. If it is asked about essential beatitude,
which consists in three things, namely seeing God clearly, loving him and
holding him, I say yes, because these things are suited to man through
his soul. If it is asked about accidental beatitude, I say that it cannot be
had, because, since the soul is naturally inclined to the body, it cannot
have all its desires fullled [without the body].153
In the distinction that follows (d. 49), Gerard species that essential
beatitude includes the intuitive cognition of the divine essence. Thus
Gerard Odonis held unambiguously in his commentary on the Sentences
that the separate souls have beatitude essentially and that essential beati-

153
Gerardus Odonis, In IV Sent., dd. 47–48, q. 5, Tarragona, Biblioteca Pública Ms.
57, f. 84va: “Quinto querebatur utrum citra resurrectionem possit haberi beatitudo.
Respondeo et dico quod haberi beatitudinem citra resurrectionem potest intelligi
dupliciter: vel in animabus separatis a corporibus et in alia vita, vel in animabus unitis
corporibus in hac vita.—Si primo modo, adhuc dupliciter, quia potest queri de beati-
tudine essentiali vel accidentali. Si queratur de essentiali, que consistit in tribus, scilicet
in videre clare Deum, amare et tenere, dico quod sic, quia ista conveniunt homini per
animam. Si queritur de accidentali, dico quod illa non potest haberi; cuius ratio est
quia, cum anima inclinetur ad corpus (universaliter del.) naturaliter, non potest habere
omnia desideria sua completa.—Si autem loquamur de beatitudine in hac vita, hoc
potest intelligi dupliciter, videlicet vel de beatitudine meritoria vel premiatoria, et tunc
dico quod meritoria beatitudo potest haberi in hac vita, quia iusti sunt beati, sed pre-
miatoria non. Patet, quia bona meritoria sunt illa per que homo dignus est beatitudine
et illa excludunt mala culpabilia, non autem penalia; sed ista bona possunt haberi in
hac vita. Bona autem premiatoria includunt bona quibus homo dignus est vita eterna;
et bona per que dignus est excludunt mala tam culpabilia quam penalia, et in istis
consistit complementum nostrorum desideriorum, que haberi non possunt in vita hac;
quare nec beatitudo premiatoria bene potest in presenti vita, ergo etc.”

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tude includes the vision of God, understood as the intuitive cognition

of the divine essence.
Odonis’ support of the papal position must have been a shock to the
theologians at the University of Paris: while there were many opinions
on the relationship between the beatic vision and beatitude, or how
the beatic vision occurred, or what it contained, the one thing Parisian
theologians thought they agreed upon was that the separate souls of
the saints currently enjoyed it. So, when Odonis came out in support
of the pope, a reasonable reaction would be to nd some passage in
his previous works where he appears to argue for the beatic vision
before the Last Judgment. The rst place such a passage appears is
in the prologue to book I. Drawing attention to Odonis’ position in
the prologue, with the standard question about the nature of the sci-
ence of theology, has another advantage: it accuses Gerard Odonis
of perverting his entire theological system, from the prologue of his
Sentences commentary clear through the end of book IV, in the name
of political expediency.
On this reading, the question tried to put Gerard in a bind, but
Gerard had anticipated it. He could not say that the souls do not see
the divine essence until the Last Judgment without contradicting his
previous teaching and leaving himself open to the charge of intellectual
dishonesty. Neither could he take a route similar to the De cognitione Dei,
and go a step further and claim that the souls have abstractive cogni-
tion of the divine essence, for he had specied that beatitude includes
intuitive cognition of the divine essence. So he developed his own
“middle way” that caused some controversy and possibly derision, as
witnessed by the cedula of four questions concerning the moderna visio
animarum.154
But how does one explain the six conclusiones that constitute the bulk
of the question? Perhaps the easiest solution is to follow the text. It
begins “In nostra disputatione de quolibet,” which could indicate the
entire quodlibetal affair: disputatio and determinatio. On the other hand,
this introduction could be a signal that the master is delivering a deter-
minatio to a disputatio. implying that it is the second part of a quodlibet,
the determinatio. The explicit states that the text is a “tractatus . . . in
quadam determinatione prolatus”: a treatise that was “brought forth”

154
Indeed, the mention of such a cedula is itself a strong argument that this disputa-
tion took the form of a quodlibet.

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in a determinatio—or possibly “extended” from one (understanding the

explicit in the sense of ex quadam determinatione prolatus). The protest at
the beginning of the determination makes clear that Odonis read the
determination from a quaternus that he intended to consign afterwards.
Yet the text of the treatise is unlikely to be what Odonis read aloud:
for the cedula of four questions on the moderna visio shows that Odonis
was able to respond to the reactions of his audience. The written
version is a revision: Gerard took the straightforward structure of his
determinatio and added in conclusions drawn from polemical material
he had at hand.
Gerard Odonis did defend in public the position of a moderna visio
animarum different from the beatic vision, and most likely defended
the view around Advent 1333, piquing curiosity and interest. His view
is different from that of the pope, and this difference is not merely
an afterthought to avoid censure, but rather central to Odonis’ effort
at maintaining doctrinal consistency between his previous theological
works and his pro-papal position on the beatic vision.

Conclusion

Gerard Odonis’ Quodlibet is the last surviving written text of a Fran-

ciscan quodlibetal disputation held on the continent. The fourteenth
century witnessed the gradual dissolution of the genre, as manuscript
witnesses become increasingly rare. The period under study here opens
with written quodlibeta being distributed as a regular part of a University
career; even when political events disrupted the University, such as the
exile of Parisian masters during Peter of England’s regency, quodlibetal
disputations were held, and the determinations were written up accord-
ing to a standard form. Two decades later, Francis Meyronnes would
repeatedly revise his Quodlibet, develop material into separate treatises,
and possibly integrate prior material into them. Gerard Odonis rep-
resents the nal stage for the Franciscans: his treatise on the vision of
God is so unlike the classic form of the quodlibet that many scholars do
not believe it is a true quodlibet. The structure of the determination has
been distorted to the degree that it is difcult to make out the outlines
of the original discussion.
The decline of the written quodlibet could be due to any number of
factors. John XXII’s papacy saw the rise of Avignon as a theological cen-
ter. As Gerard Odonis’ Quodlibet demonstrates, defenders of theological

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positions found themselves at the center of political power plays: if

we are to believe the contemporary chroniclers, what he defended in
a quodlibet as a master of theology, he was forced to recant a few days
later; in any case, shortly after his Quodlibet, all the masters of theology
in Paris assembled and condemned Odonis’ view. Alternatively, the
scarce number of written quodlibeta could be due to the internal crisis
of the Franciscan Order at the end of John XXII’s reign.
Maybe the disappearance of written quodlibeta has an institutional
basis. The content of teaching could have changed: Aufredo Gonteri
Brito, for example, produced a Sentences commentary that is more a com-
pendium of questions by other authors than an original work. Perhaps the
practice of lecturing secundum alium extended to quodlibeta as well.155
In any case, a lack of written quodlibeta does not necessarily mean
that the Franciscan masters of theology ceased to hold disputations.
The testimony of Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook serves as the
only record of the quodlibeta of Martin of Abbeville and Bertrand de la
Tour, and those of many other masters active at the time. Many mas-
ters presumably did not prepare their determinations for publication,
or at least their debates did not generate enough interest to motivate
anyone to produce copies. Moreover, the production of student texts
on the continent, and above all at Paris, would rely on the efcient
operation of University stationarii. Any perturbation of their function
in the University would manifest itself as a sudden decline or disap-
pearance of a genre.

155
On the practice of reading secundum alium, see C. Schabel, “Haec Ille: Citation,
Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism,” in The Origins of European
Scholarship, I. Taifacos, ed. (Stuttgart 2006), pp. 163–76.

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APPENDIX

THE QUESTIONS OF VAT. LAT. 1012

A recurrent theme in discussions of quodlibeta is the distinction between the quodlibet

as an event, occurring in Advent and Lent, and divided into disputatio and determinatio,
and the quodlibet as a written form. Likewise, there are two quodlibeta to reconstruct: the
enduring written text and the moments that produced it. In a sense, quodlibeta have two
contexts: as university debates and as written records, and each informs the other. So,
the manuscripts containing written quodlibeta can be used to establish texts, and through
those texts, they can help populate the disputation hall with masters, bachelors, students
and passers-by, engaged in debating the burning topics of the day; but they also testify
to how and in what context the written quodlibeta were received and used.
In the discussion of Franciscan quodlibeta after Scotus, a few manuscripts regularly
recur. One of these, Prosper of Reggio Emilia’s notebook, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, is the
subject of a chapter in this volume by William Courtenay. Another, BAV, Vat. lat. 932,
is a composite written in many hands and worthy of detailed study.156 This appendix
considers a third, BAV, Vat. lat. 1012, a witness to quodlibeta and disputed questions
in the rst two decades of the fourteenth century, and a codex long recognized as an
important source for the study of medieval Scotism.
BAV, Vat. lat. 1012, contains a collection of University texts, all of them labeled
quodlibeta.157 In reality, it has entire quodlibeta, quaestiones ordinariae, individual quodlibetal
questions, and questions of undetermined nature. Originally, the codex was two sepa-
rate books. The rst section (ff. 1–45) contains the work of William of Alnwick: his
Quaestiones de esse intelligibili (ff. 1–12rb), followed by his Quodlibet, and then two further
questions on human knowledge. The second section begins with the Quodlibet of James
of Ascoli, and is followed by his ve Quaestiones ordinariae.158 Finally, there are eighty-four
questions by various authors, some of which have been identied, and Wlodek has
shown that some exist in copies in Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 732.159
The questions should not be considered apart from the record provided by the book
that contains them. Three moments in the fourteenth century dened this book: the
production of the two sections as separate codices and their assembly into the cur-

156
Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior: Codices 679–1134, pp. 341–55.
157
These observations are based on examination of a microfilm copy of the
manuscript, and the excellent entry in Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior:
Codices 679–1134, pp. 493–9. Since I have not physically seen the manuscript, any
conclusions are tentative.
158
The colophon to another copy states that they are quaestiones ordinariae; see
B. Shailor, Catalogue of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the Beinecke Rare Book and
Manuscript Library, Yale University (Binghamton, NY 1984–1992), vol. III, no. 203: “[con-
cludes with a list of the 5 questiones and the colophon:] Expliciunt questiones ordinarie
Iacobi de esculo.”
159
Z. Wlodek, “Une question Scotiste du XIVe siècle sur la continuité du temps,”
MPP 12 (1967), pp. 117–34.

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rent codex. The scripts used at the three moments are all from the rst half of the
fourteenth century and appear to be all from Germany.160
In William of Alnwick’s section, after it was assembled someone numbered the
questions and also wrote the current question number at the bottom of each folio.
At the end (45va) was added a question list that refers to the whole preceding text as
a quodlibet.161
In the other section, James of Ascoli’s Quodlibet does not begin with the proeemium,
nor even, as it does for the other questions, the words preceding the question (“Illud
autem quod querebatur pertinens ad intra erat”). Rather, it begins directly with the
question title. Nevertheless, there does not seem to have been a preceding section.
In the miscellany that follows James’ works, a reference makes clear that the second
section, at the time it was written, began with the current f. 46. The question (C:18,
f. 81rb) Utrum agens particulare habeat per se aliquem effectum has the same title as James
of Ascoli’s Quodlibet, q. 14, but the text is not identical. Wlodek states that a copy of
C:18 in the Krakow manuscript “contains large parts of the fourteenth question of
James of Ascoli’s Quodlibet.”162 C:18, however, does not contain this question; it refers
to the reader directly to it: “Quantum ad secundum articulum, an videlicet agens
particulare habet per se aliquam effectum quere quere (sic) in secundo sexterno XIIII
questione quodlibet Magistri Iacobi de Esculo” (82ra). It is tempting to imagine the
scribe writing the rst “quere,” then stopping to check the reference and continuing
with the second.
The sextern that has most of James of Ascoli’s Quodlibet (the “rst sextern”), and
currently the rst of the second section, also has a graphical peculiarity that is difcult
to explain. Throughout the whole sextern (ff. 46–56, including a “f. 55a”–55bis) the
rst two lines of every column appear to have simply vanished. There is ample space
above each column, but no sign (on the microlm, at least) that there was ever any-
thing written there. Yet at times the column begins in the middle of a word, such as
“<crea>tis” (f. 50va). The missing lines are lled in at the bottom of each column,
in a different hand.
The next sextern contains the end of the Quodlibet and James’s ve Quaestiones ordina-
riae. The innermost two bifolios (currently folio pairs 61–64 and 62–63) are bound in
reverse order.163 A medieval script gives the standard instructions (“verte folium ad tale

160
A full analysis will have to await physical examination of the manuscript. It sufces
here to note that, in all medieval scripts on the manuscript, the abbreviations used for
est, esse and con are all typical of German scripts; moreover, the names of authors given
in the marginal notes have a Germanic form (e.g., “Heinricus de Gand,” f. 110va).
161
Vat. lat. 1012, f. 45va: “Incipiunt tytuli questionum de quodlibet fratris Wilhelm
de Alnewych de ordine fratrum minorum doctoris sacre theologie et queritur . . .”
162
Wlodek, “Une question Scotiste,” p. 119, “La question du f. 66v: Utrum agens
primum habet aliquam causalitatem effectivam respectu effectus causati immediate a causa secunda,
contient de grandes parties de la XIV e question du quodlibet de Jacques d’Ascoli.”
For the identication of this question with the Vat. lat. question, see p. 118, n. 1. V.
Doucet, “Descriptio Codicis 172 Bibliothecae Communalis Assisiensis,” AFH 25 (1932)
(pp. 257–74, 378–89), p. 274, also notes the reference to James of Ascoli.
163
Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior, p. 498, and Yokoyama, “Zwei
Quaestionen des Jacobus de Aesculo,” p. 34, note this. Throughout the whole codex,
the bottom left side of the bifolios were numbered 1–6, and some of these survived
the trimming, such as the offending bifolio 62–63, which has (62v) “5m” in the bot-
tom-left corner.

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signum”) to resolve the order. Another hand effectively labels as quodlibeta the Quaestiones
ordinariae of James of Ascoli and the questions that follow.164
When the two sections were bound together, someone saw the text as containing three
quodlibeta: one by William of Alnwick, and two by James of Ascoli.165 This someone
foliated the entire manuscript, with three divisions being marked: 1. ff. 1–45v (William
of Alnwick), 2. ff. 46r–110v and 3. ff. 110v–128. The third section starts, not uncoin-
cidentally, with a question that begins “Modo incipit 3m quodlibet,”166 and whoever
did the index must have taken this incipit to signal a break between James of Ascoli’s
rst and second quodlibeta. Two leaves (ff. I–II, now mutilated) were prepended to the
codex, providing a list of questions, numbered according to the three “quodlibeta,”
and noting the folio of which of the three sections the questions fell on. On those
leaves, someone then copied down a few fragmentary questions.
Articulation of the codex:
0. Flyleaf
A. Three anonymous theological questions
B. tabula quaestionum
C. Three anonymous philosophical questions
I. William of Alnwick
A. Quaestiones de esse intelligibili (1ra–12rb)
B. Quodlibet (12rb–39ra)
C. Two questions on knowledge (39rb–45rb)
D. tytuli questionum (45va)
II. Miscellany
A. James of Ascoli, Quodlibet (46ra–60ra)
B. James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae (60ra–66va)
C. 57 questions (66va–110ra)
D. 27 additional questions, classied as the “Third Quodlibet” (110ra–128vb)
The division of the eighty-four questions in Section II into parts C and D does not
reect the original scribe’s intention. Nevertheless, since Pelzer’s catalog divides the
questions according to it, it is maintained here.
James of Ascoli’s Quodlibet most likely took place in Lent 1311 at the latest. If, as
Vat. lat. 1012 itself attests, William of Alnwick held his Quodlibet in Oxford, that would
place it in 1316 at the latest. Among others named in the text or margin are Robert
Cowton, whose Sentences commentary has been dated to 1309–11, i.e., contemporary
to James of Ascoli’s regency (although Courtenay points out in his chapter on Vat. lat.
1086 that this is insecure); “Alexander heremita” (Alexander of Sant’Elpidio, master ca.
1307); Durand of St Pourçain; and a “Carmelita in Anglia.”167 According to Wlodek,

164
Vat. lat. 1012, f. 60v (top of page): “Explicit quolibet magistri Iacobi de Esculo.
Incipit aliud, scilicet Magistri Iacobi eiusdem etc. (Pelzer reads est for etc.)”; f. 66v (left
margin): “Incipit aliud scilicet magistri.”
165
Vat. lat. 1012, f. 1r: “Quolibet magistri Wilhelmi Almywik Anglici. Item quolibet
fratris Jacobi de Esculo et quolibet 2<o>.”
166
Vat. lat. 1012, f. 110ra. The rubricator rendered every question beginning with
modo with a capital S instead of M; this incipit is often given as “Sodo incipit tertium
quodlibet.”
167
Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior, p. 499, has a full list. The “Car-
melita in Anglia” is associated with this text (f. 114vb): “Preterea quidam, tenens de
relatione quod relatio potest de novo advenire et aliquid informare tamquam alia res,
et tamen ad eam non sit mutacio, probat sic: quia quod accipitur per mutacionem

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the Krakow codex contains marginal references to Peter Auriol, who lectured on the
Sentences at Paris in 1316–18.168
There are stylistic similarities among the questions, and the transitions suggest a
quodlibet-like articulation, such as with C:16 (“Nunc sequitur questio de specie intelligi-
bili”). Others, such as the introduction to section D:16 (“Modo sequitur questio quam
libenter scribo”), suggest an “edited” quodlibetal question, a scriptum. Yet, scholars have
attributed questions in the collection to numerous thinkers.
In his commentary on book I of the Sentences, Peter of Atarrabia makes references
to other works, which the editor, Pío Sagüés Azcona, has identied with questions in C
and D. Some part of these texts may indeed be Peter of Atarrabia’s Quodlibet, probably
from Barcelona, and prior to the surviving commentary on book I of the Sentences. Pío
Sagüés Azcona sees C:29 as possibly such a text. Moreover, D:2 has strong word-for-
word parallels with Peter’s discussion in book I, d. 26. D:10 refers internally to D:2.
On this basis, the editor concludes that at least part of D is by Peter of Atarrabia, it
is later than the Sentences commentary, and it might be a quodlibet.169
For William of Alnwick, Doucet identies C:15; Ledoux argues that C:24 is another
version of William of Alnwick’s Quodlibet, qq. 1 and 2, while linking D:22 with Alnwick
on the basis of an internal reference; Doucet further shows that D:22 is Alnwick’s ques-
tion 13 of book III of his commentary on the Sentences.170 Alliney demonstrates that
C:33 and C:34 constitute a “students’ notes” version of the third redaction, questions
1 and 2, of Alnwick’s Quaestiones de tempore.
Alliney has also noted that C:32, similar to a question by Thomas Wylton, reects
Landulph Caracciolo’s position.171 In any case, the text presents several opinions, then
what it calls the opinio Scoti. It raises dubia against Scotus, and defeats the dubia.
Doucet further found that D:14 and D:20 are word-for-word copies of Henry the
German’s quodlibet, questions 14 and 6. Moreover, D:27 is Richard of Conington’s
Quodlibet I, q. 5.172
The attributions of authorship and the discussion of marginal notations provide an
approximate date for the collection. The authors named in the margins of Vat. lat.
1012 were all active in the rst two decades of the fourteenth century. Knuuttila and
Lehtinen propose that C:30 criticizes Landulph Caracciolo’s position, in effect establish-

oportet quod agens ipsum attingat; sed agens non potest attingere actione sua rela-
tionem; ergo etc.”
168
Wlodek, “Une question Scotiste,” p. 119. Wlodek does not specify which question
Auriol’s name is associated with.
169
Pío Sagüés, Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia sive De Navarra, OFM in Primum Sen-
tentiarum Scriptum (Madrid 1974); see below under Peter of Atarrabia for a question
list for C and D.
170
V. Doucet, “Descriptio Codicis 172 Bibliothecae Communalis Assisiensis,” AFH
25 (1932), pp. 257–74, 378–89, esp. p. 274; idem, “L’oeuvre scolastique de Richard de
Conington OFM,” pp. 413–4; A. Ledoux, preface to William of Alnwick, Quaestiones
disputatae, pp. xx–xxii; Alliney, Time and Soul, pp. xv–xvii.
171
G. Alliney, “Instant of Change and Signa Naturae: New Perspectives,” in Intellect
and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy, M.C. Pacheco and J.F. Meirinhos, eds. (Turnhout
2006), vol. III (pp. 1835–49), pp. 1843–5. Thomas Wylton’s question is “Utrum instans
maneat unum et idem in toto tempore”; cf., C. Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton’s Question
‘An contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse’,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4
(1994) (pp. 91–141), p. 117, n. 15
172
Doucet, “L’oeuvre scolastique,” p. 414. For Henry the German, see the chapter
by Courtenay and Schabel in this volume.

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ing for our manuscript a terminus ante quem non of 1319.173 If the attributions to Peter
of Atarrabia are correct, this text could not have been copied before the early
1320s.174
Many questions are similar in formulation to works by known authors, but in fact
do not correspond to them. For example, the titles to C:48 and C:16 evoke Scotus’ De
anima commentary, q. 22, and there are similarities in the argumentation, but the texts
are not the same. D:17 suggests a question by John of Jandun, and even resembles
Buridan’s question in structure. As noted above, C:18 shares an incipit with James of
Ascoli’s Quodlibet, q. 14, but not only differs from it, it even instructs the reader to
consult that question in place of the second article.
This last case gives cause for concern. C:18’s evidence, combined with Wlodek’s
observation that material from James’ question 14 appears in the Krakow manuscript,
suggests that, unless C:18 is indeed by James of Ascoli, the text either reects or con-
stitutes borrowing from other authors (reading secundum alium). Therefore, what may
seem to be different redactions of the same text, in this text may actually be attributed
to different authors. If this were the case, it might explain why we seem to have so
many redactions of the same work, and it would provide some further insight on the
shift from a “systematic” to a “problem-oriented” approach in fourteenth-century
scholastic theology.
Such larger concerns aside, the questions in their thematic and resolution reect for
the most part a Scotist point of view. As noted, C:32 defends Scotus, as does C:51.175
C:41 features the marginal notation: “Opinio propria et Scoti” (101vb). The text has
long been known as a source of Franciscan thought, but its value and interest only
becomes apparent when viewed in its entirety.
Question list for Vat. lat. 1012, with notes on editions. J = Kraków, Biblioteka
Jagielloqska 732, ff. 16r–72v:
0. Flyleaf
A. Three anonymous theological questions (from Pelzer)176
1. Utrum potentie anime <Christi> differunt inter se et ab essentia divina. Ir.
2. Utrum produccio rerum ad extra presupponat productionem personarum in divinis ad intra.
Ir.
3. Utrum anima Christi intelligat omnia in verbo que intelligit. Ir.

B. Tabula quaestionum

173
S. Knuuttila and A. Lehtinen, “Change and Contadiction: A Fourteenth-Century
Controversy,” Synthèse 40 (1979) (pp. 189–207), p. 207, n. 37.
174
While neither text nor marginalia refer to Thomas Aquinas as being a saint (cf.
“Thomas” in the margin by 92va), this absence does not say anything meaningful
about the date, especially considering the strongly Franciscan avor of the manuscript’s
contents.
175
C:51 (Utrum elementa maneant in mixto secundum formas suas absolutas completas vel
incompletas), ff. 106vb–107ra: “Hic sic procedam: primo recitabo opinionem ipsius Avi-
cenne cum eius improbatione; secundo opinio Scoti cum suis motivis, et motivorum
solutio et opinionis improbatione; tertio replicabo contra solutiones argumentorum Scoti
et reducam opinionem ipsius, solvendo argumenta que sunt contra ipsum.”
176
Pelzer, Codices Vaticani Latini, vol. II, pars prior, p. 499. Pelzer’s list of these ques-
tions is augmented by their being copied (in a different hand) at the end of the list of
questions, on IIr; the microlm I use is out of focus for the relevant part.

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C. Three anonymous philosophical questions177

1. Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma substantialis hominis. IIr.
2. Utrum accidens virtute propria possit generare substantiam. IIr.
3. Utrum naturaliter possit demonstrari esse animam formam corporis. IIr.

I. William of Alnwick

A. Quaestiones de esse intelligibili.178

1. Circa esse intelligibile conveniens creature ab eterno queritur primo utrum esse
cognitum obiecti representati sit idem realiter cum forma representante et est idem utrum
esse cognitum obiecti sit idem realiter cum actu cognoscendi. 1ra.
2. Secundo queritur utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creature ab eterno sit idem realiter cum
Deo. 2vb.
3. Tertio queritur utrum esse intelligibile conveniat ab eterno creature intrinsece et formaliter.
5rb.
4. Utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creature ab eterno sit creatum ab essentia divina. 7ra.
5. Quinto querebatur utrum esse intelligible eternum creature sit productum ab intellectu
divino et hoc est querere an Deus intelligendo creaturas ab eterno produxit eas
vel instituit in esse intelligibile per actum intelligendi. 8va.
6. Questio 6 est utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creature ab eterno sit productum. 10rb,
Explicit: Unde Avicenna ibi non distinguit nisi inter uxum (rei materialis exp.) a
Deo et inter uxum rei materialis ab eodem ut patet diligenter intuente.
Explicit questiones fratris et magistri Wilhelmi de Alnewich quas disputavit Oxonie
ordinarie et ibidem determinavit. 12rb.

B. Quodlibet179
For the titles of the questions, see the section on William of Alnwick above. The
foliation is: 1. 12rb–13va; 2. 13va–17ra; 3. 17ra–19va; 4. 19va–22rb; 5. 22rb–24ra;
6. 24ra–26va; 7. 26va–29ra; 8. 29ra–31vb; 9. 31vb–35vb; 10. 35vb–39ra.

C. Two questions on knowledge

1. Utrum scientia possit creari in intellectu nostro a Deo immediate sine obiecto preostenso.
39ra.
2. Utrum scientia potest advenire intellectui scientis absque omni mutatione ex parte sui intellectus
noviter intelligentis. 41vb.
Explicit: Item, si relatio hac posita in esse suum ad aliud esse, presupponat natu-
raliter suum in esse; sed nichil formaliter idem presupponit se ipsum; ergo suum
in esse et suum ad aliud esse non sunt idem formaliter. 45rb.

II. Miscellany

A. James of Ascoli, Quodlibet

For the foliation of the Quodlibet, see the question list in the section on James of
Ascoli.

177
Ibid.
178
Published in William of Alnwick, Quaestiones Disputatae de Esse Intelligibili et de
Quodlibet, ed. Ledoux.
179
Published in William of Alnwick, Quaestiones Disputatae de Esse Intelligibili et de
Quodlibet, ed. Ledoux.

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B. James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae180

5. Utrum simplicitas divine nature compaciatur secum aliquam distinctionem ex natura rei previa
distinctioni personarum. 60ra.
1. Queritur utrum notitia actualis omnium divinorum ad intra presupponat in Deo Patre
productionem verbi passive. 62vb.
2. Utrum in productione verbi divini actus memorie presupponatur sue intelligentie. 64vb.
3. Utrum productione passive verbi divini presupponatur in tempore noticia actualis per modum
principii vel actus productivi. 63rb.
4. Utrum noticia actualis creature presupponatur in Deo noticie habituali eiusdem. 65vb.
Explicit: Nec illud quod est absolucius similiter non oportet quod sit prius origine
licet sit prius perfectione, quia nis non est absolucior hiis que sunt ad nem, sed
magis econverso. 66va.
Expliciunt questiones disputate a fratre Iacobo de Esculo ordinis fratrum minorum
cum suo quolibet magistri sacre theologie. 66va.

C. Fifty-seven questions
1. Utrum in materia sit aliqua pars forme generande. 66va.
2. Utrum forma de materia educenda presupponat ante se dimensiones realiter. 68vb
( J: 68r)181
3. Utrum in composito ex materia (ex materia iter.) et forma resultet 3a natura absoluta realiter
differens ab utroque. 70rb ( J: 56v).
4. Utrum potentia materie sive obiectiva sive que habet rationem principii differat realiter ab
ipsa. 72rb ( J: 59r).
5. Utrum materia dicat aliquem actum positivum realem alium ab actu forme. 73vb.
6. Utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce. 74rb.
7. Utrum sensus hominis sit a generante. 74va.
8. Utrum potentia visiva hominis et asini differant specie. 75rb.
9. Utrum sit dare sextum sensum. 75va.
10. Utrum quelibet pars animalis anulosi sit animal. 76rb.
11. Utrum in homine sint plures forme. 76vb.
12. Utrum anima rationalis sit immortalis sive incorruptibilis. 77rb.
13. Queritur utrum ens sit adequatum obiectum intellectus coniuncti. 77vb.
14. Postea queritur utrum idem sub eadem ratione formali sit obiectum intellectus et
voluntatis.78rb.
15. Deinde querebatur utrum intellectus sit liber per essentiam sicut voluntas. (= William
of Alnwick) 79ra.
16. Nunc sequitur questio de specie intelligibili, utrum videlicet in intellectu nostro sint
species intelligibiles priores naturaliter actu intelligendi. 79vb.
17. Utrum intellectus noster coniunctus possit simul et semel elicere plures actus intelligendi respectu
plurium obiectorum ut plura. 80va.
18. Utrum agens particulare habeat per se aliquem effectum. 81rb ( J: 66v).
19. Utrum esse sit primum creatum. 82rb.
20. An actio de genere actionis sit in passo ut in subiecto. 82vb ( J: 64r).
21. Utrum intentiones secunde sint in predicamento vel genere. 84vb ( J: 41v).

180
As noted, the inner two bifolios of this sextern are reversed, and the proper order
is: 60–61–64–62–63–65. The numeration is from Yokoyama, “Zwei Quaestionen des
Jacobus de Aesculo,” p. 34.
181
Wlodek, “Une question Scotiste,” p. 118, n. 1, also identies this question with
J: f. 61r: “Quo modo in materia rerum naturalium differt realis et oboedientialis et
ex qua et in qua.”

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22. Utrum intencio 2a sit subiective in anima. 86rb.

23. Modo secuntur questiones de modo cognoscendi et est una talis: utrum minus
universale sit prius notum vel magis universale. 86vb.
24. Queritur modo utrum simplicitas divina compaciatur secum aliquam distinctionem ex
natura rei previam distinctioni personarum. (= William of Alnwick, Quodlibet, qq. 1–2)
87rb.
25. Modo restat inquirere utrum ydee sive rationes ydeales precedant vel sequantur perfectiones
creaturarum in Deo ut iste perfectiones sunt ab essentia divina distincte et inter se. 88va.
26. Utrum esse intelligibile quod habuerunt creature ab eterno in mente divina sit esse causatum.
90rb.
27. Utrum res in mente divina ut distincte ab essentia divina prius habuerint esse intelligibile
quam intellectum. 90vb ( J: 29v).
28. Queritur an Deus cognoscat omnia alia a se. 91va.182
29. Postea querebatur utrum cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva distinguantur ab invicem per hoc
quod est continere vel non continere existentiam rei sub ratione obiecti cogniti. (= Peter of
Atarrabia) 92rb.183
30. Modo sequitur questio, scilicet utrum in uno instanti reali possint assignari diversa
signa. 93ra.184
31. Utrum nunc sit mensura substantie mobilis. 94va.
32. Utrum unum et idem instans maneat secundum substantiam in toto tempore. (= Landulph
Caracciolo?) 95rb.
33. Nunc sequitur questio utrum tempus sit quid reale extra animam. (= William of
Alnwick, Questiones de tempore, redaction 3, q. 1) 95va ( J: 45r).185
34. Sequitur questio utrum tempus secundum esse reale quod habet extra animam realiter dif-
ferat a motu. (= William of Alnwick, Questiones de tempore, redaction 3, q. 2) 96va
( J: 46v).
35. Utrum sit dare aliquod tempus discretum ex instantibus compositum. 98ra ( J: 16vb–18ra,
87va–88va).186
36. Utrum in Deo sit ponenda potentia executiva que est tertia alia ab intellectu et voluntate.
99ra.
37. Sequitur utrum voluntas divina in eodem instanti possit in opposita. 99va.
38. Tertio queritur utrum in ordine contingencium sit status ad unum primum quod sit prin-
cipium totius contingentie. 100rb.
39. Querebatur deinde utrum, nullo homine existente, ista sit vera: homo est animal.
100vb.
40. Utrum omnes homines scire desiderent. 101ra.
41. Nunc queritur utrum arismetica precedat geometriam. 101rb.
42. Postea querebatur utrum unum causativum numeri sit extra quantum. 102ra.
43. Ad continuandum materiam de scientia queritur utrum aliquod accidens possit esse
subiectum in scientia. 102rb.
44. Dubitatur deinde utrum scientia in anima respectu diversarum conclusionum secundum
speciem sit una secundum speciem vel non. 103ra.
45. Utrum subiectum alicuius scientie primum contineat virtualiter omnes passiones et conclusiones
de ipso demonstrabiles in illo scientia. 103rb.

182
Edited in Schwamm, Robert Cowton O.F.M. über das göttliche Vorherwissen, pp.
44–63.
183
Edited in Sagüés, Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia, pp. 38*–48*.
184
Discussed in Alliney, “Instant of Change,” pp. 1843–7; Knuuttila and Lehtinen,
“Change and Contradiction,” p. 207, n. 37.
185
A partial transcription can be found in Alliney, Time and Soul, pp. xx–xxiv.
186
Edited in Wlodek, “Une question scotiste,” pp. 122–34.

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46. Sequitur utrum propria passio differat a subiecto realiter. 103vb.

47. Queritur modo utrum singulare habeat propriam passionem. 104va.
48. Restat modo videre utrum singulare sit per se intelligibile ab intellectu nostro pro statu
isto. 104vb ( J: 24v).
49. Nunc agendum est de formis et utrum in formis accidentalibus sit dare gradum.
105va.
50. Viso de formis accidentalibus nunc inquiramus de formis eductis de potentia
materie utrum videlicet recipiant magis et minus. 105vb ( J: 84v) .
51. Modo sequitur utrum elementa maneant in mixto secundum formas suas absolutas completas
vel incompletas. 106vb ( J: 43v).
52. Utrum in compositione corporis humani sit aliqua pars corporis celestis. 107vb.
53. Postquam habitum est de corpore hominis queritur ergo an alimentum convertatur
in substantiam aliti. 108rb.
54. Utrum species in eucharistia nutriat. 108va.
55. Nunc sequitur questio videlicet utrum circumscripto omni agente extrinseco mixtum sit
corruptibile ab intrinseco. 109ra.
56. Continuando materiam circa mixtum iterum queritur utrum aliquod mixtum cor-
ruptum possit idem numero redire per agens naturale. 109rb.
57. Postea querebatur utrum generatio et corruptio sint contradictoria. 109vb.

D. Twenty-seven additional questions, classied as the “Third Quodlibet”

1. Modo incipit 3m quodlibet et querebatur primo utrum ab eodem intellectu idem
obiectum simul possit esse creditum per dei adherenciam et scitum per rei evidenciam.
110ra.
2. Postea querebatur utrum circumscriptis relationibus maneant persone distincte. (= Peter
of Atarrabia) 112ra.187
3. Nunc queritur utrum relationes originis in divinis sint formaliter innite. 112va.
4. Modo sequitur questio videlicet utrum primi principii ad creaturam sit aliqua relatio
realis. 113va ( J: 19r).188
5. Utrum ydemptitas sit relatio realis. 114rb.
6. Ultimo inter questiones de relatione queritur utrum ad relationem de genere relationis
sit per se motus vel mutacio. 114va.
7. Queritur utrum relationes divini fundamenti disti<n>guantur ab ipso ex natura rei.
115ra.
8. Utrum ens, sapientia, bonitas, et cetera huiusmodi attributa dicant aliquam intencionem seu
conceptum realem (univocum exp.) communem Deo et creature. 116ra.
9. Ex quo mencio fuit de ente queratur nunc utrum ens predicetur in quid de ultimis
differentiis et suis per se passionibus. 117ra.
10. Queritur modo utrum cuilibet conceptui quiditative correspondeat individuum proprium in
rei (= Peter of Atarrabia). 117vb.
11. Tunc secuntur questiones de habitibus et primo querebatur utrum habitus theologie
ut habetur a viatore sit habitus scienticus. 118vb.
12. Postea querebatur utrum habitus generentur ex actibus productivis.119vb.
13. Set statim sequitur alia de habitu, scilicet et potentia, videlicet utrum habitus cum
potentia requiratur in ratione principii elicitivi actus. 120vb.
14. Ultimo queritur utrum habitus generati in anima sint corruptibiles. (= Henry the Ger-
man, Quodlibet, q. 14) 121rb.
15. Tunc queritur utrum nolle prout distinguitur contra non velle sit actus positivus. 122rb.

187
Edited in Sagüés, Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia, pp. 48*–69*.
188
According to Wlodek, “Une question scotiste,” p. 117, n. 1, there is another copy
of this question in J between folios 84–93.

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16. Modo sequitur questio quam libenter scribo, videlicet utrum duo accidentia realia et
absoluta solo numero differentia possint simul stare in eodem subiecto. 122va ( J: 20r).189
17. Deinde querebatur utrum ultima sphera sit in loco. 123va.
18. Postea querebatur <utrum> sphera mota in plano continue semper tangat in puncto.
123vb.
19. De motu gravium et levium queritur modo utrum gravia et levia moveantur a se
ipsis. 124ra.
20. Postremo in ista materia queritur utrum in primis operibus Dei sit ponere motus ecentricos
et epyciclos. (= Henry the German, Quodlibet, q. 6) 124va.
21. Utrum (prudencia sed del.) tot sit prudencie quot virtutes. 125rb.
22. Queritur nunc utrum virtus sit forma absoluta vel respectiva. (= William of Alnwick,
In III Sent., q. 13) 125va.
23. Utrum aliquis sit nobilior nobilitate <parentum> vel nobilitate morum seu virtutum.
126ra.
24. Dehinc queritur utrum predestinacio ponat aliquam certitudinem in predestinato.
126va.
25. Queritur modo utrum Aristotiles sit salvatus. 127ra.190
26. Utrum corpora supercelestia per suum motum causent aliquam armoniam. 127va.
27. De virgine gloriosa queritur primo utrum sustinuit aliquam passionem ratione fetus a
nativitate Christi in utero usque ad nativitatem eius ex utero. (= Richard of Conington,
Quodlibet, q. 5) 128rb.
Explicit: animadvertus inspiciamus perscrutemur quoniam maiorem.

189
According to Wlodek, “Une question scotiste,” p. 117, n. 1, there is another copy
of this question in J between folios 84–93.
190
Discussed in A.-H. Chroust, “A Contribution to the Medieval Discussion: Utrum
Aristoteles Sit Salvatus,” Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1945), pp. 231–8; edited in
R. Imbach, “Aristoteles in der Hölle. Eine anonyme Questio ‘Utrum Aristotiles sit
salvatus’ im Cod. Vat. Lat. 1012 (127ra–127va) zum Jenseitsschicksal des Stagiriten,” in
Peregrina Curiositas: Eine Reise durch den orbis antiquus, A. Kessler, T. Ricklin, and G. Wurst,
eds. (Fribourg 1994), pp. 297–318.

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 OXFORD QUODLIBETA FROM OCKHAM TO HOLCOT

Rondo Keele*

As is often the case with important intellectual trends, the quodlibetal

genre in early fourteenth-century England strongly ourished at the
same time that it was beginning a steep decline in importance. The
reasons for this shift of intellectual energy away from publishing and
circulating quodlibeta seem to have been primarily internal to the uni-
versities themselves. Here we shall survey the ourishing and to a lesser
extent the decline, by looking at the quodlibetal collections of three of
the most inuential Oxford theologians in the 1320s and 1330s, Wil-
liam of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot. After a brief
account of the lives and careers of these men, and a more careful
accounting of the latest data regarding the dating, organization, and
manuscript traditions for their respective quodlibetal collections, we
will consider some philosophical issues raised by the content of their
work. I shall treat my three subjects differently depending on how
widely disseminated are the previous studies of their collections. For
Ockham, the textual history of whose Quodlibeta is already well stud-
ied in print, I shall focus primarily and in great detail on content; for
Chatton, about whose Quodlibet almost nothing is in print, and who is
himself not well known, I shall discuss biography, manuscript, dating,
and general content equally; and for Holcot, who has received more
attention than Chatton but less than Ockham, I adopt an intermedi-
ate strategy concerning manuscripts versus content, and detail versus
general overview. In addition, I will briey discuss the Quodlibet of an
important theologian, John of Rodington, who runs in this same Oxford
tradition but whose Quodlibet de conscientia is still largely unedited. I
conclude by considering what the contents of these works reveal about
the status of the quodlibetal form in this period, and its connection to
some larger trends in English philosophical theology.

* For various forms of assistance I owe special thanks to Jerry Etzkorn, Chris
Schabel, Lisa Keele, the American University in Cairo, and the Bibliothèque nationale
de France.

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General Observations

The time period under consideration here is roughly 1322 to 1334. It

was in this period that the quodlibeta of Ockham, Chatton, and Holcot
were recorded and made available for circulation. Several factors make
quodlibeta of this era both fascinating and challenging. I want to preface
my detailed discussion of individual thinkers and their manuscript
traditions by bringing some of these characteristics to the foreground.
I will not argue for these claims here, but will instead invite the reader
to see how my points are exemplied in the subsequent discussion of
my three primary subjects.

Topical Range
Reading a long quodlibetal question list for a prolic author, such as
Ockham or Holcot, can give a slightly misleading impression about
topic range. These lists suggest a kind of openness in subject matter
that might not seem possible, for example, in a commentary on a set
piece such as the Sentences. The initial expectation we might have looking
at a question list for Ockham’s Quodlibeta, say, is that we are about to
be treated to an exquisite intellectual buffet, with delicacies both rare
and strange; we may develop the expectation as readers that we are
facing a grand survey of Ockhamist thought applied to surprising and
recondite issues. Although the impression is not entirely false, this sense
of relative openness can be exaggerated. In fact, by this point Sentences
commentaries themselves had become increasingly loosely based on the
original text, often containing long digressions into philosophical topics
that had little bearing on Lombard’s original theological masterpiece.1
Similarly, even though the question sets in a quodlibet were suggested
by others (a quolibet) and were about anything (de quolibet), in practice
masters often used the questions they received, whatever the ostensible
subject matter, as an occasion to expound on favorite concerns and
issues, often twisting exotic-sounding queries toward the advancement
of time-worn debates. Hence, while quodlibetal questions often sound
recondite in the extreme, the quodlibeta of the 1320s and 1330s at Oxford

1
Chris Schabel documents this change for Sentences commentaries in this period in
“Oxford Franciscans after Ockham: Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham,” Mediaeval
Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002), pp.
359–77. More general remarks of a similar nature are found in W.J. Courtenay, Schools
and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton 1987), pp. 252–5.

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are not exceptional for the period, but are very much continuous in
method, tone, and difculty with comparable, contemporary theologi-
cal literature.

Chronology
All else aside, it is often difcult to give an exact absolute date to quod-
libeta of this period. Because fourteenth-century quodlibeta do not always
correspond to a uniquely identifying stage or stages in a scholar’s career
the way a Sentences lecture would,2 they are not as useful as other literary
forms for establishing chronologies. There are exceptions, of course,
but in general when external evidence is lacking it can be difcult to
say what the canonical ordering of questions should be within a quod-
libetal collection, or what the absolute date of a quodlibet is, or indeed
where exactly a set of quodlibetal questions ts in the author’s overall
career. Most of the arguments for establishing such facts will rely on
internal evidence that is weak to some substantial degree. Moreover,
since quodlibeta were sometimes revised by their authors, e.g., rewritten,
extended, or given a more logical ordering, there is often little certainty
regarding the date of any particular version of a quodlibet.

Intense Intellectual Exchange and Interdependence

Oxford quodlibeta of this era are characterized by extremely pointed,
detailed, directed, charge and counter-charge between contemporary
intellectual opponents. Of course, as records of disputational encoun-
ters, all quodlibeta might be expected to exemplify this characteristic to
some extent. However, the quodlibeta we will here consider (especially
those of Chatton and Ockham) reect extremely lively and occasionally
personal attacks and rebuttals, and it seems that this feature of quodlibeta
may even have increased from the late thirteenth to the fourteenth
century.3 Since the Sentences commentaries at this time had themselves
become platforms for presenting individual philosophical theories and
for opposing contemporaries by name,4 and since a person normally
undertook quodlibetal disputation at a later career stage than he under-
took a Sentences commentary, the quodlibeta of this time tend to represent
the second or even third stages of highly contended controversies. This

2
Glorieux II, pp. 33–6, and W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His
Life and Writings (Leiden 1978), p. 99, n. 220.
3
Glorieux I, pp. 55–6.
4
Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 254.

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makes them very difcult to understand in isolation; they are not very
self-contained writings.

William of Ockham

Ockham had a full and controversial life, and a long and fruitful writing
career in philosophy and theology, even if his academic and Church
careers were dramatically truncated. His peak output of non-political
work came between 1317 and 1324. Several readable and reasonably
complete short accounts of his life have been written, and there seems
little new data to add.5 Born around 1288 in the village of Ockham,
not far from London, William entered the Franciscan Order at a young
age. Having received his basic education in language and philosophy
at London, he began to study theology at Oxford in the rst few years
after the death of Scotus. He read the Sentences at Oxford during the
1317–19 biennium, and by 1321 was lecturing in theology, perhaps at
the Franciscan studium in London, where Walter Chatton and Adam
Wodeham were as well.6 While waiting for his turn at an Oxford regency
in 1324, he was summoned to Avignon to answer questions that had
arisen about the orthodoxy of his ideas on God’s power. While resident
there he famously became entangled in a controversy between Pope
John XXII and the Franciscan Order over their divergent approaches
to apostolic poverty and the ownership of property. The encounter
ended disastrously for Ockham, who, after declaring the pope a heretic,
escaped through Italy to German lands in the spring of 1328, where he
nally settled under the protection of the Emperor Louis of Bavaria.
He remained there until his death in 1347, producing a large body of
work on political theory during these two decades.

5
The clearest, most complete short account of Ockham’s life, writings, and intel-
lectual background are P.V. Spade’s “Introduction” and W.J. Courtenay’s “The Aca-
demic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham,” which form the rst two chapters of The
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, P.V. Spade, ed. (Cambridge 1999), pp. 1–29. This has
been my main source for the biographical details I give here.
6
This is controversial. See below for further discussion.

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Ockham’s Quodlibeta

Manuscript Tradition, Attribution, Dating, and Arrangement of Questions

The textual situation for Ockham’s Quodlibeta is excellent all around.
Several manuscript witnesses exist, a careful critical edition has been
prepared from them, and there is even a translation of the entire work
into English by Alfred Freddoso and Francis Kelley.7 The work contains
170 questions in all, lling one 782-page volume of the critical edition.
Four full and nine partial manuscripts attest to his Quodlibeta, as well
as three printed editions.8 There is no occasion to doubt that these
are quodlibetal disputations, since every manuscript witness agrees in
denominating the work as such, and since the many internal cross-
references use this same designation in referring the reader to other
questions.9 Similar remarks apply to authorial attribution.10
Unlike the Quodlibeta of Robert Holcot, to be examined below, there
are no serious difculties concerning the ordering and grouping of the
questions in the collection: the majority of the manuscript witnesses and
printed editions contain the order of questions that is followed in the
modern critical edition. A second tradition of ordering does exist, but it
does not square with the internal and external evidence from Ockham’s
own cross-references, and at any rate the witnesses containing this sec-
ond ordering show signs of some later editorial rearrangement.11
If these issues are moot for Ockham’s quodlibetal collection, the
issue of fontes and of the occasion for its composition and redaction
are quite fertile and important for Ockham scholarship. For Ockham
was never a master, at Oxford or elsewhere, but quodlibetal disputa-
tions were customarily recorded and circulated only for the magisterial
participants who nally determined the questions de quolibet. Why then
this rather large collection, widely circulated and copied as though of
quodlibetal determinationes? Where and why were these questions dis-
puted, recorded, and edited?

7
William of Ockham: Quodlibetal Questions, 2 vols. bound as one, trans. A. Freddoso
and F.E. Kelley (New Haven 1998).
8
The primary manuscript witnesses are, using Wey’s sigla: (1) A = Paris, BnF
lat. 16398; (2) B = BAV, Vat. lat. 3075; (3) C = BAV, Vat. lat. 956; (4) D = Giessen,
Universitätsbibliothek 733. See the introduction to Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibeta
Septem, ed. J.C. Wey, Opera Theologica IX (St Bonaventure, NY 1980), pp. 1*–22*.
9
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 26*.
10
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, pp. 32*–4*.
11
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 23*.

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The standard answer to these questions has its roots in Gedeon Gál’s
discussion of Ockham’s Summa Logicae.12 Gál suggested that Ockham
composed his Summa in London, not Oxford, because Walter Chatton
and Adam Wodeham were in the same physical location as Ockham
during its composition, and Chatton was supposedly in London. Add
to this “London hypothesis” the fact that Ockham’s Quodlibeta were dis-
puted in this same time period (see below), and that Chatton’s inuence
is similarly evident in the Quodlibeta, and we reach the conclusion that
Ockham disputed his Quodlibeta and wrote at least some of them down
in London. But the persuasive power of the London hypothesis itself
has recently been criticized by Courtenay as exceeding the strength of
the evidence.13 Since it bears on our understanding of the Quodlibeta,
some discussion of this controversy is in order here.
Before turning to the controversy, we should say what seems fairly rm
and clear about the place and time of Ockham’s Quodlibeta. Although
he is named only once, in Quodlibet I, q. 2, Walter Chatton and his
arguments are without doubt the overwhelming target of Ockham’s
attacks in an enormous number of questions. Wey nds Ockham
quoting or paraphrasing passages from Chatton’s Reportatio in no less
than sixty-eight of the 170 questions therein, and admits that there
are probably others that he missed.14 Nor are Chatton’s ideas always
selected for criticism; sometimes they are agreed with or even used to
solve problems.15 Wey presents several reasons to believe that Chatton
may have presented viva voce some of the arguments to which Ockham
responds.16 Moreover, careful attention to the details of mutual quotation
between Ockham and Chatton, as well as external evidence, suggests
that all these Quodlibeta, or at least the later ones, may have been written
down in Avignon, and that almost certainly Ockham completed some
of the redactions there.17
So much seems clear. But Wey combined these observations on the
Quodlibeta with Gál’s London hypothesis on the Summa logicae to yield

12
From the introduction to Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. G. Gál, Opera
Philosophica I (St Bonaventure, NY 1967), pp. 53*–6*.
13
W.J. Courtenay, “Ockham, Chatton, and the London Studium: Observations on
Recent Changes in Ockham’s Biography,” Die Gegenwart Ockhams, W. Vossenkuhl and
R. Schönberger, eds. (Weinheim 1990), pp. 327–37.
14
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 27*.
15
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 27*.
16
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 39*.
17
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 41*.

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the conclusion that, though they may have been composed in Avignon,
Ockham’s Quodlibeta are all the fruit of disputations held in London
between 1322 and 1324.18 On this version of events, Chatton, Ockham,
and their confrere Adam Wodeham were all living in a Franciscan
house in London during the opening years of the 1320s, engaging in
a rapid-re exchange of views, with Ockham involved in quodlibetal
disputations later written down.
Wey explains how there came to be seven Quodlibeta in just two
years by postulating a system of three academic terms in the studia,
including London, with disputations occurring each term, rather than
on the university schedule of twice per year at Lent and Advent. This
allows for three disputations to take place in a given academic cycle.
Then, observing the tight connections between Ockham’s Quodlibet I
and Chatton’s Reportatio book II, dated late in 1322, Wey distributes the
remainder of Ockham’s disputations very sensibly as follows:

1322 Autumn: Quodlibet I

1323 Winter: Quodlibet II
1323 Spring: Quodlibet III
1323 Autumn: Quodlibet IV
1324 Winter and Spring: Quodlibeta V–VII

But even if the “Chatton connection” on which this is based is quite

clear, why believe the London hypothesis? The evidence rests fundamen-
tally on two lines of argument. (1) Gál’s introduction to Summa logicae
famously argues that Ockham, Wodeham, and Chatton were together
in whatever time and place Chatton’s Reportatio was composed.19 This
claim has received nothing but support from subsequent examinations
of texts.20 (2) Gál argued in that same place that Chatton’s Reportatio

18
Wey argues that the leisurely style of the writing reects only the mode of
composition, when he had so little to do his rst year in Avignon, but this style belies
the deeper intensity of the actual exchanges that form the basis of the work. Wey,
introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, pp. 38* and 41*.
19
Gál’s introduction to Ockham, Summa logicae, p. 54*. His memorable phrasing is
ubi Chatton, ibi Wodeham; ubi Wodeham, ibi Ockham.
20
For example, we know that before Ockham left for Avignon, Wodeham showed
him a reportatio of Chatton’s Sentences lectures, taken in Wodeham’s own hand, and
that Ockham scribbled at least one response to Chatton’s arguments in the margins
of Wodeham’s own book (“manu sua in margine reportationis meae”); Courtenay,
Adam Wodeham, p. 71n., and p. 162. This manuscript is lost, sadly. The intensity seems
to have carried over to Chatton’s later works as well. Stephen F. Brown argued from

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was composed in London in 1321–23. The temporal portion of this

second claim rings true; there is good evidence that Chatton’s Reportatio
lectures occurred across the biennium 1321–23 or at the very least the
lectures on book III occurred in 1323.21 But the argument that the
Reportatio was composed in London is much weaker. The argument is
just this: Chatton refers to the villa of Oxford in his Reportatio in a way
that suggests he was outside its walls as he wrote it; but if not Oxford,
then London Greyfriars is the next most likely studium to host such a
lecture. Now London is a good guess, of course, and no better guesses
have suggested themselves, but it must be admitted that the case is
weak. Courtenay has even constructed an alternative hypothesis in
which Chatton’s reference to the villa of Oxford as if he were outside
might simply reect the fact that the Franciscan studium at Oxford is
literally outside (although not far outside) the villa itself, as dened by
the town walls.22
The consequences of this weakness for our understanding of Ock-
ham’s Quodlibeta are just these. If we set the London hypothesis aside as
conjecture, the only other evidence for London as the site of disputation
for Ockham’s Quodlibeta is also weak: the ABC family of codices twice
mention London in philosophical examples. Moreover, a recent paper
by Girard Etzkorn has given two arguments for the idea that Quodlibeta
VI and VII must have been disputed in Avignon itself, rendering any

textual evidence in Chatton’s Prologus and Lectura and in Ockham’s Quodlibeta septem and
Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis that these two men were exchanging written
copies of their arguments and rebuttals with such rapidity that we see mutual verbatim
quoting between parallel passages of text. S.F. Brown, “Walter Chatton’s Lectura and
William of Ockham’s Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis,” in Essays Honoring Allan B.
Wolter, W.A. Frank and G.J. Etzkorn, eds. (St Bonaventure, NY 1985), pp. 82–115.
21
The evidence can be summarized as follows. Chatton’s Reportatio III mentions
the constitution Ad conditionem canonum, dated December 1322, as a recent document;
thus we have a terminus post quem. Chatton did not mention the constitution Cum inter
nonnullos, dated November 1323, and, to bolster this argument from silence, we know
that Wodeham audited these lectures and passed his copies along to Ockham, who
had left England for good by summer 1324; thus we have a rm terminus ante quem of
1324. This all suggests that Chatton began lecturing on book III early in 1323, and so
possibly on books I and II in the calendar year 1322, and his prologue in 1321. See
Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 38*, and Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 69–71. For an
alternative view see R. Wood, “Introduction,” in Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda
in librum primum Sententiarum, eds. R. Wood and G. Gál (St Bonaventure, NY 1990),
pp. 12–13.
22
Courtenay, “Ockham, Chatton, and the London Studium,” pp. 333–4.

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“London versus Oxford” discussion moot.23 (1) Although Quodlibeta

I–V were plausibly debated in England, Quodlibeta VI and VII contain
verbatim quotations from some of the Avignon commission’s objections
to Ockham’s ideas on absolute power, suggesting these debates both
postdate his May 1324 departure for Avignon; Wey’s chronology has
these debates nished and in England by spring of 1324. (2) Ockham
was called to defend his views on relations at a Franciscan provincial
chapter held in Cambridge, possibly in the spring of 1323, and so the
material on relations in Quodlibeta VI and VII could be construed as a
response to this commission, rather than as records of actual quodli-
betal disputations in London. This too suggests dating later than May
1324, and so a debate-location entirely outside England, and it certainly
conicts with the London hypothesis.24 Moreover, Etzkorn’s alternative
suggestion relieves the pressure of Wey’s somewhat cramped arrange-
ment of seven Quodlibeta being debated in just two years.
It seems we must admit that we cannot be very certain about where
these debates took place, especially the later ones. However, even if
the evidence for the standard picture is thereby seriously awed, we
know that the majority of the disputations were held in England, that
they show intense inuence by Chatton, and that they were not likely
overlong in composition as a written work, despite their sheer range
and size. As such they provide us only a snapshot of Ockham’s thought,
although a useful one; these are his mature views on important issues,
as rened through intense debate with Franciscan colleagues.25

Content
Ockham’s seven Quodlibeta, collected today under the title Quodlibeta
septem, cover a great deal of intellectual ground. One does get the
impression from the frequency of certain topics that Ockham was
pressed in his disputations on just those issues where he was especially
innovative and provocative, for example, on the unreality of respective
entities in creatures and his reduction of the other accidental catego-
ries besides quality (I.18; IV.11, 18–28; V.21–23; VI.8–30; VII.1–8,
19), his idiosyncratic development and applications of terminist logic

23
G. Etzkorn, “Ockham at Avignon: His Response to Critics,” Franciscan Studies 59
(2001), pp. 9–19.
24
Wey did not know about this Cambridge provincial chapter. See Etzkorn, “Ock-
ham at Avignon,” p. 16, n. 30.
25
Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, pp. 27*–8* and 32*.

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(II.19; III.12–13; IV.12, 35; V.8–9, 14–20, 24–25; VII.10), his ideas
on the soul and cognition, especially intuitive cognition (I.6–7, 10–16;
II.10–13, 15, 17–18; III.8, 17, 20–22; IV.9, 13–16; V.5; VI.6), and to
a lesser degree, on the interior act alone being sin and right reason as
a partial object of moral acts (I.20; III.14–16).
Ockham’s Quodlibeta provide several exceptional examples of the
intricacy of argumentation and the intensity of exchange in fourteenth-
century English quodlibetal literature, in this case between Ockham
and Walter Chatton. To illustrate this point I wish to discuss Quodlibet
I, q. 5, in some detail. There Ockham develops a counter-example to
Chatton’s favorite semantic principle, which is sometimes dubbed the
“anti-razor,” but which I shall refer to as “the Chatton Principle.”26
In I.5 Ockham contends that the Chatton Principle (explained below)
is inapplicable to propositions that contain negation virtually, or that
have a negative exponent when exposited. If true, this would mean that
Chatton’s favorite argument in favor of a realist account of motion, and
his favorite proof of respective entities (roughly, relations), could not work.
After a brief description the Chatton Principle, we can see concretely
the near impossibility of understanding Ockham’s Quodlibeta aright
without having Chatton’s texts in hand.
Here is one general formulation of the Chatton Principle from his
Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4:
Consider an afrmative proposition, which, when it is veried, is veried
only for things; if three things do not sufce for verifying it, one has to
posit a fourth, and so on in turn [for four things, or ve, etc.].27
Chatton gives other versions in several places. However, the basic
idea is the same in each case: we must admit that there are as many
things as are required to make a certain proposition true. Some have
for this reason called the principle an “anti-razor.” Chatton eventu-
ally28 makes it clear that contradiction is the standard by which we judge

26
For some general scholarly discussion of the anti-razor, see A. Maurer, “Method
in Ockham’s Nominalism,” The Monist 61.3 (1978), pp. 426–43; A. Maurer, “Ockham’s
Razor and Chatton’s Anti-Razor,” Mediaeval Studies 46 (1984), pp. 463–75; and R. Keele,
Formal Ontology in the Fourteenth Century: The Chatton Principle and Ockham’s Razor (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Indiana University, 2002).
27
Walter Chatton, Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4, in Reportatio super Sententias: Liber
I, distinctiones 10–48, eds. J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn (Toronto 2002), p. 237, par. 57:
“Propositio afrmativa, quae quando vericatur, solum vericatur pro rebus; si tres non
sufciunt ad vericandum eam, oportet ponere quartam, et sic deinceps.”
28
Viz., in Lectura I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.

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what is required to make a proposition true: n things are enough to

make a (true) proposition true when it is a contradiction that these n
things exist as indicated by the proposition, and yet the proposition is
false. In a sense, we must “add” to our ontology enough entities of
the appropriate types so that it is impossible that propositions that are
in fact true would be false, if those entities existed. The underlying
assumption here is that if an existent makes a difference to truth then
it must be a thing (= res). The basis of this assumption can be found
in Aristotle29 and Scotus,30 who claim that a transition from contradic-
tory to contradictory is a change. But since according to Aristotle all
change takes place in a real subject, the previous claim about change
seems to have been interpreted by Chatton to mean that there can be
no passage from contradictory state to contradictory state without the
generation or corruption of some thing (res). In this form the assumption
might usefully be called the “Principle of Contradictories.” Ockham,
of course, would vigorously oppose this very semantic assumption and
offer various alternatives to replace or supplement it, for example, his
connotation theory.
Chatton applied his Principle, clearly related in some way to the
razor, to prove that certain respective accidents exist, in particular those
associated with causality, for example, production, and also that certain
successive accidents exist, such as motion. Chatton’s account of motion
says that, in the instant a thing begins to move, it acquires a real thing
(res), which we could call motion, which thing is a successive accident
inhering in the permanent moving object. When the object ceases to
move it loses this accident.31 The need to posit such an entity follows
from the Chatton Principle: without positing such an entity no true
sentence of the form ‘X is in motion’ could be true, and, when motion
is posited in a permanent substance X, it is indeed a contradiction that
‘X is in motion’ is false.
Ockham, of course, did not accept such an account of motion,
because he did not accept the existence of a special class of successive
entities.32 Hence, for him, motion is simply a term, and a connotative

29
For example, in Physics V.1 (225a 1–20).
30
For example, in Ordinatio I, d. 30, qq. 1–2, ed. C. Balim, Opera Omnia VI (Vatican
City 1963), p. 186, ll. 20–1.
31
For example in Chatton, Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4, ed. Wey-Etzkorn, p. 235,
parr. 45–6.
32
He argues this point in many places, for example, Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aris-
totelis, ed. S.F. Brown, Opera Philosophica VI (St Bonaventure, NY 1984) qq. 13 and 17.

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one, primarily signifying a moving object and secondarily signifying that

this object exists in the following manner: (1) successively in different
places, (2) without intervening rest, and (3) continuously.33 Hence ‘X is
in motion’ simply means that ‘X successively coexists in different places
without intervening rest, continuously’.
The primary issue in Ockham’s Quodlibet I, q. 5, is whether an angel
can move locally. To answer the question, Ockham gives the account
of motion mentioned above, but then considers an objection based
on a Chattonian realist account of motion supported by the Chatton
Principle, which he quotes explicitly. Ockham raises this Chattonian
objection and engages in imaginary debate with it along these lines: the
Chatton Principle claims that we need to posit, in the case of angelic
motion, the acquisition of a successive accident that the angel previously
lacked, while Ockham says that such an accident is not needed, but that
we need only posit an angel as a movable thing that will be in a different
place than he is in now (successively, continuously, without interven-
ing rest). To settle the issue Ockham goes after the Chatton Principle
directly with a counter-example. Ockham explains it this way:
To the rst of these arguments I reply that the principle on which this
argument is founded [viz., the Chatton Principle] is false unless it is more
adequately interpreted, since with respect to the truth of a given proposi-
tion, in some cases two things are sufcient at one time, and in some cases
two things are not sufcient, say, at another time. An example: suppose
that God creates an angel in the absence of all motion and time, and that
the proposition ‘This angel is being created’ is written down in a book. In
that case, in the beginning, when the angel is being created, three things
are sufcient to make the proposition ‘This angel is being created by God’
true—viz., God, the angel, and the book inscribed with such a proposition.
But afterwards, if exactly the same things exist, neither those things nor
any other things are sufcient to make that proposition true.34
It is not at all obvious exactly what Ockham has in mind unless one
understands Chatton’s views, and indeed the shift to talk of creating
angels in a question about the motion of angels would otherwise be
bafing. But if we recall that the substantive issue overall is whether or

33
This kind of account occurs, for example, in Quodlibet I, q. 5, but in other places
as well. Ockham adds the third clause to account for a case where God would destroy
X, then create it again in another place; this would t (1) and (2), but no one would
call it local motion.
34
Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Freddoso-Kelley, p. 30. I have added the
material in brackets.

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not the Principle of Contradictories needs to be expanded to include a

variety of ways for sentences to change truth value, it becomes easier
to see his basic strategy. This counter-example tries to show that there
is a proposition p, such that p changes from contradictory to contradic-
tory (in this case it goes from being true to being false), and that this
change occurs even though exactly the same number n of things a, b,
c, . . . exist when it is true and when it is false. If this were the case,
Chatton would have to admit that there was a change in truth value
without a change in the number of res in the world, and hence that
the Principle of Contradictories would need to be expanded to include
other ways for propositions to become true or false.
To prove his case Ockham simply claims to exhibit a p that ts the
description above. To see how the example works, let p = ‘This angel
is being created by God’, let a = God, b = an angel, c = the book
inscribed with the proposition. (The book itself plays no integral role
here; it is just that according to Ockham, only proposition tokens exist,
and in order to be actually true or false a proposition must be actual;
hence, we need the thing written down somewhere.) The problem then
seems to be as follows. Let nothing exist save for God, then imagine that
God creates an angel at time t1. In this case, according to the Chatton
Principle, ‘This angel is being created by God’ would be made true at
t1 by the existence of three distinct res, viz., God, the angel, and the
proposition in the book. But notice that at any time subsequent to t1,
say, t2, the proposition ‘This angel is being created by God’ will be false,
even if the same three res, God, the angel, and the proposition in the
book, still exist. Why will ‘This angel is being created by God’ be false
at t2? The idea seems to be that any created being has a rst instant of
existence, and it is only in that rst instant of existence that a thing can
be said to be ‘being created’. Therefore, since the instant in which the
angel is being created was posited to be t1, and since t2 is distinct from
t1, it must be the case that the angel is not being created at t2; rather,
at t2 the angel already is. But then ‘This angel is being created by God’
is clearly false at t2, even though the very same three items (viz., God,
the angel, and the proposition in the book) exist at t2 as did at t1 when
‘This angel is being created by God’ was true.
To put the matter succinctly, if Chatton were correct, something
would have to have gone out of existence at t2 in order for ‘This angel
is being created by God’ to be false then when it was true before, but
apparently the same three things exist at t2 as existed before. In gen-
eral, according to this kind of example, something else besides a res

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must account for p’s passage from truth to falsity, i.e., p’s passage from
contradictory to contradictory, and so the Principle of Contradictories
must be expanded.
Another way to see the problem Ockham is raising in I.5 is to consider
how he would exposit a proposition like ‘This angel is being created by
God’. For him, analogously with the case of motion discussed above, the
proposition means something like ‘The angel now exists and before this
he did not exist, and God brought this situation about’. In essence this
is simply to deny necessary being to the created thing, which is after all
what ‘being created’ means. But by this analysis obviously ‘This angel
is being created by God’ is false at t2, since at t2 it is not the case that
before t2 the angel did not exist; ex hypothesi the angel existed at t1, the
rst moment of its existence, and t1 is before t2.
Ockham considers two Chatton-style objections to his counter-
example in turn and then attempts to modify the same basic strategy
to handle each of the objections. Notice that, given Ockham’s example
and Chatton’s Principle, any useful Chattonian objection must either
(1) deny that p goes from being true to being false, or else (2) it must
hold that not three things a, b, and c but rather, say, four things a, b,
c, and d are required to make p true in the rst place, and that in fact
it is the non-existence of d at t2 that makes p false at that time. Both
the Chatton-style objections that Ockham attempts to rebut take the
second approach. The rst such objection I will pass over, and I will
instead look only at the second objection, and then explain Ockham’s
rebuttal to it.
Ockham describes the Chattonian objection thus: “You might object
further that a passive creation is required for the truth of this proposi-
tion.”35 By itself, this is quite cryptic, and would be almost impossible
to understand if one did not know that the “you” addressed but not
named is Walter Chatton, and what the Chatton Principle is about.
Because we know this we can make sense of the passage: Chatton could
say that God, the angel, and the book are not sufcient to make ‘This
angel is being created by God’ true in the rst place, and that a fourth

35
Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Freddoso-Kelley, p. 31. Unfortunately, I know
of no passage where Chatton makes this actual objection, so I cannot say whether
it is real or imagined. That the objection is Chattonian in style is indubitable. If
Ockham and Chatton were living and working at the Franciscan studium in London
(see above), it is possible that the objection was raised by Chatton himself in person
at this disputation.

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thing is also needed, namely, a passive respective entity of creation, which

thing is a respective accident inhering in the angel as a foundation.36
This passive accident would inhere in the angel while God created him,
i.e., at the rst moment of his existence (= t1), but not afterward, e.g.,
not at t2. Hence, the Chattonian response would go, the reason why
‘This angel is being created by God’ is true at t1 but false at t2 is that
at t1 these four things exist—viz., God, the angel, the book, and the
passive respective of creation in the angel—but at t2 only three things
exist—viz., God, the angel, and the book. But then it is in fact the
generation or corruption of some thing, namely, the passive respective
accident, which causes the proposition ‘This angel is being created by
God’ to be at rst true and then later false.
Ockham’s reply to this Chatton-style objection is essentially to say
that we do not evade the difculty even if the passive respective of cre-
ation be granted, since God by his absolute power could miraculously
conserve that passive respective accident of creation in the angel at t2,
in which case, again, the same four things exist now that the proposi-
tion is false as existed when it was true, viz., at t1. Ockham explains
his reply as follows:
This [Chattonian objection] does not help, since God can conserve that
passive creation, and the argument stands as before: The proposition will
rst be true, since it was true to say that the angel now exists and before
this did not exist; and afterwards it will be false, since . . . the proposition
‘The angel now exists and before this he did not exist’ will be false, despite
the fact that the passive creation remains in existence. Therefore I claim
that if [the Chatton Principle] has truth, then it has truth only when the
relevant proposition is such that, like ‘A human being is an animal’, ‘A
human being is white’, etc., it is not negative and does not include any
negative proposition as an exponent.37
And indeed, Ockham can generalize this strategy to account for any
other entities Chatton would posit to try to evade the problem; for any
proposition p, and number of entities n, Ockham’s strategy would seem
to show that even if Chatton posits an n + 1th entity whose non-exis-
tence at t2 would explain why p is false at t2, it remains that God can

36
There is no corresponding accident in God, of course, who has no accidental
properties at all. But this has no bearing on the issue at hand.
37
Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Freddoso-Kelley, p. 31. I have modied the
translation slightly and added the material in brackets.

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conserve that n + 1th entity through his absolute power into instant t2,
so that this entity’s absence cannot explain the falsehood of p at t2.
I pass over a discussion of whether or not Ockham’s response is
adequate.38 The point is that this material is nearly unintelligible in
much of its argumentative detail without an adequate knowledge of
the work of Walter Chatton.

Walter Chatton

Walter Chatton’s name is well known to many specialists on fourteenth-

century theology and philosophy and especially to specialists on Ock-
ham. However, even to most of them, the details of his views are only
now emerging, as his Sentences commentaries begin to be published in
full in critical editions. Although Chatton’s career was described two
decades ago in respectable detail by William Courtenay, there is some
new information and evidence to add. I begin with a sketch of Chatton’s
career based on those few hard facts and dates we do possess.
It seems best to break up Chatton’s life and career into four
stages.39

38
I think it is demonstrably inadequate in fact. Chatton did also, raising an interest-
ing line of against it in his Lectura 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, and I think a still more conclusive
refutation is possible. See R. Keele, Formal Ontology in the Fourteenth Century, Chapter 8.
39
To yield a more readable account of Chatton’s life, I shall save for the footnotes
my discussions of the controversial elements of this biography. Little corroborated evi-
dence exists for many of these claims, and in general, the more detailed any particular
claim is the more agnosticism is warranted. My primary source for this initial sketch,
and still the best overall discussion of Chatton’s life, is Courtenay, Adam Wodeham,
pp. 66–74. Other sources consulted, in descending order of their useful biographical
content, include: Keele, Formal Ontology in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 9–15; A.B. Emden,
A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500 I (Oxford 1957), pp. 395–6;
H.G. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought 1300–1335 (Ph.
D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1974), pp. 185–205; Brown, “Walter
Chatton’s Lectura,” pp. 82–115; L. Baudry, “Gauthier de Chatton et son commentaire
des Sentences,” AHDLMA 14 (1943–45), pp. 337–69; C.K. Brampton, “Gauthier
de Chatton et la provenance des mss. lat. Paris Bibl. Nat. 15886 et 15887,” Études
Franciscaines 14 (1964), pp. 200–5; P.E. Longpré, “Gualtiero di Catton: Un Maestro
Francescano D’Oxford,” Studi Francescani 9 (1923), pp. 101–14; and D.L. Douie, “Three
treatises on Evangelical Poverty,” AFH 24 (1931), pp. 341–69, continued in 25 (1932),
pp. 36–58, 210–40.

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Childhood, Ordination, and Philosophical Training (Birth to 1315)

Passing over the question of the exact year, we can say with some
condence that Walter Chatton was born between 1285 and 1290 in
the small village of Chatton, just west of Durham.40 He entered the
Franciscan Order as a puer, i.e., before the age of fourteen, and was
ordained a subdeacon on 20 May 1307. He very likely received his
philosophical training in the North and professed there as well, perhaps
at the convent in Carlisle.

Early Bachelor of Theology Studies (1315 to 1321)

Ample evidence suggests that during this period Chatton was training
in theology and interacting with Ockham and Wodeham. We know
that he was outspoken even from this stage against Ockham on many
issues, and against the views of Campsall, especially on the logic of
the Trinity.41

Advanced Bachelor Studies and Regency (1321 to 1332)

We have the least amount of hard biographical data for this period,
although it is clearly the most interesting and intense intellectual period
of his life. Textual evidence allows us to argue with varying degrees of
certainty that four of his ve extant works—Reportatio, Lectura (which
includes the separately edited Collatio et Prologus), Quodlibet, De paupertate
evangelica, and Sermo de visione beatica—were written during this period.42
We have long possessed reasonable dates (although they are wide, in
one case) for the rst two of these works: he probably delivered his
Reportatio during the biennium 1321–23,43 and his Lectura must have

40
The date we give to Chatton’s birth depends upon to which stage of his career
his Reportatio corresponds.
41
Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 60 and 69.
42
The exception is Sermo de visione beatica, which was likely written in Avignon
in 1333, and so belongs to the next stage; see M. Dykmans, “Les Frères Mineurs
d’Avignon au début de 1333 et le sermon de Gautier de Chatton sur la vision béati-
que,” AHDLMA 78 (1971), pp. 105–48. For the dating of De paupertate evangelica see
Douie, “Three treatises on Evangelical Poverty,” p. 345. The list of Chatton’s works
was compiled from R. Sharpe, A Handlist of Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland Before
1540 (2nd edition, Turnhout 2001), pp. 730–1; N.A. Fitzpatrick, “Walter Chatton on
the Univocity of Being: A Reaction to Peter Aureoli and William Ockham,” Franciscan
Studies 31 (1971), pp. 88–177; and Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias:
Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. J.C. Wey (Toronto 1989), pp. 1–2. The Reportatio
in Sententias, eds. J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn, 4 vols. (Toronto 2002–2005), has appeared,
and the Lectura will be published shortly.
43
See p. 644 above for some qualications.

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been written between 1324 and 1330.44 The rst three works listed
above are of primary philosophical importance in his corpus. During
this period Chatton also incepted as a regent master, probably in the
academic year 1329–30.45

Later Career in Avignon and Death (1332 to 1343/44)

Chatton is known to have been in Avignon on 17 January 1333. He
was summoned there in order to participate in hearings against Thomas
Waleys, and eventually served as an advisor to Pope Benedict XII, a
post he held for several years. After this we know little of him save for
two events, one uncommon, the other most common: rst, in a career-
halting accident in 1343, he was appointed bishop of the Welsh see of
Asaph, although the position was not really vacant, and second, he died
the next winter at Avignon, in late 1343 or perhaps early 1344.46

Chatton’s Quodlibet
The positive identication of Chatton’s Quodlibet was announced in 1987
by Girard Etzkorn, but it turns out that the lone manuscript containing
it was recognized as Chattonian by two previous scholars, Antonius
Samaritani, who edited question 3, on the immaculate conception, and
earlier still by Carlo Balim.47 However, Etzkorn went further than the

44
The Lectura dates are based on the mention of Ockham’s Summa logicae, which
gives a terminus post quem of 1324; Wodeham’s citation in 1330 of Lectura material gives
a terminus ante quem of 1330. Below I give reasons to suppose that the relative date of
Chatton’s Lectura is earlier than his Quodlibet. All my arguments about the date of the
Quodlibet itself are consistent with the wide dating of the Lectura just mentioned.
45
Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 67. Courtenay cites the Oxford Historical Society’s
Munimenta Civitatis Oxonie as his source. Emden cites this same source as evidence that
Chatton was in Oxford in the spring of 1330, involved on the side of the Franciscan
Order in a court case.
46
Three areas in which scholars have attempted to determine his life and career
in more detail have been more controversial, viz., (1) his exact birth year, (2) to which
career stage his Reportatio belongs—bachelor lectures or preparation for bachelor lec-
tures, and (3) the location of the Reportatio’s composition. Clearly answers to (2) and
(3) bear on each other, but also will bear on the answer to (1), since answers to (2)
and (3) suggest to us how old Chatton might have been around 1321–23, the rm
dates of the Reportatio.
47
G.J. Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” AFH 80 (1987), pp. 321–33;
A. Samaritani, “De beatae Mariae Virginis immaculata conceptione quodlibet XIII–XIV
saec. primum edita,” Marian Library Studies 5 (1973) (pp. 729–835), pp. 792–8; and
C. Balim, Ioannis de Polliaco et Ioannis de Neapoli Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione
Beatae Mariae Virginis, (Sibenik 1931), p. xlvii, n. 62.

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others in giving arguments (to be discussed below) which support the

identication of the work in question as a quodlibet, and which strongly
corroborate the claim that the author of the quodlibet was Walter Chat-
ton. Etzkorn eventually undertook a critical edition of the entire work,
but because the full edition is not yet published, there is no account
in print of the complete case for attribution of this work to Chatton,
its dating, importance, philosophical content or connection to other
Chattonian works. Therefore all these tasks must be undertaken in
some detail here.

The Manuscript, Authenticity and Nature of the Work

Chatton’s Quodlibet is known through a single manuscript, bound with
a miscellany of texts, including other quodlibeta, in Codex Paris, BnF
lat. 15805.48 Chatton’s text is in the fourth of six sections of the codex,
and runs across ff. 54ra–60rb. The manuscript yields a fairly coherent
text, requiring relatively little emendation to achieve consistency and
intelligibility. In the absence of another witness, little more can currently
be said about the accuracy of the manuscript. Twenty-nine questions
are presented, although the 29th question, the last of four on future
contingents, ends abruptly and incompletely after a few hundred words;
however, it is unlikely that this represents a large loss of material. The
list of questions, a rough translation, and their manuscript locations,
are as follows:
1. Utrum causalitas causae nalis sit realis (f. 54ra) [Whether the causality of
nal causes is real].
2. Utrum circumstantia aggravans peccatum aggravet illud contra aliquod
praeceptorum (54rb) [Whether a circumstance increasing the gravity of a
sin does so in opposition to any of the precepts].
3. Utrum beata Virgo potuit fuisse concepta in originali peccato (54rb)
[Whether the Blessed Virgin could have been conceived in original sin].
4. Utrum ignorantia invincibilis excuset peccatum (54va) [Whether invincible
ignorance excuses sin].
5. Utrum fortitudo politica sit moderativa timoris et audaciae in sensitiva
(55ra) [Whether civic courage is a quality capable of moderating fear and
recklessness in the sensitive appetite].
6. Utrum in moralibus ex circumstantia excusetur culpa (55ra) [Whether in
moral matters fault is excused on account of circumstances].

48
The manuscript details and the question list below are taken from Etzkorn, “The
Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805.”

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7. Utrum ignorantia invincibilis totaliter excuset (55rb) [Whether invincible

ignorance totally excuses sin].
8. Utrum gratia creata in anima Christi sit infinita intensive sic quod
improportionaliter excedat quamcumque gratiam purae creaturae (55vb)
[Whether the created grace in the soul of Christ is intensively innite in
such a way that it exceeds by all proportion any grace existing in a mere
creature].
9. Quattuor sunt tacta a quodam doctore contra quem volo arguere (55vb)
[Four points are touched on by a certain doctor, against whom I want to
argue here. The issues are not all related, and occur in four different articles].
10. Utrum de naturis diversis in Christo debeat concedi communicatio
in abstractis (55vb) [Whether it ought to be conceded that, in Christ,
there was some communication between the diverse natures, considered
abstractly].
11. Utrum lex praecipiens hominem occidi sit licita in quocumque casu
(56ra) [Whether a law commanding that a man be killed is licit in any
circumstances whatsoever].
12. Utrum nis sit obiectum actus moralis (56ra) [Whether an end is an object
of a moral action].
13. Utrum aliquis habitus pertinens ad prudentiam possit generari ex actibus,
voluntate contrarium eligente (56rb) [Whether some habit pertaining to
prudence can be generated by acts of the will when the will itself wills
contrary to prudence].
14. Utrum omnis aggravatio culpae sit nata contrariare rectae conscientiae
(56vb) [Whether every aggravation of fault is brought about contrary to
good conscience].
15. Utrum omnis circumstantia aggravans peccatum aggravet illud mortaliter
vel venialiter (57ra) [Whether every circumstance increasing the gravity
of a sin does so either mortally or venially].
16. Utrum solus malus actus interior sit peccatum (57rb) [Whether only an
interior wicked action counts as sin].
17. Utrum sit magis meritorium diligere amicum quam inimicum (57va)
[Whether it is more meritorious to love a friend than an enemy].
18. Utrum purus homo magis teneatur diligere humanitatem Christi quam se
ipsum (57va) [Whether a mere human being is bound to love the human-
ity of Christ more than Christ himself ].
19. Utrum Abraham credidit illud praeceptum esse iustum quo praecipiebatur
immolare lium suum (57va) [Whether Abraham believed that percept to
be just by which he was commanded to sacrice his own son].
20. Utrum praecipiens alicui percutere clericum et non intendens praecipere
nisi de levi percussione et alius excedat et graviter percutiat, utrum talis
praecipiens possit absolvi a suo episcopo diocesano (57vb) [Suppose that
someone orders a clerk to be beaten, and intends that he be struck only
lightly, but that the man doing the beating exceeds this intent and hits
him much harder. Can the man giving the order be absolved of fault by
the bishop of his own diocese?].

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21. Utrum ad salvandum dem de Trinitate sit necessarium recurrere ad

terminos reduplicativos (58ra) [Whether it is necessary to have recourse
to reduplicative terms for the sake of saving our faith in the Trinity].
22. Utrum quantitas de genere quantitatis sit res distincta realiter a substantia
et qualitatibus (58ra) [Whether a quantity in the category of quantity is
a thing really distinct from substance and quality].
23. Utrum Deus possit facere aliquam creaturam cui repugnet exsistere sine
omni creatura a se totaliter distincta (58va) [Whether God can make a
creature whose nature opposes its existence in the absence of all other
creatures totally distinct from it].
24. Utrum angelus sit visibilis in propria forma (59ra) [Whether an angel is
visible in its proper form].
25. Utrum angelus potuit peccare in primo instanti sui esse (59rb) [Whether
an angel could have sinned in the rst instant of its existence].
26. Utrum angeli superiores possunt revelare inferioribus futura contingentia
(59rb) [Whether higher angels can reveal future contingents to lower
angels].
27. Utrum aliqua creatura possit certicari de futuro contingenti (59va)
[Whether a creature can be made certain concerning a future contin-
gent].
28. Utrum certitudo revelationis de futuris contingentibus stet cum contin-
gentia eorum (60ra) [Whether the certainty of the revelation of future
contingents is consistent with their contingency].
29. Utrum omnes formae argumentorum quae solent eri in ista materia
possint solvi (60rb) incomplete [Whether every form of argument which is
usually made concerning these matters (i.e., the issue of future contingents)
can be solved].

Old Evidence for the Authenticity and the Classication of the Work
What reasons do we have to think that these are properly quodlibetal
disputations? In his initial analysis of the manuscript, Etzkorn points
out that the length and structure of the questions support this classica-
tion.49 In my examination of the text I have found nothing to contradict
Etzkorn’s characterization or judgment on this matter.
Etzkorn offered both internal and external evidence that this quodli-
bet belongs to Walter Chatton. His external evidence is as good as we
might hope for. First, there is a marginal attribution to Chaton, in the
same hand as the scribe of the main text. Second, Adam Wodeham
cites Chatton by name and then transcribes very closely a portion of
the text contained in question 16. Moreover, the internal evidence that

49
Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” p. 325.

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can be adduced from philosophical content is compelling. Etzkorn notes

that the author of this quodlibet attacks prominent Ockhamist theses,
for example “about quantity not being distinct from quality, about
circumstances being the partial object of moral acts, about the use of
reduplicative terms in explaining the Trinity, etc.”50
A closer examination of the content of the text continues to bear
this out. To the above evidence we can also add the following incidents
of corroboration: (1) in question 16, the author inveighs against the
Ockhamist view that only an interior act of bad will is properly called
sin, arguing instead that while the interior act is immediately sinful, the
consequent exterior act is also properly called sinful as well; (2) in ques-
tion 5, the author rebuts the Ockhamist view that there are two souls in
man, one sensitive, one rational; (3) in question 24 the author supports
the species in medio, a favorite Chattonian theme, and again criticizes
both the Ockhamist rejection of the species in medio and Ockham’s own
account of action at a distance; (4) stylistic considerations are broadly
consistent with the attribution to Chatton.
The nal piece of internal evidence for attribution to Chatton is
extremely strong. This concerns Chatton’s anti-razor, which Etzkorn
dubbed the propositio Chattonis, and which I discussed above under the
name “the Chatton Principle.” Question 23 contains an extended
defense of the Chatton Principle, and Etzkorn believed that this was
the most “telling evidence” for Chatton’s authorship, so important a
role does this principle play in Chatton’s argument in his Reportatio and
Lectura for the need to posit res respectivae.51

New Evidence for Authenticity and Dating

Unfortunately, to determine the date of this work we cannot simply
argue that the Quodlibet must correspond with a quodlibet Chatton deter-
mined during his regency (which began in 1329), on the ground that
all and only regent masters determined quodlibeta and recorded these
determinationes; we now believe that by the fourteenth century, formed
bachelors sometimes did this as well.52 Fortunately, however, we can x
the date using more texts from Adam Wodeham, specically books III
and IV of his Oxford commentary on the Sentences. Therein Wodeham

50
Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” p. 325.
51
Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” pp. 325–6.
52
Although this is controversial; see the discussion about dating Holcot’s Quodlibeta,
below.

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not only conrms that Chatton determined questions during the time
of his regency,53 just as we would expect, but he also gives us a glimpse
into the content of this determinatio, allowing us clearly to show that the
text identied by Etzkorn in Paris 15805 is in fact Walter Chatton’s
magisterial Oxford determinatio.
In book III, d. 14, q. 11, Wodeham takes issue with Chatton’s indivisi-
bilism as expressed in a determinatio, in particular with the opinion “that
the continuum is not composed from divisible [but rather indivisible]
parts.”54 This opinion occurred, Wodeham tells us, in a question attack-
ing Ockham on the issue of quantity.55 Although none of the question
titles in Chatton’s Quodlibet mentions the continuum directly, indivisibles
are mentioned in the text of question 22, which question deals with the
issue of quantity, taking Ockham as the principal opponent. Moreover,
Chatton apparently responded to Wodeham’s arguments in III.14.11,
coming back with arguments that Wodeham felt bound to respond to
again in book IV, q. 5, of his Oxford commentary, mentioning that
Chatton’s determinatio occurred during the time of his regency.56 Speci-
cally, Wodeham says this:
You should note what [Chatton] himself posited afterwards, in the period
of his magistracy, in a determinatio (which determinatio I myself heard—and
he said these same things previously as well, when he read the Sentences).
We have from him that one indivisible is naturally able to be together in
the same place as another indivisible, for otherwise, according to him, it
would not be possible to save condensation and rarefaction . . .57

53
Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 70, n. 112.
54
Wodeham, Lectura Oxoniensis III, d. 14, q. 11 (Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, lat.
915, f. 193va), from the transcription in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 72, n. 127. “Chat-
ton in quadam determinatione Oxon. quod continuum non componitur ex partibus
divisibilibus . . . audivi postquam illam materiam Londoniae pertractavi.”
55
Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 72.
56
Robert Holcot, Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot,
eds. P.A. Streveler and K.H. Tachau, with H.G. Gelber and W.J. Courtenay (Toronto
1995), p. 24, n. 63. Hereafter the introduction to this critical edition will be cited
thus: Tachau, Seeing the Future. See also Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 73, but only in
conjunction with the note immediately succeeding this one.
57
Wodeham, Lectura Oxoniensis IV, q. 5, a. 2 (Paris, Mazarine 915, f. 216ra, ll. 39–45).
The text is slightly corrupt. Here is an exact transcription, which I have emended in
obvious ways for my translation: “Nota quod ipse post, tempore magisterii sui, posuit
in determinatione et—quam et ego ipse tunc et sicut priora alias audivi, dum legit
Sententias, ab eo—indivisibile naturaliter esse compossibile alteri indivisibili secundum
situm, quia aliter secundum eum non posset salvari condensatio et rarecatio . . .” Note
that Courtenay transcribes this same text as “Nota quod ipse post tempus magisterii . . .”
The difference in the underlined phrase would importantly change the meaning to

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Indeed, in question 22 of the Chattonian text in Paris 15805, we nd

Chatton making this very claim in the context of an exchange with an
Ockhamist interlocutor, very possibly Wodeham himself:
We should say that this proposition is not true for really existing things
without such an accident [i.e., a quantity]: ‘This substance is naturally
unable to exist at the same time in the same place with a second sub-
stance’.
But it could be argued [against me] as follows: “The parts of quantity
can exist naturally [in the same place] at the same time, because [accord-
ing to you, Chatton], indivisibles compose the parts of substance, and
indivisibles can exist naturally [in the same place] at the same time through
natural causes. Otherwise, according to you something that is dispersed
could not be condensed.”
It should be said in response: it is true that the [indivisible] parts of
quantity can be [in the same place] at the same time. Nevertheless the
extended parts of quantity cannot . . .
I say that while one part of a quantum [which is composed of indi-
visibles] remains extended, it cannot naturally be [in the same place] at
the same time with another part of that substance, while that other part
also remains extended. Nevertheless, the indivisible, condensable parts
themselves can be in the same place [at the same time].58
So the text in Paris 15805 has Chatton arguing that indivisibles can be
in the same place at the same time, precisely to save the phenomenon of
condensation and rarefaction, just as Wodeham reports events occurred
in Chatton’s magisterial determinatio. This, together with Etzkorn’s ear-
lier arguments, settles the issue of the authorship of these questions
in Paris 15805 beyond doubt, and it also helps us x their date quite
rmly. The text must date to either 1329–30, since this is known to
be the rst year of his regency, or possibly to the year after, 1330–31,
since he would likely have also been master, although non regens, for a
second consecutive year.

say that Chatton’s determination came after the period of his regency, not during it.
Nevertheless, Tachau reads the text as I do, with post as an adverb, not a preposition,
and with tempore instead of tempus, thereby agreeing with me that the determination
was during his regency. Careful examination of Mazarine 915, f. 216ra, l. 42, reveals
the crucial abbreviation is te = tempore; so Tachau and I are correct. It should be
noted that the raised “e” of the abbreviation here is of such a form that it could easily
be mistaken for t9 = tempus. This typographical fact, and the relative infrequency of
“post” as an adverb, are the likely sources of Courtenay’s misreading.
58
Chatton, Quodlibet, q. 22, nn. 46–9, from the transcription by Etzkorn.

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Unfortunately, this new evidence for attribution raises some ques-

tion about whether the Chattonian determinatio in Paris 15805 is in fact
a quodlibet, as Etzkorn had argued, since a determinatio could be given
by a master to a question that was not asked as part of a quodlibetal
exercise. Wodeham’s use of the term determinatio, when he might have
used the more precise quodlibet (and actually does in other cases), leaves
us in some doubt about whether this text belongs in the genre at all.
Up to this point we have had only Wodeham’s use of the ambiguous
term determinatio, and his non-use of quodlibet, on the one side of the
issue, and Etzkorn’s observations of form and length on the other.
However, some new evidence can add a little weight to the case for
this text being a quodlibet. Etzkorn originally found a title for these
questions, partly obscured by the gutter margin, the visible letters of
which were “-libet.” Recent re-examination of the manuscript shows
that this title does indeed say “Quodlibet,” and conrms Etzkorn’s
judgment that the label is in the same hand as the main text and the
bulk of the organizational marginalia.59 This evidence is certainly not
decisive, but it increases the reasonableness of our presumption that
Chatton’s magisterial determinatio cited by Wodeham is correctly called
his Quodlibet.

Content
Although one can obtain some sense of the content of Chatton’s
Quodlibet through the question list and the discussion above, some more
comprehensive information about the opponents, issues, and doctrines
in the text will serve to round out and complete the picture.
The twenty-nine questions of the Quodlibet can be usefully divided
into six subject categories. The chart below shows which questions
address these topics:

59
The marginalia for these folia in Paris 15805 are in two distinct hands. Nearly all
are in the same hand as the main scribe, and consist primarily of such organizational
labels as “contra,” “prima ratio,” “secundum dubium,” and the like. In addition, all
29 questions, save only two, have a brief (usually one- or two-word) description of the
question’s subject matter. These latter remarks occur in a different hand, and would
seem to be later additions.

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Categories Questions Opponents, if known

(1) Contingency and
necessity
(1a) Future 9 a. 2—the causes of All articles in 9 seem
contingents contingency directed against Aquinas
26—revelation of future or a follower; Scotus and
contingents Aquinas are targets in 28.
27, 28—future
contingents and certitude
29—solving puzzles on
future contingents
(1b) Freedom, 25—the necessary con- Possibly Aquinas.
necessity and merit ditions for the will to sin
(1c) Contingency of 9 a. 3—necessity of a Aquinas or a follower.
creation consequentia about God’s
actions
(2) Res respectivae and 1—causality of nal All are against Ockham.
other accidental beings causes
22—the category of
quantity
23—res respectivae;
Chatton Principle
(3) Damnation, biblical 2—sin and aggravating By and large the
law, canon law, and circumstances opponents here are
sin 4—ignorance as an unknown or else there
excuse for sin is no real opponent.
6—sin and mitigating Authorities include
circumstances Augustine, Anselm, and
7—invincible ignorance canon law.
and sin
11—moral acceptability
of homicide
15—mortal vs. venial sin
20—ordering a clerk to
be beaten
(4) Moral science, right 5—civic courage as a 5, 12, 16 are aimed
reason and sin virtue against Ockham; 13
12—ends as objects of against Auriol; 14 against
moral acts Alexander of Hales;
13—prudence and the 19 against Aquinas,
will Bonaventure, et al.
14—fault and human
conscience
16—sin as an interior
act only
17—merit of loving
enemies vs. friends
19—Abraham and Isaac

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Table (cont.)
Categories Questions Opponents, if known
(5) Christology and the 8, 9 a. 4—grace in 21 is Ockham.
Trinity Christ’s soul
10—how Christ’s natures
connect
18—loving Christ’s
humanity
21—the Trinity and
reduplicative terms
(6) Miscellany 3—the Immaculate 3 surveys an enormous
Conception number of opinions:
9 a. 1—creatures being Lombard, Augustine,
present to eternity Anselm, Richard of St
24—the species in medio Victor, Grosseteste, etc.;
24 is against Ockham,
and possibly Auriol.

The distinction between categories (3) and (4) may seem a little articial,
but the basic idea is that controversies raised in questions of type (3)
are treated by Chatton as matters to be settled by canon law or biblical
interpretation (he frequently cites the Bible and the Decretales Gregorii IX
in these questions), while issues of type (4) are treated as philosophical
topics, with Ockham as the most common opponent. If we consider
the number of questions under headings (3) and (4), as well as the drift
of most of the topics in (1), we can easily convince ourselves that the
bulk of Chatton’s Quodlibet, both theologically and philosophically, is
focused on issues of moral responsibility, sin, and merit.
What explains this focus? There may not be much to explain here,
since Chatton had always discussed moral questions in his philosophy
and theology. Many old, favorite Chattonian themes do at least make an
appearance in this work dominated by moral issues: we see the debate
over res respectivae (qq. 1, 23), res in other accidental categories besides
quantity (q. 22), and future contingents (qq. 9, a. 2, and 26–29). And
yet there really does seem to be a pattern here, which reects something
about either Chatton or the climate at Oxford or perhaps both. Two
explanations suggest themselves.
It might be that this work simply reects a natural shift in interests for
Chatton, or more generally for theologians at Oxford. This shift may

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have been positive (increased interest in ethics),60 or negative (decreased

interest in epistemology). Or, it is possible that Ockham’s departure for
Avignon, and his radical shift toward political theory after 1324, had
left Chatton without his worthy opponent as a target.
I favor a combination of these explanations. Ockham was Chatton’s
strongest center of gravity, and by the earliest possible date for the
Quodlibet Ockham had completely ceased to involve himself in sub-
jects at the heart of all their old disputes. It then seems reasonable to
conclude that Chatton was thereafter inclined to shift toward a dif-
ferent pole of his thought, always present but previously overawed by
considerations of epistemology and metaphysics, which was now able
to shine forth as the well of his previous critical philosophy ran dry.
To state the matter most succinctly, it seems that Ockham’s Quodlibeta
strongly reect Chatton’s presence, while Chatton’s Quodlibet strongly
reects Ockham’s absence.

Robert Holcot

The Oxford-trained Dominican Robert Holcot was born around 1300

near Northampton, read the Sentences at Oxford in the opening years
of the 1330s, was regent in the middle 1330s, and rose to some promi-
nence in ecclesiastical and literary affairs before his death in 1349. The
customary sketch of his intellectual life associates his philosophy both
with Ockhamism and Thomism. Recent research allows us to esh out
the picture of his life and character beyond these few basic facts, and
to consider possible dates for his Sentences commentary, which in turn
yield possible dates for his Quodlibeta.
In one aspect, his intellectual personality is quite similar to Chatton’s
and Ockham’s: as we would expect, we see great reliance on the tools
of the new English theology, such as logic and conceptual analysis
stemming from supposition theory, or the theory of exponables.61 Thus,
in one way Holcot is quite representative of the tradition thriving at
Oxford during this period.

60
A point often made in H.G. Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and
Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden-Boston 2004), passim.
61
Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 269.

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A somewhat unusual feature of Holcot’s biography is his connection

with the London court of Richard de Bury, bishop of Durham. While
there is nothing unexpected about a mendicant theologian having a
patron of this sort, Richard’s court itself was unusually receptive to
and productive of literature that showed an awareness of the classi-
cal tradition. Holcot ourished in this environment, lled with people
whom Tachau refers to as “‘proto’-humanist literati.”62 From this support,
with the aid of his logically rigorous Oxford training, Holcot crafted
several extremely well-loved texts. His popular commentaries enjoyed
vast circulation in the fourteenth and fteenth centuries; indeed, it is
plausible to suggest that Holcot had a wider intellectual inuence in
the century after his death than even Ockham.63 In particular, it is for
his biblical commentaries, composed after 1334, that he was most well
known; his commentary on the Book of Wisdom survives in at least 175
fourteenth- and fteenth-century manuscript copies, and was cited into
the beginning of the seventeenth century.64 This text seems to have been
one of Chaucer’s sources for the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.65 Moreover, this
fame seems to have attached to his more academic writing as well; his
Sentences commentary, surviving in whole or part in forty-eight known
witnesses, was among the most notable of the later Middle Ages. Also
popular were his Sex articuli and Quodlibeta, composed not long after his
Sentences commentary.
But when was his Sentences commentary written? Here we nd some
disagreement and some new evidence to consider. Since the relative
dating of his Quodlibeta to his Sentences commentary brings up larger
issues about who could determine quodlibeta in this period, and since
a brief discussion of the absolute dating of his Sentences commentary
will help us x his Quodlibeta, it is a highly relevant place to begin the
discussion.

62
Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 2.
63
An enormous bibliography for Holcot can be found in Gelber, It Could Have Been
Otherwise, p. 92, n. 105. For a list of studies on Holcot before 1970, see p. 480, n. 1, of
R.E. Gillespie, “Robert Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” Traditio 27 (1971), pp. 480–90. For studies
up until 1983, see the footnotes of H.G. Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason: Three
Questions on the Nature of God, by Robert Holcot, OP (Toronto 1983), passim.
64
Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 2–3.
65
Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 2.

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Holcot’s Quodlibeta

Dating, Manuscript Tradition, Attribution, and Arrangement of Questions

There seem to be two views on when Holcot lectured on the Sentences:
either in the biennium 1330–32, a view favored by Schepers and
Courtenay,66 or else in 1331–33, a view favored by Tachau.67 Both
Courtenay and Tachau seem to agree that, at any rate, his Quodlibeta
must have come after this period, likely in 1333–34. Moreover, both
Tachau and Courtenay rely on certain references by Holcot in his
Sex articuli to a William Crathorn in order to establish their chronolo-
gies; the difference comes from the fact that Courtenay also accepts,
while Tachau rejects, an additional (apparent) assertion by Holcot that
Crathorn lectured on the Sentences for only one year. Since Crathorn’s
Sentences commentary was clearly delivered in 1330, Courtenay must
hold that Holcot too began his lectures in 1330, while Tachau, who
thinks that Holcot refers in this crucial text to a Crafton/Grafton rather
than Crathorn, is free to adopt the other view, which better ts some
other pieces of evidence.
The consequences of this disagreement for Holcot’s Quodlibeta are as
follows. While on either chronology the disputations were likely held
around 1333–34, on Tachau’s view Holcot would still be giving Bible
lectures at that same time (or would just have nished doing so), cer-
tainly not yet having attained the regency, and so we would not only
have to accept the idea of a bachelor determining quodlibeta, we would
also have to face an extremely compressed view of Holcot’s overall
career trajectory, with a tremendous bottleneck occurring in 1333–34.
Courtenay’s view avoids this bottleneck. To complicate matters, Gelber
has recently come out in favor of Tachau’s crucial assertion that Holcot
refers to Crafton/Grafton rather than Crathorn, while at the same time
disagreeing with her conclusions about the date of the Quodlibeta, and
in particular with the compression implied by Tachau’s view, as well as
the pre-magisterial timing it assumes.68 On Gelber’s latest view, these
Quodlibeta should be dated to the time of his regency, perhaps even
exclusively, an event which she places in 1336–37.

66
Although Courtenay entertains hypotheses of even earlier readings, and of his
reading for a single year only, this is the view he explicitly endorses, following Schepers.
See Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 96–100, especially p. 97.
67
A table on Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 27, nicely summarizes her views.
68
Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, pp. 90–1 and 94–5.

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Since it is difcult at this stage to see who has the better total case,
the prudent conclusion is perhaps that Holcot’s Quodlibeta can be safely
dated to around 1333–37, although the question of precisely where
the work ts in his overall career path is not simple and remains hotly
contested in the details.
Whenever it may have been compiled, Holcot’s quodlibetal collection,
containing roughly one hundred questions overall, is far closer in size
to Ockham’s than to Chatton’s collection. The questions are divided
into three Quodlibeta, two of roughly equal size, the other about twice as
large. Unfortunately, the manuscript tradition for Holcot’s Quodlibeta is
quite difcult.69 This is not to say that there are no reasonable editions
of individual questions, but rather that the amount of confusion and
conicting evidence facing an editor of Holcot’s Quodlibeta is sufcient
to block many conclusions that we would hope to draw rmly about
the ordering, relative dating, and hence preferred readings of Holcot’s
intended text. Nevertheless, some scholars70 have made heroic efforts at
managing the many detailed difculties. I will not attempt to recount
here all the details of these labors, but will instead acquaint the reader
with what seems uncontroversial, with one or two fundamental points
of difculty, and with the status of current research.
Editors of his Quodlibet rely on three manuscripts:71

(R) Royal = London, British Library, Royal 10.C.vi

(P) Pembroke = Cambridge, Pembroke College Library 236
(B) Balliol = Oxford, Balliol College Library 246

In addition there is some related disputational material in a 1497 Lyons

edition, which Gelber calls the Determinationes, as well as a fourth manu-
script, Düsseldorf, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, F.5, which has
not been used thus far and which apparently includes Determinationes
on ff. 239v–325r.72

69
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 3.
70
Notably Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, pp. 1–28, and Tachau, Seeing
the Future, pp. 1–56. See also the less extensive but foundational work in Gillespie,
“Holcot’s Quodlibeta.”
71
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 3; Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 28. For a
summary of the main physical characteristics of the manuscripts, and also references
to longer detailed descriptions, see Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 28–9.
72
See Sharpe, Handlist, p. 557 (revised 2001 edition) and the on-line catalogue of
the Düsseldorf, Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek. Manuscript F.5 is paper, 330 + i

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The three manuscripts that editors have employed differ enormously

in the questions that they contain and in the order, arrangement, and
hence implied interrelation of those questions; clearly they represent
three distinct lines of transmission.73 P contains some ninety-nine ques-
tions, B has ninety-one, while R contains only thirty-eight. (Despite
appearances, the total number of questions exceeds 100, since B and
R contain some questions not in P.) On the basis of this disparity, one
early scholarly examination74 ascribes Holcot’s personal touch to Royal.
The view is that, compared to P and B, the more logical arrangement
of R, together with its shorter length, is evidence of authorial pruning,
and hence an indication that R’s readings ought to be preferred.75 Gil-
lespie, and to a much greater degree Gelber, dispute the orderliness of
R, and hence reject this reading of R’s importance, emphasizing that
consideration of Holcot’s quodlibetal collection must be based more
on the other two witnesses, and must not rely on this assumed status of
R.76 A second tradition, developed by Schepers,77 instead elevates P on
the ground that it represents a later stage of treatment of the disputed
questions and so has preference over B. On this view, R represents, not
an authorial redaction, but a mutilated version of even later develop-
ments made previously in P. As the sole non-mutilated (i.e., relatively
complete) early version of a relatively late stage (and so authoritative)
redaction, P deserves more attention than R and B.78 Gelber tends to
discount this view also, and adduces other reasons (in terms of the
details of the pecia system) to explain the variations existing among the
manuscripts; it is due to the piecemeal availability of portions of long
texts that we see disorder and incompleteness in, for example, the Royal

folios, and contains Holcot’s complete Sentences commentary (ff. 4r–194v) as well. Gel-
ber and Tachau completed their work earlier and thus were not able to examine this
witness, although Tachau lists it for the Sentences commentary (Seeing the Future, p. 36).
Nevertheless, Gelber and Tachau remain the most recent in-depth studies.
73
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 3; Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 28. For
a table comparing the three manuscripts, question-title for question-title, see Gelber,
Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, pp. 113–17.
74
K. Michalski, “La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au
XIVe siècle,” Bulletin international de l’Académie Polonaise de Sciences et Des Lettres (Krakow
1928), pp. 125–33.
75
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 4.
76
Gillespie, “Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” pp. 485–6; Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of
Reason, pp. 3–8.
77
H. Schepers, “Holcot contra dicta Crathorn,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 77 (1970),
pp. 320–54, and 79 (1972), pp. 106–36.
78
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 8.

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manuscript.79 Rather than arguing for any one of these manuscripts

being authoritative, Gelber ends up using external and internal evi-
dence to argue through question by question, constructing a plausible
partial arrangement for the questions in the three quodlibeta.80 Tachau
proceeds in largely the same fashion, taking Gelber’s discussion as her
starting point.81
While all these authors make reasonable points and adduce plau-
sible and relevant evidence for their views, it is clear that in the end
each one approaches the text in part by feel, taking readings and
manuscript relations on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, it is clear that
this less grand approach is the right one, given the situation. The level
of detail, the dependencies and many assumptions involved in their
competing appraisals and explanations at the larger level eventually
become so ponderous that it is difcult to see who has more traction
in the debate. If we add to this that some of Holcot’s questions might
not have been originally part of any public determinatio, and hence not
even quodlibetal, since Holcot seems to have composed some of them
for inclusion in his Sentences commentary, we are faced with a bleak
outlook indeed.82 From these very skilled editors we have received as
good a version of Holcot’s text as we are likely to get in each case,
but very little weight can be rationally given to any general arguments
about the development of Holcot’s thought or career if they rely solely
on the overarching theories of manuscript relations discussed in the
sources noted above.
The attribution of these one hundred or so quodlibetal questions to
Robert Holcot is not seriously disputed. The tradition of attribution
is quite old; a handful of questions in the 1497 Lyons Determinationes
attributed (mostly correctly) to Holcot is taken in part from a manu-
script version of these very questions.83 I shall not take up space listing
the question titles; for details the reader can consult Gillespie’s helpful
enumeration of all the question titles for this material,84 and Gelber’s

79
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, pp. 9–11.
80
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, pp. 11–23. Tables 2 and 3 on pp. 116–17
collect these results for Quodlibeta I and III.
81
Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 31–5.
82
Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 21.
83
Gillespie, “Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” p. 482.
84
Gillespie, “Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” pp. 487–90.

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tables comparing question titles across manuscripts and offering partial

reconstructions of Quodlibeta I and III.85

Content
The one hundred or so questions Holcot determines reect much the
same proportion of topics as Chatton’s Quodlibet. Most questions involve
moral issues that were important at the time: sin, merit, grace, etc., for
example: “Whether Socrates should sin mortally if eternal life were to
follow from that sin,” “Whether souls leaving purgatory are grateful
for the penalty they paid there,” “Whether any venial sin diminishes
the habit of charity,” and “Whether the law of uncreated wisdom
obliges the wayfarer to impossibilities.”86 There are also the questions
on future contingents, one of which I discuss in detail below. Of course,
Holcot discussed other paradoxes of God’s knowledge that are linked
to the problem of foreknowledge and future contingents, for example
“Whether God can know more than He knows.”87
We also see in these question titles Holcot’s greater interest in bibli-
cal exegesis compared to either Ockham or Chatton. For example, he
asks “Whether the blessed Matthew correctly narrated the genealogy
of Christ” and “Whether the history of the conception of Christ is in
all respects true.”88 Similarly, the number of questions in one way or
another concerning the beatic vision reects an increased interest in
that topic compared to when Chatton and Ockham were at Oxford.
Questions on Christology and the Trinity are absolutely more numer-
ous than, but in proportion with, those in Chatton.
Not enough of Holcot’s Quodlibeta are edited for them to be useful
in pinning down his thought in any comprehensive way. However, an
interesting set of questions concerning future contingents has been
published, and I will discuss one or two issues in connection with those
questions, to highlight certain features of his treatment and to give a
glimpse of some of the philosophical substance therein.
Holcot’s treatment of future contingents shows close kinship with
that of FitzRalph, for example, in arguing that the contingent future

85
Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, pp. 113–17.
86
These are questions 32, 45, 66, and 75, respectively, from Gillespie’s enumeration,
“Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” pp. 487–90.
87
This is question 96 in Gillespie.
88
These are questions 3 and 4, respectively, in Gillespie.

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remains contingent even after revelation.89 In general, Holcot tries to

solve the dilemmas of future contingents by working the contingency
side of the equation; he is not, in general terms, a compatibilist, and
rather seems to accept that claims of necessity for revealed truths
would in fact destroy freedom, human or divine. His approach to these
questions exhibits the logical and semantic devices of the new English
theology, which was in full bloom during his time at Oxford.90
An example of this application comes in Quodlibet III, q. 3, which
asks “Whether this consequence is necessary: ‘God knows that a will
be, therefore a will be’, where ‘a’ signies a future contingent.”91 Hol-
cot thinks that the consequence is indeed necessary, but he attempts
to forestall the argument that might follow from it as a premise: for,
letting a stand for a future contingent, it seems that:

(i) if ‘God knows that a will be, therefore a will be’, is in fact neces-
sary, then
(ii) since the antecedent, ‘God knows that a will be’, is also necessary,
it follows that
(iii) the consequent, ‘a will be’, must be necessary as well.

But if every statement of the form ‘a will be’ is necessary, then the
contingency of the future seems lost.92
Wisely, Holcot does not dispute the rst premise. Rather, he focuses
his attention on (ii). The trick is to do this in way that does not com-
promise divine knowledge, for example, by making it look as though
God is somehow hazy about the future. Holcot’s overall strategy is
common; he tries to say that although God Himself is necessary, He
knows a in a contingent way: “We should say that this is contingent:
‘God knows that a will be’, because He knows that a will be in such
a way that He might never have known that a will be.”93 Nevertheless

89
A weaker position than, for example, Bradwardine. Tachau, Seeing the Future,
p. 49.
90
Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 269.
91
Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 73.
92
In terms of modern modal logic, this is simply an application of the K axiom and
modus ponens, i.e., by the K axiom we can go from the necessity of the consequence,
ß (p o q), to the necessity of both parts, (ß p o ß q). If the antecedent is also neces-
sary, ß p, we immediately have ß q. All normal modal logics, and hence most plausible
accounts of alethic modality, include the K axiom.
93
“Dicendum quod haec est contingens: ‘Deus scit a fore’, quia sic scit a fore quod
potuit numquam scivisse a fore.” Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 73.

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the execution of this common strategy is interesting: essentially, he

argues that the antecedent, ‘God knows that a will be’, when prop-
erly exposited, is seen to have two exponents: one necessary and one
contingent. This contingency, which is built into the antecedent, but
hidden within it, corrupts its overall necessity, and the argument above
is blocked at step (ii).
Does this gambit work? Holcot asserts that the proper exposition of
‘God knows that a will be’ is:

(a) God assents to this proposition: ‘a will be’, and

(b) it will turn out that a will be.94

Clearly (b), considered by itself, is contingent. This strategy appears

to work because it splits the necessity and the contingency that seem
bundled together in the claim that God knows (necessarily) what will (con-
tingently) happen, since, the division having been made, we see that the
contingency of the one pole spoils the apparent necessity of the entire
bundle.95
But it seems to me that we can easily raise the problem of future
contingents all over again using (a) and (b). Precisely what we need to
explain now, given (a) and (b) as an exposition of ‘God knows that a will
be’, is how it could be that God would assent to a proposition and yet
it would only be contingent that what that proposition says will come
true. For, let A be the proposition ‘a will be’. If God assents to A, then,
since He cannot be mistaken, it seems A must be true. The problem is
that God’s assent, on whatever ground it is given, once given makes A’s
falsehood entail a contradiction (‘God is mistaken’ is a contradiction);
which means that A cannot be false without contradiction; which means
A’s falsehood is impossible; which means A is necessary.
The original strategy is somewhat more successful if we consider
instead the general modal claim he makes, viz., that when a proposi-
tion has multiple exponents, if one of them is contingent the original
proposition is as well. With certain important qualications this claim
seems correct, and can be defended. Suppose that Holcot is saying:

94
“ ‘Deus scit a fore’ aequivalet isti copulative: ‘Deus assentit huic complexo: «a
erit», et ita erit quod a erit . . .’ ” Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 74.
95
This approach may have been pioneered by Chatton. See C. Schabel, Theology at
Paris, 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents
(Aldershot 2000), pp. 231–40, and 249.

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(i) p l (q š r)
(ii) ~ ß q › ~ ß r
(iii) therefore, ~ ß p

Here p stands for the proposition to be exposited, and q and r for two
exponents. Then, the argument is that if q and r together form the
exposition of p, and if either q or r is non-necessary, then p is non-neces-
sary as well. The argument will be valid, but only provided that premise
(i), the exposition, is itself necessary, i.e., provided we replace (i) with
the stronger claim ß [ p l (q š r)]. To see this, let us take it that one of
the exponents, say q, is non-necessary. So we have that ~ ß q. But this
means that there is a possible world in which q is false. Call this world
ƣ. Now, since q is false in ƣ, we could reason by virtue of (i), p l (q š r),
that p is false in ƣ as well, in which case we would have the desired
conclusion, ~ ß p. But this will only work if p l (q š r) is also true in
ƣ. But since ƣ is otherwise arbitrary, the truth of p l (q š r) cannot be
established in ƣ except generally, and not generally unless p l (q š r)
is true in every possible world and so is necessary; i.e., ~ ß p cannot
be established unless we have that ß [ p l (q š r)]. Similar reasoning
will work if we take the other alternative in (ii), ~ ß r.96 Thus Holcot’s
strategy is committed to the view that expositions hold necessarily, or
at least that this exposition holds necessarily. This might be plausible,
given certain views of language and truth. But notice that the specic
claim he needs here is very strong; it must be true not only that he
has given a plausible or proper exposition of ‘God knows that a will
be’, rather, it must also be true that this particular exposition necessarily
exposits ‘God knows that a will be’. For so strong a claim as this we
get no evidence from Holcot.

John of Rodington

Who else determined quodlibeta around this period? What we know of

fourteenth-century English theology suggests that every Oxford master

96
This argument for the invalidity of Holcot’s original argument is very informal, and
is so expressed for ease of reading; however, a formal counter-model can easily be given
to show the argument as written is invalid. Similarly, the formal validity of my amended
argument is easily shown in any normal modal logic, and indeed for some weaker modal
logics as well, so long as they contain the schema [ß (A š B) o (ß A š ß B)].

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would have determined some quodlibetal questions, but the survival of

written Oxford quodlibeta from 1322–34 is less than we might expect.
In addition to the three theologians discussed above there is only one
other major gure who requires some discussion, John of Rodington.
However, for the sake of completeness, before discussing Rodington, a
few gures whose quodlibeta came a little before Ockham deserve brief
mention. Only two very small quodlibetal collections are currently
known for John of Reading OFM (master in 1320, died after 1323
in Avignon); Quodlibet I, q. 4, has been edited.97 William of Alnwick
OFM (d. 1333) has an edited Quodlibet, probably delivered at Oxford in
1315–16.98 In roughly this same period, the Augustinian friar Richard
Wetwang gave a quodlibet that was recorded but does not now survive,
although it is not certain this was delivered at Oxford.99 Moreover,
Carmelite Godfrey of Cornwall (died after 1347) had a quodlibet of
unknown date, which we no longer possess, but which was cited by
fellow Carmelite John Baconthorpe.100
One nal, difcult case should be noted. Adam Wodeham refers to
a Grafton, who was once thought to be Edmund Grafton OFM (died
after 1336).101 But Wodeham’s reference is possibly rather to a John
Grafton (or Crafton) OP. John Grafton/Crafton is known only for his
currently unedited Quodlibet in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbiblio-
thek, lat. 5460, ff. 32rff. Two clear attributions testify that the question
“Utrum ex puris naturalibus homo possit habere certam cognitionem
de aliqua veritate” (f. 32ra) is quodlibetal and authored by “Iohannis
Crafton.” There follows another question, “Utrum Deus cognoscat
distincte omnia quae potest producere” (f. 32vb), which makes a refer-
ence back to the rst. Hence these two quodlibetal questions at least

97
Sharpe, Handlist, p. 300; Glorieux II, p. 184; Emden, A Biographical Register,
p. 1554; E. Longpré, “Jean de Reading et le B. Jean Duns Scot,” La France Franciscaine
7 (1924), pp. 99–109. Quodlibet I, q. 4, is edited in M. Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatorius
des Thomas Anglicus II (Münster 1930), pp. 286*–307*. C. Balimhas a transcription of
a passage from Quodlibet I, q. 3, in Ratio criticae editionis operum omnium I.D. Scoti (Rome
1941), pp. 106–8. For some biography see especially Longpré, “Jean de Reading,”
pp. 101–4.
98
Sharpe, Handlist, pp. 745–7; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 27. Alnwick’s Quod-
libet is in Quaestiones disputatae De esse intelligibili et De quodlibet, ed. A. Ledoux (Bibliotheca
Franciscana scholastica medii aevi, 10) (Quaracchi 1937), pp. 179–605. See also W.O.
Duba’s chapter in this volume.
99
Sharpe, Handlist, p. 519; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 2027.
100
Sharpe, Handlist, p. 150; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 489.
101
Sharpe, Handlist, p. 107.

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are plausibly attributable to Grafton/Crafton. But following these

two questions are eight more, before the text switches to a Sentences
commentary by William Crathorn.102 The authorship of these eight
is still in doubt, and at least one of them might belong to Crathorn
himself; indeed, it seems possible that all ten of these questions really
just belong to Crathorn, i.e., it may be that Crafton = Crathorn, and
there is no John Grafton/Crafton at all.103 The problems here bear an
obvious connection to those surrounding the dates for Holcot’s Sentences
commentary, as discussed above, and are yet to be fully solved. The
difculties of this case are further compounded by the fact that John
Grafton does not seem to have an independent biography; he does not
even appear in Emden.
It is important and remarkable to note that there really are no surviv-
ing fourteenth-century Oxford quodlibeta after those of Holcot.104
The textual situation for the Quodlibet of John of Rodington OFM
(or Rodyngton, ca. 1290–1348) is somewhat better.105 His Quodlibet is
not extensive, nor is the modern scholarship on it; it remains mostly
unedited, as does much of his Sentences commentary.106 We have from
him a few questions which circulated as the Quodlibet de conscientia, a
work with only one partial critical edition, despite the existence of six
manuscript witnesses:107

102
Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 15–17.
103
Richter, who described the manuscript, seems to believe this, contra Tachau. But
Tachau gives convincing content-based arguments against the thesis. See V. Richter,
“Handschriftliches zu Crathorn,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 94 (1972), pp. 445–9;
Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 15–17; Sharpe, Handlist, pp. 107 and 259.
104
Courtenay mentions Thomas Claxton (c. 1413) and Geoffrey Herdeby (c. 1358)
as two later examples of Oxford authors of quodlibeta. But Herdeby’s Quodlibet is only
attested, and Claxton’s collection of seven disputed questions may or may not be
quodlibetal. Even if they are, their singularity underlines, rather than undermines, the
overall point being made here. See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 45 n. 54; Sharpe,
Handlist, pp. 125 and 650; W.J. Courtenay’s “Postscript” below.
105
Sharpe, Handlist, pp. 303–4; Emden, A Biographical Register, pp. 1583–4.
106
However, this is changing. For example, C. Schabel and R.L. Friedman, “Trini-
tarian Theology and Philosophical Issues III. Oxford 1312–1329: Walsingham, Gray-
stanes, Fitzralph, and Rodington,” CIMAGL 74 (2003) (pp. 39–88), pp. 80–8 (edition
of I Sent., d. 11).
107
The discussion in Glorieux II, p. 185, is brief. In this same place he mentions that,
in addition to the Quodlibet de conscientia, the Paris manuscript follows with a list of ve
further quodlibetal questions on faith, also attributed to Rodington. But Sharpe makes
no mention of this; see Handlist, p. 304. A longer discussion of the manuscripts and
content, as well as a partial edition, is found in J. Lechner, “Johannes von Rodington
OFM und sein Quodlibet de conscientia,” Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte;

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(1) Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco 106 (129r–146v)

[Lechner’s A]
(2) Brugge, Grootseminarie (Bisschoppelijke Bibliotheek) 41/133 (145r–
164r) [Lechner’s BS]
(3) Brugge, Openbare Bibliotheek 503 (1r–20v) [Lechner’s BSt]
(4) München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 22023 (1r–17) [Lechner’s
Clm]
(5) Paris, BnF lat. 15561 (230r–243r, 244v–245v) [Lechner’s P]
(6) BAV, Ottob. lat. 179 (1r–24v) [Lechner’s O]
A note following the tabula quaestionum in A (f. 146vb) relates that
Rodington himself organized the Quodlibet into six main questions,
but that there were many subquestions: “Nota quod in istis 6 quaes-
tionibus principalibus de quolibet quaeruntur multae aliae quaestiones
secundariae, quas aliqui intitulant ut principales, sed hic ponuntur ut
magister Iohannes de Rodinghton Anglicus ordinavit. Sed non est cura,
quia totum quod est ibi et hic et e converso. Valete.” The questions
concern human free will, sin, grace, God’s relationship to human evil,
predestination, reprobation, and conscience. The question titles are as
follows:108

1. Utrum aliquis necessario vel involuntarie possit offendere Chris-

tum.
2. Utrum omnis peccans offendat Christum.
3. Utrum Christum semper offendat, qui conscientie sue erronee se
conformat.
4. Utrum existens in gratia possit esse perplexus inter duo peccata.
5. Utrum omne peccatum sit malum.
6. Utrum gubernator humani generis juste gubernat genus huma-
num.109

Rodington is recorded as the 56th Lector of the Oxford Franciscan

convent, 1333–34, the same year he incepted,110 and the explicit in
A has “Explicit Quodlibet fratris Iohannis de Rodingthon, doctoris

Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet, A.
Lang, ed. (Münster 1935), pp. 1125–68.
108
Lechner, “Johannes von Rodington OFM und sein Quodlibet de conscientia,” pp.
1139–40.
109
The wording of this question title is slightly different in some manuscripts, but
the meaning is the same in each case, and the manuscripts substantially agree on the
text of the question.
110
Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 1583.

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 oxford QUODLIBETA from ockham to holcot 691

in theologia, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum,” so we can assume that the

Quodlibet was magisterial and held at Oxford.
Relying on A, BS, BSt, and O, Lechner attempted a partial edition
of question 6. In the edited portion, one nds Rodington citing Anselm
to solve the question of how predestination relates to divine accepta-
tion, and citing Ockham’s (“per Magistrum”) discussion of voluntas
beneplaciti, particularly antecedens versus consequens,111 to explain how an
omnipotent will may in some sense be frustrated. Ockham himself says
his view is just the common opinion, so it is not clear why Rodington
cites Ockham in particular here, without also calling it the opinio com-
munis. Indeed, the edited portion of the work shows in several places
a reliance on connotation theory and Ockham-style semantic solutions
to theological puzzles. It is difcult to make any rm judgments from
the meager amount of edited material, but it seems that one possible
explanation for the popularity of this work might lie in its clear, brief
treatment of gripping questions, and its tendency to summarize popular
authorities.

Transition and Decline

To conclude this study, some discussion of the shift away from record-
ing quodlibeta is in order.112 It should be clear from the preceding survey
that in Ockham’s, Chatton’s, and Holcot’s quodlibeta we see vital and
interesting source material, recording important stages of debates on
seminal topics. But they are also the last such collections we possess
for Oxford theologians; no Oxford quodlibeta after Holcot survive. Why
this abrupt decline?
Glorieux points out that this form of disputation had fallen into
some disfavor with Pope John XXII, who criticized the empty subtle-
ties of vain philosophy therein, which drew the masters’ minds away
from useful and edifying considerations of the canons and sacred
doctrine.113 Thus it could have been in part external pressure that led

111
See his commentary on the Sentences I, d. 46, q. 1. Ockham, Scriptum, eds.
G. Etzkorn and F. Kelley, Opera Theologica IV (St Bonaventure, NY 1979), pp. 670–6.
112
See also W.J. Courtenay’s “Postscript” in this volume.
113
Thus he quotes a letter from Avignon dated 8 May 1317: “. . . alii quoque
<magistri> solemnium disputationum et determinationum frequentiam consuetam ab
olim in Parisiensi studio praetermittunt; quidam actu regentes, qui tenerentur insistere
exercitio lectionum, litigiorum anfractibus et advocationum strepitibus, et forensibus

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to the abandonment of the genre. But it seems more likely that John
XXII was reecting on dissatisfaction that existed in the studia them-
selves. The strong reasons for the decline are more likely internal to
the university itself.
Regarding internal factors, Glorieux conjectures that in Paris at least
this form of disputation became so competitive for the masters that it
simply burned itself out from intensity.114 Certainly this explanation may
also apply to Oxford. The evolution of the genre at Oxford parallels in
relevant particulars the evolution and demise on the continent.
Courtenay mentions a trend for including the results of disputations
and determinations into Sentences commentaries themselves, which would
make it unnecessary to publish and circulate them separately.115 Hence
it is possible that the rise of Sentences commentaries is a partial cause
eclipsing the motivation for circulating quodlibeta. But why the shift to
Sentences commentaries in the rst place? One hypothesis, based on
this study and so well illustrated in Ockham’s Quodlibeta, is that the
interdependence of particular personalities in quodlibetal disputes
made them difcult to understand in isolation from larger debates,
which debates were initiated early in a scholar’s career in his Sentences
commentary. Since quodlibeta of this complexity and interdependence
made less and less sense outside the larger context of the Sentences
commentaries upon which they depended and which appeared rst in
the career path, perhaps it made less and less sense to publish and to
circulate them independently.
Whatever the causes of the decline, it is clear that, with the excep-
tion of Rodington’s small set from 1333–34, Ockham’s collection was
the last to be widely circulated; in contrast to Holcot’s popular Sentences
commentary, the Dominican’s quodlibetal questions seem not to have
circulated or even to have been cited in his time; and Chatton’s col-
lection, while important for our modern understanding of him and of
Ockham, may not to have been all that important when it was written.116
The written quodlibetal genre never reconstituted itself in England in
the form it had in the golden days.

occupationibus se involvunt; quidam etiam theologi, postpositis vel neglectis canonicis

necessariis, utilibus et aedicativis doctrinis, curiosis, inutilibus et supervacuis philoso-
phiae quaestionibus et subtilitatibus se immiscent, ex quibus ipsius studii disciplina dis-
solvitur, luminis eius splendor offenditur, et postsequens studentium utilitas multipliciter
impeditur . . .”; Glorieux I, p. 57.
114
Glorieux I, pp. 56–7.
115
Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 252.
116
Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 251–2.

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 POSTSCRIPT: THE DEMISE OF
QUODLIBETAL LITERATURE

William J. Courtenay

In the rst volume of his masterwork on quodlibetal literature, Palé-

mon Glorieux limited his survey to Parisian masters of theology and
set the range of dates for his subject as 1260 to 1320, specically from
Gerard of Abbeville through Peter Auriol.1 Glorieux acknowledged
that the list of thirty-one authors surveyed in that work, along with
nine anonymous collections, was undoubtedly incomplete and that
this form of disputation could be found outside the faculty of theol-
ogy as well as outside Paris. His second volume, which included an
additional eighty-six authors along with further quodlibetal questions
from authors listed in the rst volume, also expanded the survey to
include England.2 The expanded number pushed the earliest evidence
for the genre back to Alexander of Hales in the 1230s but extended
it by only a decade, to roughly 1330. Glorieux believed that the genre
was abandoned in the early fourteenth century because it had lost its
importance to masters, who came to prefer other forms of disputation.3
He attributed the decline partly to papal pressure, citing John XXII’s
demand that Parisian masters of theology avoid involving themselves
in useless and unnecessary philosophical questions and subtleties, but
mostly to the statutory evidence that quodlibetal disputations by the
middle of the fourteenth century had become an exercise among
bachelors of theology in which masters no longer played an important
or active role. Glorieux provided examples for the continuation of the

1
Glorieux I.
2
Glorieux II.
3
Glorieux I, pp. 56–7: “ce genre de dispute tant devenu trop classique, trop connu,
ne pouvait plus sufre aux maîtres qui souhaitaient, pour se faire valoir à leur juste
mesure, une manifestation plus brillante encore. Et comme l’introduction dans les
premières années du XIVe siècle de nouvelles formes de dispute, la sorbonnique entre
autres, semblait répondre plus adéquatement à ces désirs, le quodlibet perdit de son
importance et de sa vogue; les maîtres commencèrent à s’en détacher; la belle époque
du quodlibet toucha ainsi à sa n, et la décadence s’annonça. Il est à remarquer en
effet qu’après 1320 on ne rencontre plus d’importantes collections de quodlibets . . .”

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694 william j. courtenay

genre by masters outside Paris, for example, in the fteenth century in

the faculty of arts at the University of Heidelberg, or by the lector at
the Franciscan convent in Besançon.4 The last quodlibeta he included
for Parisian masters of theology were those of John Baconthorpe and
Gerard of Siena in 1330, and that of Bernard Lombardi, a Domini-
can who incepted around 1331. James of Pamiers also composed his
quodlibetal questions around the same time, certainly after 1329 and
probably in 1332.5 Finally, it has now been argued that the last three
quodlibeta of the Dominican John of Naples, regent master at Paris in
1315–17, should be dated to Christmas 1332 and afterwards, but they
were apparently held at Naples, not at Paris.6
Glorieux acknowledged that references to disputations de quolibet
at Paris and elsewhere can be found later in the fourteenth century,
including the revisions of the statutes of the faculty of theology at
Paris in 1366 and 1389. But the fact that disputations de quolibet were
mentioned there only in reference to the obligations of bachelors of
theology was, for him, evidence that it had become an exercise among
formed bachelors rather than a magisterial exercise.
In the remarks that follow, I want to reexamine the evidence for
the claim that masters of theology ceased participation in quodlibetal
disputations in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. Did
quodlibetal disputations become primarily or solely a scholastic exercise
among bachelors that, like their commentaries on Scripture during
their time as cursores or baccalaurii biblici, were rarely thought worthy of
dissemination in written form? And if, as the written evidence suggests,
quodlibetal literature dies out in the early fourteenth century, why and
how did that happen?
First, the statutes for the faculty of theology at Paris make clear that
quodlibetal disputations remained part of the theological curriculum

4
Glorieux II, pp. 20, 309. There were also quodlibetal disputations in the faculty
of arts at Paris that appear to have continued later in the fourteenth century; see
O. Weijers, La ‘disputatio’ à la Faculté des arts de Paris (1200–1350 environ) (Turnhout 1995),
pp. 106–8; Weijers, La ‘disputatio’ dans les Facultés des arts au moyen âge (Turnhout 2002),
pp. 52–8, including her discussion of the quodlibeta in natural philosophy attributed to
Nicole Oresme.
5
Glorieux II, pp. 64–5 (Bernard Lombardi), 97–8 (Gerard of Siena), 142–3 ( James
of Pamiers), and 150–1 ( John Baconthorpe). On these see also the chapters by Friedman,
Schabel-Courtenay, and Schabel (Carmelites) in this volume. The decline of published
quodlibeta in the faculty of theology at Paris is also remarked on in Wippel, “Quodlibetal
Questions,” pp. 202–3.
6
See Friedman’s chapter in this volume.

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 postcript: the demise of quodlibetal literature 695

into the fteenth century.7 And just as bachelors took part in such dis-
putations in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries as respondentes
whose role became almost invisible in the published determinatio of the
master, so the statutory requirement that formed bachelors respond in
disputations de quolibet does not necessarily mean that masters no longer
participated in such exercises. Every formed bachelor, even if his aca-
demic obligations no longer required the close supervision of a specic
regent master, was part of an academic order that was dominated by
regent masters on whom his ultimate licensing and inception depended.
Quodlibetal disputations remained part of curricular expectations in the
fourteenth and fteenth centuries, and there is no more reason to believe
that magisterial participation was totally absent in this later period on
the grounds of the absence of published magisterial quodlibeta than to
argue that formed bachelors had no role in earlier quodlibetal disputa-
tions because they are all but invisible in the determinations published
by the masters. This type of disputation required the participation of
both bachelors and masters, and although all bachelors were obliged
to respond at least once de quolibet, there was never any requirement
that every master had to participate. This is why fourteenth-century
statutes speak about quodlibetal disputations in the context of the
requirements for licensing and inception in theology; it was never a
requirement for each and every master. Obviously, the system would
not work without the participation of some masters, but those masters
most closely involved in the supervision and promotion of their junior
colleagues were probably sufcient to meet the requirements.
One must also keep in mind the difference between what took place
as an academic exercise and what was “published” in written form. The
absence of an explication of the actual text of Peter Lombard’s Libri
Sententiarum in fourteenth-century commentaries on the Sentences is not
evidence that such a preliminary explanation was not provided by the
bachelor to his student audience along with the questions he posed and
attempted to answer. The fact that the commentaries of Bonaventure
or Thomas Aquinas in their disseminated manuscript form retained the
explication of Lombard’s text and most fourteenth-century commen-
taries did not should not be used as evidence for a major shift in what
took place in the classroom. Whether or not the text of Lombard was
itself expounded by fourteenth-century bachelors, only the questions

7
CUP II, pp. 692–3, 700–3.

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696 william j. courtenay

they treated were thought worthy of publication. Similarly, the absence

of published quodlibetal disputations by masters in the decades after
1330 should not be taken as evidence that masters no longer conducted
or participated in such exercises. The manuscript evidence reveals what
masters thought worthy of publication; it does not reveal all that went
on in the faculty of theology during the academic year. What one can
conclude from the written evidence is that masters, to the extent that
they continued to play a role in such disputations, chose not to take
the time to write up a nal determination or disseminate it in a form
that identied it as the result of a quodlibetal disputation.
From the standpoint of the written evidence, some bachelors by
the third decade of the fourteenth century were publishing their own
quodlibetal disputations. The quodlibetal questions of William of Ock-
ham are the best-known example, but Robert Holcot’s Quodlibeta, with
their references to fellow socii, suggest that many of those also resulted
from Holcot’s period as a formed bachelor.8 An earlier example of
quodlibetal disputations by a bachelor of theology are those of Peter
John Olivi.9
It may well be that quodlibetal questions, whether those of a regent
master or of a formed bachelor, were incorporated into the revised
edition of the commentary on the Sentences that an author prepared
before and sometimes after his inception as master. Stephen Brown
has suggested that this was already happening in the 1320s.10 Rather
than publish two works, a commentary on the Sentences and quodlibetal
determinations, it became more efcient to blend them into one work, or
to publish as separate treatises questions that originated out of a quod-
libetal disputation. This may well be why, in the case of the Dominican
Raymond Bequini, one manuscript of his Treatise on Apostolic Poverty,
Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Iglesia Catedral 28 (ff. 33r–47v: “Utrum

8
Guillelmi de Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, ed. J.C. Wey, Opera theologica IX
(St Bonaventure, NY 1980). On Holcot’s Quodlibeta, see H. Schepers, “Holkot contra
dicta Crathorn,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 77 (1970), pp. 320–54, and 79 (1972), pp.
106–36; W.J. Courtenay, “A Revised Text of Robert Holcot’s Quodlibetal Dispute on
Whether God is Able to Know More than He Knows,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
53 (1971), pp. 1–21; Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot,
eds. P. Streveler, K. Tachau, H. Gelber, and W. Courtenay (Toronto 1995); and Rondo
Keele’s chapter in this volume.
9
See Sylvain Piron’s chapter in volume I.
10
S.F. Brown, “Walter Chatton’s Lectura and William of Ockham’s Quaestiones In Libros
Physicorum Aristotelis,” in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter, W.A. Frank and G.J. Etzkorn,
eds. (St Bonaventure, NY 1985) (pp. 81–115), p. 93.

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 postcript: the demise of quodlibetal literature 697

Christus et apostoli habuerunt bona temporalia in communi quantum

ad proprietatem et verum dominium”), has an explicit stating that it
is part of his “rst Quodlibet”: “Et tantum de questione quolibetali de
quolibeto primo Raymundi Bequini. Amen.” The fact of circulation
under different titles is revealing and suggests that what originated as
a quodlibetal disputation was published as a treatise.11
Interest in publishing the results of quodlibetal disputations seems to
have continued slightly longer in England than it did at Paris, where
none can with certainty be dated later than 1332.12 Examples from
Oxford are the quodlibetal questions determined by John of Rodington
ca. 1333, Robert Holcot around 1335, and those of William Crathorn
and/or Johannes Grafton or Crafton around 1336.13 But even there,
publishing scholastic work identied as quodlibetal in origin disappears
before 1340.14 Elsewhere the story is similar. The lone example of the

11
On Raymond Bequini see Friedman’s chapter above. Walter Burley presents
a different situation: one manuscript refers to a group of questions written after he
commented on the Sentences at Paris as a treatise “de comparatione specierum,” and
another manuscript refers to the same questions as “questiones determinate a magistro
Gualtero dicto Burleo de quolibet.” Likewise his “Quaestio de instanti” has an explicit
in BAV, Vat. lat. 3066 (f. 54r), citing it as a “questio disputata per Burleum in suo quo-
libet Teolosse.” But these texts are also part of or connected to Burley’s Tractatus primus
and Tractatus secundus respectively and probably originated before he became master
of theology, in the second case while master of arts at Toulouse. See also A. Maier,
Ausegehendes Mittelalter I (Rome 1964), p. 475–6.
12
Gerard Odonis determined a question at Paris in December 1333 that he described
as quodlibetal (“in nostra disputatione de quolibet”); see Glorieux II, pp. 312–13, and
Guiral Ot, La vision de Dieu aux multiples formes. Quodlibet tenu à Paris en Décembre 1333, ed.
and transl. with introduction by C. Trottmann (Paris 2001). Although the text seems
to have been delivered in a university context at a time appropriate for quodlibetal
disputations, namely Advent, and Odonis was a Parisian master of theology who had
incepted in 1328 or 1329, he was not regent at the time but was the Minister General
of the Franciscan Order and a papal legate. Moreover, this was a single disputed ques-
tion of extraordinary length (53 folios), not one question within a group that would
constitute the quodlibet. Consequently it is quodlibetal only in the loosest meaning of
that term. See also William Duba’s chapter in this volume.
13
On the date of Rodington’s regency at Oxford, see W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wode-
ham. An Introduction to his Life and Writings (Leiden 1978), pp. 82–3, and Rondo Keele’s
chapter in this volume. On the Dominicans Crathorn and Grafton/Crafton, see
Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn”; F. Hoffmann, Crathorn: Quästionen zum ersten
Sentenzenbuch. Einführung und Text (Münster 1988); and H. Gelber, It Could Have Been
Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden
2004), pp. 87–91, 98–102.
14
The Augustinian Hermit Geoffrey Herdeby composed quodlibetal questions at
Oxford ca. 1358, but they are not known to have survived; see Glorieux II, p. 318.
His questions on the Sentences, however, were recently recovered; see A. Tabarroni,
“Nuovi testi di logica e di teologia in un codice palermitano,” in Filosoa e teologia nel

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698 william j. courtenay

Dominican Herman or Hartman de Augusta, whose Quodlibeta stem

from the order’s Cologne convent in the early 1350s, is instructive: he
held at least six quodlibeta, which shows that the oral activity was thriv-
ing, but only fteen questions of Quodlibet IV and eleven from Quodlibet
VI survive, and in a single witness.15
Could the decline in the preservation of quodlibetal literature have
resulted in part from a shortening of the time of regency, especially for
those for whom the papacy intervened with the chancellor of Paris on
behalf of numerous formed bachelors in the mendicant orders? The
answer is negative. The phenomenon of doctores bullati was a means by
which individual mendicants could bypass the long waiting time for
licensing and inception. The mendicant orders, through their various
studia, produced more bachelors of theology than could be promoted at
Paris through normal procedures. Just as some mendicant scholars were
allowed to read the Sentences during the summer vacation in addition
to the bachelors who had been appointed to read in the preceding or
following years, so too the promotion to master by papal intervention
was usually in addition to the candidate who was licensed and incepted
in the normal way. Moreover, the most active period of papally inu-
enced promotions in the rst half of the fourteenth century occurred
under John XXII and Clement VI, and the former ponticate coincided
with a period in which participation in and publication of quodlibetal
disputations was still very much alive.
The gradual disappearance of published quodlibeta in the second
quarter of the fourteenth century coincides with the gradual appear-
ance of principial questions (quaestiones collativae) of bachelors reading
the Sentences. In the period from 1320 to 1330 these questions, more
often than not, were imbedded among the questions of the Sentences,
but they could also be placed at the beginning or end of the questions
on the respective book of Lombard’s Sentences. In the second half of
the fourteenth century, whether attached individually to the books or
collected together as a group, they are identied as principial questions
rather than fused in with the other questions of the commentary. In
contrast to quodlibeta, however, they are not published as a separate

trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, L. Bianchi, ed. (Textes et Études du Moyen Age,
1) (Louvain-la-Neuve 1994) (pp. 337–66), pp. 341, 348–64.
15
In Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska 748. Quodlibet IV, qq. 6–7, were edited by
Z. Wlodek in MPP 6 (1960), pp. 28–50. See Quodlibase for a list of questions.

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work but appear with the commentary for which they were part of
the opening exercises.
There are a number of fteenth-century quodlibeta with theological
content, albeit at universities other than Paris. Oxford is presumably
the setting for the Dominican Thomas Claxton’s Quodlibeta (ca. 1413).16
From Louvain we have quodlibeta by Petrus de Rivo (1465 and 1469),17
Johannes Varenacker,18 and from the end of the fteenth century those
of Adrian Florensz Dedal of Utrecht (later Pope Hadrian VI)19 and
Johannes Briard of Ath;20 from Prague the Quodlibet of Jan Hus (1411);21
from Erfurt the Quodlibeta of Johannes Dorstein (1465/66);22 and from
Bologna (?) the Quodlibeta of Alexander Achillini.23
This last body of evidence suggests not only that quodlibetal disputa-
tions continued as a scholastic exercise among theologians throughout
the Late Middle Ages, but that in the fteenth and early sixteenth
century they were again thought worthy of preservation and dissemina-
tion. The almost total disappearance of quodlibeta at Oxford after the
mid-1330s coincides with a period of reduced productivity of Oxford
masters.24 The theological faculty at Paris, however, remained active
throughout the fourteenth, fteenth, and sixteenth centuries, which
means that the absence of extant quodlibetal questions from Parisian
theologians after the early 1330s can only be a result of a conscious deci-
sion on their part not to publish as quodlibeta the results of disputations
that may not have seemed as important as they once were viewed.

16
M. Grabmann, “Thomas de Claxton, O.P. (ca. 1400), Quaestiones de distinctione
inter esse et essentiam reali atque de analogia entis,” Acta Ponticiae Academiae Romanae
8 (1941–42), pp. 92–153.
17
The quodlibetal questions of Rivo were edited by Léon Baudry, La querelle des futurs
contingents (Paris 1950), pp. 70–8 (from 1465), and C. Schabel, “Peter de Rivo and the
Quarrel over Future Contingents at Louvain: New Evidence and New Perspectives,”
DSTFM 6 (1995) (pp. 363–473), pp. 416–45 (from 1469).
18
Editions: Louvain 1512; Paris 1544.
19
Editions: Louvain 1515 and nine others.
20
Editions: Louvain 1518; Paris 1527; Lyon 1547.
21
Magistri Johannis Hus, Quodlibet. Disputationis de Quolibet Pragae in Facultate Artium Mense
Ianuario Anni 1411 Habitae Enchiridion, ed. B. Ryba (Prague 1948).
22
Edited by J.B. Trapp as an appendix in R. Kestenberg-Gladstein, “The ‘Third
Reich’. A Fifteenth-Century Polemic against Joachism, and Its Background,” Journal
of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 18 (1955) (pp. 245–95), pp. 267–82.
23
Editions: Bologna 1494, Bologna 1506, and Venice 1545 (Opera Omnia). Apprecia-
tion is extended to Chris Schabel for compiling this list.
24
See W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton
1989), pp. 327–80.

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 APPENDIX

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY: AN ANALYTIC INDEX

Richard Cross

In what follows, I have attempted to provide an analytic index to the

huge number of quodlibetal questions on natural philosophy. The index
should be seen as supplementing those invaluable indices provided by
Glorieux (to all quodlibetal topics, at the end of each volume of his
repertorium)1 and Edward Grant (on specically astronomical topics,
covering a range of literature far wider than merely quodlibetal ques-
tions, and included at the end of his Planets, Stars, and Orbs).2 I have
made one very important methodological assumption throughout the
exercise, one that distinguishes my approach from those of Glorieux
and Grant. As Edith Dudley Sylla and others have argued, natural
philosophy in the age of scholasticism was inseparable from theological
issues and discussion:
In her investigations of later medieval natural philosophy, Anneliese Maier
studied theological as well as natural-philosophical works, but when she
used such texts she usually set aside the theological context of a discussion
in order to concentrate on topics of interest in relation to the later history
of science. To understand the dynamics of intellectual change in later
medieval natural philosophy it is essential, however, not only to retrieve
such discussions but also to look at the theological problems that gave rise
to them. It is sometimes debated whether medieval natural philosophy
was inherently theological (because it was essentially God-oriented) or, on
the other hand, whether it was completely dissociated from theological
concerns. It would seem, however, that the situation was more complicated
than either of these positions in its pure form would allow. Theology did
have a signicant inuence on medieval natural philosophy, but this did
not prevent natural philosophy from being scientic or from being good
philosophy . . . And sometimes the inuence ran in the other direction.
Masters teaching in theology faculties frequently called upon natural

1
Glorieux I, pp. 358–74; II, pp. 340–73. In the tables below I use “G” to refer to
this work.
2
E. Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200–1687 (Cambridge-New
York-Melbourne 1994), pp. 681–775.

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702 richard cross

philosophy to help resolve theological issues. There were thus “theologian-

natural philosophers,” who knew as much as anyone else about natural
philosophy as well as theology . . . [I]t [is] difcult to prove which context
was the controlling one. Nevertheless, it would appear that the motivation
for innovation often came from a particular theological problem, such as
that of giving what might be called a physically accurate account of the
transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ,
which was believed to occur, by God’s action, in the Eucharist.3
Sylla goes on to highlight transubstantiation and the “physics” (that
is, the location and motion) of angels as areas of particular interest.
Both of these have to do with the nature of space and extension. As a
cursory glance at the index below will reveal, there are plenty of other
cross-over topics too. (Very obvious cases are the questions of angelic
merit/demerit and of Mary’s Immaculate Conception in relation to
limit-decision problems.) So I have included below not just independent
questions on natural philosophy, but also theological questions the main
thrust of which involves discussion of an issue in natural philosophy. The
same point can be made, mutatis mutandis, for metaphysics or psychology
as well as for theology—so I have cast the net wide here, including too
questions in these areas that seem to have some relevance to natural
philosophy. And I have construed natural philosophy itself somewhat
broadly: not just obvious topics (place, space, the continuum) but every
aspect of change, substantial and accidental. In support of this, I claim
the warrant of no less an authority than Aristotle.4 So I have included
matter and form, following the lead of Aristotle’s Physics, and substance
and accident too. I have included each question just once, to allow a
quick comparison of the relative frequency of each topic.
By way of preface, I have added some very loose statistics on the
proportion of questions in each author that deal with scientic mat-
ters—statistics that I hope are despite their roughness nevertheless
informative.5 I have split the list into two somewhat arbitrary parts.
The rst includes authors with more than twenty questions in toto; the
second those from ve to twenty, included merely for interest. I have

3
E.D. Sylla, “Creation and Nature,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy,
A.S. McGrade, ed. (Cambridge 2003) (pp. 171–95), pp. 187–8.
4
See Aristotle, Metaphysics ƈ.1 (1025b3–1026a32); Physics 3.1 (200b12–14). On
the aims and scope of medieval physics, see M. Clagett, “Some General Aspects of
Medieval Physics,” Isis 39 (1948), pp. 29–44.
5
While nowhere near as detailed as the authorial analysis given by Grant in Planets,
Stars, and Orbs, pp. 766–74, the tables can be compared quite fruitfully.

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 appendix. natural philosophy: an analytic index 703

ignored authors with fewer than ve, and (for the sake of space) those
authors who include no questions on natural philosophy. The aim is to
provide statistics with some sort of meaning. Fewer than ve questions
in all seems too random, statistically, to be worth including; more than
twenty, however, begins to have some more generalizable signicance.
Quodlibetal disputations notoriously reect the interests of the audience.
But there are authors below in whom questions on natural philosophy
are strikingly present. This perhaps tells us something of the way in
which the audience perceived the presiding master, asking a master
whom they knew to have interests or abilities in natural philosophy to
determine on these sorts of questions. (It is of course possible to imagine
a malicious audience asking the master to determine on these sorts of
questions precisely because of his lack of ability; but we do not know
the extent to which the master retained the discretion to censor the
questions, and perhaps include in the disputation only those questions
that he found congenial. Either way round, the malicious audience seems
somewhat unlikely. Given censoring, an audience, whether sensible or
malicious, would only raise those questions that it thought likely to be
answered. And without censoring, every mischievous question is a block
on a genuinely more interesting topic.)6
How, then, did the audiences perceive their masters? I doubt one’s
antecedent expectations would have predicted the prominent position of
Nicholas Trivet. Mine, at any rate, did not. It was perhaps the shortness
of Scotus’s career that places him as low on the list as he is. Olivi is
surprisingly low too, until one remembers the fundamentally pastoral
context of his Quodlibeta. Doubtless, the presence of Giles of Rome and
William of Ockham so high in the listing is connected with an interest
in the impact of their very distinctive metaphysical systems on ques-
tions in physics. More generally, I leave the readers to draw their own
conclusions from an examination of the statistics provided.
Time did not permit updating the ratio tables based on discover-
ies and corrections made since Glorieux published his second vol-
ume, for example Walter Chatton’s Quodlibet, unknown to Glorieux.
Likewise, several anonymous quodlibeta have now been attributed to
named authors, and many of those of Hervaeus Natalis that Glorieux

6
On the minimal or non-existent control exercised by a master on the content of
the questions, see the absolutely invaluable account of theological quodlibeta provided by
Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” esp. pp. 165–6. See also L.E. Boyle, “The Quodlibets
of St Thomas and Pastoral Care,” The Thomist 38 (1974) (pp. 232–56), p. 240.

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704 richard cross

considered doubtful have now been securely assigned to him. I have

tried to incorporate some of these corrections in the analytical index,
however.7 Moreoever, it was not possible to compare the numbers of
questions in natural philosophy with those in metaphysics and psychol-
ogy. Even a cursory glace at the lists of questions provided by Glorieux
indicates that ethical questions constitute the largest single category. For
convenience I include in the index the dates of the various questions.8
Again, even a cursory glance reveals astonishing continuity in topics
raised over the one hundred or so years covered by the two volumes
produced by Glorieux.

7
For Chatton Hervaeus, see the chapters by Keele and Friedman respectively.
8
Generally, I follow Glorieux, though I have also used the following sources, among
others: J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work, trans. R. Royal (Wash-
ington, DC 1996); J. Gómez Caffarena, “Cronología de la ‘Suma’ de Enrique de Gante
por relación a sus ‘Quodlibetos’,” Gregorianum 38 (1957), pp. 116–33; J.F. Wippel, The
Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy
(Washington, DC 1982), pp. xxvii–xxviii.

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 APPENDIX I

AUTHORS OF TWENTY OR MORE QUESTIONS

Anon. 15 (G 2:293–4) 15/259 60% Gui Terreni 16/97 16.5%

Anon. 15 (G 2:295–6) 8/21 38.1% Matthew of 14/88 15.9%
Anon. 22 (G 2:300–1) 11/29 37.9% Aquasparta
John of Lana 10/28 35.7% Hervaeus Natalis, 10/63 15.9%
James of Viterbo 35/102 34.3% Qd. 1–410
Henry of Lübeck 23/71 32.4% Eustache (G 2:77–81) 10/65 15.4%
Vital du Four 15/47 31.9% Thomas Aquinas 40/263 15.2%
Giles of Rome 44/142 31% Thomas of Bailly 14/92 15.2%
Peter of Ang. 16/52 30.8% Godfrey of Fontaines 43/286 15%
(G 2:216–18) John Quidort11 7/48 14.6%
Giles (G 2:100–101) 10/33 30.3% Gerard of Bologna 10/69 14.5%
Nicholas Trivet 54/180 30% Peter de Trabibus 10/70 14.3%
Peter of England 22/75 29.3% Robert Walsingham 4/28 14.3%
Roger Marston 38/132 28.8% John Duns Scotus 3/21 14.3%
Remi of Florence 8/28 28.6% Peter of Saint-Denys 3/21 14.3%
Thomas Wylton 9/33 27.3% Anon. 12 (G 2:290) 3/21 14.3%
William of Ockham 46/170 27.1% Henry of Ghent 54/427 13.6%
Kikeley 10/38 26.3% Gueric of Saint- 9/78 12.6%
John of Naples 76/299 25.4% Quentin
Anon. 18 (G 2:297–8) 5/21 23.8% John of Pouilly 10/88 11.4%
Peter of Auvergne 25/106 23.6% John Pecham 15/139 10.8%
Thomas of Sutton 20/85 23.5% Raymond Rigauld 33/317 10.4%
Alexander of Hales 7/30 23.3% Ferrarius Catalaunus 2/21 9.5%
Bernard of Trilia 12/52 23% Peter John Olivi 8/92 8.7%
Richard of Middleton 17/80 21.3% Peter of Tarentasia 3/37 8.1%
Richard Knapwell 6/29 20.7% James of Thérines 3/41 7.3%
Ranulph of Homblières 8/42 19% Durand of 4/60 6.7%
William Peter of Falegar 11/60 18.3% St Pourçain
Adénulf of Anagni 4/22 18.2% Francis of Meyronnes 1/22 4.5%
Alexander of 4/22 18.2% Nicholas du Pressoir 2/49 4.1%
Alexandria Robert Holcot 3/89 3.4%
Anon. 7 (G 1:303–4) 5/29 17.2% Anon. 8 (G 1:305–06) 1/33 3%
John Baconthorpe 7/42 16.7% Gerard of Abbeville 8/272 2.9%
91011

9
I.e. 15 questions in natural philosophy from a total of 25 quodlibetal questions.
10
I include the remaining quodlibeta in the analytical index below.
11
38 of these 48 questions are probably those of Hervaeus Natalis.

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 APPENDIX II

AUTHORS OF FIVE TO NINETEEN QUESTIONS

Anon. 25 (G 2:304) 3/6 50% Prosper of Reggio 2/14 14.3%

Anon. 31 (G 3:307) 7/14 50% Emilia
Anon. 21 (G 2:300) 8/18 44.4% Gregory of Lucca 1/7 14.3%
Gerard of Sienna 7/18 38.9% Henry of Harclay 1/7 14.3%
James of Ascoli 6/16 37.5% John of Murrho 1/7 14.3%
William de la Mare 4/11 36.4% Anon. 27 (G 3:304) 1/7 14.3%
Anon. 35 (G 2:309) 5/14 35.7% Anon. 23 (G 2:302) 2/15 13.3%
Anon. 11 (G 2:289) 5/15 33.3% Peter Auriol 2/16 12.5%
William of Baro 2/6 33.3% Peter Thomas 2/16 12.5%
John Lesage 3/10 30% Berthaud of Saint 2/17 11.8%
William of Hothun 5/17 29.4% Denys
John (G 2:148) 4/14 28.6% Peter Swanington 2/17 11.8%
William of Wodeford 2/7 28.6% Adanulfe of Anagni 2/18 11.1%
Lawrence the Breton 3/12 25% Raoul the Breton 2/18 11.1%
Bertrand de la Tour 2/8 25% William of Alnwick 1/10 10%
Anon. 24 (G 2:303) 2/8 25% Eudes of Chateauroux 1/13 7.7%
John du Val 2/10 20% Amadeus of Castello 1/16 6.3%
Anon. 26 (G 2:304) 1/5 20% Sibert of Beka 1/16 6.3%
Bernard Lombardi 3/16 18.8% Gerard of Saint-Victor 1/17 5.9%
James of Aleus 2/12 16.7% Anon. 30 (G 2:306) 1/17 5.9%
Anon. 1 (G 1:296–7) 3/21 14.3% Henry of Germany 1/20 5%

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 APPENDIX III

ANALYTICAL INDEX OF QUODLIBETA12

The general headings are alphabetical; the arrangement within each

general heading is governed by content.

Accidents

Relation of accidents to substance

Dependence of accidents
Utrum inhaerentia vel dependentia sit de essentia accidentis. Giles, I.25 (? after 1325):
G 2:101
Utrum accidens dependeat a subjecto secundum essentiam suam vel per aliquid addi-
tum. John of Naples, IX.8 (? c. 1318–22): G 2:168

Accidents giving esse

Utrum Deus possit facere accidens in subiecto et non det esse subiecto. Gui Terreni,
II.7 (1314): G 1:171

Migration of accidents from substance to substance

Utrum in separatione animae a corpore spolietur corpus omnibus formis praecedentibus.
Bernard of Trilia, I.19 (1283): G 1:102
Utrum eadem accidentia numero maneant in generato et corrupto. Nicholas Trivet,
II.34 (1303): G 1:249

Numerically many accidents of same kind in one substance

Utrum sit possibile ponere plures et diversas formas accidentales differentes solo numero
simul in eodem subiecto indivisibiliter. Henry of Ghent, XV.6 (1291): G 1:199
Utrum plures formae intentionales numero differentes possunt esse in eodem subiecto
secundum eamdem partem simul. Peter of Auvergne, V.6 (1300): G 1:262
Utrum possibile sit per quamcumque potentiam realia accidentia plura numero eiusdem
speciei esse in eodem subiecto numero simili. Thomas of Bailly, III.6 (1303–04):
G 2:275
Utrum in eodem subjecto possint esse plures formae differentes tantum numero. Henry
of Harclay, II.1 (1314): G 2:134

12
J.T. Paasch, a research student at Oxford working on Ockham’s Trinitarian theol-
ogy, was responsible for the arduous task of entering all of this data, and for producing
a computer programme to facilitate this. I thank him for undertaking this otherwise
thankless job for me.

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Utrum accidentia ejusdem speciei possint simul inesse eidem subjecto. Thomas of
Wylton, I.6 (1312–13): G 2:279
Utrum plurima accidentia existentia in eodem subiecto distinguantur numero. James
of Aleus, I.11 (1285): G 1:210
Utrum Deus possit facere duo accidentia eiusdem speciei in eodem subiecto. Giles of
Rome, IV.1 (1289): G 1:144

One accident in many substances

Utrum diversa perfectibilia genere possit percere una et eadem perfectio. Giles of
Rome, VI.5 (1291): G 1:146
Utrum aliquod accidens possit esse in duobus subiectis. Giles of Rome, IV.9 (1289):
G 1:144
Utrum aliquod accidens unum numero possit esse in duobus naturis. Godfrey of
Fontaines, VI.5 (1289): G 1:157
Utrum virtute divina possit eri quod idem numero sit in diversis subjectis. Henry
Amandi, I.1 (1311–12): G 2:132

Contrary accidents in one substance

Utrum duae qualitates activae contrariae possint esse actu simul in eodem. Berthaud
of St. Denys, I.12 (1282): G 1:106
Utrum contraria possunt esse in eodem subjecto. Robert Holcot, III.11 (before 1349):
G 2:260
Utrum corpus hominis damnati in inferno possit simul esse summe calidum et frigidum.
Henry of Ghent, XII.11 (1288): G 1:195
Utrum corpus damnati simul et in eadem parte possit pati ab igne et frigore. Raymond
Rigauld, IV.24 (?): G 2:244
Utrum frigus et calor simul et semel sit in eadem parte corporis damnati. Anon 13,
I.3 (1255–75): G 2:291
Utrum corpora damnatorum in eadem parte possint pati a contrariis qualitatibus. John
Pecham, I.14 (1270): G 1:221
Utrum Deus possit facere unum corpus album et nigrum secundum eamdem partem
simul. Peter of Trabibus, II.2 (1296): G 2:231

Separated accidents

Separation possible by divine power

Utrum in Christo, quantum ad species sub quibus in sacramento altaris continetur, sint
accidentia sine subiecto. Thomas Aquinas, IX.5 (1266): G 1:286
Utrum Deus possit facere quod accidentia sint sine subiecto. Adenulfe D’Anagni, I.7
(1285): G 1:100
Utrum Deus possit facere quodcumque accidens sine subiecto. James of Viterbo, II.1
(1294): G 1:216
Utrum accidens virtute divina possit retinere terminos proriae essentiae sine subiecto.
Hervaeus, IV.9 (1308): G 1:204
Utrum Deus possit producere accidens sine subjecto. John of Naples, XIV.4 (?): G
2:162
Utrum Deus possit facere accidens sine subjecto. John of Lana, II.3 (1330s): G
2:154
Utrum maius miraculum sit facere accidens sine substantia quam substantiam sine
accidente. John of Naples, IX.9 (?): G 2:168
Utrum accidentia in sacramento altaris habeant proprie rationem suppositi. James of
Ascoli, I.10 (1311–1312): G 2:141
Utrum Deus possit facere propriam passionem sine subiecto. James of Therines, II.10
(1307): G 1:213

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Separation possible naturally

Utrum alicui accidenti conveniat per naturam habere esse sine subiecto. Godfrey of
Fontaines, I.20 (1285): G 1:152

Properties of separated accidents

Utrum accidentia quae sunt in sacramento sine subjecto nutriant. Vital du Four, II.9
(1295–96): G 2:282
Utrum hostia consecrata comesta possit nutrire. John of Naples, X.16 (?): G 2:169
Utrum duae albedines separatae a subjecto necessario essent una numero. John of
Naples, V.8 (?): G 2:163
Utrum si esset calor separatus haberet omnem perfectionem caloris. John of Viterbo,
II.4 (1294): G 1:216
Utrum tales hostiae consecratae habeant speciem in medio aeris. Peter of Trabibus,
I.8 (1295): G 2:230
Utrum forma separata, puta color aut albedo, habeat omnem rationem illorum quae sub
sua specie habent participari in subiecto. Henry of Ghent, XIV.3 (1290): G 1:198

Accidents and causal power

Utrum habitus virtutis sit principium elicitivum actus. John of Pouilly, I.11 (1307):
G 1:224
Utrum substantia sine omni accidente possit esse objectum visus. Raymond Rigauld,
IV.6 (?): G 2:244

Action/passion

Relation between action/passion and their subjects

Denition of action and passion

Utrum esse in hoc et esse ad hoc constituunt formaliter actionem et passionem. Nicholas
Trivet, II.30 (1303): G 1:249

Relation to agent/patient
Utrum actio sit in agente. Hervaeus, IV.4 (1308): G 1:203
Utrum actio sit in agente. John Baconthorpe, III.10 (1330): G 2:151
Utrum actio agentis differat realiter ab agente. Peter Auriol, I.2 (1320): G 1:255
Utrum actio ut actio sit in aliquo subjective. Kykeley, I.8 (Beginning of 14th century):
G 2:189
Utrum actio denominet agentem. John Baconthorpe, III.11 (1330): G 2:151
Utrum actio dicat eumdem respectum quem dicit agens. (Richard Conington (Anon
30), I.14 (?): G 2:306
Utrum actio creata, in quantum actio, sit forma inhaerens alicui. Nicholas Trivet, V.8
(1306): G 1:253
Utrum relatio causalitatis effectivae sit alia res a rebus absolutis. William Ockham,
VI.12 (1324–5): G 2:123
Utrum relatio calefactivi ad calefactibile sit res distincta a rebus absolutis. William
Ockham, VI.13 (1324–25): G 2:123

Variety of effects from one agent

Utrum agens particulare habeat per se aliquem effectum. James of Ascoli, I.14
(1311–12): G 2:142

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Utrum aliquod agens actione unica simul posset producere diversos effectus. Nicholas
Trivet, II.31 (1303): G 1:249
Utrum aliqua causa agens, omnino eadem, nullam habens diversitatem, possit inducere
diversos effectus. John Pouilly, I.4 (1307): G 1:224

Specication of action/passion
Utrum actio et passio sint idem re. Hervaeus (?), VII.13 (?): G 1:206, 2: 139
Utrum actio realiter differat a passione. Gui Terreni, II.3 (1314): G 1:170
Utrum actio et passio sint realiter unus actus. Gerard of Sienna, I.5 (1330): G 2:97
Utrum actio et passio sint diversa praedicamenta. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 16), I.8
(1310): G 2:295
Utrum praedicamentum actionis et passionis componatur ex conceptibus. William
Ockham, VII.4 (1324–25): G 2:124

Action and motion

Utrum actio et passio includant motum in sua ratione essentiali. Thomas of Sutton,
IV.14 (1287): G 1:296
Utrum operatio sit motus. John of Naples, VIII.10 (?): G 2:166

Action at a distance
Utrum unus angelus cognoscat alium loco distantem a se. William of Hothun (Odone),
I.7 (1280): G 1:175
Utrum agens possit agere in distans et non in propinquo. John of Naples, X.3 (?):
G 2:169

Alchemy

Utrum homo per artem possit facere verum aurum. Giles of Rome, III.8 (1288):
G 1:143

Astronomy

Heavenly bodies in general

Motion of heavenly bodies

Utrum corpora caelestia moveantur vel in pleno vel in vacuo. Nicholas Trivet, III.7
(1304): G 1:250
Utrum omnes spherae caelestes moveantur ad eamdem partem. Richard of Middleton,
I.10 (1285): G 1:268
Utrum corpora caelestia per suum motum causent aliquam harmoniam. Nicholas
Trivet, XI.19 (1314): G 1:254
Utrum aliqui orbes superiores moveantur velocius quibusdam. Nicholas Trivet, V.20
(1306): G 1:253
Utrum stella si poneretur in aere moveretur naturaliter an quiesceret. Vital du Four,
I.10 (1294–95): G 2:281

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An opinari possit sine periculo quod post communem resurrectionem luna magis lucebit
quam nunc sol, sol autem in septuplum quam modo luceat, corpora vero beatorum
septies magis sole. Anon 15, I.22 (1269–70): G 2:294
Utrum planeta sit continuus suo orbi. Henry of Lubeck, I.29 (1323): G 2:136
Utrum planetae moveantur secundum epicyclos. Nicholas Trivet, III.8 (1304):
G 1:250
Utrum sint ponendi excentrici et epicycli. Peter of England, III.23 (1305): G 2:215
Utrum in primis operibus Dei sit ponere motus excentricos et epicyclos. Henry of
Germany, I.6 (1306): G 2:131
Utrum orbis deferens corpus solis sit excentricus vel concentricus. Nicholas Trivet,
IV.23 (1305): G 1:252

Matter of heavenly bodies

Supposito quod in corporibus caelestibus sit materia, utrum sit eiusdem rationis cum
materia in istis inferioribus. Nicholas Trivet, V.19 (1306): G 1:253
Utrum omnium stellarum sit una materia. Anon 1, I.20 (?): G 1:298

Specication of heavenly bodies

Utrum corpora caelestia sunt eiusdem speciei. Nicholas Trivet, II.11 (1303): G 1:249
Utrum corpora celestia differant specie. Remi of Florence, II.7 (1303–04): G 2:253
Utrum superior orbis sit nobilior. John of Naples, II.8 (?): G 2:161

Animation of heavenly bodies

Utrum corpora celestia sint animata. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 17), q. 2 (1310):
G 2:297

Moon
Utrum cornua quae apparent in luna in novilunio sint ibi secundam existentiam vel
secundum apparentiam tantum. Peter of England, III.24 (1305): G 2:215

Earth
Utrum mundus sit sphericae gurae. Peter of Ang, I.8 (after Richard of Middleton):
G 2:216
Utrum sub equinoxiali sit habitatio. James of Viterbo, IV.8 (1295–1296): G 2:146
Utrum si minimus ignis secundum formam esset in centro terrae moveretur sursum.
James of Viterbo, IV.9 (?): G 2:146
Utrum yris fuerit ante diluvium. John of Naples, XIV.8 (?): G 2:162

Hell
An infernus sit in centro vel circa centrum terrae. Anon 15, I.19 (1269–70): G 2:294
An possit sciri distantia a supercie terrae usque ad infernum, supposito infernum esse
in centro vel circa centrum terrae. Anon 15, I.20 (1269–70): G 2:294
Utrum impii fruuntur solis luce in inferno. Gueric of Saint-Quentin, V.13 (1233–42):
G 2:110

Astrology
Utrum astrologus possit judicare de omnibus effectibus rerum inferiorum. Nicholas of
Lyra (Anon 16), I.14 (1310): G 2:295

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Utrum imagines quae unt per astrologos, secundum illorum scientiam habeant efca-
ciam in naturalibus, puta an annuli oblivionis quos Moyses dicitur fecisse habebant
virtutem oblivioni inducendi. Peter of Auvergne, I.14 (1296): G 1:259

Body, gloried/damned

Accidents of gloried body

Utrum in corpore gloricatorum sit color. Alexander of Hales, II.7 (1231–38): G 2:58
Utrum motus sit in corporibus gloricatis. Alexander of Hales, II.11 (1231–38):
G 2:59

Impassibility of gloried body

Utrum impassibilitas conveniat corporibus gloriosis per aliquam formam eis inhaerentem
vel per solam virtutem divinam eis assistentem, impedientem actionem cujuscumque
agentis nocivi. John of Naples, XIII.22 (?): G 2:172
Utrum impassibilitas corporis gloricati sit per aliquam qualitatem immanentem vel
per solam divinam virtutem assistentem. John of Naples, VIII.22 (?): G 2:166

Agility of gloried body

Utrum agilitas corporis gloricati sit sola carentia gravitatis. John of Naples, VIII.23
(?): G 2:166

Incorruptibility/corruptibility of gloried/damned body

Utrum corpora damnatorum erunt incorruptibilia. Thomas Aquinas, VII.11 (1265):
G 1:284
Utrum corpora damnatorum resurgent sine deformitatibus. Thomas Aquinas, VII.12
(1265): G 1:284
Utrum incorruptibilitas corporis damnati requirat aliquam causam positivam. Nicholas
Trivet, XI.18 (1314): G 1:254
Utrum corpora damnatorum sint corruptibilia. Ranulphe d’Homblieres, II.20 (1275):
G 1:266
Utrum dicere quod corpus Christi non potuit comburi sit incoveniens secundum dem.
Godfrey of Fontaines, III.6 (1286): G 1:153
Utrum Christus, si mortuus fuisset senio, fuisset secundum corpus putrefactus. Henry
of Ghent, XII.12 (1288): G 1:195

Causation

Causal cooperation

God’s activity
An Deus non potest nec vult movere aliquod corpus immediate. Anon 15, I.12
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An post opera sex dierum nullum corpus Deus moverit immediate. Anon 15, I.11
(1269–70): G 2:293
Utrum in actione cuiuslibet agentis concurrat actio primi agentis. Gui Terreni, VI.4
(1318): G 1:173

Can creature create?

Utrum aliquod agens creatum in agendo possit attingere substantiam primae materiae.
Henry of Ghent, XV.7 (1291): G 1:199
Utrum creare conveniat creaturae. Gerard of Abbeville, IX.1 (1266): G 1:119
Utrum aliqua pura creatura possit vel potuerit vel poterit, quecumque sit illa, sive
angelica sit sive alia, creare, quantumque fuerit illud minimum creatum, sicut musca
vel huiusmodi. Anon 9, I.6 (1278): G 1:321
Utrum potentia creandi possit communicari creaturae. Roger Marston, IV.3 (1285–86):
G 2:268
Utrum Deus possit communicare potentiam creandi creaturae. Giles of Rome, V.1
(1290): G 1:145
Utrum Deus posset conferre creaturae potentiam creandi. Hervaeus Natalis, VIII.2
(after 1304): G 2:182
Utrum Deus posset communicare potentiam creandi. Peter of England, III.4 (1305):
G 2:214
Utrum potentia creandi possit communicari creaturae. James of Ascoli, I.15 (1311–12):
G 2:142
Utrum creaturae possit communicari a Deo potentia creandi. Robert Walsingham,
II.5 (1313–14): G 2:263
Utrum Deus possit communicare creaturae potentiam creandi. John of Naples, VII.2
(1316–17): G 2:165
Utrum creatura potest creare. William Ockham, II.9 (1324–25): G 2:119
Utrum instrumentum attingat ad affectum principalis agentis. Giles of Rome, III.1
(1288): G 1:143

Causal cooperation between species

Utrum possibile sit quod duo agentia distincta specie concurrant eumdem effectum et
tamen unum non agat in alterum. Thomas of Bailly, III.4 (1303–04): G 2:275

Angelic activity in material realm

An angeli sint motores corporum celestium. Anon 15, I.1 (1269–70): G 2:293
An angeli sint motores corporum celestium. Anon 15, I.1 (1269–70): G 2:293
An angelus suo imperio potest movere totam molem terrae usque ad globum lunae.
Anon 15, I.4 (1269–70): G 2:293
An faber naturaliter possit movere manum ad malleum vel ad aliud naturaliter oper-
andum sine angelis moventibus corpora celestia. Anon 15, I.9 (1269–70): G 2:293
Utrum angelus possit formare de materia sensibili, ut de aerea, corpus humanum in
ultima necessitate dispositum ad animam rationalem. Gerard of Abbeville, XV.8
(1270): G 1:123
Utrum angeli possint agere in haec corpora inferiora. Thomas Aquinas, IX.10 (1266):
G 1:286

Efcient vs nal
Utrum nis sit causa realis effectus producibilis. Gui Terrani, III.2 (1315): G 1:171

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Backwards
Utrum possit Deus modo mundum istum facere antiquiorem. William de la Mare, I.2
(1274–75): G 2:117
Utrum Deus in hoc instanti posset facere mundum antiquiorem. Raymond Rigauld,
VI.1 (1290): G 2:246

Change, non-natural

Factual (Eucharist etc.)

Possibility of transubstantiation
Utrum transsubstantiatio panis in corpus Christi sit possibilis. Raymond Rigauld, V.23
(1290): G 2:246

Possibility of transubstantiation by natural power

Utrum per agens naturale possint species sacramentales in substantiam transmutari.
Roger Marston, II.9 (1283–84): G 2:266
Utrum operatio qua convertebatur cibus in corpus Christi, erat naturalis. Henry of
Ghent, XV.4 (1291): G 1:199

End terms of transubstantiation

Utrum materia panis maneat in sacramento altaris post conversionem. Henry of
Ghent, IX.9 (1286): G 1:191
Utrum substantia panis remaneat in sacramento. Raymond Rigauld, IX.13 (?): G
2:250
Utrum substantia panis manet post consecrationem. William Ockham, IV.30 (1324–5):
G 2:121
Utrum [corpus] sit ibi per conversionem panis in ipsum. Peter of Trabibus, I.5 (1295):
G 2:229
Utrum quantitas panis convertatur in corpus Christi. Durandus of Saint-Pourcain,
IV.4 (1315): G 2:74
Utrum Deus posset transmutare dimensiones panis in dimensiones corporis sui sicut
substantiam in substantiam. Richard of Middleton, II.3 (1286): G 1:269
Utrum in sacramento altaris vertatur quantitas in quantitate. Richard of Middleton
(?), IV.11 (?): G 1:272

Instantaneousness of transubstantiation
Utrum conversio substantiae panis in corpus Christi at subito an successive. Henry
of Ghent, III.7 (1278): G 1:181
Utrum conversio panis in corpus Christi sit subito vel successiva. Kykeley, I.7 (begin-
ning of 14th century): G 2:189

Transubstantiation and annihilation

Utrum in conversione panis in corpus Christi substantia adnihiletur. Bertrand de la
Tour, I.8 (1311–12): G 2:68
Utrum in transsubstantiatione panis in corpus Christi substantia panis annihiletur. Gui
Terreni, VI.10 (1318): G 1:174

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Change of Lot’s wife

Utrum conversio uxoris Loth in statuam salis esset naturalis. Peter of Ang, II.9 (after
Richard of Middleton): G 2:217

Counterfactual

Possible conversion of anything into anything

Utrum, supposito quod transsubstantiatio sit possibilis, quidlibet possit converti in
quolibet. Nicholas Trivet, III.3 (1304): G 1:250
Utrum Deus possit convertere quodlibet in quolibet. Anon 31, I.2 (1317–27):
G 2:307
Utrum Deus possit facere quidlibet de quolibet. Robert Holcot, III.5 (before 1349):
G 2:259

Specic examples of possible conversion

Utrum Deus posset transsubstantiare naturam spiritualem in substantiam corporalem.
Godfrey of Fontaines, V.1 (1288): G 1:155
Utrum Deus possit ex materia corrutibilis producere aliquod corpus incorruptibile.
Godfrey of Fontaines, V.2 (1288): G 1:155
An Deus possit species in Eucharistia convertere in aliquid praeexistens. John Duns
Scotus, I.10 (1307): G 1:219
Utrum creatura possit in creatorem converti. Gerard of Abbeville, XX.15 (?): G 2:93
Utrum aliqua creatura possit transsubstantiari in deitatem, puta panis in substantiam
deitatis Christi, sicut transubstantiatur in substantiam corporis Christi. Henry of
Ghent, XI.4 (1287): G 1:193
Utrum Deus possit convertere panem in divinitatem. Thomas of Sutton, IV.9 (1287):
G 1:296
Utrum Deus posset transsubstantiare aliud in se, sive utrum Christus secundum quod
homo posset transsubstantiari in verbum divinum. Peter of England, III.3 (1305):
G 2:214
Utrum in sacramento altaris vertatur quantitas in quantitate. Peter of Falco, I.11
(1280–81): G 2:126
Utrum Deus possit facere quod accidentia panis converterentur in accidentia corporis
Christi sicut substantia panis convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi. Thomas
of Sutton, IV.8 (1287): G 1:296

Change, substantial

In general

Substantial change is natural

Utrum corruptio sit a natura. Giles, I.11 (?): G 2:100
Utrum mors aliqua sit naturalis. John of Naples, IV.7 (?): G 2:162
Utrum productio alicuius creaturae sit possibilis alicui agenti creato vel increato. Vital
du Four, III.5 (1296–97): G 2:282

Of heavenly bodies
Utrum materia existente unius rationis in superioribus et inferioribus corporibus, sit
contradictio ex istis generari illa vel e contrario. Peter of Auvergne, III.17 (1298):
G 1:261

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Utrum corpus celeste possit converti seu transmutari virtute divina in corpus elementare.
John of Naples, XIII.25 (?): G 2:172

Role of angels/heavenly bodies in substantial change

An angeli sunt causa omnium quae naturaliter generantur et corrumpuntur in hoc
mundo. Anon 15, I.7 (1269–1270): G 2:293
Utrum generatio sit in istis inferioribus a primo mobili vel a motu planetarum in
zodiaco. Roger Marston, I.14 (1282–1283): G 2:265
An aliquid dicatur venire ad compositionem alterius duobus modis: uno modo per
essentiam suam, per modum principii materialis et formalis; et sic nullo modo aliquid
de natura corporis celestis venit in compositionem corporis humani vel aliorum corpo-
rum mixtorum. Secundo modo, venit ad compositionem alterius aliquid per effectum
suae virtutis; et hoc modo natura corporis celestis venit ad compositionem corporis
humani et omnium corporum mixtorum. Anon 15, I.23 (1269–70): G 2:294
Utrum caelum possit transmutare corpus humanum. John of Lana, II.12 (1330s):
G 2:154

Prime matter and substantial change

Utrum in omni generatione physica at resolutio usque ad primam materiam. Hervaeus,
IV.10 (1309–18): G 1:204
Utrum transmutatio aliqua posset eri sine subiecta materia. Henry of Ghent, VII.10
(1282): G 1:187
Utrum [sit] de natura materiae primae esse subjectum generationis. Roger Marston,
I.15 (1282–83): G 2:265

The mechanism of change

Utrum agens naturale agat transmutando id in quod agit vel per aliquid immissum ab
eo in passum. James Viterbo, III.14 (1295–96): G 2:145
Utrum aliquid possit adnihilari. Raymond Rigauld, III.12 (?): G 2:243

Corruption from internal agents

Utrum circumscripto omni agente extrinseco possit homo corrumpi. James Viterbo,
IV.22 (?): G 2:147
De rei naturalis corruptione naturali, circumscripta actione contraria continentis. Peter
of England, II.5 (1304–05): G 2:213

Examples of substantial change

Utrum causata a dissimilibus causis, ut calor qui causatur ab igne et motu, vel aliqua
quae generantur ex putrefactione et alia quae generantur per coitum, sint ejusdem
speciei. John of Naples, II.10 (?): G 2:161
Utrum motus ferri ad adamantem sit naturalis. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 21), I.14
(1300–10): G 2:300
Utrum variatio colorum in ovibus Jacob ad contemplationem virgarum in coitu, esset
naturalis. Peter of England, II.10 (after Richard of Middleton): G 2:217.
Utrum accidentia in sacramento convertant. Raymond Rigauld, IV.38 (?): G 2:245
Utrum amputata parte animalis annulosi, remaneat idem animal numero. Bernand of
Trilia, II.15 (1284): G 1:103
Utrum in qualibet parte animalis annulosi corporis decisi sit dare animam sensitivam
et motivam. Peter of England, II.3 (1304–05): G 2:213
Utrum via naturae possit generari vel eri nova species quae nunquam fuerit facta.
Giles of Rome, VI.8 (1291): G 1:146
Utrum si corpus Christi deponeretur a Verbo, corrumperetur. Vital du Four, II.4
(1295–96): G 2:281

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Procreation

Length of pregnancy
Utrum parturitio possit eri convenienter in 8 mense sicut t in 9 vel in 7. James of
Viterbo, IV.21 (?): G 2:147
Utrum mensis octavus sit bonae parturitionis. Henry of Lubeck, I.31 (1323):
G 2:136
Utrum masculus citius formetur in utero quam mulier. John of Naples, X.13 (?):
G 2:169
Utrum foetus possit vivere in utero matris existente matre mortua. James of Viterbo,
IV.20 (?): G 2:147

Causal power of semen

Utrum in semine quo organizatur foetus sit potentia animae. Gui Terreni, V.12 (1317):
G 1:173
Utrum in semine sit aliqua activa virtus ad generationem. Nicholas Trivet, IV.13
(1305): G 1:252
Utrum adveniente anima rationali corrumpatur virtus activa quae est in semine. Anon
31, I.7 (1317–27): G 2:307
An corpus spermatis cum quo exit spiritus qui est virtus principii animae est separatum
a corpore, et est res divina, et talis dicitur intellectus sic potest vel debet exponi, id est:
ille spiritus sive virtus formativa dicitur intellectus per similitudinem quia sicut intel-
lectus operatur sine organo, ita et illa virtus. Anon 15, q. 21 (1269–70): G 2:294

Causal power of mother

Utrum Beata Virgo aliquid active operata fuerit in formatione corporis Christi. Nicholas
Trivet, III.25 (1304): G 1:251
Utrum sanguis quem assumpsit a sanguine Virginis fuit de essentia Virginis. Nicholas
Trivet, V.5 (1306): G 1:252
Utrum virgo possit parere per naturam. Gueric of Saint-Quentin, V.8 (1233–42):
G 2:109

Compound (mixtum)

Do elements remain in compound?

Utrum forma specica consequens mixtionem sit substantia vel accidens. James of
Viterbo, IV.13 (?): G 2:146
Utrum mixtibilia sint actu secundum suas formas in mixto. Francis Caracciolo (Anon
22), q. 125 (1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum elementa maneant in mixto. William Ockham, III.5 (1324–25): G 2:120
Utrum miscibilia sint in mixto quantum ad suas formas substantiales. Hervaeus (?),
VII.21 (?): G 1:206; G 2:139
Utrum miscibilia sint in mixto quantum ad suas formas substantiales. Henry of Lubeck,
I.28 (1323): G 2:135
Utrum elementa agant et patiantur in mixto. John of Naples, IV.6 (?): G 2:162
Utrum elementa agant et patiantur in mixto. John of Naples, XI.8 (?): G 2:170

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Action and passion of compound

Utrum in mixto habente uniformitatem in partibus, possit esse actio et passio. Giles
of Rome, V.18 (1290): G 1:145
Utrum mixtum possit corrumpi ab aliquo intrinseco. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 16), q. 7
(1310): G 2:295

Elements and the human body

Utrum complexio Christi sic fuerit temperata quod elementa fuerint in eo mensurata
secundum pondus. James of Viterbo, IV.17 (?): G 2:147
Utrum in corpore hominis magis habundet terra et aqua quam aer et ignis. John of
Naples, XII.9 (?): G 2:171
Utrum corpus humanum constituitur immediate ex elementis. Peter of England, I.21
(1303–1304): G 2:213
Utrum ipsius [mixti] productio in loco habitationis humanae sit naturalis. Roger Mar-
ston, I.18 (1282–83): G 2:265

Condemnations

Utrum magister in theologia debet dicere contra articulum episcopi si credat oppositum
esse verum. Godfrey of Fontaines, VII.18 (1290/91 or 1291/92): G 1:158
Utrum licite possit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes con-
clusiones ejus. John of Naples, VI.2 (1315–16): G 2:164

Continuity

Continuum composed of points

Utrum Deus possit facere continuum compositum ex indivisibilibus. Thomas of Bailly,
III.3 (1303–04): G 2:275
Utrum linea componatur ex punctis. William Ockham, I.9 (1324–25): G 2:119

Continuum composed of minimal parts

Utrum in divisione quantitatis ex parte rei divisae sit naturaliter accipere minimum.
Nicholas Trivet, II.22 (1303): G 1:249
Utrum sit dare magnitudinem indivisibilem. Giles, I.10 (? (after 1325)): G 2:100
Utrum in corpore humano sit aliqua pars minima secundum speciem. James of Vit-
erbo, I.15 (1293): G 1:215

Unity of continuum
Utrum continuum, in quantum continuum, dicat aliquid praeter partes. Nicholas of
Lyra (Anon 18), q. 9 (1310): G 2:298
Utrum partes hostiae fractae differant realiter a seipsis prout sunt in hostia continua.
Thomas of Bailly, V.14 (1305–06): G 2:277
Utrum ferens intentionem suam supra dimidiam hostiam tantum, consecret. Raymond
Rigauld, IV.40 (?): G 2:245

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Utrum eri possit ab ipso sacerdote quod [consecratio] at in una parte hostiae non
divisae sine hoc quod at in alia. Peter of Trabibus, I.7 (1295): G 2:230
Si sacerdos intendat mediam hostiam consecrare tantum, utrum consecret totam vel
medietatem tantum. Vital du Four, II.7 (1295–96): G 2:282
Utrum hostia manente integra possit sacerdos unam partem hostiae consecrare non
consecrando aliam partem. Durandus of Saint-Pourcain, II.1 (1312–13): G 2:71

Creation

Continuity of creative act/passion

Utrum eadem sit actio qua Deus producit res in esse et qua conservat easdem in esse
per eiusdem esse continuationem. Godfrey of Fontaines, I.1 (1285): G 1:151
Utrum creatio sit actio perpetua. Alexander of Hales, I.5 (1231–38): G 2:57
Utrum Deus possit in uno instanti creare omne creabile. Bernard of Trilia, II.1 (1284):
G 1:103
Utrum Deus in aliquo instanti possit creare omne creabile. Raymond Rigauld, III.6
(?): G 2:243
Utrum omnia creata fuerint simul vel successive. Anon 7, q. 21 (?): G 1:304
Utrum Deus sciat primum instans in quo potuit mundum creare. Thomas Aquinas,
V.1 (1271): G 1:281
Utrum Deus sciat primum instans in quo potuit mundum creare. William de la Mare,
I.4 (1274–75): G 2:117
Utrum Deus potuit scire primum instans in quo potuit mundum creare. Matthew of
Aquasparta, IV.2 (1282): G 2:196

Creation as relation in creature

Utrum actio Dei productiva sit in producto. Gui Terreni, IV.4 (1316): G 1:172

Discontinuous Existence

Possibility of discontinuous existence

Utrum adnihilatum possit idem numero reparari. John of Naples, VI.7 (1315–16):
G 2:164
Si natura creata sit tantae virtutis quod possit reparare idem corpus numero. Nicholas
du Pressoir, I.5 (1273): G 2:202
Utrum natura possit idem numero reparare. James of Therines, I.10 (1306): G 1:212
Utrum Deus possit rem omnino in nihilum redactam eamdem numero reparare. Peter
of Tarentasia, I.32 (1264): G 2:227
Utrum Deus reparare possit idem numero quod in nihilum est redactum. Thomas
Aquinas, IV.5 (1271): G 1:280
Utrum archa resoluta et iterum reparata sit eadem numero. Raymond Rigauld, VIII.25
(?): G 2:249
Utrum Deus possit eumdem motum numero qui fuit reparare. Godfrey of Fontaines,
VI.2 (1289): G 1:157
Utrum Deus posset equum mortuum eumdem numero suscitare. Bernard of Trilia,
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Utrum corpus resurgat idem numero. Thomas Aquinas, XI.6 (1267): G 1:287
Utrum idem homo in numero possit resurgere, hoc est utrum eiusdem hominis in
numero t resurrectio. Ranulphe d’Homblieres, II.19 (1275): G 1:266
Utrum universo adnihilato Deus possit idem universum reparare de nihilo. Raymond
Rigauld, VIII.1 (?): G 2:249
Supposita secundum dem resurrectione, utrum de necessitate resurget idem homo
numero. Nicholas Trivet, III.37 (1304): G 1:251
Utrum sit de necessitate resurrectionis quod resurgens adsumat materiam eamdem
quam prius habuerit. Peter of Auvergne, I.19 (1296): G 1:259
Si corpus aliquod esset resolutum in cineres vel pulveres, utrum adveniente tempore
resurrectionis posset Deus illud corpus idem numero reparare et restituere ex aliis
pulveribus. Eustache, III.2 (1266): G 2:79
Utrum si anima in resurrectione resumeret alios cineres, esset idem homo numero qui
prius erat. James of Viterbo, I.21 (1293): G 1:216
Utrum corpora resurgentium resurgent ibidem ubi sepulta fuerunt. James of Viterbo,
I.22 (1293): G 1:216

Discontinuous existence and the problem of cannibalism

Utrum et in quo, si aliquis sit nutritus ex carnibus humanis, resurgant hujusmodi carnes:
an in comestis, an comedentibus. Giles of Rome, V.27 (1290): G 1:145
Utrum carnes comestae in aliquo resurgant in carne comedente vel in comesto. Henry
of Lubeck, I.9 (1323): G 2:135

Discontinuous existence of forms

Utrum eadem forma numero quae corrupta est possit iterato generari. Roger Marston,
I.16 (1282–83): G 2:265
Utrum forma possit redire eadem numero. Nicholas Trivet, III.14 (1304): G 1:250

Discontinuous existence and eucharistic species

Utrum si post conversionem substantiae panis in corpus Christi, dimensionibus rema-
nentibus, alia panis substantia crearetur sub illis, esset idem panis numero cum priore.
Godfrey of Fontaines, XI.2 (1295/96): G 1:162
Utrum substantia in corpus Christi conversa possit eadem numero reparari. Anon 26,
q. 2 (?): G 2:304

Christ’s blood in the resurrection

Utrum totus sanguis Christi qui in passione eius est effusus, ad corpus eius in resur-
rectione redierit. Thomas Aquinas, V.5 (1271): G 1:281
Utrum totus sanguis Christi in Christo resurrexerit. Raymond Rigauld, V.21 (?): G
2:246
Utrum totus sanguis qui fuit effusus in passione Christi redierit ad corpus eius in sua
resurrectione. John of Pouilly, IV.3 (1310): G 1:227
Utrum totus sanguis Christi effusus in passione fuerit in eo post resurrectionem. John
of Naples, XIII.5 (?): G 2:171
Utrum aliquid de sanguine eius [Christi] remanserit in terra postquam ascendit in
celum. Roger Marston, IV.14 (1285–86): G 2:268

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Dynamics

Utrum grave citius moveatur quando appropinqat ad centrum. Vital du Four, III.8
(1296–97): G 2:282
Utrum pondus rei in motu naturali intendatur ex approximatione ad terminum motus.
Nicholas Trivet, V.25 (1306): G 1:253
Utrum sagitta perveniens ad aliquod corpus impertransibile possit resilire posterius.
Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 18), q. 14 (1310): G 2:298

Elements

Fire
Utrum motus circularis supremae partis ignis sit naturalis. Francis Caracciolo (Anon
21), q. 13 (1300–10): G 2:300
Utrum ignis gehennalis sit corporeus vel incorporeus. Alexander of Hales, I.15
(1231–38): G 2:58
Utrum ex terra possit immediate generari ignis. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 16), q. 20
(1310): G 2:296
Utrum ignis possit infrigidari. John of Naples, XI.9 (?): G 2:170
Utrum ignis in sua sphera luceat et calefaciat. Giles of Rome, V.17 (1290): G 1:145

Air
Utrum aer possit inspissari. John of Naples, II.11 (?): G 2:161
Utrum aer manens in sua potestate possit transmutare corpora nostra. James of Vit-
erbo, IV.11 (?): G 2:146

Water
Utrum aqua naturaliter possit ascendere. Raymond Rigauld, IV.46 (?): G 2:245
Utrum tota aqua debeat esse naturaliter congelata. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 16), q. 19
(1310): G 2:295

Role of elements in universe

Utrum inuunt qualitates elementares in ista inferiora. Remi of Florence, II.8 (1304–05):
G 2:253
De innovatione mundi, quomodo elementa calore solvantur. Gueric of Saint-Quentin,
VI.4 (1233–42): G 2:110
Utrum ordine naturae aliqua forma praecedat in materia formas elementorum. Peter
of Auvergne, V.7 (1300): G 1:262

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Eternity of the world

Is the world eternal?

Utrum sit ponere mundum aeternum. Gerard of Abbeville, XIV.10 (1269): G 1:123
Utrum sit aliqua natura quae non incipiat sed desinat. Matthew of Aquasparta, VI.2
(1284–85): G 2:198

Possibility of eternal world

Utrum stante opinione Aristotelis de aeternitate mundi, Deus facere possit aliquid
eiusdem rationis. Gerard of Bologna, I.9 (1294): G 1:129
Utrum mundum non esse aeternum possit demonstrari. Thomas Aquinas, III.31
(1270): G 1:280
Utrum repugnet creaturae fuisse ab aeterno. Henry of Ghent, I.8 (1276): G 1:178
Utrum mundus sive aliqua creatura potuit esse vel existere ab aeterno. Godfrey of
Fontaines, II.3 (1286): G 1:152
Utrum Deus potuit facere mundum esse ab aeterno. Peter of Auvergne, I.7 (1296):
G 1:258
Utrum emanatio creaturarum immediate a Deo potuerit ess ab aeterno. James of
Therines, II.9 (1307): G 1:213
Utrum Deus potuit creare sive producere mundum ab aeterno in dispositione in qua
nunc est. Gerard of Bologna, III.3 (1296): G 1:130
Utrum omnia esse facta a Deo de novo, possit demonstrari. John of Pouilly, II.4
(1308): G 1:225
Utrum esse creatum a Deo et non incepisse esse sive esse non novum, repugnent ad
invicem vel non. John of Pouilly, V.4 (1312): G 1:228
Utrum Deus potuit fecisse mundum ab aeterno. William Ockham, II.5 (1324–25): G
2:119
Utrum Deus possit facere omne ab aeterno prius sine suo posteriori. John of Naples,
IX.3 (?): G 2:167
Utrum in tempore ratio inniti contradicat rationi praeteriti. Gerard of Sienna, I.12
(1330): G 2:98

Form, substantial

Possibility of form without matter

Utrum Deus potuit facere materiam sine forma et e converso. Gerard of Abbeville,
XX.19 (?): G 2:94

One form for all substances

Utrum sicut est rtealiter una materia omnium, sic sit realiter una forma omnium. Vital
du Four, II.13 (1295–96): G 2:282

Is there a highest created material form?

Utrum esset illa ultima forma in naturalibus de qua loquitur Commentator I Physico-
rum. Vital du Four, II.14 (1295–96): G 2:282

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Degrees of a substantial form

Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus. Henry of Ghent, IV.15 (1279):
G 1:182
Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus. Thomas of Sutton, IV.12 (1287):
G 1:296
Utrum forma substantialis possit intendi et remitti vel suscipere magis et minus. Peter
of Auvergne, III.7 (1298): G 1:260
Utrum forma substantialis suscipiat magis et minus. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 22),
q. 7 (1300–10): G 2:301

Forms, plurality of

In general
Utrum in composito substantiali sint actu ponendae plures formae substantiales. Anon
35, q. 4 (?): G 2:309
Utrum in quidditate rerum sensibilium materialium cadant plures formae substantiales
re differentes. Henry of Ghent, IV.13 (1279): G 1:182
Utrum formae praecedentes corrumpantur per adventum animae. Thomas Aquinas,
I.6 (1269): G 1:277
Utrum vegetativa et sensitiva cedant adveniente rationali. Matthew of Aquasparta,
III.5 (1280–1281): G 2:196
Utrum forma specica substantiae sit accidens vel substantia. Francis Caracciolo (Anon
21), q. 10 (1300–10): G 2:300
Utrum supposito quod in homine cum anima intellectiva sit tantum una forma alia,
utrum illa forma sit anima. Thomas of Bailly, II.7 (1302–03): G 2:274
Utrum sint eiusdem substantiae anima sensitiva et intellectiva. Thomas Aquinas, XI.5
(1267): G 1:287
Utrum anima vegetabilis et sensibilis educantur in esse per creationem. Thomas Aqui-
nas, IX.11 (1266): G 1:286

In human beings
Utrum homo habeat esse ab una forma substantiali vel a pluribus. Godfrey of Fon-
taines, II.7 (1286): G 1:153
Utrum sola anima intellectiva possit esse forma substantialis in homine. Henry of
Ghent, XII.10 (1288): G 1:195
Utrum, secundum ponentes in homine plures substantiales formas, oportet ponere in
ipso plures animas. Godfrey of Fontaines, X.10 (1294/95): G 1:161
Utrum sensitiva, vegetativa et intellectiva sint una forma. Francis Caracciolo (Anon
22), q. 17 (1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum supposito quod anima rationalis ut est forma corporis non extendatur nec per
se nec per accidens, oporteat in homine ponere plures formas substantiales. Gerard
of Bologna, III.7 (1296): G 1:131
Utrum vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum in homine sint una essentia vel plures.
Vital du Four, I.11 (1294–95): G 2:281
Utrum anima sensitiva et intellectiva distinguuntur realiter in homine. William Ockham,
II.10 (1324–25): G 2:119
Utrum anima sensitiva et forma corporeitatis distinguuntur realiter tam in brutis quam
in hominibus. William Ockham, II.11 (1324–25): G 2:119

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Utrum potentia nutritiva et augmentativa in Christo differant. Anon 25, q. 3 (?):

G 2:304
Utrum potentiae nutritiva, vegetativa et augmentativa differant realiter vel sint eadem.
John of Naples, IX.18 (?): G 2:168

Bodily form
Utrum forma corporeitatis sit materiae primae coaeterna. Anon 35,3 (?): G 2:309

Forms of organs
Utrum formae partium organicarum animalis distinguantur specie. William Ockham,
III.6 (1324–25): G 2:120

And death of body

Utrum corpus mortuum sit in aliqua specie. Raymond Rigauld, IV.23 (?): G 2:244
Utrum sit idem corpus numero vivum et mortuum. Peter of Ang, II.11 (After Richard
of Middleton): G 1:217
Utrum idem corpus numero maneat mortuum et vivum. Roger Marston, III.13
(1284–85): G 2:267
Utrum corpus hominis vivum et mortuum sit idem numero. Anon 32, q. 1 (after
1323): G 2:308

In Christ
Utrum de necessitate dei sit ponere in Christo aliam formam substantialem ab anima
intellectiva. James of Therines, I.4 (1306): G 1:211
Utrum in corpore Christi in morte fuerit aliqua forma substantialis. Hervaeus (?), VI.9
(?): G 1:205; G 2:139
Utrum sensitiva et vegetativa in Christo essent decuctae de potentia materiae. Roger
Marston, IV.9 (1285–86): G 2:268

Christ in triduum
Utrum dicere quod corpus Christi mortuum et alterius hominis mortuum fuerit corpus
aequivoce sit erroneum. Godfrey of Fontaines, III.5 (1286): G 1:153
Utrum Christus in triduo mortis fuerit idem homo. Thomas Aquinas, II.1 (1269):
G 1:278
Utrum corpus Christi consecratum in triduo mortis eius fuisset vivum an mortuum.
Henry of Ghent, II.4 (1277): G 1:179
Utrum corpus Christi in sepulchro habuit aliquam formam substantialem qua informa-
batur, anima eius ab ipso separata. Henry of Ghent, I.4 (1276): G 1:177
Utrum anima Christi separata, remansit aliqua forma in corpore eius. Henry of Ghent,
II.2 (1277): G 1:179
Utrum corpus Christi vivum et mortuum fuerit idem numero. Bernard of Trilia, I.5
(1283): G 1:102
Utrum corpus Christi idem fuerit mortuum et vivum. Roger Marston, IV.11 (1285–86):
G 2:268
Utrum incorruptionis corporis Christi fuit causa acceleratio resurrectionis vel conservatio
miraculosa alicuius formae quae prius erat in corpore vivo. Godfrey of Fontaines,
V.5 (1288): G 1:156

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Utrum in triduo mortis Christi verum fuit dicere quod Christus fuit in sepulchro.
Durandus of Saint-Pourcain, III.5 (1314): G 2:73
Utrum corpus Christi mortuum est adorandum. Bertrand de la Tour, I.7 (1311–12):
G 2:68
Utrum oculus Christi post mortem fuerit oculus aequivoce. Thomas Aquinas, III.4
(1270): G 1:279

Geometry

Utrum Deus possit facere duos angulos rectos quorum unus sit major alio. Francis
Caracciolo (Anon 19), q. 4 (1300–10): G 2:299

Heaven

Simplicity of heaven
Utrum caelum sit subiectum simplex. John Quidort, I.9 (1304): G 1:229
Utrum materia sit in celo. John of Lana, II.7 (1330s): G 2:154
Utrum caelum habeat materiam. Gerard of Bologna, I.13 (1294): G 1:129
Utrum caelum sit compositum ex materia et forma. Hervaeus, III.10 (1309–18):
G 1:203
Utrum coelum habeat materiam. Gui Terreni, V.10 (1317): G 1:173
Utrum substantia celi sit composita ex materia et forma. Anon 31, q. 4 (1317–27):
G 2:307
Utrum substantia caeli sit composita ex materia et forma. Anon 7, q. 4 (?): G 1:304
Utrum celum sit generabile et corruptibile. John of Naples, VIII.13 (?): G 2:166

Animation of heaven
Utrum celum sit animatum. Henry of Lubeck, III.7 (1325): G 2:137
Utrum celum sit animatum; vel, quod idem est, utrum intelligentia moveat celum sicut
anima ejus. John of Lana, I.4 (1330s): G 2: 153
Utrum ex anima celi et celo at magis unum quam ex anima humana et corpore
humano. Anon 25, q. 4 (?): G 2:304
Utrum intellegentia uniatur caelo quod movetur ab ipsa, in ratione formae et animae.
James of Therines, I.5 (1306): G 1:211
Utrum ex intelligentia movente celum et celo moto at unum essentialiter. Henry of
Lubeck, I.14 (1323): G 2:135
Utrum celum moveatur a forma sua. Anon 31, q. 5 (1317–27): G 2:307
Utrum celum moveatur a motore separato secundum esse. John of Naples, IX.11 (?):
G 2:168

Bodies above the heavens

Utrum angelus possit esse in convexo caeli empyrei. Thomas Aquinas, VI.3 (1272):
G 1:282
Utrum aquae sint super caelos. Thomas Aquinas, IV.3 (1271): G 1:280
Utrum positio theologorum in ponendo aquas supra rmamentum repugnet philoso-
phiae. John Baconthorpe, II.11 (1324–25): G 2:150

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Utrum Christus ascenderit super omnes caelos seu supra convexum ultimi caeli. Bernard
of Trilia, I.6 (1283): G 1:102
Utrum Christus ascendit super omnes caelos. Henry of Ghent, XV.2 (1291): G 1:199
Utrum Deus possit facere aliquem beatum ultra convexum celi empyrei. Francis Carac-
ciolo (Anon 19), q. 3 (1300–10): G 2:299
Utrum caleum empyreum habeat inuentiam super alia corpora. Thomas Aquinas,
VI.19 (1272): G 1:283

Place of heaven
Utrum ultima sphera hebeat esse ubi, sive sit in loco. Hervaeus (?), X.7 (?): G 1:208,
2:139
Utrum ultima sphera sit in loco. Henry of Lubeck, II.18 (1324): G 2:137

Size of empyreum
Utrum empyreum sit maximum corporum. Raymond Rigauld, IV.45 (?): G 2:245

Humours

Utrum humidum radicale possit restaurari. John of Naples, V.10 (?): G 2:163
Utrum sit ponere spiritum radicalem. James of Viterbo, IV.16 (?): G 2:147

Increase

Increase/decrease (incl. condensation/rarefaction)

Utrum in re augmentata sit signare partem auctam. Giles of Rome, IV.13 (1289):
G 1:144
Utrum in augmentatione naturali quaelibet pars animati secundum speciem et non
secundum materiam augeatur. Nicholas Trivet, IV.12 (1305): G 1:252
Utrum quaelibet pars aucti sit aucta. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 18), q. 13 (1310):
G 2:298
Utrum species in sacramento altaris possint condensari et rareeri vel non. Thomas
of Sutton, II.18 (1285): G 1:294
Utrum in sacramento altaris seu in accidentibus sub quibus existit sacramentaliter corpus
Christi, possit salvari motus augmenti nisi ponantur differre dimensiones terminatae
ab interminatis. James of Viterbo, III.17 (1295–96): G 2:145
Utrum membra principalia abscissa possint restaurari. Raymond Rigauld, IV.8 (1289):
G 2:244

Increase without extrinsic addition

Utrum semen de quo formandum corpus humanum, in semetipso possit multiplicari
sine additamento ab extrinseco, sicut dicitur de costa de qua formatum est corpus
Evae. Gerard of Abbeville, XVI.14 (1270): G 1:124
Utrum ex costa possibile fuit formari mulierem sine materiae additione. Henry of
Ghent, VII.9 (1282): G 1:187

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Utrum de costa Adae sine additione materiae, potuerit formari Eva. Giles of Rome,
II.11 (1287): G 1:142
Utrum Deus potuit formare corpus Evae de costa Adae absque additione alterius
materiae. Thomas of Sutton, IV.6 (1287): G 1:295

Nutrition

In general
Utrum caro secundum speciem unius hominis possit eri caro secundum speciem
alterius hominis. Nicholas Trivet, IV.16 (1305): G 1:252
Utrum calidum agat in humidum in animalibus et universaliter in hiis quae nutriuntur.
James of Viterbo, IV.14 (?): G 2:146
De nutrimento quod fuit per fructum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum in statu inno-
centiae: de nutrimento sive de modo nutriendi. Anon 11, q. 1 (rst half of 13th
century): G 2:289
Utrum ex cibo malo et intemperato possit generari sanguis purus temperatus. James
of Viterbo, IV.15 (?): G 2:147

Nutrition and bodily increase

Utrum illud quod nutritur semper augeatur. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 22), q. 24
(1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum comestione debeant proponi grossa aut subtilia. Richard of Middleton, II.17
(1286): G 1:269
Si nutritum augeretur vel etiam decresceret. Anon 11, q. 2 (rst half of the 13th
century): G 2:289

Conversion of food into truth of human nature

Utrum semen mediante quo contrahitur originale, sit de substantia generantis et non
de superuo alimenti. Ferrarius Catalaunus, I.8 (1276): G 1:109
Utrum alimentum convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae. Thomas Aquinas, VIII.5
(1267): G 1:285
Utrum aliquid nutrimenti convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae. Henry of Ghent,
II.10 (1277): G 1:180
Utrum alimentum convertatur in virtutem nutriti et specialiter hominis. John of Naples,
II.13 (?): G 2:161
Utrum qualitas nutrimenti maneat in nutrito. John of Naples, I.9 (?): G 2:160
Utrum elementum transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. Giles, I.12 (after 1325):
G 2:100
Utrum alimentum conversum in corpus Christi fuerit assumptum. Gerard of Saint-
Victor, II.2 (1312–13): G 2:96
Utrum caro secundum speciem unius hominis possit esse caro secundum speciem alterius
hominisJohn Peckham, II.8 (1269): G 2:175. Conversion of food after resurrection
Utrum Christus post resurrectionem vere comedit, cibum sibi incorporando. Thomas
Aquinas, III.5 (1270): G 1:279
Utrum aliquid nutrimenti convertatur in veritate humanae naturae in corpore resur-
gente. Gerard of Abbeville, VIII.12 (?): G 1:119
Utrum per generativam vel nutritivam aliquid de alimento convertatur in illud quod
resurget. Roger Marston, IV.26 (1285–86): G 2:269

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Indivisibles, reality of

Utrum instans dicat aliquid formaliter positivum. Peter Thomas, I.15 (1310–30?): G
2:229
Utrum indivisibile cuiuslibet continui sit aliquid positivum praeter ipsum continuum.
Nicholas Trivet, XI.22 (1314): G 1:254
Utrum Deus possit annihilare unum solum punctum lineae nitae, scilicet ejus princi-
pium vel terminum. John of Naples, X.6 (?): G 2:169

Innity

Nature of innity
Utrum innitum secundum quod innitum dicat privationem. Prosper of Reggio
Emilia, I.10 (1317–118): G 2:233

Innite by addition

Possibility of actual innite

Utrum Deus possit facere innita esse actu. Thomas Aquinas, IX.1 (1266): G 1:286
Utrum Deus possit facere contradictoria esse simul vera, et innita esse simul actu.
Thomas Aquinas, XII.2 (1270): G 1:289
Utrum Deus possit producere infinita in actu. William of Hothun, I.1 (1280):
G 1:175
Utrum Deus possit facere innitum in actu. Anon 31, q. 8 (1317–1327): G 2:307
Utrum Deus possit facere innitum in actu. Anon 7, q. 8 (?): G 1:304
Utrum Deus possit facere multitudinem innitam. William of Wodeford, I.2 (?):
G 2:128
Utrum posset producere in actu completo innitum sive multitudinem aliquam ali-
quorum entium innitam. Godfrey of Fontaines, X.2 (1294/95): G 1:161
Utrum Deus possit facere multitudinem innitam. Gerard of Bologna, II.2 (1295):
G 1:129
Utrum in numeris sit abire in innitum. Peter of England, III.22 (1305): G 2:215
Utrum, supposito quod Deus sit innitae virtutis, possit facere effectum innitum in
actu. Hervaeus Natalis, V.4 (1312–13): G 2:284
Utrum possit Deus facere innitam multitudinem suppositorum sub una specie. John
du Val, I.8 (1312–14): G 2:186
Utrum Deum possit facere innita differentia specie, aequaliter ab ipso distantia sim-
pliciter. Peter of Auvergne, I.2 (1296): G 1:258
Utrum aliquid praeter Deum possit esse innitum. John of Naples, X.1 (?): G 2:169
Utrum anima Christi possit scire innita. Thomas Aquinas, III.3 (1270): G 1:279
Utrum in Deo sit ponere aliquam innitatem idearum vel cognitorum. Henry of
Ghent, V.3 (1280): G 1:183
Utrum Deus scientia visionis cognoscat infinita. Bernand of Trilia, III.2 (1285):
G 1:104
Utrum Deus cognosceret innita. William of Alnwick, I.9 (1316): G 2:114
Utrum rationes in Deo endorum et possibilium eri sint innita. Roger Marston,
IV.4 (1285–86): G 2:268

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Equality of innites
Utrum unum innitum possit esse majus altero. Peter of Tarentasia, I.8 (1264): G 2:226
Utrum omnia innita sint aequalia. Gerard of Abbeville, XX.16 (?): G 2:93
Utrum unum innitum sit majus alio. John of Naples, X.2 (?): G 2:169
Utrum unum innitum possit esse maius altero. Anon 8, q. 8 (?): G 1:305
Utrum creatura simul cum Deo sit aliquid melius quam solus Deus. John of Naples,
XIII.26 (?): G 2:173
Utrum Deus possit producere in actu innita et plus quam innita. Remi of Florence,
II.3 (1304–05): G 2:253
Utrum intellectus divinus intelligat plura quam innita. Peter of Falco, II.2 (1281–82):
G 2:126
Utrum intellectus divinus intelligat plura quam innita. Richard of Middleton (?), V.2
(?): G 1:273

Qualitative innite
Utrum ponentes quod supra quamcumque creaturam datam Deus posset facere melio-
rem in innitum et quod caritas sit augibilis in innitum, ponant incompossibilia.
Nicholas Trivet, I.11 (1302): G 1:247
Utrum in augmento caritatis sit ponere terminum. Ranulphe d’Homblieres, I.16
(1274): G 1:265
Utrum caritas possit augeri in innitum. Henry of Ghent, V.22 (1280): G 1:184
Utrum in statu isto viae [caritas] possit augeri in innitum. Richard Knapwell, I.15
(1284–85): G 2:256
Utrum caritas possit crescere in innitum. Giles of Rome, I.18 (1286): G 1:141
Utrum caritas possit augeri in innitum. Godfrey of Fontaines, VII.12 (1290/91 or
1291/92): G 1:158
Utrum caritas in statu viae si non haberet terminum posset augeri in innitum. Giles
of Rome (?), VII.12 (?): G 1:148
Utrum caritas possit augeri in innitum propter considerationem solum rationis. Peter
of Saint-Denys, II.2 (1312–13): G 2:221
Utrum caritas possit augeri in innitum. John of Lana, II.11 (1330s): G 2:154
Utrum peccatum in creatura intellectuali incorporea secundum augmentum procedat
in innitum. Henry of Ghent, XII.7 (1288): G 1:195
Supposito quod supra quamcumque creaturam datam Deus posset facere in gradu
essentiali altiorem in innitum, utrum praetermissis mediis prout hic de mediis loqui
possumus, possit illam creare quae in innitum distat a quacumque creatura nunc
data. Thomas of Sutton, I.3 (1284): G 1:292
Utrum aliqua forma creata sit intensive et in se formaliter innita. Nicholas Trivet,
II.9 (1303): G 1:249
Utrum Deus possit subtilitatem corporis augere in innitum. Laurence the Breton, I.4
(1311–12): G 2:191
Utrum in aliquo nito sit dare potentiam innitam. Peter of England, III.10 (1305):
G 2:214
Utrum Deus possit quacumque creatura data producere nobiliorem in innitum. James
of Therines, II.5 (1307): G 1:213
Utrum Deus possit in innitum producere creaturam nobiliorem quacumque creatura
data. Hervaeus (?), VII.2 (?): G 1:205; G 2:139
Utrum absque repugnantia posset Deus facere in innitum quacumque creatura data
in perfectione nobiliorem. Anon 1, q. 6 (?): G 1:297
Utrum qualibet creatura data Deus posit facere inferiorem in innitum; et potest intelligi
de imperfecta ut est materia prima. Peter of Saint-Denys, I.5 (1311–12): G 2:221

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Innite by division
Utrum Deus potentiam continui qua est divisibile in innitum possit reducere ad actum.
Ferrarius Catalaunus, II.1 (1277): G 2:86
Utrum magnitudo naturalis sit divisibilis in innitum. Richard of Middleton, III.5
(1287): G 1:270
Utrum continuum possit dividi in innitum in partes aequales. Godfrey of Fontaines,
XV.19 (1303/04): G 2:104
Utrum Deus cognoscat omnes partes continui. John of Naples, XII.2 (?): G 2:171
Utrum Deus potentiam continui qua est divisibile in innitum possit reducere. Anon
6, q. 1 (?): G 1:302
Utrum Deus possit facere species innitas secundum omnem modum, scilicet ad
superius ut inter supremam creaturam et Deum, et ad inferius ut inter materiam
primam quae dicitur esse inma creaturarum et nihil, et in medio ut inter duas
species creatas. James of Viterbo, I.2 (1293): G 1:215
Utrum possit Deus facere innita secundum speciem differentia, inter inmam crea-
turam et non ens. Peter of Auvergne, I.3 (1296): G 1:258
Utrum Deus possit facere innita specie differentia inter supremam creaturam et ipsum.
Peter of Auvergne, I.4 (1296): G 1:258
Utrum inter duas species in universo Deus posset sic facere innitas. Peter of Auvergne,
I.5 (1296): G 1:258

Intensication and remission of forms

Reality of intensication and remission

Utrum aliqua forma accidentalis intendatur vel remittatur. Giles of Rome, II.14 (1287):
G 1:142
Utrum forma accidentalis intendatur et remittatur. Peter of Auvergne, III.6 (1298):
G 1:260
Utrum caritas suscipiat magis et minus. John Baconthorpe, II.4 (1324–25): G 2:150
Utrum qualitas recipiat magis et minus. Robert Holcot, III.10 (Before 1349):
G 2:260
Utrum aliquod accidens suscipiat magis et minus. Hervaeus (?), VI.11 (?): G 1:205;
G 2:139
Utrum rectitudo rationis, secundum id quod est, suscipiat magis et minus. John of
Pouilly, I.10 (1307): G 1:224
Utrum habitus infusa possit augeri. Henry of Ghent, V.19 (1280): G 1:184
Utrum caritas possit augeri. Richard Knapwell, I.14 (1284–1285): G 2:256
Utrum caritas quae est donum creatum possit recipere in se augmentum. Giles of
Rome (?), VII.10 (?): G 1:148
Utrum caritas possit augeri et minui. Thomas of Bailly, IV.11 (1304): G 2:276
Utrum caritas possit augeri. John of Naples, XIII.15 (?): G 2:172
Utrum caritas possit diminui cum effectu. Henry of Ghent, V.23 (1280): G 1:184
Utrum caritas possit diminui. Godfrey of Fontaines, XIV.17 (1298/99): G 1:167
Utrum caritas possit minui. Robert Walsingham, I.13 (1312–13): G 2:263
Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus . Thomas of Sutton, IV.12 (1287):
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Theories of intensication/remission

Intensication by degrees of essence

Utrum forma accidentalis suscipiat magis et minus per essentiam. Nicholas Trivet,
III.13 (1304): G 1:250
Utrum caritas per suam essentiam augeatur. Thomas Aquinas, IX.13 (1266):
G 1:286
Utrum accidentia suscipiant magis et minus secundum essentiam vel secundum esse.
James of Viterbo, II.3 (1294): G 1:216
Utrum caritas recipiat magis et minus secundum gradus in essentia. Anon 23, q. 7
(1306): G 2:302
Utrum in formis accidentalibus sint gradus quantum ad esse tantum vel etiam quantum
ad essentiam. John of Naples, I.5 (?): G 2:160
Utrum caritas possit minui secundum substantiam. Roger Marston, IV.35 (1285–86):
G 2:269
Utrum caritas sive quicumque habitus possit augeri per essentiam. Godfrey of Fon-
taines, II.10 (1286): G 1:153

Intensication by disposition of subject

Utrum caritas augeatur solum per meliorem dispositionem subjecti. William de la
Mare, I.8 (1274–75): G 2:117

Intensication by generation and corruption

Supposito quod in caritate sint gradus, utrum cum caritas intenditur gradus unus
intensus essentialiter corrumpatur. Thomas of Bailly, III.15 (1303–04): G 2:275

Intensication by addition
Utrum caritas augetur quoad habitum per aliquid sibi additum vel per alium modum.
Giles of Rome (?), VII.11 (?): G 1:148
Utrum caritas vel aliqua alia forma intendatur per aliquid novum inductum intrinsecum
ipsi formae. Kykeley, I.15 (beginning of 14th century): G 2:190
Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem novae caritatis. Robert Walsingham, I.12
(1312–113): G 2:263

Are remitted forms privations?

Utrum in augmento caritatis privatio minoris gradus habeat rationem termini a quo.
Gui Terreni, II.14 (1314): G 1:171
Utrum minus calidum opponatur perfecte calido solum privative. Thomas of Wylton,
I.10 (1312–13): G 2:279

Numerical identity of degrees

Utrum forma accidentalis intensa et remissa differant numero. Giles of Rome, VI.10
(1291): G 1:146
Utrum caritas aucta sit eadem in numero cum caritate praecedente. James of Viterbo,
II.19 (1294): G 1:217
Utrum caritas augmentata sit eadem numero quae prius. James of Therines, II.14
(1307): G 1:213
Utrum caritas aucta sit eadem numero cum precedente. Prosper of Reggio Emilia,
I.14 (1317–18): G 2:234

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Utrum qualitas intensa et remissa sit eadem numero. John (associated with John of
Naples, Giles of Rome), I.8 (?): G 2:148
Utrum aliqua forma numero possit esse terminus istorum motuum, scilicet motus inten-
sioris et motus remissioris. Kykeley, II.16 (beginning of 14th century): G 2:190
Utrum qualitas eadem numero suscipiat magis et minus. Thomas of Wylton, I.9
(1312–13): G 2:279

Indivisibility of degrees
Utrum gradus albedinis sint simpliciter indivisibiles. Thomas of Wylton, I.11 (1312–13):
G 2:279
Utrum latitudo huiusmodi graduum accipiatur secundum modum quantitatis continuae
et discretae, i.e. utrum sint aequalis perfectionis vel inaequalis. Thomas of Bailly,
III.16 (1303–04): G 2:275
Utrum cum unitate specica speciei atome alicujus qualitatis stet distinctio graduum
infra illam naturam sic unam. Thomas of Wylton, I.8 (1312–13): G 2:279
Utrum aliqua forma recipiat intentionem a parte subiecti quod tamen secundum se
consistit in indivisibili. Nicholas Trivet, V.24 (1306): G 1:253
Continuity of intensication
Utrum in qualibet alteratione sint innitae formae realiter differentes. Hervaeus, II.13
(1308): G 1:202

Specication of degrees
Utrum forma accidentalis intensa et remissa sit eadem specie. Giles of Rome, VI.9
(1291): G 1:146
Utrum qualitas intensa et remissa sint eadem specie. John (assoc with John of Naples,
Giles of Rome), I.7 (?): G 2:148

Light

Exists in the medium

Utrum lux corporalis educatur de potentia medii vel de nihilo. Francis Caracciolo
(Anon 22), q. 27 (1300–110): G 2:301
Utrum lumen educatur de potentia medii. Henry of Lubeck, III.19 (1325): G 2:137
Utrum lumen realiter sit in aere. Richard of Middleton, I.11 (1285): G 1:268
Utrum lux sit realiter in medio. James of Viterbo, IV.6 (?): G 2:146
Utrum lux in medio habeat esse reale vel intentionale tantum. Remi of Florence, I.6
(1303–04): G 2:253
An radii diversorum luminarium existentes in eadem parte aeris habeant ibi esse
distinctum. Peter John Olivi, III.6 (?): G 2:208
Utrum species habeat esse corporale in medio. Raymond Rigauld, I.8 (?): G 2:240
Utrum species rei in oculo sit realis. Peter of England, III.19 (1305): G 2:215
Utrum colores qui apparent in iride sint veri colores. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 18),
q. 10 (?): G 2:298

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As related to sight
Utrum visus at intussuscipiendo vel extramittendo. Roger Marston, I.19 (1282–83):
G 2:265
Utrum visio corporalis at per emissionem radiorum. Kykeley, I.10 (beginning of 14th
century): G 2:189
Utrum modica diversitas radiorum faciat diversitatem in effectu. Peter of England,
II.10 (1304–05): G 2:213
Utrum imago videatur in speculo vel res ipsa.Roger Marston, IV.24 (1285–86):
G 2:269

Permanent or successive
Utrum esse luminis sit in continuo eri aut habeat esse manens. John Peckham, II.7
(1269): G 2:175

Limit-decision problems

Existence for an instant

Utrum Deus possit creare angelum uno tantum instanti temporis permanentem. Roger
Marston, III.2 (1284–85): G 2:267
Utrum Deus possit facere creaturam uno solo instanti durantem. Vital du Four, III.1
(1296–97): G 2:282
Utrum Deus possit facere creaturam quae non duret nisi per unum instans. John
Quidort, I.6 (1304): G 1:229
Utrum aliqua creatura possit durare per solum unum instans. John of Naples, IX.7
(?): G 2:167
Utrum virtute divina possibile sit materiam sine forma per instans temporis vel duas
formas substantiales simul esse in eadem. Nicholas Trivet, I.6 (1302): G 1:247
Utrum forma per solum instans possit esse in subiecto. Gerard of Bologna, II.20
(1295): G 1:130
Utrum repugnet vel contradicat creaturae in quantum creatura agere in instanti; dato
quod at illuminatio in instanti, utrum illuminatio diurna hoc est quae durat per
totam diem, mensuretur sive at ex illuminationibus instantaneis sive indivisibilibus.
Vital du Four, III.7 (1296–97): G 2:282
Utrum in aliquod subjectum possit esse sub aliqua forma solum per instans. Anon 27,
q. 2 (?): G 2:304

Limit decisions
Utrum angelus potuit mereri et demereri in primo instanti. William Ockham, II.6
(1324–25): G 2:119
Utrum sit dare primum nunc in quo nimis laute expendens peccet mortaliter. Gerard
of Bologna, III.20 (1296): G 1:131
Utrum Deus simul posset infundere caritatem et augere eam. Hervaeus, II.6 (1308):
G 1:202
Utrum Beata Virgo fuerit sancticata in instanti creationis vel infusionis animae suae.
Hervaeus (?), VII.22 (?): G 1:206; G 2:139
Utrum Virgo Beata contraxerit originale sub mensura temporis vel instantis. Raymond
Rigauld, V.6 (?): G 2:245

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Utrum, supposito quod Beata Virgo fuit concepta in peccato originali, in eodem instanti
potuerit habere gratiam. Giles of Rome, VI.20 (1291): G 1:146
Utrum Beata Virgo posuit stetisse in peccato originali tantum per instans. William
Ockham, III.10 (1324–25): G 2:120
Utrum esset dare ultimum instans in quo Christus vivebat. Giles of Rome, IV.5 (1289):
G 1:144
Utrum in iusticatione impii simul in eodem instanti sit introductio, id est infusio gratiae,
et expulsio, id est remissio culpae. Bernard of Trilia, II.19 (1284): G 1:103
Utrum gratia sancticans fuit Beatae Virgini infusa in primo instanti suae creationis.
Thomas of Sutton, III.15 (1286): G 1:295
Utrum angelus in primo instanti potuerit esse in culpa, hoc est utrum in primo instanti
se potuit nimis amare. John Peckham, I.9 (1270): G 1:221
Utrum anima in instanti infusionis suae contrahat originale peccatum. Roger Marston,
II.14 (1283–84): G 2:266
Utrum angelus potest peccasse in primo instanti suae creationis. Nicholas Trivet, IV.11
(1305): G 1:252
Utrum angelus in primo instanti suae creationis poterit peccare mortaliter. John du
Val, I.5 (1312–14): G 2:186
Utrum angelus potuerit peccare in primo instanti suae durationis. John of Naples,
XII.5 (?): G 2:171
Utrum faba ascendens obvians lapidi molari descendenti quiescat. Richard of Middle-
ton, II.16 (1286): G 1:269

Naturally divisible temporal instants

Utrum duobus instantibus existentibus in tempore angeli respondeat unicum temporis
nostri. Henry of Ghent, XIII.7 (1289): G 1:197
Utrum Deus in hoc instanti posset facere mundum antiquiorem. Raymond Rigauld,
VI.1 (?): G 2:246
Utrum instans habeat rationem plurium signorum. Giles, I.9 (after 1325?): G 2:100
Utrum in eodem instanti sint plura signa. John (associated with John of Naples, Giles
of Rome), I.5 (?): G 2:148
Utrum in eodem instanti sub speciebus illis sit substantia panis et corpus Christi.
Thomas Aquinas, VII.9 (1265): G 1:284
Utrum in eodem instanti temporis possit dici quod sub illis speciebus est panis et corpus
Christi. Richard of Middleton, I.4 (1285): G 1:268
Utrum natura pure existens creata sit et non sit in eodem instanti. Anon 12, q. 6
(1265–1266): G 2:290

Matter

Reality of prime matter

Distinct from form

Utrum sit dare materiam primam. Peter of England, II.1 (1304–05): G 2:213
Utrum materia sit distincta a forma. Amadeus of Castello, I.8 (1313–14): G 2:60
Utrum probare materiam primam esse pertineat ad philosophiam naturalem. James
of Viterbo, IV.5 (?): G 2:146

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Separable from form

Utrum Deus possit facere materiam esse sine forma. Anon 13, q. 2 (1255–75):
G 2:291
Utrum Deus possit facere quod materia sit sine forma. Thomas Aquinas, III.1 (1270):
G 1:279
Utrum Deus potuit facere materiam sine forma et e converso. Gerard of Abbeville,
XX.19 (?): G 2:94
Utrum materia possit existere per se sine forma. Henry of Ghent, I.10 (1276):
G 1:178
Utrum Deus per innitam potentiam suam possit facere materiam esse sine omni
forma. John Peckham, III.1 (1277): G 2:177
Utrum possit facere materiam actu existere sine forma. Roger Marston, I.2 (1282–83):
G 2:264
Utrum Deus posset facere materiam actu sine forma. Bernard of Trilia, I.2 (1283):
G 1:102
Utrum Deus posset facere materiam primam actu existentem absque omni forma.
Roger Marston, IV.2 (1285–86): G 2:268
Utrum Deus possit facere materiam sine forma.James of Viterbo, IV.1 (?): G 2:146
Utrum materia possit eri in effectu sine forma. Kykeley, I.11 (beginning of 14th
century): G 2:189
Utrum materia prima possit conservari in esse sine omni forma. Thomas of Bailly,
I.5 (1301–02): G 2:273
Utrum Deus possit facere quod materia existat actu sine forma. Remi of Florence,
I.1 (1303–04): G 2:252
Utrum Deus possit facere quod materia existat actu sine forma. Remi of Florence,
II.1 (1304–05): G 2:253
Utrum Deus possit facere materiam esse sine forma. Hervaeus (?), VI.1 (?): G 1:205;
G 2:139
Utrum Deus possit facere materiam sine forma. John of Naples, VIII.7 (?): G 2:166
Utrum quocumque agente materia possit esse sine omni forma. Henry of Lubeck,
I.18 (1323): G 2:135
Utrum materia prima creata fuerit vel creari potuerit omnino informis sive carens omni
forma. Godfrey of Fontaines, I.4 (1285): G 1:151
Utrum Deus possit assumere materiam primam sine forma, in unitate suppositi. Peter
of Auvergne, IV.5 (1299): G 1:261
Utrum in reliquiis sanctorum, facta resolutione ad materiam, sit aliquid adorandum.
Peter of Auvergne, II.13 (1297): G 1:260

Prime matter lowest of beings

Utrum in causa materiali sit ponere statum. Peter of Ang, II.7 (after Richard of
Middleton): G 2:217
Utrum possit eri vel esse aliquod ens inferioris ordinis quam materia prima. Henry
of Lubeck, I.20 (1323): G 2:135

Matter and passive potencies

An potentia materiae sit eadem per essentiam cum materia cuius est. Peter John Olivi,
III.3 (?): G 2:208
Utrum privatio sit essentia materiae. Nicholas Trivet, II.8 (1303): G 1:249
Utrum materia sit ratio receptiva quantitatis continuae. Hervaeus, II.10 (1308):
G 1:202
Utrum materia prima sit sua potentia. Nicholas Trivet, V.22 (1306): G 1:253

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Utrum supposito quod privatio subtrahatur a materia et illa cedat in compositionem

alicuius compositi, illud compositum sit corruptibile vel incorruptibile. Francis Car-
acciolo (Anon 21), q. 12 (1300–10): G 2:300
Utrum possibilitas sit in entibus ex materia vel quia sunt ex nihilo. Raymond Rigauld,
III.11 (?): G 2:243
Utrum Deus posset facere aliquam creaturam inferiorem prima materia generalibium
et corruptibilium. Richard of Middleton, II.3 (1286): G 1:269
Utrum Deus possit percere omnem possibilitatem materiae. Raymond Rigauld, I.2
(?): G 2:240
Utrum relatio materiae sit relatio potentiae. Gui Terreni, III.4 (1315): G 1:171
Utrum possint esse duae potentiae pure passivae essentialiter distinctae. James of
Viterbo, III.16 (1295–96): G 2:145
Utrum materia possit esse pars essentialis alicujus corporis incorruptibilis per naturam.
Gregory of Lucca, I.6 (1310–11): G 2:106
Unity of matter
Utrum materia omnium habentium materiam sit una. Matthew of Aquasparta, II.9
(1279–180): G 2:195
Utrum omnium corporalium sit una materia. Willam of Hothun, I.17 (1280):
G 1:176
Utrum sit materia una numero in omni substantia eam habente. Giles of Rome (?),
VII.8 (?): G 1:148
Utrum circumscripto a materia omni respectu ad formam sit una materia omnium.
Francis Caracciolo (Anon 21), q. 11 (1300–10): G 2:300
Utrum sit omnium creaturarum communis materia. Gueric of Saint-Quentin, II.7
(1233–42): G 2:108

Grades of matter
Utrum in materia sint essentiales gradus sicut in forma. Giles of Rome, V.19 (1290):
G 1:145
Utrum in essentia materiae possit dari plus et minus. John of Naples, VII.5 (1316–17):
G 2:165

Matter and dimensions

Utrum sit ponere dimensiones interminatas in materia. Peter of Ang, II.8 (After Richard
of Middleton): G 2:217
Utrum in materia sit propria extensio sine quantitate. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 22),
q. 21 (1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum aliqua qualitas manet inseparabiliter in materia. Nicholas Trivet, III.11 (1304):
G 1:250
Utrum alia sit dimensio materiae et dimensio quantitatis. Hervaeus Natalis, VIII.10
(after 1304): G 2:182
Utrum materia existens sub quantitate habeat aliam extensionem ab extensione quan-
titatis. Nicholas Trivet, XI.21 (1314): G 1:254
Utrum in substantia corporea dimensiones indeterminatae praecedunt formam sub-
stantialem in materia. Peter of Auvergne, I.10 (1296): G 1:259
Utrum in materia generabilium praecedat aliqua dimensio formam quae inducitur.
Thomas of Wylton, I.17 (1312–13): G 2:279
Utrum in materia prima quacumque sit potentia passiva ad quamcumque extensionem.
Roger Marston, IV.23 (1285–86): G 2:269
Utrum extensio materiae sit alia ab extensione quantitatis qua est in materia. Thomas
of Sutton, III.17 (1286): G 1:295

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Matter-form composite

Form educed from matter

Utrum forma inducatur in materiam mediantibus aliquibus dispositionibus. Roger
Marston, I.17 (1282–83): G 2:265
Utrum in materia prima, virtute supernaturalis agentis, possit eri forma et species ad
quam non est in potentia naturali. Godfrey of Fontaines, II.6 (1286): G 1:153
Utrum in composito ex materia et forma educibili de potentia materiae creato, princi-
palius creetur materia an forma. Henry of Ghent, XI.3 (1287): G 1:193
Utrum forma substantialis educatur de potentia materiae. Nicholas Trivet, V.23 (1306):
G 1:253
Utrum Deus possit educere formam de potentia materiae. John of Lana, I.2 (1330s):
G 2:153
Utrum in materia prima possit induci a Deo aliqua forma quae non possit per agens
naturale educi de ea. Thomas of Wylton, I.22 (1312–13): G 2:279
Utrum forma naturalis per agens naturale recedat in potentiam materiae. Francis
Caracciolo (Anon 22), q. 23 (1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum forma quae educitur de potentia materiae sit idem cum essentia materiae.
Godfrey of Fontaines, XIV.25 (1298/99): G 1:167
Utrum anima intellectiva educatur de potentia materiae. Thomas of Sutton, I.12
(1284): G 1:293

Priority of matter or form

Utrum forma principalius creetur a Deo quam materia. Giles, I.27 (?): G 2:101

Substantiality and corporeality

Utrum esse corporeum de genere substantiae sit a forma substantiali vel a materia.
Gerard of Sienna, I.14 (1330): G 2:98
Utrum substantia praedicetur de materia et forma. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 21), q. 9
(1300–10): G 2:300

Measure

Utrum mensura et mensuratum sint unigenee. Peter of Ang, II.15 (After Richard of
Middleton): G 2:217
Utrum numerus formaliter sit ens praeter animam. Thomas of Wylton, I.15 (1312–13):
G 2:279

Medicine

Utrum si homo non peccasset utilis fuisset consideratio medicorum et utrum indiguisset
adminiculo artis medicinae. James of Viterbo, IV.18 (?): G 2:147
Utrum melius sit facere phlebotomiam in novilunio aut in plenilunio. Henry of Lubeck,
I.33 (1323): G 2:136

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Utrum sit ebotomandus a medico astrologo ille de quo judicatur per astrologiam quod
si ebotomatur moritur, et per medicinam quod si non ebotomatur moritur, utpote
qui incurrit squalentiam. John of Naples, VIII.31 (?): G 2:167

Motion of body

Necessity of motion
Utrum omne movens naturaliter de necessitate moveatur. Nicholas Trivet, III.4 (1304):
G 1:250

Motion in instant

Generally
Utrum Deus posset movere aliquod corpus localiter ab oriente in occidentem motu
recto in instanti. Richard of Middleton, II.2 (1286): G 1:268
Utrum motus naturalis possit eri in instanti. Richard of Middleton, III.6 (1287):
G 1:270
Utrum Deus possit facere quod unum corpus existens in uno loco, puta Parisus, fuerit
in loco remoto ut Romae, absque hoc quod sit in loco medio. Richard of Middleton
(?), V.4 (?): G 1:273
Utrum Deus posset movere unum corpus de loco ad locum in instanti. Peter of Tra-
bibus, II.1 (1296): G 2:231
Utrum Deus potest facere motum in instanti. William Ockham, IV.10 (1324–25):
G 2:121
An Deus possit in uno instanti transferre aliquam rem de uno loco ad alterum per
spatium intermedium. Peter John Olivi, I.1 (?): G 2:205
Utrum Deus omnipotentia sua possit facere quod corpus subito possit moveri. Gerard
of Abbeville, XV.7 (1270): G 1:123
Utrum Deus possit facere quod unum corpus existens in uno loco, puta Parisius, fuerit
in loco remoto ut Romae, absque hoc quod sit in loco medio. Peter of Falco, II.4
(1281–82): G 2:126
Utrum virtute divina vel aliqua alia, grave possit moveri in instanti. Gerard of Bologna,
IV.3 (1297): G 1:132

In vacuum
Utrum posito vacuo, motus possit fieri in instanti. Raymond Rigauld, IV.31 (?):
G 2:245
Utrum posito vacuo et quod grave descenderet per illud, ille motus descendendi foret
subitus vel successivus. Nicholas Trivet, III.17 (1304): G 1:250

Requires subject
Utrum Deus possit facere motum sine mobili. John of Naples, I.1 (?): G 2:160
Utrum Deus possit facere motum sine mobili. John of Naples, VI.16 (1315–16):
G 2:165

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As uxus formae
Utrum motus et forma ad quam est sit idem secundum rem. Francis Caracciolo (Anon
22), q. 22 (1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum motus differat realiter a suo termino. Nicholas Trivet, II.21 (1303): G 1:249
Utrum motus sit idem cum termino ad quem. John of Naples, I.8 (?): G 2:160

As relation
Utrum motus localis sit de genere relationis. Laurence the Breton, I.9 (1311–12):
G 2:191

And gloried body

Utrum motus sit in corporibus gloricatis. Alexander of Hales, II.11 (1231–38):
G 2:59
Utrum corpus gloricatum inanimatum moveatur. Gerard of Abbeville, I.10 (1264):
G 1:112
Utrum si corpus gloriosum deponeretur ab anima moveretur si poneretur in aere. Vital
du Four, III.9 (1296–97): G 2:282

Motion of heaven

Cause of motion of heaven

Utrum substantia caeli per seipsam sit mobilis. Godfrey of Fontaines, V.7 (1288):
G 1:156
Utrum Deus sit motor. John Peckham, III.2 (1277): G 2:177
Utrum Deus sit motor orbis. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 21), q. 4 (1300–10): G 2:300

Motion of heaven is natural

Utrum plus conveniat celo moveri quam quiescere. William of Barlo, I.6 (1266–67):
G 2:115

Role of motion in sustaining universe

An cessantibus motionibus celestium corporum omne corpus elementatum corruptibile
in elementa solveretur in momento. Anon 15, q. 10 (1269–70): G 2:293
An si nulla essent lumina stellarum et nullus esset motus celestium corporum omnia ani-
malia corruptibilia in memento morerentur. Anon 15, q. 13 (1269–70): G 2:293
Utrum cessatio motus caeli post iudicium erit causa incorruptionis corporum damna-
torum. Henry of Ghent, XI.15 (1287): G 1:194
Utrum celo quiescente cessent omnes alii motus. Peter of Trabibus, I.42 (1295):
G 2:231
Utrum ad causalitatem et motum istorum inferiorum requiritur necessario causalitas
et motus corporum supercaelestium. Nicholas Trivet, I.27 (1302): G 1:248
Utrum cessante motu celi cesset omnis actio in inferioribus. John of Naples, IX.12
(?): G 2:168

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Utrum posita annihilatione spherarum inferiorum prima sphera cum motore suo
sufceret ad generationem et generaturm permanentiam. Henry of Lubeck, III.9
(1325): G 2:137
Utrum cessante motu celi cessarent generationes et corruptiones. Anon 35, q. 2 (?):
G 2:309

Eternity of motion
Utrum probabilius sit primum mobile et motum eius incepisse de novo quam fuisse
ab aeterno. Hervaeus, III.11 (1309–18): G 1:203

Motion requires xity of poles

Utrum in motu celi requiratur xio polorum sicut et centri. James of Viterbo, IV.7
(1295–96): G 2:146

Motion is absolute (non-relational)

Utrum motus celi sit aliquid absolutum. Henry of Lubeck, II.19 (1324): G 2:137

Motion of immaterial substance

Reality of motion of immaterial substance

Utrum angelus moveatur de loco ad locum. Henry of Ghent, IV.17 (1279): G 1:182
Utrum angelus potest moveri localiter. William Ockham, I.5 (1324–25): G 2:118

Motion of immaterial substance instantanteous or successive

Utrum angelus moveatur in instanti vel successive. Anon 12, q. 7 (before 1265–1266):
G 2:290
Utrum angelus moveatur in instanti. Thomas Aquinas, IX.9 (1266): G 1:286
Utrum motus angeli sit in instanti. Thomas Aquinas, XI.4 (1267): G 1:287
Utrum angelus poterit vel possit moveri a loco in locum et in instanti. Peter of England,
II.25 (1304–05): G 2:214
Utrum angelus possit moveri de extremo ad extremum non transeundo per medium.
Thomas Aquinas, I.5 (1269): G 1:277
Utrum angelus possit ire et redire de loco ad locum sine quiete media. Peter of Tra-
bibus, I.9 (1295): G 2:230
Utrum angelus possit transire de celo in terram absque hoc quod transeat per medium.
Peter Swanington, I.10 (1300): G 2:224

Motion of angel through vacuum

Utrum angelus possit moveri per vacuum. William Ockham, I.8 (1324–25): G 2:119

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Operation, necessity of

Utrum cuilibet naturae specicae respondeat propria et determinata operatio. Thomas

of Sutton, I.8 (1284): G 1:292
Utrum Deus possit facere rem sine propria operatione. Anon 25, q. 2 (?): G 2:304
Utrum alicui possit convenire ratio agentis et non possit agere. Gui Terreni, III.3
(1315): G 1:171
Utrum entia naturalia differant ab articialibus per hoc quod entia naturalia habent in
se ipsis principia sui motus, et articialia non. Anon 35, q. 5 (?): G 2:309
Utrum inclinatio formae differat realiter a forma. William Ockham, III.22 (1324–25):
G 2:120

Permanent/successive distinction

Is all existence successive

An substantia intellectualis, puta angelus, sit possibilis eri successive a Deo. Peter John
Olivi, II.14 (?): G 2:207
Utrum ignis qui est in candela sit idem numero et in ne et in principio. James of
Viterbo, IV.10 (?): G 2:146
Utrum esse cuiuslibet rei semper sit in eri. Ferrarius Catalaunus, I.3 (1276): G 1:109
Utrum esse creaturae sit continue in eri. Hervaeus Natalis, VIII.7 (after 1304):
G 2:182
Utrum esse creaturae sit in continuo eri vel in continuo facto esse. John of Naples,
VI.5 (1315–1316): G 2:164
Utrum gratia in anima sit in eri vel in facto esse. John Peckham, III.39 (1277):
G 2:178
Utrum caritas habeat esse in eri vel in facto esse. Godfrey of Fontaines, IX.11
(1293/94): G 1:160
Utrum Deus possit facere substantiam spiritualem, puta angelum vel animam succes-
sive. Peter of Ang, I.1 (after Richard of Middleton): G 2:216
Utrum eri rerum permanentium differat per essentiam ab esse eorum. Peter of Ang,
I.6 (after Richard of Middleton): G 2:216
Utrum esse creaturae, ex dependentia sui a creatore, habeat esse in continuo eri vel
in esse manenti. Raymond Rigauld, I.6 (?): G 2:240
Utrum esse substantiae corruptibilis mensuretur tempore. Hervaeus, II.12 (1308):
G 1:202
Utrum substantia rei generabilis sit in tempore. Giles, I.7 (?): G 2:100
Utrum visio sit actio manens. Martin of Abbeville, II.9 (1313–14): G 2:193

Is creation successive?
Supposito secundum Commentatorem quod motus vel transmutatio sit forma imper-
fecta ad quam est sive id quod per ipsum acquiritur, utrum ista duo stent simul:
quod creatio sit idem quod factio ipsius esse creaturae et cum ipsa tota creatura
quantum ad totam essentiam et ipsum esse creetur. Godfrey of Fontaines, IX.6
(1293/94): G 1:159
Utrum angelus semper creetur. Hervaeus, IX.3 (1305–07): G 2:62

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Place of body

Nature of place

Place as a relation
Utrum deus possit facere quod manente corpore et loco, corpus non habeat ubi sive
esse in loco. John Duns Scotus, I.11 (1307): G 1:219
Utrum ubi importat rem distinctam a rebus absolutis. William Ockham, VII.6 (1324–25):
G 2:124
Utrum unitas universi vel approximatio causarum vel distantia rerum important res
distinctas a rebus absolutis. William Ockham, VII.8 (1324–25): G 2:124

Immobility of place
Utrum locus sit immobilis. Nicholas Trivet, II.23 (1303): G 1:249

Presence of body to place

Utrum substantia materialis extensa per suas partes intrinsecas sit immediate praesens
loco. William Ockham, IV.20 (1324–25): G 2:121

Proper place of body

Utrum post resurrectionem erunt aliqua individua composita in isto mundo inferiori.
Henry of Ghent, IV.12 (1279): G 1:182
Utrum corpori glorioso sit aliquis locus determinatus ad quem naturaliter moveatur.
James of Aleus, I.12 (1285): G 1:210
Utrum si Deus faceret corpus in convexo celi posset movere pedem. Laurence the
Breton, I.8 (1311–12): G 2:191

Co-location of two or more bodies

Possibility of co-location
Utrum duae materiae possint esse simul. John of Naples, I.4 (?): G 2:160
Utrum duo corpora sint in eodem loco. Gerard of Abbeville, VI.21 (1266): G 1:117
Utrum duo corpora eiusdem speciei possint aliquo modo esse simul in eodem loco
distincta secundum se. Thomas of Sutton, IV.16 (1287): G 1:296
Utrum duo corpora possint simul esse in eodem loco simul. Peter of Ang, II.14 (after
Richard of Middleton): G 2:217

Possibility of co-location by divine power

Utrum possit facere Deus idem corpus numero esse simul et semel localiter in pluri-
bus locis absque hoc quod aliquid convertatur in ipsum. William de la Mare, I.3
(1274–75): G 2:117
Utrum per miraculum possint duo corpora esse in eodem loco simul. Richard Knap-
well, I.21 (1284–85): G 2:256
Utrum Deus possit facere quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco. Raymond Rigauld,
I.7 (?): G 2:240
Utrum duo corpora simul esse in eodemloco implicet contradictionem. James of Ascoli,
I.9 (1311–12): G 2:141
Utrum per virtutem divinam posset eri quod duo corpora possent esse simul. Durandus
of Saint-Pourcain, III.8 (1314): G 2:73

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Utrum Deus possit facere quod duo corpora sint simul in eodem loco. John of Naples,
VII.4 (1316–17): G 2:165
Utrum duo corpora possint esse in eodem loco proprio quacumque virtute divina.
Anon 31, q. 3 (1317–27): G 2:307
Utrum duo corpora possint esse in eodem loco proprio quacumque virtute divina.
Anon 7, q. 3 (?): G 1:304
An duo corpora possint esse simul in eodem loco. Peter John Olivi, III.7 (?): G 2:208
Supposito quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco, utrum sint ibi circumscriptive. Anon
24, q. 7 (?): G 2:303
Utrum [duo corpora in eodem loco sint ibi] difnitive. Anon 24, q. 8 (?): G 2:303

Gloried body co-located with other bodies

Utrum corpus gloriosum possit esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco. Thomas Aquinas,
I.21 (1269): G 1:278
Utrum aliquo modo corpus gloriosum possit esse simul in eodem loco cum alio corpore.
Thomas Aquinas, I.22 (1269): G 1:278
Utrum duo corpora gloricata possint esse simul in eodem loco. Peter of Trabibus,
I.16 (1295): G 2:230
Utrum corpus gloriosum possit simul esse cum non glorioso. Roger Marston, I.23
(1282–83): G 2:265
Utrum corpus gloriosum posset esse cum non glorioso simul. Roger Marston, IV.25
(1285–86): G 2:269

Multilocation

Possibility of multilocation
Utrum idem homo possit esse corporaliter et localiter in diversis locis. John Peckham,
III.38 (1277): G 2:178
Utrum aliquod corpus possit simul esse in diversis locis. Godfrey of Fontaines, IV.5
(1287): G 1:154
Utrum unum corpus possit simul esse in diversis locis. Peter of Ang, II.13 (After Richard
of Middleton): G 2:217

Possibility of multilocation by divine power

Utrum Deus per omnipotentiam suam possit facere quod unum corpus sit localiter in
pluribus locis. Matthew of Aquasparta, IV.1 (1282): G 2:196
Utrum Deus possit facere idem corpus localiter esse simul in duobus locis. Thomas
Aquinas, III.1 (1270): G 1:279
Utrum Deus posset facere quod unum corpus esset in duobus locis sine conversione
eius in aliud corpus. Bernard of Trilia, II.3 (1284): G 1:103
Utrum idem corpus in diversis locis simul per miraculum esse possit. Richard Knapwell,
I.22 (1284–85): G 2:256
Utrum Deus possit facere idem corpus numero esse in duobus locis localiter. Roger
Marston, III.4 (1284–85): G 2:267
Utrum Deus posset facere unum corpus in diversis locis localiter. Richard of Middleton,
I.2 (1285): G 1:268
Utrum aliqua virtute possit unum corpus esse simul in pluribus locis. Francis Caracciolo
(Anon 22), q. 26 (1300–10): G 2:301
Utrum Deus possit facere idem corpus esse localiter in diversis locis. John of Naples,
V.1 (?): G 2:163
Utrum Deus posset facere quod illud quod habet diversa loca apparentia in compara-
tione ad diversos videntes ex parte materiae et naturae rei, posset apparere eisdem
in uno et eodem loco. Nicholas Trivet, I.7 (1302): G 1:247

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Utrum divina potentia una substantia creata possit esse in diversis locis maxime dis-
tantibus. Anon 23, q. 3 (1306): G 2:302

Multilocation of Christ’s body

Utrum Christus post resurrectionem apparens aliquibus sanctis in hoc mundo, eadem
hora apparitionis remaneat in caelo. Ranulphe d’Homblieres, I.10 (1274): G 1:265
Utrum corpus Christi possit esse simul in diversis locis. Vital du Four, II.3 (1295–96):
G 2:281
Utrum corpus Christi sicut est in caelo localiter et in sacro sacramento altaris, ita
possit esse simul et semel localiter in caelo et in terra.Gerard of Abbeville, VII.3
(?): G 1:118

Multilocation of Ambrose at St Martin’s funeral

Quomodo B. Ambrosius exequiis B. Martini dicit se interfuisse. Gerard of Abbeville,
IX.5 (?): G 1:119
Utrum beatus Ambrosius interfuerit exequiis beati Martini. Giles of Rome, II.17
(1287): G 1:142
Quaeritur ubi erat beatus Ambrosius quando fecit Turonis exequias beati Martini, an
Mediolani an Turonis. John of Murrho, I.2 (1289–90): G 2:158

Vacuum

Extracosmic vacuum
Utrum corpus gloriosum possit se facere extra superciem caeli empyrei. Berthaud of
Saint-Denys, I.15 (1282): G 1:106
Utrum aliquod corpus posset esse supra convexum caeli empyrei. Bernard of Trilia,
II.13 (1284): G 1:103
Utrum Deus possit creare aliquid quod, si at, non sit pars universi. Thomas of Sut-
ton, III.6 (1286): G 1:294
Utrum Deus possit facere corpus aliquod extra caelum quod non tangat caelum. Henry
of Ghent, XIII.3 (1289): G 1:197

Intracosmic vacuum
Utrum Deus possit facere spheram ultimam absque aliquo corpore interius contento.
Roger Marston, III.3 (1284–85): G 2:267
Utrum Deus possit conservare caelum et terram in esse per subtractionem inuentiae
suae, annihilatis intermediis. Nicholas Trivet, II.2 (1303): G 1:248
Utrum Deus posset conservare caelum et terram in esse, annihilatis [intermediis] per
substractionem inuentiae suae. Anon 1, q. 7 (?): G 1:297
Utrum Deus possit facere ut vacuum sit. Henry of Ghent, XV.1 (1291): G 1:199

Place of body in eucharist

Is body extended?
Utrum substantia materialis extensa corporis Christi componitur ex partibus substan-
tialibus eiusdem rationis situaliter distinctis. William Ockham, IV.19 (1324–25):
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Utrum possit totum corpus Christi sub speciebus panis contineri. Thomas Aquinas,
VII.8 (1265): G 1:284
Utrum Christus sit totus in qualibet parte hostiae. Roger Marston, III.23 (1284–85):
G 2:267
Utrum corpus Christi sub sacramento sit extensum. Roger Marston, III.24 (1284–85):
G 2:268
Utrum Deus posset facere substantiam existere secundum propriae substantiae partem.
William of Wodeford, I.3 (?): G 2:128
Utrum terminus conversionis panis in sacramento altaris sit materia corporis Christi
ut est sub modo quantitativo. John of Naples, IV.10 (?): G 2:162
Utrum substantia materialis extensa per suas partes intrinsecas sit in loco difnitive seu
circumscriptive. William Ockham, IV.20 (1324–25): G 2:121
Supposito quod quantitas sit res absoluta distincta a substantia et qualitate, utrum quan-
titas corporis Christi sub hostia possit habere positionem de genere quantitatis sine
positione quae est praedicamentum. William Ockham, IV.18 (1324–25): G 2:121

Is body really present?

Utrum corpus Christi sit vere sub sacramento. Matthew of Aquasparta, II.6 (1279–80):
G 2:195
Utrum corpus Christi gloriosum quod est in caelo habet vere esse in altari sub speciebus
panis. Godfrey of Fontaines, VI.3 (1289): G 1:157
Utrum corpus Christi sit vere sub sacramento. Matthew of Aquasparta, II.6 (1279–80):
G 2:195

Is body in a place?
Utrum vere illud corpus assumptum sit in altari. Peter of Trabibus, I.4 (1296):
G 2:229
Utrum species sacramenti corporis Christi tangunt verum corpus Christi quod est in
eis. Henry of Ghent, I.5 (1276): G 1:177
Utrum corpus Christi descendat in stomachum. John Peckham, III.41 (1277):
G 2:178
Utrum accidentia distent localiter a corpore Christi. Raymond Rigauld, IV.3 (?):
G 2:244
Utrum corpus incipiens esse sacramentaliter sub specie panis vere mutatur localiter.
William Ockham, VI.3 (1324–25): G 2:123

Extension of host required for presence

Utrum hostia consecrata tam possit dividi seu teri quod desinat esse corpus Christi.
John of Naples, XI.10 (?): G 2:170

Causal powers capacities of body

Utrum Christus videat se sub illis speciebus oculo corporali. Henry of Ghent, I.6
(1276): G 1:178
Utrum Christus seipsum videat ut est sub sacramento. Roger Marston, I.8 (1282–83):
G 2:264
Utrum sit caro Christi [caro vel puer] quae aliquotiens videtur apparere in loco hostiae
consecratae. Roger Marston, I.10 (1282–83): G 2:264

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Utrum corpus Christi in sacramento altaris sit visibile ab oculo gloricato. Peter of
England, I.8 (1303–04): G 2:212
Utrum Christus sub sacramento altaris videat se oculo corporali. Peter of Tarantasia,
I.37 (1264): G 2:227
Utrum Christus oculo suo corporali se videt sub specie sacramentali. Ranulphe
d’Homblieres, I.8 (1274): G 1:265
Utrum Christus in die Cenae quando dedit corpus suum discipulis suis, videret
illud oculo corporali sub specie sacramentali. Ranulphe d’Homblieres, I.9 (1274):
G 1:265
Utrum Christus videat se sub sacramento oculo corporali. Peter of Ang, II.41 (After
Richard of Middleton): G 2:218
Utrum Christus in coena dederit corpus suum passibile discipulis aut impassibile. Roger
Marston, II.7 (1283–84): G 2:266
Utrum angelus potest naturaliter videre corpus Christi sub sacramento altaris. Henry
of Ghent, XI.12 (1287): G 1:194
Utrum angelus possit visione intellectuali naturali videre corpus Christi sub sacramento
altaris. Robert Walsingham, I.9 (1312–13): G 2:262
Utrum Christus prout est sub sacramento altaris possit sentire. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon
16), q. 4 (1310): G 2:295
Utrum oculus gloricatus possit videre corpus Christi in sacramento altaris. Peter of
Saint-Denys, II.8 (1312–13): G 2:221
Utrum Christus existens in Eucharistia potest videre alia et videri ab aliis. William
Ockham, IV.13 (1324–25): G 2:121

Place of immaterial substance

Presence by essence/operation
Utrum angelus sit in loco. Francis of Caracciolo (Anon 22), q. 14 (1300–10):
G 2:301
Utrum angelus sit in loco per suam substantiam. William Ockham, I.4 (1324–1325):
G 2:118
Utrum substantia vel essentia angeli sit ubicumque est sua virtus. Matthew of Aquas-
parta, I.5 (1277–78): G 2:194
Utrum essentiae vel existentiae angeli, exclusa omni operatione quam habeat supra
corpora sive in corporibus, debeatur locus corporalis. Eustache, II.16 (1263–66):
G 2:79
Utrum angelus possit esse in loco et non operari in eo. John of Naples, VIII.12 (?):
G 2:166
Utrum dato quod Deus non inueret in res, esset ubique et in omnibus rebus. Eustache,
III.1 (1266): G 2:79

Denitive presence of angel in place

Utrum locus angeli possit esse supercies tantum aut necessario habeat trinam dimen-
sionem. Matthew of Aquasparta, I.4 (1277–78): G 2:194
Utrum esse limitatum sit ratio quare aliquid est in loco denitive. Nicholas Trivet,
V.26 (1306): G 1:253
Utrum angelo, ratione naturae, debeatur locus corporalis. Ranulphe d’Homblieres,
II.5 (1275): G 1:265

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Operation in place
Utrum angeli moveant corpora per intellectum et voluntatem solum. James of Viterbo,
I.10 (1293): G 1:215
Utrum in angelo sit aliquod principium activum aliud ab intellectu et voluntate. Godfrey
of Fontaines, V.6 (1288): G 1:156
Utrum necesse sit ponere in angelo aliquod principium motivum quo moveant corpus,
aliud a voluntate et intellectu. Nicholas Trivet, IV.10 (1305): G 1:252
Utrum in angelo, praeter intellectum et voluntatem, sit aliqua tertia potentia scilicet
motiva. John of Naples, I.2 (?): G 2:160
Utrum praeter intellectum et voluntatem in angelis sit alia potentia respectu motus
quem faciant in inferioribus. Henry of Lubeck, III.18 (1325): G 2:137
Utrum angelus simul mutet totum locum in quo est. Raymond Rigauld, III.14 (?):
G 2:243
Utrum spiritus possit videri oculo corporali. Raymond Rigauld, III.13 (?): G 2:243

Multilocation/co-location

Multilocation
Utrum angelus possit simul esse in diversis locis. Gueric of Saint-Quentin, VI.6
(1233–1242): G 2:110
Si angelus moveatur ab Oriente in Occidentem, vel ab A in B, si quiescit in A. Nicholas
du Pressoir, II.8 (1274): G 2:203
Utrum angelus possit simul esse in pluribus locis. Peter of Falco, II.8 (1281–1282):
G 2:127
Utrum angelus possit simul esse in pluribus locis. Richard of Middleton (?), V.8 (?):
G 1:273
Utrum possit eri quod angelus sit simul in pluribus locis. Godfrey of Fontaines, XIII.4
(1297/1298): G 1:165

Co-location
Utrum duo angeli possint esse in eodem loco simul. Peter of Ang, II.17 (After Richard
of Middleton): G 2:217
Utrum, supposito quod angelus sit localis, plures angeli possunt esse in eodem loco
corporali. William of Barlo, I.5 (1266–67): G 2:115

Plurality of worlds

Utrum plures mundos esse simul includat contradictionem. Richard of Middleton,

II.13 (1286): G 1:269
Utrum posset extra mundum istum eri altera terra eiusdem speciei cum terra huius
mundi. Godfrey of Fontaines, IV.6 (1287): G 1:154

Potency

Utrum sit dare aliquod ens quod sit pura potentia. John Baconthorpe, II.9 (1324–25):
G 2:150

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Utrum potentia quae est differentia entis sit potentia objectiva vel potentia subjectiva.
James of Ascoli, I.5 (1311–12): G 2:141
Utrum sit dare aliquam potentiam substantialem differentem a materia quae ponitur
substantiari per posseJohn Baconthorpe, II.10 (1324–25): G 2:150

Power, active

Is substance the immediate principle of operation?

Utrum substantia creata possit esse immediatum principium operationis et praecipue
transeuntis extra. Godfrey of Fontaines, XIII.3 (1297/98): G 1:165
Utrum aliqua substantia creata possit esse immediatum principium alicuius operationis.
Godfrey of Fontaines, II.4 (1286): G 1:152
Utrum substantia creata possit esse immediatum principium alicuius sui actus. Godfrey
of Fontaines, VI.4 (1289): G 1:157
Utrum aliqua substantia creata possit esse immediatum principium suae operationis.
Gui Terreni, II.10 (1314): G 1:171
Utrum cognitio sit actio de genere actionis. Gerard of Sienna, I.10 (1330): G 2:98
Can one power have many operations simultaneously?
Utrum in eadem potentiam operativa possunt simul esse plures operationes. Francis
of Meyronnes, Quod. 1 (4),16 (1323–24): G 2:90

Can one thing be the object of many powers?

Utrum idem sub eadem ratione possit esse obiectum diversarum potentiarum. John
of Pouilly, I.9 (1307): G 1:224

Does a bodily power touch its object?

Utrum virtus substantiae corporalis possit tangere corpus. Henry of Lubeck, I.16
(1323): G 2:135

Can light or motion cause heat

Utrum lumen vel motus de se calefaciat. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 18), I.11 (1310):
G 2:298

Quality

The possibility of quality without quantity

Utrum Deus possit facere quod albedo aut aliqua qualitas corporalis sit sine quantitate.
Thomas Aquinas, VII.10 (1265): G 1:284
Utrum aliqua qualitas possit habere esse absque omni subiecto, sive sine quantitate.
Godfrey of Fontaines, IV.22 (1287): G 1:155

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Distinction between substance and quality

Utrum qualitas differt realiter a substantia. William Ockham, VII.2 (1324–25):
G 2:124

Quantity

Quantity as absolute (non-relational) accident

Utrum quantitas dicat rem aliquam ultra substantiam cuius est quantitas, loquendo de
re absoluta. Richard of Middleton, II.14 (1286): G 1:269
Utrum potest evidenter probari quod quantitas sit res absoluta distincta a substantia
et qualitate. William Ockham, IV.25 (1324–25): G 2:121
Utrum per principia dei potest sufcienter probari quod quantitas sit res absoluta
distincta a substantia et qualitate. William Ockham, IV.26 (1324–25): G 2:121
Utrum de intentione Philosophi sit ponere quantitatem distinctam a substantia et
qualitate. William Ockham, IV.27 (1324–25): G 2:121
Utrum intentio sanctorum sit ponere quantitatem mediam inter substantiam et quali-
tatem. William Ockham, IV.28 (1324–25): G 2:121
Utrum substantia materialis per suas partes intrinsecas potest esse quantitas sive quanta.
William Ockham, IV.23 (1324–25): G 2:121
Utrum substantia materialis per suas partes intrinsecas potest esse quanta sine quantitate
addita sibi. William Ockham, IV.24 (1324–25): G 2:121
Utrum substantia sit id ipsum re quod quantitas. Raymond Rigauld, IV.5 (?):
G 2:244
Utrum ponere quod quantitas sit idem realiter quod substantia repugnet rationi et dei
circa Eucharistiae sacramentum. Bernard Lombardi, I.13 (1331–32): G 2:65
Utrum quantitas et modus quantitativus differunt realiter. William Ockham, VII.19
(1324–25): G 2:124

Quantity without substance in Eucharist

Utrum quantitas in sacramento altaris sit sine subiecto. Thomas of Bailly, IV.12 (1304):
G 2:276
Utrum qualitates hostiae sint subiective in quantitate post consecrationem. William
Ockham, IV.34 (1324–25): G 2:122
Utrum quantitas remanens in eucharistia post consecrationem sit subiective in qualitate
hostiae. William Ockham, IV.33 (1324–25): G 2:122
Utrum subsistere quo species panis in sacramento altaris subsistit, sit realiter idem cum
essentia. quantitatis vel aliud. Godfrey of Fontaines, VIII.17 (1292/93): G 1:159

Is continuous quantity prior to discrete quantity?

Utrum quantitas continua sit prior quam discreta. Giles, I.6 (?): G 2:100

Is quantity cause of impenetrability?

Utrum causa praecisa quare duo corpora non possunt esse simul sit dimensio. Richard
of Middleton, II.15 (1286): G 1:269

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Quantity as cause of motion

Utrum quantitas sit causa motus. Gerard of Bologna, III.22 (1296): G 1:131

Quantity immediately perfects matter

Utrum quantitas immediate perciat materiam. Gui Terreni, V.11 (1317): G 1:173

Rationes seminales

Utrum in materia sint rationes seminales eorum quae unt ex ipsa. James of Viterbo,
II.5 (1294): G 1:216
Utrum species rei habeat rationem seminalem in materia unde at, vel at de nihilo.
Vital du Four, III.6 (1296–97): G 2:282
Utrum in materia sit aliquod principium activum transmutandi se ad formam. Anon
31, q. 6 (1317–27): G 2:307
Utrum ratio seminalis hominis sit in alimentis an in substantia generantis. John Peck-
ham, IV.12 (Before 1269): G 2:180
Utrum in speciebus illis [sacramentibus altarorum] fuerint rationes seminales. Peter of
Ang, II.43 (After Richard of Middleton): G 2:218
Utrum respectu formarum differentium numero sint plures rationes seminales in eadem
parte materiae corporalis. Eustache, II.15 (1263–66): G 2:79
Utrum Deus petuerit facere vel producere in materia rationem seminalem ipsius animae
rationalis. James of Viterbo, III.10 (1295–96): G 2:145
Utrum ad evitandum creationem in generatione substantiali oportet ponere quod forma
sit aliquid in materia. John Baconthorpe, I.6 (1323–24): G 2:149
Utrum in materia sit aliquod principium activum transmutandi se ad formam. Anon
7, I.6 (?): G 1:304
Utrum potentia in materia et forma a qua est sint idem secundum rem. Peter of
Auvergne, IV.8 (1299): G 1:261
Utrum in materia ante terminum generationis praeexistat forma secundum aliquam
entitatem positivam distinctam ab entitate materiae. Kykeley, I.12 (Beginning of
14th century): G 2:189
Utrum formae physicae substantiales habeant esse in materia prima ante sui genera-
tionem. Anon 35, I.1 (?): G 2:309

Relation

Utrum aliqua relatio realis possit alicui advenire de novo sine sui mutatione. Henry
of Ghent, III.10 (1278): G 1:181
Utrum in aliqua creatura per aliquod agens posset incipere esse nova relatio absque
mutatione facta in ipsis. Giles of Rome, V.13 (1290): G 1:145
Utrum ad relationem possit esse mutatio. John of Naples, VII.17 (1316–17): G 2:166
Utrum Deus possit supplere causalitatem efcientis respectu relationis. Gui Terreni,
II.8 (1314): G 1:171

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Sea

Utrum mare propter abundantiam aquarum vel siccitatem unquam redundet vel
decrescat. Peter of Trabibus, I.43 (1295): G 2:231

Self-motion

Possibility of self-motion
Utrum aliquid potest reducere seipsum de potentia ad actum. Henry of Ghent, XI.6
(1287): G 1:193
Utrum subiecto idem possit movere seipsum. James of Viterbo, IV.4 (?): G 2:146
Utrum aliquid possit seipsum movere primo vel agere de potentia ad actum. Peter of
Auvergne, II.7 (1297): G 1:259
Utrum idem secundum idem possit agere in seipsum. Giles of Rome, V.15 (1290):
G 1:145
Utrum inconveniens sit dicere quod aliquid sit simul in potentia et in actu respectu
eiusdem. John Lesage, I.7 (1301–02): G 2:155
Utrum existens sub una perfectione possit seipsum facere sub alia perfectione. Giles
of Rome, V.16 (1290): G 1:145
Utrum magis proprie conveniat voluntati movere se quam intellectum. Godfrey of
Fontaines, X.14 (1294/95): G 1:161
Utrum corpus Christi sub sacramento possit se movere de uno altari ad aliud altare.
Peter of Ang, II.42 (After Richard of Middleton): G 2:218
Utrum sphera posita super planum possit moveri sine aliquo impellente vel intra vel
extra. Hervaeus, VIII.12 (After 1304): G 2:182

Will as self-mover
Utrum voluntas moveat seipsam. Henry of Ghent, IX.5 (1286): G 1:190
Utrum voluntas moveat seipsam. Giles of Rome, III.15 (1288): G 1:143
Utrum voluntas causet actum suum. Peter Swanington, I.8 (1300): G 2:224
Utrum ponens voluntatem se movere per se necessario habet ponere quod volens come-
dere aliquando semper velit comedere. John Lesage, I.5 (1301–1302): G 2:155
Utrum ponentes voluntatem se movere per se necessario habent ponere quod idem
gignat se. John Lesage, I.6 (1301–1302): G 2:155
Utrum ponentes voluntatem vel aliquid aliud simplex differens a se solum secundum
rationem movere seipsum motu reali, possint inquirere vel probare Deum esse per
viam motus. John of Pouilly, II.6 (1308): G 1:225
Utrum potest probari quod voluntas libere causet actus suos effective. William Ockham,
I.16 (1324–25): G 2:119

Substance as cause of its own accidents

Utrum subiectum per se possit esse causa sufciens sui accidentis. Henry of Ghent,
X.9 (1286): G 1:192
Utrum subiectum possit esse immediatum principium praecipue effectuum sui accidentis.
Godfrey of Fontaines, VIII.2 (1292/93): G 1:158
Utrum aliquod subiectum possit esse causa effectiva sui accidentis. Gerard of Bologna,
I.12 (1294): G 1:129

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Utrum subjectum possit esse causa efciens sui accidentis. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon
16), q. 5 (1310): G 2:295
Utrum subjectum sit causa effectiva propriorum accidentium. John of Naples, III.8
(?): G 2:161
Utrum essentia angeli vel animae sint in genere causae efcientis respectu suarum
potentiarum. Giles of Rome, VI.12 (1291): G 1:146
Utrum anima sit causa suarum potentiarum. John (associated with John of Naples,
Giles of Rome), I.9 (?): G 2:148
Utrum voluntas in movendo vires inferiores et partes corporis ad suos actus imprimat illis
aliquam formam quae sit principium motus. Nicholas Trivet, I.20 (1302): G 1:248

Self-motion of natural bodies

Utrum sequatur quod si grave movetur effective a generante quod moveatur effective
a forma sua. Godfrey of Fontaines, XV.20 (1303/04): G 2:104
Utrum forma gravis sit principium motus ejus. John of Naples, I.6 (?): G 2:160
Utrum gravia et levia ex se moveantur. John of Naples, I.7 (?): G 2:160
Utrum aliquid naturaliter frigidum factum actu calidum possit reverti ad naturam
suae frigiditatis, et praecipue si aliquid tale assumatur ad nutrimentum vel medici-
nam cuius calorem sustineat calor naturalis. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 21), q. 15
(1300–10): G 2:300

Soul-body relation

And natural philosophy

Utrum ad philosophiam naturalem pertineat determinare de anima rationali. John of
Naples, II.14 (?): G 2:161

Soul as form

Is soul form of body?

Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma specica propria hominis. John of Naples, XIII.9
(?): G 2:172
Utrum demonstrative possit probari animam intellectivam esse formam corporis humani.
Thomas of Wylton, I.23 (1312–13): G 2:279
Utrum potest demonstrari quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis. William Ockham,
I.10 (1324–25): G 2:119
Utrum anima rationalis est forma corporis unde corpus est. John Peckham, III.25
(1277): G 2:178
Utrum si anima Petri uniretur materiae Pauli vel lapidis, esset idem homo numero qui
fuit. John of Naples, VII.6 (1316–1317): G 2:165
Utrum anima rationalis de uno corpore egrediens possit ingredi aliud corpus et movere
illud et vivicare. Eustache, III.10 (1266): G 2:80
Utrum anima possit aliquod corpus movere non proprium, saltem ut motor. Raymond
Rigauld, V.13 (?): G 2:245
Utrum possibile sit quod anima Christi simul et semel sit in diversis locis. Gerard of
Abbeville, VIII.9 (?): G 1:119
Utrum intellectus creatus humanus possit dare alicui enti naturali suum formale
complementum. Gerard of Sienna, I.11 (1330): G 2:98

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Can angel inform matter?

Utrum Deus possit facere angelum informare materiam. John Duns Scotus, I.9 (1307):
G 1:219

Union of body and soul by natural powers

Utrum corpore humano disposito et organico, anima virtute propria possit corpus suum
intrare et percere. Richard of Middleton (?), V.9 (?): G 1:273
Utrum anima separata non impedita, suo corpori omnino disposito propria virtute
posset reuniri. Henry of Ghent, XI.14 (1287): G 1:194
Utrum corpore humano disposito et organico, anima virtute propria possit corpus
suum intrare et percere. Peter of Falco, II.9 (1281–82): G 2:127

Necessity of union of soul with disposed body

Utrum materia disposita ad receptionem animae intellectualis Deus possit eam non
infundere. Peter of Auvergne, IV.3 (1299): G 1:261

Place of soul
Utrum Deus sit locus animae. Raymond Rigauld, II.3 (?): G 2:242

Degrees of soul
Utrum sicut corpora humana differunt per gradus mixtionis et complexionis ita animae
percientes corpora differant per gradus naturae. Vital du Four, III.4 (1296–97):
G 2:282

Immateriality of soul
Si anima est immaterialis et incorporea. Eudes of Chateauroux, I.5 (1238–40):
G 2:76

Separated soul

Separated soul as form

Utrum anima, destructo corpore, remaneat forma. Raymond Rigauld, V.11 (?):
G 2:245
Utrum in triduo Christus esset anima. Raymond Rigauld, VI.3 (?): G 2:246
Utrum Deus potuit facere quod anima Christi in triduo fuisset separata a corpore in
sepulchro et coniuncta illi consecrato in pyxide, si fuisset consecratum. Henry of
Ghent, XIII.4 (1289): G 1:197

Place of separated soul

Utrum animae separatae locus limitetur secundum limites ubi sui corporis. Raymond
Rigauld, VI.6 (?): G 2:247
Utrum animae possint alicubi extra corpus suum. Eustache, I.21 (1263–66): G 2:78

Is separation instantaneous or successive?

Utrum anima separetur a corpore subito an successive. John Peckham, I.11 (1270):
G 1:221
Utrum anima separetur a corpore subito vel sucessive. Raymond Rigauld, VII.8 (?):
G 2:248

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Is separation natural or by divine power?

Utrum anima gloriosa possit se a suo corpore separare. Roger Marston, II.15 (1283–84):
G 2:266

Soul as mover
Utrum vita praecedat motum localem viventis vel e contrario. John of Naples, II.12
(?): G 2:161
Utrum anima Christi potest movere corpus Christi in Eucharistia. William Ockham,
IV.14 (1324–25): G 2:121

Extension of soul/non-intellective form

Extension of sensitive soul in body

Utrum anima sensitiva sit extensa ad extensionem totius corporis. Kykeley, I.3 (begin-
ning of 14th century): G 2:189

Extension of intellective soul in body

Qualiter anima est in corpore et tota in qualibet parte. Anon 11, q. 4 (rst half of
the 13th century): G 2:289
Utrum [anima] magis sit in una parte quam in alia. Anon 11, q. 5 (rst half of the
13th century): G 2:289
Utrum tota anima per essentiam sit in qualibet parte corporis. Guerric of Saint-Quen-
tin, I.6 (1233–42): G 2:107
Utrum anima tota secundum essentiam suam sit in qualibet parte corporis. Gui of
Cluny, VII.5 (1233–42): G 2:111
Utrum anima ita sit in corpore quod ab ipso difniatur. Eustache, III.9 (1266): G 2:80
Utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. William of Hothun, I.10 (1280):
G 1:176
Utrum sit anima in qualibet parte corporis tota. Raymond Rigauld, V.25 (?):
G 2:246
Utrum anima intellectiva sit in qualibet parte corporis. Nicholas Trivet, III.18 (1304):
G 1:250
Utrum anima intellectiva sit tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet ejus parte. John
of Naples, XIII.10 (?): G 2:172
Utrum anima intellectiva sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. William Ockham,
I.12 (?): G 2:119
Utrum similiter sit anima rationalis in corpore sicut anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis.
Anon 11, q. 6 (First half of the 13th century): G 2:289
Utrum forma substantialis non educta de potentia materiae sit extensa per accidens.
John of Pouilly, I.8 (1307): G 1:224

Form and organs

Utrum aliqua operatio humana debeat plus poni in una parte hominis quam in alia.
Peter of England, III.18 (1305): G 2:215
Utrum operatio membri corporis humani sit ab anima vel a membri complexione.
John of Naples, XII.10 (?): G 2:171
Utrum cor vel hepar sit primum membrum in animali. Remi of Florence, II.10
(1304–05): G 1:253

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Substance

Individuation of substance
Utrum principium individuationis substantiae sit proprietas substantialis quae praecedat
naturaliter omne accidens. Thomas of Sutton, I.21 (1284): G 1:293

Possibility of substance without accident

Utrum Deus posset facere aliquam substantiam sine quantitate et qualitate. Raoul the
Breton, I.3 (1312–14): G 2:237
Utrum substantia corporea per essentiam suam sit quanta. Peter of Auvergne, I.9
(1296): G 1:259
Utrum substantia creata per naturam possit esse sine omni accidente. Eustache, III.3
(1266): G 2:79
Utrum Deus possit hoc facere quod aliqua substantia esset sine omni accidente.
Eustache, III.4 (1266): G 2:80
Utrum Deus posset facere substantiam animatum sine omni accidente ut hominem vel
equum. Peter of Falco, I.2 (1280–81): G 2:125
Utrum Deus possit facere substantiam sine accidente. Peter of Ang, I.2 (After Richard
of Middleton): G 2:216
Utrum substantia sine omni accidente possit esse objectum visus. Raymond Rigauld,
IV.6 (?): G 2:244
Utrum si corpus humanum resurgeret sine quantitate esset idem numero quod prius.
Godfrey of Fontaines, VI.16 (1289): G 1:157
Utrum aliquod corpus humanum resurgens sine quantitate sit idem in numero quod
prius. Hervaeus, V.14 (1312–13): G 2:284
Utrum si homo resurgeret sine dimensionibus esset idem numero qui prius. Henry of
Lubeck, II.14 (1324): G 2:136
Utrum Deus potest conservare substantiam materialem extensam sine motu locali
destruendo omne accidens absolutum in ea. William Ockham, IV.22 (?): G 2:121

Time

Subject of time
Utrum tempus habeat esse in aliquo subjective. Peter Thomas, I.14 (1310–30):
G 2:229
Utrum prius et posterius in motibus posterioribus numerata sint tempus an solum in
motu primo. Peter of Auvergne, V.5 (1300): G 1:262
Utrum tempus sit passio motus primi mobilis. Nicholas of Lyra (Anon 16), q. 21
(1310): G 2:296
Utrum instans temporis continui sit idem quod substantia rei mobilis. Gerard of
Bologna, II.21 (1295): G 1:130
Utrum tempus habeat esse suum completum in materia. Henry of Lubeck, I.24 (1323):
G 2:135
Utrum tempus sit numerus numerans vel numerus numeratus. Peter of England, II.6
(1304–05): G 2:213

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Continuity of time
Utrum tempus sit quantitas continua. Giles of Rome, V.20 (1290): G 1:145
Utrum idem instans maneat in eodem tempore. Nicholas Trivet, II.24 (1303):
G 1:249

Time and owing now

Utrum tempus sit idem quod nunc uens. Peter John Olivi, I.2 (?): G 2:205
Utrum sit idem et unum instans manens in toto tempore vel sint diversa instantia.
Peter of England, II.8 (1304–05): G 2:213

Reality of time
Utrum mundus potuerit eri antequam sit factus. Thomas of Bailly, II.4 (1302–03):
G 2:274
Utrum praedicamentum quando importat rem distinctam a rebus absolutis. William
Ockham, VII.5 (1324–25): G 2:124
Utrum tempus possit esse sine anima. Henry of Ghent, III.11 (1278): G 1:181
Utrum tempus sit aliquid in rerum natura praeter operationem animae. James of
Viterbo, III.12 (1295–96): G 2:145
Utrum innita numerata motus seu temporis praeteriti fuerit realis quantitas discreta
vel tantum entia rationis. Bernard Lombardi, I.16 (1331–32): G 2:65

Time, angelic (aevum)

Does the aevum measure highest angel?

Utrum primum aeviternum sit mensurabile aliqua mensura. Godfrey of Fontaines,
XV.9 (1303–04): G 2:103
Utrum angelus supremus mensuretur aliqua mensura. Peter of Auvergne, VI.3 (1301):
G 1:263

Is there one aevum or many?

Utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum. Matthew of Aquasparta, IV.3 (1282):
G 2:197
Utrum unum sit aevum omnium aeviternorum. Henry of Ghent, XI.11 (1287):
G 1:193
Utrum esse omnium sempiternorum sive angelorum mensuretur una mensura. Godfrey
of Fontaines, VII.8 (1290/91 or 1291/92): G 1:158
Utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum. James of Viterbo, I.9 (1293):
G 1:215
Utrum Lucifer sit subiectum aevi. Thomas Aquinas, V.7 (1271): G 1:281

Does the aevum have a subject?

Utrum aevum sit substantia an accidens. Henry of Ghent, IX.7 (1286): G 1:190

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Is the aevum permanent or successive?

Utrum mensura angelorum, quae est aevum, sit permanens vel successiva. Gerard of
Abbeville, II.10 (?): G 1:113
Utrum aevum quod est mensura angelorum sit mensura simplex indivisibilis et manens
tota simul, an continua et successiva. Matthew of Aquasparta, I.3 (1277–78):
G 2:194
Utrum in aevo sit successio aliqua omnino. Henry of Ghent, V.13 (1280): G 1:184
Utrum aevum sit mensura simplex vel continua permanens. Matthew of Aquasparta,
III.4 (1280–81): G 2:196
Utrum in ipso aevo sit successio. Francis Caracciolo (Anon 22), q. 13 (1300–10):
G 2:301
Utrum in aevo sit successio. Sibert of Beka, I.13 (1318): G 1:275
Utrum duratio angeli habeat prius et posterius. Thomas Aquinas, X.4 (1266):
G 1:286

Relations beween the aevum and time

Utrum tempus movens creaturam spiritualem et mensurans temporalem sit idem.
Thomas Aquinas, II.5 (1269): G 1:278
Utrum pluribus instantibus mensurantibus plura mutata esse in motu angeli succes-
sivo respondeat unum instans temporis nostri. Godfrey of Fontaines, VI.13 (1289):
G 1:157
Utrum operatio angeli intrinseca per se mensuretur tempore nostro. Nicholas Trivet,
I.1 (1302): G 1:248

Time (eternity)

Utrum necesse sit Deum praecessisse productionem mundi duratione, vel natura tantum.
Nicholas Trivet, I.5 (1302): G 1:247
Supposito quod mundus fuerit creatus in primo instanti temporis et quod non potuerit
creari ab aeterno, et item quod prius potuerit creari quam creatus est, et non in
innitum, quaeritur an Deus praesciverit primum instans possibile in quo mundus
potuit creari. John Peckham, III.5 (1277): G 2:177

Universal hylomorphism

Do all creatures include matter?

Utrum una sit materia corporalium et spiritualium. Alexander of Hales, I.7 (1231–38):
G 2:58
Supposito quod non [sit omnium creaturum communis materia], utrum sicut una est
communis materia omnium corporalium ita una sit omnium spirituum. Gueric of
Saint-Quentin, II.8 (1233): G 2:108
Utrum in omni supposito creato necesse sit ponere materiam primam simpliciter. Peter
of Auvergne, V.3 (1300): G 1:262
Utrum in omni substantia subsistente a Deo producta sit compositio formae et materiae.
Nicholas Trivet, II.10 (1303): G 1:249

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Utrum in natura intellectuali sit dare purum possibile. Gerard of Sienna, I.6 (1330):
G 2:97

Do angels include matter?

Utrum angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Thomas Aquinas, IX.6 (1266):
G 1:286
Utrum in angelis sit materia . John Peckham, III.15 (1277): G 2:177
Utrum angeli sint corporei. John Peckham, III.16 (1277): G 2:177
Utrum materia prima sit in angelis, William of Hothun. I.16 (1280): G 1:176
Utrum substantia angelica sit composita ex materia et forma. Giles of Rome, I.8
(1286): G 1:141
Utrum natura angelica sit composita ex vera materia et vera forma. Godfrey of Fon-
taines, III.3 (1286): G 1:153
Utrum natura angelica sit composita ex materia et forma. Peter of England, II.24
(1304–05): G 2:214

Do souls include matter?

Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Thomas Aquinas, III.20 (1270):
G 1:279

Can an angel change into a heavenly body?

Supposito quod in superioribus, scilicet caelo vel angelis, sit materia eiusdem rationis,
utrum implicetur contradictio dicendo quod possunt ad invicem transmutari. John
of Pouilly, IV.5 (1310): G 1:227

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 INDEX OF MAIN TREATMENTS OF
QUODLIBETAL AUTHORS*

Thomas Aquinas, OP i 49–133, Gerard of Saint-Victor ii 372–3

526–58 John of Tongres, ii 374–5
John Pecham, OFM i 135–41 O.Praem.
Matthew of Aquasparta, i 141–3 Laurence of Poulangy, ii 376–7
OFM Val-des-Écoliers
Roger Marston, OFM i 143–9, John du Val, Val-des- ii 377
ii 32–5 Écoliers
William de la Mare, i 151–70 Laurence of Dreux, Val- ii 377–8
OFM des-Écoliers
Henry of Ghent i 171–231, James of Aaleus, OSA ii 378–9
ii 23–32 Peter of Saint-Denis, ii 380–2
Giles of Rome, OESA i 233–86, OSB
ii 35–43 Laurence l’Anglais, OSB ii 382
Godfrey of Fontaines i 287–344, Pierre Roger, OSB ii 382–4, 397
ii 43–51 Albert of Cluny, ii 385
Vital du Four, OFM i 407–9, O.Clun.
ii 58–9 Guy of Cluny, O.Clun. ii 385–6
Peter of Trabibus, OFM i 409–10 Guy of l’Aumône, ii 387–9,
Peter John Olivi, OFM i 411–17, O.Cist. 398–9
427–33, John of Waarde, O.Cist. ii 389–90
ii 55–6 Rainier Marquette, ii 390–1
Richard of Menneville, i 417–20 O.Cist.
OFM James of Thérines, ii 391–4
Peter de Falco, OFM i 420–1 O.Cist.
Raymond Rigaud, i 423–7 Nicholas of Vaux- ii 394–6, 400
OFM Cernay, O.Cist.
Jacques du Quesnoy, i 423–7 Hannibaldus of ii 403
OFM Hannibaldi, OP
Peter of Auvergne ii 81–130 Ferrarius Catalanus, OP ii 403–4
John Duns Scotus, OFM ii 131–98 William Hothum, OP ii 404–5
John of Pouilly ii 199–229 Peter of Tarantaise, OP ii 405–8
Thomas Wylton ii 231–66 Bernard of Trilia, OP ii 408–11,
Peter Auriol, OFM ii 267–329 477–80
Jacques Fournier, O.Cist. ii 354–5 Bernard of Auvergne, ii 411–18,
Servais of Guez, ii 363–9 OP 481–8
Mont-Saint-Éloi John Quidort of Paris, ii 66–9, 418
Andrew of Orchies, ii 369–70 OP
Mont-Saint-Éloi Richard Knapwell, OP ii 59–60,
John of Maroeuil, ii 370–1 418–19
Mont-Saint-Éloi

* i = vol. I: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth
Century, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 1 (Brill: Leiden/Boston 2006);
ii = vol. II: this volume.

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760 index of main treatments of quodlibetal authors

Robert of Orford, OP ii 420–2, Prosper of Reggio ii 554–5

489–91 Emilia, OESA
Thomas of Sutton, OP ii 60–6, Augustinus Triumphus, ii 555
423–6 OESA
Nicholas Trivet, OP ii 426–9 John of Lana, OESA ii 556–7
Remigio dei Girolami, ii 429–30 William of Cremona, ii 557
OP OESA
Hervaeus Natalis, OP ii 70–3, Gerard of Siena, OESA ii 557–62
431–49 James of Pamiers, ii 562–8
Durand of St Pourçain, ii 449–51 OESA
OP Peter Sutton, OFM ii 56–8,
Peter of Palude, OP ii 451–4 570–1
Francis Caracciolo, OP ii 454–5 Peter of England, OFM ii 572–9
John of Naples, OP ii 75–8, Alexander of ii 579–82
455–63 Alessandria, OFM
Raymond Bequini, OP ii 464–5 Nicholas of Lyra, OFM ii 582–91
Henry of Lübeck, OP ii 73–5, James of Ascoli, OFM ii 591–4
466–73 Bertrand de la Tour, ii 595–6
Bernard Lombardi, OP ii 473–4 OFM
Peter Swanington, ii 495–500, Martin of Abbeville, ii 596–8
O.Carm. 542–3 OFM
Robert Walsingham, ii 500–4 William of Alnwick, ii 598–600
O.Carm. OFM
Gerard of Bologna, ii 505–14 Francis of Marchia, ii 600–9
O.Carm. OFM
Simon of Corbie, ii 514–17 Francis of Meyronnes, ii 609–21
O.Carm. OFM
Guy Terrena, O.Carm. ii 330–1, Aufredo Gonteri Brito, ii 621–5
517–23 OFM
Sibert of Beek, O.Carm. ii 524–7 Peter of Atarrabia, ii 625
John Baconthorpe, ii 527–37, OFM
O.Carm. 540–1 Peter Thomae, OFM ii 626–7
James of Viterbo, ii 51–5, William of Rubio, OFM ii 628–9
OESA 547–50 Gerard Odonis, OFM ii 629–38
Henry the German, ii 550–2 William of Ockham, ii 654–66
OESA OFM
Gregory of Lucca, ii 552–3 Walter Chatton, OFM ii 666–78
OESA Robert Holcot, OP ii 678–87
Amadeus de Castello, ii 553–4 John of Rodington, ii 689–91
OESA OFM

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 INDEX MANUSCRIPTORUM*

Angers, Bibliothèque publique theol. lat. fol. 226 – ii 414n, 442

212 – ii 405 theol. lat. fol. 428 – ii 98, 100, 101n,
223 (214) – ii 98–100, 106–7, 109–14, 103–4, 106–30
124–30 theol. lat. fol. 456 – i 419–20
theol. lat. fol. 975 – ii 616n
Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento
di San Francisco (olim Biblioteca Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale
Comunale) dell’Archiginnasio
106 – ii 690–1 A.886 – ii 581
134 – i 141 A.913 – ii 82n
136 – ii 135, 142–98, 268–71, A.943 – ii 414n, 415n, 416, 481–8
280–329, 592 A.1024 – ii 521
157 – ii 610
Bologna, Biblioteca del Collegio di
158 – ii 377, 419n, 424n
Spagna
166 – ii 599
47 – ii 616n
172 – ii 551, 592
133 – i 215
174 – i 151n
Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale
Augsburg, Universitätsbibliothek
167 – ii 548, 562–4
II.1.2o.1 – ii 414n, 416n
Avignon, Bibliothèque Municipale Brugge, Grootseminarie (Bisschoppelijke
314 – ii 465n, 562–6, 602 Bibliotheek)
41/133 – ii 690–1
Avignon, Médiathèque Ceccano
1071 – ii 506n, 509 Brugge, Openbare Bibliotheek
228 – ii 98, 102–3, 106–7, 109–14,
Barcelona, Archivo Capitular de la 124–30
Catedral 491 – i 315, 318n
54 – ii 135, 142, 155n, 156 503 – ii 690–1
Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona de’Aragó Burgos, Biblioteca Municipal
Ripoll 95 – ii 506–9, 512 62 – ii 134n
San Cugat 54 – ii 410n, 414n
Cambrai, Bibliothèque Municipale
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek 573 – ii 134n
B.IV.4 – ii 428
B.VIII.28 – ii 465n Cambridge, Corpus Christi College
F.I.15 – ii 444 Library
H.III – ii 134n 298 – ii 428n

Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College

Kulturbesitz Library
Magdeburg 149 – ii 84, 98–100, 104, 285 – ii 138, 141, 155n, 156
106–7, 109–30 335 – ii 624
theol. lat. fol. 93 – ii 433n 371 – ii 135, 142, 154–6

* i = vol. I: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth
Century, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 1 (Brill: Leiden/Boston 2006);
ii = vol. II: this volume.

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762 index manuscriptorum

Cambridge, Pembroke College Library Vat. lat. 817 – ii 473–4

170 – i 288n Vat. lat. 829 – ii 417n, 508–9
236 – ii 681–2 Vat. lat. 859 – ii 447n
Vat. lat. 869 – ii 584–5, 590, 624
Cambridge, Peterhouse Library
Vat. lat. 879 – ii 136, 141, 154–6
128 – i 31n; ii 60n, 419
Vat. lat. 890 – ii 623
129 – ii 420
Vat. lat. 900 – ii 610, 619
Cambridge, St. John’s College Library Vat. lat. 901 – ii 269–70, 613
149 – ii 135 Vat. lat. 932 – i 44n; ii 81n, 84–5,
160 – ii 135 89, 99, 102–4, 106–30, 454, 508,
572–82, 592–4, 640
Cambridge, University Library Vat. lat. 939 – ii 555
1231 (FF.III.23) – ii 135, 139n, 142, Vat. lat. 946 – ii 269–71
155n, 156, 592 Vat. lat. 956 – ii 655n, 658
1235 (FF.III.27) – ii 134 Vat. lat. 982 – i 33, 44n; ii 585–90
Canterbury, St Augustine Vat. lat. 985 – ii 413n
606 – ii 502n Vat. lat. 987 – ii 420–1, 446n,
489–91
Cesena, Biblioteca Maletestiana Vat. lat. 1012 – ii 6n, 11, 551, 592–4,
D.XVII.4 – ii 135, 142, 154–6 599, 625, 640–9
Plut. VIII sin. 2 – ii 231n, 236, 238, Vat. lat. 1015 – i 32n, 355n, 357n,
245, 249–50, 254 359n, 387n, 392n, 394n, 395n,
Città del Vaticano, BAV 397n, 400n, 483n
Borghese 10 – ii 464 Vat. lat. 1017 – i 443n, 461n; ii 97n,
Borghese 36 – i 478n, 484n; ii 82n, 203, 204n, 206n, 207, 213n, 219n,
135, 142, 154–6, 233–4, 236–66 220n, 222n, 223n, 224n, 225n,
Borghese 39 – i 444n; ii 280, 330–1, 227n, 228–9
518n, 519–26, 533–4 Vat. lat. 1031 – i 288n, 304n, 341
Borghese 89 – ii 362n, 383, 397 Vat. lat. 1032 – i 288n, 298, 304n,
Borghese 122 – i 315, 318n, 319n, 341
429n Vat. lat. 1075 – ii 450n
Borghese 123 – ii 268–72 Vat. lat. 1076 – ii 450n
Borghese 139 – i 34–5, 355; ii 405n, Vat. lat. 1085 – ii 601
406 Vat. lat. 1086 – i 443, 451n, 452n,
Borghese 156 – ii 370, 408–9, 410n, 460n, 467n, 468n, 472n, 482n,
477–9 493n; ii 8, 81n, 345–57; 360–1,
Borghese 164 – i 318n 370–1, 373, 377, 380–2, 434n,
Borghese 298 – ii 414n, 548n 440, 503n, 513n, 515–17, 520n,
Borghese 301 – i 288n, 298 521n, 552–6, 591–2, 595–8, 605,
Borghese 302 – i 288n, 298 639–40
Borghese 348 – ii 521 Vat. lat. 1095 – i 407n
Borghese 361 – i 151n, 159n, 160n, Vat. lat. 1113 – ii 622n
163n, 165n, 166n Vat. lat. 1116 – i 413n
Chigi. lat. B.VII.113 – ii 601–4 Vat. lat. 1453 – ii 521
Chigi. lat. E.VIII.247 – ii 556 Vat. lat. 2173 – ii 508–9
Ottob. lat. 179 – ii 690–1 Vat. lat. 3066 – ii 697n
Ottob. lat. 196 – ii 84, 99–100, 102, Vat. lat. 3075 – ii 655n, 658
104–7, 109–16, 124–30 Vat. lat. 3091 – i 37n
Ottob. lat. 280 – ii 629–30 Vat. lat. 4245 – i 41n, 43n
Ottob. lat. 1126 – ii 6n Vat. lat. 4709 – ii 231n
Ross. lat. 1065 – ii 521 Vat. lat. 5733 – ii 527–30, 532,
Urb. lat. 119 – ii 135, 142, 155n, 535–6, 540–1
156 Vat. lat. 6768 – ii 601
Vat. lat. 772 – ii 414n Vat. lat. 11610 – ii 626
Vat. lat. 782 – i 31n, 44n Vat. lat. 12995 – i 291, 304n

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Cîteaux Conv. Soppr. D.6.359 – i 409n, 410n,

214 – i 33n 433n, 434n, 482n, 484n, 486n,
487n, 488n, 490n, 492n, 493n,
Clermont-Ferrand, Bibliothèque
494n, 495n, 503n
Municipale
Conv. Soppr. E.5.532 – ii 416
109 – ii 268–71
Conv. Soppr. G.4.854 – i 157n, 159n
Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale Conv. Soppr. J.X.10 – ii 457
434 – i 31n II.I.117 – ii 203, 222n, 223n
II.II.182 – ii 98, 101n, 103, 105, 107,
Dublin, Trinity College 109–14, 124–30, 414n
360 – ii 502n II.II.280 – ii 506–10
Dubrovnik, Library of the Dominican II.II.281 – ii 236–8, 520–1
Monastery Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek
12 – ii 134n 731 – ii 136, 142, 155n, 156
Düsseldorf, Universitäts- und 733 – ii 655n
Landesbibliothek Ithaca, Cornell University Library
F.5 – ii 681, 682n B.11 – ii 549
Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und
Dep. Erf. CA 2 108 – ii 98, 105–7, Landesbibliothek
116–21 El.f.36 – ii 136, 142, 154–6
Dep. Erf. CA F.131 – ii 549n
Dep. Erf. CA F.178 – ii 231n Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek
Dep. Erf. CA F.321 – ii 414n, 549n CCl 179 – ii 440
Dep. Erf. CA F.349 – i 172n CCl 291 – ii 635n
Dep. Erf. CA F.368 – ii 134n CCl 307 – ii 136, 139n, 142, 155n,
Dep. Erf. CA Q.170 – ii 592 156, 592
Escorial, BConv. S, Lorenzo Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloqska
D.III.12 – i 504n 732 – ii 594n, 599, 640–1, 644,
646–9
Falconara, Archivio dei Frati Minori 748 – ii 464, 698n
delle Marche 770 – ii 410n
17 – ii 134n 1391 – ii 548–9
Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea 1408 – ii 136, 138, 155n, 156
Laurenziana 1577 – ii 414n
Aedil. 164 – ii 570–1 2060 – ii 616n
Conv. Soppr. 123 – i 433n Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek
Plut. 17 sin., cod. 7 – i 151n 451 – ii 134n
Plut. 17 sin., cod. 8 – i 151n 470 – ii 6n, 592
Plut. 17 sin., cod. 10 – ii 503, 529 – ii 452, 465n, 473, 562
504n 609 – ii 592
Plut. 31 dextr., cod. 3 – ii 585–8 894 – ii 560n
Plut. 31 dextr., cod. 7 – ii 134n
Plut. 31 dextr., cod. 8 – ii 134n, London, British Library
592–4 Add. 14077 – ii 581
Plut. 31 dextr., cod. 9 – ii 136 Burney 358 – i 141
Plut. 32 dextr., cod. 12 – ii 268–71 Royal 6.B.xi – ii 428n
Royal 8.G.viii – ii 136, 138, 155n,
Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale 156
Conv. Soppr. A.2.993 – ii 134n Royal 10.C.vi – i 24n, 25n;
Conv. Soppr. A.3.1153 – ii 409–10, ii 681–2
477n, 478–80 Royal 11.B.i – ii 134
Conv. Soppr. B.VI.340 – ii 464n Royal 11.C.vi – ii 521–2, 526,
Conv. Soppr. C.4.940 – ii 430 535
Conv. Soppr. D.4.94 – ii 440

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Louvain, University Library Marston 203 – ii 592

G 30 – i 288n, 290
Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek
Lüneborg, Ratsbücherei Cent. I.67 – ii 440
Theol. 2 19 – ii 625n Cent. III.75 – ii 200, 201n, 202–3,
212n
Madrid, Biblioteca de El Escorial
h. II. 1 – i 172n Oxford, Balliol College Library
63 – ii 269–71, 509, 556n
Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional
70 – ii 616
226 – ii 433n, 445, 449
91 – ii 231n, 236, 247
228 – ii 134n
192 – ii 134
503 – ii 604 209 – ii 137, 142, 154–6
2015 – ii 231n 246 – ii 681–2
2017 – ii 626
Oxford, Bodleian Library
Madrid, Biblioteca de Palacio Real 794 – i 377n
411 – ii 134n Laud. Misc. 540 – ii 467
Marseilles, Bibliothèque Municipale Oxford, Lincoln College Library
256 – ii 616–17, 619 36 – ii 134
Modena, Biblioteca Estense Oxford, Magdalen College Library
Universitaria 9 – ii 617
K.4.8 – ii 134n
80 – ii 627
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 99 – ii 134, 425
Clm 3726 – ii 613–14 163 – ii 134n
Clm 8717 – ii 133, 136, 139, 141–98,
Oxford, Merton College Library
581, 624
65 – ii 137, 141, 155n, 156
Clm 15829 – ii 136, 139
87 – ii 134, 137, 139, 142
Clm 22023 – ii 690
90 – ii 137, 142, 155n
Clm 23572 – ii 137, 142, 155n, 156
237 – i 151n, 412n
Clm 26309 – ii 133, 137, 142–98,
269–71, 545n, 558–60 Oxford, University Library
110 – ii 134n
München, Nationalmuseum Bibliothek
935 – ii 616n Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana
173 Scaff. IX – ii 137, 143–98
München, Universitätsbibliothek
295 Scaff. XIII – ii 431n, 599
2o, 40 – ii 616n
373 Scaff. XVII – ii 98, 105–7,
Münster, Universitätsbibliothek 109–14, 124–30
175 – ii 451n 426 Scaff. XX – i 423, 424n, 425n,
199 – ii 134 426n, 430n, 431n, 486n, 488n,
308 (172) – ii 9, 472 492n, 494n, 495n, 496n, 497n;
ii 562
Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale 662 Scaff. XXIII – ii 98, 102, 104,
VII.A.36 – ii 134n 107, 109–30, 550–1
VII.B.26 – i 469n, 470n
VII.B.28 – i 482n, 486n, 487n, 488n, Padova, Biblioteca Capitolare
489n, 490n, 495n, 498n; ii 455n, C.37 – ii 137, 141, 155n, 156
456–8
Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria
VII.B.31 – ii 268–71, 280–329
694 – i 482n, 484n, 493n, 494n,
VII.C.6 – ii 550n, 557
495n
VII.C.47 – i 151–2
1125 – ii 137, 141, 143–98
XIII.A.17 – ii 452
1909 – i 415
New Haven, Yale University Library 2006 – ii 137, 142–98, 562–6
Beinecke General 470 – ii 231n, 234, 2094 – i 414–15
236, 244, 249, 254

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Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Iglesia lat. 15842 – i 287n, 288n, 338, 341

Catedral lat. 15845 – i 287n
28 – ii 98–100, 106, 109–30 passim, lat. 15846 – i 287n
451n, 468n, 521–2, 696–7 lat. 15848 – i 178
lat. 15849 – ii 481–8
Paris, Archives Nationales
lat. 15850 – i 422n, 482n, 484n,
JJ.65b – ii 549n
487n, 489n, 493n, 494n, 495n,
LL.1157 – ii 380n
496n, 498n; ii 7–8, 333–43,
Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 360–1, 370, 376, 386, 390, 410n,
379 – ii 403 411
457 – i 141, 151n lat. 15851 – ii 99–100, 102–5, 107,
530 – i 493n; ii 403 109–30
lat. 15855 – ii 137, 141, 155n, 156
Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine lat. 15867 – ii 268–71
889 – ii 580–2 lat. 15985 – ii 335n, 338
915 – ii 673n, 674n lat. 16089 – i 44n, 508n
3511 – ii 134n lat. 16110 – ii 601, 603, 604n, 605–6,
3512 – ii 85, 98, 101–4, 106, 109–30 609
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France lat. 16149 – i 34–5; ii 405–6
lat. 3062 – ii 137, 141, 155n, 156 lat. 16158 – ii 335n, 337
lat. 3071 – ii 604 lat. 16160 – ii 335n
lat. 3147 – ii 137, 142, 155n, 156 lat. 16398 – ii 655n, 658
lat. 3557 – ii 369 lat. 16405 – i 355n, 357n, 359n,
lat. 4046 – ii 555 387n, 392n, 394n, 395n, 397n,
lat. 4246 – i 462n 400n, 477n, 496n, 498n
lat. 6433B – ii 626n lat. 16523 – ii 521
lat. 13466 – i 478n, 495n, 403 lat. 17485 – ii 268–71, 280–329,
lat. 14311 – i 287n, 288n, 291 506–9, 512, 514
lat. 14557 – i 392n, 395n, 397n lat. F 3121 A – ii 84, 98, 102, 104–5,
lat. 14562 – ii 84, 99, 102–3, 105–6, 107
109–30 Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université
lat. 14565 – ii 202n, 203, 220n de Paris (olim Bibliothèque de la
lat. 14566 – ii 268–71 Sorbonne)
lat. 14572 – i 493n, 496n, 497n, 38 – ii 137–9, 141, 143–98
498n; ii 418, 433n, 450, 508–9 575 – ii 137, 141, 155n, 156
lat. 14891 – ii 362n, 388, 398–9
lat. 14899 – ii 362n, 378 Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium
lat. 15350 – i 178–9, 207, 247, 355n, Duchownego
359n, 497n; ii 99, 102, 105, 107, 53/102 – ii 527–8, 530–2, 535
109–14, 124–30, 337n, 338n, 362n, 53/103 – ii 451n
364
Piacenza, Biblioteca Landiana
lat. 15351 – ii 335n
112 (393) – ii 619
lat. 15364 – i 287n
lat. 15371 – ii 204, 219 Pisa, Biblioteca Cateriniana del
lat. 15372 – ii 199n, 200n, 201n, 203, Seminario
204n, 206n, 207n, 208n, 209n, 45 – ii 410n
210n, 213n, 216n, 217n, 218n,
219n, 220n, 222n, 223n, 224n, Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli
225n, 228 C.21.3 (438) – ii 137, 142, 154–6
lat. 15561 – ii 689n, 690 M.92 – ii 626
lat. 15565 – ii 362n, 391–2 1389 – ii 616n
lat. 15805 – ii 404, 405n, 668–71, 1439 – ii 616n
673–5 1446 – ii 616n
lat. 15818 – ii 335n 1599 – ii 616n
lat. 15841 – i 287n, 463n; ii 85, 95n, Praha, Národní Knihovna
99–130 XII.F.6 – ii 410n, 414n

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XIII.D.5 (Y.II. 3.n.1.) (2297) – ii 739 – ii 134n, 268–71, 280–329

99–100, 106–7, 109–30, 412n 744 – ii 268–71, 414n, 452, 457n
Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale
502 – ii 465n 269 – ii 84, 99, 102–7, 109–30
296 – ii 555
Roma, Biblioteca Angelica
639 – ii 97, 99n
625 – ii 545n, 558–66
661 – ii 2n
Roma, Biblioteca Vallicelliana 994 – ii 138, 592
E.30 – ii 420 995 – ii 617–18, 619n, 634
1788 – i 151n
St Andrews, University Library
B.763.D.7 (1815) – ii cover, 134, 138 Valencia, Biblioteca de la Catedral
200 – ii 521
Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque Municipale
129 – ii 465n Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale
Marciana
Schlägl, Prämonstratenser- 139 (2010) – ii 410n
Stiftsbibliothek Marc. lat. 285 – ii 134n
Cpl. 140 – ii 137, 142, 155n, 156 Marc. lat. III.104 – ii 616n
Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Venezia, San Giovanni e Paolo
Intronati 139 – ii 599
G.V.15 – ii 548n 216 – ii 452
G.VII.40 – ii 451n
Washington, D.C., John K. Mullen
Stuttgart, Württembergische of Denver Library, The Catholic
Landesbibliothek University of America, Rare Books
theol. IV, n. 160 – i 151n and Special Collections Department
Tamié Abbey Library, O.Cist. 200 – i 121n
Unnumbered – ii 362n, 394–5, 396n, 201 – i cover, 120–33
400 Wien, Österreichische
Tarragona, Biblioteca Pública Nationalbibliothek
57 – ii 636n lat. 1382 – ii 466–71
lat. 1447 – ii 133, 138, 139n, 142–98,
Todi, Biblioteca comunale 581, 592–4
44 – i 141 lat. 1494 – ii 627
70 – ii 134 lat. 1560 – ii 613–14, 615n
95 – i 424 lat. 2165 – ii 373
98 – i 423–4 lat. 4151 – ii 560n
Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale lat. 5460 – ii 688
K.III.6 – ii 5–6 Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter
Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral y Library
del Cabildo de la Santísima Iglesia F.3 – ii 138, 141, 143–98, 428,
Catedral (Archivo Capitular) 501–4
43 – ii 450n F.60 – ii 133, 138–9, 142–98
88 – ii 234, 236–8, 240, 244–8, F.139 – ii 506n, 510–11
254–5, 258–64 Q.99 – ii 381, 419n, 429n, 495–500,
96 – ii 613 542–3
139 – ii 138, 139n, 142, 155n, 156, Wroclaw, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka
580–1, 583, 585n B 1604 – ii 616n
244 – ii 455n, 456–8
Zwickau, Stadtbibliothek
Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale I.13.25 – ii 134n
180 – ii 268–71

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 INDEX NOMINUM ET LOCORUM*

Note: The index is comprehensive for both volumes, except for the Appendix. Entries
are almost always by rst name for pre-modern authors, usually in English. Religious
afliations are not given for modern authors.

Abaqa, Mongol khan i 371 Alexander of Hales, OFM i 9, 25, 26n,

Abate, G. ii 137n 27–8, 38, 51n, 486, 488; ii 427n, 676,
Abelard: see Peter Abelard 693
Acerenza ii 386 Alexander of Hungary, OESA ii 356
Acre i 209, 472–3 Alexander of Sant’Elpidio, OESA i
Adam of St Victor ii 372 463; ii 356, 549, 550n, 552n, 557, 642
Adam Wodeham, OFM ii 654, 656–7, Algazali ii 93
658n, 667, 668n, 671–5, 688 Allemang, G. ii 386n
Adam, C. i 516n Allen, E.B. ii 446n
Adams, L. i 171n Alliney, G. i 441n; ii 437n, 598n, 599n,
Adelard of Bath i 284 643, 647n
Adenulf of Anagni i 149 Alluntis, F. ii 132–3, 138n, 139n, 141n,
Adrian Florensz Dedal of Utrecht: see 143n, 149–51, 158n, 160n
Hadrian VI Alphagranus ii 93
Aertsen, J.A. i 175n, 207n, 234n, 239n, Alphonsus Dionysii of Lisbon ii 351n,
247n, 253n, 267n, 284n, 287n, 309n, 352n
555n; ii 23n, 38n, 40n, 44n, 84n, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, OESA ii
367n, 371n 547, 549, 562
Aix-en-Provence ii 268 Amadeus de Castello, OESA ii 357,
Alain Gontier i 443, 493n; ii 81n, 546, 553–4, 568
356–7 Amalar of Metz i 529n
Alberigo, G. ii 333n Ambrose of Milan i 98–9, 249
Albert of Cluny, OClun ii 360, 362, Amerini, F. ii 569n, 581n
367, 384–6, 396 Amiens i 418; ii 363–4, 367, 385
Albert the Great, OP i 25, 66n, 119n, Amorós, L. i 297n, 298; ii 2n, 622
202, 284, 442, 549–51; ii 19n, 199, Anagni ii 393
335n, 403n, 467 Anaxagoras i 335; ii 93
Albert of Padua, OESA ii 567n Ancona ii 555
Albert of Saxony i 162 André, G.S. ii 408, 411, 477–9
Albumasar ii 93 Andrea de’ Mozzi, OFM i 409, 411
Alexander III, pope i 503n Andreas of Saint-Victor i 26n
Alexander IV, pope i 233; ii 388 Andrew of Anchin: see Andrew
Alexander Achillini ii 699 d’Orchies
Alexander of Alessandria, OFM I 478, Andrew of Auchy: see Andrew d’Orchies
498, 501n; ii 22n, 138n, 139, 570, Andrew Elemosine de Perugia,
579–82 OESA ii 567n
Alexander of Aphrodisias i 100; ii 93, Andrew d’Orchies, Mont-Saint-Éloi i
209–10, 288 422; ii 340, 343, 360–1, 363, 369–70

* i = vol. I: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth
Century, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 1 (Brill: Leiden/Boston 2006); ii
= vol. II: this volume.

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Andrew of Sennes i 247 Arnobius, Junior i 144

Andrews, R. ii 244 Arnold of Liège, OP ii 440, 442–5
Angel of Camerino, OESA i 236; ii Arnulfus de Lasteria, OP ii 352n
356, 552 Arras ii 362–3, 369n, 383
Anger, P. ii 380n Artois ii 364
Anheim, É. ii 383n Arway, R.J. ii 49
Anjou i 383, 408, 418n Asaph ii 668
Anselm of Canterbury, OSB i 143, Ascoli, A.R. i 92n
306, 420–1; ii 93, 178, 242, 481, 484, Assenmacher, J. ii 19n
489–90, 520n, 537, 676–7 Athanasius of Alexandria i 99, 554;
Antioch ii 629 ii 93
Anzulewicz, H. i 176n, 246n, 362n, Atroposmath of Athens ii 356
419n, 420n, 456n Aubert, J.-M. i 72n
Appignano del Tronto ii 600 Aubert, R. ii 359n, 363n, 364n, 370n,
Aquila i 406n 377n, 378n, 386n, 387n, 390n, 391n
Aquitaine i 408n, 424, 425n; ii 267, Auer, J. ii 626n
595 Aufredo Gonteri Brito, OFM ii 11,
Aragon i 209; ii 625, 628 570, 621–5, 639
Ardura, B. ii 359n, 373n Augustine of Ancona, OESA i 463–6;
Arezzo i 406n ii 356, 546, 555, 568
Arezzo, A. i 207n Augustine of Hippo i 57, 62–3, 76,
Argerami, O. 83n, 103, 105, 110, 427n 82, 84, 89–90, 93, 98–101, 110–11,
Aristotle i 14–15, 21–2, 49, 56n, 62, 70, 115–16, 135, 139, 143, 145–6, 148,
77, 100–1, 107, 110–11, 149, 163–4, 169–70, 196, 202, 255, 272, 278, 285,
166, 168, 172, 202, 237–8, 253, 255, 384, 432, 509, 512n, 519n, 538, 548n;
258, 261, 266–7, 272, 274, 276, 278, ii 92–3, 148, 151–2, 160–2, 166, 169,
284, 307–10, 312–13, 320–2, 325–6, 171–3, 177, 189, 195–8, 215–16,
328, 330, 332–3, 335–6, 339, 358–60, 241–2, 264, 280n, 282, 307, 317–18,
379–80, 388n, 389, 395, 401, 411, 325–6, 373, 375, 484–5, 520n, 521n,
426–8, 441–3, 444n, 445, 446n, 448, 542, 596n, 676–7
451n, 466–7, 469–70, 475–6, 490, Augustinus Triumphus: see Augustine of
492, 494, 501, 504–5, 507, 511, 512n, Ancona
515, 519, 521, 527, 533, 537, 539–40, Aumône ii 387–8
545, 552, 557; ii 13, 19, 24–6, 29–30, Australia i 161
34–5, 38n, 57, 68, 79, 82, 92–4, 96n, Auvergne i 513
124, 126–8, 140–1, 165, 172, 178–80, Avarucci, G. ii 135n
188–91, 197, 205, 208–11, 213–19, Averroes i 35, 100, 253, 267n, 268,
221, 223, 226, 228n, 231, 241, 246–7, 336, 426, 444n, 518n, 519n; ii 29, 30n,
258–9, 261–2, 275–6, 279n, 282–92, 43, 62, 92, 96n, 128, 209–10, 228n,
294–5, 297, 299–302, 304, 306–9, 232, 246–7, 251–3, 259–61, 275,
311, 314–16, 318–19, 322, 327, 536, 279n, 280n, 282–303, 306–13, 315,
593, 604n, 615, 625n, 635n, 661, 702 319–20, 535–6
Arius i 547–9 Avicebron i 100, 542n
Armand of Belvezer, OP ii 464 Avicenna i 100, 169–70, 244n, 335,
Armstrong, D.M. i 161 512n, 543; ii 26–7, 46, 93, 207–8, 228,
Armstrong, L. i 485n; ii 545n, 560n, 251–2, 485, 644n, 645n
561 Avignon i 40, 44; ii 11, 199, 203, 222,
Arnau de Vilanova i 435; ii 84, 90, 95, 353, 372, 432n, 449–51, 464, 505,
228, 517 507–8, 510, 512–13, 518, 600–2, 610,
Arnaud Gaillard, OFM i 412–13, 418, 621, 626, 633, 638, 654, 657–9, 667n,
431–2 668, 678, 688, 691n
Arnaud Royard, OFM i 408–9; Axters, É. i 33n; ii 394, 395n, 396n,
ii 356 400n
Arnaud de Saint-Michel ii 630 Azanza, A. ii 625

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B. de Massaut, OP i 405n Benedict XI, pope i 343–4, 459–60,

Babylon i 472n 473; ii 393, 429, 572
Bade/Badius Ascensius, J. i 171n, 179, Benedict XII, pope ii 8, 354–5, 357,
213n, 510n, 521n, 523n, 524n; ii 18n, 383, 387, 626, 629, 668
20n, 27n, 29n, 30n, 31n, 32n, 33n, Benedict Gaetani: see Boniface VIII
40n, 41n, 42n, 183n, 184n, 185n, Benedict of Nursia i 63; ii 596n
210n Benevento ii 547
Bakker, P.J.J.M. i 4n; ii 413, 414n, Ber., OFM ii 357
418n Béraud du Puy, OP i 408
Balcoyiannopoulou, I. ii 432n, 434n, Berengar, OP ii 227
449n, 452n, 522n Berger, D. i 74n
Baldwin, J.W. i 388n, 400n, 475n Berges, W. i 439n
Bale, J.: see John Bale Bériou, N. i 412n
Balim, C. i 170n; ii 18n, 33n, 65n, 69n, Berlière, U. ii 379n, 380n
97n, 132, 136n, 137n, 225n, 608n, Berlin i 419–20
661n, 668, 688n Bermond d’Anduze, OFM i 412
Baluze, É. ii 385n Bernard of Auvergne, OP i 45, 178,
Bandinius, A.M. ii 136n 454–5, 501n; ii 9, 411–18, 421–2,
Bar ii 336n 446–7, 474–5, 481–8, 547–8
Barbanti, M. i 219n Bernard de Botone ii 225
Barbet, J. ii 382n, 519n, 534, 616n, Bernard of Clairvaux, OCist i 33n,
617n 364; ii 93
Barcelona i 29n; ii 621–2, 624–6, Bernard de Gamaches ii 373
628–9, 643 Bernard Gui, OP i 405n; ii 354n, 411,
Bardy, G. i 21n 431n, 432n, 440n, 457n
Bar-le-Duc ii 336n Bernard Lombardi, OP ii 12, 464,
Barnaba Hechich, P. ii 136n, 137n 473–5, 694
Barolini, T. i 92n Bernard Olivarii, OESA ii 565–7
Baron, S.W. i 383n Bernard of Pavia ii 93
Bartholomew of Capua i 555n Bernard of Trilia, OP i 422, 501, 531n;
Bartoli, M. i 455n ii 9, 343, 408–11, 477–80
Barubé, O. ii 360n, 362n, 363n, 374n Bernardino of Siena, OFM i 47–8, 436
Bataillon, L.-J. i 17n, 18n, 412n, 417n, Bernardus de Boscarello, OP ii 352n
421n; ii 334n, 335n Bernat de Puigcercós, OP i 501n
Baudry, L. i 435n; ii 666n, 699n Bertaldus, OFM ii 356–7
Bauer, M. ii 218n Bertelloni, F. ii 539n
Bayerer, W.G. ii 136n Berthaud of Saint-Denis i 204n, 212,
Bayerri y Bertomeu, E. ii 138n, 456n, 424, 449
460n Berthier, J.J. i 22n, 23n
Bayerschmidt, P. ii 415n, 416n, 420, Bertram of Alen, OFM i 13, 47,
446n 291–2, 304n, 341
Bazàn, B.C. i 18n, 39, 56n, 251n, Bertram, M. i 462n
293–4, 295n, 439n; ii 624n Bertrand of Alimania ii 474
Beatriz da Costa, J. ii 83n Bertrand of Got: see Clement V
Beaulieu-en-Argonne ii 341, 386, 396 Bertrand de la Tour, OFM i 409n,
Beauvais ii 199 531n; ii 267, 570, 580, 595–6, 634,
Beccarisi, A. i 47n 639
Bede, the Venerable i 81 Besançon ii 694
Beek ii 524 Beumer, J. ii 463n
Bégou-Davia, M. i 386n Bianchi, L. i 234n, 239n, 245n, 246n,
Bel., OFM ii 357 259n, 265n, 284n, 365; ii 698n
Bellemare, L. i 173n Bihl, M. i 47n, 427n
Belmond, S. i 144n Biller, P. i 262n, 408n
Beltrán de Heredia, P. ii 433n Black, J. i 26n, 41n, 51n, 524n; ii 403n

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Blaise, A. i 19, 20n Brighton i 135

Blanchette, O. i 111n Brittany, Bretons ii 431, 623
Bleienstein, F. i 451n Broomeld, F. i 400n
Boehner, P. i 429n Brouette, É ii 387n, 390n, 391n
Boese, H. ii 126n, 127n, 130n Brown, E.A.R. i 185n, 450n, 523n; ii
Boethius i 68, 100, 113, 117, 168, 83n, 116, 368
512n; ii 46, 87–8, 92, 94, 427, 481 Brown, S.F. i 418n; ii 6n, 10, 23n, 25n,
Boethius of Dacia i 511n; ii 19n 76n, 81n, 97n, 272n, 273, 345n, 346n,
Bologna i 27, 141, 365, 410; ii 346, 371n, 454n, 493n, 501n, 507–10, 512,
554–6, 557n, 598, 699 513n, 519, 520n, 538n, 539n, 549n,
Bonafede, G. i 144n 657n, 658n, 661n, 666n, 696
Bonagratia of Bergamo, OFM ii 601 Brumberg-Chaumont, J. i 407n
Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, OFM i Brundage, J. i 477n
11, 25, 71, 81, 89, 90n, 102, 113–14, Brunet, A. i 17n, 21n
137, 144, 149, 153–8, 160–1, 202, Bruni, G. i 233n, 235n, 237n, 238n,
335, 350n, 418, 420, 433, 459, 492n, 239n, 247, 261n; ii 412n
518n, 520n, 530; ii 32n, 57, 277, 336, Bucichowski, W. ii 73n, 74n, 75n, 466n,
676, 695 473n
Bongianino, L. i 40n, 480n Buerke, B. ii 191n
Boniface VIII, pope i 176, 185, 236, Burgundy ii 582
246, 286, 343–4, 354, 357, 361, 377n, Burkhart, P. ii 452n
425n, 439, 456, 459, 462–3, 499n; ii Burnett, C. i 253n
84, 368, 386, 393, 413n Burr, D. i 412, 413n, 429n, 431n, 490n
Bonino, S.-T. i 72n, 108n Busa, R. i 50n
Borde, H. (M.-B.) ii 435n, 493n, 505n, Buytaert, E.M. i 513n, 530n, 545n,
506n, 507, 509, 513n 548n; ii 267n, 268n, 413n, 626–7
Bordeaux i 473; ii 393, 496, 500, 532 Byzantium i 371
Borleffs, J.G.P. i 543n
Bosnia ii 629 Ç., master ii 356
Bossier, F. i 519n Cahors i 106, 382, 405n
Bossuet Jacques Bénigne i 542 Cairola, J. i 144n
Boston ii 272n Callebaut, A. i 136n; ii 349n
Bougerol, J.G. ii 138n, 387n, 388n Callus, D.A. i 153n, 555n
Boulnois, O. i 343, 398n Camboulit ii 629, 633
Boureau, A. i 3, 60n, 73n, 94n, 136n, Cambridge i 143; ii 155, 531, 537, 545,
239n, 281n, 346n, 347n, 398n, 413n, 659
419n, 428n, 455n, 482n, 526, 527n, Candia i 414, 436
528, 529n, 540n, 541n, 555n, 556n; ii Cañedo Cervera, A. ii 517n
3n, 341n, 473 Canivez, J.-M. ii 391n, 394n
Bourges i 236, 244, 286 Cannizzo, G. ii 83, 84n, 85n, 89, 94,
Boutry, M. i 20n 99–106, 111, 120
Boyle, J.F. i 49n, 56n Canterbury i 136, 201, 281; ii 419, 531,
Boyle, L.E. i 26n, 53n, 60, 86n, 248, 537
346n, 357n, 377n; ii 703n Capitani, O. i 484n, 492n, 493n, 497n
Brady, I. i 61n, 137n, 139n, 142n, 143, Caresmar, I. ii 135n
404n, 447n, 478n, 491n, 492n, 493n, Carlisle ii 667
494n, 503n, 510n, 529n, 531n, 535n; Carnap, R. i 159n
ii 20n, 32n, 33n, 34n, 35n, 626n Caroti, S. ii 14n, 98n
Brampton, C.K. ii 666n Castagnoli, P. ii 572n
Brams, J. i 519n Castro y Castro, M. de i 411n; ii 626n
Brandt, S. i 512n Catalonia, Catalans i 408; ii 9, 505
Bréquigny, L.-G. de i 382n Catania ii 629
Brett, A.S. i 504n Cathala, M.-R. i 100n
Brewer, J.S. i 153n Catto, J.I. ii 419n

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Cazelles, R. ii 363n 15–16, 51n, 81n, 225n, 345–57, 361n,

Ceccarelli, G. i 15, 219n, 388n, 439n, 367n, 373n, 377, 378n, 381n, 382n,
475–505, 523n; ii 365n, 386n, 406n, 387n, 401n, 419n, 434n, 435n, 437n,
463n 440n, 444n, 495n, 502n, 503n, 504n,
Celestine V, pope i 354, 462–3; ii 94 505n, 512n, 515, 545–68, 591–2,
Cenci, C. ii 135n 597, 598n, 601n, 602, 640, 642, 643n,
Chaise-Dieu, La ii 382 652n, 653n, 654n, 655n, 658, 666,
Charles II, king of Naples and Sicily 667n, 668n, 673n, 674n, 678n, 680,
i 383 685n, 689n, 691n, 692–9
Charles IV, king of France ii 382, 610 Cousins, E.H. i 154n, 161n
Chartres ii 353n Cova, L. i 441n; ii 334n
Chatton ii 667 Coxe, H.O. ii 137n
Chaumont ii 353n Craig, E. i 233n
Chavasse, A. ii 592n Cranz, F.E. ii 135n, 137n
Chazan, R. i 383n Crawford, F.D. ii 246n, 283n, 284n,
Chenu, M.-D. i 29n, 95n, 96n; ii 333, 285n, 286n, 288n, 289n, 290n, 291n,
335n 292n, 293n, 294n, 295n, 296n, 297n,
Chevalier, P. i 279n 298n, 300n, 301n, 308n, 309n, 310n,
Childeric, Merovingian king i 468 311n, 313n
Christian Maurer i 122 Crete i 414
Chroust, A.-H. ii 649n Crisciani, C. i 249n
Ciceri, A. i 17n, 37n Cross, R. i 9; ii 4, 12–13, 533n, 539n,
Cicero i 100, 327; ii 93, 195 701–55
Cîteaux ii 390, 394–5 Crowley, T. i 136n
Clagett, M. ii 702n Cyril of Alexandria i 554
Clairmarais ii 390
Clairvaux ii 386, 394 Dahan, G. ii 367n, 394n
Clavero, B. i 476n, 500n Dales, R.C. i 239n; ii 83n, 103, 105,
Clement IV, pope i 197–8 110, 245, 427n
Clement V, pope i 405, 408, 464, 473, Dante Alighieri i 14, 92, 170, 435;
499n; ii 205, 386, 393, 412, 555 ii 430
Clement VI, pope ii 8, 360, 362, Dautrey, P. ii 387n
382–4, 396–7, 456, 519, 523, 533–4, David of Dinant i 96
536, 612, 629, 698 Deahl, J. i 1
Clermont ii 85, 100, 412 Dean, R.J. ii 427n
Cockshaw, P. i 178n De Benedictis, A. i 439n
Cohen, J. i 147n; ii 367n, 582n Decker, B. ii 431n, 444
Collingwood, R.G. i 511 De Coninck, P.D. i 510n, 511n, 553n
Cologne i 365; ii 73, 81n, 132, 454n, Decorte, J. i 171n, 182, 188, 191–2,
464, 466, 472, 524, 572, 579, 698 197, 202n, 204n, 205–6, 216, 221,
Colonna family i 286, 462 241n, 267n, 279n, 376n, 395n, 397n,
Conetti, M. i 456n 400n, 501n, 502n, 503n, 531n
Congar, Y.-M. i 25, 45n, 368n, 380n, Dedieu, H. i 407n, 420n, 425n
381n, 453n, 480n Defraia, S. i 37n, 48, 413–15, 416n,
Constable, G. i 502n 424, 436n, 437n, 479n, 481n, 482n,
Constantine, Roman emperor i 93, 484n, 493n, 494n, 495n, 496n, 497n,
456 498n; ii 55n, 56n
Constantinople ii 363 Delisle, L. ii 137n, 335
Conti, A.D. i 269n; ii 134n, 626n Delorme, F.M. i 84n, 136n, 137n,
Copsey, R. ii 497, 504n 144n, 166n, 407n, 409n, 417n, 423,
Cornet, D. i 371n, 372n, 373n, 481n 427n, 432n, 453n, 466n, 480n, 484n,
Courtenay, W.J. i 2n, 4n, 8–9, 46n, 491n, 492n, 493n, 494n, 496n, 502n,
265n, 403n, 408n, 410, 411n, 416, 503n, 531n; ii 58n, 59n, 341n
443n, 466n, 479n; ii 8, 10, 12, 14n, Del Punta, F. i 233n, 234n, 235n, 236n,

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240n, 244n, 245n, 286n, 409n, 433n; Dufeil, M.-M. i 52n; ii 388n
ii 35n, 254 Duhem, P. i 508n; ii 75n
Denie, H. i 153n; ii 354n, 380n Dumont, S.D. i 441n; ii 65n, 81n, 231,
Denmark i 507 232n, 234, 244n, 254n, 345n, 508n,
Denzinger, H. ii 199n, 273n, 274n, 510n, 513n, 520n, 521n, 539n, 621n,
281n, 316n 623–4, 626n
Deodat of Séverac, OSB ii 372–3, 384 Dunbabin, J. i 461n; ii 452n
Depoin, J. ii 380n Durand of St Pourçain, OP i 40, 44,
Descartes, R. i 516n 493n, 496n, 497–8, 531n; ii 2, 9, 201n,
Desiderio, F. ii 520n, 539n 232, 351–2, 356–7, 381, 413n, 414,
Destrez, J. ii 99n, 334–5 432, 434n, 436, 438, 445n, 448–52,
Dettloff, W. ii 591n 454–5, 457n, 458, 463, 465, 467–71,
Dewender, T. ii 97n, 454n, 513n, 520n 474–5, 522, 536, 539, 551, 565–7,
De Wulf, M. i 287n, 361n, 363n, 367n, 633, 642
368n, 374n, 376n, 397n, 400n, 448n, Durham ii 667, 679
484n, 488n, 489n, 493n, 494n, 501n, Duval, A. ii 333n
502n, 521n, 522n, 523n, 524n, 525n, Duval-Arnould, L. ii 360n
529n, 531n; ii 20n, 44n, 45n, 46n, Dykmans, M. ii 383n, 667n
47n, 48n, 49n, 50n, 67n, 364n, 439n
Dietrich of Freiburg, OP ii 467 Eardley, P.S. i 270n, 278n
Diez, A. i 372n, 503n Eastman, J.R. i 462n, 463; ii 83n, 94n,
Di Giovanni, M. i 253n 95n, 111
Digne ii 609 Ebbesen, S. i 458n
Dimier, A. ii 387n Eckart, W.P. ii 19n
Dionysius the Areopagite: see Pseudo- Eckermann, W. ii 550n
Dionysius Eckhart, OP ii 357
Dionysius de Borgo San Sepolcro, Eco, U. i 159n
OESA ii 97, 349, 549, 566–7 Edmund Grafton, OFM ii 688–9
Dolcino of Novara i 473; ii 393 Edward I, king of England i 383
Dombart, R. i 512n Egenter, R. i 310n, 311n
Dominicus Mariae Berardelli, OP Egger, C. i 451n; ii 375n
ii 599n Egypt i 371n
Donati, S. i 233n, 234n, 235n, 236n, Ehrle, F. i 136n, 408n, 410n, 412n,
240n, 244n, 245n, 286n; ii 22n, 30n, 427n; ii 226, 228n, 423, 427–9, 601,
35n, 43n 604n, 628n
Dondaine, A. i 143n, 405n, 406n, 434n Elna ii 517
Dondaine, H.F. i 63, 64n Emden, A.B. ii 231n, 348, 497n, 666n,
Douais, C. i 405n, 406n 668n, 688n, 689, 690n
Doucet, V. i 2n, 27, 38, 142, 404n, Emery, K. Jr. i 174n, 175n, 234n, 239n,
407n, 413n, 415, 423–4, 425n, 486n; 247n, 267n, 284n, 287n, 309n, 555n;
ii 6, 82n, 136n, 427n, 550n, 571n, ii 44n, 367n, 371n, 624n
592n, 599, 622, 624n, 641n, 643 Emmen, A. i 142n
Douie, D.L. i 136n, 281n; ii 666n Empedocles i 284
Dreiling, R. ii 75n Endress, G. i 253n
Dreux ii 353n England, English i 135, 138, 143–4,
Dreyer, M. ii 136n 197, 208, 377, 383, 417–18, 476n,
Driscoll, A.M. i 55n 480n; ii 6, 11, 20, 56, 60, 235, 348n,
Drossbach, G. ii 545n 401n, 405, 419, 464n, 466, 473n,
Duba, W.O. i 8–9, 48n, 402n, 558n; 495–6, 500, 504–5, 511, 527, 531–2,
ii 3n, 10–12, 56n, 229n, 345n, 350n, 536–7, 545n, 569, 630, 651, 658n,
444n, 493n, 545n, 551n, 566n, 659–60, 678, 685, 687, 692–3, 697
569–649, 688n, 697n Ennis, A.J. ii 545n
Dublin ii 405 Erfurt i 365, 420; ii 550, 699
Du Boulay, C.E. ii 378n Ermatinger, C.J. ii 238

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Esteban, E. I; 235n, 240n, 245n Florence, Florentines i 15, 29n, 103,

Étienne de Bourret i 365 406, 409–10, 413, 416, 433, 481,
Étienne Tempier i 145, 184, 193, 195, 485n, 486; ii 420, 430, 590n
197–200, 206–8, 211–12, 234, 349, Flores, J.C. ii 211n
351, 362, 364–5; ii 19, 23, 25, 35, 199, Flüeler, C. i 439n, 443n, 450n, 466n,
368 470; ii 81n
Etzkorn, G.J. i 10–11, 40n, 41n, 84n, Fohlen, J. i 41n, 43n
135–49, 447n, 453n, 478n, 480n, Folger-Fonfara, S. ii 569n, 608, 609n
484n, 491n, 492n, 493n, 494n, 496n, Forlivesi, M. ii 415n
502n, 503n, 510n, 525n, 531n, 535n, France, French i 40, 106, 157n, 184,
541n, 543n, 545n, 550n, 555n; ii 11, 286, 343, 381n, 383, 403, 405, 412n,
20n, 32n, 33n, 34n, 35n, 56n, 57n, 418, 425–6, 468n, 476n, 480–1, 498,
58n, 65n, 67n, 132n, 140n, 244, 405n, 523, 558n; ii 363, 373, 393–4, 408,
451n, 549n, 569n, 570–1, 600, 651n, 412, 431, 434, 444–5, 452n, 505,
658–9, 660n, 661n, 667n, 668–75, 514–15, 537, 545, 551, 562, 582
691n, 696n Francesc Eiximenis, OFM i 436, 501n
Etzwiler, J.P. ii 517n, 539n Francis of Assisi i 136, 149, 459;
Eudes of Châteauroux i 345, 444n ii 627
Eugenius V, pope i 43n Francis Bacon, OCarm ii 527
Eustace, master ii 378 Francis Caracciolo, OP ii 81, 82n,
Eustache of Arras, OFM i 355, 478, 356–7, 454–5, 457n, 510n
495, 513, 515, 520n Francis of Marchia, OFM ii 2, 11, 533,
Eustache of Grandcourt i 498, 525n; 565–7, 570, 600–9, 628
ii 339–41, 343 Francis of Meyronnes, OFM ii 11, 382,
Eustratius i 163; ii 93 474, 519, 533, 564–7, 570, 592n, 600,
Evans, G.R. i 1n, 426n; ii 15, 268n, 602, 609–21, 634, 638
345n, 437n, 493n, 528n, 546n, 652n Franciscus Christophori ii 352n
Évrard, abbot of Clairvaux ii 386 Franciscus Robini de Sancto
Évrard of Voulaines, Val-des-Écoliers Michaele ii 352n
ii 376 Frank, W.A. ii 133, 158n, 658n, 696n
Eynde, D. van den ii 302n Franklin, A. ii 376n
Franks i 473
Faenza ii 346n, 350 Freddoso, A. ii 655, 662n, 664n, 665n
Faes de Mottoni, B. i 17n Frederick II, Holy Roman emperor
Fajdek, B. i 17n i 253
Favier, J. i 382n, 383n Frege, G. i 159n
Fécamp ii 383 Friedberg, E. i 357n
Felder, H. i 153n Friedman, R.L. i 8–9, 142n, 143n,
Feltre i 414–15 426n, 439n, 458n; ii 1, 3n, 8–10, 15,
Ferrarius Catalanus, OP i 493n; 59n, 60n, 66n, 73n, 81n, 82n, 345n,
ii 402–4 401–91, 493n, 503n, 511n, 512n,
Ferruolo, S.C. ii 359n 513n, 514n, 520n, 522n, 526n, 535n,
Ferté, la ii 394 538n, 548n, 600, 601n, 603n, 604n,
Fidora, A. ii 249 605n, 628n, 689n, 694n, 697n, 704n
Figeac ii 629 Friemar ii 550
Finke, H. i 176n; ii 353n, 354n, Frioli, D. ii 135n
580n Funke, G. ii 218n
Fioravanti, G. i 219n, 233n; ii 232n Fussenegger, G. i 428n, 429n
Fiorentino, F. ii 610n
Fitzpatrick, N.A. ii 667n Gabriel, A.L. i 345n
Flanders, Flemish i 454, 462, 480 Gaetani: see Boniface VIII
Flasch, K. ii 514n Gaianos i 548
Flavius Renatus Vegetius: see Vegetius Gál, G. i 142n, 429n; ii 76n, 626n,
Fleury ii 380 656–7, 658n

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Galle, G. ii 51n, 81n, 82n, 126n, 128n Giardina, G.R. i 219n

Ganterus: see Gonterus Gil de Zamora, OFM i 411
Garand, M.-C. i 178n Gilbert of Poitiers i 184, 201, 208
Garfagnini, G.C. ii 135n Gilchrist, J. i 476n, 499n
Garinus ii 351, 357 Giles of Lessines, OP i 139, 148, 484,
Gascony, Gascons i 383n, 408–9; ii 610 498, 501n, 549–50, 551n; ii 364n
Gauchet, M. i 349n Giles of Montmirail, Val-des-Écoliers
Gaudry, OClun ii 384 ii 376
Gaussin, P.-R. ii 372n, 373n, 375n Giles of Rome, OESA i 6, 8–9, 12–13,
Gauthier, Val-des-Écoliers ii 376 139, 148, 174, 176n, 201, 204–5,
Gauthier, R.-A. i 33n, 53–4, 55n, 71, 206n, 210–11, 215, 233–86, 313,
74n, 78n, 81–3, 88n, 91, 98, 100n, 351–2, 418–19, 433, 446, 463, 466–7,
101–3, 106, 112, 119, 121–2, 124, 479, 493–5, 496n, 501, 510n, 511n,
353n, 357n, 358n, 360n, 361n, 369n, 513, 514n, 518n, 521, 528, 531n, 536,
370n, 373n, 387n, 389n, 390n, 393n, 541n, 543n, 549–50, 551n, 552n,
394n, 397n, 398n, 399n, 400n, 484n, 553n; ii 3, 10, 20n, 35–43, 46, 54n,
485n, 488n, 489n, 494n, 495n, 512n, 72n, 164n, 215, 335n, 351, 357, 364n,
515n, 517n, 520n, 522n, 526n, 533n, 378, 392, 412n, 421–2, 459–60, 467,
536n, 541n, 542n, 545n, 552n, 553n 473, 475, 545n, 546–7, 550, 554, 565,
Gelber, H.G. ii 423n, 427n, 432n, 567–8, 703
666n, 673n, 678n, 679n, 680n, 681–4, Gilles Aycelin i 416n
696n, 697n Gilles, H. i 408n
Genet, J.-P. i 379n Gillespie, R.E. ii 679n, 681n, 682–3,
Gensler, M. ii 81n 684n
Geoffrey Chaucer ii 679 Gillon, L.-B. ii 405–6
Geoffrey Herdeby ii 689n, 697n Gilson, É. i 144n; ii 15, 25n, 537
Geoffrey of Plessis ii 380 Gilson, J.P. ii 136n
Gerard of Abbeville i 5, 7, 10, 13, 32n, Giordanengo, G. i 386n
40n, 71, 72n, 74–6, 136–7, 140, 143, Giovanni da Murrovalle, OFM i 408n,
172, 348, 355, 357, 359, 360n, 371–4, 409n
387, 392–5, 397n, 400n, 402, 436n, Giovinnazzo ii 598
452, 477, 479, 481n, 483, 484n, 496n, Glorie, F. ii 485n
498, 500, 502–3, 510n, 523–4, 525n, Glorieux, P. i 2–6, 18–19, 26n, 27, 31n,
544n, 556; ii 406, 693 35n, 37n, 39n, 40n, 41n, 44n, 51n,
Gerard of Bologna, OCarm i 521n; 56n, 72n, 106, 135n, 141, 151, 157n,
ii 10, 354, 356–7, 493–4, 496, 502–3, 171, 174–6. 179, 181, 186, 206n,
505–14, 517–18, 523, 537–9, 545n 209n, 215, 216n, 217, 220n, 233n,
Gerard Odonis, OFM i 42n, 409n, 234n, 236n, 240, 241n, 242–3, 245n,
503, 504n; ii 11–12, 75n, 97, 98n, 350, 288n, 289n, 292–3, 294n, 295–6, 298,
565–7, 570, 629–39, 697n 301–2, 304n, 319n, 343, 345n, 348n,
Gerard of Saint-Victor i 443, 460, 472; 351, 378n, 403, 407n, 412n, 418n,
ii 351–2, 355–7, 360–1, 370n, 372–3, 420–2, 429n, 442n, 444n, 459n, 460n,
392n, 444 464–6, 472n, 473n, 476, 478n, 479n,
Gerard of Siena, OESA i 479, 493–4; 483n, 484n, 486n, 493n, 497n, 502n,
ii 10, 12, 513, 546–7, 549, 557–62, 510n, 513n, 514n, 518n, 519n, 520n,
568, 694 521n, 523n, 524n, 525n, 526n, 528n,
Gerard of Troyes, Val-des-Écoliers 531n, 542n, 543n, 553n, 555n, 556n;
ii 376 ii 2, 5–13, 20n, 60n, 72, 77n, 81, 82n,
Germany, Germans i 403n; ii 73, 406, 83–5, 89, 99, 101n, 132, 203, 233–4,
472, 504, 524, 545, 550–1, 572, 641, 244n, 256, 278n, 333–5, 336n, 337n,
654 338, 340–3, 345n, 346n, 347–53,
Gervais of Mont-Saint-Éloi: see Servais 354n, 360–1, 363–4, 367n, 368n,
Geyer, B. i 442n, 549n, 550n, 551n 369n, 370, 371n, 373n, 374, 376,
Giacopo Fey, OFM ii 504n 377n, 378, 379n, 380n, 381n, 383n,

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384n, 385n, 388, 390n, 391, 393n, Graf, D.T. i 319n; ii 84n, 102, 120, 221,
394n, 401n, 403, 404n, 405–9, 410n, 503n, 539n
412n, 416n, 419n, 420n, 421n, 423–4, Gräfengaden i 122
428n, 429n, 431n, 434, 435n, 439–40, Grand, P. i 348n, 544n, 556n
441n, 442, 449–50, 454–5, 456n, 457, Grant, E. ii 701, 702n
459, 461n, 464–6, 473n, 496–8, 500n, Gratian i 368–9, 372, 397n, 529n
501n, 506n, 508, 510–12, 518, 519n, Grau, A.F. ii 135n
522, 524–5, 527–8, 531, 535n, 546–8, Gravina, D. ii 456n
550n, 552, 554–60, 562–73, 580–2, Greeks i 88, 142–3; ii 94
585–97, 598n, 601, 610, 628n, 630, Green, R. ii 624n
653n, 688n, 689n, 691–4, 697n, 701, Green-Pedersen, N.G. i 511n; ii 19n
703–4 Gregory I the Great, pope i 63, 84–5;
Gloucester ii 382 ii 93, 543, 596n
Goddard, E.D. ii 352n, 545n Gregory VII, pope i 476, 491
Godfrey of Cornwall, OCarm ii 688 Gregory IX, pope i 499n; ii 620, 677
Godfrey of Fontaines i 5, 8, 10, 12–13, Gregory X, pope i 375n, 382, 384
30, 45, 148, 172, 185, 201, 204, 206, Gregory XII, pope i 43n
234, 240–1, 243n, 245–7, 265n, 278, Gregory of Burgundy, Val-des-
283, 287–344, 348–9, 352, 354–5, Écoliers ii 376
357–8, 361–5, 367, 374–85, 387, Gregory of Lucca, OESA ii 10, 351,
390–4, 396, 397n, 400n, 419, 425n, 355–7, 546, 552–3, 568
441–2, 444, 447–9, 453–4, 456–9, Gregory of Rimini, OESA ii 97,
462–3, 477, 480, 481n, 484n, 487, 546–7, 549–50, 556n, 557, 562
488n, 489, 491, 493–4, 496n, 498, Groppo, G. ii 435n
501, 502n, 503–4, 520n, 521n, 522n, Grossi, P. i 504n
523n, 524n, 525, 529n, 531n; ii 1, 3, Grottaferrata i 17n
9, 20n, 43–51, 53, 55, 59–61, 63, 67, Grundmann, H. i 347n
72, 81, 89, 98, 99n, 105, 107, 199, Gubbio i 29n
202, 217, 221, 227, 250, 252, 336–8, Guerric of Saint-Quentin, OP i 9,
353, 356–7, 364, 367–8, 393, 412–16, 26–8, 41, 51n, 66n, 524n; ii 1, 402n,
417n, 418, 439, 440n, 467, 475, 536, 403n
538–9, 548 Guglielmo Centueri de Cremona,
Gómez Caffarena, J. i 174–6, 213, OFM ii 557n
242n, 243; ii 704n Guiard de Cressonessart ii 381n
Gondras, A.-J. i 142n, 356n, 420n, 421, Guibert, J. de i 113n
538n, 540n, 544n Guillaume Durand i 357n, 375n, 376–8
Goñi, J. ii 99n, 521n Guillaume Grimoard, OSB: see Urban V
Gonsalvus of Spain, OFM i 293, Guillaume de Leus, OP i 405, 408
296–8, 343; ii 2 Guillaume de Vorillon, OFM ii 622–4
Gonterus ii 342 Guillelmus de Millat (or Nilach),
González-Haba, M. ii 60n, 61n, 62n, OFM i 419n
63n, 64n, 65n, 423 Guimaraes, A. de ii 271n, 431n, 432n,
Goris, W. i 9; ii 5, 6n, 411, 472n, 493n, 433n, 434n, 435–6, 437n, 444, 445n,
503–4, 507, 538n 452n, 453n, 456n
Gorman, M. i 114–17 Guldentops, G. i 172n, 173n, 208n,
Gosselin, E.A. ii 583n 214n; ii 209n
Gotha ii 550 Gullick, M. ii 428n
Grabmann, M. i 171; ii 209, 373, Gumbert-Hepp, M. i 19n
403n, 409, 411, 466n, 467, 472–3, Gusinde, M. ii 84n, 122
699n Gutierrez, D. i 233n; ii 545n, 548
Gracia, J.J.E. i 447n; ii 18n, 19n, 23n, Guy of l‘Aumône, OCist ii 8, 360, 362,
51n, 57n, 70n, 235n, 432n, 493n, 387–90, 396, 398–9
502n, 519, 520n, 523, 538n, 539n, Guy of Beaulieu: see Guy of Pernes
610n Guy of Cluny: see Guy of Pernes

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Guy of Foulques: see Clement IV 281n, 282–6, 313, 320n, 348–52,

Guy of Pernes, OClun i 482, 484n, 357n, 358–9, 361–4, 366–7, 373–4,
496n; ii 340–1, 360–1, 384–6, 396 376n, 378–82, 384n, 388n, 389–90,
Guy Terrena, OCarm i 443–4, 496n, 391n, 393–7, 398n, 399n, 400n,
525n; ii 232, 234–5, 240–1, 244, 249, 419–21, 426n, 433, 444–7, 449,
277, 278n, 280, 330–1, 356–7, 450n, 453–4, 456–7, 459n, 472–3, 477, 482,
454, 462, 494, 514, 517–26, 532–3, 484, 485n, 486–8, 492–5, 497n,
537–9, 551 500–1, 502n, 503, 510–11, 519n,
Guyon, C. ii 343n, 353n, 359n, 375n, 521–2, 523n, 524n, 525n, 528, 531n,
376n, 377n, 378n 537, 540; ii 1, 3, 5, 9, 18n, 20n, 23–35,
Guyot, B.G. i 27, 35n, 45n, 64n, 112n, 37–42, 45–6, 47n, 51n, 58–9, 64, 67,
376n, 459n; ii 83n, 102, 104, 111, 69, 76, 81, 98, 157–8, 164n, 165n,
335n, 369n 166n, 167n, 181–8, 199–200, 202,
204–11, 213–17, 219, 221, 224,
Hackett, J. i 153n 226–9, 336, 339n, 345, 357, 364,
Hadrian VI, pope ii 699 367–8, 393, 404, 411–17, 420–2,
Hali ii 93 424–5, 432, 446–7, 465, 467, 475,
Halm, C. ii 136n, 137n 481–91, 505, 535–6, 538–9, 610,
Halphen, L. i 345n 641n
Hamelin, A.M. i 478n, 498n Henry of Harclay i 478, 484n; ii 82n,
Hamesse, J. i 3n, 8–10, 15, 17–48, 51n, 232, 245, 254, 356, 429, 501–2, 504
81n, 168n; ii 12, 126n, 165n, 373n, Henry of Herford ii 413
383n, 403n, 620n Henry of Hesse (Langenstein) i 501n;
Hannibaldus Hannibaldi, OP ii 402–3, ii 352n
536 Henry of Lübeck, OP ii 3, 9, 73–5,
Hardwick, C. ii 135n 426n, 429, 464, 466–73, 475
Hartmannus de Augusta: see Herman of Henry (Totting) of Oyta i 501n
Augsburg Henry, B. i 121n
Hasse, D.G. i 284n Hentschel, F. ii 84n, 89, 99n, 103–6,
Hauke, H. ii 66n, 427–8 122
Hauréau, B. i 508n; ii 363, 378n, 381, Heraklion: see Candia
457n Hereford i 281
Haverals, M. i 172n, 180, 195–6, 267n, Herman of Augsburg, OP ii 464, 698
453n Hernando, J. i 485n
Heidelberg i 45n; ii 694 Hervaeus Natalis, OP i 289, 461, 531n;
Heiman, A.J. ii 66, 418, 440n ii 2–3, 7, 9, 70–4, 77, 79, 213–14, 218,
Heinzmann, R. ii 591n 223, 227–8, 271–2, 279, 357, 413–14,
Henninger, M.G. ii 51n, 70, 73n, 254, 416, 417n, 418n, 431–49, 452, 459,
493n, 502n 463n, 474–5, 510–12, 536, 539,
Henquinet, F.M. i 41n 565–6, 703–4
Henricus Heinbuch: see Henry of Hesse Herveus Sulven ii 352n
Henry III, king of England i 197 Heydeck, K. ii 99n
Henry Amandi ii 81n, 227, 351, 356–7 Heylbut, G. i 163n
Henry of Friemar the Elder: see Henry Heynck, V. ii 413, 414n, 416n, 418
the German Heysse, A. i 420n; ii 302n
Henry of Friemar the Younger ii 550, Hilary of Poitiers i 99
552, 568 Hissette, R. 145n, 193, 207, 254n, 256n,
Henry the German, OESA i 441, 266n, 270n, 276n, 365n, 511n; ii 20n,
466–7, 472; ii 201, 356–7, 546–7, 214n, 314n, 363n, 369n
550–2, 568, 643, 648–9 Hocedez, E. i 174–5, 242n, 262n,
Henry of Ghent i 5, 8, 10–14, 44–5, 418n, 419; ii 44n, 50n, 51n, 70n, 83n,
138, 145, 148–9, 171–231, 234–5, 89, 94, 102, 105–6, 112, 477
241–3, 246, 259–60, 262–3, 265n, Hödl, L. i 8–9, 172n, 180, 195–6,
267n, 268, 269n, 271, 277, 279–80, 199n, 234n, 267n, 453n, 456n, 461n;

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ii 5, 19n, 28n, 72, 73n, 81n, 94n, Imbach, R. i 435; ii 14n, 46n, 98n,
199–229, 245, 413n, 435n, 438–44, 505n, 649n
459, 593n Innocent III, pope i 370
Hoenen, M.J.F.M. i 4n; ii 500n Innocent IV, pope ii 388
Hoeres, W. ii 56n Innocent V, pope: see Peter of Tarentaise,
Hoffmann, F. i 24n, 25n; ii 697n OP
Hoffmans, J. i 243n, 287n, 288n, 290, Inoue, J. i 111n
338, 355n, 357n, 361n, 362n, 363n, Iohannis Gewss i 121
364n, 365n, 367n, 375n, 376n, 377n, Ireland ii 496, 545n
378n, 379n, 380n, 381n, 382n, 383n, Iribarren, I. ii 432n, 446n, 448n
384n, 385n, 387n, 390n, 391n, 393n, Italy, Italians i 52, 71, 86, 102–3, 106,
394n, 397n, 400n, 448n, 449n, 454n, 141, 240, 288n, 382n, 403, 406,
457n, 458n, 462n, 481n, 484n, 488n, 409–10, 411n, 473, 476n, 485n;
489n, 491n, 493n, 494n, 496n, 498n, ii 346–9, 393, 408, 430, 505, 545–6,
501n, 502n, 503n, 504n, 521n, 522n, 555, 600, 654
523n, 524n, 525n, 531n; ii 20n, 44n, Ivo of Caen, OP ii 356–7, 440, 442
45n, 46n, 47n, 48n, 49n, 50n, 67n, Izumi, S. ii 450n
252n, 336n
Hofmann, G. i 414n, 436n J., OFM ii 357
Hollander, R. i 92n Jacobus Ber.: see Benedict XII
Honorius III, pope ii 375 Jacobus Dalos: see James of Aaleus
Honorius IV, pope i 198, 201, 234, 251 Jacopo da Fabriano, OFM i 407
Hood, J.Y.B. i 94n Jacquart, D. i 39n
Hooper, M.R. ii 626n, 627 Jacques Fournier, OCist: see Benedict
Horst, U. ii 466n XII
Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio) i 368, Jacques de Molay, Templar ii 353n
370n, 371–2, 373n; ii 93 Jacques du Quesnoy, OFM i 14, 407,
House, R.H. ii 335n 423–5, 433
Houser, R.E. i 118n, 142n Jadin, L. ii 387n
Hugh, OP ii 534 James of Aaleus, OSA ii 360, 362,
Hugh of Digne, OFM i 492n 378–9
Hugh of Novocastro, OFM ii 356–7, James des Alleus: see James of Aaleus
624n James of Aqui, OP i 119n
Hugh of Saint-Cher, OP i 25, 26n, 39 James of Ascoli, OFM i 423; ii 139,
Hugh of St Victor i 98, 165, 456n; ii 351, 354, 356–7, 570, 590–4, 640–2,
372 644–6
Hughes, B. i 136n James Capoccio: see James of Viterbo
Hugo Lenvoisie ii 352n James de Corbolio ii 353, 356
Hugo, V. i 508 James of Dijon, OCist ii 354
Hugolino, bishop of Faenza ii 346n, James of Eltville, OCist ii 354n
350 James of Lausanne, OP ii 8, 348–50,
Hugolino of Orvieto, OESA ii 354n, 352, 356
547, 550 James of Metz, OP i 517n, 518n;
Huguccio (Hugh of Pisa) i 370n, 400; ii 19n, 413, 432, 442n
ii 93 James of Pamiers, OESA ii 10, 12,
Hüllen, J. ii 19n 546–7, 549, 558, 560, 562–8, 601–2,
Humbert of Preuilly, OCist ii 387 694
Humbert of Romans, OP i 22n, 23 James de Royallieu, Val-des-Écoliers
Humphreys, K.W. i 29n, 47n ii 376
Hungary i 371n; ii 629 James of Thérines, OCist i 6, 473,
Huning, H.A. i 409n, 410n 531n; ii 2, 8, 354, 360, 362, 370n, 372,
387, 391–4, 396
Idanna ii 352n James of Viterbo, OESA i 29–30, 32,
Île-de-France ii 394 37n, 236, 242–3, 296n, 307–10, 320n,

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321, 334–7, 339, 442, 450–1, 514n, John Dorstein ii 699

518–19, 520n; ii 2–3, 9–10, 51–5, John Duns Scotus, OFM i 9, 11, 138–9,
61–2, 77, 114, 357, 364n, 412–15, 154, 158, 160–1, 170, 409n, 423, 427,
417, 463n, 475, 546–50, 563, 565–7 471n, 478, 487, 490, 520n, 522n; ii
James, M.R. ii 135n 2, 4–5, 10, 12, 18, 19n, 33n, 56n, 60,
Jan Hus ii 699 64–7, 69–71, 73, 77n, 78–9, 97, 108,
Jansen, B. i 155n, 160n, 413n, 416n, 131–98, 211, 225, 232–3, 250, 348n,
428n; ii 22n, 33n, 56n, 581n 349–50, 357, 371, 423–6, 432, 443n,
Janssen, R. i 55n 465, 474–5, 496–7, 501, 503, 511,
Jean de la Fontaine, OFM i 407, 427n 514, 535–6, 538–9, 550, 565, 567,
Jean de Rocquigny, OPraem ii 373 569–72, 584–5, 594, 598, 607–8,
Jellouschek, C. ii 455n, 458n, 463n 621–3, 625, 640, 643–4, 654, 661,
Jenkins, H. i 507n 676, 703
Jerome i 93, 99 John Duval: see John du Val
Jerome of Ascoli, OFM i 153, 412 John de Dyscowe of Bologna, OP
Jeschke, T. ii 81n, 109, 454n ii 466
Jews i 7, 26n, 88, 93, 147, 209, 382n, John of Falisca i 295n; ii 354n
383, 386, 395–6, 398, 410, 451, 499, John Fisher i 122
524; ii 366, 384, 394, 583–4 John of Freiburg, OP i 60
Jodogne, P. i 178n John of Ghent ii 205–7, 211, 227
Johannes Caillaudi de Quercu ii 352n John Grafton/Crafton, OP ii 688–9,
Johannes de Chateaufort/Chetiafort: see 697
John of Châtillon John the Grammarian ii 93
Johannes de Diodona ii 352n John of Hé, OCist ii 387
Johannes Textoris ii 352n John Hiltalinger of Basel, OESA ii 547,
Johannes de Trelon ii 352n 550, 562
John XXII, pope i 42n, 43–4, 461, John of Jandun ii 205, 207, 232, 235,
499n; ii 11, 267, 346n, 350, 372, 238, 382, 644
382–3, 392, 409, 410n, 456n, 461–2, John of Lana, OESA ii 546, 556–7,
518, 524, 555, 595, 601, 609, 626, 568
630–3, 638–9, 654, 691–3, 698 John Lesage i 18n; ii 2, 81
John of Alleux i 199–200 John of Limoges, OCist ii 387
John Baconthorpe, OCarm ii 9–10, John of Lixy, OClun ii 384
12, 97, 232, 339n, 414, 493–5, 500, John Mankael ii 501
502–4, 514, 521–3, 525–41, 688, 694 John (de Maroeuil) of Mont-Saint-Éloi
John Bale, OCarm ii 348n, 497, 501–2, i 451–2, 467–8, 472, 482; ii 351,
513–14, 532 356–7, 360–1, 363, 370–1, 392n
John of Barastre (OP) ii 359, 363n John de Mes (Metz), OESA ii 567n
John of Barastre, Mont-Saint-Éloi ii John of Mirecourt, OCist i 2n; ii 383
362–3 John of Murro, OFM i 176n, 246, 422
John Birchel/Berchel ii 353, 356–7 John of Murrovalle ii 341
John of Bologna: see John of Lana John of Naples, OP i 467n, 469–71,
John Brammart, OCarm ii 504 477, 481, 482n, 484n, 486n, 487–90,
John of Bray, Val-des-Écoliers ii 342–3, 492, 493n, 495, 497, 498n; ii 2–3, 9,
376 12, 77–8, 356, 429, 433, 434n, 443,
John Briard of Ath ii 699 446n, 449, 452, 455–64, 475, 694
John Buridan i 162; ii 644 John Paignote of St Victoria, OESA ii
John Capreolus, OP ii 97, 413, 513 347n, 348, 356–7
John of Châtillon, Val-des-Écoliers John of Paris, OCarm ii 533
i 493n; ii 342, 361, 376 John of Paris (Quidort), OP i 147, 451,
John Chrysostom i 63, 99; ii 93 463, 514–16, 517n, 518; ii 3, 21n,
John of Cirey, OCist ii 395n 66–9, 72–3, 77, 79, 343, 356, 374,
John of Damascus i 63, 97, 512–13, 405, 418, 429, 440, 442–3, 450n
530n, 545, 548n; ii 26, 46, 93, 265 John Pecham, OFM i 10–11, 40, 41n,

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44, 54–5, 82–4, 86–7, 135–41, 143–4, 446n, 451n, 454n, 455n, 456n, 459n,
146–8, 153, 157–9, 166–7, 170, 201, 461, 462n, 464n, 465n, 466n
208, 281, 377–8, 404, 418, 452, 453n, Kalb, A. i 512n
480, 483, 484n, 491n, 492n, 493n, Kaluza, Z. ii 14n, 98n, 278n
494, 496n, 502n, 503n, 525n, 527–8, Kant, I. i 217
531n, 541n, 543n, 545n, 550n, 555n, Kantorowicz, H. i 508n
556; ii 348n, 369, 406n, 419 Karger, E. i 343, 398n
John of Pershore ii 341–2 Kärkkäinen, P. ii 272n
John of Pouilly i 5, 9, 148, 442, 443n, Kaye, J. i 490n, 491n, 499n
460–1, 464, 471–2; ii 2, 5, 81, 94, 97, Keele, L. ii 651n
199–229, 353, 356–7, 382, 435, 453, Keele, R. i 9; ii 11–12, 464n, 493n,
475, 551, 554 651–92, 696n, 697n, 704n
John of Prato, OP ii 612 Keinz, F. ii 136n
John of Prémontré ii 373–4 Kelley, F.E. ii 419n, 421n, 422, 655,
John of Prisches, OPraem ii 374 662n, 664n, 665n, 691n
John Quidort: see John of Paris (Quidort) Kempshall, M.S. i 219n, 307n, 309n,
John of Reading, OFM ii 688 310n, 447, 448n, 450–1, 454, 456n,
John Regis ii 354n 457, 458n, 462n
John of Rodington, OFM ii 12, 651, Kennedy, L. ii 134n, 532n
687–92, 697 Kenny, A. ii 28n
John of Saint-Germain ii 500 Kent, B. i 309, 319n, 320n
John of St Victor, OSA ii 357 Ker, N.R. ii 138n
John Scotus Eriugena i 63 Kertzer, D.I. ii 384n
John of Sedeloos, Val-des-Écoliers ii Kessler, A. ii 649n
376 Kestenberg-Gladstein, R. ii 699n
John Sharpe ii 134, 626n Kible, B. ii 13
John Sindewint, OCist ii 361, 387 Kieldrecht ii 205
John of Tongres, OPraem ii 360, 362, King, E. i 136n
374–5, 396 King, P. ii 18n, 57n, 65n
John Trisse of Nîmes, OCarm ii 514 Kingsford, C.L. i 480n
John du Val, Val-des-Écoliers ii 357, Kirshner, J. i 485n, 499n
360–1, 374, 376–7 Klepper, D.C. ii 583, 585, 590
John Varenacker ii 699 Klima, G. ii 66n
John of Waarde, OCist ii 342, 360–1, Knuuttila, S. ii 272n, 643–4, 647n
387–90, 392 Kobusch, T. i 418n; ii 97n, 273n, 454n,
John Walsham ii 500 513n, 520n
John Walsingham ii 500, 501n Koch, J. i 319n, 461n; ii 84n, 94, 102,
John, J. ii 373n 105, 122, 199n, 201n, 431n, 433n,
Johnson, M.F. i 92n, 95n, 118n 434–5, 436n, 438n, 439n, 441, 442n,
Jolif, J.-Y. i 389n 448n, 449–50, 451n, 453, 454n, 455n,
Jordan, M.D. ii 21n 456n, 457, 458n, 462, 473n, 474, 510
Jordan, W.C. ii 354n, 381n, 391, 392n, Kohlenberger, H. ii 28n
393n, 394n Köhler, T.W. ii 19n, 414n, 415n, 416,
Jossua, J.-P. ii 333n 441n, 442n
Judycka, J. i 511n Konrad von Arnstadt, OFM i 420
Julian of Halicarnassus i 548n Kowalczyk, M. ii 464n
Jullien de Pommerol, M.-H. ii 336n Krakow i 419
Jung, E. i 35n; ii 232n, 235–8, 446n, Kraml, H. i 11, 135, 151–70
474n, 493n Krause, F. ii 580n
Jung-Palczewska, E: see Jung, E. Kraye, J. i 471n
Kremer, O. i 500n
Kaeppeli, T. i 405n, 406n, 422n, 434n; Kretzmann, N. ii 28n
ii 59n, 66n, 341n, 354n, 386n, 401n, Krieger, G. ii 136n
403n, 405n, 411n, 414n, 420n, 427n, Kristeller, P.O. ii 135n

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Krüger, P. i 400n Lawrence, C.H. ii 360n, 379n, 387n

Kübel, W. i 442n Lazaro Soardi: see Soardi, L.
Kuiters, R. i 233n Lazarus i 524
Kuksewicz, Z. ii 232n, 235–6, 238, Lechner, J. i 406n, 423n; ii 689n, 690–1
244 Leclercq, J. i 345n, 355n, 359n, 364n,
Künzle, P. ii 343n, 408–9, 410n, 411, 449n; ii 83n, 94, 102, 110, 366n, 368n,
477–8 371n, 380n, 382n, 389n, 391n
Kuttner, S. i 370n Lecoy de la Marche, A. ii 369n, 376n
Kwanten, F.E. ii 387n Ledoux, A. ii 598–600, 643, 645n,
Kykeley i 5; ii 501 688n
Le Goff, J. i 383n
Laarmann, M. i 172n; ii 19n Lehmann, P. ii 616n
Laberge, D. i 430n Lehner, J. i 466n
Labrosse, H. ii 582n, 583–8 Lehtinen, A. ii 643–4, 647n
Lagarde, G. de i 440 Leijenhorst, C. ii 22n
Lagny-sur-Marne ii 372 Le Mené, M. i 379n
Lambertini, R. i 14–15, 375n, 439–74, Leo I the Great, pope ii 592n
476n, 480n, 523n; ii 94n, 97, 369n, Leonardi, C. ii 232n
394n, 463n, 600n, 610n Le Paige, J. ii 374n
Lamy, M. i 285n Le Puy ii 567
Landgraf, A.M. i 529n Lerner, R.E. i 419n; ii 355n, 381n
Landulph Caracciolo, OFM ii 533, Leuven ii 9, 472
600, 643, 647 Lewes i 135
Lanercost i 404n Libera, A. de i 508n, 511
Lang, A. i 406n, 423n, 466n; ii 507n, Liétbert, bishop of Arras ii 362
539n, 690n Lille ii 333, 390
Langholm, O. i 280n, 388n, 389n, Limousin ii 382
390n, 401n, 475–6, 477n, 478n, 479n, Lindberg, D.C. i 137n
481n, 482n, 484n, 485n, 486n, 488n, Lio, E. i 492n
490n, 491n, 494n, 495n, 496n, 497n, Litt, T. i 111
498n, 499n, 500n, 501, 502n, 504n; Little, A.G. i 25n, 137n, 480n; ii 10,
ii 365n, 550n, 558–60 348n, 381, 419n, 424n, 427n, 429n,
Langres ii 353n 495–500, 502n, 510n
Languedoc, Languedocians i 411, 431, Livesey, S.J. ii 493, 546n
481 Lohr, C. ii 205n, 626n
Laon ii 199 Lombardy, Lombards i 382, 480, 481n,
Laplane, H.P.F. de ii 391n 498
Lapparent, P. de ii 517n London i 24, 543n, 556; ii 11, 231,
Lateran i 453, 498, 499n; ii 224, 620 427, 495–6, 504, 654, 656–9, 664n,
Laurence of Dreux, Val-des-Écoliers 679
ii 353–4, 356–7, 361–2, 370n, 376–8, Long, R.J. i 354n; ii 455n, 457
434n Longpré, E. i 144, 151, 153, 157, 160n;
Laurence of Fougères, OP ii 361 ii 583n, 584–5, 587n, 616, 666n, 688n
Laurence of Nantes, OP ii 351, 353–4, Lord, M.L. ii 428n
356–7, 361, 377, 432n, 434 Lorraine i 418; ii 336n
Laurence of Poulangy, Val-des-Écoliers Lot ii 629
ii 342–3, 351, 353, 360–1, 376–8 Lottin, O. i 31n, 174–5, 241n, 242n,
Laurent le Breton: see Laurence of 287n, 289–91, 315, 330n, 441n, 442n;
Nantes ii 407
Laurent, M.-H. i 555n; ii 406n Louis of Bavaria, Holy Roman
Laurentius Anglicus, OSB ii 241, 353, emperor ii 551, 654
361, 377, 382 Louis IX, king of France i 382, 480; ii
Laurière, Eusèbe de i 383n 362–3, 405n, 504
Lawn, B. i 39n, 44n Louis X, king of France ii 551

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Louis of Anjou, OFM i 408, 418n Marasca, C., OCarm ii 529–30, 535–6,
Louvain i 40, 290; ii 699 540
Low Countries ii 505 Marcel, OClun ii 384
Lubec, H. de i 529n March, J.M. ii 455n, 456n, 460
Lühty, C. ii 22n Marcolino, V. ii 556n
Luisetto, G. ii 137n Marcuzzi, P.G. ii 518n, 520n
Luna, C. i 215, 233n, 234n, 235n, Marenbon, J. ii 238
236n, 240n, 241n, 244n, 245n, 247n, Marguerite Porete ii 205, 370, 372,
256n, 263n, 271n, 278n, 286n, 409n, 381, 392, 550, 552n, 591
433n, 543n, 549n, 552n; ii 35n, 254, Mariani, N. ii 601–5, 606n, 607,
335n 609
Lusignan, S. ii 375n Marino, E. i 406n; ii 429n
Lutz-Bachmann, H. ii 249 Marmursztejn, E. i 7–8, 10, 13–14,
Lyons i 142, 375n, 377n, 382, 498, 60n, 73n, 78n, 94n, 220n, 345–402,
499n 452; ii 337n, 366n, 369n, 391n
Lyre ii 582 Marne ii 353n
Maroeuil ii 370n
Macken, R. i 171n, 172n, 173n, 175, Marquette ii 390
176n, 177–8, 180, 182–5, 187–9, Marrone, J.T. ii 453n
191–2, 195–6, 198, 200, 202–5, 208, Marseilles i 408n
212–14, 242n, 247n, 260n, 267n, Marsilius of Padua ii 382, 524
277n, 357n, 359n, 361n, 362n, 376n, Marston i 143
381n, 384n, 388n, 389n, 391n, 398n, Marti de Barcelona ii 626n
399n, 400n, 447n, 453n, 485n, 486n, Martin, St i 249, 527n, 555n
488n, 492n, 494n, 500n, 510n, 523n, Martin IV, pope i 176, 189, 198–201,
524n, 531n; ii 206, 215n, 216n, 224n, 206, 208, 211, 214, 362, 453; ii 224
336n, 360n, 364n, 414n, 420n, 447n Martin of Abbeville, OFM ii 357, 570,
MacLaren, B. i 137n 596–8, 639
Mâcon i 421; ii 335, 338 Martin of Dacia ii 19n
Maguelone i 416n Martin, R.-M. ii 436n, 441n, 446n,
Maier, A. i 416n; ii 135n, 232n, 233–8, 447n
242, 245, 249–50, 257, 383n, 397n, Martin, S. ii 410n, 411n
401n, 455n, 456n, 457n, 461, 462n, Martin, T. i 527n, 543n, 555n
463n, 464n, 518, 519n, 533–4, 539n, Matthew of Aquasparta, OFM
630–2, 697n, 701 i 10–11, 135, 141–3, 147, 160, 170,
Maierù, A. i 40n; ii 252n 404, 413, 430, 482n, 500, 503, 538n,
Maillard, P.-Y. i 64n 540n; ii 339n, 430, 475
Maine i 383 Matthew Orsini, OP ii 349
Majorca ii 517 Matthew Paris ii 379
Mäkinen, V. i 219n, 458, 459n Maumont ii 382
Maldura, F. ii 137n Maurer, A.A. i 50n; ii 660n
Mamelukes i 371n Maurice of Ireland ii 611n
Mandonnet, R.P. i 49n, 50n, 51n, 58n, Mauro, V. i 417n
65n, 67n, 69n, 87n, 96, 98n, 193, 207, Mazzarella, P. ii 414n
240, 242, 256n, 259n, 265n, 266n, McAuliffe, J.D. i 56n
270n, 276n, 335n, 536n, 541n, 551n; McCord Adams, M. i 261n
ii 333 McCready, W.D. i 461n
Manfredi, A. i 41n, 43n McGowan, J.K. ii 506n
Manganaro, P. i 219n McGrade, A.S. ii 702n
Mangenot, E. i 548n McLaughlin, T.P. i 388n, 495n, 497n,
Mangiapane, S. 446n 499n, 503n
Mansi, G.D. i 382n McMichael, S.J. i 476n
Mantovani, M. ii 458n, 459n, 460–1, McNab, B. ii 381n
463n Meier, L. i 403n, 435n

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Meijer, A. de i 233n Mulchahey, M. i 24n, 404, 405n; ii 134

Meirinhos, J.F. i 332n; ii 643n Mulder, W. i 464–5
Melani, G. i 137n Müller, J.P. i 514n; ii 66–7, 68n, 69n
Mengaldo, P.V. i 92n Münster i 47; ii 9, 472
Merlin the Magician i 249, 261 Munich i 549
Merovingians i 468 Murano, G. i 38n; ii 85n, 99n, 101n
Merta, F. ii 463n Muslims i 88; ii 92
Metz i 418n Myers, S.E. i 476n
Meyer, G. i 25n; ii 136n, 137n Mynors, R.A.B. ii 137n
Michael VIII Palaiologos, Byzantine
emperor i 371 Nahon, G. i 383n
Michael Aiguani, OCarm ii 514 Naples i 15, 52, 103, 383, 418, 471,
Michael of Cesena, OFM ii 595, 601, 481; ii 454, 456, 459n, 460–2, 547–8,
629 554n, 555, 598, 600, 694
Michael Coulon, Mont-Saint-Éloi ii Narbonne i 14, 184, 413–14, 416, 433,
363 436–7, 478, 481; ii 432n, 496, 500
Michael of Massa, OESA ii 414, 549, Nash, P.W. i 241n, 244n, 259n, 271n,
566–7 279n
Michalski, K. ii 514n, 682n Navarre ii 625
Michaud-Quantin, P. i 346n, 469, Nebbiai-dalla Guarda, D. ii 380n
471n; ii 25n, 387n, 463n Neumann, B. i 319n, 329n
Michiels, G. ii 472n Newman, W. i 249n
Miethke, J. i 439, 461n, 462n, 463n, Nicholas III, pope i 457; ii 410
464, 469, 472n Nicholas IV, pope i 209, 354, 409n,
Milan i 249; ii 345, 350 472n; ii 419
Minio-Paluello, L. i 22n, 512n Nicholas of Autrecourt ii 383
Ministeri, B. ii 555n Nicholas of Bar-le-Duc i 5–6, 421; ii
Mohammed i 364 7–8, 81, 333–43, 360–1, 365n, 370,
Moisisch, B, ii 586n 376, 386, 389–90, 410n, 411
Möhle, H. ii 136n Nicholas of Cusa i 154, 161, 170
Molina, B. i 438n, 476n Nicholas of Duisans, Mont-Saint-Éloi
Mollat, G. ii 385n ii 363
Möller, J. ii 66n Nicholas of Gorran, OP i 184
Mommsen, T. i 396n Nicholas of Lisieux i 136
Monahan, A. ii 83n, 102, 112 Nicholas of Lyra, OFM i 147, 482n;
Mongols i 371 ii 11, 570, 580, 582–91, 634
Mont César Abbey ii 472 Nicholas de Noulette, Mont-Saint-Éloi
Montdidier ii 367, 385–6, 396 ii 363
Montpellier i 15, 407–9, 412–13, Nicholas of Ockham, OFM ii 424n
416–17, 425n, 427n, 432–3, 435–6, Nicholas du Pressoir i 5, 419, 422;
478, 481; ii 55, 58, 532–3, 598–9 ii 341, 367
Monza ii 611n Nicholas of Strasbourg, OP i 37; ii 584
Moos, M.F. i 49n, 50n, 58n, 65n, 67n, Nicholas Trivet, OP i 521n; ii 66n,
69n, 87n, 96, 98n, 530n, 532n, 533n, 425–9, 463n, 501, 703
534n, 535n, 539n, 540n, 541n, 544n, Nicholas of Vaux-Cernay, OCist i 33n;
545n, 546n, 556n, 557n, 558n ii 8, 360, 362, 387, 394–6, 400
Morard, M. ii 464n Nicholas de Vich, OESA ii 567n
Morewedge, P. i 263n; ii 28n Nickerson, W.E. i 122
Morimond ii 394 Nicole Oresme i 162; ii 694n
Mortara, Edgardo ii 384 Nielsen, L.O. i 9; ii 6–7, 232n, 235,
Moscard, J. i 357n, 375n 238, 239n, 240, 241n, 242–3, 244n,
Mountain, W.J. ii 485n 248n, 249–50, 264n, 265n, 267–331,
Mucciolus, G.M. ii 135n 436–7, 465, 493n, 518, 520n, 525,
Muessig, C. i 1n 526n, 600

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Nijmegen ii 524 Paasch, J.T. ii 705n

Nilus ii 342, 390 Pacetti, D. ii 560n
Nîmes ii 514 Pacheco, M.C. i 332n; ii 643n
Noble, M.T. i 72n Padua i 12, 233–8, 410; ii 459, 460n,
Nolan, K. i 261n 555, 611n
Nolan, S.F. ii 493n, 507 Paganus, OESA ii 534
Nold, P. i 409n; ii 595n Paluch, M. i 113–14
Noonan, J.T. i 475n, 493n, 494n, 495n, Pamplona ii 452n
499n, 501n Panella, E. i 406n; ii 401n, 409–10,
Noone, T.B. i 9, 49n; ii 4–5, 6n, 79n, 429–30
131–98, 235n, 243, 244n, 248n, Panovsky, E. i 56n
264n, 265n, 432n, 502n, 539n, 610n, Papal Curia i 2, 11, 14, 40, 41n, 44,
624n 135, 139, 141, 236, 404, 406, 468; ii
Norbert of Xanten ii 373 199, 214, 222, 395, 430, 602, 610
Normandy, Normans i 417; ii 582 Paravicini-Bagliani, A. i 246n, 261n,
Northumbria i 417 286n; ii 252n
Norwich i 144 Paré, G. i 17n, 21n
Novara ii 557 Paris i 1–2, 4–6, 9–15, 17–18, 24–31,
Noves ii 626 33n, 37n, 40, 42–8, 52, 54, 60, 63,
Noyon, A. ii 369n, 405n 71–2, 74, 81–2, 102–3, 106, 118,
135–6, 138, 141, 143, 151, 154, 157,
Obert-Piketty, C. ii 387n, 391n, 392n, 170, 172, 177–8, 184, 193, 197–201,
394n 204, 207, 209–10, 233–4, 236–7, 240,
Ochoa, X. i 372n, 503n 245–6, 255, 258n, 276, 287, 298, 341,
Ockham ii 654 343–51, 354, 361, 363–5, 401, 403–8,
O’Donnell, J.R. ii 66n, 83n, 418n 409n, 410–13, 417–20, 422–8, 430,
Oise ii 392 433–5, 456–7, 462, 468, 472n, 473,
Oliger, L. i 137n 478, 480, 482, 484n, 499, 523, 530,
Oliva, A. i 17n 541, 551n, 556, and passim; ii 1, 4–6,
Oliver of Tréguier, OP i 185, 422, 8–10, 12–14, 19, 35, 38n, 43, 66, 77,
523n; ii 341, 411, 412n 81–2, 84–5, 94, 97, 108, 121, 123,
Olivier-Martin, F.J.M. ii 383n 131–2, 139n, 199–205, 212–17,
Orchies ii 369n 225–9, 231–3, 235–6, 267, 271–3,
Origen ii 93 278–80, 314, 333–6, 338, 340–3,
Orioli, R. i 473n; ii 394n 345–50, 351n, 352–4, 359–64, 367,
Orléans ii 380 368n, 369, 372–92, 394–6, 402–6,
Orosius ii 93 408–9, 410n, 411–12, 418, 427, 429,
Orvieto i 52 431, 433n, 434–8, 440, 444, 447,
Osbert Pickingham, OCarm ii 495 449–52, 454–61, 465–7, 472–3, 494,
Osborne, T.M, Jr. i 91n 496, 504–5, 507, 510–11, 513–15,
Ottaviano Scoto ii 611n 517, 524, 528, 531–3, 536–7, 545–57,
Ouy, G. ii 352n, 385, 388n 561–2, 567, 579–80, 582, 590–1,
Ovid i 258 597–8, 600, 604, 609–12, 620–3,
Owens, J. i 68 625–6, 628–35, 637–40, 643, 692–4,
Oxford i 2, 9, 11, 14, 24–5, 40, 135, 697–9, and passim
138, 143, 153, 201, 233, 404, 418, Parvillers-Le Quesnoy, Somme i 425n
427, 480; ii 5, 9, 11–13, 32, 56n, Pas-de-Calais ii 390
59n, 77, 97, 134, 155, 231, 235, 348, Patcham i 135
350, 353, 369, 377, 382, 386, 408, Pattin, A. i 7, 178n, 556n; ii 37n, 83n,
419–20, 423–9, 494–6, 500–3, 504n, 99n, 102–6, 113, 390n, 412–13, 414n,
505, 510–11, 545, 570, 598–9, 642, 415–16
645, 651–6, 658–9, 668n, 672–3, Paul of Perugia, OCarm ii 514, 523
677–9, 684–5, 687–92, 697, 699, Paul of Venice ii 626
705n Paulmier-Foucart, M. ii 375n

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Paulus, J. i 174–5, 242n, 243, 262n; 47, 160, 168, 170, 286, 403, 409n,
ii 23n 410–17, 418n, 419, 423n, 424n, 425n,
Pease, A.S. ii 195n 427–33, 435–8, 455–6, 478, 479n,
Pedersen, F.S. ii 280n 481–2, 484, 487, 490–5, 496n, 497,
Pelster, F. i 25, 27, 31n, 41n, 151n, 417; 498n; ii 2–3, 22, 33n, 55–6, 58, 342,
ii 132, 136n, 267n, 268n, 278n, 279n, 353, 560, 696, 703
280n, 381, 407, 412n, 419n, 422n, Peter of Limoges i 29
423, 424n, 427n, 429n, 433n, 436n, Peter Lombard i 1, 57, 61, 89–91,
440n, 445, 464–5, 495, 556n, 580n, 96–99, 127, 138, 146, 152–3, 156,
581n, 584–90, 601–2, 624n 159, 170, 196, 201–2, 240, 244, 275,
Pelzer, A. i 31n, 287n, 288n, 289n, 291, 283, 294–5, 477, 509, 529n, 530, 532,
298, 303n, 304n, 341, 361n, 367n, 557; ii 91, 93, 269, 275, 427n, 604,
368n, 374n, 397n, 400n, 406n, 443n, 652, 677, 695, 698
484n, 489n, 493n, 494n, 523n, 524n, Peter of Navarre: see Peter of Atarrabia
525n, 529n, 531n; ii 136n, 336n, 345n, Peter de la Palu: see Peter of Palude
346n, 347n, 349n, 350–1, 353, 360n, Peter of Palude, OP: i 460–1, 464; ii
361, 371n, 377n, 380n, 382, 390n, 356, 413, 433, 449, 451–5, 475, 521–2
407, 439, 515, 552–3, 585, 591n, 596, Peter of Prés ii 268
630, 640n, 641n, 642, 644 Peter de Rivo ii 699
Pera, C. i 541n; ii 324n Peter of Rome, OESA i 236
Perarnau i Espelt, J. ii 84n, 120, Peter of Saint-Denis, OSB ii 351,
520n, 521 356–7, 360–1, 370n, 380–2, 392n
Pereira, M. i 249n Peter of Saint-Omer ii 340–1, 343
Pérez-Estévez, A. i 204n Peter Starrington, OCarm ii 496
Perfetti, S. ii 232n Peter Sutton, OFM ii 3, 56–8, 570–1
Perron, R. i 173n Peter Swanington, OCarm ii 9–10,
Persia i 371 419n, 494–500, 505, 538, 542–3
Perugia ii 393, 430, 600 Peter of Tarentaise, OP i 34, 466, 483,
Peter III, king of Aragon i 209 484n; ii 402, 405–8
Peter Abelard i 529 Peter Thomae, OFM ii 2, 570, 626–7
Peter d’Ailly: see Pierre d’Ailly Peter of Trabibus, OFM i 14, 160, 170,
Peter of Atarrabia, OFM ii 570, 625, 409–10, 417, 433–5, 481–2, 484n,
643–4, 647–8 486–7, 488n, 490, 492n, 493n, 494–5,
Peter Auriol, OFM i 2n, 9, 40, 409n, 503
417n; ii 2–3, 6–7, 75–6, 97, 231–2, Peter of Verberie, Val-des-Écoliers
234, 237, 254, 267–329, 331, 349–50, ii 376
382, 413, 436–8, 452n, 465, 474–5, Petrarch, Francesco i 170
506–7, 513, 518, 523–5, 527–8, Petrus de Croc: see Peter of Auvergne
532–3, 535–6, 539, 549, 564–7, 570, Pfeiffer, H. ii 136n
584, 600, 643, 676–7, 693 Philip III, king of France i 184, 209,
Peter of Auvergne i 5, 9, 44n, 450, 383, 523, 527; ii 368
459, 462–3, 470, 513–16, 518n, 520n; Philip IV (the Fair), king of France
ii 2–5, 44, 50–1, 81–130, 335n, 357, i 184, 286, 378, 382n, 383, 425n, 439,
364n, 412, 467 451, 472; ii 368, 372, 381, 386, 392–4,
Peter of Bergamo, OP i 112n 550
Peter of Candia, OFM i 2n; ii 601 Philip V, king of France ii 551
Peter the Cantor i 364n, 400 Philip VI Valois, king of France ii 630
Peter Ceffons, OCist ii 354n Philip III, king of Navarre ii 625
Peter Comestor ii 93 Piacenza ii 610
Peter of England, OFM ii 384n, 570, Piana, C. i 142n
572–9, 638 Piccari, P. ii 432n
Peter de Falco i 135, 356, 358, 420–1 Piché, D. i 256n, 259n, 264n, 266n,
Peter Gracilis ii 384n 270n, 276n, 511n; ii 20n, 438n, 493n,
Peter John Olivi, OFM i 14, 36, 37n, 507

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Pickavé, M. i 9; ii 1, 3–4, 12–13, Prosper of Reggio Emilia, OESA i 5–6,

17–79, 81n, 83, 89n, 274n, 508n, 292–3, 443; ii 8, 81, 345–57, 360–1,
571n 370–1, 373, 377, 380–2, 387n, 434n,
Pico della Mirandola ii 413 437n, 440, 442, 513, 515, 520, 523,
Pieper, J. i 105n 546, 552–5, 568, 591–2, 595–8, 605,
Piero delle Travi: see Peter of Trabibus, 639–40
OFM Provence, Provençals i 405, 417; ii 392,
Pierre d’Ailly i 295n; ii 352n 609
Pierre Roger, OSB: see Clement VI Pryds, D. i 40n
Pietro Pomponazzi ii 527 Pseudo-Alcuin i 529n
Pinborg, J. ii 19n, 28n Pseudo-Anselm ii 537
Pini, G. i 12, 233–86; ii 35, 38n, 65n, Pseudo-Aristotle ii 92
460n, 546n Pseudo-Augustine ii 326
Piper, A.J. ii 138n Pseudo-Boethius ii 92
Piron, S. i 3, 14, 40n, 135n, 141, 356n, Pseudo-Dionysius i 62–3, 258, 279;
398n, 403–38, 455n, 476n, 478n, ii 93, 324–5, 417, 485, 611
479n, 481, 482n, 484n, 486n, 487n, Ptolemy i 101; ii 93
490n, 491n, 492n; ii 3n, 7–8, 13, 55n, Puchades i Battaller, R.J. i 501n
58n, 81n, 333–43, 365n, 376, 385n, Putallaz, F.-X. i 199n, 241n, 257n,
390, 401n, 411n, 430, 464n, 493n, 267n, 270n, 284n, 349n; ii 202
569n, 620n, 696n Pythagoras ii 93
Pisa i 12
Pisapia, A. i 439n Quaglioni, D. i 484n, 497n
Plato i 100–1, 163, 170, 335, 445–6, Queller, D.E. ii 84n
451; ii 93–4, 473 Quimper ii 623
Plessis d’Argentré, C. du ii 314n Quinto, R. i 31n
Plevano, R. ii 624n
Plotnik, K. ii 439n R. of Arras ii 342
Pluta, O. ii 586n, 593n Rabanus Maurus ii 93
Poitou i 383 Rabelais, F. i 510
Poland i 371n Raciti, G. ii 390n
Pomaro, G. ii 135n Radulphus Brito ii 81n, 351–2, 356–7
Pontigny ii 392, 394 Radulphus the Norman ii 356
Pope, S.J. i 72n Rainier Marquette of Clairmarais,
Porebski, S.A. ii 474n OCist i 350n, 510n; ii 340–1, 360–1,
Porphyry i 512; ii 19n, 46, 54n, 93 387, 390–1, 396
Porro, P. i 11–12, 171–231, 242n, Ramon Lull i 435
278n, 348n, 510n; ii 23n, 28n, 420n, Ramon Saera i 501n
421n Randi, E. i 265n
Portugal ii 352n Ranulf of Normandy ii 385
Post, G. i 372 Ranulph of Houblonnière i 18n,
Potter, V.G. i 137n, 139n 199–201, 362, 412n, 520n; ii 385
Pouilly ii 199 Raymond Bequini, OP ii 267n, 279n,
Poulangy ii 353n 464–5, 475, 696–7
Prague ii 699 Raymond de Fronsac, OFM i 408n,
Prémontré ii 373 412n
Prepositinus i 202 Raymond Geoffroy, OFM i 413, 417
Preuilly ii 394 Raymond Guilha, OP i 422; ii 341,
Prezioso, F. i 144n 411, 412n
Principe, W.H. i 26n, 51n, 524n; Raymond of Peñafort, OP i 202, 346,
ii 403n 372, 503n
Priori, D. ii 604n, 609n Raymond Rigaud, OFM i 14, 423–5,
Priscian i 82 433, 466n, 486n, 488n, 492n, 494–5,
Proclus ii 92–3, 107, 126–7, 130 496n, 497, 524n, 543n; ii 22n

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786 index nominum et locorum

Reading i 377 655, 672n, 673n, 678–87, 689, 691–2,

Recchia, S. i 437n 696–7
Reichert, B.M. i 24n, 43n, 404n, 406n Robert Kilwardby, OP ii 368–9
Reig, J.B. ii 135n Robert the Monk ii 564, 567
Remigio dei Girolami, OP i 2n, 406; Robert of Orford, OP ii 9, 420–2,
ii 408–10, 420, 429–30 446–7, 474–5, 489–91
Renier, OFM i 419n Robert of Torto Collo: see Robert of
Renna, L. ii 537n Orford
Reynolds, P.L. i 90n Robert de Voto, OCist ii 354n
Rhodes, D.E. i 414n Robert Walsingham, OCarm i 426n;
Ribaillier, J. i 389n ii 494, 500–4, 509, 513–14, 537–8
Ribordy, O. ii 229n Roberts, H.F. ii 4–5, 131–98
Ricardus, master ii 356 Robertus Meduana ii 567
Richard Bromwich, OSB ii 499, Robilliard, J.-A. i 72n
510–12 Robson, B. i 408n
Richard de Bury ii 679 Rocca, G. i 67, 68n
Richard of Conington, OFM i 9; ii Roccaberti de Perelada, T. i 463n
5–6, 503–4, 643, 649 Rochais, H.-M. i 364n
Richard FitzRalph ii 684–5 Roensch, J. ii 401n, 421n, 446n
Richard Knapwell, OP i 31n, 139, 148, Roest, B. i 25n, 427n
206n, 208; ii 3, 21n, 59–60, 418–19, Roger Bacon, OFM i 153–4, 157n
424n Roger Marston, OFM i 10–11, 135,
Richard of Menneville (Mediavilla/ 143–9, 418, 447, 477n, 478, 491n,
Middleton), OFM i 14, 147–8, 170, 492n, 493n, 494, 503, 510n, 531n,
174, 204n, 400n, 417–21, 423n, 426, 535n, 555n; ii 1, 3, 20n, 32–5, 42, 48,
428–31, 449–50, 479, 482, 486, 488, 50, 55, 59, 61, 76
490, 500, 501n, 502n, 503, 520n, Roland-Gosselin, M.D. ii 19n
530n, 542n; ii 70, 570, 584 Roman Curia: see Papal Curia
Richard Rufus of Cornwall, OFM Rome i 11, 52, 86, 139, 141, 166, 198,
i 158 348, 405n; ii 133, 388, 393–4, 419,
Richard of St Victor ii 93, 183, 372, 430, 579
677 Roos, H. ii 19n
Richard Wetwang, OESA ii 688 Roover, R. de i 499n
Richard, J. i 371n Rossetti, G. i 486n
Richards Luard, H. ii 379n Rossi, P. ii 135n
Richter, V. ii 689n Roßmann, H. ii 11, 602n, 610, 611n,
Ricklin, T. ii 649n 612, 613n, 615–20, 634
Rijk, L.M. de ii 46n, 75n, 98n, 448, Roth, B. ii 11, 610, 612–14, 616n, 619
629n Roth, F. i 233n; ii 545n
Rilus ii 342, 390 Rouen ii 381
Rimini ii 346n Rouse, L.M. i 121n, 123n; ii 338
Ritter, J. i 72n Rouse, R.H. i 123n; ii 338
Robert the Wise, king of Naples/ Royal, R. ii 403n, 704n
Sicily ii 600, 609 Rubert Candáu, J.M. ii 628, 629n
Robert, count of Artois ii 364 Rubin, M. i 347n
Robert of Colletorto: see Robert of Ruiz, D. i 492n
Orford Ruiz, T.F. ii 381n
Robert of Courson i 400 Russia i 371n
Robert Cowton, OFM ii 348, 356–7, Ryba, B. ii 699n
425, 503, 510, 512, 642
Robert Graystanes, OSB ii 504 Saarinen, R. i 471n
Robert Grosseteste ii 467, 677 Sabellius ii 487
Robert Holcot, OP i 24–5, 248n, Saffrey, H.D. i 58n
403n; ii 8, 11–12, 401, 464, 651–2, Saggi, L.M. ii 535n

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Sagüéz Azcona, P. ii 625, 643, 647n, Scholz, R. i 464, 465n; ii 555

648n Schönberger, R. i 192–3; ii 13, 656n
St Andrews ii 134 Schönmetzer, A. ii 199n, 281n, 316n
Saint-Bertin ii 363 Schwamm, H. ii 594, 647n
Saint-Leu d’Esserent ii 385 Scotland ii 630
Saint-Mihiel ii 336n Segarro, F. ii 83n, 102, 111
Saint-Quentin ii 359, 363n Seneca i 100; ii 93
St Paul, Minnesota i 49n Senko, W. ii 6, 232n, 244–6, 249–50,
Saint-Saulve-de-Valenciennes ii 385 251n, 252n, 278n, 439n, 446n, 527–8,
Sainte-Bertille ii 370n 530
Sainte-Marthe, D. ii 363n “enocak, N. i 424n
Saintonge i 383 Sergius, pope i 529n
Sajó, G. i 511n Servais of Guez, Mont-Saint-Éloi i 6,
Salerno ii 267 185, 355, 358–9, 365, 376n, 400, 419,
Salomon ii 357 423n, 459, 484n, 487–9, 493, 494n,
Samaritani, A. ii 339n, 440n, 507–8, 495, 497n, 500, 501n, 523n, 526n; ii 8,
509n, 512, 514n, 520n, 538n, 668 337–8, 360, 362–9, 378, 391, 396
San Cristóbal Sebastián, A. i 175n Shailor, B. ii 592n, 640n
Santi, F. i 185n Shakespeare, W. i 507–8
Santiago de Carvalho, M.A. i 172n, Sharpe, R. ii 134n, 401n, 427n, 464n,
173n 667n, 681n, 688n, 689n
Saracens i 437n Sibert of Beek, OCarm ii 239, 272–3,
Sarnano, cardinal ii 269n 494, 514, 519, 523–7, 533, 538–9
Saxony ii 466 Sicily i 383
Sbaralea, G.G. ii 600n Siena i 233, 235–6; ii 552
Scarcia, G. i 438n, 476n Sikes, J.G. ii 453n
Schabel, C. i 1–16, 40n, 233n, 243, Sileo, L. i 154n; ii 65n, 79n, 349n,
417n, 439n, 443n, 466n, 479n; ii 633n
1–16, 51n, 81–130, 232n, 233n, 235, Simon of Brion: see Martin IV
277n, 345n, 377n, 401n, 413, 414n, Simon of Corbie, OCarm ii 9, 354,
419n, 423n, 432n, 434n, 435n, 444n, 356–7, 494, 514–17, 524
449n, 451n, 452n, 460n, 465n, Simon of Guiberville i 18n; ii 340, 343
489–91, 493–543, 545–68, 569n, Simon of Lens, OFM i 422; ii 342
600, 601n, 602, 603n, 604n, 605n, Simon Matifas i 364–5
626n, 628n, 629n, 639n, 643n, 651n, Simon Stock, OCarm ii 496, 497n
652n, 686n, 689n, 694n, 699n Simonin, H.-D. ii 405n
Schaefer, J. i 136n Simplicius ii 93
Schaub, J.F. i 476n Smalley, B. i 26n, 153n, 172n; ii 427,
Scheffczyk, L. ii 591n 505n
Schepers, H. ii 680, 682, 696n Smet, J. ii 493n
Schepps, G. i 512n Soardi, L. i 414, 419, 428n, 436
Schmaus, M. i 406n, 423n, 466n; ii Socrates i 445, 446n; ii 536, 684
60n, 61n, 62n, 63n, 64n, 65n, 237, Sokolowski, R. i 49n, 68n
245, 423, 431n, 572, 578n, 621n, 688n Solère, J.-L. i 8, 15–16, 44n, 139n,
Schmidt, H.-J. ii 365n 220n, 343, 398n, 507–58; ii 3, 17, 97,
Schmitt, F.S. i 306n; ii 178n, 481n, 337, 393n
484n, 489n Somerville i 122
Schnapper, B. i 481n, 500n Somme i 425n
Schneider, J. ii 60, 66n, 423n, 424–5, Sontag, G. i 343, 398n
426n, 429n Spade, P.V. ii 654n
Schneider, N. ii 600n Spain, Spanish i 476n; ii 545
Schneider, R. ii 463n Speer, A. i 175n, 207n, 234n, 239n,
Schneyer, J.B. ii 364n, 369n, 378n, 247n, 267n, 284n, 287n, 309n, 555n;
381n, 385n, 386n ii 23n, 44n, 84n, 367n, 371n

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Spettmann, H. i 136n, 137n 480n; ii 267n, 268n, 275n, 416n, 417n,

Spiazzi, R.M. i 100n, 542n 436n, 439n, 441–2, 445, 473n, 496,
Spicciani, A. i 219n, 479n, 481n 510, 531, 532n
Stabile, G. ii 14n, 98n Teeuwen, M. i 20n, 233n
Stadter, E. i 152n Tempier: see Étienne Tempier
Standaert, M. ii 387n Ter Duinen ii 389
Steel, C. i 172n, 173n, 208n, 214n; Terra di Lavoro ii 580
ii 209n Tertullian i 542, 543n
Stegmüller, F. i 2; ii 347n Teske, R.J. i 513n, 538n; ii 432n
Stella, P.T. i 178n, 289, 531n; ii 77n, Thadeus of Parma ii 356
78n, 214, 412n, 413n, 415n, 416, Theissing, H. ii 423n
434–5, 439n, 445n, 446–8, 450, 457n, Themistius ii 93, 295
458n, 459, 461, 463n, 468–71, 511n, Theophrastus ii 93, 295
512 Thérines ii 392
Stephanus, frater ii 373–5 Théry, A. i 420n, 421
Stephanus, magister ii 564–5, 567 Thijssen, J.M.M.H. i 254n; ii 22n, 245,
Stephanus Escaillart de Chalendry 369n
ii 352n Tholosanus ii 93
Stephen of Fermont, Mont-Saint-Éloi Thomas Aquinas, OP i 6, 8–11, 13,
ii 363–4, 369, 374 16, 25, 33, 37, 49–133, 136–9, 144–5,
Stephen Gebenensis i 29–30 148–9, 153–4, 156–7, 159–61, 164–8,
Stephen of Lexington, abbot of 170, 201–2, 204n, 234, 238, 239n,
Clairvaux ii 386 245, 254–6, 263–4, 266, 269n, 270,
Stephen Patryngton, OCarm ii 504n 272, 274, 279–81, 284–5, 309n, 320n,
Storey, H.W. i 92n 335, 346n, 348–50, 352–3, 357n,
Stornajolo, C. ii 135n 358–61, 369–70, 373–4, 384n, 387,
Strayer, J.R. i 379n, 381n, 383n; ii 84n 390, 393–5, 397n, 398, 399n, 400n,
Streveler, P.A. ii 673n, 696n 406n, 418, 424, 427, 429–30, 433,
Stroick, C. i 466n, 467n; ii 19n, 551 442, 471, 483, 484n, 485n, 487–8,
Sturlese, L. i 33n; ii 14n, 98n, 466n, 489n, 493–5, 507–8, 512, 514–17,
467, 472, 473n 518n, 520n, 522n, 526–58; ii 1, 3,
Suárez, G. i 241n, 244n 5, 8–10, 16, 19n, 20–1, 25, 26n,
Suarez-Nani, T. i 256n, 265n; ii 23n, 38n, 47n, 49, 58–9, 63n, 79, 89–90,
56n, 500n 98, 125n, 164n, 165n, 199, 204–5,
Suchla, B.R. i 279n 217–18, 220–1, 223, 226–8, 335n,
Sullivan, T. i 9; ii 1, 8, 352n, 353n, 347n, 364n, 382, 384n, 389n, 401–3,
354n, 359–400, 434n 406, 408n, 411, 418–19, 421–3,
Susemihl, F. i 443n 425–6, 427n, 428, 430, 432–3, 446n,
Sylla, E.D. ii 252n, 701–2 447, 456, 458–9, 462, 463n, 465, 467,
Synan, E.A. i 50n, 81n, 89n, 90n, 472–5, 479, 491, 513–14, 520n, 526,
102n, 118 535–6, 538–9, 550, 565, 567, 570,
Szabó, T. i 155n, 160n 644n, 676, 678, 695
Thomas de Argenteuil, OESA ii 567n
Tabarroni, A. i 457n; ii 697n Thomas of Bailly i 5, 9, 343, 442,
Tabbagh, V. ii 381n 459–60, 473, 502n; ii 2, 81, 201, 385
Tachau, K.H. i 168n; ii 437n, 673n, Thomas Bradwardine ii 527, 685n
674n, 679–80, 681n, 682n, 683, 685n, Thomas of Cantilupe i 281
686n, 689n, 696n Thomas of Cantimpré, OP ii 473
Taifacos, I. ii 639n Thomas of Celano, OFM i 149
Takada, T. ii 450n Thomas of Chobham i 400
Tamié ii 362n, 394–5, 400 Thomas Claxton, OP ii 464n, 689n,
Tannery, P. i 516n 699n
Tartars i 371n Thomas Ebendorfer de Haselbach
Teetaert, A. i 3, 39, 136n, 174, 452n, i 121

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Thomas of Fabriano, OESA ii 356, Ubertino da Casale, OFM i 410–11,

566–7 478
Thomas of Ireland ii 335n, 338 Ubl, K. i 451, 472n
Thomas of Strasbourg, OESA ii 547, Umberto Guidi, OP i 406, 434
549, 555–7 Urban IV, pope i 197
Thomas of Sutton, OP i 139, 148, Urban V, pope ii 383
204n; ii 1–3, 60–8, 71, 76, 412n,
423–9, 446–7, 474–5, 503 Vacant, A. i 548n
Thomas Waleys, OP ii 668 Valencia i 419
Thomas Wylton i 5, 9, 35; ii 2, 6–7, Valenciennes i 103
81, 231–66, 271–3, 277n, 278n, 279, Valois, N. ii 199n, 267n, 391, 394n
351–2, 356–7, 423n, 518, 523, 525–6, Valvekins, J.B. ii 374
536, 539, 565, 567, 643 Vancio, A. ii 560n
Thomas, G. ii 136n Van den Wyngaert, A. i 137n
Thomson, R.M. ii 138n, 428n, 495n, Van Dyck, L.C. ii 374n
500n, 501n Vanhamel, W. i 172n; ii 28n, 31n
Thorndike, L. i 4n Van Riet, S. i 169n, 512n, 543n;
Thuringia ii 550 ii 485n
Thurot, C. i 293, 294n Van Steenberghen, F. i 551n, 552n
Tierney, B. i 218, 459n; ii 453, 523n Varanini, G.M. i 484n, 497n
Tihon, P. i 313, 314n Vatican i 288n; ii 134
Tocco, F. i 480n Vauchez, A. i 352n; ii 360n
Todeschini, G. i 219n, 415n, 476n, Vaughan, R. ii 379n
479n, 484n, 486n, 491n, 492n, 497n, Vaux-Cernay ii 394
499n, 502n, 504n Vegetius i 210
Tokarski, F. ii 622n Velázquez-Campo, L. ii 439n, 446n,
Tomarchio, J. i 65n 457n, 460n
Tönnies, B. ii 136n Vella, A.P. ii 420, 421n
Torino ii 5–6 Velli, A. ii 135n
Toronto ii 15 Venice, Veneto i 414, 419; ii 555, 599,
Torrell, J.-P., i 26n, 31n, 39, 51n, 52n, 611n
53n, 62n, 63n, 66n, 72n, 78n, 81n, Veraja, F. i 142n, 219n, 280n, 400n,
234n, 245n; ii 403n, 704n 422n, 482, 483n, 499n, 500n, 501n,
Toste, M. ii 81n 502n, 503n; ii 343n
Toul ii 386, 396 Verdeyen, P. ii 370n, 372n, 381n, 392n
Toulouse i 405, 406n, 408–9, 416, 420, Verdun ii 336n
424–5, 432–3; ii 567, 629 Verger, J. i 356n, 358n
Tournai i 179; ii 205, 333 Vergier-Boimond, J. i 369n
Tours i 210, 249 Vermandois i 425n
Trapp, D. ii 35n, 414n, 547n, 550n, Veuthy, L. ii 580n
556n, 557n, 562n, 566–7 Vicogne ii 360, 374–5, 396
Trapp, J.B. ii 699 Vidier, A. ii 380n
Traver, A.G. i 53n; ii 336n, 624n Vieillard, J. ii 336n
Tremblay, P. i 17n, 21n Vienna i 365
Trifogli, C. i 9, 233n, 278n; ii 6–7, 81n, Vienne i 286, 410, 498, 499n; ii 272,
231–66, 273n, 278n, 525, 526n, 643n 274, 276, 277n, 279, 392, 453n, 460,
Trimble, G. ii 278n 512, 572, 591
Trottmann, C. i 42n; ii 463n, 629n, Vilevault, L.-G. de i 382n
630, 631n, 632–4, 697n Villani-Lubelli, U. ii 472n, 473n
Truchet, J. i 543n Vincennes ii 383, 630
Tübingen ii 100 Vincent of Beauvais, OP i 25
Tulle ii 336n Vinx, L. i 451
Tumamensis ii 611n Virgil ii 428n
Turley, T. ii 453–4, 461–2, 463n, 518n Vital du Four, OFM i 14, 407–10, 413,

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416–17, 423–4, 425n, 432; ii 1, 3, Wierzbicki, M. i 17n

58–9, 341–2 William of Alnwick, OFM i 458; ii 2,
Vitalis Zuccolius i 171n 232, 238, 245, 348n, 501, 570,
Viterbo i 406; ii 430 598–600, 640–3, 645–7, 649, 688
Vitolo, G. i 486n William of Auvergne i 513, 538n
Vivès, J.L. i 520n; ii 65n, 133, 138n, William of Auxerre i 202, 389
139n, 141n, 143n, 149–51, 158n, William of Champeaux ii 372
160n, 585, 623n William Crathorn, OP ii 680, 689,
Volk, H. ii 626n 697
Vollert, C.O. ii 421n, 433n, 436, 441n, William of Cremona, OESA ii 546,
539n 557, 568
Vooght, P. de ii 505n William of Falgar (or Falegar), OFM
Vos, A. i 343–4 i 135, 420, 528n, 542n, 544n
Vossenkuhl, W. ii 656n William Hothum, OP ii 402–5, 419
Vuillemin-Diem, G. i 512n William of Hycham, OESA ii 502
Vyver, É. van de ii 390n William of Lauduno, OP ii 349
William of Ludlington, OCarm
Waarde ii 389 ii 496
Wadding, L. i 170n, 426n; ii 133, 141n, William of Maccleseld, OP ii 425
149–51, 158n, 584–5, 623–4 William of Mâcon i 241n; ii 363–4,
Wadley, W. i 136n 367
Wales, Welsh ii 668 William de la Mare, OFM i 8, 11,
Walter of Bruges, OFM i 157, 168, 170 135, 147, 151–70, 429–30, 528, 555n;
Walter Burley ii 82n, 232, 697n ii 9, 20–1, 59, 348n, 402n, 419, 421,
Walter Chatton, OFM ii 11, 474, 475
651–4, 656–78, 681, 684, 686n, William of Ockham, OFM i 161, 168,
691–2, 703, 704n 403, 429; ii 2–3, 11, 76–8, 97, 451n,
Walter of Gamaches, OClun ii 384, 474, 513, 549, 601, 651–67, 668n,
386 672–4, 676–9, 681, 684, 688, 691–2,
Walter of Heyham ii 500, 502 696, 703, 705n
Walter of St Victor ii 372 William Paganerus ii 500
Warner, G.F. ii 136n William of Peter Godin, OP i 461;
Wawrykow, J.P. i 554n ii 19n
Weber, H.J. i 513n, 514n, 517n, 518n; William Rubio, OFM ii 11, 570, 601,
ii 83n, 89, 102, 111, 463n 628–9
Wei, I.P. i 345n, 350n, 355n, 359n, William of St Amour i 71, 136, 148;
363n; ii 365n, 366n, 368n, 371n, 388, ii 336
389n, 396n, 398n, 399n William of Tocco, OP i 555n
Weigl, H. i 451n William of Ware, OFM i 160–1, 204n,
Weijers, O. i 19n, 20, 23n, 32n, 39n, 426; ii 348n, 356
172n, 508n; ii 694n Williman, D. i 436n
Weisheipl, J.A. i 52n, 72n, 81n; ii 390n, Wilson, G.A. i 138n, 171n, 172n, 178n,
600n 179–81, 187–91, 196–7, 202, 208n,
Wengert, R.G. ii 437n, 438n 210, 212–13, 259n, 390n, 393n, 394n,
Wey, J.C. i 429n; ii 655n, 656–7, 659, 397n, 400n, 446n, 484n, 487n, 489n,
660n, 661n, 667n, 696n 493n, 497n, 500n, 503n, 519n, 522n,
White, K. i 10, 49–133, 348n; ii 402, 525n; ii 31n, 417n
406n Winter, U. ii 99n
Wielockx, R. i 121, 171n, 179, 181–4, Wippel, J.F. i 3, 12–13, 26n, 30, 49n,
187, 191, 193–4, 197, 211, 214–15, 51n, 56n, 57n, 68n, 103n, 114,
236n, 239n, 240n, 242, 246n, 252n, 116–17, 119, 122n, 177, 181, 206n,
254n, 255n, 256n, 257n, 290, 350n, 209n, 215, 216n, 217, 236n, 243n,
351–2, 457n, 531n, 537n; ii 20n, 23n, 247n, 248n, 252n, 263n, 265n, 278n,
24n, 25n, 26n, 27n, 28n, 29n, 38n 283n, 287–344, 348n, 378n, 403n,

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 index nominum et locorum 791

447n, 521n; ii 28n, 30n, 43n, 44, 45n, York, i 29n

46n, 48n, 51n, 55n, 338n, 364n, 374n, Ypma, E. i 29, 30n, 32n, 236n, 242–3,
395n, 407–8, 416n, 417n, 423n, 424n, 296n, 309n, 321n, 336n, 442n, 450n,
435n, 437n, 438n, 441n, 443n, 444, 519n; ii 10, 51n, 52n, 53n, 54n, 55n,
445n, 549n, 694n, 703n, 704n 548–9, 563
Wissink, J.B.M. ii 245 Yukio, I. ii 450n
Witelo ii 357 Yves Cadomensis: see Ivo of Caen
Wlodek, Z. ii 464n, 594n, 640–4, 646n, Yves of Chartres i 202, 529n
647n, 648n, 649n, 698n Yves de Cordellis
Wolter, A.B. i 471n, 478n; ii 133, Yves de Vergy, OClun ii 380
143n
Wood, D. i 475n; ii 382n, 383n, Zacharias, pope i 468
384n Zavalloni, R. i 239n, 418n, 530n, 542n,
Wood, R. ii 658n 549n
Wrigley, J.F. ii 382n Zazzeri, R. ii 135n
Wurst, G. ii 649n Zeeland ii 389
Zeyen, R. i 461n, 472n
Xiberta, B.E. i 496n; ii 9–10, 240–1, Ziegler, J. i 262n
244, 493n, 494–7, 500, 501n, 502, Zimara, M.A. ii 433, 437n, 438, 445,
503n, 504n, 505n, 506n, 507n, 508, 528, 535–6, 540
510–12, 513n, 514n, 515, 517–18, Zimmermann, A. i 25n; ii 250,
519n, 521–34, 535n, 536n, 538n, 580n
539 Zuckerman, C. i 45n, 455n; ii 414n,
415, 453
Yamazaki, S. ii 438n Zumkeller, A. ii 547n, 548n, 549n,
Yokohama, T. ii 591n, 592n, 593n, 550n, 551n, 552, 554, 556–7, 560n,
641n, 646n 562n, 567

Chris Schabel - 978-90-47-43168-8

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 Brill’s Companions
to the
Christian Tradition
Volumes deal with persons, movements, schools and genres in medieval and early modern
Christian life, thought and practice. Written by the foremost specialists in the respective
fields, they aim to provide full balanced accounts at an advanced level, as well as synthesis
of debate and the state of scholarship in 8-15 substantial chapters. Volumes are in English
(contributions from continental scholars are translated). 2-3 volumes of 350-600 pages will
be published each year. The series is expected to comprise 20-30 volumes.

1. Schabel, C. (ed.). Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century.
2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-12333-5, ISBN-10: 90-04-12333-4
2. Cox, V. & J.O. Ward (eds.). The Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Early Renaissance
Commentary Tradition. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-13177-4, ISBN-10: 90-04-13177-9
3. McGuire, B.P. (ed.). A Companion to Jean Gerson. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15009-6,
ISBN-10: 90-04-15009-9
4. Levy, I.C. (ed.). A Companion to John Wyclif. Late Medieval Theologian. 2006.
ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15007 2, ISBN-10: 90 04 15007 2
5. Swanson, R.N. (ed.). Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merits. Indulgences in Late
Medieval Europe. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15287-8, ISBN-10: 90-04-15287-3
6. Stayer, J.M. & J.D. Roth (eds.). A Companion to Anabaptism and Spiritualism, 1521-1700.
2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15402-5, ISBN-10: 90-04-15402-7

Chris Schabel - 978-90-47-43168-8

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